DA20-0082INTHESUPREMECOURTOFTHESTATEOFMONTANA2021MT261NCITYOFBILLINGS,PlaintiffandAppellee,v.FILEKATRINALYNNHOFMAN,OCT052021DefendantandAppellant,BowenGreenwoodClerkofSuprerneCourtStateofMontanaAPPEALFROM:DistrictCourtoftheThirteenthJudicialDistrict,InandFortheCountyofYellowstone,CauseNo.DC19-0041HonorableMaryJaneKnisely,PresidingJudgeCOTINSELOFRECORD:ForAppellant:Filed:ChadWright,AppellateDefender,MosesOkeyo,AssistantAppellateDefender,Helena,MontanaForAppellee:AustinKnudsen,MontanaAttorneyGeneral,JonathanM.Krauss,AssistantAttorneyGeneral,Helena,MontanaGinaDahl,BillingsCityAttorney,ChantelAnderson,DeputyCityAttorney,Billings,MontanaSubmittedonBriefs:August4,2021Decided:October5,2021Clerk10/05/2021Case Number: DA 20-0082Justice Beth Baker delivered the Opinion
of the Court. ¶1 Pursuant
to Section

I, Paragraph 3(c), Montana Supreme Court Internal Operating Rules, this case is decided by memorandum opinion and shall not be cited and does not serve as precedent.

Its case title, cause nurnber, and disposition shall be included

in this Court's quarterly list of noncitable cases published

in the Pacific Reporter and Montana Reports. ¶2 Katrina Lynn Hofinan was convicted
of two counts of Violation
of Order of Protection

in the Billings Municipal Court after multiple alleged contacts with C.S., the person protected
by the order. The Thirteenth Judicial District Court affirmed. On appeal to this Court, Haman argues that the Municipal Court should have excluded from evidence a recording C.S. made of one of Hofman's phone calls without her knowledge because C.S. violated Montana's Privacy
in Communications statute,

§ 45-8-213, MCA. We affirm. ¶3 In February 2018, C.S. obtained
an order of protection against Haman, his former girlfriend, because she was allegedly harassing him and his family through text messages. The protective order stated in part that "[Haman] shall not harass, annoy, disturb the peace of, telephone, email, contact
or otherwise communicate, directly
or indirectly, with [C.S.]." In March 2018, Haman violated this provision
by phoning C.S. more than fifty times within one hour. C.S. recorded one of these phone conversations because he knew that Hofman typically called from unknown phone numbers. C.S. provided the recording

to Officer Stovall, the investigating officer. Officer Stovall also photographed C.S.'s phone to document Hofman's numerous calls.

2¶4 The City of Billings charged Hofman

in the Municipal Court with two counts of Violation
of Order of Protection. The Municipal Court held

a trial on December
12, 2018. At trial, Hofman's defense attorney objected

to the admission

of the recording
on the ground that it was obtained

in violation
of the Privacy
in Comrnunications statute. The City countered that Hofman should have raised the objection

in a pretrial motion
to suppress. The court denied the objection, noting that, although Hofman had every right to report the incident
to law enforcement,
she could not use the Privacy
in Comrnunications statute to exclude the recording from evidence. The court also agreed with the City that the objection should have been raised in a pretrial motion
to suppress. ¶5 On appeal to the District Court, Hofman argued that the Municipal Court abused its discretion when

it refused
to consider her objection and that the court erred when

it admitted the phone recording. The District Court held: (1) the Municipal Court did not abuse its discretion because Hofman had ample tirne and opportunity

to raise her objection before trial and, therefore, could not establish the "good cause" exception

of § 46-13-101, MCA; and (2) the Municipal Court did not err by admitting the recording because the Privacy
in Cornmunications statute "does not provide an independent statutory remedy" for suppression

of evidence. ¶6 We review "an appeal of a district court's decision on appeal from

a rnunicipal court as if the appeal originally had been filed in this Court." City of Missoula

v. Pope, 2021 MT 4, ¶ 5, 402 Mont. 416, 478 P.3d 815 (citation omitted). We review

a denial of a motion
to suppress

to determine whether the district court's findings
of fact were clearly 3erroneous and whether
its interpretation
and application

of the law were correct. State
v. Wolfe, 2020 MT 260, ¶ 6, 401 Mont. 511, 474 P.3d 318 (citation omitted). Hofman asserts that the issue she appeals

is properly before this Court because the trial court had full opportunity

to consider

it after hearing the parties' arguments, and both the Municipal Court and the District Court addressed

it. We turn to the merits of Hofinan's claim. ¶7 In State
v. Long, 216 Mont. 65, 71, 700 P.2d 153, 157 (1985), we held that "the privacy section of the Montana Constitution contemplates privacy invasion
by state action only." We explicitly overruled

a line of cases holding that "private searches invade privacy rights protected
by the Constitution and are properly the subject of our exclusionary rule." Long, 216 Mont.
at 67, 69, 700 P.2d at 155-56 (overruling State
v. Hyem, 193 Mont. 51, 630 P.2d 202 (1981), and similar cases).
In State
v. Christensen, 244 Mont. 312, 319, 797 P.2d 893, 897 (1990), we addressed the question Long did not resolve, stating that "the exclusionary rule does not apply to evidence resulting from the conduct of private individuals, even if felonious, unless that conduct involves state action." ¶8 Hofinan does not argue that C.S.'s recording
of her phone call involved any state action. She instead urges this Court to revisit Long and re-establish
the line of precedent it overruled.

In support of this argument, Hofinan cites State v. Van Haele, 199 Mont. 522, 530, 649 P.2d 1311, 1315 (1982), overruled
by Long, where we stated that adrnitting illegally obtained evidence
by private citizens would "encourage

a vigilante movementil" We considered and rejected similar policy arguments

in Long and in Christensen. See Long, 216 Mont.
at 71-72, 700 P.2d at 157-58 (discussing the extension
of the silver 4platter doctrine and holding that "judicial integrity" did not justify exclusion
of evidence seized by a private trespasser); Christensen, 244 Mont.
at 317-18, 797 P.2d at 896 ("The respondent's arguments awaken the image of spectral horsemen riding forth from Virginia City to enforce law and order in our communities,
but leaving
in their dust the trampled remnants
of the constitution.").
We decline
to revisit Long as Hofman offers no novel arguments
for overruling

it and fails to demonstrate that it is manifestly incorrect. ¶9 Hofman's situation

is addressed squarely by Christensen. Even if C.S. violated the Privacy
in Communications statute, the recording

is not subject
to the exclusionary rule because C.S. obtained

it privately, without state involvement. Therefore, the Municipal Court correctly overruled Hofman's objection

to the admission
of the phone recording. ¶10 We have determined

to decide this case pursuant
to Section

I, Paragraph 3(c) of our Internal Operating Rules, which provides for mernorandum opinions.

In the opinion of the Court, the case presents

a question controlled
by settled law. The District Court correctly applied the law when

it upheld Hofinan's conviction.

Its December
10, 2019 Order
is affirmed.

Justici We Concur: Chief Justice

5(Af/j°4‘eS2iin-4,14,.Justices