U NITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
R ONNIE LEE ALSTON , ) ) Plaintiff, ) ) v. ) Civil Action No. 1:21- cv -02078 ( UNA ) ) ) NATIONAL CREDIT ) UNION ASSOCIATION , et al ., ) ) Defendants. )
MEMORANDUM OPINION
T his matter is before the court on its initial review of plaintiff’s pro se complaint, ECF No. 1, and application for leave to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”)

. The court will grant plaintiff’s IFP application and dismiss the complaint for failure to comply with Federal Rule 8(a)

. Plaintiff, who provides a “c/o” address in the District, but seems to be domiciled in Forestville, Maryland, see Compl. Exhibits, ECF No. 1

- 1, at 3, 14, 19, 30, 32, 34, 36, sues the National Credit Union Association (“NCUA”) and the Democracy Federal C redit Union (“DFCU”), both of which are headquartered in Alexandria, Virginia, see id. at 3, 39; Compl. at 1. In the case caption, plaintiff provides a District address affiliated with a singular DFCU branch,

see Compl. at 1, but the allegations in the co mplaint have little to no connection with that branch. Instead, the allegations mostly arise from plaintiff’s interactions with a DFCU branch located in Hill Branch, Maryland, near his residence in Forestville. 1 See id . at 2; Compl. Exs. at 5

– 12, 14

– 19, 22, 24, 26–8.

1 F or these reasons, the basis for venue in this District is also quite unclear. Venue in a civil action is generally proper only in (1) the district where any defendant resides, if all defendants reside in the same state in which the district is located, (2) in a district in which a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred (or a subs tantial part of the property that is the subject of the action is situated), or (3) in a district in which any defendant may be found,The complaint is far from a model in clarity, and plaintiff cites to a litany of federal authority, including, but not limited to: the First, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendments, the Truth in Lending Act (“TILA”) , and the Fe deral Tort Claims Act (“FTCA”)

. See Compl. at 1,4

– 5, 7; Compl. Exs. at 3. The applicability of these amendments and statutes to plaintiff’s claims and to the intended defendants are, at best, vague, and at worst, completely misplaced. Where it can be

un derstood, plaintiff alleges that certain DFCU defendants are engaged in an ongoing conspiracy to infringe upon his rights. See Compl. Exs. at 3, 6, 9

– 12 , 14. At root, plaintiff is aggrieved regarding the DFCU Branch’s alleged mishandling of several loan applications and their respective eventual denials. See id. at 5

– 40; see Compl. at 2

– 5. He additionally contends that NCUA has failed to properly communicate and assist him in proceeding administratively with his FTCA and TILA claims against DFC U

. See Compl. at 1

– 9. He seeks millions in damages. See Compl. Exs.
at 3. The 51

- page complaint is rambling, disorganized, and difficult to follow. Rule 8(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires complaints to contain “(1) a short and plain stateme nt of the groun ds for the court’ s jurisdiction [and] (2) a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a); see Ashcroft v. Iqbal , 556 U.S. 662, 678

- 79 (2009); Ciralsky v. CIA , 355 F.3d 661, 668

- 71 (D.C. Cir. 2004). The Rule 8 standard ensures that defendants receive fair notice of the claim being asserted so that they can prepare a responsive answer and an adequate defense and determine whether the doctrine of res judicata ap plies. Brown v. Califano , 75 F.R.D. 497, 498 (D.D.C. 1977). When a “complaint [] contains an untidy

if there is no district in which the action may otherwise be brought. See 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1406 (a) (providing for dismissal)

. It does not appear that any of the defendants are located here , or at the very least, their head quarters are located in Virginia. The events transpired in Maryland. To the extent that p laintiff may rely on 28 U.S.C. § 1402(b) to establish venue, as noted, it is uncertain if plaintiff is actually domiciled here or in Maryland.assortment of claims that are neither plainly nor concisely stated, nor meaningfully distinguished from bold conclusions, sharp h arangues and personal com ments [,]” it does not fulfill the requirements of Rule 8. Jiggetts v. D.C ., 319 F.R.D. 408, 413 (D.D.C. 2017), aff’ d sub nom

. Cooper v. D.C ., No. 17

- 7021, 2017 WL 5664737 (D.C. Cir. Nov. 1, 2017). The instant complaint falls within this category. Furt hermore, the complaint paragraphs are conflated and are not limited

“ to a single set of circumstances. ” See Fed. R. Civ. P. 10(b). Finally, plaintiff fails to adequately plead the dep rivation of a protected right. While plaintiff references, in passing , various types of “discrimination,” and vague violations of his constitutional rights, there is no articulation of specific facts supporting the types of discrimination allegedly endured , and “[e] vents may not have unfolded as Plain tiff wished, but his dissatis faction . . . [does] not form a basis for a due process violation[,]” Melton v. District of Columbia , 85 F. Supp. 3d 183, 193 (D.D.C. 2015). Plaintiff also fails to identify other individual or individuals to whom these righ ts he was deprived were afforded , nor does he allege how [] other individuals were similarly situated, as he must in order to state a viable equal protection claim.” Id. “[F]ederal court jurisdiction must affirmatively appear clearly and distinctly. The me re suggestion of a federal question is not sufficient to establish the jurisdiction of federal courts.” Johnson v. Robinson , 576 F.3d 522, 522 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (citing Bilal v. Kaplan , 904 F.2d 14, 15 (8th Cir.1990) (per curiam)). For all of these reasons, this case is dismissed without prejudice

. A separate order accompanies this memorandum opinion.
Date: August 23, 2021 /s /______________________ EMMET G. SULLIVAN United States District Judge