Filed 12/27/2 3 In re A.C. CA2/5

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION FIVE

In re A

. C.

, a P erson Coming Under Juvenile Court Law.

________

_______________________ LOS ANGELES COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN AND FAMILY SERVICES

,

Plaintiff and Respondent

,

v.

J

. H

. ,

Defendant and Appellant ;

A.C.,

Respondent

. B32 1960 c /w B326226

(Los Angeles County Super. Ct. No. 22C C JP00122B )

APPEAL from order s of the Superior Court of Los Angeles Co unty, Nancy Ramirez

, Judge

. Affirmed

. Michelle D. Pena

, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant

. Liana Serobian

, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, f or Responde nt

.

### 2 Dawyn R. Harrison

, C ounty Counsel, Kim Nemoy, Assistant County Counsel, and Stephen Watson , Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

_____________________

INTRODUCTION
Father appeals from the juvenile court’s order removing daughter (A .C.) from his custody and the court’s exit order granting him monitored visitation. Respondent s Department of Children and Family Services (Department) and mother contend
that father d o es not have standing to appeal the custody order.
Mother also argues that father’s appeal is moot

. Finally, mother
contends the juvenile court’s exit order was within its
di s cr e tion. 1 We conclude the appeal is not moot. As to father’s standing we will assume, but not decide, that he may pursue the appeal

, but we hold th at father suffered no prejudice from the custody order. We also hold that the visitation order was not an
abuse of discretion

. We affirm both orders.

1 The Department takes no position on the propriety of the exit order.

### 3 DISCUSSIO N 2
On January 10, 2022, the Department filed a section 300 petition asking the juvenile court to assert jurisdiction over A.C. based on allegations that mental problems and aggressive
behavior of A.C.’s half

- brother limited mother’s ability to care for A.C. and her two other half siblings

. 3 On May 19, 2022, the juvenile court sustained an amended

p etition. At the June 30, 2022, dispositional hearing, the juvenile
court ordered A.C. , then 12 years old, “ removed ” from father’s custody. On January 4, 2023, the juvenile court terminated its jurisdiction over A.C. and issued an exit order with sole leg al and physical custody to mother and monitored visits to father

. Father appeals both orders.
1. Removal Order
Father contends the June 30, 2022, removal order was unnecessary and not supported by substantial evidence.
A. Standing and Mootness
As a threshold matter, the Department and mother urge that father lacks standing to appeal the removal order because (1) he did not have custody at the time of the order and ( 2 ) he is merely the biological, not the presumed, father and

, therefore

, not entitled to custod y. We will assume for the purposes of

2 The parties are familiar with the facts and procedural history, and this opinion does not meet the criteria for publication (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.1105(c)). We therefore resolve this appeal by memorandum opinion under Standard 8.1 of the Standards of Judicial Administration.

3 The half

- brother is mother’s son and was born in 2009. None of A.C.’s half siblings is a party to this appeal.

### 4

further discuss ion that father has standing

. As for mother’s argument that the appeal is moot , we find mother has failed to demonstrate that the appeal itself is moot as no intervening
events have occurred to render the appeal moot

. (See Committee for Sound Water & Land Development v. City of Seaside (2022)

79 Cal.App.5th 389, 405 [moot cases are those in which an actual controversy did exist but, by the passage of time or a change in circumstances, ceased to exist ]. )
B. Any Error in the Court’s Removal Order Was
Harmless
Father contest s the juvenile court order removing A.C. from his custody. We conclude that , if the juvenile court erred (a point we do not decide)

, any error was harmless under father’s own theory of the case. Father urges that the juvenile court erred in removing A.C. from his custody because father “was noncustodial, making the removal order unnecessary.” The Department
concedes the point . Instead, the Department argues that

, by
father’s own wor ds

, the error is harmless because , when the proceedings started

, he did not have custody and , there fore, no

error in purporting to remove custody from father could have prejudiced him

. We agree. Father’s custody status was not changed by the court’s order. On the unique facts of this case

, b efore the order father did not have custody of A.C., and after the order he did not have custody of A.C. An error in state law

“ ‘generally does not warrant reversal unless there is a reasonable probability that in the absence of the error, a result more favorable to the appealing party would have been
reached.’ ” ( In re Christopher L. (2022) 12 Cal.5th 1063, 1073 .)
Here

, father’s status as a noncustodial parent was unchanged

, and father suffered no prejudice

.

### 5

2. The Exi t Order Granting Father Monitored Visitation
Was W ithin the Court’s Discretion
O n January 4, 2023, the juvenile court terminated its jurisdiction over A.C. with an exit order granting sole legal and physical custody to mother and monitored visits to fathe r

. The
order set the duration and frequency of the visits. Father argues that the juvenile court abused its discretion by not providing a way to “ensure enforceability” of father’s right to monitored
visitation with A.C. and by not specifying in the exit order how father could request unmonitored visits from the family court.
A. Enforceability of V isitation O rders
When a juvenile court terminates jurisdiction, it has broad discretion to make exit orders concerning visitation. (§ 362.4; In
re J.M. (2023) 89 Cal.App.5th 95, 112

- 113 ( J.M. ).) These orders remain in effect until modified or terminated by order of the family court. (§ 362.4, subd. (b); J.M. , at p. 112.) When a juvenile court makes an exit order, the juvenile court must look
to the best inter ests of the child and consider the totality of the circumstances. ( In re Nicholas H. (2003) 112 Cal.App.4th 251, 268; In re Chantal S. (1996) 13 Cal.4th 196, 201.) We review the juvenile court’s exit orders for abuse of discretion ( In re J.P. (2019) 37 C al.App.5th 1111, 1119; In re Alexandria M. (2007)

156 Cal.App.4th 1088, 1095 ( Alexandria M. ))

, and thus determine whether the juvenile court’s order “ ‘ “ exceeded the bounds of

reason. ” ’ ” ( In re Stephanie M. (1994) 7 Cal.4th 295, 318;
Alexandria M. , at pp. 1095

- 1096.)
Father contends the court erred in not including some kind of enforcement mechanism in its exit order granting father
visitation . Father’s stated concern was that A .C. h ad steadfastly
refused t o speak with father , even in the face of prio r visitation

### 6

orders

. At the outset, f ather has forfeited the argument. F ather did not request an enforcement mechanism in the juvenile court ; he asked for and received a visitation order. “Absent a request, it is not the court’s burden to sua sponte come up with a solution to the intractable problem of a child’s steadfast refusal to visit a parent.” ( In re Sofia M. (2018) 24 Cal.App.5th 1038, 1046.)

“ ‘[D]ependency courts “simply do not have the time and resources to constantly fine tune an order in res ponse to the progress or lack thereof in the visitation arrangement, or in reaction to physical or psychological conduct which may threaten
the child’s well

- being.” ’ ” ( Ibid ., quoting In re Julie M. (1999)

69 Cal.App.4th 41, 51.)
Nor does father identi fy on appeal any particular
enforcement mechanism the juvenile court should have included
in its exit order. Father’s failure to raise the point below and his failure to develop it on appeal forfeits his argument.
If we were to consider the merits of f ather’s argument, he
would fare no better. The juvenile court does not have the authority or discretion to impose a condition on the family court ’ s ability to modify an exit order. ( In re Cole Y. (2015)

233 Cal.App.4th 1444, 1456; but see In re D.B. (202 0)

48 Cal.App.5th 613, 627.) On the contrary, parties may seek the
assistance of the family court to enforce dependency visitation orders. ( In re Chantal S. (1996) 13 Cal.4th 196, 208 [“courts are often placed in the position of enforcing orders of other courts, even though the enforcing court could not have made the order in the first instance”] .)
B. Adequacy of I nformation in the E xit O rders Father argues that the juvenile court was required to

, but
did not

, “explain the circumstances” that led to its e xit order

### 7

providing father only with monitored visitation. Observing that a family court must find “there has been a significant change of
circumstances” before modify ing a juvenile court’s visitation order (§ 302, subd. (d)), father urges that this lack of information is prejudicial insofar as it may preclude him from proving “a substantial change of circumstances to obtain expanded visitation rights at a later time.” Accordingly, father argues that
the exit order must be reversed “with directions to ord er joint custody or at least clarify that [f]ather was nonoffending and provide directions for [f]ather and family court with specificity as to how he can prove a substantial change in circumstances.” We disagree

. Although the juvenile court might not ha ve expressly stated why it was ordering monitored visitation for father, we see

no error in its failure to do so

. Father again cites no authority for this proposition, instead relying on cases in which the juvenile court gave too much discretion to third person s to change
visitation orders. The juvenile court at least implicitly found that
the visitation it awarded was in A.C.’s best interests, and “the
record is clear as to the circumstances” that warranted this finding . (See In re Marriage of McHugh (2 014) 231 Cal.App.4th 1238, 1248 [ in the ab sence of a request for specific trial court findings “appellate courts .

. . must presume the trial court made all factual findings necessary to support the judgment for which
there is substantial evidence” ] ; In re Jennifer R. (1993)

14 Cal.App.4th 704, 714 [no prejudice from lack of specificity of exit order given that the record showed the circumstances warranting it].)
The record shows that father lacked any significant relationship with A.C. and A.C. had conti nuously expressed her

### 8

desire to avoid contact with father. From this record, a family

court will be able to discern whether there has been a ny future change in circumstances that warrants a modification of the
visitation order. 4
DISPOSITION
The June 30, 2022, and the January 4, 2023, order s are affirmed.

RUBIN, P. J.
WE CONCUR :

BAKER, J.

KIM , J

.

4 Father cites In re Anna T. (2020) 55 Cal.App.5th 870 in passing, but the case is distinguishable. T he juvenile court in that case declined to enter a proper exit order and instead purported to “revert[] to [an] original family law order,” with some modifications as stated in a minute order. ( Id . at pp. 874

- 875.) Here, the juvenile court issued a proper exit order.