If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to 

revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports.

-1-

S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N

C O U R T O F A P P E A L S

LINDA PERSON,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

UNPUBLISHED

April 11, 2024

v No. 364494

Oakland Circuit Court

TRANZ 1 SOLUTIONS, LLC and PIONEER 

STATE MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY,

LC No. 2021-186850-CZ

Defendants-Appellees,

and

CACT GROWTH & NEW DEVELOPMENT, LLC 

and RENN INSURANCE AGENCY, INC,

Defendants.

Before: RIORDAN, P.J., and O’BRIEN and MALDONADO, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

Plaintiff appeals as of right the trial court’s order granting summary disposition to 

defendants, Tranz 1 Solutions, LLC, Pioneer State Mutual Insurance Company, CACT Growth & 

New Development, LLC, and Renn Insurance Agency, Inc.1 On appeal, plaintiff does not 

challenge the trial court’s decision granting summary disposition in favor of defendants, but 

 

1

In the order appealed, the trial court stated that it was a final order and dismissed plaintiff’s

complaint. But, at the time, there was a default judgment against CACT outstanding. The trial 

court subsequently clarified that the failure to dismiss CACT in the order appealed from was an 

oversight and that the order appealed from was intended to dismiss the action altogether, including 

plaintiff’s claims against CACT.
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instead argues that the trial court erred by denying plaintiff’s request to amend her complaint to 

add Tranz 1’s insurer, Old Republic Insurance Company, as a party. We affirm.

I. BACKGROUND

On June 5, 2019,2two vehicles drove onto plaintiff’s lawn and got stuck. Tranz 1 never 

denied or contested the fact that it owned at least one the vehicles. According to an email plaintiff 

sent shortly after this incident, the vehicles got stuck in plaintiff’s septic-tank field, and a “tow 

truck had to pull over the septic tank to get them out.” This resulted in damage to plaintiff’s septictank system; plaintiff said that the system now “leaks in to [sic] the driveway” as well as into the 

drain field. Plaintiff said that she spoke with a contractor, who estimated that it would cost up to 

$45,000 to fix, possibly more pending county permits and the type of septic system that the county 

required.

Shortly after this incident, plaintiff was in contact with Colleen Bruckner from “Sedgwick 

Claims Management Services, Inc.,” which is the company that “manages claims on behalf of Old 

Republic,” Tranz 1’s automobile insurer. Bruckner’s email signature states that she is a “Claims 

Representative-Consumer” with Sedgwick. Plaintiff’s correspondence with Bruckner shows that 

Sedgwick was aware of plaintiff’s damages; plaintiff explained the extent of her damages, was 

requested to—and did—send photos of her damages, and kept Sedgwick representatives up to date 

about the steps that plaintiff was taking to address the damages. During the course of the emails, 

plaintiff said that she was running into problems with installing the septic system, and that she was 

required to hire an engineer and submit a design plan to the county for approval of the new septic 

system.

On July 16, 2019, the Oakland County Health Division sent plaintiff a letter stating that 

plaintiff’s “permit to install an onsite wastewater treatment system is denied” because plaintiff’s 

property could not safely accommodate such a system. Plaintiff provided this letter to Bruckner 

in an email dated July 23, 2019. Plaintiff subsequently hired a contractor to “draw[] up plans for 

the septic system,” and forwarded the contractor’s information and cost estimate to Sedgwick on 

August 8, 2019.

On December 3, 2019, Bruckner on behalf of Sedgwick sent plaintiff a letter informing 

plaintiff that Sedgwick was missing documents necessary to process plaintiff’s claim, and she 

needed a reply by December 17, 2019, or Sedgwick would assume that plaintiff did “not wish to 

pursue [her] claim.” Plaintiff’s counsel responded on December 16, 2019, informing Bruckner 

that plaintiff was in the process of collecting all of the supporting documents and, when finished, 

would “make a ‘demand’ regarding . . . damages.”

On March 11, 2020, the Oakland County Health Division sent plaintiff a letter stating that 

it had received her proposed engineered plan for a new septic system but was placing the plan on 

hold so that plaintiff could address several problems that had been identified with plaintiff’s plans. 

The letter concluded by stating that the plan as submitted contained “certain site conditions” so 

“no permit may be issued at this time.” But the letter advised that plaintiff could submit “changes 

 

2 Plaintiff’s complaint originally misstated the date as June 15, 2019.
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and corrections” to the current plan to bring it into compliance. Plaintiff apparently addressed the 

problems identified with her plans because the Oakland County Health Division issued plaintiff a 

permit to install an onsite sewage disposal system on May 22, 2020.

The record contains no information about what transpired between March 2020 and 

November 2020. On November 3, 2020, David Clark, whose email signature line suggests that he 

is a “Forensic Engineer” affiliated with Sedgwick, sent an email to Plaintiff’s attorney stating that 

Bruckner had “asked for a report,” and that Clark hoped to have it completed “in the next two 

days.”3

On March 12, 2021, plaintiff filed a two-count complaint against Tranz 1 and CACT, 

seeking to recover for the damage to plaintiff’s property. Count 1 alleged that plaintiff’s property 

was damaged as a result of intentional trespass, and Count 2 alleged that plaintiff’s property was 

damaged as a result of negligence.

On April 30, 2021, Bruckner sent a letter to plaintiff’s counsel stating:

I am following up in regards to the property damage claim for your client 

[plaintiff]. Our insured informed us that they had received a notice from you. We 

had previously accepted liability for the damages, and had set up an inspection for 

damages. Have you had an inspection done of the damages, or is there an estimate 

or invoice for repair?

On July 15, 2021, plaintiff’s counsel sent a letter to Bruckner. In that letter, plaintiff’s 

counsel referenced a June 14, 2021 email that supposedly “asked . . . for an update of [plaintiff’s] 

damages” but that email does not appear in the lower court file. Regardless, the July letter claimed 

that plaintiff’s damages amounted to $90,097.69. Attached to the letter was documentation to 

support the amount of damages requested.

On July 22, 2021, Ryan Williams, whose email signature identifies him as a “Claims Team 

Lead—Liability” with Sedgwick, sent an email to plaintiff’s counsel in response to the July 15 

letter. In the email, Williams stated that there were some charges that were “in question,” but 

agreed that the “Total of Charges” amounted to at least $76,572.69.

Further negotiations apparently took place because on August 10, 2021, Williams sent 

plaintiff’s attorney another email with a new proposed payment. Williams’ email discussed 

plaintiff’s demands, items included in plaintiff’s demand that Williams wanted removed, and 

charges in plaintiff’s demand that Williams was not prepared to agree to but was willing to 

negotiate about. The email concluded by proposing a payment of $77,051.85. This is the last 

 

3 Plaintiff claims in her brief on appeal that Clark contacted plaintiff’s counsel on January 7, 2020, 

and states that counsel’s notes from the call are available. Those notes are not part of the lower 

court record, however, and plaintiff has not moved to expand the record on appeal. Sherman v Sea 

Ray Boats, Inc, 251 Mich App 41, 56; 649 NW2d 783 (2002) (“This Court’s review is limited to 

the record established by the trial court, and a party may not expand the record on appeal.”).
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correspondence of any kind between plaintiff (or plaintiff’s counsel) and Old Republic (or its 

agents) in the lower court record. While it is not clear what happened, it is clear that settlement 

negotiations between Old Republic and plaintiff broke down at some point after August 2021, and 

Old Republic thereafter refused to pay any amount to plaintiff to settle her claim.4

Back in the instant action, on August 25, 2021, Tranz 1 filed an answer and affirmative 

defenses to plaintiff’s complaint. The case then stalled until December 29, 2021, when Tranz 1 

moved for summary disposition on grounds that plaintiff’s claim should have been brought against 

Tranz 1’s automobile insurer (Old Republic), not Tranz 1. Tranz 1 recognized that, generally, 

plaintiff would be able to amend her complaint to add Old Republic as a party, but argued that any 

amendment in this case would be futile because any claim against Old Republic was barred by the 

statute of limitations for actions to recover property protection insurance benefits.

Plaintiff did not respond to Tranz 1’s motion, and the parties instead entered a stipulated 

order on March 10, 2022, in which they agreed that (1) plaintiff would be permitted to add two 

new parties as defendants and (2) the hearing on Tranz 1’s motion would be adjourned “without 

date,” to be rescheduled by the trial court after the new parties were added and Tranz 1 refiled its 

dispositive motion. Pursuant to this order, plaintiff filed an amended complaint on April 6, 2022. 

In addition to adding Pioneer and Renn as parties to the action, plaintiff’s amended complaint 

added two new counts. In Count III, plaintiff alleged a breach-of-contract claim against Pioneer. 

In Count IV, plaintiff alleged a claim of negligence against Renn.

On June 22, 2022, Tranz 1 refiled its motion for summary disposition, raising the same 

arguments it raised in its December 2021 motion. Briefly, Tranz 1 argued that plaintiff’s complaint 

against Tranz 1 was barred by the no-fault act, and that plaintiff should have brought her claims 

against Tranz 1’s insurer, Old Republic. Tranz 1 also reiterated its belief that adding Old Republic 

as a defendant would be futile because any claim plaintiff may have had against Old Republic was 

barred by the applicable statute of limitations.

In response to Tranz 1’s motion, plaintiff argued that there was an exception to the no-fault 

act for intentional torts, and plaintiff was alleging that the damage to her property was caused by 

Tranz 1’s employees’ trespass. Plaintiff alternatively argued that she should be permitted to amend 

her complaint to add Old Republic as a party, and that the amendment would not be futile because 

the statute of limitations should be equitably tolled. Plaintiff contended that equitable tolling was 

available in this case because she had negotiated with Old Republic in good faith since the accident 

first occurred; she had cooperated with Old Republic’s investigation whenever requested; and she 

only failed to file a timely complaint against Old Republic because she relied on Old Republic’s 

April 30, 2021 representation that it was accepting liability for the damage to plaintiff’s property. 

Plaintiff concluded that, under these facts, Old Republic should be estopped from asserting a 

statute-of-limitations defense.

The trial court heard Tranz 1’s motion for summary disposition on December 21, 2022. 

After brief argument, the trial court delivered a ruling from the bench. In pertinent part, the trial 

 

4 Plaintiff repeatedly blames the breakdown of negotiations on Old Republic’s counsel, but nothing 

in the lower court record corroborates plaintiff’s accusations.
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court granted Tranz 1’s motion for summary disposition because the proper defendant for 

plaintiff’s claims against Tranz 1 was Tranz 1’s insurer, Old Republic. With respect to plaintiff’s 

request to amend her complaint, the court reasoned that an amendment would be futile because 

any such claim would be time-barred.

This appeal followed.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

If there are no questions of fact, whether a cause of action is barred by the statute of 

limitations presents a question of law reviewed de novo. Doe v Roman Catholic Archbishop of 

Archdiocese of Detroit, 264 Mich App 632, 638; 692 NW2d 398 (2004). Likewise, whether 

equitable relief is proper presents a question of law reviewed de novo. McDonald v Farm Bureau 

Ins Co, 480 Mich 191, 197; 747 NW2d 811 (2008).

III. ANALYSIS

On appeal, plaintiff only argues that the trial court erred by not granting plaintiff leave to 

amend her complaint to add Old Republic as a defendant. We disagree.

Tranz 1 moved for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(7), (8), and (10), but the 

trial court granted the motion under only MCR 2.116(C)(8) and (10). Under MCR 2.116(I)(5), “If 

the grounds asserted are based on subrule (C)(8), (9), or (10), the court shall give the parties an 

opportunity to amend their pleadings as provided by MCR 2.118, unless the evidence then before 

the court shows that amendment would not be justified.” MCR 2.118(A)(2) in turn provides that, 

generally, a party can only amend a pleading by leave of the court, but clarifies that “[l]eave shall 

be freely given when justice so requires.” One reason to deny a party leave to amend a pleading 

is when the amendment would be futile. Weymers v Khera, 454 Mich 639, 658; 563 NW2d 647 

(1997). Examples of futile amendments to pleadings include merely restating the pleading’s 

allegations and adding allegations that would still result in dismissal. Jawad A Shah, MD, PC v 

State Farm Mut Auto Ins Co, 324 Mich App 182, 209; 920 NW2d 148 (2018).

It cannot be seriously disputed that, absent tolling, any claim against Old Republic resulting 

from the June 5, 2019 accident would be barred by the statute of limitations in MCL 500.3145(5).5 

That statute states, “An action for recovery of property protection insurance benefits may not be 

 

5 The no-fault act was substantially amended by 2019 PA 21, effective June 11, 2019. Plaintiff’s 

original complaint alleged that the at-issue accident took place four days after this effective date 

(June 15, 2019). But she later alleged that this was a scrivener’s error and was allowed to amend 

her complaint to reflect that the at-issue accident took place six days before the effective date of 

2019 PA 21 (June 5, 2019). Both parties cite MCL 500.3145(5) as the applicable statute of 

limitations, which was the statute in effect when plaintiff filed her suit. At the time of plaintiff’s 

accident, however, this statute of limitations was located in MCL 500.3145(2). Because the parties 

agree that the current version of the statute is applicable here, we will likewise refer to and rely on 

the current version of MCL 500.3145 in this opinion.
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commenced later than 1 year after the accident.” MCL 500.3145(5). This statute of limitations 

expired on June 5, 2020.6 Plaintiff did not bring her action against Tranz 1 until March 12, 2021, 

well after the statute of limitations in MCL 500.3145(5) expired.

Old Republic, moreover, was not a party to this action as originally filed, so any allegation 

against Old Republic in an amended complaint would not relate back to plaintiff’s original March 

12, 2021 filing. See Miller v Chapman Contracting, 477 Mich 102, 106; 730 NW2d 462 (2007) 

(“The relation-back doctrine does not apply to the addition of new parties.”). Nor did filing this 

action toll the statute of limitations; the general rule is that, for any defendant not party to an action, 

“the statute of limitations continues to run in their favor until” they are “made parties” to the action. 

Ciotte v Ullrich, 267 Mich 136, 139; 255 NW 179 (1934) (quotation marks and citation omitted). 

Accordingly, if Old Republic was added as a party now and was permitted to raise a statute-oflimitations defense, Old Republic would plainly prevail because any claim against it arising out of 

the June 5, 2019 accident would be time-barred.

To avoid this result, plaintiff argues that Old Republic should not be permitted to assert 

(or, stated differently, should be estopped from asserting) the statute of limitations as a defense. 

Plaintiff relies on two cases in support of this argument: Cincinnati Ins Co v Citizens Ins Co, 454 

Mich 263; 562 NW2d 648 (1997) and Matti Awdish, Inc v Williams, 117 Mich App 270; 323 

NW2d 666 (1982).

A. CINCINNATI INS

In Cincinnati Ins, a building insured by the plaintiff was damaged in a motor vehicle 

accident. Id. at 264. The plaintiff insurance company coordinated with the defendant no-fault 

insurer to iron-out details about the plaintiff’s subrogation claim. The accident occurred in 

February 1992. Id. The plaintiff provided documents to the defendant in January 1993 

substantiating the plaintiff’s $207,400 loss for its insured’s property damage, with an 

accompanying letter stating that the plaintiff was still compiling documents to determine its 

insureds “business-interruption loss.” Id. at 265-266. Defendant responded by saying that it “did 

not want to handle the claim piecemeal, i.e., to handle the contents-damage part separately from 

the business-interruption loss.” Id. at 266. In accordance with the defendant’s wishes, the plaintiff 

finalized its documents substantiating its business-interruption loss, and, in May 1993, sent those 

documents to defendant and requested a check for $231,233. Id. Following additional contacts in 

June and July 1993, the defendant in August 1993 advised the plaintiff that it “was not going to 

pay the subrogation claim” because it was now time-barred. Id. at 267. The plaintiff accordingly 

initiated suit in September 1993, arguing in relevant part that the defendant should be equitably 

estopped from raising a statute-of-limitations defense. Id.

 

6 Plaintiff does not offer any argument that the statute was tolled by AO 2020-3. See, e.g., Carter 

v DTN Mgt Co, ___ Mich App ___, ___; ___ NW3d ___ (2023); (Docket No. 360772), slip op at 

4-5. Even if she did, it would not make a difference. Under the broadest interpretation of AO 

2020-3, the statute of limitations was tolled 102 days. See, e.g., Compagner v Burch, ___ Mich 

App, ___; ___ NW3d ___ (2023); (Docket No. 359699), slip op at 9. September 15, 2020, is 102 

days after June 5, 2020.
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Our Supreme Court agreed. The Court first explained that the doctrine of equitable 

estoppel in this context “is essentially a doctrine of waiver that extends the applicable period for 

filing a lawsuit by precluding the defendant from raising the statute of limitations as a bar.” Id. at 

270. “One who seeks to invoke the doctrine generally must establish that there has been (1) a false 

representation or concealment of a material fact, (2) an expectation that the other party will rely 

on the misconduct, and (3) knowledge of the actual facts on the part of the representing or 

concealing party.” Id. Generally, for the doctrine to apply, a defendant must engage in intentional 

or negligent conduct designed to induce the plaintiff to bring an untimely action. Id. “Negotiations 

intended to forestall” the plaintiff from bringing a timely suit can be sufficient under the right 

circumstances. Id. citing Friedberg v Ins Co of N Am, 257 Mich 291, 293; 241 NW 183 (1932).

The Court explained that the first element of equitable estoppel was met in the case before 

it because the defendant made false or negligent representations to the plaintiff by suggesting that 

it would review any documents submitted by the plaintiff “to determine whether the loss was 

appropriate.” Cincinnati Ins, 454 Mich at 271. The Court reasoned that the plaintiff relied on 

these representations to not bring suit sooner “for the convenience of [the defendant],” such that it 

would be “unjust to allow” the defendant to now assert a statute-of-limitations defense to avoid 

liability. Id. The Court further reasoned that the plaintiff always kept the defendant informed 

about its claim, which included submitting documents substantiating its $207,400 loss in January 

1993—within the limitations period. Id. Besides evidence in the record, the Court relied on the 

absence of evidence that the defendant expressed displeasure with the manner in which plaintiff 

was processing the claim. Id. “To the contrary, the record indicates that [the plaintiff] proceeded 

as it did at the request of [the defendant].” Id. at 271-272. The Court summarized its holding as 

follows:

In short, the record contains ample evidence that [the plaintiff] was justified 

in relying, and did rely, on the representations of [the defendant] that the 

subrogation claim would be processed without difficulty, once all the 

documentation was complete. The fact that [the defendant] did not intend to honor 

its representations is demonstrated by the fact that it did not honor them. It is not 

significant whether the final decision was made by [one of the defendant’s 

employees], as long as both the intent and the decision can be imputed to [the 

defendant]. [Id. at 272.]

Unlike the plaintiff in Cincinnati Ins, plaintiff here cannot rely on the doctrine of equitable 

estoppel to toll the statute of limitations for Old Republic because plaintiff cannot point to any 

intentional or negligent conduct by Old Republic that induced plaintiff to bring an untimely action. 

Arguing against this result, plaintiff first directs this Court’s attention to the April 30, 2021 email 

in which Bruckner said, “We had previously accepted liability for the damages, and had set up an 

inspection for damages.” (Emphasis added.) This plainly could not have induced plaintiff to not 

bring her action in an untimely manner because, by the time this email was sent, the statute of 

limitations had long since expired.7 Plaintiff alternatively argues that Old Republic “accept[ed] 

liability for damages” a second time in its August 10, 2021 email proposing a payment of 

 

7 Plaintiff, moreover, does not identify the communication in which Old Republic “previously 

accepted liability for damages.”
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$77,051.85. This argument is unconvincing for the same reason as plaintiff’s first argument—the 

August 10, 2021 email was sent well after the statute of limitations expired. Plainly, 

communications after the limitations period expired could not induce plaintiff to bring her action 

after the limitations period expired.

More generally, there is nothing in the record to suggest that Old Republic did anything to 

induce plaintiff to bring an untimely action. Shortly after the accident, plaintiff was in contact 

with a representative from Sedgwick, the company that manages Old Republic’s claims. Plaintiff 

forwarded relevant information about her claim to the representative. That information was 

apparently insufficient to process plaintiff’s claim, however, so the representative sent a formal 

letter to plaintiff on December 3, 2019, saying that the representative needed more documentation. 

Plaintiff’s counsel responded on December 16, 2019, assuring the representative that plaintiff was 

in the process of collecting the necessary documentation. Unfortunately, nothing in the record 

suggests that plaintiff forwarded that documentation to the representative before the statute of 

limitations expired. Indeed, the record contains no communications between Old Republic and 

plaintiff between the December 2019 letters and the running of the statute of limitations in June

2020. The next communication between Old Republic and plaintiff in the record is the November 

2020 email from the engineer affiliated with Old Republic. Thus, unlike the plaintiff in Cincinnati 

Ins, plaintiff here did not submit documents to Old Republic substantiating her loss and demanding 

payment before the statute of limitations expired. Correspondingly, unlike the defendant in 

Cincinnati Ins, the defendant here did not respond to such a request in a way that induced plaintiff 

to believe that her claim would be processed without difficulty once all the documentation was 

received.

On this record, plaintiff cannot attribute the delay in filing her complaint to Old Republic’s 

conduct or representations. With that being the case, plaintiff cannot invoke the doctrine of 

equitable estoppel to prevent Old Republic from raising a statute-of-limitations defense. See 

McDonald v Farm Bureau Ins Co, 480 Mich 191, 205; 747 NW2d 811 (2008) (“The trial court’s 

factual finding that defendant caused delays is insufficient to grant estoppel because there is no 

evidence that plaintiff relied on anything defendant did or said.”). Stated differently, plaintiff’s 

failure to bring a timely action was her own; it was not induced by an act or representation by Old 

Republic. See id.

B. MATTI AWDISH

In Matti Awdish, which was decided 15 years before Cincinnati Ins, this Court addressed 

whether a no-fault insurer should be allowed to raise a statute-of-limitations defense after a 

plaintiff named the no-fault insurer’s insured, rather than the insurer itself, as the defendant in a 

suit for no-fault benefits. The plaintiffs’ property was damaged as a result of the defendantinsured’s operation of a motor vehicle in November 1978. Matti Awdish, 117 Mich App at 273. 

The defendant’s insurer, Farmers Insurance Group, offered the plaintiffs a settlement, but the 

plaintiffs refused, believing that the amount offered was insufficient. Id. The plaintiffs thereafter 

filed suit against the defendant, who eventually moved to dismiss, arguing that the proper 

defendant was the defendant’s insurer, Farmers. Id. at 272. The trial court granted the defendant’s 

motion, and the plaintiffs moved to amend their complaint to add Farmers as a defendant. Id. The 

trial court denied the motion, and the plaintiffs appealed. Id.
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This Court first concluded that Farmers was indeed the proper defendant, so “the grant of 

summary judgment in [the] defendant’s favor was proper.” Id. at 277. Turning to the plaintiffs’ 

request to amend their complaint, this Court first noted that this motion was “apparently denied” 

because it was time-barred by the statute of limitations then in MCL 500.3145(2) (now in 

subsection(5)). Matti Awdish, 117 Mich App at 277. Then, while recognizing the general rule that 

filing an action against one defendant does not toll the statute of limitations against another 

defendant, Matti Awdish reasoned that this rule was “not sacrosanct,” and its application depended 

on the particular facts of the case. Id. at 278.

And on the particular facts of the case before it, Matti Awdish concluded that “the statute 

of limitations should not be a bar to allowing the amendment adding the insurer as a party 

defendant.” Id. Matti Awdish’s reasoning for this result leaned heavily on Farmers’ 

gamesmanship in getting plaintiff’s action dismissed. After the plaintiff served the defendant, he 

forwarded the information to Farmers, who retained a law firm to handle the defendant’s defense. 

Id. It was thus “obvious that the Farmers Insurance Group had actual knowledge of the pendency 

of the suit.” Id. But neither Farmers nor the law firm it retained on defendant’s behalf acted 

diligently in getting the case against the defendant dismissed. Instead, the law firm retained by 

Farmers waited to bring the defendant’s motion for summary disposition (which argued that the 

plaintiff sued the wrong defendant) until after the one-year limitations period had “safely expired.” 

Id. The Matti Awdish panel inferred from this sequence of events that the actions were taken “with 

malice aforethought,” particularly because the defendant knew from the start of litigation that he 

was not the proper defendant as evidenced by his answer “assert[ing] as an affirmative defense 

that he was ‘an improper party to this litigation.’ ” Id. The panel then contrasted these events with 

what would have “[p]resumably” happened if the defendant had hired his own attorney—“that 

lawyer would have immediately moved for summary judgment and not have waited until the 

limitations period had run against the insurer.” Id. at 279. The no-fault act was also still somewhat 

novel at the time, and the panel believed that it was not clear “based on existing present” that “the 

insured was an improper party.” Id.

Additionally, Matti Awdish likened the situation before it to “so-called misnomer cases 

where the right party is served under a wrong name or in an incorrect capacity.” Id. While 

conceding that the case did “not involve a true misnomer problem,” the panel believed that courts 

in “misnomer cases” tolled the statute of limitations “because the true defendant had notice of the 

litigation and was not prejudiced by the amendment,” and that reasoning was equally applicable 

to the case before it. Id. Not only did Farmers know of the action—“it ran the defense.” Id. at 

280. And “given the fact that the insurer actually controlled the defense in this action, the policy 

behind recognizing a statute of limitations defense—the foreclosure of stale claims—is wholly 

inapplicable.” Id.

The instant case is readily distinguishable from Matti Awdish on its facts.8 In Matti Awdish, 

the plaintiffs brought a complaint that would have been timely against Farmers if it had named 

Farmers as a defendant. Here, plaintiff’s March 2021 complaint would not have been timely 

against Old Republic. In Matti Awdish, this Court relied heavily on the fact that the insurer “ran” 

 

8 Neither party raises any issue with the reasoning from Matti Awdish, so we accept that reasoning 

as proper for purposes of this opinion.
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the insured’s defense and waited to bring a motion for summary disposition until the statute of 

limitations for a claim against the insurer had “safely expired.” Id. at 278. Here, it is not evident 

that Old Republic “ran” Tranz 1’s defense. But even if it did, Tranz 1 did not engage in 

gamesmanship by waiting to bring its motion for summary disposition until plaintiff’s claim 

against Old Republic had expired. Rather, as already stated, plaintiff’s claim against Old Republic 

was already time-barred when plaintiff filed her March 2021 complaint. In Matti Awdish, the 

plaintiffs named the wrong defendant in part because “based on existing precedent, it could not be 

said to have been obvious that the insurer was the proper party defendant to a suit seeking no-fault 

benefits for economic loss[.]” Id. at 279. Here, plaintiff did not file this suit seeking no-fault 

benefits, so in that sense, she did not name the wrong defendant. Regardless, four decades after 

Matti Awdish was decided, plaintiff cannot claim confusion that Old Republic, as Tranz 1’s insurer, 

was the proper defendant for any claim seeking no-fault benefits.

Accordingly, we reject plaintiff’s argument that the trial court should have granted 

plaintiff’s request to amend her complaint on the basis of this Court’s opinion in Matti Awdish.

C. NECESSARY JOINDER

Plaintiff alternatively argues that she should be permitted to amend her complaint to add 

Old Republic because Old Republic is a necessary party. MCR 2.205 governs the necessary 

joinder of parties, providing in relevant part:

(A) Necessary Joinder. Subject to the provisions of subrule (B) and MCR 

3.501, persons having such interests in the subject matter of an action that their 

presence in the action is essential to permit the court to render complete relief must 

be made parties and aligned as plaintiffs or defendants in accordance with their 

respective interests.

(B) Effect of Failure to Join. When persons described in subrule (A) have 

not been made parties and are subject to the jurisdiction of the court, the court shall 

order them summoned to appear in the action, and may prescribe the time and order 

of pleading. . . .

“The purpose of the rule is to prevent the splitting of causes of action and to ensure that all parties 

having a real interest in the litigation are present.” Mason Co v Dep’t of Cmty Health, 293 Mich 

App 462, 489; 820 NW2d 192 (2011). “A party is indispensable to a case if that party has an 

interest of such a nature that a final decree cannot be made without either affecting that interest, or 

leaving the controversy in such a condition that its final determination may be wholly inconsistent 

with equity and good conscience.” Mather Inv’rs, LLC v Larson, 271 Mich App 254, 257-258; 

720 NW2d 575 (2006). “[W]here a party’s presence in the action is not essential to the court 

rendering complete relief, factors such as judicial economy or avoidance of multiple litigation are 

not enough to compel joinder.” Hofmann v Auto Club Ins Ass’n, 211 Mich App 55, 96; 535 NW2d 

529 (1995).

For her necessary-joinder argument, plaintiff merely restates MCR 2.205, recaps her 

negotiations with Old Republic, then concludes, “As set forth above, [O]ld Republic Insurance 

Company has an interest in the subject matter of this case [such] that its presence in the action is 
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essential to permit the court to render complete relief, and therefore it must be made a party and 

aligned as a defendant in this matter.” This last assertion is simply a restatement of MCR 2.205(A) 

and in no way explains how Old Republic satisfies the requirements of MCR 2.205(A). We 

accordingly conclude that plaintiff’s necessary-joinder argument is abandoned. See Mitcham v 

City of Detroit, 355 Mich 182, 203; 94 NW2d 388 (1959) (“It is not enough for an appellant in his 

brief simply to announce a position or assert an error and then leave it up to this Court to discover 

and rationalize the basis for his claims, or unravel and elaborate for him his arguments, and then 

search for authority either to sustain or reject his position.”).

Even addressing the merits of plaintiff’s arguments, we would conclude that Old Republic 

was not a necessary party, so joinder was not required under MCR 2.205. Plaintiff’s amended 

complaint alleged four counts: Count I alleged trespass against Tranz 1 and CACT; Count II

alleged negligence against Tranz 1 and CACT; Count III alleged breach of contract against 

Pioneer; and Count IV alleged negligence by Renn. Plaintiff does not seek to add Old Republic 

as a party to resolve any of these claims.9 Rather, plaintiff seeks to add Old Republic as a party to 

assert a claim for no-fault benefits. Just like Tranz 1, CACT, Pioneer, and Renn would not be 

necessary parties to render complete relief to plaintiff in her claim against Old Republic seeking 

no-fault benefits, Old Republic is not a necessary party to render complete relief to plaintiff in her 

various claims against those parties. In short, Old Republic’s joinder in this action is not essential 

to a determination of the rights and obligations between plaintiff and the named defendants, nor to 

permit the court to render complete relief to plaintiff on her asserted claims. Accordingly, Old 

Republic cannot be compelled to join this action as a necessary party. See Hofmann, 211 Mich 

App at 96-97 (“Notwithstanding any common interest the [unnamed party] may have in the subject 

matter of this action, its joinder is not essential to a determination of the rights and obligations 

between plaintiffs and [the defendant], nor to permit the court to render complete relief. Therefore, 

the [unnamed party] may not be compelled to join this action as a necessary party.”).

Affirmed.

/s/ Michael J. Riordan

/s/ Colleen A. O’Brien

/s/ Allie Greenleaf Maldonado

 

9

Indeed, if Old Republic was added as a party now, it would be not only the lone defendant in this 

action but plaintiff would not be seeking relief on any of the claims alleged in her amended 

complaint. The trial court granted summary disposition in favor of the four originally-named 

defendants, and plaintiff does not contest those rulings on appeal.