THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA In The Supreme Court

Brandon Garren, Respondent,

v.

State of South Carolina, Petitioner.

Appellate Case No. 2015-000756

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI

Appeal from Pickens County Eugene C. Griffith, Jr., Pos t-Conviction Relief Judge

Opinion No. 27794 Submitted September 27, 2017 – Filed April 25, 2018

REVERSED

Attorney General Alan Wilson and Assistant Attorney General Ruston W. Neely, both of Columbia, for

Petitioner.

Appellate Defender David Al exander, of Columbia, for Respondent.

JUSTICE KITTREDGE: Respondent Brandon Garren pl ed guilty to assault and battery of a high and aggravated n ature (ABHAN) and criminal do mestic violence of a high and aggravated nature (CDVHAN) in connection with a s eries of brutal attacks on his live-in girlfrie nd (Victim). He was sentenced t o concurrent prisonterms of fifteen years and ten years, respectively. No direct appeal was taken. Garren then filed an applicati on for post-convi ction relief (PCR). The PCR court granted relief, finding plea co unsel was ineffective for failin g to obtain a competency evaluation prior to Garren's guilty plea and that Ga rren's plea was involuntary due to his use of med ication. We reverse and reins tate Garren's guilty plea and sentence.

I.

In January 2012, the Pickens C ounty Sheriff's Office responded to a call and found Garren screaming at the Victim w ith a pistol in his pocket. Th e Victim was crying and had visible injuries. The Vi ctim stated Garren repeatedly struck her and swung an ax at her head , barely missing her. The responding of ficers found an ax on the premises and saw a hole in the wall which the Victim ind icated occurred when Garren swung the ax at her head. The Victim also indicated Garren had pointed the gun at her when she called law enforcement.

Thereafter, in June 2012, the S heriff's Office responded to ano ther call, this time

from neighbors, who heard the Vict im screaming and noticed the Victim outside, badly beaten and partially clothed, wandering in the yard while holding her pants. The Victim told deputies she a nd Garren had been apart, but Gar ren picked her up and held her against her will for a week, threatening to kill her if she left and beating her repeatedly over the last two days.

This attack began in the bathr oom, where Garren forced unknown pills down the

Victim's throat and asked her if she wanted to die. Then Garre n submerged the

Victim in the bathtub and told h er that he was authorized, as h er husband, to beat her. Garren tied up the Victim and dragged her throughout the house, beating her with golf clubs, wine bottles, a m edicine cabinet, a toaster ov en, a lantern, and a belt, all of which were recovere d from the scene. The Victim b elieved she was going to die, so she encourag ed Garren to take some pills, whic h eventually caused him to pass out. At that point, the Victim grabbed her clothes and tried to escape,

but she could not see due to her facial swelling, and she was f ound wandering along a fence by neighbors who h eard her screams and called pol ice.

The Victim's injuries were exten sive. Her eyes were swollen shut and her face was severely beaten, with broken b ones requiring multiple facial re constructive surgeries. She had blood and gl ass throughout her hair, and he r hair had to be cut

off to remove the debris. The Vic tim also required dental reco nstructive surgery toreplace the teeth knocked out duri ng the attacks, and she under went neurological

evaluations due to the extreme na ture of her injuries and resul ting trauma. When law enforcement arrived, the Vic tim was transported to the Inte nsive Care Unit in

Greenville.

As a result of these incidents , Garren was charged with attempt ed murder, kidnapping, CDVHAN, and pointing and presenting a firearm, and Garren retained counsel to represent him. Garren faced up to a total of eighty-five years in prison—up to thirty years each f or the attempted murder and kid napping charges; up to twenty years for the CDV HAN charge; and up to five years for the firearm charge. See S.C. Code Ann. § 16-3- 29 (attempted murder); id. § 16-3-910 (kidnapping); id . § 16-25-65(B) (CDVHAN); id . § 16-23-410 (pointing and presenting). Following plea couns el's negotiations with the St ate, Garren entered a "straight up" guilty plea to CD VHAN and the lesser charge of AB HAN. The more serious charges (and the fir earm charge) were dropped.

During the plea proceeding, the assistant solicitor stated "[th e victim's] face was beaten worse than any woman's fa ce I've ever seen. I've never seen anything like that." Garren informed the pl ea judge that he understood the o ffenses to which he was pleading guilty; the constitu tional rights, as enumerated b y the plea judge, that he was waiving; and the possible sentences that could be impose d. Garren stated

he had discussed his situation with plea counsel and that he wa s "most satisfied" with counsel's services. Notably , Garren confirmed he was not under the influence of any drugs or alcohol and that no one promised him anything o r forced him to plead guilty.

During the plea hearing, plea co unsel told the judge that Garre n suffered from various physical health problems and that Garren "obviously has some mental problems." Counsel claimed that at the time of the incidents, both Garren and the Victim abused prescription medi cations and that Garren had "lit tle" memory of the incidents. However, counsel expl ained that since entering the detention facility, Garren was much improved, as he had "gotten off pills" and gain ed weight— almost fifty pounds.

Plea counsel asked the plea court to consider a three- to five-year sentence with five years' probation and substa nce abuse treatment; however, t he plea court found "[t]his case is beyond [the] pale " and sentenced Garren to conc urrent prison terms of fifteen years for ABHAN and ten years for CDVHAN. No direct appeal was

taken.Garren filed a PCR application alleging counsel was ineffective for failing to request a mental health evalua tion and that Garren's guilty ple a was rendered involuntary as a result of medic ations he was given while in jail which impaired his ability to understand the plea proceedings. Specifically, Garren alleged:

Due to being in a state of leth argy from medication given to me by the [P]ickens County Jail which was mind altering, and the result o f medical treatment being given me by the Cancer Center of the Carolinas, The comb ined effects rendered me unable to, or incompetent to enter a plea.

Garren nevertheless fa iled to offer at the PCR hearing any evid ence as to the specific medications and dosages h e was administered at the Pic kens County jail while awaiting trial and during th e time period immediately pri or to his guilty plea.

At the PCR hearing, plea counsel testified that Garren initiall y faced several serious charges and that the phot ographs depicting the Victim's extensive facial injuries were "devas tating" to Garren's case. Plea counsel tes tified that he negotiated a reduction in charges, as well as a plea offer from the State for a total of fifteen years, which Garren rejected.

Plea counsel testified that there was no indication Garren had any mental health issues at the time of the plea th at necessitated further evalua tion. Plea counsel explained that he never saw the need for Garren to undergo a co mpetency evaluation, but that he was bothered by the length of the sente nce Garren ultimately received. It is abund antly clear from the record th at counsel was anticipating a different plea j udge. As plea counsel testified , Garren was expected to appear before a different pl ea judge in the morning, but Gar ren was not transported from jail until the afternoon. Counsel stated he f irmly believed that "the switch in judges . . . added something to [Garren's] sente nce. I can't say how

much. But I think it did add so mething." Counsel stated Garre n came from "a great family" and explained that, in hindsight, based on the ac tual sentence

received:

I really wish that we had taken t he time to get a psychological evaluation. Because while I did, at that time, believe him to be competent[,] and I continue to believe he is competent, I believe there are some psychological i ssues that would have mitigated hispunishment and materially affected the sentence that he got. And I really regret that I did not do that.

(emphasis added).

When asked if Garren seemed confus ed or "out of it" at the plea proceeding, counsel stated Garren's affect is always "a little bit spacey" but Garren nevertheless appeared to follow everything that was happening, and at no tim e did Garren

indicate he did not under stand what was going on.

Garren's testimony was similar to counsel's, as he, too, focused on the length of his

sentence. Garren testified that he was unhappy with his senten ce, specifically claiming he believed he was goi ng to receive a sentence of two to five years, plus probation, but that fell through when he "got the wrong judge." Garren admitted that plea counsel never promised Garren he would receive a two- to five-year sentence. And the plea judge, i n a thorough guilty plea colloq uy, explained the potential sentence Garren was facing.

While it is manifest the focus of Garren's PCR is the length of his sentence, he may not challenge a lawful sentence merely because he was hoping fo r a more lenient one. Garren, of course, understa nds that, and he has postured his PCR on the basis that his plea counsel was ineff ective for failing to request a competency evaluation.

Garren is uncertain whether he eve r requested a competency eval uation, but he thinks his mother may have asked for one. Garren's mother did not testify at the PCR hearing, and Garren offered no evidence of what a mental he alth evaluation would have shown had one been soug ht prior to his guilty plea.

As to the voluntariness of his g uilty plea, Garren claimed he d id not understand or have any recollection of the pl ea proceeding itself—including t hat he informed the judge his plea was not induced by any promises or threats and that he was not

under the influence of alcohol o r drugs. As to the issue of me dication, Garren

testified on direct examination:

Q: Now, I know you've raised some issues in regards to your ca se. And one of them is dealing with m edication and the effects on y ou regarding—understanding what w as going on. Can you go into

some detail about that?A: I don't know what kind of medication they was giving me in the county. But they have a way of giving medication that's—they have a bunch of little glasses on a tray. And they just give y ou medicine. I don't know if they g ive me the wrong medicine or what they done. But I had a reac tion two different times to th at medicine they give me.

Q: Okay. Have you at any time eve r had a mental evaluation?

A: No, sir. They never did hav e me one for — while I was in t he county the whole time.

Q: Okay. Do you think that — did you want one, or ever reques t one or talk to [plea counsel] about that?

A: I think my mother had requested to get one.

Q: Okay, I guess —and what I'm t rying to understand, did you understand what you were doing on the day you pled guilty?

A: No, sir.

Q: Okay. Did you ever explain th at to [plea counsel], or have a conversation with him about, I don't know what I'm doing, what I'm pleading guilty to or any of that?

A: [Plea counsel] told me that h e wouldn't never represent me again when he come into the courtroom that day — I meant into the hallway. I reckon that was where it's at.

Garren testified further on cross-examination:

Q: Okay. So you don't recall on e way or the other about what [you and plea counsel] talked about?

A: The only thing I really recal l is how I got the transcript of the trial

and read it myself. That's the only way I can remember what happened.. . .

Q. Okay. So you don't remember anything about t he guilty plea

itself.

A. No, ma'am.

Q. Okay. So you don't remember telling the judge that no one had made any promises to you? You don't recall that?

A. No, ma'am

Q. And do you recall [ever] telli ng [plea counsel] that mornin g that you just didn't understand what was going on, or you just don't

recall?

A. [Plea counsel] come in the ha llway and told me he wasn't ne ver going to represent me again.

Q. Okay. So you recall that conve rsation with [plea counsel], you just don't remember anyt hing else about the plea?

A. That's it.

This testimony was the only evid ence Garren offered in support of his claim that his plea was affected by medica tion. Although Garren's PCR app lication identified

his medical records as further support for this claim, Garren d id not offer into

evidence his medical records or any information indicating he t ook medication on the day of the plea or identifying the type, dosag e, or potential mind-altering effects of the medication(s) whic h he claimed rendered him inco mpetent to enter a guilty plea. Further, Garren o ffered no testimony or other evi dence indicating that he would not have entered a guilty plea but for the influence of medication.

Nevertheless, the PCR court gran ted relief, concluding plea cou nsel was deficient for failing to seek a competency evaluation before Garren pled guilty and finding that Garren's guilty plea was ente red involuntarily due to "the influence of medication which affected [Garre n's] ability to understand what he was doing on the day of his plea." This C ourt granted the State's petition for a writ of certiorari

to review the PCR court's decision.II

.

This Court will uphold the findings of the PCR court when there is any evidence of probative value to support them. Caprood v. State , 338 S.C. 103, 109–10, 525 S.E.2d 514, 517 (2000). However, t his Court will reverse the P CR court's decision when it is controlled by an erro r of law or unsupported by the evidence. Edwards

v. State , 392 S.C. 449, 455, 710 S.E.2d 60, 64 (2011).

The State now argues this Court should reverse because there is no evidence in the record to support the PCR court' s findings that (1) counsel was ineffective in not obtaining a competency evaluati on; and (2) that Garren was unab le to understand the plea proceeding due to medica tion. We agree and reverse.

A.

"There is a two-prong test for e valuating claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. First, a PCR applicant must show that his counsel's p erformance was

deficient such that it falls bel ow an objective standard of rea sonableness." Suber v.

State , 371 S.C. 554, 558, 640 S. E.2d 884, 886 (2007) (citing Strickland v. Washington , 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984); Alexander v. State , 303 S.C. 539, 541, 402 S.E.2d 484, 485 (1991)). "Second , an applicant must show there is a reasonable probability, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the resul t of the proceeding

would have been different." Id . (citing Strickland , 466 U.S. at 687; Alexander , 303 S.C. at 541–42, 402 S.E.2d at 485).

"A guilty plea is a solemn, judi cial admission of the truth of the charges against an individual; thus, a criminal inma te's right to contest the vali dity of such a plea is usually, but not invariably, foreclosed." Dalton v. State , 376 S.C. 130, 137, 654 S.E.2d 870, 874 (Ct. App. 2007) (citing Blackledge v. Allison , 431 U.S. 63, 74 (1977)). Indeed, where a thorough colloquy is conducted, court s must exercise caution in setting aside the guilty plea. See Jamison v. State , 410 S.C. 456, 469– 71, 765 S.E.2d 123, 129–30 (2014) ( observing that "guilty plea[ s] must be treated as final in the vast majority of cases" and instructing that ca ution must be exercised

so as not to "undermine the sole mn nature of a guilty plea and the finality that generally attaches to a guilty plea").

"[W]hen establishing Strickland prejudice in the context of plea counsel's failure to request a mental competency evalu ation, the applicant need only show areasonable probability that he was incompetent at the time of t he plea." Ramirez v.

State , 419 S.C. 14, 21, 795 S.E.2d 841 , 845 (2017) (internal marks o mitted) (quoting Jeter v. State , 308 S.C. 230, 233, 417 S.E.2d 594, 596 (1992)); see Matthews v. State , 358 S.C. 456, 458, 596 S.E.2d 49, 50 (2004) ("Due process prohibits the conviction of an in competent defendant, and this right may not be waived by a guilty plea.") (citing Jeter , 308 S.C. at 232, 417 S.E.at 595–96); see also id. , 308 S.C. at 232, 417 S.E.2d at 596 ("The test of competency t o enter a plea is the same as required to s tand trial. The accused must have sufficient capability to consult with his law yer with a reasonable degree of rational understanding and have a rational as well as factual understanding of the proceedings against him." (citations omitted)).

As to the deficiency prong of the Strickland analysis, the State correctly argues that

there is no evidence in the reco rd that plea counsel's failure to seek a competency evaluation fell below an objectiv e standard of reasonableness. To the contrary, plea counsel testified that, based on his interactions with Gar ren, a competency evaluation was unnecessary; that counsel believed Garren was co mpetent at the time of the plea; and that he con tinued to believe Garren was c ompetent. Compare

Jeter , 308 S.C. at 232–33, 417 S.E.2d at 596 (finding counsel acted reasonably in relying on his own perceptions o f a defendant's competency), with Ramirez , 419

S.C. at 22–23, 795 S.E.2d at 845–46 (finding plea counsel was d eficient in failing to seek an independent competenc y evaluation where plea counsel was "clearly on

notice" the defendant had mental health issues based on his own personal interactions with the defendant, as well as a previous psychological evaluation identifying several mental hea lth issues). Because the record contains no evidence to support a finding that counsel's decision not to seek a comp etency evaluation fell below reasonable professional norms, the PCR court erred in fin ding counsel was

deficient.

Likewise, there is no evidence i n the record to support the PCR court's findings as to the prejudice prong of the Strickland analysis. Garren presented no evidence to demonstrate a reasonable proba bility that he woul d have been fo und incompetent to enter a guilty plea had a competency evaluation been conduct ed. Cf

. Glover v.

State , 318 S.C. 496, 498–99, 458 S.E. 2d 538, 540 (1995) (holding pre judice from trial counsel's failure to proc ure and present evidence cannot be shown where the omitted evidence is not presented at the PCR hearing). Indeed, without any proof

that Garren suffered from identifiable mental health issues tha t undermined his competency to plead guilty, any claim of prejudice is purely sp eculative. See id. (observing mere speculation and conjecture by the applicant is insufficient toestablish the allegation that c ounsel's deficient performance r esulted in prejudice);

Jeter , 308 S.C. at 233–34, 417 S.E.2d at 596 (explaining that an app licant asserting

counsel was ineffective in faili ng to procure a mental evaluati on must show there is a reasonable probability that he would have been determined to be incompetent at the time of the plea). There is no evidence to support the PCR court's prejudice finding.

B.

The State further claims the P CR court erred in finding Garren's guilty plea was entered involuntarily as a result of Garren's medications, whic h he claimed impaired his ability to enter a voluntary guilty plea. We agre e.

Before a defendant may plead gu ilty, it must be established tha t the defendant is

competent and that the defendant 's decision to plead guilty is a knowing and voluntary one. Sims v. State , 313 S.C. 420, 423–24, 438 S.E.2d 253, 254–55 (1993) (citing Godinez v. Moran , 509 U.S. 389, 398–01 (1993)). The test for competency is the same whether a defendant pleads guilty or goe s to trial— namely, "whether the defendant h as the present ability to consu lt with his attorney with a reasonable degree of ra tional understandi ng" and the req uirement that the

defendant "have a rational as w ell as a factual understanding o f the proceedings against him." Id . at 422–23, 438 S.E.2d 254.

"The focus of a competency inqui ry is the defendant's mental ca pacity; the question is whether he has the ability to understand the proceedings." Godinez

, 509 U.S. at 401 n.12 (citing Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S. 162, 171 (1975) (observing that a defendant is incompetent if he "lacks the capacity to understand the nature and object of the proc eedings against him") (emphasi s added)). "The purpose of the 'knowing and voluntary' inquiry, by contrast, is to determine whether the defendant actually does understand the significance and consequences of a particular decision and whet her the decision is uncoerced. " Id . (citing Faretta v. California , 422 U.S. 806, 835 (1975)).

"That the plea be voluntary is not only a requirement of due pr ocess, but a premise of the defendant's meaningful participation in the plea process ." United States v.

Savinon-Acosta , 232 F.3d 265, 268 (1stCir. 2000) (citing McCarthy v. United

States , 394 U.S. 459, 466 (1969)). "Comm on sense, backed by ample ca se law, suggests that medication can in some circumstan ces affect a def endant's mental state to a degree that undermines the defendant's ability to en ter a voluntary plea."Id . "The critical question is whether the drugs—if they have a c apacity to impair the defendant's ability to plead —have in fact done so on this o ccasion." Id . (citing

Miranda-Gonzalez v. United States , 181 F.3d 164, 166 (1st Cir. 1999)) (holding that the plea court, upon learni ng a defendant has recently tak en medication, should conduct an inquiry "to identify which drugs a defendant is taking, how recently they have been taken a nd in what quantity, and (so far as possible) the purpose and consequences of the drugs in question").

If a PCR applicant claims his guilty plea was involuntary due to the influence of medication, he must show "that his mental faculties were so impaired by drugs when he pleaded that he was in capable of full understanding and appreciation of the charges against him, of co mprehending his constitutional ri ghts, and of realizing the consequences of his plea." United States v. Truglio , 493 F.2d 574, 578 (4th Cir. 1974) (quotation marks and citation omitted). A PCR court must consider "objective data" about t he nature and effect of the me dication the

defendant had taken and evaluate whether such medication "had the capability to produce a sufficient effect on his mental faculties to render h im incompetent to enter a guilty plea." United States v. Damon , 191 F.3d 561, 565 (4th Cir. 1999) (recognizing that not all medication will influence a defendant 's mental state to the point that the guilty plea must be invalidated) (citation omitt ed). 1 "The dispositive feature of this inquiry is whethe r the medication is in fact ca using such an impairment." United States v. Caramadre , 807 F.3d 359, 368 (1st Cir. 2015).

"In a PCR action, the petitioner bears the burden of proof and is required to show by a preponderance of the eviden ce he was incompetent at the ti me of his plea."

1 The dissent characterizes our reliance upon Truglio and Damon as being misplaced, portraying these case s as being procedurally distinguishable and underpinned by Rule 11 of the Fed eral Rules of Criminal Procedu re. Our inquiry, however, is substantive rather t han procedural in nature. Inde ed, "[t]he question of

an effective waiver of a federa l constitutional right in a [ple a] proceeding is of course governed by federal standards." Boykin v. Alabama , 395 U.S.238, 243 (1969). Because Rule 11 embodies procedural safeguards designe d to ensure compliance with substantive standards established by the United States Constitution, we find Truglio and Damon to be persuasive. See McCarthy , 394

U.S. at 465 (observing Rule 11 "is designed to assist the district judge in making the constitutionally required dete rmination that a defendant's guilty plea is truly voluntary" (footnotes omitted)).Jeter , 308 S.C. at 232, 417 S.E.2d at 596 (citing Rule 71.1, SCRCP). "In determining guilty plea issues, it is proper to consider the gu ilty plea transcript as well as evidence at the PCR hearing." Suber , 371 S.C. at 558, 640 S.E.2d at 886 (citation omitted).

Nothing in the guilty plea tran script suggest Garren was under the influence of drugs or otherwise dispossessed of his mental faculties at the time the guilty plea was entered. To the contrary, Ga rren informed the plea court, under oath, that he

was not under the influence of any drugs or alcohol. 2 Likewise, plea counsel testified at the PCR hearing th at, at the time of the guilty pl ea, Garren's affect was not unusual and that Garren app eared to understand the proceedi ngs, never saying or doing anything to suggest otherwise. 3 Indeed, the only evidence in the record supporting Garren's claim is his own PCR testimony that he was given some unidentified medication at some point while he was in jail and that he did not recall or understand the plea proceedings.

Even under our deferential standa rd of review, this testimony a lone is insufficient to establish that Garren's guilty plea was entered involuntaril y. 4 Garren's testimony establishes, at most, that Garren was administered one or more unknown medications in jail at some unknow n point in time prior to plea ding guilty. These vague assertions fall shor t as a matter of law. See Sims , 313 S.C. at 424, 438 S.E.2d at 255 (observing that certain medications enhance, rath er than diminish, a defendant's "demeanor, emotiona l responses, cognitive skills, a nd ability to

2 We note some courts find this dispositive. United States v. Rivera , 191 F. App'x 309, 311 (5th Cir. 2006) (refusing to consider documents and me dical evidence contradicting defendan t's sworn statements during plea colloquy that he was not under the influence of any medications at the time of the plea)

.

3 See United States v. Hardimon , 700 F.3d 940, 943 (7th Cir. 2012) (observing a "combination of deeply confused or clouded thinking with cohere nt speech and normal demeanor is rare").

4 The dissent's position is anchor ed on this Court's highly defe rential standard of review. While we acknowledge the deference owed the PCR court, deference to a credibility finding is not the iss ue. The lack of evidence is. Even if we defer to implicit credibility findings, a s urged by the dissent, there i s zero evidence in the record to support the PCR cour t's finding that Garren's guilty plea was influenced by any type of medication.comprehend and communicate"); see also Weeks v. State , 341 S.W.3d 701 (Mo. Ct. App. 2011) ("The mere ingestion of drugs is insufficient to ren der a person incapable of pleading guilty, and the recent ingestion of drugs does not invalidate a plea of guilty where the ability o f the defendant to understand and give free assent to the conviction remain unimpaired.").

Indeed, the record is utterly devoid of any evidence that Garren had taken any

medication on the day he pled guilty or that he was, as th e PCR court found, "under

the influence of medication whic h affected his ability to under stand what he was doing on the day of his plea." Absent any evidence that Garren 's ability to understand the guilty plea procee ding was diminished by the min d-altering effects of one or more specific medica tions, Garren has failed to meet his burden of proving his plea was constitutionally infirm, and his claim fai ls as a matter of law. See, e.g.

, Anderson v. United States , 865 F.3d 914, 920 (7th Cir. 2017) (finding a

defendant's statement that he was taking unspecified psychotrop ic drugs, without additional information about "exactly what drugs [the defenda nt] was on, and how they affected his cognition," was an insufficient basis for the court to evaluate the defendant's competenc y to enter a plea); United States v. Carter , 795 F.3d 947, 951–55 (9th Cir. 2015) (rejecting a defendant's claim that his guilty plea was entered involuntarily where he f ailed to "explain how the medic ations at issue would have impacted his ability t o enter a plea knowingly and v oluntarily"); United States v. Yang Chia Tien , 720 F.3d 464, 470 (2d Cir. 2013) (characterizing

the lack of information as to the potential effects of medicati ons a defendant had

taken and whether those medicati ons could impact the defendant' s understanding of the proceedings as a "critical omission"); Miranda-Gonzalez v. United States

, 181 F.3d 164, 165 (1st Cir. 1999) ( explaining "[w]hen, as now, a defendant wishes to have his plea declared invalid due to his use of prescriptio n medication or illicit drugs, the mere fact that [he] took potentially mood-altering m edication is not sufficient to vitiate his plea. Rather, he must show that the medication affected his rationality." (internal citations, alterations, and quotation m arks omitted)); United States v. Browning , 61 F.3d 752, 754–55 (10th Cir . 1995) (placing the onus on a

defendant to demonstrate that the medication in question affected his "ability to think or comprehend" and rejecti ng the claim that his guilty pl ea was involuntary due to medications in light of "t he complete absence of evidenc e that his ability to enter a knowing and voluntary plea was affected by the medications"); United

States v. Dalman , 994 F.2d 537, 539 (8th Cir. 1993) (rejecting a defendant's c laim that his guilty plea was involuntarily entered, observing "ther e is nothing in the record to indicate that [the de fendant] was not fully in posses sion of his faculties during the [plea] proceedings" and noting the defendant's "perf ormance during theplea hearing is inconsistent with his after-the-fact claim that he did not understand the proceeding").

III.

We reverse the PCR court's findings and reinstate Garren's conv ictions and

sentences.

REVERSED. BEATTY, C.J., and HEAR N, J., concur. FEW, J ., concurring in a separate opinion. JAMES, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part.JUSTICE FEW: I concur in the result reached by the majority. I write sepa rately to explain the narrow points of disagreement I have with the ma jority's analysis.

As to Garren's claim that plea counsel should have sought a mental health evaluation before he pled guilty , I agree with the majority's a nalysis of the prejudice prong of Strickland , and its conclusion that "a ny claim of prejudice is purely speculative." However, I disagree with the majority's c onclusion that Garren failed to prove deficien cy under the first prong of Strickland

.

I begin with my belief that the PCR court's finding of deficien cy was not so narrow as the majority suggests. The PCR court found "trial counsel s hould have requested that [Garren] have a ps ychological evaluation before [he] pled guilty." In disagreeing with the majority as to deficiency, I am not con tending counsel was required to have a "competency ev aluation." Rather, focusing o n what I believe was the finding of the PCR court, the issue before us is whethe r counsel was obligated to get some professional input to assist counsel in u nderstanding how to most effectively defend Garren in light of his obvious mental h ealth issues.

As to the merits of this issue , the evidence supports the PCR c ourt's finding that

counsel was deficient in not seek ing this assistance. The majo rity recites most of

this evidence in its excellent a nd detailed descri ption of the brutality of this crime. In addition to this evidence, Ga rren told the victim during the crime sequence he was the Apostle Paul and he bapti zed her. Plea counsel stated at the plea hearing that Garren "obviously had some m ental problems," and at the PC R trial, "I really

wish that we had taken the time to get a psychological evaluati on." The victim's brother told the plea court, "I can only think that a man that would want to do this would have to be mentally distu rbed." In the face of these fac ts, the PCR court's finding that plea counsel was deficient in failing to seek some input from some professional as to the nature an d extent of Garren's obvious me ntal problems and the role they may have played in the events of those terrible d ays is amply supported by the evidence. As the majority states, "This Court will uphold the [factual] findings of the PCR cou rt when there is any evidence of probative value to support them." See Sellner v. State , 416 S.C. 606, 610 , 787 S.E.2d 525, 527 (2016).

As to Garren's claim that his p lea was involuntary, I agree wit h the majority the

PCR court erred as a matter of law in granting relief because t he evidence Garren presented the PCR court was le gally insufficient. The standard of proof on thisclaim is stated in United States v. Truglio , 493 F.2d 574, 578 (4th Cir. 1974) 5 —the applicant must show "that his mental faculties were so impaired by drugs when he pleaded that he was incapable o f full understanding and appreci ation . . . ." Initially, the responsibility of det ermining whether the defendant is pleading guilty knowingly and voluntarily falls to the plea court. See generally Roddy v. State

, 339 S.C. 29, 33-34, 528 S.E.2d 418, 421 (2000) (exp laining that the plea court must ensure a knowing a nd voluntary plea) (citing Boykin v. Alabama , 395 U.S. 238, 242, 89 S. Ct. 1709, 1711-12 , 23 L. Ed. 2d 274, 279 (1969) ); see also State v. Armstrong , 263 S.C. 594, 598, 211 S.E.2d 889, 891 (1975). In this case, the record of the guilty plea is devoid of a ny meaningful dialogue between the plea court and

the defendant from which the plea court could have made the req uired determination. The longest answe r Garren gave to any question asked by the plea court was literally, "yes ma'am," except that when asked whethe r he was satisfied with his lawyer, he added , "I'm most satisfied."

Nevertheless, there is nothing i n this guilty plea transcript t hat indicates an invalid plea. When asked whether he wa s under the influence of any dru gs or alcohol, Garren responded, "No." As the m ajority points out, plea couns el testified at the PCR hearing he observed nothing unusual about his client at the plea, and Garren appeared to understand what he was doing. Therefore, there was nothing the plea

court could have observed that indicated Garren was not pleadin g guilty voluntarily. On its face, thi s was a valid guilty plea.

The State has a compelling inte rest in maintaining the finality of a valid guilty plea. See Jamison v. State , 410 S.C. 456, 469, 765 S.E. 2d 123, 129 (2014) (stating "a valid guilty plea must be trea ted as final in the vast majority of cases" and citing

McMann v. Richardson , 397 U.S. 759, 773, 90 S. Ct. 1441, 1450, 25 L.Ed.2d 763, 775 (1970), for the State's "compelling interests in maintainin g the finality of guilty-plea convictions validly obtained"). To overcome this c ompelling interest, it is the applicant's burden to demonstrate the plea was not valid . Garren testified at

the PCR trial that he might have taken an unnamed medication that possibly had

unknown side effects, as a result of wh ich he did not know what he was doing when he pled guilty. This testimony tells us nothing about the validity of the plea.

Even if the PCR court did find t he testimony to be credible, th e testimony is legally insufficient to support the invalidation of his plea.

5 It is a federal standard, ari sing under the Due Process Clause s of the Fifth and

Fourteenth Amendments. Anderson v. State , 342 S.C. 54, 57, 535 S.E.2d 649, 651 (2000).The Due Process standard set forth in Truglio requires more than the applicant's unsupported testimony that he did not know what he was doing wh en he pled guilty. This is the basis of th e Fourth Circuit's reliance on "objective data" in

United States v. Damon , 191 F.3d 561 (4th Cir. 1999). Under Truglio and Damon

, he must prove—certainly through expert testimony—that specific medication with explained side effects "had the capability to produce a suffici ent effect on his

mental faculties to render him in competent to enter a guilty pl ea." Damon , 191 F.3d at 565 (citing Truglio , 493 F.2d at 578). Because Garren utterly failed to meet this standard of proof, the PCR court erred as a matter of law in granting him

relief.JUSTICE JAMES: I concur in part and dissent in part. I agree with the majority's conclusion that the PC R court erred as a matter of l aw in concluding

Garren is entitled to PCR on the ground trial counsel was ineff ective in not requesting a competency evaluation.

However, I respectfully disagree with the majority's conclusion that there is no probative evidence supporting the PCR court's factual finding t hat Garren had

established he was under the influence of medication and did no t understand the effect of his guilty plea. I bel ieve this Court's standard of review in PCR cases requires us to affirm the PCR c ourt's grant of relief on this g round. See Smith v.

State , 386 S.C. 562, 565, 689 S.E.2d 629, 631 (2010) ("In reviewing the PCR [court's] decision, an appellate court will uphold the PCR cour t if any evidence of probative value supports the decision."); Edwards v. State , 392 S.C. 449, 455, 710 S.E.2d 60, 64 (2011) ("The appellate court w ill reverse the PCR court only where there is either no probative ev idence to support the decision o r the decision was controlled by an error of law."); Simuel v. State , 390 S.C. 267, 270, 701 S.E.2d 738, 739 (2010) ("This Court gives great deference to a PCR [co urt's] findings [of fact] where matters of cr edibility are involved.").

I agree the facts of this case are disturbing, and the injuries sustained by the victim were horrific. However, these facts have nothing to do with wh ether Garren's guilty plea was voluntary. Whether the fifteen-year aggregate prison term imposed upon Garren was harsh or lenient and whether he was expecting to plead in front of a different judge are likewise i rrelevant to our analysis of th e issues before us. The majority cites its perception th at the focus of Garren's PCR cl aim is his displeasure with his fifteen-year aggregate sentence. That may be true, bu t Garren 's motivation in pursuing PCR is som ething to be considered by the PCR court in its evaluation of all the evidence, not by this Court. Otherwise, we would be weighing evidence, which is not w ithin our province in a PCR ca se. The PCR court could have easily consider ed these facts, concluded Garre n's overall testimony was not credible, and c oncluded Garren had not met hi s burden of proof. However, the PCR court sifted t hrough all the evidence—includin g Garren's selfserving testimony—and c oncluded he had prove n he did not enter his plea voluntarily.

I must add that many might consid er the fifteen-year sentence i mposed to be relatively light under the circums tances. Presumably, Garren is aware that if the PCR court's decision is upheld , on remand the kidnapping and we apon charges would be reinstated, the ABHAN c harge would return to the indic ted greater offense of attempted murder, the CDVHAN charge would remain in place, and hewould be facing a much harsher a ggregate sentence than that imp osed by the plea

court.

The PCR court found Garren "was under the influence of medicat ion which affected his ability to understa nd what he was doing on the day of his plea." The evidentiary support, however slight, for this factual finding i s Garren's own testimony at the PCR hearing. I respectfully disagree with the majority's

conclusion that the PCR court did not find Garren's testimony t o be credible. While the PCR court did not exp licitly state it found Garren's testimony to be credible or not to be credible, t he PCR court did note it had t he opportunity to

observe each witness who testifie d at the hearing, was able to "closely pass" upon their credibility, and weighed their testimony accordingly. Ga rren testified:

I don't know what kind of medication they was giving me in the county [jail]. But t hey have a way of giving medication that's -- they have a bunch of little glasses on a tray. And they just give you medicine. I don't know if they give me the wrong medici ne or what they done. But I had a reaction two different times to the medicine they give me.

Garren testified he did not kno w what he was doing when he pled guilty. Although self-serving, his testimony is still probative evidence to supp ort the PCR court's ruling that Garren's guilty plea was involuntary due to the med ication he was given in jail. See Davie v. State , 381 S.C. 601, 613, 675 S.E.2d 416, 422 (2009) (providing that depending on the facts of a case, self-serving testimony may be sufficient).

Because the PCR court granted Ga rren relief based upon the evid ence before it,

and because Garren was the only witness who testified he was un der the influence

of medication and did not under stand the effect of his guilty p lea, the PCR court undeniably deemed his testimony cr edible. I believe Garren's s elf-serving testimony—believed by the PCR c ourt—constitutes probative evide nce in support of the PCR court's ruling that Garren's guilty plea was involun tary due to the medication he was given in jail.

The majority cites United States v. Truglio for the proposition that Garren was required to prove to the PCR co urt "that his mental faculties w ere so impaired by drugs when he pleaded that he w as incapable of full understandi ng and appreciation of the charges aga inst him, of comprehending his c onstitutional rights,and of realizing the consequences of his plea." 493 F.2d 574, 578 (4th Cir. 1974) (quotation marks and citation om itted). That is precisely what Garren established

to the satisfaction of the PCR c ourt, the only tribunal in a po sition to evaluate Garren's credibility on this most crucial issue. In Truglio , the Fourth Circuit held the record supported the distri ct court's factual finding that the defendant was "alert and very well possessed of his f aculties" at the time he entere d his guilty plea. Id. at 579. Here, our standard of re view requires us to honor the PCR court's factual finding that Garren was not well possessed of his faculties at the time of his plea.

The majority relies upon United States v. Damon for the proposition that Garren had the burden of presenting objective data to the PCR court establishing the

nature and effect of the medicat ions Garren had taken, and that Garren was required to present evidence th e medication "had the capability to produce a

sufficient effect on his mental faculties to render him incompe tent to enter a guilty plea." 191 F.3d 561, 565 (4th Cir. 1999). In Damon , while entering a guilty plea to a murder charge, the defendant Damon advised the plea court that he was taking an antidepressant drug; his lawyer advised the plea court that one side effect of the drug was impaired judgment. Id. at 563. After Damon was sentenced to life in prison, he moved to vacate his plea on the ground that he enter ed the plea involuntarily due to the me dication he was taking. Id. The plea court denied the

motion. Id. Damon appealed, claiming the pl ea court had a duty, when info rmed he was taking the medication, to conduct further inquiry into t he effect the drug had on his ability to voluntarily enter the plea. Id. at 564.

I believe the major ity's reliance upon Damon is misplaced. The Fourth Circuit's resolution of Damon's appeal was primarily dependent upon its analysis of the plea

court's adherence to Rule 11 of t he Federal Rules of Criminal P rocedure, which admittedly requires inquiry into a pleading defendant's ingesti on of medication.

The Fourth Circuit concluded th e plea court erred in failing to conduct further inquiry into the effect Damon's ingestion of the antidepressant drug had upon the voluntariness of his plea and re manded to the plea court, holdi ng that Rule 11 required such further inquiry. Damon , 191 F.3d at 566. In the instant case, Garren's assertion that his pl ea was involuntary is properly in cluded as part of his claim for PCR, not as part of a motion to vacate his plea for a Rule 11 deficiency.

We have never before held or eve n intimated that a PCR applican t is required to present objective data regardi ng the properties, combinations, and effects of drugs

to establish he did not volunta rily enter a guilty plea. I wou ld hold the PCR court was entitled to rely solely upon Ga rren's self-serving testimon y. If the PCR court

had ruled Garren's te stimony on this point was not credible and rejected his PCR claim for the very reasons cite d by the majority, our standard of review would haverequired us to affirm in that i nstance as well. At the very le ast, if the majority

deems Damon to be binding on the point, a r emand to the PCR court would be in order, as that was the result or dered by the Fourth Circuit in Damon

.

In State v. Rosier , 312 S.C. 145, 146, 439 S.E.2d 307, 308 (Ct. App. 1993), the defendant pled guilty t o assault and battery with intent to kil l. Three days later, he moved to withdraw his plea, all eging that when he pled guilty, he was under the

influence of Darvocet and Valium t o the extent that he was unab le to enter a knowing and voluntary plea. Id. at 147-48, 439 S.E.2d at 309. The defendant testified at the motion hearing held three days after his plea. Id. at 149, 439 S.E.2d

at 310. The circuit court denied the motion to withdraw the pl ea, finding the

defendant was not under the influence of his medications to the extent that he did not voluntarily enter his plea. Id. In so finding, the circuit court stated it did not believe the defendant's testimony at the motion hearing and con cluded the defendant was "faking." Id. The court of appeals affi rmed, noting the plea judge had the opportunity to observe the defendant at the plea hearin g and at the motion hearing. Id. The court of appeals—correctly i n my view—yielded to the simp le premise that "[t] he determination of credibility m ust be left to the trial judge who

saw and heard the witnesses a nd is therefore in a better positi on to evaluate their veracity." Id.

The majority concludes nothing in the plea transcript suggests Garren was "under the influence of drugs or otherw ise dispossessed of his mental faculties" at the time of his plea. I submit this is of no consequence. In Hyman v. State , 397 S.C. 35, 39, 723 S.E.2d 375, 376-77 (2 012), the PCR applicant pled guilty to a drug distribution offense. In his PCR action, the applicant maintained he entere d his plea involuntarily because he was not allowed to view the videotape of the alleged drug

transaction. Id. at 42, 723 S.E.2d at 378. The PCR court concluded the applican t's testimony was not credibl e and denied relief. Id. at 41, 723 S.E.2d at 378. We affirmed, citing Solomon v. State , 313 S.C. 526, 443 S.E. 2d 540 (1994), for the proposition that an appellate court's deference to a PCR judge' s credibility findings is so great that this Court is required to uphold the PCR judge 's determination

" even where testimony at [the] PCR heari ng was unequivocally contradicted by the

trial record ." Hyman , 397 S.C. at 45, 723 S.E.2d at 380 (emphasis added).

I would affirm the PCR court's decision to grant Garren's appli cation for relief.