No

No. 98-507

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA

1999 MT 278N

LAURIE DEBUFF,

Petitioner and Appellant,

v.

HAROLD DEBUFF,

Respondent and Respondent.

APPEAL FROM: District Court of the Tenth Judicial District,

In and for the County of Fergus,

The Honorable David Cybulski, Judge presiding.

COUNSEL OF RECORD:

For Appellant:

Gary S. Deschenes and Randy L. Tarum, Deschenes Law Office;

Great Falls, Montana

For Respondent:

file:///C|/Documents%20and%20Settings/cu1046/Desktop/opinions/98-507%20Opinion.htm (1 of 13)4/9/2007 2:16:38 PM
No

Jock B. West, West, Patten, Bekkedahl & Green, P.L.L.C.;

Billings, Montana

Submitted on Briefs: April 29, 1999

Decided: November 23, 1999

Filed:

__________________________________________

Clerk

Justice Jim Regnier delivered the opinion of the Court.

1. ¶ Pursuant to Section I, Paragraph 3(c), Montana Supreme Court 1996 Internal 

Operating Rules, the following decision shall not be cited as precedent but shall be 

filed as a public document with the Clerk of the Supreme Court and shall be 

reported by case title, Supreme Court cause number and result to the State Reporter 

Publishing Company and to West Group in the quarterly table of noncitable cases 

issued by this Court.

2. ¶ On November 6, 1997, Laurie DeBuff filed a petition for dissolution in the Tenth 

Judicial District Court, Fergus County. At the conclusion of the hearing on the 

matter, the District Court announced its findings and order, which were later 

incorporated in its Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order. Following entry 

of the Final Decree of Dissolution of Marriage, Laurie DeBuff filed a Motion to 

Amend Findings and/or Make Additional Findings; Motion to Alter or Amend 

Judgment; Motion for New Trial; Motion for Relief from Judgment. These motions 

were denied by the District Court. Laurie DeBuff appeals from the District Court's 

order denying her posthearing motions and the Final Decree of Dissolution of 

Marriage and Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order. We affirm in part 

and reverse in part.

3. ¶ Laurie raises the following issues on appeal:

4. ¶ 1. Did the District Court abuse its discretion when it failed to consider the tax 

file:///C|/Documents%20and%20Settings/cu1046/Desktop/opinions/98-507%20Opinion.htm (2 of 13)4/9/2007 2:16:38 PM
No

implications and liquidation costs associated with the grain, equipment, and 

machinery it awarded to Laurie?

5. ¶ 2. Did the District Court abuse its discretion when it adopted values for the farm 

and personal property?

6. ¶ 3. Did the District Court abuse its discretion when it awarded both the parties' 

residences to Harold?

7. ¶ 4. Did the District Court fail to consider all the marital assets and liabilities in 

making its Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order?

8. ¶ 5. Did the District Court fail to make an equitable division of the marital estate?

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

9. ¶ Laurie and Harold DeBuff were married on February 4, 1978. A short time later, 

the couple acquired property in Fergus County, Montana, consisting of 28 acres. 

Then in 1982, the couple acquired a farm located in Wheatland County, Montana, 

consisting of 2360 acres. From the date of acquisition, the couple operated the farm 

throughout their marriage. At the hearing, Harold's counsel stipulated on Harold's 

behalf that Laurie's contributions as a homemaker were equal to Harold's 

contributions as the wage earner.

10. ¶ In addition, on occasion during the marriage Laurie worked various part-time jobs 

and Harold worked as an equipment operator for a road construction company. In 

May 1997 Laurie went to work as a clerk for IGA in Lewistown, Montana. The 

couple separated on September 30, 1997. At the time of the hearing, Laurie was still 

employed at IGA and Harold continued to run the farm and work as an equipment 

operator.

11. ¶ Following the couple's separation, Laurie rented an apartment and later a house in 

Lewistown, Montana. Harold and the couple's two minor sons lived on the property 

in Fergus County. In addition, Harold had rented out the residence located on the 

farm in Wheatland County.

12. ¶ At the dissolution hearing, Laurie expressed her desire to have the marital assets 

sold and the proceeds divided between the parties in order to enable her to purchase 

her own home. In addition, Laurie expressed concerns about Harold's proposal to 

pay her a lump sum over time for her share of the marital assets. These concerns 

prompted discussion of some type of security arrangement being placed on the 

property until Laurie was paid in full. 

13. ¶ After hearing one and a half days of testimony and evidence, the District Court 

awarded Harold the farm in Wheatland County, the property in Fergus County, 

file:///C|/Documents%20and%20Settings/cu1046/Desktop/opinions/98-507%20Opinion.htm (3 of 13)4/9/2007 2:16:38 PM
No

miscellaneous personal property and accounts receivable. Harold's total distribution 

was valued at $334,439. Laurie was awarded farm machinery and equipment, grain, 

vehicles, and miscellaneous personal property. Laurie's total distribution was valued 

at $346,513. In addition, the District Court gave Laurie three weeks to remove the 

items from the farm.

14. ¶ Alleging that the District Court's final distribution was inequitable, Laurie filed a 

motion to amend the findings and/or make additional findings, to alter or amend the 

judgment, for a new trial, and for relief from the judgment. Laurie's primary 

contention was that the District Court should have considered the tax consequences 

and liquidation costs associated with its property distribution. Laurie also challenged 

the values the District Court attached to the farm machinery and equipment and the 

real property located in Wheatland County. In addition, Laurie argued that the 

District Court should not have awarded both the marital residences to Harold, 

leaving her with none.

15. ¶ On June 14, 1998, the District Court entered an order denying Laurie's motions. 

Laurie appeals from this order, the final decree of dissolution, and the findings of 

fact, conclusions of law, and order.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

16. ¶ We review the division of marital property by a district court to determine whether 

the findings upon which the district court relied are clearly erroneous. See In re 

Marriage of Engen, 1998 MT 153, ¶ 26, 289 Mont. 299, ¶ 26, 961 P.2d 738, ¶ 26; In 

re Marriage of Foreman, 1999 MT 89, ¶ 14, 979 P.2d 193, ¶ 14, 56 St.Rep. 373, ¶ 

14, (citations omitted). "If the findings are not clearly erroneous, we will affirm the 

distribution of property unless the district court abused its discretion." Engen, ¶ 26 

(citations omitted). 

17. ¶ Additionally, we review discretionary rulings, including marital estate 

distributions and the valuations of marital property, to determine whether the district 

court abused its discretion. See In re Marriage of Rada (1994), 263 Mont. 402, 405, 

869 P.2d 254, 255. The test for abuse of discretion in a dissolution proceeding is 

"whether the district court acted arbitrarily without employment of conscientious 

judgment" or whether the district court "exceeded the bounds of reason resulting in 

substantial injustice." Engen, ¶ 26 (citation omitted).

ISSUE 1

file:///C|/Documents%20and%20Settings/cu1046/Desktop/opinions/98-507%20Opinion.htm (4 of 13)4/9/2007 2:16:38 PM
No

18. ¶ Did the District Court abuse its discretion when it failed to consider the tax 

implications and liquidation costs associated with the grain, equipment, and 

machinery it awarded to Laurie?

19. ¶ Laurie argues that the District Court failed to consider the tax consequences and 

liquidation costs of its marital property distribution, which renders the distribution 

inequitable. In response, Harold contends that the District Court did take into 

account the tax consequences of the property distribution as evidenced by the 

District Court's order denying Laurie's combined motions. 

20. ¶ Despite the evidence presented at the hearing on Laurie's combined motions with 

respect to the tax consequences and liquidation costs associated with the property 

distribution, the District Court stated the following in its order denying her motions:

Petitioner believes the Court failed to take into account income tax consequences of 

the distribution. The court gave all consideration to the tax consequences of the 

distribution possible, based on the testimony presented at trial.

. . . .

. . . The Petitioner forgets that liquidation creates selling expenses and income tax 

consequences whether real property is sold or farm equipment is sold. Petitioner did 

not want to receive payments from Respondent. The only other equitable division 

was to divide the property. Petitioner is not required to sell this property under the 

decree, and thus there is no immediate and concrete tax liability. This sale decision 

is a post trial decision made by her.

However, as Laurie pointed out in her combined motions, neither party proposed or 

contemplated a partial sale of the marital assets and as such, no extensive testimony 

was given regarding the tax liabilities or liquidation costs associated with such a 

distribution at the dissolution hearing. Laurie had proposed a total liquidation of the 

marital assets with all costs of sale and tax liabilities shared equally by the parties 

prior to distribution of any proceeds. Harold proposed no sale at all, but rather 

payment over time to Laurie with no interest for her portion of the marital assets. 

21. ¶ Nevertheless, extensive testimony was offered at the hearing on Laurie's combined 

motions regarding the tax consequences and liquidation costs associated with the 

property distribution. Laurie presented the testimony of a certified public accountant 

who estimated Laurie's tax liability from the potential gain on the sale of the 

file:///C|/Documents%20and%20Settings/cu1046/Desktop/opinions/98-507%20Opinion.htm (5 of 13)4/9/2007 2:16:38 PM
No

equipment and the grain to be approximately $117,000. This witness also estimated 

sales commission and liquidation costs of 10 percent, plus advertising costs of 2 

percent. Another witness, the owner of an auction firm in the business of selling 

farm equipment, confirmed that liquidation costs on the equipment would be 10 

percent, plus advertising at an average cost of $3000 to $3500.

22. ¶ Section 40-4-202, MCA, sets forth the criteria a district court must consider when 

equitably apportioning marital assets in a dissolution proceeding:

In making apportionment, the court shall consider the duration of the marriage and 

prior marriage of either party; the age, health, station, occupation, amount and 

sources of income, vocational skills, employability, estate, liabilities, and needs of 

each of the parties; custodial provisions; whether the apportionment is in lieu of or 

in addition to maintenance; and the opportunity of each for future acquisition of 

capital assets and income. The court shall also consider the contribution or 

dissipation of value of the respective estates and the contribution of a spouse as a 

homemaker or to the family unit. 

Section 40-4-202, MCA (1997) (emphasis added). The liabilities of the parties are 

specifically enumerated as a factor a district court must consider in its equitable 

apportionment of marital property.

23. ¶ With regard to tax consequences, we have previously held that a district court's 

"failure to address the tax consequences of the distribution of property" amounts to 

an abuse of discretion. In re Marriage of Lee (1991), 249 Mont. 516, 519-20, 816 

P.2d 1076, 1078. In Lee, we stated:

In relation to tax liabilities, this Court has held that "where a property distribution 

ordered by a court includes a taxable event precipitating a concrete and immediate 

tax liability, such tax liability should be considered by the court before entering its 

final judgment."

249 Mont. at 519, 816 P.2d at 1078 (quoting In re Marriage of Beck (Mont. 1981), 

631 P.2d 282, 285, 38 St.Rep. 1054, 1058). We required the District Court in Lee to 

make specific findings regarding the potential tax consequences of the distribution 

of the marital estate and to indicate how the tax liabilities would be accounted for in 

the distribution. See Lee, 249 Mont. at 519, 816 P.2d at 1078.

file:///C|/Documents%20and%20Settings/cu1046/Desktop/opinions/98-507%20Opinion.htm (6 of 13)4/9/2007 2:16:38 PM
No

24. ¶ In this case, the District Court awarded grain and farm machinery and equipment 

to a wife who had moved off the farm and was employed as a grocery store clerk. In 

addition, the District Court only gave her three weeks to remove the property from 

the farm. Harold attempts to assert that Laurie could have rented out the farm 

equipment to generate income. However, no evidence was presented at the hearing 

regarding the rental market or income-producing potential for such equipment. In 

addition, there was no evidence presented regarding Laurie's qualifications or desire 

to engage in the business of equipment rental. The only reasonable conclusion that 

can be reached from the evidence presented at the hearings and the District Court's 

distribution is that Laurie would have to sell the grain and equipment. The District 

Court incorrectly interpreted Lee when it stated that its distribution did not cause an 

immediate and concrete tax liability. Thus, we conclude that the District Court 

abused its discretion when it failed to take into account the parties' liabilities, which 

include tax consequences and liquidation costs, in its distribution of the marital 

property.

ISSUE 2

25. ¶ Did the District Court abuse its discretion when it adopted values for the farm and 

personal property?

26. ¶ We will begin with the personal property. At the dissolution hearing, both parties 

presented testimony as to the values of the personal property. The values Laurie 

presented were taken from a financial statement signed by both parties in 1997 for 

the purpose of obtaining a bank loan. Harold testified, however, that he did not 

believe the financial statement fairly reflected the equipment's fair market values 

because these values were "rounded up" to "make it look good." Harold also had an 

agricultural implement dealer testify that people normally inflate values on financial 

statements and that the values of this particular farm equipment were considerably 

less.

27. ¶ Based on this testimony, Laurie argues that the District Court's findings with 

regard to the values from the financial statement were not supported by substantial 

credible evidence. Harold contends that Laurie has no basis to complain since the 

District Court adopted the values she provided. In its order denying Laurie's 

posthearing motions, the District Court stated that for the most part it had adopted 

Laurie's values because it appeared that Harold was understating values. 

28. ¶ With regard to a district court's determination of the valuation of marital property, 

we have previously stated:

file:///C|/Documents%20and%20Settings/cu1046/Desktop/opinions/98-507%20Opinion.htm (7 of 13)4/9/2007 2:16:38 PM
No

A district court has far reaching discretionary powers to determine the value of 

property in a dissolution action. Its valuation can be premised on expert testimony, 

lay testimony, documentary evidence, or any combination thereof. As long as the 

valuation is reasonable in light of the evidence submitted, we will not disturb that 

finding on appeal.

In re Marriage of Milesnick (1988), 235 Mont. 88, 94-95, 765 P.2d 751, 755 

(citations omitted). In relation to property valuations in a dissolution proceeding, we 

have also stated that:

It is well settled law that "[w]hen there is a dispute over property in a marriage 

dissolution, the district court may assign any value that is within the range of values 

presented into evidence." "However, if the values are widely conflicting, then the 

district court must state its reasons for determining a certain value."

In re Marriage of McNellis (1994), 267 Mont. 492, 499, 885 P.2d 412, 416 (quoting 

In re Marriage of Taylor (1993), 257 Mont. 122, 127, 848 P.2d 478, 481) (citations 

omitted).

29. ¶ Accordingly, we find that the District Court did not err when it adopted values for 

the personal property from the financial statement presented by Laurie. These values 

were premised on a combination of the 1997 financial statement signed by both the 

parties for the purpose of obtaining a bank loan as well as lay witness and expert 

testimony. There is no abuse of discretion where, as here, the court has adopted a 

reasonable valuation of marital property supported by the record. See Rada, 263 

Mont. at 405, 869 P.2d at 255-56 (citing In re Marriage of Luisi (1988), 232 Mont. 

243, 756 P.2d 456).

30. ¶ Next, we consider the real property. Laurie argues that the District Court erred 

when it adopted a value for the farm property that contained computation errors and 

did not include the value of conservation reserve program (CRP) contracts or 

buildings located on the property. The land has been described as 2360 acres of dryland farm: 1400 acres of planted land, 340 acres of conservation reserve program 

(CRP) land, and the remainder is native grasses. 

31. ¶ Laurie presented expert testimony from a farm and ranch appraiser, who gave his 

estimate of the fair market value of the property. Using three methods, a cost 

approach, a sales comparison approach, and an income approach, he valued the land 

at $538,785, plus improvements of $33,000. Another witness, a farm and ranch 

file:///C|/Documents%20and%20Settings/cu1046/Desktop/opinions/98-507%20Opinion.htm (8 of 13)4/9/2007 2:16:38 PM
No

realtor, estimated the dry-land farm and CRP land to be worth $250 to $275 an acre, 

the native grassland to be worth $80 to $100 an acre and the buildings at $30,000. 

His total valuation was $516,000 to $572,000.

32. ¶ Harold presented testimony from a real estate broker who had sold property 

adjacent to the DeBuff farm. She valued the dry-land farm and CRP land at $175 to 

$185 an acre and the grass land at $85 an acre, for an average of $150 an acre. The 

District Court assigned the average per acre figure to its own calculations and 

arrived at a value of $354,000 for the land, and added $45,000 for the buildings and 

grain bins.

33. ¶ Laurie alleges there were computation errors in the real estate broker's valuation of 

the Wheatland County property. Laurie argues that since the real estate broker's 

opinion was based on prior sales, she should have been required to use the per acre 

values from her sale of property adjacent to the DeBuff farm. However, the real 

estate broker testified at the hearing that she had marketed the adjacent property at a 

higher price than the area and sold it at a recreational price rather than at a farm 

price. 

34. ¶ Laurie assumes that only a comparative sales analysis can be used to establish the 

value of the DeBuff property. However, the District Court relied on available 

credible evidence, which was offered by the real estate broker who had sold 

property adjacent to the DeBuff farm. In doing so, the District Court reasoned that:

As far as the land goes, the farm, I am going to award the farm to Harold, give that a 

value of $399,000. How I arrived at that value I assigned Carole Songer's land value 

of $354,000 to the dirt, and I picked that, decided that is a little better valuation, 

from my view, from a review of things, primarily because she had the experience of 

actually selling land in the area. There is nothing like going out and trying to sell 

dirt somewhere to find out what it's really worth. You know, you can surmise and 

speculate and comparable-sale all you want.

35. ¶ We defer to the District Court's ability to judge the credibility of witnesses and to 

resolve any conflicts in the evidence. See In re Marriage of Pearson, 1998 MT 236, 

¶ 56, 291 Mont. 101, ¶ 56, 965 P.2d 268, ¶ 56. In that regard, we have stated:

When confronted with conflicting evidence, the court must use its fact-finding 

powers to determine which evidence is more credible. Having had the opportunity to 

observe the witnesses, the trial court is in a position superior to that of the appellate 

court to judge the credibility of the testimony. Unless there is a clear preponderance 

file:///C|/Documents%20and%20Settings/cu1046/Desktop/opinions/98-507%20Opinion.htm (9 of 13)4/9/2007 2:16:38 PM
No

of the evidence against the District Court's valuation, its findings, where based on 

substantial though conflicting evidence, will not be disturbed on appeal.

Milesnick, 235 Mont. at 95, 765 P.2d at 755 (citations omitted).

36. ¶ Here, the District Court chose to adopt the valuation of the property presented by a 

real estate broker who had actually sold property in the area and stated its reason for 

doing so. As previously noted, the district court may assign any value that is within 

the range of values presented into evidence. See McNellis, 267 Mont. at 499, 885 

P.2d at 416. In addition, while the values were widely conflicting the District Court 

provided the basis for its decision to adopt the value presented by the real estate 

broker.

37. ¶ In relation to Laurie's argument that the value of the property adopted by the 

District Court did not incorporate an additional per acre value based on the CRP 

contracts, this does not concern us. In its order, the District Court accounted for the 

CRP contracts by awarding them separately to Harold as accounts receivable. In 

addition, the District Court accounted for the value of the buildings and grain bins 

located on the property by adding an additional $45,000 to the value of the land 

presented by the real estate broker. Thus, we conclude that the District Court did not 

err in adopting the real estate broker's value for the farm. Therefore, there was no 

abuse of discretion.

ISSUE 3

38. ¶ Did the District Court abuse its discretion when it awarded both the parties' 

residences to Harold?

39. ¶ Laurie argues that while the District Court has discretion in dividing the marital 

property, the District Court should be guided by principles of equity. Laurie asserts 

that neither common sense nor the District Court's findings of fact provide any 

guidance to determine how equity was served by awarding both marital homes to 

Harold and leaving Laurie to rent housing. Harold asserts that when the overall 

scheme of the marital distribution is considered, there is no abuse of discretion by 

the District Court.

40. ¶ At the conclusion of the hearing, the District Court stated its reasoning for 

awarding the residence located in Fergus County to Harold:

I awarded that to Harold. The primary reason for doing that is because he has those 

file:///C|/Documents%20and%20Settings/cu1046/Desktop/opinions/98-507%20Opinion.htm (10 of 13)4/9/2007 2:16:38 PM
No

two boys living with him, and they need a place to stay. They are all settled in there. 

They had furniture in there. That's best for the kids. That's the big reason I put that 

there.

However, the District Court did not provide any basis for also awarding the 

residence in Wheatland County to Harold.

41. ¶ As mentioned previously, the guidelines for the division of marital property in a 

dissolution proceeding are contained in § 40-4-202, MCA. Findings of fact and 

conclusions of law provide the foundation for a district court's judgment. See In re 

Marriage of Stratford (1981), 193 Mont. 195, 197, 631 P.2d 296, 298. "This 

foundation need not consist of a multitude of evidentiary facts, but the findings of 

fact must set forth a recordation of the essential and determining facts upon which 

the court rested its conclusions of law and without which the judgment would lack 

support." Stratford, 193 Mont. at 197-98, 631 P.2d at 298 (citation omitted).

42. ¶ We have reviewed the evidence presented and examined the District Court's 

Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order. This review has revealed that the 

District Court failed to make findings with regard to the criteria set forth in § 40-4-

202, MCA (1997), pertinent to the division of the marital property in this case. The 

District Court did not give any explanation for awarding both residences to Harold, 

which prevents us from adequately reviewing the equity of the distribution. 

Therefore, we conclude that the District Court abused its discretion in awarding both 

marital residences to Harold.

ISSUE 4

43. ¶ Did the District Court fail to consider all the marital assets and liabilities in 

making its Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order?

44. ¶ Based on our resolution of Issue 1, we do not consider this issue in detail. We have 

already determined that the District Court failed to consider all the liabilities 

associated with the property distribution contained in its Findings of Fact, 

Conclusions of Law and Order. Accordingly, we conclude that the failure to 

consider all liabilities associated with its property distribution was an abuse of 

discretion by the District Court.

ISSUE 5

file:///C|/Documents%20and%20Settings/cu1046/Desktop/opinions/98-507%20Opinion.htm (11 of 13)4/9/2007 2:16:38 PM
No

45. ¶ Did the District Court fail to make an equitable division of the marital estate?

46. ¶ Laurie asserts that the District Court abused its discretion by not making findings 

pursuant to the statutory guidelines contained in § 40-4-202, MCA (1997). Harold 

contends that since Laurie received more than half of the marital estate and that it 

was her decision to sell the property awarded to her, Laurie is responsible for the 

consequences and that this does not constitute an inequitable settlement.

47. ¶ A District Court need not articulate each factor contained in § 40-4-202, MCA, 

separately so long as the findings are sufficient to allow nonspeculative review by 

this Court. See In re Marriage of Gerhart (1990), 245 Mont. 279, 282, 800 P.2d 

698, 700-01. While articulation of these factors is encouraged, the absence of 

specific findings does not automatically warrant remand. See Gerhart, 245 Mont. at 

282, 800 P.2d at 700. The test for the adequacy of findings of fact is "whether they 

are sufficiently comprehensive and pertinent to the issues to provide a basis for 

decision, and whether they are supported by the evidence presented." Gerhart, 245 

Mont. at 282, 800 P.2d at 701 (citation omitted). It is not the lack of specific 

findings that constitutes reversible error, but the lack of substantial evidence to 

support the district court's judgment. See Gerhart, 245 Mont. at 282, 800 P.2d at 

700 (citations omitted). Consequently, we review both the District Court's reasoning 

as well as the evidence in the record.

48. ¶ Unfortunately, the District Court's findings are devoid of any reference to the 

statutory criteria for the division of marital property contained in § 40-4-202, MCA 

(1997). Therefore, we remand this matter to the District Court for a redetermination 

of the division of marital property in accordance with the statutory criteria set forth 

in § 40-4-202, MCA (1997).

49. ¶ Accordingly, we affirm in part and reverse in part the judgment of the District 

Court. We affirm the District Court's adoption of values for the personal property 

presented by Laurie and the adoption of the real estate broker's value for the 

property in Wheatland County. We reverse the District Court's property distribution 

insofar as it failed to consider the liabilities associated with such distribution and 

failed to consider the mandatory statutory criteria for division of marital property. 

Therefore, we remand this cause to the District Court for redetermination of the 

distribution of the marital estate in accordance with § 40-4-202, MCA (1997).

50. ¶ Affirmed in part, reversed in part and remanded.

/S/ JIM REGNIER 

We Concur:

file:///C|/Documents%20and%20Settings/cu1046/Desktop/opinions/98-507%20Opinion.htm (12 of 13)4/9/2007 2:16:38 PM
No

/S/ KARLA M. GRAY

/S/ JAMES C. NELSON

/S/ TERRY N. TRIEWEILER 

/S/ W. WILLIAM LEAPHART

file:///C|/Documents%20and%20Settings/cu1046/Desktop/opinions/98-507%20Opinion.htm (13 of 13)4/9/2007 2:16:38 PM