IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

City of Philadelphia :

:

v. : No. 267 C.D. 2018

: Argued: November 14, 2019

Darren Hart :

:

Appeal of: Omont Wiggins :

:

:

City of Philadelphia, :

Appellant :

:

v. : No. 351 C.D. 2018

: Argued: November 14, 2019

Darren Hart :

BEFORE: HONORABLE P. KEVIN BROBSON, Judge

HONORABLE ELLEN CEISLER, Judge

HONORABLE BONNIE BRIGANCE LEADBETTER, Senior Judge

OPINION BY JUDGE BROBSON FILED: January 3, 2020

Appellants City of Philadelphia (City) and Omont Wiggins (Wiggins) 

appeal from an order of the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County (trial 

court), dated January 30, 2018, which granted the amended petition to set aside a tax 

sale of real property filed by Appellee Darren Hart (Hart). The City conducted the 

tax sale pursuant to what is commonly referred to as the Municipal Claims and Tax 

Liens Act, Act of May 16, 1923, P.L. 207, as amended, 53 P.S. §§ 7101-7505 

(MCTLA). For the reasons set forth below, we reverse the trial court’s order. 
2

I. BACKGROUND

We previously summarized the undisputed background facts of this 

case in our unreported decision Hart v. Bulldawg LLC (Pa. Cmwlth., 

No. 107 C.D. 2016, filed February 14, 2017) (Hart):1

The underlying dispute involves delinquent real 

estate taxes beginning with the 2011 tax year for property 

located at 26 Apsley Street, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania 

(the Property). Hart purchased the Property in 2013 for 

$20,000. 

On July 21, 2014, the City petitioned the trial court 

for a rule to show cause why the Property should not be 

sold free and clear of all encumbrances at a sheriff’s sale 

pursuant to the MCTLA for unpaid real estate taxes. On 

September 18, 2014, the trial court granted the City’s 

petition and issued a rule to show cause why a decree 

should not be entered permitting the sale of the Property 

free and clear of all liens and encumbrances. On 

October 31, 2014, the City filed an affidavit of sheriff’s 

service, stating that the Property had been posted with 

notice of the petition and rule to show cause. The City also 

filed an affidavit of service, stating that the petition and 

rule to show cause had been sent by certified and first class 

mail to Hart. After receiving no response, the trial court 

issued a decree on December 31, 2014, permitting the City 

to sell the Property at a sheriff’s sale. On 

January 29, 2015, the City served Hart with notice of the 

sheriff’s sale. On February 18, 2015, the Property was 

sold at the sheriff’s sale. The only bidder, Bulldawg LLC, 

purchased the Property for the amount of $1,100. 

On March 10, 2015, Hart filed a petition to set aside 

the sheriff’s sale, alleging he did not receive notice from 

the posting, first class mail, or certified mail. On 

March 20, 2015, the sheriff’s deed was acknowledged. On 

March 27, 2015, the City filed an answer to Hart’s petition 

 

1 Pursuant to Section 414(a) of the Commonwealth Court Internal Operating Procedures, 

“[a]n unreported opinion of this [C]ourt may be cited and relied upon when it is relevant under the 

doctrine of law of the case, res judicata or collateral estoppel.” 210 Pa. Code § 69.414(a). 
3

to set aside. The City attached to its answer a certified 

mail receipt[,] which indicated that delivery of the petition 

and rule to show cause was made to Hart’s address and 

included Hart’s signature. Then on April 1, 2015, the 

sheriff’s deed reflecting Bulldawg LLC’s ownership of the 

Property was recorded. 

On April 13, 2015, Hart amended his petition to set 

aside the sheriff’s sale. In his amended petition, Hart 

argued first that Bulldawg LLC installed a security gate 

while trespassing on the Property, preventing Hart from 

entering the Property. Hart also argued that the fair market 

value of the Property exceeds $78,000 and that the bid 

price of $1,100 at the sheriff’s sale was grossly inadequate. 

Hart argued that, in light of the trespass and gross 

inadequacy of the bid price, failure to set aside the sheriff’s 

sale would “constitute a gross miscarriage of equitable 

justice.” In his amended petition to set aside, Hart did not 

contest notice. 

On May 4, 2015, the City filed an answer to Hart’s 

amended petition. The City argued that it would be 

prejudiced if the sale was set aside and that there was no 

indication that Hart would pay the delinquent taxes that he 

failed to pay in the past. 

The trial court held a hearing on the amended 

petition to set aside on June 9, 2015. At the hearing, Hart 

testified that he was willing to pay the delinquent taxes or 

enter into a payment plan if the sale was set aside. Hart 

also reiterated the argument that the bid price was 

approximately 2% of the fair market value of the Property 

and, thus, was grossly inadequate. Hart, by his attorney, 

argued that “for sales less than [10%], that has typically 

been found to be grossly inadequate.” Hart testified that 

the bulk of the money due was for an unpaid water bill. 

The City’s attorney refuted Hart’s contention that this case 

originated from a water bill and stated that there is a 

separate procedure for unpaid water bills—thus the matter 

before the trial court was exclusively a result of delinquent 

taxes. The City also argued that Hart was not entitled to 

relief from the sale under the MCTLA.

The trial court’s order, dated June 15, 2015, denied 

Hart’s [amended] petition to set aside the tax sale. In an 
4

opinion dated October 7, 2015, the trial court reasoned 

that, despite the low bid price of $1,100 in comparison to 

the alleged fair market value of $78,000 [to $100,000], 

Hart did not offer evidence to support the alleged fair

market value. Specifically, the trial court noted that while 

Hart attached supporting documents to his pleadings, Hart 

did not introduce any evidence at the hearing regarding the 

alleged gross inadequacy of the bid price compared to the 

fair market value. The trial court also noted that, pursuant 

to Rule 3132 of the Pennsylvania Rules of Civil 

Procedure, it was unable to set aside the sheriff’s sale, 

because, by the time of the hearing on June 9, 2015, the 

sheriff’s deed had been delivered. Thus, the trial court 

reasoned, Hart’s petition to set aside was untimely.

Hart, slip. op. at 2-5 (footnotes and citations omitted). 

Hart appealed the trial court’s decision to this Court, arguing that the 

trial court abused its discretion and/or committed an error of law by: (1) failing to 

consider the exhibits to his amended petition to set aside the tax sale as evidence of 

the Property’s fair market value; (2) failing to reach a conclusion as to the Property’s 

fair market value; and (3) denying his amended petition to set aside the tax sale due 

to the gross inadequacy of the Property’s sale price. Hart, slip op. at 5. By opinion 

and order dated February 14, 2017, this Court concluded that the trial court did not 

commit an error of law by determining that the Property’s alleged fair market value 

of $78,000 to $100,000 was not supported by the evidence of record. Hart, slip op. 

at 7. In so doing, this Court reasoned that Hart’s claim that the Property had a fair 

market value of $78,000 or greater was unsubstantiated because Hart failed to 

introduce the two documents attached to his amended petition to set aside the tax 

sale into evidence at the time of the evidentiary hearing. Hart, slip op. at 7. This 

Court also concluded, however, that Hart did present the trial court with evidence 

that the Property had an alleged fair market value of $20,000—i.e., the amount Hart 

paid to purchase the Property in 2013—and, therefore, the trial court erred by failing 
5

to evaluate such evidence or determine whether the Property’s sale price was grossly 

inadequate. Hart, slip op. at 8. As a result, this Court vacated the trial court’s order 

and remanded the matter to the trial court for the issuance of a new determination 

regarding whether the tax sale should be set aside for gross inadequacy. Hart, slip 

op. at 8.

The trial court conducted an evidentiary hearing on 

November 17, 2017, and December 8, 2017. At that time, the parties stipulated that 

the amount of the municipal liens on the Property at the time of the tax sale was in 

excess of $35,000. (Reproduced Record (R.R.) at 230a.) The City also stipulated 

that there would be no personal liability against Hart for any of the unpaid municipal 

liens for the Property. (Id.) Hart testified that he purchased the Property, which was 

a 3-floor “shell” that needed to be gutted and completely rehabbed, in 

September/October 2013 for $10,000.

2

 (Id. at 232.) Hart explained that, prior to the

purchase, he cleaned and gutted the Property to the studs and replaced the roof, but 

he thereafter sealed the Property and stopped working around July 2013 because his 

mother passed away. (Id. at 232a-34a.) Hart also presented the testimony of Edward 

Drach (Drach), a certified residential appraiser, who testified that, on 

February 18, 2015, the Property’s fair market value was $30,000. (Id. at 239a.) 

Drach stated that, in his appraisal report, he compared the Property to another 

property located a couple of blocks away that sold for $46,000 and made adjustments 

to the Property’s value based upon the condition of both properties. (Id. at 183a, 

235a, 237a-39a.) Drach explained that, even though the comparable property was 

livable and the Property was a completely gutted shell with no stairs, windows, 

 

2 We note for the record that, during the prior proceedings in this case, Hart represented 

that he purchased the Property for $20,000. 
6

kitchen, bathrooms, floors, interior walls, electric, or plumbing, the difference in 

value between the comparable property and the Property was only about $15,000. 

(Id. at 240a.) Drach explained further that the adjustments that he made to account 

for the difference in value are adjustments that he has been using for 28 years that 

relate to “similar type properties in similar type areas . . . that ha[ve] nothing to do 

with the cost of what is there or the cost of what you can put in there.” (Id.)

The City presented the testimony of John Adams (Adams), a certified 

residential appraiser. (Id. at 240a-41a.) Adams testified that, while the comparable 

properties used by Drach in his appraisal report were appropriate, he would have 

made different adjustments because there were no comparable properties in the 

neighborhood that were “as bad as” the Property. (Id. at 241a.) Adams testified 

further that the negative adjustments3 made by Drach—i.e., $10,000 for the 

condition, $3,500 for the basement, and $5,000 for the kitchen and bathroom—were 

inadequate and insufficient given the superior condition of the comparable 

properties. (Id.) Adams indicated that he would have made a $40,000 negative 

adjustment for the condition of the Property and an overall negative adjustment of 

$60,000. (Id. at 242a.) When questioned about the amount of his adjustments in 

light of the value of a comparable property, Adams explained that a $60,000 negative 

adjustment could be appropriate when compared to a $46,000 property depending 

on the circumstances. (Id. at 245a-46a.)

Wiggins,4the current owner of the Property, who purchased the 

Property from Bulldawg LLC for $1,000 in 2015, testified that he performed certain 

 

3 Drach also made a positive adjustment in the amount of $2,500 for the Property’s view. 

(R.R. at 241a.)

4 The trial court granted Wiggins leave to intervene in this matter by order dated 

December 8, 2017. 
7

work on the Property in 2015 and 2016 and invested approximately $100,000 into 

the Property. (Id. at 250a-53a.) With the exception of a few receipts for lumber, 

concrete, and other building materials, however, Wiggins did not provide any 

documentation to support his estimates of the amount of money that he expended for 

labor and materials in connection with the Property. (Id. at 253a-55a.)

By order dated January 30, 2018, the trial court granted Hart’s amended 

petition to set aside the tax sale. The City and Wiggins appealed the trial court’s 

decision to this Court, and the trial court directed the City and Wiggins to file a 

statement of errors complained of on appeal pursuant to Pennsylvania Rule of 

Appellate Procedure (Rule) 1925. In its Rule 1925(a) opinion, the trial court 

concluded, inter alia, that the Property’s sale price “was grossly inadequate in 

proportion to the [P]roperty’s value,” and that Wiggins was not entitled to 

reimbursement for the expenditures that he made to improve the Property after he 

purchased the Property from Bulldawg LLC. (Trial Ct. Op. at 10-13.) 

II. ARGUMENTS ON APPEAL

On appeal,5the City argues: (1) Hart lacks standing to challenge the 

Property’s sale price as grossly inadequate; and (2) the trial court committed an error 

of law and/or abused its discretion by concluding that the Property’s sale price was 

grossly inadequate. In addition to adopting those arguments set forth on appeal by 

the City, Wiggins also argues that the trial court committed an error of law and/or 

abused its discretion by: (1) failing to take into consideration his interest and equity 

in the Property as an innocent purchaser, who acquired title to the Property free and 

 

5

“This Court’s review in tax sale cases is limited to a determination of whether the trial 

court abused its discretion, erred as a matter of law or rendered a decision with [a] lack of 

supporting evidence.” Wiles v. Washington Cty. Tax Claim Bureau, 972 A.2d 24, 27 n.2 

(Pa. Cmwlth. 2009).
8

clear of all claims and thereafter invested approximately $100,000 into the Property 

for improvements; and (2) failing to require Hart to compensate him for the $100,000 

that he reasonably invested into the Property for improvements. 

III. DISCUSSION 

A. Standing

The City argues that Hart lacksstanding to challenge the Property’s sale 

price as grossly inadequate because, even if the Property had been sold for 

$30,000—i.e., the Property’s fair market value as alleged by Hart—Hart would not 

have received any proceeds from the Property’s sale, and, therefore, Hart was not 

harmed by any alleged gross inadequacy in the Property’s sale price. More 

specifically, the City contends that, given the $35,000 in municipal liens on the 

Property, there is absolutely no difference to Hart between a $1,100 sale price and a 

$30,000 sale price, because with either sale price all of the proceeds from the sale 

would go to the City to satisfy the municipal liens and the City stipulated that it 

would not proceed against Hart personally for any remaining unpaid municipal liens. 

In response, Hart argues that the amount of the municipal liens on the Property is 

irrelevant to and has no effect on a determination of the Property’s fair market value. 

Hart further contends that he has been harmed by the Property’s grossly inadequate 

sale price because he testified that he is willing to pay or enter into a payment plan 

for the delinquent taxes and unpaid water and utility bills for the Property. 

A party seeking to set aside a sheriff’s sale, like any other “party 

seeking judicial resolution of a controversy in this Commonwealth must, as a 

prerequisite, establish that he has standing to maintain the action.” Merrill Lynch 

Mortg. Capital v. Steele, 859 A.2d 788, 789-90 (Pa. Super. 2004), appeal denied, 
9

872 A.2d 1199 (Pa. 2005) (quoting In re Hickson, 821 A.2d 1238, 1243 (Pa. 2003)).

6

 

“A party has standing if he is aggrieved, i.e., he can show a substantial, direct, and 

immediate interest in the outcome of the litigation.” Id. at 790. In addition to 

establishing that he is aggrieved, a party filing a petition to set aside a sheriff’s sale 

must also demonstrate that he is a “party in interest” as required by Pennsylvania 

Rule of Civil Procedure No. 3132.7 Id.

Here, it appears that the City is confusing the concept of standing to file 

the amended petition to set aside the tax sale with the issue of whether Hart can be 

successful on the merits—i.e., proving that the Property’s sale price was grossly 

inadequate. Just because Hart may not benefit financially from setting aside the tax

sale does not mean that Hart does not have standing to challenge the tax sale. Hart 

was the record owner of the Property at the time of the tax sale and at the time that

he filed his initial petition to set aside the tax sale. As the record owner of the 

Property, Hart was a party in interest, who had a substantial, direct, and immediate 

interest in avoiding the transfer of the Property to Bulldawg LLC. As a result, we 

cannot conclude that Hart lacked standing to file his amended petition to set aside 

the tax sale. 

 

6 Although not binding on this Court, Pennsylvania Superior Court decisions may be cited 

for their persuasive value when they address analogous issues. Lerch v. Unemployment Comp. Bd. 

of Review, 180 A.3d 545, 550 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2018).

7 Pennsylvania Rule of Civil Procedure No. 3132 provides:

Upon petition of any party in interest before delivery of the personal property or of 

the sheriff’s deed to real property, the court may, upon proper cause shown, set 

aside the sale and order a resale or enter any other order which may be just and 

proper under the circumstances.
10

B. Sale Price Not Grossly Inadequate

The City argues that the trial court committed an error of law and/or 

abused its discretion by concluding that the Property’s sale price was grossly 

inadequate, because the trial court: (1) improperly relied on the Property’s $78,000 

assessed value to determine the Property’s fair market value and then misapplied its 

own methodology in determining whether the sale price was grossly inadequate; 

(2) failed to take into consideration that Bulldawg LLC—the successful bidder at the 

tax sale—sold the Property to Wiggins—a subsequent purchaser—for only $1,000; 

and (3) improperly relied on the inaccurate testimony of Hart’s appraiser. In 

response, Hart argues that the trial court did not commit an error of law or abuse its 

discretion by granting his amended petition to set aside the tax sale because the 

Property’s $1,100 sale price was grossly inadequate when compared to the 

Property’s $30,000 fair market value. 

Where a tax sale is challenged based upon the adequacy of the price, 

our courts have frequently held that mere inadequacy of price, standing alone, is not 

a sufficient basis for setting aside a sheriff’s sale. Allegheny Cty. v. Golf Resort, 

Inc., 974 A.2d 1242, 1247 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2009) (quoting Provident Nat’l Bank, N.A. 

v. Song, 832 A.2d 1077, 1081 (Pa. Super. 2003)). Where a gross inadequacy exists, 

however, courts have found proper grounds to set aside a sheriff’s sale, and each 

case is determined on its own facts. Id. “It is for this reason that the term ‘grossly 

inadequate price’ has never been fixed by any court at any given amount or any 

percentage amount of the sale.” Scott v. Adal Corp., 509 A.2d 1279, 1283 

(Pa. Super. 1986), appeal denied, 523 A.2d 1132 (Pa. 1987). In addition, a

presumption exists that the price received at a public sale is the highest and best 
11

available. Blue Ball Nat’l Bank v. Balmer, 810 A.2d 164, 167 (Pa. Super. 2002), 

appeal denied, 820 A.2d 702 (Pa. 2003). 

Here, Hart’s appraiser testified that the Property’s fair market value was 

$30,000.8 Even if we were to assume that the trial court properly relied upon the 

testimony of Hart’s appraiser to establish the Property’s fair market value, the 

evidence of record does not establish that the Property’s sale price was grossly 

inadequate. Hart is essentially asking this Court to compare the Property’s sale price 

to the Property’s fair market value and, based solely on the fact that the Property’s 

sale price was a small percentage of the Property’s fair market value, determine that 

the Property’s sale price was grossly inadequate. This we will not do, as we must 

decide each case, including this one, on its own facts. Allegheny Cty., 974 A.2d 

at 1247. We must, therefore, consider all of the facts of this case and not just the 

difference between the Property’s sale price and the Property’s fair market value. 

Here, it is apparent to this Court that a consideration of whether the Property’s sale

price was grossly inadequate serves the purpose of either protecting the Property’s 

 

8

In its opinion, the trial court appears to have performed its analysis of whether the 

Property’s sale price was grossly inadequate based upon its indication that Hart’s appraiser 

“assessed the [P]roperty’s fair market value at $78,000.” (Trial Ct. Op. at 10.) In support of its 

statement as to the fair market value of the Property, however, the trial court cited not to the 

testimony of Hart’s appraiser but rather to a statement made on the record by Hart’s counsel at the 

time of the June 2, 2017 proceeding. (See Supplemental Original Record, Notes and Testimony, 

June 2, 2017, at 4-5 (“[T]he Commonwealth Court remanded the matter in front of us today for an 

evidentiary hearing to demonstrate that [Hart’s] evaluation of the [P]roperty, which was at least 

$78,000, can be shown with evidence.”).) Based upon our review of the record and the parties’

briefs, it appears to this Court that the trial court mistakenly referenced Hart’s original, 

unsupported position as the Property’s fair market value rather than the $30,000 fair market value 

established by the testimony of Hart’s appraiser at the time of the evidentiary hearing. Regardless 

of any misapprehension by the trial court, Hart appears to concede in his brief to this Court that he 

presented evidence establishing that the fair market value of the Property was $30,000, not 

$78,000. Thus, we will restrict our review to whether the Property’s sale price was grossly 

inadequate based upon a $30,000 fair market value. 
12

money value in excess of the municipal liens against it—i.e., Hart’s equity—or 

preventing Hart from being personally liable for the difference between the 

Property’s sale price and the amount of the debt owed to the City. In that regard, we 

must consider the municipal liens and their effect on Hart’s financial interest in the 

Property when determining whether the Property’s sale price was grossly 

inadequate. The parties stipulated that the amount of the municipal liens at the time 

of the tax sale was in excess of $35,000. (R.R. at 230a.) The City also stipulated 

that Hart would not be personally liable for any unpaid municipal claims following 

the tax sale. (Id.) As a result, the Property’s $1,100 sale price was not grossly 

inadequate even though it was a small percentage of the Property’s $30,000 fair 

market value, because, given the $35,000 in municipal liens, Hart had no equity in 

the Property to protect and was not personally responsible for any of the unpaid 

municipal liens after the tax sale. In other words, even if the sheriff sold the Property 

for its fair market value of $30,000, Hart would have seen no benefit because the 

municipal liens exceeded the fair market value of the Property. For these reasons, 

we must conclude that the trial court committed an error of law and abused its 

discretion by concluding that the Property’s sale price was grossly inadequate.

IV. CONCLUSION

Accordingly, we reverse the trial court’s order.9

P. KEVIN BROBSON, Judge

 

9 Given our disposition above, we need not consider the additional arguments raised by 

Wiggins on appeal. 
IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

City of Philadelphia :

:

v. : No. 267 C.D. 2018

:

Darren Hart :

:

Appeal of: Omont Wiggins :

:

:

City of Philadelphia, :

Appellant :

:

v. : No. 351 C.D. 2018

:

Darren Hart :

O R D E R

AND NOW, this 3

rd day of January, 2020, the order of the Court of 

Common Pleas of Philadelphia County is hereby REVERSED.

P. KEVIN BROBSON, Judge