[Cite as Wineberry v. N. Star Painting Co., 2012-Ohio-4212.]

STATE OF OHIO, MAHONING COUNTY 

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS 

SEVENTH DISTRICT 

WILLIAM WINEBERRY, ) CASE NO. 11 MA 103 

) 

PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT, ) 

) 

VS. ) O P I N I O N 

) 

NORTH STAR PAINTING CO., et al., ) 

) 

DEFENDANTS-APPELLEES. ) 

CHARACTER OF PROCEEDINGS: Civil Appeal from Common Pleas Court, 

Case No. 09CV1559. 

JUDGMENT: Affirmed. 

APPEARANCES: 

For Plaintiff-Appellant: Attorney Jeffrey Leikin 

Attorney Brenda Johnson 

1370 Ontario Street, Suite 100 

Cleveland, Ohio 44113-1708 

For Defendants-Appellees: Attorney John Pfau 

P.O. Box 9070 

Youngstown, Ohio 44513 

JUDGES: 

Hon. Joseph J. Vukovich 

Hon. Gene Donofrio 

Hon. Cheryl L. Waite 

Dated: September 14, 2012
[Cite as Wineberry v. N. Star Painting Co., 2012-Ohio-4212.]

VUKOVICH, J. 

{¶1} Plaintiff-appellant William Wineberry appeals the decision of the 

Mahoning County Common Pleas Court granting summary judgment in favor of 

defendant-appellee North Star Painting Company, Inc. The trial court ruled that there 

was no evidence presented that created a genuine issue of material fact that North 

Star intended to injure Wineberry. Specifically, the trial court found that under R.C. 

2745.01(C) there was not a rebuttable presumption of intent to injure by the 

deliberate removal of a safety device because to deliberately remove a safety device 

requires that the device was originally contained on the object in question. In this 

case, the alleged safety device, guardrails, were not. 

{¶2} Wineberry finds fault with the trial court’s narrow interpretation of 

deliberate removal and contends that a rebuttable presumption was created because 

guardrails were not installed around the perches Wineberry was required to use to 

perform his job. That failure to act, according to him, amounts to a deliberate 

removal. North Star disagrees with Wineberry’s position and contends the trial 

court’s interpretation is correct. 

{¶3} For the reasons expressed below, we find the trial court’s interpretation 

of deliberate removal to be overly narrow. Deliberate removal, as contemplated by 

R.C. 2745.01(C), not only encompasses the act of removing a safety device, but also 

the act of failing to install a safety device that is required by the manufacturer. That 

said, summary judgment is still warranted because there is no evidence to support 

the position that the perches were required to have guardrails. Thus, the trial court’s 

decision is hereby affirmed. 

Statement of Case

{¶4} On July 21, 2008 Wineberry filed an employer intentional tort action 

against North Star. This action was the result of an injury that occurred to Wineberry 

on July 24, 2006, while in Ashland, Kentucky working on the 13th Street Bridge. 

North Star was hired by the State of Kentucky to paint the bridge; Wineberry was 

employed by North Star as a painter/sandblaster. His injury occurred while he was 

sandblasting a part of the bridge. According to him, he was out on a perch that 

extended from the swing stage of the scaffolding when the scaffolding buckled and 
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he fell approximately 15 feet. During the fall he sandblasted his arm. In the 

complaint it is alleged that at the time of incident, the perch and scaffolding lacked 

the necessary and required safety equipment and fall protection which would have 

prevented the incident. 

{¶5} North Star answered the complaint on July 1, 2009. Extensive 

discovery by way of depositions then occurred. 

{¶6} In August 2010, North Star filed a motion for summary judgment 

arguing that R.C. 2745.01, the statute on employer intentional torts, is applicable and 

there is no evidence that North Star intended to cause injury to Wineberry. On 

September 16, 2010, Wineberry filed a motion in opposition to summary judgment. 

He contended that the failure to have safety guards is evidence of intent to cause 

injury. He cited to R.C. 2745.01(C), the section on deliberate removal of safety 

guards. North Star replied in January 2011. 

{¶7} In March 2011, the magistrate issued its decision. The magistrate 

applied R.C. 2745.01 and found that there is no evidence that North Star directly 

intended to cause injury to Wineberry. It also found that R.C. 2745.01(C) was not 

applicable because there was no evidence that North Star removed a safety guard. It 

specifically stated: 

 The statute is clear that in order to trigger Section C, there must 

be a deliberate removal by the employer of an equipment safety guard. 

The statute does not say in the construction or assembly of equipment 

that failure to construct or assemble the equipment with safety guards 

constitutes a rebuttable preemption. The legislative intent is clear from 

the statute and the statute cannot be rewritten beyond the clear 

meaning of the language. Had the legislature intended to include in 

Section C that the failure to install a safety guard is tantamount to 

deliberate removal, they would have stated it. The enactment of R.C. 

2745.01 by the general assembly has statutory narrowed the common 

law definition to “direct intent” torts only. 
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03/31/11 J.E. 

{¶8} Wineberry objected to the decision and North Star filed responses to 

those objections. Upon reviewing the objections and responses, the trial court 

overruled the objections, affirmed the magistrate’s decision, and granted summary 

judgment in favor of North Star. 06/02/11 J.E. Wineberry timely appeals. 

Assignment of Error

{¶9} “The trial court erred in adopting the magistrate’s decision granting 

summary judgment in favor of defendant-appellee North Star Painting Co., Inc.” 

{¶10} In reviewing a summary judgment award, we apply a de novo standard 

of review. Cole v. Am. Industries & Resources Corp., 128 Ohio App.3d 546, 552, 715 

N.E.2d 1179 (1998). Thus, we apply the same test as the trial court. Civ.R. 56(C) 

provides that the trial court shall render summary judgment if no genuine issue of 

material fact exists and when construing the evidence most strongly in favor of the 

nonmoving party, reasonable minds can only conclude that the moving party is 

entitled to judgment as a matter of law. State ex rel. Parsons v. Flemming, 68 Ohio 

St.3d 509, 511, 628 N.E.2d 1377 (1994). 

{¶11} The statute on employer intentional torts is R.C. 2745.01. It provides: 

{¶12} “(A) In an action brought against an employer by an employee, or by 

the dependent survivors of a deceased employee, for damages resulting from an 

intentional tort committed by the employer during the course of employment, the 

employer shall not be liable unless the plaintiff proves that the employer committed 

the tortious act with the intent to injure another or with the belief that the injury was 

substantially certain to occur. 

{¶13} “(B) As used in this section, ‘substantially certain’ means that an 

employer acts with deliberate intent to cause an employee to suffer an injury, a 

disease, a condition, or death. 

{¶14} “(C) Deliberate removal by an employer of an equipment safety guard 

or deliberate misrepresentation of a toxic or hazardous substance creates a 

rebuttable presumption that the removal or misrepresentation was committed with 

intent to injure another if an injury or an occupational disease or condition occurs as 

a direct result.” R.C. 2745.01. 
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{¶15} The trial court and magistrate found that Wineberry could not establish 

a material issue of fact that North Star specifically intended to cause injury to 

Wineberry and it further found that division (C) was inapplicable. 

{¶16} Our analysis begins with whether the facts asserted show intent to 

cause injury under division (A). 

{¶17} The parties dispute how this accident occurred. Wineberry stated in his 

deposition that he had bypassed the dead man switch on the sand blasting unit so 

that it would stay on. He stated he would duct tape the dead man switch every 

morning. (Wineberry Depo. 83). He indicated that every man operating a sandblaster 

would do this. (Wineberry Depo. 83). To use the sandblaster, the dead man switch 

had to be pressed on and when it was released, the unit would automatically shut off. 

Wineberry called an expert witness that stated had the right fall protection 

(guardrails) been utilized Wineberry would not have lost control of the sandblasting 

gun and would not have blasted himself with it. (Wright Depo. 73). 

{¶18} North Star contends that the injury would not have occurred if 

Wineberry had not deactivated the dead man switch; when he fell the sandblaster 

would have turned off because his hand would not be on the dead man switch and 

he would not have gotten shot with the sandblaster. 

{¶19} North Star also appears to claim that Wineberry did not fall off the 

perch, but instead jumped off after he accidentally sandblasted his arm. It asserts 

that Wineberry’s version of events is not plausible. He contends that he fell 15 feet 

and landed on “the piece of concrete that helps cars from falling off the bridge.” 

(Wineberry Depo. 61). His only injury was the sandblast to his arm. North Star 

contends that there would have been other injuries if he had fallen 15 feet and landed 

on concrete. Furthermore, other employees testified that the scaffolding was almost 

the height of the bridge roadway, not 15 feet above it. (Likouris Depo. 18; Klimis 

Depo. 20-21). In fact, Gus Klimis, who was working with Wineberry that day on the 

same scaffolding stated that he did not feel the scaffold buckle, the scaffold was at 

road level and that he did not know that Wineberry was injured until someone 

unplugged his equipment. He explained: 
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{¶20} “When it’s happening was exactly on the roadway. Because like I say, I 

walk and open the curtains and I went out. And they told me what happened. 

{¶21} “Q. So when you walked out of the curtains you stepped right on the 

roadway? 

{¶22} “A. Yes.” (Klimis Depo. 20). 

{¶23} Thus, there are different theories as to how this injury occurred. The 

plausibility of the theories is for the jury to decide. On summary judgment the court 

views the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Thus, we 

must accept Wineberry’s version of the accident that he fell 15 feet and sandblasted 

his arm during the fall. 

{¶24} The testimony shows that there were fall protection policies in place. 

For instance the sandblasters used safety ropes; the ropes were placed around a 

higher beam and would help prevent the sandblasters from falling off the scaffolding. 

On the day of the accident, Wineberry’s safety rope was not in place when he arrived 

at the job site. He informed his supervisors of this and was told to place the line 

himself. According to him, he asked for all sandblasting to stop so he could place the 

line. He stated that he believed he could not place the line safely while other workers 

were sandblasting. The supervisors would not stop the sandblasting. Therefore, he 

used his lanyards and tied down his 7 foot line to the scaffolding. North Star 

contends that Wineberry could have placed the line in the correct position without 

leaving the scaffolding and other sandblasting would not have prevented this. 

(Kalouris Affidavit paragraph 5). 

{¶25} The fact that Wineberry’s safety rope was not in place and that the 

supervisors would not stop the sandblasting so that he could place the line does not 

show an intent to injure Wineberry under division (A). The key undisputed fact that 

Wineberry cannot overcome is that he was told to correctly place his safety line and 

he did not do so. 

{¶26} That said, we must still review to determine whether intent to injure can 

be shown under division (C) of R.C. 2745.01. That section we quote below, actually 

states that deliberate removal of safety guards creates a rebuttal presumption of 

intent to injure. 
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{¶27} Both the magistrate and the trial court found that this section was not 

applicable: 

 7. The statute [sic] R.C. 2745.01(C) states: 

 “(C) Deliberate removal by an employer of an equipment safety 

guard * * * creates a rebuttable presumption that the removal * * * was 

committed with intent to injury another if an injury or occupational 

disease or condition occurs as a direct result.” 

 8. The statute is clear that in order to trigger Section C, there 

must be a deliberate removal by the employer of an equipment safety 

guard. The statute does not say in the construction or assembly of 

equipment that failure to construct or assemble the equipment with 

safety guards constitutes a rebuttable presumption. The legislative 

intent is clear from the statute and the statute cannot be rewritten 

beyond the clear meaning of the language. Had the legislature 

intended to include in Section C that the failure to install a safety guard 

is tantamount to deliberate removal, they would have stated it. The 

enactment of R.C. 2745.091 by the General Assembly has statutorily 

narrowed the common–law definition of “direct intent” torts only. 

06/02/11 J.E. 

{¶28} Wineberry acknowledges that the trial court correctly noted that the 

statute does not define “deliberate removal.” However, he contends that the trial 

court’s definition of deliberate removal is too narrow. He asserts that the failure to 

place guardrails around the perches constitutes a deliberate removal of the 

guardrails. For purposes of understanding the mechanics of the scaffolding and the 

perch it must be explained that the scaffolding itself had a guardrail attached to the 

back side and a pulley system on the two ends. The fourth side, the front, was open 

to allow the perch to move. The perch is the unit that the sandblaster positions and 

moves along the front of the scaffolding to reach the outer side of the beam he is 

sandblasting. 
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{¶29} In support of his position that deliberate removal should be interpreted 

more broadly he directs this court to decisions from our sister districts. In those 

cases, the courts have provided the following definitions: 

{¶30} “‘[D]eliberate’ as used in the statute means “‘characterized by or 

resulting from careful and thorough consideration—a deliberate decision.’“ Forwerck 

v. Principle Business Ents., Inc., 6th Dist. No. WD–10–040, 2011–Ohio–489, quoting 

Merriam–Webster's Collegiate Dictionary (10 Ed.1996) 305. See also, Fickle v. 

Conversion Technologies Intl., Inc., 6th Dist. No. WM-10-016, 2011-Ohio-2960 and 

Hewitt v. L.E. Meyers Co., 8th Dist. No. 96138, 2011-Ohio-5413, ¶ 24. 

{¶31} “’Remove’ is defined in Merriam–Webster's Collegiate Dictionary (10 

Ed.1996) 987 as ‘to move by lifting, pushing aside, or taking away or off”; also “to get 

rid of: eliminate.’” McKinney v. CSP of Ohio, L.L.C., 6th Dist. No. WD-10-070, 2011-

Ohio-3116, ¶ 17. See also, Hewitt at ¶ 24. Physical separation from the machine is 

not required to constitute removal, rather removal may be accomplished by the act of 

bypassing, disabling, or rendering inoperable. McKinney at ¶ 17. See also, Hewitt at 

¶ 24. 

{¶32} Using these definitions our sister courts have reached the following 

decisions. In Fickle, the plaintiff was injured when her left hand and arm became 

caught in the pinch point of a roller at the rewind end of an adhesive coating 

machine, which was equipped with a “jog/continuous” switch. Fickle at ¶ 2. The 

Fickle court held that while the term “equipment safety guard” would be commonly 

understood to mean a device that is designed to shield the operator from exposure to 

or injury by a dangerous aspect of the equipment, “the jog control and emergency 

stop cable” was not an “equipment safety guard.” Id. at ¶ 43-44. The court reached 

this determination because the switch was not designed to prevent an operator from 

encountering the pinch point on the rewind roller. Id. Therefore, division (C) was not 

met. 

{¶33} In McKinney, the appellate court found that the plaintiff had established 

a rebuttable presumption of deliberate removal. McKinney, 6th Dist. No. WD-10-070, 
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2011-Ohio-3116, ¶ 28. A co-worker advised a supervisor that the machine was not 

working properly. The supervisor indicated that maintenance would come and repair 

the machine, but to continue working on it. When McKinney arrived at work she was 

not told that the machine was not working properly and was subsequently injured on 

it. The court stated that it was undisputed that the press was improperly programmed 

and had it been properly programmed, the safety devices would have been in place 

and McKinney would not have been injured. Id. at ¶ 27. In finding deliberate intent it 

reasoned: 

 Given the deposition testimony in this case that a supervisor was 

notified there was problem with the press, a complaint he either ignored 

or did not appreciate the seriousness of, and, given the testimony that 

the workers were told to keep running the press after the complaint, and 

given the testimony from a CSP supervisor that “none of the right 

people were present” to ensure that the two safety measurers were on 

press 5 the night of [McKinney’s] accident, we find that [McKinney] has 

established a rebuttable presumption that the removal was committed 

with intent to injure. 

Id. at ¶ 28. 

{¶34} In Hewitt, the appellate court concluded that the employer failed to 

rebut the presumption created in R.C. 2745.01(C) regarding deliberate removal of a 

safety device. Hewitt, 8th Dist. No. 96138, 2011-Ohio-5413, ¶ 30-36. Hewitt, an 

employee and second year apprentice, was installing new electrical wires when he 

was shocked from a live wire. At the time of his injury, he was instructed to work 

alone and unsupervised in a bucket, without his safety equipment. Id. at ¶ 31. 

Working unsupervised in the bucket without safety equipment violated not only the 

American Line Builders Apprenticeship Training Program safety regulations, but also 

violated OSHA regulations. The court reasoned: 
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 Just as in McKinney, in the instant case, L.E. Myers’ actions 

cannot be described as reckless. Rather, after thorough consideration, 

L.E. Myers’ supervisors made a deliberate decision to place Hewitt in 

close proximity to energized wires without wearing protective rubber 

gloves or sleeves. Their actions amounted to the deliberate removal of 

an equipment safety guard when they instructed Hewitt, a second-step 

apprentice lineman, not to wear his protective gloves and sleeves and 

by sending him alone and unsupervised up in the bucket to work with 

excessive amounts of electricity, despite the known safety measures 

and risks. 

Id. at ¶ 34. 

{¶35} L.E. Myers did not present any evidence to rebut the presumption, and 

as such, failed to carry its burden. Id. at ¶ 35. Thus, the appellate court found that 

the trial court did not err when it denied the employer’s motion for directed verdict and 

motion for JNOV. Id.

{¶36} In all of these cases, the safety guards were actually removed. For 

instance in Hewitt, Hewitt was instructed to not wear the safety equipment he had 

previously worn. In McKinney, the machine was malfunctioning, but had it been 

properly programmed, the safety guards would have been in place. Therefore, even 

under a narrow interpretation of the statute the actions would still result in a 

deliberate removal. 

{¶37} Here, guardrails were not actually removed, but purportedly were never 

put in place. Given the above case law and the language of the statute, we 

understand how the trial court’s interpretation and reasoning is derived. The word 

“remove” does have a connotation of an action, not an omission. The element must 

be present and then eliminated; you cannot remove something when it is not there to 

begin with. Thus, the trial court held that the guardrail had to be on the perch and 

then removed in order to constitute deliberate removal. 

{¶38} There is a problem, however, with such a narrow construction of the 

word remove. If a machine is shipped not fully assembled and the employer does not 

install the guard that comes with the machine, under a narrow construction it might 
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not be considered deliberate removal since the guard was not initially attached. For 

that reason, we find that the trial court’s interpretation to be too narrow. Instead, we 

hold that a broader interpretation of deliberate removal is necessary. Thus, we hold 

that deliberate removal not only encompasses removing safety equipment, but also 

the failure to attach safety equipment provided by the manufacturer. 

{¶39} Despite our disagreement with the trial court, summary judgment for 

North Star was appropriately granted. It was Wineberry’s burden to show the 

rebuttable presumption of deliberate removal, which he did not do. There is nothing 

in the record to suggest that in the assembly of the perches guardrails were provided 

or required, but they were not attached. There is no deposition or affidavit testimony 

from the workers who constructed the scaffolding to indicate whether there should be 

guardrails attached to the perches and whether they were instructed to omit such 

guardrails. Furthermore, nothing in the record indicates that North Star was ever 

asked to put guardrails on the perches but declined to do so. The only reference in 

the record is North Star’s averment that it did not believe it was violating any 

regulation by not having guardrails around the perches. (Kalouris Affidavit paragraph 

3). 

{¶40} Furthermore, although it is not conclusive evidence of deliberate 

removal, we additionally note that there has not been an OSHA violation cited for 

Wineberry’s accident. See Hewitt, 8th Dist. No. 96138, 2011-Ohio-5413 (OSHA 

violation in some instances may evince deliberate removal). Likewise, it does not 

appear that the Code of Federal Regulations on scaffolding and guardrails definitively 

requires guardrails around perches. 29 CFR 1926.450 and 29 CFR 1926.451. 

Guardrails are required to be around the type of scaffolding that was used on this job. 

29 CFR 1926.451(G)(1) and 29 CFR 1926.450. However, nothing in those sections 

discusses perches. 

{¶41} Therefore, the evidence presented does not create a genuine issue of 

material fact as to whether there was a deliberate removal of guardrails on the 

perches. Since Wineberry cannot show a genuine issue of material fact as to section 

(A) or (C) of R.C. 2749.01, summary judgment was appropriately granted. For all the 
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above stated reasons this assignment of error lacks merit. The trial court’s decision 

is hereby affirmed. 

Donofrio, J., concurs. 

Waite, P.J., concurs.