NO T F OR F UL L- TEX T P UB LIC AT ION F ile Nam e: 10a0423n.06 No. 08-5712 UN ITED STA TES C OU RT OF AP P EA LS F OR THE SI XT H C IR CU IT
UNITED STAT ES O F AMERICA,

P laintif f-App ellee, ON AP P EA L F RO M THE v. UNITED STAT ES DIS TRICT COURT F OR THE WE STE RN CO RE Y FERGUS ON , DI S TR IC T O F K EN TU CKY Defendan t-Appellant, __________________________________/ BEF OR E: SUH RH EIN RI CH , C OLE a nd G ILM AN ; C ir c uitJudg e s. SUHRHEINRICH, Circuit Judge. Def endant Corey Fe rg uson appea ls his jury conviction and sente nce f

or conspira cy

and distribution of coca ine. He also appea ls the forf eiture of $5,026.00 seized fr o m h is residenc e. We AF FI RM Fer g uson’s conviction and se ntence , but REVERSE t he order of for feiture

. I. Bac kgr ound I n 2 00 3, the B ow ling G re e n/Wa rr e n Co un ty

Dr ugTa sk F or c e and

B ur e a u o f A lc oh ol, Tobac co, F irea

rms, and Explosi ves beg an investigating the Fa dz 4 Day s Ba rber Shop in the B owling Gre en, Ke ntucky

are a for drug -traf

ficking activity

. On May 3, 2006, Fe rg uson was indicted along with seven other

individuals for various d rug-tra ffickingoffe nses and a war rant for his arre st was iss ue d. On

July 12 , 2 00 6, the g ra

nd jur y re tur ne d a su pe rs e din g indictm e nt c ha rg ingF e rgus on

in three counts: (1) c onsp i ra cy t o manufa cture cra ck coc aine a nd to distribute powder a nd cra ck
c oc a ine fr om Jun e 1, 20 03 , to F e br ua ry 17 , 2 00 6, in v iol a tio n of 21 U. S.C. § 8 46 , a nd to k no wi ng ly-2-

possess with intent to dis tribute marijuana , in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) ( Count 1); (2) manufa cturing cra ck coc aine between January 28, 2006, and F ebrua

ry 8, 2006, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) (Count 17); and dist ri buting powde r coc aine on F ebrua ry 1, 2006, in violation of 21 U. S.C. § 841 (a )( 1) (C ount 18)

. I n ad dit ion , the Go ve rnme nt sou g ht f or fe iture of

c e rt a in i te ms seized pursuant to 21 U.S.C. § 853 (Count 28). Fe rg uson filed a motion to suppress the evide nce se ized from his home during the execution of a state sear ch warra

nt. He also filed a motion in limine to ex clude c ash and ma rijuana se ized from F e rgus on ’s Mt. L e ba

no n Ch ur c h Ro a d r e sid e nc e . Th e dis tr ic t c ourt g ra nte d in pa rt and de nie d in part the motion to suppress, and de nied the motion in limine. Fe rg uson was tried befor e a jury . The Gover nment prese nted twelve w itnesses, including codef endants Jerome Shanklin, the owner of the barbe r shop, Richard Cox, a barbe r in the shop, and William Downey , a cooperating indivi dual. The dis tr ic t c ourt

su bmi tte d s ix spe c ia l ve rd ic t f or ms c on c e rn ingthe of

fens es of c on sp ir a c y

to
manu fa c tur e c ra c k c oc a ine , c on sp ir a c y to d ist ri bu te po wd e r c oc a ine , c on sp ir a c y to d istri bu te marijuan a, ai d i n g and abe tting in the distribution of cra ck coc aine, a nd aiding and abe tting in the distribution of powder coc aine. The forf eiture c ount was not consider ed by the jury . The jury convi c te d F e r g u s o no f

c o n s p ir a c y

to d is tr ib u te b e tw e e n

5 0 0 g r a ms an d

f iv e k il o g r a ms o f

p o w d er
coca ine pursuant to Count 1, and distribution of more than 500 g rams of coca ine pursuant to C ount 18. The jury

acquitted him on Count 17. T h e d i s t ri ct court de nied his motion for judgme nt of

a c qu itt a l or

ne w tri a l. Severa l months l ater , the prosec utor informed F erguson’s counsel that she rec ently lear ned that the Assistant United States Attorney (AUSA) former ly assig ned to the case had made an offe r of c on sid e ratio n f

or tr ia l te sti mon

y to D ow ne y . F e rgus on

fi le d a no the r m oti on fo r a ne w tri a l a s a-3-

re s u lt

. T h e d is tr ic t c o u rt d e n ie d th e mo ti o n w it h o u t a h e ar in g , c o n c lu d in g th a t th e r e wa s no
rea sonable proba

bility that the out come of the proceeding s would have be en diffe rent ha d Fe rg uson known of the of

fer

. Fe rg uson also moved for r eturn of $5,026 se ized from his residenc e pursua nt to the searc h
war rant. The district court denie d the motion without a hearingand ordered the monies forfe ited. The pre sentenc e r e p o rt c a lc u late d F e r gu s o n ’ s g u id e li n e s r an g e a t 3 6 0 months to life imp ri so nme nt. Th e dis tr ic t c ourt re du c e d F e rgus on ’s se nte nc e to a dju st fo r the dis pa ri ty a mon g his
c od efen dan ts
. Af

te r c on sid e ri ngthe 18 U. S.C. § 3 55 3( a ) f a c tor s, the c ourt

imp os e d a

30 0- mon th sentenc e. Th is a pp e a l f oll ow s. II. Ana lys is

A. New Trial Motion F e rgus on argue s th a t th e dis tr ic t c ourt e rr e d in re fu sin g to g ra nt him a ne w tri a l pu

rs ua nt t o F e d. R. C ri m. P . 3 3 b a se d o n th e g ov e rnme nt’s fa ilure to d isc los e its c oo pe ratio n a g re e me nt w ith Downey . This Court reviews the district co u rt’s dec ision to deny a motion for new

trial based on newly discovere d evidenc e or Bradyviolations for abuse of discretion. Un ite d S

tat es v . W hit e , 492 F.3d 380, 408 ( 6th Cir. 2007). Brady v. Mary land

require s the g overnme nt to turn over evide nce f avora ble to the ac cused

an d mate r ia l to g u il t o r p u n is h me nt. Brady v. Maryland , 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963). This includes evidenc e that could be used to impeac h the cr edibility of a w itness. Giglio v . United States , 4 05 U. S. 15 0, 15 4- 55 (1 97 2) ; Schledwitz v. United States , 169 F.3d 1003, 1 0 11 (6th Cir. 1999). Not eve ry failure to disclose favor able e vidence require s a newtrial, howeve r. Sc hle dwi tz , 169 F.3d at 1011.-4-

Favorable evidenc e mus t be mater ial, “and c onstitut ional err or re sults from its suppression by the g overnme nt, ‘ if there is a rea sonable probability that, had the e vidence been disc losed to the defe nse, the result of the proce eding would have be en diffe rent.’” Kyles v. W hitley , 514 U.S. 419, 433 (1995) (q u o t i n g United States v. Bagley , 473 U.S. 667, 682 (1985)). See also Strickle r v. Gre ene , 5 27 U. S. 26 3, 28 1- 82 (1999 ). Th is m e ans that th e de fe nd ant m us t sh owthat th e ne w e vid e nc e “ c ou ld
rea sonably

be take n to put the whole case i n such a diff ere nt light as to under

mine confide nce in the verdic t.” Kyles , 514 U.S. at 435. See a ls o Bell v . B e ll , 512 F.3d 223, 236- 37 (6th Cir. 2008) (e n banc) (same) , cert. de nied , 129 S. Ct . 114. I n the context of impe ac h m ent evidence, “ [w] hen the ‘re liability

of a g iven witness may

well be de terminative of guilt or innocence ,’ the nondisclosure of evide nce a ffe cting cre dibilit y falls within” the Brady rule requiring a new trial. Gi gli o , 4 05 U. S. at 154. The g ood faith or ba d faith of the gover nment is irrele vant i n a Bradyanaly sis. Brady , 373 U. S. at 87 ; se e als o U

nit e d St at es v . A gu rs , 427 U.S. 97, 110 (1976) (“ Nor do we believe the constitutional obli g ation is mea s u r e d b y th e mo r a l c u lp a

bility , or the willfulness, of the prosec utor.”); W hit e , 492 F.3d at 409 (“I t matters little wh et h er t he g overnme nt suppresses the e vidence out of oversig ht or g uile.”). At trial, the Gove rnment introduce d Downey ’s plea ag ree ment, which explicitly stated that “[n] o other promises or inducements have been made” to D owney below the twe nty -y ear

minimum in e xch ang e fo r his te sti mony a g a ins t F e rgus on . H ow e ve r, fo ur mon ths a ft e r h is c on vic tio n, AU SA J o L awless, the tr ial prosec utor, sent Fe rg uson’s counsel a letter disclosing for the f

irst time that the former AUSA assigned to the c ase, B rian B utler , ag ree d to consider Dow ney for a sentenc e less than tw e nty y e ars if he te sti fi e d tru thf

ull y duri ng any tr ia l ( the “ c oo pe ratio n a g re e me nt” ). Ac c or din g to L awless, B utler had a lso ag ree d to exclud e t h e co o p eration ag ree ment from the wr itten plea-5-

ag ree ment. Fe rg uson had re quested such Bradym at er i al p ri o r t o t ri al

. At D o w n ey ’s s en t en ci n g, which wa s held afte r F erguson’s conviction, the Gover nment moved to r educe Downey ’s sentenc e below twenty

y ear s consi stent with the cooper ation ag ree ment, and the district cour t reduc ed Downey ’s sentenc e to eig hteen y ear s. Do wn e y te sti fi e d at tr ia l that no thi ng in t he ple a a g re e me nt p ro mis e d h im a se nte nc e of

le ss than t w enty y ear s. On cross- examination, Downey acknow ledg ed that he w as looking at a mandatory min imum of

tw e nty y e ars , b ut t

hat he wa s te sti fy

ing in ho pe s o f g e tti nga

se nte nc e be low

tw e nty y ear s based on a U.S.S.G. § 5K1.1 reduc tion. On re-dir ect, Dow ney testified that the plea

ag ree ment contained no pr omise of a § 5K1.1 motion. The c ooperation ag ree ment is inconsistent with the writt en plea ag ree ment’s statement that “[n] o other promises or inducements have been made to D efe ndant in c onnection with t h i s case .” Th e c oo pe ratio n a g re e me nt the re fo re wa s im pe a c hme nt e vid e nc e . H ow e ve r, Do wn e y ’s re lia bil ity was not “dete rminative of g uilt or i nnocenc e,” so a new trial was not required unde r Gi gli o . Downey was only one of twe lve g overnme nt witnesses, six of whom testified conce rning their knowledg e of Fe rg uson’s drugdealing . Although D owney testified that he was involved in two pow der c ocaine tr ans a c tio ns wi th F e rgus on in Janu ary 20 06 , D ow ne y

un lik e se ve ra l ot

he rs , h a d n o d ir e c t dr

ugde a ls with Fer g uson, but dealt only throug h a middleman. On the oth e r h and , Sh ank lin , w ho c ome s th e c los e st to be ing c ha ra c te ri zed a s a “ ke y wi tne ss” in t his c a se , te sti fi e d th a t he re cei ve d c oc a ine dir e c tly fr om F e rgus on

thr e e tim e s - - o ne ha lf

kil o and then one kilo in J anuar y , and another

half kilo on Fe bruar

y 1, 2006. The jury

viewed vide otapes
and c e llu lar t e le ph on e re c or ds that c or ro bo ra te d Sh ank lin ’s de sc ri pti on of the F e br ua ry 1 in c ide nt. The jury found F erg

uson g uilty

of Count 18 (the F ebrua ry 1, 2006 transac tion) as well as the-6-

conspirac y

char g e for

that time period. Shanklin’s testimony supports the jury ’s ver dict here

. Cf. Harris v. Lafler , 5 53 F .3 d 1 02 8, 10 33 (6 th C ir . 2 00 9) (h old ingthat th e state ’s fa ilure to d isc los e in a murde r trial thre e stateme nts police made to its key witness, including a

promise that he would be rele ased if he implicated the defe ndant, was materia l under Bradywher e the witness “ was the ke y wi tne ss f or the pr os e c uti on ” wh o g a ve an e y e wi tne ss a c c ount that wa s the on ly e vid e nc e that di re c tly lin ke d th e de fe nd ant a s th e g un man) ; see also id. at 1034 (noting that “[c]onsi dera ble authority

from the S upreme Court and our court indi cate s that a def endant suff

ers pr ejudice f

rom the withholding of f av o ra b l e impeachme nt evidence when the pr osecution’s c ase hing es on the testimony of one witness”). F e rgus on a lso argue s that the e vid e nc e in qu e sti on c ou ld have be e n us e d to i mpe a c h Sh a nk lin

and Cox be c a

us e a ll o f t

he inf or mant- wi tne sses ente re d in to p le a a g re e me nts c on ta ini ngthe same langua g e a s p ara g ra

ph 20 of Do wn e y ’s ple a a g re e me nt. Th is ar g ume nt is unava ili ngbe c a us e bo th Cox and Sha nk lin te sti fi e d tha t the po ssi bil ity of a § 5K1 .1 mot ion a pp e are d in the ir

ple a a g re e me nts
. I n short, the district court did not abuse its discre tion in deny ing F erguson’s motion for a ne w trial based on the undisclosed impeac hment evidenc e. Fe rg uson also claims that a ne w trial is require d beca use t he Government knowing ly relied
on pe rj ur e d te sti mony a t tr ia l. A re la xed sta nd ard a pp lie s in c a se s wh e re the pr os e c uti on kn ow ing ly uses per jured testimony

. Un ite d S tat es v . O ’D e ll , 8 0 5 F. 2 d

6 3 7 , 6 4 1 (6 t h C i r. 1 9 8 6 ) ( ci t i n g Bagley , 47 3 U .S. 66 7 at 67 8) . In s uc h a c a se , “ the co nv ict io n wi ll be se t a sid e ‘i f t he re is a ny re a so na ble likelihood that the false testimony could have aff

ecte d t h e j u dg ment of the jury .’” Id. (quoting Bagley , 473 U.S. at 678).-7-

But a new tria l is not required unde r this standard e ither. As st ated, Downey was not t he key witness ag ainst Fe rg uson. Cf. Gi gli o , 405 U.S. a

t 154- 55 (holding that a new trial was r equire d afte r fo rm e r A USAfa ile d to dis c los e to t he tr ia l pr os e c uto r t

hat he pr omi se d a ke y wi tne ss that th e wi tne ss would not be prosec uted if he co operated and the g overnme nt’s case depende d almost entirely on that w itn e ss’ s te sti mony

). As als o state d a

bo ve , Sh ank lin ’s , a s w e ll a s Co x’s t e sti mony , e a sil y supports the jury ’s ver dict. Thus, it cannot be said that there was “ any rea sonable likelihood that the false te stimony

could have aff

ecte d the j udg ment of the jury .” Rosencrantz v. Lafler , 568 F.3d 577, 584, 589 (6th Cir. 2009) (interna l quotation marks and citation omitted), (holding that the
uncorr ecte d false e vidence by key prosec ution witness de ny ing pr etrial mee ting with the pr osecutor would likely

fail to “substantially

influence ” the jury

ver d ic t g iv e n

w itness’s consistent identification of the de fenda

nt, and the impeac hment evidenc e alr eady in the rec ord), cert. de nied , 7 8 U
. S. L
. W. 3642 (U.S. May

3, 2010). Nor is there any indication that AUSA L awless kne w of the pr omise to consider a depar ture at the time of trial such that it c ould be said she k no win gly used per jured testimony . I ndeed, it is she who broug ht the cooper ation ag ree ment to Fer g uson’s attention. Cf. Nap ue v . I lli no is , 360 U.S. 264 (1959) ( holding that wher e the murder prosec ution a g ainst the petitioner was based pr incipally on the te sti mony

of a wi tne ss w ho fa lse ly

te sti fi e d th a t he ha d re c e ive d no pro mis e of c on sid e ra

tio n in return f or his testimony , and the prosec utor knew this but did nothing to corr ect it, a new trial wa s require d beca

use the jury ’s estim at e o f hi s testimony might have been de terminative of guilt or inn oc e nc e ); Sc hn e ide r v . E ste lle , 552 F.2d 593 ( 5th Cir. 1977) (new tr ial require d wher e the state ’s chief witness, a police of

fice r, knowing ly

testified fa lsely

at trial).-8-

A hea ring was not nece ssary . Un ite d S tat es v . W hit e , 492 F.3d 380 ( 6th Cir. 2007), does not support Fe rg uson. There , the def endants we re de prived of a number of doc uments they alleg ed contained e x culpatory

information. Id. a t 41 3. Th is c ourt he ld that the de fe nd ants we re e nti tle d to an evide ntiary

hear ing be cause “t h e s u pporting evidenc e deta iled the g overnme nt’s rathe r g reat leng ths to deny Def

endants acce ss to the re quested doc uments,” which “ eff ectively fore closed [the defe ndants] from making the requisite showing t hat t he documents wer e material and fa vorable

. . . and that the suppre ssion prejudiced the m.” Id. By c on tr a st, the tr ia l pr os e c uto r h e re , A USA L awless, disclosed the i nformation as soon as she discove red it. Un ite d Sta te s v . F ro st , 125 F.3d 346 (6th Cir. 1997), is e qually

distinguishable. The re, w e held that a n evidentiar

y hear ing w as nec essar

y beca use it was uncle ar f

rom the re cord w hether

the testimony

of a g overnme nt expert who was not
c a lle d cou ld hav e es ta

bli sh e d th a t th e de fe nd ant, wh o h a d b e e n c ha rg e d w ithma il f

ra ud in
c on ne c tio n w ithan a lle g e d s c he me to d e fr a ud the g ov e rnme nt o f t

uit ion , a c tua lly

e ng a g e d in common billing pra ctices w hich would have neg ated a n intent to defra

ud. Id. at 383-84. He re, no further inquiry was ne cessa

ry beca use the Gove rnment disclosed the Brady materia l, and the district
c ourt wa s a ble to a sse ss t

he imp a c t of

the vio la tio n o n th e jur

y ve rd ic t. I n sum, then, the district court did not abuse its discre tion in deny ing F erguson’s motion for new tria l or in denying his re quest for a n evidentiar

y hear ing. B. M ot ion to Suppr e ss F e rgus on c la ims that th e e vid e nc e ob ta ine d a t th e Mt. L e ba no n Chur c h Ro a d a dd

re ss s ho uld have be e n sup pr e sse d be c a us e (1 ) t he re wa s n o n e xus b e tw e e n th e a dd re ss a nd the c ri min a l a c tiv ity to support probable c ause f or the sea rch w arr ant, (2) the aff

idavit contained f

alse statements, and (3)-9-

the items taken outsi d e t h e scope of the sea rch w arr ant wer e not of a n immediately

appar ent incriminating nature
. Detec tive Craig Sutter, an off icer who was a ssigne d to th e drug ta sk forc e involved in the inv e sti g a tio n, state d in

his a ff ida vit in s up po rt

of the a pp lic a ti on for th e se arc h w arr ant o f t he Mt. L ebanon Churc h Road reside nce that he and se vera l office rs ar rived at 2946 Mt. L ebanon Churc h Road, Bow ling Gr een, K entucky , at appr ox imately 8:30 a.m., on May

15, 2006, to execute a fede ral

arr est war rant for Fe rg uson. Sutt er knoc ked on the front door, but no one answ ere d. Sutter hear d music coming from the r esidenc e and sa w someone pe er throug h the bl i n d s of a f ront window. Sutter also observe d two piece s of m ail bear ing Fer g uson’s name in plain view ins ide a black For d Ex plorer a ssociated with Fer gu s o n that was pa rked in the dr iveway . The off icer s waited approximately

forty -five minutes be fore leaving

. The a ffidavit fur

ther s t ated that at about 10:10 a.m., dispatch re ceive d a phone c all from Corey Fe rg uson’s neig hbor at 3013 Mt. L ebanon Roa d, and that “[t]hi s neig hbor advised t hat she saw Corey Ferguson l ea v e 2 9 4 6 M t
. L eb an o nR o adi n a r ed Do d ge p i cku

p t ru ckt h at wa s t o wi n g a trailer.” (Emphasis adde d.) S utter attested that at 10:17 a.m. another trooper stoppe d the re d pickup and that Corey

Fe rg uson was in this vehicle. The trooper pla ced F erguson under a rre st, and during

a se arc h in c ide nt t o a

rr e st, the tr oo pe r fo un d a 12 g a ug e sh otgun sh e ll in F e rgus on ’s pa nts po c ke t. The a ffidavit noted that F erguson was a c onvicted fe lon, a nd that the af

fiant knew

Fe rg uson to be eng ag ed in drug traff

icking

. L astly , Sutter stated that base d on his ex perie nce a nd training , he knew that drug traff

icker s are fre quently

arme d and ofte n maintain firea rms in their homes. A Kentuc ky

state-c ourt mag istrate judg e issued a se arc h war rant for the Mt. L ebanon Roa d residenc e. I t authorized the offic ers to seize “12 g aug e shotg un shells, [a] 12 g aug e shotg un, [and]-10-

do c ume ntatio n r e g ard ingthe purc ha se of a 12 g a ug e sh otgun .” Whil e e xec uti ngthe se arc h w a rr a nt, t h e o f f i c e r s s e i z e d

$ 5 , 0 2 6 i nc a s h , f

i v e s h o t g u n s h e l l s , o n e b a g g i e o f m ar i j u an a , a s a f e d e p o s i tk e y, various d o cu m en t s, four rif le rounds of a

mmuniti on, four surve illance c amer as, and a J VC television. The district cour

t c oncluded that the war

rant wa s valid beca

use “the discovery

of F erguson’s illega l possession of ammunition m inutes afte r lea ving the residenc e at 2946 Mt. L ebanon Churc h Road established proba

ble ca use to believe that additional evidenc e of his possession of fire arms or ammunition would be found in that residenc e.” “In revie wing a district c ourt’s denia l of a motion to suppress evidenc e, this court re views the dis tr ic t c ourt ’s fi nd ing s of fa c t fo r c le ar e rr or , and its le g a l c on c lus ion s de novo .” United States

v . G ill is , 358 F.3d 386, 390 (6th Cir. 2004)

. Any err or is subjec t to harmless-e rror revie w. United Sta te s v . G ar c ia , 4 9 6 F. 3 d

4 9 5 , 5 1 2 (6 t h C i r. 2 0 0 7 ) ( ci t i n g Cha pm an v . Ca lif

or nia , 386 U.S. 18, 22 (1967); F ed. R. Crim. P. 52(a)). Th e dis tr ic t court ’s c on c lus ion that the state se arc h warr ant w a s v a lid is p ro ble ma tic . F ir st, as F erguson points out, pos session of amm u n i t i o n by a fe lon is not i n fac t illega l under Ke ntucky law. Sutter conc eded this at the suppr ession hear ing. Y et the Gove rnment re lies i n i t s b ri ef on F e rgus on ’s “ ill e g a l po sse ssi on of a mm un it io n” in j us tif

y ingthe va lid ity

of the se arc h w a rr a nt. Second, the ne ighbor

did not actually

identify Fe rg uson as the individual who left the Mt. L ebanon
re sid e nc e . Rathe r, the te sti mony a t th e su pp re ssi on he ari ng re ve a le d tha t the ne ig hb or sim ply tol d the dis patc he r t

hat a bla c k ma le e nte re d a

re d p ic ku p tr uc k. Thus , Su tte r’ s st a te me nt in the a ff ida vit was not ac curate. Thi s inacc urac y is materia l beca use i t was the key fac t connec ting Fer g uson to the residenc e duringthe re levant time period, and ther efor e linking the shotgun she ll to the suspectedEven if this proposition were conclusively established, it wo u l d not nece ssarily equal 1 probable cause . See United States v. Mc Phearson , 469 F.3d 518, 524-25 (6th Cir. 2006) (re jecting the g overnme nt’s argument that the defe ndant’s arr est outside his r esidenc e with drug s on his person was sufficie nt to establish probable c ause be cause it assumed that the def endant wa s likely

to have stored drug s in that same re sidence ; additional fac ts were neede d to support such an infe renc e). -11- possession of fire arms in the re sidence . I n addition, Sutt er te stified at the suppre ssion hearingthat he had not c onducted surve illance on the Mt. L eb an o n re sidence , and both he a nd Special Ag ent Ha y e s te sti fi e d th at th ey had no dir e c t e vid e nc e that F e rgus on wa s d e a lin g dr

ug s o ut o f t

his residenc e. Sutter also stated that he had no infor mation that Fer g uson kept firea rms in his home. I n s ho rt , th e fa c ts co nn e c tin g c ri min a l ac tiv ity to the Mt. L e ba no n Roa d re sid e nc e are sc a nt. Probable c ause f

or the sea rch c ould have be en base d only on the fa ctual pre dicate that Fer g uson left thi s r e sid e nc e a nd

min ute s late r w a s f

ound wi th a

sh otgun sh e ll i n h is p oc ke t. H ow e ve r, the a ff ida vit di d n o t co n cl usively

establish that the black ma n that the neig hbor saw le aving the Mt. L ebanon
re sid e nc e in a

re d tr uc k w a s F e rgus on . Al tho ug h la w enf or c e me nt w e re pr ob a

bly jus tif ie d in 1 draw ing the infere nce that the “black m an” was i ndeed Fer g uson, this infere nce should have bee n
reve aled to the mag istrate ju d ge s o t h at the judg e could make an indepe ndent deter mination of probable cause rathe r than mer ely rubber stamping the conclusions of Sutter. Neve rth e le s s , w e n e e d n o t d e c id e w h e th e r th e s e ar c h w ar r an t w a s v a li d

. G iv e n the
overw helming e vidence of F erguson’s g ui l t on the coc aine c harg es, any err or wa s harmless her e. Se e Ga rc ia , 496 F.3d at 512-13 (holding harmless e rrone ous admission of items not l isted in searc h
warr an t w h o s e il le g a li ty

w a s n o t i mm e d iate ly

a p p ar e n t b e c a

u s e o f a b u n d an t e v id e n c e to c o n v ic t defe ndant of drugtraff

icking conspirac y

).F e rgus on do e s n ot c on te st the sei z ure of th e ba g g ie of mari jua na or the sh otgun

and ri fl e 2 rounds beyond his ge nera l challeng e to the validity of the sea

rch w arr ant. -12- Concerningthe items seized, the parties a g ree that the ca sh, the safe deposit key , the four
surve il la n c e c a me r a s , an d th e JV C te le v is io n w e r e o u ts id e th e s c o p e o f th e s e ar c h w ar r an t. The 2 Gover nment maintains that these items n onetheless we re pr operly seized under the pla in-view exception to the war

rant require ment. “Seizing items be y ond the scope of a wa rra nt’s authorization violates the F ourth Amendment rights of the subje ct of a sear ch.” Shamaeizadeh v . Cunigan , 338 F.3d 535, 554 ( 6th Cir. 2003) (c i t i n g A ndresen v . Maryland , 427 U.S. 463, 480 (1976)). O n the other ha nd, t he plain-vie w doctrine “author izes seiz ure of illega l or evidentiar

y items visibl e to a police officer who has acc ess t o the object, ha s some prior F ourth Amendment justification, and w ho has probable cause to suspect the item is connec ted with criminal ac tivity .” Illinois v. Andreas , 463 U. S. 765 , 7 71 (1 98 3) (c itatio n o mit te d) . I t c ann ot b e sa id t hat th e inc ri min a tin g natur e of the se ite ms was immediately

appar ent g iv en t h at t he off icer s were purportedly

sear ching for e vidence that Fe rg uson illega lly

possessed a f

irea rm. See Sham aeizadeh , 338 F.3d at 554 (stating that to invoke p l ai n -v i ew d o ct ri n e, t h e e v i d en ce m u s t b e i n p l ai nv i ew an d o f a n“i m m ed i at el y

i n cr i m i n at i n g” char acte r). Ag ain thoug h, the introduction of this evidenc e at tria l was har mless. Notwithstanding, a s discussed below, we find that the $5,026 wa s improperly forf eited. C. M ot ion in Li m ine Fe rg uson challeng es the district c ourt’s ruling denying his r equest to e x clude the ba g g ie of marijuana and the c ash. He complains that there was nothi ng rele vant about a pe rsonal-use amount of marijuana

or $5,026 in assorted c oins and one- dollar, two-dollar , and five -dollar bills found in a water -coole r si zed plastic jar. The dist rict court acknow ledg ed that the marijuana was found a fter-13-

the tim e fr a me of

the c on sp ir a c y

and wa s o nly a sm all a mou

nt, bu t st a te d th a t “ F e rgus on ’s a c c e ss to t he mari jua na re ma ins re le va

nt t o th e c ha

rg e s a g a ins t hi m,” and

fu rt he r n ote d th a t la

rg e a mou nts
o f c as h ar e o ft en as s o ci at edwi t h dru g t ra ff i ck i n g. Relevant evidenc e is “ evidenc e having any tendenc y to make the e x istence of

any fac t that is o f c on seq uence to t

he de te rm inatio n o f t

he a c tio n mo re pr ob a

ble or le ss p ro ba

ble tha n it wo uld be without the evidenc e.” Fe d. R. Evid. 401. Evidence which is not rele vant is not admissible. F ed. R. Evid. 402. A district court’s evide ntiary ruling s as to rele vance and unfa ir prejudice are revie wed for a buse of discr etion. United States v. W hittingon , 455 F.3d 736, 738 ( 6th Cir. 2006). F ur the rm or e , a

n e rr on e ou s a dmi ssi on

of e vid e nc e that do e s n ot a ff e c t th e su bs tanti a l r ig hts of

a pa rt y is deemed ha

rmless. Id. (citations omitted). Fe rg uson cannot show any prejudice as to the marijuana , beca use the jury

returne d a spec ial verdic t finding him not g uilty of t he marijuana count. So any err or was harmless. The same is true for the c ash , gi v en t h e am ple evidenc e of F erguson’s g uilt. However , as for the ca sh, the lack of rele vance at trial is rele vant to the question of for feiture , as discussed be low. D. Suf fi ciency of the Evidence Fe rg uson argues that the evidenc e did not establish a conspirac y betwee n himself and t he drug deale rs that he supplied. He further complains that there was no pro o f t h at t h e substance he provided to Shanklin on Fe bruar y 1, 2006, was c ocaine

. A jur y ’s ve rd ic t will be up he ld if , “ a ft e r v ie wi ngthe e vid e nc e in t he lig ht m os t f

a vo ra ble to the prosec ution, any rational trier of fa ct could have found the e ssential elements of the crime be y ond
a re asonable doubt.” J

ac k so n v . V irg ini a , 443 U. S. 307 , 319 (1 97 9)

. Cir c ums tanti a l evi de nc e wi ll suffice , and “suc h evidenc e need not exclude ever y possible hy

pothesis except that of g uilt.” United-14-

States v. Jac kson , 55 F.3d 1219, 1225 (6th Cir. 1995). All infere nces a re dr awn in fa

vor of the jur

y ’s verdic t. United States v. Maliszewski , 161 F.3d 992, 1006 ( 6th Cir. 1998). To sustain a drug conspirac y conviction under

21 U.S.C. § 846, the gove rnment must prove bey ond a re asonable doubt that (1) there was an agr eeme nt to violate druglaws; (2) the defe ndant had knowledge of and intent to join the conspiracy ; and (3) he par ticipated in the conspira cy . United States v. Gardner , 488 F.3d 700, 710 ( 6th Cir. 2007). Shanklin testified that illega l drug dealingwas oc curr ing a t the barbe r shop. The c onspiracy started with mar ijuana and e scalated to coca ine and cra ck coca ine. Shanklin state d that he re ceive d
coca ine from F erguson on three oc casions–twice in J anuar y 2006 and on ce i n Fe bruar y 2006. Shanklin described how , on Fe bruar y 1, 2006, Fe rg uson instructed Shanklin to meet him at a pa rking lot to e xch ang e the c oc a ine tha t F e rgus on

wa s f ro nti nghim , a

nd to c a ll F e rgus on

a t a fri e nd ’s ho us e afte r Shanklin had obtained t h e m o n ey from an individual name d Der rick L ander . Surveillance
c a me ra s c a

ptu re d Sha nk lin ’s de liv e ry of the c oc a ine to L and e r, L and e r’ s de liv e ry of a bo x with $12,000 to Shanklin in return, and Shanklin’s deliver y of the box to Ferguson’s vehicle

. F ro m the me re fa c t tha t the bo x c on ta ine d a size a ble su m of mo ney , $12 ,0 00 , it c an e a sil y be infe rre d that Fe rg uson was paid f or coc aine a

nd not something e lse. I n fac t, a dea l er named An ton io Wi lso n te sti fi e d tha t Fe rgus on c ha

rg e d mor e fo r h is c oc a ine tha n o the r d e a le rs be c a

us e it was of a highe r quality

. Cox testified that Fe rg uson fronted him c ocaine with the understandingthat Cox would pay Fe rg uson once Cox sold the coca ine. And, the surveillanc e ca mera s in the barbe r shop re corde d a
conver sation betwee n Cox and Shanklin discussing F erguson as Cox ’s supplier. I n short, the evidenc e wa s sufficient to support the jury verdic ts on Counts 1 and 18.-15- E. Sentencing Disp arities At se nte nc ingthe Go ve rnme nt r e c omm e nd e d a se nte nc e of

thi rt y y e ars to l if

e imp ri so nme nt. The district c ourt questioned “whe ther Fe rg uson was the top ma n in the org anization.” The district
c ourt c on sid e re d th e se nte nc e s o f t he oth e r c od e fe nd ants in t he c a se, n oti ngtha

t th e ne xt low e st sentenc e imposed wa s 240 months for Colin Carpe nter. To avoid disparity betwee n the sentenc es of all the c odefe ndants, the district court g rante d Fergu s o n a variance , and sente nced him to 300 months (25 y ear s) in prison. Although the district court g rante d Fe rg uson a var iance , Fe rg uson claims that it was insufficient be cause the district court did not consider the possibilit y

that his codefen d ants might
rec eive se ntence reduc tions. Bec ause he failed to pr esent this issue below at any point, even af ter the dis tr ic t c ourt

a sk e d if the pa

rt ie s ha d any ob

je c tio ns to the se nte nc e imp os e d, we re vie w f or pla in
err or only

. See United States v. Vonne r , 5 16 F .3 d 3 82 , 3 85 -8 6 ( 6th Cir . 2 00 8) (e n b anc ); se e als o Un ite d S tat es v . B os tic , 371 F.3d 865, 871 ( 6th Cir. 2004). Plain error i s “( 1 ) er ror ( 2) that wa s ob vio us or c le ar, (3 ) that a ff e c te d de fe nd ant’ s su

bs tanti a l ri g hts and (4 ) that a ffected th e fa ir ne ss, integ rity , or public re putation of the judicial pr o ce ed ings.” Vonner , 516 F.3d at 386 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Specifica lly , Fe rg uson contends that the district cour t should have con s i dere d that his codefe ndants, who plea ded g uilty to c rac k coca ine offe nses, would be elig ible for a two-leve l reduc tion under the Sentencing Commi ssion’s r etroa ctive amendment to the Dr ug Quantity

Table in U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(c ). Howe ver, a s this C ourt has noted, “ [s] ubsection 3553(a )(6) is conce rned w ith national disparities among the many defe ndants wi th simi lar c riminal backg rounds convicte d of similar criminal conduc t.” United States v. Houston, 529 F.3d 743, 752 (6th Cir. 2008) (internal quotationRul e 32 .2 wa s ame nd e d o n D e c e mbe r 1, 2 00 9. Th e a me ndme nts do no t a ff e c t ou r a na ly sis 3 of this issue. I n fac t, the Advisory Commi ttee notes a dvise that the ame ndment to subdivisi on (a) “make s it clear that the indictment or information n ee d only provide g ener al notice that the g ov e rnme nt is se e kin g fo rf e iture , w ith ou t id e nti fy

ingthe sp e c if

ic pr op e rt y be ingso ug ht. ” F e d. R. Cr im. P. 3 2. 2, Ad

vis or y Com mit te e No te s to 20 09 Am e ndme nts
.

-16- marks and c itation omit ted), cert. de nied , 129 S. Ct. 2764 (2009). Thus, there was no err or, let alone plain err or, af

fec ting F erguon’s substantial rig hts.

F . Notice of Forfeiture Fe rg uson objects to the forfeiture of his interest in the $5,026, claiming that he did not
rec eive notice that it was subject to forfe iture. He also argues that there was no ne x us betwee n the cash a nd his drug crimes. 1. Notice Fe rg uson claims that he did not rec eive noti ce t h at the $5,026 was subjec t to forfe iture beca use the super seding indictment does not set it out specific ally

. This argument is raised f or the first time on appea l and re viewed f or plain er

ror only

. Fe dera l Rule of Criminal Proc edure 32.2(a) states that “[a] cour t must not e nter a judg ment of for feiture in a cr iminal procee ding unle ss the indictment or inform at i o n contains notice to the de fe nd ant t

hat th e g ov e rnme nt w ill seek th e forf e iture of pr op e rt y a s p art of any se nte nc e in
acc ordanc e with the applica ble statute.” F ed. R. Crim. P. 32.2(a). 3 Count 28 of t h e S u p er seding I ndictment meets this require ment. I t states that the United States soug ht f

orfe iture of “any

and all prope rty

constituting, or de rived fr om, proce eds [Fer g uson] obtained, dire ctly

or indirec tly , as a r esult of the said off enses.” Fur

thermore , it is obvi ous that Fe rg uson knew that the G overnme nt sought for feiture of the c ash. The Go v er n ment’s trial-17-

memorandum re sta t edt h i s i n t en t i o nt o o b t ai nfo rf ei tu re . P o s t -c o n v i ct i o n , Fe rgu s o nfi l eda d o cument entitled “Motion for Return of $5,026.” Fe rg uson’s relianc e on United States v. J ones , 502 F.3d 388 (6th Cir. 2007), i s misplaced. J on es involved the g overnme n t ’s attempt to forfe it real prope rty and a mobile home ba sed in part
on the de fe nd ant’ s inv olv e me nt in a c on sp ir a c y to dis tr ibute mari jua na . Th e ind ic tme nt s ou g ht t o forf eit simply “3.2 acr es of rea l pr operty in L aure l County , Kentucky .” This Court held th at the mob ile ho me on

the pr op e rt

y wa s not sub

je c t to fo rf

e iture be c a

us e it wa s not list e d in

the ind ic tme nt, and the g overnme nt failed to establish a ne x us betwee n the cr iminal activity ch ar ged i n the indictment and the re al prope rty
. Id. at 394. 2. Ne xus Pr op e rt y may be su bje c t to fo rf

e iture wh e n it

is t he dir e c t or

ind ir e c t pr oc e e ds of

the c ri me of convic tion. 21 U.S.C. § 853(a) (1). The property must bear a “sufficient nex us” or “ substantial
connec tion” to the underlying of fense

. Un ite d S

tat es v . S mi th , 966 F.2d 1045, 1055 ( 6th Cir. 1992). See also F e d. R. Cr im. P. 32 .2 (b )( 1) (s ta tin g that wh e n the g ov e rnme nt se e ks fo rf e iture of sp e c if ic proper ty , “the c ourt mu s t d et ermine w hether the g overnme nt has established the r equisite nexus b e t w e e nt h e p r o p e r

t y an d t h e o f f e n s e ” )

. T h e g o v e r

n m e n t h a s t h e b u r d e n o f p r o v i n g f o r f e i tu r e b y a preponde ranc e of the evidenc e. Jones , 5 02 F .3 d at 39 1; Sm ith , 966 F.2d a t 1052. Ne ith e r p art

y in thi s ca se re qu e ste d a jur y de te rm inatio n of fo rf

e iture duri ng tr ia l. A ft e r t

ri a l, but before sentenc ing, F erguson and his wife joint ly moved for a return of the ca sh seized from the Mt. L ebanon Roa d residenc e under Rule 41(g ) of the F eder al R ules of Criminal Procedur e. The court d en i ed t h i s motion and ordere d the forf eiture of the ca sh pursuant to 21 U.S.C. § 853(n).-18-

Howeve r, the for feiture was not di scussed at sentencingand wa s not included in the final judg ment
as re quired by

Rule 32.2(b)(4) of the F eder al Rules of Criminal Procedur e. I n their motion, the Fergusons noted that the Gove rnment did not produce any evidenc e duri ngthe su

pp re ssi on he ari ngor

a t tr ia l li nk ingthi s mo ne y to F e r g us on ’s dr

ug -t ra ff ic kin g a c tiv iti e s, and that the Gove rnment f ai l ed t o s ee k civil or criminal for feiture during trial. Rather, the Gover nment had expressed its intention to seek a fine ag ainst Fe rg uson in the exact amount of the seized cash. In response , the Gover nment conce ded that “due to oversig ht the United States did not
se e k a jur y ve rd ic t on the fo rf

e iture c ount, ” bu t cla ime d tha t the mon e y wa s n e ve rt

he le ss s ub je c t to criminal for feiture . The Gov er n m en t argued that it also had the r ight to re tain the money , as
e vid e nc e , unti l th e c on c lus ion o f t he c ri min a l pr oc e e din g . F ina lly , th e Go ve rnme nt r e ite ra te d it s intention to seek impositi on of a f ine in the amount of the se ized cash. The district cour

t denied the F ergusons’ motion without an evide ntiary hear ing a

nd sua sp on te or de re d th e se ize d mo ne y fo rf e ite d. Th e dis tr ic t c ourt

re a so ne d a s f

oll ow s: Th e P res ent ence I nv est igat io n R epo rtin di cat es t hat Ferguso n h as asse ts $ 10 ,5 00 . H is 2 0 0 5 i n co m e w as $ 1 2 , 0 0 0
. I t i s i n co n gru o u s t h at Fe rgu s o n wo u l d h av e su ch a l ar ge a mou nt o f c a shon

ha nd c on sid e ri nghis le ve l of inc ome and his ho ldi ng s. R ec o gn i z i n g t h at l ar ge q u an t i t i es o f ca s h ar e of t en as s o ci at ed wi t h dru g t ra ff i ck i n g, and co n sidering Fe rg uson’s convictions on Counts One and Eig hteen of the SupersedingI ndict m en t , this Court finds t hat the Gove rnment has e stablished the requisite nexus betwee n the $5,026 and the of fense

. The proble m w ith the district c ourt’s re asoning is that the Governme nt never actua lly soug ht fo rf e iture and the re fo re never off

ere d th e se argume nts and e vid e nc e in s up po rt . Ind e e d, the on ly rele vant evidenc e, presented by Fe rg uson at t he suppression hearing , established the lack of a ne xus. Spe c ia l A g e nt H ay es tes ti fi ed at the su pp re ssi on he ari ngthat th e a

pp ro xima te ly

$5 ,0 00 in c a sh-19-

dis c ov e re d at th e Mt. L e ba no n Ch ur c h Roa d re sid e nc e wa s in a pla sti c jug in the ma ste r b e dr oo m. F e rgus on ’s wi fe te sti fi e d th a t the mon e y wa s fr om savin g s and g if ts f ro m f a mil y me mbe rs . Sh e sa id sh e and F e rgus on ke pt i t in “ a pla sti c ov e rs ize d bott le that had a pla sti c top that wa s a ban k, ” wi th a slit in the top, and that it held “ones, twos and f ives and c hang e.” F erguson’s mother testified f or the def ense that “this was like a community jar, that they put one s, twos, fives in there a s they g ot them over a

bout a three t o fi v e-y ear

period.” Ag ent Hay es testified that the de nominations of the cash in the pla stic jug w ere not c onsistent with the quantities of coc aine F erguson was dea ling with.

Although the prese nce of a not insubstantial amount of ca sh could perha ps raise a n infere nce of illeg ality g iven Fe rg uson’s modest leg itimate income, the Gove rnment did not offe r any evidenc e to support such an infe renc e. I n stead, the undisputed swor n testimony

in the rec ord supported Fe rg uson’s alternative explanation for the money . The location of the m oney in the pigg y -bank- like plast ic ju g a n d th e s ma ll d e n o mi n a ti o n s o f c a s h , s a v e d o v e r a thr e e - y e ar p e r io d , s u g g e s t th a t the money was not obt ained by drug traff icking

. Fur

thermore , g iven the lac k of evide nce that Fer g uson
e ng a g e d in dr

ug tr a ff ic kin g ou t of

the Mt. L e ba

no n Ro a d r e sid e nc e , th e Go ve rnme nt w a s o bli g e d to produce some evidenc e linking the seized cash to F erguson’s drug -traf ficking activity . I n sum, then, the mon e y

wa s n ot p ro pe rl y

su bje c t to c ri min a l for fe iture be c a us e the Go ve rnme nt f

a ile d to me e t it s burden of establishing a

nexus between the se ized cash and F erguson’s convictions. We theref ore rever se t he dis trict court’s forfe iture of the cash and orde r it be re turned to the Fe rg usons beca

use the money

was both improper ly

seized and improper ly

forf eited. III. Conclusi on-20-

For the fo r e g o in g r e a s o n s , w e A F F I RM th e ju d g me n t o f c o n v ic ti o nan d

s e n te n c e , b ut REV ERS E the or de r o f f

or fe iture . Th e c a se is R EM AN DE D f or fu rt he r p ro c e e din g s c on sis te nt w ith this opini on.