Present: Kinser, C.J., Lemons, Goodwyn, Millette, and Mims, 

JJ., and Russell and Lacy, S.JJ.

DOLORES DAVIS

v. Record No. 100632 OPINION BY JUSTICE DONALD W. LEMONS

June 9, 2011

COUNTY OF FAIRFAX 

FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA

In this appeal, we consider whether the Circuit Court of 

Fairfax County erred when it exercised subject matter 

jurisdiction over a case that originated in Fairfax County 

General District Court, was appealed to the circuit court and 

non-suited there, was subsequently re-filed in the general 

district court, dismissed, and then appealed to the circuit 

court.

I. Facts and Proceedings 

In September 2007, Fairfax County ("the County") filed a 

petition in the general district court, pursuant to former Code 

§ 3.1-796.115(A),1 seeking an order declaring Dolores Davis 

("Davis") to be an unfit pet owner and alleging that Davis had 

deprived her animals "of necessary food, drink, shelter or 

emergency veterinary treatment." Following a trial, the 

general district court entered an order declaring Davis unfit 

 1 After all proceedings in the Fairfax County General 

District and Fairfax County Circuit Court, former Title 3.1 was 

repealed, revised, and reenacted as Title 3.2. Specifically, 

former Code § 3.1-796.115 was amended and reenacted as Code 

§ 3.2-6569. See 2008 Acts ch. 860.
2

to own and care for the 20 animals she kept in her house. 

Davis appealed the general district court's judgment to the 

circuit court.

Thereafter, in March 2008, the County filed a motion to 

nonsuit the case and the circuit court granted the County's 

motion by an order dated March 14, 2008. The nonsuit order 

stated that the County had to return Davis' animals by 5 p.m. 

on March 14, 2008, unless a new petition had been filed by that 

time. The County filed a new petition to declare Davis an 

unfit pet owner in the general district court that same day. 

The general district court subsequently dismissed the petition 

on the ground that it lacked jurisdiction. The County noted an 

appeal to the circuit court.

Davis then filed a motion in the circuit court to enforce 

the provisions of the nonsuit order requiring that the County 

return Davis' animals to her. The circuit court denied Davis' 

motion by order stating that the "circuit [court] has no 

original jurisdiction under [Code] § 3.1-796.115," but placed 

the case on the docket as an appeal from the general district 

court. Davis objected to the circuit court's order and 

maintained that "the [general district court] is without 

jurisdiction and this case must be heard in the Circuit Court." 

Following a bench trial in June 2008, the circuit court 

entered an order declaring Davis to be an unfit pet owner. 
3

Thereafter, the circuit court ordered Davis to reimburse the 

County for $51,504.64 in costs it incurred in boarding her 

animals during the pendency of the dispute. Davis timely noted 

her appeal to this Court,2 but we decided, citing former Code 

§ 3.1-796.115(C), that "[i]t appears that this Court does not 

have jurisdiction over this case." Davis v. County of Fairfax, 

Record No. 081825 (Oct. 29, 2008). Accordingly, we transferred 

Davis' appeal to the Court of Appeals and the Court of Appeals 

subsequently granted Davis' petition for appeal.

In an unpublished opinion, a three-judge panel of the 

Court of Appeals affirmed the circuit court's exercise of 

jurisdiction over the case. Davis v. County of Fairfax, Record 

No. 1697-08-4, slip op. at 13 (Aug. 4, 2009). In so doing, the 

panel relied on the Court of Appeals' prior decision in Lewis 

v. Culpeper County Dept. of Social Services, 50 Va. App. 160, 

647 S.E.2d 511 (2007), which held that when a plaintiff who 

prevailed in the district court takes a nonsuit in the 

defendant's de novo appeal in circuit court, "the combined 

effect of the principles applicable to nonsuits and de novo

appeals is to nullify the entire suit as if it had never 

existed in either court." Davis, slip op. at 2 (quoting Lewis, 

 2 It appears that, because Davis had been unsure which 

court had jurisdiction over this appeal when she first filed 

her notice of appeal, she filed appeals in both the Court of 

Appeals and this Court.
4

50 Va. App. at 167, 647 S.E.2d at 514). The Court of Appeals 

subsequently granted Davis' petition for a rehearing en banc

and, relying upon Lewis, a majority of the court affirmed the 

circuit court's exercise of subject matter jurisdiction in this 

case. Davis v. County of Fairfax, Record No. 1697-08-4, slip 

op. at 2 (March 2, 2010).

Davis timely filed her notice of appeal, and we granted an 

appeal on the following assignment of error:

1. The Court of Appeals erred when it ruled that the 

circuit court could exercise subject matter 

jurisdiction over a case that originated in the general 

district court; was appealed to the circuit court and 

non-suited there; re-filed in the general district 

court — contrary to the dictates of § 8.01-380—and then

appealed to the circuit court.

II. Analysis

A. Standard of Review

"[A]n issue of statutory interpretation is a pure question 

of law which we review de novo." Conyers v. Martial Arts World 

of Richmond, Inc., 273 Va. 96, 104, 639 S.E.2d 174, 178 (2007).

When the language of a statute is unambiguous, 

we are bound by the plain meaning of that 

language. Furthermore, we must give effect to 

the legislature's intention as expressed by the 

language used unless a literal interpretation of 

the language would result in a manifest 

absurdity. If a statute is subject to more than 

one interpretation, we must apply the 

interpretation that will carry out the 

legislative intent behind the statute.
5

Id. (citations omitted). Additionally, "[t]he plain, obvious, 

and rational meaning of a statute is to be preferred over any 

curious, narrow, or strained construction, and a statute should 

never be construed in a way that leads to absurd results." 

Meeks v. Commonwealth, 274 Va. 798, 802, 651 S.E.2d 637, 639 

(2007) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).

B. Subject Matter Jurisdiction

During the relevant time period, former Code § 3.1-796.115 

set forth the procedure governing a petition to declare a 

person an unfit pet owner. Specifically, former Code § 3.1-

796.115(A) stated that "[u]pon seizing or impounding an animal, 

the [investigating official] shall petition the general 

district court in the city or county wherein the animal is 

seized for a hearing . . . not more than ten business days from 

the date of the seizure of the animal." Additionally, former 

Code § 3.1-796.115(C) stated that the "procedure for appeal and 

trial shall be the same as provided by law for misdemeanors 

[and t]he Commonwealth shall be required to prove its case 

beyond a reasonable doubt." Accordingly, the County properly 

filed its first petition in this case in the general district 

court, pursuant to Code § 3.1-796.115. However, Davis 

subsequently appealed the general district court's ruling to 

the circuit court for a de novo review, and the circuit court 

later granted the County a nonsuit in that case. Following the 
6

nonsuit in the circuit court, the County re-filed its petition 

in the general district court. At issue in this case is 

whether the County re-filed its petition in the proper court, 

following the nonsuit.

Davis argues that the circuit court retained jurisdiction 

over the case after the nonsuit order was entered, "so that 

when the County elected to re-file its petition, it was limited 

to doing so only in the circuit court." As a result, Davis 

argues, "the general district court lacked jurisdiction over 

the dispute and the County's re-filing of its petition in that 

court was a nullity." Consequently, on appeal from the general 

district court, the circuit court lacked jurisdiction to enter 

the orders that are the subject of this appeal because "the 

circuit court's jurisdiction over a case is derivative of the 

inferior tribunal's." We agree with Davis.

Code § 8.01-380(A) declares that "[a]fter a nonsuit no new 

proceeding on the same cause of action or against the same 

party shall be had in any court other than that in which the 

nonsuit was taken, unless that court is without jurisdiction, 

or not a proper venue, or other good cause is shown." 

Therefore, because the nonsuit was taken in the circuit court,

the County was required by Code § 8.01-380(A) to re-file its 

petition, following the nonsuit, in the circuit court "unless 

that court is without jurisdiction."
7

Code § 17.1-513 defines the jurisdiction of circuit courts 

in Virginia. In pertinent part, it declares that circuit

courts "shall have appellate jurisdiction in all cases . . . in 

which an appeal may . . . be taken from the judgment or 

proceedings of any inferior tribunal." (Emphasis added.) 

Additionally, circuit courts "shall have original and general 

jurisdiction of all civil cases . . . except such cases as are 

assigned to some other tribunal." Id. Former Code § 3.1-

796.115(A) "assigned" cases arising under that statute to 

general district courts by requiring that investigating 

officials "shall petition the general district court in the 

city or county wherein the animal is seized for a hearing." 

Accordingly, the circuit court did not have original or general 

jurisdiction over petitions filed pursuant to former Code 

§ 3.1-796.115(A). See Code § 17.1-513. The circuit court did, 

however, obtain appellate jurisdiction derivatively from the de 

novo appeal taken from the general district court. Id.

Significantly, Code § 16.1-106 declares that

[f]rom any order entered or judgment rendered in 

a court not of record in a civil case in which 

the matter in controversy is of greater value 

than fifty dollars . . . there shall be an appeal 

of right . . . to a court of record. Such appeal 

shall be to a court of record having jurisdiction 

within the territory of the court from which the 

appeal is taken and shall be heard de novo.
8

(Emphasis added.) Accordingly, circuit courts in Virginia have 

no power to remand appeals taken from general district courts 

back to the general district court from which the appeal was 

taken. Rather, once a circuit court in Virginia acquires 

appellate jurisdiction over a case, by way of an appeal of 

right from a general district court, it is required to hear the 

appeal de novo. See Code §§ 16.1-106 and 17.1-513. Just as 

circuit courts cannot remand appeals of right taken from 

general district courts back to the general district court from 

which the appeal was taken, they do not lose appellate 

jurisdiction over an appeal of right taken from a lower court 

simply by granting a nonsuit in that particular case. See Code 

§§ 16.1-106 and 17.1-513.

In this case, the circuit court obtained appellate 

jurisdiction over this suit derivatively from the de novo 

appeal taken from the general district court. The circuit 

court's subsequent grant of the County's nonsuit did not divest 

the circuit court of its appellate jurisdiction. Accordingly, 

the circuit court retained appellate jurisdiction to hear this 

case after it granted the County's nonsuit and, as a result, 

the County was required by Code § 8.01-380 to re-file its 

petition in the circuit court. See Code § 8.01-380. However, 

the County did not do so.
9

The County improperly re-filed its petition, following the 

nonsuit, in the general district court; therefore, the general 

district court properly dismissed the re-filed petition for 

lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The County then appealed 

to the circuit court for a de novo review and the circuit court 

placed the case on its docket. Whether this exercise of

jurisdiction was proper remains to be decided. Because the 

circuit court's appellate jurisdiction is derivative of the 

general district court's jurisdiction, we hold that the circuit 

court did not have jurisdiction to decide the re-filed case on 

the merits after the general district court's dismissal for 

lack of subject matter jurisdiction.

We held, in Stacy v. Mullins, 185 Va. 837, 40 S.E.2d 265

(1946), and Addison v. Salyer, 185 Va. 644, 40 S.E.2d 260

(1946), that "the jurisdiction of the appellate court on appeal 

from the [general district court] is derivative, and if the 

[general district court] had no jurisdiction the appellate 

court acquires none on appeal." Hoffman v. Stuart, 188 Va. 

785, 794, 51 S.E.2d 239, 244 (1949) (emphasis added). 

Additionally, we observed in Stacy that

[t]he rule is well settled that, if the court in 

which the action is brought has no jurisdiction 

of the subject matter, the appellate court will 

acquire none by the appeal, and this, too, even 

if the appellate court would have jurisdiction of 

the subject matter had the action been commenced 

there. The reason is, an appeal is a mere 
10

continuation of the original case, – a proceeding 

in the action. The want of jurisdiction of the 

subject matter in the court where the action was 

brought, continues in every court to which the 

action may be appealed, for the reason that it is 

the same action, and an appeal is authorized only 

where the court from which the appeal is taken, 

in case of the failure to appeal, would have had 

authority to enforce its judgment.

185 Va. at 841, 40 S.E.2d at 266 (citations and internal 

quotation marks omitted). Here, the general district court 

properly decided that it had no subject matter jurisdiction to 

hear the re-filed petition following the nonsuit in the circuit 

court. As a result, the circuit court had no appellate 

jurisdiction to hear the re-filed case on the merits following 

the general district court's dismissal for lack of jurisdiction

because the circuit court's appellate jurisdiction is 

derivative of the general district court's jurisdiction. Id. 

It should be noted that the circuit court lacked jurisdiction 

to decide this case as it did even though it would have had 

jurisdiction to hear the case had the County properly re-filed 

its petition in the circuit court following the nonsuit of its 

first petition in that court. Id. To the extent that Lewis v. 

Culpeper County Dept. of Social Services, 50 Va. App. 160, 647 

S.E.2d 511 (2007), is inconsistent with this opinion, it is 

expressly overruled.

III. Conclusion
11

We hold that the Court of Appeals erred when it affirmed

the judgment of the circuit court. Accordingly, we will 

reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals and enter final 

judgment for Davis.

Reversed and final judgment.