[Cite as Reeves v. Tait, 2022-Ohio-393.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO 

FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT 

WASHINGTON COUNTY 

RUTH REEVES, : 

 : Case No. 20CA38 

Petitioner-Appellant, : 

 : 

v. : DECISION AND JUDGMENT 

 : ENTRY 

PAIGE TAIT, ET AL., : 

 : 

Respondents-Appellees. : RELEASED: 02/02/2022 

 

APPEARANCES: 

Laura A. Knab, Marietta, Ohio for Appellant. 

William L. Burton, Marietta, Ohio for Appellee. 

 

Wilkin, J. 

{¶1} This is an appeal by petitioner-appellant, Ruth Reeves (“Reeves”), 

from a Washington County Court of Common Pleas judgment entry that denied 

her petition for grandparent visitation rights due to a lack of standing. Reeves 

appeals asserting a single assignment of error: “[t]he trial court erred in finding 

Petitioner had no standing to petition the court for grandparent visitation under 

R.C. 3109.12 with regard to minor child, [R.T.].”1 There was no transcript of any 

proceeding from the trial court, so after reviewing the party’s arguments, trialcourt pleadings, and applicable law, we find that the trial court did not err in 

denying Reeve’s petition. Therefore, we affirm the trial court’s judgment entry 

1 Reeves sought visitation of all three of her grandsons, R.T., J.T., and B.T., and the court found 

that she lacked standing to seek visitation of all three. However, her appeal addresses only R.T., 

so our decision is limited to him. 
Washington App. No. 20CA38 2

denying Reeve’s petition for lack of standing. 

BACKGROUND 

{¶2} Reeves is Paige Tait’s mother. Paige Tait (“Paige”) and Joseph 

Fields (“Joseph”) were married on November 5, 2013. On November 23, 2013, 

Paige gave birth to R.F. n.k.a. R.T. Approximately two years later, on September 

13, 2015, Paige and Joseph divorced. Subsequent to her divorce, Paige married 

Kelly Tait (“Kelly”). During their marriage, Paige and Kelly had two sons, J.T and 

B.T, and Kelly adopted R.F. and changed his name to R.T. 

{¶3} As their maternal grandmother, Reeves filed a motion seeking 

visitation with her three grandsons pursuant to R.C. 3109.051(B) and (C), and 

R.C. 3109.12. Appellees-respondents, Paige and Kelly, filed a response arguing 

that all three children “are now the children of a married couple.” They claimed 

that “the biological mother [Paige] and her husband [Kelly] are joined in their 

effort to prevent [Reeves] further access to their children as a direct result of 

abusive and detrimental behavior on the part of [Reeves].” 

{¶4} The magistrate issued a decision that concluded that Reeves lacked 

standing to seek visitation of her three grandchildren. The magistrate first 

determined that Reeves could not seek visitation under R.C. 3109.051(B) 

because the “situational premise” of the statute - “divorce, dissolution of 

marriage, legal separation, annulment, or child support proceeding that involves 

a child” – “does not apply to the facts of this case.” The magistrate also found 

R.C. 3109.12(A), which requires the mother of a child to be unmarried at the time 
Washington App. No. 20CA38 3

she gives birth, did not apply because Paige was married at the time she gave 

birth to her three children. 

{¶5} Reeves objected to the magistrate’s decision. She acknowledged

that Joseph was R.T.’s biological father, but claimed that because Paige and 

Joseph divorced and Kelly subsequently adopted the child, Joseph is no longer 

considered R.T.’s father for purposes of this case. Rather, Reeves asserted that 

Paige’s current spouse, Kelly, who adopted R.T., is R.T.’s father. Therefore, 

Reeves argued because Paige was not married to Kelly when she gave birth to 

R.T., Paige was unmarried for purposes of R.C. 3109.12. Thus, Reeves 

maintained that she had standing to file a petition seeking visitation under that 

provision. 

{¶6} The trial court overruled Reeves’ objections, finding that R.C.

3109.051(B) was not applicable because the “Court no longer has jurisdiction 

over [R.T.], as he has been adopted by Kelly and the parental rights of [R.T.’s] 

biological parent, Joseph, have been terminated, nor was he born to an 

unmarried woman.” (Emphasis added.) The court also found that neither J.T nor 

B.T. were born to an unmarried woman. Therefore, the court overruled Reeves’ 

objections and adopted the magistrate’s decision. It is this judgment that Reeves 

appeals. 

ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR 

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING PETITIONER HAD NO 

STANDING TO PETITION THE COURT FOR GRANDPARENT 

VISITATION UNDER R.C. 3109.12 WITH REGARDS TO MINOR 

CHILD [R.T.]. 
Washington App. No. 20CA38 4

{¶7} Reeves asserts that the stepparent adoption of R.T. “did not sever 

the familial ties for the mother’s family[,]” and therefore she has standing under 

R.C. 3109.12 to pursue visitation rights with her grandson, R.T., citing Moore v. 

Strassel, 4th Dist. Pickaway No. 97CA32, 1998 WL 101354 (Feb. 26, 1998). She 

acknowledges that “[i]f a child is born to an unmarried woman, the parents of the 

woman ... may file a complaint requesting the court ... to grant them reasonable 

companionship or visitation rights with the child.” She claims that “[Kelly] Tait’s 

adoption broke any ties that the family of the natural father previously had to the 

minor child. * * * The adoption related back to birth and as such, Mr. Tait is the 

father listed on [R.T.’s] birth certificate.” Thus, Reeves argues that at the time of 

the child’s birth, Paige was not married to the person who is currently identified 

as R.T.’s father. Accordingly, Reeves maintains Paige was unmarried at the time 

that she gave birth to R.T., so Reeves has standing under R.C. 3109.12 to seek 

visitation with R.T. 

{¶8} In response, appellees argue that Reeves’ assertion that “[a]t the 

time of birth, the legal parents of [R.T.] were unmarried” - is incorrect. Appellees 

cite to a North Carolina court order that indicates Paige and Joseph were married 

at the time R.T. was born. Consequently, appellees argue that Paige was not 

unmarried when she gave birth to R.T., which is a requirement under R.C. 

3109.12(A) for a relative to petition for visitation. Accordingly, appellees argue 

that the trial court did not err in holding that Reeves lacked standing to petition for 

visitation with R.T. 
Washington App. No. 20CA38 5

A. Standard of Review 

{¶9} Because standing is a question of law, we apply a de novo standard 

of review. Holiday Haven Members Assn. v. Paulson, 4th Dist. Hocking No. 

13CA13, 2014-Ohio-3902, ¶ 13. “De novo appellate review means that we afford 

no deference to a trial court's decision and, instead, conduct our own, 

independent review of the evidence.” Id., citing Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. 

Odita, 10th Dist. Franklin No. 13AP-663, 2014-Ohio-2540, ¶ 8. 

 {¶10} “[G]randparents have no constitutional right of association with their 

grandchildren.” In re Martin, 68 Ohio St. 3d 250, 252, 626 N.E.2d 82 (1994), 

citing In re Schmidt, 25 Ohio St.3d 331, 336, 496 N.E.2d 952 (1986). Rather, the 

only right for grandparents to visit their grandchildren “must be provided for by 

statute, and that the Ohio statutes allow visitation only if it is in the 

grandchildren’s best interest.” Id., citing In re Whitaker, 36 Ohio St.3d 213, 217, 

522 N.E.2d 563 (1988). “The General Assembly has authorized grandparent 

visitation in three situations: (1) in divorce, dissolution, legal separation, or 

annulment proceedings (R.C. 3109.051); (2) where the parent of the child is 

deceased (R.C. 3109.11); and (3) where the child is born to an unmarried 

mother * * * (R.C. 3109.12[A]).” (brackets sic.) Id. at 253, see also McFall v. 

Watson, 4th Dist. Vinton No. 8CA667, 2008-Ohio-5205, ¶ 12. “Grandparental 

visitation rights in Ohio do not vest until the occurrence of [at least one these 

three] disruptive precipitating event[s]” occurs. In re Gibson, 61 Ohio St. 3d 168, 

169, 573 N.E.2d 1074 (1991). 
Washington App. No. 20CA38 6

B. Analysis 

 {¶11} Reeves’ complaint sought visitation under R.C. 3109.051, as well as 

R.C. 3109.12. The trial court found that Reeves lacked standing under both 

provisions. However, on appeal, Reeves challenges the trial court’s 

interpretation of R.C. 3109.12 only. Accordingly, our analysis is limited to R.C. 

3109.12, which states: 

(A) If a child is born to an unmarried woman, the parents of the 

woman and any relative of the woman may file a complaint 

requesting the court * * * to grant them reasonable * * * visitation 

rights with the child. 

* * * 

(B) The court may grant the parenting time rights or 

companionship or visitation rights requested under division (A) of 

this section, if it determines that the granting of the parenting 

time rights or companionship or visitation rights is in the best 

interest of the child. * * *. 

The marriage or remarriage of the mother or father of a child 

does not affect the authority of the court under this section to 

grant the natural father reasonable parenting time rights or the 

parents or relatives of the natural father or the parents or 

relatives of the mother of the child reasonable companionship or 

visitation rights with respect to the child. 

(Emphasis added.) 

{¶12} Reeves acknowledges the “unmarried” requirement in R.C. 

3109.12(B), but she asserts that “[t]he issue in this case is whether the 

subsequent marriage of the parents of the minor child to each other interferes 

with the Court’s authority to grant reasonable companionship to relatives after 

marriage.” [Emphasis sic.] In effect, Reeves maintains the question is whether 

Paige was married to Kelly when she gave birth to R.T., and because she was 
Washington App. No. 20CA38 7

not, Paige was “unmarried” at the time that she gave birth to R.T. for purposes of 

R.C. 3109.12(A). We agree with Reeves that the “disruptive precipitating event” 

that determines whether Reeves has standing to seek visitation with R.T. is 

whether Paige was unmarried when she gave birth to R.T. However, we 

disagree with Reeves’ assertion that the question is whether Paige was married 

to Kelly. 

{¶13} “Under Ohio law, it is a cardinal rule that a court must first look to 

the language of the statute itself to determine the legislative intent.” In re Collier, 

85 Ohio App. 3d 232, 237, 619 N.E.2d 503 (4th Dist. 1993), citing Shover v. 

Cordis Corp., 61 Ohio St.3d 213, 218, 574 N.E.2d 457 (1991). “Courts should 

give effect to the words of the statute and should not modify an unambiguous 

statute by deleting or inserting words; that is, we have no authority to ignore the 

plain and unambiguous language of a statute under the guise of statutory 

interpretation.” State v. Clemons, 2013-Ohio-3415, 996 N.E.2d 507, ¶ 7 (4th 

Dist.), citing State v. McDonald, 4th Dist. Ross No. 04CA2806, 2005-Ohio-3503, 

¶ 11. 

{¶14} “[T]he clear language of R.C. 3109.12, if a child is born to an

unmarried mother, the grandparents may request visitation rights.” Moore v. 

Strassel, Pickaway No. 97 CA 32, 1998 WL 101354, *3 (Feb. 26, 1998). 

We find this language necessarily asks whether the woman was married at the 

time that she gave birth to the child. At the time that Paige gave birth to R.T. she 

was still married to Joseph. Therefore, for purposes of R.C. 3109.12(A), Paige 

was not unmarried when she gave birth to R.T. Without the occurrence of that 
Washington App. No. 20CA38 8

disruptive precipitating event, Reeves lacked standing to seek visitation under 

R.C. 3109.12. 

{¶15} Contrary to Reeves’ argument, there are no words in R.C. 3109.12 

that indicate that a woman’s marriage, subsequent to the birth of her child, 

relates back to date of the child’s birth for purposes of R.C. 3109.12(A). To 

accept Reeves’ argument that Paige’s subsequent marriage to Kelly and his 

adoption of R.T. is the disruptive precipitating event changing Paige’s marital 

status at the time of R.T.’s birth would require us to insert words into R.C. 

3109.12(A) that do not exist, which is beyond our authority. Only the 

General Assembly has the authority to enact, amend, or repeal laws. City of 

Toledo v. State, 2018-Ohio-2358, 154 Ohio St. 3d 41, 47, 110 N.E.3d 1257, 

citing Article II, Section 1, and Article III, Section 5 of the Ohio Constitution. 

{¶16} Our plain reading of R.C. 3109.12(A) is also consistent with 

its purpose, which “authorizes a parent of an unmarried woman to seek 

visitation with a child born to her [because the] statute ‘recognizes that 

the * * * maternal * * * relatives of a child born to an unmarried mother 

often play a significant role in the care and upbringing of a child, which 

can be strained or severed as time progresses * * *.’ ” In re H.A., 2d 

Dist. Montgomery No. 25832, 2013-Ohio-5457, ¶ 4, quoting Nicoson v. 

Hacker, 11th Dist. Lake No. 2000-L-213, 2001 WL 1602666, *2 (Dec. 14, 

2001). 

{¶17} Therefore, we conclude that the plain language of R.C. 3109.12(A) 

requires that a mother be unmarried at the time she gives birth to a child as a 
Washington App. No. 20CA38 9

prerequisite to the mother’s parents seeking visitation with their grandchildren. 

Accordingly, the future event of divorce, remarriage and adoption of the child are 

not relevant because what matters is the mother’s marital status at the time of 

the birth of the child. At the time Paige gave birth to R.T., she was married to 

her, now ex-husband, Joseph Fields. Consequently, because there was no 

disruptive, precipitating event (i.e., that Paige was not unmarried at the time she 

gave birth to R.T.), Paige’s mother, Reeves, had no standing to seek visitation 

rights with R.T. under R.C. 3109.12. 

CONCLUSION 

{¶18} Because R.C. 3109.12(A) permits a mother’s parent or relatives to 

seek visitation with their daughter’s children only if the mother is unmarried at the 

time of their birth, Reeves lacked standing to seek visitation with R.T. because 

Paige was married at the time she gave birth. Consequently, the trial court did 

not err in denying Reeves’ motion for visitation due to a lack of standing. 

Therefore, we overrule Reeves’ assignment of error and affirm the judgment of 

the trial court denying Reeves’ petition. 

JUDGMENT AFFIRMED. 
Washington App. No. 20CA38 10 

JUDGMENT ENTRY 

 It is ordered that the JUDGMENT IS AFFIRMED and that appellant shall 

pay the costs. 

 The Court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.

 It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this Court directing the 

Washington County Common Pleas Court to carry this judgment into execution. 

 A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 

27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure. 

Smith, P.J. and Hess, J.: Concur in Judgment and Opinion. 

 For the Court, 

 BY: ____________________________ 

 Kristy S. Wilkin, Judge

NOTICE TO COUNSEL 

 Pursuant to Local Rule No. 14, this document constitutes a final 

judgment entry and the time period for further appeal commences from the 

date of filing with the clerk.