*

Honorable Arthur L. Alarcon, Senior U.S. Circuit Judge for the Ninth Circuit, sitting by designation. 

 1

We do not decide whether a defendant who has satisfied the requirement of section 5C1.2(5) is entitled

to a reduction for acceptance of responsibility: That issue is not before us. 

 2

Section 5C1.2(5) requires the defendant to "truthfully provide[ ] to the Government all information and

evidence the defendant has concerning the offense or offenses that were part of the same course of conduct

UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

Giovani YATE, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 97-5155.

United States Court of Appeals,

Eleventh Circuit.

May 24, 1999.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida. (No. 97-25-CR-JAL), Joan

A. Lenard, Judge.

Before EDMONDSON and MARCUS, Circuit Judges, and ALARCON*

, Senior Circuit Judge.

PER CURIAM:

Defendant Giovani Yate appeals his 120-month sentence for conspiracy to import cocaine in violation

of 21 U.S.C. § 963.

This case presents the issue of whether a sentencing court's finding that a defendant has truthfully

admitted the conduct comprising the offense of conviction for purposes of an acceptance-of-responsibility

reduction under U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1, is incompatible with a finding that the defendant has failed to satisfy the

requirement of U.S.S.G. § 5C1.2(5) that the defendant truthfully disclose to the government all information

and evidence that he has about the offense and all relevant conduct.

A sentencing court's conclusion that a defendant accepted responsibility under section 3E1.1 does

not preclude a finding that the defendant has failed to meet the affirmative-disclosure requirement of section

5C1.2(5):1

 briefly stated, section 5C1.2(5) is a "tell-all " provision, demanding a different kind of disclosure

than section 3E1.1 demands.2

 See United States v. Sabir, 117 F.3d 750, 752 (3d Cir.1997) ("[T]he acceptance
or of a common scheme or plan[.]" In contrast, for an acceptance-of-responsibility reduction, "a defendant

is not required to volunteer, or affirmatively admit, relevant conduct beyond the offense of conviction.... A

defendant may remain silent in respect to relevant conduct beyond the offense of conviction without affecting

his ability to obtain [the reduction,]" as long as the defendant does not falsely deny relevant conduct.

U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1, comment. (n.1(a)). 

 3

Yate's other arguments—about the factual sufficiency of his disclosure, a mitigating-role reduction, and

a downward departure—lack merit and do not warrant discussion. 

2

of responsibility provisions in the guidelines plainly do not subsume all of a defendant's responsibilities under

the safety valve provisions."); United States v. Arrington, 73 F.3d 144, 149 (7th Cir.1996) ("[T]he admission

of responsibility necessary to obtain a reduction under § 3E1.1(a) is not necessarily sufficient to satisfy [§

5C1.2(5) ]."); United States v. Adu, 82 F.3d 119, 124 (6th Cir.1996) ("[T]he fact that the defendant qualified

for a two-level acceptance of responsibility reduction under § 3E1.1(a) does not establish eligibility for a

safety valve reduction under § 5C1.2."). We therefore AFFIRM Yate's sentence.3

AFFIRMED.