2680 Federal Register / Vol. 83, No. 12 / Thursday, January 18, 2018 / Notices 

advisory/acrs.html for additional 

information about the ACRS. Criteria 

used to evaluate candidates include 

education and experience, demonstrated 

skills in nuclear reactor safety matters, 

the ability to solve complex technical 

problems, and the ability to work 

collegially on a board, panel, or 

committee. The Commission, in 

selecting its Committee members, also 

considers the need for specific expertise 

to accomplish the work expected to be 

before the ACRS. ACRS Committee 

members are appointed for four-year 

terms with no term limits. The 

Commission looks to fill one vacancy as 

a result of this request. For this position, 

a candidate must have extensive 

experience in nuclear power plant light 

water reactor (LWR) severe accident 

behavior, accident source terms (i.e., 

fission product release and transport 

and aerosol/particulate dynamics for 

LWRs), and advanced reactor systems. 

Best qualified candidates must also have 

at least 20 years of broad experience and 

a distinguished record of achievement 

in one or more areas of nuclear science 

and technology or related engineering 

disciplines. It would be useful if the 

candidate also has experience in fuel 

qualification, fuel performance, fuel 

fabrication and process development, as 

well as irradiation testing and postirradiation examination. Candidates 

with pertinent graduate level experience 

will be given additional consideration. 

Consistent with the requirements of 

the Federal Advisory Committee Act, 

the Commission seeks candidates with 

diverse backgrounds, so that the 

membership on the Committee is fairly 

balanced in terms of the points of view 

represented and functions to be 

performed by the Committee. 

Candidates will undergo a thorough 

security background check to obtain the 

security clearance that is mandatory for 

all ACRS members. The security 

background check will involve the 

completion and submission of 

paperwork to the NRC. Candidates for 

ACRS appointments may be involved in 

or have financial interests related to 

NRC-regulated aspects of the nuclear 

industry. However, because conflict-ofinterest considerations may restrict the 

participation of a candidate in ACRS 

activities, the degree and nature of any 

such restriction on an individual’s 

activities as a member will be 

considered in the selection process. 

Each qualified candidate’s financial 

interests must be reconciled with 

applicable Federal and NRC rules and 

regulations prior to final appointment. 

This might require divestiture of 

securities or discontinuance of certain 

contracts or grants. Information 

regarding these restrictions will be 

provided upon request. As a part of the 

Stop Trading on Congressional 

Knowledge Act of 2012, which bans 

insider trading by members of Congress, 

their staff, and other high-level Federal 

employees, candidates for appointments 

will be required to disclose additional 

financial transactions. 

A resume describing the educational 

and professional background of the 

candidate, including any special 

accomplishments, publications, and 

professional references should be 

provided. Candidates should provide 

their current address, telephone 

number, and email address. All 

candidates will receive careful 

consideration. Appointment will be 

made without regard to factors such as 

race, color, religion, national origin, sex, 

age, or disabilities. Candidates must be 

citizens of the United States and be able 

to devote approximately 100 days per 

year to Committee business, but may not 

be compensated for more than 130 

calendar days. Resumes will be 

accepted until February 20, 2018. 

Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 11th day 

of January, 2018. 

For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. 

Annette L. Vietti-Cook, 

Secretary of the Commission. 

[FR Doc. 2018–00770 Filed 1–17–18; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 7590–01–P 

NUCLEAR REGULATORY 

COMMISSION 

[Docket Nos. 50–206, 50–361, and 50–362; 

NRC–2018–0004] 

Southern California Edison Company; 

San Onofre Nuclear Generating 

Station, Units 1, 2, and 3 

AGENCY: Nuclear Regulatory 

Commission. 

ACTION: Exemption; issuance. 

SUMMARY: The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory 

Commission (NRC) is issuing an 

exemption from the requirement to 

maintain a specified level of onsite 

property damage insurance in response 

to an October 22, 2015, request from the 

Southern California Edison Company 

(the licensee). Specifically, the licensee 

requested that the San Onofre Nuclear 

Generating Station, Units 1, 2, and 3, be 

granted an exemption to permit the 

licensee to reduce its onsite property 

damage insurance from $1.06 billion to 

$50 million. 

ADDRESSES: Please refer to Docket ID 

NRC–2018–0004 when contacting the 

NRC about the availability of 

information regarding this document. 

You may obtain publicly-available 

information related to this document 

using any of the following methods: 

• Federal Rulemaking website: Go to 

http://www.regulations.gov and search 

for Docket ID NRC–2018–0004. Address 

questions about NRC dockets to Carol 

Gallagher; telephone: 301–415–3463; 

email: Carol.Gallagher@nrc.gov. For 

technical questions, contact the 

individual listed in the FOR FURTHER

INFORMATION CONTACT section of this 

document. 

• NRC’s Agencywide Documents 

Access and Management System 

(ADAMS): You may obtain publicly 

available documents online in the 

ADAMS Public Documents collection at 

http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/ 

adams.html. To begin the search, select 

‘‘ADAMS Public Documents’’ and then 

select ‘‘Begin Web-based ADAMS 

Search.’’ For problems with ADAMS, 

please contact the NRC’s Public 

Document Room (PDR) reference staff at 

1–800–397–4209, 301–415–4737, or by 

email to pdr.resource@nrc.gov. The 

ADAMS accession number for each 

document referenced (if it is available in 

ADAMS) is provided the first time that 

it is mentioned in this document. 

• NRC’s PDR: You may examine and 

purchase copies of public documents at 

the NRC’s PDR, Room O1–F21, One 

White Flint North, 11555 Rockville 

Pike, Rockville, Maryland 20852. 

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: 

Marlayna Vaaler, Office of Nuclear 

Material Safety and Safeguards, U.S. 

Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 

Washington, DC 20555–0001; telephone: 

301–415–3178; email: 

Marlayna.Vaaler@nrc.gov. 

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: 

I. Background 

The San Onofre Nuclear Generating 

Station, Units 1, 2, and 3 (SONGS), 

operated by the Southern California 

Edison Company (SCE) is located 

approximately 4 miles south of San 

Clemente, California. The SONGS, Unit 

1, Docket No. 50–206, was a 

Westinghouse 456 megawatt electric 

(MWe) pressurized water reactor which 

was granted Facility Operating License 

No. DPR–13 on January 1, 1968 

(ADAMS Accession No. ML13309A138), 

and ceased operation on November 30, 

1992 (ADAMS Accession No. 

ML13319B040). The licensee completed 

defueling on March 6, 1993 (ADAMS 

Accession No. ML13319B055), and 

maintained the unit in SAFSTOR until 

June 1999, when it initiated 

decommissioning (ADAMS Accession 

No. ML13319B111). On December 28, 

1993 (ADAMS Accession No. 


sradovich on DSK3GMQ082PROD with NOTICES
Federal Register / Vol. 83, No. 12 / Thursday, January 18, 2018 / Notices 2681 

ML13319B059), the NRC approved the 

Permanently Defueled Technical 

Specifications for SONGS, Unit 1. 

The SCE submitted the proposed 

Decommissioning Plan for SONGS, Unit 

1, on November 3, 1994 (ADAMS 

Accession No. ML13319B073). As a 

result of the 1996 revision to the 

regulations in section 50.82 of title 10 of 

the Code of Federal Regulations (10 

CFR), the NRC replaced the requirement 

for a decommissioning plan with a 

requirement for a Post Shutdown 

Decommissioning Activities Report 

(PSDAR). On August 28, 1996, the 

SONGS, Unit 1, Decommissioning Plan 

became the SONGS 1 PSDAR (61 FR 

67079; December 19, 1996). On 

December 15, 1998 (ADAMS Accession 

No. ML13184A353), SCE submitted an 

update to the PSDAR to the NRC, as 

required by 10 CFR 50.82(a)(7), in order 

to begin planning for the dismantlement 

and decommissioning of SONGS, Unit 

1. 

The SONGS, Units 2 and 3, Docket 

Nos. 50–361 and 50–362, are 

Combustion Engineering 1127 MWe 

pressurized water reactors, which were 

granted Facility Operating Licenses 

NPF–10 on February 16, 1982, and 

NPF–15 on November 15, 1982, 

respectively. In June 2013, pursuant to 

10 CFR 50.82(a)(1)(i), the licensee 

certified to the NRC that as of June 7, 

2013, operations had ceased at SONGS, 

Units 2 and 3 (ADAMS Accession No. 

ML131640201). The licensee 

subsequently certified, pursuant to 10 

CFR 50.82(a)(1)(ii), that all fuel had 

been removed from the reactor vessels 

of both units, and committed to 

maintaining the units in a permanently 

defueled status (ADAMS Accession Nos. 

ML13204A304 and ML13183A391 for 

Unit 2 and Unit 3, respectively). 

Therefore, pursuant to 10 CFR 

50.82(a)(2), SCE’s 10 CFR part 50 

licenses no longer authorize operation 

of SONGS or emplacement or retention 

of fuel into the reactor vessels. The 

licensee is still authorized to possess 

and store irradiated nuclear fuel. 

Irradiated fuel is currently being stored 

onsite in spent fuel pools (SFPs) and in 

dry casks at an Independent Spent Fuel 

Storage Installation (ISFSI). 

The PSDAR for SONGS, Units 2 and 

3, was submitted on September 23, 2014 

(ADAMS Accession No. ML14272A121), 

and the associated public meeting was 

held on October 27, 2014, in Carlsbad, 

California (ADAMS Accession No. 

ML14352A063). The NRC confirmed its 

review of the SONGS, Units 2 and 3, 

PSDAR and addressed public comments 

in a letter dated August 20, 2015 

(ADAMS Accession No. ML15204A383). 

On July 17, 2015, the NRC approved the 

Permanently Defueled Technical 

Specifications for SONGS, Units 2 and 

3 (ADAMS Accession No. 

ML15139A390). 

II. Request/Action 

Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.12, ‘‘Specific 

exemptions,’’ SCE requested an 

exemption from 10 CFR 50.54(w)(1), by 

letter dated October 22, 2015 (ADAMS 

Accession No. ML15299A220). The 

exemption from the requirements of 10 

CFR 50.54(w)(1) would permit the 

licensee to reduce the required level of 

onsite property damage insurance from 

$1.06 billion to $50 million. 

The regulation at 10 CFR 50.54(w)(1) 

requires each licensee to have and 

maintain onsite property damage 

insurance to stabilize and 

decontaminate the reactor and reactor 

site in the event of an accident. The 

onsite insurance coverage must be either 

$1.06 billion or whatever amount of 

insurance is generally available from 

private sources (whichever is less). 

The licensee states that the risk of an 

incident at a permanently shutdown 

and defueled reactor is much less than 

the risk from an operating power 

reactor. In addition, since reactor 

operation is no longer authorized at 

SONGS, there are no events that would 

require the stabilization of reactor 

conditions after an accident. Similarly, 

the risk of an accident that that would 

result in significant onsite 

contamination at SONGS is also much 

lower than the risk of such an event at 

operating reactors. Therefore, SCE is 

requesting an exemption from 10 CFR 

50.54(w)(1) to reduce its onsite property 

damage insurance from $1.06 billion to 

$50 million, commensurate with the 

reduced risk of an incident at the 

permanently shutdown and defueled 

SONGS site. 

III. Discussion 

Under 10 CFR 50.12, the Commission 

may, upon application by any interested 

person or upon its own initiative, grant 

exemptions from the requirements of 10 

CFR part 50 when (1) the exemptions 

are authorized by law, will not present 

an undue risk to public health or safety, 

and are consistent with the common 

defense and security; and (2) any of the 

special circumstances listed in 10 CFR 

50.12(a)(2) are present. 

The financial protection limits of 10 

CFR 50.54(w)(1) were established after 

the Three Mile Island accident out of 

concern that licensees may be unable to 

financially cover onsite cleanup costs in 

the event of a major nuclear accident. 

The specified $1.06 billion coverage 

amount requirement was developed 

based on an analysis of an accident at 

a nuclear reactor operating at power, 

resulting in a large fission product 

release and requiring significant 

resource expenditures to stabilize the 

reactor and ultimately decontaminate 

and cleanup the site. 

These cost estimates were developed 

based on the spectrum of postulated 

accidents for an operating nuclear 

reactor. Those costs were derived from 

the consequences of a release of 

radioactive material from the reactor. 

Although the risk of an accident at an 

operating reactor is very low, the 

consequences onsite and offsite can be 

significant. In an operating plant, the 

high temperature and pressure of the 

reactor coolant system (RCS), as well as 

the inventory of relatively short-lived 

radionuclides, contribute to both the 

risk and consequences of an accident. 

With the permanent cessation of reactor 

operations at SONGS and the permanent 

removal of the fuel from the reactor 

cores, such accidents are no longer 

possible. As a result, the reactors, RCS, 

and supporting systems no longer 

operate and have no function related to 

the storage of the irradiated fuel. 

Therefore, postulated accidents 

involving failure or malfunction of the 

reactors, RCS, or supporting systems are 

no longer applicable. 

As described in the PSDAR, SONGS, 

Unit 1, is being returned to a condition 

suitable for unrestricted use. According 

to SCE, there are no structures, systems, 

or components (SSCs) classified as 

safety-related remaining at SONGS, Unit 

1. Plant dismantlement is complete and 

nearly all of the SSCs have been 

shipped offsite for disposal. Only the 

spent fuel, reactor vessel, and the 

below-grade portions of some buildings 

remain onsite. The principal remaining 

decommissioning activities are soil 

remediation, compaction, and grading. 

This is to be completed in conjunction 

with the future decommissioning of the 

ISFSI subsequent to shipment offsite of 

the SONGS stored spent fuel. 

The licensee also stated that 

decommissioning of SONGS, Units 2 

and 3, has begun and the nuclear 

reactors and essentially all associated 

SSCs in the nuclear steam supply 

system and balance of plant that 

supported the generation of power have 

been retired in place and are being 

prepared for removal. The SSCs that 

remain operable are associated with the 

SFPs and the spent fuel building, are 

needed to meet other regulatory 

requirements, or are needed to support 

other site facilities (e.g., radioactive 

waste handling, ventilation and air 

conditioning, etc.). No remaining active 

SSCs are classified as safety-related. 


sradovich on DSK3GMQ082PROD with NOTICES
2682 Federal Register / Vol. 83, No. 12 / Thursday, January 18, 2018 / Notices 

During reactor decommissioning, the 

largest radiological risks are associated 

with the storage of spent fuel onsite. In 

its October 22, 2015, exemption request, 

SCE discusses both design-basis and 

beyond design-basis events involving 

irradiated fuel stored in the SFPs. The 

licensee determined that there are no 

possible design-basis events at SONGS 

that could result in an offsite 

radiological release exceeding the limits 

established by the U.S. Environmental 

Protection Agency’s (EPA) early-phase 

Protective Action Guidelines (PAGs) of 

1 rem (roentgen equivalent man) at the 

exclusion area boundary, as a way to 

demonstrate that any possible 

radiological releases would be minimal 

and not require precautionary protective 

actions (e.g., sheltering in place or 

evacuation). The staff evaluated the 

radiological consequences associated 

with various decommissioning 

activities, and design basis accidents at 

SONGS, in consideration of SONGS’s 

permanently shut down and defueled 

status. The possible design-basis 

accident scenarios at SONGS have 

greatly reduced radiological 

consequences. Based on its review, the 

staff concluded that no reasonably 

conceivable design-basis accident exists 

that could cause an offsite release 

greater than the EPA PAGs. 

The only incident that might lead to 

a significant radiological release at a 

decommissioning reactor is a zirconium 

fire. The zirconium fire scenario is a 

postulated, but highly unlikely, beyond 

design-basis accident scenario that 

involves loss of water inventory from 

the SFP, resulting in a significant heatup of the spent fuel, and culminating in 

substantial zirconium cladding 

oxidation and fuel damage. The 

probability of a zirconium fire scenario 

is related to the decay heat of the 

irradiated fuel stored in the SFP. 

Therefore, the risks from a zirconium 

fire scenario continue to decrease as a 

function of the time that SONGS has 

been permanently shut down. The 

licensee provided a detailed analysis of 

hypothetical beyond-design-basis 

accidents that could result in a 

radiological release at SONGS in its 

March 31, 2014, submittal to the NRC 

(ADAMS Accession No. ML14092A332), 

as supplemented by letters dated 

September 9, October 2, October 7, 

October 27, November 3, and December 

15, 2014 (ADAMS Accession Nos. 

ML14258A003, ML14280A265, 

ML14287A228, ML14303A257, 

ML14309A195, and ML14351A078, 

respectively). One of these beyond 

design-basis accidents involves a 

complete loss of SFP water inventory, 

where cooling of the spent fuel would 

be primarily accomplished by natural 

circulation of air through the uncovered 

spent fuel assemblies. The licensee’s 

analysis of this accident shows that by 

August 31, 2014, air-cooling of the spent 

fuel assemblies will be sufficient to keep 

the fuel within a safe temperature range 

indefinitely without fuel damage or 

offsite radiological release. 

The Commission has previously 

authorized a lesser amount of onsite 

financial protection, based on this 

analysis of the zirconium fire risk. In 

SECY–96–256, ‘‘Changes to Financial 

Protection Requirements for 

Permanently Shutdown Nuclear Power 

Reactors, 10 CFR 50.54(w)(1) and 10 

CFR 140.11,’’ dated December 17, 1996 

(ADAMS Accession No. ML15062A483), 

the staff recommended changes to the 

power reactor financial protection 

regulations that would allow licensees 

to lower onsite insurance levels to $50 

million upon demonstration that the 

fuel stored in the SFP can be air-cooled. 

In its Staff Requirements Memorandum 

to SECY–96–256, dated January 28, 

1997 (ADAMS Accession No. 

ML15062A454), the Commission 

supported the staff’s recommendation 

that, among other things, would allow 

permanently shutdown power reactor 

licensees to reduce commercial onsite 

property damage insurance coverage to 

$50 million when the licensee was able 

to demonstrate the technical criterion 

that the spent fuel could be air-cooled 

if the spent fuel pool was drained of 

water. The staff has used this technical 

criterion to grant similar exemptions to 

other decommissioning reactors (e.g., 

Maine Yankee Atomic Power Station, 

published in the Federal Register on 

January 19, 1999 (64 FR 2920); and Zion 

Nuclear Power Station, published in the 

Federal Register on December 28, 1999 

(64 FR 72700)). These prior exemptions 

were based on these licensees 

demonstrating that the SFP could be aircooled, consistent with the technical 

criterion discussed above. 

In SECY–00–0145, ‘‘Integrated 

Rulemaking Plan for Nuclear Power 

Plant Decommissioning,’’ dated June 28, 

2000, and SECY–01–0100, ‘‘Policy 

Issues Related to Safeguards, Insurance, 

and Emergency Preparedness 

Regulations at Decommissioning 

Nuclear Power Plants Storing Fuel in 

the Spent Fuel Pool,’’ dated June 4, 2001 

(ADAMS Accession Nos. ML003721626 

and ML011450420, respectively), the 

NRC staff discussed additional 

information concerning SFP zirconium 

fire risks at decommissioning reactors 

and associated implications for onsite 

property damage insurance. Providing 

an analysis of when the spent fuel 

stored in the SFP is capable of aircooling is one measure that can be used 

to demonstrate that the probability of a 

zirconium fire is exceedingly low. 

However, the staff has more recently 

used an additional analysis that bounds 

an incomplete drain down of the SFP 

water, or some other catastrophic event 

(such as a complete drainage of the SFP 

with rearrangement of spent fuel rack 

geometry and/or the addition of rubble 

to the SFP). The analysis postulates that 

decay heat transfer from the spent fuel 

via conduction, convection, or radiation 

would be impeded. This analysis is 

often referred to as an adiabatic heatup. 

The licensee’s analyses referenced in 

its exemption request demonstrates that 

under conditions where the SFP water 

inventory has drained completely and 

only air-cooling of the stored irradiated 

fuel is available, there is reasonable 

assurance that after August 2014, the 

SONGS spent fuel will remain at 

temperatures far below those associated 

with a significant radiological release. 

However, a portion of the air-cooling 

analyses credits operation of the normal 

fuel building ventilation systems 

because the fuel building structures are 

robust and offer little potential for 

natural air exchange with the 

environment for cooling. Because the 

normal fuel building ventilation could 

become unavailable during an initiating 

event that would lead to complete SFP 

drainage (i.e., a seismic event), the NRC 

staff also relied upon the additional 

time that the fuel in the SONGS SFPs 

has had to cool since the plant was 

permanently shutdown in June 2013 

during its evaluation of the licensee’s 

exemption request. As discussed in the 

staff response to a question in SECY– 

00–0145, ‘‘the staff believes that full 

insurance coverage must be maintained 

for 5 years or until a licensee can show 

by analysis that its spent fuel pool is no 

longer vulnerable to such [a zirconium] 

fire.’’ 

Although the official certifications for 

permanent cessation of power 

operations and permanent removal of 

fuel from the reactor vessel were not 

submitted until June 2013, the staff 

notes that SONGS was in an extended 

outage to address steam generator 

issues, and neither SONGS, Units 2 nor 

3, have produced power since January 

2012. This additional storage time for 

the fuel in the SONGS SFPs has allowed 

it to cool for greater than the 5 years 

suggested in SECY–00–0145, which 

supports the conclusion that zirconium 

fire risks from the irradiated fuel stored 

in the SFPs is of negligible concern and 

exemption from the requested 

requirements is warranted. 


sradovich on DSK3GMQ082PROD with NOTICES
Federal Register / Vol. 83, No. 12 / Thursday, January 18, 2018 / Notices 2683 

In addition to the air-cooling scenario, 

the licensee’s adiabatic heat-up analyses 

demonstrate that as of October 12, 2014, 

there would be at least 17 hours after 

the loss of all means of cooling (both air 

and/or water), before the spent fuel 

cladding would reach a temperature 

where the potential for a significant 

offsite radiological release could occur. 

The licensee states that for this loss of 

all cooling scenario, 10 hours is 

sufficient time for personnel to respond 

with additional resources, equipment, 

and capability to restore cooling to the 

SFPs, even after a non-credible, 

catastrophic event. 

As provided in SCE’s letters dated 

October 7 and December 15, 2014, the 

licensee furnished information 

concerning its makeup strategies, in the 

event of a loss of SFP coolant inventory. 

The multiple strategies for providing 

makeup to the SFPs include: using 

existing plant systems for inventory 

makeup; an internal strategy that relies 

on installed fire water pumps and 

service water or fire water storage tanks; 

or an external strategy that uses portable 

pumps to initiate makeup flow into the 

SFPs through a seismic standpipe and 

standard fire hoses routed to the SFPs 

or to a spray nozzle. These strategies 

will be maintained by a license 

condition until such time as all fuel has 

been moved to dry storage in an onsite 

ISFSI. The licensee states that the 

equipment needed to perform these 

actions are located onsite, and that the 

external makeup strategy (using portable 

pumps) is capable of being deployed 

within 2 hours. The licensee also stated 

that, considering the very lowprobability of beyond design-basis 

accidents affecting the SFPs, these 

diverse strategies provide defense-indepth and time to mitigate and prevent 

a zirconium fire, using makeup or spray 

into the SFPs before the onset of 

zirconium cladding rapid oxidation. 

In the safety evaluation of the 

licensee’s request for exemptions from 

certain emergency planning 

requirements dated June 4, 2015 

(ADAMS Accession No. ML15082A204), 

the NRC staff assessed the SCE accident 

analyses associated with the 

radiological risks from a zirconium fire 

at the permanently shutdown and 

defueled SONGS site. The NRC staff has 

confirmed that under conditions where 

cooling air flow can develop, suitably 

conservative calculations indicate that 

by the end of August 2014, the fuel 

would remain at temperatures where the 

cladding would be undamaged for an 

unlimited period. The staff also finds 

that the additional cooling time 

provided for the fuel between January 

2012 and the issuance of this exemption 

provides reasonable assurance that 

zirconium fire risks from the irradiated 

fuel stored in the SFPs is of negligible 

concern. For the very unlikely beyond 

design-basis accident scenario, where 

the SFP coolant inventory is lost in such 

a manner that all methods of heat 

removal from the spent fuel are no 

longer available, there will be a 

minimum of 10 hours from the 

initiation of the accident until the 

cladding reaches a temperature where 

offsite radiological release might occur. 

The staff finds that 10 hours is sufficient 

time to support deployment of 

mitigation equipment, consistent with 

plant conditions, to prevent the 

zirconium cladding from reaching a 

point of rapid oxidation. 

The staff’s basis as to why it considers 

$50 million to be an adequate level of 

onsite property damage insurance for a 

decommissioning reactor, once the 

spent fuel in the SFP is no longer 

susceptible to a zirconium fire, is 

provided in SECY–96–256. The staff has 

postulated that there is still a potential 

for other radiological incidents at a 

decommissioning reactor that could 

result in significant onsite 

contamination besides a zirconium fire. 

In SECY–96–256, the NRC staff cited the 

rupture of a large (∼450,000 gallon) 

liquid radioactive waste storage tank 

containing slightly radioactive water, 

causing soil contamination and 

potential groundwater contamination, as 

the most costly postulated event to 

decontaminate and remediate (other 

than a SFP zirconium fire). The 

postulated large liquid radwaste storage 

tank rupture event was determined to 

have a bounding onsite cleanup cost of 

approximately $50 million. 

The NRC staff has determined that the 

licensee’s proposed reduction in onsite 

property damage insurance coverage to 

a level of $50 million is consistent with 

SECY–96–256 and subsequent 

insurance considerations, resulting from 

additional zirconium fire risks, as 

discussed in SECY–00–0145 and SECY– 

01–0100. In addition, the NRC staff 

notes that similar exemptions have been 

granted to other permanently shutdown 

and defueled power reactors, upon 

demonstration that the criterion of the 

zirconium fire risks from the irradiated 

fuel stored in the SFP is of negligible 

concern. As previously stated, the staff 

concluded that as of October 12, 2014, 

sufficient irradiated fuel decay time has 

elapsed at SONGS to decrease the 

probability of an onsite radiological 

release from a postulated zirconium fire 

accident to negligible levels. In 

addition, the licensee’s proposal to 

reduce onsite insurance to a level of $50 

million is consistent with the maximum 

estimated cleanup costs for the recovery 

from the rupture of a large liquid 

radwaste storage tank. Finally, the staff 

notes that in accordance with the 

SONGS PSDAR, all spent fuel will be 

removed from the SFPs and moved into 

dry storage at an onsite independent 

spent fuel storage installation (ISFSI) by 

the end of 2019, and the probability of 

an initiating event that would threaten 

pool integrity occurring before that time 

is extremely low, which further 

supports the conclusion that the 

zirconium fire risk is negligible. 

The Exemption Is Authorized by Law 

In accordance with 10 CFR 50.12, the 

Commission may grant exemptions from 

the regulations in 10 CFR part 50 as the 

Commission determines are authorized 

by law. The NRC staff has determined 

that granting the licensee’s proposed 

exemption will not result in a violation 

of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, 

Section 170, as amended, other laws, or 

the Commission’s regulations, which 

require licensees to maintain adequate 

financial protection. Therefore, the 

proposed exemption for SONGS from 

the onsite property damage insurance 

requirements of 10 CFR 50.54(w)(1) is 

authorized by law. 

The Exemption Will Not Present an 

Undue Risk to Public Health and Safety 

The onsite property damage insurance 

requirements of 10 CFR 50.54(w)(1) 

were established to provide financial 

assurance that following a significant 

nuclear incident, onsite conditions 

could be stabilized and the site 

decontaminated. The requirements of 10 

CFR 50.54(w)(1) and the existing level 

of onsite insurance coverage for SONGS 

are predicated on the assumption that 

the reactor is operating. However, 

SONGS is a permanently shutdown and 

defueled facility. The permanently 

defueled status of the facility has 

resulted in a significant reduction in the 

number and severity of potential 

accidents, and correspondingly, a 

significant reduction in the potential for 

and severity of onsite property damage. 

The proposed reduction in the amount 

of onsite insurance coverage does not 

impact the probability or consequences 

of potential accidents. The proposed 

level of insurance coverage is 

commensurate with the reduced risk 

and reduced cost consequences of 

potential nuclear accidents at SONGS. 

Therefore, the NRC staff concludes that 

granting the requested exemption will 

not present an undue risk to the health 

and safety of the public. 


sradovich on DSK3GMQ082PROD with NOTICES
2684 Federal Register / Vol. 83, No. 12 / Thursday, January 18, 2018 / Notices 

The Exemption Is Consistent With the 

Common Defense and Security 

The proposed exemption would not 

eliminate any requirements associated 

with physical protection of the site and 

would not adversely affect SCE’s ability 

to physically secure the site or protect 

special nuclear material. Physical 

security measures at SONGS are not 

affected by the requested exemption. 

Therefore, the proposed exemption is 

consistent with the common defense 

and security. 

Special Circumstances 

Under 10 CFR 50.12(a)(2)(ii), special 

circumstances are present if the 

application of the regulation in the 

particular circumstances would not 

serve the underlying purpose of the rule 

or is not necessary to achieve the 

underlying purpose of the rule. The 

underlying purpose of 10 CFR 

50.54(w)(1) is to provide reasonable 

assurance that adequate funds will be 

available to stabilize conditions and 

cover onsite cleanup costs associated 

with site decontamination, following an 

accident that results in the release of a 

significant amount of radiological 

material. Because SONGS is 

permanently shut down and defueled, it 

is no longer possible for the radiological 

consequences of design-basis accidents 

or other credible events at SONGS to 

exceed the limits of the EPA PAGs at the 

exclusion area boundary. The licensee 

has performed site-specific analyses of 

highly unlikely, beyond-design-basis 

zirconium fire accidents involving the 

stored irradiated fuel in the SFPs. The 

analyses show that after October 12, 

2014, the probabilities of such an 

accident are minimal. The NRC staff’s 

evaluation of the licensee’s analyses 

confirm this conclusion. 

The NRC staff also finds that the 

licensee’s proposed $50 million level of 

onsite insurance is consistent with the 

bounding cleanup and decontamination 

cost, as discussed in SECY–96–256, to 

account for hypothetical rupture of a 

large liquid radwaste tank at the SONGS 

site, should such an event occur. The 

staff notes that the SONGS technical 

specifications provide controls for 

unprotected outdoor liquid storage 

tanks to limit the quantity of 

radioactivity contained in these tanks, 

in the event of an uncontrolled release 

of the contents of these tanks. Therefore, 

the staff concludes that the application 

of the current requirements in 10 CFR 

50.54(w)(1) to maintain $1.06 billion in 

onsite insurance coverage is not 

necessary to achieve the underlying 

purpose of the rule for the permanently 

shutdown and defueled SONGS 

reactors. 

Under 10 CFR 50.12(a)(2)(iii), special 

circumstances are present whenever 

compliance would result in undue 

hardship or other costs that are 

significantly in excess of those 

contemplated when the regulation was 

adopted, or that are significantly in 

excess of those incurred by others 

similarly situated. The NRC staff 

concludes that if the licensee was 

required to continue to maintain an 

onsite insurance level of $1.06 billion, 

the associated insurance premiums 

would be in excess of those necessary 

and commensurate with the radiological 

contamination risks posed by the 

SONGS site now that it has entered 

decommissioning. In addition, such 

insurance levels would be significantly 

in excess of other decommissioning 

reactor facilities that have been granted 

similar exemptions by the NRC. 

The NRC staff finds that compliance 

with the existing rule would result in an 

undue hardship or other costs that are 

significantly in excess of those 

contemplated when the regulation was 

adopted and are significantly in excess 

of those incurred by others similarly 

situated. Therefore, the special 

circumstances required by 10 CFR 

50.12(a)(2)(ii) and 10 CFR 50.12(a)(2)(iii) 

exist for the proposed exemption from 

the onsite property damage insurance 

requirements of 10 CFR 50.54(w)(1). 

Environmental Considerations 

The NRC approval of an exemption to 

insurance or indemnity requirements 

belongs to a category of actions that the 

Commission, by rule or regulation, has 

declared to be a categorical exclusion, 

after first finding that the category of 

actions does not individually or 

cumulatively have a significant effect on 

the human environment. Specifically, 

the exemption is categorically excluded 

from further analysis under 10 CFR 

51.22(c)(25). Pursuant to 10 CFR 

51.22(c)(25), the granting of an 

exemption from the requirements of any 

regulation in Chapter I of 10 CFR is a 

categorical exclusion provided that (i) 

there is no significant hazards 

consideration; (ii) there is no significant 

change in the types or significant 

increase in the amounts of any effluents 

that may be released offsite; (iii) there is 

no significant increase in individual or 

cumulative public or occupational 

radiation exposure; (iv) there is no 

significant construction impact; (v) 

there is no significant increase in the 

potential for or consequences from 

radiological accidents; and (vi) the 

requirements from which an exemption 

is sought are among those identified in 

10 CFR 51.22(c)(25)(vi). 

The NRC staff has determined that 

approval of the exemption request 

involves no significant hazards 

consideration because reducing the 

licensee’s onsite property damage 

insurance at the decommissioning San 

Onofre Nuclear Generating Station, 

Units 1, 2, and 3, does not (1) involve 

a significant increase in the probability 

or consequences of an accident 

previously evaluated; (2) create the 

possibility of a new or different kind of 

accident from any accident previously 

evaluated; or (3) involve a significant 

reduction in a margin of safety. The 

exempted financial protection 

regulation is unrelated to the operation 

of SONGS. 

Accordingly, there is no significant 

change in the types or significant 

increase in the amounts of any effluents 

that may be released offsite, and no 

significant increase in individual or 

cumulative public or occupational 

radiation exposure. The exempted 

regulation is not associated with 

construction, so there is no significant 

construction impact. The exempted 

regulation does not concern the source 

term (i.e., potential amount of radiation 

involved an accident) or accident 

mitigation; therefore, there is no 

significant increase in the potential for, 

or consequences from, a radiological 

accident. In addition, there would be no 

significant impacts to biota, water 

resources, historic properties, cultural 

resources, or socioeconomic conditions 

in the region. The requirement for onsite 

property damage insurance may be 

viewed as involving surety, insurance, 

or indemnity matters in accordance 

with 10 CFR 51.22(c)(25)(vi). 

Therefore, pursuant to 10 CFR 

51.22(b) and 10 CFR 51.22(c)(25), no 

environmental impact statement or 

environmental assessment need be 

prepared in connection with the 

approval of this exemption request. 

IV. Conclusions 

Accordingly, the Commission has 

determined that, pursuant to 10 CFR 

50.12(a), the exemption from 10 CFR 

50.54(w)(1) is authorized by law, will 

not present an undue risk to the public 

health and safety, and is consistent with 

the common defense and security. In 

addition, special circumstances are 

present. Therefore, the Commission 

hereby grants SCE an exemption from 

the requirements of 10 CFR 50.54(w)(1), 

to permit the licensee to reduce its 

onsite property damage insurance to a 

level of $50 million. 

This exemption is effective upon 

issuance. 


sradovich on DSK3GMQ082PROD with NOTICES
Federal Register / Vol. 83, No. 12 / Thursday, January 18, 2018 / Notices 2685 

Dated at Rockville, Maryland, on January 

10, 2018. 

For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. 

Gregory Suber, 

Deputy Division Director, Division of 

Decommissioning, Uranium Recovery and 

Waste Programs, Office of Nuclear Material 

Safety and Safeguards. 

[FR Doc. 2018–00715 Filed 1–17–18; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 7590–01–P 

NUCLEAR REGULATORY 

COMMISSION 

[Docket No. 70–0938; NRC–2016–0152] 

Massachusetts Institute of 

Technology, Cambridge, 

Massachusetts; License Renewal; 

Issuance 

AGENCY: Nuclear Regulatory 

Commission. 

ACTION: License renewal; issuance. 

SUMMARY: The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory 

Commission (NRC) issued a renewal of 

Special Nuclear Materials (SNM) 

License No. SNM–986 held by the 

Massachusetts Institute of Technology 

(MIT) to possess and use SNM for 

education, research, and training 

programs. The renewed license 

authorizes MIT to continue to possess 

and use SNM for an additional 10 years 

from the date of issuance. 

DATES: The renewed license SNM–986 

was issued on December 14, 2017. 

ADDRESSES: Please refer to Docket ID 

NRC–2016–0152 when contacting the 

NRC about the availability of 

information regarding this document. 

You may obtain publicly-available 

information related to this document 

using any of the following methods: 

• Federal Rulemaking website: Go to 

http://www.regulations.gov and search 

for Docket ID NRC–2016–0152. Address 

questions about NRC dockets to Carol 

Gallagher; telephone: 301–415–3463; 

email: Carol.Gallagher@nrc.gov. For 

technical questions, contact the 

individual listed in the FOR FURTHER

INFORMATION CONTACT section of this 

document. 

• NRC’s Agencywide Documents 

Access and Management System 

(ADAMS): You may obtain publiclyavailable documents online in the 

ADAMS Public Documents collection at 

http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/ 

adams.html. To begin the search, select 

‘‘ADAMS Public Documents’’ and then 

select ‘‘Begin Web-based ADAMS 

Search.’’ For problems with ADAMS, 

please contact the NRC’s Public 

Document Room (PDR) reference staff at 

1–800–397–4209, 301–415–4737, or by 

email to pdr.resource@nrc.gov. The 

ADAMS accession number for each 

document referenced (if it is available in 

ADAMS) is provided the first time that 

a document is referenced. For the 

convenience of the reader, the ADAMS 

accession numbers are provided in a 

table in the ‘‘Availability of Documents’’ 

section of this document. 

• NRC’s PDR: You may examine and 

purchase copies of public documents at 

the NRC’s PDR, Room O1–F21, One 

White Flint North, 11555 Rockville 

Pike, Rockville, Maryland 20852. 

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: 

Tyrone D. Naquin, Office of Nuclear 

Material Safety and Safeguards, U.S. 

Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 

Washington, DC 20555–0001; telephone: 

301–415–7352; email: Tyrone.Naquin@

nrc.gov. 

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: 

I. Discussion 

Pursuant to section 2.106 of title 10 of 

the Code of Federal Regulations (10 

CFR), the NRC is providing notice of the 

issuance of license renewal to Material 

License No. SNM–986, to MIT, which 

authorizes MIT to possess and use SNM 

for education, research, and training 

programs at its campus in Cambridge, 

Massachusetts. This licensee’s request 

for renewal of its license was made on 

February 24, 2016. Because the licensed 

material will be used for research and 

development and for educational 

purposes, renewal of SNM License No. 

SNM–986 is an action that is 

categorically excluded from a 

requirement to prepare an 

environmental assessment or 

environmental impact statement, 

pursuant to 10 CFR 51.22(c)(14)(v). A 

notice of receipt of the license renewal 

application with an opportunity to 

request a hearing and petition for leave 

to intervene was published in the 

Federal Register on August 8, 2016 (81 

FR 52478). The NRC did not receive a 

request for a hearing or for a petition for 

leave to intervene. This license renewal 

complies with the standards and 

requirements of the Atomic Energy Act 

of 1954, as amended, and the NRC’s 

rules and regulations as set forth in 10 

CFR Chapter 1. Accordingly, this license 

renewal was issued on December 14, 

2017, and is effective immediately. 

The NRC prepared a safety evaluation 

report for the renewal of SNM–986 and 

concluded that the licensee can 

continue to operate the facility without 

endangering the health and safety of the 

public. 

II. Availability of Documents 

The documents identified in the 

following table are available to 

interested persons through ADAMS 

accession numbers as indicated. 

Document ADAMS 

accession No. 

Massachusetts Institute of 

Technology Request for 

Renewal Application ......... ML16092A171 

NRC Request for Additional 

Information ........................ ML16257A205 

MIT Response to Request 

for Additional Information .. ML16302A017 

Transmittal of MIT License 

Renewal (SNM–0986) ....... ML17086A517 

Safety Evaluation Report for 

MIT License Renewal ....... ML17086A565 

SNM–986 MIT Materials License ................................. ML17086A581 

Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 11th day 

of January, 2018. 

For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. 

Tyrone D. Naquin, 

Project Manager, Fuel Manufacturing Branch, 

Division of Fuel Cycle Safety, Safeguards and 

Environmental Review, Office of Nuclear 

Material Safety and Safeguards. 

[FR Doc. 2018–00800 Filed 1–17–18; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 7590–01–P 

OFFICE OF PERSONNEL 

MANAGEMENT 

President’s Commission on White 

House Fellowships Advisory 

Committee: Closed Meeting 

AGENCY: President’s Commission on 

White House Fellowships, Office of 

Personnel Management. 

ACTION: Notice of meeting. 

SUMMARY: The President’s Commission 

on White House Fellowships (PCWHF) 

was established by an Executive Order 

in 1964. The PCWHF is an advisory 

committee composed of Special 

Government Employees appointed by 

the President. 

Name of Committee: President’s 

Commission on White House 

Fellowships. 

Date: January 30, 2018. 

Time: 8:00 a.m.–5:30 p.m. 

Place: Eisenhower Executive Office 

Building. 

Agenda: The Commission holds a 

mid-year meeting to talk with current 

Fellows on how their placements are 

going and discuss preparations for 

future events. 

Location: Washington, DC. 

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: By 

mail: Elizabeth Pinkerton, Director, 

President’s Commission on White 

House Fellowships, 712 Jackson Place 

NW, Washington, DC 20503; By phone: 

202–395–4522. 


sradovich on DSK3GMQ082PROD with NOTICES