### IN THE COURT OF APP EALS OF TENNESS EE AT KNOXVI LLE N ove m be r 16, 200 5 S es sio n ST A TE OF TE N N ES SE E D EP A R TM EN T O F C HI LD R EN 'S S ER V IC ES v. J.A.H., J R., ET AL 

### . Appeal f romthe Juvenile Court for Ham ilton Coun ty No. 192,664 Suzann e Bailey, Judge
F iled Dece m ber 28, 2005
No . E 2 0 0 5 -0 0 8 6 0 -C O A- R3 -PT

I n th is c a se , th e bio log ic a l f a the r o f a c hil d c on te nd s th at th e tr ia l c ou rt e rr e d inte rm inatin g his pare ntal rig hts

. Fa t h er arg ues that the e vidence prese nted is not sufficient to establish statutory g rounds for termination and that the Tennessee Department of C hildren’s S ervic es failed to make rea sonab le e f

f o r ts to w ar d r e u n if

ic a ti o n . U p o n o u r

f in d in g th a t f

a th e r w a s in c ar c e r a te d w h e n the pe tit ionto t e rm inate wa s f ile d a ndfaile d to vis it the c hil d fo r f ou r c on se c uti ve mon ths imm e diate ly prec eding his incarc eration and our further finding that the Depa rtment made r easona

ble ef forts at reunific ation, we a ffirm the judg ment of the trial c ourt. Te nn. R . A pp. P . 3 App e al a s o f Rig ht ; J udgm e nt of t he Juv e nileCo ur t A ffirm e d; Ca use Rem anded S HAR ON G. LEE , J ., delivere d the opi nion of the court, in which H ER SCH EL P. F RAN KS , P.J ., and D. M I CH A EL S WI NEY , J ., joined. Robin Ruben Flores, Chattanoog a, Te nnessee , for the A ppellant, J .A.H., Jr.
Paul G . Su mme rs , A tto rn e y Ge ne ra l a ndRe po rt e r, a ndDo ug la s E arl Di mond , S enior Cou ns e l, Gene ral Civil Divisi on, Nashville, Tenne ssee, for t he Appe llee, State of Te nnessee , Depa rtment of Chi ldr e n' s Se rv ic e s. OP IN ION
I.A l t ho ugh we ordinari l y i d ent i f y t he p art i es i n a p arent al t erm i nat i o n case b y t hei r i ni t i al s o nl y , i n t hi s case t he 1 sim ilar ity o f t h e p a rtie s’ initials c o m p e ls us to id e n tif y the c h ild b y his g ive n na m e . -2- This appea l arises out of the te rmination of the par ental rig hts of the Appellant J.A. H., J r. (“F ather ”) to his son, J ames who was born on J anuary 9, 2003. The Appe llee State of Te nnessee 1 Depa rtment of Children’s Service s (“D CS”) assumed custody of J ames and place d him in a foster home immediately

afte r hi s birth beca

use hi s biologica l mother (“Mother”) was inca rce rate d at that time and neither

her husba nd nor F ather

could be located.
Father attests that he hired a n attorney in J anuary

or F ebrua

ry of 2003 “t o g et my

son - - I want my son to ha ve my name and I wanted my son out of foster c are .” F ather further testifies that he spoke w ith J an Humphre y s, the DCS case w orker assig ned the c ase on the day of James’s birth, and advised her that he was J ames’s fathe r and stated his w ish to have J ames live with him. Father attests that he wa s denied this reque st because pate rnity had not bee n established.
Ms. Humphrey s attests that in Fe bruary of 2003, she m et wit h Father, Mother , and DCS team coordinator Susan J acquith to prepa re a perma nency

plan. Ms. Humphrey s further attests that when this plan was pre pare d Father ha d not been identified as J ames’s father by DCS. Our revie w of the perma nency

plan, which is date d Fe bruary 7, 2003, shows that the plan wa s not signed by Father a lth ou g h it

lis ts h im a s Jam e s’ s putativ e fathe r an d re qu ir e s, a mon g oth e r thi ng s, that he s ub mit to a lc oh ol anddr

ug te sti ng , u nd e rg o p are nti ng a sse ssm e nt, a ndpr ov ide pr oo f of ade qu a te inc ome to provide for

J ames. Ms. Humphre y s attests that at this meet i n g s h e ad v i s ed Father what steps he n e e d e d to ta

k e to le g it im iz e h is c h il d , a n d F a th e r te s ti f ie s th a t h e in it iate d th e p r o c e d u r e to le g it im iz e J ames a s soon as he wa s g iven this information. Custodyof James was re stored to Mother on April 16, 2003. At that time, Mother and James resided w ith Father and Father ’s m other. L ess t han two months later, on May 29, 2003, Mother and Father we re a

rre sted upon alleg ations of do m estic violence . Subsequently , Mother wa s jailed on outstanding w arr ants, and Father wa s jailed and re lease d on bond. As befor e, Mother’ s husband’s wh e re abo uts we re un kn ow n, a nd F a the r h a d s til l no t le g iti mize d th e c hil d. Un de r the se c ir c ums ta nc e s, DC S a g a in a ssu me d c us tod y of Jame s on June 2, 20 03 , a ndthe c hil d w a s p la c e d in t h e c ar e o f

a f o s t e r f a m i l y. O n Ju n e 1 2 , 2 0 0 3 , a n o r d e r w a s e n te r e d r e c o g n iz in g th a t F a th e r w a s inf

a c t Jame s’s biologica l father

based upon the results of DNAtesting. During the month of J une, 2003, DCS conducte d meeting s to develop a se cond permanenc y plan dated June 19, 2003. Ms. Humphrey s testifies that she contacted Mother by telephone r eg arding these mee tings. Althoug h Ms. Humphrey s’ conf irms that s h e never spoke dir ectly with Fathe r reg arding these mee tings, Mother and F ather

wer e re siding tog ether

at t h at t i m e. Father did not attend any

of the mee tings to deve lop the second pe rmanen cy p l an . Ms. Humphrey s testifies that althoug h she attempted to provide Father with a co py of this permane ncy

plan by mail on two occa sions, on the first occa sion the mailing wa s returne d beca use of inade quate postag e and on theN e ithe r o f t h e se ter m ina tio n s is a t i ssu e in this a p p e a l. 2
-3- second o c c a s ion, the mailing wa s returne d stamped “unc laimed.” Ac cording ly , it appear s that Father never rec eived a

copy of the plan.
At so me tim e in Jun e of

20 03 Mo the r andF a the r b e g a n t o v isi t Jam e s w e e kly un de r D CS supervision. Ms. Humphrey s attests that, althoug h Father missed two or thre e visits, he was g e ne ra lly “ pr e tty re g ula r” in v isi tin g . H ow e ve r, Ms. Hu mph re y s als o att e sts that F a the r “ ha d lo ts of very ba d b e ha vio r” a ndthat so me tim e s h e wo uldbe “ hig hly up se t.” Sus a n Jac qu ith , w ho is employ ed by

DCS as a team c oordinator, attests that she was ca lled in to personally supervise the visits i n early

September of

2003. On Octobe r 2 4 , 2 0 03, an adjudicatory hearing w as held in the juvenile c ourt for H amilton County . Mother wa s prese nt at this hearing ; however , Father failed to appea r. I n its order e ntere d November

20, 2003, the juvenile court found J am es t o be depe ndent and ne g lected by clea r and c on vin c ing e vid e nc e a nda wa rd e d c us tod y

of Jame s to DC S. T he c ou rt a lso state d a s f

oll ow s: That base d upon the mother’s in-court admission during this Hea ring that she used c rac k cocaine the pre vious ni g ht, her obvious state of s e r io u s ly imp a ir e d c o g n it iv e ab il ity inc o u r t i n c lu d in g marke d confusion and dif

ficulty answe ring simple que stions, and the fac t that she re sides in the same home w ith [ Father], al l visitation between [ Fa t h er ] an d t h e s u b

j ec tch i l d s h o u l d b e s u s p en d ed p en d i n g a favor able r eport fr o m an alcohol and drug evaluation/screening of [F a th e r ]. Ms. Humphrey s testifies that a few day s afte r t he hearing she called Father and told him t hat visitation had been suspende d and that it would be re instated if he submit ted to alcohol and dr ug a sse ss m e n t

. M s . H u m p h r e y s s t a t e s t h a tu p o n b e i n g t o l d t h i s “ [F a t h e r ] s t ar t e d c u r s i n g a n d h e s a id he couldn’t believe all the things that he had to do, he doesn’t know how I could do that and ca lled me very vulga r name s.” Althoug h Father attests that he ag ree d to submit to drug scre ening so that he could r esume visitation with James, he did not do so and he has not se en J ames since October of 2003. Mother wa s incarc erated i n M arch of 2004, and in April of 2004, Father wa s incarc erated upon char g es of thef

t, hara ssment, driving on a revoke d l i ce n s e, an d possession of drug pa ra ph e rn a lia . On Jun e 11 , 2 00 4, DC S f ile d a pe tit ionin the juv e nil e c ou rt fo r H a mil tonCou nty

to terminate the pare ntal rig hts of Mother, F ather and Mother’ s husband. The pa renta l rig hts of Mother and he r husband we re te rminated on Oc tober 25, 2004, and September 20, 2004, r espec tively

. Hea ring s on the petition to terminate the par ental rig hts of Father 2 wer e held on January

14, 2005, and F ebrua

ry 1, 2005, and on Marc h 8, 2005, the trial court entere d an orde r terminating Father’s pa renta l rig hts and g ranting DCS the right to place J ames for adoption.-4-

Th e c ou rt ’s ru lin g wa s b a se d u po n f ind ing s o f w ill ful aban do nme nt, failu re to c omp ly wi th perma nency

plans, failure to make re asonable eff orts to provide a suitable home, and persistence of conditions that le d to James’s remova l. The court further found that termination of F ather ’s par ental ri g hts wa s in Jame s’ s b e st i nte re st. Th e re a ft e r, F a the r f ile d th e ins ta nt a

pp e a l.

II.
We a dd re ss the fo llo wi ng iss ue s in thi s a pp e a l: 1) Whe the r the tr ia l c ou rt ’s fi nd ing of at lea st on e g ro un d f

or te rm inatio n is a de qu a te ly supported by

the evidenc e. 2) Whether F ather

was de nied his rig ht to due proc ess on g rounds that DCS failed to make rea sonable e fforts to assist hi m in reunification and in establishing a home for his c hild.
III . A biologica l pa

rent’s rig ht to the car e and c ustody of his or her

child is among the oldest of the jud ic ia lly re c og nize d libe rty int e re sts pr ote c te d by the du e pr oc e ss c laus e s o f the fe de ra l a ndstate constitutions. Trox e l v . G ra nv ill e , 5 30 U. S. 5 7, 65 , 1 20 S. Ct . 2 05 4, 20 59 -6 0 ( 20 00 ); Ha wk v . H awk , 85 5 S.W.2 d 5 73 , 5 78 -5 79 (T e nn . 1 99 3) ; Ray v . Ray , 83 S.W .3d 726, 731 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2001). Al tho ug h th is rig ht i s f

un da me nta l a ndsu pe ri or

to c lai ms of othe r p e rs on s a ndthe g ov e rn me nt, it is not absolute. Sta te v . C. H. K. , 154 S.W .3d 586, 589 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2004). I t continues without interruption only

as long as a pa

rent ha s not relin q u i s h ed i t , abandone d it, or eng ag ed in conduc t requiring its li mitation or termination. Blair v . Badenhope , 77 S. W.3 d 1 37 , 1 41 (T e nn . 2 00 2) . It is we ll e sta bli sh e d that " pa

re nts ha ve a fu nd a me nta l ri g ht to the c are , c us tod y , a nd c on tr ol of t heir children.” In re Drinnon , 7 7 6 S. W. 2 d 9 6 , 9 7 ( T e n n . Ct

. A p p . 1988)( cit in g Stan ley v . I lli no is , 405 U.S. 645, 92 S.C t. 1208, 31 L .Ed.2d 551 (1972). H oweve r, this rig ht is not absolu t e and pa renta l rig hts may

be terminated if there is clea r and convincing evidenc e justify ing suc h termination under the applica

ble statute. Id. Termination proc eeding s are g overne d by statute in Tennesse e. Parties who ha ve standing to seek the te rmination of a biolog ical par ent’s par ental rig hts must fi rs t prove at least one of the statutory g rounds for te rmination. Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(c )(1)

. Secondly , they must prove that termination of the pa rent’s ri g hts is in t he child’s be st interest. Tenn. Code A nn. § 36-1- 11 3( c )( 2) . B e c aus e the de c isi on to te rm inate pa re nta l r ig hts ha s p ro fo un d c on se qu e nc e s, c ou rt s mu st apply a higher standard of

proof in dec iding termination cases. The ref ore, to justify

termination of pare ntal r ig h ts , th e p ar ty s e e k in g te r mi n a ti o n mu s t p r o v e b y c le ar a n d c o n v in c in g e v id e n c e the g round (or g rounds) for termination and that termination is in the child’s best interest. Te nn. Code An n. §3 6- 1- 11 3( c ); In re Vale ntine , 79 S.W . 3d 539, 546 (Tenn. 2002)

.-5-

The he ighte ned burde n of proof minimiz es the risk of e rrone ous decisions. I n r e C

. W. W. , 37 S.W. 3d46 7, 47 4 ( Te nn . Ct . A pp . 2 00 0) ; In re M. W .A ., J r. , 980 S.W .2d 620, 622 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1998). Evidenc e satisfying the clea r and convincing evidenc e standard establishes that the truth of the fac ts a sserted is hig hly p ro b able, Sta te v . D e ma rr , N o . M 2 0 0 2

- 0 2 6 0 3

- CO A

- R3

- JV , 2 0 0 3 WL 21946726, at *9 (Te nn. Ct. App. Aug . 13, 2003) no appl. perm. filed , and elimi nates any serious or substantial doubt about the corr ectne ss of the conc lusions draw n from the e vidence

. In re Vale ntine , 79 S.W. 3d53 9, 54 6 ( Te nn . 2 00 2) ; In re S.M

. , 1 49 S .W .3 d 63 2, 63 9 ( Te nn . Ct . A pp . 2 00 4) ; In re J .J .C. , 148 S.W .3d 919, 925 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2004). I t produce s in a fact-f inder’s mind a f

irm belief or conviction reg arding the t ruth of t he fa cts soug ht to be established. In re A.D .A. , 84 S.W .3d 592, 59 6 ( Te nn . Ct . A pp . 2 00 2) ; Ray v . Ray , 8 3 S. W.3 d 7 26 , 7 33 (T e nn . Ct . A pp . 2 00 1) ; I n r e C

. W. W. , 37 S.W .3d at 474.
I n a non-jury

case such as this one, we revie w the re cord de novo with a pre sumption of corr ectne ss as to the t rial court’s determination of facts, and we must honor those finding s unless the e vid e nc e pr e po nd e rate s to the c on tr ary . Te nn . R. Ap p. P. 1 3( d) ; Union Carbide v. Huddleston , 854 S.W .2d 87, 91 (Tenn. 1993) . When a trial court has seen and heard witnesses, e specia lly wher e issues of cr edibilityand we ight of oral testimo n y ar e involved, considera ble def ere nce must be acc orded to the tria l court’s fa ctual finding s. Seals v. England/Corsair Upholstery Mfg. Co., Inc., 9 8 4 S.W .2d 912, 915 (Tenn. 1999)

. F u r th e r , “ [o ]n a n is s u e w h ic h h in g e s o n th e c r e d ib il ity of witnesses, the trial court will not be reve rsed unless there is f ound in the rec ord cle ar, c oncre te, and convincing evidenc e other than the ora l testimonyof witnesses whic h co n t ra d ict the trial court’s finding s.” Ga lbre ath v . H ar ris , 8 1 1 S

. W

. 2 d 8 8 , 9 1 (T en n . C t

. Ap p . 1 9 9 0 ), ci t i n g Tennessee Valley Kao lin Cor

p. v . P e rry , 526 S.W .2d 488, 490 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1974). A fter r evie wi n g t h e trial c ou rt ’s sp e c if

ic fa c tua l f

ind ing s to a sc e rt a in that the e vid e nc e do e s no t pr e po nd e rate a g a ins t th e m, we mus t de te rm ine wh e the r the e le me nts re qu ir e d fo r te rm inatio n a re e ith e r c le arl y

a ndc on vin c ing ly established by

the trial court’s fac tual finding s or are supported by a preponderance of the evidenc e. In re S.M

. , 149 S.W .3d 632, 640 (Tenn. Ct. A p p . 2 0 0 4 ). The trial c ourt’s conc lusions of law are revie wed de novo and ar e ac corde d no presumption of cor rec tness. Campbell v. Florida Steel Corp., 91 9 S. W.2 d 2 6, 35 (T e nn . 1 99 6) ; Pre sle y v . B e nn e tt , 860 S.W .2d 857, 859 (Tenn. 1993)

. IV. The fir st issue we addr ess is whether the trial court erre d in f

inding that ther e we re statutory g rounds for te rminating Father’s pa renta l rig hts. I n addre ssing this issue, we be ar in mind that we need not r eview e ach of

the g rounds upon which the trial court ba sed i t s d ec i s ion. As long a s one statut ory g ro un d fo r te rm inatio n is e sta bli sh e d by the fa c ts in this c a se a ndte rm inatio n is in the be st interest of the child, the trial court’s dec i s i o n wi l l be suff iciently supported. In re D.L.B., 118 S.W .3d 360, 367 (Tenn. 2003) . Fath er does not contend that the trial court e rre d in finding that termination of his pare ntal rig hts was in J ames’s be st interest and the evidence in this case does not pr e po nd e rate a g a ins t th a t f ind ing

. We mus t, how e ve r, de te rm ine wh e the r the e vid e nc e a lso su pp orts a g round for

termination under a

pplicable statutory

law.-6-

Abandonment is one of

the statutory

g rounds for te rmination of par ental rig hts which are set forth at Te nn. Code Ann. § 36-6- 113(g ) and, as we have noted above, this is one of the g rounds that the trial court relied on in t erminating Father’s parenta l rig hts in the instant matter. B eca use F ather was inca rce rate d when DCS filed its petition to t erminate pare ntal rig hts, the rele vant def inition of “abandonment” is that set forth at Tenn. Code Ann. § 36- 1-102(1) (A)( iv):

A par ent or g uardia n is incarc erated at the time of the instit ution of an ac t i on or proc eeding to declar e a c hild to be an aba ndoned child, or the par ent or g uardia n has bee n incar cer ated during a ll or part of the four ( 4) months immediately prec eding the instit ution of such ac tion or pr oc e e din g , an d eithe r ha s will fu lly faile d to vis it o r h a s w ill fu lly faile d to su pp ort or

ha s w ill fu lly

faile d to make re a so na

ble pay me nts toward the support of the c hild for four ( 4) conse cutive months immediately

prec eding such par ent’s or g uardia n’s i ncar cer ation, or the par ent or g uardia n has eng ag ed in conduct prior to incarc eration which exhibits a wa nton disreg ard f or the we lfare of the c hild.
The trial c ourt’s orde r terminating Father’s pa renta l rig hts is based in part upon the following fi n d i n g: [Father] failed to visit the Child for a perio d o f m o re tha n four ( 4)

months when he wa s fr ee t o do so. He ha s had no conta ct with the Child s ince visitation was suspende d by the Court in October

2003 pending his providing the Court with evide nce of completion of an alcohol and dr

ug assessment. [Fathe r] chose not to subm i t to the a sse ssm e nt.
I t is un dis pu te d th a t F a the r d id n ot v isi t Jam e s f or fo ur c on se c uti ve mo nt hs pre c e din g his incar cer ation - F ather

was inca rce rate d o n Ap ri l 4, 2004, and has not visited J ames since October of 2003. Howeve r, Father contends t hat hi s failure to visit J ames was not willful. He asserts that

“ th e e v id e n c e a t t

r ia l d idn o t r e f

le c t th a t [ h e ] wilf

ully faile d to vis it the c hil d w ith in the fo ur mon th time before his tim e in custody .” We disag ree . As we ha ve noted, the trial court’s or der of November

20, 2003, s u s p ended visit ation betwee n Father a nd J ames until Father submitted favor able dr ug and alc ohol evaluation results. As we ha ve further noted, there afte r Ms. H umphrey s contac ted Father and advised him that resumption of visitation would be conting ent upon his dr ug and alc ohol assessment. When asked if he was made awa re of the re quirement that he su b m i t t o this testing bef ore he could visit J ames a g ain, Father testifies “I ag ree d to r andom drug testing to try and g et this done .” Even though this pre requisite wa s the on ly ob sta c le to f

urthe r v isi ta tio n, F a the r ne ve r sa tis fi e d it. We a lso no te , a s d id the tr ia l c ou rt , that in his testimony Father acknowledg es t hat an appointment was made for him to underg o drug a nda lc oh ol a sse ssm e nt andthat he c ho se no t to me e t thi s app oin tme nt be c aus e it c on fl ic te d wi th h is-7-

me e tin g wi th an atto rn e y . F a the r p re se nte d n o p ro of that he ma de a ny

e ff ort at a ny

tim e to resc hedule a n assessment.
I n In re AudreyS., No . M20 04 -0 27 58 -C OA -R 3- PT, 20 05 WL 20 51 28 6 at *13 ,1 4 ( Te nn . Ct

. App. Aug ust 25, 2005) perm. app. dismissed (Tenn. N ov. 4, 2005), we rec ently stated as f

ollows wi th r e g ardto w ill fu lne ss i n th e c on te xt of a c a se inv olv ing the te rm inatio n o f p are nta l r ig hts : Conduct is “willful” if it is the product of fre e will rathe r than c oe rc ion . T hu s, a

pe rs on a c ts “ wi llf

ull y ” if he or sh e is a fr e e a g e nt, kn ow s w hat he or sh e is do in g , a ndint e nd s to do wh a t he or sh e is d o i n g. Fa ilure to visit or support a child is “willful” when a pe rson is awa re of his or her duty to visit or support, has the c apac ity to do so, makes no attempt to do so, and has no justifiabl e ex cu s e for not doing so. (citations omitted)
The trial c ourt found that F ather chose not to submit to the testing that wa s a pre condition to further visitation, an d

F ath e r prese nts no evidence that preponde rate s ag ainst this finding. F ather ’s choice in refusing to cooper ate in this reg ard c onstitut ed a w ill fu l d ec i sion to discontinue visi ting his son. The rec ord supports the conc lusion that Father abandone d J ames unde r Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-102( 1)(A) (iv).
We are awa

re that the trial court based its de cision to terminate F ather ’s par ental rig hts on sever al g rounds in addition to that of abandonme nt and that Father arg ues that the trial court e rre d in finding the se additional g rounds. Howe ver, in view of our affirmation of the t rial court’s decision on the is su e of abandon me nt, we ne e d n ot a dd re ss F a the r’ s a rg ume nt that th e tr ia l c ou rt e rr e d in terminating his pare ntal rig hts upon these additional g rounds. S e e I n r e C

. W. W. , 37 S.W .3d 467, 475 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2000). As we ha ve noted, a ny one of the g rounds listed at Tenn. Code A nn. § 36-1- 11 3( g ) is suf

fi c ie nt to sup po rt a n ord e r of te rm inatio n an d, a c c or din g ly , issu e s ra ise d by F a the r w ith respe ct to other g rounds ar e pre termitted.
V.
The re maining issue w e address i n this case is whe ther DCS violated Father’s rights of due pr oc e ss b y

faili ng to m ake re a so na

ble e ff orts t o a ssi st him in re un if

ic a tio n an d ine sta

bli sh ing a ho me for James. Father c ontends that the main i ntere st of DCS employ ee J an Humphrey s was not t o return J ames to h im , b u t r a th e r

to p la c e Ja me s ina n a d o p ti v e h o me . I n s u p p o r t o f th is ar g u me n t, F a th er no te s th a t a t th e te rm inatio n h e a ri ng Ms. Hu mph re y s wa s a sk e d “ I s it y ou r g oa l to pla c e thi s c hil d in an a do pti ve ho me ? ” a nd sh e a ns we re d “ Ye s. ” F a the r a lso re fe re nc e s a DC S qu art e rl y

pr og re ss re po rt date d D e c e mbe r 7 , 2 00 4. Se c tio n 1 6 o f thi s re po rt is d e sig nate d “ Pe rm a ne nc y Pla n Pr og re ss - Child’s Needs” and compels a listing of eac h “ac tion plan step, prog ress made , since last re view and rema ining ba

rrier s.” The r esponse at this sec tion state s, “James will have a loving , stable, supportive a ndsa fe pe rm a ne nt ho me wh e re a ll h is p hy sic a l, d e ve lop me nta l, e mot ion a l, andme dic a l ne e ds wi ll-8-

be met. The barrier is termination of f ather ’s par ental rig hts.” Fat h er i n d icates that the second se nte nc e of

thi s r e sp on se sh ow s th a t D CS’ s g oa l w a s to pla ce J ame s for a do pti on rathe r tha n to reunify him with Father

. Both the r efe renc ed testimony of Ms. Hu m p h re y s to the eff ect that it is her g oal to place Jame s in a n a do pti ve ho me a ndthe c ite d re sp on se in the pr og re ss r e po rt pe rt a in t o a

tim e wh e n D CS h a d a l r e a d y m a d e r e a s o n ab l e e f f o r t s i n t h i s c a s e a n d t h o s e e f f o r t s h a d f a i l e d

. B o t h M s . H u m p h r e ys testimonyand the prog ress report r elate to a point in time a fter Father had demonstrated his re fusal to cooper ate by

failing to submit to dr

ug and alc ohol assessment and ha d not visit ed his child for an extensive period, and the be st interest s o f t h e ch i ld dictated that F ather ’s par ental rig hts be terminated. O f cour se, at that point in time placing J ames for adoption, not reunification, was the proper go al o f DC S . Additional testimonyof Ms. Humphrey s under c ross examination provides further evidenc e in this reg ard: Q L ast question, is there ev er a t ime y ou had come to a conc lusion, in essence t h at y ou just wrote a pa rent off and start f

ocusing on a f o s t e r f a m i l y? A That wa s never

my job, I was foste r ca

re.

. . . .
Q B ut y ou fac ilitated this foster family for a n adoption, haven’ t y ou?
A N o, I ha ve no t.

. . . .
Q It’ s y ou r g oa l to pla c e thi s c hil d ina do pti on , is n’ t it ?
A N o, it w a s my

g oa l to re turn [Jam e s] to the pa re nt. Q Okay

. So that was an incorre ct statement that y ou g ave to Mr. N eal a minute ag o, that the g oal was to plac e this ch i l d i n an adoptive home? A Well, I think i t i s n o w b u t that was not our origina l intent. Our orig ina l in te nt w a s to re turn th e c hil d to the pa re nt.
F a the r’ s a rg ume nt that D CS f

a ile d to make re a so na

ble e ff orts in thi s c a se a nd that DC S di d not attempt reunific ation, but only soug ht to place James for a doption is not supported by the re cord a ndis w ith ou t me ri t.-9- VI . For the fore g oing rea sons, we affirm the judgme nt of the trial court and re mand for f urther action consistent with this opinion. Costs on a ppeal a re a djudge d ag ainst the Appellant, J.A.H., J r.

_________________________________________ SHARON G. LEE, J UDGE