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Filed 8/5/24 P. v. Miller CA1/3

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for 

publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or 

ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. 

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION THREE

THE PEOPLE,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

CHRISTOPHER MILLER,

Defendant and Appellant.

 A168367

 (Contra Costa County

 Super. Ct. No. 05001204387)

Defendant Christopher Miller appeals an order resentencing him under 

Penal Code section 1172.75.1 He contends the trial court should have stayed 

the sentence for one or more of his convictions of failing to register as a sex 

offender. We conclude that the sentence for one of these convictions must be 

stayed under section 654.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Defendant was previously convicted of possessing child pornography, 

which required him to register as a sex offender. He was released from 

prison in December 2008, and thereafter he failed to complete his sex 

offender registration. 

1 All undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.
2

Around February 2009, defendant began living in the home of his 

friend Jonathan, who had foster children.2 One of Jonathan’s foster children

was a friend of John Doe 1 (Doe 1) and John Doe 2 (Doe 2), two brothers who 

were 11 and seven years old respectively in February. Doe 1 and Doe 2 would 

often visit Jonathan’s house and frequently spent the night there. During 

those visits, Doe 1 began sleeping in defendant’s bedroom and sharing a bed 

with him, and defendant repeatedly sexually molested him. 

During this period, the mother of Doe 1 and Doe 2 (Mother) became 

friendly with defendant. She did not know he was required to register as a 

sex offender. On June 1, 2009, defendant moved into the home Mother 

shared with Doe 1 and Doe 2, where he occupied his own room.3 Doe 1 often 

spent the night in defendant’s bedroom, initially on a sofa or a second bed, 

but eventually in the same bed as defendant. Defendant continued to commit 

sexual crimes against Doe 1. 

Defendant was arrested on December 1, 2009. 

2 Defendant testified at trial that he met Jonathan on the internet, in a 

chat group or message board for men who shared a sexual interest in boys. 

Defendant did not tell Jonathan he was a registered sex offender because he 

wanted to live with Jonathan and knew that a foster parent would not be 

allowed to live with a sex offender. In the interest of the privacy of the 

children involved in this case, we will refer to Jonathan solely by his first 

name.

3 Mother’s testimony was less specific; she recalled that defendant 

moved in the last week of May or the first week of June, but defendant 

testified to the more precise date of June 1, 2009. He also testified he had to 

move out of Jonathan’s home because he learned about a month beforehand 

that Jonathan was going to move to a different city and be a foster parent 

there, and defendant knew that if he moved with Jonathan he would be 

fingerprinted and his criminal history would be exposed. 
3

A jury convicted defendant of 29 counts of committing a lewd act on a 

child under the age of 14 (§ 288, subd. (a); counts 1 through 29), one count of 

possessing child pornography (§ 311.11, subd. (b); count 30), and three counts 

of failure to register as a sex offender: one for failing to register upon his 

release from incarceration (§ 290.015, subd. (a); count 31); one for failing to 

complete his annual registration within five working days of his birthday 

(§ 290.012, subd. (a); count 33); and one for failing to register within five

working days of a change of residence (§ 290, subd. (b); count 34). Two 

enhancement allegations for prior prison terms under section 667.5, 

subdivision (b) were found true. The trial court imposed the upper term of 

eight years for count 1 and consecutive terms for all remaining counts, for a 

total sentence of 69 years and four months in state prison.

It appears that in June 2022, the California Department of Corrections 

and Rehabilitation (CDCR) notified the trial court that defendant might be 

entitled to relief under section 1172.75, which invalidates certain prior prison 

term enhancements imposed under section 667.5, subdivision (b) and 

establishes a mechanism for resentencing after the CDCR provides this 

notification.

4

4 Section 1172.75 requires the CDCR to identify inmates who may be 

eligible for relief and provide that information to the sentencing court that 

imposed the enhancement. (§ 1172.75, subd. (b).) This action vests the trial 

court with jurisdiction to resentence the defendant, even after the judgment 

is final. (People v. Cota (2023) 97 Cal.App.5th 318, 332–333; People v. 

Escobedo (2023) 95 Cal.App.5th 440, 447–449.) Here, the CDCR sent a list of 

eligible inmates to the Contra Costa County Public Defender’s Office on June 

29, 2022; it is the CDCR’s practice also to send the lists to the trial court. 

Although the trial court did not retain emails from June 2022, we will 

presume that the CDCR carried out its duty to provide the information to the 

trial court as well. (See Evid. Code, § 664 [presuming that official duty is

regularly performed]; People v. Tenner (1993) 6 Cal.4th 559, 566.) The 
4

A resentencing hearing took place on July 20, 2023. Among other 

things, defendant asked the court to stay two of his sentences for failing to 

register as a sex offender under section 654. The trial court denied this 

request, instead striking the two one-year prior prison terms enhancements 

and making no other changes to the original sentence. 

DISCUSSION

Section 654 prohibits “[a]n act or omission that is punishable in 

different ways by different provisions” from being “punished under more than 

one provision.” (§ 654, subd. (a).) Thus, a defendant may not receive multiple 

punishment for “a single act or indivisible course of conduct”; rather, all but 

one sentence for that act or course of conduct must be stayed. (People v. 

Hester (2000) 22 Cal.4th 290, 294.) 

In considering whether multiple punishment is proper, courts follow “a 

two-step inquiry, because the statutory reference to an ‘act or omission’ may 

include not only a discrete physical act but also a course of conduct 

encompassing several acts pursued with a single objective. [Citations.] We 

first consider if the different crimes were completed by a ‘single physical act.’ 

[Citation.] If so, the defendant may not be punished more than once for that 

act. Only if we conclude that the case involves more than a single act—i.e., a 

course of conduct—do we then consider whether that course of conduct 

reflects a single ‘ “intent and objective” ’ or multiple intents and objectives.” 

(People v. Corpening (2016) 2 Cal.5th 307, 311 (Corpening).) 

In considering whether a defendant acted with only a single intent and 

objective, courts must apply a “rigorous” test rather than taking “ ‘a “broad 

and amorphous” view’ ” of the defendant’s intent. (People v. Morelos (2008) 

Attorney General does not dispute that the trial court had jurisdiction to 

resentence defendant. 
5

168 Cal.App.4th 758, 769, citing People v. Harrison (1989) 48 Cal.3d 321, 

335–336.) Our high court has cautioned against accepting such a “broad, 

overriding intent and objective” as to “preclude punishment for otherwise 

clearly separate offenses,” because that would violate the statute’s purpose to 

“[e]nsure that a defendant’s punishment will be commensurate with his 

culpability.” (People v. Perez (1979) 23 Cal.3d 545, 552 [multiple sexual 

crimes against single victim for purpose of sexual gratification could be 

punished separately].) We uphold a trial court’s express or implied 

determination that crimes involved separate objectives if supported by 

substantial evidence. (People v. Brents (2012) 53 Cal.4th 599, 618.) 

These principles have been applied in the context of multiple 

convictions for failure to register as a sex offender. Two cases are 

particularly pertinent to our inquiry. The first is People v. Britt (2004) 32 

Cal.4th 944 (Britt). The defendant in Britt moved from one county to another 

and failed to notify authorities in either county of the move, in violation of 

two statutory provisions requiring him to notify the authorities in both his 

former and new residences. (Id. at p. 949, 951 & fns. 2 & 3; former § 290, 

subds. (a)(1)(A) & (f)(1).) Our high court first noted that the defendant could 

properly be convicted of both offenses. (Britt, at p. 951.) However, the court 

continued, section 654 barred multiple punishment for the two offenses, 

which were based on a single change of residence. The court explained: 

“ ‘The purpose of [the registration requirements] is to assure that persons 

convicted of [sexual offenses] shall be readily available for police surveillance 

at all times because the Legislature deemed them likely to commit similar 

offenses in the future.’ [Citations.] Defendant’s objective in violating [section 

290] was the opposite of the government’s—to avoid police surveillance. To 

fulfill this objective, he committed two crimes of omission, but each crime 
6

furthered the same objective. The failure to notify the former jurisdiction 

([former] § 290, subd. (f)(1)) and the failure to register in the new jurisdiction 

([former] § 290, subd. (a)(1)(A)) were means of achieving the same objective—

to prevent any law enforcement authority from learning of his current 

residence.” (Britt, at p. 952.) The court thus held that a person who violates 

separate reporting requirements through a single change of residence may be 

punished for only one of those crimes. (Id. at pp. 953–954; see also People v. 

Villegas (2012) 205 Cal.App.4th 642, 648–649 [following Britt, defendant 

could not be punished both for not filing a change of address and not 

providing new address in another state].)

On different facts, the appellate court in People v. Meeks (2004) 123 

Cal.App.4th 695 (Meeks) reached a different conclusion. The defendant there 

was convicted of two counts of failing to register as a sex offender over largely 

overlapping periods that ended when the defendant was arrested: one for 

failing to register within five days of changing his address between January 1 

and May 15, 2000 (former § 290, subd. (a)(1)(A)), and one for failing to 

register within five days of his birthday between December 1, 1999 and May 

15, 20005 (former § 290, subd. (a)(1)(D)), and the trial court imposed 

sentences for both offenses. (Meeks, at pp. 699–700, 703.) After rejecting the 

defendant’s contention that, because the duty to register is a continuing one, 

5 The defendant’s birthday was on December 3, and he last registered 

in mid-December 1997. (Meeks, supra, 123 Cal.App.4th at p. 705.) He also

changed his residence more than once between this last registration and

March 2000. (Id. at pp. 700–701, 705.) The opinion in Meeks does not 

explain why the time periods for the charged offenses were limited as they 

were, but it does explain that the offenses were continuing ones, that is, that 

they continued as long as the duty to register persisted and the defendant

failed to do so. (Id. at p. 703.) 
7

he could be convicted of only one offense of failure to register (id. at pp. 702–

703), the appellate court likewise rejected his argument that he could be 

sentenced for only one offense (id. at pp. 703–706). In doing so, it 

distinguished Britt on the ground that the defendant in Britt needed to avoid 

his reporting obligations in both counties to fulfill his objective of avoiding 

police surveillance. (Meeks, at pp. 704–705.) In Meeks, in contrast, the court 

explained there were multiple events that triggered the defendant’s 

obligation to register: his birthdays on December 3, 1998 and 1999, and 

changes in residence occurring sometime in 1998, in January 1999 when he 

was evicted and became homeless, and in February or March 2000 when he 

moved in with a family member. (Id. at pp. 700–701, 705.) “Although the 

periods for [the two charged] offenses overlap somewhat and the objective of 

each is the same, it cannot reasonably be argued that defendant can be 

punished only once for each successive failure to register,” the court 

concluded. (Id. at p. 705.)6

6 The facts of Meeks are complicated. The defendant there was 

convicted of one count of failing to register within five days of his birthday 

and one count of failing to register within five days of a move, offenses that 

took place respectively between December 1, 1999 and May 15, 2000 and 

between January 1 and May 15, 2000. (Meeks, supra, 123 Cal.App.4th at 

pp. 699–700.) But the evidence showed he twice failed to register upon his 

birthday (by December 8, 1998 and 1999), and three times failed to register a 

move (when he was evicted sometime in 1998, when he was again evicted in 

January 1999, and when he moved into a new home in February or March of

2000). (Meeks, supra, 123 Cal.App.4th at pp. 699–701, 705.) As the Attorney 

General points out, in the course of its analysis the appellate court noted, 

“[a]lthough conceivably the triggering events of defendant’s two [1998] 

registration requirements could have come on the same day, if defendant was 

evicted on this birthday, the triggering events were nevertheless distinct.” 

(Id. at p. 705.) True enough. But that does not mean that if those were the 

only two triggering events and they took place on the same day, the 

defendant would have had separate intents and objectives in concealing his 
8

Defendant acknowledges Meeks, but he argues that it is not good law 

on this point in light of Supreme Court precedent. In particular, he points to 

Corpening, supra, 2 Cal.5th 307. The question in Corpening was whether the 

forceful taking of a vehicle, which accomplished the crimes of both robbery 

and carjacking, was a “single physical act subject to the prohibition on 

multiple punishment under section 654.” (Id. at p. 309.) Setting forth the 

applicable law, the court explained that application of section 654 “requires a 

two-step inquiry, because the statutory reference to an ‘act or omission’ may 

include not only a discrete physical act but also a course of conduct 

encompassing several acts pursued with a single objective. [Citations.] We 

first consider if the different crimes were completed by a ‘single physical act.’ 

[Citation.] If so, the defendant may not be punished more than once for that 

act. Only if we conclude that the case involves more than a single physical 

act—i.e., a course of conduct—do we then consider whether that course of 

conduct reflects a single ‘ “intent and objective” ’ or multiple intents and 

objectives.” (Id. at p. 311.) In Corpening, the court reached only the first step 

of that inquiry, concluding that a single physical act served as the basis for 

both crimes and that multiple punishment was therefore improper, thus 

ending its analysis. (Id. at p. 316.) 

Relying on Corpening, defendant argues that all three offenses of 

failure to register furthered the same intent and objective—that is, to prevent 

law enforcement from learning his whereabouts—and that multiple 

punishment is therefore improper under the second step of the test set forth 

in Corpening. 

whereabouts, and the Meeks court did not so hold. In any case, the events of 

1998 do not appear to be the basis for the defendant’s convictions of failing to 

register in late 1999 or early 2000. 
9

We do not give Corpening such a cramped interpretation. While all 

three of defendant’s registration offenses may have shared a generic objective 

to avoid surveillance, there was a significant separation in time between the 

offense charged in count 31 and those charged in counts 33 and 34. That is, 

count 31 was based on defendant’s failure to register upon his release from 

custody in 2008. The other two offenses took place months later, around

June 1, 2009, at a time when defendant was moving into a home where a 

child victim of his ongoing sexual abuse resided. This record supports a 

reasonable inference that defendant’s general intent to avoid surveillance at 

the time of his release was distinct from his particular objective several 

months later to live with Doe 1 undisturbed, so as to continue his sexual 

crimes against him. 

There is a more persuasive argument that defendant may not be 

punished separately for counts 33 and 34, however. In count 33, defendant 

was charged with failure to complete his annual registration within five

working days of his May 28, 2009 birthday, which fell on a Thursday.

7 

(§ 290.012, subd. (a).) In count 34, he was charged with failure to register 

within five working days of a change of address. (§ 290, subd. (b).) The 

record in the underlying case indicates defendant moved in with Mother on or 

about Monday, June 1, 2009, a mere two working days after his birthday. It 

thus appears that there was an overlap of several days during which he could 

have simultaneously satisfied both registration requirements with a single 

visit to the police station. 

7 We grant defendant’s May 31, 2024 request for judicial notice of the 

calendars for May and June 2009.
10

In the context of these two offenses, Meeks is readily distinguishable. 

As in Meeks, there was more than one triggering event and thus there were

separate offenses. (See Meeks, supra, 123 Cal.App.4th at p. 705.) But the 

two triggering events in the case before us were so close in time that

defendant had not yet committed the crime of failing to register within five 

working days of his birthday when his obligation to register upon his move to 

Mother’s home arose. (See Wright v. Superior Court (1997) 15 Cal.4th 521, 

526 [offense complete at expiration of grace period].) In Meeks, on the other 

hand, the evidence showed that the defendant’s failure to register his most 

recent change of address did not take place until two or three months after 

his most recent birthday. (Meeks, at pp. 701, 705.) As to these offenses, thus, 

the crimes—although continuing in nature—were completed at different 

times. 

The case before us is in some respects similar to Britt, in that

defendant here had to avoid his registration requirement as to both those 

triggering events to achieve a single objective of obscuring from authorities 

his residence as of June 1, and as a result maintaining access to Doe 1. 

(Britt, supra, 32 Cal.4th at p. 953.) Thus, as to these largely simultaneous 

offenses, “each failure to report was ‘a means toward the objective of the 

commission of the other.’ ” (Ibid.) 

In fact, this case may present a stronger argument for the application 

of section 654 than Britt, since here defendant’s single omission was his

failure to register in the first few days of June 2009. This act, or failure to 

act was the basis for the charge in both counts 33 and 34. Thus, as in 

Corpening, the court need only have reached the first step of the two-part 

inquiry, concluding that because a single physical act or omission served as 

the basis for both crimes, multiple punishment was therefore improper,
11

without regard to whether defendant harbored a single or multiple objectives. 

(Corpening, supra, 2 Cal.5th at pp. 311, 316.) 

The Attorney General suggests that defendant’s failure to register 

within five days of his May 28 birthday was intended to forward the goal of 

continuing to live with Jonathan and his foster children, a goal separate from 

his goal of living with Mother and Doe 1. But we have already explained that

the record indicates defendant moved to Mother’s home before his crime of 

failing to register upon his birthday was complete. Even if we reach the 

second step of the inquiry, we are not persuaded that substantial evidence 

supports a conclusion that defendant had separate intents and objectives for 

failing to register within five working days of his birthday and of his move to 

Mother’s house. The trial court must therefore stay the sentence for either 

count 33 or count 34.

DISPOSITION

The judgment is reversed in part. On remand, the trial court is 

directed to stay the sentence for either count 33 or count 34. The clerk of the 

superior court shall prepare an amended abstract of judgment and forward it 

to the CDCR. In all other respects, the judgment is affirmed.

TUCHER, P.J.

WE CONCUR:

FUJISAKI, J.

PETROU, J.

People v. Miller (A168367)