J-S11003-18

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

v.

JARON BROWN 

Appellant

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 1294 EDA 2017

Appeal from the PCRA Order April 10, 2017

In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County 

Criminal Division at No(s): CP-51-CR-0001112-2013, 

CP-51-CR-0002978-2013, CP-51-CR-0003683-2013, 

CP-51-CR-0014844-2012, CP-51-CR-0014848-2012, 

CP-51-CR-0014853-2012

BEFORE: OTT, J., STABILE, J., and MUSMANNO, J.

MEMORANDUM BY OTT, J.: FILED JULY 24, 2018

Jaron Brown appeals from the order entered on April 10, 2017, in the 

Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County denying him relief, without a 

hearing, on his petitions filed pursuant to the Post Conviction Relief Act

(PCRA), 42 Pa.C.S. § 9541 et seq. In this timely appeal,1 Brown argues that 

the trial court imposed an illegal mandatory minimum sentence under 42 

Pa.C.S. § 9712(a). The PCRA court, which was also the trial court, noted 

Brown was not sentenced pursuant to Section 9712(a) in this, or in any of the 

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1 There are six related appeals that were disposed of at one time by a single 

order. This appeal addresses the trial court docket number CP-51-CR0003683-2013, which was the first docket number listed on Brown’s notice of 

appeal. Brown listed the docket numbers in descending order, most recent to 

oldest, rather than in oldest to most recent, which is the convention used by 

our Court.
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cases. Our review of the certified record confirms the PCRA court’s finding. 

Accordingly, we affirm.

Before we address the substance of this appeal, we first note that a 

single order disposed of all the cases listed in the caption. Brown filed a single 

notice of appeal from the order, despite the fact the order disposed of separate 

matters. This was a common practice. However, our Supreme Court has 

recently determined that in instances, such as is currently before us, where a 

single order disposes of multiple cases, the appellant must file a notice of 

appeal for each case. If the appellant files a single notice of appeal, the appeal 

is to be quashed. See Commonwealth v. Walker, ____ A.3d ____ (Pa.,

June 1, 2018). The Walker decision is to be applied prospectively from the 

date of the opinion. Id. at 13. Because this appeal was filed prior to the 

Walker decision, we may address the substance of the appeal.

The PCRA court succinctly described the relevant history of this matter 

as follows:

On December 12, 2013, Defendant Jaron Brown pled guilty 

to six (6) counts each of Robbery (18 Pa.C.S.A. § 3701(a)(1)(ii)), 

Conspiracy (18 Pa.C.S.A. § 903), and Possessing Instruments of 

Crime (18 Pa.C.S.A. § 907(a)). On April 11, 2014, this Court 

sentenced [Brown] to seven (7) to fourteen (14) years’ 

incarceration for each Robbery charge, seven (7) to fourteen (14) 

years’ incarceration for each Conspiracy charge, to run 

concurrently to the Robbery sentences, and five (5) years of 

probation to run consecutive to the Robbery charges. No postsentence motions or direct appeals were filed.

On March 20, 2015, [Brown] filed a pro se petition under 

the Post Conviction Relief Act (PCRA). On April 7, 2016, [Brown] 

through counsel, filed an amended petition under the PCRA. On 
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April 10, 2017, this Court denied [Brown’s] petition. On April 13, 

2017, [Brown] filed a Notice of Appeal to the Superior Court of 

Pennsylvania. [Brown] filed a Concise Statement of Matters 

Complained of on Appeal on May 24, 2017, alleging that this Court 

erred by failing to find that trial counsel was ineffective for failing 

to raise the issue of unconstitutionality of the mandatory 

sentences at sentencing or file a direct appeal regarding the issue.

PCRA Court Opinion, 6/26/2017, at 1-2.

“When reviewing the denial of a PCRA petition, our standard of review

is limited to examining whether the PCRA court's determination is supported 

by evidence of record and whether it is free of legal error.” Commonwealth 

v. Jordan, 182 A.3d 1046, 1049 (Pa. Super. 2018) (citations omitted).

Here, Brown asserts he was sentenced pursuant to the unconstitutional 

mandatory minimum provisions of 42 Pa.C.S. § 9712(a). See Alleyne v. 

United States, 570 U.S. 99 (2013) (any fact that increases the penalty for a 

crime beyond the prescribed statutory minimum sentence be submitted to a 

jury), Commonwealth v. Ferguson, 107 A.3d 206 (Pa. Super. 2015) 

(Section 9712(a) is unconstitutional pursuant to Alleyne). He further asserts 

trial counsel was ineffective for failing to challenge the imposition of the 

mandatory minimum sentence either at sentencing or in a direct appeal. 

The requirements for proving ineffective assistance of counsel are as 

follows:

“[C]ounsel is presumed effective, and [appellant] bears the 

burden of proving otherwise.” Commonwealth v. Steele, 599 

Pa. 341, 961 A.2d 786, 796 (2008) (citing Commonwealth v. 

Hall, 549 Pa. 269, 701 A.2d 190, 200-01 (1997)). To prevail on 

an ineffectiveness claim, appellant must establish:
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(1) the underlying claim has arguable merit; (2) no 

reasonable basis existed for counsel's actions or failure to 

act; and (3) [appellant] suffered prejudice as a result of 

counsel's error such that there is a reasonable probability 

that the result of the proceeding would have been different 

absent such error.

Commonwealth v. Lesko, 609 Pa. 128, 15 A.3d 345, 373-74 

(2011) (citing Commonwealth v. Peirce, 515 Pa. 153, 527 A.2d 

973, 975 (1987)). Failure to prove any prong of this test will 

defeat an ineffectiveness claim. Commonwealth v. Basemore, 

560 Pa. 258, 744 A.2d 717, 738 n. 23 (2000) (citation omitted). 

“[I]f a claim fails under any necessary element of the Strickland

test, the court may proceed to that element first.” Lesko, at 374 

(citations omitted). When an appellant fails to meaningfully 

discuss each of the three ineffectiveness prongs, “he is not entitled 

to relief, and we are constrained to find such claims waived for 

lack of development.” Steele, at 797; see also Commonwealth 

v. Walter, 600 Pa. 392, 966 A.2d 560, 566 (2009) (citation 

omitted). Further, counsel cannot be deemed ineffective for failing 

to raise a meritless claim. Commonwealth v. Washington, 592 

Pa. 698, 927 A.2d 586, 603 (2007) (citations omitted).

Commonwealth v. Fears, 86 A.3d 795, 804 (Pa. 2014) (footnotes omitted).

Although it is Brown’s responsibility to provide this Court with a certified 

record sufficient to review the issues raised, the notes of testimony from the 

sentencing hearing have not been included. However, in five of the six cases 

before this panel, including this matter, the certified record contains form DC300B (Part 1). This form, completed by the trial court, confirms Brown was 

not subjected to a mandatory minimum sentence. The PCRA court aptly noted 

that because Brown was not subjected to a mandatory minimum sentence, 

his claim that counsel was ineffective for failing to challenge the imposition of 

a mandatory minimum sentence is without merit. Because counsel cannot 

be ineffective for failing to raise a meritless claim, the PCRA court’s denial of 

Brown’s petition is supported by the certified record and is free from legal 
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error. As such, we are required to affirm the PCRA court’s order denying 

Brown relief.

Order affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 7/24/18