Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 71A05-1708-CT-1720 | February 28, 2018 Page 1 of 17

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT

Jennifer E. Davis

Garan Lucow Miller, PC

Merrillville, Indiana

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE

Charles P. Rice

Patrick D. Murphy

Murphy Rice, LLP

South Bend, Indiana

I N T H E

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

Grange Mutual Casualty Co., 

Mark Madejek, and Alice 

Blaisdell,1

Appellant-Defendants,

v.

Estate of Stephen P. Stetz, by 

Jeffrey and Dana Stetz, Personal 

Representatives,

Appellee-Plaintiff.

February 28, 2018

Court of Appeals Case No.

71A05-1708-CT-1720

Appeal from the

St. Joseph Circuit Court

The Honorable

John E. Broden, Judge

Trial Court Cause No.

71C01-1511-CT-420

Kirsch, Judge.

 

1 Although Mark Madejek and Alice Blaisdell are not parties to this appeal, we include them in the caption 

pursuant to Indiana Appellate Rule 17(A), providing that “[a] party of record in the trial court . . . shall be a 

party on appeal.”
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[1] Jeffrey and Dana Stetz, as Personal Representatives for the Estate of Stephen P. 

Stetz (together, “the Estate”) filed suit against Grange Mutual Casualty Co. 

(“Grange”) seeking coverage for their deceased son, Stephen P. Stetz 

(“Stephen”), who died from injuries he sustained after being hit, while a 

pedestrian, by an uninsured motorist. The Estate and Grange each filed a 

motion for summary judgment, and, after a hearing, the trial court granted the 

Estate’s motion, finding that Grange was liable for coverage. Grange appeals 

and raises the following restated issued: whether the trial court properly found 

that Stephen was a covered family member under his parents’ automobile 

policy and granted summary judgment in favor of the Estate and against 

Grange.

[2] We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[3] Jeffrey and Dana Stetz (“Parents”) are residents of Uniontown, Ohio. Stephen 

was born in 1988 in Michigan, and when he was six or seven years old, the 

family moved to Uniontown. Stephen graduated from high school in nearby 

Akron, Ohio, and he thereafter attended Holy Cross College in South Bend,

Indiana, graduating in 2012. After college, Stephen moved back to Parents’ 

home in Uniontown and obtained a job with North American Breweries, where 

he had an assigned sales territory in nearby Kent, Ohio. He lived and worked 

out of Parents’ home. In April or May 2014, Stephen obtained and began a 

new sales job with Chicago Beverage, headquartered in Chicago, Illinois. He 

signed a one-year lease on an apartment in the Lincoln Park area of Chicago,
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and when that expired, he signed a lease and moved to another apartment in 

the Chicago area. 

[4] In August 2015, Parents renewed their Personal Auto Policy Ohio (“the 

Policy”) with Grange, for the period of August 26, 2015 to February 26, 2016. 

Appellant’s App Vol. II at 82. The Declarations page identifies the Policy as a 

Family Auto policy type and identifies the named insured and address as: 

Jeffrey Stetz and Dana Stetz of “1889 White Chapel Cir NW Uniontown OH 

44685.” Id. The Policy listed and covered five vehicles, including a 2004

Honda Civic and a 2008 Honda Civic, and all five of the vehicles were owned 

by Parents, were registered in Ohio, and had Ohio license plates. The Policy’s 

Rating Information Page listed four drivers, namely Jeffrey, Dana, Stephen, 

and his older sister. Id. at 87. Stephen began driving the 2004 Civic when he 

was a senior in high school and continued driving it other than when it was 

being repaired, when he drove the 2008 Civic. Stephen did not own his own 

vehicle. 

[5] With regard to uninsured motorists coverage, the Policy provides in relevant 

part:

PART C – UNINSURED MOTORISTS COVERAGE 

(Includes Underinsured Motorists Coverage) 

Insuring Agreement 
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A. We will pay damages which an insured is legally entitled to 

recover from the owner or operator of an uninsured motor 

vehicle because of: 

1. Bodily Injury sustained by the insured and caused by an 

accident; and 

2. Property damage . . . 

The owner’s or operator’s liability for these damages must arise 

out of the ownership, maintenance, or use of the uninsured 

motor vehicle. . . . 

B. “Insured” as used in this Part means: 

1. You or any family member. 

2. Any family member who does not own a motor vehicle. 

3. Any other person while occupying your covered auto

with a reasonable belief that that person is entitled to do 

so, if that person is not insured for Uninsured Motorists 

Coverage under another policy.

Id. at 105. The Policy excludes uninsured coverage as follows: 

Exclusions

A. We do not provide Uninsured Motorists Coverage for bodily 

injury sustained by any person.

. . .
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6. When the person actually suffering the bodily injury, 

sickness, disease, or death is not an insured under the 

policy.

Id. at 106. The Policy provides the following relevant definitions:

DEFINITIONS

A. The terms defined below appear in bold type throughout this 

policy. You and Your refer to the named insured, which 

includes the individual named on the Declarations page or that 

person’s spouse if a resident of the same household. . . .

B. “We”, “us” and “our” refer to Grange Mutual Casualty 

Company.

. . . . 

F. “Family member” means a person related to you by blood, 

marriage or adoption and whose principal residence is at the 

location shown in the Declarations. If a court has adjudicated 

that one parent is the custodial parent, that adjudication shall be 

conclusive with respect to the minor child’s principal residence.

Id. at 97 (bold in original; emphasis added with underlining). The Policy does 

not define the words “principal” or “residence.” 

[6] On October 15, 2015, Stephen was in South Bend, and, as a pedestrian, he was 

struck by a vehicle driven by Mark Madejek (“Madejek”). Madejek was 

operating a vehicle owned by his mother, Alice Blaisdell (“Blaisdell”). Stephen 

died from his injuries on October 23, 2015. Madejek was uninsured, and 
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Blaisdell did not have any insurance that applied to the vehicle Madejek was 

driving. 

[7] Following his death, Parents opened an estate in the St. Joseph County probate 

court for the administration of the Estate.2 On November 20, 2015, the Estate 

filed suit in the St. Joseph Circuit Court against Madejek and Blaisdell for the 

wrongful death of Stephen, and it amended the complaint in February 2016 to 

add Grange as a defendant, seeking uninsured motorists coverage.

3

Id. at 16-20. 

More specifically, the Estate’s Complaint alleged that Stephen was an insured 

family member under the Policy. Grange’s Answer maintained that Stephen’s 

principal residence was in Chicago, Illinois at the time of his death, and, 

therefore, he did not meet the definition of insured family member under the

Policy and was not entitled to uninsured motorists coverage. Id. at 22-32.

[8] On August 24, 2016, the Estate filed its motion for summary judgment, arguing 

that Stephen was entitled to uninsured motorists coverage as a family member 

under the Policy. Id. at 38. The Estate designated evidence that Stephen, while 

in Chicago, drove a parent-owned car, which had Ohio license plates, he had 

an Ohio driver’s license with the Uniontown address, he had a key to the 

Uniontown house, and a garage door opener, he received some mail at the 

 

2

Steven was single, never having been married.

3 The Estate’s claim against Madejek and Blaisdell asserted negligence and intentional tort. In January 2016, 

the trial court entered a default judgment against Madejek and Blaisdell. That same month, Madejek pled 

guilty to felony charges of leaving the scene of an accident resulting in death of another person and driving 

while suspended resulting in death of another person. 
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Uniontown address, and he was registered to vote, and did vote, in Ohio. The 

designated evidence also showed that Stephen would visit “fairly often,” for 

holidays, vacations, to visit friends, with at most a stretch of a month or two of 

not coming back to Parents’ home, and he did not bring a duffel or suitcase 

with him when he came back because “he had everything that he needed,” 

including clothes, toiletries, and the like, and usually only brought things like 

his computer, coat, and gloves. Appellant’s App. Vol. II at 217, 221. He kept his 

local Key Bank account in Uniontown, and he did not do banking in Chicago, 

other than visits to an ATM. Parents still provided some financial support to 

Stephen for the period of time that he was in Chicago, as Mother co-signed on 

his two Chicago apartment leases, Parents paid his first and last month’s rent 

and the security deposits, and they bought furnishings for his apartments, and 

Stephen remained at all times on the family’s cell phone plan. He also 

continued to work with his accountant in Akron, Ohio and with his financial 

planner in Cuyahoga Falls, Ohio. In September 2015, Stephen was treated in 

Ohio by his long-time family doctor, and, while in Chicago, Stephen also 

continued to be under the care of his dentist in Ohio and his eye doctor in Ohio. 

Stephen told his mother and a long-time friend, Amy, of his plan and intent to 

return to the Stetz family home in Ohio after his work assignment in Chicago. 

A few weeks before he died, Stephen was at the Uniontown home and told his 

mother that he was considering leaving his job at Chicago Beverage and said, “I 

think I might want to come home.” Id. at 141. Stephen did not submit any 

change of address notification form that would forward his mail from 

Uniontown to Chicago. Id. at 143. 
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[9] On February 27, 2017, Grange filed a Combined Response that (1) opposed the 

Estate’s motion and (2) supported its own cross-motion for Summary 

Judgment. Grange did not assert that any material issue of fact precluded

summary judgment for the Estate. Rather, Grange asserted that no genuine 

issue of material fact precluded summary judgment in its favor. Id. at 62, 64, 

79. Grange’s position was that Stephen maintained his “principal residence” in 

Chicago and was, therefore, not an insured and was excluded from coverage

under the Policy. Grange designated evidence showing: Stephen was a college 

graduate; he had a full-time job in Chicago since April or May 2014 and was 

past the probationary period; he had an apartment in Chicago and was part-way 

through his second one-year lease; many of his bills, including utility bills, were 

mailed to his Chicago address; he paid his own rent and utilities; he saw a 

doctor in the Chicago area for a medical issue; and his obituary stated that he 

was living in Chicago at the time of his death, as did his Facebook page.

[10] After the Estate filed a reply and supplemental designation of evidence, the trial 

court held a hearing on the cross-motions for summary judgment on May 1, 

2017. The trial court issued an order (“Order”) on May 25, 2017.

4

 In it, the 

trial court observed: 

 

4 The trial court’s Order noted, “The legal issue before the Court was exceptionally well briefed and 

succinctly stated by the parties[.]” Appellant’s App. Vol. II at 9. We agree with the trial court in that regard, 

both as to briefing at the trial court level and, here, on appeal.
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It is clear to the Court that Stephen was “living” in Chicago at 

the time of his death. However, the language in the insurance 

policy in question does not reference where one is “living”, but 

rather the insurance policy employs the words “principal 

residence”. The word “residence” has always envisioned a great 

deal more than where one finds themselves living at any snapshot 

in time and its definition has vexed many courts, election boards, 

and auditor’s officers in making such determinations. Whether it 

be the graduate student, the Peace Corps volunteer, military 

personnel, or, in Stephen’s case, the young adult who is 

branching out on his own but certainly has yet to attain full 

independence, many people find themselves living in a particular 

physical place but they still maintain a primary or principal 

residence somewhere else, typically the place where they are 

from and intend to return.

Id. at 12. The trial court opined that Stephen’s situation “much more resembled 

a graduate student away at school than he did someone who has fully moved 

and relocated to a new city leaving his childhood home behind[,]” id. at 13, and 

it ultimately determined that Stephen was a principal resident of Parents’ home 

in Uniontown, Ohio and was entitled to coverage under the Policy’s uninsured 

motorists coverage. In reaching its decision, the court also considered the 

following:

Because Grange Insurance chose not to define the words 

“principal residence” in the Stetz’ family auto insurance policy, 

the term is implicitly ambiguous and capable of multiple different 

interpretations. Because of this ambiguity, under Ohio law, the 

language is to be strictly construed against Grange and liberally 

construed in favor of coverage for [the Estate]. [The Estate]

correctly points out the word residence has no fixed meaning 

under Ohio law. Further, adding the modifier “principal” in 

front of residence does not resolve the ambiguity. [The Estate]
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correctly points out the Black Law Dictionary definition of 

“principal” contains multiple definitions and these varying 

definitions are not all synonymous with each other. 

Id. at 14. The trial court granted the Estate’s motion and denied Grange’s 

motion. Thereafter, the Estate, with the agreement of Grange, filed an Indiana 

Trial Rule 54(B) Motion for Entry of Final Appealable Judgment as to the 

Order, which the trial court granted. Id. at 7, 228. Grange now appeals. 

Discussion and Decision

[11] When reviewing the grant of a summary judgment motion, we apply the same 

standard applicable to the trial court. Summary judgment is proper only when 

there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled 

to judgment as a matter of law. Ind. Trial Rule 56(C). We do not weigh the 

evidence, but will consider the facts in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Wagner v. Yates, 912 N.E.2d 805, 808 (Ind. 2009). If there are no 

genuine issues of material fact, we will affirm a summary judgment on any legal 

theory supported by the record. Matteson v. Citizens Ins. Co. of Am., 844 N.E.2d 

188, 192 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006).

[12] The parties agree that Ohio substantive law controls.5 Appellant’s Br. at 12;

Reply Br. at 6; Appellee’s Br. at 19. Under Ohio law, “The interpretation of an 

 

5 Grange is an Ohio corporation with its “Home Office” in Columbus, Ohio. Appellee’s App. Vol. II at 54. 

Parents are residents of Ohio, and they procured the Policy through an Ohio agency. The five vehicles listed 

in the Policy were registered in Ohio. The Policy is titled “Personal Auto Policy Ohio.” Id. at 23.
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automobile liability insurance policy presents a question of law that an 

appellate court reviews without deference to the trial court.” Wetzel v. AutoOwners Ins. Co., 60 N.E.3d 27, 29 (Ohio Ct. App. 2016), discretionary appeal not 

allowed. In construing terms of an insurance policy, the Ohio Supreme Court 

has explained:

When confronted with an issue of contractual interpretation, the 

role of a court is to give effect to the intent of the parties to the 

agreement. We examine the insurance contract as a whole and 

presume that the intent of the parties is reflected in the language 

used in the policy. We look to the plain and ordinary meaning of 

the language used in the policy unless another meaning is clearly 

apparent from the contents of the policy. When the language of 

a written contract is clear, a court may look no further than the 

writing itself to find the intent of the parties. 

Cincinnati Ins. Co. v. CPS Holdings, Inc., 875 N.E.2d 31, 33-34 (Ohio 2007) 

(citations and quotations omitted). As a matter of law, a contract is 

unambiguous if it can be given a definite legal meaning. Id. at 34. However, 

where provisions of a contract of insurance are reasonably susceptible of more 

than one interpretation, they will be construed strictly against the insurer and 

liberally in favor of the insured. Wetzel, 60 N.E.3d at 29. That is, in cases of 

ambiguities, policy terms will be construed in favor of coverage. Fahlbush v. 

Crum-Jones, 891 N.E.2d 1242, 1246 (Ohio Ct. App. 2008). This rule, however, 

will not be applied so as to provide an unreasonable interpretation of the words 

of the policy. Cincinnati Ins. Co., 875 N.E.2d at 34. Ambiguous words will be 

construed in favor of coverage “with greater force to language that purports to 
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limit or to qualify coverage.” Auto-Owners Ins. Co. v. Merillat, 854 N.E.2d 513,

518 (Ohio Ct. App. 2006) (quotations omitted). 

[13] In the present case, the relevant facts are not in dispute. Rather, the 

disagreement is whether Stephen was a “family member” under the terms of the 

Policy. The clause at issue provides, in relevant part:

F. “Family member” means a person related to you by blood, 

marriage or adoption and whose principal residence is at the 

location shown in the Declarations. 

Appellant’s App. Vol. II at 97 (underlining added). The location “shown in the 

Declarations” was the Uniontown Stetz home address. Thus, to determine the 

existence or non-existence of coverage, the inquiry is whether Stephen’s 

“principal residence” at the time of his death was in Chicago or was in 

Uniontown. 

[14] Grange argues on appeal that the trial court erred when it granted summary 

judgment for the Estate because Stephen’s “principal residence” was in Chicago 

and not at Parents’ Uniontown address. Grange urges that the relevant point in 

time is where Stephen was living at the time that he died, not where he was 

living before that point in time or where he planned to live at some later date. 

Grange urges that the designated evidence shows that, at the time of his 

passing, Stephen was living, working, and supporting himself in Chicago, first 

living in one apartment for a year, and then in another for part of a year, until 

the fatal accident. Thus, argues Grange, although Stephen was certainly 
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welcome at his Parents’ Uniontown home, his principal residence was his own 

dwelling in Chicago. The Estate maintains that the trial court’s decision, 

determining that the Estate was entitled to uninsured motorists coverage, was 

correct for a number of reasons, including that the term “principal residence” 

was ambiguous, such that the Policy should be construed against Grange. We 

agree with the Estate.6

[15] Here, the Policy does not define “residence,” nor does it define “principal.”7 

We acknowledge that the failure to define a term in an insurance policy does 

not automatically render the policy ambiguous. Fahlbush, 891 N.E.2d at 1246. 

A court must give undefined words used in an insurance contract their plain 

and ordinary meaning. Collins v. Auto-Owners Ins. Co., 80 N.E.3d 542, 548 

(Ohio Ct. App. 2017). However, provisions that are “reasonably susceptible of 

more than one interpretation” are ambiguous and “will be construed strictly 

against the insurer and liberally in favor of the insured.” Crabtree v. 21st Century 

Ins. Co., 892 N.E.2d 925, 928 (Ohio Ct. App. 2008). When a word is 

undefined, Ohio courts have directed that “we examine the common meaning 

 

6 The Estate also argues that the trial court’s decision was correct because (1) the undisputed facts establish 

that Stephen’s principal residence was in Uniontown, and (2) the premium charged was based in part on the 

number of rated drivers listed on the Policy’s “Rating Information Page” and Stephen was a “rated driver.” 

Because we find the ambiguity issue dispositive, we do not reach the other proffered arguments.

7

Compare Allstate Ins. Co. v. Eyster, 939 N.E.2d 1274, 1276 (Ohio Ct. App. 2010) (where policy defines 

“Resident” as “a person who physically resides in your household with the intention to continue residence 

there. . . . Your unmarried dependent children while temporarily away from home will be considered 

residents if they intend to resume residing in your household.”). 
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of the word and Ohio case law involving the language at issue.” Merillat, 854 

N.E.2d at 517. 

[16] With regard to the first undefined term, “principal,” the Ohio Supreme Court, 

in State ex rel. Kilburn v. Industrial Commission of Ohio, 438 N.E.2d 422, 423 (Ohio

1982), a worker’s compensation case, addressed the terms “principal 

business[,]” namely whether an employer’s “principal business” consisted of 

building and demolition work. In reaching its decision that the employer’s 

principal business was to supply water, and not to engage in building work, the 

Kilburn Court considered the definitions of “principal” found in Webster’s 

Third New International Dictionary and in Black’s Law Dictionary. Id. 

Webster’s defined “principal” as “most important, consequential, or 

influential” and Black’s Law Dictionary defined it as “[c]hief; leading; most 

important or considerable; primary; original.” Id. 

[17] Ohio courts have held the term “resident” has “no fixed meaning in the law.” 

See Merillat, 854 N.E.2d at 518 (stating “the term ‘resident’ has no fixed 

meaning in the law”); Entenman v. Auto-Owners Ins. Co., 737 N.E.2d 119, 124 

(Ohio Ct. App. 2000) (“The term ‘resident’ is not defined in the Auto-Owners 

insurance policy and has no fixed meaning in the law.”). The Estate urges that 

the appellate decision of Prudential Property & Casualty Insurance Co. v. Koby, 705 

N.E.2d 748 (Ohio Ct. App. 1997), discretionary appeal not allowed, is particularly 

relevant and applicable. We agree. 
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[18] In Koby, Edgar Koby Jr. (“Koby”) was a 32-year-old captain in the Army, 

stationed in Texas. Id. at 749. While visiting his parents’ home in Ohio, Koby 

was target shooting in his parents’ backyard, and he accidentally struck and 

injured another man, who filed suit against Koby and his parents. His parents’ 

Prudential homeowner’s policy provided coverage for the insured and 

“residents of your household.” Id. Prudential asserted that it had no duty to 

defend because Koby was not a resident in the household of his parents, but 

instead, “has his own residence in Texas, where he is stationed.” Id. The trial 

court entered summary judgment for Koby and against Prudential, and 

Prudential appealed. 

[19] The Ohio court of appeals ultimately affirmed the trial court’s grant of 

summary judgment for Koby, and, in analyzing the issue, the court initially 

observed that the term “resident” was not defined in the Prudential insurance 

contract. Id. The Koby court examined Black’s Law Dictionary’s definition: “a 

dweller, habitant or occupant; one who resides or dwells in a place for a period 

of more, or less, duration.” Id. at 750. The court next examined Ohio case law 

and stated:

The words “resident,” “residence” and “residing” have no 

precise, technical and fixed meaning applicable to all cases. 

“Residence” has many shades of meaning, from mere temporary 

presence to the most permanent abode. It is difficult to give an 

exact or even satisfactory definition of the term “resident,” as the 

term is flexible, elastic, slippery and somewhat ambiguous. * * * 

Definitions of “residence” include “a place of abode for more 

than a temporary period of time” and “a permanent and 

established home” and the definitions range between these two 
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extremes. This being the case, our courts have held that such 

terms should be given the broadest construction and that all who 

may be included, by any reasonable construction of such terms, 

within the coverage of an insurance policy using such terms, 

should be given its protection.

Id. at 750 (internal citation omitted). The Koby court opined, “The factual 

pattern of the case plays a significant role in determining whether one is a 

resident of a household.” Id. at 751. The Koby court recognized that Koby had 

a residence in Texas, was thirty-two, and was self-supporting, but also 

recognized that Koby regularly made visits to his parents’ home, and had other 

connections to his parents’ household, including his Ohio driver’s license, Ohio 

voting record, and his expressed intention to return to his parents’ home or area

after his enlistment term was completed. Given this fact scenario, the Koby

court found that Ohio’s dual residency rule was applicable. Id. at 752-53. After 

analyzing case authorities, “and construing the term ‘resident’ liberally and in 

favor of the insured,” the Koby court held that Koby qualified as a “resident” of 

his parents’ household for purposes of the Prudential policy. Id. at 753.

[20] As stated, a contract is unambiguous as a matter of law if it can be given a 

definite legal meaning. Cincinnati Ins. Co., 875 N.E.2d at 34. However, as the 

Koby court observed, the term residence has “shades of meaning” ranging from 

“a place of abode for more than a temporary period of time” to “a permanent 

and established home[.]” Id. at 750. Principal may mean “primary,” as Grange 

suggests, but it may also mean “most important, consequential, or influential” 

or “original.” Id. Accordingly, we find that the words principal residence 
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cannot be given “a definite legal meaning.” Id. Rather, the Policy’s undefined 

terms “principal residence” are reasonably susceptible to more than one 

interpretation, are ambiguous, and therefore must be construed against Grange 

and liberally in favor of coverage.

8

 The trial court did not err in finding that 

Stephen was a family member under the Policy and in granting summary 

judgment for the Estate and against Grange.

[21] Affirmed.

[22] Bailey, J., and Pyle, J., concur.

 

8 Even if we were to find that the language was not ambiguous, we find that the designated evidence 

demonstrates that Stephen’s principal residence was at the Uniontown address and that the Estate was 

entitled to summary judgment. “[T]he fact pattern of a particular case plays a significant role in determining 

whether an individual is a resident of a household,” and “Ohio courts usually examine several factors 

including ‘the amount of time the person spends at the household, the person’s age, the person’s intent, and 

whether the insured is ‘legally obligated’ to the person.’” Martin v. Wandling, 65 N.E.3d 103, 126 (Ohio Ct. 

App. 2016) (quoting Prudential Property & Cas. Co. v. Koby, 705 N.E.2d 748, 750-751 (1997)). Here, Stephen 

had been in Chicago for less than two years, Parents were continuing to help him financially, by co-signing 

for and furnishing his apartments, as well as providing him with a cell phone and a vehicle to drive, and 

Stephen had told his mother and a friend not long before he died of his intention to find a job and move back 

to Uniontown. Additionally, he visited Parents’ home with regularity, not going more than a month or two 

without coming back, and kept clothing and toiletries at the residence. He also did not change his driver’s 

license or voter registration from Ohio to Illinois.