IN THE SUPREME COURT OF APPEALS OF WEST VIRGINIA 

January 2014 Term FILED 

May 8, 2014 

released at 3:00 p.m. 

RORY L. PERRY II, CLERK 

No. 13-0885 SUPREME COURT OF APPEALS 

OF WEST VIRGINIA 

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA,
 

PENNSYLVANIA FISH AND BOAT COMMISSION,
 

Plaintiff Below, Petitioner
 

v. 

CONSOL ENERGY, INC.,
 

CONSOLIDATION COAL COMPANY,
 

Defendants Below, Respondents
 

Appeal from the Circuit Court of Monongalia County
 

The Honorable Russell M. Clawges, Jr., Judge
 

Civil Action No. 11-C-556
 

REVERSED AND REMANDED
 

Submitted: April 8, 2014 

Filed: May 8, 2014 

Robert P. Fitzsimmons, Esq. Christopher B. Power, Esq. 

Fitzsimmons Law Firm Mychal S. Schulz, Esq. 

Wheeling, West Virginia Jennifer J. Hicks, Esq. 

and Dinsmore & Shohl LLP 

Sharon Z. Hall, Esq. Charleston, West Virginia 

Zimmer Kunz PLLC Counsel for Respondents 

Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania 

Counsel for Petitioner 

The Opinion of the Court was delivered PER CURIAM. 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

SYLLABUS BY THE COURT
 

1. “Appellate review of a circuit court’s order granting a motion to 

dismiss a complaint is de novo.” Syl. Pt. 2, State ex rel. McGraw v. Scott Runyan 

Pontiac-Buick, 194 W.Va. 770, 461 S.E.2d 516 (1995). 

2. “Standing is comprised of three elements: First, the party attempting 

to establish standing must have suffered an ‘injury-in-fact’--an invasion of a legally 

protected interest which is (a) concrete and particularized and (b) actual or imminent and 

not conjectural or hypothetical. Second, there must be a causal connection between the 

injury and the conduct forming the basis of the lawsuit. Third, it must be likely that the 

injury will be redressed through a favorable decision of the court.” Syl. Pt. 5, Findley v. 

State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 213 W.Va. 80, 576 S.E.2d 807 (2002). 

3. “Although an express grant of powers to an administrative agency 

will be determined to include such other powers as are necessarily or reasonably incident 

to the powers granted, the agency’s powers should not be extended by implication 

beyond what may be necessary for their just and reasonable execution.” Syl. Pt. 3, Walker 

v. W.Va. Ethics Com’n, 201 W.Va. 108, 492 S.E.2d 167 (1997). 

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Per Curiam: 

This action is before the Court upon the appeal of the Commonwealth of 

Pennsylvania, Pennsylvania Fish and Boat Commission (“PFBC”), from the July 12, 

2013, order of the Circuit Court of Monongalia County dismissing its complaint against 

Consol Energy, Inc. and Consolidation Coal Company (collectively “Consol”). For the 

reasons that follow, this Court concludes PFBC has standing to file this civil action in 

West Virginia to seek recovery of damages for losses of fish and aquatic life allegedly 

caused by Consol’s discharges of pollutants into a stream which flows between West 

Virginia and Pennsylvania. We reverse the order of the circuit court and remand this 

action for further proceedings. 

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 

PFBC is an independent administrative agency of the Commonwealth of 

Pennsylvania charged with protecting, preserving, and managing fish within the 

Commonwealth and overseeing jurisdictional responsibility for fishing and recreational 

boating. See 30 Pa. Cons. Stat. §§ 321, 322 (1980). Consol operates long wall coal 

mining operations in West Virginia and Pennsylvania. As part of the mining operations, 

Consol applied for and received National Pollution Discharge Elimination System 

(“NPDES”) permits from the West Virginia Department of Environmental Protection 

(“WVDEP”), which regulated the point source discharges from Consol’s mines into 

certain waterways including Dunkard Creek. 

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In September of 2009, a massive fish kill occurred in Dunkard Creek, a 

forty-five mile stream that runs across the Pennsylvania and West Virginia border. The 

United States Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”) immediately joined other state 

and federal environmental agencies in the fish kill investigation, including the WVDEP, 

the Pennsylvania Department of Environmental Protection, and PFBC. Water samples 

taken during the investigation identified elevated levels of chloride and total dissolved 

solids (“TDS”) in Dunkard Creek. Chad Harsh, a lead environmental scientist of the 

EPA, stated: 

the cause of the fish kill was the release of a toxin produced 

by Prymnesium parvumi, also referred to as golden algae. 

This species of algae thrive in saline conditions. Discharges 

of mine pool water into Dunkard Creek with elevated levels 

of chloride and TDS from Consol’s Blacksville No. 2 and St. 

Leo mines contributed substantially to the conditions 

favorable for the golden algae to bloom. 

The United States Department of Justice and the EPA brought a civil action 

against Consol in the United States District Court for the Northern District of West 

Virginia pursuant to Section 309(b) and (d) of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act 

(“Clean Water Act” or the “CWA”), 33 U.S.C. §§ 1319(b) and (d) (1990). They alleged 

Consol discharged pollutants into Dunkard Creek and other waterways in violation of the 

CWA and in violation of the conditions and limitations of the NPDES issued by West 

Virginia that created and/or contributed to the conditions favorable for the golden algae 

to thrive and bloom which ultimately led to the fish kill. That civil action was resolved by 

a consent decree. Without admitting liability, Consol agreed to pay a $5.5 million civil 

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penalty. In addition to the civil penalty, the parties agreed Consol would spend over $200 

million on a treatment facility to treat its mine water before it is discharged into 

waterways of the United States. A separate consent decree required Consol to pay 

WVDEP an additional $500,000 for loss of fish and aquatic life to West Virginia. The 

federal agencies did not pursue any relief for the damages that occurred in the waters of 

the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania. 

By letter dated August 2, 2011, PFBC requested authorization from the 

Pennsylvania Attorney General to initiate a civil action against Consol for damages 

resulting from the 2009 fish kill. PFBC explained the federal preemption doctrine limits 

state law claims where interstate water pollution is caused by a point source located in 

another state. See Int’l Paper Co. v. Oulette, 479 U.S. 481, 494 (1987) (finding the CWA 

does not completely preempt all state common law claims). PFBC stated: “the 

Commonwealth’s claims must be based upon the law of the state where the point source 

is located, in this case, West Virginia.” PFBC estimated the damage for loss of aquatic 

life in the Commonwealth and loss of recreational opportunities for Pennsylvania anglers 

exceeded $1 million. On August 4, 2011, the Pennsylvania Attorney General delegated 

authority to PFBC to carry out this litigation. 

PFBC filed suit in the Circuit Court of Monongalia County, West Virginia, 

on September 2, 2011, against Consol for damages allegedly caused by Consol’s 

discharge of waste water into Dunkard Creek in West Virginia which flows into 

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Pennsylvania. PFBC alleged that between May and November of 2009, Consol 

discharged significant amounts of chloride through their mining operations into Dunkard 

Creek near Greene County, Pennsylvania. PFBC alleged these levels exceeded daily 

maximum effluent limitations within the NPDES permits. During this same period, high 

levels of TDS were present in the receiving waters which led to and created the release of 

toxins from golden algae within Dunkard Creek that were fatal to fish and other aquatic 

wildlife. PFBC alleged the Commonwealth suffered significant losses of fish and aquatic 

life. PFBC estimated its recorded share of the 2009 fish kill at over forty-two thousand 

fish, comprised of forty species; over fifteen thousand freshwater mussels, comprised of 

fourteen species; and over six thousand mudpuppies.1 

In the complaint, PFBC set forth West Virginia common law tort claims 

against Consol including nuisance (Count I), trespass (Count II), negligence and 

negligence per se (Counts III and IV). PFBC seeks various damages including recovery 

for the fish, freshwater mussels, and mudpuppies killed, the costs incurred in 

investigating, cleaning up and documenting the fish kill, any future costs associated with 

restoration of aquatic life in the Pennsylvania sections of Dunkard Creek, and punitive 

damages in addition to attorney’s fees and costs. 

1 A mudpuppy is an aquatic salamander commonly known as a waterdog. 

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Consol removed the civil action to the United States District Court for the 

Northern District of West Virginia, based upon 28 United States Code § 1331 (1980), 

federal jurisdiction, claiming all of PFBC’s West Virginia common law claims were 

completely preempted by the CWA. PFBC filed a motion to remand to state court, which 

the federal court granted on September 4, 2012. Following briefing and oral argument, 

the federal court found PFBC’s West Virginia common law claims were not completely 

preempted by the CWA, and, therefore, it lacked jurisdiction to adjudicate the action. The 

federal court found the CWA governs actions based upon interstate water pollution, but it 

specifically preserves the availability of state law causes of action brought by any 

“person” as defined by the Act, 2 under the law of the source state. See Ouellette, 479 

U.S. at 492. (“Although Congress intended to dominate the field of pollution regulation, 

the saving clause negates the inference that Congress ‘left no room’ for state causes of 

action.”). 

Following remand to state court, Consol filed a motion to dismiss the 

complaint pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1) of the West Virginia Rules of Civil Procedure on the 

ground that the circuit court lacked subject matter jurisdiction. Consol argued: 1) PFBC’s 

legal authority to allege claims for loss of aquatic life is limited to Pennsylvania causes of 

2 In the definitions section of the CWA, subsection five defines the term “person” 

to include the following: “individual, corporation, partnership, association, State, 

municipality, commission, or political subdivision of a state, or any interstate body.” 33 

U.S.C. § 1362(5). 

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action for losses caused by violations of Pennsylvania law; and 2) the West Virginia 

Water Pollution Control Act (“WVWPCA”), West Virginia Code § 22-11-25 (2009), is 

the exclusive basis for seeking recovery for loss of fish or aquatic life in West Virginia 

courts and PFBC had no authority to bring an action under the WVWPCA. 

By order entered July 12, 2013, the circuit court granted Consol’s motion to 

dismiss. The circuit court found PFBC is “only authorized to bring civil suits for damages 

as a result of violations of Pennsylvania law, based on the language of 30 Pa. C.S. § 

2506(b) [1980]” and the “narrow and explicit language does not allow . . . any implied 

right” to bring a cause of action under West Virginia common law.3 PFBC appeals this 

order. 

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW 

Consol’s motion to dismiss the complaint, granted by the circuit court, was 

filed under Rule 12(b)(1) of the West Virginia Rules of Civil Procedure, concerning lack 

3 The circuit court rejected Consol’s argument regarding the WVWPCA and 

stated: 

Even if West Virginia Code § 22-11-25 creates the only 

available cause of action for loss of fish under the jurisdiction 

of West Virginia, it does not protect fish or aquatic life of 

another State. [PFBC] is pursuing this action for the loss of 

aquatic life inhabiting waters of Pennsylvania only. 

Therefore, this argument is not applicable and has no bearing 

on [PFBC’s] authority to seek recovery under West Virginia 

common law. 

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of subject matter jurisdiction. Thus, this Court’s review of the ruling of the circuit court is 

de novo. We held in syllabus point two of State ex rel. McGraw v. Scott Runyan PontiacBuick, 194 W.Va. 770, 461 S.E.2d 516 (1995): “Appellate review of a circuit court’s 

order granting a motion to dismiss a complaint is de novo.” See Cleckley, Davis and 

Palmer, Litigation Handbook on West Virginia Rules of Civil Procedure § 12(b)(1) at 328 

(4th ed. 2012) (confirming that appellate review of a dismissal under a Rule 12(b)(1) 

facial attack is de novo). 

The de novo standard is particularly applicable in this matter insofar as the 

circuit court’s order raises a purely legal issue: whether a Pennsylvania state agency has 

standing to bring its West Virginia common law tort claims of nuisance, trespass, and 

negligence in a West Virginia circuit court. As this Court held in syllabus point two of 

State ex rel. Orlofske v. City of Wheeling, 212 W.Va. 538, 575 S.E.2d 148 (2002): 

“‘Where the issue on an appeal from the circuit court is clearly a question of law . . . we 

apply a de novo standard of review’ Syllabus point 1, in part, Chrystal R.M. v. Charlie 

A.L., 194 W.Va. 138, 459 S.E.2d 415 (1995).” With these principles in mind, we consider 

the arguments of the parties. 

III. DISCUSSION 

As a preliminary matter, this Court notes that Consol filed its motion to 

dismiss PFBC’s complaint alleging lack of subject matter jurisdiction. See Rule 12(b)(1) 

W.Va. R. Civ. Pro. Jurisdiction is the inherent power of a court to decide a case. See Syl. 

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Pt. 2, Vanover v. Stonewall Cas. Co., 169 W.Va. 759, 289 S.E.2d 505 (1982) 

(“‘Jurisdiction deals with the power of the court, while venue deals with the place in 

which an action may be tried.’ Syllabus Point 7, Lester v. Rose, 147 W.Va. 575, 130 

S.E.2d 80 (1963).”). Without question, the circuit court has jurisdiction to decide PFBC’s 

West Virginia common law tort claims under the general powers set forth in article VIII, 

§ 6 of the Constitution of West Virginia. Considering the amount in controversy, the 

circuit court has original and general jurisdiction of this matter. See W.Va. Code § 51-2-2 

(2008). As the federal court found in remanding this case to state court, PFBC’s West 

Virginia common law causes of action of nuisance, trespass, and negligence were not 

preempted by the CWA because the claims were asserted under the law of the source 

state. 

On appeal to this Court, the parties focus on PFBC’s standing. PFBC 

maintains it has standing to bring this cause of action against Consol in West Virginia for 

the killing of the Commonwealth’s fish and aquatic life. PFBC raises two assignments of 

error. First, PFBC argues the circuit court erred in holding it lacked standing under the 

pertinent statute and the general authority and powers of the agency. Second, PFBC 

contends the circuit court erred by holding that the delegation of authority by the 

Pennsylvania Attorney General for PFBC to bring the action in West Virginia did not 

establish standing. In response, Consol claims the circuit court’s ruling should be 

affirmed because PFBC lacked standing under the controlling statute and the delegation 

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of authority by the Pennsylvania Attorney General did not create any additional rights in 

PFBC beyond that statute. 

Therefore, the sole issue on appeal is whether PFBC has standing to bring 

this action. The question of standing is whether PFBC is entitled to have a West Virginia 

circuit court decide the merits of the dispute. In other words, the question is whether 

PFBC is a proper party to request an adjudication of the claims. “Further, standing is 

gauged by the specific common law, statutory or constitutional claims that a party 

presents.” Cleckley, Davis and Palmer, Litigation Handbook on West Virginia Rules of 

Civil Procedure § 12(b)(1) at 329. To resolve this issue, we begin with the general rule 

that 

[s]tanding is comprised of three elements: First, the party 

attempting to establish standing must have suffered an 

“injury-in-fact”--an invasion of a legally protected interest 

which is (a) concrete and particularized and (b) actual or 

imminent and not conjectural or hypothetical. Second, there 

must be a causal connection between the injury and the 

conduct forming the basis of the lawsuit. Third, it must be 

likely that the injury will be redressed through a favorable 

decision of the court. 

Syl. Pt. 5, Findley v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 213 W.Va. 80, 576 S.E.2d 807 

(2002). 

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Viewing the complaint in the light most favorable to PFBC, 4 we readily 

conclude that it has met the three elements set forth in Findley to establish standing. First, 

the factual allegations in the complaint demonstrate PFBC suffered an actual and 

concrete injury as a result of the 2009 fish kill. PFBC alleges the Commonwealth 

suffered significant losses of fish and aquatic life. Second, PFBC alleges a causal 

connection between the fish kill and Consol’s discharge of pollutants into Dunkard Creek 

in violation of the limitations of the NPDES issued by West Virginia that affected 

Pennsylvania waters. Third, it is likely that the injury will be redressed through a 

favorable decision of the circuit court should a jury award damages to PFBC for the loss 

of fish and aquatic life, the costs incurred in investigating, cleaning up and documenting 

the fish kill, and any future costs associated with stream restoration. 

Having found PFBC meets the Findley factors, we now address the specific 

question of whether PFBC, as an agency of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, has 

statutory authority and/or implicit power to bring a cause of action in West Virginia 

under West Virginia common law. PFBC’s authority to bring this action must be either 

expressly conferred by the legislature or given by necessary implication. See 

4 See generally Collia v. McJunkin, 178 W.Va. 158, 159, 358 S.E.2d 242, 243 

(1987) (“[m]otions to dismiss are generally viewed with disfavor because the complaint 

is to be construed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff and its allegations are to be 

taken as true.”); and Courtney v. Smith, 297 F.3d 455, 459 (6th Cir. 2002) (stating for 

purposes of ruling on a motion to dismiss for lack of standing, a complaint must be 

viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff; all material allegations of the 

complaint must be accepted as true). 

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Commonwealth v. Am. Ice Co., 178 A.2d 768, 773 (Pa. 1962) (“Only those powers within 

the legislative grant, either express or necessarily implied, can be exercised by the 

administrative body.”); see also Tex. Mun. Power Agency v. Pub. Util. Comm’n of Tex., 

253 S.W.3d 184, 192 (Tex. 2007) (recognizing a state agency’s powers are limited to: 1) 

powers expressly conferred by the legislature; and 2) implied powers that are reasonably 

necessary to carry out its express responsibilities). This Court has held: “Although an 

express grant of powers to an administrative agency will be determined to include such 

other powers as are necessarily or reasonably incident to the powers granted, the agency’s 

powers should not be extended by implication beyond what may be necessary for their 

just and reasonable execution.” Syl. Pt. 3, Walker v. W.Va. Ethics Comm’n, 201 W.Va. 

108, 492 S.E.2d 167 (1997). 

Consol argues PFBC is only authorized to bring civil suits for damages as a 

result of violations of Pennsylvania law. Consol focuses primarily on the following 

sentence from the Pennsylvania Fish and Boat Code: 

The commission, as an agency of the Commonwealth 

authorized to regulate, control, manage and perpetuate fish 

may, in addition to criminal penalties provided in this title, 

bring civil suits in trespass on behalf of the Commonwealth 

for the value of any fish killed or any stream or streambed 

destroyed or injured in violation of this chapter. 

30 Pa. Const. Stat. § 2506(b), in part (1980)(emphasis added). 

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PFBC refutes this restrictive reading of the statute. PFBC states it has the 

authority to bring this cause of action under the powers expressly conferred to it under 

the entirety of the Pennsylvania Fish and Boat Code and related Pennsylvania case law 

explaining the implicit powers held by governmental agencies. We agree. The applicable 

statute provides, in its totality: 

§ 2506. Commonwealth actions for damage to fish. 

(a) Declaration of policy.--The Commonwealth has 

sufficient interest in fish living in a free state to give it 

standing, through its authorized agencies, to recover 

damages in a civil action against any person who kills any 

fish or who injures any streams or streambeds by pollution or 

littering. The proprietary ownership, jurisdiction and control 

of fish, living free in nature, are vested in this Commonwealth 

by virtue of the continued expenditure of its funds and its 

efforts to protect, perpetuate, propagate and maintain the fish 

population as a renewable natural resource of this 

Commonwealth. 

(b) General rule.--The commission, as an agency of 

the Commonwealth authorized to regulate, control, manage 

and perpetuate fish may, in addition to criminal penalties 

provided in this title, bring civil suits in trespass on behalf of 

the Commonwealth for the value of any fish killed or any 

stream or streambed destroyed or injured in violation of this 

chapter. In determining the value of fish killed, the 

commission may consider all factors that give value to such 

fish. These factors may include, but need not be limited to, 

the commercial resale value, the replacement costs or the 

recreational value of angling for the fish killed. In addition, 

the commission is entitled to recover the costs of gathering 

the evidence, including expert testimony, in any civil suit 

brought under this section where the defendant is found 

otherwise liable for damages. 

Id. (emphasis added). 

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A plain reading of the statute demonstrates PFBC possesses broad statutory 

authority to commence “a civil action against any person who kills any fish[.]” Id. The 

very purpose and function of PFBC is to manage and protect the fish and aquatic life of 

the Commonwealth. The statute clearly accords PFBC the authority to pursue litigation to 

seek redress on behalf of the citizens of the Commonwealth when fish are killed by the 

actions of others.5 

PFBC is charged with enforcing the laws of the Commonwealth of 

Pennsylvania with regard to the protection of fish. Under subsection (b) of § 2506 of the 

Pennsylvania Fish and Boat Code, PFBC may bring civil suits in trespass, in addition to 

criminal penalties, for the value of any fish killed or any stream of streambed destroyed 

or injured in violation of the Pennsylvania Fish and Boat Code. However, subsection (b) 

does not contain limiting language that restricts PFBC’s standing to litigate only those 

actions. We reject Consol’s argument that subsection (b) does so because it is in direct 

contradiction to the stated policy and purpose of the agency and the standing specifically 

conferred to PFBC by subsection (a) that it may bring a civil action against “any person 

who kills any fish[.]” Id. In refusing a similarly narrow interpretation of an agency’s 

5 When a West Virginia statute has such express language as exists in this case, 

this Court applies its plain meaning as it is not necessary to resort to any interpretation. 

See Syl. Pt. 3, Subcarrier Commc’ns, Inc. v. Nield, 218 W.Va. 292, 624 S.E.2d 729 

(2005) (“‘Where the language of a statute is free from ambiguity, its plain meaning is to 

be accepted and applied without resort to interpretation.’ Syllabus point 2, Crockett v. 

Andrews, 153 W.Va. 714, 172 S.E.2d 384 (1970).”). 

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powers, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania held it was “inappropriate to determine the 

power of an administrative agency in a linguistic vacuum” and “the power of 

administrative agencies includes such powers as are implied necessarily.” 

Commonwealth, Dep’t of Envtl. Res. v. Butler Cnty Mushroom Farm, 454 A.2d 1, 6 (Pa. 

1982). 

In addition to the Pennsylvania legislature’s express grant of powers to 

PFBC, its authority to bring this civil action is reasonably incident to the agency’s duties 

and responsibilities to protect, preserve, and manage fish within the Commonwealth of 

Pennsylvania. The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania has stated: 

Although our law of standing is generally articulated 

in terms of whether a would-be litigant has a “substantial 

interest” in the controverted matter, and whether he has been 

“aggrieved” or “adversely affected” by the action in question, 

we must remain mindful that the purpose of the “standing” 

requirement is to insure that a legal challenge is by a proper 

party. Application of Biester [409 A.2d 848 (Pa. 1979)]. The 

terms “substantial interest”, “aggrieved” and “adversely 

affected” are the general, usual guides in that regard, but they 

are not the only ones. For example, when the legislature 

statutorily invests an agency with certain functions, duties and 

responsibilities, the agency has a legislatively conferred 

interest in such matters. From this it must follow that, unless 

the legislature has provided otherwise, such an agency has an 

implicit power to be a litigant in matters touching upon its 

concerns. In such circumstances the legislature has implicitly 

ordained that such an agency is a proper party litigant, i.e., 

that it has “standing.” 

Commonwealth, Pa. Game Comm’n v. Commonwealth, Dep’t of Envtl. Res., 555 A.2d 

812, 815-16 (Pa. 1989). Accord Commonwealth v. Beam, 788 A.2d 357, 360 (Pa. 2002). 

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See also U.S. ex rel. Chapman v. Fed. Power Comm’n, 345 U.S. 153, 173 (1953) (finding 

Secretary of Interior had standing to challenge the licensing of a new hydroelectric 

generating station because it impacted upon the Department of Interior’s general statutory 

duties relating to the conservation of the nation’s water resources); and Racine Fire and 

Police Comm’n v. Stanfield, 234 N.W.2d 307, 309 (Wis. 1975) (explaining that a 

particular power or duty conferred by statute, may, of necessity, require the additional 

power to maintain or defend an action arising out of that power or duty). 

Based on the foregoing, we find that PFBC has a substantial interest in the 

fish and aquatic life under its control sufficient to give it standing to file suit in West 

Virginia and bring West Virginia common law tort claims against Consol in the Circuit 

Court of Monongalia County to seek recovery of damages as a result of the 2009 fish kill. 

The pertinent statute confers standing to PFBC “to recover damages in a civil action 

against any person who kills any fish.” 30 Pa. Const. Stat. § 2506(a). Further, PFBC is a 

Commonwealth agency explicitly charged by statute with the obligation and authority to 

regulate, protect, manage and preserve the fish and aquatic life of the Commonwealth and 

the waters entrusted to its care. See Pa. Const. Stat. §§ 321, 322. Therefore, PFBC is a 

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proper party litigant in this civil action because it has a legislatively conferred interest in 

this matter. 6 

IV. CONCLUSION 

For the reasons set forth above, the July 12, 2013, order of the Circuit Court 

of Monongalia County is reversed, and this action is remanded for further proceedings. 

Reversed and remanded. 

6 We have resolved the matter on appeal by addressing PFBC’s statutory authority 

and implicit power to bring this cause of action; it is therefore not necessary that we reach 

the merits of PFBC’s second assignment of error. 

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