NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

FREDY MIGUEL SOLARES-AGUILAR, 

Petitioner, 

 v. 

MERRICK B. GARLAND, Attorney 

General, 

Respondent.

No. 16-71255 

Agency No. A206-772-402 

MEMORANDUM*

On Petition for Review of an Order of the

Board of Immigration Appeals

Submitted April 12, 2022**

Pasadena, California

Before: PAEZ and BADE, Circuit Judges, and CARDONE,*** District Judge.

Petitioner Fredy Solares-Aguilar, a citizen of Guatemala, petitions for 

review of the decision of the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) dismissing his 

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent 

except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision 

without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

*** The Honorable Kathleen Cardone, United States District Judge for the 

Western District of Texas, sitting by designation.

FILED

APR 14 2022

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
2 

appeal of the denial of his applications for asylum, withholding of removal, and 

relief under the Convention Against Torture (CAT). Our jurisdiction is governed 

by 8 U.S.C. § 1252. “We review for substantial evidence the [agency’s] factual 

findings.” Conde Quevedo v. Barr, 947 F.3d 1238, 1241 (9th Cir. 2020). We 

review de novo the legal question of whether a particular social group is 

cognizable, except to the extent that deference is owed to the BIA’s interpretation 

of the governing statutes and regulations. Id. at. 1241–42. We deny the petition 

for review.

1. The agency did not err in concluding that Solares-Aguilar’s proposed

particular social group of “Guatemalan child who has been subjected to physical 

harm and emotional trauma by his teachers at school, and who suffered threats 

after notifying the government” was not cognizable. To demonstrate membership 

in a cognizable particular social group, an applicant must show that “‘the group is 

(1) composed of members who share a common immutable characteristic, (2) 

defined with particularity, and (3) socially distinct within the society in question.’” 

Reyes v. Lynch, 842 F.3d 1125, 1131 (9th Cir. 2016) (quoting Matter of M-E-V-G-, 

26 I. & N. Dec. 227, 237 (BIA 2014)).

Substantial evidence supports the BIA’s determination that the proposed 

social group lacks social distinction because there is no “evidence showing that 

society in general perceives, considers, or recognizes persons sharing the particular 
3 

characteristic to be a group.” See Cordoba v. Barr, 962 F.3d 479, 482 (9th Cir. 

2020) (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). 

2. Solares-Aguilar waived any challenge to the IJ’s denial of relief under 

the CAT because he failed to meaningfully raise such a claim in his opening brief. 

See Rizk v. Holder, 629 F.3d 1083, 1091 n.3 (9th Cir. 2011); Singh v. Ashcroft, 

361 F.3d 1152, 1157 n.3 (9th Cir. 2004). Moreover, this court would lack 

jurisdiction over any challenge to the IJ’s denial of relief under the CAT because 

Solares-Aguilar did not challenge the IJ’s resolution of this CAT claim on appeal 

to the BIA. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(d)(1) (stating that this court may review a final 

order if “the alien has exhausted all administrative remedies available to the alien 

as of right”); Barron v. Ashcroft, 358 F.3d 674, 677-78 (9th Cir. 2004) (holding 

that § 1252(d)(1) mandates exhaustion and, thus, this court generally lacks 

jurisdiction over “the merits of a legal claim not presented in the administrative 

proceedings below”).

3. We reject Solares-Aguilar’s contention that the BIA erred in streamlining 

his case because the BIA did not streamline his case.

PETITION FOR REVIEW DENIED.