* The case is unanimously ordered submitted without o ral argument

pursuant to Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2) and 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. The court g enerally disfavors the citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order and ju dgment may be cited under the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3. F I L E D United States Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit APR 14 1999 PATRICK FISHER Clerk UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

TENTH CIRCUIT

ARTHUR J. ABELL, JR., Plaintiff - Appellant, v. BRUCE BABBITT, Secretary, Department of the Interior and ROGER KENNEDY, Director, National Park Service, Defendants - Appellees. No. 98-2315 (D.C. No. CIV-95-942-JC) (District of New Mexico)

ORDER AND JUDGMENT *

Before BRORBY , EBEL and LUCERO , Circuit Judges.

Arthur J. Abell, Jr., pro se, appeals the district court’s grant of summary judgment for defendant the National Park Service (“NPS”) on his claims under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (“ADEA”), 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634, and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“Tit le VII”), 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e--2-

2000e-17. Abell also argues that the district court erred by allowing six separate attorneys to withdraw as his counsel and by denyinghis motion to extend the deadline for discovery. Exercising jurisdiction un der 28 U.S.C. § 1291, we affirm.
I In 1991 and 1992, Abell filed grievances with NPS against four of his supervisors for failure to evaluate his performance and offer him a permanent promotion. His relationship with his supervisors s ubsequently deteriorated, leading to his suspension for five days in November1992. Abell then filed two Equal Employment Opportunity (“EEO”) grievances in January 1993, alleging discrimination based on age and race. After he received a second suspension in February 1 993 and notification from NPS that he would be terminated in May 1993, A bell filed another EEO complaint in May 1993, alleging that his imminent t ermination was in retaliation for his previous complaints. He was terminated a m onth later. Abell then filed suit in district court in 1995 alleging violations of the ADEA and Title VII.
II Even construed liberally, as we must do with pro se litigants, see Hughes v. Rowe , 449 U.S. 5, 9-10 (1980), Abell’s brief provides n either a legal nor factual basis for reversing the district court’s grant of s ummary judgment to NPS. He1 The district court found that Abell did not allege age, sex, or race

discrimination allegations in any of his pre-1993 g rievances. Therefore, the court concluded, only those adverse employment actions oc curring on or after his initial EEO complaint on January 29, 1993, were rel evant under Title VII. -3- identifies no evidence in the record to show that e mployees who were either younger or of a different race or sex received favo rable treatment from his employer. See Beaird v. Seagate Tech. Inc. , 145 F.3d 1159, 1165 (10th Cir.), cert. denied , 119 S. CT. 617 (1998) (citing Ingels v. Thiokol Corp. , 42 F.3d 616, 621 (10th Cir. 1994)) (holding that plaintiff in di scrimination case can show employer’s intent to discriminate against member of protected class through circumstantial evidence of less favorable treatment ). Furthermore, the district court correctly found that even if Abell had established a prima facie case of age, sex, or race discrimination, he failed to rebut appellees’ evidence of legitimate, nondiscrim inatory reasons for their actions. See Randle v. City of Aurora , 69 F.3d 441, 451 (10th Cir. 1995). Because we agree with the district court’s findings and reasoning, and because appellant gives us no reason to hold otherwise, we affirm the dismissal of his ADEA and Title VII claims of age, sex, and race dis crimination. The district court also summarily dismissed Abell’s Title VII retaliation claim because he neither presented direct evidence that his suspension and termination in 1993 1 were in retaliation for his protected opposition t o Title VII-4-

discrimination or participation in a Title VII proc eeding, nor established an inference of retaliation. Abell did show that NPS terminated him one month af ter he filed his EEO complaint alleging discrimination. “We have recognized that protected conduct closely followed by adverse actio n may justify an inference of retaliatory motive.” Marx v. Schnuck Markets, Inc. , 76 F.3d 324, 329 (10th Cir. 1996)

. But we have also said that where discipline had beg un prior to protected action, further disciplinary action “simply complet ed the disciplinary process already set in motion,” and does not necessarily le ad to an inference of retaliatory motive. Morgan v. Hilti, Inc. , 108 F.3d 1319, 1324 (10th Cir. 1997). In rejecti ng Abell’s retaliation claim, the district court foundthat his termination was a culmination of disciplinary actions that NPS had in itiated against him before his initial EEO filing. Because Abell again fails to c hallenge the district court’s careful findings and reasoning, we affirm. III Appellant argues that the district court abused its discretion in allowing six successive attorneys to withdraw from representing him. “The grant or denial of an attorney’s motion to withdraw in a civil case is a matter addressed to the discretion of the trial court and will be reversed on appeal only when the trial court has abused its discretion.” Washington v. Sherwin Real Estate, Inc. , 694 F.2d 1081, 1087 (7th Cir. 1982). The record before us shows that in seeking to-5-

withdraw, at least three of appellant’s former atto rneys cited either irreconcilable differences with their client or their inability to advance his claims against NPS in good faith. Their withdrawal caused delays thataffected both parties as well as the court. Other than his generalized complaint s of prejudice, Abell fails to provide any evidence or make any legal argument to support his claim that the district court abused its discretion in allowing co unsel to withdraw their representation. We review the denial of appellant’s motions to comp el discovery and extend the discovery deadline for abuse of discretion. See GWN Petroleum Corp. v. OK-TEX Oil & Gas, Inc. , 998 F.2d 853, 858 (10th Cir. 1993). The record shows that both Abell and NPS complained to the dis trict court that the opposing side was delaying the discovery process. Abell mak es generalized claims of prejudice that we conclude are without merit. He a lso argues that NPS should have provided him with twenty affidavits from its e mployees that NPS attached to its motion for summary judgment. These affidavi ts are not part of the discovery process, and are protected by the attorne y-client and attorney work product privileges. Moreover, Abell fails to expla in why he could not depose these witnesses himself. Having reviewed the recor d, we conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion in deny ing Abell’s discovery request. IV-6-

For these reasons, we AFFIRM. The mandate shall issue forthwith. ENTERED FOR THE COURT

Carlos F. Lucero Circuit Judge