2366 Federal Register / Vol. 83, No. 11 / Wednesday, January 17, 2018 / Rules and Regulations 

(2) For more information about this AD, 

contact Tom Rodriguez, Aerospace Engineer, 

International Section, Transport Standards 

Branch, FAA, 1601 Lind Avenue SW, 

Renton, WA 98057–3356; telephone: 425– 

227–1137; fax: 425–227–1149. 

(j) Material Incorporated by Reference 

None. 

Issued in Renton, Washington, on January 

5, 2018. 

Michael Kaszycki, 

Acting Director, System Oversight Division, 

Aircraft Certification Service. 

[FR Doc. 2018–00656 Filed 1–16–18; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 4910–13–P 

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION 

Federal Aviation Administration 

14 CFR Part 39 

[Docket No. FAA–2017–0141; Product 

Identifier 2016–SW–067–AD; Amendment 

39–19154; AD 2018–02–01] 

RIN 2120–AA64 

Airworthiness Directives; The Enstrom 

Helicopter Corporation Helicopters 

AGENCY: Federal Aviation 

Administration (FAA), DOT. 

ACTION: Final rule. 

SUMMARY: We are superseding 

Airworthiness Directive (AD) 2015–08– 

51 for the Enstrom Helicopter 

Corporation (Enstrom) Model F–28A, 

280, F–28C, F–28C–2, F–28C–2R, 280C, 

F–28F, F–28F–R, 280F, 280FX, and 480 

helicopters. AD 2015–08–51 required an 

inspection of the main rotor spindle 

(spindle) and reporting the inspection 

results to the FAA. This new AD was 

prompted by additional reports of 

cracked spindles and requires 

establishing a life limit and a recurring 

inspection. The actions of this AD are 

intended to prevent the unsafe 

condition on these products. 

DATES: This AD is effective February 21, 

2018. 

ADDRESSES: For service information 

identified in this final rule, contact 

Enstrom Helicopter Corporation, 2209 

22nd Street, Menominee, MI; telephone 

(906) 863–1200; fax (906) 863–6821; or 

at www.enstromhelicopter.com. You 

may view this referenced service 

information at the FAA, Office of the 

Regional Counsel, Southwest Region, 

10101 Hillwood Pkwy., Room 6N–321, 

Fort Worth, TX 76177. 

Examining the AD Docket 

You may examine the AD docket on 

the internet at http://

www.regulations.gov in Docket No. 

FAA–2017–0141; or in person at the 

Docket Management Facility between 9 

a.m. and 5 p.m., Monday through 

Friday, except Federal holidays. The AD 

docket contains this AD, the economic 

evaluation, any comments received, and 

other information. The address for the 

Docket Office (phone: 800–647–5527) is 

Document Management Facility, U.S. 

Department of Transportation, Docket 

Operations, M–30, West Building 

Ground Floor, Room W12–140, 1200 

New Jersey Avenue SE, Washington, DC 

20590. 

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: 

Manzoor Javed, Senior Aerospace 

Engineer, Chicago ACO Branch, 

Compliance and Airworthiness 

Division, FAA, 2300 East Devon Ave., 

Des Plaines, IL 60018; telephone (847) 

294–8112; email manzoor.javed@

faa.gov. 

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: 

Discussion 

We issued a notice of proposed 

rulemaking (NPRM) to amend 14 CFR 

part 39 to remove AD 2015–08–51, 

Amendment 39–18160 (80 FR 28172, 

May 18, 2015) (AD 2015–08–51) and 

add a new AD. AD 2015–08–51 applied 

to Enstrom Model F–28A, 280, F–28C, 

F–28C–2, F–28C–2R, 280C, F–28F, F– 

28F–R, 280F, 280FX, and 480 

helicopters with a spindle part number 

(P/N) 28–14282–11 or 28–14282–13 

installed. AD 2015–08–51 required 

conducting a one-time magnetic particle 

inspection (MPI) of the spindle for 

cracks and reporting the inspection 

results to the FAA. AD 2015–08–51 was 

prompted by a fatal accident and reports 

of spindles with cracks. AD 2015–08–51 

was issued as an interim action and was 

intended to detect a crack in a spindle 

and prevent loss of a main rotor blade 

and subsequent loss of control of the 

helicopter. 

The NPRM published in the Federal 

Register on March 2, 2017 (82 FR 

12308). The NPRM was prompted by 

additional reports of cracked spindles. 

Based on review of in-service data and 

a fatigue analysis, the FAA determined 

a life limit and recurring MPIs are 

necessary to reduce the risk of a crack 

developing in a spindle. We also 

determined the reporting requirement in 

AD 2015–08–51 is no longer necessary. 

Accordingly, the NPRM proposed to 

require an MPI of the spindle every 500 

hours time-in-service (TIS) until the 

spindle reaches its new life limit of 

1,500 hours TIS. 

Since the NPRM was issued, the 

FAA’s Aircraft Certification Service has 

changed its organizational structure. 

The new structure replaces product 

directorates with functional divisions. 

We have revised some of the office titles 

and nomenclature throughout this Final 

rule to reflect the new organizational 

changes. Additional information about 

the new structure can be found in the 

Notice published on July 25, 2017 (82 

FR 34564). 

Comments 

After our NPRM was published, we 

received comments from 50 

commenters. 

A. Support for the NPRM 

One commenter supported the 500- 

hour repetitive inspection proposed by 

the NPRM. 

B. Comments Regarding the FAA’s 

Justification of the Unsafe Condition 

Many commenters, including 

Enstrom, disagreed with the FAA’s 

determination that an unsafe condition 

exists and requested the FAA provide 

more information about the additional 

cracks that prompted this AD. 

Request: A few commenters noted the 

entire fleet has been inspected in 

accordance with AD 2015–08–51 and no 

additional cracks were found. Other 

commenters stated no additional cracks 

have been found in the area of a spindle 

where a failure could cause a 

catastrophic accident. A few 

commenters, including Enstrom, stated 

no additional cracking has been 

reported in the same location as that of 

the accident spindle. 

Other commenters requested the FAA 

provide information about the number 

of additional reported cracks and 

whether there is any correlation 

between cracks and manufacturing dates 

or suppliers. Enstrom stated the cracked 

spindles discovered after the accident 

were manufactured between 1975 to 

1980 by two specific suppliers. 

FAA Response: We agree to provide 

information about the cracks that 

prompted this AD. Contrary to the 

public comments stating there were no 

additional cracks found by the 

inspections required by AD 2015–08– 

51, those inspection results revealed 34 

cracked spindle assemblies. The 

commenters are correct that the 

additional cracking was not in the same 

location as that of the accident spindle. 

The location of the additional 34 

spindle cracks was at the hole for the 

cotter pin securing the lamiflex bearing 

nut. However, we disagree that the 

additional cracks were not in an area 

where a failure could cause a 

catastrophic accident. A spindle 

assembly is a primary structural element 

and a critical part. Flight with any 

known crack is prohibited in primary 


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Federal Register / Vol. 83, No. 11 / Wednesday, January 17, 2018 / Rules and Regulations 2367 

structural elements including spindle 

assemblies. Regardless of the location of 

the crack, failure of a spindle assembly 

could result in loss of a main rotor 

blade. 

We agree with Enstrom’s comment 

that the cracked spindles discovered 

after the accident were manufactured 

between 1975 to 1980 by two specific 

suppliers. However, the accident 

helicopter had two cracked and one 

failed spindle that were manufactured 

in 1984 by a third manufacturer. The 

identities of the manufacturers are 

unknown. The parts were marked 

differently with a letter designation at 

the end depending on the manufacturer, 

but no manufacturing records exist to 

indicate which letter corresponds to 

which manufacturer. Therefore, no 

investigation could be conducted as to 

what manufacturing processes or 

specifications used by these suppliers 

may have resulted in the cracking. 

Accordingly, we cannot draw a 

conclusion as to whether the 

manufacturer and date range are causal 

factors in the accident. 

Request: One commenter questioned 

whether the FAA investigated the 

possibility that the cracked spindle 

resulted from improper maintenance 

action or procedures. 

FAA’s Response: As part of the 

accident investigation, the NTSB lab 

inspected the three spindles from the 

accident aircraft for any tool marks that 

might indicate an initiation point that 

was maintenance related. They were 

unable to find such marks. Based on the 

number of cracks found in the field and 

the fact that they were not all 

maintained by the same organization, 

there is no data to suggest that this 

resulted from improper maintenance. 

C. Comments Regarding the Required 

Actions 

Request: Thirty-eight commenters, 

including Enstrom, requested the AD 

not require the 1,500-hour life limit 

because it would be burdensome and 

unnecessary. Most of these commenters 

also stated that the repetitive 

inspections specified by Enstrom would 

be effective in identifying cracks and 

removing any cracked spindles from 

service. Four commenters requested the 

life limit be higher than 1,500 hours, 

and proposed alternative life limits of 

4,000 hours, 6,750 hours, between 8,000 

and 9,000 hours, and 15,000 hours. 

FAA Response: We disagree. The 

corrective action outlined in the 

Enstrom service information did not 

reduce the risk to an acceptable level. 

Consequently, we used the crack data to 

conduct a risk assessment in accordance 

with the FAA’s Rotorcraft Risk Analysis 

Handbook, Revision 3, dated September 

10, 2014. The accident investigation and 

inspection results from AD 2015–08–51 

show cracked spindles from 1,800 hours 

up to 9,300 hours (on the accident 

helicopter). A Weibull analysis 

identified a life limit of approximately 

800 hours. But the goodness of fit was 

not high as the times on these parts 

historically have not been tracked, so 

we assumed the part time to be the time 

on the airframe, which may not be 

accurate. We therefore applied an 

additional method to determine an 

appropriate life limit. We used 

inspection results as baseline data to 

conduct a fatigue analysis using 

standard fatigue methodology and 

scatter factors found in Advisory 

Circular (AC) 23–13A, ‘‘Fatigue, FailSafe, and Damage Tolerance Evaluation 

of Metallic Structure For Normal, 

Utility, Acrobatic, and Commuter 

Category Airplanes.’’ While this AC was 

written for small aircraft, its approach 

for establishing a life limit is 

conventional and was the most 

computationally valid method 

considered. This analysis resulted in a 

life limit of 1,500 hours. We also 

reviewed the potential for higher life 

limits, but these resulted in 

unacceptably short inspection intervals. 

For example, a retirement age of 10,000 

hours with an initial inspection at 1,500 

hours would require repetitive 

inspections every 75 hours to maintain 

an acceptable level of risk. We rejected 

these short inspection frequencies 

because of the potential for increased 

maintenance errors. Additionally, we 

considered the life limit of 1,500 hours 

is similar to those for spindles used in 

other rotorcraft. 

Request: Twenty-three commenters, 

including Enstrom, disagreed with the 

compliance time for the 500-hour initial 

inspection. To support this 

disagreement, most of these commenters 

stated no cracks have been reported on 

spindles with less than 1,800 hours TIS. 

The commenters requested that the AD 

require the initial inspection within 

1,500 hours as specified in Enstrom’s 

service information. 

FAA Response: We disagree. While 

the commenters are correct that no 

cracks have been reported on spindles 

with less than 1,800 hours TIS, this 

factor is less significant than those 

discussed above. Standard practice in 

addressing fatigue and life limits require 

inspection intervals that provide two 

inspection opportunities to detect a 

crack before a life limit is reached. 

Because the FAA determined a life limit 

of 1,500 hours TIS is required for the 

spindles, it follows that at a minimum 

initial and repetitive inspections every 

500 hours TIS are necessary. 

Request: One commenter requested 

the AD require the spindle life limit of 

7,500 cycles instead of 1,500 flight 

hours. 

FAA Response: We disagree. All data 

considered and analysis conducted for 

this AD has been determined using 

flight hours. The commenter states he 

used figure AC 27 MG 11–9 from AC 

27–1B, ‘‘Certification of Normal 

Category Rotorcraft,’’ for his conversion. 

The spectrum in that figure is an 

example and therefore we do not find 

the commenter’s conversion the most 

appropriate in this case. 

Request: Two commenters disagreed 

with the AD because of the service 

history of their helicopters and 

Enstrom’s history in general. 

FAA Response: The fact that the 

individual helicopters owned or 

operated by some commenters have not 

experienced cracking does not negate 

the existence of an unsafe condition. 

The risk analysis used to support the 

requirements of this AD was based on 

in-service data reported as a result of 

AD 2015–04–51. This data represents 

the actual service state of the current 

Enstrom fleet, which is more accurate 

than the factors mentioned by the 

commenters. 

D. Requests To Allow Alternative 

Actions 

Request: Many commenters, including 

Airwolf Aerospace (Airwolf), requested 

the AD allow installing an Airwolf 

tension-torsion strap assembly (TT 

strap) as a means of complying with or 

terminating the AD. In support of this 

request, Airwolf stated that TT strap 

installation completely removes the 

threaded area of the spindle, leaving 

nothing left to inspect. 

FAA Response: We disagree. The 

commenter’s request is unnecessary. 

The Airwolf TT strap installation 

modifies the helicopter and the spindle, 

changing the P/N of the spindle, such 

that the AD would no longer apply. 

Request: One commenter requested 

that instead of a life limit, the AD 

require a visual inspection of the cotter 

pin hole at each 100-hour or annual 

inspection. No technical data 

supporting this request was provided by 

the commenter. 

FAA Response: We disagree. As 

explained above, the FAA has 

determined a life limit is required to 

correct the unsafe condition. Inspection 

programs alone are not sufficient to 

lower the risk to an acceptable level. 

Request: Four commenters stated they 

have already inspected the spindles in 

accordance with AD 2015–08–51. One 


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2368 Federal Register / Vol. 83, No. 11 / Wednesday, January 17, 2018 / Rules and Regulations 

commenter requested the AD allow a 

300-hour grace period for spindles that 

have already been inspected. 

FAA Response: We disagree. 

Providing a grace period within which 

to comply with a life limit essentially 

extends the life limit and would not be 

appropriate. 

E. Comments Regarding Costs of 

Compliance With This AD 

Request: Many commenters stated 

that the cost to comply with this AD is 

underestimated or inaccurate. These 

commenters stated the cost should 

include the costs associated with loss of 

utility; should reflect a replacement cost 

of $24,492 for three spindles; and 

should increase the labor rate. 

FAA’s Response: We disagree. The 

cost analysis in AD rulemaking actions 

typically includes only the costs 

associated with complying with the AD, 

which does not include indirect costs 

such as down-time and loss of revenue. 

The parts costs for this AD were 

provided by the manufacturer. We do 

not control any price differences or 

retail pricing. 

The labor rate of $85 per hour is 

provided by the FAA Office of Aviation 

Policy and Plans for the FAA to use 

when estimating the labor costs of 

complying with AD requirements. 

Request: Several commenters 

requested the FAA not issue the AD 

because the extremely high cost will 

cause small operators to cease 

operations. 

FAA’s Response: We disagree. 

Although the FAA sympathizes with 

owners and the economic impact this 

AD may have, it does not negate the 

need to correct the identified unsafe 

condition. The applicable spindles in 

this design are critical for safe flight. 

FAA’s Determination 

We have reviewed the relevant 

information and determined that an 

unsafe condition exists and is likely to 

exist or develop on other helicopters of 

these same type designs and that air 

safety and the public interest require 

adopting the AD requirements as 

proposed. 

Related Service Information 

We reviewed Enstrom Service 

Directive Bulletin No. 0119, Revision 3, 

dated June 24, 2016, for Model F–28A, 

F–28C, F–28F, 280, 280C, 280F, and 

280FX helicopters with a spindle P/N 

28–14282–11 or 28–14282–13. We also 

reviewed Enstrom Service Directive 

Bulletin No. T–050, Revision 3, dated 

June 24, 2016, for Model 480 

helicopters, serial numbers 5001 

through 5004 and 5006, and with a 

spindle P/N 28–14282–13, except those 

aircraft modified with tension-torsion 

straps. Both service directive bulletins 

specify sending the spindle to Enstrom 

for an MPI before the spindle reaches 

1,500 hours TIS, or within 5 hours TIS 

for those spindles with 1,500 or more 

hours TIS. Thereafter, the service 

directive bulletins specify returning the 

spindle to Enstrom for an MPI every 500 

hours. 

Differences Between This AD and the 

Service Information 

This AD requires establishing a 

spindle life limit of 1,500 hours TIS. 

The service information does not 

specify a life limit. 

This AD requires that the MPI be 

conducted by a Level II or Level III 

inspector or equivalent. The service 

information specifies sending the 

spindle to Enstrom for an MPI. 

This AD requires an initial MPI before 

further flight for a spindle with 500 or 

more hours TIS, unless an MPI has been 

done within the last 500 hours TIS. The 

service information specifies an initial 

MPI compliance time of within 5 hours 

TIS for a spindle with 1,500 or more 

hours TIS. 

Costs of Compliance 

We estimate that this AD affects 323 

helicopters of U.S. Registry. We estimate 

that operators may incur the following 

costs in order to comply with this AD. 

Labor costs are estimated at $85 per 

work-hour. Inspecting the spindles takes 

about 15 work-hours for an estimated 

cost of $1,275 per helicopter and 

$411,825 for the U.S. fleet per 

inspection cycle. Replacing a cracked 

spindle costs $8,164 for parts and no 

additional work-hours. Replacing a set 

of three spindles that have reached their 

life limit takes about 14 work-hours and 

parts will cost $17,500 for a total cost 

of $18,690 per helicopter. 

Authority for This Rulemaking 

Title 49 of the United States Code 

specifies the FAA’s authority to issue 

rules on aviation safety. Subtitle I, 

Section 106, describes the authority of 

the FAA Administrator. Subtitle VII, 

Aviation Programs, describes in more 

detail the scope of the Agency’s 

authority. 

We are issuing this rulemaking under 

the authority described in Subtitle VII, 

Part A, Subpart III, Section 44701, 

‘‘General requirements.’’ Under that 

section, Congress charges the FAA with 

promoting safe flight of civil aircraft in 

air commerce by prescribing regulations 

for practices, methods, and procedures 

the Administrator finds necessary for 

safety in air commerce. This regulation 

is within the scope of that authority 

because it addresses an unsafe condition 

that is likely to exist or develop on 

products identified in this rulemaking 

action. 

Regulatory Findings 

We have determined that this AD will 

not have federalism implications under 

Executive Order 13132. This AD will 

not have a substantial direct effect on 

the States, on the relationship between 

the national government and the States, 

or on the distribution of power and 

responsibilities among the various 

levels of government. 

For the reasons discussed above, I 

certify that this AD: 

(1) Is not a ‘‘significant regulatory 

action’’ under Executive Order 12866; 

(2) Is not a ‘‘significant rule’’ under 

DOT Regulatory Policies and Procedures 

(44 FR 11034, February 26, 1979); 

(3) Will not affect intrastate aviation 

in Alaska to the extent that a regulatory 

distinction is required; and 

(4) Will not have a significant 

economic impact, positive or negative, 

on a substantial number of small entities 

under the criteria of the Regulatory 

Flexibility Act. 

List of Subjects in 14 CFR Part 39 

Air transportation, Aircraft, Aviation 

safety, Incorporation by reference, 

Safety. 

Adoption of the Amendment 

Accordingly, under the authority 

delegated to me by the Administrator, 

the FAA amends 14 CFR part 39 as 

follows: 

PART 39—AIRWORTHINESS 

DIRECTIVES 

■ 1. The authority citation for part 39 

continues to read as follows: 

Authority: 49 U.S.C. 106(g), 40113, 44701. 

§ 39.13 [Amended] 

■ 2. The FAA amends § 39.13 by 

removing Airworthiness Directive (AD) 

2015–08–51, Amendment 39–18160 (80 

FR 28172, May 18, 2015), and adding 

the following new AD: 

2018–02–01 The Enstrom Helicopter 

Corporation (Enstrom): Amendment 39– 

19154; Docket No. FAA–2017–0141; 

Product Identifier 2016–SW–067–AD. 

(a) Applicability 

This AD applies to Enstrom Model F–28A, 

280, F–28C, F–28C–2, F–28C–2R, 280C, F– 

28F, F–28F–R, 280F, and 280FX helicopters, 

all serial numbers; and Enstrom Model 480 

helicopters, serial numbers 5001 through 

5006; with a main rotor spindle (spindle) part 

number (P/N) 28–14282–11 or 28–14282–13, 

installed, certificated in any category. 


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1We originally adopted the Filer Manual on April 

1, 1993, with an effective date of April 26, 1993. 

Release No. 33–6986 (April 1, 1993) [58 FR 18638]. 

We implemented the most recent update to the Filer 

Manual on September 13, 2017. See Release No. 33– 

10413 (September 13, 2017) [82 FR 45434]. 

2See Rule 301 of Regulation S–T (17 CFR 

232.301). 

3See Release No. 33–10385 (July 6, 2017) [82 FR 

35062] (implementing revisions to reflect EDGAR 

Release 17.2. For additional history of EDGAR Filer 

Manual revisions, please see the citations therein). 

4The Commission previously adopted 

amendments requiring registrants to include a 

hyperlink to each exhibit listed in the exhibit index 

of certain filings, including filings on Form 10–D. 

See Release Nos. 33–10322, 34–80132 (March 1, 

2017) [82 FR 14130 (March 17, 2017)]. 

(b) Unsafe Condition 

This AD defines the unsafe condition as a 

crack in a spindle, which, if not detected, 

could result in loss of a main rotor blade and 

subsequent loss of control of the helicopter. 

(c) Affected ADs 

This AD supersedes AD 2015–08–51, 

Amendment 39–18160 (80 FR 28172, May 18, 

2015). 

(d) Effective Date 

This AD becomes effective February 21, 

2018. 

(e) Compliance 

You are responsible for performing each 

action required by this AD within the 

specified compliance time unless it has 

already been accomplished prior to that time. 

(f) Required Actions 

(1) Before further flight, remove from 

service any spindle P/N 28–14282–11 or 28– 

14282–13 that has 1,500 or more hours timein-service (TIS). If the hours TIS of a spindle 

is unknown, use the TIS of the helicopter. 

Thereafter, remove from service any spindle 

P/N 28–14282–11 or 28–14282–13 before 

accumulating 1,500 hours TIS. 

(2) For each spindle with 500 or more 

hours TIS, using the hours TIS of the 

helicopter if the hours TIS of the spindle is 

unknown: 

(i) Before further flight, unless already 

done within the last 500 hours TIS, conduct 

a magnetic particle inspection (MPI) of the 

spindle for a crack, paying particular 

attention to the threaded portion of the 

spindle. The MPI of the spindle must be 

conducted by a Level II or Level III inspector 

qualified in the MPI in the Aeronautics 

Sector according to the EN4179 or NAS410 

standard or equivalent. If there is a crack in 

the spindle, replace it with an airworthy 

spindle before further flight. 

(ii) Thereafter at intervals not to exceed 

500 hours TIS, repeat the MPI specified in 

paragraph (f)(2)(i) of this AD. 

(g) Alternative Methods of Compliance 

(AMOCs) 

(1) The Manager, Chicago ACO Branch, 

FAA, may approve AMOCs for this AD. Send 

your proposal to: Manzoor Javed, Senior 

Aerospace Engineer, Chicago ACO Branch, 

Compliance and Airworthiness Division, 

FAA, 2300 East Devon Ave., Des Plaines, IL 

60018; telephone (847) 294–8112; email 

manzoor.javed@faa.gov. 

(2) For operations conducted under a 14 

CFR part 119 operating certificate or under 

14 CFR part 91, subpart K, we suggest that 

you notify your principal inspector, or 

lacking a principal inspector, the manager of 

the local flight standards district office or 

certificate holding district office, before 

operating any aircraft complying with this 

AD through an AMOC. 

(h) Additional Information 

Enstrom Service Directive Bulletin Nos. 

0119 and T–050, both Revision 3 and both 

dated June 24, 2016, which are not 

incorporated by reference, contain additional 

information about the subject of this AD. For 

service information identified in this AD, 

contact Enstrom Helicopter Corporation, 

2209 22nd Street, Menominee, MI; telephone 

(906) 863–1200; fax (906) 863–6821; or at 

www.enstromhelicopter.com. You may 

review a copy of the service information at 

the FAA, Office of the Regional Counsel, 

Southwest Region, 10101 Hillwood Pkwy., 

Room 6N–321, Fort Worth, TX 76177. 

(i) Subject 

Joint Aircraft Service Component (JASC) 

Code: 6220, Main Rotor Head. 

Issued in Fort Worth, Texas, on January 8, 

2018. 

James A. Grigg, 

Acting Director, Compliance & Airworthiness 

Division, Aircraft Certification Service. 

[FR Doc. 2018–00659 Filed 1–16–18; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 4910–13–P 

SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE 

COMMISSION 

17 CFR Part 232 

[Release Nos. 33–10444; 34–82246; 39– 

2519; IC–32938] 

Adoption of Updated EDGAR Filer 

Manual 

AGENCY: Securities and Exchange 

Commission. 

ACTION: Final rule. 

SUMMARY: The Securities and Exchange 

Commission (the ‘‘Commission’’) is 

adopting revisions to the Electronic Data 

Gathering, Analysis, and Retrieval 

System (‘‘EDGAR’’) Filer Manual and 

related rules to reflect updates to the 

EDGAR system. The EDGAR system is 

scheduled to be upgraded on December 

11, 2017. 

DATES: Effective January 17, 2018. The 

incorporation by reference of the 

EDGAR Filer Manual is approved by the 

Director of the Federal Register as of 

January 17, 2018. 

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: In 

the Division of Investment Management, 

for questions concerning Form N– 

LIQUID and additional data submission 

protocols for Form N–CEN, contact 

Heather Fernandez at (202) 551–6708; 

and in the Division of Corporation 

Finance, for questions concerning the 

combined Form 10–D/ABS–EE 

submission protocols or the new CERT 

submission form type, contact Heather 

Macintosh at (202) 551–8111. 

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: We are 

adopting an updated EDGAR Filer 

Manual, Volume II. The Filer Manual 

describes the technical formatting 

requirements for the preparation and 

submission of electronic filings through 

the EDGAR system.1 It also describes 

the requirements for filing using 

EDGARLink Online and the Online 

Forms/XML website. 

The revisions to the Filer Manual 

reflect changes within Volume II, 

entitled EDGAR Filer Manual, Volume 

II: ‘‘EDGAR Filing,’’ Version 44 

(December 2017). The updated manual 

will be incorporated by reference into 

the Code of Federal Regulations. 

The Filer Manual contains all the 

technical specifications for filers to 

submit filings using the EDGAR system. 

Filers must comply with the applicable 

provisions of the Filer Manual in order 

to assure the timely acceptance and 

processing of filings made in electronic 

format.2 Filers may consult the Filer 

Manual in conjunction with our rules 

governing mandated electronic filing 

when preparing documents for 

electronic submission.3

The EDGAR system will be upgraded 

to Release 17.4 on December 11, 2017 

and will introduce the changes 

referenced below. 

EDGAR Release 17.4 will update 

EDGAR to allow, but not require, assetbacked securities filers to submit a 

combined Form 10–D and Form ABS– 

EE. The combined submission would 

allow filers to concurrently submit and 

create hyperlinks in Form 10–D to the 

Form ABS–EE exhibits incorporated by 

reference into the Form 10–D.4 The 

combined submission will be subject to 

a size limitation of 800MB, with 600MB 

for the Form ABS–EE submission and 

200MB for the Form 10–D submission. 

Corresponding changes will be made to 

Chapter 5 (Constructing Attached 

Documents and Document Types) and 

Chapter 7 (Preparing and Transmitting 

EDGARLink Online Submissions) of the 

EDGAR Filer Manual, Volume II. 

EDGAR Release 17.4 will update 

EDGAR to allow, but not require, 

national securities exchanges to submit 

a new certification form type on EDGAR 

to evidence the approval of securities 

for listing on an exchange. EDGAR 

Release 17.4 will introduce submission 


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