COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 

Present: Judges Willis, Bumgardner and Agee 

Argued at Salem, Virginia 

THOMAS LEWIS BRADNER 

 MEMORANDUM OPINION* BY 

v. Record No. 2640-00-3 JUDGE RUDOLPH BUMGARDNER, III 

 OCTOBER 23, 2001 

COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 

FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF DANVILLE 

James F. Ingram, Judge 

 Jon Ian Davey (Law Office of Jon I. Davey, on 

brief), for appellant. 

 Leah A. Darron, Assistant Attorney General 

(Mark L. Earley, Attorney General, on brief), 

for appellee. 

 

* Pursuant to Code § 17.1-413, this opinion is not 

designated for publication.

The trial court convicted Thomas Lewis Bradner of robbery 

as a principal in the second degree in violation of Code 

§§ 18.2-58 and -18. On appeal he challenges the sufficiency of 

the evidence by contending he did not aid, abet, or act in 

concert nor do anything in furtherance of or to assist in the 

commission of the robbery. Finding no error, we affirm. 

Two armed men robbed Mama Possum's restaurant of $500 cash 

and fled on foot behind an adjacent shopping center. They left 

the area in a purple, four-door Ford. The police stopped a car 

matching that description shortly thereafter. The perpetrators, 
Linberg Wilson and Willie Woods, Jr., fled on foot, but were 

quickly apprehended. 

The defendant sat in the front passenger seat with his 

cousin, the driver. Two loaded pistols were on the rear 

floorboard behind the driver. A blue jersey, two skullcaps, and 

sunglasses, which matched items worn by the robbers, were either 

in the glove compartment or on the floorboard in front of the 

defendant. 

The defendant gave two irreconcilable, written statements 

to the police. First, he stated he did not know the 

perpetrators who were sweaty, out-of-breath hitchhikers that he 

and his cousin picked up shortly before the police stopped them. 

A few hours later, the defendant volunteered a different story. 

He stated that he was driving around with his cousin and Wilson, 

and they picked up Woods. The defendant knew Woods and Wilson 

were armed and intended to commit a robbery somewhere. Wilson 

and Woods asked the defendant and his cousin to stop the car and 

to wait for them. The defendant and his cousin waited for 

fifteen minutes behind a nearby strip shopping center. The 

defendant claimed he was scared but did not feel he could leave. 

The perpetrators ran to the car, jumped in pulling money from 

their pockets, and shouted, "Let's go." 

It is well settled that "'"[a] principal in the second 

degree is one not the perpetrator, but present, aiding and 

abetting the act done."'" Foster v. Commonwealth, 179 Va. 96, 

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99, 18 S.E.2d 314, 315-16 (1942) (citations omitted). Mere 

presence at the scene of a crime is insufficient. However, when 

the person present at the scene of a crime is "'"encouraging or 

inciting the same by words, gestures, looks, or signs, or who in 

any way, or by any means, countenances or approves the same is, 

in law, assumed to be an aider and abettor, and is liable as 

principal."'" Id. at 99, 18 S.E.2d at 316 (emphasis added) 

(citations omitted). See Jones v. Commonwealth, 208 Va. 370, 

373, 157 S.E.2d 907, 909 (1967). 

The facts of the present case parallel in all crucial 

respects those of Whitbeck v. Commonwealth, 210 Va. 324, 170 

S.E.2d 776 (1969). Whitbeck claimed he was present at, but did 

not assist in, the robbery. His two companions robbed a service 

station, returned to the car with two boxes, and put them on the 

front floorboard. The defendant claimed he slept on the 

backseat and never left the car, and he denied being a lookout. 

The trial court characterized Whitbeck's testimony as a 

"fantastic story," found that he was "present lending support," 

and convicted him as a principal. In affirming, the Supreme 

Court noted the defendant was at the scene of the crime, with 

others was found in possession of the tools and fruits of the 

crime, and gave an explanation of his presence and detachment 

from the crime that the trial court termed fantastic. Id. at 

326, 170 S.E.2d at 778. 

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The facts of Whitbeck contrast with those in Webb v. 

Commonwealth, 214 Va. 377, 200 S.E.2d 518 (1973). In Webb, the 

defendant was driving the get-away car when stopped shortly 

after a robbery. The defendant claimed he joined the 

perpetrators after the robbery but before being stopped, and he 

maintained he was not with them during the robbery. No evidence 

placed him at the scene of the robbery. The Supreme Court held 

his presence with the robbers as the driver of a vehicle seen at 

the robbery was suspicious, but the circumstances did not 

eliminate the defendant's claim he was not at the scene and not 

the get-away driver. 

In the present case, the defendant was with the 

perpetrators before and after the robbery. He knew their 

intentions, and at their request, he and his cousin waited out 

of sight but nearby while the robbery took place. Nothing 

suggests the defendant tried to dissuade the perpetrators from 

committing the crime, or tried to get out of the car during the 

fifteen minutes he waited for their return. The defendant drove 

off with the perpetrators and helped discard or conceal their 

identifying clothing. 

The defendant gave conflicting stories initially saying he 

did not know the perpetrators then acknowledging that he knew 

them, that they intended to rob some place, and that he waited 

for them during the robbery. The fact finder may accept or 

reject in whole or in part either party's account of the facts. 

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Pugliese v. Commonwealth, 16 Va. App. 82, 92, 428 S.E.2d 16, 24 

(1993). The defendant maintains he did nothing to aid the 

perpetrators and did not share their intent to commit a robbery, 

but "the fact finder is entitled to disbelieve the self-serving 

testimony of the accused and to conclude that the accused is 

lying to conceal his guilt." Marable v. Commonwealth, 27 Va. 

App. 505, 509-10, 500 S.E.2d 233, 235 (1998) (citation omitted). 

The defendant was not "merely present" as he maintains. 

When a defendant does nothing to discourage the commission of a 

crime, but is present with full knowledge of the perpetrator's 

intent, he "bolsters the perpetrator's resolve, lends 

countenance to the perpetrator's criminal intentions, and 

thereby aids and abets the actual perpetrator in the commission 

of the crime." Pugliese, 16 Va. App. at 94, 428 S.E.2d at 25. 

See Grant v. Commonwealth, 216 Va. 166, 168-69, 217 S.E.2d 806, 

808 (1975). 

The defendant knew the perpetrators were going to commit a 

robbery, he waited for them in the get-away vehicle to 

facilitate their escape, and during the escape he tried to hide 

the clothing worn during the robbery by placing it in the glove 

compartment or at his feet. A reasonable person could conclude 

the defendant shared the intent to commit a robbery. We 

conclude the evidence is sufficient to prove beyond a reasonable 

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doubt the defendant aided and abetted in the commission of a 

robbery. Accordingly, we affirm his conviction. 

Affirmed.

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