## I N T H E C O U R T O F C R I M I N A L A P P E A L S

O F T E X A S

N O

. P D

- 0 1 5 9

- 1 2

G R E G G C A R L B A I R D

, A p p e l l a n t

v

.

T H E S T A T E O F T E X A S

O N A P P E L L A N T ’ S P E T I T I O N F O R D I S C R E T I O N A R Y R E V I E W

F R O M T H E T E N T H C O U R T O F A P P E A L S

B R A Z O S C O U N T Y

P R IC E

, J

. , d e l i v e r e d t h e o p i n i o n o f t h e C o u r t i n w h i c h W O M A C K

, K E A S L E R

,

H ER V EY

, C O C H R A N

, a n d A L C A L A

, J J

. , j o i n e d

. K E L L E R

, P

. J

. , f i l e d a c o n c u r r i n g o p i n i o n

.

M E Y E R S

, J

. , f

i l e d a d i s s e n t i n g o p i n i o n

. J O H N S O N

, J

. , c o n c u r r e d i n t h e r e s u l t

.

O P I N I O N

T h e a p p e l l a n t h i r e d D a w n K i l l i a n t o s t a y a t h i s h o m e a n d c a r e f o r h i s d o g w h i l e h e

w a s a w a y o n v a c a t i o n

. D u r i n g h e r s t a y

, K i l l i a n u s e d t h e a p p e l l a n t ’ s c o m p u t e r i n h i s m a s t e r

b e d r o o m a n d f

o u n d c h i l d p o r n o g r a p h y

. A t a p r e

- t r i a l m o t i o n t o s u p p r e s s h e a r i n g

, t h e

a p p e l l a n t c l a i m e d t h a t K i l l i a n ’ s a c c e s s t o h i s b e d r o o m a n d c o m p u t e r w a s i l l e g a l ; t h e r e f o r e

,

t h e S t a t e c o u l d n o t u s e t h e e v i d e n c e a g a i n s t h i m a t h i s t r i a l

, u n d e r A r t i c l e 3 8

. 2 3 ( a ) o f t h eBa ird — 2

T e x a s C o d e o f C r i m i n a l P r o c e d u r e

. T h e t r i a l c o u r t d e n i e d t h e m o t i o n t o s u p p r e s s

, a n d t h e 1

T e n t h C o u r t o f A p p e a l s a f f i r m e d

. W e g r a n t e d t h e a p p e l l a n t ’ s p e t i t i o n f o r d i s c r e t i o n a r y 2

r e v i e w t o e x a m i n e t h i s h o l d i n g

. W e n o w a f f i r m

.

F A C T S A N D P R O C E D U R A L H I S T O R Y

I n t h e T r i a l C o u r t

T h e a p p e l l a n t w a s i n d i c t e d f o r t h i r t e e n c o u n t s o f c h i l d p o r n o g r a p h y

. P r i o r t o t r i a l

, 3

t h e a p p e l l a n t f

i l e d a m o t i o n t o s u p p r e s s t h e f i l e s s e i z e d f

r o m h i s c o m p u t e r

, c l a i m i n g t h a t t h e y

s h o u l d b e e x c l u d e d u n d e r A r t i c l e 3 8

. 2 3 ( a ) o f t h e C o d e o f C r i m i n a l P r o c e d u r e

. S p e c i f i c a l l y

,

t h e a p p e l l a n t a l l e g e d t h a t D a w n K i l l i a n r e c o v e r e d t h e c o m p u t e r f i l e s w h i l e v i o l a t i n g t h e

T e x a s P e n a l C o d e p r o v i s i o n s t h a t p r o h i b i t c r i m i n a l t r e s p a s s a n d b r e a c h o f c o m p u t e r s e c u r i t y. 4

A t t h e s u p p r e s s i o n h e a r i n g

, K i l l i a n t e s t i f i e d t o t h e e v e n t s t h a t l e d u p t o h e r f i n d i n g c h i l d

p o r n o g r a p h y o n t h e a p p e l l a n t ’ s c o m p u t e r

.

K i l l i a n c a m e t o k n o w t h e a p p e l l a n t t h r o u g h a m u t u a l f r i e n d

, a n d t h e a p p e l l a n t

a r r a n g e d f

o r h e r t o p e t s i t f

o r h i s d o g w h i l e h e w a s o u t o f t o w n

. I n p r e p a r a t i o n f o r t h e j o b

,

1

See T E X

. C O D E C R I M

. P R O C

. art. 38.23(a) (evide nce o btained in violation of the laws or

constitutions of Tex as or the U nited States may not be used a s evidenc e in a c riminal case ).

2

Baird v. State , 379 S.W .3d 353, 358 ( T e x

. A p p

. — W a c o 2 0 1 2 )

.

3

T E X

. P E N A L C O D E § 43.26(a)

.

4

See T E X P E N A L C O D E § 30.05(a) (1) and § 33.02(a)

. At the suppression hear ing, the appellant

also alleg ed that Killian violated other penal provisions, but he did not press those claims on appea l

or in his petition for discretionar y revie w, and so we have no oc casion to addr ess them.Ba ird — 3

K i l l i a n v i s i t e d t h e a p p e l l a n t ’ s h o m e t w i c e

, o n c e t o m e e t t h e d o g a n d a s e c o n d t i m e o n t h e d a y

t h a t t h e a p p e l l a n t p l a n n e d t o l e a v e s o h e c o u l d s h o w h e r a r o u n d t h e h o m e

. T h i s t o u r o f t h e

a p p e l l a n t ’ s h o m e

, K i l l i a n m a i n t a i n e d

, i n c l u d e d a w a l k t h r o u g h t h e m a s t e r b e d r o o m a n d

b a t h r o o m a s w e l l a s t h e g u e s t b e d r o o m a n d b a t h r o o m

, w h e r e s h e w a s t o s t a y

. T h e a p p e l l a n t

a l s o p o i n t e d o u t h i s r o o m m a t e ’ s b e d r o o m a n d o f f i c e a n d “ k i n d o f i n d i c a t [ e d ] t h a t t h o s e w e r e

p r o b a b l y p l a c e s t h a t n e i t h e r I [ n ] o r t h e d o g w o u l d b e g o i n g

. ” I n t h e k i t c h e n

, t h e a p p e l l a n t

“ o p e n [ e d ] c a b i n e t s a n d c u p b o a r d s ” s p e c i f i c a l l y t o s h o w K i l l i a n w h e r e t h e d o g ’ s l e a s h c o u l d

b e f o u n d a n d t o “ k i n d o f s h o w [ ] [ h e r ] w h e r e t h i n g s w e r e a t

. ” W h i l e t h e y w e r e i n t h e k i t c h e n

,

t h e a p p e l l a n t t o l d K i l l i a n

, “ H e l p y o u r s e l f t o a n y t h i n g

. ” A c c o r d i n g t o K i l l i a n

, t h i s s t a t e m e n t

w a s r e p e a t e d a t l e a s t o n c e d u r i n g t h e t o u r o f t h e h o m e

. A t o n e p o i n t

, K i l l i a n q u o t e s t h e

a p p e l l a n t a s g o i n g s o f

a r a s t o t e l l h e r t h a t s h e c o u l d “ [ h ] e l p [ h e r ] s e l f t o e v e r y t h i n g

. ” A s p a r t

o f t h e t o u r

, t h e a p p e l l a n t d e m o n s t r a t e d h o w t o u s e t h e v a r i o u s r e m o t e c o n t r o l s t o h i s “ v e r y

l a r g e T V ” a n d D V D p l a y e r

. T h e a p p e l l a n t i n s t r u c t e d K i l l i a n t o k e e p t h e m a s t e r b e d r o o m

d o o r c l o s e d “ b e c a u s e h e d i d n ’ t w a n t t h e d o g s l e e p i n g i n h i s b e d [

. ] ” H o w e v e r

, t h e a p p e l l a n t

n e v e r s p e c i f

i c a l l y i n s t r u c t e d K i l l i a n t h a t s h e w a s n o t p e r m i t t e d t o e n t e r t h e m a s t e r b e d r o o m

o r t h a t s h e w a s n o t a l l o w e d t o a c c e s s h i s c o m p u t e r i n t h e m a s t e r b e d r o o m

.

K i l l i a n t h e n e x p l a i n e d h o w s h e c a m e t o u s e t h e a p p e l l a n t ’ s c o m p u t e r

. I n a n a t t e m p t

t o c o p y s o n g s f

r o m o n e o f t h e a p p e l l a n t ’ s c o m p a c t d i s k s o n t o h e r p h o n e

, K i l l i a n e n t e r e d t h e

m a s t e r b e d r o o m a n d a c t i v a t e d t h e c o m p u t e r f r o m i t s s l e e p m o d e b y s i m p l y m o v i n g t h e

m o u s e

. T h e c o m p u t e r w a s p o w e r e d o n a n d w a s n o t p a s s w o r d p r o t e c t e d

. S h e i n s e r t e d aBa ird — 4

c o m p a c t d i s k i n t o t h e c o m p u t e r t o b e g i n t h e c o p y i n g p r o c e s s

. A f t e r r e a l i z i n g t h a t t h e p r o c e s s

w o u l d b e m o r e c o m p l i c a t e d t h a n s h e o r i g i n a l l y b e l i e v e d

, K i l l i a n d e c i d e d t o a b a n d o n h e r i d e a

t o t r a n s f e r t h e s o n g s

. H o w e v e r

, b y t h i s t i m e s h e h a d a l r e a d y l o a d e d t h e m u s i c o n t o t h e

c o m p u t e r

. I n a n a t t e m p t t o “ c l e a n u p w h a t [ s h e ] h a d d o n e

, ” s h e w e n t i n t o t h e “ r e c e n t

d o c u m e n t s ” f

o l d e r

. T h e r e s h e s a w t i t l e s t h a t s u g g e s t e d t h e a p p e l l a n t h a d c h i l d p o r n o g r a p h y

o n h i s c o m p u t e r

. K i l l i a n a l s o o p e n e d t h e “ r e c y c l e b i n

. . . [ t ] o t a k e t h e s e c o n d s t e p o f 5

d e l e t i n g t h e m u s i c

. ” T h e r e s h e d i s c o v e r e d t h u m b n a i l i m a g e s o f w h a t s h e t h o u g h t w a s c h i l d

p o r n o g r a p h y

. W h e n p l a y i n g a v i d e o u l t i m a t e l y c o n f i r m e d h e r s u s p i c i o n

, K i l l i a n c o n t a c t e d

t h e C o l l e g e S t a t i o n P o l i c e D e p a r t m e n t

.

T o c o r r o b o r a t e K i l l i a n ’ s t e s t i m o n y

, t h e S t a t e c a l l e d W i l l i a m O d o m

, a f o r e n s i c

c o m p u t e r e x p e r t

, w h o s t u d i e d a “ f o r e n s i c c o p y ” o f K i l l i a n ’ s a c t i v i t y o n t h e a p p e l l a n t ’ s

c o m p u t e r

. O d o m ’ s t e s t i m o n y l a r g e l y s u b s t a n t i a t e d K i l l i a n ’ s s t o r y

, e x c e p t t h a t h e d i d n o t

6

f i n d a n y e v i d e n c e t h a t s o n g s w e r e t r a n s f e r r e d o n t o o r d e l e t e d f

r o m t h e c o m p u t e r

.

T h e a p p e l l a n t t e s t i f

i e d

, c o n t e s t i n g K i l l i a n ’ s t e s t i m o n y i n a f e w k e y a s p e c t s

. H e d e n i e d

h a v i n g t a k e n K i l l i a n i n t o t h e m a s t e r b e d r o o m o r b a t h r o o m

. H e c o n f i r m e d t h a t h e t o l d K i l l i a n

t o k e e p t h e d o o r t o t h e m a s t e r b e d r o o m c l o s e d

. H i s i n t e n t i o n w a s n o t o n l y t o k e e p h i s d o g

o u t

, b u t t o k e e p K i l l i a n o u t a s w e l l

. H o w e v e r

, i t i s u n c l e a r f r o m h i s t e s t i m o n y w h e t h e r h e

5

Whil e Killian could not reme mber the title of the files at the hear ing, she ag ree d that it was

something to the e ffe ct of “ y oung er boy sucks older ma

n.”

6

The rec ord does not clea

rly reve al exactly what a “for ensic copy ” is. Whatever it is, it seems

to have pr ovided Odom with specific information about Killian’s ac cess to the c omputer.Ba ird — 5

e v e r c o m m u n i c a t e d e i t h e r o f t h e s e s p e c i f

i c i n t e n t i o n s t o K i l l i a n

. H e d i d a c k n o w l e d g e t h a t 7

7

On cross-e x amination, the prosec utor asked the appellant about his instruction to keep the

door closed a

nd his moti vation behind that instruction:

Q N o w

, y o u i n d i c a t e d y o u t o l d h e r t h e b e d r o o m d o o r s h o u l d r e m a i n s h u t

. Y o u n e v e r

t o l d h e r s h e c o u l d n o t g o i n t o t h e b e d r o o m

. Is t h a t c o r r e c t ?

A Corre ct.

Q The idea of keeping the bedroom door shut rea lly had to do about keeping the dog

out while she wa s not there; is that rig ht?

A True

.

***

Q So no question y ou never told Dawn, “D o not go into my bedroom? ”

A I never stated - - - I

told Dawn to kee p the bedr oom door shut.

Q And that was in connec tion with keeping the dog out of there when she wasn’t in

there ? Yes or no?

A Corre ct.

***

Q But y our rec ollection now is that y ou specific ally told her, “I don’t want [t he dog ]

in my bedroom? ”

A Corre ct.

***

A The only statement I rec all telling her was to please keep my bedroom door shut.

Q I n connec tion with [ the dog ], right?

A I don’t know if those two stateme nts were made c oncurr ently at the same time.

I n response to a question on redire ct examination, the appellant indicated that the rea son he

wanted the door closed was to keep both the dog and Killian out of t h e bedroom. He was neverBa ird — 6

h e n e v e r e x p r e s s l y t o l d K i l l i a n n o t t o e n t e r h i s m a s t e r b e d r o o m

. W i t h r e s p e c t t o h i s s t a t e m e n t

t o K i l l i a n t h a t s h e s h o u l d “ [ h ] e l p [ h e r ] s e l f t o a n y t h i n g

, ” t h e a p p e l l a n t c l a i m e d t h a t h e m a d e

t h i s o f f e r i n t h e k i t c h e n a n d t h a t i t p e r t a i n e d s p e c i f i c a l l y a n d e x c l u s i v e l y t o f o o d

. H e

e x p l a i n e d t h a t h e a c t u a l l y t o l d K i l l i a n

, “ Y o u c a n h e l p y o u r s e l f t o a n y f o o d y o u f

i n d

, ” w h i l e

g e s t u r i n g t o t h e r e f

r i g e r a t o r

. A s e v i d e n c e o f t h i s l i m i t e d i n t e n t i o n

, h e t o l d t h e t r i a l c o u r t t h a t

h e h a d s t o c k e d h i s k i t c h e n w i t h K i l l i a n ’ s p r e f e r r e d b e e r a n d f

o o d

. H e a d m i t t e d t h a t h e

s h o w e d K i l l i a n h o w t o u s e b o t h h i s t e l e v i s i o n a n d h i s s t e r e o

. F i n a l l y

, w h i l e h e m a i n t a i n e d

t h a t K i l l i a n d i d n o t h a v e h i s c o n s e n t t o a c c e s s h i s c o m p u t e r

, t h e a p p e l l a n t a c k n o w l e d g e d t h a t

h e a l l o w e d h i s r o o m m a t e t o u s e i t

.

T h e d e f e n s e n e x t c a l l e d R o s e H u b b a r d

, a c o m p u t e r f o r e n s i c e x a m i n e r

. S h e a g r e e d

w i t h O d o m t h a t t h e r e w a s n o i n d i c a t i o n t h a t m u s i c h a d b e e n l o a d e d o n t o o r d e l e t e d f r o m t h e

c o m p u t e r

. U n l i k e O d o m

, H u b b a r d t e s t i f i e d t h a t s h e d i d n o t f

i n d e v i d e n c e c o n s i s t e n t w i t h

K i l l i a n i n s e r t i n g a c o m p a c t d i s k i n t o t h e c o m p u t e r

. I n s t e a d

, H u b b a r d e x p l a i n e d

, t h e e v i d e n c e

s i m p l y s h o w e d t h a t “ a f i l e w a s a c c e s s e d

. ” 8

asked, howeve r, and never offe red whether he expressed this motivation to Killian during the tour.

8

I t is unclea

r from Hubbar d’s testimony exactly what kind of file she believed was acc essed.

Hubbar d ref

ers to the file in question as an “AOL CAT file,” a “CAB file,” a “M.C.S.C. CAT” file,

or a file consistent with “the computer being aslee p and updating itself.” I t is also unclea r from her

testimony whether she believed that the computer was still in sleep mode duri n g t h i s t i m e. The

defe nse atto rney inquired about the s tate of the computer during the t ime Killian claims she i nput

a compa ct disk:

Q S o y our testimony

is that this j ust happene d while the computer was a sleep?

A Possibly

.Ba ird — 7

T h e t r i a l c o u r t d e n i e d t h e a p p e l l a n t ’ s m o t i o n t o s u p p r e s s t h e i m a g e s t a k e n f r o m h i s

c o m p u t e r

, c r e d i t i n g K i l l i a n ’ s t e s t i m o n y o v e r t h e a p p e l l a n t ’ s

. S p e c i f i c a l l y

, t h e t r i a l c o u r t 9

f o u n d t h a t t h e a p p e l l a n t d i d n o t e x p l i c i t l y e x c l u d e K i l l i a n f r o m h i s b e d r o o m o r f

r o m h i s

c o m p u t e r ; t h a t h e w a l k e d h e r t h r o u g h t h e m a s t e r b e d r o o m a n d b a t h r o o m ; a n d t h a t h e t o l d h e r

Q Possibly ?

A Yes.

9

The suppression hear ing conclude d on Fe bruar y 26, 2010. The State filed proposed finding s

of fac t and conclusion of law on May 27, 2010. On Aug ust 3, 2010, the appellant reque sted finding s.

See State v. Cullen

, 195 S.W .3d 696, 699 (Tex. Crim. App

. 2 006). The trial court subsequently

adopted the State’ s proposed finding s and conc lusions, which included the following :

3. Dawn Killian provided cre di ble testimony reg arding the circ umstances of her

acc ess to [t he appellant’ s] home, bedroom, computer, and information o n that

computer.

* * *

8. [The appellant] place d no limit s or res t ri cti ons on Dawn Killian’s acc ess to his

home.

9. Specifica lly

, [t he appellant] place d no limit ations or restrict i o n s o n Dawn

Killian’s acc ess to his bedroom.

10. [The appellant] place d no limit ations or restric tions on Dawn Killian’s acc ess to

his computer.

11. [The appellant] . . . took no steps to protect the information on his computer[.]

12. Prior to leaving his home, [t he appellant] showed Dawn Killian around his home,

including his be droom and ba throom.

13. [The appellant] told Dawn Killian to “help y ourself to any thing” or words of that

eff ect.Ba ird — 8

t o “ [ h ] e l p [ h e r ] s e l f t o a n y t h i n g

. ” B a s e d o n t h e s e f a c t f i n d i n g s

, t h e t r i a l c o u r t d e t e r m i n e d t h a t

K i l l i a n d i d n o t v i o l a t e t h e P e n a l C o d e b e c a u s e s h e h a d t h e a p p e l l a n t ’ s e f f e c t i v e c o n s e n t t o

e n t e r t h e b e d r o o m a n d u s e t h e c o m p u t e r

, a n d i t h e l d t h a t

, w i t h o u t e s t a b l i s h i n g t h a t K i l l i a n

v i o l a t e d t h e l a w

, t h e a p p e l l a n t c o u l d n o t i n v o k e A r t i c l e 3 8

. 2 3 t o e x c l u d e t h e m a t e r i a l

. 1 0

A f t e r t h e t r i a l c o u r t d e n i e d h i s m o t i o n t o s u p p r e s s

, t h e a p p e l l a n t p l e d g u i l t y t o t e n 1 1

c o u n t s o f c h i l d p o r n o g r a p h y

, a n d t h e t r i a l c o u r t s e n t e n c e d h i m t o t e n y e a r s ’ i n c a r c e r a t i o n o n

n i n e o f t h e c o u n t s a n d f i v e y e a r s ’ i n c a r c e r a t i o n o n t h e r e m a i n i n g c o u n t

. T h e j u d g e o r d e r e d

t h e f i v e y e a r s e n t e n c e a n d o n e o f t h e t e n y e a r s e n t e n c e s t o r u n c o n s e c u t i v e l y t o t h e e i g h t o t h e r

t e n y e a r s e n t e n c e s

. O n a p p e a l

, t h e a p p e l l a n t c h a l l e n g e d t h e p r e

- t r i a l s u p p r e s s i o n r u l i n g

.

I n t h e C o u r t o f A p p e a l s

T h e c o u r t o f a p p e a l s a f f i r m e d t h e t r i a l c o u r t ’ s r u l i n g

. T h e c o u r t o f a p p e a l s 1 2

1 0

Under either provision, Killian violated the Penal Code only if she did not have eff ective

consent. See T E X

. P E N A L C O D E § 3 0

. 0 5 (a) (“A person commits an offense if the person enter s or

rema ins on or in proper

ty of another

, including residential land, ag ricultural land, a re creational

vehicle park, a building, or an airc raf t or other vehicle without eff ective consent and the person: (1)

had notice that the entry was forbidden; or (2) rec eived notice to depar t but failed to do so.”); T E X

. P E N A L C O D E § 33.02(a) (“A person commits an o ff en s e if the person knowing ly acc esses a

computer, c omputer networ k, or computer

sy stem without effe ctive conse nt of the owne r.”)

.

1 1

At the conclusion of prese n t at i o n o f ev idence at the suppression hear ing, counsel for the

appellant made his closing arg ument first, followed by the prosec utor. Wit hout awa iting rebut t al

arg ument from the appellant, the trial court orally denied the motion to suppress. C ounsel for the

appellan t compl ained that he had not been permitted to rebut, but ultimately y ielded with the

observa tion that, “I ’m not g oing to do a useless thing.” The trial court apolog ized for encr oaching

, observing that “I

thought y ou wer e throug h.” Tria l counsel conc luded, “Tha t’s fine, Judge.”

1 2

Baird

, supra , at 358.Ba ird — 9

c o n c l u d e d t h a t t h e t r i a l c o u r t ’ s r e s o l u t i o n o f t h e f a c t u a l d i s p u t e w a s s u p p o r t e d b y t h e

e v i d e n c e e l i c i t e d a t t h e s u p p r e s s i o n h e a r i n g a n d t h a t t h e t r i a l c o u r t c o r r e c t l y d e n i e d t h e

m o t i o n t o s u p p r e s s u n d e r A r t i c l e 3 8

. 2 3 b a s e d u p o n t h e f a c t s a s t h u s r e s o l v e d

. A c c o r d i n g 1 3

t o t h e c o u r t o f a p p e a l s

, K i l l i a n d i d n o t v i o l a t e e i t h e r s e c t i o n o f t h e P e n a l C o d e b e c a u s e s h e

h a d t h e a p p e l l a n t ’ s a p p a r e n t c o n s e n t t o a c c e s s h i s m a s t e r b e d r o o m a n d u s e h i s c o m p u t e r

.

T h a t i s t o s a y t h a t

, w h i l e s h e d i d n o t h a v e t h e a p p e l l a n t ’ s e x p r e s s a s s e n t i n f a c t

, s h e d i d h a v e

h i s a p p a r e n t a s s e n t i n f

a c t

. W e g r a n t e d r e v i e w o f t h e a p p e l l a n t ’ s p e t i t i o n f o r d i s c r e t i o n a r y 1 4

r e v i e w t o s c r u t i n i z e t h i s h o l d i n g

. 1 5

A P P E L L A T E S T A N D A R D

A n a p p e l l a t e c o u r t r e v i e w s a t r i a l c o u r t ’ s p r e

- t r i a l s u p p r e s s i o n r u l i n g u n d e r a

b i f u r c a t e d s t a n d a r d

. A l m o s t t o t a l d e f e r e n c e i s a f

f o r d e d t o t h e t r i a l c o u r t ’ s d e t e r m i n a t i o n 1 6

o f f a c t

. D e t e r m i n a t i o n s o f f a c t i n c l u d e “ w h o d i d w h a t

, w h e n

, w h e r e

, h o w

, o r w h y ” a n d 1 7

1 3

Id . at 357-58.

1 4

Id

.

1 5

T E X

. R. A P P

. P. 66.3( b). One consideration infor ming this Court’s decision on whether to

g rant a petition for discretionar y review is “whe ther a court of appea ls has decide d an important

question of st ate or fede ral law that has not been, but should be, settl ed by th e C o u rt o f C riminal

Appea ls.”

1 6

Valtierra v. State , 310 S.W .3d 442, 447 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010).

1 7

Id

.Ba ird — 10

“ c r e d i b i l i t y d e t e r m i n a t i o n s

. ” B e c a u s e “ [ t ] r i a l j u d g e s

. . . a r e u n i q u e l y s i t u a t e d t o ‘ o b s e r v e [ ] 1 8

f i r s t h a n d t h e d e m e a n o r a n d a p p e a r a n c e o f a w i t n e s s [

, ] ’ ” t h i s C o u r t h a s l o n g r e c o g n i z e d t h a t

t h e y a r e t h e s o l e a r b i t e r o f q u e s t i o n s o f f a c t a n d o f t h e w e i g h t a n d c r e d i b i l i t y t o g i v e

t e s t i m o n y

. I n t h a t c a p a c i t y

, a t r i a l j u d g e i s f r e e t o b e l i e v e o r d i s b e l i e v e a n y p a r t o f t h e 1 9

t e s t i m o n y a s h e s e e s f

i t

. W h e n a t r i a l j u d g e m a k e s w r i t t e n f i n d i n g s o f f

a c t

, a s h e d i d i n t h e 2 0

i n s t a n t c a s e

, a r e v i e w i n g c o u r t m u s t e x a m i n e t h e r e c o r d i n t h e l i g h t m o s t f a v o r a b l e t o t h e

r u l i n g a n d u p h o l d t h o s e f a c t f i n d i n g s s o l o n g a s t h e y a r e s u p p o r t e d b y t h e r e c o r d

. T h e 2 1

r e v i e w i n g c o u r t t h e n p r o c e e d s t o a d e n o v o d e t e r m i n a t i o n o f t h e l e g a l s i g n i f i c a n c e o f t h e

f a c t s a s f

o u n d b y t h e t r i a l c o u r t

. T h a t d e n o v o d e t e r m i n a t i o n s o m e t i m e s i n v o l v e s 2 2

c o n s t r u c t i o n o f s t a t u t o r y l a n g u a g e

. 2 3

A N A L Y S I S

T h e T r i a l C o u r t ’ s R e s o l u t i o n o f F a c t u a l D i s c r e p a n c i e s

T h e a p p e l l a n t o b

j e c t s t o t h e t r i a l c o u r t ’ s f i n d i n g s t h a t h e p l a c e d n o l i m i t s o n K i l l i a n ’ s

1 8

State v. Sheppard , 271 S.W .3d 281, 291 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008).

1 9

W iede v. State

, 214 S.W .3d 17, 25 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007) (quoting State v. Ross

, 32 S.W .3d

853, 855 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000)).

2 0

Ross

, supra , at 855.

2 1

Valtierra

, supra , at 447.

2 2

Derichsweiler v . State, 348 S.W .3d 906, 913 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011).

2 3

W illiams v. State , 253 S.W .3d 673, 677 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008).Ba ird — 11

a c c e s s t o e i t h e r h i s b e d r o o m o r h i s c o m p u t e r

. W e d o n o t d i s a g r e e t h a t t h e a p p e l l a n t ’ s o w n 2 4

t e s t i m o n y w o u l d s u p p o r t h i s c o n t e n t i o n t h a t h e n e v e r a s s e n t e d i n f a c t t o h e r e n t e r i n g h i s

b e d r o o m a n d a c c e s s i n g h i s c o m p u t e r

. B u t w e r e v i e w t h e r e c o r d i n t h e l i g h t m o s t f a v o r a b l e

t o t h e t r i a l c o u r t ’ s r e s o l u t i o n o f d i s p u t e d f a c t s a n d c o n c l u d e t h a t t h e e v i d e n c e

— s p e c i f i c a l l y

K i l l i a n ’ s t e s t i m o n y

— a d e q u a t e l y s u p p o r t s t h e t r i a l c o u r t ’ s c o n t r a r y f a c t f i n d i n g s

. K i l l i a n

t e s t i f i e d

, a n d t h e a p p e l l a n t c o n f i r m e d

, t h a t h e n e v e r e x p l i c i t l y e x c l u d e d h e r f r o m h i s m a s t e r

b e d r o o m o r f

r o m h i s c o m p u t e r

. S h e a l s o t e s t i f i e d t h a t h e t o l d h e r t o “ [ h ] e l p [ h e r ] s e l f t o

a n y t h i n g ” a n d “ e v e r y t h i n g ” ; h e w a l k e d h e r t h r o u g h t h e m a s t e r b e d r o o m

, w h e r e t h e c o m p u t e r

w a s k e p t ; a n d h e t o l d h e r t o k e e p t h e b e d r o o m d o o r c l o s e d o n l y f o r t h e e x p r e s s p u r p o s e o f

k e e p i n g t h e d o g o u t

. W i t h r e g a r d t o t h e s p e c i f i c f i n d i n g t h a t a p p e l l a n t p l a c e d n o l i m i t s o n

K i l l i a n ’ s a c c e s s t o h i s c o m p u t e r

, t h e a p p e l l a n t a c k n o w l e d g e d t h a t h e r e g u l a r l y a l l o w e d h i s

r o o m m a t e t o u s e i t

. H e a l s o c o n c e d e d t h a t h e h a d s h o w e d K i l l i a n h o w t o u s e o t h e r e l e c t r o n i c

d e v i c e s s u c h a s h i s t e l e v i s i o n a n d s t e r e o

. K i l l i a n ’ s t e s t i m o n y t h a t t h e a p p e l l a n t h a d l e f t t h e

c o m p u t e r p o w e r e d o n a n d d i d n o t p u t a p a s s w o r d o n i t a l s o s u p p o r t s t h i s f i n d i n g

.

T h e a p p e l l a n t p a r t i c u l a r l y c o n t e s t s t h e t r i a l c o u r t ’ s i m p l i c i t f i n d i n g t h a t t h e a p p e l l a n t

t o l d K i l l i a n t o “ [ h ] e l p [ h e r ] s e l f t o a n y t h i n g ” i n t h e h o u s e

. A g a i n

, h e p o i n t s t o h i s o w n 2 5

2 4

See note 9 ante , Finding of F act #8.

2 5

See note 9, ante

, Finding of Fa ct #13. Whil e this finding of fac t, when v i ew ed al o ne, is

somewhat ambig uous as to whether the statement applied to a particula r are a of the house or the

home as a whole, whe n viewed in the contex t of t he trial c ourt’s other f indings, it is rea sonable to

conclude that the trial court found that the statement appli ed to the entire house. The trial court

deeme d Killian’s testimony to be cre dible. Killian testified that the statement applied to the entireBa ird — 12

t e s t i m o n y t h a t t h i s c o m m e n t w a s o n l y m a d e i n t h e k i t c h e n

, a n d s p e c i f i c a l l y i n r e f

e r e n c e t o

f o o d

. H o w e v e r

, t h e a p p e l l a n t d o e s n o t a c k n o w l e d g e t h a t K i l l i a n t e s t i f i e d t h a t t h e a p p e l l a n t

r e p e a t e d t h i s s t a t e m e n t a t l e a s t o n c e d u r i n g t h e t o u r o f t h e h o m e a n d t o l d h e r a l s o t o “ [ h ] e l p

h e r s e l f t o e v e r y t h i n g

. ” W e c o n c l u d e t h a t t h e t r i a l c o u r t ’ s r e s o l u t i o n o f t h i s 2 6

house. She even quotes the appellant at one time say ing she could “[h] elp [her]self to ever y thing.”

Killian’s testimony

, combined with the trial court’s finding that the appell an t p l ace d no limit s on

Killian’s acc ess to his h o m e, support the infere nce that the trial court implicitl y found that the

statement applied to the e ntire home.

2 6

The rec ord prese nts ample rea son for the trial court to find Killian’s acc ount more cre dible,

including her testimony that the appellant’ s invitation to “help herse lf” was extended more than once

and was not limit ed to the contents of the kitchen. I m m ed i at el y after acc essing the appellant’ s

computer and finding what looked to her like child pornog raphy

, Killian took part in a leng thy

I nterne t “cha

t room” conver sation, which was acc essed by the State’s computer expert, downloaded,

printed out, and admitted into evidenc e at the suppression hear ing. I n it, Killian descr ibed the tour

that the appellant had g iven her of the house, which “included direc tions to the 5 remotes to the tv,

the stere o, the sec urity , etc[.] and a g ener al ‘he lp y ourself to a ny thing’ statement.”

Killian then descr ibed how she

decide d to copy 2 song s from a cd to my phone and ‘woke ’ the computer from sleep

mode, installed the music disc, completed the transfe r, then o p en ed the start

menu/my rec ent documents to r ight click and remove the 2 song s from the list then

delete them from the trash. Both the trash and the my rec ent documents list are full

of video download titles such as ‘emo b o y s l av e, ’ ‘3 boy s of fun, ‘my 10 y r old

boy friend’ (this would be when I throw up).

Killian admitted to a cer

tain para noia, such as whether she might be acc used o f downloading the

pornog raphy

, and wonder ed whether she should tell her boss, who is a friend of appellant, what she

had seen. Then she worrie d that her boss, who also had a key to appellant’ s house, might be acc used

of downloading the videos. She explained that the situation was

horribly serious. On one hand I have no desire to falsely accus e an y o n e of

downloadin g childporn (I have seen what being labeled a sex offe nder can do to

persons that y ou and I wouldn’t consider dang erous)

. . . nor deal with all the drama

this revelation could initiate (its possible my boss could dislike me for “telling” on

his friend)

. On the other hand, my boss has a boy child, this neig hborhood is full of

children and this man has had y ear s o f acc ess as Big Br other/Eag le/adventur eBa ird — 13

f a c t u a l / c r e d i b i l i t y d i s p u t e b e t w e e n t h e p a r t i e s

— t h a t t h e a p p e l l a n t ’ s i n v i t a t i o n w a s n o t l i m i t e d

t o f o o d

— i s s u p p o r t e d b y t h e r e c o r d

.

A p p a r e n t C o n s e n t

T h e a p p e l l a n t a l s o c h a l l e n g e s t h e c o u r t o f a p p e a l s ’ s r u l i n g w i t h r e s p e c t t o t h e l e g a l

s i g n i f i c a n c e o f t h e f

a c t s e v e n a s t h e t r i a l c o u r t f o u n d t h e m

. T h e c o u r t o f a p p e a l s h e l d t h a t 2 7

K i l l i a n h a d t h e e f

f e c t i v e c o n s e n t t o e n t e r t h e a p p e l l a n t ’ s b e d r o o m a n d u s e h i s c o m p u t e r

b e c a u s e h e g a v e h e r h i s “ a p p a r e n t ” a s s e n t i n f a c t t o d o s o

. T h e c o u r t o f a p p e a l s d i d n o t

2 8

e l a b o r a t e o n w h a t i t m e a n t b y “ a p p a r e n t

, ” a n d t h e P e n a l C o d e d o e s n o t d e f i n e i t

.

W h e t h e r K i l l i a n c o m m i t t e d e i t h e r t r e s p a s s o r b r e a c h o f c o m p u t e r s e c u r i t y d e p e n d s

u p o n w h e t h e r s h e h a d t h e a p p e l l a n t ’ s “ e f f e c t i v e c o n s e n t

. ” T h e i s s u e i s n o t w h e t h e r a n y 2 9

c o n s e n t t h a t t h e a p p e l l a n t m a y h a v e g i v e n w a s “ e f f e c t i v e ” a s t h a t t e r m i s d e f i n e d i n t h e P e n a l

Scout[ .]

Numerous “cha

t room” people respond with advice

, virtually all of it rec ommending that she notify

the authorities. Killian bemoane d the situation in which she found he rself:

Why did I want to dog sit for money

. . . (is fling money for my san dieg o trip worth

this? ? ) I wish I had neve r wa

nted to put that music on my phone.

Killian and the chat room participa nts decide d that she must repor t what she had seen. Killian signe d

off, say ing, “mea

nwhile I am taking the dog and g oing to my house[.] [T] his fanc y place is cre eping

me out now. [T] omorrow is g oing to be a busy tough day .” This chat room conver sation is entirely

consistent with Killian’s testimony at the suppre ssion hearing

.

2 7

Appellant’s B rief a

t 17.

2 8

Baird

, supra , at 357-58.

2 9

See note 10, ante

.Ba ird — 14

C o d e

, b u t w h e t h e r h e g a v e a n y c o n s e n t a t a l l

. “ C o n s e n t ” i s s t a t u t o r i l y d e f i n e d a s “ a s s e n t 3 0

i n f a c t

, w h e t h e r e x p r e s s o r a p p a r e n t

. ” T h e r e i s n o c o n t e n t i o n h e r e t h a t t h e a p p e l l a n t 3 1

e x p r e s s l y a s s e n t e d i n f

a c t t o K i l l i a n e n t e r i n g h i s b e d r o o m a n d a c c e s s i n g h i s c o m p u t e r

. T h e

i s s u e t h e r e f

o r e b o i l s d o w n t o w h e t h e r

, a s t h e c o u r t o f a p p e a l s h e l d

, t h e a p p e l l a n t g a v e h i s

“ a p p a r e n t ” a s s e n t i n f

a c t t o h e r d o i n g s o

. W h e t h e r K i l l i a n ’ s d e s c r i p t i o n o f h e r e n c o u n t e r w i t h

t h e a p p e l l a n t f

i t s t h e s t a t u t o r y c r i t e r i a f o r a p p a r e n t a s s e n t i n f

a c t t u r n s o n w h a t w e c o n s t r u e

“ a p p a r e n t ” t o m e a n i n t h e c o n t e x t o f t h e s t a t u t o r y l a n g u a g e i n w h i c h i t a p p e a r s

.

S o w h a t d o e s S e c t i o n 1

. 0 7 ( 1 1 ) o f t h e P e n a l C o d e m e a n b y “ a s s e n t i n f a c t ” t h a t i s

“ a p p a r e n t ” a s o p p o s e d t o “ e x p r e s s ” ? T h e c a r d i n a l p r i n c i p l e o f s t a t u t o r y c o n s t r u c t i o n i s t o

i m p l e m e n t t h e w i l l o f t h e L e g i s l a t u r e

. I n c o n s t r u i n g s t a t u t o r y l a n g u a g e

, w e a l w a y s b e g i n 3 2

w i t h t h e l i t e r a l t e x t

, r e a d i n g i t i n c o n t e x t a n d c o n s t r u i n g i t a c c o r d i n g t o t h e r u l e s o f g r a m m a r

a n d c o m m o n u s a g e

. W e a s s u m e t h a t e v e r y w o r d w a s m e a n t t o s e r v e a d i s c r e t e p u r p o s e t h a t 3 3

s h o u l d b e g i v e n e f

f e c t

. A n d w e m a y a l s o c o n s u l t s t a n d a r d d i c t i o n a r i e s t o d e t e r m i n e t h e 3 4

c o m m o n u s a g e o f a w o r d w h e r e t h a t w o r d d o e s n o t h a v e a t e c h n i c a l m e a n i n g o r i s n o t

3 0

T E X

. P E N A L C O D E § 1.07(19).

3 1

T E X

. P E N A L C O D E § 1.07(11).

3 2

Ive y v. State , 277 S.W .3d 43, 52 n.51 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009).

3 3

Tapps v. State

, 294 S.W .3d 175, 177 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009).

3 4

Id

.Ba ird — 15

p a r t i c u l a r l y d e f

i n e d b y t h e L e g i s l a t u r e i n t h e s t a t u t e i t s e l f

. I f

, h a v i n g i m p l e m e n t e d t h e s e 3 5

b a s i c c a n o n s o f s t a t u t o r y c o n s t r u c t i o n

, w e f i n d t h a t t h e s t a t u t o r y l a n g u a g e i s p l a i n o n i t s f a c e

,

w e a r e o r d i n a r i l y c o n s t r a i n e d t o a d h e r e t o t h e p l a i n i m p o r t o f t h a t s t a t u t o r y l a n g u a g e

,

r e g a r d i n g i t a s t h e d e f

i n i t i v e i n d i c i u m o f t h e l e g i s l a t i v e i n t e n t

. W e m a y n o t r e s o r t t o e x t r a

3 6

t e x t u a l f a c t o r s t o c o n s t r u e s t a t u t o r y l a n g u a g e o t h e r w i s e t h a n b y i t s p l a i n i m p o r t

— u n l e s s

i m p l e m e n t a t i o n o f t h e p l a i n l a n g u a g e w o u l d l e a d t o a b s u r d c o n s e q u e n c e s t h a t t h e L e g i s l a t u r e

c o u l d n o t p o s s i b l y h a v e i n t e n d e d

.

T h e w o r d “ a p p a r e n t ” h a s t w o d i c t i o n a r y d e f i n i t i o n s t h a t c o u l d p l a u s i b l y a p p l y i n t h e

c o n t e x t o f S e c t i o n 1

. 0 7 ( 1 1 ) o f t h e P e n a l C o d e

. T h e o l d e s t s e n s e o f t h e w o r d i s “ c l e a r o r

m a n i f e s t t o t h e u n d e r s t a n d i n g

. ” B u t t h e w o r d m a y a l s o m e a n

, i n s o m e c o n t e x t s

, “ m a n i f e s t 3 7

t o t h e s e n s e o r m i n d a s r e a l o r t r u e o n t h e b a s i s o f e v i d e n c e t h a t m a y o r m a y n o t b e f a c t u a l l y

v a l i d

. ” A s t a t u t e i s a m b i g u o u s w h e n t h e l a n g u a g e i t e m p l o y s i s r e a s o n a b l y s u s c e p t i b l e t o

3 8

3 5

Cornet v. State

, 359 S.W .3d 217, 222 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012) (plurality opinion); Ex parte

Rieck , 144 S.W .3d 510, 512 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004).

3 6

Tapps

, supra

.

3 7

M E R R I A M W E B S T E R ' S C O L L E G I A T E D I C T I O N A R Y 56 (10th ed. 1996).

3 8

Id

. Other dictionaries we have consulted manifest a simil ar duality of meaning for the word

“appa rent.” See B L A C K ’ S L A W D I C T I O N A R Y 112 (9 ed. 2009) (“ 1. Visible; manifest; obvious. 2. t h

Ostensibly ; seeming .”); W E B S T E R ’ S T H I R D N E W I N T E R N A T I O N A L D I C T I O N A R Y U N A B R I D G E D 102

(2002) (“ 1: capa

ble of easy perc eption: as a: rea dily perc eptible t o the s enses, esp. sight : open to

rea dy observa

tion or full view : unobstructed and unconce aled

. . . b: capa b l e of being rea dily

perc eived by the sensibiliti es or understanding as cer tainly exis tent or prese nt

. . . 2: rea dily manifest

to senses or mind as rea l or true and supp o rt ed b y cre dible evidenc e of g enuine exis tence but

possibly distinct from or contra

ry to rea lity or truth”)

.Ba ird — 16

m o r e t h a n o n e u n d e r s t a n d i n g

. B u t b e f o r e w e d e c l a r e a w o r d t h a t h a s m o r e t h a n o n e 3 9

p l a u s i b l y a p p l i c a b l e d e f i n i t i o n s u f

f i c i e n t t o r e n d e r a s t a t u t e a m b i g u o u s

, a n d t h e r e f o r e s u b j e c t

t o i n t e r p r e t a t i o n b y e x t r a

- t e x t u a l f a c t o r s

, w e m u s t b r o a d e n o u r e x a m i n a t i o n t o t h e s e t t i n g i n

w h i c h t h e w o r d a p p e a r s

, i n o r d e r t o d e t e r m i n e w h e t h e r c o n t e x t m a k e s c l e a r w h i c h d e f i n i t i o n

t h e L e g i s l a t u r e i n t e n d e d

. R e a d i n g “ a p p a r e n t ” i n c o n t e x t

, a n d i n v o k i n g t h e c a n o n t h a t e v e r y 4 0

w o r d i s p r e s u m e d t o h a v e a d i s c r e t e l y e f f e c t i v e p u r p o s e

, w e t h i n k i t p l a i n w h i c h o f t h e

c o m m o n

- u s a g e d e f

i n i t i o n s t h e L e g i s l a t u r e i n t e n d e d

. 4 1

O n l y t h e f

i r s t d e f i n i t i o n o f “ a p p a r e n t ” s e t o u t a b o v e g i v e s t h e “ a s s e n t i n f a c t ” c l a u s e

i n S e c t i o n 1

. 0 7 ( 1 1 ) i t s f u l l m e a n i n g a n d p u r p o s e

. T o a s s e n t

, i s “ t o a g r e e t o s o m e t h i n g

e s p [ e c i a l l y ] a f

t e r t h o u g h t f

u l c o n s i d e r a t i o n

. ” “ I n f a c t ” h a s b e e n d e f

i n e d a s “ a c t u a l o r r e a l

. ” 4 2 4 3

F o r “ a s s e n t ” “ i n f

a c t ” t o o c c u r

, t h e r e f

o r e

, t h e r e m u s t b e a n a c t u a l o r r e a l a g r e e m e n t a f t e r

t h o u g h t f u l c o n s i d e r a t i o n

. I n t h e c o n t e x t o f S e c t i o n 1

. 0 7 ( 1 1 ) ’ s d e f i n i t i o n o f c o n s e n t

, t o g i v e

t h e w o r d “ a p p a r e n t ” t h e s e c o n d d e f i n i t i o n a b o v e

— s o m e t h i n g t h a t s e e m s r e a l e n o u g h b u t

w h i c h i s n o t n e c e s s a r i l y s o

— w o u l d s t r i p t h e “ a s s e n t i n f a c t ” c l a u s e o f i t s p l a i n a n d l i t e r a l

3 9

E.g.

, Mahaffey v . State , 364 S.W .3d 908, 913 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012).

4 0

Cornet

, supra at 222.

4 1

Id

.

4 2

W E B S T E R ’ S

, supra , at 69.

4 3

B L A C K ’ S

, supra , at 846.Ba ird — 17

s i g n i f i c a n c e

. A f

t e r a l l

, c o n s e n t c a n n o t b e b o t h a n “ a c t u a l o r r e a l ” a g r e e m e n t “ a f t e r

t h o u g h t f u l c o n s i d e r a t i o n ” a n d a t t h e s a m e t i m e o n l y a s e e m i n g a g r e e m e n t t h a t “ m a y o r m a y

n o t b e f a c t u a l l y v a l i d

. ” W e t h e r e f o r e c o n c l u d e t h a t

, r e a d i n c o n t e x t

, t h e w o r d “ a p p a r e n t ” a s

i t a p p e a r s i n S e c t i o n 1

. 0 7 ( 1 1 ) e m b r a c e s t h e f i r s t d i c t i o n a r y d e f

i n i t i o n o f “ a p p a r e n t ”

— a s s e n t

i n f a c t t h a t

, w h i l e n o t c o m m u n i c a t e d e x p r e s s l y

, i s n o l e s s “ c l e a r a n d m a n i f e s t t o t h e

u n d e r s t a n d i n g ” f

o r n o t h a v i n g b e e n e x p l i c i t l y v e r b a l i z e d

. B e c a u s e w e d e e m t h e s t a t u t o r y 4 4

4 4

Our construction of “appa rent” for purposes o f d et ermini ng the meaning of consent as

define d by Section 1.07(11) obviously differ s from the meaning of “appa rent” in the context of thirdparty authorit y t o consent to a sear ch for Four th Amendment purposes. When a police office r

o b t ai n s co n s en t to conduct a war rantless sear ch from a third party

, we ref er to that third-par

ty ’s

seeming authority to consent, though ultimately found invalid, a s “appa rent” authority to c onsent.

Limon v. State

, 340 S.W .3d 753, 756-57 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011); Hubert v. State

, 312 S.W .3d 554,

560-62 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010). I f the office r rea sonably

, though mistakenly

, believes that the third

party was authorized to g ive consent, then that “appa rent” (that is to say

, seeming ) authority rende rs

the sear ch rea sonable for Four th Amendment purposes. Id

. The Four th Amendment d o es not

demand that police asse ssment of the situation be invaria bly acc urate —only that it be rea sonable.

Illinois v Rodriguez

, 497 U.S. 177, 184 (1990). For Four th Amendment purposes, then, it is enoug h

that authority to g ive consent is rea sonably “appa rent” under the circ umstances, in the sense that

there is ever

y indication that such authority exis ts even if, in rea lity

, it does not. But, for rea sons we

explain in the text

, we do not think the L eg islature meant for the word “appa rent” in Section 1.07(11)

to denote “se eming ” for

purposes of de fining criminal off enses in the Pena l Code.

By letter brief following submissi on of the case

, the appellant has called our attention to

l an gu age fr om the very rec ent opinion in Florida v. Jardines

, 133 S.Ct

. 1409 (2013). There

, th e

United States Supreme Court rema rked that “[t] he scope of a lic e n s e

— e xp r e s s o r im p lie d—is limit ed

not only to a particula

r are a but also to a specific purpose.” Id

. at *5. Nothing that we say today

conflicts with this proposition. The Supreme Court’s rema rk in Jardines came in the cont ext of

resolving a question, not of the proper scope of an express or implied c onsent to sear ch for Four th

Amendment purposes, but of what kind of officia l conduct constitutes a “sea rc h ” to beg in with.

Specifica lly

, the Court was called u p o n t o deter mine the point at which police deviation from

“customar

y ” or “tra ditional” rec og nition of public acc ess to the curtilag e of a home is suf ficient to

trig g er the rea sonablene ss require ment of the Four th Amendment. Her e, we are not conce rned with

the s co p e o f “customar

y ” or “tra ditional” consent to enter a premises, but with the scope of the

permission that was conveyed

, ex p re s s ly or impliedly

, by the appellant’ s particula r lang uag e and

conduct under the circ umstances of this particula r case

. What is the scope of the “par ticular are as”Ba ird — 18

l a n g u a g e t o b e p l a i n

, w e h a v e n o o c c a s i o n t o r e s o r t t o e x t r a t e x t u a l f a c t o r s t o d e t e r m i n e t h e

m e a n i n g o f “ a p p a r e n t ” c o n s e n t

. 4 5

A p p a r e n t C o n s e n t

U n d e r t h i s c o n s t r u c t i o n o f t h e t e r m

, t h e e v i d e n c e s u p p o r t s a f i n d i n g t h a t t h e a p p e l l a n t

g a v e K i l l i a n h i s a p p a r e n t c o n s e n t

. T h e a p p e l l a n t i n v i t e d K i l l i a n t o h e l p h e r s e l f t o “ a n y t h i n g ”

a n d “ e v e r y t h i n g

, ” a n d t h i s i n v i t a t i o n w a s n o t l i m i t e d t o t h e r e f r i g e r a t o r a n d p a n t r y

, b u t w a s

r e p e a t e d d u r i n g t h e c o u r s e o f t h e t o u r o f t h e h o u s e

, w h i c h i n c l u d e d h i s m a s t e r b e d r o o m

.

W h a t e v e r h e m a y h a v e i n t e n d e d

, t h e a p p e l l a n t t o l d K i l l i a n o n l y t h a t h e r e q u i r e d h e r t o k e e p

t h e b e d r o o m d o o r c l o s e d i n o r d e r t o k e e p t h e d o g o u t

. H e d i d n o t e x p r e s s l y b a n i s h h e r f r o m

t h e b e d r o o m

, n o r d i d h e f o r b i d h e r t o u s e h i s c o m p u t e r

. H e s h o w e d h e r h o w t o o p e r a t e t h e

t e l e v i s i o n a n d s t e r e o

. H e d i d n o t p o w e r t h e c o m p u t e r d o w n o r p a s s w o r d

- p r o t e c t i t

, a n d h e

a d m i t t e d t h a t h e a l l o w e d h i s r o o m m a t e t o u s e i t r e g u l a r l y

. G i v e n t h i s c o n v e r g e n c e o f f a c t s

,

t h e t r i a l c o u r t w a s j u s t i f i e d i n c o n c l u d i n g t h a t K i l l i a n h a d t h e a p p e l l a n t ’ s a p p a r e n t

c o n s e n t

— t h a t i s t o s a y

, i t i s c l e a r a n d m a n i f e s t t o t h e u n d e r s t a n d i n g t h a t s h e h a d h i s a s s e n t

i n f a c t

— t o e n t e r h i s b e d r o o m a n d u s e h i s c o m p u t e r

.

of his home, and of the “spec ific purpose” for which she could acc ess those are as, that the appellant

communicated, if only implicitl y

, during his interac tions with K illian? Jardines does not spe ak to

this question. I n any event, as we have observe d in the immediately prec eding para g raph, we are

h er e concerne d with the extent to which the appellant’ s lang uag e and conduct communicated

consent, not as i t has been understood for Four th Amendment purposes, but as i t is properly to be

understood as a

function of Sec tion 1.07(11) of the Pena l Code.

4 5

Ive y, supra , at 52 n.51.Ba ird — 19

C O N C L U S I O N

A c c o r d i n g l y

, w e a f

f i r m t h e j u d g m e n t o f t h e c o u r t o f a p p e a l s

.

D E L I V E R E D : M a y 8

, 2 0 1 3

P U B L I S H