FILED

April 21, 1999

Cecil Crowson, Jr.

Appellate C ourt Clerk

IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE

AT KNOXVILLE

FEBRUARY SESSION, 1999

STATE OF TENNESSEE, ) C.C.A. NO. 03C01-9804-CR-00133

)

Appellee, )

)

) HAMILTON COUNTY

VS. )

) HON. DOUGLAS A. MEYER

MITCHELL EDW ARD M INGIE,) JUDGE

)

Appellant. ) (Direct Appeal - DUI - Revoked 

) License)

FOR THE APPELLANT: FOR THE APPELLEE:

CONRAD FINNELL JOHN KNOX WALKUP

P. O. Box 1476 Attorney General and Reporter

Cleveland, TN 37364-1476

ELLEN H. POLLACK

Assistant Attorney General

425 Fifth Avenue North

Nashville, TN 37243

BILL COX

District Attorney General

PARKE MASTERSON

Assistant District Attorney

City and County Courts Building

Chattanooga, TN 37402

OPINION FILED ________________________

AFFIRMED

JERRY L. SMITH, JUDGE
1

 The trial court also revoked Appellant’s driving privileges for three (3) years and imposed a fine

of $1,110 for driving under the influence and $50 for driving on a revoked license.

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OPINION

The appellant, Mitchell Edward Mingie, was convicted by a Hamilton

County jury of one (1) count of driving under the influence of an intoxicant, fifth

offense. He also pled guilty to one (1) count of driving on a revoked license. The

trial court sentenced Appellant to concurrent terms of six (6) months for driving

on a revoked license and eleven (11) months and twenty-nine (29) days for

driving under the influence.1

 On appeal, Appellant claims that the evidence was

insufficient to sustain the jury’s verdict for driving under the influence. After a

thorough review of the record before this Court, we affirm the trial court’s

judgment.

I

Officer Ragan McDevitt with the Hamilton County Sheriff’s Department

testified as follows. At approximately 9:30 p.m. on June 22, 1996, he was

dispatched to the scene of a single motor vehicle accident in Hamilton County,

Tennessee. When McDevitt arrived, other emergency personnel were present,

and Appellant, his wife, and his fifteen (15) year old niece, Jessica Long, were

standing outside of the vehicle. When McDevitt inquired as to how the accident

occurred, Appellant informed the officer that he had lost control of the vehicle
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while maneuvering a curve and traveling down a hill. Appellant advised the

officer that he had been driving the vehicle and did not have his driver’s license.

The vehicle involved in the accident was a Toyota pickup with a bench

seat. When McDevitt questioned the passengers as to their relative positions in

the truck when the accident occurred, Cheryl Mingie, Appellant’s wife, advised

the officer that she had been sitting in the middle of the seat. Jessica stated that

she was sitting next to the passenger door. 

While investigating the accident, the officer noticed that Appellant was

having difficulty keeping his balance. McDevitt observed that Appellant had

bloodshot eyes and smelled of alcohol. Further, McDevitt noticed that Appellant’s

speech was slow and he was unstable on his feet. Officer McDevitt arrested

Appellant for driving under the influence of an intoxicant and, while escorting

Appellant to the police car, had to “hold on to him to keep him from falling.” 

Subsequently, Appellant signed an implied consent form and acquiesced

in a breathalyser test. Appellant’s blood alcohol content was found to be 0.17.

At trial, Jessica Long testified on behalf of the defense. She stated that

Cheryl Mingie, not Appellant, had been driving the vehicle at the time of the

accident. Jessica testified that, when Officer McDevitt inquired as to who was the

driver of the vehicle, Appellant responded, “If I tell you I was driving this truck, will

you let the ladies go?” On cross-examination, however, Long acknowledged that

she failed to advise anyone that Cheryl Mingie was the driver of the vehicle until

the day of trial, which was approxim ately eighteen (18) m onths after the date of

the incident. 

The jury found Appellant guilty of driving under the influence of an

intoxicant. The parties submitted the issue whether Appellant was guilty of a fifth
2

 Because the only issue at trial was whether Appellant was driving the vehicle at the time of the

accident, Appellant agreed to plead guilty to driving on a revoked license if the jury found him guilty of

driving under the influence.

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offense to the trial court. The trial court found Appellant to be a fifth offender of

driving under the influence. Appellant also pled guilty to driving on a revoked

license.2 From his conviction of driving under the influence, Appellant brings this

appeal.

II

In his sole issue on appeal, Appellant challenges the sufficiency of the

convicting evidence. Specifically, he claims that he cannot be convicted solely

on the basis of his uncorroborated extra-judicial confession. He further argues

that because Jessica Long was present at the time of the accident, her testimony

is more reliable than that of Officer McDevitt. Therefore, he contends that the

jury should have afforded Long’s testimony greater weight than McDevitt’s.

A.

When an accused challenges the sufficiency of the evidence, this Court

must review the record to determine if the evidence adduced during the trial was

sufficient “to support the findings by the trier of fact of guilt beyond a reasonable

doubt.” Tenn. R. App. P. 13(e). This rule is applicable to findings of guilt

predicated upon direct evidence, circumstantial evidence or a combination of

direct and circumstantial evidence. State v. Brewer, 932 S.W.2d 1, 19 (Tenn.

Crim. App. 1996).

In determining the sufficiency of the evidence, this Court does not reweigh

or reevaluate the evidence. State v. Cabbage, 571 S.W.2d 832, 835 (Tenn.
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1978). Nor may this Court substitute its inferences for those drawn by the trier

of fact from circumstantial evidence. Liakas v. State, 199 Tenn. 298, 305, 286

S.W.2d 856, 859 (1956). To the contrary, this Court is required to afford the state

the strongest legitimate view of the evidence contained in the record as well as

all reasonable and legitimate inferences which may be drawn from the evidence.

State v. Tuttle, 914 S.W.2d 926, 932 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1995). “A guilty verdict

by the jury, approved by the trial judge, accredits the testimony of the witnesses

for the State and resolves all conflicts in favor of the theory of the State.” State

v. Grace, 493 S.W.2d 474, 476 (Tenn. 1973).

Because a verdict of guilt removes the presumption of innocence and

replaces it with a presumption of guilt, the accused has the burden in this Court

of illustrating why the evidence is insufficient to support the verdict returned by

the trier of fact. State v. Tuggle, 639 S.W.2d 913, 914 (Tenn. 1982); State v.

Grace, 493 S.W.2d at 476.

B.

Appellant maintains that the state did not present sufficient evidence to

corroborate his confession that he was the driver of the vehicle. It is well

established that the corpus delicti of a crime may not be proven by a defendant’s

extra-judicial confession alone. Ashby v. State, 124 Tenn. 684, 139 S.W. 872,

875 (1911). To establish the corpus delicti of a crime, the state must prove two

elements: (1) “[t]hat a certain result has been produced,” and (2) “[t]hat the result

was created through criminal agency.” State v. Ervin, 731 S.W.2d 70, 71-72

(Tenn. Crim. App. 1986). The elements of corpus delicti may be proven by

circumstantial evidence. Id. at 72.
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In the case sub judice, Appellant informed the officer that he was the driver

of the vehicle when the accident occurred. This inculpatory statement was

corroborated when the other passengers of the vehicle informed Officer McDevitt

that Appellant’s wife was sitting in the middle of the seat, and Jessica was by the

passenger door. Neither Mrs. Mingie nor Jessica contradicted Appellant’s

statement that he was the driver of the vehicle. Officer McDevitt testified at trial

that he received “no indication” from the passengers that Appellant was not the

driver of the vehicle.

The question whether the state has sufficiently proven the corpus delicti is

a question for the jury. Ervin, 731 S.W.2d at 71. Furthermore, “[o]nly slight

evidence of the corpus delicti is necessary to corroborate a confession and thus

sustain a conviction.” Id. at 72. We conclude that the state presented sufficient

corroborative evidence to support Appellant’s conviction.

This issue is without merit.

C.

Appellant further asserts that because Jessica was an eyewitness to the

incident, her testimony deserves greater weight than that of Officer McDevitt.

However, it is beyond dispute that questions concerning the credibility of the

witnesses, the weight and value to be given the evidence as well as all factual

issues raised by the evidence are resolved by the jury as the trier of fact. State

v. Tuttle, 914 S.W.2d at 932. The jury was able to observe the demeanor of both

witnesses and assess their credibility accordingly. Clearly, the jury discredited

Long’s testimony. This Court is not at liberty to overturn the jury’s determination.

This issue has no merit.
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-8-

III

We conclude that the evidence is sufficient to support Appellant’s

conviction for driving under the influence of an intoxicant. Accordingly, the

judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

____________________________________

JERRY L. SMITH, JUDGE

CONCUR:

___________________________________

JOSEPH M. TIPTON, JUDGE

___________________________________

L. TERRY LAFFERTY, SPECIAL JUDGE