J-S75043-14

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

Appellee

v.

SEAN C. CRAWFORD,

Appellant No. 1600 EDA 2014 

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence entered April 30, 2014,

in the Court of Common Pleas of Chester County,

Criminal Division, at No(s): CP-15-CR-0003465-2011

BEFORE: ALLEN, LAZARUS, and MUNDY, JJ.

MEMORANDUM BY ALLEN, J.: FILED DECEMBER 08, 2014

Sean Crawford (“Appellant”) appeals from the judgment of sentence 

imposed after he violated the conditions of his parole. Appellant’s appointed 

counsel seeks to withdraw, citing Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 

(1967) and Commonwealth v. McClendon, 434 A.2d 1185 (Pa. 1981). 

We affirm the judgment of sentence and grant counsel’s petition to 

withdraw. 

The trial court summarized the pertinent facts and procedural history 

as follows: 

On August 29, 2011, [Appellant] was charged for an 

assault on his then girlfriend, Amanda Hayman (“Ms. Hayman”). 

[Appellant] pled guilty to Simple Assault before the Honorable 

Phyllis Streitel and was sentenced on November 1, 2011 to 6 to 

23 months incarceration. [Appellant] filed a Motion for Parole on 

January 9, 2012. [Appellant was released on parole on February 

22, 2012]. If [Appellant] had been in compliance with the 

conditions of his parole, it would have expired on July 22, 2013.
J-S75043-14

- 2 -

On July 21, 2012, Officer David Spigarelli of the West 

Goshen Police Department was dispatched to investigate the 

report of an assault. Upon arriving at the scene, a female 

assault victim, Ms. Hayman, stated to Officer Spigarelli that she 

was punched in the face by her fiancé, [Appellant]. Ms. Hayman 

was diagnosed with a broken nose. [Appellant] was taken into 

custody and charged for a second assault on Ms. Hayman [at 

Docket No. 2624-2013].

On July 22, 2012, pursuant to an application for a Bench 

Warrant and a Petition for Violation of Probation and Parole, a 

Bench Warrant was issued and a detainer was lodged by Chester 

County Adult Probation and Parole. The Petition alleged that 

[Appellant] had violated his parole by incurring new charges, 

failing to pay $1,384.00 in fines and costs, failing to submit to a 

drug and alcohol evaluation, failing to complete outpatient 

treatment, failing to complete the Domestic Violence Program, 

and having criminal contact with Ms. Hayman.

A jury trial on the 2013 case [at Docket No. 2624-2013] 

began on January 28, 2014. Ms. Hayman, two independent lay 

witnesses, and a medical expert testified. The jury returned a 

verdict of “Guilty” on the charge of Simple Assault. ... 

Thereafter, the sentencing proceeding [at Docket No. 2624-

2013] and a hearing on the parole violation of the 2011 case 

were held [on April 21, 2014 and April 30, 2014]. [O]n April 30, 

2014, [a] Violation of Parole Order was issued finding [Appellant 

in violation of the conditions of his parole] and [Appellant was 

sentenced] to the balance of the maximum term, 16 months and 

18 days. [Appellant] was made eligible for parole after serving 

six months. This sentence was to run consecutive to the one to 

two year state sentence imposed on the 2013 case.

[Appellant] filed a Motion to Modify Sentence immediately 

after the sentencing proceeding. [Appellant] argued that the 

sentence imposed was excessive and should be reduced. [The 

trial court] denied his motion without a hearing on May 9, 2014. 

On May 29, 2014, [Appellant] filed his appeal to the sentence 

imposed on April 30, 2014 and our denial of his Post-Sentence 

Motion on May 9, 2014. [Both Appellant and the trial court have 

complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b).]

Trial court opinion, 8/7/14, at 1-3 (footnotes omitted).
J-S75043-14

- 3 -

Appellant presents one issue for our review:

Did the [trial] court err when it considered [Appellant’s] 

conviction in Case No. CP-15-CR-2624-2013 — which is currently 

on Appeal in case No. 1600 EDA 2014 — when deciding to 

revoke his parole and to recommit him for the balance of his 

maximum sentence.

Anders Brief at 4.

Preliminarily, we note that Appellant’s counsel has filed a brief 

pursuant to Anders and its Pennsylvania counterpart, McClendon. See

Anders, 386 U.S. 738; McClendon, 434 A.2d at 1187. Where an 

Anders/McClendon brief has been presented, our standard of review 

requires counsel seeking permission to withdraw pursuant to Anders to: 

(1) petition the court for leave to withdraw stating that after making a 

conscientious examination of the record it has been determined that the 

appeal would be frivolous; (2) file a brief referring to anything that might 

arguably support the appeal, but which does not resemble a “no merit” letter 

or amicus curiae brief; and (3) furnish a copy of the brief to the defendant 

and advise him of his right to retain new counsel or raise any additional 

points that he deems worthy of the court's attention. Commonwealth v. 

McBride, 957 A.2d 752, 756 (Pa. Super. 2008). Counsel is required to 

submit to this Court “a copy of any letter used by counsel to advise the 

appellant of the rights associated with the Anders process.” 

Commonwealth v. Woods, 939 A.2d 896, 900 (Pa. Super. 2007). 

Pursuant to Commonwealth v. Santiago, 978 A.2d 349, 361 (Pa. 2009), 

appellant’s counsel must state in the Anders brief the reasons for 
J-S75043-14

- 4 -

concluding that the appeal is frivolous. If these requirements are met, this 

Court may then review the record to determine whether we agree with 

counsel’s assessment that the appeal is frivolous.

In the instant case, by letter dated September 23, 2014, Appellant’s 

counsel notified Appellant of his intent to file an Anders brief and petition to 

withdraw with this Court, and informed Appellant of his rights to retain new 

counsel and raise additional issues. That same day, Appellant’s counsel filed 

an appropriate petition seeking leave to withdraw. Finally, Appellant’s 

counsel has submitted an Anders brief to this Court, with a copy provided to 

Appellant. Accordingly, the technical requirements of Anders have been 

met. We will therefore conduct our own independent examination of the 

issues set forth in counsel’s brief to determine if they are frivolous and 

whether counsel should be permitted to withdraw.

Appellant asserts that the trial court erred in revoking his probation 

and resentencing him to the balance of his maximum sentence. Anders

Brief at 9-10. Specifically, Appellant argues that the trial court improperly 

considered his conviction at Docket No. 2524-2013, which is currently on 

appeal, when it revoked his parole and resentenced him to serve the balance 

of his maximum term.

“The primary concern of probation, as well as parole, is the 

rehabilitation and restoration of the individual to a useful life. It is a 

suspended sentence of incarceration served upon such lawful terms and 

conditions as imposed by the sentencing court.” Commonwealth v. 
J-S75043-14

- 5 -

Mullins, 918 A.2d 82, 85 (Pa. 2007). “[T]he purposes of a court's parolerevocation hearing—the revocation court's tasks—are to determine whether 

the parolee violated parole and, if so, whether parole remains a viable 

means of rehabilitating the defendant and deterring future antisocial 

conduct, or whether revocation, and thus recommitment, are in order. The 

Commonwealth must prove the violation by a preponderance of the evidence 

and, once it does so, the decision to revoke parole is a matter for the court's 

discretion. In the exercise of that discretion, a conviction for a new crime is 

a legally sufficient basis to revoke parole.” Commonwealth v. Kalichak, 

943 A.2d 285, 290-291 (Pa. Super. 2008) (citations omitted). “Following 

parole revocation and recommitment, the proper issue on appeal is whether 

the revocation court erred, as a matter of law, in confinement.” 

Commonwealth v. Snavely, 982 A.2d 1244, 1246 (Pa. Super. 2009) 

(citations omitted).

The trial court provided the following rationale for its revocation of 

Appellant’s parole:

Alarmingly, in this case, [Appellant’s] criminal violation was his 

assault of the same victim he had assaulted in 2011. This time 

he broke her nose. It was also significant to the [trial court] that 

[Appellant] had failed to complete any of the conditions 

originally imposed at the time of the sentencing on the 2011 

case. Any of those violations alone would have constituted the 

basis for finding [Appellant] had violated his parole. [T]he 

totality of the circumstances indicated [Appellant’s] parole had 

not been a successful means of rehabilitation.

Trial Court Opinion, 8/7/14, at 4.
J-S75043-14

- 6 -

Upon independent review of the record, we find no error in the trial 

court’s determination that Appellant violated the conditions of his parole. 

The November 11, 2011 sentencing order specifies that Appellant is to 

attend an anger management and domestic violence program. Trial Court 

Order, 11/11/11. At the parole revocation hearing, the Commonwealth 

presented testimony from Appellant’s probation officer that following 

Appellant’s release on parole on February 22, 2012, Appellant failed to 

complete drug and alcohol treatment, failed to complete a domestic violence 

program, in addition to incurring a new conviction for his second assault of 

Ms. Hayman. N.T., 4/21/14, at 5. Appellant was afforded opportunities for 

rehabilitation and domestic violence counseling, and his failure to comply 

with the trial court’s mandates supports the trial court’s decision to revoke 

Appellant’s parole. We conclude that the court had sufficient grounds upon 

which to revoke Appellant’s parole and recommit him to serve the remaining 

back time on his original simple assault charge.

We additionally find no merit to Appellant’s assertion that the trial 

court could not consider his 2013 conviction in its decision to revoke his 

parole because Appellant has appealed that conviction. In Commonwealth 

v. Smith, 534 A.2d 120 (Pa. Super. 1987), we explained “[the] 

Pennsylvania Supreme Court [has] found probation and parole revocation 

hearings could be held prior to the trial for the subsequent offense.” Smith, 

534 A.2d at 121-122 citing Commonwealth v. Kates, 305 A.2d 701 (Pa. 
J-S75043-14

- 7 -

1973). We reasoned that “[since] revocation may occur prior to trial, we 

cannot possibly find merit to [an] argument that revocation proceedings

should not occur until the appeal process [for the subsequent offense] is 

complete.” Smith, 534 A.2d at 122. Accordingly, Appellant’s claim fails.

Upon independent review of the record, we agree with counsel that 

this appeal is frivolous. We therefore grant counsel’s petition to withdraw 

and affirm the judgment of sentence.

Judgment of sentence affirmed. Petition to withdraw granted.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 12/8/2014