IN THE

SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF ARIZONA

IN DIVISION

JUDITH K. LOHR, A QUALIFIED ELECTOR

Plaintiff/Appellant,

v.

SHAWNNA BOLICK, A REPUBLICAN PRIMARY CANDIDATE FOR ARIZONA 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES IN LEGISLATIVE DISTRICT 20, ET AL.

Defendant/Appellee.

No. CV-20-0129-AP/EL

Filed: September 8, 2020

Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County 

The Honorable M. Scott McCoy, Judge

No. CV2020-004868

AFFIRMED IN PART AND REVERSED IN PART

COUNSEL:

James E. Barton II, Jacqueline Mendez Soto, Torres Law Group, PLLC, 

Tempe, Attorneys for Judith K. Lohr

Kory Langhofer, Thomas Basile, Statecraft PLLC, Phoenix, Attorneys for 

Shawnna Bolick

Katie Hobbs, Arizona Secretary of State, In Propria Persona

Mark Brnovich, Arizona Attorney General, Joseph A. Kanefield, Chief 

Deputy, Brunn (Beau) W. Roysden III, Division Chief, Jennifer J. Wright, 

Assistant Attorney General, Phoenix, Attorneys for Amicus Curiae Mark 

Brnovich

CHIEF JUSTICE BRUTINEL authored the opinion of the Court, in which 

VICE CHIEF JUSTICE TIMMER, and JUSTICES GOULD and

MONTGOMERY joined.
LOHR v. BOLICK

Opinion of the Court

2

CHIEF JUSTICE BRUTINEL, opinion of the Court:

¶1 Judith K. Lohr challenged the legal sufficiency of candidate

Shawnna Bolick’s nomination documents because she used a private 

mailbox address as her place of residence.1 The superior court denied the 

challenge, and Lohr appealed pursuant to A.R.S. § 16-351(A). Sitting in 

division, we previously affirmed the trial court decision in part and ordered

that Bolick’s name remain on the ballot. In this opinion, we explain that 

decision and hold that use of a private mailbox address, under the facts of 

this case, substantially complied with the statutory requirements for 

petitions and nomination papers, but not for circulator verifications on 

paper petition sheets.

I. BACKGROUND

¶2 Shawnna Bolick physically resides in U.S. Postal Zip Code 

85022. Rather than using her physical residence address, she listed 610 E. 

Bell Road, #2-142, Phoenix, AZ 85022 on her nomination paper, petitions, 

and circulator verifications as her residence address. That address is a 

private mailbox in a UPS Store.

¶3 It is undisputed that Bolick is a resident and qualified elector 

of Legislative District 20 and that the address she provided is in the same 

city, county, zip code, and district as her physical residence. The zip code 

85022 includes portions of Legislative District 20 and District 28. In 2014, 

Bolick unsuccessfully ran for office in Legislative District 28.

¶4 Bolick is married to a judge who is entitled under Arizona law 

to restrict public access to his residence address in certain public records. 

See A.R.S. § 16-153. As such, after her husband was appointed to the bench, 

the Maricopa County Superior Court entered an Order to Restrict Public 

Access to Address and Telephone Numbers in Specified Public Records, 

making Bolick’s actual residence address confidential in certain public 

records. In 2018, Bolick successfully ran for office in Legislative District 20 

and currently serves as a State Representative. In that election, Bolick used 

the same private mailbox address on her nomination paper, petitions, and 

circulator verifications without legal challenge.

 

1 Similar to a Post Office (“PO”) Box available from the United States 

Postal Service, individuals may rent a private mailbox from private postal 

businesses such as The UPS Store.
LOHR v. BOLICK

Opinion of the Court

3

¶5 Lohr, a qualified elector within Legislative District 20, filed a 

complaint challenging Bolick’s nomination petitions and the nomination 

paper. Lohr asserted Bolick did not comply with A.R.S. §§ 16-

311(A), -314(C), and -315(B) by failing to list her residence address. The trial 

court found Bolick substantially complied with the applicable election laws 

because voters were unlikely to have been confused or misled by the 

technical error at issue.

¶6 Lohr maintains that Bolick’s use of a private mailbox located 

at a UPS store rather than her physical residence address disregarded clear 

statutory requirements in their entirety and that such use is not a mere 

technical error that can be remedied by substantial compliance.

II. DISCUSSION

¶7 We review a challenge to the form or content of nomination 

documents to determine whether the documents “‘substantially compl[ied] 

with the statutory requirements’ before denying access to a ballot.” Bee v. 

Day, 218 Ariz. 505, 506 ¶ 8 (2008) (quoting Moreno v. Jones, 213 Ariz. 94, 101–

02 ¶ 40 (2006)).

¶8 This Court considers whether nomination documents

substantially complied with statutory requirements even if the statute at 

issue does not expressly state substantial compliance is sufficient. Id. ¶ 9. 

Under a “substantial compliance” analysis, this Court does not remove 

candidates from the ballot “for mere technical departures from the form.” 

Id. ¶ 10. Rather, the focus is “on whether the omission of information could

confuse or mislead electors signing the petition.” Id. (quoting Moreno, 213 

Ariz. at 102 ¶ 42). This Court evaluates nomination documents from 

challenges under a substantial compliance analysis unless there is “a clear 

statement that the legislature intended a particular form requirement to be 

indispensable.” Id. We review whether nomination documents 

substantially complied with statutory requirements de novo. Malnar v. 

Joice, 236 Ariz. 170, 172 ¶ 9 (2014).

A. A.R.S. § 16-311(A)

¶9 The relevant part of § 16-311(A) provides:

Any person desiring to become a candidate at a primary 

election for a political party and to have the person’s name 

printed on the official ballot shall . . . sign and cause to be filed 
LOHR v. BOLICK

Opinion of the Court

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a nomination paper giving the person’s actual residence 

address or description of place of residence and post office 

address . . . . 

“A person who does not file a timely nomination paper that complies with 

[§ 16-311(A)] is not eligible to have the person’s name printed on the official 

ballot for that office.” § 16-311(I).

¶10 Bolick did not strictly comply with the requirements of § 16-

311(A) because by listing a private mailbox located at a UPS store, and not 

her physical residence, Bolick failed to give her “actual residence address 

or description of place of residence and post office address.” However, 

Bolick substantially complied with the statutory nomination paper 

requirement.

¶11 The substantial compliance analysis “considers the 

nomination paper as a whole and ‘focuse[s] on whether the omission of 

information could confuse or mislead electors.’” Dedolph v. McDermott, 230 

Ariz. 130, 133 ¶ 17 (2012) (internal citation omitted) (quoting Moreno, 213 

Ariz. at 102 ¶ 42). In Dedolph, the defendant listed her name incorrectly in 

her nomination paper. Id. ¶ 18 (stating the defendant should have listed 

her name in the nomination paper as “McDermott, Jean Cheuvront” rather 

than “Cheuvront–McDermott, Jean”). This Court determined the error did 

not cause electors signing her nomination petitions to be confused or misled 

about her identity. Id. at 133 ¶¶ 16, 18, 133–34 ¶ 19. Therefore, the 

defendant substantially complied with the requirements of § 16-311(G), 

which requires a candidate to list his or her legal surname in the nomination 

papers. Id. ¶¶ 16, 18.

¶12 Similarly, Bolick’s use of a private mailbox at a UPS store was 

unlikely to have misled or confused voters about her eligibility to run as a 

resident of Legislative District 20 because Bolick’s residence is in the same 

state, county, legislative district, municipality, and zip code as the UPS 

store. Providing an address in the district in which Bolick lives and seeks 

to represent also fulfills the purpose of the statutory address requirement 

which is to ensure that a candidate “reside[s] in the county, district or 

precinct that the person proposes to represent.” § 16-311(A); see also Adams

v. Bolin, 77 Ariz. 316, 320 (1954) (explaining the general purpose of statutory 

nomination requirements is to ensure only bona-fide, eligible candidates 

are placed on the ballot).
LOHR v. BOLICK

Opinion of the Court

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¶13 Lohr argues the substantial compliance doctrine does not 

apply here because the doctrine cannot apply when a candidate 

purposefully places incorrect information on a nomination paper. Lohr 

asserts the use of the private mailbox address was not a technical error 

because Bolick knew that was not her physical residence address. We 

disagree. Bolick’s actions were not taken to mislead electors. Rather, Bolick 

relied, erroneously, on the court order restricting public access to her 

address in specified public records.2 And, because Bolick had previously 

run in 2018 using that same address without legal challenge, there is no 

evidence to suggest she had prior knowledge of the error or intended to 

violate the statute. The substantial compliance doctrine applies and 

because any confusion about her eligibility was unlikely, Bolick 

substantially complied with § 16-311(A).

B. A.R.S. § 16-314(C) 

¶14 Section 16-314(C) requires that a partisan nomination petition 

include the address at which the candidate resides. Bolick did not strictly 

comply with § 16-314(C) when stating in her nomination petitions sheets 

that she “resides” at an address other than her actual residence address.

¶15 Lohr argues Bolick’s use of a private mailbox address likely 

misled or confused voters and as a result did not substantially comply with 

§ 16-314(C). Again, we disagree.

¶16 In Baker v. Saban, No. CV-16-0140-AP/EL (Ariz. June 29, 2016), 

this Court resolved a similar case but did not issue an opinion. Although 

Baker has no precedential value, it is persuasive on this issue. See Ariz. R. 

Sup. Ct. 111. There, this Court found that the defendant did not strictly 

comply with the requirements of § 16-314(C) by listing a UPS facility 

address in the blank following the phrase “resides at” on his nomination 

petition sheets. Decision Order, Baker, No. CV-16-0140-AP/EL. However,

 

2 Section 16-153 is limited to the eligible persons’ voter registration 

record and does not extend to candidate filings. See § 16-153(A). The law 

expressly provides that protected voters who are signing petitions are not 

required to put their actual address if their “actual residence is protected 

pursuant to § 16-153.” A.R.S. § 16-321(E). The legislature has provided no 

such exception for candidate nomination documents that require listing an 

“actual residence address.” Based on the residency requirements provided 

in the Arizona Constitution and the applicable statutes, candidates are 

required to provide their actual residence address on candidate nomination 

documents even if they are protected voters under § 16-153.
LOHR v. BOLICK

Opinion of the Court

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the Court found that by providing accurate information as to the city, 

county, state, and zip code matching those of his actual physical residence, 

his petition sheets were unlikely to cause confusion or to mislead electors 

as to whether the defendant lived in Maricopa County, the jurisdiction 

where he sought to be nominated to elected office. Therefore, the defendant 

substantially complied with § 16-314(C) and his name was left on the ballot 

for the office of Maricopa County Sheriff.

¶17 In Bee v. Day, the defendant failed to designate the expiration

date of the prior unexpired vacant term, in violation of § 16-314(D). Bee, 218 

Ariz. at 506 ¶¶ 3–4. The Court found that the defendant’s petitions 

substantially complied with § 16-314 and could not have misled electors 

because the petitions listed the name of the office sought, and there was 

only one seat for that office contested in the upcoming election. Id. at 508 

¶ 14. And the petitions could not have misled electors into believing they 

were nominating the defendant for a full term because no such seat would 

be on the ballot. Id.

¶18 In Moreno v. Jones, a petition form left blank the exact date of 

that year’s primary election, listing only the election year. Moreno, 213 

Ariz. at 102 ¶ 44. The form did list the name of the office sought. Id. There 

was “only one primary election” date possible for that office that 

year. Id. Although different dates for other offices were possible, this Court 

held that there was no risk of confusion, and therefore, the petition form 

substantially complied because “electors would automatically know for 

which primary election they were signing.” Id. ¶ 45 (internal quotation 

marks omitted).

¶19 Similarly, Bolick substantially complied with § 16-314(C). 

Like the defendant in Baker, Bolick’s physical residence is in the same 

legislative district and zip code as the UPS Store. Thus, Bolick’s nomination 

petition sheets were unlikely to cause confusion or mislead electors as to 

whether she lives in and is a qualified elector in District 20, the District from 

which Bolick is running for office. Lohr argues this case is distinguishable 

because the zip code of the UPS store includes portions of Legislative 

District 20 and District 28, and in 2014, Bolick ran for office from District 28. 

This difference is not enough to distinguish Baker. In 2018, the most recent 

election, Bolick ran for office from Legislative District 20, and Bolick is 

currently a State Representative for District 20. And, similar to Bee and 

Moreno, the circumstances here do not implicate the concerns subsection (C) 

was intended to address, such as to prevent confusion as to which District 
LOHR v. BOLICK

Opinion of the Court

7

the candidate was running for office. Bolick substantially complied with 

§ 16-314(C).

C. A.R.S. §§ 16-315(B) and 16-316

¶20 Section 16-315(B) provides that a petition should include the 

“[c]irculator’s actual residence address or, if no street address, a description 

of residence location shall be included on the petition.” With respect to 

Bolick’s paper petition sheets, Bolick did not strictly or substantially comply 

with § 16-315(B).

¶21 Although this court has found that a signer’s use of a private 

mailbox as an address on a nomination petition’s signature line does not 

render the signature invalid per se, this holding did not apply to petition 

circulators. See Jenkins v. Hale, 218 Ariz. 561, 565–66 ¶¶ 20, 22–23 (2008). 

The circulator’s role is important—the person circulating a nomination

petition is required to verify the status of petition signers. § 16–321 (“A 

circulator shall verify that . . . in his belief each signer was a qualified elector 

who resides at the address given as the signer’s residence on the date 

indicated . . . .”). “[S]tatutory circulation procedures are designed to reduce 

the number of erroneous signatures, guard against misrepresentations, and 

confirm that signatures were obtained according to law.” Brousseau v. 

Fitzgerald, 138 Ariz. 453, 456 (1984). This Court has held that “petitions 

containing false certifications by circulators are void, and the signatures on 

such petitions may not be considered in determining the sufficiency of the 

number of signatures to qualify for placement on the ballot.” Id.; see Parker 

v. City of Tucson, 233 Ariz. 422, 438 ¶ 47 (App. 2013).

¶22 Section 16-315(D) requires out-of-state petition circulators to 

register with the Secretary of State and the Secretary of State must provide 

for “a method of receiving service of process for those petition circulators.” 

In context of § 16-315 as a whole, the address provided by any circulator, 

out-of-state or otherwise, is to ensure there can be ready and accurate 

service of process in the event of a petition challenge. Therefore, the 

purpose of the address requirement is to ensure that a circulator can be 

contacted and questioned about the validity of gathered signatures. 

Whitman v. Moore, 59 Ariz. 211, 233 (1942), overruled in part on other grounds

by Renck v. Superior Court of Maricopa Cty., 66 Ariz. 320 (1947) (“The purpose 

of requiring the signature of the circulator is so that if any question arises 

in which his testimony is needed, he can readily be found.”). Providing a 

private mailbox address does not fulfill this purpose. Thus, the paper 

petition sheets Bolick circulated herself without her residence address did 

not substantially comply with § 16-315(B).
LOHR v. BOLICK

Opinion of the Court

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¶23 With respect to Bolick’s online “E-Qual” petition sheets 

submitted pursuant to A.R.S. § 16-316,3 there is no statutory requirement 

that a candidate state her address.4 Therefore, there is no statutory basis to 

challenge or invalidate Bolick’s online E-Qual petitions on these grounds. 

Because Bolick did not substantially comply with § 16-315(B), 290 

signatures from the paper petition sheets circulated by Bolick were invalid.

However, all of Bolick’s online E-Qual signatures remained valid.

III. CONCLUSION

¶24 Bolick submitted 895 signatures. After the County Recorder 

invalidated 75 of the candidate’s signatures, she had 820 valid signatures 

remaining. In our Order, we invalidated 290 signatures from the paper 

petition sheets submitted, leaving 530 valid signatures, more than the 

statutory requirement of 455. Accordingly, we ordered that Bolick’s name 

be included on the ballot for the office of Representative for Legislative 

District 20. Our conclusion that Bolick substantially complied with §§ 16-

311(A) and -314(C) under these facts does not mean she or any other 

candidate should use anything other than their actual residence address on 

future nomination papers and petitions. Sections 16-311(A) and -314(C) 

direct candidates to use their actual residence addresses and a candidate 

who intentionally does otherwise flirts with disqualification.

 

3 “Notwithstanding any other statute in this title, the secretary of state 

shall provide a system for qualified electors to sign a nomination petition 

and to sign . . . for a candidate by way of a secure internet portal. The system 

shall allow only those qualified electors who are eligible to sign a petition 

for a particular candidate to sign the petition . . . and shall provide a method 

for the qualified elector’s identity to be properly verified.” § 16-316(A). 

4 Section 16-315(E) allows for the Secretary of State to authorize the 

use and submission of petitions in “electronic form if those petitions 

provide for an appropriate method to verify signatures of petition 

circulators and signers.” The E-Qual system meets this requirement by 

electronically verifying petition signatures with the Secretary of State’s 

Arizona Voter Information Database. § 16-316(A).