J-S46010-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

v.

SHARON LEE BLACK 

Appellant

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 1480 WDA 2022

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered October 17, 2022

In the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County Criminal Division at 

No(s): CP-02-CR-0007975-2021

BEFORE: DUBOW, J., MURRAY, J., and SULLIVAN, J.

MEMORANDUM BY DUBOW, J.: FILED: May 7, 2024

Sharon Lee Black (“Appellant”) appeals from the judgment of sentence 

of 90 days’ electronic home monitoring followed by a term of 28 months’ 

probation entered after the court found her guilty of two counts of Driving 

Under Influence of Controlled Substance (“DUI”) and one count of Careless 

Driving.1 She challenges the denial of her suppression motion and the 

sufficiency of the evidence supporting one of her DUI convictions. After careful 

review, we affirm.

The trial court set forth the following factual and procedural history of 

the case, which is supported by the record.

On April 16, 2021, Officer Paris Johnson, Sr.,[] was working 

“Shaler School District Crossing Detail” for children at 7:00 a.m. 

when he observed a Ford Escape come to a complete stop in the 

middle of the intersection at a solid red light. He observed that 

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1 75 Pa.C.S. §§ 3802(d)(1), 3802(d)(2), and 3714(a), respectively. 
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the vehicle’s headlights were on and the brake lights were 

engaged displaying a solid red, which indicated the vehicle was 

still in drive[].

Officer Johnson approached the vehicle and observed the driver’s 

head was tilted forward toward the steering wheel and that she 

appeared to be unresponsive, which prompted him to call County 

Dispatch. As Officer Johnson walked to the rear of the vehicle in 

order to provide Dispatch the defendant’s license plate 

information, the driver, later identified as Sharon Black, 

attempted to drive off, almost striking the vehicle facing the 

opposite direction in the left lane[].

The Officer made contact with the defendant who stated that she 

was on her way home from working a 12-hour shift and had 

stopped at the methadone clinic. Ms. Black informed the officer 

that she is prescribed methadone and takes her dose at the clinic. 

While speaking with the defendant[,] the officer observed that the 

defendant’s speech was slowed and her mannerisms and 

movement were slow. Ms. Black advised that this was from 

working a 12 hour shift[].

Shortly thereafter, Ross/West View EMS responded to the scene 

to assess Ms. Black’s wellbeing[,] and no further medical issues 

were discovered[]. Officer Johnson then requested Ms. Black to 

submit to standardized field sobriety tests, to which she agreed. 

The tests administered were the walk-and-turn and the one-leg 

stand, both of which were conducted on a flat, leveled sidewalk, 

free of any debris[]. During the walk-and-turn, Ms. Black was 

observed not to touch heel-to-toe on several steps and did not 

follow the instructions of pivoting properly in her turn around. 

During the one-leg-stand, Ms. Black was unable to keep her foot 

elevated and placed her foot on the ground to re-evaluate three 

times[].

Officer Johnson testified that based upon his training and 

experience, all of the above indicated that Ms. Black showed signs 

of impairment that rendered her incapable of safely operating a 

motor vehicle[]. Officer Johnson then placed Ms. Black under 

arrest for suspicion of DUI. Officer Johnson read Ms. Black the

DL-26B form[,] and she agreed to undergo a chemical blood test 

and signed the form. The Allegheny County lab report was 

entered into evidence as Commonwealth Exhibit 1. The report of 

Ms. Black’s blood test was positive for methadone and marijuana.
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Trial Ct. Op., 2/28/23, at 1-3 (unpaginated).

On December 10, 2021, the Commonwealth charged Appellant with, 

inter alia, the above charges. On January 27, 2022, Appellant filed a motion 

to suppress her blood test results, asserting that her arrest following the field 

sobriety tests was not supported by probable cause. The court held a hearing 

on May 26, 2022, during which Officer Johnson testified in conformance with 

the above facts. Following counsels’ arguments, the court denied Appellant’s

suppression motion.

Appellant’s non-jury trial proceeded on June 23, 2022. The parties 

stipulated to the admission of Officer Johnson’s suppression hearing testimony

because he was unavailable to testify the day of trial. The parties also 

stipulated to the admission of the lab report indicating the presence of 

cannabinoids and methadone in Appellant’s blood sample. The 

Commonwealth presented no further evidence.

Appellant’s supervisor at her place of employment testified on 

Appellant’s behalf as to Appellant’s demeanor during her overnight shift just 

prior to the incident, stating that Appellant appeared sober and coherent. Per 

stipulation, the court admitted a document from Summit Treatment Services 

indicating Appellant received a scheduled dose of methadone at 5:45 a.m. the 
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morning of the incident.

2 Following argument from counsel, the court took 

the matter under advisement. 

On June 30, 2022, the court delivered its verdict in open court, finding 

Appellant guilty of the above offenses. The court continued the matter for 

sentencing pending the completion of a presentence investigation report. 

On October 17, 2022, the court sentenced Appellant on the violation of 

Section 3801(d)(1) as a second offense to 90 days’ probation with restrictive 

conditions (ankle monitor). The court imposed no penalties on Appellant’s 

remaining convictions.

Appellant filed a timely appeal. She raises the following issues for our 

review:

1. Should Appellant’s pretrial motion to suppress the blood test 

result evidence in her 75 Pa.C.S. § 3802(d)(1-2) prosecution 

have been suppressed, given the Commonwealth’s failure to 

establish that probable cause existed to arrest her for the crime 

of driving while under the influence of a controlled substance?

2. Should Appellant’s conviction for having violated 75 Pa.C.S. 

§ 3802(d)(2) be vacated on grounds of insufficient evidence 

given the Commonwealth’s failure to establish that it was her 

consumption of marijuana and methadone, rather than some 

other circumstance (such as extreme fatigue), that rendered 

her unable to safely drive an automobile?

Appellant’s Br. at 4.

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2 The parties also stipulated to the admission of a letter from an employee at 

a medical facility indicating Appellant was in treatment as of March 2021 and 

had been diagnosed with bipolar disorder and posttraumatic stress disorder. 
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A.

Appellant first argues that the evidence obtained from the blood draw 

should be suppressed because “probable cause to arrest her for having 

violated Pennsylvania’s [DUI] statute, 75 Pa.C.S. § 3802, did not exist in her 

case; instead, she should have been issued a ticket for careless driving, and 

permitted to proceed on her way.” Appellant’s Br. at 15. In support, Appellant 

challenges the officer’s observations of her performance on the field sobriety 

tests and asserts that there are other plausible explanations for her poor 

performance. Id. at 19-23. She states that the fact that she did not stagger 

or fall over during the heel-to-toe walk and one-legged stand indicates that 

the officer’s conclusion was based on “trivial failure on her part” and that the 

officer arrested her only on a “hunch that [she] had consumed drugs.” Id. at 

24. She concludes that the totality of the circumstances, viewed from the 

perspective of “an objective reasonable police officer,” does not support a 

finding of probable cause to support her arrest. Id. at 24. We disagree.

Standard of Review

We review the trial court’s decision to deny a motion to suppress to 

determine “whether the suppression court’s factual findings are supported by 

the record and whether the legal conclusions drawn from those facts are 

correct.” Commonwealth v. Freeman, 150 A.3d 32, 34 (Pa. Super. 2016)

(citation omitted). “Because the Commonwealth prevailed before the 

suppression court, we may consider only the evidence of the Commonwealth 
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and so much of the evidence for the defense as remains uncontradicted when 

read in the context of the record as a whole.” Id. “Our scope of review of 

suppression rulings includes only the suppression hearing record and excludes 

evidence elicited at trial.” Commonwealth v. Yandamuri, 159 A.3d 503, 

516 (Pa. 2017).

We are highly deferential to the suppression court’s factual findings and 

credibility determination. See Commonwealth v. Batista, 219 A.3d 1199, 

1206 (Pa. Super. 2019). “It is within the suppression court’s sole province as 

factfinder to pass on the credibility of witnesses and the weight to be given to 

their testimony. The suppression court is free to believe all, some or none of 

the evidence presented at the suppression hearing.” Commonwealth v. 

Elmobdy, 823 A.2d 180, 183 (Pa. Super. 2003). “[I]f the record supports 

the suppression court’s findings, we may not substitute our own findings.” 

Bastista, 219 A.3d at 1206 (citation omitted). However, we “give no 

deference to the suppression court’s legal conclusions” and review them de 

novo. Id. (citation omitted).

*

The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article 1, 

Section 8 of our state Constitution “protect citizens from unreasonable 

searches and seizures.” In re D.M., 781 A.2d 1161, 1163 (Pa. 2001). “To 

secure the right of citizens to be free from . . . [unreasonable searches and 

seizures], courts in Pennsylvania require law enforcement officers to 
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demonstrate ascending levels of suspicion to justify their interactions with 

citizens as those interactions become more intrusive.” Commonwealth v.

Beasley, 761 A.2d 621, 624 (Pa. Super. 2000). Our Supreme Court has 

defined three levels of interaction between citizens and police officers: (1) 

mere encounter, (2) investigative detention, and (3) custodial detention. 

The first of these is a “mere encounter” (or request for 

information) which need not be supported by any level of 

suspicion, but carries no official compulsion to stop or to respond. 

The second, an “investigative detention” must be supported by a 

reasonable suspicion; it subjects a suspect to a stop and a period 

of detention, but does not involve such coercive conditions as to 

constitute the functional equivalent of an arrest. Finally, an arrest 

or “custodial detention” must be supported by probable cause.

Commonwealth v. Ranson, 103 A.3d 73, 76-77 (Pa. Super. 2014) (citation 

omitted).

To determine whether a warrantless arrest is justified by probable 

cause, we review the “totality of the circumstances.” Commonwealth v.

Dommel, 885 A.2d 998, 1002 (Pa. Super. 2005) (citation omitted). “Probable

cause does not involve certainties[;]” rather, it involves “the factual and 

practical considerations of everyday life on which reasonable and prudent men 

act.” Id. (citations omitted). “It is only the probability and not a prima facie

showing of criminal activity that is a standard of probable cause.” Id. (citation

omitted.

Here, the suppression court concluded that based on Officer Johnson’s

testimony—that Appellant stopped in the middle of the intersection, was
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initially somewhat unresponsive and slow when he spoke with her, and almost

drove off into oncoming traffic—the officer had “enough for him to proceed

beyond the mere traffic stop[.]” N.T. Suppression, 5/26/22, at 39-40. The

court also concluded that the officer’s testimony demonstrated that, under the

circumstances, including Appellant’s admission of having taken her prescribed

dose of methadone prior to the incident, the officer had reasonable suspicion

to conduct an investigative detention and that his testimony regarding the

field sobriety tests established probable cause to arrest Appellant on suspicion

of DUI. Id. at 40-41.

Based on our review, we conclude that the suppression court’s findings

of fact are supported by the evidence presented at the suppression hearing. 

Officer Johnson testified that (1) he had been with the Millvale Borough Police

Department since 2020, following his employment as a police officer in Ohio;

(2) he had administered at least 50 field sobriety tests; (3) he was aware from

his past experience that methadone slows down a person’s speech and can

make people sleepy; and (4) his decisions to administer the field sobriety tests

are generally based on “multiple circumstances” attendant at the time of the

stop. Id. at 5, 16-17, 27. He also testified that Appellant stopped her vehicle

in the middle of the intersection past the crosswalk, and when he approached

Appellant in her car, she appeared sleepy and had slow speech, but did not

have red eyes or reek of alcohol. Id. at 7, 9, 16, 19, 29. After Appellant

informed him that she had recently taken a prescribed dose of methadone at
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a clinic, Officer Johnson became very concerned about her sleepiness and her

ability to drive safely so he requested the services of an emergency medical

service (“EMS”) to conduct a health assessment. Id. at 16; see also id. at

20 (Officer Johnson testifying that he had never encountered a driver falling

asleep as he spoke to them), and 21 (Officer Johnson reiterating that

Appellant was very sleepy while he was talking to her prior to EMS’s arrival). 

After EMS concluded that Appellant did not appear to have any apparent

health conditions, Officer Johnson asked Appellant if “she would be willing to

submit to a field sobriety test,” to which she agreed. Id. at 10; Trial Ct. Op.

at 2 (unpaginated). Officer Johnson further testified that he arrested

Appellant for suspicion of DUI based on Appellant’s unsuccessful performance

on the field sobriety tests, her admission that she had taken her prescribed

methadone dose shortly before the incident, and his observations of her

behavior. Id. at 17.

Appellant does not address the suppression court’s conclusion that

Officer Johnson’s request that she submit to field sobriety tests after the initial

traffic stop was supported by reasonable suspicion. Nor does she challenge

the voluntariness of her consent to participate in those tests. Rather,

Appellant’s argument is, essentially, that the suppression court should have

given less weight to Officer Johnson’s testimony regarding her performance

on the field sobriety tests because there were other potential explanations for

her behavior. 
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Based on our review of the record—and pursuant to our standard of

review that requires us to review the evidence in the light most favorable to

the Commonwealth and provide deference to the suppression court’s findings

of fact and weight determinations—we conclude that the court properly

determined that Officer Johnson had probable cause to arrest Appellant and

the blood test results were, therefore, admissible. Accordingly, Appellant’s

first issue fails to garner relief.

C.

Appellant next challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting her

conviction of 75 Pa.C.S. § 3802(d)(2). Appellant’s Br. at 26-33. While she

concedes the evidence was sufficient to support her conviction under Section

3801(d)(1),3 she argues that “the Commonwealth’s failure to present any

evidence whatsoever supporting the proposition that the consumption of

marijuana or methadone results in the diminution of the motor skills needed

to drive safely means that the evidence presented at her trial was insufficient

to convict her if having violated § 3802(d)(2).” Id. at 26-27. 

We review a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence to “determine 

whether the evidence admitted at trial, and all reasonable inferences drawn 

therefrom, when viewed in a light most favorable to the Commonwealth as 

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3 Section 3802(d)(1) prohibits driving when “[t]here is in an individual’s blood 

any amount of” a Schedule I or II controlled substance or a metabolite of a 

controlled substance. 75 Pa.C.S. § 3802(d)(1). 
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verdict winner, support the conviction beyond a reasonable doubt.”

Commonwealth v. Tarrach, 42 A.3d 342, 345 (Pa. Super. 2012) (citation 

omitted). “The evidence established at trial need not preclude every 

possibility of innocence[,] and the fact-finder is free to believe all, part, or 

none of the evidence presented.” Id. (citation omitted).

“It is not within the province of this Court to re-weigh the evidence and 

substitute our judgment for that of the fact-finder.” Id. (citation omitted). 

Notably, the “Commonwealth’s burden may be met by wholly circumstantial 

evidence and any doubt about the defendant’s guilt is to be resolved by the 

fact finder unless the evidence is so weak and inconclusive that, as a matter 

of law, no probability of fact can be drawn from the combined circumstances.” 

Id. (citation omitted).

Section 3802(d)(2) provides that “[a]n individual may not drive, operate 

or be in actual physical control of the movement of a vehicle . . . [if t]he

individual is under the influence of a drug or combination of drugs to a degree 

which impairs the individual’s ability to safely drive, operate or be in actual 

physical control of the movement of the vehicle. 75 Pa.C.S. § 3802(d)(2). 

Section 3802(d)(2) “does not require proof of a specific amount of a drug in 

the driver’s system. It requires only proof that the driver was under the 

influence of a drug or combination of drugs to a degree that the ability to drive 

is impaired.” Tarrach, 42 A.3d at 345. 
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In addition, “[e]xpert testimony is not required” to prove that a 

defendant violated Section 3802(d)(2). Id. Rather, a need for expert 

testimony arises only when the factfinder “is confronted with factual issues 

whose resolution requires knowledge beyond the ken of the ordinary layman.’”

Commonwealth v. Griffith, 32 A.3d 1231, 1239 (Pa. 2011) (quoting Kozak

v. Struth, 531 A.2d 420, 422 (Pa. 1987)). The determination of whether 

expert testimony is required is “evaluated on a case-by-case basis, taking into 

account not just the specific drug at issue, prescription or otherwise, but also 

the nature and overall strength of the Commonwealth’s evidence, viewed 

pursuant to the general standard expressed in Kozak, supra.” Griffith, 32

A.3d at 1239.

In Griffith, our Supreme Court addressed “whether the evidence to 

establish a violation of subsection 3802(d)(2) can ever be sufficient in the 

absence of expert testimony as to causation.” Id. at 1235. After analyzing 

the statute and reviewing prior Superior Court opinions, the Court concluded 

that the following evidence proved that the appellee had violated Section 

3802(d)(2): “An experienced police officer closely observed Appellee’s

behavior, demeanor, unsteadiness, and inability to perform field sobriety 

tests, all of which led him to request laboratory tests for the detection of 

controlled substances in Appellee’s blood” and “Appellee admitted taking one 

prescription medication in the morning of the day of her arrest.” Id. at 1240. 

The Griffith Court also noted that the blood test results showed the presence 
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of two additional controlled substances, including a metabolite. Id. The 

Court, thus, concluded the evidence was sufficient to support the Section 

3802(d)(2) conviction and reversed the Superior Court’s disposition.

Griffith is dispositive in the instant case. Here, the trial court found

that “the Commonwealth had presented sufficient evidence at trial to conclude

that [Appellant] was driving while under the influence of drugs which impaired 

her ability to safely drive,” observing:

Among the evidence presented by the Commonwealth was 

testimony from Officer Johnson concerning the following: his 

observation of [Appellant’s] vehicle coming to a complete stop in 

the middle of an intersection at a solid red light; [Appellant’s] near 

collision with opposing traffic in the left lane while [he] 

approached the vehicle; [his] observations of [Appellant’s] head 

tilted forward toward the steering wheel when he approached her 

vehicle; [Appellant’s] slowed mannerisms and slowed speech; 

[Appellant’s] unsatisfactory performance of the field sobriety 

tests; [Appellant’s] admission to the officer that she had just come 

from the methadone clinic where she took her prescribed dose of 

methadone; and, the lab report of [Appellant’s] blood test which 

was positive for [both] methadone and marijuana.

Trial Ct. Op., at 3-4. We add that Officer Johnson testified that he had seen 

people under the influence of alcohol and methadone and that Appellant’s 

actions were consistent with his experiential knowledge of the impairing 

effects of these substances. See N.T. Suppression at 16-17.

Based on our review, Appellant’s argument regarding the evidence the 

Commonwealth did not present does not persuade us that the evidence that 

was presented was insufficient to support the Section 3802(d)(2) conviction. 

Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, as we 
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must, we conclude that the evidence was sufficient to support the court’s

verdict of guilt for violating Section 3802(d)(2). Appellant’s second issue,

thus, garners no relief.

D.

In conclusion, the record supports the suppression court’s determination

that Officer Johnson had probable cause to arrest Appellant for driving while 

impaired. Thus, the court properly denied Appellant’s motion to suppress the 

results of the blood tests. In addition, based on our review and analysis of 

relevant case law and consideration of Appellant’s arguments, we conclude 

that sufficient evidence supported the court’s verdict of guilt for violating 75 

Pa.C.S. § 3802(d)(2). We, thus, affirm Appellant’s judgment of sentence.

Judgment of Sentence affirmed.

5/7/2024