COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 

Present: Judges Bray, Elder and Senior Judge Overton 

SONYA P. BRUNDIDGE 

 MEMORANDUM OPINION* 

v. Record Nos. 1457-00-1 and PER CURIAM 

 1830-00-1 JANUARY 30, 2001 

LAWRENCE A. BRUNDIDGE 

FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF YORK COUNTY 

Prentis Smiley, Jr., Judge 

 (Sonya P. Brundidge, on briefs), pro se. 

(Roy H. Lasris; Lasris & Vannan, P.C., on 

brief), for appellee. 

 

* Pursuant to Code § 17.1-413, this opinion is not 

designated for publication.

 In Record No. 1457-00-1, Sonya P. Brundidge, wife, appeals an 

equitable distribution award of the trial court. She contends the 

trial court erred by: (1) including the Langley Federal Credit 

Union checking account as marital property, valuing it at 

pre-separation amounts, and accepting Lawrence A. Brundidge's 

(husband's) evidence for these amounts; (2) "not attributing the 

correct amounts for property during the equitable distribution 

hearing"; and (3) finding that the pilot bonus annuity could not 

be included in property for equitable distribution, then including 

it as part of husband's income for support calculation purposes. 
 In Record No. 1830-00-1, wife appeals an order of the trial 

court concerning child and spousal support. On appeal, she argues 

the trial court erred in: (4) finding that the pilot bonus 

annuity was included as part of husband's income, but not 

providing "a specific timeframe for said amount to be paid until a 

certain dollar figure was realized"; (5) attributing the pilot 

annuity as income, "yet there is no reflection of that 

attribution"; (6) decreasing wife's support payments although 

husband's income increased; (7) not requiring husband to pay 

support payments in arrears; (8) not allowing wife to have a 

payroll deduction order effectuated through the military pay 

center; (9) not giving wife the opportunity to note her objections 

on orders before they were signed by the trial court; (10) not 

addressing child custody in the final decree or post-decree 

orders; (11) awarding husband attorney's fees; (12) not making 

wife designated beneficiary of the military Survivor Benefit Plan 

and not giving her the opportunity to maintain the policy; (13) 

accepting post-decree amendments without notice or evidence to 

"confirm calculations"; (14) not ordering husband to maintain a 

life insurance policy for the children and to maintain the 

children as beneficiaries; (15) not ordering husband to pay 

uninsured medical and dental expenses for the children that exceed 

$100 per year; and (16) giving husband every Christmas holiday 

with the children. Upon reviewing the record and briefs of the 

parties, we conclude that these arguments are without merit. 

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Accordingly, we summarily affirm the decision of the trial court. 

Rule 5A:27. 

 "Under familiar principles, we view the evidence and all 

reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the 

prevailing party below . . . ." Lutes v. Alexander, 14 Va. App. 

1075, 1077, 421 S.E.2d 857, 859 (1992). 

"The burden is on the party who alleges 

reversible error to show by the record that 

reversal is the remedy to which he is 

entitled." We are not the fact-finders and 

an appeal should not be resolved on the 

basis of our supposition that one set of 

facts is more probable than another. 

Id. (citations omitted). 

BACKGROUND

 The parties were married in 1988 and separated in 1998. The 

parties have three children. The trial court ordered an equal 

division of the marital property based on husband's request. 

However, the trial court found that an overall analysis of the 

factors favored husband. The trial court awarded custody of the 

children to wife with visitation to husband. In addition, the 

trial court awarded wife monthly child support and spousal 

support. More detailed facts are recited where the specific 

issues are addressed in this opinion. 

RECORD NO. 1457-00-1

I. 

 Wife contends the trial court erred by including the Langley 

Federal Credit Union checking account as property for equitable 

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distribution and valuing this account at pre-separation amounts. 

She also asserts that the trial court erred in accepting husband's 

testimony concerning the amount of money in the account. However, 

the trial judge's notes indicate that at the April 13, 2000 

hearing, the parties agreed wife withdrew $7,000 from this account 

prior to the parties' separation and in anticipation of the 

parties' separation. Husband later withdrew the remaining $3,650 

after the parties separated. Thus, contrary to wife's assertion, 

the record does not indicate that the trial court accepted only 

husband's evidence as to the value of the account. Rather, the 

parties agreed to the amount of money in the account. 

 Furthermore, wife admits in her objections to the equitable 

distribution order that the account was a "common checking 

account" used to pay for "living expenses" and "bills." The 

record contains no evidence that the account was the separate 

property of either party. Therefore, the money in the account was 

properly classified as marital property to be distributed as part 

of the equitable distribution award. Property is presumed to be 

marital if it was "acquired by either spouse during the marriage, 

and before the last separation of the parties," unless evidence 

proves that the property is separate. Code § 20-107.3(A)(2). 

 Furthermore, "waste" is defined as the "dissipation of 

marital funds in anticipation of divorce or separation for a 

purpose unrelated to the marriage and in derogation of the marital 

relationship at a time when the marriage is in jeopardy." Booth 

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v. Booth, 7 Va. App. 22, 27, 371 S.E.2d 569, 572 (1988). "Once 

the aggrieved spouse shows that marital funds were either 

withdrawn or used after the breakdown, the burden rests with the 

party charged with dissipation to prove that the money was spent 

for a proper purpose." Clements v. Clements, 10 Va. App. 580, 

586, 397 S.E.2d 257, 261 (1990). "When waste has occurred, the 

court must include the wasted assets as marital property and must 

consider the waste as a factor in determining the monetary award." 

Booth, 7 Va. App. at 28-29, 371 S.E.2d at 573. Expenditures for 

living expenses and counsel fees in the divorce do not constitute 

waste. Id. at 28, 371 S.E.2d at 573. The record indicates that 

wife failed to prove she used the $7,000 for living expenses. 

Accordingly, the trial court did not err in including the $7,000 

in the equitable distribution award. 

 In addition, the record contains no evidence from wife 

concerning what she claims the value of the account was at the 

time of the evidentiary hearing. The only evidence presented to 

the trial court was that wife withdrew $7,000 from the joint 

account prior to the parties' separation and that husband later 

withdrew the remaining $3,650 and closed the account. Based on 

this record, we cannot say the trial court abused its discretion 

in choosing a valuation date other than the date of the 

evidentiary hearing. See Code § 20-107.3(A). 

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II. 

 Wife contends the trial court erred in "not attributing the 

correct amounts for property" during the equitable distribution 

hearing. In her argument, wife states, "This [equitable 

distribution] order had inaccurate amounts attributed to various 

investment accounts." However, wife fails to specify the 

"investment accounts" to which she is referring. "Statements 

unsupported by argument, authority, or citations to the record do 

not merit appellate consideration. We will not search the record 

for errors in order to interpret appellant's contention [nor] 

correct deficiencies in a brief." Buchanan v. Buchanan, 14 Va. 

App. 53, 56, 415 S.E.2d 237, 239 (1992). 

 Wife also asserts that, for "further clarification," the 

final equitable distribution order "should state that [wife] is 

awarded her USAA IRA account and [husband] is awarded his USAA IRA 

account." Upon our review of the final equitable distribution 

order, we find that the order clearly specifies that wife was 

awarded her USAA IRA account and husband was awarded his USAA IRA 

account. Accordingly, wife's argument is without merit. 

III. 

 Wife argues that the trial court erred in ruling that the 

pilot bonus annuity could not be included as property for 

equitable distribution, then adding the pilot annuity as part of 

husband's income for support calculation purposes. However, the 

record does not indicate that wife argued to the trial court that 

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the pilot bonus should be part of the equitable distribution 

award. 

 The record contains no transcripts and no written statement 

of facts. Indeed, the trial court rejected wife's proposed 

written statement of facts, finding that it was inaccurate and 

contained descriptions of events that occurred outside of the 

courtroom. As appellant, wife had the burden of providing a 

record which substantiates her claims of error. See Jenkins v. 

Winchester Dep't of Soc. Servs., 12 Va. App. 1178, 1185, 409 

S.E.2d 16, 20 (1991). We are unable to determine from this 

record the arguments made by wife and the trial court's rulings 

concerning whether the pilot bonus annuities should be part of 

the equitable distribution award. 

[O]n appeal the judgment of the lower court 

is presumed to be correct and the burden is 

on the appellant to present to us a 

sufficient record from which we can 

determine whether the lower court has erred 

in the respect complained of. 

Justis v. Young, 202 Va. 631, 632, 119 S.E.2d 255, 256-57 

(1961). 

 Furthermore, the trial court correctly ruled that the pilot 

bonuses were a part of husband's gross income for purposes of 

calculating support awards. In computing a party's gross income 

for child support purposes, Code § 20-108.2(C) requires the 

inclusion of "all income from all sources." Such income "shall 

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include, but not be limited to, income from salaries, wages, 

commissions, [and] bonuses . . . ." Code § 20-108.2(C). 

 Wife appears to make an argument concerning calculation 

errors related to the bonuses. However, she points to no 

specific errors of the trial court, she advances no argument in 

support of her contention, and she cites no legal authority for 

her contention. Therefore, we will not address this argument. 

See Buchanan, 14 Va. App. at 56, 415 S.E.2d at 239. 

RECORD NO. 1830-00-1

IV. and V. 

 Wife argues the trial court erred in attributing the pilot 

bonus annuity as part of husband's gross income, yet "no 

attribution was made and no timeframe was given for this amount to 

be paid until a certain dollar amount was realized." As addressed 

above, the trial court correctly attributed the pilot bonus as 

part of husband's gross income. Furthermore, by order entered on 

August 23, 2000, the trial court included in husband's gross 

income calculation the $6,640 pilot bonus husband received on 

September 1, 1999. The trial court then recalculated husband's 

spousal and child support obligations, prospectively and 

retroactively to July 1, 2000. The evidence included only the 

amount of husband's 1999 pilot bonus. The trial court could not 

speculate as to the amount of future bonuses husband may receive, 

if any. Accordingly, the trial court properly included the 1999 

pilot bonus in husband's gross income calculation. 

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VI. 

 Wife contends the trial court erred in decreasing the amount 

of support she receives because husband did not request a decrease 

and because the trial court lacked jurisdiction to modify the 

awards. Wife appears to be arguing that the trial court erred in 

making permanent spousal and child support awards in amounts that 

were less than the amounts awarded to her in prior pendente lite

support orders. 

 The record indicates that on January 7, 2000, the trial court 

awarded wife $1,425 per month in child support. The monthly 

spousal support award in the order was $1,548 per month. The 

final divorce decree entered on April 18, 2000 reserved 

jurisdiction to make further determinations as to child and 

spousal support. By order entered on July 12, 2000, the trial 

court awarded wife $1,131 per month in periodic child support and 

$1,150 per month in periodic spousal support. However, on August 

23, 2000, the trial court entered an amended order to correct 

clerical errors in the permanent child support award. In this 

order, the trial court awarded wife $1,248 per month in periodic 

child support. 

 Although the permanent periodic support awards were less than 

the support amounts awarded in the January 7, 2000 pendente lite

court order, permanent support is separate and distinct from 

pendente lite support. See Weizenbaum v. Weizenbaum, 12 Va. App. 

899, 903-04, 407 S.E.2d 37, 39-40 (1991). Factors which the court 

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must consider prior to an award of permanent support are not 

required to be considered before an award of pendente lite

support. Cf. Code §§ 20-107.1 and 20-103. The record indicates 

the trial court considered all of the factors required under Code 

§§ 20-107.1 and 20-108.1 concerning the support awards. 

Accordingly, we reject wife's argument that the trial court erred 

in determining the amount of the support awards. 

 Furthermore, the record does not indicate wife argued to the 

trial court that it lacked jurisdiction to make the permanent 

support awards. See Rule 5A:18. 

VII. 

 Wife makes no argument for this issue. Thus, we will not 

address it. Buchanan, 14 Va. App. at 56, 415 S.E.2d at 239. 

VIII. 

 Wife argues the trial court erred in not allowing her to 

receive support through payroll deduction from the military 

payment center. Code § 20-79.1 provides that the trial court has 

discretion whether to require an involuntary payroll deduction for 

support payments. Furthermore, Code § 20-79.1 provides 

circumstances under which the trial court shall order such income 

deductions. None of these circumstances apply here. Accordingly, 

based on this record, we find that the trial court did not abuse 

its discretion in refusing to require husband to pay support 

through a mandatory payroll deduction. 

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IX. 

 Wife argues the trial court erred in not allowing her the 

opportunity to note her objections on court orders before the 

trial court signed them. However, the record is replete with 

wife's objections to the trial court's orders. Wife either noted 

her objections in writing on the court's orders, or she filed 

separate documents with the court noting her objections. 

Therefore, we find wife was not denied the opportunity to object 

to any of the trial court's orders. 

 Wife also contends she was not given the opportunity to 

object to the final decree in this case. However, the record 

indicates otherwise. The final divorce decree, entered on April 

18, 2000, contains handwritten comments by wife regarding items 

she wanted added to the decree. In addition, wife filed a 

separate document entitled Motion Concerning Final Decree in which 

she raised numerous concerns and objections regarding the final 

divorce decree. Accordingly, we find that the trial court did not 

deny wife the opportunity to voice her objections. 

X. 

 Wife argues the trial court erred in not addressing child 

custody in the final decree or post-decree order. In the final 

divorce decree, entered on April 18, 2000, the trial court ordered 

that all prior orders of the court remain in effect until 

modified, and the trial court specifically reserved jurisdiction 

to make further determinations related to child custody. The 

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trial court had previously entered a pendente lite order 

addressing child custody issues. On July 12, 2000, the trial 

court entered the Spousal and Child Support Order and Attorney's 

Fees Order, again addressing child custody matters. The July 12, 

2000 court order provided for the maintenance, support, care and 

custody of the children pursuant to Code § 20-79. Because the 

child custody issues were addressed in this order, and because the 

final divorce decree had specifically reserved jurisdiction to 

address these issues at a later date, we find no error. "A court 

speaks . . . through its orders." Cunningham v. Smith, 205 Va. 

205, 208, 135 S.E.2d 770, 773 (1964). It is not necessary to 

repeatedly address all the issues in a case in every order entered 

in the case. 

XI. 

 Wife contends the trial court abused its discretion in 

ordering her to pay $7,000 in husband's attorney's fees. 

 "An award of attorney's fees is a matter submitted to the 

trial court's sound discretion and is reviewable on appeal only 

for an abuse of discretion. The key to a proper award of counsel 

fees is reasonableness under all the circumstances." Brooks v. 

Brooks, 27 Va. App. 314, 319, 498 S.E.2d 461, 463-64 (1998) 

(citations omitted). 

 On April 3, 2000, the trial court entered an order finding 

wife in contempt of court for intentionally frustrating husband's 

contact with the children and for denying him visitation ordered 

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by the trial court. The trial court ordered wife to spend thirty 

minutes in jail, and it suspended wife's spousal support until 

further order of the court. The record also indicates wife failed 

to timely comply with discovery orders. Therefore, based on the 

issues involved and wife's conduct during the proceedings, the 

award was reasonable, and the trial court did not abuse its 

discretion in making the award. 

 Wife also argues in her brief that the trial court lacked 

jurisdiction to award attorney's fees pursuant to Rule 1:1. On 

the contrary, the record shows that the trial court retained 

jurisdiction over the case at the time it entered the award of 

fees. 

XII. 

 Wife contends the trial court erred in not making her the 

beneficiary of husband's military survivor benefit plan. Under 

Code § 20-107.3(G)(2), the trial court may order that a spouse be 

designated as irrevocable beneficiary of a survivor benefit plan. 

Therefore, the trial court has discretion in deciding whether to 

order the designation of wife as an irrevocable beneficiary. 

Based on this record and the facts of this case, no evidence 

supports a finding that the trial court abused its discretion in 

refusing to order husband to designate wife as an irrevocable 

beneficiary. 

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XIII. 

 Wife contends the trial court erred in signing the August 23, 

2000 amended post-decree order "without having the proper 

evidentiary documents to confirm calculations." In her argument, 

wife asserts that the trial court violated Rule 1:1 when it 

entered the order more than twenty-one days after the entry of the 

July 12, 2000 order. 

 The August 23, 2000 order is entitled, "Amended Order On Post 

Decree Motions to Correct Clerical Errors." This order corrects 

clerical errors contained in the July 28, 2000 court order related 

to monthly spousal and child support payments. 

 Code § 8.01-428(B) provides: 

Clerical Mistakes.--Clerical mistakes in all 

judgments or other parts of the record and 

errors therein arising from oversight or 

from an inadvertent omission may be 

corrected by the court at any time on its 

own initiative or upon the motion of any 

party and after such notice, as the court 

may order. 

 On this record, we cannot say the trial court erred in 

amending the July 28, 2000 order. Moreover, we note that the 

clerical corrections were beneficial to wife. 

XIV. 

 Wife argues the trial court erred in failing to order husband 

to maintain an existing life insurance policy for his children and 

to name them as beneficiaries. Code § 20-108.1(D) provides that 

the trial court: 

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shall have the authority to order a party to 

(i) maintain any existing life insurance 

policy on the life of either party provided 

the party so ordered has the right to 

designate a beneficiary and (ii) designate a 

child or children of the parties as the 

beneficiary of all or a portion of such life 

insurance . . . . 

On this record, we find that the trial court acted within its 

statutory authority based upon the evidence presented. 

XV. 

 Wife argues the trial court erred in not ordering husband to 

pay for uninsured medical and dental expenses for the children 

that exceed $100 per year. As wife correctly states, the pendente

lite order provided that husband was to pay one hundred percent of 

any uninsured medical and dental bills for the children. Although 

the final Spousal and Child Support Order did not address 

uninsured medical and dental bills, the order states that "all 

previous orders regarding the support, [and] care" of the children 

"are continued in full force and effect," with the exception of 

child support payments. Accordingly, husband is required to pay 

the uninsured medical and dental expenses of the children. 

Therefore, wife's argument is without merit. 

XVI. 

 Wife argues the trial court erred in awarding a visitation 

schedule in which husband spends the Christmas holiday with the 

children. She contends the trial court's order bars her from 

sharing the holiday with her children. 

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 Determination of visitation rights is a matter of judicial 

discretion. See Eichelberger v. Eichelberger, 2 Va. App. 409, 

412, 345 S.E.2d 10, 11 (1986). We will not set aside the trial 

court's decision on visitation unless plainly wrong or without 

evidence to support it. Farley v. Farley, 9 Va. App. 326, 328, 

387 S.E.2d 794, 795 (1990). 

 The trial court awarded wife sole custody of the children. 

The trial court entered a pendente lite order allowing husband 

"reasonable visitation" with the children. By order entered on 

January 7, 2000, the trial court found that wife committed acts 

"specifically designed to frustrate the pendente lite order" and 

"deliberately and intentionally aimed at denying" husband contact 

with his children. The trial court then ordered the visitation 

schedule that provided husband would have visitation with the 

children from "Christmas Day at 12:00 noon and ending on New 

Year's Day at 12:00 noon." The order clearly provides that wife 

will spend Christmas Day with the children until 12:00 noon. 

Therefore, she is not denied the opportunity to spend the 

Christmas holiday with the children. Furthermore, under these 

circumstances, we cannot say the trial court abused its discretion 

in ordering the visitation schedule. 

 Accordingly, the decision of the trial court is summarily 

affirmed. 

 Affirmed.

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