U.S. Department

of Transportation Federal Aviation Administration 

# Advisory

Circular

Subject: S afety Management Systems for Airports Date: DRAFT Initiated by: AAS

- 300 AC No: 150/5200

- 37 A

CHANGE:

1. Purpose

. This Advisory Circular (AC) presents the concepts of a Safety Management System (SMS) and provides detailed guidance about developing and implementing SMS on an airport.
An SMS enhances safety, ensures compliance with applicable regulatory sta ndards, and can be integrated into all aspects of airport operations, including business and management practices. This AC explains how SMS will help airports develop an explicit, pro

- active, and engaged process for identifying and quantifying potential ha zards and risks and for managing them in a systematically coherent, logical, and reasonable way.

2. Applicability

. T his AC applies to all civil airports, when adapted to the size, activity level, staff level, and resources of each facility

. In addition, th is AC establishes guidelines for SMS implementation for and by airport operators at airports certificated under title 14 Code of Fed eral Regulations (CFR) part 139
, Certification of Airports (part 139)

.
The AC focuses on airport operational safety in the airfield environment

. However, airport operators can apply these principals anywhere on the ir airport s (including the landside environment) to address safety

concerns.

3. Background

. The U nited States is a member state of the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO). In November 2005, ICAO amended Annex 14, Volume I ( Aerodrome Design and Operations)
, to require member s tates to have certificated international airports establish SMS. The Federal Aviation Administration ( FAA ) supports harmonization w ith international sta ndards and has worked to make FAA aviation safety regulations consistent with ICAO standards and recommended practices. The implementation of SMS at U.S. airports is designed to meet the intent of the ICAO standard in a way that comple ments existing part 139 airport safety require ments and standards.
SMS encompasses the activities of every level of airport personnel

– from the executive level to those who perform the many daily, routine tasks required to operate the airport. Applying a systematic, proactive, and well

- defined safety program (as is inherent in an SMS) allows airports to strike a realistic and efficient balance between safety and service.
The forecast growth in air transportation requires new measures and greater effort fro m all aviation service providers

– including airport operators

– to achieve continuing improvements to aviation safety. The use of an SMS at an airport can help this effort by increasing the likelihood that the airport operator will detect and correct safe ty problems before they result in an aircraft accident or incident.DRAFT AC 150/5200

- 37A 0 6 / 29 /2012

ii 4. Related Reading Material. Appendix B lists additional documents that will help airport operators understand SMS. Appendix A defines terms and acronyms used in this AC.

5. Point o f Cont act. Send c omments or suggestions for improv ing this AC to:
Manager, Airport Safety and Operations Division Federal Aviation Administration ATTN: AAS

- 300 800 Independence Avenue SW Washington DC 20591

6

. Availability

. The FAA makes t his AC available online at http://www.faa.gov/airports/resources/advisory_circulars/

.

Michael J. O’Donnell Director of Airport Safety and Standards0 6 / 29 /2012 DRAFT AC 150/5200

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iii 

## Table of Contents

CHAPTER 1. SAFETY MANAGEMENT SY STEMS (SMS) OVERVIEW

................................ 1 1. Background.

................................ ................................ ................................ ................. 1 2. W hat is SMS.

................................ ................................ ................................ ................ 1 3. History.

................................ ................................ ................................ ......................... 2 4. Current Applications of SMS.

................................ ................................ ...................... 3 5. Format of this AC.

................................ ................................ ................................ ........ 4 6. Scalability.

................................ ................................ ................................ .................... 4

CHAPTER 2. GETTING STARTED

................................ ................................ ............................... 5 1. Introduction.

................................ ................................ ................................ ................. 5 2. Documentation.

................................ ................................ ................................ ............ 5 3. SMS Implementation Plans.

................................ ................................ ......................... 5 4. SMS Manual.

................................ ................................ ................................ ................ 7 5. ACM Revision.

................................ ................................ ................................ ............. 7

CHAPTER 3. SAFETY POLICY

................................ ................................ ................................ ...... 9 1. Introduction.

................................ ................................ ................................ ................. 9 2. Developing and Implementing the Safety Policy.

................................ ........................ 9

CHAPTER 4. SAFETY RISK MANAGEME NT (SRM)

................................ .............................. 17 1. Introduction.

................................ ................................ ................................ ............... 17 2. Developing and Implementing Safety Risk Management.

................................ ......... 17 3. Scalability of SRM.

................................ ................................ ................................ .... 34 4. Integrated SRM Efforts.

................................ ................................ ............................. 34 5. Example #1 of SRM.

................................ ................................ ................................ .. 35 6. Example #2 of SRM.

................................ ................................ ................................ .. 36 7. Introduction.

................................ ................................ ................................ ............... 39 8. Developing and Implementing Safety Assurance.

................................ ..................... 40

CHAPTER 5. SAFETY PROMOTION

................................ ................................ .......................... 47 1. Introduction.

................................ ................................ ................................ ............... 47 2. Developing and Implementing Safety Promotion.

................................ ..................... 48

APPENDIX A. DEFINITIONS AND ACRO NYMS

................................ ................................ ....... 51

APPENDIX B. RELATED READING MATE RIAL

................................ ................................ ...... 54

APPENDIX C. SAMPLE SMS IMPLEMENT ATION PLAN TEMPLATE AND

CHECKLIST

................................ ................................ ................................ ............ 55

APPENDIX D. SAMPLE SMS MANUAL

................................ ................................ ....................... 61

APPENDIX E. SAMPLE SAFETY REPORT ING DASHBOARDS

................................ ............. 77DRAFT AC 150/5200

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iv 

## List of Figures

Figure 1

- 1. Four SMS Components

................................ ................................ ................................ .............. 2 Figure 1

- 2. Reason’s Accident Causation Model (Adapted)

................................ ................................ ........ 3 Figure 3

- 1. Safety Policy

................................ ................................ ................................ .............................. 9 Figure 3

- 2. Sample Organizational Chart for Safety Oversight

................................ ................................ .. 11 Figure 3

- 3. Sample Safety Responsibilities

................................ ................................ ................................ 12 Figure 3

- 4. Simple Safety Policy Statement

................................ ................................ ............................... 14 Figure 3

- 2. Complex Safety Policy Statement

................................ ................................ ............................ 15 Figure 4

- 1. Elements of SRM

................................ ................................ ................................ ..................... 17 Figure 4

- 2. Five Steps of SRM

................................ ................................ ................................ ................... 19 Figure 4

- 3. The 5M Model

................................ ................................ ................................ .......................... 20 Figure 4

- 4. Preliminary Hazard Analysis Worksheet

................................ ................................ ................. 21 Figure 4

- 7. Sample 4x4 Predictive Risk Matrix with Likelihood and Severity Definition and Two

Levels of Risk: Acceptab le and Unacceptable

................................ ................................ ........ 29 Figure 4

- 8. FAA Office of Airports’ Predictive Risk Matrix

................................ ................................ ..... 30 Figure 4

- 9. Sample 4x4 Hazard Assessment Form

................................ ................................ ..................... 33 Figure 5

- 1. Safety Assurance

................................ ................................ ................................ ...................... 39 Figure 5

- 2. SRM/Safety Assurance Relationship

................................ ................................ ....................... 40 Figure 5

- 3. Sample Confidential Hazard Reporting Form

................................ ................................ .......... 42 Figure 6

- 1. Safety Promotion

................................ ................................ ................................ ...................... 47



## List of Tables

Table 2

- 1. Examples of Existing Processes and Procedures

................................ ................................ ......... 6 Table 4

- 1. Sample Severity and Likelihood Definitions

................................ ................................ ............. 23 Table 4

- 2. Sample Severity and Likelihood Definitions

................................ ................................ ............. 23 Figure 4

- 5. FAA Office of Airports’ Severity Definitions

................................ ................................ ......... 26 Figure 4

- 6. FAA Office of Airports’ Likelihood Definitions

................................ ................................ ..... 270 6 / 29 /2012 DRAFT AC 150/5200

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1 

## Chapter 1. Safety Management Systems (SMS) Overview

1. Background

.
The FAA is committed to improving safety in air transportation

. As the demand for air transportation increases, the impacts of additional air traffic and surface operations, changes in air traffic procedures, and airport construction can heighten the risks associated with aircraft operations

. While FAA regulations and technical operating standards ha ve effective ly addressed many of these risks
, they can st ill leave gaps best handled by enhanced airport safety management practices.

A irports best understand their own unique operating environments , so they are in the best position to address their safety issues

. The FAA will continue to conduct regular annual inspections at airports certificated under part 139 , but SMS will provide both certificated and other airports with a powerful tool for identifying hazards and mitigation strategies, communicating safety issues, promoting safety, and reduc ing the potentia l for accidents and incidents

.
2. What is SMS.
ICAO defines SMS as a “systematic approach to managing safety, including the necessary organizational structures, accountabilities, policies, and procedures

. ” 1 SMS is comprise d of four basic components:

 Safety Policy
,

 Safety Risk Management
,

 Safety Assurance
, and

 Safety Promotion.
The four components serve as the “basic building blocks of an SMS” (ICAO, 2009)

. Figure 1

- 1 defines these components and shows how the y relate to each other

. Safety Policy serves as t he foundation of SMS ; it documents the airport’s means of deploying the SMS

. Safety Risk Management (SRM) and Safety Assurance (SA) are the two operational components of SMS

. Safety Promotion encompass all three of the other components by ensuring that ind ividuals with a role in SMS are properly trained and that safety issues identified through any of the activities associated with the components are communicated.

1 International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), Safety Management M anual , at 6.5.3 ICAO Doc. 9859

- AN/474 (2 nd ed. 2009).DRAFT AC 150/5200

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2 Figure 1

- 1 . Four SMS Components
Components a re then subdivided into elements

. E lements represent subprocesses, policies, or procedures that support each of the four component s

. For example, Safety Policy typically include s a minimum of seven supporting elements

. Safety Risk Management typically incl udes a minimum of four supporting elements.

3. History.
SMS emerged as a recognized safety methodology about 30 years ago, as investigative inquiries after accidents began to focus on preventing accidents rather than just reacting to the causes of specific

ac cidents

. The “reactive mode” often resulted in “fixing” one series of causal factors supposedly related to a single accident and often led to severe restrictions and changes in regulations

. This kind of investigation could show “who” had the accident and “ what” happened, but gave less attention to identifying “how” and “why” it happened

. Industry started to accept the concept that failures, especially human failures at the operational level
, can trigger latent conditions that can then breach a system’s saf ety defenses

. I t became evident that by monitoring the organizational process and identifying and addressing these latent conditions
, c orrections could be made before an incident or accident occur red

.

T he “how” and “why” of incidents and accidents has bec ome much clearer due to the creation of James Reason’s “ Accident Causation Model ,” 2 shown in Figure 1

- 2. Reason used this model to transform thinking about safety and accident investigation. Rather than focus ing on an isolated event ( the “who,” “what
, ” and “when” ), Reason shift ed the focus to “organizational decisions” or “layers” of events that ultimately result ed in an accident. Of course , t here are limits to the application of the Reason model, so it must be seen as a theoretical framework and not a cure

- all . However, it is a tool that helps identify the chain of events leading to an incident or accident.

2 James Reason, Human Error, Ca mbridge University Press ( 1990 ).0 6 / 29 /2012 DRAFT AC 150/5200

- 37A

3 Figure 1

- 2

. Reason’s Accident Causation Model (Adapted )

Reason’s model was the true beginnin g of safety management . It relied on collecti ng data, identifying hazards and trends, determining risk severity, mitigating risk to an acceptable level , and establishing a safety culture

—

the basic components of SMS . The United States became a strong propon ent of SMS and supported ICAO ’s introduction of SMS and the amend ment of Annex 14, Aerodromes
, to require member states to implement SMS.

4. Current Applications of SMS.

SMS supports a pro

- active approach to safety through a framework of tools and methodologi es to address safety issues

. It also establishes a safety

- consc ious environment and culture

. It e n compasses all personnel in any operational area since observation, evaluation, and reporting are integral to achieving effective safety

- related outcomes

. In s hort, it implies there is a system with components that, when managed and directed accurately, can achieve an improved level of safety and eliminate or mitigate the conditions that can result in accidents

. Having an SMS does not mean an airport will be acc ident

- free , but when implemented, it facilitates a safer airport and aviation system.

This AC focuses on developing and implementing SMS in the airport environment (including airport movement and non

- movement areas). Under SMS, t he interdependencies within the airport operational environment become much more apparent

. However, airport operators can apply these principals anywhere on their airports (including the landside environment) to address safety concerns.
While there are costs associated with implemen ting an SMS, the Transportation Research Board’s Airport Cooperative Research Program (ACRP) 2009 report 3 identified the following as potential benefits:

 Reduced likelihood of accidents,

3 Transportation Research Board. (2009). Airport Cooperative Research Program Report 1, Safety Management Systems for Airports, Volume 2: Guidebook [Adobe Digital Editions version]. Retrieved from http://www.trb.org/Publications/Blurbs/162491.aspx

.DRAFT AC 150/5200

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4  Reduced costs related to accidents and incidents,

 Assurance that a sy stematic process is in place to monitor and address safety issues in a transparent and informed way,

 The potential for reduced insurance and liability costs,

 Competitive advantage and the possibility of more business opportunities,

 Improved regulatory com pliance,

 Improved employee morale and performance,

 Identification of the best use of limited resources,

 Reduced reliance on a few key personnel,

 Improved control, and

 Consistency.

5. Format of this AC.

The AC contains six chapters

. Chapter 2 explains how to begin developing an SMS and the required documentation

. Appendices C, D, E , and F include a s ample Implementation Plan , SMS Manual, and Safety Dashboards

. Chapters 3 through 6 address the four components of SMS : Safety Policy, Safety Risk Management, Safet y Assurance, and Safety Promotion

. Each chapter begins by defining the component and examining how it could be applied on the airport

. The chapters also include examples to help operator s of each type of airport understand the component better and determin e what is appropriate for
, and applicable to
, their facilities

.
6. Scalability

. Airports are each unique , not only in physical layout but also in management structure and
, often, in management style. Therefore
, a one

- size

- fits

- all approach to SMS is not advi sable

. This AC stress es the importance of recognizing that small, medium, and large airports have different operational environments and different levels of resources

. Airport operators of small airports can use simple methods for conducting the processes with in the SMS . M edium and large airports may require more detailed processes within the SMS.
At airports that have only a manager and perhaps minimal support staff to carry out daily responsibilities, this AC suggests a common sense approach to the SMS

. The manager may handle most of the SMS processes alone

. At medium and large airports, the complexity and departmentalization of duties on the airport may require that more personnel be involved in the SMS

. Regardless of airport size, many certificated airp orts will find their existing processes and procedures can serve as the foundation for portions of their SMS.0 6 / 29 /2012 DRAFT AC 150/5200

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5 

## Chapter 2. Getting Started

1. Introduction

. Shifting from a reactive to a proactive approach to safety management takes time and considerable effort

. Therefor e, an airport should methodically develop an SMS that utilizes existing policies and procedures as much as possible and document and communicate changes related to SMS development and deployment

. Managers, employees, and tenants may resist change
, so train ing and communication will be crucial to gaining buy

- in and participation in the SMS

. Airports may find it helpful to appoint an individual or team to coordinat e the dev elopment and deployment of SMS

- related processes

. This individual, commonly referred to as an SMS Champion 4

, does not need to be the individual ultimately responsible for daily oversight of the SMS but should have credibility and authority throughout the airport and with its stakeholders

. Similarly, if a team approach is used, the team shoul d comprise individuals with a variety of backgrounds and authority throughout the airport to facilitate wide

- spread buy

- in and support for the SMS.
Regardless of the initial approach, it is essential that airports establish certain document ation requiremen ts to build a solid foundation for SMS implementation and operation

.
2. Documentation

.
There are three levels of documentation in an SMS : implementation

- related documentation, deployment

related documentation, and ongoing documentation

. Later chapters address d ocumentation related to SMS requirements like Safety Risk Management, which are developed on an on

- going basis.
Typical documentation required for SMS development and deployment include an SMS Implementation Plan and an SMS Manual

. Certificated a irports may also choose to incorporate the requirements of SMS directly into their Airport Certification Manual s instead of creating separate SMS Manual s

.
3. SMS Implementation Plans

.
The airport should create an SMS Implementation Plan early in the development of it s SMS

. The SMS Implementation Plan should clearly identify a realistic strategy for implementing SMS through a framework and series of steps

. By documenting this strategy, the airport can ensure consistency in its implementation

. Some airports may find it helpful to conduct a gap analysis as a way to understand what the airport does today related to safety and what it needs to do in the future to satisfy an SMS

. The gap analysis can be as simple or complex as the airport desires

. In its simplest form, a gap analysis identif ies existing processes and procedures required by regulation or established for safe operations and then compare s them to SMS requirements

. This process identifies and highlights g aps between the two

. The ACRP ’s SMS for Airports Volume 2: Guidebook and ICAO’s Safety Management Manual provide examples of gap analysis tools and documentation.

4 ACRP’s SMS for Airports Volume 2: Guidebook, identifies the SMS Champion as the individual or team responsible for coordination and promotion of SMS related implementation. The main role of the SMS Champion is project management for SMS implementation and this individual or team may be different from the manager appointed to pro vide daily oversight of the SMS once operational.DRAFT AC 150/5200

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6 Regardless of whether a gap analysis is used, the airport should identify and use existing processes and procedures as much as possible when developing the SMS

. This will add value and credibility to the SMS

s ince employees will already be familiar with them

. It may also lessen implementation costs

. Table 2

- 1 includes e xamples of existing processes and procedures that can serve as the foundation for SMS

c omponents and elements.

Table 2

- 1. Examples of Existing Processes and Procedures

Existing Policy/Procedure/Practice Adaptability to SMS

Policy Statement Safety Policy

. Many airport governing bodies have policy statements

. These preexisti ng statements may include safety

- related initiatives or may be geared solely toward employee safety

. Using this policy as a foundation or revising it to address operational safety (and not just employee safety ) can help in the develop ment of a Safety Polic y Statement.

Daily Self

- Inspections Safety Assurance

. Daily self

- inspections performed to meet part 139 requirements or airport

imposed requirements are good means of identifying safety hazards.

Airport Committees Safety Promotion & Safety Risk Manageme nt

. Many airports have preexisting airport committees made up of airport staff and managers or stakeholders like air carriers, fixed

- base operators, and airport tenants

. These committees can serve two roles under SMS

. They can help communicate important sa fety issues and initiatives as part of Safety Promotion

. Also, they can identify individuals needed for safety risk assessments as part of Safety Risk Management.

Airport Intranet or Internet Website Safety Assurance & Safety Promotion

. Airport internet o r intranet websites provide excellent means for distributing safety information to employees and tenants as part of Safety Promotion

. These sites can also house portals to the airport’s hazard reporting system as part of Safety Assurance.

Training Safety Promotion

. SMS training and safety awareness can be included in preexisting training programs, saving time and reducing implementation costs.

Record k eeping Safety Risk Management & Safety Promotion

. Preexisting recordkeeping practices can serve as0 6 / 29 /2012 DRAFT AC 150/5200

- 37A

7 the fou ndation for documentation and tracking of Safety Risk Management findings and training/communication performed under Safety Promotion.

Appendix C includes a sample Implementation Plan

. Note that an SMS Implementation Plan is more than just a checklist or table ; it allows the airport to explain its approach to implementation, discuss any strategies or challenges concerning deployment, and identify major milestones

. The accompanying checklist can be tailored to the airport’s needs

. The sample includes a “Sta tus” column , allowing it to

serve not only as a one

- time plan
, but also as a n ongoing tool for communicat ing implementation status to management

. Therefore, airports should update their SMS Implementation Plans frequently and consider using them to update executives on the status of developing and implementing the SMS.

4. SMS Manual

. An airport may choose to develop an SMS Manual to document how it complies with the four components of SMS and their elements

. ACRP’s SMS for Airports Volume 2: Guidebook describe s the SMS Manual as follows:

The SMS Manual describes the SMS elements and how they will be established and will function

. It is a document that may resemble the ACM

. Whereas the ACM describes how the airport operates, the SMS manual describes how the SMS functions.
Appendix D provides an example showing the preferred arrangement of an SMS Manual

. However, not all SMS Manuals will look alike

. Manuals will vary in size, specificity, and scope

. The airport should tailor the manual to meet its unique operation al and governance needs.

This AC focuses on SMS application on the airside ; however, airports may choose to apply SMS to their landside or terminal environments
, as well

. If so, the SMS Manual can discuss these additional areas , but landside or terminal di scussions should be kept separate from airside applications

. Also, some airport governing bodies with multiple airports in their system may choose to develop one SMS Manual for the entire system instead of individual SMS Manuals for each airport

. This meth od is acceptable as long as all included airports understand how the manual applies to them

. The SMS Manual should remain a living document . The airport should review and updat e it as needed and communicate changes to all individual s with a need to know.

5. A CM Revision

. Because SMS is not currently required under part 139, airports should keep SMS related documentation such as SMS Manuals and Implementation Plans separate from their Airport Certification Manuals.DRAFT AC 150/5200

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8 This page intentionally left blank0 6 / 29 /201 2 DRAFT AC 150/5200

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9 

## Chapter 3. S afety Policy

1. Introduction

. Safety Policy , t he first of the four SMS components, provides the foundation or framework for the SMS

. S afety Policy is the statement and documentation adopted by an airport that defines its commitment to safety and its overall safety vision

. Airport management develop s , document s , and communicat es a Safety Policy that demonstrates its commitment to providing a safe and secure environment for the passengers, employees, and users of the airport’s services.

Figure 3

- 1 shows the numerous elements that make up Safety Polic y:

Figure 3

- 1 . Safety P olicy

2. Developing and Implementing the Safety Policy

.

a. Identify the accountable executive

. The accountable executive is the person designated by the airport to act on its behalf for the implementation and maintenance of the SMS

. T he support of a senior executive is essential; otherwise
, there is little incentive for employees and tenants to actively participate in SMS activities and initiatives

. The accountab le executive should have sufficient control over human and financial resources for the airport to ensure that enough personnel and funding are available to develop and implement the SMS

. A key point of SMS is ensuring that top management within the airport is aware of the safety issues and hazards identified on the airport

. In many cases, the accountable executive will have minimal daily hands

on management of the SMS. However, at times this person may need to make decisions related to particular safety is sues and hazards

.DRAFT AC 150/5200

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10 A irports that are governed by larger entities such as city councils, airport authorities, or governing boards may find it challenging to identify a single individual to act in this role

. However, an airp ort should strive to identify a sin gle individual in a senior executive leadership position within the airport management structure

. Ideally , this individual could be one of the following : the Airport Director, the Airport Manager, or the Chief Executive Officer.

The accountable executive s hould not delegate overall responsibility for SMS oversight

. However, this individual may wish to delegate responsibility for daily oversight and the administration of SMS

- related processes or initiatives to an SMS Manager, SMS Coordinator, or SMS Administ rator

. ( The airport should refrain from calling this supporting position the Safety Manager because it might infer or imply that managing safety is the responsibility of that division or manager alone and not of any other airport department

. ) T he ICAO Saf ety Management Manual (200 9) and ACRP’s SMS for Airports Volume 2: Guidebook (2009 ) provide characteristics, job descriptions, and tasks for this supporting position.
Smaller airport organizations may choose to identify only an accountable executive

. L arge r air ports with

more complex organizational structures may choose to identify an accountable executive and support staff, including an SMS Manager, for the daily implementation and oversight of the SMS

. Either method is acceptable as long as the accountabl e executive is regularly apprised of :

 P ertinent safety information , including the airport’s performance toward its safety objectives ( see section f below ) ;

 C ritical safety information commun icated to employees a nd tenants ;

 T he status of ongoing mitigations required under the airport’s SRM policies ( see Chapter 4 ) ; and

 T he status of SMS implementation

.
b. Identify and communicate the safety organizational structure

. It is important to identify the position s and off ices within the airport organization that have responsibility f or or play a role in the safety of airport operations

. This includes the “chain of command” and the means by which airport employees report their safety concerns, hazards, and other safety

- rela ted information

. Identifying the safety organizational structure begins with the accountable executive and flows from there through the organization

. T ypically , this structure includes airport o perations departments as well as Maintenance and Public Safety

. It may also include any Human Resources divisions responsible for employee safety issues

. At a small airport, with a flattened management structure and few employees, there may be straight

- line reporting to the accountable executive. At medium and large airports, there usually is a more detailed reporting structure in place, with department supervisors or line managers first in line to receive and act on information about safety concerns, hazard reports, and other safety

- related items.
Each manager accoun table for safety and with responsibilities under SMS should be identified, and each employee should know the point of contact for particular safety issues. This identification ensures that senior management is aware of the daily activities of the various d epartments and can play an active role in airport safety or the managemen t/direction of SMS initiatives.0 6 / 29 /201 2 DRAFT AC 150/5200

- 37A

11 An organizational chart can provide the simplest means of communicating the safety organizational structure

. Figure 3

- 2 provides a sample organization al chart for safety oversight.

Figure 3

- 2. Sample Organizational Chart for Safety Oversight
If the airport establishes a Safety or SMS Committee to help promot e SMS initiatives, make decision s , or perform othe r SMS activities, the chart should include the SMS Committee

. Safety Committees are usually made up of members of airport departments, tenant organizations, and airport stakeholders and are often chaired by the accountable executive or the SMS Manager

. Dep ending on the complexity of the committee’s structure, the airport may find it useful to include a separate organizational chart identify ing committee members and showing how the committee interacts with airport management.

c. Identify the lines of safety res ponsibility and accountability

.
Once the airport identifies the positions and divisions with roles in ensuring safe operations, it should

ensure their responsibilities and accountabilities are clearly defined and documented

. The airport should create p osi tion descriptions for each position and division with safety oversight

. For example, employees with airfield access play a role in safety; they report hazards and identify safety issues to the proper point of contact or the airport’s hazard reporting syste m

. Additionally, a irfield operations specialists or inspectors conducting daily self

- inspections play a role; they identify safety issues through the course of their inspections and so also contribute to safety oversight.
While the safety organizational st ructure may best be depicted in an organization al chart, safety responsibilities and accountabilities are best described in the SMS Manual

. Once these descriptions are developed, the airport must make them available to all identified individuals so they un derstand their responsibilities under the SMS.
When describing responsibilities and accountabilities , only include those items related to safety and the implementation and oversight of SMS

- related initiatives

. General job descriptions are best kept in huma nDRAFT AC 150/5200

- 37 A 0 6 / 29 /201 2

12 resource document s , not the SMS Manual

. However, if new positions are created to support SMS development and implementation, the airport may choose to incorporate these job descriptions and tasks into this section since they specifically relate to safety oversight and the SMS.
Figure 3

- 3 depicts an excerpt from the Safety Responsibilities section of an SMS Manual

. Notice that it includes descriptions for all positions/divisions identified in the organizational chart show n in Figure 3

- 2

. It also contains a broad concluding statement that encompasses the responsibility every individual with access to the movement and non

- movement area has for hazard reporting

.

Figure 3

- 3. Sample Safety Responsibilities

d. Establis h and maintain a S afety P olicy S tatement

. Normally established early in SMS development, the Safety Policy Statement documents airport management’s commitment to providing a safe airport

. Frequently confused with the overall Safety Policy component, the S afety Policy Statement is just one element of many that encompas s the Safety Policy component

.0 6 / 29 /201 2 DRAFT AC 150/5200

- 37A

13 By developing
, accepting , and giving visibility to the Safety Policy Statement early in SMS development, airport management and the accountable executive show t heir support for SMS and its development and deployment

. This assures airport personnel that management is leading the effort to make safety a priority and assures the travelling public that airport management and airport personnel are striving to improve safety. The accountable executive signs this statement to formally express airport management’s commitment to the SMS as well as its processes and initiatives

. Alternatively, t he Safety Policy component, as documented in the SMS Manual, outlines the method s and processes the airport will use to achieve the desired safety outcomes.

The statement should be easily understood by managers, employees, and tenants and take into account the airport’s complexity and structure

. When developing the Safety Policy Stat ement, airports should look to existing Policy Statements, Mission Statements, or other high

- level concept documents as models

. For example, many airports owned by municipalit ies may already have Safety Statement s from their local government s

. The airport may be able to build on or replace these preexisting documents but should consult its legal department before doing so

. Internal policies or regulations may prevent s ome airports from using the term s “Policy” or “Statement”

. If so , it is acceptable to call the Safety Policy Statement by another name, as long as it includes the necessary commitments to SMS implementation and operation s

. There is no prescribed length for a Safety Policy Statement; they typically range from one paragraph to one page in length. A Safety Policy Statement should contain the following items:

 A commitment to make airport safety the highest priority

.

 The commitment of senior airport management to implement SMS

.

 A commitment to continually improve safety on the airport

.

 The encourage ment of employees to report safety issues without fear of reprisal

.

 A commitment to provide the necessary resources needed for safe operations

.

 A commitment to comply with all regulatory requirements related to safety

. (Adapted from ACRP’s SMS for Airports Volume 2: Guidebook)

A Safety Policy Statement should not include:

 Unrealistic commitment s , such as a zero accident rate

. SMS will help facilitate a safer airport and aviation system. It does not guarantee the airport will be accident or incident free

.

 T he airport’s safety objectives and goals ( see S ection f below )

. These objectives and goals may change frequently over time; the Safety Policy Statement should not

. Figures 3

- 4 and 3

- 5 provide examples of Safety Policy Statements

. Figure 3

- 4 shows a statement that would be appropriate for a small airport. It is simple, concise, and expresses the core principles of SMS.DRAFT AC 150/5200

- 37 A 0 6 / 29 /201 2

14 Figure 3

- 4

. Simple Safety Policy Statement
Figur e 3

- 5 presents a more complex statement more suited to an airport where several departments have responsibilities for separate but interdependent f unction s on the airport. Without identifying each department, the statement makes clear there are many types of airport personnel with safety

- related roles. It also explains that an office charged with safety oversight is necessary to meet the wide

- ranging responsibilit ies of the SMS.

Excelsior airport

1 Airport Boulevard Mon terey, CA 90293

June 7, 201 2

The Excelsior Airport is committed to the implementation of a Safety Management System (SMS) that enables its management, employees, the airlines, tenants, and other busi ness partners to operate in a safe environment. Safety is among the Airport’s highest priorities. The Airport is dedicated to creating an environment that minimizes exposure to hazards and risks, expects continuous safety improvement, and encourages confid ential reporting of any safety related situation, incident, or accident. We will ensure that necessary policy direction and resources are available to enable the success of the SMS, compliance with standards and regulations, and enhanced operational safety

.

John R. Smith

John R. Smith Airport Manager0 6 / 29 /201 2 DRAFT AC 150/5200

- 37A

15 Figure 3

- 2

. Complex Safety Policy Statement

e. Ensure the Safety Policy Statement is available to all employees

. Making the safety policy statement available to all airport personnel and tenants confirms management’s intention to prioritiz e safety. The airpor t can issue the statement to each airport employee
, make it available online , and/or post it in prominent locations throughout the airport

. The airport should also give it to tenants since their employees should understand their role in reporting hazards a nd contributing to airport safety

. M ention ing the policy statement frequently and periodically adding excerpts of it to bulletins and other documents co n firm s airport management’s continuing commitment and reinforc e s its safety focus to the entire airport community.

xyz A uthority

SUPERIOR INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT

100 Lake Shore Blvd. Minocqua, WI 54548

April 1, 2012

Superior International Airport employees and tenants shall systematically integrate safety into management a nd work practices at all levels so that airport operations are accomplished safely. The application of an effective Safety Management System (SMS) is integral to all of our airport activities with the objective of achieving the highest levels of safety sta ndards and performance. Safety is the responsibility of everyone and the participation of airport and tenant employees is paramount to the success of the SMS. Our commitment is to:

 Continuously promote a safety culture across all airport operations that

re cognizes the importance of safety in our daily activities and the value of an effective SMS. Encourage confidential hazard reporting by all employees and tenants.

 Ensure all staff members are aware of their responsibilities and accountabilities in the exec ution of and participation in the SMS. Provide adequate and appropriate safety information and training.

 Provide skilled and trained personnel and other resources necessary to ensure the effectiveness of the SMS.

 Analyze and manage risk(s) associated with airport

- related operations, incidents, or accidents.

 Comply with local, State, and Federal legislative and regulatory requirements and standards. Continue to improve our safety performance.

Jane L. Doster Aviation DirectorDRAFT AC 150/5200

- 37 A 0 6 / 29 /201 2

16 f. Establish and maintain safety objectives

. Under Safety Policy, the airport establish es and maintain s safety objectives . These objectives will help focus employees and management when developing and implementing the various processes and proc edures under SMS

. Articulating objectives and sharing related metrics allow the airport, its stakeholders, and the FAA to verify achievements or progress toward the airport’s safety improvement

. The airport should tie its s afety objectives to its Safety As surance activities ( see Chapter 5 .) That is, when the airport conducts its evaluations to verify safety performance, it should do so with these objectives in mind.
Safety objectives should be specific to the airport but can be tied to national

- level obje ctives set by the FAA, state aviation organizations, or industry groups (e.g., national effort to reduce the number of vehicle / pedestrian deviations )

. Additionally, airports may choose to develop more specific goals or targets related to these objectives. “Examples of Safety Objectives and Goals” illustrates the differences between an objective and a goal.
The airport should k eep the following points in mind when developing the airport’s safety objectives:

 Specific: The objective should be focused

on one thing only.

 Measurable: It should be possible to measure whether the airport meet s the objective

.

 Achievable: The objective should be within the airport’s capabilities.

 Relevant: The objective should be something of importance or significance to safety

.

 Timed: There should be a defined deadline for meeting the objective.
(Adapted from ACRP’s SMS for Airports Volume 2: Guidebook)
As discussed in Chapter 5 , Safety Assurance, the airport should establish processes to report progress on the airport’s safet y objectives on a regular basis

. Once objectives are met, the airport should develop new safety objectives and communicate them throughout the airport community. Examples of Safety Objectives
an d Goals
Safety Objective 1 : Reduce the number of accidents on the airport by x% in x years.
Safety Objective 2 : Reduce the number of foreign object debris (FOD) occurrences by x% in x months.
Safety Objective 3 : Reduce the number of vehicle/pedestrian d eviations by x% in x years.

 Goal 3.1: Increase the number of driver training sessions by x% in x years.

 Goal 3.2: Develop and promote a driver training promotion program within x months.0 6 / 29 /201 2 DRAFT AC 150/5200

- 37A

17 

## Chapter 4. Safety Risk Management (SRM)

1. Introduction

.
SRM is the s econd component of SMS and considered a core operational component because of its related elements

. SRM uses a set of standard processes to identify hazards formally in a proactive manner, analyze and assess potential risks, and design appropriate risk mit igation strategies

. Figure 4

- 1 depicts the minimum elements of SRM. When properly implemented, SRM processes also promote productive communication among stakeholders and a positive safety culture within and around the airport environment.
A comprehensive S MS using SRM provides management with a tool for identifying hazards and risks and prioritiz ing their resolution

. While each airport’s SRM processes may be unique to the airport’s operations , physical geometry, history of incidents, and organizational stru cture, the airport should develop processes and procedures for hazard identification and analysis appropriate to the airport’s operating environment

. As previously stated, SMS processes and procedures should be scalable; the airport’s SRM program should be scalable, as well

.

Figure 4

- 1

. Elements of SRM
The SRM component is sometimes used synonymously with one of its elements

— the systematic process to analyze hazards and their assoc iated risks (i.e., the “ 5

- step process ” )

. While a very important part of SRM, the 5

- step process is not the only part of a comprehensive SRM program.

2. Developing and Implementing Safety Risk Management

.

a. Establish a system for identifying safety issues

.
Ide ntifying safety issues is an essential step in proactive risk management

. While the airport may have processes in place that support the identification of safety issues , it should ensure these processes are documented and communicated for further assessmen t. T he airport should implement identification processes and procedures that reflect the management structure and complexity of the airport environment

.DRAFT AC 150/5200

- 37 A 0 6 / 29 /201 2

18 The term “hazard” will confuse many individuals

. Therefore, the system put in place under this requirem ent should identify safety issues or changes to the airport’s operations or ge ometry that could create hazards

. Safety issues can be identified through the following:

 The airport’s hazard reporting system (see Chapter 5, Safety Assurance ) ;

 Airport self

- ins pections ;

 Maintenance activities ; or

 Manager or tenant meetings.

Furthermore, the evaluation of certain activities or events may identify safety issues. T hese include:

 Airport accidents or incidents ;

 Airfield changes (including geometry, construction, conv ersion from movement to non

movement areas, airfield procedures, and pavement marking modifications ) ;

 Irregular o perations or events ;

 Winter weather operations ;

 Tenant operational changes (including new servicing eq uipment and aircraft using airport ) ; and

 Ramp operations (including use of ramp for activities not originally intended)

.
b. Establish a systematic process to analyze hazards and their associated risks.
Using the SRM process, airport s can develop an approach appropriate to the ir operational environm ent

. Any of the items listed above could potentially introduce new hazards in the airfield environment

. Therefore, airport management should formally determine whether those hazards create a level of risk that the airport is willing to accept

. For those ha zards with unacceptable risk, the airport should ensure mitigations are in place or stop the operation

. The airport should have processes in place to ensure events that could produce hazards automatically trigger the 5

- step hazard assessment process. For e xample, the 5

- step process should be triggered if an airport tenant notifies the airport of a change in the type of aircraft servicing the airport

. The airport’s 5

- step process should also be triggered for hazards reported through the airport’s hazard repo rting system.

The 5

- step hazard assessment process provides a framework and guidance that serve all airports, from those whose operational environments are simple and uncomplicated to those whose are complex and extensive. Since resources are involved, the scalability of this effort is key to making it work

. Figure 4

- 2 shows the 5

- step process

.0 6 / 29 /201 2 DRAFT AC 150/5200

- 37A

19 Figure 4

- 2 . Five Steps of SRM
The airport should identify who conducts the 5

- step process

. Anyone operating on the airfield can i dentify hazards. However, individuals responsible for conducting or leading the 5

- step hazard analysis process should have proper training and oversight to ensure that the process is compl eted correctly and consistently.
In some cases, the airport may want more than one individual completing the 5

- step process, usually when more subject

- matter expertise is required for adequate analysis

. In these cases, the airport may want to ensure that i ndividuals receive proper instruction on how to complete the process, the airport’s risk analysis tools, and the airport’s risk acceptance procedures. The airport’s SMS Manual should clearly explain how the airport will select individuals or organizations to participate in the 5

- step process.

(1) Describe the system

. The first step of the 5

- step process is to describe the system

. The system description depicts the operating environment in which the hazards will be identified

. The description of the system sets the boundaries for hazard identification

. Questions that help define this description could include the following:

(a) What are the meteorological conditions ( e.g., VMC or IMC? )

(b) Are seasonal conditions involved and are they abnormal?

(c) Are there known defects o r deficiencies (e.g., paved area problems, safety area problems, deteriorated marking, missing or deficient signs, or lighting deficiencies)?

(d) Is time of day or night a factor?

(e) Is traffic volume involved (peak activity or low activity)?

(f) Do normal operation s prevail or are there abnormal conditions like construction or a closed runway or taxiway?

(g) What type of infrastructure or media is involved (e.g., runway, taxiway, apron, or drainage facility)?DRAFT AC 150/5200

- 37 A 0 6 / 29 /201 2

20 Airports can choose from s everal models to help define their operational environments

. For example, t he 5M Model is used to deconstruct the proposed change or condition for analysis to distinguish elements that are part of, or impacted by, the proposed change or condition

. These elements later help identify

sources , causes, hazards, and current and proposed hazard mitigations. The 5M Model analyzes five elements for impacts: Mission, Man, Machine, Management
, and Media ( s ee Figure 4

- 3 ) . These elements are defined as follows:

 Mission

– A clearly defined role of the SRM panel
, describing, in detail, the operation or change

.

 (hu)Man/Person

– The human operators or maintainers.

 Machine

– The equipment used in the system, including hardware, firmware, software, human

- to

system i nterface
, and avionics.

 Management

– The procedures and policies that govern the system’s behavior.

 Media

– The environment s in which the system is operated and maintained (i.e. , the airport).

Figure 4

- 3

. The 5M Model

(2) Identify the hazards

. T he second step of the hazard assessment process identifies hazards in a systematic way based on the system described in the first step

. A hazard is any condition that could foreseeably cause or contribute to an aircraft accident as defined in title 49 CFR 830.2
, Notification a nd0 6 / 29 /201 2 DRAFT AC 150/5200

- 37A

21 Reporting o f Aircraft Accidents o r Incidents a nd Overdue Aircraft, a nd Preservation o f Aircraft Wreckage, Mail, Cargo, a nd Records : Definitions.

The term hazard is often misused
, so it is importan t that the airport’s training program for those individuals conducting the 5

- step process ( s ee Chapter 6, Safety Promotion) clearly defines and provides examples of hazards

. A simple example of a hazard is snow or ice on active runways

. A hazard could also be a construction vehicle entering an active runway without clearance or a pilot’s los s of visibility on final approach due to dust from construction

. Hazards must be considered with respect to the original system description

. For example, a construction vehicle entering an active runway would only be reasonable if there is ongoing construction and the runway is in use. When identifying hazards, a ll possible sources of system failure should be considered

. Depending on the nature and size of the system unde r consideration, these sources could include:

 Equipment (e.g., construction equipment operating in or near the movement area ),

 The operating environment (e.g., weather conditions, season, or time of day ),

 Maintenance procedures (e.g., nightly movement area inspections ), and

 External services (e.g., ramp traffic by tenants or law enforcement vehicles)

. It may be best to identify the cause and effect to verify whether the hazard is actually a hazard

. For example, if there is snow on an active runway, the caus e would be accumulation of freezing precipitation and the likely effect would be limited braking action.

The use of a simple but well

- defined hazard analysis tool ensure s thorough assessment and documentation of SRM

. There are many tools available
, includ ing the Preliminary Hazard Analysis, Operational Safety Assessment, Comparative Safety Assessment, Fault

- Hazard Analysis, What

- If Analysis, Scenario Analysis, and the Fault Tree Analysis

. Airports may find it useful to use the Preliminary Hazard Analysis, since this is the primary analysis tool used by FAA Airports

. Figure 4

- 4 depicts the Preliminary Hazard Analysis Tool

. Once the airport selects a tool, it should use it continuously throughout the 5

- step process

. The tools are not interchangeable.

Figure 4

- 4

. Preliminary Hazard Analysis Worksheet

(3) Analyze the risk of identified hazards

. During the third step of hazard assessment
, the airport analyzes the risk associated with each of the hazards identified in the previous step

. For eachDRAFT AC 150/5200

- 37 A 0 6 / 29 /201 2

22 hazard, the airport sh ould consider the worst credible outcome (harm), which is the most unfavorable condition that is believable and possible given the system state described in step one.
It is important to remember that in identifying hazards, airports should strive for rea sonable assessments that cite credible outcomes

. N ot all hazards could technically result in a catastrophic accident

. The airport should strive for quantitative or real

- life examples of outcomes based on the hazard

. Using examples from airports of similar size and operations may help add credibility.
Using the previous example of snow on the active runway , the worst credible outcome based on the system description (e.g., daytime versus nighttime operations or VFR versus IFR operations) is established

. The w orst credible outcome without consideration to the unique airport environment is likely a runway excursion

. Whether that excursion results in significant damage or loss of life will be determined based on the system description

. For example, at an airport that lacks standard safety areas or has non

- frangible objects in the safety areas, the end result of a runway excursion could be worse than at an airport with standard safety areas.

Based on the worst credible outcome of each hazard , the airport then dete rmines the severity and likelihood of that outcome using qualitative and/or quantitative methods

. To do this, the airport should have pre

- defined Severity and L ikelihood levels

. These levels are typically unique to each organization, since they are managem ent’s means of defining what constitutes acceptable and unacceptable levels of risk. The airport should develop these levels commensurate with its operational needs and complexity.
Severity and Likelihood levels and definitions should reflect both quantita tive and qualitative values

. In some cases, the airport may have data to draw on to establish a quantitative value for things like likelihood

. In others, it may have to rely on the subject

- matter expertise of those individuals completing the analysis.
Agai n, the airport should develop its own definitions and categories based on its unique operating environment

. However, many airports may find it useful to use a standard five

- level or three

- level system

. Table s 4

- 1 and 4

- 2 depict two samples of five

- level Se verity and Likelihood definitions.0 6 / 29 /201 2 DRAFT AC 150/5200

- 37A

23 Table 4

- 1

. Sample Severity and Likelihood Definitions



### Severity

Negligible Minor Major Hazardous Catastrophic

No first aid required injury/illness; no lost work time; none to very limited operational impact (less than 1 hour ) ; none to minimal equipment loss ( less than 1 day out of service ) ; no environmental impact; none to minimal budget impact I njury/illness ( first

aid required ); little to no lost work time ( less tha n 2 da ys ) ; none to v ery limited operational impact ( less than 4 hours ) ; none to minimal equipment loss ( less than 2 days out of service ) ; contained with none to limited impact to environment; minimal budget impact Injury/illness ( 1 to 5

persons ) ; death ( less tha n 2 persons ) ; lost work time ( less than 1 week ) ; loss of total operations ( less than 2 hours ) ; loss of partial operations ( less than1 day ) ; equipment loss ( less than 1week ) ; non

contained ( manageable/ mitigat e d within 1 day ) ; moderate budget impact Injury /illness ( 6 to

49 persons ) ; death (less than 5 persons) ; lost work time ( 1 week to 1 month ); loss of total operation ( 2 to 12 hours ) ; partial loss of operation ( 48 hours or less ) ; equipment loss ( less than 30 days ) ; non

contained, resulting in environmenta l impact ( 1 to 30 day ) ; serious budget impact Injury/illness

( greater than 50 persons ) ; death ( g reater than 5 persons ) ; lost work time ( greater than 1 month ) ; loss of total operation (greater than 12 hours ) ; loss of partial operations ( greater than 48 hour s ) ; total loss of equipment; non

contained resulting in long

- term environmental impact ( greater than 30 days ) ; grave budget impact



### Likelihood

Extremely Improbable Extremely

Remote Remote Probable Frequent

Almost impossible; possibly only once in 10 to 1 00 years Conceivable but

highly unlikely; possibly once in every 5 to less than 10 years Possibly once a year

or multiple times from 1 year to less than 5 years;

u nlikely but possible to occur Likely to occur

multiple times per year or once per month; reg ularly expected to occur in the system Likely to occur once

a day or multiple times per week; continuously expected to occur in the system

Table 4

- 2. Sample Severity and Likelihood Definitions



### Severity

People Assets Reputation

Catast rophic Fatality Loss of an aircraft/or over $ 1 million in damage/or loss of critical system(s) for an extended period of time An event or series of events resulting in the community not using the airport for an extended period of time

Hazardous Severe injury

(requiring hospitalization) Damage to an aircraft taking it

out of service for an extended period of time/or damage in An event or a series of events resulting in the community lessening the use of the airportDRAFT AC 150/5200

- 37 A 0 6 / 29 /201 2

24 excess of $500,000/or disruption of critical services for extended period of time causing negative financial or operational impacts

Major Minor injury

(requiring medical treatment) Damage to an aircraft that is

repairable/or damage to equipment or facility that is reparable within a short per iod of time An event or a series of events resulting in the community lessening the use of the airport for a short period of time

Minor Minor injury (not

requiring medical treatment) Minor damage to an aircraft,

equipment, or facility not requiring it to be taken out of service An event or a series of events resulting in the community questioning the reliability of the airport

No Safety Effect No injury No d amage No impact



### Likelihood

Frequent Occurs once every month or 3,000 aircraft operations or 25,00 0 enplanements

Probable Occurs once every year or 34,000 aircraft operations or 300,000 enplanements

Remote Occurs once every 5 years or 170,000 aircraft operations or 1,500,000 enplanements

Extremely Remote Occurs once every 10 years or 340,000 aircraf t operations or 3,000,000 enplanements

Extremely Improbable Occurs once every 10+ years or 340,000+ aircraft operations or 3,000,000+ enplanements

The FAA developed Severity and Likelihood definitions , depicted in Figures 4

- 5 and 4

- 6, for its hazard

ass essments

. Airports do not need to use the FAA definitions when developing their own, but they will need to reference them when participating in FAA

- led hazard assessments . They should ensur e that airport participants on FAA

- led panels understand any differ ences ( s ee section 4
, Integrated SRM Efforts

. )

.0 6 / 29 /201 2 DRAFT AC 150/5200

- 37A

25 Effect On: Minimal

5 Minor

4 Major

3 Hazardous

2 Catastrophic

1 ATC Services Conditions resulting in a minimal reduction in ATC

ser vices, or a loss of separation resulting in a Category D Runway Incursion (RI), Operational Deviation (OD) or Proximity Event (PE) Conditions resulting

in a slight reduction in ATC services, or a loss of separation resulting in a Category C RI, or Operatio nal Error (OE) Conditions resulting

in a partial loss of ATC services, or a loss of separation resulting in a Category B RI or OE Conditions resulting

in a total loss of ATC services (ATC Zero), or a loss of separation resulting in a Category A RI or OE Co nditions resulting

in a collision between aircraft, obstacles, or terrain

Flight Crew - Flight crew receives TCAS Traffic Advisory (TA) informing of nearby traffic

- PD where loss of airborne separation falls within the same parameters of a Class D OE or PE

- Minimal effect on operation of aircraft - Potential for PD due

to TCAS Preventive Resolution Advisory (PRA) advising crew not to deviate from present vertical profile

- PD where loss of airborne separation falls within the same parameters of Category C OE

- Reduction of functional capability of aircraft but does not impact overall safety (e.g., normal procedures as per AFM) - PD due to response

to TCAS Corrective Resolution Advisory (CRA) issued advising crew to take vertical action to avoid developing confli ct with traffic

- PD where loss of airborne separation falls within the same parameters of a Category B OE

- Reduction in safety margin or functional capability of the aircraft, requiring crew to follow abnormal procedures as per AFM - Near mid

- air

collision (NMAC) results due to proximity of less than 500 feet from another aircraft or a report is filed by pilot or flight crew member that a collision hazard existed between two or more aircraft

- Reduction in safety margin and functional capability of the aircra ft requiring crew to follow emergency procedures as per AFM Conditions resulting

in a mid

- air collision (MAC) or impact with obstacle or terrain resulting in hull loss, multiple fatalities, or fatal injury

Flying Public Minimal injury or discomfort to
pas senger(s) - Physical discomfort

to passenger(s) (e.g., extreme braking action; clear air turbulence causing unexpected movement of aircraft causing injuries to one or two passengers out of their seats)

- Minor injury to greater than zero to less or equal to 10% of passengers - Physical distress on

passengers (e.g., abrupt evasive action; severe turbulence causing unexpected aircraft movements)

- Minor injury to greater than 10% of
passengers Serious injury to

passenger(s) Fatalities, or fatal

injury to
passenge r(s)DRAFT AC 150/5200

- 37 A 0 6 / 29 /201 2

26 Effect On: Minimal

5 Minor

4 Major

3 Hazardous

2 Catastrophic

1

Airport No damage to aircraft but minimal injury or discomfort of little consequence to passenger(s) or worker(s) - Minimal damage to

aircraft

- Minor injury to passenger(s)

- Minimal unplanned airport operations limitations (e.g., taxiway closure)

- Min or incident involving the use of airport emergency procedures - Major damage to

aircraft and/or minor injury to passenger(s)/ worker(s)

- Major unplanned disruption to airport operations

- Serious incident

- Reduction on the airport’s ability to deal with adver se conditions - Severe damage to

aircraft and/or serious injury to passengers(s)/ worker(s)

- Complete unplanned airport closure

- Major unplanned operations limitations (e.g., runway closure)

- Major airport damage to equipment and facilities - Complete loss of

aircraft and/or facilities or fatal injury to passenger(s)/ worker(s)

- Complete unplanned airport closure and destruction of critical facilities

- Airport facilities and equipment destroyed

Minor Injury Any injury that is neither fatal nor serious. Serio us Injury Any injury which: (1) requires hospitalization for more than 48 hours, commencing within 7

days from the date the injury was received; (2) results in a fracture of any bone (except simple fractures of fingers, toes, or nose); (3) causes severe he morrhages, nerve, muscle, or tendon damage; (4) involves any internal organ; or (5) involves second

- or third

- degree burns, or any burns affecting more than 5 percent of the body surface. Fatal Injury Any injury that results in death within 30 days of the accident.

Figure 4

- 5. FAA Office of Airports’ Severity Definitions 5

5 Adapted from FAA Order 5200.11, FAA Office of Airport Safety Management System . Incorporates changes to FAA Air Traffic Organization definitions from April 2008.0 6 / 29 /201 2 DRAFT AC 150/5200

- 37A

27 NAS Systems & ATC Operational NAS Systems ATC Operational Flight Procedures Airports

Quantitative Qualitative Airport Specific Individual Item/System ATC Service/

NAS Level System Per

Facility NAS

- wide Frequent

A Probability of
occurrence per operation/ operational hour is equal to or greater than 1x10 - 3 Expected to

occur about once every 3 months for an item Continuously

experienced in the system Expected

to occur

more than

onc e per week Expected

to occur more than every 1

- 2 days Probability of

occurrence per operation/ operational hour is equal to or greater than 1x10 - 5 Expected to

occur more than once per week or every 2500 departures, whichever

occurs sooner Probable

B Proba bility of
occurrence per operation/ operational hour is less than 1x10 -
3 , but equal to or greater than 1x10 - 5 Expected to

occur about
once per year for an item Expected to

occur frequently in the system Expected

to occur about

once every month Expected

to occur about several times per month Expected to occur about
once every month or 250,000 departures, whichever

occurs sooner Remote

C Probability of
occurrence per operation/ operational hour is less than or equal to 1x10 - 5 but equal to or greater than 1x 10 - 7 Expected to

occur several times in the life cycle of an item Expected to

occur

numerous times in the system life cycle Expected

to occur about

once every year Expected

to occur about once every few months Probability of

occurrence per operation/
opera tional hour is less than or equal to 1x10 - 5 but equal to or greater than 1x10 - 7 Expected to

occur about
once every year or 2.5 million departures, whichever

occurs sooner Extremely Remote

D Probability of
occurrence per operation/ operational hour is less than or equal to 1x10 - 7 but equal to or greater than 1x10 - 9 Unlikely to

occur, but possible in an item’s life cycle Expected to

occur several times in the system life cycle Expected

to occur about

once every 10

- 100
years Expected

to occur about once
every 3
years Probability of

occurrence per operation/ operational hour is less than or equal to 1x10 - 7 but equal to or greater than 1x10 - 9 Expected to

occur once every 10

- 100 years or 25 million departures, whichever

occurs sooner Extremely Improbable

E Proba bility of
occurrence per operation/ operational hour is less than 1x10 - 9 So unlikely

that it can be assumed that it will not occur in an item’s life cycle Unlikely to

occur, but possible in system life cycle Expected

to occur less than

once every 100
years Expected

to occur less than
once every 30 years Probability of

occurrence per operation/ operational hour is less than 1x10 - 9 Expected to

occur less than every 100 years

Figure 4

- 6. FAA Office of Airports’ Likelihood Definitions 6

Based on these definitions, the airport can determine a S everity and L ikelihood of the worst credible effect for each hazard

. Generally, S everity is established first for each worst credible outcome since it

6 Adapted from FAA Order 5200.11, FAA Offi ce of Airport Safety Management System . Incorporates changes to FAA Air Traffic Organization definitions from April 2008.DRAFT AC 150/5200

- 37 A 0 6 / 29 /201 2

28 should be independent of likelihood

. Next, the L ikeli hood , or the expression of how often an event is expected to occur, is established for the worst credible outcome.

(4) Assess the level of risk associated with identified hazards

. In th e fourth step of hazard assessment, the airport uses the S everity and L ikel ihood values assessed in the third step and compares it to the organization’s acceptable and unacceptable levels of safety risk

. This is considered “initial risk” since it does not consider any mitigations.
As airport management develops the SMS Manual, it should identify what acceptable and unacceptable risk is for the airport

. As discussed above, SMS does not mean accident free. Some risk should be accepted or the airport would never operate

. The number of levels of risk is really an airport decision

. Th e simplest system will only have two levels: acceptable and unacceptable risk

. FAA Airports typically uses a three

- level predictive risk matrix that includes high, medium, and low risk

. The airport must document its risk levels
, train individuals responsib le for conducting the 5

- step process on the meaning of these levels , and ensure individuals who accept risk understand their responsibilities.

There are numerous tools available to quantify and/or qualify risk

. Fo r example, using a predictive risk matrix
, the airport operator can determine whether the hazard presents a low, medium, o r high risk of causing damage or compromising safety. A predictive risk matrix ( s ee Figure 4

- 7 ) graphically depicts the various levels of Severity and Likelihood as they relate to the levels of risk

. On a typical predictive risk matrix, Severity and L ikelihood are place d on axes on a graph ( i.e.
, the X

- and Y

- axes ) . The severity and likelihood assessed during the third step of hazard assessment can then be plotted on the risk mat rix grid for each of the hazards to be assessed

. Figure 4

- 8 depicts FAA’s predictive risk matrix.

When developing a risk matrix, the airport should consider the following characteristics:

 The matrix should fit the airport’s needs based on its size and comp lexity

.

 It should be simple and easy to use and understand

.

 You should not need extensive knowledge of quantitative risk tools to be able to use it

.

 It should clearly define acceptable and unacceptable risk levels and any procedures required based on those definitions

. ( Adapted from ACRP’s SMS for Airports Volume 2: Guidebook )
The important part of this third step is to understand and accurately position on the matrix what kind of threat the hazard is to the safety of the airport, the users, and the airport ’s total operational environment. The individuals making this determination should use common sense to ensure their judgment prioritizes safety but is not unreasonable.

When the Severity and Likelihood of a hazard’s effect are plotted on the risk matrix, t he airport can see whether the hazard’s safety risk is acceptable to the organization. Generally, as the Severity and L ikelihood increases, the risk increases. It is important to graph risk appropriately and pay attention not only to those hazards with sev ere risks
, but also to those hazards that are likely to occur more frequently, even though their severity may be low.0 6 / 29 /201 2 DRAFT AC 150/5200

- 37A

29 Figure 4

- 7 . Sample 4x4 Predictive Risk Matrix with Likelihood and Severity Definition and

Two Levels of Risk: Acceptable and UnacceptableDRAFT AC 150/5200

- 37 A 0 6 / 29 /201 2

30 Severity

Likelihood Minimal

5 Minor

4 Major

3 Hazardous

2 Catastrophic

1

Frequent A

Probable B

Remote C
Extremely Remote D Extremely Improbable E *

High Risk Medium Risk Low Risk

Figure 4

- 8 . FAA Office of Airports’ Predictive Risk Matrix

The individual or persons conducting the analysis should not pre

- judge or try to manipulate the analysis to keep the hazard and its outcome from being “unacceptable” or “high risk

. ”

(5) Mitiga te the risks of identified hazards, when appropriate

. The fifth step is only used if the initial risk of the hazard’s outcome , as determined in step four, is unacceptable or if the airport requires mitigation of certain types of acceptable risk

. For exampl e, FAA Airports considers high risk unacceptable and requires mitigation . M edium risk is acceptable
, but mitigation is preferred when possible

. There are a variety of risk mitigation strategies the airport can use to decrease the severity or likelihood of the hazard’s outcome

. According to ICAO (2009), these approaches include:

 Risk Avoidance

– The operation or activity is cancelled because the safety risks exceed the benefits of continuing the operation or activity (e.g., cancelling rather than allowing c onstruction during low visibility night operations)

.

 Risk Reduction

– The frequency of the operation or activity is reduced, or action is taken to reduce the magnitude of the consequences of the accepted risks (e.g., limiting c onstruction to daytime hours during low

- traffic operations ). * Unacceptable with Single Point and/or Common Cause Failures0 6 / 29 /201 2 DRAFT AC 150/5200

- 37A

31  Segregation of Exposure

– Action is taken to isolate the impacts of the hazard or redundancy is built in to protect against the impacts (e.g., conducting a dditional FOD sweeps before operations during periods of construction )

. Mitigation measures should be appropriate, timely, and cost

- effective

. Further, if an airport put s in place a requirement to mitigate acceptable risk, not just unacceptable risk, the airport should only take the mitigating action if it i s practicable.

A CRP’s SMS for Airports Volume 2: Guidebook (2009) offers a variety of examples of mitigations to reduce Likelihood and Severity

. The following are ways to reduce the outcome’s likelihood:

 Raising awareness and/or control [ e.g., safety campaigns, notices to airmen ( NOTAMs )
, or briefings ].

 Provid ing training (e.g., on

- the

- job training, recurrent training, or improving skills)

.

 Establishing procedures (e.g., avoid operations under certain conditions, develop or modify standard operating procedures
, or intensif y frequency of sweeping areas subject to FOD)

.

 Avoid ing risk by ceasing the activity (e.g., close taxiway for operations during maintenance activities)

.

 Increas ing supervision (e.g., escorting non

- airport employees or conducting a dditional inspections)

.

 Im proving infrastructure (e.g., improved signage or taxiway layout)

.
The ACRP Guidebook also suggests mitigations for reducing severity:

 Improving emergency response (e.g., additional vehicles or positioning)

.

 Improving infrastructure (e.g., extending runway safety areas or removing obstacles)

.

 Establishing standard operating procedures (e.g., define procedures for strong wind conditions)

.

 Creating special programs (e.g., speed rules for non

- movement areas)

. Once a mitigation is established, the airport shoul d have processes in place to assign responsibility for ensuring the mitigation is completed ( sometimes called verification )

. Also, the individual or persons responsible for the 5

- step process should re

- analyze the hazard based on the mitigation to establis h the “residual risk” . Residual risk is the risk that remains after all risk mitigations have been implemented and their completion verified

. If the residual risk of the hazard’s outcome still places it in an unacceptable risk level, then the airport shoul d identify additional mitigations or stop the operation or change causing the hazard

. The airport’s Safety Assurance processes (see Chapter 5) should include procedures to trigger re

evaluations of the hazard if data or hazard reports indicate a mitigation is not effectively reducing the risk of the hazard’s outcome

. For example, if an airport put in place a mitigation to decrease the likelihood of a runway incursion but safety performance data then showed an increase in runway incursions after the mitigati on was put in place , then the mitigation may not be effective

.DRAFT AC 150/5200

- 37 A 0 6 / 29 /201 2

32 c. Documentation

. The formalized, proactive identification and analysis of hazards
, as is found under SRM
, provides airport management with a tool to make decisions about safety , but only if the process and hazards are documented

. Airport management should establish its documentation process and procedures early in SMS development and include them in the SMS Manual.

Documentation also allows meaningful analysis of operational safety

- related trends on the airfield and of overall airport system safety. Documentation provides historical information that can be used when making decisions in the future.
Airports have a range of options to document SRM

. Some larger airports or airports with more complex operations may choose to purchase or create software that guides individuals through the SRM process or even integrates hazard reporting, identification, analysis, and documentation

. While this technological approach is not required, it may prove more time ly and cost

- beneficial for some airports.
Other airports may find it easier to establish forms or databases to track mitigations and document the 5

- step process

. Figure 4

- 9 depicts a sample hazard assessment form

. The airport should establish record
retent ion policies for these documents

. However, the documents should be maintained for at least the life cycle of the operation, change, or mitigations

. The airport may also want to consult with its legal department to determine the best means for using and ret aining these documents

.0 6 / 29 /201 2 DRAFT AC 150/5200

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33 Figure 4

- 9 . Sample 4x4 Hazard Assessment FormDRAFT AC 150/5200

- 37 A 0 6 / 29 /201 2

34 d. Provide for regular assessment to ensure that mitigations are effective.
Successful mitigations, which are tied to achieving safety objectives, are the increme ntal steps toward improving the level of safety at an airport. Consequently, the airport should review its mitigations periodically to evaluate the ir status and ensure their continued effectiveness or recognize a need to modify them in terms of meeting ide ntified safety objective s

. The airport should include d ata collection and analysis specific to verifying mitigation s as part of its Safety Assurance activities (see Chapter 5)

. If this analysis suggests mitigations are not working, the airport should have processes in place to trigger re

evaluation of the hazard and its mitigations for effectiveness. The airport should also use data from

a ccident or incident investigations on the airport or at airports with similar operations (when this information is made available) to spot ineffective mitigations.

3. Scalability of SRM.

As with other components of SMS, the airport should establish SRM processes and procedures in a scalable manner

. Hazard assessment processes should be understandable and timely and not disrup t the airport’s operations

. Processes also should be effective in identifying and quickly assessing hazards so that unacceptable changes or operations are stopped quickly.
Larger airports could be well

- served by establishing two types of hazard assessment: hazard triage and integrated SRM

. Integrated SRM is discussed in the next section.
In hazard triage, the SMS Manager or other Operations staff is sufficiently trained and given autonomy to review identified safety issues or hazards and determine if immedi ate action must be taken

. These individuals can conduct the 5

- step process, typically using a form to direct and document their actions

. For more complex issues, these individuals forward hazard s to airport management, a safety committee, or other body to conduct hazard assessment s using subject matter experts representing impacted stakeholders such as other airport divisions, tenants, the FAA, or other airport users.
Smaller airport s may choose to route all identified hazards through the accountable execut ive, SMS Manager, or Operations department

. Again, the hazard assessment process must be streamlined to prevent assessments from get ting bog ged down

. While smaller airports may choose to have an individual conduct much of their hazard assessment s , they sho uld ensure that findings and mitigations are discussed and communicated with applicable stakeholders.

4. Integrated SRM Efforts

. Airports are not the only sector of the aviation industry using SRM or SMS

- related initiatives

. Many air carriers, fixed

- base ope rators, aircraft manufacturers, and training organizations are also actively developing and implementing proactive, risk management procedures for their organizations

. Military tenants have similar programs, such as Operational Risk Management, active on t heir property

. In many ways, airport management can use these developments to help shape and promote their SMS initiatives

. Airport management should meet early in the airport’s SMS development with tenants, especially those with SMS, to develop procedures for sharing hazard information, conducting integrated hazard assessments, and verif

ying mitigations.
Similarly, the FAA has integrated SMS concepts and processes and SRM into its operations

. To reduce redundancy, the airport may participate in FAA

- led SRM activities instead of conducting its own hazard
assessment

. FAA Airports take s the lead on SRM activities for the following activities:

 FAA review of airport development projects (e.g., Airport Layout Plan changes)

.0 6 / 29 /201 2 DRAFT AC 150/5200

- 37A

35  Approval of part 150 Noise Compatibilit y Program modifications that may impact aviation safety

.

 FAA review of modifications of airport design standards

.

 FAA review of Construction Safety Phasing Plans

. FAA’s Air Traffic Organization or NextGen Office may also lead SRM

- related activities on the airport

. When FAA is the lead, the airport is not responsible for facilitating the 5

- step process

. However, the airport may be asked to secure a third

- party facilitator, provide data or documents needed for quantitative analysis, or provide subject matter experts for the integrated assessment.
When conducting integrated SRM efforts, the panel use s the lead organization’s Severity and likelihood definitions

. Therefore, for FAA

- led assessments, the panel use s the FAA’s severity and likelihood definitions and predictive risk matrix for the assessment

. Any documentation required by the lead organization is used

. For example, FAA Airports requires the use of a Safety Assessment Screening (SAS) Form by the FAA Project Manager to document the project, panel members , and assessment findings

. The SAS form, Project Proposal Summary, Hazard Assessment Tool, narrative, and any pictures are combined to form the assessment documentation ( s ee FAA Office of Airports SMS Desk Reference (June 2012) available at http://www.faa. gov/airports/airport_safety/safety_management_systems/internal ])

.
5. Example #1 of SRM

. Seratame Airport in Wicker, Alaska is operated by the Wicker Airport Authority. The Authority holds a Class I AOC and is Index E. Seratame is served by a regional carrier that operates 2 daily Beech 1900 roundtrip flights to its hub. Seratame provides all the services and employees to turn

- around the aircraft. The carrier recently notified the Authority that it plans to replace the Beech 1900’s with Bombardier CRJs. The cha nge in aircraft operating at the airport triggers the airport’s SRM processes and the Operations Manager conducts a hazard assessment. Since the Authority’s employees service the aircraft, the Operations Manager determines there is no need to include the c arrier in the initial assessment.

(1) Describe the system. The airport has two runways, Runway 12/30, which is a 7,000 foot paved, grooved, and marked for an ILS approach, and Runway 9/27 which is a 3,500 foot rolled grass runway primarily used by experimental and general aviation aircraft. There is no active construction on air port at this time.
The airport’s existing facilities including the runways and taxiways meet design specifications for the CRJ. The airport has standard markings in the movement area. Ho wever, non

- movement area markings are specific to the Beech 1900.
Other than the regional carrier, the airport is used by general aviation aircraft.
Identify the hazards

. The Operations Manager bounds out the movement area from the analysis since the

runwa y and taxiway meet design specifications for the CRJ. Based on the system description, the Operations Manager identifies two hazards

(a) Incorrect aircraft parking at gate (caused by old markings) ; and

(b) Misalignment of aircraft on ramp (caused by old markings )

.DRAFT AC 150/5200

- 37 A 0 6 / 29 /201 2

36 (2) Analyze the risk. Using the airport’s Severity and Likelihood definitions (see Figures 4

- 5 and 4

- 6), the Operations Manager examines the worst credible outcome of each hazard.

(a) Potential for aircraft collision with servicing equipment and/or jetway bri dge most likely during nighttime conditions

. Based on existing controls, severity is Minor since aircraft is at e xtremely low speed. Based on an analysis of past incidents in the non

- movement area, the Operations Manager categorizes the likelihood of this effect as Remote.

(b) Potential for aircraft collision with other parked aircraft or vehicles during nighttime conditions. Based on existing controls, severity is Major since taxiing speeds could result in major damage if aircraft impacts another aircraft or vehicle unexpectedly. Based on an analysis of past incidents in the non

- movement area, the Operations Manager categorizes the likelihood of this effect as Probable.

(3) Assess the risks. Using the airport’s risk matrix (see Figure 4

- 8), the Operations Manager determined the following results :

(a) The risk associated with incorrect parking at gate results in Low Risk.

(b) The risk associated with misalignment of the aircraft in the gate area results in High Risk.

(4) Mitigate the risks. All High Risk must be mitigated under the Authority’s Safety Policy. Therefore, the Operations Manager develops a risk mitigation strategy that includes short

- term and long

term solutions. In the short term, the Authority will establish temporary parking restrictions for aircraft in the non

- movement area to ensure clearance for the CRJ as it transits from the movement to the non

movement area. In the long term, the Authority will remove the old non

- movement area markings and re

paint to accommodate the CRJ. These mitigations reduce the risk from High to Medium. Additionally, repainting eliminates both hazards, once complete.

6. Example # 2 of SRM.

As the fixed

- base operator (FBO) for Timmons Municipal Airport, Flying Flag Incorporated has provided all ramp and fuel services on the airport for ye ars. Flying Flag’s responsibilities include servicing general aviation aircraft, the three weekly air carrier flights, and occasional charter flights. The FBO also maintains the on

- airport fuel farm.
Recently, the owner of Flying Flag decided to close the FBO after his unsuccessful attempts to find someone to take over the business. The airport is reviewing proposals from two companies to replace Flying Flag but both are relatively new operations. The airport manager is concerned that a new FBO will lack ex perience in ramp and fuel operations. She decided to proactively identify the hazards associated with the new operator.

(1) Describe the system. The airport holds a Class I Airport Operating Certificate with Index A ARFF services. Air carrier flights only rece ntly picked up and the airport operates on a very tight budget with a relatively small staff. Most services, field maintenance, and aircraft servicing and fueling are provided by the FBO.
The airport has two runways, 7,250 foot long runway for air carriers and one smaller general aviation runway. Although there are three air carrier flights a week with Beech 1900 aircraft, general aviation operations make up the bulk of Timmons traffic. During yearly events at the local race track and golf course, general a viation traffic increases dramatically and the airport relies on the FBO to also manage0 6 / 29 /201 2 DRAFT AC 150/5200

- 37A

37 ramp and parking operations. These events increase traffic and parking to the point that the airport’s ramp is at capacity.
A contract air traffic control tower operate s 14 hours per day from 0600 to 2000 hours, seven days a week. Air carrier flights operate during these times, except for the occasional charter flight. The airport published a prior permission request requirement (RPR) for air carrier flights outside of n ormal operating hours.
Other than the regional carrier, the airport is used by general aviation aircraft.

(2) Identify the hazards

. To help identify hazards, the airport manager decided to use a panel of subject matter experts that includes local pilots, the a ir carrier station manager, and members of the airport manager’s staff. The panel of experts identified three potential hazards generated by a change of FBO.

(a) Reduction in experience levels and potential confusion in ramp operations,

(b) Reduction in experienc e levels and potential confusion in parking/apron management and ground loading of passengers, and

(c) Reduction in experience levels and potential confusion in fueling operations.

(3) Analyze, Assess, and Mitigate the Risk. Using the airport’s Sever ity and Likeli hood definitions and Predictive Risk Matrix, the panel used the airport’s Risk Assessment Worksheet to assist their analysis and determined the following:

Timmons Municipal Airport Risk Assessment Worksheet # Hazard Risk Severity Likelihood Resultant R isk Mitigation Residual Risk 1 Reduced experience and confusion in ramp operations Collision of

ground support equipment with aircraft.

Aircraft to aircraft collision.

FOD damage to aircraft Minor

Major

Minor Remote

Remote

Probable Low

Medium

Medium Redesign ramp driving

training program and require new FBO personnel to complete.

Limit number of aircraft on ramp by SOP. Conduct survey of ramp needs and develop new ramp marking plan from that survey. Remark ramp as
appropr iate.

Perform FOD walks. Develop FOD awareness training course and require new FBO personnel to attend. Develop FOD awareness Low

Low

LowDRAFT AC 150/5200

- 37 A 0 6 / 29 /201 2

38 Timmons Municipal Airport Risk Assessment Worksheet # Hazard Risk Severity Likelihood Resultant R isk Mitigation Residual Risk campaign under the direction of airport
manager. Develop FOD log and require FBO to use and maintain. 2 Re duced experience and confusion in fueling operations Fuel spills.

Inadequate grounding/b onding causes fire. Minor

Major Probable

Extremely
remote Medium

Low Require training of FBO

personnel IAW FAA Part 139 to be completed and verified before contract assignment. Require independent safety audit of fuel delivery procedures within 90 days of FBO beginning operations

Audit FBO Medium

Low

3 Reduced experience and confusion in
passenger operations & loading Passenger

injury due to j et

blast/prop

wash.

Passenger injury caused due
to contact with turning propeller. Major

Catastro phic Remote

Extremely improbable Medium

Low Provide ramp agent

awareness training Mark ramp and provide cones for movement of personnel. Define by SOP limits of passenger movement on ramp area. Require FBO to provide passenger escort at all times. By written SOP require parked aircraft with turning propeller to have turning prop on side opposite of ramp. Low

Low0 6 / 29 /201 2 DRAFT AC 150/5200

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39 

## Chapter 5. Safety Assurance

1. Introduction.
Safety Assurance is the third component of SMS and serves as checks and balance s for the SMS

. Under Safety Assurance, the airport operator should establish processes and procedures to verify and monitor the effectiveness o f the SMS

. To do this, the airport should develop and implement a me thod for monitoring safety performance, establish and maintain a confidential hazard reporting system, and develop processes to report pertinent safety information to the accountable execu tive ( s ee Figure 5

- 1)

. A key outcome of Safety A ssurance is continuous improvement

. Safety Assurance activities also :

 H elp the airport evaluate the continued effectiveness of implemented risk mitigation strategies under SRM

.

 Support the identification of new hazards

.

 S ystematically provide confidence that the airport is meeting or exceeding its safety objectives through continuous improvement

.

 Provide the foundation for data collection
, which help airport management with decisionmaking.

Figure 5

- 1 . Safety Assurance
The Safety Assurance and SRM components are closely linked

. As discussed in Chapter 4
, SRM ensures hazards and their associated risks are identified, analyzed, and asse ssed and mitigations are put in place when necessary

. Safety Assurance processes then take over, using data to evaluate whether the mitigations are having the desired effect

. Figure 5

- 2 depicts the SRM/Safety Assurance relationship

.DRAFT AC 150/5200

- 37 A 0 6 / 29 /201 2

40 Figure 5

- 2

. SRM/Safety Assurance Relationship

2. Developing and Implementing Safety Assurance

.

a. Establish and maintain a hazard reporting system that provides a means for reporter confidentiality.

A hazard reporting system broadens the airport’s a bility to capture information that airport management might not otherwise observe

. Airport employees are typically the first to become aware of hazardous situations in the movement and non

- movement areas of the airport. Similarly, p ilots, airfield tenants
, airline employees, and other individuals on the air field may identify hazards
, so the airport should provide a system that allows these individuals to report hazards

. A n airport should develop the kind of system that is best for its operational environme nt

. Smaller airports with few employees and less turnover may find formalized hazard reporting difficult to establish. Employees at these airports may be used to directly reporting safety issues to airport management. While direct communication may have w orked in the past, it fails to formally document the issues or provide a means for the airport to track trends and systemic problems. At airports where informal reporting has been the norm, airport management should continually re

- affirm its commitment to the new formal reporting system until its use becomes standard practice.0 6 / 29 /201 2 DRAFT AC 150/5200

- 37A

41 An airport can establish a reporting system in a variety of ways

. Airport management can receive h azards reports via:

 Hardcopy forms and dropboxes throughout the airport ;

 Internal an d/or public web sites with reporting capabilities ;

 An airport hotline ;

 Manager/ tenant meetings ; and/or

 Daily i nspections

. The airport should base its hazard reporting format choice on the size and complexity of the airport’s operations

. A smaller airport wi th few employees and tenants may find it cost

- beneficial to use dropboxes throughout the airport

. Whereas, a larger airport with many employees and tenants may need multiple reporting formats and/or an information technology solution such as an online repo rting tool

.

D aily inspections should not be the primary means of receiving hazard reports since there are many more individuals with access to the airfield , beyond the airport’s own staff, who can identify hazards.
Regardless of the format, a good hazard r eporting system should :

 Be v oluntary, impartial, and confidential (to the extent practicable)

.

 Be e as ily accessed by all airport employees and tenants.

 Provide feedback to reporters.

 Formally d ocument reports

.

 Safeguard confidentiality

.

 Provide prompt noti fication to management

.

 Be a dministered by one individual or department that is responsible for managing the status of a report and investigati ng the identified hazard(s)

.

 Provide trust and encourage reporting

.

 Be scalable.
(Adapted from ACRP’s SMS for Air ports Volume 2: Guidebook )

The airport may use its reporting process to report incidents and accidents as well as safety issues and hazards

. The airport should ensure that reporters understand the definitions of these terms and how to use the report forms

. Figure 5

- 3 includes a simple hazard report form that airports could use for incident and accident reporting.DRAFT AC 150/5200

- 37 A 0 6 / 29 /201 2

42 Confidential Hazard /Incident/Accident Reporting Form
This form should be used to report any airside hazard that has caused or could cause an acci dent or incident

. Place in any labeled “Hazard Reporting Drop b ox” on the airport or send to the airport’s SMS Manager as soon as possible.

HAZARD OR EVENT DESCRIPTION

(To be completed by person reporting the event)

DATE: / / Time: AM/PM

LOCATION: _____________________________________________________________________

DESCRIPTION: __________________________________

________________________________

_____________________________________________________________________________ ____

_________________________________________________________________________________

_________________________________________________________________________________ WITNESSES: ____________________________________________________________________

REPORT ER NAME (optional): ______________________________________________________
REPORTER POSITION (optional): ___________________________________________________

CONTACT NUMBER/EMAIL ADDRESS: _____________________________________________

Confidentiality Com mitment

You can choose to report anonymously by omitting name
, position , and other identifying details

. If you provide your name, only the SMS Manager will see it and potentially use it to gather additional information about the even and discuss follow

- up actions if required . U nder no circumstances will your identity be disclosed to any person or organization without your express permission

. However, these confidentiality commitments d o not apply to any willful disregard of regulation or negligent acts

comm itted on the airport.

Figure 5

- 3

. Sample Confidential Hazard Reporting Form

(1) Confidentiality concerns. While there has been much emphasis in the past on establishing

non

- punitive hazard reporting systems, U.S. airports may find it difficu lt to prevent punishment of non

airport employees (e.g., tenant employees)

. Therefore, the airport should establish a confidential hazard reporting system that protect s the reporter’s identity

. Furthermore, airports may wish to include statements on their reporting forms explaining that the airport cannot provide confidentiality to individuals who willfully disregard regulations or participate in negligent acts

. Airport management should consult with legal counsel when deciding whether to add such language

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43 Airport management should also consult with its legal counsel on the applicability of state open records laws commonly known as “sunshine laws”

. State open records laws are different from the Federal Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) . FOIA only applies t o records obtained by the Federal government

. Therefore, an airport’s confidential hazard reports would not be subject to Federal FOIA protections

.
Due to differences in data protection laws from state to state , some airports may find it difficult to convi nce tenant s to encourage their employee s to use the hazard reporting system

. In these cases, airports may work with these tenants to educa te them on disclosure policies and means of protecting confidentiality

. Note: Where tenants remain resistant, airports may also consider including cl auses in future lease agreements requiring use of the system.

(2) Feedback to reporters. Airports should also keep in mind when establishing hazard reporting system s that reporters should get feedback on the resolution of their r eport s

. While it may not be possible under a confidential reporting system to provide direct feedback, the airport should establish a process, usually linked to communications under Safety Promotion ( see Chapter 6 )
, to provide feedback

. For example, an air port could communicate feedback by including it in safety bulletin s , posting information on a safety bulletin board, discussing it during management meetings, and/or posting feedback on a dedicated area of the airport’s internal website.
If the airport cho oses a technology

- b ased approach to reporting, it should consider the following when building the reporting tool:

 Determine whether existing information technology systems used by the airport
, such as asset or fleet management software
, have reporting capa bilities or whether a new system must be developed

. In cases where new systems are developed, the airport may want to link existing and new systems.

 Determine who will report and from whom the airport will accept reports

. Will the airport accept reports fr om the general public? If so, a public reporting interface on the airport’s website may be a viable solution

. It may not be advisable to require reporters to sign into the system to report hazards because they may worry about confidentiality.

 Use p re

- defi ned fields or drop

- down menus for data entry to help standardize reporting and analysis

. This will also aid in timely review and action.

 Where possible, link hazard location descriptions to an airport layout plan or allow tag ging through the airport’s Geog raphical Information System (GIS).

 Ensure the system automatically notifies a designated airport management official, such as the SMS Manager, when a report is submitted.

 Determine who will host the data

. Will it be hosted offsite by a third party? If so, does the airport have sufficient rights to re t ain the data once any contracts with the third party are complete?

 Design scalability into the system to ensure it can be expanded to track more issues, allow reporting from more sources, and be connected to o ther airport systems.

b. Develop and maintain a means for monitoring safety performance.

To facilitate continuous improvement, an airport should set baselines and measure its performance against those baseline s

. To do this, the airport should develop and mai ntain a means for monitoring safetyDRAFT AC 150/5200

- 37 A 0 6 / 29 /201 2

44 performance that ensures the airport meets the safety objectives identified under the Safety Policy component (see Chapter 3 ), ensures the airport meets the requirements of its SMS, and verif ies the effectiveness of the mitigations est ablished under SRM

. To accurately monitor safety performance, the airport should :

 Collect data ;

 Analyze collected data ;

 Evaluate the SMS processes and procedures ; and

 Monitor mitigations developed under SRM

. (1) Data collection. While the airpor t may use processes such as internal evaluations, safety reviews, and similar methods to monitor safety performance, it should measure changes in performance by first collecting and analyzing data

. This monitoring goes well beyond self

- inspections, as requ ired under part 139, because the airport proactively looks for safety issues, trends, and failures.
Safety d ata may come from many sources

. C ertificated airports already collect it through self

inspection reports, maintenance logs and tracking, and acciden t/incident investigations

. Under SMS, hazard reports and Hazard A ssessments will also provide the airport with safety data it can use to track performance

. The data collected can and should relate to the airport’s safety objectives , but the airport may col lec t additional data.
Data collection and analysis can be as simple or as complex as n ecessary

. ACRP’s SMS Guidebook and ICAO’ s Safety Management Manual both provide in

depth discussions on data collect ion, analysis, and
measurement

. Essentially, the airp ort should use data to determine whether there are safety trends or failures in the system

. (See “Example A: Using Safety Assurance to Monitor the Effectiveness of Mitigations.”)

(2) Safety evaluations. Performance monitoring should take into account both shor t

- term and long

- term goals and look at both individual safety objectives and bigger systematic issues such as overall SMS implementation and effectiveness

. T he airport may conduct safety evaluations (also referred to as safety audits) to assess the impleme ntation and effectiveness of SMS components and initiatives, including safety objectives, as well as the SMS as a whole. (See “Example B: Using Safety Evaluations to Track Safety Objectives.”) Ex ample A: Using Safety Assurance to Monitor the Effectiveness of Mitigations.

Airport XYZ conduct s a Hazard Assessment using its SRM requirements for a construction project

. In order to accept the risk of the project, the airport puts in place a mitigation to increase the number of FOD sweeps of the taxiways

. However, d ata gathered through self

inspections during the construction project show s an increase in FOD on the taxiways that was supposed to have been removed during the additional FOD sweeps . Through its Safety Assurance process, the airport discovers this mitigation (additional FOD sweeps) is not having its desired effect. It decides to re

- evaluate the mitigation and consider additional mitigations or more oversight

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- 37A

45 The SMS Manager or accountable executive may conduct the s afe ty evaluations

. However, other levels of airport management or divisions within the airport can also conduct periodic evaluations to assess their operations and implementation of SMS provisions

. Some airports may also find it helpful to use third

party eva luators or other airports when evaluating SMS implementation as a whole.
The airport should establish timing and processes appropriate to the complexity and size of the airport

. For example, a smaller airport may choose to conduct quarterly or semi

- annual evaluations due to resource limitations

. Larger airports, with various divisions and layers of management, may wish to conduct multiple levels of evaluations
, culminating in a third

- party or external evaluation
to gain a more objective review of the SMS ’s effectiveness.
Regardless of how often the airport chooses to evaluate itself, it should ensure that data including hazard, incident, and accident reports is constantly being reviewed and make adjust ments to the program when necessary

.

c. Develop and implemen t a process for reporting pertinent safety information and data to the accountable executive on a regular basis.
Since the accountable executive is responsible for overall airport safety, this person should receive sufficient safety information to ensure priorities are set appropriately , resources are allocated correctly
, and decisions are made on actions that often must be coordinated with several affected parties.
The accountable executive should receive briefings on the following safety information and data:

 Performance with safety objectives established under the airport’s Safety Policy
,

 Safety critical information distributed under the airport’s Safety Promotion activities
,

 Status of ongoing mitigations required under the airport’s SRM policies and pr ocedures
, and

 Status of the airport’s schedule for developing or implementing initiatives under the SMS.

Airport management should determine the appropriate length of time between briefings and document this schedule in the SMS Manual

. B riefings may range from weekly to monthly

. While quarterly reporting alone is not advisable, some systemic reporting may be done on a quarterly basis

. Some accountable executives may want to be updated more regularly than others

. A sma ller airport, where the accountable exec utive may be the same individual responsible for overseeing and maintaining this information , may not need to establish a process for regular update s

.
There are many methods the SMS Manager or others may use to communicate safety information to the account able executive

. Some may choose more formalized reports, while others may choose verbal presentations

. Airports may find it helpful to u se a visual “dashboard” to track progress toward the Example B: Using Safety Evaluati ons to Track Safety Objectives.

Airport XYZ selects a safety objective related to decreased V/PDs . Based on data collected during performance monitoring, the airport finds the number of V/PDs has increased. The airport decides to evaluate the incidents and look for contributing factors, root causes , and ways to meet the safety objective in the future.DRAFT AC 150/5200

- 37 A 0 6 / 29 /201 2

46 organization’s safety objectives and other pertinent safety informa tion

. Appendix F includes a sample dashboard.0 6 / 29 /201 2 DRAFT AC 150/5200

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47 

## Chapter 6. Safety Promotion

1. Introduction.
The fourth component of SMS, Safety Promotion, establishes processes to foster a safety culture . This includes safety training for all individuals with access to the airfield an d communication of important safety information ( see Figure 6

- 1)

. A s afety culture is defined as:

“ [T] he product of individual and group values, attitudes, competencies, and patterns of behavior that determine the commitment to, and the style and proficien cy of, the organization’s management of safety

. Organizations with a positive safety culture are characterized by communications founded on mutual trust, by shared perceptions of the importance of safety, and by confidence in the efficacy of preventative m easures” ( ACRP, 2009 )

. While all SMS components contribute to a strong safety culture, “Safety Promotion sets the tone that predisposes both individual and organizational behavior and fills in the blank spaces in the organization’s policies, procedures and processes, providing a sense of purpose to safety efforts” ( ICAO, 2009 )

. Through communications and training
, individuals will understand their responsibilities under the SMS and accept and trust the SMS initiatives

. Safety culture is not easy to quantif y, but an airport will know it is on the right path when people begin reporting hazards

. (See ACRP’s SMS for Airports Volume 2: Guidebook for more information on the elements of a safety culture.)

Figure 6

- 1 . Safety Promotion

Certificated airports already have numerous training and communications programs and processes in place for compliance with part 139

. Existing part 139 programs focus on training those individuals withDRAFT AC 150/5200

- 37 A 0 6 / 29 /201 2

48 speci fic roles in implementing part 139 requirements
, such as operations inspectors, firefighters, and individuals with access to the movement areas

. Similarly, part 139 communications requirements focus on informing stakeholders
, including airlines
, about info rmation specific to part 139
, such as pavement condition, emergency plans, or operational changes

. These existing requirements serve as the foundation for SMS training and communications, but they must apply to all individuals with access to the movement

a nd non

- movement area and address more than the technical requirements of part 139

. SMS assumes

e veryone has a role in promoting and enhancing operational safety on the airport , and SMS supports this assumption through role

- specific training and communicati ons

.
Even where training and communications programs already exist , airports should anticipate some resistance to change, especially when there is l ittle or no turnover of employees

. These airports may have to work especially hard to show employees , who mi ght ask “ Aren’t we already safe?” , why they should accept SMS. To counter resistance
, the airport could use case studies to show how close the airport may have been to an accident in the past . Such real

- life example can help employees u nderstand the need for SMS

. Further, the airport may want to show how existing processes and procedures did not catch systemic issues or how documentation and trend analysis can reduce workload.

2. Developing and Implementing Safety Promotion

.

a. Provide safety training

.
The succe ss of SMS initiatives depends on individuals understanding their roles and responsibilities

. While the Safety Policy component provides for document ing these roles and responsibilities, training provides the essential tools needed to put these roles and re sponsibilities into practice

. The goal of safety training is to ensure that individuals are competent to perform their responsibilities under the SMS.

Similar to the other SMS elements, SMS training should reflect the complexity and needs of the airport

. I f they lack internal expertise , airports may want to seek the help of consultants or academics when develop ing these training programs

. Airports should have at least two tiers of training: specialized SMS training for individuals and managers with operatio nal roles under SMS and safety awareness/orientation for all other individuals.

(1) Specialized SMS training for individuals and managers with operational roles under SMS will typically consist of one or more courses specific to their SMS

- related responsibilit ies

. At smaller airports, this may be one course covering all facets of the airport’s SMS requirements

. Larger airports that spread oversight and implementation responsibilities over numerous staff and management positions may find it helpful to have numer ous , role

- specific courses (e.g., one multi

- day course on hazard analysis and the 5

- step SRM process ; one high

- level
, 3

- hour course on the airport’s SMS requirements ; and a short course on developing safety objectives)

. Regardless of the approach, the airp ort should ensure it provides the courses to individuals in a logical manner and over a reasonable time period.

(2) Safety awareness/orientation provides all other individuals (besides those requiring specialized SMS training) with access to the airfield an un derstanding of what constitutes a safety hazard, how to report safety issues and hazards, and where to find safety

- related information

. Unlike specialized SMS training, safety awareness/orientation can be accomplished through written communication like bro chures , which can be handed out during indoctrination training or badging processes

. Safety awareness training should answer the following questions:

 What is a hazard?0 6 / 29 /201 2 DRAFT AC 150/5200

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49  How are hazards reported? Can hazards be reported confidentially?

 What happens to hazar d reports and how will the airport provide feedback?

 How will the airport communicate important safety information?

(3) Training format. The airport should decide how to deliver SMS training

. However, airport management should recognize that some courses/topic s will demand different approaches for maximum effectiveness

. For example, hazard assessment and SRM courses may be best taught using a lecture format and case studies with hands

- on applications during the course

. Whereas, a high

- level course about SMS req uirements designed for the accountable executive and other top managers may work best as computer

- based training.

(4) Recurrent training. Recurrent training should also be an important part of the airport’s overall SMS training program . This training should i ncorporate any new processes, procedures, or safety objectives developed through the SMS’s continuous improvement efforts

. (5) Review of training materials. T he airport should also periodically review training materials to verify their applicability and curre ncy

.
b. Maintain training records.
A key result of SMS is documentation
, which can be reviewed to ensure compliance and to monitor safety performance

. This documentation includes training records, so the airport should have a process to ensure it record s comp leted training.

The records f

or individuals
, including managers
, requiring specialized SMS training or recurrent training should include details such as training dates and copies of course documents including quizzes and
rosters. It may be cumbersome, how ever, to keep detailed records f or individuals who only need safety awareness/orientation

. For these individuals , the airport should just have a process in place to ensure they receive the awareness/orientation

. The airport should keep records of all trai ning sessions, attendance rosters, test results (if applicable), and syllabuses for a period of time that provides data for Safety Assurance activities. A good practice would be to keep records for at least 24 months after the training takes place.

Furthe r, it should periodically verify that its training record process is effective and captures the correct information for all those being trained

. An airport may wish to incorporate this review into its safety evaluations under the Safety Assurance component

.

c. Develop and maintain means for communicating important safety information.
Communicating safety information is essential to promoting a safety culture

. When deciding what information to c ommunicate , the airport should consider the following:

 Awareness of SMS and its initiatives

– N ot all individuals need to understand what the SMS does, but they should understand it s functions and expected outcomes

. Safety Promotion should clearly explain processes and procedures for proactive hazard identification and re sults aimed at continuous improvements in operational safety . It should then reaffirm both t hrough visible actions.DRAFT AC 150/5200

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50  Safety

- critical information

– Airport management determines what constitutes safety

- critical information based on the airport’s unique oper ating environment

. The airport may want to use information required by regulation s such as part 139 as the foundation for its list of safety

- critical information

.

 Feedback about actions taken

– To support continuous reporting of hazards, the airport should inform reporters of actions taken because of their reports

. Such f eedback will encourage reports from individuals who may have been initially apprehensive or skeptical about reporting

. If the airport’s hazard reporting system is not able to communicate di rectly with confidential reporters, the airport can provide feedback via bulletin boards
, safety bulletins and newsletters , or other

means

. Even when the airport can provide feedback directly to reporters, it should consider sharing the feedback broadly.

 R easons for new or revised safety proc edures

– If the airport changes procedures or develops

new ones based on lessons learned, it should communicate this information to encourage adoption of the safety procedure s and support of SMS initiatives.

 “ N ice

- to

- kn ow” information that foster s support for the SMS

– General safety information helps convey and support the airport’s safety objectives and goals

. However, the airport should use different channels to share “ nice

- to

- know” information and safety

- critical inf ormation so employees and tenants understand the difference.
(Adapted from ICAO Safety Management Manual, 2009)
When establishing the SMS, the airport should evaluate when to use verbal communication instead of written communication

. Further, the airport s hould determine the specific type of communication for different types of information . For example, the airport may :

 D ecide a memorandum or safety bulletin is a better way than a newsletter to communicate safety

critical information to employees and tenant s

.

 C hoose to relay time

- sensitive information or information for management at monthly manager or tenant meetings

.

 Use its public or internal websites or topic

- specific posters to share “ nice

- to

- know” or SMS awareness information
, depending on its relevanc e and sensitivity.

d. Maintain communications records.

As with other SMS elements
, the airport should periodically review communications and evaluate their effectiveness . Over time, this will help the airport identify those methods that work best

. The airport should keep c ommunications records for a sufficient period of time to support periodic evaluations. A good practice would be at l east 12 months

. These records will help with evaluation and compliance as well as trend and historical analysis

.0 6 / 29 /201 2 DRAFT AC 150/5200

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51 

## Appendix A. Definitio ns and Acronyms

Aircraft accident

– A n occurrence associated with the operation of an aircraft which takes place between the time any person boards the aircraft with the intention of flight and all such persons have disembarked, and in which any person su ffers death or serious injury, or in which the aircraft receives substantial damage

. As defined in title 49 CFR 830.2.

Accountable Executive

– A person designated by the airport to act on its behalf for the implementation and maintenance of the airport’s S afety Management System

. The accountable executive has sufficient control of the airport’s human and financial resources for airport operations.
Airport Safety Management System

– A n integrated collection of processes and procedures that ensures a formaliz ed and proactive approach to system safety through risk management

. Gap Analysis

– A comparison between existing systems, processes, and procedures and SMS requirements.

Hazard

– A c ondition that could foreseeably cause or contribute to an aircraft acciden t as defined in title 49 CFR 830.2.

Hazard Assessment

– A systematic, comprehensive evaluation of a change, operation, system, or safety issue.

Incident

– An occurrence other than an accident, associated with the operation of an aircraft, which affects or could affect the safety of operations

. As defined in title 49 CFR 830.2.

Movement Area

–

T he runways, taxiways, and other areas of an airport that are used for taxiing, takeoff, and landing of aircraft, exclusive of loading ramps and aircraft parking areas

. As defined in title 14 CFR 139.5.

Non

- movement Area

– The area, other than that described as the movement area, used for the loading, unloading, parking, and movement of aircraft on the airside of the airport (including ramps, apron areas, and on

- airport fuel farms).

Risk

– The composite of predicted s everity and l ikelihood of the potential effect of a hazard. Severity is the measure of how bad the results of an event are predicted to be; usually determined by the worst credible outcome. Likelihood is th e estimated probability or frequency, in quantitative or qualitative terms, of a hazard’s effect; it is often an expression of how often an effect is expected to occur.
Risk Analysis

– The process during which a hazard is characterized for its likelihood a nd the severity of its effect or harm. Risk analysis can be either quantitative or qualitative; however, the inability to quantify or the lack of historical data on a particular hazard does not preclude the need for analysis.
Risk Mitigation

– Any action t aken to reduce the risk of a hazard's effect

. Safety A ssurance

– The process management functions that evaluate the continued effectiveness of implemented risk mitigation strategies
, support the identification of new hazards
, and function to systematically provide confidence that an organization meets or exceeds its safety objectives through continuous improvement

.DRAFT AC 150/5200

- 37 A 0 6 / 2 9 /201 2

52 Safety Evaluation

– Procedures to monitor performance with safety objectives, SMS requirements
, or initiatives.
Safety Objectives

– A measurable goal or desirable outcome related to safety.
Safety Policy

– The statement and documentation adopted by the airport that defin es its commitment to safety and provides its overall safety vision.
Safety P romotion

–

The combination of safety culture, training , and communication activities that support the implementation and operation of an SMS.
Safety Risk Management (SRM)

– A formal process within an SMS that describ es the system ; identif ies the hazards ; and analyz es , assess es , and mitigat es the risk.0 6 / 29 /201 2 DRAFT AC 150/5200

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53 Acrony ms

AC Advisory Circular

ACM Airport Certification Manual

ACRP Airport Cooperative Research Program

FBO Fixed

- b ase Operator

FOD Foreign Object Damage or Foreign Object Debris

FOIA Freedom of Information Act

GIS Geographical Information Systems

ICAO International Civil Aviation Organization

SMS Safety Management System

SRM Safety Risk ManagementDRAFT AC 150/5200

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54 

## Appendix B. Related Reading Material

Dolbeer, R. A., & Wright, S

. (2009, Fall)

. Safety Management Systems: H ow useful will the FAA National Wildlife Strike Database be ? Human

- Wildlife Conflicts 3(2), 167

- 178

.
Federal Aviation Administration

. (2011)

. Report on Airport Safety Management System (SMS) Pilot Studies

. Retrieved from http://www.re gulations.gov/#!documentDetail;D=FAA

- 2010

- 0997

- 0074

.
Federal Aviation Administration

. (2012)

. Part 139 Safety Management System (SMS) Pilot Study: November 2011 Roundtable Meeting Summary . Retrieved from http://www.faa.gov/airports/airport_safety/safety_management_systems/external/pilot_studies/medi a/part139SMSImplementationStudyRoundtable.pdf

. Fligh t Safety Foundation

. (2005, November/December)

. Unlocking the Potential of a Safety Management System

. Flight Safety Digest

. Retrieved from http://flightsafety.org/fsd/fsd_nov

- dec05.pdf

.
Interna tional Civil Aviation Organization

. (2009)

. Safety Management Manual (Doc 9859) [Adobe Digital Editions version]

. Retrieved from http://www2.icao.int/en/ism/Pages/GuidanceMaterials.as px

. Kirsch, P

. (2011, April/May)

. Ready, Set, Go: Legal Considerations in Implemen ting a Safety Management System

. Airport Magazine , 26

- 28

. Stolzer, A., Halford, C, and Goglia, J

. (2010). Safety management systems in aviation

. Burlington: Ashgate

. Transp ortation Research Board

. ( 2007)

. Airport Cooperative Research Program Report 1, Safety Management Systems for Airports, Volume 1: Overview [Adobe Digital Editions version]

. Retrieved from ht tp://www.trb.org/Publications/Blurbs/159030.aspx

. Transportation Research Board

. (2009)

. Airport Cooperative Research Program Report 1, Safety Management Systems for Airports, Volume 2: Guidebook [Adobe Digital Editions version]

. Retrieved from http://www.trb.org/Publications/Blurbs/162491.aspx

.

## Appendix C. Sample SMS Implementation Plan Template and Checklist

This appendix contains a sample SMS Implementation Checklist.

[ Insert Airport Name ] Safety Management System Implementation Plan

[ Instructions: Use this Implemen tation Plan Template to summarize the airport’s plans for implementing SMS. The template includes areas for narrative descriptions and a checklist with common implementation steps. Expand the template where necessary to ref lect your unique operating enviro nment and programs

. ] 

## SMS Development and Deployment Strategy:

[ Instructions: In this section, provide a detailed proposal on how the airport will develop its SMS

. Use the subsections to guide your description and add subsections where necessary

. Each subs ection includes lists of items to include in the narrative. ]


## I

. SMS Development

 How will the airport develop its SMS Manual? Will it procure consultant assistance or develop it in

- house ?

 Will the airport conduct a formal gap analysis? If so, what is the timeline for completion?

 Are there any existing programs, policies, or practices that the airport plans to use as a foundation for the SMS elements?


## II

. SMS Deployment Strategy

 Does the airport plan to use a phasing strate gy? If so, what will be phased (i .e. , phasing the SMS into the movement area first and then into the non

- movement area or phasing the components and elements of SMS) ?

 Will the airport include its landside operations in the SMS? If so, how will landside requirements be kept separate from airside requirements?


## III

. Procurement

 Does the airport plan to acquire any new systems or technology that will require procurement? If so, how long does the airpo rt anticipate that procurement taking?

Approved by: [ signature ] Date: [ insert dat e ]06/29/2012DRAFT AC 150/5200-37A55[ Insert Airport Name ] Safety Management System

Implementation Plan



## Schedule for SMS Development and Deployment:

[ Instructions: In this section, document the major milestones and any potential chall enges to implementation.]


## I

. Major Milestones [ List the major milestones associated with SMS development and deployment

. This can be in narrative or tabular format

. A sample table is provided below . T

his section should summarize the airport’s major milesto nes and the target date for completion

. It can duplicate some of the entries in the checklist in the next section but should focus on higher

- level milestones leading up to complete implementation. ]

Milestone Target Date Conduct Gap Analysis

... Finalize SMS Manual

... Provide SMS Training

... Deploy Hazard Reporting System

... Full Implementation of SMS

Conduct first evaluation of SMS implementation



## II

. Challenges [ List and explain any challenges the airport may face that could impact these target dates (e.g., lease or union negotiations or procurement schedules ). Where possible, include a description of the methods the airport will use to mitigate these challenges where possible and track the status of these issues. ]

Approved by: [ signat ure ] Date: [ insert date ] DRAFT AC 150/5200

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0 6 / 29 /2012 5 6[ Insert Airport Name ] Safety Management System

Implementation Plan 

## SMS Implementation Checklist: [Instructions: The Implementation Checklist provides a guide for airpor ts to use in developing and deploying the essential components and elements of an SMS

. For efficiency, airports should look to existing systems, processes, and procedures to determine whether they can be used within the SMS

. Additionally, the “status of im plementation” column can be updated over time to communicate progress to the accountable executive

. An airport could use this c hecklist as a means for updating the accountable executive on the progress of SMS implement ation .]

Item Task Description of Any E xisting Systems/Processes Being Used t o Meet the Task Status of Implementation Target for

Completion

1

. Documentation 1. 1 SMS Manual (optional method) 2

. Safety Policy 2.1 Identify the a ccountable e xecutive 2.2 Develop and distribute a Safety Po licy Statement 2.3 Make Safety Policy Statement available to all employees and tenants 2.4 Identify organizational structure responsible for airport safety issues 2.5 Communicate safety organizational structure to airport employees and managers 2.6 Define airport management, including various levels throughout the organization, responsibilities and accountabilities for safety issues 2.7 Establish a procedure to periodically review management responsibilit ies and accountabilities for safe ty issues 2.8 Establish S afety O bjectives

Approved by: [ signature ] 3 of 84 Date: [ insert date ]06/29/2012DRAFT AC 150/5200-37A57[ Insert Airport Name ] Safety Management System

Implementation Plan

2.9 Establis h process or procedure to maintain and periodically review the Safety Objectives 2.10 Define methods, processes, and organizational structure necessary to meet Safety Objectives 3

. Safety Risk Management 3.1 Establish a system for identifying safe ty hazards 3.2 Establish a systematic process to analyze hazards and their associated risks to an acceptable level 3.3 Establish a system for regular assessment to ensure mitigations are effective 3.4 Establish processes or procedures to docume nt SRM efforts and retain those documents 4

. Safety Assurance 4.1 Establish processes or procedures to monitor safety performance and safety objectives identified through Safety Policy 4.2 Establish a hazard reporting system that provides

a means for reporter confidentiality 4.3 Maintain the hazard reporting system and establish a process for reviewing and analyzing reported hazards 4.4 Establish a process or procedure for reporting safety information and data on a regular basis to the acco untable executive 5.0 Safety Promotion 5.1 Develop training on airport’s SMS requirements specific to the audience’s roles and responsibilities 5.2 Provide initial training to personnel with role s and responsibilit ies in airport’s SMS

Appro ved by: [ signature ] Date: [ insert date ] DRAFT AC 150/5200

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0 6 / 29 /2012 5 8[ Insert Airport Name ] Safety Management System

Implementation Plan

5.3 Develop processes or procedures to record training 5.4 Develop informational mater ial about hazard awareness and reporting 5.5 Develop methods for communicating important safety information 5.6 Establish a procedure to periodically review and update communication methods 5.7 Develop processes or procedures to record safety

c ommunications

Approved by: [ signature ] 5 of 84 Date: [ insert date ]06/29/2012DRAFT AC 150/5200-37A59DRAFT AC 150/5200

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0 6 / 29 /2012 6 0 This page intentionally left blank.0 6 /29/2012 DRAFT AC 150/5200

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61 

## Appendix D. Sample SMS Manual

This appendix contains a sample SMS Manual for a small

- to

- medium

- size airport.DRAFT AC 150/5200

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## SXI Safety Management System Manual

62 

# Safety Management System Manual

Gambrills Regional Airport Washington, DC

January 1, 20120 6 / 29 /201 2 DRAFT AC 150/5200

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## SXI Safety M anagement System Manual

63 

## Table of Contents

Section 1: Introduction to Gambrills’ Safety Management System (SMS)

..................... 64 Section 2: Safety Policy

................................ ................................ ................................ ... 65 Section 3: Safety Risk Management

................................ ................................ ................ 68 Section 4: Safety Assurance

................................ ................................ ............................. 72 Section 5: Safety Promotion

................................ ................................ ............................ 74 Appendix 1: Definitions and Acronyms

................................ ................................ .......... 75 Appendix 2: Safety Policy Statement

................................ ................................ .............. 75 Appendix 3: Safety Objectives

................................ ................................ ........................ 75 Appendix 4: Hazard Assessment Form

................................ ................................ ............ 75 Appendix 5: Hazard Reporting Form

................................ ................................ .............. 75DRAFT AC 150/5200

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## SXI Safety Management System Manual

64 

## Section 1: Introduction to Gambrills’ Safety Management System (SMS)

1.1 What is SMS ? [Include a brief, plain language description of the SMS and what it means.]

A Safety Management System (SMS) is a systematic approach to managing safety, including all necessary organizational structures, accountabilities, statements, processes, and procedures.

SMS provides airport management with a set of tools to make safety related decisions

. SMS also helps airp ort management identify safety risks associated with airport operations, development, and other changes to proactively address those issues before they result in accidents, incidents, injury, or damage.

It materializes itself through a series of complemen tary processes and procedures which are closely coordinated by a well

- defined safety organizational structure, where the safety roles and responsibilities of everyone, including top management, are clearly defined and understood by all

. Further, safety obj ectives and data analysis will facilitate continuous improvement throughout the airport.

....
1.2 Applicability [Include a statement recognizing who this must following the SMS requirements.]

All individuals with access to the movement and non

- movement areas of the airport must follow the policies and procedures identified in this Manual

. Every individual with this access has a responsibility for safety

. All tenants will ensure that employees with access to the areas identified in Section 1.3 receive proper tr aining or awareness of their roles and responsibilities under the airport’s SMS.

1.3 Scope [Include a statement declaring the physical areas where the SMS initiatives shall apply. It may be helpful to include an ALP or graphical depiction of scope.]

All proc esses and procedures developed under the SMS apply to the movement and non

movement area

. SMS initiatives do not apply to landside operations including inside the terminals.0 6 / 29 /201 2 DRAFT AC 150/5200

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## SXI Safety M anagement System Manual

65 

## Section 2: Safety Policy

2.1 Accountable Executive [Identify the Accountable Execu tive by Position Title and include any specific responsibilities for the role.]

The [Insert Position] is the designated Accountable Executive for the Gambrills Regional Airport.

2.2 Safety Policy Statement [Reference the Safety Policy Statement in this secti on

. The document is usually inserted as an Appendix because it will be signed by the Accountable Executive and may need to be updated over time

. A summary of that statement can also be included in this section

. Also add any procedures for reviewing the Saf ety Policy Statement for currency.]

Gambrills Regional Airport is committed to ensuring that safety is a top priority of management

. As declared in the airport’s Safety Policy Statement (See Appendix 2), the airport encourages confidential hazard reportin g and commits itself to communicating safety issues and resolution of reported hazards.

.... The Safety Policy Statement will be reviewed annually to ensure it remains current.

2.3 Safety Organizational Structure [Identify the organization structure responsib le for making safety related decisions on the airport

. If a committee format is used for some of these processes, identify that organization.]DRAFT AC 150/5200

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## SXI Safety Management System Manual

66 

### The Safety Committee is comprised of representatives of the three airport division s and tenants on the airport including the regional airline, fixed

- base operator, and flight school

. The SMS Manager chair s the Safety Committee.

2.4 Management Responsibility and Accountability for Safety Issues [For those positions or committees identified in 2.3, clearly list each position or committee’s responsibilities and accountabilities for safety issues

. This description should not include items outside the scope of the SMS.]

Accountable Executive The Accountable Executive ensure s that the necessary assets and financial support are available for successful SMS development, implementation, operation, and continuous improvement.

In carrying out those duties, the Accountable Executive is responsible for:

 Accepting and signing the Safety Policy Statemen t

 Providing adequate resources to ensure implementation and management of the SMS

 Providing leadership in safety related issues by actively participating in safety significant events

 Ensuring that all managers are aware of, and held accountable for their r oles and responsibilities under the SMS

 Promoting and encouraging a positive safety culture within the airport

 Ensuring ongoing effectiveness of the SMS by facilitating, participating, or reviewing periodic reviews and evaluations

 Designating the airport’s safety objectives

 Reviewing SMS related data provided by the SMS Manager

SMS Manager The SMS Manager [Operations Manager] is responsible for the daily implementation, operation, and oversight of SMS related activities and initiatives.

In carrying out th ose duties, the SMS Manager is responsible for:

 Revising and maintaining the SMS Manual

 Chairing the SMS Committee



.... Safety Committee The Gambrills Regional Airport establish es a Safety Committee comprised of representatives of the airport divisions and tenants and chaired by the SMS Manager

. The Safety Committee meet s at least quarterly

. The Safety Committee is responsible for:0 6 / 29 /201 2 DRAFT AC 150/5200

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## SXI Safety M anagement System Manual

67 

###  Making safety recommendations to the Accountable Executive

 Establishing panel membership for complex Safety Risk Assessments r equiring stakeholder subject matter expertise

 Reviewing major accident and incident investigations for the airport since the past meeting



.... Maintenance Manager

....

Risk Administrator

....
2.5 Gambrills’ Safety Objectives [Safety objectives should be quanti tative

. They may be attached as an appendix to allow easier revisions and dissemination

. Be sure to include any processes or procedures for review, updating, tracking, and communicating.]

To facilitate continuous emphasis on improving safety, Gambrills Re gional Airport establish es safety objectives

. These objectives are quantitative and should reflect national and local safety goals.

The current objectives are attached in Appendix 3.

The Accountable Executive approve s new safety objectives as recommended by the Safety Committee and the SMS Manager

. Any revisions are communicated to airport employees and tenants.

....DRAFT AC 150/5200

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## SXI Safety Management System Manual

68 

## Section 3: Safety Risk Management

Gambrills Regional Airport supports the proactive formal analysis of hazards as is key to Safety Risk M anagement (SRM) and SMS

. SRM is defined as a formal process within SMS composed of describing the system, identifying hazards, analyzing, assessing, and mitigating risk.

Gambrills Regional Airport is committed to establishing and maintaining hazard identi fication and analysis processes as are discussed in this section

. No unacceptable risk, otherwise referred to as “High Risk”
, is tolerated at the airport.

....
3.1 Hazard Identification [Describe the processes and initiatives in place that identify and communi cate hazards through the SMS.]

Hazards and safety issues are identified through the following means:

 Daily Self

- Inspections

 Maintenance Logs

 Confidential Hazard Reporting System

 Monthly Managers/Tenant Meetings

The SMS Manager is responsible for hazard intake and initial processing and determines whether further action under the airport’s SRM processes is required.

....
3.2 SRM Process [Explain what processes will be used to formally assess hazards

. What triggers this assessment? Who conducts it? When is a panel of subject matter experts used? Can individuals conduct hazard assessment? What are the airport’s definitions and categories for severity and likelihood and is there a predictive risk matrix that should be used?]

Gambrills Regional Airport use s t he 5

- step process for hazard assessment which includes:

1. Describing the System 2. Identifying Hazards 3. Analyzing Risk 4. Assessing Risk 5. Mitigating Risk0 6 / 29 /201 2 DRAFT AC 150/5200

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## SXI Safety M anagement System Manual

6 9 

### The 5

- step process is instituted for any operational change on the airport including changes in tenant operati ons within the movement and non

- movement areas, and for changes in airfield infrastructure

. The 5

- step process is used when safety trends are identified through Safety Assurance activities or hazards are identified through self

- inspection, maintenance logs
, management meetings, or reported through the Confidential Hazard Reporting System

. The SMS Manager has the authority to conduct hazard assessment for any other issue he or she deems necessary

.
Hazard assessment take s two forms: hazard triage and integra ted hazard assessment.

The SMS Manager has the authority to conduct or delegate hazard triage

. All identified hazards, trends, or operational changes already being implemented go through hazard triage which is when the SMS Manager or their designee indivi dually conducts the 5

- step process to quickly determine if any hazards present unacceptable risk and require immediate mitigation.

For those complex changes to airfield infrastructure or identified hazards that subject matter expertise outside the airport , then an integrated hazard assessment is conducted

. The SMS Manager notif

ies the Safety Committee when an integrated hazard assessment is needed

. The Safety Committee then establish es a panel of subject matter experts.

Individuals or panels conducting ha zard assessment use the following definitions and tables for analysis

. No High Risk is accepted without mitigation

. The Accountable Executive is informed of any hazard assessment that results in High Risk

. Where mitigation is not possible, the Accountable Executive is responsible for approving the continued operation.DRAFT AC 150/5200

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## SXI Safety Management System Manual

70 High Risk level occurrences are unacceptable and s h ould be promptly mitigated to an acceptable level of safety.

Moderate

- High level of occurrences, are generally unacceptable, but wi th the implemen t ation of appropriate contr o ls, the occurrence could be c ome an acceptable risk.

Medium level of occurrences, are generally acceptable, providing the appropriate safety controls have been established.

Lo w level occurrences, pose little or no ri s k and h a v e adequate levels of control established.



### ....
3.3 Means for ensuring mitigations are effective [Describe the process or procedure that will be used to verify that mitigations are having their desired effect

. This process or procedure will be close ly tied to Safety Assurance

. Who is responsible for this action and will the hazard assessment need to be re

- verified?]
The SMS Manager is responsible for reviewing data through the airport’s Safety Assurance program to verify that mitigations required un der SRM are having their desired effect

. In those cases where data indicates mitigations are ineffective, the SMS Manager re

- verif ies the hazard assessment and for those developed by a panel; determine s whether the panel should re

- convene.

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71 

### 3.4 Documentati on and Record Retention [Describe the documentation and retention policies for SRM related documents.] All hazard assessments conducted either individually by the SMS Manager, their designee, or by a panel of subject

- matter experts established by the Safet y Committee, are documented using the Hazard Assessment Form (Appendix 4)

. Dissenting opinions or any additional narrative are included by attachment to the Form.

SRM related documents are retained electronically in the airport’s shared network for the li fe of the change, operation, or as long as mitigations are being implemented.

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## SXI Safety Management System Manual

72 

## Section 4: Safety Assurance Safety Assurance is a critical part of the SMS since it includes processes that help determine the effectiveness of SMS initiatives and institut e a Confidential Hazard Reporting System

. Safety Assurance is the process management functions that evaluate the continued effectiveness of implemented risk mitigation strategies; support the identification of new hazards; and function to systematically pr ovide confidence that an organization meets or exceeds its safety objectives through continuous improvement.

4.1 Safety Performance Monitoring [Describe how safety objectives will be monitored

. What data will be collected and how? Who’s responsible for colle cting and analyzing the data? Include any procedures for accident and incident investigations

. Describe methods for safety evaluation including who conducts, how often, and what they should cover.]

The SMS Manager is responsible for overseeing data colle ction and analysis to look for safety trends, identify new hazards, and verify compliance with SMS requirements

. Data analysis also is used to verify performance with safety objectives.

Data is collected from the following sources:

 Daily Self

- Inspection Reports

 Maintenance Logs



.... Safety evaluations are conducted quarterly and annually

. Quarterly evaluations focus on evaluating compliance with one aspect of SMS requirements

. Annual evaluations verify airport

wide compliance with all SMS requirements and report on safety performance as it relates to established safety objectives.

....

4.2 Confidential Hazard Reporting System [Explain how the airport will establish and maintain a confidential hazard reporting system

. I nclude any clauses that except individuals from confidentiality such as intentional or reckless behavior

. What format will reports be made? Who reviews the reports and is responsible for action? How will reporters get feedback?]

Gambrills Regional Airport encourages everyone who has access to t he airfield to report any and all safety concerns, hazardous conditions, and incidents and accidents

. Many incidents can be avoided if a concern is reported in a timely manner.0 6 / 29 /201 2 DRAFT AC 150/5200

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## SXI Safety M anagement System Manual

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### Employees and tenants have two ways to report safety concerns: in paper via dr op

- boxes throughout the airport and electronically through the airport’s internet portal

. A copy of the Hazard Reporting Form is available in Appendix 5

. Reporters can submit the form anonymously or include their name and contact information.

Operations s taff is r esponsible for checking drop

- boxes daily and forwarding any forms found to the SMS Manager

. The SMS Manager review s the paper and electronic forms on a daily basis to identify immediate safety concerns requiring action through hazard triage or for warding to the SMS Committee for panel review.

....
4.3 Reporting Safety Information [Describe what types of information will be reported to the accountable executive

. Who has responsibility for this task and what method or format will be used to communicate? How often is this information communicated?]

The SMS Manager report s weekly and monthly to the Accountable Executive regarding safety information.

On a weekly basis, the SMS Manager report s the following via written report:

 Number of hazard reports rece ived with summary of status

 Summary and examples of safety related communications with tenants



.... On a monthly basis, the SMS Manager meet s with the Accountable Executive to report the following:

 Performance with safety objectives

 Status of ongoing mitiga tions required under SRM

 Status of SMS implementation



....

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## SXI Safety Management System Manual

74 

## Section 5: Safety Promotion Safety Promotion means the combination of safety culture, training, and communication activities to support the implementation and operation of an SMS

. At the Gambr ills Regional Airport, employees have the resources necessary to carry out SMS initiatives including appropriate training

. Further, airport management is committed to ensuring employees and tenants receive safety critical communications in a timely manner.

....
5.1 Training [Describe what training will be provided and identify who receives what training

. When will employees and tenants be trained? Can tenants train/inform their own employees? How will training be documented and how long will training records be kept? How often with the program be reviewed for currency? It may be beneficial to include the syllabus or course objectives of the training programs as an appendix to this section.]

Gambrills Regional Airport has a two

- prong approach to training

. Al l employees responsible for SMS implementation and oversight receive specific SMS training upon initial hiring and on an annual recurring basis

. All other individuals, including tenant employees, with access to the airfield receive a safety orientation pac kage upon hiring.

The SMS Manager is responsible for developing, implementing, and updating the training program and ensuing that tenants have safety orientation packages for all new employees.

....
5.2 Communication [What constitutes safety related informati on that should be communicated? Describe the process for communicating information with employees and tenants including the method or format for communicating

. How long will communications documentation be kept?]

Gambrills Regional Airport is committed t o open and continuous communication of safety critical issues

. The airport communicate s safety issues using the following formats:

 Monthly Managers/Tenant Meetings

 Safety Bulletin Boards

 Direct email (via SMS Manager)

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## SXI Safety M anagement System Manual

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## Appendix 1: Definitions and Acr onyms

Appendix 2: Safety Policy Statement

Appendix 3: Safety Objectives

Appendix 4: Hazard Assessment Form

Appendix 5: Hazard Reporting FormDRAFT AC 150/5200

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## SXI Safety Management System Manual

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77 

## Appendix E. S ample Safety Reporting Dashboards

Figure A E

- 1

. Sample Dashboa rd 1 (Courtesy of San Antonio Airport System)DRAFT AC 150/5200

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78 Figure A E

- 2

. Sample Dashboard 2 (Courtesy of San Antonio Airport System)0 6 / 29 /201 2 DRAFT AC 150/5200

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79 Figure A E

- 3

. Sample Dashboard 3 (Courtesy of City of Atlanta)DRAFT AC 150/5200

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