J-S32003-17

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

IN THE INTEREST OF: N.A.P., A 

MINOR

APPEAL OF: D.P, MOTHER

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

No. 1962 EDA 2016

Appeal from the Decree May 23, 2016

In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County 

Family Court Juvenile Division at No(s): 51-FN-002024-2013, 

CP-51-AP-0000255-2016

IN THE INTEREST OF: D.N.P., A 

MINOR

APPEAL OF: D.P, MOTHER

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

No. 1963 EDA 2016

Appeal from the Decree May 23, 2016

In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County 

Family Court Juvenile Division at No(s): 51-FN-002024-2013, 

CP-51-AP-0000254-2016

IN THE INTEREST OF: B.A.P., A 

MINOR

APPEAL OF: D.P, MOTHER

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 1964 EDA 2016

Appeal from the Decree May 23, 2016

In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County 

Family Court Juvenile Division at No(s): 51-FN-002024-2013, 

CP-51-AP-0000253-2016
J-S32003-17

___________________________

*Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.

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IN THE INTEREST OF: K.D.P., A 

MINOR

APPEAL OF: D.P, MOTHER

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

No. 1965 EDA 2016

Appeal from the Decree May 23, 2016

In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County 

Family Court Juvenile Division at No(s): 51-FN-002024-2013, 

CP-51-AP-0000243-2016

BEFORE: GANTMAN, P.J., STABILE, J., and FITZGERALD, J.*

MEMORANDUM BY GANTMAN, P.J.: FILED MAY 23, 2017

Appellant, D.P. (“Mother”), appeals from the decrees entered in the 

Philadelphia County Court of Common Pleas Family Court Juvenile Division, 

which granted the petitions of the Department of Human Services (“DHS”) 

for involuntary termination of Mother’s parental rights to her four minor 

children, N.A.P., D.N.P., B.A.P., and K.D.P. (“Children”). We affirm. 

In its opinion, the Juvenile Court fully and correctly set forth the 

relevant facts and procedural history of this case. Therefore, we will only 

briefly summarize them. Mother is the natural parent of Children. DHS first 

became involved with the family on May 10, 2013, after receiving a general 

protective service report alleging, inter alia, Mother had left B.A.P. and 

another child home alone for more than 24 hours. The report further alleged 
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that Mother was unemployed, suffered from substance abuse, and had a 

history of domestic violence. DHS obtained an order for protective custody 

of D.N.P. and B.A.P. on May 20, 2013. DHS returned D.N.P. and B.A.P. to 

Mother on August 23, 2013. On March 31, 2014, St. Joseph’s Hospital staff 

observed Mother under the influence of an unknown substance that they 

believed was Phencyclidine (PCP). Mother was belligerent with the hospital 

staff and refused to cooperate with DHS. As a result, DHS obtained an order 

for protective custody of N.A.P., D.N.P., and B.A.P on April 1, 2014. The 

court adjudicated N.A.P., D.N.P., and B.A.P dependent on April 10, 2014. 

K.D.P. was born in November 2014 and lived with Mother until November 5, 

2015, when Mother stabbed a neighbor, fled the scene, and left K.D.P. alone 

in her crib. Later that evening, the police found K.D.P. alone and alerted 

DHS. DHS obtained an order for protective custody of K.D.P. Police 

arrested Mother for the stabbing on November 6, 2015. The court 

adjudicated K.D.P. dependent on November 10, 2015, and placed her in 

foster care. 

On March 22, 2016, DHS filed petitions for the involuntarily 

termination of Mother’s parental rights to N.A.P., D.N.P., and B.A.P. 

pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(1), (a)(2), (a)(5), (a)(8), and (b) of the 

Adoption Act, and a petition for the involuntarily termination of Mother’s 

parental rights to K.D.P. under Sections 2511(a)(1), (a)(2), and (b). At the 

May 23, 2016 termination hearing, DHS added Section 2511(a)(5) to its 
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petition to terminate Mother’s parental rights to K.D.P. On May 23, 2016, 

the court entered decrees involuntarily terminating Mother’s parental rights 

to Children under Sections 2511(a)(1), (a)(2), (a)(5), (a)(8), and (b). The 

court also terminated the parental rights of the fathers, who did not contest 

termination; they are not involved in this appeal. Mother timely filed notices 

of appeal and concise statements of errors complained of on appeal per 

Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a)(2)(i). 

Mother raises three issues for our review:

WHETHER THE [JUVENILE] COURT ERRED IN 

TERMINATING [MOTHER’S] PARENTAL RIGHTS UNDER 23 

PA.C.S.A. [§] 2511(A)(1), THE EVIDENCE HAVING BEEN 

INSUFFICIENT TO ESTABLISH MOTHER HAD EVIDENCED A 

SETTLED PURPOSE OF RELINQUISHING PARENTAL CLAIM, 

OR HAVING REFUSED OR FAILED TO PERFORM PARENTAL 

DUTIES?

WHETHER THE...EVIDENCE WAS SUFFICIENT TO 

ESTABLISH THAT [MOTHER] HAD REFUSED OR FAILED TO 

PERFORM PARENTAL DUTIES, CAUSED CHILDREN TO BE 

WITHOUT ESSENTIAL PARENTAL CARE, THAT CONDITIONS 

HAVING LED TO PLACEMENT HAD CONTINUED TO EXIST, 

OR FINALLY THAT ANY OF THE ABOVE COULD NOT HAVE 

BEEN REMEDIED?

WHETHER THE EVIDENCE WAS SUFFICIENT TO ESTABLISH 

THAT TERMINATION OF PARENTAL RIGHTS WOULD BEST 

SERVE THE NEEDS AND WELFARE OF...CHILDREN, UNDER 

23 PA.C.S.[A. §] 2511(B)?

(Mother’s Brief at 5). 

Appellate review of termination of parental rights cases implicates the 

following principles: 

In cases involving termination of parental rights: “our 
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standard of review is limited to determining whether the 

order of the trial court is supported by competent 

evidence, and whether the trial court gave adequate 

consideration to the effect of such a decree on the welfare 

of the child.” 

In re Z.P., 994 A.2d 1108, 1115 (Pa.Super. 2010) (quoting In re I.J., 972 

A.2d 5, 8 (Pa.Super. 2009)). 

Absent an abuse of discretion, an error of law, or 

insufficient evidentiary support for the trial court’s 

decision, the decree must stand. ... We must 

employ a broad, comprehensive review of the record 

in order to determine whether the trial court’s 

decision is supported by competent evidence. 

In re B.L.W., 843 A.2d 380, 383 (Pa.Super. 2004) (en 

banc), appeal denied, 581 Pa. 668, 863 A.2d 1141 (2004) 

(internal citations omitted). 

Furthermore, we note that the trial court, as the 

finder of fact, is the sole determiner of the credibility 

of witnesses and all conflicts in testimony are to be 

resolved by the finder of fact. The burden of proof is 

on the party seeking termination to establish by 

clear and convincing evidence the existence of 

grounds for doing so. 

In re Adoption of A.C.H., 803 A.2d 224, 228 (Pa.Super. 

2002) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). 

The standard of clear and convincing evidence means 

testimony that is so clear, direct, weighty, and convincing 

as to enable the trier of fact to come to a clear conviction, 

without hesitation, of the truth of the precise facts in issue. 

In re J.D.W.M., 810 A.2d 688, 690 (Pa.Super. 2002). We 

may uphold a termination decision if any proper basis 

exists for the result reached. In re C.S., 761 A.2d 1197, 

1201 (Pa.Super. 2000) (en banc). If the court’s findings 

are supported by competent evidence, we must affirm the 

court’s decision, even if the record could support an 

opposite result. In re R.L.T.M., 860 A.2d 190, 191-92 

(Pa.Super. 2004). 
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In re Z.P., supra at 1115-16 (quoting In re Adoption of K.J., 936 A.2d 

1128, 1131-32 (Pa.Super. 2007), appeal denied, 597 Pa. 718, 951 A.2d 

1165 (2008)). 

DHS filed petitions for the involuntary termination of Mother’s parental 

rights to Children on the following grounds: 

§ 2511. Grounds for involuntary termination

(a) General Rule.―The rights of a parent in regard to a 

child may be terminated after a petition filed on any of the 

following grounds:

(1) The parent by conduct continuing for a period of 

at least six months immediately preceding the filing 

of the petition either has evidenced a settled purpose 

of relinquishing parental claim to a child or has 

refused or failed to perform parental duties.

(2) The repeated and continued incapacity, abuse, 

neglect or refusal of the parent has caused the child 

to be without essential parental care, control or 

subsistence necessary for his physical or mental 

well-being and the conditions and causes of the 

incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal cannot or will 

not be remedied by the parent.

* * *

(5) The child has been removed from the care of the 

parent by the court or under a voluntary agreement 

with an agency for a period of at least six months, 

the conditions which led to the removal or placement 

of the child continue to exist, the parent cannot or 

will not remedy those conditions within a reasonable 

period of time, the services or assistance reasonably 

available to the parent are not likely to remedy the 

conditions which led to the removal or placement of 

the child within a reasonable period of time and 

termination of the parental rights would best serve 

the needs and welfare of the child.
J-S32003-17

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* * *

(8) The child has been removed from the care of the 

parent by the court or under a voluntary agreement 

with an agency, 12 months or more have elapsed 

from the date of removal or placement, the 

conditions which led to the removal or placement of 

the child continue to exist and termination of 

parental rights would best serve the needs and 

welfare of the child.

* * *

(b) Other considerations.―The court in terminating 

the rights of a parent shall give primary consideration to 

the developmental, physical and emotional needs and 

welfare of the child. The rights of a parent shall not be 

terminated solely on the basis of environmental factors 

such as inadequate housing, furnishings, income, clothing 

and medical care if found to be beyond the control of the 

parent. With respect to any petition filed pursuant to 

subsection (a)(1), (6) or (8), the court shall not consider 

any efforts by the parent to remedy the conditions 

described therein which are first initiated subsequent to 

the giving of notice of the filing of the petition.

23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(1), (a)(2), (a)(5), (a)(8), and (b).1 “Parental rights 

may be involuntarily terminated where any one subsection of Section 

2511(a) is satisfied, along with consideration of the subsection 2511(b) 

provisions.” In re Z.P., supra at 1117. 

Initially, the focus is on the conduct of the parent. The 

party seeking termination must prove by clear and 

convincing evidence that the parent’s conduct satisfies the 

____________________________________________

1 Mother limits her appellate challenge to the court’s termination decisions to 

Sections 2511(a)(1), (a)(2), and (b). Therefore, we will not review the 

court’s decisions under Sections 2511(a)(5) and (a)(8). 
J-S32003-17

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statutory grounds for termination delineated in Section 

2511(a). Only if the court determines that the parent’s 

conduct warrants termination of...her parental rights does 

the court engage in the second part of the analysis 

pursuant to Section 2511(b): determination of the needs 

and welfare of the child under the standard of best 

interests of the child.

In re L.M., 923 A.2d 505, 511 (Pa.Super. 2007) (internal citations omitted).

Termination under Section 2511(a)(1) involves the following:

To satisfy the requirements of [S]ection 2511(a)(1), the 

moving party must produce clear and convincing evidence

of conduct, sustained for at least the six months prior to 

the filing of the termination petition, which reveals a 

settled intent to relinquish parental claim to a child or a 

refusal or failure to perform parental duties. In addition,

Section 2511 does not require that the parent 

demonstrate both a settled purpose of relinquishing 

parental claim to a child and refusal or failure to 

perform parental duties. Accordingly, parental rights 

may be terminated pursuant to Section 2511(a)(1) if 

the parent either demonstrates a settled purpose of 

relinquishing parental claim to a child or fails to 

perform parental duties. 

Once the evidence establishes a failure to perform parental 

duties or a settled purpose of relinquishing parental rights, 

the court must engage in three lines of inquiry: (1) the 

parent’s explanation for...her conduct; (2) the postabandonment contact between parent and child; and (3) 

consideration of the effect of termination of parental rights 

on the child pursuant to Section 2511(b). 

In re Z.S.W., 946 A.2d 726, 730 (Pa.Super. 2008) (internal citations 

omitted). Regarding the six-month period prior to filing the termination 

petition:

[T]he trial court must consider the whole history of a given 

case and not mechanically apply the six-month statutory 
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provision. The court must examine the individual 

circumstances of each case and consider all explanations 

offered by the parent facing termination of...her parental 

rights, to determine if the evidence, in light of the totality 

of the circumstances, clearly warrants the involuntary 

termination. 

In re B.,N.M., 856 A.2d 847, 855 (Pa.Super. 2004), appeal denied, 582 Pa. 

718, 872 A.2d 1200 (2005) (internal citations omitted). 

The grounds for termination of parental rights under Section 

2511(a)(2), due to parental incapacity that cannot be remedied, are not 

limited to affirmative misconduct; to the contrary those grounds may include 

acts of refusal as well as incapacity to perform parental duties. In re 

A.L.D., 797 A.2d 326, 337 (Pa.Super. 2002). “Parents are required to make 

diligent efforts towards the reasonably prompt assumption of full parental 

responsibilities.” Id. at 340. The fundamental test in termination of 

parental rights under Section 2511(a)(2) was long ago stated in the case of 

In re Geiger, 459 Pa. 636, 331 A.2d 172 (1975), where the Pennsylvania 

Supreme Court announced that under what is now Section 2511(a)(2), “the 

petitioner for involuntary termination must prove (1) repeated and continued 

incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal; (2) that such incapacity, abuse, 

neglect or refusal caused the child to be without essential parental care, 

control or subsistence; and (3) that the causes of the incapacity, abuse, 

neglect or refusal cannot or will not be remedied.” In Interest of Lilley, 

719 A.2d 327, 330 (Pa.Super. 1998). 

Under Section 2511(b), the court must consider whether termination 
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will meet the child’s needs and welfare. In re C.P., 901 A.2d 516, 520 

(Pa.Super. 2006). “Intangibles such as love, comfort, security, and stability 

are involved when inquiring about the needs and welfare of the child. The 

court must also discern the nature and status of the parent-child bond, 

paying close attention to the effect on the child of permanently severing the 

bond.” Id. Significantly:

In this context, the court must take into account whether a 

bond exists between child and parent, and whether 

termination would destroy an existing, necessary and 

beneficial relationship. 

When conducting a bonding analysis, the court is not 

required to use expert testimony. Social workers and 

caseworkers can offer evaluations as well. Additionally, 

Section 2511(b) does not require a formal bonding 

evaluation.

In re Z.P., supra at 1121 (internal citations omitted).

“The statute permitting the termination of parental rights outlines 

certain irreducible minimum requirements of care that parents must provide 

for their children, and a parent who cannot or will not meet the requirements 

within a reasonable time following intervention by the state, may properly be 

considered unfit and have...her rights terminated.” In re B.L.L., 787 A.2d 

1007, 1013 (Pa.Super. 2001). This Court has said:

There is no simple or easy definition of parental duties. 

Parental duty is best understood in relation to the needs of 

a child. A child needs love, protection, guidance, and 

support. These needs, physical and emotional, cannot be 

met by a merely passive interest in the development of the 

child. Thus, this [C]ourt has held that the parental 

obligation is a positive duty which requires affirmative 
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performance. 

This affirmative duty encompasses more than a financial 

obligation; it requires continuing interest in the child and a 

genuine effort to maintain communication and association 

with the child. 

Because a child needs more than a benefactor, parental 

duty requires that a parent exert [herself] to take and 

maintain a place of importance in the child’s life. 

Parental duty requires that the parent act affirmatively 

with good faith interest and effort, and not yield to every 

problem, in order to maintain the parent-child relationship 

to the best of...her ability, even in difficult circumstances. 

A parent must utilize all available resources to preserve 

the parental relationship, and must exercise reasonable 

firmness in resisting obstacles placed in the path of 

maintaining the parent-child relationship. Parental rights 

are not preserved by waiting for a more suitable or 

convenient time to perform one’s parental responsibilities 

while others provide the child with his or her physical and 

emotional needs. 

In re B.,N.M., supra at 855 (internal citations omitted). “[A] parent’s basic 

constitutional right to the custody and rearing of...her child is converted, 

upon the failure to fulfill...her parental duties, to the child’s right to have 

proper parenting and fulfillment of [the child’s] potential in a permanent, 

healthy, safe environment.” Id. at 856. 

After a thorough review of the record, the briefs of the parties, the 

applicable law, and the opinion of the Honorable Lyris F. Younge, we 

conclude Mother’s issues merit no relief. The Juvenile Court opinion 

comprehensively discusses and properly disposes of the questions 

presented. (See Juvenile Court Opinion, filed December 15, 2016, at 4-7) 
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(finding: (1-2) Mother received Family Single Case Plan (“FSP”) permanency 

objectives in April 2014 to address mental health issues, substance abuse, 

unstable employment, and visitation; DHS social worker credibly testified 

Mother had history of mental health concerns, substance abuse, and 

domestic violence; throughout dependency, Mother failed to procure steady 

employment, maintain sobriety for substantial period, or consistently 

participate in either intensive outpatient drug and alcohol cessation program 

or dual diagnosis treatment program for mental health ailments; prior to 

Mother’s incarceration, Mother visited N.A.P., D.N.P., and B.A.P. weekly; 

upon her release from imprisonment, Mother visited Children sporadically; 

DHS did not allow Mother to have unsupervised visits with Children 

throughout dependency; at time of termination hearing, N.A.P., D.N.P., and 

B.A.P. had been in foster care for 23 months [and K.D.P. had been in foster 

care for 71⁄2 months], yet Mother had failed to meet her FSP objectives; 

Mother did not remedy conditions, which led to Children’s placement in 

foster care, and she was unlikely to remedy conditions within reasonable 

time; (3) DHS employee credibly testified Children would not suffer 

irreparable harm if court terminated Mother’s parental rights to Children; 

N.A.P., D.N.P., and B.A.P. displayed no negative behaviors when Mother was 

incarcerated or when their visits with Mother became more sporadic; 

Children have stronger bond with foster mother, whom N.A.P., D.N.P., and 

B.A.P. acknowledge as “mom”; termination of Mother’s parental rights is in 
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Children’s best interests). Accordingly, we affirm on the basis of the 

Juvenile Court’s opinion. 

Decrees affirmed. 

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 5/23/2017
On May 10, 20 \ °? DHS received a General Protective Services (OPS) report alleging that Mother 

left B.P: in the family's home unsupervised. Mother traveled out of town on May 9, 2013 

and left D.P. in the care of the child's paternal grandmother. The report stated mother contacted 

paternal grandmother on May 10, 2013 to advise her B.P. - - -=- __ had been left in the family 

home unsupervised for more than twenty four hours (24). D.P.'s school contacted maternal 

grandmother because mother failed to retrieve D.P. from school at the end of the school day. The 

report also alleged B.P. suffered from an unknown medical condition. The report further alleged 

Factual and Procedural Background: 

A summary of the relevant procedural history is set forth as follows: 

Younge,J. 

This appeal arises from this Court's Order on May 23, 2016, terminating the parental rights of 

P. r. ("mother"), pursuant to the petitions filed on behalf of the Department of Human 

Services ("DHS") by the City of Philadelphia Solicitor's Office. Jay Stillman, attorney for mother, 

filed a timely appeal from the May 23, 2016 order terminating mother's parental rights including 

an attached Concise Statement of Errors, Affidavit of Service, and other related documents 

necessary to perfect this Appeal. 

OPINION 

Superior Court 

No. 1964 EDA 2016 

No. 1963 EDA 2016 

No. 1965 EDA 2016 

No. 1962 EDA 2016 

APPEAL OF: D.P., Mother 

CP-51-AP-0000255-2016 

INRE:N.P. -€P-51-D~-0000'194-2014 

-GP 51 DP 0001046·2013 

CP-51-AP-0000254-2013 

INRE: D.P. 

GP 51 DP 000Hl44 201~ 

CP-51-AP-0000253-2016 

IN RE: B.P. 

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CP-51-AP-0000243-2016 

INRE: K.P. 

THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF PHILADELPHIA COUNTY 

FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA 

FAMILY COURT DIVISION 

Circulated 05/01/2017 02:47 PM
2 

On June 6, 2015, D.P. B.P. and N.P. were removed from paternal grandfather's care and placed 

in respite foster care. 

On January 8, 2015, a Permanency Review Hearing for D.P., B.P. and N.P. was held before Judge 

Johnson, who ordered that they remain committed to DHS. The Court found mother was receiving 

inpatient drug and alcohol treatment. The Court ordered mother to comply with her FSP objectives, 

services and recommendations. 

mother was unemployed, suffered from substance abuse and had been arrested in May 2012 

pursuant to a domestic violence dispute. The report was substantiated. DHS obtained an Order of 

Protective Custody (OPC) on May 20, 2013 for D.P. and B.P. 

On August 23, 2013, Mother was convicted of driving without proper child restraint system. D.P. 

and B.P. were returned to Mother's care with DHS supervision. On October 21, 2013, DHS 

supervision and the children's dependent petitions were discharged. 

On November 25, 2013, DHS received a OPS report alleging that N.P., born prematurely on June 

2013 with a chronic respiratory difficulties, was not receiving the appropriate medical care. 

N.P. had a history of retinopathy due to prematurity which could lead to blindness, if not treated 

properly. The report stated Mother failed to make the necessary medical appointments for N.P. 

Mother failed to take N.P. to his ophthalmologist and developmental appointments. The report 

alleged mother had been incarcerated prior to giving birth to N.P. The report was substantiated. 

On April 1, 2014, DHS obtained an OPC for D.P. B.P. and N.P. after mother was observed to be 

under the influence of an unknown substance. Mother was belligerent and refused DHS services 

and a drug screen. The staff at St. Joseph's Hospital suspected mother was under the influence of 

Phencyclidine ( PCP). 

At a Shelter Care Hearing held on April 3, 2014 for D.P, B.P. and N.P., Judge Johnson lifted the 

OPC and ordered temporary commitment to DHS. Mother was ordered to the Clinical Evaluation 

Unit ( CEU) for a drug screen. 

At the Adjudicatory Hearing for D.P., B.P. and N.P. held on April 10, 2014, Judge Johnson 

discharged the temporary commitment to DHS, adjudicated the children dependent and committed 

them to DHS. Judge Johnson issued a stay away order against Mother from the care giver paternal 

grandfather of D.P. and B.P. Mother was referred to CEU for a drug and alcohol screen and dual 

diagnosis assessment and three random drug and alcohol screens. Judge Johnson ordered all of 

Mother's contact with the children was to be supervised. 

On July 15, 2014, the Initial Permanency Review Hearing for D.P., B.P. and N.P. was held before 

Judge Johnson, who ordered that the children remain committed to DHS. The children were placed 

in separate homes. 

On September 29, 2014, a Permanency Review Hearing for D.P. was held before Judge Johnson, 

who ordered that DHS implement kinship care in the home of parental grandfather. 

On October 14, 2014 a Permanency Review Hearing for D.P., B.P. and N.P. was held before Judge 

Johnson where the Court found mother had been minimally compliant with the plan for 

reunification. K.P. was born on November : 2014. 
3 

On June 30, 2015, a Permanency Review Hearing for D.P., B.P. and N.P. was held before Master 

Ciccone, who ordered that the children remain committed to DHS. Mother was referred to the 

CEU for a forthwith drug and alcohol screen, a dual diagnosis and monitoring. 

On July 28, 2015, OHS received a GPS report alleging that mother was a patient at a local hospital 

experiencing severe manic episodes and had admitted she had consumed alcohol. Mother had a 

history of depression and bipolar disorder. The report further alleged mother was agitated, 

thrashing and verbally abusive to the hospital staff. There report indicated mother resided with 

K.P .. alone. K.P was transported to DHS. 

On September 14, 2015, Judge Johnson conducted a Permanency Review Hearing for D.P., B.P. 

and N.P. and ordered the children remain committed to DHS. After review of the evidence, the 

Court held mother was discharged from a treatment center due to aggressive behavior and was 

admitted to the hospital due to a positive screen for Phencyclidine (PCP). Mother was referred to 

CEU for drug and alcohol screen and proof of substance abuse treatment. The Court ordered DHS 

to obtain an OPC for K.P. if mother tested positive for PCP. 

On November 5, 2015, DHS received a GPS report alleging Philadelphia Police responded to a 

telephone call reporting mother stabbed a neighbor in her residential building. Mother fled the 

scene prior to the arrival of the police. The report alleged police found K.P. in her crib inside 

mother's apartment where there was minimal furniture and multiple male visitors. The report 

further alleged drugs were being sold from mother's apartment. DHS obtained an OPC for K.P. 

and placed her in a foster home through the Juvenile Justice Center (JJC). 

At the Shelter Care hearing for K.P. held on November 6, 2015, the OPC was lifted and K.P. 

temporary commitment to DHS was ordered to stand. Mother's whereabouts were unknown. 

On November 6, 2015, Mother was arrested and charged with aggravated assault, possessing of an 

instrument of crime with intent to employ it criminally, simple assault, and recklessly endangering 

another person pursuant to the incident in the November 5, 2015 GPS report. Mother was 

incarcerated at Riverside Correctional Facility (FCF) 

The matter was the listed on a regular basis before Judges of the Philadelphia Court of Common 

Pleas, Family Court Division- Juvenile Branch pursuant to section 6351 of the Juvenile Act, 42 

Pa. C.S.A. $ 6351, and evaluated for the purpose ofreviewing the permanency plan of the child. 

In subsequent hearings, the Dependency Review Orders reflect the Court's review and disposition 

as a result of evidence presented, primarily with the goal of finalizing the permanency plan. 

On May 23, 2016, during the Termination of Parental Rights hearing for mother, the Court found 

by clear and convincing evidence that mother's parental rights as to B.P., D.P., K.P., and N.P. 

should be terminated pursuant to the Juvenile Act. Furthermore, the Court held it was in the best 

interest of the children that the goal be changed to Adoption. 

The appeal of mother is as follows: 

Issues 

1) Whether under the Juvenile Act, 42 Pa. C.S. section 6351, and 55 Pa. Code Section 

3130.74, in accordance with the provisions of the Federal Adoption and Safe Families 

Act, 42 U.S.C. Section 671 et seq., reasonable efforts were made to reunite the Mother 
4 

In proceedings to involuntarily terminate parental rights, the burden of proof is on the party seeking 

termination to establish by clear and convincing evidence the existence of grounds for termination. 

In re Adoption o(Atencio, 650 A.2d 1064 (Pa. 1994). The standard of clear and convincing 

evidence is defined as testimony that is so "clear, direct, weighty and convincing as to enable the 

trier of fact to come to a clear conviction without hesitation of the truth of the precise facts in 

issue." In re J.D. WM, 810 A2d 688, 690 (Pa.Super. 2002). 

To satisfy§ 251 l(a)(l), the moving party must produce clear and convincing evidence of conduct 

sustained for at least six ( 6) months prior to filing of the termination petition, which reveal a settled 

intent to relinquish parental claim to a child or a refusal or failure to perform parental duties. It is 

clear from the record that for a period of six (6) months leading up to the filing of the Petition for 

Involuntary Termination, mother failed to perform parental duties for the children. The Court 

found by clear and convincing evidence that the mother refused or failed to perform her parental 

duties. 

In the instant matter, mother was given FSP objectives to address issues of stable 

employment, treatment for mental health and drug and alcohol abuse, and visitation (N.T. 5/23/16, 

pg. 41). Testimony of the social worker revealed, mother failed to maintain sobriety for a 

substantial period of time (N.T. 5/23/16 pg. 46). Moreover, mother failed to demonstrate she could 

successfully complete an intensive outpatient drug and alcohol cessation program and was 

discharged due to inactivity. (N.T. 5/23/16, pgs. 42-43) Mother's failed to maintain continuous 

participation in a dual diagnosis treatment in the several programs she attended. (N.T. 5/23/16, 

pgs. 43-46) Testimony of the social worker revealed that mother was discharged from the treatment 

programs due to inactivity, due to incidents at facilities or lack of participation due to incarceration. 

(N.T. 5/23/16 pgs. 43-44) Furthermore, the social worker's testimony revealed mother failed to 

demonstrate an ability to be employed during the life of the placement of the children. (N.T. 

5/23/16, pg. 46) 

A parent has an affirmative duty to act in her children's best interest. "Parental duty requires that 

the parent not yield to every problem, but must act affirmatively, with good faith interest and effort, 

In the present case, mother's parental rights were terminated based on §§251 l(a), (1), (2), (5), (8) 

and §251 l(b). 

The grounds for involuntary termination of parental rights are enumerated in the Adoption Act at 

23 Pa. C.S. § 2511. Under this statute, the trial court must engage in a bifurcated process in which 

it initially focuses on the conduct of the parent under§ 2511(a). In the Interest ofB.C., 36 A.3d 

601 (Pa. Super 2012). If the trial court determines that the parent's conduct warrants termination 

under§ 251 l(a), it must then engage in an analysis of the best interest of the child under§ 251 l(b). 

Id. 

Discussion 

with her children and whether the goal change to Adoption was the disposition well 

suited to the safety, protection and physical, mental and moral welfare of the children. 

2) Whether it was proven by clear and convincing evidence that Mother's parental rights 

should be terminated under Sections 2511 (a)(2) and 251 l(b). 
5 

to maintain the parent-child relationship to the best of his or her ability, even in difficult 

circumstances." In re Dale A .• II, 683 A.2d 297, 302 (Pa. Super. 1996). In reference to the parental 

contact, "to be legally significant, the contact must be steady and consistent over a period of time, 

contribute to the psychological health of the child, and must demonstrate a serious intent on the 

part of the parent to recultivate a parent-child relationship, and must demonstrate and willingness 

and capacity to undertake the parenting role". In re D.J.S., 737 A2d 283, 286 (Pa.Super. 1999) 

(quoting In re Adoption o(Hamilton, 549 A.2d 1291, 1295 (Pa.Super. 1988)). 

In the present matter, during the twenty three months (23) the children have been in DHS care, 

mother has struggled with maintaining sobriety as well as stable mental health. (N.T. 5/23/16, pg. 

65) The social worker's testimony revealed mother's history of mental health, substance abuse and 

domestic violence issues necessitated the children's placement with DHS (N.T. 5/23/16 pgs. 40- 

41) Furthermore, prior to mother's incarceration, mother visited weekly with D.P., B.P. and N.P .. 

and monthly with K.P. ( N.T. 5/23/16, pg 48) After mother's release from incarceration, mother 

was sporadic in her visits with D.P., B.P., K.P. and N.P. (N.T. 5/23/16 pg. 48) There was no 

recommendation to increase the supervised visits to unsupervised. (N.T. 5/23/16, pgs. 66). 

Section 2511 ( a)(2) requires that "repeated and continued incapacity, abuse neglect or refusal of 

the parent has caused the child to be without essential parental care, control or subsistence 

necessary for her physical or mental well-being and the condition and causes of the incapacity, 

· abuse, neglect, or refusal, cannot or will not be remedied by the parent. 23 Pa. C.S. § 2511 (a)(2). 

Termination of parental rights under §2511 (a)(2) is not limited to affirmative misconduct but may 

include acts of refusal, as well as incapacity to perform parental duties. In re A.L.D., 797 A.2d 326, 

337 (Pa.Super. 2002). 

As of the May 23, 2016 hearing, B.P., D.P., , and N.P. have been in care for at least twenty 

three (23) months, and mother had not progressed in her FSP permanency objectives in a way that 

would permit reunification to occur. (N.T. 5/23/16, pgs. 45-49) Moreover, the Court found the 

repeated and continued incapacity, abuse, neglect, or refusal to parent has caused the children to 

be without essential parental care. (N.T. 5/23/16, pg. 66). 

§2511 (a)(5) requires that : 

(5) The child has been removed from the care of the parent by the court or under a 

voluntary agreement with an agency for a period of at least six months, the conditions 

which led to the removal or placement of the child continue to exist, the parent cannot or 

will not remedy those conditions within a reasonable time, the services or assistance 

reasonably available to the parent are not likely to remedy the conditions which led to the 

removal or placement of the child within a reasonable period of time and termination of 

parental rights would best serve the needs and welfare of the child. 

§2511 (a)(8) states: 

(8) The child has been removed from the care of the parent by the court or under a 

voluntary agreement with an agency, twelve (12) months or more has elapsed from the date 

of the removal or placement, the conditions which led to the removal or placement of the 

child continue to exist and termination of the parental rights would serve the best needs 

and welfare of the child. 
6 

Conclusion: 

For the foregoing reasons, the Court finds that the Department of Human Services met its statutory 

burden by clear and convincing evidence regarding the termination of parental rights pursuant to 

23 Pa. C.S. §2511 (a),(1), (2), (5) and (8) and §251 l(b). Furthermore, the Court finds that its ruling 

will not cause B.P., D.P., K.P., and N.P. to suffer irreparable harm and it is in the best interest of 

The Court stated concern about reunification or permanency if visitation was not expanded as such 

the case in this particular matter. (N.T. 5/23/16, pg. 67-68) The Court found convincing the 

testimony that the children indicated they would be fine in their current placement with the foster 

parent. (N.T. 5/23/16, pg. 68) Hence, the Court concluded the children would not suffer irreparable 

harm. (N.T. 5/23/16, pgs. 68-69). 

The Trial Court found by clear and convincing evidence that the Department of Human Services 

met their statutory burden pursuant to 23 Pa. C.S.A. § 2511 (a) (2),(5), (8) & (b) and that it was in 

the best interest of the children, to change their goal to adoption (N.T. 5/23/16, pg. 67-69) 

The evidence as discussed above pursuant to §2511 (a)(5) and (a)(8), equally support the Court's 

conclusion to terminate mother's parental rights. 

In order to terminate the parental rights, the party seeking termination must prove by clear and 

convincing evidence that the termination is in the best interest of the child. 23 Pa. C. S. §2511 (b ); 

In re Bowman, 64 7 A.2d 217 (Pa. Super. 1994 ). The best interest of the child is determined after 

consideration of the needs and welfare of the child. The trial court must examine the individual 

circumstances of each case and consider all explanations offered by the parent facing termination 

of this parental rights to determine if the evidence, in the light of the totality of the circumstances, 

clearly warrant involuntary termination. 

When determining the best interest of the child, many factors are to be analyzed, "such as love, 

comfort, security, security and stability. In re Adoption ofT.B.B., 835 A.2d 387, 397 (Pa. Super. 

2003). Another factor that a court is to consider is what, if any, bond exist for the child. In re 

Involuntary Termination ofC. WS.M and KA.L.M., 839 A.2d 410, 415 (Pa. Super 2003). 

Pursuant to Section 2511 (b ), the trial court must take account whether a natural parental bond 

exists between child and parent, and whether termination would destroy an existing, necessary and 

beneficial relationship. In re C.S., 761 A.2d 1197(Pa. Super. 2000). In the instant matter, the 

testimony established that the children, D.P., B.P., K.P and N.P. would not suffer any irreparable 

emotional harm if mother's parental rights were terminated. (N.T. 5/23/16, pgs. 51-56) Testimony 

of the social worker testified the D.P., B.P. and N.P. are very close to their foster mother. (N. T. 

5/23/16 pgs. 52-53) Furthermore, the social worker testified D.P., B.P. and N.P. have bonded with 

their foster parent and acknowledge her as "Mom". (N.T. 5/23/16, pg. 62) Testimony described 

the children, D.P., B.P., K.P. and N.P. were more bonded with foster caregivers than mother. (N.T. 

5/23/16 pg. 65) Furthermore, social worker testified, D.P., B.P. and N.P. were found not to display 

negative behaviors during mother's incarceration or decrease in consistent visitation since her 

release from incarceration. (N.T. 5/23/16, pg. 65) Testimony established there is a parent/child 

bond between D .P ., B.P. and N .P. and their foster parent which did not exist between the children 

and their mother. (N.T. 5/23/16, pg. 66) 
7 

By the Court: 

the children, based on the testimony regarding the children's safety, protection, mental, physical 

and moral welfare, to terminate mother's parental rights. 

Accordingly, the Trial Court's Order entered on May 23, 2016, terminating the parental rights of 

mother, should be properly affirmed. 
Lee Kuhlmann, Esquire 

1800 JFK Blvd., Suite 300 

Philadelphia, PA 19103 

Bennette Harrison, Esquire 

City of Philadelphia Law Department 

1515 Arch Street, 16th Floor 

Philadelphia, PA 19103 

I hereby certify that this court is serving, today, December 15, 2016, the foregoing Opinion, by 

regular mail, upon the following person(s): 

PROOF OF SERVICE 

Superior Court 

No. 1964 EDA2016 

No. 1963 EDA2016 

No. 1965 EDA2016 

No. 1962 EDA 2016 

APPEAL OF: D.P., Mother 

CP-5l-DP-0000794-2014 

CP-51-AP-0000255-2016 

INRE:N.P .. 

CP-5l-DP-0002725-2015 

CP-5l-AP-0000243-2016 

IN RE: K.P. 

CP-51-DP-0001046-2013 

CP-51-AP-0000254-2013 

IN RE: D.P. 

CP-51-DP-0001044-2013 

CP-51-AP-0000253-2016 

INRE: B.P. 

THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF PHILADELPHIA COUNTY 

FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA 

FAMILY COURT DIVISION 
9 

BY THE COURT 

Jay Stillman, Esquire 

1901 JFK Blvd., Suite 1913 

Philadelphia, PA 19103 

Lisa Visco, Esquire 

1800 JFK Blvd., Suite 300 

Philadelphia, PA 19103