* Honorable Arthur L. Alarcon, Senior U.S. Circuit Judge for the Ninth Circuit, sitting by designation.

1 We do not decide whether a defendant who has satisfi ed the requirement of section 5C1.2(5) is entitled to a reduction for acceptance of responsibility: That issue is not before us.

2 Section 5C1.2(5) requires the defendant to "truthfully provide[ ] to the Government all information and evidence the defendant has concerning the offense or o ffenses that were part of the same course of conduct UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee,

v. Giovani YATE, Defendant-Appellant.
No. 97-5155. United States Court of Appeals, Eleventh Circuit.

May 24, 1999. Appeal from the United States District Court for the S outhern District of Florida. (No. 97-25-CR-JAL), Joan A. Lenard, Judge. Before EDMONDSON and MARCUS, Circuit Judges, and ALARCON * , Senior Circuit Judge.
PER CURIAM: Defendant Giovani Yate appeals his 120-month senten ce for conspiracy to import cocaine in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 963. This case presents the issue of whether a sentenci ng court's finding that a defendant has truthfully admitted the conduct comprising the offense of c onviction for purposes of an acceptance-of-responsibility reduction under U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1, is incompatible with a finding that the defendant has failed to satisfy the requirement of U.S.S.G. § 5C1.2(5) that the defendant truthfully disclose to the government all information and evidence that he has about th e offense and all relevant conduct. A sentencing court's conclusion that a defenda nt accepted responsibility under section 3E1.1 does not preclude a finding that the defendant has failed to meet the affirmative-disclosure requirement of section 5C1.2(5): 1 briefly stated, section 5C1.2(5) is a "tell- all " provision, demanding a different kind of disclosure than section 3E1.1 demands. 2 See United States v. Sabir, 117 F.3d 750, 752 (3d Cir.1997) ("[T]he acceptanceor of a common scheme or plan[.]" In contrast, for an acceptance-of-responsibility reduction, "a defendant is not required to volunteer, or affirmatively admit, relevant conduct beyond the o ffense of conviction.... A defendant may remain silent in respect to relevant conduct beyond the offense of conviction without affecting his ability to obtain [the reduction,]" as long as the defendant does not falsel y deny relevant conduct. U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1, comment. (n.1(a)).

3 Yate's other arguments—about the factual sufficiency of his disclosure, a mitigating-role reduction, and a downward departure—lack merit and do not warrant discussion. 

## 2 of responsibility provisions in the guidelines plainly do not subsume all of a defendant's responsibilities under the safety valve provisions."); United States v. Arrington, 73 F.3d 144, 149 (7th Cir.1996) ("[T]he admission of responsibility n ecessary to obtain a reduction under § 3E1.1(a) is not necessarily sufficient to satisfy [§ 5C1.2(5) ]."); United States v. Adu, 82 F.3d 119, 124 (6th Cir.1996) ("[T]he fact that the defendant qualified for a two-level acceptance of responsibility reduction u nder § 3E1.1(a) does not establish eligibility for a safety valve reduction under § 5C1.2."). We therefore AFFIRM Yate's sentence. 3
AFFIRMED.