* This order and judgment is not binding precedent except under the

doctrines of law of the case, res judicata and collateral estoppel. The court generally disfavors the citation of orders and judg ments; nevertheless, an order and judgment may be cited under the terms and condi tions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3. 

## F I L E D United States Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit 

### APR 2 1997 

### PATRICK FISHER Clerk UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

TENTH CIRCUIT

JAMES JACKSON, Petitioner-Appellant,

v. WARDEN, ADMINISTRATIVE MAXIMUM, Florence, Colorado, Respondent-Appellee. No. 96-1222 (D.C. No. 95-S-2667) (D. Colo.)

ORDER AND JUDGMENT *

Before BRORBY, EBEL and KELLY , Circuit Judges.

After examining the briefs and appellate record, th is panel has determined unanimously that oral argument would not materiallyassist the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a); 10th Cir. R. 34.1.9. The c ase is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument.1 The case was subsequently transfered to the Distr ict of Colorado.

-2- Appellant James Jackson filed a petition for a writof habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (1994) in the United S tates District Court for the Southern District of Illinois. 1 The district court determined Mr. Jackson's actio n was without merit and dismissed the petition. Mr. Jackson appeals the district court's determination, and we affirm.

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND In 1990, Mr. Jackson was convicted of conspiracy to manufacture a controlled substance in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 84 6 (1994). The United States District Court for the Central District of Californ ia sentenced Mr. Jackson to a twelve-year term of imprisonment. Mr. Jackson was incarcerated at the United States P enitentiary in Terre Haute, Indiana, from September 21, 1993 until Janua ry 21, 1994. On January 19, 1994, a riot broke out in the inmate dining hall atTerre Haute Penitentiary. Several inmates and prison employees were assaultedand injured. Prison employee Gary Wills reported he observed Mr. Jackson holding a knife and shouting at prison staff during the riot. Although Mr. Jackson denied any involvement in the disturbance, the Bureau of P risons filed an incident report-3-

charging Mr. Jackson with possession of a weapon. Mr. Jackson was placed in administrative detention and the incident was refer red to a Special Investigative Service for investigation. The Special Investigative Service determined Mr. Ja ckson's role in the prison riot was larger than prison officials origin ally had thought. Hence, the Bureau of Prisons filed a second incident report ch arging Mr. Jackson with assault. Mr. Jackson received a Notice of Discipli nary Hearing for both incident reports informing him of his rights with respect to the disciplinary process. Mr. Jackson also received a staff representative to ass ist in preparing a defense to the charges against him. In April 1994, the Disciplinary Hearing Officer hel d hearings on the assault and possession of a weapon charges. Based on the e vidence submitted at the hearing, the Disciplinary Hearing Officer determine d Mr. Jackson possessed a weapon and "aid[ed] and assist[ed] in the serious a ssault on four staff members and four inmates." The Disciplinary Hearing Office r imposed the following sanctions on Mr. Jackson: (1) forfeiture of 263 days of statutory good time credit and (2) sixty days disciplinary segregation. In September 1994, Mr. Jackson filed his motion fora writ of habeas corpus, alleging the Bureau of Prisons violated his due process rights during the disciplinary hearing. Mr. Jackson accused Bureau o f Prison staff of fabricating2Because Mr. Jackson brought this action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241,

we need not determine whether a certificate of appe alability should issue pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2253. See Bradshaw v. Story , 86 F.3d 164 (10th Cir. 1996) (no certificate of appealability required where appella nt is federal prisoner and appeal is from final order denying § 2241 petition).

3 In his opening brief, Mr. Jackson appears to argu e the Bureau of Prisons also violated his rights under 28 C.F.R. § 0.95(c), (d) (1996). 28 C.F.R. § 0.95(c) requires the Director of the Bureau of Prisons to p rovide for the "protection, instruction, and discipline of all persons charged with or convicted of offenses against the United States." 28 C.F.R. § 0.95(d) ma kes the Director of the Bureau of Prisons responsible for the "[c]lassification, c ommitment, control, or treatment of persons committed to the custody of the AttorneyGeneral." Assuming 28 C.F.R. § 0.95 creates a private cause of action forfederal inmates (a premise we strongly doubt), we conclude Mr. Jackson has not sh own that the Bureau of -4- evidence and withholding exculpatory evidence. Notwithstanding Mr. Jackson's accusations, the United States Magistrate Judge det ermined Mr. Jackson was afforded the minimum requirements of due process atthe disciplinary hearing. Accordingly, the Magistrate Judge recommended that the district court dismiss Mr. Jackson's petition. The district court agreed with the Magistrate Judge's recommendation and dismissed Mr. Jackson's motion f or a writ of habeas corpus.

II. ANALYSIS Mr. Jackson appeals the district court's denial of his petition for a writ of habeas corpus. 2 Mr. Jackson contends the district court erred by failing to determine the prison disciplinary hearing violated his rights to due process under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. 3 Specifically, Mr. Jackson asserts hePrisons violated this regulation.

Mr. Jackson also asserts a "personal retaliation cl aim" and an Eighth Amendment claim in his opening brief. Having thoro ughly reviewed these claims, we find them to be utterly without merit. Finally, Mr. Jackson claims the district court impr operly denied his petition without allowing him the opportunity to obtain cert ain discovery from the appellee. The availability of discovery during a h abeas corpus proceeding is committed to the sound discretion of the district c ourt. Campbell v. Blodgett , 982 F.2d 1356, 1358 (9th Cir. 1993). Here, to the exte nt the district court denied Mr. Jackson the opportunity to obtain any discovery fro m the appellee, we do not believe the court abused its discretion.

-5- sustained the following due process violation at th e disciplinary hearing: (1) he was denied adequate staff representation, (2) the d isciplinary hearing officer fabricated statements in his findings, and (3) excu lpatory evidence was withheld from Mr. Jackson. We review the district court's d enial of Mr. Jackson's habeas corpus petition de novo. Bradshaw , 86 F.3d at 166. It is true that federal inmates have a liberty inte rest in earned statutory good time credits. Ponte v. Real , 471 U.S. 491, 495 (1985). Such credits may not b e forfeited without due process of law. Id. However, "[p]rison disciplinary proceedings are not part of a criminal prosecution, and the full panoply of rights due a defendant in such proceedings does not apply. " Wolff v. McDonnell , 418 U.S. 539, 556 (1974). The Supreme Court has held t he minimum due process requirements for prisoners in the context of a disc iplinary hearing are: (1) written-6-

notice of the charges brought against the inmate atleast twenty-four hours before the hearing; (2) the opportunity to call witnesses and present evidence at the hearing; and (3) a written statement by the fact fi nder as to the evidence relied upon and the reason for any action taken. Id. at 564-66. Here, as determined by the district court, the Bureau of Prisons afforded Mr. Jackson the minimum requirements of due process at this disciplinary he aring. Thus, Mr. Jackson cannot establish a violation of his due process rig hts.

III. CONCLUSION For the reasons stated above, as well as the reason s set forth in the district court's March 11, 1996 order, we conclude Mr. Jacks on's appeal is without merit and should be dismissed.

DISMISSED

.

Entered for the Court

WADE BRORBY United States Circuit Judge