IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Ward Truckload Express, LLC, :

Petitioner :

:

v. :

:

Workers’ Compensation :

Appeal Board (Roy), : No. 2623 C.D. 2015

Respondent : Submitted: May 20, 2016

BEFORE: HONORABLE ROBERT SIMPSON, Judge

HONORABLE ANNE E. COVEY, Judge

HONORABLE BONNIE BRIGANCE LEADBETTER, Senior Judge

OPINION NOT REPORTED

MEMORANDUM OPINION BY 

JUDGE COVEY FILED: September 2, 2016

Ward Truckload Express, LLC (Employer) petitions this Court for 

review of the Workers’ Compensation (WC) Appeal Board’s (Board) December 16, 

2015 order affirming the Workers’ Compensation Judge’s (WCJ) decision granting 

Roscoe Roy’s (Claimant) Petition to Reinstate WC Benefits (Reinstatement Petition) 

and Petition to Review WC Benefits (Review Petition) (collectively, Petitions). 

There are essentially two issues before this Court: (1) whether the Petitions are barred 

by res judicata/collateral estoppel; and (2) whether the Board erred by affirming the 

WCJ’s grant of Claimant’s Petitions when Claimant failed to prove that his condition 

changed, and the WCJ did not proffer a reasoned decision. After review, we affirm.

On October 20, 2011, Claimant sustained a right ankle sprain/strain 

during the course and scope of his employment with Employer. Claimant was 

evaluated at WorkNet, where he was diagnosed with a right ankle sprain and 

prescribed anti-inflammatory medications, therapy, and magnetic resonance imaging 
2

(MRI). Employer issued a Notice of Compensation Payable (NCP), and paid 

Claimant WC benefits. Claimant did not work, and treated at WorkNet from October 

21, 2011 until December 21, 2011, when WorkNet released him to full-duty work. 

Several weeks later, on January 20, 2012, Claimant began to experience 

increased right ankle pain and swelling, which he mentioned during an unrelated visit 

to his family doctor, Paul J. Baughman, D.O. (Dr. Baughman). Dr. Baughman 

referred Claimant to the Orthopedic Institute of Pennsylvania/William R. Polacheck, 

Jr., M.D. (Dr. Polacheck) for evaluation of his ankle. 

On January 30, 2012, Dr. Polacheck deemed Claimant’s November 2011 

MRI “consistent with a significant ligament injury around the ankle” and, upon 

examination, observed “mild swelling of [Claimant’s] ankle.” Reproduced Record 

(R.R.) at 74a. Dr. Polacheck diagnosed Claimant with a “[r]ight ankle sprain with 

residual pain and swelling” and concluded:

[Claimant’s] job as a truck driver works against him. With 

it dependent [sic] all day, he is going to be prone to 

swelling. I am having him fitted with a new support. He 

should be in a corset. I explained that we can’t do much 

more to increase his function. He does not need to be 

rigidly mobilized at this point. There is no role for surgery. 

I am going to have him use the brace and see how he does 

over the next month or so. He should try to elevate the leg 

when he has the opportunity. A stationary bike would be 

great exercise for him since he does not want to do any 

more rehab.

R.R. at 74a. 

A few days later, on or about February 1, 2012, Employer terminated 

Claimant’s employment for disobeying instructions. See R.R. at 170a-171a. On 

February 18, 2012, Employer petitioned to modify/suspend/terminate Claimant’s WC 

benefits (Termination Petition), and a WCJ hearing was held. On May 10, 2012, the 

WCJ granted Employer’s Termination Petition and discontinued Claimant’s WC 
3

benefits effective December 21, 2011. Claimant did not appeal from the WCJ’s 

decision. 

For approximately 18 months following his appointment with Dr. 

Polacheck, Claimant wore his ankle brace, but continued to experience constant pain 

and swelling depending upon his activity. He did not seek further medical treatment. 

Claimant retained counsel in 2013 because his ankle had not yet healed. 

On July 16, 2013, Claimant was evaluated by orthopedic surgeon Craig 

M. Fultz, M.D. (Dr. Fultz). Dr. Fultz reviewed Claimant’s medical records, took xrays, obtained Claimant’s medical history, and examined Claimant. Dr. Fultz 

diagnosed that Claimant was experiencing neurogenic pain, allodynia and hypesthesia 

that were causally related to Claimant’s October 20, 2011 right ankle work injury. 

Dr. Fultz prescribed a transdermal cream and pain management care.

On August 2, 2013, Claimant filed the Reinstatement Petition seeking to 

have his WC benefits reinstated due to the worsening of his work injury. A WCJ 

hearing was held on October 4, 2013. On October 10, 2013, Claimant filed the 

Review Petition, requesting to amend the NCP “to include additional injuries as 

reflected in [Dr. Fultz’s] 07/16/13 office notes and report.” R.R. at 59a. Employer 

denied Claimant’s allegations.

On November 13, 2013, foot and ankle surgeon Howard J. Zlotoff, 

D.P.M. (Dr. Zlotoff) conducted an independent medical examination (IME) at 

Employer’s request. Dr. Zlotoff concluded that Claimant had fully recovered from 

his work injury, and did not require any additional treatment. See R.R. at 154a-156a. 

Claimant’s Petitions were consolidated. Additional WCJ hearings were 

held on June 6, August 28 and October 24, 2014. By February 4, 2015 decision, the 
4

WCJ granted the Petitions. Employer appealed to the Board. On December 16, 

2015, the Board affirmed the WCJ’s decision. Employer appealed to this Court.1

Initially, relative to reinstatement petitions, Section 413(a) of the 

Workers’ Compensation Act (Act)2states, in pertinent part:

A workers’ compensation judge designated by the 

department may, at any time . . . reinstate . . . a notice of 

compensation payable . . . upon proof that the disability of 

an injured employe has increased . . . [or] recurred . . . . 

Such . . . reinstatement . . . shall be made as of the date 

upon which it is shown that the disability of the injured 

employe has increased . . . [or] recurred[.]

77 P.S. § 772. “Generally, a claimant seeking reinstatement . . . must prove that 

through no fault of his own, his disability is again adversely affected by the work 

injury, and the disability giving rise to the original claim continues.” Ward v. 

Workers’ Comp. Appeal Bd. (City of Phila.), 966 A.2d 1159, 1162 (Pa. Cmwlth. 

2009).

With respect to review petitions, Section 413(a) of the Act also provides, 

in pertinent part: “A [WCJ] may, at any time, review and modify . . . a[n NCP] . . . 

upon petition filed by either party with the [D]epartment [of Labor and Industry 

(Department)], . . . if it be proved that such [NCP] or agreement was in any material 

respect incorrect.” 77 P.S. § 771. “The burden of proof is on the party seeking to 

modify the NCP . . . .” Anderson v. Workers’ Comp. Appeal Bd. (Pa. Hosp.), 830 

A.2d 636, 641 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2003). 

 

1

“On review[,] this Court must determine whether constitutional rights were violated, errors 

of law were committed, or necessary findings of fact were supported by substantial competent 

evidence.” Stepp v. Workers’ Comp. Appeal Bd. (FairPoint Commc’ns, Inc.), 99 A.3d 598, 601 n.6 

(Pa. Cmwlth. 2014).

Employer filed an application for supersedeas, which this Court denied by March 16, 2016 

memorandum and order. 

2 Act of June 2, 1915, P.L. 736, as amended, 77 P.S. §§ 1-1041.4, 2501-2708.
5

Employer argues at great length in its brief that Claimant’s Petitions are 

barred by res judicata/collateral estoppel because Claimant failed to appeal from the 

WCJ’s May 10, 2012 termination order. We disagree. 

“[T]echnical res judicata and collateral estoppel are both encompassed 

within the parent doctrine of res judicata, which ‘prevents the relitigation of claims 

and issues in subsequent proceedings.’” Weney v. Workers’ Comp. Appeal Bd. (Mac 

Sprinkler Sys., Inc.), 960 A.2d 949, 954 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2008) (quoting Henion v. 

Workers’ Comp. Appeal Bd. (Firpo & Sons, Inc.), 776 A.2d 362, 365 (Pa. Cmwlth. 

2001)).

Under the doctrine of technical res judicata, often referred 

to as claim preclusion, ‘when a final judgment on the merits 

exists, a future suit between the parties on the same cause of 

action is precluded.’ [Henion, 776 A.2d at 365]. In order 

for technical res judicata to apply, there must be: ‘(1) 

identity of the thing sued upon or for; (2) identity of the 

cause of action; (3) identity of the persons and parties to the 

action; and (4) identity of the quality or capacity of the 

parties suing or sued.’ Id. at 366. Technical res judicata 

may be applied to bar ‘claims that were actually litigated as 

well as those matters that should have been litigated.’ Id.

(emphasis added). ‘Generally, causes of action are identical 

when the subject matter and the ultimate issues are the same 

in both the old and the new proceedings.’ Id.

The doctrine of collateral estoppel, often referred to as issue 

preclusion, ‘is designed to prevent relitigation of an issue in 

a later action, despite the fact that the later action is based 

on a cause of action different from the one previously 

litigated.’ Pucci v. Workers’ Comp[.] Appeal B[d.]

(Woodville State Hosp.), 707 A.2d 646, 647-48 (Pa. 

Cmwlth. 1998). 

Weney, 960 A.2d at 954.
6

Employer previously petitioned to terminate Claimant’s WC benefits 

and succeeded.3 Claimant does not contend that his WC benefits should not have 

been terminated effective December 21, 2011, but rather seeks to have his status 

amended based upon changes that have occurred since December 21, 2011, as 

recorded by Dr. Fultz on July 16, 2013. Section 413(a) of the Act expressly 

authorizes Claimant to do so.

This Court has explained: 

To have [his] benefits reinstated after a termination, 

Claimant had to prove a causal connection between [his]

current condition and the prior work-related injury by 

establishing that (1) [his] work injury has recurred and (2) 

[his] physical condition has changed since the prior 

decision. By contrast, in a termination proceeding, the 

employer bears the burden of proving that the claimant’s 

disability has ceased or that any current disabilities are 

unrelated to the work injury. The ultimate and controlling 

issue decided in Employer’s termination petition was 

whether Claimant was fully recovered from [his] workrelated injury, and []he was found to be fully recovered as 

of [December 21, 2011]. The ultimate controlling issue in 

Claimant’s reinstatement petition . . . is whether [his] work 

injury recurred as of [July 16, 2013]. These issues are not 

identical because they involve factual questions about 

Claimant’s condition at two unrelated time periods. In 

short, Claimant’s reinstatement petition is not barred by res 

judicata or collateral estoppel.

 

3

Employer erroneously states that, in granting the Termination Petition, the WCJ declared 

that the “‘injury’ from which Claimant originally suffered no longer exists.” Employer Br. at 26. 

Under the law, it is not the work injury, but the resulting disability that is examined in a termination 

proceeding. “In workers’ compensation, the term ‘disability’ means a loss of earning power.” 

Ingrassia v. Workers’ Comp. Appeal Bd. (Universal Health Servs., Inc.), 126 A.3d 394, 401 (Pa.

Cmwlth. 2015). There is no question in this case that Claimant returned to work without a loss of 

earnings as of December 21, 2011 and, thus, the WCJ properly determined that Claimant’s 

disability ceased as of that date. 

Notably, Employer filed to terminate Claimant’s benefits approximately two weeks after

Employer discharged him. Thus, Claimant’s loss of earning power was related to his work conduct 

rather than his October 20, 2011 work injury. Accordingly, in granting Claimant’s Petitions, the 

WCJ required Employer to pay only reasonable and necessary medical benefits.
7

Nat’l Fiberstock Corp. (Greater N. Y., Mut. Ins. Co.) v. Workers’ Comp. Appeal Bd. 

(Grahl), 955 A.2d 1057, 1061-62 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2008) (citations omitted; emphasis 

added).

Employer next argues that the Board erred by affirming the WCJ’s grant 

of Claimant’s Petitions when Claimant failed to prove that his condition changed, and 

the WCJ did not proffer a reasoned decision. We disagree.

Neither the Board nor the Court may reweigh the WCJ’s credibility 

determinations. Sell v. Workers’ Comp. Appeal Bd. (LNP Eng’g), 771 A.2d 1246 (Pa. 

2001). 

Notwithstanding the authority of the WCJ over questions of 

weight and credibility of evidence, the WCJ’s findings must 

still be supported by substantial evidence of record. 

Substantial evidence is relevant evidence that a ‘reasonable 

person might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.’ 

Hoffmaster v. Workers’ Comp. Appeal Bd. (Senco Prods., 

Inc.), 721 A.2d 1152, 1155 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1998). In 

reviewing a decision for substantial evidence, the court 

must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the 

party who prevailed before the WCJ and draw all 

reasonable inferences from the evidence in favor of the 

prevailing party.

Wieczorkowski v. Workers’ Comp. Appeal Bd. (LTV Steel), 871 A.2d 884, 890 (Pa. 

Cmwlth. 2005). “[I]t is irrelevant whether the record contains evidence to support 

findings other than those made by the WCJ; the critical inquiry is whether there is 

evidence to support the findings actually made.” Lahr Mech. v. Workers’ Comp. 

Appeal Bd. (Floyd), 933 A.2d 1095, 1101 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2007) (quoting Minicozzi v. 

Workers’ Comp. Appeal Bd. (Indus. Metal Plating, Inc.), 873 A.2d 25, 29 (Pa.

Cmwlth. 2005)). Finally, “[t]he determination of whether a claimant’s subjective 

complaints of pain are accepted is a question of fact for the WCJ.” Udvari v. 

Workmen’s Comp. Appeal Bd. (USAir, Inc.), 705 A.2d 1290, 1293 (Pa. 1997).
8

In support of his Petitions, Claimant testified and offered his medical 

records and Dr. Fultz’s testimony into evidence. According to Claimant, his 

WorkNet therapy rendered him pain free and able to return to full-duty work as of 

December 21, 2011, but that his pain and swelling increased approximately 21⁄2 weeks 

after his return to work. He described visiting Dr. Baughman on January 20, 2012, 

being referred to Dr. Polacheck and, thereafter, wearing his ankle brace for 

approximately 18 months before contacting counsel, who referred him to Dr. Fultz.

4

 

Claimant reported that his ankle had worsened since January 2012, 

shortly after he returned to work. Claimant related that he experiences constant daily 

right ankle pain, and swelling that depends upon his activity level. He described that 

ankle pain limits his ability to do “[t]hings like standing there pushing my daughter 

on a swing, standing there just to cook or even on the grill, playing basketball, 

walking long distances.” R.R. at 176a. Claimant also explained that although work 

as a truck driver after his February 2012 discharge affected his ankle, he has not been 

restricted from working as a result. See R.R. at 171a-172a. At the October 24, 2014 

hearing, Claimant pronounced that he was in school. See R.R. at 181a. Thus, 

Claimant is seeking only medical benefits for his work injury. See R.R. at 176a.

Dr. Fultz testified that he treated Claimant on July 16, 2013, and again in 

August, September and December 2013. He represented that Claimant’s only 

reported injury history was his October 20, 2011 work injury. As a result of 

Claimant’s records review, history and examinations, Dr. Fultz concluded:

A. The diagnosis I assigned [Claimant] was right ankle and

foot pain, status post a work-related injury in October of

2011 with MRI findings consistent with a sprain of the

interior talofibular ligament, deep deltoid ligament,

 

4 Claimant testified that he retained counsel because when he contacted the Bureau of 

Workers’ Compensation and reported that “something’s wrong with [his] foot still,” he was notified 

that his case was closed. R.R. at 168a. 
9

posterior talofibular ligament and calcaneofibular ligament

with bone bruising and ongoing pain and dysesthesia in the

medial aspect of the hindfoot.

Q. And do you have an opinion to a reasonable degree of

medical certainty whether those conditions are directly

related to the October 2011 work injury?

A. It’s my opinion that they are causally related to the 

work-related injury.

Q. Okay. Now, as a result of those conditions, did you

diagnose any additional medical condition directly related

to those conditions?

A. It’s my opinion that the neurogenic pain, the allodynia 

and hypesthesia are a result of that injury, so that is also 

considered an additional diagnosis to his foot and ankle.

Q. And now, you’ll have to explain to the Judge how the

neurogenic pain resulted from those injuries, please?

A. When people have injuries, it’s not unusual for them to 

have the foot positioned, in a position that would cause a 

stretch injury to the nerves that run across the injury area, or 

the nerves get injured either due to stretching, due to 

swelling or actual pressure on them.

And the history provided to me and as is in the medical 

records that this gentleman did have swelling in his foot. 

And the injuries we see on the MRI scan would be

consistent with somebody developing significant swelling 

in his foot and ankle after sustaining those injuries.

And it’s my opinion, and we see this with some frequency, 

that people that have ankle fractures, ankle sprains, that 

have a stretch injury or swelling caused by the initial injury, 

can sometimes get nerve disfunction. And it can run the 

gamut to a little bit of numbness, to a little bit of numbness 

and pain, to hypersensitivity. And then there’s the whole 

spectrum of which nerves are involved, and some people 

can get causalgia and other more complicated nerve 

problems.

And this gentleman, fortunately he did not have symptoms 

of causalgia, or what some people call RSD [reflex
10

sympathetic dystrophe syndrome/complex regional pain 

syndrome]. But he did have a very discrete pattern of 

where he had the hypersensitivity that fits with the medial 

calcaneal sensory nerve, which I believe has been causing 

pain for him. And it’s very discrete. It’s been reproducible 

on his exams and transdermal therapeutic creams for 

neurogenic pain has helped him to some degree, which 

further supports that diagnosis.

. . . .

Q. And his condition as of the last time you saw him, which 

was --

A. 9/13/2013.

Q. Thank you.

A. Correction. 12/19/2013 was the last time I saw him.

When I saw him on 9/13/2013, his symptoms had 

improved; although, not resolved with the transdermal 

cream. And we had talked about him seeing a noninterventional pain management physician. And the reason 

why I had suggested that is with these types of injuries of 

the nerve, surgical intervention is usually not successful. 

Oftentimes, non-interventional treatment is helpful. And 

there are some medications out there that we, as 

orthopedics, don’t usually manage, but pain management 

physicians do, that oftentimes help people that have 

neuropathic pain, like Neurontin, Lyria, Gabapentin, those 

medications. 

So I recommended [he] pursue that, and in the meantime I’d 

recommend [he] continue to use the cream. The cream I 

supplied him was a combination cream that has medications 

that usually are helpful to people who have neuropathic 

pain.

. . . .

Q. Doctor, do you believe that he, as of your last office visit 

of December of 2013, has fully recovered from his October 

of 2011 work injury, as you diagnosed it?

A. No.
11

Q. Do you believe he would require any additional

treatment?

A. I believe he would benefit from ongoing use of a support 

stocking, which I had discussed and recommended at a 

previous visit, and ongoing treatment for his nerve pain that 

he’s having. I think the treatment that I initiated has helped 

him to some degree, but I think there’s potential that he 

would get more pain relief with perhaps a systemic 

medication.

Q. Okay, and do you believe that that treatment that you 

prescribed would be reasonable and necessary for his work 

injury?

A. Yes.

Q. What is his prognosis?

A. Given that he is two years out from the injury and

having ongoing nerve pain, it’s not likely he’s going to

become asymptomatic. And with people like this, my

experience has been often times we can improve his

symptoms, but it may not eradicate them.

R.R. at 98a-102a. Dr. Fultz acknowledged that he has not restricted Claimant’s 

ability to work. 

In response, Dr. Zlotoff testified that “[t]here was a significant 

difference” between the way Claimant walked in the parking lot before and after his 

appointment (i.e., “propulsively and without a limp”), and the manner in which he 

walked during his examination (i.e., “with a significantly [impaired] gait”). R.R. at 

123a; see also R.R. at 124a. Dr. Zlotoff stated that he reviewed Claimant’s medical 

records, took Claimant’s medical history and conducted a physical examination. He 

recalled that Claimant’s right ankle was not swollen and that, despite Claimant’s 

assertion that his right ankle was too weak to stand on his toes, Claimant’s x-rays,

and neurologic and musculoskeletal exams were normal. Dr. Zlotoff also related that 

Claimant responses to some of his examination reflected that Claimant’s “credibility 
12

was significantly questionable.” R.R. at 127a. Dr. Zlotoff diagnosed Claimant as 

having a sprained right ankle.

With respect to Dr. Fultz’s findings and diagnoses, Dr. Zlotoff declared:

A. I was not able to discriminate any objective findings that 

would indicate [Claimant] had [neurogenic] pain.

Q. Did you have an impression or an opinion as to whether 

this man was suffering from complex regional pain 

syndrome or RSD?

A. He had no indication subjectively or objectively of that.

Q. Given his description of how he injured himself and the 

early records describing the injury, would that mechanism 

of injury normally be associated with RSD or complex 

regional pain syndrome?

A. No.

Q. Do you believe that his ongoing complaints and

treatment are the result of the work injury of October 20, 

2011?

A. No.

Q. Now, there has been a determination by [the WCJ] that 

this gentleman recovered from the effects of the work injury 

by December of 2011.

Do you concur with that finding?

A. I do.

Q. If he had been your own patient, would you have fully 

discharged him from treatment?

A. Yes.

Q. And in your opinion did he require any modalities of 

treatment for his foot and ankle?

A. No.

R.R. at 129a-130a. 
13

Dr. Zlotoff acknowledged that a June 2014 electromyogram (EMG)

reflected positive findings of right plantar sensory neuropathy, possibly related to 

traumatic injury, but deemed them not credible in light of his findings and a notation 

on the EMG report that some of the results may be biased due to Claimant’s 

sensitivity in the affected areas.

5

 See R.R. at 79a, 136a-140a. Notwithstanding that 

Dr. Zlotoff was not in attendance at Claimant’s 2012 visit with Dr. Polacheck and 

2013 visits with Dr. Fultz, he opined that Claimant was fully recovered from his work 

injury as of December 21, 2011. 

The law is well established that “[t]he WCJ . . . is free to accept or reject, 

in whole or in part, the testimony of any witness, including medical witnesses.” 

Griffiths v. Workers’ Comp. Appeal Bd. (Red Lobster), 760 A.2d 72, 76 (Pa. Cmwlth. 

2000). Moreover, Section 422(a) of the Act provides, in pertinent part:

All parties to an adjudicatory proceeding are entitled to a 

reasoned decision containing findings of fact and 

conclusions of law based upon the evidence as a whole 

which clearly and concisely states and explains the rationale 

for the decisions so that all can determine why and how a 

particular result was reached. The workers’ compensation 

judge shall specify the evidence upon which the workers’

compensation judge relies and state the reasons for 

accepting it in conformity with this section. When faced 

with conflicting evidence, the workers’ compensation judge 

must adequately explain the reasons for rejecting or 

discrediting competent evidence. 

77 P.S. § 834. This Court has stated: 

To constitute a reasoned decision within the meaning of 

Section 422(a) [of the Act], a WCJ’s decision must permit 

adequate appellate review. . . . ‘[S]ome articulation of the 

actual objective basis for the credibility determination must 

 

5 Claimant paid out-of-pocket for an June 25, 2014 EMG in preparation for his claims. See

R.R. at 79a, 179a-180a. 
14

be offered for the decision to be a ‘reasoned’ one which 

facilitates effective appellate review.’ 

Green v. Workers’ Comp. Appeal Bd. (US Airways), 28 A.3d 936, 940 (Pa. Cmwlth. 

2011) (quoting Dorsey v. Workers’ Comp. Appeal Bd. (Crossing Constr. Co.), 893 

A.2d 191, 194–95 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2006)). 

The reasoned decision requirement in “Section 422(a) [of the Act] does 

not permit a party to challenge or second-guess the WCJ’s reasons for credibility 

determinations. Unless made arbitrarily or capriciously, a WCJ’s credibility 

determinations will be upheld on appeal.” Dorsey, 893 A.2d at 195 (citation 

omitted). “A capricious disregard of evidence occurs only when the fact-finder 

deliberately ignores relevant, competent evidence.” Williams v. Workers’ Comp. 

Appeal Bd. (USX Corp.-Fairless Works), 862 A.2d 137, 145 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2004). 

Capricious disregard, by definition, does not exist where, as here, the WCJ expressly

considers and rejects the evidence. Id. “The reasoned decision requirement is simply 

that the WCJ must articulate some objective reasoning to facilitate appellate review 

of the same.” Green, 28 A.3d at 940. 

Based upon the foregoing evidence, the WCJ made the following 

findings of fact: 

52. This [WCJ] finds Claimant’s testimony to be credible 

in its entirety and worthy of belief. This [WCJ] finds it 

significant that Claimant did not appear to defend the prior 

round of litigation based upon a failure to receive the 

hearing notices in question, which resulted in findings that 

he fully recovered from his October 2011 work injury.

53. This [WCJ] finds that the totality of the medical 

records reveal a change in [C]laimant’s ankle which caused 

the recurrence of his work injury. The record supports the 

occurrence of this change as early as just a few weeks after 

Claimant’s December 21, 2011 full recovery, and was

apparent during Claimant’s July 16, 2013 examination with 

Dr. Fultz. Claimant’s medical records in early 2012 

document pain and swelling and the effect his work at the 
15

time had on his ankle condition. Moreover, Dr. Fultz’s 

examinations demonstrate objective and reproducible

neurogenic pain.

54. This [WCJ] credits the opinion of Dr. Fultz as 

competent, credible, and worthy of belief in its entirety. Dr. 

Fultz evaluated Claimant and reviewed his medical history. 

He provided an opinion that Claimant sustained a work 

injury in October 2011 that ultimately resulted in the

following diagnoses:

a. Right ankle and foot pain status post a workrelated injury in October 2011.

b. MRI findings consistent with a work-related 

sprain of the interior talofibular ligament, deep 

deltoid ligament, . . . posterior talofibular ligament, 

and calcaneofibular ligament with bone bruising and 

ongoing pain in the medial aspect of the hindfoot.

c. Work-related neurogenic pain resulting from the 

above injuries.

According to Dr. Fultz, Claimant’s only ongoing problem 

was the neurogenic pain. He related this condition to the 

swelling in Claimant’s ankle. This swelling is well 

documented in Claimant’s medical records in early 2012 

and in Dr. Fultz’s testimony/records.

55. This [WCJ] rejects the opinion of Dr. Zlotoff as not 

credible, as it is not consistent with the credible opinions of 

Dr. Fultz. Dr. Zlotoff’s opinion is largely based upon his 

subjective observation of Claimant entering/leaving his 

office in comparison to Claimant’s presentation during his 

examination. Dr. Zlotoff attempted to evaluate Claimant’s 

credibility, which is the function of this [WCJ], not Dr. 

Zlotoff. This [WCJ] rejects his opinion in favor of the 

opinion of Dr. Fultz. 

56. Based upon the competent and credible evidence of 

record, this [WCJ] finds as a fact that Claimant’s injury 

recurred after December 21, 2011, a finding that was 

confirmed as of Dr. Fultz’s examination of Claimant on 

July 16, 2013.
16

WCJ Dec. at 8-9. The WCJ concluded that “Claimant met his burden of proving his 

work injury recurred on July 16, 2013 and his condition had worsened since 

December 21, 2011,” and ordered Employer to pay reasonable and necessary medical 

expenses related to Claimant’s work injury. WCJ Dec. at 9. Finding no error, the 

Board agreed. See Board Op. at 9-10.

The WCJ’s decision in this case, which included lengthy summations of 

the respective witnesses’ testimony, reveals that the WCJ considered the full 

testimony of all the witnesses and he set forth the reasons for his determinations. 

Because the Board and this Court are able to determine why and how he reached the 

result he did, the WCJ issued a reasoned decision.6 Green. 

Moreover, viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to Claimant, as 

we must, and drawing all reasonable inferences which are deducible from the 

evidence the WCJ deemed credible, we hold that there was substantial evidence to 

support the WCJ’s findings that there was a causal connection between Claimant’s 

current condition and his work-related injury, and that his condition “has changed 

since the [WCJ’s prior termination] decision.” Nat’l Fiberstock Corp., 955 A.2d at 

1061. Substantial evidence also supported the WCJ’s determination that the NCP 

should be amended to include neurogenic pain, allodynia and hypesthesia. 

Accordingly, the Board properly affirmed the WCJ’s decision granting Claimant’s 

Petitions.

 

6 Although the WCJ failed to specify how he selected the July 16, 2013 reinstatement date, it 

is clear from the WCJ’s findings of fact that Claimant’s medical benefits were reinstated as of the 

first date on which Claimant treated with Dr. Fultz - July 16, 2013. A recurrence date can be based 

upon a physician’s examination date. See Nat’l Fiberstock Corp.
17

Based on the foregoing, the Board’s order is affirmed.

___________________________

ANNE E. COVEY, Judge
IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Ward Truckload Express, LLC, :

Petitioner :

:

v. :

:

Workers’ Compensation :

Appeal Board (Roy), : No. 2623 C.D. 2015

Respondent :

O R D E R

AND NOW, this 2

nd day of September, 2016, the Workers’ 

Compensation Appeal Board’s December 16, 2015 order is affirmed.

___________________________

ANNE E. COVEY, Judge