COURT OF APPEALS

EIGHTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS

EL PASO, TEXAS

TEXAS DEPARTMENT OF MOTOR 

VEHICLES,

 Appellant,

v.

GERALDINE BUSTILLOS,

 Appellee.

§

§

§

§

§

§

No. 08-18-00165-CV

Appeal from the

243rd District Court

of El Paso County, Texas

(TC# 2018DCV1204)

CONCURRING OPINION

I join the court’s opinion because I agree the trial court erred in denying the Department’s 

plea to the jurisdiction. I write separately to clarify that the majority is not relying on evidence

excluded by the trial court, because some of the evidence offered by each party overlapped, I 

believe we should clearly delineate the source of the evidence on which the court relies to render 

its opinion.

I.

I would resolve this circumstantial-evidence case on the sole ground that Appellee failed 

to create a genuine issue of material fact as to pretext, which precludes a finding that Appellant 

acted with retaliatory intent when Appellee was terminated.
2

Geraldine Bustillos (“Bustillos”) filed suit against the Texas Department of Motor Vehicles 

(“the Department”) alleging she was terminated from her employment as a title clerk in retaliation 

for filing a worker’s compensation claim after sustaining an injury at work in violation of Chapter 

451 of the Texas Labor Code.1In her original petition, Bustillos alleged facts supporting both the 

existence of a causal link between her termination and her worker’s compensation claim, as well 

as her belief that the reason justifying her termination was a pretext for retaliation.2

In support of the causal-link element,3 Bustillos alleged that “[a]s soon as” her supervisor, 

James Chesshire, became aware of Bustillos’s work injury, he displayed a change in attitude 

toward her and became more negative. Bustillos also alleged facts establishing a temporal 

proximity between her termination and work injury.4 Specifically, Bustillos alleged within thirty1 Bustillos originally filed suit on August 16, 2016 in a separate state court action that was removed to federal court 

by the Department because it raised a federal question arising from an allegation that the self-care provision of the 

FMLA was violated. See Bustillos v. TxDMV, USDC No.3:17-cv-00132-PRM (W.D. Tex. (El Paso Div.)). On 

February 21, 2018, after the parties engaged in substantial discovery, the federal district court granted the 

Department’s motion for summary judgment as to the FMLA claim on the ground that Congress had not waived 

sovereign immunity for claims brought under the FMLA’s self-care provision. The federal court, however, did not 

grant summary judgment as to the state-law retaliation claim, opting instead not to exercise its pendent jurisdiction 

over it and dismissed it without prejudice. Bustillos refiled her retaliation claim in the court below on April 2, 2018.

2 We apply a burden-shifting analysis when reviewing a claim of retaliatory discharge under Chapter 451. Hernandez 

v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 198 S.W.3d 288, 291 (Tex.App.—El Paso 2006, no pet.). First, the employee must establish a 

causal link between the filing of the worker’s compensation claim and her termination. Id. Second, if a causal link is 

established, the burden shifts to the employer to present a legitimate non-retaliatory reason for the termination. Id.

Third, if the employer does so, the burden shifts back to the employee to produce controverting evidence of a 

retaliatory motive. Id.

3 A causal connection between an employee’s termination and her compensation claim can be demonstrated through 

direct or circumstantial evidence. Echostar Satellite L.L.C. v. Aguilar, 394 S.W.3d 276, 287 (Tex.App.—El Paso 2012, 

pet. denied). Circumstantial evidence sufficient to establish a causal link may include: (1) knowledge of the 

compensation claim by those making the decision to terminate; (2) expression of a negative attitude toward the 

employee’s injured condition; (3) failure to adhere to established company policies; (4) discriminatory treatment in 

comparison to similarly situated employees; and (5) evidence that the stated reason for the discharge was false. Id. 

(citing Cont'l Coffee Prods. Co. v. Cazarez, 903 S.W.2d 70, 77–8 (Tex.App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1995), aff'd in 

part and rev'd in part on other grounds, 937 S.W.2d 444 (Tex. 1996)).

4 See Aguilar, 394 S.W.3d at 288 (observing that temporal proximity between termination and the date of injury or 

claim is “[a]n additional factor” that may be considered when determining whether sufficient circumstantial evidence 

of causal link exists) (citing Porterfield v. Galen Hosp. Corp., Inc., 948 S.W.2d 916, 919 (Tex.App.—San Antonio 
3

six days after the Department became aware of her work injury she was notified that disciplinary 

action was being taken against her due to her issuance of numerous illegitimate vehicle permits 

beginning almost a year before her injury. She also alleged she was terminated five days after she 

received the disciplinary-action notice and forty-one days after she sustained her work injury.

Bustillos also alleged facts supporting her claim that the Department’s justification for her 

termination was false and a pretext for retaliation. Specifically, she alleged that the disciplinary 

action resulting in her termination was unwarranted because the permits she issued improperly 

were not her fault, but rather, resulted because she was improperly trained on how to use “VIN 

assist,” a computer program designed to prevent the issuance of permits to illegitimate vehicle 

identification numbers.

The Department challenged the existence of jurisdictional facts by filing a plea to the 

court’s jurisdiction and a no-evidence motion for summary judgment in a single pleading.5 The 

Department argued it could negate some jurisdictional facts alleged in Bustillos’s petition with 

evidence and that other jurisdictional facts could not be established at all because “no evidence” 

existed supporting them. Specifically, the Department challenged the existence of a causal link by 

arguing Bustillos could not produce evidence of four out of five Continental Coffee factors: (1) a

1997, writ denied)).

5 Contrary to the majority’s opinion, Bustillos does not argue that the Department is not protected by sovereign 

immunity against invalid claims brought under Chapter 451. Bustillos assumes sovereign immunity applies, but argues 

that the Department failed to preserve error because some of the evidence on which it relied in the court below to 

support its plea was excluded by the trial court. According to Bustillos, the exclusion of some of the Department’s 

evidence means her burden to respond to the plea and no-evidence summary judgment was not triggered. However, it 

is well established that the absence of jurisdiction is an issue that can be raised at any time, even for the first time on 

appeal, which means no error preservation is required. Moreover, as demonstrated below, the Department’s 

documentary evidence demonstrating its non-retaliatory reason for terminating Bustillos was neither objected to nor 

excluded. Finally, on the issue of pretext, the burden was on Bustillos to present more than a scintilla of evidence to 

support her claim that the non-retaliatory reason raised by the Department’s evidence was false, which she failed to 

do.
4

negative attitude toward Bustillos’s injury; (2) a similarly situated employee who was treated more 

favorably; (3) the stated reason for Bustillos’s termination was false; and (4) failure to adhere to 

established policies when Bustillos was terminated.

The Department also argued that its evidence showed the Department “had a legitimate 

non-retaliatory reason for the termination—a reason which Bustillos was keenly aware she was 

under investigation for, and which pre-dated any alleged workplace injury and leave[,]” which 

“weighs against the inference” that Bustillos was terminated because of her compensation claim. 

Finally, the Department argued that Bustillos could produce “no evidence” that the Department’s 

reason for terminating her was a pretext for retaliation. The Department repeated its arguments on 

appeal.

The material facts in this case are all undisputed. Indeed, other than the jurisdictional issue, 

the only other dispute existing in this case is a legal one. Bustillos argues that Melissa Frescas is a 

similarly situated employee because she shared the same supervisor with Bustillos and Frescas 

“was not doing her job” when Bustillos issued the illegal permits. I agree with my colleagues that 

Frescas is not similarly situated to Bustillos. “Employees are similarly situated if their 

circumstances are comparable in all material respects, including similar standards, supervisors, 

and conduct.” Ysleta Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Monarrez, 177 S.W.3d 915, 917 (Tex. 2005) (per curiam) 

(footnotes omitted). Although “similarly situated” employees need not be “identical,” Frescas was 

a supervisor, not a title clerk, and while she was responsible for training Bustillos and the other 

clerks on VINAssist, there is no evidence demonstrating that she herself issued illegal permits or 

that Frescas was directly responsible for Bustillos doing so. Indeed, the evidence demonstrates 

only that Frescas attempted to train Bustillos and had sent Bustillos an email with instructions on 
5

how to create her VINAssist credentials, which Bustillos failed to open. Accordingly, the fact that 

Frescas was not fired for conduct committed by Bustillos does not weigh in Bustillos’s favor on 

the issues of causation or pretext.

Having resolved this legal issue against Bustillos we are left with only undisputed facts 

from which a jury could not infer retaliatory intent. It is undisputed the Department’s stated nonretaliatory reason for terminating Bustillos was that it believed Bustillos issued a large number of

illegal permits. It is also undisputed that Bustillos, in her written response to the allegation, did not 

deny that she had done so, rather, Bustillos contended only that she had done so unintentionally.

Moreover, instead of accepting responsibility, Bustillos blamed Melissa Frescas for allegedly 

failing to properly train her to use VINAssist, for which Bustillos claimed she had never received 

a password. In her deposition, however, Bustillos admitted that Frescas had sent her an email 

containing the VINAssist password instructions approximately one year earlier, but Bustillos

failed to read the email.

6 The undisputed facts further establish that the investigation into 

6

In her deposition, Bustillos testified: 

Q: So I’m trying to understand—your testimony has been that you never got given a user and a 

password to have access to VINAssist.

A: Correct.

Q: So help me understand. You—you did get this. There’s this email from 2014, November 2014 

correct?

A: Uh-huh. Correct.

Q: And you’ll agree with me that this contains a user ID for you to use VINAssist?

A: Correct.

Q: And it contains a password for you to log in for the first time to use VINAssist.

A: Correct.

Q: Did you never use VINAssist after this email?

A: I never got this email.

. . .

Q: Did you –were there occasions where you didn’t get emails in your –in your work email, other 

than this one, that you can think of?

A: I got tons of emails. I didn’t look at all of them.

Q: You didn’t look at all of the emails?

A: No. I don’t remember seeing this one. This is—if you’re saying that this is something I had to 

use or that they wanted me to use it, I would think that they would have told me, “You have an 

email that you need to open.”
6

Bustillos’s misconduct began prior to her injury, that Bustillos was removed from her regular 

duties prior to her injury, and that Bustillos herself believed the negative attitude exhibited by 

“everyone” in the office, including Chesshire, which in her own words, caused her to feel like “a 

leper” began prior to her injury. In addition, Bustillos neither alleged nor attempted to show that 

the result of the investigation, demonstrating she was the only clerk who issued a large number of 

illegal permits, was incorrect. Finally, the evidence is undisputed that her back injury caused her 

to miss only about one month of work. The brevity of this comp time versus the severity of the 

illegal permit issue only further supports the inference that Bustillos was terminated for the 

legitimate non-retaliatory reason proffered.

In her attempt to show the existence of a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the 

Department’s proffered reason for terminating her was false, Bustillos points to the following

facts: (1) temporal proximity between her termination and her injury; (2) Chesshire was aware of 

Bustillos’s contention that the illegal permits resulted, not from her own incompetence, but 

because Frescas “refused” to train her on VINAssist; (3) Chesshire lacked documentation 

contradicting Bustillos claim that she was improperly trained; and (4) prior to Bustillos’s injury, 

Chesshire gave Bustillos positive annual reviews. None of these undisputed facts, raises a fact 

issue as to whether the Department’s stated reason was false.

First, it is well established that neither temporal proximity, nor an employer’s knowledge 

Q: Well, isn’t that the purpose of an email, is that you send an email, and then somebody opens it?

A: I don’t use email.

Q: You don’t use email?

A: No, sir, not at work. I go to work, not to email.

Q: So when do you use email? Just for personal?

A: Exactly.

Q: Did you tell Melissa that you don’t use email?

A: No, I don’t think we had that conversation.
7

of a worker’s compensation claim standing alone is sufficient to raise a genuine issue of material 

fact with respect to pretext. Hernandez, 198 S.W.3d at 293-94. Second, Bustillos does not allege 

nor attempt to show that other clerks, who were also trained by Frescas, had issued a large number 

of illegal permits, which might give rise to an inference that Bustillos was not to blame for the 

issuance of the illegal permits. The absence of such evidence, however, coupled with the fact that 

Bustillos did not open the email from Frescas instructing her how to log on to VINAssist, precludes 

her argument that Frescas “refused” to train Bustillos and raises only an inference that the fault for 

the illegal permits lies with Bustillos, which would support, not negate the Department’s stated 

reason for terminating her. Third, Bustillos’s last positive performance review occurred several 

months before the investigation into the issuance of illegal permits was initiated, and the injury 

occurred after the investigation began. This sequence of events raises only the inference that at the 

time these positive performance reviews were given, Chesshire was unaware Bustillos was issuing 

illegal permits but once discovered it was this fact, not the worker’s compensation claim, that 

caused the change in attitude about her work performance.

In sum, no rational jury could find that the Department’s proffered reason for terminating 

Bustillos under these facts was false or a pretext for retaliation. Because Bustillos did not raise 

more than a scintilla of evidence as to pretext, a no-evidence summary judgment is proper. 

II.

In rendering our decision, we relied on the Department exhibits to which Bustillos did not 

object, which consisted of Exhibits A, C, C1, C2, C3, D, I, L, and M containing the following

evidence: Bustillos’s deposition excerpts (Ex. A); a declaration by Jeremiah Kuntz (the 

Department’s Director of Vehicle Titles and Registration Division) (Ex. C); the Department’s 
8

notice of possible disciplinary action (Ex. C1); Bustillos’s response thereto (Ex. C2); the 

Department’s termination letter (Ex. C3); a declaration by Melissa Frescas (Ex. D); Bustillo’s 

report of injury (Ex. I); Chesshire’s deposition excerpts (Ex. L); and the federal court order on the 

Department’s motion for summary judgment (Ex. M). Finally, we only relied on those portions of 

Chesshire’s declaration (Ex. B) to which Bustillos did not object.

We also relied on the evidence offered by Bustillos which consisted of the following: the 

entire sworn depositions of herself and Chesshire (Exs. A-B); her 2014 and 2015 performance 

evaluations (Exs. C-D); her medical diagnosis following her work injury (Ex. E); copies of the 

Department’s disclosures submitted in the federal proceeding (Ex. F); her FMLA application (Ex. 

G); the Department’s notice of possible disciplinary action (Ex. H); Bustillos response to the notice 

of possible disciplinary action (Ex. I); the Department’s termination letter (Ex. J); and Bustillos’s

timesheets for October-December 2015 (Ex. K).

YVONNE T. RODRIGUEZ, Chief Justice

January 25, 2021

Before Rodriguez, C.J., Palafox, J., and McClure, C.J. (Senior Judge)

McClure, C.J. (Senior Judge), sitting by assignment