UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

TESFAYE SETARGIE; NIGIST ASSEFA;

EMANUEL TESFAYE,

Petitioners,

v. No. 98-1536

U.S. IMMIGRATION & NATURALIZATION

SERVICE,

Respondent.

On Petition for Review of an Order

of the Board of Immigration Appeals.

(A70-509-0601, A72-372-485, A72-415-956)

Submitted: August 25, 1998

Decided: September 16, 1998

Before ERVIN and MOTZ, Circuit Judges, and

BUTZNER, Senior Circuit Judge.

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Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

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COUNSEL

Mikre Michael Ayele, Arlington, Virginia, for Petitioners. Frank W.

Hunger, Assistant Attorney General, Brenda E. Ellison, Senior Litigation Counsel, John C. Cunningham, Office of Immigration Litigation,

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, Washington,

D.C., for Respondent.

_________________________________________________________________
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See

Local Rule 36(c).

_________________________________________________________________

OPINION

PER CURIAM:

Tesfaye Setargie, a native and citizen of Ethiopia, petitions for

review of a final order of the Board of Immigration Appeals (the

"Board") denying his application for asylum and withholding of

deportation. Setargie's wife, Nigist Assefa, and their son, Emanuel

Tesfaye, also natives and citizens of Ethiopia, appear as copetitioners. They were listed as dependents on Setargie's application

for asylum and are subject to the same final order of deportation

entered by the Board. Because substantial evidence supports the

Board's decision, we affirm.

The Immigration and Nationality Act (the "Act") authorizes the

Attorney General, in her discretion, to confer asylum on any refugee.

8 U.S.C.A. § 1158(b) (West Supp. 1998). The Act defines a refugee

as a person unwilling or unable to return to his native country "because of persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution on account

of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group,

or political opinion." 8 U.S.C.A. § 1101(a)(42)(A) (West Supp.

1998); see M.A. v. INS, 899 F.2d 304, 307 (4th Cir. 1990) (en banc).

The "well-founded fear of persecution" standard contains both a

subjective and an objective component. An applicant may satisfy the

subjective element by presenting "`candid, credible, and sincere testimony' demonstrating a genuine fear of persecution." BerroteranMelendez v. INS, 955 F.2d 1251, 1256 (9th Cir. 1992) (quoting

Blanco-Comarribas v. INS, 830 F.2d 1039, 1042 (9th Cir. 1987)); see

Figeroa v. INS, 886 F.2d 76, 79 (4th Cir. 1989). The objective element requires a showing of specific, concrete facts that would lead a

reasonable person in like circumstances to fear persecution. See

Huaman-Cornelio v. Board of Immigration Appeals, 979 F.2d 995,

999 (4th Cir. 1992).

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A finding of past persecution creates a rebuttable presumption of

a well-founded fear of future persecution. See 8 C.F.R. § 208.13(b)(1)

(1998). This presumption may be rebutted by evidence demonstrating

that there is no longer a reasonable fear of future persecution, such as

when conditions in an alien's native country have changed significantly. See 8 C.F.R. § 208.13(b)(1) (1998). "Eligibility for asylum can

[also] be based on grounds of past persecution alone even though

there is `no reasonable likelihood of present persecution.'" Baka v.

INS, 963 F.2d 1376, 1379 (10th Cir. 1992) (quoting Rivera-Cruz v.

INS, 948 F.2d 962, 969 (5th Cir. 1991)). "To establish such eligibility,

an alien must show past persecution so severe that repatriation would

be inhumane." Id.; see Matter of Chen , 20 I. & N. Dec. 16 (BIA

1989).

We must uphold the Board's determination that Setargie is not eligible for asylum if the determination is "supported by reasonable,

substantial, and probative evidence on the record considered as a

whole." 8 U.S.C.A. § 1105a(a)(4) (West Supp. 1998). We accord the

Board all possible deference. See Huaman-Cornelio, 979 F.2d at 999.

The decision may be "reversed only if the evidence presented by

[Setargie] was such that a reasonable factfinder would have to conclude that the requisite fear of persecution existed." INS v. EliasZacarias, 502 U.S. 478, 481 (1992).

Setargie contends that the Board erred by finding that he failed to

show that he suffered from past persecution and by requiring him to

show a well-founded fear of persecution. Setargie insists that he was

the victim of a history of past persecution due to his religious beliefs

and, based on that showing, was not required to show a well-founded

fear of persecution. Setargie also contends that he has a well-founded

fear of future persecution due to his religious beliefs, political opposition to Ethiopia's current government, and his Amharan ethnicity.

Our review reveals, however, that substantial evidence supports the

Board's finding that Setargie did not satisfy his statutory burden.

Evidence established that Setargie was an accountant employed by

the Ethiopian Electric Light and Power Company, a government

agency, from 1975 until he voluntarily quit in 1990. Setargie also

served the Meseret Kristos Pentecostal Church as an elder, teacher

and preacher. During this period, Ethiopia was ruled by the Marxist

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regime of Colonel Mengistu. Setargie contended that members of his

church were jailed in 1981 and property was confiscated. Church

members were forced to meet secretly for worship. Setargie was

jailed in 1983 for thirty-three days because he was one of the leaders

of the underground movement. He was also threatened by his supervisor, one time with a gun, and co-workers, because of his religious

activity. In 1988, Setargie was permitted to leave Ethiopia for six

weeks to attend a religious conference in Singapore. When he

returned, he was suspended from his government job for two months.

At the urging of his manager, he was reinstated. In 1990, he received

a notice from the government instructing him to report for military

duty. He quit his job, obtained a passport from the government, and

came to the United States. In 1991, the Mengistu regime was overthrown by the Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Front. In

1992, his wife and child joined Setargie in the United States.

The immigration judge ("IJ") found that Setargie did not show a

sufficient level of past persecution or a well-founded fear of future

persecution based on his religious or political beliefs or his ethnicity.

On appeal, the Board concluded that the IJ applied the correct legal

standard. The Board noted that Setargie failed to provide details concerning his 1983 jail term and that he remained employed by the government despite his religious activity. The Board also noted that

Setargie failed to present any objective evidence supporting his claim

that he would face persecution due to his religion if he were to return

to Ethiopia. In addition, the Board found that Setargie failed to present any evidence supporting his claim that he would face persecution

based upon his political beliefs or ethnicity.

We conclude that substantial evidence supports the Board's finding

that Setargie failed to show past persecution. Persecution is the infliction of suffering or harm upon those who differ due to a protected status in a way regarded as offensive. See Prasad v. INS, 47 F.3d 336,

339 (9th Cir. 1995). It includes non-life threatening violence and

abuse. But not every "bullying" tactic by government agents rises to

the level of persecution. See Marquez v. INS, 105 F.3d 374, 379-80

(7th Cir. 1997). The evidence showed that Setargie was jailed only

once over a period of many years and remained employed by a government agency with knowledge that Setargie was active in his religious group. He was permitted to leave the country in order to further

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his religious education. Neither he nor his family suffered any physical abuse or severe economic sanctions. Furthermore, Setargie cannot

base his claim of asylum on the Ethiopian government's attempt to

draft him into the military. See M.A., 899 F.2d at 312.

Setargie's argument that the Board applied the wrong legal standard is dependent upon a finding that Setargie suffered past persecution. Setargie misreads the Board's decision. The Board clearly stated

that Setargie failed to show that he was persecuted due to his religion.

(A.R. at 4).

We also find substantial evidence supports the Board's finding that

Setargie does not have a well-founded fear of future persecution if he

were to return to Ethiopia. There is no evidence that he faces persecution due to his religious beliefs. The new constitution includes a provision granting religious freedom. Setargie bases his fear due to his

political beliefs on two conversations he had with Ethiopian government authorities here in the United States, in addition to the assertion

that the current government is Marxist. He contends that his opposition to some of the government's current policies, expressed to the

government authorities, would make him a target for persecution were

he to return. Prior to coming to the United States, Setargie was not

active in any political movement. There is nothing in the record suggesting that he faces persecution due to these conversations. The State

Department has reported that Ethiopian citizens have greater political

freedom than at any time in the nation's history. (A.R. at 251).

Finally, there is no evidence to support Setargie's fear of persecution

due to his ethnicity.

The standard for withholding of deportation is more stringent than

that for granting asylum. See INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421,

431-32 (1987). To qualify for withholding of deportation, an applicant must demonstrate a "clear probability of persecution." Id. at 430.

As Setargie has not established entitlement to asylum, he cannot meet

the higher standard for withholding of deportation. See HuamanCornelio, 979 F.2d at 1000.

We accordingly affirm the Board's order. We dispense with oral

argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately pre-

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sented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid

the decisional process.

AFFIRMED

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