United States Court of Appeals 

for the Federal Circuit ______________________ 

APPLE INC.,

Plaintiff-Appellant

v.

WI-LAN INC.,

Defendant-Cross-Appellant

______________________ 

2020-2011, 2020-2094

______________________ 

Appeals from the United States District Court for the 

Southern District of California in Nos. 3:14-cv-02235-DMSBLM, 3:14-cv-1507-DMS-BLM, Judge Dana M. Sabraw.

______________________ 

Decided: February 4, 2022

______________________ 

MARK S. DAVIES, Orrick, Herrington & Sutcliffe LLP, 

Washington, DC, argued for plaintiff-appellant. Also represented by BENJAMIN PAUL CHAGNON, JAMES ANGLIN 

FLYNN, KATHERINE M. KOPP; MAX CARTER-OBERSTONE, San 

Francisco, CA; THOMAS KING-SUN FU, Los Angeles, CA;

SEAN C. CUNNINGHAM, ERIN GIBSON, STANLEY JOSEPH 

PANIKOWSKI, III, DLA Piper LLP (US), San Diego, CA.

 JEFFREY A. LAMKEN, MoloLamken LLP, Washington, 

DC, argued for defendant-cross-appellant. Also represented by RAYINER HASHEM, LUCAS M. WALKER; LEONID 

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2 APPLE INC. v. WI-LAN INC. 

GRINBERG, New York, NY; WARREN LIPSCHITZ, MIKE 

MCKOOL, McKool Smith, PC, Dallas, TX. 

 ______________________ 

Before MOORE, Chief Judge, BRYSON and PROST, Circuit 

Judges.

MOORE, Chief Judge.

The U.S. District Court for the Southern District of 

California entered a final judgment (1) that Apple infringed claims 9, 26, and 27 of U.S. Patent No. 8,457,145 

and claim 1 of U.S. Patent No. 8,537,757; (2) that those 

claims had not been proven invalid; and (3) that awarded 

Wi-LAN $85.23 million in damages. Apple appeals, and 

Wi-LAN cross-appeals. For the following reasons, we affirm-in-part, reverse-in-part, vacate-in-part, and remand. 

BACKGROUND

I 

The ’145 patent is directed to allocating bandwidth in 

a wireless communication system. ’145 patent at Abstract, 

1:28–30. Wireless communication systems facilitate twoway communication between user devices (e.g., mobile 

phones) and an associated fixed network infrastructure

(e.g., wire-line system). Id. at 1:36–47. The wireless network described in the ’145 patent does so using subscriber 

units associated with the user devices. Id. The subscriber 

units communicate with a base station connected to the 

fixed network infrastructure. Id. Because each base station has limited bandwidth for transmissions to and from 

the subscriber units it supports, those subscriber units 

must share bandwidth. Id. at 9:8–11. To that end, the subscriber units send bandwidth requests to the base station, 

which then allocates bandwidth. Id. at 3:19–28. This process itself also requires bandwidth. The ’145 patent purports to provide a bandwidth allocation method that 

requires less bandwidth. Id. at 5:41–43, 51–56; 6:65–67. 

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APPLE INC. v. WI-LAN INC. 3

In one aspect, each subscriber unit, rather than the base 

station, maintains and allocates bandwidth across data 

queues for the physical channels it serves (e.g., data or 

voice), relieving the base station from performing these

tasks. Id. at 7:39–53; 8:8–14; 22:25–38. In another aspect, 

each subscriber unit aggregates bandwidth requests across 

different queues and sends them out periodically, rather 

than separately passing each bandwidth request to the 

base station. Id. at 27:4–11. Asserted independent claims 

9 and 26 recite:

9. A subscriber unit for a wireless communication 

system, wherein the wireless communication system includes a plurality of subscriber units in communication with an associated base unit, 

comprising:

a plurality of queues, each queue for grouping data based on the QoS; and

a media access (MAC) module configured to

set an initial value for a timer associated with a queue, and

periodically, on expiration of the 

value of the timer, transmit a bandwidth request indicating an 

amount of bandwidth required for 

transmitting the data from the 

queue.

26. A subscriber unit for a wireless communication 

system, comprising:

a plurality of queues for buffering user traffic according to a traffic parameter, each 

queue having an associated logical state;

a media access control (MAC) element capable of

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4 APPLE INC. v. WI-LAN INC. 

transmitting an uplink (UL) bandwidth request based on the logical 

state of the queues during a bandwidth request opportunity, and

allocating between the queues a 

bandwidth allocation received in 

response to the UL bandwidth request, based on the current state of 

the queues.

The ’757 patent, while unrelated to the ’145 patent, is 

directed to similar subject matter. See ’757 patent at Abstract, 1:27–29. The patent purports to improve signal 

quality and offer greater error protection in data transmission using a modulation scheme. Id. at 4:53–5:46. Claim 

1 recites: 

A subscriber station for a wireless communication 

system comprising:

a modem section configured to receive 

downlink data from a base station on a 

downlink link and to transmit uplink data 

to the base station on an uplink link shared 

with other subscribers stations;

a receive signal quality module configured 

to monitor a downlink (DL) quality parameter for the downlink data providing a parameter value; and

a control section configured to:

determine a preferred downlink 

physical (PHY) mode for the downlink data among a plurality of PHY 

modes of different degrees of robustness, the preferred downlink 

PHY mode being defined between a 

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APPLE INC. v. WI-LAN INC. 5

first and a second threshold for the 

parameter value;

instruct the modem section to 

transmit to the base station an indication of the preferred downlink 

PHY mode;

identify in a DL sub-frame map received from the base station, a current downlink PHY mode selected 

for the subscriber station based on 

the preferred downlink PHY mode 

and the bandwidth available to the 

subscriber station on the downlink 

link; and

instruct the modem section to receive the downlink data based on 

the current downlink PHY mode,

wherein the downlink PHY mode specifies 

a modulation format and a forward error 

correction technique used for transmission 

of downlink data.

II

In May 2014, Apple sued Wi-LAN in the Southern District of California, seeking a declaratory judgment of noninfringement and invalidity for all claims of the ’145 and 

’757 patents. Wi-LAN counterclaimed, alleging that certain Apple devices—including the iPhone 6, iPhone 6 Plus,

iPhone 5, iPhone 5S, and iPhone 5C—infringed at least one 

claim of those patents based on their use of the Long-Term 

Evolution (LTE) wireless communication standard.1 Wi1 Apple also sought declaratory judgment, and WiLAN counterclaimed, on claims of other patents not at issue in this appeal. 

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6 APPLE INC. v. WI-LAN INC. 

LAN contended that its patented technology enabled Voice 

over Long-Term Evolution (VoLTE), which provides voice

call service over a 4G LTE network. 

During claim construction, the parties disputed the 

construction of “subscriber unit” and “subscriber station,” 

which they agreed should be construed the same.2 Apple 

proposed the terms mean a “fixed or portable customer 

premises equipment [CPE] that wirelessly receives [uplink] bandwidth from a base station, and allocates the 

bandwidth across connected user devices.” J.A. 5. The district court rejected that construction in favor of Wi-LAN’s 

construction: “module that receives [uplink] bandwidth 

from a base station, and allocates the bandwidth across its 

user connections.” J.A. 5–7. 

Apple moved for partial summary judgment of noninfringement for all accused phones equipped with Intel 

chips based on a 2011 license agreement between Wi-LAN 

and Intel. The parties agreed that the license shielded Intel and its customer Apple from liability pertaining to sales 

of iPhones containing Intel chipsets sold during the license 

term. They disagreed, however, on whether section 3.2 of 

that agreement extended the license in perpetuity. The 

district court granted Apple’s motion, reasoning that this 

section “specifically states that ‘the licenses granted . . . 

shall survive the expiration of the Term License Period.’” 

J.A. 25 (alterations in original); Wi-LAN’s Opening & Response Br. 70. 

Infringement and damages were tried to a jury. At 

trial, Wi-LAN’s damages expert, David Kennedy, applied a 

hypothetical-negotiation framework to compute a royalty 

of $0.85 per phone, or $145.1 million total. J.A. 10617–70. 

He relied largely on the testimony of Dr. Vijay Madisetti

2 The parties also agreed that the terms should be 

construed consistently across both patents at issue. J.A. 5.

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APPLE INC. v. WI-LAN INC. 7

regarding the incremental benefits of the ’145 patent. To 

measure those benefits, Dr. Madisetti tested systems that 

use VoLTE against the best purported noninfringing alternative, Skype. J.A. 10260–61. In particular, Dr. Madisetti 

compared the voice quality of each system and attributed 

the difference to the ’145 patent. J.A. 10261–72. Mr. Kennedy’s damages theory relied on his testimony.

The jury found Apple infringed claims 9, 26, and 27 of 

the ’145 patent and claim 1 of the ’757 patent and awarded 

Wi-LAN $145.1 million in damages. J.A. 629–30. Apple 

moved for judgment as a matter of law, renewing its claim

construction arguments and arguing that Wi-LAN had 

failed to prove infringement even under the district court’s 

construction of subscriber unit. It also moved for a new 

trial on damages or, alternatively, a remittitur.

The district court denied Apple’s motion for judgment 

as a matter of law and granted its motion for a new trial on 

damages or, alternatively, a remittitur. It determined that 

Dr. Madisetti’s testimony conflated the patented technology with VoLTE generally. J.A. 35–37. Because the inventors admittedly did not invent VoLTE technology, the 

district court concluded Dr. Madisetti’s testimony lacked a 

factual basis and should not have been presented to the 

jury. J.A. 37. Because Dr. Madisetti’s testimony was essential to Wi-LAN’s damages theory, the district court offered Wi-LAN a choice between remittitur to $10 million or 

a new trial on damages. J.A. 38. Wi-LAN chose a new trial.

In the second damages retrial, Mr. Kennedy pivoted to 

a royalty rate of $0.45 per phone based on three comparable licenses that covered the asserted patents. J.A. 15216. 

The jury awarded Wi-LAN a royalty rate of $0.45 per phone 

resulting in total damages of $85.23 million. J.A. 756. Apple moved for judgment as a matter of law of no damages, 

arguing Mr. Kennedy failed to properly apportion the comparable licenses to reflect the value of the asserted patents. 

J.A. 764–72. The district court denied Apple’s motion. J.A. 

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8 APPLE INC. v. WI-LAN INC. 

62. Apple appeals, and Wi-LAN cross-appeals. We have 

jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(1).

DISCUSSION

Apple argues the district court erred in construing the

“subscriber unit” and “subscriber station” terms3 to include

components of a user device. Apple also argues that there 

is no record evidence that the accused iPhones as sold contain a subscriber unit because they do not have the required user connections. Lastly, Apple argues that 

Mr. Kennedy failed to apportion for the value of the patented technology and, thus, the jury should not have been 

allowed to consider his testimony. 

In its cross-appeal, Wi-LAN argues that the district 

court erred in interpreting the 2011 license agreement between Wi-LAN and Intel to grant a perpetual license for 

Intel to sell certain chipsets to Apple. It also argues that 

the district court erred in ordering a new trial on damages

and asks that we reinstate the original damages verdict.

I 

We start with Apple’s challenge to the district court’s 

construction of subscriber unit as a “module that receives 

[uplink] bandwidth from a base station, and allocates the 

bandwidth across its user connections.” We review a district court’s claim construction and its interpretations of intrinsic evidence de novo. Forest Lab’ys, LLC v. 

Sigmapharm Lab’ys, LLC, 918 F.3d 928, 932–33 (Fed. Cir. 

2019). We review any subsidiary fact findings based on extrinsic evidence for clear error. Id. 

A claim term is generally given its plain and ordinary 

meaning as understood by a skilled artisan. See Phillips v. 

AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1313 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc). 

3 For simplicity, we use the term subscriber unit to 

refer to both subscriber unit and subscriber station. 

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“We depart from the plain and ordinary meaning of claim 

terms based on the specification in only two instances: lexicography and disavowal.” Hill-Rom Servs., Inc. v. Stryker 

Corp., 755 F.3d 1367, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (citing Thorner 

v. Sony Computer Ent. Am. LLC, 669 F.3d 1362, 1365 (Fed.

Cir. 2012)). “To act as its own lexicographer, a patentee 

must clearly set forth a definition of the disputed claim 

term other than its plain and ordinary meaning and must 

clearly express an intent to redefine the term.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). Embodiments in the specification—even if there is only one embodiment—cannot 

limit the scope of the claims absent the patentee’s “words 

or expressions of manifest exclusion or restriction.” Id. at 

1372 (quoting Liebel-Flarsheim Co. v. Medrad, Inc., 358 

F.3d 898, 906 (Fed. Cir. 2004)).

Rather than rely on the plain-and-ordinary meaning of 

“subscriber unit,” Apple claims the written description redefines that term. It argues the patentee defined “subscriber unit” as CPE. Apple points to four aspects of the 

intrinsic record that allegedly show this redefinition: first, 

the patents’ interchangeable use of CPE and subscriber 

unit; second, the patents’ use of CPE as the sole embodiment of the “subscriber unit”; third, the patentee’s preliminary amendment that replaced claims reciting CPE with 

claims reciting “subscriber unit”; and fourth, the patentee’s 

interchangeable use of subscriber unit with other similar 

terms in related patents. We are not persuaded that the 

record in this case shows that the patentee clearly set forth 

this definition of subscriber unit.4 

First, the written description does not equate CPE and 

subscriber unit through interchangeable use. It does not 

4 Accordingly, we need not address the second portion of Apple’s claim construction argument: that CPE excludes subcomponents of a user’s device (e.g., part of a 

user’s phone). 

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10 APPLE INC. v. WI-LAN INC. 

use the terms interchangeably at all. The terms are never 

used to describe the same facet of a device or embodiment, 

nor are they used to refer to the same element of a figure. 

Cf. Edwards Lifesciences LLC v. Cook Inc., 582 F.3d 1322, 

1329 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (consistent use of intraluminal graft 

and graft to refer to same object and figure element was 

“akin to a definition equating the two”). Between the two 

patents, they appear in the same sentence only once: 

The broadband wireless communication system facilitates two-way communication between a plurality of base stations and a plurality of fixed 

subscriber stations or Customer Premises Equipment (CPE). 

’145 patent at 2:1–4 (emphasis added). And that sentence 

does little to explain the relationship between a subscriber 

station and a CPE because it relates to fixed subscriber stations. Even then, it is unclear whether the sentence describes fixed subscriber stations and CPEs as alternatives 

or equates the two. 

Nor does the patents’ use of the term CPE in specific

communication system embodiments and the term subscriber unit in general communication system descriptions

show interchangeability. The patents use subscriber unit 

to refer to a generic component of wireless communication 

systems in the related art. For example, they introduce a 

wireless communication system as simply “facilitat[ing] 

two-way communication between a plurality of subscriber 

units (fixed and portable) and a fixed network infrastructure.” See ’145 patent at 1:36–40. Moreover, the patents 

explain that prior art systems typically use well-known duplexing schemes such as “time division duplexing (TDD) or 

frequency division duplexing (FDD)” to facilitate the exchange of information “between the base station and the 

subscriber units.” See id. at 1:58–64 (emphasis added). 

Categories of general network transmissions are likewise 

described in terms of subscriber units and base stations. 

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Id. at 1:55–58 (describing downlink and uplink transmissions). 

Then in each communication system embodiment, the 

patents describe CPEs with specific qualities and features 

communicating with their respective base station. See,

e.g., ’145 patent at 2:11–15 (describing communication between a base station and CPEs “positioned at fixed customer sites 112 throughout the coverage area”); 6:11–16 

(describing CPEs that transmit incremental and aggregate 

bandwidth requests to associated and respective base stations). These CPEs match the description of subscriber 

units in the background, but, unlike subscriber units, they 

are never used to describe components common to communication systems broadly. 

Thus, the written description merely reveals that a 

CPE is a type of subscriber unit, which Wi-LAN freely admits. Wi-LAN’s Opening & Response Br. 34. The fact that 

a CPE is an example of a subscriber unit, however, does not 

show those terms are interchangeable. And there is no evidence that the patents accord CPE the same scope as subscriber unit. As such, Apple fails to show the terms are 

interchangeable. 

That brings us to Apple’s second argument: the patents’ use of CPE as the sole embodiment of the subscriber 

unit is a redefinition. That argument fails because there 

are no “words or expressions of manifest exclusion or restriction” in the written description. See Hill-Rom, 755 

F.3d at 1372. The patents do not describe the invention as 

limited to a CPE. There is no disclosure that, for example, 

the present invention is, includes, or refers to a CPE. See, 

e.g., Edwards Lifesciences, 582 F.3d 1322 at 1330 (“the 

specification frequently describes an ‘intraluminal graft’ as 

‘the present invention’ or ‘this invention,’ indicating an intent to limit the invention to intraluminal devices”). Nor 

are there any statements expressing the advantages, importance, or essentiality of using a CPE as opposed to a 

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12 APPLE INC. v. WI-LAN INC. 

subscriber unit. See, e.g., Techtronic Indus. Co. v. Int’l 

Trade Comm’n, 944 F.3d 901, 907–10 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (the 

patent’s focus on placement of a detector in the wall console 

as the objective of the invention and improvement over 

prior art garage door operators effected a disavowal of alternative locations). Nothing in the written description 

makes clear that the invention is limited to a CPE. In fact, 

there is some language suggesting the embodiments are 

not limiting. ’145 patent at 8:65–67, 31:60–63; ’757 patent 

at 2:66–3:2, 17:35–43. Absent such language, we do not 

import limitations from the written description into the 

claims. Hill-Rom, 755 F.3d at 1372–73.

Apple’s two remaining arguments for equating subscriber unit and CPE are likewise unpersuasive. Merely 

replacing one claim term with another during prosecution 

does not alone mean the terms are equivalent or interchangeable. Similarly, Wi-LAN does not dispute it used 

different terms for subscriber unit (such as wireless subscriber unit, subscriber radio unit, and subscriber radio 

station) across its many patents. If anything, that only 

shows subscriber unit is interchangeable with subscriber 

radio station and other, similar terms. It is not evidence 

that CPE and subscriber unit (or any of its variations) are 

interchangeable. 

In sum, our review of the intrinsic record does not support Apple’s claim that subscriber unit should be construed 

as CPE. Apple’s claim construction argument, which 

would confine the term to standalone devices, rises and 

falls with that redefinition. We reject Apple’s argument 

and uphold the district court’s construction of subscriber 

unit.

II

Apple next argues that the district court erred in denying its motion for judgment as a matter of law that the accused products do not infringe. Apple contends that 

substantial evidence does not support the jury’s 

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APPLE INC. v. WI-LAN INC. 13

infringement finding because the iPhones as sold do not 

have a subscriber unit under the district court’s construction of that term. Apple’s Opening Br. 42–48. We do not 

agree. 

We review a denial of judgment as a matter of law under the law of the regional circuit. Godo Kaisha IP Bridge 

1 v. TCL Commc’n Tech. Holdings Ltd., 967 F.3d 1380, 

1382 (Fed. Cir. 2020). The Ninth Circuit reviews such a 

denial de novo. Est. of Diaz v. City of Anaheim, 840 F.3d 

592, 604 (9th Cir. 2016). We review a jury’s infringement 

finding for substantial evidence. Godo Kaisha, 967 F.3d at 

1383. “A factual finding is supported by substantial evidence if a reasonable jury could have found in favor of the 

prevailing party in light of the evidence presented at trial.” 

Id. 

Substantial evidence supports the jury’s finding that 

the accused iPhones as sold have a subscriber unit. The 

district court construed that limitation to require a “module that . . . allocates the bandwidth across its user connections.” J.A. 5–7. At trial, Wi-LAN contended that the 

accused iPhones meet this limitation because each has a 

module that allocates bandwidth across two connections: 

data and VoLTE. Utilizing the graphic below, Dr. Madisetti testified that the baseband processor in the accused 

iPhones has two LTE connections with the application processor: a VoLTE connection (green) and a data connection

(blue). 

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14 APPLE INC. v. WI-LAN INC. 

J.A. 7561, 10251–52. He further testified that the baseband processor’s media access controller (MAC) allocates 

bandwidth across these two connections. J.A. 10253–54. 

More specifically, he testified that the VoLTE connection 

carries voice packets from the application processor’s 

phone application into the baseband processor using an I2S 

bus, where they are stored in a priority queue, and that 

packets from other applications are sent over the data connection using a PCIE bus and stored in a different queue. 

J.A. 10287–88; Wi-LAN’s Opening & Response Br. 48–49. 

The MAC then reads packets from the queues, in order of 

priority, and transmits them to the base station. J.A. 

10253–54. Finally, Dr. Madisetti testified that the physical 

connections between the baseband processor and application processor (i.e., the I2S bus and PCIE bus) exist “inside 

the iPhone as sold.” J.A. 10253. This testimony provides 

substantial evidence for the jury’s finding that the accused 

iPhones contain a subscriber unit, i.e., a module that allocates bandwidth across its user connections. 

Apple argues that the data and voice connections do not 

exist in iPhones as sold because those connections are not 

established until the user turns on the phone and connects 

to a network with VoLTE service. Apple’s Opening Br. 44–

48. And because the phrase “user connections” in the district court’s construction of subscriber unit is structural, 

the iPhones’ capabilities of forming these connections are 

irrelevant. However, substantial evidence supports the 

jury’s contrary finding. As Dr. Madisetti testified, the 

physical I2S bus provides the VoLTE connection between 

the baseband chip and user application, and, likewise, the 

physical PCIE bus provides the data connection between 

the same. J.A. 10253, 10257. And both components exist 

in the iPhone as sold. J.A. 10253.

Apple attempts to undermine Dr. Madisetti’s testimony by arguing those physical connections (i.e., I2S bus 

and PCIE bus) do not satisfy the user connections requirement. Citing its expert’s testimony, Apple claims the I2S 

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APPLE INC. v. WI-LAN INC. 15

and PCIE buses stop at the edge of the applications processor, meaning the connection would be incomplete. Apple’s 

Response & Reply Br. 21–22 (citing J.A. 11025). The jury, 

however, was free to weigh the testimony of Apple’s expert 

against that of Dr. Madisetti. And we cannot say, in view 

of Dr. Madisetti’s testimony, that the jury’s determination 

was unreasonable. 

Apple further argues the phones must be connected to 

a network to receive parameters to build “the ‘software 

structures’ necessary to establish a connection.” Apple’s 

Opening Br. 46. To the extent that is a separate noninfringement argument, substantial evidence supports a contrary finding. Dr. Madisetti testified that no modification 

of hardware or software is required to perform the claimed 

allocation. J.A. 10258. And Apple admits that the relevant 

users are the iPhone applications, which run on the applications processor. Apple’s Response & Reply Br. 21. 

Accordingly, substantial evidence supports the jury’s 

finding that the accused iPhones contain a subscriber unit 

as sold. Therefore, the district court did not err in denying 

Apple’s motion for judgment as a matter of law on infringement. 

III

Apple next challenges Mr. Kennedy’s damages methodology in the second trial. We agree that his methodology 

was flawed, and thus, the district court abused its discretion by denying Apple’s motion for a new trial. 

In Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 

U.S. 579, 589–95 (1993), the Supreme Court set forth the 

standards governing admissibility of expert testimony under Federal Rules of Evidence 702 and 703. The Court explained that the trial judge plays a “gatekeeping role,” id.

at 597, which “entails a preliminary assessment of whether 

the reasoning or methodology underlying the testimony is 

scientifically valid and of whether that reasoning or 

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16 APPLE INC. v. WI-LAN INC. 

methodology properly can be applied to the facts in issue,” 

id. at 592–93. The Court emphasized that the focus “must 

be solely on principles and methodology, not on the conclusions that they generate.” Id. at 595. “[A] reasonable or 

scientifically valid methodology is nonetheless unreliable 

where the data used is not sufficiently tied to the facts of 

the case.” Summit 6, LLC v. Samsung Elecs. Co., Ltd., 802 

F.3d 1283, 1296 (Fed. Cir. 2015). Likewise, “ideal input 

data cannot save a methodology that is plagued by logical 

deficiencies or is otherwise unreasonable.” Id. But where 

the methodology is reasonable and its data or evidence are 

sufficiently tied to the facts of the case, the gatekeeping 

role of the court is satisfied. Id. 

At trial, Wi-LAN used the hypothetical negotiation approach for calculating reasonable royalty damages under 

35 U.S.C. § 284. This approach attempts to calculate the 

royalty rate the parties would have agreed upon had they 

negotiated an agreement prior to the start of the infringement. In determining a reasonable royalty, “parties frequently rely on comparable license agreements.” Bio-Rad 

Labs, Inc. v. 10X Genomics Inc., 967 F.3d 1353, 1372 (Fed. 

Cir. 2020). When relying on comparable licenses to prove 

a reasonable royalty, we require a party to “account for differences in the technologies and economic circumstances of 

the contracting parties.” VirnetX, Inc. v. Cisco Sys., Inc., 

767 F.3d 1308, 1330 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (citation omitted). We 

review a district court’s decision concerning the methodology for calculating damages for an abuse of discretion. Lucent Techs., Inc. v. Gateway, Inc., 580 F.3d 1301, 1310 (Fed. 

Cir. 2009). We review a denial of judgment as a matter of 

law and the denial of a motion for a new trial under the law 

of the regional circuit. Id. at 1309. In the Ninth Circuit, 

denial of a motion for a new trial is reviewed for abuse of 

discretion. Smith v. City & Cnty. of Honolulu, 887 F.3d 

944, 949 (9th Cir. 2018).

To estimate a reasonable royalty in this case, Mr. Kennedy first culled more than 150 Wi-LAN license

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APPLE INC. v. WI-LAN INC. 17

agreements down to three comparable agreements5: the 

Vertu, Doro, and Unnecto license agreements. He chose 

those three licenses because they (1) involved phones as 

the licensed products; (2) became effective in 2013 or later; 

(3) licensed patents covering LTE or related technology; 

and (4) were executed after the asserted patents issued. 

J.A. 15220–23. In addition to licensing patents covering 

LTE, each agreement also licensed other patents in WiLAN’s portfolio. 

Mr. Kennedy then set out to adjust for the differences 

between those licenses and the license that would have resulted from the hypothetical negotiation. He acknowledged that—unlike the Vertu, Doro, and Unnecto portfolio 

licenses—the hypothetical negotiation would have resulted 

in a license to only the ’145 and ’757 patents. J.A. 15231–

32. 

To account for this difference, Mr. Kennedy first sought 

to establish that, in practice, only a handful of valuable patents drive the royalty rate for a license, and the rest of the 

portfolio is included for a marginal upcharge. J.A. 15233–

34. For example, he testified:

I’ve done many deals working for both sides of the 

table. Both parties understand and expect that the 

rest of the portfolio will be included, maybe for 

some upcharge. But it’s not dividing the patents by 

numbers and multiplying it by, you know, a thousand patents. It just doesn’t work that way. 

5 Sufficient comparability is a threshold requirement for licenses to be admissible. Elbit Sys. Land & C4I 

Ltd. v. Hughes Network Sys., LLC, 927 F.3d 1292, 1299 

(Fed. Cir. 2019). And Apple admits that the running-royalty licenses Mr. Kennedy relied on were admissible. Oral 

Arg. at 5:36–5:43, https://oralarguments.cafc.uscourts.gov

/default.aspx?fl=202011_10082021.mp3. 

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18 APPLE INC. v. WI-LAN INC. 

. . . 

You can cut out portions of the patent portfolio anyway as, Mr. Skippen testified, that just don’t relate, or if they’re Bluetooth, they’re already 

licensed, so Wi-LAN is thinking, I can’t collect 

again. So that number is not really a thousand. 

But whatever the number is, you’re bringing forth

your most valuable ones and that sets the price.

J.A. 15232–33. Mr. Skippen, on whom Mr. Kennedy relied,

likewise testified that, in the industry, parties focus on a 

handful of “key patents,” “like throwing in the chaff with 

the wheat,” to provide the licensee respite and increase the 

royalty amount somewhere between 5 and 35 percent on 

average. J.A. 15157–58. 

Mr. Kennedy, relying in part on Mr. Skippen’s testimony, determined that the ’145 and ’757 patents were key 

patents in the three licenses for three reasons: they were 

specifically listed in the comparable licenses, they were discussed in negotiations, and Apple continued to use the 

technology after the patents were asserted against them, 

rather than switch to a noninfringing alternative. J.A. 

15236–38; see also Wi-LAN Opening & Response Br. 57 

(“the ’145 and ’757 patents were ‘crown jewels’, ‘key patents’ that phone makers like Doro ‘focus[ed] on’ in negotiations”), 60 (“the ’145 and ’757 patents . . . came up in 

negotiations, and were expressly named in the Doro and 

Vertu licenses”). For example, when asked about how he 

determined that others value the patented technology as 

important, Mr. Kennedy referenced Mr. Skippen’s testimony that Doro “reupped [its] license in 2018, specifically 

talking about how these two patents . . . had been found 

valid and infringed.” J.A. 15237. He then pointed out that 

the Vertu license listed one of the asserted patents, and 

that the Unnecto license listed both asserted patents. J.A. 

15237–38. Mr. Kennedy also emphasized that Apple’s continued use of the patented technology after being found to 

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APPLE INC. v. WI-LAN INC. 19

infringe “tells you it’s valuable to Apple or they would just 

take it out.” J.A. 15236–37. Based on these facts, Mr. Kennedy treated the asserted patents as the key patents. To 

separate the value of the key patents from the rest of the 

licensed portfolio, he reduced the royalty rate by 25 percent. J.A. 15238. He selected this rate based on Mr. Skippen’s testimony that, in practice, the rest of a portfolio was 

licensed for a 5 to 35 percent markup. See J.A. 15158. 

Mr. Kennedy’s opinion that the asserted patents were 

key patents is untethered to the facts of this case. As a 

preliminary matter, all three licenses were obtained prior 

to any litigation. J.A. 15240–41. Thus, unlike Apple, the

licensees did not continue to use the technology after being 

found to infringe. More importantly, those licenses treated 

the asserted patents as chaff, not wheat. For example, 

there is no evidence that the ’757 patent was discussed during negotiations for any of the comparable licenses.6 Each 

license divided the licensed patents between two categories: Asserted Patents and Non-Asserted Patents. None of 

the licenses list the ’757 patent among the “Asserted Patents,” which were the patents focused on during underlying negotiations. J.A. 861, 885, 923, 935. Two of the 

licenses, Doro and Vertu, do not list the ’757 patent at all. 

And Unnecto’s reference to the ’757 patent is easily lost in 

a schedule listing hundreds of Non-Asserted patents. J.A. 

886, 900–22. And Mr. Skippen also expressly testified that 

the ’757 patent was not discussed in initial negotiations of 

the Doro license agreement. J.A. 15163. There is no record 

evidence supporting Mr. Kennedy’s assumption that the 

’757 patent was a key patent. Accordingly, Mr. Kennedy’s 

conclusion that the ’757 patent falls into the key patent 

6 Mr. Kennedy’s justification that the ’757 patent 

was later discussed in 2018 during renegotiations is immaterial because, as he acknowledged, the relevant timeframe 

for the hypothetical negotiation was 2013. See J.A. 15222. 

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20 APPLE INC. v. WI-LAN INC. 

category because it was identified as such in the comparable licenses is inconsistent with the available facts. None 

of the three license agreements treats the ’757 patent as a 

key patent, and no testimony on negotiations suggested the 

contrary. 

For similar reasons, the record does not support that 

the Doro or Unnecto licenses treated the ’145 patent as a 

key patent. Neither lists the ’145 patent as one of the “Asserted Patents.” Doro doesn’t list it at all, and as with the 

’757 patent, Unnecto lists the ’145 patent with hundreds of 

other patents in the chaff. There is also no evidence that 

the ’145 patent was discussed in negotiations for either 

agreement. Mr. Skippen expressly testified that the ’145

patent was not discussed in negotiations of the Doro license 

agreement. J.A. 15163. There is, therefore, no basis upon 

which to conclude based upon the evidence presented that 

either the Doro or Unnecto license is a meaningful proxy 

for the royalty rate of the ’145 patent. 

That just leaves the Vertu license’s treatment of the 

’145 patent. Mr. Skippen testified that the ’145 patent was 

discussed during the Vertu license negotiations. J.A. 

15166. And that license lists the ’145 patent as one of the 

“Asserted Patents.” J.A. 923, 935. However, it also lists 

five other “Asserted Patents.” Id. And Mr. Kennedy failed 

to address the extent to which these other patents contributed to the royalty rate in the Vertu license. Yet he opined 

that excluding these patents (and the rest of Wi-LAN’s 

portfolio) from the hypothetical negotiation would have 

netted Apple only a 25 percent discount. Mr. Kennedy’s 

silence on these equally situated patents is troubling and 

makes his opinion unreliable. 

Mr. Kennedy’s methodological and factual errors in analyzing the comparable license agreements render his opinion untethered to the facts of this case. Thus, Mr. 

Kennedy’s damages testimony should have been excluded. 

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APPLE INC. v. WI-LAN INC. 21

We conclude the district court abused its discretion in 

denying Apple’s motion for a new trial on damages. 

IV

Turning to Wi-LAN’s cross-appeal, the district court 

held that section 3.2 of the license agreement between WiLAN and Intel unambiguously provided Intel a perpetual 

license to the asserted patents. J.A. 24–25. Accordingly, it 

granted Apple’s motion for summary judgment of no infringement for all iPhones supplied with Intel chipsets after the license agreement term expired. J.A. 25. Section 

3.2 recites in part:

3.2 Term License for Wi-LAN Patent Portfolio. For 

the Term License Period, Wi-LAN . . . grants to Intel . . . a worldwide . . . license, without the right to 

sublicense, under the Licensed Patents to directly 

or indirectly engage in Licensed Activities. For 

clarity, . . . the licenses granted pursuant to this 

Section 3.2 with respect to Licensed Activities that 

were actually engaged in during the Term License 

Period shall survive the expiration of the Term License Period . . . . 

J.A. 5432. Wi-LAN argues that this section does not provide a perpetual license for chipsets Intel sold after the 

agreement expired. We agree. 

We review a district court’s grant of summary judgment under the law of the regional circuit, here, the Ninth 

Circuit. Edgewell Pers. Care Brands, LLC v. Munchkin, 

Inc., 998 F.3d 917, 919 (Fed. Cir. 2021). The Ninth Circuit 

reviews a district court’s grant of summary judgment de 

novo. Greater Yellowstone Coal. v. Lewis, 628 F.3d 1143, 

1148 (9th Cir. 2010). The relevant license agreement between Wi-LAN and Intel is governed by Delaware law. J.A. 

5433. Under Delaware law, contract interpretation is a 

question of law that we review de novo. GMG Cap. Invs., 

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22 APPLE INC. v. WI-LAN INC. 

LLC v. Athenian Venture Partners I, L.P., 36 A.3d 776, 779 

(Del. 2012).

Contracts must be “read as a whole, giving meaning to 

each term, and avoiding an interpretation that would render any term ‘mere surplusage.’” Sunline Com. Carriers, 

Inc. v. CITGO Petroleum Corp., 206 A.3d 836, 846 (Del. 

2019). When the contract language is clear and unambiguous, “the parties’ intent is ascertained by giving the language its ordinary and usual meaning.” Nw. Nat’l. Ins. Co. 

v. Esmark, Inc., 672 A.2d 41, 43 (Del. 1996). A contract is 

not ambiguous merely because the parties disagree as to 

its proper interpretation. Id. “Rather, a contract is ambiguous only when the provisions in controversy are reasonably or fairly susceptible to different interpretations or may 

have two or more different meanings.” Id. (citation omitted).

Section 3.2 of the license agreement unambiguously 

grants a term license. In the first sentence, Wi-LAN grants 

Intel a worldwide license to engage in Licensed Activities 

only “for the Term License Period,” which expired January 

21, 2017. J.A. 5429, 5431–32. The introductory phrase of 

the next sentence explains the purpose of the sentence: 

“[f]or clarity.” J.A. 5432. The sentence goes on to clarify 

that “(i) the licenses granted . . . with respect to the Licensed Activities that were actually engaged in during the 

Term License Period shall survive the expiration of the 

Term License Period.” J.A. 5432. Thus, Intel continues to 

enjoy protection for Licensed Activities, such as past sales, 

engaged in prior to the license’s expiration. Our review of 

section 3.2 reveals no intent of the parties to extend the 

term license in perpetuity to Licensed Activities occurring 

after the license’s expiration.

Apple disagrees and argues the plain meaning of the 

second sentence provides a perpetual license for any future

Licensed Activities of the type it actually engaged in during 

the license term, including sales of Intel chipsets to Apple. 

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APPLE INC. v. WI-LAN INC. 23

Apple’s Response & Reply Br. 65–67. Under Apple’s interpretation, the second sentence contradicts the first sentence by extending the term of the license, which goes 

against the express purpose of that sentence: clarity. 

Moreover, Apple’s interpretation inserts uncertainty into 

the agreement by granting perpetual licenses for unspecified categories of Licensed Activities, the scope of which 

could not be determined until the expiration of the agreement. This is particularly suspect given the preceding sentence unambiguously grants a license of a limited duration. 

Apple’s interpretation is not reasonable. Because section 

3.2 unambiguously grants Intel a limited license that does 

not extend to Licensed Activities occurring after the expiration of the agreement, we reverse the district court’s 

grant of summary judgment of no infringement.

V 

Wi-LAN next argues the district court abused its discretion in granting a new trial on damages because 

Dr. Madisetti’s testimony about the benefits of the patented invention should not have been presented to the 

jury.7 We do not agree. 

We review a district court’s grant of a motion for a new 

trial under the law of the regional circuit. Ericsson, Inc. v. 

D-Link Sys., Inc., 773 F.3d 1201, 1225 (Fed. Cir. 2014). The 

Ninth Circuit reviews such a grant for abuse of discretion. 

Dees v. Cty. of San Diego, 960 F.3d 1145, 1151 (9th Cir. 

2020). Evidentiary rulings are also reviewed for an abuse 

of discretion. Crowley v. Epicept Corp., 883 F.3d 739, 752 

(9th Cir. 2018). We “must uphold the district court if any 

7 Because Wi-LAN agrees that its challenge rises 

and falls with the district court’s decision regarding 

Dr. Madisetti’s testimony, we need not address its challenge to the admissibility of other evidence. Wi-LAN’s Reply Br. 19. 

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24 APPLE INC. v. WI-LAN INC. 

of its grounds for granting a new trial are reasonable.” 

Dees, 960 F.3d at 1151 (citation omitted).

We see no reversible error in the district court’s reasoning. The district court focused on Dr. Madisetti’s testimony 

about the incremental benefits of the patented technologies, which formed the basis of Wi-LAN’s damages theory. 

J.A. 34–35. And it determined that Dr. Madisetti conflated 

the benefits of the patented technologies with VoLTE generally based on three facets of his testimony. First, 

Dr. Madisetti used VoLTE as a starting point to determine 

the benefits of the patented invention, despite an admission that the inventors of the patented technology did not 

invent VoLTE. J.A. 35. Second, Dr. Madisetti primarily 

relied on testing comparing the voice call quality of VoLTE 

with Skype, a purported noninfringing alternative that did 

not utilize VoLTE technology, and attributed the difference 

to the benefit of the asserted patents. J.A. 36. Lastly, WiLAN’s line of questioning connected VoLTE generally with 

the benefits of the asserted patents. J.A. 36–37. The district court cited trial testimony throughout its analysis. 

Because the inventors of the patented technology admittedly did not invent VoLTE, Dr. Madisetti’s testimony conflating the patented technologies with VoLTE lacked a 

factual basis and should not have been presented to the 

jury. J.A. 37. Moreover, Dr. Madisetti’s testimony was the 

basis for Wi-LAN’s damages theory. Thus, the district 

court did not abuse its discretion in granting Apple’s motion for a new trial on damages. 

Wi-LAN argues Dr. Madisetti did not conflate VoLTE 

with the invention of the ’145 patent because it compared 

VoLTE and Skype call quality under multitasking or loading conditions (i.e., with multiple applications using the 

phone’s network connection). Wi-LAN’s Opening & Response Br. 78–80. And improved voice quality during loading is the benefit the patented technology provided. 

Dr. Madisetti certainly did testify concerning background 

applications running on the phone during testing. See, e.g.,

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APPLE INC. v. WI-LAN INC. 25

J.A. 10265. However, Dr. Madisetti made much broader 

statements about the value of the patented technology in 

his testimony, which the district court relied on in its analysis. For example, counsel for Wi-LAN engaged in the following exchange with Dr. Madisetti:

Q: Apple’s use of these three inventions in the patent claims in the accused iPhones, do they improve 

the iPhone as a whole for voice and cellular data?

A: Yes.

Q: Better voice and higher speeds?

A: Yes.

J.A. 10271–72. Counsel also asked Dr. Madisetti:

Q: . . . You provided your expert opinion as to the 

benefit that Apple realizes by inclusion of these patents in the iPhone; is that correct?

A: Yes. . . .

Q: At a high level, what are those benefits?

A: You get great quality from the VoLTE, that is 

2.3 MOS better. . . .

J.A. 10385–86. Our review on this issue is highly deferential, and the trial judge is in the best position to evaluate 

trial proceedings. Given the breadth of certain portions of 

Dr. Madisetti’s testimony, we see no abuse of discretion in 

the district court’s analysis. 

CONCLUSION

For the above reasons, we uphold the district court’s 

claim construction of the subscriber unit term, affirm its 

denial of judgment as a matter of law of noninfringement, 

reverse its partial summary judgment of no infringement 

with respect to iPhones with Intel chips, affirm its grant of 

a new damages trial after the first trial, vacate its denial 

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26 APPLE INC. v. WI-LAN INC. 

of a new damages trial after the second trial, and remand 

for a new trial on damages consistent with this opinion. 

AFFIRMED-IN-PART, REVERSED-IN-PART,

VACATED-IN-PART, AND REMANDED 

COSTS

No costs.

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