UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v. No. 98-4476

JOHNNY RAY KNIGHT,

Defendant-Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Middle District of North Carolina, at Durham.

Frank W. Bullock, Jr., Chief District Judge.

(CR-98-18)

Submitted: February 9, 1999

Decided: February 24, 1999

Before ERVIN and TRAXLER, Circuit Judges, and

HALL, Senior Circuit Judge.

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Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

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COUNSEL

Thomas H. Johnson, Jr., GRAY, NEWELL & JOHNSON, L.L.P.,

Greensboro, North Carolina, for Appellant. Walter C. Holton, Jr.,

United States Attorney, Harry L. Hobgood, Assistant United States

Attorney, Greensboro, North Carolina, for Appellee.

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Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See

Local Rule 36(c).

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OPINION

PER CURIAM:

Johnny Knight appeals from a district court judgment order entered

pursuant to his guilty plea to one count of mail fraud, in violation of

18 U.S.C. § 1341 (1994). Knight was the leader of a conspiracy

designed to defraud various merchants in North Carolina and other

states by having members of the conspiracy cash phony payroll

checks at their establishments. The conspirators opened accounts at

several banks in the names of companies that did not exist. Next, the

conspirators obtained checks from check printing companies in Ohio

and Florida, bearing the names of the fictitious companies and the

account numbers of their bank accounts.

The printing companies sent the checks through United Parcel Service, a commercial interstate carrier, to addresses maintained by the

conspirators. Knight completed the checks so that they would look

like payroll checks. Persons chosen by the conspirators then cashed

the checks at retail establishments such as grocery stores. When the

banks closed their accounts for insufficient funds, the conspirators

opened new accounts and repeated the fraudulent scheme.

On January 27, 1998, Knight and his co-defendants were indicted

on three counts of violating the mail fraud statute. Prior to entering

his plea, Knight moved to dismiss the indictment on the ground that

his conduct did not violate the statute, divesting the district court of

jurisdiction over the case. The only issue in this appeal is whether the

district court acted properly by denying Knight's motion to dismiss.

Mail fraud requires a showing of (1) knowing participation in a

scheme to defraud and (2) a mailing in furtherance of the scheme. 18

U.S.C. § 1341; United States v. Dozie, 27 F.3d 95, 97 (4th Cir. 1994).

Knight does not contest the elements that he knowingly participated

in a fraudulent scheme or that his scheme involved use of the mail.

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Rather, he contends that the mailings were not sufficiently closely

related to his scheme to bring his conduct within the coverage of the

statute. He relies on case authority holding that the mailings in question must aid the execution of the scheme, and cannot occur after the

fraud has been completed. See United States v. Maze, 414 U.S. 395,

402-03 (1974).

The Supreme Court has found that the use of the mails need not be

an essential element of the scheme, but need only be incidental to an

essential part of the scheme. Schmuck v. United States, 489 U.S. 705,

710-11 (1989). In any event, however, the acquisition of the blank

checks was certainly essential to Knight's fraudulent scheme. Moreover, the acquisition of the checks through the mail occurred at an

early stage of the scheme, long before the scheme reached fruition.

Knight's challenge to federal jurisdiction was therefore without merit,

and his motion to dismiss the indictment was properly rejected by the

district court.

Accordingly, the judgment order of the district court is affirmed.

We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and

argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED

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