[Cite as State v. Cortez, 2017-Ohio-8154.]

COURT OF APPEALS 

LICKING COUNTY, OHIO 

FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT 

STATE OF OHIO : JUDGES: 

 : Hon. Patricia A. Delaney, P.J. 

 Plaintiff - Appellee : Hon. William B. Hoffman, J. 

 : Hon. Craig R. Baldwin, J. 

-vs- : 

 : 

JOHN F. CORTEZ : Case No. 17-CA-35 

 : 

 Defendant - Appellant : O P I N I O N 

 

CHARACTER OF PROCEEDING: Appeal from the Licking County 

Court of Common Pleas, Case No. 

2007-CR-00751 

 

JUDGMENT: Affirmed 

DATE OF JUDGMENT: October 10, 2017 

APPEARANCES: 

For Plaintiff-Appellee For Defendant-Appellant 

WILLIAM C. HAYES JOHN F. CORTEZ, pro se 

Licking County Prosecutor Inmate # A596827 

 Chillicothe Correctional Institution 

By: PAULA M. SAWYERS 15802 State Route 104 

Assistant Prosecuting Attorney North Chillicothe, Ohio 45601 

20 S. Second Street, Fourth Floor 

Newark, Ohio 43055 
Licking County, Case No. 17-CA-35 2 

Baldwin, J.

{¶1} Defendant-appellant John F. Cortez appeals from the May 19, 2017 

Judgment Entry of the Licking County Court of Common Pleas denying his Motion to 

Memorialize Judgment. Plaintiff-appellee is the State of Ohio. 

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS AND CASE 

{¶2} On January 9, 2009, appellant pled guilty to 23 counts of unlawful sexual 

conduct with a minor (R.C. 2907.04(A)) and one count of corrupting another with drugs 

(R.C. 2925.02(A)(4)(a)). As memorialized in a Judgment Entry filed on January 9, 2009, 

appellant sentenced to an aggregate term of incarceration of 16 years. He was also 

classified as a Tier II sexual offender. Appellant did not file an appeal. 

{¶3} Thereafter, on August 5, 2013, appellant filed a Petition to Invalidate his sex 

offender classification and a Motion to Present Plain Errors pursuant to Crim. R. 52(B). 

Appellant argued that his trial counsel was ineffective, his sentence was excessive and 

the court did not make proper findings for the imposition of consecutive sentences, and 

that the offenses were allied offenses of similar import. 

{¶4} The trial court, as memorialized in a Judgment Entry filed on November 22, 

2013, found that appellant had been improperly classified under the Adam Walsh Act and 

that his classification was therefore void. The trial court further found that Crim. R. 52(B) 

does not provide appellant any post-trial right to review, converted his motion to a Petition 

for Post-Conviction relief, and dismissed the petition as untimely and barred by res 

judicata. Appellant appealed from the trial court’s November 22, 2013 Judgment Entry. 

{¶5} The trial court scheduled a hearing on appellant’s sexual classification for 

January 10, 2014. The hearing was later continued to March 14, 2014. Pursuant to a 
Licking County, Case No. 17-CA-35 3 

Judgment Entry filed on March 17, 2014, the trial court, following a hearing, designated 

appellant as a sexually oriented offender. 

{¶6} Pursuant to an Opinion filed on September 3, 2014 in, State v. Cortez, 5th 

Dist. Licking No. 13–CA–121, 2014–Ohio–3814, this Court affirmed the judgment of the 

trial court with respect to appellant’s earlier appeal of the trial court’s November 22, 2013 

Judgment Entry. 

{¶7} On December 5, 2014, appellant filed a Motion for Resentencing, arguing 

that his sentence was void because the trial court failed to notify him that his failure to 

pay court costs could subject him to community service, and the trial court failed to impose 

post-release control on each separate count. By Judgment Entry filed July 1, 2015, the 

trial court denied the motion, finding in part the motion was a Petition for Post-Conviction 

relief and was therefore untimely, and the failure to impose post-release control on each 

separate count did not have any “practical effect.” 

{¶8} Appellant then appealed. Pursuant to an Opinion filed on February 26, 2016 

in State v. Cortez, 5th Dist. Licking No. 15–CA–55, 2016–Ohio–768, this Court affirmed 

the judgment of the trial court. 

{¶9} Appellant, on March 30, 2016, filed a Notice of Appeal, appealing from the 

trial court’s March 14, 2014 1 Judgment Entry. This Court, as memorialized in a Judgment 

Entry filed on May 16, 2016, denied appellant’s Motion for Leave to File Delayed Appeal. 

{¶10} On September 26, 2016, appellant filed a Motion for Judicial Release. The 

trial court denied such motion via a Judgment Entry filed on October 26, 2016. Appellant 

then, on May 18, 2017, filed a Motion to Memorialize Judgment. Appellant, in his motion, 

 

1 Appellant actually was appealing from the trial court’s March 17, 2014 Judgment Entry. 
Licking County, Case No. 17-CA-35 4 

argued that the March 17, 2014 Judgment Entry was not a valid final judgment and 

violated the one document rule set forth in State v. Baker, 119 Ohio St.3d 197, 2008-

Ohio-3330, 893 N.E.2d 163. The trial court denied appellant’s motion pursuant to a 

Judgment Entry filed on May 19, 2017. 

{¶11} Appellant now raises the following assignment of error on appeal: 

{¶12} I. THE LOWER COURT COMMITTED PREJUDICIAL ERROR IN ITS 

FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH THE LEGISLATURE. 

I 

{¶13} Appellant, in his sole assignment of error, contends that the trial court erred 

in denying his Motion to Memorialize Judgment. Appellant specifically argues that the trial 

court should have granted such motion because he has never received a valid judgment 

of conviction. Appellant maintains that the trial court’s March 17, 2014 Judgment Entry 

designating appellant a sexually oriented offender not a valid judgment of conviction 

because it did not comply with the standards for a final order set forth in State v. Lester, 

130 Ohio St.3d 303, 2011–Ohio–5204, 958 N.E.2d 142 and does not comply with the one 

document rule articulated by the Ohio Supreme Court in State v. Baker, 119 Ohio St.3d 

197, 2008–Ohio–3330, 893 N.E.2d 163. 

{¶14} As noted by the court in State v. Straley, 4th Dist. Highland No. 13CA30, 

2014-Ohio-5110, ¶ 10: 

Sexual offender classifications are civil in nature, State v. Wilson,

113 Ohio St.3d 382, 865 N.E.2d 1264, 2007–Ohio–2202, syllabus, and thus 

constitute separate proceedings when not coupled with an initial conviction 

and sentence. State v. Garabrandt, 6th Dist. Lucas No. L–06–1400, 2008–
Licking County, Case No. 17-CA-35 5 

Ohio–4128. The sexual offender classification proceedings are separate 

and distinct from the criminal conviction and sentence. See, State ex rel. 

Culgan v. Collier, 132 Ohio St.3d 394, 972 N.E.2d 579, 2012–Ohio–2916, 

¶ 1 and State v. Gibson, 2nd Dist. Champaign No.2009CA47, 2010–Ohio–

3447, ¶ 25 (appeal from sex-offender classification is legally distinct from 

an appeal from the underlying sentence). 

{¶15} Appellant’s argument that the “one document rule” was violated by the trial 

court thus fails. The analysis of State v. Baker, 119 Ohio St.3d 197, 2008–Ohio–3330, 

893 N.E.2d 163 is not applicable to the facts of this case. See Straley, supra. 

{¶16} Appellant further argues that the trial court, in accepting his plea, failed to 

substantially comply with Crim.R. 11. Res judicata bars the assertion of claims against a 

valid, final judgment of conviction that have been raised or could have been raised on 

appeal. State v. Ketterer, 126 Ohio St.3d 448, 2010–Ohio–3831, 935 N.E.2d 9, ¶ 59, 

citing State v. Perry, 10 Ohio St.2d 175, 226 N.E.2d 104 (1967), paragraph nine of the 

syllabus. Appellant’s claim that the trial court did not comply with Crim.R. 11 in accepting 

his plea could have been raised in a direct appeal, but was not. Appellant, therefore, is 

barred by the doctrine of res judicata from raising such issue now. 

{¶17} Based on the foregoing, appellant’s sole assignment of error is overruled. 

 
Licking County, Case No. 17-CA-35 6 

{¶18} Accordingly, the judgment of the Licking County Court of Common Pleas is 

affirmed. 

By: Baldwin, J. 

Delaney, P.J. and 

Hoffman, J. concur.