SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY

APPELLATE DIVISION

DOCKET NO. A-1020-19T1

VAMA F.Z. CO.,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

PACIFIC CONTROL SYSTEMS 

(L.L.C.) and DILIP RAHULAN,

Defendants-Respondents.

___________________________

Argued December 2, 2020 – Decided

Before Judges Geiger and Mitterhoff.

On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law 

Division, Morris County, Docket No. L-2375-18.

Steven L. Caponi, (Rome Blank) of the Delaware Bar, 

admitted pro hac vice, argued the cause for appellant 

(K&L Gates LLP, attorneys; Reymond E. Yammine, of 

counsel and on the briefs; Steven L. Caponi, on the 

brief).

David C. Dreifuss argued the cause for respondent 

(Dreifuss, Bonacci & Parker, PC, attorneys; David C. 

Dreifuss, of counsel and on the brief; Paul M. 

McCormick, on the brief).

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the 

internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.

January 20, 2021
2

A-1020-19T1

PER CURIAM

Plaintiff Vama F.C. Co. (Vama) appeals from a September 24, 2019 order 

granting summary judgment to defendants Pacific Control Systems, L.L.C. 

(Pacific) and Dilip Rahulan declaring that a foreign money-judgment Vama 

obtained against defendants in the Court of First Instance in Dubai, United Arab 

Emirates (UAE) (the Dubai judgment), was not recognized in New Jersey and 

shall not be filed as a judgment in New Jersey. We affirm. 

We derive the following facts from the record. Vama is a UAE 

corporation whose majority owner is Tejas Shah. Pacific is a UAE limited 

liability company located in Dubai, and Rahulan was its Chairman and Chief 

Executive Officer. Rahulan is an Australian citizen who lived in Dubai until 

May 1, 2016, when he moved to New Jersey. 

During 2016, Shah attempted to cash two checks drawn on Pacific's 

checking account that were payable to Vama. Both checks, signed with

Rahulan's name, were issued to pay a debt Pacific owed to Vama. The checks 

totaled 21,852,500 UAE dirham (AED), or $5,949,255 on the dates they were

issued.

1

 Neither check cleared due to insufficient funds in Pacific's account. 

1

 The UAE dirham is the currency of UAE. 
3

A-1020-19T1

In August 2016, Vama's attorney issued a notice informing Pacific and 

Rahulan that the checks had been returned for insufficient funds, and that Vama 

would take legal action if the debt was not paid. The notice listed Pacific and 

Rahulan's address as "Dubai, Bur Dubai, Sheikh Zayed Street, TP 101423, 

Techno Park." 

Rahulan alleged that he did not sign either check, was not aware the 

checks had been issued, and did not know the reason for issuance. He believed

his signature had been forged by Srinivasan Narasimhan, Pacific's former Chief 

Financial Officer (CFO). 

The Dubai Proceedings

Having received no payment from Pacific or Rahulan, Vama commenced 

a civil action against them in Dubai. On August 23, 2016, a Dubai court officer 

served notice of the action on defendants by delivering it to a receptionist named 

Adeel Gawanico at "Bur Dubai- Sheikh Zayed Road – Guidance Phone No.: 

0506539145." The notices stated delivery to Pacific was made "in the area of 

Technopark Co," and to Rahulan "in the area of Sheik Zayed Road." A month 

later, on September 22, 2016, the Dubai Court of First Instance entered an order 

for execution of provisional attachments on Pacific and Rahulan's bank 
4

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accounts. According to Shah, the court served provisional attachments on 

defendants' bank accounts a few days later. 

Defendants did not file a responsive pleading or participate in the 

proceedings. On January 17, 2017, the Dubai Court of First Instance issued a 

judgment against them for 21,852,500 AED plus interest. Rahulan certified he 

did not learn of the judgment until May 2017, when he asked his Dubai counsel 

to investigate after Shah called him and mentioned the lawsuit. 

Rahulan asserted that he never received notice of the lawsuit. He certified 

he could not have received notice personally, as he had "left Dubai (U.A.E.) on 

May 1, 2016 and was living in New Jersey throughout the pendency of the civil 

proceedings and the entry of [a] criminal judgment against [him]." Moreover, 

Pacific's correct address "was and is: Pacific Control Systems (L.L.C.), Post 

Box 37316, Techno Park, Sheikh Zayed Road, Dubai, [UAE]. Techno Park is a 

large complex with numerous businesses which is miles away from Bur Dubai. 

Therefore, it is clear that the [process] server went to the wrong address." He 

averred that no one named Adeel Gawanico had ever worked for Pacific, and 

Pacific's actual receptionist was not authorized to accept important documents. 

In addition, Rahulan certified that he never received notification from the banks 

about the provisional attachments served on his and Pacific's accounts. 
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A-1020-19T1

On June 19, 2017, defendants filed an appeal challenging the Dubai 

judgment. The Dubai Court of Appeal affirmed the judgment without 

considering the merits of the case, finding that the appeal was untimely because 

appeals in Dubai must be filed within thirty days of the issuance of the judgment 

being challenged. In its opinion, the court noted that Pacific received notice of 

the judgment through service on its accountant Sobish Sondran on February 20, 

2017, and Rahulan had been notified by publication on March 28, 2017. 

Rahulan certified that Pacific did not employ an individual named Sobish 

Sondran, and he was not aware of any such published notice. 

The New Jersey Proceedings

In November 2018, Vama applied to the Clerk of the Superior Court to 

record the Dubai judgment in New Jersey. The Clerk refused to docket the 

judgment because Vama had not submitted an exemplified copy. 

In response, on December 5, 2018, defendants filed this declaratory 

judgment action against Vama, seeking: (1) nonrecognition of the Dubai 

judgment pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2A:49A-16.6(c), on grounds of lack of 

jurisdiction, lack of notice, lack of due process, and violation of public policy; 

and (2) injunctive relief to preclude enforcement and execution of the Dubai 
6

A-1020-19T1

judgment.2 Defendants also applied for a temporary restraining order and 

preliminary injunction against plaintiff. The trial court denied the application 

for injunctive relief without prejudice, finding defendants had failed to 

demonstrate they would suffer irreparable harm. 

Vama filed an answer and counterclaim seeking recognition of the Dubai 

judgment pursuant to the Foreign Country Money-Judgments Recognition Act 

of 2015 (the Recognition Act), N.J.S.A. 2A:49A-16.1 to -16.11. Vama alleged 

that the balance due on the Dubai judgment was $5,949,998.70 plus interest at 

nine percent per annum and attorney's fees. Defendants filed an answer to 

Vama's counterclaim.3 

In February 2019, the Dubai Court of First Instance issued a decision in a 

separate action brought by two directors of Pacific, dismissing Rahulan from his 

2

 The complaint initiating this action was filed by Pacific and Rahulan against 

Vama. The caption was subsequently amended to designate Vama as plaintiff 

and Pacific and Rahulan as defendants. See n.3, infra. In this opinion we will 

likewise refer to the parties in that fashion. 

3

 Included with the answer to Vama's counterclaim, Rahulan filed a third-party 

complaint against Shah, alleging various torts committed in the course of 

responding to Rahulan's refusal to pay the judgment. The third-party action was 

severed from this case. The same order also amended the caption, naming Vama 

as plaintiff and Pacific and Rahulan as defendants. 
7

A-1020-19T1

management role in the company. In July 2019, the Dubai Court of Appeal 

affirmed. Rahulan participated in both proceedings through his UAE counsel. 

Defendants moved for summary judgment for nonrecognition of the Dubai 

judgment. Rahulan asserted that he left Dubai in May 2016 to travel to the 

United States and has remained here ever since. He claimed he never received 

proper notice of the proceedings in Dubai and first learned of the judgment from 

Shah during a threatening phone call in May 2017. Defendants filed an appeal 

of the Dubai judgment on June 11, 2017, only to have the Dubai Court of Appeal 

rule the appeal was time-barred. 

Rahulan further claimed that plaintiff was aware of his address in New 

Jersey, telephone number, and email address at the time the action was 

commenced in Dubai. Both Rahulan and Pacific claimed that Gwanico never 

worked for them. Vama did not produce evidence of Gwanico's employment. 

Defendants argued that in addition to lacking in personam jurisdiction, the 

Dubai courts lacked the judicial independence that American courts require to 

enforce a foreign money-judgment. They point to a 2017 United States 

Department of State report on the UAE, that states that Dubai "court decisions 

remained subject to review by the political leadership. Authorities often treated 

noncitizens differently from citizens. The judiciary consisted largely of 
8

A-1020-19T1

contracted foreign nationals subject to deportation, further compromising its 

independence from the government . . . ." 

In his supporting affidavit, Rahulan stated that he "did not endorse" the 

first check made payable to Vama, was not "aware of its issuance at the time,"

and was not "aware of why this check was issued." He made identical statements 

regarding the second check. Rahulan asserted that he ultimately learned both 

checks were signed by Narasimhan, Pacific's former CFO, without his

knowledge or consent. 

Vama opposed the motion, arguing that, in accordance with legal 

procedure in Dubai, the Dubai court served legal notice on defendants at their 

business office and by publication in a local newspaper in Dubai. Vama claimed

that personal service on Pacific's receptionist was valid. 

Judge Stephan C. Hansbury found there were no material facts in dispute 

and issued a September 24, 2019 order and written statement of reasons granting 

summary judgment to defendants. The judge identified the controlling issue as 

"whether the UAE judiciary system afforded [d]efendants sufficient due process 

as to legitimize the Dubai [j]udgment consistent with this State's standards." 

Because the Dubai judgment was entered by default, the judge shifted the burden 

of proof to Vama pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2A:49A-16.4(d).
9

A-1020-19T1

The judge concluded that American due process standards applied when 

examining a foreign country's legal procedures. As to Rahulan, the judge 

determined that service upon the receptionist did not comport with "American 

due process standards" or "meet our sense of due process," citing Rule 4:4-4. 

The judge noted that the address served was incorrect, and Pacific did not 

employ an Adeel Gawanico, the purported receptionist. More fundamentally, 

Rahulan was not living in Dubai at the time service was attempted. Moreover, 

Vama was aware of Rahulan's email address and telephone number. 

The judge determined that service upon Pacific also violated due process, 

explaining that Rule 4:4-4(a)(6): 

requires service of a corporation on an officer, director, 

trustee or managing or general agent, someone 

designated by law or someone authorized to accept 

service or in charge of that office. The reason is clear. 

It must be someone with a fiduciary-like duty to the 

corporation. In our system of due process, service 

cannot be accomplished by dropping off papers at the 

reception door. 

While the method of service of process used by Vama may be permitted in UAE, 

the judge found it "is repugnant to the public policy of this State or of the United 

States," quoting N.J.S.A. 2A:49A-16.4(c)(3). 

Lastly, the judge rejected Vama's assertion that Rahulan's counsel could 

not also represent Pacific, finding the summary judgment motion was properly 
10 A-1020-19T1

brought, because "Rahulan remains President at this time." The judge did not 

reach the other issues raised by Vama. This appeal followed. 

The Delaware Proceedings

In October 2018, Vama filed a parallel application in the Superior Court 

of Delaware seeking recognition of the Dubai judgment in that state. Defendants 

opposed the application. Following discovery and an evidentiary hearing at 

which Rahulan testified but Vama presented no witnesses, defendants moved for 

dismissal. (Pa908). Commissioner Katharine L. Mayer issued a written opinion 

granting defendants' motion to dismiss.4 

Commissioner Mayer found that Rahulan has resided in the United States 

since May 1, 2016. During May 2016 and January 2017, Rahulan and Shah 

emailed each other regarding Pacific's debts. A few days later, the Dubai 

judgment was entered. "Rahulan testified that the signatures on the checks were 

not his and he believe[d] that his signature was fraudulently copied." He stated 

that he learned of the Dubai court proceedings in the Spring of 2017, months 

after the entry of judgment. 

4

 Under the Delaware law, a Commissioner issues a recommendation on 

dispositive pretrial motions, which is not considered a decision of the court. See

Del. Code Ann, tit. 10, § 512(b)(1)(a) and (b); Franklin v. State, 855 A.2d 274, 

276-77 (Del. 2004). 
11 A-1020-19T1

Based on the translated Dubai judgment, which set forth the evidence 

considered by the Dubai court, Commissioner Mayer found: 

[T]here is no record of an "Adeel Gawanico" having 

ever been an employee of [Pacific]. In addition, "Bur 

Dubai" is not the address for [Pacific] and is located 

approximately 20 kilometers away from the 

headquarters. Later, after the appellate court issued an 

opinion on the [j]udgment, it was served upon someone 

by the name of "Sobish Sondran." Again, there is no 

record of an employee by that name. Finally, 

[d]efendants were given notice of the [j]udgment by 

publication. The notice is dated March 28, 2017, and 

indicates that [Pacific] and "[Rahulan] Dilip, whose 

address is unknown[,]" were notified of a judgment 

obtained by Vama. The notice does not state where it 

was publicized and for how long. Rahulan testified that 

he has not been personally served by any authorities, 

including anyone acting on behalf of the [UAE]. 

[(footnotes omitted).] 

The Superior Court of Delaware dismissed Vama's recognition 

application, applying preclusive effect to the trial court's decision in this case

under the doctrine of res judicata. Vama F.Z. Co. v. Pac. Control Sys., No. 

N18J-07985 DCS (De. Super. Ct. Oct. 22, 2019). The Delaware Supreme Court 

affirmed. Vama F.Z. Co. v. Pac. Control Sys. (L.L.C.), No. 487 (Del. Aug. 26, 

2020). 

Vama raises the following points for our consideration:
12 A-1020-19T1

POINT I

THE UAE JUDICIARY AFFORDED THE 

DEFENDANTS-RESPONDENTS SUFFICIENT DUE 

PROCESS AS TO LEGITIMIZE THE DUBAI 

JUDGMENT CONSISTENT WITH THE UNIFORM

FOREIGN COUNTRY MONEY JUDGMENTS 

RECOGNITION ACT (N.J.S.A. 2A: 49A-16.6, et seq).

A. The Trial Court Erred in Finding that DefendantsRespondents Were not Properly Notified of the Dubai 

Proceeding and Were not Afforded the Opportunity to 

Defend Themselves.

POINT II

VAMA SUFFICIENTLY MET THE BURDEN FOR 

RECOGNITION AS REQUIRED BY THE 

RECOGNITION ACT. (N.J.S.A. 2A:49A-16.6, et 

seq.).

A. The Court Erred By Allowing Mr. Rahulan, Who 

Had Been Removed from [Pacific's] Management by 

the Courts of Dubai, to Represent [Pacific] and Oppose 

[Vama's] Application. 

"A trial court's interpretation of the law and the legal consequences that 

flow from established facts are not entitled to any special deference." 

Manalapan Realty, L.P. v. Twp. Comm. of Manalapan, 140 N.J. 366, 378 (1995)

(citations omitted). In contrast, we afford deference to a trial court's factual 

findings that are supported by substantial credible evidence in the record, 
13 A-1020-19T1

considering the proofs as a whole. Alderiso v. Med. Ctr. of Ocean Cnty., Inc., 

167 N.J. 191, 198 (2001). 

In reviewing a grant of summary judgment, we apply the same standard 

under Rule 4:46-2(c) that governs the trial court. Steinberg v. Sahara Sam's 

Oasis, LLC, 226 N.J. 344, 349-50 (2016). We consider the factual record, and 

reasonable inferences that can be drawn from those facts, "in the light most 

favorable to the non-moving party" to decide whether the moving party was 

entitled to judgment as a matter of law. IE Test, LLC v. Carroll, 226 N.J. 166,

184 (2016) (citing Brill v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 142 N.J. 520, 540

(1995)). That said, the non-moving party cannot successfully oppose a summary 

judgment motion by merely raising an insubstantial fact in dispute or by relying 

on evidence that is not competent. Accordingly, "once the moving party 

presents sufficient evidence in support of the motion, the opposing party must 

'demonstrate by competent evidential material that a genuine issue of fact 

exists[.]'" Globe Motor Co. v. Igdalev, 225 N.J. 469, 479-80 (2016) (alteration

in original) (quoting Robbins v. Jersey City, 23 N.J. 229, 241 (1957)).

The Recognition Act authorizes New Jersey courts to recognize "final, 

conclusive, and enforceable" foreign-country judgments that "grant[] or den[y]

recovery of a sum of money," unless an exception enumerated in N.J.S.A. 
14 A-1020-19T1

2A:49A-16.4(b) or (c) applies. N.J.S.A. 2A:49A-16.4(a). Where an exception 

applies, "[a] party against whom a foreign-country judgment is entered may file 

an action for a declaration that the foreign-country judgment shall not be subject 

to recognition." N.J.S.A. 2A:49A-16.6(c). 

N.J.S.A. 2A:49A-16.4(b) prohibits recognition of a foreign-country 

judgment under three circumstances:

(1) the judgment was rendered under a judicial system 

that does not provide impartial tribunals or procedures 

compatible with the requirements of due process of law, 

as determined by the court using standards developed 

by the American Law Institute and the International 

Institute for the Unification of Private Law to govern 

resolution of transnational disputes;

(2) the foreign court did not have personal jurisdiction 

over the defendant; or

(3) the foreign court did not have jurisdiction over the 

subject matter.

In turn, under N.J.S.A. 2A:49A-16.4(c), the court:

may determine, in its discretion, not to recognize a 

foreign-country judgment if: 

(1) the defendant in the proceeding in the foreign court 

did not receive notice of the proceeding in sufficient 

time to enable the defendant to defend;

(2) the judgment was obtained by fraud that deprived 

the losing party of an adequate opportunity to present 

its case;
15 A-1020-19T1

(3) the judgment or the cause of action on which the 

judgment is based is repugnant to the public policy of 

this State or of the United States;

. . . . 

(7) the judgment was rendered in circumstances that 

raise substantial doubt about the integrity of the 

rendering court with respect to the judgment; or

(8) the specific proceeding in the foreign court leading 

to the judgment was not compatible with the 

requirements of due process of law, as determined by 

the court using standards developed by the American 

Law Institute and the International Institute for the 

Unification of Private Law to govern resolution of 

transnational disputes.

The burden of proof for nonrecognition rests with the party resisting

recognition except when the foreign-country judgment is entered by default. 

N.J.S.A. 2A:49A-16.4(d). Where the judgment is entered by default, the party 

seeking recognition must prove the following:

(1) the rendering court had jurisdiction over the 

defendant in accordance with the law of the country of 

origin of judgment;

(2) the defendant was served with initiating process in 

accordance with the law of the country of origin; and

(3) the rendering court had jurisdiction over the 

defendant on a basis provided pursuant to [N.J.S.A. 

2A:49A-16.5].
16 A-1020-19T1

[N.J.S.A. 2A:49A-16.4(d).]

Vama argues that there were two material facts in dispute precluding 

summary judgment: (1) whether service of process upon defendants was made 

at the correct address; and (2) whether Gawanico was an employee of Pacifico, 

who was authorized to accept service on behalf of defendants. For the reasons 

that follow, we disagree. 

Defendants did not file a responsive pleading or otherwise participate in 

the Dubai proceedings. The judge correctly determined that the Dubai judgment 

was entered by default and properly shifted the burden of proof to Vama

pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2A:49A-16.4(d). 

The judge also found that Vama did not meet its burden of proof by 

demonstrating that Pacific and Rahulan were served with process in compliance 

with Dubai law or this State's due process requirements. We concur. The fact 

that service was attempted by a court officer is not controlling. 

Service of Pacific was made upon an individual, who, according to 

Rahulan, was not even employed by Pacific. Vama provided no competent 

evidence that the corporation was served at the correct address or that Gawanico

was a Pacific employee, much less an individual authorized to accept process on 

its behalf. Indeed, the proof of service listed an incorrect service address. 
17 A-1020-19T1

Rahulan has lived in the United States since May 1, 2016. Therefore, 

service months later by publication in Dubai did not provide Rahulan with 

adequate notice and opportunity to defend the Dubai proceedings. Serving a 

purported Pacific receptionist, who was not authorized to accept service on 

Rahulan's behalf, was similarly defective. Moreover, the notice sent by Vama's 

counsel in August 2016 to Ruhalan's prior address in Dubai was likewise 

inadequate. Thus, Rahulan was not afforded due process. 

In addition, the attempted service of process on defendants did not provide 

due process under New Jersey law. See Choi v. Kim, 50 F.3d 244, 250 (3d Cir. 

1995) (affirming the district court's decision declining to recognize a Korean 

judgment because the person against whom it was entered in Korea was not 

accorded due process protections under New Jersey law). 

"Personal service is the primary method of service in New Jersey." City 

of Passaic v. Shennett, 390 N.J. Super. 475, 483 (App. Div. 2007) (citing R.

4:43-3, -4). Other methods are appropriate only "[i]f personal service cannot be 

effectuated 'after a reasonable and good faith attempt.'" Ibid. (quoting R. 4:4-

3(a)). 

Personal service of a competent adult in this State is accomplished by 

delivering process to that individual personally, or by leaving a copy with a 
18 A-1020-19T1

competent household member at least fourteen years old at the individual's 

dwelling or usual place of abode, or by delivering a copy to a person authorized 

to accept service on the individual's behalf. R. 4:4-4(a)(1). If service cannot be 

effected in this manner, and the serving party submits an affidavit confirming 

his or her diligent efforts and inquiry, then personal service upon an individual 

outside of the United States may be effected by delivering notice "in accordance 

with any governing international treaty or convention to the extent required 

thereby, and if none, in the same manner as if service were made within the 

United States, except that service shall be made by a person specially appointed 

by the court for that purpose." R. 4:4-4(b)(1)(B). 

Personal service upon a corporation is accomplished by serving:

any officer, director, trustee or managing or general 

agent, or any person authorized by appointment or by 

law to receive service of process on behalf of the 

corporation, or on a person at the registered office of 

the corporation in charge thereof, or, if service cannot 

be made on any of those persons, then on a person at 

the principal place of business of the corporation in this 

State in charge thereof, or, if there is no place of 

business in this State, then on any employee of the 

corporation within this State acting in the discharge of 

his or her duties, provided, however, that a foreign 

corporation may be served only as herein prescribed 

subject to due process of law. 

[R. 4:4-4(a)(6).]
19 A-1020-19T1

If service upon a corporation cannot be made in accordance with these 

provisions, and the serving party submits an affidavit confirming diligent efforts 

and inquiry, then personal service may be accomplished by:

mailing a copy of the summons and complaint by 

registered or certified mail, return receipt requested, 

and, simultaneously, by ordinary mail to . . . a 

corporation . . . that is subject to suit under a recognized 

name, addressed to a registered agent for service, or to 

its principal place of business, or to its registered office. 

[R. 4:4-4(b)(1)(C).] 

By any measure, the service of process on defendants did not meet these 

standards. Here, it is undisputed that the Dubai court officer did not deliver 

notice to Rahulan personally or to his dwelling or usual place of abode. Further, 

there is no evidence that the officer delivered notice to someone authorized to 

accept service on Rahulan's behalf. Vama provided no competent evidence that 

Gawanico was authorized to accept service on Rahulan's behalf. Regardless, 

service on Pacific's alleged receptionist does not suffice to serve Rahulan 

personally under this State's standards. The attempted service of Rahulan is 

particularly troubling given that Rahulan's email address and New Jersey 

telephone number were known when service was attempted. 

As to service upon Pacific, it is undisputed that the court officer did not 

deliver notice to an "officer, director, trustee or managing or general agent" of 
20 A-1020-19T1

Pacific, "or on a person at the registered office or principal place of business in 

charge thereof." R. 4:4-4(a)(6). Rahulan certified that Pacific's receptionist was 

not authorized to accept service. Generally, service upon a receptionist is 

permissible only if the corporation has no place of business in New Jersey and 

the receptionist is discharging his or her duties in New Jersey. R. 4:4-4(a)(6). 

Moreover, although Vama denies Rahulan's certification that Gawanico was not 

employed by Pacific, a denial alone is insufficient to create a genuine dispute, 

especially since Vama declined the opportunity to serve any discovery demands 

or depose anyone with knowledge relevant to this matter. Put simply, Vama 

proffered no competent evidence that Gawanico was employed by Pacific, much 

less that she was authorized to accept service on its behalf. 

Given these facts, recognition of the Dubai judgment was barred by 

N.J.S.A. 2A:49A-16.4(b)(2). In addition, the judge properly exercised his 

discretion to not recognize the Dubai judgment under N.J.S.A. 2A:49A16.4(c)(1). 

The judge also concluded that while this method of service of process may 

be permitted in UAE, it "is repugnant to the public policy of this State or of the 

United States," quoting N.J.S.A. 2A:49A-16.4(c)(3). We concur. For the 

reasons we have stated, defendants were not afforded meaningful notice and 
21 A-1020-19T1

opportunity to be heard, the two core elements of due process in this State and 

country. The inadequate opportunity to be heard extended to the appellate 

proceeding. Defendants' appeal was dismissed as untimely without considering 

the merits of the arguments they raised. The failure to properly serve defendants 

clearly thwarted their ability to file the appeal within thirty days of the issuance 

of the judgment. 

Our court rules permit a defendant to move for relief from the operation 

of a judgment when the judgment is void. See R. 4:50-1(d). "A judgment may 

be set aside as void for lack of personal jurisdiction without the need of the 

defendant to show a meritorious defense." Pressler & Verniero, Current N.J. 

Court Rules, cmt. 5.4.2 on R. 4:50-1(d) (2021) (citing Peralta v. Heights Med. 

Ctr., Inc., 485 U.S. 80, 86 (1988); City of Passaic v. Shennett, 390 N.J. Super. 

475, 486 (App. Div. 2007); Jameson v. Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co., 363 N.J. 

Super. 419, 425 (App. Div. 2003); L.L.C. v. Simmons, 392 N.J. Super. 520, 530 

(Law Div. 2006)). Defendants filed their appeal within a reasonable time after 

learning of the judgment entered against them. See R. 4:50-2. The dismissal of

the appeal as untimely "is repugnant to the public policy of this State or of the 

United States." N.J.S.A. 2A:49-16.4(c)(3). For this additional reason, the judge 

properly exercised his discretion in not recognizing the Dubai judgment. 
22 A-1020-19T1

In light of our ruling, we do not reach these additional grounds raised by 

defendants. Any issues raised by Vama but not otherwise addressed were found 

to lack sufficient merit to warrant discussion in our opinion. R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(E).

Affirmed.