F OR P UBLICATION



### UNIT E D ST AT E S CO URT O F APPE AL S FO R T H E NINT H CIRCUIT

C H A D E I C H E

N B E R G E R , Plaintiff-Appellant
,

v

.

E S P N , I N C ., a Delaware corporation, Defendant-Appellee. No. 15-35449

D.C. No. 2:14-cv-00463-TSZ

OPI NI ON

A ppeal from the United States District Court for the W e stern District of W ashing ton Thomas S. Z illy , Senior District J udg e, Presiding

A rg ued and Submitted October 3, 2017 Pasadena, California

F iled November 29, 2017

B efore: Susan P. Graber, Mary H. Murg uia, and Morg an Christen, Circuit J udg es.

Opinion by

J udg e GraberE I C H E N B E R G E R V

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SUMMARY *

Video P rivacy P rotection Act

The panel affirmed the district court’s dismissal under F ed. R. Civ. 12(b)(6) o f a n action a lleg ing that ESPN, I nc. disclosed the plaintiff’s “personally identifiable information” in violation of the V ideo Privacy Protection Act of 1998 b y g iving a third pa r ty , Adobe Analy tics, the p laintiff’s Roku device serial number a

nd b y identify

ing videos he w atched throug h the W atchESPN application.

The p anel rejected ESPN’s contention that the p laintiff lacked standin g. The p anel held that every disclosure of an individual’s “personally identifiable information” and videoviewing history o ffends the interests that the statute protects, and that the p laintiff need n ot alleg e any further harm to have standing

.

The panel h eld that “personally identifiable information”

u nder the statute means o nly that information that woul d

re a d i l y permit an ordinary p erson to identify a specific individual’s video-wa t ch ing behavior. Apply ing that definition here, the pan e l c o ncluded that an ordinary person could not use the information that ESPN alleg edly disclosed
to identify an individual, because the a lleg edly -disclosed informati o n c annot identify an individual unless it is combined with other data in Adobe’s possession—data that ESPN never disclosed and apparently never even possessed.

* T h is su m m ary co n stitu

tes n o p art o f th e o pin io n o f th e co u rt. It h as b een p rep ared b y

co u rt staf

f f o r th e co n v en i en ce o f

th e read er.E I C H E N B E R G E R V

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The panel concluded that the plaintiff therefore failed to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6).

COUNSEL

J ohn A

. L a

wson (arg

u ed), Rog e r Perlstadt, and Ry a n D

. Andrews, Edelson PC, Chicag o, I l linois, for PlaintiffAppellant.

Daniel P. Collins (arg

ued) and Glenn D. Pomerantz
, Mung er T o l l es & Olson L L P, L os Ang eles, California; B ry an H

. Heckenlively
, J onathan H. B l a vin, a nd Rosemarie T. Ring
, Mung er Tolles & Olson L L P, San F rancisco, California; AnaMaria Popp, Cairncross & Hempelman n P .C., Seattle, W a shing ton; for Defendant-Appellee.

Marc Rotenerg and Alan B u tler, W ashing ton, D.C., as and for Amicus Curiae Electronic Privacy I nformation Center.

OP INION

GRAB ER, Circuit J udg e:

Plaintiff Chad Eich e n

b e r g e r a l l e g e s t

h a t Defendant E SPN, I nc. viola t e d t he Video Privacy Protection Act of 1988 (“VPP A ” )
, which bars a “video tape service provider” from knowin gl y disclosing “personally identifiable information concernin g any consumer of such provider.” 18 U .S.C. § 2 7 1 0 ( b)(1). The district court dismissed the action under F ederal Rule of Ci v i l Procedure 12(b)(6) on the g round that the operative com p l a i nt fails to state a claim that theE I C H E N B E R G E R V

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i n f o r m a t i o n d i s c l o s e d w a s “ p e r s o n a l l y i d e n t i f i a b l e information” within the meaning of the VPPA. W e affirm.

F ACTUAL

AND PROCEDURAL

HI STORY

W e accept as true a ll factual alleg ations in the o pe r ative complaint, and we construe them in the lig ht most favorable to Plaintiff as the non-moving party

. Mollett v. Netflix, Inc.
, 795 F .3d 1062, 1065 (9th Cir. 2015).

D e f e n d a n t p r o d u c e s s p o r t s

- r e l a t e d n e w s a n d entertainment prog ramming

. T houg h best know n for its television channel, Defendant a l s o o f fers access to video
content throug h an application called the “W a tchESPN Channel,” which is available on the Roku dig ital streaming device. Roku allows users to v iew v ideos and other content on their televisions by

means of I

n ternet streaming

.

Plai n t i ff downloaded the W atchESPN Channel on his Roku device and used it to watch sports-re l a t e d n ews a nd
events. He did not consent to Defendant’s sharing his information with a third party

. B ut e ver y t i m e Plaintiff watched a video, Defendant knowing ly discl o s e d t o a third party , A dobe Analy

tics: (1 ) Plaintiff’s Roku device serial number and (2) the identity of the video that he watched.

Adobe u ses the infor m a t i o n obtained from Defendant to identify specific consumers by connecting that information “with ex isting data a lready in Adobe’s profile o f th[ ose] i n d i v i d u a l [ s ]

. ” A d o b e o b t a i n s t h e a d d i t i o n a l information—such as “email addresses, a ccount information,

or F acebook profile information, including photos a nd

usernames ”—from sources other than Defendant. Adobe gi ves the resulting data back to Defendant in an ag g r eg a t e dE I C H E N B E R G E R V

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form; Defendant in turn provides advertisers with a g g reg ated information about its users’ demog raphics.

I n this a ction, Plaintiff a l l eg es that Adobe used the foreg oing process to identify him as having watched specific videos. He arg ues tha t D e fendant disclosed his “ personally identifiable information” b y g iving Adobe his Roku device serial number and identify i n g the v ideos that he watched, because Defendant knew that Adobe c o uld and would use that information to identify him. The district court dismissed the action on the gr o u n d that the information that Defendant disclosed did not constitute “personally ide ntifiable information” w i t hin the meaning o f the VPPA. Plaintiff timely appeals.

STANDARD OF REVI EW

W e review de novo the district court ’ s decision to g rant

a motion to dismiss a claim u nder Rule 12(b)(6). Mollett
, 795 F

. 3d at 1065. To survive a motion to dismiss, the claim
must be plausible on its face. Ashcroft v. Iqbal
, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). W e must u

p hold a distri c t c o u rt’s d ecision to dismiss either if a cog niz able l e g al theory is absent or if the facts alleg ed fail to suffice u nder a c og n iz able claim. Mollett
, 795 F .3d at 1065.

D I SCUSSI ON

A. Standing

Defendant first a

rg ues that Plaintiff lacks Art i c l e I I I standing because he has not al l e ged a concrete h arm a s required by Spokeo, Inc. v

. R obins ( Spokeo I ), 136 S. Ct. 1540 (2016). W e disag r ee.E I C H E N B E R G E R V

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To have Article I I I standing
, a plaintiff mu s t h ave suffer ed an injury in fact that is (1) concrete a nd particulariz ed, (2) traceable to the defendant, a nd (3) redressable by judicial order. Lujan v. Defs. o f W ildlife
, 504 U.S. 555, 560–61 (199 2 )

. For a n injury to be concrete, it “must be ‘ de facto ’ ; that is, it must actually ex ist.” Spokeo I
, 136 S. Ct. at 1548. Nevertheless, an intangible harm may qualify a s an in

j u r y i n f act. Id. at 1549. I n d etermining whether an intang ible injury is suffi c iently concrete, “both history and the judg ment of Cong r ess play important roles.” Id.

I n Spokeo I

, the Supreme Court a ddressed whether a violation of p rocedural r equirements imposed by the F air Credit Reporting Act (“F CRA”), alo n e , could constitute an injury in fact sufficient to confer standing

. Id. at 1549. There, the plaintif

f ( Robins) claimed that Spokeo had v iolated the F CRA by disseminating inaccurate inf o r m ation about him. I d. at 1546. I nitially
, we held that the alleg ed violation, by itself, sufficed to confer Article I I I standing

. The Supreme Court vacated our decision and r e manded, ex pl a ining that Article I I I “requires a concrete inj u r y even in the contex t o f

a statutory violation” a

nd that a “bare procedural violation, divorced from any c oncrete harm,” is not enoug h. I d. at 1549. On remand, we held that even thoug h Robins alleg ed procedural violations of the F CR A
, h e alleg ed a sufficient risk o f h arm (for ex ample, the loss of emp l o y m e n t opportunities) to obtain standing

. Robins v. Spokeo, Inc. ( S pokeo II ), 867 F .3d 1108, 1118 (9th Cir. 2017).

I mportantly
, Spokeo con c e r ned procedural violations o f the F CRA that would not invariably injure a concrete interest. Id

. at 1114 (describing the F CRA provisions at issue a s

“ procedural requirements” (e mphasis a dded)); id. at 1116E I C H E N B E R G E R V

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(ex amining the plaintiff’s “ procedural rig hts” (emphasis added)). I ndeed, the central provision at issue in Spokeo was 15 U.S.C. § 1681e(b), w hich falls under the F CR A ’s “Compliance procedures” s ection and requires consumer reporting a g e ncies to tak e “ reasonable p rocedures to assure

max imum possible accuracy ” of the information they report. B ut a violation of that provision does n ot necessarily affect a plaintiff’s concrete interests. See Spokeo I
, 136 S. Ct. at 1550 (noting that “not all inaccuracies ca u s e h a r m or p r esent any material risk of h arm” and g iving
, a s an ex ample, the dissemination o f a consumer’s incorrect z ip code). As a consequence, the Spokeo plainti ff had to p lead additional harm to obtain standing

. Id.

B y contrast, 1 8 U.S.C. § 2 710(b)(1), the VPPA provision
at issue here, codifies a contex t-specific ex tensio n of the substan t ive rig ht to privacy : “A video tape service provider who knowing ly disclose s , to any person, personally identifiable information concerning any consumer of such
p r o v i d e r shall be liable to the ag g rieved person

. . . .” That provision d oes not describe a p r ocedu r e that video service
pr o v i ders must follow. Rather, it p rotects g e nerally a consumer’s substantive privacy interest in his or her videoviewing history

. Mollett
, 7 9 5 F.3d at 1065 (citing S. Rep. N o

. 100-599, at 1 (1988), reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4342 )

. According ly
, every disclosure of an individual’s “personally identifiable information” and video-viewing history offends the interests that the statute protects.

Cong r essional judg ment leaves little doubt that 18 U .S.C. § 2710(b)(1) is a substantive provision that protects concrete interests. Cong ress enacted the VPPA “to ex tend privacy protection to records that contain information about i n d i viduals.” S. Rep. No. 1 00-599, a t 2. To that end, t h eE I C H E N B E R G E R V

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VPPA permits consumers to obtain damag es for a violation of § 2 7 1 0 (b)(1) without showing consequential harm. 1 8 U.S.C. § 2710(c)(2). 1 The VPPA does not protect o n l y ag ainst h arms such as embarrassment and h arassment—as D e f endant arg ues. Rather, the statute also p rotects priv a c y interests more g enerally by ensuring that consumers r e t a i n control over their personal information. See S. Rep. No. 100- 599, at 6–7 (ex plaining t h a t the VPPA protects ag ainst intrusion in an ag e when con s u mers “provide to businesses

. . . personal information without having any co n t r ol over where that information g oes”).

Histo r ical practice confirms that understanding

. Violations o f the rig ht to privacy h ave long been actionable
at c ommon law. See Braitbe r g v

. Charter Commc’ns, Inc.
, 8 3 6 F .3d 925, 930 (8th Cir. 2016) (stating that “th e r e i s a

common law tradition of lawsuits for invasion of p r ivacy ”). I ndeed, the Supreme Court h a s noted that “both the common law and the literal understanding of p r i v a c y encompass the individual’s c ontrol of information c o n cerning his or her
person. ” U.S. Dep’t of Justice v. Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the Press
, 489 U.S. 74 9, 763 (1989). Telling ly
, privacy torts do not alway s re q u i r e additional consequences to be actionable. See, e .g

. , R es tatement (Second) of Torts § 652B cmt. b. (Am. L aw I nst. 1977) (recog niz ing the tort o f

1 In Def en dan t’ s v iew
, th e w o rd “ ag g riev ed ” su g g ests th at th e statu te req u ires a s h o w i n g o f ad d itio n al h arm an d th at, w ith o u t su ch a sh o w in g , a co n su m er d o es n o t h av e stan d in g

. W e d isag ree. T h e Su p rem e Co u rt h as

ex p lain ed th at th e term “ ag g riev ed ” d em o n strates an “ in ten t t o c a s t th e stan d in g n et b ro ad ly .” Fed

. Electio n Co m m’n v. Akin s , 5 2 4 U.S. 1 1
, 1 9 (1 9 9 8) (ad d ressin g th e t erm in th e co n t ex t o f p ru d en tial stan din g ). Reg ard le s s , co n g ressio n al h isto ry clearly s h o w s th at Co n g ress th o u g h t th at

ev ery u n au th o rized disclo su re “ ag g riev es” a co n s u m er. Mo llett
, 7 9 5 F.3 d at 1 0 6 5

.E I C H E N B E R G E R V

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i n t r u sion upon seclusion, for which the “intrusion itself ” makes the de f

e n d a n t liable). T he VPPA functions in the
same way

.
Thus, althoug h the F CRA out l ines procedural o blig ations that sometimes protect individual interests
, the VPPA identifies a subs tantive rig ht to privacy that suffers any time

a video service provider discloses otherwise p r ivate information. As a r esult, every 18 U.S.C. § 27 1 0 (b ) ( 1 ) violation “present[ s] the precise harm and infring e[ s] the

same privacy interests Cong ress sou gh t t o protect” b y enacting the VPPA. V

a n Patten v. Vertical Fitness Grp., LLC
, 847 F .3d 1037, 1043 (9th Ci r

. 2 0 1 7 ) (so holding with respect to the Telephone Consumer Protection A ct of 1991). According ly
, Spokeo I a

nd Spokeo II are d isting uishable from this VPPA claim, a

nd Plaintiff need not alleg e any f urther harm to have standing

. I

d. 2 W e therefore join the two other circuits that, after S

pokeo I
, have found Article I I I standing in similar c ases arising under the VPPA. Perry v. Cable News Network, I

nc. , 854 F .3d 1336, 1341 ( 1 1 t h Cir. 2017); In re Nickelodeon Consumer Privacy Litig.
, 827 F .3d 2 62, 274 (3d Cir. 2016), cert. denied , 137 S. Ct. 624 (2017).

2 T h e V P P A ’ s h isto ry sh o w s w h y an alleg atio n o f ad d itio n al h arm is

u n n ecessary

. C o n g ress en acted t h e VP P A af

ter a n ew sp ap er p u

b lish ed Su p rem e Co u

rt n o m in ee Ro b ert B o r k ’s v id eo ren tal h isto ry

. No t ab ly
, J u d g e Bo rk ’ s ren t al h isto ry w as d ecid ed ly co m m o n p lace, an d th e article d i d n o t h u r t h i s n o m i n a t i o n

. C a s e C o m m e n t , S t a t u t o ry In terp reta t io n —Th e Vid eo Priva cy Pro tectio n Act—Eleven th Circu i t Limits th e S

co p e o f “S u b scrib er”

fo r VPPA Pro tectio n s.—Ellis v. Ca rto o n Netwo rk, In c., 8 0 3 F.3 d

1 2 51 ( 1 1 th Cir. 2 0 1 5

)
, 1 2 9 Harv

. L . Rev . 2 0 1 1
, 2 0 1 8

– 1 9 (2 0 1 6 ). W e r e w e t o accep t Def en d an t’ s arg u m en t reg ard in g stan d in g , th e VP P A w o u ld n o t p r o vi d e leg al reco u rse to th o se in th e p recise situ atio n

th at p ro m

p ted th e statu te’ s en actm en t in th e f irst p lace.E I C H E N B E R G E R V

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B

. “ Personally Identifiable Information ”

The district cou r t dismissed Plaintiff’s claim on the
g round that the alleg e d l y d isclosed information did not constitute “personally identifiable information” within the meaning of the VPPA. The V PPA defines “pe r s o n a l ly identifiable information” t o “include[ ] information which identifies a p erson as having requested or o b t ained specific video materials o r s ervices from a video tape service provider.” 1 8 U.S.C. § 2710(a)(3). W e a g ree with the district court’s conclusion.

As an initial matter, “personally identifiable information”
must include more information tha n that which, by itself, identifies an individual as having w atched c e r t a in videos. I nstead, “personally identifiable information” covers some information that can be used to identify

an individual.

Two reasons support that conclusion, a n d b oth flow directly f rom the VPPA’s tex t. F irst, § 2710(a)(3) uses the

o p e n-ended word “includes,” w hich sug g ests that t h e proffered definition describes o nly one ex ample o f “personally identifiable in fo r m ation.” Read in contex t, the word “includes” seems particularly deliberate here. Compare 18 U.S.C. § 2710( a )( 3 ) (using the w ord “ includes”) with 18 U.S.C. § 2710(a)(1)
, (a)(2) & (a)(4) ( using the word “means” to define other statutory terms). Second, Cong ress used t he word “identifi able .” 1 8 U.S.C. § 2710(a)(3) (emphasis added). And the suffix “able” means “capable of.” W ebster’s Third N

e w I nt’l Dictionary 4, 1 1 23 (unabr. ed. 1981). I t follows, then, that the term “personally identifiable information” c overs some information that is “capab l e of” i d entify ing a p erson, as well as information that, standing alone, identifies a person.E I C H E N B E R G E R V

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The q uestion remains, thoug h: Under the V PPA, what information did Cong r ess intend to cover as “ capable of” identify ing an individual? Two circuits have considered that question in similar cases, and each has articulated a different

s tandard. Y

ershov v. Gannett Satellite Info. Network, In c

. , 820 F .3d 482, 486 (1st C i r

. 2016); In re Nickelodeon Consumer Privacy Litig. , 827 F .3d 262, 284 (3d Cir. 2016).

I n Y ershov
, the F irst Circuit held that the term “ personally i d e n t i f i a b l e i n f

o r m a t i o n ” e n c o m p a s s e s “ i n f o r m a t i o n reasonably and foreseeably likely to reveal which

. . . v ideos [ a p erson] has obtained.” 820 F .3d a t 4 86 (emphasis added). The court concluded that a n iPho n e user’s GPS coordinates and device identifier fell w i t h in that definition. Id. I n a similar case, thoug h, t h e T hird Circuit held that a unique I P address did not q

ualify a s “personally identifiable information,” b ecause the term includes only information that “readily permit[ s] an ordinary person to identify a [ particular i n d ividual as having w atched certain videos] .” In re Nickelodeon
, 827 F .3d at 290 (emphasis add ed). W e adopt the Third Circuit’s “ordinary person” standard.

The “or dinary person” test better informs video service providers o f their oblig ations under the VPPA. The VP P A protects consumer privacy by directing video service providers n ot to do certain thing s with consumer information. To that end, 18 U.S.C. § 2 7 10(b)(1) focuses on what information a v ideo service provider “knowing ly discloses.” I n other words, the statute views disc l o s u re from the perspective o f t h e disclosing p a r ty

. I t looks to what information a video service provider discloses, not to what the reci p i en t o f that information decides to do with it. A s a

r e s ult, “personally identifiable information” must have the

same meaning without reg ard to i t s recipient’s capabilities.E I C H E N B E R G E R V

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H o l d ing otherwise w ould make “[ t] he lawfulness of [ a ] disclosure

. . . depend on circumstances outside of [ a video service provider’s] control.” Mollett
, 795 F .3d at 1066. The Third Circuit’s “ordinary p erson” tes t , b y contrast, provides video service providers with enoug h g uidance to comply with the VPPA’s requirements.

The interpretation that we a dopt fits most neatly with the
reg ime that the VPPA’s enacting Cong ress likely had in mind. I n 1988, the I nternet had not y et transformed the way that individuals and companies u se consumer data—at least

n ot to the e x tent that it has today

. Then, the VPPA ’s instructions were clear. The manag er of a video rental store in L os Ang eles understood that if h e o r s he d isclosed the

name and address of a c u s t o m er—along with a list of the videos that the customer had v iewed —the recipient of that information could identify the customer. B y contrast, it was clear that, if the disclosure were that “a local high school teacher” had rented a p articular movie
, t h e manag e r would
not h ave violated the statute. T hat was so eve n i f o ne recipient of the information happened to be a r esourceful private investig ator who could, w i t h great effort, fig ure out which of the hundreds of teachers had rented the v ideo. Plaintiff’s Roku device serial number is like the information in the la t t e r s cenario. I t c r eates a siz able “pool” of possible viewers—here, Roku use rs

— j ust as the information in the latter ex ample does—there, high school teachers.

I t is true that today ’s technolog y may a llow A dobe to identify an individual from the larg e pool by usi n g other information—as Plai n t iff alleg es. B ut the advent of the I nternet did not chang e the disclosing -party focus o f the
statute. And w e are not persuaded that the 1988 Cong ress intended for the VPPA to cover circumstances so d iffe r entE I C H E N B E R G E R V

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from the ones that motivated its passag e. Therefore, drawing

o n the T hird Circuit’s reasoning
, we hold that “personal l y i d entifiable information” means o nly that information t h at

w o uld “readily permit an ordinary person to identi fy a specific individual’s video-watching behavior.” In re Nickelodeon , 827 F .3d at 267.

Apply ing that definition here, the operative complaint is deficient. Plaintiff alleg e s that D efendant d isclosed to Adobe: ( 1) h is Roku device serial number and (2) the names of the v i d e os that he w atched. As Plaintiff concedes, that i n f o rmation cannot identify a n individual unless it i s combined with other d ata in Adobe’s possession—data that ESPN never disclosed and apparently never even possessed. I ndeed, according to Plaintiff, A dobe can identify individuals only because it uses a complex “Visitor Stitching technique”
to link an individual’s Roku device n u m b er with other identify ing information derived f rom “an enormous amount of information” collected “from a varie t y o f sources.” W e

co n c l u d e that an ordinary person c ould not use the information that Defendant a lleg edly disclosed to identify an individual. Plaintiff has therefore f ailed to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6).

Our d ecision today
, thoug h it adopts a different test, does
not necessarily c onfl ict with Y ershov

. The F irst Circuit’s holding in that case was quite narrow. The court held

only that the transaction d e s cribed in the complaint—wher e b y Y e r s h o v u s e d t h e m o b ile device application tha t Gannett provided to him, which g ave Gannett the G PS location o f Yershov’s mobile device a t th e time he viewed a video, h is de v i c e identifier, and theE I C H E N B E R G E R V

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titles of the videos h e v iewed in return for access to Gannett’s video content—plausibly plead[ ed] a case that the VPPA’s prohibition on disclosure applies.

Y e rshov
, 820 F .3d at 4 89. The F irst Circuit relied, in part, on the nature of GPS l o c a tion data, which the court noted “would enable most p eople to identify [ an individual’s home and work addresses]

. ” Id. a t 486 (emphasis added). And the
court e x pressly noted that, at some point, “the l i n k a ge o f information to identity become s t o o uncertain” to trig g er liability under the VPPA. Id. That is precisely the situation here.

Nor does our holding make the statute powerless. Names and addresses, of course, s t i l l qualify

. See 18 U .S.C. § 2710(b)(2)(D) (permitting video service providers to

“ d i s close p ersonally identifiable information

. . . if [ among other conditions] the disclosure is solely o f t he names and addresses of

consumers ” (emphasis added)). I t is not d ifficult
to imag ine other ex amples that may also count—for ex ample,

an individual’s name a

n d telephone number or an individual’s

name and birthday

or, as in Y

ershov
, the GPS coordinates o f

a particular device. And mo dern technolog y may indeed alter—or may already have altered—what qualifies u nder the
statute. A F acebook link or a n email a d dress may very w ell readily enable an “ordinary person” to identify an individual. W e need not a

nd do not opine on the merits of those theories. T h e alleg ations before us, thoug h, a re simply too attenua t e d to qualify under the standard that we adopt today

. 3

3 In v iew o f o u r h o ld in g , w e n e e d n ot reach an y o th er issu e. W e th eref o re d o n o t d e c i d e , f

o r ex am p le, w h eth er P lain tif

f h as ad eq u ately alleg ed h is statu s as a “ co n su m er” u n d er th e VP P A

.E I C H E N B E R G E R V

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CONCL USI ON

Plaintiff has Ar t i c l e I I I standing to bring his claim because 18 U.S.C. § 271 0 ( b ) ( 1) is a substantive provision protecting consumers’ concrete interest in their privacy

. W e affirm the judg ment of dismissal b ecause the information described in Plai n tiff’s complaint does not constitute “personally

identifiable information” under the VPPA.

AF F IRMED.