Filed 5/15/13 Certified for publication 6/11/13 (order attached)

COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

STATE OF CALIFORNIA

CITY OF SAN DIEGO et al.,

Plaintiffs and Respondents,

v.

ESTHER BOGGESS,

Defendant and Appellant.

 D061715

 (Super. Ct. No. MCR 12-006)

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of San Diego County, Frederick 

Maguire, Judge. Affirmed.

James M. Crawford, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and 

Appellant.

Jan I. Goldsmith, City Attorney, Mary Jo Lanzafame, Assistant City Attorney, 

Paige E. Folkman, Deputy City Attorney for Plaintiffs and Respondents. 
2

Appellant Esther Boggess appeals an order for the seizure and destruction of her 

firearms following a petition filed under Welfare and Institutions Code1 section 8102 

after her release from a facility at which she was detained for psychiatric evaluation 

under section 5150. The court granted the petition, finding petitioners City of San Diego, 

Chief of Police William Lansdowne, and the San Diego Police Department (collectively 

City) demonstrated return of the firearms to Boggess would be likely to result in 

endangering Boggess or others, and they should not be returned to her, but forfeited and 

destroyed. 

Boggess contends there was insufficient evidence to support the court's 

determination that return of the firearms would be likely to pose a risk of harm to herself 

or others. She also contends section 8102 is unconstitutional in light of two United States 

Supreme Court cases, District of Columbia v. Heller (2008) 554 U.S. 570 (Heller) and 

McDonald v. City of Chicago (2010) 561 U.S. ___ [130 S.Ct. 3020] (McDonald), as the 

statute infringes on her fundamental Second and Fourteenth Amendment right to bear 

arms. We reject these contentions and affirm the order.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Police Response2

On December 31, 2011, San Diego Police Officer Stephanie Ott responded to a 

report of a suicide threat made by then seventy-two-year-old Esther Boggess. A 

 

1 All statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code unless otherwise 

stated.

2 This portion of the factual background is taken from the declaration of the 

responding police officer. 
3

concerned family member had called the San Diego Police Department after Boggess 

said she wanted to "get it over with" and that she wanted to shoot herself with a gun but 

was just missing the bullets.

When Officer Ott arrived at Boggess's apartment, she asked if there were any 

firearms in the house and Boggess replied, "Yes, but it is put away right now." Officer 

Ott called Boggess's niece, the family member who had called the police, to confirm her 

concerns. The niece had been talking with her aunt on the phone earlier when she made 

the statements concerning her desire to shoot herself. Boggess told her niece that she was 

depressed about ailing health and stated, "What's the point of living, what else is gonna 

happen now?" Boggess admitted to Officer Ott that she made that remark to her niece 

over the phone. Boggess was detained and transported to the County of San Diego 

Mental Health Services (CMH) for an evaluation. While driving to the hospital, Boggess 

told Officer Ott that she was only joking when she made those statements and mumbled 

several times, "What else is gonna happen now?" The officer found three handguns in 

Boggess's closet and had them impounded. 

Mental Health Evaluation

Upon arrival to CMH, Boggess received a psychosocial assessment, medication 

evaluation, and crisis stabilization. She was evaluated by Alan Edwards, M.D., who 

noted Boggess had expressed concerns about her failing health. She also stated that she 

complained to her niece about her car being towed and the extremely high storage fee. 

Boggess denied being suicidal or having any history of earlier suicide attempts or 

psychiatric hospitalizations. On the day of her assessment, when asked about any 
4

suicidal thoughts she told a nurse, "I'm Catholic—it goes against God's law." Dr. 

Edwards noted Boggess was generally "dysphoric," (feeling unhappy or unwell, see 

Merriam-Webster's Collegiate Dictionary (11th ed. 2006) p. 389) and diagnosed her with 

depressive disorder with contributing psychosocial and environmental problems of 

economic hardship and access to healthcare. 

Dr. Edwards opined that Boggess's current potential for harm "could be high as the 

patient has few supports, multiple stresses, and lethal means." After Dr. Edwards's 

evaluation, he admitted Boggess to the emergency psychiatric unit on an involuntary 

basis. He indicated that "[d]ischarge will be considered when the patient is no longer 

suicidal, when adequate support system has been ascertained, and when reasonable 

stresses have been dealt with." 

A CMH client assignment & service record shows that Boggess was referred out 

to Mesa Vista hospital because she required a higher level of medical care. Her legal 

status at the time of discharge from CMH was marked as "5150"3 and it was noted that 

she had previously had access to weapons. At the time of transfer Boggess was listed as 

stable, but was transferred by ambulance because she posed a risk of harm to herself or 

others. 

 

3 Section 5150 states in part that "any person, as a result of mental disorder . . . upon 

probable cause [can] be taken . . . into custody and place[d] . . . in a facility designated by 

the county and approved by the State Department of Social Services as a facility for 72-

hour treatment and evaluation."
5

The Section 8102 Hearing

Pursuant to section 8102, City filed a petition to retain and destroy the firearms 

seized from Boggess. Boggess requested a hearing (§ 8102, subds. (e), (f)), at which the 

trial court and parties reviewed her medical records. At the hearing, in response to 

questions regarding the police report and the statements made to her niece over the 

phone, Boggess explained that the guns belonged to her late husband; that she had not 

touched them in six years and did not know how to put a bullet in them. She admitted 

talking to her niece, who had called after she found out Boggess's car had been towed, 

but Boggess stated she was "kidding" with her niece and the only thing she said was, 

"With that money I'm going to spend, I don't think—why I am going to live?" Boggess 

asserted her niece just "imagine[d]" that she was going to kill herself, and that her 

religious beliefs precluded her from considering suicide.

During the hearing, City presented medical records and a police report to the 

court. The court acknowledged that Boggess was under financial pressure and was 

having medical problems at the time of the incident. It took note of the fact that Boggess 

was involuntarily admitted for psychiatric evaluation stating, "Not everybody who 

presents to CMH gets admitted. They admitted you." The court concluded that CMH 

was concerned about Boggess's mental well-being, and rather than accepting Boggess's 

explanations, the court relied on the medical opinion that she was a danger to herself. 

Though the court accepted Boggess's representation that she was an educated dentist, it 

found her answers to be "nonresponsive" and "rambling" and that the petitioners had 

proved by a preponderance of the evidence that return of the firearms would be likely to 
6

result in endangering Boggess or others. The court ordered the firearms seized be 

forfeited and destroyed.

DISCUSSION

I. Overview of Section 8102

Section 8102 authorizes the seizure and possible forfeiture of weapons belonging 

to persons detained for examination under section 5150 because of their mental 

condition. (Rupf v. Yan (2000) 85 Cal.App.4th 411, 416-417 (Rupf); People v. One 

Ruger .22-Caliber Pistol (2000) 84 Cal.App.4th 310, 312.) Section 8102, subdivision (a) 

provides in part: "Whenever a person, who has been detained or apprehended for 

examination of his or her mental condition . . . is found to own, have in his or her 

possession or under his or her control, any firearm whatsoever, or any other deadly 

weapon, the firearm or other deadly weapon shall be confiscated by any law enforcement 

agency or peace officer, who shall retain custody of the firearm or other deadly weapon." 

At the time the weapons are seized, the agency must notify the person from whom the 

weapon is seized of the procedure for the return of the confiscated firearms. (§ 8102, 

subd. (b).) The law enforcement agency must make the firearms available for return 

unless it timely files a petition to determine whether returning them "would be likely to 

result in endangering the person or others, and . . . send[s] a notice advising the person of 

his or her right to a hearing on this issue." (§ 8102, subds. (c), (d); Rupf, 85 Cal.App.4th 

at p. 420.) Section 8102 thus "places the onus upon law enforcement to initiate the 

forfeiture proceeding, and to bear the burden of proof on the issue of the danger presented 

by return of the weapons." (Rupf, at p. 420, citing § 8102, subd. (c).)
7

"Section 8102 directly safeguards public health and safety by allowing law 

enforcement officers to confiscate any firearm in the possession or control of a person 

who is appropriately detained or apprehended for a mental examination. Keeping a 

firearm away from a mentally unstable person is a reasonable exercise of the police 

power. It is not unreasonable to conclude there is a significant risk that a mentally 

unstable gun owner will harm himself or others with the weapon." (Rupf, supra, 85 

Cal.App.4th at p. 423.)

II. The Court's Forfeiture Decision is Supported by Substantial Evidence

Boggess challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support the trial court's 

factual conclusion that she would not be likely to use firearms in a safe and lawful 

manner. Comparing the circumstances of her case to those in People v. Keil (2008) 161 

Cal.App.4th 34 and People v. Jason K. (2010) 188 Cal.App.4th 1545, she maintains the 

sole evidence submitted by City was medical records of her three-hour hospitalization 

and her niece's remarks, which she characterizes as a "misinterpretation." As Boggess 

summarizes the evidence, she claims she "never threatened to shoot or harm herself or 

others" and she points out she "steadfastly denied having threatened to harm herself" at 

the hospital. Boggess also argues there was no evidence that she had ever used her 

firearms in a dangerous way, nor was there evidence suggesting she had a prior history of 

mental illness or a criminal record. Finally, Boggess states she was stable when 

discharged from the hospital, and had only been diagnosed with depression "not 

otherwise specified," which is not enough to show she would be unlikely to use her late 
8

husband's firearms in a safe and lawful manner, or that their return to her would result in 

danger to her or others. 

We apply the substantial evidence standard of review. (People v. Jason K., supra, 

188 Cal.App.4th at p. 1553; People v. Keil, supra, 161 Cal.App.4th at p. 38.) An order 

authorizing the destruction of the weapons can only withstand appellate scrutiny if 

"substantial evidence supports the court's determination that return of the firearms to 

appellant would likely result in endangering appellant or other persons." (Rupf, supra, 85 

Cal.App.4th at p. 428.) In determining whether a trial court's ruling is supported by 

substantial evidence, the appellate court should view the whole record in the light most 

favorable to the ruling, resolving all evidentiary conflicts and drawing all reasonable 

inferences supporting the court's decision. (People v. Jason K., at p. 1553.) If the trial 

court finds City has not met its burden of proof, the restriction is removed, and the person 

shall be entitled to own, possess, control, receive or purchase firearms, unless another 

legal restriction applies. (People v. Keil, at p. 38, citing § 8103, subd. (f)(1).)

Looking to City's evidence and all reasonable inferences favoring the superior 

court's findings, we conclude the record contains substantial evidence to support the 

granting of the petition and its finding that return of the firearms would endanger 

Boggess or others. The mental health evaluation in the record indicates Boggess was 

under significant stress regarding her health and financial matters. Contrary to Boggess's 

characterization of the evidence as showing she never threatened to shoot herself, her 

statements to her niece documented by Officer Ott—that Boggess was depressed about 

her health and car being impounded, wanted to "get it over with," and was going to shoot 
9

herself with a gun but was missing the bullets—plainly show otherwise. These 

comments worried Boggess's niece enough to call the police. Further, Boggess was not 

only presented to the CMH, but was admitted to the emergency psychiatric unit on an 

involuntary basis for depression. 

The medical records showed Boggess was diagnosed with "depressive disorder" 

and a medical evaluation noted that she was "a woman with emerging stresses, some 

limited coping skills, and fairly distant support system," with impaired insight and 

judgment. The judge considered these factors in making the ultimate assessment of the 

danger posed by Boggess. Boggess could have presented her own evidence of her 

medical or mental health condition (see, e.g., Rupf, supra, 85 Cal.App.4th at p. 424 

["Both the gun owner and the authorities have the opportunity to present evidence of the 

gun owner's mental condition, including introduction of testimony by medical 

professionals"]) but she instead chose to argue she was "kidding" and that her niece 

misinterpreted her statements, a claim the trial court was entitled to disbelieve and reject. 

Even if Boggess's statements triggering the December 31 incident were the result 

of her niece's misunderstanding, the trial court was presented with police statements and 

medical records persuading it that City's evidence met the preponderance standard. 

Further, after hearing from Boggess, the court determined, implicitly if not expressly, that 

the circumstances that lead to the section 5150 detention had not changed. "The court 

may properly consider whether the circumstances leading to the section 5150 detention 

might occur again and whether possession or control of those confiscated weapons in 
10

such circumstance would pose a risk of danger to appellant or to others." (Rupf, supra,

85 Cal.App.4th at p. 424.)

We are not convinced by Boggess's comparison of her circumstances with those 

individuals in People v. Keil, supra, 161 Cal.App.4th 34 and People v. Jason K, supra, 

188 Cal.App.4th 1545. Substantial evidence review turns on whether the facts presented 

in each case support the findings of the trial court. Looking to the specific facts of Keil 

and Jason K. is unhelpful to our analysis. In sum, the medical reports, police 

observations, statements from Boggess's niece, and Boggess's own conduct at the hearing 

constitute substantial evidence to support the trial court's findings that return of the 

firearms would be likely to result in endangering Boggess or others.

III. Section 8102 Does Not Violate the Second and Fourteenth Amendment Right 

to Bear Arms.

Boggess contends, in light of Heller, supra, 554 U.S. 570 and McDonald., supra,

561 U.S. ___ [130 S.Ct. 3020], section 8102 is facially unconstitutional because it denies 

her fundamental Second and Fourteenth Amendment right to bear arms "based on little or 

scant proof." In so arguing, Boggess urges us to disregard Rupf, supra, 85 Cal.App.4th 

411, in which the court held section 8102 was not facially invalid because it did not deny 

an individual gun owner his or her substantive due process rights nor was it 

unconstitutionally vague. (Rupf, at pp. 419-428.) Boggess argues Heller and McDonald

have invalidated the "collective rights" model of the Second Amendment applied in 
11

Rupf,4 and that Heller and McDonald now confirm there is a fundamental and individual 

constitutional right to bear arms.5 Although a defendant's failure to present an issue to 

the trial court generally forfeits it on appeal, we exercise our discretion to consider the 

issue to the extent it presents a pure question of law or involves undisputed facts. (See In 

re Sheena K. (2007) 40 Cal.4th 875, 880-881, 887-888, fn. 7.)

We begin by recognizing the "strong presumption of the constitutionality of an act 

of the Legislature." (Delaney v. Lowery (1944) 25 Cal.2d 561, 569.) " 'In considering 

the constitutionality of a legislative act we presume its validity, resolving all doubts in 

favor of the Act. Unless conflict with a provision of the state or federal Constitution is 

clear and unquestionable, we must uphold the Act.' " (Amwest Sur. Ins. Co. v. Wilson

(1995) 11 Cal.4th 1243, 1252.) "[M]ere doubt by the judicial branch of the government 

as to the validity of a statute will not afford a sufficient reason for a judicial declaration 

 

4 The "collective rights" view interprets the Second Amendment right to bear arms 

as securing only the right of the states to have a well regulated militia, not a right of 

individuals. (Glenn Harlan Reynolds, A Critical Guide to the Second Amendment (1995) 

62 Tenn. L.Rev. 461, 488-490; see Heller, supra, 554 U.S. at p. 579 [rejecting notion that 

Second Amendment may be exercised "only through participation in some corporate 

body" to maintain effective state militias].)

5 We note Boggess's arguments have several flawed premises. First, section 8102 

does not eliminate a detainee's right to possess any and all firearms. Rather, as City 

points out, it implicates only the detainee's property right in the specific firearms 

confiscated by law enforcement. The statute is further limited to persons who are 

detained for examination of their mental condition, and those weapons that were in their 

custody and control at time of incident leading to their detention for a mental health 

evaluation. Second, section 8102 requires a preponderance standard of proof that return 

of firearms is likely to result in endangering Boggess or others, and thus Boggess's bare 

assertion that it is permits forfeiture of firearms on "little or scant proof of mental illness" 

is incorrect.
12

of its invalidity, but . . . statutes must be upheld as constitutional unless their invalidity 

clearly, positively, and unmistakably appears." (People v. Superior Court of San 

Bernardino County (1937) 10 Cal.2d 288, 298, italics added.) These principles govern a 

challenge to the facial validity of a statute. (See, e.g., Calfarm Ins. Co. v. Deukmejian 

(1989) 48 Cal.3d 805, 814-815 [applying presumption in challenge to facial 

constitutionality of initiative.)

When confronted with a facial challenge to the constitutional validity of a statute, 

the California Supreme Court has sometimes articulated differing standards. (Coffman 

Specialties, Inc. v. Department of Transp. (2009) 176 Cal.App.4th 1135, 1145, citing 

Guardianship of Ann S. (2009) 45 Cal.4th at 1110, 1126.) "Under the strictest test, the 

statute must be upheld unless the party establishes the statute ' "inevitably pose[s] a 

present total and fatal conflict with applicable constitutional prohibitions." ' [Citation.] 

Under the more lenient standard, a party must establish the statute conflicts with 

constitutional principles ' "in the generality or great majority of cases." ' [Citation.] 

Under either test, the plaintiff has a heavy burden to show the statute is unconstitutional 

in all or most cases, and ' "cannot prevail by suggesting that in some future hypothetical 

situation constitutional problems may possibly arise as to the particular application of the 

statute." ' " (Coffman Specialties, Inc., at p. 1145; see also Tobe v. City of Santa Ana

(1995) 9 Cal.4th 1069, 1084 [in a facial challenge, the court considers only the text of the 

statute itself, not its application to the particular circumstances of an individual].) If a 

statute is constitutional in its general and ordinary application, the statute is not facially 

unconstitutional merely because "there might be some instances in which application of 
13

the law might improperly impinge upon constitutional rights." (American Academy of 

Pediatrics v. Lungren (1997) 16 Cal.4th 307, 347; see also Guardianship of Ann S., 

supra, 45 Cal.4th at p. 1132; People v. Yarbrough (2008) 169 Cal.App.4th 303, 311.) 

The Second Amendment of the United States Constitution provides: "A well 

regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a free State, the right of the people to 

keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed." (U.S. Const., 2nd Amend.) The laws at 

issue in Heller and McDonald effectively banned the possession of handguns in the 

home. (Heller, supra, 554 U.S. at p. 574; McDonald, supra, 561 U.S. at p. ___ [130 

S.Ct. at p. 3026].) This court discussed the cases in Jason K.: "In Heller, the high court 

evaluated the meaning of the Second Amendment, and concluded the constitutional right

to possess firearms was not limited to possession for military use and included an 

individual's right to possess firearms in the home for self-defense. [Citation.] But the 

court stated that '[l]ike most rights, the right secured by the Second Amendment is not 

unlimited' [citation], and specifically noted that 'nothing in [its] opinion should be taken 

to cast doubt on longstanding prohibitions on the possession of firearms by felons and the

mentally ill, or laws forbidding the carrying of firearms in sensitive places . . . .' 

[Citation.] The court further explicitly recognized 'the problem of handgun violence in 

this country,' and confirmed that the 'Constitution leaves . . . a variety of tools for

combating that problem . . . .' " (People v. Jason K., supra, 188 Cal.App.4th at p. 1555, 

italics added.)

In McDonald, the court held the Second Amendment right is "fully applicable to 

the States" through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. (McDonald, 
14

supra, 561 U.S. at p. ___ [130 S.Ct. at p. 3026] (plur. opn. of Alito, J.); id. at pp. 3058, 

3088 (conc. opn. of Thomas, J.); see People v. Jason K., supra, 188 Cal.App.4th at p. 

1555; People v. Delacy (2011) 192 Cal.App.4th 1481, 1487.) However, it expressly 

"repeat[ed] [its] assurances" from Heller that "the right to keep and bear arms is not 'a 

right to keep and carry any weapon whatsoever in any manner whatsoever and for 

whatever purpose' " and that its holding "did not cast doubt on such longstanding 

regulatory measures as 'prohibitions on the possession of firearms by felons and the 

mentally ill . . . .' " (McDonald, supra, 561 U.S. at p. ___ [130 S.Ct. at p. 3047], quoting 

Heller, supra, 554 U.S. at pp. 626-627.)

The holdings of Heller and McDonald address whether the Second Amendment 

protects the right to possess a handgun in the home for self defense; they did not extend 

Second Amendment protections to persons whose firearms are seized because they were 

found to be a danger to themselves by reason of their mental health.6 To the contrary, as 

indicated above, both Heller and McDonald identified an expressly nonexclusive list of 

traditional limitations on the right to bear arms, characterizing them as "presumptively 

lawful regulatory measures . . . ." (Heller, supra, 554 U.S. at p. 627, fn. 26; McDonald, 

supra, 561 U.S. ___ [130 S.Ct. at p. 3047] (plur. opn. of Alito, J.); see People v. Delacy, 

supra, 192 Cal.App.4th at p. 1487.) Section 8102, which prohibits a person detained 

 

6 In Heller, the court indicated that, if confronted with a constitutional challenge to 

its nonexclusive list of presumptively lawful exceptions to the Second Amendment, there 

would "be time enough to expound upon the historical justifications for the exceptions 

[it] mentioned if and when those exceptions [came] before [it]." (Heller, supra, 554 U.S. 

at p. 635.)
15

under section 5150 from recovering their seized firearms upon proof by the seizing 

agency that returning the weapon would be likely to result in endangering that person or 

others, is such a regulatory measure. We reject that in Heller and McDonald the U.S.

Supreme Court categorically invalidated such laws, which are designed to keep firearms 

out of the hands of a dangerous person. 

Moreover, though Rupf relies on authorities predating and now abrogated by 

Heller and McDonald,7 neither Heller or McDonald alter Rupf's recognition of the state 

of California's "long . . . established" regulation of firearms as a "proper police function." 

(Rupf, supra, 85 Cal.App.4th at p. 421, citing Galvan v. Superior Court of City and 

County of San Francisco (1969) 70 Cal.2d 851, 866.) The Rupf court pointed to the 

legitimacy of the ends sought to be accomplished by section 8102: "The exercise of the 

police power to regulate firearms is clearly related to the public health, safety and 

welfare. [Citation.] Respondent identifies the object of the statute as providing a means 

whereby authorities can confiscate firearms in an emergency situation and may keep 

firearms from mentally unstable persons. The legislative history of the statute expressly 

 

7 In Heller, the court determined the treatment of the Second Amendment in Lewis 

v. United States (1980) 445 U.S. 55, 65-66 [Second Amendment guarantees no right to 

keep and bear a firearm that does not have some reasonable relationship to the 

preservation or efficiency of a well regulated militia]) to be "footnoted dictum . . . ." 

(Heller, supra, 554 U.S. at p. 625, fn. 25.) Rupf relied on Lewis v. United States for the 

proposition that " '[l]egislative restrictions on the use of firearms are neither based upon 

constitutionally suspect criteria, nor do they trench upon any constitutionally protected 

liberties.' " (Rupf, supra, 85 Cal.App.4th at p. 421.) It also relied on Ninth Circuit and 

other federal authorities—now abrogated—holding that the Second Amendment is a right 

held by the states, and does not protect the possession of a weapon by a private citizen. 

(Ibid., quoting Hickman v. Block (9th Cir. 1996) 81 F.3d 98, 101.)
16

recognizes the urgency and importance of such an objective . . . ." (Rupf, at p. 422.) 

"Keeping a firearm away from a mentally unstable person is a reasonable exercise of the 

police power. It is not unreasonable to conclude there is a significant risk that a mentally 

unstable gun owner will harm [her]self or others with the weapon." (Rupf, at p. 423.) 

We acknowledge Heller and McDonald's expansion of the right to own and bear 

arms. (Heller, supra, 554 U.S. 570 at pp. 2797, 2827-2828, 2821-2822; McDonald, 

supra, 561 U.S. ___ [130 S.Ct. at p. 3026] (plur. opn. of Alito, J.); id. at pp. ___, ___ 

[130 S.Ct. at pp. 3058, 3088] (conc. opn. of Thomas, J.).) However, neither holding 

prohibits the government from regulating the possession of guns by persons proven to be 

dangerous due to mental illness or suggests that those regulations are in direct conflict 

with the Second Amendment. Subsequent decisions have affirmed that the state may 

ensure that firearms are not in the hands of someone who may use them dangerously. 

(See People v. Keil, supra, 161 Cal.App.4th 34; People v. Jason K., supra, 188 

Cal.App.4th 1545.) Section 8102 has procedural devices and burdens set in place to 

remedy constitutional deficiencies (see People v. One Ruger .22-Caliber Pistol, supra, 84 

Cal.App.4th at pp. 313-314) and Heller and McDonald do not alter its validity. 

For the foregoing reasons, we conclude persons whose firearms are seized and 

forfeited under section 8102 fall outside the scope of the Second Amendment, Boggess 

has not demonstrated the statute to be facially unconstitutional, and California may 

therefore enforce the law to protect the health, safety and welfare of its citizens.
17

DISPOSITION

The judgment is affirmed. 

O'ROURKE, J.

WE CONCUR:

McDONALD, Acting P. J.

AARON, J.
Filed 6/11/13

COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

STATE OF CALIFORNIA

CITY OF SAN DIEGO et al.,

Plaintiffs and Respondents,

v.

ESTHER BOGGESS,

Defendant and Appellant.

 D061715

 (Super. Ct. No. MCR 12-006)

ORDER CERTIFYING OPINION 

FOR PUBLICATION

THE COURT:

The opinion filed May 15, 2013, is ordered certified for publication. 

McDONALD, Acting P. J.

Copies to: All parties