DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA

FOURTH DISTRICT

TRAVIS PALMER and 

COFFEY TRIAL LAW,

Appellants,

v.

THE FELICETTI LAW FIRM, PLLC, et al.,

Appellees.

No. 4D2023-0493

[February 21, 2024]

Appeal from the Circuit Court for the Seventeenth Judicial Circuit, 

Broward County; Keathan B. Frink, Judge; L.T. Case No. CACE-19-

025931.

Samuel Coffey of Coffey McPharlin Trial Lawyers, Fort Lauderdale, for 

appellants.

Jason Tenenbaum of Tenenbaum Law Group, PLLC, Coral Gables, for 

appellee The Felicetti Law Firm, PLLC.

DAMOORGIAN, J.

Appellants, Travis Palmer (“the client”) and Coffey Trial Law (“successor 

counsel”), appeal the final order awarding The Felicetti Law Firm, PLLC 

(“former counsel”) a charging lien in the amount of $110,000. Appellants 

raise several arguments on appeal, only one of which warrants reversal. 

Appellants argue the trial court awarded former counsel a charging lien in 

excess of the amount provided for in former counsel’s retainer agreement. 

We agree and reverse for the limited purpose of reducing the charging lien 

amount.

Former counsel initially represented the client in the underlying 

personal injury lawsuit. Per the retainer agreement, the client agreed to 

pay former counsel “40% of any recovery up to $1 million through the time 

of the trial of the case.” The retainer agreement also included the following 

provision regarding payment in the event former counsel was discharged:
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I reserve the right to discharge my attorney at any time. If I 

discharge my attorney, I agree to compensate him for his 

services rendered through the date of discharge, as well as 

reimburse him for the costs expended in handling my case. If 

I discharge my attorney, he shall be entitled to the same 

percentages of any recovery as noted above based on the last 

settlement offer prior to his discharge, or based on the verdict 

or award if a verdict or award has been rendered prior to the 

attorney’s discharge. If no settlement offer has been made or 

no verdict or award been rendered, then the attorney shall be 

entitled to an attorney’s fee based on the reasonable value of 

his services rendered through the date of discharge.

(emphasis added).

The personal injury case proceeded to mediation during which the 

defendants offered a $200,000 settlement. The client rejected the offer. A 

few weeks later, the client sent former counsel a termination letter. Former 

counsel then promptly filed a charging lien.

The client thereafter hired successor counsel pursuant to another 

contingency fee agreement. A few months later, the parties in the 

underlying personal injury case settled for $550,000. From that amount, 

the trial court determined successor counsel was entitled to a net 

contingency fee of $220,000.

Following the charging lien hearing, the trial court awarded former 

counsel a $110,000 charging lien. The court also ordered the charging 

lien be paid out of the $220,000 contingency fee award secured by 

successor counsel, thereby leaving successor counsel with a contingency 

fee of $110,000.1 This appeal follows.

As we recently reiterated in Perlman, Bajandas, Yevoli & Albright, P.L. 

v. Atlas Holding Corp., “[d]ischarged attorneys hired under a contingent fee 

contract are entitled to recover quantum meruit for their services, limited 

by the maximum fee allowable under the [the discharged attorney’s] fee 

1 One of Appellants’ arguments on appeal is that the trial court erred in reducing 

successor counsel’s contingency fee to allocate for former counsel’s fees. 

Although we agree that was error, see Perlman, Bajandas, Yevoli & Albright, P.L. 

v. Atlas Holding Corp., 48 Fla. L. Weekly D1791, D1794 (Fla. 4th DCA Sept. 6, 

2023) (“In the absence of an agreement to split successor counsel’s contingency 

fee, the trial court could not reduce successor counsel’s fee to allocate it to former 

counsel.”), the issue is not preserved for appellate review.
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agreement.” 48 Fla. L. Weekly D1791, D1793 (Fla. 4th DCA Sept. 6, 2023)

(emphasis added) (second alteration in original) (quoting Lubell v. Martinez, 

901 So. 2d 951, 952–53 (Fla. 3d DCA 2005)); see also Levin v. Rosenberg, 

372 So. 2d 956, 958 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979) (holding, in the context of a 

quantum meruit fee award, that “in no event can [an attorney] recover 

more for his services than the maximum amount he himself has set on 

those services by contract”).

In the present case, former counsel’s retainer agreement entitled it to

40% of the last settlement offer obtained prior to discharge. As the only 

settlement offer obtained by former counsel prior to discharge was for

$200,000, the maximum fee allowable under former counsel’s retainer 

agreement was $80,000, not $110,000 as awarded. Accordingly, we 

reverse and remand for the limited purpose of reducing the charging lien 

amount to $80,000.

Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.

WARNER and FORST, JJ., concur.

* * *

Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.