## I N T H E C O U R T O F C R I M I N A L A P P E A L S

O F T E X A S

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E X P A R T E A L B E R T O G I R O N P E R E Z

, A p p l i c a n t

O N A P P L I C A T I O N F O R A W R I T O F H A B E A S C O R P U S

C A U S E N O

. 2 6 4 9

- C R I N T H E 5 0 J U D I C I A L D I S T R I C T C O U R T T H

F R O M C O T T L E C O U N T Y

A L C A L A

, J

. , d e l i v e r e d t h e o p i n i o n o f t h e C o u r t i n w h i c h K E L L E R

, P

. J

. , P R IC E

,

W O M A C K

, K E A S L E R

, H E R V E Y

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O P I N I O N

I n t h i s c a s e

, w e a l t e r t h e p a r a m e t e r s o f t h e e q u i t a b l e d o c t r i n e o f l a c h e s a s i t a p p l i e s

t o b a r a l o n g

- d e l a y e d a p p l i c a t i o n f o r a w r i t o f h a b e a s c o r p u s

. R e c o g n i z i n g t h a t o u r c u r r e n t

a p p r o a c h t o l a c h e s i n t h e h a b e a s c o r p u s c o n t e x t h a s i m p o s e d a n u n r e a s o n a b l y h e a v y b u r d e n

u p o n t h e S t a t e

, w e n o w a d o p t a r e v i s e d a p p r o a c h t h a t i s c o n s i s t e n t w i t h t h e T e x a s c o m m o n

l a w d e f i n i t i o n o f t h a t d o c t r i n e

. I n d o i n g s o

, w e e x p a n d t h e d e f i n i t i o n o f p r e

j u d i c e u n d e r t h e

e x i s t i n g l a c h e s s t a n d a r d t o i n c o r p o r a t e a l l f o r m s o f p r e

j u d i c e s o t h a t a c o u r t m a y c o n s i d e r t h ePerez - 2

t o t a l i t y o f t h e c i r c u m s t a n c e s i n d e c i d i n g w h e t h e r t o h o l d a n a p p l i c a t i o n b a r r e d b y l a c h e s

. O u r

r e v i s e d a p p r o a c h i s m o t i v a t e d b y o u r r e c o g n i t i o n t h a t t h e c u r r e n t l a c h e s s t a n d a r d i s t o o r i g i d

a n d

, a s a r e s u l t

, s o m e a p p l i c a n t s h a v e b e e n p e r m i t t e d t o s e e k p o s t

- c o n v i c t i o n r e l i e f d e s p i t e

e x c e s s i v e a n d u n

j u s t i f i e d d e l a y s t h a t h a v e p r e j u d i c e d t h e S t a t e ’ s a b i l i t y t o d e f e n d l o n g

s t a n d i n g c o n v i c t i o n s

. T h i s a p p r o a c h h a s f a i l e d t o a c c o u n t f

o r t h e S t a t e ’ s i n t e r e s t i n f i n a l i t y

a n d i s i n c o m p a t i b l e w i t h f u n d a m e n t a l p r i n c i p l e s o f f a i r n e s s a n d e q u i t y

, w h i c h m u s t u n d e r l i e

a n y g r a n t o f

h a b e a s c o r p u s r e l i e f

. I n l i g h t o f o u r r e v i s e d a p p r o a c h t o t h e d o c t r i n e o f l a c h e s

,

w e r e m a n d t h i s c a s e t o t h e t r i a l c o u r t t o g i v e b o t h A l b e r t o G i r o n P e r e z

, a p p l i c a n t

, a n d t h e

S t a t e a n o p p o r t u n i t y t o p r e s e n t a d d i t i o n a l e v i d e n c e

.

I

. B a c k g r o u n d a n d P r o c e d u r a l H i s t o r y

A p p l i c a n t w a s f

o u n d g u i l t y o f m u r d e r

, a n d h i s c o n v i c t i o n w a s a f f i r m e d b y t h e c o u r t

o f a p p e a l s i n 1 9 9 2

. P e r e z v

. S t a t e

, N o

. 0 7

– 9 1

– 0 0 2 2 5

– C R ( T e x

. A p p

. — A m a r i l l o O c t

. 9

,

1 9 9 2

, n o p e t

. )

. I n 2 0 1 1

, a l m o s t t w e n t y y e a r s l a t e r

, a p p l i c a n t f i l e d t h i s a p p l i c a t i o n f

o r p o s t

c o n v i c t i o n r e l i e f p u r s u a n t t o T e x a s C o d e o f C r i m i n a l P r o c e d u r e A r t i c l e 1 1

. 0 7

. S e e T E X

.

C O D E C R IM

. P R O C

. a r t

. 1 1

. 0 7

. A p p l i c a n t c o n t e n d s t h a t h e w a s d e n i e d t h e o p p o r t u n i t y t o

p u r s u e d i s c r e t i o n a r y r e v i e w i n t h i s C o u r t b e c a u s e h i s a p p e l l a t e c o u n s e l f a i l e d t o n o t i f

y h i m

o f h i s c o n v i c t i o n ’ s a f

f i r m a n c e i n t h e c o u r t o f a p p e a l s u n t i l J u n e 1 9 9 3

, b y w h i c h t i m e t h e

d e a d l i n e f

o r f i l i n g a p e t i t i o n f

o r d i s c r e t i o n a r y r e v i e w ( P D R ) h a d p a s s e d

. A p p l i c a n t f u r t h e r 1

“[A]ppellate counsel ha s a duty to notify the appe llant of t he actions of t he appellate court 1

(continued...)Perez - 3

c o n t e n d s t h a t a p p e l l a t e c o u n s e l ’ s f a i l u r e t o t i m e l y n o t i f

y h i m o f h i s c o n v i c t i o n ’ s a f f i r m a n c e

c o n s t i t u t e d i n e f

f e c t i v e a s s i s t a n c e o f c o u n s e l a n d t h a t h e s h o u l d n o w b e a f f o r d e d t h e

o p p o r t u n i t y t o f

i l e a n o u t

- o f

- t i m e P D R

. I n r e s p o n s e

, t h e S t a t e i n v o k e s t h e e q u i t a b l e d o c t r i n e

o f l a c h e s a n d u r g e s t h a t a p p l i c a n t b e b a r r e d f r o m p r o c e e d i n g w i t h h i s a p p l i c a t i o n f o r p o s t

c o n v i c t i o n r e l i e f

.

T h e t r i a l c o u r t ’ s f

i n d i n g s

, w h i c h a r e s u p p o r t e d b y t h e r e c o r d

, s h o w t h a t a p p e l l a t e

c o u n s e l d i d n o t p r o v i d e a p p l i c a n t w i t h n o t i c e o f t h e c o u r t o f a p p e a l s ’ s o p i n i o n u n t i l a f t e r t h e

d e a d l i n e f

o r f i l i n g a P D R

, a n d t h a t a p p l i c a n t h a d t h e i n f o r m a t i o n n e c e s s a r y t o s e e k a n o u t

- o f

t i m e P D R a s e a r l y a s 1 9 9 3 b u t f a i l e d t o d o s o u n t i l a l m o s t t w o d e c a d e s l a t e r

. T h e t r i a l c o u r t

(...continued)

[on direc t appea l] .” Ex parte Jarrett

, 891 S.W .2d 935, 940 (T ex

. Crim. App. 1994) (holding that

appellate counsel was under obliga tion, in 1991, to advise applicant reg arding rig ht to seek

discretionar

y revie w and to g ive notice of appellate court opin i o n ), o ve r r u l ed in part by Ex parte

W ilson

, 956 S.W .2d 25, 26-27 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997) (re aff irming counsel’s obliga tion to inform

defe ndant of conviction’s aff irmance and rig ht to seek discretionar y revie w, but reje cting aspec t of

Jarrett that require d counsel to express “prof essional judgme nt about possible g rounds for revie w”

and “adva ntag es and disadvantag es of further revie w”)

. Be cause an appellant has a rig ht to prepa re

and file a pro se petition for discretionar y revie w, denial o r ab ri dg ement of this rig ht throug h the

“misfea sance or nonfea sance of counsel” constitutes ineffe ctive assistance of counsel. Id. at 939-40.

This rule stems from thi s Court’s 1982 opinion in A ya l a v. State, in which we stated t hat, “[ i] f an

appointed counsel deprive d the client of his rig ht to apply

, pro se, for discretionar y revie w

. . . there

m i gh t be a due proce ss violation.” 633 S.W .2d 526, 528 n.4 (Tex. Crim. App. 1982); E x p a r t e

Fontenot

, 3 S.W .3d 32, 34 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999) (re cogni z i ng Ayala as “seminal decision”

establishing that counsel was ineffe ctive if “thro u gh ei t h er an act of commission or omission, he

cause d the depriva tion of [t he] rig ht” to pursue discretionar y revie w). Thus, to the extent that counsel

failed to timely inform applicant of the court of appea ls’s decision or failed to provide a copy of the

opinion, such an omission would have rende red counsel consti tutionally ineffe ctive at the t ime of

the conviction’s aff

irmance in 1992. See Fontenot

, 3 S.W .3d at 3 4 (holding that ineffe ctive

assistance claim based on counsel’s failure to timely advise an appl i ca n t o f his rig ht to seek

discretionar

y revie w “c ould have be en re asonably formulated” under Ayala as ea rly as 1982).Perez - 4

c o n c l u d e d t h a t a p p l i c a n t f a i l e d t o s h o w t h a t

, a b s e n t c o u n s e l ’ s c o n d u c t

, h e w o u l d h a v e t i m e l y

f i l e d a P D R

.

O n t h e i s s u e o f l a c h e s

, t h e t r i a l c o u r t f o u n d t h a t t h e S t a t e w o u l d b e p r e j u d i c e d i n i t s

a b i l i t y t o r e t r y a p p l i c a n t i f h e w e r e a w a r d e d a n e w t r i a l t h r o u g h h a b e a s c o r p u s r e l i e f

. T h i s

f i n d i n g a d d r e s s e d t h e S t a t e ’ s c o n t e n t i o n t h a t i t h a s b e e n p r e j u d i c e d a s a r e s u l t o f a p p l i c a n t ’ s

f i l i n g d e l a y “ b e c a u s e o f t h e p a s s a g e o f t i m e a s w e l l a s i t s i n a b i l i t y t o l o c a t e t h e m u r d e r

w e a p o n

, k e y e y e w i t n e s s e s t o t h e s h o o t i n g a n d i t s r e a s o n a b l e e x p e c t a t i o n t h a t t h e f a d e d

m e m o r i e s o f t h e w i t n e s s e s w i l l h a m p e r t h e S t a t e ’ s a b i l i t y t o p r e s e n t a c a s e

. ” T h e S t a t e f u r t h e r

n o t e d t h a t t h e l e a d i n v e s t i g a t o r i n t h e c a s e w a s r e t i r e d a n d e l d e r l y

.

T h e t r i a l c o u r t a l s o f

o u n d t h a t t h e S t a t e i s p r e j u d i c e d i n i t s a b i l i t y t o r e s p o n d t o t h e

a p p l i c a t i o n b a s e d o n a p p e l l a t e c o u n s e l ’ s “ h a z y m e m o r y o f t h e e v e n t s ” r e l a t e d t o t h e P D R

.

T h e t r i a l c o u r t ’ s f

i n d i n g w a s b a s e d o n a n a f f i d a v i t f r o m a p p e l l a t e c o u n s e l

, i n w h i c h h e s t a t e d

t h a t

, a s i d e f

r o m h i s f a i l u r e t o t i m e l y c o m m u n i c a t e t h e c o n v i c t i o n ’ s a f f i r m a n c e

, h e h a d “ l i t t l e

i n d e p e n d e n t m e m o r y o f t h e e v e n t s d e s c r i b e d i n a p p l i c a n t ’ s w r i t ” a n d h a d r e t a i n e d n o r e c o r d s

p e r t a i n i n g t o h i s r e p r e s e n t a t i o n o f a p p l i c a n t

. B a s e d o n h i s “ c u s t o m a n d p r a c t i c e

, ” c o u n s e l

s t a t e d t h a t h e w o u l d h a v e i n f o r m e d a p p l i c a n t t h a t h e w a s e n t i t l e d t o “ a f i r s t a p p e a l a s a m a t t e r

o f r i g h t

, t h a t a s e c o n d a p p e a l w a s n o t a m a t t e r o f r i g h t a n d t h a t [ c o u n s e l ] w o u l d n o t f i l e a

m e r i t l e s s P D R

, t h o u g h [ a p p l i c a n t ] c o u l d

. ” C o u n s e l f u r t h e r s t a t e d t h a t i t w a s h i s “ u s u a l

p r a c t i c e a n d r o u t i n e ” t o t i m e l y f o r w a r d a c o p y o f t h e c o u r t o f a p p e a l s ’ s o p i n i o n t o

d e f e n d a n t s

, a n d t h a t h e d i d “ n o t r e m e m b e r ” w h y a p p l i c a n t d i d n o t r e c e i v e a c o p y o f t h ePerez - 5

o p i n i o n o r t i m e l y n o t i c e o f t h e c o n v i c t i o n ’ s a f f i r m a n c e

.

T h i s C o u r t o r d e r e d b r i e f i n g o n t h e i s s u e o f w h e t h e r l a c h e s c o u l d b e t h e b a s i s t o d e n y

a p p l i c a n t t h e o p p o r t u n i t y t o f i l e a n o u t

- o f

- t i m e P D R b a s e d o n t h e S t a t e ’ s c l a i m o f p r e j u d i c e

t o i t s a b i l i t y t o r e t r y h i m

. S e e E x p a r t e P e r e z

, N o

. A P

– 7 6

, 8 0 0

, 2 0 1 2 W L 1 8 8 2 2 3 4

, a t * 1 2

( T e x

. C r i m

. A p p

. 2 0 1 2 ) ( n o t d e s i g n a t e d f o r p u b l i c a t i o n )

. A p p l i c a n t a r g u e s t h a t t h i s C o u r t

,

i n k e e p i n g w i t h i t s c u r r e n t a p p r o a c h

, s h o u l d f i n d a h a b e a s a p p l i c a t i o n b a r r e d b y l a c h e s o n l y

i f t h e S t a t e d e m o n s t r a t e s

, a m o n g o t h e r t h i n g s

, p r e c i s e l y h o w a n a p p l i c a n t ’ s d e l a y e d f i l i n g h a s

c a u s e d t h e S t a t e t o b e u n a b l e t o r e s p o n d t o t h e a l l e g a t i o n s r a i s e d i n t h e a p p l i c a t i o n

. A p p l i c a n t

u r g e s t h a t t h e S t a t e ’ s a s s e r t i o n o f p r e j u d i c e t o i t s a b i l i t y t o r e

- t r y a p p l i c a n t i s i r r e l e v a n t t o t h e

l a c h e s i n q u i r y a n d s h o u l d b e d i s r e g a r d e d

. T h e S t a t e r e s p o n d s b y a r g u i n g t h a t t h i s C o u r t

s h o u l d r e v i s e i t s c u r r e n t a p p r o a c h t o l a c h e s t o p e r m i t c o n s i d e r a t i o n o f p r e j u d i c e t o t h e S t a t e ’ s

a b i l i t y t o r e t r y a n a p p l i c a n t

, a n d f u r t h e r u r g e s t h i s C o u r t t o a p p l y a r e b u t t a b l e p r e s u m p t i o n

o f p r e j u d i c e w h e n a n a p p l i c a n t ’ s c o n v i c t i o n i s m o r e t h a n f i v e y e a r s o l d

. A l t h o u g h w e d e c l i n e

t o a d o p t a r e b u t t a b l e p r e s u m p t i o n o f p r e j u d i c e t o t h e S t a t e a f

t e r a s p e c i f

i e d p e r i o d o f t i m e

,

w e a g r e e w i t h t h e S t a t e t h a t t h e c u r r e n t a p p r o a c h t o l a c h e s s h o u l d b e r e v i s e d t o a f f o r d c o u r t s

g r e a t e r l a t i t u d e t o w e i g h a l l e q u i t a b l e c o n s i d e r a t i o n s i n a p a r t i c u l a r c a s e

.

Specifica lly

, we asked “whe ther the State’s showing that it would be prejudice d in its ability 2

to re- try Applicant if this Court wer e to g rant relief on a petition for discretionar y revie w is sufficie nt

to invoke t he doctrine of l ache s and deny Applicant the opportunity to file an out-of -time petition

for discretionar

y revie w. I f a showing of prejudice in the State’s ability to re- try a case is sufficie nt,

then under what circ umstances is it require d, and how may such a s h o wi n g be rebutted by the

applicant? ” Ex parte Perez

, No. AP–76,800, 2012 WL 1882234, at *1 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012) (not

desig nated f

or publication).Perez - 6

I I

. A p p l i c a t i o n o f L a c h e s i n t h e P o s t

- C o n v i c t i o n C o n t e x t

A

. T h i s C o u r t H a s P r e v i o u s l y A p p l i e d F e d e r a l S t a n d a r d I n A n a l y z i n g L a c h e s

I n E x p a r t e C a r r i o

, t h i s C o u r t d e t e r m i n e d t h a t t h e d o c t r i n e o f l a c h e s w a s a p p r o p r i a t e

f o r a p p l i c a t i o n i n t h e h a b e a s c o r p u s c o n t e x t

. 9 9 2 S

. W

. 2 d 4 8 6

, 4 8 7

- 8 8 ( T e x

. C r i m

. A p p

. 1 9 9 9 )

( “ [ T ] h e d o c t r i n e o f l a c h e s i s a t h e o r y w h i c h w e m a y

, a n d s h o u l d

, e m p l o y i n o u r

d e t e r m i n a t i o n o f w h e t h e r t o g r a n t r e l i e f i n a n y g i v e n 1 1

. 0 7 c a s e

. ” )

. T h e c o m m o n

- l a w

d o c t r i n e o f l a c h e s i s d e f i n e d a s

n e g l e c t t o a s s e r t r i g h t o r c l a i m w h i c h

, t a k e n t o g e t h e r w i t h l a p s e o f t i m e a n d

o t h e r c i r c u m s t a n c e s c a u s i n g p r e j u d i c e t o a n a d v e r s e p a r t y

, o p e r a t e s a s a b a r i n

a c o u r t o f e q u i t y

. A l s o

, i t i s t h e n e g l e c t f o r a n u n r e a s o n a b l e a n d u n e x p l a i n e d

l e n g t h o f t i m e u n d e r c i r c u m s t a n c e s p e r m i t t i n g d i l i g e n c e

, t o d o w h a t i n l a w

,

s h o u l d h a v e b e e n d o n e

.

I d

. a t 4 8 7 n

. 2 ( c i t i n g B L A C K ’ S L A W D I C T I O N A R Y 8 7 5 ( 6 t h e d

. 1 9 9 0 ) )

. 3

I n C a r r i o

, w e r e a s o n e d t h a t l a c h e s c o u l d b e t h e b a s i s f o r d e n i a l o f h a b e a s r e l i e f e v e n

i n t h e a b s e n c e o f a n a p p l i c a b l e s t a t u t e o r r u l e b e c a u s e “ l a c h e s i s a n e q u i t a b l e c o m m o n

- l a w

I n T ex as

, lache s has been descr ibed as “an equitable remedy that preve nts a plainti ff from 3

asser ting a claim due to lapse of time.” Gree n v. Parrack

, 974 S.W .2d 200, 204 (Tex. App.—San

Antonio 1998, no pet.); see also Rege nt Intl. Hotels, Ltd. v. Las Colinas Hotels Corp., 704 S.W .2d

101, 106 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1985, no writ) (“G ener ally

, lache s i s a cre ature of equity

. I t is

principally a q u es t i o n o f whether it is inequitable to permit a claim to be enfor ced if the delay in

asser ting the claim has worke d an injury to the opposing party .”). The Texas common-law doctrine

of lache s ty

pically require s proof by a preponde ranc e of the evidenc e of two elements: unrea sonable

delay by the opposing party and prejudice resulting from the delay

. See, e.g., Caldwell v. Barnes

, 975

S.W .2d 535, 538 (Tex. 1998) (“Tw o essential elements of lache s are (1) unrea sonable delay by one

having leg al or equitable rig hts in asser ting them; and (2) a g ood faith chang e of position by another

to his detriment beca

use of the delay .”) (interna l citations and quotations omitted); Gulf, Colorado,

& San t a F

e Railway Co. v. McBride

, 322 S.W .2d 492, 500 (Tex. 1959) (desc ribing lache s as

“unre asonable delay which has worke d injur y t o an other person” ; lache s must be established by

preponde ranc e of e vidence ).Perez - 7

d o c t r i n e

, ” a n d h a b e a s c o r p u s i s a n e q u i t a b l e r e m e d y

. S e e i d

. a t 4 8 8 ; E x p a r t e G a i t h e r

, 3 8 7

S

. W

. 3 d 6 4 3

, 6 4 8 ( T e x

. C r i m

. A p p

. 2 0 1 2 ) ; C a l d w e l l v

. B a r n e s

, 9 7 5 S

. W

. 2 d 5 3 5

, 5 3 8 ( T e x

.

1 9 9 8 ) ( w h e n c l a i m “ i s e q u i t a b l e i n n a t u r e

, l a c h e s m a y b e r a i s e d a s a d e f e n s e t o i t s

p r o s e c u t i o n ” )

. W e f

o u n d i t a p p r o p r i a t e t o a p p l y l a c h e s i n t h e p o s t

- c o n v i c t i o n c o n t e x t b e c a u s e

“ e q u i t y a i d s t h e v i g i l a n t a n d n o t t h o s e w h o s l u m b e r o n t h e i r r i g h t s

. ” S e e C a r r i o

, 9 9 2 S

. W

. 2 d

a t 4 8 7 n

. 2 ( i n t e r n a l q u o t a t i o n s o m i t t e d )

. W e n o t e d t h a t

, “ w h e n [ ] c l a i m s a r e a s s e r t e d a f t e r t h e

p a s s a g e o f m a n y y e a r s

, a t t o r n e y s f o r t h e d e f

e n d a n t a n d t h e s t a t e h a v e d i f f i c u l t y a s c e r t a i n i n g

t h e f a c t s

. ” I d

. a t 4 8 7 ( c i t i n g A d v i s o r y C o m m i t t e e N o t e s

, f o r m e r R u l e 9 ( a ) o f t h e R u l e s

G o v e r n i n g 2 8 U

. S

. C

. § 2 2 5 4 C a s e s )

. W e f u r t h e r r e a s o n e d t h a t i t w o u l d b e i n e q u i t a b l e t o

p e r m i t l o n g

- d e l a y e d c l a i m s t o p r o c e e d b e c a u s e “ o f t e n t h e d e f

e n s e a t t o r n e y h a s l i t t l e o r n o

r e c o l l e c t i o n a s t o w h a t t o o k p l a c e a n d m a n y o f t h e p a r t i c i p a n t s i n t h e t r i a l a r e d e a d o r t h e i r

w h e r e a b o u t s u n k n o w n

. F u r t h e r

, t h e c o u r t r e p o r t e r ’ s n o t e s m a y h a v e b e e n l o s t o r d e s t r o y e d

,

t h u s e l i m i n a t i n g a n y e x a c t r e c o r d o f w h a t t r a n s p i r e d

. ” I d

. a t 4 8 7

- 8 8

.

I n h o l d i n g t h a t w e w o u l d e m p l o y l a c h e s t o e v a l u a t e p o s t

- c o n v i c t i o n w r i t s o f h a b e a s

c o r p u s

, w e c i t e d f

a v o r a b l y t o t h e f

e d e r a l c o u r t s ’ a p p l i c a t i o n o f l a c h e s t o f e d e r a l p e t i t i o n s f

o r

h a b e a s c o r p u s

. S e e i d

. a t 4 8 7

- 8 8

. W e e x p l a i n e d t h a t f e d e r a l c o u r t s “ h a v e l o n g r e c o g n i z e d ”

l a c h e s i n “ e v a l u a t i n g p o s t

- c o n v i c t i o n w r i t s ” a n d h a v e “ c o d i f i e d t h a t d o c t r i n e i n R u l e 9 ( a ) o f

t h e R u l e s G o v e r n i n g 2 8 U

. S

. C

. § 2 2 5 4 C a s e s

. ” S e e i d

. ; f o r m e r R u l e 9 ( a ) f

o l l

. 2 8 U

. S

. C

. §

2 2 5 4 ( W e s t 1 9 9 4 ) ; W

a l t e r s v

. S c o t t

, 2 1 F

. 3 d 6 8 3

, 6 8 6 ( 5 t h C i r

. 1 9 9 4 ) ( i n t e r p r e t i n g f e d e r a l

R u l e 9 ( a ) ) ; S t r a h a n v

. B l a c k b u r n

, 7 5 0 F

. 2 d 4 3 8

, 4 4 1 ( 5 t h C i r

. 1 9 8 5 ) ( s a m e )

. R u l e 9 ( a ) w a sPerez - 8

a s t a t u t o r y r u l e o f l a c h e s t h a t p r o v i d e d f o r d i s m i s s a l o f a f

e d e r a l p e t i t i o n f

o r a w r i t o f h a b e a s

c o r p u s “ i f i t a p p e a r s t h a t t h e s t a t e o f w h i c h t h e r e s p o n d e n t i s a n o f f i c e r h a s b e e n p r e

j u d i c e d

i n i t s a b i l i t y t o r e s p o n d t o t h e p e t i t i o n

. . . . ” 4

T h e f e d e r a l l a c h e s s t a n d a r d w a s r o o t e d i n t h e c o m m o n

- l a w d o c t r i n e o f l a c h e s

, b u t

c o n t a i n e d s e v e r a l i m p o r t a n t d i f f e r e n c e s

. U n d e r t h e F i f

t h C i r c u i t i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f F e d e r a l

R u l e 9 ( a )

, t o i n v o k e l a c h e s i n r e s p o n s e t o a h a b e a s p e t i t i o n

, a s t a t e w a s r e q u i r e d t o “ ( 1 ) m a k e

a p a r t i c u l a r iz e d s h o w i n g o f p r e j u d i c e

, ( 2 ) s h o w t h a t t h e p r e j u d i c e w a s c a u s e d b y t h e

p e t i t i o n e r h a v i n g f

i l e d a l a t e p e t i t i o n

, a n d ( 3 ) s h o w t h a t t h e p e t i t i o n e r h a s n o t a c t e d w i t h

r e a s o n a b l e d i l i g e n c e a s a m a t t e r o f l a w

. ” C a r r i o

, 9 9 2 S

. W

. 2 d a t 4 8 8 ( c i t i n g W a l t e r s

, 2 1 F

. 3 d

a t 6 8 6

- 8 7 )

. I m p o r t a n t l y

, t h e f e d e r a l l a c h e s s t a n d a r d l i m i t e d t h e t y p e o f p r e j u d i c e t h e S t a t e 5

Fe dera l Rule 9(a) r ead in its entirety

, 4

Delay ed Petitions. A petition m ay be dis missed if it appea rs t hat the state of

which

the responde nt is an office r h as b een prejudice d in its ability to respond to the

petition by delay

in its fili ng unless the petitioner shows that it is ba sed on g rounds

of which he or she could not have had knowl ed ge b y t h e exercise of rea sonable

diligenc e bef

ore the circ umstances pr ejudicial to the state oc curr ed.

See For mer Rule 9(a) foll. 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (dele ted 2004). Rule 9(a) was enac ted in 1976 and

g overne d dismiss al of delay ed applications for fede ral habea s corpus until 1996, when a strict oney ear statute of limit ations was enac ted. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d) (one- y ear statu t e of limit ations

applies to all fede ral ha

beas c orpus petitions).

Procedur ally

, under the Fifth Circuit lache s standard, the State was require d to initially make 5

a “par ticularized showing of prejudice ” with respe ct to the “state’ s ability to respond to the petition.”

Strahan v. Blackburn

, 750 F.2d 438, 441 (5th Cir. 1985) (c iting for mer Rule 9(a ) foll. 28 U.S.C.§

2254). The State was further require d to demonstrate that the applicant’ s delay was unrea sonable as

a matter of law an d t h at the resulting “pre judice was cause d by the delay .” Id

. Causation in this

context meant that the State bore the “burde n of proving that [petit ioner’s] delay in filing his habea s

petition cause d [specific] source s of evidenc e to be lost.” W alters v. Scott

, 21 F.3d 683, 688 (5th Cir.

(continued...)Perez - 9

c o u l d s h o w t o “ p r e

j u d i c e i n i t s a b i l i t y t o r e s p o n d t o t h e a l l e g a t i o n s i n t h e p e t i t i o n

. ” I d

. ;

W a l t e r s

, 2 1 F

. 3 d a t 6 8 7 ; S t r a h a n

, 7 5 0 F

. 2 d a t 4 4 1

. T h e s e s p e c i f i c r e q u i r e m e n t s

, i m p o s e d b y 6

t h e f e d e r a l c o u r t s a f

t e r i m p l e m e n t a t i o n o f R u l e 9 ( a )

, s t o o d i n s t a r k c o n t r a s t t o t h e

r e q u i r e m e n t s u n d e r T e x a s c o m m o n l a w

, w h i c h p e r m i t t e d a p a r t y t o m a k e a s h o w i n g o f

p r e j u d i c e b a s e d o n a “ g o o d f a i t h c h a n g e o f p o s i t i o n

. . . t o [ i t s ] d e t r i m e n t b e c a u s e o f t h e

d e l a y

. ” C a l d w e l l

, 9 7 5 S

. W

. 2 d a t 5 3 8 ( i n t e r n a l c i t a t i o n s a n d q u o t a t i o n s o m i t t e d )

.

A l t h o u g h t h i s C o u r t

, i n C a r r i o

, d i d n o t e x p r e s s l y s t a t e t h a t i t w a s a d o p t i n g t h e F i f t h

C i r c u i t l a c h e s s t a n d a r d

, t h a t s t a n d a r d h a s

, i n p r a c t i c e

, g o v e r n e d o u r a p p r o a c h t o l a c h e s i n

(...continued)

1 9 9 4 ). “A t a m inimum, this require s the state to establish that if [petit ioner] had filed his habea s

petition a t some ear lier time, the evidenc e the state say s it ha s lost would have been available .” Id

. Delay alone was inadequa te and any “impact that delay may have had on a possible retria l is not to

be considere d.” Strahan

, 7 5 0 F. 2d at 441. I f the State met these require ments, only then did the

burden “ shift[ ] t o the petitioner to neg ate prejudice or show that the delay ‘is based on g rounds of

which he could not have had knowledg e by the exercise of rea sonable diligenc e b efore the

circ umstances pr ejudicial to the state oc curr ed.’” Id.

To meet the require ment that it make a particula rized showing of prejudice in its ability to 6

respond to the alleg ations, the State could “not mere ly alleg e prejudicia l fac ts,” but was require d to

“off er concr ete proof of the alleg ations.” Rideau v. W hitley

, 237 F.3d 472, 482 (5th Cir. 2000). Wit h

respe ct to missing witnesses or an unavailable trial judge

, the State was require d to show, “as a fac tor

establishing prejudice ,” that “ther e are no other source s from which the state can obtain the requisite

information.” W

alters

, 21 F.3d at 688 n.18 (citing McD onnell v. Estelle

, 666 F.2d 246, 253 (5th Cir.

1982)). And with respe ct to missing trial rec ords, the State was require d to show that the “substance

of t hose re cords is unavailable from other source s.” Id

. at 688. Apply ing this standard in W alters

, the Fifth Circuit held that the State had not met its burden of showing prejudice

, notwithstanding the

death of the court repor

ter, unavailable court re cords, a nd an af fidavit from c ounsel stating that he

had no memory of the circ umstances surrounding p e ti ti o n e r ’ s in e f f e c ti v e

- a s s is tance claim. Id

. at 687-

88 (re jecting application of lache s afte r nine-y ear delay ). Simi larly

, in Rideau

, the Fifth Circuit held

that the State had not shown adequate prejudice to its ability to respond to petitioner’s claim of

rac ially discriminatory jury selec tion, in spite of missing documentar y evidenc e and unavailability

of witnesses. 237 F.3d at 483 (re jecting application of lache s afte r 30-y ear delay ; beca use State failed

to make adequa

te prima fa cie showing of pre judice, “unne cessa

ry ” for court to de termine whether

petitioner’s de lay

was unre asonable ).Perez - 10

s u b s e q u e n t p o s t

- c o n v i c t i o n c a s e s

. S e e C a r r i o

, 9 9 2 S

. W

. 2 d a t 4 8 8 ; I n r e S t e p t o e

, 1 3 2 S

. W

. 3 d

4 3 4

, 4 3 5 ( T e x

. C r i m

. A p p

. 2 0 0 4 ) ( P r i c e

, J

. , c o n c u r r i n g ) ( n o t i n g t h a t

, a l t h o u g h i t d i d n o t

e x p r e s s l y a d o p t f

e d e r a l l a c h e s s t a n d a r d

, t h i s C o u r t i n C a r r i o “ r e l i e [ d ] a l m o s t e x c l u s i v e l y o n

R u l e 9 ( a ) a n d c a s e s i n t e r p r e t i n g i t ” )

. B y i m p l i c i t l y a d o p t i n g t h e f e d e r a l l a c h e s s t a n d a r d i n

C a r r i o

, t h i s C o u r t h a s r e q u i r e d t h e S t a t e t o g o b e y o n d w h a t w o u l d h a v e b e e n r e q u i r e d t o r a i s e

l a c h e s a t c o m m o n l a w b y ( 1 ) r e q u i r i n g t h e S t a t e t o m a k e a p a r t i c u l a r i z e d s h o w i n g o f

p r e j u d i c e a n d ( 2 ) l i m i t i n g t h e t y p e o f p r e j u d i c e t h e S t a t e m a y s h o w t o p r e j u d i c e t o i t s a b i l i t y 7

t o r e s p o n d t o t h e c l a i m s r a i s e d i n a n a p p l i c a t i o n

. S e e C a r r i o

, 9 9 2 S

. W

. 2 d a t 4 8 7

- 8 8

.

B

. F e d e r a l L a c h e s S t a n d a r d N o L o n g e r A p p r o p r i a t e f o r T e x a s

T h i s C o u r t ’ s a d o p t i o n o f t h e f e d e r a l l a c h e s s t a n d a r d i n C a r r i o w a s l o g i c a l l y s o u n d a t

t h e t i m e

, b u t t h e e v e n t s o f t h e d e c a d e s i n c e C a r r i o d e m a n d t h a t w e a b a n d o n t h a t s t a n d a r d i n

f a v o r o f a m o r e e q u i t a b l e a p p r o a c h

. A s w e e x p l a i n i n t h r e e p o i n t s b e l o w

, t h o s e e v e n t s s h o w

t h a t f e d e r a l c o u r t s n o l o n g e r e m p l o y t h e f e d e r a l l a c h e s s t a n d a r d w e a d o p t e d ; a s i g n i f i c a n t

I n adopting t he term from the fede ral court’s i mplementation of R ule 9, this Court did not 7

define how the State would make “ a par ticularized showing of prejudice ” in Carrio

. See Ex parte

Carrio

, 992 S.W .2d 486, 487-88 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999). The Four t ee n t h C ourt of Appea ls

descr ibed the State’s burden of making such a particularized showing of prejudice as a “ca usal

connec tion.” See Ex parte W olf

, 296 S.W .3d 160, 168 (Tex. App.— Houston [14t h Dist.] 2009, pet.

ref ’d) (“[The] rec ord contains no evidenc e of a causa l connec tion b et we en [ counsel’s] alleg ed

memory failure s and Wolf’s alleg ed failure to act with rea sonable diligenc e as a matter of law. The

State did not make a particula rized showing of prejudice to its ability to respond to the alleg ations.”).

The term “par

ticularized prejudice ” as use d in the context of speedy -trial complaints m eans that a

party must prove with specific ity how the complained- of delay has actua l l y impacted him. See

Dokter v. State

, 281 S.W .3d 152, 160 (Tex. App.— Texarkana 2009, no pet.). For example, courts

assessing speedy -trial complaints have require d a defe ndant to show more than the fact t h at the

State’s delay cause d witnesses to be missing; a defe ndant must additionally show the materia lity of

the missing testimony and establish how the absenc e of such testimony would impact his defe nse.

Prihoda v. State , 352 S.W .3d 796, 806 (Tex. App. — San Antonio 2011, pet. ref ’d).Perez - 11

n u m b e r o f o t h e r j u r i s d i c t i o n s h a v e r e j e c t e d t h a t s t a n d a r d ; a n d t h a t s t a n d a r d

, a s a p p l i e d i n

T e x a s

, h a s p r o v e n t o o r i g i d t o e f f e c t i v e l y s e r v e a s a n e q u i t a b l e s t a n d a r d

.

F i r s t

, t h e f

e d e r a l l a c h e s s t a n d a r d i s n o l o n g e r g o o d l a w

. S e v e r a l y e a r s p r i o r t o t h i s

C o u r t ’ s a d o p t i o n o f t h e f e d e r a l s t a n d a r d

, C o n g r e s s e n a c t e d a s t r i c t o n e

- y e a r l i m i t a t i o n s p e r i o d

f o r f e d e r a l h a b e a s c o r p u s t h a t h a s n o w o b v i a t e d t h e n e e d f o r t h e l a c h e s d o c t r i n e i n t h a t

c o n t e x t

. S e e 2 8 U

. S

. C

. § 2 2 4 4 ( d ) ; P u b

. L

. 1 0 4

- 1 3 2

, 1 1 0 S t a t

. 1 2 1 7

, 1 2 2 0 ( A p r

. 2 4

, 1 9 9 6 )

.

T h e e n a c t m e n t o f a o n e

- y e a r l i m i t a t i o n s p e r i o d w a s

, i n p a r t

, a c o n g r e s s i o n a l r e a c t i o n t o t h e

f a i l u r e o f t h e f

e d e r a l c o u r t s t o e f

f e c t i v e l y e m p l o y e q u i t a b l e d o c t r i n e s

, s u c h a s l a c h e s

, t o b a r

a p p l i c a n t s f

r o m s e e k i n g h a b e a s c o r p u s r e l i e f a f t e r l e n g t h y d e l a y s

. S e e S t e p t o e

, 1 3 2 S

. W

. 3 d

a t 4 4 0

- 4 4 ( C o c h r a n

, J

. , d i s s e n t i n g ) ( s t a t i n g i t w a s p o s s i b l e t h a t “ f e d e r a l c o u r t s ’ f

a i l u r e t o

a p p l y R u l e 9 ( a ) w i t h g r e a t e r a p p r e c i a t i o n f o r t h e j u r i s p r u d e n t i a l c o n c e r n s o v e r a f l o o d o f

s t a l e

, m e r i t l e s s w r i t s i n t h e f e d e r a l c o u r t s w a s p a r t i a l l y r e s p o n s i b l e f o r w h a t m a n y t h i n k w a s

t h e d r a c o n i a n s o l u t i o n o f a n a b s o l u t e s t a t u t e

- o f

- l i m i t a t i o n s b a r ” )

. T h e l e g i s l a t i v e h i s t o r y

s u r r o u n d i n g t h e o n e

- y e a r f e d e r a l l i m i t a t i o n s p e r i o d r e v e a l s t h a t t h e s t a t u t e w a s e n a c t e d t o

a d d r e s s “ t h e a b u s e o f h a b e a s c o r p u s t h a t r e s u l t s f r o m d e l a y e d a n d r e p e t i t i v e f i l i n g s ” a n d t o

“ c u r b t h e l e n g t h y d e l a y s i n f i l i n g t h a t n o w o f

t e n o c c u r

. . . w h i l e p r e s e r v i n g t h e a v a i l a b i l i t y

o f r e v i e w w h e n a p r i s o n e r d i l i g e n t l y p u r s u e s s t a t e r e m e d i e s a n d a p p l i e s f o r f e d e r a l h a b e a s

r e v i e w i n a t i m e l y m a n n e r

. ” S e e H

. R

. R p t

. N o

. 1 0 4

- 2 3

, a t 9 ( 1 9 9 5 )

. A l t h o u g h t h e f e d e r a l

c o u r t s n o l o n g e r e m p l o y t h e R u l e 9 ( a ) l a c h e s s t a n d a r d i n l i g h t o f C o n g r e s s ’ s e n a c t m e n t o f

a m o r e r e s t r i c t i v e o n e

- y e a r l i m i t a t i o n s p e r i o d

, t h i s C o u r t h a s c o n t i n u e d t o a p p l y t h e f e d e r a l

s t a n d a r d w h e n e v e r t h e S t a t e r a i s e s l a c h e s i n a p o s t

- c o n v i c t i o n c a s e

.Perez - 12

S e c o n d

, o t h e r s t a t e s h a v e r e j e c t e d t h e f

e d e r a l s t a n d a r d a s n o t c u r r e n t

, t o o n a r r o w

, a n d

o v e r l y r i g i d

. F o r e x a m p l e

, C a l i f o r n i a r e j e c t e d t h e f

e d e r a l s t a n d a r d b e c a u s e i t f o u n d t h a t

s t a n d a r d w a s “ n e i t h e r c u r r e n t n o r c o n t r o l l i n g

. ” S e e I n r e D o u g l a s

, 1 3 2 C a l

. R p t r

. 3 d 5 8 2

,

5 8 8 ( C a l

. A p p

. 4 t h D i s t

. 2 0 1 1 ) ( h o l d i n g t h a t f e d e r a l s t a n d a r d “ i s n e i t h e r c u r r e n t n o r

c o n t r o l l i n g ” a n d t h a t c o u r t w o u l d i n s t e a d a p p l y “ a b r o a d e r c o n c e p t i o n o f l a c h e s u s e d i n

C a l i f o r n i a ” ) ( c i t i n g I

n r e C l a r k

, 8 5 5 P

. 2 d 7 2 9

, 7 6 5 ( C a l

. 1 9 9 3 ) )

. S i m i l a r l y

, O k l a h o m a h a s

e x p r e s s l y d i s a v o w e d r e l i a n c e o n t h e f e d e r a l s t a n d a r d

. S e e T

h o m a s v

. S t a t e

, 9 0 3 P

. 2 d 3 2 8

,

3 3 2 ( O k l a

. C r i m

. A p p

. 1 9 9 5 ) ( f e d e r a l a c t u a l p r e

j u d i c e s t a n d a r d “ n o t t h e l a w i n O k l a h o m a ” ;

a p p l i c a b i l i t y o f l a c h e s “ n e c e s s a r i l y t u r n s o n t h e f a c t s o f e a c h p a r t i c u l a r c a s e ” ) ; P a x t o n v

.

S t a t e

, 9 0 3 P

. 2 d 3 2 5

, 3 2 7 ( O k l a

. C r i m

. A p p

. 1 9 9 5 ) ( n o t i n g t h a t f e d e r a l r e q u i r e m e n t t h a t s t a t e

“ d e m o n s t r a t e a c t u a l p r e j u d i c e

. . . b e f

o r e t h e d o c t r i n e o f l a c h e s m a y b e t r i g g e r e d i s n o t t h e

l a w i n O k l a h o m a a n d w e d e c l i n e t o a d o p t a n y s u c h r e q u i r e m e n t ” )

. A n d G e o r g i a a n d K a n s a s

h a v e

, t o o

. S e e F l i n t v

. S t a t e

, 7 0 1 S

. E

. 2 d 1 7 4

, 1 7 6 ( G a

. 2 0 1 0 ) ( F e d e r a l r u l e “ n o l o n g e r e x t a n t ”

i n l i g h t o f f

e d e r a l l i m i t a t i o n s p e r i o d ; f e d e r a l c a s e s i n t e r p r e t i n g R u l e 9 ( a ) n o t c o n t r o l l i n g i n

G e o r g i a ) ; R o a c h v

. S t a t e

, 7 P

. 3 d 3 1 9

, 3 2 3 ( K a n

. A p p

. 2 0 0 0 ) ( R u l e 9 ( a ) “ h e l d n o t t o b e

a p p l i c a b l e t o s t a t e h a b e a s p r o c e e d i n g s ” i n K a n s a s )

. A l t h o u g h m a n y s t a t e s h a v e r e j e c t e d t h e

f e d e r a l l a c h e s s t a n d a r d i n f a v o r o f o t h e r a p p r o a c h e s

, i n c l u d i n g r e s t r i c t i v e s t a t u t e s o f

l i m i t a t i o n

, t h i s C o u r t h a s c o n t i n u e d t o a p p l y t h a t s t a n d a r d

. 8

Over half of all states now employ statutes of limit ation for state post-conviction relief

, thus 8

making the equitable doctri n e o f l ac h es larg ely inapplicable in those states. See, e.g.

, A L A

. R U L E

C R I M

. P R O C

. 32.2(c) (Alaba ma, one-y ear statute o f limit ations); A L A S K A S T A T

. § 12.72.020 (Alaska

, 18 months); F L

. R. C R I M

. P R O C

. 3.850 (F lorida, two y ear s); G A

. C O D E AN N

. 9-14-42 (Ge org ia, four

(continued...)Perez - 13

T h i r d

, t h e f

e d e r a l s t a n d a r d h a s p r o v e n t o o r i g i d t o s e r v e e f f e c t i v e l y a s a n e q u i t a b l e

s t a n d a r d

. F e d e r a l c o u r t s f o u n d t h a t

, u n d e r t h e i r r e s t r i c t i v e i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f R u l e 9 ( a )

, t h e

S t a t e f a c e d a n a l m o s t i m p o s s i b l e b u r d e n t o e s t a b l i s h l a c h e s

, e v e n w h e n a n a p p l i c a n t ’ s d e l a y

w a s “ e x t r e m e

. ” S e e

, e

. g

. , S m i t h v

. J o n e s

, 2 5 6 F

. 3 d 1 1 3 5

, 1 1 4 3 n

. 8 ( 1 1 t h C i r

. 2 0 0 1 ) ( “ O u r

d e c i s i o n s i n d i c a t e t h a t l a c h e s r a r e l y a p p l i e s e v e n w h e r e t h e d e l a y i n f i l i n g a p e t i t i o n h a s b e e n

e x t r e m e ” ) ; R i d e a u v

. W

h i t l e y

, 2 3 7 F

. 3 d 4 7 2

, 4 7 8 ( 5 t h C i r

. 2 0 0 0 ) ( “ [ L ] a p s e s o f t i m e t h a t a f f e c t

t h e s t a t e ’ s a b i l i t y [ t o r e s p o n d ]

, b u t t h a t d o n o t m a k e i t ‘ v i r t u a l l y i m p o s s i b l e ’ f o r t h e s t a t e t o

r e s p o n d

, [ d o n o t ] r e q u i r e d i s m i s s a l ” f o r l a c h e s ) ( i n t e r n a l q u o t a t i o n o m i t t e d ) ; W a l t e r s

, 2 1 F

. 3 d

a t 6 8 6 ( s t a t e s e e k i n g d i s m i s s a l o f h a b e a s p e t i t i o n u n d e r R u l e 9 ( a ) f a c e s “ h e a v y b u r d e n ” )

. 9

U n d e r t h e f

e d e r a l s t a n d a r d

, t h e S t a t e ’ s b u r d e n h a s b e e n i m p o s s i b l y h i g h p r i m a r i l y d u e t o t h e

r e q u i r e m e n t t h a t t h e S t a t e m a k e a p a r t i c u l a r i z e d s h o w i n g o f p r e j u d i c e t o i t s a b i l i t y t o r e s p o n d

t o t h e a p p l i c a t i o n

. S e e E

x p a r t e W

o l f

, 2 9 6 S

. W

. 3 d 1 6 0

, 1 6 7 ( T e x

. A p p

. — H o u s t o n [ 1 4 t h D i s t

. ]

2 0 0 9

, p e t

. r e f ’ d ) ( S t a t e b e a r s b u r d e n o f p r o v i n g “ p a r t i c u l a r i z e d p r e j u d i c e ” t o i t s a b i l i t y t o

r e s p o n d t o a l l e g a t i o n s i n h a b e a s a p p l i c a t i o n )

. T h e p a r t i c u l a r i z e d p r e j u d i c e s t a n d a r d h a s b e e n

(...continued)

y ear s); I D A H O C O D E § 19-4902( A ) (I daho, one y ear ); I L L

. C O D E C R I M

. P R O C

. A R T

. 122 (I llinois

, three

y ear s); K

A N

. S T A T

. 60–1507 (Ka

nsas, one y ear ); M D

. C O D E C R I M

. P R O C

. § 7–103 (Mar y land, ten

y ear s); N E V

. R E V

. S T A T

. § 34.726(1) (Ne vada, one y ear ); T E N N

. C O D E AN N

. § 4 0 -3 0 -1 0 2 (b)

(Tenne ssee, one y ear ); R E V

. C O D E W A S H

. § 10.73.090 (Washington, one y ear ).

As a result of the difficulties inhere nt in meeting the former fede ral lache s standar d

, 9

applicants wer e fre quently permitted to seek fede ral habea s relief even afte r leng thy delay s. See, e.g,

Bedford v. Attorney Gene ral of Alabama

, 934 F.2d 295, 299-300 (11th Cir. 1991) (apply ing fede ral

lache s doctrine, finding no lache s afte r 19-y ear filing delay ); Campas v. Zimmerman

, 876 F.2d 318,

324 (3d Cir. 1989) (same, reg arding 17-y ear delay ); Hannon v. Maschne r

, 845 F.2d 1553, 1557 (10th

Cir. 1988) (same, reg arding 25-y ear delay ); Buchanon v. Mintzes

, 734 F.2d 274, 281-82 (6th Cir.

1984) (same, reg arding 23-y ear delay ); Sutton v. Lash

, 576 F.2d 738, 744 (7 t h Cir. 1978) (same,

reg arding 21-y ear

delay ).Perez - 14

i n t e r p r e t e d t o r e q u i r e t h e S t a t e t o d e m o n s t r a t e a c o m p l e t e i n a b i l i t y t o r e s p o n d t o t h e

a p p l i c a t i o n

. S t e

p t o e

, 1 3 2 S

. W

. 3 d a t 4 3 5 ( P r i c e

, J

. , c o n c u r r i n g ) ( f o r l a c h e s t o a p p l y

, S t a t e m u s t

s h o w t h a t i t i s “ u n a b l e t o r e s p o n d t o t h e m e r i t s o f t h e c l a i m ” )

. B e c a u s e t h e f e d e r a l l a c h e s

s t a n d a r d h a s i m p o s e d a n a l m o s t i m p o s s i b l e b u r d e n o f p r o o f o n t h e S t a t e

, e v e n i n c a s e s o f

e x c e s s i v e d e l a y b y a p p l i c a n t s

, t h a t s t a n d a r d h a s b e e n i n e f f e c t i v e a t w e e d i n g o u t s t a l e c l a i m s

i n T e x a s p o s t

- c o n v i c t i o n c a s e s a n d h a s p r e v e n t e d c o u r t s f r o m t a k i n g i n t o a c c o u n t t h e f u l l 1 0

r a n g e o f r e l e v a n t e q u i t a b l e c o n s i d e r a t i o n s

.

A s s h o w n b y t h e e v e n t s o f t h e d e c a d e s i n c e t h i s C o u r t d e c i d e d C a r r i o

, t h e f e d e r a l

s t a n d a r d t h a t w e a d o p t e d h a s b e e n a b a n d o n e d b y t h e f e d e r a l c o u r t s a n d a s i g n i f i c a n t n u m b e r

o f s t a t e c o u r t s

, a n d h a s s t r a y e d f a r f r o m t h e c o m m o n

- l a w u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f l a c h e s b y

e s t a b l i s h i n g a b u r d e n o f p r o o f t h a t h a s b e e n n e a r l y i m p o s s i b l e f o r t h e S t a t e t o s a t i s f

y

. W e

,

We cite the following unpublished case s as examples, rec og nizi ng that they are non-binding 1 0

and non-pre cede ntial. See, e.g., Ex parte W aites

, No. WR -71,327-01, 2009 WL 252355, at *1 (Tex.

Crim. App. 2009) (stating that, in spite of applicant’ s 16-y ear delay in seeking post-conviction relief

,

no lache s; althoug h prosec utors and judge from applicant’ s trial wer e dece ased, habea s rec ord “does

not contain any

th i n g to direc tly support [t he] asser tion of prejudice ”); Ex parte Like

, No. WR

70,021-01, 2008 WL 2677329, at *1 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008) (stating that, in spite of 24-y ear delay

, State’s “conc lusory

statement” tha t it was prejudice d in ability to respond insufficient; “[a]bsent a

particula rized showing of how Applicant’s delay has prejudice d the State’s ability to respond to his

claims, the doctrine of lache s should not bar revie w” of applicant’ s claim that plea was involuntary );

Ex parte Eliff

, No. WR -64,223-01, 2006 WL 1545499, at *1 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006) (stating that,

in spite of 23-y ear delay in seeking habea s, no lache s; althoug h one member of prosec ution team had

died, other prosec utor was avai la b le to testify reg arding applicant’ s Brady claim); Ex parte Scott

, No.

WR -66,090-01, 2006 WL 3308748, at *1 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006) (re jecting lache s defe nse afte r

five-y ear filing delay ; notwithstanding counsel’s death, State failed to show that preju d i ce t o i t s

ability to respond to ineff

ective a ssistance c laim w as ca used by delay ); see also W

olf , 296 S.W .3d

at 168 (re jecting lache s defe nse afte r five-y ear filing delay ; while applicant’ s attorney had destroy ed

all case files per

taining to r epre sentation of applica nt and claimed he had no independe nt memory

of rele vant events, “the rec ord contains no evidenc e of a causa l connec tion betwee n [counsel’s]

memory failure s and [applicant’s] alleg ed fa ilure to ac t with reasona ble dilige nce” ).Perez - 15

t h e r e f o r e

, a b a n d o n t h a t f

o r m u l a i c s t a n d a r d i n f a v o r o f t h e m o r e f

l e x i b l e c o m m o n

- l a w

a p p r o a c h t o l a c h e s i n t h e p o s t

- c o n v i c t i o n c o n t e x t

.

I I I

. C o m m o n

- L a w S t a n d a r d B e t t e r C o m p o r t s W i t h E q u i t a b l e C o n s i d e r a t i o n s

A s w e h a v e d e s c r i b e d a b o v e

, t h e e v e n t s o f t h e l a s t d e c a d e r e q u i r e t h a t w e a b a n d o n t h e

a s p e c t o f C a r r i o t h a t a p p r o v e d o f T e x a s ’ s a p p l i c a t i o n o f t h e f e d e r a l l a c h e s s t a n d a r d

. S e e

C a r r i o

, 9 9 2 S

. W

. 2 d a t 4 8 8

. W e

, h o w e v e r

, r e a f f i r m C a r r i o ’ s h o l d i n g t h a t T e x a s c o u r t s m a y

a p p l y t h e c o m m o n

- l a w d o c t r i n e o f l a c h e s i n d e t e r m i n i n g w h e t h e r t o g r a n t h a b e a s r e l i e f

. S e e

i d

. W e

, t h e r e f

o r e

, a l t e r t h e h o l d i n g o f C a r r i o o n l y t o t h e e x t e n t t h a t w e n o w a p p l y T e x a s

c o m m o n l a w

, r a t h e r t h a n t h e f e d e r a l s t a n d a r d

, t o d e f

i n e t h e p a r a m e t e r s o f t h e d o c t r i n e o f

l a c h e s i n T e x a s h a b e a s c o r p u s c a s e s

. S e e i d

.

C o n s i s t e n t w i t h t h e c o m m o n

- l a w d o c t r i n e o f l a c h e s

, g o i n g f o r w a r d

, w e w i l l ( 1 ) n o

l o n g e r r e q u i r e t h e S t a t e t o m a k e a “ p a r t i c u l a r i z e d s h o w i n g o f p r e j u d i c e ” s o t h a t c o u r t s m a y

m o r e b r o a d l y c o n s i d e r m a t e r i a l p r e j u d i c e r e s u l t i n g f

r o m d e l a y

, a n d ( 2 ) e x p a n d t h e d e f i n i t i o n

o f p r e j u d i c e u n d e r t h e e x i s t i n g l a c h e s d o c t r i n e t o p e r m i t c o n s i d e r a t i o n o f a n y t h i n g t h a t p l a c e s

t h e S t a t e i n a l e s s f

a v o r a b l e p o s i t i o n

, i n c l u d i n g p r e j u d i c e t o t h e S t a t e ’ s a b i l i t y t o r e t r y a

d e f e n d a n t

, s o t h a t a c o u r t m a y c o n s i d e r t h e t o t a l i t y o f t h e c i r c u m s t a n c e s i n d e c i d i n g w h e t h e r

t o g r a n t e q u i t a b l e r e l i e f

. S e e C a l d w e l l

, 9 7 5 S

. W

. 2 d a t 5 3 8 ( c o m m o n

- l a w d e f i n i t i o n o f

p r e j u d i c e i n l a c h e s c o n t e x t i s “ g o o d f a i t h c h a n g e o f p o s i t i o n b y a n o t h e r t o h i s d e t r i m e n t

b e c a u s e o f t h e d e l a y ” )

. 1 1

Other states, apply ing their own common-law doc trine of lac hes, have permitted a court to 1 1

consider whether the State will b e p re j u d i ce d in its ability to retry an applicant. See, e.g., Raso v.

W all

, 884 A.2d 391, 396 n.14 (R.I

. 2005) (apply ing common-law doctrine of lache s to applicationsPerez - 16

O u r r e v i s e d a p p r o a c h w i l l p e r m i t c o u r t s t o m o r e b r o a d l y c o n s i d e r t h e d i m i n i s h e d

m e m o r i e s o f t r i a l p a r t i c i p a n t s a n d t h e d i m i n i s h e d a v a i l a b i l i t y o f t h e S t a t e ’ s e v i d e n c e

, b o t h

o f w h i c h m a y o f

t e n b e s a i d t o o c c u r b e y o n d f i v e y e a r s a f

t e r a c o n v i c t i o n b e c o m e s f i n a l

. S e e

,

e

. g

. , S t e p t o e

, 1 3 2 S

. W

. 3 d a t 4 3 7

- 3 9 ( C o c h r a n

, J

. , d i s s e n t i n g ) ( a d v o c a t i n g a d o p t i o n o f

r e b u t t a b l e p r e s u m p t i o n o f p r e j u d i c e t o S t a t e f

i v e y e a r s a f

t e r c o n v i c t i o n i n l i g h t o f s o c i a l a n d

a d m i n i s t r a t i v e c o s t s a s s o c i a t e d w i t h r e t r i a l ) ; M c C r a y v

. F l o r i d a

, 6 9 9 S o

. 2 d 1 3 6 6

, 1 3 6 8 ( F l a

.

1 9 9 7 ) ( a p p l y i n g p r e s u m p t i o n o f p r e j u d i c e i n F l o r i d a p o s t

- c o n v i c t i o n c a s e s a f t e r f i v e y e a r s

,

e x p l a i n i n g t h a t i t w a s “ o b v i o u s t h a t t h e s t a t e h a s b e e n m a n i f e s t l y p r e j u d i c e d a n d n o r e a s o n

f o r a n e x t r a o r d i n a r y d e l a y h a s b e e n p r o v i d e d ” )

. 1 2

for post-conviction relief and permitting consideration of State’s ability to retry the case ); Armstrong

v. State

, 747 N.E.2d 1119, 1120 (I nd. 2001) (same, noting that “pre judice ex i sts when the

unrea sonable delay opera tes to materia lly diminis h a rea sonable likelihood of succe ssful reprosec ution”); In re Douglas

, 132 Cal. Rptr. 3d 582, 588 (Cal. App. 4th Dist. 2011) (same, noting

“diffic ulty of retria l in the event that a judgme nt is se t a side on habea s corpus many y ear s afte r the

conviction”) (citing In re Clark

, 855 P.2d 729, 765 (Cal. 1993)); Thomas v. State

, 903 P.2d 328 (Okl.

Crim. App. 1995) (same) ; In re S mi t h

, 339 P.2d 796 (Okla. Crim. App. 1959) (same, reje cting

applicatio n

, s t ating

, “I f a new trial in eac h case was g rante d afte r over twenty -four y ear s lapse of

time, the probabilities would be that it would be impossibl e to f ind the persons with know ledg e of

the fac ts s urrounding the deaths of the two persons petitioner was char g ed with murdering ”);

Moguel v. State

, 966 A.2d 963, 969 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2009) (in laches context, “[p] rejudice is

g ener ally held to be any

thing that plac es [the opposing pa rty ] i n a less fa

vorable position”).

We do not identify any prec ise period of time afte r which lache s nece ssarily applies, althoug h 1 2

we r ecog nize that delay s of m ore than five y ear s may g ener ally be conside red unr easona ble in the

absenc e of any justification for the delay

. See, e.g., Ex parte Florentino

, 206 S.W .3d 124, 126 (Tex.

Crim. App. 2006) (Cochra n, J

., concur

ring ) (“Eig ht y ear s elapse d betwee n the time applicant’ s

conviction was aff

irmed and the time at which he may file a PDR. Normally

, lache s should bar any

re l ief on this claim.”)

. We, howeve r, recog nize that, as a result of the s tatutory bar on s u b s eq u en t

habea s applications, applica nts are limited to “one bite at t he apple,” and, as such, applicants may

be motivated to delay filing in order to fully develop all potentially meritoriou s cl ai m s for

consideration by the Court. See Carrio

, 992 S.W .2d at 491 n.5 (Mey ers, J

., dissenting) (noting that

applicants are “plac ed in the awkwa rd position of deter

mining when they have waited long enoug h

to ensure that all claims are included, but not so long as to invoke the appli ca t i o n o f lache s”).

Be cause of t he tension betwee n lache s and the ba r on subseque nt writs, we do not fore see tha t thePerez - 17

O u r r e v i s e d a p p r o a c h u n d e r t h e b r o a d e n e d p r e j u d i c e s t a n d a r d i s c o n s i s t e n t w i t h t h e

p r i n c i p l e t h a t t h e w r i t o f h a b e a s c o r p u s i s a n e x t r a o r d i n a r y r e m e d y

, a n y g r a n t o f w h i c h m u s t

b e u n d e r s c o r e d b y e l e m e n t s o f f a i r n e s s a n d e q u i t y

. S e e

, e

. g

. , E x p a r t e E m m o n s

, 6 6 0 S

. W

. 2 d

1 0 6

, 1 1 0 ( T e x

. C r i m

. A p p

. 1 9 8 3 ) ; E x p a r t e D r a k e

, 8 8 3 S

. W

. 2 d 2 1 3

, 2 1 5 ( T e x

. C r i m

. A p p

.

1 9 9 4 )

. T h i s r e v i s e d s t a n d a r d w i l l p e r m i t c o u r t s t o e n g a g e i n a c a s e

- b y

- c a s e i n q u i r y t o

1 3

d e t e r m i n e w h e t h e r e q u i t a b l e r e l i e f i s w a r r a n t e d i n l i g h t o f t h e p a r t i c u l a r c i r c u m s t a n c e s

s u r r o u n d i n g e a c h c a s e

. S e e

, e

. g

. , H o l l a n d v

. F l o r i d a

, 1 3 0 S

. C t

. 2 5 4 9

, 2 5 6 3 ( 2 0 1 0 ) ( c o u r t s o f

e q u i t y m u s t t a k e a c c o u n t o f “ s p e c i f i c c i r c u m s t a n c e s

, o f

t e n h a r d t o p r e d i c t i n a d v a n c e

, [ t h a t ]

c o u l d w a r r a n t s p e c i a l t r e a t m e n t i n a n a p p r o p r i a t e c a s e ” ) ; B a g g e t t v

. B u l l i t t

, 3 7 7 U

. S

. 3 6 0

, 3 7 5

( 1 9 6 4 ) ( “ e x e r c i s e o f a c o u r t ’ s e q u i t y p o w e r s

. . . m u s t b e m a d e o n a c a s e

- b y

- c a s e b a s i s ” ) ;

H o l m b e r g v

. A r m b r e c h t

, 3 2 7 U

. S

. 3 9 2

, 3 9 6 ( 1 9 4 6 ) ( “ E q u i t y e s c h e w s m e c h a n i c a l r u l e s ; i t

d e p e n d s o n f

l e x i b i l i t y

. ” )

. I t w i l l a l s o p r o v i d e t h e f l e x i b i l i t y n e c e s s a r y f

o r b a l a n c i n g e q u i t i e s

t o d e t e r m i n e w h e t h e r l a c h e s s h o u l d a p p l y

. S e e

, e

. g

. , B a x t e r v

. E s t e l l e

, 6 1 4 F

. 2 d 1 0 3 0

, 1 0 3 3

-

3 4 ( 5 t h C i r

. 1 9 8 0 ) ( “ L a c h e s i s a n e q u i t a b l e d o c t r i n e

. I t s a p p l i c a t i o n m u s t b e c o n s i d e r e d o n

t h e f a c t s o f e a c h c a s e

, b a s e d o n t h e r e a s o n a b l e n e s s o f t h e p a r t y ’ s b e h a v i o r u n d e r t h e

c i r c u m s t a n c e s

. ” ) ; E s s o I n t ’ l

, I n c

. v

. S S C a

p t a i n J o h n

, 4 4 3 F

. 2 d 1 1 4 4

, 1 1 5 0 ( 5 t h C i r

. 1 9 7 1 )

doctrine of lache s will ordinarily apply to any application filed within five y ear s afte r the exhaustion

of direc t appea ls.

Be cause the State raised lache s in response to this application, we do not rea ch the question 1 3

of whether the S t ate must plead lache s for a court to consider it in deter mining whether to g rant

equitable relief

. We do observe

, howeve r, that any pleading s invoking lache s in the habea s context

need only g ive notice to the opposing side and need not rise to the level of a prima fac ie showing of

particula rized prejudice

, as was require d under the fede ral courts’ i nterpre tation o f R u l e 9 (a ). See

W alters , 21 F.3d a t 686; Strahan , 750 F.2d a t 441.Perez - 18

( a p p l i c a b i l i t y o f l a c h e s t o b e d e t e r m i n e d “ a f t e r w e i g h i n g t h e e q u i t i e s a s t h e y a p p e a r f r o m t h e

f a c t s o f e a c h c a s e ” )

. 1 4

S i m i l a r t o a c o u r t ’ s r e v i e w o f a c l a i m t h a t a d e f e n d a n t ’ s r i g h t t o a s p e e d y t r i a l h a s

b e e n v i o l a t e d

, i t m a y b e p r o p e r t o c o n s i d e r

, a m o n g a l l r e l e v a n t c i r c u m s t a n c e s

, f a c t o r s s u c h

a s t h e l e n g t h o f

t h e a p p l i c a n t ’ s d e l a y i n f i l i n g t h e a p p l i c a t i o n

, t h e r e a s o n s f o r t h e d e l a y

, a n d

t h e d e g r e e a n d t y p e o f p r e j u d i c e r e s u l t i n g f

r o m t h e d e l a y

. S e e D r a g o o v

. S t a t e

, 9 6 S

. W

. 3 d

3 0 8

, 3 1 4 ( T e x

. C r i m

. A p p

. 2 0 0 3 )

. A s w e h a v e o b s e r v e d w i t h r e s p e c t t o s p e e d y

- t r i a l

c o m p l a i n t s

, “ [ n ] o s i n g l e f a c t o r i s n e c e s s a r y o r s u f f i c i e n t

. ” I d

. I n s t e a d

, c o u r t s m u s t “ e n g a g e

i n a d i f f i c u l t a n d s e n s i t i v e b a l a n c i n g p r o c e s s ” t h a t t a k e s i n t o a c c o u n t t h e p a r t i e s ’ o v e r a l l

c o n d u c t

. Z a m o r a n o v

. S t a t e

, 8 4 S

. W

. 3 d 6 4 3

, 6 4 8 ( T e x

. C r i m

. A p p

. 2 0 0 2 )

. I n c o n s i d e r i n g

w h e t h e r p r e

j u d i c e h a s b e e n s h o w n

, a c o u r t m a y d r a w r e a s o n a b l e i n f e r e n c e s f

r o m t h e

c i r c u m s t a n t i a l e v i d e n c e t o d e t e r m i n e w h e t h e r e x c e s s i v e d e l a y h a s l i k e l y c o m p r o m i s e d t h e

r e l i a b i l i t y o f a r e t r i a l

. I d

. ( i n s p e e d y

- t r i a l c o n t e x t

, “ e x c e s s i v e d e l a y p r e s u m p t i v e l y

c o m p r o m i s e s t h e r e l i a b i l i t y o f a t r i a l i n w a y s t h a t n e i t h e r p a r t y c a n p r o v e

, o r

, f o r t h a t m a t t e r

,

i d e n t i f y ” ) ( c i t i n g D o g

g e t t v

. U n i t e d S t a t e s

, 5 0 5 U

. S

. 6 4 7

, 6 5 5 ( 1 9 9 2 ) )

. I f p r e j u d i c e t o t h e

S t a t e i s s h o w n

, a c o u r t m u s t t h e n w e i g h t h a t p r e j u d i c e a g a i n s t a n y e q u i t a b l e c o n s i d e r a t i o n s

t h a t m i l i t a t e i n f

a v o r o f g r a n t i n g h a b e a s r e l i e f

.

W i t h r e s p e c t t o t h e d e g r e e o f p r o o f r e q u i r e d

, t h e e x t e n t o f t h e p r e j u d i c e t h e S t a t e m u s t

Our altere d approa ch is consistent with other states that, in apply ing their own common law, 1 4

have rec og nized that the lache s inquiry m u s t be flexibl e and made in light of the particula r

circ umstances of the case

. See, e.g., Raso

, 884 A.2d at 395-96 (stating that lache s inquiry is flexibl e

and any “dete rmination must be made in light of the circ umstances of

the par ticular c ase” ).Perez - 19

s h o w b e a r s a n i n v e r s e r e l a t i o n s h i p t o t h e l e n g t h o f t h e a p p l i c a n t ’ s d e l a y

. T h i s “ s l i d i n g s c a l e ”

a p p r o a c h i s a n a l o g o u s t o t h e f l e x i b l e b u r d e n o f p r o o f a p p l i c a b l e t o s p e e d y

- t r i a l c l a i m s

. I n t h a t

c o n t e x t

, t h i s C o u r t h a s o b s e r v e d t h a t t h e d e f e n d a n t ’ s b u r d e n o f p r o v i n g a s p e e d y

- t r i a l

v i o l a t i o n v a r i e s i n v e r s e l y w i t h t h e S t a t e ’ s d e g r e e o f c u l p a b i l i t y a n d t h e l e n g t h o f t h e d e l a y

.

S e e C a n t u v

. S t a t e

, 2 5 3 S

. W

. 3 d 2 7 3

, 2 8 0 ( T e x

. C r i m

. A p p

. 2 0 0 8 ) ( “ [ T ] h e g r e a t e r t h e S t a t e ’ s

b a d f a i t h o r o f f i c i a l n e g l i g e n c e a n d t h e l o n g e r i t s a c t i o n s d e l a y a t r i a l

, t h e l e s s a d e f e n d a n t

m u s t s h o w a c t u a l p r e

j u d i c e o r p r o v e d i l i g e n c e i n a s s e r t i n g h i s r i g h t t o a s p e e d y t r i a l

. ” )

. H e r e

,

s i m i l a r l y

, t h e l o n g e r a n a p p l i c a n t d e l a y s f i l i n g h i s a p p l i c a t i o n

, a n d p a r t i c u l a r l y w h e n a n

a p p l i c a n t d e l a y s f

i l i n g f o r m u c h m o r e t h a n f

i v e y e a r s a f

t e r c o n c l u s i o n o f d i r e c t a p p e a l s

, t h e

l e s s e v i d e n c e t h e S t a t e m u s t p u t f o r t h i n o r d e r t o d e m o n s t r a t e p r e j u d i c e

. T h e r a t i o n a l e f

o r t h i s

s l i d i n g

- s c a l e a p p r o a c h i s b a s e d o n t h e c o m m o n

- s e n s e u n d e r s t a n d i n g t h a t t h e l o n g e r a c a s e

h a s b e e n d e l a y e d

, t h e m o r e l i k e l y i t i s t h a t t h e r e l i a b i l i t y o f a r e t r i a l h a s b e e n c o m p r o m i s e d

.

S e e D r a g o o

, 9 6 S

. W

. 3 d a t 3 1 4 ; D o g g e t t

, 5 0 5 U

. S

. a t 6 5 5

.

F u r t h e r m o r e

, o u r r e v i s e d a p p r o a c h c o m p o r t s w i t h t h i s C o u r t ’ s p r i o r s t a t e m e n t s t h a t

,

i n d e t e r m i n i n g w h e t h e r h a b e a s r e l i e f i s w a r r a n t e d

, w e m u s t a f f o r d a d e q u a t e w e i g h t t o t h e

S t a t e ’ s b r o a d i n t e r e s t i n t h e f i n a l i t y o f a l o n g

- s t a n d i n g c o n v i c t i o n

. S e e E x p a r t e M o r e n o

, 2 4 5

S

. W

. 3 d 4 1 9

, 4 2 9 ( T e x

. C r i m

. A p p

. 2 0 0 8 ) ( S t a t e p o s s e s s e s l e g i t i m a t e i n t e r e s t i n “ t h e r e p o s e

a n d f i n a l i t y o f i t s c o n v i c t i o n s ” ) ; E x p a r t e W

o o d s

, 2 9 6 S

. W

. 3 d 5 8 7

, 6 1 3 n

. 4 1 ( T e x

. C r i m

.

A p p

. 2 0 0 9 ) ( n o t i n g t h a t c o u r t s m u s t “ s e e k t h r o u g h t h e w r i t o f h a b e a s c o r p u s t o b a l a n c e

f u n d a m e n t a l f

a i r n e s s t o c r i m i n a l d e f

e n d a n t s a n d t h e S t a t e ’ s l e g i t i m a t e i n t e r e s t i n t h e f i n a l i t y

o f l i t i g a t i o n ” )

. B y e x p a n d i n g t h e s c o p e o f t h e p r e j u d i c e i n q u i r y

, w e f

u r t h e r e n s u r e t h a t c o u r t sPerez - 20

a r e p e r m i t t e d t o c o n s i d e r t h e S t a t e ’ s a n d s o c i e t y ’ s i n t e r e s t i n t h e f i n a l i t y o f a c o n v i c t i o n i n

d e t e r m i n i n g w h e t h e r l a c h e s s h o u l d a p p l y

. 1 5

A s i d e f r o m t h e c h a n g e s d i s c u s s e d a b o v e

, w e l e a v e i n t a c t t h e e q u i t a b l e p r i n c i p l e s t h a t

p e r m i t a c o u r t t o r e

j e c t t h e S t a t e ’ s r e l i a n c e o n l a c h e s w h e n t h e r e c o r d s h o w s t h a t

• a n a p p l i c a n t ’ s d e l a y w a s n o t u n r e a s o n a b l e b e c a u s e i t w a s d u e

t o a j u s t i f

i a b l e e x c u s e o r e x c u s a b l e n e g l e c t ;

• t h e S t a t e w o u l d n o t b e m a t e r i a l l y p r e j u d i c e d a s a r e s u l t o f t h e

d e l a y ; o r

• t h e a p p l i c a n t i s e n t i t l e d t o e q u i t a b l e r e l i e f f o r o t h e r c o m p e l l i n g

r e a s o n s

, s u c h a s n e w e v i d e n c e t h a t s h o w s h e i s a c t u a l l y

i n n o c e n t o f t h e o f

f e n s e o r

, i n s o m e c a s e s

, t h a t h e i s r e a s o n a b l y

l i k e l y t o p r e v a i l o n t h e m e r i t s

.

S e e

, e

. g

. , E

x p a r t e S c o t t

, 1 9 0 S

. W

. 3 d 6 7 2

, 6 7 5 ( T e x

. C r i m

. A p p

. 2 0 0 6 ) ( C o c h r a n

, J

. ,

c o n c u r r i n g ) ( s u g g e s t i n g t h a t e q u i t a b l e r e l i e f m i g h t b e w a r r a n t e d n o t w i t h s t a n d i n g a p p l i c a n t ’ s

d e l a y i n s e e k i n g h a b e a s r e l i e f w h e r e a p p l i c a n t s h o w s t h a t c o n v i c t i o n w a s w r o n g l y a f f i r m e d

b y c o u r t o f a p p e a l s ) ; E

x p a r t e B l u e

, 2 3 0 S

. W

. 3 d 1 5 1

, 1 7 0 ( T e x

. C r i m

. A p p

. 2 0 0 7 ) ( K e l l e r

,

P

. J

. , c o n c u r r i n g ) ( h a b e a s c o u r t s p o s s e s s “ e q u i t a b l e d i s c r e t i o n ” t o s e e t h a t “ f e d e r a l

The diss enting opinion sug g ests that, at this stage , we ne ed not consider the S tate’s ability 1 5

to r etry a case beca

use that can be done later. But there will ne ver be a later time. I f, in g ranting an

application for a w ri t of habeas corpus, an appellate court returns a case to a trial court for retria l,

a trial court has no authority to disreg ard the direc tive by deter mining that the retria l would be barr ed

by lache s. Specific to the issue of out-of-time PDRs, the dissenting opinion sug g ests that we should

g rant leave to fi l e an out-of-time PDR and decide the lache s issue only if we later decide on

discretionar

y review t h at applicant (now turned appellant) is entitled to relief

. Such an approa ch

would not only overlook the State’s proper ly raised lache s arg ument here

, but it would also overlook

the fac t that this Court’s decision to g rant an out-of-time PDR is a proce durally signific ant one that

restore s cer

tain rig hts to an appellant. See Mestas v. State

, 214 S.W .3d 1, 4 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007)

(ef fec t of g ranting out-of-time appeal is that it “restore s the defe ndant” to position he was in prior

to deprivation of r ight of

appea l).Perez - 21

c o n s t i t u t i o n a l e r r o r s d o n o t r e s u l t i n t h e i n c a r c e r a t i o n o f i n n o c e n t p e r s o n s ” ) ( q u o t i n g He r r e r a

v

. C o l l i n s

, 5 0 6 U

. S

. 3 9 0

, 4 0 4

- 0 5 ( 1 9 9 0 ) )

.

G i v e n t h e n a t u r e o f h a b e a s c o r p u s r e l i e f

, i t i s r e a s o n a b l e t o p e r m i t a c o u r t t o c o n s i d e r

w h e t h e r a n a p p l i c a n t h a s s l e p t o n h i s r i g h t s a n d

, i f h e h a s

, h o w t h a t h a s a f f e c t e d t h e S t a t e

,

a n d w h e t h e r

, i n l i g h t o f t h e d e l a y

, i t i s f a i r a n d j u s t t o g r a n t h i m r e l i e f

. I n c a s e s i n w h i c h a n

a p p l i c a n t ’ s d e l a y h a s b e e n e x c e s s i v e

, i n g e n e r a l

, i t i s m o r e l i k e l y t h a t t h e S t a t e w i l l b e a b l e

t o s h o w i t h a s b e e n p r e

j u d i c e d b y t h e d e l a y a n d t h a t a n a p p l i c a n t w i l l f a c e a d i f f i c u l t t a s k t o

s h o w w h y h i s a p p l i c a t i o n s h o u l d n o t b e b a r r e d b y l a c h e s

. S e e S m i t h v

. C a t e r p i l l a r

, I n c

. , 3 3 8

F

. 3 d 7 3 0

, 7 3 3 ( 7 t h C i r

. 2 0 0 3 ) ( l a c h e s d o c t r i n e a p p l i e d o n a “ s l i d i n g s c a l e ” : t h e l o n g e r t h e

d e l a y

, t h e l e s s p r e

j u d i c e m u s t b e s h o w n )

. W e

, h o w e v e r

, a l s o r e a f f i r m t h a t “ w e h a v e n o d e s i r e

t o i m p o s e u p o n d e f

e n d a n t s t h e r e q u i r e m e n t t h a t c l a i m s f o r r e l i e f b e a s s e r t e d w i t h i n a

s p e c i f i e d p e r i o d o f t i m e

, ” b u t w i l l c o n t i n u e t o a p p l y l a c h e s a s a b a r t o r e l i e f w h e n a n

a p p l i c a n t ’ s u n r e a s o n a b l e d e l a y h a s p r e j u d i c e d t h e S t a t e

, t h e r e b y r e n d e r i n g c o n s i d e r a t i o n o f

h i s c l a i m i n e q u i t a b l e

. S e e C a r r i o

, 9 9 2 S

. W

. 2 d a t 4 8 7 ( c i t i n g E x p a r t e G a l v a n

, 7 7 0 S

. W

. 2 d

8 2 2

, 8 2 4 ( T e x

. C r i m

. A p p

. 1 9 8 9 ) )

. T h o u g h p r o o f o f m e r e p a s s a g e o f t i m e w i l l c o n t i n u e t o

b e i n s u f f i c i e n t t o r a i s e l a c h e s

, w e w i l l w e i g h a l l r e l e v a n t e q u i t a b l e c o n s i d e r a t i o n s i n

d e t e r m i n i n g w h e t h e r a l o n g

- d e l a y e d a p p l i c a t i o n f o r p o s t

- c o n v i c t i o n r e l i e f s h o u l d b e b a r r e d

b y l a c h e s

.

I I I

. C o n c l u s i o n

I n l i g h t o f o u r r e v i s e d a p p r o a c h t o t h e d o c t r i n e o f l a c h e s

, a n d b e c a u s e n e i t h e r

a p p l i c a n t n o r t h e S t a t e h a s h a d t h e b e n e f i t o f t h i s o p i n i o n

, w e r e m a n d t h i s c a s e t o t h e t r i a lPerez - 22

c o u r t s o t h a t t h e p a r t i e s m a y b e a f f o r d e d t h e o p p o r t u n i t y t o p r o d u c e a d d i t i o n a l e v i d e n c e

.

D e l i v e r e d : M a y 8

, 2 0 1 3

P u b l i s h