1 Filed 2/6/14 In re E.G. CA1/5 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION FIVE

In re E.G., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law.

ALAMEDA COUNTY SOCIAL SERVICES AGENCY, Plaintiff and Respondent,

v. IRVING R., Defendant and Appellant. A138048
(Alameda County Super. Ct. No. OJ10015595)

Appellant Irving R. (Father) is the biolog ical father of E.G. , who was determined to be a dependent child as a result of Fathe r’s physical and emotional abuse of E.G. and her mother (Mother), as well as Mother’s ne glect of the child. Father was granted reunification services by the court, but was neve r recognized as a presumed father. While Father complied with his case plan and signi ficantly improved his relationship with E.G.,
the court found that he did not play a parental role in the child’s life and terminated his parental rights. Father appeals. Responde nt Alameda County Soci al Services Agency (Agency) argues that, as a biological father only, he lacks standing to challenge the termination order. Father argues that the Agen cy is estopped from contesting his status. We disagree. We in any event find no merit to his substantive objections to the court’s
order.2 I. B ACKGROUND Jurisdiction In September 2010, the Agency filed a j uvenile dependency pe tition on behalf of
then 11-month-old E.G. As finally amended and su stained by the court as true, the petition cited several incidents of domestic violence and child abuse: “On 4/24/2010, the father held the minor by the ankles and swung her towards the
mother and the mother caught the minor. The fa ther then tried to ei ther grab or hit the mother, which resulted in the minor getting tw o scratches on her forehead and cheek.
The father threw the minor onto the bed with the mother and urinated on both the minor and the mother. The father dragged the minor by her ankles and threw her in the bushes when the [father] kicked the mother out[,] telling the moth er to take the minor with her.” 1 “On 04/27/2010, the father ‘b eat’ the mother with a belt, his fists and other objects resulting in the mother having cuts and brui ses on her back, wrist and legs. The father
also threw the minor on a bed and urinated on both the mother and the minor. The father
also threatened the mother w ith a hammer and knife when she told him that she no longer wanted to be in a relationship with him. Th e father then grabbed the minor by the ankles and dragged her outside and threw her in the bushes telling the mother to take the minor
with her.” “In or about May 18, 2010, the mo ther obtained a Restraining Order [2] but the
mother has allowed the father b ack in the home . . . .” “On or about August 18, 2010, the father kicked th e mother in the minor’s presence.” The petition also alleged that Mother was developmentally delayed and mildly mentally retarded and that both parents ha d a history of drug us e. The sustained

1 It was raining heavily that night and, because Father took Mother’s cell phone, mother had to walk acro ss town with E.G. in the rain to her home.

2 A five-year restraining order that was issu ed on June 18, 2010, required Father to stay away from Mother and E.G. and did not allow for visitation betw een Father and E.G.3 jurisdictional allegations became final wh en the parents failed to appeal from the disposition order and are not subject to attack in this appeal.
E.G. was not detained when the original petition was file d, but was detained about one week later, in early October 2010, after Mother left her in the care of roommates with few provisions and did not retu rn or respond to calls or me ssages. Mother later admitted that she used drugs while sh e was away from E.G. Father claimed Mother engaged in prostitution. Mother reported that Father ha d come to her apartmen t and taken her work clothes and E.G.’s birth certificate, Medi-Cal card, and electronic benefit transfer card, but Father denied taking these items. Mother also reported that Father sent her a text reading, “Bitch you got my daughter taken aw ay, die,” and that he threatened to “come and get her” after the re straining order expired. In November 2010, E.G. was formally removed from Mother’s care and placed with her godmother (G odmother), a friend of Mother. Mo ther was granted reunification
services. Paternity Testing, Visitatio n and Reunification Services Following a positive paternity test, and at the Agency’s request, the court declared Father E.G.’s biological father in December 2010 and granted him reunification services. Before formal services started, Father was taking anger management classes for a workrelated incident and he voluntar ily enrolled in parenting classes as well. He asked for custody of E.G., but he lacked stable housi ng. In its October 2 010 report, the Agency wrote, “[Father] appears to care for the minor and wants what’s best for her but he needs to work on his anger issues and parenting skills to ensure that the minor would be safe at all times when in his custody. [Father] l acks maturity and could benefit from therapy to enhance his relationship skill[s].” According to the Agency’s April 2011 status review report, Father had a criminal record—seven misdemeanor convictions, 17 failures to appear in court, and 15 revocations of probation—and he was consistently testing positive for marijuana. He al so continued to violate the restraining order by having unsupervised contact with E.G. and Mother. In April 2011, Mother reported that she was two months pregnant and belie ved Father was the father.4 From November 2010 to April 2011, th e social worker s upervised weekly visitation between E.G. and Father. “[E.G. ] sometimes appears to be cautious when interacting with her father and sometime s appears to be anxious, confused or
uncomfortable with her father. [E.G.] normally cries or protests when her father picks her up. [E.G.] is sometimes ve ry quiet when first interacti ng with her father and will sit quietly and not smile.” Because of the Agency’s concern ab out these visits, therapeutic visits supervised by a psychologist were arranged and began in about April 2011. A June 2011 report on the therapeutic visits between Father and E.G. explained that the “goals of treatment have been to help [E.G.] reduc e her anxiety around transitioning into the visits with her father and to increa se her ability to verbalize her feelings and seek out a primary caregiver for comfort and soothing when she is upset. . . . [¶] . . . From my observations during the visits, . . . [E.G .] has displayed a range of
emotions and behavior in relation to her fath er. She has periods of quickly warming up to her father, displaying laughing, talking and mutual interactions and the start of symbolic play, which is what we would expe ct for her age. [¶] [She] also has periods where she is more disorganized when she arrives and has a harder time transitioning from caregiver to visits with her fa ther. During these times, [E.G .] can cry for long periods of time, avoid eye contact, and display[] a sti ff body posture, some times clinging to her father and other times refusing to be picked up by him. . . . [She] frequently will continue to display some watchfulness or clinging behavior, along with distractibility and restlessness throughout the rest of the visit.” In June 20 11, the court ordered continued
services. Termination of Services In a September 2011 report, the Agency recommended termination of services for both parents. A September 12, 2011 update on the therapeutic visits 3 stated, “[A]lthough [E.G.] has shown much improvement in her relationship with her father and in her

3 In July 2011, the restraining order wa s modified to allow therapeutic visits between Father and E.G.5 developmental abilities, she con tinues to present as quieter than would be expected and with less language than typica l for her age. In order for [E.G.] to heal from her past trauma and to develop skills and behaviors that would be typical for her age she would need to have a strong attachment relations hip with a primary caregiver. This means someone she feels comfortable seeking out when she is scared or anxious.” The psychologist questioned whether E.G. had such a relationship with Godmother, but clearly implied that E.G. did not have such a relationship with Fath er. While Father had gained insight into his relationship with E.G. and had improved his ability to read E.G.’s cues during visits, at times he would “become preoccupied by his own feelings of grief or sadness,” causing E.G. to engage in self-pro tective role reversal by comforting Father. The social worker opined th at E.G. could not safely be placed in Father’s care because Father “lack[ed] insight into the effects the domestic violence may have had on [E.G.]. . . . The father’s domes tic violence instructor says that the father has made progress in addressing his ange r and history of domestic vi olence but also admits that progress is slow for the father and the father needs to continue to attend his class and complete the entire 52 week program. The pare nts deny that they ha ve been in contact with each other . . . [but a]t the same time the parents both state they would like to get back together someday to live as a family.” 4 Nevertheless, the so cial worker observed that “the parents love [E.G.] and hopefully they will be able to maintain a relationship with her as both parents currently appear to have a cordial relationship with [Godmother].” Contested status review hearings took place in February, March, April, and May 2012. In the meantime, the Agency filed additional reports. In January 2012, th e Agency reported that Father had finished 37 weeks of the
52-week domestic violence cl ass, had completed his outpa tient drug treatment program, and had tested negative on all of his drug test s with one exception fo r alcohol. He also

4 Mother gave birth to a nother daughter in Novemb er 2011. Both parents continued to believe Father was the new baby’s father.6 continued to participate in i ndividual therapy and attend th erapeutic visits with E.G. “The father’s relationship w ith [E.G.] has now improved and she now appears to enjoy the time she spends with him.” The social worker wrote that E.G. appeared to have developed a parental rela tionship with Godmother. By March 2012, Father and E.G. had made further progress in therapeutic visits: “[E.G.] has continued to show developmental progress in her sessions with her father. . . . [¶] Within the last three m onths, [E.G.] has displayed a reduction in her watchful
behavior and a broader affect. . . . She is also displaying . . . limit testing . . . . [H]er newly expressed protest, broader affect, and the developmental improvements she is displaying are good signs of in creased comfort. . . . [¶] [Father] continues to show improvement in his ability to follow [E.G.’s ] lead in play and read her cues. He continues to be open to interv entions and psychoeducation . . . . [H]e has incorporated into his knowledge the importance of routine a nd consistency for [E.G.] Further, [he] has shown an ability to empathize with [E.G.’s] experience and to delight in her joys and allow her protests. . . . [¶] . . . [¶] . . . [Howev er,] I . . . continue to have concerns about the impact of the reported dom estic violence and physical a buse on [E.G.] Further, there
continues to be times when [Father] becomes preoccupied by his own needs or feelings and is not able to read [E.G.’s] cues of prot est or bids for attention. He continues to display many instances of parent-directed pl ay or being triggered and can miss [E.G.’s]
cues or bids for interaction at these times. . . . [Although] I continue to see [Father] taking responsibility and considering the impact that his actions have had most specifically on his daughter[,] . . . he does not discuss any spec ific details related to his past actions.” In April 2012, the Agency wrote that, wh ile Father continued to seek custody of E.G., he only had a studio apartment and stru ggled to pay rent each month. The social worker continued to opine that the parent s lacked insight into the effects domestic violence may have had on E.G. “The father’s domestic violence instructor reports that the father has been a consistent participant in his class . . . [but the instructor] has also been unwilling to discuss specif ic aspects of [Father’s] progre ss related to his own history
of Domestic Violence.” Father admitted that he had relapsed into using alcohol, and had7 been arrested for driving under the influence on February 2, 2012. As a result, he had been required to re-ent er a treatment program. In May 2012, the Agency re ported that Father had disclosed that he had contact with Mother periodically du ring January and February 2012, in violation of the restraining order. On one of those occasions , Father became angry because he suspected Mother of using drugs, and he destroyed a radio he ha d given Mother as a gift. On May 15, 2012, the court terminated the parents’ reunification services and set a
Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26 5 hearing for August. Because Father did not challenge that order by writ petition, the order is final and cannot be directly or collaterally challenged in this appeal. (§ 366.26, subd. ( l ).)
Section 366.26 Proceedi ngs and Bonding Study At the April 2012 contested hearing on te rmination of services, the court ordered a bonding study. In the August 6, 2012 section 366.26 repo rt, the Agency described the purpose of the study as follows: 6 “[G]iven the unusual circumstances of [F]ather’s progress in therapeutic visitation, and the lim ited knowledge of th e child’s relationship with [Godmother], [the court decided] it woul d be most valuable to have an evaluation that considers the relationship of the child in both parental relations hips.” Since the study had not begun by the August hearing, the court ordered a 90-day continuance so the study could be prepared and gran ted another 90-day continuance in November. In the meantime, the Agency f iled additional reports. In August 2012, th e Agency reported that Fathe r’s relationship with E.G. had improved significantly and E.G. now referred to him as “my Daddy.” Beginning in August, therapeutic visits were replaced by join t therapy for Father a nd E.G., followed by a visit. In October, an additio nal hour of weekly visitation was added. In November, the Agency reported that E.G. “is much more relaxed with her father and seeks out his

5 All further statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code unless otherwise indicated.

6 The appellate record does not include reporters’ transcripts of the contested hearings on termination of services.8 attention constantly. [She] is playful and affe ctionate with her father and goes to him for comfort when needed. Her father is respons ive to [her] and follows her lead. He is appropriate, affectionate and loving towards he r. The father also continues to participate in . . . [a] relapse prevention program, test ne gative for the use of drugs and alcohol, and participate in weekly individual therapy.” In February 2013, the Agen cy wrote that E.G. continued to have difficulty with transitions at the beginning and end of the visits, especially when Godmother provided transportation. “After [E.G.] recovers, she be gins to interact and engage with her father and appears to enjoy these interactions. For th e remainder of the visit, [she] is talkative and demonstrates a wide range of affect. . . . [¶] . . . [¶] At the end of the visit, [E.G.] occasionally becomes somb er again. . . . On the way home, [she] asks [the social worker] questions about her father such as ‘Where ’s my daddy going?’ or ‘Is this Daddy’s house?’ [¶] . . . [Father] has reflected with insight on the changes he has been able to make in his life while participating in indi vidual therapy and subs tance abuse recovery services, and in his visits and therapy with [E.G.].” Godmot her said she wanted E.G. to have ongoing, regular contact with her birth parents. The bonding study, co nducted by a licensed psyc hologist, was filed in February 2013. The psychologist conclude d that E.G. did not exhibit “secure base
behavior” with Father that a child typically would exhibit with a primary attachment figure. “[E.G.] appeared to be stressed/worri ed, tense and her affect became increasingly confused and disorganized. It appears that she does not experience [F ather] as a source of comfort, soothing, or protection. [¶] . . . [¶] . . . [T]his is not an attachment relationship.” The psychologist had a lim ited opportunity to observe E.G. with Godmother and concluded, in contrast, that when E.G. was with Godmother she “was calm, focused on quiet play ac tivities and demonstrated what ap peared to be secure base behavior. She demonstrated a clear respons e to separation during the exchange between [the Godmother and Father] in our office [w hen she clung to Godmother]. She showed a greater range of affect when she was with [Godmother] and did not demonstrate confused/confusing affective reactions.” Furt her, the psychologist reported that Father’s9 comments during a parenting interview “foc used more on expectations for [E.G.’s] performance rather than on her emotional wellbeing or needs for a sense of safety,” whereas Godmother could describe “the ways her children see things differently from
her” and “could make connections between [E.G.’s] actions/behavio rs . . . and . . . possible feeling states that [E .G.] might be experiencing.” “In summary,” the psychologist wrote, “1) the evidence sh ows that [E.G.] differentiates these two relationships and the evidence is that she considers [Godmother] her attachment figure or psychological pare nt. 2) [E.G.’s] functional competences are vulnerable to stress, suggesting that she needs the emotional scaffolding and coregulation of a trusted caregiver in times of uncertainty, distress or threat. Thus, . . . stability is going to matter a lot[.] 3) . . . [E .G.] is demonstrating significant symptoms of an anxiety disorder. [E.G.’s] best interest s and her emotional we ll-being will be best served by continuity in her current living s ituation, continuity in relationship to her attachment figure, and reduction or elim ination of uncertain ty extant in the impermanence that accompanies her current status.” While Father had established himself as a person “who does have meani ng to [E.G.,] . . . [h]e might be viewed similarly to a regular babysitter or childcare provider.” Continuing visitation with Father to see if an attachment relationship developed
between him and E.G. “would be detrimental to [E.G.] . . . [becaus e it] would continue the uncertainty. . . . [E.G.] is developing increased awareness . . . of the contrasts between her and [Godmother’s] other children, that they do not go to ‘visits’; she is increasingly able to anticipate and worry abou t the separations as her sense of time matures. At worst, [continued visits] would be de structive because [E.G.] would have separation and loss imposed on her, . . . and her developmental pr ogress could be even more significantly
derailed.” An update on the therapeutic visits reache d similar conclusions. “[E.G.] presents with marked symptoms of anxiety, which may be attributed to previous trauma, separation, as well as the un certainty in permanence asso ciated with prolonged Child Welfare involvement. [Father] has demonstrated perseverance and effort . . . . There has10 been considerable progress within the parent-child re lationship given the limited opportunity they have together. Neverthele ss, under the current ci rcumstances and with given time constraints, [E.G.] and her father have not had the o pportunity to build a primary attachment relationship. . . . [¶] It is crucial to note that . . . [E.G.’s] current relationships [(e.g., with Godmother)], if they are functioning as attachments in a supportive way, should not be disrupted as that would cause mental health damage. [¶] . . . [¶] In conclusion, given her symptoms, a resoluti on to the question of [E.G.’s] placement is urgent.”
At the section 366.26 heari ng, Father cited comments in the bonding study and the report on therapeutic visitation that E.G. would benefit from a continuing relationship with him, and he asked the court to adopt a permanent plan of legal guardianship rather than adoption. “[G]iven . . . the caregiver’s lack of being consistent with the visits, [Father’s] concern is[] . . . that he’ll be shut out of [E.G.’s] life altogether . . . .” The court acknowledged that Father had been “ste llar” in his consistency with visitation, “more than just about any fath er I can think of over the last three years now or so,” but also noted the severity of the abuse that br ought E.G. into court dependency in the first place. The court adopted the Agency’s re commendation to terminate parental rights.
II. D ISCUSSION Father challenges the juvenile court’s ru ling, arguing that the beneficial parental relationship exception to termination of parental rights applied in this case.
A. Standing The Agency argues Father lacks standing to cha llenge the termination of his parental rights. It argues that, as a matte r of law, biological fathers who have not established presumed father status lack st anding to challenge the termination of their parental rights. The Agency correctly not es that a mere biological father (i.e., a biological father who has not established pr esumed father status) has only limited rights to notice of the proceedings and an opportunity to establish presumed father status. ( In re Joseph G. (2000) 83 Cal.App.4th 712, 715.) A bi ological or alleged father who has received an opportunity to establish presumed fa ther status and has not done so ordinarily11 cannot challenge the juvenile court’s deci sion to terminate parental rights. ( In re Joseph G. , at pp. 715–716 [alleged father who had notice of proceedings and did not appear or seek presumed father status lacked standing to appeal te rmination of parental rights]; cf. In re Baby Boy V. (2006) 140 Cal.App.4th 1108 , 1116–1117 [alleged father has standing to appeal order terminating hi s paternal rights on the ground he was never provided an opportunity to establish presumed father status].) Th e Agency argues that “[s]tanding to appeal is jurisdictional” ( In re Harmony B. (2005) 125 Cal. App.4th 831, 837), and that we must dismiss the appe al if we find Father lacks standing. Here, upon establishing pate rnity, Father was declared the biological father and granted reunification services. (See § 361.5, subd. (a) [court may order services for the child and biological father if it determines services will benefit th e child].) Nothing in
the record indicates that Father ever asked to be elevated to presumed father status or that
the court ever did so. Father was identifie d as “alleged father” or “father” in minute orders of court hearings; as “father” in the Agency’s reports during the reunification period, and as “father (biological)” in the Agency’s section 366.26 report and subsequent reports, never as “presumed father.” Father argues in his reply brief that th e Agency should be equitably estopped from challenging his standing. 7 “Whenever a party has, by hi s own statement or conduct, intentionally and deliberately led another to be lieve a particular thing true and to act upon such belief, he is not, in any litigation arising out of such statement or conduct, permitted to contradict it.” (Evid. Code, § 623; City of Long Beach v. Mansell (1970) 3 Cal.3d 462, 488–489.) Father cites evidence that might suppo rt his argument. As a mere biological father, Father lacked standing to challenge the jurisdiction and disp osition orders in the

7 In his opening brief, Father largely ignores the issue and simply identifies himself as “father of the minor” without diff erentiating his status. Only in a footnote, without any reasoned discussion, does Father ev en suggest that he is a presumed father, contending that it is “unclear from the record” when his status was el evated, but that he was “considered” a presumed father by the time of the section 366.26 hearing.12 juvenile court. (See In re Alyssa F. (2003) 112 Cal.App.4th 846, 855 [“[a]n alleged
father is entitled to notice so that he ma y change his paternity status, but he has no standing to challenge other orders”]; In re Karla C. (2003) 113 Cal.App.4th 166, 172, 179–180 [implying alleged fath er lacked standing to par ticipate in jurisdiction and disposition hearing].) However, insofar as the appellate record discloses, 8 the Agency raised no objection when Father (along with Mother) contested thos e orders and actively participated in the contested hearing by pr esenting evidence. Si milarly, the Agency raised no objection when Father (again al ong with Mother) contested termination of services and presented evidence at the conteste d hearings, despite a lack of standing to do so. Most strikingly, the Agency apparently raised no objection to the order for a bonding study to evaluate Father’s re lationship with E.G., even thou gh the result of such a study was legally irrelevant to the termination of parental rights of a biological father. (See In re Christopher M. (2003) 113 Cal.App.4t h 155, 160 [alleged fath er had no standing to participate in section 366.26 hearing].) Fi nally, the Agency did not object to Father’s participation in the section 366.26 hearing itsel f. Because Father was receiving all of the services and procedural right s he would have been entitled to as a presumed father (including appointed counsel), and because the Agency made no objection to his full participation in the dependency case, he ar guably was led to believe by the Agency’s conduct that the Agency would not object to his exercise of those same rights on appeal and thus justifiably failed to perfect his pres umed father status in the juvenile court. Father also correctly notes that the court referred to him as “the presumed father” when it issued its oral ruling at the section 366.26 hearing, although the minute order of the hearing stated that “Parental rights of . . . Alleged Father (Irving [R.]) are hereby
terminated.” Father argues, in essence, that we shou ld consider the entiret y of the record and award him presumed father status for purpose s of this appeal. But Father’s equitable

8 The appellate record does not include re porters’ transcripts of hearings before August 2012.13 estoppel argument raises fact issu es that were not argued or resolved in the juvenile court,
and Father cites no case in which a father has been able to achieve a parental status on appeal that he never sought or achieved in the trial court. Father was represented by counsel and shou ld have been well aware of the need to obtain presumed father status to ensure his ability to contest termin ation of his parental rights. Father cannot reasonably argue that the court’s isolated reference to him as a “presumed father” at the secti on 366.26 hearing led him to belie ve his status was elevated in the absence of any fo rmalities. The juvenile court was authorized to grant services to the biological father in its discretion, and to allow Father to participate in hearings touching on those services as a result, withou t recognizing Father as a presumed father. Further, Father has not established that he declined to seek presumed father status in
reliance on the Agency’s stance, and the Agency notes that the language used by Father’s attorney at the section 366.26 hearing—reques ting rather than asserting a right to the beneficial parent relationship exception to te rmination of parental rights—might reflect a deliberate decision not to pursue the issue. Moreover, because Father never obtained unsupervised visitation, much less custody of E.G., it is unclear wh ether he could have achieved presumed father status had he even pursued it. We agree with the Agency that Father lacks standing to challenge the court’s order.
Even if we were to assume that Father could somehow establis h de facto standing, we would in any event affirm the juvenile court’s order.
B. Beneficial Parental Relationship Exception to Termination of Parental Rights At a section 366.26 hearing, the juven ile must determine by clear and convincing evidence whether it is likely the dependent minor will be adopted. (§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1).) If the court finds a likelihood of adopti on, the court must terminate parental rights and order the child placed for adopti on unless, as applicable here, it finds a “compelling reason” that termination would be detrimental under one of the exceptions listed in section 366.26 subdivision (c)(1 )(B). A party arguing that one of those exceptions applies has the burden of producin g evidence that establ ishes the exception.14 ( In re Lorenzo C. (1997) 54 Cal.App.4th 1330, 13 43 [discussing former § 366.26, subd. (c)(1), predecessor of § 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(B)].) Under the beneficial parental relati onship exception, the court must find a “compelling reason” that termination of pare ntal rights would be detrimental because “[t]he parents have maintained regular visita tion and contact with the child and the child would benefit from continuing the relationship.” (§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(B)(i).) “The
existence of interaction between the natural parent and child will always confer some incidental benefit to the child.” ( In re Lorenzo C., supra, 54 Cal.App.4th at p. 1342.) The beneficial parental relationship exceptio n requires more, “that the parent-child relationship promote the well-being of the child to such a degree that it outweighs the well-being the child would gain in a perm anent home with new, adoptive parents. [Citation.]” ( Ibid. ) A juvenile court’s decision on app lication of the beneficial parental relationship exception is reviewed either for substantial eviden ce or for abuse of discretion; in this context, there is little di fference between these standards of review. ( In re Bailey J. (2010) 189 Cal.App.4th 1308, 1314–1315; In re Jasmine D. (2000) 78 Cal.App.4th 1339, 1351–1352.) The juvenile court’s decision here is am ply supported by the re cord. While Father
showed sustained commitment toward E. G. during the reunification period and significantly improved his relationship with her, he never established a parental relationship with her. The bonding study repo rted that E.G. continued to show anxiety
around him under circumstances of stress an d did not turn to him for comfort or otherwise treat him as an attachment figure. The latest report on therapeutic visitation, which was based on a much longer period of observation and sustained therapeutic engagement with Father, reached the same co nclusion. The finding is unsurprising given the historical facts of the case, which incl ude Father’s physical abuse of E.G. and physical and emotional abuse of Mother and his contributio n to instability in E.G.’s early life. Moreover, both reports found that E.G. was a particularly emotionally fragile child who urgently needed stability. While the juvenile court a ppropriately commended Father for the progress he made during the depe ndency case, the critical issue at the15 section 366.26 hearing was E.G .’s then current need for pe rmanence and stability, taking
into account her actual attachments to adult figures in her life. The bonding study specifically advised that it would be more harm ful to E.G. to delay permanence in order to maintain her relationship w ith Father than it would be to free her for adoption at the risk of her cutting her off from Father. Fath er had established himself as a person “who does have meaning to [E.G.],” but his re lationship was only similar “to a regular babysitter or childcare provider.” Father had not established such an important parental relationship that maintenance of the rela tionship outweighed E.G.’s need for the permanence of adoption by Godmother, her primary attachment figure. The court’s ruling is affirmed.
III. D ISPOSITION The order terminating pare ntal rights is affirmed.16 _ ____________ ____________ Bruiniers, J.

We concur:

_____________ ____________ Jones, P. J.

_____________ ____________ Needham, J.