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2024 IL App (5th) 230090-U 

NO. 5-23-0090 

IN THE

APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS

FIFTH DISTRICT

______________________________________________________________________________ 

KARL DANIEL, ) Appeal from the 

 ) Circuit Court of 

Plaintiff-Appellee, ) St. Clair County. 

 ) 

v. ) No. 22-MR-231 

 ) 

DRURY HOTELS COMPANY, LLC, ) Honorable 

 ) Julie K. Katz, 

Defendant-Appellant. ) Judge, presiding. 

______________________________________________________________________________ 

JUSTICE WELCH delivered the judgment of the court. 

Justices Moore and McHaney concurred in the judgment. 

 

 ORDER

¶ 1 Held: The circuit court erred in not dismissing the petitioner’s petition for discovery filed

pursuant to Illinois Supreme Court Rule 224 (eff. Jan. 1, 2018) where the petitioner

already knew the identity of a potential defendant who may be responsible for his

alleged injuries.

¶ 2 The petitioner, Karl Daniel, commenced the underlying action to ascertain the identities of 

those responsible for the personal injuries he suffered after a slip and fall on premises owned by 

the respondent, Drury Hotels Company, LLC. On November 14, 2022, the petitioner filed a 

petition for discovery pursuant to Illinois Supreme Court Rule 224 (eff. Jan. 1, 2018), naming the 

respondent as the entity in possession of information that would identify the potential defendants 

responsible for his personal injuries. The instant appeal arises from the circuit court’s order of 

February 8, 2023, denying the respondent’s motion to dismiss filed pursuant to section 2-615 of 

NOTICE

This order was filed under 

Supreme Court Rule 23 and is 

not precedent except in the 

limited circumstances allowed 

under Rule 23(e)(1).

NOTICE

Decision filed 09/16/24. The 

text of this decision may be 

changed or corrected prior to 

the filing of a Petition for 

Rehearing or the disposition of 

the same.
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the Code of Civil Procedure (Code) (735 ILCS 5/2-615 (West 2020)), finding that the petitioner 

was entitled to certain discovery. For the following reasons, we reverse.1

¶ 3 I. BACKGROUND

¶ 4 On November 14, 2022, the petitioner filed a petition for discovery pursuant to Rule 224, 

which indicated that, on February 5, 2022, the petitioner was a patron and customer of the Drury 

Inn and Suites (Drury Inn) located at 12 Ludwig Drive in Fairview Heights, Illinois. While walking 

on the premises, the petitioner slipped and fell on a frozen substance caused by either an unnatural 

accumulation of ice, snow, or other substance or a natural cause aggravated by the property owner.

As a result of this slip and fall, the petitioner suffered personal injuries. 

¶ 5 The petitioner brought this Rule 224 petition to ascertain the identities of those who may 

be responsible for his injuries. Specifically, the petitioner sought the following identifying 

information from the respondent: (1) the names and addresses of all individuals or entities doing 

business as Drury Inn at that location as of the time of the occurrence; (2) the names and addresses 

of all employees of that Drury Inn on the date of the incident; (3) the names and addresses of all 

current employees of that Drury Inn; (4) the names and addresses of all owners of that Drury Inn 

on the date of the occurrence; (5) the current names and addresses of all owners of that Drury Inn;

(6) the names and addresses of all individuals and entities that provided snow or ice removal 

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We note that the petitioner has failed to file an appellee’s brief. There are three distinct, 

discretionary options a reviewing court may exercise in the absence of an appellee’s brief: (1) it may serve 

as an advocate for the appellee and decide the case when the court determines justice so requires, (2) it may 

decide the merits of the case if the record is simple and the issues can be easily decided without the aid of 

the appellee’s brief, or (3) it may reverse the trial court when the appellant’s brief demonstrates prima facie

reversible error that is supported by the record. Thomas v. Koe, 395 Ill. App. 3d 570, 577 (2009). In this 

case, the record is simple, and the claimed errors are such that we can easily decide them without the aid of 

the appellee’s brief.
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services to that Drury Inn from November 1, 2021, through February 5, 2022; (7) the names and 

addresses of all individuals and entities that provided salting services to that Drury Inn from 

November 1, 2021, through February 5, 2022; (8) the names and addresses of all individuals and 

entities that provided maintenance, repairs, or alterations to the pavement at that Drury Inn during 

the five years prior to the date of the incident; and (9) the names of all individuals, businesses, and 

entities that have not otherwise been identified that had an interest in that Drury Inn at the time of 

the incident and their interest in the premises. The petition requested that the circuit court enter an 

order requiring the respondent to produce the requested information and to allow the petitioner to 

use all available discovery means to obtain this information. 

¶ 6 On December 15, 2022, the respondent filed a motion to dismiss the petition pursuant to 

section 2-615 of the Code (735 ILCS 5/2-615 (West 2020)) as well as a supporting memorandum 

of law. In the motion, the respondent contended that Rule 224 was limited to ascertaining the 

identity of one individual or entity who may be responsible for the petitioner’s damages. The 

respondent argued that the petitioner could not use Rule 224 to conduct pre-suit discovery when 

he was already aware of the identity of at least one potential defendant, the respondent; he was 

aware that the respondent was the manager and operator of the premises where he was allegedly 

injured. Instead, the petitioner was required to file suit against the known defendant and utilize the 

standard discovery process to ascertain the identity of other potential defendants. In the 

memorandum, the respondent contended that the petitioner had exceeded the scope and intent of 

Rule 224 by seeking the identities of nine separate categories of other persons or entities, including 

current and former employees, and the Rule 224 petition constituted an unwarranted fishing 

expedition. 
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¶ 7 On December 27, 2022, the petitioner filed a response to the motion to dismiss, in which 

he disagreed with the respondent’s argument that Rule 224 discovery was not permitted when a 

petitioner knew the name of at least one potential defendant. The petitioner contended that he was 

not seeking any information about liability or responsibility. Instead, he only sought information 

that would identify certain businesses and individuals. Moreover, the petitioner indicated that he 

had already contacted the respondent’s counsel and offered to limit the Rule 224 discovery even 

further to only the identification of persons or entities that provided snow removal, ice removal, 

or salting services during a specific four-month period. 

¶ 8 On February 8, 2023, the trial court held a hearing on the motion to dismiss. During the 

hearing, the court indicated that there was a conflicting line of cases as to whether a petitioner was 

prohibited from filing a Rule 224 action when the identity of one defendant was known. The court 

then indicated that it would follow Beale v. EdgeMark Financial Corp., 279 Ill. App. 3d 242 

(1996), which permitted a Rule 224 action for discovery despite petitioner already having 

knowledge of the identities of some individuals who may be liable. That same day, the circuit court 

entered a written order, denying the motion to dismiss and ordering discovery related to the identity 

of persons or entities that provided snow removal, ice removal, or salting services within four 

months of the incident. The respondent appeals. 

¶ 9 II. ANALYSIS

¶ 10 The sole issue on appeal is whether the trial court erred in denying the respondent’s motion 

to dismiss and permitting the Rule 224 action for certain discovery. 

¶ 11 A motion to dismiss filed under section 2-615 challenges the legal sufficiency of the 

complaint based on defects apparent on its face. Marshall v. Burger King Corp., 222 Ill. 2d 422, 

429 (2006). The relevant question is whether the facts alleged in the complaint, viewed in the light 
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most favorable to petitioner, and taking all well-pleaded facts and all reasonable inferences that 

may be drawn from those facts as true, are sufficient to state a cause of action upon which relief 

may be granted. Reynolds v. Jimmy John’s Enterprises, LLC, 2013 IL App (4th) 120139, ¶ 25. A 

court should dismiss a claim pursuant to section 2-615 when it is clearly apparent that no set of 

facts can be proven that will entitle plaintiff to recovery. Marshall, 222 Ill. 2d at 429. We review 

the court’s ruling on a section 2-615 motion to dismiss de novo. Id.

¶ 12 Also, in general, this court reviews a trial court’s ruling on a Rule 224 petition under an 

abuse of discretion standard. Maxon v. Ottawa Publishing Co., 402 Ill. App. 3d 704, 709 (2010).

However, where a trial court’s exercise of discretion relies upon a conclusion of law, our review 

is de novo. Id. at 710. 

¶ 13 Illinois Supreme Court Rule 224(a)(1)(i) (eff. Jan. 1, 2018) provides that “[a] person or 

entity who wishes to engage in discovery for the sole purpose of ascertaining the identity of one 

who may be responsible in damages may file an independent action for such discovery.” Rule 

224(a)(1)(ii) further provides that the verified petition seeking such discovery must set forth the 

reason the discovery is necessary, and the nature of the discovery sought. Ill. S. Ct. R. 224(a)(1)(ii) 

(eff. Jan. 1, 2018). An order granting the petition should limit discovery to the identification of 

responsible persons and entities. Id.

¶ 14 The plain language of Rule 224 permits a petitioner to engage in discovery to ascertain the 

identity of persons or entities who may be responsible in damages. Ingram v. Angela Intili, M.D., 

Ltd., 2022 IL App (1st) 210656, ¶ 13. It is “not intended to permit a party to engage in a wideranging, vague, and speculative quest to determine whether a cause of action actually exists.” Id.

Thus, discovery pursuant to Rule 224 is limited to ascertaining the identity of potential defendants.

Malmberg v. Smith, 241 Ill. App. 3d 428, 432 (1993). Once the identity of a potential defendant 
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has been ascertained, the purpose of the rule has been accomplished, and the action should be 

dismissed. Roth v. St. Elizabeth’s Hospital, 241 Ill. App. 3d 407, 413 (1993). A Rule 224 petition 

is inapplicable when the identity of any potential defendant is already known. Maxon, 402 Ill. App. 

3d at 710. Once a potential defendant’s identity is learned, a petitioner can then file a case and use 

the discovery provisions of the Illinois Supreme Court rules or of the Code to conduct full 

discovery of those named as respondents-in-discovery to determine who was responsible. Ingram, 

2022 IL App (1st) 210656, ¶ 13. 

¶ 15 However, emphasis should not be placed on identity alone but on the entire phrase used in 

Rule 224: “identity of one who may be responsible.” Ill. S. Ct. R. 224(a)(1)(i) (eff. Jan. 1, 2018); 

Beale, 279 Ill. App. 3d at 252. To determine those who may be responsible, petitioner must be able 

to identify “those individuals or entities who stand in the universe of potential defendants.” Beale, 

279 Ill. App. 3d at 252. If there is a sufficient connection to the injury by an individual or entity 

so as to place such individual or entity within the universe of potential defendants, petitioner may 

not seek further discovery pertaining to any actual wrongdoing. Id. “However, where the known 

connection to the injury is remote and does little or nothing to limit or define the universe of 

potential defendants, the petitioner should not be precluded from ascertaining additional 

connecting facts to further refine the universe of defendants having potential liability so long as 

the attempted discovery does not seek to delve into any actual details of wrongdoing.” Id. at 252-

53. 

¶ 16 Here, in his petition seeking Rule 224 discovery, the petitioner indicated that he was a 

patron and customer of the Drury Inn on February 5, 2022, when he was walking on the premises 

and slipped and fell on a frozen substance caused by either an unnatural accumulation of ice, snow, 
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or other substance, or a natural cause aggravated by the premise owner that resulted in him 

suffering personal injuries. The respondent was the manager and operator of the premises. 

¶ 17 In seeking Rule 224 discovery, the petitioner did not dispute that he knew the identity of a 

potential defendant, the respondent, but he argued that Rule 224 discovery was necessary to 

determine the identity of the individual or entity who provided snow removal and/or salting 

services to the Drury Inn on the date in the question. The petitioner argued that, if the accident was 

the result of the person or entity providing snow removal and/or salting services, then Drury Inn 

might not be liable for his injuries. Relying on a footnote in Beale, the trial court found that 

knowledge of the identity of one potential defendant did not preclude Rule 224 discovery to 

ascertain the identity of other potential defendants. In making this decision, the court 

acknowledged that there were cases that supported the respondent’s position, but the court found 

Beale more well-reasoned and, thus, followed it. The court also noted that the petitioner had limited 

his inquiry to learning the identities of potential defendants. 

¶ 18 Beale involved an alleged insider trading scheme of EdgeMark stock. Id. at 246-47. 

Although petitioner knew the identity of stock purchasers and that some of them were insiders, 

petitioner sought to discover which stock purchasers had access to insider information. Id. at 253. 

In finding that the request did not exceed the scope of Rule 224, the First District Appellate Court 

concluded that petitioner’s knowledge of the names of individuals who acquired stock in 

EdgeMark immediately before the public announcement, without more, did little if anything to 

define or narrow the universe of potential defendants from the general members of the stockpurchasing public. Id. The court, thus, concluded that a reasonable interpretation of Rule 224 

would permit the trial court some latitude of discretion under its provisions to allow discovery of 
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certain additional facts pertaining to the relationship between the stock purchasers and the 

corporate insiders to further define and narrow the universe of potential defendants. Id. 

¶ 19 The relevant footnote in Beale that the trial court here relied on in making its decision 

stated as follows:

“EdgeMark relies on language in Roth v. St. Elizabeth’s Hospital, 241 Ill. App. 3d 407 *** 

(1993), that the Rule 224 petition was factually inappropriate because the petitioner 

admittedly knew the names of several individuals involved in the decedent’s medical care.

In reliance on that language, EdgeMark argues that Beale was not entitled to utilize Rule 

224 because he knew the identity of some defendants and had filed a federal lawsuit against 

them which was pending at the time the trial court ruled upon Beale’s Rule 224 petition.

We disagree. As discussed in the text of this opinion, Roth did not hold that Rule 224 

discovery is not permitted where the petitioner knows the name of a potential defendant.

In fact, the court recognized that the petitioner was permitted access by way of her Rule 

224 petition to the name of an additional doctor who acted as a consultant. See 241 Ill. 

App. 3d at 419 ***. Roth held that Rule 224 discovery is not permissible where the 

petitioner knows the names and certain other information that establishes the potentiality 

for liability. In Roth, the petitioner knew the names of the doctors as well as their liability 

potential in the fact that they had rendered medical care to the decedent. The petitioner’s 

Rule 224 petition was denied because it sought specific information concerning actual 

liability.” Id. at 251 n.3. 

¶ 20 Thus, on occasion, the identification of a potential defendant may require more than simply 

a name. Gaynor v. Burlington Northern & Santa Fe Ry., 322 Ill. App. 3d 288, 294 (2001). In those 

instances, “discovery under Rule 224 is not limited to the petitioner’s ascertainment of a name 

only. However, even under Beale, knowledge of the connection of an individual to the injury 

involved will preclude further discovery under the rule.” Id. 

¶ 21 Even under Beale, which has expanded the discovery permitted under Rule 224, we 

conclude that the petitioner here is not permitted to proceed with Rule 224 discovery since he 

already knows the identity of a potential defendant who may be responsible for his alleged injuries.

The purpose of a Rule 224 action is to ascertain “the identity of one who may be responsible in 

damages.” (Emphasis added.) Ill. S. Ct. R. 224(a)(1)(i) (eff. Jan. 1, 2018). The petitioner was 

allegedly injured while on the respondent’s premises. It was undisputed that, when the petitioner 
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filed his Rule 224 petition, he knew the identity of the manager and operator of the property where 

his alleged injury occurred. Thus, the connection between his alleged injury and the identity of a 

potential defendant is already known and not remote. 

¶ 22 As stated above, it is well established that, once the identity of a potential defendant has 

been ascertained, the purpose of the rule has been accomplished, and the action should be 

dismissed. Roth, 241 Ill. App. 3d at 413. Thus, we conclude that the trial court abused its discretion 

when it ordered the discovery sought by the petitioner in the Rule 224 action. To obtain additional 

discovery, the petitioner may now utilize either the respondents-in-discovery statute of the Code 

(735 ILCS 5/2-402 (West 2020)) or the general discovery provisions of the Illinois Supreme Court 

rules. 

¶ 23 III. CONCLUSION

¶ 24 For the foregoing reasons, the order entered by the circuit court of St. Clair County is 

reversed, and the petition is dismissed. 

¶ 25 Order reversed.