NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.

UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL

AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE

ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS

DIVISION ONE

PETER G., Appellant,

v.

DEPARTMENT OF CHILD SAFETY, S.G., D.G., Appellees.

No. 1 CA-JV 16-0306

Appeal from the Superior Court in Yavapai County

No. V1300JD201580005

The Honorable Anna C. Young, Judge

AFFIRMED

COUNSEL

Law Office of Florence M. Bruemmer, P.C., Anthem

By Florence M. Bruemmer

Counsel for Appellant

Arizona Attorney General’s Office, Mesa

By Ashlee N. Hoffmann

Counsel for Appellee Department of Child Safety
PETER G. v. DCS, et al.

Decision of the Court

2

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Judge Lawrence F. Winthrop delivered the decision of the Court, in which 

Presiding Judge Kent E. Cattani and Chief Judge Michael J. Brown joined.

W I N T H R O P, Judge:

¶1 Peter G. (“Father”) appeals the juvenile court’s decision 

severing his parental rights to S.G. and D.G. (collectively, “the children”). 

Father argues that the trial court erred in terminating his parental rights 

because his waiver of his right to a severance trial was not voluntary. For 

the following reasons, we affirm.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶2 In March 2015, Father, R.G. (“Mother”),1 four of their adult 

children, and two of their minor children were involved in a physical 

altercation with multiple police officers in a commercial parking lot. One 

of the adult children was shot and killed during the encounter. The 

surviving family members were arrested, and the two minor children were 

sent to a juvenile detention center.

¶3 DCS took temporary custody of the children and filed a 

petition for dependency. Upon being released from detention, S.G. was 

placed in a licensed foster home and D.G. was placed in a group home.

¶4 In June 2015, the juvenile court ordered the children 

dependent as to Father on the ground of neglect, due to his incarceration 

and criminal conduct. The court also found S.G. dependent as to Father 

based on neglect for failure to protect.

 

1 Mother did not contest the termination of her parental rights and is 

not a party to this appeal.
PETER G. v. DCS, et al.

Decision of the Court

3

¶5 After initially finding that a case plan of family reunification 

was appropriate, the court later granted DCS’s request to change the case 

plan to severance and adoption.

2

¶6 DCS subsequently moved to terminate Father’s parental 

rights to the children, alleging that Father neglected the children by not 

providing them with basic necessities, such as schooling and medical care. 

See Ariz. Rev. Stat. (“A.R.S.”) §§ 8-201(24), -533(B)(2).3 DCS also alleged that 

Father neglected S.G. by failing to remove her from the center of the 

family’s 2015 brawl with police officers in the parking lot. Finally, DCS

alleged that Father willfully abused or failed to protect the children from 

willful abuse, based on disclosures made by the children regarding alleged

sexual abuse and manipulation by Father. See A.R.S. §§ 8-201(2), -533(B)(2).

¶7 At the Report and Review and Pretrial Conference, Father’s 

counsel advised the court that Father might change his position regarding 

severance if he would be able to address the court regarding placement.4 

The court agreed to allow Father “to make statements regarding placement 

at the beginning of trial and prior to testimony,” noting, however, that it 

“will not make a decision regarding placement that day.”

¶8 In June 2016, the court conducted a severance hearing and, at 

the outset, indicated it would not be addressing any issues relating to the 

placement on that day. Before hearing testimony, the court noted that

Father had indicated at the prior hearing that “if [he] were allowed to give 

an unsworn statement, 15 minutes, that he would be changing his plea on 

the severance.” Father’s attorney then stated that Father would not be 

changing his plea, and that he wanted to go forward with the severance 

 

2 Along with its request for a change in case plan, DCS submitted a 

report to the juvenile court indicating, among other things, that Father’s 

“strong antigovernment and antisocial beliefs were a contributing factor in 

the reported abuse of his children over the years” and that “[s]hould 

[Father’s] children be returned to his care, there is serious concern he would 

return to his antigovernment ideals and again keep the children isolated 

from society.” Further, the report noted that “[n]either child has expressed 

a desire to return to their parents[‘] care.”

3 Absent material changes after relevant events, we cite a statute’s 

current version.

4 Father had concerns about his children being placed with their 

paternal grandfather.
PETER G. v. DCS, et al.

Decision of the Court

4

trial and address the court regarding his position on placement. The court 

reiterated that it would not address placement at this hearing.

¶9 After entering exhibits into evidence for trial, Father’s counsel 

requested a five-minute recess. Upon returning, Father’s counsel stated,

Your Honor, my client feels like he didn’t understand it was 

an either/or proposition with regard to addressing the court 

or going to trial. I asked him what’s the most important to 

him. It’s a very personal decision as to him, as to what he 

wanted to proceed with. I do want to note his objection as to 

that, but he would prefer to keep the children safe and 

address you with regard to placement.

The court then confirmed that Father would be making an unsworn 

statement and changing his plea to no contest on the termination, again 

specifically advising that if Father preferred to proceed with a severance 

trial, he had the right to do so.

¶10 To confirm Father’s decision, the court addressed him 

directly, asking if he preferred to give a 15-minute statement and change 

his plea to no contest. Father stated, “It’s not how I’d like it, but my priority 

is to keep my children safe.” The court then engaged in a colloquy with 

Father to determine whether he wished to proceed with the severance 

hearing:

THE COURT: So you’d be agreeing basically that I would 

allow you to make a 15-minute unsworn statement, and then 

you would be entering a plea of no contest to the termination; 

is that correct?

THE FATHER: I guess, yeah.

THE COURT: Well, not I guess. It’s either a “yes” or “no.”

THE FATHER: Well, I don’t seem to have any choice, so yes.

THE COURT: Well, you do have a choice. You have an 

absolute right to proceed with the trial we’ve got set.

THE FATHER: I was told if my rights were severed I 

wouldn’t have anything to do with placement or say anything 

about placement, so it’s more important to me that I be able 

to speak and they be safe.
PETER G. v. DCS, et al.

Decision of the Court

5

THE COURT: But you understand that I would not be 

making any decisions regarding placement today. Do you 

understand that?

THE FATHER: I do understand that.

THE COURT: All right. Just to confirm with you your 

understanding of your trial rights. You have the absolute 

right to go forward with the severance trial we’ve got set. 

Your attorney would be able to ask questions of the other 

party’s witnesses. Your attorney could subpoena people to 

testify for you and you could choose to testify on your own 

behalf. Do you understand all that?

THE FATHER: Yes.

¶11 When the court again attempted to confirm that Father was 

waiving his right to trial, Father responded he was doing so “[i]n order to 

speak.” The court then stated that “it’s not in order to speak” because 

Father had the right to testify. Father stated that he felt he was being “black 

mailed” because if he lost at trial he would not have a say in the children’s 

placement. After again reiterating Father’s absolute right to a trial, the court 

stated Father’s two options were to “either go forward with the trial . . . or 

[] waive your right to trial and enter the plea of no contest.” Father formally 

waived his right to trial, and the court accepted his plea of no contest, noting 

it was made knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily. Father then briefly 

addressed the court on placement before exiting the courtroom.

¶12 After Father was excused, the court heard testimony from the 

DCS case manager and indicated it would take the matter under 

advisement. The court subsequently issued an order severing Father’s 

parental rights to the children, finding that Father “knowingly, intelligently 

and voluntarily entered a plea of no contest to the termination of his 

parental rights.” The court further found that DCS had established the 

statutory grounds for severance of Father’s parental rights and that 

severance was in the children’s best interests.

¶13 Father timely appealed, and we have jurisdiction pursuant to 

Article 6, Section 9 of the Arizona Constitution; A.R.S. § 8-235(A); and Rule 

103(A) of the Arizona Rules of Procedure for the Juvenile Court.
PETER G. v. DCS, et al.

Decision of the Court

6

ANALYSIS5

¶14 Father argues that the juvenile court erred in terminating his 

parental rights to the children because his waiver of his right to a trial was 

not voluntary.6 He contends that the juvenile court “induced” him into 

waiving his constitutional right to a trial by promising that he would be 

permitted to address the court regarding placement if he changed his plea

to no contest.

¶15 Pursuant to rule 66(D)(1) of the Arizona Rules of Juvenile 

Procedure, a parent may waive his right to a severance trial by not 

contesting the allegations against him. In accepting a plea of no contest, the 

juvenile court shall:

a. Determine whether the party understands the rights being waived;

b. Determine whether the admission or plea of no contest is knowingly, 

intelligently and voluntarily made;

c. Determine whether a factual basis exists to support the termination 

of parental rights; and

d. Proceed with entering the findings and orders as set forth in 

subsection (F) of this rule.

Ariz. R. Juv. P. 66(D)(1).

¶16 “In reviewing the procedural requirements for accepting ‘a no 

contest plea in a termination proceeding, we turn for guidance to the 

analogous context of guilty or no contest pleas made by criminal 

defendants.’” Timothy W. v. Dep’t of Child Safety, 240 Ariz. 232, 233, ¶ 6, 377 

P.3d 1026, 1027 (App. 2016) (quoting Tina T. v. Dep’t of Child Safety, 236 Ariz. 

 

5 We review a juvenile court’s termination order in the light most 

favorable to sustaining the court’s decision. Denise R. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. 

Sec., 221 Ariz. 92, 95, ¶ 10, 210 P.3d 1263, 1266 (App. 2009).

6 Father does not contest the juvenile court’s findings regarding the 

statutory grounds for severance or the court’s best interests findings. 

Accordingly, he has waived any challenge on appeal to those findings. See 

Childress Buick Co. v. O’Connell, 198 Ariz. 454, 459, ¶ 29, 11 P.3d 413, 418 

(App. 2000) (“[I]ssues not clearly raised in appellate briefs are deemed 

waived.”).
PETER G. v. DCS, et al.

Decision of the Court

7

295, 298-99, ¶ 15, 339 P.3d 1040, 1043-44 (App. 2014)). In the criminal 

context, a defendant’s waiver of a constitutional right is valid where it is 

“done with sufficient awareness of the relevant circumstances and likely 

consequences.” Brady v. U.S., 397 U.S. 742, 748 (1970). “A plea will be found 

involuntary only where a defendant lacks information of ‘true importance 

in the decision-making process.’” State v. Pac, 165 Ariz. 294, 295-96, 798 P.2d 

1303, 1304-05 (1990) (quoting State v. Crowder, 155 Ariz. 477, 481, 747 P.2d 

1176, 1180 (1987)).

¶17 Here, we find no indication that Father’s no contest plea was 

anything other than voluntary. Father received and signed a Form 3

(“Notice to Parent in Termination Action”),

7 which advised him of his right 

to trial. Additionally, the juvenile court’s extensive dialogue with Father, 

explaining his options and advising him multiple times of his right to 

proceed with trial, refutes any contention that Father was unaware of the 

circumstances of his plea. Cf. State v. Rodriguez, 25 Ariz. App. 111, 113-14, 

541 P.2d 574, 576-77 (App. 1975) (stating that the defendant’s plea was valid 

where the court engaged in an oral colloquy with him regarding the 

voluntariness of his plea); State v. Baker, 217 Ariz. 118, 121, ¶ 15, 170 P.3d 

727, 730 (App. 2007) (holding that the defendant’s waiver of his jury trial 

right was invalid where the transcript did not contain a discussion of 

waiver or show the court had a personal colloquy with the defendant).

¶18 Although Father argues that he “was in a catch-22 because, in 

order to address the court regarding placement, he had to give up his right 

to trial,” the record does not indicate the court, or anyone else, induced him 

to give up his right to a trial. Rather, the court patiently and repetitively 

confirmed Father’s understanding and decision to not contest the statutory 

basis for severance and the best interests analysis. Although the court 

reiterated that it would not be addressing placement on that day, it 

nevertheless permitted Father to make a statement concerning placement.

¶19 Finally, the fact that Father was represented and advised by 

counsel throughout the dependency proceedings and during the severance 

trial at which he entered his no contest plea “strongly militates against the 

conclusion that the plea was involuntary.” State v. Lerch, 107 Ariz. 529, 530, 

490 P.2d 1, 3 (1971) (internal quotation marks omitted). Accordingly, we 

find no abuse of discretion.

 

7 See Ariz. R.P. Juv. Ct. Form 3.
PETER G. v. DCS, et al.

Decision of the Court

8

CONCLUSION

¶20 The juvenile court’s order terminating Father’s parental rights 

is affirmed.