Opinion issued June 10, 2021

In The

Court of Appeals 

For The 

First District of Texas 

————————————

NOS. 01-20-00673-CV

01-20-00689-CV

01-20-00690-CV

01-20-00691-CV

01-20-00692-CV

01-20-00693-CV

01-20-00694-CV

01-20-00695-CV

———————————

HOUSTON COMMUNITY COLLEGE, Appellant

V.

THE HALL LAW GROUP, PLLC, DOLCEFINO CONSULTING, 

AND SCOTT LAHA, Appellees

On Appeal from the 334th District Court

Harris County, Texas

Trial Court Case Nos. 2020-31380, 2020-31380A, 2020-31380B, 2020-31380C,

2020-31380D, 2020-31380E, 2020-31380F, 2020-31380G

MEMORANDUM OPINION
2

Appellees, The Hall Law Group, PLLC (“Hall”), Dolcefino Consulting

(“Dolcefino”), and Scott Laha submitted various requests to appellant, Houston 

Community College (“HCC”), for public information, pursuant to the Texas Public 

Information Act (“TPIA”).1 Asserting that HCC refused to release the requested 

information, appellees sought writs of mandamus to compel HCC to comply with

their requests.

2

 HCC filed a plea to the jurisdiction, arguing that the trial court lacked 

subject matter jurisdiction over appellees’ claims because HCC is a governmental 

body and that appellees failed to establish a waiver of governmental immunity under 

the TPIA, i.e., that HCC had “refused” to act. The trial court found that HCC had 

failed to comply with the TPIA, including provisions governing the suspension of 

deadlines during an epidemic,

3

and that such failure constituted a refusal to release 

public information under the TPIA. The trial court denied HCC’s plea to the 

jurisdiction and granted mandamus relief, ordering that HCC provide all public 

1 See TEX. GOV’T CODE § 552.001–.376.

2 See id. § 552.321(a) (authorizing requestor to file suit for mandamus against 

governmental body that refuses to release public information).

3 See Act of May 17, 2019, 86th Leg., R.S., ch. 462, § 4, 2019 Tex. Gen. Laws 865, 

866, amended by Act of May 11, 2021, 87th Leg., R.S., ch. 164, § 1 (S.B. 1225) 

(current version at TEX. GOV’T CODE § 552.233, “Temporary Suspension of 

Requirements for Governmental Body Impacted by Catastrophe”). Because the 

requests at issue were received, and this action was filed, prior to September 1, 2021, 

the effective date of the amendments, we apply the current version of the statute.
3

information responsive to appellees’ TPIA requests. The trial court granted 

appellees’ motions to sever their requests into separate writs.4 

In its sole issue in this interlocutory appeal,

5 HCC contends that the trial court 

erred in denying its plea to the jurisdiction.

We affirm.

Background

In its plea to the jurisdiction, HCC stated that, on December 11, 2019, Hall

served it with a request for public information under the TPIA, seeking seven

categories of documents pertaining to HCC’s Chief Human Resources Officer, Janet 

May (“May”).

6

 On December 18, 2019, HCC acknowledged receipt of the request

and sought clarification. On January 2, 2020, Hall responded with another TPIA 

4 Trial court case no. 2020-31380 is appellate cause no. 01-20-00673-CV.

Trial court case no. 2020-31380A is appellate cause no. 01-20-00689-CV. 

Trial court case no. 2020-31380B is appellate cause no. 01-20-00690-CV.

Trial court case no. 2020-31380C is appellate cause no. 01-20-00691-CV.

Trial court case no. 2020-31380D is appellate cause no. 01-20-00692-CV.

Trial court case no. 2020-31380E is appellate cause no. 01-20-00693-CV. 

Trial court case no. 2020-31380F is appellate cause no. 01-20-00694-CV. 

Trial court case no. 2020-31380G is appellate cause no. 01-20-00695-CV.

5 See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 51.014(a)(8).

6 The precise nature of the requests is not pertinent to this appeal. Generally, the 

requests sought documents regarding May’s job duties and work schedule; 

complaints filed against her or relating to her; documents authorizing her to perform 

services on behalf of The Harris Center for Mental Health and IDD (“The Harris 

Center”); and documents regarding the number of African Americans she had 

recommended or approved for termination.
4

request, seeking seven new categories of documents.

7

 HCC requested clarification 

as to whether Hall’s response constituted a new or modified request. On January 7, 

2020, Hall responded to both requests by consolidating them into one request 

containing eleven items (“Request No. 1”). On January 17, 2020, HCC responded 

to Hall, stating that, after a diligent search, it did not have records responsive to six 

of the requested items and seeking clarification regarding the remaining five items. 

On February 4, 2020, HCC sent a request to the Office of the Attorney General 

(“OAG”), asking whether it was required to release information related to one of the

five remaining items. On February 10, 2020, HCC released records to Hall related 

to two of the remaining items, and HCC notified Hall that it “did not have records 

responsive to the last two of its requested items” and considered the request closed.

On March 4, 2020, Dolcefino submitted a TPIA request to HCC (“Request 

No. 2”), seeking information concerning certain land sale contracts. Seven business 

days later, however, HCC closed its offices for its scheduled Spring Break—March 

16, 2020 through March 20, 2020. Thereafter, beginning on March 20, 2020 and 

continuing thereafter, HCC “closed its offices indefinitely due to the COVID-19 

pandemic.” 

7 Generally, the requests involved documents relating to May’s work at The Harris 

Center and records showing any payments she had made or received for her work.
5

HCC asserted that, beginning in late March, “much of the country (indeed the 

world) largely stopped functioning due to COVID-19.” And, “[a]mong the hundreds 

of state and local pronouncements issued throughout Texas in response to the 

pandemic, the [OAG] informed all governmental entities” that the computation of 

“business days” under the TPIA was affected as follows:

If a governmental body has closed its physical offices for purposes of a 

public health or epidemic response or if a governmental body is unable 

to access its records on a calendar day, then such day is not a business 

day, even if staff continues to work remotely or staff is present but 

involved directly in the public health or epidemic response.

Accordingly, on April 3, 2020, HCC notified Dolcefino of HCC’s closure due 

to the COVID-19 pandemic, stating that it would “process open records 

requests . . . upon HCC’s return to normal operations/business days, in accordance 

with the [TPIA] and the [OAG’s] guidelines,” as follows:

To protect the health and safety of our students, faculty, and staff with 

regard to COVID-19 (Coronavirus), [HCC] facilities are closed 

beginning March 20, 2020 until further notice. Due to the COVID-19 

pandemic and the Texas Governor’s recent disaster declaration, HCC 

is following the Texas Attorney General’s guidelines regarding the 

[TPIA]. The Attorney General has clarified that if a governmental body 

has closed its physical offices for purposes of a public health or 

epidemic response or if a governmental body is unable to access its

records on a calendar day, then such day is not a business day for 

purposes of the [TPIA], even if staff continues to work remotely or staff 

is present but involved directly in the public health or epidemic 

response. As such, HCC will process open records requests submitted 

during HCC’s closure/period of altered operations and will continue to 

process pending requests such as yours upon HCC’s return to normal 

operations/business days, in accordance with the [TPIA] and the

Attorney General’s guidelines.
6

On April 13, 2020, Hall submitted a TPIA request to HCC (“Request No. 3”), 

seeking seven categories of information, including emails and text messages 

involving May, documents authorizing her work on personnel matters at The Harris 

Center, and May’s applications and resumes. On April 22, 2020, HCC again notified 

Hall of its closure due to the COVID-19 pandemic and stated that the request would 

be processed “upon HCC’s return to normal operations/business days, in accordance 

with the [TPIA] and the [OAG’s] guidelines.”

On May 18, 2020, Hall submitted a TPIA request to HCC (“Request No. 4”), 

seeking two categories of information. On May 19, 2020, HCC again notified Hall 

of its closure due to the COVID-19 pandemic and stated that the request would be 

processed “upon HCC’s return to normal operations/business days, in accordance 

with the [TPIA] and the [OAG’s] guidelines.”

On May 25, 2020, Hall filed a Petition for Writ of Mandamus, asking the trial 

court to compel HCC to comply with the TPIA by producing all public information

requested in each of Hall’s requests, i.e., Request Nos. 1, 3, and 4.

On June 23, 2020, Laha submitted a TPIA request to HCC (“Request No. 5”), 

seeking information about certain contracts and settlements. Later that day, HCC 

notified Laha of its closure due to the COVID-19 pandemic and stated that his 

request would be processed “upon HCC’s return to normal operations/business days, 

in accordance with the [TPIA] and the [OAG’s] guidelines.”
7

On June 25, 2020, Dolcefino submitted a TPIA request to HCC (“Request No.

6”), seeking copies of certain settlement agreements and documents detailing certain

expenditures. HCC asserts that, later the same day, it again notified Dolcefino of its 

closure due to the COVID-19 pandemic and stated that it would process the request 

“upon HCC’s return to normal operations/business days, in accordance with the 

[TPIA] and the [OAG’s] guidelines.”

On June 29, 2020, Dolcefino submitted a TPIA request to HCC (“Request No. 

7”), seeking certain documents detailing the race and nationality of employees 

terminated from HCC since 2014. HCC again notified Dolcefino that it would 

process the request “upon HCC’s return to normal operations/business days, in 

accordance with the [TPIA] and the [OAG’s] guidelines.”

On July 27, 2020, Dolcefino and Laha, alleging that HCC had refused to

respond to their TPIA requests, intervened in Hall’s suit for mandamus relief. They 

asked the trial court to compel HCC to provide the public information requested in 

Request Nos. 2, 5, 6, and 7. They also asked the trial court to sever their requests 

and enter separate writs. 

On August 14, 2020, HCC filed its First Amended Plea to the Jurisdiction, 

seeking the dismissal of appellees’ claims. HCC asserted that the trial court lacked 

subject matter jurisdiction over appellees’ claims because HCC, as a governmental 

body, was immune from suit, and the TPIA provides only a limited waiver of 
8

immunity in cases in which a governmental body has “refused” to supply public 

information. HCC asserted that there was no evidence that it had “refused” to give 

appellees access to the requested public information.

HCC asserted that, with respect to Request No. 1, it had (1) conducted a goodfaith search and notified Hall that it did not have any responsive information to 

several of its requests; (2) produced some responsive information; and (3) sought an 

OAG decision as to whether it was required to disclose certain information that it 

believed was protected by attorney-client privilege. HCC asserted that it received 

Request No. 2 on March 4, 2020 and began processing it. However, before it was 

complete, and before its deadline under the TPIA had expired, HCC closed its offices

for Spring Break, which continued until March 20, 2020. On March 20, 2020, HCC 

closed its offices due to the COVID-19 pandemic. And, as of the date of its amended 

plea on August 14, 2020, HCC had remained closed. HCC asserted that appellees 

sent Request Nos. 3 through 8 while HCC’s offices were closed. Thus, pursuant to 

the OAG’s guidelines, HCC was not incurring “business days” under the TPIA and 

“had no obligation under the law to respond.” Rather, all statutory deadlines had

indefinitely ceased.

Subsequently, on August 19, 2020, Hall submitted another TPIA request to 

HCC (“Request No. 8”), seeking copies of certain purchase orders and related 

materials. On August 21, 2020, Hall filed a second amended petition for writs of 
9

mandamus, asking the trial court to compel HCC to produce all public information 

requested in each of Hall’s TPIA requests, i.e., Request Nos. 1, 3, 4, and 8. Hall also 

asked the trial court to sever each request and issue a separate writ.

In addition, Hall filed a response, which Dolcefino and Laha joined, to HCC’s 

First Amended Plea to the Jurisdiction. Appellees argued that the trial court had 

jurisdiction over their claims because they, as requestors, were statutorily authorized

under the TPIA to seek mandamus relief when, as here, a public entity had refused

either to release requested public information or to timely seek an OAG decision 

about the request. Appellees asserted that, with respect to Request No. 1, HCC’s 

mere request of an OAG opinion did not indefinitely excuse HCC from complying 

with their requests. And, no OAG opinion had been forthcoming. With respect to 

Request Nos. 2 through 8, HCC was required to take certain statutorily-mandated

actions if it wished to delay the production of public information during the COVID19 epidemic and that HCC had failed to comply. Appellees further asserted that the 

OAG’s guidelines were advisory and that the OAG had no authority to invalidate 

statutory law or to excuse HCC’s failure to comply with the TPIA.

On September 24, 2020, the trial court denied HCC’s plea to the jurisdiction. 

In its order, the trial court expressly declined to rule on Request No. 1 (the combined 

request from December 2019 and January 2020), as follows:
10

The Court finds that HCC has partially responded to [Hall’s] December 

and January TPIA requests and withheld some information while 

seeking an opinion from the Attorney General.

[Hall] asks the Court to find that HCC’s requests for clarification of its 

December and January TPIA requests were unreasonable stall tactics 

and that HCC was untimely in seeking an AG opinion. While the Court 

finds that some of HCC’s requests for clarification were reasonable, 

most were not. HCC advises that an opinion from the Attorney General 

has been received, but has not offered the opinion to the Court. [Hall] 

also has not provided any evidence that HCC has failed to follow the 

AG’s opinion. For this reason, the record is insufficient for the court to 

rule on the December and January TPIA requests and reserves 

Judgment on these requests until further proceedings.

With respect to Request Nos. 2 through 8, the trial court found that “HCC’s 

purported justifications for not responding in any manner to these requests are not 

tenable and that the failure to respond is effectively a refusal to respond.” 

The trial court also granted appellees’ requested mandamus relief and severed

each of the requests into a separate writ, as follows:

With respect to Request No. 2,

8

the trial court found:

The record in this case shows that on March 4, 2020 Dolcefino 

served a written TPIA request on HCC. The request asked for four (4) 

categories of public information. The Court finds that the requests were 

reasonably clear as to the public information being sought and HCC 

never sought clarification of the requests.

More than six (6) months have passed since Dolcefino served its

March 4, 2020 TPIA requests on HCC. The record shows that HCC has 

not fully supplied all public information requested . . . and has not 

supplied the Court with a statutorily authorized excuse for failing to 

comply with the TPIA in responding to the . . . request. . . .

8 Trial court case number 2020-31380A.
11

With respect to Request No. 3,

9

the trial court found:

The record in this case shows that on April 13, 2020 Hall served 

a written TPIA request on HCC. The request asked for seven (7) 

categories of public information. The court finds that the requests were 

reasonably clear as to the public information being sought.

More than five months have passed since Hall served its April 

13, 2020 TPIA requests on HCC. The record shows that HCC has not 

fully supplied all public information requested by [Hall] and has not 

supplied the Court with a statutorily authorized excuse for failing to 

comply with the TPIA in responding to the . . . request. . . .

With respect to Request No. 4,

10 the trial court found:

The record in this case shows that on May 18, 2020 Hall served 

a written TPIA request on HCC. The request asked for two (2) 

categories of public information. The court finds that the requests were 

reasonably clear as to the public information being sought.

More than four months have passed since Hall served its May 18, 

2020 TPIA requests on HCC. The record shows that HCC has not fully 

supplied all public information requested by [Hall] and has not supplied 

the Court with a statutorily authorized excuse for failing to comply with 

the TPIA in responding to the May 18, 2020 TPIA request. . . .

With respect to Request No. 5,

11 the trial court found:

The record in this case shows that on June 23, 2020 Laha served 

a written TPIA request on HCC. The request asked for six (6) categories 

of public information. The Court finds that the requests were reasonably 

clear as to the public information being sought and HCC never sought 

clarification of the requests.

More than forty-five (45) days have passed since Laha served his 

June 23, 2020 TPIA requests on HCC. The record shows that HCC has 

not fully supplied all public information requested . . . and has not 

9 Trial court case number 2020-31380E.

10 Trial court case number 2020-31380F.

11 Trial court case number 2020-31380B.
12

supplied the Court with a statutorily authorized excuse for failing to 

comply with the TPIA in responding to the June 23, 2020 TPIA 

request. . . .

With respect to Request No. 6,

12 the trial court found:

The record in this case shows that on June 25, 2020 Dolcefino 

served a written TPIA request on HCC. The request asked for two (2) 

categories of public information. The Court finds that the requests were 

reasonably clear as to the public information being sought and HCC 

never sought clarification of the requests.

More than forty-five (45) days have passed since Dolcefino 

served its June 25, 2020 TPIA requests on HCC. The record shows that 

HCC has not fully supplied all public information requested . . . and has 

not supplied the Court with a statutorily authorized excuse for failing 

to comply with the TPIA in responding to the . . . request. . . .

With respect to Request No. 7,

13 the trial court found:

The record in this case shows that on June 29, 2020 Dolcefino 

served a written TPIA request on HCC. The request asked for four (4) 

categories of public information. The Court finds that the requests were 

reasonably clear as to the public information being sought and HCC 

never sought clarification of the requests.

More than forty-five (45) days have passed since Dolcefino 

served its June 29, 2020 TPIA requests on HCC. The record shows that 

HCC has not fully supplied all public information requested . . . and has 

not supplied the Court with a statutorily authorized excuse for failing 

to comply with the TPIA in responding to the . . . request. . . .

With respect to Request No. 8,

14 the trial court found:

The record in this case shows that on August 19, 2020 Hall

served [a] written TPIA request on HCC. The request asked for four (4) 

12 Trial court case number 2020-31380C.

13 Trial court case number 2020-31380D.

14 Trial court case number 2020-31380G.
13

categories of public information. The court finds that the requests were 

reasonably clear as to the public information being sought.

More than one month has passed since Hall served its August 19, 

2020 TPIA requests on HCC. The record shows that HCC has not fully 

supplied all public information requested by [Hall] and has not supplied 

the Court with a statutorily authorized excuse for failing to comply with 

the TPIA in responding to the August 19, 2020 TPIA request. . . .

In addition, in each writ, the trial court found that:

HCC’s failure to comply with the unambiguous requirements of Tex. 

Gov’t Code 552.233 governing a public entity’s suspension of the TPIA

during an epidemic was not excused. Further, the record shows that 

HCC did not comply with the legal notice and requirements specified 

in the [TPIA] to suspend its compliance with the TPIA during an 

epidemic like COVID-19.

The trial court ordered that HCC provide all public information responsive to each 

request. And, if HCC did not comply, appellees could have “any law enforcement 

officer compel compliance . . . by use of any and all lawfully permitted and available 

means.” 

Plea to the Jurisdiction

In its sole issue, HCC argues that the trial court erred in denying its plea to the 

jurisdiction because HCC is a governmental body and appellees did not establish a 

waiver of governmental immunity under the TPIA, i.e., that HCC refused to seek an 

OAG decision as to whether appellees’ requested information constituted public

information or refused to supply public information. See TEX. GOV’T CODE

§ 552.321(a). 
14

Standard of Review and Governing Legal Principles

A trial court’s ruling on a jurisdictional plea is subject to de novo review. Tex. 

Nat. Res. Conservation Comm’n v. IT-Davy, 74 S.W.3d 849, 855 (Tex. 2002). A 

plea to the jurisdiction is a dilatory plea that seeks dismissal of a case for lack of 

subject matter jurisdiction. Harris Cty. v. Sykes, 136 S.W.3d 635, 638 (Tex. 2004). 

Although the plaintiffs’ claims may form the context against which the jurisdictional 

plea is determined, the purpose of the plea is “to defeat a cause of action without 

regard to whether the claims asserted have merit.” Bland Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Blue, 

34 S.W.3d 547, 554 (Tex. 2000).

Review of a plea challenging the existence of jurisdictional facts, as here,

mirrors that of a traditional summary-judgment motion. Mission Consol. Indep. Sch. 

Dist. v. Garcia, 372 S.W.3d 629, 635 (Tex. 2012); City of Hous. v. Guthrie, 332 

S.W.3d 578, 587 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2009, pet. denied) (“[T]his 

standard generally mirrors that of a summary judgment under Texas Rule of Civil 

Procedure 166a(c) . . . . By requiring the [governmental body] to meet the summary 

judgment standard of proof . . . , we protect the plaintiffs from having to put on their 

case simply to establish jurisdiction.”); see also TEX. R. CIV. P. 166a(c). A court 

may consider evidence as necessary to resolve a dispute over the jurisdictional facts, 

even if the evidence “implicates both the subject matter jurisdiction of the court and 

the merits of the case.” Tex. Dep’t of Parks & Wildlife v. Miranda, 133 S.W.3d 217, 
15

226 (Tex. 2004). We take as true all evidence favorable to the plaintiffs and indulge 

every reasonable inference and resolve any doubts in their favor. Id. at 228. 

If the governmental body meets its burden to establish that the trial court lacks 

jurisdiction, then the plaintiffs must show that there is a disputed material fact 

regarding the jurisdictional issue. Id. at 227–28. If the evidence raises a fact issue 

regarding jurisdiction, the plea cannot be granted and a factfinder must resolve the 

issue. Id. If the evidence is undisputed or fails to raise a fact issue, the plea must be 

determined as a matter of law. Id. at 228.

Here, it is undisputed that HCC is a “governmental body” generally immune 

from suit, except where that immunity has been specifically waived by the 

legislature. See TEX.GOV’T CODE § 552.003(1)(A); Alamo Heights Indep. Sch. Dist. 

v. Clark, 544 S.W.3d 755, 770 (Tex. 2018); see also Mosley v. Houston Cmty. Coll. 

Sys., 951 F. Supp. 1279, 1290 (S.D. Tex. 1996). 

The TPIA provides a limited waiver of governmental immunity by allowing 

a requestor of public information to bring a suit for a writ of mandamus to compel a 

governmental body to release the information. See TEX. GOV’T CODE § 552.321(a). 

A requestor may seek mandamus relief under the TPIA if the governmental body 

“refuses” (1) to seek an OAG decision as to whether requested information is public

or (2) to supply public information. See id. It is the refusal to supply public 

information that is the standard by which to determine whether governmental 
16

immunity has been waived and whether a court has subject matter jurisdiction over 

the claim. City of Galveston v. CDM Smith, Inc., 470 S.W.3d 558, 572 (Tex. App.—

Houston [14th Dist.] 2015, pet. denied) (“By its plain terms, the [TPIA’s] waiver of 

immunity for mandamus relief requires the [governmental body] to have ‘refuse[d]’

to supply public information.”). In the context of the TPIA, to “refuse” means to 

“show or express a positive unwillingness to do or comply.” City of El Paso v. 

Abbott, 444 S.W.3d 315, 324 (Tex. App.—Austin 2014, pet. denied). 

The purpose of the TPIA is to provide accountability and transparency in 

government by establishing mechanisms to foster public access to government 

records. See TEX. GOV’T CODE § 552.001(a); Greater Hous. P’ship v. Paxton, 468 

S.W.3d 51, 57 (Tex. 2015); Jackson v. State Office of Admin. Hearings, 351 S.W.3d 

290, 293 (Tex. 2011) (noting purpose of TPIA to provide public with “complete 

information about the affairs of government and the official acts of public officials 

and employees”). The TPIA “shall be liberally construed in favor of granting a 

request for information.” TEX. GOV’T CODE § 552.001(b). 

 Pursuant to the TPIA, “[a]n officer for public information of a governmental 

body shall promptly produce public information for inspection, duplication, or both 

on application by any person to the officer.” Id. § 552.221(a). “Promptly” means 

“as soon as possible under the circumstances, that is, within a reasonable time, 

without delay.” Id. If the governmental body cannot produce the public information 
17

“within 10 business days” after the date the information is requested, it “shall certify 

that fact in writing to the requestor and set a date and hour within a reasonable time 

when the information will be available.” Id. § 552.221(d). If the request is “unclear 

to the governmental body, it may ask the requestor to clarify the request.” Id.

§ 552.222(b). For high volume requests, the governmental body may discuss with 

the requestor how the scope of the request might be narrowed. Id.

If a governmental body wishes to withhold requested information from public 

disclosure that it considers to be within one of the exceptions under the TPIA, it 

must, “not later than the 10th business day” after receiving the request, ask the OAG 

for a decision on the matter, unless there has been a previous decision, and notify 

the requestor. Id. § 552.301. If the governmental body does not timely comply, the 

information at issue is presumed public and must be released, unless there is a 

compelling reason to withhold the information. Id. § 552.302.

The deadlines under the TPIA may be extended during a catastrophic event. 

Government Code section 552.233, titled “Temporary Suspension of Requirements 

for Governmental Body Impacted by Catastrophe,” allows a governmental body 

impacted by a catastrophic event, including an epidemic (or pandemic) like 

COVID-19, to elect to “suspend” the requirements of the TPIA for a period of up to 
18

14 consecutive days. See id. § 552.233 (defining “catastrophe” and providing 

procedure for electing “suspension period”).

15

 

Section 552.233 provides that:

The requirements of [the TPIA] do not apply to a governmental body 

during the suspension period determined by the governmental body 

under Subsections (d) and (e) if the governmental body:

(1) is currently impacted by a catastrophe; and

(2) complies with the requirements of this section.

Id. § 552.233(b). A governmental body that elects to temporarily suspend the 

TPIA’s requirements “must submit notice to the [OAG] that the governmental body 

is currently impacted by a catastrophe and has elected to suspend the applicability 

of those requirements during the initial suspension period,” which may not exceed 

“seven consecutive days.” See id. § 552.233(c)–(d). The governmental body may 

15 In 2021, the Texas Legislature amended section 552.233 to provide that a 

“‘catastrophe’ does not mean a period when staff is required to work remotely and 

can access information responsive to an application for information electronically, 

but the physical office of the governmental body is closed.” See Act of May 17, 

2019, 86th Leg., R.S., ch. 462, § 4, 2019 Tex. Gen. Laws 865, 866, amended by Act 

of May 11, 2021, 87th Leg., R.S., ch. 164, § 1 (S.B. 1225) (current version at TEX.

GOV’T CODE § 552.233). In addition, the Legislature added section 552.2211, 

providing that: “Except as provided by Section 552.233, if a governmental body 

closes its physical offices, but requires staff to work, including remotely, then the 

governmental body shall make a good faith effort to continue responding to 

applications for public information, to the extent staff have access to public 

information responsive to an application, pursuant to this chapter while its 

administrative offices are closed.” See Act of May 17, 2019, 86th Leg., R.S., ch. 

462, § 4, 2019 Tex. Gen. Laws 865, 866, amended by Act of May 11, 2021, 87th

Leg., R.S., ch. 164, § 2 (S.B. 1225) (to be codified at TEX. GOV’T CODE § 552.2211). 

As noted above, we apply the current version of the TPIA. 
19

extend the initial suspension period “one time” for “not more than seven consecutive 

days.” Id. § 552.233(e). A governmental body that suspends the applicability of the 

TPIA must provide certain notices to the public. Id. § 552.233(f). The OAG “shall 

prescribe the form of the notice that a governmental body must submit to the office” 

and “shall continuously post” on its website each notice submitted to the office under 

this section. Id. § 552.233(i), (j). 

Analysis

In its live plea to the jurisdiction, HCC argued that the trial court lacked

subject matter jurisdiction over appellees’ TPIA claims because the jurisdictional 

evidence establishes that HCC did not “refuse” (1) to seek an OAG decision as to 

whether the requested information was public or (2) to supply public information. 

See id. § 552.321; CDM Smith, 470 S.W.3d at 572. 

With respect to Request No. 1, under which Hall consolidated its December 

11, 2019 and January 2, 2020 requests, the trial court found that HCC had “partially 

responded” and had “withheld some information while seeking an opinion from the

[OAG].” In addition, it found that, although HCC had advised that an OAG opinion 

had been received, HCC had not offered the opinion to the trial court. Conversely, 

Hall had “not provided any evidence that HCC ha[d] failed to follow the [OAG’s]

opinion.” The trial court concluded that, “[f]or this reason, the record [was]

insufficient for the court to rule.” And, it “reserve[d] judgment on these requests 
20

until further proceedings.” We conclude that, there being fact issues regarding the 

trial court’s jurisdiction over Request No. 1 and no ruling, nothing is presented for 

our review. See Miranda, 133 S.W.3d at 227–28 (stating that if evidence raises fact 

issue regarding jurisdiction, plea cannot be granted and factfinder must resolve). 

With respect to Request Nos. 2 through 8, it is undisputed that HCC did not 

seek an OAG decision as to whether the requested information was public. See TEX.

GOV’T CODE § 552.321. The parties do not dispute that the information appellees 

sought in Request Nos. 2 through 8 constituted “public information.” See id. 

§ 552.002. The question presented is whether the jurisdictional evidence establishes 

that HCC refused to supply the requested public information. See id. § 552.321. 

Resolution of jurisdictional questions frequently entails, as here, issues of 

statutory construction, which itself presents a question of law. Abbott, 444 S.W.3d 

at 320. When construing a statute, our primary objective is to ascertain and give 

effect to the legislature’s intent. TEX. GOV’T CODE § 312.005; see TGS-NOPEC 

Geophysical Co. v. Combs, 340 S.W.3d 432, 439 (Tex. 2011). To discern that intent, 

we begin with the words of the statute. TEX. GOV’T CODE § 312.002. If a statute 

uses a term with a particular meaning or assigns a particular meaning to a term, we 

are bound by the statutory usage. Combs, 340 S.W.3d at 439. Undefined terms are 

typically given their ordinary meaning, unless a different or more precise definition 

is apparent from their use in the context of the statute. Id. If a statute is 
21

unambiguous, we adopt the interpretation supported by its plain language unless 

such an interpretation would lead to absurd results. Id. We consider statutes as a 

whole. Id. We presume that the legislature chooses a statute’s language with care, 

including each word for a purpose, while purposefully omitting words not chosen. 

Id. If there is vagueness, ambiguity, or room for policy determinations in a statute 

or regulation, we may defer to agency interpretation unless it is plainly erroneous or 

inconsistent with the language of the statute, regulation, or rule. Id. at 438.

Here, the TPIA required that HCC, on the application of any person,

“promptly produce” public information. See TEX. GOV’T CODE § 552.221(a). 

Again, “promptly” means “as soon as possible under the circumstances, that is, 

within a reasonable time, without delay.” Id. If HCC could not produce the 

requested public information “within 10 business days” after the date of the request, 

HCC was required to “certify that fact in writing to the requestor and set a date and 

hour within a reasonable time when the information [would] be available.” Id.

§ 552.221(d). 

HCC does not dispute that it did not produce the public information responsive 

to Request Nos. 2 through 8 within 10 business days after the information was 

requested and did not “set a date and hour within a reasonable time when the 

information would be available,” as statutorily required See id. Nor does HCC 

dispute that it did not produce the requested public information by the time of the 
22

trial court’s ruling, on September 24, 2020, which was up to six months after HCC 

received appellees’ requests. HCC admits that it did not process the requests, as 

required under the TPIA, and that it notified appellees that processing their requests

was indefinitely postponed. Thus, the record supports the trial court’s finding that 

HCC’s “failure to respond [was] effectively a refusal to respond” under the TPIA. 

See id. § 552.321; Abbott, 444 S.W.3d at 324 (noting that, in context of TPIA, to 

“refuse” means to “show or express a positive unwillingness to do or comply”). 

Again, the TPIA provides that, during a catastrophic event, including a

pandemic such as COVID-19, a governmental body may elect to temporarily 

suspend the ten-business-day deadline up to a total of 14 consecutive, or calendar, 

days. See TEX. GOV’T CODE § 552.233. It is undisputed that HCC did not make an 

election to temporarily suspend the applicability of the TPIA, although we note that 

HCC’s delays in releasing the requested public information exceeded the maximum 

suspension period under the statute regardless. See id. 

HCC argued in its plea to the jurisdiction that its failure to supply the public 

information at issue did not constitute a “refusal” under the TPIA because, in light 

of the COVID-19 pandemic, the OAG issued guidelines defining the term “business 

day” in the TPIA in a manner that suspended the TPIA indefinitely and rendered a

temporary suspension unnecessary. See id. §§ 552.221(d), .233, .321. In support of 
23

its argument, HCC attached to its plea a copy of the OAG’s guidelines, which the 

OAG posted on its website. The guidelines state:

Update: Calculation of Business Days and COVID-19

As part of the unprecedented response to coronavirus in Texas, and in 

light of the Governor’s recent disaster declaration, our office has 

received inquiries regarding the calculation of business days under the 

Public Information Act (the “Act”) and related use of the new 

temporary suspension process under section 552.233 of the 

Government Code.

Section 552.233 of the Government Code permits a governmental body 

impacted by a catastrophe or disaster to suspend the applicability of the 

Act for up to 14 calendar days. Use of the section 552.233 suspension 

process is appropriate where a governmental [body] is open for 

business but determines that a catastrophe has interfered with its ability 

to comply with the Act. A section 552.233 suspension is not necessary 

if the governmental body is not open for business or if the applicable 

suspension period does not otherwise encompass a business day, as 

described below: 

• Holidays observed by governmental bodies are not business 

days.

• Weekends are not business days.

• Skeleton crew days are not business days. 

• A day on which a governmental body’s administrative offices are 

closed is not a business day.

• If a governmental body has closed its physical offices for 

purposes of a public health or epidemic response or if a 

governmental body is unable to access its records on a calendar 

day, then such day is not a business day, even if staff continues 

to work remotely or staff is present but involved directly in the 

public health or epidemic response. 

(Emphasis added.) 

HCC asserted that it “closed its offices from Monday, March 16 to Friday, 

March 20, 2020, for spring break, and thereafter closed its offices beginning March 
24

20, 2020 due to COVID-19.” And, “HCC’s offices remain closed to this day.” 

Relying on the emphasized language, it asserted, “HCC has not incurred any 

‘business days’ under the TPIA since March 16, [2020] and all of its deadlines under 

the TPIA have ceased.” And, thus, “it was not refusing to comply” with the TPIA. 

HCC essentially asserted that this language authorized it to indefinitely postpone 

producing public information responsive to appellees’ requests and that it notified 

each requestor accordingly. 

HCC asserted that it was “processing” Request No. 2 when it closed for Spring 

Break on March 16, 2020. At that point, HCC had incurred only 7 business days 

since its receipt of the request. And, HCC remained closed for Spring Break through 

March 20, 2020. Thereafter, beginning on March 20, 2020, HCC “closed its offices 

indefinitely due to the COVID-19 pandemic.” HCC notified Dolcefino on April 3, 

2020 of HCC’s closure due to the COVID-19 pandemic and stated that it would 

process Request No. 2 “upon HCC’s return to normal operations/business days, in 

accordance with the [TPIA] and the [OAG’s] guidelines.” 

With respect to Request Nos. 3 through 8, HCC asserted that it notified each 

requestor immediately after receipt of their request that HCC was closed. Hall 

submitted Request Nos. 3 and 4 on April 13, 2020 and May 19, 2020, respectively. 

On April 22, 2020 and May 19, 2020, HCC again notified Hall of its closure due to 

the COVID-19 pandemic and stated that its requests would be processed “upon 
25

HCC’s return to normal operations/business days, in accordance with the [TPIA] 

and the [OAG’s] guidelines.” Laha submitted Request No. 5 on June 23, 2020. HCC 

notified Laha that same day of its closure due to COVID-19 and that his request 

would be processed “upon HCC’s return to normal operations/business days, in 

accordance with the [TPIA] and the [OAG’s] guidelines.” Dolcefino submitted 

Request Nos. 6 and 7 on June 25 and 29, 2020, respectively. HCC again notified 

Dolcefino of its closure and stated that it would process the requests “upon HCC’s 

return to normal operations/business days, in accordance with the [TPIA] and the 

[OAG’s] guidelines.” Hall submitted Request No. 8 on August 19, 2020. On August 

20, 2020, HCC again notified Hall of its closure due to COVID-19 and that it would 

process the request “upon HCC’s return to normal operations/business days, in 

accordance with the [TPIA] and the [OAG’s] guidelines.”

HCC notes that, “[t]hroughout the TPIA, the statute mandates that virtually 

all deadlines are calculated using the responding governmental entity’s ‘business 

days.’” See, e.g., TEX. GOV’T CODE §§ 552.221(d), .225(a), .233(g), .2615, .301(b). 

We note that the term “business day” is not defined in the TPIA. “When a statute 

uses a word that it does not define, our task is to determine and apply the word’s 

common, ordinary meaning.” Jaster v. Comet II Const., Inc., 438 S.W.3d 556, 563 

(Tex. 2014). In determining the common, ordinary meaning of a term, we may look 

to a “wide variety of sources, including dictionary definitions, treatises and 
26

commentaries, our own prior constructions of the word in other contexts, the use and 

definitions of the word in other statutes and ordinances, and the use of the words in 

our rules of evidence and procedure.” Id. 

The common meaning of the term “business day” is “[a] day that most 

institutions are open for business.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 402 (7th ed. 1999). 

The term “business day” is defined elsewhere in the Government Code, and in other 

statutes, as a day other than a Saturday, Sunday, or holiday. See TEX. GOV’T CODE

§ 2116.001 (“Business day” means a day other than a Saturday, Sunday, or banking 

holiday for a bank chartered under the laws of this state.”); see also TEX. EST. CODE

§ 452.004 (defining “business day” as “a day other than a Saturday, Sunday, or 

holiday recognized by this state”); TEX. FAM. CODE § 86.0011 (defining “business 

day” as “a day other than a Saturday, Sunday, or state or national holiday”); TEX.

HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 775.0221 (defining “business day” as “a day other than 

a Saturday, Sunday, or state or national holiday”); TEX. INS. CODE § 542.051

(defining “business day” as “a day other than Saturday, Sunday, or holiday 

recognized by this state”); TEX. LOC. GOV’T CODE § 143.034 (“In computing this 

period, a Saturday, Sunday, or legal holiday is not considered a business day.”); TEX.

PROP. CODE § 62.026 (providing that “business day” means “a day other than a 

Saturday, Sunday, or holiday recognized by this state”).
27

The OAG guidelines, in pertinent part, state that, “[a]s part of the 

unprecedented response to coronavirus in Texas, and in light of the Governor’s 

recent disaster declaration,” it has received inquiries regarding the “calculation of 

business days” under the TPIA. And, it concludes that a section 552.233 suspension 

is “not necessary” if the governmental body is “not open for business or if the 

applicable suspension period does not otherwise encompass a business day,” which 

it describes as follows:

If a governmental body has closed its physical offices for purposes of a 

public health or epidemic response or if a governmental body is unable 

to access its records on a calendar day, then such day is not a business 

day, even if staff continues to work remotely or staff is present but 

involved directly in the public health or epidemic response.

(Emphasis added.)

Beginning with the context in which the OAG issued its guidelines, the Texas 

Disaster Act of 1975 (“Disaster Act”), codified at Government Code Chapter 418, 

is a “comprehensive, detailed continuity-of-government framework that carefully 

allocates powers, duties, and responsibilities across various levels of state 

government and multiple agencies.” State v. El Paso Cty., 618 S.W.3d 812, 831–32 

(Tex. App.—El Paso 2020, mand. dism’d) (Rodriguez, J., dissenting); see TEX.

GOV’T CODE ch. 418. One of its stated purposes is to “clarify and strengthen the 

roles of the governor, state agencies, the judicial branch of state government, and 

local government in prevention of, preparation for, response to, and recovery from 
28

disasters.” TEX. GOV’T CODE § 418.002(4). It authorizes the governor to waive or 

suspend certain statutory provisions, requirements, and deadlines if compliance 

would hinder or delay actions necessary to cope with a disaster. See id. § 418.016. 

On March 13, 2020, Governor Greg Abbott issued a proclamation certifying 

that COVID-19 “poses an imminent threat of disaster for all counties in the State of 

Texas.”16 Each month thereafter, throughout the time pertinent to this appeal, the 

Governor renewed his state disaster declaration and issued numerous emergency 

orders pertaining to the coronavirus pandemic.17 For instance, these orders included 

suspensions of portions of the Texas Open Meetings Act.18 See id.; see also TEX.

GOV’T CODE ch. 551. However, we are unaware of, and HCC has not directed us to, 

any such orders suspending the TPIA. 

“The Attorney General is a member of the Executive Department whose 

primary duties are to render legal advice in opinions to various political agencies and 

to represent the State in civil litigation.” Perry v. Del Rio, 67 S.W.3d 85, 92 (Tex.

2001); see TEX. GOV’T CODE § 402.021. “While Attorney General opinions are 

16 The Governor of the State of Tex., Proclamation No. 41-3720 (issued Mar. 13, 

2020), 45 Tex. Reg. 2094, 2094–95 (2020).

17 See The Governor of the State of Tex., Exec. Orders GA-08–36, available at 

https://lrl.texas.gov/legeLeaders/governors/displayDocs.cfm?govdoctypeID=5&go

vernorID=45 (last visited June 7, 2021).

18 See Office of Governor Greg Abbott, COVID-19 OMA Suspension Letter,

https://www.texasattorneygeneral.gov/sites/default/files/files/divisions/opengovernment/COVID-19-OMA-Suspension-Letter.pdf (last visited June 7, 2021).
29

persuasive, they are not controlling on the courts.” Holmes v. Morales, 924 S.W.2d 

920, 924 (Tex. 1996); see In re Smith, 333 S.W.3d 582, 588 (Tex. 2011) (“The 

opinion of the attorney general is not binding on this Court. . . .”).

Here, HCC relies, not on a formal opinion by the OAG, but on guidelines 

posted on the OAG’s website. The OAG is tasked with “maintain[ing] uniformity 

in the application, operation, and interpretation” of the TPIA. TEX. GOV’T CODE 

§ 552.011; Harris Cty. Appraisal Dist. v. Integrity Title Co., LLC, 483 S.W.3d 62, 

66 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2015, pet. denied). “While the Attorney 

General’s interpretation of the [TPIA] may be persuasive, it is not controlling.” City 

of Dall. v. Abbott, 304 S.W.3d 380, 384 (Tex. 2010); Harris Cty. Appraisal Dist., 

483 S.W.3d at 66.

Again, our task in construing a statute is to give effect to the legislature’s

intent in enacting it. Abbott, 304 S.W.3d at 384. We are ordinarily confined to the 

statute’s plain language. Id. When a provision is silent, such as to the definition of 

“business day,” as here, we look to the statute as a whole and strive to give it a 

meaning that is in harmony with its other provisions. Id. 

The TPIA is to be “liberally construed in favor of granting a request for 

information.” TEX. GOV’T CODE § 552.001(b). And, a governmental body is 

required to “promptly produce public information . . . on application by any person 

to the officer.” Id. § 552.221(a). “Promptly” means “as soon as possible under the 
30

circumstances, that is, within a reasonable time, without delay.” Id. The TPIA 

requires that if a governmental body cannot produce requested public information 

“within 10 business days” after the date of the request, it “shall certify that fact in 

writing to the requestor and set a date and hour within a reasonable time when the 

information will be available.” See id. § 552.221(d). 

In the language upon which HCC relies in the OAG’s guidelines, the OAG 

expanded the common definition of the term “business day,” as discussed above, 

such that the term, under the TPIA, does not include days on which a governmental 

body has closed its physical offices in response to an epidemic, i.e., COVID-19, even 

if staff continues to work remotely, without regard to duration. Notably, HCC 

asserts that, as of the date of the trial court’s ruling, HCC had thus been “closed” for 

over six months. It does not assert that, during that time, it was unable to access its 

records or that all of its staff was directly involved in the epidemic response. If, 

under such circumstances, “business days” do not accrue, then a governmental 

body’s duty to comply with the TPIA is suspended indefinitely. See id. § 552.221(d)

(requiring production of requested public information within 10 “business days”). 

Again, as HCC notes, “[t]hroughout the TPIA, the statute mandates that virtually all 

deadlines are calculated using the responding . . . entity’s ‘business days.’” 

We conclude that the OAG’s interpretation of the term “business day” under 

the TPIA, insofar as it excludes days that a “governmental body has closed its 
31

physical offices for purposes of a public health or epidemic response . . . , even if 

staff continues to work remotely,” without limit or regard to duration, is inconsistent 

with the TPIA as a whole, which is to be “liberally construed in favor of granting a 

request for information” and requires a governmental body to “promptly produce 

public information.” Id. §§ 552.001(b), 552.221(a); see Abbott, 304 S.W.3d at 384 

(noting that “[t]he Legislature has clearly expressed an intent that governmental 

entities respond promptly to requests for public information,” declining to follow 

OAG’s interpretation of TPIA provision involving silent matter and instead 

construing in light of “statute as a whole”). 

In addition, the OAG’s interpretation is inconsistent with section 552.233, 

which expressly addresses the processing of TPIA requests during an epidemic and 

caps the suspension period at a maximum of 14 consecutive days. See TEX. GOV’T 

CODE § 552.233; see Abbott, 304 S.W.3d at 384 (concluding that OAG’s

interpretation of TPIA provision was “inconsistent with other provisions of the Act”

and declining to follow). 

Because we are not persuaded by the OAG’s interpretation of the term 

“business day,” insofar as discussed, we decline to follow it.

19

 See Abbott, 304 

19 We note that the attorney general must be served with a copy of any proceeding 

challenging the constitutionality of a statute or ordinance and is entitled to be heard. 

See TEX. CONST. art. V, § 32, TEX. GOV’T CODE § 402.010 (requiring courts to 

notify OAG of state constitutional challenges); TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE

§ 37.006(b). This is not, however, a proceeding challenging the constitutionality of 
32

S.W.3d at 384; see also Boeing Co. v. Paxton, 466 S.W.3d 831, 838 (Tex. 2015)

(“While the Attorney General’s interpretation of the [TPIA] is entitled to due 

consideration, as with other administrative statutory constructions, such deference 

must yield to unambiguous statutory language.”); see, e.g., Abbott v. Tex. State Bd. 

of Pharmacy, 391 S.W.3d 253, 259 (Tex. App.—Austin 2012, no pet.); Allegheny 

Cas. Co. v. State, 52 S.W.3d 894, 900 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2001, no pet.); City of 

Garland v. Dall. Morning News, 969 S.W.2d 548, 554–55 (Tex. App.—Dallas 

1998), aff’d, 22 S.W.3d 351 (Tex. 2000).

We conclude that HCC did not establish as a matter of law that its failure to 

supply public information responsive to appellees’ requests did not constitute a 

“refusal” under the TPIA. See TEX. GOV’T CODE §§ 552.221(d), .321(a); CDM 

Smith, 470 S.W.3d at 572 (“By its plain terms, the [TPIA’s] waiver of immunity for 

mandamus relief requires the [governmental body] to have ‘refuse[d]’ to supply 

public information.”); see also Miranda, 133 S.W.3d at 227–28. Because we 

conclude that the trial court has jurisdiction over appellees’ TPIA claims, we hold 

that the trial court did not err in denying HCC’s plea to the jurisdiction. 

We overrule HCC’s sole issue.

a statute or ordinance. We do not determine whether the OAG’s website guidelines 

vitiate Government Code section 552.233 because it is undisputed that HCC did not 

invoke section 552.233. 
33

Conclusion

We affirm the trial court’s denial of HCC’s plea to the jurisdiction. 

Sherry Radack

Chief Justice 

Panel consists of Chief Justice Radack and Justices Landau and Countiss.