DLD-149 NOT PRECEDENTIAL 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 

___________ 

No. 16-1296 

___________ 

IN RE: CHRISTIAN DIOR WOMACK, 

 Petitioner 

____________________________________ 

On a Petition for Writ of Mandamus from the 

United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 

(Related to E.D. Pa. Crim. No. 2:13-cr-00206-001) 

____________________________________ 

Submitted Pursuant to Rule 21, Fed. R. App. P. 

February 19, 2016 

Before: CHAGARES, GREENAWAY, JR. and SLOVITER1

, Circuit Judges 

(Opinion filed: May 5, 2016) 

_________ 

OPINION*

_________ 

PER CURIAM 

 Christian Dior Womack, a.k.a. Gucci Prada, presents another petition for a writ of 

 

1

 The Honorable Dolores K. Sloviter participated in the decision in this case. Judge 

Sloviter assumed inactive status on April 4, 2016 after the submission date, but before the 

filing of the opinion. This opinion is filed by a quorum of the panel pursuant to 28 

U.S.C. § 46(d) and Third Circuit I.O.P. Chapter 12. 

*

 This disposition is not an opinion of the full court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 

constitute binding precedent. 
2 

mandamus relating to criminal proceedings that culminated in his guilty plea to charges 

of sex trafficking of a minor and sex trafficking by force. 2 In his current petition (and 

supplement thereto) he objects to what he describes as a “coercive appointment of 

counsel” in May 2014 when he rescinded his waiver of counsel and his standby counsel 

became counsel of record. Womack argues that it is as if he had no counsel at a critical 

stage of the proceedings because the District Court did not make “an effective 

appointment of counsel.” He also claims a later violation of his right to counsel when the 

District Court terminated the appointment after Womack paid to privately retain his 

counsel. Womack asserts that the District Court should have first made a finding about 

Womack’s ability to pay for counsel, and by not doing so, violated the Fifth and Sixth 

Amendments and the Criminal Justice Act. He claims that the perceived violations 

render his sentence a nullity, and, as relief, he asks us to vacate his conviction and 

sentence. 

 Mandamus is an extraordinary remedy. See Kerr v. U.S. Dist. Court, 426 U.S. 

394, 402 (1976). Mandamus is not a substitute for appeal. See Cheney v. U.S. Dist. 

Court, 542 U.S. 367, 380-81 (2004); Madden v. Myers, 102 F.3d 74, 79 (3d Cir. 1996). 

A petitioner must ordinarily have no other means to obtain the desired relief, and he must 

show a clear and indisputable right to issuance of the writ. In re School Asbestos Litig., 

977 F.2d 764, 772 (3d Cir. 1992). 

 

2

 Womack also has appealed from the judgment entered in his case. 

 
3 

 Essentially, Womack seeks to challenge the judgment against him through his 

claims of alleged improper actions by the District Judge relating to the appointment of 

counsel and the termination of a counsel appointment once Womack paid to retain 

counsel. Mandamus relief is not available because these are claims that he can raise in 

his direct appeal. See In re Briscoe, 448 F.3d 201, 212-13 (3d Cir. 2006). Accordingly, 

we will deny Womack’s mandamus petition.