COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 

Present: Chief Judge Moon, Judges Baker and Coleman 

Argued at Richmond, Virginia 

DANIEL CARSON WILLIAMS 

v. Record No. 0701-95-2 MEMORANDUM OPINION*

 BY JUDGE JOSEPH E. BAKER 

COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA MAY 14, 1996 

FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF POWHATAN COUNTY 

Thomas V. Warren, Judge 

 Andrea C. Long (David E. Boone; Boone, Beale, 

Carpenter & Cosby, on brief), for appellant. 

 Brian Wainger, Assistant Attorney General 

(James S. Gilmore, III, Attorney General, on 

brief), for appellee. 

 Daniel Carson Williams (appellant) appeals his bench trial 

convictions of aggravated sexual battery of his granddaughter, a 

female child less than thirteen years of age, in violation of 

Code § 18.2-67.3, and for violation of Code § 18.2-370.1 by the 

Circuit Court of Powhatan County (trial court). The sole issue 

is whether the trial court erred in admitting evidence that 

appellant had previously sexually abused his daughter (the 

victim's mother). 

 Appellant was indicted by a Powhatan County grand jury on 

six charges, two of them being that on or about July 22, 1994 he 

committed aggravated sexual battery upon his granddaughter (WRN), 

 a female child of less than thirteen years of age, and that on 

 

 *Pursuant to Code § 17-116.010 this opinion is not 

designated for publication. 
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that same date he exposed his genital parts to WRN. The 

remaining indictments charged appellant with having sexually 

abused his daughter (Trecia), the victim's mother, and another 

grandchild. 

 Appellant moved to sever the several charges for trial 

purposes. The motion was granted and the two charges involving 

WRN were scheduled for trial together, with the other charges to 

be tried subsequently. 

 At trial, WRN testified that during the late morning hours 

of July 22, 1994, appellant, who she affectionately called "Pop 

Pop," picked her up from her house and took her out for ice 

cream. After she ate the ice cream, he took her back to his 

house where he pulled down his pants, exposed his penis, and 

rubbed it against her vagina. Appellant was drunk at the time. 

 Trecia testified that on the day of the offenses she left 

WRN at home with her sixteen-year-old son. When she found out 

that appellant had picked up WRN and that WRN was at appellant's 

house, she panicked. 

 Appellant objected when Trecia was asked on direct 

examination whether there was any particular reason why she would 

not have asked appellant "to pick [WRN] up." Appellant argued 

that the Commonwealth should not be permitted "to get into some 

of the charges that were set for trial in January."1

 The trial 

 1This reference was to the charges that had been severed by 

the trial judge for trial pursuant to appellant's motion. 
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court overruled the objection holding that the answer "goes to 

[Trecia's] state of mind." 

 Trecia subsequently testified that she knew appellant had 

been drunk the night before. After Trecia's testimony about 

appellant's drinking problem, the following dialogue occurred: 

COMMONWEALTH: Did you have any experience in 

the past that impacted on your wishes about 

[WRN] being alone with your father? 

TRECIA: Yes, sir. 

COMMONWEALTH: What was that? 

TRECIA: He had abused me, molested me as a 

child. 

COMMONWEALTH: Approximately how old were you 

when he started to do that? 

TRECIA: I can remember back as far as, I 

guess, seven or eight. 

 Appellant voiced no objection to these specific questions or 

answers. 

 Trecia further testified that when she left work she headed 

straight for her parents' house. Trecia was accompanied by a 

fifteen-year-old female (Rebecca), a trainee at her job. Trecia 

retrieved WRN. She testified that appellant was "stone drunk" 

and "acting nasty," that he "put his hands across [her] breast," 

and attempted to slip his hand down Rebecca's dress. Trecia took 

WRN home and temporarily left WRN at her home with Rebecca while 

she took her son outside. She came back shortly thereafter and 

found Rebecca crying and telling her that Trecia needed to talk 

to WRN. 
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 After learning from WRN that appellant had sexually abused 

her, Trecia examined WRN's vaginal area, discovered evidence of 

the abuse, and reported the assault to the police. WRN was taken 

to The Medical College of Virginia Hospital where she was 

examined and treated by Dr. Dinea DeSouze (DeSouze). 

 DeSouze examined WRN and found that she suffered tremendous 

physical trauma. DeSouze observed significant irregularities to 

WRN's external genitalia. Her entire labia minora was bright 

red, and there was an abrasion on the right side of the labia 

majora. DeSouze noted that her vaginal tissue was very 

"friable," that is, there was no active bleeding but if it were 

touched with a Q-tip, it would start bleeding. DeSouze stated, 

"there is no question" that the child was traumatized and because 

of the nature and location of the injury, it was not 

self-inflicted. 

 Rebecca testified that two or three days prior to the 

incident, appellant had asked her about her "pussy," and that at 

a time prior to that he had shown her a pornographic picture of 

two women and a man having sex. 

 Appellant told Detective Gregory Neal that Trecia had asked 

him to pick up WRN and take care of her. Trecia denied that 

claim and explained why she would not have made such a request. 

At trial, appellant admitted that Trecia had never asked him to 

pick up WRN. 

 Evidence presented on behalf of appellant obviously was 
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rejected by the fact finder and need not be repeated here. 

 Citing Kirkpatrick v. Commonwealth, 211 Va. 269, 176 S.E.2d 

802 (1970), appellant argues that Trecia's testimony concerning 

her being sexually abused by appellant constituted evidence of 

other crimes, requiring that his convictions be reversed. We 

disagree. 

 "The admissibility of evidence is within the broad 

discretion of the trial court, and a ruling will not be disturbed 

on appeal in the absence of an abuse of discretion." Blain v. 

Commonwealth, 1 Va. App. 10, 16, 371 S.E.2d 838, 842 (1988). As 

a general rule, other crimes evidence is inadmissible. 

Kirkpatrick, 211 Va. at 272, 176 S.E.2d at 805. However, the 

"general rule" must sometimes yield to society's interest in the 

truth-finding process and numerous exceptions allow evidence of 

prior misconduct whenever the legitimate probative value 

outweighs the incidental prejudice to the accused.2 Lewis v. 

Commonwealth, 225 Va. 497, 303 S.E.2d 890 (1983); see also

Wilkins v. Commonwealth, 18 Va. App. 293, 443 S.E.2d 440 (1994). 

 For this reason, rather than stating the rule as an exclusionary 

rule with "numerous exceptions," it may be more helpful to phrase 

it in terms of relevancy. Wilkins, 18 Va. App. at 297, 443 

S.E.2d at 443 (citing Charles E. Friend, The Law of Evidence in 

Virginia §§ 12-13 (4th ed. 1993). 

 

 2See Sutphin v. Commonwealth, 1 Va. App. 241, 337 S.E.2d 897 

(1985)(listing eight exceptions). 
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 In the case before us, appellant had stated to the police 

that Trecia had asked him to pick up WRN and to take her to 

appellant's house. Whether that explanation was truthful was 

material to appellant's credibility and his explanation of how 

WRN happened to be in his custody. The issue of credibility was 

particularly material after Trecia testified that upon learning 

that appellant had taken WRN to his house without Trecia's 

permission, Trecia "panicked." Thus, the objected to evidence 

was relevant to show why she panicked and to prove that appellant 

had not been truthful when he told the police that Trecia had 

asked him to pick up WRN. The trial court limited the evidence 

and did not allow any details of the prior sexual assaults. 

Accordingly, we hold that the legitimate probative value 

outweighs any incidental prejudice to appellant, particularly 

where as here the trial judge in a bench trial is presumed to 

disregard prejudicial or even inadmissible evidence. See Hall v. 

Commonwealth, 14 Va. App. 892, 421 S.E.2d 455 (1992). 

 Finally, appellant argues that in finding him guilty and 

imposing sentence, the trial judge erroneously considered 

Trecia's testimony of appellant's prior abuse. The record 

indicates otherwise. 

 For the reasons stated, we affirm the judgment of the trial 

court. 

 Affirmed.