T he f ul l w o rding o f

c o unt two o f

the p res ent m ent charged t hat t he p et i t i o ner “ d i d unl awf ul l y , f el o ni o usl y and 1
kn owi ng l y poss es s t hr ee hu ndr ed ( 30 0) g r ams o r mo r e of a s ubs t anc e c ont ai ni ng Co cai ne, a Sch edul e I I Co nt r ol l ed S u b sta n c e , w ith the inte n t t o se ll o r d e live r th e sa id c o n tro lled su b sta n c e .” 

### IN THE COURT OF CRIMI NAL AP PEALS OF TENNES SEE

AT KNOXVI LLE A ssi gne d on Br ie fs S ep te m be r 28, 200 5

MA RC US E. THOM PS ON v. ST ATE OF TEN NES SEE

Direc t Appeal from the Cr im inal Cou rt for Sulli van Coun ty

No. C48,784 P hylli s H. Miller, Judge

No. E2004-03028-CC A-R3- P C - F iled Janu ary 4, 2006

The pe titioner, Marc u s E . Thompson, appea ls the denial of his petition for post-c onviction relief, arg uing that the post-conviction court erre d in finding he rec eived e ffe ctive assistance of trial and appellate counsel. F ollowing our revie w, we a ffirm the de nial of the pe tition.
Tenn. R. App . P . 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgme nt of th e Cr im inal Cou rt A ff irm ed

A L AN E. G L EN N , J ., delivere d the opinion of the co u rt , in which J OS EP H M. T I PTON and J ER R Y L. S MI TH , J J ., joined.

L arry R. Dillow, Kingsport, Te nnessee , for the a ppellant, Marc us E. Thompson.

Paul G. Sum me rs , Attorne y Ge ne ra l a nd Re po rt e r; Jenn if e r L . B le ds oe , A ssi stant A tto rn e y Ge ne ra l; H. Gre eley

Wells, Jr., District Attorney Gene ral; and Robert H. Montg omery , J r., Assistant District Attorney Gene ral, for

the appe llee, State of Te nnessee

.

OP IN ION

F AC TS

P roce dural Hi story

On Se p te mb e r

8 , 1 9 9 8 , th e Su ll iv a n Co u n ty G r a n d Ju r y

is s u e d a f iv e

- c o u n t p r e s e ntment char g ing the petitioner with criminal conspira cy to sell or deliver more than 300 g rams of c ocaine (count one ); possession of more tha n 300 g rams of cocaine for resa le (c ount two); sale of ove r .5 1T he f ul l wo rding o f

co unt t hree of t he p res ent m ent charged t hat t he p et i t i o ner “ d i d unl awf ul l y , f el o ni o usl y and 2
kn owi ng l y s el l or del i ver poi nt f i ve (

. 5) g r ams or more of a s ubs t anc e c ont ai ni ng Co cai ne, a Sch edul e I I Co nt r ol l ed Subs t anc e. ”
-2- g rams of c ocaine (count thre e); p o ssession of drug para pherna lia (count four ); and possession of 2 over one-half ounce of marijuana for resale ( count five) . The fa cts of this matter, as la id out in the pe tit ion e r’ s d ir e c t app e a l, a re a s f oll ow s:

Tri a l c o m m e n c e d o n M a y 2 1 , 2 0 0 1

. T h e S t a t e c a l l e d L arr y R o b b i ns a s it s fi rs t w itn e ss. Rob bin s te sti fi e d th a t in Ap ri l 19 98 , h e wo rk e d f or the John so n Ci ty Police Bur eau and was assigne d to work as an ag ent for the 1st J udicial District Drug Task F orce (1st DTF ). Robbins ex plained that " [t ]he First Dist rict i s made up of our (4 ) f ou r c ou nti e s, Was hin g ton , Ca rt e r, Un ic oi and John so n, a nde a c h d e pa rt me nt i s e nc ouraged to se nda n e mpl oy e e fr om the ir de pa rt me nt t o th e Dr

ug Ta sk F or c e to work a s one entity

to work t he drug s in that four county are a." Robbins related that often the case s crosse d the county lines into another jurisdiction and there upon the 1st DTF would c o ntact the dr ug task forc e fr om the other jurisdiction and the two forc es would work tog ether

. The 1st DTF

arr ang ed a c ontrolled buy of one ounce of

cra ck coc aine f

rom Sa nf or d Wh e tse l, a lso kn ow n a s T ur k Wh e tse l, o n A pril 2 9, 19 98

. Up on his arr e st
a nd in e xch a ng e fo r a po ssi ble " re c omm e nd a tio n f ro m th e D. A. ," Whe tse l a g re e d to
arr ang e for

his supplier, M elisa L ong , to bring him more cra ck coc aine. At that time, L o n g r e s i d e d i n K i n g s p o r t , o u t s i d e t h e j u r i s d i c t i o n o f t h e 1 s tD T F

. A c c o r d i n g l y, W h et s el arra n ged fo r Lon g t o b ri n g t wo o u n ce s o f c ra ck c o ca i n e t o a M cD o n al d 's Restaura nt in Gray , a locale in Washington County , which wa s within the jurisdiction of the 1st DTF . The ag ree d purcha se price was $1,600 or $1,800 an ounce. Robbins fu rt h ern o t ed t h at"[ s ] o m eo n e w h o 's b u y i n g a n o u n c e ata t i m e i s s o m eo n e t h at 's g oing to be rese lling it."

L ater on April 29, 1998, L ong broug ht the cra ck coc aine to the pr ear rang ed location and she was a

rre sted. Robbins talked with L ong about coope rating with the 1st DTF to " help her self out and hope fully g et a rec ommendation towards the D .A. about her involvement." L ong reve aled that he r supplier, t h e[petitioner], was located in S ull ivan Co un ty , w ith in the jurisd ic tio n o f the 2n d Jud ic ia l D ist ri c t D ru g Ta sk For ce ( 2nd DTF ). Robbins conta cted Brian Bishop, the Direc tor of the 2nd DT F a nd
a sk e d f or c oo pe ratio n in app re he nd ing L on g ' s su pp lie r. Di re c tor B ish op a g re e d to help.

L ater

that evening , L ong , acting per he r ag ree ment with the 1st DTF, made a tel e p h o n e c a ll to a c e r tain n u mb e r to arr a n g e a d ru g tr a n s a c ti o n with the [pe tit ion e r]. Rob bin s sa w the numbe r that L on g dia le d, bu t he wa s u na ble to
o v e rh e ar t h e c o n v e r s a t i o n

. T h e r e a f t e r , a g e n t s w i t h t h e 1 s t D T F d r o v e L o ng to-3-

Sulli van County . Prior to the arr ang ed buy , L ong ' s person a nd possessions were
sear ched and no contra

band wa s found. The rest of t he ar rang ed buy

was c onducted th rou gh mem bers of t he 2 nd DTF.

Robbins r e late d th a t L o n g w a s c h ar g e d w ith a c r im e in th e Wa s h in g ton Cou nty Cr imi na l Cou rt a nd that tho se c ha rg e s we re sti ll pe nd ing a t the tim e of tr ia l. Robbins opined that L on g hoped her case would be dismissed in return for her
c oo pe ratio n w iththe auth oriti e s.
Melisa L ong testified that she was arr ested by Robbins on April 29, 1998, at a McD onald' s Restaurant in Gr ay . Rob b i n s asked L ong to tell him where she obtained the c rac k cocai n e. L o ng reve aled that the [petitioner] was her supplier. After ag ree ing to he lp the 1st DTF a pprehe nd th e [ p et i t i o ner], L ong called the [petit ioner] from a pay

phone outside the McD onal d 's R es t aurant. L ong told the [petit ioner] that "I

neede d more of w hat I

had before," indicating that she nee ded two
more ounc es of c rac k cocaine. L ong asserted that the pric e of the cra ck coc aine wa s o v er $ 1 , 0 0 0 an ounce , but that she alre ady knew the price be fore she ca lled. The [ pe tit ion e r] d ir e c te d L on g to g o to the ho us e of his c ou sin , Jen ic e Th omp so n, to obtain the drug s. Specifica lly , L ong testified that " [t he [petit i o n er]] t old me to go. I mean, he told me to go ther e. I been the re be fore . And he told me to g o."

L ong further

stated that within thirty

day s prior t o April 29, 1998, she had been to Thompson's r esidenc e to obtain coc aine at the [petit ioner’s] direc tion. The [petit ioner] objected to this testimony , but th eo b je ction was ove rruled. L ong asserted that on the pre vious occa sion, she went to T hompson's apartment in the A mber Court Apartments on Moreland Drive. Thom pson' s boy friend, Daryl Wil liams, also known
as Da ry l L athen, was also at the a partment. L ong did not give T hompson or Willi a ms any

mon e y ; ho we ve r, sh e ob ta ine d c oc a ine fr om on e of the m. L on g c ou ld not specifica lly

rec al l wh ether Thompson or Wil liams ga ve her the coc aine. L ong did not have to ask for

the coc aine be cause "[t]hey knew what I

was c oming f

or."

I n the ea rly morning hours of April 30, 1998, Direc tor Bishop with the 2nd DTFdrove L ong to Thompson's a partment. While Direc t o r Bishop waited in the vehicle, L ong went inside Thomps on' s apartment. Once ag ain, bot h Thompson and Wil liams were in the apartment. "The y " g ave L ong the cr ac k cocaine. L ong e xpla ine d tha t she did no t re me mbe r wh ic h pe rs on g a ve he r the c ra c k co c a ine , b ut d id
rec all that it was eit h er T h o m p son or Will iams. L ong also stated that she did not have to tell Thompson or Willi ams why she wa s there. L ong apolog ized for being late a n d p la c e d th e c r a c k c o c a in e in h e r p u r s e

. Sh e d id n o t g iv e T h o mp s on or Wil liams any

money at that time. L ong then left the apartment and g ot into the car with Direc tor Bishop to whom she r elinquished possession of the cr ack c ocaine

.-4- L ater in the afte rnoon of April 30, 1 9 9 8 , L ong called the [petit ioner] and
arr ang ed to me et him in the parking lot of a Revco dr ug store on Stone Drive in order to pay him f

or the cra ck cocaine. L ong was to pay the [petiti oner] $3,600 which she ob ta ine d f ro m D TF a g e nts

. Soo n a ft e r the te le ph on e c a ll, the [pe tit ion e r] arrive d a t the Re vc o p arking lot

. L ong sat i n t h e front passeng er se at of the [petitioner’s] vehicle. L ong told the [petit ioner] t h at s h e had the money and the [petitioner] inst ructe d L ong to put the money in the g love compartment of his ve hicle. L ong remove d the money from her purse a nd place d $ 3 , 300 in the [petit ioner’s] g love compartment. L ong explained that sh e ke pt $ 30 0 o f the mon e y be c a us e

I gu es s i twa s m y
-- fo r m a k i n g l i k e go i n g d o wn t h er e a n d m ak i n g a run or whatever , I

g uess t hat' s what I was supposed to g et paid out of it.

. . . .
I think we, may

be it was supposed to have been maybe a hundred an ou nc e or so me thi ng lik e that, s o it c ome up to be th ree ou nc e s, so three hundred dollar s ($300.00).

A f te r L o n g p la c e d th e mo n e y in th e g lo v e c o mp ar tm e n t, s he and the [petit ioner] talked for a short time. Shortlythere afte r, they wer e appr oache d by

the authorities and we re a

rre sted.

L ong testified that she ha d known t he [petitioner] for approximately ten y ear s and they had attende d high sc hool toge ther. L ong admitted th at she ha d been the [petit ioner’s] g irlfriend in hig h school, but aft er L ong became pre g nant, the [pe tit ion e r] e nd e d th e re la tio ns hip . A pp ro xima te ly te n y e ars a ft er th e e ndof the ir
re la tio ns hip , L on g e nc ou nte re d th e [ pet it ion e r] i n a c lub a ndre ne we d th e ir acquaintance. Soon ther eaf ter, L ong contac ted the [p et i t i oner] about purc hasing
c ra c k c oc a ine fo r h e r s ist e r wh o wa s an ad dic t. She e xplaine d th a t " I ' m no t r e a dy to g o out in the street and buy no drug s." L ong asserted that she did not use drug s at the tim e of the of fe ns e s.

L ong t est ified that she ha d never been c harg ed with a c rime in Sulli van Countybut stil l had cha

rg es in W as h i n gt on Countywhich had be en pending for approximately

three y ear s. Neve rtheless, L ong hoped to have the cha rg es dismissed. L ong admitted that she neve r took dr ug s direc tly from the [petitioner’s] hands, "but he would tell me whe re to g et it."-5- Reg arding the ounce of cr ack c ocaine she sold to Whetsel, L ong related that ini tia lly sh e did no t ha ve to pay fo r tho se dr ug s. I ns te a d, the dr

ug s w e re " fr on te d" to L o n g b e c au s e s h e a lr e a d y h a d a b u y e r f o r th e c r a c k c o c a in e

. A f te r r e c eiving the money from the buy er, L ong was to re turn with the m oney and pay for the c ocaine

. L ong explained that even thoug h she had obta ined cr ack c ocaine from Thompson and Wil liams on previous occa sions, " they ' re not going to front anything to me if he [t he [petit ioner] didn't tell them to."

L ong stated that in the thirty day s prior to April 29, 1998, she had obta ined drug s throug h the [pet i t i o n er ] o n three occa sions. She opined that "the f irst one, I p ro b ab l y wa s at the bridg e. The second two ma y be had be en at the house [of Thompson] . That wa s three y ear s ag o. I don' t rea lly reme mber that far ba ck." L ong related that the bridg e wa s at " J ohn B. D ennis and More land Drive ." She stated that Thompson's a

p a r tm e n t was also on More land Drive . Furthermore , L ong testified that p r io r to o b tain in g d ru g s f

r o m u n d e r n e a thth e b r id g e , s h e s p o k e w ith th e [p e ti ti o n e r ]. The [petitioner] ins tructed L ong to g o to that particula r l ocation to obt ain the cr ack
cocaine.

B ri a n B ish op , th e dir e c tor of the 2n d D TF , te sti fi e d th a t a t app ro xima te ly midnight on April 29, 1998, he w as conta cted by the 1st DTF and wa s advised " that a pick u p o f co ca ine had be en ar rang ed." Subsequently , ag ents with the 1st DTF broug ht L ong to S ullivan Countyto meet with Direc tor Bishop. Dire ctor B ishop
s ea r c h ed L o n g's p er s o n an d b el o n gi n gs p ri o r [ t o ] t h ei r d ep ar t u re fo r T h o m p s o n 's apartment. L ong had no contraband or money on her pe rson or in her

purse. Dir ector Bishop then drove L ong to Thompson's a partment on More land Drive at
app ro ximatel y 1:00 a .m. on Ap ri l 30 , 1 99 8. Di re c tor B ish op waite d in the ve hic le while L ong wen t into the apartment. L ong returne d to the vehicle w ith what appea red to be two ounces of

cra ck cocaine. D irec tor Bishop testified that such an amount of cr ack c ocaine was fa r too larg e for

persona l use.

Direc tor Bis h o p n ex t had conta ct with L ong on the af ternoon of A pril 30, 1998. L ong had ar

rang ed to me et the [petit ioner] in the Re vco par king lot to pay

for the d ru g s

. L o n g w a s w ir e d w ith a b o d y tr a n s mi tt e r

a n d th e a g e n ts mo n it o r e d the transac tion with a recei v er

. L ong was g iven $3,600 prior to mee ting with the [petit i o n er ] to pay

for the c rac k cocaine. When the ag ents hea rd a pr e-a

rra ng ed signa l, they

moved in and took t he [ petitioner] into custody . During a sea rch of the vehicle, the age n t s discovere d the money in the g love compartment of the [petit ioner’s] vehicle.

Ba sed upon these ev en t s, the authorities obtained a sear ch wa

rra nt for Thompson's apartment. D irec tor Bishop and office rs with the 1st D TF, the King sport Police Depa

rtment, and the Sullivan County Police Depa

rtment wer e involved in the
e xec uti on of

the se arc h w arr a nt o n A pril 3 0, 19 98 , at 9: 00 p. m.-6- Direc tor Bishop stated that Thompson ha d a two-bedr oom a partment. One of the bedr ooms appea

red to be a child' s room. On the top shelf of the close t in the ch i l d 's ro o m , o ff

i ce rs d i s co v er ed a car d b o ar d b o x co n t ai n i n g a p l as t i c s h o p p i n g b ag. I n s i d e t h e s h o p p i n g b ag w er e s ev er al l ar ge b ags o f wh i t e p o wd er , t wo s m al l erb ags of whit e powder, and two bag s of a g ree n leaf y substance be lieved to be marijuana. Direc tor Bishop opined that the white powder was c ocaine and he e stimated that the bag s con t ai n ed h al f a kilog ram, or 500 g rams, of c ocaine . On the top shelf of the
se con d bedro om, the of

fi c e rs dis c ov e re d a

sma ll b a g c on ta ini ng se ve ra l pl a sti c sandwich ba g "c orner s" of white powder

subs t an ce, also believed to be cocaine, which wa s packa g ed for

resa le. The of

fice rs also dis co v er ed a se t of dig ital scales which Dire ctor B ishop ex plained could be used in the we ighing of controlled substances. Additionally , office rs di scover ed more plastic sandwich bag s of t he ty pe used to pac kag e coc aine f or re sale.

Di re c tor B ish op state d th a t no mon e y wa s f ou ndin T ho mps on ' s a

pa rt me nt. Moreove r, t here wer e no expensive-looking items in the apartment. Direc tor Bishop conclude d that the marijuana discovere d was pa ckag ed as if f or re sale a nd had a street va lue of $225 or $250. D irec tor Bishop a lso ex plained that crac k cocaine was typically smoked, but the office rs found no device in the apartment for the smoking of c ra c k c o c a i n e

. F u r t h e r m o r e , D i r e c t o r B i s h o p s t a t e d t h a tp o w d e r c o c a i n e c ou ld eit h er b e snorted or injec ted, but no implements for either type of use wer e discov e r e d

in T h o mp s o n ' s a

p a r tm e n t. D irec tor Bishop a dmitted that although va rious items were chec ked for

fing erprints, "there wer e no prints d eveloped that wer e identified [as the petitioner’s]." H oweve r, t here wer e also no fing erprints which were "ide ntified" as belong ing to Thompson or Williams even thoug h they both resided in the apa rt me nt.

A g e n tD e n i s e B u c k n e r

w i t h t h e T e n n e s s e e B u r e a u o f In v e s t i g a t i o n ( T B I) crime la boratory in Knox ville testified that she ana ly zed a portion of the substanc es obtained by

the police during the se eve nts. Both the Stat e an d the [petiti oner] stipulated that Ag ent B uckner was a n expert in drug ch em i s try . Ag ent B uckner testified that she analy zed two bag s of a substance and dete rmined that it was 53.11 g rams of c ocaine base, w hich is also known as c rac k cocaine.
Next, the St ate and the [petiti oner] stipulated that Ag ent David Holloway , a f o r e n s i c c h e m i s t w i t h t h e T B I c r i m e l ab o r a t o r y, w a s a n e x p e r ti n f o r e n s i c c h e m i s tr y. Ag ent Holloway

testified that he analy zed a total of 467.8 g rams, or 1.03 pounds, of powder cocaine which wa s obtained fr om Thompson's a partment. Ag ent Holloway also asserted that the gre en leafy substance w eig hed 32.46 g rams and te sted positive for marijuana.

Rob bin s w a s r e c a lle d to the standa ndhe te sti fi e d th a t L on g dia le d the sa me telephone numbe r to obtain the drug s as she ha d dialed to ar rang e payment for theT her e i s co n f u s i on a bo u t h ow t h e pe t i t i on e r ’ s s e n t e n c e s w e r e s t r u c t u r e d. I n h i s br i e f , t h e pe t i t i on e r c l a i ms 3

c o u n ts o n e a n d two a re c o n c u rr e n t with e a c h o the r a n d c o u n t th re e is c o n se c u tive to c o u n t o n e

. I n its o rd e r d e n ying p o stconvi ct i on r el i ef , t he po s t

- convi ct i on cour t s t at ed t he s ame t hi ng

. Even i n t he pet i t i oner ’ s di r ect appeal , t hi s cour t s t at ed tha t co u n t t w o w a s to b e se rv e d c o n c u rr e n tly w ith c o u n t o n e . T h o m p so n , 2 0 0 3 W L 2 1 9 9 9 3 7 6 , at *6 . W e tak e this

o p p o rtu n ity to se t t h e re c o rd stra igh t. T h e ju d g m e n ts a n d the se n te n c ing h e a rin g tra n sc rip t b o th c le a rly sta te tha t co u n ts tw o a n d thr e e a re c o n c u rr e n t with e a c h o the r, b u t b o th a re c o n se c u tive to c o u n t o n e

.

T h is is no t t h e o n ly am e n d e d p e tit io n tha t wa s fil e d

. In d e e d , the p e tit io n e r ha s p ro v e n h im se lf to b e a p ro lif ic 4

w rite r, fil ing , p ro se , t h e fol l owi n g : a men ded pet i t i on on M ar ch 11, 2004; a men ded pet i t i on on M ar ch 19, 2004; mot i on t o s up p l em ent pe t i t i o n on M ay 1 3 , 20 0 4 ; am end ed s up p l em ent al p et i t i o n o n June 9 , 20 0 4 ; and “ M o t i o n t o A l ert C o urt C o unsel has b een N o t i f i ed o f t he Fo l l o wi ng” o n June 28 , 2 0 0 4

. In ad d i t i o n, p o st

- co nvi ct i o n co unsel f i l ed a s up p l em ent t o a men ded pet i t i on on M ay 25, 2004; a n d a n a men ded pet i t i on for r el i ef f r om s en t en ce on Au g u s t 6, 2004.
-7- drug s. Soon after t he sec ond telephone c all, the [petiti oner] arrived at the Revc o pa rking lot

. State v. Marc us Thompson, No. E2001-02521-CCA-R3-CD, 2003 WL 21999376, at **1-5 (T enn. Crim. App. Aug . 22, 2003), perm. to appeal de nied (Te nn. J an. 5, 2004) ( footnote omitted).

The trial c ourt, finding no evidenc e to support count five , g rante d a judg ment of ac quittal for that count. I d. at *6. The jury acquitted the pe titioner on count four and found him g uiltyof the following : “conspira cy

to sell and deliver at least twenty six g rams but less than thre e hundre d g rams of cocaine” (count one); “possession of at least twenty -six g rams but le ss tha n three hundred g rams of c ocaine with intent to sell and deliver” ( count two); and “sale and delivery of five- tenths g ram or more of coc aine” (count thre e). B ased upon the se g uiltyverdic ts, the trial court sente nced the petitioner a s a Rang e I I , multipl e off ender to twenty y ear s for e ach of fense . Counts two and three
wer e run c oncurr ently

with eac h other but conse cutively to count one for a total ef fec tive sentenc e of fo rty y e ars

. Th e pe tit ion e r, wi th n e wl y app oin te d a

pp e llate c ou ns e l, a

pp eal e d h is c on vic tio ns , 3 raising numerous issues. On August 22, 2003, this court affirmed both the petitioner’s c onvictions and sente nces on dire ct appe al, re manding only for a reduc tion in the amount of fines. See id. at*21.

There afte r, the p et i tioner filed a pro se petition for post-conviction re lief on F ebrua ry 2, 2004, alleg ing that both trial and appellate counsel denied him eff ective assistance of

counsel. On Fe bruary 25, 2004, post-conviction counse l was appointed, and an ame nded petition was filed on April 1, 2004. I n his original and ame nded petitions, the petitioner asse rted, a mong nume rous other

4

c la ims , th a t tria l a ndapp e llate c ou ns e l w e re ine ff e c tiv e be c a us e the y

bo th f a ile d to c ha lle ng e his prese ntment for being duplicitous and his jury verdic ts f or not be ing unanimous. He further a lleg ed both counsel we re ine ffe ctive bec ause the y failed to attack the jury

ins tr u c ti ons as an unc onstitut ional
a me nd me nt t o th e pr e se ntm e nt.W e no te tha t alth o u g h he ra ise d nu m e ro u s issu e s in h is p o s t- c o n v ic tio n p e tit io n s, w h ic h w e re tho ro u g h ly 5
addr es s ed du r i n g h i s pos t

- con v i ct i on h ea r i n g , on appe al t h e pet i t i on er as k s on l y t h at h i s c on v i ct i on a s t o c ou n t t h r ee be

r ev er s ed an d di s mi s s ed du e t o i n ef fec t i v e a s s i s t an ce of

cou n s el

. As s u ch , w e l i mi t ou r r ec ou n t i n g of t h e pos t

- con v i ct i on hea r i ng t o t es t i mo ny conc er ni ng coun t t hr ee al one.

W e no t e t hat ap p el l at e co unsel f i l ed t he b ri ef

o n A ugust 5 , 2 0 0 2 , a nd the I sabell de ci si o n was r el eased on June 6 27, 2003. T h e pet i t i on er ’ s opi n i on w as r el ea s ed l es s t h an t wo mon t h s l at er on Au g u s t 22, 2003.
-8- P os t- Co nvi c ti on H e ar ing
At the October 15, 2004, evidentiary hearing, the petitioner testified that a lthough he thought count three was duplicitous, he never discussed this belief with either trial or appe llate counse l. He 5 said he believed he was being convicted “of t he two offe nses wit hin the s ingle count” and asked tria l counsel if he “could be convicted of both but [ he] did not know that the corre ct term for . . . what
wa s g oin g on wa s dup lic ito us .” He a c kn ow le dg e d tha t tria l cou ns e l hadfi le d a mot ion to d ism iss
c ou nt three, n ot f

or be ing du pli c ito us , a ndthe fi rs t ti me the iss ue wa s r a ise d w a s in his po stconviction petition. The jury i n s t ru ct i o ns for c ount three c harg ed that the jury could find the petitioner g uiltyof the “ sale or de livery ” or “ both the sale and delivery ” of coc aine. The petitioner testified that he n ev er agr eed to his pre sentment being amende d but acknowle dg ed he ma de no ob je c tio n to the tr ia l c ou rt ’s ins truc tio ns

. Th e pe tit ion e r re lie s so le ly on State v. An g e la E. I sa be ll, No. M2002-00584-CCA-R3-CD, 2003 WL 21486982 (Tenn. Crim. App. J une 27, 2003), which w as decide d afte r he w as convic ted and se ntence d in J uly 2001, to support his arg ument that count three
wa s d up lic ito us a ndhis jury ve rd ic t w a s n ot u nanim ou s. The pe titioner’s appe llate counse l testified that he had been in pr actice for thirtee n y ear s and handled a pproxi mately seventy -five appea ls. Counsel said he met with the petitioner prior to writing the brief to disc uss w hat issues should be prese nted on appea l. T he petitioner r equeste d to see the appellate brief befor e it wa s filed so that his “ jail house lawy er” could re view it. Counsel describe d his f iling as “a pretty extensive brief

. . . [wit h] some forty -some odd pag es” and said the petitioner h ad t h e o p p ortunity

to review the brief

and made no objection to it being f iled. As for the petitioner’s a

rg ument that count three was duplicitous a nd the verdic t w as not unanimous, counsel testified that he had alr eady filed the pe titioner’s brief when the I sabell dec ision was rele ased and 6 that he wa s not awar e of any other cases before I sabell t hat ex plained that the s ale and delivery of drug s were separ ate c rimes. He a lso testified that he had r eviewe d the jury instructions but did not think there wa s a unanimity problem with the ver dict beca use t he trial c ourt instructed the jury they could find the petit ioner guilty of “sale and delivery .” On c ross-examination, counsel ac knowledg ed that he did not raise the question about duplicity on the petitioner’s dire ct appe al. The pe titioner’s trial counse l testified that he had been prac ticing law for thirty -five y ear s and that his practice was almost e x clusively criminal law. He explained that he repr esente d the petitioner on drug char g es both in state and fe dera l court. Asked a bout the jury

instructions and unanimity of the jury verdic t, he testified that he never discussed with the petitioner “what w e would now ca ll the I sabell issue” a n d t h at h e d i d n ot think at the time of the trial there was a ny question about the unanimity of the verdic t. On cross-e x amination, he ac knowledg ed that, althoug h he re alized now-9-

there was authority

that count three of the pr esentment wa s duplicitous, at the time of trial the duplicity issue was not “obviously

appar ent to those . . . who pra cticed c riminal law.” Trial counsel testified that he f

elt like he did eve rything he could to protec t the petitioner’s be st interest. The post-c onviction court issued a le ng thy and deta iled order

addre ssing t

h eis s ues pre sented by the petitioner. In deny ing r el i ef , t h e court found that the petitioner had not prove n that trial or appellate counsel wa s defe ctive:

The [c]ourt finds t h at t h e [ p]etit ioner ha s failed to prove by clea r and convincing evidenc e that he rec eived inef fec tive assistance of counse l . . . at either the tr ia l or

app e llate le ve l.

He wa s repr esente d at trial by [t rial counsel] , an attorne y with many

y ear s of
e xpe ri e nc e re pr e se nti ng de fe nd a nts in c ri min a l c a ses, many of the m c apit a l c a se s. Th e [c]o urt f

ind s th a t c on sid e ri ng the [p]e tit ion e r h a s p le d g uil ty in f e de ra l c ou rt

to a cha rg e base d on the s am e al l egations contained in Case No. S41,514 and ha d signe d a n “ a g r e e d f

a c tu a l b a s is ” a d mi tt e d h is g u il t, [tr ia l c o u n s e l] r e p r e s e n te d the [petit ioner] at trial in an exemplary manner

. The [p] etitioner pre sented no c redible e vidence that the re sult wo u ld have b e e n d i f f e r e n ti n C a s e N o

. S 4 1 , 5 1 4 i f [ tr i a l c o u n s e l ] h a d d o n e a n yt h i n g d i f f e r e n t l y. The [c]ourt finds that [ appellate counsel] presente d the issues on appe al in a
c le ar andtho ro ug h mann e r a s e vid e nc e d b y hi s app ellate brie f andthe app e llate
c ou rt ’s de c isi on . A g a in, the [p]e tit ion [er ] didno t pr e se nt any e vid e nc e that th e re su lt
wo uldha ve be e n a ny

dif fe re nt i f [a

pp e llate cou ns el] hadpr e se nte d h is c a se differ ently

.
I t is from this order that the petitioner appea ls, a rg uing the post-conviction court err ed in f inding tria l and appe llate counse l had n ot been inef fec tive as to count three of his prese ntment. I n the alternative, he asks that, under Te nnessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 52(b), we find the duplicitous pr e se ntm e nt i n c ou nt thr e e to c on sti tut e plain e rr or a nd , a c c or din g ly , r e ve rs e a nd dis mis s the c ou nt.

AN AL YSI S

I. Stand ard of Review The pos t -c o n v i ct ion petitioner bea rs the burde n of proving his alleg ations by clea r and
c on vin c ing e vid e nc e . Se e Te nn . Co de An n. § 4 0- 30 -1 10 (f ) (2 00 3) . When a n e vid e nti ary he ari ng is held in the post-conviction setting , as occur red in this case , the finding s of fa ct made by the court
ar e c onclusive on appea l unle ss the evidenc e preponde rate s ag ainst them. See State v. Burns, 6 S.W .3d 453, 461 (Tenn. 1999) ; Tidwell v. State, 922 S.W .2d 49 7 , 5 0 0 (Tenn. 1996) . Where
app e llate re vie w i nv olv e s p ur e ly fa c tua l is su e s, the a

pp e llate c ou rt sh ou ld not

re we ig h o r r e e va luate-10-

the evidenc e. See H enley v. State, 960 S.W .2d 572, 578 (Tenn. 1997). Howeve r, review of a trial
c ou rt ' s app lic a tio n of the la w to the fa c ts of the c a se is de novo , w ith no pr e su mpt ionof c or re c tne ss. See Ruff v. State, 978 S.W .2d 95, 96 (Tenn. 1998). The issues of defic ient perf ormanc e of c ounsel and possible pre

judice to the def

ense a re mixed questions of law and f act a nd, th u s , s u b

ject to de
novo re vie w b y

the app e llate c ou rt

wi th a pr e su mpt ionof

c or re c tne ss g ive n o nly

to the po stc on vic tio n c ou rt ’s fi nd ing s o f f a c t. S e e F ie lds v. Sta te , 4 0 S. W.3 d 4 50 , 4 58 (T e nn . 2 00 1) ; B urns , 6 S.W .3d at 461.

II. Ine ffec ti ve As sis ta nc e of C ouns e l

I n order to determine the competenc e of counsel, Te nnessee courts have applied standa rds develope d in fede ral c ase la w. See State v. Tay lor, 968 S.W .2d 900, 905 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1997) (n oti ng that th e sa me stand ardfo r d e te rm in ing ine ff e c tiv e a ssi stanc e of

c ou ns e l th a t is app lie d in fede ral c ases a lso a

pplies in T ennesse e). The United States Supre me Court articulated the standa rd in S tr ic klandv. Was hin g ton , 4 66 U. S. 6 68 , 1 04 S. Ct . 2 05 2, 80 L . Ed. 2d67 4 ( 19 84 ), wh ic h is wi d el yacc epted a s the appropriate standa rd for all claims of a c onvicted petitioner that counsel's assistance was de fec tive. The standa rd is f irmly g rounded in the belief that counsel play s a role that is "c ritical to the ability

of the a dversa

rial sy stem to produce just re sults." I d. at 685, 104 S. Ct. at 20 63 . T he Stric klandstand ardis a tw o- pr on g te st:

F ir st, the defend antmu st sh ow t hat cou ns el's perf orm ance w as d efi cient . T his require s showing that counsel made err ors so serious that counsel was not fu nc tio nin g a s th e " c ou ns e l" g ua rant eed th e de fe nd a nt b y the Sixth A me nd me nt. Sec o n d , th e d e f

e n d a n t mu s t s h o w th a t th e d e f ic ie n t p e r f

o r man c e p r e

ju d ic e d the defe nse. This requir es showing that counsel' s err ors wer e so serious as to deprive the defe ndant of a

fair trial, a trial whose result is reliable.

I d. at 687, 104 S. Ct. at 2064. The Strickland Court further explai n ed t h e m ea ning of "de ficient pe rf orma nc e " in the fi rs t pr on g of the te st i n th e fo llo wi ng way :

I n any case prese nting a n ineffe ctiveness claim, the perf ormanc e inquiry

must be whether counsel' s assistance w as re asonable considering all the circ umstances. . . . No particular set of

detailed r ule s f o r c o unsel' s conduct c an satisfa ctorily take a ccount of the va ri e ty of cir c ums ta nc e s f

a c e d b y de fe ns e c ou ns e l or

the rang e of

le g iti ma te decisions re g arding how best to repr esent a criminal def

endant.

I d. a t 68 8- 89 , 1 04 S. Ct . at 20 65 . T he pe tit io ner mu st est abli sh " that c ou ns e l' s r e pr e se ntatio n f e ll below an obje ctive standa rd of r easona

bleness under

prevailing p r o f

e s s ional norms." H ouse v. State, 44 S.W .3d 508, 515 (Tenn. 2001) (citing Goad v. State, 938 S.W.2d 363, 369 (Tenn. 1996))

. As for the prejudice prong of the test, the Strickland Court stated: " The de fendant must show that there is a rea sonable proba bilitythat, but for counse l 's u n p ro fe s sional err ors, the re sult of the pr oc e e din g wo uldha ve be e n d if fe re nt. A r e a so na

ble pr ob abil ity

is a pr ob abil ity

su ff ic ie nt t o-11-

undermine c onfidenc e in the outcome." 466 U.S. at 694, 104 S

. C t

. at 2068; see a lso Overton v. State , 8 74 S.W. 2d6, 11 (T e nn

. 19 94 ) (c on c lud ing that pe tit ion e r faile d to e sta bli sh that " the re is a
rea sonable proba

bilitythat, but for counsel' s err ors, the outcome of the proc eeding s would have be en differ ent" ).

Cou rt s ne e d no t app ro a c h the Stric kland te st in a sp e c if ic or de r or e ve n " a dd ress both components of the inquiry if the def endant make s an insufficie nt showing on one ." 466 U.S. at 697, 104 S. Ct

. at 2069; see also Goad, 938 S.W .2d at 370 (stating that "f ailure to prove either de ficienc y or pre judice provide s a suffic ient basis to deny relief on the ineff

ective a ssistance c laim")

.
We note that when post-c onviction proce eding s have inc luded a f ull evidentiary

hearing, a s was true in this case , the t rial j udg e’s findings of fac ts and conclusions of l aw a re g iven the ef

fec t and we ight of

a jury verdic t, and thi s court is “bound by the trial judg e’s f indings of f

act unless we conclude that the evidenc e contained in the rec ord preponde rate s ag ainst the judgme nt e ntere d in the
c aus e .” B la c k v . St a te , 7 94 S.W. 2d 75 2, 75 5 (T e nn

. Cr im. Ap p. 19 90 ). Th e re vie wi ng c ou rt mus t ind u l g e a s tr o n g p r e s u m p t i o n t h a tt h e c o n d u c to f c o u n s e l f

a l l s w i t h i n t h e r a n g e o f

r e a s o nable profe ssional assistance, se e Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690, 104 S. Ct. at 2 0 6 6 , and may not second- g uess the tac tical and strateg ic choice s made by trial counsel un l es s those choice s were uninformed be cause of inade quate pr epar ation. See He llard v. State, 629 S.W.2d 4, 9 (Tenn. 1982). The fa ct that a strateg y

or tac tic failed or h u rt t h e defe nse does not alone support the claim of ineffe ctive assistanc e of counsel. See Thompson v. State, 958 S.W .2d 156, 165 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1997). F inally , a per son char g ed with a criminal offe nse i s not entitled to perf ect repre sentation. See Denton v. State, 945 S.W.2d 793, 796 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1996). As explained in Burns, 6 S.W .3d at 462, “[c]onduct that is unrea sonable under t he facts of one case may be perfec tly

rea sonable unde r the fa cts of anothe r.”

On app e a l, the pe tit ion e r co nte nd s tha t tria l a ndapp e llate c ou ns e l w e re ine ff e c tiv e be c aus e the y faile d to ra ise the iss ue of du pli c ity in co un t th re e of the pr e se ntm e nt, c ha

rg ing him wi th “ sa le or delivery ” of c ocaine , and failed to attacke d the jury instructions, which he a rg ues we re a n unconstitutional amendment al l owing “the jury the rig ht to pick and choose offe nses from the prese ntment.”

The petitioner relies solely on the I sabell holding to support his arg ument that count three of the pre sentment was duplicitous and the ve rdict wa s not unanimous. I n I sabell, the de fendant was char g ed with “sa le or de livery ” of a controlled substanc e and a rg ued t he jury

verdic t finding he r g uiltyof “sa le or de livery ” of a controlled substanc e wa s n o t unanimous. I n reve rsing the convictions, this court explained:

The sente ncing commission comments following Te nness e eCo d eA n n o tated section 39-17- 417 explain that "[t] he commission wished to ma ke it clea r that ea ch
o f t h ese acts [, i.e. the manufac ture of a controlled substanc e, the de livery of a controlled substance, and the sale of a c ontrolled substance ,] was a sepa rate offe nse." S ee T en n

. C o d e A n n

. § 3 9 -1 7 -4 1 7 (a )( 1 )- (3 ). Ge n er al l y , i ti s i m p er m i s s i b l e t o ch ar ge-12-

two distinct offenses in a

single count indictment. See S tate v. J eff erson, 529 S.W.2d 674, 678 (Tenn. 1975). I n other wor ds, "a ll crimes arising fr om the same incide nt that are no t le sse r i nc lud e d o ff e ns e s of an oth e r crime c ha rg e d in th e ind ic tme nt mus t be c ha rg e d in se pa

rate c ou nts ." Sta te v. Gi lli a m, 90 1 S.W. 2d38 5, 38 9 ( Te nn . Crim. App. 1995). Acc ording ly , if the indictments underly ing the offe nses had c harg ed the offe nses in separ ate a lterna t i v e counts ; e.g ., count one the sa le of c rac k cocaine,
c o u n t t w o th e d e li v e r y

o f c r a c k c o c a in e ; th e in d ic tm e n t w o u ldnot b e f a u lt y
. We
a g re e wi th the app e llan t th a t th e ind ic tme nts imp e rm iss ibl y c ha rg e d tw o s e pa

rate of fe ns e s w ith in a

sin g le c ou nt.

Moreove r, in Tenne ssee a criminal accused enjoy s a constit utional rig ht to a jury tr ia l w he n s he fa c e s con fi ne me nt or a fi ne of mor e than fif ty do lla rs . Se e Sta te v. L emac ks, 996 S.W .2d 166, 169 (Tenn. 1999) . "T his constituti onal rig ht
nece ssarily

includes the rig ht to a unanimous jury verdic t b ef

o re a conviction of a criminal off

ense may be imposed." I d. at 169-70. Nota bly , [q] uestions reg arding jury unanimi t yg ener ally

arise in c ases whe re the prosec ution presents evide nce to the jury that tends to show more than one c riminal offe nse, but the underly ing indic t m en t is not specific as to the off

ense f or which the acc used is being tried.

I d

. a t 1 7 0

. I mp o r tan tl y , th e r ig h t t o u n a n im it y p r o te c ts a g a in s t th e p o s s ibilit y of a "patchwork" verdic t. See S tate v. F orbes, 918 S.W.2d 431, 446 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1995). I n other wor ds, the appe llant is enti t l ed to be c onvicted of the sa le of a controlled substanc e or the delivery o f a c ontrolled substance ; she ca nnot be convicted of

the sale or delivery of a c ontrolled substance ba sed upon the same set of fa c ts u nd e r a

sin g le c ou nt o f an in dic tme nt.

I sabell, 2003 WL

21486982, at *3 (e mphasis in origina l).

Unlike in I sabell, the issue here is not whether c ount three of the pre sentment was duplicitous
or the c ou nt thr e e ve rd ic t w a s n ot u na nim ou s, bu t w heth e r t ri a l a ndapp e llate c ou ns e l’ s f a ilu re to addre ss the duplicity and unanimity issues fall “below an objec tive standard of rea sonablene ss under prevailing prof

essional norms.” House , 44 S.W .3d at 515. We conclude that it does not.

The I sabell opinion was release d more than two y ear s afte r the pe titioner’s trial. On dire ct
e xami natio n, tr ia l c ou ns e l te sti fi e d a bo ut the du pli c ity

iss ue thu sly : Q. L et me ask y ou, [t h e p et i t i o ner] also raise s an issue with reg ard to the prese ntment and the way

the counts ar e phra sed in ea ch of the three , it uses both sell or deliver. With reg ard - - y ou’ve had a chance obviously to see the jury instructions, remember

those.-13-

A. Rig ht.
Q. Di d y ou fe e l th a t a s it wa s in str uc te d in thi s c ase th ere w a s a qu e sti on a s to wh e the r o r n ot, and as y ou un de rs too d th e la w t o b e a t th e tim e of the tr ia l, that there was any question about unanimity of the verdic t of the jury at that time?

A. No, I

don’t, thoug h I

would say I ’m confide nt that I never discussed with [the pe tit ion e r] w hat w e wo uld no w ca ll the I sa be ll issu e a nd I

su pp os e if

y ou , if y ou go back a ndre se arc h th e la w y ou c e rt a inl y c a n c ome up to u lti ma te ly what the Court of A ppeals c ame up to. You know, it’s probably a g ood decision but, y ou know, if I should ha ve for seen it then I should have for seen it. I didn’t and I ’m confide nt I never discussed that with [the petitioner]. I
rec all the [c]ourt di scussing the jury instructions and that she wa s g oing to do it in the way

that she did it.

On c ro ss- e xami natio n, he fu rthe r c lari fi e d h is u nd e rs ta nd ing of the du pli c ity

iss ue : Q. [Tria l c ou ns e l], I

thi nk we a ll kno w now a t lea st Cou nt Th re e is d up lic ito us

. A. I f it w as t oday , y ou know, I think we’d c erta [i nly ] be raising that issue or p e rh ap s t h e S t a t e w o u l d n ’ te v e n b e i n d i c t i n g l i k e th a tt o d a y. Q. Correc t. And at that time this issue was not re ally that well known among the trial lawy ers he re in Ea st Tennessee

. A. I think that’s a corr ect statement. We all, the word duplicitous certainly isn’t
a ne w t e rm

a ndwe a ll u nd e rs ta ndthat bu t, y ou know, at th at time it
certa[inl y ] di dn’t seem to be some thing that was, that was obviously appar ent to those of us who pra cticed c riminal law and some sma rt lawy er ca m e up with the idea a nd he wa s repr esenting a fe llow by the name of

I sabell.
Q. And g ener ally

it was pretty

well known t h at an i n dictment for r ece iving or
c o n c e a l i n g w o u l d b e d u p l i c i t o u s , r i g h t ?

A. Rig ht, ha ve to b e se pa rate c ou nts

. Q. But a s far

as the drug are a that wa sn’t all that until . . . the I sabell ca se.
A. Th e ind ic tme nts in the F ir st Di stric t, f or ins ta nc e , w e re dr a wn jus t e xac tly in the same w ay

as they are over he re.
Simi larl y , p os t- c on vic tio n c ou ns e l te sti fi e d a bo ut the se iss ue s a s f

oll ow s:-14-

Q. . . . And also Co u n t T hree , knowing ly s[ell] or deliver . And what [the pe tit ion e r] I thi nk is al le g ing thr ou g h co un se l is, is th a t th a t w a s d up lic ito us

. No w, fi rs t of

a ll I g ue ss the qu e sti on that I

want t o a sk

is, is that th e I sa

be ll
case that he re fer

red to wa s decide d in 2003, so at t he ti me y ou prepa red y our brief ha d that case been de cided?

A. No.
Q. And as fa

r as y ou knew in y our role and having do ne appe llate ca ses, wer e y ou awa re of any decisions that had been filed dealing with thefac t that the
sa le a ndthe ph ra se de liv e ry or the wo rdde liv e ry

we re a c tua lly

se pa rate crimes a s decide d in the I sabell ca se?

A. No.
Q. The other

question that I want to ask y ou then in the -- is the que stion of, the question of unanimity

of the jury

in this particular c ase w hen they found [the petiti o n e r ] g u il ty in [c o u n t th r e e ]. Y o u h a d a n o p p o r tu n it y to s e e the tr a ns c ri pt andse e the jury ins truc tio ns , c or

re c t?

A

. Y e s , I w o u l d n o r m a l l y. Q. I mean the jury instructions w ould ha ve been rea d. I mean y ou would have had –

A. Cor

re c t.
Q. -- the tr anscript and they would have be en re ad in the tra nscript.

A. I t’s in the rec ord.
Q. And then y ou would have a lso had the re cord of what the jury

found.

A. Cor

re c t.
Q. And the Judge, in he r ins t ru ct i on, told the jury to find either a

sale or a de liv e ry or a sa le a nd de liv e ry

. I s tha t y ou r re c oll e c tio n o f h e r i ns truc tio ns to t h e m [ ?]

A. Yes. Ye s, I

just reviewe d the –
Q. You re viewed the m just a moment ag o.-15-

A. Ye ah, y e ah, bu t I

wo uld n’ t ha ve re c a lle d, bu t y e s. Q. And in eac h o f t h o s e case s, and ag ain I think y ou specific ally

have a
rec ollection of this, that the jury found both a sale and delivery
. A. That’s my

rec ollection.
Q. And ag ain, is the re any thing in y our mind that would sugg est bec ause the jury found sale and delivery , that there was any question as t o the unanimity of the jury in the particula

r ca se?

A. To me I

wouldn’t have thought of that at the ti m e an d wo u l dn’t have addre ssed it, y ou know, and the c ourt may say I ’m wrong , but I wouldn’t have and I g uess for y ear s we didn’t, so.
Q. But ther e’s nothing in y our mind that cause s y ou to think that the jury might have been looking at a sale or they might have been looking at a d eli very be c aus e the ph ra se “ a nd ” wa s inc lud e d in b oththe sa le a ndthe de liv e ry , th e ir final finding

. A. I don’t think so.

As this uncontradicte d testimonyat the post-convic tion hearing shows, prior to I sabell, duplicity and
ve rd ic t un a nim ity

wi th dru g of

fe ns e s ind ic te d in this way we re c on sid e ratio ns wh ic h w e re no t “ we llkn ow n” by

tr ial att orne y s in Ea st T e nn e sse e . F urthe r, the wo rd ing of c ou nt thr e e wa s id e nti c a l to that of similar cha

rg es appa rent l y h abitually

broug ht in the district. The petitioner has ma de no showing that these wer e not tr ue. Acc ording ly , we conclude that the petitioner ha s failed to show that tria l a ndapp e llate c ou ns e l’ s re pr e se ntatio n f e ll b e low a ny

ob je c tiv e stand ardof

re a so na ble ne ss. On appe al, the pet i tioner ar g ues that “both trial a nd appellate counsel’s f ailure to raise the issue [t hat the prese ntment a llowed the jury to e lect offe nses and the jury char g e lessened the State’s burden and/or alternatively amende d the pre sentment af ter je opardy attache d without the petitioner’s
consen t] a mo u n te d to in e f f e c ti v e a s s is tan c e o f

c o u n s e l. ” N o r e f

e r e n c e s ar e ma d e to th e rec ord sh ow ing that this cl a im wa s a rg ue d to the po st- c on vic tio n c ou rt , n or are a ny auth oriti e s c ite d f

or his pro po sit ionthat th e wo rd ing of jury ins truc tio ns c a n a mou nt t o a me nd ing a pr e se ntm e nt. Acc ording ly , this claim is waived. Tenn. R. App. P. 27(a )(7)

. The pe titioner urg es us, under Tenne ssee Rule of Criminal Proce dure 52( b), to find that the duplicitous presentment co nstitut es “pla in error .” It is true that wher e nec essary to do substantial justice, an a

ppellate c ourt may

take notice of a “ plain er ror” not raised at trial if it affe cted a substantial righ t o f t h e defe ndant. Tenn. R. Crim. P. 52(b). This is not, however, the petitioner’s direc t appea l. This court has pre viously explained that “the plain err or doctrine has no application in post-conviction relief

proce eding s.” Corwyn E. Winfield v. St ate, No. W2003-00889-CCA-R3--16-

PC, 2003 W L

22922272, at * 5 (T en n . Crim. App. Dec. 10, 2003) , perm. to appe al denied ( Tenn. May 1 0 , 2 0 0 4 ); s ee a lso St ate v. West, 19 S.W .3d 753, 756-57 (Te nn. 2000). We conc lude, there fore , that the petitioner is not entitled to plain error revie w of the possible dupli ci t o u s nature of count thre e of his pre sentment.

CO NC LU SION

Ba sed upon the for eg oing a uthorities and re asoning , we aff irm the post-conviction court’s dismiss al of the pe tition.

___________________________________ ALAN E. GL

ENN, JUDGE