Federal Register / Vol. 74, No. 66 / Wednesday, April 8, 2009 / Rules and Regulations 15833 

may damage surrounding structure or 

any adjacent systems, equipment, or 

electrical wiring of the airplane in such 

a way as to cause a major or more-severe 

failure condition, in accordance with 14 

CFR 25.1309(b) and applicable 

regulatory guidance. 

6. Each lithium-battery installation 

must have provisions to prevent any 

hazardous effect on structure or 

essential systems caused by the 

maximum amount of heat the battery 

can generate during a short circuit of the 

battery or of its individual cells. 

7. Lithium battery installations must 

have a system to automatically control 

the charging rate of the battery, to 

prevent battery overheating or 

overcharging, and, 

a. A battery-temperature-sensing and 

over-temperature-warning system with a 

means for automatically disconnecting 

the battery from its charging source in 

the event of an over-temperature 

condition, or, 

b. A battery-failure-sensing-andwarning system with a means for 

automatically disconnecting the battery 

from its charging source in the event of 

battery failure. 

8. Any lithium-battery installation, 

the function of which is required for 

safe operation of the airplane, must 

incorporate a monitoring-and-warning 

feature that provides an indication to 

the appropriate flight-crew members 

when the state-of-charge of the batteries 

has fallen below levels considered 

acceptable for dispatch of the airplane. 

9. The Instructions for Continued 

Airworthiness, required by 14 CFR 

25.1529 (and 26.11), must contain 

maintenance steps to: 

a. Assure that the lithium battery is 

sufficiently charged at appropriate 

intervals specified by the battery 

manufacturer. 

b. Ensure the integrity of lithium 

batteries in spares-storage to prevent the 

replacement of batteries, whose function 

is required for safe operation of the 

airplane, with batteries that have 

experienced degraded charge-retention 

ability or other damage due to 

prolonged storage at a low state of 

charge. 

The Instructions for Continued 

Airworthiness maintenance procedures 

must contain precautions to prevent 

mishandling of the lithium battery, 

which could result in short-circuit or 

other unintentional damage that, in 

turn, could result in personal injury or 

property damage. 

Note 1: The term ‘‘sufficiently charged’’ 

means that the battery will retain enough of 

a charge, expressed in ampere-hours, to 

ensure that the battery cells will not be 

damaged. A battery cell may be damaged by 

lowering the charge below a point where the 

battery’s ability to charge and retain a full 

charge is reduced. This reduction would be 

greater than the reduction that may result 

from normal, operational degradation. 

Note 2: These special conditions are not 

intended to replace 14 CFR 25.1353(b) in the 

certification basis of the Boeing 737–600, 

–700, –800, and –900 Series airplanes. These 

special conditions apply only to lithium 

batteries and their installations. The 

requirements of 14 CFR 25.1353(b) remain in 

effect for batteries and battery installations in 

Boeing 737–600, –700, –800, and –900 Series 

airplanes that do not use lithium batteries. 

Compliance with the requirements of 

these special conditions must be shown 

by test, or analysis by the Aircraft 

Certification Office, or its designees, 

with the concurrence of the FAA 

Transport Airplane Directorate. 

Issued in Renton, Washington, on March 

30, 2009. 

Stephen P. Boyd, 

Acting Manager, Transport Airplane 

Directorate, Aircraft Certification Service. 

[FR Doc. E9–7907 Filed 4–7–09; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 4910–13–P 

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION 

Federal Aviation Administration 

14 CFR Part 25 

[Docket No. NM402; Special Conditions No. 

25–381–SC] 

Special Conditions: TTF Aerospace, 

LLC, Modification to Boeing Model 

767–400 Series Airplanes; Aft LowerLobe Crew-Rest Module (CRM) 

AGENCY: Federal Aviation 

Administration (FAA), DOT. 

ACTION: Final special conditions; request 

for comments. 

SUMMARY: These special conditions are 

issued for Boeing Model 767–400 series 

airplanes. These airplanes, modified by 

TTF Aerospace, LLC (TTF), will have a 

novel or unusual design feature 

associated with an aft, lower-lobe, crewrest module (CRM). The applicable 

airworthiness regulations do not contain 

adequate or appropriate safety standards 

for this design feature. These special 

conditions contain the additional safety 

standards that the Administrator 

considers necessary to establish a level 

of safety equivalent to that established 

by the existing airworthiness standards. 

DATES: The effective date for these 

special conditions is March 31, 2009. 

We must receive comments by May 26, 

2009. 

ADDRESSES: Please mail two copies of 

your comments to: Federal Aviation 

Administration, Transport Airplane 

Directorate, Attention: Rules Docket 

(ANM–113), Docket No. NM402, 1601 

Lind Avenue, SW., Renton, Washington 

98057–3356. You may deliver two 

copies to the Transport Airplane 

Directorate at the same address. You 

must mark your comments: Docket No. 

NM402. You can inspect comments in 

the Rules Docket weekdays, except 

federal holidays, between 7:30 a.m. and 

4 p.m. 

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: John 

Shelden, FAA, Airframe/Cabin Safety 

Branch, ANM–115, Transport Airplane 

Directorate, Aircraft Certification 

Service, 1601 Lind Avenue, SW., 

Renton, Washington, 98057–3356; 

telephone (425) 227–2785; facsimile 

(425) 227–1320. 

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: The FAA 

has determined that notice and 

opportunity for prior public comment is 

impracticable, because these procedures 

would significantly delay issuance of 

the design approval and thus delivery of 

the affected aircraft. In addition, the 

substance of these special conditions 

has been subject to the public-comment 

process in several prior instances with 

no substantive comments received. The 

FAA therefore finds that good cause 

exists for making these special 

conditions effective upon issuance. 

Comments Invited 

We invite interested people to take 

part in this rulemaking by sending 

written comments, data, or views. The 

most helpful comments reference a 

specific portion of the special 

conditions, explain the reason for any 

recommended change, and include 

supporting data. We ask that you send 

us two copies of written comments. 

We will file in the docket all 

comments we receive, as well as a 

report summarizing each substantive 

public contact with FAA personnel 

about these special conditions. You can 

inspect the docket before and after the 

comment closing date. If you wish to 

review the docket in person, go to the 

address in the ADDRESSES section of this 

preamble between 7:30 a.m. and 4 p.m., 

Monday through Friday, except Federal 

holidays. 

We will consider all comments we 

receive by the closing date for 

comments. We may change these special 

conditions based on the comments we 

receive. 

If you want us to acknowledge receipt 

of your comments on these special 

conditions, include with your 

comments a self-addressed, stamped 

postcard on which you have written the 

docket number. We will stamp the date 

on the postcard and mail it back to you. 


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Background 

On June 20, 2008, TTF Aerospace, 

LLC, applied for a supplemental type 

certificate to permit installation of an 

aft, lower-lobe, crew-rest module (CRM) 

in Boeing 767–400 series airplanes. 

The CRM will be a one-piece, selfcontained unit to be installed under the 

passenger-cabin floor in the aft portion 

of the aft cargo compartment. It will be 

attached to the existing cargo-restraint 

system, and the aft portion of the crew 

rest will be hard-mounted to the aircraft 

structure. Occupancy for the CRM will 

be limited to a maximum of five (5) 

occupants. An approved seat or berth, 

able to withstand the maximum flight 

loads when occupied, will be provided 

for each occupant permitted in the 

CRM. The CRM is intended to be 

occupied only in flight, i.e., not during 

taxi, takeoff, or landing. A smokedetection system, manual fire-fighting 

system, oxygen system, and occupant 

amenities will be provided. 

Two entry/exits between the maindeck area will be required. The floor 

structure will be modified to provide 

access for the main-entry hatch and the 

emergency-access hatch. 

Type Certification Basis 

Under the provisions of § 21.101, TTF 

must show that Boeing Model 767–400 

series airplanes, with the CRM, continue 

to meet either: 

(1) The applicable provisions of the 

regulations incorporated by reference in 

Type Certificate No. A1NM, or 

(2) The applicable regulations in 

effect on the date of TTF’s application 

for the change. 

The regulations incorporated by 

reference in the type certificate are 

commonly referred to as the ‘‘original 

type-certification basis.’’ The 

certification basis for Boeing Model 

767–400 series airplanes is 14 CFR part 

25, as amended by Amendments 25–1 

through 25–89. Refer to Type Certificate 

No. A1NM for a complete description of 

the certification basis for this model. 

According to 14 CFR 21.16, if the 

Administrator finds that the applicable 

airworthiness regulations do not contain 

adequate or appropriate safety standards 

for the Boeing Model 767–400 series 

airplanes because of a novel or unusual 

design feature, the Administrator 

prescribes special conditions for the 

airplane. 

As defined in 14 CFR 11.19, special 

conditions are issued in accordance 

with 14 CFR 11.38 and become part of 

the type-certification basis in 

accordance with 14 CFR 21.101. 

Special conditions are initially 

applicable to the model for which they 

are issued. If the type certificate for that 

model is amended to include any other 

model that incorporates the same or 

similar novel or unusual design feature, 

the special conditions would also apply 

to that model. Similarly, if any other 

model already included on the same 

type certificate is modified to 

incorporate the same or similar novel or 

unusual design feature, the special 

conditions would apply to that other 

model under the provisions of 14 CFR 

21.101. 

In addition to the applicable 

airworthiness regulations and special 

conditions, Boeing Model 767–400 

series airplanes must comply with the 

fuel-vent and exhaust-emission 

requirements of 14 CFR part 34, and the 

noise-certification requirements of 14 

CFR part 36. 

Novel or Unusual Design Features 

While installation of a CRM is not a 

new concept for large, transportcategory airplanes, each module has 

unique features based on its design, 

location, and use. The CRM to be 

installed on the Boeing Model 767–400 

series airplanes is novel in that it will 

be located below the passenger-cabin 

floor in the aft portion of the aft cargo 

compartment. 

Because of the novel or unusual 

features associated with the installation 

of a CRM, special conditions are 

considered necessary to provide a level 

of safety equal to that established by the 

airworthiness regulations incorporated 

by reference in the type certificates of 

these airplanes. These special 

conditions do not negate the need to 

address other applicable part 25 

regulations. 

Operational Evaluations and Approval 

These special conditions specify 

requirements for design approvals (i.e., 

type-design changes and supplemental 

type certificates) of CRMs administered 

by the FAA’s Aircraft Certification 

Service. The FAA’s Flight Standards 

Service, Aircraft Evaluation Group, 

must evaluate and approve the ‘‘basic 

suitability’’ of the CRM for occupation 

by crewmembers before the module may 

be used. If an operator wishes to use a 

CRM as ‘‘sleeping quarters,’’ the module 

must undergo an additional operational 

evaluation and approval. The Aircraft 

Evaluation Group would evaluate the 

CRM for compliance to §§ 121.485(a) 

and 121.523(b), with Advisory Circular 

121–31, Flight Crew Sleeping Quarters 

and Rest Facilities, providing one 

method of compliance to these 

operational regulations. 

To obtain an operational evaluation, 

the supplemental-type-design holder 

must contact the Aircraft Evaluation 

Group within the Flight Standards 

Service that has operational-approval 

authority for the project. In this 

instance, it is the Seattle Aircraft 

Evaluation Group. The supplementaltype-design holder must request a 

‘‘basic suitability’’ evaluation or a 

‘‘sleeping quarters’’ evaluation of the 

crew-rest module. The supplementaltype-design holder may make this 

request concurrently with the 

demonstration of compliance with these 

special conditions. 

The Boeing Model 767–400 Flight 

Standardization Board Report Appendix 

will document the results of these 

evaluations. In discussions with the 

FAA Principal Operating Inspector, 

individual operators may refer to these 

standardized evaluations as the basis for 

an operational approval, instead of an 

on-site operational evaluation. 

Any change to the approved CRM 

configuration requires an operational reevaluation and approval, if the change 

affects any of the following: 

• Procedures for emergency egress of 

crewmembers, 

• Other safety procedures for 

crewmembers occupying the CRM, or 

• Training related to these 

procedures. 

The applicant for any such change is 

responsible for notifying the Seattle 

Aircraft Evaluation Group that a new 

evaluation of the CRM is required. 

All instructions for continued 

airworthiness, including service 

bulletins, must be submitted to the 

Seattle Aircraft Evaluation Group for 

approval before the FAA approves the 

modification. 

Discussion of Special Conditions No. 9 

and 12 

The following clarifies the intent of 

Special Condition No. 9 relative to the 

requirements of § 25.1439(a): 

Amendment 25–38 modified the 

requirements of § 25.1439(a) by adding, ‘‘In 

addition, protective breathing equipment 

must be installed in each isolated separate 

compartment in the airplane, including 

upper and lower lobe galleys, in which 

crewmember occupancy is permitted during 

flight for the maximum number of 

crewmembers expected to be in the area 

during any operation.’’ 

The CRM is an isolated, separate 

compartment, so § 25.1439(a) is 

applicable. However, the requirements 

of § 25.1439(a) for protective breathing 

equipment in isolated, separate 

compartments are not appropriate, 

because the CRM is novel and unusual 

in terms of the number of occupants. 

In 1976, when Amendment 25–38 was 

adopted, small galleys were the only 


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isolated, separate compartments that 

had been certificated. Two 

crewmembers were the maximum 

expected to occupy those galleys. 

These special conditions address a 

CRM which can accommodate up to five 

crewmembers. This number of 

occupants in an isolated, separate 

compartment was not envisioned at the 

time Amendment 25–38 was adopted. It 

is not appropriate for all occupants to 

don protective breathing equipment in 

the event of a fire, because the first 

action should be for each occupant to 

leave the confined space, unless that 

occupant is fighting the fire. Taking the 

time to don protective breathing 

equipment would prolong the time for 

the emergency evacuation of the 

occupants and possibly interfere with 

efforts to extinguish the fire. 

Regarding Special Condition No. 12, 

the FAA considers that during the 1- 

minute smoke-detection time, 

penetration of a small quantity of smoke 

from the aft, lower-lobe, CRM into an 

occupied area of the airplane would be 

acceptable, given the limitations in 

these special conditions. The FAA 

considers that the special conditions 

place sufficient restrictions on the 

quantity and type of material allowed in 

crew carry-on bags that the threat from 

a fire in the remote CRM would be 

equivalent to the threat from a fire in the 

main cabin. 

Applicability 

As discussed above, these special 

conditions are applicable to Boeing 

Model 767–400 series airplanes as 

modified by TTF to include an aft 

lower-lobe CRM. If TTF Aerospace 

applies at a later date for a change to the 

supplemental type certificate to include 

another model listed on the same typecertificate data sheet, which 

incorporates the same or similar novel 

or unusual design feature, these special 

conditions would also apply to that 

model. 

Conclusion 

This action affects only certain novel 

or unusual design features on Boeing 

Model 767–400 series airplanes. It is not 

a rule of general applicability, and it 

affects only the applicant which applied 

to the FAA for approval of these features 

on the airplane. 

List of Subjects in 14 CFR Part 25 

Aircraft, Aviation safety, Reporting 

and recordkeeping requirements. 

■ The authority citation for these 

special conditions is as follows: 

Authority: 49 U.S.C. 106(g), 40113, 44701, 

44702, 44704. 

The Special Conditions 

■ Accordingly, pursuant to the authority 

delegated to me by the Administrator, 

the following special conditions are 

issued as part of the type-certification 

basis for the Boeing Model 767–400 

series airplanes, modified by TTF 

Aerospace. 

1. Occupancy of the aft, lower-lobe, 

crew-rest module (CRM) is limited to 

the total number of installed bunks and 

seats in each module. An approved seat 

or berth, able to withstand the 

maximum flight loads when occupied 

for each occupant permitted in the 

CRM, must be provided. The maximum 

occupancy in the CRM is five. 

(a) There must be appropriate 

placard(s) displayed in a conspicuous 

place at each entrance to the CRM to 

indicate the following: 

(1) The maximum number of 

occupants; 

(2) Occupancy is restricted to 

crewmembers who are trained in 

evacuation procedures for the CRM; 

(3) Occupancy is prohibited during 

taxi, take-off and landing; 

(4) Smoking is prohibited in the CRM; 

(5) Hazardous quantities of flammable 

fluids, explosives, or other dangerous 

cargo are prohibited in the CRM. 

(6) Stowage in the CRM must be 

limited to emergency equipment, 

airplane-supplied equipment (e.g., 

bedding), and crew personal luggage. 

Cargo or passenger baggage is not 

allowed. 

(b) At least one ashtray must be 

located conspicuously on or near the 

side of any entrance to the CRM. 

(c) A means must be available to 

prevent passengers from entering the 

CRM in the event of an emergency or 

when no flight attendant is present. 

(d) Any door installed between the 

CRM and the passenger cabin must be 

designed to be opened quickly from 

inside the module, even when crowding 

occurs at each side of the door. 

(e) All doors installed in the 

evacuation routes must be designed to 

prevent anyone from being trapped 

inside the module. If a locking 

mechanism is installed, it must be 

capable of being unlocked from the 

outside without the aid of special tools. 

The lock must not prevent opening from 

the inside of the module at any time. 

2. At least two emergency evacuation 

routes must be available, each of which 

can be used by each occupant of the 

CRM to rapidly evacuate to the main 

cabin. The exit door/hatch for each 

route must be able to be closed from the 

main cabin after evacuation of the CRM. 

In addition: 

(a) The routes must be located with 

one at each end of the module, or with 

two having sufficient separation within 

the module and between the routes to 

minimize the possibility of an event 

(either inside or outside the CRM) 

rendering both routes inoperative. 

(b) The routes must minimize the 

possibility of blockage which might 

result from fire, mechanical, or 

structural failure, or from persons 

standing on top of or against the escape 

route. If an evacuation route uses an 

area where normal movement of 

passengers occurs, it must be 

demonstrated that passengers would not 

impede egress to the main deck. If a 

hatch is installed in an evacuation 

route, the point at which the evacuation 

route terminates in the passenger cabin 

should not be located where normal 

movement by passengers or crew 

occurs. Examples include the main 

aisle, cross aisle, passageway, or galley 

complex. If it is not possible to avoid 

such a location, the hatch or door must 

be capable of being opened when a 

person, the weight of a 95th percentile 

male, is standing on the hatch or door. 

The use of evacuation routes must not 

depend on any powered device. If low 

headroom is at or near an evacuation 

route, provisions must be in place to 

prevent or to protect occupants of the 

CRM from head injury. 

(c) Emergency-evacuation procedures 

must be in place, including procedures 

for the emergency evacuation of an 

incapacitated occupant from the crewrest module. All of these procedures 

must be transmitted to all operators for 

incorporation into their training 

programs and appropriate operational 

manuals. 

(d) There must be a limitation, in the 

Airplane Flight Manual or other suitable 

means, for training crewmembers in the 

use of evacuation routes. 

3. An incapacitated person, 

representative of a 95th percentile male, 

must be capable of being evacuated from 

the CRM to the passenger-cabin floor. 

The evacuation must be demonstrated 

for all evacuation routes. A flight 

attendant or other crewmember (a total 

of one assistant within the CRM) may 

provide assistance in the evacuation. Up 

to three persons in the main passenger 

compartment may provide additional 

assistance. For evacuation routes having 

stairways, the additional assistants may 

descend to one-half the elevation 

change from the main deck to the lowerdeck compartment or to the first 

landing, whichever is higher. 

4. The following signs and placards 

must be provided in the CRM: 

(a) At least one exit sign, which meets 

the requirements of § 25.812(b)(1)(i) at 

Amendment 25–58, located near each 

exit. However, the exit sign may have a 


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reduced background area of no less than 

5.3 square inches (excluding the letters), 

provided that it is installed so that the 

material surrounding the exit sign is 

light in color (e.g., white, cream, or light 

beige). If the material surrounding the 

exit sign is not light in color, an exit 

sign with a minimum of a one-inchwide background border around the 

letters would also be acceptable. 

(b) An appropriate placard located 

near each exit, defining the location and 

the operating instructions for each 

evacuation route; 

(c) Placards must be readable from a 

distance of 30 inches under emergencylighting conditions; and 

(d) The exit handles and placards (see 

4.(b) above) for each evacuation route 

must be illuminated to at least 160 

micro-lamberts under emergencylighting conditions. 

5. In the event of failure of the 

airplane’s main power system or of the 

normal lighting system for the CRM, 

emergency illumination to the CRM 

must be automatically provided. 

(a) This emergency illumination must 

be independent of the main lighting 

system. 

(b) The sources of general cabin 

illumination may be common to both 

the emergency- and main-lighting 

systems, if the power supply to the 

emergency-lighting system is 

independent of the power supply to the 

main lighting system. 

(c) The illumination level must be 

sufficient for the occupants of the CRM 

to locate and transfer to the main 

passenger-cabin floor by means of each 

evacuation route. 

(d) The illumination level must be 

sufficient for each occupant of the CRM 

to locate a deployed oxygen mask, 

including when privacy curtains, if 

installed, are in the closed position. 

6. Two-way voice communications 

must be available between 

crewmembers on the flightdeck and 

occupants of the CRM. Public-addresssystem microphones must be located at 

each flight-attendant seat that is 

required to be near a floor-level exit in 

the passenger cabin, per § 25.785(h) at 

Amendment 25–51. The public-address 

system must allow two-way voice 

communications between flight 

attendants and the occupants of the 

CRM. However, one microphone may 

serve more than one exit, if the 

proximity of the exits allows unassisted 

verbal communication between seated 

flight attendants. 

7. Manual activation of an aural 

emergency-alarm system must be 

available, audible during normal and 

emergency conditions, to enable 

crewmembers, on the flight deck and at 

each pair of required floor-level 

emergency exits, to alert occupants of 

the CRM to an emergency situation. Use 

of a public-address or crew-interphone 

system is acceptable, provided it has an 

adequate means of differentiating 

between normal and emergency 

communications. The system must be 

powered, in flight, for at least ten 

minutes after the shutdown or failure of 

all engines and auxiliary power units, or 

the disconnection or failure of all power 

sources that depend on the continued 

operation of the engines and auxiliary 

power units. 

8. An indication to fasten seatbelts 

must be readily detectable by seated or 

standing occupants of the CRM. In the 

event no seats are available, at least one 

means, such as sufficient handholds, 

must be in place to address anticipated 

turbulence. Seatbelt-type restraints must 

be provided for berths and must be 

compatible for the sleeping attitude 

during cruise conditions. A placard 

must be located on each berth requiring 

that seat belts be fastened when the 

berth is occupied. If compliance with 

any of the other requirements of these 

special conditions is predicated on 

specific head location, a placard must 

identify the head position. 

9. In lieu of the requirements 

specified in § 25.1439(a) at Amendment 

25–38 that pertain to isolated 

compartments, and to provide a level of 

safety equivalent to that which is 

provided occupants of a small, isolated 

galley, the following equipment must be 

provided in the CRM: 

(a) At least one approved, hand-held 

fire extinguisher, appropriate for the 

kinds of fires likely to occur; and 

(b) Protective breathing equipment 

approved to Technical Standard Order 

(TSO)–C116 (or equivalent), suitable for 

fire-fighting for at least two persons. If 

three or more hand-held fire 

extinguishers are installed, protective 

breathing equipment must be available 

for one person for each hand-held fire 

extinguisher. 

Note: Additional protective breathing 

equipment and fire extinguishers in specific 

locations (beyond the minimum numbers 

prescribed in Special Condition No. 9) may 

be required as a result of any egress analysis 

accomplished to satisfy Special Condition 

No. 2(a). 

(c) One flashlight. 

10. A smoke- or fire-detection system 

(or systems) must be installed to 

monitor each occupiable area within the 

CRM, including areas partitioned by 

curtains. Flight tests must be conducted 

to show compliance with this 

requirement. Each system (or systems) 

must provide the following: 

(a) A visual indication to the 

flightdeck within one minute after the 

start of a fire; 

(b) An aural warning in the CRM; and 

(c) A warning in the main passenger 

cabin. This warning must be readily 

detectable by a flight attendant, taking 

into consideration the positioning of 

flight attendants throughout the main 

passenger compartment during various 

phases of flight. 

11. The CRM must be designed so that 

fires within the CRM can be controlled 

without a crewmember entering the 

module or so that crewmembers 

equipped for fire fighting have 

unrestricted access to the module. The 

time for a crewmember on the main 

deck to react to the fire alarm, don 

protective gear (such as protective 

breathing equipment and gloves), obtain 

fire-fighting equipment, and gain access 

to the module must not exceed the time 

for the module to become smoke-filled, 

making it difficult to locate the fire 

source. 

12. There must be a means to exclude 

hazardous quantities of smoke or 

extinguishing agent, originating in the 

CRM, from entering any other 

compartment occupied by crewmembers 

or passengers. This means must include 

the time periods during the evacuation 

of the CRM and, if applicable, when 

accessing the CRM to manually fight a 

fire. Smoke entering any other 

compartment occupied by crewmembers 

or passengers, when the entrance to the 

CRM is opened during an emergency 

evacuation, must dissipate within five 

minutes after the entrance to the module 

is closed. Hazardous quantities of smoke 

may not enter any other compartment 

occupied by crewmembers or 

passengers during subsequent access to 

manually fight a fire in the CRM. (The 

amount of smoke entrained by a 

firefighter exiting the module through 

the access is not considered hazardous). 

During the 1-minute smoke-detection 

time, penetration of a small quantity of 

smoke from the CRM into an occupied 

area is acceptable. Flight tests must be 

conducted to show compliance with 

this requirement. 

If a built-in fire extinguishing system 

is used instead of manual fire fighting, 

the fire-extinguishing system must be 

designed so that no hazardous 

quantities of extinguishing agent enter 

other compartments occupied by 

passengers or crew. The system must 

have adequate capacity to suppress any 

fire occurring in the CRM, considering 

the fire threat, the volume of the 

module, and the ventilation rate. 

13. A supplemental oxygen system 

must be provided, equivalent to that 

provided for main-deck passengers, for 


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each seat and berth in the CRM. The 

system must provide aural and visual 

signals to warn the CRM occupants to 

don oxygen masks in the event of 

decompression. The warning must 

activate before the cabin-pressure 

altitude exceeds 15,000 feet, and must 

sound continuously for a minimum of 

five minutes or until a reset pushbutton 

in the CRM is depressed. Procedures for 

occupants of the CRM to follow, in the 

event of decompression, must be 

established. These procedures must be 

transmitted to the operators for 

incorporation into their training 

programs and appropriate operational 

manuals. 

14. The following requirements apply 

to CRMs that are divided into several 

sections by curtains or partitions: 

(a) To warn sleeping occupants, an 

aural alert must be in place, that is 

audible in each section of the CRM, and 

that accompanies automatic 

presentation of supplemental-oxygen 

masks. In each section where seats or 

berths are not installed, there must be a 

visual indicator that occupants must 

don oxygen masks. A minimum of two 

supplemental oxygen masks is required 

for each seat or berth. The crewmembers 

must also be able to manually deploy 

the oxygen masks from the flightdeck. 

(b) A placard must be located adjacent 

to each curtain that visually divides or 

separates the CRM into small sections 

for privacy. The placard must specify 

that the curtain remains open when the 

private section it creates is unoccupied. 

(c) For each section of the CRM 

created by a curtain, the following 

requirements of these special conditions 

apply, both with the curtain open and 

with the curtain closed: 

(1) Emergency illumination (Special 

Condition No. 5); 

(2) Emergency alarm system (Special 

Condition No. 7); 

(3) Seatbelt-fasten signal (see Special 

Condition No. 8) or return-to-seat signal, 

as applicable; and 

(4) Smoke- or fire-detection system 

(Special Condition No. 10). 

(d) Crew-rest modules, visually 

divided to the extent that evacuation 

could be affected, must contain exit 

signs that direct occupants to the 

primary stairway exit. Exit signs must 

be located in each separate section of 

the CRM, and that meet the 

requirements of § 25.812(b)(1)(i) at 

Amendment 25–58. An exit sign with 

reduced background area, as described 

in Special Condition No. 4(a), may be 

used to meet this requirement. 

(e) For sections within a CRM that are 

created by a partition with a door 

separating the sections, the following 

requirements of these special conditions 

must be met both with the door open 

and with the door closed: 

(1) A secondary evacuation route 

must be available from each section to 

the main deck. Alternatively, any door 

between the sections must preclude 

anyone from being trapped inside the 

compartment. The ability to remove an 

incapacitated occupant from within this 

area must be considered. A secondary 

evacuation route from a small room, 

designed for only one occupant for a 

short time, such as a changing area or 

lavatory, is not required. However, the 

ability to remove an incapacitated 

occupant from within this area must be 

considered. 

(2) Doors between the sections must 

be capable of opening when crowded 

against, even when crowding occurs at 

each side of the door. 

(3) No more than one door may be 

located between any seat or berth and 

the primary stairway exit. 

(4) Exit signs must be located in each 

section, and must meet the requirements 

of § 25.812(b)(1)(i) at Amendment 25– 

58. These signs must direct occupants to 

the primary stairway exit. An exit sign 

with reduced background area, as 

described in Special Condition No. 4(a), 

may be used to meet this requirement. 

(5) The following Special Conditions 

apply both with the door open and with 

the door closed: 

• Special Conditions No. 5 

(emergency illumination), 

• No. 7 (emergency alarm system), 

• No. 8 (fasten-seatbelt signal or 

return-to-seat signal, as applicable) and 

• No. 10 (smoke- or fire-detection 

system) 

(6) Special Conditions No. 6 (two-way 

voice communication) and No. 9 

(emergency fire-fighting and protective 

equipment) apply independently for 

each separate section, except for 

lavatories or other small areas that are 

not occupied for extended periods. 

15. Each waste-disposal receptacle 

must have a built-in fire extinguisher 

that discharges automatically upon 

occurrence of a fire in the receptacle. 

16. Materials, including finishes or 

decorative surfaces applied to the 

materials, must comply with the 

flammability requirements of § 25.853 at 

Amendment 25–116, and mattresses 

must comply with the applicable 

flammability requirements of § 25.853(c) 

at Amendment 25–116. 

17. All lavatories within the CRM 

must meet the requirements for a 

lavatory installed on the main deck, 

except with regard to Special Condition 

No.10 for smoke detection. 

18. When a CRM is installed or 

enclosed as a removable module in part 

of a cargo compartment or is located 

directly adjacent to a cargo 

compartment without an intervening 

cargo compartment wall, the following 

apply: 

(a) Any wall of the module that forms 

part of the boundary of the reduced 

cargo compartment, subject to direct 

flame impingement from a fire in the 

cargo compartment, and that includes 

any interface between the module and 

the airplane structure or systems, must 

meet the applicable requirements of 

§ 25.855 at Amendment 25–72. 

(b) When the CRM is not installed, the 

fire-protection level of the cargo 

compartment must comply with the 

following regulations: 

• § 25.855 at Amendment 25–72, 

• § 25.857 at Amendment 25–60, and 

• § 25.858 at Amendment 25–54. 

(c) Use of each emergency-evacuation 

route must not require occupants of the 

CRM to enter the cargo compartment to 

allow them to return to the passenger 

compartment. 

(d) The aural warning in Special 

Condition No.7 must sound in the CRM 

in the event of a fire in the cargo 

compartment. 

19. All enclosed stowage 

compartments within the CRM that are 

not limited to stowage of emergency 

equipment or airplane-supplied 

equipment (e.g., bedding) must meet the 

design criteria in the table below. As 

indicated in the table, this special 

condition does not address enclosed 

stowage compartments with an interior 

volume greater than 200 cubic feet. 

(Fire protection for such large stowage 

compartments would necessitate design 

requirements and operational 

procedures similar to those for Class C 

cargo compartments.) 

Fire protection features 

Stowage compartment interior 

volumes 

Less than 

25 ft 3

25 ft 3 to 

57 ft 3

57 ft 3 to 

200 ft 3

Materials of Construction 1 ............................................................................................................................. Yes .......... Yes .......... Yes. 


rwilkins on PROD1PC63 with RULES
15838 Federal Register / Vol. 74, No. 66 / Wednesday, April 8, 2009 / Rules and Regulations 

Fire protection features 

Stowage compartment interior 

volumes 

Less than 

25 ft 3

25 ft 3 to 

57 ft 3

57 ft 3 to 

200 ft 3

Detectors 2 ..................................................................................................................................................... No ............ Yes .......... Yes. 

Liner 3 ............................................................................................................................................................. No ............ No ............ Yes. 

Locating Device 4 ........................................................................................................................................... No ............ Yes .......... Yes. 

1 Material: The material used to construct each enclosed stowage compartment must at least be fire resistant and must meet the flammability 

standards for interior components specified in § 25.853. For compartments with an interior volume less than 25 cubic feet, the design must contain a fire likely to occur within the compartment under normal use. 2 Detectors: Enclosed stowage compartments equal to or exceeding 25 cubic feet in interior volume must have a smoke- or fire-detection system to ensure that a fire can be detected within 1 minute. Flight tests must be conducted to show compliance with this requirement. Each system 

must provide the following: 

(a) A visual indication in the flight deck within 1 minute after the start of a fire; 

(b) An aural warning in the CRM; and 

(c) A warning in the main passenger compartment. This warning must be readily detectable by a flight attendant, taking into account the location of flight attendants throughout the main passenger compartment during various phases of flight. 3 Liner: If the material used to construct the stowage compartment meets the flammability requirements of a liner for a Class B cargo compartment, then no liner would be required for enclosed stowage compartments equal to or greater than 25 cubic but less than 57 cubic feet in interior 

volume. For those enclosed stowage compartments the interior volume of which is equal to or greater than 57 cubic feet, but less than or equal 

to 200 cubic feet, the liner must meet the requirements of § 25.855 at Amendment 25–72 for a Class B cargo compartment. 4 Location Detector: Crew-rest areas that contain enclosed stowage compartments interior volumes of which exceed 25 cubic feet, and that are 

located away from one central location, such as the entry to the CRM or a common area within the CRM, would require additional fire-protection 

devices to assist the firefighter in determining the location of a fire. 

Issued in Renton, Washington, on March 

31, 2009. 

Stephen P. Boyd, 

Acting Manager, Transport Airplane 

Directorate, Aircraft Certification Service. 

[FR Doc. E9–7901 Filed 4–7–09; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 4910–13–P 

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION 

Federal Aviation Administration 

14 CFR Part 25 

[Docket No. NM395; Special Conditions No. 

25–379–SC] 

Special Conditions: Dassault Falcon 

2000 Series Airplanes; Aircell Airborne 

Satcom Equipment Consisting of a 

Wireless Handset and Associated Base 

Station, With Lithium Battery 

Installations 

AGENCY: Federal Aviation 

Administration (FAA), DOT. 

ACTION: Final special conditions. 

SUMMARY: These special conditions are 

issued for the Dassault Falcon 2000 

series airplanes. These airplanes, as 

modified by Aircell LLC, will have a 

novel or unusual design feature 

associated with the Aircell airborne 

satcom equipment (ASE) which use 

lithium battery technology. The 

applicable airworthiness regulations do 

not contain adequate or appropriate 

safety standards for this design feature. 

These special conditions contain the 

additional safety standards that the 

Administrator considers necessary to 

establish a level of safety equivalent to 

that established by the existing 

airworthiness standards. 

DATES: Effective Date: May 8, 2009. 

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: 

Nazih Khaouly, FAA, Airplane and 

Flight Crew Interface Branch, ANM– 

111, Transport Airplane Directorate, 

Aircraft Certification Service, 1601 Lind 

Avenue, SW., Renton, Washington 

98057–3356; telephone (425) 227–2432; 

facsimile (425) 227–1149. 

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: 

Background 

On March 15, 2007, Aircell LLC, 

applied for a type design change to an 

existing STC (ST01388WI–D), to install 

additional equipment on Dassault 

Falcon 2000 series airplanes. This 

installation adds components to the 

existing airplane installation to include 

a low power Wi-Fi handset containing 

a single cell lithium polymer 

rechargeable battery. The battery 

identified for application in this design 

is a low capacity, single cell lithium 

polymer rechargeable battery, with a 

nominal capacity of 1400mAh and a 

nominal voltage of 3.7V. The battery has 

a weight of 26.5 grams. The battery has 

been Underwriters Laboratories, Inc. 

(UL) tested and qualified by DO–160E in 

the Aircell handset (P12857). The 

design is supported by a System Safety 

Assessment/Functional Hazard 

Assessment (SSA/FHA) analysis. The 

Aircell Wi-Fi handset, which is a 

component of the Aircell ASE, consists 

of a wireless handset and associated 

base station (cradle and charging unit), 

both with protective circuits and fuse 

devices which provide multiple levels 

of redundant protection from hazards, 

such as overcharging or discharging. 

The lithium battery is installed in the 

handset. 

A lithium battery has certain failure, 

operational, and maintenance 

characteristics that differ significantly 

from those of the nickel-cadmium and 

lead-acid rechargeable batteries 

currently approved for installation on 

large transport category airplanes. The 

FAA is issuing these special conditions 

to require that (1) all characteristics of 

the lithium batteries and their 

installations that could affect safe 

operation of the Dassault Falcon 2000 

are addressed, and (2) appropriate 

continued airworthiness instructions, 

which include maintenance 

requirements, are established to ensure 

the availability of electrical power from 

the batteries when needed. At present, 

there is limited experience with use of 

rechargeable lithium batteries in 

applications involving commercial 

aviation. However, other users of this 

technology, ranging from wireless 

telephone manufacturers to the electric 

vehicle industry, have noted safety 

problems with lithium batteries. These 

problems include overcharging, overdischarging, and flammability of cell 

components. 

1. Overcharging 

In general, lithium batteries are 

significantly more susceptible to 

internal failures that can result in selfsustaining increases in temperature and 

pressure (i.e., thermal runaway) than 

their nickel-cadmium or lead-acid 

counterparts. This is especially true for 

overcharging that causes heating and 

destabilization of the components of the 

cell, leading to the formation (by 

plating) of highly unstable metallic 

lithium. The metallic lithium can ignite, 

resulting in a self-sustaining fire or 


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