United States Court of Appeals

For the Eighth Circuit 

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No. 22-1586

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United States of America

 Plaintiff - Appellee

v.

Phillip Vincent Ridings

 Defendant - Appellant

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No. 22-1649

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United States of America

 Plaintiff - Appellee

v.

Jody Douglas Davis

 Defendant - Appellant

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Appeal from United States District Court 

for the Western District of Arkansas - Fayetteville

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Submitted: January 12, 2023

Filed: July 28, 2023

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Before KELLY, ERICKSON, and STRAS, Circuit Judges. 

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ERICKSON, Circuit Judge. 

Jody Davis and Phillip Ridings appeal their convictions for conspiracy to 

commit wire fraud, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1349; wire fraud and aiding and 

abetting wire fraud, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1343 and 2; money laundering, in 

violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1957; and money laundering and aiding and abetting money 

laundering, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1957 and 2. On appeal, both Davis and 

Ridings claim the district court1 erred when it admitted a redacted plea agreement 

that Ridings signed, but which did not ultimately result in a guilty plea. By the terms 

of the plea agreement, Ridings waived his rights under Rule 410 of the Federal Rules 

of Evidence. Davis also appeals his sentence, asserting that the district court 

imposed a sentence above the Sentencing Guidelines range based on his religious 

beliefs in violation of the First Amendment. We affirm.

I. BACKGROUND

Davis and Ridings convinced numerous people to invest in a wind generator 

concept invented by Ridings named “Dragonfly.” Davis and Ridings represented 

that the Dragonfly was a revolutionary, jet engine-shaped wind turbine generator 

that could produce 60% more power than a traditional wind turbine generator. 

Ridings and Davis hired Belcan Engineering Group to make the Dragonfly design 

operational, agreeing to pay Belcan $574,000. Belcan required a downpayment of 

$58,000 before beginning any work. Belcan concluded that the design was not 

feasible and returned $15,766.50 of the original $58,000 payment.

Ridings also retained DAR Corporation to assist with prototyping the 

Dragonfly concept. DAR reported that Dragonfly was not commercially viable. 

1

The Honorable Timothy L. Brooks, United States District Judge for the 

Western District of Arkansas.
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Notwithstanding this, Ridings and Davis utilized materials indicating that DAR had 

performed a computational fluid dynamics validation of the Dragonfly.

 

Ridings also discussed Dragonfly with Jeffrey Marchetta, a professor at the 

University of Memphis’ Engineering Department. Marchetta’s response was, at 

best, lukewarm, but Ridings altered a letter from Marchetta indicating Marchetta had 

“validated” Dragonfly. Ridings used letterhead containing the University of 

Memphis logo and did not include a faculty name or signature. Marchetta testified 

at trial that he considered the altered letter “a gross misrepresentation of [his] work.” 

This altered letter was shown to numerous investors.

Davis met Uchenna Obi through a prayer line. Davis represented to Obi that 

Dragonfly wassuperior to current wind turbines, and that he would receive exclusive 

Dragonfly rights in Africa if he was willing to invest enough money in the project. 

Obi invested in Dragonfly and testified that he trusted Davis because he was “a 

Christian brother.” Obi also recruited his business partners and brother-in-law into 

the scheme. Davis and Ridings showed the Obi investors the altered University of 

Memphis letter, stating they needed money to finish a working model. The Obi 

investors ultimately delivered $73,500 to Ridings.

Ridings and Davis made similar misrepresentations to a number of other 

investors, ultimately obtaining $1,138,845.28 from numerous victims. One investor 

reported that Davis frequently spoke of being a Godly and religious person and 

another stated that he felt a connection with Davis because of their shared Christian 

faith.

 

Ridings and Davis were indicted on charges of conspiracy to commit wire 

fraud, wire fraud and aiding and abetting wire fraud, money laundering, and 

engaging in monetary transactions in property derived from specified unlawful 

activity and aiding and abetting. 

 
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Ridings signed a plea agreement with the United States, but the plea 

agreement fell through at the change of plea hearing and Ridings declined to change 

his plea. The written plea agreement waived the protections of Federal Rule of 

Evidence 410 and expressly allowed the factual statements made by Ridings in the 

agreement to be used against him. The district court granted a motion by the 

government to admit at trial a redacted factual stipulation from Ridings’ plea

agreement with all references to Davis removed. Davis also unsuccessfully moved 

to exclude the redacted statement or to sever the trial. The court gave the following 

limiting instruction: “You may consider that statement of Mr. Ridings only in the 

case against him, but not in the case against Mr. Davis. You may not consider or 

even discuss Mr. Ridings’ statement in any way when you are deciding if the 

government proved beyond a reasonable doubt its case against Mr. Davis.”

 

Ridings and Davis were convicted on all counts. Ridings was sentenced to a 

97-month term of imprisonment on each count to be served concurrently. The court 

upward varied and sentenced Davis to a 180-month term of imprisonment on five of 

the counts and a 120-month sentence on the remaining counts with all sentences to 

run concurrently. Ridings and Davis were both ordered to pay restitution jointly and 

severally in the amount of $1,138,845.28. Both defendants appeal.

II. DISCUSSION 

1. Admission of the Plea Agreement

We first address whether the district court erred in receiving Ridings’ redacted 

plea agreement into evidence at the joint trial. Federal Rule of Evidence 410(a)

provides that “a guilty plea that was later withdrawn . . . or . . . a statement made 

during plea discussions with an attorney for the prosecuting authority if the 

discussions did not result in a guilty plea or they resulted in a later-withdrawn guilty 

plea” is not admissible. The protections offered by the rule are waivable. See United 

States v. Washburn, 728 F.3d 775, 779-80 (8th Cir. 2013) (quoting United States v. 

Young, 223 F.3d 905, 909 (8th Cir. 2000)). Ridings does not dispute the district 
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court’s conclusion that his plea agreement waived the protections under Rule 410. 

Rather, he claims the statement should have been excluded under Rule 403 of the 

Federal Rules of Evidence.

A court may exclude relevant evidence under Rule 403 if its probative value 

is substantially outweighed by a danger of unfair prejudice, risks confusing the

issues or misleading the jury, causes undue delay, wastes time, or amounts to

cumulative evidence. Rule 403 prejudice is something different than simply being 

evidence that is detrimental to a party’s case; instead, the “rule protects against 

evidence that is unfairly prejudicial, that is, if it tends to suggest decision on an 

improper basis.” United States v. Myers, 503 F.3d 676, 682 (8th Cir. 2007). District 

courts have broad discretion under Rule 403, and we generally review for an abuse 

of discretion. Id. If the defendant fails to object, we review for plain error. See

United States v. Jumping Eagle, 515 F.3d 794, 801 (8th Cir. 2008). To establish 

plain error, the party who failed to object must establish error that is both obvious 

and affected his substantial rights. United States v. Combs, 44 F.4th 815, 818 (8th

Cir. 2022) (per curiam).

Even though Ridings objected to receipt of the factual statement, he did so on 

different grounds than he raises on appeal, thus we review for plain error. See

Ludwig ex rel. McKnight v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 36 F.3d 1396, 1407 (8th Cir. 

1994) (“An objection on one ground does not allow a party to argue on appeal that 

the evidence should have been excluded on different grounds.”). Here, the 

admission of Ridings’ statement was not unfairly prejudicial as against Ridings as it 

did not suggest decision on an improper basis. While Ridings argues that proposed 

plea agreements are not signed under oath and plea agreements are frequently

accepted to minimize the consequences, he nonetheless admitted to the facts at issue, 

which, while unhelpful to his defense, were relevant and proper to consider in 

arriving at a verdict. They are in their nature no different than any number of 

statements or admissions that a defendant may make and are routinely received into 

evidence. The purpose of Rule 410 is to carve out an exception for statements made 

in plea negotiations, the knowing waiver of which leaves the statements exactly 
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where they would have been in the absence of the Rule. There is no error here, plain 

or otherwise.

Davis contends that receipt of the statement against Ridings violated his rights 

under the Sixth Amendment, and that receipt of the statement was more prejudicial 

than probative towards Davis and the trial should have been severed. In Bruton v. 

United States, the Supreme Court held that admitting a co-defendant’s confession in 

a joint trial violates the Sixth Amendment’s Confrontation Clause. See 391 U.S. 

123, 126 (1968). That said, Bruton is not implicated when a non-testifying 

defendant’s statement inculpates a co-defendant “inferentially-through linkage to 

other evidence.” United States v. Coleman, 349 F.3d 1077, 1085 (8th Cir. 2003); 

see Samia v. United States, 599 U.S. ___, 2023 WL 4139001, *11 (June 23, 2023) 

(determining that admission of a non-testifying co-defendant’s confession that did 

not directly inculpate the defendant and the court offers a limiting instruction telling 

the jurors they may consider the confession only with respect to the confessing codefendant does not violate the Confrontation Clause). Thus, Bruton violations “may 

be avoided through redaction if a cautionary jury instruction is given, if the 

redactions are neutral, and if they do not obviously directly refer to the defendant.” 

Coleman, 349 F.3d at 1085.

Davis argues that the admission of the statement in his joint trial violated Rule 

403, Bruton, and Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004). The Crawford

question is easily disposed of because Crawford is concerned with the inability to 

cross-examine a person who made a testimonial statement. See Crawford, 541 U.S. 

at 38, 68. In this case, Ridings testified, was subject to cross-examination, and no 

Crawford problem exists. Consistent with Rule 403, the statement as received and 

presented to the jury was entirely silent about Davis or any conduct that could be 

attributed to Davis. The district court fully instructed the jury regarding the limited 

use of the plea statement and the redactions to the document do not refer to Davis, 

nor were the redactions such that they drew an inference to Davis, as the entire 

document never mentioned Davis or any conduct attributable to him. The district 
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court did not abuse its discretion in declining to sever the trial. See Samia, 2023 WL 

4139001, at *10. 

Finally, even if Bruton was implicated, there was an overwhelming quantum 

of evidence received at trial that was consistent with Ridings’ statement, rendering 

admission of the factual statement, even if it was error, harmless beyond a reasonable 

doubt. See Coleman, 349 F.3d at 1086 (stating there is no Bruton problem if the 

evidence erroneously received is cumulative of overwhelming and largely 

uncontroverted evidence). 

2. Davis’s Sentence

 We review the imposition of a sentence, including an upward variance and the 

substantive reasonableness of the particular sentence, applying a deferential abuseof-discretion standard. See United States v. John, 27 F.4th 644, 651 (8th Cir. 2022) 

(citations omitted). Unobjected-to procedural sentencing errors are forfeited, and 

reviewed only for plain error. United States v. Burnette, 518 F.3d 942, 946 (8th Cir. 

2008) (citation omitted). Since Davis did not object below to the sentence on First 

Amendment grounds, we review his procedural claims for plain error.

Here, the district court specifically stated that its sentence was not based on 

Davis’s faith, but rather, the district court considered that Davis used faith to 

manipulate people who were susceptible to such manipulation and lull people into a 

false sense of security. This Court has upheld sentences where the district court took 

into account a defendant’s abuse of a religious connection. See, e.g., United States 

v. Gunderson, 211 F.3d 1088, 1089 (8th Cir. 2000) (affirming sentence when the 

district court was concerned the defendant’s crime reflected a moral failure and the 

court did not punish the defendant or hold him to a higher standard based on his 

professed faith); United States v. Hoffman, 626 F.3d 993, 998-99 (8th Cir. 2010)

(determining the district court’s statements that victims were frightened into 

believing they risked a loss of their salvation if they did not surrender and that 
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defendant abused his power as the girls’ pastor were permissible sentencing 

considerations).

A “district court’s rationale for granting [a] variance does not need to be 

extraordinary, only substantively reasonable.” United States v. Davis, 20 F.4th 

1217, 1221 (8th Cir. 2021). Here, the district court did not abuse its discretion by 

considering Davis’s abuse of others’ faith, nor is the sentence it imposed 

substantively unreasonable. 

III. CONCLUSION

We affirm the judgment of the district court.

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