### IN THE COURT OF APP EALS OF TENNESS EE AT NAS HVILLE A ugus t 19 , 200 5 S es sio n
JE RRY LYNN SWIFT v. GAL E J OANN (RIT CHI E) SW IFT

Appeal f romthe Chancer y Court for Stewart County No. 02-11-001 R obert E. Burch, Judge

No. M2004- 01501-COA-R 3-CV - F iled Dece m ber 27, 2005

This appea l involves the division of property upon divorce wher e ther e existed a valid Antenuptial Ag ree ment that included provisions g overnin g such distribution. Bec ause w e find that the tria l court’s distribution was consistent with the terms of the ag ree ment and supported by the re cord, w e a ff ir m. Tenn. R. App . P . 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgme nt of th e Chancer y Court Aff irm ed

P ATR I C I A J. C O T T RE LL , J ., delivere d the opinion of the court, in which W I L L I AM B. C A IN and F R ANK G. C L EME NT , J R ., J J ., joined.

Jer ry W. H a mli n, As hlandCity , T e nn e sse e , f or the app e lla nt, Ga le Joan n Sw if t.

Ma rk A. Ra ssa s, Julia

P. N orth, Cla

rk sv ill e , T e nn e sse e , f

or the app e lle e , Jer

ry Ly nn Swi ft

. OP IN ION

Jer ry Ly nn Swi ft

a ndGa le Joan n Ri tc hie Swi ft we re marrie d Se pte mbe r 26 , 19 97

. I t wa s h is second ma

rriag e and he r seve nth. They had known eac h other for a few y ear s and had lived toge ther fo r s ome tim e be fo re the marria g e . M r. Swi ft ha d b e e n inthe log g ing bu sin e ss in Ste wa rt Cou nty fo r m a ny y e ars , an d he c on tin ue d tha t busi ne ss thr ou g ho ut the marria g e . M s. Swi ft didso me pa

rt

time work for

Mr. Swift’s log g ing busine ss both before and af ter the ma rriag e.
Th e day be fo re the ir

marria g e the pa

rt ie s e nte re d int o a n An te nu pti a l Ag re e me nt. Th e lis ts of asse ts ex chang ed as pa

rt of the a g ree ment’s execution show that Ms. Swift owned about $25,000 in household and per sonal g oods, while Mr. Swift owned business a ssets including la nd, timber, and equipment, as we ll as other asse ts, all totaling over $1,000,000.-2-

On September

12, 2002, Mr. Swift filed a c omplaint for divorce

. I n an agr eed bif urcated proce eding , the trial court first determined the validity of the Antenuptial Ag ree ment. The trial c ourt
ru l ed o n t h e a gre em en twa s en fo rc eab l e a n d b i n d i n g. The pa rties stipulated as to g rounds for divor ce, and they wer e declare d divorce d. Trial wa s held on the distribution of marital prope rty . The trial court identified the prope rty it deemed marital and aw arde d some trac ts of rea l property and six tee n horses to Mr. Swift along with all other property in his possession. The court aw arde d Ms. Swift a 2000 L incoln auto m o bile, persona l items, and half

of household items. The c ourt also orde red Mr . Swift to pay a bala nce of approximately

$9,330 in cre dit card de bt incurre d by Ms. Swift after the parties’ separ ation.

Ms. Swi ft ha s a pp e a le d f ro m th e fi na l or de r d ist

ri bu tin g the pr op e rt y . Wi tho ut g oin g int o more de tail about the basis of he r appe al at this point, suffice it to say that she thinks she should have g o t t e n m o r e p r o p e r t y.
I. T HE A N TENU PT I A L A GRE E M E NT
Ms. Swift does not a

ppeal the trial court’ s ruling that the Antenuptial Ag ree ment is valid and enfor cea ble. Consequently , any revie w of the distribution of property must beg in with the releva nt po rt ion s o f that do c ume nt: The pa rties ag ree that in the unfortunate circumstances that proce eding s are broug ht for a bsolute divorce, divor ce f rom bed a nd board, f

or sepa rate maintenanc e or any other domestic r emedy , then re g ardle ss of which pa rty i s g rante d relief

, and reg ardle ss of fault, they

will be bound by

the terms of this Ag ree ment and see k no oth e r r e c ou rs e fr om any

Cou rt . In s uc h e ve nt the pa rt ie s a g re e that:
( A ) S e p ar a t e P r o p e r t y. All Separate Property , as def in ed i n this Agr eeme nt, including the appre ciation and income there of, wil l rema in the S epar ate Property of the re spective parties. Ea ch party ag ree s he or she wil l assert no claim of any type or kind to such Separate Property

of the other

. ( B ) J o i n tP r o p e r t y.
All J oint Property

will be divided so that eac h party rec eives one -half of

the pr op e rty or pr oc e e ds , if own e d in equ a l share s, or re c e ive the app ro pria te ow ne rs hip sh are , if ow ne d dif

fe re ntl y

. I f any

pa rt y ha s c on tr ibu te d to the joi ntl y he ld p ro pe rt y with his or her Separate Property , he or she shall be cre dited with the value o f t h at property befor e the Joint Property , or the proc eeds the reof , are divided.-3-

An te nu pti a l a g re e me nts are va lid a nde nf or c e able in this state a s lo ng a s th e y are e nte re d in to fre ely , knowing ly , and without duress or undue influence

. Perkinson v . Perkinson , 802 S.W .2d 600, 603 (Tenn. 1990) . Specific statutory authorit y exis ts for, and c ourts are bound by , an ante nuptial ag ree ment conce rning property owned by

either or both spouses befor e mar

riag e. Tenn. Code Ann. § 3 6- 3- 50 1. Ad dit ion a lly , part ie s may a g re e prior to m arria g e on the div isi on a t di vo rc e of pr op e rt y a c qu ir e d d uring the marria g e . T e nn . Co de An n. § 3 6- 4- 12 1( g ); P e rkinson , 8 02 S.W .2d at 603. Cou rt s a re sp e c if ic a lly auth orize d to inc orpor ate su c h a g re e me nts on the div isi on of pr op e rt y int o a divorc e dec ree . Tenn. Code Ann. § 36- 4-121(g ). Wh ere an a ntenuptial ag ree ment is valid and enfor cea ble, having been show n to meet the pre requisit es, the terms of that ag ree ment reg arding distribution of property

upon divorce will be applied instead of the statutory

definitions of marital
a n d s e p ar a te p r o p e r ty o r g e n e r a l p r in c ip le s r e g a r d in g a n e q u it ab le d is trib ution. P er kinson , 802 S.W .2d at 603-04.

Be cause the t ri al court’s holding that the Ante nuptial Ag ree ment betwee n the parties was enfor cea ble has not been appea led, our task is to enfor ce the terms of the ag ree ment in light of the fac ts in the recor d. Antenuptial ag ree ments are treated as any other c ontrac t, Minor v. Minor , 863 S.W .2d 51, 54 (T en n . Ct. App. 1993). Consequently , the g ener al rules r eg arding contra ct interpre tation apply

. “The centr al tenet of

contra ct construc tion is t hat the intent of the contra cting parties at the time of executing the ag ree ment should gove rn.” Pl an te rs Gin Co. v . F e d. Com pre ss & W

are ho us e Co., Inc. , 7 8 S. W.3 d 8 85 , 8 90 (T e nn . 2 00 2) . T he pu rp os e of int e rp re tin g a

writt e n c on tr act is t o asce rtain and g ive ef

fec t to the contrac ting pa

rties’ intentions, and wher e the parties ha ve re duced their ag ree ment to writing, their intentions are ref lected in the c ontrac t itself. Id. ; Fr izz e ll Co ns tr. Co. v . G atl inb ur

g, L.L. C. , 9 S.W. 3d 79 , 8 5 ( Te nn . 1 99 9) . “ Th e int e nt o f the pa rt ie s is pr e su me d to be that spec ifically expressed in the body of the contra ct . . . .” Planters Gin Co. , 78 S.W .3d at 890. Th e re fo re , th e c ou rt ’s ro le in r e so lvi ng dis pu te s re g ard ing the int e rp re ta tio n o f a c on tr a c t is to
asce rtain the intent i on of the pa rties base d upon the usual, natura l, and ordinary meaning of the lang uag e used. Guiliano v. CLEO, Inc. , 99 5 S.W. 2d 88 , 9 5 ( Te nn . 1 99 9) ; Bob Pearsall Motors, Inc. v. Re gal Chrysler-Plymouth Inc ., 521 S.W .2d 578, 580 (Tenn. 1975)

. Where the la ng uag e of the contract i s clea r and unambig uous, its li tera l meaning controls the
ou tc ome of

c on tr a c t di sp ute s; b ut, wh e re a c on tr a c tua l pr ov isi on is ambi g uo us , i.e ., su sc e pti ble to more than one rea so n ab l e i n t er pretation, the parties’ intent c annot be de termined by a litera l interpre tation of the lang uag e. Planters Gin Co. , 7 8 S. W.3 d at 89 0. I n that situatio n, c ou rt s mu st
resort to other rules of c onstruction, and only if ambig uity rema ins a fter application of the pertinent
ru le s d o e s th e le g a l me a n in g o f th e c o n tr a c t b e c o me a question of fa ct. Id. Howeve r, a stra ined construction may

not be placed on the l ang uag e used by the parties to find or create ambig uity wher e none exists. Id. at 891.
The que stion of interpretation of a contra ct is a question of law

. Guiliano , 995 S.W .2d at 95. There fore , the trial court’s interpre tation of a c ontrac tual document is not entitled to a presumption of cor rec tness on appea l. Id .; Angus v. W estern He ritage Ins. Co. , 48 S. W.3 d 7 28 , 7 30 (T e nn . Ct

.H e cl ai med i n t hat fi l i ng and at t r i al t hat t he p e n d e n te li te s uppo r t he pai d under cour t order s houl d be cr edi t ed 1

t o hi m si nce t he A nt enu pt i al A gr eement provi ded t hat nei t her part y woul d be ent i t l ed t o a ny s uppo r t

. H e a l s o as ked t hat

cer t ai n c r edi t ca r d deb t be as s i gn ed s ol el y t o hi s wi fe.
-4- App. 2000). This court must review t h e d o cu ments ourselves a nd make our own determination reg arding their mea n i n g an d l egal import. Hillsboro Plaza Ent ers. v. M oon , 860 S.W .2d 45, 47 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1993).

Ms. Swi ft ’s ob

je c tio n to the tr ia l c ou rt ’s dis tr ibu tio n of the pa rt ie s’ a sse ts d e a ls w ith pr op e rt y a c qu ir ed af

te r the marria g e . In th e An te nu pti a l A g re e me nt, the pa rt ie s c on te mpl a te d th a t so me property ac q u i re d during the marriag e would be jointly owned. The y

ag ree d as to how such joint property would be dis tributed if they divorce d. I n pertinent pa rt, the Ag ree ment provides that ea ch pa rty woul d recei ve on e ha lf

of the pr op e rt y

or pr oc e e ds fr om the pr op e rt y , b ut that th e on e -h a lf division would applyonly to t he value rema ining a fter subtra ction of the va lue of e ither party ’s
s e p ar a t e l y o w n e d p r o p e r t y t h a tw a s c o n tr i b u t e d t o w ar d t h e j o i n tp r o p e r t y.

II. T HE T R I A L C OURT ’ S D IVISI O N O F P R OPERTY
Well before trial Mr. Swift f iled a L ist of Property Subject to Division, i n which he itemized property he dee med joint property under the Antenuptial Agre ement as w ell as making claims for reimburse ment for c erta in items. Closer to trial, he ame nded the lis t to ref lect chang ed value s due 1 to market c hang es. The pr operty h e i d en t i fi ed as j oint included four ( 4) lots in Holiday Shores, a fi ft e e n- a c re tr a c t of

la ndide nti fi e d a s L e a the rw oo d Pa stu re , an d sixte e n hor se s. He inc lud e d a lis t of household items and e quipment that he valued at $2,525. I t was Mr. Swift’s position that all the joint or marital property

listed was purc hased solely with his separate money

or prope rty , and he later testified to that. Consequently , he asse rted, the pr operty should be divided ac cording to Parag raph 7(B ) of the A ntenuptial Ag ree ment: his ini tial contribution to acquire the prop er t y s h ould be subtracte d from the c urre nt va lue and any rema inder divided equally

. The values he assig ned we re, in a lmo st a ll c a se s, no g re a te r tha n th e orig ina l c os t.

Ms. Swift did not , prior to trial, di spute the l ist supplied by her husba nd or submit a list of he r ow n. At tr ia l sh e pr e se nte d a nd te sti fi e d abo ut a lis t of ho us e ho ld ite ms, inc lud ing e qu ipm e nt, appliance s, and furnishing s that she wanted in the property division. Mr. Swift w as g i v en the op po rtun ity to re vie w the lis t, andhe mark e d th os e ite ms h e dis pu te d s ho uldbe a wa rd e d to he r. Ms. Swift then testified about the mar k ed i t ems . Some she said belong ed to her befor e the mar

riag e; so me we re g if

ts; a nd so me sh e a c kn ow le dg e d w e re joi ntl y a c qu ir e d d uring the marria g e . Sh e a lso
so me tim e s se t va lue s a s to pa rt ic ula r i te ms.
At the c los e of

the he ari ng , th e tr ia l cou rt dir e c te d tha t Mr . Sw if t di vid e the dis pu te d p ro pe rt y int o tw o lis ts a nd that Ms . Sw if t c ho os e on e of

the lis ts. I n th e fi na l or de r, the c ou rt a wa rd e d M s. Swift all the undisputed property shown on the list she submitt ed at trial and “the items se t out on one of the two lists s ubmitted to her, throug h counsel. The specific list shall be filed with this court.”A d d iti o n a ll y , M r

. S w if t h a d p a id a ll e x p e n se s fo r c a re a n d fee d ing o f t h e ho rs e s d u rin g the a p p ro x im a te ly 2

e igh te e n m o n ths b e tw e e n the p a rtie s’ se p a ra tio n a n d the trial, w h ic h he c a lc u la te d a t $ 1 2 8 p e r d a y. -5- Neither party appea ls the trial court’s divisi on of the household pr operty or the method used. G e n e r a l l y, h o w e v e r , t h i s c o u r t i s r e q u i r e d t o r e v i e w t h e tr i a l c o u r t ’ s o v e r a l l d i s tr i b u t i o n o f p r o p e r t y, in c l u d i n g c l a s s i f

i c a t i o n a n d v a l u a t i o n d e t e r m i n a t i o n s , i n o r d e r t o p r o v i d e ap p r o p r i a t e ap p e lla te revie w of the tria l court’s duty to make an e quit ab l e division of marital property , but only marital property . As to the disputed household items, the trial court made no classification or valuation finding s. The re cord befor e us does not inc lude the final list of items awarde d to Ms. Swift, as the court orde red. N either pa rty has submitt ed a Tenn. R. Ct. App. 7 tabulation of theproperty . Under t h i s r e c o r d , i ti s i m p o s s i b l e t o d e t e r m i n e w h a tt h e o v e r a l l d i s tr i b u t i o n o f m ar i t a l p r o p e r t y

w a s

. In
ma ny c a se s, that w ou ld r e qu ir e re ma ndfo r s pe c if ic fi nd ing s.

I n th is c a se , h ow e ve r, ou r ta sk is not to de te rm ine wh e the r the tr ia l c ou rt ma de a n e qu ita

ble distribution of the marital estate. Instead, t h e q u es tions before us are whether the prope rty

was c o rr e c tl y id e n ti f

ie d a s jo in t p r o p e r ty u n d e r th e A n te n u p ti a l A g r e e me n t a n d , if s o , w h e th e r it was d i s tri b u t ed i n ac co rd an ce wi t h t h e r el ev an tp ro v i s i o n s o f t h at Agr ee m en t

. W e r ev i ew t h e t ri al co u rt 's fi nd ing s o f f

a c t de novo, with a pre sumption of t h e co rre ctness of the fac tual finding s of the trial
c ou rt , u nle ss the e vid e nce p reponde rate s o the rw ise . T e nn . R. Ap p. P. 1 3( d) ; Bogan v. Bogan , 60 S.W .3d 721, 727 (Tenn. 2001). Since neither party has direc ted us to any

perc eived e rror

in either the tr ia l c ou rt ’s de te rm inatio n tha t ce rt a in pr op e rt y wa s “jo int pr op e rt y ” un de r the a g re e me nt o r i n the trial court’s distribution of t hat property as t o any of t he household items appea ring on any

of the lists s ubmitted, we must assume those items were corr ectly awa rded.

The ne x t set of items acknow ledg ed by Mr. Swift as marital prope rty are the ho rs es . Mr. Swift provided a list of the horses with the purcha se price and curr ent value of eac h ref lected. Prior to trial, he ame nded the va lues and testified the v al u e o f the horse s had dec rea sed in the past fe w months. He also prese nted a witness who had boug ht and sold hor ses in the are a for many y ear s and who had sold Mr. Swift most or all of the horses at issue. The witness verified the a mended va lues and testified a s to the recent decre ase in values, especially for br ood mare s. The total purc hase price paid was $39,150, and the current value was $28,200. Mr. Swift testified he ha d purcha sed all of 2 the horses at issue with his separate funds. Ms. Swift disputed that to som e deg ree , asserting that she we nt with him to purcha se som e of the horses and that some of her money was a lso used in the purcha se price . Under

the Antenuptial Ag ree ment, Ms. Swift would be entitled to one- half the va lue of the ho rs e s th a t e xce e de d th e orig ina l a mou nt o f s e pa rate pr op ert y con tr ib ute d b y Mr . Sw if

t. Al tho ug h th e tr ia l c ou rt

did no t sp e c if

ic a lly fi ndthat Mr . Sw if

t’ s se pa rate pr op e rt y

wa s u se d to purcha se the horse s, that conclusion could be imp l i ed , and the evidence supports that conclusion. I n any event, Ms. Swift does not contest the award of the horses to Mr. Swift or point to any err or in any pa rt ic ula r d e c isi on by

the tr ia l c ou rt

re g ard ing the ho rs e s.
At the time of the divorc e, the pa rties held joi nt titl e to four lots in Holiday Shores which ha d b ee n l o gged an d t o o n e fi ft ee n ac re p ar ce l o f pa s t u re k n o wn as t h e L ea t h er wo o d P ro p er t y

. Al t h o u gh the Holiday

Shores lots had not appre ciated in va lue since the pur chase , Mr. Swift disclosed that theT h e p ro o f i n d ic a te s the c a r w a s d riv e n 3 8 ,0 0 0 m iles w h ile sh e ha d it

. 3

A ltho u g h M r. S w if t a r g u e s t h a t th e d e b t he w a s re q u ire d to a ssu m e sh o u ld b e c re d ited in h is fav o r in 4

c o n sid e ra tio n o f t h e p ro p e rty d ivisio n , h e d o e s n o t d ire c tly c h a llen g e th e trial c o u rt’s a llo c a tio n o f t h a t d e b t t o him . W e d o not need t o co nsi d er whet her t hat al l o cat i o n was app rop ri at e. H o wever, we no te th a t t he A nt enup t i al A greem ent p rovides t hat each p art y shal l b e res p o nsi b l e fo r d eb t s he o r s he co nt ract ed duri ng t he m arri age and s hal l i nd em ni f y t he ot her for t he pay ment of s uch debt

. Si nce t he A nt enu pt i al Agr eement deal s wi t h a pp ort i onment of debt upon di vor ce, it w o u ld a p p ly ra the r th a n ge n e ra l p rin c ip le s re g a rd ing the id e n tif ic a tio n a n d a llo c a tio n o f m a rita l d e b t.
-6- ba s is o f th e lo ts h a d b e e n r e d u c e d b y $ 1 , 0 0 0 b y th e lo g g in g

. B e c a u s e h e c laim s th e lots we re purcha sed solely

with his separate assets, he claims that only the $1,000 is subject to equal dis tr ibu tio n u nd e r the An te nu pti a l A g re e me nt.

The L eathe rwood prope rty was orig inally a forty -ac re trac t, but all but fifteen a cre s had bee n sold during the marria g e. Mr. Swift testified he purcha sed the prope rty with his separate funds, but that it was jointlyheld. Throug h the sale of parts of the orig inal trac t, he had r ecove red his orig inal inv e stm e nt. He a c kn ow le dg e d th a t th e va lue of the re ma ini ng pa rc e l w a s jo int

pr op e rt y su bje c t to equal division under the A ntenuptial Ag ree ment and value d the re maining tr act at $22,500.
Thus, acc ording to Mr. Swift, the joint property subject to equa l divisi on under the An te nu pti a l A g re e me nt t ota le d $2 3, 50 0 a t th e tim e of the div or c e . A c c or din g ly , e a c h p art y wo uld be entitled to $11,750. Howeve r, Mr. Swift also arg ues t hat Ms. Swift’s share must be offset by the
va lue of the L inc olnTo wn Car s he wa s a wa rd e d e ve n th ou g h it

tit le d s ole ly

in his na me . H e a lso
asserts that the cre dit card de bt ass i gn ed t o h im but incurred by her should be c onsidered in the equation as w ell as the $6,600 in pe nd e nte lit e support h e paid that was not authorized by the An te nu pti a l A g re e me nt.

Ms. Swift valued the Lincoln at $11,000 to $14,000 and testi fied that Mr. S wift broug ht the
car to her t o u s e af

ter their se paration since she had no othe r mode of tr ansportation. Mr. Swift
arg ue s sh e de pr e c ia te d th e c ar b y pu tti ng e xce ssi ve mil e a g e on it d uring he r p os se ssi on of it. 3

M r. S wi ft ar gu es t h e t ri al co u rt ’s d i v i s i o n o f p ro p er t y wa s m o re t h an eq u i t ab l e. E v en t h o u gh he does not dire ctly

challeng e the court’s divisi on, he ar g ues that it resulted in Ms. Swift rec eiving
mor e than s he wa s e nti tle d to un de r the An te nu pti a l Ag re e me nt. Ms. Swi ft do e s not d ir e c tly dis pu te the court’s decisions re g arding the spec ific prope rty and debts c overe d by

the orde r.

T h e tr i a l c o u r tap p ar e n t l y a c c e p t e d M r

. S w i f t ’ s i t e m i z a t i o n a n d v a l u a t i o n o f j o i n tp r o p e r t y. Our re view of the evidenc e supports the same c onclusion. Howeve r, the trial c ourt awa rded a ll the land to Mr. Swif

t , an d the value of

that joint property , apply ing the Antenuptial Ag ree ment’s methodology , is $23,500. He wa s also require d to pay $9,330.35 in cre dit card de bt that the court foun d was attributable to char g es incurr ed following the parties’ sepa ration. Ms. Swift was awa rded 4 t h e L i n c o l n au t o m o b i l e , w h i c h w e m u s ta s s u m e t h e tri a l c o u r ttr e a t e d a s m ar i t a l o r j o i n tp r o p e r t y.H e a l s o bo ug ht nu merous par cel s i n hi s name onl y , and t her e was no r eal expl ana t i on o f why some wer e t i t l ed 5 jo intly a n d so m e se p a ra te ly.

T he re w ere also refere nc es to an o t he r jo i nt p erso na l a cc o un t , an d M r. S w i f t testi f i ed t ha t t he b usiness p aid M s. 6
S w ift e v e ry w e e k a n d a lso p a id him , a ll o u t o f the b u sin e ss ac c o u n t. It is d iff ic u lt to d e te rm ine p re c ise ly wh a t ac c o u n ts t he p art i es ar e ref

erri ng t o or what was paid o ut of each. N o net hel ess , a general pa t t ern was shown.
-7- Under the Antenuptial Ag ree ment, the only property subject to eq u al distribution was the value of any joint property

owned at t he time of divorc e af ter subtra ction of either

party ’s contribution to a cquisition of the assets from his or her separ ate property

. Be cause Mr. Swift set that amount at $23, 500 for the land, and Ms. Swift offere d no counter vailing e vidence , we a cce pt that amount. Be cause the c o u rt treated the Lincoln as joint property , its value, as dete rmined by the Ante n u p ti al A g ree ment’s provisions, should have bee n included. The re is little evidencefrom which to determine that amount. Howeve r, the e vidence supports a finding that Mr. Swift boug ht the car wi th h is s e pa

rate fu nd s a ndthat it

wa s p a id f

or by the tim e of

the div or c e . It is reas on able to conclude that its value has dec rea sed since its purc hase. Conseque ntly , there is no amount to be divided betwee n the parties.

Under the Antenuptial Ag ree ment, Ms. Swift was enti t l ed t o one-ha lf of the $23,500 identified a s b y M r. Swift, or $11, 750. She was a war ded prope rty worth, ac cording to her testimony , betwee n $11,000 and $14,000. We conc lude that the trial court’s division of the spe cified property was consistent with the parties’ ag ree ment as evide nced in the pr ovisions of the Antenuptial Ag ree ment.

III. M S . S W IF T ’ S A RGUMENT

Ms. Swi ft ’s ob

je c tio n to the tr ia l c ou rt ’s div isi on of pr op e rt y do e s not r e la te to the sp e c if ic assets desc ribed a

bove that we re ow ned at the time of the divorce

. I n s t ea d, her a rg ument is more g e ne ra l.

As stated ea

rlier, Mr. Swift wa s in the logg ing bu s iness for more than twenty y ear s befor e he marrie d M s. Swi ft

a ndc on tin ue d in tha t busi ne ss during the marria g e . As p art of that bu sin e ss, Mr . Sw if t f re qu e ntl y bo ug ht l a nd wi th stand ing timbe r, c ut the timbe r, ha d it s a wn int o lu mbe r, so ld the lumber, a nd then re sold the land. The intent in purc hasing land was to re -sell it quickly afte r timbe r w a s r e mov ed. He ma de ma ny su c h tr a ns a c tio ns du ri ng the c ou rs e of the marria g e , a ndin
some s itu a ti o n s h a d th e lan d ti tl e d in b o th h is a n d M s

. Sw if t’ s n a me s

. I n th o s e c a s e s , M s. Swift

5 signe d the documents tra nsfer ring the land to t he new buy ers upon re- sale. Ms. S wift testified about a fe w of these jointly -held prope rties. Her position was that “her” share of prof its, if any , from the sales wa s used to pur chase other property

. Essentially , she believe d that the money that continued to b e us e d inse qu e nti a l tr a ns a c tio ns wa s h a lf he rs

. Th e p r o c e e d s f

r o mt h e l a n d s a l e s w e r e d e p o s i t e d i n t o M r

. S w i f t ’ s b u s i n e s s a c c ou nt. 6 Simi larly , p roce eds fr om the sale of timber logg ed off

those trac ts were also deposited in that
acc ount. The business paid M s. Swift $200 per week both befor e and during the marriag e for herS h e re q u e sts tha t t h e c a se b e re m a n d e d w ith ins tru c tio n tha t t h e trial c o u r t in c lu d e a s m a rita l p ro p e rty “a ll 7
p rop ert y p u rc hased i n t he nam es of bo t h pa rt i es as wel l as al l ass et s co m i ng i nt o t he p ers o nal busi ness acco unt of t he hu s band” an d t hat t he cour t make a more eve n di s t r i but i on of t hat mar i t al es t at e.

T he t r act s M s

. Swi f

t t es t i f i ed about wer e n ot owned by t he part i es at t he t i me of t he di vor ce and n ot s ubj ect 8

to d ivisio n un d e r e ithe r th e A n te n u p tial A g re e m e n t o r th e sta tute s tha t wo u ld o the rw ise a p p ly.

I n a r gu i ng t he nee d f or t es t i mo ny f r om ot her wi t nes s es who had n ot been s er ved wi t h s ubpeonas , coun s el s t at ed 9
he was not ask i ng f or a co nt i nu anc e b eca us e t he mat t er had al r eady b een d el ay ed and hi s cl i ent needed t o get t he di vor ce.
-8- part-time wor

k. She maintained a persona l c hecking acc ount and, althoug h at some time she adde d Mr. Swift’s name to that a ccount, he never wrote any chec ks or made othe r withdraw als on it. There was no testimony

or other e vidence as to th e am o unts at the time of the hea ring in any

of the
acc ounts refe rre d to.

Ms. Swift testified that it was not possible for her to g ive the court a number or value of what she wa s entitled to. She has not be en more specific on appea l. Her arg uments are subject to sever al 7 int e rp re ta tio ns

.
I f Ms. Swift’s position is interpre ted as an arg ument that she acquired some interest in t he business or its profits, we find no support for that arg ument in either the A ntenuptial Ag ree ment or the fa c ts i n th e re c or d. Un de r the An te nu pti a l A g re e me nt, Mr . Sw if t’ s p rem ari ta l bu sin e ss a sse ts
rema ined his separ ate pr operty , as did any income fr om those assets. The A g ree ment cannot be rea d to g ive Ms. Swi ft

a ny int e re st i n th e bu sin e ss or its pr of its , e ve n if

tho se pr of

its we re inc ome g ener ated during the marria g e. Ms. Swift did not dispute that the trac ts of land she testified a bout
we re bo ug ht f

or us e in the bu sin e ss. F urthe r, Ms. Swi ft di d no t pro ve th e va lue of the bu sin e ss, while Mr. Swift produce d tax returns showing a decline in pr ofits during the marriag e.

An oth e r w a y to int e rp re t Ms. Swi ft ’s arg ume nt i s th a t sh e is e nti tle d to a sh are of the pr of its , if any , g ener ated by

l and titled in both names, eve n though the land was no long er ow ned by the p ar t i e s a t t h e t i m e o f t h e d i v o r c e

. In o p e n i n g s t a t e m e n t s , t h a ti s t h e ar g u m e n tm a d e b y h e r a t t o r n e y. 8 Essentially , he ar g ued that whe n profits wer e made on land t itled in both names, those prof its were marital prope rty , but that Mr. Swift de posited those profits into his busi ness ac count and use d them to invest in some other proper ty . The attorney

s t at ed that evidenc e re levant to the ac quisiti on of assets and use of the proce eds fr om the sale of joint prope rty would be pre sented. “ What did they
earn off of

those assets, off of t hat j oint investment? Was his ini tial investment under the a g ree ment
r e p a i d ? A n d , t h e n , w h a th ap p e n e d w i t h t h e p r o f i t s ?”

Ho we ve r, the a tto rn e y

a lso a c kn ow le dg e d th at, al tho ug h h e ha d b e e n p ro vid e d w ith
vo lum ino us re c or ds fr om M r. Swi ft ’s bu sin e ss, it w a s impo ssi ble to r e c on str uc t the tr a ns a c tio ns in prec ise detail without testimony from an a ccounta nt, which he did not have . Counsel reque sted that the c ou rt re fe r the fi na nc ia l matte rs to a sp e c ia l ma ste r wi th a c c ou nti ng skill s to tr a c e a ll the a sse ts acquir ed and disposed of

during the marria g e. The court did not then appoint a specia l ma ster, but 9

rat h e r t o o k p r o o f

. I n i t s f i n a l o r d e r , t h e tr i a l c o u r t s t a t e d i t d i d n o t b e l i e v e a s p e c i a l ma ste r c ou ld-9-

specific ally

determine any

profit receive d from any sales of pr operty

that had bee n held in joint names be cause of the manne r of operation of the busine ss and, conse quently , appointment of a
ma ste r w ou ld n ot b e be ne fi c ia l, “ pa rt ic ula rl y sin c e it h a d not be e n a sk e d f or pr e vio us ly , th e fi rs t ti me it was reque sted was during the trial in this cause.”

Ms. Swift sim pl ydid not prove that prof its were a ctually

g ener ated f

rom the sale any particula r trac ts of land that wer e titled joi n t l y . The trial c ourt found that Ms. Swift’s “c laims for interest in prope rty

that was a cquire d in joint names during the marriag e, the majority of which ha d previously

been disposed of

, only considere d g ross values a nd did not include costs and expenses of business oper ations and there fore her values and claims wer e not supported in fa ct.” The evidenc e does not preponde rate ag ainst this finding that Ms. Swift failed to prove any profits wer e g ener ated from jointly titled pr operty

. Additionally , she did not prove how any such profits wer e used, w hether they still exis ted, or tie them to any subsequent transaction. There wa s simil arly no proof a s to the value of Mr. Swift’s business, the balanc e in his business or other acc ounts, or the value of any other property he owne d at divorce . Consequently , this arg ument fails for la ck of pr oof.

On app e a l, M s. Swi ft

arg ue s mos t str on g ly that Mr . Sw if t’ s tr e a tme nt o f h is s e pa

rate pr op e rt y a ndthe pa

rt ie s’ joi nt p ro pe rty

re su lt ed in c omm ing lin g of tho se a sse ts andtr a ns mut a tio n o f h is
se pa rate pr op e rty , h is b us ine ss a c c ou nt s pe c if ic a lly , in to mar tial p ro pe rt y su bje c t to a n e qu ita

ble division. S he ar g ues that proc eeds f rom the sale of

joint property

wer e deposited in Mr. Swift’s bu sin e ss a c c ou nt o r i n the mari ta l ac c ou nt an d tha t fa mil y e xpe ns e s w e re pa id f

ro m bo th a c c ou nts

. M s

. Sw if t ar g u e s th a t th is c o mm in g li n g o f ma r it a l p r o p e r ty w ith s e p ar a te p r o p e r ty r e s u lted in the tr a n s m u t a t i o n o f

b o t h a c c o u n t s i n t o m ar i t a l p r o p e r t y. Not only does this arg ument suffe r from the s ame lack of specific proof that any profits wer e g e ne rate d f

ro m jo int ly -h e ld p ro pe rty , it is al so inc on sis te nt w ith the An te nu pti a l A g re e me nt. Whil e the Ag ree ment rec og nizes that the parties mig ht acqu i re “joint property ,” it also anticipate s that “joint property ” may

be owne d in differ ent share s. Any “joint property ” held at divorce is to be divided acc ording to the appropriate owne rship share s, but only afte r ea ch party

is credited w ith any
c on tr ibu tio n f

ro m se pa rate pr op e rty

ma de tow ardthe joi ntl y

he ld p ro pe rt y . The se pr ov isi on s a re in direc t contradic tion to the concepts of c ommingling and tra nsmutation. The Ante nuptial Ag ree ment established the methodolog y for division of prope rty ac quired during the marriag e, and that is the methodology

that must be applied.

IV. C ONCL US I ON
The trial c ourt’s division of property was c onsistent with the t er ms of the Antenuptial Ag ree ment and with the evidence in the record and is, theref ore, a ffirme d. We note that even if the usual rules of pr operty

division were a

pplied, based on t h e re co rd b efore us, we could af firm the division ordered by

the court. This was a marriag e of r elatively short duration, and the parties we re returned to essentially

the same r elative f

inancial position they

enjoy ed prior to the ma rriag e. Throug hout the marria g e, Mr. Swift provided the financ ial support for thec o u p le , p aid or contributed to the costs of Ms. Swift’s custody battle with a former husband, paid or contributed to child support-10-

she owe d, and provide d financ ial support to members of her family

. Ms. Swift’s only income wa s t h e $ 2 0 0 p er we ek s h e r ec ei v ed fr o mM r. S wi ft ’s co m p an y

. T h e p ar t i es s p en td u ri n g t h e m arri age for mutual bene fit, and there is no proof re g arding exactly how much they

owned at divorce.

Th e jud g me nt of the tr ia l cou rt is af fi rm e d. Cos ts of thi s app e a l ar e ta xed to the app e lla nt, Ga le Joan n Sw if

t.

____________________________________ PATRI CI A J . COTTRELL , J UDGE