J-S37016-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

IN THE INTEREST OF: E.C. a/k/a 

B.B.C., A MINOR

APPEAL OF: C.C., MOTHER

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 1039 EDA 2023

Appeal from the Order Entered March 23, 2023

In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County 

Juvenile Division at No: CP-51-DP-0001166-2020

IN THE INTEREST OF: E.C. a/k/a 

B.B.C., A MINOR

APPEAL OF: C.C., MOTHER

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 1040 EDA 2023

Appeal from the Decree Entered March 23, 2023

In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County 

Juvenile Division at No(s): CP-51-AP-0000089-2023

BEFORE: BENDER, P.J.E., MURRAY, J., and SULLIVAN, J.

MEMORANDUM BY SULLIVAN, J.: FILED DECEMBER 8, 2023

C.C. (“Mother”) appeals from the decree involuntarily terminating her 

parental rights to her son, E.C. a/k/a B.B.C. (“Child”), born in October 2020.1 

____________________________________________

1 On the same date, by separate decree, the court terminated the parental 

rights of any unknown father with respect to Child. No purported father 

participated in the lower court proceedings, filed an appeal, or participated in 

the instant appeals.
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Mother also appeals from the order changing Child’s permanency goal from 

reunification to adoption. Upon review, we affirm the termination decree and 

dismiss the appeal from the goal change order as moot.

The factual and procedural history of this case is as follows. In October 

2020, the Philadelphia Department of Human Services (“DHS”) learned 

through a general protective services report that Mother and Child tested 

positive for fentanyl and cocaine at Child’s birth. See N.T., 3/23/23, at 45. 

Due to withdrawal symptoms, Child remained in the neonatal intensive care 

unit until October 30, 2020. See id. Upon discharge, DHS obtained an order 

of protective custody. See id. Following a shelter care hearing on November 

2, 2020, Child remained in the care and custody of DHS. Thereafter, the court 

adjudicated Child dependent on December 15, 2020. See id. at 45-46.

In furtherance of Child’s permanency goal of reunification, Mother was 

required to complete the following goals: (1) attend weekly supervised 

visitation with Child; (2) participate in a drug and alcohol program and a 

mental health program; (3) submit to random drug screens at the Clinical 

Evaluation Unit (“CEU”); (4) participate in Achieving Reunification Center 

(“ARC”) services, including parenting classes; (5) locate suitable housing; and 

(6) sign all releases. See id. at 46. Mother was informed of her objectives. 

See id. Mother’s objectives largely remained the same throughout the 

duration of Child’s dependency in which the trial court conducted regular 

permanency review hearings. See id. at 46-47.
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Aside from completing a parenting course through ARC in April 2021, 

Mother failed to accomplish these objectives. See id. at 63. Mother attended 

most weekly visits with Child, but she consistently arrived forty-five to fiftyfive minutes late to the hour-long visits. See id. at 49. As a result, in July 

2022, the court reduced Mother’s visitation schedule to once every two weeks. 

See id. at 49-50. However, even after the change, Mother continued to arrive 

forty-five to fifty-five minutes late. See id. at 50. Further, Mother failed to 

engage in any alcohol, drug, or mental health treatment. See id. at 47. 

Mother also never submitted to an assessment or random drug screen at CEU. 

See id. at 48-49. Finally, DHS referred Mother to ARC to aid in her search for 

suitable housing. See id. at 66. However, ARC discharged her on three 

separate occasions because Mother failed to engage with the service. See id.

On March 6, 2023, DHS filed a petition seeking the involuntary 

termination of Mother’s parental rights pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(1), 

(2), (5), (8), and (b), and a separate petition to change Child’s permanency 

goal from reunification to adoption. The trial court conducted an evidentiary 

hearing on March 23, 2023, when Child was approximately two-and-a-half 

years old, wherein he was represented by a guardian ad litem (“GAL”).2 

____________________________________________

2

Insofar as Child was two years old at the time of these proceedings and 

incapable of articulating a well-settled preference with respect to termination, 

we determine that Child’s right to legal counsel pursuant to section 2313(a) 

is satisfied. See In re T.S., 192 A.3d 1080, 1092-93 (Pa. 2018) (holding that 

if a child is “too young to be able to express a preference as to the outcome 

(Footnote Continued Next Page)
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Mother was represented by counsel and testified on her own behalf via

telephone. DHS presented the testimony of CUA case manager Destiny 

Vargas (“Ms. Vargas”).

Ms. Vargas testified that Child was adjudicated dependent because 

Mother and Child tested positive for fentanyl and cocaine at Child’s birth. See 

N.T., 3/23/23, at 45. DHS provided Mother with objectives, but Ms. Vargas 

testified that Mother only successfully completed one, a parenting class 

through ARC. See id. at 63. On direct examination, Ms. Vargas testified to

Mother’s failures, as follows:

Q: And is Mother engaged in any drug and alcohol treatment at 

this time?

A: No. ...

Q: Is Mother engaged in any mental health treatment at this time?

A: No.

* * * *

Q: And at each permanency review hearing, was Mother referred 

to the CEU for a forthwith, randoms [sic], and an assessment?

A: That’s correct.

Q: Has Mother attended any of the -- has Mother attended a CEU 

assessment?

____________________________________________

of the proceedings,” there is no conflict between a child’s legal and best 

interests, and a child’s section 2313(a) right to counsel is satisfied by an 

attorney serving as GAL who represents the attorney-GAL’s view of the child’s 

best interests); see also 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2313(a).
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A: The last -- she attend[ed] -- she went to the CEU on 

10/13[/22]; however, she refused to give a screen and left.

Q: And other than the 10/13/[]22, has she had any other screens 

through the CEU?

A: No.

Id. at 47-49.3 

Ms. Vargas additionally testified that Child never resided with Mother, 

and, during Child’s dependency Mother did not spend enough time with Child 

to establish a parent-child bond due to her tardiness. See id. at 51-52. 

Moreover, Ms. Vargas testified that Child has a parent-child bond with the 

foster parent, as follows:

Q: And have you observed [Child’s] relationship with the resource 

parent?

A: Yes.

Q: And what does their interaction look like?

A: He looks to her as his mother.

Q: And does the resource parent meet all of his needs?

A: Yes.

Q: And who does [Child] look to for love, protection, and support?

A: The foster parent.

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3 Mother testified that she no longer used illegal substances. See N.T., 

3/23/23, at 79-80. Ms. Vargas and Mother also testified that Mother had 

reported to Ms. Vargas that she (Mother) had attended therapy, but there is 

no evidence of record to substantiate that Mother had actually received 

treatment. See id. at 47, 56, 82-84.
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Q: And is this a preadoptive home?

A: Yes.

Q: And do you believe that [Child] would suffer irreparable harm 

if Mother’s rights were terminated today?

A: No.

Id. at 53. 

By decree dated and entered on March 23, 2023, the trial court 

involuntarily terminated Mother’s parental rights pursuant to section

2511(a)(1), (5), (8), and (b). See, e.g., N.T., 3/23/23, at 113.4 In addition, 

by order entered the same date, the court changed Child’s permanency goal 

to adoption. Both Mother and the trial court complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925.

5

 

On appeal, Mother presents the following issues for review:

1. Whether the trial court committed error by involuntarily 

terminating [Mother’s] parental rights to [Child], where such 

determination was not supported by clear and convincing 

evidence establishing grounds for termination under the 

Adoption Act, 23 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 2511(a)(1), (a)(2), (a)(5)[,] and 

(a)(8)?

2. Whether the trial court committed error by involuntarily 

terminating [Mother’s] parental rights where such ruling did 

not give primary consideration to the developmental, physical, 

and emotional needs and welfare of [Child] as required by the 

Adoption Act, 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(b)?

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4 We note that at the hearing, the trial court terminated pursuant to only 

section 2511(a)(5) and (8), but in the subsequent decree, the trial court added 

section 2511(a)(1) as a grounds for termination. Compare N.T., 3/23/23, at 

113 with Decree, 3/23/23. This discrepancy does not affect our analysis.

5 This Court sua sponte consolidated Mother’s appeals from the termination 

decree and goal change order. See Order, 6/14/23.
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3. Whether the trial court committed error by changing [Child’s] 

permanency goal from reunification with the parent(s) to 

adoption?

Mother’s Brief at 5.

Our standard of review is as follows:

[I]n cases involving involuntary termination of parental rights[,

our review] is limited to determining whether the trial court’s

determination is supported by competent evidence. When

applying this standard of review, an appellate court must accept

the findings of fact and credibility determinations of the trial court

if they are supported by evidence of record. Where the trial

court’s factual findings are supported by the evidence, an

appellate court may not disturb the trial court’s ruling unless it

has discerned an error of law or abuse of discretion. An abuse of

discretion is found where there is a demonstration of manifest

unreasonableness, partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill will. It matters

not that an appellate court might have reached a different

conclusion, as it is well-established that absent an abuse of

discretion, an error of law, or insufficient evidentiary support for

the trial court’s decision, the decree must stand.

In re Adoption of L.A.K., 265 A.3d 580, 591 (Pa. 2021) (internal citations 

omitted).

Pennsylvania’s Adoption Act (“the Act”) governs involuntary termination 

of parental rights proceedings. See 23 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 2101-2938. Subsection

2511(a) provides grounds for the involuntary termination of parental rights. 

If the trial court finds clear and convincing evidence supporting the existence 

of one of the grounds for termination set forth in subsection (a), the court 

must then consider whether termination would best serve the child under 

subsection (b). See id. § 2511(b). This Court need only agree with one of 
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the grounds set forth in subsection (a) to affirm, provided subsection (b) is 

also satisfied. See In re B.L.W., 843 A.2d 380, 384 (Pa. Super. 2004).

Here, the trial court involuntarily terminated Mother’s parental rights to 

Child pursuant to section 2511(a)(1), (5), (8), and (b). As we need only agree 

with the trial court’s determination as to any one section of 2511(a), we limit 

our discussion to sections 2511(a)(8) and (b), which provide as follows: 

(a) General Rule.—The rights of a parent in regard to a child 

may be terminated after a petition filed on any of the following 

grounds:

* * * *

(8) The child has been removed from the care of the parent 

by the court or under a voluntary agreement with an 

agency, 12 months or more have elapsed from the date of 

removal or placement, the conditions which led to the 

removal or placement of the child continue to exist and 

termination of parental rights would best serve the needs 

and welfare of the child.

* * * *

(b) Other considerations.—The court in terminating the rights 

of a parent shall give primary consideration to the developmental, 

physical and emotional needs and welfare of the child. The rights 

of a parent shall not be terminated solely on the basis of 

environmental factors such as inadequate housing, furnishings, 

income, clothing and medical care if found to be beyond the 

control of the parent. With respect to any petition filed pursuant 

to subsection (a)(1), (6) or (8), the court shall not consider any 

efforts by the parent to remedy the conditions described therein 

which are first initiated subsequent to the giving of notice of the 

filing of the petition.

23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(8), (b).
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In her first issue, Mother argues the trial court erred in finding grounds 

for termination of her parental rights pursuant to section 2511(a)(8). In order 

to satisfy section 2511(a)(8), the petitioner must prove that: (1) the child has 

been removed from the parent’s care for at least twelve months; (2) the 

conditions which led to the removal or placement still exist; and (3) 

termination of parental rights would best serve the needs and welfare of the 

child. See In re Adoption of J.N.M., 177 A.3d 937, 943 (Pa. Super. 2018). 

Furthermore, termination pursuant to section 2511(a)(8) does not require an 

evaluation of a parent’s willingness or ability to remedy the conditions that led 

to the removal or placement of the child. See In re M.A.B., 166 A.3d 434, 

446 (Pa. Super. 2017). Rather, our inquiry is focused upon whether the atissue “conditions” have been “remedied” such that “reunification of parent and 

child is imminent at the time of the hearing.” In re I.J., 972 A.2d 5, 11 (Pa. 

Super. 2009). 

Finally, this Court has explained that,

while both [s]ection 2511(a)(8) and [s]ection 2511(b) direct us 

to evaluate the “needs and welfare of the child,” we are required 

to resolve the analysis relative to [s]ection 2511(a)(8)[] prior to 

addressing the “needs and welfare” of [the child], as pr[e]scribed 

by [s]ection 2511(b); as such, they are distinct in that we must 

address [s]ection 2511(a) before reaching [s]ection 2511(b).

In re Adoption of C.L.G., 956 A.2d 999, 1009 (Pa. Super. 2008) (en banc).

Regarding section 2511(a)(8), Mother, without citing to any legal 

precedent, asserts that Child was not removed from her care because he was 

placed directly into foster care upon his discharge from the hospital. See 
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Mother’s Brief at 26. As such, she contends that there was no evidence of 

neglect, abuse, inability, or abandonment of Child. See id. at 27. Mother 

also generally asserts that the trial court erred in terminating her parental 

rights because DHS failed to offer reasonable services and assistance for her 

to achieve reunification. See id. at 21-23. 

Instantly, in determining that DHS satisfied section 2511(a)(8), the 

court stated the following:

This [c]ourt found that Ms. Vargas’[s] testimony was 

credible regarding Mother and her single case plan objectives. 

This [c]ourt found that Mother did not remedy any of the 

conditions which led to the removal of [Child]. The testimony 

offered by Mother proved to the trial court that the conditions 

which brought [Child] into care had not been remedied. Mother 

was notified of her single case plan objectives in January of 2021. 

Mother did not comply with any of her single case plan objectives. 

The primary objective was drug and alcohol treatment given that 

[Child] and Mother tested positive for fentanyl and cocaine at 

[Child’s] birth. There has not been any proof of drug or alcohol 

treatment for Mother throughout the life of the case. Mother has 

not attended any randoms [sic] or drug screens whatsoever in the 

entire life of this case. Another single case plan objective was 

mental health treatment and there was no proof offered of mental 

health treatment for Mother. There was some testimony from Ms. 

Vargas that Mother told her she was attending therapy . . ., but 

Ms. Vargas did not have any record of that treatment. Mother 

testified this was because [the provider] had her under the wrong 

name[,] but Mother did not provide proof to support this assertion. 

Mother has also not obtained suitable housing for herself and 

[Child]. Mother’s visitation with [Child, initially,] was . . . weekly 

one hours visits but the testimony from Ms. Vargas was that 

throughout the life of the case, Mother was consistently 45-55 

minutes late for the visits, giving her very little time with [Child]. 

As a result of this lateness, the visits were switched to bi[-]weekly 

hour visits and still Mother would show up very late to the visits. 

Mother gave both Ms. Vargas and the [c]ourt reasons for why she 

was always late but the [c]ourt did not find them credible. In fact, 

the [c]ourt found that Mother arriving over an hour and a half late 
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for the termination hearing was further supportive evidence of 

Mother attending the visits late without valid reasons. Based on 

all these reasons, the [c]ourt found that DHS met its burden by 

clear and convincing evidence to terminate Mother’s parental 

rights pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)[(8)] . . ..

Trial Court Opinion, 6/7/23, at 15-16 (internal citation omitted).

Following our review, we discern no abuse of discretion or error of law 

by the trial court. It is undisputed that Child, at the time of the termination 

hearing, was in DHS’s care for more than two years, far in excess of the 

statutory minimum. Concerning the second factor, Mother’s lack of 

compliance with her objectives, especially the objectives tailored towards 

achieving sobriety, supports the trial court’s conclusion that the conditions 

which led to Child’s removal still exist. Lastly, regarding the third section 

2511(a)(8) factor, the trial court heard sufficient testimony that termination 

of Mother’s parental rights would best serve the needs and welfare of Child

for the following reasons: Child has never resided with Mother as he was 

placed in the care of DHS following his discharge from the hospital. See N.T., 

3/23/23, at 45. Further, although Mother attended visitation, she consistently 

arrived forty-five to fifty-five minutes late, and her tardiness caused her 

visitation time to be reduced by half. See id. at 49-50. Ms. Vargas testified 

that Mother’s habitual tardiness prevented her from achieving a parent-child 

bond with Child. See id. at 51-52. In contrast, the record demonstrates a 

parent-child bond between foster parent and Child. See id. at 53-54. Foster 

parent is a pre-adoptive resource that meets all of Child’s needs. See id.
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Based on the foregoing testimony, the trial court was well within its discretion 

to terminate Mother’s parental rights under section 2511(a)(8) because Child

had been removed from Mother’s care in excess of the twelve-month statutory 

minimum; the conditions which led to Child’s removal continue to exist; and 

termination would best serve the needs and welfare of Child. See In re 

Adoption of J.N.M., 177 A.3d at 943. 

With respect to Mother’s argument that Child was not removed from her 

care because he was removed upon his discharge from the hospital, she does 

not cite to any controlling law, and we are not aware of any that states this 

proposition. Indeed, Mother’s assertion is contrary to precedent from our 

Supreme Court. See In re Adoption of J.J., 515 A.2d 883, 889-90 (Pa. 

1986) (affirming termination pursuant to section 2511(a)(5), which includes 

the same language as section 2511(a)(8) regarding removal of a child, where 

the child had been under the care of the agency since his birth and where the 

father had “never had custody of, nor provided support for, [the] child”).

To the extent Mother argues that DHS’s burden during the termination 

hearing included proving reasonable efforts by DHS, we find her argument to 

be waived for failure to provide a discussion with citation to the relevant law 

and develop the issues in a manner allowing for meaningful review. See In 

re W.H., 25 A.3d 330, 339 n.3 (Pa. Super. 2011) (noting that “[w]here an 

appellate brief fails to provide any discussion of a claim with citation to 

relevant authority or fails to develop the issue in any other meaningful fashion 
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capable of review, that claim is waived”) (internal quotations omitted) (citing, 

inter alia, Pa.R.A.P. 2119(a)).

6

Mother next argues the trial court erred in finding that termination was 

in the best interests of Child pursuant to section 2511(b). Section 2511(b) 

affords primary consideration to the developmental, physical and emotional 

needs and welfare of the child. See T.S.M., 71 A.3d at 267. “Notably, courts 

should consider the matter from the child’s perspective, placing [their] 

developmental, physical, and emotional needs and welfare above concerns for 

the parent.” In the Interest of K.T., 296 A.3d 1085, 1105 (Pa. 2023). This 

determination “should not be applied mechanically,” but “must be made on a 

case-by-case basis,” wherein “the court must determine each child’s specific 

needs.” Id. at 1106. Accordingly, there is no “exhaustive list” of factors that 

must be considered in this context. Id. at 1113 n.28.

Regarding the section 2511(b) best interest analysis, this Court has 

explained:

While a parent’s emotional bond with his or her child is a 

major aspect of the subsection 2511(b) best-interest analysis, it 

is nonetheless only one of many factors to be considered by the 

court when determining what is in the best interest of the child. 

The mere existence of an emotional bond does not preclude the 

____________________________________________

6 Even if this claim were not waived, we would deem it to be meritless. In In 

the Interest of D.C.D., 105 A.3d 662 (Pa. 2014), our Supreme Court held 

that, with respect to section 2511 of the Adoption Act, “Neither subsection (a) 

nor (b) requires a court to consider the reasonable efforts provided to a parent 

prior to termination of parental rights.” Id. at 672. Therefore, Mother’s 

assertion that the court erred in terminating her parental rights because DHS 

failed to provide reasonable efforts is misplaced.
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termination of parental rights. Rather, the [trial] court must 

examine the status of the bond to determine whether its 

termination would destroy an existing, necessary and beneficial 

relationship. . . ..

In addition to a bond examination, the trial court can equally 

emphasize the safety needs of the child, and should also consider 

the intangibles, such as the love, comfort, security, and stability 

the child might have with the foster parent. Additionally, . . . the 

trial court should consider the importance of continuity of 

relationships and whether any existing parent-child bond can be 

severed without detrimental effects on the child.

In re N.A.M., 33 A.3d 95, 103 (Pa. Super. 2011) (internal citations, 

quotations, brackets, and indentation omitted). Furthermore, our Supreme 

Court has stated that, “[c]ommon sense dictates that courts considering 

termination must also consider whether the children are in a pre-adoptive 

home and whether they have a bond with their foster parents.” In re T.S.M., 

71 A.3d 251, 268 (Pa. 2013). In weighing the bond considerations pursuant 

to section 2511(b), “courts must keep the ticking clock of childhood ever in 

mind.” Id. at 269. Children “are young for a scant number of years, and we 

have an obligation to see to their healthy development quickly. When courts 

fail . . . the result, all too often, is catastrophically maladjusted children.” Id.

Our High Court recently explained:

Severance of a “necessary and beneficial” bond would predictably

cause more than the “adverse” impact that, unfortunately, may

occur whenever a bond is present. By contrast, severance of a

necessary and beneficial relationship is the kind of loss that would 

predictably cause “extreme emotional consequences” or 

significant, irreparable harm. 
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K.T., 296 A.3d at 1109-10 (internal citations omitted). As such, the K.T.

Court distinguished “extreme emotional consequences” from an “adverse 

impact” to the child when parental rights are terminated. Id. at 1111. 

Specifically, the Court cautioned that a trial court “must not truncate its

analysis and preclude severance based solely on evidence of an ‘adverse’ or

‘detrimental’ impact to the child.” Id. at 1114. The Court concluded, “to grant 

termination when a parental bond exists, there must be clear and convincing 

evidence that the bond is not necessary and beneficial.” Id.

Moreover, in reiterating that the parental bond is only one part of the 

analysis, the K.T. Court held that the “[s]ection 2511(b) inquiry must also 

include consideration . . . [of] certain evidence if it is present in the record.” 

Id. at 1113, n.28 (emphasis omitted). The Court recognized that “case law 

indicates that bond, plus permanency, stability and all ‘intangible’ factors may 

contribute equally to the determination of a child’s specific developmental, 

physical, and emotional needs and welfare, and thus are all of ‘primary’

importance in the section 2511(b) analysis.” Id. at 1109. For instance, if 

relevant in a case, a trial court “can equally emphasize the safety needs of the 

child” in its analysis under section 2511(b). See In re M.M., 106 A.3d 114, 

118 (Pa. Super. 2014).

Mother posits that the trial court erred in terminating her parental rights 

under section 2511(b) because DHS did not present any expert evidence to 

establish that Child would not experience significant detrimental harm if her 
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parental rights were terminated. See Mother’s Brief at 28. Mother argues 

that the trial court inappropriately relied on the testimony of Ms. Vargas who 

was unqualified to establish whether Mother lacked a parental bond with Child. 

See id.

The trial court explained that the section 2511(b) best interests 

militated in favor of termination:

The [c]ourt found credible all of the testimony from Ms. 

Vargas that there is a lack of a parent child bond between Mother 

and [Child]. Ms. Vargas provided the reasons for this as there 

was never any consistency in their visits and a bond could not 

have been formed given the [five to fifteen] minute visits that 

Mother had with [Child] throughout the life of the case. These 

short visits were due to Mother’s chronic lateness. The [c]ourt 

also found credible all of the testimony from Ms. Vargas as to the 

bond between Child with the resource parent and that all of Child’s 

needs are being met on a daily basis with the resource parent. 

[Child] has been in this foster care home since April of 2021 and 

it is preadoptive. The [c]ourt also heard testimony that [Child] 

would not suffer any irreparable harm if Mother’s parental rights 

were terminated. This was based on the resource parent 

providing for [Child’s] needs and the lack of involvement and bond 

with Mother. 

Trial Court Opinion, 6/7/23, at 17.

Following our review, we conclude the trial court did not commit an error 

of law or abuse its discretion in finding that termination of Mother’s parental 

rights was in Child’s best interests. Initially, we hold that the trial court did 

not err in relying on the testimony of Ms. Vargas. See In re Z.P., 994 A.2d 

1108, 1121 (Pa. Super. 2010) (stating that “[w]hen conducting a bonding 

analysis, the court is not required to use expert testimony[; rather, s]ocial 

workers and caseworkers can offer evaluations as well”) (internal citations 
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omitted). Additionally, Ms. Vargas’s testimony, which the trial court could rely 

on, established that Mother had not formed a parent-child bond and that Child, 

instead, looks to his “resource parent,” i.e., his foster parent, who is a 

preadoptive resource, as a mother, and he looks to her for his needs, 

including, love, protection, and support. See N.T., 3/23/23, at 49-54. Ms. 

Vargas additionally opined that E.C. would not suffer irreparable harm if 

Mother’s parental rights were terminated. See id. at 53. Thus, the trial court 

did not abuse its discretion in determining that termination best serves the 

Child’s developmental, physical, and emotional needs and welfare pursuant to 

section 2511(b), and that termination of Mother’s parental rights would not 

sever a “necessary and beneficial” relationship or cause “extreme emotional 

consequences.” See K.T., 296 A.3d at 1109-10.

Given our disposition affirming the decree terminating Mother’s parental 

rights, her third issue regarding the trial court’s decision to change Child’s 

permanency goal from reunification to adoption is moot. See Int. of A.M.,

256 A.3d 1263, 1272-73 (Pa. Super. 2021) (finding issues regarding goal

change moot in light of termination of parental rights); see also In re 

Adoption of A.H., 247 A.3d 439, 446 (Pa. Super. 2021) (holding that “the 

effect of our decision to affirm the orphans’ court’s termination decree 

necessarily renders moot the dependency court’s decision to change Child’s

goal to adoption”); In re D.K.W., 415 A.2d 69, 73 (Pa. 1980) (stating that
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once parental rights are terminated, issues of custody and dependency are

moot). Therefore, we do not review this issue. 

Based on the foregoing, we affirm the decree terminating Mother’s 

parental rights to Child and dismiss as moot the order changing Child’s 

permanency goal to adoption.

Decree affirmed. Appeal from goal change order dismissed.

Date: 12/8/2023