[Cite as Reeves v. Tait , 2022-Ohio-393.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT WASHINGTON COUNTY RUTH REEVES, : : Case No. 20CA38 Petitioner-Appellant, : : v. : DECISION AND JUDGMENT : ENTRY PAIGE TAIT, ET AL., : : Respondents-Appellees. : RELEASED: 02/02/2022 APPEARANCES: Laura A. Knab, Marietta, Ohio for Appellant. William L. Burton, Marietta, Ohio for Appellee.

Wilkin, J. {¶1} This is an appeal by petitioner-appellant, Ruth Reeves (“Reeves ”), from a Washington County Court of Common Pleas judgment entry t hat denied her petition for grandparent visitation rights due to a lack of standing. Reeves appeals asserting a single assignment of error: “[t]he trial co urt erred in finding Petitioner had no standing to petition the court for grandparen t visitation under R.C. 3109.12 with regard to minor child, [R.T.].” 1 There was no transcript of any proceeding from the trial court, so after reviewing the party’s arguments, trialcourt pleadings, and applicable law, we find that the trial cou rt did not err in denying Reeve’s petition. Therefore, we affirm the trial court ’s judgment entry

1 Reeves sought visitation of all three of her grandsons, R.T., J.T., and B.T., and the court found that she lacked standing to seek visitation of all three. Howe ver, her appeal addresses only R.T., so our decision is limited to him.Washington App. No. 20CA38 2 denying Reeve’s petition for lack of standing. BACKGROUND {¶2} Reeves is Paige Tait’s mother. Paige Tait (“Paige”) and Josep h Fields (“Joseph”) were married on November 5, 2013. On Novembe r 23, 2013, Paige gave birth to R.F. n.k.a. R .T. Approximately two years l ater, on September 13, 2015, Paige and Joseph divorced. Subsequent to her divorce , Paige married Kelly Tait (“Kelly”). During t heir marriage, Paige and Kelly h ad two sons, J.T and B.T, and Kelly adopted R.F. and changed his name to R.T. {¶3} As their maternal grandmother, Reeves filed a motion seeking visitation with her three grandsons pursuant to R.C. 3109.051(B ) and (C), and R.C. 3109.12. Appellees-respondents, Paige and Kelly, filed a response arguing that all three children “are now the children of a married coup le.” They claimed that “the biological mother [Paige] and her husband [Kelly] are joined in their effort to prevent [Reeves] further access to their children as a direct result of abusive and detrimental behavior on the part of [Reeves].” {¶4} The magistrate issued a decision that concluded that Reeves lac ked standing to seek visitation of her three grandchildren. The ma gistrate first determined that Reeves could not seek visitation under R.C. 310 9.051(B) because the “situational premise” of the statute - “divorce, di ssolution of marriage, legal separation, annulment, or child support proceed ing that involves a child” – “does not apply to the facts of this case.” The mag istrate also found R.C. 3109.12(A), which requires the mother of a child to be unm arried at the timeWashington App. No. 20CA38 3 she gives birth, did not apply because Paige was married at the time she gave birth to her three children. {¶5} Reeves objected to the magistra te’s decision. She acknowledged that Joseph was R.T.’s biological father, but claimed that beca use Paige and Joseph divorced and Kelly subsequently adopted the child, Josep h is no longer considered R.T.’s father for pur poses of this case. Rather, Re eves asserted that Paige’s current spouse, Kelly, who adopted R.T., is R.T.’s fath er. Therefore, Reeves argued because Paige was not married to Kelly when she g ave birth to R.T., Paige was unmarried for pu rposes of R.C. 3109.12. Thus, Reeves maintained that she had standing to file a petition seeking vis itation under that provision. {¶6} The trial court overruled Reeves ’ objections, find ing that R.C. 3109.051(B) was not applicable because the “Court no longer has jurisdiction over [R.T.], as he has been adopted by Kelly and the parental r ights of [R.T.’s] biological parent, Joseph, have been terminated, nor was he born to an unmarried woman .” (Emphasis added.) The court also found that neither J.T no r B.T. were born to an unmarried woman. Therefore, the court ove rruled Reeves’ objections and adopted the magist rate’s decision. It is this j udgment that Reeves appeals. ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN F INDING PETITIONER HAD NO STANDING TO PETITION THE COURT FOR GRANDPARENT VISITATION UNDER R.C. 3109.12 WITH REGARDS TO MINOR CHILD [R.T.].Washington App. No. 20CA38 4 {¶7} Reeves asserts that the stepparent adoption of R.T. “did not se ver the familial ties for the mother ’s family[,]” and therefore she has standing under R.C. 3109.12 to pursue visitation rights with her grandson, R.T ., citing Moore v. Strassel , 4th Dist. Pickaway No. 97CA32, 1998 WL 101354 (Feb. 26, 1998) . She acknowledges that “[i]f a child is born to an unmarried woman, the parents of the woman ... may file a complaint requesting the court ... to grant th em reasonable companionship or visitation rights with the child.” She claims that “[Kelly] Tait’s adoption broke any ties that the family of the natural father p reviously had to the minor child. * * * The adoption related back to birth and as s uch, Mr. Tait is the father listed on [R.T.’s] birth certificate.” Thus, Reeves arg ues that at the time of the child’s birth, Paige was not married to the person who is c urrently identified as R.T.’s father. Acco rdingly, Reeves maintains Paige was unma rried at the time that she gave birth to R.T., so Reeves has standing under R.C. 3109.12 to seek visitation with R.T. {¶8} In response, appellees argue that Reeves’ assertion that “[a]t the time of birth, the legal parents of [R.T.] were unmarried” - is incorrect. Appellees cite to a North Carolina court o rder that indicates Paige and J oseph were married at the time R.T. was born. Conse quently, appellees argue that Paige was not unmarried when she gave birth to R.T., which is a requirement u nder R.C. 3109.12(A) for a relative to pet ition for visitation. Accordin gly, appellees argue that the trial court did not err in holding that Reeves lacked standing to petition for visitation with R.T.Washington App. No. 20CA38 5

A. Standard of Review {¶9} Because standing is a question of law, we apply a de novo stand ard of review. Holiday Haven Members Assn. v. Paulson , 4th Dist. Hocking No. 13CA13, 2014-Ohio-3902, ¶ 13. “De novo appellate review means that we afford no deference to a trial court's decision and, instead, conduct our own, independent review of the evidence.” Id ., citing Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. Odita, 10th Dist. Franklin No. 13AP-663, 2014-Ohio-2540, ¶ 8. {¶10} “[G]randparents have no constitutional right of association wi th their grandchildren.” In re Martin , 68 Ohio St. 3d 250, 252, 626 N.E.2d 82 (1994), citing In re Schmidt , 25 Ohio St.3d 331, 336, 496 N.E.2d 952 (1986). Rather, the only right for grandparents to visit their grandchildren “must be provided for by statute, and that the Ohio statu tes allow visitation only if it is in the grandchildren’s best interest.” Id ., citing In re Whitaker, 36 Ohio St.3d 213, 217, 522 N.E.2d 563 (1988). “The General Assembly has authorized gr andparent visitation in three situations: (1) in divorce, dissolution, le gal separation, or annulment proceedings (R.C. 3109.051); (2) where the parent of the child is deceased (R.C. 3109.11); and (3) where the child is born to an unmarried mother * * * (R.C. 3109.12[A]).” (brackets sic.) Id . at 253, see also McFall v. Watson , 4th Dist. Vinton No. 8CA667, 2008-Ohio-5205, ¶ 12. “Grandpar ental visitation rights in Ohio do not vest until the occurrence of [ at least one these three] disruptive precipitating event[s]” occurs. In re Gibson , 61 Ohio St. 3d 168, 169, 573 N.E.2d 1074 (1991).Washington App. No. 20CA38 6 B. Analysis {¶11} Reeves’ complaint sought visitation under R.C. 3109.051, as wel l as R.C. 3109.12. The trial court found that Reeves lacked standin g under both provisions. However, on appeal, Reeves challenges the trial co urt’s interpretation of R.C. 3109.12 only. Accordingly, our analysis is limited to R.C. 3109.12, which states: (A) If a child is born to an unmarried woman, the parents of the woman and any relative of the woman may file a complaint requesting the court * * * to grant them reasonable * * * visit ation rights with the child. * * * (B) The court may grant the parenting time rights or companionship or visitation rights requested under division (A) of this section, if it determines that the granting of the parenti ng time rights or companionship or visitation rights is in the bes t interest of the child. * * *. The marriage or remarriage of the mother or father of a child does not affect the authority of the court under this section to grant the natural father reasonable parenting time rights or the parents or relatives of the natural father or the parents or relatives of the mother of the child reasonable companionship or visitation rights with respect to the child. (Emphasis added.) {¶12} Reeves acknowledges the “unmarried” requirement in R.C. 3109.12(B), but she asserts that “[t]he issue in this case is w hether the subsequent marriage of the parents of the minor child to each other interferes with the Court’s authority to grant reasonable companionship to relatives after marriage.” [Emphasis sic.] In effect, Reeves maintains the que stion is whether Paige was married to Kelly when she gave birth to R.T., and bec ause she wasWashington App. No. 20CA38 7 not, Paige was “unmarried” at the time that she gave birth to R .T. for purposes of R.C. 3109.12(A). We agree with Reeves that the “disruptive pre cipitating event” that determines whether Reeves has standing to seek visitation with R.T. is whether Paige was unmarried when she gave birth to R.T. Howeve r, we disagree with Reeves’ assertion that the question is whether Pa ige was married
to Kelly

. {¶13} “Under Ohio law, it is a cardinal rule that a court must first look to the language of the statute itself to determine the legislative intent.” In re Collier , 85 Ohio App. 3d 232, 237, 619 N.E.2d 503 (4th Dist. 1993), citi ng Shover v. Cordis Corp. , 61 Ohio St.3d 213, 218, 574 N.E.2d 457 (1991). “Courts shoul d give effect to the words of the statute and should not modify a n unambiguous statute by deleting or inserting words; that is, we have no aut hority to ignore the plain and unambiguous language of a statute under the guise of statutory interpretation.” State v. Clemons , 2013-Ohio-3415, 996 N.E.2d 507, ¶ 7 (4th Dist.), citing State v. McDonald, 4th Dist. Ross No. 04CA2806, 2005-Ohio-3503, ¶ 11. {¶14} “[T]he clear language of R.C. 3109.12, if a child is born to an unmarried mother, the grandparents may request visitation right s.” Moore v. Strassel , Pickaway No. 97 CA 32, 1998 WL 101354, *3 (Feb. 26, 1998). We find this language necessarily asks whether the woman was ma rried at the time that she gave birth to the child. At the time that Paige gave birth to R.T. she was still married to Joseph. Ther efore, for purposes of R.C. 3 109.12(A), Paige was not unmarried when she gave birth to R.T. Without the occu rrence of thatWashington App. No. 20CA38 8 disruptive precipitating event, Reeves lacked standing to seek visitation under R.C. 3109.12. {¶15} Contrary to Reeves’ argument, there are no words in R.C. 3109.1 2 that indicate that a woman’s marriage, subsequent to the birth of her child, relates back to date of the child’s birth for purposes of R.C. 3109.12(A). To accept Reeves’ argument that Paige’s subsequent marriage to Kel ly and his adoption of R.T. is the disruptive precipitating event changing Paige’s marital status at the time of R.T.’s birth would require us to insert w ords into R.C. 3109.12(A) that do not exist, whi ch is beyond our authority. O nly the General Assembly has the authority to enact, amend, or repeal l aws. City of Toledo v. State , 2018-Ohio-2358, 154 Ohio St. 3d 41, 47, 110 N.E.3d 1257, citing Article II, Sec tion 1, and Article III, Section 5 of the Ohio Constitution. {¶16} Our plain reading of R.C. 3109.12(A) is also consistent with its purpose, which “authorizes a parent of an unmarried woman t o seek visitation with a child born to her [because the] statute ‘reco gnizes that the * * * maternal * * * relatives of a child born to an unmarr ied mother often play a significant role in the care and upbringing of a c hild, which can be strained or severed as time progresses * * *.’ ” In re H.A ., 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 25832, 2013-Ohio-5457, ¶ 4, quoting Nicoson v. Hacker, 11th Dist. Lake No. 2000-L-213, 2001 WL 1602666, *2 (Dec. 14, 2001). {¶17} Therefore, we conclude that the plain language of R.C. 3109.12( A) requires that a mother be unmarried at the time she gives birth to a child as aWashington App. No. 20CA38 9 prerequisite to the mother’s parents seeking visitation with th eir grandchildren. Accordingly, the future event of divorce, remarriage and adopti on of the child are not relevant because what matters is the mother’s marital statu s at the time of the birth of the child. At the time Paige gave birth to R.T., she was married to her, now ex-husband, Joseph Fields. Consequently, because ther e was no disruptive, precipitating event (i.e., that Paige was not unmar ried at the time she gave birth to R.T.), Paige’s mother, Reeves, had no standing to seek visitation rights with R.T. under R.C. 3109.12. CONCLUSION {¶18} Because R.C. 3109.12(A) permits a mother’s parent or relatives to seek visitation with their daughter’s children only if the moth er is unmarried at the time of their birth, Reeves lacked standing to seek visitation with R.T. because Paige was married at the time she gave birth. Consequently, th e trial court did not err in denying Reeves’ motion for visitation due to a lack of standing. Therefore, we overrule Reeves’ assignment of error and affirm t he judgment of the trial court denying Reeves’ petition.

JUDGMENT AFFIRMED.Washington App. No. 20CA38 10

JUDGMENT ENTRY It is ordered that the JUDGMENT IS AFFIRMED and that appellant shall pay the costs. The Court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal. It is ordered that a special m andate issue out of this Court d irecting the Washington County Common Pleas Court to carry this judgment int o execution. A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pu rsuant to Rule 27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure. Smith, P.J. and Hess, J.: Concur in Judgment and Opinion.

For the Court,

BY: ____________________________ Kristy S. Wilkin, Judge

NOTICE TO COUNSEL Pursuant to Local Rule No. 14, t his document constitutes a fin al judgment entry and the time peri od for further appeal commences from the date of filing with the clerk.