### TEXA S C OU R T OF A PPEAL S, THIR D DIST R ICT , AT AU STIN

NO. 03-0 8 -00 204 -CV

Cha r le s Hul l , A ppe lla nt

v. Abel Dutch Vidaurri , Appellee

FROM TR

AV IS C OUNT Y, COUN TY C OURT A T LA W N O. 2 , HO NORAB LE ERIC SHEP P ERD, JUDGE P RESIDING

M E M O R

A N D U M O P I N I O N
Charles Hull wa s involved in an automobile collision with Abel Vidaurr i. Vidaurri la te r s ue d H ull fo r i nju

ri e s and pr op e rt y dama g e su sta ine d a s a re su lt of the c oll isi on ; ho we ve r, Hu ll was not ser

ved until seve ral months a fter the statute of limitations had expi red. A t the conclusion of the trial, the jur

y found that Vidaur

ri was dilig ent in his effor ts to serve Hull and a

war ded Vidaurr i compensatory and punitive damag es. B eca use we ultimately

conclude that there was insufficient e vidence to support the jury ’s dilige nce de terminatio n , we wi l l reve rse the judg ment of the trial c ourt.
BACK GR OUND

On Fe bruar

y 19, 2003, Vidaurr i and Hull wer e invol ved in an a utomobile collisi on. As a re sult of the collision, Vidaurr i later sued Hull for neg lige nce. Vidaurri f iled his petition aroundDuring the trial, Hull a lleg ed that the petition was not filed until after the limit ations period 1 had run. H oweve r, the jury deter mine d t hat Vidaur

ri’s petition was filed w ithin the statutory deadline. H ull does not challeng e this determination on appe al. 2 the e nd of the tw o- y e a r s ta tut e of lim itatio ns . See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 16.003(a )

1 (We st Sup p. 20 08) ( e xpla ini ngthat in g e ne ra l, p e rs on

mus t br ingpe rs on a l- inj ur y c la im w ith in two y ear s of “da

y the ca use of a ction acc rues” ). Althoug h the ca se wa s fi l ed near the end of

the limit ations period, ser

vice of proce ss was not succe s s f

u ll y c o mpleted until approxi mately six months afte r the statute of

limit ations had run. Af te r H ull wa s se rv e d, a

tr ia l e ns ue d. Hu ll sti pu la te d to or din a ry ne g lig e nc e a nd

to proper ty damag e to Vidaur

ri’s vehic le. Afte r the pa

rties rested, the jury

awa rded H ull compensatory and punitive damag es and specific ally deter mined that Vidaurr i had made dilig ent ef forts to serve Hu ll. On c e the jur

y re le a se d its f

ind ing s, Hu ll m ov e d f

or a jud g me nt n otw ith sta

nd ingthe ve rd ic t, arguing, in pa

rt, that there was no e vidence that Vidaurr i acted w ith the requisite level of diligenc e. The trial c ourt denied the motion. I n its judgment, althoug h the trial cour t redu ce d the punitive damag e aw ard in orde r to comply with th e s t atutory

cap, see Tex. Ci v. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 41.008(b) ( West 2008), the court a war ded Vi d aurr i all of the re maining c ompensation
rec ommended by

the jury . Hull appea ls the judgme nt of the trial cour t.
DI SCU SSIO N On appe al, Hull contends, among othe r thing s, that the trial cour t erre d by concluding that Vidaurr i had made dilig ent eff orts to execute servic e of pr ocess be cause the evidenc e supporting that de te rm inatio n is le g a lly ins uf fi c ie nt. Whe n pe rf

or min g a le g a l- su ff

ic ie nc y a na ly sis , c ourt s mu st3

deter mine whether

the evidence presented w ould allow “re asonable and fa ir-minded people to rea ch the ver dict under r eview.” City of Keller v. W ilson , 168 S.W .3d 802, 827 (Tex. 2005). The e vidence prese nted is leg ally

insufficient if the rec ord shows “a complete absence of evidence of a vital fa ct,” if “the e vidence offe red to prove a v ital fac t is no more than a mer e scintilla,” or if “the e vidence establishes conc lusively

the opposite of the vital fa ct.” I d. at 81 0 (qu otingRob e rt W. Ca lve rt , “No Evidence” &“Insufficient Evidence ” Points of Error , 3 8 T e x. L . Re v. 36 1 ( 19 60 )) . B e c a us e this iss ue is dispositi ve, we need not a ddress the othe r ar g uments made by Hull. I t i s undisputed that service was not per formed until af ter the statute of

limit ations had run. See Te x. Civ . Pr a c . & Re m. C od e Ann. § 16. 00 3( a ). To pr op e rl y br ingsu it, a

pla int if f m us t file his petition and execute ser vice of proce ss on the defe ndant. Bo y att ia v . H

ino jos a , 18 S.W .3d 729, 733 (Tex. App.—Dal l as 2 0 0 0 , pet. denied) . Filing a lawsuit, on its own, will not “avoid the expiration of a statute of limitations.” Id. When service is not perf ormed until af

ter the limitations period ha s run, a plaintiff must justify the delay in service
. Se e Pr ou lx v . W e lls , 235 S.W .3d 213, 215 (T ex . 2007). I n other wor ds, a plaintiff must prese nt evidence conce rning the ef forts that he made to ser

ve the defe ndant and “to explain eve ry lapse in ef fort or pe riod of dela

y .” Id. a t2 1 6
. If the delay s are unexplained or “pate ntly unrea sonable,” the evidenc e “ma y demonstrate a

lack of due diligenc e as a

matter of la

w.” Id. ; see also Holt v. D’ Hanis State Bank , 993 S.W .2d 237, 241 (Tex. App.—San Antoni o 1999, no pet.) (stating that “unexplained delay constitutes a lack of due diligenc e as a matter of law”)
. I n other words, althoug h a dil ige nce determination i s ty pically a fa ct questio n , t h e re cord ma

y establish a lac k of dilige nce a s a matter of law. Ashley v . Hawkins , 293 S.W .3d 175, 179 (Tex. 2009). Althoug h the passage of time is an important fac tor to consider,4

courts must also cons i d er the “ove rall ef fort expended ove r the g ap in servic e, and w hether the
sear ch ce ased to be rea sonable, e specia lly when other

methods of servic e we re a vailable.” Id. at 181;

se e Pr ou lx , 2 35 S.W. 3d

a t 21 6 ( e xpla ini ngthat c ourt s mu st c on sid e r h owlong it too k p la int if f t o execute ser

vice a nd “the ty

pe of ef fo rt s . . . the plaintiff expended in proc uring service ”). I f the plaintiff did not exercise due dilig ence , “the law suit is dee med filed on the date of service .” Ho lt , 993 S.W .2d at 241. When assessing whether the plaintiff exerc ised the re quisite level of dili g ence , courts must consider “ whether the plaintiff acte d as an ordinarily prudent pe rson would have acte d under the same or similar c ircumstance s and wa s diligent up un t i l t he time the def endant wa s
serve d.” Pr ou lx , 2 35 S.W. 3d a t 21 6; se e Ho dg e v . S mi th , 856 S.W
. 2 d 212, 215 (T e x. Ap p. —H ou sto n [1s t D ist .] 19 93 , w ri t de nie d) . M or e ov er, the du ty of du e dil ig e nc e is conti n u o u s and ex tends until the date ser vice is executed. Taylor v. Thompson , 4 S.W .3d 63, 65 (T e x. Ap p. —H ou sto n [1s t D ist .] 19 99 , p e t. de nie d)
. I n a na ly zingthe se ty

pe s o f c a se s, c ourt s mu st bear in mind that it “is the re sponsibili ty of the pa rty reque sting service , not the proce ss server to see that service is properly

acc omplished.” Id. For the re asons discussed a

bove, Vidaur

ri had the bu rd en of de monstrating that he acte d with due dilige nce in his attempts to serve Hull a nd of prese nting evidenc e explaining the dela y in service
. Se e Pr ou lx , 235 S.W .3d at 215.

At the time this case wa s filed, Sara Parham wa s the lawy er at t h e law f irm
re pr e se nti ng Vi dau rri wi th p ri mary re sp on sib ili ty

fo r t he c a se . M uc h o f t

he te sti mony

re la tin g to service of proc ess per

tains to her effor

ts, but Parham did not testify
. During the trial, three witnesses testified re g ardingthe ef

forts made to serve H ull. The first was a n attorney , Chris Morg an, who ha d5

been hir ed by

Hull to repre sent him in an unrelate d matter. In his testimony , Morg an ex plained that his repre sentation of Hull en d ed s omewher e betwe en the middle of A pril 2005 and May

1, 2005,
a pp ro xima te ly

tw o mont hs a ft e r the laws uit in thi s ca se wa s file d. Th e se c on d w itn e ss w a s a pr oc e ss
serve r, B arba

ra Stinnet, who was hired by the l aw f irm repr esenting Vidaurr i. The final witness wa s Debr a F oster, who wa s a leg al assistant at the fir m repre senting Vidaurr i. The testimony of Morga

n and S tinnet reve aled that there was a signific ant per iod of time in which no steps wer e taken to e x ecute service of proce ss. I n particula r, t h ei r t estimony
e xpla ine d th a t th e fo llo wi nge ve nts oc c ur re d in 20 05 :

C Fe bruar

y 25: Sti nnet attempted to execute service at Hull’s pare nts’ home but was told t h at h e n o longe r lived there . Howeve r, Hull’s par ents did g ive Hull’s cell phone numbe r to Stinnet

C Fe bruar

y 26: Sti nnet enter ed Hull’s n am e into a databa se to try and find a no the r a dd

re ss at w hic h to se rv e him

C Fe bruar

y 28: Sti nnet attempted to execute service at the addre ss found in the data ba se bu t w a s to ld b y

the oc c up a nt t

hat he ha d ju st m ov e d in

the re a nd did no t kn owHu ll

C Marc h 1: Sti nnet contac ted the post of fice to de termine if Hull w as listed as re c e ivi ngma il at e ith e r o f t he loc a tio ns a t wh ic h sh e ha d atte mpt e d to e xec ute service

C Marc h 2 : Sti nn e t c a lle d the nu mbe r g ive n to her by Hu ll’ s par e nts a nd le ft a m es s age

C Marc h 3 : H ull re tur ne d Stinne t’ s c a ll a nd tol d he r to se nd the do c ume nts to Morg anA written c opy of the messa g e wa s filed as a n exhibi t in this case . 2 We note that in some of Stinnet’s testim o n y , s h e re fers to Vidaurri’s f irm rather

than 3 Parham individually
. Morg an’s notes r eg ardingthe phone c all wer e also submitted as an e x hibit. 4 See Tex. R. Civ. P. 11 (re quiring ag ree ment betwee n attorney s or par ties to be in writing 5 and to be sig ned and f

iled). 6 C Marc h 3: Parham ca lled Morg an and le ft a messa g e stating that Hull asked her to send the service documents to Morg an 2

C Marc h 4: Sti nnet ca lled Parham a nd left a me ssag e askingfor f urther instructions

C Marc h 10: Stinnet called Par ham ag ain bec ause she had not hea rd fr om her. 3 Reg ardingthe conve rsation, Stinnet stated that she fe lt th e s er v ice wa s “on hold” bec ause Par

ham had not dec ided how to proc eed

C Marc h 2 9: M organ cal led Pa rh a m and tol d h e r t

hat H ull ha d g ive n h im pe rm iss ion

to a c c e pt s e rv ic e on beh alf of Hu ll. During that conver sation,

4 Morg an and Par

ham discussed the n ee d for a rule 11 a g ree ment reg arding 5 the service documents. Morg an stated that he neve r re ceive d the discussed a g re e me nt o r a

ny pr oc e ss d oc ume nts

C Som e tim e a ft e r M a rc h 29 : Mo rg a n re c e ive d thr e e ph on e c a lls re g a rd ingHu ll, bu t he te sti fi e d that he did no t kn owwh o ma de the c a lls or wh e the r t he same person made all three calls. Reg ardingone o f t h e calls, he stated that he inf or me d th e c a lle r that he no lon g e r re pr e se nte d H ull a nd , th e re fo re , c ou ld not acc ept ser v ice f

or him. I n his testimony , Morg an indicate d that the conver sation descr ibed above occur red in the summer

C Ap ri l 22 : Sti nn e t c a lle d Pa rh a m and le ft a me ssa g e a sk ingfo r a

n u pd a te

C Mid April to May 1: Morg an’s r epre sentation of Hull terminate d

C May

1- May 5: Stinne t re c e ive d no tic e fr om the po st of fi c e that H ull wa s st ill lis te d a s r e c e ivi ngma il at hi s pare nts ’ h ou se bu t no t a t th e se c on d a dd re ss wher e Stinnet attempted to execute ser viceI n her te stimony , Stinnet st ated that a fter the service documents we re r eturne d, she made 6 two further

attempts to contact Hull on the phone
. Reg ardingthe first attempt, she spe cified that she called H ull and that when she was a bout to leave a

messag e, he cal l ed h er b ac k
. Fur ther, she explained that sometime after she answere d his call, he asked to place her on hold and that she hung up afte r beingon hold for a minute or two. Reg arding the second attempt, she stated that she tried to call Hull back a fter ha

ng ing up on him but that her call we nt straig ht to his voi cema il. St innet could not rec all whether

she had le ft a messa g e duringthe last phone c all. See Tex. R. C iv. P. 106(b) (allowing service to be executed in manne r other t h an by 7 deliveringdocuments to person w hen attempts to serve person have bee n unsucce ssful). 7 C May

1: Sti nnet left a

messag e for

Parham stating that she ha d rec eived inf or ma tio n f ro m th e po st o ff

ic e sh ow ingthat H ul l wa s li ste d a s a c tiv e ly re c e ivi ngma il at hi s p a re nts ’ h ou se

C Sometime on or befor e Aug ust 1: Stinnet rec eived a phone ca ll from a new attorney at t h e firm Vida

urri hire d. The attorney

informed he r that he ha d taken ove r the c ase, a

nd Stinnet tol d the new attorney that she believed that Hu ll h a d a g re e d to a llo w M or g a n to a c c e pt s e rv ic e on his be ha lf

C Aug ust 1: the new attorne y called Stinnet and infor med her that Morg an would no longe r acc ept service on behalf of Hull a nd instructed her

that she must now ex ecute service in person

C Sometime between Aug ust 1 and Aug ust 5: Stinnet ca lled Hull ag ain and lef t a messag e. Hull re turned h er ca l l and g ave he r an a ddress in Da llas for de liv e ry of the pr oc e ss d oc ume nts

C Au g us t 5: Stinne t ma ile d th e do c ume nts to the a dd re ss g ive n to he r b y

Hu ll

C Aug ust 25: The documents we re r eturne d to Sti nnet as “ undelivera ble” 6

C September 1: Vida urri files a

motion for substitut ed ser vice 7

C September 6: Stinnet executes substituted service a t Hull’s pare nts’ home
Th e te sti mony

of Stinne t and

Mo rg a n r e ve a ls that th e re wa s a sig nif ic a nt l a ps e in eff orts to serve Hull starting in March. A lthough Par ham left a messag e for

Morg an in ea

rly Marc h, the testimony

ind i ca t es that Parham made no follow up eff ort. I nstead, Morg an ca lled Parham8

approximately three wee ks later to discuss ac cepting service for Hull. Althoug h Morg an testified that he ag ree d to acc ept servic e for Hull, he stated that no service documents wer e ever sent. I n light of the pre cedingand in l ight of Vidaurr i’s burden to demonstrate his eff orts in further ance of ser

vice, it i s q ue sti on a ble wh e the r the Mo rg a n- ini tiate d ca ll co uld se rv e a s evi de nc e of dil ig e nc e by

Vi da ur ri
. As su min g fo r t

he sake of

a rgume nt t

hat Mo rg a n’ s c a ll o n Ma

rc h 29 c ou ld p ro pe rl y
serve as evidence of diligenc e, the testimony summarized above reve als a four-month g ap betwe en when Morg an ag ree d to acc ept servic e on beha lf of Hull (Mar ch 29) and whe n a lawy er instruc ted Stinnet to obt ain a c urre nt ad d re s s for Hull so that ser vice of proce ss could be executed in pe rson (Aug us t 1)
. Al tho ug h Stinne t re c e ive d inf or ma tio n f ro m th e po st o ff

ic e a nd ma de mul tip le c a lls to Parham asking for further instructions, Stinnet did not e ng ag e in any eff orts to serve H ull during that time and was not g iven furthe r instructions until Aug ust 1. I n fac t, in her testimony , Stinnet admitt ed that f ro m March 4 to Aug ust 1 she made no attempt to se rve Hull, did not c all Hull, a nd did not try to asce rtain his location. Moreove r, she testified that it wa s her impression that “the pa pers we re on hold” and that the “ hold” did not have a ny thing to d o wi t h t rying to a scer tain wher e Hull was sta y ing . F ur the rm or e , s he te sti fi e d th a t de sp ite le a vin g s e ve ra l me ssa g e s f

or Parh a m in

Marc h, Ap ri l, and May , no one fr om the firm re turned he r ca lls unti l severa l months l ater when the ne w attorne y called her and informed her that he had taken over the case . I n addition, a lthough Morg an did testify that h e o n l y re p re s ented Hull for a fe w more w eeks a fter inf orming Parham that he would acc ept
se rv ic e fo r H ull , M or g a n s ta te d th a t no on e e ve r s e nt h im a ny pr oc e ss d oc ume nts
. As summarized above, Mor g an and Stinnet mentioned seve ral phone calls t hat they
re c e ive d a ft e r t

he fi rs t g a p w a s o ve r. F or

so me of the c a lls , M or g a n a

nd Stinne t pr ov ide d th e date9

on which those c alls were made, but the y provided no specific chronolog ical information re g arding four of the phone c alls listed above. In particula r, Morg an testi fied reg arding three phone calls that he re ceive d conce rning Hull, and Stinnet mentioned a phone c all from a ne w attorne y at the firm Vidaurr i had hired.

Re g a rd ing tw o of the c a lls to Mor g a n, oth e r tha n sta tin g that th e c a lls re la te d to Hu ll, Mo rg a n p ro vid e d n o in fo rm a tio n a bo ut t he c a lls a nd

state d th a t he did

no t kn owwh o h a d ma de tho se
c a lls . In o the r w or ds , h e did no t me nti on

wh e the r he act ual ly talke d w itha ny on e or wh a t, i f
a ny thi ng , w a s d isc us se d dur ing tho se c a lls
. Ac c or din g ly , noth ing in his te sti mony c ou ld se rv e a s a basis from which the jury could rea sonably infer that those calls wer e made in further ance of ser vice of proc ess. Moreove r, although Morga n intimated that those two calls occurre d afte r he told Parham that he wo uld a c c e pt se rv ic e fo r Hu ll, Mo rg a n p ro vid e d n o in fo rm a tio n f ro m w hic h th e jur

y c ou ld deter mine if the calls occur

red in the four- month g ap, and no other evidenc e in the re cord makes any ref ere nce to these calls. Richard v. Turner , No. 13-08-00015- CV, 2009 Tex. App. L EXI S 6973, at *6-7 (Te x . App.—Corpus Christi Aug. 31, 2009, pe t. filed) (me m. op.) (conc lu d i n g t h at rec ord
e sta bli sh e d la c k o f d

ue dil ig e nc e a s mat te r of law an d noti ng that pl a int if f f a ile d to pr ov ide sp e c if

ic date s r e g a rd ingse rv ic e e ff or ts) ; see also City of Keller , 1 68 S.W. 3d a t 81 3 ( e xpla ini ngthat if circ umstances a

re e qually consistent with two fac ts, neither may be infe rre d). Reg arding the other call, Morg an stated that he talked to some one and informed that pe rs on that he no lon g e r r e pr e se nte d H ull a nd , the re fo re , co uld no t ac c e pt s e rv ic e on be ha lf of Hu ll. No spec ific date was g iven re g ardingwhen this ca ll was made. I t is worth noting that of the thre e phone ca lls mentioned by Morg an, this is the only phone call for whic h Morg an provide d testimony relating to the f

urthera nce of service of proc ess. Althoug h Morg an did not identify who the ca ller10

for the third call was, in l ight of Stinnet’s testim ony , the jury could re asonably

have inf err ed that the
ca l l er was a

n attorney

from the f

irm Vidaurr i had hired. Spec ifically , Stinnet testi fied that she
rec eived a phone call from a new attorney at the firm r epre senting Vidaurr i informing he r that he w as taking over the case and that duringthat call, she infor med the attorne y

that Hu l l had author ized Morg an to acc ept s ervic e. Fr om this testimony , the j ury could re asonably infer that Morg an talked to the new attorney . As with the ca ll to Morg an, Stinnet provide d no explanation r eg ardingwhen she re ceive d the ca ll.

Although no date was g iven re g ardingeither of the above calls, Stinnet also testified that she re ceive d a second call from the new attorney on Aug ust 1, in which the attorney informed her that Morg an would not ac cept se rvice for Hull. In light o f S t i n n et ’s testimony reg ardingthe second c all, the jury

could re asonably

have i n fe rr ed t h at t he two ca lls described a bove occ urre d during the four- month ga

p. Howeve r, other tha

n those two calls, the testimony summarized above does no t s u

p p o rt a n in f

e r e n c e th a t a n y a d d it io n a l s te p s in f u rth e r a n c e o f s e r

v ic e o f p r o c ess wer e made dur ing the g ap.

Mo re ov e r, the te sti mony

o f S t i nn e t r e v e a l e d t h a t de sp ite the fa ile d atte mpt s to e xec ute service on Hull in Fe bruar y , no attempt to execute subst ituted service was attempted until si x months later in Septembe r. Cf. Car ter v. Mac Fadye n , 93 S.W .3d 307, 3 1 4 -1 5 (Tex . App.—Houston [14t h D ist .] 20 02 , p e t. de nie d) (“ A fl ur ry of ine ff e c tiv e a c tiv ity

do e s n ot c on sti tut e du e dil ig e nc e if easily available and more eff

ective a lternatives a

re ig nored” ). The g ap in servic e and the decision to f org o substitut ed service until late September, if unexplained, would establish a lac k of due dilig ence as a matter of law
. Se e Pr ou lx , 235 S.W .3d at 216. Com

pa re Ashley , 293 S.W .3d at 180-81 (T ex. 2009) (explaining that evidenc e that plaintiff,P ri o r t o o ra l ar gu m en ti n t h i s ca s e, Vi d au rr i fi l e d a p o s t -s u b m i s s i o n b ri ef

co n t ai n i n g a 8 rec ent appe llate dec ision. Se e Lawr e nc e v . G e ic o G e n. In s. , No. 01-07-00873- CV, 2009 Tex. App. L EXI S 5082 (Tex. App.—Houston [ 1st Dist.] J uly 2, 2009, no pet.) (me m. op.). I n that case , the court uphe ld a jury

deter mination finding that Ge ico ac ted dilige n t l y i n serving L awr ence even though the re w as a g ap of eig ht or nine months betwee n when the c ase w as filed a nd when se rvice was e x ecute d. Id. at *10-11. In light of that case , Vidaurr i arg ues that he w as ac ting dilig ently
. 11 over e ight- month period, s ea rc h ed for defe ndant for 20 hour s was insuffic ient as matter of law), Ma ur ic io v . Ca str o , 287 S.W .3d 476, 480 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2009, no pet.) (holding that defe ndant
was e ntitled to directed ve rdict whe n no evidenc e wa s adm itted to ex plain thirty -one- day delay betwee n day

statute of limitations ex pired a nd date of s er v i ce ), Mitchell v. Timme rman , No. 03-08-00320- CV, 2008 Tex. App. L EXI S 9710, at *22 (Tex. A pp.—Austin D ec. 3 1 , 2 0 0 8, no pet.) (me m. op.) (stating that four- month delay in serving defe ndant constitu ted lack of due diligenc e as matter of law ), Zimmerman v. M assoni , 32 S.W .3d 254, 256 (Tex. App.—Austin 2000, pet. denied) (upholding jury deter mination that plaintiff was not dilig ent when he ser ved def endant fo ur m o n t h s a f

t e r f i l i n g s u i td e s p i t e e v i d e n c e t h a tl a p s e s b e t w e e n e f

f o rt s t o s e r v e w e r e re la tiv e ly
sm al l an d d espite re peate d attempts at servic e in per son and by alternative means), and Taylor , 4 S.W. 3d a t 6 5 (conc lud ingthat e ve n th ou g h mo st o f f our- mon th d e lay

in s e rv ic e oc c ur

re d w ith in limit ations period, fa ilure to explain delay re n dere d case barr ed by statute of limitations), with Pr ou lx , 235 S.W .3d at 217 (dete rmining that evidenc e of 30 attempts at servic e at f ive addr esses ove r
e ig ht- mon th p e ri od

a nd of hir ingof tw o p ro c e ss s e rv e rs a nd

tw o inve sti g a tor s wa s su ff ic ie nt t o c re a te fac t issue reg ardingdiligenc e), and Franklin v. Bullock, No. 03-07-00511-C V, 2008 Tex . App. L EXI S 6239 (Tex. App.—Austin Aug
. 14, 2008) (mem. op.) (concluding that there was fa ct issue prec luding summary

judgme nt reg ardingdiligenc e whe n evidenc e showe d repe ated attempts at service at var ious residenc es over three -month period). 8Howeve r, we believe Vidaurr i’s relianc e on this case is misplaced. I n Lawrence , al t h o u gh the g ap betwe en the f

ile date a nd service was long er tha n the delay in this case, ther e wa s no unexplained ga

p as larg e as the one pre sent in this case . When explaining t he delay in service , Geico showed that ther e wa s a dela y in the first two months beca use t he trial court did not issue the citation un til tw o mo nth s a ft e r G e ic o f ile d s uit de sp ite the fa c t th a t G e ic o s pe c if ic a lly a sk e d f or imm e diate citation. Id. at *3. Fur

ther, Geico presented e vidence that during the third month its process serve r attempted to serve L awr ence five times, re peate dly ca l l ed L awr ence , and found e ight potential a d dr e s s e s f

o r L awr ence . Id. a t *3 -4 . Re g a rd ingthe fo ur th a nd fi ft h mo nth s, Ge ic o s ta te d th a t it attempted to execute se rvice at t he eig ht additional addre sses. Id. at *4. Fina lly , Geico stated that in the seventh month it filed a motion to serve L awr ence by publication, that the cour t gr anted the re qu e st i n th e e ig hth

mon th, a nd

tha t th e no tic e wa s p ub lis he d f or fo ur we e ks sta

rt ingin t he nin th month. Id. at *4-5. I n h e r t e sti mony , F os te r d isc us se d th e a c tio ns Stinnet to ok to e xec ute se rv ic e of pr oc e ss 9 that we summarized above
. We n ote that no po rt ion of the fi le wa s a dmitte d in to e vid e nc e a nd that on a pp e a l H ull 10 contends that the tria l court er red by allowi ng in Foster’ s testimony beca use she ha d no persona l knowledg e of the efforts m ade in further ance of service on Hull. See Tex. R. Evid. 602 (explaining that witness may

not testify

unles s evidenc e is introduced show ing that witness has persona l kn ow le dg e of

su bje c t) . F or

the sake of a rgume nt, we wi ll a ssume that th e tr ia l c ourt did no t e rr in admitting F oster’s testimony
. 12

On appe al, Vidaur

ri attempts to expl ain the dela y b y re fe rr i n g to the testimony of Foster
. During the trial, Foster stated that she wor

ked for Parham—the attorney

orig inally

assig ned 9 to this case—at the time this suit was filed. I n her testimony , Foster admitted that she neve r had a ny direc t contact with Hull, Morg an, or Stinnet during the time pe riod in que stion. F urther, she testified that during the re levant time pe riod she wa s the assistant working on Vidaurr i’s file and e x plained that her te stimony

was ba sed in part on the note s in the file. 10 I n li g ht o f t he p reced in g, Fos ter

mad e sev eral general iz ed s tat eme nt s re garding e ff or ts that had bee n made in f

urthera nce of service of proc ess. Specific ally , she stated that he r firm tried to serve H ull severa l times, that the “attorney s” in the firm we re t ry i n g to serve H ull, that “many people” from the f

irm tried to call Hull “over many periods of time” but that Hull did not return anyI n her te stimony , Foster explained that Hull had instructed them to s en d the servic e 11 do c ume nts to M or g a n, bu t late r F os te r s ta te d th a t Sti nn e t w a s th e on e wh o told Parh a m to se rv e Hu ll throug h Morg an.

Fo s t er al so testified that Parham ha d made “ at least two” phone ca lls to Morga n. 12 Reg ardingthose communications, Foste r later stated that Parham had attempted to c ontact Morg an “by the proc ess serve r.” 13 of t h ei r ca lls, that Hull kept telli ng the firm to send the pa pers to Morg an, that se ve ra l a tte mpt s 11
wer e made to contact Morg an, and that Morg an said he could not contac t Hull. Se e Ri c ha rd , 20 09 Te x. Ap p. L EX I S 69 73 , at *6 -7 (e xpla ini ng that g e ne ra l st a te me nts re g a rd ingse rv ic e a tte mpt s do no t e sta

bli shdu e dil ig e nc e ). I n ad dit ion , Fo ste r e xpla ine d th a t Pa rh a m “ ha d to ” have ta lke d w ith Stinnet about serving Hull beca use Parham was aw are of the unsucc essful ef forts Stinnet had made. Finally , she stated that the f irm’s in-house investigator unsuccessf ully tried t o trac k down Hull by looking f or evide nce of

a pape r trail and that the firm attempted to deter mine Hull’s addre ss based on his cell-phone numbe r. 12

Ho we ve r, F os te r did no t pr ov ide a ny date s or fu rt he r d e ta ils fo r a

ny of the se a c tio ns . See id. I mportantly , Foster provided no testimony

from which the jury

rea s o n ab l y could have
c on c lude d th a t any

of the se a c tio ns oc c ur

re d d ur ingthe g a

p d e sc ri be d p re vio us ly , a s o pp os e d to outside of it. See City of Keller , 168 S.W .3d at 813 (a ddressing equal infe renc es). F or this rea son and in light of

the burde n on Vidaurr i to ex plain all g aps and de monstrate his d i l i gen t eff orts, her g e ne ra l te sti mony

that c e rt a in a c tio ns oc c ur

re d at some tim e is not e vid e nc e that th e y oc c ur re d w ith in the a ll e g e d ly im

p r o p e r g a p . A c c o r d in g ly , th e te s ti mo n y d o e s n o t e xp la in th e la p s e in s e r v ic e and cannot e stablish whether V idaurri wa s acting with the requisite leve l o f diligenc e. B y notAs de sc ri be d e a rl ie r, Stinne t te sti fi e d th a t a lth ou g h s he le ft se ve ra l me ssa g e s f

or Pa rh a m, 13 she had no communication with Par ham afte r Marc h 10 and that she left her last messag e for Parham on May 1. I n her te stimony , Foster testified that she re membere d seeingmessag es fr om Sti nnet.

14 providing evidenc e of the dates of e ffor ts toward s er vice, F oster’s testimony failed to prove Vidaurr i’s diligenc e.

Moreove r, F oster later

clar ified some of he r more g ener al testimony . For example,
a lth ou g h Fo ste r or ig ina lly state d tha t sev e ra l atto rn e y s and me mbe rs of the fi rm we re a tte mpt ingto
e xec ute se rv ic e , s he la te r a dmi tte d th a t th e o n l y a tto rn e y that sh e a c tua lly

re me mbe re d ma

kin g e ff or ts perta ining to ser

ving H ull was Parham. Similarly , althoug h Foster intimated that Parham wa s
c omm unic a tin g wi th S tin ne t, F os te r a dmi tte d th a t sh e c ou ld n ot r e me mbe r a ny sp e c if ic communication betwe en Parha m and Stinnet and that Parham ne ver infor med h er rega

rding any
c on ve rs a tio n th a t sh e ha d w ithStinne t. 13

Although in a

leg al suffic iency

revie w, cour t s m ay n ot substit ute their opinion on
cre dibilit y

“for those of t he jurors,” proper revie w “prevents jurors f rom substitut ing the ir opinions for undisputed truth.” Id. a t 8 1 6

- 1 7
. F o s t e r ’ s l a t e r t e s t i m o n y n e g a t e d h e r p r i o r g e n e r a l t e s t i m o n y, and jurors c ould not disreg ard the admission th at s h e o n l y rec alled Parha

m eng ag ing in se rvice
e f f o rts. See id. at 815 (e x plaining that when conduc ting leg al suffic iency revie w, cour

ts may not ignor e admissions that jury could not). We a lso note that Foster

g ave no inf

ormation reg ardingthe amount of time that the investigator spent try ing to tr ack down Hull or reg arding the amount of eff ort exerted in attempting to a scer tain Hull’s addre ss by using his cell-phone numbe r. Cf. Ashley , 293 S.W .3d at 180-81 at *12I n h e r dis se nt, Justi c e Pa tte rs on state s tha t “ the re c or d is c le a r t hat th e law f

ir m’ s in -h ou se 14 inv e sti g a tor wa s c on du c tin g a uto tr a c k se a rc he s” duri ng the fo ur -m on th g a p. Ho we ve r, no thi ngin t h e r e c o r d

i n d i c a t e s w h e n t h o s e e f

f o rt s w e r e m a d e o r h o w m u c h e f f o rtw a s e x e rt e d
. A c c o r d i n g l y, the jur y c ou ld n ot h a ve re a so na

bly inf e rr e d th a t th e in- ho us e inv e sti g a tor wa s att e mpt ing to l oc a te Hull during either g ap pre viously discussed. I n h e r te s ti mo n y , F o s te r s tate d th a t H u ll “ h a d li k e f iv e a d dr e s s e s a t t

h e ti me ” a n d

th a t “ [h ]e 15 was a very difficult puppy

to serve.” 15 (consider ing a

mount of time spent attempting to e x ecute service when deter mining whether

plaintiff was dilig ent). 14 I n addition to ref err ing to Foster ’s testimony , Vidaurr i also ref ers to the testimony

of Hu ll a s an e xplanatio n f

or the lap se in se rv ic e . In h is t e sti mony , H ull a dmi tte d th a t he wa s in ja il around the time that this case wa s filed, that he moved to Da llas afte r being rele ased, that he lived
a t va ri ou s a dd re sse s wh ile in D a lla s, and that he ha d sever al jobs while in Dallas. In light of that 15 te sti mony , Vi dau rri ur g e s th a t H ull ’s lif e a t th e tim e wa s n oma dic in n a tur e a nd that w e sh ou ld consider this whe n deter

mining whe ther Vida

urri wa s diligent in his eff orts to serve H ull. I t is true that courts have c o n s id ere d evidenc e that a de fenda nt has repe atedly

chang ed
re sid e nc e s w he n d e te rm ini ngwh e the r s e rv ic e of pr oc e ss wa s dil ig e ntl y e xec ute d. F or e xamp le , in P r o u lx , t he supre me cour t considere d evidenc e that a de fenda nt was ac tively

avoiding service by stay ing w ith various relatives. 235 S.W .3d at 217. However, the evidenc e wa s considere d as par t of the e x planation for w hy the plaintiff’s 30 attempts to execute servic e of pr ocess at five re sidence s
wer e unsucc essful. Id. at 215, 217.

I n this case, no evidenc e was prese nted that any service attempt was made during the four- month ga

p at issue. Due to the abs en ce o f evidence demonstrating e ffor ts furtheringservice during this ga

p, Hull’s testi mony

cannot se rve a s an explanation for why service was not16

acc omplished. Moreover , we note that Stinnet testified t hat t he delay in service was not due to an inability to asce rtain an a ddress for Hull. I n li g ht of the burd e n on Vi da ur ri to jus tif y the de lay in s e rv ic e a nd to d e mon str a te that he ac ted with due dilige nce in attempting to serve Hull, we must concl u d e t h at t he trial c ourt
err ed by deter mining that Vidaurr i a cted with the requisite leve l of dilige nce in attempting to serve Hu ll b e c a

us e ins uf fi c ie nt e vid e nc e wa s p re se nte d to e xpla in t he g a p in service a tte mpt s. Ac c or din g ly , w e su sta in H ull ’s iss ue on a pp e a l.
CO NC LU SION Be cause the evidenc e re g ardingdiligenc e wa s leg ally insufficient, we conclude that Hull was entitled to a dire cted ve rdict i n h i s fa v o r. There fore , we r ever se the judg ment of the trial court a

nd rende r judg ment that Vidaurr i take nothing from Hull.

David Pury ear , J ustice Be fore J ustices Patterson, Pury ear and Pember

ton Dissenting O pinion by J ustice Patterson; Reverse d and Rende red Filed: January

22, 2010