Opinion filed Jan uary29 , 2 010



### In The 

# Eleven th Court of Appeals

___________ 

### No. 1 1- 08 -0 00 14 -CV

____ ____ __ CHRIS TUS HE ALTH SOUTH EAST T EXAS D/B /A CHRISTU S ST . E LIZ ABE TH HOS PITA L, Ap pellant
V.
FL O WILSON AN D JA MES WILSON , A ppellee s

On App eal from the 60th Distric t Court
Jeff erson County, Texas Trial Court Cause No. B-175,570

O P I N I O N
F lo a nd James W ilson

su e d Chri stu s H e a lthSouthe a st T e xas d /b/ a Chr ist us St. El iza

be th Hospital for injuries F lo sustained when she slipped and fell in a hospital parkingg ara g e. The jury found that St. Eliz ab et h an d Fl o Wil son were both neg lige nt. The jury allocate d 50% of the negl i gen ce t o St. Eli zabeth, 30% of the ne g lige nce to F lo, and the re maining 20% to a settling de fe nd ant. Th e jur

y a lso fo un d th a t F lo s us ta ine d d a ma g e s o f $ 79 5, 00 0. Th e tr ia l court re du c e d th is2

awa rd to ref lect F lo’s neg lige nce a

nd St. Eli za b et h ’s s et t lement cr edit, and it enter ed judg ment

a c c or din g ly . We a ff

ir m. I

. Back ground Christus Health operated S t. Eliz abeth Hospital. In 2002, St. Eli zabeth built a parking g ara g e that wa s known as the Calder or West g ara g e. Allco serve d as the building contra ctor. The g ara g e had f

ive levels an d fo u r stairwe lls. There w as a la nding at the stairwell entr ance on eac h level. Visitors walkingfrom their c ars to the stairs steppe d up onto the landing , and visitors walking from the stairs to their c ars steppe d off it. The pla ns for the g ara g e ca lled for the ste ps to be painted with a six -inch y ellow stripe on the top and side ; however , Allco fa iled to paint the steps, and St. El iza be th f a ile d to no tic e it. I n 2005, Flo we nt to St. Eliz abeth’ s to visit her sister-in-law

. She parke d on the sec ond level of the g ara g e and took the elevator to the first floor. Af ter he r visit, Flo returne d to the g ara g e. The elevator was out of se rvice , and she took the s tairs t o the s econd level. After exit ing the stairca se, Flo fa iled to see the la

nding ste p, and she f

ell and injured he rself. I I

. Issues St. El iza be th c ha lle ng e s th e jud g me nt w ithfo ur iss ue s, c o nt e n d i n g

t h a t th e e vid e nc e is le g a lly or fa ctually

insufficient to support the jury ’s neg lige nce f inding, that the tr ial court er re d b y not inc lu d in g a s e tt li n g to rtf e a s o r in th e n e g li g e n c e qu e s ti o n , an d th a t th e tr ia l c o u rt a ls o err ed by permitting e vidence of a subse quent re medial measur e. I I I

. Discussion A. Premises Liability. Property owner s owe a

duty to their invitees to exercise r easona ble ca re to prote ct them from dan ger o us conditions on the premises that ar e known or discovera

ble by the owner

. W

al- Ma rt Sto re s, In c . v . S

urra tt , 1 02 S.W. 3d

43 7, 44 1 (Tex

. App .—Ea stl and 20 03 , p e t. d e nie d) . T his duty does not ma

ke the owner

an insurer

of the invitee’ s safe ty

. W al-Mart Stores, Inc. v . Gonzalez , 968 S.W .2d 934, 936 (Tex. 1998). I nstead, the invit ee must establish that the owne r knewor should have known of a

dang erous c ondition on the premises that prese nted an unrea sonable risk of ha rm and that this condition prox imately cause d the invitee’s injury

. Se iden e c k v . Ca l B ay re uth e r A sso cs. , 451 S.W .2d 752, 754 (Tex. 1970).3

St. Eli z abeth a

rgues that the e vidence is leg ally insufficient, c ontending that there was no evidenc e that it ha d knowledg e of a condition posing an unrea sonable risk of harm, that there was
no evidenc e that a condition imposing an unrea sonable risk of harm exis ted, and that there was no
e v i d e n c e i t s a c t i o n s w e r e t h e p r o x i m a t e c a u s e o f F l o ’ s i n j u r y. 1. Standard of Review

. I n c on sid e ri nga

le gal su ffi cie nc y

c ha lle ng e , w e re vie w a ll the e vid e nc e in t he lig ht m os t favor able to the pr evailing party and indul g e every infere nce in its favor. City of Keller v. W ilson , 168 S.W .3d 802, 822 (Tex. 2005). We must credit any favor able e vidence if a re asonable fac tfinder could and disreg ard any contra ry evidenc e unless a reasonable fac tfinder could not. Id . at 821-22, 82 7. We m ay

su sta in a le g a l su ff

ic ie ncy chal le ng e on ly

wh e n ( 1) the re c or d d isc los e s a c omp le te absenc e of e vidence of a vital fa ct, (2) the court is bar red by ru l es o f l aw or

evidenc e fr om giving weig ht to the only evidenc e offere d to prove a vital fac t, (3) the only evidenc e off

ere d to prove a

vital fac t is no more than a mer e scintilla, or (4) the evidenc e conc lusively establishes the opposite of a vital fac t. Id . at 810. I n revie wing a fa ctual suff iciency challeng e, we consider all of the evidenc e and uphold the finding unless the evidenc e is too wea k to suppor

t it or the finding is so ag ainst the overwhelming weig ht of the evide nce a s to be manifestly u n j u s t. Pool v. Ford Motor Co. , 715 S.W .2d 629, 635 (Tex. 1986)

. Appropriate defe renc e must be g iven to the jury ’s deter mination, especia lly

conce rning its judgment on the we ight and cr edibility of witness testimony

beca use it is the sole judge of the

cre dibilit y of the witnesses a nd the weig ht to be g iven their testimony

. Nat’l Freight, Inc. v. Snyde r , 191 S.W .3d 416, 425 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2006, no pet.)

.

2. Knew or Should Have Known. St. Eli zabeth does not dispute that it knew, or at least should have known, that the curb w as unpainted. J ames P ear son, St. Eliz abeth’ s direc tor of pl ant s ervic es, t estified that the plans f or the g ara g e re qu ir e d th a t the are a wh e re F lo f

e ll b e pa int e d b ut t

hat it wa s n ot. He a g re e d th a t he sh ou ld have notice d this. I nstead, St. Eliz abeth c ontends that i t h ad n o notice that an unpa inted step constituted a dang erous c ondition, and it points to testimony that, prior to Flo’ s fall, there wer e no repor ted incidents in the park i n g gara g e’s stairw ells. The Wilsons contend that the g ara g e’s blueprints and evide nce of other fa lls in t he g ara g e constituted notice.4

The jury hear d from John McGinty , an ar chitect r etained by the Wils ons as an e x pert but called a s a witness by

St. Eli zabeth, to establish that Allco brea ched the construction contr act by not pa int ingthe c ur

b. Af te r S t. E liza

be th c omp le te d it s e xami natio n, Mc Gi nty te sti fi e d in

re sp on se to the Wilson s’ qu e sti on s th a t “ the re ha d b e e n a pr ior a c c ide nt at th is l oc a tio n, or in t he g ara g e , at a sim ila r l oc a tio n. ” Pe ars on

a lso te sti fi e d th a t he wa s awa re of pe op le fa lli ngof

f u np a int e d c ur

bs in the g ara g e prior to F lo’ s i n j u ry
. P earson testified that cur bs are painted to hig hlight ele vation chang es. The a

rea wher e F lo fell was pa inted afte r her fall, and to Pea

rson’s knowledg e, no one has fallen since

. St. Eliz abeth contends that this testimony is insufficient to prove notice beca use Pear son was
no t a sk e d to des c ri be the c ur bs ’ he ig hts , the ir

loc a tio n, or

the c ir c ums tanc e s o f t

he pr ior inc ide nts

. St. Eli zabeth direc ts us to the supreme cour t’s decision in Nissan Motor Co. Ltd. v. Armstrong , 145 S.W .3d 131, 143 (Tex. 2004), for the proposition that, without thi s evidenc e, Pear son’s testimony is no evidence

. Armstrong wa s a pr od uc ts l ia bil ity a c tio n invo lvi nga lle g a tio ns of a stu c k thro ttl e in a 300Z X. The c laimant offe red the testimony of four indivi d u al s wh o cl aim ed that they had experience d unintended acc eler ation events in the ir 300Z Xs. Id. The c ourt noted that the witnesse s could not identify

the def ect that c aused the ir unintended a cce leration; that one had bee n sanctioned for f iling a f rivolous suit; and that, in two incidents, the c ars ha d been e x amined by the individual’s expert or by

an indepe ndent g overnme ntal ag ency and no def

ect identifie d. Id. Th e c ourt fo un d th a t, be c a us e no ne of the wi tne sse s c ou ld ve ri fy a de fe c t a s th e c a

us e of the ir un int e nd e d a c c e le ratio n, it

was e rror to allow their testimony

. Id. We ag ree that mere ly beca use ot her people had fallen in the gar ag e is no evidenc e that the hospital was on notice that unpa inted curbs c o n s t i t u t ed an unr easona bly dang erous c ondition. Ho we ve r, we dis a g re e tha t Armstrong stands for the proposition that the Wi lsons failed to produce

any e vid e nc e of

no tic e . In a

no -e vid e nc e re vie w, we mus t vi e w t he evi dence in t

he lig ht m os t favor able to the Wilsons. City of Keller , 168 S.W .3d at 8 2 2

. The Wilsons contended that the unpainted curb was unrea sonably dang erous beca use Flo had inadequate notice of a n elevation chang e. The fac t that others had a lso fal l en o ff u n p ai n ted cur bs in the g ara g e is some evidenc e people we re not noticingthe eleva tion chang e. The jury , there fore , had leg ally sufficie nt evidence with which to conclude that the hospital had notice of a potentially

dang erous c ondition.Sim ilarly , see Motel 6 G.P., In c. v. Lopez , 929 S.W .2d 1, 3 (T ex
. 1996) (be ca use m ote l had no k

now le dg e of

a da n g er ous 1 condi tion, any

pre m is es li abi lit

y c la im pre dic at ed upon ne g lig ent m ai nte nanc e, a

f ai lu re t o w ar

n, or a bse nce of s af et y de v ic es is bar re d). 5

3. Unreasonably Dange rous Condit ion. St. Eli zabeth next arg ues that an unpa inted curb c annot constitute an unre asonably dang erous
c on dit ion a s a matte r o f l aw, po int ingto r e c e nt s up re me c ourt de c isi on s su c h a s Brinson Ford, Inc. v

. Alger , 228 S.W .3d 161 (Tex. 2007). The Wilsons respond that wh et her somethingis an

unrea sonably

dang erous c ondition is inhere ntly a fa ct question. Th e su prem e co ur

t de fi ne s an unr e a so na

bly da ng e ro us c on dit ion

a s “ on e in whic h th e re is a suff icient proba

bility of a h ar m ful event oc curr ing that a re asonably prudent pe rson would have f o r e s e e n it o r s o me s im il ar e v e n t a s li k e ly to h a ppen.” S

ei den eck , 4 51 S.W. 2d

a t 75 4. Th is definition prec ludes a de finitive, objective test. Id. Consequently , the Wil sons a re co rr ec t t o the extent that whether a

condition is unrea sonably dang erous is ordinar ily a fa ct question. I t would be a mistake, howe ver, to a ssume that this makes any fac t finding pr eclusive. The supre me cour

t has found conditions wer e not unreasonably dang erous a s a matter of

law. F o r e xa mp le , in S

ei d en eck , the cour

t held that a showroom r

ug was not unre asonably dang erous relying upon e vidence that no one had pr eviously tripped on it and upon the lack of evidenc e that the rugwas de fec tive or unusual. Id. at 754-55. In Brinson , the cour t held that a pede strian ramp was
no t an u n reasonably

dang erous c ondition as a matter of law. The court noted that the ramp met applicable safe ty

standards; tha

t i t “ w a s f u r ther outlined in y ellow stripping that the deale rship added, which is a common method used t o indicate a chang e in elevation”; that the hi g hest unrailed por tion

wa s lo we r t

ha n an aver age s tep ; and

that no on e ha d b e e n in

jur e d o n th e ra

mp i n o ve r t e n y e ars
. Brinson , 228 S.W .3d at 163

. There is no dispute that the hos pital’s parking g ara g e complied with the applica ble building codes, e ven thoug h the curb was unpainted, and St. Eli zabeth corr ectly notes that the mere fac t that something c an be ma de saf er is insuffic ient to make a c ondition unreasonably dang erous. See Brookshire G r o ce ry Co. v. Taylor , 222 S.W .3d 406, 408 (Tex. 2006) (a c ondition is not
unrea sonably dang erous simply beca use it is not foolproof). I n Taylor , a piec e of ic e on the f loor 1 was not an unr easona

bly dang erous c ondition because the store had no knowledg e of its presenc e.6

Id . at 40 9

. T h e co urt held that this lack of notice prec luded any duty to take pre ventive mea sures such as plac ing a dditional mats on the floor. But that was not the c ase he re. St. Elizabeth did have notice that people had fa llen off unpa inted curbs in the g ara g e. Furthermor e, McGinty testified that the cur b should have be en painted be cause there wer e two similar mater ials in a path of tra ffic a nd, there fore , people ne eded a war ning that there was a

n elevation chang e. The se fa ctors distinguish the p re s en t case from both Seidene ck and Brinson

. T h e ju

r y d id , th e r e f

o r e , h a v e le g a ll y

s u f f icient evidenc e with which to conclude that the unpainted curb was an unre asonably dang erous c ondition. 4. Proximate Cause. Prox imate ca

use consists of two fa ctors: cause -in-fa ct and forese eability

. Travis v. City of Me sq uite , 830 S.W .2d 94, 98 (Tex. 1992). The test for cause -in-fa ct is whether the neg lige nt act or omi ssi on wa s a su bs tanti a l f

a c tor in br ing ing a

bo ut the inj ur

y and wi tho ut whic h th e inj ur y wo uld not have oc curr ed. Id. Cause-in-f act must be proved by

evidenc e of pr obative for ce a nd not by mere conjec ture, gues s , or spec ulation. Leitch v. Hornsby , 935 S.W .2d 114, 119 (Tex. 1996). The evidenc e must be suffic i en t fo r t h e jury to determine w ithin a rea sonable proba bility that the plaintiff’s injury

would not have oc c u

r r ed without the def

endant’ s neg lige nce. Lenger v. Phy sician’s Gen. Hosp., I

nc , 455 S.W .2d 703, 706 (Tex. 1970). Caus e- i n -f ac t i s est ablished whe n the ac t or omission wa s a substantial fac tor in bring ing out the injurie s, and without it, the harm would not have oc curr ed. W

estern Inv s., Inc. v . Urena , 162 S.W .3d 547, 551 (Tex. 2005). I f the de fenda nt’s

a c tio ns me re ly fu

rn ish e d a c on dit ion

tha t ma de the inj ur ie s p os sib le , th e re c an b e no c a us e -i n- fa c t. Id. St. Elizabeth contends that ther e wa s no evidenc e that the f ailure to pa int the curb wa s the p r o xi m a t e c a

u s e o f F l o ’ s i n

j u r y b e c a u s e t h e W i l s o n s ’ t e s t i m o n y i s s p e c u l a t i v e
. S t . E lizabe th conten d s t h at t he Wilsons were re quired to produc e evide nce that paint attrac ts the attention of someone such a s Flo. St. Eliz abeth argued at trial that Flo wa s contributorily neg lige nt, and the jury at t ri b u t ed 3 0 % of the responsibility to he r. On appea l, St. Eliz abeth notes that people fall for a number of r easons, many of which are unrelated to visibil ity issues, and sug g ests that the Wils ons had the ob l igation to ex clude these or to otherwise establish that a painted c urb would have pr e ve nte d h e r f

a ll.7

The W ilsons direc t us to Flo’s testim ony that she would have seen a y ellow s tripe and that thi s w ou ld h ave pr e ve nte d h e r f a ll. Th e y a lso highli g ht R og e rs Jone s’ s te sti mony . H e wa s a B a pti st pastor who went to St. Eliz abeth’ s fre quently and wa s familiar with the pa rking g ara g e. Pastor Jones t es t i fi edt h at t h er e w as a p l at fo rm co m i n g o u t o f t h e s t ai rw el l , t h at t h er e w as an el ev at i o nch an ge betwee n the platform and the floor, and that there was nothing to highlig ht this chang e in elevation. He te sti fi e d th a t th e c ur

b c ou ld be mis se d, and

he state d th a t pa int ingit w ou ld h a ve he lpe d p e op le see the step. St. Eli zabeth is corre ct that there was no definitive, scientific study of the impact of a painted ste p a nd , in fa c t, t hat th e re wa s e vid e nc e that se ve ra l pe op le had fal len on or of f p a int e d c ur

bs

. Howeve r, the jury

did have e vidence that painting the curb w ould have made the step more visible. I n f a c t, t he su pr e me c ourt ha s no te d that thi s is the c omm on wa y to a le rt pe op le to e le vatio n c ha

ng e s. See B rinson , 228 S.W .3d at 163

. The jury also had Flo’s testimony that a painted c urb would have pr e ve nte d h e r f

a ll. Th is i s so me e vid e nc e that F lo f e ll b e c a us e sh e did

no t se e the c ha

ng e in elevation; that a painted cur b would have a lerted he r to this chang e; and, ther efor e, that a pa inted curb w ould have pr evente d her f all. I ssue One is ove rruled. 5. Factual Sufficiency

. I n a fa ctual suff

iciency revie w we c onsider all of the evidenc e. Pool , 715 S

. W

. 2 d at 6 35. St. Eli zabeth distinguishes the other falls in the g ara g e, conte nding that they wer e so dissimil ar that t h ey d o n o t co n s t i tu t e no t i ce t h at t h e un p ai n t ed cu rb wa s a da n ger o u s co n d i t i o n
. J ac k P at ri ckBr i ggs is responsible for risk manag ement, safe ty , and secur ity at the hospital. He te stified that the hospital had re ceive d repor

ts of three other fa lls in t he g ara g e. One occur red when a visitor f

ell afte r exiti ng her c ar, one occur

red w hen a visit or fell off a c urb af ter e x iting the e levator, a

nd the third involved a visitor in a whee lchair tipping over on the g round floor handica p ramp. St. Eli zabeth argues that t h e e l ev at o r i n ci d en ti s n o n o t i ce b ec au s e t h e v i s i t o r d i d n o tco mp l ai no f v i s i b i l i t y . Ho we v er , Br i ggs testified that the visitor “ca me out of the e levator at the Calder g ara g e and didn’t see the curb. She fell off of the curb and fell on her right knee.” Thus, even St. Elizabeth’s evidenc e esta blished one prior fa ll off an unpa inted curb. Combined with Pear son’s and McG int y ’s testimony ref ere ncing other fa lls off curbs and Pearson’s testimony that he should have noticed that the c urbs had not bee n8

painted as r equire d, the jury had f ac t u ally sufficie nt evidence that the hospital had notice of a po te nti a l pr e mis e s d e fe c t. The jury also had suff

icient evidenc e with which to conc lude that this was, in fac t, an
unre a so na

bly da ng e ro us c on dit ion . St . E liza be th c or re c tly no te s that the g ara g e me t th e a pp lic a ble

c od e , a nd the re wa s e vid e nc e that F lo w a s ne g lig e nt fo r no t pa yingsu ff ic ie nt atte nti on

– p art ic ula

rl y since she had succe ssfully navig ated other curbs in the g ara g e the day of her fall. But St. Eliz abeth’ s own witnesses conce ded that curbs wer e painted to aler t people to elevation chang es and to pre vent or minimiz e the r isk of falls. McGinty testified that a war

ning was needed in this case beca use the land ingand

pa rk ing g ara g e fl oo r we re ma de of sim ila r m a te ri a ls. Th is w ou ld m a ke it m or e dif fi c ult t o s ee t h e c h an ge i nel ev at i o nan d , t h er ef o re , wo u l d

cr ea t e t h e n ee d

fo r s o m et h i n g s u ch as a c h an ge in color to serve as a w arning

. This risk was hig hlighted by the fa ct that people had fa llen off unpa inted curbs pr ior to Flo’s fa ll a nd that no one had fal le n s inc e the c ur bs we re pa int e d. St. El iza be th c or re c tly no te s th a t it

c ha lle ng e d th is e vid e nc e by dis c us sin g the sp e c if

ic s of the thr e e re po rt e d f a lls and , in

the pr oc e ss, by distinguishing the m. But in light of McGinty ’s and Pearson’ s testimony , the jury was not re quired to c on c lud e tha

t th e se we re the on ly

fa lls . T he re wa s a lso e vid e nc e that Ch arl e s E ng lis h s ub se qu e ntl y fell at the same spot. Furthe rmore, it wa s undisputed that the plans ca lled for the c urbs to be painted in the first instance. We do not hold that thi s wo u l d be notice in a ll inst ance s. But bec ause the ho sp ita l wi tne sse s c on c e de d th a t th e y sh ou ld h a ve no tic e d A llc o h a d f a ile d to pa int

the c ur bs , it is evidenc e in this case. Th e e vid e nc e a lso su ffi c ie ntl y e sta bli sh e s p ro xima te c a

us e . St . E liza

be th a dmi tte d in response to r equests for admission that the curb wa s painted to provide notice of possible tripping h az ar d s
. P ea rs o nt es t i fi edt h at t h e cu rb wo u l d h av e be en m o re v i s i b l e i f i th adb ee np ai n t ed

. Br i ggs ag ree d that a painted c urb would have g iven someone a better oppor t u nity

to see the e levation chang e. F inally , Flo testified that she thought she would have noticed t he curb if it had bee n painted. B e c a us e th ere is no o bje c tiv e te st f or de te rm ini ngwh e the r a

pa rt ic ula r c on dit ion

is

unrea sonably

dang erous, we must afford the jury ’s deter mination appropriat e d efe renc e. The evidenc e, conside red in its totality , is not so weak or so agai n s t the over whelming weig ht of the evidenc e as to make the jury ’s dec ision manifestly unjust. Pool , 715 S.W .2d at 635. The e vidence9

is factua lly

sufficie nt to support the jury ’s deter mination that, in thi s instance, the unpa inted curb w as
an unre asonably

dang erous condition and that it was the proxi mate cause of Flo’s injury

. I ssue Two is overrule d. B. Cha rg e Erro r. St. El iza be th c on te nd s that the tr ia l c ourt e rr e d by su bmi tti nga

ne g lig e nc e qu e sti on

that di d not include Allco. The jury char g e aske d t h e jury

to determine if St. Elizabeth and F lo were neg lige nt. The sec ond question, howeve r, asked the jury to apportion responsibility among st three pa rt ie s: St . E liza

be th, F lo, and Al lc o. Th e Wils on s re sp on d that any ob je c tio n wa s w a ive d b e c a

us e it w a s o bs cure d or con cea le d a nd that any e rr or wa s o the rw ise wa ive d b e c a us e St. El iza

be th

r e p r e s e n t e d

t o t h e c o u rt t h a t i t d i d n o t c o n t e n d t h a t A l l c o h a d an y l e g a l r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r F l o ’ s i n j u r y. Th e la st c on te nti on

is e a sil y dis patc he d. Th e Wils on s d id n ot o bje c t w he n St . E liza be th called the ir expert, McGinty , as a witness to establish that Allco brea ched the construction contr act by not painting the c urb. Nor do the W ilsons complain t hat t he trial court erre d by including A llco in the apportionment question. I t is also clea r that St. Eliz abeth pr operly raised its objec tion to the

e xclu sio n o f A llc o f

ro m th e ne g lig e nc e iss ue and that the tr ia l c ourt wa s awa re of thi s is su e . In f

a c t, the trial court specific ally asked the Wil sons’ counsel about this and was assure d by counsel that the Wils on s w e re wi lli ngto r

un the ri sk of no t in c lud ingAl lc o in the ne g lig e nc e iss ue . St . E liza be th h a s, there fore , not waived its objection to the cha rg e. Whether Allco brea ched a duty was raised by the evidenc e. But this doe s not establish error bec au s e t here was, in fa ct, no dispute that Allco had br eac hed a duty . Be cause there was no fa ct qu e sti on , th e tr ia l c ourt

did no t e rr by no t a sk ing the jur y to de te rm ine wh e the r Al lc o wa s n e g lig e nt. Elba or v . S

mi th , 845 S.W .2d 240, 243 (Tex. 1992) (a tr ial court may ref use to submit a jury

question when it is not supported by any evidenc e). But e ven if the tria l court er red, w e re verse for c harg e er ror onl y if, afte r consider ing the

re c or d a s a

whol e incl ud ingthe ple a din g s, the e vid e nc e pr e se nte d at tr ia l, a nd the c ha rg e in i ts
e nti re ty , w e c on c lud e the e rr or pr ob a bly c a us e d th e re nditi on

of an im pr op e r v e rd ic t or

pr ob a bly preve nt ed St. Eli zabeth from pre senting the ca se to this court. T EX
. R. A PP
. P. 4 4. 1; W al- Ma rt Stores, Inc. v . Johnson , 1 0 6 S

. W

. 3 d 7 1 8 , 7 2 3 (T ex
. 2 0 0 3 ). S t

. E l i z ab et h h as s h o wn n o h ar m
. It argues that Allco’s r esponsibility could hav e b ee n substantially highe r than the 20% found by the10

jury if the trial cour

t had aske d the jury

to determine whether Allco was neg lige nt beca use Allco’s neg lige nce w as otherw ise minimi zed. We fail to follow this log ic. Be cause the trial court did not ask the jury i f Allco was ne g lige nt but did ask the jury to determine A llco’s per centa g e of responsibility , this would not minimi ze Allco’s re sponsibili ty but would be more likely seen a s an indication from the tria l court that Allco wa s neg lige nt. Moreover , St. Eli zabeth was not pre cluded fr om o ff e r i n g an y e v i d e n c e o f A l l c o ’ s n e g l i g e n c e o r f r o m m a k i n g an y ar g u m e n t c o n c e r n i n g its responsibility . The jury

did assign g reater re sponsibil i t y t o S t

. E liz abeth than A llco, and as the builder, Allco ha d primary or initial responsibility

for pa inting the c urb. That f inding, howe ver, doe s
no te s t a b l i s h h ar m
. T h e g ar a g e h a d

b e e no p e r a t i o n a l an d

u n d e r S t

. E l i z a b e t h ’ s c o n t r o l f

o r a lmo st three y e ar s a t th e ti me o f F lo ’ s f a ll

. T h e ju

r y c o u ld r e a s o n a

b ly c o n c lu d e th a t, w it

h the passag e of tim e , A llc o’ s r e sp on sib ili ty de c re a se d a

nd St. El iza be th’ s r e sp onsi bi li ty

inc re a se d. I ssu e Th re e is

overr uled. C. Subsequent Rem edial Measure s . St. Eli zabeth next complains t hat the trial c ourt err ed by admitting evide nce of

subsequent

reme dial measure s, specific ally the fac t that the curb was painted afte r Flo’s fall. T h e W ilsons respond that a

ny err or has be en wa ived. We revie w a tria l court’s e videntiary ruling s for a

buse of discretion. See O wens-Corning Fiberglas Corp. v. Malone , 972 S.W .2d 35, 43 (Tex. 1998). A trial court a buses its discr etion if it a cts without r efe renc e to any g uiding r ules or princ iples or ac ts in an arbitra ry or unre asonable manner
. Downer v. Aquamarine Operators, Inc. , 701 S.W .2d 238, 241-42 (Tex. 1985). The Wilsons offere d into e vidence a picture of the stairs that wa s taken a fter F lo’s fall and afte r the step ha d b ee n painted. St. Eliz abeth objec ted, contendingthat the photo had not bee n produc ed d u ri ng discovery and that it ref

ere nced a subsequent re medial measur e. The trial court asked if the picture ha d been pr oduced, a nd when the Wilsons told t he cour t that it had, it overruled St. Eli zabeth’s objection. The Wil sons argue that the tria l court only ruled on the discove ry objection and that, be cause St. Elizabeth did not obtain a specific ruling on its subsequent remedia l

measure objection, St. Elizabeth waived this a rgument. We disag ree . St. Eli zabeth clea rly broug ht to t he tr ia l cour t’s atte nti on

its c on te nti on , a

nd the fa c t th a t th e tr ia l c ourt on ly a sk e d c ouns e l a11

question about discover

y does not mean that the trial court did not consider the subsequent r emedial

measure objection. St. Eliz abeth’ s contention has bee n prese rved. Sub se qu e nt r e me dia l me a sure s are no t a dmi ssi ble to e sta bli sh lia bil ity fo r a

pr ior a c c ide nt. T EX
. R. E V ID . 407. Howeve r, this rule is not without exception, and the Wil sons contend that the photogr aph wa s admissible “ to show the way [t he cur b is] supposed to be painted.” Howeve r, there

was no dispute about how the c urb should have be en painted. Rule 407 pr ovides: “This rule doe s not requ i re the exclusion of evidence of subseque nt remedia l measure s when off ere d for a nother purp os e , s uc h a s p ro vin g ow ne rs hip , c on tr ol , or feas ibi lity of pr e c a uti on ary me a sure s, if controve rted, or impea chment.” B eca use St. Eliz abeth did not contest how the cu rb s hould have been pa inted, this ex ception does not a pply

. I n the abse nce of

any exception, the trial court e rre d by admitting evide nce of

a subseque nt remedia l measure

. Errone ous admission of evidenc e is ha rmless unless the ruling probably cause d the re ndition of an im pr op e r j ud g me nt. Rul e 44 .1 (a ). Th e su pr e me c ourt

ha s in str uc ted in ter med iate c ourt s
c on du c tin g a

ha rm ana ly sis to e va luate th e wh ole c a se fr om v oir dir e to c los ingargume nt,
c on sid e ri ngth e st ate of

the e vid e nc e , th e str e ng th a nd we a kn e ss o f t

he c a se , a

nd the ve rd ic t. Re lia nc e Ste e l &Al um inu m C o. v . S e v c ik, 267 S.W .3d 867, 871 (Tex. 2008). Texas law limits the admissibilit y of evidenc e of subsequent reme dial measure s so that the jury does not consider

them as proof

of neg lige nce. B r o o k

s h i r e B r o s
. , I

n c
. v
. Le wis , 9 1 1 S.W .2d 791, 797 (Tex. App.—Ty l er 1 9 9 5 , writ denied) . I n Le wis , the cour t held that admission of a subsequent re medial measur e wa s harmful be cause the necessity of t he re medial measur e wa s at the hear t of the ca se, and the fac t tha t it was done af ter the a ccide nt could be see n as an a dmission by the def endant. Id. I n this case, ther e wa s no question that the curbs we re suppose d to be painted. Thus, the fa ct that S t. Eliz abeth painted them afte r Flo’s fall did not constitute an admission of an oth e rw ise c on te ste d is su e . T he tr ia l c ourt ’s e rr or wa s h arm le ss. D. Su bs e qu e nt F

all

. Finally , St. Eli zabeth complains that the tri al co u rt err ed by admitting evide nce of

a
su bs e qu e nt f a ll . S peci fi cal ly , S t. El iz abet h co mp lai ns of ev id ence i nt roduceddu ring Pe a rs on ’s c ro sse xami na ti o nt h a ts o m e o n e e l s e f e l l a tt h e s a m e c u r

b a f t e r F l o ’ s i n j u r y . P e ar s o nh a d

p r e vio us ly te sti fi e d th a t, p ri or

to F lo’ s f a ll, the re we re no re po rt e d fa lls in a ny of the g ara g e ’s fo ur

sta ir we lls

. He a g ree d with his counsel’s desc ription of this a s “pre tty g ood safe ty .” On c ross-examination, the Wil sons’ counsel r ef

er re d t o this statement and aske d Pearson if he knew Char les Eng lish.12

St. Eli zabeth’s counse l asked to appr oach the bench. The subsequent conve rsation was unr ecor ded, bu t th e Wils on s’ ne xt que sti on wa s: “ Do y ou

re c a ll M r. Cha

rl e s E ng lis h w ho fe ll o n th e e xac t sa me spot that Flo Wil son fell off the curb? ” S t. Eliz abeth did not object to this question or the next, but it did o b j ec t to the clear

question on the g round that the subseque nt fall was irr eleva nt. The trial court a dvised counsel that it had made its ruling , appar ently ref err ing to the be nch discussion, and direc ted counse l to move on. Pearson was then questioned about a repor t involvingEng lish falling of f t he c ur b a ft e r e xitin g the sta ir s. Ba sed upon thi s re co rd , St. Eli zabeth’s complaint was not pre serve d. See W arrantech Corp. v . Computer Adapters Servs., I nc. , 134 S.W. 3d 51 6, 52 9 ( Te x. Ap p. —F or t Wor th 2 00 4, pe t. dismiss ed) ( off- the-re cord be nch conf ere nce doe s not preser

ve er ror)

. But e ven if it wer e, the tria l

c ourt did no t a bu se its dis c re tio n b y

fi nd ingthe su

bs e qu e nt fa ll re le va

nt. A su bs e qu e nt f

a ll w ou ld not establish notice, but St. Eli zabeth did not request a limit ing instruction. Howeve r, a subse quent fa ll f ro m th e same c ur

b w a s p ro bativ e of

wh e the r t he un pa int e d c ur

b w a s unr e a so na

bly da ng e ro us
. St. Eli zabeth’s fourth issue is over ruled. I V. Holding The judg ment of the trial c ourt is affir med.

RI CK STRANGE

JUSTI CE

J anuar y 29, 2010 Panel consists of: Wright, C.J ., M c C a l l , J. , an d

S t r an g e , J.