MAINE	SUPREME	JUDICIAL	COURT Reporter	of	Decisions

Decision: 2020 ME	59

Docket: Kno-19-328

Submitted

On	Briefs: February	26,	2020

Decided: May	12,	2020

Panel: MEAD,	GORMAN,	JABAR,	HUMPHREY,	HORTON,	and	CONNORS,	JJ.

STEVE	ANCTIL	JR.1

v.

GLADYS	CASSESE

PER	CURIAM

[¶1]	 	 Steve Anctil	 Jr. appeals	 from a	 judgment	 entered	 by the	 District	

Court	 (Rockland,	 Mathews,	 J.)	 dismissing	 his	 complaint	 for	 protection	 from	

harassment	against	Gladys	Cassese.		We	affirm.

I.		BACKGROUND

[¶2]	 	 Anctil	 alleged the	 following	 facts	 in	 his	 complaint.	 	 On	

January 14, 2019,	 while	 he	 was	 an	 inmate	 at	 the	 Maine	 State	 Prison,	 Anctil

appeared	in	court	in	connection	with	a	matter separate	from this	one.		The court

gave him	 “paperwork” that	 contained,	 among	 other	 things, the	 name	 and	

 1		Cognizant	of	the	federal	Violence	Against	Women	Act,	we	note	that	this	matter	does	not	involve	

a	judicial	 determination	 that	 domestic	 violence	 or	 stalking	 occurred,	 and	we	 therefore	 name	 the	

plaintiff	in	our	decision.		See 18	U.S.C.S. §§	2261,	2261A,	2265(d)(3),	2266	(LEXIS	through	Pub.	L.	No.	

116-140).
2

contact	 information	 of	 an	 attorney	 appointed	 to	 represent	 him.	 	 When he	

returned	to	the	prison,	a	correctional	officer	confiscated	the	paperwork,	telling	

Anctil	that	he	did	not	think	Anctil	should	have	it	but	that	he	would	ask	the	unit	

manager.	 	Cassese was	the	 unit	 manager,	 and	 she	ordered	 the	 officer	 not	 to	

return	 the	 paperwork.	 	 Anctil	 requested	 the	 paperwork	 two	 weeks	 later.		

Cassese	 denied	 his	 request,	 claiming	 that	 allowing	 him	 to	 possess	 the	

paperwork	 would	 present	 a	 security	 risk.	 	 Cassese	 declined	 to	 reconsider	

despite	Anctil’s comment	that	all	of	the	information	contained	in the	paperwork	

was	available	to	the	public,	and	“[a]nybody	c[ould]	get	it	by	calling	the	[c]ourt	

and	 requesting	 it.”	 	 In	 his	 request	 for	 a	 protection	 from	 harassment	 order	

against	Cassese,	Anctil	alleged	that	his	claim	involved	“an	allegation	of	domestic	

or	dating	violence,	sexual	assault	or	stalking.”

[¶3]		The	court	set a	hearing	on	Anctil’s	complaint	for	May	17,	2019,	and	

then	continued	the	hearing	until	July	24,	2019.		Cassese	then	filed	a	motion	to	

dismiss	Anctil’s complaint,	arguing	that	his	allegations	were	insufficient	to	state	

a	claim	of	harassment	as	that	term	is	defined	by	statute.		See 5	M.R.S.	§	4651(2)	

(2020);	M.R.	Civ.	P.	12(b)(6).		In	his	written	response,	Anctil	acknowledged	that	

on	 January	 28,	 2019,	 Cassese	 had	 provided	 him	 with	 his	 attorney’s	 contact	

information	after	Anctil	filed	a	grievance	against	her.
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[¶4]		Before	the	upcoming	hearing	date,	by	order	dated	July	18,	2019,	the	

court	 granted	 Cassese’s	 motion	 to	 dismiss,	 concluding	 that	 “[t]he	 complaint	

fail[ed] to	 state	a	basis	upon	which	 relief	c[ould] be	granted.”2		Anctil	 timely	

appeals.		See 14	M.R.S.	§	1901	(2020);	M.R.	App.	P.	2B(c)(1).

II.		DISCUSSION

[¶5]		Anctil	argues that	the	court	was	required	to	hold	a	hearing	before	

adjudicating	his	complaint	and,	in	the	alternative, that	the	court	erred	when	it	

dismissed his	complaint	pursuant	to	Rule	12(b)(6).

A. Adjudication	Without	a	Hearing

[¶6]	 	 Anctil first argues that	the	 protection	 from	 harassment	 statutes	

prohibited	 the	 court	 from	 adjudicating	 his	 complaint without	 first	 holding	 a	

hearing.		“The	interpretation	of	a	statute,	including	whether	or	not	the	statute	

requires	a	hearing,	is	an	issue	of	law	that	we review	de	novo.”		Copp	v.	Liberty,	

2008	ME	97,	¶	6,	952	A.2d	976 (quotation	marks	omitted).		“We	look	first	to	the	

 2		The	court	also	stated	that	it	was	granting	Cassese’s	motion	on	 the	additional	ground	 that	it	

lacked	subject	matter	jurisdiction.		Cassese	had	argued,	in	her	motion	to	dismiss,	that	the	court	could	

not	adjudicate	Anctil’s	complaint	because	it	“involve[d]	an	allegation	of	harassment	by	a	prisoner	

against	a	prison	employee	while	that	employee	[was]	acting	in	her	official	capacity	at	the	Maine	State	

Prison.”		She	acknowledged,	however,	 that	 the	District	Court	“is	generally	vested	with	jurisdiction	

and	authority	over	protection	 from	harassment	complaints.”		See 5	M.R.S.	 § 4652	 (2020).		To	 the	

extent	that	the	court’s	determination	was	based	on	principles	of	sovereign	immunity,	we	need	not	

address	it,	given	our	ruling,	see	infra ¶¶	10-18,	that	Anctil’s	complaint	failed	to	state	a	claim	upon	

which	 relief	could	be	granted.		Cf.	Mulero-Carrillo	v.	Román-Hernández,	790	F.3d	99,	105	 (1st	Cir.

2015) (bypassing	sovereign	immunity	issues	to	review	and	affirm	a	Rule 12(b)(6)	dismissal).
4

plain	language	 of	 the	 statute	 to	determine	its	meaning	if	we can	do	so	while	

avoiding	absurd,	illogical,	or	inconsistent	results.”		State	v.	Conroy,	2020	ME	22,	

¶	 19,	 --- A.3d	 ---.	 	 “In	 interpreting	 a	 statute,	 we	 must	 consider	 the	 entire	

statutory	 scheme	 in	 order	 to	 achieve	 a	 harmonious	 result.”	 	 Town	 of	

N. Yarmouth	v.	Moulton,	1998 ME	96,	¶	5,	710	A.2d	252.

[¶7]		The	relevant	statutes	contain	several	provisions	that	touch	on	the	

role	of	a	hearing	in	a	protection	 from	harassment	proceeding.		First,	5	M.R.S.	

§ 4654(1) (2020) provides that	“[a] hearing	must	be	held	at	which	the	plaintiff	

shall	prove	the	allegation	of	harassment	by	a	preponderance	of	the	evidence.”		

Another	of	the	protection	from	harassment	statutes	provides,	however,	that	the	

court	 “may grant”	 a	 protection	 from	 harassment	 order	 “after	 a	 hearing	 and	

upon	 finding	 that	 the	 defendant	 has	 committed	 the	 harassment	 alleged.”		

5 M.R.S.	 §	 4655(1) (2020) (emphasis	 added).	 	 Finally,	 “[u]nless	 otherwise	

indicated	 in	 [the] chapter [governing	 protection	 from	 harassment],	 all	

proceedings	shall	be	in	accordance	with	 the	Maine	Rules	of	Civil	Procedure.”		

5 M.R.S.	§	4658(1)	(2020).

[¶8]		Although	subsection	4654(1) contains	the	phrase	“[a]	hearing	must	

be	held,”	viewing	that	statute	alongside	the	provisions	of	sections	4655(1) and	

4658(1)	 quoted	 above,	 we	 cannot	 conclude	 that	 a	 court	 is	 prohibited	 in	 all	
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circumstances from	 dismissing	 a	 protection	 from	 harassment	 complaint	

without	 first	 holding	 a	 hearing.	 	 Because	 we	 can	 discern	 no	 reason	 for	 the	

Legislature	to	require	the	court	to	hold	a	hearing	on	a	complaint	that	fails,	on	

its	 face,	 to	 state	 a	 claim,	we	 agree with	 Cassese	 that	 it	 would	 be	 illogical	 to

interpret	 the	 statute	 to	 require	 a	 hearing	 in	 those	 circumstances.	 	 See

M.R. Civ. P.	 1; Merrifield	 v.	 Hadlock,	 2009	 ME	 1,	 ¶	 6,	 961	 A.2d	 1107 (“[T]he	

overall	purpose	of	the	Rules	of	Civil	Procedure .	.	. is	to	ensure	the speedy	and	

inexpensive	resolution	of	a	case.”).

[¶9]	 	 This conclusion	 is	 consistent	 with	 our	 decision	 in	 Nadeau	 v.	

Frydrych, in	 which	 the	 trial	 court	 dismissed	 a	 protection	 from	 harassment	

complaint	 on	 Rule	 12(b)(6)	 grounds “after	 a	 non-testimonial	 hearing.”	

2014 ME	154,	¶¶	1,	4,	108	A.3d	1254.		We	vacated	the	judgment	based	on	our	

conclusion	that	“the	allegations	in	the	complaint	[were]	sufficient	to	overcome	

a	 12(b)(6)	 motion	 to	 dismiss”—not	 because	 the	 court	 had	 failed	 to	 hold	 an	

evidentiary	 hearing.	 	Id. ¶	 9;	see	 Staples	 v.	 Michaud,	 2003	 ME	 133,	 ¶	 1	 n.1,	

836 A.2d	 1288 (rejecting	 a	 similar	 argument	 where	 the	 applicable	 statute,	

5 M.R.S.A.	§	4654(1)	(2002),	provided	that	“[w]ithin	21	days	of	the	filing	of	a	

petition,	a	hearing	shall	be	held	at	which	the	plaintiff	shall	prove	the	allegation	

of	 harassment	 by	 a	 preponderance	 of	 the	 evidence”).	 	 Here,	 we	 conclude	
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expressly	 that	 section	 4654(1) does not	 always preclude	 the	 court	 from	

adjudicating	a	 protection	 from	harassment complaint	without	first	holding	 a	

hearing.

B. Rule	12(b)(6)	Dismissal

[¶10]	 	 We	 now	 turn	 to	 address	 whether	the	 trial	 court	 erred	when	 it	

dismissed	Anctil’s	complaint	based	on	its	conclusion	 that	Anctil	had failed	 to	

state	a	claim	upon	which	relief	could	be	granted.		See M.R.	Civ.	P.	12(b)(6).		We	

review	the	legal	sufficiency	of	the	complaint	de	novo,	viewing	the	allegations	in	

the	complaint	“in	the	light	most	favorable	to	the	plaintiff	to	determine	whether	

[the	 complaint] sets	 forth	 elements	 of	 a	 cause	 of	 action	 or	 alleges	 facts	 that	

would entitle	the	plaintiff	to	relief	pursuant	to	some	legal	theory.”	 Ramsey	v.	

Baxter	 Title	 Co.,	 2012	 ME	 113,	 ¶	 6,	 54	 A.3d	 710 (quotation	 marks	 omitted).		

“A dismissal	 is	 proper	 only	 when	 it	 appears	 beyond	 doubt	 that	 a	 plaintiff	 is	

entitled	to	no	relief	under any	set	of	facts	that	he	might	prove	in	support	of	his	

claim.”	 	 Bog	 Lake	 Co.	 v.	 Town	 of	 Northfield,	 2008	 ME	 37,	 ¶	 6,	 942 A.2d	 700

(quotation	marks	omitted).

[¶11]	 	 As	 described	 above,	 a	 court	 may	 grant	 a	 protection	 from	

harassment	 order	 only	“upon	 finding that	 the	 defendant	 has	 committed	 the	

harassment	alleged.”		5	M.R.S.	§	4655(1).		Harassment	is	defined	by	statute	in	
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two	different	ways.		See 5	M.R.S.	§	4651(2).		Because	the	first	involves	“[t]hree	

or	 more	 acts of	 intimidation,	 confrontation,	 physical	 force	 or	 the	 threat	 of	

physical	force,”	see 5 M.R.S.	§	4651(2)(A) (emphasis	added),	it	plainly	does	not	

apply	here,	so	we	do	not	discuss	it	further.		The	second	definition	of	harassment	

is:

A	single	act	or	course	of	conduct	constituting	a	violation	of	section

4681;	Title	17,	section	2931;	or	Title	17-A,	section	201,	202,	203,	

204,	 207,	 208,	 209,	 210,	 210-A,	 211,	 253,	 254,	 255-A,	 256,	 258,	

259-A,	259-B,	260,	261,	282,	283,	301,	302,	303,	506,	506-A,	511,	

511-A,	556,	802,	805,	806,	852 or	853.

5	M.R.S.	§	4651(2)(C).		Harassment “does	not	include	any	act	protected	by	law.”		

5	M.R.S.	§	4651(2).

[¶12]		Anctil	argues that	the	allegations	in	his	complaint	were	sufficient	

to	allege	harassment	pursuant	to	this	second	definition	because	they	allege	a	

violation	 of either 17	 M.R.S.	 § 2931	 (2020) or 5	 M.R.S.	 §	 4681	 (2020).

3		

Section 2931	provides:

A	person	may	not,	by	force	or	threat	of	force,	intentionally	injure,	

intimidate	 or	 interfere	 with,	 or	 intentionally	 attempt	 to	 injure,	

intimidate	 or	interfere	with	 or	intentionally	 oppress	 or	 threaten	

any	other	person	in	the	free	exercise	or	enjoyment	of	any	right	or	

privilege,	 secured to	 that	person	by	 the	Constitution	 of	Maine	 or	

laws	of	the	State	or	by	the	United	States	Constitution	or	laws	of	the	

United	States.

 3		He	also	argues	 that	he	alleged	violations	of	 the	stalking	and	criminal	mischief	statutes	in	his	

complaint.		See 17-A	M.R.S.	§§	210-A(1)(A)(4),	806(1)(A)	(2020). We	are	not	persuaded	by	those	

arguments.
8

“[I]ntentionally,”	 as	 used	 in	 this	 section,	 means	 that	 it	 was	 the	 person’s	

“conscious	 object	 to	 cause”	 the	 result	 of	 his	 or	 her	 conduct.	 	 17-A	 M.R.S.	

§ 35(1)(A)	(2020);	see 17	M.R.S.	§	2931.		Section	4681,	part	of	the	Maine	Civil	

Rights	Act,	provides,	similarly:

Whenever	 any	person,	whether	 or	 not	acting	under	color	 of	law,	

intentionally	 interferes	 or	 attempts	 to	 intentionally	 interfere	 by	

physical	force	or	violence	against	a	person,	damage	or	destruction	

of	 property	 or	 trespass	 on	 property	 or	 by	 the	 threat of	 physical	

force	 or	 violence	 against	 a	 person,	 damage	 or	 destruction	 of	

property	or	 trespass	on	property	with	 the	exercise	or	enjoyment	

by	 any	 other	 person	 of	 rights	 secured	 by	 the	 United	 States	

Constitution	or	the	laws	of	the	United	States	or	of	rights	secured	by	

the	Constitution	 of	Maine	 or	laws	 of	 the	State	 or	 violates	 section	

4684-B,	the	Attorney	General	may	bring	a	civil	action	for	injunctive	

or	 other	 appropriate	 equitable	 relief	 in	 order	 to	 protect	 the	

peaceable	exercise	or	enjoyment	of	the	rights	secured.

[¶13]		Anctil	did	not	specify	in	his	complaint	which	constitutional	rights	

he	 claimed were	 at	 issue.	 	 In	 his	 brief	 on	 appeal,	 he	 argues	 that	 Cassese’s	

conduct	 interfered	 with	 his	 rights	 to	 due	 process	 and to	 be	 free	 from	

unreasonable	 searches	 and	 seizures.	 	 He	 also	 implied,	 in	 his	 opposition	 to	

Cassese’s	 motion	 to	 dismiss,	 that	 Cassese’s	 conduct	 implicated	 his	 Sixth	

Amendment	right	to	counsel.

[¶14]	 	 We	 first conclude	 that Anctil’s search	 and	 seizure argument	 is	

unpersuasive because	 he	 had	 no	 reasonable	 expectation	 of	 privacy	 in	 the	
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paperwork	at	issue in	the	prison	setting.

4		See U.S.	Const.	amend. IV;	Me. Const.	

art.	I,	§	5; Hudson	v.	Palmer,	468	U.S.	517,	526-28	(1984) (explaining	that	“the	

right	 of	 privacy	 in	 traditional	 Fourth	 Amendment	 terms	 is	 fundamentally	

incompatible	 with	 the	 close	 and	 continual	 surveillance	 of	 inmates	 and	 their	

cells	 required	 to	 ensure	 institutional	 security	 and	 internal	 order”); State	 v.	

O’Rourke,	2001	ME	163, ¶	20,	792	A.2d	262 (concluding	that	a	prisoner	had	no	

reasonable	expectation	of	privacy	in the	contents	of	his	prison	locker).

[¶15]		We	also	disagree	with	Anctil’s	argument	that	the	allegations	in	his	

complaint	 were	 sufficient	 to	 allege	 a	 due	 process	 violation.	 	 See U.S.	 Const.	

amend.	V.		“[A]n	unauthorized	intentional	deprivation	 of	property	by	a	 state	

employee	does	not	constitute	a	violation	of	the	procedural	requirements	of	the	

Due Process	 Clause	 of	 the	 Fourteenth	 Amendment	 if	 a	 meaningful	

postdeprivation	remedy	for	the	loss	is	available.”		Hudson,	468	U.S.	at 533.		Here,	

Anctil acknowledges	 that	a	meaningful	post-deprivation	 remedy—the	prison	

grievance	process—was	available,	and	that	he	took	advantage	of	it,	resulting	in	

 4		“[W]hile	persons	imprisoned	for	crime	enjoy	many	protections	of	the	Constitution,	it	is	also	clear	

that	imprisonment	carries	with	it	the	circumscription	or	loss	of	many	significant	rights.”		Hudson	v.	

Palmer,	468	U.S.	517,	524	(1984).
10

the	 return	 fourteen	 days	 later	 of	 the	 information	that	 was	 withdrawn	 from	

him.5

[¶16]		Nor	were	the	allegations	in	Anctil’s	complaint	sufficient	to	make	

out	 a	 claim	 that	 the	 confiscation	 of	 the	 paperwork	 at	 issue	 constituted	 a	

violation	of	Anctil’s	Sixth	Amendment	right	to	counsel.		See U.S.	Const.	amend.	

VI.		In	general,	a	criminal	defendant	seeking	to	demonstrate	that	he	was	denied	

the	 right	 to	 the	 effective	 assistance	 of	 counsel	 must	 show	 that	 his	 legal	

representation	was	deficient	and	that	the	deficiency	resulted	in	prejudice	to	his	

defense.		See	Strickland	v.	Washington,	466	U.S.	668,	687	(1984).	 Addressing	a	

claim	that	the government	affirmatively	interfered	with	a	defendant’s	access to

counsel in	a	criminal	case,	the	Supreme	Court	has	stated	that	the	“[g]overnment	

violates	the	right	to	effective	assistance	when	it	interferes	in	certain	ways	with	

the	ability	of	counsel to	make	independent	decisions	about	how	to	conduct	the	

defense.”		Perry	v.	Leeke,	488	U.S.	272,	280	(1989) (quotation	marks	omitted).		

In	circumstances	that	amount	to a	denial	of	the	effective	assistance	of	counsel	

at	a	“critical	stage”	of	a	trial,	the	prejudice	required	by	Strickland is presumed,	

 5		To	the	extent	that	Anctil	argues	that	the	confiscation	of	his	paperwork	amounted	to	a	violation	

of	his	right	to	meaningful	access	to	the	courts,	see	LeGrand	v.	York	Cty.	Judge	of	Prob.,	2017	ME	167,	

¶ 34	&	n.11,	168	A.3d	783 (citing	Me.	Const.	art.	I,	§§	6-A,	15), that	argument	is	also	unpersuasive	

because	he	did	not	allege	that	Cassese’s	conduct	resulted	in	any	actual	injury	 to	him.		See	Lewis	v.	

Casey,	 518	 U.S.	 343,	 349-51	 (1996) (explaining	 that	 an	 inmate	 alleging	 a	 violation	 of	 his	 or	 her	

constitutional	right	of	access	to	the	courts	“must	show	actual	injury”).		
11

and	the	defendant	therefore	need	not	show	actual	injury.		See United	States	v.	

Cronic,	466	U.S.	648,	659-60	(1984).

[¶17]		Here,	Anctil	did	not	allege	that	Cassese’s	action	resulted	in	a	denial	

of	 access	 to	 his	 court-appointed	 counsel	during a	 critical	 stage	 of	 a	 criminal	

prosecution	against	him.6		See U.S.	Const.	amend.	VI;	Me.	Const.	art. 1,	§	6; Van	

v.	Jones,	475	F.3d	292,	312-15	(6th	Cir.	2007) (cataloging	the	Supreme	Court’s	

tests	for	determining	whether	a	given	proceeding	constitutes	a	critical	stage);

State	v.	Hill,	2014	ME	16,	¶	5	n.1,	86	A.3d	628 (noting	that	“[t]he	right	to	counsel	

afforded	 by	 the	 Maine	 Constitution	 is	 coextensive	 with	 that	 of	 the	

Sixth Amendment”).	 	 He	 also	 alleged no	 actual	 injury	 or	 prejudice	 resulting	

from	 the	 confiscation	 of	 his	 court	 paperwork,	 or	 even	 that	 the	 confiscation	

actually	prevented	him	 from	contacting	his	attorney.

7		Cf. Strickland,	466	U.S.	

at 687.		Under	these	circumstances,	the	allegations	in	Anctil’s complaint	failed

to	state	a	claim	that	Cassese	intentionally	interfered	with	his	Sixth	Amendment	

right	to	counsel.

 6		Indeed,	although	we	can	make	inferences	from	filings in	the	record	outside	of	Anctil’s	complaint	

for	protection	 from	harassment,	Anctil	did	not	allege	that	the	“court	paperwork”	confiscated	 from	

him	was	related	to	a	criminal	case	at	all.

7		As	we	have	noted,	see	supra ¶	2,	Anctil	alleged	that	he	told	Cassese	that	the	information	in	the	

paperwork	was	available	to	anyone	who	“call[ed] the	[c]ourt	and	request[ed] it.”
12

[¶18]	 	 Finally,	 blanketing each	 of	 these	 constitutional	 claims is	 the

additional	requirement	that	Anctil	prove	that	Cassese	acted	intentionally	and	

“by	 force	 or	 threat	 of	 force,”	 17	 M.R.S.	 §	 2931,	 or	 by	 actual	 or	 threatened	

“physical	force	or	violence	.	.	.	,	damage	or	destruction	of	property[,] or	trespass	

on	property,”	5	M.R.S.	§	4681(1).		Even	viewing	the	allegations	in	the	complaint	

in	the	light	most	favorable	to	Anctil,	see	Ramsey,	2012	ME	113,	¶	6,	54	A.3d	710,	

we	cannot	conclude	that	they	are	sufficient	to	state	a	claim	on	these	elements.		

See	M.R.	 Civ.	 P.	 12(b)(6);	Chapman	 v.	 Robinson,	 2012	ME	 141,	 ¶	 12,	 58	 A.3d	

1123.

The	entry	is:

Judgment	affirmed.

Steve	Anctil	Jr.,	appellant	pro	se

Aaron	M.	Frey,	Attorney	General,	and	Alisa	Ross,	Asst.	Atty.	Gen.,	Office	of	the	

Attorney	General,	Augusta,	for	appellee	Gladys	Cassese

Rockland	District	Court	docket	number	PA-2019-45

FOR	CLERK	REFERENCE	ONLY