STATE OF MINNESOTA

IN COURT OF APPEALS

A23-1799

Michelle Lynn Wilson,

Respondent,

vs.

Ryan Converse Wilson,

Appellant.

Filed August 12, 2024

Affirmed

Schmidt, Judge

Wright County District Court

File No. 86-CV-23-2436

Debra Julius, Julius Law Office, Ltd., Prior Lake, Minnesota (for respondent)

Laura Schultz, Laura L. Schultz Law Office, Edina, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Harris, Presiding Judge; Schmidt, Judge; and 

Kirk, Judge.

∗

SYLLABUS

A stipulation between parties in a dissolution judgement and decree to waive “all 

liability, claims, and obligations of any kind against the other party, whether arising in 

contract, status, tort or otherwise” does not operate as a waiver of a party’s right to seek a 

harassment restraining order based, in part, on conduct that occurred during the marriage.

∗ Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant to 

Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.
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OPINION

SCHMIDT, Judge

In this appeal from the district court’s grant of a harassment restraining order 

(HRO), appellant Ryan Converse Wilson (husband) argues that the district court (1) should 

have assigned the case to the judge who had presided over the parties’ dissolution 

proceedings; (2) clearly erred in making credibility determinations; (3) erred by 

considering certain allegations that husband maintains were waived in the prior dissolution

proceedings; and (4) abused its discretion in granting the HRO because the record does not 

support the existence of harassment. We affirm.

FACTS

The parties dissolved their marriage, by stipulated findings of fact, conclusions of 

law, order for judgment, and judgment and decree in October 2017. Relevant to the 

arguments presented by husband in this matter, the parties “expressly waived any and all 

liability, claims, and obligations of any kind against the other party, whether arising in 

contract, status, tort or otherwise,” and they agreed to be “barred from bringing any actions 

relating to such liability, claims, or obligations.”

In May 2023, respondent Michelle Lynn Wilson (wife) filed a petition for a HRO. 

Wife alleged that husband made uninvited visits to her home, had frightened her with 

threatening behavior at appointments for their children, and harassed her over social media. 

Wife described being afraid when husband yelled at her and noted that husband previously 

would yell before physically abusing her. Wife believed the harassment would continue 

because their relationship consisted of a history of abuse.
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The district court declined to issue an ex parte HRO and, instead, scheduled a 

hearing on wife’s petition. Husband wrote a letter to request that the court refer the HRO 

matter to the family court judge who handled the parties’ divorce. The district court 

rejected the request and retained the HRO matter.

At the hearing in August 2023, wife testified that during their marriage husband hit 

her, pushed her to the floor, threatened to kill her in front of their children, bit her nose, 

and kicked her while she was pregnant. Wife stated the abuse made her afraid of husband. 

Wife testified about multiple occasions since the divorce when husband yelled at 

her. Wife described a May 2023 incident when husband yelled at her at a counseling 

appointment for their child. Wife testified that this event was similar to past incidents from 

their marriage when husband would yell at her and “then it ended up being violent.” Wife 

testified that she felt scared and unsafe at the appointment.

Wife testified about a February 2023 event when she notified a counselor that their 

children had seen feces in the bathroom of husband’s home. After husband learned about 

the disclosure, husband “got mad and said that [wife] was making that up.” Wife testified 

that husband’s reaction was like instances during their marriage when husband would 

become angry and then physically abuse her. Wife felt scared by husband’s reaction.

Wife provided another example of husband yelling during a virtual medical 

appointment. Even though she was not in husband’s physical presence, wife testified that 

she felt anxious, her heart started racing, and she began crying.
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Wife further testified about another doctor visit when husband yelled at her 

regarding their child’s diagnosis. The doctor asked husband to step out of the room due to 

his yelling. Wife testified that this incident made her feel scared.

Wife also detailed other instances of husband yelling at her in public. In addition, 

she detailed other instances of husband’s harassment, such as unwanted text messages,

uninvited visits to her home, and harassing messages over social media.

Husband testified at the hearing, claiming wife accused him of child abuse at an 

appointment and screamed at him. Husband asserted that wife’s “character assassination” 

testimony stemmed from her not liking the results from the divorce proceedings.

On cross-examination, husband admitted that he responded to wife in a “loud voice” 

during one medical appointment, but he “did not consider it yelling.” Husband denied 

yelling at other appointments. Husband denied biting wife’s nose and hitting her during 

their marriage, but he could not recall if he said he would kill wife. Husband admitted that 

at times during the marriage he yelled and acted inappropriately, but he believed it was 

unreasonable, in his opinion, for wife to be afraid of him.

Following the hearing, the district court granted the HRO. The district court found 

wife to be credible and afforded her testimony “great weight.” In contrast, the district court 

found husband’s testimony, “particularly regarding past domestic abuse allegations, was 

not credible.” The court found husband’s answers to be “evasive and/or non-responsive.” 

The district court also found that there were “reasonable grounds to believe that [husband] 

has engaged in harassment which has or is intended to have a substantial adverse effect on 

safety, security, or privacy of [wife].” The court also found that husband threatened to kill 
5

wife and “yelled at [her] during therapy and/or doctor appointments in front of one of the 

parties’ children and others.” The court concluded that husband’s “recent conduct in light 

of the past abuse demonstrates how [husband’s] more recent behavior was intended to 

frighten and intimidate [wife].”

After the district court issued the HRO, husband moved for amended findings and 

to vacate the order. Husband asserted that only the judge that oversaw the dissolution 

proceedings had jurisdiction over the parties, which precluded a different judge from ruling 

on the HRO petition. Husband also argued that the district court’s findings of fact did not 

meet the statutory standard for issuing a HRO. Husband further claimed that wife violated 

the stipulated decree from their divorce by presenting allegations “arising prior to the 2017 

decree in her petition and testimony.” 

The district court held a second hearing in October 2023 to address husband’s 

motion. The court noted that the HRO proceeding was “an independent proceeding from 

the family court file” that raised “separate issues” and, as such, the court determined it 

could issue the HRO “even though there is a family court file.” Following the hearing, the 

district court issued an amended HRO that provided clarity regarding certain restrictions 

related to the children’s medical care and attendance at appointments but did not otherwise 

substantively alter the original order. 

Husband appeals.
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ISSUES

I. Did the court abuse its discretion by not reassigning the case to the judge who 

presided over the parties’ dissolution proceedings?

II. Did the district court clearly err in its credibility determinations?

III. Did the district court err by considering allegations regarding husband’s conduct 

prior to the parties’ divorce?

IV. Did the district court abuse its discretion in granting the HRO?

ANALYSIS

I. The district court acted within its discretion in rejecting husband’s request to 

reassign the HRO petition.

Husband argues that the district court “erred by not assigning the matter to the 

family court judge.” To support this argument, husband relies on a general practice rule 

that states “the chief judge of the district or the chief judge’s designee may order that all 

pretrial and trial proceedings shall be heard before a single judge” in circumstances that 

“the court or parties believe is likely to be complex, or where other reasons of efficiency 

or the interests of justice dictate.” Minn. R. Gen. Prac. 113.01(a). 

Husband requested to have the HRO petition matter reassigned by filing a letter 

directed to the judge assigned to handle the petition. But filing a letter directed to the judge 

assigned to handle a case is not the appropriate process to request to have a case reassigned. 

Instead, a party that desires to have a case reassigned must either make the “suggestion” 

when filing a civil cover sheet under Minnesota Rule of General Practice 104, or file a 

motion directed to the chief judge of the district. Minn. R. Gen. Prac. 113.01(a), .02. If 

the party elects to file a motion to request that a case be reassigned, the motion must 
7

“comply with these rules and shall be supported by affidavit(s).” Minn. R. Gen. P. 

113.01(a). Compliance with “these rules” includes Minnesota Rule of General Practice 

115.04 regarding nondispositive motions. That rule details the timing for a nondispositive 

motion, requirements to include a notice of motion and motion, affidavits, and a 

memorandum, and provides an opportunity for the opposing party to respond. See Minn. 

R. Gen. Prac. 115.04 (a), (b).

Here, husband’s letter was not a civil cover sheet that he filed pursuant to rule 104. 

See Minn. R. Gen. Prac. 113.01(a). The letter also did not constitute a motion that complied

with the rules. See id. Nor was the letter supported by any affidavit. See id. Most 

significantly, husband did not direct his request to the chief judge of the district, who has 

the sole authority to either (1) rule on the request, or (2) assign a designee to rule on the 

request. See id.1

 These procedural defects demonstrate that the district court acted well 

within its discretion in rejecting husband’s request to reassign the HRO petition to the judge 

who oversaw the divorce proceedings.

Even if husband’s request was not procedurally infirm, rule 113.01 uses the word 

“may” when detailing the power and process for the chief judge to consolidate proceedings 

before a single judge. Id. The word “may” confers discretion to the district court regarding 

decisions made under the rule. See State v. Olson, 884 N.W.2d 395, 397 (Minn. 2016)

(noting “may” confers discretion within a criminal rule). Thus, rule 113.01 simply grants 

the chief judge discretion to order all proceedings be heard by a single judge. 

1 Husband cites no case or rule—and we could not find any—that empowers any judge—

other than the chief judge or the chief judge’s designee—to reassign a case.
8

Husband has identified no legal authority that requires reversal when a chief judge 

declines to grant the relief available under this discretionary rule. Simply put, there is no 

requirement that the HRO petition be decided by the judge who presided over the parties’

divorce proceedings. As such, the district court did not abuse its discretion in declining to 

grant the relief sought in husband’s procedurally defective letter.

II. The district court did not clearly err in its credibility determinations.

“A district court’s findings of fact will not be set aside unless clearly erroneous, and 

due regard is given to the district court’s opportunity to judge the credibility of witnesses.” 

Peterson v. Johnson, 755 N.W.2d 758, 761 (Minn. App. 2008). “Credibility 

determinations are the province of the trier of fact.” Id. at 763; see also In re Civ. 

Commitment of Kenney, 963 N.W.2d 214, 221-23 (Minn. 2021) (discussing clear-error 

standard appellate courts use to review findings of fact).

Husband argues the district court erred in finding wife credible about past abuse 

because her testimony “was a vague statement that it occurred, with no context as to time, 

specifics, description of said acts, or any details whatsoever.” Husband also argues that 

the court erred in finding his testimony not credible because “his answers were not evasive 

or nonresponsive.” However, our deferential standard of review requires us to defer to the 

fact-finder’s credibility determinations. Peterson, 755 N.W.2d at 763. Having seen the 

live testimony, the district court is in the best position to assess the credibility of the 

witnesses. As such, we will not disturb the district court’s findings related to the credibility 

of husband or wife’s testimony. 
9

III. The district court did not err by considering allegations of husband’s conduct 

during the parties’ marriage.

In the order granting the HRO, the district court relied, in part, upon evidence of 

husband’s conduct that occurred during the parties’ marriage. Husband argues that the 

court erred in considering any conduct that occurred prior to the divorce because the parties 

expressly waived, and agreed to be barred from bringing any future action related to, “all 

liability, claims, and obligations of any kind against the other party.”

Courts accord stipulated marriage-dissolution judgments the same sanctity as a 

binding contract. Pooley v. Pooley, 979 N.W.2d 867, 873 (Minn. 2022). When contract 

language is unambiguous, we must apply its plain meaning. See Nelson v. Nelson, 

806 N.W.2d 870, 872 (Minn. App. 2011).

As relevant to this appeal, the parties’ divorce decree stipulated:

Barred Future Actions. The parties, having mutually and 

expressly waived any and all liability, claims, and obligations 

of any kind against the other party, whether arising in contract, 

status, tort or otherwise, are barred from bringing any actions 

relating to such liability, claims, or obligations.

Husband has cited to no authority that this language would bar a court from 

considering conduct that occurred during a marriage that, when combined with 

postdissolution harassing and abusive conduct, warrants the issuance of a HRO. Abusive 

and harassing conduct does not constitute a “liability,” a “claim[],” or an “obligation[].” 

Even if those terms could include harassing and abusive conduct, we conclude that 

the stipulation does not operate as a waiver of a party’s right to seek a HRO based, in part, 

on conduct that occurred during the marriage. At a minimum, the district court may use 
10

evidence of the predissolution conduct for purposes of providing a historical perspective 

regarding the parties’ relationship when considering whether to grant a HRO based upon 

alleged postdissolution conduct. 

The relationship history may provide context for a district court when deciding 

whether the harasser’s conduct was “objectively unreasonable” and whether the allegations 

from the person allegedly being harassed constitute an “objectively reasonable belief.” See 

Dunham v. Roer, 708 N.W.2d 552, 567 (Minn. App. 2006) (detailing statutorily required 

considerations that district courts must use when deciding whether to grant a HRO 

petition). The previous relationship conduct also provides insight to a person’s reaction to 

the new alleged conduct, which is relevant to the district court’s consideration of the 

alleged harasser’s intent at the time they engaged in the alleged unreasonable conduct. Id.

(holding harassment statute requires “objectively unreasonable conduct or intent on the 

part of the harasser” (emphasis added)); see also State v. Smith, 825 N.W.2d 131, 136-37 

(Minn. App. 2012) (noting victim’s reaction is circumstantial evidence showing intent), 

rev. denied (Minn. Mar. 19, 2013). The history of the parties’ relationship may also assist 

the district court in making credibility findings related to the parties’ testimony, including 

why the person being harassed may have given contradictory accounts related to prior 

physical or emotional abuse, or whether the allegedly abused individual has a history of 

reports that had been thoroughly investigated and proven to be false. See, e.g.,

State v. Grecinger, 569 N.W.2d 189, 196 (Minn. 1997) (holding that expert testimony 

regarding battered-woman syndrome is admissible when it helps the fact-finder 

“understand behavior that might otherwise undermine the complainant’s credibility”). 
11

Notably, the district court’s order repeatedly used the past domestic abuse to inform 

its decision as to the current allegations of harassment and abuse. For example, the district 

court found that wife “credibly testified that [husband’s] behavior during appointments was 

intimidating, especially given the context of past domestic abuse.” The court later 

determined that “[wife’s] description of [husband’s] recent conduct in light of the past 

abuse demonstrates how [husband’s] more recent behavior was intended to frighten and 

intimidate her.” Thus, even if the parties’ stipulated divorce decree could waive the use of 

such conduct, the district court appropriately used the predissolution conduct as context to 

inform its decision regarding the allegations of postdissolution harassment.

IV. The district court did not abuse its discretion in granting the HRO.

Husband further argues that the district court abused its discretion in granting the 

HRO. We review the issuance of a HRO for an abuse of discretion. Peterson, 755 N.W.2d 

at 761. “A district court abuses its discretion by making findings of fact that are 

unsupported by the evidence, misapplying the law, or delivering a decision that is against 

logic and the facts on record.” Bender v. Bernhard, 971 N.W.2d 257, 262 (Minn. 2022) 

(quotation omitted). The district court’s findings of fact will not be set aside unless clearly 

erroneous, and we defer to the district court’s opportunity to assess the credibility of 

witnesses. Peterson, 755 N.W.2d at 761.

A district court may grant a HRO if it finds “there are reasonable grounds to believe 

that the respondent has engaged in harassment.” Minn. Stat. § 609.748, subd. 5(b)(3)

(2022). “Harassment” is defined, in relevant part, as:
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[R]epeated incidents of intrusive or unwanted acts, words, or 

gestures that have a substantial adverse effect or are intended 

to have a substantial adverse effect on the safety, security, or 

privacy of another, regardless of the relationship between the 

actor and the intended target.

Id. at subd. 1(a)(1) (2022). This definition requires both objectively unreasonable conduct 

or intent on the part of the harasser and an objectively reasonable belief on the part of the 

person being harassed. Dunham, 708 N.W.2d at 567. 

A single incident of words is insufficient to be harassment. Kush v. Mathison, 

683 N.W.2d 841, 844 (Minn. App. 2004), rev. denied (Minn. Sept. 29, 2004). 

“[H]arassment laws place carefully limited restraints on individuals whose conduct goes 

beyond an acceptable expression of outrage and civilized conduct, and instead causes a 

substantial adverse effect on another’s safety, security or privacy.” Id. at 846.

Husband contends that the incidents of yelling at wife during their children’s 

appointments were “not intrusive or unwanted acts that have a substantial adverse effect or 

are intended to have a substantial adverse effect on the safety, security, or privacy of 

another.” Husband also asserts that yelling during medical and therapy appointments was

not “objectively unreasonable conduct.” We disagree.

The district court found that husband “[y]elled at [wife] during therapy and/or 

doctor appointments in front of one of the parties’ children and others.” The court afforded 

wife’s testimony “great weight” and found that wife “credibly testified that [husband’s] 

behavior during appointments was intimidating, especially given the context of past 

domestic abuse.” Husband offers general arguments, but points to no evidence suggesting 

that these findings are clearly erroneous. As such, this court accepts those findings. 
13

Peterson, 755 N.W.2d at 761. In addition, we have already rejected husband’s arguments 

regarding the district court’s credibility determinations and, thus, we accept the court’s 

findings that wife was credible, and husband was not. 

Husband argues that wife could not objectively and reasonably believe that 

husband’s conduct of yelling during the appointments constituted harassment. But the 

record does not reflect husband’s conduct was merely inappropriate statements. Instead, 

the record demonstrated that husband’s conduct was unwanted and aggressive behavior, to 

the point that healthcare providers asked husband to step out of the room on one occasion. 

Additionally, based upon wife’s credible testimony, the district court found that 

husband’s conduct was “intended to frighten and intimidate” her. See Dunham, 

708 N.W.2d at 567 (requiring intent or objectively unreasonable conduct). The district 

court also found that husband’s actions had, or were intended to have, a substantial adverse 

effect on wife’s safety and security. The court also found that wife’s description of 

husband’s recent conduct, “in light of the past abuse[,] demonstrates how [husband’s] more 

recent behavior was intended to frighten and intimidate [wife].” Again, we defer to the 

district court’s credibility findings, and nothing in the record suggests these findings of fact 

are clearly erroneous. Peterson, 755 N.W.2d at 761.

Husband’s arguments that the district court abused its discretion in granting the 

HRO are largely premised upon the flawed foundation that the court could not consider

husband’s conduct during the marriage. But as we have already held, the district court 

could—and properly did—consider wife’s credible testimony regarding husband’s conduct 

during their marriage as context relevant to husband’s postdissolution conduct. The 
14

combination of the predissolution conduct combined with the postdissolution conduct

constitutes ample evidence for the district court to find that husband harassed wife.

The facts, as found by the district court, support the determination that husband’s

actions constituted harassment because they were objectively intrusive, unwanted, 

intended to frighten and intimidate wife, and they had a substantial adverse effect on her. 

The district court acted well within its discretion in granting the HRO.

DECISION

The district court acted within its discretion in rejecting husband’s request to 

reassign the HRO matter to the judge that oversaw the divorce proceedings. The district 

court also did not clearly err in its credibility findings or err in considering conduct from 

the parties’ marriage to inform its decision on whether to grant the equitable relief of a 

HRO based upon post-divorce conduct. Because the record supports the district court’s 

findings of fact, and because those findings of fact support the district court’s grant of the 

HRO, the district court did not abuse its discretion in granting the HRO.

Affirmed.