1 (Slip Opin i o n) OCTOBER T ERM, 20 08 Sy llabu s N O TE : Wh er e it i s feas ibl e , a s y llab u s (h ead n ot e) wil lbe rel e as ed , as is bein g d o n e incon n ecti onwithth is cas e , a tth e ti meth e op in i o n is is s u ed

. Th e s y ll abu s con s titu tes n o p a r t of th e op in i o nof th eC o u r t bu t h a s be en pre p are dbyt h e Re po rte ro f De ci sio n s fo r t h e co nveni e nce of t h e reade r . Se e United Statesv. Detroit Timbe r& Lumb er Co., 200U. S

. 3 21, 337

. 

## SUPREME CO URT O F THE UNI TED STATES
Sy llabu s R E P UB LIC O FIRAQ v . BEATY ET AL
. CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE DISTRI CT OF COLUMBIA CIRCU IT No. 07–1 09 0. Ar g u ed Apr i l 20, 200 9—Dec i ded Ju n e 8, 200 9 * The Foreign S o vereign Immunities Ac t of 197 6 (FS IA) pr oh ibits su i t s

ag ain s t oth e rc o u n t r i es inA m er ic anc o ur ts, 28 U. S. C. §160 4, with c e r t ainex c e ption s . On e ex c e ption , §1 605( a)(7) (n ow r e pealed), stripped a for e ign state of i mmunity in any suit arising from certai n a c t s of t e rroris mt h a toccurred whe nt h e s t at e wa s designa t ed a s a sponsor of ter r orism under §6(j) of the Ex port Adm i nist ration Act o f 197 9 or§620A of th e For e i g n Assi stan c eAc t of 1961. Ir aq was desig n ated as a spo n sorof terr or i s m in199 0, bu t in2003 , following the American-led invasi on of Ir aq, Congress enacted the Emergency Wartime Supplemental Ap propriations Act (EWSA A

) , §1503 of which included a proviso cl au se (th esec o n di na ser i e s of eight) authorizing the President to “m ake inapplic ab le with r e spec t to Ir aq [§]62 0A o f th e For e ig n Assi st an c eAc t of 196 1 oran yoth e rpr ov i

s i on of la w t h a ta p plies t ocount ries t h a t have s u pport ed t e rroris m .” Although Pres ident Bush exercised that a u thor ity , the D. C. Circ uit held in its 2 0 04 Acreede cision that the EWSA A did n o t permit the Pr esiden t to waiv e §1605( a)(7), an d th erebyr e stor e Iraq’ s sov e r e ig n immu n i ty , forc l aims ar isin gfr om ac tion s Ir aq took wh il e desig n ate d a s as p ons o r of t e rroris m .

Thereafter, C o ng ress repealed §16 05(a)( 7 ) in §1083(b)( 1 )(A)(iii) of th e Nation al Defen s e Au thor izationAc t forFisc al Y e ar2008 (NDA A) an d r e plac ed i twitha n e w, r o u gh l ysimila rex c e ption , §1083( a). Th e NDAA also d e c l ar ed th at n o th in g in EWSAA “ev e r authorized, di

rectly or indirectly, the mak i ng ina pplicab le of any provision of [th e FSIA] or the removal of the jurisd ic tion of anyc o ur t” (t hus pur p or t

-

——————

* Tog e th er withNo. 08– 539, Republic of Iraq et al. v. S i mon et al., a l s oon cert ior a ri t ot h e s a me cou r t

.2 REPUBLI C OF IRAQ v. BEATY Sy llabu s ingto r a tify Acre e), §1083(c )(4); an d au t h or ized th e Pr esiden t to waive “any provision of this sectio n with r e spec t to Ir aq” underc e r tain conditions, §108 3(d). On the same day the President signed the NDAA into la w he also waived all of §108 3 ’ s pr ov ision s as to Ir aq. Respon den t s f iled th ese su it s ag ain s t Ir a qinear l y2003 , allegi n g mistr e a tmen t byIr aqi offic i als du r i n gan d afterth e 19 91 Gu lf War

. Under Ac re e , th e c o u r ts belowr e fu sed to dismi ss eith erc a se onju r i s dict iona l grounds

. The D. C. Circuita l so rej e ct ed Ira q ’ s a l t e rna t ive ar g u men tth at ev enif §1 6 05(a)( 7 )’ s ap pl ic ationto it su rv iv ed th e President’s EWSAA waiver , the pr ovision was repealed by NDAA §108 3(b)(1)(A) (iii); and that th e President had waived NDAA §108 3(a)’ s new ex c e ptionwithr e spec t to Ir aq u n d erh i s §108 3(d) au

thor ity

. The c o ur t held i n stead th at i tretained jurisdiction over c a ses pen d in gag ain s t Ir aq w h enth e N D AA was en ac ted. Held:Ir aq is n olon g er su bjec t to su it infeder a l c o u r t. Pp. 6–17. (a) Th e Distr i ct Cou r t lost ju r i sdic tionov er bothsu its inM a y2003 , when thePresident exercised his EW SAA author it yto make §160 5(a)(7) “ i n a pplic ab le wit hr e spec t to Iraq.” Pp. 6–13. (i) Ir aq’ s (an dth e Un ited St ates’ ) r e adin gof EWSAA § 1 503’ s sec on d pr ov iso as sweepin gin §1605( a)(7)’ s ter r o r i sm ex c e ptionto for

eign sovereign immunity is straight forward. In the pro v iso’s terms, the ex c e ption is a “pr o v i sionof law ” (indi s putably) that “appl ies to ” (str ips i mmunityfr om) “c ountr i es that ha v esuppor t ed ter r o r i sm” (a s des i gna t ed pu rs ua nt to certa i n s t a t utory provis ions ). Beca us e he ex

er c i sed h i s w a iv erau th or ityw i thr e sp ect to “al l” provisio ns of l a w en c o mpassedby th e sec o n dpr ov iso, h i s ac tio n s made § 160 5(a)(7) “in a p plic able ” to Ir aq. Pp. 6–7. (ii) Acre e ’ s r e sistanc eto the abov ec o nstruc tion was based on a sophistic a ted atte mpt to c o nstr ue EWSA A §150 3’ s sec o nd pr ov iso as limit ing that section’s principal cl au se, w h ic hau th or ized su spen sion of “any provision of the Iraq Sancti on s Ac t of 199 0.” Whil e a proviso’s “general office

. . . is to except so me thingfr om the en ac tin gc l au se, or to qualify andrestrain its g e nerality,” United Stat esv. Morro w , 266 U. S. 531, 534 , an oth e r r e c o g n ized u s e is “to in tr odu c e in depen d en t legisla t ion,” id., at 535, wh ic hwas th e fu n c tionof th e pr ov iso h e r e . Inan yev en t, §160 5(a)(7) f a lls wi th in the scope of the proviso even a ccept ing t h e na rrowe r int e rpret a t i on a d opt e d b yt h e A cre edecision. Pp. 7–11. (iii) Responde nts’ other object ions to the straightforward inter

pr etationof EWSAA §1 50 3’ s pr ov iso ar e r e jec t ed. Pp. 11–12. (iv) Not h ing i nt h e NDA A

c h a n ges t h e ab o ve a n a l ys is

. Al t h ough NDAA §1083( c)(4) appears to ratify Acre e , this Cour t need not dec i de whet her s u charat i fica tion is e ffective because §1083( d)(1) author

ized the President to “waive any pro v ision of this section with respect3 Cite as: 55 6 U

. S. ____ (2009) Sy llabu s to Ir aq,” an d h ewaiv ed “all” su c hpr ov ision s , in c l u d ing §1083(c )(4 )

. Pp. 12–1 3.

(b) Th e Cou r t r ejec t s th e ar g u men tth at §160 5(a)(7)’ s in applic ab il

itydoes n o tb a rc l aim s ar i s i n gfr om Ir aq’ s c o n d u c t prior to the Pr es i

dent’s waiver. In order to e x ercisejurisdiction overthese case s, the Distr i c tCou r t h a d to “apply” §1605( a)(7) withr e spec t to Ir aq, bu t th e President’s waiver made that provision “inapplicab le.” N oretroactiv

ity problem is posed by this constr uction, if only be ca us et h e prim a r y conductb yIra qt h a tform s t h e b a s is for t h es e s u it s a c t u a lly occu rred befor e§1605( a)(7)’ s en ac tmen t

. Pp. 13–16.

(c ) Respon dents a l so ar g u e th at EW SA A §150 3’ s su n s e tc l au se— under w h ich “t he a u thorities conta i ned in [tha t] s e ction ” expired in 200 5—r e v iv e d §160 5(a)(7) a n d r e stor ed ju r i sdic tionas o f th e su n s et date. But expiration of the §1503 authori t ies is not the same a s c a n cellation of the effectof the prior valid exercise of thoseauthorities. Pp. 16–1 7. No. 07–1 09 0, an d No. 08–5 3 9 , 529 F. 3d 11 87, r e v e r s ed.

S CALI A , J ., delivered the opin ion for a una ni mous Court._________________

_________________ 1 Cite as: 55 6 U

. S. ____ (2009) Opinion of theCourt
NOTIC E : Th is op i n ionis subjec t to f o rma lrevi si onbef o r e publicat ioninth e p r eli m in ary p rin t of th e U n it edS t at es R e p o rts

. R e ad ers ar e r e qu es ted to n o tif yth e R e p o r t e rof D e c i s i on s , Su p r em e C o u r t of th e U n ited St at es , Wa s h

ington, D. C. 2054 3, of any typ o gra p hical or other f o rmal err o rs , in or der th atc o rr ect i on sm a y b e mad eb e f o r e th ep r e lim in aryp rin t go es t o p r es s . 

## SUPREME CO URT O F THE UNI TED STATES

Nos. 07– 10 90 an d 08– 539 REPUBLIC OF IRAQ, PETITIONER 07–1090 v. JOR D AN B EATY ET AL
. R E P UB LIC O FIRAQ , ET AL ., PET I TIONERS 08–539 v. ROB ERT SIMON ET AL
. ON WRITS OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STAT ES COURT OF APPEAL S FOR THE DISTR I CT OF COLUMBIA CIRCU IT [Ju n e8, 2009] J USTICE S CALIA delivered the opini o n of the Co urt. We conside rin these cases whether the Republic of Iraq remains subject to suit in America ncourts pursuant to the terrorism exception to foreig n sovereign immunity, now repealed, that had been codified at 28 U. S. C. §1605(a)(7). I A Under the venerable principle of foreign sovereign im

munity, foreign states are ordina rily “immune from th e jurisdiction of the courts of the United Sta t es and of the States,” §1 604. See generally SchoonerExchan gev. McFaddon, 7 Cranch 1 16 (1812). But the sta t ute embody

ing that pri n ciple—the Foreign So vereign Immunities Act of 1976 (FSIA), 28 U. S. C. §1602 et s e q. —recognizes a number of exceptions; if any of these is ap plicable, the state is subject to suit, and federal districtcourts have2 REPUBLI C OF IRAQ v. BEATY Opinion of theCourt jurisdiction to adjudicate the claim. §1330( a); Verlinden B. V. v. Cen t ral Bank of Nige ria , 46 1 U. S. 480, 489 (1983). In 1996, C o ngress added to the list of statu t ory excep tions one for state sponsors of terrorism, which was codi

fied at 28 U. S. C. §1605(a)(7). Subject to limitations n o t relevant here, that exceptio n stripped immunity in any suit for money damages “against a foreign state for personal injury or death that was caused by an act of torture, extrajudicial kill

ing, aircraftsabotage, hostage taki ng, or the provision of material support or r e sources . . . for such an act .

. . except that the court shall declin e to hear ac l aim un

der this par a graph— “(A) if the foreign state was not designated as a state sponsor of terrorism under section 6(j) of the Ex

port Admi nistration Act of 197 9 (50 U. S. C. App. 2405(j)) or section 620A of the Foreign As sistance Act of 196 1 (22 U. S. C. 2371) at the time the act occurred . . . .” In brief, §1605(a)(7) stripped immunity from a foreign state for claims arisin g from particular acts, if those ac ts were takenat a time when the state was designated as a sponsor of terrorism. B In September 1990, Acting Secretary of State Lawrence Eagleburge r formally designatedIraq, pursuant to §6(j) of the Export Administration Act o f 1979, as redesignated and amended, 99 Stat. 135, 50 U. S. C. App. § 2405(j), as “a country wh ich has repeatedly provided support for acts o f international terrorism,” 55 Fed. Reg. 37 793. Over a decade later, in March 2003, the United States and a coalition of allies initi a ted milita r y action against that country. In a matterof weeks, the regime of Iraqi dictato r Saddam Hussein collapsed and coalition forces occupi ed3 Cite as: 55 6 U

. S. ____ (2009) Opinion of theCourt Baghdad. American attention soon shifted f r om comba t operations to the longer term project of rebuilding Iraq, with the ultimate goal of creating a stable ally in the region. Toward tha tend, Congress enacted in April 2003 the Emergency Wartime Supplemental Appropriations Act (EWSAA), 117 Stat. 559. Section 1503 of th at Act auth o r ized the President to “ m ake inapplicable with respect to Iraq section620A of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 or any other provision of law that a p plies to countries that have supported ter r orism.” Id. , at 579. Pres ident George W. Bush exercised that authori ty to its fullest extent in May 2003, declaring “inapplicable with respect to Iraq section 620A of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 . . . an d any other provision of law that a p plies to countries that have supported terrori sm.” 68 Fed. Reg. 26459. Shortly thereafter, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Col u mbia Circ uit had occ a sion to con

sider whet her that P r esidential action hadthe effect of rendering inapplicable to Iraq th e terrorism exception to foreign sovereign immunity. The Court concluded in a divided pa nel decision that the President’s EWSAA au thority did not permit him to waive §160 5(a)(7), an d thereby res t ore sovereign immunity to Iraq, for claims arising from acts it h a d taken while design ated as a spon

sor of terror. Acreev. Republic of Iraq , 370 F. 3d 41, 48 (2004). Because Iraq succeeded in havin g the clai ms against it dismissed on other grounds, id. , at 59–60, it could not s eek certior ari to chall e nge the D. C. Circui t ’s interpretati on of the EWSAA. C There is yet another legislative enactment, and yet another corresponding executiv e waiver, that bear on the question presented. The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008 (NDAA), 122 Stat. 3, was passed4 REPUBLI C OF IRAQ v. BEATY Opinion of theCourt in January 2008. That Act (1) repealed the F S IA’s terror

ism exception, §1083(b )(1)(A)(iii); (2) replaced it with a new, roughl y similar exception, §1083(a); (3) declared tha t nothing in §1503 of the EWSAA had “ever authorized, directly orindirectly, the making inapplicable of any provision of chapter 97 of titl e 28, United States Code, or the removal of the jurisdiction of any court of the United States” (th u s purporti ng to ra tify the Court of Appeals’ Acre e decision), §1083(c)(4), 122 Stat. 343; an d (4) author

ized the President to waive “any provision o f this section with respec t to Iraq” s o long as he made certain findings and so notified Congress within 3 0 days, §10 83(d), id. , at 343–344. The last provision was added to the NDAA after the President vetoed an ea rlier versio n of the bil l , which did not include the waiver authority

. The President’s veto message sai dthat the bill “wou ld imperil billi ons of dolla rs of Iraqi assets at a cru c ial juncture in that na tion’s recon

struction efforts.” Memorandum to the Hou s e of Repre

sentatives Returning Without Approval th e “National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008,” 43 Weekly Comp. of Pres . Doc. 1641 (2007). Only when Con

gress adde d the waiver authority to the NDAA did the President agree to approve it; and on the same day he signed it into law he also officiall ywaived “all provision s of section 1083 of the Act with re spect to Ira q ,” 73 Fed. Reg. 6571 (2008). II We consider today t w o case s that have been navigatin g their way t h rough the lower court s against th e backdrop of the above-described congressional , military, Presidential, and judicial actions. Respondents in the Simoncase are American nationals (an drelatives of those nationals) who allege that they were captured an d cruelly m i streated by Iraqi officia l s during the 1991 G u lf War. T h e Beaty re -5 Cite as: 55 6 U

. S. ____ (2009) Opinion of theCourt spondents are the chil dren of two other Ame r icans, Ken

neth Beaty and Willia m Barloon, who are all e ged to have been sim ila rly abused by the regime of Saddam Husseinin the aftermath of that war. Ea chset of respondents filed suit in early 2003 agai nst Iraq inthe United States Dis

trictCourt for the Dist rict of Columbia, allegi ng violations of local, fed e ral, and in ternational law. Respondents invoked the te rrorism exceptio n to foreign sovereign immunity, and given Acre e ’s holding that the President had not rendered that statutory pro vision inap

plicable to Iraq, the DistrictC o urt refused to dismiss either case on jurisdictional grounds. In Beaty , after the District Court denied Iraq’s motion to dismiss, 480 F. Supp. 2d 60, 70 (200 7), Iraq invoked the collateral order doctrine to support an interlocutory appeal. See Mitchell v. Forsyth , 472 U. S. 511, 524–52 9 (1985). In Simon , the District Co urt determ ined t hat the claims were time barred and dismissedon that alternative b a sis, Vine v. Republic of Iraq , 459 F. Supp. 2d 10, 25 (2006), after which the Simonrespondents appealed. In the Beaty appeal, Iraq (supported by the United States as amic us ) requ ested that t h e Court of Appeals for the Districtof Columbia Circuit re consider Acree ’s holding en banc. The Court denied that request over the dissent of Judges Bro w n and Ka vanaugh, a n d a panel then summa

rily affirmed in an unpublished order the Di strict Cour t ’ s denial of Iraq’s motionto dismiss. No. 07–70 57 (Nov. 21, 2007) (per c u riam) , App. to Pet. for Cert. 1a–2 a. While the Simon appeal was still pending, Congress enacted the NDAA, an d the Cour t of Ap peals requested supplemental briefing addressing the impact of that legis

lation on the court’s j u risdiction. Iraq cont ended, as an alternative argument to its p o sition that Acreewa s wrongly de cided, that even if 2 8U. S. C. §1605(a)(7)’s application to Iraq survived the President’s EWSA A waiver, the provision was repealedby §1083(b )(1)(A)(iii) of6 REPUBLI C OF IRAQ v. BEATY Opinion of theCourt the NDAA, 122 Stat. 341; and that the new ter r orism exception to sovereign immunity—which was created by the NDAA and codified at 28 U. S. C. A. §1605A (July 2008 Supp.)—was waived by the President wi th respect to Iraq pursuant to his NDAA au thority. The Court of Appeals rejected th at argument, holdin g instead, bas ed on aclos e readin g of the statutory text, that “the N D AA leaves intact our juri sdiction over cases . .

. that were pending against Iraq when the Congress en

acted the NDAA. ” 529 F. 3d 1187, 1194 (2008). The panel then reversed the District Co urt’s determination that the Simonrespondents’ claims were untimely, id. , at 1195 – 1196, and rebuffed Ira q ’s request for dismiss a l under the political question doctrine, id. , at 1 196–1198. Iraq sought this Court’s review of both cases, asking us to determine whether under cur r e nt law it remains sub

ject to suitin the fed e ral courts. We grant ed certiorar i, 555 U. S. ___ (2009), an d consolidated the cases

. III A Section 1503 of the EWSAA consists of aprincipa l clause, foll owed by eight separate proviso clauses. The dispute in t h ese case s concerns the second of the provisos. The principal clause an d that pro viso read: “The President may suspend the application of any provision of the Iraq Sanctions Act of 1990: .

. . Pro

vided furth e r , That the President may mak e inappli

cable with respect to Iraq section 620A of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 or any oth e r provision of law that applies to countri es that hav e supportedterror

ism . . . .” 1 17 Stat. 579

. Iraq and the United States bo th read the quoted proviso’s residual clause as sweeping in the terrorism exception t o foreign sovereign immunity. Ce rtainly that reading is, as7 Cite as: 55 6 U

. S. ____ (2009) Opinion of theCourt even the Acre e Cour t ac knowledged, “s tra ightforwa r d

. ” 370 F. 3d, at 52. Title 28 U. S. C. §1605(a)(7)’s exception to sovereign immunity f o r state spo n sors of ter r orism strip p ed jurisdic

tional imm unity from a country unless “the f o reign state was not designated as a state sponsor of terrorism.” This is a “provi sion of law” (indisp u tably) tha t“applies to” (strips im munity fro m ) “count ries that ha ve support e d terrorism” (as designa t ed pursuant to certain statuto r y provisions). Of course the word “a ny” (in the phrase “an y other provi s ion of la w”) has a n“expansive meaning,” UnitedStatesv. Gonza les , 520 U. S. 1, 5 (199 7), giving u s no warrant to limit th e class of provisions of law that the President may waive. Because the President exercised his authority with respec t to “all” provisions of law encom

passed by the second proviso, his actions made §1605(a)(7) “inapplicable” to Iraq. To a layperson, the notion of the President’s suspending the operation of a valid law might seem strange. But the practice is well established, at least in the s p here of for

eign affairs. See United Sta t esv. Curtis s-Wright Export Corp. , 299 U. S. 304, 322–324 (1 936) (canvassing prece

dents from as early as the “inception of the national gov

ernment”). The granting of Presi d ential waiver authority is particularly apt wit hresp ect to congressional elimina

tion of foreign sovereign immunity, since the granting o r denial of that immunity was histo r ically the case-by-cas e prerogative of the Exec utive Branch. See, e.g. , E x

parte Peru , 318 U. S. 578, 586–590 (1943). It is entirely unre

markable that Congre ss, having taken uponitself in the FSIA to “fr ee the Gov e rnment” fr om the diplomatic pres

sures engendered by the case-by-case approach, Verlinden , 461 U. S., at 488, would noneth eless think it prudent to afford the President some flexibility in unique circum

stances such as these.8 REPUBLI C OF IRAQ v. BEATY Opinion of theCourt B The Court of Appeals in Acree re sisted the above con

struction, p r imarily on the ground that the relevant tex ti s found in a proviso. We have saidthat, at least presump

tively, the “ grammatica land lo gical scope [of a proviso] is confined to the subject-matter of the principal clause.” United S t a t esv. Morro w , 266 U. S. 531, 534–535 (1925). Using that proposition as a guide , the Acreepanel strove mightily to construe t h e proviso as somehow rest ricti ng the principal clause of EWSAA § 1503, which authorized the President to suspe n d “any pro vision of the Iraq Sanc

tions Act of 1990,” 117 Stat. 579. In the Court of Appeals’ view, the second proviso related to that sub s ection of the Iraq Sanctions Act ( r eferred to in the principal provision) which dictated thatcertain enu

merated statutory provisions, including §620A of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 and “all other provisions of law that i m pose san c tionsagain s t a country which ha s repeatedly provided su pport for a cts of inter national ter

rorism,” shall be fully enforced against Iraq. §586F(c), 104 Stat. 2051 (emphasis added). The panel u n derstood the second EW SAA pro viso as doing nothing more than clari

fying that the authority granted b ythe principal clause (t o suspend any part of the Iraq Sanctions Act) included the power to make inapplicable to Iraq the various independ

ent provisions of law that §586F(c) of the Ir aq Sanctions Act instruc t ed to be enforced against Iraq—which migh t otherwise continue to apply of their own force even with

out the Iraq Sanctions Act. Howe ver, the residual clause of §586F(c) encompasses only provisions that “impose sanctions”; and, in the Court of Appeals’ view, that ex

cludes §16 05(a)(7), which is a rule going instead to the jurisdiction of the fede ral courts. Thus, the EWSAA p r o viso swept only as broadly as §586F(c), and therefore did not permitthe President to wa ive the FS IA terroris m exception.9 Cite as: 55 6 U

. S. ____ (2009) Opinion of theCourt This is a highly sophisticated effort to construe the proviso as a limitation upon the principal clause. Ulti

mately, however, we think th a t effort neither necessary nor successful. It is tr ue that the “general office of a pro

viso is to ex cept something from the enacting clause, or to qualify and restrain its generality.” Morrow , sup ra , a t 534. But its general (and perhaps appropria t e) office is not, alas, its exclusive use. Use of a provis o “to state a general, independent rule,” Alaskav. Uni t ed Sta t es , 54 5 U. S. 75, 106 (2005), m a y be lazy drafting, bu t is hardly a novelty. See, e.g. , McDonaldv. United S t a t es , 279 U. S. 12, 21 (192 9). Morro w itself came withthe c a veat that a proviso is sometimes used “to introduce independent legislation.” 266 U. S. , at 535. We think that was its office here. The principal clause granted the President a power; the second pr oviso purp orted to gr ant him a n additional power. It was not, on any fair reading, an exception to, qualification of, or restraint on the principal power. Contrastingthe second EWSA A p r oviso to some of the other provi s os illustrates the point. For example, the first proviso cautioned that “nothing in this sectionshall affect the applicability of the Iran- Iraq Arms Non-Proliferation Act of 1992,” 117 Stat. 579, and the third forbade the export of certain military equipment “under the authority of this sect ion.” Ibid. Both of t h ese plain l y sought to define andlimit the authority granted by the principal clause. Th e fourth proviso, however, mandated that “sec

tion 307 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 19 61 shall not apply with respect to p r ograms of international organiza

tions for Iraq,” ibid. , a n d it is im possible to see h o w that self-executing suspensi on of adistinct statute in any way cabined or clarified the principal clause’s authorization to suspend the Iraq Sancti ons Act. There are other indications that the secon dproviso’s waiver authority was not limit edto the sta t utory pro v i

-10 REPUBLI C OF IRAQ v. BEATY Opinion of theCourt sions embr aced by §586F(c) of the Iraq Sanctions Act. If that is all it was mea n t to accomplish, why would Con

gress not simply have trac k ed §58 6 F(c)’s residual clause? Instead of restricting t h e President’s authorit yto statu t es that “impos e sanctions” on sponsors of terror, the EWSA A extended it to any sta t ute that“applies” to such states. That is undoubtedly a broader class. Even if the best readi n g of the EWSAA proviso were that it encompassed on ly statut es that impose sanctions or prohibit assistance to state spo n sors of terrorism, see Acre e , 370 F. 3d, at 54, we would disagree with the Court of Appeals’ conclusion t hat the FSIA exception is not such a law. Allowing lawsuits to proceed certainly has the extra benefit of facilit ating the compensation of injured victims, but the fact th at §1605(a)(7) targeted only foreign states designated as sponso rs of terrorism suggests th at the law was intended as a sanction, to punish and deter undesirable conduct. Strippin g th e immunity that foreig n sovereigns ordinarily enjoy is as m u ch a sanction as elimi

nating bilateral assista n ce or prohibiting export of muni

tions (both of which are explic itly mandated b y§586F(c) of the Iraq Sa nctions Act). The application of this sanction affects the jurisdiction of the federal courts, but that fa ct alone does not deprive it of its character as a sanction. It may well be that wh en Congress enacted the EWSAA it did not have specifically inmind the terrorism exception to sovereign immunity. The Court of App e als evidently found that to be of some importance. Id. , a t56 (noting there is “no reference in the legislative his t ory to the FSIA”). Bu t the whole value of a generally phrased resid

ual clause, lik e the one used in the second proviso, is that it serves as a catchall for matters not specifically contem

plated—kn o wn unknowns, in the happy phrase coined b y Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld. Pi eces of Intelli

gence: The Existential Poetry of Donald H. Rumsfeld 2 ( H

. Seely comp. 2003). If Congress wanted to limit the waiver11 Cite as: 55 6 U

. S. ____ (2009) Opinion of theCourt authority to particular statutes that it had in mind, it could have enumerated them individually. We cannot say with any certainty (for those who thin k this matters) whether the Congress thatpassed the EWSAA wo uld have wantedthe P r esident to be permitted to waive §1605(a)(7). Certainly the exposure of Iraq to billion s of d o llars inda mages coul d be though t to jeopard

ize the sta t ute’s goal of speedyreconstruction of tha t country. Atleast the President thought so. And in the “vast exter nal realm, with its important, complicated, delicate and manifold problems,” Curti ss- Wright Export Corp. , 299 U. S., at 319, courts ou ght to be es pecially wary of overriding apparent statut ory text supported by execu

tive interpretation in f a vor of speculation about a law’s true purpose. 1 C Respondents advance two other objections to the straightfor w ardinter p retation of the EW SAA provi s o. First, in a less compelling variant of the D. C. Circuit ’s approach, the Simon r e spondents argue that “section 620A of the Foreign Assistan ce Act of 1 961 or any other provi

sion of law that applies to count ries that have supported terrorism” means section 620A of the Foreign Assistance Act or any other provision of law cited therein. The pro vi

sion would thus allow the President to make inapplicable to Iraq the statutes that §620A precludes from being us ed to provide support to terror-sp on soring nations. Not to put too fine a point upon it, that i s an absurd reading, not

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1 The eighth proviso of EWSAA §15 0 3 sa ys tha tab s e nt furthercon gressional acti on, “the au thorities containe d in this secti o n shall expire onSeptem ber30, 2 0 0 4 .” 117 St at. 5 7 9

. Th e Cou r t of Appeal s ex pres s e d doub t tha tCongres s would have wa nted federa l-court j u ris d ic

tion to d i s a pp earfora y e ar and then sudd enly return. Acre ev. Rep u b

lic of Iraq , 3 70 F. 3d 41, 56– 57 ( CADC 20 04). Ou ran aly s is of th e s uns et provis ion, see Part V, infra , dispose s of that conce r n.12 REPUBLI C OF IRAQ v. BEATY Opinion of theCourt only textual ly but in the resultit produces: It would mean that the effect of the E W SAA was to permit the President to exclude Iraq from, rather than include it within, such beneficent legislation a s the Food for Peace Act of 1966, 7 U. S. C. §1691 et seq. Both respondents also invoke the canon against implied repeals, TVAv. Hill , 437 U. S. 153, 190 (197 8), but that canon has no force here. Iraq’s co nstruction of the statu t e neither rests on implication nor effects a repeal. The EWSAA proviso expres slyallowed the President to rende r certain statutes inapplicable; th e only qu estion is it s scope. And it did not repeal anything, but merely grante d the President authorit yto waive the applic ation of pa r ticular statutes to a single foreign nation. Cf. Clin tonv. City of Ne w York , 524 U. S. 417, 443–445 (1998). D We must consider whether anyth ing in the s ubsequent NDAA legis l ation changes the above analysis. In pa rticu

lar, §1083(c)(4) of th at statute specifically says th at “[n]othing i nsection 1503 of the [EWSAA] h a s ever au thorized, directly or in directly, th e making inapplicable of any pro vision of chapter 97 of titl e 28, United Sta t es Co de, or the removal of the jurisdictio nof any c o urt of the United States.” 122 Stat. 343. T h is looks like a ratifica

tion by Congress of t h e conclusion reached in the Acre e decision. Is such a ratification effe ctive? The NDAA is not subse

quent legis l ative history, as Iraqclaims, cf. Sullivanv. Finkelstein , 496 U. S. 617, 632 (1990) (S CALI A , J., concu r ring in pa r t); rather, it is binding law, a p proved by th e Legislature and signed by the President. Subsequent legislation can of course alter the meaning of an existin g law for the future; and it can even alter the past operation of an existing law (co n stitutional objections aside) if it makes thatretroactive operation clear. Lan d graf v. USI13 Cite as: 55 6 U

. S. ____ (2009) Opinion of theCourt Film Produ c ts , 511 U. S. 244, 267 –268 (1994). To tell th e truth, howe ver, we are unaware of any case dealing with the retroactive amendment of a law that had already expired, as the EWSAA had here. And it is doubtful whether Congress can retroactive l yclaw back power it has given to the Executive, inva lidating Presidential action that was valid when it was ta ke n. Thankfully, however, we need not explore these difficulti e s here. In §1083(d)(1) of the NDAA, the President was given authority t o “waive a n y provision of this section with respect to Iraq.” 122 Stat. 343. The President proceeded to waive “al l” provisions of that section as to Iraq, includ

ing (presumably) §1083(c)(4). 73 Fed. Reg. 6571. The Act can therefore add nothing to our analysis of the EWSAA. Respondent Beaty obje cts thatthe President cannot waive a fact

. But neither can Congress legislate a fact. Se ction 1083(c)(4) could change our inter p retation of the disputed EWSAA language only if it has some substantiveeffect, changing what would otherwise be the law. And if the President’s waiver do es anything, it eliminates any s ub

stantive effect that th e NDAA would otherwise have on cases to which Iraq is a party. 2 IV Havingco ncluded th at the P r esident did render 28 U. S. C. §1605(a)(7) “inapplicable with respect to Iraq,” and that such action was within his assigned powers, we consider respondents’ argumentthat the inapplicability of

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2 Respondents contend that the NDAA waiver is irrelevant because the President’s veto of the initial version of the bi ll—which did not include the waiver authority—was defe cti v e. We need not inquire into tha tpoint, since Congres s (evidentlythinking the vet oeffective) en

acted a new bill that wa s id entical inall materia lresp ects but for the addition of presidential wai v er auth ority. Since that authority woul d be n u g ator y , an d th e r e st of th e n e w la w u tter l yr e du n d an t, if a l a w resulting fromthe former bill remain ed in effect, that law wouldhave been effectively repealed.14 REPUBLI C OF IRAQ v. BEATY Opinion of theCourt the provision does n o t bar their claims, si nce they arise from Iraq’s conduct prior to the President’s waiver. Any other interpretation, they say, would cause the law to operate in adisfavored retroactive fashion. This argum e nt proceeds as follows : The FSIA exception becomes “a pplicable” to a foreign state when that foreign state is designated as a sponsor of terrorism. In parallel fashion, rendering the exception “inapplicable” should b e equivalent to removing the state’s designation. And un der §1605(a)(7), jurisdictio nturned on the foreign state’s designation “at the ti me the act [giving rise to the clai m] occurred.” On this reading, the President’s waiver meant only that I r aq could n o t be sued pursuant to §1605(a)(7) for any futureconduc t, even though it technically re

mained desi gnated as a state sponsor of terrorism. Respondents support t h is interpr e tation wit ha policy argument a n d a canon of construction. First, why would Congress h a ve sought to give Ira q bettertre atment tha n any other state that sa w the error of its ways, reformed its behavior, and was accordingly re moved from the list of terror-spon soring regimes? See Acre e , 370 F. 3d, at 5 6 (calling such a result “ p erplexing”). Providing immunity for future a cts is one t h ing, but wiping the sl ate clean is quite another. Second, this Court has often applied a presumption that, absent clear indication to the contrar y , statutory a m endments do not a p ply to pending case s. Landgraf , supra , at 28 0. A narrow reading of “inapplica

ble” would better comp ort with tha tpresumpti o n. As a tex t ua l matter, th e proffered definition of “inappli

cable” is un persuasive. If a provision of law is “inapplica

ble” then itcannot be applied; to “apply” a statute is “[t]o put [it] to use.” Webster’ s Ne w International Dictiona r y 131 (2d ed. 1954). When the District Co urt exercised jurisdiction over these cases against Iraq, itsurely was putting §16 05(a)(7) to use with r e spect to t hat countr y . Without the applica t i o nof that provision, there was no15 Cite as: 55 6 U

. S. ____ (2009) Opinion of theCourt basis for subject-matt er jurisdiction. 28 U. S. C. §§1604 , 1330(a). If Congress had wanted to authorize the Pres i

dent merely to cancel Ir aq’s designation as as t ate sponsor of terrorism, then Congress could have done so. As a policy matter, moreover, we do not find that result particularly“perplexing.” As t h en-Judge Roberts ex

plained in his separate opinionin Acree , Congress in 20 03
“ for the first timeconfronted the p r ospect that a friendly successor government would, in it s infancy, be vulnerable under Secti on 1605(a)( 7 ) to crushing liability for the ac

tions of its renounced predecessor.” 370 F. 3 d , at 61 (opin

ion concurring in part and concurring in ju dgment) (em

phasis in original). The Government was at the time spending considerable sums of money to rebuild Iraq, see Rogers, Congress Gives Initial Approval for War Funding , Airline Aid, Wall Street Journal, Apr. 4, 2 003, p. A10. What would seem per p lexing is converting a billi on-doll a r reconstructi on project i n to a compensation scheme for a few of Sadd am’s victim s . As for the judicial presum ption against re troactivit y , that does not induce us to read the EWSAA proviso more narrowly. Laws tha tmerelyalter the rules of foreign sovereign immunity, rather than modify substantive rights, are not opera t ing ret r oactively when applied t o pending ca ses. Foreign sovereign immunity “ r eflects current political realiti e s and relat i onships,” a n d its avail

ability (or lack thereof) gene rally is not something on which parties can rely “in shaping their prim ary condu c t.” Republic of Austri av. Altmann , 5 41 U. S. 67 7, 696 (2004); see als o id. , at 703 (S CALIA , J., concurring). In any event, the pri m ary conduct by Iraqthat forms the basis for these suits actually occurredprior to the enactment of the FSIA terrorism exception in 1996. See Saudi Arab iav. Nels on , 507 U. S. 349, 351 (1993). Tha t is, Iraq was immune from suit at the time it is alleged t o have harmed respondents. The President’s elimination of16 REPUBLI C OF IRAQ v. BEATY Opinion of theCourt Iraq’s latersubjection to suit could hardly h a ve deprived respondents of any expectation they held at the time of their injury that the y would be able to sue Iraq in United States courts. V Accordin gly , the District Co urt lost jurisdiction over both suits in May 2003, when the President exercised his authority to make §160 5(a)(7) inapplicable with respect to Iraq. At that point, immunity kicked back in an d the cases ough t to have been dismi ssed, “the only function remaining to the court [being] that of announc ing the fact and dismissing the cause.” Ex parte McCa r d le , 7 Wall. 506, 514 (1869). In respondents’ view, that is notfatal to th eir claims. They point to the eighth proviso in §1503 of th e EWSAA:

“Provided f u rthe r , Tha tthe autho rities contained in this section shall expire on September 30, 2004, or on the date of enactment of a subseq uent Act au thorizing assistance for Iraq and that specifically amends, re

peals or oth e rwise makes inapplicab le the aut horities of this section, whichever occurs first.” 117 Stat. 579. The effect of this provision, they contend, is that the EWSAA wa iver expire d in 2005, 3and that when it did s o §1605(a)(7) was revived, immunity was a g a i n stripped, and jurisdic tion was restored. If that is true, then at th e very least t h ey ought t o be pe rmitted to refile their suits and claim equitable tolling for the period between 2005 and the pr esent, during whichti me they un derstandably relied on Ac ree ’s holding. The premis e, however, is f l awed. It is tru e that the “authorities contained in” §1503 of the EWSAA expired, but expiration of the authori t ies(viz., the President’s

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3 Th e su n s et date was ex ten d ed byon e y e arina laterbil l

. 108–10 6, §220 4(2), 11 7 Sta t . 123 0.17 Cite as: 55 6 U

. S. ____ (2009) Opinion of theCourt powers to s u spend and make inapplicable certain laws) is not the same as cancellation of the effectof the President’s prior valid exercise of those authorities (viz., the restora

tion of sovereign immunity). As Iraq points out, Congres s has in oth e r statutes pr ovided explicitly that boththe authorities granted an dthe effects of their ex ercise sunset on a partic u lar date. E.g. , 19 U. S. C. §2 432(c)(3) (“A waiver wi threspect to any countr yshall terminate on the day after the waiver a u thority granted by th is subsection ceases to be effective with re spec t to such co untry” )

. T h e EWSAA contains no s u ch language. We think t h e better reading of the eighth EWSAA p r o viso (the su nset clause) is that the powers granted by the section could be exercised only for a limited time, but that actions taken by the President pursuant to those powers ( e.g. , suspension of the Iraq Sanctions Act) would not lapse on the sunset date. If it were otherwise, then the Ir aq Sanctions Act—which h a s never been repealed, and whi c h imposes a whole host of restrict ions on relations with Iraq—would have returned to force in September 200 5. Nobody believes that is so.

* * * When the President exercised his authorityto make inapplicable with respect to Iraq all provisions of law th at apply to c o untries that have su pported ter r orism, the exception to foreign sovereign immunity for state sponsors of terrorism became inoperative as againstIraq. As a result, the courts below lacked ju risdiction; we therefore need not reach Iraq’s alternat ive argument th at the NDAA subsequentl ystripped jurisdiction over the cases. The judgments of the Court of Appeals are reversed. It is so orde red.