IV 

118TH CONGRESS 

1ST SESSION H. RES. 697 

Expressing the sense of the House of Representatives relating to the Communist Party of China’s ‘‘Made In China 2025’’ Plan and publiclyknown malign Communist Party of China’s actions supporting the goals 

of its ‘‘Made in China 2025’’ plan. 

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

SEPTEMBER 18, 2023 

Ms. SHERRILL (for herself, Mr. GALLAGHER, and Mr. KRISHNAMOORTHI) submitted the following resolution; which was referred to the Committee on 

Foreign Affairs 

RESOLUTION 

Expressing the sense of the House of Representatives relating to the Communist Party of China’s ‘‘Made In China 

2025’’ Plan and publicly-known malign Communist Party 

of China’s actions supporting the goals of its ‘‘Made 

in China 2025’’ plan. 

1 Resolved, 

2 SECTION 1. THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF CHINA’S ‘‘MADE IN 

3 CHINA 2025’’ PLAN. 

4 The House of Representatives finds the following: 

5 (1) In 2006, the Communist Party of China (in 

6 this resolution referred to as ‘‘CCP’’) intensified its 

7 focus on science and technology innovation as a naVerDate Sep 11 2014 02:59 Sep 19, 2023 Jkt 039200 PO 00000 Frm 00001 Fmt 6652 Sfmt 6201 E:\BILLS\HR697.IH HR697

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1 tional goal under the ‘‘Medium- and Long-Term 

2 Plan for Science and Technology Development’’ and 

3 its 13th and 14th Five-Year Plans. 

4 (2) The ‘‘Made in China 2025’’ plan (in this 

5 resolution referred to as ‘‘MIC2025’’), issued in 

6 2015, under the 13th Five Year Plan is the CCP’s 

7 10-year national science and technology industrial 

8 policy that seeks to vault China into global leader9 ship in the research and manufacturing of advanced 

10 science and technology tools, applications, and prod11 ucts, while using a whole-of-society approach, deep 

12 government intervention, and market protections for 

13 the People’s Republic of China (in this resolution re14 ferred to as ‘‘PRC’’) businesses in the select sectors. 

15 (3) MIC2025 prioritizes raising high bars to 

16 foreign market access, while increasing PRC invest17 ments in and government and business focus on 

18 proactively acquiring technology and knowledge 

19 abroad on these advanced science and technology 

20 areas: 

21 (A) Advanced information technology and 

22 telecommunications services. 

23 (B) Advanced machining and robotics. 

24 (C) Aerospace engineering and equipment. 


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1 (D) Maritime infrastructure, equipment, 

2 and next generation vessels. 

3 (E) Advanced railway infrastructure. 

4 (F) Renewable energy products, batteries, 

5 and electric vehicles. 

6 (G) Advanced materials. 

7 (H) Innovative farming equipment, tech8 nology, and agriculture. 

9 (I) Biotechnology, pharmaceuticals, and 

10 advanced medical equipment. 

11 (J) Next generation electrical equipment. 

12 (4) MIC2025 sector development will further 

13 integrate emerging technologies, such as advance 

14 semiconductors, 3D printing, cloud computing, big15 data analytics, quantum computing, artificial intel16 ligence (AI), and new forms of energy. 

17 (5) The PRC’s leader Xi Jinping, who currently 

18 holds the role of State Chairman of the PRC, Gen19 eral Secretary of the Chinese Communist Party, and 

20 Chairman of the Central Military Commission, 

21 states that CCP plans to lessen the PRC’s reliance 

22 on foreign markets for goods and services by 2025 

23 and a goal for at least seventy-percent self-suffi24 ciency in MIC2025 areas by using foreign techVerDate Sep 11 2014 02:59 Sep 19, 2023 Jkt 039200 PO 00000 Frm 00003 Fmt 6652 Sfmt 6201 E:\BILLS\HR697.IH HR697

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1 nology acquisitions and joint ventures to acquire, do2 mestically produce, and then sell these goods abroad. 

3 (6) The PRC’s stated goal in its MIC2025 pol4 icy is to advance production in the PRC from prod5 ucts that are ‘‘Made in China’’ to those that are 

6 ‘‘Created in China’’, using the underpinnings of 

7 MIC2025 to transform foreign innovations into a 

8 homegrown industrial base to promote scientific, 

9 technological, and manufacturing independence. 

10 (7) In 2021, the CCP’s Central Committee pub11 lished a resolution on its self-made achievements 

12 over the course of the past century, stating that 

13 PRC ‘‘self-reliance in science and technology’’ and 

14 its ‘‘bolstered . . . creation, protection, and applica15 tion of intellectual property rights’’ are key tenets of 

16 boosting the CCP’s position, while not including ref17 erences to foreign trade or economic and commercial 

18 partnerships as a part of its advancement. 

19 (8) In November 2022, during the CCP’s Party 

20 Congress, the CCP noted again that science and 

21 technological innovation are core tenets of the PRC’s 

22 development and according to the PRC’s Ministry of 

23 Science and Technology, international collaborative 

24 science and technology efforts are ultimately focused 

25 on boosting the PRC’s security. 


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1 (9) Importantly, that along with the MIC2025 

2 plan, there is a policy of ‘‘dual-circulation’’, both 

3 policies which are overseen by General Secretary Xi 

4 Jinping, that seek to transfer into the PRC the 

5 globe’s innovative technical ideas and products, 

6 produce them domestically for their own large popu7 lation, and then sell them abroad to obtain growing 

8 shares of foreign markets, all the while protecting 

9 those domestic businesses from foreign competition. 

10 (10) To further support ‘‘dual-circulation’’ and 

11 speed its MIC2025 developments, the PRC uses offi12 cially sanctioned tools such as unfair government 

13 subsidies, state-sponsored talent acquisition pro14 grams, lax labor and environmental regulations, co15 erced foreign investments and acquisitions, direct 

16 state investments and policy direction, burdensome 

17 paperwork requirements for foreign firms, and 

18 forced transfers of intellectual property. 

19 (11) The CCP broadly uses a national concept 

20 of military-civil fusion to adapt and adopt civilian 

21 technologies—either domestically produced or taken 

22 from abroad—to boost its military capabilities. 

23 (12) The CCP has over the past few years and 

24 especially in 2023, broadened and deepened the 

25 scope of its counterintelligence and data security 


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1 laws, along with the use of these laws against busi2 nesses from other countries. 

3 (13) MIC2025 is rapidly coming to a close, and 

4 the next steps include a CCP desire to dominate 

5 international standard setting by 2035 and be the 

6 global leader in technological innovation, manufac7 turing, industrial production, and military capabili8 ties by 2049, supported by its 14th Five Year Plan 

9 and its National Medium- to Long-Term Science 

10 and Technology Development Plan. These plans’ in11 tentions focus on basic science, domestication of crit12 ical commercial areas and getting the PRC to the 

13 forefront of ‘‘this century’s critical technologies’’. 

14 SEC. 2. PUBLICLY-KNOWN MALIGN CCP ACTIONS SUP15 PORTING ITS MIC2025 GOALS. 

16 The House of Representatives finds the following: 

17 (1) In March 2023, the PRC Commerce Min18 ister stated that 2023 would be a year of 

19 ‘‘Invest[ing] in China’’, in front of global business 

20 executives, stating the PRC sought to boost invest21 ments in its manufacturing and high-tech sectors 

22 and that the PRC would reduce restrictions on for23 eign firms. However, the government took immediate 

24 actions to the contrary. 


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1 (2) In April 2023, the National People’s Con2 gress passed an updated and newly expanded coun3 terespionage law stating that any, ‘‘attempts to ille4 gally obtain or share state secrets or other data, ma5 terials, or items related to national security or na6 tional interests, which are carried out by or for for7 eign elements other than an espionage organization 

8 . . .’’ is punishable, without defining ‘‘national secu9 rity’’, ‘‘national interests’’, or organizations of con10 cern, while reiterating the policy that all aspects of 

11 society are to collect, report, and defend against any 

12 transgressions against the government. 

13 (3) In 2023, PRC authorities raided global con14 sulting firms Bain & Company, Capvision, and 

15 Mintz Group on the grounds of collecting and as16 sessing PRC business data, which have been a rou17 tine part of these companies’ business operations. 

18 (4) General Secretary Xi Jinping has overseen 

19 an expansive growth in national security laws that 

20 are loosely defined and nebulously enforced with no 

21 legal recourse and requiring mandatory cooperation. 

22 These laws include the new Counterespionage Law, 

23 the National Security Law, the Foreign NGO Man24 agement Law, the National Intelligence Law, the 


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1 Hong Kong National Security Law, and the Data 

2 Security Law. 

3 (5) In 2023, PRC regulators put on notice 

4 United States semiconductor company Micron Tech5 nologies by embarking on a surprise investigation 

6 without claiming any vulnerabilities in Micron’s 

7 products and without concrete evidence that PRC 

8 regulators needed to ‘‘secur[e] the information of in9 frastructure of [China’s] supply chain’’, ostensibly 

10 for national security reasons. 

11 (6) In 2023, the PRC’s State Administration 

12 for Market Regulation reportedly slowed and denied 

13 its review process slowed its review process of United 

14 States global acquisitions and mergers, while requir15 ing United States firms make available all of their 

16 products in the PRC that are available to other 

17 countries in a likely effort to dull United States ex18 port controls. 

19 (7) In 2022, the Department of Justice indicted 

20 the PRC firm Hytera Communications Corp for 

21 retro-engineering and stealing proprietary Motorola 

22 technology, which Hytera then sold abroad. 

23 (8) In 2021, a PRC front company named 

24 ‘‘LinkOcean’’ falsified its business information to 

25 steal and transfer to a PRC military university on 


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1 the Department of Commerce’s Entity List over 

2 $100,000 in special underwater marine technologies. 

3 (9) In 2020, the PRC software technology firm 

4 Baidu used fake ad-clicking software to boost its ad 

5 revenues, while stealing user information and trans6 mitting it back to the PRC. 

7 (10) Since 2020, the CCP has not fulfilled its 

8 obligations under the Phase One Trade Agreement 

9 between the United States and the PRC and con10 tinues to require the transfer of sensitive United 

11 States agricultural company knowledge to PRC 

12 firms. 

13 (11) In 2019, United States firm Akhan Semi14 conductor’s proprietary glass was stolen by PRC 

15 telecommunications firm Huawei, who attempted to 

16 retro-engineer it in violation of United States export 

17 control law. 

18 (12) In 2018, United States wind energy firm 

19 ASMC, after signing a sales deal with the PRC firm 

20 Sinovel Wind Group Co., Ltd., had its proprietary 

21 intellectual property stolen by Sinovel, who then 

22 manufactured ASMC’s products and sold the prod23 ucts in the United States. 


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1 (13) In 2017, PRC cyber actors were caught 

2 widely illicitly collecting private business information 

3 on sectors across the MIC2025 portfolio. 

4 (14) In 2016, a PRC seed company illicitly ac5 quired and intended to smuggle proprietary seeds 

6 from Iowa to the PRC, while to this day the PRC 

7 agricultural seed market remains blocked from for8 eign competition. 

9 (15) Throughout the 2020s, PRC state-sanc10 tioned cyber actor ‘‘APT 41’’ conducted operations 

11 in line with MIC2025, stealing at least hundreds of 

12 billions of dollars worth of intellectual property from 

13 multinational corporations, much of which was 

14 emerging technology or not yet invented products. 

15 (16) According to a Center for Strategic and 

16 International Studies analysis of publicly known 

17 PRC espionage cases, which vastly outnumber any 

18 other foreign state, almost half of the perpetrators 

19 were military affiliates, almost half used cyber 

20 means to steal data, and over half sought to collect 

21 commercial information. 

22 (17) The PRC’s Tax Bureau previously ordered 

23 United States companies doing business in the PRC 

24 to use software purposefully loaded with malicious 

25 malware. 


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1 (18) PRC ‘‘Talent Programs’’ have been used 

2 to select certain well-placed individuals to target cer3 tain United States research sectors to compromise 

4 intellectual property, tarnishing the sanctity of open 

5 and transparent norms of international research, 

6 international academic collaboration, and America’s 

7 vibrant and vital foreign student researcher popu8 lation. 

9 (19) The China Scholarship Council, which fa10 cilitates high performing PRC students studying 

11 abroad and foreign students to study in the PRC, 

12 has been found to require students sign Council con13 tracts that require reporting on their work to PRC 

14 officials and limitations on students’ academic free15 dom while abroad. 

16 (20) The CCP allows forced labor, low environ17 mental standards, mandated overproduction of prod18 ucts, and minimal worker safeguards, all of which 

19 act as non-monetary subsidies to cheapen products 

20 from the PRC. 

21 (21) Since General Secretary Xi Jinping as22 sumed power, he re-asserted the role of state-owned 

23 enterprises in the economy and increased the pur24 chases of shares in private PRC businesses. 


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1 (22) The Department of Commerce, because of 

2 continued PRC government intervention into impor3 tant sectors of the PRC economy, continues to cer4 tify that the PRC remains a non-market economy, 

5 alongside the Republic of Armenia, the Republic of 

6 Azerbaijan, the Republic of Belarus, Georgia, the 

7 Kyrgyz Republic, the Republic of Moldova, the Rus8 sian Federation, the Republic of Tajikistan, 

9 Turkmenistan, the Republic of Uzbekistan, and the 

10 Socialist Republic of Vietnam. 

11 (23) Upon widespread public acknowledgment 

12 and initial United States action to confront 

13 MIC2025, the CCP still abides by, but no longer 

14 publicly acknowledges MIC2025 or the detailed 

15 plans, intentions, and activities to accomplish its 

16 14th Five Year Plan or long-term science and tech17 nology goals. 

18 SEC. 3. SENSE OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES. 

19 It is the sense of the House of Representatives that— 

20 (1) the United States finds itself in not only a 

21 security and diplomatic competition, but one heavily 

22 based upon economic and commercial competition; 

23 (2) the CCP seeks to dominate the sectors in 

24 MIC2025 through unfair trade practices, such as 

25 forced labor, low environmental standards, illegal 


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1 subsidies, and stolen foreign research and intellec2 tual property, and then create and recreate the prod3 ucts in the PRC often to be sold abroad at cheaper4 than-market rates, with the ultimate goal being to 

5 undercut, if not bankrupt, United States businesses 

6 and stifle United States manufacturing and invest7 ments in critical future technologies; 

8 (3) all United States businesses, research insti9 tutions, and United States Federal entities involved 

10 in cutting edge research and design—no matter 

11 their size, funding, or where they are located—are 

12 MIC2025 targets for CCP disruption, intelligence 

13 collection, intellectual property theft, unfair competi14 tive practices, and commercial coercion; 

15 (4) United States science and technology firms 

16 should prepare themselves for growing unfair trade 

17 practices and continued theft of intellectual prop18 erty, particularly as Xi Jinping’s tenure continues; 

19 (5) United States public, private, and non-profit 

20 collaboration will drive United States innovation and 

21 must do so with speed and purpose, as this era of 

22 strategic competition will be won by close, coordi23 nated, and collaborative work between the United 

24 States public, private, and non-profit sectors and 

25 strategic partners abroad; 


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1 (6) United States businesses, non-profits, aca2 demia, and Federal entities should review their secu3 rity practices to protect their buildings, technology, 

4 products, proprietary knowledge, and personnel from 

5 all undue foreign interference and espionage, includ6 ing instituting thorough screenings and reviews for 

7 business or research collaborations with countries 

8 and entities that are named in sanctions or export 

9 control documents or are known to use illicit third 

10 party entities, such as ‘‘shell companies’’, to subvert 

11 import restrictions or obfuscate dual-use military in12 terests in seemingly benign civilian research efforts; 

13 (7) United States businesses, non-profits, aca14 demia, and Federal entities involved in MIC2025 

15 areas should review and invest in Federal and State 

16 guidelines on cybersecurity practices and tools, re17 search security standards, and counterintelligence 

18 risk postures; 

19 (8) every United States Government agency and 

20 department should orient their internal resources 

21 and postures to prepare for an era of strategic com22 petition with the CCP, which will affect security, 

23 diplomatic, economic, and commercial factors; 

24 (9) Federal entities should also seek to boost 

25 outreach to the private, academic, and non-profits 


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1 sectors to find new ways to partner in science and 

2 technical efforts, alongside new ways to protect 

3 United States innovation; 

4 (10) United States Government agencies and 

5 departments should review their regulations and 

6 processes to ensure that internal rulemaking does 

7 not unnecessarily slow the United States ability to 

8 compete with the CCP and that it protects United 

9 States ingenuity and commercial products, while 

10 keeping pace with the rate of scientific, techno11 logical, manufacturing, and commercial advance12 ments; 

13 (11) the Department of Commerce finds itself 

14 at the frontline of global strategic competition; 

15 (12) Congress should support the Department 

16 of Commerce’s efforts at home and abroad while 

17 conducting rigorous oversight to ensure the Depart18 ment is prioritizing the long-term interest of the na19 tional security, economic security, and well-being of 

20 the United States; 

21 (13) Federal entities should support United 

22 States private and research institutions organiza23 tions that seek to diversify their supply chains, in24 crease their understanding of the level of PRC-proVerDate Sep 11 2014 02:59 Sep 19, 2023 Jkt 039200 PO 00000 Frm 00015 Fmt 6652 Sfmt 6201 E:\BILLS\HR697.IH HR697

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1 duced content in their supply chains, or extend trade 

2 relationships with new Pacific partners; 

3 (14) United States treaty allies and non-treaty 

4 partners have a tremendous part to play in strategic 

5 competition and the United States Government 

6 should seek to bolster diplomatic and commercial re7 lationships with these partners; 

8 (15) the United States desires a stable and fair 

9 playing field in its commercial relationships abroad, 

10 with reciprocal access and mutual benefits, and the 

11 United States values international research and de12 velopment relationships based upon trust and good13 will; and 

14 (16) opposes the above-mentioned unfair, ag15 gressive actions and policies of the CCP and sup16 ports the people of the PRC in creating an economy 

17 that is open to honest global partnership, free from 

18 malign intent, and aligns with the norms of modern 

19 global trade. 

Æ 


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