In the 

United States Court of Appeals 

For the Seventh Circuit ____________________ 

No. 23-1816 

AMANDA RAKES, Administrator of the Estate of Amylyn 

Slaymaker and Next Friend to the minor children G.C. and 

M.C.,

Plaintiff-Appellant, 

v.

JONATHAN P. ROEDERER and ESTATE OF TE’JUAN JOHNSON, 

Defendants-Appellees. 

____________________ 

Appeal from the United States District Court for the 

Southern District of Indiana, New Albany Division. 

No. 4:21-cv-00114 — Jane Magnus-Stinson, Judge. 

____________________ 

ARGUED JANUARY 18, 2024 — DECIDED SEPTEMBER 25, 2024 

____________________ 

Before RIPPLE, BRENNAN, and SCUDDER, Circuit Judges. 

PER CURIAM. On the night of July 18, 2019 in Charlestown, 

Indiana, bystanders called 911 to report that a man, RJ 

Slaymaker (RJ), and a woman, Amylyn Slaymaker (Amylyn), 

were fighting in the middle of a residential street. Two police 

officers responded to the call and separated RJ and Amylyn. 

Amylyn told the officers that RJ (her husband) was drunk, 
2 No. 23-1816

had hit her, had guns on him and at their house, and was 

threatening to kill her and himself. RJ denied hitting her or 

making any threats. The officers called an ambulance for RJ 

so he could get help with mental health issues at a nearby 

hospital. After RJ left in the ambulance, the officers allegedly 

told Amylyn that RJ would be kept at the hospital under a 24-

hour mental health hold. 

But if they did say that to Amylyn, it was not true: neither 

the officers nor anyone else placed RJ under a hold. Instead, 

the officers merely encouraged him to seek help voluntarily. 

RJ left the hospital shortly after arriving and returned to the 

house that he shared with Amylyn. There, he shot and killed 

Amylyn, then himself. 

The administrator of Amylyn’s estate subsequently 

brought this action against Officer Roederer and the estate of 

Officer Johnson (who died shortly before this litigation). She 

primarily relies on the state-created danger doctrine, under 

which state officials can in limited circumstances be held 

liable under section 1983 for recklessly placing plaintiffs at 

risk of harm from third parties. The district court concluded 

that the defendants were entitled to qualified immunity and 

granted summary judgment on that basis. 

We now affirm the judgment of the district court insofar 

as it relates to Officer Roederer. He may recover his costs 

related to this appeal. We reverse the judgment of the district 

court and remand for further proceedings insofar as it relates 

to Officer Johnson. His estate may recover its costs on this 

appeal. 

Each judge of the panel has filed a separate opinion setting 

forth his view on the appropriate disposition of this appeal. 
No. 23-1816 3

Judge Ripple would reverse the judgment of the district court 

with respect to both defendants and remand for further 

proceedings. Judge Scudder would reverse the judgment and 

remand for further proceedings with respect to the estate of 

Officer Johnson. He would affirm the judgment with respect 

to respect to Officer Roederer. Judge Brennan would affirm 

the judgment of the district court with respect to both 

defendants. The opinion of each judge is set forth below. 

RIPPLE, Circuit Judge. At the time of their deaths, RJ and 

Amylyn Slaymaker had been married for about seven years. 

The allegations of abuse during that period are startling. He 

shot at her on multiple occasions, and he once set fire to their 

couches in an attempt to burn down their house. He also often 

“dared” her to engage in sexual acts with other men and 

threatened to hurt her if she did not complete the “dares.” 

Examples of these threats included “I’ll break your fucking 

jaw [if] you walk in my fucking house without completeing 

[sic] my dare”1 and “Come home and not complete shit, you 

will be in the hospital.”2 Whenever Amylyn suggested 

divorce, RJ threatened suicide. If she called the police, RJ said 

he would commit “suicide by cop.”3

On the night in question, RJ completely lost control. He 

had a few drinks, then a few more drinks. At around 11 p.m., 

he texted Amylyn to say that, because she had not completed 

one of his “dares,” he was going to “gun [d]own” Eric, 

1 R.67-21 at 7. 

2 Id.

3 R.67-3 at 20:53-58; R.67-4 at 22. 
4 No. 23-1816 

Amylyn’s ex-husband and the father of her two children.4 Eric 

was watching the children at his house that night. RJ taunted 

Amylyn: “Watch [m]e on gps. ... Heading to your kids 

house.”5 He told her to “[g]ive it 10 mins and call the cops.”6

It would be a “[r]eal suicide crime scene,” he predicted.7

Amylyn barely beat RJ to Eric’s house, stopping him right in 

front of Eric’s driveway. RJ said to her, “Do you want me to 

shoot you? And then the kids come out in the morning to see 

their mother dead?”8 The two of them got into a physical 

altercation in the street. 

One of Eric’s neighbors saw them fighting and called 911. 

The neighbor told dispatchers that he and his wife saw a man 

hitting a woman on the street near his house and that the man 

may have had a gun. Charlestown Police Department Officers 

Te’Juan Johnson and Jonathan Roederer responded to the call. 

The officers drove to the scene separately, and video cameras 

mounted on the dashboards of their cars captured much of 

what followed. When the officers arrived, Amylyn told them 

that RJ was drunk and armed and that she was “scared for 

[her] life.”9 The officers handcuffed RJ, confiscated his gun, 

and separated the spouses. 

The officers endeavored to find out what had happened. 

Officer Johnson spoke with Amylyn. She showed him the 

4 R.82-4 at 1. 

5 Id.

6 Id.

7 Id. 

8 R.67-4 at 14. 

9 R.67-3 at 1:33-35; R.67-4 at 4–5. 
No. 23-1816 5

texts RJ had sent her and told him that, during the fight in the 

street, RJ had punched her and hit her with the front sight of 

his gun. She also told him about RJ’s other threatening 

behavior and that he had two AR-15s at their house. Officer 

Roederer spoke with RJ and the neighbors. RJ denied hitting 

Amylyn and said he was having a hard time with PTSD he 

developed in military service. The neighbors admitted 

uncertainty about whether they had actually seen RJ hit her. 

At one point, Amylyn asked Officer Johnson if the officers 

could remove RJ’s AR-15s from her house. Officer Johnson 

relayed the request to Officer Roederer and suggested that 

Officer Roederer drive RJ back to the house and remove the 

AR-15s. Officer Roederer expressed hesitation: 

OFFICER ROEDERER: You want me to get the guns 

from his house? 

OFFICER JOHNSON: Yeah, the two AR-15s, yeah. 

... 

OFFICER ROEDERER: I mean, should I keep him in 

cuffs until I get the guns? I’m 

not -- I mean, I don’t want to 

walk inside --10 

In his deposition, Officer Roederer confirmed that his concern 

was one of “officer[] safety.”11 Officer Johnson seemed to 

appreciate this concern, and the two of them discussed other 

potential courses of action. 

10 R.67-3 at 29:32-30:15; R.67-4 at 30–31. 

11 R.82-3 at 66. 
6 No. 23-1816 

After some deliberation, the officers ruled out one such 

course of action: arresting RJ. Officer Johnson told Amylyn 

that they did not plan to arrest RJ, and he explained to 

Amylyn certain options she had, including going to the 

courthouse in the morning and asking the court to commit RJ 

to a hospital on account of his suicide risk. Amylyn then said 

to them: “I have proof that he tried to attempt suicide before. 

Will that help? ... [H]e sent me a picture of his gun against his 

head recently.”12 Amylyn showed the officers the picture, and 

Officer Johnson told her, “Wait right here for me.”13 

The officers walked over to RJ and suggested that he go to 

a nearby hospital to “get checked out.”14 They assured him 

that they would not go with him to the hospital and that they 

would not show anyone else the picture in which he was 

pointing a gun to his head. They also told him that if he did 

not agree to go to the hospital, they could compel him to stay 

there for a week. But if he went on his own accord, Officer 

Roederer said, “you don’t have to stay in there.”15 Officer 

Johnson twice told RJ that he would prefer that RJ go 

voluntarily, because otherwise he would have to type up a 

report.16 RJ reluctantly agreed. The officers called an 

ambulance, which arrived at around 12:40 a.m. Officer 

12 R.67-3 at 39:10-21; R.67-4 at 41. 

13 R.67-3 at 44:25-27; R.67-4 at 47. 

14 R.67-3 at 44:59-45:02; R.67-4 at 48. 

15 R.67-3 at 48:10-13; R.67-4 at 53. 

16 See R.67-4 at 48 (“I’d rather for you to do it voluntarily, or -- you know, 

so now I got to type a report.”); id. at 51 (“If you’re willing to go -- or if 

not, I go back to the station, type up papers, then I got to corroborate 

everything it says in there.”). 
No. 23-1816 7

Johnson told the EMTs: “This is RJ. Man, he got into it with 

his wife. He was having a bad day. Problems -- you know, he 

wants to voluntarily get checked out.”17 

The officers then went back to speak with Amylyn. The 

conversation that followed is at the center of this case: 

OFFICER JOHNSON: Are you going to go to your 

house? You’re -- you’re going 

to be at your parents’ house? 

AMYLYN SLAYMAKER: Well, you -- you said it’s a 24-

hour thing, right? For an 

evaluation? 

OFFICER JOHNSON: Yeah ... .18 

The conversation continued, eventually returning to the topic 

of where Amylyn planned to stay that night: 

OFFICER JOHNSON: Okay, so are you going to go to 

your house? 

AMYLYN SLAYMAKER: Well, tonight, yeah. 

OFFICER JOHNSON: Are you going to -- 

AMYLYN SLAYMAKER: You said it’s a 24 hour? 

OFFICER JOHNSON: Yeah. So are you going to get 

the guns and everything when 

you go home? 

17 R.67-3 at 1:02:39-47; R.67-4 at 73. 

18 R.67-3 at 1:08:03-15; R.67-4 at 77–78. 
8 No. 23-1816 

AMYLYN SLAYMAKER: Yeah, I’m going to take them 

with me to my parents’.19

According to Ms. Rakes, these exchanges indicate that, at 

some time earlier that night, the officers told Amylyn that 

they would send RJ to the hospital with instructions for 

hospital staff to put him under a 24-hour mental health hold. 

The officers were permitted to put RJ under such a hold by 

state law,20 and they were required to do so by their 

department’s policy.21

Everyone eventually left the scene, but not long 

afterwards, Officer Johnson got a call from Amylyn. She told 

19 R.67-3 at 1:29:24-33; R.67-4 at 97. 

20 At the time, Indiana law permitted law enforcement to transport a 

person who has a mental illness, is dangerous, and “is in immediate need 

of hospitalization and treatment” to a nearby hospital, and to detain that 

person for up to 24 hours. See Ind. Code § 12-26-4-1 et seq. (repealed in 

2023); see also T.K. v. Dep’t of Veterans Affairs, 27 N.E.3d 271, 273 n.1 (Ind. 

2015) (describing circumstances under which the state law then in effect 

permitted involuntary civil commitment). 

21 Under the policy, 

A Department officer ..., who during the course of their duties as 

a law enforcement officer, has reasonable grounds to believe that 

an individual is mentally ill, dangerous to themselves or others, 

and/or in immediate need of hospitalization and treatment shall: 

1. Exercise immediate twenty-four (24) hour detention for mental 

evaluation authority provided for in Indiana Code 12-26-4. 

2. Summons an ambulance to transport the individual to the 

nearest medical facility with psychiatric intake personnel ... . 

3. Complete a narrative style report or proper facility form(s) ... . 

R.48-3. 
No. 23-1816 9

him that she had found a scratch on her arm that was 

consistent with having been hit by RJ’s gun in their fight 

earlier. Amylyn went to the police station and showed Officer 

Johnson the scratch. Officer Johnson summarized the 

conversation that followed in a report he filed at least one day 

later (i.e., after he learned about the murder-suicide). In that 

report (the veracity of which Ms. Rakes questions), Officer 

Johnson wrote that he told Amylyn to “make sure to get the 

other two AR-15s and stay at her mother[’s] house.”22 He also 

wrote: “Amylyn asked several times how long will [RJ] be in 

the hospital. Officers told her we did not know.”23

Meanwhile, RJ walked into the hospital at approximately 

1 a.m., alone. He received a psychiatric evaluation and was 

discharged at 3:41 a.m. Sometime after that, he went home 

and shot Amylyn in the head with one of his AR-15s. He sent 

a message to his mother at 7:49 p.m. the following evening, 

stating that he had killed Amylyn because she had “[s]crewed 

[him] so bad.”24 RJ sent his mother another message at 

approximately 11:43 p.m. (by now, nearly 24 hours after RJ 

entered the hospital). The message stated: “I’m not going to 

prison. Amylyn is dead. And so am I.”25 RJ’s mother called 

the police department to request a welfare check, which 

prompted officers to go to RJ and Amylyn’s house at around 

22 R.67-9 at 15. 

23 Id.

24 R.82-11 at 2. 

25 R.67-11 at 6. 
10 No. 23-1816 

midnight. The officers found both RJ and Amylyn dead. 

Amylyn’s body was “cold to the touch.”26

Amanda Rakes, the administrator of Amylyn’s estate, 

brought this action in the United States District Court for the 

Southern District of Indiana. Her complaint sets forth a 

substantive due process claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and a 

gender-discrimination conspiracy claim under 42 U.S.C. 

§ 1985. She named as defendants Officer Roederer and, 

because Officer Johnson died between the events in question 

and the filing of this suit, Officer Johnson’s estate. The 

defendants moved for summary judgment on both claims. 

The district court granted summary judgment to the 

defendants. The court noted that Ms. Rakes’s substantive due 

process claim was based on the premise that the officers had 

told Amylyn “that RJ would be held for 24 hours at the 

hospital and that it therefore was safe for her to go home.” 

Rakes v. Roederer, No. 4:21-cv-00114, 2023 WL 2712370, at *16 

(S.D. Ind. Mar. 30, 2023). It then held that Officer Roederer 

was entitled to qualified immunity because, in the district 

court’s view, there was no evidence that he had made any 

assurances to Amylyn and there was generally a “lack of 

evidence of any personal involvement” on his part. Id. at *18 

n.8. 

The district court also held that Officer Johnson was 

entitled to qualified immunity. Here, the court focused on the 

time that Officer Johnson had spent trying to talk Amylyn into 

staying at her parents’ house. It further deemed significant 

that “RJ had been a danger to Amylyn for months before the 

incident and would likely have continued to be so even if he 

26 R.67-12 at 2. 
No. 23-1816 11

had been held for 24 hours at the hospital.” Id. at *18. Finally, 

the district court separately rejected Ms. Rakes’s genderdiscrimination conspiracy claim. It entered summary 

judgment for the defendants on both claims. 

Ms. Rakes appealed the district court’s grant of summary 

judgment on her substantive due process claim. 

We review de novo a district court’s decision granting 

summary judgment. Pierner-Lytge v. Hobbs, 60 F.4th 1039, 1043 

(7th Cir. 2023). Summary judgment is appropriate if “there is 

no genuine dispute of fact” and the moving party is “entitled 

to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). In 

applying this standard, we view the facts and draw all 

reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the 

nonmoving party. Pierner-Lytge, 60 F.4th at 1043. 

The main basis for the district court’s grant of summary 

judgment was its conclusion that the defendants are entitled 

to qualified immunity. “Determining whether a defendant 

state officer is entitled to qualified immunity involves two 

inquiries: ‘(1) whether the facts, taken in the light most 

favorable to the plaintiff, make out a violation of a 

constitutional right, and (2) whether that constitutional right 

was clearly established at the time of the alleged violation.’” 

Gibbs v. Lomas, 755 F.3d 529, 537 (7th Cir. 2014) (quoting 

Williams v. City of Chicago, 733 F.3d 749, 758 (7th Cir. 2013)). 

“If either inquiry is answered in the negative, the defendant 

official is entitled to summary judgment.” Id. 

The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment 

generally does not impose a duty upon the State to protect 

individuals from harm by private actors. DeShaney v. 

Winnebago County Department of Social Services, 489 U.S. 189 
12 No. 23-1816 

(1989), embodies that principle. DeShaney involved a due 

process claim brought on behalf of a young boy who was 

abused by his father. Id. at 191. County social workers became 

aware of suspicious injuries and other signs of abuse but took 

no action to remove the child from his father’s custody. Id.

After the latest and most severe beating left the boy 

permanently disabled, the father was arrested and convicted 

of child abuse. Id. at 193. The boy’s mother then brought a 

section 1983 action against the county and the social workers. 

She claimed that they had violated her son’s right to due 

process of law. Id. The Supreme Court articulated the general 

principle that “a State’s failure to protect an individual 

against private violence simply does not constitute a violation 

of the Due Process Clause.” Id. at 197. It accordingly rejected 

the mother’s claim because “the State had no constitutional 

duty to protect [the boy] against the father’s violence.” Id. at 

202. 

Although state officials do not have a federal 

constitutional duty to protect individuals not in custody, they 

do have a duty not to “needlessly create risks of harm.” Paine 

v. Cason, 678 F.3d 500, 510 (7th Cir. 2012). Indeed, the Court 

indicated as much in DeShaney, when it emphasized, no less 

than three times, that the defendants played no part in the 

creation of the danger the boy faced. 489 U.S. at 197, 201, 201–

02. Accordingly, although mindful of DeShaney, we have 

recognized in several decisions that state officials can, in 

limited circumstances, be held liable under § 1983 for 

unjustifiably placing a person at risk of harm from third 

parties. See, e.g., Paine, 678 F.3d at 510–11 (police could be 

liable under § 1983 for arresting woman in safe area and 

releasing her in area with an exceptionally high crime rate); 

Reed v. Gardner, 986 F.2d 1122, 1127 (7th Cir. 1993) (police 
No. 23-1816 13

could be liable under § 1983 for arresting car driver and 

leaving keys in hands of intoxicated passenger). We have 

termed such claims state-created danger claims and called the 

resulting doctrine the state-created danger doctrine. Most 

other circuits have recognized a version of this doctrine. See 

Irish v. Fowler, 979 F.3d 65, 67, 73 (1st Cir. 2020) (collecting 

cases from nine circuits and joining those circuits). 

The state-created danger doctrine has important limits. 

First, the plaintiff must show that “the state affirmatively 

place[d] the individual in a position of danger the individual 

otherwise would not have faced.” Wallace v. Adkins, 115 F.3d 

427, 430 (7th Cir. 1997). Second, the plaintiff must show “that 

the state’s failure to protect him from that danger was the 

proximate cause of his injury.” First Midwest Bank v. City of 

Chicago, 988 F.3d 978, 988 (7th Cir. 2021). “Finally, because the 

right to protection against a state-created danger arises from 

the substantive component of the Due Process Clause, the 

state’s failure to protect the plaintiff must shock the 

conscience.” Id. at 989. 

I pause here to clarify two points pertinent to the 

remainder of the discussion. First, a plaintiff bringing a statecreated danger claim need not establish that the defendant 

official cut off other avenues of aid or rendered the victim 

unable to help himself. We rejected that requirement in 

Monfils v. Taylor, 165 F.3d 511 (7th Cir. 1998). In that case, we 

rejected an argument that the state-created danger doctrine 

contained an “absolute requirement that all avenues of selfhelp be restricted.” Id. at 517. We stated that “a state can be 

held to have violated due process by placing a person in a 

position of heightened danger without cutting off other 

avenues of aid.” Id. 
14 No. 23-1816 

The defendants invite us to reverse course and to require 

a showing that the State has disabled or undermined self-help 

or sources of private assistance. But it is hard to see why this 

showing should be required. Even if the police (for example) 

have not cut off other avenues of aid, if “the police place a 

person in a situation in which he is endangered by other 

private persons[,] the police in effect are their accomplices—

unwitting, but if reckless, culpable.” Slade v. Bd. of Sch. Dirs. of 

Milwaukee, 702 F.3d 1027, 1030 (7th Cir. 2012). The defendants 

submit that DeShaney requires this showing. However, 

DeShaney made clear that it was not addressing a case in 

which the State had created the danger the boy faced. It 

should not be read, therefore, as imposing any particular 

requirements onto such claims. Most of the other circuits have 

not imposed this requirement for state-created danger claims. 

See Erwin Chemerinsky, The State-Created Danger Doctrine, 23 

Touro L. Rev. 1, 15–18 (2014) (surveying circuit decisions). In 

short, the defendants have not provided a “compelling 

reason” for overruling circuit precedent. Wilson v. Cook Cnty., 

937 F.3d 1028, 1035 (7th Cir. 2019). 

The second point warranting mention relates to Officer 

Roederer’s involvement in the alleged constitutional 

violation. “A governmental actor may be held personally 

liable only for constitutional violations in which [he] 

personally participated.” Harnishfeger v. United States, 943 

F.3d 1105, 1122 (7th Cir. 2019). We have previously addressed 

the application of this principle to the state-created danger 

context. In that context, if one officer could be held liable for 

placing an individual in a position of danger, and there is 

another officer who, with the requisite state of mind, 

“participa[ted] in the conduct giving rise to the peril,” then 

the second officer can be liable along with the first one. 
No. 23-1816 15

Richman v. Sheahan, 512 F.3d 876, 885 (7th Cir. 2008); see Paine, 

678 F.3d at 512 (officer could be liable under the state-created 

danger doctrine when other officers arrested woman in a safe 

area, the officer ignored phone calls from the woman’s 

mother while the woman was in custody, and the officer 

failed to return the woman’s cell phone to her before she was 

released by other officers in a dangerous area); Richman, 512 

F.3d at 885 (explaining that, if two officers arrest a drunk 

driver and strand the passengers by taking the keys from the 

ignition and then driving off, both officers can be liable under 

the state-created danger doctrine, even if only one had 

removed the keys). 

The district court concluded that Officer Roederer was 

entitled to summary judgment for the independent reason 

that there was a “lack of evidence of any personal 

involvement” on his part in the alleged constitutional 

violations. Rakes, 2023 WL 2712370, at *18 n.8. The record does 

not support this characterization. Officer Roederer played an 

active role, which included persuading RJ to go to the hospital 

and convincing Officer Johnson not to send him to pick up the 

guns from the house. He was also present for many of Officer 

Johnson’s conversations with Amylyn, including the 

conversation in which Officer Johnson twice indicated that 

RJ’s hospital stay would be a “24-hour thing.” Even if Officer 

Roederer were not the one to tell Amylyn that RJ would be 

put under a 24-hour hold, or to confirm as much, a jury could 

find that he played a significant role in the alleged violation.

With these principles and clarifications in mind, I proceed 

to evaluate Ms. Rakes’s state-created danger claim. 

To prevail on her state-created danger claim, Ms. Rakes 

first must show that the officers “placed [Amylyn] in a 
16 No. 23-1816 

position of danger that [s]he would not otherwise have 

faced.” Wallace, 115 F.3d at 430. This means that she must 

stake her claim on “an affirmative act on the part of the state,” 

Stevens v. Umsted, 131 F.3d 697, 705 (7th Cir. 1997), rather than 

on a mere failure to protect her from harm. See Doe v. Vill. of 

Arlington Heights, 782 F.3d 911, 918 (7th Cir. 2015) (officer who 

saw three men carrying intoxicated woman but did not 

intervene to stop the sexual assault that ensued could not be 

liable under § 1983); Windle v. City of Marion, 321 F.3d 658, 

661–62 (7th Cir. 2003) (police officer who did nothing after 

learning that a teacher was molesting a minor student could 

not be liable under § 1983). 

Ms. Rakes contends that the officers created a danger for 

Amylyn by falsely telling Amylyn that RJ would be detained 

at the hospital for 24 hours. Although she has not presented 

evidence that directly establishes that either of the officers 

made such a statement, she submits that a jury could 

reasonably infer—from the department policy, Indiana law, 

and the exchanges about the “24-hour thing”—that one or 

both of the officers made such a statement or acquiesced in 

Amylyn’s articulation of it. I agree that a jury could draw that 

inference. 

A jury could conclude that the officers’ alleged 

misrepresentations created a danger for Amylyn that she 

would not otherwise have faced. According to Ms. Rakes’s 

account (which a jury would be entitled to credit), the officers 

told Amylyn that they had transferred RJ to the hospital with 

instructions to keep him detained for 24 hours. In this 

account, Officer Johnson twice confirmed this misleading 

statement with Officer Roederer standing by. The misleading 

statements created a risk that Amylyn would be at the home 
No. 23-1816 17

when RJ returned, angry at Amylyn and with access to his 

two AR-15s. This was not a risk Amylyn otherwise faced. RJ 

posed far less of a risk to her before their encounter with the 

officers, and he certainly would have posed far less of a risk 

to her if she had known that he was not in fact being detained. 

On this record, a jury would be entitled to conclude that, if 

she had known that RJ might return home that night, she 

would not have returned to her home but would have gone 

directly to her parents’ house.27

Another consideration supports this conclusion. Given 

Officer Johnson’s statements on the dash cam, a jury would 

be entitled to conclude that, having told her that RJ would not 

be returning to the home that evening, the officers tasked her 

with removing the AR-15s before RJ’s return, a job that they 

preferred not to undertake themselves. The record is 

susceptible to the inference that the officers encouraged her to 

perform this task so that they would not have to be bothered 

or endangered. A jury would be entitled to conclude that she 

not only returned to her home under false assurances of her 

safety but also based on the officers’ encouragement to secure 

the weaponry present there prior to RJ’s return. 

Judge Brennan’s opinion argues that, given the troubled 

state of the Slaymaker marriage, the officers did not leave 

Amylyn any worse off than they had found her. Fairly read, 

the record supports, and a jury would be entitled to conclude, 

that Amylyn was hardly left in the situation that she had 

experienced throughout her troubled marriage to RJ. The 

27 Although Judge Brennan’s opinion recites several times that the 

evidence must be interpreted in the light most favorable to the Estate, it 

does not apply that rule with any consistency. 
18 No. 23-1816 

record makes clear that a chronically bad marital situation 

had now escalated to a crisis level where the parties not only 

had irreconcilable differences but could not remain under the 

same roof without the possibility of deadly violence. More 

than anyone, the officers understood that the residual discord 

of the past had reached a new and dangerous level that 

implicated not only the couple but their children and others 

such as Amylyn’s former husband. They urged her to seek the 

protection of the courts against further unwanted contact 

with RJ. They also urged her to abandon her efforts to seek 

help for RJ and to make her safety and that of her children her 

primary objective. Amylyn, at least by the end of her time 

with the officers, understood that she faced a new and more 

dangerous situation. She made it clear that she would not 

return to the home if RJ might be there. She went back to the 

home to collect the AR-15s only on the misrepresentation of 

the officers that RJ would not be there. 

Ms. Rakes next must show that the officers’ conduct 

proximately caused Amylyn’s death. Proximate cause in this 

context is “a fact specific inquiry, involving a consideration of 

time, geography, range of potential victims, and the nature of 

harm that occurred.” Buchanan-Moore v. Cnty. of Milwaukee, 

570 F.3d 824, 829 (7th Cir. 2009). In this case, the officers and 

Amylyn expressly discussed the danger that RJ posed to her 

that night, at the home the two of them shared, if RJ had access 

to his guns. Indeed, Officer Johnson expressly anticipated 

that, if RJ were allowed to go voluntarily to the hospital, “the 

next thing you know, you’re back at the house, fighting, guns 

involved and stuff like that.”28 This case is nothing like cases 

28 R.67-3 at 1:00:22-28; R.67-4 at 71. 
No. 23-1816 19

in which courts have held that a lack of proximate cause 

defeated a state-created danger claim. See, e.g., Martinez v. 

California, 444 U.S. 277, 285 (1980) (parole board members 

could not be liable under § 1983 when someone they paroled 

committed a random murder five months later, because the 

death was “too remote a consequence” of their parole 

decision); Buchanan-Moore, 570 F.3d at 828–29 (victim of 

random burglary at hands of mentally ill man prematurely 

released from jail did not have a valid § 1983 claim). A 

reasonable jury could certainly find that Ms. Rakes has 

established proximate cause for purposes of the state-created 

danger doctrine. 

Ms. Rakes also must show that the officers’ conduct was 

“so egregious, so outrageous, that it may fairly be said to 

shock the contemporary conscience.” Cnty. of Sacramento v.

Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 847 n.8 (1998). “[W]hen the circumstances 

permit public officials the opportunity for reasoned 

deliberation in their decisions,” we will “find the official’s 

conduct conscience shocking when it evinces a deliberate 

indifference to the rights of the individual.” King v. E. St. 

Louis, 496 F.3d 812, 819 (7th Cir. 2007). “‘[D]eliberate 

indifference’ is a stringent standard of fault, requiring proof 

that a municipal actor disregarded a known or obvious 

consequence of his actions.” Bryan Cnty. v. Brown, 520 U.S. 

397, 410 (1997). The parties have assumed that deliberate 

indifference is the proper standard for this case; we will not 

challenge that assumption. 

A jury could reasonably find that the officers were aware 

of the risk that, if RJ were not detained that night and Amylyn 

went back to her house, RJ would use his guns to hurt or kill 

her. The officers knew that RJ was drunk and unstable. 
20 No. 23-1816 

Amylyn told them that he was hitting her and about the 

threats he was making, and she showed Officer Johnson the 

alarming texts that RJ sent her just beforehand. Further, 

Amylyn and the officers discussed at multiple junctures the 

issue of the AR-15s at Amylyn and RJ’s house. Officer 

Roederer even acknowledged the danger posed by RJ’s access 

to those AR-15s when he said that he would not want to 

confiscate them himself if RJ were not detained. Amylyn’s 

questions to the officers about the “24-hour thing” also 

support an inference that the officers were aware of the 

specific risk. She asked those questions in response to the 

question of whether she was going to her and RJ’s house that 

night—indicating to the officers that her decision about where 

to go depended on whether RJ would be detained. 

A jury could also reasonably find that the officers acted 

with deliberate indifference to the danger I have just 

described. Of all of the options the officers had, they seem to 

have chosen the one most dangerous to Amylyn: letting RJ go, 

but nonetheless leading Amylyn to believe that he had been 

detained. If that is what the officers did, a jury could conclude 

that they did so because it was safest and most convenient for 

them. Placating RJ and lying to Amylyn spared the officers 

from having to deal with the two of them anymore. It also 

spared the officers from needing to do the paperwork that 

presumably would have followed an arrest or civil 

commitment, which was something Officer Johnson twice 

told RJ he wanted to avoid. In addition, if they did mislead 

Amylyn, doing so helped them avoid the hassle and potential 

danger of removing the AR-15s from her and RJ’s house. The 

record clearly allows a jury to conclude that Amylyn agreed 

to undertake that task without the officers’ help only because 

they lulled her into believing that RJ would be detained while 
No. 23-1816 21

she completed the task. As Judge Brennan’s opinion 

emphasizes, the officers were at the scene for more than 

ninety minutes. But the evidence also would allow a jury to 

find that, during those ninety minutes, they deliberately 

manipulated the resolution of the encounter to relieve 

themselves of further work, even though that self-interest 

exposed Amylyn to a new and immediate danger. The 

evidence of deliberate indifference, considered in totality, is 

sufficient to present to a jury for evaluation. 

The defendants maintain that, even if Ms. Rakes has 

established a triable state-created danger claim, they are 

nonetheless entitled to qualified immunity. “Qualified 

immunity attaches when an official’s conduct does not violate 

clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which 

a reasonable person would have known.” City of Escondido v. 

Emmons, 586 U.S. 38, 42 (2019) (quoting Kisela v. Hughes, 584 

U.S. 100, 104 (2018) (per curiam)). “A clearly established right 

is one that is ‘sufficiently clear that every reasonable official 

would have understood that what he is doing violates that 

right.’” Mullenix v. Luna, 577 U.S. 7, 11 (2015) (per curiam) 

(quoting Reichle v. Howards, 566 U.S. 658, 664 (2012)). 

A plaintiff can demonstrate that a right is clearly 

established in several ways, one of which is by identifying a 

“closely analogous case finding the alleged violation 

unlawful.” Stockton v. Milwaukee Cnty., 44 F.4th 605, 620 (7th 

Cir. 2022). The case must be “controlling,” Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 

563 U.S. 731, 741 (2011) (quoting Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 

617 (1999)), which for our purposes means that it came from 

the Supreme Court or this court. Lovett v. Herbert, 907 F.3d 986, 

992 (7th Cir. 2018). The case need not be “directly on point,” 

Kisela, 584 U.S. at 104 (quoting White v. Pauly, 580 U.S. 73, 79 
22 No. 23-1816 

(2017) (per curiam)), and it need not have held that “the very 

action in question” was unlawful, Anderson v. Creighton, 483 

U.S. 635, 640 (1987). But it “must have placed the statutory or 

constitutional question beyond debate,” Kisela, 584 U.S. at 104 

(quoting White, 580 U.S. at 79), and “in the light of pre-existing 

law the unlawfulness” of the official’s conduct must be 

“apparent,” White, 580 U.S. at 80 (quoting Anderson, 483 U.S. 

at 640). 

Ms. Rakes primarily relies on Monfils v. Taylor, supra. In 

that case, an informant told the police about a theft at his 

workplace, in a call that the police recorded. 165 F.3d at 513. 

The informant called again later on, and he told the 

department’s deputy chief that he feared that he would be 

killed or badly hurt if the recording of the call were released. 

Id. at 514–15. The informant asked the deputy chief multiple 

times whether the police planned to release the recording, 

and each time the deputy chief told him it would not be 

released. Id. But the department did release it, and the thief 

obtained it and killed the informant soon afterwards. Id. at 

515. 

We held that the deputy chief could be liable under § 1983 

and that he was not entitled to qualified immunity. Critically, 

we did so, not because the deputy chief was somehow 

responsible for the recording’s release, but because he falsely 

represented to the informant and others that the recording 

would not be released. We explained: “[The deputy chief] 

clearly created a danger and, by assuring Hitt (the assistant 

district attorney) that he would make sure the tape was not 

released but not following through, he created a danger 

Monfils would not otherwise have faced.” Id. at 518. For this 
No. 23-1816 23

reason, we concluded that the deputy chief “is not and never 

was entitled to qualified immunity.” Id.

Monfils rendered it clearly established in this circuit that a 

police officer can be liable under the state-created danger 

doctrine if he recklessly and repeatedly lies to a person about 

the danger that person faces from an identified and violent 

third party. Respectfully, this core holding of Monfils remains 

good law, despite the defendants’ and the statements in Judge 

Brennan’s opinion to the contrary. To be sure, there is dicta in 

an earlier decision of ours suggesting that Monfils “may well 

have been superseded by” Town of Castle Rock v. Gonzales, 545 

U.S. 748 (2005). Sandage v. Bd. of Comm’rs of Vanderburgh Cnty., 

548 F.3d 595, 599 (7th Cir. 2008). That speculation was, and is, 

raw dicta and its cold reception by our colleagues in other 

circuits confirms its unreliability.29

The officers’ conduct in this case, viewed in the light most 

favorable to Ms. Rakes, falls squarely within that 

constitutional prohibition. Indeed, this case presents a more 

egregious situation than the one presented in Monfils. The 

officers, acutely aware of the danger that Amylyn would face 

if she were alone at her house with RJ, nevertheless told her 

to remove RJ’s arsenal before his return. Yet, Officer Roederer 

29 See Robinson v. Lioi, 536 Fed. App’x 340, 345 & n.3 (4th Cir. 2013) 

(concluding that state-created danger claims were not “foreclosed by 

Castle Rock” because the Supreme Court did not have before it a 

substantive due process claim); Caldwell v. City of Louisville, 200 Fed. App’x 

430, 435 (6th Cir. 2006) (“There is nothing in Castle Rock that compels a 

conclusion the Supreme Court intended to eliminate the state-created 

danger exception to the DeShaney rule. This is not surprising since the 

Court did not have occasion to address or consider the plaintiff’s 

substantive due process claim as it was not before the Court.”). 
24 No. 23-1816 

himself admitted that he was not willing to remove RJ’s AR15s from the house unless RJ were detained. Taking the facts 

in the light most favorable to Ms. Rakes, the officers, although 

aware that RJ might return to the home at any time, falsely 

assured Amylyn that he would be absent for 24 hours and 

that, during that time, she should secure RJ’s weapons, a task 

that they were unwilling to undertake because of its 

dangerousness. In other words, taking the facts in the light 

most favorable to the nonmoving party, a finder of fact would 

be entitled to conclude that the officers repeatedly lied to 

Amylyn about whether they had placed RJ under a mental 

health hold and told her to retrieve dangerous weapons while 

knowing that she might well confront RJ as she did so. 

Amylyn acted on these misrepresentations and, 

consequently, died at RJ’s hand. On this record, the 

defendants are not entitled to qualified immunity. 

A reasonable jury could find the defendants liable on 

Ms. Rakes’s state-created danger claim, and the defendants 

are not entitled to qualified immunity. Accordingly, I would 

reverse the district court’s judgment and remand the case for 

proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
No. 23-1816 25 

BRENNAN, Circuit Judge. Amylyn Slaymaker’s murder at 

the hands of her husband, RJ Slaymaker, is tragic. Her death 

was the culmination of a long-term abusive relationship in 

which RJ subjected her to his wrath, threats, and physical violence. Charlestown, Indiana ȱ ȱ Ĝȱ

Te’Juan Johnson and Jonathan Roederer responded to the last 

occasion of domestic violence before Amylyn’s murder. The 

ȱȱĜȱȱ remanded for a jury to decide 

whether he should be held liable for Amylyn’s death. 

The legal doctrine underpinning the alleged liability—the 

state-created danger doctrine—has narrow requirements that, 

in my evaluation, the undisputed evidence here cannot meet. 

Even more, that evidence entitles ȱĜȱȱęȱȬ

munity because they did not violate Amylyn’s clearly established constitutional rights. On theȱǰȱȱ ȱĜȱ

the district court’s decision to grant summary judgment to the 

Ĝǯ

I. Background 

The per curiam opinion provides the relevant facts, but to 

me two points require greater emphasis. First, RJ victimized 

Amylyn with pervasive violence for ȱȱȱĜȬ

ȱ ȱ ȱǯȱ ǰȱ ȱ Ĝȱ ¢ȱ ȱȬ

ylyn for over ninety minutes, continuously reassessing the situation to seek a safe resolution for all the involved parties. I 

restate the facts pertinent to these points because, in my view, 

¢ȱ ěȱ somewhat from the recitation in Judge Ripple’s 

opinion. 

Amylyn was in constant danger for months before she was 

killed. As she explained ȱȱĜ, violence and domestic 

ȱȱ¢ȱęȱher marriage with RJ. Over the last 
26 No. 23-1816 

six to eight months they ȱȱęȱ¢. RJ had constantly abused Amylyn. He had even shot ȱęȱat her “a 

couple of times” and had been drinking heavily. Amylyn suggested that they separateǰȱ ȱ ǰȱ ȱ ȱ Ĵȱ ȱ

crueltyǰȱěȱȱ with threats of suicide. 

Fearing for her life, just nine days before her murder, Amylyn wrote ȱ Ĵȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȃȱ Ȭ

pen[ed] to” her.1 ȱȱĴȱhe documented RJ’s abuse—he 

had previously tried to choke her to death and threatened to 

kill her and her children. She also explained that she shot RJ 

in the hand in self-defense. The next day she added to the letter, in which she wrote, “RJ did it again ... he threatened me. 

... [H]e made me hold his hand [and] try to get me to help 

shoot him in the head.2

ȱȱȱĜȂȱȱȱ, from the time they 

arrived on the scene, they were constantly talking with Amylyn and RJ, collecting new information, and correcting their 

course of action. Their response was to ȱȱȱȱĚȱ

and dangerous scenarios for law enforcement: domestic violence. 

When the Ĝȱarrived to investigate, they separated RJ 

ȱ¢¢ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱęǯȱȱȬ

tained and spoke with RJ, while Johnson spoke with Amylyn. 

Amylyn described  ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ę: RJ had 

PTSD, was intoxicated, and had threatened to kill her and her 

children. She also told Johnson she had two guns in her purse. 

RJ told ȱěȱ¢ǯȱ
ȱȱ ȱ was a veteran, 

1 Dist. Ct. DE 67–17 at 1. The officers did not know about this letter. 

2 Id. at 2.
No. 23-1816 27 

Amylyn did not want him to leave the house because she did 

not want him to ȱȱ ȱȱȱȱĚ, 

ȱęȱ ȱȱ¢, and he did not pull his gun. 

ȱĜȱǰȱȱ ȱ¢ȱȱȱǰȱȱ

then spoke with Amylyn. She disputed some of RJ’s statements. She said RJ had pulled his gun, pistol-whipped her, 

ȱĴȱȱȱȱin the ȱȱęȱȱȬ

ȱ ȱ Ĝȱ ǯȱShe said she grabbed her guns because RJ threatened her children and ex-husband that night, 

even going so far as to send her photos of him driving toward 

her children’s location. Amylyn also explained that RJ was 

irate because she did noȱȱȃ¡ȱě” (what turned out 

to be arranged sexual interactions with strangers). Johnson 

did not see any bruises or marks on Amylyn at that time. He 

also ȱ¢¢ȱȱȱǰȱȱȱǰȱęȱȱȱȬ

vorce, and seek an emergency protective order. 

Johnson and Roederer decided they could not charge RJ 

with a crime (including ȱȱȱĚȱor public 

intoxication) because of the inconsistencies in the Slaymakers’ 

statements and the lack of visible, physical injury to Amylyn. 

But they agreed to take RJ’s and Amylyn’s guns for safekeeping. 

Amylyn informed Johnson that there were more guns at 

her and RJ’s residence, including two AR-15s, and she asked 

if Johnson could retrieve them. The two discussed the possibility of Amylyn staying at her parents’ home for the night. 

But Amylyn was concerned that leaving RJ alone would result 

ȱ ȱ Ĵȱ ȱ ¢ȱ ȱ . Meanwhile, 

Roederer told RJ that he would not be charged, he would need 

a ride home, and they were taking his handgun for safekeeping until he sobered up. 
28 No. 23-1816 

ȱĜȱ ȱȱ ȱȱȱȱȱȱ

back to the home, picking up the AR-15s, and taking them 

back to the police station, in light of Amylyn’s revelation that 

RJ previously “tried to burn the house down.” The two agreed 

to take RJ to the police station, take Amylyn home to retrieve 

the guns, and then to take RJ home while Amylyn went to her 

parents. 

Amylyn again raised her fear that RJ would burn down 

their house if left alone. Johnson tried to convince Amylyn not 

to return to the home she shared with RJ. Johnson reminded 

her, “a home can be replaced. Your life can’t.” He advised her 

to go to court, get a no-ȱǰȱęȱȱǰȱȱȱ

up from RJ. And Johnson went so far as to caution her that if 

their kids were present, child protective services would get 

involved and “[her] kids are going to be taken away.” 

After Amylyn mentioned that, to her knowledge, RJ had 

never had a mental health evaluation, Roederer explained the 

process for obtaining a mental inquest warrant. Johnson also 

asked Amylyn to share a photo she mentioned of RJ holding 

a gun to his head. Roederer and Johnson then returned to RJ. 

ȱ ȱ Ĝȱȱ ȱȱ ȱ ȱ ¢ȱ

admission for medical treatment to RJ, he became irate and 

worried about the loss of his gun rights. Eventually, Johnson 

convinced ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ¢ȱ ę¢ǯȱ

Johnson told RJ that he needed to “follow through” with their 

agreement, and that if things escalated again, he would have 

to turn over the photo. Johnson relayed the agreed upon message to Emergency Medical Services (EMS) that RJ was involved in a domestic dispute with his wife and wanted to voluntarily speak about his mental health issues. EMS then transported RJ to Clark Memorial Hospital at 12:43 A.M. RJ arrived 
No. 23-1816 29 

at the emergency department roughly ęȱȱ. 

He remained there until his discharge at 3:41 A.M. 

After EMS took RJ from the scene, Johnson asked Amylyn 

if she was going to her parents’ house. Amylyn responded, 

“Well, you – you said it’s a 24-hour thing right? For an evaluation?” Johnson replied, “Yeah, so what are you going to do?” 

Johnson explained that they took RJ’s gun and were going to 

ȱ¢¢Ȃȱȱ ȱǯȱȱęȱ ǰȱ ȱ ȱ

Amylyn discussed her plan for the rest of the night: 

Johnson: [W]hat’s the plan? Like, what -- 

Amylyn: I’m going to have to stay with my parents, I guess. 

Johnson: Okay. So are you going to go to your 

house? 

Amylyn: Well, tonight, yeah. 

Johnson: Are you going to – 

Amylyn: You said it’s a 24 hour? 

Johnson: Yea. So are you going to get the guns 

and everything when you go home? 

Amylyn: Yeah, I’m going to take them with me 

to my parents’. 

About half an hour later, Amylyn called Johnson to report she 

found a visible injury where RJ had hit her. Johnson told her 

to come to the police station, where he could take a picture of 

the injury. Consistent with his earlier directions, he again 

asked Amylyn to retrieve the AR-15s and stay at her mother’s 

house. At the station Amylyn again asked how long RJ would 

ȱ ȱ ȱ ǯȱ ȱ Ĝȱ ǰȱ ȱ ǰȱ
30 No. 23-1816 

informed her that they did not know, and Johnson again directed her to take the opportunity to gather her things and go 

to her parents’ house. When asked if she was going to go to 

her parents’ house, Amylyn reportedly stated “yes.” 

Amylyn never made it to her parents’ house. Sometime after the hospital discharged RJ, he returned home, murdered 

Amylyn, and then killed himself. 

¢¢Ȃȱ ȱ ęȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ Ĝǰȱ bringing 

claims under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1985. Relevant here, the 

ȂȱȗȱŗşŞřȱȱȱȱĜȱȃĜ¢ȱȱ

Amylyn in a heightened state of special danger that [she] 

would not otherwise have faced when they falsely told Amylyn that RJ would be in the hospital for 24 hours and it was 

safe to return home.” 

ȱ Ĝȱȱ ȱ ¢ȱ ǯȱ ȱ ȱ

ȱȱȱĜȂȱȱȱȱȱǯȱ

On ȱ Ȃȱ ȗȱ ŗşŞřȱ ǰȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ęȱȬ

¢ȱȱȱĜȱȱ¢ȱȱȃȱ ȱ

ȱ ¢ȱ ȱ  ȱ ȱ ě ... ȱ ȱ Ĝȱ

Roederer and Johnson on notice that their actions violated 

Amylyn’s constitutional rights.” 

The Estate now appeals the dismissal of its § 1983 claim at 

summary judgmentǰȱěȱtwo arguments. First, the Estate 

argues the facts satisfy the narrow criteria to succeed on a 

state-created danger claim under DeShaney v. Winnebago, 489 

U.S. 189 (1989), and subsequent authorities. Second, the Estate 

ȱ ęȱ ¢ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȃȱ  ȱ

clearly established that misleading victims about violent 

threats” violates the victims’ due process rights. 
No. 23-1816 31 

II. State-Created Danger 

I do not see the undisputed evidence giving rise to a viable 

DeShaney state-created danger claim. 

The Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause provides that “[n]o State shall ... deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.” U.S. CONST.

amend. XIV, § 1. This language “is phrased as a limitation on 

the State’s power to act, not as a guarantee of certain minimal 

levels of safety and security.” DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 195. That 

is, the Due Process Clause is meant “to protect the people 

from the State, not to ensure that the State protect[s] them 

from each other.” Id. at 196. Generally, “a State’s failure to 

protect an individual against private violence simply does not 

constitute a violation of the Due Process Clause.” Id. at 197. 

This court does recognize two exceptions to this general rule: 

(1) the “special relationship” exception; and (2) the “state-created danger” exception. See Doe v. Village of Arlington Heights, 

782 F.3d 911, 916 (7th Cir. 2015); ęȱǯȱ¢, 165 F.3d 511, 

516 (7th Cir. 1998). 

The state-created danger exception “exists when the state 

Ĝ¢ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ

danger the individual would not have otherwise faced.” Doe, 

782 at 916 (cleaned up). But it is a “narrow one,” and applies 

in “rare and often egregious” circumstances “where the state 

creates or increases a danger to an individual.” Id. at 917. 

Our court has recognized three principles to guide the in-

¢ǯȱǰȱȃȱǰȱ¢ȱȱĜȱǰȱȱȱ

increase a danger faced by an individual.” King v. E. St. Louis 

Sch. Dist. 189, 496 F.3d 812, 818 (7th Cir. 2007). “Second, the 

failure on the part of the state to protect an individual from 
32 No. 23-1816 

such a danger must be the proximate cause of the injury to the 

individual.” Id. “Third, ... the state’s failure to protect the individual must shock the conscience.” Id. If no basis exists in 

the record to support any of these requirementsǰȱ ȱ ěȱ

cannot make out a state-ȱȱȱȱȱĴȱȱ

law. 

ȱȱ ȱȱȱȱĜ¢ȱ ȱȱ

or increase danger to Amylyn, proximately cause Amylyn’s 

death, or act in a manner that shocks the conscience. 

A. Create or Increase Danger 

The Estate argues that ȱĜȱȃȱȱȄȱȱ

Amylyn by informing her that RJ would be detained for 

twenty-four hours and concealing information from EMS that 

would have resulted in a statutory mental evaluation. 

ȱ ęȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ Ȃȱ -created danger 

analysis is “the key one.” Sandage v. Bd. of Comm’rs of Vanderburgh Cnty., 548 F.3d 595, 599 (7th Cir. 2008). We must be wary 

of interpreting this principle “so broadly as to erase the essential distinction between endangering and failing to protect” to 

avoid circumventing DeShaney’s general rule. Doe, 782 F.3d at 

917 (quoting Sandage, 548 F.3d at 599). “Increasing” danger 

means “the state did something that turned a potential danger 

into an actual one, rather than that it just stood by and did 

nothing to prevent private violence.” Sandage, 548 F.3d at 600. 

ȱǰȱȱȂȱĜǰȱȱȱȱȱȱ

victim from a position of safety to a position of danger. Id. at 

śşŞǯȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȃĜǰȄȱȃ ȱ

must then ask what new danger would have otherwise befallen the victim.” Windle v. City of Marion, 321 F.3d 658, 662 

(7th Cir. 2003). The burden rests on the Estate to show that the 
No. 23-1816 33 

Ĝȱȃȱȱȱǽ¢¢Ǿȱȱȱȱ¢ȱcreated 

or made worse.” Id. (emphasis in original). In many of our cases 

applying the state-created danger exception, this has been the 

line dividing successful and unsuccessful claims. 

ȱ¢£ǰȱȱęȱȱȱȱ-created danger exception can be viewed as a spectrum from safety to danger. The exception can provide for liability only if an Ĝ’s 

action moved ȱěȱup the scale toward danger. But li-

¢ȱȱĴȱȱȱĜȱȱȱěȱas is, or (especially) if the Ĝȱȱ ȱěȱ  ȱ safety. To 

ǰȱęȱȱĚȱȱȱ¡ǯȱSee Reed v. Gardner, 986 

F.2d 1122 (7th Cir. 1993); ę, 165 F.3d 511; Paine v. Cason, 

678 F.3d 500 (7th Cir. 2012); Windle, 321 F.3d 658; Doe, 782 F.3d 

911.

Three of these cases show how law enforcement action 

crosses the line into liability—Reed, ę, and Paine. In Reed, 

ȱȱȱ ȱȱ Ĝȱȱ ȱ¢ȱȱ

the state-created danger exception where they arrested a sober driver and left an intoxicated passenger with the vehicle’s 

keys, enabling the intoxicated passenger to drive from the 

scene, cȱȱǰȱȱȱȱěǯȱşŞŜȱǯŘȱȱ

1127. 

In ę, our court concluded that the actions of a law 

ȱĜȱȱȱȱȗȱŗşŞřȱ¢ȱȱȱ

state-created danger theory. 165 ǯřȱȱśŗŞǯȱęȱȱȬ

formed the authorities that one of his coworkers was going to 

steal electrical cord from their workplace. Id. at 513. Aware of 

ȱ  Ȃȱ ȱ ȱ¢ȱ ȱǰȱęȱ Ȭ

peatedly—on four separate occasions over ten days—con-

ȱȱ	ȱ¢ȱȱȱȱȱȱĴȬ

¢ȂȱĜȱȱȱȱȱelease a recording of his call 
34 No. 23-1816 

to law enforcement. Id. at 513–ŗśǯȱ¢ȱȱęȱȱ

 ȱȱ ȱȱĜȱȱȱȱǰȱȱȱ

whether the recorded conversation of that call would be released. Id. On each occasion, law enforcement assured Monęȱȱȱ ȱȱȱǯȱId. Despite knowing that 

ȱȂȱȱ ȱȱęȱȱǰȱȱ

Deputy Chief of Detectives, James Taylor, did nothing to pre-

ȱȱȱȱȱȱę’ multiple pleas 

over many days. Id. at 514–ŗśǯȱęȂȱ ȱȱȱ

¢ȱȱȱǰȱ£ȱę’ voice, and, along with 

ęȱǰȱȱęǯȱId. at 513, 515. 

Paine involved the arrest of a woman by law enforcement 

in a safe area and her subsequent release in a dangerous area. 

678 F.3d at 509. The woman—while in an acute manic phase—

was arrested at Chicago’s Midway Airport and released by 

police the next day near a public housing project with an “exceptionally high crime rate.” Id. at 504. The police failed to return her cell phone, the woman did not know where she was, 

and she was unwell. Id. Five hours after her release, a man 

raped her at knifepoint in a nearby apartment. Id. at 505–06. 

Ĵȱȱǰȱȱ ȱȱȱȱȂȱ

  ǰȱȱȱǰȱȱěȱȱȱǯȱ

Id. at 506. 

ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ǰȱ ¢ȱ Ĵȱ ȱ ȱ Ȭ

ȱ Ĝȱ ȃȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ

one,” Reed, 986 F.2d at 1127, or “created a danger [the victim] 

would not have otherwise faced.” ę, 165 F.3d at 518. 

Windle and Doe are on the other side of the liability line. 

Windle evaluated whether a Marion, Indiana Police Department sergeant violated a minor’s due process rights by failing 

to intervene to protect her from molestation perpetuated by a 
No. 23-1816 35 

teacher. 321 F.3d at 660. The sergeant intercepted several cell 

phone conversations between the minor and the teacher, the 

content of which evidenced an ongoing sexual relationship. 

Id. However, the sergeant did not intervene for two months. 

Id. In DoeǰȱȱȱĜȱȱȱȂȱȱȱȬ

other state-created danger case. 782 F.3d at 913ǯȱȱĜȱȬ

sponded to a 9-1-1 call about a minor female drinking with a 

group of teenage boys outside an apartment complex. Id. She 

was intoxicated; one of the group was holding her up when 

ȱĜȱǯȱId. ȱĜȱȱȱȱęȱ

(which meant he did not discover that one of the boys was an 

adult ȱǼǰȱȱě ȱȱĜǰȱȱ

allowed the group to leave with the girl. Id. The group then 

carried the girl into the complex’s laundry room, where the 

probationer sexually assaulted her. Id.

In these two cases, the state-created danger claim failed at 

ȱĜȱȱȱȱȱĜȂȱȱȱȱ

“proactive[ly] creat[e] or exacerbat[e] [] danger,” Windle, 321 

F.3d at 662. Nor were the victims “safe, or even considerably 

safer,ȄȱȱȱĜȱǯȱDoe, 782 F.3d at 918. Rather, 

the victims “[were] in actual danger already.” Id. 

ȱęȱȱaccurately set forth the requirements for 

 ȱ ȱ  ȱ ȱ Ĝȱ¢ȱ ȱ Ĝ¢ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ

increase danger to ȱě. Before an Ĝȱs, danger to 

the victim must be nonexistent or only potential. State-created 

ȱ¢ȱĴȱ¢ȱ ȱȱȱȱȱ¡Ȭ

istent or potential danger into an actual one or create some 

risk for the victim. Such was the case in Reed, ę, and 

Paine. Where no new danger befalls the victim, such as in Windle and Doe, state actors cannot be held liable. 
36 No. 23-1816 

This case is analogous to Windle and Doe and distinguishable from Reed, ę, and Paine. As in both Windle and 

Doe—and unlike in Reed, ę, and Paine—ȱĜȂȱȬ

tions did not create a new danger to Amylyn or otherwise increase an existing danger. “To create” danger means to bring 

danger into existence. Likewise, “to increase” danger means 

to escalate the likelihood that danger will occur. In the context 

of private violence, the state must do something “that turn[s] 

a potential danger into an actual one” rather than merely 

standing by and doing nothing. Sandage, 548 F.3d at 600. 

Johnson’s two brief replies (“yeah”/”yea”) to Amylyn’s 

questions about the length of RJ’s detention did not create any 

new dangers, increase the likelihood of danger, or otherwise 

propel Amylyn into danger. She was already in grave danger 

 ȱ ȱĜȱȱ ȱȱ ȱ¢¢ȱȱ

RJ. As Amylyn herself recorded more than a week prior, RJ 

had consistently abused her over the previous six to eight 

months. The abuse escalated to the point where Amylyn shot 

RJ in self-defense. Further, ȱĜrs left Amylyn (or at least 

ĴȱȱȱǼȱȱȱĴȱȱȱȱȱȱ

on that night. By taking RJ’s gun and leaving Amylyn in possession of hers, they deprived RJ of a means to escalate his 

violent abuse and left Amylyn with recourse to self-defense. 

ȱȱȱǰȱȱĜȂȱȱȱȱȱ

ȱȱĜȱȱȱ¢¢ȱȱǯȱȱȱ

¡ȱȱȱȱȱȱĜȱȱ ȱȱȱ

to comply with department policies, “§ 1983 protects plain-

ěȱ ȱ ȱ ǰȱ ȱ ȱ  ... departmental regulations and police practices.” ȱǯȱȬ

cagoǰȱŚŝŘȱǯřȱŚŚŚǰȱŚśŚȱǻŝȱǯȱŘŖŖŜǼǯȱȱĜȂȱȱȱ

follow Charlestown Police Department policy “or even a state 
No. 23-1816 37 

law is completely immaterial as to the question of whether a 

violation of the federal constitution has been established.” Id.

 My colleagues conclude that Johnson created a danger to 

Amylyn that she would not have otherwise faced because the 

ĜȂ statements escalated a risk that she would encounter 

an enraged RJ at their home with ready access to two AR-15s. 

This takes too narrow of a view of the undisputed facts and 

of the risk Amylyn had consistently faced for a long time. 

Johnson did not make new and immediately dangerous the 

already incendiary circumstances between RJ and Amylyn. 

The possibility of deadly violence between these spouses had 

existed for many months. Choking, threats to kill, a request to 

help attempt suicide—Amylyn documented all this more 

than a week before the officers ever spoke with the couple. 

Before his discharge from the hospital and return home, RJ 

had already shot a firearm at Amylyn a couple of times, and 

she had returned fire in self-defense. In advance of these officers ever entering the picture, Amylyn had described in 

writing RJ’s threats, abuse, use of firearms, and her fear for 

her life. 

RJ created the danger, not the actions of the officers. By 

telling Amylyn that RJ would be held for 24 hours, the officers 

did not affirmatively act to create or increase any danger to 

Amylyn. The affirmative act requirement means that “state 

actors may not disclaim liability when they themselves throw 

others to the lions.” Pinder v. Johnson, 54 F.3d 1169, 1177 (4th 

Cir. 1995) (citing 
ǯ
ǯȱ¡ȱǯȱ¢ȱǯȱ, 914 F.2d 846, 

849 (7th Cir. 1990)) (rejecting mother’s characterization of her 

claim that officer’s false assurance—that it was safe to return 

to work—and failure to charge ex-boyfriend was an affirmative action resulting in her children’s death). But that 
38 No. 23-1816 

requirement does “not ... entitle persons who rely on promises of aid to some greater degree of protection from lions at 

large” to impose liability on state actors. Id. To decide otherwise subjects “every representation by the police and every 

failure to incarcerate” to liability. Id. at 1175. And it interprets 

the state-created danger exception “so broadly as to erase the 

essential distinction between endangering and failing to protect,” which we should not do. Sandage, 548 F.3d at 599. 

Without a ȱȱ£ȱȱĜȂȱstatements to 

¢¢ȱ ȱ Ĝȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱȱ ȱ

risk of danger, the inquiry could end here. See King, 496 F.3d 

ȱ ŞŗŞȱ ǻĜȱ ȱ Ȃȱ ¢ȱ ȱ ȱ

based solely on one prong of the state-created danger exception). To be complete, though, I next address the exception’s 

second and third prongs. 

B. Proximate Cause 

The state’s failure “to protect an individual from [] a danger must be the proximate cause of the injury to the individual” for DeShaney ¢ȱ ȱ Ĵȱ ȱ ȱ -created 

danger exception. Id. The individual must be a foreseeable 

victim of the government’s acts. Buchanan-Moore v. County of 

Milwaukee, 570 F.3d 824, 828 (7th Cir. 2009). “To satisfy the 

proximate cause requirement, the state-created danger must 

entail a foreseeable type of risk to a foreseeable class of persons.” First Midwest Bank, Guardian v. City of Chicago, 988 F.3d 

978, 988–89 (7th Cir. 2021) (citing Buchanan-Moore, 570 F.3d at 

ŞŘŞǼǯȱȃȱ£ȱȱȱęȱȱȱȱȱ

ĜǯȄȱId at 989.

Analogizing to Reed and distinguishing Buchanan-Moore, 

the Estate asserts it was foreseeable that RJ would kill Amylyn 
No. 23-1816 39 

ȱȱȱȱȱĜȂȱǯȱȱReed, proximate cause existed because “[t]he dangers presented by drunk drivers are 

ȱ ȱ ęDzȱ ȱ ǰȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ

harm has a limited range and duration.” 986 F.2d at 1127. In 

Buchanan-MooreǰȱȱȱȱȱȱěȱȱȱȬ

lege facts making out proximate cause where law enforcement arrested and then released a mentally unstable individual who went on to murder a resident of the north Milwaukee 

suburbs. 570 F.3d at 826. Because the complaint alleged no 

facts that the County knew of a special danger to the resident, 

rather than the public at large, and because the unstable individual’s “mental illness and propensity for criminal acts existed without temporal boundaries,” the ěȂȱ ȱ

failed. Id. at 828–29. 

Like the dangers of drunk driving apparent in Reed, but 

unlike the danger posed by the unstable individual in Buchanan-Moore, the Estate posits “domestic violence involves a 

¢ȱȱȱȱȱǰȱęǰȱȱȱȱȱ

scope to a foreseeable class of persons.” This argument is incorrect twice over. First, though RJ’s abuse was certainly specęȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ—Amylyn—

RJ’s conduct was not so limited in time and scope as the Estate 

characterizes it. The undisputed facts illustrate at least six to 

eight months of verbal and physical abuse accentuated by RJ’s 

mercurial temper and unpredictable actions. RJ posed a gen-

£ȱ ȱ ȱ¢¢Ȃȱȱȱęȱȱ ȱȬ

ǯȱȱ¢¢ȱ¡ȱȱȱĴǰȱȂȱȱȱ

was ongoing for many months, with no discernible end in 

sight, so long as Amylyn remained with RJ. And as Amylyn 

herself explained to Roederer and Johnson, RJ heightened his 

physical and emotional abuse whenever Amylyn raised the 
40 No. 23-1816 

ȱȱĴȱǯ3 RJ, the abuser, was exercising power 

and control over Amylyn, and had done so for many months. 

ȱĜȂȱȱȱ¢¢ȱȱȱ ȱȱȱ

cause of Amylyn’s death—RJ was. 

Second, RJ’s conduct posed a danger more comparable to 

that of the unstable individual in Buchanan-Moore. Again, RJ 

had been perpetuating the abuse—violence; forcing Amylyn 

into unwanted sexual situations with strangers; threatening 

to kill her, her ex-husband, and her children; and property destruction—for many months. Like the unstable individual in 

Buchanan-Moore, RJ’s abusive conduct had no temporal 

boundaries. Therefore, the Estate cannot establish the proximate causation requirement. 

C. Shock the Conscience 

“Conduct ... which shocks the conscience is that conduct 

which may be deemed arbitrary in the constitutional sense.” 

KingǰȱŚşŜȱǯřȱȱŞŗŞȱǻȱȱĴǼǯȱȱȱ

inquiry is “necessarily fact-bound,” the “emphasis on 

whether conduct shocks the conscience points toward the tort 

law’s spectrum of liability.” Id. at 818–19. “Only conduct 

3 The United States Department of Justice defines domestic violence 

as “a pattern of abusive behavior ... that is used by one partner to gain or 

maintain power and control over another intimate partner.” 

https://www.justice.gov/ovw/domestic-violence (last viewed September 

25, 2024). Domestic violence is not limited to physical abuse. The underlying problem is the abuser’s need to exercise power and control. “Domestic 

violence can be physical, sexual, emotional, economic, psychological, or 

technological actions or other patterns of coercive behavior that influence 

another person within an intimate partner relationship. This includes any 

behaviors that intimidate, manipulate, humiliate, isolate, frighten, terrorize, coerce, threaten, blame, hurt, injure, or wound someone.” Id. 
No. 23-1816 41 

falling toward the more culpable end of the spectrum” shocks 

the conscience. Id. at 819. This court has noted—though not 

ę¢ȱ ȱ ȱ -created danger context—that such 

conduct generally “involves the use of intentional force 

against an individual’s person or the threat of such force.” 

Robbin v. City of Berwyn, 108 F.4th 586, 591, (7th Cir. 2024) (collecting cases). 

This court has held that “when the circumstances permit 

ȱ Ĝȱ ȱ ¢ȱ ȱ ȱȱȱ

their decisionsǰȱ ȱȱęȱȱĜȂs conduct conscience 

ȱ  ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ěȱ ȱ ȱ

rights of the individual.” King, 496 F.3d at 819. Where Ĝȱ

must make hurried judgments, “render[ing] reasoned deliberation impractical,” conduct shocks the conscience only 

 ȱȱ ȃǽǾȱȱ ȱȱĚȱ ȱ

injury.” Id. Crucially, “the conduct must be more culpable 

than mere negligence, which is ‘categorically beneath the 

threshold of constitutional due process.’” Id. (quoting County 

of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 849 (1998); see Est. of Her v. 


, 939 F.3d 872, 877 (7th Cir. 2019) (same); see also Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 331 (1986) (describing the due 

process guarantee as historically applying only to “deliber-

ȄȱȱȱȱȱȱĜǼǯ

The Estate argues that “[t]he combination of the passage 

of time, the repeated and knowing lies, and the continued dis-

ȱ ȱ ¢¢Ȃȱ ¢ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ěȬ

ence.” But the facts, viewed in the light most favorable to the 

Estate, do not support that assertion. Over the course of more 

ȱşŖȱǰȱȱĜDZȱ

 separated and questioned Amylyn and RJ; 
42 No. 23-1816 

 interviewed the 9-1-1 callers; 

 ęȱȂȱȱȱĴȱ¢¢ȱȱȱȱ

ęDzȱ

 ȱ ¢¢ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ęȱ

from her house and to spend the night at her parents’ 

residence; 

 counseled her to do what was right to protect herself 

and her children; and 

 encouraged her to obtain an emergency protective order, twice suggested that she seek a divorce, and advised her of the process to obtain a mental inquest warrant. 

These facts do not  ȱȱĜȱȱdeliberately indifferent toward Amylyn’s personal safety and security. Their 

consistent reassessment of the information they collected undercuts a ȱȱȱěǯȱȱ¡ǰȱ

once Johnson informed Roederer that RJ had previously tried 

to burn the house down and ȱĜȱdiscussed RJ’s mental 

state, they decided they would not take RJ back to the house 

where the AR-15s were located. 

Johnson’s Ĝȱ responses to Amylyn’s question 

about the length of RJ’s detention were at most negligent, 

based on his understanding that Amylyn would go to her parents’ house that night. ȱȱȱȱȱĜȱ

to meet the high bar of action that shocks the conscience. King, 

496 F.3d at 819. 

* * * 

If the Estate cannot satisfy just one of the three elements 

underlying the state-ȱ ȱ ¡ǰȱ ȱ Ĝ
No. 23-1816 43 

cannot be held liable. Because they did not act to create or increase danger, proximately cause death, or act in a manner 

that shocks the conscience, the district court’s grant of sum-

¢ȱȱȱȱĜǯ

III. ęȱ¢

Even if the Estate could succeed on the DeShaney question, 

the Ĝȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ęȱ¢ because they 

did not violate a clearly established right. “The doctrine of 

ęȱ¢ȱȱȱĜȱȁȱȬ

ity for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate 

clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which 

a reasonable person would have known.’” Pearson v. Callahan, 

555 U.S. 223, 231 (2009) (quoting 
 ȱǯȱĵ, 457 U.S. 

800, 818 (1982)). “ęȱ¢ȱ ... the need to 

ȱȱĜȱȱ ȱ¢ȱ¡ȱ ȱȬ

¢ȱȱȱȱȱȱĜȱȱǰȱ

distraction, and liability when they perform their duties reasonably.” Id.

 ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ęȱ ¢ȱ ¢DZȱ

ȃęǰȱ ȱȱȱǰȱȱȱȱȱȱȬ

ȱȱȱěǰȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ

right; and second whether the federal right at issue was 

clearly established at the time of the alleged violation.” Smith 

v. Finkley, 10 F.4th 725, 737 (7th Cir. 2021). Even assuming the 

ĜȂ actions violated Amylyn’s constitutional rights, the 

federal right at issue was not clearly established at the time of 

the alleged violation. 

It is the Estate’s burden to demonstrate the existence of a 

clearly established right at the time of the alleged violation. 

ȱ 	ȱ ǯȱ  , 868 F.3d 629, 633 (7th Cir. 2017). “A 
44 No. 23-1816 

constitutional right is clearly established if the right in ques-

ȱȱĜ¢ȱȱ ȱ ȱȱĜȱ ȱȬ

derstand that what he is doing violates that right.” Finkley, 10 

F.4th ȱ ŝŚŘȱ ǻȱ ȱ ĴǼǯȱ ȃȱ ¢ȱ Ȭ

ȱȱȱȱęȱ ȱę¢ǰ” id. (citing City 

of Escondido v. Emmons, 568 U.S. 38, 42 (2019)) (cleaned up), a 

requirement the Supreme Court has made clear “[o]ver and 

over.” Weiland v. Loomis, 938 F.3d 917, 919 (7th Cir. 2019) (collecting cases). 

ȱȱ ȱȱȱȱęȱ ȱȱȬ

ȱę¢ǰȱȃ ȱ¢£ȱ ȱȱ¢ȱȬ

ȱȱȱȱǰȱȱȱ ȱȱęȱ¢ȱ

established law at too high a level of generality.” Finkley, 10 

F.4th at 742 (cleaned up). “[A] defendant cannot be said to 

have violated a clearly established right unless the right’s con-

ȱ ȱĜ¢ȱęȱȱ¢ȱȱĜȱȱ

the defendant’s shoes would have understood that he was violating it.” ěȱǯȱ, 572 U.S. 765, 778–79 (2014). “In 

other words, existing precedent must have placed the statutory or constitutional question confronted ¢ȱȱĜȱȬ

yond debate.” Id. (quotations ĴǼDzȱsee also Doe, 782 F.3d 

at 915 (“[T]ȱěȱȱȱeither that a court 

had upheld the purported right in a case factually similar to 

the one under review, or that the alleged misconduct constituted an obvious violation of a constitutional right.”). That is, 

ȱȱȱȃȱȱęȱȱ ȱȱȱ

of the case at hand.” Doxtator v. O’Brien, 39 F.4th 852, 863 (7th 

Cir. 2022) (citing White v. Pauly, 580 U.S. 73, 79 (2017) (per curiam)). 

To the Estate, ȱ Ĝȱ ȱ ȱ ¢ȱ ȱ

right, contending “[t]here is authority within this circuit and 
No. 23-1816 45 

ȱȱȱȱȱ¢ȱȱ¢ȱěȬ

ent.” The Estate cites Paine; ȱǯȱ ȱȱ, 48 

F. App’x 925 (6th Cir. 2002); 
¢ȱǯȱ¢ȱȱę, 439 

F.3d 1055 (9th Cir. 2006); and Irish v. Fowler, 979 F.3d 65 (1st 

Cir. 2020). But these authorities do not support a conclusion 

ȱȱĜȱȱ¢¢Ȃȱ¢ȱȱǯ4

My colleagues read ę as “render[ing] it clearly estab-

ȱȱ ȱȱ ȱȱȱĜȱȱȱȱȱ

the state-created danger doctrine if he recklessly and repeatedly lies to a person about the danger that person faces from 

ȱęȱȱȱȱ¢ǯȄȱI do not read ęȱto 

provide such clarity. 

First, ęȱ is not “particularized to the facts of [this] 

case.” Pauly, 580 U.S. at 79. Before the release of the tape, MonęȂȱ¢ȱȱȱȱ ȱ¢ȱȱȱȬ

ous coworkers. The release of the tape recording unmasked 

ęǯȱ
ǰȱ ǰȱȱĜȂȱȱȱȱȱȬ

ylyn of anonymity. She was known to RJ and the subject of his 

ȱ ȱȱȱĜȱǯ 

ę is described as a case about reckless and repeated 

lies. But here, Johnson’s statements to Amylyn about the 

4 Robinson and Irish may be disposed of immediately. Robinson is an 

unpublished Sixth Circuit opinion reversing a district court’s grant of a 

motion to dismiss a state-created danger claim. 48 F. App’x at 925. That 

court later affirmed the district court’s grant of summary judgment to the 

defendant law enforcement officers, in part because they were not on notice that their conduct violated a clearly established right. Robinson v. 

 ȱȱ, No. 04-1117, slip op. at 10–11 (6th Cir. July 20, 2005). 

And the First Circuit’s Irish opinion postdates the events of this case, so it 

cannot aid the clearly established inquiry. See Brosseau v. Haugen, 543 U.S. 

194, 200 n.4 (2004). 
46 No. 23-1816 

length of RJ’s absence were negligent at most, not reckless. 

His statements also were not “repeated” like the promise not 

to release the tape in ęȱwas repeated. See 678 F.3d at 513–

15 (four separate promises over ten days). Johnson gave two 

one-word responses within a lengthy discussion, during 

 ȱȱĜȱȱ¢¢ȱȱȱȱȱȂȱ

house that night. And both representations were made during 

a roughly ninety-minute interaction among ȱĜǰȱȬ

ylyn, and RJ. 

Second, ę rests on uncertain ground. This court has 

noted that ę “may well have been superseded by” the 

Supreme Court’s decision in  ȱȱȱȱǯȱ	£, 

545 U.S. 748. Sandage, 548 F.3d at 599.

In SandageǰȱȱȱȱȱȱěȂȱȬ

cedents while on work release as part of a four-year robbery 

sentence. Id. at 596. Twice previously, one of the decedents 

contacted police to report that Moore was harassing her. Id.

ȱěȱȱ¢ȱĜ “claim[ing] that the [sher-

ěȂǾȱȂȱ ȱ ȱȱȱ ȱȱȱȬ

ment by revoking Moore’s work-release privilege and reimprisoning him deprived their decedents of their lives without 

due process of law.” Id.

As part of its analysis, this court looked to Castle Rock. That 

case involved “police refus[ing] to enforce a domestic-abuse 

restraining order, despite repeated demands by the woman 

against whose husband the order was directed, and he murdered the couple’s three children.” Id. at 597. Answering the 

“technical question” of “whether the State of Colorado had 

created a property right in the enforcement of restraining orders,” id., the Supreme Court held that the answer was no. 

Castle Rock, 545 U.S. at 768. Additionally, the Court noted that 
No. 23-1816 47 

ȃȱęȱȱȱȱ¢ȱ¢ȱȱȱȱȬ

one else arrested for a crime generally does not trigger protections under the Due Process Clause, neither in its procedural nor in its ‘substantive’ manifestations.” Id.

As this court saw, the ěȂȱȱ Sandage was “similar” to that raised in Castle Rock: “that the county was constitutionally required to revoke Moore’s work release and return 

him to custody.” 548 F.3d at 597. It would have been the same 

case as Castle Rock, “if Moore had not been serving a sentence 

but had threatened [the decedent] and she had complained to 

ȱ ěȂȱ ǰȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ

Ĵȱȱȱ¢ȱǰȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȬ

guided exercise of his prosecutorial discretion not to order 

Moore arrested and charged.” Id. 

Our court also distinguished ę. Unlike that case, 

 ȱ ȃȱ ȱ ȱȱȱ ȱęȄȱ ¢ȱ Ȭ

leasing the tape recording, in Sandage “the danger was created 

by Moore, and by Moore alone.” Id. at 599. Based on that rea-

ǰȱ ȱ ȱ Ĝȱ ȱ ȱ Ȃȱ ȱ ȱ

ěȂȱȱȱȱȱȱȱǯȱId. at 600. Critically, 

in its conclusion the court noted “after Castle Rock a broken 

promise—ȱȱȱȱ ȱȱȱěȱȱȱ

case and the present ěȱ  (though there was 

more in ę—the handing over the tape to the murderer)—may very well not be enough.” Id. That should be 

true hereǯȱ ȱ ȱ ȱęȱ ¢ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ

panel majority is a false promise of security. After Castle Rock, 
48 No. 23-1816 

such an act likely ȱȱȱȱȱȱęȱ

immunity.5

Next, the Estate urges that Paine and this case are the same 

because the ĜȂ misrepresentations to Amylyn made her 

“more vulnerable than she otherwise would have been.” Paine 

ȃ¢ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ǰȱ ȱ ęȬ

tion, increase a person’s risk of harm violate the Constitution.” 678 F.3d at 510. But as discussed above, Paine is not sufę¢ȱ to this case. TȱĜȱhere did not make 

Amylyn more vulnerable to any danger posed by RJ. Amylyn 

was in grave danger before and after ȱĜȂȱǯȱ

The Estate’s reliance on Paine is also misplaced because it 

Ěȱ ȱ ȱȱ ȱȱȱ¢, of which the Supreme 

Court has repeatedly warned. Mullenix v. Luna, 577 U.S. 7, 12 

(2015) (citing Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 742 (2011)); see 

also City of ȱǯȱ, 595 U.S. 9, 11 (2021) (per curiam); 

Kisela v. Hughes, 584 U.S. 100, 104 (2018) (per curiam). Paine 

does not ȱȱȱȱ ȱȱȱȱĜȱ

5 For similar reasons, Kennedy does not help the Estate. There, a police 

officer assured the plaintiff that she would be given prior notice of police 

contact with the family of the boy who had been accused of molesting the 

plaintiff’s daughter. Kennedy, 439 F.3d at 1058. After law enforcement officers spoke with the boy’s family about the allegations, they made the 

additional assurance to the plaintiff that police would patrol their neighborhood. Id. The boy broke into the home and shot the victim and her husband. Id. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s recognition that 

the officer in that case was not entitled to qualified immunity. But it did 

so in mitigating fashion: “we do not rest our judgment that [the officer] 

affirmatively created a danger on [the] assurance [that the police would 

patrol the neighborhood] alone.” Id. at 1063. Though “an additional and 

aggravating factor,” the assurance alone was not enough to constitute a 

due process violation. Id.
No. 23-1816 49 

ȱ ȱ Ĝȱ ȱ ȱ¢¢Ȃȱȱ ȱ

RJ’s hospitalization violated her constitutional rights. Cases 

 ȱęȱ¢ȱȱȱȱproblematic law 

enforcement conduct support this conclusion. See, e.g., Doe, 

782 F.3d at 915, 918 (holding it not clearly established that call-

ȱěȱȱȱĜǰȱȱ¢ȱȱȱȱ

that the scene was clear, resulted in a violation of a constitutional right of a victim of private violence). 

The cases the Estate cites do not place the constitutional 

question beyond debate. If a constitutional right of Amylyn’s 

was violated, it was not clearly established when ȱĜȱ

responded to this domestic violence episode. As a result, 

ęȱ¢ȱȱȱĜȱȱȗȱŗşŞřȱ¢ǯ

IV. Conclusion 

I end where I began: Amylyn was tragically murdered by 

her husband RJ. The rule is that the state has no duty to protect citizens from private violence. The state-created danger 

doctrine is a narrow exception to that rule. This decision 

sends thȱȱȱĜȱȱto a jury when the un-

ȱȱȱȱȱ¢ȱȱĴȱȱȱȱ

limits of this doctrine. And it does so notwithstanding the 

ȱȱȱęȱ¢ǯȱ
50 No. 23-1816 

SCUDDER, Circuit Judge. This case is difficult on many levels 

and, in the end, I find myself split on the conclusions reached 

by my colleagues. I agree with Judge Ripple that the claim 

against Officer Te’Juan Johnson’s estate should proceed to 

trial. On the other hand, I agree with Judge Brennan and the 

district court that qualified immunity defeats the claim 

against Officer Jonathan Roederer. Above all else, this case 

presents a tragic example of the risks posed by domestic violence and the consequences of law enforcement’s failure to 

appreciate those risks. No matter how many times I review 

the record, the same conclusion rushes to mind: police departments ought to prioritize training on responses to domestic 

violence. 

I 

Whether the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process 

Clause precludes state actors from creating danger to a person 

remains unanswered by the Supreme Court. We know for certain state actors do not shoulder an affirmative duty to protect 

individuals from dangers posed by third parties. That is the 

holding of DeShaney v. Winnebago, 489 U.S. 189 (1989). But 

what the Justices have yet to answer is whether the Due Process Clause, while disallowing duty-to-protect claims, allows 

a claim in facts and circumstances where state actors create 

the danger that proximately causes harm to an individual. 

Circuit courts have struggled with the question in DeShaney’s 

wake. See, e.g., Est. of Romain v. City of Grosse Pointe Farms, 935 

F.3d 485, 493–96 (6th Cir. 2019) (Murphy, J., concurring) (identifying unresolved questions about the validity of the statecreated danger doctrine). 

Our court is among those that have recognized a claim for 

state-created dangers. See, e.g., Reed v. Gardner, 986 F.2d 1122, 
No. 23-1816 51 

1127 (7th Cir. 1993); Monfils v. Taylor, 165 F.3d 511, 518 (7th 

Cir. 1998); Paine v. Cason, 678 F.3d 500, 509–11 (7th Cir. 2012). 

Duty bound to follow that precedent, I see it applying in different ways to the two officers in question. 

When viewing the facts, as we must, in the light most favorable to Amylyn Slaymaker, a jury could find that Officer 

Te’Juan Johnson affirmatively placed her in more danger than 

she faced before law enforcement intervened. Officer Johnson 

reached an agreement with Amylyn’s husband, RJ: if RJ voluntarily went to the hospital, Officer Johnson would not have 

him committed involuntarily. But when Amylyn asked 

whether her husband had been placed under a 24-hour mental health hold, Officer Johnson twice answered in the affirmative. Knowing that Amylyn planned to go home, Officer 

Johnson’s misrepresentations—the false sense of safety he 

conveyed—created a risk that Amylyn would be at the house 

and caught off-guard when RJ returned and had access to his 

AR-15s. This is not a risk Amylyn would have faced had she 

known RJ was free to leave the hospital at a time of his own 

choosing. 

To violate clearly established law—the second prong of 

the qualified immunity analysis—“existing precedent must 

have placed the statutory or constitutional question beyond 

debate.” Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 741 (2011). I agree 

with Judge Ripple that our decision in Monfils supplies the 

relevant precedent here. Monfils clearly established that a police officer can be liable under the state-created danger doctrine if he makes false promises about the danger a person 

faces from an identified and violent third party. See 165 F.3d 

at 518. Like the officer’s false assurances to Thomas Monfils, 

Officer Johnson’s false assurances rendered Amylyn more 
52 No. 23-1816 

vulnerable to a danger than she otherwise would have been 

had he told her the truth. With these findings available to a 

jury, Officer Johnson is not entitled to qualified immunity and 

the suit against his estate should proceed. 

But not so for Officer Roederer. The record shows that his 

actions did not add to the risk of harm already created by Officer Johnson. Officer Roederer made no representations to 

Amylyn regarding how long her husband would be in the 

hospital or whether it was safe for her to return home. Yes, 

Officer Roederer was present for Officer Johnson’s conversations with both Amylyn and RJ. But his failure to correct any 

representations Officer Johnson made to Amylyn is insufficient because “mere inactivity by police does not give rise to 

a constitutional claim.” Rossi v. City of Chicago, 790 F.3d 729, 

735 (7th Cir. 2015). And Officer Roederer’s statements to RJ 

merely repeated back the arrangement Officer Johnson had 

previously contrived about going to the hospital voluntarily. 

The evidence of Officer Roederer’s personal involvement 

falls short of allowing a jury to find that he created a danger 

to Amylyn. Even if his acts or omissions contributed to her 

tragic death, no jury could reasonably conclude that he put 

Amylyn in a position of danger she would not have otherwise 

faced or that his actions violated a clearly established right. 

Indeed, on issues of qualified immunity, close calls go to the 

defendant. See Kikumura v. Turner, 28 F.3d 592, 597 (7th Cir. 

1994) (underscoring that “the point of qualified immunity...is 

that government officials are not, as a rule, liable for damages 

in close cases”). So I agree with Judge Brennan that qualified 

immunity shields Officer Roederer from liability. 
No. 23-1816 53 

II 

This case should sound the equivalent of a five-alarm fire 

for police departments to the risks of domestic violence. In my 

view, Officer Johnson’s response to what he encountered during the early morning hours of July 19, 2019 remains shocking 

in the extreme. When you read the facts, you can see the tragic 

ending coming from a mile away with about 100% certainty. 

No doubt domestic violence incidents are among the most 

challenging circumstances that police officers encounter. And 

federal judges are in no position to advise police departments 

on how best to respond to 911 reports of domestic violence. 

But respond they must. And this case shows just how a police 

officer can take an already dangerous situation and make it 

worse—fatally so. The district court got it right when observing that a case like this should cause police departments to 

reevaluate their training related to domestic violence encounters. Under no circumstance should a law enforcement officer 

act in a way that escalates the danger faced by someone in the 

vulnerable and trapped position that Amylyn Slaymaker 

found herself. See Br. of Amicus Curiae Everytown for Gun 

Safety and the Indiana Coalition Against Domestic Violence 

in Support of Pl.-Appellant, ECF No. 15 (collecting social science research on the risk factors of domestic violence). 

Judge Brennan’s opinion emphasizes that Amylyn was in 

grave danger before the officers intervened. I could not agree 

more. Amylyn endured ongoing, violent abuse at the hands 

of her husband for many months. Nobody could plausibly say 

that RJ did not pose a serious threat to Amylyn’s life on July 

19. While accurate, that observation is incomplete and in no 

way resolves the question before us. 
54 No. 23-1816 

It was Officer Johnson’s response that escalated the risk to 

Amylyn’s life. He agreed to allow RJ to voluntarily go to the 

hospital while affirmatively misleading Amylyn about that 

fact. A jury could easily find that Officer Johnson’s duplicity 

left her vulnerable to new risk—more immediate and acute 

risk. These circumstances existed because of Officer Johnson’s 

actions: yes, Amylyn was in an abusive marriage, but she had 

no idea that Officer Johnson had cut a deal with RJ that would 

allow him to return home in less than 24 hours, find her there 

alone, and murder her with one of the guns known to be in 

the house. 

If the state created danger doctrine reflects sound law, it 

fits this case to a T: a jury could find that Officer Johnson responded to the undeniably difficult situation he encountered 

on July 19 by putting Amylyn at a very high risk of losing her 

life. The case against Officer Johnson’s estate should go to 

trial.