United States Court of Appeals 

For the First Circuit 

No. 16-1293 

ELAINE BROWN, 

Petitioner, 

v. 

UNITED STATES, 

Respondent. 

APPLICATION FOR LEAVE TO FILE A SECOND 

OR SUCCESSIVE MOTION UNDER 28 U.S.C. § 2255 

Before 

Lynch, Stahl, and Thompson, 

Circuit Judges. 

Bjorn R. Lange for petitioner. 

 Seth R. Aframe, Assistant U.S. Attorney, with whom Scott W. 

Murray, United States Attorney, was on brief, for respondent. 

October 12, 2018 
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LYNCH, Circuit Judge. Elaine Brown seeks permission to 

file a successive motion under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 to vacate her 

conviction and sentence for possessing a destructive device 

"during and in relation to" and "in furtherance of" a "crime of 

violence," in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c). 18 U.S.C. 

§ 924(c)(1)(A). Brown hopes to argue in the district court that 

the rule announced in Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551 

(2015), and reiterated in Sessions v. Dimaya, 138 S. Ct. 1204 

(2018), renders the definition of "crime of violence" under which 

she was convicted and sentenced void for vagueness under the Fifth 

Amendment's Due Process Clause. We deny her application. 

I. 

Elaine Brown and her husband staged a nine-month-long 

armed standoff with federal law enforcement in 2007. United 

States marshals sought to apprehend the Browns after their 

convictions for tax evasion. Heavily armed with firearms, 

ammunition, and explosives, including pipe bombs, the Browns 

locked themselves in their New Hampshire house and announced, via 

Internet radio, that the government lacked authority to arrest 

them. The Browns threatened to kill law enforcement who 

approached the house. 

When the standoff ended with the Browns' arrest, Elaine 

Brown was indicted in the District of New Hampshire on six counts, 

including: (1) conspiracy to prevent federal officers from 
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discharging their duties, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 372; 

(2) conspiracy to assault, resist, or interfere with federal 

officers, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371 and 18 U.S.C. 

§ 111(a)(1); and (3) possession of a firearm or destructive device 

during and in relation to and in furtherance of a crime of 

violence, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c). Section 924(c)(3) 

defines a "crime of violence" as: 

[A]n offense that is a felony and -- 

(A) has as an element the use, attempted use, or 

threatened use of physical force against the person 

or property of another, or 

(B) that by its nature, involves a substantial risk 

that physical force against the person or property 

of another may be used in the course of committing 

the offense. 

18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(3). 

At Brown's trial in 2009, the jury was instructed that 

the conspiracy counts were "crimes of violence." Here, the 

parties agree that the predicates were found under § 924(c)(3)(B), 

which is known as the residual clause. 

The jury convicted Brown on all counts, and she was 

sentenced to 420 months in prison. The § 924(c) charge carried a 

mandatory minimum sentence of thirty years because it was for 

possession of a destructive device. See id. § 924(c)(1)(B)(ii). 

Brown's direct appeal was unsuccessful, United States v. 

Brown, 669 F.3d 10, 34 (1st Cir. 2012), cert. denied, 566 U.S. 

1017 (2012), as were her earlier § 2255 motions to "vacate, set 
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aside or correct [her] sentence," 28 U.S.C. § 2255(a); see Brown 

v. United States, No. 13-CV-21-GZS, 2013 WL 2474683 (D.N.H. June 

7, 2013); Brown v. United States, No. 14-1410 (1st Cir. Apr. 22, 

2014); Brown v. United States, No. 15-1689 (1st Cir. June 25, 

2015). Brown first sought to file this successive motion in March 

2016, following the Supreme Court's decision in Johnson. She 

supplemented her motion this summer after Dimaya. 

Before a federal prisoner can file a second or successive 

§ 2255 motion in the sentencing court, the circuit court must give 

permission. See 28 U.S.C. § 2255(h). As gatekeeper, this court 

may "authorize the filing of a . . . successive application only 

if" the application "makes a prima facie showing," id. 

§ 2244(b)(3)(C), that it "relies on a new rule of constitutional 

law, made retroactive to cases on collateral review by the Supreme 

Court, that was previously unavailable," id. § 2244(b)(2)(A); see 

id. § 2255(h) (stating that a "successive motion must be certified 

as provided in section 2244").1 A prima facie showing is "a 

sufficient showing of possible merit to warrant a fuller 

exploration by the district court." Moore v. United States, 871 

 1 Although § 2244 only states that it applies to § 2254, 

we have held that § 2244(b)'s requirements also apply to § 2255. 

See Moore v. United States, 871 F.3d 72, 78 (1st Cir. 2017); see 

also, e.g., Bennett v. United States, 119 F.3d 468, 469 (7th Cir. 

1997) (holding the same). 
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F.3d 72, 78 (1st Cir. 2017) (quoting Rodriguez v. Superintendent, 

Bay State Corr. Ctr., 139 F.3d 270, 273 (1st Cir. 1998)). 

The question here is whether Brown has made a prima facie 

showing that Johnson's rule was new and previously unavailable, 

has been made retroactive by the Supreme Court, and applies to her 

conviction and sentence under § 924(c)'s residual clause. See id. 

at 78-80 (describing our approach to evaluating second or 

successive § 2255 motions). 

Johnson held that the residual clause of the Armed Career 

Criminal Act's (ACCA) definition of "violent felony" was 

unconstitutionally vague. 135 S. Ct. at 2555-57. ACCA imposes 

on a defendant a more severe penalty for being a felon in 

possession of a firearm if he has three or more prior convictions 

for a "violent felony." 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(1). In Dimaya, the 

residual clause of the definition of "crime of violence" at 18 

U.S.C. § 16(b) had been used to evaluate a prior conviction in an 

immigration removal proceeding. 138 S. Ct. at 1211. Applying 

Johnson's reasoning, Dimaya invalidated § 16(b)'s residual clause, 

the text of which was identical in relevant part to the text of 

§ 924(c)'s residual clause, quoted above. Id. at 1216. 

It is undisputed that Johnson established a new rule of 

constitutional law that was previously unavailable to Brown and 

that has been made retroactive to cases on collateral review. 

See, e.g., Moore, 871 F.3d at 80 (explaining Johnson's novelty, 
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availability, and retroactivity); see also Welch v. United States, 

136 S. Ct. 1257, 1264-65 (2016) (making Johnson retroactive). 

Disputed is whether Johnson's rule, reaffirmed in 

Dimaya, extends to Brown's conviction under § 924(c)'s residual 

clause. Brown argues that this is reasonably likely because 

§ 924(c)'s residual clause is textually identical in relevant part 

to § 16(b)'s and is materially the same as ACCA's. The government 

counters that Johnson's rule cannot reach § 924(c)'s residual 

clause because that provision demands a case-specific rather than 

a categorical, or ordinary case, approach to "crime of violence" 

determinations. This is significant because the Court had applied 

a categorical approach to both § 16(b)'s and ACCA's residual 

clauses. As the Court explained in Johnson and Dimaya, the 

intolerable vagueness of those provisions largely derived from the 

categorical approach. See Johnson, 135 S. Ct. 2557-58; id. at 

2561; Dimaya, 138 S. Ct. at 1213-16; see also Welch, 136 S. Ct. at 

1262 ("The vagueness of [ACCA's] residual clause rests in large 

part on its operation under the categorical approach."). 

Johnson's rule would not extend to a provision that evaluated 

crimes of violence using a case-specific approach. 

Recently, in United States v. Douglas, No. 18-1129, slip 

op. at 14 (1st Cir. Oct. 12, 2018) we held that § 924(c)(3)(B) 

requires a case-specific approach. We rejected a Johnson-based 
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challenge to that provision. See Douglas, slip op. at 2. After 

Douglas, we cannot certify Brown's application. 

In that decision, we emphasized that the Supreme Court 

has never applied the categorical approach in a context like 

§ 924(c)'s residual clause. See id. at 25-26. That approach was 

devised to address practical and Sixth Amendment concerns related 

to judicial evaluation at sentencing of prior convictions, 

especially remote prior convictions. See id. at 15-19. But 

§ 924(c) charges are always contemporaneous with the underlying 

"crime of violence" charges. When predicate charges are 

contemporaneous, a conduct-specific evaluation by the jury or 

through the plea hearing is both practical and consistent with the 

right to a jury trial. See id. at 25-30. We also concluded that 

the text of § 924(c)(3)(B), and the congressional intent behind 

that text, indicate a case-specific approach. Id. at 20-25. 

In Douglas, we rejected the arguments that Brown 

advances and that she would advance in the district court. As a 

result, Brown cannot make the requisite "showing of possible merit 

to warrant a fuller exploration in the district court." Moore, 

871 F.3d at 78 (quoting Rodriguez, 139 F.3d at 273). It is "clear 

as a matter of law" that Brown could not get relief in the district 

court under her "identified constitutional rule." See United 

States v. Evans-García, 744 F.3d 235, 240-41 (1st Cir. 2014) 

(denying an application where the identified rule was 
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inapplicable); see also In re Hoffner, 870 F.3d 301, 311 (3d Cir. 

2017) (explaining that an application "foreclosed by our 

precedent" cannot be certified (quoting In re Arnick, 826 F.3d 

787, 790 (5th Cir. 2016) (Elrod, J., dissenting))). We must deny 

her application. 

Brown emphasizes that other circuits have granted 

petitions like hers. See Acosta v. United States, No. 16-1492 (2d 

Cir. June 8, 2018); In re Chapman, No. 16-246 (4th Cir. May 3, 

2016); Ruiz v. United States, No. 16-1193 (7th Cir. Feb. 19, 2016); 

Freeman v. United States, No. 15-3687 (2d Cir. Jan. 26, 2016); In 

re Pinder, 824 F.3d 977 (11th Cir. 2016). But these circuits had 

precedent requiring a categorical approach to § 924(c)'s residual 

clause. See, e.g., United States v. Cardena, 842 F.3d 959, 996 

(7th Cir. 2016), cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 247 (2017); United States 

v. Ivezaj, 568 F.3d 88, 95 (2d Cir. 2009). So did the circuits 

that have held § 924(c)(3)(B) to be unconstitutionally vague after 

Johnson and Dimaya. See United States v. Salas, 889 F.3d 681, 

684-86 (10th Cir. 2018); United States v. Eshetu, 898 F.3d 36, 37 

(D.C. Cir. 2018) (per curiam); United States v. Davis, 903 F.3d 

483, 486 (5th Cir. 2018) (per curiam); Cardena, 842 F.3d at 996. 

But see United States v. Taylor, 814 F.3d 340, 379 (6th Cir. 2016) 

(upholding § 924(c)'s residual clause); United States v. Barrett, 

903 F.3d 166, 184 (2d Cir. 2018) (same). In contrast, before 

Douglas adopted the case-specific approach to § 924(c)'s residual 
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clause, this circuit had adopted neither a categorical nor a casespecific approach. See Douglas, slip op. at 15; see also United 

States v. Turner, 501 F.3d 59, 67 (1st Cir. 2007). Douglas dooms 

this application. 

We would deny Brown's application even absent Douglas. 

Brown would have to show sufficiently that the categorical 

approach, and with it Johnson's rule, applies to § 924(c)(3)(B). 

This is a hurdle she cannot clear. Circuit precedent does not 

help her. The Supreme Court has never applied Johnson's rule, or 

the related categorical approach, in a context like this one, 

involving pending charges, not prior convictions. See Douglas, 

slip op. at 25; Barrett, 903 F.3d at 181-82. As explained, that 

approach was designed to address the practical and constitutional 

problems attendant to evaluating prior convictions at sentencing. 

Recognizing all of this, Brown leans on the text, arguing 

that the Dimaya plurality required a categorical approach to 

§ 924(c)(3)(B) when it commented that § 16(b)'s language was 

"[b]est read" to "demand[] a categorical approach." Dimaya, 138 

S. Ct. at 1217 (plurality opinion). Brown cannot make a prima 

facie showing that the categorical approach applies based on this 

statement. For one, § 924(c)(3)(B) might be read differently 

because it applies to pending, not prior convictions. In 

addition, this statement garnered only four votes. Justice 

Gorsuch, the majority's fifth member, "remain[s] open to different 
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arguments . . . about . . . language like this." Id. at 1233 

(Gorsuch, J., concurring in part and concurring the judgment).2 

In short, neither the Dimaya plurality, nor other 

Supreme Court precedent, nor circuit case law require a categorical 

approach for § 924(c)(3)(B). Contrast this with Moore, in which 

we certified a motion arguing that Johnson's rule applied to a 

sentencing law that used the same language as ACCA's residual 

clause. Moore, 871 F.3d at 80. To make a prima facie showing 

that Johnson applied to his sentence, Moore needed to demonstrate 

that this sentencing law, as applied to him, fixed sentences. Id. 

The court looked closely at how the Supreme Court and the First 

Circuit had applied that sentencing law at the time Moore was 

sentenced, before the Supreme Court made sentencing guidelines 

advisory in United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005). Based 

on this case law, the court determined that Moore had made a prima 

facie showing that the law could fix sentences and therefore that 

Johnson applied. Moore, 871 F.3d at 83-84. Brown has not made a 

comparable showing under relevant case law that the categorical 

approach, and with it Johnson, applies to § 924(c)(3)(B). 

 2 Any suggestion by other circuits that Dimaya implicitly 

held that § 924(c)(3)(B), like § 16(b)'s residual clause, is 

unconstitutional depended on binding precedent in those circuits 

holding that the categorical approach applies. See Davis, 903 

F.3d at 485-86; id. at 486 ("Because the language of the residual 

clause here and that in § 16(b) are identical, this court lacks 

the authority to say that, under the categorical approach, the 

outcome [here and in Dimaya] would not be the same."). 
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Of course, if the Supreme Court decides that Johnson's 

rule applies, or otherwise holds that § 924(c)(3)(B) is 

constitutionally problematic, then Brown can at that time seek 

permission to file a new motion. This application, however, does 

not meet the requirements for certification of a successive § 2255 

motion. 

II. 

We deny certification of Brown's successive motion under 

28 U.S.C. § 2255(h).