U.S. Department

of Transportation

Federal Aviation

Administration

Advisory

Circular

Subject: Safety Management Systems

for Airports

Date: DRAFT

Initiated by: AAS-300

AC No: 150/5200-37A

CHANGE:

1. Purpose. This Advisory Circular (AC) presents the concepts of a Safety Management System (SMS) 

and provides detailed guidance about developing and implementing SMS on an airport.

An SMS enhances safety, ensures compliance with applicable regulatory standards, and can be integrated 

into all aspects of airport operations, including business and management practices. This AC explains 

how SMS will help airports develop an explicit, pro-active, and engaged process for identifying and 

quantifying potential hazards and risks and for managing them in a systematically coherent, logical, and 

reasonable way.

2. Applicability. This AC applies to all civil airports, when adapted to the size, activity level, staff level, 

and resources of each facility. In addition, this AC establishes guidelines for SMS implementation for and 

by airport operators at airports certificated under title 14 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) part 139, 

Certification of Airports (part 139).

The AC focuses on airport operational safety in the airfield environment. However, airport operators can 

apply these principals anywhere on their airports (including the landside environment) to address safety 

concerns. 

3. Background. The United States is a member state of the International Civil Aviation Organization 

(ICAO). In November 2005, ICAO amended Annex 14, Volume I (Aerodrome Design and Operations),

to require member states to have certificated international airports establish SMS. The Federal Aviation 

Administration (FAA) supports harmonization with international standards and has worked to make FAA

aviation safety regulations consistent with ICAO standards and recommended practices. The 

implementation of SMS at U.S. airports is designed to meet the intent of the ICAO standard in a way that 

complements existing part 139 airport safety requirements and standards.

SMS encompasses the activities of every level of airport personnel – from the executive level to those 

who perform the many daily, routine tasks required to operate the airport. Applying a systematic, 

proactive, and well-defined safety program (as is inherent in an SMS) allows airports to strike a realistic 

and efficient balance between safety and service.

The forecast growth in air transportation requires new measures and greater effort from all aviation 

service providers – including airport operators – to achieve continuing improvements to aviation safety. 

The use of an SMS at an airport can help this effort by increasing the likelihood that the airport operator 

will detect and correct safety problems before they result in an aircraft accident or incident.
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4. Related Reading Material. Appendix B lists additional documents that will help airport operators 

understand SMS. Appendix A defines terms and acronyms used in this AC. 

5. Point of Contact. Send comments or suggestions for improving this AC to: 

Manager, Airport Safety and Operations Division 

Federal Aviation Administration 

ATTN: AAS-300 

800 Independence Avenue SW 

Washington DC 20591 

6. Availability. The FAA makes this AC available online at 

http://www.faa.gov/airports/resources/advisory_circulars/.

Michael J. O’Donnell

Director of Airport Safety and Standards
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Table of Contents

CHAPTER 1. SAFETY MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS (SMS) OVERVIEW................................ 1

1. Background. .................................................................................................................1

2. What is SMS.................................................................................................................1

3. History..........................................................................................................................2

4. Current Applications of SMS.......................................................................................3

5. Format of this AC.........................................................................................................4

6. Scalability.....................................................................................................................4

CHAPTER 2. GETTING STARTED ............................................................................................... 5

1. Introduction. .................................................................................................................5

2. Documentation. ............................................................................................................5

3. SMS Implementation Plans. .........................................................................................5

4. SMS Manual.................................................................................................................7

5. ACM Revision..............................................................................................................7

CHAPTER 3. SAFETY POLICY...................................................................................................... 9

1. Introduction. .................................................................................................................9

2. Developing and Implementing the Safety Policy.........................................................9

CHAPTER 4. SAFETY RISK MANAGEMENT (SRM).............................................................. 17

1. Introduction. ...............................................................................................................17

2. Developing and Implementing Safety Risk Management..........................................17

3. Scalability of SRM. ....................................................................................................34

4. Integrated SRM Efforts. .............................................................................................34

5. Example #1 of SRM...................................................................................................35

6. Example #2 of SRM...................................................................................................36

7. Introduction. ...............................................................................................................39

8. Developing and Implementing Safety Assurance. .....................................................40

CHAPTER 5. SAFETY PROMOTION.......................................................................................... 47

1. Introduction. ...............................................................................................................47

2. Developing and Implementing Safety Promotion. .....................................................48

APPENDIX A. DEFINITIONS AND ACRONYMS ....................................................................... 51

APPENDIX B. RELATED READING MATERIAL...................................................................... 54

APPENDIX C. SAMPLE SMS IMPLEMENTATION PLAN TEMPLATE AND 

CHECKLIST............................................................................................................ 55

APPENDIX D. SAMPLE SMS MANUAL....................................................................................... 61

APPENDIX E. SAMPLE SAFETY REPORTING DASHBOARDS............................................. 77
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List of Figures

Figure 1-1. Four SMS Components..............................................................................................................2

Figure 1-2. Reason’s Accident Causation Model (Adapted) ........................................................................3

Figure 3-1. Safety Policy ..............................................................................................................................9

Figure 3-2. Sample Organizational Chart for Safety Oversight..................................................................11

Figure 3-3. Sample Safety Responsibilities................................................................................................12

Figure 3-4. Simple Safety Policy Statement ...............................................................................................14

Figure 3-2. Complex Safety Policy Statement............................................................................................15

Figure 4-1. Elements of SRM .....................................................................................................................17

Figure 4-2. Five Steps of SRM ...................................................................................................................19

Figure 4-3. The 5M Model..........................................................................................................................20

Figure 4-4. Preliminary Hazard Analysis Worksheet .................................................................................21

Figure 4-7. Sample 4x4 Predictive Risk Matrix with Likelihood and Severity Definition and Two 

Levels of Risk: Acceptable and Unacceptable ........................................................................ 29

Figure 4-8. FAA Office of Airports’ Predictive Risk Matrix .....................................................................30

Figure 4-9. Sample 4x4 Hazard Assessment Form.....................................................................................33

Figure 5-1. Safety Assurance......................................................................................................................39

Figure 5-2. SRM/Safety Assurance Relationship .......................................................................................40

Figure 5-3. Sample Confidential Hazard Reporting Form..........................................................................42

Figure 6-1. Safety Promotion......................................................................................................................47

List of Tables

Table 2-1. Examples of Existing Processes and Procedures.........................................................................6

Table 4-1. Sample Severity and Likelihood Definitions.............................................................................23

Table 4-2. Sample Severity and Likelihood Definitions.............................................................................23

Figure 4-5. FAA Office of Airports’ Severity Definitions .........................................................................26

Figure 4-6. FAA Office of Airports’ Likelihood Definitions.....................................................................27
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Chapter 1. Safety Management Systems (SMS) Overview

1. Background. 

The FAA is committed to improving safety in air transportation. As the demand for air transportation 

increases, the impacts of additional air traffic and surface operations, changes in air traffic procedures, 

and airport construction can heighten the risks associated with aircraft operations. While FAA regulations 

and technical operating standards have effectively addressed many of these risks, they can still leave gaps 

best handled by enhanced airport safety management practices. 

Airports best understand their own unique operating environments, so they are in the best position to 

address their safety issues. The FAA will continue to conduct regular annual inspections at airports 

certificated under part 139, but SMS will provide both certificated and other airports with a powerful tool 

for identifying hazards and mitigation strategies, communicating safety issues, promoting safety, and 

reducing the potential for accidents and incidents. 

2. What is SMS.

ICAO defines SMS as a “systematic approach to managing safety, including the necessary organizational 

structures, accountabilities, policies, and procedures.”

1

 SMS is comprised of four basic components:

 Safety Policy,

 Safety Risk Management,

 Safety Assurance, and

 Safety Promotion.

The four components serve as the “basic building blocks of an SMS” (ICAO, 2009). Figure 1-1 defines 

these components and shows how they relate to each other. Safety Policy serves as the foundation of 

SMS; it documents the airport’s means of deploying the SMS. Safety Risk Management (SRM) and 

Safety Assurance (SA) are the two operational components of SMS. Safety Promotion encompass all 

three of the other components by ensuring that individuals with a role in SMS are properly trained and 

that safety issues identified through any of the activities associated with the components are 

communicated.

 

1

International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), Safety Management Manual, at 6.5.3 ICAO Doc. 9859-AN/474 

(2nd ed. 2009).
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Figure 1-1. Four SMS Components

Components are then subdivided into elements. Elements represent subprocesses, policies, or procedures 

that support each of the four components. For example, Safety Policy typically includes a minimum of 

seven supporting elements. Safety Risk Management typically includes a minimum of four supporting 

elements.

3. History.

SMS emerged as a recognized safety methodology about 30 years ago, as investigative inquiries after 

accidents began to focus on preventing accidents rather than just reacting to the causes of specific 

accidents. The “reactive mode” often resulted in “fixing” one series of causal factors supposedly related 

to a single accident and often led to severe restrictions and changes in regulations. This kind of 

investigation could show “who” had the accident and “what” happened, but gave less attention to 

identifying “how” and “why” it happened. 

Industry started to accept the concept that failures, especially human failures at the operational level, can 

trigger latent conditions that can then breach a system’s safety defenses. It became evident that by 

monitoring the organizational process and identifying and addressing these latent conditions, corrections 

could be made before an incident or accident occurred.

The “how” and “why” of incidents and accidents has become much clearer due to the creation of James 

Reason’s “Accident Causation Model,”2shown in Figure 1-2. Reason used this model to transform 

thinking about safety and accident investigation. Rather than focusing on an isolated event (the “who,”

“what,” and “when”), Reason shifted the focus to “organizational decisions” or “layers” of events that 

ultimately resulted in an accident. Of course, there are limits to the application of the Reason model, so it 

must be seen as a theoretical framework and not a cure-all. However, it is a tool that helps identify the 

chain of events leading to an incident or accident. 

 

2

James Reason, Human Error, Cambridge University Press (1990).
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Figure 1-2. Reason’s Accident Causation Model (Adapted)

Reason’s model was the true beginning of safety management. It relied on collecting data, identifying

hazards and trends, determining risk severity, mitigating risk to an acceptable level, and establishing a 

safety culture—the basic components of SMS. The United States became a strong proponent of SMS and 

supported ICAO’s introduction of SMS and the amendment of Annex 14, Aerodromes, to require member 

states to implement SMS.

4. Current Applications of SMS.

SMS supports a pro-active approach to safety through a framework of tools and methodologies to address 

safety issues. It also establishes a safety-conscious environment and culture. It encompasses all personnel 

in any operational area since observation, evaluation, and reporting are integral to achieving effective 

safety-related outcomes. In short, it implies there is a system with components that, when managed and 

directed accurately, can achieve an improved level of safety and eliminate or mitigate the conditions that 

can result in accidents. Having an SMS does not mean an airport will be accident-free, but when 

implemented, it facilitates a safer airport and aviation system.

This AC focuses on developing and implementing SMS in the airport environment (including airport 

movement and non-movement areas). Under SMS, the interdependencies within the airport operational 

environment become much more apparent. However, airport operators can apply these principals 

anywhere on their airports (including the landside environment) to address safety concerns.

While there are costs associated with implementing an SMS, the Transportation Research Board’s Airport 

Cooperative Research Program (ACRP) 2009 report3identified the following as potential benefits:

 Reduced likelihood of accidents,

 

3 Transportation Research Board. (2009). Airport Cooperative Research Program Report 1, Safety Management 

Systems for Airports, Volume 2: Guidebook [Adobe Digital Editions version]. Retrieved from 

http://www.trb.org/Publications/Blurbs/162491.aspx. 
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 Reduced costs related to accidents and incidents,

 Assurance that a systematic process is in place to monitor and address safety issues in a 

transparent and informed way, 

 The potential for reduced insurance and liability costs,

 Competitive advantage and the possibility of more business opportunities,

 Improved regulatory compliance,

 Improved employee morale and performance,

 Identification of the best use of limited resources, 

 Reduced reliance on a few key personnel,

 Improved control, and

 Consistency.

5. Format of this AC.

The AC contains six chapters. Chapter 2 explains how to begin developing an SMS and the required 

documentation. Appendices C, D, E, and F include a sample Implementation Plan, SMS Manual, and 

Safety Dashboards.

Chapters 3 through 6 address the four components of SMS: Safety Policy, Safety Risk Management, 

Safety Assurance, and Safety Promotion. Each chapter begins by defining the component and examining 

how it could be applied on the airport. The chapters also include examples to help operators of each type 

of airport understand the component better and determine what is appropriate for, and applicable to, their 

facilities. 

6. Scalability.

Airports are each unique, not only in physical layout but also in management structure and, often, in 

management style. Therefore, a one-size-fits-all approach to SMS is not advisable. This AC stresses the 

importance of recognizing that small, medium, and large airports have different operational environments 

and different levels of resources. Airport operators of small airports can use simple methods for 

conducting the processes within the SMS. Medium and large airports may require more detailed processes 

within the SMS.

At airports that have only a manager and perhaps minimal support staff to carry out daily responsibilities, 

this AC suggests a common sense approach to the SMS. The manager may handle most of the SMS 

processes alone. At medium and large airports, the complexity and departmentalization of duties on the 

airport may require that more personnel be involved in the SMS. Regardless of airport size, many 

certificated airports will find their existing processes and procedures can serve as the foundation for 

portions of their SMS.
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Chapter 2. Getting Started

1. Introduction.

Shifting from a reactive to a proactive approach to safety management takes time and considerable effort. 

Therefore, an airport should methodically develop an SMS that utilizes existing policies and procedures 

as much as possible and document and communicate changes related to SMS development and 

deployment. Managers, employees, and tenants may resist change, so training and communication will be 

crucial to gaining buy-in and participation in the SMS.

Airports may find it helpful to appoint an individual or team to coordinate the development and 

deployment of SMS-related processes. This individual, commonly referred to as an SMS Champion4, 

does not need to be the individual ultimately responsible for daily oversight of the SMS but should have 

credibility and authority throughout the airport and with its stakeholders. Similarly, if a team approach is 

used, the team should comprise individuals with a variety of backgrounds and authority throughout the 

airport to facilitate wide-spread buy-in and support for the SMS.

Regardless of the initial approach, it is essential that airports establish certain documentation requirements 

to build a solid foundation for SMS implementation and operation.

2. Documentation.

There are three levels of documentation in an SMS: implementation-related documentation, deploymentrelated documentation, and ongoing documentation. Later chapters address documentation related to SMS 

requirements like Safety Risk Management, which are developed on an on-going basis.

Typical documentation required for SMS development and deployment include an SMS Implementation 

Plan and an SMS Manual. Certificated airports may also choose to incorporate the requirements of SMS 

directly into their Airport Certification Manuals instead of creating separate SMS Manuals.

3. SMS Implementation Plans.

The airport should create an SMS Implementation Plan early in the development of its SMS. The SMS 

Implementation Plan should clearly identify a realistic strategy for implementing SMS through a 

framework and series of steps. By documenting this strategy, the airport can ensure consistency in its 

implementation.

Some airports may find it helpful to conduct a gap analysis as a way to understand what the airport does 

today related to safety and what it needs to do in the future to satisfy an SMS. The gap analysis can be as 

simple or complex as the airport desires. In its simplest form, a gap analysis identifies existing processes 

and procedures required by regulation or established for safe operations and then compares them to SMS 

requirements. This process identifies and highlights gaps between the two. The ACRP’s SMS for Airports 

Volume 2: Guidebook and ICAO’s Safety Management Manual provide examples of gap analysis tools 

and documentation.

 

4 ACRP’s SMS for Airports Volume 2: Guidebook, identifies the SMS Champion as the individual or team 

responsible for coordination and promotion of SMS related implementation. The main role of the SMS Champion is 

project management for SMS implementation and this individual or team may be different from the manager 

appointed to provide daily oversight of the SMS once operational.
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Regardless of whether a gap analysis is used, the airport should identify and use existing processes and 

procedures as much as possible when developing the SMS. This will add value and credibility to the SMS 

since employees will already be familiar with them. It may also lessen implementation costs. Table 2-1 

includes examples of existing processes and procedures that can serve as the foundation for SMS 

components and elements.

Table 2-1. Examples of Existing Processes and Procedures

Existing Policy/Procedure/Practice Adaptability to SMS

Policy Statement Safety Policy. Many airport governing bodies have 

policy statements. These preexisting statements 

may include safety-related initiatives or may be 

geared solely toward employee safety. Using this 

policy as a foundation or revising it to address 

operational safety (and not just employee safety)

can help in the development of a Safety Policy 

Statement.

Daily Self-Inspections Safety Assurance. Daily self-inspections 

performed to meet part 139 requirements or airportimposed requirements are good means of 

identifying safety hazards.

Airport Committees Safety Promotion & Safety Risk Management. 

Many airports have preexisting airport committees 

made up of airport staff and managers or 

stakeholders like air carriers, fixed-base operators, 

and airport tenants. These committees can serve 

two roles under SMS. They can help communicate 

important safety issues and initiatives as part of

Safety Promotion. Also, they can identify 

individuals needed for safety risk assessments as 

part of Safety Risk Management.

Airport Intranet or Internet Website Safety Assurance & Safety Promotion. Airport 

internet or intranet websites provide excellent 

means for distributing safety information to 

employees and tenants as part of Safety Promotion. 

These sites can also house portals to the airport’s 

hazard reporting system as part of Safety 

Assurance.

Training Safety Promotion. SMS training and safety 

awareness can be included in preexisting training 

programs, saving time and reducing 

implementation costs.

Recordkeeping Safety Risk Management & Safety Promotion. 

Preexisting recordkeeping practices can serve as 
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the foundation for documentation and tracking of 

Safety Risk Management findings and 

training/communication performed under Safety 

Promotion.

Appendix C includes a sample Implementation Plan. Note that an SMS Implementation Plan is more than 

just a checklist or table; it allows the airport to explain its approach to implementation, discuss any 

strategies or challenges concerning deployment, and identify major milestones. The accompanying 

checklist can be tailored to the airport’s needs. The sample includes a “Status” column, allowing it to 

serve not only as a one-time plan, but also as an ongoing tool for communicating implementation status to 

management. Therefore, airports should update their SMS Implementation Plans frequently and consider 

using them to update executives on the status of developing and implementing the SMS.

4. SMS Manual.

An airport may choose to develop an SMS Manual to document how it complies with the four 

components of SMS and their elements. ACRP’s SMS for Airports Volume 2: Guidebook describes the 

SMS Manual as follows:

The SMS Manual describes the SMS elements and how they will be established 

and will function. It is a document that may resemble the ACM. Whereas the 

ACM describes how the airport operates, the SMS manual describes how the 

SMS functions.

Appendix D provides an example showing the preferred arrangement of an SMS Manual. However, not 

all SMS Manuals will look alike. Manuals will vary in size, specificity, and scope. The airport should 

tailor the manual to meet its unique operational and governance needs.

This AC focuses on SMS application on the airside; however, airports may choose to apply SMS to their 

landside or terminal environments, as well. If so, the SMS Manual can discuss these additional areas, but 

landside or terminal discussions should be kept separate from airside applications. Also, some airport 

governing bodies with multiple airports in their system may choose to develop one SMS Manual for the 

entire system instead of individual SMS Manuals for each airport. This method is acceptable as long as all 

included airports understand how the manual applies to them.

The SMS Manual should remain a living document. The airport should review and update it as needed 

and communicate changes to all individuals with a need to know.

5. ACM Revision.

Because SMS is not currently required under part 139, airports should keep SMS related documentation 

such as SMS Manuals and Implementation Plans separate from their Airport Certification Manuals.
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Chapter 3. Safety Policy

1. Introduction.

Safety Policy, the first of the four SMS components, provides the foundation or framework for the SMS. 

Safety Policy is the statement and documentation adopted by an airport that defines its commitment to 

safety and its overall safety vision. Airport management develops, documents, and communicates a Safety 

Policy that demonstrates its commitment to providing a safe and secure environment for the passengers, 

employees, and users of the airport’s services.

Figure 3-1 shows the numerous elements that make up Safety Policy:

Figure 3-1. Safety Policy

2. Developing and Implementing the Safety Policy.

a. Identify the accountable executive.

The accountable executive is the person designated by the airport to act on its behalf for the 

implementation and maintenance of the SMS. The support of a senior executive is essential; otherwise,

there is little incentive for employees and tenants to actively participate in SMS activities and initiatives. 

The accountable executive should have sufficient control over human and financial resources for the 

airport to ensure that enough personnel and funding are available to develop and implement the SMS. A 

key point of SMS is ensuring that top management within the airport is aware of the safety issues and 

hazards identified on the airport. In many cases, the accountable executive will have minimal daily handson management of the SMS. However, at times this person may need to make decisions related to 

particular safety issues and hazards.
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Airports that are governed by larger entities such as city councils, airport authorities, or governing boards

may find it challenging to identify a single individual to act in this role. However, an airport should strive 

to identify a single individual in a senior executive leadership position within the airport management 

structure. Ideally, this individual could be one of the following: the Airport Director, the Airport 

Manager, or the Chief Executive Officer.

The accountable executive should not delegate overall responsibility for SMS oversight. However, this 

individual may wish to delegate responsibility for daily oversight and the administration of SMS-related 

processes or initiatives to an SMS Manager, SMS Coordinator, or SMS Administrator. (The airport 

should refrain from calling this supporting position the Safety Manager because it might infer or imply

that managing safety is the responsibility of that division or manager alone and not of any other airport 

department.) The ICAO Safety Management Manual (2009) and ACRP’s SMS for Airports Volume 2: 

Guidebook (2009) provide characteristics, job descriptions, and tasks for this supporting position.

Smaller airport organizations may choose to identify only an accountable executive. Larger airports with

more complex organizational structures may choose to identify an accountable executive and support 

staff, including an SMS Manager, for the daily implementation and oversight of the SMS. Either method

is acceptable as long as the accountable executive is regularly apprised of:

 Pertinent safety information, including the airport’s performance toward its safety objectives (see 

section f below);

 Critical safety information communicated to employees and tenants;

 The status of ongoing mitigations required under the airport’s SRM policies (see Chapter 4); and

 The status of SMS implementation. 

b. Identify and communicate the safety organizational structure.

It is important to identify the positions and offices within the airport organization that have responsibility

for or play a role in the safety of airport operations. This includes the “chain of command” and the means 

by which airport employees report their safety concerns, hazards, and other safety-related information.

Identifying the safety organizational structure begins with the accountable executive and flows from there 

through the organization. Typically, this structure includes airport operations departments as well as 

Maintenance and Public Safety. It may also include any Human Resources divisions responsible for 

employee safety issues.

At a small airport, with a flattened management structure and few employees, there may be straight-line 

reporting to the accountable executive. At medium and large airports, there usually is a more detailed 

reporting structure in place, with department supervisors or line managers first in line to receive and act 

on information about safety concerns, hazard reports, and other safety-related items.

Each manager accountable for safety and with responsibilities under SMS should be identified, and each 

employee should know the point of contact for particular safety issues. This identification ensures that 

senior management is aware of the daily activities of the various departments and can play an active role 

in airport safety or the management/direction of SMS initiatives.
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An organizational chart can provide the simplest means of communicating the safety organizational 

structure. Figure 3-2 provides a sample organizational chart for safety oversight.

Figure 3-2. Sample Organizational Chart for Safety Oversight

If the airport establishes a Safety or SMS Committee to help promote SMS initiatives, make decisions, or 

perform other SMS activities, the chart should include the SMS Committee. Safety Committees are 

usually made up of members of airport departments, tenant organizations, and airport stakeholders and are 

often chaired by the accountable executive or the SMS Manager. Depending on the complexity of the 

committee’s structure, the airport may find it useful to include a separate organizational chart identifying 

committee members and showing how the committee interacts with airport management.

c. Identify the lines of safety responsibility and accountability.

Once the airport identifies the positions and divisions with roles in ensuring safe operations, it should 

ensure their responsibilities and accountabilities are clearly defined and documented. The airport should 

create position descriptions for each position and division with safety oversight. For example, employees 

with airfield access play a role in safety; they report hazards and identify safety issues to the proper point 

of contact or the airport’s hazard reporting system. Additionally, airfield operations specialists or 

inspectors conducting daily self-inspections play a role; they identify safety issues through the course of 

their inspections and so also contribute to safety oversight.

While the safety organizational structure may best be depicted in an organizational chart, safety 

responsibilities and accountabilities are best described in the SMS Manual. Once these descriptions are 

developed, the airport must make them available to all identified individuals so they understand their 

responsibilities under the SMS.

When describing responsibilities and accountabilities, only include those items related to safety and the 

implementation and oversight of SMS-related initiatives. General job descriptions are best kept in human 
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resource documents, not the SMS Manual. However, if new positions are created to support SMS 

development and implementation, the airport may choose to incorporate these job descriptions and tasks 

into this section since they specifically relate to safety oversight and the SMS.

Figure 3-3 depicts an excerpt from the Safety Responsibilities section of an SMS Manual. Notice that it 

includes descriptions for all positions/divisions identified in the organizational chart shown in Figure 3-2. 

It also contains a broad concluding statement that encompasses the responsibility every individual with 

access to the movement and non-movement area has for hazard reporting.

Figure 3-3. Sample Safety Responsibilities

d. Establish and maintain a Safety Policy Statement.

Normally established early in SMS development, the Safety Policy Statement documents airport 

management’s commitment to providing a safe airport. Frequently confused with the overall Safety 

Policy component, the Safety Policy Statement is just one element of many that encompass the Safety 

Policy component. 
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By developing, accepting, and giving visibility to the Safety Policy Statement early in SMS development, 

airport management and the accountable executive show their support for SMS and its development and 

deployment. This assures airport personnel that management is leading the effort to make safety a priority 

and assures the travelling public that airport management and airport personnel are striving to improve 

safety. The accountable executive signs this statement to formally express airport management’s 

commitment to the SMS as well as its processes and initiatives. Alternatively, the Safety Policy 

component, as documented in the SMS Manual, outlines the methods and processes the airport will use to 

achieve the desired safety outcomes.

The statement should be easily understood by managers, employees, and tenants and take into account the 

airport’s complexity and structure. When developing the Safety Policy Statement, airports should look to 

existing Policy Statements, Mission Statements, or other high-level concept documents as models. For 

example, many airports owned by municipalities may already have Safety Statements from their local 

governments. The airport may be able to build on or replace these preexisting documents but should 

consult its legal department before doing so.

Internal policies or regulations may prevent some airports from using the terms “Policy” or “Statement”. 

If so, it is acceptable to call the Safety Policy Statement by another name, as long as it includes the 

necessary commitments to SMS implementation and operations.

There is no prescribed length for a Safety Policy Statement; they typically range from one paragraph to 

one page in length. A Safety Policy Statement should contain the following items:

 A commitment to make airport safety the highest priority.

 The commitment of senior airport management to implement SMS.

 A commitment to continually improve safety on the airport.

 The encouragement of employees to report safety issues without fear of reprisal.

 A commitment to provide the necessary resources needed for safe operations.

 A commitment to comply with all regulatory requirements related to safety.

(Adapted from ACRP’s SMS for Airports Volume 2: Guidebook)

A Safety Policy Statement should not include:

 Unrealistic commitments, such as a zero accident rate. SMS will help facilitate a safer airport and 

aviation system. It does not guarantee the airport will be accident or incident free. 

 The airport’s safety objectives and goals (see Section f below). These objectives and goals may 

change frequently over time; the Safety Policy Statement should not.

Figures 3-4 and 3-5 provide examples of Safety Policy Statements. Figure 3-4 shows a statement that 

would be appropriate for a small airport. It is simple, concise, and expresses the core principles of SMS.
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Figure 3-4. Simple Safety Policy Statement

Figure 3-5 presents a more complex statement more suited to an airport where several departments have 

responsibilities for separate but interdependent functions on the airport. Without identifying each 

department, the statement makes clear there are many types of airport personnel with safety-related roles. 

It also explains that an office charged with safety oversight is necessary to meet the wide-ranging 

responsibilities of the SMS.

Excelsior airport

1 Airport Boulevard

Monterey, CA 90293

June 7, 2012

The Excelsior Airport is committed to the implementation of a Safety 

Management System (SMS) that enables its management, employees, the airlines, 

tenants, and other business partners to operate in a safe environment. Safety is 

among the Airport’s highest priorities. The Airport is dedicated to creating an 

environment that minimizes exposure to hazards and risks, expects continuous 

safety improvement, and encourages confidential reporting of any safety related 

situation, incident, or accident. We will ensure that necessary policy direction and 

resources are available to enable the success of the SMS, compliance with 

standards and regulations, and enhanced operational safety.

John R. Smith

John R. Smith

Airport Manager
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Figure 3-2. Complex Safety Policy Statement

e. Ensure the Safety Policy Statement is available to all employees. 

Making the safety policy statement available to all airport personnel and tenants confirms management’s 

intention to prioritize safety. The airport can issue the statement to each airport employee, make it 

available online, and/or post it in prominent locations throughout the airport. The airport should also give 

it to tenants since their employees should understand their role in reporting hazards and contributing to 

airport safety. Mentioning the policy statement frequently and periodically adding excerpts of it to 

bulletins and other documents confirms airport management’s continuing commitment and reinforces its

safety focus to the entire airport community.

xyz Authority

SUPERIOR INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT

100 Lake Shore Blvd.

Minocqua, WI 54548

April 1, 2012

Superior International Airport employees and tenants shall systematically integrate 

safety into management and work practices at all levels so that airport operations 

are accomplished safely. The application of an effective Safety Management 

System (SMS) is integral to all of our airport activities with the objective of 

achieving the highest levels of safety standards and performance. Safety is the 

responsibility of everyone and the participation of airport and tenant employees is 

paramount to the success of the SMS. Our commitment is to:

 Continuously promote a safety culture across all airport operations that 

recognizes the importance of safety in our daily activities and the value 

of an effective SMS. Encourage confidential hazard reporting by all 

employees and tenants.

 Ensure all staff members are aware of their responsibilities and 

accountabilities in the execution of and participation in the SMS. Provide 

adequate and appropriate safety information and training.

 Provide skilled and trained personnel and other resources necessary to 

ensure the effectiveness of the SMS.

 Analyze and manage risk(s) associated with airport-related operations, 

incidents, or accidents.

 Comply with local, State, and Federal legislative and regulatory 

requirements and standards. Continue to improve our safety performance.

Jane L. Doster

Aviation Director
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f. Establish and maintain safety objectives.

Under Safety Policy, the airport establishes and maintains safety objectives. These objectives will help 

focus employees and management when developing and implementing the various processes and 

procedures under SMS. Articulating objectives and sharing related metrics allow the airport, its 

stakeholders, and the FAA to verify achievements or progress toward the airport’s safety improvement. 

The airport should tie its safety objectives to its Safety Assurance activities (see Chapter 5.) That is, 

when the airport conducts its evaluations to verify safety performance, it should do so with these 

objectives in mind.

Safety objectives should be specific to the airport 

but can be tied to national-level objectives set by the 

FAA, state aviation organizations, or industry 

groups (e.g., national effort to reduce the number of 

vehicle/pedestrian deviations). Additionally, airports 

may choose to develop more specific goals or 

targets related to these objectives. “Examples of 

Safety Objectives and Goals” illustrates the 

differences between an objective and a goal.

The airport should keep the following points in mind 

when developing the airport’s safety objectives:

 Specific: The objective should be focused 

on one thing only.

 Measurable: It should be possible to 

measure whether the airport meets the

objective.

 Achievable: The objective should be 

within the airport’s capabilities.

 Relevant: The objective should be 

something of importance or significance to

safety.

 Timed: There should be a defined deadline

for meeting the objective.

(Adapted from ACRP’s SMS for Airports Volume 2: Guidebook)

As discussed in Chapter 5, Safety Assurance, the airport should establish processes to report progress on

the airport’s safety objectives on a regular basis. Once objectives are met, the airport should develop new 

safety objectives and communicate them throughout the airport community.

Examples of Safety Objectives 

and Goals

Safety Objective 1: Reduce the 

number of accidents on the airport by 

x% in x years.

Safety Objective 2: Reduce the 

number of foreign object debris (FOD) 

occurrences by x% in x months.

Safety Objective 3: Reduce the 

number of vehicle/pedestrian 

deviations by x% in x years.

 Goal 3.1: Increase the number of 

driver training sessions by x% in x 

years.

 Goal 3.2: Develop and promote a 

driver training promotion program 

within x months.
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Chapter 4. Safety Risk Management (SRM)

1. Introduction.

SRM is the second component of SMS and considered a core operational component because of its 

related elements. SRM uses a set of standard processes to identify hazards formally in a proactive manner, 

analyze and assess potential risks, and design appropriate risk mitigation strategies. Figure 4-1 depicts the 

minimum elements of SRM. When properly implemented, SRM processes also promote productive 

communication among stakeholders and a positive safety culture within and around the airport 

environment.

A comprehensive SMS using SRM provides management with a tool for identifying hazards and risks and 

prioritizing their resolution. While each airport’s SRM processes may be unique to the airport’s 

operations, physical geometry, history of incidents, and organizational structure, the airport should 

develop processes and procedures for hazard identification and analysis appropriate to the airport’s 

operating environment. As previously stated, SMS processes and procedures should be scalable; the 

airport’s SRM program should be scalable, as well.

Figure 4-1. Elements of SRM

The SRM component is sometimes used synonymously with one of its elements—the systematic process 

to analyze hazards and their associated risks (i.e., the “5-step process”). While a very important part of 

SRM, the 5-step process is not the only part of a comprehensive SRM program.

2. Developing and Implementing Safety Risk Management.

a. Establish a system for identifying safety issues.

Identifying safety issues is an essential step in proactive risk management. While the airport may have 

processes in place that support the identification of safety issues, it should ensure these processes are 

documented and communicated for further assessment. The airport should implement identification 

processes and procedures that reflect the management structure and complexity of the airport 

environment.
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The term “hazard” will confuse many individuals. Therefore, the system put in place under this 

requirement should identify safety issues or changes to the airport’s operations or geometry that could 

create hazards.

Safety issues can be identified through the following:

 The airport’s hazard reporting system (see Chapter 5, Safety Assurance);

 Airport self-inspections;

 Maintenance activities; or

 Manager or tenant meetings.

Furthermore, the evaluation of certain activities or events may identify safety issues. These include:

 Airport accidents or incidents;

 Airfield changes (including geometry, construction, conversion from movement to nonmovement areas, airfield procedures, and pavement marking modifications);

 Irregular operations or events;

 Winter weather operations;

 Tenant operational changes (including new servicing equipment and aircraft using airport);

and

 Ramp operations (including use of ramp for activities not originally intended).

b. Establish a systematic process to analyze hazards and their associated risks.

Using the SRM process, airports can develop an approach appropriate to their operational environment. 

Any of the items listed above could potentially introduce new hazards in the airfield environment. 

Therefore, airport management should formally determine whether those hazards create a level of risk 

that the airport is willing to accept. For those hazards with unacceptable risk, the airport should ensure 

mitigations are in place or stop the operation. The airport should have processes in place to ensure events 

that could produce hazards automatically trigger the 5-step hazard assessment process. For example, the 

5-step process should be triggered if an airport tenant notifies the airport of a change in the type of aircraft 

servicing the airport. The airport’s 5-step process should also be triggered for hazards reported through 

the airport’s hazard reporting system.

The 5-step hazard assessment process provides a framework and guidance that serve all airports, from 

those whose operational environments are simple and uncomplicated to those whose are complex and 

extensive. Since resources are involved, the scalability of this effort is key to making it work. Figure 4-2

shows the 5-step process.
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Figure 4-2. Five Steps of SRM

The airport should identify who conducts the 5-step process. Anyone operating on the airfield can identify 

hazards. However, individuals responsible for conducting or leading the 5-step hazard analysis process 

should have proper training and oversight to ensure that the process is completed correctly and 

consistently.

In some cases, the airport may want more than one individual completing the 5-step process, usually 

when more subject-matter expertise is required for adequate analysis. In these cases, the airport may want 

to ensure that individuals receive proper instruction on how to complete the process, the airport’s risk 

analysis tools, and the airport’s risk acceptance procedures. The airport’s SMS Manual should clearly 

explain how the airport will select individuals or organizations to participate in the 5-step process.

(1) Describe the system. The first step of the 5-step process is to describe the system. The 

system description depicts the operating environment in which the hazards will be identified. The 

description of the system sets the boundaries for hazard identification. Questions that help define this 

description could include the following:

(a) What are the meteorological conditions (e.g., VMC or IMC?)

(b) Are seasonal conditions involved and are they abnormal?

(c) Are there known defects or deficiencies (e.g., paved area problems, safety area problems, 

deteriorated marking, missing or deficient signs, or lighting deficiencies)?

(d) Is time of day or night a factor?

(e) Is traffic volume involved (peak activity or low activity)?

(f) Do normal operations prevail or are there abnormal conditions like construction or a 

closed runway or taxiway? 

(g) What type of infrastructure or media is involved (e.g., runway, taxiway, apron, or 

drainage facility)?
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Airports can choose from several models to help define their operational environments. For example, the 

5M Model is used to deconstruct the proposed change or condition for analysis to distinguish elements 

that are part of, or impacted by, the proposed change or condition. These elements later help identify 

sources, causes, hazards, and current and proposed hazard mitigations. The 5M Model analyzes five 

elements for impacts: Mission, Man, Machine, Management, and Media (see Figure 4-3). These elements 

are defined as follows:

 Mission – A clearly defined role of the SRM panel, describing, in detail, the operation or change. 

 (hu)Man/Person – The human operators or maintainers. 

 Machine – The equipment used in the system, including hardware, firmware, software, human-tosystem interface, and avionics. 

 Management – The procedures and policies that govern the system’s behavior.

 Media – The environments in which the system is operated and maintained (i.e., the airport).

Figure 4-3. The 5M Model

(2) Identify the hazards. The second step of the hazard assessment process identifies hazards in 

a systematic way based on the system described in the first step. A hazard is any condition that could 

foreseeably cause or contribute to an aircraft accident as defined in title 49 CFR 830.2, Notification and 
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21

Reporting of Aircraft Accidents or Incidents and Overdue Aircraft, and Preservation of Aircraft 

Wreckage, Mail, Cargo, and Records: Definitions.

The term hazard is often misused, so it is important that the airport’s training program for those 

individuals conducting the 5-step process (see Chapter 6, Safety Promotion) clearly defines and provides 

examples of hazards. A simple example of a hazard is snow or ice on active runways. A hazard could also

be a construction vehicle entering an active runway without clearance or a pilot’s loss of visibility on final 

approach due to dust from construction. Hazards must be considered with respect to the original system 

description. For example, a construction vehicle entering an active runway would only be reasonable if 

there is ongoing construction and the runway is in use. When identifying hazards, all possible sources of 

system failure should be considered. Depending on the nature and size of the system under consideration, 

these sources could include:

 Equipment (e.g., construction equipment operating in or near the movement area),

 The operating environment (e.g., weather conditions, season, or time of day),

 Maintenance procedures (e.g., nightly movement area inspections), and

 External services (e.g., ramp traffic by tenants or law enforcement vehicles).

It may be best to identify the cause and effect to verify whether the hazard is actually a hazard. For 

example, if there is snow on an active runway, the cause would be accumulation of freezing precipitation 

and the likely effect would be limited braking action.

The use of a simple but well-defined hazard analysis tool ensures thorough assessment and documentation 

of SRM. There are many tools available, including the Preliminary Hazard Analysis, Operational Safety 

Assessment, Comparative Safety Assessment, Fault-Hazard Analysis, What-If Analysis, Scenario 

Analysis, and the Fault Tree Analysis. Airports may find it useful to use the Preliminary Hazard Analysis,

since this is the primary analysis tool used by FAA Airports. Figure 4-4 depicts the Preliminary Hazard 

Analysis Tool. Once the airport selects a tool, it should use it continuously throughout the 5-step process. 

The tools are not interchangeable.

Figure 4-4. Preliminary Hazard Analysis Worksheet

(3) Analyze the risk of identified hazards. During the third step of hazard assessment, the

airport analyzes the risk associated with each of the hazards identified in the previous step. For each 
DRAFT AC 150/5200-37A 06/29/2012

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hazard, the airport should consider the worst credible outcome (harm), which is the most unfavorable 

condition that is believable and possible given the system state described in step one.

It is important to remember that in identifying hazards, airports should strive for reasonable assessments 

that cite credible outcomes. Not all hazards could technically result in a catastrophic accident. The airport 

should strive for quantitative or real-life examples of outcomes based on the hazard. Using examples from 

airports of similar size and operations may help add credibility.

Using the previous example of snow on the active runway, the worst credible outcome based on the 

system description (e.g., daytime versus nighttime operations or VFR versus IFR operations) is 

established. The worst credible outcome without consideration to the unique airport environment is likely 

a runway excursion. Whether that excursion results in significant damage or loss of life will be 

determined based on the system description. For example, at an airport that lacks standard safety areas or 

has non-frangible objects in the safety areas, the end result of a runway excursion could be worse than at 

an airport with standard safety areas. 

Based on the worst credible outcome of each hazard, the airport then determines the severity and 

likelihood of that outcome using qualitative and/or quantitative methods. To do this, the airport should

have pre-defined Severity and Likelihood levels. These levels are typically unique to each organization, 

since they are management’s means of defining what constitutes acceptable and unacceptable levels of 

risk. The airport should develop these levels commensurate with its operational needs and complexity.

Severity and Likelihood levels and definitions should reflect both quantitative and qualitative values. In 

some cases, the airport may have data to draw on to establish a quantitative value for things like 

likelihood. In others, it may have to rely on the subject-matter expertise of those individuals completing 

the analysis.

Again, the airport should develop its own definitions and categories based on its unique operating 

environment. However, many airports may find it useful to use a standard five-level or three-level system. 

Tables 4-1 and 4-2 depict two samples of five-level Severity and Likelihood definitions.
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Table 4-1. Sample Severity and Likelihood Definitions

Severity

Negligible Minor Major Hazardous Catastrophic

No first aid required 

injury/illness; no lost 

work time; none to 

very limited 

operational impact

(less than 1 hour); 

none to minimal 

equipment loss (less 

than 1 day out of 

service); no 

environmental 

impact; none to 

minimal budget 

impact

Injury/illness (first 

aid required); little 

to no lost work time 

(less than 2 days); 

none to very limited 

operational impact 

(less than 4 hours); 

none to minimal 

equipment loss (less 

than 2 days out of 

service); contained 

with none to limited 

impact to 

environment; 

minimal budget 

impact

Injury/illness (1 to 5 

persons); death (less 

than 2 persons); lost 

work time (less than 

1 week); loss of total 

operations (less than 

2 hours); loss of 

partial operations 

(less than1 day); 

equipment loss (less 

than 1week); noncontained 

(manageable/

mitigated within 1 

day); moderate 

budget impact

Injury/illness (6 to 

49 persons); death 

(less than 5 persons); 

lost work time (1 

week to 1 month); 

loss of total 

operation (2 to 12 

hours); partial loss 

of operation (48 

hours or less); 

equipment loss (less 

than 30 days); noncontained, resulting 

in environmental 

impact (1 to 30 day); 

serious budget 

impact

Injury/illness 

(greater than 50 

persons); death 

(greater than 5

persons); lost work 

time (greater than 1 

month); loss of total 

operation (greater 

than 12 hours); loss 

of partial operations 

(greater than 48 

hours); total loss of 

equipment; noncontained resulting 

in long-term 

environmental 

impact (greater than 

30 days); grave 

budget impact

Likelihood

Extremely 

Improbable

Extremely 

Remote

Remote Probable Frequent

Almost impossible; 

possibly only once

in 10 to 100 years

Conceivable but 

highly unlikely; 

possibly once in 

every 5 to less than 

10 years

Possibly once a year 

or multiple times 

from 1 year to less 

than 5 years; 

unlikely but possible 

to occur

Likely to occur 

multiple times per 

year or once per 

month; regularly 

expected to occur in 

the system

Likely to occur once 

a day or multiple 

times per week; 

continuously 

expected to occur in 

the system

Table 4-2. Sample Severity and Likelihood Definitions

Severity

People Assets Reputation

Catastrophic Fatality Loss of an aircraft/or over 

$1 million in damage/or loss 

of critical system(s) for an 

extended period of time

An event or series of events 

resulting in the community not 

using the airport for an extended 

period of time

Hazardous Severe injury

(requiring 

hospitalization)

Damage to an aircraft taking it 

out of service for an extended 

period of time/or damage in 

An event or a series of events 

resulting in the community 

lessening the use of the airport 
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excess of $500,000/or 

disruption of critical services 

for extended period of time

causing negative financial or 

operational impacts

Major Minor injury 

(requiring medical 

treatment)

Damage to an aircraft that is 

repairable/or damage to 

equipment or facility that is 

reparable within a short 

period of time

An event or a series of events 

resulting in the community 

lessening the use of the airport for 

a short period of time

Minor Minor injury (not 

requiring medical 

treatment)

Minor damage to an aircraft, 

equipment, or facility not 

requiring it to be taken out of 

service

An event or a series of events 

resulting in the community 

questioning the reliability of the 

airport

No Safety Effect No injury No damage No impact

Likelihood

Frequent Occurs once every month or 3,000 aircraft operations or 25,000 enplanements

Probable Occurs once every year or 34,000 aircraft operations or 300,000 enplanements

Remote Occurs once every 5 years or 170,000 aircraft operations or 1,500,000 enplanements

Extremely 

Remote

Occurs once every 10 years or 340,000 aircraft operations or 3,000,000 enplanements

Extremely 

Improbable

Occurs once every 10+ years or 340,000+ aircraft operations or 3,000,000+ enplanements

The FAA developed Severity and Likelihood definitions, depicted in Figures 4-5 and 4-6, for its hazard 

assessments. Airports do not need to use the FAA definitions when developing their own, but they will 

need to reference them when participating in FAA-led hazard assessments. They should ensure that 

airport participants on FAA-led panels understand any differences (see section 4, Integrated SRM 

Efforts.).
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Effect

On:

Minimal

5

Minor

4

Major

3

Hazardous

2

Catastrophic

1

ATC Services

Conditions resulting 

in a minimal 

reduction in ATC 

services, or a loss of 

separation resulting 

in a Category D 

Runway Incursion 

(RI), Operational 

Deviation (OD) or 

Proximity Event (PE)

Conditions resulting 

in a slight reduction 

in ATC services, or a 

loss of separation 

resulting in a 

Category C RI, or 

Operational Error 

(OE)

Conditions resulting 

in a partial loss of 

ATC services, or a 

loss of separation 

resulting in a 

Category B RI or OE

Conditions resulting 

in a total loss of ATC 

services (ATC Zero), 

or a loss of 

separation resulting 

in a Category A RI or 

OE

Conditions resulting 

in a collision 

between aircraft, 

obstacles, or terrain

Flight Crew

-Flight crew receives 

TCAS Traffic 

Advisory (TA) 

informing of nearby 

traffic

-PD where loss of 

airborne separation 

falls within the same 

parameters of a 

Class D OE or PE

-Minimal effect on 

operation of aircraft

-Potential for PD due 

to TCAS Preventive 

Resolution Advisory 

(PRA) advising crew 

not to deviate from 

present vertical 

profile

-PD where loss of 

airborne separation 

falls within the same 

parameters of 

Category C OE

-Reduction of 

functional capability 

of aircraft but does 

not impact overall 

safety (e.g., normal 

procedures as per 

AFM)

-PD due to response 

to TCAS Corrective 

Resolution Advisory 

(CRA) issued advising 

crew to take vertical 

action to avoid 

developing conflict 

with traffic

-PD where loss of 

airborne separation 

falls within the same 

parameters of a 

Category B OE

-Reduction in safety 

margin or functional 

capability of the 

aircraft, requiring 

crew to follow 

abnormal 

procedures as per 

AFM

-Near mid-air 

collision (NMAC) 

results due to 

proximity of less 

than 500 feet from 

another aircraft or a 

report is filed by 

pilot or flight crew 

member that a 

collision hazard 

existed between two 

or more aircraft

-Reduction in safety 

margin and 

functional capability 

of the aircraft 

requiring crew to 

follow emergency 

procedures as per 

AFM

Conditions resulting 

in a mid-air collision 

(MAC) or impact 

with obstacle or 

terrain resulting in 

hull loss, multiple 

fatalities, or fatal 

injury

Flying Public

Minimal injury or 

discomfort to 

passenger(s)

-Physical discomfort 

to passenger(s) (e.g., 

extreme braking 

action; clear air 

turbulence causing 

unexpected 

movement of 

aircraft causing 

injuries to one or 

two passengers out 

of their seats)

-Minor injury to 

greater than zero to 

less or equal to 10% 

of passengers

-Physical distress on 

passengers (e.g., 

abrupt evasive 

action; severe 

turbulence causing 

unexpected aircraft 

movements)

-Minor injury to 

greater than 10% of 

passengers

Serious injury to 

passenger(s)

Fatalities, or fatal 

injury to 

passenger(s)
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Effect

On:

Minimal

5

Minor

4

Major

3

Hazardous

2

Catastrophic

1

Airport

No damage to 

aircraft but minimal 

injury or discomfort 

of little 

consequence to 

passenger(s) or 

worker(s)

-Minimal damage to 

aircraft

-Minor injury to 

passenger(s)

-Minimal unplanned 

airport operations 

limitations (e.g., 

taxiway closure)

-Minor incident 

involving the use of 

airport emergency 

procedures

-Major damage to 

aircraft and/or minor 

injury to 

passenger(s)/

worker(s)

-Major unplanned 

disruption to airport 

operations

-Serious incident

-Reduction on the 

airport’s ability to 

deal with adverse 

conditions

-Severe damage to 

aircraft and/or 

serious injury to 

passengers(s)/

worker(s)

-Complete 

unplanned airport 

closure

-Major unplanned 

operations 

limitations (e.g., 

runway closure)

-Major airport 

damage to 

equipment and 

facilities

-Complete loss of

aircraft and/or 

facilities or fatal 

injury to 

passenger(s)/ 

worker(s)

-Complete 

unplanned airport 

closure and 

destruction of 

critical facilities

-Airport facilities and 

equipment 

destroyed

Minor Injury Any injury that is neither fatal nor serious.

Serious Injury Any injury which: (1) requires hospitalization for more than 48 hours, commencing within 7 

days from the date the injury was received; (2) results in a fracture of any bone (except simple 

fractures of fingers, toes, or nose); (3) causes severe hemorrhages, nerve, muscle, or tendon 

damage; (4) involves any internal organ; or (5) involves second-or third-degree burns, or any 

burns affecting more than 5 percent of the body surface.

Fatal Injury Any injury that results in death within 30 days of the accident.

Figure 4-5. FAA Office of Airports’ Severity Definitions5

 

5 Adapted from FAA Order 5200.11, FAA Office of Airport Safety Management System. Incorporates changes to 

FAA Air Traffic Organization definitions from April 2008.
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NAS Systems & 

ATC Operational

NAS Systems ATC Operational Flight Procedures Airports

Quantitative Qualitative Airport 

Individual Specific

Item/System

ATC Service/ 

NAS Level 

System

Per 

Facility

NAS-wide

Frequent

A

Probability of 

occurrence per 

operation/

operational hour 

is equal to or 

greater than 

1x10-3

Expected to 

occur about 

once every 3 

months for 

an item

Continuously 

experienced 

in the system

Expected 

to occur 

more 

than 

once per 

week

Expected 

to occur 

more than 

every 1-2 

days

Probability of 

occurrence per 

operation/

operational hour 

is equal to or 

greater than 

1x10-5

Expected to 

occur more 

than once per 

week or every 

2500 

departures, 

whichever 

occurs sooner

Probable

B

Probability of 

occurrence per 

operation/

operational hour 

is less than 1x10-

3

, but equal to or 

greater than 

1x10-5

Expected to 

occur about 

once per 

year for an 

item

Expected to 

occur 

frequently in 

the system

Expected 

to occur 

about 

once 

every 

month

Expected 

to occur 

about 

several 

times per 

month

Expected to 

occur about 

once every 

month or 

250,000 

departures, 

whichever 

occurs sooner

Remote

C

Probability of 

occurrence per 

operation/

operational hour 

is less than or 

equal to 1x10-5

but equal to or 

greater than 

1x10-7

Expected to 

occur 

several 

times in the 

life cycle of 

an item

Expected to 

occur 

numerous 

times in the 

system life 

cycle

Expected 

to occur 

about 

once 

every 

year

Expected 

to occur 

about once 

every few 

months

Probability of 

occurrence per 

operation/

operational hour 

is less than or 

equal to 1x10-5

but equal to or 

greater than 

1x10-7

Expected to 

occur about 

once every 

year or 2.5 

million 

departures, 

whichever 

occurs sooner

Extremely Remote

D

Probability of 

occurrence per 

operation/

operational hour 

is less than or 

equal to 1x10-7

but equal to or 

greater than 

1x10-9

Unlikely to 

occur, but 

possible in 

an item’s life 

cycle

Expected to 

occur several 

times in the 

system life 

cycle

Expected 

to occur 

about 

once 

every 10-

100 

years

Expected 

to occur 

about once 

every 3 

years

Probability of 

occurrence per 

operation/

operational hour 

is less than or 

equal to 1x10-7

but equal to or 

greater than 

1x10-9

Expected to 

occur once 

every 10-100 

years or 25 

million 

departures, 

whichever 

occurs sooner

Extremely 

Improbable

E

Probability of 

occurrence per 

operation/

operational hour 

is less than 1x10-9

So unlikely 

that it can 

be assumed 

that it will 

not occur in 

an item’s life 

cycle

Unlikely to 

occur, but 

possible in 

system life 

cycle

Expected 

to occur 

less than 

once 

every 

100 

years

Expected 

to occur 

less than 

once every 

30 years

Probability of 

occurrence per 

operation/

operational hour 

is less than 1x10-9

Expected to 

occur less 

than every 

100 years

Figure 4-6. FAA Office of Airports’ Likelihood Definitions6

Based on these definitions, the airport can determine a Severity and Likelihood of the worst credible 

effect for each hazard. Generally, Severity is established first for each worst credible outcome since it 

 

6 Adapted from FAA Order 5200.11, FAA Office of Airport Safety Management System. Incorporates changes to 

FAA Air Traffic Organization definitions from April 2008.
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should be independent of likelihood. Next, the Likelihood, or the expression of how often an event is 

expected to occur, is established for the worst credible outcome.

(4) Assess the level of risk associated with identified hazards. In the fourth step of hazard

assessment, the airport uses the Severity and Likelihood values assessed in the third step and compares it 

to the organization’s acceptable and unacceptable levels of safety risk. This is considered “initial risk” 

since it does not consider any mitigations.

As airport management develops the SMS Manual, it should identify what acceptable and unacceptable 

risk is for the airport. As discussed above, SMS does not mean accident free. Some risk should be 

accepted or the airport would never operate. 

The number of levels of risk is really an airport decision. The simplest system will only have two levels: 

acceptable and unacceptable risk. FAA Airports typically uses a three-level predictive risk matrix that 

includes high, medium, and low risk. The airport must document its risk levels, train individuals 

responsible for conducting the 5-step process on the meaning of these levels, and ensure individuals who 

accept risk understand their responsibilities.

There are numerous tools available to quantify and/or qualify risk. For example, using a predictive risk 

matrix, the airport operator can determine whether the hazard presents a low, medium, or high risk of 

causing damage or compromising safety. A predictive risk matrix (see Figure 4-7) graphically depicts the 

various levels of Severity and Likelihood as they relate to the levels of risk. On a typical predictive risk 

matrix, Severity and Likelihood are placed on axes on a graph (i.e., the X- and Y-axes). The severity and 

likelihood assessed during the third step of hazard assessment can then be plotted on the risk matrix grid 

for each of the hazards to be assessed. Figure 4-8 depicts FAA’s predictive risk matrix.

When developing a risk matrix, the airport should consider the following characteristics:

 The matrix should fit the airport’s needs based on its size and complexity.

 It should be simple and easy to use and understand.

 You should not need extensive knowledge of quantitative risk tools to be able to use it.

 It should clearly define acceptable and unacceptable risk levels and any procedures required 

based on those definitions.

(Adapted from ACRP’s SMS for Airports Volume 2: Guidebook)

The important part of this third step is to understand and accurately position on the matrix what kind of 

threat the hazard is to the safety of the airport, the users, and the airport’s total operational environment.

The individuals making this determination should use common sense to ensure their judgment prioritizes 

safety but is not unreasonable.

When the Severity and Likelihood of a hazard’s effect are plotted on the risk matrix, the airport can see 

whether the hazard’s safety risk is acceptable to the organization. Generally, as the Severity and 

Likelihood increases, the risk increases. It is important to graph risk appropriately and pay attention not

only to those hazards with severe risks, but also to those hazards that are likely to occur more frequently, 

even though their severity may be low.
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Figure 4-7. Sample 4x4 Predictive Risk Matrix with Likelihood and Severity Definition and 

Two Levels of Risk: Acceptable and Unacceptable
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Severity

Likelihood

Minimal

5

Minor

4

Major

3

Hazardous

2

Catastrophic

1

Frequent

A

Probable

B

Remote

C

Extremely 

Remote

D

Extremely 

Improbable

E

*

High Risk

Medium Risk

Low Risk

Figure 4-8. FAA Office of Airports’ Predictive Risk Matrix

The individual or persons conducting the analysis should not pre-judge or try to manipulate the analysis 

to keep the hazard and its outcome from being “unacceptable” or “high risk.”

(5) Mitigate the risks of identified hazards, when appropriate. The fifth step is only used if 

the initial risk of the hazard’s outcome, as determined in step four, is unacceptable or if the airport 

requires mitigation of certain types of acceptable risk. For example, FAA Airports considers high risk 

unacceptable and requires mitigation. Medium risk is acceptable, but mitigation is preferred when 

possible. 

There are a variety of risk mitigation strategies the airport can use to decrease the severity or likelihood of

the hazard’s outcome. According to ICAO (2009), these approaches include:

 Risk Avoidance – The operation or activity is cancelled because the safety risks exceed the 

benefits of continuing the operation or activity (e.g., cancelling rather than allowing construction 

during low visibility night operations).

 Risk Reduction – The frequency of the operation or activity is reduced, or action is taken to 

reduce the magnitude of the consequences of the accepted risks (e.g., limiting construction to 

daytime hours during low-traffic operations).

* Unacceptable with Single 

Point and/or Common Cause 

Failures
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 Segregation of Exposure – Action is taken to isolate the impacts of the hazard or redundancy is

built in to protect against the impacts (e.g., conducting additional FOD sweeps before operations 

during periods of construction).

Mitigation measures should be appropriate, timely, and cost-effective. Further, if an airport puts in place a 

requirement to mitigate acceptable risk, not just unacceptable risk, the airport should only take the 

mitigating action if it is practicable.

ACRP’s SMS for Airports Volume 2: Guidebook (2009) offers a variety of examples of mitigations to 

reduce Likelihood and Severity. The following are ways to reduce the outcome’s likelihood:

 Raising awareness and/or control [e.g., safety campaigns, notices to airmen (NOTAMs), or 

briefings].

 Providing training (e.g., on-the-job training, recurrent training, or improving skills).

 Establishing procedures (e.g., avoid operations under certain conditions, develop or modify 

standard operating procedures, or intensify frequency of sweeping areas subject to FOD).

 Avoiding risk by ceasing the activity (e.g., close taxiway for operations during maintenance 

activities).

 Increasing supervision (e.g., escorting non-airport employees or conducting additional 

inspections).

 Improving infrastructure (e.g., improved signage or taxiway layout).

The ACRP Guidebook also suggests mitigations for reducing severity:

 Improving emergency response (e.g., additional vehicles or positioning).

 Improving infrastructure (e.g., extending runway safety areas or removing obstacles).

 Establishing standard operating procedures (e.g., define procedures for strong wind conditions).

 Creating special programs (e.g., speed rules for non-movement areas).

Once a mitigation is established, the airport should have processes in place to assign responsibility for 

ensuring the mitigation is completed (sometimes called verification). Also, the individual or persons 

responsible for the 5-step process should re-analyze the hazard based on the mitigation to establish the 

“residual risk”. Residual risk is the risk that remains after all risk mitigations have been implemented and 

their completion verified. If the residual risk of the hazard’s outcome still places it in an unacceptable risk 

level, then the airport should identify additional mitigations or stop the operation or change causing the 

hazard.

The airport’s Safety Assurance processes (see Chapter 5) should include procedures to trigger reevaluations of the hazard if data or hazard reports indicate a mitigation is not effectively reducing the risk 

of the hazard’s outcome. For example, if an airport put in place a mitigation to decrease the likelihood of 

a runway incursion but safety performance data then showed an increase in runway incursions after the 

mitigation was put in place, then the mitigation may not be effective.
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c. Documentation.

The formalized, proactive identification and analysis of hazards, as is found under SRM, provides airport 

management with a tool to make decisions about safety, but only if the process and hazards are

documented. Airport management should establish its documentation process and procedures early in 

SMS development and include them in the SMS Manual.

Documentation also allows meaningful analysis of operational safety-related trends on the airfield and of 

overall airport system safety. Documentation provides historical information that can be used when 

making decisions in the future.

Airports have a range of options to document SRM. Some larger airports or airports with more complex 

operations may choose to purchase or create software that guides individuals through the SRM process or 

even integrates hazard reporting, identification, analysis, and documentation. While this technological 

approach is not required, it may prove more timely and cost-beneficial for some airports.

Other airports may find it easier to establish forms or databases to track mitigations and document the 5-

step process. Figure 4-9 depicts a sample hazard assessment form. The airport should establish record 

retention policies for these documents. However, the documents should be maintained for at least the life 

cycle of the operation, change, or mitigations. The airport may also want to consult with its legal 

department to determine the best means for using and retaining these documents.
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Figure 4-9. Sample 4x4 Hazard Assessment Form
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d. Provide for regular assessment to ensure that mitigations are effective.

Successful mitigations, which are tied to achieving safety objectives, are the incremental steps toward 

improving the level of safety at an airport. Consequently, the airport should review its mitigations 

periodically to evaluate their status and ensure their continued effectiveness or recognize a need to modify 

them in terms of meeting identified safety objectives. The airport should include data collection and 

analysis specific to verifying mitigations as part of its Safety Assurance activities (see Chapter 5). If this 

analysis suggests mitigations are not working, the airport should have processes in place to trigger reevaluation of the hazard and its mitigations for effectiveness. The airport should also use data from 

accident or incident investigations on the airport or at airports with similar operations (when this 

information is made available) to spot ineffective mitigations.

3. Scalability of SRM.

As with other components of SMS, the airport should establish SRM processes and procedures in a 

scalable manner. Hazard assessment processes should be understandable and timely and not disrupt the

airport’s operations. Processes also should be effective in identifying and quickly assessing hazards so 

that unacceptable changes or operations are stopped quickly.

Larger airports could be well-served by establishing two types of hazard assessment: hazard triage and 

integrated SRM. Integrated SRM is discussed in the next section.

In hazard triage, the SMS Manager or other Operations staff is sufficiently trained and given autonomy to 

review identified safety issues or hazards and determine if immediate action must be taken. These 

individuals can conduct the 5-step process, typically using a form to direct and document their actions. 

For more complex issues, these individuals forward hazards to airport management, a safety committee, 

or other body to conduct hazard assessments using subject matter experts representing impacted 

stakeholders such as other airport divisions, tenants, the FAA, or other airport users.

Smaller airports may choose to route all identified hazards through the accountable executive, SMS 

Manager, or Operations department. Again, the hazard assessment process must be streamlined to prevent

assessments from getting bogged down. While smaller airports may choose to have an individual conduct 

much of their hazard assessments, they should ensure that findings and mitigations are discussed and 

communicated with applicable stakeholders.

4. Integrated SRM Efforts.

Airports are not the only sector of the aviation industry using SRM or SMS-related initiatives. Many air 

carriers, fixed-base operators, aircraft manufacturers, and training organizations are also actively 

developing and implementing proactive, risk management procedures for their organizations. Military 

tenants have similar programs, such as Operational Risk Management, active on their property. In many 

ways, airport management can use these developments to help shape and promote their SMS initiatives. 

Airport management should meet early in the airport’s SMS development with tenants, especially those 

with SMS, to develop procedures for sharing hazard information, conducting integrated hazard 

assessments, and verifying mitigations.

Similarly, the FAA has integrated SMS concepts and processes and SRM into its operations. To reduce 

redundancy, the airport may participate in FAA-led SRM activities instead of conducting its own hazard 

assessment. FAA Airports takes the lead on SRM activities for the following activities:

 FAA review of airport development projects (e.g., Airport Layout Plan changes).
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 Approval of part 150 Noise Compatibility Program modifications that may impact aviation 

safety.

 FAA review of modifications of airport design standards.

 FAA review of Construction Safety Phasing Plans.

FAA’s Air Traffic Organization or NextGen Office may also lead SRM-related activities on the airport. 

When FAA is the lead, the airport is not responsible for facilitating the 5-step process. However, the 

airport may be asked to secure a third-party facilitator, provide data or documents needed for quantitative 

analysis, or provide subject matter experts for the integrated assessment.

When conducting integrated SRM efforts, the panel uses the lead organization’s Severity and likelihood 

definitions. Therefore, for FAA-led assessments, the panel uses the FAA’s severity and likelihood 

definitions and predictive risk matrix for the assessment. Any documentation required by the lead 

organization is used. For example, FAA Airports requires the use of a Safety Assessment Screening 

(SAS) Form by the FAA Project Manager to document the project, panel members, and assessment 

findings. The SAS form, Project Proposal Summary, Hazard Assessment Tool, narrative, and any pictures 

are combined to form the assessment documentation (see FAA Office of Airports SMS Desk Reference 

(June 2012) available at 

http://www.faa.gov/airports/airport_safety/safety_management_systems/internal]).

5. Example #1 of SRM.

Seratame Airport in Wicker, Alaska is operated by the Wicker Airport Authority. The Authority holds a 

Class I AOC and is Index E. Seratame is served by a regional carrier that operates 2 daily Beech 1900 

roundtrip flights to its hub. Seratame provides all the services and employees to turn-around the aircraft. 

The carrier recently notified the Authority that it plans to replace the Beech 1900’s with Bombardier 

CRJs. The change in aircraft operating at the airport triggers the airport’s SRM processes and the 

Operations Manager conducts a hazard assessment. Since the Authority’s employees service the aircraft, 

the Operations Manager determines there is no need to include the carrier in the initial assessment.

(1) Describe the system. The airport has two runways, Runway 12/30, which is a 7,000 foot 

paved, grooved, and marked for an ILS approach, and Runway 9/27 which is a 3,500 foot rolled grass 

runway primarily used by experimental and general aviation aircraft. There is no active construction on 

airport at this time.

The airport’s existing facilities including the runways and taxiways meet design specifications for the 

CRJ. The airport has standard markings in the movement area. However, non-movement area markings 

are specific to the Beech 1900.

Other than the regional carrier, the airport is used by general aviation aircraft.

Identify the hazards. The Operations Manager bounds out the movement area from the analysis since the 

runway and taxiway meet design specifications for the CRJ. Based on the system description, the 

Operations Manager identifies two hazards

(a) Incorrect aircraft parking at gate (caused by old markings); and

(b) Misalignment of aircraft on ramp (caused by old markings).
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(2) Analyze the risk. Using the airport’s Severity and Likelihood definitions (see Figures 4-5 

and 4-6), the Operations Manager examines the worst credible outcome of each hazard. 

(a) Potential for aircraft collision with servicing equipment and/or jetway bridge most likely 

during nighttime conditions. Based on existing controls, severity is Minor since aircraft is at extremely 

low speed. Based on an analysis of past incidents in the non-movement area, the Operations Manager 

categorizes the likelihood of this effect as Remote.

(b) Potential for aircraft collision with other parked aircraft or vehicles during nighttime 

conditions. Based on existing controls, severity is Major since taxiing speeds could result in major 

damage if aircraft impacts another aircraft or vehicle unexpectedly. Based on an analysis of past incidents 

in the non-movement area, the Operations Manager categorizes the likelihood of this effect as Probable.

(3) Assess the risks. Using the airport’s risk matrix (see Figure 4-8), the Operations Manager

determined the following results:

(a) The risk associated with incorrect parking at gate results in Low Risk.

(b) The risk associated with misalignment of the aircraft in the gate area results in High Risk.

(4) Mitigate the risks. All High Risk must be mitigated under the Authority’s Safety Policy. 

Therefore, the Operations Manager develops a risk mitigation strategy that includes short-term and longterm solutions. In the short term, the Authority will establish temporary parking restrictions for aircraft in 

the non-movement area to ensure clearance for the CRJ as it transits from the movement to the nonmovement area. In the long term, the Authority will remove the old non-movement area markings and repaint to accommodate the CRJ. These mitigations reduce the risk from High to Medium. Additionally, 

repainting eliminates both hazards, once complete.

6. Example #2 of SRM.

As the fixed-base operator (FBO) for Timmons Municipal Airport, Flying Flag Incorporated has provided 

all ramp and fuel services on the airport for years. Flying Flag’s responsibilities include servicing general 

aviation aircraft, the three weekly air carrier flights, and occasional charter flights. The FBO also 

maintains the on-airport fuel farm.

Recently, the owner of Flying Flag decided to close the FBO after his unsuccessful attempts to find 

someone to take over the business. The airport is reviewing proposals from two companies to replace 

Flying Flag but both are relatively new operations. The airport manager is concerned that a new FBO will 

lack experience in ramp and fuel operations. She decided to proactively identify the hazards associated 

with the new operator.

(1) Describe the system. The airport holds a Class I Airport Operating Certificate with Index A 

ARFF services. Air carrier flights only recently picked up and the airport operates on a very tight budget 

with a relatively small staff. Most services, field maintenance, and aircraft servicing and fueling are 

provided by the FBO.

The airport has two runways, 7,250 foot long runway for air carriers and one smaller general aviation 

runway. Although there are three air carrier flights a week with Beech 1900 aircraft, general aviation 

operations make up the bulk of Timmons traffic. During yearly events at the local race track and golf 

course, general aviation traffic increases dramatically and the airport relies on the FBO to also manage 
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ramp and parking operations. These events increase traffic and parking to the point that the airport’s ramp 

is at capacity.

A contract air traffic control tower operates 14 hours per day from 0600 to 2000 hours, seven days a 

week. Air carrier flights operate during these times, except for the occasional charter flight. The airport 

published a prior permission request requirement (RPR) for air carrier flights outside of normal operating 

hours.

Other than the regional carrier, the airport is used by general aviation aircraft.

(2) Identify the hazards. To help identify hazards, the airport manager decided to use a panel of 

subject matter experts that includes local pilots, the air carrier station manager, and members of the 

airport manager’s staff. The panel of experts identified three potential hazards generated by a change of 

FBO. 

(a) Reduction in experience levels and potential confusion in ramp operations,

(b) Reduction in experience levels and potential confusion in parking/apron management and 

ground loading of passengers, and

(c) Reduction in experience levels and potential confusion in fueling operations.

(3) Analyze, Assess, and Mitigate the Risk. Using the airport’s Severity and Likelihood 

definitions and Predictive Risk Matrix, the panel used the airport’s Risk Assessment Worksheet to assist 

their analysis and determined the following: 

Timmons Municipal Airport Risk Assessment Worksheet

# Hazard Risk Severity Likelihood Resultant 

Risk

Mitigation Residual 

Risk

1 Reduced 

experience 

and 

confusion 

in ramp 

operations

Collision of 

ground 

support 

equipment 

with aircraft.

Aircraft to 

aircraft 

collision.

FOD damage 

to aircraft

Minor

Major

Minor

Remote

Remote

Probable

Low

Medium

Medium

Redesign ramp driving 

training program and 

require new FBO 

personnel to complete.

Limit number of aircraft 

on ramp by SOP. Conduct 

survey of ramp needs 

and develop new ramp 

marking plan from that 

survey. Remark ramp as 

appropriate.

Perform FOD walks.

Develop FOD awareness 

training course and 

require new FBO 

personnel to attend. 

Develop FOD awareness 

Low

Low

Low
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Timmons Municipal Airport Risk Assessment Worksheet

# Hazard Risk Severity Likelihood Resultant 

Risk

Mitigation Residual 

Risk

campaign under the 

direction of airport 

manager.

Develop FOD log and 

require FBO to use and 

maintain.

2 Reduced 

experience 

and 

confusion 

in fueling 

operations

Fuel spills.

Inadequate 

grounding/b

onding 

causes fire.

Minor

Major

Probable

Extremely 

remote

Medium

Low

Require training of FBO 

personnel IAW FAA Part 

139 to be completed and 

verified before contract 

assignment. Require 

independent safety audit 

of fuel delivery 

procedures within 90 

days of FBO beginning 

operations

Audit FBO

Medium

Low

3 Reduced 

experience 

and 

confusion 

in 

passenger 

operations 

& loading

Passenger 

injury due to 

jetblast/propwash.

Passenger 

injury 

caused due 

to contact 

with turning 

propeller. 

Major

Catastro

phic

Remote

Extremely 

improbable

Medium

Low

Provide ramp agent 

awareness training

Mark ramp and provide 

cones for movement of 

personnel.

Define by SOP limits of 

passenger movement on 

ramp area.

Require FBO to provide 

passenger escort at all 

times.

By written SOP require 

parked aircraft with 

turning propeller to have 

turning prop on side 

opposite of ramp.

Low

Low
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Chapter 5. Safety Assurance

1. Introduction.

Safety Assurance is the third component of SMS and serves as checks and balances for the SMS. Under 

Safety Assurance, the airport operator should establish processes and procedures to verify and monitor the 

effectiveness of the SMS. To do this, the airport should develop and implement a method for monitoring 

safety performance, establish and maintain a confidential hazard reporting system, and develop processes 

to report pertinent safety information to the accountable executive (see Figure 5-1). A key outcome of 

Safety Assurance is continuous improvement. 

Safety Assurance activities also:

 Help the airport evaluate the continued effectiveness of implemented risk mitigation strategies 

under SRM.

 Support the identification of new hazards.

 Systematically provide confidence that the airport is meeting or exceeding its safety objectives 

through continuous improvement. 

 Provide the foundation for data collection, which help airport management with decisionmaking.

Figure 5-1. Safety Assurance

The Safety Assurance and SRM components are closely linked. As discussed in Chapter 4, SRM ensures 

hazards and their associated risks are identified, analyzed, and assessed and mitigations are put in place 

when necessary. Safety Assurance processes then take over, using data to evaluate whether the 

mitigations are having the desired effect. Figure 5-2 depicts the SRM/Safety Assurance relationship.
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Figure 5-2. SRM/Safety Assurance Relationship

2. Developing and Implementing Safety Assurance.

a. Establish and maintain a hazard reporting system that provides a means for reporter 

confidentiality. 

A hazard reporting system broadens the airport’s ability to capture information that airport management

might not otherwise observe. Airport employees are typically the first to become aware of hazardous 

situations in the movement and non-movement areas of the airport. Similarly, pilots, airfield tenants, 

airline employees, and other individuals on the airfield may identify hazards, so the airport should provide 

a system that allows these individuals to report hazards. An airport should develop the kind of system that 

is best for its operational environment.

Smaller airports with few employees and less turnover may find formalized hazard reporting difficult to 

establish. Employees at these airports may be used to directly reporting safety issues to airport 

management. While direct communication may have worked in the past, it fails to formally document the 

issues or provide a means for the airport to track trends and systemic problems. At airports where 

informal reporting has been the norm, airport management should continually re-affirm its commitment to 

the new formal reporting system until its use becomes standard practice.
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An airport can establish a reporting system in a variety of ways. Airport management can receive hazards 

reports via:

 Hardcopy forms and dropboxes throughout the airport;

 Internal and/or public websites with reporting capabilities;

 An airport hotline;

 Manager/tenant meetings; and/or

 Daily inspections.

The airport should base its hazard reporting format choice on the size and complexity of the airport’s 

operations. A smaller airport with few employees and tenants may find it cost-beneficial to use dropboxes 

throughout the airport. Whereas, a larger airport with many employees and tenants may need multiple 

reporting formats and/or an information technology solution such as an online reporting tool.

Daily inspections should not be the primary means of receiving hazard reports since there are many more 

individuals with access to the airfield, beyond the airport’s own staff, who can identify hazards.

Regardless of the format, a good hazard reporting system should:

 Be voluntary, impartial, and confidential (to the extent practicable).

 Be easily accessed by all airport employees and tenants.

 Provide feedback to reporters.

 Formally document reports.

 Safeguard confidentiality.

 Provide prompt notification to management.

 Be administered by one individual or department that is responsible for managing the status of a 

report and investigating the identified hazard(s).

 Provide trust and encourage reporting.

 Be scalable.

(Adapted from ACRP’s SMS for Airports Volume 2: Guidebook)

The airport may use its reporting process to report incidents and accidents as well as safety issues and 

hazards. The airport should ensure that reporters understand the definitions of these terms and how to use 

the report forms. Figure 5-3 includes a simple hazard report form that airports could use for incident and 

accident reporting.
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Confidential Hazard/Incident/Accident Reporting Form

This form should be used to report any airside hazard that has caused or could cause an accident or 

incident. Place in any labeled “Hazard Reporting Dropbox” on the airport or send to the airport’s SMS 

Manager as soon as possible.

HAZARD OR EVENT DESCRIPTION

(To be completed by person reporting the event)

DATE: / / Time: AM/PM

LOCATION: _____________________________________________________________________

DESCRIPTION: __________________________________________________________________

_________________________________________________________________________________

_________________________________________________________________________________

_________________________________________________________________________________

WITNESSES: ____________________________________________________________________

REPORTER NAME (optional): ______________________________________________________

REPORTER POSITION (optional): ___________________________________________________

CONTACT NUMBER/EMAIL ADDRESS: _____________________________________________

Confidentiality Commitment

You can choose to report anonymously by omitting name, position, and other identifying details. If you 

provide your name, only the SMS Manager will see it and potentially use it to gather additional 

information about the even and discuss follow-up actions if required. Under no circumstances will your 

identity be disclosed to any person or organization without your express permission. However, these 

confidentiality commitments do not apply to any willful disregard of regulation or negligent acts 

committed on the airport.

Figure 5-3. Sample Confidential Hazard Reporting Form

(1) Confidentiality concerns. While there has been much emphasis in the past on establishing 

non-punitive hazard reporting systems, U.S. airports may find it difficult to prevent punishment of nonairport employees (e.g., tenant employees). Therefore, the airport should establish a confidential hazard 

reporting system that protects the reporter’s identity. Furthermore, airports may wish to include 

statements on their reporting forms explaining that the airport cannot provide confidentiality to

individuals who willfully disregard regulations or participate in negligent acts. Airport management 

should consult with legal counsel when deciding whether to add such language.
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Airport management should also consult with its legal counsel on the applicability of state open records 

laws commonly known as “sunshine laws”. State open records laws are different from the Federal 

Freedom of Information Act (FOIA). FOIA only applies to records obtained by the Federal government. 

Therefore, an airport’s confidential hazard reports would not be subject to Federal FOIA protections.

Due to differences in data protection laws from state to state, some airports may find it difficult to 

convince tenants to encourage their employees to use the hazard reporting system. In these cases, airports 

may work with these tenants to educate them on disclosure policies and means of protecting 

confidentiality. Note: Where tenants remain resistant, airports may also consider including clauses in 

future lease agreements requiring use of the system.

(2) Feedback to reporters. Airports should also keep in mind when establishing hazard 

reporting systems that reporters should get feedback on the resolution of their reports. While it may not be 

possible under a confidential reporting system to provide direct feedback, the airport should establish a 

process, usually linked to communications under Safety Promotion (see Chapter 6), to provide feedback. 

For example, an airport could communicate feedback by including it in safety bulletins, posting 

information on a safety bulletin board, discussing it during management meetings, and/or posting 

feedback on a dedicated area of the airport’s internal website.

If the airport chooses a technology-based approach to reporting, it should consider the following when 

building the reporting tool:

 Determine whether existing information technology systems used by the airport, such as asset or 

fleet management software, have reporting capabilities or whether a new system must be 

developed. In cases where new systems are developed, the airport may want to link existing and 

new systems.

 Determine who will report and from whom the airport will accept reports. Will the airport accept 

reports from the general public? If so, a public reporting interface on the airport’s website may 

be a viable solution. It may not be advisable to require reporters to sign into the system to report 

hazards because they may worry about confidentiality.

 Use pre-defined fields or drop-down menus for data entry to help standardize reporting and 

analysis. This will also aid in timely review and action.

 Where possible, link hazard location descriptions to an airport layout plan or allow tagging

through the airport’s Geographical Information System (GIS).

 Ensure the system automatically notifies a designated airport management official, such as the 

SMS Manager, when a report is submitted.

 Determine who will host the data. Will it be hosted offsite by a third party? If so, does the airport 

have sufficient rights to retain the data once any contracts with the third party are complete?

 Design scalability into the system to ensure it can be expanded to track more issues, allow 

reporting from more sources, and be connected to other airport systems.

b. Develop and maintain a means for monitoring safety performance. 

To facilitate continuous improvement, an airport should set baselines and measure its performance against

those baselines. To do this, the airport should develop and maintain a means for monitoring safety 
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performance that ensures the airport meets the safety objectives identified under the Safety Policy 

component (see Chapter 3), ensures the airport meets the requirements of its SMS, and verifies the 

effectiveness of the mitigations established under SRM.

To accurately monitor safety performance, the airport should:

 Collect data;

 Analyze collected data;

 Evaluate the SMS processes and procedures; and

 Monitor mitigations developed under SRM.

(1) Data collection. While the airport may use processes such as internal evaluations, safety 

reviews, and similar methods to monitor safety performance, it should measure changes in performance 

by first collecting and analyzing data. This monitoring goes well beyond self-inspections, as required 

under part 139, because the airport proactively looks for safety issues, trends, and failures.

Safety data may come from many sources. 

Certificated airports already collect it through selfinspection reports, maintenance logs and tracking, and 

accident/incident investigations. Under SMS, hazard 

reports and Hazard Assessments will also provide the 

airport with safety data it can use to track 

performance. The data collected can and should relate 

to the airport’s safety objectives, but the airport may 

collect additional data.

Data collection and analysis can be as simple or as 

complex as necessary. ACRP’s SMS Guidebook and 

ICAO’s Safety Management Manual both provide indepth discussions on data collection, analysis, and 

measurement. Essentially, the airport should use data 

to determine whether there are safety trends or failures

in the system. (See “Example A: Using Safety 

Assurance to Monitor the Effectiveness of 

Mitigations.”)

(2) Safety evaluations. Performance 

monitoring should take into account both short-term 

and long-term goals and look at both individual safety 

objectives and bigger systematic issues such as overall 

SMS implementation and effectiveness. The airport 

may conduct safety evaluations (also referred to as 

safety audits) to assess the implementation and 

effectiveness of SMS components and initiatives, 

including safety objectives, as well as the SMS as a whole. (See “Example B: Using Safety Evaluations 

to Track Safety Objectives.”)

Example A: Using Safety 

Assurance to Monitor the 

Effectiveness of Mitigations.

Airport XYZ conducts a Hazard

Assessment using its SRM 

requirements for a construction 

project. In order to accept the risk of 

the project, the airport puts in place a 

mitigation to increase the number of

FOD sweeps of the taxiways. 

However, data gathered through selfinspections during the construction 

project shows an increase in FOD on 

the taxiways that was supposed to have 

been removed during the additional 

FOD sweeps. Through its Safety 

Assurance process, the airport 

discovers this mitigation (additional 

FOD sweeps) is not having its desired 

effect. It decides to re-evaluate the 

mitigation and consider additional 

mitigations or more oversight.
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The SMS Manager or accountable executive may conduct the safety evaluations. However, other levels of 

airport management or divisions within the airport can also conduct periodic evaluations to assess their 

operations and implementation of SMS provisions. 

Some airports may also find it helpful to use thirdparty evaluators or other airports when evaluating 

SMS implementation as a whole.

The airport should establish timing and processes 

appropriate to the complexity and size of the 

airport. For example, a smaller airport may choose 

to conduct quarterly or semi-annual evaluations 

due to resource limitations. Larger airports, with 

various divisions and layers of management, may 

wish to conduct multiple levels of evaluations,

culminating in a third-party or external evaluation 

to gain a more objective review of the SMS’s

effectiveness.

Regardless of how often the airport chooses to 

evaluate itself, it should ensure that data including 

hazard, incident, and accident reports is constantly 

being reviewed and make adjustments to the program when necessary.

c. Develop and implement a process for reporting pertinent safety information and data to the 

accountable executive on a regular basis. 

Since the accountable executive is responsible for overall airport safety, this person should receive 

sufficient safety information to ensure priorities are set appropriately, resources are allocated correctly, 

and decisions are made on actions that often must be coordinated with several affected parties. 

The accountable executive should receive briefings on the following safety information and data:

 Performance with safety objectives established under the airport’s Safety Policy,

 Safety critical information distributed under the airport’s Safety Promotion activities,

 Status of ongoing mitigations required under the airport’s SRM policies and procedures, and

 Status of the airport’s schedule for developing or implementing initiatives under the SMS.

Airport management should determine the appropriate length of time between briefings and document 

this schedule in the SMS Manual. Briefings may range from weekly to monthly. While quarterly 

reporting alone is not advisable, some systemic reporting may be done on a quarterly basis. Some 

accountable executives may want to be updated more regularly than others. A smaller airport, where the 

accountable executive may be the same individual responsible for overseeing and maintaining this 

information, may not need to establish a process for regular updates.

There are many methods the SMS Manager or others may use to communicate safety information to the 

accountable executive. Some may choose more formalized reports, while others may choose verbal 

presentations. Airports may find it helpful to use a visual “dashboard” to track progress toward the 

Example B: Using Safety 

Evaluations to Track Safety 

Objectives.

Airport XYZ selects a safety objective 

related to decreased V/PDs. Based on 

data collected during performance 

monitoring, the airport finds the 

number of V/PDs has increased. The 

airport decides to evaluate the 

incidents and look for contributing 

factors, root causes, and ways to meet 

the safety objective in the future.
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organization’s safety objectives and other pertinent safety information. Appendix F includes a sample 

dashboard.
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Chapter 6. Safety Promotion 

1. Introduction.

The fourth component of SMS, Safety Promotion, establishes processes to foster a safety culture. This 

includes safety training for all individuals with access to the airfield and communication of important 

safety information (see Figure 6-1). A safety culture is defined as:

“[T]he product of individual and group values, attitudes, competencies, and patterns of behavior 

that determine the commitment to, and the style and proficiency of, the organization’s 

management of safety. Organizations with a positive safety culture are characterized by 

communications founded on mutual trust, by shared perceptions of the importance of safety, and 

by confidence in the efficacy of preventative measures” (ACRP, 2009).

While all SMS components contribute to a strong safety culture, “Safety Promotion sets the tone that 

predisposes both individual and organizational behavior and fills in the blank spaces in the organization’s 

policies, procedures and processes, providing a sense of purpose to safety efforts” (ICAO, 2009). 

Through communications and training, individuals will understand their responsibilities under the SMS 

and accept and trust the SMS initiatives. Safety culture is not easy to quantify, but an airport will know it 

is on the right path when people begin reporting hazards. (See ACRP’s SMS for Airports Volume 2: 

Guidebook for more information on the elements of a safety culture.)

Figure 6-1. Safety Promotion

Certificated airports already have numerous training and communications programs and processes in 

place for compliance with part 139. Existing part 139 programs focus on training those individuals with 
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specific roles in implementing part 139 requirements, such as operations inspectors, firefighters, and 

individuals with access to the movement areas. Similarly, part 139 communications requirements focus 

on informing stakeholders, including airlines, about information specific to part 139, such as pavement 

condition, emergency plans, or operational changes. These existing requirements serve as the foundation 

for SMS training and communications, but they must apply to all individuals with access to the movement 

and non-movement area and address more than the technical requirements of part 139. SMS assumes 

everyone has a role in promoting and enhancing operational safety on the airport, and SMS supports this 

assumption through role-specific training and communications.

Even where training and communications programs already exist, airports should anticipate some 

resistance to change, especially when there is little or no turnover of employees. These airports may have 

to work especially hard to show employees, who might ask “Aren’t we already safe?”, why they should 

accept SMS. To counter resistance, the airport could use case studies to show how close the airport may 

have been to an accident in the past. Such real-life example can help employees understand the need for 

SMS. Further, the airport may want to show how existing processes and procedures did not catch

systemic issues or how documentation and trend analysis can reduce workload.

2. Developing and Implementing Safety Promotion.

a. Provide safety training.

The success of SMS initiatives depends on individuals understanding their roles and responsibilities. 

While the Safety Policy component provides for documenting these roles and responsibilities, training 

provides the essential tools needed to put these roles and responsibilities into practice. The goal of safety 

training is to ensure that individuals are competent to perform their responsibilities under the SMS.

Similar to the other SMS elements, SMS training should reflect the complexity and needs of the airport. If 

they lack internal expertise, airports may want to seek the help of consultants or academics when

developing these training programs.

Airports should have at least two tiers of training: specialized SMS training for individuals and managers 

with operational roles under SMS and safety awareness/orientation for all other individuals.

(1) Specialized SMS training for individuals and managers with operational roles under SMS 

will typically consist of one or more courses specific to their SMS-related responsibilities. At smaller 

airports, this may be one course covering all facets of the airport’s SMS requirements. Larger airports that 

spread oversight and implementation responsibilities over numerous staff and management positions may 

find it helpful to have numerous, role-specific courses (e.g., one multi-day course on hazard analysis and 

the 5-step SRM process; one high-level, 3-hour course on the airport’s SMS requirements; and a short 

course on developing safety objectives). Regardless of the approach, the airport should ensure it provides 

the courses to individuals in a logical manner and over a reasonable time period.

(2) Safety awareness/orientation provides all other individuals (besides those requiring 

specialized SMS training) with access to the airfield an understanding of what constitutes a safety hazard, 

how to report safety issues and hazards, and where to find safety-related information. Unlike specialized 

SMS training, safety awareness/orientation can be accomplished through written communication like 

brochures, which can be handed out during indoctrination training or badging processes.

Safety awareness training should answer the following questions:

 What is a hazard?
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 How are hazards reported? Can hazards be reported confidentially?

 What happens to hazard reports and how will the airport provide feedback?

 How will the airport communicate important safety information?

(3) Training format. The airport should decide how to deliver SMS training. However, airport 

management should recognize that some courses/topics will demand different approaches for maximum 

effectiveness. For example, hazard assessment and SRM courses may be best taught using a lecture 

format and case studies with hands-on applications during the course. Whereas, a high-level course about 

SMS requirements designed for the accountable executive and other top managers may work best as

computer-based training.

(4) Recurrent training. Recurrent training should also be an important part of the airport’s 

overall SMS training program. This training should incorporate any new processes, procedures, or safety 

objectives developed through the SMS’s continuous improvement efforts. 

(5) Review of training materials. The airport should also periodically review training materials 

to verify their applicability and currency.

b. Maintain training records.

A key result of SMS is documentation, which can be reviewed to ensure compliance and to monitor safety 

performance. This documentation includes training records, so the airport should have a process to ensure 

it records completed training.

The records for individuals, including managers, requiring specialized SMS training or recurrent training

should include details such as training dates and copies of course documents including quizzes and 

rosters. It may be cumbersome, however, to keep detailed records for individuals who only need safety 

awareness/orientation. For these individuals, the airport should just have a process in place to ensure they 

receive the awareness/orientation. 

The airport should keep records of all training sessions, attendance rosters, test results (if applicable), and 

syllabuses for a period of time that provides data for Safety Assurance activities. A good practice would 

be to keep records for at least 24 months after the training takes place.

Further, it should periodically verify that its training record process is effective and captures the correct 

information for all those being trained. An airport may wish to incorporate this review into its safety 

evaluations under the Safety Assurance component.

c. Develop and maintain means for communicating important safety information.

Communicating safety information is essential to promoting a safety culture. When deciding what 

information to communicate, the airport should consider the following:

 Awareness of SMS and its initiatives – Not all individuals need to understand what the SMS 

does, but they should understand its functions and expected outcomes. Safety Promotion should 

clearly explain processes and procedures for proactive hazard identification and results aimed at 

continuous improvements in operational safety. It should then reaffirm both through visible 

actions.
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 Safety-critical information – Airport management determines what constitutes safety-critical 

information based on the airport’s unique operating environment. The airport may want to use

information required by regulations such as part 139 as the foundation for its list of safety-critical 

information.

 Feedback about actions taken – To support continuous reporting of hazards, the airport should

inform reporters of actions taken because of their reports. Such feedback will encourage reports 

from individuals who may have been initially apprehensive or skeptical about reporting. If the 

airport’s hazard reporting system is not able to communicate directly with confidential reporters, 

the airport can provide feedback via bulletin boards, safety bulletins and newsletters, or other 

means. Even when the airport can provide feedback directly to reporters, it should consider 

sharing the feedback broadly.

 Reasons for new or revised safety procedures – If the airport changes procedures or develops 

new ones based on lessons learned, it should communicate this information to encourage adoption 

of the safety procedures and support of SMS initiatives.

 “Nice-to-know” information that fosters support for the SMS – General safety information 

helps convey and support the airport’s safety objectives and goals. However, the airport should 

use different channels to share “nice-to-know” information and safety-critical information so 

employees and tenants understand the difference.

(Adapted from ICAO Safety Management Manual, 2009)

When establishing the SMS, the airport should evaluate when to use verbal communication instead of

written communication. Further, the airport should determine the specific type of communication for 

different types of information. For example, the airport may:

 Decide a memorandum or safety bulletin is a better way than a newsletter to communicate safetycritical information to employees and tenants.

 Choose to relay time-sensitive information or information for management at monthly manager or 

tenant meetings.

 Use its public or internal websites or topic-specific posters to share “nice-to-know” or SMS 

awareness information, depending on its relevance and sensitivity.

d. Maintain communications records.

As with other SMS elements, the airport should periodically review communications and evaluate their 

effectiveness. Over time, this will help the airport identify those methods that work best. The airport

should keep communications records for a sufficient period of time to support periodic evaluations. A 

good practice would be at least 12 months. These records will help with evaluation and compliance as 

well as trend and historical analysis. 
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Appendix A. Definitions and Acronyms

Aircraft accident – An occurrence associated with the operation of an aircraft which takes place between 

the time any person boards the aircraft with the intention of flight and all such persons have disembarked, 

and in which any person suffers death or serious injury, or in which the aircraft receives substantial 

damage. As defined in title 49 CFR 830.2.

Accountable Executive – A person designated by the airport to act on its behalf for the implementation 

and maintenance of the airport’s Safety Management System. The accountable executive has sufficient 

control of the airport’s human and financial resources for airport operations.

Airport Safety Management System – An integrated collection of processes and procedures that ensures 

a formalized and proactive approach to system safety through risk management.

Gap Analysis – A comparison between existing systems, processes, and procedures and SMS 

requirements.

Hazard – A condition that could foreseeably cause or contribute to an aircraft accident as defined in title 

49 CFR 830.2.

Hazard Assessment – A systematic, comprehensive evaluation of a change, operation, system, or safety 

issue.

Incident – An occurrence other than an accident, associated with the operation of an aircraft, which 

affects or could affect the safety of operations. As defined in title 49 CFR 830.2.

Movement Area –The runways, taxiways, and other areas of an airport that are used for taxiing, takeoff, 

and landing of aircraft, exclusive of loading ramps and aircraft parking areas. As defined in title 14 CFR 

139.5.

Non-movement Area – The area, other than that described as the movement area, used for the loading, 

unloading, parking, and movement of aircraft on the airside of the airport (including ramps, apron areas, 

and on-airport fuel farms).

Risk – The composite of predicted severity and likelihood of the potential effect of a hazard. Severity is 

the measure of how bad the results of an event are predicted to be; usually determined by the worst 

credible outcome. Likelihood is the estimated probability or frequency, in quantitative or qualitative 

terms, of a hazard’s effect; it is often an expression of how often an effect is expected to occur.

Risk Analysis – The process during which a hazard is characterized for its likelihood and the severity of 

its effect or harm. Risk analysis can be either quantitative or qualitative; however, the inability to quantify 

or the lack of historical data on a particular hazard does not preclude the need for analysis.

Risk Mitigation – Any action taken to reduce the risk of a hazard's effect.

Safety Assurance – The process management functions that evaluate the continued effectiveness of 

implemented risk mitigation strategies, support the identification of new hazards, and function to 

systematically provide confidence that an organization meets or exceeds its safety objectives through 

continuous improvement.
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Safety Evaluation – Procedures to monitor performance with safety objectives, SMS requirements, or 

initiatives.

Safety Objectives – A measurable goal or desirable outcome related to safety.

Safety Policy – The statement and documentation adopted by the airport that defines its commitment to 

safety and provides its overall safety vision.

Safety Promotion –The combination of safety culture, training, and communication activities that 

support the implementation and operation of an SMS.

Safety Risk Management (SRM) – A formal process within an SMS that describes the system; identifies

the hazards; and analyzes, assesses, and mitigates the risk.
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Acronyms

AC Advisory Circular

ACM Airport Certification Manual

ACRP Airport Cooperative Research Program

FBO Fixed-base Operator

FOD Foreign Object Damage or Foreign Object Debris

FOIA Freedom of Information Act

GIS Geographical Information Systems

ICAO International Civil Aviation Organization

SMS Safety Management System

SRM Safety Risk Management
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Appendix B. Related Reading Material

Dolbeer, R. A., & Wright, S. (2009, Fall). Safety Management Systems: How useful will the FAA 

National Wildlife Strike Database be? Human-Wildlife Conflicts 3(2), 167-178.

Federal Aviation Administration. (2011). Report on Airport Safety Management System (SMS) Pilot 

Studies. Retrieved from http://www.regulations.gov/#!documentDetail;D=FAA-2010-0997-0074.

Federal Aviation Administration. (2012). Part 139 Safety Management System (SMS) Pilot Study: 

November 2011 Roundtable Meeting Summary. Retrieved from 

http://www.faa.gov/airports/airport_safety/safety_management_systems/external/pilot_studies/medi

a/part139SMSImplementationStudyRoundtable.pdf.

Flight Safety Foundation. (2005, November/December). Unlocking the Potential of a Safety Management 

System. Flight Safety Digest. Retrieved from http://flightsafety.org/fsd/fsd_nov-dec05.pdf.

International Civil Aviation Organization. (2009). Safety Management Manual (Doc 9859) [Adobe 

Digital Editions version]. Retrieved from 

http://www2.icao.int/en/ism/Pages/GuidanceMaterials.aspx. 

Kirsch, P. (2011, April/May). Ready, Set, Go: Legal Considerations in Implementing a Safety 

Management System. Airport Magazine, 26-28.

Stolzer, A., Halford, C, and Goglia, J. (2010). Safety management systems in aviation. Burlington: 

Ashgate.

Transportation Research Board. (2007). Airport Cooperative Research Program Report 1, Safety 

Management Systems for Airports, Volume 1: Overview [Adobe Digital Editions version]. 

Retrieved from http://www.trb.org/Publications/Blurbs/159030.aspx. 

Transportation Research Board. (2009). Airport Cooperative Research Program Report 1, Safety 

Management Systems for Airports, Volume 2: Guidebook [Adobe Digital Editions version]. 

Retrieved from http://www.trb.org/Publications/Blurbs/162491.aspx. 
Appendix C. Sample SMS Implementation Plan Template and Checklist

This appendix contains a sample SMS Implementation Checklist. 

[Insert Airport Name] Safety Management System

Implementation Plan

[Instructions: Use this Implementation Plan Template to summarize the airport’s plans for implementing SMS. The template includes 

areas for narrative descriptions and a checklist with common implementation steps. Expand the template where necessary to reflect your 

unique operating environment and programs.]

SMS Development and Deployment Strategy:

[Instructions: In this section, provide a detailed proposal on how the airport will develop its SMS. Use the subsections to guide your 

description and add subsections where necessary. Each subsection includes lists of items to include in the narrative.]

I. SMS Development

 How will the airport develop its SMS Manual? Will it procure consultant assistance or develop it in-house?

 Will the airport conduct a formal gap analysis? If so, what is the timeline for completion?

 Are there any existing programs, policies, or practices that the airport plans to use as a foundation for the SMS elements?

II. SMS Deployment Strategy

 Does the airport plan to use a phasing strategy? If so, what will be phased (i.e., phasing the SMS into the movement area first and 

then into the non-movement area or phasing the components and elements of SMS)?

 Will the airport include its landside operations in the SMS? If so, how will landside requirements be kept separate from airside 

requirements?

III. Procurement

 Does the airport plan to acquire any new systems or technology that will require procurement? If so, how long does the airport 

anticipate that procurement taking?

Approved by: [signature]

Date: [insert date]

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[Insert Airport Name] Safety Management System

Implementation Plan

Schedule for SMS Development and Deployment:

[Instructions: In this section, document the major milestones and any potential challenges to implementation.]

I. Major Milestones

[List the major milestones associated with SMS development and deployment. This can be in narrative or tabular format. A sample table is 

provided below. This section should summarize the airport’s major milestones and the target date for completion. It can duplicate some of 

the entries in the checklist in the next section but should focus on higher-level milestones leading up to complete implementation.]

Milestone Target Date

Conduct Gap Analysis

...

Finalize SMS Manual

...

Provide SMS Training

...

Deploy Hazard Reporting System

...

Full Implementation of SMS

Conduct first evaluation of SMS implementation

II. Challenges

[List and explain any challenges the airport may face that could impact these target dates (e.g., lease or union negotiations or 

procurement schedules). Where possible, include a description of the methods the airport will use to mitigate these challenges where 

possible and track the status of these issues.]

Approved by: [signature]

Date: [insert date]

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[Insert Airport Name] Safety Management System

Implementation Plan

SMS Implementation Checklist:

[Instructions: The Implementation Checklist provides a guide for airports to use in developing and deploying the essential components and 

elements of an SMS. For efficiency, airports should look to existing systems, processes, and procedures to determine whether they can be 

used within the SMS. Additionally, the “status of implementation” column can be updated over time to communicate progress to the 

accountable executive. An airport could use this checklist as a means for updating the accountable executive on the progress of SMS

implementation.]

Item Task Description of Any Existing 

Systems/Processes Being Used to 

Meet the Task

Status of 

Implementation

Target for 

Completion

1. Documentation

1.1 SMS Manual (optional method)

2. Safety Policy

2.1 Identify the accountable executive

2.2 Develop and distribute a Safety Policy Statement

2.3 Make Safety Policy Statement available to all 

employees and tenants

2.4 Identify organizational structure responsible for 

airport safety issues

2.5 Communicate safety organizational structure to 

airport employees and managers

2.6 Define airport management, including various 

levels throughout the organization, 

responsibilities and accountabilities for safety 

issues

2.7 Establish a procedure to periodically review 

management responsibilities and accountabilities 

for safety issues

2.8 Establish Safety Objectives

Approved by: [signature] 3 of 84

Date: [insert date]

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[Insert Airport Name] Safety Management System

Implementation Plan

2.9 Establish process or procedure to maintain and 

periodically review the Safety Objectives

2.10 Define methods, processes, and organizational 

structure necessary to meet Safety Objectives

3. Safety Risk Management

3.1 Establish a system for identifying safety hazards

3.2 Establish a systematic process to analyze hazards 

and their associated risks to an acceptable level

3.3 Establish a system for regular assessment to 

ensure mitigations are effective

3.4 Establish processes or procedures to document 

SRM efforts and retain those documents

4. Safety Assurance

4.1 Establish processes or procedures to monitor 

safety performance and safety objectives 

identified through Safety Policy

4.2 Establish a hazard reporting system that provides 

a means for reporter confidentiality

4.3 Maintain the hazard reporting system and 

establish a process for reviewing and analyzing 

reported hazards

4.4 Establish a process or procedure for reporting 

safety information and data on a regular basis to 

the accountable executive

5.0 Safety Promotion

5.1 Develop training on airport’s SMS requirements 

specific to the audience’s roles and 

responsibilities

5.2 Provide initial training to personnel with roles

and responsibilities in airport’s SMS

Approved by: [signature]

Date: [insert date]

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[Insert Airport Name] Safety Management System

Implementation Plan

5.3 Develop processes or procedures to record 

training

5.4 Develop informational material about hazard 

awareness and reporting

5.5 Develop methods for communicating important 

safety information

5.6 Establish a procedure to periodically review and 

update communication methods

5.7 Develop processes or procedures to record safety communications

Approved by: [signature]5 of 84

Date: [insert date]

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Appendix D. Sample SMS Manual

This appendix contains a sample SMS Manual for a small-to-medium-size airport.
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Safety

Management

System

Manual

Gambrills Regional Airport

Washington, DC

January 1, 2012
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Table of Contents

Section 1: Introduction to Gambrills’ Safety Management System (SMS)..................... 64

Section 2: Safety Policy................................................................................................... 65

Section 3: Safety Risk Management................................................................................ 68

Section 4: Safety Assurance............................................................................................. 72

Section 5: Safety Promotion ............................................................................................ 74

Appendix 1: Definitions and Acronyms.......................................................................... 75

Appendix 2: Safety Policy Statement .............................................................................. 75

Appendix 3: Safety Objectives ........................................................................................ 75

Appendix 4: Hazard Assessment Form............................................................................ 75

Appendix 5: Hazard Reporting Form .............................................................................. 75
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Section 1: Introduction to Gambrills’ Safety Management 

System (SMS)

1.1 What is SMS?

[Include a brief, plain language description of the SMS and what it means.]

A Safety Management System (SMS) is a systematic approach to managing safety, including all 

necessary organizational structures, accountabilities, statements, processes, and procedures.

SMS provides airport management with a set of tools to make safety related decisions. SMS also 

helps airport management identify safety risks associated with airport operations, development, 

and other changes to proactively address those issues before they result in accidents, incidents, 

injury, or damage.

It materializes itself through a series of complementary processes and procedures which are 

closely coordinated by a well-defined safety organizational structure, where the safety roles and 

responsibilities of everyone, including top management, are clearly defined and understood by 

all. Further, safety objectives and data analysis will facilitate continuous improvement 

throughout the airport.

....

1.2 Applicability

[Include a statement recognizing who this must following the SMS requirements.]

All individuals with access to the movement and non-movement areas of the airport must follow 

the policies and procedures identified in this Manual. Every individual with this access has a 

responsibility for safety. All tenants will ensure that employees with access to the areas 

identified in Section 1.3 receive proper training or awareness of their roles and responsibilities 

under the airport’s SMS.

1.3 Scope

[Include a statement declaring the physical areas where the SMS initiatives shall apply. It may 

be helpful to include an ALP or graphical depiction of scope.]

All processes and procedures developed under the SMS apply to the movement and nonmovement area. SMS initiatives do not apply to landside operations including inside the 

terminals.
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Section 2: Safety Policy

2.1 Accountable Executive

[Identify the Accountable Executive by Position Title and include any specific responsibilities for 

the role.]

The [Insert Position] is the designated Accountable Executive for the Gambrills Regional 

Airport.

2.2 Safety Policy Statement

[Reference the Safety Policy Statement in this section. The document is usually inserted as an 

Appendix because it will be signed by the Accountable Executive and may need to be updated 

over time. A summary of that statement can also be included in this section. Also add any 

procedures for reviewing the Safety Policy Statement for currency.]

Gambrills Regional Airport is committed to ensuring that safety is a top priority of management. 

As declared in the airport’s Safety Policy Statement (See Appendix 2), the airport encourages 

confidential hazard reporting and commits itself to communicating safety issues and resolution 

of reported hazards.

....

The Safety Policy Statement will be reviewed annually to ensure it remains current.

2.3 Safety Organizational Structure

[Identify the organization structure responsible for making safety related decisions on the 

airport. If a committee format is used for some of these processes, identify that organization.]
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The Safety Committee is comprised of representatives of the three airport divisions and tenants 

on the airport including the regional airline, fixed-base operator, and flight school. The SMS 

Manager chairs the Safety Committee.

2.4 Management Responsibility and Accountability for Safety Issues

[For those positions or committees identified in 2.3, clearly list each position or committee’s 

responsibilities and accountabilities for safety issues. This description should not include items 

outside the scope of the SMS.]

Accountable Executive

The Accountable Executive ensures that the necessary assets and financial support are available 

for successful SMS development, implementation, operation, and continuous improvement.

In carrying out those duties, the Accountable Executive is responsible for:

 Accepting and signing the Safety Policy Statement

 Providing adequate resources to ensure implementation and management of the SMS

 Providing leadership in safety related issues by actively participating in safety significant 

events

 Ensuring that all managers are aware of, and held accountable for their roles and 

responsibilities under the SMS

 Promoting and encouraging a positive safety culture within the airport

 Ensuring ongoing effectiveness of the SMS by facilitating, participating, or reviewing 

periodic reviews and evaluations

 Designating the airport’s safety objectives

 Reviewing SMS related data provided by the SMS Manager

SMS Manager

The SMS Manager [Operations Manager] is responsible for the daily implementation, operation, 

and oversight of SMS related activities and initiatives.

In carrying out those duties, the SMS Manager is responsible for:

 Revising and maintaining the SMS Manual

 Chairing the SMS Committee

 ....

Safety Committee

The Gambrills Regional Airport establishes a Safety Committee comprised of representatives of 

the airport divisions and tenants and chaired by the SMS Manager. The Safety Committee meets

at least quarterly. The Safety Committee is responsible for:
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 Making safety recommendations to the Accountable Executive

 Establishing panel membership for complex Safety Risk Assessments requiring 

stakeholder subject matter expertise

 Reviewing major accident and incident investigations for the airport since the past 

meeting

 ....

Maintenance Manager

....

Risk Administrator

....

2.5 Gambrills’ Safety Objectives

[Safety objectives should be quantitative. They may be attached as an appendix to allow easier 

revisions and dissemination. Be sure to include any processes or procedures for review, 

updating, tracking, and communicating.]

To facilitate continuous emphasis on improving safety, Gambrills Regional Airport establishes

safety objectives. These objectives are quantitative and should reflect national and local safety 

goals.

The current objectives are attached in Appendix 3.

The Accountable Executive approves new safety objectives as recommended by the Safety 

Committee and the SMS Manager. Any revisions are communicated to airport employees and 

tenants.

....
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Section 3: Safety Risk Management

Gambrills Regional Airport supports the proactive formal analysis of hazards as is key to Safety 

Risk Management (SRM) and SMS. SRM is defined as a formal process within SMS composed 

of describing the system, identifying hazards, analyzing, assessing, and mitigating risk.

Gambrills Regional Airport is committed to establishing and maintaining hazard identification 

and analysis processes as are discussed in this section. No unacceptable risk, otherwise referred 

to as “High Risk”, is tolerated at the airport.

....

3.1 Hazard Identification

[Describe the processes and initiatives in place that identify and communicate hazards through 

the SMS.]

Hazards and safety issues are identified through the following means:

 Daily Self-Inspections

 Maintenance Logs

 Confidential Hazard Reporting System

 Monthly Managers/Tenant Meetings

The SMS Manager is responsible for hazard intake and initial processing and determines whether 

further action under the airport’s SRM processes is required.

....

3.2 SRM Process

[Explain what processes will be used to formally assess hazards. What triggers this assessment? 

Who conducts it? When is a panel of subject matter experts used? Can individuals conduct 

hazard assessment? What are the airport’s definitions and categories for severity and likelihood 

and is there a predictive risk matrix that should be used?]

Gambrills Regional Airport uses the 5-step process for hazard assessment which includes:

1. Describing the System

2. Identifying Hazards

3. Analyzing Risk

4. Assessing Risk

5. Mitigating Risk
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The 5-step process is instituted for any operational change on the airport including changes in 

tenant operations within the movement and non-movement areas, and for changes in airfield 

infrastructure. The 5-step process is used when safety trends are identified through Safety 

Assurance activities or hazards are identified through self-inspection, maintenance logs, 

management meetings, or reported through the Confidential Hazard Reporting System. The SMS 

Manager has the authority to conduct hazard assessment for any other issue he or she deems 

necessary.

Hazard assessment takes two forms: hazard triage and integrated hazard assessment.

The SMS Manager has the authority to conduct or delegate hazard triage. All identified hazards, 

trends, or operational changes already being implemented go through hazard triage which is 

when the SMS Manager or their designee individually conducts the 5-step process to quickly 

determine if any hazards present unacceptable risk and require immediate mitigation.

For those complex changes to airfield infrastructure or identified hazards that subject matter 

expertise outside the airport, then an integrated hazard assessment is conducted. The SMS 

Manager notifies the Safety Committee when an integrated hazard assessment is needed. The 

Safety Committee then establishes a panel of subject matter experts.

Individuals or panels conducting hazard assessment use the following definitions and tables for 

analysis. No High Risk is accepted without mitigation. The Accountable Executive is informed 

of any hazard assessment that results in High Risk. Where mitigation is not possible, the 

Accountable Executive is responsible for approving the continued operation.
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High Risk level occurrences are unacceptable and should be promptly mitigated to an 

acceptable level of safety.

Moderate-High level of occurrences, are generally unacceptable, but with the 

implementation of appropriate controls, the occurrence could become an acceptable

risk.

Medium level of occurrences, are generally acceptable, providing the appropriate safety 

controls have been established.

Low level occurrences, pose little or no risk and have adequate levels of control 

established.

....

3.3 Means for ensuring mitigations are effective

[Describe the process or procedure that will be used to verify that mitigations are having their 

desired effect. This process or procedure will be closely tied to Safety Assurance. Who is 

responsible for this action and will the hazard assessment need to be re-verified?]

The SMS Manager is responsible for reviewing data through the airport’s Safety Assurance 

program to verify that mitigations required under SRM are having their desired effect. In those 

cases where data indicates mitigations are ineffective, the SMS Manager re-verifies the hazard 

assessment and for those developed by a panel; determines whether the panel should re-convene.

....
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3.4 Documentation and Record Retention

[Describe the documentation and retention policies for SRM related documents.]

All hazard assessments conducted either individually by the SMS Manager, their designee, or by 

a panel of subject-matter experts established by the Safety Committee, are documented using the 

Hazard Assessment Form (Appendix 4). Dissenting opinions or any additional narrative are

included by attachment to the Form.

SRM related documents are retained electronically in the airport’s shared network for the life of 

the change, operation, or as long as mitigations are being implemented.

....
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Section 4: Safety Assurance

Safety Assurance is a critical part of the SMS since it includes processes that help determine the 

effectiveness of SMS initiatives and institute a Confidential Hazard Reporting System. Safety 

Assurance is the process management functions that evaluate the continued effectiveness of 

implemented risk mitigation strategies; support the identification of new hazards; and function to 

systematically provide confidence that an organization meets or exceeds its safety objectives 

through continuous improvement.

4.1 Safety Performance Monitoring

[Describe how safety objectives will be monitored. What data will be collected and how? Who’s 

responsible for collecting and analyzing the data? Include any procedures for accident and 

incident investigations. Describe methods for safety evaluation including who conducts, how 

often, and what they should cover.]

The SMS Manager is responsible for overseeing data collection and analysis to look for safety 

trends, identify new hazards, and verify compliance with SMS requirements. Data analysis also 

is used to verify performance with safety objectives.

Data is collected from the following sources:

 Daily Self-Inspection Reports

 Maintenance Logs

 ....

Safety evaluations are conducted quarterly and annually. Quarterly evaluations focus on 

evaluating compliance with one aspect of SMS requirements. Annual evaluations verify airportwide compliance with all SMS requirements and report on safety performance as it relates to 

established safety objectives.

....

4.2 Confidential Hazard Reporting System

[Explain how the airport will establish and maintain a confidential hazard reporting system. 

Include any clauses that except individuals from confidentiality such as intentional or reckless

behavior. What format will reports be made? Who reviews the reports and is responsible for 

action? How will reporters get feedback?]

Gambrills Regional Airport encourages everyone who has access to the airfield to report any and 

all safety concerns, hazardous conditions, and incidents and accidents. Many incidents can be 

avoided if a concern is reported in a timely manner.
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Employees and tenants have two ways to report safety concerns: in paper via drop-boxes 

throughout the airport and electronically through the airport’s internet portal. A copy of the 

Hazard Reporting Form is available in Appendix 5. Reporters can submit the form anonymously 

or include their name and contact information.

Operations staff is responsible for checking drop-boxes daily and forwarding any forms found to 

the SMS Manager. The SMS Manager reviews the paper and electronic forms on a daily basis to 

identify immediate safety concerns requiring action through hazard triage or forwarding to the 

SMS Committee for panel review.

....

4.3 Reporting Safety Information

[Describe what types of information will be reported to the accountable executive. Who has 

responsibility for this task and what method or format will be used to communicate? How often 

is this information communicated?]

The SMS Manager reports weekly and monthly to the Accountable Executive regarding safety 

information.

On a weekly basis, the SMS Manager reports the following via written report:

 Number of hazard reports received with summary of status

 Summary and examples of safety related communications with tenants

 ....

On a monthly basis, the SMS Manager meets with the Accountable Executive to report the 

following:

 Performance with safety objectives

 Status of ongoing mitigations required under SRM

 Status of SMS implementation

 ....

....
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Section 5: Safety Promotion

Safety Promotion means the combination of safety culture, training, and communication 

activities to support the implementation and operation of an SMS. At the Gambrills Regional 

Airport, employees have the resources necessary to carry out SMS initiatives including 

appropriate training. Further, airport management is committed to ensuring employees and 

tenants receive safety critical communications in a timely manner.

....

5.1 Training

[Describe what training will be provided and identify who receives what training. When will 

employees and tenants be trained? Can tenants train/inform their own employees? How will 

training be documented and how long will training records be kept? How often with the 

program be reviewed for currency? It may be beneficial to include the syllabus or course 

objectives of the training programs as an appendix to this section.]

Gambrills Regional Airport has a two-prong approach to training. All employees responsible for 

SMS implementation and oversight receive specific SMS training upon initial hiring and on an 

annual recurring basis. All other individuals, including tenant employees, with access to the 

airfield receive a safety orientation package upon hiring.

The SMS Manager is responsible for developing, implementing, and updating the training 

program and ensuing that tenants have safety orientation packages for all new employees.

....

5.2 Communication

[What constitutes safety related information that should be communicated? Describe the 

process for communicating information with employees and tenants including the method or 

format for communicating. How long will communications documentation be kept?]

Gambrills Regional Airport is committed to open and continuous communication of safety 

critical issues. The airport communicates safety issues using the following formats:

 Monthly Managers/Tenant Meetings

 Safety Bulletin Boards

 Direct email (via SMS Manager)

....
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Appendix 1: Definitions and Acronyms

Appendix 2: Safety Policy Statement

Appendix 3: Safety Objectives

Appendix 4: Hazard Assessment Form

Appendix 5: Hazard Reporting Form
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Appendix E. Sample Safety Reporting Dashboards

Figure AE-1. Sample Dashboard 1(Courtesy of San Antonio Airport System)
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Figure AE-2. Sample Dashboard 2 (Courtesy of San Antonio Airport System)
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Figure AE-3. Sample Dashboard 3 (Courtesy of City of Atlanta)
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