Filed 2/22/22 Ross v. County of Madera CA5

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for 

publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication 

or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

ANITA ROSS,

Plaintiff and Appellant,

v.

COUNTY OF MADERA,

Defendant and Appellant.

F079038

(Super. Ct. No. MCV072774)

ORDER MODIFYING OPINION AND 

DENYING REHEARING

[NO CHANGE IN JUDGMENT]

It is hereby ordered that the nonpublished opinion filed herein on January 27, 

2022, be modified as follows:

1. On page 38, the first and second full sentences in the first partial paragraph are 

deleted and replaced with the following sentences:

The trial court noted the statement that Ross “brought the lawsuit as 

soon as she could” was outside the record and it was clear she could 

have brought the lawsuit earlier, although it did not think it rose to 

the level “of doing anything with the jury at this point.” When the 

trial court noted it did not hear “any request for that,” the County’s 

attorney responded that was correct as it would only compound the 

problems.

2. On page 43, the third sentence in the first full paragraph is deleted and replaced 

with the following sentence: 

Ross further asserts she was forced to take an unpaid leave from 

June 2007 to February 2008, which was an adverse employment 

action as a matter of law. 
2.

Except for the modifications set forth, the opinion previously filed remains 

unchanged. This modification does not effect a change in the judgment. 

Appellant Ross’s petition for rehearing filed on February 15, 2022, is denied.

 DE SANTOS, J.

WE CONCUR:

SMITH, ACTING P. J.

SNAUFFER, J.
Filed 1/27/22 Ross v. County of Madera CA5 (unmodified opinion)

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for 

publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication

or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

ANITA ROSS,

Plaintiff and Appellant,

v.

COUNTY OF MADERA,

Defendant and Appellant.

F079038

(Super. Ct. No. MCV072774)

OPINION

APPEAL from orders of the Superior Court of Madera County. James E. Oakley, 

Judge.

LTL Attorneys, Caleb H. Liang, Julia Levitskaia, and David M. Grimes for 

Plaintiff and Appellant.

Sagaser, Watkins & Wieland, Howard A. Sagaser, Ian B. Wieland, Amanda Kjar 

Miller, David G. Litman, and Michael J. Conway II for Defendant and Appellant.

-ooOooA jury found in favor of plaintiff Anita Ross and against her former employer, 

defendant County of Madera (County), for violations of the California Fair Employment 

and Housing Act (FEHA), arising from retaliation and failure to prevent retaliation. The 

jury awarded Ross a total of $2 million in economic and noneconomic damages. The 
2.

County moved for judgment notwithstanding the verdict (JNOV) and a new trial. While 

the trial court denied the motion for JNOV, it partially granted the new trial motion. The 

trial court found four incidents of attorney misconduct and an instructional error, the 

cumulative effect of which prevented the County from having a fair trial, and the 

damages awarded were excessive. 

Ross appeals from the order granting the new trial, while the County cross-appeals 

from the order denying its motion for JNOV. In Ross’s appeal, we conclude the trial 

court did not abuse its discretion when it granted the new trial motion based on 

misconduct and instructional error. In the County’s cross-appeal, we conclude the trial 

court did not err in rejecting the County’s contention the doctrine of laches bars Ross’s 

lawsuit. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s orders.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

I. Facts Giving Rise to Ross’s Complaint

Ross, who holds a master’s degree in social work, started working for the 

County’s Department of Social Services (department) as a social worker in November 

2002. She was hired as a “Social Worker IV,” which requires a master’s degree and is 

the highest nonsupervisory social worker position. Ross was required to type case 

narratives and case plans for children brought into custody and to handwrite her 

interactions with inmates she worked with at the prison in Chowchilla. In the summer of 

2004, she was diagnosed with de Quervain’s tenosynovitis, a wrist injury that caused her 

thumb and fingers to “lock down” and required her to take a year off work for treatment 

and recovery. 

When Ross returned to work in the summer of 2005, she was limited in the 

amount of typing and writing she could do. The County accommodated these restrictions 

by granting her less typing-intensive assignments and providing her with a dictation 

device to record client contact narratives which an office assistant would transcribe. Ross 

became permanent and stationary in March 2006 and her restrictions were lightened so 
3.

she could write and type longer—specifically, her writing and data entry each were 

restricted to 15 minutes per 30-minute period. Ross discussed her accommodations with

her supervisors, and it was agreed Ross could be assigned some cases with the use of a 

dictation device to record contacts, which an office assistant would type into the system. 

A. Ross is Passed Over for the Foster Parent Liaison Position 

Ross wanted to be assigned a special project, which she believed would entail little 

to no handwriting or data entry, in the hope of moving up to management and 

supervision. Around this time, a special project that consisted of working with minors 

aging out of the foster care system opened. Ross claimed she told Lutz, who was her 

program manager, she was interested in a special project to better utilize her skills and 

experience, and to move away from computer work. Another employee, however, was 

appointed to the position without the job opening being announced and without Ross 

being given the opportunity to apply. Ross testified she told Lutz she would have liked 

the opportunity to compete for the position and she did not think the employee who was 

appointed was qualified for the position. 

After this, Lutz announced an opening for a foster parent resource liaison position, 

which involved recruiting potential foster parents through community events. Ross, who 

had been a foster parent, believed the position was a good fit because of her training to 

become a foster parent and a certification she received at the County to teach foster 

parent training classes. Ross applied for the position and interviewed with Lutz. 

Afterwards, Ross was “very confident” she would receive the position as Lutz told her 

the interview went very well and she answered all the questions correctly. The position, 

however, was given to another employee, Janie Leal. 

Susan Arteaga, who was a deputy director of the department at the time of these 

events, explained at trial the foster parent liaison position was not intended for a Social 

Worker IV, as the Social Worker IV’s education level made them more appropriately 

utilized with complex children and families and their skill set was unnecessary for the 
4.

foster parent liaison’s responsibilities. Leal was below a Social Worker IV. In addition, 

Lutz, who along with program manager Fern Mills, selected Leal for the position, 

testified Leal was selected because she had the characteristics that were needed for the 

position. According to Lutz, special assignments do not result in a promotion or pay 

raise, and do not involve supervising staff or managing a budget. 

Upon learning she did not receive the position, Ross told Lutz she could not 

understand how she could be denied the position after being made to go through an 

interview process and answer all the questions and asked if it was because she was 

African American. According to Ross, at that time no African American had received a 

special project. 

B. Ross is Moved to the Permanent Placement Unit

The same day, July 31, 2006, Ross’s supervisor, Raye Hoevertsz, asked Ross to 

immediately move to the permanent placement unit. Ross was upset because she was not 

given the usual two weeks to transition to the new unit. Ross testified that when she 

resisted the move, Hoevertsz reminded Ross she had to do her performance evaluation. 

Ross felt threatened, believing Hoevertsz would give her a negative evaluation if she did 

not move. Ross’s computer and phone were moved to the new unit on August 4, 2006. 

Ross, however, stayed at her old desk, without a computer or phone, until she moved to 

the new unit on August 9. 

Meanwhile, on August 1, 2006, social worker Otilia Zaragoza wrote incident 

reports at Hoevertsz’s request regarding Ross’s handling of two home visits Ross 

conducted in late June and early July on Zaragoza’s cases. Two days later, Hoevertsz 

issued an interoffice memorandum to Ross based on the two incidents explaining the 

proper protocol when an allegation of abuse arises during a home visit, which Ross 

believed was a “write-up.” Ross claimed when she presented documents to Hoevertsz 

and Lutz that showed she followed the proper protocol, Hoevertsz told her the 

memorandum would not go into her personnel folder. Ross testified she had not been 
5.

written up like this before, she had never seen a social worker draft a report about another 

social worker’s performance and she had never seen a write-up that concerned incidents 

that occurred nearly a month or more earlier. Zaragoza testified this was the only time 

she had ever been asked to write a report concerning another social worker’s 

performance. 

Hoevertsz, however, testified that while the accusations were serious, the 

memorandum was not a form of discipline, but rather was a reminder that went into a 

folder that supervisors kept in their offices. Adrienne Calip, the County’s deputy county 

administrative officer overseeing human resources, also testified the memorandum was 

not formal discipline or a written reprimand, and it would not have gone into Ross’s 

official personnel file. 

On August 7, 2006, Mills told Ross her coworker, Natina Brown,1 who is African 

American, was a “troublemaker.” Ross responded that Mills had said the same about her. 

Ten days later, Ross went to the administration building to get a reimbursement check 

and the person who handed her the check asked “what type of trouble” she was starting. 

According to Brown, a social worker supervisor who worked in the same area as 

Ross, she and other supervisors were concerned about Ross’s transfer to the permanent 

placement unit because the caseload is higher and involves more typing. In addition, 

Ross was taking over a full Spanish-speaking caseload, but Ross did not speak Spanish. 

Arteaga agreed the permanent placement unit has the highest caseload and if Ross were 

assigned a full caseload there, she could be required to work beyond her restrictions. 

Arteaga testified the foster parent liaison position did not have an assigned caseload and 

admitted it potentially required less typing and handwriting than a case-carrying social 

worker. Lutz agreed the permanent placement unit had a higher caseload count than 

1 At the time of these events, Natina Brown was known as Natina Smith. 
6.

other units but explained the work level was the same as there were fewer people to 

contact. Ross conceded a normal caseload varied depending on the unit. 

Ross claimed she told Lutz on August 18, 2006, that she was concerned about her 

ability to manage her caseload given her hand disability, but Lutz told her she should be 

able to manage it and that Arteaga said she had to, as she would have the same caseload 

as other social workers. Ross further claimed she was issued a dictation device that day, 

but an office assistant was not made available to her to do the transcribing, so she did it 

herself. Ross also said she told Lutz she did not have an office assistant to transcribe, but 

Lutz responded she would just have to manage on her own. Ross, however, never filed a 

written complaint about Lutz not allowing people to transcribe her work. 

Ross hurt her hand again on September 3, 2006, when her left thumb locked down 

into the palm of her hand. Ross attributed it to overextending herself while working on a 

court report. Ross claimed she showed the injury to her supervisor, Michelle Hansen, 

who told her to shake it off and finish the report. 

C. The Incident Involving Ross’s Performance Evaluation

On September 6, 2006, when Ross asked Hoevertsz about her performance 

evaluation, Hoevertsz said she sent it to administration for approval. According to 

Hoevertsz, Ross became angry and put her hand hard on Hoevertsz’s desk; Hoevertsz felt 

bullied and tried to diffuse the situation. Ross, who was concerned about not having an 

opportunity to review the evaluation first, could not find the evaluation at administration 

and believed Hoevertsz was playing games with her. 

Ross asked Lutz about the evaluation eight days later and saw the evaluation on 

Lutz’s desk. Lutz and Ross went to Hoevertsz’s office to ask her about it; Hoevertsz 

apologized for telling Ross the evaluation was at administration. Ross accepted the 

apology and was ready to leave when Hoevertsz claimed Ross was harassing her. Ross 

felt uncomfortable and wanted to leave the office they were in, but according to Ross, 

Lutz ordered her to remain there as she wanted the two of them to work the matter out. 
7.

Ross, who asked for a union representative, managed to leave the office and return with 

Brown, who moved to suspend the meeting because Ross was being forced to defend 

herself. Lutz did not understand why Ross was so angry as they had resolved the location 

of the evaluation; Lutz, who thought the situation was blown out of proportion, believed 

they needed to discuss why Ross felt she had to complain to her about something she 

should have resolved with Hoevertsz. 

The evaluation, which was given to Ross on September 18, 2006, showed 

Hoevertsz rated Ross as competent in all areas. 

D. Ross Files an EEOC Complaint 

Ross filed a charge of discrimination with the Equal Employment Opportunity 

Commission (EEOC) and the California Department of Fair Employment and Housing 

(DFEH) on September 29, 2006, which the County received notice of that day. The 

charge alleged, among other things, that in retaliation for complaining about racial 

discrimination, Ross was denied (1) promotion opportunities, (2) the foster parent liaison 

position, and (3) accommodations for her disability. The subsequent EEOC and DFEH 

proceedings are detailed below (see, infra, part II.B.). While Ross received a right to sue 

letter from the DFEH in October 2006, which stated it closed its case because the EEOC 

was investigating the charge, Ross did not receive a right to sue letter from the EEOC 

until July 2016. 

Arteaga, who the EEOC interviewed in response to the 2006 complaint, was 

personally offended by the EEOC complaint—she thought it defamed her and was the 

worst insult anyone could lay at her feet. Lutz felt bullied by Ross and that Ross was 

watching to see if she did something wrong. 

E. Ross Engages in the Interactive Process

In October, November, and December 2006, Ross met with Terry Hurt from 

human resources to engage in the interactive process to determine a reasonable 

accommodation for her disability. During these meetings, Ross admitted she was unable 
8.

to manage her caseload and she was working outside her restrictions. Ross did not tell 

Hurt anyone was refusing to transcribe her materials, although she claimed her 

supervisor, Arteaga, and Lutz all knew about it. 

F. Ross is Investigated and Takes Medical Leave

In January 2007, Ross discovered she was the subject of an investigation into a 

complaint lodged by social worker Felicia Riley, who is African American, that Ross 

used a racial slur when referring to Riley. An outside attorney investigated the 

complaint. He interviewed Ross, who denied making the statement. It appeared to Ross 

that Riley did not write the complaint because it was written in the third person. 

Hoevertsz, however, testified Riley came into her office complaining about the incident. 

Hoevertsz said she took the matter to Mills and she understood Riley filed a written 

complaint about the incident. Hoevertsz denied being involved with helping Riley draft 

the complaint. The County advised Ross in March 2007 that based on the investigation, 

it was “determined that there was insufficient evidence regarding the complaint.” Calip 

confirmed the County has an obligation to investigate verbal and written complaints 

regarding retaliation, discrimination, and harassment. 

Soon after the investigator interviewed her in January, Ross had a panic attack and 

took a medical leave of absence. She began treatment with psychologist Dr. Dennis 

Lewis. She was diagnosed with acute stress and fell into a depression. 

In February 2007, the County advised Ross that based on her January 2007 

handwriting and data entry restrictions, it could not find an appropriate work assignment 

for her and did not believe she could perform the duties of her position. Ross was 

confused because the County had previously accommodated restrictions which were 

more limited than the new ones. After this, Ross continued to treat with Dr. Lewis. 

Ross was prepared to return to work on temporary modified duty in June 2007; 

Dr. Lewis cleared her to work 20 hours per week and in March 2007, her hand doctor 

determined she was permanent and stationary and could return to her prior handwriting 
9.

and typing restrictions. Ross claimed Hurt told her she could not return to work until all 

her restrictions were gone. In late June 2007, the County sent Ross a letter stating 

Dr. Lewis’s fitness for duty certificate referred to the January 2007 restrictions, which 

precluded her return to work, and advised her to provide written documentation when her 

restrictions were modified. Dr. Lewis’s medical records for Ross showed he had taken 

Ross completely off work for most of 2007. 

Ross again attempted to return to work in January 2008, when Dr. Lewis cleared 

her to return full time. At first the County advised Ross it was unable to return her to 

work unless there was a change in her medical restrictions, but after engaging in an 

interactive process with Ross and Ross applied for unemployment, the County agreed she 

could return to her position with the accommodations of a voice activated recording 

device and use of office staff to transcribe her tapes and handwritten notes. 

G. Ross is Passed Over for a Supervisory Position

Ross interviewed for a supervisory position in the summer of 2009. On July 3, 

2009, before Ross learned whether she got the position, Lutz told a story at a workplace 

lunch which she ended by imitating the accent of an individual she identified as being 

southeast Asian. A week later, Ross filed a written grievance about the incident. 

Three days later, on July 13, 2009, an email was sent to all staff with an attached 

announcement that Cynthia Suarez was promoted to the supervisory position Ross 

interviewed for. Ross believed she was the most qualified candidate for the position 

because she had been selected to act as an interim supervisor a few months earlier and 

performed “really well,” and it was rare for interim supervisors not to be promoted to a 

permanent supervisor when the opportunity arose. While Suarez had not been an interim 

supervisor, she had prior supervisory experience and was a licensed clinician in another 

state who was in the process of getting a California license, which, according to Arteaga,

conferred higher standing than a master’s degree. Lutz, who was on the interview panel, 
10.

testified Suarez was selected for the position because she had the qualities and 

characteristics needed for the position. 

In March 2010, Ross received a performance evaluation from Suarez, who was her 

supervisor, but Ross refused to sign it. The evaluation, which marked Ross as competent 

in every category, stated Ross’s case plan compliance rate of 80.7 percent had been 

discussed with her and it was expected the rate would improve over the next review 

period. Ross claimed she was not at fault for the case plan compliance issue, as she had 

completed the case plans, but Hoevertsz left them in her desk when she separated from 

the County, leaving Lutz responsible for them. 

H. The Intended Notice of Discipline

In August 2010, Ross was served with a subpoena from the County’s district 

attorney’s office to appear for an interview regarding an investigation involving a 

department coworker. Ross, who was “kind of afraid” because she had never been 

subpoenaed before, asked then-department Director Kelly Woodard if she could bring a 

legal representative to the interview. Ross claimed Woodard called county counsel and 

asked if she could discipline Ross if she did not participate in the investigation. Because 

Ross could not secure a legal representative on such short notice, she brought an 

acquaintance with her who had experience negotiating contracts with the County, but the 

investigator refused to meet with them because the acquaintance was not an attorney. 

Ross claimed she tried to contact Woodard for guidance on how to proceed, but Woodard 

refused to meet with her. Ross was served with a notice of intended order of discipline 

on September 21, 2010. 

Ross attended a meeting on October 4, 2010, regarding the intended order of 

discipline; she was given a proposed order of disciplinary action indicating the County 

was considering issuing a three-day suspension for insubordination. The County, 

however, declined to issue the suspension after Ross explained why she did not comply 

with the subpoena. 
11.

After Ross was served with the notice of intended order of discipline, she suffered 

a panic attack, took medical leave, and did not return to work. In February 2012, the 

County asked Ross to apply for a disability retirement. Ross submitted the retirement 

paperwork and was examined by Dr. Thomas Callahan in February 2013 so CalPERS 

could assess her ability to work. Dr. Callahan diagnosed Ross with major depression and 

occupational stress, and concluded she was substantially permanently incapacitated from 

the performance of her usual duties. As a result, Ross received a permanent disability 

retirement, which was effective April 24, 2012. 

II. Ross’s Claims Before the Jury and the Special Verdict

In August 2016, Ross filed a complaint against the County, which included the 

following causes of action: (1) race discrimination in violation of title VII of the Civil 

Rights Act of 1964 (42 U.S.C. § 2000e et. seq.; title VII) and the Fair Employment and 

Housing Act (Gov. Code, § 12940; FEHA); (2) disability discrimination in violation of 

title I of the Americans with Disabilities Act (42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq.) and FEHA; 

(3) claims under FEHA for failure to accommodate, failure to engage in the interactive 

process, harassment, retaliation for opposing discrimination and harassment, and failure 

to prevent discrimination, harassment, and retaliation; and (4) declaratory relief. Ross 

sought economic damages, including lost past and future earnings and benefits, and 

noneconomic damages, including severe emotional distress and emotional and mental 

anguish. 

Ross named two of the County’s managerial employees, Susan Arteaga and Donna 

Lutz, as individual defendants, alleging only the harassment cause of action against them. 

Arteaga and Lutz, represented by the County’s law firm, demurred to the harassment 

cause of action on the ground they were protected from personal liability by the doctrine 

of managerial immunity. The trial court sustained the demurrer with leave to amend. In 

her first amended complaint, Ross named only Lutz as an individual defendant in her 

harassment claim. Lutz again demurred to the harassment claim on the same ground. 
12.

The trial court sustained the demurrer without leave to amend and dismissed Lutz from 

the case. 

In July 2018, the trial court granted Ross’s motion to file a second amended 

complaint, which added an eleventh cause of action for constructive discharge in 

violation of public policy. 

A nearly five-week jury trial commenced in October 2018 and concluded the 

following month. During trial, the parties stipulated to dismissing Ross’s claims for 

racial and disability discrimination in exchange for waivers of costs. Thus, the only 

claims before the jury were those under FEHA for failure to accommodate, failure to 

engage in the interactive process, harassment, retaliation, and failure to prevent 

discrimination, harassment, and retaliation. 

The jury returned a special verdict finding in Ross’s favor only on her claims for 

retaliation and failure to prevent harassment, discrimination, or retaliation. The jury 

found the County was not liable on Ross’s remaining claims for failure to accommodate 

Ross’s disability, failure to engage in the interactive process, hostile work environment 

harassment, and constructive discharge in violation of public policy. The jury awarded 

Ross damages totaling $2 million, comprised of $750,000 for past economic loss, 

$250,000 for future economic loss, $750,000 for past noneconomic loss, and $250,000 

for future noneconomic loss. 

III. The Motions for JNOV and New Trial

The County moved for JNOV and a new trial. As pertinent here, the County 

argued it was entitled to JNOV because laches barred the case, as Ross’s delay in filing 

this lawsuit was unreasonable and it was prejudiced by the delay. With respect to the 

new trial motion, the County asserted numerous grounds for granting a new trial, 

including prejudicial attorney misconduct, giving an improper jury instruction, and 

excessive damages. 
13.

Following oral argument on the motions, the trial court denied the motion for 

JNOV, but granted the motion for new trial on some, but not all, of the stated grounds. 

The trial court issued an order granting the motion for new trial and specification of 

reasons (the Specification), which stated the motion was granted on the following 

grounds: (1) irregularity in the proceedings of the court, jury or adverse party, or any 

order of the court or abuse of discretion by which either party was prevented from having 

a fair trial, based on attorney misconduct and giving an improper instruction (Code Civ. 

Proc.,2 § 657, subd. 1); (2) excessive economic and noneconomic damages (§ 657, 

subd. 5); and (3) error in law, occurring at the trial and excepted to by the party making 

the application, based on the improper instruction (§ 657, subd. 7). The trial court set 

aside the judgment, vacated the special verdict, and ordered a new trial on all issues. 

DISCUSSION

I. Ross’s Appeal

Ross appeals from the order granting a new trial and argues the trial court erred in 

granting a new trial based on attorney misconduct, instructional error, and excessive 

damages.

A trial court may vacate a verdict, in whole or in part, and grant a new trial for any 

of the grounds listed in section 657 “materially affecting the substantial rights of a party,” 

including, as pertinent here: (1) “Irregularity in the proceedings of the court, jury or 

adverse party ... by which either party was prevented from having a fair trial”; 

(2) “Excessive or inadequate damages”; and (3) “Error in law, occurring at the trial and 

excepted to by the party making the application.” (§ 657, subds. 1, 5 & 7.)

When the trial court grants a new trial motion, it is required to specify both the 

grounds upon which the motion is granted and its reasons for granting the motion on each 

of those grounds. (§ 657; see Bell v. Bayerische Motoren Werke Aktiengesellschaft 

2 Undesignated statutory references are to the Code of Civil Procedure.
14.

(2010) 181 Cal.App.4th 1108, 1121 (Bell).) “An order granting a new trial must be 

affirmed on appeal if a new trial ‘should have been granted upon any ground stated in the 

motion, whether or not specified in the order or specification of reasons,’ except that an 

order can be affirmed on the ground of insufficiency of the evidence to justify the verdict 

or excessive or inadequate damages only if such ground was stated in the order and can 

be affirmed on those grounds only for the reasons specified in the order or specification 

of reasons.” (Ibid.)

Appellate courts grant a high degree of deference to the determination to grant a 

motion for a new trial, as the trial court in ruling on the motion sits as an independent 

trier of fact. (Lane v. Hughes Aircraft Co. (2000) 22 Cal.4th 405, 412.) Thus, a trial 

court’s factual determinations, reflected in its decision to order the new trial, are entitled 

to the same deference that an appellate court would ordinarily accord a jury’s factual 

determinations. (Ibid.)

Indeed, an order granting “a new trial rests so completely within the discretion of 

the trial court that its action will not be disturbed unless a manifest and unmistakable 

abuse of discretion clearly appears.” (Brandelius v. City & County of San Francisco

(1957) 47 Cal.2d 729, 733 (Brandelius).) All presumptions are indulged in support of the 

order granting a new trial, and the appellate court will affirm so long as the order can be 

sustained on any ground, even if “the reviewing court might have ruled differently in the 

first instance.” (Id. at pp. 733‒734; see Maher v. Saad (2000) 82 Cal.App.4th 1317, 

1323.) In essence, an order granting a new trial must be sustained on appeal unless the 

opposing party can demonstrate that no reasonable finder of fact could have found for the 

movant on the trial judge’s theory. (See Lane v. Hughes Aircraft Co., supra, 22 Cal.4th 

at p. 412.) “So long as a reasonable or even fairly debatable justification under the law is 

shown for the order granting the new trial, the order will not be set aside.” (Jiminez v. 

Sears, Roebuck & Co. (1971) 4 Cal.3d 379, 387.)
15.

Our review of the circumstances in the present case leads to the conclusion that the 

trial court’s order granting a new trial was well within its broad discretion and must be 

affirmed.

A. The Absence of Affidavits

The Specification cites five instances the trial court found constituted irregularities 

which had the cumulative effect of depriving the County of a fair trial. As Ross points 

out, the County only offered an affidavit as to one of these instances. While we address 

each of these instances below, we first must address, as a threshold matter, Ross’s 

contention the incidents were not irregularities within the meaning of the statute because 

they were not raised by affidavit.

Section 658 provides that when an application for a new trial is made under 

section 657, subdivision (1), it must be made on affidavits.3 Ordinarily, a motion for new 

trial under that subdivision cannot be granted if the motion is not supported by affidavits. 

(Bakurjian v. Pugh (1935) 4 Cal.App.2d 450, 452.) This is because “ ‘[i]rregularity in 

the proceedings’ (§ 657, subd. 1) ‘is intended to refer to matters which appellant cannot 

fully present by exceptions taken during the progress of the trial, and which must 

therefore appear by affidavits.’ ” (Gibbons v. Los Angeles Biltmore Hotel Co. (1963) 

217 Cal.App.2d 782, 791‒792.) 

However, an exception exists where the facts the party moving for a new trial 

relies on appear on the face of the record. (Webber v. Webber (1948) 33 Cal.2d 153, 

163‒164 (Webber).) In Webber, the plaintiff moved for a new trial in part under 

section 657, subdivision 1, asserting the trial court committed misconduct which deprived 

her of a fair trial. (Webber, at pp. 163‒164.) Our Supreme Court rejected the defendant’s 

contention the plaintiff could not urge this point on appeal because the new trial motion 

3 Section 658 provides: “When the application is made for a cause mentioned in the 

first, second, third and fourth subdivisions of Section 657, it must be made upon 

affidavits; otherwise it must be made on the minutes of the court.”
16.

was not supported by affidavits, reasoning: “It will be noted that section 658 ... does not 

purport to require affidavits in all cases but only in support of those grounds specified in 

the first four subdivisions of section 657, which grounds can ordinarily be shown solely 

by facts which do not appear upon the face of the record. But where, as here, the party 

moving for a new trial under subdivision one of section 657 relies wholly upon facts 

appearing upon the face of the record, the reason for the rule requiring affidavits ceases 

and such rule should be held inapplicable [citation]. To hold otherwise would do 

violence to the principle that the law does not require idle acts.” (Webber,supra,

33 Cal.2d at p. 164, citing Civ. Code, §§ 3510 & 3532;4see Green v. Merced County

(1944) 62 Cal.App.2d 570, 571‒572 [noting there is a recognized exception to the rule 

requiring affidavits when moving for a new trial on the ground of attorney misconduct 

since requiring affidavits where “the alleged misconduct fully appears from a reading of 

the reporter’s transcript” would be unreasonable as they would “constitute a mere copy of 

those particular portions of the transcript”].) 

“In view of the holding in Webber, the rule appears to be that affidavits are 

required in support of each of the first four grounds of section 657, unless, as to the 

particular ground specified, the party moving for a new trial relies solely upon facts 

appearing on the face of the record.” (Cembrook v. Sterling Drug Inc. (1964) 

231 Cal.App.2d 52, 67.)5 Thus, “[u]nder some circumstances, the absence of a 

4

In so holding, the court disapproved of language in two cases that indicated a 

contrary view, Estate of Magerl (1927) 201 Cal. 162, 168 and Jennings v. Day (1935) 

7 Cal.App.2d 555, 558, explaining “such language is based upon a slavish adherence to 

the letter of the statute without consideration of the obvious reason and purpose thereof, 

resulting in an undue limitation upon the power of the trial court in passing upon a 

motion for new trial, and of the reviewing court on appeal.” (Webber,supra, 33 Cal.2d at 

p. 164.)

5

In Cembrook, the appellate court held the trial court properly refused to admit oral 

testimony in support of a motion for new trial brought on the ground of irregularity in the 

proceedings. (Cembrook v. Sterling Drug Inc., supra, 231 Cal.App.2d at pp. 65‒67.) 

The appellate court explained it was “clear from the language of section 658 that where 
17.

supporting affidavit is noncalamitous and other support appearing in the record may be 

accepted.” (McCown v. Spencer (1970) 8 Cal.App.3d 216, 228.) Moreover, the failure to 

obtain affidavits does not deprive the court of jurisdiction to hear and determine the 

motion for a new trial. (McConnell v. Superior Court (1921) 51 Cal.App. 744, 745.) 

Here, all the matters the trial court considered were available on the face of the 

record. The failure to provide affidavits did not deprive the court of jurisdiction to hear 

and decide the motion for a new trial, but rather was a “noncalamitous” omission. While 

Ross would have the availability of a new trial motion based on “irregularities in the 

proceedings” limited to matters the trial court could not have addressed at trial, such a 

limitation would render the trial court, as in cases where the defendant failed to object to 

attorney misconduct, “ ‘powerless to correct what might be an obvious miscarriage of 

justice.’ ” (Seimon v. Southern Pacific Transportation Co. (1977) 67 Cal.App.3d 600, 

604‒605 (Seimon).)6 Accordingly, the trial court did not err in considering the County’s 

grounds for the motion even if based solely on the record rather than affidavits.

the basis of the motion for a new trial is facts which can be shown solely by facts 

[outside] the record, the Legislature, insofar as the first four grounds of section 657 are 

concerned, intended to limit the showing solely to affidavits.” (Id. at p. 67.) Our 

Supreme Court later affirmed the Cembrook decision, stating that, “[r]ecognizing the 

proceedings to be strictly statutory, the court held that when the motion is based on one 

of the first four grounds of section 657, and on facts outside the record, section 658 limits 

the presentation exclusively to affidavits.” (Linhart v. Nelson (1976) 18 Cal.3d 641, 

644.) The court went on to hold that a new trial motion brought on the first four grounds 

of section 657 cannot be based on oral testimony, but rather “must be presented solely by 

affidavit.” (Linhart, supra, 18 Cal.3d at pp. 644‒645.) The court, however, did not 

address the distinction noted in Cembrook, namely, whether a new trial motion may be 

based solely on matters stated on the record.

6 Ross asserts we should not follow Webber because the Supreme Court did not 

engage in a “serious analysis of the rationale for section 658” and the Supreme Court 

later made clear that courts may not eliminate an express statutory requirement under the 

guise of judicial construction, stating the Legislature’s power in “ ‘specifying procedural 

steps for new trials is exclusive and unlimited,’ ” and a court “ ‘may not usurp the 

legislative function by substituting its own ideas for those expressed by the 

[L]egislature.’ ” (Mercer v. Perez (1968) 68 Cal.2d 104, 117‒118.) Notably, Mercer did 
18.

B. Attorney Misconduct

A new trial may be granted where there is an “[i]rregularity in the proceedings” 

that deprived a party of a fair trial. (§ 657, subd. 1.) “No accurate classification of such 

irregularities can be made, but it is said that an overt act of the trial court, jury, or adverse 

party, violative of the right to a fair and impartial trial, amounting to misconduct, may be 

regarded as an irregularity.” (Gray v. Robinson (1939) 33 Cal.App.2d 177, 182.) The 

statute’s language “is sufficiently broad to include any departure by the court from the 

due and orderly method of disposition of an action by which the substantial rights of a 

party have been materially affected.” (Gay v. Torrance (1904) 145 Cal. 144, 149.) 

It is well settled that attorney misconduct is an irregularity in the proceedings upon 

which a grant of a new trial may be based. (City of Los Angeles v. Decker (1977) 

18 Cal.3d 860, 870; Bell, supra, 181 Cal.App.4th at p. 1122.) Attorney misconduct may 

consist of: (1) pandering to the jury’s prejudice, passion, or sympathy (Bigler-Engler v. 

Breg, Inc. (2017) 7 Cal.App.5th 276, 295); (2) improper argument to the jury, such as by 

deliberately attempting to appeal to the jury’s social and economic prejudices where that 

appeal is not relevant to the issues in the case (Hoffman v. Brandt (1966) 65 Cal.2d 549, 

552‒553 (Hoffman)), urging facts not justified by the record, or suggesting the jury may 

resort to speculation (City of Los Angeles v. Decker, at p. 870); and (3) “repeated 

violations of pretrial in limine rulings, despite sustained objections” (Bigler-Engler v. 

Breg, Inc., at p. 295).

“Attorney misconduct can justify a new trial only if it is reasonably probable that 

the party moving for a new trial would have obtained a more favorable result absent the 

misconduct.” (Bell, supra, 181 Cal.App.4th at p. 1122.) Even where the misconduct 

not address the issue presented here, namely, whether a new trial motion brought under 

subdivision 1 of section 657 may be based solely on the record. Whether we agree with 

the Supreme Court’s reasoning in Webber is irrelevant. (Auto Equity Sales, Inc. v. 

Superior Court (1962) 57 Cal.2d 450, 455.)
19.

does “not seem too serious from our vantage point, we give weight to the expressed 

opinion of the trial judge” that the misconduct “in fact resulted in a verdict of passion and 

prejudice.” (Seimon, supra, 67 Cal.App.3d at p. 606.)

While in some circumstances the failure to object to attorney misconduct may 

constitute a waiver, the rules applicable to waiver, invited error, or estoppel do not apply 

when an appellate court is considering the propriety of an order granting a new trial. 

(Malkasian v. Irwin (1964) 61 Cal.2d 738, 747 (Malkasian); accord Menasco v. Snyder 

(1984) 157 Cal.App.3d 729, 734.) “Where the appeal is from an order granting a new 

trial and counsel for appellant has been guilty of misconduct, the fact that counsel for 

respondent has failed to take timely exception is not to be considered in determining 

whether the trial court has abused its discretion in granting the motion. [Citations.] ‘To 

hold otherwise would mean that the trial court, by reason of the action of the parties, 

would be powerless to correct what might be an obvious miscarriage of justice.’ 

[Citation.] Thus even though defendant technically may have waived his right to claim 

error with respect to opposing counsel’s misconduct, that fact could not impair the power 

of the court to do justice by granting a new trial.” (Seimon, supra, 67 Cal.App.3d at 

pp. 604‒605.)

On review of each incident below, we cannot say the trial court erred in finding 

they constitute “irregularities” within the meaning of section 657, subdivision 1.

1. Interjection of Ross’s Faith

While Ross was testifying about what happened after she retired from the County, 

Ross’s attorney7 asked her: “Now, you’re also a Christian; right?” Ross responded, 

“Yes.” The County’s attorney objected. After the trial court sustained the objection, an 

off-the-record bench conference was held. The trial court later explained in a conference 

7 As the Specification does not distinguish between the two attorneys who 

represented Ross at trial, we will not do so. 
20.

held outside the jury’s presence it did not see any basis for going into a person’s religious 

beliefs before a jury in any action, even if there were some arguable bases for it, and it 

presents “a 352 situation.” The County’s attorney moved for a mistrial, stating it was “so 

elementary that you do not interject religion in a trial” and asserted it was done only to 

prejudice the jury. 

Ross’s attorney stated the question was relevant to Ross’s damages and emotional 

state. The trial court responded it would be a different situation if this were a religious 

discrimination or retaliation case, but it did not hear in any of the pretrial motions Ross’s 

religion or the effect on her religious beliefs would be raised. The County’s attorney 

confirmed this issue was never raised in depositions, discovery, or interrogatory answers. 

Ross’s attorney, however, asserted faith came up during Ross’s deposition, when she 

testified about using her religion and faith to cope with her depression, and the doctor 

who performed Ross’s fitness-for-duty examination directly mentioned in his report that 

Ross coped with her negative emotions by talking with God and through prayer. The trial 

court stated it was going to strike Ross’s answer and advised the jury it granted the 

motion to strike Ross’s last answer and it was “to treat the answer as if it never was 

stated.” 

Brown and Dr. Lewis both made references to prayer during their testimonies: 

Brown stated she prayed with Ross before they went into the meeting with Lutz and 

Hoevertsz, and Dr. Lewis stated it was clear throughout Ross’s work with him that she 

found relief in her faith and in prayer. The trial court noted, outside the jury’s presence, 

there was an ongoing objection to bringing Ross’s religion into the case. The trial court 

explained it tried to follow this rule: it sustained the objection and granted the motion to 

strike when Ross was asked if she was a Christian because it did not believe it was 

appropriate for a particular religion or denomination to be the subject of testimony, but it 

overruled the objections to Brown’s and Dr. Lewis’s references to prayer because it did 

not believe the answers were overly prejudicial and they had a psychological component. 
21.

The County’s attorney stated that while the court was well-intended, the jury’s 

impression was much different than intended. The trial court agreed the jury’s 

impression was permanently affected by the fact Ross was asked if she was a Christian, 

which was reinforced by the references to prayer. 

In the Specification, the trial court explained it was “particularly troubling” that 

the question was deliberate and leading and came as a complete surprise to defense 

counsel and the court. While the trial court heard numerous motions in limine before jury 

selection started, Ross never brought this issue to the attention of the court and counsel. 

Since the County had no reason to anticipate Ross’s particular faith would be an issue in 

this action, it did not have a reason to bring a motion in limine. When it denied the 

motion for mistrial, the trial court believed this single question and answer was 

insufficient by itself to justify ending the trial, but it now found “the interjection before 

the jury of [Ross]’s personal faith, when considered together with other irregularities 

which occurred later in the trial, resulted in the cumulative effect of the [County] being 

prevented from having a fair trial.” 

Ross contends the question about whether she is a Christian was not misconduct 

because her faith was relevant to her damages claim. She asserts the County knew before 

trial her faith was an issue because a fitness-for-duty evaluation stated Ross managed her 

negative emotions and stress “by talking with God, prayer,” and she explained at her 

deposition that she chose not to take medication for her depression because of her faith. 

Ross further asserts her faith was relevant because the County’s questioning at trial 

suggested her failure to take medication indicated the insincerity of her claim for 

emotional distress and the County could argue her refusal to take medication was a 

failure to mitigate damages. Ross claims her attorney intended to transition from this 

question to a discussion of the relationship between Ross’s emotional distress and her 

faith, and her attorney never argued or even insinuated she was more credible because 

she is a Christian.
22.

The County responds the attorney’s intentional interjection of Ross’s Christian 

faith when her religion had nothing to do with her claims was misconduct. The County 

points out the evidence of religious belief “is inadmissible to attack or support the 

credibility of a witness” (Evid. Code, § 789), and asserts it is elementary an attorney does 

not interject religion into trial.

We agree with the County that Ross’s religious affiliation was irrelevant to the 

issues in this case, and therefore asking her a leading question about it constituted 

misconduct. (Hoffman, supra, 65 Cal.2d at pp. 552‒553 [arguing irrelevant matters that 

attempt to appeal to the jury’s social and economic prejudices constitutes misconduct].) 

While we agree with Ross that her reliance on prayer and her faith in general was 

relevant to her emotional distress claim, as it showed how she dealt with her stress and 

why she declined to take medication, her religious affiliation was not relevant to her 

claims. 

This case is not like the one Ross relies on, People v. Baustista (2008) 

163 Cal.App.4th 762, where the defendant, a pastor of an independent Pentecostal 

church, was convicted of committing sex offenses involving two teenage girls who were 

his congregants. There, the religious beliefs and practices of the defendant and some 

witnesses provided context for the defendant’s actions and the girls’ delayed reporting of 

the incidents, and therefore were relevant to determining whether the defendant 

committed the alleged crimes. (Id. at pp. 784‒785.) Here, although Ross’s spiritual 

practices were relevant to her claims, her religious affiliation was not.

Ross contends the mention of her religion was not prejudicial because the question 

and answer were brief, and any harm was immediately cured by the trial court’s 

admonition to the jury that, when it granted the motion to strike Ross’s last answer, the 

jury was “to treat the answer as if it never was stated.” Moreover, the jury was advised at 

the beginning and end of the trial that when the trial court grants a motion to strike, they 

“must totally disregard that testimony” and “treat it as though it did not exist.” Finally, 
23.

the jury was instructed not to be “biased against any witness because of his or her ...

religion.” Ross argues the trial court was required to presume the jury followed these 

instructions, citing Tingley v. Times Mirror Co. (1907) 151 Cal. 1, 23‒24 and Bell, supra,

181 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1122‒1123, and asserts the record shows the admonition was 

effective. 

We recognize, as stated in Bell, that “admonitions ordinarily are effective except 

in cases of extreme misconduct” and “we presume that the jury followed the instructions 

absent some indication to the contrary.” (Bell, supra, 181 Cal.App.4th at p. 1123.) But 

here, although the reference to Ross’s Christian faith was brief and the jury was 

admonished to disregard it, the trial court reasonably could conclude the subsequent 

references during Dr. Lewis’s testimony to Ross using faith and prayer to deal with her 

emotional problems,8 and Brown’s testimony that she prayed with Ross, would have 

confused the jury, since it was told to disregard that Ross was a Christian but then told 

about her spiritual practices, and served only to remind the jury of her Christian faith. 

The trial court consequently did not abuse its discretion in finding the jury was 

permanently affected regardless of the admonition, and therefore prejudice resulted.

2. The Questioning of Donna Lutz

When Arteaga testified in Ross’s case-in-chief, Ross’s attorney asked several 

questions about being offended when she received the EEOC complaint. On crossexamination, the County’s attorney asked Arteaga, without objection, if she was 

8 Ross’s attorney read the contents of Dr. Lewis’s reports that specifically dealt with 

prayer during his testimony. For example, Ross’s attorney read a note from November 

2007, which stated, among other things, that she was “letting go in prayer” and was 

uncertain regarding what to do about her job, and then asked if she expressed indecision 

about returning to work. Later Ross’s attorney read Dr. Lewis’s report stating, “Wakes at 

3 a.m. and prays ... she’s remaining positive with her reading and prayer” and then asked 

if it seemed, in addition to her family support and the coping strategies he was teaching 

her, whether “she also found relief in her faith and with prayer.” Dr. Lewis responded, 

“Yes, that was clear throughout her work with me.” 
24.

personally sued in this lawsuit. Arteaga responded: “I was, and that was set aside.” The 

trial court, however, sustained Ross’s attorney’s objection to Arteaga being asked if she 

understood she was dismissed from the lawsuit “due to lack of merit.” Following an 

unreported bench conference, the trial court struck the last question and answer. 

When Lutz took the stand in the County’s case, the County’s attorney asked if 

Ross named her as an individual defendant in this lawsuit. After an unreported bench 

conference, the trial court sustained Ross’s attorney’s objection as to relevance and 

prejudice. The County’s attorney asserted in his declaration in support of the new trial 

motion that the court and counsel discussed that the parties would not go into the fact that 

Lutz was previously a defendant in the case. 

On cross-examination, Ross’s attorney asked Lutz if she was represented by the 

County’s attorneys. Lutz responded, “That’s correct.” Ross’s attorney then asked why 

she felt the need for legal representation, to which Lutz answered, because “it’s serious” 

and “it’s important to have legal representation.” The following exchange ensued:

“Q. You’re not named in this case. You’re not a defendant. 

Right?

“A. Not anymore.

“Q. Okay. And there’s no claims being made against you, no 

causes of action, no actual lawsuits filed against you currently. Right?

“A. Not anymore, no.

“Q. And who’s paying for your legal fees?

“A. I haven’t received a bill yet.

“Q. How long have they represented you for? When did you first 

retain them?

“A. When I first received the subpoena—or whenever we first 

received the charges back ...
25.

“Q. How about—so I don’t know when that happened. How 

about you just give me an idea, like an estimate as to time. How long have 

they been your lawyers for?

“A. They have been representing me since this case initially 

came.

“Q. You’re saying back in 2016? They’ve been your lawyer since 

2016?

“A. I believe that’s correct.

“Q. You’re saying you retained them for the past 2 years; is that 

right?

“A. Correct.

“Q. And you haven’t received a single bill for services; is that 

right?

“A. That’s correct.

“Q. The County is paying for your legal—your representation; 

isn’t that right?

“A. That’s correct.

“Q. So I just want to make sure I’m on the same page here—”

The County’s attorney then asked to approach the bench, stating: “These are the 

questions I was trying to ask earlier.” 

During a discussion held outside the jury’s presence, the trial court and parties 

discussed the problem with this line of questioning and the appropriate resolution. The 

trial court was surprised Ross’s attorney went into this after the earlier bench discussion 

that the County’s attorney would not go into the fact Lutz had been a defendant in the 

case, but Lutz gave a natural answer when asked if she was represented by the County’s 

attorneys. 
26.

The County’s attorney asserted what Ross’s attorney was doing was entirely unfair 

because Lutz was sued improperly and should not have been named in the first place, and 

she was entitled to a defense as a County employee under Labor Code section 2802. He 

believed the questioning led to the perception Lutz might be biased because taxpayer 

dollars were being used for her defense, and Ross’s attorney should not have gone there 

based on their prior bench conference. The trial court noted it would have been 

appropriate to object earlier and they could have “just headed the whole thing off,” 

adding that at this point, Lutz was asked several questions to which there was no 

objection, it was before the jury, and it was unsure what to do now. 

Ross’s attorney stated the purpose of his questioning was not to get into the fact 

Lutz had been previously named, but to ask how much time she spent preparing for the 

case and speaking with defense counsel, like he asked other witnesses. He was surprised 

Lutz said she was currently represented, which was why the line of questioning 

proceeded the way it did. 

The County’s attorney did not accept that explanation because Ross’s attorney 

knew: (1) he named her as a defendant and an attorney-client relationship existed at one 

point; (2) a lay witness who is asked to give a legal conclusion as to who their attorney is 

would give that type of answer; (3) he could simply ask how long she met with the 

attorneys without violating attorney-client privilege; (4) under Labor Code section 2802, 

the County was obligated to provide the defense; and (5) once he got into that area, he 

was putting the County in a difficult position of having to object in front of the jury and 

look like they were trying to cover up something. 

The trial court was not sure what was being asked of it and listed some possible 

solutions, including striking the testimony, which would legally be treated as if they had 

never heard it. Ross’s attorney stated he did not understand what he was being accused 

of doing wrong. The trial court responded it did not think Ross’s attorney could say it 

was appropriate for this matter to remain unanswered, and it would point out the 
27.

sequence of events which Ross’s attorney, upon reflection, would see it did not “seem 

right” that the “question and answer sequence” came out the way it did in front of the 

jury. 

After further discussion about the problem and resolution, during which the 

County’s attorney asserted Ross’s attorney could have given them advanced warning of 

this area of inquiry and conceded they never formally dropped their representation of 

Lutz, Ross’s attorney apologized for any confusion and stated it was not their intention to 

trick Lutz, but when someone answers the way they do, it raises questions. After 

continued discussion, the County’s attorney suggested the court read the jury instruction 

regarding dismissed parties. 

The following day, at the outset of the proceedings, the trial court told the jury: 

“You heard testimony yesterday that Donna Lutz had been named as a party in this case 

and was represented by [the County’s attorneys]. Donna Lutz is no longer a party to this 

case. Do not speculate as to why Donna Lutz is no longer a party to this case. You 

should not consider this during your deliberations.” 

In the Specification, the trial court explained it was troubled that this line of 

questioning came as a complete surprise, and noted it commented at the time the 

questioning was unfair to the County and the parties should understand how bad it 

sounded before the jury. 

Ross asserts her attorney’s questions were proper because he was trying to 

determine whether Lutz had an attorney-client relationship with defense counsel that 

would prevent him from asking Lutz about her discussions with defense counsel in 

preparing her trial testimony. Ross states she did not have the opportunity to resolve 

whether Lutz was still represented by defense counsel before trial because Lutz was 

unavailable for deposition. Ross further asserts her attorney’s questions regarding who 

was paying Lutz’s legal fees and why she felt the need for representation were intended 

to explore whether the attorney-client privilege applied, as these questions were directly 
28.

relevant to the reasonableness of Lutz’s belief she was represented. Ross also claims that 

because Lutz was no longer a defendant, the County was not required to pay any legal 

fees accrued in preparing her to testify at trial and if the County paid them, Ross could 

impeach Lutz by arguing her testimony was prepared with the assistance of defense 

counsel and paid for by the County.

The County asserts the questioning constituted misconduct because Ross’s 

attorney ignored the bench discussion “that the parties would not go into the fact that Ms. 

Lutz was previously a defendant in this case.” The County’s attorney stated in his 

declaration in support of the new trial motion that at the bench discussion “the Court and 

the parties’ counsel discussed that the parties would not go into the fact that Ms. Lutz was 

previously a defendant in the case.” The trial court, however, when discussing the 

County’s objections to this line of questioning, stated on the record it was surprised 

Ross’s attorney went into this “after the earlier discussion in which it was discussed at the 

bench that [the County’s attorney] would not go into the fact ... that she had [] previously 

been a defendant in the case.” Ross asserts, based on the trial court’s statement on the 

record, the prohibition against asking whether Lutz had been a defendant was directed 

only toward the County’s attorney and we should reject his declaration as self-serving. 

The trial court, however, apparently found, despite its statement on the record, that the 

prohibition included both attorneys. 

Even if the prohibition was directed only at the County’s attorney, the questioning 

by Ross’s attorney was improper as it ignored the bench discussion. When Lutz 

confirmed she was represented by defense counsel, rather than take the matter up with the 

trial court, Ross’s attorney, knowing Lutz had been a named defendant who the County 

had represented, continued to ask questions about her need for representation, whether 

she was a defendant in the case and whether claims were being made against her. As the 

County points out, the questions about who was paying Lutz’s legal fees, how long she 

had been represented by defense counsel, and that the County had been paying for her 
29.

legal representation were focused, not as Ross asserts on who was paying Lutz’s attorney 

fees to prepare her to testify at trial, but rather were general questions that reached back 

to the County’s representation of her from the inception of the case, when it clearly was 

obligated to pay her fees under Labor Code section 2802.9 As such, they were improper 

areas of inquiry, as Ross’s attorney questioned Lutz on matters not permitted by the trial 

court and improperly inferred bias to the jury.10

We agree with the County these series of questions were prejudicial as they 

insinuated to the jury that Lutz lacked credibility because she had been a defendant, she 

felt she needed representation, and she had not paid her legal fees or received a bill 

because the County was paying her fees. 

Ross asserts this line of questioning could not be prejudicial because it was

defense counsel who asked Lutz if Ross named her as an individual defendant and argued

to the jury in closing argument that Arteaga and Lutz “were personally sued when they 

shouldn’t have been,” and the jury was admonished twice not to speculate why Lutz was 

no longer a party to, or involved in, the case. The prejudice, however, arose from the 

questions apart from being named as a defendant, such as that she felt the need for 

9 Labor Code section 2802, subdivision (a) provides: “An employer shall indemnify 

his or her employee for all necessary expenditures or losses incurred by the employee in 

direct consequence of the discharge of his or her duties, or of his or her obedience to the 

directions of the employer, even though unlawful, unless the employee, at the time of 

obeying the directions, believed them to be unlawful.” The statute requires the employer 

to defend an employee who is sued for conduct arising out of his or her employment. 

(Jacobus v. Krambo Corp. (2000) 78 Cal.App.4th 1096, 1100.)

10 Ross contends the County waived any claim of error by failing to timely object 

and invited the error by agreeing to admonish the jury regarding Lutz’s status as a 

defendant. But as we have explained, when an appellate court is considering the 

propriety of an order granting a new trial, waiver, invited error and estoppel are 

inapplicable. (Malkasian,supra, 61 Cal.2d at p. 747; Seimon, supra, 67 Cal.App.3d at 

pp. 604‒605.)
30.

continued representation and the County was paying her legal fees. Thus, the 

admonishment did not cure the error.

Finally, Ross asserts no prejudice accrued from these questions because the jury 

had ample cause to doubt Ross’s credibility based on her testimony on cross-examination 

concerning the story she told in which she imitated the accent of an individual she 

identified as being southeast Asian, and at the time of trial she was seeking employment 

with the County. The County disputes that the reasons Ross asserts are supported by the 

record.11 Regardless, the trial court believed the improper questioning already tainted 

the jury’s perception of Lutz prior to any potential discrediting testimony elicited 

thereafter. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding the questions were 

prejudicial. 

3. Natina Brown’s Testimony

Ross wanted Brown, who filed an EEOC charge and lawsuit against the County, to 

testify as a “me too” witness, namely, that she experienced discrimination or harassment 

while working at the County. The County moved in limine to exclude Brown’s 

testimony about her allegations on the ground she was not similarly situated to Ross. The 

trial court denied the motion, stating it would address the issue when it arose. It generally 

agreed the testimony would not be relevant if it concerned treatment by persons other 

than the supervisors in Ross’s case, but if Brown “was retaliated against by the same 

supervisor for filing an EEOC complaint as alleged by Ms. Ross, then it would appear to 

me she would come in for that purpose.” 

11 For example, the record does not show Lutz was seeking employment at the 

County. While Lutz testified she had been looking for work since August 2018, she did 

not testify she was seeking employment at the County. Instead, the record shows Ross’s 

attorney asked Lutz if she thought she would have a better chance of getting a job at the 

County if she did well testifying on the County’s behalf. Lutz answered, “No.” 
31.

When Ross’s attorney called Brown as a witness, the County’s attorney objected 

stating they needed to discuss the motion in limine. After a bench conference, the trial 

court overruled the objection. The trial court later stated Ross’s attorney represented at 

the bench conference he would notify the trial court when he was going to go into “me 

too” testimony. After Ross’s attorney elicited testimony from Brown on other issues, he 

asked to discuss the issue. 

In a conference held outside the jury’s presence, the trial court asked for an offer 

of proof as to the “me too” evidence and the foundation for its similarity to Ross’s 

claims. Ross’s attorney responded they established Brown and Ross were in the same 

department with the same managers and supervisors. The attorney stated Brown filed a 

charge with the EEOC in 2006, which outlined issues that paralleled those in Ross’s case, 

including favoritism towards non-African American employees in terms of caseload, 

special projects and working out of class, creating division among African American 

employees, and Mills failing to take appropriate steps to address a racial slur a 

subordinate called Brown. The attorney added all these issues were outlined in Brown’s 

EEOC pre-complaint questionnaire and reports to the EEOC. The attorney further stated 

after Brown filed her EEOC charge, retaliatory acts immediately occurred and explained 

what those were, including Lutz changing her work schedule, being a target of Riley’s 

complaint, harassment by Mills and Lutz, Hoevertsz being promoted to the program 

manager position over Brown, and actions that surrounded Brown’s separation from 

employment. Ross’s attorney stated their intention was to stop before these latter actions 

and they were “just going to focus on the immediate aftermath of the EEOC complaint 

and the retaliation she suffers.” 

The attorneys agreed the County could ask Brown about her lawsuit against it, but 

not about the circumstances of her termination. As for the “me too” testimony, the 

County’s attorney argued there was nothing in the offer of proof that was relevant to 

Ross’s claims for retaliation and harassment, the evidence was not “me too” evidence, 
32.

and even if admissible, the evidence should be excluded under Evidence Code section 

352. The trial court, however, found the offer of proof sufficient, as it identified specific 

areas Brown would testify to concerning harassment or retaliation involving the same 

supervisors, namely, Mills and Lutz. The court added it would be receptive to valid 

objections made at the appropriate time. 

Ross’s attorney asked to clarify if Brown could testify about being called a racial 

slur, which was reported in her EEOC charge and which Mills did not address, which he 

said was relevant because Ross’s case concerned an EEOC charge for race discrimination 

that resulted in retaliation. The trial court stated if Mills was the one who allegedly failed 

to respond appropriately, it would allow it. 

When Brown’s testimony resumed, Ross’s attorney began to elicit the contents of 

Brown’s EEOC complaint in detail and led Brown, who could not recall exactly what she 

reported to the EEOC, through each individual allegation using her EEOC pre-complaint 

questionnaire to refresh her memory. The allegations included favoritism towards nonAfrican American employees, working out of class, being treated differently with respect 

to special projects, and efforts to divide African Americans. Brown gave narrative 

answers concerning many of the allegations and the attorney asked many follow up 

questions regarding the charges. 

After the jury was excused during a break in testimony, the County’s attorney 

expressed his concern that if they were just trying to show Brown filed a complaint and 

retaliatory actions occurred, they only needed to say there was an EEOC complaint and 

certain actions took place. The attorney complained there would now be a minitrial on 

each allegation raised in the EEOC complaint, which he did not understand to be the 

court’s ruling. The trial court agreed, stating it was “very surprised with the detail” 

Brown went into, although it recognized that was “her speaking persona” and the way she 

responded to questions. The trial court also was surprised Brown needed to have her 

recollection refreshed for anything stated in the report and thought she would be better 
33.

prepared. The trial court was unsure why the report’s details, other than on a very 

summary level, would need to be given. The trial court asked Ross’s attorney if he was 

anticipating that. 

Ross’s attorney thought it was just the way she responded, and he believed it was 

important to show the parallels with Brown’s EEOC charge because the same type of 

complaints led to retaliatory actions. Ross’s attorney said he could tell Brown to keep her 

answers shorter. The County’s attorney was surprised because he thought they were just 

going to establish she filed the EEOC complaint, which the County would have stipulated 

to, and when Ross’s attorney questioned Brown and purposely went into greater detail, 

that was contrary to everyone’s understanding. The trial court was concerned with the 

detail, but it was not sure the testimony should be limited to just the fact she filed a 

complaint because they would not know what the complaint was. The County’s attorney 

responded the complaint could have been summarized without going into detail; the trial 

court stated it thought that was going to happen, but it would leave it to Ross’s attorney to 

direct Brown to keep her answers shorter. 

Ross’s attorney denied making a deliberate effort to try a case within a case; he 

thought he made a clear record of what they would get into and what in the EEOC charge 

they would talk about, but he would speak to Brown and not go into as much detail. 

When the County’s attorney complained the damage had already been done, the trial 

court stated all it could do prospectively was to try to keep it shorter. 

After the lunch break, before Brown’s testimony resumed, there was further 

discussion about this issue. Ross’s attorney asserted defense counsel’s objection was 

belated and asked that they object sooner. The trial court responded that always was the 

preference, but the concern was not with the specific questions asked but rather the 

overall response given in long narratives. The County’s attorney asserted Ross’s attorney 

was putting an impossible burden on the defense by having to constantly object defeated 

the purpose of the motions in limine, and he again asked for a mistrial. 
34.

In the Specification, the trial court stated Brown’s testimony “went into details of 

her own complaints against the Department and went far beyond the bounds of what the 

Court had permitted the plaintiff.” The trial court explained both it and counsel were 

taken by surprise by the depth and detail into which Brown described her complaints 

against the County, and she should have simply testified she filed the EEOC complaint 

and had been retaliated against in a similar manner. The trial court noted its comments at 

the time that it was very surprised at the details Brown testified to concerning her own 

complaints and experiences with the County, which were irrelevant to Ross’s issues and 

highly prejudicial to the County. 

Ross contends there was no misconduct because in its initial ruling on the motion 

in limine, the trial court stated it would allow testimony regarding the events that

precipitated Brown’s EEOC complaint. Ross further contends there was never a limiting 

instruction on Brown’s testimony and the trial court made clear it was the County’s 

responsibility to object when it felt her testimony went too far. Ross asserts her counsel 

examined Brown in the exact manner he declared he would within the boundaries the trial 

court established, and her testimony was relevant to Ross’s retaliation claim because both 

Brown and Ross alleged race-based discrimination followed by similar retaliatory 

treatment. Ross asserts the fact Brown alleged she was retaliated against after 

complaining of racial discrimination was circumstantial evidence of Arteaga’s retaliatory 

intent toward Ross.

The County contends Ross’s attorney engaged in misconduct by exceeding the 

scope of Brown’s testimony in violation of the trial court’s limiting instructions. The 

County asserts, based on the extensive discussions about the admission of Brown’s “me 

too” testimony and Ross’s attorney’s representation that he was “going to focus on the 

immediate aftermath of the EEOC complaint and the retaliation [Brown] suffer[ed],” the 

trial court and the County “were under the impression” Brown’s testimony would consist 

of a summary of her EEOC complaint and the resulting retaliatory acts. Instead, Brown 
35.

went into extensive detail about her complaints and Ross’s attorney later admitted he 

intended to elicit these details because he believed it was important to show the parallels 

between Brown’s and Ross’s complaints. 

We agree with the County. After hearing arguments concerning the admissibility 

of the “me too” evidence, the trial court permitted Brown’s testimony for the purpose of 

proving similar acts of harassment or retaliation by the same supervisors who were the 

subject of Ross’s claims, such as Mills and Lutz. The trial court did not state Brown 

could testify in detail about her racial discrimination claims that precipitated her EEOC 

complaint. Ross’s attorney violated the trial court’s limitation by eliciting testimony 

from Brown that went beyond it, and thereby committed misconduct.12

As for prejudice, the testimony brought to light allegations against the County that 

were not part of Ross’s claims. Specifically, Brown testified about: (1) two white 

supervisors without master’s degrees supervised workers with master’s degrees in 

violation of protocol, while Brown, who had a master’s degree, was given difficult 

workers with less education so she could fire them; (2) after being promoted to 

supervisor, Brown was required to keep working the cases she held as a case worker 

instead of them being distributed to other workers as was done for non-African American 

supervisors; (3) Brown was not allowed to assign work to a white subordinate who did 

not carry a caseload; (4) a special project Brown developed based on her work in 

Alabama did not receive a budget, while projects run by non-African American 

coworkers received budgets and staff; and (5) she felt the County was trying to divide 

African Americans because her supervisor told her Ross was a troublemaker and the 

12 Ross contends the County waived any objection to Brown’s testimony, and invited 

any error, by waiting to object until the maximum prejudice accrued. As we have 

explained, when an appellate court is considering the propriety of an order granting a new 

trial, waiver, invited error and estoppel are inapplicable. (Malkasian, supra, 61 Cal.2d at 

p. 747.)
36.

supervisor said the same thing to Ross and another African American coworker about 

her. 

Since Ross dismissed her race discrimination claims, these incidents of alleged 

racial discrimination were irrelevant to Ross’s claims and left the County to either defend 

against claims that were not before the trial court or jury or leave the jury with the 

impression the County regularly engages in discriminatory conduct. While Ross 

minimizes these incidents, arguing they are not inflammatory and therefore not 

prejudicial, her attorney asserted at trial the incidents were important to show parallels 

between the two cases. In that sense, they were inflammatory. Ross contends that 

Brown’s claims of race-based discrimination were relevant circumstantial evidence of 

Arteaga’s retaliatory intent, but it was not necessary to go into the details of Brown’s 

claims to show she complained of racial discrimination. Moreover, Brown’s testimony 

did little to prove the motive behind Ross’s alleged harassment or retaliation. 

Accordingly, the trial court properly found the testimony prejudicial. 

4. The Closing Argument

In the County’s closing argument, the County’s attorney asserted its witnesses 

were credible and Ross’s counsel “made a big issue” that some of them were unable to 

remember details from 10 to 14 years ago. The County’s attorney argued it was not the 

County’s fault some of the events went back to 2004 or 2006, as Ross was the one who 

decided to file the lawsuit, she had a right to sue letter in 2006,13 and she could have filed 

this case anytime from 2006 to 2010, but she did not do so until 2016. The County’s 

attorney further asserted Ross did not explain why she did not file the lawsuit earlier. 

13 After Ross filed her initial EEOC complaint, she received a right to sue letter from 

the DFEH in October 2006, which stated it had closed its case because the EEOC was 

responsible for processing the complaint. The letter was not admitted into evidence at 

trial. 
37.

After the County’s closing argument was completed, a discussion was held outside 

the jury’s presence in which Ross’s attorney objected to this argument as improper. The 

attorney asserted if the County could argue Ross should have filed the case sooner, she 

should be able to get into the fact she filed the lawsuit after receiving the EEOC’s right to 

sue letter.14 

The trial court noted the lawsuit could have been filed after Ross received the first 

right to sue letter, but it did not fault Ross for not filing then because the law encourages 

a party to try to resolve issues before going to court. The trial court further noted neither 

the statute of limitations nor laches was before the jury, although in ruling on a motion in 

limine on this issue, it said the parties were free to talk about how old the lawsuit was. 

Ross’s attorney proposed being allowed to mention Ross was dealing with the EEOC 

until 2016. The County’s attorney agreed Ross’s attorney could state Ross was still 

dealing with the EEOC up until just before this case was filed, but it would go too far to 

state a right to sue letter was issued in 2016. The trial court questioned if the 2016 right 

to sue letter was in evidence but stated it would allow Ross’s attorney to assert Ross “was 

working through the EEOC up until that time.” 

During rebuttal, Ross’s attorney stated she wanted to address the comment that 

Ross did not bring this case sooner. The attorney asserted Ross filed several EEOC 

complaints throughout her employment and even after, and while they “would have 

wished to bring this lawsuit earlier, Ms. Ross was working with the EEOC until 2016, 

and that’s when she filed her lawsuit, in August of 2016. So she did bring it as soon as 

she could.” 

Following the rebuttal, outside the jury’s presence, the County’s attorney objected 

to the rebuttal being improper on several grounds. As pertinent here, he asserted there 

14 The EEOC did not issue a right to sue letter until July 2016; Ross filed this lawsuit 

the following month. 
38.

were “some misstatements” about the EEOC charges when it was represented “they 

brought the lawsuit as soon as she could,” which was untrue and was not agreed to. The 

trial court noted the statement that Ross “brought the lawsuit as soon as she could” was 

outside the record and it was clear she could have brought the lawsuit earlier, although it 

did not think it rose to the level of doing anything with the jury. When the trial court 

noted it did not hear a request for that, the County’s attorney responded that was correct, 

as it would only compound the problems. 

In the Specification, the trial court stated it ruled Ross could argue she had been 

working with the EEOC until the time of the resolution of the last complaint, which made 

the present action timely, but it would not be proper to argue the present action was 

brought as soon as possible. The trial court stated that nevertheless, Ross’s counsel 

argued Ross filed the present lawsuit “as soon as she could,” and when the County 

objected the statement was false and beyond what the court allowed, it agreed. While the 

trial court recognized no trial is perfect, and it would not expect perfection from either 

counsel, it found the “misstatement of counsel” that Ross filed this lawsuit “as soon as 

she could” was an irregularity occurring during trial. 

Ross first asserts improper argument to the jury cannot, as a matter of law, be an 

“irregularity” within the meaning of section 657, citing Gibbons, supra, 217 Cal.App.2d 

at p. 791. While the court in Gibbons does state arguments to the jury are not 

irregularities within the meaning of section 657, our Supreme Court has subsequently 

held closing arguments that are based on matters not supported by the evidence or appeal 

to the jury’s sympathy and prejudice, constitute misconduct upon which a grant of a new 

trial may be based. (Hoffman, supra, 65 Cal.2d at pp. 552‒553.) Therefore, we reject 

Ross’s contention that misconduct during argument is not a proper ground for granting a 

new trial.

Ross argues her attorney’s argument “comports perfectly” with the trial court’s 

guidance, as the statement merely implies Ross filed the lawsuit “ ‘as soon as she could 
39.

after allowing the administrative efforts at conciliation to play out.’ ” But that is not 

what her attorney stated. Instead, the attorney implied Ross could not have brought the 

lawsuit earlier because she was working with the EEOC, which was not true and was not 

supported by the evidence. Moreover, Ross’s attorney violated the trial court’s order to 

limit the argument to stating Ross was working with the EEOC up until just before this 

suit was filed. While Ross claims her attorney was merely curing the County’s 

misleading suggestion that Ross’s actions in bringing suit when she did were problematic 

or less than timely, her attorney still violated the trial court’s order. In addition, the 

added statement was unnecessary to show the present action was timely, since the 

attorney was permitted to state, as she did, that they filed the lawsuit in 2016, after 

working with the EEOC.15

Ross contends no prejudice could result from her attorney’s remark because the 

statement was de minimis. The statement, however, was false and harmed the credibility 

of the County’s witnesses, who were unable to recall events when questioned by Ross’s 

attorney, which left them looking like they were hiding something. The trial court 

reasonably could presume that by stating Ross brought the lawsuit “as soon as she 

could,” the jury was misled and likely left to question why answers were not provided.

C. The Cat’s Paw Jury Instruction

The trial court found the improper inclusion of the cat’s paw jury instruction was 

both an irregularity in the proceedings under section 657, subdivision 1 and an error in 

15 Ross also contends the County waived any objection to the statement by failing to 

raise it while a curative admonition could be issued. However, as we have explained, 

when an appellate court is considering the propriety of an order granting a new trial, 

waiver, invited error and estoppel are inapplicable. (Malkasian,supra, 61 Cal.2d at 

p. 747.) For this reason, Ross’s reliance on Horn v. Atchison, Topeka and Santa Fe 

Railway Co. (1964) 61 Cal.2d 602, for the proposition that a party waives a claim of 

misconduct if the party fails to timely object and request that the jury be admonished, is 

misplaced, as there the court was reviewing the denial of a motion for a new trial. (Id. at 

p. 610.) 
40.

law under section 657, subdivision 7. It is well settled giving an erroneous instruction is 

an error of law under section 657, subdivision 7. (Gonsalves v. Petaluma Building 

Materials Co. (1960) 181 Cal.App.2d 320, 335‒336.) Moreover, “[t]he grant of a new 

trial is a proper remedy for the giving of an erroneous jury instruction when the improper 

instruction materially affected the substantial rights of the aggrieved party.” (Caldwell v. 

Paramount Unified School Dist. (1995) 41 Cal.App.4th 189, 205.)

In assessing instructional error, we first determine whether there was error in 

giving the instruction. (Brandelius,supra, 47 Cal.2d at p. 734.) While we determine as a 

question of law whether the instruction was erroneous, once error is shown, we may not 

substitute our judgment for that of the trial court on the issue of prejudice. (Treber v. 

Superior Court (1968) 68 Cal.2d 128, 132.) “[T]he sole issue is whether the order 

granting a new trial, viewed in the light of the whole record, constituted a manifest abuse 

of discretion.” (Ibid.) When a new trial is granted based on an erroneous instruction, 

“ ‘the order “will not be disturbed unless the questioned instruction was absolutely 

accurate and under no reasonable interpretation could possibly have misled or confused 

the jury.” ’ ” (Caldwell, supra, 41 Cal.App.4th at p. 205; Brandelius, supra, 47 Cal.2d at 

pp. 745‒746.)

Here, Ross proposed instructing the jury with CACI No. 2511, which is entitled 

“Adverse Action Made by Decision Maker Without Animus (Cat’s Paw).” According to 

the directions for use, this instruction may be given if the “cat’s paw” rule is a factor in 

the case, which applies when “the person who actually took the adverse employment 

action against the employee was not acting out of any improper animus,” but “acted on 

information provided by another person who was acting out of discriminatory or 

retaliatory animus with the objective of causing the adverse employment action.” (CACI 

No. 2511, Directions for Use.) Ross’s attorney asserted this instruction was appropriate 

because there were nothing to show the heads of departments or directors engaged in 
41.

wrongful conduct, while Ross claimed supervisors and program managers engaged in 

wrongful conduct. 

The instruction was given over the County’s objection. As read to the jury, the 

jury was instructed: “In this case, the decision to take adverse employment action against 

Anita Ross was made by Hubert Walsh. Even if Hubert Walsh did not hold any 

retaliatory intent, the County of Madera may still be liable for retaliation if Anita Ross 

proves both of the following: One, that Anita Ross’ protected activities or attributes were

substantial motivating reasons for Terry Hurt, Kelly Woodard, Susan Arteaga, Donna 

Lutz, or Raye Hoevertsz’s recommendations; and, two, that Terry Hurt, Kelly Woodard, 

Susan Arteaga, Donna Lutz, or Raye Hoevertsz’s recommendations were substantial 

motivating reasons for Hubert Walsh’s decision to take adverse employment action 

against Anita Ross.”16 

In the Specification, the trial court found the instruction as given was erroneous. 

The trial court explained the instruction was not proper as submitted to the jury because it 

assumed Hubert Walsh had taken an adverse employment action against Ross. Instead, 

the instruction should have stated the precise adverse action allegedly against Ross, and 

the jury would then decide whether any of these actions constituted an adverse 

employment action. As given, however, it declared to the jury that an adverse 

employment action had been taken against Ross and the director of the department, 

Hubert Walsh, had taken such action. The trial court found giving this erroneous 

instruction, along with the other irregularities, had the cumulative effect of preventing the 

County from having a fair trial. 

We agree with the trial court that the instruction was erroneous because it assumed 

Walsh had taken an adverse employment action against Ross. The unmodified 

16 In the written instruction in the clerk’s transcript, the term “adverse employment 

action” as read to the jury is in the plural, i.e., “adverse employment actions.” 
42.

instruction, as stated in the Specification, provides: “In this case, the decision to 

[discharge/[other adverse employment action]] [name of plaintiff] was made by [name of 

decision maker]. Even if [name of decision maker] did not hold any [discriminatory/

retaliatory] intent [or was unaware of [name of plaintiff]’s conduct on which the claim of 

retaliation is based], [name of defendant] may still be liable for [discrimination/

retaliation] if [name of plaintiff] proves both of the following: [¶] 1. That [name of 

plaintiff]’s [specify protected activity or attribute] was a substantial motivating reason for 

[name of supervisor]’s [specify acts of supervisor on which decision maker relied]; and 

[¶] 2. That [name of supervisor]’s [specify acts on which decision maker relied] was a 

substantial motivating reason for [name of decision maker]’s decision to [discharge/

[other adverse employment action]] [name of plaintiff].” 

Rather than list the specific adverse employment actions, Ross’s protected activity 

or attributes, and the supervisors’ acts on which Hubert Walsh relied, the instruction as 

given generally states: (1) “the decision to take adverse employment actions against 

Anita Ross was made by Hubert Walsh”; and (2) Ross must prove her “protected 

activities or attributes were substantial motivating reasons for Terry Hurt, Kelly 

Woodard, Susan Arteaga, Donna Lutz, or Raye Hoevertsz’s recommendations” and their 

“recommendations were substantial motivating reasons for Hubert Walsh’s decision to 

take adverse employment actions against Anita Ross.” (Italics added.) 

The phrase “the decision to take adverse employment actions against Anita Ross 

was made by Hubert Walsh” implies Walsh had in fact taken adverse employment 

actions against Ross, an issue that was for the jury to decide. The term “adverse 

employment actions” also made the instruction open-ended and confusing, as the jury 

also was instructed that Ross must prove she was subjected to an adverse employment 

action, which was defined for the jury, but then was told Walsh had decided to take 

adverse employment actions against Ross. The instruction also was open-ended and 

confusing because it did not specify Ross’s protected activity or attribute, which was not 
43.

defined for the jury, or identify the supervisors’ acts on which Walsh relied, instead 

stating only that they made “recommendations.” Thus, the instruction was erroneous 

because it was incorrect as modified, argumentative, and invaded the province of the jury 

by instructing on the facts. (Soule v. General Motors Corp. (1994) 8 Cal.4th 548, 572 

[“A party is entitled upon request to correct, nonargumentative instructions on every 

theory of the case advanced by him which is supported by substantial evidence.”]; 

Galway v. Guggolz (1931) 117 Cal.App. 639, 641‒642 [an instruction is erroneous where 

it is argumentative, instructs on the facts thereby invading the province of the jury, or is 

misleading].)

Ross argues the cat’s paw instruction was not improper because “it merely stated 

an uncontroverted fact” that Walsh had authorized an adverse employment action against 

her. Ross asserts it was “conclusively established, as a matter of law, that Hubert Walsh 

did take an adverse employment action against [Ross] when he refused to allow her to 

return to work in 2007,” as it was “not disputed” she “attempted to return to work but was 

disallowed.” Ross further asserts she was forced to take an unpaid leave from January 

2007 to February 2008, which was an adverse employment action as a matter of law. 

Ross claims that even if the phrasing was technically erroneous, given the litany of 

alleged adverse employment actions and that the occurrence of some of them was 

disputed, any instruction that included all of them would have been more prejudicial than 

the instruction that was given.

The County vigorously contests it was conclusively established that Walsh 

disallowed Ross from returning to work and that unpaid leave constitutes an adverse 

employment action. Even if these acts were conclusively established to be adverse 

employment actions, however, the instruction did not differentiate between those that 

Ross contends were undisputed and others that were disputed. As Ross concedes, the 

occurrence of some of the adverse employment actions was “hotly contested.” Telling 

the jury that Walsh made the decision to “take adverse employment action against” Ross 
44.

implies that all the incidents Ross claimed constituted adverse employment actions in fact 

were adverse employment actions. Therefore, the instruction was not accurate, as Ross 

contends.

This leaves whether the instruction likely misled or confused the jury. We will not 

disturb the trial court’s “broad discretion” in granting a new trial on this basis even if it is 

only “ ‘fairly debatable’ ” that the instruction may have been misleading. (Christian v. 

Bolls (1970) 7 Cal.App.3d 408, 415.) Here, the cat’s paw instruction likely could have 

misled the jury into assuming, without deciding the issue on its own, that an adverse 

employment action occurred and was taken by Walsh, and thereby find in Ross’s favor 

on that element of her retaliation claim. 

Ross contends the jury was not confused because it was given other instructions 

that stated she was required to prove this element, no attorney argued the jury should 

presume an adverse employment action had been taken, the special verdict form did not 

use the term “adverse employment action” but rather asked the jury whether the County 

engaged “in conduct that, taken as a whole, materially and adversely affected the terms 

and conditions of Anita Ross’ employment,” and the jury’s “Yes” answer to this question 

was not unanimous, as one juror did not agree. Even if the jurors did not all agree, some 

still may have been confused by being told an adverse employment action had been 

taken. Given the conflicting instructions, it is at least fairly debatable that the cat’s paw 

instruction was misleading. Accordingly, we cannot say the trial court abused its 

discretion in finding the erroneous cat’s paw instruction was prejudicial.

D. Cumulative Error

The trial court found that while neither the four instances of attorney misconduct 

nor the instructional error by themselves supported granting a new trial, when they were 
45.

considered together, their cumulative effect prevented the County from having a fair 

trial.17 

Under the “cumulative error” doctrine, errors that are individually harmless may 

nevertheless have a cumulative effect that is prejudicial. (Delzell v. Day (1950) 

36 Cal.2d 349, 351 [while numerous improper comments by the trial judge did not justify 

reversal of the judgment when taken separately, “considering the entire record, it cannot 

reasonably be said that their cumulative effect did not prejudice the appellants’ case”]; 

Du Jardin v. City of Oxnard (1995) 38 Cal.App.4th 174, 180 [concluding prejudice was 

apparent from the cumulative errors].) For example, the doctrine applies when there are 

numerous minor instances of attorney misconduct during trial that have a cumulatively 

prejudicial effect. (Gackstetter v. Market Street Railway Co. (1933) 130 Cal.App. 316, 

325‒327.)

The cumulative errors consist of: (1) identifying Ross as a Christian; (2) eliciting 

testimony from Lutz that she felt the need for legal representation and the County was 

paying her legal fees; (3) eliciting testimony from Brown that she experienced racial 

discrimination while working at the department; (4) commenting during closing argument 

17 Ross asserts because the trial court failed to explicitly state in the Specification 

that it found it was reasonably likely the County would have achieved a more favorable 

result but for the purported irregularities, the trial court failed to perform the analysis 

required of it under the state Constitution and find a miscarriage of justice. (Cal. Const., 

art. VI, § 13.) Ross asks us to either reverse the grant of new trial as an abuse of 

discretion or deem the Specification inadequate and exercise our own judgment to 

determine whether a new trial is legally required, citing Thompson v. Friendly Hills 

Regional Medical Center (1999) 71 Cal.App.4th 544, 550. A trial court, however, is not 

required to explain in its specification of reasons why it believed the irregularities or 

errors of law were prejudicial. (Treber v. Superior Court, supra, 68 Cal.2d at pp. 131‒

132.) Moreover, having granted a new trial, we presume the trial court considered the 

whole record and decided there was prejudicial error that resulted in a miscarriage of 

justice. (McCarty v. Department of Transportation (2008) 164 Cal.App.4th 955, 986; 

Maher v. Saad, supra, 82 Cal.App.4th at p. 1324; Pitt v. Southern Pacific Co. (1932) 121 

Cal.App. 228, 238.)
46.

that Ross filed this lawsuit “as soon as she could”; and (5) instructing the jury that Walsh 

had taken an adverse employment action against Ross. These errors bolstered Ross’s 

credibility, impeached Lutz’s credibility, damaged the reputation of the County and its 

witnesses, and invaded the province of the jury in determining whether an adverse 

employment action occurred. Taken together, in a case that turned on witness credibility, 

the trial court could find if not for the cumulative effect of these errors, it was reasonably 

likely a different result would have occurred. 

Ross contends cumulative prejudice must be more extreme than these “five 

discrete, inconsequential issues,” citing Bigboy v. County of San Diego (1984) 154

Cal.App.3d 397, 411‒412. There, the appellate court reviewing the trial court’s denial of 

a new trial motion rejected the argument that four instances of purported attorney 

misconduct constituted cumulative error under Love v. Wolf (1964) 226 Cal.App.2d 378. 

(Bigboy v. County of San Diego, at pp. 411‒412.) The court concluded there was no 

comparison between the conduct in its case and that in Love, where the court “found 

60 instances of flagrant misconduct” which was “intentional, blatant and continuous and 

was carefully contrived and calculated to inflame the jury.” (Bigboy v. County of San 

Diego, at pp. 411‒412.)

Here, while the misconduct was not as persistent as that in Love, the trial court 

reasonably could find the errors raised “the strong possibility the aggregate prejudicial 

effect of such errors was greater than the sum of the prejudice of each error standing 

alone.” (People v. Hill (1998) 17 Cal.4th 800, 845.) As we have explained, each incident 

of misconduct or instructional error had a prejudicial effect on the jury and, when 

considered together, cast doubt on the credibility of the County and its witnesses, and 

bolstered Ross’s credibility. In this reasonably close case, prejudice is apparent. 

Accordingly, the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it granted the motion for a 

new trial based on misconduct and instructional error. Since the trial court did not err in 
47.

granting a new trial on this ground, it is not necessary to address whether the trial court 

erred in granting a new trial on the ground of excessive damages.

II. The County’s Cross-Appeal

Throughout this case, the County has asserted Ross’s lawsuit is barred by the 

doctrine of laches, arguing the 10-year delay in filing suit since receiving the first DFEH 

right-to-sue letter was unreasonable and prejudiced the County. The trial court rejected 

this claim numerous times—it denied the County’s summary judgment motion brought 

on this basis and denied the County’s motions for nonsuit and directed verdict during 

trial. Finally, the County raised the laches defense in its motion for JNOV. In denying 

the motion, the trial court explained that while it found the County was prejudiced due to 

the delay, as essential witnesses for the County had died and the memories of all parties 

were diminished, it was not convinced it could “find the delay to prohibit” the action 

from proceeding and did not believe it had “the ability” to find laches “under the law.” 

In its cross-appeal, the County challenges the last ruling, arguing it was erroneous 

because laches applies to Ross’s FEHA claims as a matter of law and the County satisfied 

the elements of laches.

A. Laches and the Standard of Review

“Laches is an equitable, affirmative defense which requires a showing of both an 

unreasonable delay by the plaintiff in bringing suit, ‘ “plus either acquiescence in the act 

about which plaintiff complains or prejudice to the defendant resulting from the 

delay.” ’ ” (Highland Springs Conference & Training Center v. City of Banning (2016) 

244 Cal.App.4th 267, 282.) If, considering the lapse of time and other relevant 

circumstances, a court concludes a party’s failure to assert a right has caused an adverse 

party prejudice, the court may apply the equitable defense of laches to bar assertion of 

that right. (Ibid.) “The party asserting laches bears the burden of production and proof 

on each element of the defense.” (Ibid.) “ ‘Generally speaking, the existence of laches is 
48.

a question of fact to be determined by the trial court in light of all of the applicable 

circumstances....’ ” (Ibid.)

An appellate court reviews de novo a denial of a motion for JNOV, using the same 

standard as the trial court. (Oakland Raiders v. Oakland–Alameda County Coliseum, 

Inc. (2006) 144 Cal.App.4th 1175, 1194; Mason v. Lake Dolores Group (2004) 

117 Cal.App.4th 822, 829–830.) JNOV must be granted where, “viewing the evidence in 

the light most favorable to the party securing the verdict, the evidence compels a verdict 

for the moving party as a matter of law.” (Oakland Raiders v. Oakland‒Alameda County 

Coliseum, Inc., at p. 1194; Paykar Construction, Inc. v. Spilat Construction Corp.

(2001) 92 Cal.App.4th 488, 493–494; see Lent v. California Coastal Com. (2021) 

62 Cal.App.5th 812, 837‒838 [where trial court refused to apply laches defense, standard 

of review is whether the evidence compels a finding in the appellant’s favor as a matter 

of law].) Where a motion for JNOV raises legal issues, we review the trial court’s 

ruling “under a de novo standard of review.” (Sweatman v. Department of Veterans 

Affairs (2001) 25 Cal.4th 62, 68.) The purpose of a JNOV motion “ ‘is not to afford a 

review of the jury’s deliberation but to prevent a miscarriage of justice in those cases 

where the verdict rendered is without foundation.’ ” (Sukoff v. Lemkin (1988) 

202 Cal.App.3d 740, 743.)

B. Analysis

Ross filed her initial charge with the EEOC and DFEH on September 29, 2006. 

On October 2, 2006, the DFEH issued a notice advising Ross and the County the EEOC 

was responsible for processing the complaint, the DFEH would not be investigating the 

matter, and the DFEH was “closing its case on the basis of ‘processing waived to another 

agency.’ ” The DFEH further advised the letter was a right-to-sue notice that allowed 

Ross to file a lawsuit in state court under the provisions of FEHA within one year of the 

notice, but the period was tolled during the pendency of the EEOC’s investigation of the 

complaint. 
49.

On May 18, 2007, Ross filed a complaint with the EEOC and DFEH; the EEOC 

sent the County a notice that a charge of discrimination had been filed against it; the 

attached charge was Ross’s September 2006 charge. Ross also filed charges with the 

EEOC and DFEH on March 23, 2010, and August 29, 2011. The DFEH issued Ross a 

right-to-sue letter dated August 29, 2011, with respect to the 2011 charge that stated the 

DFEH was closing its case because the EEOC was responsible for processing the 

complaint. Finally, the United States Department of Justice (DOJ) issued a letter on July 

15, 2016, stating it had been determined it would not file suit on the 2006 charge the 

EEOC referred to it, the EEOC’s conciliation was unsuccessful, and Ross had the right to 

sue under title VII. Ross filed her complaint against the County the following month.18 

Ross testified that prior to 2016, she had communications with the EEOC about 

the progress of her case. She provided information to someone at the EEOC’s Fresno 

office, who gave her some of the County’s responses the EEOC received, and she went to 

the EEOC office to discuss her case. The County submitted a letter to the EEOC in 

response to the 2006 charge in June 2007 and provided further information to the EEOC 

in January 2008. 

Federal courts have applied the defense of laches in title VII cases brought by 

private plaintiffs. (Bernard v. Gulf Oil Co. (5th Cir. 1979) 596 F.2d 1249, 1256

(Bernard).) In Bernard, the court rejected the defendant’s argument the plaintiffs, who 

waited nine years after filing charges of discrimination with the EEOC to file suit, could 

have requested a right-to-sue letter and filed suit earlier, in favor of the plaintiffs’ 

18 Ross cites to February 2015 EEOC determinations on the 2006 and 2011 

complaints in which the EEOC stated it found reasonable cause to believe the County 

subjected Ross to retaliation and a hostile work environment for opposing discrimination 

and was constructively discharged, which she submitted in opposition to the County’s 

summary judgment motion. We note that while the clerk’s transcript contains the 

determinations, as well as the EEOC charges and the right-to-sue letters, only the 2006 

EEOC charge was admitted into evidence at trial. 
50.

argument it was “their asserted right to await the completion of the EEOC administrative 

process.” (Id. at pp. 1256‒1257.) The court explained the private remedy allowed by 

42 United States Code section 2000e-5(f)(1) “is only an alternative method for a plaintiff 

to obtain relief from discrimination”; therefore, “[a] plaintiff cannot be penalized for 

choosing to forgo this alternative and electing instead the legislatively and judicially 

favored method of relying on the administrative processes of the EEOC.” (Bernard, at 

p. 1257.) Accordingly, the court held “the plaintiffs’ failure to file their [t]itle VII claim 

until completion of the EEOC process was not inexcusable delay” that would support 

laches. (Ibid.; accord Holsey v. Armour & Co. (4th Cir. 1984) 743 F.2d 199, 211; 

Howard v. Roadway Express, Inc. (11th Cir. 1984) 726 F.2d 1529, 1532‒1534.)

“ ‘The conclusion that a delay is “inexcusable” comprehends both the application 

of a legal standard and an exercise of the trial court’s sound discretion in assessing the 

equitable circumstances of a particular case.’ ” (Waddell v. Small Tube Products, Inc.

(3d Cir. 1986) 799 F.2d 69, 77.) While “plaintiffs have some obligation to monitor the 

progress of their charge and do not have the absolute right to await termination of EEOC 

proceedings where it would appear to a reasonable person that no administrative 

resolution will be forthcoming, whether the circumstances warranted the delay in a 

particular case requires an ad hoc determination.” (Ibid.) If the elements of laches are 

met, “a court may dismiss the entire case, dismiss certain claims, or restrict the damages 

available to the plaintiff.” (EEOC v. Timeless Investments, Inc. (E.D. Cal. 2010) 

734 F.Supp.2d 1035, 1067.)

Ross argues laches does not apply here because under California law, laches is a 

defense only to equitable, not legal, claims, and in this lawsuit, she is seeking only 

monetary damages. (See, e.g., Reid v. City of San Diego (2018) 24 Cal.App.5th 343, 362 

[“laches does not apply as a defense to causes of action seeking money judgments, even 

where joined with claims in equity”]; Connolly v. Trabue (2012) 204 Cal.App.4th 1154, 

1164 [“it is well established, both in California and generally, that laches applies to 
51.

equitable actions, not actions at law”].) In contrast, she asserts, in federal actions laches 

is available as an affirmative defense regardless of whether the lawsuit is at law or in 

equity. (See, e.g., Chirco v. Crosswinds Communities, Inc. (6thCir. 2007) 474 F.3d 227, 

234.) Ross urges us not to adopt a federal philosophy that conflicts with longstanding 

California authority that precludes a laches defense to actions seeking money damages. 

The County responds the federal cases applying laches to title VII claims are 

instructive and we should follow them because California law under the FEHA mirrors 

federal law under title VII. (Godwin v. Hunt Wesson, Inc. (9th Cir. 1998) 150 F.3d 1217, 

1219; Brundage v. Hahn (1997) 57 Cal.App.4th 228, 235.) The County also points out 

that in Couveau v. American Airlines, Inc. (9th Cir. 2000) 218 F.3d 1078, the Ninth 

Circuit addressed an employer’s argument in a summary judgment motion that laches 

barred the plaintiff’s FEHA claims, concluding there were genuine issues of material fact 

that precluded summary judgment. (Couveau, at pp. 1081 & fn. 2, 1083‒1084.) Finally, 

the County notes our Supreme Court has concluded laches barred the plaintiff’s petition 

for writ of administrative mandate, filed in conjunction with a complaint that alleged 

causes of action under FEHA and title VII, which challenged the personnel board and 

city council actions concerning the plaintiff’s dismissal and sought reinstatement, 

backpay and benefits. (Johnson v. City of Loma Linda (2000) 24 Cal.4th 61, 66‒69.)

There do not appear to be any California cases that have addressed whether laches 

is an available defense to FEHA claims seeking money damages.19 We need not decide 

this issue, however, because even if laches may be asserted as a defense in this case, the 

County failed to satisfy its burden of proving the first element of laches—unreasonable 

delay. While Ross could have filed suit on her DFEH claims after receiving the DFEH’s 

19 While this court stated in County of Fresno v. Fair Employment & Housing Com.

(1991) 226 Cal.App.3d 1541, 1556, that laches “bars an equitable remedy” when the 

plaintiff engages in inexcusable delay, we did not address whether laches may also bar 

claims that seek only legal remedies.
52.

right-to-sue letters, Ross was awaiting the resolution of her EEOC charges before filing 

suit. For some reason that is not apparent in the record, it took the EEOC about eight and 

a half years to complete its investigation and make a determination on Ross’s complaints, 

and another year and a half to engage in conciliation efforts and for the DOJ to decide 

whether to file suit. Once the DOJ declined to do so, Ross timely filed this action. There 

is nothing in the trial record to suggest Ross was responsible for the EEOC’s delay in 

processing her EEOC charges. (See County of Fresno v. Fair Employment and Housing 

Commission, supra, 226 Cal.App.3d at p. 1556 [declining to find unreasonable delay 

necessary to support laches where there was no evidence the employees seeking remedies 

caused the delays; “[d]elays on the part of the [Fair Employment and Housing] 

Commission and D[FEH] do not give rise to a laches defense”].)

The County contends the delay in filing suit was at least partially attributable to 

Ross because she could have sued after receiving the DFEH’s right-to-sue letters in 

October 2006 and August 2011, and she acquiesced to the EEOC’s unreasonable delay by 

waiting four years following her 2012 retirement to file suit. We disagree that Ross was 

required to act on the DFEH right-to-sue letters considering the DFEH notified her the 

EEOC was conducting the investigation into her charges and closed its case on that basis. 

In these circumstances, the private remedy afforded Ross under the FEHA was only an 

alternative method to obtain relief from discrimination and she cannot be penalized for 

choosing to forgo this alternative and electing instead to rely on the EEOC’s 

administrative processes. (Bernard,supra, 596 F.2d at p. 1257.) While she could have 

filed suit after her retirement, given the EEOC’s investigation was ongoing, she could 

continue to await the conclusion of that investigation. 

The County failed to produce any evidence at trial showing the EEOC was not 

actively engaged in the administrative process or that Ross failed to exercise diligence in 

monitoring the EEOC’s progress. While the County asserts “the EEOC’s investigation 

was undoubtedly not ‘bearing fruit,’ ” there is nothing in the trial record to support that 
53.

conclusion.20 It was the County’s burden to show unreasonable delay. (Torres v. City of 

Montebello (2015) 234 Cal.App.4th 382, 393.) Based on the evidence presented at trial, 

we cannot say the trial court was compelled to find unreasonable delay as a matter of 

law.21 Therefore, the trial court did not err in denying the County’s motion for JNOV 

based on laches.

DISPOSITION

The trial court’s orders granting a new trial and denying the County’s motion for 

judgment notwithstanding the verdict are affirmed. The parties shall bear their own costs 

on appeal.

 DE SANTOS, J.

WE CONCUR:

SMITH, ACTING P. J.

SNAUFFER, J.

20 Ross asserts that she complained to the EEOC about the case dragging on; she told 

the EEOC she did not understand how a case filed in 2006 was still open and being 

investigated until 2016. The EEOC told her if she went to court before it completed its 

investigation it would not find in her favor, citing to her deposition testimony submitted 

in the summary judgment motion. The County asserts Ross’s frustration demonstrates 

she acted unreasonably in waiting for the EEOC process to conclude. Even if we agree 

with the County, this evidence was not presented at trial. On the trial record, we cannot 

say the trial court was required to find unreasonable delay as a matter of law.

21 Since the County failed to prove unreasonable delay, we do not address whether it 

also proved prejudice.