Opinion issued May 6, 2014

In The

Court of Appeals 

For The 

First District of Texas 

————————————

NO. 01-13-00970-CV

———————————

IN THE INTEREST OF T.M.D., JR., B.M.D., Z.T.D., AND E.M.D., 

CHILDREN

On Appeal from the 312th District Court

Harris County, Texas

Trial Court Case No. 2007-02141

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Appellant L.M. appeals from the trial court’s decree terminating her parental 

rights to her children: T.M.D., Jr., B.M.D., Z.T.D., and E.M.D. In five issues, she 

argues that the evidence is insufficient to support the court’s findings on any of the 
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four predicate acts that the court found were satisfied or that termination of her 

parental rights was in the best interest of the children. 

We affirm.

Background

L.M. is the biological mother of the four special-needs children at issue in 

this appeal: T.M.D., Jr., B.M.D., Z.T.D., and E.M.D. These children were aged 7, 

6, 5, and 4, respectively at the time the Texas Department of Family and Protective 

Services interceded and removed them from their parents’ care. Ultimately the trial 

court ordered the termination of the mother’s parental rights, and it is from this 

decree that she appeals. The trial court’s decree also terminates the parental rights 

of the children’s father, T.D., but he does not appeal, and thus we focus our 

discussion and analysis on the mother.

Prior to the events that gave rise to this case, the attorney general initiated a 

suit affecting the parent-child relationship pursuant to Chapter 233 of the Texas 

Family Code. In December 2006, by an Agreed Child Support Review Order, T.D. 

was adjudicated as the father of T.M.D., Jr. and B.M.D., and the mother and father

were appointed as joint managing conservators of the children. As of this time, 

Z.T.D. and E.M.D. had not yet been born. The mother was given the right to 

determine the children’s residence without regard to geographic location. Although 

the order included “child support guideline findings,” because the parents were 
3

living together as a family at the time the order was entered, the trial court made no 

orders as to child support except to admonish both parents “to provide support, to 

the best of their abilities.”

Approximately four-and-a-half years later, in July 2011, the trial court 

entered an order modifying the 2006 order. Among other things, this new order 

adjudicated T.D. as the father of two additional children, Z.T.D. and E.M.D. Both

parents were again named joint managing conservators, but the father was 

designated as having the exclusive right to designate the primary residence of the 

children in Harris County or any contiguous county. The order provided the mother

with periods of unsupervised access and possession and stated on its face that it 

could be enforced by a peace officer. The order recited that the father was allowing

the mother to reside with him, but he was seeking ongoing monetary support. The 

trial court found that the father was unemployed and was obligated by a court order 

to provide medical and child support for another child who was not before the 

court. The mother was ordered to pay child support to the father on a graduated 

schedule which declined as each of the four children reached the age of majority. 

Income withholding orders were included in the court’s order.

The family lived together until the father forcibly removed the mother from 

the home in April 2012. Around that time, the parents “argued a lot,” and the 

mother sometimes feared for the children’s safety. She testified that she left the 
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home with them on several occasions because the father “got really loud and 

rambunctious quite often and I couldn’t have my children around it.” The mother’s

testimony about the father’s treatment of the children was somewhat contradictory. 

She initially testified that the children told her that he had abused them physically 

and verbally, but she later testified that they told her that he had abused them 

verbally but not physically. She said, “They had only stated they got a whopping 

and put in time out. They didn’t exaggerate to what extent because they are so 

small.” She also testified that she witnessed the father verbally abusing the 

children, but she did not see him physically abuse them. She testified that the last 

time any of the children reported such abuse to her was in March 2012 “before he 

had kicked me out.” Her testimony was unclear about dates; she initially testified 

that she resided with the father and the children until she was removed from the 

home in 2011, but she later said it was 2012, just before the Department became 

involved. 

Despite the mother’s testimony that she did not witness physical abuse while 

she was living with her children and their father, she told employees at her 

children’s school to contact Child Protective Services if they noticed “any marks or 

anything abnormal” on her children. She testified that she did so because she 

anticipated that the father would follow through on his threats to remove her from 

the home. But she conceded at trial that asking the school to be on the lookout for 
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signs of physical abuse suggested that she had reason to believe the father was 

abusing the children.

The mother testified that when she was forcibly evicted by the father, she 

could not take the children with her “because he had primary custody,” apparently 

referring to the July 2011 court order. She also said that the “only reason he had 

primary custody” was that she had been sick with a double kidney infection and 

blood infection and had feared that she would die. 

On April 25, 2012 and May 7, 2012, the Department of Family and 

Protective Services received referrals alleging that T.M.D., Jr. had been physically 

abused by his father. According to information provided by the school, T.M.D., Jr. 

had six fresh bruises on his arms, neck, and cheek on April 23. A week later, he 

arrived at school with a large bruise on his left eye and an open cut on his face. A 

week after that, he came to school with fresh bruises on his face, specifically his 

right eye. The referral also alleged that he “often shows up to school with bruises 

on his face and neck, dirty clothes, hungry, [and] emotionally disturbed.”

Emerald Ealy, a caseworker with the Department, spoke with T.M.D., Jr. at 

his elementary school on April 25. The child told Ealy that when he misbehaved at 

home, his father whipped him with a belt. He gave various stories to explain the 

visible bruising on his body—including that he had been bitten by a bug or 

accidentally injured while playing in the park—before becoming upset and 
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withdrawn. The school’s speech pathologist told Ealy that she had observed 

bruises on T.M.D., Jr., he was always hungry, and he was emotionally disturbed. 

The school nurse told Ealy that the mother was not “in the picture,” and when she 

was involved, the children often missed school. 

That same day, Ealy visited the father’s house, where she saw the three 

younger children. She did not observe any marks or bruises on them. She did not 

interview the two youngest children due to their age, and she did not understand 

B.M.D., who is autistic. The father reported that he did not know how T.M.D., Jr. 

sustained his bruises. He also told her that: (1) he had been with the children since 

their birth; (2) he had no family support; (3) T.M.D, Jr. is speech impaired, and 

B.M.D. is autistic; (4) the mother is bipolar and has other health issues; and (5) he 

did not have contact information for the mother.

Two weeks later, another Department caseworker, Latoya Dunbar, 

interviewed T.M.D., Jr. at his elementary school. This time the child stated that his 

father punched him on his left eye and slapped him hard in the face near his right 

eye. The mother was unable to take the children at that time because she did not 

have housing and furniture. Accordingly, all four children were removed from the 

father’s home and placed in foster care. 

The Department filed suit for protection of the children, conservatorship, 

and termination. After an adversary hearing, the trial court entered a temporary 
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order, appointing the Department temporary managing conservator for the 

children. In addition, the court ordered the mother to “comply with each 

requirement set out in the Department’s original, or any amended, service plan 

during the pendency of this suit,” and notified her that “failure to fully comply with 

these orders may result in the restriction or termination of parental rights.” In 

addition, the first item on the family service plan also informed the mother that 

failure to comply could result in termination of her parental rights:

THIS IS A VERY IMPORTANT DOCUMENT. ITS PURPOSE IS 

TO HELP YOU PROVIDE YOUR CHILD WITH A SAFE 

ENVIRONMENT WITHIN THE REASONABLE PERIOD 

SPECIFIED IN THE PLAN. IF YOU ARE UNWILLING OR 

UNABLE TO PROVIDE YOUR CHILD WITH A SAFE 

ENVIRONMENT, YOUR PARENTAL AND CUSTODIAL DUTIES 

AND RIGHTS MAY BE RESTRICTED OR TERMINATED OR 

YOUR CHILD MAY NOT BE RETURNED TO YOU. THERE 

WILL BE A COURT HEARING AT WHICH A JUDGE WILL 

REVIEW THIS SERVICE PLAN.

The family service plan required, among other things, that the mother

(1) participate in domestic violence classes and present a certificate of completion 

to the caseworker no later than 30 days from the last class, (2) participate fully in a 

psycho-social assessment to address her emotional and mental needs and that she 

follow all recommendations from the evaluation including psychological or 

psychiatric evaluation, individual therapy, and group therapy, (3) participate in 

parenting classes with an emphasis on special-needs children, and (4) obtain and 
8

maintain stable housing for more than six months, which was to be safe, clean, and 

free of hazards and to have operational utilities.

Although the mother completed many of the services that were required by 

the family service plan, including maintaining employment and visitations, she did 

not complete all of the services. Larry Johnson, the caseworker assigned to this 

case, testified that the mother did not complete a “victims of domestic violence”

course or a parenting class. Although she did complete a psycho-social assessment, 

she did not follow through with recommendations from that assessment, including 

psychological assessment, individual counseling, and family counseling.

Adele Countrymen, the volunteer child advocate, testified that she reviewed 

the services with the mother many times. She said that she had “great hopes” that 

the mother would “get things done,” and that although the mother did “start some 

things,” “[e]very time she started, she would stop and they would have to find 

another place or move to another place so the services are not completed to fulfill 

what should have happened probably almost, more than a year ago.”

The mother conceded at trial that she had not completed all of her services. 

At the time of trial she had been living with a friend in a two-bedroom apartment 

for approximately one month. She testified that she did not have a place to live that 

was suitable for her children.
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In addition, the record includes evidence of the mother’s mental health

history. The mother said she had been hospitalized five or six times for mental 

health issues, most recently in 2011. Her first psychiatric hospitalization was an 

outpatient visit when she was between the ages of 11 and 13, and her first inpatient 

psychiatric hospitalization was after the birth of T.M.D., Jr., when she was 17 or 

18 years old. She said her diagnoses have not all been consistent. She testified that 

she had been previously diagnosed with ADHD, an emotional distress disorder, 

and “just a number of odd random things that I don’t even know.” However, she 

did recall that her most recent mental health diagnosis was “manic bi-polar major 

depressive disorder,” which she said could be confused with another disorder that 

“has to do with spousal abuse or physical, verbal abuse from the spouse.” The 

mother testified that the father verbally abused her, and she said, “In other words, 

he was just making me crazy.” 

The child advocate testified about her understanding of the mother’s mental 

health history, and she said that she had repeatedly spoken with the mother about 

her mental health. The mother acknowledged that both the Department and Child 

Advocates had advised her to seek a mental health evaluation through MHMRA, 

but she did not do so and was not under the care of a mental health professional at 

the time of trial. 
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No evidence was presented that the mother’s mental health issues had 

resolved; rather, she testified, “I just felt like I didn’t need any more medication.” 

She further explained that there were “extenuating circumstances” that had 

prevented her from addressing her mental health during the pendency of the case. 

She said she could not afford it because the monthly child support garnishment

from her wages left her without enough money to pay for transportation. The child 

advocate testified that the mother never asked for help regarding access or 

transportation to medical services, and that “she just said it was too far, and she 

wasn’t going to go there, she couldn’t go there, she didn’t have the money to go 

there, there was no reason to go there, that she was fine.” The mother asserted that 

she knew how to take care of herself, and she said, “As far as medication goes, I no

longer need medication. All I have to do is prove that to the court and that means I 

have to go to MHMRA which means I have to afford to go there. I cannot afford to 

go there and do that.” 

The mother testified that she worked 40 hours a week as a security guard 

and that if she were not obligated to pay child support, she would be “fine” 

financially. She also said that although her work schedule included afternoons, 

evenings, and weekends, she could adjust her work schedule to fit her children’s 

school schedule. She said that her roommate, who was also a friend of many years, 

could pick up the children from school and watch them while she worked. But the 
11

friend did not testify at trial and the mother conceded that no one connected to the 

case had met her. The mother testified that she had “looked up and researched” her 

children’s conditions and was “already . . . familiar” with T.M.D., Jr.’s and 

B.M.D.’s needs. She said, “I believe I have familiarized myself enough with them 

and their conditions to be able to take care of them properly with their conditions.” 

Finally, she testified that she loved her children, wanted to be reunited with them, 

could care for them, and hoped the court would not terminate her rights to them.

A caseworker testified about the children’s special needs. T.M.D., Jr. has 

ADHD, mood disorder, oppositional defiant disorder, and anger management 

issues. B.M.D. has been diagnosed with autism, ADHD, adjustment disorder with 

mixed disturbance of emotion and conduct, mixed receptive expressive language 

disorder, borderline intellectual functioning, pica, and gross and fine motor skill 

delays. Z.T.D. has severe developmental, academic, and motor skills delays, which 

affect eating, dressing, and independent functioning. Z.T.D. is verbally and 

physically aggressive, has frequent temper tantrums, has been diagnosed with 

pervasive developmental disorder, ADHD, disruptive behavior disorder, and mild 

intellectual disability. E.M.D. has language, emotional, and behavioral delays, and 

she has been diagnosed with ADHD and borderline intellectual functioning. All 

four children take prescription medication for their conditions and receive therapy, 

counseling, or both.
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Both the caseworker and the child advocate testified that the children were 

doing well and living together in their current therapeutic foster home. The child 

advocate described the children as “a handful,” but she explained how well the 

children were doing since being placed in a foster home together. Though previous 

attempts to find adoptive parents for the children had not been successful, she 

testified that she believed a different approach could be successful in finding 

adoptive parents for the four children, and she asked the court to permit her to 

remain assigned to the case to help find adoptive parents.

The child advocate also opined that it was not in the children’s best interest 

to be reunited with their parents. She said:

My major concern is that they do not have a stable home life in which 

these four children need stability. Neither parent is currently living on 

their own, being able to pay their own bills, to provide a home. I do 

not believe that either parent is aware of what grade their children are 

in or which type of classes they are in, what needs to be done, how 

often they need to go to the doctor. They’ve never ask[ed] me. And I 

have checked many, many times, but I know, I know they have not. 

They don’t know these answers, which concerns me a lot, in the fact 

that if you are not taking care of your own situation and you have 

other precarious financial situations, bringing four special needs 

children in is a huge risk at this time. 

The trial court found by clear and convincing evidence that the mother

(1) voluntarily left the children alone or in the possession of another without 

providing adequate support for the children and remained away for a period of at 

least six months, see TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 161.001(1)(C) (West 2014);
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(2) knowingly placed or knowingly allowed the children to remain in conditions or 

surroundings which endanger the physical or emotional well-being of the children, 

see id. § 161.001(1)(D); (3) engaged in conduct or knowingly placed the children 

with persons who engaged in conduct which endangers the physical or emotional 

well-being of the children, see id. § 161.001(1)(E); and (4) failed to comply with 

the provisions of a court order that specifically established the actions necessary 

for her to obtain the return of the children, see id. § 161.001(1)(O). In addition, the 

trial court found that termination of the parent-child relationship between the 

mother and T.M.D., Jr., B.M.D., Z.T.D., and E.M.D. was in the children’s best 

interest. See id. § 161.001(2). Accordingly, the trial court entered a decree 

terminating the mother’s rights with respect to the children.

The mother filed a request for findings of fact and conclusions of law and a 

motion for new trial, contesting the legal and factual sufficiency of the evidence to 

support the court’s findings. The trial court filed findings of fact and conclusions 

of law, reiterating the findings included in the termination decree. After a nonevidentiary hearing, the trial court denied the motion for new trial. L.M. appealed. 

Analysis

Termination proceedings are strictly scrutinized on appeal. Holick v. Smith,

685 S.W.2d 18, 20 (Tex. 1985). Clear and convincing evidence must support the 

decision to terminate parental rights. In re J.F.C., 96 S.W.3d 256, 263–64 (Tex.
14

2002); see also Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 747–48, 102 S. Ct. 1388, 1391–

92 (1982). “Clear and convincing evidence” is “the measure or degree of proof that 

will produce in the mind of the trier of fact a firm belief or conviction as to the 

truth of the allegations sought to be established.” TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 101.007 

(West 2014); J.F.C., 96 S.W.3d at 264; see also Holick, 685 S.W.2d at 20 (citing 

Santosky, 455 U.S. at 747, 102 S. Ct. at 1391)).

Because of this heightened burden of proof, both legal and factual 

sufficiency review of a decree terminating parental rights require a reviewing court 

to consider all of the evidence to determine whether the factfinder could have 

formed a firm belief or conviction about the truth of the matters as to which the 

Department bore the burden of proof. In re J.P.B., 180 S.W.3d 570, 573 (Tex. 

2005) (legal sufficiency); In re C.H., 89 S.W.3d 17, 25 (Tex. 2002) (factual 

sufficiency).

In a legal sufficiency review, we view the evidence in the light most 

favorable to the finding. J.P.B., 180 S.W.3d at 573; J.F.C., 96 S.W.3d at 266. To 

do this, we “consider all of the evidence, not just that which favors the verdict,” 

J.P.B., 180 S.W.3d at 573, and we “assume that the factfinder resolved disputed 

facts in favor of its finding if a reasonable factfinder could do so.” Id. (quoting 

J.F.C., 96 S.W.3d at 266); see also Jordan v. Dossey, 325 S.W.3d 700, 712–13 

(Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2010, pet. denied). We also “disregard all 
15

evidence that a reasonable factfinder could have disbelieved or found to have been 

incredible.” J.P.B., 180 S.W.3d at 573 (quoting J.F.C., 96 S.W.3d at 266); see also 

Jordan, 325 S.W.3d at 712–13.

In a factual sufficiency review, we consider the entire record, including 

evidence both supporting and contradicting the finding. See In re H.R.M., 209 

S.W.3d 105, 108 (Tex. 2006) (quoting J.F.C., 96 S.W.3d at 266). “‘If, in light of 

the entire record, the disputed evidence that a reasonable factfinder could not have 

credited in favor of the finding is so significant that a factfinder could not 

reasonably have formed a firm belief or conviction, then the evidence is factually 

insufficient.’” Id.

In order to justify the termination of parental rights pursuant to 

section 161.001, the Department must establish, by clear and convincing evidence, 

that (1) the parent committed one or more of the statute’s enumerated acts or 

omissions justifying termination and (2) termination is in the best interest of the 

child. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 161.001; C.H., 89 S.W.3d at 23. Both elements 

must be established, and termination may not be based solely on the best interest of 

the child as determined by the trier of fact. Tex. Dep’t of Human Servs. v. Boyd,

727 S.W.2d 531, 533 (Tex. 1987). “Only one predicate finding under section 

161.001(1) is necessary to support a judgment of termination when there is also a 
16

finding that termination is in the child’s best interest.” In re A.V., 113 S.W.3d 355, 

362 (Tex. 2003).

I. Failure to comply with court order

In her fourth issue, the mother argues that the evidence was legally and 

factually insufficient to support the trial court’s finding under Family Code 

section 161.001(1)(O) that she “failed to comply with the provisions of a court 

order that specifically established the actions necessary for [her] to obtain the 

return of the children who have been in the permanent or temporary managing 

conservatorship of the Department . . . as a result of the children’s removal from 

the parent under Chapter 262 for the abuse or neglect of the children.” See TEX.

FAM. CODE ANN. § 161.001(1)(O). 

The mother argues that there was no evidence that the children were 

removed from her as a result of her abuse or neglect of them. We disagree. Chapter 

262 of the Family Code does not define “neglect,” but the Supreme Court of Texas 

has held that the definition in Chapter 261 “surely inform[s] the term[’s] meaning.” 

In re E.C.R., 402 S.W.3d 239, 248 (Tex. 2013). Under Chapter 261, “neglect 

includes placing a child in or failing to remove a child from a situation that 

requires actions or judgment beyond his capabilities and that results in ‘a 

substantial risk of immediate harm to the child.’” Id. at 246 (quoting TEX. FAM.

CODE ANN. § 261.001(4)(B)(i)). Accordingly, for Chapter 262, “‘abuse or neglect 
17

of the child’ necessarily includes the risks or threats of the environment in which 

the child is placed . . . [including] the harm suffered or the danger faced by other 

children under the parent’s care.” Id. at 248. 

The mother testified that she was aware that the father was verbally and 

physically abusive to the children because she witnessed it and the children told 

her about it. She also testified that before the father removed her from the home, 

she asked the school to look for and report to the authorities any signs of physical 

abuse. She conceded at trial that this demonstrated her knowledge and awareness 

that her children were at risk for abuse in the father’s home. The mother had joint 

managing conservatorship of the children, pursuant to a court order that could be 

enforced by a peace officer. That order gave her, among other things, the right to 

unsupervised periods of access to and possession of the children and the duty “of 

care, control, [and] protection” of the children. Although there was no evidence 

that the mother herself verbally or physically abused the children, there was 

evidence that she neglected them by disregarding a known risk of abuse and failing 

to remove or otherwise protect them from a situation that posed a substantial risk 

of immediate harm. See E.C.R., 402 S.W.3d at 247–48. 

There was undisputed evidence at trial that the mother failed to fully comply 

“with the provisions of a court order that specifically established the actions 

necessary for [her] to obtain the return of the children who have been in the 
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permanent or temporary managing conservatorship of the Department . . . as a 

result of the children’s removal from the parent under Chapter 262 for the abuse or 

neglect of the children.” See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 161.001(1)(O). An order 

under this subsection need not bear a title stating that it is an order “to obtain return 

of a child”; rather, it will be sufficient under subsection (O) so long as it directs a 

parent to perform specific acts and advises the parent that failure to provide a safe 

environment within a reasonable time could result in termination of her parental 

rights. See J.F.C., 96 S.W.3d at 277 & n.74. A trial court may direct a parent to 

perform specific acts by ordering her to comply with a family service plan created 

by the Department. See In re G.A., No. 01-11-00565-CV, 2012 WL 1068630, at *4

(Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Mar. 29, 2012, pet. denied) (mem. op.); In re 

A.W.B., No. 14-11-00926-CV, 2012 WL 1048640, *3–4 (Tex. App.—Houston 

[14th Dist.] Mar. 27, 2012, no pet.) (mem. op.). Partial or substantial compliance 

with a court order is not enough to avoid a termination finding under section 

161.001(1)(O). See In re M.C.G., 329 S.W.3d 674, 675–76 (Tex. App.—Houston 

[14th Dist.] 2010, pet. denied); In re T.T., 228 S.W.3d 312, 319 (Tex. App.—

Houston [14th Dist.] 2007, pet. denied).

The undisputed evidence at trial showed that the mother did not complete 

parenting classes or a course for victims of domestic violence. Most notably, she 

failed to obtain and maintain stable housing for more than six months. We hold 
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that the evidence of this predicate act is both legally and factually sufficient to 

support the trial court’s finding. J.P.B., 180 S.W.3d at 573; C.H., 89 S.W.3d at 25; 

see also TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 161.001(1)(O). In light of this holding, we need 

not consider issues one through three, which challenge the other findings of 

separate predicate acts under section 161.001(1). See A.V., 113 S.W.3d at 362 

(only one predicate act required). 

II. Best interest of the child

In her fifth issue, the mother argues that the evidence is legally and factually 

insufficient to support the trial court’s determination that termination of her 

parental rights was in her children’s best interest.

A strong presumption exists that a child’s best interests are served by 

maintaining the parent-child relationship. In re L.M., 104 S.W.3d 642, 647 (Tex.

App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2003, no pet.). In determining whether termination of a 

mother’s parental rights was in the child’s best interest, we consider several 

nonexclusive factors, including (1) the child’s desires, (2) the current and future 

physical and emotional needs of the child, (3) the current and future physical 

danger to the child, (4) the parental abilities of the person seeking custody, 

(5) whether programs are available to assist the person seeking custody in 

promoting the best interests of the child, (6) plans for the child by the person 

seeking custody, (7) stability of the home, (8) acts or omissions of the parent that 
20

may indicate that the parent-child relationship is improper, and (9) any excuse for 

acts or omissions of the parent. Holley v. Adams, 544 S.W.2d 367, 371–72 (Tex. 

1976). The Department is not required to prove all of these factors, and the absence 

of evidence about some factors does not preclude the factfinder from reasonably 

forming a strong conviction that termination is in the child’s best interest. See 

C.H., 89 S.W.3d at 27. Evidence establishing one of the predicate acts under 

section 161.001(1) may also be relevant to determining the best interest of the 

child. See id. at 28.

Several of the Holley factors weigh in favor of the trial court’s finding that 

termination of the mother’s parental rights was in the children’s best interest. We 

consider the current and future physical and emotional needs of the children, which 

are great, the parenting ability of the mother, and the stability of the home together 

because they are related.

All of the children have special physical and emotional needs, including 

developmental, academic, and motor skills delays. They take medication and 

receive counseling and therapy. Although the mother was ordered to take a class 

on parenting special-needs children, she failed to do so. The mother testified that 

she had “looked up and researched” the children’s conditions and believed she 

could properly care for them. However the child advocate testified that she did not 

believe that the mother knew what grades the children were in, what classes they 
21

took, how often they needed to go to the doctor, or how to meet each child’s needs. 

The mother also demonstrated a limitation on her parenting ability by failing to 

remove her four young special-needs children from an abusive situation. 

Stability of the home is also a relevant factor in this case. “Stability is 

important in a child’s emotional and physical development.” In re T.G.R.-M., 404 

S.W.3d 7, 17 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2013, no pet.). “Without stability, 

income, or a home, [a parent] is unable to provide for the child’s emotional and 

physical needs.” In re C.A.J., 122 S.W.3d 888, 894 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2003, 

no pet.). The mother failed to obtain and maintain stable housing for more than six 

months as required by the court. At trial, she testified that she did not have suitable 

housing for the children and had been living with a friend in a two-bedroom 

apartment for a month. She said that her friend would care for the children while 

she worked. However the friend did not testify at trial, and the mother conceded 

that no other person associated with the case had ever met her friend. 

Finally, relating to both the mother’s parenting abilities and the stability of 

the home, we consider the mother’s mental health issues. Both the mother and the 

child advocate testified about the mother’s history of mental illness, which has 

necessitated multiple hospitalizations in the past. The diagnoses included: “manic 

bi-polar major depressive disorder,” mood disorder, major depression with 

psychotic features, and a suicide attempt and suicidal ideations. Yet the mother
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also had a history of refusing to address her mental health issues and failing to 

follow through with recommended treatments. While mental illness is not a ground 

for parental termination, the impact of a parent’s mental illness on her ability to 

parent and the stability of the home are relevant factors in the best interest of the 

child analysis. See, e.g., In re E.S.C., 287 S.W.3d 471, 475–76 (Tex. App.—Dallas 

2009, pet. denied) (considering mental illness as factor in analysis of whether 

termination under § 161.001(1)(O) was in the best interest of the children); see 

also Adams v. Tex. Dep’t of Family & Protective Servs., 236 S.W.3d 271, 281 

(Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2007, no pet.) (considering mother’s potential 

failure to continue taking medication prescribed for mental illness as factor in best 

interest analysis); cf. Liu v. Dep’t of Family & Protective Servs., 273 S.W.3d 785, 

797–98 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2008, no pet.) (applying Holley best 

interest factors in termination of parental rights under §161.003 and considering 

impact of parent’s failure to treat mental illness on ability to provide stability and 

meet the needs of the child). Here, the mother failed to address mental health 

issues that have in the past led her to be hospitalized and to consider or attempt 

suicide. Such behavior subjects her children to uncertainty and instability. See 

Jordan, 325 S.W.3d at 723–24. All of these factors—the needs of the children, the 

parenting ability of the mother, and stability of the home—weigh in favor of the 
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court’s conclusion that termination of the mother’s parental rights was in the 

children’s best interest.

The Holley factors are not necessarily the only considerations relevant to 

determining the best interest of the child. In re A.C., 394 S.W.3d 633, 642 (Tex. 

App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2012, no pet.). “[T]he prompt and permanent placement 

of the child in a safe environment is presumed to be in the child’s best interest.” 

TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 263.307(a) (West 2014). In determining whether a parent 

is willing and able to provide a safe environment, we consider several factors, 

including (1) the child’s age and vulnerabilities; (2) whether there is a history of 

abusive or assaultive conduct by the child’s family or others who have access to 

the child’s home; (3) willingness and ability of the child’s family to seek, accept, 

and complete counseling services and cooperate with agency supervision; (4) the 

willingness and ability of the child’s family to effect positive changes within a 

reasonable period of time; and (5) whether the child’s family demonstrates 

adequate parenting skills. Id. § 263.307(b). Evidence establishing one of the 

predicate acts under section 161.001(1) also may be relevant to determining the 

best interest of the child. See C.H., 89 S.W.3d at 28.

Here, all of these factors weigh in favor of the trial court’s decision. The 

children were 4, 5, 6, and 7 years old at the time of removal, and they had special 

needs that made them entirely dependent on others for care. The mother has a 
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history of allowing her children to remain in an abusive situation. She has not 

followed through with services, shown a willingness to affect positive changes in a 

reasonable time, or demonstrated adequate parenting skills to address the specific 

needs of these children. Considering all of the evidence in light of the Holley and 

statutory factors relevant to a determination of the best interest of the children, we 

conclude that a reasonable factfinder could have formed a firm belief that 

termination of the mother’s parental rights was in the best interest of T.M.D., Jr., 

B.M.D., Z.T.D., and E.M.D. We hold that the evidence was legally and factually 

sufficient to support the trial court’s best interest finding, and we overrule this 

issue.

Conclusion

We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Michael Massengale

Justice 

Panel consists of Chief Justice Radack and Justices Massengale and Huddle.