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# United States Court of Appeals For the Seventh Cir c uit

No. 12-3037

C HI CA G O B UI L D I N G D E S I G N , P

. C., and J E RE MI AH J O H N S O N , P laintiffs-Appellants ,

v
.
M O N G OL I AN H OUS E, I N C ., RY AN G OL D E N

, M AR K P E R RE S , and J O H N A. W I L S O N

, Defendants-Appellees

.
A ppea l fro m the U ni ted S ta tes Di stri ct Co u rt fo r the No rthern Di stri ct o f Il l i no is, Ea stern Di v i si o n

. No . 1 2 C 1 0 1 0 — Ela ine E. Bucklo , Judg e

. A RGUE D F E B R

UAR Y 13, 2013

— D E C I D E D O C T OB E R 23, 2014

Befor e B AU E R

, S YKE S , and H AMI L

T ON , Cir cuit Judges

. S YKE S , Cir cuit Judge

. Thi s case inv olv es clai ms of copyr i ght i nfr i ngement ar i sing out of a fail e d business r elati onshi p betw een a Chi cago ar chi tectur al fi r m and i ts cli ent. Chi cago Bui lding Desi gn, P

. C. (“CBD”) , s p eci a li zes in the desi gn and constr ucti on of restaur ants. It s cli ent, Mongoli a n House, Inc.,2 No. 12-3037

w anted to renov ate an upscale restaur ant in Chi cago known as “Plan B .” CBD desi gned the inter i or of t he r estaur ant and in June 2006 fi led bluepr ints wi th the Ci ty of Chi cago to obtai n a “r epai r a nd r eplace” bui lding per mi t for the pr oj ect. Mongoli a n House r etai ned CBD to do the constr ucti on w or k, and the fi r m completed the r enov ati ons in 2007. S ometi me in 2008 a CBD employ ee v i si ted the Ci ty’s offi c es
on other b usiness and chanced upon a set of bluepr ints for Plan B that appea r e d t o b e copi es of the fi r m’s desi gns but w er e labeled wi th another ar chi tect’s name. CBD asked the Ci ty for
a copy of the bluepr i nts to deter mine i f they wer e in fact copi es of i ts own. The Ci ty deni ed the r equest, saying the bluepr ints

w er e exempt fr om di sclosur e. In th e meanti me, Mongoli an House d efaulted on payments due CBD for the 2006–2007

w or k. On May 8, 2009, the Ci ty i ssued a new bui lding per mi t for Plan B based on th e 2008 b luepr ints. On Febr uar y 13, 2012—not qui te t hr ee y ear s later —CBD sued Mongoli an House, i ts owner s, and i ts ar chi tect allegi ng copyr i gh t infr in gement and assor ted state-law clai ms. The defendants mov ed to di smi ss the feder al clai ms as ti me-bar r ed under t h e Copyr i ght Act’s thr ee-y ear statute of li m i tati ons. See 17 U.S .C. § 507(b). The di str i ct cour t gr anted the moti on, holdi n g that CBD w as on “inqui ry noti ce” of a p ossi ble copyr i ght v i olati on w hen i ts employ ee h a ppened upon the 2 0 0 8 b luepr i nts at the Ci ty’s offi ces, whi ch occur r ed not late r than December 31, 2008. The li mi tati ons clock star ted to r un on that date, the cour t held, ev en thou g h C B D w as unable to di scov er whether the 2008 bluepr ints infr in g ed i ts copyr i ght. The c our t also r ej ected CBD’s a lter nati v e ar gument under theNo. 12-3037 3
“conti nuing v io l ati on” doctr in e, holdi ng that CBD fai led to allege acts of infr i ngement w i thi n the li mi tati ons per i od. The
cour t r eli nqui shed j u r i sdi cti on ov er the s tate-law clai ms, and CBD appealed.
W e r ev er se. The S upr eme Cour t r ecently c lar i fi ed that the Copyr i ght Act’s statute of li mi tati ons e stabli s hes a “ separ ate
accr ual r ule” so that “each infr ingi n g act star ts a new lim it a
ti ons pe r i od.” Petrella v
. Metr o -Goldwyn-Mayer

, Inc. , 134 S

. Ct. 1962, 1969 (2014). CBD’s complain t a lleges potenti a lly infr ingi ng acts that occur r e d wi thi n the thr ee-y ear look-back per i od fr om the date of sui t, so the c ase sho uld not hav e been di smi ssed. T

o the extent that CBD s e e k s r ecov er y f or ear l i er i nfr i ngi ng acts, the i ssue may hav e to be r ev i si ted on r e m a nd i n li ght of P etr

ella

.

I. Background The plainti ffs ar e C hi cago Bui lding Desi gn, P .C., an
ar ch i tectur al and constr ucti on fi r m, and Jer emi ah Johnson, i ts pr e s id e nt. W

e r efer to them c ollecti v ely as “CBD” u nless the context r equi r es other wi se. The d efendant s a r e Mongoli an House, Inc., a r estaur ant company; R y an Golden and M ar k Per r es, i ts owner s; a nd John A. W i lson, i ts outsi de ar chi tect. W e
r efer to the defendants collecti v ely as “Mongoli an House” unless i t’s necessar y to di stin gui s h betw een them. The case w as di smi ssed for fai lur e to state a clai m under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Feder al Rules of Ci v i l P r ocedur e, so we take the followin g facts fr om the latest i ter ati on of the complaint, accept them a s tr ue, and dr aw r easonable infer ences in CBD’s fav or

. Lars o n v
. United Healthcare Ins., Inc. , 723 F .3d 905, 908 (7th Ci r . 2011).4 No. 12-3037
In 2006 M o n goli an House r etained CBD to desi gn Plan B,
an upscale r estaur ant in Chi cago that i t s o ught to renov ate. Mongoli a n House pr omi sed to p a y CBD $15,000 for ar chi tectur al s er v i ces. After r ecei v ing CBD’s d esi gn, Mongoli a n House
aw ar ded the fi r m the cor r esponding constr ucti on w or k. Under the constr ucti on contr act, Mongoli a n House pr o mi sed to compe ns a t e C BD i n tw o w ays: a cash payment of $259,100, plus 15% of the pr ofi ts ear n ed by Plan B. In June 2006 CBD fi led bluepr ints for the Plan B r enov ati on wi th the Ci ty i n or der to obtai n a “ r epai r and replace” bui lding per mi t for the pr oj ect. The Ci ty i ssued the p er mi t author i zing the w or k to begi n, and CBD c ompleted the renov ati on in Mar ch 2007. CBD r egi ster ed i ts copyr i ght in the bluepr in ts on May 1, 2009. The com p laint a lleges that someti me in 2008, Golden and Per r es, Mongoli an House’s owner s, copi ed CBD’ s b l u epr ints and di str ibuted them to W i lson, who placed hi s name on the copi es and fi l ed them wi th t he Ci ty w i th the intenti on of passing the bluepr i nts off as hi s own. The pur po s e w a s to obtai n a “full” bui lding per m i t for Plan B. In contr a s t to a “r epai r and r eplace” per mi t, a “full” per mi t author i zes cer tai n addi ti onal i nter i or alter ati ons a n d a n incr ease in occupancy on the pr emi ses. On May 8, 2009, the Ci ty i ssued the full p er mi t, and i n accor dance wi th customar y pr acti ce, di str ib u t e d tw o copi es o f t he appr ov ed 2008 bluepr ints to Mongoli an House. T o comply wi th the Ci ty’s r egulati ons, Mongoli an House w as
r equi r ed keep the b luepr ints on the pr emi s es. Golden, Per r es, and W i lson ther eafter used the infr ingi ng b luepr ints to pass anNo. 12-3037 5

i nspecti on on or about Jul y 27, 2009, and used them agai n in other per i odi c in s pecti ons thr ough Januar y 2012.
S ometi m e in 2008, a CBD employ ee v i si ted the Ci ty’s offi c es
on u nr elated zoni ng business and happened to s ee documents that looked l i ke the fi r m’s b luepr ints but b or e Wi l son’s name. At thi s poi nt CBD “di d not know

... whether the Bluepr ints

w er e the ones Plainti ffs fi led wi th the Ci ty of Chi c ago to secur e
a r epai r a nd replace per mi t f or the P r emi ses, s ome modif ie d

v er si on o f the Bluepr ints submi tted for other pur poses, or a wholly di ffer ent no n-infr ingi ng set of bluepr ints copyr i ghted by W i lson.” T

o get mor e infor mati on, CBD fi led a c ompl a i nt wi th the Illi n oi s Depar tment of Fi nanci al and Pr ofessi onal Regu lati on, whi ch responded by letter explai n ing that i t may open an i nv esti gati on. CBD next asked the Ci ty’s B ui ldings Depar tment for a copy of the 2008 bluepr in ts under the Illi noi s Fr eedom of Infor mati on Act. The Depar tment responded that the bluepr i nts wer e exempt fr om di sclosur e. Fi nally , CBD per i odi cally consulted Chi c ago’s Bui ldin g Data W ar ehouse Repor t, i n whi ch the Ci ty a n n o un c e s the i ssuance of bui lding per mi ts. CBD rev i ew ed the May 8, 2009 r epor t a nd l ear ned that the Ci ty i ssued a bui lding per mi t that day based on the 2 008 bluepr i nts Wi lson had submitted. Meanwhi le, Mongoli an House d efaulted on payments due CBD under the par ti es’ contr acts. T o date, Mongo l i an House has pai d CBD $11,000 on the d esi gn contr ac t and j u st $45,000 on the constr ucti on contr act. On Febr uar y 13, 2 012, CBD sued Mongoli an House, Golden, Per r es, and W i l son allegi n g v a r i ous f or m s o f c o p y r i ght i nfr i ngement und e r t he Copyr i ght Act. See 17 U.S .C. §§ 1016 No. 12-3037

et seq

. The i nfr i ngeme n t a l l egati ons cluster into the following categor i es: (1) wh e n G o lden and Per r es c opi ed the or i gi nal b luepr i nts wi thout author i zati on, they v i olated CBD’s ex c l u
si v e r i ght to c opy

, see id. § 106(1); ( 2) when they gav e the bluepr i nts to W i lson, they v i olated CBD’s exclusi v e r i ght to di str ibute, see id. § 106(3); (3) when W i lson put hi s name on the bluepr i nts to pass them off as hi s own, he vi olated CBD’s exclusi v e r i ght to cr eate der i v ati v e w or ks, see id. § 106(2); and (4) when the defendants used the infr ingi ng bluepr ints to pass per i odi c ci ty i nspecti ons, they a gai n vi olated CBD’s exclusiv e
r i ght to d i s tr ib ute, see id. § 106(3). Th e complaint a lso alleged state-law c lai ms based on Mongol i an House’s f ai lur e to pay what i t ow ed CBD for desi gn and constr ucti on w or k. The de f e ndants mov ed to di smi ss the copyr i ght clai ms under Rule 12(b)(6), inv oki ng the Copyr i gh t A ct’s thr ee-y ear st a t ute of li m i tati ons. See § 507(b). Th e di str i ct cour t gr anted the moti on, holdi ng that CB D w a s on “inqui r y noti ce” of a possi ble vi olati on of i ts ri ghts when i ts empl o y e e v i si ted the Ci ty’s offi ces on other business and “saw the bluepr ints, whi ch happened no later than Dec. 31, 2008.” The li mi tati ons per i od began to r un on that date, the j udge concluded, and thi s w as s o
ev en though CBD “could not at that ti me v er i fy that i nfr in gement had occur r ed.” S tar ti ng the li m i tati ons c lock on that date meant that CBD’s sui t—fi led on Febr uar y 13, 2012— w as about si x w eeks too late.
CBD ar gued i n t h e alter nati v e that the infr ingi ng acts consti tu ted a “conti nuing v i olati on” that extended into the thr ee-y ear li mi tati ons per i od. Th e j udge rej ected thi s ar gument
as w ell, holdi ng that the “post-2008 acts” di d not a m o u n t toNo. 12-3037 7

i nfr i ngement because di str ib uti ng an a rchi tectur al w or k to a bui lding inspector i s a “li mi ted publi cati on” not cov er ed by the Copyr i ght Act.
Hav ing di smi ssed the co p yr i ght clai ms, the cour t r elinqui s hed j ur i sdi cti on o v er the s tate-law clai ms. See 28 U.S

. C. § 1 367(c)(3). The cour t enter ed final j u dgment, a nd thi s appeal follow ed.

II. Discussion When a d efendant char ges n oncompli ance wi th the statute
o f l i m i t a t i ons, “[d]i smi ssal under Rule 12(b)(6) [i s] i r r egul a r , fo r the statute of l im i tati ons i s an affi rmati v e defense.” United States v. N. T

rust Co. , 372 F .3d 886, 888 (7th Ci r . 2004). Because “complaints need not anti ci pate and attempt to plead ar ound defenses,” id. , a moti on to di smi ss based on failur e to comply wi th the statute of li mi t a ti ons should be gr anted only wher e “the allegati ons o f t h e complaint i tself set for th ev er ythi ng
necessar y to s ati sfy the affi r mati v e defense.” Unite d States v
. Lewis , 411 F .3d 838, 842 (7th Ci r

. 2005). In o t h er w or ds, the plainti ff must affi r mati v e l y plead hi m self out of cour t; the complaint must “plainly r ev eal[] that [th e ] acti on i s unti mely under the gov er ning st atute of li mi tati ons.” Id

. W e r ev i ew de
nov o a di str i ct cour t’s deci sion to di smi s s a complaint on statute-of-li mi tati ons gr ounds. Indep. T rust Corp. v
. Stewart Info. Servs. Corp. , 665 F .3d 930, 934 (7th Ci r . 2012). The Copyr i ght Act pr ov i des that “[n]o ci v i l acti on shall be maintai ned under the pr ov i si ons of thi s ti tle u nless i t i s commenced wi thi n thr ee y ear s after the c lai m accr ued.”8 No. 12-3037 § 5 0 7(b). Our ci r cui t r ecogni zes a di scov er y r ule in copyr i ght
cases: “[T]he copyr i ght statute of l i m i tati ons star ts to run when the plainti ff lear ns, or should a s a r eason a b l e p e rson hav e lear ned, that the defendant w as v i olati ng hi s r i ghts.” Gaiman v
. McFarl ane, 360 F .3d 644, 6 5 3 (7th Ci r

. 2004); see also T aylor v
. Meirick , 712 F .2d 1112, 1117 (7th Cir

. 1 9 8 3). As thi s case
o r i gi n ally came to us, the p ar ti es’ di spute center ed o n t he pr oper appli cati on of the di s cov er y r ule to the facts alleged in CBD’s complain t. But the S u p r eme Cour t’s r ecent deci s i on in Petrella casts the li mi tati ons questi on in qui te a d i ffer ent li ght. The i ssue i n Petrella w as “whether the equi table defense of laches

... may bar r eli ef on a copyr i ght in f r ingement clai m br ought wi thi n § 507(b)’s thr ee-y ear li mi tati ons per i od.” 134 S

. Ct. at 1967. T

o answe r that questi on, the Cour t fi r st exami ned “how the Copyr i ght Act’s l i mi tati ons p er i od w or ks” and “when a c o p y r i gh t in fr in gement clai m accr ues.” Id. at 1969. Thi s par t of Petrella affects the analysi s her e. The Cour t began its opi ni on in Petrella by noti ng the gener ally a ppli cable r ule of accr ual in l i m i tati ons law: A cause of acti on accr ues, and the li mi tati ons per i od be gi ns to r un, “when [a] p lainti ff has a complete and pr esent c ause of acti on.” Id. (quoti ng Bay Area Laundry & Dry Cleaning Pension T rust Fund v
. Ferber Corp. of Cal. , 522 U.S

. 192, 201 (1997) (al t e r ati on i n or i gi nal)). For copyr i gh t cases in par ti cular , the Cour t explai ned tha t a n i nfr ingement clai m a ccr ues “when an i nfr i ngi ng act occur s.” I d. Mor e speci fi cally

, the Cour t held that the Copyr i ght Act’s statute of l i mit a t i ons establi shes a “separ a te accr ual r ule” for each v i olati on:No. 12-3037 9
Under that r ul e , when a defendant commi ts successiv e vio l a ti ons, the statute of l i mi tati ons
r u ns s epar atel y fr om each vi olati on. Each ti me
an i nfr i ngi n g w or k i s r epr oduced or di str ibuted, the infr i nger commi ts a new wr ong. Each wr ong gi v es r i s e to a di scr ete “clai m” that “ accr ue[s]” a t the ti me the wr ong occur s. In s hor t, each infr ingi ng act star ts a new li m i tati ons per i od. Id. ( f ootnote & ci tati on omi tted). Put mor e succinctly , § 507(b) pr escr ibes “a thr ee- y ear look-back li mi tati ons per i od for all ci v i l clai ms ar i sing under the Copyr i ght Act.” Id. at 1968. In a n i m p o r t a n t footnote wi th potenti al i mpli cati ons for thi s case, the Cour t n oted that although c opyr i ght clai ms gener ally
accr ue when the i nfr ingi n g act occur s, most cir c u it s “ hav e adopted, as an alter nati v e t o the inci dent of inj u r y r ule, a ‘di scov er y r ule,’ whi ch star ts the li mi tati ons per i od when ‘the plainti ff di scov er s, or wi th due di li gence should hav e di scov
er ed, the i nj ur y that for ms the basi s for hi s clai m.’” Id. at 1969 n.4 (quoti ng W

illiam A. G r aham Co. v
. Haughey, 568 F .3d 425, 433 (3d Ci r

. 2009)). The Cour t di d not comment fur ther on the subj ect, but si mply obser v ed that i t had not y et had an oppor
tuni ty to “pass[] on the questi on” of di scov er y accr ual in copyr i ght cases. Id. The Cour t di d, how ev er , sp e c if i cally di sti ngui s h the separ a te-accr u al r ule establi shed in § 507(b) fr om the “conti nui ng v i olati on” doctr i ne: “S epar ately accr uin g har m should not be confuse d w it h har m fr om past vi olati ons that a r e c onti nui ng.” Id. at 1969 n.6; see a lso Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp. v
. Mor gan , 536 U.S

. 101, 1 14–121 ( 202) (di sti ngui sh in g b etw een di scr ete10 No. 12-3037

acts of employment di scr i min ati on, each of whi ch i s indi v i dually acti onable, a nd conduct th a t i s c o n t inu in g a n d “cumulativ e i n effect,” li ke a clai m of hosti le w or k env i r onment). W e take t h e Cour t’s statement to mean that the conti nuing-v i olati on doctr ine does not apply i n thi s context. That under standing i s confi r med by the Cour t’s summar y of thi s par t of i ts opi ni on:

Under the [Cop y r i ght] Act’s thr ee-y ear pr ov i s i on, an infr ingement i s acti onable wi thi n thr ee y ear s, and only thr ee y ear s, of i ts occur
r ence. And the infr inger i s insulated fr om li ab i li ty f or ear l i er infr ingement s o f the s ame w or k. Se e 3 M. Ni mmer & D. N i mmer , Copyr i ght § 12.05[B][1][b] , p

. 12–150.4 (2013) ( “If infr in gement occur r ed wi thi n thr ee y ear s pr i or to fi l ing, the acti on wi ll not be bar r ed ev en i f p r i or infr i ngements by the same par ty as to the same
w or k a r e bar r ed because they occur r ed mor e than thr ee y ear s pr e v i ously”). Thus, when a defendant has engaged (or is alleged to hav e engaged) i n a s e r ie s of di scr ete infr ingi ng acts, the copyr i ght holder ’s sui t or d inar i ly will be ti mely under § 507(b) w i th r espect to mor e recent
ac t s o f i nfr i ngement ( i.e. , acts wi thi n the thr eey ear w i ndow), but unti mely wi th r espect to p r i or acts of the same or si mi lar ki nd.
Petrella , 134 S . Ct. at 1969–70 (footnote omi tted).
Petrella si gni fi cantly changes the focus o f a n a l ysi s in thi s case. As the p ar ti es fr amed the i ssue, the di spute hin ges on theNo. 12-3037 11

star t d a te for the s tatute of li mi tati ons—mor e par ti cular l y , the date on whi ch CBD ei ther actually or “constr u cti v ely” di scov
er ed the c opyr i ght infr ingement. Actual di scov er y i s j ust what i t sounds li ke; “constr u cti v e” d i scov er y r efer s to the d ate on whi ch CBD a s a r easonably di li gent plainti ff should hav e di scov er ed that the defendants wer e vi olati n g i ts r i ghts. See Gaiman , 3 60 F .3d at 653. The d i s tr i ct cour t held that the statute of li mi tati o n s b e gan to r un when CBD had “ in qui r y noti ce,” i .e., knowledge that w ould hav e l e d a r easonable per son to star t i nv esti gati ng the possi bi li ty t h a t hi s r i ghts had b een
v i olated.
But “i nqui r y n oti ce” i s not the s ame as actual or constr uct iv e di scov er y

. In another context, the S u pr eme Cour t h a s explai ned that when a li mi tati ons per io d i s k ey ed to the plainti f f ’ s d i scov er y of hi s inj ur y , “inqui r y n oti c e” does not star t t h e l im i tati ons clock. See Merck & Co., Inc. v
. Reynolds , 559 U.S

. 633, 651–53 (2010). In Merck the Cour t w as asked to i nter p r et the statute of li mi tati ons fo r s e cu r i ti es fr aud, 28 U.S

. C. § 1658(b)(1), whi ch pr ov i des in r elev ant par t that an acti on for
secur i ti es fr a ud must be br ought “not later than

... 2 y ear s after the d is cov er y of the facts consti tuti ng the v i olati on.” S ome ci r cui ts had equated “di scov er y” wi th “ inqui r y no t ic e,” i .e., “the p oi nt a t whi ch a plainti ff possesses a quantum of infor mati on suffi ci ently suggesti v e of wr ongdoi ng that he should conduct a fur ther i nqui r y” Merck , 559 U.S

. a t 6 5 0 (inter nal quotati on mar ks omi tted). The Cour t fi r mly r ej ected that under standing of “di scov er y”:

W e conclude that the l i mi tati ons per i od in § 1658(b)(1) begin s to run once the plainti ff di d12 No. 12-3037
di scov er or a r easonably di li gent plainti ff w ould hav e “di scov er [ed] the facts consti tuti ng the

v i olati on”—whi chev er comes fi r s t. In deter mini ng the t i me at whi ch “di scov er y” of those “facts” occur r ed, ter ms s uch as “inqui r y noti ce” and “ stor m w ar nings” may be useful to the extent tha t t h e y i denti fy a ti me when the facts

w ould hav e p r ompted a r easonably di li gent plainti ff to begi n inv esti gati ng. But the li mi tati ons per i od does not begi n to r un u n ti l the plainti ff ther eafter di s cov e r s or a r easonably di li gent plainti ff w ould hav e dis cov er ed “the facts consti tuti ng the v i olati on”

... i r r especti v e of whether the actual plainti ff under took a r easonably di li gent i nv esti gati on. Id. at 653. Merc k i n v olv ed a statutor y di scov er y r ule; in copyr i ght
cases the di scov er y r u le i s a common-law gloss. S ti ll, Merck clar i fi ed that “i n qui r y noti ce” i s not a s ubsti tu t e for actual or constr ucti v e di scov er y

, a n d th a t c l ar i fi cati on i s instr ucti v e h er e. The concept of inqui r y noti ce may help to i denti fy the ti me a t whi ch a r easonable plainti ff c an be expected to star t inv esti gati ng a possi

b le vi olati on of hi s r i ghts, but i t does not i tself tr i gger the statute of li mi tati ons. Accor dingly , the d i str i ct cour t should not hav e used inqui r y noti ce as the star ti ng date for the statute of li mi tati ons. Mor e fundamentally

, how ev er

, in li ght of Petrella , w e now k now that the r i ght questi on to ask in copyr i ght c ases i s whether the complaint contai n s allegati ons of inf r in g ing actsNo. 12-3037 13
that occur red wi thi n the thr ee-y ear look-back per i od fr om the date on whi ch the sui t w a s fi led. Her e, the answer to that questio n i s plain ly “y es.” The complaint alleges that Per r es, G o l d en, and W i lson d i str ibuted the infr in gi ng bluepr ints to bui lding i ns p ector s dur in g inspecti ons in J uly 2009 and per i odi cally ther eafter

, thr ough Januar y 2012. The s e acts fall

w it h in the thr ee-y ear l i mi tati ons p er i od fr om the date of su it (Febr uar y 13, 2012). Mongoli a n House ar gues that these “post-2008 acts” do not consti tute c opyr i ght in fr ingement because di st r ibuting an
ar ch i tectur al w or k to bui l ding inspector s i s a “li mi ted publi cati on” that falls outsi de the Copyr i ght Act. M ongoli an House a dv ances thi s ar gument in r e sponse to CBD’s f allback posi ti on that the i n fr ingement alleged her e should be constr u ed as a conti nuous v i olati on that str etched into the li mi tati ons per i od. As w e hav e explai ned, how ev er , the “conti nuing
v i olati on” doctr i n e i s incompatible wi th t h e s epar ate-accr ual

r u le of § 507(b), so CBD’s alter nati v e ar gument i s no longer in the pi ctur e. T o the extent that the “ li mi te d publi c ati on” ar gument i s addr essed to the mer i ts r ather than the statute of li m i tati ons, i t

w as mi sapplie d her e. The “li mi ted publi c ati on” concept w as dev eloped unde r the copyr i ght r egi me that exi sted betw een 1909 and 1 978, w h e n c o pyr i ght w as gov er n ed by both the feder al Copyr i ght Act of 1 9 09 and state comm o n law

. See J AN E C. G I N S B URG & R OB E R T A. G OR

MAN , C O PYR

I G HT L A

W 108–09 (2012). At common law and unde r t h e 1909 Act, an author ’s abi li ty to enfor ce hi s ri ghts in a w or k depended in par t
on whether the w or k w as p u b l i shed, whether i t w as mar ked14 No. 12-3037

wi th a c opyr i ght not i ce, and whether the copyr i ght w as
r egi ster ed. Id. Th e Copyr i ght Act of 1976 aboli shed state copyr i ght law and changed the rules gov er ning t h e e ffect of

r egi str ati on and p ub l icati on on the author ’s r i ghts and remedi es underthe Act. Id. at 114–15.
Because the w a y in whi ch a n author publi sh e d hi s w or k affected h i s r i ghts a nd r emedi es under both t he old and new copyr i ght r egi m es, some cour t s d ev eloped the concept of “li mi ted publi cati on” to mi ti gate s ome of the har s her effects of these r u les. Id. at 10 9 ; s e e a l s o 2 M E L VI L L E B. N I MM E R & D A VI D N I MM E R , N I MM E R O N C O PYRI G HT § 8.11[C][1] (2014). The b asi c i dea i s that an a uthor doesn’t sur r ender r i ghts in a w or k si m p ly by s har i ng i t wi th a small gr oup of people for li mi ted pur poses. See G I N S B URG & G OR MA N, s u p ra , at 109. The cases Mongoli an House ci tes for the li mi ted-publi cati on pr inci ple ar e of thi s type; they hold that an author ’s p ubl ic a t i on of hi s w or k to a li m i ted gr oup for a li mi ted pur pose (for example, “publi shing”
an ar chi tectur a l w or k to bui lding inspecto r s ) does n ot f or fei t hi s r i ghts. See, e.g. , Data Cash Sy s ., Inc. v
. JS&A Grp., Inc. , 6 2 8 F .2d 1038 ( 7th Ci r

. 1980); McIntosh v
. N. Cal. Uni v e r s al Enters. Co. , 670 F

. Supp. 2d 1069 (E.D. Cal. 2009); Kunycia v
. M elville Realty Co. , 755 F

. S u pp. 566 (S .D.N.Y

. 1990); In t o w n Enters., Inc. v
. Barnes , 721 F

. Supp. 1263 (N.D. Ga. 1989); Aitken, Hazen, Hoffman, Miller

, P

. C. v
. Empire Const. Co. , 542 F

. S upp. 252 (D. Neb. 1982); Kisling v
. Rothsch i ld, 388 S o. 2d 1310 (Fla. Di st. Ct. App. 1980).
S o the l i mi ted-pub l i c a t i o n p r in c ip l e p r o t e c t s a u th o r s a g a in s t
a for fei tur e of thei r r i ghts. But i t’s not a t all clear what bear ing i t has on the questi on of infr in gement. Mongoli an H o use hasNo. 12-3037 15

not explai n ed how the pr inci p le appli es to it s o w n conduct as
a n accused i nfr i nger or pr ov i des a d efense to copyr ig h t li abi l i ty

. The Copyr i ght Act pr ov i des tha t “ [ a]ny one who v i olates any of t he e x c lusi v e r i ghts of the copyr i ght owner

... i s an i nfr i nger

. ” 17 U.S .C. § 501(a). As r elev ant her e, the exclusi v e
r i ghts of the copyr i ght owner include the following: (1) to r epr oduce the copyr i ghted w or k in copi es
or phonor ecor ds; (2) to p r epa r e der i v ati v e w or ks based on the copyr i ghted w or k; [and] (3) to di str ibute copi es or phonor ec or ds of the copyr i ghted w or k to the public by sale or other tr ansfer of owner shi p, or by renta l , lease, or lending[.] Id. § 106. The c omplaint all e ges that Golden, Per r es, and W i lson di str ibuted the i nfr i ngi ng bluepr ints to ci ty b u i l ding inspector s at per i odi c i n s pecti ons fr om July 2 009 thr ough Januar y 2012, in
v i olati on of CBD’s r i ghts un d e r § 106(3). These acts occur r ed wi thi n the thr ee-y ear look-back per i od fr om the d a te of sui t and ar e at least potenti ally a cti onable. Mongoli an House has not dev eloped a substanti v e a r gu m e n t th a t these post-2008 acts do not quali fy as acts of infr ingement based on the text of the statute, though w e can cer tai n ly env i s i on one. A copyr i ght
owner has the exclus iv e r i ght to di str ib ute hi s w or k “ to the publi c b y s a le or other tr ansfer o f o w n e r s hi p, or by r ental, lease, or lending.” Id. § 106(3). It’s a n o p en questi on whether16 No. 12-3037
di str ibuting an u nlawfully copi ed ar chi tectu r a l w or k to a bui lding i nspector quali fi e s a s a v i olati on of the author ’s exclusi v e r i ght to di str ib ute hi s w or k “ to the public by sale o r other transfer of ownership, or by r ental, lease, or lending .” As far as w e can tell, thi s i s a questi on of fi r st i mpr essi on in thi s ci r cui t and appar ently in other ci rcui ts as w ell. As a mor e gener al matter

, the scope of the exclusi v e r i ght to di str ib ute
u n d e r § 106(3) i s a di ffi cult i ssue on whi ch c our ts hav e dis

agr eed. 1 See generally 2 N I MM E R & N I MM E R , supra , § 8.11[C][1]. Mongoli a n House’s ar gument on thi s poi nt i s at best under dev e l o p ed. The pr oper s cope of § 106(3)’s exclusi v e r i ght to di str ibute has i mpli cati ons far bey ond thi s case ; it w o uld be i mpr udent for us to v entur e an opi ni on based on inadequate br i efing. See Judge v
. Quinn , 612 F .3d 537, 557 (7th Ci r

. 2 010) (“Per f unct o r y and undev eloped ar guments

... ar e w ai v ed.” (inter n al quotati on mar ks omi tted)). The most we can say at thi s junctur e i s that the case should not hav e been di smi ssed on the p leadin gs based on the statute

1 “ Di stri b u t e” i s no t a defi ned term i n the Co pyri ght A ct, b ut the l an gua ge
o f 1 7 U .S .C. § 1 0 6(3 ) i s a l mo st i denti ca l to the A ct’s defi ni ti o n o f “ pub l i ca
ti on.” S ee 1 7 U .S .C. § 1 0 1

. There is suppo rt b o th fo r a nd a ga i nst rea di ng the tw o terms a s co ex tensi v e. See g e neral ly 2 M E L VIL L E B. N IM M E R & D A V I D N I M M E R , N IM M E R ON C OPYRIG HT § 8 .1 1 [C][ 1 ] (2 0 1 4 ) (co l lecti ng l egi sl a ti v e hi sto ry a nd ca ses). The di stri ct co urt sta ted tha t “ [t]he S ev enth Ci rcui t ha s hel d tha t [the] ri ght of di stri b ut i o n i n the Co pyri ght A ct i s syno nymo us wi th the ri ght o f pub li ca ti o n.” Tha t w a s a mi sta ke. The co urt ci ted K ennedy
v
. Na t ional Juv enile D etention Ass’n , 1 8 7 F .3 d 6 9 0 , 6 9 7 (7 th Ci r

. 1 99 9 ), a s suppo rt fo r thi s pro po si ti o n, b u t the ci ted pa s sa ge a ctua l l y a pp e a r s i n a pa rti a l di ssent. A s w e’v e n o t ed, the meri ts questi o n here i s one o f fi rst i mpressi o n i n thi s ci rcui t.No. 12-3037 17
of li mi tatio ns

. CBD’s complain t alleges that the defendants commi tt e d i nfr ingi ng acts wi thin the thr ee-y ear look-back per i od befor e sui t. The li mi ted-publi cati on pr in ci ple does not take these acts outsi de the Act as a categor i cal matter

. The case
can mov e f or w ar d, though much remains f or fur ther dev elopment, both legally and factually

. A final w or d on the statute-of

- l im itati ons: If on remand CBD c onti nues to clai m a r i ght to r ecov er for infr ingi n g a cts that occur r ed i n 2008, outsi de the thr ee-y ear look-back per i od, the par ti es wi ll need to addr ess whether P etr ella abr ogates the di scov er y r ule i n copyr i ght cases. W e expr ess no o p ini on on that questi on today

. The par ti es hav e not br i efed i t, 2 and i t may not a r i se on r emand. W e note that C BD seeks statutor y damages in li eu of actual damages; a n a w ar d of statutor y damages i s cumulativ e in natur e, cov er ing “all infr ingements i nv olv ed i n the acti on, wi th r espect to any one w or k.” 17 U.S

. C. § 504(c)(1). S o Petrella ’s effect on the di scov er y r ule may not need to be deci ded in thi s case. W e leav e t h at matter to be
sor ted out on r emand.
For the f or egoi ng reasons, w e R E V E RS E and R E MAND for fur ther pr oceedi ngs consi stent wi th thi s opini on.

2 Nei ther si de fi l ed a Ru l e 2 8 (j ) l etter rega rdi ng the effect o f Petrella o n thi s ca s e. SeeF E D

. R

. A P P

. P

. 2 8 (j ).