1 Filed 9/16/19 CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION THREE

In re A.J., a Person Coming Under the

Juvenile Court Law.

THE PEOPLE,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

A.J.,

Defendant and Appellant. A155044

(Solano County Super. Ct. No. J43873)

This is an appeal from an order denying the request by defendant A.J. (minor) for

informal supervision under Welfare and Institutions Code section 654.2 in lieu of a

declaration of wardship

. 1 After the juvenile court issued i ts order, minor admitted the

allegation that he committed vehicular manslaughter without gross negligence (Pen.

Code, § 192, subd. (c)(2)), was adjudged a ward of the court, placed on probat ion and

ordered t o pay restitution in an amount to be determined by the probation department

. For reasons set forth below, we affirm

.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On October 24 , 2017 , a juvenile wardship petition was filed pursuant to Welfare

and Institutions Code section 602 , subdivision (a) , alleging that minor committed one

1 Unless otherwise stated, all statutory citations herein are to the Welfare and

Institutions Code.2 count of misdemeanor vehicular manslaughter without gross negligence in violation of

Penal Code section 192, subdivision (c)(2) (hereinafter, petition)

. 2

On June 8 , 2018 , mi nor filed a motion asking the juvenile court to grant him

informal supervision pursuant to section 654 in lieu of adjudging him a ward of the court

under section 602

. The probation department supported minor’s request , noting, among

other things, that min or was remorseful, had no prior delinquency history or significant

disciplinary record

, had been receptive to receiving services throughout these

proceedings and, in fact, had taken the initiative to obtain services, and had full familial

support. T he pro secution , however, o pposed minor’s request and a contested hearing was

held

.

At the conclusion of this contested hearing, the juvenile court rejected minor’s

request for informal supervision, reasoning that he was statutorily ineligible for informal

supervision under section 654. 3 , subdivision (g) because “ [ r ] estitution can clearly be over

[ $1,000 ] in this case” give n the likely expense to the victim’s family of burial costs and

other economic loss es

. In so r easoning , the juvenile court rejected minor’s argument s

that , one, no permissible claims fo r restitution had been made by the victim’s family 3

and, two, this was an unusual case arising from “a tragic accident” where the interests of

justice would best be served by informal supervision notwithstanding the potential

restitution issue

. (See § 654.3.)

After the juvenile court de nied the request for informal supervi sion

, a readiness

conference was held at which minor admitted the allegation s in the petition . The

2 Minor made an illegal left turn while driving his father’s car shortly after being issued a provisional driver’s license and killed a motorcyclist.

3 The v ictim’s mother submitted a questionable restitution claim in excess of $5,000 that included the cost of a vehicle she claimed she was “ ‘ forced ’ ” to buy because she had previously relied on her son for her transportation needs. The victim’s father

report ed to the probation department that he had not yet decided whether to submit a restitution claim and later indicated to the prosecution that he was considering submitting a claim for funeral and burial expenses. However, the father had not submitted any c laim

as of the date of the contested hearing.3 probation department thereafter recommended minor be granted informal probation

pursuant to section 725 without being adjudge d a ward of the court. T he juv enile court

, however, rejected thi s recommendation, adjudged m inor a ward of the court

, placed him

on formal probation and ordered him to pay restitution in an amount to be determined by

the probation department

. After minor timely appeal ed the juvenile court ’s order denying him informal

supervision , the prosecution moved to dismiss his appeal for moot ness . In doing so, the

prosecution assert ed that, after the challenged ruling was made , minor successfully

completed his probationary term and the juvenile court dismissed the petition , terminated

his wardship and ordered his juvenile record seal ed . As such, the prosecution reasoned,

there is no effective relief available to minor on appeal

. Minor filed an opposition to this

motion based on severa l grounds, including the lack of evidence in the appellate record

that the juvenile court in fact dismissed the petition and sealed his juvenile record.

O n May 14 , 2019, this court deferred ruling on t he prosecution’s motion to

dismiss until consideration of the appeal on the merits . Accordingly, the parties timely

filed their respective appellate briefs, which we have now considered in full.

DISCUSSION

Minor contends the juvenile court erred when it deni ed his motion for informal

supervision under section 654.2

, thereafter adjudg ed him a ward of the court under

section 602

, and plac ed him on formal probation

. Minor requests that we reverse the

juvenile court’s denial and remand with instructions to withdraw minor’s admission of

the allegations in t he petition and place him on informal supervision under section 654.2.

Alternatively, if the juvenile court finds minor has successfully completed the

requirements of informal supervision in the interim time period, minor asks that we

instruct the court t o dismiss the petition.

The prosecution, in turn, asks that we dismiss minor’s appeal as moot or,

alternatively, that we determine minor has forfeited his challenge on appeal b ecause “[he ]

did not object to the trial court’s exercise of its discretion to grant or deny [his ] request

for informal supervision, nor did he o bject to the trial court’s finding that he was4 presumptively ineligible for such supervision ” based on the amount of restitution owed to

the victim ’s family

. Turning first to the prosecutio n’s threshold arguments, we agree with minor that

the appellate record provides no factual basis for dismissing his appeal for mootness.

The essence of the prosecution’s motion to dismiss the appeal is this: This court cannot

grant minor any effective re lief on appeal because he has already completed probation,

the petition was dismissed, his record was sealed, and there is no collateral consequence

of his sealed juvenile record. As minor points out, ho wever, there is nothing in the

appellate record that establishes, first, that the petition was actually dismissed and,

second , that his juvenile record h as been sealed. While the record was recently

augmented to include a reporter’s transcript establishing that, on January 22, 2019, the

juvenile court foun d minor successfully completed the terms of his wardship and entered

an order terminating the wardship as satisfactory, this transcript does not establish the

petition was dismissed and his record sealed. Accordingly, there are inadequate facts in

our rec ord to support the prosecution’s motion for dismissal. 4

We also reject the prosecution’s forfeiture ar gument

. “[T] he purpose of the

section 654 informal supervision program is to avoid a true finding on criminal

culpability which would result in a criminal record for the minor. If the informal

supervision program is satisfactorily completed by the minor, the petition must be

dismissed. ” ( In re A dam R

. (1997) 57 Cal.App.4th 348, 352 .) Here, m inor requested that

the juvenile court place him on informal supervision after a section 602 petition was filed

in his case

. A lthough the probation department recommended that minor’s request be

granted, the juvenile court denied it after finding that, pursuant to section 654.3,

subdivision (g), minor was not eligible for the informal supervision program because he

would likely owe restitution in an amount exceeding $1,000. In doing so, the juvenile

4 Minor raises several other legal and policy grounds for denying the prosecution’s

motion to dismiss his appeal. However, given our conclusion that the appellate record fails to support the prosecution’s moti on, we need not address minor’s alternative grounds.5 court co nsidered and rejected the argument raised by minor’s counsel that there was no

information before the court that restitution would be in excess of $1,000

. In arguing minor has forfeited his challenge on appeal to the juvenile court’s

denial of his informal supervision request , the prosecution points out that, i n this court

,

minor raises a n argument not made below, based on the statutory language of

section 654.3, subdivision (g). Specifically, section 654.3, subdivision (g) provides : “ No

minor sha ll be eligible for the program of supervision set forth in Section 654 or 654.2 in

the following cases, except in an unusual case where the interests of justice would best be

served and the court specifies on the record the reasons for its decision: [¶]

. . . [¶] (g) A

petition alleges that the minor has violated an offense in which the restitution owed to the

victim exceeds one thousand dollars ($1,000)

. . . . ” ( § 654.3, subd. (g)

, italics added.)

According to one of minor ’s argument s on appeal

, the juvenile court erroneously relied

on this provision to deny his request because the petition did not specifically allege he

owed victim restitution in excess of $1,000

— an argument the prosecution insists was not

raised below. However, wh ile it may b e true minor’s legal argument s are more

developed on appeal than his argument s in the juvenile court, th e essence remain s the

same: Minor contends the presumption of ineligibility set forth in s ection 654.3

,

subdivision (g) does not apply in his case

. Because minor’s argument s below w ere

sufficient to fairly inform the juvenile court and the prosecution of the specific reason (s)

for objecting to the court’s ruling, we conclude minor’s challenge is properly before us

for review. ( See People v. Geier (2007) 41 Cal.4th 555, 609 [ an objection suffices to

preserve an issue on appeal if it “ ‘fairly inform [s] the trial court, as well as the

[opposing] party

. . . , of the specific reason or reasons the objecting party believes [a

particular ruling should be made] , so the [opposing] party

. . . can respond appropriately

and the court can make a fully informed r uling’ ” ]. ) Accordingly, w e proceed to the

merits.

The statutory law governing the juvenile court’s informal supervision program is

fairly straightforward . S ection 654. 2 , subdivision ( a ) gives the court discretion to order a

program of informal supervis ion for a minor without adjudging him or her a ward of the6 court. ( § 654.2, subd. (a) [“ If a petition has been filed by the prosecuting attorney to

declare a minor a ward of the court under Section 602

, the court may, without adjudging

the minor a ward of the court and with the consent of the minor and the minor’s parents

or guardian, continue any hearing on a petition for six months and order the minor to

participate in a program of supervision as set forth in Section 654”] ; see also Kody P. v.

Sup erior Court (2006) 137 Cal.App.4th 1030, 1033

. ) At the same time

, section 654.3

delineates certain circumstances under which a minor is presumptively ineligible for th is

program , including the circumstance relevant here

, whe re it is alleged in the section 602

petition that the minor has violated an offense in which the restitution owed to the victim

exce eds $1,000. ( § 654.3, subds. (a)

– ( h ).) Also under section 654.3, t h e juvenile court

has discretion to override any of these statutory presumption s “ in an unusual case where

the interests of justice would best be served and the court specifies on the record the

reasons for its decision

. . . . ” ( § 654.3

. )

Applying these statutory provisions to the case at hand, w e conclude the juvenile

court’s finding that minor is not eligible for informal supervision because “[r]estitution

can clearly be over [$1,000] in this case” was appropriate. In so concluding, we first

reject minor’s argument based on the statutory language of section 654.3, subdivision (g)

that the court’s ruling is erro neous because the petition filed against him “contained no

statement as to the amount of restitu t ion and the victim’s family had not submitted any

permissible claims or evidence of restituti on a t the time of the section 654.2 hearing.”

Minor reads this provision too narrowly , as it requires allegations of an offense in which

restitution owed to the victim exceeds $1,000

, rather than proof of permissible claims or

restitution over the stated amount

. (§ 654.3, subd. (g).) And here, t he petition clearly

allege d that minor committed vehicular manslaughter in violation of Penal Code

section 192, subdivision (c)(2)

, “in that said minor did unlawfully, and without malice,

kill G. S., a human being

. . . . ” The petition further alleged minor’s parent or guardian

“may be liable for the payment of court

- ordered restitutions.” While minor is correct the

petition

— filed at the onset of these proceedings

— was silent as to the actual amount of

restit ution owed

, as the juvenile court explained at the subsequent contested hearing

,7 there we re several inferences relating to the potential amount of restitution that could

reasonably be drawn based on the serious n ature of hi s crime alone, which crime result ed

in the victim’s death notwithstanding the absence of malice or gross negligence. (See

Derick B. v. Superior Court (2009) 180 Cal.App.4th 295, 301 [“section 654.2 provides

the court with discretion to order informal supervision postpetition but before

a djudication of the charges alleged in the petition, rather than continuing with the petition

proceedings

, ” italics added ]

. )

Specifically, w hile minor insists it is mere speculation that restitution could exceed

$1,000 , at the hearing both parties agreed restitution above this amount was indeed

possible given that minor’s offense resulted in a death . The victim’s mother had already

submitted a restitution claim seeking $ 5,660.24 , an amount covering her travel expenses

to and from court , as well as the cost for her to acquire a vehicle that she asserted was

necessary because she had relied on her son to provide her transportation until his death

. In addition, while the victim’s father had not yet submitted a claim for r estitution, it was

the prosecutor’s understanding that h e had indicated that he was considering submitting a

claim for burial and funeral expenses. The probation officer testified at the hearing that

she “would imagine” that, should father claim restituti on for either burial expenses or

mental health counseling, his claim would exceed $1,000. In light of t h ese

circumstances, the juvenile court concluded when applying section 654.3 to the facts at

hand that it “can’t ignore the amount of restitution. I just want to make sure the parties

agree that restitution could be over a thousand dollars because we have a claim by one

individual already over 5,000. Whether that’s going to be ordered or not, we don’t know.

But the way the court has t o look at it in terms of timing of how to process the case i s

whether it can be over a thousand dollars. That’s not even taking into account any

economic loss or property damage of the motorcycle, burial. Counseling for the extended

family members we’ve heard from today

. . . . I mean, I can see pain on both sides here.”

Th is record clearly supports the lower court’s analysis. (See In re Armondo A . (1992) 3

Cal.App.4th 1185, 1190

– 1191 [at a contested hearing regarding a minor’s suitability for8 inclusio n in the informal supervision program, the juvenile court should consider all

relevant information as presented by the probation department].)

Thus

, w hile minor makes much of the fact that the victim’s family had not

submitted any permissible claims or in formation about restitution by the time of the

section 654.2 hearing, the statutory law does not require the victim or victim’s family to

submit claims

, or the prosecution to present evidence of restitution in excess of $1,000

, before the juvenile court ma y apply the presumption of ineligibility

. Rather, as stated

above, this presumption applies if the section 602 petition alleges the minor has violated

an offense in which the restitution owed to the victim exceeds $1,000. The petition meets

this standard, as it alleges an offense, vehicular manslaughter resulting in the death of a

human being , that by its very nature carries the potential for property and other economic

loss likely to exceed $1,000, including funeral and burial expenses

. Finally, we acknowledge that minor augmented the record on appeal with

evidence that the juvenile court ultimately ordered restitution in the amount of $770

based upon a stipulation by the parties . This evidence, which did not exist when the

juvenile c ourt decided minor’s request for informal supervision, does not alter our

analysis or conclusion that the court acted appropriately based on the record that was

before it

. 5

DISPOSITION

The juvenile court’s order is affirmed

.

5 When denying minor’s request for informal supervision, t he juvenile court made the additional finding that hi s case did not qualify under section 654.3 as an “ ‘ unusual

case w here the interest of justice would best be served ’ ” by granting informal supervision in lieu of adjudging him a ward of the court, notwithstanding the fact that restitution could exceed $1,000. Minor has not challenged this discretionary finding on appeal and, accordingly, w e affirm the order without addressing i t further.9 _________________________ Wick, J. *

WE CONCUR:

_________________________ Fujisaki, Acting P. J.

_________________________ Petrou, J.

A155044/ In re A.J.

* Judge of the Superior Court of Sonoma County, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.10 A155044/In re A.J.

Trial Court: Superior Court of Contra Costa County

Trial Judge: Donna L. Stashyn , J.

Counsel: Law Office of Erin W. Keefe and Erin W. Keefe for Defendant and Appellant.

Xavier Becerra, Attorney General, Gerald A. Engler, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Jeffrey M. Laurence, Assistant Atto rney General,

Arthur P. Beever and Christen Somerville , Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.