Federal Register / Vol. 83, No. 8 / Thursday, January 11, 2018 / Notices 1383 

multispectral, remotely-sensed imagery 

through the Landsat program. Landsat 

satellite imagery has been available at 

no cost to the public since 2008, which 

has resulted in the distribution of 

millions of scenes each subsequent year, 

as well tens of thousands of Landsat 

users registering with USGS to access 

the data. In order to continue to provide 

high quality imagery that meets the 

needs of users, LRS is collecting current 

and future user requirements for sensor 

and satellite attributes. These attributes 

include spatial resolution, spectral 

bands, frequency of acquisition, and 

many others. LRS will use the 

information from this collection to 

understand if they are currently meeting 

the needs of their user community and 

to help determine the features of future 

Landsat satellites. Questions will be 

asked to determine user characteristics, 

current uses of imagery, preferred 

attributes of Landsat imagery, and 

benefits of Landsat imagery. All current 

U.S. Landsat imagery users who are 

registered with USGS will be invited to 

take part in the survey and a large 

sample of international Landsat users 

will also be invited. 

To protect the confidentiality and 

privacy of survey respondents, the data 

from the survey will not be associated 

with any respondent’s email address at 

any time and will only be analyzed and 

reported in aggregate. All files 

containing PII will be passwordprotected, housed on secure USGS 

servers, and only accessible to the 

research team. The data from the survey 

will be aggregated and statistically 

analyzed and the results will be 

published in publically available USGS 

reports. 

OMB Control Number: 1028–NEW. 

Title: Current and Future Landsat 

User Requirements. 

Type of Request: New information 

collection. 

Respondent Obligation: None. 

Participation is voluntary. 

Frequency of Collection: One time 

only. 

Description of Respondents: General 

public. 

Estimated Total Number of Annual 

Responses: 11,660 

Estimated Time per Response: We 

estimate that it will take 20 minutes per 

person to complete the full survey and 

5 minutes per person to complete the 

non-response survey. 

Estimated Annual Burden Hours: 

3,335 

Estimated Annual Reporting and 

Recordkeeping ‘‘Non-Hour Cost’’: There 

are no ‘‘non-hour cost’’ burdens 

associated with this collection of 

information. 

Public Disclosure Statement: The PRA 

(44 U.S.C. 3501, et seq.) provides that an 

agency may not conduct or sponsor and 

you are not required to respond to a 

collection of information unless it 

displays a currently valid OMB control 

number. Until the OMB approves a 

collection of information, you are not 

obliged to respond. 

The authority for this action is the 

Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995 (44 

U.S.C. 3501, et seq.). 

Timothy Newman, 

Land Remote Sensing Program Coordinator. 

[FR Doc. 2018–00351 Filed 1–10–18; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 4311–AM–P 

JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE 

UNITED STATES 

Hearings of the Judicial Conference 

Advisory Committee on the Federal 

Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure 

AGENCY: Advisory Committee on the 

Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure, 

Judicial Conference of the United States. 

ACTION: Notice of cancellation of public 

hearing. 

SUMMARY: The following public hearing 

on proposed amendments to the Federal 

Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure has been 

canceled: Bankruptcy Rules Hearing on 

January 30, 2018, in Pasadena, CA. 

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: 

Rebecca A. Womeldorf, Rules 

Committee Secretary, Rules Committee 

Staff, Administrative Office of the 

United States Courts, Washington, DC 

20544, telephone (202) 502–1820. 

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: 

Announcement for this hearing was 

previously published in 82 FR 37610. 

Dated: January 8, 2018. 

Rebecca A. Womeldorf, 

Rules Committee Secretary. 

[FR Doc. 2018–00385 Filed 1–10–18; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 2210–55–P 

NUCLEAR REGULATORY 

COMMISSION 

[Docket Nos. 50–361 and 50–362; NRC– 

2018–0003] 

Southern California Edison Company, 

San Onofre Nuclear Generating 

Station, Units 2 and 3 

AGENCY: Nuclear Regulatory 

Commission. 

ACTION: Exemption; issuance. 

SUMMARY: The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory 

Commission (NRC) is issuing an 

exemption from certain power reactor 

financial protection requirements in 

response to a September 16, 2015, 

request from the Southern California 

Edison Company (the licensee). The 

exemption would permit the San Onofre 

Nuclear Generating Station, Units 2 and 

3 (SONGS), to reduce the required level 

of primary financial protection from 

$450 million to $100 million, as well as 

to withdraw from participation in the 

secondary layer of financial protection 

effective immediately. 

ADDRESSES: Please refer to Docket ID 

NRC–2018–0003 when contacting the 

NRC about the availability of 

information regarding this document. 

You may obtain publicly-available 

information related to this document 

using any of the following methods: 

• Federal Rulemaking website: Go to 

http://www.regulations.gov and search 

for Docket ID NRC–2018–0003. Address 

questions about NRC dockets to Carol 

Gallagher; telephone: 301–415–3463; 

email: Carol.Gallagher@nrc.gov. For 

technical questions, contact the 

individual listed in the FOR FURTHER

INFORMATION CONTACT section of this 

document. 

• NRC’s Agencywide Documents 

Access and Management System 

(ADAMS): You may obtain publicly 

available documents online in the 

ADAMS Public Documents collection at 

http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/ 

adams.html. To begin the search, select 

‘‘ADAMS Public Documents’’ and then 

select ‘‘Begin Web-based ADAMS 

Search.’’ For problems with ADAMS, 

please contact the NRC’s Public 

Document Room (PDR) reference staff at 

1–800–397–4209, 301–415–4737, or by 

email to pdr.resource@nrc.gov. The 

ADAMS accession number for each 

document referenced (if it is available in 

ADAMS) is provided the first time that 

it is mentioned in this document. 

• NRC’s PDR: You may examine and 

purchase copies of public documents at 

the NRC’s PDR, Room O1–F21, One 

White Flint North, 11555 Rockville 

Pike, Rockville, Maryland 20852. 

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: 

Marlayna Vaaler, Office of Nuclear 

Material Safety and Safeguards; U.S. 

Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 

Washington, DC 20555–0001; telephone: 

301–415–3178; email: 

Marlayna.Vaaler@nrc.gov. 

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: 

I. Background 

The San Onofre Nuclear Generating 

Station, Units 1, 2, and 3 (SONGS), 

operated by the Southern California 

Edison Company (SCE) is located 

approximately 4 miles south of San 


srobinson on DSK9F5VC42PROD with NOTICES
1384 Federal Register / Vol. 83, No. 8 / Thursday, January 11, 2018 / Notices 

Clemente, California. The SONGS, Unit 

1, Docket No. 50–206, was a 

Westinghouse 456 megawatt electric 

(MWe) pressurized water reactor which 

was granted Facility Operating License 

No. DPR–13 on January 1, 1968 

(ADAMS Accession No. ML13309A138), 

and ceased operation on November 30, 

1992 (ADAMS Accession No. 

ML13319B040). The licensee completed 

defueling on March 6, 1993 (ADAMS 

Accession No. ML13319B055), and 

maintained the unit in SAFSTOR until 

June 1999, when it initiated 

decommissioning (ADAMS Accession 

No. ML13319B111). On December 28, 

1993 (ADAMS Accession No. 

ML13319B059), the NRC approved the 

Permanently Defueled Technical 

Specifications for SONGS, Unit 1. 

The SCE submitted the proposed 

Decommissioning Plan for SONGS, Unit 

1, on November 3, 1994 (ADAMS 

Accession No. ML13319B073). As a 

result of the 1996 revision to the 

regulations in section 50.82 of title 10 of 

the Code of Federal Regulations (10 

CFR), the NRC replaced the requirement 

for a decommissioning plan with a 

requirement for a Post Shutdown 

Decommissioning Activities Report 

(PSDAR). On August 28, 1996, the 

SONGS, Unit 1, Decommissioning Plan 

became the SONGS 1 PSDAR (61 FR 

67079; December 19, 1996). On 

December 15, 1998 (ADAMS Accession 

No. ML13184A353), SCE submitted an 

update to the PSDAR to the NRC, as 

required by 10 CFR 50.82(a)(7), in order 

to begin planning for the dismantlement 

and decommissioning of SONGS, Unit 

1. The SONGS, Unit 1, received 

approval for an exemption from the 

financial protection requirements under 

10 CFR part 140 and 10 CFR 50.54(w), 

similar to what is being requested for 

SONGS, Units 2 and 3, on May 4, 1994. 

The SONGS, Units 2 and 3, Docket 

Nos. 50–361 and 50–362, are 

Combustion Engineering 1127 MWe 

pressurized water reactors, which were 

granted Facility Operating Licenses 

NPF–10 on February 16, 1982, and 

NPF–15 on November 15, 1982, 

respectively. In June 2013, pursuant to 

10 CFR 50.82(a)(1)(i), the licensee 

certified to the NRC that as of June 4, 

2013, operations had ceased at SONGS, 

Units 2 and 3 (ADAMS Accession No. 

ML131640201). The licensee 

subsequently certified, pursuant to 10 

CFR 50.82(a)(1)(ii), that all fuel had 

been removed from the reactor vessels 

of both units, and committed to 

maintaining the units in a permanently 

defueled status (ADAMS Accession Nos. 

ML13204A304 and ML13183A391 for 

Unit 2 and Unit 3, respectively). 

Therefore, pursuant to 10 CFR 

50.82(a)(2), SCE’s 10 CFR part 50 

licenses no longer authorize operation 

of SONGS Units 2 and 3, or 

emplacement or retention of fuel in the 

reactor vessels. The licensee is still 

authorized to possess and store 

irradiated nuclear fuel. Irradiated fuel is 

currently being stored onsite in spent 

fuel pools (SFPs) and in dry casks at an 

Independent Spent Fuel Storage 

Installation (ISFSI). 

The PSDAR for SONGS, Units 2 and 

3, was submitted on September 23, 2014 

(ADAMS Accession No. ML14272A121), 

and the associated public meeting was 

held on October 27, 2014, in Carlsbad, 

California (ADAMS Accession No. 

ML14352A063). The NRC confirmed its 

review of the SONGS, Units 2 and 3, 

PSDAR and addressed public comments 

in a letter dated August 20, 2015 

(ADAMS Accession No. ML15204A383). 

On July 17, 2015, the NRC approved the 

Permanently Defueled Technical 

Specifications for SONGS, Units 2 and 

3 (ADAMS Accession No. 

ML15139A390). 

II. Request/Action 

Pursuant to 10 CFR 140.8, ‘‘Specific 

exemptions,’’ SCE requested an 

exemption from 10 CFR 140.11(a)(4), by 

letter dated September 16, 2015 

(ADAMS Accession No. ML15260B188). 

The exemption from 10 CFR 

140.11(a)(4) would permit the licensee 

to reduce the required level of primary 

offsite liability insurance from $450 

million to $100 million, and would 

allow SCE to withdraw from 

participation in the secondary layer of 

financial protection (also known as the 

industry retrospective rating plan). The 

request to eliminate the requirement to 

carry secondary financial protection is 

for SONGS, Units 2 and 3, only. The 

NRC previously granted an exemption 

for SONGS, Unit 1, from the 

requirements of 10 CFR 140.11(a)(4), 

which permitted SCE’s withdrawal from 

participation in the industry 

retrospective rating plan in 1994 

(Legacy ADAMS Accession No. 

9405090151). 

The regulation at 10 CFR 140.11(a)(4) 

requires each licensee to have and 

maintain primary financial protection in 

an amount of $450 million. In addition, 

the licensee is required to participate in 

an industry retrospective rating plan 

(secondary financial protection) that 

commits each licensee to pay into an 

insurance pool to be used for damages 

that may exceed primary insurance 

coverage. Participation in the industry 

retrospective rating plan will subject 

SCE to deferred premium charges up to 

a maximum total deferred premium of 

$121,255,000 with respect to any 

nuclear incident at any operating 

nuclear power plant, and up to a 

maximum annual deferred premium of 

$18,963,000 per incident. 

The licensee states that the risk of an 

offsite radiological release is 

significantly lower at a nuclear power 

reactor that has permanently shut down 

and defueled, when compared to an 

operating power reactor. Similarly, the 

associated risk of offsite liability 

damages that would require insurance 

or indemnification is commensurately 

lower for permanently shut down and 

defueled plants. Therefore, SCE is 

requesting an exemption from 10 CFR 

140.11(a)(4), to permit a reduction in 

primary offsite liability insurance and to 

withdraw from participation in the 

industry retrospective rating plan. 

III. Discussion 

Pursuant to 10 CFR 140.8, the 

Commission may, upon application by 

any interested person or upon its own 

initiative, grant exemptions from the 

requirements of 10 CFR part 140, when 

the exemptions are authorized by law 

and are otherwise in the public interest. 

The Price-Anderson Act of 1957 

(PAA) requires that nuclear power 

reactor licensees have insurance to 

compensate the public for damages 

arising from a nuclear incident. 

Specifically, the PAA requires licensees 

of facilities with a ‘‘rated capacity of 

100,000 electrical kilowatts or more’’ to 

maintain the maximum amount of 

primary financial protection that is 

commercially available (currently, $450 

million) with access to the aggregate 

amount of secondary financial 

protection available to the industry 

(currently, up to $121,255,000 per 

reactor covered by the rating plan 

totaling approximately $13 billion for 

the industry per incident). The NRC’s 

regulations at 10 CFR 140.11(a)(4) 

implement these PAA requirements and 

set forth the amount of primary and 

secondary financial protection that each 

power reactor licensee must have. 

As noted above, the PAA 

requirements with respect to primary 

and secondary financial protection, and 

the implementing regulations at 10 CFR 

140.11(a)(4), apply to licensees of 

facilities with a ‘‘rated capacity of 

100,000 electrical kilowatts or more.’’ 

When the NRC issues a license 

amendment to a decommissioning 

licensee to reflect the defueled status of 

the facility, the license amendment 

includes removal of the rated capacity 

of the reactor from the license. 

Accordingly, a reactor that is 

undergoing decommissioning has no 

‘‘rated capacity.’’ Removal of the rated 

capacity from the facility of a 


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Federal Register / Vol. 83, No. 8 / Thursday, January 11, 2018 / Notices 1385 

1See Memorandum from William D. Travers, 

Executive Director for Operations, to the 

Commission, dated August 16, 2002 (ADAMS 

Accession No. ML030550706). 

decommissioning licensee, thus, allows 

the NRC to take the reactor licensee out 

of the category of reactor licensees that 

are required to maintain the maximum 

available insurance and to participate in 

the industry retrospective rating plan 

under the PAA, subject to a technical 

finding that lesser potential hazards 

exist at the facility after termination of 

operations. 

The financial protection limits of 10 

CFR 140.11(a)(4) were established to 

require a licensee to maintain sufficient 

financial protection, as specified under 

the PAA, to satisfy liability claims by 

members of the public for personal 

injury, property damage, and the legal 

cost associated with lawsuits, as the 

result of a nuclear incident at an 

operating reactor with a rated capacity 

of 100,000 electric kilowatts (or greater). 

Thus, the financial protection levels 

established by this regulation, and as 

required by the PAA, were associated 

with the risks and potential 

consequences of an incident at an 

operating reactor with a rated capacity 

of 100,000 electric kilowatts (or greater). 

The legal and associated technical basis 

for granting exemptions from 10 CFR 

part 140 is set forth in SECY–93–127. 

The legal analysis underlying SECY–93– 

127 concluded that, upon a technical 

finding that lesser potential hazards 

exist after termination of operations 

(and removal of the rated capacity), the 

Commission has the discretion under 

the PAA to reduce the amount of 

insurance required of a licensee 

undergoing decommissioning. 

As a technical matter, the fact that a 

reactor has permanently ceased 

operations is not itself determinative as 

to whether a licensee may cease 

providing the offsite financial protection 

coverage required by the PAA and 10 

CFR 140.11(a)(4). In light of the 

presence of freshly discharged 

irradiated fuel in the spent fuel pool at 

a recently shutdown reactor, the 

primary consideration is the risk and 

potential consequence of an offsite 

radiological release from a zirconium 

fire. That risk generally remains the 

greatest for a period of about 15 to 18 

months of decay time for the fuel used 

in the last cycle of power operation. 

After that time, the offsite consequences 

of an offsite radiological release from a 

zirconium fire are negligible for 

shutdown reactors, but the SFP is still 

operational and an inventory of 

radioactive materials still exists onsite. 

Therefore, an evaluation of the potential 

for offsite damage is necessary to 

determine the appropriate level of 

offsite insurance post shutdown, in 

accordance with the Commission’s 

discretionary authority under the PAA 

to establish an appropriate level of 

required financial protection for such 

shutdown facilities. 

The NRC staff has conducted an 

evaluation and concluded that, aside 

from the handling, storage, and 

transportation of spent fuel and 

radioactive materials for a permanently 

shut down and defueled reactor, no 

reasonably conceivable potential 

incident exists that could cause 

significant offsite damage. During 

normal power reactor operations, the 

forced flow of water through the reactor 

coolant system (RCS) removes heat 

generated by the reactor. The RCS, 

operating at high temperatures and 

pressures, transfers this heat through the 

steam generator tubes converting nonradioactive feedwater to steam, which 

then flows to the main turbine generator 

to produce electricity. Many of the 

accident scenarios postulated for 

operating power reactors involve 

failures or malfunctions of systems that 

could affect the fuel in the reactor core, 

which in the most severe postulated 

accidents, would involve the release of 

large quantities of fission products. 

With the permanent cessation of reactor 

operations at SONGS and the permanent 

removal of the fuel from the reactor 

cores, such accidents are no longer 

possible. The reactors, RCS, and 

supporting systems no longer operate 

and have no function related to the 

storage of the irradiated fuel. Therefore, 

postulated accidents involving failure or 

malfunction of the reactors, RCS, or 

supporting systems are no longer 

applicable. 

As described in the PSDAR, SONGS, 

Unit 1, is being returned to a condition 

suitable for unrestricted use. According 

to SCE, there are no structures, systems, 

or components (SSCs) classified as 

safety-related remaining at SONGS, Unit 

1. Plant dismantlement is complete and 

nearly all of the SSCs have been 

shipped offsite for disposal. Only the 

spent fuel, reactor vessel, and the 

below-grade portions of some buildings 

remain onsite. The principal remaining 

decommissioning activities are soil 

remediation, compaction, and grading. 

This is to be completed in conjunction 

with the future decommissioning of the 

ISFSI subsequent to offsite shipment of 

the spent fuel. 

The licensee also stated that 

decommissioning of SONGS, Units 2 

and 3, has begun and the nuclear 

reactors and essentially all associated 

SSCs in the nuclear steam supply 

system and balance of plant that 

supported the generation of power have 

been retired in place and are being 

prepared for removal. The SSCs that 

remain operable are associated with the 

SFPs and the spent fuel building, are 

needed to meet other regulatory 

requirements, or are needed to support 

other site facilities (e.g., radioactive 

waste handling, ventilation and air 

conditioning, etc.). No remaining active 

SSCs are classified as safety-related. 

During reactor decommissioning, the 

principal radiological risks are 

associated with the storage of spent fuel 

onsite. In addition, a site with a 

permanently shutdown and defueled 

reactor may contain an inventory of 

radioactive liquids, activated reactor 

components, and contaminated 

materials. For purposes of modifying the 

amount of financial protection 

maintained by a permanently shutdown 

and defueled reactor licensee, the 

potential radiological consequences of 

these non-operating reactor nuclear 

incidents are appropriate to consider, 

despite their very low probability of 

occurrence. On a case-by-case basis, 

licensees undergoing decommissioning 

have been granted permission to reduce 

the required amount of primary offsite 

financial protection from $450 million 

to $100 million, and to withdraw from 

the industry retrospective rating plan.1

One of the technical criteria for granting 

the exemption is elimination of the 

possibility of a design-basis event that 

could cause significant offsite damage. 

In its September 16, 2015, exemption 

request, SCE discusses both design-basis 

and beyond design-basis events 

involving irradiated fuel stored in the 

SFPs. The staff independently evaluated 

the offsite consequences associated with 

various decommissioning activities, 

design basis accidents, and beyond 

design basis accidents at SONGS, in 

consideration of its permanently shut 

down and defueled status. The possible 

design-basis and beyond design basis 

accident scenarios at SONGS show that 

the radiological consequences of these 

accidents are greatly reduced at a 

permanently shut down and defueled 

reactor, in comparison to a fueled 

reactor. Further, the staff has used the 

offsite radiological release limits 

established by the U.S. Environmental 

Protection Agency (EPA) early-phase 

Protective Action Guidelines (PAGs) of 

one roentgen equivalent man (rem) at 

the exclusion area boundary in 

determining that any possible 

radiological releases would be minimal 

and would not require precautionary 

protective actions (e.g., sheltering in 

place or evacuation), which could result 

in offsite liability. 


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The only beyond design-basis event 

that has the potential to a significant 

radiological release at a 

decommissioning reactor is a zirconium 

fire. The zirconium fire scenario is a 

postulated, but highly unlikely, beyond 

design-basis accident scenario that 

involves loss of water inventory from 

the SFP, resulting in a significant heatup of the spent fuel, and culminating in 

substantial zirconium cladding 

oxidation and fuel damage. The 

probability of a zirconium fire scenario 

is related to the decay heat of the 

irradiated fuel stored in the SFP. 

Therefore, the risks from a zirconium 

fire scenario continue to decrease as a 

function of the time that SONGS has 

been permanently shut down. 

The licensee provided a detailed 

analysis of the events that could result 

in an offsite radiological release at 

SONGS in its March 31, 2014, submittal 

to the NRC (ADAMS Accession No. 

ML14092A332), as supplemented by 

letters dated September 9, October 2, 

October 7, October 27, November 3, and 

December 15, 2014 (ADAMS Accession 

Nos. ML14258A003, ML14280A265, 

ML14287A228, ML14303A257, 

ML14309A195, and ML14351A078, 

respectively). One of these beyond 

design-basis accidents involves a 

complete loss of SFP water inventory, 

where cooling of the spent fuel would 

be primarily accomplished by natural 

circulation of air through the uncovered 

spent fuel assemblies. The licensee’s 

analysis of this accident shows that by 

August 31, 2014, air-cooling of the spent 

fuel assemblies will be sufficient to keep 

the fuel within a safe temperature range 

indefinitely without fuel cladding 

damage or offsite radiological release. 

The NRC staff has confirmed the 

reduced risks at SONGS by comparing 

the generic risk assumptions in the 

analyses in NUREG–1738, ‘‘Technical 

Study of Spent Fuel Pool Accident Risk 

at Decommissioning Nuclear Power 

Plants,’’ dated February 28, 2001 

(ADAMS Accession No. ML010430066) 

to site-specific conditions at SONGS; 

based on this assessment, the staff 

determined that the risk values in 

NUREG–1738 bound the risks presented 

by SONGS. 

The Commission has previously 

authorized a lesser amount of financial 

protection, based on an analysis of the 

zirconium fire risk. In SECY–93–127, 

‘‘Financial Protection Required of 

Licensees of Large Nuclear Power Plants 

during Decommissioning,’’ dated May 

10, 1993 (ADAMS Accession No. 

ML12257A628), the staff outlined a 

policy for reducing required liability 

insurance coverage for 

decommissioning reactors, and 

concluded that there was a low 

likelihood and reduced short-term 

public health consequences of a 

zirconium fire once a decommissioning 

plant’s spent fuel has sufficiently 

decayed. The discussions in SECY–93– 

127 centered primarily on the public 

health and safety risks associated with 

storing fuel in spent fuel pools. In its 

Staff Requirements Memorandum dated 

July 13, 1993 (ADAMS Accession No. 

ML003760936), the Commission 

approved a policy that would permit 

reductions in financial protection, when 

a licensee was able to demonstrate that 

the spent fuel could be air-cooled if the 

SFP was drained of water. 

Upon demonstration of this technical 

criterion, the Commission policy 

allowed decommissioning licensees to 

withdraw from participation in the 

industry retrospective rating plan, and 

permitted reductions in the required 

amount of primary financial protection 

from $450 million to $100 million. The 

staff has used this technical criterion to 

grant similar exemptions to other 

decommissioning reactor licensees (e.g., 

Maine Yankee Atomic Power Station, 

published in the Federal Register on 

January 19, 1999 (64 FR 2920); and Zion 

Nuclear Power Station, published in the 

Federal Register on December 28, 1999 

(64 FR 72700)). Additional discussions 

of other decommissioning reactor 

licensees that have received exemptions 

to reduce their primary insurance level 

to $100 million is provided in SECY– 

96–256, ‘‘Changes to Financial 

Protection Requirements for 

Permanently Shutdown Nuclear Power 

Reactors, 10 CFR 50.54(w)(1) and 10 

CFR 140.11,’’ dated December 17, 1996 

(ADAMS Accession No. ML15062A483). 

These prior exemptions were based on 

the licensee demonstrating that the SFP 

could be air-cooled, consistent with the 

technical criterion discussed above. 

In SECY–00–0145, ‘‘Integrated 

Rulemaking Plan for Nuclear Power 

Plant Decommissioning,’’ dated June 28, 

2000, and SECY–01–0100, ‘‘Policy 

Issues Related to Safeguards, Insurance, 

and Emergency Preparedness 

Regulations at Decommissioning 

Nuclear Power Plants Storing Fuel in 

the Spent Fuel Pool,’’ dated June 4, 2001 

(ADAMS Accession Nos. ML003721626 

and ML011450420, respectively), the 

staff discussed additional information 

concerning SFP zirconium fire risks at 

decommissioning reactors and 

associated implications for offsite 

insurance. Analyzing when the spent 

fuel stored in the SFP is capable of aircooling is one measure that 

demonstrates when the probability of a 

zirconium fire would be exceedingly 

low. However, the staff has more 

recently used an additional analysis that 

would bound an incomplete drain down 

of the SFP water, or some other 

catastrophic event (such as a complete 

drainage of the SFP with rearrangement 

of spent fuel rack geometry and/or the 

addition of rubble to the SFP). The 

analysis postulates that decay heat 

transfer from the spent fuel via 

conduction, convection, or radiation 

would be impeded. This analysis is 

often referred to as an adiabatic heat-up 

analysis. 

The licensee’s analyses referenced in 

its exemption request demonstrates that 

under conditions where the SFP water 

inventory has drained completely and 

only air-cooling of the stored irradiated 

fuel is available, after August 2014 aircooling of the spent fuel assemblies will 

be sufficient to keep the fuel within a 

safe temperature range indefinitely 

without fuel cladding damage or offsite 

radiological release. However, a portion 

of the air-cooling analyses credits 

operation of the normal fuel building 

ventilation systems because the fuel 

building structures are robust and offer 

little potential for natural air exchange 

with the environment for cooling. 

Because the normal fuel building 

ventilation could become unavailable 

during an initiating event that would 

lead to complete SFP drainage (i.e., a 

seismic event), the NRC staff also relied 

upon the additional time that the fuel in 

the SONGS SFPs has had to cool since 

the plant was permanently shutdown in 

June 2013 during its evaluation of the 

licensee’s exemption request. 

As discussed in the staff response to 

a question in SECY–00–0145, ‘‘the staff 

believes that full insurance coverage 

must be maintained for 5 years or until 

a licensee can show by analysis that its 

spent fuel pool is no longer vulnerable 

to such [a zirconium] fire.’’ In addition, 

as discussed in the staff response to 

another question in SECY–00–0145: 

Since the zirconium fire scenario would be 

possible for up to several years following 

shutdown, and since the consequences of 

such a fire could be severe in terms of offsite 

health consequences, property damage, and 

land contamination, the staff position is that 

full offsite liability coverage (both primary 

and secondary levels) must be retained for 

five years or until analysis has indicated that 

a zirconium fire is no longer possible. At that 

point, primary coverage would be reduced 

from $200 million to $100 million and 

participation in the secondary retrospective 

rating pool would no longer be required. 

Although the official certifications for 

permanent cessation of power 

operations and permanent removal of 

fuel from the reactor vessel were not 

submitted until June 2013, the staff 

notes that SONGS was in an extended 


srobinson on DSK9F5VC42PROD with NOTICES
Federal Register / Vol. 83, No. 8 / Thursday, January 11, 2018 / Notices 1387 

outage to address steam generator 

issues, and neither SONGS, Units 2 nor 

3, have produced power since January 

2012. This additional storage time for 

the fuel in the SONGS SFPs has allowed 

it to cool for greater than the 5 years 

suggested in SECY–00–0145, which 

supports the conclusion that zirconium 

fire risks from the irradiated fuel stored 

in the SFPs is of negligible concern and 

exemption from the requested 

requirements is warranted. 

In addition to the air-cooling scenario, 

the licensee’s adiabatic heat-up analyses 

demonstrate that as of October 12, 2014, 

there would be at least 17 hours after 

the loss of all means of cooling (both air 

and/or water), before the spent fuel 

cladding would reach a temperature 

where the potential for a significant 

offsite radiological release could occur. 

The licensee states that for this loss of 

all cooling scenario, 10 hours is 

sufficient time for personnel to respond 

with additional resources, equipment, 

and capability to restore cooling to the 

SFPs, even after a non-credible, 

catastrophic event. 

As provided in SCE’s letters dated 

October 7 and December 15, 2014, the 

licensee furnished information 

concerning its makeup strategies, in the 

event of a loss of SFP coolant inventory. 

The multiple strategies for providing 

makeup to the SFPs include: Using 

existing plant systems for inventory 

makeup; an internal strategy that relies 

on installed fire water pumps and 

service water or fire water storage tanks; 

or an external strategy that uses portable 

pumps to initiate makeup flow into the 

SFPs through a seismic standpipe and 

standard fire hoses routed to the SFPs 

or to a spray nozzle. These strategies 

will be maintained by a license 

condition until such time as all fuel has 

been moved to dry storage in an onsite 

ISFSI. The licensee states that the 

equipment needed to perform these 

actions are located onsite, and that the 

external makeup strategy (using portable 

pumps) is capable of being deployed 

within 2 hours. The licensee also stated 

that, considering the very lowprobability of beyond design-basis 

accidents affecting the SFPs, these 

diverse strategies provide defense-indepth and time to mitigate and prevent 

a zirconium fire, using makeup or spray 

into the SFP before the onset of 

zirconium cladding rapid oxidation. 

In the safety evaluation of the 

licensee’s request for exemptions from 

certain emergency planning 

requirements dated June 4, 2015 

(ADAMS Accession No. ML15082A204), 

the NRC staff assessed the SCE accident 

analyses associated with the 

radiological risks from a zirconium fire 

at the permanently shutdown and 

defueled SONGS site. The NRC staff has 

confirmed that under conditions where 

cooling air flow can develop, suitably 

conservative calculations indicate that 

by the end of August 2014, the fuel 

would remain at temperatures where the 

cladding would be undamaged for an 

unlimited period. The staff also finds 

that the additional cooling time 

provided for the fuel between January 

2012 and the issuance of this exemption 

provides reasonable assurance that 

zirconium fire risks from the irradiated 

fuel stored in the SFPs is of negligible 

concern. For the very unlikely beyond 

design-basis accident scenario, where 

the SFP coolant inventory is lost in such 

a manner that all methods of heat 

removal from the spent fuel are no 

longer available, there will be a 

minimum of 10 hours from the 

initiation of the accident until the 

cladding reaches a temperature where 

offsite radiological release might occur. 

The staff finds that 10 hours is sufficient 

time to support deployment of 

mitigation equipment, consistent with 

plant conditions, to prevent the 

zirconium cladding from reaching a 

point of rapid oxidation. 

The NRC staff has determined that the 

licensee’s proposed reduction in 

primary offsite liability coverage to a 

level of $100 million, and the licensee’s 

proposed withdrawal from participation 

in the secondary insurance pool for 

offsite financial protection, are 

consistent with the policy established in 

SECY–93–127 and subsequent 

insurance considerations, resulting from 

additional zirconium fire risks, as 

discussed in SECY–00–0145 and SECY– 

01–0100. The NRC has previously 

determined in SECY–00–0145 that the 

minimum offsite financial protection 

requirement may be reduced to $100 

million and that secondary insurance is 

not required, once it is determined that 

the spent fuel in the spent fuel pool is 

no longer thermal-hydraulically capable 

of sustaining a zirconium fire based on 

a plant-specific analysis. In addition, 

the NRC staff notes that similar 

exemptions have been granted to other 

permanently shutdown and defueled 

power reactors, upon demonstration 

that the criterion of the zirconium fire 

risks from the irradiated fuel stored in 

the SFP is of negligible concern. Finally, 

the staff notes that in accordance with 

the SONGS PSDAR, all spent fuel will 

be removed from the SFPs and moved 

into dry storage at an onsite ISFSI by the 

end of 2019, and the probability of an 

initiating event that would threaten SFP 

integrity occurring before that time is 

extremely low, which further supports 

the conclusion that the risk of a 

zirconium fire is negligible. 

The Exemption Is Authorized by Law 

In accordance with 10 CFR 140.8, the 

Commission may grant exemptions from 

the regulations in 10 CFR part 140 as the 

Commission determines are authorized 

by law. The NRC staff has determined 

that granting the licensee’s proposed 

exemption will not result in a violation 

of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, 

Section 170, as amended, other laws, or 

the Commission’s regulations, which 

require licensees to maintain adequate 

financial protection. Therefore, the 

proposed exemption for SONGS from 

the primary offsite liability insurance 

and secondary financial protection 

requirements of 10 CFR 140.11(a)(4) is 

authorized by law. 

The Exemption Is Otherwise in the 

Public Interest 

The financial protection limits of 10 

CFR 140.11 were established to require 

licensees to maintain sufficient offsite 

liability insurance to ensure adequate 

funding for offsite liability claims, 

following an accident at an operating 

reactor. However, the regulation does 

not consider the reduced potential for 

and consequences of nuclear incidents 

at permanently shutdown and 

decommissioning reactors. 

In SECY–93–127, SECY–00–0145, and 

SECY–01–0100 provide a basis for 

allowing licensees of decommissioning 

plants to reduce their primary offsite 

liability insurance and to withdraw 

from participation in the retrospective 

rating pool for deferred premium 

charges. As discussed in these 

documents, once the zirconium fire 

concern is determined to be negligible, 

possible accident scenario risks at 

permanently shutdown and defueled 

reactors are greatly reduced, when 

compared to operating reactors, and the 

associated potential for offsite financial 

liabilities from an accident are 

commensurately less. The licensee has 

analyzed and the staff has confirmed 

that the possible accidents that could 

result in an offsite radiological risk are 

minimal, thereby justifying the 

proposed reductions in offsite liability 

insurance and withdrawal from 

participation in the secondary 

retrospective rating pool for deferred 

premium charges. 

Additionally, participation in the 

secondary retrospective rating pool 

could be problematic for SCE because 

the licensee would incur financial 

liability if an extraordinary nuclear 

incident occurred at another nuclear 

power plant. Because SONGS is 

permanently shut down, it does not 


srobinson on DSK9F5VC42PROD with NOTICES
1388 Federal Register / Vol. 83, No. 8 / Thursday, January 11, 2018 / Notices 

1 15 U.S.C. 78s(b)(1). 

2 17 CFR 240.19b–4. 

produce revenue from electricity 

generation sales to cover such a liability. 

Therefore, such liability, if incurred, 

could significantly affect the financial 

resources available to the facility to 

conduct and complete radiological 

decontamination and decommissioning 

activities. Furthermore, the shared 

financial risk exposure to SCE is greatly 

disproportionate to the radiological risk 

posed by SONGS when compared to 

operating reactors. 

The reduced overall risk to the public 

at decommissioning power plants does 

not warrant SCE to carry full operating 

reactor insurance coverage, after the 

requisite spent fuel cooling period has 

elapsed, following final reactor 

shutdown. The licensee’s proposed 

financial protection limits will maintain 

a level of liability insurance coverage 

commensurate with the risk to the 

public. These changes are consistent 

with previous NRC policy and 

exemptions approved for other 

decommissioning reactors. Thus, the 

underlying purpose of the regulations 

will not be adversely affected by 

reductions in the insurance coverage for 

SONGS. 

Accordingly, the proposed exemption 

for SONGS from the primary offsite 

liability insurance and secondary 

financial protection requirements of 10 

CFR 140.11(a)(4) is in the public 

interest. 

Environmental Considerations 

Pursuant to 10 CFR 51.22(c)(25), the 

granting of an exemption from the 

requirements of any regulation in 

Chapter I of 10 CFR is a categorical 

exclusion provided that (i) there is no 

significant hazards consideration; (ii) 

there is no significant change in the 

types or significant increase in the 

amounts of any effluents that may be 

released offsite; (iii) there is no 

significant increase in individual or 

cumulative public or occupational 

radiation exposure; (iv) there is no 

significant construction impact; (v) 

there is no significant increase in the 

potential for or consequences from 

radiological accidents; and (vi) the 

requirements from which an exemption 

is sought are among those identified in 

10 CFR 51.22(c)(25)(vi). 

The NRC staff has determined that 

approval of the exemption request 

involves no significant hazards 

consideration because reducing the 

licensee’s offsite liability requirements 

at the decommissioning San Onofre 

Nuclear Generating Station, Units 2 and 

3, does not (1) involve a significant 

increase in the probability or 

consequences of an accident previously 

evaluated; (2) create the possibility of a 

new or different kind of accident from 

any accident previously evaluated; or 

(3) involve a significant reduction in a 

margin of safety. The exempted 

financial protection regulation is 

unrelated to the operation of SONGS. 

Accordingly, there is no significant 

change in the types or significant 

increase in the amounts of any effluents 

that may be released offsite, and no 

significant increase in individual or 

cumulative public or occupational 

radiation exposure. 

The exempted regulation is not 

associated with construction, so there is 

no significant construction impact. The 

exempted regulation does not concern 

the source term (i.e., potential amount 

of radiation involved an accident) or 

accident mitigation; therefore, there is 

no significant increase in the potential 

for, or consequences from, a radiological 

accident. In addition, there would be no 

significant impacts to biota, water 

resources, historic properties, cultural 

resources, or socioeconomic conditions 

in the region. The requirement for 

offsite liability insurance may be viewed 

as involving surety, insurance, or 

indemnity matters in accordance with 

10 CFR 51.22(c)(25)(vi). 

Therefore, pursuant to 10 CFR 

51.22(b) and 10 CFR 51.22(c)(25), no 

environmental impact statement or 

environmental assessment need be 

prepared in connection with the 

approval of this exemption request. 

IV. Conclusions 

Accordingly, the Commission has 

determined that, pursuant to 10 CFR 

140.8, the exemption is authorized by 

law, and is otherwise in the public 

interest. Therefore, the Commission 

hereby grants SCE exemption from the 

requirement of 10 CFR 140.11(a)(4) to 

permit the licensee to reduce primary 

offsite liability insurance to $100 

million, accompanied by withdrawal 

from participation in the secondary 

insurance pool for offsite liability 

insurance. 

This exemption is effective upon 

issuance. 

Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 5th day 

of January 2018. 

For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. 

Gregory Suber, 

Deputy Division Director, Division of 

Decommissioning, Uranium Recovery and 

Waste Programs, Office of Nuclear Material 

Safety and Safeguards. 

[FR Doc. 2018–00318 Filed 1–10–18; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 7590–01–P 

SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE 

COMMISSION 

[Release No. 34–82449; File No. SR–GEMX– 

2017–60] 

Self-Regulatory Organizations; Nasdaq 

GEMX, LLC; Notice of Filing and 

Immediate Effectiveness of Proposed 

Rule Change To Amend Various Fees 

and Rebates Set Forth in Section I of 

the Exchanges Schedule of Fees 

January 5, 2018. 

Pursuant to Section 19(b)(1) of the 

Securities Exchange Act of 1934 

(‘‘Act’’),1 and Rule 19b–4 thereunder,2

notice is hereby given that on December 

22, 2017, Nasdaq GEMX, LLC (‘‘GEMX’’ 

or ‘‘Exchange’’) filed with the Securities 

and Exchange Commission 

(‘‘Commission’’) the proposed rule 

change as described in Items I and II 

below, which Items have been prepared 

by the Exchange. The Commission is 

publishing this notice to solicit 

comments on the proposed rule change 

from interested persons. 

I. Self-Regulatory Organization’s 

Statement of the Terms of Substance of 

the Proposed Rule Change 

The Exchange proposes to amend 

various fees and rebates set forth in 

Section I of the Exchanges Schedule of 

Fees. 

The text of the proposed rule change 

is available on the Exchange’s website at 

http://nasdaqgemx.cchwallstreet.com/, 

at the principal office of the Exchange, 

and at the Commission’s Public 

Reference Room. 

II. Self-Regulatory Organization’s 

Statement of the Purpose of, and 

Statutory Basis for, the Proposed Rule 

Change 

In its filing with the Commission, the 

Exchange included statements 

concerning the purpose of and basis for 

the proposed rule change and discussed 

any comments it received on the 

proposed rule change. The text of these 

statements may be examined at the 

places specified in Item IV below. The 

Exchange has prepared summaries, set 

forth in sections A, B, and C below, of 

the most significant aspects of such 

statements. 

A. Self-Regulatory Organization’s 

Statement of the Purpose of, and 

Statutory Basis for, the Proposed Rule 

Change 

1. Purpose 

The purpose of the proposed rule 

change is to amend various fees and 


srobinson on DSK9F5VC42PROD with NOTICES