J-S73019-16 

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37 

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA 

 Appellee 

v. 

DEVANTAE BENSON 

 Appellant No. 213 WDA 2016 

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence January 12, 2016 

In the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County 

Criminal Division at No(s): CP-02-CR-0009546-2015 

BEFORE: FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E., LAZARUS, J., and JENKINS, J. 

MEMORANDUM BY LAZARUS, J.: FILED NOVEMBER 1, 2016 

 Devantae Benson appeals from the judgment of sentence entered in 

the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County. After careful review, we 

affirm. 

Benson entered a guilty plea to one count each of Possession with 

Intent to Deliver (Heroin)1 and Conspiracy.2 The court sentenced Benson to 

one (1) year less one day to two (2) years less two days’ incarceration, 

followed by three years’ probation. After sentencing was pronounced, 

Benson orally sought to withdraw his plea, stating several times that he was 

____________________________________________ 

1

 35 P.S. § 780-113(a)(3). 

2

 18 Pa.C.S. § 903(c). 
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“confused” and did not understand what was going on. The trial court 

denied the motion. 

On appeal, Benson claims the court erred in denying his motion to 

withdraw. He argues that because “the plea was entered when Mr. Benson 

suffered from confusion from his mental illness” that his plea was not 

knowing or intelligent and, therefore, this established manifest injustice. 

We disagree. 

 There is no absolute right to withdraw a guilty plea, and the decision 

as to whether to allow a defendant to do so is a matter within the sound 

discretion of the trial court. Commonwealth v. Muhammad, 794 A.2d 378, 

382 (Pa. Super. 2002). After sentencing, “a showing of prejudice on the 

order of manifest injustice” is required before withdrawal is properly 

justified. Commonwealth v. Shaffer, 446 A.2d 591, 593 (Pa. 1982), 

quoting Commonwealth v. Starr. 301 A.2d 592, 595 (Pa. 1973). “[A] 

manifest injustice occurs when a plea is not tendered knowingly, 

intelligently, voluntarily, and understandingly.” Commonwealth v. Gunter, 

771 A.2d 767, 771 (Pa. 2001). In determining whether a plea is valid, the 

court must examine the totality of the circumstances surrounding the plea. 

Commonwealth v. Broaden, 980 A.2d 124, 129 (Pa. Super. 2009). 

Further, post-sentence motions for withdrawal are subject to higher scrutiny 

since courts strive to discourage the entry of guilty pleas as sentencingtesting devices. Commonwealth v. Kelly, 5 A.3d 370, 377 (Pa. Super. 

2010). 
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The Pennsylvania Rules of Criminal Procedure mandate pleas be 

taken in open court and require the court to conduct an on-therecord colloquy to ascertain whether a defendant is aware of his 

rights and the consequences of his plea. Under Rule 590, the 

court should confirm, inter alia, that a defendant understands: 

(1) the nature of the charges to which he is pleading guilty; (2) 

the factual basis for the plea; (3) he is giving up his right to trial 

by jury; (4) [] the presumption of innocence; (5) he is aware of 

the permissible ranges of sentences and fines possible; and (6) 

the court is not bound by the terms of the agreement unless the 

court accepts the plea. The reviewing Court will evaluate the 

adequacy of the plea colloquy and the voluntariness of the 

resulting plea by examining the totality of the circumstances 

surrounding the entry of that plea. 

Commonwealth v. Prendes, 97 A.3d 337, 352–53 (Pa. Super. 2014) 

(citations omitted). 

Thus, in order to establish manifest injustice, Benson must show that 

his guilty plea was not knowing, intelligent or voluntary. Here, the court 

conducted a guilty plea colloquy on January 12, 2016. The court asked 

Benson if he had taken any medications, drugs or alcohol in the last 24 

hours that would impair his ability to understand or respond to the court’s 

questions, or if he had any “mental illness, mental infirmity and/or physical 

infirmity that would impair” his ability to understand or respond to the 

court’s questions. Benson replied, “No, Your Honor.” N.T. Guilty Plea and 

Sentencing, 1/12/16, at 5-6. 

Benson acknowledged that he faced a maximum sentence of 15 years 

imprisonment and/or a fine of $250,000 for each offense. Id. at 6-7. 

Additionally, Benson signed an eleven-page guilty plea colloquy form, 

initialed each page of the form, stated that he had read each question and 
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understood each question, and stated that he answered the questions 

“honestly and truthfully.” Id. at 7-8. 

 At the conclusion of the recitation of the facts that the Commonwealth 

was prepared to prove (undercover officers conducted a controlled buy of 

$120 worth of heroin), Benson stated that he was entering his guilty plea 

because he was, in fact, guilty. Id. at 10. The court proceeded immediately 

to sentencing. 

The court sentenced Benson to a county sentence of imprisonment of 

one (1) year less one day to two (2) years less two days. The court 

specifically noted it was “going below the mitigated range,” id. at 23, in light 

of the fact that Benson’s counsel informed the court that Benson had several 

mental health diagnoses (bipolar disorder, depression, anxiety and posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD)). Id. at 15. The court also sentenced 

below the mitigated range to accommodate Benson’s release after 

incarceration to a mental health/substance abuse community related 

rehabilitation program. Id. at 15-16, 23-24. 

As indicated above, Benson fully participated in a verbal and written 

colloquy and was represented by counsel throughout the plea proceedings. 

The court conducted a thorough colloquy and went out of its way to 

accommodate Benson with respect to his mental health issues. Benson 

admitted his guilt and acknowledged his understanding that he faced a 

sentence of up to fifteen years’ imprisonment on each count. It was only 
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after the court had pronounced the sentenced that Benson stated he was 

confused. 

Before withdrawal of guilty plea after sentencing is justified, some 

demonstration must be made that the plea was not voluntary or that the 

plea was entered without knowledge of the charge such that refusing to 

allow the petitioner to withdraw his plea would amount to a manifest 

injustice. Commonwealth v. Shaffer, 446 A.2d 591 (Pa. 1982). Benson 

has made no such showing. If a plea of guilty could be retracted with ease 

after sentencing, the accused might be encouraged to plead guilty to test 

the weight of potential punishment, and withdraw the plea if the sentence 

were unexpectedly severe. Starr, supra. Further, this Court has held that 

“a person who elects to plead guilty is bound by the statements he makes in 

open court while under oath and he may not later assert grounds for 

withdrawing the plea which contradict the statements he made at his plea.” 

Commonwealth v. Turetsky, 925 A.2d 876, 880 (Pa. Super. 2007), citing

Commonwealth v. Stork, 737 A.2d 789, 790-91 (Pa. Super. 1999). 

Here, there is no indication in the record before us that Benson’s 

counseled written and oral pleas were involuntary. There is nothing in the 

record prior to sentencing that indicates Benson was confused about 

anything. It was only after pronouncement of sentence that Benson claimed 

confusion. Benson’s post-sentence assertion that his guilty plea was 

unknowing, unintelligent or involuntary is refuted by the record and, 
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therefore, we discern no manifest injustice that would permit him to 

withdraw it. 

Judgment of sentence affirmed. 

Judgment Entered. 

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq. 

Prothonotary 

Date: 11/1/2016