NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

MAURICIO ISAAC RIVERA-IBANEZ,

Petitioner,

v.

MERRICK B. GARLAND, Attorney 

General,

Respondent.

No. 23-454

Agency No.

A200-975-662

MEMORANDUM*

On Petition for Review of an Order of the

Board of Immigration Appeals

Submitted March 26, 2024**

Before: TASHIMA, SILVERMAN, and KOH, Circuit Judges. 

Mauricio Isaac Rivera-Ibanez, a native and citizen of El Salvador, petitions 

pro se for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (“BIA”) order dismissing 

his appeal from an immigration judge’s (“IJ”) decision denying his applications for 

asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against 

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent 

except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision 

without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

FILED

APR 17 2024

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
2 23-454

Torture (“CAT”). We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252. We review de 

novo the legal question of whether a particular social group is cognizable, except 

to the extent that deference is owed to the BIA’s interpretation of the governing 

statutes and regulations. Conde Quevedo v. Barr, 947 F.3d 1238, 1241-42 (9th Cir. 

2020). We review for substantial evidence the agency’s factual findings. Id. at 

1241. We deny the petition for review.

Because Rivera-Ibanez does not challenge the agency’s determination that 

he conceded through counsel he was ineligible for asylum, we do not address 

it. See Lopez-Vasquez v. Holder, 706 F.3d 1072, 1079-80 (9th Cir. 2013). We also 

do not address Rivera-Ibanez’s contention that his untimely asylum application 

warrants an exception because the BIA did not deny relief on that ground. See 

Santiago-Rodriguez v. Holder, 657 F.3d 820, 829 (9th Cir. 2011) (“In reviewing 

the decision of the BIA, we consider only the grounds relied upon by that agency.” 

(citation and internal quotation marks omitted)). Thus, Rivera-Ibanez’s asylum

claim fails.

Because Rivera-Ibanez does not challenge the agency’s determination that 

he failed to establish past persecution, we do not address it. See Lopez-Vasquez, 

706 F.3d at 1079-80. As to his fear of future persecution, the BIA did not err in 

concluding that Rivera-Ibanez failed to establish membership in a cognizable 

particular social group. See Reyes v. Lynch, 842 F.3d 1125, 1131 (9th Cir. 2016) 
3 23-454

(to demonstrate membership in a particular social group, “[t]he applicant must 

‘establish that the group is (1) composed of members who share a common 

immutable characteristic, (2) defined with particularity, and (3) socially distinct 

within the society in question’” (quoting Matter of M-E-V-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 227, 

237 (BIA 2014))); Nguyen v. Barr, 983 F.3d 1099, 1103 (9th Cir. 2020) (“The 

particularity element requires characteristics that provide a clear benchmark for 

determining who falls within the group,” and “[t]he group must also be discrete 

and have definable boundaries—it must not be amorphous, overbroad, diffuse, or 

subjective.” (internal quotation marks and citations omitted)). 

Rivera-Ibanez’s contention that the IJ failed to state the relevant law 

regarding particular social groups is not properly before the court because he failed 

to raise it before the BIA. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(d)(1) (exhaustion of administrative 

remedies required); see also Santos-Zacaria v. Garland, 598 U.S. 411, 417-19 

(2023) (section 1252(d)(1) is a non-jurisdictional claim-processing rule). 

In light of this disposition, we need not reach Rivera-Ibanez’s remaining 

contentions regarding his withholding of removal claim. See Simeonov v. Ashcroft, 

371 F.3d 532, 538 (9th Cir. 2004) (courts and agencies are not required to decide 

issues unnecessary to the results they reach). Thus, Rivera-Ibanez’s withholding of 

removal claim fails.

Substantial evidence supports the agency’s denial of CAT protection 
4 23-454

because petitioner failed to show it is more likely than not he will be tortured by or 

with the consent or acquiescence of the government if returned to El Salvador. See 

Zheng v. Holder, 644 F.3d 829, 835-36 (9th Cir. 2011) (possibility of torture too 

speculative). We reject Rivera-Ibanez’s claims the agency applied the incorrect 

legal standard or otherwise erred in its analysis as unsupported by the record. 

Thus, Rivera-Ibanez’s CAT claim fails. 

We reject Rivera-Ibanez’s contention the BIA erred by only listing the last 

name of the Appellate Immigration Judge in its decision where he points to no 

authority requiring the BIA to list the judge’s full name.

Rivera-Ibanez’s motion for appointment of counsel (Docket Entry No. 23) is 

denied.

The temporary stay of removal remains in place until the mandate issues. 

PETITION FOR REVIEW DENIED.