* This order and judgment is not binding precedent, e xcept under the

doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and col lateral estoppel. The court generally disfavors the citation of orders and judg ments; nevertheless, an order and judgment may be cited under the terms and condi tions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3. 

## F I L E D United States Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit 

### AUG 26 1999 

### PATRICK FISHER Clerk UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT

SARAH A. DIXON,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v. KENNETH S. APFEL, Commissioner, Social Security Administration,

Defendant-Appellee. No. 98-5167 (D.C. No. 97-CV-343-J) (N.D. Okla.)

ORDER AND JUDGMENT *

Before TACHA , McKAY , and MURPHY , Circuit Judges.

After examining the briefs and appellate record, th is panel has determined unanimously to grant the parties’ request for a dec ision on the briefs without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(f); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument.-2-

Claimant Sarah Dixon appeals the decision of the Co mmissioner of the Social Security Administration, made through an Adm inistrative Law Judge (ALJ), to deny her claim for disability insurance b enefits. The ALJ determined at step four of the sequential evaluation process thatclaimant retained the residual functional capacity to perform her past relevant wo rk. On appeal, we review the record to determine whether the decision of the ALJ is supported by substantial evidence and to verify that the law was correctly applied. See Kepler v. Chater , 68 F.3d 387, 388 (10th Cir. 1995). Applying this s tandard, we affirm. Claimant, who has a long history of diabetes mellit us, alleged she is disabled due to pain in her hips, knees, feet, shou lders and hands and persistent headaches. On appeal, claimant argues that the ALJ failed to enumerate specific findings to support the three phase evaluation requ ired in step four cases under Winfrey v. Chater , 92 F.3d 1017, 1023-25 (10th Cir. 1996). We disag ree. In the first phase of the Winfreyanalysis, the ALJ must evaluate a claimant’s residual functional capacity. After con sidering claimant’s testimony, including all of her claimed impairments, the evide nce regarding her daily activities, and the fact that none of claimant’s tr eating physicians had placed any functional limitations on her activities, the ALJ c oncluded that claimant could do light work limited by only occasional bending and t he need to occasionally1 Claimant’s argument regarding whether she earned en ough money as a

telephone enumerator for that job to qualify as pas t relevant work was not raised before the district court and will not be considered by this court on appeal. See Crow v. Shalala , 40 F.3d 323, 324 (10th Cir. 1994). -3- change positions. This analysis fulfilled the ALJ’ s duty under step one of Winfrey

. Continuing with the Winfreyrequirements, the ALJ noted that claimant’s past relevant work was as an enumerator for a telep hone survey company, described by her as calling people for eight hours each day to verify telephone information. The record also contains a work report submitted by claimant in which she more fully described the physical activit ies involved in her past relevant work. See Appellant’s App. Vol. II at 103-04. Additionally, the ALJ specifically cited the testimony of the vocational expert who testified at the hearing as to the nature of claimant’s past relevan t work. See id. at 52-53. This evidence was sufficient to determine the physical a nd mental demands of claimant’s past work and to satisfy the ALJ’s oblig ation under Winfreyto enumerate specific findings. 1 The last Winfreyrequirement demands that the ALJ decide whether th e claimant has the ability to meet the job demands of her past relevant work, determined in phase two, despite the limitations id entified during phase one. The ALJ clearly performed this step by turning again to testimony from a vocational-4-

expert who testified that, even with her residual f unctional capacity for light work limited by bending and position change requirements , claimant could perform her past relevant work. See Appellant’s App., Vol. II at 52-53. Thus the ALJ adequately complied with the Winfreyrequirements in determining that claimant could perform her past relevant work. Claimant next asserts that the ALJ failed to consid er her limited mobility and pain. There is no evidence in the record, howe ver, of any objective medical findings establishing that claimant has mobility pr oblems. Indeed, the consultative examiner’s report included the followi ng: No gross joint deformity noted that I can see. She has pain with gripping with the right hand. She has none with th e left hand. She has some right shoulder pain with movement but she pretty much has a full range of motion that I can tell. No gross o rthopedic deformity noted to the feet. There is no redness to any join ts. There is minimal, if any, swelling or heat to any joints. T here is tenderness to the right hand and most of the finger, metacarpopha langeal joints, shoulder and hip joints. Gross and fine manipulati ve strength is five and she can write her name without difficulty. Wit h respect to gait, she has normal speed, ability and safety. Toe walk ing is a little bit of a problem for her. The patient is able to heel walk. She does not need a crutch or a cane to walk.

Id. at 205. There is no evidence that any physician e ver diagnosed claimant with anything but mild arthritis, which could possibly c ontribute to pain and/or mobility problems, or ordered any arthritis diagnos tic tests performed. Claimant takes only Anacin for her pain. Claimant’s subject ive complaints regarding-5-

limited mobility and pain may be disregarded if uns upported by clinical findings.
See Frey v. Bowen , 816 F.2d 508, 515 (10th Cir. 1987). Claimant argues that the ALJ improperly made his ow n RFC findings instead of procuring such an opinion from a physici an. Initially we note that the record contains an RFC completed by Dr. Luther Wood cock on March 2, 1994, and later adopted as written by Dr. Thurma Jo Feigl e on August 2, 1994, which amply supports the ALJ’s finding that claimant can do light work with certain limitations. Additionally, the RFC is an administr ative assessment made on the basis of all of the evidence in the record, not onl y the medical evidence, and, as such, is the well within the province of the ALJ. See Soc. Sec. Rul. 96-8p (explaining that RFC is an administrative assessment made by “adjudicators at each level of the administrative review process bas ed on all of the relevant evidence in the case record, including information about the individual’s symptoms and any medical source statements”) (quotation omitted). The judgment of the United States District Court fo r the Northern District of Oklahoma is AFFIRMED.

Entered for the Court

Monroe G. McKay Circuit Judge