J-S38030-17

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

Appellee

v.

LATIFF HADI,

Appellant No. 1402 EDA 2016

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence November 26, 2013

In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County

Criminal Division at No(s): CP-51-CR-0005036-2012

BEFORE: GANTMAN, P.J., SHOGAN and FITZGERALD,*JJ.

MEMORANDUM BY SHOGAN, J.: FILED JULY 18, 2017

Appellant, Latiff Hadi, appeals from the November 26, 2013 judgment 

of sentence following his conviction by a jury of third-degree murder, 

conspiracy to commit aggravated assault, and endangering the welfare of a 

child on September 27, 2013. We affirm.

The trial court thoroughly summarized the facts of this horrific crime 

as follows:

On March 20, 2012, codefendants Tina Cuffie [(“Cuffie”)1] 

and [Appellant] were arrested and charged with murder and 

related charges in the death of their son, Khalil Wimes.1. . . 

____________________________________________

*

 Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.

1

 This Court affirmed the judgment of sentence of Appellant’s co-defendant, 

Tina Cuffie, on February 2, 2015. Commonwealth v. Cuffie, 120 A.3d 

365, 3597 EDA 2013 (Pa. Super. 2015) (unpublished memorandum).
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1

 [Appellant] is also known as Floyd Wimes. [N.T., 

9/25/13, at 22].

* * *

Alicia Nixon was approached in 2006 to raise the child 

victim in this case, Khalil Wimes, who was not yet born but 

whose parents [Appellant and Cuffie] had three children under 

the supervision of Philadelphia’s Department of Human Services 

(“DHS”). [Appellant’s] mother initially asked if [Nixon] and her 

husband would take in the unborn child, and then a week after 

he was born, [Appellant], who is Nixon’s cousin, asked if [Nixon] 

were [sic] still willing to take [in the baby]. When Nixon said 

yes, [Appellant, Cuffie, Appellant’s mother], and a representative 

of DHS came with Khalil to her home. The DHS permitted 

[Appellant and Cuffie] to see Khalil, but not to take custody of 

him because their home was unfit for a child.

For a time, this arrangement was agreeable to all parties, 

and [Appellant and Cuffie] saw Khalil during the day several 

times a week but always returned him to Nixon’s home at night. 

Eventually, however, [Appellant] exchanged words with Nixon as 

he was picking Khalil up for the day, and threatened not to 

return him to her that evening. Nixon became worried that he 

would follow through on his threat, and called the police, 

directing them to meet her at a supermarket where [Cuffie] 

worked and where [Appellant, Cuffie,] and Khalil frequently 

spent time together during the day. The police made sure that 

Khalil was returned to Nixon’s care, but shortly thereafter Nixon 

initiated legal proceedings to gain permanent custody of Khalil. 

[Appellant and Cuffie] contested custody, and were temporarily 

awarded custody of Khalil shortly after he turned [one], in 

February of 2007. One week later, Khalil was returned to 

Nixon’s custody, because [Appellant and Cuffie] had failed to 

obtain necessary asthma medication and had not followed an 

appropriate diet for [Khalil], and he had to be hospitalized within 

a week.

During his first three years when he lived with Nixon, 

Khalil thrived. He reached early milestones like holding his 

bottle, crawling, and walking on or ahead of schedule. By the 

time he was three, he was learning both English and Arabic, and 

could read certain words and write his name with assistance. He 

was also a healthy eater. Nixon addressed Khalil’s early issues 
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with asthma and eczema with diet and skin cream, and both 

cleared up. Nixon kept many photographs she had taken of 

Khalil, and in those photographs he appears to have a healthy 

weight, clear, unscarred skin, and a bright demeanor. After 

March of 2009, when Khalil was removed from [Nixon’s] care 

and returned to [Appellant and Cuffie], who did not allow Nixon 

any visitation, Nixon did not see [Khalil] again until his funeral.

At approximately 1:00 a.m. on March 20, 2012, Gary 

Hines, a social worker with DHS, received a hotline call from the 

Children’s Hospital of Philadelphia, (“CHOP”) about a child who 

had recently come to the hospital and was dead. He went to the 

hospital, as the call indicated that there were other small 

children in the deceased child’s family. There he spoke to the 

child’s parents, [Appellant and Cuffie]. Cuffie told him that Khalil 

had fallen getting out of the tub. She also told him that [Khalil] 

would not eat regular food, so they fed him primarily fast food, 

and that [Khalil] was constantly vomiting. [Appellant] told him 

that he received a call that Khalil was injured, and then he went 

to the house and immediately arranged for an elder son to drive 

them to the hospital.

Hines also observed the body of [Khalil], who at the time 

of his death was six years of age but appeared to be three years 

of age and was extremely thin. Hines saw a knot on [Khalil’s] 

forehead and lesions in his mouth, as well as marks up and down 

his body on both sides. Hines also examined the parents’ other 

minor child, M.W., and saw no evidence of abuse.

Kiwan DaCosta, a social worker at [CHOP], met with 

[Appellant and Cuffie] at the hospital on the night that Khalil 

died. [Cuffie] told her that Khalil had fallen during his morning 

bath and injured his face, but had otherwise had a normal day, 

and that when she went to check on him in the evening he was 

not breathing. When DaCosta saw Khalil’s body, she 

immediately noticed that he was emaciated and covered with 

scars and injuries. Although he was six years old, he looked to 

her as if he was only three. When [Appellant and Cuffie] 

indicated to [DaCosta] that they were about to leave the 

hospital, DaCosta called the police to make sure that they were 

on their way and would arrive soon. The police arrived before 

[Appellant and Cuffie] left the hospital.
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Philadelphia Detective Mark Webb took a statement from 

[Appellant] on March 20th, 2012. In that statement, [Appellant] 

said that Khalil was accident-prone, and that he and [Cuffie] had 

trouble keeping [Khalil’s] weight up because of his vomiting. 

Philadelphia Detective Michael McGoldrick took a statement 

from [Cuffie] on March 20th, 2012 at 4:35 a.m. In it, [Cuffie] 

said that Khalil fell getting out of the bath the prior morning and 

landed on his face. She also said that Khalil tended to fall 

frequently and “marked easily.”

Philadelphia Detective Gregory Santamala took a second 

statement from [Appellant] on March 21, 2012 at 2:30 a.m. In 

it, [Appellant] indicated an awareness that if a doctor saw 

Khalil’s pre-death physical condition, “yes, you would get in 

trouble.” [Appellant] acknowledged that he would “tap him on 

his butt” but denied using a belt on him. He said that sometimes 

Khalil was punished by withholding his food from him. 

[Appellant] also said that he intended to find housing with his 

[new] girlfriend, . . . and move Khalil in with them at that time.

Philadelphia Detective Howard Peterman took a statement 

from [Cuffie] on March 21, 2012, at 11:35 a.m., in which she 

said that as Khalil was getting out of the bathtub on the morning 

of the day he died, she “popped him in the back of his head and 

knocked him to the floor,” causing [Khalil] to hit his face and 

split his lip. She also reported that for the rest of the day, Khalil 

seemed weak, wobbly, and disoriented. When asked if she had 

hit Khalil in the past, [Cuffie] said she had done so, with her 

hand and with a belt. When asked how often she would hit him 

with a belt, [Cuffie] said “it wasn’t every day but it was often 

enough.”

Officer Tiffany Richardson of the Philadelphia Police 

Department’s Crime Scene Unit went to [Khalil’s] home on March 

21st, 2012, to examine where [Khalil] received the injuries that 

led to his death. She saw, and photographed, several bloodspatter stains on the wall in the main hallway across from the 

bathroom, in [Khalil’s] bedroom, in the bathroom, and on a 

child’s toilet in another bedroom, as well as a hook-and-loop lock 

at the top of the outside of [Khalil’s] bedroom. Subsequent 

testing revealed that at least one of the blood spatter samples 

collected from [Appellant’s] apartment walls matched Khalil’s 

DNA, as did a sample from the child’s toilet; other samples were 
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inconclusive or did not contain DNA or sufficient DNA for a 

positive test.

Aaron Cuffie, [Cuffie’s] 28-year-old son and Khalil’s halfbrother, had been told by [Appellant and Cuffie] that they 

installed the latch on Khalil’s door in order to keep him from 

getting food from the kitchen during the night. [Cuffie] told 

Aaron that the marks and bruises on Khalil’s face and body were 

from fights with his younger sister, M.W., and from times when 

he would “hurt himself” while he was being spanked. Aaron saw 

Khalil the day before he died, when he looked sick and 

repeatedly passed out. Aaron told [Cuffie] that she should take 

Khalil to the hospital, and [Cuffie] replied that she was going to 

do that eventually. The next day, when he came to Cuffie’s 

home and saw that Khalil was unresponsive and appeared not to 

be breathing, he drove [Appellant and Cuffie] to the hospital 

with Khalil.

After he found out that Khalil had died, Aaron became very 

angry with both [Appellant and Cuffie]. At the hospital, [Cuffie] 

told [Aaron] that she was sorry and [Appellant] told him not to 

say anything to anybody.

Khalil had been home-schooled by [Cuffie], and at one 

point [Appellant] told Aaron that this was because [Appellant 

and Cuffie] did not want anyone to see Khalil and call DHS. 

Aaron saw Khalil being disciplined by being forced to run up and 

down the hallway in the family’s apartment, and said that 

[Khalil] would frequently fall while he was running. Aaron said 

that Khalil frequently vomited after eating, and that [Appellant 

and Cuffie] would become angry at [Khalil] and punish him when 

this happened. On the day before he died, Khalil was made to 

run up and down the hallway as punishment for vomiting, and 

when he fell and hit his head, [Cuffie] helped him back up and 

then directed him to continue running.

Kevin Cuffie, the 20-year-old son of [Appellant and 

[Cuffie], had seen Khalil being sent to stand in a corner for 

approximately two hours as punishment for transgressions such 

as getting food from the kitchen without permission. In 

December of 2011, [Kevin] noticed that Khalil was listless and 

weak. [Kevin] mentioned this to [Cuffie], who claimed that she 

was taking him to see a doctor. Kevin also noticed the 

accumulating scars and bruises on Khalil’s body, and saw them 
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multiply in the months before his death. [Kevin] saw both 

[Appellant and Cuffie] hit Khalil on various parts of his body as a 

form of discipline.

Wanda Byrd dated [Appellant] . . . for approximately nine 

months. Their relationship ended shortly after Khalil’s death. In 

the months prior to [Khalil’s] death, Byrd understood [Appellant] 

to be living with a friend of his near 21st and Mifflin Streets in 

Philadelphia, and separated from [Cuffie]. [Appellant] told her 

that Khalil was homeschooled because he was afraid that if Khalil 

went to school, he and [Cuffie] would get into trouble again with 

DHS due to Khalil’s issues with vomiting and wetting himself. 

She gave [Appellant] $20 to take Khalil to see someone about 

his medical issues, but to her knowledge he did not follow 

through. [Appellant] was with Byrd when [Cuffie] called to tell 

him that Khalil was unresponsive, at which time he left to join 

[Cuffie].

Randee Cuffie Shaw, [Cuffie’s] 26-year-old daughter and 

[Appellant’s] step-daughter, testified for [Cuffie]. [Shaw] lived 

with her mother from July, 2011, to January, 2012. During that 

time, she observed her mother hit Khalil with her hand and with 

a belt on various occasions, sometimes on his head. She also 

observed [Appellant] hit [Khalil] with a phone charger cord and 

with his hand, including at least once on his head. She noticed 

marks that she thought were made with an extension cord on 

Khalil’s limbs, and said that she has the same marks on her 

arms, inflicted by [Appellant]. Shaw also saw [Appellant] 

withholding food from Khalil, and would sometimes sneak Khalil 

extra food while she lived with him.

Dr. Sam Gulino, Chief Medical Examiner for the City of 

Philadelphia, gave expert testimony as to the cause and manner 

of Khalil’s death, which he attributed to starvation and physical 

abuse, including a serious recent blow to the head. [Dr. Gulino] 

described numerous scars from a looped weapon, such as an 

electrical cord, which covered Khalil’s torso, and head and brain 

injuries in various states of healing. He also described Khalil’s 

extreme state of starvation, as demonstrated by, for instance, 

loose folds of skin around his buttocks where fat was once 

stored.
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Trial Court Opinion, 2/10/14, at 1–8 (internal citations and footnotes 

omitted).2

Following the denial of a pretrial motion to suppress, Appellant 

proceeded to a bench trial with Cuffie on September 25–27, 2013. The trial 

court adjudged both Appellant and Cuffie guilty of third-degree murder, 

conspiracy to commit aggravated assault, and endangering the welfare of a 

child.3 On November 26, 2013, the trial court sentenced both Appellant and 

Cuffie to serve terms of twenty to forty years of imprisonment for thirddegree murder followed by a consecutive term of ten to twenty years in 

prison for conspiracy to commit aggravated assault.

Appellant filed a post-sentence motion on December 9, 2013, three 

days beyond its due date of December 6, 2013. Pa.R.Crim.P. 720 (“[A] 

written post-sentence motion shall be filed no later than 10 days after 

imposition of sentence.”). The trial court denied the motion on December 

11, 2013. Appellant filed a notice of appeal to this Court on January 9, 

2014. We quashed the appeal, which was filed forty-four days after the trial 

court imposed sentence, as untimely on February 4, 2015, holding that 

“Appellant was thus required to file his notice of appeal ‘within 30 days of 

____________________________________________

2

 In its Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a) opinion filed on May 24, 2016, the trial court 

attached and incorporated its original Rule 1925(a) opinion filed on 

February 10, 2014.

3 18 Pa.C.S. §§ 2502(c), 903(a) and 2702(a)(1), and 4304(a)(1), 

respectively.
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imposition of sentence’—or, by December 26, 2013. Pa.R.Crim.P. 

720(A)(3); Pa.R.A.P. 903(a).” Commonwealth v. Hadi, 120 A.3d 368, 377 

EDA 2014 (Pa. Super. filed February 4, 2015) (unpublished memorandum at 

2).

Appellant filed a pro se petition for collateral relief pursuant to the Post 

Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”), 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 9541–9546, on March 24, 

2015. New counsel was appointed, who filed an amended PCRA petition on 

April 6, 2016. The PCRA court reinstated Appellant’s appeal rights nunc pro 

tunc on April 28, 2016. Both Appellant and the trial court complied with 

Pa.R.A.P. 1925.

Appellant raises the following two issues in this appeal:

A. Whether the evidence was insufficient as a matter of law to 

sustain Appellant’s conviction for murder in the third 

degree[?]

B. Whether the evidence was insufficient as a matter of law to 

sustain Appellant’s conviction for conspiracy to commit 

aggravated assault[?]

Appellant’s Brief at 6.

Because a determination of evidentiary sufficiency presents a 

question of law, our standard of review is de novo and our scope 

of review is plenary. Commonwealth v. Sanchez, 614 Pa. 1, 

36 A.3d 24, 37 (2011).

“In reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, we must 

determine whether the evidence admitted at trial, and all 

reasonable inferences drawn from that evidence, when viewed in 

the light most favorable to the Commonwealth as verdict winner, 

was sufficient to enable the fact finder to conclude that the

Commonwealth established all of the elements of the offense 

beyond a reasonable doubt.” Commonwealth v. Fears, 575 
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Pa. 281, 836 A.2d 52, 58–59 (2003). The Commonwealth may 

sustain its burden by means of wholly circumstantial evidence. 

Commonwealth v. Spell, 611 Pa. 584, 28 A.3d 1274, 1278 

(2011). Further, the trier of fact is free to believe all, part, or 

none of the evidence. Commonwealth v. Martin, 627 Pa. 623, 

101 A.3d 706, 718 (2014).

Commonwealth v. Woodard, 634 Pa. 162, 129 A.3d 480, 489–490 

(2015), cert. denied sub nom. Woodard v. Pennsylvania, 137 S.Ct. 92 

(2016).

Appellant asserts that the evidence supporting third-degree murder is 

insufficient because it showed he was “more inept than . . . cruel.” 

Appellant’s Brief at 19. Appellant suggests he “lacked the hardness of heart 

and the malice required for third degree murder,” without citing to the 

evidence that supports that claim. Id. at 19–20. With regard to his 

conviction of conspiracy to commit aggravated assault, Appellant contends 

that while he was neglectful, his “conduct and . . . agreement or joint action

[with Cuffie] did not rise to the level of intent required under the law.” Id. 

at 20.

Third degree murder is a killing committed with malice. Malice 

consists of “wickedness of disposition, hardness of heart, wantonness, 

cruelty, recklessness of consequences, or a mind lacking regard for social 

duty.” Commonwealth v. Devine, 26 A.3d 1139, 1146 (Pa. Super. 2011) 

(quoting Commonwealth v. Johnson, 719 A.2d 778, 785 (Pa. Super. 

1998)). The malice required for third degree murder does not require a 

specific intent to kill. It “is an intentional act, characterized by malice, that 
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results in death, intended or not.” Commonwealth v. Fisher, 80 A.3d 

1186, 1191 (Pa. 2013).

Conspiracy to commit aggravated assault encompasses the following:

§ 2702. Aggravated assault

(a) Offense defined.—A person is guilty of aggravated assault 

if he:

(1) attempts to cause serious bodily injury to another, or causes 

such injury intentionally, knowingly or recklessly under 

circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to the value of 

human life;

18 Pa.C.S. § 2702.

Criminal conspiracy is governed by Section 903 of the Crimes Code:

(a) Definition of conspiracy.—A person is guilty of conspiracy 

with another person . . . to commit a crime if with the intent of 

promoting or facilitating its commission he:

(1) agrees with such other person . . . that they or 

one or more of them will engage in conduct which 

constitutes such crime or an attempt or solicitation 

to commit such crime; or

(2) agrees to aid such other person or persons in the 

planning or commission of such crime or of an 

attempt or solicitation to commit such crime.

18 Pa.C.S. § 903; Commonwealth v. Chambers, 157 A.3d 508, 512 (Pa. 

Super. 2017).

In response to these claims, the trial court stated the following, in 

pertinent part:

Here, ample physical and eyewitness evidence established 

that both defendants routinely struck and otherwise abused their 

child victim with their hands and with belts and cords, and that 
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both defendants were complicit in denying him food, thus 

weakening him, and keeping him away from school and from 

medical care in order to cover up their own abuse. This latter 

point shows not only that they placed their own concerns before 

the very real medical and developmental needs of their child 

victim, but it also demonstrates their consciousness of their 

culpability and their conspiracy to hide their victim, thus 

prolonging the time during which they might beat and starve 

him.

The defendants worked in concert to perform, over time, 

three separate courses of action that each establishes their 

extreme and hardhearted indifference to Khalil’s life and wellbeing. First, they starved him so severely that he appeared to 

be a child of half his age and thereby, for all practical purposes, 

utterly arrested his normal physical and intellectual 

development. In doing so, they went so far as to punish him by 

withholding food and putting a lock on his door so that he could 

not obtain food on his own. Second, knowing the weakened 

state into which they had reduced him, they nevertheless beat 

him ruthlessly, covering his diminished body with scars. They 

did not spare his head, despite the fact that it is obviously a vital 

area. Third, they withheld medical care, in order that their 

behavior might not be subject to scrutiny and in order that they 

might continue to treat him in this appalling and obviously 

malicious manner. It is beyond cavil that their behavior 

establishes the requisite legal malice to support their convictions 

for Third Degree Murder, and this argument is meritless.

* * *

In Commonwealth v. Geiger, 944 A.2d 85 (Pa. Super. 

2008), alloc. denied, 964 A.2d 1 (Pa. 2009), the Superior Court 

upheld a conviction for Conspiracy to Commit Third Degree 

Murder where the defendant and her boyfriend both routinely 

beat four young girls entrusted to their care, and failed to 

provide adequate food to them. The youngest of them 

succumbed to a particularly harsh beating carried out almost 

exclusively by the defendant’s boyfriend. The defendant’s 

conviction was upheld, as “the law is well-settled that 

conspirators are responsible for the actions of their cohorts, 

whether such conduct is planned by the consortium or engaged 

in by a conspirator without prior approval of the group.” Id. at 

92. There, as here, any codefendant quibbles over who was the 
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primary abuser of the child are irrelevant, both to the murder 

charge and to the charge of Conspiracy to Commit Aggravated 

Assault. This is especially true where, as here, both defendants 

acknowledged either to their adult children or to police that they, 

in concert, avoided permitting Khalil to go to school or taking 

him to see a doctor because they were afraid of getting into 

trouble. The evidence is more than sufficient to support 

[Appellant’s] conviction[] for Conspiracy, and this argument is 

meritless.

Trial Court Opinion, 2/10/14, at 10–12.

We have reviewed the complete record and considered the arguments 

of the parties and the applicable law. The record fully supports the existence 

of ample and sufficient evidence to uphold the verdicts of third-degree 

murder and conspiracy to commit aggravated assault.4

____________________________________________

4

 We are compelled to comment on the apparent failure by Philadelphia 

Department of Human Services to intervene in this case. Detective Michael 

McGoldrick presented a statement from Cuffie dated March 20, 2012, in 

which Cuffie stated that DHS closed Khalil’s case on March 6, 2009. N.T., 

9/27/13 at 132. Ms. Nixon, who raised Khalil the first three years of his life, 

testified she “begged” DHS to permit visitation with Khalil after he was 

thrust into Appellant’s and Cuffie’s care in 2009, but they refused, and 

eventually, “stopped tak[ing her] calls anymore.” N.T., 9/26/13, at 63.

It is noteworthy that no one from DHS testified at trial. Instead, on 

September 27, 2013, the final day of trial, all counsel stipulated to 

presentation of the structured progress notes prepared by Courtnei Nance, 

DHS caseworker for five of Appellant’s and Cuffie’s eight children, who had 

been removed from their care in 1995. N.T., 9/26/13, at 103; 9/27/13, at 

99–102. These notes, prepared on April 4, 2012, and admitted into 

evidence as Collective Exhibit C-88, N.T., 9/27/13, at 102, are not included 

in the record certified to us on appeal. The progress notes stated that Ms. 

Nance had “face-to-face” visits at Appellant’s and Cuffie’s home on 

November 26, 2011, and December 27, 2011, at ARC on February 4, 2012, 

at the home on February 18, 2012, and at ARC on March 3, 2012. N.T., 

9/27/13, at 99–102. Khalil was present at all of the meetings. Id.

(Footnote Continued Next Page)
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Judgment of sentence affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 7/18/2017

(Footnote Continued) _______________________

Recalling that Khalil died on March 20, 2012, these meetings occurred in 

the sixteen months preceding Khalil’s tragic death and as recently as mere 

weeks before the child’s murder. All family witnesses at trial testified to the 

drastically changed appearance of this little boy. All family witnesses 

testified there was an obvious latch on the outside of the child’s bedroom 

door. All witnesses testified to the bruises and scars readily apparent all 

over Khalil’s emaciated body. In Appellant’s March 20, 2012 statement to 

Detective Mark Webb of the Special Victims Unit, Appellant revealed, 

admittedly without providing a date, that “the DHS caseworker asked us if 

[Khalil] was okay because he would throw up and do stuff while she was 

there.” N.T., 9/26/13, at 108. All of these facts raise the unsettling 

question of whether our child welfare system failed this six-year-old boy as 

he was starved and tortured during the latter half of his life.