AFFIRMED and Opinion Filed June 28, 2024 

S 

In The 

Court of Appeals 

Fifth District of Texas at Dallas 

No. 05-23-00176-CV 

YUMNAH SAID, Appellant 

V. 

DICK'S SPORTING GOODS, INC., Appellee 

On Appeal from the 160th Judicial District Court 

Dallas County, Texas 

Trial Court Cause No. DC-21-09591 

MEMORANDUM OPINION 

Before Justices Nowell, Miskel, and Kennedy 

Opinion by Justice Nowell 

 Appellant Yumnah Said sued appellee Dick’s Sporting Goods, Inc. (DSG) 

after she tripped over a wagon handle on the sales floor and suffered injuries. The 

trial court granted DSG’s no-evidence motion for summary judgment on Said’s 

premises liability claim. In a single issue, Said argues she raised a genuine issue of 

material fact on each element of her claim. We affirm. 

Background 

On July 24, 2019, Said tripped over a wagon handle in the football cleats aisle 

of DSG. Said described the area as follows: “[T]he shoes are to the left, and the 
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clothes are to the right, and they had the boxes in the middle . . . [in] the open aisle 

or the one that should be an open aisle.” She explained the wagon was behind the 

stacked boxes in the aisle so she could not see it from the direction she was walking. 

As she walked by the boxes, she tripped over the wagon handle. Said was five 

months pregnant at the time and twisted her back to mitigate the fall. She filed suit 

alleging negligence and premises liability. 

 DSG filed a no-evidence motion for summary judgment challenging both 

causes of action. DSG contended there was no evidence (1) the wagon handle posed 

an unreasonably dangerous risk of harm; (2) DSG knew or should have known of 

the alleged unreasonably dangerous condition; or (3) DSG’s alleged failure to use 

reasonable care proximately caused Said’s alleged injuries. DSG also argued Said 

was limited to a premises theory of liability; therefore, her negligence claim was 

without merit. 

 Said filed a response and attached her deposition testimony and discovery 

responses. She argued these documents “on their face” established more than a 

scintilla of evidence raising a genuine issue of material fact regarding the 

unreasonable and dangerous nature of the condition because she was walking and 

tripped on the wagon handle “behind the boxes that were stacked” in the aisle. She 

argued, in part, DSG had knowledge of the dangerous condition because advertising 

and advertising displays were entirely within its management and control. On 
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January 19, 2023, the trial court granted DSG’s no-evidence motion for summary 

judgment without stating the grounds. This appeal followed. 

Standard of Review 

A no-evidence motion for summary judgment is appropriate when there is no 

evidence of one or more essential elements of a claim on which the adverse party 

will bear the burden of proof at trial. TEX. R. CIV. P. 166a(i). “When reviewing a 

no-evidence summary judgment, we review the evidence presented by the motion 

and response in the light most favorable to the party against whom the summary 

judgment was rendered, crediting evidence favorable to that party if reasonable 

jurors could, and disregarding contrary evidence unless reasonable jurors could not.” 

Mack Trucks, Inc. v. Tamez, 206 S.W.3d 572, 582 (Tex. 2006). 

A trial court must grant a no-evidence motion for summary judgment unless 

the nonmovant produces more than a scintilla of evidence to raise a genuine issue of 

material fact on the challenged elements. TEX. R. CIV. P. 166a(i); Hamilton v. 

Wilson, 249 S.W.3d 425, 426 (Tex. 2008) (per curiam). A nonmovant produces 

more than a scintilla of evidence when the evidence “rises to a level that would 

enable reasonable and fair-minded people to differ in their conclusions.” Ford 

Motor Co. v. Ridgway, 135 S.W.3d 598, 601 (Tex. 2004). A nonmovant produces 

no more than a scintilla when the evidence is so weak that it does no more than create 

a mere surmise or suspicion of a fact. Forbes Inc. v. Granada Biosciences, Inc., 124 

S.W.3d 167, 172 (Tex. 2003). 
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Premises Liability Law and Discussion 

 A plaintiff seeking damages in a premises liability case must prove (1) the 

owner/operator had actual or constructive knowledge of some condition on the 

premises; (2) the condition posed an unreasonable risk of harm; (3) the 

owner/operator did not exercise reasonable care to reduce or eliminate the risk; and 

(4) such failure proximately caused the plaintiff’s injuries. Wal–Mart Stores, Inc. v. 

Gonzalez, 968 S.W.2d 934, 936 (Tex. 1998). DSG owed Said, as an invitee, a duty 

to exercise reasonable care to protect her from dangerous conditions in the store that 

were known or reasonably discoverable, but it was not an insurer of her safety. Wal–

Mart Stores, Inc. v. Reece, 81 S.W.3d 812, 814 (Tex. 2002). 

To prevail, Said had to prove, among other things, that DSG had actual or 

constructive notice of the wagon handle lying in the aisle. There is no one test for 

determining actual or constructive knowledge that an alleged condition presents an 

unreasonable risk of harm. Dubiel v. Dr. Pepper Snapple Grp., Inc., No. 05-17-

01050-CV, 2018 WL 6716655, at *5 (Tex. App.—Dallas Dec. 21, 2018, no pet.) 

(mem. op.). Said could satisfy the notice element by establishing that (1) DSG 

placed the wagon handle on the floor, (2) DSG actually knew the wagon handle was 

on the floor, or (3) it is more likely than not the condition existed long enough to 

give DSG a reasonable opportunity to discover it. Reece, 81 S.W.3d at 814. 

In determining whether an owner had knowledge of an unreasonably 

dangerous condition, courts generally consider whether the premises owner has 
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received reports of the alleged danger created by the condition or reports of prior 

injuries. Dubiel, 2018 WL 6716655, at *5; see also Zook v. Brookshire Grocery 

Co., 302 S.W.3d 452, 455 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2009, no pet.) (considering lack of 

reports of previous injuries for whether owner knew or should have known of 

dangerous condition). Said produced no evidence of prior reports or injuries caused 

by the wagon handle. To the extent she asserts the advertising display boxes were 

entirely within DSG’s control thereby raising a genuine issue of material fact as to 

DSG’s knowledge of the wagon handle, we disagree. Although proof a premises 

owner created a condition that posed an unreasonable risk of harm may constitute 

circumstantial evidence of knowledge, evidence of the owner’s knowledge or 

appreciation of the dangerous condition must be established. Dubiel, 2018 WL 

6716655, at *6. Said has not cited to any evidence DSG placed the wagon handle in 

the aisle or knew there was a problem with the display or the wagon. 

What constitutes a reasonable time for a premises owner to discover a 

dangerous condition will vary depending upon the facts and circumstances 

presented. Reece, 81 S.W.3d at 816. But there must be some proof of how long the 

hazard was there before liability can be imposed on the premises owner for failing 

to discover and rectify, or warn of, the dangerous condition. Id. Otherwise, owners 

would face strict liability for any alleged dangerous condition on their premises, an 

approach the Texas Supreme Court has clearly rejected. Id. Said produced no such 

evidence. She testified, “I was just walking, and I tripped on a handle of the wagon, 
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and the wagon was behind the boxes that were stacked in the hall. So I couldn’t see 

it.” She did not see any employees working nearby when she tripped, and there was 

nothing else on the floor contributing to the fall. 

It was Said’s burden to establish it was more likely than not that DSG should 

have been aware of the wagon handle in the aisle because it existed long enough to 

give DSG a reasonable opportunity to discover and rectify it, or to warn about it. 

Because Said failed to meet that burden, the trial court did not err by granting the 

no-evidence motion for summary judgment. We need not address whether she 

produced more than a scintilla of evidence on the other challenged elements. TEX.

R. APP. P. 47.1; TEX. R. CIV. P. 166a(i); Rodriguez v. Lusk, No. 08-03-00385-CV, 

2004 WL 2307443, at *3 (Tex. App.—El Paso Oct. 14, 2004, no pet.) (mem. op.) 

(affirming no-evidence summary judgment when no evidence supports any one of 

the challenged elements). We overruled Said’s issue. 

Conclusion 

 We affirm the trial court’s judgment. 

230176F.P05 

 

/Erin A. Nowell/

ERIN A. NOWELL 

JUSTICE 
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S 

Court of Appeals 

Fifth District of Texas at Dallas 

JUDGMENT 

YUMNAH SAID, Appellant 

No. 05-23-00176-CV V. 

DICK’S SPORTING GOODS, INC., 

Appellee 

 On Appeal from the 160th Judicial 

District Court, Dallas County, Texas 

Trial Court Cause No. DC-21-09591. 

Opinion delivered by Justice Nowell. 

Justices Miskel and Kennedy 

participating. 

 In accordance with this Court’s opinion of this date, the judgment of the trial 

court is AFFIRMED. 

 It is ORDERED that appellee DICK’S SPORTING GOODS, INC. recover 

its costs of this appeal from appellant YUMNAH SAID. 

Judgment entered June 28, 2024.