NOT PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

____________

No. 23-2738

____________

JANE DOE, Individually, and on behalf of herself and those similarly situated

v.

CENTERVILLE CLINICS INC.,

Appellant

____________

On Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Western District of Pennsylvania

(D.C. No. 2:23-cv-01107)

District Judge: Hon. J. Nicholas Ranjan

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Argued June 3, 2024

Before: CHAGARES, Chief Judge, CHUNG, and FISHER, Circuit Judges.

(Filed:August 6, 2024)

Matthew S. Freedus [ARGUED]

Khatereh S. Ghiladi

Rosie D. Griffin

Feldesman Leifer

1129 20th Street NW

Suite 400

Washington, DC 20036

Counsel for Appellant

James Gerald Stranch, IV

Michael C. Iadevaia [ARGUED]

Stranch Jennings & Garvey

223 Rosa L. Parks Avenue

Suite 200

Nashville, TN 37203
2

Lynn A. Toops

Cohen & Malad

One Indiana Square

Suite 1400

Indianapolis, IN 46204

Counsel for Appellee

Dana Kaersvang [ARGUED]

United States Department of Justice

950 Pennsylvania Avenue NW

Washington, DC 20530

Counsel for Amicus Curiae

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OPINION*

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FISHER, Circuit Judge.

Plaintiff Jane Doe, on behalf of herself and a putative class of similarly situated

individuals, sued Centerville Clinics in Pennsylvania state court. Doe alleged that 

Centerville embedded tracking software on its website and patient portal to gather 

personal data—including personal medical information—from its patients, which it then 

transmitted to Facebook for use in advertising in violation of Pennsylvania law.

1

Centerville removed the case to federal court, invoking the Federally Supported Health 

* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 

does not constitute binding precedent.

1 The complaint asserted state law causes of action for invasion of privacy; 

intrusion upon seclusion; breach of implied contract; unjust enrichment; breach of 

fiduciary duty; violation of the Pennsylvania Unfair Trade Practices and Consumer 

Protection Law, 73 Pa. Stat. §§ 201-01, et seq.; and violation of the Pennsylvania 

Wiretapping and Electronic Surveillance Control Act, 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 5701, et seq. 
3

Centers Assistance Act (Health Centers Act), 42 U.S.C. § 233(l)(2), and the federal 

officer removal statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1442(a)(1). The District Court rejected these bases 

for removal and remanded the case to state court. For the reasons set forth below, we will 

affirm.2

I.

The District Court was required to remand to state court unless Centerville could 

establish that it was authorized to remove the case under the Health Centers Act or the 

federal officer removal statute.3

A. Removal Under the Health Centers Act

Centerville argues that removal was proper under the Health Centers Act because:

(1) as a “deemed” federal Public Health Service (PHS) employee,

4

it was entitled to 

absolute immunity from any civil action related to conduct within the scope of its 

employment, and (2) the Attorney General’s representative appeared in state court but did 

2 Because Centerville asserted the federal officer removal statute as a basis for 

removal, we have jurisdiction to review any basis for removal the District Court

addressed. Maglioli v. All. HC Holdings LLC, 16 F.4th 393, 402–03 (3d Cir. 2021) (citing 

28 U.S.C. § 1447(d); BP P.L.C. v. Mayor of Baltimore, 141 S. Ct. 1532, 1538 (2021)). 

We review orders remanding for lack of subject matter jurisdiction de novo. Maglioli, 16 

F.4th at 403.

3 See Frederico v. Home Depot, 507 F.3d 188, 193 (3d Cir. 2007) (“[T]he party 

asserting federal jurisdiction in a removal case bears the burden of showing, at all stages 

of the litigation, that the case is properly before the federal court.”).

4 Federally funded community health centers and their employees, officers, and 

individual contractors are eligible for medical malpractice coverage under the Federal 

Tort Claims Act to the same extent as federal employees of the PHS. 42 U.S.C. § 233(g).
4

not make a coverage determination within the fifteen-day statutory period. Neither 

argument can be squared with the plain text of § 233.

Removal under the Health Centers Act is authorized “in only two circumstances.”5

First, the government may remove a case to federal court at “any time before trial” if the 

Attorney General appears in the state-court proceeding within fifteen days of being 

notified and makes an affirmative determination that the defendant is entitled to coverage 

under the Act.6 Second, the defendant may remove the case itself if the Attorney General 

fails to appear in the state-court proceeding within fifteen days of being notified.7

Centerville argues that because it was a “deemed” PHS employee under § 233

when the events giving rise to this action occurred, it has the right to remove and removal 

under § 233(l)(1) should be automatic upon the Attorney General’s appearance. But 

Centerville misreads the statute, conflating the Attorney General’s prior deeming 

determination with its specific coverage determination.

When she timely appeared in state court, the Assistant United States Attorney 

(representing the Attorney General) explained that while Centerville had been deemed a 

PHS employee, the government had not determined under § 233(l)(1) whether 

5 Allen v. Christenberry, 327 F.3d 1290, 1294–95 (11th Cir. 2003).

6 42 U.S.C. §§ 233(c) and (l)(1).

7

Id. § 233(l)(2).
5

Centerville’s deemed status extends “to the acts or omissions that are the subject of this

civil action.”8

A prior annual determination under § 233(g) that Centerville is deemed a PHS 

employee—perhaps made well before the conduct related to the suit occurred—cannot 

satisfy § 233(l)(1)’s requirement that the government’s coverage determination account 

for the specifics of the conduct related to the pending lawsuit. We therefore agree with 

the District Court that “just because Centerville has a prior determination from HHS”

does not mean that the government has made its specific coverage determination “for 

purposes of this action.”

9 Centerville cannot remove under § 233(l)(1).

Centerville next argues that it had a right to remove the action under § 233(l)(2) 

because the Attorney General appeared in the state-court proceeding, but did not make a 

specific coverage determination within the fifteen-day statutory period. But this theory 

ignores the plain text of the statute, which permits a state-court defendant to remove the 

action only “[i]f the Attorney General fails to appear in State court within the [fifteenday] time period prescribed.”10 The text of § 233(l)(2) is clear: there is no requirement

that the Attorney General also make a coverage determination within that period, and we 

decline to read that extra-textual language into the statute. The Attorney General 

8 Appendix (“A”) 93–94 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 233(l)(1)).

9 A6.

10 42 U.S.C. § 233(l)(2); In re Price, 370 F.3d 362, 368 (3d Cir. 2004) (“We are to 

begin with the text of a provision and, if its meaning is clear, end there.”).
6

appeared within the statutory period, and so Centerville’s reliance on § 233(l)(2) is 

misplaced.11

B. Federal Officer Removal

Centerville argues in the alternative that removal was proper under the federal 

officer removal statute because it is either a federal officer, or was acting under a federal 

officer while engaged in the conduct at issue in this lawsuit. Neither assertion is correct.

Section 1442(a)(1) “permits certain officers of the United States to remove actions 

to federal court.”12“It also allows ‘private persons who lawfully assist [a] federal officer 

in the performance of his official duty’ to remove a case to federal court.”

13 The statute’s

“‘central aim’ . . . ‘is to protect officers of the federal government from interference by 

litigation in state court while those officers are trying to carry out their duties.’”

14

Contrary to Centerville’s first assertion, it is not a federal officer in its own right. 

Centerville is a private health center that receives federal grant funding. While 

Centerville may be deemed a PHS employee, that status is only relevant “[f]or purposes

11 See, e.g., Allen, 327 F.3d at 1295 (holding that § 233(l)(2) “does not permit” 

removal where the “Attorney General did appear” within the statutory period and advised 

the state court “that no [coverage] decision had been made but one was forthcoming”).

12 Maglioli, 16 F.4th at 404.

13 Mohr v. Trs. of Univ. of Pa., 93 F.4th 100, 104 (3d Cir. 2024) (quoting Watson 

v. Philip Morris Cos., 551 U.S. 142, 151 (2007)).

14 Golden v. N.J. Inst. of Tech., 934 F.3d 302, 309 (3d Cir. 2019) (alterations 

omitted) (quoting Papp v. Fore-Kast Sales Co., 842 F.3d 805, 811 (3d Cir. 2016)).
7

of” the Health Centers Act.

15 The fact that Centerville receives federal funds does not 

otherwise transform it into a federal officer.

16

For a private defendant, like Centerville, to remove a case under § 1442(a)(1), it

must meet four requirements:

(1) the defendant must be a “person” within the meaning of the statute; 

(2) the plaintiff’s claims must be based upon the defendant “acting under”

the United States, its agencies, or its officers; (3) the plaintiff’s claims 

against the defendant must be “for or relating to” an act under color of 

federal office; and (4) the defendant must raise a colorable federal defense 

to the plaintiff’s claims.17

Centerville, as the party seeking removal, bears the burden of establishing that each 

requirement is met.18

The District Court concluded that Centerville did not satisfy the fourth 

requirement because it failed to raise a colorable federal defense. We agree. As explained 

above, Centerville could not properly remove this action under § 233. And § 233 

immunity was the sole basis Centerville provided to satisfy § 1442(a)(1)’s federal15 42 U.S.C. § 233(g)(1)(A).

16 See Watson, 551 U.S. at 151 (distinguishing between a “private person” and a 

“federal officer” for purposes of removal); Maglioli, 16 F.4th at 404–05 (distinguishing 

between “private parties” and “federal actors”), Mohr, 93 F.4th at 104–05 (same).

17 Maglioli, 16 F.4th at 404 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1442(a)(1)).

18 Frederico, 507 F.3d at 193.
8

defense requirement. So Centerville has not met its burden of establishing that it raised a 

colorable federal defense and therefore is not entitled to removal under § 1442(a)(1).

19

II.

For these reasons, we will affirm the District Court’s order granting Doe’s motion 

to remand.

19 The parties, including the United States as amicus, provided the Court with 

helpful supplemental briefing addressing whether § 233’s removal framework should be 

read to foreclose Centerville’s reliance on § 1442(a)(1) as a separate and independent 

basis for removal. This Court has not yet spoken to § 233’s potential exclusivity as a 

means of removal. Because Centerville was not entitled to remove under either statutory 

scheme, however, we need not reach this question to resolve this appeal and therefore 

decline to do so.