Opinion filed October 6, 2022

In The

Eleventh Court of Appeals __________

No. 11-22-00106-CV

__________

IN THE INTEREST OF R.L.R., A CHILD

On Appeal from the 259th District Court

Shackelford County, Texas

Trial Court Cause No. 2021-003

M E M O R A N D U M O P I N I O N

This is an appeal from an order in which the trial court terminated the parental 

rights of the mother and the father of R.L.R. The father filed this appeal. On appeal, 

he presents one issue in which he challenges the trial court’s finding that the 

termination of his parental rights would be in R.L.R.’s best interest. We affirm the

order of the trial court. 

Termination Findings and Standards

The termination of parental rights must be supported by clear and convincing 

evidence. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 161.001(b) (West 2022). To terminate parental 

rights, it must be shown by clear and convincing evidence that the parent has 
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committed one of the acts listed in Section 161.001(b)(1)(A)–(U) and that 

termination is in the best interest of the child. Id. In this case, the trial court found 

that Appellant had committed two of the acts listed in Section 161.001(b)(1)—those 

found in subsections (O) and (P). Appellant does not challenge these findings on 

appeal. 

The trial court also found, pursuant to Section 161.001(b)(2), that termination 

of Appellant’s parental rights would be in the best interest of the child. See id.

§ 161.001(b)(2). In his sole issue on appeal, Appellant challenges both the legal and 

factual sufficiency of the evidence to support the trial court’s best interest finding.

To determine if the evidence is legally sufficient in a parental termination case, 

we review all of the evidence in the light most favorable to the finding and determine 

whether a rational trier of fact could have formed a firm belief or conviction that its 

finding was true. In re J.P.B., 180 S.W.3d 570, 573 (Tex. 2005). To determine if the 

evidence is factually sufficient, we give due deference to the finding and determine 

whether, on the entire record, a factfinder could reasonably form a firm belief or

conviction about the truth of the allegations against the parent. In re C.H., 89 S.W.3d 

17, 25–26 (Tex. 2002). We note that the trial court is the sole arbiter of the credibility 

and demeanor of witnesses. In re A.B., 437 S.W.3d 498, 503 (Tex. 2014) (citing In 

re J.L., 163 S.W.3d 79, 86–87 (Tex. 2005)). 

With respect to the best interest of a child, no unique set of factors need be 

proved. In re C.J.O., 325 S.W.3d 261, 266 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2010, pet. denied). 

But courts may use the non-exhaustive Holley factors to shape their analysis. 

Holley v. Adams, 544 S.W.2d 367, 371–72 (Tex. 1976). These include, but are not 

limited to, (1) the desires of the child, (2) the emotional and physical needs of the 

child now and in the future, (3) the emotional and physical danger to the child now 

and in the future, (4) the parental abilities of the individuals seeking custody, (5) the 

programs available to assist these individuals to promote the best interest of the 
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child, (6) the plans for the child by these individuals or by the agency seeking 

custody, (7) the stability of the home or proposed placement, (8) the acts or 

omissions of the parent that may indicate that the existing parent–child relationship 

is not a proper one, and (9) any excuse for the acts or omissions of the parent. Id. 

Additionally, evidence that proves one or more statutory grounds for termination 

may also constitute evidence illustrating that termination is in the child’s best 

interest. C.J.O., 325 S.W.3d at 266. 

Evidence and Analysis

The record shows that the Department of Family and Protective Services 

became involved with Appellant when R.L.R. was five years old.1

 The concerns 

were that Appellant was using methamphetamine while R.L.R. was in his care and 

that R.L.R. was left alone without adult supervision. To prevent removal of the child 

from Appellant, the Department instituted a safety plan. However, when Appellant 

later tested positive for methamphetamine, R.L.R. was removed from Appellant’s

care and placed with a relative. 

After R.L.R. was removed from Appellant’s care, Appellant was ordered by 

the trial court to complete a substance abuse assessment, successfully complete 

substance abuse treatment, submit to random drug tests as requested by the 

Department, submit to a psychological evaluation, attend counseling, successfully 

complete parenting classes, maintain legal employment, and comply with the 

requirements of his family service plan. Appellant, at first, participated in some 

services and even attended rehab at Serenity House, which he completed in April 

2021. However, not long thereafter, Appellant’s drug use again became a concern. 

Appellant admitted that he had relapsed and was again using illegal drugs and that 

1

We note that R.L.R.’s mother had abandoned R.L.R. when he was ten months old and that, despite 

the efforts of the Department and others, the mother could not be located. We also note that both R.L.R. 

and the mother tested positive for methamphetamine at the time of R.L.R.’s birth. 
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he had struggled with drug use from a young age. He begged the trial court for a 

second chance, which the trial court granted—extending the automatic dismissal 

deadline in this case to allow Appellant more time to work his services and complete 

rehab at Serenity House a second time. Appellant went to rehab for a second time, 

but he checked himself out after only three days. After that, Appellant 

“disappear[ed].” 

Appellant did not appear for the termination hearing even though he was 

aware that it was being held. At the time of trial, Appellant had not had any contact 

with the Department in five months and had not seen R.L.R. in approximately eight 

months. A permanency case manager testified that Appellant’s counselor was 

concerned because Appellant lacked adequate parenting skills. She also testified that 

Appellant failed to complete the court-ordered services required of him, failed to 

obtain stable housing, failed to maintain employment, failed to submit to drug tests 

when requested, and continued to use illegal drugs. The testimony showed that 

Appellant’s use of a controlled substance endangered the health and safety of R.L.R.;

that Appellant completed a substance abuse treatment program but, after doing so, 

continued to abuse controlled substances; and that Appellant failed to complete the 

substance abuse treatment program during his second attempt.

The Department’s plan for R.L.R. was for him to remain in the care of, and 

ultimately be adopted by, the father’s cousin—with whom R.L.R. had been placed 

since the safety plan was instituted. The record shows that R.L.R. wants to be 

adopted by the cousin. The cousin and her husband were in the process of getting 

licensed as foster parents in the hopes of adopting R.L.R. The permanency case 

managers and the cousin testified that it would be in R.L.R.’s best interest for 

Appellant’s parental rights to be terminated. 

The trial court, as the trier of fact, is the sole judge of the witnesses’ credibility.

A.B., 437 S.W.3d at 503. We are not at liberty to disturb the determinations of the 
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trier of fact as long as those determinations are not unreasonable. J.P.B., 180 S.W.3d 

at 573. Giving due deference to the trial court, we hold that, based on the evidence 

presented at trial and the Holley factors, the trial court could reasonably have formed 

a firm belief or conviction that termination of Appellant’s parental rights would be 

in the best interest of R.L.R. See Holley, 544 S.W.2d at 371–72. Upon considering 

the record as it relates to the desires of the child, the emotional and physical needs 

of the child now and in the future, the emotional and physical danger to the child 

now and in the future, the parental abilities of those involved, the plans for the child 

by the Department, Appellant’s continued use of drugs while the case was pending 

below, Appellant’s failure to visit or have any contact with his child for

approximately eight months, and the instability of Appellant’s situation, we hold that 

the evidence is legally and factually sufficient to support the finding that termination 

of Appellant’s parental rights is in the best interest of R.L.R. See id. We defer to the 

trial court’s finding as to R.L.R.’s best interest, see C.H., 89 S.W.3d at 27, and we 

cannot hold in this case that the trial court’s finding as to best interest is not supported 

by clear and convincing evidence. Accordingly, we overrule Appellant’s sole issue. 

This Court’s Ruling

We affirm the order of the trial court. 

JOHN M. BAILEY

CHIEF JUSTICE

October 6, 2022

Panel consists of: Bailey, C.J.,

Trotter, J., and Williams, J.