Federal Register / Vol. 74, No. 65 / Tuesday, April 7, 2009 / Notices 15779 

result in a violation of the Atomic 

Energy Act of 1954, as amended, or the 

Commission’s regulations. Therefore, 

the exemption is authorized by law. 

No Undue Risk to Public Health and 

Safety 

The underlying purpose of the 

reporting requirements specified in 10 

CFR 50.36a(a)(2) is to report to the 

Commission annually the quantity of 

each of the principal radionuclides 

released to unrestricted areas in liquid 

and in gaseous effluents during the 

previous 12 months, including any 

other information as may be required by 

the Commission to estimate maximum 

potential annual radiation doses to the 

public resulting from effluent releases. 

This exemption does not affect the 

information required to be submitted or 

the time period the report covers, only 

the date the report is submitted. Based 

on the above, no new accident 

precursors are created by extending the 

submittal date for the 2008 Radioactive 

Effluent Release Report to prior to May 

1, 2009. Thus, the probability of 

postulated accidents is not increased. 

Also, based on the above, the 

consequences of postulated accidents 

are not increased. Therefore, there is no 

undue risk to public health and safety. 

Consistent With Common Defense and 

Security 

The proposed exemption would allow 

the licensee to submit the 2008 

Radioactive Effluent Release Report 

prior to May 1, 2009, which would 

exceed the report submittal requirement 

of no longer than 12 months specified 

in 10 CFR 50.36a(a)(2). This change has 

no relation to security issues. Therefore, 

the common defense and security is not 

impacted by this exemption. 

Special Circumstances 

Special circumstances, in accordance 

with 10 CFR 50.12(a)(2)(v), are present 

whenever application of the regulation 

would provide only temporary relief 

from the applicable regulation and the 

licensee or applicant has made good 

faith efforts to comply with the 

regulation. The underlying purpose of 

the reporting requirement specified in 

10 CFR 50.36a(a)(2) is to require each 

licensee to submit a report to the 

Commission annually that specifies the 

quantity of each of the principal 

radionuclides released to unrestricted 

areas in liquid and in gaseous effluents, 

including any other information as may 

be required by the Commission to 

estimate maximum potential annual 

radiation doses to the public resulting 

from effluent releases. The proposed 

amendment does not affect the 

information required to be submitted or 

the time period the report covers, only 

the date the report is to be submitted. 

The requested exemption provides 

temporary relief from the regulation in 

that it affords a one-time extension for 

submitting the annual report. The 

proposed amendment is an appropriate 

means to ensure that future reports are 

submitted on an annual basis as 

required by 10 CFR 50.36a(a)(2). 

Therefore, since the underlying purpose 

of 10 CFR 50.36a(a)(2) is achieved, the 

special circumstances of 10 CFR 

50.12(a)(2)(v) for the granting of an 

exemption from 10 CFR 50.36a(a)(2) 

exists. 

4.0 Conclusion 

Accordingly, the Commission has 

determined that, pursuant to 10 CFR 

50.12(a), the exemption is authorized by 

law, will not present an undue risk to 

the public health and safety, and is 

consistent with the common defense 

and security. Also, special 

circumstances are present. Therefore, 

the Commission hereby grants Indian 

Michigan Power Company a one-time 

exemption from the requirements of 10 

CFR 50.36a(a)(2), for Donald C. Cook 

Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 2. 

Pursuant to 10 CFR 51.32, the 

Commission has determined that the 

granting of this exemption will not have 

a significant effect on the quality of the 

human environment (74 FR 9315) 

This exemption is effective upon 

issuance. 

Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 30th day 

of March, 2009. 

For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. 

Joseph G. Giitter, 

Director, Division of Operating Reactor 

Licensing, Office of Nuclear Reactor 

Regulation. 

[FR Doc. E9–7808 Filed 4–6–09; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 7590–01–P 

NUCLEAR REGULATORY 

COMMISSION 

[Docket No. 50–289; NRC–2009–0154] 

Exelon Generation Company, LLC, 

Three Mile Island Nuclear Station, Unit 

No. 1; Exemption 

1.0 Background 

The Exelon Generation Company 

(Exelon, the licensee, formerly AmerGen 

Energy Company, LLC) is the holder of 

Facility Operating License No. DPR–50 

which authorizes operation of the Three 

Mile Island Nuclear Station, Unit 1 

(TMI–1). The license provides, among 

other things, that the facility is subject 

to all rules, regulations, and orders of 

the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory 

Commission (NRC, the Commission) 

now or hereafter in effect. 

The facility consists of a pressurized 

water reactor (PWR) located in Dauphin 

County, Pennsylvania. 

2.0 Request/Action 

Title 10 of the Code of Federal 

Regulations (10 CFR), part 50, Section 

50.48, requires that nuclear power 

plants that were licensed before January 

1, 1979, must satisfy the requirements of 

10 CFR part 50, Appendix R, Section 

III.G, ‘‘Fire protection of safe shutdown 

capability.’’ TMI–1 was licensed to 

operate prior to January 1, 1979. As 

such, the licensee’s Fire Protection 

Program (FPP) must satisfy the 

established fire protection features of 10 

CFR Part 50, Appendix R, Section III.G. 

NRC Regulatory Information Summary 

(RIS) 2006–10, ‘‘Regulatory Expectations 

with Appendix R Paragraph III.G.2, 

Operator Manual Actions,’’ noted that 

NRC inspections identified that some 

licensees had relied upon operator 

manual actions, instead of the options 

specified in 10 CFR part 50, Appendix 

R, Section III.G.2 (III.G.2) as a 

permanent solution to resolve issues 

related to Thermo-Lag 330–1 fire 

barriers. 

In a letter dated February 4, 2008 

(Agencywide Documents Access and 

Management System (ADAMS) 

Accession Number ML080350369), 

supplemented by letter dated January 

28, 2009 (ADAMS Accession Number 

ML090280577), the licensee identified 

one operator manual action that was 

previously included in correspondence 

with the NRC and found acceptable in 

a fire protection-related Safety 

Evaluation (SE) dated September 7, 

1988 (ADAMS Accession Number 

ML082060262). However, RIS 2006–10 

identifies that an exemption under 10 

CFR 50.12 is necessary for the use of 

operator manual actions in lieu of the 

requirements of III.G.2 even if the NRC 

previously issued an SE that found the 

manual actions acceptable. 

The licensee also identified a second 

operator manual action that was 

previously permitted for use in a fire 

area covered by 10 CFR part 50, 

Appendix R, Section III.G.3 (III.G.3). As 

such, an exemption was not required 

because the action was found acceptable 

as part of a safety evaluation for 

alternate shutdown. However, since the 

fire area of origin requiring this manual 

action was reclassified as a III.G.2 area, 

the manual action requires approval for 

use in a III.G.2 area. Since III.G.2 is a 

separate part of the rule and this action 

is not considered previously approved 

for III.G.2, the NRC has preformed a new 

15780 Federal Register / Vol. 74, No. 65 / Tuesday, April 7, 2009 / Notices 

review of this action in accordance with 

the NRC’s current review standard, 

NUREG–1852, ‘‘Demonstrating the 

Feasibility and Reliability of Operator 

Manual Actions in Response to Fire.’’ 

Since both operator manual actions 

require an exemption from III.G.2, the 

staff has reviewed the request and 

determined that both operator manual 

actions are acceptable. This exemption 

provides the formal vehicle for NRC 

approval for the use of the two specified 

operator manual actions in lieu of the 

requirements specified in III.G.2 for 

TMI–1. 

In summary, by letter dated February 

4, 2008, supplemented by letter dated 

January 28, 2009 (ADAMS Accession 

Numbers ML080350369 and 

ML090280577, respectively), Exelon 

submitted a request for exemption from 

10 CFR part 50, Appendix R, Section 

III.G, ‘‘Fire Protection of Safe Shutdown 

Capability,’’ for the use of one operator 

manual action in lieu of the 

requirements specified in III.G.2 for one 

previously approved operator manual 

action and one new review of an 

operator manual action that was 

previously approved as part of a III.G.3 

review. 

3.0 Discussion 

Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.12, the 

Commission may, upon application by 

any interested person or upon its own 

initiative, grant exemptions from the 

requirements of 10 CFR PART 50 when: 

(1) The exemptions are authorized by 

law, will not present an undue risk to 

public health or safety, and are 

consistent with the common defense 

and security; and (2) when special 

circumstances are present. One of these 

special circumstances, described in 10 

CFR 50.12(a)(2)(ii), is that the 

application of the regulation in the 

particular circumstances would not 

serve the underlying purpose of the 

rule, or is not necessary to achieve the 

underlying purpose of the rule. 

The underlying purpose of 10 CFR 

part 50, Appendix R, Section III.G.2 is 

to ensure that one of the redundant 

trains necessary to achieve and maintain 

hot shutdown conditions remains free of 

fire damage in the event of a fire. 

Section III.G.2 provides the following 

means to ensure that a redundant train 

of safe shutdown cables and equipment 

is free of fire damage, where redundant 

trains are located in the same fire area 

outside of primary containment: 

a. Separation of cables and equipment 

by a fire barrier having a 3-hour rating; 

b. Separation of cables and equipment 

by a horizontal distance of more than 20 

feet with no intervening combustibles or 

fire hazards and with fire detectors and 

an automatic fire suppression system 

installed in the fire area; or 

c. Enclosure of cables and equipment 

of one redundant train in a fire barrier 

having a 1-hour rating and with fire 

detectors and an automatic fire 

suppression system installed in the fire 

area. 

Exelon indicated that the operator 

manual actions listed in their February 

4, 2008, exemption request are those 

that were previously included in 

correspondence with the NRC and were 

found acceptable in a Fire Protection SE 

dated September 7, 1988. The first 

operator manual action included in this 

exemption is the tripping of all four 

reactor coolant pumps (RCPs) locally at 

the 1A and 1B switchgear for a fire in 

Fire Area CB–FA–1, which is located in 

the Control Building Health Physics Lab 

(Lab). The second operator manual 

action included in this exemption is the 

transferring of Nuclear Service River 

Water Pump 1B (NR–P–1B) to its 

alternate power supply for a fire in Fire 

Area CB–FA–2b, which is located in the 

Control Building 1S Switchgear Room 

(Switchgear Room). This action was 

described in the January 28, 2009, letter 

as not previously approved as part of 

III.G.2. Section 2.1, titled ‘‘Fire Hazards 

Analysis Report Revision 9’’, of the 

September 7, 1988, SE states, 

By letter dated October 27, 1987, GPU 

[General Public Utilities] Nuclear, the 

licensee, submitted Revision 9 to the Fire 

Hazards Analysis Report (FHAR) for Three 

Mile Island Nuclear Station, Unit 1. This 

revision includes a number of modifications 

which have resulted from an extensive 

design verification effort by the licensee. As 

stated by the licensee, Revision 9 represents 

the ‘‘as-built condition of TMI–1’’. Also, 

Revision 9 includes a number of 

modifications involving the addition of 

references to GPUN and NRC correspondence 

concerning the justification and subsequent 

acceptance of exemptions to 10 CFR Part 50 

Appendix R and deviations from Appendix 

A to [Branch Technical Position] APCSB 9.5– 

1. In addition, the FHAR has been modified 

to specify where certain fire barriers may not 

be completely rated or contain some nonrated feature but have been analyzed to 

provide adequate protection. This type of 

analysis is allowed by Generic Letter 86–10 

and the non-rated features included in 

Revision 9 have generally been evaluated in 

previous NRC Safety Evaluation Reports. 

The FHAR has been reviewed by Science 

Applications International Corporation 

(SAIC) under contract to the NRC, and has 

been found to be in compliance with NRC 

guidelines. The details of the review are 

discussed in Enclosure 2, which is the 

Technical Evaluation Report (TER) prepared 

by SAIC. The staff concurs with the TER 

findings and concludes that the changes to 

the fire protection program identified by the 

licensee in Revision 9 are acceptable. 

The two operator manual actions in 

question are listed in attachments 3–0 

and 3–3Q of the FHAR where a brief 

description of the action to be 

performed and its location is also 

included. In the January 28, 2009, letter, 

responding to a request for additional 

information from the NRC staff, Exelon 

included a detailed discussion and 

justification of the two manual actions 

that describe how defense-in-depth is 

maintained during the scenarios where 

these manual actions would be 

necessary. The licensee outlined the 

approach that was taken to evaluate and 

assess the effectiveness of the operator 

manual actions and provided a 

justification for why the operator 

manual actions are appropriate for 

maintaining equivalency and 

consistency with the intent of Section 

III.G.2 of Appendix R. 

The NRC staff reviewed the licensee’s 

evaluation in support of the subject 

exemption request for the use of 

operator manual actions in lieu of the 

requirements specified in Section III.G.2 

of Appendix R, and concluded that 

given the existing fire protection 

features in the affected fire zones in 

conjunction with the use of the two 

operator manual actions, in specific 

instances, Exelon continues to 

demonstrate equivalence to the 

underlying purpose of 10 CFR part 50, 

Appendix R, Section III.G.2 for TMI–1. 

The following technical evaluation 

provides the basis for this conclusion. 

3.1 Operator Manual Action To Trip 

RCPs 

3.1.1 Fire Prevention 

The Lab area has limited or low 

combustible fuel loading (equivalent fire 

severity of less than 45 minutes). The 

combustible fuel loads consist primarily 

of stored and transient materials, cable 

insulation, and Thermo-Lag. ThermoLag is a fire barrier material used for the 

protection of cable raceways that is 

considered combustible. The primary 

sources of ignition in the areas are 

limited to cabling and electrical 

equipment. The licensee has indicated 

that in most cases, the cable insulation 

is qualified to the Institute of Electrical 

and Electronics Engineering, Inc. (IEEE) 

383 flame test, thereby the growth and 

spread of cable insulation fires would be 

slow. The redundant cables in this area 

that are required for safe shutdown are 

located greater than 25 feet apart, thus 

providing physical separation. 

Additionally, the Lab area is of a large 

volume (90,000 cubic feet) to potentially 

disperse and stratify heat and smoke 

within the space to prevent wide area 

Federal Register / Vol. 74, No. 65 / Tuesday, April 7, 2009 / Notices 15781 

1NRC letter dated April 20, 1999, (ADAMS 

Legacy Library Accession Number 9905040102) 

approved the exemption request on these barriers 

from the requirements of Section III.G.2.c for 1-hour 

fire barriers where circuits of redundant safe 

shutdown equipment in the same fire area are 

enclosed in a 1-hour fire barrier. 

2An incipient fire detection system is a fire 

detection system designed to provide more rapid 

Continued 

damage due to a damaging hot gas layer 

forming in the area. 

The NRC staff finds that the limited 

fuel load combined with the number of 

ignition sources, and spatial 

characteristics in the Lab area, results in 

a low likelihood of a fire occurring and 

spreading within the fire area. 

3.1.2 Detection, Control and 

Suppression 

The NRC staff evaluated the fire 

detection, control and suppression 

systems in the Lab area. The Lab area 

has an automatic ionization smoke 

detection system installed that sends an 

alarm to the Control Room upon 

activation of the fire/smoke detections 

systems. 

The area is enclosed by 3-hour rated 

walls, floors and ceilings to prevent fire 

from spreading to or from the area and 

the structural frame is also protected 

with 3-hour fireproofing material. In 

addition, all doors, penetrations and 

ventilation dampers through the fire 

area boundaries are provided with 3- 

hour rated fire protection assemblies. 

The Lab area also has a wet-pipe fire 

sprinkler system installed below the 

suspended ceiling in the area. In this 

fire area, rated Thermo-Lag fire barriers, 

with ratings ranging from 39 to 50 

minutes, are also provided for circuits of 

redundant safe shutdown equipment.1

The active fire suppression systems 

listed above are supplemented by 

handheld fire extinguishers and hose 

lines staged at locations directly outside 

the fire area. Additionally, fire brigade 

response time has been estimated to be 

within 15 minutes. 

The NRC staff finds that the fire 

barriers, fire detection, control and 

suppression systems are adequate to 

mitigate and contain the fire hazards in 

this area. 

3.1.3 Feasibility and Preservation of 

Safe Shutdown Capability 

The NRC staff has evaluated the 

feasibility review provided by the 

licensee in the January 28, 2009, letter 

responding to a request for additional 

information from the NRC staff. The 

feasibility review documents that 

procedures are in place, in the form of 

abnormal operating procedures (AOPs), 

to ensure that clear and accessible 

instructions on how to perform the 

manual action are available to the 

operators. The instructions outline the 

number of fully trained, dedicated 

operators that are required and the 

procedures they are to follow to perform 

the action including any tools or 

equipment necessary to complete the 

action. Several potential environmental 

concerns were also evaluated, such as 

radiation levels, temperature/humidity 

conditions, ventilation configuration 

and fire effects that the operators may 

encounter during certain emergency 

scenarios, and were determined not to 

have a material effect on the 

performance of the manual action. The 

licensee’s feasibility review shows that 

the operator manual action is feasible 

because the operators performing the 

manual actions would not be exposed to 

adverse or untenable conditions during 

the operator manual action procedure or 

during the time needed to perform the 

procedure, primarily because the 

manual actions are located in fire areas 

that are completely separated from the 

originating fire area. The NRC staff has 

evaluated the licensee’s feasibility 

review and determined that the operator 

manual actions can be reasonably 

completed in time to support the 

needed mitigative functions. Training, 

equipment, and procedures are 

maintained to support the specified 

actions. 

Given the procedures and conditions 

described above, the NRC staff finds that 

this operator manual action is feasible 

and that the operator will be provided 

with adequate access and egress to the 

area such that environmental conditions 

will not preclude completion of the 

action or result in harm to the operator. 

3.1.4 Time To Ensure Reliability 

The NRC staff reviewed the time 

necessary to complete the manual action 

versus the time before the action 

becomes critical to safely shutting down 

the unit as presented in the feasibility 

analyses. This manual action must be 

completed within 10 minutes. The 

action is identified in the AOPs as OP– 

TM–AOP–001–C01 and requires an 

operator to travel from the control room 

to a location in the turbine building, 

where the 1A and 1B 6900V feeder 

breakers are located, to trip the reactor 

coolant pumps (RCPs). The combined 

time to complete the travel and 

specified action requires a total of 8 

minutes, leaving a 2 minute margin of 

safety. While a 2 minute margin of 

safety is considered small, this action is 

only needed when both of the cables 

located in the fire area are affected by 

fire. Based on the protection and spatial 

separation between the cables, it is 

highly unlikely that both DC control 

power cables would be lost before the 

control room operator could trip the 

RCPs. Based on information provided by 

the licensee, this manual operator action 

will commence immediately upon 

detection/confirmation of a fire in CB– 

FA–1 (Lab) and/or failure to trip the 

RCPs from the control room. The 

licensee has indicated that the manual 

operator action was verified via 

walkdowns with different operators to 

verify the reliability of the manual 

action. 

In addition, the fire area where the 

redundant equipment trains reside is 

located in a separate building from the 

fire area where the manual action 

occurs, with the exception of the 

portion of travel in the control tower 

stairwell (to trip the RCPs), which is 

separated from the control building by 

3-hour assemblies. This helps to ensure 

that operators do not encounter 

untenable or fire-affected conditions 

during the operator manual action 

procedure. 

The NRC staff finds that the margin 

available to perform the action is small. 

Based on the low likelihood of the 

damage occurring to both DC control 

power cables, as well as the procedural 

controls and walkdowns described, the 

NRC staff concludes that the small 

margin is acceptable due to the low 

likelihood of a fire that impacts both DC 

control power cables. 

3.2 Operator Manual Action To 

Transfer Nuclear Service River Water 

to Alternate Power 

3.2.1 Fire Prevention 

The Switchgear Room has limited or 

low combustible fuel loading 

(equivalent fire severity of less than 45 

minutes). The combustible fuel loads 

consist primarily of minor transient 

materials, cable insulation, Thermo-Lag 

and electrical equipment. The primary 

sources of ignition in the area are 

limited to cabling and electrical 

equipment. The licensee has indicated 

that in most cases, the cable insulation 

is qualified to the IEEE 383 flame test, 

thereby the growth and spread of cable 

insulation fires would be slow. 

The NRC staff finds that the limited 

fuel load, combined with the number of 

ignition sources, results in a low 

likelihood of a fire occurring and 

spreading within the fire. 

3.2.2 Detection, Control and 

Suppression 

The NRC staff evaluated the fire 

detection, control and suppression 

systems in the Switchgear Room. There 

is an incipient fire detection system,2 as 

15782 Federal Register / Vol. 74, No. 65 / Tuesday, April 7, 2009 / Notices 

detection than conventional smoke detection 

systems. 

well as an HVAC duct smoke detection 

system installed in the space that sends 

an alarm to the Control Room upon 

activation of the fire/smoke detections 

systems. 

The Switchgear Room is enclosed by 

3-hour rated walls, floors and ceilings to 

prevent fire from spreading to or from 

the area and the structural frame is also 

protected with 3-hour fire proofing 

material. In addition, all doors, 

penetrations and ventilation dampers 

through the fire area boundaries are 

provided with 3-hour rated fire 

protection assemblies. 

The Switchgear Room does not have 

a fire suppression system installed but 

does have 1-hour rated fire barriers 

provided for circuits of redundant safe 

shutdown equipment. A 1-hour rated 

fire barrier is not provided for the 

transfer of nuclear service water to 

alternate power cables. Manual 

suppression capability can be provided 

by operators and fire brigade by using 

the handheld fire extinguishers and 

hose lines staged at locations directly 

outside of the fire area. Additionally, 

fire brigade response time has been 

estimated to be within 15 minutes for 

this fire area. The NRC approved an 

exemption on July 11, 1997, (ADAMS 

Accession No. ML003765666) 

exempting this area from the 

requirement to have an automatic 

suppression system. 

The NRC staff finds that the fire 

barriers, fire detection system and the 

manual suppression capability, in 

conjunction with the passive means of 

protection, is adequate to mitigate and 

contain the fire hazards in this area. 

3.2.3 Feasibility and Preservation of 

Safe Shutdown Capability 

The NRC staff evaluated the feasibility 

review provided by the licensee in the 

January 28, 2009, letter, responding to a 

request for additional information from 

the NRC staff. The feasibility review 

documents that procedures are in place, 

in the form of AOPs, to ensure that clear 

and accessible instructions on how to 

perform the manual action are available 

to the operators. The instructions 

outline the number of fully trained, 

dedicated operators that are required 

and the procedures they are to follow to 

perform the action including any tools 

or equipment necessary to complete the 

action. Several potential environmental 

concerns were also evaluated, such as 

radiation levels, temperature/humidity 

conditions, ventilation configuration 

and fire effects that the operators may 

encounter during certain emergency 

scenarios, and determined not to have a 

material effect on the performance of the 

manual action. The NRC staff has 

evaluated the licensee’s feasibility 

review and determined that the operator 

manual actions can be reasonably 

completed in time to support the 

needed mitigative functions. Training, 

equipment, and procedures are 

maintained to support the specified 

actions. 

In addition, the fire area where the 

redundant equipment trains reside is 

located in a separate building from the 

fire area where the manual actions 

occur. This helps to ensure that 

operators do not encounter untenable or 

fire-affected conditions during the 

operator manual action procedure. 

Given the procedures and conditions 

described above, the NRC staff finds that 

this operator manual action is feasible 

and that the operator will be provided 

with adequate access and egress to the 

area such that environmental conditions 

will not preclude completion of the 

action or result in harm to the operator. 

3.2.4 Time To Ensure Reliability 

The NRC staff also reviewed the time 

necessary to complete the manual action 

versus the time before the action 

becomes critical to safely shutting down 

the unit as presented in the feasibility 

analyses. The action must be completed 

within 4 hours. This action is identified 

in the AOPs as OP–TM–AOP–001–C2B, 

which states that AOP OP–TN–541–443 

(‘‘Swap NR–P–1B to Alternate Power 

Supply’’), should be performed and 

instructs an operator to travel from the 

control room to the intake screen and 

pump house (ISPH), which is outside 

the plant protected area. The operator 

must first pass through a security access 

gate before traveling to Fire Areas ISPH– 

FZ–1 and ISPH–FZ–2 where they will 

energize nuclear service river water 

pump, NR–P–1B, at the 1R 480V 

switchgear to provide nuclear river (NR) 

water flow and support letdown for a 

fire in Fire Area CB–FA–2b (Switchgear 

Room). In order to swap the NR pump 

power supply, the operator manual 

action entails racking out the NR–P–1B 

breaker on the 1T 480V bus and racking 

in the NR–P–1B breaker on the 1R 480V 

bus. The combined time to complete the 

travel, including the time required for 

security to open the access gate, and the 

specified actions is less than 30 

minutes. Additionally, this action is 

only necessary if the pressurizer heaters 

are unavailable and is of low complexity 

with a time margin of 31⁄2 hours. 

The NRC staff finds that there is a 

sufficient amount of time available to 

complete this proposed operator manual 

action and that adequate conditions 

exist for it to be performed efficiently 

and reliably. 

3.3 Evaluation 

As stated in 10 CFR part 50, 

Appendix R, Section II: 

The fire protection program shall 

extend the concept of defense-in-depth 

to fire protection with the following 

objectives: 

1. To prevent fires from starting, 

2. To detect rapidly, control, and 

extinguish promptly those fires that do 

occur, and 

3. To provide protection for 

structures, systems, and components 

important to safety so that a fire that is 

not promptly extinguished by the fire 

suppression activities will not prevent 

the safe shutdown of the plant. 

The NRC staff has evaluated the 

elements of defense-in-depth used for 

fire protection at TMI–1, applicable to 

the fire zones under review. Based upon 

consideration of the limited fire ignition 

sources and fire hazards in the affected 

areas, and the existing fire protection 

measures at TMI–1, the NRC staff 

concludes that objective one of defensein-depth is adequately met. 

Based on the evaluation of fire 

detection and suppression systems 

provided in the affected fire zones, the 

NRC staff determined that any 

postulated fire is expected to be 

promptly detected by the available 

automatic fire detection systems in the 

associated fire areas. The available fire 

detection and suppression equipment in 

these fire areas ensure that a postulated 

fire will not be left unchallenged. In 

addition, all fire areas are separated 

from adjacent fire areas by fire-rated 

barriers and penetrations to provide a 

level of compartmentalization between 

the fire areas and buildings. This 

compartmentalization helps to ensure 

that fires will not spread to adjacent fire 

areas and that any fire damage will be 

limited to the fire area of origin. In 

addition, when fires are contained in 

the fire area of origin, the licensee has 

demonstrated that the manual actions 

are feasible and reliable. Based on this 

information, the NRC staff concludes 

that objectives 2 and 3 of defense-indepth are adequately met. 

Therefore, the NRC staff concludes 

that the requested exemption to use 

operator manual actions in combination 

with the other installed fire protection 

features in lieu of the requirements of 10 

CFR part 50, Appendix R, Section III.G.2 

is consistent with the underlying 

purpose of the rule and the defense-indepth concepts necessary at nuclear 

power plants and will maintain an 

equivalent level of protection for postfire safe-shutdown capability at TMI–1. 

Federal Register / Vol. 74, No. 65 / Tuesday, April 7, 2009 / Notices 15783 

3.4 Authorized by Law 

This exemption would allow TMI–1 

the use of operator manual actions in 

lieu of meeting the requirements 

specified in 10 CFR part 50, Appendix 

R, Section III.G.2. As stated above, 10 

CFR 50.12 allows the NRC to grant 

exemptions from the requirements of 10 

CFR part 50. The NRC staff has 

determined that granting of the 

licensee’s proposed exemption will not 

result in a violation of the Atomic 

Energy Act of 1954, as amended, or the 

Commission’s regulations. Therefore, 

the exemption is authorized by law. 

3.5 No Undue Risk to Public Health 

and Safety 

The underlying purpose of 10 CFR 

part 50, Appendix R, Section III.G.2 is 

to ensure that one of the redundant 

trains necessary to achieve and maintain 

hot shutdown conditions remains free of 

fire damage in the event of a fire. Based 

on the existing fire barriers, fire 

detectors, automatic and manual fire 

suppression equipment, and the absence 

of significant combustible loads and 

ignition sources in the fire areas 

associated with this exemption, the NRC 

staff has concluded that granting of this 

involves no undue risk to public health 

and safety. 

The NRC staff has determined that 

this exemption also does not increase 

the probability or consequences of 

previously evaluated accidents. This 

determination is based on the NRC staff 

finding that the operator manual actions 

are not the sole form of protection relied 

upon due to the other fire protection 

features and procedures in place and the 

manual actions are considered feasible 

and reliable to ensure safe shutdown 

capability following a fire. The 

combination of the operator manual 

actions in conjunction with all of the 

measures and systems discussed above, 

results in an adequate level of 

protection. No new accident initiators 

are created by allowing the use of 

operator manual actions in the fire areas 

identified in this exemption and the 

probability of postulated accidents is 

not increased. Similarly, the 

consequences of postulated accidents 

are not increased. Therefore, there is no 

undue risk to public health and safety. 

3.6 Consistent With Common Defense 

and Security 

This exemption would allow TMI–1 

to credit the use of specific operator 

manual actions and installed fire 

protection features in lieu of meeting 

the requirements specified in 10 CFR 

part 50, Appendix R, Section III.G.2. 

This change, to the operation of the 

plant, has no relation to security issues 

nor does it diminish the level of safety 

from what was intended by the 

requirements contained in Section 

III.G.2. Therefore, the common defense 

and security is not impacted by this 

exemption. 

3.7 Special Circumstances 

One of the special circumstances 

described in 10 CFR 50.12(a)(2)(ii) is 

that the application of the regulation is 

not necessary to achieve the underlying 

purpose of the rule. The underlying 

purpose of 10 CFR part 50, Appendix R, 

Section III.G.2 is to ensure that one of 

the redundant trains necessary to 

achieve and maintain hot shutdown 

conditions remains free of fire damage 

in the event of a fire. For the fire areas 

specified in this exemption, the NRC 

staff finds that the operator manual 

actions are feasible, can be reliably 

performed and that the fire protection 

features installed in the areas are 

effective at preventing and suppressing 

fires. Therefore, the conditions 

described herein will ensure that a 

redundant train necessary to achieve 

and maintain safe shutdown of the plant 

will remain free of fire damage in the 

event of a fire in these fire areas. The 

staff concludes that combination of the 

operator manual actions, in conjunction 

with all of the measures and systems 

discussed above, results in an 

equivalent level of protection to that 

intended by III.G.2. Since the 

underlying purpose of 10 CFR part 50, 

Appendix R, Section III.G is achieved, 

the special circumstances required by 

10 CFR 50.12(a)(2)(ii) for the granting of 

an exemption from 10 CFR part 50, 

Appendix R, Section III.G.2 exist. 

4.0 Conclusion 

Accordingly, the Commission has 

determined that, pursuant to 10 CFR 

50.12(a), the exemption is authorized by 

law, will not present an undue risk to 

the public health and safety, and is 

consistent with the common defense 

and security. Also, special 

circumstances are present such that 

application of the regulation in these 

particular circumstances is not 

necessary to achieve the underlying 

purpose of the rule. Therefore, the 

Commission hereby grants Exelon an 

exemption from the requirements of 

Section III.G.2 of Appendix R of 10 CFR 

part 50, to TMI–1 for the two operator 

manual actions discussed above. 

Pursuant to 10 CFR 51.32, the 

Commission has determined that the 

granting of this exemption will not have 

a significant effect on the quality of the 

human environment (74 FR 9437). 

This exemption is effective upon 

issuance. 

Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 30th day 

of March 2009. 

For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. 

Joseph G. Giitter, 

Director, Division of Operating Reactor 

Licensing, Office of Nuclear Reactor 

Regulation. 

[FR Doc. E9–7807 Filed 4–6–09; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 7590–01–P 

NUCLEAR REGULATORY 

COMMISSION 

Sunshine Federal Register Notice 

DATES: Weeks of April 6, 13, 20, 27, May 

4, 11, 2009. 

PLACE: Commissioners’ Conference 

Room, 11555 Rockville Pike, Rockville, 

Maryland. 

STATUS: Public and closed. 

Week of April 6, 2009 

There are no meetings scheduled for 

the week of April 6, 2009. 

Week of April 13, 2009—Tentative 

Wednesday, April 15, 2009 

9:30 a.m. Briefing on NRC Corporate 

Support (Public Meeting) 

(Contact: Karen Olive, 301–415– 

2276). 

This meeting will be webcast live at 

the Web address— http://www.nrc.gov. 

Thursday, April 16, 2009 

1:30 p.m. Briefing on Human Capital 

and EEO (Public Meeting) 

(Contact: Kristin Davis, 301–492– 

2266). 

This meeting will be webcast live at 

the Web address—http://www.nrc.gov. 

Friday, April 17, 2009 

9:30 a.m. Briefing on Low Level 

Radioactive Waste—Part 1 (Public 

Meeting) 

(Contact: Patricia Swain, 301–415– 

5405). 

This meeting will be webcast live at 

the Web address—http://www.nrc.gov. 

Friday, April 17, 2009 

1:30 p.m. Briefing on Low Level 

Radioactive Waste—Part 2 (Public 

Meeting) 

(Contact: Patricia Swain, 301–415– 

5405). 

This meeting will be webcast live at 

the Web address—http://www.nrc.gov. 

Week of April 20, 2009—Tentative 

Thursday, April 23, 2009 

2 p.m. Briefing on Radioactive Source 

Security (Public Meeting)