Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-CR-3126 | April 30, 2020 Page 1 of 6

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), 

this Memorandum Decision shall not be 

regarded as precedent or cited before any 

court except for the purpose of establishing 

the defense of res judicata, collateral 

estoppel, or the law of the case.

APPELLANT PRO SE

Richard Dodd

Westville, Indiana

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE

Curtis T. Hill, Jr.

Attorney General of Indiana

Benjamin J. Shoptaw

Deputy Attorney General

Indianapolis, Indiana

I N T H E

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

Richard Dodd,

Appellant-Petitioner,

v.

State of Indiana,

Appellee-Respondent.

April 30, 2020

Court of Appeals Case No.

18A-CR-3126

Appeal from the St. Joseph 

Superior Court

The Honorable Elizabeth C. 

Hurley, Judge

Trial Court Cause No.

71D08-9712-CF-550

Mathias, Judge.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-CR-3126 | April 30, 2020 Page 2 of 6

[1] Richard Dodd, pro se, appeals the denial of his motion to correct erroneous 

sentence in the St. Joseph Superior Court. Dodd presents the issue of whether 

the trial court abused its discretion in denying the motion. 

[2] We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[3] Dodd committed the offenses underlying this appeal in December 1997. He was 

charged and convicted of Class A felony attempted murder and Class C felony 

burglary following a jury trial. Dodd was originally sentenced to the maximum 

term of fifty years for attempted murder and the maximum term of eight years 

for burglary, to be served consecutively based on the sentencing court’s 

identification of multiple aggravating factors. On direct appeal, a panel of this 

Court upheld Dodd’s convictions and sentence. Dodd v. State, No. 71A03-9809-

CR-394 (Ind. Ct. App. July 23, 1999), trans. denied. 

[4] A subsequent motion to correct erroneous sentence was denied by the trial 

court in 2006 and affirmed on appeal. Dodd v. State, No. 71A05-0605-PC-234 

(Ind. Ct. App. May 9, 2007). Dodd filed a successive petition for postconviction relief, and at the conclusion of a post-conviction relief hearing, the 

State conceded that Dodd’s convictions were part of a single episode of criminal 

conduct for sentencing purposes under Indiana Code section 35-50-1-2. 

Accordingly, the post-conviction court determined that Dodd’s consecutive 

sentences exceeded the maximum sentence permitted by statute and remanded 

the case for resentencing. 
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[5] In November 2013, following a hearing, the resentencing court imposed 

consecutive sentences of fifty years for attempted murder and five years for 

burglary, the maximum sentence permitted for this episode of criminal conduct. 

Dodd appealed, alleging that the resentencing court abused its discretion by 

failing to consider mitigating factors. This Court found no abuse of discretion in 

Dodd’s resentencing and affirmed his fifty-five-year sentence in 2014. Dodd v. 

State, No. 71A03-1312-CR-475 (Ind. Ct. App. July 29, 2014). 

[6] Dodd filed a motion to correct erroneous sentence on October 19, 2018, 

alleging that his fifty-five-year sentence exceeded the maximum sentence 

permitted by statute. The trial court denied Dodd’s motion to correct erroneous 

sentence on December 12, 2018, writing in part:

2. In this case, the Defendant does not allege that the sentence 

itself is erroneous on its face. Instead, Defendant challenges the 

sentence, arguing that the sentence violates the law because he 

interprets the law to say that the Court had to sentence him to the 

advisory sentences for his offenses.

3. The Defendant requests relief that is not appropriate for a 

Motion to Correct Erroneous Sentence. Furthermore, the 

Defendant has litigated the issue of his sentence multiple times 

unsuccessfully. Most recently, the Indiana Court of Appeals 

found that he waived the issue in his successive Petition for PostConviction Relief, although added, via a footnote, the following:

Waiver notwithstanding, Dodd’s claim is without merit 

because he has failed to meet his burden of showing that 

[resentencing] counsel rendered deficient performance or 

that he was prejudiced by counsel’s failure to pursue the 
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issue in his resentencing appeal. See Robertson v. State, 871 

N.E.2d 280, 285-86 (Ind. 2009) (explaining the application 

of Indiana Code § 35-50-2-1.3(c) and revealing the lack of 

merit in Dodd’s argument that the statute required the 

resentencing court to impose an advisory term for each of 

his convictions). Richard Dodd v. State of Indiana, Court of 

Appeals case no. 71-A03-1702-PC-452, pg. 15 fn. 6. 

Appellant’s App. p. 9. Dodd now appeals.

Discussion and Decision

[7] We review the denial of a motion to correct erroneous sentence for an abuse of 

discretion. Felder v. State, 870 N.E.2d 554, 560 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007). An abuse 

of discretion will be found only when the trial court’s decision is against the 

logic and effect of the facts and circumstances before it. Id. A defendant who 

believes that he has been erroneously sentenced may file a motion to correct an 

erroneous sentence, which are designed to provide a prompt and uncomplicated 

process to correct sentences. Neff v. State, 888 N.E.2d 1249, 1250–51 (Ind. 

2008). Indiana Code section 35-38-1-15 provides:

If the convicted person is erroneously sentenced, the mistake 

does not render the sentence void. The sentence shall be 

corrected after written notice is given to the convicted person. 

The convicted person and his counsel must be present when the 

corrected sentence is ordered. A motion to correct sentence must 

be in writing and supported by a memorandum of law 

specifically pointing out the defect in the original sentence.

[8] Motions made pursuant to Indiana Code section 35-38-1-15 may only be used 

to attack a sentence that is “erroneous on its face.” Robinson v. State, 805 N.E.2d 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-CR-3126 | April 30, 2020 Page 5 of 6

783, 786 (Ind. 2004). A sentence is defective on its face if it violates express 

statutory authority in effect at the time the sentence was pronounced. Woodcox 

v. State, 30 N.E.3d 748, 750 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015). When claims of sentencing 

errors require consideration of matters outside the face of the sentencing 

judgment, the alleged errors may only be attacked by direct appeal or, when 

appropriate, by petitions for post-conviction relief. Robinson, 805 N.E.2d at 787. 

“Claims that require consideration of the proceedings before, during, or after 

trial may not be presented by way of a motion to correct sentence.” Id.

[9] Here, Dodd argues that the trial court abused its discretion in denying his 

motion because the resentencing court misinterpreted the applicable sentencing 

statute. Appellant’s Br. at 6. The State argues that Dodd’s motion to correct 

erroneous sentence is impermissible under Robinson because it is not a facial 

attack on the sentencing order, and thus the trial court did not abuse its 

discretion in denying his motion. We agree. 

[10] Dodd contends that his fifty-five-year sentence was contrary to the statutory 

mandate of Indiana Code section 35-50-2-1.3(c)(1), which identifies the 

circumstances under which an advisory sentence must be imposed. Dodd 

argues that, under this statute, the resentencing court was required to have 

imposed the advisory terms for each of his convictions. Dodd’s statutory 

challenge, however, involves his dispute with whether the offenses for which he 

was sentenced involved serious bodily injury or arose out of a single episode of 

criminal conduct. Appellant’s Br. at 7. Such factors cannot be evaluated 

without looking at the facts and circumstances underlying Dodd’s convictions, 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-CR-3126 | April 30, 2020 Page 6 of 6

which are beyond the face of the sentence itself and therefore unavailable for 

review as part of a motion to correct erroneous sentence. See Davis v. State, 937 

N.E.2d 8, 11 n.1 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010), trans. denied (no abuse of discretion 

where defendant claimed that two convictions were one episode of criminal 

conduct because such claim required “consideration of the evidence presented 

at trial and thus definitely falls outside the ‘face of the sentencing judgment.’”) 

(quoting Robinson, 805 N.E.2d at 787). Therefore, Dodd is unable to raise this 

challenge to his sentence by means of a motion to correct erroneous sentence, 

and the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion. 

Conclusion

[11] Accordingly, we hold that the trial court properly denied Dodd’s motion to 

correct erroneous sentence.

[12] Affirmed.

Riley, J., and Tavitas, J., concur.