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DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA COURT OF APPEALS

No. 16-BG-704

IN RE MENACHEM E. LIFSHITZ, 

RESPONDENT.

 

A Suspended Member of the Bar

of the District of Columbia Court of Appeals

(Bar Registration No. 428625)

On Report and Recommendation 

of the Board on Professional Responsibility

(BDN-214-16)

(Submitted February 1, 2017 Decided February 23, 2017)

Before FISHER and EASTERLY, Associate Judges, and REID, Senior 

Judge. 

PER CURIAM: In response to this court’s show cause order as to why 

he should not be disbarred in this reciprocal discipline matter, respondent 

Menachem E. Lifshitz requested that his sanction be less severe, and that at 

any rate, the sanction be effective nunc pro tunc to November 20, 2008, the 

effective date of his disbarment in the State of New York. Pursuant to D.C. 

Bar R. XI, § 11 (d), Disciplinary Counsel recommends disbarment, to run 

nunc pro tunc to July 28, 2016, the date of Mr. Lifshitz’s interim suspension 

2/23/17
2

in this jurisdiction. For the reasons stated below, Mr. Lifshitz is disbarred, 

effective nunc pro tunc to November 20, 2008.

FACTUAL SUMMARY

Mr. Lifshitz pleaded guilty to one count of filing a false personal tax 

return in violation of N.Y. Tax Law § 1804 (b) and accordingly notified the 

New York Clerk of the Court of his resignation on November 20, 2008. Mr. 

Lifshitz was disbarred on October 1, 2009, effective nunc pro tunc to 

November 20, 2008, the date of his conviction.1 

Mr. Lifshitz was admitted to the District of Columbia Bar on May 24, 

1991, but he never practiced in the District of Columbia at any point during 

his career. He did not immediately self-report his New York disbarment to 

the District of Columbia’s Disciplinary Counsel. However, he stopped 

 

1

The New York State Supreme Court, Appellate Division, First 

Department, determined that Mr. Lifshitz “falsely understated his income tax 

liabilities by more than $1,500 on his New York State Personal Income Tax 

Return for 2005.” At the time of his guilty plea, he agreed to pay $442,827 

to the New York State Department of Tax and Finance, and $4,750,000 to 

the New York District Attorney, a sum which covered the costs of 

investigation and a payment in lieu of fines and forfeitures. In re Lifshitz, 

885 N.Y.S.2d 592 (N.Y. App. Div. 2009).
3

paying his dues in 2009, and he was administratively suspended in this 

jurisdiction on October 1, 2009. He notified Disciplinary Counsel of his 

conviction and New York disbarment in January 2016—when he sought 

reinstatement in New York. This court suspended Mr. Lifshitz on July 28, 

2016, pursuant to D.C. Bar R. XI, § 11 (d), and ordered him to show cause 

as to why reciprocal discipline should not apply in his case—as well as 

indicating that he should file an affidavit pursuant to D.C. Bar R. XI, § 14

(g). Mr. Lifshitz filed his 14 (g) affidavit and an affidavit pursuant to In re 

Goldberg, 460 A.2d 982 (D.C. 1982), on August 12, 2016.

In September 2016, a hearing panel of the New York Disciplinary 

Committee recommended to the New York State Supreme Court, Appellate 

Division, that Mr. Lifshitz’s petition for reinstatement be granted. The 

hearing panel took into consideration Mr. Lifshitz’s failure to immediately 

self-report his New York disbarment to the District’s Disciplinary Counsel. 

The panel determined that his “stated reasons for failing to notify [this 

jurisdiction] of his conviction and disbarment are credible[,]” and the panel 

concluded that his “conduct was clearly unintentional.” 
4

ANALYSIS

Reciprocal Discipline

D.C. Bar R. XI, § 11 (c), governing reciprocal discipline establishes a 

default rule requiring this court to impose the same discipline as the original 

disciplining jurisdiction unless the attorney establishes by clear and 

convincing evidence that his or her case falls within one of five stated 

exceptions; we interpret these exceptions narrowly. See In re Katz, 150 

A.3d 778, 780 (D.C. 2016) (citing In re Chaganti, 144 A.3d 20, 23 (D.C. 

2016)).

2 Mr. Lifshitz has invoked only the § 11 (c)(3) exception which 

provides that: “The imposition of the same discipline by [this] [c]ourt would 

result in grave injustice.” 

Mr. Lifshitz argues that reciprocal discipline in his case would be a 

“grave injustice” because if he were disbarred, then he would have to wait 

until 2021—thirteen years after his initial disbarment in New York—to 

 

2

This court previously has said that D.C. Bar R. XI, § 11 (c) 

establishes a “rebuttable presumption,” but see Chaganti, supra, 144 A.3d at 

23 n.3 (“it seems more accurate to say that [§ 11 (c)] sets forth a [default] 

rule subject to [narrow] exceptions”). 
5

apply for reinstatement in the District of Columbia. We have previously 

held that when, as here, an attorney has never practiced, has no clients, and 

no intent to practice in the future in the District of Columbia, assertions of 

“grave injustice” regarding the reciprocal discipline doctrine are “largely 

meritless.” In re Fuchs, 905 A.2d 160, 164 (D.C. 2006) (“This argument is 

largely meritless as respondent argues grave injustice and then stipulates that 

he has never practiced in the District of Columbia, has no relationship with 

any counsel in the District of Columbia, has no clients or office in the 

District of Columbia and has no plans to practice law in the District of 

Columbia.”). Accordingly, the grave injustice exception does not apply in 

Mr. Lifshitz’s case, and thus, we impose reciprocal discipline.

Disbarment

Mr. Lifshitz argues that his disbarment in the District of Columbia 

should run retroactively from the effective date of disbarment in New York, 

that is, November 20, 2008. Pursuant to In re Goldberg, supra, it is 

generally the norm that reciprocal discipline runs concurrently with the 

original disbarment. 460 A.2d at 985. However, it is required that an
6

attorney promptly notify Disciplinary Counsel after disbarment and refrain

from practicing law in the District of Columbia. See id.

Mr. Lifshitz did not promptly notify Disciplinary Counsel. However, 

he analogizes his case with that of In re Glasco, 726 A.2d 680 (D.C. 1999).

In Glasco, the respondent did not notify the District of Columbia of his 

disbarment until he was already reinstated in the foreign jurisdiction. Id. at 

681. The respondent had never practiced in the District of Columbia and did 

not do so during his suspended time. Id. Although, as here, Disciplinary 

Counsel opposed retroactive application in In re Glasco, this court held that 

respondent’s discipline would be applied retroactively despite his failure to 

promptly notify Disciplinary Counsel. Id. at 681-82. The court reasoned 

that, as in this case, the respondent in In re Glasco never practiced in the 

District and that he took “extraordinary strides towards rehabilitating his 

reputation and career.” Id. at 682. Moreover, the court recognized the 

“harsh result that would occur” because “respondent could not petition for 

reinstatement until . . . sixteen years after his [original suspension].” Id.

“Whether a particular suspension should be concurrent will depend to 

a considerable extent on the actions of the attorney involved.” Id. at 682 
7

(quoting In re Goldberg, supra, 460 A.2d at 985). Similar to the respondent 

in In re Glasco, Mr. Lifshitz never practiced in the District of Columbia and 

thus his failure to report was not a calculated feat designed to illegally 

practice in the District. Indeed, as he indicates, in October 2009 he was 

administratively suspended from the practice of law due to his nonpayment 

of dues. Moreover, the New York Departmental Disciplinary Committee, 

which was aware of this disciplinary matter in the District of Columbia, 

concluded that Mr. Lifshitz “has demonstrated that he possesses the requisite 

character and general fitness to practice law.” That Committee stressed Mr. 

Lifshitz’s moral transformation and newfound goals to set up a pro bono 

practice.

3

Accordingly, Mr. Lifshitz is disbarred, effective nunc pro tunc to 

November 20, 2008.

So ordered.

 

3

To be reinstated to the District of Columbia Bar, Mr. Lifshitz is 

required to file an appropriate petition for reinstatement with the Board. Mr. 

Lifshitz may petition for readmission to the bar in this jurisdiction

immediately because it has been more than five years since the effective date 

of his disbarment. The criteria and the process for reinstatement in contested 

petitions are set forth in D.C. Bar R. XI, § 16 (d).