IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA

No. 3-1220 / 13-0637

Filed February 5, 2014

JOHN R. HARVEY,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

vs.

POLK COUNTY BOARD OF REVIEW,

Respondent-Appellee.

________________________________________________________________

Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Polk County, Lawrence P. 

McLellan, Judge. 

John Harvey appeals the district court order dismissing his petition for 

judicial review. AFFIRMED. 

John Harvey, Des Moines, appellant pro se.

John P. Sarcone, County Attorney, and David W. Hibbard, Assistant Polk 

County Attorney, Des Moines, for appellee.

Considered by Doyle, P.J., and Tabor and Bower, JJ.
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BOWER, J.

John Harvey appeals the district court order dismissing his petition for 

judicial review. Harvey argues the district court erred in failing to rule on his 

motion for default judgment prior to the County’s challenge to the jurisdiction of 

the court. We find the jurisdictional issue of whether the proper party was 

named, and whether proper service was achieved, are prerequisites to district 

court involvement, and were properly considered before Harvey’s motion for 

default judgment. We affirm. 

I. Background Facts and Proceedings

John Harvey appealed the tax assessment of a residential property in Des 

Moines believing the assessment was unfair when compared to other properties. 

Harvey filed an appeal with the Polk County Board of Review (PCBR), which 

affirmed the assessment. Harvey then appealed the assessment to the Iowa 

Property Assessment Appeal Board (IPAAB). After the IPAAB affirmed the 

assessment, Harvey filed a petition for judicial review. In the petition, he named 

the PCBR as the respondent but argued “[t]he conclusions of the appeal board 

are not supported by substantial evidence in the record.” There is no evidence 

anyone other than the PCBR was given proper notice of the petition.1 

On December 7, 2012, the Polk County Attorney’s office returned the 

petition to Harvey with a letter instructing him to name the IPAAB as respondent. 

Harvey refused to do so. As a result the Polk County Attorney was delayed in 

 

1 Although the IPAAB is noted in the body of the petition it is not named in the petition.

Harvey provided a “courtesy copy” of the petition to the IPAAB by email. This method of 

service fails to comply with Iowa Code sections 441.38, 441.38B or 17A.19 (2011). 
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filing an appearance in the case and Harvey filed a motion for default judgment. 

Polk County filed a motion to dismiss arguing Harvey had failed to name the 

proper party as respondent, depriving the district court of jurisdiction. Agreeing 

with Polk County’s arguments, the district court dismissed the petition. 

II. Discussion

Harvey raises a single argument, phrased in two different ways. His 

argument is not that the substance of the district court’s ruling was incorrect, but 

the district court should not have considered the motion to dismiss until after 

considering Harvey’s motion for default judgment. Harvey does not enunciate 

the standard of review he believes applies, as required by Iowa Rule of Appellate 

Procedure 6.903(2)(g)(2). 

A party aggrieved by a decision of the IPAAB is permitted to seek judicial 

review of the decision as provided by Chapter 17A of the Code. Iowa Code 

§ 441.38B. Actions of the local board may also be appealed in the same way. 

Id. § 441.38. Section 17A.19(4) requires the appellant name the agency as 

respondent, and section 441.38(2) requires notice be served upon a particular 

individual depending upon whether it is an action of the local board, or of the 

IPAAB, whichever is the subject of the appeal. The appellant must substantially 

comply with notice requirements. See Resthaven Cemetery Ass’n v. Bd. of 

Review of Polk Cnty., 249 N.W.2d 618, 621–22 (Iowa 1977). Failure to comply 

with such requirements is jurisdictional, absent which the district court is without 

power to consider other matters. See Cowell v. All-American, Inc., 308 N.W.2d 

92, 94 (Iowa 1981) (“Nevertheless, substantial compliance with statutory 
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prerequisites is essential for the district court to acquire jurisdiction); Ball v. Iowa 

Dep’t of Job Serv., 308 N.W.2d 54, 55–56 (Iowa 1981). Had Harvey provided 

proper notice to the IPAAB, our ruling may have been different. See Cooksey v. 

Cargill Meat Solutions Corp., 831 N.W.2d 94, 103–05 (2013) (“[W]hen a 

respondent in an administrative action is identified in the body of the petition and 

served with notice . . . the matter is not subject to dismissal for failure to name 

the party in the caption.”). Because the motion to dismiss challenged the

jurisdiction of the court, it was properly considered before taking up other issues, 

including Harvey’s motion for default judgment. 

AFFIRMED.