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*********************************************** 
STATE OF CONNECTICUT v. JOSEPH

LOUIS IMPERIALE

(SC 20391)

Robinson, C. J., and Palmer, McDonald, D’Auria,

Mullins, Kahn and Ecker, Js.*

Syllabus

The defendant, who had been on probation after his conviction of possession

of child pornography in the second degree, appealed from the trial

court’s judgment revoking his probation. In connection with the defendant’s child pornography conviction, the sentencing court had imposed a

term of imprisonment followed by a period of probation with conditions,

including sex offender treatment. After being released from prison, the

defendant entered an inpatient sex offender treatment facility for treatment. Before completing his course of treatment there, however, he

was discharged on the basis of his failure to adhere to various conditions

established by the facility for continued placement there. The defendant

subsequently was charged with violating his probation as a result of his

failure to complete sex offender treatment. The defendant filed a motion

to dismiss the violation of probation charge, contending, inter alia, that

the probationary condition requiring him to successfully complete the

sex offender treatment program violated his due process rights. The

trial court denied the motion and found the defendant to be in violation

of his probation. On appeal from the trial court’s judgment revoking

the defendant’s probation, held that the trial court properly denied the

defendant’s motion to dismiss the violation of probation charge: the

defendant’s claim that his placement at the treatment facility violated his

right to due process on the ground that it was the functional equivalent

of incarceration was unavailing, as the restrictions imposed on persons

receiving treatment at the facility were appreciably less onerous than

those placed on prison inmates, and, thus, residency at the facility

was materially different from confinement in a prison; moreover, the

defendant’s placement at the facility furthered the rehabilitative and

public safety purposes of probation, and, because the defendant’s probation officer reasonably concluded that the defendant’s placement at the

facility was the best, most appropriate option under the circumstances,

that probationary condition did not offend principles of due process;

furthermore, there was no merit to the defendant’s claim that subjecting

him to the highly restrictive conditions at the facility violated his right

to equal protection on the ground that he was placed there due to his

status as a homeless person upon his release from prison, as that claim

foundered on the trial court’s factual finding that he was not referred

to the facility because he was homeless, and the defendant’s claim that

requiring him to attend the sex offender treatment program at the facility

as a condition of probation violated his eighth amendment right to be

free from cruel and unusual punishment also failed when, as in the

present case, the condition of probation was reasonably necessary to

accomplish the legitimate goals of probation.

Argued January 23, 2020—officially released January 7, 2021**

Procedural History

Information charging the defendant with violation of

probation, brought to the Superior Court in the judicial

district of Litchfield, where the court, Danaher, J.,

denied the defendant’s motion to dismiss and rendered

judgment revoking the defendant’s probation, from

which the defendant appealed. Affirmed.

James B. Streeto, senior assistant public defender,

for the appellant (defendant).

Matthew A. Weiner, assistant state’s attorney, with
whom, on the brief, were David S. Shepack, former

state’s attorney, David R. Shannon, supervisory assistant state’s attorney, and Gregory L. Borrelli, assistant

state’s attorney, for the appellee (state).
Opinion

PALMER, J. The defendant, Joseph Louis Imperiale,

appeals from the judgment of the trial court, Danaher,

J., revoking his probation and sentencing him to an

effective term of imprisonment of two years. He claims

that the trial court improperly denied his motion to

dismiss the violation of probation charge because the

condition of probation on which the charge was predicated, namely, that he participate in an inpatient sex

offender treatment program, violated his fourteenth

amendment rights to due process and equal protection,

as well as the constitutional prohibition against the

imposition of cruel and unusual punishment. We disagree and, accordingly, affirm the judgment of the

trial court.

The following undisputed facts and procedural history are relevant to our resolution of this appeal. On

January 4, 2013, the defendant pleaded guilty to illegal

possession of child pornography in the second degree,

in violation of General Statutes § 53a-196e.1 At the time

of the guilty plea, the assistant state’s attorney informed

the trial court, Ginocchio, J., that, following a police

investigation into the trafficking of child pornography,

the defendant had confessed to the possession of

numerous images on his personal computer depicting

young children involved in various sex acts. Before

accepting the defendant’s plea, the court explained to

the defendant that he was waiving certain constitutional

rights by pleading guilty, and the defendant stated that

he understood he was doing so. The court also

explained to the defendant that, under the plea agreement, he would be sentenced to a term of imprisonment

of ten years, suspended after four years, followed by

ten years of probation, the conditions of which would

include sex offender registration and ‘‘most likely . . .

sex offender evaluation and treatment and many other

conditions that may involve contact with children and

anything [that the Office of Adult Probation] believe[s]

is reasonably related to this charge.’’ The court further

advised the defendant that if, following the completion

of a presentence investigative report, the court determined that the sentence contemplated under the plea

agreement was appropriate, the defendant would not be

allowed to withdraw his guilty plea without the court’s

permission. When asked whether he understood, the

defendant responded that he did. The defendant also

indicated that he understood that he would be permitted

to withdraw his plea if the court, after reviewing the

presentence investigation report, determined that the

sentence agreed on by the parties was not appropriate.

Following this colloquy, the court accepted the defendant’s guilty plea after finding that he had made it knowingly and voluntarily and with the assistance of

competent counsel.

The trial court subsequently determined that the sen-
tence negotiated by the parties was appropriate, and,

on March 15, 2013, the court sentenced the defendant

in accordance with the terms of the plea agreement.

At the time of sentencing, the court also recounted the

following standard and special conditions of probation,

as expressly set forth under the plea agreement: ‘‘[S]ex

offender registration, sex offender evaluation and treatment through [a Connecticut Association for the Treatment of Sexual Offenders] provider,’’ and compliance

‘‘with all recommended sex offender conditions of probation as deemed appropriate by the supervising [probation] officer.’’ Moreover, in imposing sentence, the

court emphasized the seriousness of the crime of possession of child pornography insofar as it fuels and

perpetuates the ‘‘heinous’’ and ‘‘horrendous’’ sex trade

that so grievously exploits and harms young children.

In August, 2015, after completing a short term sex

offender treatment program for inmates, the defendant

was released on parole to a transitional housing setting

in Torrington. His parole was revoked almost immediately, however, after it was discovered that, just two

weeks after his release, he was using a public computer

to access child pornography. He was returned to prison

on September 1, 2015.

On April 5, 2017, the defendant, who was still incarcerated, first met with his probation officer, Nicole

Grella, via video conference. During this intake meeting,

the defendant and Grella reviewed his offense, sentence

and the conditions of his probation. They also discussed

additional details about the defendant’s life, including

housing, his support network, and his concerns and

anticipated needs for his impending probation. At that

time, the defendant explained to Grella that he believed

that he had reoffended so soon after being paroled in

2015 because of the abrupt transition from prison to

community based, independent living without sufficient

structure and support. The defendant further told Grella

that he needed additional supervision and counseling

to overcome his acknowledged addiction to child pornography and to successfully complete his period of

probation.

Prior to this video conference, Grella reviewed the

defendant’s presentence investigation report and

records. As a result of this research, Grella learned,

among other things, that the defendant had committed

a violent sex offense as a juvenile and that he had failed

to successfully complete an inpatient sex offender treatment program at that time. Moreover, while participating in that program, the defendant exhibited

‘‘pervasive[ly] negative behavior’’ and admitted that he

had devised a plan to be alone with one of the female

staff members and to molest her. In addition, the defendant had been deemed a ‘‘high risk to sexually reoffend’’

on the basis of a sex offender evaluation conducted

after he was sentenced to serve time in prison in 2013.
In late March, 2017, Grella spoke with the defendant’s

mother to discuss housing options for the defendant

upon his release from prison. The defendant’s mother

indicated to Grella that she was in the process of moving

out of state but would be able to pay for her son’s

housing while he remained on probation. Grella spoke

with the defendant’s mother again in early June, 2017,

at which time she told Grella that she had secured a bed

for the defendant at the same residence in Torrington

where he had resided briefly following his short-lived

release on parole.

Grella thereafter told the defendant that she had

decided to refer him to the January Center (center), an

inpatient sex offender treatment facility in Montville,

for placement there upon his discharge from prison.

Grella explained that the center offers the most intensive and restrictive sex offender treatment program

available through the Judicial Branch’s Court Support

Services Division and is operated by an entity known as

The Connection, Inc., which runs numerous treatment

programs throughout the state. The typical length of a

stay at the center, where residents live in individual

rooms and participate in daily therapy, is three to six

months, depending on the resident’s progress. The facility is located on the grounds of the Corrigan Correctional Institution and is surrounded by a high, exterior

fence topped with razor wire. Although residents of the

center may not leave the facility without permission

and a staff escort, the building is unlocked, and staff

members are instructed not to restrain or touch a probationer seeking to leave without proper authorization.

If a resident who is on probation does leave the center

without such authorization, however, he or she may be

charged with a violation of probation.

The defendant was initially resistant to being placed

at the center, in large measure because he believed that

his referral to such a restrictive treatment facility was

unduly harsh and punitive. He also told Grella that his

placement at the center was not warranted because his

mother had secured housing for him and he had already

lined up a possible employment opportunity. Over the

course of several phone calls with the defendant, however, Grella explained in detail why she believed that

placement at the center was the most appropriate discharge option for him. On the basis of her expertise, it

was Grella’s view that the conditions imposed by the

center, including daily therapy sessions, would afford

the defendant the best structure and opportunity for

his successful reentry into the community. Grella also

discussed other benefits of the defendant’s placement

at the center, including its minimal cost to him and his

mother, and the support and assistance it would afford

him when he returned to the community upon his departure from the facility, a consideration that the defendant

himself had identified as critical to a successful transi-
tion. Over time, the defendant grew more agreeable to

his placement at the center, and he assured Grella that

he would abide by the center’s rules. He also told Grella

that he understood that, if he refused to comply with

those rules or any other aspect of his discharge plan,

he would be in violation of his probation.

On June 28, 2017, the defendant signed the conditions

of his probation, thereby acknowledging his obligation

to abide by them. Among the court-ordered special probationary conditions, probation officials were authorized to require the defendant to participate in a

residential sex offender treatment program, and the

defendant was required to complete sex offender evaluation and treatment through an approved provider and

to comply with all other conditions deemed appropriate

by his probation officer in view of his offense. More

specifically, the defendant expressly acknowledged the

requirement imposed by his probation officer that he

reside and receive treatment at the ‘‘[c]enter, a secure

[twenty-four] hour residential treatment facility/program,’’ and he further agreed to ‘‘follow the . . . [c]enter’s restrictions, policies and procedures until

satisfactory completion of the program.’’ Finally, the

defendant acknowledged that leaving the center without permission would constitute a violation of his probation.

Upon his release from prison on July 14, 2017, the

defendant commenced his placement at the center. He

thereafter signed sex offender treatment and accountability agreements pursuant to which he was required

to abide by the center’s policies and rules, including

the requirements that he ‘‘not engage in any violence,

threats or intimidation’’ or ‘‘in any behavior that

adversely [a]ffects the treatment or confidentiality of

any other client,’’ and that he ‘‘abide by all of the rules

of [t]he . . . [c]enter in order to [coexist] . . . with

other clients, staff members and volunteers.’’ He also

agreed to ‘‘be respectful to all staff and clients [of the

center],’’ including ‘‘allowing [them] personal space, not

getting involved in other client’s concerns or staff member’s undertakings, not swearing, being aware of how

[his] behavior or words can make people feel uncomfortable, analyzing situations [that] may trigger anger

before reacting, and not causing . . . disturbances

within the . . . [c]enter community.’’ In addition, the

defendant acknowledged that any violation of these

rules would result in his being issued a ticket and in

notification to his probation officer. Finally, the defendant was informed that repeated violations could lead

to his immediate dismissal from the center.

Although the defendant completed the initial phase

of his treatment program, on October 30, 2017, before

completing that program, he was discharged from the

center because of his failure to adhere to various conditions established by the center for continued placement
there. According to a discharge summary prepared by

the center, the defendant’s treatment was terminated

as a result of his ‘‘[noncompliance] with program rules

and expectations and disorderly conduct’’ after receiving multiple disciplinary tickets for engaging in a pattern

of wilful disobedience and disrespect that adversely

affected the therapeutic environment at the center,

repeatedly becoming confrontational toward staff, verbally threatening to harm staff, propping open the door

to his room when it was supposed to be closed and

locked,2 and not completing his assigned chores. On

one of those occasions, the center staff called the state

police to respond to the defendant’s behavior. Shortly

thereafter, the staff concluded that they had exhausted

all efforts to work productively with the defendant and

that he had become ‘‘a safety concern to himself and

the community.’’

The defendant subsequently was charged with violating his probation for failing to complete sex offender

treatment at the center. The defendant moved to dismiss the charge, claiming that the probationary condition requiring him to successfully complete the center

treatment program violated his rights under the due

process clause of the fourteenth amendment to the

United States constitution.3

In support of this claim, the

defendant asserted that the conditions at the center

were so severe and restrictive as to constitute the functional equivalent of incarceration and, therefore, were

impermissibly onerous as a matter of law. The defendant further claimed that, even if his placement at the

center was not tantamount to incarceration, the restrictions imposed on him there nevertheless violated his

right to due process because, in light of his background

and offense history, those restrictions were not justified

as reasonably related to his rehabilitation. Finally, the

defendant asserted a third due process violation,

namely, that he had been denied adequate notice of his

placement at the center when the trial court sentenced

him and placed him on probation.

In addition, the defendant maintained that his referral

to the center violated his right to equal protection under

the federal constitution4 because the referral was predicated on his status as a homeless person. Finally, the

defendant claimed that his placement at the center violated the constitutional prohibition against cruel and

unusual punishment5 because he was placed at the center, and thereby subjected to its punitive conditions,

on account of his homelessness.6

Following an evidentiary hearing, the trial court,

Danaher, J.,

7

issued a thorough memorandum of decision in which the court credited the state’s witnesses,

rejected each of the defendant’s claims and, accordingly, denied his motion to dismiss. With respect to the

defendant’s contention that his placement at the center

constituted a due process violation because it was tanta-
mount to incarceration, the trial court stated: ‘‘[T]he

defendant was not incarcerated at the [c]enter. The

evidence presented at the hearing . . . makes clear

that a probationer leaving the . . . [c]enter would not

be charged with escape. The . . . [c]enter is not staffed

by correctional officers. It does not contain cells; it has

individual rooms. Residents at the . . . [c]enter leave

for religious services and medical appointments.

Although the . . . [c]enter is on the grounds of a correctional facility and . . . is surrounded by a fence

topped with barbed wire, if a probationer referred to

the . . . [c]enter elected to leave without permission,

that person could walk through the gate or have the

gate opened for them. The staff members at the . . .

[c]enter are specifically instructed not to touch or try

to restrain a probationer seeking to leave the [c]enter

without permission. It is true that, in the foregoing

event, the probationer would be charged with violation

of probation, but the latter fact does not compel the

conclusion that referral to the . . . [c]enter is ‘essentially’ incarceration.’’

In rejecting the defendant’s claim that his placement

at the center violated his right to due process because

his referral there was unreasonable, the trial court

explained: ‘‘[T]he Office of Adult Probation engaged in

a careful process that led to the conclusion that referral

to the . . . [c]enter was appropriate for this defendant.

Indeed, the defendant specifically requested additional

help in effecting a transition from a correctional institution due to his inability to refrain from obtaining child

pornography. He was, after an analysis, designated as

a high risk to reoffend, and the . . . [c]enter was a

placement designed to respond to such individuals. It

offered group treatment and daily individual treatment.

It offered help to those seeking employment and assistance obtaining housing and other services. The defendant’s placement at the . . . [c]enter was not in any

way arbitrary; it was a carefully selected, eminently

reasonable placement for a sex offender such as this

defendant.’’ The court further explained: ‘‘[T]he evidence adduced at the hearing fully supports the court’s

finding that the defendant’s placement at [the] [c]enter

was based on empirical evidence, including an understanding of the defendant’s offenses and offense history; his rapid reoffense after his initial release in 2015;

his own request for additional assistance in effecting a

transition; the nature of the . . . [c]enter; and the programs available at [the] [c]enter for high risk offenders.

The defendant’s placement at the . . . [c]enter was

hardly unreasonable; on the contrary, it was completely

appropriate. That placement comports with all requirements that must apply to a condition of probation.’’

Finally, the trial court rejected the defendant’s equal

protection and cruel and unusual punishment claims,

both of which were predicated on his contention that

he was referred to the center on the basis of his home-
lessness, because the testimony adduced at the hearing

on the motion to dismiss established that he had not

been placed there for that reason. Rather, the court

found that, ‘‘although homelessness is a factor in deciding whether to place a [probationer] in the . . . [c]enter, such placement is based primarily on whether the

probationer is a high risk sex offender, not on whether

the [probationer] is homeless,’’ and, further, in the present case, the defendant ‘‘was not placed at the . . .

[c]enter because he was homeless; he was placed at

the . . . [c]enter because he is a high risk offender.’’

Thereafter, the trial court found that the defendant

had violated his probation by virtue of his improper

actions and conduct at the center, and his failure to

complete the treatment program there due to that misconduct. The court revoked the defendant’s probation

and sentenced him to a term of imprisonment of six

years, execution suspended after two years, followed

by four years of probation. This appeal followed.8

In this court, the defendant renews the constitutional

claims that he raised in the trial court, which we address

in turn. Before doing so, however, we briefly summarize

the principles relating to probation that guide our analysis of the defendant’s claims. ‘‘[P]robation is, first and

foremost, a penal alternative to incarceration . . . .

[Its] purpose . . . is to provide a period of grace in

order to aid the rehabilitation of a penitent offender;

to take advantage of an opportunity for reformation

which actual service of the suspended sentence might

make less probable. . . . [P]robationers . . . do not

enjoy the absolute liberty to which every citizen is entitled, but only . . . conditional liberty properly dependent on observance of special [probation] restrictions.

. . . These restrictions are meant to [ensure] that the

probation serves as a period of genuine rehabilitation

and that the community is not harmed by the probationer’s being at large.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.)

State v. Faraday, 268 Conn. 174, 180, 842 A.2d 567

(2004).

Nevertheless, because probation is itself ‘‘a conditional liberty,’’ once granted, it is ‘‘a constitutionally

protected interest’’; (internal quotation marks omitted)

State v. Orr, 199 Conn. App. 427, 434–35, 237 A.3d 15

(2020); and, therefore, ‘‘[a]ny restriction . . . [on] a

probationer’s otherwise inviolable constitutional rights

can be justified only to the extent actually required by

legitimate demands of the probation process in any

given case.’’ State v. Smith, 207 Conn. 152, 166, 540 A.2d

679 (1988). In other words, principles of due process

require that probationary conditions must be reasonably related to the purposes of probation, with appropriate regard for the background and circumstances of

the individual probationer, a requirement that is also

mandated statutorily under General Statutes § 53a-30.9

In view of the nature and goals of probation, however,
and because any number of probationary conditions or

combinations thereof are likely to be suitable in any

particular case, the trial court ‘‘has an exceptional

degree of flexibility in determining [the] terms [of probation]’’; (internal quotation marks omitted) State v.

Silas S., 301 Conn. 684, 692, 22 A.3d 622 (2011); and

we therefore review those terms for abuse of discretion

only. See id. Thus, ‘‘[i]f it appears that the trial court

reasonably was satisfied that the terms of probation

had a beneficial purpose consistent with the defendant’s

reformation and rehabilitation, then the order must

stand. . . . In reviewing the issue of discretion, we do

so according it every reasonable presumption in favor

of the trial court’s ruling.’’ (Internal quotation marks

omitted.) Id.

‘‘The success of probation as a correctional tool is

in large part tied to the flexibility within which it is

permitted to operate. . . . In this regard, modifications

of probation routinely are left to the [O]ffice of [A]dult

[P]robation. When the court imposes probation, a defendant thereby accepts the possibility that the terms of

probation may be modified or enlarged in the future

pursuant to . . . § 53a-30. . . . To this end, probation

officers shall use all suitable methods to aid and encourage [a probationer] and to bring about improvement in

his [or her] conduct and condition.’’ (Citations omitted;

footnote omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.)

State v. Faraday, supra, 268 Conn. 180–82. Accordingly,

it is well established that, depending on the circumstances of a particular case, the Office of Adult Probation properly may impose conditions of probation that

place significant restrictions on a probationer’s liberty

during the term of his or her probation, if such restrictions are reasonably necessary. See, e.g., State v. Reid,

204 Conn. 52, 55, 526 A.2d 528 (1987). Of course, a

defendant may challenge the probationary condition he

or she is alleged to have violated on the ground that it

was unreasonable and, therefore, unlawful. See State

v. Smith, 255 Conn. 830, 840, 769 A.2d 698 (2001); see

also Practice Book § 41-8 (8) (defendant may file motion

to dismiss charge on ground that ‘‘the law defining

the offense charged is unconstitutional or otherwise

invalid’’). Indeed, ‘‘[e]ven prior to the violation of probation hearing, if an individual on probation believes that

the [O]ffice of [A]dult [P]robation [has] imposed an

unreasonable condition, he may request a hearing pursuant to . . . § 53a-30 (c).’’ State v. Smith, supra, 255

Conn. 840. If a condition of probation is determined to

be invalid, a revocation of probation predicated on a

violation of that condition also is unlawful. See, e.g.,

State v. Cooley, 3 Conn. App. 410, 415, 488 A.2d 1283

(‘‘[i]f . . . the condition [of probation] serves no rehabilitative purpose and there is undisputed evidence that

the condition was unnecessary at its inception, or was

without any beneficial purpose as of the date of the

hearing, reasonableness of a revocation of the proba-
tion is lacking’’), cert. denied, 196 Conn. 805, 492 A.2d

1241 (1985).

Finally, ‘‘in determining whether a condition of probation impinges unduly [on] a constitutional right [in any

particular case], a reviewing court should evaluate the

condition’’ to ensure that it is ‘‘reasonably related to

the purposes of [probation].’’ (Internal quotation marks

omitted.) State v. Smith, supra, 207 Conn. 170. ‘‘Consideration of three factors is required to determine whether

[such] a reasonable relationship exists: (1) the purposes

sought to be served by [the] probation[ary] [condition];

(2) the extent to which constitutional rights enjoyed by

law-abiding citizens should be accorded to probationers; and (3) the legitimate needs of law enforcement.’’

(Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id. Upon application of these principles, we conclude that the trial court

properly rejected the defendant’s claims.

We first address the defendant’s contention that, contrary to the determination of the trial court, his placement at the center violated his right to due process

because it was the functional equivalent of incarceration.10 In support of this contention, the defendant

focuses on the highly restrictive nature of the conditions

at the center, in particular, the facts that center residents may leave the facility only with permission and

an escort, that relatively strict security protocols are

followed and enforced by center staff, and that the

facility is situated on the grounds of a correctional

institution with a fence surrounding it.11 We disagree

with the defendant’s claim.

It is axiomatic that ‘‘[t]he . . . object of imprisonment is confinement. Many of the liberties and privileges enjoyed by other citizens must be surrendered by

the prisoner. An inmate does not retain rights inconsistent with proper incarceration.’’ Overton v. Bazzetta,

539 U.S. 126, 131, 123 S. Ct. 2162, 156 L. Ed. 2d 162

(2003). Probationers, on the other hand, are afforded

a conditional liberty that is dependent on their adherence to certain specified limitations on the freedoms

they otherwise would enjoy, without restriction, if they

were not subject to a criminal sanction. See, e.g., Griffin

v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 873–75, 107 S. Ct. 3164, 97

L. Ed. 2d 709 (1987). Generally speaking, the infringement on liberty caused by an order of probation is

considerably less intrusive than the extreme restrictions attendant to incarceration. See, e.g., United States

v. Nachtigal, 507 U.S. 1, 5, 113 S. Ct. 1072, 122 L. Ed.

2d 374 (1993). Nevertheless, as we previously noted,

conditions of probation that are reasonably necessary

and appropriate for the rehabilitation of the probationer

and the safety of the community are lawful and proper,

even though they place significant restrictions on the

probationer’s liberty during the term of his or her probation. See, e.g., Blanton v. North Las Vegas, 489 U.S.

538, 542, 109 S. Ct. 1289, 103 L. Ed. 2d 550 (1989) (‘‘pro-
bation . . . may engender a significant infringement of

personal freedom’’ (internal quotation marks omitted)).

Thus, depending on the circumstances of a particular

case, probation may ‘‘involve serious restraints on a

probationer’s [lifestyle], associations, movements and

activities.’’ State v. Reid, supra, 204 Conn. 55. ‘‘Indeed,

conditions [of probation] may appear to the defendant

[to be] more onerous than the sentence of confinement

[that] might be imposed.’’ (Internal quotation marks

omitted.) Id., 55 n.2.

In the present case, the trial court’s factual findings,

which are unchallenged, demonstrate that, although the

restrictions imposed on persons receiving treatment

at the center are by no means insignificant, they are

appreciably less onerous than those placed on prison

inmates, and, accordingly, those findings support the

court’s conclusion that residency at the center is materially different from confinement in a prison. As we noted

previously, the center contains individual rooms rather

than cells, residents are not locked in their rooms, and,

in further contrast to prison, the center itself is not

locked. Indeed, residents may leave the facility with

permission and an escort, and, even if a resident seeks

to leave the facility without permission, center staff are

directed not to restrain the individual as he or she is

leaving, and he or she will not be charged with the

crime of escape. To be sure, the center’s treatment

program is both restrictive and structured. But residents there retain a number of important rights and

privileges that are indisputably unavailable to incarcerated individuals. We therefore agree with the trial court

that the defendant’s placement at the center for a period

of months is not tantamount to a term of imprisonment.12

In this regard, we are aware of only one occasion in

which this court has held that a person who was not

imprisoned in a correctional facility nevertheless was

confined under circumstances tantamount to incarceration. In Connelly v. Commissioner of Correction, 258

Conn. 394, 780 A.2d 903 (2001), the petitioner, William

A. Connelly, was acquitted of kidnapping and assault

by reason of lack of capacity due to mental disease or

defect (insanity) and committed to the custody of the

Commissioner of Mental Health for a period of ten

years, subject to periodic review by the Psychiatric

Security Review Board. Id., 399. For the duration of his

commitment, Connelly was confined at Whiting Forensic Institute (Whiting) in Middletown, a maximum security facility for the treatment of violent offenders. Id.,

405–406. Several years after his commitment and while

still a patient at Whiting, Connelly filed a petition for

a writ of habeas corpus, claiming that he was entitled

to a new trial because the record did not affirmatively

establish that he had been advised of his right to a jury

trial. Id., 400. The habeas court agreed with Connelly

and awarded him a new trial. Id. After a trial at which
Connelly did not raise an insanity defense, a jury found

Connelly guilty of the kidnapping and assault charges,

and he was sentenced to a total effective prison term

of forty years. Id.

Thereafter, Connelly filed another habeas petition

seeking credit toward his forty year sentence for the

period of time that he had been confined at Whiting

pursuant to the commitment order following his insanity acquittal. Id., 401. The habeas court again agreed

with Connelly’s claim and ordered the Commissioner

of Correction to grant Connelly credit toward his sentence for the period of his confinement at Whiting. Id.,

402. We affirmed the judgment of the habeas court,

explaining that, ‘‘[a]lthough the purpose of an order of

commitment issued as a result of an insanity acquittal

is significantly different from that of a prison sentence

imposed as a result of a criminal conviction . . . the

effect of such a commitment on the acquittee is no less

a deprivation of liberty than that of a prison sentence.

Indeed, the United States Supreme Court has aptly characterized the involuntary confinement for treatment of

mental illness as a massive curtailment of liberty. . . .

In fact, [t]he United States Supreme Court has recognized involuntary commitment to a mental institution

. . . as involving more than a loss of freedom from

confinement . . . due to its stigmatizing consequences, and the potential exposure to invasive, compulsory medical and psychiatric treatment.’’ (Citations

omitted; emphasis in original; internal quotation marks

omitted.) Id., 405. We further explained that such a

‘‘loss of liberty is all the more profound when the institution to which the patient has been committed is a maximum security facility such as Whiting.’’ Id., 405–406.

Finally, we observed that a sentenced prisoner who is

transferred from a correctional institution to Whiting

for treatment is entitled to full credit toward his sentence for the time spent at Whiting. Id., 406.

The present case is readily distinguishable from Connelly because, as we have explained, placement at the

center is not akin to imprisonment, let alone is it the

equivalent of confinement in a maximum security facility. Thus, our reasoning in Connelly and our resolution

of that case simply are inapplicable to the present case,

which presents an entirely different set of relevant circumstances. Moreover, as the trial court observed, the

fact that a probationer placed at the center may be

charged with violating probation for leaving the center

without permission does not alter the conclusion that

placement at the center is not functionally the same as

incarceration, as a probationer is always subject to

being charged with a probation violation whenever he

or she fails to comply with a probationary condition.

See, e.g., State v. Reid, supra, 204 Conn. 56–57.

The defendant also asserts that his placement at the

center was not reasonably related to the purposes of
probation because the factors that Grella considered in

determining the sex offender treatment program most

appropriate for the defendant militated against a placement as restrictive as the center. To support his claim

that Grella reasonably could not have concluded that

his placement at the most restrictive treatment sex

offender treatment facility available was warranted, the

defendant cites his positive work and disciplinary history in prison, his completion of a short-term sex

offender treatment program while incarcerated, and the

fact that his mother had secured housing for him upon

his release from prison. We are not persuaded.

As we have explained, the Office of Adult Probation

has wide latitude to impose conditions on probationers

that serve ‘‘to foster the offender’s reformation and to

preserve the public’s safety . . . .’’ State v. Smith,

supra, 207 Conn. 168. Of course, this includes the

authority to require a probationer to undergo sex

offender treatment when such treatment is reasonably

necessary; see, e.g., State v. Smith, supra, 255 Conn.

844 (sex offender treatment was ‘‘a key component of

the [defendant’s] rehabilitative process because it was

directly connected to one of the underlying crimes to

which the defendant had pleaded guilty’’); see also State

v. Thorp, 57 Conn. App. 112, 117, 747 A.2d 537 (under

§ 53a-30, sex offender treatment may be imposed as

condition of probation, even when it was not explicitly

included in court-ordered terms of probation), cert.

denied, 253 Conn. 913, 754 A.2d 162 (2000); as well

as to require that a probationer adhere to stringent

residential conditions and rules. See, e.g., State v. Agli,

122 Conn. App. 590, 596, 1 A.3d 133 (probation officer

properly required probationer convicted of sex offense

to adhere to strict curfew at shelter as condition of

probation), cert. denied, 298 Conn. 920, 4 A.3d 1229

(2010).

We agree with the trial court that the defendant’s

placement at the center furthered the rehabilitative and

public safety purposes of probation. Before deciding

where to refer the defendant, Grella reviewed the defendant’s record and spoke with him on a number of occasions to ascertain his needs and to select an appropriate

sex offender treatment program tailored to those needs,

with due regard, of course, for community safety.

Among other things, Grella learned that the defendant

had committed a violent sex offense as a juvenile13 and

that he had failed to complete sex offender treatment

deemed necessary in light of the offense. In addition,

Grella was aware that the defendant had reoffended

within days of his release on parole two years earlier

despite his having completed a sex offender treatment

program in prison. Furthermore, the defendant himself

believed that he had not been afforded adequate supervision and guidance following his release on parole and

that he needed additional support in order to overcome

his admitted addiction to child pornography and to
avoid offending again. Based on her eight years of experience as a probation officer, Grella reasonably concluded that the center’s intensive program of individual

and group therapy, administered in the structured environment of a residential facility and coupled with the

housing and employment assistance offered by the center at the time of the defendant’s discharge from the

center, was likely to afford the defendant his best opportunity to successfully address his child pornography

addiction. It also was reasonable for Grella to conclude

that, because the defendant presented a high risk of

reoffending, legitimate law enforcement interests

would best be served by placing the defendant at a

restrictive facility like the center. Cf. State v. Crouch,

105 Conn. App. 693, 701–702, 939 A.2d 632 (2008)

(rejecting defendant’s claim that requiring sex offender

treatment as condition of probation violated his right

to due process because facts of his underlying conviction of risk of injury to child suggested that sex offender

evaluation and treatment were conditions of probation

that were ‘‘reasonably related to the defendant’s reformation’’ and to ‘‘the legitimate purpose of law enforcement in rehabilitating him and in protecting the

community’’).

The defendant asserts that, because a less restrictive

sex offender treatment program would have sufficed

to accomplish probation’s dual goals of rehabilitation

and public safety, the Office of Adult Probation was

obligated to have selected such a program for him. As

a general rule, the beneficial rehabilitative purpose of

probation will be best served when the probationer is

afforded the opportunity to succeed under conditions

that do not limit or restrict his liberty to a greater extent

than necessary to accomplish that end. Probationary

conditions, however, must also account for the community’s legitimate safety concerns. Thus, we will not second-guess the imposition of probationary conditions,

as long as they may be justified as reasonably necessary

to accomplish the purposes of probation. Cf. State v.

Faraday, supra, 268 Conn. 180–82 (probation officer is

responsible for determining conditions that will assist

probationer in achieving positive change in behavior).

As we previously stated, we must afford the probation

officer such flexibility because of the many variables

involved in the determination of what set of conditions

is best suited to a particular probationer. See State v.

Misiorski, 250 Conn. 280, 287–88, 738 A.2d 595 (1999).

Because Grella reasonably concluded that the defendant’s placement at the center was the best, most appropriate option under the circumstances—not despite the

restrictive conditions there but because of them—that

probationary condition did not offend principles of

due process.

The defendant next claims that subjecting him to the

highly restrictive conditions at the center violated his

right to equal protection because he was placed there
due to his status as a homeless person. We need not

consider the substantive issue raised by the defendant’s

claim, that is, whether the right to equal protection bars

the placement of a probationer at the center on the

basis of his or her homelessness, because his claim

founders on the trial court’s factual finding—fully supported by the record—that he was not referred there

for that reason. Moreover, it is difficult to see how the

defendant could fairly be characterized as homeless in

view of the fact that his mother had secured housing

for him upon his release from prison. Because the defendant’s equal protection claim is belied by the record,

the claim fails.

The defendant finally argues that the condition of

probation requiring him to attend sex offender treatment at the center violated his eighth amendment right

against cruel and unusual punishment because assigning him to the most restrictive treatment facility in the

state was grossly disproportionate given his background and offense history.14 The defendant cannot prevail on this claim because of our determination,

explained in connection with our rejection of his due

process claim, that his placement at the center was

reasonably related to the purposes of probation: a condition of probation that is reasonably necessary to

accomplish the legitimate goals of probation cannot

be unduly harsh. Accordingly, the defendant’s eighth

amendment claim also lacks merit.15

The judgment is affirmed.

In this opinion the other justices concurred.

* The listing of justices reflects their seniority status on this court as of

the date of oral argument.

** January 7, 2021, the date that this decision was released as a slip

opinion, is the operative date for all substantive and procedural purposes.

1 General Statutes § 53a-196e provides in relevant part: ‘‘(a) A person is

guilty of possessing child pornography in the second degree when such

person knowingly possesses (1) twenty or more but fewer than fifty visual

depictions of child pornography . . . .’’

2 The defendant would prop open the door to his room during required

therapy sessions, even though the door was supposed to be closed and

locked at that time so as to render the room inaccessible to him during

such sessions.

3 The due process clause of the fourteenth amendment to the United

States constitution provides in relevant part: ‘‘No State shall . . . deprive

any person of life, liberty or property, without due process of law . . . .’’

U.S. Const., amend. XIV, § 1.

4 The equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment to the United

States constitution provides in relevant part: ‘‘No State shall make or enforce

any law which shall . . . deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal

protection of the laws.’’ U.S. Const., amend XIV, § 1.

5 The eighth amendment to the United States constitution provides:

‘‘Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel

and unusual punishments inflicted.’’ U.S. Const., amend. VIII.

The eighth amendment’s prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment

is made applicable to the states through the due process clause of the

fourteenth amendment to the United States constitution. See, e.g., Tuilaepa

v. California, 512 U.S. 967, 970, 114 S. Ct. 2630, 129 L. Ed. 2d 750 (1994).

6 Several other claims that the defendant raised in the trial court are not

the subject of this appeal.

7 Unless otherwise noted, all references hereinafter to the trial court are

to Judge Danaher.

8 The defendant appealed to the Appellate Court from the judgment of
the trial court, and we transferred the appeal to this court pursuant to

General Statutes § 51-199 (c) and Practice Book § 65-1.

9 General Statutes § 53a-30 provides in relevant part: ‘‘(a) When imposing

sentence of probation or conditional discharge, the court may, as a condition

of the sentence, order that the defendant . . . (17) satisfy any other conditions reasonably related to the defendant’s rehabilitation. . . .

(b) When a defendant has been sentenced to a period of probation, the

Court Support Services Division may require that the defendant comply

with any or all conditions which the court could have imposed under subsection (a) of this section which are not inconsistent with any condition actually

imposed by the court. . . .’’

10 As the defendant acknowledges, the term ‘‘incarceration’’ is not defined

in our statutes, and neither he nor the state has advocated for a particular

definition of the term. For present purposes, therefore, we, like the parties,

use the term in accordance with its commonly understood meaning, namely,

involuntary confinement in a jail or a prison. See Magee v. Commissioner

of Correction, 105 Conn. App. 210, 215, 937 A.2d 72 (imprisonment ‘‘commonly and primarily refers to a condition of physical confinement, usually

by means of coercion, in a prison’’), cert. denied, 286 Conn. 901, 943 A.2d

1102 (2008).

11 Although situated on the grounds of a correctional institution, it is

undisputed that the defendant was not in the custody of the Commissioner

of Correction while he resided at the center.

12 The defendant also makes brief reference to an additional alleged due

process violation, namely, that he did not receive adequate notice at the

time of his plea and sentencing that he could be placed at a facility as

restrictive as the center. The trial court rejected this claim and, to the extent

that the defendant has renewed that claim on appeal, so do we. As we

explained, at the plea hearing, the court, Ginocchio, J., advised the defendant

that his probation officer likely would impose ‘‘many other conditions,’’

including sex offender evaluation and treatment, that the officer reasonably

believed were appropriate in light of the nature of his offense. Additionally,

at the time of sentencing, the court ordered as a special condition of probation that the defendant complete ‘‘sex offender evaluation and treatment

through [an approved] provider’’ and that he ‘‘[c]omply with all recommended sex offender conditions of probation as deemed appropriate by the

supervising [probation] officer.’’ Furthermore, under § 53a-30, a probation

officer has broad discretion to impose reasonable probationary conditions

and, if warranted, to require that a probationer participate in a sex offender

treatment program at a residential facility like the center, which, as the

trial court expressly found, ‘‘provide[s] community based treatment for the

treatment of sex offenders.’’ Finally, the defendant himself recognized that

he needed an intensive and structured treatment program if he was to

successfully address his addiction to child pornography and to avoid reoffending. As we explain more fully hereinafter, in light of the defendant’s

addiction and his offense history and likelihood of recidivism, his placement

at the center fell squarely within the discretion afforded his probation officer

to impose such conditions. Consequently, the defendant’s claim that he was

not on notice that he could be placed at a residential facility like the center

is devoid of merit.

13 We disagree with the defendant’s contention that it was improper for

Grella to have considered his violent sex offense as a juvenile in referring

the defendant to the center. Although at least one court has held that a

probationary condition may not be predicated solely on a juvenile conviction;

see United States v. Worley, 685 F.3d 404, 408–409 (4th Cir. 2012); in the

present case, the defendant’s juvenile record was only one of a number of

considerations that led Grella to conclude that the defendant should be

placed at the center. The fact that the defendant had committed a violent

sex offense as a juvenile, and then failed to complete sex offender treatment

following that offense, was certainly relevant to Grella’s determination as

to the appropriate conditions of probation, and we see no reason why Grella

was prohibited from factoring that information into her decision.

14 The defendant apparently did not raise this argument in the trial court

in support of his eighth amendment claim; he maintained, rather, that it

constituted cruel and unusual punishment to place him at the center due

to his homelessness. We see no reason, however, not to address the merits

of the eighth amendment argument he now makes in this court.

15 In his reply brief, the defendant concedes that, under the circumstances

presented, an adverse decision on his due process claim also would require

an adverse decision on his eighth amendment claim.