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22-2666

United States v. Frink

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

SUMMARY ORDER

RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. 

CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS 

PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE 

PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT’S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A 

SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST 

CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH 

THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING A SUMMARY ORDER 

MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL. 

At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, held at the 

Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of New York, on the 

23rd day of February, two thousand twenty-four.

Present:

DEBRA ANN LIVINGSTON,

Chief Judge,

RAYMOND J. LOHIER, JR.,

JOSEPH F. BIANCO,

Circuit Judges.

_____________________________________

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Appellee,

v. 22-2666

GLYN FRINK,

Defendant-Appellant.

_____________________________________

For Defendant-Appellant: James P. Egan, Assistant Federal Public Defender, for 

Lisa A. Peebles, Federal Public Defender, Syracuse, 

NY.

For Appellee: Paul D. Silver, Assistant United States Attorney, for

Carla B. Freedman, United States Attorney for the 

Northern District of New York, Syracuse, NY.
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Appeal from a judgment of the United States District Court for the Northern District of 

New York (Kahn, J.).

UPON DUE CONSIDERATION, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND 

DECREED that the judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.

Defendant-Appellant Glyn Frink appeals from a judgment of the United States District 

Court for the Northern District of New York (Kahn, J.) sentencing him principally to 36 months’ 

imprisonment following his conviction, upon guilty plea, for escaping from custody in violation 

of 18 U.S.C. § 751(a). At the time of Frink’s escape from custody, he was serving the end of a 

criminal sentence at the Horizon House Residential Reentry Center, a Bureau of Prisons (“BOP”) 

halfway house, following his seventh revocation of supervised release. During the approximately 

five-month period in which Frink evaded authorities, he failed to register as a sex offender in his 

new location, for which he was charged in state court. On appeal, Frink argues that his 36-month 

federal sentence, which is above the United States Sentencing Guidelines (“Guidelines”) range of 

18 to 24 months, is substantively unreasonable.1 We assume the parties’ familiarity with the 

underlying facts, the procedural history of the case, and the issues on appeal, which we discuss 

here only insofar as necessary to explain our decision to AFFIRM.

* * *

This Court reviews sentences for substantive reasonableness under “a particularly 

deferential form of abuse-of-discretion review.” United States v. Broxmeyer, 699 F.3d 265, 278 

(2d Cir. 2012) (quotation marks omitted). We find substantive error “only in exceptional cases 

where the trial court’s decision ‘cannot be located within the range of permissible decisions.’” 

1 Frink’s opening brief on appeal alleged procedural error as well, but in a letter dated May 31, 2023 Frink’s counsel 

withdrew this claim, which was premised on what proved to be an error in the sentencing transcript that has now 

been corrected. 
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United States v. Cavera, 550 F.3d 180, 189 (2d Cir. 2008) (quoting United States v. Rigas, 490 

F.3d 208, 238 (2d Cir. 2007)). District courts must “remain cognizant” of the Guidelines when 

fashioning a sentence, Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 50 n.6 (2007), but it is “emphatically 

clear that the Guidelines are guidelines—that is, they are truly advisory,” Cavera, 550 F.3d at 189. 

Just as this Court cannot presume that a within-Guidelines sentence is reasonable, we cannot 

“presume that a non-Guidelines sentence is unreasonable, or require ‘extraordinary’ circumstances 

to justify a deviation from the Guidelines range.” Cavera, 550 F.3d at 190 (quoting Gall, 552 U.S.

at 47). 

Frink argues that the district court assigned undue weight to Frink’s history of supervision 

violations and his failure to register as a sex offender following his escape—an analysis which he 

argues did not adequately incorporate the factors set forth at 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) and resulted in a 

sentence that was greater than necessary to achieve the purposes of sentencing. We disagree. 

At the sentencing hearing, the district court stated that it had considered “all pertinent 

information,” including the § 3553(a) factors, the Presentence Report and addendum, submissions 

by counsel, and the Guidelines imprisonment range of 18 to 24 months. Gov’t App’x 14. The 

court remarked on Frink’s “extensive criminal history,” including twelve convictions, “extensive 

history of violations of his supervised release,” and status as a BOP inmate at the Horizon House 

following his seventh revocation of supervised release. Gov’t App’x 15. The court considered 

Frink’s “repeated violations of his sex offender registration requirements, his persistent disregard

for court orders and his supervised release obligations, his escape from the custody of the halfway 

house and his reported reasons for said detainment.” Id. The district court also noted Frink’s

failure to address substance abuse and sex offender issues and to update his sex offender 

registration during his five months evading authorities. Id. The court stated as follows:
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It’s evident from this extensive history that Mr. Frink is expected, will continue to 

violate the law and the orders of this Court. As such, the sentence is necessary in 

order to meet the goals of sentencing outlined in 18 U.S.C., Section 3553(a), 

including the need for the sentence to reflect the seriousness of the offense, promote 

respect for the law, and provide just punishment for this offense and to afford 

adequate deterrence to other criminal conduct and, finally, to protect the public 

from further crimes of this defendant.

Gov’t App’x 16. The district court’s written statement of reasons reiterated that the court imposed 

a sentence that varied upward from the applicable Guidelines range for these reasons. 

The district court did not abuse its discretion in considering Frink’s history of seven

supervision violations and the instant registration violation, among multiple other factors, in

arriving at a sentence. Frink argues, inter alia, that because “registering as a sex offender would 

have brought [his] escape status to the attention of law enforcement authorities,” his most recent 

registration violation should not have been separately considered. Appellant’s Br. 13. We are 

unpersuaded. Here, the court’s explanation of its sentence—including its consideration of Frink’s 

failure to register and his seven violations—accords with the statutory factors and, in particular,

with Section 3553(a)(1)–(2), which provides that “[t]he court . . . shall consider . . . the nature and 

circumstances of the offense and the history and characteristics of the defendant,” 18 U.S.C. § 

3553(a)(1), and the need for the sentence “to promote respect for the law,” id. § 3553(a)(2)(A).

We are also not convinced, despite Frink’s argument to the contrary, that the district court 

abused its discretion by imposing a sentence that was greater than necessary. Frink indicates that 

the court did not find him likely to endanger the public—only that he would “continue to violate 

the law and the orders of this Court.” Appellant’s Br. 14 (quoting Defendant-Appellant’s App’x 

61). But even assuming the district court was required specifically to address this point (and it 

was not), the court in fact indicated that Frink’s sentence was necessary to “protect the public from 
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further crimes of this defendant,” Gov’t App’x 16, and that Frink’s escape from custody had 

“halted treatment attempts,” Gov’t App’x 15. 

The district court appropriately relied on the factors it cited in fashioning Frink’s 36-month 

sentence. It adequately explained why his escape from custody, in view and continuation of his 

history of violating court orders, warranted an upward variance from the Guidelines in order to 

best satisfy the purposes of sentencing. Here, Frink’s 36-month sentence is not “shockingly high” 

in light of the factors cited by the district court. Rigas, 583 F.3d at 123. We therefore lack any

basis upon which to find his sentence substantively unreasonable.

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We have considered Frink’s remaining arguments and conclude they lack merit. We 

therefore AFFIRM the district court’s judgment.

FOR THE COURT:

Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk of Court