UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

MARILYN D. THOMAS,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

No. 96-2733

TECHNICAL RESOURCES,

INCORPORATED,

Defendant-Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Maryland, at Baltimore.

J. Frederick Motz, Chief District Judge.

(CA-95-769-JFM)

Submitted: October 31, 1997

Decided: April 20, 1998

Before MURNAGHAN and WILKINS, Circuit Judges, and

PHILLIPS, Senior Circuit Judge.

_________________________________________________________________

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

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COUNSEL

Abbey G. Hairston, Adrian V. Nelson, II, ALEXANDER, BEARDEN, HAIRSTON & MARKS, L.L.P., Silver Spring, Maryland, for

Appellant. William J. Carter, Thomas L. McCally, CARR, GOODSON, LEE & WARNER, P.C., Rockville, Maryland, for Appellee.

_________________________________________________________________
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See

Local Rule 36(c).

_________________________________________________________________

OPINION

PER CURIAM:

Marilyn D. Thomas appeals from the district court orders granting

summary judgment to her former employer, Technical Resources, Inc.

(TRI), on her action alleging violations of Title VII of the Civil

Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 2000e to 2000e-16 (West 1994

& Supp. 1997), and denying her motion for reconsideration. We

affirm.

Thomas's complaint alleged discriminatory discharge based on her

race, wrongful breach of an implied employment contract, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of TRI on September 10, 1996. On

September 26, 1996, Thomas filed a motion to extend time to file a

motion for reconsideration under Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e) and a Rule

59(e) motion. On October 4, 1996, the district court granted Thomas's

motion to extend time. The district court denied Thomas's motion for

reconsideration on October 23, 1996, and on November 25, 1996,

Thomas appealed the district court's order granting summary judgment and denying her motion for reconsideration.

To the extent that Thomas appeals the district court's order entered

on September 10, 1996, her appeal is untimely. Thomas's Rule 59(e)

motion for reconsideration was not timely filed. A motion for reconsideration must be "filed no later than 10 days after entry of judgment," and a district court judge may not extend the time to file a

Rule 59(e) motion. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 59; Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(b). Therefore, the appeal period from the September 10 order was not tolled by

the filing of the motion for reconsideration. See Fed. R. App. P.

4(a)(4); Dove v. CODESCO, 569 F.2d 807, 809 (4th Cir. 1978).

To the extent that Thomas appeals the district court's order denying

her Rule 59(e) motion, we affirm the district court's order because the

motion was not timely filed. Even if we were to construe the motion

as a reconsideration motion under Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b), we find that

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the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion.

Thomas failed to establish mistake, newly discovered evidence, or

fraud. Further, to prevail on a claim of discriminatory discharge,

Thomas must show that: (1) she is a member of a protected class; (2)

she was qualified for the job and that her job performance was satisfactory; (3) in spite of her qualifications, she was fired; and (4) the

position remained open to similarly qualified applicants after her dismissal. See Williams v. Cerberonics, Inc., 871 F.2d 452, 455 (4th Cir.

1989). Once a prima facie case is established, the burden shifts to the

defendants to produce evidence that shows some legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for their actions. See Texas Dep't of Community

Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253 (1981). If the defendants meet

this burden, the burden then shifts back to the plaintiff to show that

the reason proffered by the defendants was false and that race was the

real reason for the adverse action. St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509

U.S. 502, 514-15 (1993).

Our review of the record and the district court's opinion discloses

that Thomas failed to establish a prima facie case of discrimination.

Thomas failed to establish that her job performance was satisfactory.

TRI received complaints about Thomas, investigated them, and determined that Thomas's conduct was unacceptable. Thomas claims that

she received several satisfactory job performance evaluations prior to

the investigation. However, "[p]revious satisfactory job performance

cannot be used by an employee to insulate [herself] from dismissal

once performance becomes unacceptable." See Ransome v. Bowling,

851 F. Supp. 204, 208 (D. Md. 1993), aff'd, 21 F.3d 423 (4th Cir.

1994). Thus, Thomas fails to establish that she was discharged

because of her race.

Accordingly, we affirm the district court's order. We grant

Thomas's unopposed motion to amend or supplement requested

relief. Because we affirm the district court's orders, the relief

requested is not warranted. We dispense with oral argument because

the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED

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