IN THE SUPREME COURT OF IOWA 

No. 29 / 04-2028 

Filed May 11, 2007 

STATE PUBLIC DEFENDER, 

Plaintiff, 

vs. 

IOWA DISTRICT COURT FOR WOODBURY COUNTY, 

Defendant. 

Certiorari to the Iowa District Court for Woodbury County, Brian L. 

Michaelson, Associate Juvenile Judge. 

State Public Defender petitioned for a writ of certiorari, challenging 

the juvenile court’s authority to grant recovery on the basis of quantum 

meruit. WRIT SUSTAINED. 

Thomas G. Becker, State Public Defender, Mark C. Smith, First 

Assistant State Public Defender, and Julie A. Miller, Senior Assistant State 

Public Defender, Des Moines, for plaintiff. 

Elizabeth A. Rosenbaum, Sioux City, for defendant. 
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LARSON, Justice.

 Attorney Elizabeth Rosenbaum was appointed by the juvenile court to 

act as guardian ad litem in a child-in-need-of-assistance proceeding. 

Rosenbaum was not under contract with the State Public Defender. Upon 

completion of her representation, Rosenbaum submitted her fee claim to the 

public defender. The public defender denied that portion of Rosenbaum’s 

fee claim in excess of statutory fee limitations because Rosenbaum did not 

submit to the juvenile court her application to exceed fee limitations prior to 

exceeding the fee limitations, and there was no finding of good cause for the 

late filing of her application in the court’s order authorizing her to exceed. 

The public defender filed a petition for writ of certiorari after the juvenile 

court ordered it to pay Rosenbaum’s entire fee claim on the basis of 

quantum meruit. We conclude that quantum meruit cannot serve as the 

basis for recovery when the statutory requirements for compensation of 

court-appointed attorneys have not been met. Writ sustained. 

I. Facts and Prior Proceedings.

In October 2003 the juvenile court for Woodbury County appointed 

Elizabeth Rosenbaum as guardian ad litem in a child-in-need-of-assistance 

proceeding. Rosenbaum was not under contract with the public defender at 

the time of the appointment, though she had, in the past, been under such 

a contract. The court appointed Rosenbaum to this particular case because 

she had represented the child in a prior proceeding and was familiar with 

the child’s background and the complicated case history. 

 In March 2004 Rosenbaum submitted a fee claim of $2194.81 for her 

representation of the child pursuant to Iowa Code section 815.7 (2003). 

Because Rosenbaum’s fees exceeded the statutory limit of $1000, an 

application and order to exceed fee limitations, both filed March 17, 2004, 

were attached to the fee claim. The public defender reduced Rosenbaum’s 
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fee claim to $1117.31 (the $1000 fee limit for appointment as a guardian ad 

litem in a child-in-need-of-assistance proceeding plus $117.31 for 

reasonable expenses), explaining that Rosenbaum’s application to exceed 

was untimely because it was not filed, and approved, prior to actually 

exceeding the fee limitations. See Iowa Code § 815.10A(2). Further, the 

order authorizing Rosenbaum to exceed did not contain a finding of good 

cause for the late filing of the application, as required by Iowa Code section 

815.10A(2). 

 Rosenbaum filed a motion for review of her fee claim, arguing she was 

entitled to her entire fee claim on the basis of quantum meruit. Rosenbaum 

asserted that she had previously been permitted to obtain any necessary 

orders to exceed statutory fee limitations at the time she submitted her fee 

claim, and the public defender had honored such orders. After a hearing on 

the matter, the juvenile court concluded that, although Rosenbaum did not 

comply with the statutory requirements governing compensation of courtappointed attorneys, she was entitled to fees in excess of the fee limitations 

under a theory of quantum meruit. The juvenile court stated: 

Although there is a statute [Iowa Code section 815.10A(2) and 

Iowa Administrative Code rule 493-12.6(3)] setting forth the 

rule cited by the Public Defender, it has not been enforced until 

recently. To hold a party responsible for a rule that has 

consistently been ignored does not conform to equity 

principles. Moreover, this rule is one of procedure and seems 

to be something of a technicality. Even though Rosenbaum 

has completed a great amount of work in this case, the Public 

Defender claims she should not be paid for 50% of her fee 

claim because she did not file the correct paper at the correct 

time. This Court finds that to deny Rosenbaum her fee does 

not comply with principles of equity. 

 The public defender filed a petition for writ of certiorari, which we 

granted. The public defender argues that Rosenbaum did not properly raise 

the issue of quantum meruit in her motion for review and that quantum 
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meruit cannot be used to supersede the statutory requirements of Iowa Code 

section 815.10A(2). 

II. Standard of Review.

 In a certiorari case, we review the district court’s ruling for correction 

of errors at law. State Pub. Defender v. Iowa Dist. Ct., 721 N.W.2d 570, 572 

(Iowa 2006). 

 “A writ of certiorari lies where a lower board, tribunal, or 

court has exceeded its jurisdiction or otherwise acted illegally 

. . . . ‘Illegality exists when the court’s findings lack 

substantial evidentiary support, or when the court has not 

properly applied the law.’ ” 

Id. (quoting State Pub. Defender v. Iowa Dist. Ct., 633 N.W.2d 280, 282 (Iowa 

2001) (citations omitted)). We are bound by the district court’s factual 

findings, if well supported. State Pub. Defender v. Iowa Dist. Ct., 644 N.W.2d 

354, 356 (Iowa 2002). 

III. Merits.

 The public defender is statutorily authorized to review fee claims for 

representation of indigents in Iowa. Iowa Code § 13B.4(4). Because 

Rosenbaum was not under contract with the public defender, Iowa Code 

sections 815.7 and 815.10A govern her compensation. The public defender 

is required to establish fee limitations for particular categories of cases, and 

the fee limitation for an attorney appointed as guardian ad litem for a minor 

in a child-in-need-of-assistance proceeding is $1000. Iowa Code § 13B.4(a); 

Iowa Admin. Code r. 493-12.6. An attorney may recover fees in excess of 

this fee limitation for good cause. The procedure for recovering fees in 

excess of fee limitations is set forth in Iowa Code section 815.10A(2): 

An attorney shall obtain court approval prior to exceeding the 

fee limitations established by the state public defender 

pursuant to section 13B.4. An attorney may exceed the fee 

limitations, if good cause is shown. An attorney may obtain 

court approval after exceeding the fee limitations, if good cause 
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is shown. The order approving an application to exceed the fee 

limitations shall be effective from the date of filing the 

application unless the court order provides an alternative 

effective date. Failure to file an application to exceed a fee 

limitation after exceeding the fees shall not constitute good 

cause. The application and the court order approving the 

application to exceed fee limitations shall be submitted with 

any claim for compensation. 

(Emphasis added.) 

 The reasonableness of Rosenbaum’s fee claim is undisputed. Thus, 

had she filed a timely application to exceed fee limitations, the court likely 

would have found good cause for her to exceed and would have issued an 

order to that effect. As the juvenile court emphasized, this was an 

extremely complicated case involving a contested emergency removal and 

allegations of severe child abuse by adoptive parents. Rosenbaum’s prior 

involvement with the child and her knowledge of the past case history 

improved the quality of representation for the minor child. We commend 

Rosenbaum for her willingness to act as a court-appointed attorney in these 

difficult cases and for providing quality representation for indigents. 

However, it is clear that she did not comply with the requirements set forth 

in section 815.10A(2). A testament to the difficulty of this particular case, 

Rosenbaum exceeded the $1000 fee limitation on November 8, 2003, a full 

three months before she completed her representation. Unfortunately, she 

did not file her application to exceed until March 17, 2004. Although the 

juvenile court approved her application, thus finding good cause for her to 

exceed the fee limitation, it did not find good cause for Rosenbaum’s failure 

to file a timely application. Therefore, pursuant to Iowa Code section 

815.10A(2), the public defender was clearly entitled to deny that portion of 

Rosenbaum’s fee claim in excess of the fee limitation. 

 Nonetheless, the juvenile court concluded that, under a theory of 

quantum meruit, Rosenbaum was entitled to her entire fee claim. We do not 
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address the public defender’s contention that Rosenbaum failed to properly 

raise this issue in her motion for review, as required by Iowa Administrative 

Code rules 493-12.9(1)(b) and 493-12.9(2)(d), and assume, for purposes of 

this certiorari action, that the issue was properly pled. 

 Quantum meruit is a quasi-contractual theory of recovery providing 

that, “ ‘[when] one person renders services for another which are known to 

and accepted by him, the law implies a promise on his part to pay 

therefor.’ ” In re Estate of Walton, 213 Iowa 104, 105-06, 238 N.W. 577, 577 

(1931) (quoting Scully v. Scully’s Ex’r, 28 Iowa 548, 550-51 (1870)). The 

theory of quantum meruit is premised on the idea that it is unfair to allow a 

person to benefit from another’s services when the other expected 

compensation. While it is tempting to allow recovery under a theory of 

quantum meruit in the instant case, especially considering the hard work 

and quality representation Rosenbaum provided to the minor child, we 

cannot do so. 

 In enacting section 815.10A(2), the legislature set forth clear 

requirements with which a court-appointed attorney must comply in order 

to receive compensation in excess of statutory fee limitations. This 

legislation serves to protect both the court-appointed attorney and the 

taxpayer by ensuring that the attorney will be compensated for all 

reasonable services provided, and the taxpayer will not be saddled with 

costs that are unnecessary for the representation in each particular case. 

Requiring prior approval to exceed the fee limitations provides a level of 

control over the indigent-defense fund, which is necessary to ensure that all 

those who are entitled to legal representation receive it. Allowing a theory of 

quantum meruit to supersede clear statutory requirements would serve to 

undermine the legislature’s purpose in enacting section 815.10A(2). 
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 We have considered this issue previously in other contexts and have 

concluded that quantum meruit cannot be used to supersede the affirmative 

requirements of a statute. See Equal Access Corp. v. Utils. Bd., 510 N.W.2d 

147, 151 (Iowa 1993) (quoting Madrid Lumber Co. v. Boone County, 255 Iowa 

380, 387, 121 N.W.2d 523, 527 (1963)) (“ ‘[The court is] bound by positive 

provisions of a statute . . . and where the contract is void because not in 

compliance with express statutory provisions, a court . . . cannot give 

validity to the contract [under a theory of quantum meruit].’ ”); Maynes Real 

Estate, Inc. v. J.F. McPherron, 353 N.W.2d 425 (Iowa 1984). As we stated in 

Maynes, 

[u]nder the plaintiffs’ theory, it would make little difference 

whether the statutory requirement of a writing had been 

complied with or not if they could fall back on the theory of 

quantum meruit. Clearly, the result would defeat the purpose 

of the rule . . . . 

 . . . . 

We hold since plaintiffs cannot recover on an oral 

contract of employment, neither can they recover for the same 

services on a quantum meruit theory. 

Maynes Real Estate, Inc., 353 N.W.2d at 427-28. We conclude that the 

juvenile court exceeded its authority by ordering the public defender to pay 

Rosenbaum fees in excess of statutory fee limitations on the basis of 

quantum meruit. 

IV. Conclusion.

 Iowa Code section 815.10A(2) clearly sets forth the requirements with 

which a court-appointed attorney must comply in order to recover fees in 

excess of statutory fee limitations. Although it appears the public defender 

has, in the past, failed to consistently enforce these requirements, a theory 

of quantum meruit cannot be asserted in order to circumvent affirmative 

statutory requirements. We sympathize with Rosenbaum and understand 

her frustration with the public defender’s denial of her fee claim. However, 
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as we have stated in the past, “[i]f this rule works some ‘inequities in 

particular cases, it is within the purview of the legislature and not this court 

to correct what is now well-settled public policy.’ ” Maynes Real Estate, Inc., 

353 N.W.2d at 428 (quoting Wright v. Smith, 249 A.2d 56, 57 (R.I. 1969)). 

The juvenile court exceeded its authority by ordering the public defender to 

pay Rosenbaum fees in excess of statutory fee limitations on the basis of 

quantum meruit. We sustain the public defender’s writ of certiorari. 

WRIT SUSTAINED.