COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA

Present: Judges Athey, Causey and Callins

Argued at Winchester, Virginia

RICHARD REBH, ET AL.

OPINION BY

v. Record No. 0240-23-4 JUDGE DOMINIQUE A. CALLINS

MAY 7, 2024

THE COUNTY BOARD OF ARLINGTON

 COUNTY, VIRGINIA

FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF ARLINGTON COUNTY

Judith L. Wheat, Judge

Craig J. Blakeley (Alliance Law Group LLC, on briefs), for 

appellants.

Ann Mayhew Golski, Assistant County Attorney (Arlington County 

Attorney’s Office, on brief), for appellee.

Following Amazon’s 2018 decision to establish an east coast headquarters in Arlington 

County, the County Board of Arlington County (the “Board”) adopted the Pentagon City Sector 

Plan (“Sector Plan”) and its associated amendments that increased the height and density limits 

for buildings located within certain zoning districts in Pentagon City. The plaintiffs 

(collectively, “Rebh” or “Residents”) are eleven residents of two condominium buildings located 

just outside one of the zoning districts affected by the Board’s actions. Rebh filed a four-count 

complaint for declaratory judgment and injunctive relief against the Board, alleging that the 

Board’s actions are void ab initio because (1) the Board adopted the Sector Plan and its 

associated amendments without the necessary resolution and certification from the Arlington 

County Planning Commission (the “Commission”), in violation of Code §§ 15.2-2225 

and -2226; (2) the Board provided insufficient public notice of its proposed actions, in violation 

of Code § 15.2-2204(A); (3) the amendments violated the uniformity requirement under Code 

PUBLISHED
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§ 15.2-2282; and (4) the Board acted arbitrarily and capriciously. The Board demurred, and the 

trial court sustained the demurrer on all four counts. On appeal, Rebh challenges the trial court’s 

ruling as to the first three counts. We hold that the Board satisfied the resolution and 

certification requirement and the uniformity requirement, but the Board did not provide 

sufficient public notice of its proposed actions.

1 We therefore reverse the trial court’s judgment

and declare the Board’s actions void ab initio. 

BACKGROUND

Since 1976, the Pentagon City Phased Development Site Plan (“PDSP”) has guided 

growth and development in the Pentagon City area in Arlington County. RiverHouse is an 

Arlington County apartment complex located primarily in an RA6-15 Multiple-Family Dwelling 

zoning district and consisting of three buildings: the James, the Potomac, and the Ashley. The 

PDSP boundaries enclose a C-O-2.5 Mixed-Use zoning district in Pentagon City, and the 

RiverHouse property has not historically been considered by Arlington County (the “County”) as 

part of the PDSP. The Residents live in two condominium buildings—the Representative and 

the Ridge House—that overlook RiverHouse from the west and have iconic views of 

Washington, DC that are currently unimpeded by the existing RiverHouse buildings. 

In 2018, Amazon committed to establishing its east coast “HQ2” headquarters in 

Arlington County. In preparation for the anticipated growth associated with Amazon’s arrival, 

the Board entered into a memorandum of agreement with certain Pentagon City property owners 

in January 2020 to conduct a planning study to update the PDSP. During the planning study, the 

Planning Commission led a focus group to obtain input from various key stakeholders, area 

property owners, civic associations, and renter organizations. The planning study culminated 

1 Although the doctrine of judicial restraint would permit us to resolve this appeal solely 

on the public notice issue alone, we will address the other two issues for the purpose of resolving 

them should they arise again in future proceedings.
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with the County’s creation of a draft Pentagon City Sector Plan dated January 2022, which 

included proposals to amend the Arlington County Zoning Ordinance (“ACZO”), General Land 

Use Plan (“GLUP”), and Master Transportation Plan (“MTP”). 

On January 21 and 27, 2022, the Board published notice in the Washington Times 

announcing its proposal to adopt the Sector Plan and the amendments to the ACZO, GLUP, and 

MTP. The notice provided a one-paragraph descriptive summary of the proposed changes and 

announced that the Planning Commission and the Board would each hold a public hearing on the 

proposed changes. During a public hearing conducted by the Commission on February 2, 2022, 

the Commission voted unanimously in support of a motion to recommend that the Board adopt 

the Sector Plan and its associated amendments. On February 9, 2022, the Commission sent a 

letter to the Board summarizing the Commission’s actions during the February 2 meeting and its 

recommendations to the Board. The letter was signed by the Commission Chair. On February 

12, 2022, the Board held a public hearing on the proposed changes and voted unanimously to 

adopt the Sector Plan and its associated amendments. 

The amendments to the GLUP redesignated the GLUP map’s “Note #4” boundary as the 

Pentagon City Coordinated Redevelopment District (“PCCRD”) and expanded the Note #4 

boundary to include the RiverHouse property. The amendments to the ACZO created ACZO 

§ 9.6 governing properties located in the PCCRD and amended ACZO § 6.5, which governs 

RA6-15 zoning districts, and ACZO § 7.12, which governs C-O-2.5 zoning districts. Under 

these ACZO amendments, properties located in an RA6-15 or C-O-2.5 zoning district that are 

also located in the PCCRD may be developed in accordance with the requirements of ACZO 

§ 9.6. Under ACZO § 9.6.4., properties located in both the PCCRD and an RA6-15 zoning 

district—i.e., RiverHouse—may be developed to up to 150 dwelling units per acre and up to 350 

feet in height, and properties located in both the PCCRD and a C-O-2.5 zoning district—i.e., the 
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PDSP property—may be developed to up to a 9.0 Floor Area Ratio (“FAR”)2and up to 350 feet 

in height. The ultimate effect of the GLUP and ACZO amendments is a significant increase in 

the height and density limits for properties located in the PCCRD than would otherwise be 

permitted for properties located in an RA6-15 or C-O-2.5 zoning district in Arlington County. 

On March 14, 2022, Rebh filed a four-count complaint for declaratory judgment and 

injunctive relief against the Board alleging that the Board’s adoption of the Sector Plan and the 

amendments to the ACZO, GLUP, and MTP violated the Dillon Rule3and was void ab initio 

because (1) the Board adopted the Sector Plan and its associated amendments without the 

necessary resolution and certification from the Commission, in violation of Code §§ 15.2-2225 

and -2226; (2) the Board provided insufficient public notice of the proposed amendments, in 

violation of Code § 15.2-2204(A); (3) the amendments violated the uniformity requirement 

under Code § 15.2-2282; and (4) the Board acted arbitrarily and capriciously. In the complaint, 

Rebh claimed that the increased height limits for buildings on the RiverHouse property would 

obstruct the Residents’ views of Washington, DC and decrease the property values of their 

condominiums at the Representative and the Ridge House. 

On April 15, 2022, the Board filed a demurrer and plea in bar to all counts of Rebh’s 

complaint. The Board also filed a motion craving oyer requesting that the complete record of the 

2

“Floor Area Ratio” is a measure of the total building floor area on a site, including each 

floor, compared to the size of the site. 

3 The Dillon Rule is based on the principle that “local governing bodies ‘have only those 

powers that are expressly granted, those necessarily or fairly implied from expressly granted 

powers, and those that are essential and indispensable.’” Sinclair v. New Cingular Wireless PCS, 

LLC, 283 Va. 567, 576 (2012) (quoting Marble Techs., Inc. v. City of Hampton, 279 Va. 409, 

417 (2010)). Under the Dillon Rule, “[i]f there is a reasonable doubt whether legislative power 

exists, the doubt must be resolved against the local governing body.” Id. (quoting Bd. of 

Supervisors v. Reed’s Landing Corp., 250 Va. 397, 400 (1995)). “In considering whether a local 

governing body had authority to enact an ordinance, there is no presumption that it is valid; if no 

delegation from the legislature can be found to authorize its enactment, it is void.” Id.
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Commission’s February 2 and 9, 2022 actions and the Board’s February 12, 2022 actions be 

made part of the pleadings. On June 29, 2022, the trial court entered a consent order granting the 

motion craving oyer. On December 1, 2022, the trial court held a nonevidentiary hearing on the 

demurrer and plea in bar. By final order dated January 10, 2023, the trial court sustained the 

Board’s demurrer on all four counts. The trial court also issued a letter opinion explaining the 

reasoning for its decision. This appeal followed.

ANALYSIS

On appeal, Rebh challenges the trial court’s judgment as to the first three counts of his 

complaint regarding (1) the resolution and certification requirement under Code §§ 15.2-2225 

and -2226, (2) the public notice requirement under Code § 15.2-2204(A), and (3) the uniformity 

requirement under Code § 15.2-2282. In evaluating a trial court’s decision to sustain a demurrer, 

“[w]e accept as true all facts properly pleaded in the bill of complaint and all reasonable and fair 

inferences that may be drawn from those facts.” Glazebrook v. Bd. of Supervisors, 266 Va. 550, 

554 (2003). “Because appellate review of the sustaining of a demurrer involves a matter of law, 

we review the trial court’s judgment de novo.” Id.

Additionally, “[w]hether a locality has the power to act is a question of law subject to de 

novo review.” Berry v. Bd. of Supervisors, 302 Va. 114, 127 (2023). “Issues related to the 

interpretation of statutes and ordinances also are questions of law subject to de novo review.” Id. 

“When interpreting a statute or ordinance, ‘our primary objective is “to ascertain and give effect 

to legislative intent,” as expressed by the language used in the statute.’” Id. (quoting Cuccinelli 

v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 283 Va. 420, 425 (2012)). “‘[W]e determine [that] 

intent from the words contained in the statute’ or ordinance.” Id. at 128 (alterations in original) 

(quoting Williams v. Commonwealth, 265 Va. 268, 271 (2003)). “[W]ords in a statute [or 

ordinance] are to be construed according to their ordinary meaning, given the context in which 
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they are used.” Id. (alterations in original) (quoting City of Va. Beach v. Bd. of Supervisors, 246 

Va. 233, 236 (1993)).

I. Resolution and Certification

Code § 15.2-2225 provides that, upon approval by a local planning commission of a 

comprehensive plan or any part thereof, “the commission shall by resolution recommend the 

plan, or part thereof, to the governing body and a copy shall be certified to the governing body.” 

Code § 15.2-2225 (emphases added). In turn, Code § 15.2-2226 provides that “[a]fter 

certification of the plan or part thereof,” the governing body “shall act within 90 days of the local 

planning commission’s recommending resolution.” Code § 15.2-2226 (emphases added). A 

“resolution” is “[a] main motion that formally expresses the sense, will, or action of a 

deliberative assembly.” Resolution, Black’s Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019); see also 

Resolution, Webster’s Third New International Dictionary (2002) (“[A] formal expression of 

opinion, will, or intent by an official body or assembled group.”). A “certification” is “[t]he act 

of attesting; esp., the process of giving someone or something an official document stating that a 

specified standard has been satisfied.” Certification, Black’s Law Dictionary, supra; see also 

Certify, Webster’s Third New International Dictionary, supra (“[T]o confirm or attest often by a 

document under hand or seal as being true, meeting a standard, or being as represented.”).

Here, the Commission’s actions during its February 2, 2022 hearing, combined with its 

February 9, 2022 letter to the Board, satisfied the resolution and certification requirement under 

Code §§ 15.2-2225 and -2226. In its February 2 hearing, the Commission voted unanimously in 

support of a motion to recommend that the Board adopt nine attachments relating to the Sector 

Plan, ACZO, GLUP and MTP. In passing the motion, the Commission formally expressed its

will as a deliberative assembly, thus performing a “resolution.” And in its February 9 letter, the 

Commission recommended that the Board adopt the nine attachments, which were part of the
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official electronic record maintained by the County and were posted on both the County’s and 

Commission’s websites. In conjunction with the Commission Chair’s signature, the February 9 

letter was an official document sent from the Commission to the Board attesting to the merit of 

the nine attachments, thus constituting a “certification” of the attachments by the Commission.

Accordingly, the Board adopted the Sector Plan and its associated amendments with the requisite

resolution and certification from the Commission, and the trial court did not err in sustaining the 

Board’s demurrer as to count one of the complaint.

Rebh argues that the Commission’s actions did not constitute a resolution and 

certification because the Commission did not specifically use the terms “resolution” and 

“certification” in the February 9 letter, but this argument elevates form over substance. Code 

§§ 15.2-2225 and -2226 contain no language specifically requiring these words to be invoked by 

a local planning commission for its actions to constitute a resolution and certification to the 

governing body, and we will not read such a requirement into these statutes. Rebh also argues

that the nine attachments to the February 9 letter were not certified by the Commission to the 

Board because physical copies of these attachments were not attached to the February 9 letter. 

But Rebh again elevates form over substance. Code §§ 15.2-2225 and -2226 contain no

language mandating any specific manner in which a copy of the plan being certified by a local 

planning commission must be transmitted or made available to the governing body. We will not 

read Rebh’s preference for physical copies over electronic copies into these statutes absent any 

statutory language to that effect.

II. Public Notice

The version of Code § 15.2-2204 that was in effect at the time of the Board’s actions in 

this case provided, in relevant part:

Plans or ordinances, or amendments thereof, recommended or 

adopted under the powers conferred by this chapter need not be 
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advertised in full, but may be advertised by reference. Every such 

advertisement shall contain a descriptive summary of the proposed 

action and a reference to the place or places within the locality 

where copies of the proposed plans, ordinances or amendments 

may be examined.

Code § 15.2-2204(A) (2022) (emphases added).4

In Glazebrook v. Board of Supervisors, the Supreme Court defined the “descriptive 

summary” requirement of Code § 15.2-2204(A) as “a statement that covers the main points 

concisely, but without detailed explanation, in a manner that serves to describe an object for the 

knowledge and understanding of others.” 266 Va. at 554-55. The Court clarified that “the notice 

need not contain the full text of the proposed amendment, nor explain the proposed amendment 

in detail,” but maintained that “[i]f the notice does not cover the main points of the proposed 

amendment and does not accurately describe the proposed amendment, it does not satisfy Code 

§ 15.2-2204(A).” Id. at 555. The Court continued, “it is not enough to provide information that 

will merely direct readers to the physical location of the actual text of the proposed amendments. 

The ‘descriptive summary’ requirement goes beyond referral to the primary document.” Id. at 

556. The Court also remarked that “[t]here is no indication that the General Assembly expected 

affected citizens to engage in legal research in order to decide whether to participate in the 

hearing or to decide what their interests may be in a proposed amendment.” Id. at 555. 

Applying these principles, the Court held that a county board’s public notice that merely stated 

that “development standards” for certain zoning districts would be amended violated Code 

§ 15.2-2204(A) because:

No citizen could reasonably determine, from the notice, whether he

or she was affected by the proposed amendments except in the

most general sense of being located in a particular type of zoning

4 The General Assembly amended Code § 15.2-2204 effective July 1, 2023, to remove 

the requirement that a public notice contain a “descriptive summary” of the proposed action.

2023 Va. Acts chs. 506-07. Neither party disputes that the earlier version of Code § 15.2-2204 

in effect at the time of the Board’s actions in this case should control the outcome of this appeal.
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district. Nor could a citizen determine whether the proposed

amendments affected zoning issues that were of interest or concern

to the citizen. Given the number of issues subsumed under the

heading “development standards,” using that heading as a

descriptive summary fails to inform citizens of the universe of

possible zoning ordinance amendments in any meaningful way.

Id. at 556.

Subsequently, in Gas Mart Corp. v. Board of Supervisors, 269 Va. 334 (2005), the Court 

applied Glazebrook and held that a county board’s public notice containing a proposal titled 

“Provisions to implement the Conservation Design policies in the Revised General Plan” failed 

to satisfy Code § 15.2-2204(A)’s descriptive summary requirement because:

The name of the policies (i.e., “Conservation Design”) provides the

only clue regarding the Board’s proposed action. There is no

description or summary of the content of those policies, and the

notices do not indicate the particular areas of the County that

would be affected by the proposed policies. Clearly, the lone

statement fails to cover the main points in a manner that informs

the public regarding the content of the policies and the affected

areas of the County.

Id. at 346-47. The Court also held that the county board’s statement in the public notice that 

“most of . . . the western portion of the County” would be rezoned was also insufficient under 

Code § 15.2-2204(A) because:

In setting forth a description of the areas proposed to be rezoned, 

the Board failed to state any specific geographic boundaries or 

landmarks that would have allowed the public to ascertain the 

areas that would be affected by these amendments. Thus, 

landowners were compelled to try to determine what the Board 

meant by “most of . . . the western portion of the County.”

Id. at 347.

Here, the Board’s January 21 and 27, 2022 public notices contained the following 

descriptive summary of the Board’s proposed actions:

Adoption of the Pentagon City Sector Plan and its associated 

amendments to the General Land Use Plan, Master Transportation 

Plan, and the Arlington County Zoning Ordinance. The Pentagon 
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City Sector Plan (PCSP) includes an updated vision and planning 

principles for an area of Pentagon City which reflect current 

priorities identified by the community and builds upon earlier 

policy documents that have guided Pentagon City over the past 

decades. The Sector Plan defines conditions under which 

additional growth may be appropriate through an extensive 

development framework, design guidelines, and an implementation 

matrix that addresses subsequent efforts needed to achieve the 

Plan’s goals. Through the use of diagrams, exhibits, and narrative, 

the PCSP establishes expectations for urban design, public spaces, 

and community benefits of new development in a balanced 

approach that considers certainty and flexibility. The Sector Plan 

also provides new emphasis on equity, biophilia, and strategic 

improvements to the public realm that would be delivered with 

near-term redevelopment opportunities. The associated 

amendments to the General Land Use Plan (GLUP), Master 

Transportation Plan (MTP), and Arlington County Zoning 

Ordinance (ACZO) help establish a regulatory framework for 

considering major site plan applications in this area that will 

implement the Sector Plan moving forward. The GLUP 

amendments include an expansion of the Note #4 boundary, 

several land use designation changes within this area, and the 

addition of multiple open space symbols indicating general 

location of future public spaces. The MTP amendments expand 

the areas planned for new streets to coincide with the boundaries of 

the Sector Plan and reclassify a segment of 12th Street South to 

align with its intended purpose more closely. The ACZO 

amendments establish site eligibility within the two zoning districts 

comprising the Sector Plan area and establish a new special 

planning area which would correlate between the updated GLUP 

Map and the Pentagon City Sector Plan.

(Emphases added).

Rebh argues that the Board’s public notice did not satisfy Code § 15.2-2204(A)’s 

descriptive summary requirement because (1) the notice did not state that the proposed 

expansion of the GLUP map’s Note #4 boundary would include the RiverHouse property, and 

(2) the notice did not state that the Board’s proposal would include an increase in the height and 

density limits for buildings located in the geographic areas affected by the Board’s proposed 

actions, including RiverHouse. We agree.
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Under Glazebrook and Gas Mart, the Board’s statement that “[t]he GLUP amendments 

include an expansion of the Note #4 boundary, [and] several land use designation changes within 

this area” was not sufficient to either (1) notify the public as to what specific geographic area 

would be affected by the Note #4 boundary expansion, or (2) notify the public as to the manner 

in which this geographic area would be affected. The Board’s general reference to “several land 

use changes” is akin to the general references to “development standards” in Glazebrook and 

“Conservation Design policies” in Gas Mart that our Supreme Court held were not descriptive 

enough to inform the public in any meaningful way about the nature of the proposed changes. 

Glazebrook, 266 Va. at 556; Gas Mart, 269 Va. at 346-47. The Board’s vague reference to an 

“expansion of the Note # 4 boundary” is also analogous to the vague reference to “most of . . .

the western portion of the County” in Gas Mart. Gas Mart, 269 Va. at 347. By merely referring 

to an “expansion” of the Note #4 boundary without further detail, the descriptive summary could

not sufficiently inform a member of the public as to which specific geographic area this 

expansion would affect. To obtain this information—as well as information about the nature of 

the land use changes—a member of the public would have had to refer to an external document 

apart from the public notice itself, an action that the Glazebrook Court disfavored. Glazebrook, 

266 Va. at 555-56.

The Board argues that, under Glazebrook, Code § 15.2-2204(A)’s descriptive summary 

requirement does not require a county board to include every possible detail regarding its 

proposed actions and that such a requirement would be impractical. We agree with this 

argument in principle, as the Glazebrook Court made clear that “the notice need not contain the 

full text of the proposed amendment, nor explain the proposed amendment in detail.” Id. at 555. 

But here, the level of detail that would have been required for the Board to satisfy the descriptive 

summary requirement would not have imposed an unreasonable burden on the Board or required 
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the Board to include an excessive level of detail in its descriptive summary. To satisfy the

Glazebrook standard, the Board would have simply had to state that the “expansion of the Note 

#4 boundary” would “include RiverHouse,” since this is the only property being affected by the 

expansion. Further, the Board would have simply needed to indicate that the “several land use 

changes” would “increase the height and density limits” for the affected properties.

“If the notice published by the Board did not meet the requirements of Code § 15.2-2204, 

the Board acted outside the authority granted by the General Assembly and the amendments are 

void ab initio.” Glazebrook, 266 Va. at 554. Accordingly, since the Board did not satisfy the 

descriptive summary requirement of Code § 15.2-2204(A), the Board’s adoption of the Sector 

Plan and the amendments to the GLUP, ACZO, and MTP is void ab initio, and the trial court 

erred in sustaining the Board’s demurrer as to count two of the complaint.

III. Uniformity

Code § 15.2-2282 provides that “[a]ll zoning regulations shall be uniform for each class 

or kind of buildings and uses throughout each district, but the regulations in one district may 

differ from those in other districts.” Code § 15.2-2282 (emphasis added). “The crux of the 

uniformity requirement [under Code § 15.2-2282] is to assure that zoning regulations are 

nondiscriminatory.” Schefer v. City Council of Falls Church, 279 Va. 588, 593 (2010). “[T]he 

uniformity requirement ‘is in reality a statutory reaffirmation of the equal protection of the law 

guaranteed to all persons by the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution.’” Id. at 594 

(quoting Bell v. City Council of Charlottesville, 224 Va. 490, 496-97 (1982)). However, 

“[u]niformity is not absolute and rational regulations based on different conditions within a zone 

are permissible so long as similarly situated property is treated the same.” Id. (quoting Rumson 

Estates, Inc. v. Mayor & Council of the Borough of Fair Haven, 828 A.2d 317, 329-30 (N.J. 

2003)).
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In Schefer v. City Council of Falls Church, the Supreme Court held that, under Code 

§ 15.2-2282, a city was permitted to apply different height regulations for one-family dwellings 

on “substandard” lots and one-family dwellings on “standard” lots, even though these lots fell 

under the same R1-B zoning district classification. 279 Va. at 594-95. In reaching this 

conclusion, the Court found that “this case is . . . about two ‘kind[s]’ of ‘uses’ as contemplated 

by Code § 15.2-2282, that is residential use on standard lots and residential use on substandard 

lots.” Id. at 594-95 (second alteration in original). Thus, the Court held that the city’s different 

treatment of substandard and standard lots in R1-B zoning districts did not violate the uniformity 

requirement because:

There is no dispute that the City uniformly applies its building

height regulations for one-family dwellings on standard lots and

uniformly applies its building height regulations for one-family

dwellings on substandard lots in the R1-B zoning district. In

sum, . . . the building height regulations for one-family dwellings

on all substandard lots are applied identically, and those

regulations for one-family dwellings on standard lots are applied

identically.

Id. at 595.

Rebh argues that the Board, in creating new height and density limits for properties in the 

PCCRD with an RA6-15 or C-O-2.5 zoning district classification, violated the uniformity 

requirement under Code § 15.2-2282 by treating these properties differently from properties 

located in other RA6-15 or C-O-2.5 zoning districts throughout Arlington County. We disagree.

Here, the Board, by redesignating the GLUP map’s Note #4 boundary as the PCCRD,

expanding the Note #4 boundary to include the RiverHouse property, and creating new PCCRDrelated regulations in the ACZO, established new “uses” for the RA6-15 and C-O-2.5 zoning 

districts located in the PCCRD. Unlike the other RA6-15 and C-O-2.5 zoning districts 

throughout Arlington County, the RA6-15 and C-O-2.5 zoning districts in the PCCRD have their 
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own unique uses tied to the goals and purposes of the Sector Plan.5 Because the RA6-15 and 

C-O-2.5 zoning districts in the PCCRD have different uses than other RA6-15 and C-O-2.5 

zoning districts throughout Arlington County, the Board’s different treatment of the RA6-15 and 

C-O-2.5 zoning districts in the PCCRD does not violate Code § 15.2-2282’s uniformity 

requirement. See Schefer, 279 Va. at 594-95. The PCCRD-related regulations in ACZO § 9.6 

also apply uniformly to all properties located in both the PCCRD and an RA6-15 or C-O-2.5 

zoning district, further demonstrating that the Board’s actions do not violate the uniformity 

requirement. See id. at 595. Accordingly, the trial court did not err in sustaining the Board’s 

demurrer as to count three of the complaint.6

5 ACZO § 9.6.1 states: 

The purpose of the Pentagon City Coordinated Redevelopment 

District is to encourage mixed-use development of office, retail 

and service commercial, hotel and multi-family dwelling uses 

within the area designated as the Pentagon City Coordinated 

Redevelopment District on the General Land Use Plan. The goal 

of this district is to advance the vision of the Pentagon City Plan, 

including: A. The creation of a dynamic downtown for Arlington 

and the region, and a neighborhood where everyone is welcome 

and able to live regardless of race, income, age, and immigration 

status; and B. The redevelopment of Pentagon City that strengthens 

the entire 22202 community, diversifies housing options, and 

embraces biophilic design that makes nature a universal part of the 

everyday experience of the area.

ACZO § 9.6.3 states that the Board may permit additional height and density limits for properties 

in the PCCRD above that typically allowed for RA6-15 and C-O-2.5 zoning districts only where 

“[t]he development project helps achieve the Planning Principles specified in the Pentagon City 

Sector Plan,” “[t]he development project is consistent with other applicable policy guidance for 

the [PCCRD],” and “[t]he development project adheres to the development framework identified 

in the Pentagon City Sector Plan.”

6 Rebh also argues that the trial court erred in sustaining the Board’s demurrer on count 

three because the trial court erroneously determined that the Board, in amending the GLUP and 

ACZO, created two wholly new zoning districts in Arlington County. We conclude that “the 

best and narrowest ground for decision is the determination that the trial court reached the right 

result for a reason different than the one upon which it appears ultimately to have relied.” 

Vandyke v. Commonwealth, 71 Va. App. 723, 731 (2020).
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CONCLUSION

In summary, we hold that the Board did not violate the resolution and certification 

requirement under Code §§ 15.2-2225 and -2226 nor the uniformity requirement under Code 

§ 15.2-2282, but the Board violated the public notice requirement under Code § 15.2-2204. 

Accordingly, we reverse the trial court’s judgment and enter final judgment for Rebh, declaring 

the Board’s adoption of the Pentagon City Sector Plan and the amendments to the ACZO, 

GLUP, and MTP void ab initio.

Reversed and final judgment.