46298 Federal Register / Vol. 78, No. 147 / Wednesday, July 31, 2013 / Proposed Rules 

not cause the autothrust system to effect a 

transient response that alters the airplane’s 

flight path any greater than a minor 

transient, as defined in paragraph (l)(1) of 

this section. 

(d) Under normal conditions, the 

disengagement of any automatic control 

function of a flight guidance system may not 

cause a transient response of the airplane’s 

flight path any greater than a minor 

transient. 

(e) Under rare normal and non-normal 

conditions, disengagement of any automatic 

control function of a flight guidance system 

may not result in a transient any greater than 

a significant transient, as defined in 

paragraph (l)(2) of this section. 

(f) The function and direction of motion of 

each command reference control, such as 

heading select or vertical speed, must be 

plainly indicated on, or adjacent to, each 

control if necessary to prevent inappropriate 

use or confusion. 

(g) Under any condition of flight 

appropriate to its use, the flight guidance 

system may not produce hazardous loads on 

the airplane, nor create hazardous deviations 

in the flight path. This applies to both faultfree operation and in the event of a 

malfunction, and assumes that the pilot 

begins corrective action within a reasonable 

period of time. 

(h) When the flight guidance system is in 

use, a means must be provided to avoid 

excursions beyond an acceptable margin 

from the speed range of the normal flight 

envelope. If the airplane experiences an 

excursion outside this range, a means must 

be provided to prevent the flight guidance 

system from providing guidance or control to 

an unsafe speed. 

(i) The flight guidance system functions, 

controls, indications, and alerts must be 

designed to minimize flightcrew errors and 

confusion concerning the behavior and 

operation of the flight guidance system. 

Means must be provided to indicate the 

current mode of operation, including any 

armed modes, transitions, and reversions. 

Selector switch position is not an acceptable 

means of indication. The controls and 

indications must be grouped and presented 

in a logical and consistent manner. The 

indications must be visible to each pilot 

under all expected lighting conditions. 

(j) Following disengagement of the 

autothrust function, a caution (visual and 

auditory) must be provided to each pilot. 

(k) During autothrust operation, it must be 

possible for the flightcrew to move the thrust 

levers without requiring excessive force. The 

autothrust may not create a potential hazard 

when the flightcrew applies an override force 

to the thrust levers. 

(l) For purposes of this section, a transient 

is a disturbance in the control or flight path 

of the airplane that is not consistent with 

response to flightcrew inputs or 

environmental conditions. 

(1) A minor transient would not 

significantly reduce safety margins and 

would involve flightcrew actions that are well 

within their capabilities. A minor transient 

may involve a slight increase in flightcrew 

workload or some physical discomfort to 

passengers or cabin crew. 

(2) A significant transient may lead to a 

significant reduction in safety margins, an 

increase in flightcrew workload, discomfort 

to the flightcrew, or physical distress to the 

passengers or cabin crew, possibly including 

non-fatal injuries. Significant transients do 

not require, in order to remain within or 

recover to the normal flight envelope, any of 

the following: 

(i) Exceptional piloting skill, alertness, or 

strength. 

(ii) Forces applied by the pilot which are 

greater than those specified in Sec. 23.143(c). 

(iii) Accelerations or attitudes in the 

airplane that might result in further hazard 

to secured or non-secured occupants. 

The applicant must also functionally 

demonstrate independence between the 

left and right ATS installation to prove 

they cannot have a single point failure 

that is not extremely improbable that 

inadvertently leads to a loss of thrust, or 

to substantial uncommanded thrust 

changes and transients, in both engines 

simultaneously. 

Issued in Kansas City, Missouri, on July 24, 

2013. 

Earl Lawrence, 

Manager, Small Airplane Directorate, Aircraft 

Certification Service. 

[FR Doc. 2013–18399 Filed 7–30–13; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 4910–13–P 

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION 

Federal Aviation Administration 

14 CFR Part 39 

[Docket No. FAA–2013–0629; Directorate 

Identifier 2012–NM–214–AD] 

RIN 2120–AA64 

Airworthiness Directives; Fokker 

Services B.V. Airplanes 

AGENCY: Federal Aviation 

Administration (FAA), DOT. 

ACTION: Notice of proposed rulemaking 

(NPRM). 

SUMMARY: We propose to adopt a new 

airworthiness directive (AD) for certain 

Fokker Services B.V. Model F.28 Mark 

0070 and 0100 airplanes. This proposed 

AD was prompted by a design review, 

which revealed that under certain 

failure conditions of the maximum level 

(Max Level) sensor wiring, a short 

circuit may develop that causes a hot 

spot on the wiring conduit, or 

puncturing of the wiring conduit wall in 

the center wing fuel tank. This proposed 

AD would require installing fuses in the 

Max Level sensor wiring; and revising 

the airplane maintenance program by 

incorporating critical design 

configuration control limitations. We 

are proposing this AD to prevent an 

ignition source in the center wing fuel 

tank vapor space, which could result in 

a fuel tank explosion and consequent 

loss of the airplane. 

DATES: We must receive comments on 

this proposed AD by September 16, 

2013. 

ADDRESSES: You may send comments by 

any of the following methods: 

• Federal eRulemaking Portal: Go to 

http://www.regulations.gov. Follow the 

instructions for submitting comments. 

• Fax: (202) 493–2251. 

• Mail: U.S. Department of 

Transportation, Docket Operations, 

M–30, West Building Ground Floor, 

Room W12–140, 1200 New Jersey 

Avenue SE., Washington, DC 20590. 

• Hand Delivery: U.S. Department of 

Transportation, Docket Operations, 

M–30, West Building Ground Floor, 

Room W12–140, 1200 New Jersey 

Avenue SE., Washington, DC, between 9 

a.m. and 5 p.m., Monday through 

Friday, except Federal holidays. 

For service information identified in 

this proposed AD, contact Fokker 

Services B.V., Technical Services Dept., 

P.O. Box 1357, 2130 EL Hoofddorp, the 

Netherlands; telephone +31 (0)88–6280– 

350; fax +31 (0)88–6280–111; email 

technicalservices@fokker.com; Internet 

http://www.myfokkerfleet.com. You may 

review copies of the referenced service 

information at the FAA, Transport 

Airplane Directorate, 1601 Lind Avenue 

SW., Renton, WA. For information on 

the availability of this material at the 

FAA, call 425–227–1221. 

Examining the AD Docket 

You may examine the AD docket on 

the Internet at http:// 

www.regulations.gov; or in person at the 

Docket Operations office between 9 a.m. 

and 5 p.m., Monday through Friday, 

except Federal holidays. The AD docket 

contains this proposed AD, the MCAI, 

the regulatory evaluation, any 

comments received, and other 

information. The street address for the 

Docket Operations office (telephone 

(800) 647–5527) is in the ADDRESSES

section. Comments will be available in 

the AD docket shortly after receipt. 

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Tom 

Rodriguez, Aerospace Engineer, 

International Branch, ANM–116, 

Transport Airplane Directorate, FAA, 

1601 Lind Avenue SW., Renton, 

Washington 98057–3356; telephone 

425–227–1137; fax 425–227–1149. 

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: 

Comments Invited 

We invite you to send any written 

relevant data, views, or arguments about 

this proposed AD. Send your comments 


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to an address listed under the 

ADDRESSES section. Include ‘‘Docket No. 

FAA–2013–0629; Directorate Identifier 

2012–NM–214–AD’’ at the beginning of 

your comments. We specifically invite 

comments on the overall regulatory, 

economic, environmental, and energy 

aspects of this proposed AD. We will 

consider all comments received by the 

closing date and may amend this 

proposed AD based on those comments. 

We will post all comments we 

receive, without change, to http:// 

www.regulations.gov, including any 

personal information you provide. We 

will also post a report summarizing each 

substantive verbal contact we receive 

about this proposed AD. 

Discussion 

The European Aviation Safety Agency 

(EASA), which is the Technical Agent 

for the Member States of the European 

Community, has issued EASA 

Airworthiness Directive 2012–0240, 

dated November 12, 2012 (referred to 

after this the Mandatory Continuing 

Airworthiness Information, or ‘‘the 

MCAI’’), to correct an unsafe condition 

for the specified products. The MCAI 

states: 

Prompted by an accident * * *, the FAA 

published Special Federal Aviation 

Regulation (SFAR) 88, and the Joint Aviation 

Authorities (JAA) published Interim Policy 

INT/POL/25/12. 

The design review conducted by Fokker 

Services on the Fokker 70 and Fokker 100 in 

response to these regulations revealed that 

under certain failure conditions of the 

maximum level (Max Level) sensor wiring, a 

short circuit may develop that causes a hot 

spot on the wiring conduit, or puncturing of 

the wiring conduit wall in the tank. 

This condition, if not corrected, could 

create an ignition source in the centre tank 

vapour space, possibly resulting in a fuel 

tank explosion and consequent loss of the 

aeroplane. 

For the reasons described above, this 

[EASA] AD requires the installation of fuses 

in the Max Level sensor wiring and 

subsequently, the implementation of the 

associated Critical Design Configuration 

Control Limitations (CDCCL[s]) [by revising 

the maintenance program to incorporate the 

CDCCLs]. 

You may obtain further information by 

examining the MCAI in the AD docket. 

The FAA has examined the 

underlying safety issues involved in fuel 

tank explosions on several large 

transport airplanes, including the 

adequacy of existing regulations, the 

service history of airplanes subject to 

those regulations, and existing 

maintenance practices for fuel tank 

systems. As a result of those findings, 

we issued a regulation titled ‘‘Transport 

Airplane Fuel Tank System Design 

Review, Flammability Reduction and 

Maintenance and Inspection 

Requirements’’ (66 FR 23086, May 7, 

2001). In addition to new airworthiness 

standards for transport airplanes and 

new maintenance requirements, this 

rule included Special Federal Aviation 

Regulation No. 88 (‘‘SFAR 88,’’ 

Amendment 21–78, and subsequent 

Amendments 21–82 and 21–83). 

Among other actions, SFAR 88 (66 FR 

23086, May 7, 2001) requires certain 

type design (i.e., type certificate (TC) 

and supplemental type certificate (STC)) 

holders to substantiate that their fuel 

tank systems can prevent ignition 

sources in the fuel tanks. This 

requirement applies to type design 

holders for large turbine-powered 

transport airplanes and for subsequent 

modifications to those airplanes. It 

requires them to perform design reviews 

and to develop design changes and 

maintenance procedures if their designs 

do not meet the new fuel tank safety 

standards. As explained in the preamble 

to the rule, we intended to adopt 

airworthiness directives to mandate any 

changes found necessary to address 

unsafe conditions identified as a result 

of these reviews. 

In evaluating these design reviews, we 

have established four criteria intended 

to define the unsafe conditions 

associated with fuel tank systems that 

require corrective actions. The 

percentage of operating time during 

which fuel tanks are exposed to 

flammable conditions is one of these 

criteria. The other three criteria address 

the failure types under evaluation: 

Single failures, single failures in 

combination with a latent condition(s), 

and in-service failure experience. For all 

four criteria, the evaluations included 

consideration of previous actions taken 

that may mitigate the need for further 

action. 

The Joint Aviation Authorities (JAA) 

has issued a regulation that is similar to 

SFAR 88 (66 FR 23086, May 7, 2001). 

(The JAA is an associated body of the 

European Civil Aviation Conference 

(ECAC) representing the civil aviation 

regulatory authorities of a number of 

European States who have agreed to cooperate in developing and 

implementing common safety regulatory 

standards and procedures.) Under this 

regulation, the JAA stated that all 

members of the ECAC that hold type 

certificates for transport category 

airplanes are required to conduct a 

design review against explosion risks. 

We have determined that the actions 

identified in this AD are necessary to 

reduce the potential of ignition sources 

inside fuel tanks, which, in combination 

with flammable fuel vapors, could result 

in fuel tank explosions and consequent 

loss of the airplane. 

Relevant Service Information 

Fokker Services B.V. has issued 

Fokker Service Bulletin SBF100–28– 

073, dated August 10, 2012, including 

the following attachments (* the issue 

date is not specified on the drawing) 

and manual change notification: 

• Fokker Drawing W41192, Sheet 

052, Issue AS*; 

• Fokker Drawing W41192, Sheet 

054, Issue AR*; 

• Fokker Drawing W59520, Sheet 

003, Issue F, dated May 12, 2011; and 

• Fokker Manual Change Notification 

MCNM F100–150, dated August 10, 

2012. 

The actions described in this service 

information are intended to correct the 

unsafe condition identified in the 

MCAI. 

FAA’s Determination and Requirements 

of This Proposed AD 

This product has been approved by 

the aviation authority of another 

country, and is approved for operation 

in the United States. Pursuant to our 

bilateral agreement with the State of 

Design Authority, we have been notified 

of the unsafe condition described in the 

MCAI and service information 

referenced above. We are proposing this 

AD because we evaluated all pertinent 

information and determined an unsafe 

condition exists and is likely to exist or 

develop on other products of the same 

type design. 

This AD requires revisions to certain 

operator maintenance documents to 

include new Critical Design 

Configuration Control Limitations 

(CDCCLs). Compliance with these 

CDCCLs is required by 14 CFR 

91.403(c). For airplanes that have been 

previously modified, altered, or repaired 

in the areas addressed by this AD, the 

operator may not be able to accomplish 

the actions described in the revisions. In 

this situation, to comply with 14 CFR 

91.403(c), the operator must request 

approval for an alternative method of 

compliance according to paragraph (j) of 

this AD. The request should include a 

description of changes to the required 

actions that will ensure the continued 

operational safety of the airplane. 

Costs of Compliance 

We estimate that this proposed AD 

affects 10 products of U.S. registry. 

We estimate the following costs to 

comply with this proposed AD: 


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ESTIMATED COSTS

Action Labor cost Parts cost Cost per 

product 

Cost on U.S. 

operators 

Installation and revision of maintenance program.7 work-hours × $85 per hour = $595 ............. $2,100 $2,695 $26,950 

Authority for This Rulemaking 

Title 49 of the United States Code 

specifies the FAA’s authority to issue 

rules on aviation safety. Subtitle I, 

section 106, describes the authority of 

the FAA Administrator. ‘‘Subtitle VII: 

Aviation Programs,’’ describes in more 

detail the scope of the Agency’s 

authority. 

We are issuing this rulemaking under 

the authority described in ‘‘Subtitle VII, 

Part A, Subpart III, Section 44701: 

General requirements.’’ Under that 

section, Congress charges the FAA with 

promoting safe flight of civil aircraft in 

air commerce by prescribing regulations 

for practices, methods, and procedures 

the Administrator finds necessary for 

safety in air commerce. This regulation 

is within the scope of that authority 

because it addresses an unsafe condition 

that is likely to exist or develop on 

products identified in this rulemaking 

action. 

Regulatory Findings 

We determined that this proposed AD 

would not have federalism implications 

under Executive Order 13132. This 

proposed AD would not have a 

substantial direct effect on the States, on 

the relationship between the national 

Government and the States, or on the 

distribution of power and 

responsibilities among the various 

levels of government. 

For the reasons discussed above, I 

certify this proposed regulation: 

1. Is not a ‘‘significant regulatory 

action’’ under Executive Order 12866; 

2. Is not a ‘‘significant rule’’ under the 

DOT Regulatory Policies and Procedures 

(44 FR 11034, February 26, 1979); 

3. Will not affect intrastate aviation in 

Alaska; and 

4. Will not have a significant 

economic impact, positive or negative, 

on a substantial number of small entities 

under the criteria of the Regulatory 

Flexibility Act. 

We prepared a regulatory evaluation 

of the estimated costs to comply with 

this proposed AD and placed it in the 

AD docket. 

List of Subjects in 14 CFR Part 39 

Air transportation, Aircraft, Aviation 

safety, Incorporation by reference, 

Safety. 

The Proposed Amendment 

Accordingly, under the authority 

delegated to me by the Administrator, 

the FAA proposes to amend 14 CFR part 

39 as follows: 

PART 39—AIRWORTHINESS 

DIRECTIVES 

■ 1. The authority citation for part 39 

continues to read as follows: 

Authority: 49 U.S.C. 106(g), 40113, 44701. 

§ 39.13 [Amended] 

■ 2. The FAA amends § 39.13 by adding 

the following new AD: 

Fokker Services B.V.: Docket No. FAA– 

2013–0629; Directorate Identifier 2012– 

NM–214–AD. 

(a) Comments Due Date 

We must receive comments by September 

16, 2013. 

(b) Affected ADs 

None. 

(c) Applicability 

This AD applies to Fokker Services B.V. 

Model F.28 Mark 0070 and 0100 airplanes, 

certificated in any category, equipped with a 

center wing fuel tank. 

(d) Subject 

Air Transport Association (ATA) of 

America Code 28, Fuel. 

(e) Reason 

This AD was prompted by a design review, 

which revealed that under certain failure 

conditions of the maximum level (Max Level) 

sensor wiring, a short circuit may develop 

that causes a hot spot on the wiring conduit, 

or puncturing of the wiring conduit wall in 

the center wing fuel tank. We are issuing this 

AD to prevent an ignition source in the 

center wing fuel tank vapor space, which 

could result in a fuel tank explosion and 

consequent loss of the airplane. 

(f) Compliance 

You are responsible for having the actions 

required by this AD performed within the 

compliance times specified, unless the 

actions have already been done. 

(g) Installation of Fuses 

Within 24 months after the effective date 

of this AD: Do the actions specified in 

paragraphs (g)(1) and (g)(2) of this AD, as 

applicable. 

(1) For Fokker Services B.V. Model F.28 

Mark 0070 airplanes having serial numbers 

11244 through 11441 inclusive, equipped 

with a center wing bag tank: Install fuses in 

the wiring of the Max Level sensors of the 

center wing fuel tank, in accordance with 

Parts 1 and 3 of the Accomplishment 

Instructions of Fokker Service Bulletin 

SBF100–28–073, dated August 10, 2012, 

which includes the attachments identified in 

paragraphs (g)(1)(i) through (g)(1)(iv) of this 

AD (* the issue date is not specified on the 

drawing). 

(i) Fokker Drawing W41192, Sheet 052, 

Issue AS*. 

(ii) Fokker Drawing W41192, Sheet 054, 

Issue AR*. 

(iii) Fokker Drawing W59520, Sheet 003, 

Issue F, dated May 12, 2011. 

(iv) Fokker Manual Change Notification 

MCNM F100–150, dated August 10, 2012. 

(2) For Fokker Services B.V. Model F.28 

Mark 0070 and Mark 0100 airplanes having 

serial numbers 11442 and up, equipped with 

an integral center wing tank: Install fuses in 

the wiring of the Max Level sensors of the 

center wing fuel tank, in accordance with 

Parts 2 and 3 of the Accomplishment 

Instructions of Fokker Service Bulletin 

SBF100–28–073, dated August 10, 2012, 

which includes the attachments identified in 

paragraphs (g)(2)(i) through (g)(2)(iv) of this 

AD (* the issue date is not specified on the 

drawing). 

(i) Fokker Drawing W41192, Sheet 052, 

Issue AS*. 

(ii) Fokker Drawing W41192, Sheet 054, 

Issue AR*. 

(iii) Fokker Drawing W59520, Sheet 003, 

Issue F, dated May 12, 2011. 

(iv) Fokker Manual Change Notification 

MCNM F100–150, dated August 10, 2012. 

(h) Revision of Maintenance or Inspection 

Program 

After doing any action required by 

paragraph (g) of this AD, before further flight, 

revise the airplane maintenance or inspection 

program, as applicable, by incorporating the 

CDCCLs specified in paragraph 1.L.(1)(c) of 

Fokker Service Bulletin SBF100–28–073, 

dated August 10, 2012, including the 

drawings specified in paragraphs (h)(1) 

through (h)(4) of this AD (* the issue date is 

not specified on the drawing) and manual 

change notification. 

(1) Fokker Drawing W41192, Sheet 052, 

Issue AS*. 

(2) Fokker Drawing W41192, Sheet 054, 

Issue AR*. 

(3) Fokker Drawing W59520, Sheet 003, 

Issue F, dated May 12, 2011. 

(4) Fokker Manual Change Notification 

MCNM F100–150, dated August 10, 2012. 

(i) No Alternative CDCCLs 

After the CDCCLs have been incorporated, 

as required by paragraph (h) of this AD, no 

alternative CDCCLs may be used unless the 

CDCCLs are approved as an alternative 

method of compliance (AMOC) in 


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accordance with the procedures specified in 

paragraph (j) of this AD. 

(j) Other FAA AD Provisions 

The following provisions also apply to this 

AD: 

(1) Alternative Methods of Compliance 

(AMOCs): The Manager, International 

Branch, ANM–116, Transport Airplane 

Directorate, FAA, has the authority to 

approve AMOCs for this AD, if requested 

using the procedures found in 14 CFR 39.19. 

In accordance with 14 CFR 39.19, send your 

request to your principal inspector or local 

Flight Standards District Office, as 

appropriate. If sending information directly 

to the International Branch, send it to ATTN: 

Tom Rodriguez, Aerospace Engineer, 

International Branch; ANM–116, Transport 

Airplane Directorate, FAA, 1601 Lind 

Avenue SW., Renton, WA 98057–3356; 

telephone 425–227–1137; fax 425–227–1137. 

Information may be emailed to: 9-ANM-116- 

AMOC-REQUESTS@faa.gov. Before using 

any approved AMOC, notify your appropriate 

principal inspector, or lacking a principal 

inspector, the manager of the local flight 

standards district office/certificate holding 

district office. The AMOC approval letter 

must specifically reference this AD. 

(2) Airworthy Product: For any requirement 

in this AD to obtain corrective actions from 

a manufacturer or other source, use these 

actions if they are FAA-approved. Corrective 

actions are considered FAA-approved if they 

are approved by the State of Design Authority 

(or their delegated agent). You are required 

to assure the product is airworthy before it 

is returned to service. 

(k) Related Information 

(1) Refer to the Mandatory Continuing 

Airworthiness Information (MCAI) European 

Aviation Safety Agency Airworthiness 

Directive 2012–0240, dated November 12, 

2012, for related information. The MCAI can 

be found in the AD docket on the Internet at 

http://regulations.gov. 

(2) For service information identified in 

this AD, contact Fokker Services B.V., 

Technical Services Dept., P.O. Box 1357, 

2130 EL Hoofddorp, the Netherlands; 

telephone +31 (0)88–6280–350; fax +31 

(0)88–6280–111; email 

technicalservices@fokker.com; Internet 

http://www.myfokkerfleet.com. You may 

review copies of the referenced service 

information at the FAA, Transport Airplane 

Directorate, 1601 Lind Avenue SW., Renton, 

WA. For information on the availability of 

this material at the FAA, call 425 227–1221. 

Issued in Renton, Washington, on July 21, 

2013. 

Stephen P. Boyd, 

Acting Manager, Transport Airplane 

Directorate, Aircraft Certification Service. 

[FR Doc. 2013–18390 Filed 7–30–13; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 4910–13–P 

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION 

Federal Aviation Administration 

14 CFR Part 39 

[Docket No. FAA–2013–0631; Directorate 

Identifier 2012–NM–142–AD] 

RIN 2120–AA64 

Airworthiness Directives; BAE 

Systems (Operations) Limited 

Airplanes 

AGENCY: Federal Aviation 

Administration (FAA), DOT. 

ACTION: Notice of proposed rulemaking 

(NPRM). 

SUMMARY: We propose to adopt a new 

airworthiness directive (AD) for all BAE 

Systems (Operations) Limited Model 

BAe 146 and Avro 146–RJ series 

airplanes. This proposed AD was 

prompted by a report of a cracked pickup bracket of the forward outboard 

pylon of the number 1 engine due to 

stress corrosion. This proposed AD 

would require repetitive inspections 

and, depending on findings, repair of 

the pylon pick-up brackets. We are 

proposing this AD to detect and correct 

cracking of the pick-up bracket, which 

could result in the engine pylon 

separating from the wing, with 

consequent damage to the airplane and 

reduced controllability. 

DATES: We must receive comments on 

this proposed AD by September 16, 

2013. 

ADDRESSES: You may send comments by 

any of the following methods: 

• Federal eRulemaking Portal: Go to 

http://www.regulations.gov. Follow the 

instructions for submitting comments. 

• Fax: (202) 493–2251. 

• Mail: U.S. Department of 

Transportation, Docket Operations, 

M–30, West Building Ground Floor, 

Room W12–140, 1200 New Jersey 

Avenue SE., Washington, DC 20590. 

• Hand Delivery: U.S. Department of 

Transportation, Docket Operations, 

M–30, West Building Ground Floor, 

Room W12–140, 1200 New Jersey 

Avenue SE., Washington, DC, between 9 

a.m. and 5 p.m., Monday through 

Friday, except Federal holidays. 

For service information identified in 

this proposed AD, contact BAE Systems 

(Operations) Limited, Customer 

Information Department, Prestwick 

International Airport, Ayrshire, KA9 

2RW, Scotland, United Kingdom; 

telephone +44 1292 675207; fax +44 

1292 675704; email RApublications@

baesystems.com; Internet http://

www.baesystems.com/Businesses/

RegionalAircraft/index.htm. You may 

review copies of the referenced service 

information at the FAA, Transport 

Airplane Directorate, 1601 Lind Avenue 

SW., Renton, WA. For information on 

the availability of this material at the 

FAA, call 425–227–1221. 

Examining the AD Docket 

You may examine the AD docket on 

the Internet at http:// 

www.regulations.gov; or in person at the 

Docket Operations office between 9 a.m. 

and 5 p.m., Monday through Friday, 

except Federal holidays. The AD docket 

contains this proposed AD, the 

regulatory evaluation, any comments 

received, and other information. The 

street address for the Docket Operations 

office (telephone (800) 647–5527) is in 

the ADDRESSES section. Comments will 

be available in the AD docket shortly 

after receipt. 

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: 

Todd Thompson, Aerospace Engineer, 

International Branch, ANM–116, 

Transport Airplane Directorate, FAA, 

1601 Lind Avenue SW., Renton, WA 

98057–3356; phone: (425)–1175; fax: 

(425)–1149. 

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: 

Comments Invited 

We invite you to send any written 

relevant data, views, or arguments about 

this proposed AD. Send your comments 

to an address listed under the 

ADDRESSES section. Include ‘‘Docket No. 

FAA–2013–0631; Directorate Identifier 

2012–NM–142–AD’’ at the beginning of 

your comments. We specifically invite 

comments on the overall regulatory, 

economic, environmental, and energy 

aspects of this proposed AD. We will 

consider all comments received by the 

closing date and may amend this 

proposed AD based on those comments. 

We will post all comments we 

receive, without change, to http:// 

www.regulations.gov, including any 

personal information you provide. We 

will also post a report summarizing each 

substantive verbal contact we receive 

about this proposed AD. 

Discussion 

The European Aviation Safety Agency 

(EASA), which is the Technical Agent 

for the Member States of the European 

Community, has issued EASA 

Airworthiness Directive 2012–0136, 

dated July 20, 2012 (referred to after this 

as the Mandatory Continuing 

Airworthiness Information, or ‘‘the 

MCAI’’), to correct an unsafe condition 

for the specified products. The MCAI 

states: 

While carrying out a scheduled 

environmental inspection, an operator found 


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