United States Court of Appeals

For the Eighth Circuit

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No. 19-2583

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United States of America

lllllllllllllllllllllPlaintiff - Appellee

v.

Dontay Lavarice Reese

lllllllllllllllllllllDefendant - Appellant

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Appeal from United States District Court 

for the District of Minnesota

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 Submitted: April 7, 2020

Filed: April 10, 2020

[Unpublished]

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Before BENTON, WOLLMAN, and GRASZ, Circuit Judges. 

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PER CURIAM.

Dontay Lavarice Reese appeals after he pled guilty to kidnapping, pursuant to

a binding plea agreement containing an appeal waiver, and the district court1

 accepted

1The Honorable Patrick J. Schiltz, United States District Judge for the District

of Minnesota.
his guilty plea and the plea agreement. Counsel has moved for leave to withdraw, and

has filed a brief under Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), arguing that Reese

should not have been permitted to proceed pro se, and should have been permitted to

withdraw his guilty plea. Having jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, this court

dismisses the appeal in part based on the appeal waiver, and otherwise affirms.

This court rejects Reese’s claim that the district court erred in permitting him

to proceed pro se because the record shows he knowingly and voluntarily waived his

right to counsel. See United States v. Armstrong, 554 F.3d 1159, 1165 (8th Cir. 2009)

(waiver of Sixth Amendment right to counsel must be voluntary, intelligent, and

knowing). This court declines to consider Reese’s ineffective-assistance claim on

direct appeal. See United States v. Ramirez-Hernandez, 449 F.3d 824, 826-27 (8th

Cir. 2006) (ineffective-assistance claims are best litigated in collateral proceedings,

where record can be properly developed).

To the extent Reese challenges the voluntariness of his guilty plea, the court

concludes his claims lack merit. See United States v. Scott, 627 F.3d 702, 704 (8th

Cir. 2010) (de novo review of validity and applicability of appeal waiver). Reese

confirmed at the plea hearing that he was satisfied with counsel; he agreed that the

factual basis set forth in the plea agreement was true; and he confirmed that he

understood the terms of the plea agreement, including the appeal waiver. 

Additionally, the record shows he was competent to plead guilty, because he

underwent a psychological evaluation and was found to be competent to stand trial;

and, during the plea hearing, Reese stated he was thinking clearly, he understood the

court’s questions, and defense counsel indicated he believed Reese was competent

to enter a plea. See United States v. Martinez, 446 F.3d 878, 881 (8th Cir. 2006)

(explaining that defendant is competent to enter guilty plea if he is able to consult

with his lawyer with reasonable degree of rational understanding and has rational and

factual understanding of proceedings); United States v. Denton, 434 F.3d 1104,

1112-13 (8th Cir. 2006) (affording defense counsel’s opinion as to defendant’s

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competency “significant weight,” as counsel is in a position to evaluate defendant’s

ability to understand proceedings); Nguyen v. United States, 114 F.3d 699, 703 (8th

Cir. 1997) (defendant’s statements made during plea hearing carry strong

presumption of verity). 

Reese’s assertion that he did not know that a kidnapping conviction might

trigger a probation violation is not cognizable in this appeal. See United States v.

Foy, 617 F.3d 1029, 1033-34 (8th Cir. 2010) (to extent defendant presents argument

to establish his plea was unknowing or involuntary, such claim would not be

cognizable on direct appeal where he failed to move in district court to withdraw his

guilty plea on that basis). This court concludes the appeal waiver is enforceable as

to the remaining arguments. See United States v. Andis, 333 F.3d 886, 889-92 (8th

Cir. 2003) (en banc) (appeal waiver will be enforced if appeal falls within scope of

waiver, defendant knowingly and voluntarily entered into waiver and plea agreement,

and enforcing waiver would not result in miscarriage of justice). 

This court has reviewed the record independently under Penson v. Ohio, 488

U.S. 75 (1988), and found no non-frivolous issues outside the scope of the appeal

waiver. 

The appeal is dismissed in part, and the judgment is affirmed. Counsel’s

request to withdraw is granted. 

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