J-A06043-18

*Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION – SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P 65.37

LYDIA HOOVER AND LONIE MAE 

SNOBERGER, N/K/A LONIE M. 

MCDONALD, CO-EXECUTRIX OF THE 

LAST WILL AND TESTAMENT OF CLAIR 

A. SNOBERGER,

 Appellants

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CHARLES A. SMITH, JR., SHIRLEY M. 

SMITH, HUSBAND AND WIFE; TYLER J. 

SMITH, AND NATALIE C. SMITH, 

HUSBAND AND WIFE; LYLE R. SMITH 

AND DAWN S. SMITH, HUSBAND AND 

WIFE; AND LANE SMITH,

 Appellees

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IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

 

 

 No. 1452 WDA 2017

Appeal from the Order Entered September 6, 2017

in the Court of Common Pleas of Blair County

Civil Division at No(s): No. 2016 GN 2844

BEFORE: BENDER, P.J.E, SHOGAN, and STRASSBURGER,* JJ.

MEMORANDUM BY STRASSBURGER, J.: FILED APRIL 13, 2018

Lydia Hoover and Lonie Mae Snoberger (the Snobergers) appeal from 

the September 6, 2017 order dismissing the Snobergers’ complaint for 

injunction. We affirm.

This appeal arises from a dispute between the Snobergers and Charles 

Smith, Jr., Shirley Smith, Tyler Smith, Natalie Smith, Lyle Smith, Dawn Smith, 

and Lane Smith (the Smiths) over the use of and width of Seneca Lane. The 

Snobergers utilize Seneca Lane as the sole means of ingress and egress to 
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their property; the Smiths live along and own property adjacent to and under 

Seneca Lane. On September 16, 2016, the Snobergers filed a complaint for 

injunction to prevent the Smiths “from interfering with the [Snobergers’]

ability to transport necessary farm equipment to harvest the crops growing on 

[the Snobergers’] land[,]” and “to prevent [the Smiths] from imposing [their] 

width limitation[.]” Complaint for Injunction, 9/16/2016, at ¶¶ 7, 11. 

On October 20, 2016, the trial court issued an order (1) granting a

preliminary injunction enjoining the Smiths from interfering with the 

Snobergers’ use of Seneca Lane as it currently existed; (2) allowing each party 

the opportunity to conduct a survey of Seneca Lane; and (3) scheduling an 

evidentiary hearing on the complaint for injunction. 

The Snobergers filed an amended complaint for injunction on January 

20, 2017, and the Smiths responded with answers and new matter on 

February 14, 2017, and February 16, 2017. 

The trial court held evidentiary hearings on January 31, February 16,

February 17, and April 10, 2017, at which the Snobergers and the Smiths 

presented testimony and evidence. The Snobergers argued that “they are 

entitled to widen Seneca Lane because it is a private road.” Trial Court 

Opinion, 9/6/2017, at 7. On September 6, 2017, the trial court denied the 

Snobergers’ complaint and amended complaint for injunction, and found that: 

(1) “[the Snobergers] have a prescriptive easement over Seneca Lane[;]” (2) 

“[t]he present width of the roadbed of Seneca Lane represents the width of 
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the prescriptive easement[;]” and (3) “[the Smiths] have no legal right to 

impede the [Snobergers’] use of their prescriptive easement [for ingress and 

egress to their property.]” Id. at 9-10. 

On September 22, 2017, the Snobergers filed post-trial motions. On 

October 3, 2017, before the trial court ruled on the post-trial motion, the 

Snobergers filed a notice of appeal.1 The Snobergers present the following 

issues for our consideration.

[1.] Did the trial court err or misapply the law by failing to follow 

the [o]pinion and [d]ecree of Judge Baldridge as to ownership of 

the roadway?

[2.] Did the trial court err or misapply the law in concluding that 

[the Snobergers] have a prescriptive easement over Seneca Lane?

[3.] Did the trial court err or misapply the law in concluding that 

the present width of the roadbed of Seneca Lane represents the 

width of the prescriptive easement?

The Snobergers’ Brief at 4. 

Before we reach the merits of the Snobergers’ claims, we must 

determine whether the claims were preserved.

Pennsylvania Rule of Civil Procedure 227.1 provides that post-trial 

motions must be filed within ten days, and that any issues not raised timely

are waived. Pa.R.C.P. 227.1(b)(2), (c). Here, the Snobergers filed post-trial 

 

1 The trial court did not order the Snobergers to file a Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) 

statement; however, the trial court complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a) by issuing 

a statement indicating its reliance on its September 6, 2017 opinion and order. 
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motions on September 22, 2017, more than ten days after the September 6, 

2017 trial court order.2 Thus, to the extent the Snobergers were required to 

file post-trial motions, the issues are waived.

The Snobergers argue that pursuant to Chalkey v. Roush, 757 A.2d 

972 (Pa. Super. 2000) (en banc), they did not have to file post-trial motions. 

The Snobergers’ Response to Rule to Show Cause, 12/1/2017 (citing Chalkey, 

757 A.2d at 978, for the proposition that an appeal should not be dismissed 

for failure to file post-trial motions where the order appealed from was “neither 

entitled a decree nisi nor [] indicate[d] that post-trial motions [were] 

required”). The Snobergers are incorrect, because the exception they rely 

upon does not apply to future cases. In fact, our Supreme Court held 

specifically that 

pursuant to Rule 227.1 of the Pennsylvania Rules of Civil 

Procedure, parties are required to file post-trial motions from a 

trial court’s order following a trial in both actions at law and in 

equity in order to properly preserve issues that they wish to raise 

on appeal, [but] we also find that this rule shall be applied 

prospectively only.

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[W]e find that there is no excuse for a party’s failure to file posttrial motions from a trial court’s order following an equity trial...

With this unequivocal rule, there is no danger that parties will be 

confused as to whether they should file post-trial motions or 

proceed directly to an appeal from an order entered by a trial court 

in an action in equity.

 

2 However, the Snobergers filed their notice of appeal within 30 days of the 

trial court’s September 6, 2017 order in this case. Thus, we have jurisdiction 

to entertain the appeal. 
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Chalkey v. Roush, 805 A.2d 491, 492, 496-97 (Pa. 2002) (some citations 

and footnotes omitted).

Moreover, the hearings in this case had all the hallmarks of a trial. See 

City of Philadelphia v. New Life Evangelistic Church, 114 A.3d 472, 478 

(Pa. Cmwlth. 2015) (emphasis omitted) (summarizing Newman Dev. Grp. 

of Pottstown, LLC v. Genuardi's Family Markets, Inc., 52 A.3d 1233, 

1247 (Pa. 2012)) (“Thus, the Supreme Court, while recognizing that not all 

court proceedings constitute “trials” for the purpose of Pa. R.C.P. [] 227.1, 

nevertheless signaled that a hearing that bears the hallmarks of a trial by 

requiring or admitting, or []offering a party the opportunity to present 

additional evidence, does constitute a ‘trial’ for the purposes of Pa. R.C.P. []

227.1[.]”). Accordingly, we conclude that timely-filed post-trial motions were 

required. Because the Snobergers failed to file timely post-trial motions, all 

claims are waived.

Order affirmed. 
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Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 4/13/2018