In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit ____________________

No. 14-2877

JAMES BRUNSON and BRUNSON PACKAGE, INC.,

Plaintiffs-Appellants,

v.

SCOTT MURRAY, et al.,

Defendants-Appellees.

____________________

Appeal from the United States District Court for the

Southern District of Illinois.

No. 3:12-cv-00225-NJR-DGW — Nancy J. Rosenstengel, Judge.

____________________

ARGUED FEBRUARY 24, 2016 — DECIDED DECEMBER 13, 2016

____________________

Before EASTERBROOK, ROVNER, and HAMILTON, Circuit 

Judges.

HAMILTON, Circuit Judge. Plaintiff James Brunson owns a 

package liquor store in Bridgeport, Illinois. He asserts that 

city officials violated his constitutional rights by refusing to 

renew his liquor license and orchestrating a campaign of harassment and outright violence. Brunson has offered evidence 

that after he purchased the business, he was subjected to continued harassment by the defendants, including Max Schauf, 
2 No. 14-2877

the town’s mayor and local liquor commissioner. When 

Mayor Schauf refused to consider Brunson’s application for a 

routine renewal of his liquor license, Brunson was forced to 

close his business and to alert state authorities to reopen. A 

few weeks later, while keeping watch over his store late at 

night after vandalism incidents, Brunson was attacked by one 

of Schauf’s associates. The two men fought until Brunson was 

able to pin down the attacker and call police. Two weeks later, 

Brunson was the one arrested for felony aggravated battery.

Brunson brought this suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging 

federal claims of false arrest, denial of equal protection, and 

denial of due process, as well as several state-law claims. The 

district court granted summary judgment on Brunson’s federal claims and dismissed the state-law claims without prejudice. We affirm in part and reverse in part. We affirm summary judgment for prosecutor Lisa Wade, who is protected by 

absolute prosecutorial immunity for her role in this case. We 

also affirm summary judgment for the City of Bridgeport and 

for all remaining defendants as to Brunson’s false arrest claim. 

But we reverse summary judgment on Brunson’s class-of-one 

equal protection claim. We also reverse summary judgment 

for Schauf and hold he is not entitled to absolute immunity on 

Brunson’s due process claim for Schauf’s refusal to act on the 

liquor license renewal.

I. Factual and Procedural Background

On appeal from a grant of summary judgment to the defendants, we construe the evidence in the light reasonably 

most favorable to the plaintiffs and give them the benefit of 

all reasonable inferences from that evidence, without vouching for the objective truth of this account. E.g., Chaib v. GEO 

Group, Inc., 819 F.3d 337, 340–41 (7th Cir. 2016).
No. 14-2877 3

A. Brunson’s Liquor Store

In the summer of 2008, James Brunson purchased the only 

liquor store in Bridgeport, Illinois. As part of the purchase, he 

obtained a liquor license. Brunson’s store was one of only five 

places to buy alcohol in Bridgeport.

Bridgeport Police Chief Scott Murray was a frequent visitor to the shop. He often told Brunson that he was violating 

state and local liquor laws. Brunson would try to track down 

the laws Murray accused him of violating, only to find they 

did not actually exist. On one occasion, Chief Murray told 

Brunson that he had to be a Bridgeport resident to own a liquor business. Brunson, finding this odd, called Bridgeport 

Mayor Max Schauf, who was also the local liquor commissioner. Schauf “confirmed” that such a law was on the books, 

but it was not. 

There is evidence that Schauf’s interest in Brunson’s business was a matter of self-interest. First, Schauf had made a 

competing offer to purchase the store and had lost out to 

Brunson. Also, Schauf already owned or had an interest in 

one of the other establishments in town that served alcohol—

Red Hills Veterans Club—by way of subterfuge. The Veterans 

Club was ostensibly run by Beverley Pruez. An investigation 

by the Illinois Liquor Control Commission revealed that 

Pruez had a romantic relationship with Schauf, who had 

owned the club and signed liquor license renewals under the 

table for Pruez. And Schauf’s son Mark would open another 

Bridgeport bar and restaurant called “The Place to Be.” Since 

Schauf was the local liquor commissioner, this type of selfregulation would of course be verboten.
4 No. 14-2877

B. 2010 Liquor License Renewal

In April 2010, Brunson applied to renew his liquor license 

several weeks before it would expire. This is typically a simple 

process. A licensee with no violations is entitled to a pro forma

license renewal. Instead, Chief Murray visited for an inspection. Brunson asked if there would be any trouble with the 

license renewal. Chief Murray told him to hire a lawyer. Receiving no updates on the status of his application, Brunson 

called Schauf the day his license was set to expire. Schauf told 

Brunson that he would not be renewing the license in time 

and did not know when he would make a decision. On May 

1, with Mayor Schauf running out the clock, Brunson was 

forced to shutter his business and hire counsel.

Brunson contacted the state Commission, which assigned 

Special Agent Randal Mendenhall to investigate. Schauf told 

Mendenhall that he was taking time to review Brunson’s license. Mendenhall pointed out that under state law, Schauf 

did not have this type of discretion: Schauf could renew or not 

renew the license, but he was not entitled to delay indefinitely. 

The state Commission ordered that Brunson be allowed to operate the store pending a hearing. 

Brunson re-opened his store, prompting another visit 

from Chief Murray to ask: “What makes you think you can 

reopen your store when we say you can’t.” Brunson’s liquor 

supplier also received a call from the city clerk saying it could 

no longer sell to Brunson. Brunson showed Murray the Commission’s order, and the supplier continued to sell to Brunson 

when the city clerk could not give any specific reason for the 

prohibition. Shortly before the Commission’s scheduled hear-
No. 14-2877 5

ing over Brunson’s license, Schauf renewed the license without comment or explanation and backdated it to make it appear as if he had renewed it on time.

C. The Violent Events of August 7, 2010

Brunson’s experience as a store owner worsened still further in the summer of 2010. One weekend in July, Brunson 

discovered that someone had attempted to break into the 

store by trying to remove the back door from its hinges. The 

act appeared to be both premeditated and at least a little sophisticated. The vandal had left behind a flashlight and safety 

glasses and had chipped away the door to get at the dead bolt. 

Chief Murray visited the scene but dismissed the incident as 

the work of teenagers. He did not file a police report. The following weekend, Brunson discovered that the compressor 

outside his store had been vandalized. He again called police 

but found no satisfaction.

Sensing a pattern, and finding little help from the local police, Brunson turned to self-help. He stood guard over his 

store the next weekend, armed with a loaded gun. A little past 

3:00 a.m. on August 7, Brunson noticed a car crawling back 

and forth past his store. Then the car stopped, a man emerged, 

and Brunson heard the store’s front windows shatter. He hurried to the scene and found Jody Harshman—a convicted 

felon, an off-and-on employee at Mayor Schauf’s businesses, 

and a friend of the Schauf family.

Harshman raised a hammer and turned on Brunson, who 

in turn raised his gun. Harshman thought Brunson was bluffing and moved toward him. Brunson, who was not bluffing, 

pulled the trigger but the gun jammed. Harshman threatened, 

“Now you’re f***ing dead,” and swung the hammer at 
6 No. 14-2877

Brunson. Brunson blocked the blow and the two men fought. 

Brunson’s gun fired and Harshman fled.

Brunson did not disengage. Trailing Harshman at a distance, he called authorities. Before police arrived, Harshman 

tossed his hammer away, and in doing so caught sight of 

Brunson. Harshman charged at Brunson, who felled Harshman with a blow to the face. When Harshman tried to get up, 

Brunson knocked him down again with a kick. Brunson fixed 

the jam on his gun and held Harshman at gunpoint until police arrived. Brunson also noticed a car parked nearby with 

Mark Schauf—son of Mayor Schauf and a friend of Harshman—inside. As Harshman was being placed in an ambulance, Chief Murray reached the scene and took over the investigation. Brunson gave his account of the incident; he also 

pointed Murray’s attention to Mark Schauf and asked 

whether Murray should be involved in the investigation. 

Another officer at the scene, Officer Dooley, later explained the significance of this exchange. There was no good 

reason for Mark Schauf to have been at the scene in the early 

hours of the morning. In Dooley’s opinion, there was a “likelihood that Mark Schauf may have been an accomplice involved in planning or carrying out the crime,” a suspicion 

Dooley said Murray shared. And given that Mark’s father was 

Chief Murray’s boss, “Murray should not have investigated 

this case himself.” Dooley believed that officers from a different jurisdiction—preferably the state police—should take 

over the investigation. Nonetheless, Chief Murray stayed on 

the case.

Two weeks later, on August 20, both Harshman and 

Brunson were arrested. Harshman was charged with criminal 

damage to property and pled guilty to a misdemeanor. 
No. 14-2877 7

Brunson was charged with felony aggravated battery. He pled 

not guilty. At least at the time of the district court’s decision in 

2014, that case was still pending. 

D. Procedural History

Brunson’s § 1983 suit alleged violations of both federal and 

state law by Mayor Schauf, Chief Murray, State’s Attorney 

Lisa Wade, Harshman, the city of Bridgeport, and Lawrence 

County. The three federal-law claims were: (1) false arrest, (2) 

denial of equal protection under the Fourteenth Amendment, 

and (3) denial of due process under the Fourteenth Amendment. The three state-law counts were: (1) tortious interference with business expectation, (2) conspiracy, and (3) tortious supervisory liability against the city and county. 

On defendants’ motions for summary judgment, the district court first held that State’s Attorney Wade was absolutely 

immune from liability for her role in prosecuting Brunson for 

battery and that Lawrence County was entitled to summary 

judgment because Brunson failed to respond to the county’s 

motion. On the merits, the district court granted summary 

judgment to all defendants on the false arrest claim (Count 1) 

because there was probable cause to arrest Brunson for battery. The court granted summary judgment on the equal protection claim (Count 2) because Brunson did not have evidence of similarly situated comparators. The court granted 

summary judgment on the due process claim (Count 3) based 

on Killinger v. Johnson, 389 F.3d 765 (7th Cir. 2004), where we 

said that a local Illinois liquor commissioner had absolute judicial immunity even if his official actions were riddled with 

errors. The district court declined supplemental jurisdiction 

over the three state-law claims and dismissed them without 

prejudice. 
8 No. 14-2877

We review a grant of summary judgment de novo. United 

Central Bank v. KMWC 845, LLC, 800 F.3d 307, 310 (7th Cir. 

2015). As noted, we construe the evidence in the light most 

favorable to Brunson as the non-moving party and give him 

the benefit of all reasonable inferences in his favor. Tolan v. 

Cotton, 572 U.S. —, 134 S. Ct. 1861 (2014); Boston v. U.S. Steel 

Corp., 816 F.3d 455, 462 (7th Cir. 2016).1

II. Prosecutorial Immunity

Brunson claims that prosecutor Wade participated in his 

false arrest and deprived him of the equal protection of the 

laws. She is entitled to summary judgment based on absolute 

prosecutorial immunity.

Wade’s first involvement with Brunson’s case came after 

the violent August 7 incident. On August 11, after the Bridgeport police finished their investigation, Chief Murray turned 

the case file over to Wade. After Murray and Wade discussed 

the case, Wade’s office prepared a formal charge of aggravated battery and sought an arrest warrant, which was issued 

on August 20. Before the arrest, Wade also spoke with Officer 

Dooley, who confirmed that Chief Murray alerted her to Mark 

Schauf’s presence at the scene. Wade also recognized Chief 

 1 Brunson’s co-plaintiff is the corporate entity, Brunson Package, Inc., 

through which Brunson purchased the package liquor store. The district 

court and the appellate briefs did not differentiate between the two, nor 

do we, though we presume the corporate plaintiff could have no claim for 

false arrest. On remand, it may be necessary to look more carefully at the 

two plaintiffs. See, e.g., Assaf v. Trinity Medical Center, 821 F.3d 847, 849 

(7th Cir. 2016) (individual plaintiff could not assert claim for money that 

should have been paid to professional corporation).
No. 14-2877 9

Murray’s possible conflict of interest. Wade would later appear on behalf of the State at Brunson’s probable cause hearing.

Prosecutors are absolutely immune from liability “for 

their core prosecutorial actions.” Lewis v. Mills, 677 F.3d 324, 

330 (7th Cir. 2012), citing Hartman v. Moore, 547 U.S. 250, 261–

62 (2006) (prosecutor “is absolutely immune from liability for 

the decision to prosecute”); see also Spiegel v. Rabinovitz, 121 

F.3d 251, 257 (7th Cir. 1997) (“Under Illinois law, the State’s 

Attorney ... is vested with exclusive discretion in the initiation and management of a criminal prosecution.”). When a 

prosecutor performs investigative or administrative actions, 

however, she receives only the qualified immunity afforded 

to law-enforcement officers. Lewis, 677 F.3d at 330, quoting 

Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 509 U.S. 259, 276 (1993). Core actions 

covered by absolute prosecutorial immunity are those “intimately associated with the judicial phase of the criminal process.” Lewis, 677 F.3d at 330, quoting Buckley, 509 U.S. at 270. 

The issue is whether the prosecutor was acting as an officer of the court and performing actions related to the judicial 

rather than investigative phase of the criminal process. Fields 

v. Wharrie, 672 F.3d 505, 510 (7th Cir. 2012). For example, a 

prosecutor is not absolutely immune when she swears to the 

facts in a charging document—an investigative function—but 

she is absolutely immune for signing the charging document 

itself and initiating a prosecution. Olson v. Champaign County, 

784 F.3d 1093, 1102–03 (7th Cir. 2015) (no immunity for Illinois 

prosecutor swearing to allegedly false information to obtain 

arrest warrant). 

Absolute prosecutorial immunity covers Wade’s conduct 

in this case. Wade’s decision to charge Brunson with battery 
10 No. 14-2877

and her appearance at Brunson’s preliminary hearing were 

core prosecutorial functions. Nor does Brunson allege that 

Wade omitted exculpatory evidence in bad faith. Brunson argues, though, that Wade is not immune for her failure to call 

for the state police to take over the investigation in light of 

Chief Murray’s conflict of interest. We reject this argument. 

The prosecutor’s choice to accept the police report and go forward with the prosecution without seeking further investigation by the state police was not an investigative act. It was a 

deliberate decision not to interfere with the investigation. 

Wade’s work began after the police investigation had ended. 

See Fields, 672 F.3d at 512 (“Prosecutors do not function as advocates before probable cause to arrest a suspect exists.”). 

III. Equal Protection Claim

This leaves Brunson’s three federal claims against the remaining defendants: Mayor Schauf, Chief Murray, and the 

City of Bridgeport. We focus first on Brunson’s most straightforward claim, that the defendants violated his Fourteenth 

Amendment right to equal protection of the law. The crux of 

this claim is that Mayor Schauf, with the aid of the other defendants, harassed Brunson under color of state law in an attempt to drive him out of business for Schauf’s own personal 

gain or other illegitimate purposes. Brunson’s equal protection claim covers the entire campaign against him, including 

Schauf’s arbitrary delay in renewing Brunson’s liquor license 

as well as the harassment by law enforcement, the interference in his business, the vandalism of his store, and the investigation of his violent encounter with Harshman.

The Equal Protection Clause guards against government 

discrimination on the basis of race and other immutable characteristics, but it also extends to protect people from so-called 
No. 14-2877 11

“class-of-one” discrimination in which a government arbitrarily and irrationally singles out one person for poor treatment. 

Geinosky v. City of Chicago, 675 F.3d 743, 747 (7th Cir. 2012). 

These class-of-one claims are designed to prevent government actors from singling out a person for arbitrary abuse. See 

Village of Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562, 564 (2000). Classof-one discrimination “is illustrated when a public official, 

‘with no conceivable basis for his action other than spite or 

some other improper motive ... comes down hard on a hapless private citizen.’” Swanson v. City of Chetek, 719 F.3d 780, 

784 (7th Cir. 2013), quoting Lauth v. McCollum, 424 F.3d 631, 

633 (7th Cir. 2005) (alteration in original).

The district court determined that Brunson’s claim failed 

for lack of evidence that defendants treated other similarly situated persons better than they treated him. Citing the Supreme Court’s decision in Village of Willowbrook, the court 

wrote that a class-of-one claim requires a two-part showing: 

first, that a plaintiff was intentionally treated worse than similarly situated comparators, and second, that there was no rational basis for the different treatment. Brunson’s claim failed, 

the court said, because he did not produce evidence of similarly situated licensees in Bridgeport who had been treated 

better during their own licensing processes. Instead, his claim 

focused too heavily on prong two of the equal protection analysis. See Srail v. Village of Lisle, 588 F.3d 940, 945–46 (7th Cir. 

2009) (granting summary judgment to defendants where 

plaintiffs failed to raise genuine issue of material fact with respect to similarly situated comparators).2

 2 Defendants did not assert absolute immunity against this claim.
12 No. 14-2877

The elements of class-of-one claims have remained unsettled since this court’s decision in Del Marcelle v. Brown County 

Corp., 680 F.3d 887 (7th Cir. 2012) (en banc). In that case, the 

en banc court produced three separate opinions in a tie vote 

affirming the district court’s dismissal of the suit. The crux of 

the disagreement was whether the plaintiff in a class-of-one 

claim must demonstrate only that there is no possible justification or rational basis for the defendant’s actions, id. at 900 

(Easterbrook, C.J., concurring in the judgment), or if the plaintiff must demonstrate a lack of justification and also present 

evidence of hostile intent or animus, id. at 889 (Posner, J., plurality opinion), or if the plaintiff must demonstrate an absence 

of rational basis, which can be satisfied with evidence of animus, id. at 913 (Wood, J., dissenting). Brunson’s class-of-one 

claim survives summary judgment under all three standards.

The standard in Judge Easterbrook’s opinion gives motive 

and intent in class-of-one suits “no role at all.” Id. at 900 

(Easterbrook, C.J., concurring). Class-of-one claims must 

simply address “whether a rational basis can be conceived, not 

whether one is established on the record or occurred to a defendant.” Id. Under that standard, the “only proper use of intent in a class-of-one case is to show that discrimination exists.” Id. 

The standard in Judge Posner’s plurality opinion requires 

the plaintiff to demonstrate that “he was the victim of discrimination intentionally visited on him by state actors who knew 

or should have known that they had no justification, based on 

their public duties, for singling him out for unfavorable treatment—who acted in other words for personal reasons, with 

discriminatory intent and effect.” Id. at 889 (Posner, J., plurality opinion) (emphasis in original removed). 
No. 14-2877 13

And the third standard, explained in Judge Wood’s dissent 

joined by four additional judges, laid out four elements to a 

class-of-one claim: “(1) plaintiff was the victim of intentional 

discrimination, (2) at the hands of a state actor, (3) the state 

actor lacked a rational basis for so singling out the plaintiff, 

and (4) the plaintiff has been injured by the intentionally discriminatory treatment.” Id. at 913 (Wood, J., dissenting). Under this standard, “personal animus, illegitimate motives, 

[and] inexplicable deviations from clear rules” illustrate the 

kind of facts a plaintiff may rely upon to demonstrate that a 

lack of rational basis is plausible. Id. 

While we await a final resolution of the doctrinal debate, 

Brunson’s claim survives summary judgment under all three 

standards. First, while earlier cases cited by the district court 

had required evidence of similarly situated comparators, see 

Srail, 588 F.3d at 945 (7th Cir. 2009); Vision Church v. Village of 

Long Grove, 468 F.3d 975, 1002 (7th Cir. 2006), our more recent 

cases have made clear that such evidence is not always required. Evidence of similarly situated individuals is not required as part of a formalistic mandate, but such evidence 

may help to establish disparate treatment: “if all principal 

characteristics of the two individuals are the same, and one 

received more favorable treatment, this may show there was 

no proper motivation for the disparate treatment.” Swanson, 

719 F.3d at 784. Some cases, however, present the circumstance where disparate treatment “is easily demonstrated but 

similarly situated individuals are difficult to find.” Id. These 

class-of-one claims are also viable. See, e.g., Miller v. City of 

Monona, 784 F.3d 1113, 1120–21 (7th Cir. 2015) (collecting 

cases). 
14 No. 14-2877

For instance, in Geinosky v. City of Chicago, we reversed a 

dismissal based on a plaintiff’s failure to identify and describe 

comparators in his complaint. 675 F.3d at 748–49. The pattern 

of the defendants’ conduct toward the plaintiff—two dozen 

false parking tickets in fourteen months—demonstrated on its 

own “the officers’ improper discriminatory purpose. ... 

[W]here the alleged facts so clearly suggest harassment by 

public officials that has no conceivable legitimate purpose,” 

the plaintiff did not need to identify comparators. Id. at 748.

Our later en banc decision in Del Marcelle found common 

ground in supporting the Geinosky approach to comparators. 

We said that if the allegations signal that the plaintiff alone 

suffered the defendant’s harassment, there is no need to identify a comparator. 680 F.3d at 914–15 (Wood, J., dissenting); 

see also id. at 898 (Posner, J., plurality opinion) (demonstrated 

pattern against one individual “adds up to deliberate and unjustified official harassment” even without comparators), 

quoting Geinosky, 675 F.3d at 745.

Defendants argue here, and the district court agreed, that 

because Brunson held the only Class B liquor license in 

Bridgeport, he could not identify any similarly situated comparators. Bridgeport is a small town of 2,500, with just five 

establishments selling or serving any liquor. Brunson owned 

the only package liquor store and Class B liquor license. Thus, 

as in many small communities, it would have been practically 

impossible for Brunson to produce similarly situated comparators among Class B liquor license holders as distinguished 

from Class A restaurants and Class C clubs. In this case, requiring Brunson to produce a comparator among Class B liq-
No. 14-2877 15

uor establishments “would not help distinguish between ordinary wrongful acts and deliberately discriminatory denials 

of equal protection.” Geinosky, 675 F.3d at 748. 

Brunson offered evidence of a pattern of discriminatory 

behavior on the part of a government. As we recognized in 

Geinosky, such a pattern can perform the same function as the 

similarly situated requirement in other class-of-one claims. 

Id.3 As the district court noted, Chief Murray repeatedly visited “to inform Brunson that he and his store were in violation” of non-existent state and local liquor laws. Mayor Schauf 

attempted to single Brunson out with a proposed local rule 

that would have driven only him out of business. When 

Schauf arbitrarily refused to act on his license renewal, 

Brunson was forced to close his store and hire counsel. A city 

official tried to intimidate Brunson’s liquor supplier in an attempt to cut off Brunson’s receipt of product. Brunson also 

 

3 Even if this were not the case, Brunson also provided the district 

court with evidence of similarly situated comparators. The process of obtaining license renewal is identical for Class A, Class B, and Class C establishments. Brunson claims that no other business that needed to renew its 

liquor license—including at least one Class C club in which Mayor Schauf 

held an ownership interest—experienced the same harassment, scrutiny, 

and delay that he and his store experienced. The district court could and 

should have found sufficient evidence of similarly situated comparators. 

See Swanson, 719 F.3d at 782, 785 (noting, in a case where a mayor used his 

position to harass an abutting neighbor over the building of a fence, that 

a resident in the same neighborhood whose property did not abut the 

mayor’s property and who was treated better could be “helpful in indicating the norm governing the regulation of fences” in the town, and “could 

be invoked as additional support for a direct showing of animus,” if the 

direct evidence were less strong than in the present case).
16 No. 14-2877

produced an affidavit from Agent Mendenhall that reasonably described this behavior as harassment.

Brunson has also offered evidence sufficient to avoid summary judgment that there was no rational and legitimate basis 

for Mayor Schauf to single out Brunson for discriminatory 

treatment. He had no overwhelming number of license renewals to review nor insufficient resources to do so. The average was not even one renewal per month. According to the 

State Commission’s Agent Mendenhall, Schauf had no discretion to delay the pro forma renewal. As Brunson emphasizes in 

his brief, even Schauf himself—from the time Brunson and 

Agent Mendenhall first inquired until he submitted his appellate brief—has not offered a reason, “any reason, not even a 

spurious reason, for his inaction.” A jury could find that 

Schauf had no conceivable justification for his actions based 

on his public duties as liquor commissioner. See Del Marcelle, 

680 F.3d at 900 (Easterbrook, C.J., concurring in the judgment).

Accordingly, Brunson has shown a lack of rational basis so 

that his claim survives summary judgment under Judge 

Easterbrook’s standard in Del Marcelle. Still, “something other 

than the normal rational-basis test applies to class-of-one 

claims,” id., even if that something has not been clearly delineated. Brunson will need to address intent on remand.4

 4 While the standard in class-of-one cases remains unsettled, district 

judges may find it prudent to use jury instructions and verdict forms to 

distinguish between findings of hostile animus and findings of objectively 

arbitrary acts that lack justification based on public duties.
No. 14-2877 17

With regard to hostile intent and animus, whether the 

standard requires it or only allows its use as evidence, the pattern of harassment and discriminatory acts driven by Schauf’s 

personal interests in Bridgeport is sufficient to satisfy both the 

plurality and dissenting opinions in Del Marcelle. See id. at 

889, 913. Brunson, supported by Mendenhall’s affidavit, 

paints a clear picture of the motive for this pattern of behavior: Schauf had a number of personal interests adverse to 

Brunson’s store, and he sought to harass Brunson to drive him 

out of business. Brunson has offered evidence of substantial 

animus and a continuing misuse of power by government 

agents akin to an “orchestrated campaign of official harassment motivated by sheer malice” that we have said is sufficient (though it may not be necessary) to support an equal 

protection claim. Olech v. Village of Willowbrook, 160 F.3d 386, 

388 (7th Cir. 1998) (internal quotation marks omitted), aff’d, 

528 U.S. 562 (2000).

Courts must handle class-of-one claims carefully to avoid 

turning “every squabble over municipal services, of which 

there must be tens or even hundreds of thousands every year, 

into a federal constitutional case.” Id. But the severity and extent of the defendants’ harassment shown by Brunson’s evidence convince us that this claim should go to trial. 

IV. False Arrest

We turn to Brunson’s false arrest claim. Brunson was arrested on August 20 on a warrant. Brunson argues that Murray participated in his arrest but lacked probable cause to believe he had committed the crime charged. Brunson contends 

that clear evidence of self-defense defeated any probable 

cause to support an arrest for aggravated battery. The district 

court, reasoning that affirmative defenses play no part in the 
18 No. 14-2877

probable cause determination, granted the defendants’ motion for summary judgment on the claim. We affirm but on a 

different ground. 

The key point is that Chief Murray arrested Brunson on 

the basis of an arrest warrant. A state court issued the facially 

valid warrant upon application by the prosecuting attorney. 

Murray concluded his investigation and turned over his police report to State’s Attorney Wade. Wade then reviewed the 

police report and determined there was probable cause to arrest Brunson for aggravated battery. Her office prepared, and 

she personally signed, a charging document for Brunson. 

Chief Murray affirmed the factual allegations: that Brunson 

committed a battery in that he “struck Jody Harshman in the 

head and kicked Jody Harshman in the face, head, and chest.” 

A court issued an arrest warrant for Brunson on August 20, 

and Murray arrested Brunson that day.

When a person has been arrested as a result of such formal 

legal processes, his claim is not for an unconstitutional false 

arrest but (perhaps, if at all) for malicious prosecution, which 

we leave to state law in Illinois. See Bianchi v. McQueen, 818 

F.3d 309, 321 (7th Cir. 2016).5 A police officer who receives a 

facially valid arrest warrant is ordinarily expected to act upon 

it, not to second-guess the court’s decision to issue it. The officer does not personally violate the Constitution by making 

the arrest the court has authorized.

 5 The Supreme Court is now considering a case that may shed new 

light on these doctrinal issues. See Manuel v. City of Joliet, 590 Fed. Appx. 

641 (7th Cir. 2015), cert. granted, No. 14-9496, 136 S. Ct. 890 (2016). The 

Court heard oral argument in Manuel on October 5, 2016.
No. 14-2877 19

We have recognized a narrow exception to this rule where 

a reasonable officer would have known that the evidence provided to support the warrant failed to establish probable 

cause. Williamson v. Curran, 714 F.3d 432, 442 (7th Cir. 2013). 

That exception does not apply here. Chief Murray was entitled to investigate, to turn over the results to the prosecutor, 

and to let the prosecutor and then the court figure out if there 

was probable cause for the arrest or whether Brunson was 

clearly acting in self-defense. This case therefore does not present an issue concerning the scope of a police officer’s duty, 

on the street, to evaluate available evidence of an affirmative 

defense. See McBride v. Grice, 576 F.3d 703, 707 (7th Cir. 2009) 

(officer may end investigation once he has probable cause, but 

“may not ignore conclusively established evidence of the existence of an affirmative defense,” though Fourth Amendment imposes no duty to investigate validity of defense), 

quoting Hodgkins ex rel. Hodgkins v. Peterson, 355 F.3d 1048, 

1061 (7th Cir. 2004).

A second narrow exception could apply if Murray himself 

“knowingly or intentionally or with a reckless disregard for 

the truth, made false statements to the judicial officer, and [if] 

the false statements were necessary to the judicial officers’ determinations that probable cause existed for the arrests.” See 

Beauchamp v. City of Noblesville, 320 F.3d 733, 742–43 (7th Cir. 

2003), citing Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 155–56 (1978). 

This can include law enforcement deliberately or recklessly 

failing to inform the judicial officer of facts negating probable 

cause. Id. at 743. Brunson has not offered evidence that Murray deliberately or recklessly made any false statement or 

omitted any critical fact. He has not identified anything in 

Murray’s police report or in the factual portion of the application for an arrest warrant that is demonstrably deceptive or 
20 No. 14-2877

false. Accordingly, Brunson has not cleared the high bar to 

support his false arrest claim.

V. Due Process and Mayor Schauf’s Immunity

We next address Brunson’s claim that he was deprived of 

a property interest (his liquor license) without due process of 

law when Mayor Schauf refused to act in a timely manner on 

his application to renew the annual license. According to 

Brunson, the license should have been renewed automatically. 

Schauf’s refusal to act forced Brunson to close his business until he could persuade the state Commission to step in and allow him to reopen. The district court granted summary judgment to Schauf on this claim based on the defense of absolute 

quasi-judicial immunity. The district court correctly limited 

its discussion of immunity to Brunson’s due process claim.6

The district court’s grant of absolute immunity for action 

on a license renewal has support in our opinions in Killinger 

v. Johnson, 389 F.3d 765 (7th Cir. 2004), and Reed v. Village of 

Shorewood, 704 F.2d 943 (7th Cir. 1983), which hold or indicate 

that absolute immunity is available not only for a local liquor 

commissioner’s decisions to suspend or revoke licenses, but 

also for actions on license renewals. On further consideration, 

 

6 Schauf’s absolute immunity defense does not affect Brunson’s 

broader equal protection claim because his claim of harassment “extends 

beyond [Schauf’s] conduct as local liquor control commissioner ... to his 

nonjudicial, nonlegislative conduct as mayor.” Reed v. Village of Shorewood, 

704 F.2d 943, 951 (7th Cir. 1983) (reversing in part summary judgment for 

defendant acting as both mayor and local liquor commissioner). As in

Reed, when a defendant is both mayor and local liquor commissioner, we 

separate out claims that primarily concern the defendant’s actions in the 

mayoral role. Id.
No. 14-2877 21

however, and in light of supplemental briefing on the question, we conclude that those cases must be narrowed so as to 

exclude license renewal decisions. The key holding expressed 

in Reed based its grant of absolute immunity for license renewal decisions on a view of Illinois law that is no longer accurate and on a broad view of absolute immunity that the Supreme Court has narrowed. We reverse the grant of absolute

immunity to the mayor with respect to the non-renewal of 

Brunson’s liquor license. 

We start the analysis with the Supreme Court’s approach 

to the strong medicine of absolute immunity. Absolute immunity is a powerful shield attaching primarily to judicial 

functions—not to the person or position. Cleavinger v. Saxner,

474 U.S. 193, 201 (1985), citing Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 

511 (1978). When a functional analysis of the responsibilities 

at issue reveals that they are judicial in nature, the actor is entitled to absolute immunity from damages no matter how erroneous the act or injurious the consequences. Id. at 199–200. 

If the functions are not judicial in nature, however, then absolute immunity is not available. The official is left with the stillimportant protection of qualified immunity, which defeats individual liability unless his or her actions were contrary to 

clearly established law. Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231 

(2009).

Under the reasoning of Cleavinger and Butz, the action of 

renewing or not renewing an Illinois liquor license is a bureaucratic and administrative act—not a judicial act. Under 

state law, a local liquor commissioner’s action on a license renewal lacks the procedural formalities and protections that 

apply to the same official’s decision to suspend or revoke a 
22 No. 14-2877

license. The differences are great enough to produce different 

results for the availability of absolute immunity.

An overview of the state statute and facts of this case is 

helpful here. Under the Illinois Liquor Control Act, a liquor 

license holder is entitled to important procedural protections 

when a local liquor commissioner acts to suspend or revoke a 

license and/or to impose a fine. Those actions by a local liquor 

commissioner require a public hearing, with at least three 

days’ written notice. The licensee must have an opportunity 

to be heard, and an official written record of evidence is required. Liquor Control Act of 1934, 235 Ill. Comp. Stat. 5/7-5. 

The Act also provides additional procedural safeguards, including additional hearings and appeals. Id.; 235 Ill. Comp. 

Stat. 5/7-9; see also Killinger, 389 F.3d at 770 (holding that local 

liquor commissioner was entitled to absolute immunity for 

actions in suspending license). The Act also allows emergency 

suspensions of up to seven days without a prior hearing but 

provides for expedited hearings to contest them. 235 Ill. 

Comp. Stat. 5/7-5.

License renewal does not provide comparable procedural 

protections. The Act provides that a license holder may renew 

a license at its expiration, “provided he is then qualified to 

receive a license and the premises for which such renewal license is sought are suitable for such purpose.” 235 Ill. Comp. 

Stat. 5/6-1. The Act also gives the local liquor commissioner 

the right to investigate any applicant for a local license renewal, including examining the applicant’s books and records 

and taking testimony and evidence. 235 Ill. Comp. Stat. 5/4-5. 

However, the local application for Bridgeport renewal applicants is a one-page, tick-the-box form, and Agent Mendenhall 
No. 14-2877 23

testified that approval was virtually “automatic.” Most important for our purposes, the Act does not grant a right to notice and a hearing in the event of a planned or actual decision 

not to renew, nor does the Act require the commissioner to 

state for the record any reasons for denying renewal. The licensee has the right to appeal a denial to the state Commission, the filing of which allows the licensee to continue its operations. See 235 Ill. Comp. Stat. 5/7-9. Such an appeal is quite 

different from an appeal of a revocation or suspension, either 

of which would require notice, a hearing, a record, and a reasoned decision.7

In this case, Brunson submitted the pro forma application 

for renewal three weeks before his license was set to expire. 

Although the local ordinance required Schauf to review the 

application within 15 days, he sat on it for seven weeks, forcing Brunson to close his store. By simply not acting, Schauf 

made it difficult for Brunson to appeal, which is a key safeguard against unlawful or unconstitutional acts. With no 

other recourse available to him, Brunson sought the aid of 

hired counsel and the state Commission. Only because 

 

7 The Act also provides: “Notwithstanding any other provision of this 

Section to the contrary, the mayor of a city with a population of 55,000 or 

less ... that has an interest in the manufacture, sale, or distribution of alcoholic liquor must direct the council or board over which he or she presides to appoint, by majority vote, a person other than him or her to serve 

as the local liquor control commissioner.” 235 Ill. Comp. Stat. 5/4-2. This 

provision may be relevant to Brunson’s argument that Schauf violated the 

statute by holding, directly or indirectly, interests in liquor sales in Bridgeport.
24 No. 14-2877

Brunson independently solicited the aid of the state Commission was he able to reopen his store with the involvement of 

Agent Mendenhall.

Cleavinger offers a guide to assessing the relative importance of these facts and statutory characteristics. 474 U.S. 

at 201–02. Our functional analysis of the immunity issue is 

aided by the six factors “characteristic of the judicial process” 

set out in the decision, which are “to be considered in determining absolute as contrasted with qualified immunity”:

(a) the need to assure that the individual can perform 

his functions without harassment or intimidation;

(b) the presence of safeguards that reduce the need for 

private damages actions as a means of controlling 

unconstitutional conduct;

(c) insulation from political influence;

(d) the importance of precedent;

(e) the adversary nature of the process; and

(f) the correctability of error on appeal. 

Id. at 202, citing Butz, 438 U.S. at 512.

These factors weigh decisively against absolute immunity 

for an Illinois local liquor commissioner’s action on whether 

to renew a liquor license. First, while the risk of harassment 

may be substantial when a local liquor commissioner makes 

decisions to suspend or revoke licenses, the risk of harassment is minimal where the decision to renew is “automatic” 

and “not discretionary.” Second, while there are substantial 

procedural safeguards available in cases of suspensions or 

revocations, including notice, a prompt public hearing on an 

official record, and a reasoned written decision, see 235 Ill. 
No. 14-2877 25

Comp. Stat. 5/7-5, those protections do not apply to actions on 

license renewals. Third, unlike many judges, the local liquor 

commissioner is an elected mayor, not insulated at all from 

political influence, though that factor applies equally to any 

of the official’s actions. See 235 Ill. Comp. Stat. 5/4-2. Fourth 

and fifth, we have no indication that precedent is important 

in the administrative renewal process, nor is the process adversarial or even based on a record of evidence. 

The sixth and only factor that tends to support absolute 

immunity is that errors can be corrected on appeal to the state 

Commission. That factor is limited to some extent, however, 

because in the case of inaction on a license renewal, the appellant must show there is a local commissioner’s “order or action ... having the effect of ... denying a renewal application.” 

235 Ill. Comp. Stat. 5/7-9. When the local commissioner 

simply refuses to act, as Mayor Schauf did here, the inaction 

poses a further challenge to effective review.

We have applied absolute immunity under federal law 

only when the official’s duties “are functionally comparable 

to those of a judicial officer.” Tobin for Governor v. Illinois State 

Bd. of Elections, 268 F.3d 517, 521 (7th Cir. 2001), citing Butz, 

438 U.S. at 512–13; see also id. at 526 (absolute immunity for 

election board members when “they rule on the validity of 

nomination petitions”); Capra v. Cook County Bd. of Review, 733 

F.3d 705, 709–10 (7th Cir. 2013) (absolute immunity for members of county board of review for property tax appeals); 

Heyde v. Pittenger, 633 F.3d 512, 518 (7th Cir. 2011) (absolute 

immunity for members of a county board of review for quasijudicial functions, which required notice, a hearing, and otherwise engaging in a judicial proceeding); Wilson v. Kelkhoff, 
26 No. 14-2877

86 F.3d 1438, 1444 (7th Cir. 1996) (absolute immunity for members of parole board when they “grant, deny, or revoke parole,” quoting Walrath v. United States, 35 F.3d 277, 281 (7th Cir. 

1994)). 

However, where an official’s actions “do not involve acts 

that are analogous to those performed by judges,” we have 

rejected absolute immunity defenses. Dawson v. Newman, 419 

F.3d 656, 662 (7th Cir. 2005) (no absolute immunity for parole 

officers’ actions involving “day-to-day duties in the supervision of a parolee”); Snyder v. Nolen, 380 F.3d 279, 288–89 (7th 

Cir. 2004) (no absolute immunity for clerks of court whose 

duty to “maintain the official record was purely ministerial,” 

involving “none of the discretion that ... is at the heart of absolute judicial immunity”); Richman v. Sheahan, 270 F.3d 430, 

438 (7th Cir. 2001) (no absolute immunity for sheriffs or deputies whose misconduct involved “the manner in which they 

enforced the judge’s order,” which is an “executive, not judicial, function”); Auriemma v. Montgomery, 860 F.2d 273, 278–79 

(7th Cir. 1988) (no absolute immunity for extra-judicial, pretrial investigations by government attorneys; absolute immunity available “only when such activities are intimately associated with the court-related duties”). See also Cleavinger, 

474 U.S. at 201–02, 206 (no absolute immunity for members of 

prison disciplinary committee).

The Cleavinger factors thus weigh heavily against extending absolute immunity to an Illinois local liquor commissioner’s actions on whether to renew a license, even while 

they weigh in favor of absolute immunity for decisions to revoke or suspend licenses. Denying absolute immunity runs 

contrary to one holding in a pre-Cleavinger case, which was 

repeated in dicta more recently. We therefore find it necessary 
No. 14-2877 27

to overrule one holding in Reed v. Village of Shorewood and to 

disapprove one phrase of dictum in Killinger v. Johnson.

To explain, in 1983 in Reed, we faced allegations of a pattern of official harassment of a liquor licensee similar to the 

harassment of Brunson in this case. The harassment in Reed

included harassment of customers and groundless suspensions of the license, and eventually included denial of license 

renewal. 704 F.2d at 947–48. We reversed in part the dismissal 

of the licensee’s due process claim, holding first and foremost 

that an Illinois liquor license is a property interest within the 

meaning of the due process clause. Id. at 949. We also held that 

the local liquor commissioner was entitled to absolute quasijudicial immunity for his actions in suspending and revoking 

the license. Id. at 951–52. We agree with those holdings, which 

are consistent with the later Supreme Court decision in Cleavinger. 

In Reed we also extended that absolute immunity to actions to renew or deny renewal of a license. We reasoned that 

even though the Illinois statute did not prescribe the same 

procedural protections for denials of license renewals that it 

does for suspensions and revocations, Illinois case law required those procedures. Id. at 948–49, citing City of Wyoming 

v. Liquor Control Comm’n of Illinois, 362 N.E.2d 1080, 1084 (Ill. 

App. 1977). We also read the Act as suggesting “that the Illinois legislature expected most licenses to be renewed as a 

matter of course.” Reed, 704 F.2d at 948–49. 

More recently, in Killinger we considered a similar due 

process claim based on two relatively brief suspensions of a 

liquor license, including one summary suspension. We followed Reed to hold that the local liquor commissioner was en-
28 No. 14-2877

titled to absolute immunity on those claims based on the suspensions. 389 F.3d at 770. We repeated the Reed holding that 

absolute immunity applied to decisions “to renew or revoke a 

liquor license,” id. (emphasis added), though strictly speaking 

the reference to renewal was dictum in Killinger, which presented no issue involving license renewals.

In this appeal, we invited the parties to file supplemental 

briefs on whether the absolute immunity holding of Reed and 

the dictum of Killinger on license renewals should be revisited. 

The principles of stare decisis demand that we give significant 

weight to our prior decisions unless supervening developments arise. See, e.g., Grandberry v. Keever, 735 F.3d 616, 617 

(7th Cir. 2013); McClain v. Retail Food Employers Joint Pension 

Plan, 413 F.3d 582, 586 (7th Cir. 2005). While recognizing the 

importance of stare decisis in general, we conclude that we 

must narrow the Reed holding and disagree with the dictum in 

Killinger. We must deny absolute immunity to local liquor 

commissioners in decisions to renew licenses. We take this 

step based on developments in both federal and state law.8

The principal development in federal law is the Supreme 

Court’s decision in Cleavinger, which laid out the factors discussed above for deciding when the rare grant of absolute immunity is required. See also Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 

807–08 (1982) (qualified immunity is the norm; absolute immunity is appropriate only when public policy so requires); 

Saxner v. Benson, 727 F.2d 669, 675 (7th Cir. 1984) (Cudahy, J., 

concurring), aff’d sub nom. Cleavinger, 474 U.S. 193. Cleavinger 

 8 Because we overrule one holding in Reed, we have circulated this 

opinion to all active judges under Circuit Rule 40(e). No active judge 

voted to hear this case en banc.
No. 14-2877 29

was decided after Reed and was not cited in Killinger, which in 

any event did not need to address whether absolute immunity should apply to decisions whether to renew licenses.

The developments in Illinois state law are two-fold. First, 

recently an Illinois appellate decision has rejected the City of 

Wyoming holding that “nonrenewal is equivalent to a revocation or suspension.” Knoob Enterprises, Inc. v. City of Carbondale, 948 N.E.2d 183, 186 (Ill. App. 2011). The court in Knoob 

Enterprises found that the Act unambiguously distinguished 

between the procedures for renewals and the procedures for 

revocations and suspensions. Id. at 186–87. In the case, a liquor licensee appealed the non-renewal of its license. The decision turned on whether the licensee was appealing a suspension or revocation on one hand or a non-renewal on the 

other. The local government relied on City of Wyoming to argue that there was no difference, and the appellate court rejected that view, explaining that City of Wyoming “gives no 

reason to depart from the plain language of the Act.” Id. at 

186. 

While it might be possible to treat Knoob Enterprises as an 

inconclusive decision by another district of the Appellate 

Court of Illinois, the opinion also pointed out that the Illinois 

legislature had responded to City of Wyoming. It did so with a 

statutory amendment to allow appeals of actions “having the 

effect of ... denying a renewal application,” but without imposing the sorts of procedural requirements that apply to local liquor commissioners’ decisions to suspend or revoke licenses. 948 N.E.2d at 186–87, quoting Pub. Act 86–1279, § 1 

(1991). That limited legislative response—to allow appeals of 

non-renewals but without requiring the procedures critical to 

absolute immunity—persuades us that Reed’s view of Illinois 
30 No. 14-2877

law on this point is no longer viable, however sensible it 

might have been.

Accordingly, the combination of Cleavinger, the Illinois legislative response to City of Wyoming, and the more recent decision in Knoob Enterprises convinces us that the key assumption in Reed concerning non-renewals no longer applies. Absolute immunity should no longer apply to non-renewal decisions, which lack the hallmarks of a judicial act. Schauf has 

not claimed qualified immunity, which would not apply in 

any event if Brunson can prove his claims on the merits. We 

reverse the district court’s grant of absolute immunity to 

Schauf on the due process claim.

VI. Remaining Due Process Issues

A. City of Bridgeport

We affirm the district court’s grant of summary judgment 

to the City of Bridgeport on the due process claim. The city is 

liable for Schauf’s actions only insofar as its municipal policy 

caused a constitutional violation. Killinger, 389 F.3d at 771, citing Monell v. Dep’t of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 690 (1978). 

The district court rejected Brunson’s argument that the city 

was liable on the due process claim for Schauf’s actions as a 

final policymaker for Bridgeport. The court’s conclusion 

might well raise an eyebrow, see Reed, 704 F.2d at 953 (official 

acts of municipal officials are acts of the municipality for purposes of § 1983 liability, even if official is entitled to immunity 

from individual liability), but Brunson has waived the point 

by not arguing it on appeal.

Brunson instead hints briefly at an alternative theory of 

due process liability for the city and the other defendants: that 

the overall campaign of harassment deprived him of the value 
No. 14-2877 31

of his liquor license. See id., at 949. But Brunson provides only 

an underdeveloped argument, so that issue is also waived. 

Puffer v. Allstate Ins. Co., 675 F.3d 709, 718 (7th Cir. 2012).

B. Defendants’ Parratt Defense to Due Process Claim

Defendants suggest that we affirm summary judgment on 

Brunson’s due process claim based on Parratt v. Taylor, 451 

U.S. 527 (1981). Parratt held that a claim under § 1983 for deprivation of property without prior notice and an opportunity 

for hearing fails where the property deprivation is the result 

of random and unauthorized acts by state officials and where 

a meaningful post-deprivation remedy is available. See Easter 

House v. Felder, 910 F.2d 1387, 1396 (7th Cir. 1990), citing Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517 (1984). The district court did not 

consider this argument in granting summary judgment to defendants. We decline to affirm summary judgment on this basis. Defendants have presented us with only black letter law 

of the Parratt line of cases. They have not shown how that narrow exception would apply to the circumstances of this case.9

 

9 We are skeptical in any event. Parratt is a rare exception to due process norms. See Parratt, 451 U.S. 527 (1981); Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517

(1984). It is “limited to a narrow category of due process cases where the 

plaintiff claims he was denied a meaningful pre-deprivation hearing, but 

under circumstances where the very notion of a pre-deprivation hearing 

would be impractical and even nonsensical, and where the deprivation 

was not carried out through established state procedures.” Armstrong v. 

Daily, 786 F.3d 529, 539 (7th Cir. 2015). The procedures to protect 

Brunson’s property interest in his liquor license were available and wellestablished. A deliberate decision to prevent him from using those procedures does not fit within the narrow Parratt doctrine, and certainly not 

where there is no obvious and sufficient post-deprivation remedy available under state law.
32 No. 14-2877

VII. Supplemental Jurisdiction

Finally, the district court declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Brunson’s state-law claims because it 

had dismissed all of the federal claims over which it had original jurisdiction. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3). Because we reinstate some of Brunson’s federal claims under § 1983, the district court will need to revisit the question of supplemental 

jurisdiction on remand. See McCullah v. Gadert, 344 F.3d 655, 

662 (7th Cir. 2003).

* * *

To recapitulate, summary judgment for Wade on the basis 

of prosecutorial immunity and summary judgment as to all 

defendants on Brunson’s false arrest claim are AFFIRMED. 

Summary judgment in favor of defendants Schauf, Murray, 

and the City of Bridgeport on Brunson’s claim for denial of 

equal protection is REVERSED. Summary judgment on 

Brunson’s claim of denial of due process is also REVERSED as 

to defendants Schauf and Murray, but AFFIRMED as to defendant City of Bridgeport. The case is REMANDED to the 

district court for further proceedings consistent with this 

opinion.