By Orde r of January

30, 2009, the Court defe rre d rulingon Mr. Squires’s motion for a 1 defa ult judgment to per

mit him time to document his actual damag es in support of a de mand for a sum ce rtain. When, as here , a plaintiff is per mitted to procee d in f

or ma pa up e ris , th e Court

is 2 require d to “dismiss t he ca se at a ny time [ it] deter

mines that. . . the ac tion . . . fails to state a c la im o n whic h r e lie f m ay be g ra nte d. ” 28 U. S.C. § 1 91 5( e )( 2) (B )( ii) . T he Court lib e ra lly construes both pa

rties’ pro s esubmissi ons. See H aines v. Kerne r , 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972) UNITED STAT ES DIS TRICT COURT F OR THE D ISTRIC T OF CO LU M BIA

) CHARLES B REWSTE R SQUIRES, JR., ) ) P laintif f, )

) v. ) Civil Action No. 08-1219 (RMC) ) LEROY BROWN, e t al

. , )

) Defendan ts. ) ) M EM OR

AN DU M OP IN ION In th is c ivi l a c tio n b ro ught pro s e , plaintiff Charles B rew ster Squires, Jr., sues L eroy Br own and Tr oy

McNish, both residents of N orth Carolina, for brea ch of c ontrac t and

“ int e nti on a l ne g lig e nc e ” ba se d o n th e a lle g e d b re a c h. Mr . B ro wn ha s n ot a pp e are d in

the c a se
an d a d ef au l th as b ee nen t er edaga i n s th i m . M r. M cN i s h , p ro ce ed i n g pro s e , mo ve s to dis mis s 1 the c omp la int

[Dk t. N o. 16 ]. B e c a

us e ne ith e r t

he c omp la int

no r M r. Squ ir e s’ s o pp os iti on re ve a ls
an esse ntial element of a

binding c ontrac t, i.e ., consideration, the Court will gra nt Mr. McNish’s mot ion to d ism iss , d e ny

Mr . Sq uir e s’ s mo tio n f

or a de fa ult jud g me nt a g a ins t Mr . B ro wn [Dk t. No. 27] and dismis s the complaint in its entirety pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915. 22 I. BACKG ROUND Mr . Sq uir e s a lle g e s th at he e nte re d into a ve rb a l c ontr a c t w ithMr . B ro wn “ to unconditionally

repr esent my

inventions,” and a

written contra ct with Mr. B rown a nd Mr. McNish “to g ive me promotional photo-shoots taken in De cembe r 2007.” Compl. at 1. Mr. Squires claims that both contrac ts were cre ated in the District of Columbi a, but he ha s not produce d the written c ontrac t. Mr. McNish asser ts that he met Mr. Squires through Mr. B rown, who was try

ing to he lp Mr. Squires marke t his inventions t hrough “a dig ital video disk (DVD) .” De f. ’s Mo t. at 1. Th e DV D w a s a lso int e nd e d to sh ow c a se Mr . Sq uir e s’ s “ c ha lle ng e s” a s a homeless man. Id . Mr. B rown re cruited Mr . McNish in Dec ember 2007 “to help cr eate a DVD for Mr. Squire s to send out to TV persona lities.” Id . The DV D was “ never completed . . . beca use [Mr. Squires] beca

me pushy and commanding .” De f.’s Mot. at 2. He nce, the Def endants “ have nothingto give [Mr. S quires].” Id

.

At so me un sp e c if

ie d ti me , at Mr . Sq

uir e s’ s r e qu e st, Mr . B ro wn a lle g e dly contac ted a c ompany

to “assist in making [Mr. Squires] a prototy pe of one of [his] inventions and promoting . . . the invention to companies[.] ” Pl.’s Opposition to C o-De fenda nt Troy McNish’s Motion to Dism iss [ Dkt. No. 25] at 3. Mr. Br own met with Mr. Squires in the District and prese nted him with a confide ntiality agree ment from the c ompany , Invention Support, Inc., which would have pr otected Mr . Squires’s rights to his i nventions. SeeDe f. ’s M o t . , At t ac h

. Al th o u gh Mr. Squires sig ned the a g ree ment, which also wa s signe d by a re prese ntative of Invention Support, he “re fused to allow Mr. B rown to pay the $2000 [or $3,000] prototy pe and lice nsing fee .” De f.’s Mot. at 1; Pl.’s Opp’n at 3-4. Rather, Mr. Squires thre atene d to sue Invention Support for bre ach of

contra ct base d on its pre-pa y ment require ment, but Mr. Br own “sa id he3

was not g oing to be part of the lawsuit.” Pl.’s Opp’n at 4. Mr. Squire s then “instructe d Mr. Br own to retrie ve all of my materia ls from the compa ny .” Id . A lle g e dly , M r. B ro wn a g re e d to do so, but he had not re trieved the materia ls at the time this civil action commenced on July 17, 2008. Id . O n Se pte mbe r 9 , 2 00 8, Mr . Sq uir e s f ile d w ithhis un su c c e ssf

ul m oti on fo r a de fa ult jud g me nt a g a ins t Mr . M c Ni sha bu lky no te bo ok c onta ini ngsk e tc he s o f h is “ Un iqu e Inv e nti on s” [D kt. N o . 6

- 3 ]. II. AN AL YSI S

Mr. McNish asse rts that “Mr. Squires wa s not [ ] t aken a dvantag e of . . . [,] has not been c heate d [or] lost money .” De f.’s Mot. at 2. At this pleadingstag e, a c omplaint may be dismiss ed for

failure to state a c laim upon a deter mination that the plaintiff cannot e stablish “any set of fa cts consistent with the alleg ations in the complaint” to support the alleg ed violation. Be ll At lan ticCor

p. v . Two mb ly , 550 U.S. 544, ___ 127 S.C t. 1955, 1969 (2007) (c itations omi tted);

se eHa rri s v . La dn e r, 127 F.3d 1121, 1123 ( D.C. Cir. 1997), cert. de nied, 531 U.S. 1147 (2001); Kow al v . M

CI Com mu nic ati on s Co rp . , 16 F.3d 1271, 1276 ( D.C. Cir. 1994). The c ourt nee d not
acc ept leg al conc lusions cast as fa ctual alleg ations, W arre n v . D ist

ric t of Colum bia , 353 F.3d 36, 40 (D.C. Cir. 2004), or “ infere nces dr awn by [t he plaintiff] if such infer ence s are unsupported by the fa cts set out in the complaint,” Kowal , 16 F.3d at 1276.

A bre ach of

contra ct claim nec essar ily depends on the formation of a contra ct. See Pa rk v . A rn ott , 1991 WL184521 * 4 (D.D.C. Jul y 14, 1992) (“ To state a c laim for bre ach of contra ct, a c omplaint mustalleg e that a c ontrac t exi sted, that plaintiff per formed its contra ctual obligations, that defenda

nt brea ched the contra ct, and that plaintiff suf fer ed dama g es due to the br e a c h. ” ) ( c itatio n o mitte d) ; Fowler v. A &A Co. , 2 62 A. 2d 34 4, 34 7 ( D. C. 1 97 0) (“ B re a c h isMr. Squires attac hed to the af oreme ntioned motion for defa ult judgment ag ainst Mr. 3 McNish a written agree ment purportedly signe d by

the par ties on Dec ember

1, 2007 that prohibits the distributi on of the photos without his written consent [Dkt. No. 6-2]. For the re a so ns dis c us se d n e xt, th at do c ume nt l a c ks the ne c e ssa ry e le me nts of

an e nf or c e a ble c ontr a c t. “(1) Consideration for a promise is (a) an ac t other than a promise, or (b) a for

bear ance , 4 or (c ) the c reation, modification or destruction of a leg al re lation, or (d) a

return pr omise,

(continued...) 4 ‘an unjustified fa ilure to perf orm all or any

part of what is promised in a contra ct’ e ntitli ngthe injured par

ty to damag es.”) (citations omitted). “Consideration is, of course, a require d element of contra ct formation.” ATACS Cor p. v. Trans W

orld Communications, Inc. , 155 F.3d 659, 665 (3 d Ci r. 19 98 ); see H

enkev. U.S. De

p’t of Commerce , 83 F.3d 1445, 1450 ( D.C. Cir. 1996) (listing “e ssential elements” of a c ontrac t as “c ompetent par ties, lawful subjec t matter, leg al consideration, mutualit y

of asse nt and mutuality

of oblig ation”) ( citations omitt ed); St. Paul Merc ury Ins. Co. v. Capitol Sprinkler Inspec tion, Inc ., 573 F. Supp.2d 152, 173 (D.D .C. 2008) (“ Un d er th e l aw o f t h e D i s tri cto f C o l umb i a, p art i es m ay o ra l l y m o d i fy a w ri tt enco n tra ctthro u gh mutual consent, provided that ‘the modification [] possess[es] the same e lements of consideration as nece ssary for nor mal contra ct formation.’” (inter nal citation omitted)). “T he party asser ting the e x istence of

an enf orce able c ontrac t . . . bear s the burden of proof on the issue of contra ct formation.” Virtual Defense and De velopme nt Intern., Inc . v. Re public of Moldova , 133 F. Supp.2d 9, 17 (D.D .C. 2001).

Although Mr . Squires claims a bre ach of contra ct, he ha s not provided a written contra ct or a lleg ed any

fac ts to support the formation of a c ontrac t betwee n him and either of the De fe nd ants . M r. Squ ir e s a lle g e s o nly that Mr . B ro wn

pr omi se d “ to u

nc on dit ion a lly

repr e se nt my inv e nti on s” and

that bo th D e fe nd ants pr omi se d “ to g iveme pr omo tio na l ph oto -s ho ots take n in De c e mbe r 2 00 7. ” Com

pl. at 1. He ha s n ot i de nti fi e d th e “ mate ri a l te rm s” of an e nf or c e a ble 3 contra ct, espe cially

the “ba rg ained- for” consideration. Clay v. Chesapeak e &Potomac Tel. Co. , 4(...continued) 4 barg ained f

or and g iven in exchang e for the promise.” Re statement (F irst) of Contrac ts § 75 (1932). 5 18 4 F .2 d 9 95 , 9 96 (D .C. Cir . 1 95 0) (“ [N]e ith e r m on e y no r b e ne fi t mo vin gto t

he pr omi so r i s essential to a c ontrac t; consideration may consist as well of de triment to the promisee. The
essenc e of c onsideration, howe ver, . . . is that it is a barg ained- for e quivalent.”) (citation omitted). Mr. McNish’s stateme nt that “Mr. Squires promises millions if the inventions sol d [but that] [ n]o one really

car ed about that,” Def

.’s Mot. at 1, also sug g ests the lack of an agree ment on the eleme nt of consider ation. The c omplaint fails to alleg e any fac ts from which the ne cessa ry “mee ting of

the minds with respec t to the material ter ms” ca n be found or

rea sonably

inferr ed. Segar v. M

ukasey , 508 F.3d 16, 21 ( D.C. Cir. 2007) (citation and inter nal quotation mark omi tte d) ; Vi rtu al D e

fe ns e , 1 33 F . Su

pp .2 d at 17 (“ F or

an e nf or c e a ble c ontr a c t to e xist und e r D .C. law, the re mus t be a g re e me nt a s to a ll m ate ri a l te rm s [ e.g. , s ub je c t matte r, pr ic e , p ay

me nt t e rm s, quantity , quality

and duration] and an intention of the parties to be bound.” ) (c itation omit ted). In other wor ds, Mr. Squires has not pleade d “with suffic ient definitene ss” to support the formation of a

contra ct. Vi rtu al D e

fe ns e , 133 F. Supp.2d at 18. A s f o r th e n e g l i g e n c e c l a i m , M r . S q u i r e s mu s ta l l e g e f

a c t s e s t a b l i s h i n g“ ( 1 ) a

d uty, owed by the def endant to the plaintiff, to e x erc ise rea sonable c are , (2) a brea ch of this duty , and (3) a n injury to the plaintiff proxim ately cause d by

the def endant' s brea ch.” W

ilson v. Good Hu mo r Co rp ., 757 F.2d 1293, 1297 n.3 ( D.C. Cir. 1985). Mr. Squires has a cknowledg ed Mr. B ro wn ’s e ff

or ts t o h ave a

pr oto ty pe of his inv e nti on

bu ilt and the re c ru itm e nt o f M r. McNi shto
c re ate a DV D s ho wc a sin ghim

and his inv e nti on s. Thus , to the e xtent th at Mr . Sq uir e s c ou ld show a duty

owed him, he ha s failed to state a ny fac ts from which a

brea ch of sa id duty

can be found or r easona

bly inferr ed.Even if Mr. Squire s had stated c laims for bre ach of contra ct and ne g lige nce, he would not preva il in the suitbeca use he ha s not alleg ed any fac ts supporting a

n injury to him. On the contra ry , the Def

endants “ trave led [from North Carolina] and spent [their] m oney on g as.” Def .’s Mot. at 2. And Mr. B rown e ither paid or w as g oing to pa y Invention Support to develop the pr oto ty

pe , b ut M r. Squ ir e s to ld M r. B ro wn that “ if you se nd the mon e y [,] Iam no t g oin gto
re imb ur se you

wh e n o r i f t

he inv e nti on

se lls !” Pl. ’s Op p’ n at 4. I f a ny thi ng , M r. Squ ir e s h a s n ot upheld his part of the purported ba rg ain. III . C ON CL USI ON F or the fo re g oin gre a so ns , th e Court c on c lud e s th at Mr . Sq

uir e s h a s f

a ile d to state a cla im upon which relief may be grante d and, thus, grants Mr. McNish’s motion to di smiss. A separ ate Or der dismissing the c omplaint in it s entirety acc ompanies this Memorandum Opinion.

Date : Apr il 2 , 2 00 9 /s/ ROSEMARY M. COL LYER United States District J udg e