FILED 

MARCH 15, 2016 

In the Office of the Clerk of Court 

WA State Court of Appeals, Division III 

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHING TON 

DIVISION THREE 

STATE OF WASHINGTON, 

Respondent, 

v. 

JUAN MANUAL REYES, 

Appellant. 

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No. 32799-0-111 

UNPUBLISHED OPINION 

SIDDOWAY, C.J. - After a jury found Juan Reyes guilty of first degree robbery, 

he was sentenced to 40 months in prison and 36 months of community custody. The 

sentencing court imposed, as costs, $489 .18 in defense investigator fees advanced by the 

State. Mr. Reyes did not object. He now appeals the term of community custody and the 

legal financial obligation (LFO). 

The State concedes that only "serious violent offense[ s ]" as defined by the 

Sentencing Reform Act of 1981, chapter 9.94A RCW, subject an offender to a three year 

sentence to community custody, and first degree robbery is not a "serious violent 

offense." RCW 9.94A.030(45); RCW 9.94A.701(1). First degree robbery, a class A· 

felony, is a "violent offense," and is subject to an 18-month sentence to community 

custody. RCW 9.94A.030(54)(a)(i); RCW 9A.56.200(2); RCW 9.94A.701(2). We 
No. 32799-0-111 

State v. Reyes 

accept the State's concession and remand with directions to correct the term of 

community custody. 

The only remaining issue is whether imposing the cost of the defense investigator 

as part of Mr. Reyes's judgment and sentence violates Washington statutes or the United 

States or Washington Constitutions. For reasons set forth below, we conclude that it does 

not, and we affirm that legal financial obligation. 

ANALYSIS 

"Whenever a person is convicted in superior court, the court may order the 

payment of a legal financial obligation as part of the sentence." RCW 9.94A.760(1). 

Among costs that fall within the statutory definition of "legal financial obligation" are 

"court-appointed attorneys' fees, and costs of defense ... assessed to the offender as a 

result of a felony conviction." RCW 9.94A.030(30). RCW 10.01.160(2) describes the 

scope and limitations on the type of costs that can be imposed on an offender, and 

provides that they "shall be limited to expenses specially incurred by the state in 

prosecuting the defendant" and "cannot include expenses inherent in providing a 

constitutionally guaranteed jury trial." 

Mr. Reyes represents that his trial lawyer obtained court authorization to hire the 

investigator whose services accounted for the $489 .18 under "CrR 3 .1 ( f)( 1) [which] 

provides: 'A lawyer for a defendant who is financially unable to obtain investigative, 

expert, or other services necessary to an adequate defense in the case may request them 

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No. 32799-0-111 

State v. Reyes 

by a motion to the court.'" Br. of Appellant at 6. From that, he argues that his 

investigator's services were "inherent in providing a constitutionally guaranteed jury 

trial" within the meaning ofRCW 10.01.160(2) and therefore not chargeable as costs. He 

also suggests that State payment of necessary investigative services performed for an 

indigent defendant is required by the Fifth, Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the 

United States Constitution. 

We examined the meaning of the phrase "expenses inherent in providing a 

constitutionally guaranteed jury trial" in RCW 10.01.160(2) in State v. Diaz-Farias, 

observing that no reported Washington decision had construed the prohibition on 

imposing such expenses "or attempted to reconcile it with the legislature's provision 

elsewhere that some constitutionally required expenditures by the State can be imposed 

on criminal defendants." _ Wn. App._, 362 P.3d 322, 326 (2015). Following case 

law in Michigan and Oregon, from whose cost-reimbursement statutes RCW 10.01.160 

was copied, we concluded that in using the phrase "expenses inherent in providing a 

constitutionally guaranteed jury trial," the legislature "intended to encompass only 

expenses relating to a defendant's jury trial itself, not expenses associated with other 

constitutional rights that apply at the time of trial." Diaz-Farias, 362 P.3d at 327. 

Accordingly, RCW 10.01.160(2) does not exclude the cost of a defense investigator from 

costs of defense that can be imposed on an offender. 

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State v. Reyes 

Diaz-Farias also observed that it was determined long ago that Washington's cost 

reimbursement statutes "satisfy the requirements of a constitutional cost and fee recovery 

regime." Id. at 325 (citing State v. Curry, 118 Wn.2d 911, 915-16, 829 P.2d 166 (1992)). 

Washington statutes include requirements that "[t]he court shall not order a defendant to 

pay costs unless the defendant is or will be able to pay them," RCW 10.01.160(3), and 

provide for remission of costs or modification of the method of payment if the court 

determines after the sentence is imposed that the costs "will impose a manifest hardship 

on the defendant or his family." RCW 10.01.160(4); and see Curry, 118 Wn.2d at 

915-16 (identifying constitutional requirements that are met by Washington statutes). 

Because defense investigation costs imposed by the court fall within the statutory 

definition of "legal financial obligations," are not excluded from recovery by RCW 

10.01.160(2), and Washington has adopted a constitutional cost recovery regime, the trial 

court did not err in imposing the cost. 

STATEMENT OF ADDITIONAL GROUNDS 

In a pro se statement of additional grounds (SAG), Mr. Reyes raises two: that ( 1) 

he was not given proper clothing for trial, and (2) he was required to wear a wrist band 

that identified him as an inmate. 

Trial clothing. Mr. Reyes contends that he was given only his own street clothing 

to wear during trial, which he contends was dirty, inappropriate, and prejudiced the jury 

against him. 

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No. 32799-0-111 

State v. Reyes 

We note first that this challenge depends on matters outside our record. We have 

no information whether Mr. Reyes requested some reasonable accommodation as to his 

attire that was denied, 1 or just how dirty and inappropriate his clothing was. As a result, 

we cannot consider any alleged error, abuse and prejudice in this direct appeal. State v. 

McFarland, 127 Wn.2d 322, 335, 899 P.2d 1251 (1995). The issue is more properly 

raised in a Personal Restraint Petition. 

We also observe that Mr. Reyes has not cited any authority supporting a right to 

wear clothing of his choice to trial. Street clothes, even if dirty, do not imply or suggest 

guilt. Johnson v. State, 838 S.W.2d 906, 909 (Tex. App. 1992). 

Wrist band. Likewise, there is nothing in our record that suggests that Mr. Reyes 

brought his concern about his jail identification wristband to the attention of the court, or 

that jurors could even see the wristband and recognize what it was. Here again, the 

record is insufficient for review on direct appeal. 

We also point out that other jurisdictions have rejected due process challenges to 

an inmate's having worn a wristband during trial absent evidence that the wristband 

affected the outcome of the trial, often noting that institutions other than jails use 

wristbands for identification. E.g., Morris v. State, 696 S.W.2d 616, 621 (Tex. App. 

1 Even objection to being tried in identifiable prison clothes can be waived. 

Estelle v. Williams, 425 U.S. 501, 512-13, 96 S. Ct. 1691, 48 L. Ed. 2d 126 (1976). 

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No. 32799-0-111 

State v. Reyes 

1985); State v. Johnson, 128 N.C. App. 361, 365, 496 S.E.2d 805 (1998); People v. 

Williams, 33 Cal. App. 4th 467, 475-76, 39 Cal. Rptr. 2d 358 (1995). 

We affirm the LFO and remand the case for the limited purpose of correcting the 

term of community custody. 

A majority of the panel has determined this opinion will not be printed in the 

Washington Appellate Reports, but it will be filed for public record pursuant to RCW 

2.06.040. 

WE CONCUR: 

Lawrence-Berrey, J. 

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