J. S14044/20

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION – SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA :

:

IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

v. :

:

GRANT A. BARBOUR, : No. 2831 EDA 2019

:

 Appellant :

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered July 18, 2016,

in the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County

Criminal Division at No. CP-51-CR-0000350-2015

BEFORE: BOWES, J., KING, J., AND FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E.

MEMORANDUM BY FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E.: FILED JULY 22, 2020

Grant A. Barbour appeals from the July 18, 2016 judgment of sentence 

entered by the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County after appellant 

was convicted in a bench trial of attempted murder, aggravated assault, 

simple assault, terroristic threats, recklessly endangering another person

(“REAP”), and possession of an instrument of crime (“PIC”).

1

 The trial court 

sentenced appellant to an aggregate term of 181⁄2 to 40 years’ imprisonment. 

After careful review, we affirm.

The trial court set forth the following factual history:

On the evening of October 26, 2014[, appellant’s wife, 

Shneek Walker (“the victim”)] was at her mother’s 

home at 143 West Wyneva in the Germantown section 

of the city and county of Philadelphia. Appellant 

 

1 18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 901(a), 2702(a)(1), 2701(a), 2706(a), 2705, and 907(a), 

respectively.
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arrived to pick up [the victim] at or about 9:30 pm. 

[The victim,] who had previously taken Oxycodone, 

drove while appellant sat in the passenger seat. [The 

victim] drove toward I-76 Eastbound when the two 

began arguing. After reaching the highway, and while 

arguing, appellant got out of the car.[Footnote 1] 

After about ten minutes [he] returned to the car and 

[the victim] drove again.

[Footnote 1] [The victim] previously 

testified that she was driving at a speed 

of forty (40) miles per hour when 

appellant got out of the car.

Once [the victim] reached a driving speed of 

approximately fifty-five miles per hour, appellant 

stated that he would kill himself and then said “we’re 

both going to die tonight.” Quickly thereafter, 

appellant reached over and grabbed the steering 

wheel “and yank[ed] it toward the left.” The car 

struck the center-dividing wall and flipped over twice. 

EMS removed [the victim] from the car and 

transported her and appellant to the hospital. 

Appellant repeatedly apologized and told [the victim] 

to “just tell everybody that [she] lost control of the 

car.”

State Trooper Michelle Naab, Badge #11186, 

responded to the scene of the accident at or about 

10:00 pm. Appellant was out of the car and walking. 

Appellant told Trooper Naab he had been asleep at the 

time of the crash. After the vehicle was towed, 

Troopers Naab and Revak went to HUP (University of 

Pennsylvania Hospital) to conduct interviews. 

Trooper Naab spoke with appellant first, as [the 

victim] was not in stable condition until several hours 

later. Trooper Naab took statements from [the victim] 

at 3:00 [a.m.] immediately following the accident on 

October 27, 2014, and again on October 29, 201[4].

[The victim] was hospitalized from October 26, 2014 

until November 14, 2014. [The victim’s] injuries 

included a broken fibula, punctured spleen, crushed 
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ribs, fracture of her thoracic spine, and four plates and 

sixteen screws in her ankle. [The victim] was 

transferred from trauma to the ICU where she 

underwent two surgeries. [The victim] was 

discharged to rehab and required another surgery to 

remove the screws and plates from her ankle.

Upon his release from the hospital on October 27, 

2014, the morning following the accident, appellant 

was placed under arrest. . . .

. . . . 

While he was in custody awaiting trial, appellant made 

repeated phone calls to [the victim] while she was in 

the hospital and continued once she was discharged. 

Eight of the call recordings were played for trial, 

following proper authentication, without objection. 

Trial court opinion, 10/10/19 at 1-3 (citations to the record, footnotes, and 

extraneous capitalization omitted).

Following a bench trial, the trial court convicted appellant of the 

aforementioned crimes. On July 18, 2016, the trial court imposed sentence. 

Appellant filed a timely motion to reconsider sentence, which the trial court 

denied on July 26, 2016.

Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal. On August 2, 2018, this court 

dismissed appellant’s appeal for failure to file a brief. Commonwealth v. 

Barbour, No. 2785 EDA 2016, per curiam order (Pa.Super. filed Aug. 2,

2018). On September 7, 2018, appellant filed a petition pursuant to the Post 

Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”),

2 seeking reinstatement of his direct appeal

 

2 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-9546.
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rights nunc pro tunc. The trial court reinstated appellant’s direct appellate 

rights nunc pro tunc on October 23, 2018. This court quashed appellant’s 

appeal sua sponte on July 12, 2019, for failing to file a timely notice of 

appeal. Commonwealth v. Barbour, No. 3586 EDA 2018, per curiam order

(Pa.Super. filed July 12, 2019).

Appellant filed a PCRA petition on August 30, 2019, in which he sought 

reinstatement of his direct appeal rights nunc pro tunc. The trial court 

granted appellant’s petition on September 24, 2019, and appellant filed a 

notice of appeal that same day. The trial court did not order appellant to file 

a concise statement of errors complained of on appeal pursuant to 

Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b). On October 10, 2019, the trial court filed an opinion 

pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a).

Appellant raises the following issues for our review:3

[I.] Was the evidence insufficient to sustain the 

verdict?

[II.] Did the lower court abuse its discretion in 

allowing the Commonwealth to present 

evidence of recorded prison phone calls, where 

the evidence was not properly authenticated?

[III.] Did the lower court abuse its discretion in 

allowing the Commonwealth to present a 

transcript of recorded prison phone calls, 

where the transcript was inaccurate?

[IV.] Did the lower court abuse its discretion in 

allowing the Commonwealth to question the 

[victim] about prior inconsistent statements 

 

3 For ease of discussion, we have re-ordered appellant’s issues.
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made at a preliminary hearing where the 

prosecutor failed to establish that the [victim]

recalled making the prior statement and that 

the prior statement was correct?

[V.] Did the lower court err in allowing the 

Commonwealth to introduce prior written 

statement [sic] by [the victim] where [the 

victim] and the interrogating officer failed to 

establish the statements were taken in a 

reliable, verbatim manner?

[VI.] Did the prosecutor commit misconduct in her 

closing argument when she introduced 

evidence of other bad acts, where that 

evidence was irrelevant and highly prejudicial?

[VII.] Did the prosecutor commit misconduct in her 

closing argument when she stated that this 

case evidenced the cycle of domestic violence, 

where there was no testimony elicited 

regarding such cycle?

[VIII.] Was the verdict against the weight of the 

evidence?

[IX.] Did the lower court abuse its discretion by 

considering other bad acts of [appellant] that 

were not criminally charged in determining the 

sentence?

Appellant’s brief at 6-7.4

 

4 Preliminarily, we note that appellant failed to divide the argument section of 

his brief into as many parts as there are questions to be answered pursuant 

to Pa.R.A.P. 2119(a). We have the authority to dismiss appeals for failing to 

comply with the Rules of Appellate Procedure and will do so in cases where 

such a failure hinders our ability to conduct meaningful appellate review. 

In re R.D., 44 A.3d 657, 674 (Pa.Super. 2012), appeal denied, 56 A.3d 398 

(Pa. 2012), citing Commonwealth v. Hardy, 918 A.2d 766, 771 (Pa.Super. 

2007), appeal denied, 940 A.2d 362 (Pa. 2008); see also Pa.R.A.P. 2101 

(requiring that briefs conform with all material aspects of the relevant Rules 

of Appellate Procedure and granting appellate courts the power to quash or 
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I.

We will first address appellant’s sufficiency of the evidence issue, as a 

successful sufficiency of the evidence claim warrants a discharge of the 

pertinent crimes. Commonwealth v. Scott, 176 A.3d 283, 286 n.5 

(Pa.Super. 2017), quoting Commonwealth v. Torrito, 67 A.3d 29, 33 

(Pa.Super. 2013) (en banc), appeal denied, 80 A.3d 777 (Pa. 2013).5

When reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, we use the following 

standard:

As a general matter, our standard of 

review of sufficiency claims requires that 

we evaluate the record in the light most 

favorable to the verdict winner giving the 

prosecution the benefit of all reasonable 

inferences to be drawn from the evidence. 

Evidence will be deemed sufficient to 

support the verdict when it establishes 

each material element of the crime 

charged and the commission thereof by 

the accused, beyond a reasonable doubt. 

Nevertheless, the Commonwealth need 

 

dismiss appeals in cases where defects in the brief are substantial). Here, 

because our ability to conduct meaningful appellate review has not been 

hindered despite appellant’s violation of Rule 2119(a), we will not dismiss his 

appeal.

5 Both the Commonwealth and the trial court contend that appellant has 

waived this issue on appeal because he did not raise the particular theory of 

evidentiary insufficiency in his Rule 1925(b) statement that he now raises 

before this court. (See Commonwealth’s brief at 22; trial court opinion, 

10/10/19 at 14.) The trial court did not order appellant to file a Rule 1925(b) 

statement on this particular appeal. As noted by the trial court, however, 

“[a]ppellant filed identical [Rule] 1925(b) statements on April 2, 2018 and 

December 28, 2018 for each of the previous appeals.” (Id. at 9 n.14.) We, 

therefore, shall consider appellant’s sufficiency of the evidence claim on its 

merits.
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not establish guilt to a mathematical 

certainty. Any doubt about the 

defendant’s guilt is to be resolved by the 

fact finder unless the evidence is so weak 

and inconclusive that, as a matter of law, 

no probability of fact can be drawn from 

the combined circumstances.

The Commonwealth may sustain its 

burden by means of wholly circumstantial 

evidence. Accordingly, [t]he fact that the 

evidence establishing a defendant’s 

participation in a crime is circumstantial 

does not preclude a conviction where the 

evidence coupled with the reasonable 

inferences drawn therefrom overcomes 

the presumption of innocence. 

Significantly, we may not substitute our 

judgment for that of the fact finder; thus, 

so long as the evidence adduced, 

accepted in the light most favorable to the 

Commonwealth, demonstrates the 

respective elements of a defendant’s 

crimes beyond a reasonable doubt, the 

appellant’s convictions will be upheld.

Commonwealth v. Franklin, 69 A.3d 719, 722-23 

(Pa.Super. 2013) (internal quotations and citations 

omitted). Importantly, “the [fact finder], which 

passes upon the weight and credibility of each 

witness’s testimony, is free to believe all, part, or 

none of the evidence.” Commonwealth v. 

Ramtahal, [] 33 A.3d 602, 607 ([Pa.] 2011).

Commonwealth v. Sebolka, 205 A.3d 329, 336-337 (Pa.Super. 2019).

In his argument, appellant contends that the Commonwealth presented 

insufficient evidence because the evidence against him consisted of an 

uncorroborated hearsay statement of “a single witness who recanted those 

statements under oath at trial.” (Appellant’s brief at 17.) In support of his 
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argument, appellant cites to cases from Montana, Alaska, Missouri, Florida, 

and Utah. (See id. at 17-18 (citations omitted).)

Appellant specifically argues that “Pennsylvania jurisprudence is lacking 

on this issue[.]” (Appellant’s brief at 17.) Our case law belies this claim. 

Indeed, in Commonwealth v. Brown, 52 A.3d 1139 (Pa. 2012), our supreme

court held as follows:

[C]riminal convictions which rest only on prior 

inconsistent statements of witnesses who testify at 

trial do not constitute a deprivation of a defendant’s 

right to due process of law, as long as the prior 

inconsistent statements, taken as a whole, establish 

every element of the offense charged beyond a 

reasonable doubt, and the finder-of-fact could 

reasonably have relied upon them in arriving at its 

decision. Prior inconsistent statements, which meet 

the requirements for admissibility under Pennsylvania 

law,[Footnote 52] must, therefore, be considered by 

a reviewing court in the same manner as any other 

type of validly admitted evidence when determining if 

sufficient evidence exists to sustain a criminal 

conviction.

[Footnote 52] These requirements are 

that the witness who gave the prior 

inconsistent statement testify at trial and 

be subject to cross-examination regarding 

the statement, and, also, that the 

witness’s previous inconsistent statement 

was “given under oath subject to the 

penalty of perjury at a trial, hearing, or 

other proceeding, or in a deposition, or 

(b) is a writing signed and adopted by the 

declarant, or (c) is a verbatim 

contemporaneous recording of an oral 

statement.” Pa.R.E. 803.1(1).

Id. at 1171.
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We now turn to appellant’s specific claims pertaining to his convictions. 

Appellant challenges his convictions of attempted murder and aggravated 

assault, contending that the Commonwealth failed to establish beyond a 

reasonable doubt that appellant possessed the requisite intent to kill. 

(Appellant’s brief at 19-20.) Appellant further argues that the Commonwealth 

failed to establish that he possessed the requisite intent to cause serious 

bodily injury to warrant a conviction of aggravated assault. (Id. at 19.) 

“For a defendant to be found guilty of attempted 

murder, the Commonwealth must establish specific 

intent to kill.” Commonwealth v. Geathers, 847 

A.2d 730, 734 (Pa.Super. 2004). Therefore, “[i]f a 

person takes a substantial step toward the 

commission of a killing, with the specific intent in mind 

to commit such an act, he may be convicted of 

attempted murder.” In re R.D., 44 A.3d 657, 678 

(Pa.Super. 2012). “The Commonwealth may 

establish the mens rea required for first-degree 

murder, specific intent to kill, solely from 

circumstantial evidence.” Id.

Commonwealth v. Tucker, 143 A.3d 955, 964 (Pa.Super. 2016), appeal 

denied, 165 A.3d 895 (Pa. 2017). This court has also held that in cases where 

we determine that the Commonwealth has introduced sufficient evidence to 

warrant a conviction of attempted murder, sufficient evidence has also been 

introduced for the fact-finder to conclude that every element of aggravated 

assault has been proven beyond a reasonable doubt. Commonwealth v. 

Dale, 836 A.2d 150, 154-155 (Pa.Super. 2003) (citations omitted).

In the instant case, the Commonwealth established, through the victim’s 

January 12, 2015 preliminary hearing testimony that appellant, while sitting 
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in the passenger seat of a car driven by the victim at a speed of 55 miles per 

hour on Interstate 76 said, “we’re going to die tonight.” (Notes of testimony, 

5/20/16 at 29-30.) The evidence further established that five seconds after 

saying, “we’re going to die tonight,” appellant grabbed the steering wheel, 

causing the car to hit the dividing wall on Interstate 76 and flip over. (Id. at 

30-31.) As a result of the collision, the evidence reflects that the victim 

suffered a fracture of her thoracic spine, multiple fractures to her right ankle, 

and a lacerated spleen. (Id. at 68.)6

We find that, when viewed in the light most favorable to the 

Commonwealth, as verdict winner, the Commonwealth’s evidence establishes 

beyond a reasonable doubt that appellant took a substantial step toward killing 

the victim, with the intent to kill her, when he grabbed the steering wheel of 

the car the victim was driving. Tucker, 143 A.3d at 964. Because the 

Commonwealth established the elements of attempted murder beyond a 

reasonable doubt, we find that the Commonwealth also proved the elements 

of aggravated assault beyond a reasonable doubt. Dale, 836 A.2d at 

154-155. Accordingly, appellant’s sufficiency of the evidence claims are 

without merit.

 

6 Appellant concedes that the victim sustained serious bodily injury. 

(Appellant’s brief at 19 n.3.)
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II.

Appellant’s next four issues challenge evidentiary decisions by the trial 

court. Appellate review of the admission of evidence by the trial court is 

governed by the following standard of review:

In reviewing a trial court’s ruling on the 

admissibility of evidence, our standard of 

review is one of deference. It is firmly 

established, “questions concerning the 

admissibility of evidence lie within the 

sound discretion of the trial court, and [a 

reviewing court] will not reverse the 

court’s decision on such a question absent 

clear abuse of discretion.”

Commonwealth v. Baker, 963 A.2d 495, 503-504 

(citations omitted). Additionally,

[i]t is not sufficient to persuade the 

appellate court that it might have reached 

a different conclusion[;] it is necessary to 

show an actual abuse of the discretionary 

power. An abuse of discretion will not be 

found based on a mere error of judgment, 

but rather exists where the court has 

reached a conclusion [that] overrides or 

misapplies the law, or where the 

judgment exercised is manifestly 

unreasonable, or the result of partiality, 

prejudice, bias or ill-will.

Commonwealth v. Christine, [] 125 A.3d 394, 397 

([Pa.] 2015) (citations omitted).

Commonwealth v. Sweitzer, 177 A.3d 253, 260-261 (Pa.Super. 2017).

In his second issue, appellant alleges that the trial court “abused its 

discretion in permitting into evidence recorded prison phone calls without 

proper authentication.” (Appellant’s brief at 9.) The Commonwealth contends 
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that appellant has waived this issue on appeal. (Commonwealth’s brief at 

9-10.)

“The absence of a contemporaneous objection below 

constitutes a waiver of the claim on appeal.” 

Commonwealth v. Rodriguez, 174 A.3d 1130, 

1145 (Pa.Super. 2017) (citing Commonwealth v. 

Powell, [] 956 A.2d 406, 423 ([Pa.] 2008)). Our 

Supreme Court has stated:

[I]t is axiomatic that issues are preserved 

when objections are made timely to the 

error or offense. See Commonwealth v. 

May, [] 887 A.2d 750, 761 ([Pa.] 2005) 

(holding that an “absence of 

contemporaneous objections renders” an 

appellant’s claim waived); and 

Commonwealth v. Bruce, [] 916 A.2d 

657, 671 ([Pa. Super.] 2007), appeal 

denied, [] 932 A.2d 74 ([Pa.] 2007) 

(holding that a “failure to offer a timely 

and specific objection results in waiver of”

the claim). Therefore, we shall consider 

any issue waived where Appellant failed to 

assert a timely objection.

Commonwealth v. Baumhammers, [] 960 A.2d 59, 

73 ([Pa.] 2008).

Similarly, this Court has stated:

Our Pennsylvania Rules of Appellate 

Procedure and our case law provide the 

well-established requirements for 

preserving a claim for appellate review. It 

is axiomatic that “[i]ssues not raised in 

the lower court are waived and cannot be 

raised for the first time on appeal.”

Pa.R.A.P. 302(a). “The absence of a 

contemporaneous objection below 

constitutes a waiver” of the claim on 

appeal. Commonwealth v. Powell, [] 

956 A.2d 406, 423 ([Pa.] 2008); Tindall 
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v. Friedman, 970 A.2d 1159, 1174 

(Pa.Super. 2009) (“On appeal, we will not 

consider assignments of error that were 

not brought to the tribunal’s attention at 

a time at which the error could have been 

corrected or the alleged prejudice could 

have been mitigated.”) (citation 

omitted)[].

Rodriguez, 174 A.3d at 1144-45.

Commonwealth v. Smith, 213 A.3d 307, 309 (Pa.Super. 2019), appeal 

denied, 223 A.3d 1286 (Pa. 2020).

The certified record reflects that during its direct examination of the 

victim, the Commonwealth played recordings of prison telephone calls 

between appellant and the victim. (Notes of testimony, 5/20/16 at 35-38, 

41-47.) At no point did appellant raise an objection as to the authentication 

of the recordings. Therefore, we find that appellant has waived this issue on 

appeal.

Even if appellant had properly preserved this issue for appellate review, 

he would, nonetheless, not be entitled to relief. In order to properly 

authenticate evidence, the Pennsylvania Rules of Evidence require a 

proponent to “produce evidence sufficient to support a finding that the item is 

what the proponent claims it is.” Pa.R.E. 901(a). Rule 901 permits 

authentication by way of opinion about a voice. Pa.R.E. 901(b)(5). 

Specifically, Rule 901 states that the authentication requirement is satisfied

when the proponent presents “[a]n opinion identifying a person’s voice--

whether heard firsthand or through mechanical or electronic transmission or 
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recording--based on hearing the voice at any time under circumstances that 

connect it with the alleged speaker.” Id.

Here, the Commonwealth authenticated the evidence in question 

through the victim’s testimony. The victim was a party to each of the 

telephone calls, and as noted by the trial court, she identified both her voice 

and appellant’s voice. (Notes of testimony, 5/20/16 at 36-38, 41-43, 45-47; 

trial court opinion, 10/10/19 at 10-11.) Accordingly, the trial court did not 

abuse its discretion when it admitted the recordings at issue. Appellant’s 

second issue, therefore, would have been without merit.

III.

In his third issue, appellant complains that the trial court erred when it 

“accepted an inaccurate transcription of the purported calls.” (Appellant’s 

brief at 10.) Preliminarily, we note that the record reflects that appellant 

raised an objection to the use of the transcripts during the trial. (Notes of 

testimony, 5/20/16 at 39-40.) Specifically, appellant contended that the 

transcripts being introduced by the Commonwealth were “incomplete” and 

“poorly done.” (Id. at 40.) Upon appellant’s request, the trial court noted 

the transcripts were not controlling. (Id. at 39-40.)

Both the Commonwealth and the trial court state that the transcripts 

were not admitted into evidence. (See Commonwealth’s brief at 11-12; trial 

court opinion, 10/10/19 at 11.) The record belies this conclusion. Indeed, 

the transcripts at issue were identified at the trial as Commonwealth’s 
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Exhibits C-7, C-8, C-10, C-11, C-14, C-16, and C-17. (Notes of testimony, 

5/20/16 at 37, 38, 41, 42, 44, 46, and 47.) At the conclusion of its 

case-in-chief, the Commonwealth requested that Exhibits C-1 through C-22 

be admitted into evidence, and the trial court admitted the exhibits. (Id. at 

85-86.) In determining whether the trial court’s admission of the transcripts 

into evidence was in error, we find our supreme court’s decision in 

Commonwealth v. Bango, 742 A.2d 1070 (Pa. 1999), to be instructive.

In Bango, the defendant on was on trial for, inter alia, possession of 

a controlled substance with intent to deliver. Id. at 1071. As part of its 

case-in-chief, the Commonwealth played 53 tape-recorded conversations to 

the jury. Id. Before playing the recordings, the Commonwealth distributed 

transcripts of the conversations that were prepared by a Pennsylvania State 

Police trooper who testified as the tapes were being played. Id. After the 

Commonwealth’s case-in-chief, the trial court admitted the transcripts into 

evidence. Id. During deliberation, the trial court permitted the jury to review 

the recordings and corresponding transcripts, with the following instruction:

Again, and this is really important and I want to really 

stress this to you, in deliberations those transcripts 

are not the evidence. The evidence is the tapes and 

so that is what you should rely on and not the 

transcripts but I will send the transcripts out with you 

to help you identify what tape it is that you are looking 

for and listening to and guide you somewhat as to 

what you are hearing but again I can’t stress this 

strongly enough that the tapes themselves and what 

is on those tapes is the evidence that you should 

consider.
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Id. at 1072 (citation omitted).

Our supreme court held that because the trial court “took meticulous 

care” to ensure that the jury “understood that the transcripts were to be used 

only as guideposts and not as verbatim translations,” the trial court did not 

abuse its discretion. Id. at 1073. The court further concluded that the trial 

court’s decision “was grounded in common sense and allowed the jury to 

evaluate and weigh the evidence in an efficient and reliable manner.” Id.

Our analysis, however, cannot end here. Indeed, appellant contends 

that the trial court erred because “a defendant must also be afforded the 

opportunity to cross-examine the individual who prepared the transcript.” 

(Appellant’s brief at 10, citing Commonwealth v. Stetler, 431 A.2d 992, 998 

(Pa. 1981).) In Stetler, our supreme court held that the trial court did not 

err when it permitted a police officer to read transcripts to the jury that he 

prepared of emergency phone calls to the police. Id. The court based its 

reasoning on the fact that the defendant “was afforded full opportunity to 

cross-examine the officer who prepared and read the transcripts.” Id. Unlike 

the instant case, the defendant in Stetler did not dispute the completeness 

or the accuracy of the transcript read to the jury. Id.

Here, appellant was afforded no such opportunity on cross-examination, 

as the person who prepared the transcripts at issue was not identified at trial, 

and was therefore not subject to cross-examination by appellant. We find, 

however, that any error on the part of the trial court was harmless.
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Even where the trial court erroneously admitted 

evidence, this Court may still sustain the verdict if it 

finds the error harmless. See Commonwealth v. 

McClure, 144 A.3d 970, 975 (Pa.Super. 2016). An 

error is harmless only if it could not have contributed 

to the verdict. See id., at 975-976. This Court will 

find harmless error where the error did not prejudice 

the appellant, or the prejudice was de minimis. See 

Commonwealth v. Brown, [] 185 A.3d 316, 330 

([Pa.] 2018). Similarly, where “the properly admitted 

and uncontradicted evidence of guilt was so 

overwhelming and the prejudicial effect of the error 

was so insignificant by comparison that the error could 

not have contributed to the verdict,” we will deem the 

error harmless. Id. (citation omitted).

Commonwealth v. Akhmedov, 216 A.3d 307, 320 (Pa.Super. 2019) 

(en banc), appeal denied, 224 A.3d 364 (Pa. 2020). This court may find 

harmless error sua sponte, regardless of whether the parties raised the 

argument. Commonwealth v. Melvin, 103 A.3d 1, 20 (Pa.Super. 2014), 

citing Commonwealth v. Allshouse, 36 A.3d 163, 182 n.21 (Pa. 2012), 

cert. denied sub nom. Allshouse v. Pennsylvania, 569 U.S. 972 (2013).

Here, the record reflects that the trial court’s error did not prejudice 

appellant. Indeed, we find that the trial court in the instant case employed 

the same standard in its role as the fact-finder, as the jury was instructed by

the Bango trial court. See Bango, 742 A.2d at 1072. Specifically, the trial 

court stated on the record that the transcripts were not controlling and that 

“the exhibit is the tape because that has the voices[,]” and that the transcripts 

were only being used as an aid. (Notes of testimony, 5/20/16 at 39-41.) 

Accordingly, we find that any error on the part of the trial court in admitting 
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the transcripts into evidence was harmless and appellant’s third issue is 

without merit.

IV. & V.

In his fourth and fifth issues, appellant avers that the trial court erred 

when it permitted the Commonwealth to impeach the victim with her prior 

inconsistent statements from her preliminary hearing testimony and her 

written statements to the police after the victim, when testifying for the 

Commonwealth, stated that appellant “wasn’t trying to harm anyone or 

anything” when he grabbed the steering wheel. (Appellant’s brief at 11-12; 

notes of testimony, 5/20/16 at 14.) Appellant waives both of these issues on 

appeal, as he failed to preserve them for appellate review.

The record reflects that appellant initially objected to the 

Commonwealth’s use of the victim’s prior statements to the police before 

immediately withdrawing his objection. (Notes of testimony, 5/20/16 at 

18-19.) The record further reflects that appellant did not raise any objection 

pertaining to the victim’s preliminary hearing testimony. As noted by the trial 

court, “significant portions of [the victim’s] prior written statements and 

preliminary hearing testimony were read into the record.” (Trial court opinion, 

10/10/19 at 12, citing notes of testimony, 5/20/16 at 19-33 (footnote 

omitted).)

Even if appellant had properly preserved these issues for appellate 

review, he would, nonetheless, not be entitled to relief. On appeal, appellant 
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contends that the victim’s prior statements and testimony were admitted into 

evidence in violation of Pennsylvania Rule of Evidence 613 and that the 

statements were not sufficiently reliable. (Appellant’s brief at 12-13.)

Rule 613 governs the use of prior inconsistent statements for the 

purposes of impeaching a witness and provides, in relevant part:

(a) Witness’s Prior Inconsistent Statement to 

Impeach. A witness may be examined 

concerning a prior inconsistent statement made 

by the witness to impeach the witness’s 

credibility. The statement need not be shown 

or its contents disclosed to the witness at that 

time, but on request, the statement or contents 

must be shown or disclosed to an adverse 

party’s attorney.

(b) Extrinsic Evidence of a Witness’s Prior 

Inconsistent Statement. Unless the interests 

of justice otherwise require, extrinsic evidence 

of a witness’s prior inconsistent statement is 

admissible only if, during the examination of the 

witness,

(1) the statement, if written, is shown 

to, or if not written, its contents are 

disclosed to, the witness;

(2) the witness is given an opportunity 

to explain or deny the making of the 

statement; and

(3) an adverse party is given an 

opportunity to question the witness.

Pa.R.E. 613(a)-(b).

The use of prior inconsistent statements for the purpose of impeaching 

a witness, however, is not without limitation. In order for a statement to have 
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been adopted by a witness, the statement must be either given under oath at 

a formal legal proceeding, put in a writing signed and adopted by the witness, 

or the statement may be a contemporaneous verbatim recording of a witness’s 

statements. Brown, 52 A.3d at 1154 n.15, citing Commonwealth v. Lively, 

610 A.2d 7, 10 (Pa. 1992). 

Here, the statements in question were either put in a writing, signed,

and adopted by the victim, or were given under oath at a formal legal 

proceeding. Indeed, the record reflects that the statements the victim gave 

to the police were in her own handwriting and signed by the victim. (Notes of 

testimony, 5/20/16 at 17-33.) The record further reflects that the 

Commonwealth showed each of the statements to the witness, the witness 

had an opportunity to explain or deny the making of the statement when the 

Commonwealth asked the victim whether the statements contained her 

handwriting and signature, and appellant was given an opportunity to 

cross-examine the victim. (Id.) Accordingly, appellant’s Rule 613 claim is 

without merit.

Appellant next contends that the victim’s three written statements given 

to the police were unreliable. (Appellant’s brief at 12.) Specifically, appellant 

argues that “[s]tatements made by injured persons in a hospital setting must 

be considered ‘extremely suspect.’” (Id. at 13, citing Commonwealth v. 

Perry, 379 A.2d 545 (Pa. 1977); Commonwealth v. Grimes, 648 A.2d 538 
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(Pa.Super. 1994).) Both Perry and Grimes are readily distinguishable from 

the instant case.

In Perry, our supreme court noted that “[t]he legislature has recognized 

in [a civil context] that statements made by injured persons in a hospital 

setting raise very serious questions as to whether such statements should be 

recognized as valid by the law.” Perry, 379 A.2d at 547. The Perry court, 

however, was not reviewing the voluntariness of a witness’s statements; 

rather, the statement at issue was a confession made by a criminal 

defendant in the course of a police investigation. Id. at 546-547 (emphasis 

added). The court determined that the defendant, who was on a catheter

during the interview with the detective, complained of pain, and had pain 

medication withheld during the interview, did not render a voluntary 

confession. Id. at 547-548.

In Grimes, this court addressed the reliability of prior inconsistent 

statements given by a lay witness. The witness gave a written statement 

implicating the defendant to the police while he was under the influence of 

cocaine and alcohol. Grimes, 648 A.2d at 543. At trial, the witness recanted 

his previous statement and the Commonwealth sought to confront the witness 

with his previous inconsistent statement. Id. The trial court admitted the 

witness’s statement as substantive evidence. Id. On appeal, the defendant 

averred that the trial court erred when it admitted the witness’s statement as 

substantive evidence because the Commonwealth did not sufficiently validate 
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the reliability of the statement. Id. at 544. This court noted the when the 

witness in Grimes was first observed by the police, he had consumed so much 

cocaine and alcohol that he was unconscious and lying in his own vomit. Id. 

The court held that the admission of the witness’s statement “flies in the face 

of the reliability requirement announced in Lively, supra, . . . and will not be 

tolerated.” Grimes, 648 A.2d at 544.

In the instant case, appellant contends that the victim was under the 

influence of pain medication at the time she made her statements to the 

police; therefore, the trial court erred when it admitted her previous 

inconsistent statements as substantive evidence. (Appellant’s brief at 14.) 

The record reflects that the victim gave statements to the police on 

October 27, 2014, October 29, 2014, and November 7, 2014. (Notes of 

testimony, 5/20/16 at 20, 21, 24.) The record further reflects that the victim 

testified at the January 12, 2015 preliminary hearing. As noted by the 

Commonwealth, the victim’s three statements to the police, as well as her 

testimony at the preliminary hearing, were consistent. (See Commonwealth’s 

brief at 15-16; notes of testimony, 5/20/16 at 19-33.)

In his brief, appellant cites two instances in the victim’s trial testimony 

in which she indicates that on the night of the crash, she had taken pain 

medication and had received more pain medication at the hospital. 

(Appellant’s brief at 14, citing notes of testimony, 5/20/16 at 17, 57-58.) 

Appellant does not specifically allege that the victim was under the influence 
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of pain medication when she gave all three statements to the police and when 

she testified at the preliminary hearing. Rather, appellant speculates that due 

to the victim’s injuries, the fact that she underwent multiple surgeries, and 

due to her “physical condition and heavy dose of medication, her prior 

statements must be excluded as suspect, particularly when she herself 

disavows them on the stand.” (Appellant’s brief at 14, citing notes of 

testimony, 5/20/16 at 14.)

We find that the use of pain medication by the victim in this case does 

not rise to the level of impairment exhibited by the witness in Grimes. 

Indeed, the record reflects that the victim hand-wrote and signed all three of 

her statements to the police in the instant case. (Notes of testimony, 5/20/16 

at 18-24.) The victim’s testimony during the preliminary hearing, which took 

place months after the crash, was consistent with her statements to the police. 

Therefore, the trial court did not err when it admitted the victim’s prior 

inconsistent statements as substantive evidence, and appellant would not be 

entitled to relief.

VI. & VII.

In his sixth and seventh issues, appellant alleges two instances of 

prosecutorial misconduct during the Commonwealth’s closing argument. 

Specifically, appellant contends that the Commonwealth committed 

prosecutorial misconduct when its counsel introduced un-redacted exhibits of 

prior bad acts allegedly committed by appellant and by stating during its
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closing argument that appellant’s alleged conduct in this case “matched the 

cycle of domestic violence.” (Appellant’s brief at 14.)

We must first determine whether appellant has properly preserved this 

issue for appellate review. Our supreme court has held that in order to 

preserve a claim of prosecutorial misconduct for appellate review, a defendant 

must raise a contemporaneous objection before the trial court. 

Commonwealth v. Powell, 956 A.2d 406, 423 (Pa. 2008) (citations 

omitted), cert. denied sub nom. Powell v. Pennsylvania, 556 U.S. 1131 

(2009); Commonwealth v. Ali, 10 A.3d 282, 293 (Pa. 2010) (citations 

omitted).

We begin with appellant’s contention that the Commonwealth 

committed prosecutorial misconduct when it “provided to the trial court[ 

]exhibits in the form of the victim’s statements to the police that contained 

multiple references to prior assaults and threats allegedly committed against 

[the victim] by [a]ppellant.” (Appellant’s brief at 15, citing Exhibits C-1 and 

C-2.) The record reflects that counsel did not raise an objection to the 

admission of either exhibit. Accordingly, appellant’s claim is waived on appeal. 

Powell, 956 A.2d at 423.7

 

7 We note that it is unclear as to whether appellant is raising a claim of 

prosecutorial misconduct or a violation of the notice requirement pursuant to 

Pa.R.E. 404(b)(3) (requiring the Commonwealth to provide notice to 

defendant of intent to introduce evidence of defendant’s prior bad acts at 

trial). (See appellant’s brief at 14-15; Commonwealth’s brief at 17; trial court 

opinion, 10/10/19 at 12-13.) Because appellant framed his issue in his 

statement of questions presented as one of prosecutorial misconduct, we shall 
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Next, appellant claims that the Commonwealth committed prosecutorial 

misconduct when its counsel referred to a cycle of domestic violence during 

its closing argument. (Appellant’s brief at 16.) Appellant baldly claims that 

the Commonwealth’s remarks “caused the trial court to become biased and 

hostile towards [a]ppellant, rendering it impossible to render a fair and 

dispassionate verdict[,]” thereby entitling appellant to a new trial. (Id.)

Here, the record reflects that appellant failed to object to the 

Commonwealth’s reference to the “cycle of domestic violence” during the 

Commonwealth’s closing argument. Accordingly, appellant’s prosecutorial 

misconduct claim is waived on appeal. Powell, 956 A.2d at 423.

Even if appellant had preserved both prosecutorial misconduct claims 

for appellate review, his claims would be without merit. Our supreme court 

has held that in a bench trial, in order for a defendant to be entitled to relief 

on a prosecutorial misconduct claim, the defendant must, “demonstrate[] by 

the record that the verdict was indeed the product of” the prosecutor’s 

prejudicial remarks and comments. Commonwealth v. Harvey, 526 A.2d 

330, 333 (Pa. 1987). 

Based on our review of the record, we find that the trial court’s verdict 

was not the result of any prejudicial remarks or commentary on the part of 

 

analyze his issue under the standard of review for prosecutorial misconduct. 

We further note that appellant would not have been entitled to relief under 

Pa.R.E. 404(b)(3) because he failed to raise a contemporaneous objection at 

trial. See Smith, 213 A.3d at 309.
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the Commonwealth. Indeed, the trial court noted that it based its verdict on 

“testimony evidence and documentary evidence.” (Notes of testimony, 

5/20/16 at 98.) Accordingly, appellant did not meet his burden for 

establishing prosecutorial misconduct; therefore, his prosecutorial misconduct 

claims are without merit. 

VIII.

In his eighth issue, appellant avers that the verdict was against the 

weight of the evidence. Specifically, appellant alleges that “the 

Commonwealth was unable to produce any credible evidence that [a]ppellant 

acted intentionally to cause harm. Indeed, the trial court’s verdict relied 

entirely on unreliable hearsay and is therefore so weak as to ‘shock the 

conscience.’” (Appellant’s brief at 21.) Appellant’s weight of the evidence

claim is waived on appeal.

“[A] weight of the evidence claim must be preserved either in a 

post-sentence motion, by a written motion before sentencing, or orally prior 

to sentencing. Failure to properly preserve the claim will result in waiver, 

even if the trial court addresses the issue in its opinion.” Commonwealth v. 

Lofton, 57 A.3d 1270, 1273 (Pa.Super. 2012), appeal denied, 69 A.3d 601 

(Pa. 2013) (citation omitted); Pa.R.Crim.P. 607(A). Here, appellant failed to 

raise a weight of the evidence claim in a written motion before sentencing, 

nor did he orally raise the issue prior to sentencing. Appellant also failed to 
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include a weight claim in his motion to reconsider sentence. Accordingly, 

appellant waives his weight of the evidence claim on appeal.

Even if appellant had preserved his weight claim for appellate review, 

he would not be entitled to relief. 

The weight of the evidence is exclusively for the finder 

of fact, which is free to believe all, part, or none of the 

evidence, and to assess the credibility of the 

witnesses. Commonwealth v. Johnson, [] 668 A.2d 

97, 101 ([Pa.] 1995). . . . An appellate court cannot 

substitute its judgment for that of the [finder of fact] 

on issues of credibility. Commonwealth v. 

DeJesus, [] 860 A.2d 102, 107 ([Pa.] 2004).

Commonwealth v. Palo, 24 A.3d 1050, 1055 (Pa.Super. 2011), appeal 

denied, 34 A.3d 828 (Pa. 2011).

Here, appellant extends an invitation for us to reassess the fact-finder’s 

credibility determinations in his favor. (See appellant’s brief at 21.) This is 

an invitation that we must decline. Because we cannot substitute the 

fact-finder’s judgment on witness credibility with our own, we conclude that 

appellant’s weight claim is without merit. 

IX.

In his final issue, appellant raises a challenge to the sentence imposed 

by the trial court. Specifically, appellant contends that the trial court 

“improperly considered unindicted criminal activity in determining 

[a]ppellant’s sentence.” (Appellant’s brief at 21.) Here, appellant specifically 

raises a challenge to the discretionary aspects of his sentence. See 

Commonwealth v. Rhodes, 990 A.2d 732, 744 (Pa.Super. 2009), appeal 
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denied, 14 A.3d 827 (Pa. 2010) (determining that allegations of trial court 

considering matters not of record when imposing sentence raises discretionary 

aspects of sentence challenge).

Challenges to the discretionary aspects of sentence 

are not appealable as of right. Commonwealth v. 

Leatherby, 116 A.3d 73, 83 (Pa.Super. 2015). 

Rather, an appellant challenging the sentencing 

court’s discretion must invoke this Court’s jurisdiction 

by (1) filing a timely notice of appeal; (2) properly 

preserving the issue at sentencing or in a motion to 

reconsider and modify the sentence; (3) complying 

with Pa.R.A.P. 2119(f), which requires a separate 

section of the brief setting forth “a concise statement 

of the reasons relied upon for allowance of appeal with 

respect to the discretionary aspects of a sentence[;]”

and (4) presenting a substantial question that the 

sentence appealed from is not appropriate under the 

Sentencing Code. Id. (citation omitted).

“Objections to the discretionary aspects of a sentence 

are generally waived if they are not raised at the 

sentencing hearing or in a motion to modify the 

sentence imposed.” Commonwealth v. Griffin, 65 

A.3d 932, 935 (Pa.Super. 2013) (citation omitted). 

See also Commonwealth v. Cartrette, 83 A.3d 

1030, 1042-1043 (Pa.Super. 2013) (en banc) 

(concluding substantial question waived for failing to 

raise it at sentencing or in post-sentence motion); 

Commonwealth v. Tejada, 107 A.3d 788, 799

(Pa.Super. 2015) (observing the trial court must be 

given the opportunity to reconsider its sentence either 

at sentencing or in a post-sentence motion).

Commonwealth v. Padilla-Vargas, 204 A.3d 971, 975-976 (Pa.Super. 

2019).

Here, appellant filed a timely notice of appeal and filed a motion for 

reconsideration of sentence in which he alleged that the trial court imposed a 
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sentence outside of the guidelines for his conviction of attempted murder. 

(See appellant’s motion for reconsideration of sentence, 7/22/16 at 

unnumbered pages 1-2, ¶¶ 4-5.) The record reflects that appellant did not 

raise an oral objection at his sentencing hearing. On appeal, however, 

appellant contends that the trial court improperly considered facts not of 

record when imposing sentence. Accordingly, appellant has not preserved his 

discretionary aspects of sentence challenge, and we do not have jurisdiction 

to decide this issue on its merits.8 Padilla-Vargas, 204 A.3d at 975-976; 

see also Commonwealth v. Mann, 820 A.2d 788, 794 (Pa.Super. 2003), 

appeal denied, 831 A.2d 599 (Pa. 2003) (holding that failure to preserve a 

specific discretionary aspect of sentencing issue will result in waiver).

Judgment of sentence affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 7/22/2020

 

8

In its Rule 1925 opinion, the trial court states the sentencing issues raised 

related to the length of the sentence and the application of the deadly weapon 

enhancement. (Trial court opinion, 10/10/19 at 16-18.)