SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY

APPELLATE DIVISION

DOCKET NO. A-0274-21

CAPITAL ONE BANK (USA),

N.A., 

Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

CHRISTOPHER A. ROGALSKI,

Defendant-Appellant.

_____________________________

Argued October 6, 2022 – Decided October 19, 2022

Before Judges Firko and Natali.

On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law 

Division, Cape May County, Docket No. DC-000819-

21.

Christopher A. Rogalski, appellant, argued the cause 

pro se.

Kellie T. Hannum argued the cause for respondent 

(Hayt, Hayt & Landau, LLC, attorneys; Kellie T. 

Hannum, on the brief).

PER CURIAM

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the 

internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
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A-0274-21

In this collection matter involving non-payment of a credit card debt, 

defendant Christopher Rogalski appeals from the September 16, 2021 Special 

Civil Part order granting plaintiff Capital One Bank (USA), N.A.'s motion for 

summary judgment. Defendant also challenges the October 7, 2021 order 

denying his motion for recusal of the judge. The judge improperly denied 

defendant's requests for oral argument on plaintiff's motion for summary 

judgment, and in granting summary judgment, rendered no findings of fact or 

conclusions of law. We therefore reverse, remand, and permit the parties to 

engage in summary judgment motion practice anew. However, we affirm the 

October 7, 2021 order denying recusal of the judge.

I.

Plaintiff filed a complaint seeking damages of $9,721.77 due on 

defendant's account plus interest, counsel fees, and costs. Defendant filed an 

answer asserting that in 2019, he was living and working in the Kingdom of 

Saudi Arabia and plaintiff blocked his ability to make online payments without 

prior notice. In addition, defendant averred plaintiff engaged in deceptive 
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A-0274-21

practices in violation of the Dodd-Frank Consumer Protection Act,1 damaged 

his credit rating, and began charging usurious rates under New Jersey law. 2

Plaintiff moved for summary judgment. Defendant opposed the motion 

and requested oral argument, which was denied. The judge granted plaintiff's 

motion on the papers and did not render any findings of fact or conclusions of 

law. Further, the judge did not articulate any reason for denying defendant's 

request for oral argument.

Defendant then filed a motion for stay of the judgment and for recusal of 

the motion judge. In support of his recusal motion, defendant argued the judge 

was biased against him and favored plaintiff. The motion was denied.

On appeal, defendant raises the following arguments for our 

consideration:

A. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY NOT 

REQUIRING THAT [PLAINTIFF], THE MOVING 

PARTY, FILE A "STATEMENT OF UNDISPUTED 

FACTS" REQUIRED BY RULE 4:46-2, OR 

ANYTHING APPROXIMATING ONE TO GIVE 

[DEFENDANT] NOTICE WHAT FACTS WERE 

CLAIMED TO HAVE BEEN NOT DISPUTED, FOR 

PURPOSES OF FUNDAMENTAL FAIRNESS, AND 

DUE PROCESS OF LAW.

1

 12 U.S.C. § 5536(a)(1)(B); 15 U.S.C. § 1666i-1(c)(1).

2

 N.J.S.A. 31:1-1 to -4; N.J.S.A. 2C:21-19.
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A-0274-21

B. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY REFUSING 

[DEFENDANT'S] REQUEST FOR ORAL 

ARGUMENT.

C. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY FAILING TO 

FILE A STATEMENT OF REASONS FOR ITS 

DECISION.

D. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY FAILING TO 

RECUSE HIMSELF DUE TO OBVIOUS PERSONAL 

BIAS.

Since we are reversing and remanding for the parties to engage in summary 

judgment practice anew, we need not reach the substantive arguments raised by 

the parties.

II.

The judge was required to conduct oral argument on the dispositive 

motions or explain his reasons for not doing so. He did neither. And, the judge 

should have made findings of fact and conclusions of law on the merits of the 

summary judgment motions.

Rule 1:6-2(d) governs oral argument on motions in civil cases and 

provides in relevant part:

[N]o motion shall be listed for oral argument unless a 

party requests oral argument in the moving papers or in 

timely-filed answering or reply papers, or unless the 

court directs. A party requesting oral argument may, 

however, condition the request on the motion being 

contested. If the motion involves pretrial discovery or 
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is directly addressed to the calendar, the request shall 

be considered only if accompanied by a statement of 

reasons and shall be deemed denied unless the court 

otherwise advises counsel prior to the return day. As to 

all other motions, the request shall be granted as of 

right.

"The denial of oral argument when a motion has properly presented [as

here] a substantive issue to the court for decision 'deprives litigants of an 

opportunity to present their case fully to a court.'" Palombi v. Palombi, 414 N.J. 

Super. 274, 285 (App. Div. 2010) (quoting Mackowski v. Mackowski, 317 N.J. 

Super. 8, 15 (App. Div. 1998), superseded by statute on other grounds, R. 5:8-

6, as recognized in D.A. v. R.C., 438 N.J. Super. 431, 457 (App. Div. 2014)).

A request for oral argument respecting a substantive motion may be 

denied. Raspantini v. Arocho, 364 N.J. Super. 528, 531-32 (App. Div. 2003). 

However, in accordance with Rule 1:6-2(d), "[w]here . . . the trial [judge] 

decides the motion on the papers despite a request for oral argument, the trial 

[judge] should set forth in its opinion its reasons for disposing of the motion for 

summary judgment on the papers in its opinion." LVNV Funding, L.L.C. v. 

Colvell, 421 N.J. Super. 1, 5 (App. Div. 2011); see Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co., 

Inc. v. Checchio, 335 N.J. Super. 495, 497-98 (App. Div. 2000) (reversing 

summary judgment where the trial court did not conduct oral argument, which 

was requested by the moving party, because the court did not find any basis for 
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relaxing the rule and the judge provided no basis for denial in the record). Where 

a request for oral argument on a substantive motion is properly made, denial of 

argument—absent articulation of specific reasons on the record—constitutes 

reversible error. Raspantini, 364 N.J. Super. at 533.

A judge is required to make findings of fact and reach conclusions of law. 

Rule 1:7-4(a) provides that "[t]he court shall, by an opinion or memorandum 

decision, either written or oral, find the facts and state its conclusions of law 

thereon . . . on every motion decided by a written order that is appealable as of 

right." The inclusion is particularly important "in the case of motions for 

summary judgment, as to which [Rule] 4:46-2(c) specifically directs the court 

to make findings and conclusions in accordance with [Rule] 1:7-4[(a)]."

Raspantini, 364 N.J. Super. at 533.

The failure to include a statement of reasons for granting the original 

motion—especially in the absence of oral argument—impedes our ability to 

consider the parties' arguments, even when we apply a de novo standard of 

review. See Est. of Doerfler v. Fed. Ins. Co., 454 N.J. Super. 298, 301-02 (App. 

Div. 2018) (noting that "[a]lthough our standard of review from the grant of a 

motion for summary judgment is de novo . . . our function as an appellate court 

is to review the decision of the trial court, not to decide the motion tabula rasa").
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As a result of these deficiencies, we have no basis on which to conduct any 

meaningful review either of the judge's denial of oral argument or his decision 

to grant summary judgment, warranting reversal.

We reject defendant's argument that plaintiff was required to file a 

statement of undisputed facts in support of its motion for summary judgment in 

accordance with Rule 4:46-2(a). In the rules governing civil practice in the 

Special Civil Part, Rule 6:6-1 states "that the requirements of a statement of 

material facts and a responding statement contained in [Rule] 4:46-2(a) and (b) 

shall not apply." Therefore, defendant's argument on this issue lacks merit.

III.

We next address defendant's argument that the judge erred by denying the 

motion for his recusal. Generally, recusal motions are "entrusted to the sound 

discretion of the judge and are subject to review for abuse of discretion." State 

v. McCabe, 201 N.J. 34, 45 (2010). We review de novo whether the judge 

applied the proper legal standard. Ibid. Judges must act in a way "that promotes 

public confidence in the independence, integrity and impartiality of the 

judiciary, and shall avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety." Code 

of Jud. Conduct r. 2.1; see also In re Reddin, 221 N.J. 221, 227 (2015).
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To determine if an appearance of impropriety exists, we ask "[w]ould a 

reasonable, fully informed person have doubts about the judge's impartiality?" 

DeNike v. Cupo, 196 N.J. 502, 517 (2008); see also Code of Jud. Conduct r. 2.1 

cmt. 3. Judges must recuse themselves from "proceedings in which their 

impartiality or the appearance of their impartiality might reasonably be 

questioned," Code of Jud. Conduct r. 3.17(B), or if "there is any other reason 

which might preclude a fair and unbiased hearing and judgment, or which might 

reasonably lead counsel or the parties to believe so," R. 1:12-1(g).

Withdrawing from a case "upon a mere suggestion" of disqualification is 

improper. Panitch v. Panitch, 339 N.J. Super. 63, 66-67 (App. Div. 2001). A 

judge should not step aside from a case "unless the alleged cause of recusal is 

known by [them] to exist or is shown to be true in fact." Hundred E. Credit 

Corp. v. Eric Schuster Corp., 212 N.J. Super. 350, 358 (App. Div. 1986); see 

also Laird v. Tatum, 409 U.S. 824, 837 (1972) (holding a judge's "duty to sit

where not disqualified . . . is equally as strong as the duty to not sit where 

disqualified" (emphases added)); State v. Marshall, 148 N.J. 89, 276 (1997) 

("[J]udges are not free to err on the side of caution; it is improper for a court to 

recuse itself unless the factual bases for its disqualification are shown by the 

movant to be true or are already known by the court.").
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To hold otherwise would create an incentive for disgruntled litigants to 

claim bias in order to remove a judge from a case who has ruled against them. 

That a judge rendered decisions in a case that did not favor the party seeking 

recusal—even a decision we reversed on appeal—is insufficient grounds for 

recusal. Marshall, 148 N.J. at 276; Hundred E. Credit Corp., 212 N.J. Super. at 

358. A judge is not prevented from sitting by giving an "opinion on any question 

in controversy in the pending action in the course of previous proceedings 

therein." N.J.S.A. 2A:15-49; see also R. 1:12-1.

Rule 1:12-2 states that a party may file a motion seeking a judge's 

disqualification. This can also be done upon the court's own motion when there 

is any "reason which might preclude a fair and unbiased hearing and judgment, 

or which might reasonably lead counsel or the parties to believe so." R. 1:12-

1(g). A judge's participation in prior proceedings in a case is not, on its own, 

sufficient grounds for disqualification. Matthews v. Deane, 196 N.J. Super. 441, 

445 (Ch. Div. 1984) (citing State v. Walker, 33 N.J. 580, 591 (1960)).

It is crucial for the moving party to demonstrate "prejudice or potential 

bias" in order to succeed on a motion for judicial qualification. State v. Flowers, 

109 N.J. Super. 309, 312 (App. Div. 1970). The mere suggestion of bias is 

insufficient to support a Rule 1:12-2 motion—the cause of disqualification must 
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be known to be true to the judge or demonstrated to be true in fact. Hundred E. 

Credit Corp., 212 N.J. Super. at 358.

In support of his claim that the motion judge exhibited bias against him, 

defendant makes three arguments: (1) the judge did not require plaintiff to file 

a statement of undisputed facts under Rule 4:46-2; (2) the judge did not grant 

his request for oral argument; and (3) the judge failed to file a statement of 

reasons for his decision.

We see no abuse of discretion or misapplication of the law as to the first 

argument. As we stated, no statement of undisputed facts was required here 

because Rule 6:6-1 controls in the Special Civil Part, not Rule 4:46-2(a) as 

defendant contends. And, since we are reversing and remanding on the issue of 

summary judgment, there is no basis to justify recusal. Moreover, the record is 

devoid of any indication the decision to grant summary judgment was the 

product of bias or unfair treatment. Nothing in the record demonstrates there 

was actual prejudice or an appearance of prejudice on the part of the judge. 

Defendant's disagreements with the judge's decision are not a sufficient basis 

for recusal under Rule 1:12-2. Therefore, we affirm the denial of the recusal 

motion.
11 A-0274-21

Reversed and remanded. Because the parties may engage in summary 

judgment motion practice anew, and since any future appeal will be from a 

different record, we do not retain jurisdiction.