### IN THE TENTH COURT OF APPEALS No. 10
- 18
- 00092
- CV IN THE INTEREST OF I .D.C.,

A CHILD ,

From the 66th District Court Hill County, Texas Trial Court No. CV315
- 17
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Appellant C.C., acting pro se , appeals from the trial court’s final order terminating his parental rights to his child, I.D.C., following a jury trial. The jury found that C .C. had knowingly engaged in criminal conduct that resulted in his confinement or imprisonment and inability to care for I.D.C. for not less than two years from the date of the filing of the petition and that t ermination was in I.D.C.’s best interest. See T EX
. F AM
. C ODE A NN . § § 161.001(b)(1)(Q) and (b)(2) (West Supp. 2017 ) . We will affirm. Background This is the second termination action filed regarding C.C.’s parental relationship with I.D.C. The record before us reflects that in Cause Number 50,144, also filed in HillIn re I.D.C. Page 2

County, the State removed I.D.C. and her half

- brother, B.W., from the custody of their mother, D.G. , and moved to terminate her parental rights. At the time I.D.C. was removed, C.C. was serving a four

- year sentence arising out of his convictions for DWI and criminal mischief in Cause Numbers 11

- 13

- 0367

- CR and 11

- 13

- 0368

- CR

. The trial court appointed counsel to represent C.C. during th e termination proceeding. D.G. voluntarily r elinquished her parental rights, and the children were placed in the custody of C.S., a non - relative who is the petitioner in t he present case. C.C. entered into a Rule 11 agreement by which he would retain his parental rights to I.D.C. and would resume

v isitation after he was released from prison and after completi ng a parenting class and undergoing drug testing

. The trial court signed a final order on December 9, 2013 that terminated D.G.’s parental rights to I.D.C. , appointed C.S. as sole managing cons ervator, and appointed C.C. as possessory conservator. The final order incorporated the provisions of the Rule 11 agreement. No appeal was taken from the final order. After C.C. was released from incarceration, he was convicted for assault family viole nce, enhanced by a previous conviction for assault family violence, in Cause Number B

- 44,709

- A. C.C. was sentence d to twelve years’ incarceration. C.S. then initiated the present suit to terminate C.C.’s parental rights. C.C. was still incarcerated when the present matter went to trial.
Issues We have construed the document filed by C.C. entitled “First Response to the Court’s July 25, 2018 Order” as his brief. C.C. first argues that we do not have jurisdiction to consider his appeal. Appellate courts have jurisdiction over final judgments andIn re I.D.C. Page 3

interlocutory orders made appealable by statute. See Lehmann v. Har

- Con Corp ., 39 S.W.3d 191, 195 (Tex. 2001). Our jur isdiction is triggered by the timely filing of a sufficient notice of appeal. Summers v. State , 555 S.W.3d 844, 849 (Tex. App.

— Waco 2018, no pet.). As C.C. appeals from a final judgment with a sufficient notice of appeal, we have jurisdiction to conside r this matter.
T he Texas Constitution provides district courts “exclusive, appellate, and original jurisdiction of all actions, proceedings, and remedies, except in cases where exclusive, appellate, or original jurisdiction may be conferred by this Consti tution or other law on some other court, tribunal, or administrative body.” T EX
. C ONST
. A RT
. V , § 8 (West 2007 ). The district court’s jurisdiction includes those cases that would affect the parent

- child relationship. See T EX
. F AM
. C ODE A NN
. § 155.001 (W est Supp. 2017); see also Armstrong v. Reiter , 628 S.W.2d 439, 440 (Tex. 1982). The trial court had jurisdiction to consider the termination of C.C.’s parental rights. C.C. next claims that his underlying criminal conviction for assault family violence
i n Cause Number B

- 44,709

- A should not have been used to support the termination of his rights in the present termination because it was not final. In this context, a conviction is final if it has been affirmed by an appellate court and the mandate has been issued. See Lundgren v. State , 434 S.W.3d 594, 598 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014); see also Johnson v. State , 784 S.W.2d 413, 414 (Tex. Crim. App. 1990). C.C.’s conviction was affirmed, and his petition for writ of discretionary review was denie d. See Cobos v. State , No. 11

- 15

- 00210

- CR, 2017 WL 253663 (Tex. App.

— Eastland Jan. 20, 2017, pet. ref’d) (mem. op., not designated forIn re I.D.C. Page 4

publication). Mandate was issued by the Eleventh Co urt of Appeals on June 7, 2017. The assault family violence convict ion was final, therefore, prior to trial beginning in thi s case on February 20, 2018. On January 1, 2018, C.C. filed an application for writ of habeas corpus in the Court of Criminal Appeals, once again challenging his conviction in Cause Number B

- 44,709

- A

. See In re Cobos , No. WR

- 78,605

- 03 (Tex. Crim. App. 2018). His application was denied on March 14, 2018 without written order. Id . An application for a writ of habeas corpus
is not available until after a conviction has become final. See Ex parte Br own , 662 S.W.2d 3, 4 (Tex. Crim. App. 1983); see also T EX
. C ODE C RIM
. P ROC
. A NN
. art . 11.07 (West 2015). Such an application, however, does not revive a final conviction. See Ex parte Webb , 270 S.W.3d 108, 111 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008) (granting PDR and rei nstating appeal process does not render court of appeal’s mandate ineffective). Therefore, C.C.’s argument is
without merit. The rest of C.C.’s arguments are based upon alleged irregularities in Cause Number 50,144, the prior termination case. C.C. first a sserts that he did not receive a copy of the trial court’s final order, thereby depriving him of his right to appeal and rendering the judgment invalid. However, a judgment that is defective because of a failure to follow proper procedure is voidab le rather than void. See State ex rel. Latty v. Owens , 907 S.W.2d 484, 48 5

- 8 6 (Tex. 1995); see also Office of the Atty. Gen. v. Phillips , No. 01

- 05

- 00973

- CV, 2007 WL 1 5 59804, at *3 (Tex. App.

— Houston [1st D ist.] May 31, 2007, no pet.) (mem. op.) (lack of notice does not render a judgment void.). C.C.’s remedy , if heIn re I.D.C. Page 5

was unable to file a timely notice of appeal , was to file a motion for new trial or a bill of
review with the trial court rather than attempt to contest it in a collateral proceeding

. See
F r ost Nat. Bank v. Fernandez , 315 S.W.3d 494, 504 (Tex. 2010). As C.C. did neither, we are unable to review his claims in regard to Cause Number 50, 144. Even if C.C. could effectively challenge the final order in Cause Number 50,144, the documents he has placed in the record do not support his claims. Although not admitted, C.C. introduced at trial in this case a document filed i n Cause Number 50,144 on October 17, 2013 that he identifies as his notice of appeal. That document was filed almost two mo nths prior to entry of the final order. A notice of appeal is premature if it is filed before the judgment or final order is signed. See In re Norris , 371 S.W.3d 546, 552 (Tex. App.

— Austin 2012, no pet.). Under Rule 27.1 of the Rules of Appellate Proced ure, “a prematurely filed notice of appeal is effective and deemed filed on the day of, but after, the event that begins the period for perfecting the appeal.” However, C.C.’s “notice of appeal” does not challenge the trial court’s final order of terminat ion but rather the Rule 11 agreement. C.C. specifically states in the “notice of appeal” that “Defendant [sic] is requesting an appeal/modification of the Rule 11 agreement of the Texas Family Code, and supplement thereto filed on the 30th day of Septembe r, 2013 in Hill County, Texas in cause # 051440.” As C.C.’s “notice of appeal” does not address the validity of the final order of termination, it cannot be construed as a premature notice of appeal. C.C. also fails to present anything to indicate that h e requested leave to pursue an interlocutory appeal or that an interlocutory appeal is otherwise permissible in relation to the Rule 11 agreement.In re I.D.C. Page 6

To the extent C.C. raises additional issues, they are also without merit and are overruled. Having overruled C.C.’s issues, we affirm the trial court’s judgment. C.C. has also filed a document entitled “Declaration for Entry of Default.” As we have resolved all issues, his request for additional relief is denied as moot.

REX D. DAVIS Justice Before Chief Justice Gray, Justice Davis, and Justice Scoggins (Chief Justice Gray concurs in the Court’s judgment to the extent it affirms the trial court’s judgment. A separate opinion will not issue.) Affirmed Opinion delivered and filed No vember 28, 2018 [CV06]