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File Name: 16a0244n.06

Case No. 15-3861

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT

RONALD HARRIS,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

ROBERT LANGLEY; PATRICK 

PETRANEK; CLEVELAND POLICE 

DEPARTMENT; CALVIN WILLIAMS; 

CITY OF CLEVELAND,

Defendants,

DOMINIK PENDLETON, Individually and as 

an Employee of the Cleveland Police 

Department,

Defendant-Appellant.

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ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED 

STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR 

THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF 

OHIO

BEFORE: BATCHELDER and WHITE, Circuit Judges; LIPMAN, District Judge.*

SHERYL H. LIPMAN, District Judge. This appeal addresses whether Defendant 

Officer Dominik Pendleton, a Cleveland Police Officer, is entitled to immunity from federal 

statutory and state common law claims brought by Plaintiff Ronald Harris stemming from 

allegations that Officer Pendleton body-slammed and handcuffed Harris for no apparent reason. 

 

* The Honorable Sheryl H. Lipman, United States District Judge for the Western District of Tennessee, sitting by 

designation.
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Officer Pendleton moved for summary judgment, asserting the defense of qualified immunity 

and state-law immunity. The district court denied Officer Pendleton summary judgment on 

Harris’ claims of excessive force and unlawful seizure under the Fourth Amendment, assault and 

battery, and false arrest and imprisonment. For the reasons set forth below, we AFFIRM the 

district court’s decision.

I. BACKGROUND

On July 19, 2013, Harris called 911, twice, to report that his eighty-six year old mother 

required evaluation by emergency medical services (“EMS”) for “mental status changes.” R. 26, 

Harris Depo., PID 153. Harris, a retired nurse in his sixties, was concerned that his mother’s 

unusual speech patterns, “body mechanics,” and behavior were precursors to a stroke. Id. at PID 

150, 152, 174. Officer Pendleton, a patrol officer for the City of Cleveland, Division of Police, 

and his partner, Officer Langley, arrived at Harris’ residence after receiving a call from dispatch 

to conduct a welfare check on an elderly female. The parties disagree about what transpired 

next; however, because of the posture of this case – an appeal of a denial of summary judgment 

on qualified immunity grounds – we only consider, and recite, the facts in the most favorable 

view for Harris. See Berryman v. Rieger, 150 F.3d 561, 563 (6th Cir. 1998) (“[T]he defendant 

must nonetheless be willing to concede the most favorable view of the facts to the plaintiff for 

purposes of the appeal.”).

According to Harris, when the officers arrived at his door, Harris informed them that he 

had asked for EMS, and not for police assistance. R. 26, Harris Depo., PID 153-54. Harris 

repeated that sentiment at least once, but the police officers did not acknowledge Harris’ 

statements. Id. at PID 154, 166. Believing there had been “a problem of communication with 

us,” Harris invited each officer to come inside. Id. at PID 155. Both officers declined the 
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invitation, stating that it was too hot. Id. at PID 155-56. Harris then began to pull his door 

closed and reach for the keys to lock it. Id. at PID 156, 164-65. 

At that moment, according to Harris, Officer Pendleton opened the door and was “all in 

[Harris’] face.” Id. at PID 156. Officer Pendleton body-slammed Harris and knocked him to the 

floor on his back. Id. As a result, Harris hit his head on the back of the wall, stunning him to the 

point that he was temporarily unsure of where he was. Id. Officer Pendleton placed his left knee 

on Harris’ back, grabbed Harris’ wrist, and handcuffed him. Id. at PID 156-57. Harris asked 

Officer Pendleton, multiple times, why he was being handcuffed, and Officer Pendleton replied 

that it was because Harris had called him a “motherfucker.” Id. at PID 156, 166. Harris, 

however, claims that he did not use that word or any other vulgar or aggressive language with the 

officers. Id. at PID 166. Harris was handcuffed for approximately two minutes. R. 27, 

Pendleton Depo., PID 217. Shortly after this incident, Officer Langley entered Harris’ home and 

said that he would call a supervisor. R. 26, Harris Depo., PID 158. A supervisor arrived at the 

scene, and Harris filled out a complaint against Officer Pendleton. Id. at PID 159. Harris 

“wasn’t in any shape to seek medical treatment that day,” but at some point he was examined at 

the VA hospital for injuries to his back and right wrist, and for general soreness. Id. at PID 188. 

At no point did Officers Pendleton or Langley speak to Harris’ mother or attempt to ascertain her 

health status. Id. at PID 158. 

II. ANALYSIS

A. Jurisdiction

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291, this court has “jurisdiction of appeals from all final 

decisions of the district courts.” “Denial of summary judgment is usually considered an 

interlocutory order, not a final judgment, and thus not appealable to this court. However, denial 
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of a motion for summary judgment on the ground of qualified immunity may be deemed a final, 

appealable order because the qualified immunity doctrine exists partly to protect officials from 

having to stand trial, and a defendant wrongly forced to go to trial loses the benefit of the 

immunity even if exonerated after trial.” Bishop v. Hackel, 636 F.3d 757, 764 (6th Cir. 2011). 

Accordingly, this court has jurisdiction to review a district court’s denial of a claim of qualified 

immunity to the extent that the appeal raises questions of law, “notwithstanding the absence of a 

final judgment.” Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 530 (1985); see also Johnson v. Jones, 

515 U.S. 304, 317 (1995) (“[C]onsiderations of delay, comparative expertise of trial and 

appellate courts, and wise use of appellate resources argue in favor of limiting interlocutory 

appeals of ‘qualified immunity’ matters to cases presenting more abstract issues of law.”).

“[A] defendant, entitled to invoke a qualified immunity defense, may not appeal a district 

court’s summary judgment order insofar as that order determines whether or not the pretrial 

record sets forth a ‘genuine’ issue of fact for trial.” Johnson v. Jones, 515 U.S. 304, 319-20 

(1995). “Instead, a defendant denied qualified immunity may appeal only if the issue on appeal 

is whether the plaintiff’s facts, taken at their best, show that the defendant violated clearly 

established law.” Quigley v. Tuong Vinh Thai, 707 F.3d 675, 680 (6th Cir. 2013). 

Here, Officer Pendleton presents three issues for review:

(1) Whether the District Court erred by denying summary judgment as to the excessive 

force claim when Officer Pendleton’s alleged conduct would have been objectively 

reasonable?

(2) Whether the District Court erred by denying summary judgment as to the unlawful 

seizure claim when the alleged detention of suspect was based upon probable cause?

(3) Whether the District Court erred by denying summary judgment as to the state-law 

claims when Officer Pendleton’s alleged conduct was not malicious, in bad faith, or 

wanton or reckless?
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Pendleton Br. 7. Harris opposes appellate jurisdiction, asserting that Officer Pendleton’s 

“statement in support of jurisdiction, as well as the arguments themselves, do not identify the 

specific legal issue but only complain of the district court’s weighing of factors . . . .” Harris 

Br. 5. The court agrees that Officer Pendleton wastes much of his brief arguing that the district 

court did not weigh certain disputed facts properly. See Estate of Carter v. City of Detroit, 

408 F.3d 305, 309-10 (6th Cir. 2005) (“Because this court does not have appellate jurisdiction 

over factual issues, a defendant must ‘concede the most favorable view of the facts to the 

plaintiff for purposes of the appeal.’”) (quoting Berryman v. Rieger, 150 F.3d 561, 563 (6th Cir. 

1998)).1 However, “even where, as here, the defendant makes impermissible arguments 

regarding disputes of fact, if the defendant also raises the purely legal issue of whether the 

plaintiff's facts show that the defendant violated clearly established law, then there is an issue 

over which this court has jurisdiction.” Quigley v. Tuong Vinh Thai, 707 F.3d 675, 680 (6th Cir. 

2013). Because Officer Pendleton does at times concede Harris’ version of the facts and argues 

that, despite this concession, he did not violate any of Harris’ clearly established constitutional 

rights, this court has jurisdiction to hear his appeal. Pendleton Br. 17, 23. Thus we proceed on 

Harris’ version of the facts. But “in accepting the district court’s factual determinations and 

relying on the plaintiff’s record evidence for the purpose of deciding interlocutory appeal, we do 

 

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For instance, Officer Pendleton argues that “[t]he District Court . . . incorrectly held that it must 

accept Plaintiff’s version and may not weigh different versions. Rather the appropriate standard 

calls for determining whether or not an officer’s actions were reasonable under ‘the totality of 

the circumstances.’” Pendleton Br. 20 (quoting Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396-97 

(1989)). This statement is wholly incorrect: Officer Pendleton conflates the burden of proof with 

the elements of an excessive force claim. At summary judgment, where there are disputed issues 

of material fact, the district court is required to view the facts in the light most favorable to the 

non-moving party, and then determine whether the totality of the circumstances demonstrates 

that a use of force was objectively reasonable.
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not ourselves make any findings of fact or inference for purposes of any subsequent 

proceedings.” DiLuzio v. Vill. Of Yorkville, 796 F.3d 604, 611 (6th Cir. 2015) (citations 

omitted). 

B. Qualified Immunity

“Under the doctrine of qualified immunity, government officials performing discretionary 

functions are shielded from civil liability unless their conduct violates clearly established 

constitutional rights. Thus, a defendant is entitled to qualified immunity on summary judgment 

unless the facts, when viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, would permit a 

reasonable juror to find that: (1) the defendant violated a constitutional right; and (2) the right 

was clearly established.” Bishop, 636 F.3d at 765 (citing Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 

818 (1982)). “Either step can precede the other as desired.” Gordon v. Louisville/Jefferson Cty. 

Metro Gov’t, 486 F. App’x 534, 541 (6th Cir. 2012). We review the district court’s denial of 

summary judgment on the grounds of qualified immunity, as limited to questions of law, de 

novo. Bishop, 636 F.3d at 765. 

1. Excessive Force

We first review whether Officer Pendleton violated Harris’ Fourth Amendment right to 

be free from excessive force when he allegedly grabbed Harris by the wrist, body-slammed him, 

and placed his knee into Harris’ back. We then determine whether that right, if violated, was 

clearly established. 

The Fourth Amendment prohibits police officers from using excessive force. Graham v. 

Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 394 (1989). When a citizen claims “that law enforcement officials used 

excessive force in the course of making an arrest, investigatory stop, or other ‘seizure’ of his 

person . . . such claims are properly analyzed under the Fourth Amendment’s ‘objective 
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reasonableness’ standard.” Id. at 388. “[O]bjective reasonableness turns on the facts and 

circumstances of each particular case. A court must make this determination from the 

perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene, including what the officer knew at the time, not 

with the 20/20 vision of hindsight.” Kingsley v. Hendrickson, 135 S. Ct. 2466, 2473 (2015) 

(internal quotation and citation omitted). “Determining whether the force used to effect a 

particular seizure is reasonable under the Fourth Amendment requires a careful balancing of the 

nature and quality of the intrusion on the individual’s Fourth Amendment interests against the 

countervailing governmental interests at stake.” Graham, 490 U.S. at 396 (internal quotations 

and citations omitted). 

The court must also examine the following factors in this balancing test: “the relationship 

between the need for the use of force and the amount of force used; the extent of the plaintiff's 

injury; any effort made by the officer to temper or to limit the amount of force; the severity of 

the security problem at issue; the threat reasonably perceived by the officer; and whether the 

plaintiff was actively resisting.” Kingsley, 135 S. Ct. at 2473. “Not every push or shove, even if 

it may later seem unnecessary in the peace of a judge’s chambers, violates the Fourth 

Amendment. The calculus of reasonableness must embody allowance for the fact that police 

officers are often forced to make split-second judgments—in circumstances that are tense, 

uncertain, and rapidly evolving—about the amount of force that is necessary in a particular 

situation.” Graham, 490 U.S. at 396-97 (internal quotations and citation omitted); see also 

Lopez v. City of Cleveland, 625 F. App’x 742, 746 (6th Cir. 2015) (“The Court has identified 

three non-exhaustive factors for lower courts to consider in determining the reasonableness of a 

police officer’s use of force: (1) the severity of the crime at issue; (2) whether the suspect posed 
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an immediate threat to the safety of the officer or others; and (3) whether the suspect actively 

resisted arrest or attempted to evade arrest by flight.”).

Here, conceding the facts in favor of Harris, Officer Pendleton’s actions are sufficiently 

excessive to be in violation of the Fourth Amendment. Harris requested EMS to come to his 

home to evaluate his elderly mother’s health. When two police officers arrived on the scene, 

Harris explained to them that he had requested EMS and not the police. Both police officers 

ignored Harris, at which point Harris invited them to come inside. Both police officers denied 

Harris’ invitation. At no point did the police officers inquire into Harris’ mother’s health, 

vitiating any argument that the police officers felt compelled to use force for Harris’ mother’s 

sake. Moreover, Harris did not exhibit any signs of threatening or at-risk behavior to the police 

officers. There was no need for any force in this situation because no crime was being 

committed and there was no immediate threat to the safety of anyone; yet, when Harris decided 

to close the door to his own home, Officer Pendleton suddenly attacked him without warning. 

This unprovoked violence cannot be excused as the consequence of a “split-second judgment.” 

The facts, as alleged, portray a patently unreasonable use of force. 

The court must next determine whether Harris’ violated rights were clearly established. 

For a right to be clearly established, “the contours of the right must be sufficiently clear that a 

reasonable official would understand that what he is doing violates that right.” Anderson v. 

Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640 (1987). “In deciding whether the right was clearly established, the 

Supreme Court has cautioned lower courts ‘not to define clearly established law at a high level of 

generality.’” Al-Lamadani v. Lang, 624 F. App’x 405, 409 (6th Cir. 2015) (citing Ashcroft v. alKidd, 563 U.S. 731, 131 S. Ct. 2074, 2084, 179 L.Ed.2d 1149 (2011)). “This is not to say that an 

official action is protected by qualified immunity unless the very action in question has 
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previously been held unlawful, but it is to say that in the light of pre-existing law the 

unlawfulness must be apparent.” Anderson, 483 U.S. at 640 (internal citation omitted). Here, 

there is no opacity in the Fourth Amendment’s prohibition on unprovoked body slams from 

police officers, whether this exact scenario has been held unlawful in a previous decision or not. 

Because Officer Pendleton allegedly violated Harris’ clearly established constitutional right to be 

free from excessive force, Officer Pendleton does not receive the shield of qualified immunity on 

this claim. 

2. Unlawful Detention

We now determine whether Officer Pendleton’s temporary handcuffing of Harris was an 

unlawful seizure in violation of the Fourth Amendment, and, if so, whether that right was clearly 

established. 

There are two prongs to a Fourth Amendment unlawful seizure analysis: first, whether a 

“seizure” occurred, and, second, whether that seizure was unreasonable. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 

1, 16 (1968). As to the first inquiry, “[i]t must be recognized that whenever a police officer 

accosts an individual and restrains his freedom to walk away, he has ‘seized’ that person.” Id. at 

16; see also Al-Lamadani, 624 F. App’x at 410 (“The Fourth Amendment protects against 

unreasonable seizures, including seizures that involve only a brief detention short of traditional 

arrest.”) (quotation marks and citation omitted). Although Harris was not arrested, it is clear that 

Officer Pendleton seized Harris when he placed his knee into Harris’ back and handcuffed him, 

restraining his liberty. We next consider the second prong of the analysis: whether that seizure 

was unreasonable.

Every arrest must be supported by probable cause to be considered reasonable; however, 

in a case such as this one, where there has been a limited intrusion on a person’s liberty but no 
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formal arrest, that intrusion may be justified by something less than probable cause. See 

Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692, 700 (1981); see also Bailey v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 

1031, 1037 (2013) (cataloging cases where a less severe intrusion was justified absent probable 

cause). “There is no ready test for determining reasonableness other than by balancing the need 

to search (or seize) against the invasion which the search (or seizure) entails.” Terry, 392 U.S. at

21 (internal quotation marks omitted). Here, again in the most favorable view for Harris, his 

detention was unreasonable because the scale tips uniformly on one side – there was no need to 

detain Harris, but his liberty was invaded nonetheless.

In his brief, Officer Pendleton contends that he had probable cause to detain Harris 

because Harris obstructed official business in violation of Ohio Revised Code § 2921.31 and 

Cleveland Codified Ordinance 615.06. Pendleton Br. 18-19. Ohio Revised Code § 2921.31 

states that, “no person, without privilege to do so and with purpose to prevent, obstruct, or delay 

the performance by a public official of any authorized act within the public official’s official 

capacity, shall do any act that hampers or impedes a public official in the performance of the 

public official’s lawful duties.” The Cleveland Ordinance includes a parallel provision requiring 

a purposeful intent to obstruct the performance of a public official’s duty. Harris acknowledged 

that he made a call for a welfare check, and that public officials are asked to conduct welfare 

checks; however, relying on Harris’ version of the facts, there can be no question that Harris did 

not intend to prevent, obstruct, or delay the performance of the police officers by pulling his door 

closed after the police officers had just declined his invitation to enter his home. 

Officer Pendleton also lacked probable cause to suspect that Harris pulled the door closed 

to commit a crime against his elderly mother. Harris called for emergency medical services, 

greeted the police officers when they arrived at the scene, and invited the police into his home –
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there is no reason to believe that Harris was in pursuit of harming his mother. Although there 

was no probable cause to believe that Harris had committed or was about to commit any crime, 

that does not end the analysis because, in Summers, 452 U.S. at 700, the Supreme Court 

enumerated a number of other considerations that may justify a limited intrusion absent probable 

cause. 

In Summers, the Supreme Court found that a limited intrusion was reasonable when the 

police temporarily restrained a person, absent probable cause, while conducting a search in that 

person’s home pursuant to a validly executed search warrant. Id. “The rule announced in 

Summers allows detention incident to the execution of a search warrant ‘because the character of 

the additional intrusion caused by detention is slight and because the justifications for detention 

are substantial.’” Bailey v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 1031, 1038, 185 L. Ed. 2d 19 (2013) 

(quoting Muehler v. Mena, 544 U.S. 93, 125 S. Ct. 1465, 161 L. Ed. 2d 299 (2005)). The 

additional intrusion was considered “slight” because, according to the Supreme Court, a 

homeowner may wish to remain in her home during a search and the impaired dignity of a public 

detention is absent inside the privacy of one’s own home. Summers, 452 U.S at 700. The Court 

also tallied the following justifications for such intrusions: preventing flight, minimizing the risk 

of harm to the officers, a suspicion of wrongdoing regarding the detained resident, and

promoting the orderly completion of the search. Id. at 702-703. Ultimately, “[a] determination 

of reasonableness hinges on ‘the law enforcement interest and the nature of the ‘articulable facts’

supporting the detention.’” Gordon, 486 F. App’x at 542 (quoting Summers, 452 U.S. at 702).

Here, there are no articulable facts or law enforcement interests supporting any detention, 

light or otherwise: There was no “interest in minimizing the risk of harm to the officers,” 

Summers, 452 U.S. at 702, because there was no credible threat to the police officers’ safety 
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when Harris pulled his door closed after the police officers declined his invitation to enter; there 

was no valid search warrant requiring detention for “the orderly completion of [a] search,” id. at 

703; there was no viable concern that Harris was engaged in wrongdoing, as discussed supra, 

nor was there any “legitimate law enforcement interest in preventing flight in the event that 

incriminating evidence is found,” id. at 702, because there was no search warrant and Harris was 

the person who called for emergency medical services and even invited the police officers into 

his home. Conceding Harris’ version of the facts, Officer Pendleton’s seizure of Harris was 

demonstrably unreasonable. Moreover, the Fourth Amendment clearly prohibits an absolutely 

unjustified seizure of an individual. As a matter of law, Officer Pendleton is not entitled to the 

shield of qualified immunity for this claim.

C. State-law Immunity

The district court denied Officer Pendleton’s state-law immunity defense for the claims 

of assault and battery and false arrest and imprisonment. Ohio Revised Code § 2744.03(A)(6) 

provides immunity to state employees of political subdivisions for any act in connection with a 

government function causing injury, unless the act was “manifestly outside the scope of the 

employee’s employment or official responsibilities” or was done “with malicious purpose, in bad 

faith, or in a wanton or reckless manner.” When federal qualified immunity and Ohio state-law 

immunity under § 2744.03(A)(6) rest on the same questions of material fact, the court may 

review the state-law immunity defense “through the lens of the federal qualified immunity 

analysis.” Chappell v. City of Cleveland, 585 F.3d 901, 907 n.1 (6th Cir. 2009). As discussed, 

conceding the facts in favor of Harris, there is no justification for either the body slam or the 

detention; accordingly, there is no state-law immunity from the claims arising out of those 
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actions because they were done in bad faith and in a wanton or reckless manner. As a matter of 

law, Officer Pendleton is not entitled to state-law immunity from Harris’ state-law claims.

III. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the order of the district court is AFFIRMED.