1

Filed 1/11/21

CERTIFIED FOR PARTIAL PUBLICATION*

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION FOUR

THE PEOPLE,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

MORIAH NOEL QUINN,

Defendant and Appellant.

A156932

(San Mateo County

Super. Ct. No. 18NF014303A)

Following her conviction for attempting to transport marijuana across 

state lines, defendant Moriah Noel Quinn was placed on supervised probation

with the condition, among others, that she abstain from the use and 

possession of controlled substances, including marijuana. On appeal, 

defendant contends the condition prohibiting the use or possession of 

marijuana is unreasonable under People v. Lent (1975) 15 Cal.3d 481 (Lent)

and that the restriction on her use or possession of “controlled substances” is 

overbroad. Defendant also challenges a $300 restitution fine and contends 

that the term of her probation must be reduced from three years to two years 

pursuant to recently enacted Assembly Bill No. 1950 (2019-2020 Reg. Sess.). 

We conclude that the prohibition on defendant’s use and possession of 

marijuana is amply justified by her current conviction and criminal history

* Pursuant to California Rules of Court, rules 8.1105(b) and 8.1110, this 

opinion is certified for publication with the exception of parts 1, 2, and 3 of 

the Discussion.
2

but agree that the restriction on her use or possession of “controlled 

substances” is overbroad and must be modified to permit the use and 

possession of legally prescribed medications. We also agree that the 

restitution fine must be stricken and the term of defendant’s probation 

reduced to two years under the recent statutory amendment.

Background

Defendant was convicted by a jury of felony attempted interstate 

transportation of marijuana in violation of Health & Safety Code, 

section 11360, subdivision (a)(3). At trial, security-screening officers at San 

Francisco International Airport testified that they found over 13 pounds of 

marijuana in luggage belonging to defendant and her mother. After her

arrest, defendant admitted that she did not pack her suitcase and was paid to 

transport the bag containing marijuana from San Francisco to New York. She

also admitted that she had previously flown with marijuana in her luggage

on at least two other occasions. Defendant was placed on supervised 

probation for a period of three years.

Discussion

1. The probation condition prohibiting use or possession of marijuana is 

not unreasonable.*

A sentencing court has broad discretion to fashion appropriate 

conditions of probation that facilitate rehabilitation and foster public safety. 

(People v. Carbajal (1995) 10 Cal.4th 1114, 1120.) We review the conditions 

imposed for abuse of discretion. (People v. Olguin (2008) 45 Cal.4th 375, 379.) 

A condition of probation is invalid if it “ ‘ “(1) has no relationship to the crime 

of which the offender was convicted, (2) relates to conduct which is not in 

itself criminal, and (3) requires or forbids conduct which is not reasonably 

* See footnote, ante, page 1. 
3

related to future criminality.” ’ ” (In re Ricardo P. (2019) 7 Cal.5th 1113, 

1118, quoting People v. Lent, supra, 15 Cal.3d at p. 486.) “The Lent test “is 

conjunctive—all three prongs must be satisfied before a reviewing court will 

invalidate a probation term.’ ” (Ricardo P., at p. 1118.)

There is no dispute that the condition satisfies the second prong of the 

test, as the possession and use of marijuana is not itself criminal in the State 

of California. (See People v. Cruz (2020) 54 Cal.App.5th 707, 711.) The 

condition, however, does not satisfy the remaining prongs. Contrary to 

defendant’s arguments, the condition is amply supported by the facts of 

defendant’s conviction and her prior criminal history. As reflected in the 

probation report, defendant was (1) convicted of attempting to transport 

marijuana for sale in the current offense; (2) had a prior felony conviction for 

possession of marijuana in Texas; (3) had an active warrant out of Madison 

County, Tennessee for drug related charges; (4) admitted to “being a ‘mule’ ” 

in transporting narcotics; and (5) previously engaged in transporting or 

trafficking marijuana. The prohibition of her possessing marijuana is entirely 

reasonable.

Defendant’s suggestion that the condition improperly restricts her use

of marijuana because the record does not demonstrate she has a history of 

marijuana use is not persuasive. As the Attorney General argues, the court 

reasonably could have concluded that defendant’s continued involvement 

with marijuana, whether possessing, using, transporting or selling, was 

impeding her rehabilitation and decreasing her chances for success on 

probation. Absent any indication in the record that an exception should be 

made for medicinal use of marijuana, the blanket prohibition was warranted 

in this case.
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2. The restriction that defendant “abstain from the use and possession of 

controlled substances” is overbroad. *

The court ordered defendant to “abstain from the use and possession of 

controlled substances including marijuana.” The clerk’s transcript adds the 

additional requirement that defendant “abstain from the use or possession of 

narcotics or illegal drugs.” Defendant contends that the restriction that she 

“abstain from the use and possession of controlled substances” is overbroad 

because it fails to allow her to take prescription medications, and that the 

additional condition in the clerk’s transcript is not controlling in light of the 

court’s oral pronouncement. The Attorney General argues that the reporter’s 

transcript cited by defendant contains a “transcription error” which was 

subsequently corrected to “reflect what was said on the record.” The amended 

minute order eliminates the requirement that she “abstain from the use and 

possession of controlled substances including marijuana” and leaves in place 

the requirement that she “abstain from the use or possession of narcotics or 

illegal drugs, including marijuana.” Defendant disputes the Attorney 

General’s assertion that the correction resolved the matter and continues to 

seek clarification of the conditions of her probation.

The Attorney General does not dispute that a blanket prohibition on 

the use or possession of controlled substances without an exception for 

prescription medications is overbroad. Therefore, we see no reason not to 

provide the requested clarification. “Controlled substances” are defined and 

listed in Health and Safety Code sections 11054 and 11055. They include not 

only schedule I substances, which generally have no recognized medical use, 

like heroin (Health & Saf. Code, § 11054, subd. (c)(11), but many other 

commonly prescribed medications. Accordingly, the condition shall be 

* See footnote, ante, page 1. 
5

modified to require that defendant abstain from the use and possession of 

controlled substances including marijuana without a valid prescription.

3. The restitution fine must be stricken.*

At sentencing, the trial court found that defendant was indigent and 

sought to “waive as many fees” as possible. The court explained that it was 

waiving these fees based on counsel’s statement that his client was indigent 

and the probation department’s report “that even though she’s worked in the 

past, she’s now dependent on her mother” and “also the fact that somebody 

that’s served 188 days in jail and now has a felony conviction on her is going 

to be -- has not been able to be employed [in the past] and may find it hard to 

be employed in the future.” However, the court imposed the minimum 

“restitution fine plus the ten percent collection fee” noting that imposition of 

a restitution fine under Penal Code section 1202.4 is mandatory.

On appeal, defendant contends that the imposition of a restitution fine

on an indigent defendant violates due process. She relies on People v. Dueñas

(2019) 30 Cal.App.5th 1157, 1164, in which the court held that imposition of a

restitution fine without consideration of a defendant’s ability to pay violates 

due process.1 This court has previously declined to “join the courts that have 

declared Dueñas to have been wrongly decided” but has agreed that “[a] 

* See footnote, ante, page 1. 

1 Defendant acknowledges that some courts have declined to follow 

People v. Dueñas, supra, 30 Cal.App.5th 1157. (See, e.g., People v. Petri (2020) 

45 Cal.App.5th 82, 87; People v. Adams (2020) 44 Cal.App.5th 828, 831-832; 

People v. Hicks (2019) 40 Cal.App.5th 320, 325-327, review granted Nov. 26, 

2019, S258946; People v. Aviles (2019) 39 Cal.App.5th 1055, 1061, 1067-

1068.) The California Supreme Court may soon resolve the conflict. (See 

People v. Kopp (2019) 38 Cal.App.5th 47, review granted Nov. 13, 2019, 

S257844.)
6

suitable framework for analyzing the constitutionality” of a minimum 

restitution fine imposed under Penal Code section 1203.4 “is the excessive 

fines prohibition in the Eighth Amendment and its counterpart under the 

California Constitution, article I, section 17.” (People v. Cowan (2020) 47 

Cal.App.5th 32, 42, review granted, June 17, 2020, S261952.)

In People v. Cowan, supra, 47 Cal.App.5th at page 48, this court held, 

“Because ability to pay is an element of the excessive fines calculus under 

both the federal and state Constitutions, we conclude that a sentencing court 

may not impose . . . restitution fines without giving the defendant, on 

request, an opportunity to present evidence and argument why such 

monetary exactions exceed his ability to pay.” We provided the following 

guidance for the trial court on remand: The evaluation of ability to pay must 

include both a defendant’s present ability to pay and their future ability to 

pay. (Id. at p. 49.) The defendant bears the burden of proof regarding 

inability to pay. (Ibid.) And, finally, “If, upon remand, an excessive fines 

objection is made and upheld, the ruling will amount to a determination that 

the clause in Penal Code section 1202.4, subdivision (c) barring consideration 

of ability to pay . . . is unconstitutional as applied, thus prohibiting 

imposition of the fine altogether.” (Id. at p. 50.) Here, the court found that 

defendant was indigent and generally unable to pay the fees and fines. 

Accordingly, the court erred in imposing the restitution fine.

4. The term of probation must be reduced.

Assembly Bill No. 1950, signed by the Governor on September 30, 2020,

and effective on January 1, 2021 (Stats. 2020, ch. 328, § 2), reduces felony 

probation terms to two years, with certain exceptions, by modifying Penal 

Code section 1203.1. When defendant was sentenced, Penal Code 

section 1203.1 authorized felony probation “for a period of time not exceeding 
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the maximum possible term of the sentence” but where the “maximum 

possible term of the sentence is five years or less, then the period of 

suspension of imposition or execution of sentence may, in the discretion of the 

court, continue for not over five years.” (Stats. 2010, ch. 178, § 75.)Effective 

January 1, 2021, Penal Code section 1203.1, subdivision (a) reads: “The court, 

or judge thereof, in the order granting probation, may suspend the imposing 

or the execution of the sentence and may direct that the suspension may 

continue for a period of time not exceeding two years, and upon those terms 

and conditions as it shall determine. . . .”2

The legislative history reflects that the Legislature’s concern was that 

lengthy probationary periods do not serve a rehabilitative function and 

unfairly lead to reincarceration for technical violations. The author’s 

statement with respect to the bill provides: “California’s adult supervised

probation population is around 548,000 ‒ the largest of any state in the 

nation, more than twice the size of the state’s prison population, almost four 

times larger than its jail population and about six times larger than its parole 

population. [¶] A 2018 Justice Center of the Council of State Governments 

study [citation] found that a large portion of people violate probation and end 

up incarcerated as a result. The study revealed that 20 percent of prison 

admissions in California are the result of supervised probation violations, 

accounting for the estimated $2 billion spent annually by the state to 

incarcerate people for supervision violations. Eight percent of people 

incarcerated in a California prison are behind bars for supervised probation 

violations. Most violations are ‘technical’ and minor in nature, such as

missing a drug rehab appointment or socializing with a friend who has a 

2 Penal Code section 1203.1, subdivision (m) identifies two exceptions, 

not applicable here, to the two-year probation limit.
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criminal record. [¶] Probation ‒ originally meant to reduce recidivism - has 

instead become a pipeline for re-entry into the carceral system. [¶] Research 

[citation] by the California Budget & Policy Center shows that probation 

services, such as mental healthcare and addiction treatment, are most 

effective during the first 18 months of supervision. Research also indicates 

that providing increased supervision and services earlier reduces an 

individual’s likelihood to recidivate. A shorter term of probation, allowing for 

an increased emphasis on services, should lead to improved outcomes for both 

people on misdemeanor and felony probation while reducing the number of 

people on probation returning to incarceration.” (Assem. Com. on Public 

Safety, Analysis of Assem. Bill No. 1950 (2019-2020 Reg. Sess.) as amended 

May 6, 2020, pp. 3-4.) The analysis concludes that a two-year period of 

supervision is sufficient to fulfill the rehabilitative function of probation. 

(Assem. Com. on Public Safety, Analysis of Assem. Bill No. 1950 (2019-2020 

Reg. Sess.) as amended May 6, 2020, p. 6.)3 Subsequent analysis also cites 

3 With respect to the “Time Length of Probation,” the analysis reads:

“Probation can include conditions which require the defendant to complete 

certain requirements such as drug, alcohol, or mental health treatment. 

Defendants might be required to complete domestic violence or other 

counseling. Probation supervision can serve to connect defendants to 

community based organizations and resources which can provide support and 

assistance. Probation can help defendants connect to resources to assist with 

needs like housing and job training. [¶] A two-year period of supervision 

would likely provide a length of time that would be sufficient for a 

probationer to complete any counseling or treatment that is directed by a 

sentencing court. To the extent that a probationer is not complying with the 

treatment or counseling directed by the court during a probationary period, 

the court can revoke the defendant’s probation until the defendant is back in 

compliance. The period while probation is revoked tolls the running of time 

towards the end point of the probationary period. That tolling process would 

effectively extend the probationary period for individuals that are not in 

compliance with the conditions of their probation.” (Assem. Com. on Public 
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research by the Prison Policy Institute finding that “like incarceration, 

probation affects already marginalized populations in troubling ways. Black 

Americans make up 13% of the U.S. adult population, but 30% of those under 

community supervision” and cites additional “ ‘research that suggests that 

the maximum time needed to engage probationers in behavior change and 

reduce the likelihood of reoffending is no more than two years, while also 

creating incentives for individuals to engage in treatment and services early 

on.’ ” (Sen. Com. on Public Safety, Analysis of Assem. Bill No. 1950 (2019-

2020 Reg. Sess.) as amended June 10, 2020, pp. 4-5.)

Defendant contends that the amendment should be applied 

retroactively to reduce her period of probation from three years to two. In 

People v. Frahs (2020) 9 Cal.5th 618, 627-628, the California Supreme Court 

recently summarized the relevant law: “Generally, statutes are presumed to 

apply only prospectively. [Citation.] However, this presumption is a canon of 

statutory interpretation rather than a constitutional mandate. [Citation.] 

Accordingly, ‘the Legislature can ordinarily enact laws that apply 

retroactively, either explicitly or by implication.’ [Citation.] Courts look to the 

Legislature's intent in order to determine if a law is meant to apply 

retroactively. [Citation.] [¶] In [In re Estrada (1965) 63 Cal.2d 740 (Estrada)],

we held that amendatory statutes that lessen the punishment for criminal 

conduct are ordinarily intended to apply retroactively. [Citation.] In 

endeavoring to ascertain the legislative intent in enacting such a statute, we 

found ‘one consideration of paramount importance.’ [Citation.] We explained: 

‘When the Legislature amends a statute so as to lessen the punishment it has 

obviously expressly determined that its former penalty was too severe and 

Safety, Analysis of Assem. Bill No. 1950 (2019-2020 Reg. Sess.) as amended 

May 6, 2020, p. 6.)
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that a lighter punishment is proper as punishment for the commission of the 

prohibited act. It is an inevitable inference that the Legislature must have 

intended that the new statute imposing the new lighter penalty now deemed 

to be sufficient should apply to every case to which it constitutionally could 

apply. The amendatory act imposing the lighter punishment can be applied 

constitutionally to acts committed before its passage provided the judgment 

convicting the defendant of the act is not final. This intent seems obvious, 

because to hold otherwise would be to conclude that the Legislature was 

motivated by a desire for vengeance, a conclusion not permitted in view of 

modern theories of penology.’ [Citation.] [¶] We reasoned that ‘ “[a] legislative 

mitigation of the penalty for a particular crime represents a legislative 

judgment that the lesser penalty or the different treatment is sufficient to 

meet the legitimate ends of the criminal law. Nothing is to be gained by 

imposing the more severe penalty after such a pronouncement; the excess in 

punishment can, by hypothesis, serve no purpose other than to satisfy a 

desire for vengeance. As to a mitigation of penalties, then, it is safe to 

assume, as the modern rule does, that it was the legislative design that the 

lighter penalty should be imposed in all cases that subsequently reach the 

courts.” ’ [Citations.] [¶] ‘Estrada stands for the proposition that, “where the 

amendatory statute mitigates punishment and there is no saving[s] clause, 

the rule is that the amendment will operate retroactively so that the lighter 

punishment is imposed.” ’ [Citations.] If there is no express savings clause, 

the statute must demonstrate contrary indications of legislative intent ‘ “with 

sufficient clarity” ’ in order to rebut the Estrada rule.”

The Attorney General argues that Assembly Bill No. 1950 is not subject 

to the Estrada presumption of retroactivity because probation is not a form of 

criminal punishment. The Attorney General acknowledges that the one court
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to consider this issue on the merits has concluded that the Estrada 

presumption applies to Assembly Bill No. 1950. In People v. Burton (2020) 

__ Cal.App.5th Supp. __ [2020 Cal.App. Lexis 1174], the Los Angeles County 

Superior Court appellate department found that in the Estrada context, 

probation amounted to punishment. The court observed, “It is unquestionable 

the reduction of the maximum amount of time a person may be placed on 

probation . . . inures greatly to the benefit of many persons subject to 

supervision. At any time a person is on probation, the court has the authority 

to revoke probation and sentence the person to jail, and a probation violation 

may even be based on violating court rules that do not amount to new crimes. 

[Citation.] The longer a person is on probation, the potential for the person to 

be incarcerated due to a violation increases accordingly. The possibility of 

incarceration due to being on probation for periods longer than a year based 

on minor probation violations was relied on by the Legislature in enacting the 

provision lowering the maximum probationary period. [Citation.]

[¶] Moreover, while a person is on probation, the individual may lawfully be 

ordered to comply with numerous and varied conditions, including, as in this 

case, ordering the person to provide prosecutors a list of properties they own. 

In other situations, they may be subject to search and seizure by law 

enforcement with or without a warrant [citation], submitting urine samples 

for narcotics use monitoring [citation], and regularly interrupting persons’ 

work and schooling and traveling to court for progress reports. In addition, 

when a court's orders are violated, courts have power to increase a 

probationer’s supervision and intensify restrictions by modifying probation 

conditions. [Citation.] The longer the length of probation, the greater the 

encroachment on a probationer’s interest in living free from government 
12

intrusion.”4 (Id. at pp. *19-*21.) The court acknowledged that in other 

contexts probation is not viewed as punishment, but concluded that those 

cases were not controlling for the purpose of determining retroactivity. The 

court explained, “It has been noted, a ‘[g]rant of probation is, of course, 

qualitatively different from such traditional forms of punishment as fines or 

imprisonment. Probation is neither “punishment” [citation] nor a criminal 

“judgment” [citation]. Instead, courts deem probation an act of clemency in 

lieu of punishment [citations], and its primary purpose is rehabilitative in 

nature [citation].’ [Citations.] [¶] But, although probation is not considered 

‘punishment’ for specified purposes, the presumption of legislative intent in 

Estrada is not confined to only situations when jail and prison sentences are 

directly decreased due to new laws. A court may presume an intent to broadly 

apply laws even when they ‘merely [make] a reduced punishment possible.’

[Citation.] The Legislature in this instance clearly contemplated that 

reducing the amount of time probation can last was significantly beneficial to 

persons on probation, and that concomitantly, being on probation for longer 

than a year was detrimental ‘rather than being rehabilitative.’ As previously 

noted, ‘a legislative body ordinarily intends for ameliorative changes to the 

criminal law to extend as broadly as possible’ [citation], not solely to changes 

that reduce ‘punishment’ as defined in contexts different than assessing 

whether Estrada is applicable.” (Id. at pp. *22-*23.) 

We consider the reasoning in Burton persuasive. We add that since the 

Legislature has determined that the rehabilitative function of probation does 

not extend beyond two years, any additional period of probation can only be 

4 Burton involved a misdemeanor conviction and thus focused on 

Assembly Bill No. 1950’s amendment of Penal Code section 1203a which 

reduced misdemeanor probation to one year. 
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regarded as punitive, and therefore within the scope of Estrada. Moreover,

even if Assembly Bill No. 1950 is not entitled to a presumption of 

retroactivity, the “ameliorative nature” of the amendment “places it squarely 

within the spirit of the Estrada rule.” (People v. Frahs, supra, 9 Cal.5th at 

p. 631.) The amendment applies retroactively because of the “clear 

indication” of the Legislature’s intent that it do so. (Tapia v. Superior Court 

(1991) 53 Cal.3d 282, 287.)

In People v. Brown (2012) 54 Cal.4th 314, 325, the court emphasized 

that where the Estrada presumption does not apply to a statutory

amendment, courts must “consider whether it is ‘very clear from extrinsic 

sources’ [citation], or whether such sources support the ‘ “clear and 

unavoidable implication” ’ [citation], that the Legislature intended the 

amendment to operate retroactively.” (Id. at p. 320, citing Evangelatos v. 

Superior Court (1988) 44 Cal.3d 1188, 1208-1209.) As with Estrada, the only 

reasonable inference to draw from the legislative history of Assembly Bill 

No. 1950 is that the shorter term of probation “now deemed to be sufficient 

should apply to every case to which it constitutionally could apply.” (People v. 

Frahs, supra, 9 Cal.5th at pp. 627-628.) The alternative is untenable: that the 

legislature intended to subject thousands of criminal defendants whose cases 

are not yet final to terms of probation determined to be unnecessary for 

rehabilitation, arguably discriminatory and likely to result in unfair and 

unnecessary reincarceration. 

The Attorney General’s arguments to the contrary are not persuasive.

The Attorney General argues that the existence of a “procedure for successful 

termination of probation, where warranted in the interests of justice . . .

renders unnecessary a blanket termination of ongoing probations. Those who 

are ready can seek early discharge . . . . Those who are not ready, who need 
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additional services and supervision as agreed upon, can stay the course.” The 

Attorney General argues further that “[g]iven the relatively short time 

frames involved in probation, the need to see the plans through and complete 

requirements before the scheduled end of probation in order for the 

rehabilitative goals to be met, and the disruption that would occur if 

probation plans already underway were suddenly cut short, retroactive effect 

was not intended by the Legislature.”

The Attorney General’s reliance on People v. Conley (2016) 63 Cal.4th 

646 is misplaced. In Conley, the court held that the Three Strikes Reform Act 

of 2012, passed by initiative, does not authorize automatic resentencing for 

third strike defendants serving nonfinal sentences imposed under the former 

version of the Three Strikes law. (Id. at pp. 657-658.) The court relied on 

three “interpretative considerations” in finding that the Estrada presumption 

had been overridden. First, the court noted that “the Reform Act is not silent 

on the question of retroactivity. Rather, the Act expressly addresses the 

question in [Penal Code] section 1170.126, the sole purpose of which is to 

extend the benefits of the Act retroactively. Section 1170.126 creates a special 

mechanism that entitles all persons ‘presently serving’ indeterminate life 

terms imposed under the prior law to seek resentencing under the new law. 

By its terms, the provision draws no distinction between persons serving final 

sentences and those serving nonfinal sentences, entitling both categories of 

prisoners to petition courts for recall of sentence under the Act.” (Id. at 

p. 657.) Second, the court explained that “the nature of the recall mechanism 

and the substantive limitations it contains call into question the central 

premise underlying the Estrada presumption: that when an amendment 

lessens the punishment for a crime, it is reasonable to infer that the enacting 

legislative body has categorically determined that ‘imposition of a lesser 
15

punishment’ will in all cases ‘sufficiently serve the public interest.’ ” (Id. at 

p. 658.) Finally, the court noted that “unlike in Estrada, the revised 

sentencing provisions at issue in this case do more than merely reduce 

previously prescribed criminal penalties. They also establish a new set of 

disqualifying factors that preclude a third strike defendant from receiving a 

second strike sentence . . . [which] add an additional layer of complexity to 

defendant's request for automatic resentencing under the revised penalty 

scheme.” (Id. at p. 659.) The same considerations do not weigh in favor of 

prospective application in this instance. 

Assembly Bill No. 1950 is silent on retroactivity; it does not create a

mechanism by which probationers may petition for early termination. Penal 

Code section 1203.3 already existed.5 While that procedure may prove 

beneficial to a probationer whose case is already final, it does not support an 

inference of legislative intent with respect to a probationer whose sentence is 

not yet final. Moreover, unlike in Conley, the amendment of Assembly Bill 

No. 1950 reflects a categorical determination that a shorter term of probation 

is sufficient for the purpose of rehabilitation. The court is not required to 

make a determination regarding dangerousness, the value of further 

probationary supervision, or any other consideration. Rather, the Legislature 

has made that determination. There is no indication in the legislative history 

that the Legislature was concerned with disruptions to probationary 

proceedings already in progress. To the contrary, the studies cited in the 

legislative history indicate there is little if any rehabilitative impact of 

services continued beyond two years.

5 Penal Code section 1203.3, subdivision (a) authorizes a court to “at 

any time when the ends of justice will be subserved thereby, and when the 

good conduct and reform of the person so held on probation shall warrant it, 

terminate the period of probation, and discharge the person held.”
16

Accordingly, we shall reduce the term of defendant’s probation to two 

years.

Disposition

Defendant’s probation is reduced to a term of two years and the 

conditions of defendant’s probation are amended to require that she “abstain 

from the use and possession of controlled substances including marijuana 

without a valid prescription.” In addition, the $300 fine imposed under Penal 

Code section 1203.4 is stricken. The judgment is affirmed in all other 

respects.

POLLAK, P. J.

WE CONCUR:

TUCHER, J.

BROWN, J.
17

Trial court: San Mateo County Superior Court

Trial judge: Honorable Nancy Fineman

Counsel for plaintiff and 

appellant:

Jonathan D. Roberts, under appointment by 

the Court of Appeal

Counsel for defendant and 

respondent:

Xavier Becerra 

Attorney General of California 

Lance E. Winters 

Chief Assistant Attorney General 

Jeffrey M. Laurence 

Senior Assistant Attorney General 

Catherine A. Rivlin 

Supervising Deputy Attorney General

Basil R. Williams 

Deputy Attorney General