SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY

APPELLATE DIVISION

DOCKET NO. A-3317-18

STATE OF NEW JERSEY,

Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

JOHN L. WILLIAMS, JR.,

Defendant-Appellant.

________________________

Submitted January 21, 2021 – Decided May 12, 2021

Before Judges Sumners and Mitterhoff.

On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law 

Division, Ocean County, Indictment Nos. 12-03-0677 

and 13-06-1587.

Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney for 

appellant (Karen A. Lodeserto, Designated Counsel, on 

the brief).

Bradley D. Billhimer, Ocean County Prosecutor, 

attorney for respondent (Samuel J. Marzarella, Chief 

Appellate Attorney, on the brief).

PER CURIAM

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the 

internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
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A-3317-18

Defendant John Williams, Jr., appeals from an order of the Law Division

denying his petition for post-conviction relief (PCR) without an evidentiary 

hearing. We affirm substantially for the reasons set forth in Judge Guy P. Ryan's 

thoughtful and thorough written opinion. We add only the following comments.

A jury found defendant guilty of second-degree eluding, N.J.S.A. 2C:29-

2(b). Before he was sentenced, defendant plead guilty to charges arising under 

a separate indictment, to third-degree possession of heroin with intent to 

distribute within a school zone, N.J.S.A. 2C:35-7(a), third-degree possession of 

cocaine with intent to distribute, N.J.S.A. 2C:35-5(a)(1) and (b)(3), third-degree 

possession of Oxycodone with intent to distribute, N.J.S.A. 2C:35-5(a)(1) and 

(b)(5), third-degree possession of Suboxone with intent to distribute, N.J.S.A. 

2C:35-5(a)(1) and (b)(13), third-degree possession of Alprazolam with intent to 

distribute, N.J.S.A. 2C:35-5(a)(1) and (b)(13), and fourth-degree possession of 

marijuana with intent to distribute, N.J.S.A. 2C:35-5(a)(1) and (b)(12). (4T5:7-

6:2). 

Defendant's jury conviction arose from his attempt to flee from a police 

officer while operating a Toyota Camry. Defendant was initially observed by 

Manchester Township Police Officer Adam Guker traveling east on Route 571

at approximately twenty miles per hour in a fifty-mile-per-hour zone. 
3

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Immediately after Guker passed the Camry in his patrol car, defendant made a 

left, crossing three lanes of traffic, onto a side street. Guker briefly lost sight of 

the vehicle, and when he caught sight of it again, activated his overhead lights. 

Defendant did not pull over. As the Camry approached Route 571, Guker 

activated his siren. After failing to heed a stop sign, defendant turned right onto 

Route 571. He traveled down Route 571 for a short distance before making a 

right onto another side street. Defendant traveled about halfway down the block, 

in the wrong lane, before coming to a stop on the left side of the road. 

Defendant was ordered out of the vehicle, handcuffed, and searched. A 

razor blade wrapped in duct tape was discovered in his back pocket. After 

verifying his credentials, Guker learned defendant's license was suspended and 

the vehicle was not registered in his name. Backup arrived shortly after the stop 

was initiated. Officer Danny Barker noticed the Camry's front end appeared to 

be damaged. After retracing defendant's route of travel, he discovered a 

damaged chain link fence near the road. Barker spoke to the homeowner at that 

address, who indicated that the fence was not damaged when he went to bed the 

night before. The officers concluded defendant ran into the fence while out of 

Guker's view. Defendant was arrested and issued thirteen traffic citations. 
4

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While awaiting trial, defendant was pulled over by an officer of the Toms 

River Police Department for failing to use a turn signal, N.J.S.A. 39:4-81, 

driving with a suspended license, N.J.S.A. 39:3-40, and failing to heed a stop 

sign, N.J.S.A. 39:4-144. A search of defendant revealed that he was in 

possession of cocaine, Alprazolam, Oxycodone, heroin, marijuana, and 

Suboxone. Defendant was arrested and issued three traffic citations. 

Defendant pled not guilty to the eluding charge, opting to go to trial. At

trial, the State presented the testimony of Guker and Barker, as well as the owner 

of the damaged fence. Portions of the video footage captured by Guker's dashcamera were also played for the jury. At the close of the State's case, the trial 

judge engaged in a lengthy colloquy with defendant regarding his decision to 

testify. The judge explained his rights and that the State would be permitted to

present evidence of his prior convictions to impeach his credibility.

1 The judge 

then granted a seventy-five-minute recess to allow defendant to confer with his 

1

 Prior to trial, the judge ruled that if defendant testified, the State would be 

permitted to introduce evidence of six of his prior convictions, including fourthdegree failure to register as a sex offender, N.J.S.A. 2C:7-2(d), criminal 

trespass, N.J.S.A. 2C:18-3, second-degree possession of a controlled dangerous 

substance with intent to distribute within 500 feet of a public park, N.J.S.A. 

2C:35-7.1, and three counts of third-degree possession of a controlled dangerous 

substance, N.J.S.A. 2C:35-10.
5

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attorney. When the parties returned, defendant waived his right to testify. The 

following day, the jury convicted him of eluding. 

Once convicted, defendant pled guilty, pursuant to a negotiated

agreement, to six of the seventeen drug-related offenses. In exchange for his 

guilty plea, the State recommended an aggregate eight-year term of 

incarceration on the drug-related charges with a three-year period of parole 

ineligibility pursuant to the Brimage Guidelines,

2

for count six—possession of 

heroin with intent to distribute within a school zone, N.J.S.A. 2C:35-5(a)(1) and 

(b)(3). The judge carefully explained the maximum penal exposure and fines 

associated with each of the charges. The judge explicitly noted the three-year

period of parole ineligibility included in the State's offer. Defendant confirmed 

that he understood his rights, the charges, and the potential penal exposure he 

faced, before defense counsel elicited a factual basis for the plea. The judge 

found the plea was freely and voluntarily entered. 

On September 19, 2014, defendant was sentenced to a ten-year term of 

incarceration with a three-year period of parole ineligibility on the eluding 

conviction. He was also sentenced, in accordance with the State's 

recommendation, to an aggregate eight-year term of incarceration with a three2

 State v. Brimage, 153 N.J. 1 (1998); see also N.J.S.A. 2C:43-6(f). 
6

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year period of parole ineligibility on the drug-related convictions. On direct 

appeal, this court affirmed defendant's eluding conviction and sentence. State 

v. Williams, No. A-1289-14 (App. Div. July 15, 2016) (slip op. at 4). The 

Supreme Court denied certification. State v. Williams, 228 N.J. 80 (2016). 

On December 22, 2016, defendant filed a pro se petition for PCR. 

Defendant's pro se petition raised the following arguments:

POINT I

[DEFENDANT] WAS DENIED THE EFFECTIVE 

ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL GUARANTEED BY 

BOTH THE [SIXTH] AMENDMENT OF THE 

UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION AND ARTICLE 

[ONE] PARAGRAPH [TEN] OF THE NEW JERSEY 

STATE CONSTITUTION[] DUE TO TRIAL 

COUNSEL'S FAILURE TO FOLLOW THROUGH 

WITH SUPPRESSION MOTION.

POINT II

[DEFENDANT] WAS DENIED THE EFFECTIVE 

ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL GUARANTEED BY 

BOTH THE [SIXTH] AMENDMENT OF THE 

UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION AND ARTICLE 

[ONE] PARAGRAPH [TEN] OF THE NEW JERSEY 

STATE CONSTITUTION[] DUE TO TRIAL 

COUNSEL'S FAILURE [TO] REVIEW OR INFORM 

DEFENDANT OF PLEA OPTIONS, SEEK [A] 

FAVORABLE PLEA, OR CHALLENGE THE 

VALIDITY OF THE PLEA OFFERED BY THE 

STATE. 

POINT III
7

A-3317-18

[DEFENDANT] WAS DENIED THE EFFECTIVE 

ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL GUARANTEED BY 

BOTH THE [SIXTH] AMENDMENT OF THE 

UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION AND ARTICLE 

[ONE] PARAGRAPH [TEN] OF THE NEW JERSEY 

STATE CONSTITUTION[] DUE TO TRIAL 

COUNSEL'S ALLOWANCE OF AN ILLEGAL 

EXTENDED TERM.

POINT IV

[DEFENDANT] WAS DENIED THE EFFECTIVE 

ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL GUARANTEED BY 

BOTH THE [SIXTH] AMENDMENT OF THE 

UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION AND ARTICLE 

[ONE] PARAGRAPH [TEN] OF THE NEW JERSEY 

STATE CONSTITUTION[] DUE TO TRIAL 

COUNSEL'S FAILURE TO CHALLENGE THE 

MISAPPLICATION OF MANDATORY MINIMUM 

SENTENCING GUIDELINES, AND [ITS] DUE 

PROCESS.

POINT V

THE [BRIMAGE] PLEA OFFERED BY THE STATE 

WAS VINDICTIVE, AND IN VIOLATION OF . . . 

DUE PROCESS GUARANTEED BY BOTH THE 

[FIFTH] AND [FOURTEENTH] AMENDMENT OF 

THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION[] AND 

ARTICLE [ONE] OF PARAGRAPH [ONE] OF THE 

NEW JERSEY STATE CONSTITUTION.

POINT VI

[DEFENDANT] WAS DENIED THE EFFECTIVE 

ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL GUARANTEED BY 

BOTH THE [SIXTH] AMENDMENT OF THE 

UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION AND ARTICLE 
8

A-3317-18

[ONE] PARAGRAPH [TEN] OF THE NEW JERSEY 

STATE CONSTITUTION[] DUE TO TRIAL 

COUNSEL'S FAILURE TO CHALLENGE THE 

WEAKNESSES AND THE VALIDITY OF ARREST[] 

INCLUDING THE REFUSAL TO PLACE NEW 

PROBATION SENTENCE ON RECORD WITH 

COURT.

POINT VII

[DEFENDANT] WAS DENIED THE EFFECTIVE 

ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL GUARANTEED BY 

BOTH THE [SIXTH] AMENDMENT OF THE 

UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION AND ARTICLE 

[ONE] PARAGRAPH [TEN] OF THE NEW JERSEY 

STATE CONSTITUTION[] DUE TO TRIAL 

COUNSEL[] COERCING DEFENDANT TO 

INVOLUNTARILY ACCEPT A PLEA, FAILING TO 

INFORM CLIENT OF SERIOUS CHARGES IN 

[THE] PLEA, AND FAILING TO INFORM 

DEFENDANT OF HIS EXPOSURE TO THE STATE'S 

PETITION TO REFUSE PAROLE.

POINT VIII

[DEFENDANT] WAS DENIED THE EFFECTIVE 

ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL GUARANTEED BY 

BOTH THE [SIXTH] AMENDMENT OF THE 

UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION AND ARTICLE 

[ONE] PARAGRAPH [TEN] OF THE NEW JERSEY 

STATE CONSTITUTION[] DUE TO TRIAL 

COUNSEL'S FAILURE TO PETITION THE COURT 

FOR A PSYCHIATRIST TO EXAMINE/EVALUATE 

DEFENDANT TO ESTABLISH THAT HE WAS 

COMPETENT TO ENTER A GUILTY PLEA, AND 

FAILING TO OBTAIN A COMPLETE COPY OF 

DEFENDANT'S MENTAL HEALTH RECORDS, 

DIAGNOSES, MEDICATIONS HE WAS TAKING, 
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AND HIS BEING HOUSED ON THE SPECIAL 

NEEDS UNIT OF THE COUNTY JAIL.3

On September 17, 2018, defendant's assigned counsel filed a supplemental brief. 

On January 11, 2019, Judge Ryan denied defendant's petition without an 

evidentiary hearing.

On appeal, defendant raises the following arguments for our 

consideration:

POINT I

THE PCR COURT ERRED IN DENYING 

DEFENDANT AN EVIDENTIARY HEARING 

BECAUSE TESTIMONY IS NEEDED REGARDING 

THE CIRCUMSTANCES SURROUNDING 

[DEFENDANT'S] DECISION TO PLEAD GUILTY

UNDER INDICTMENT [No.] 13-06-1587.

POINT II

THE PCR COURT ERRED IN DENYING 

DEFENDANT AN EVIDENTIARY HEARING 

BECAUSE TESTIMONY IS NEEDED REGARDING 

TRIAL COUNSEL'S FAILURE TO HAVE 

DEFENDANT TESTIFY ON HIS OWN BEHALF AT 

TRIAL UNDER INDICTMENT [No.] 12-03-0677.

3

 All of the issues raised in defendant's pro se petition were comprehensively 

addressed in Judge Ryan's well-reasoned decision and were rejected as without 

merit. After careful review of the record, we agree and therefore find 

defendant's pro se arguments do not warrant further discussion in a written 

opinion. R. 2:11-3(e)(2).
10 A-3317-18

Where, as here, the PCR judge "did not hold an evidentiary hearing on the 

claim defendant now raises on appeal, we 'conduct a de novo review.'" State v. 

Jackson, 454 N.J. Super. 284, 291 (App. Div. 2018) (quoting State v. Harris, 

181 N.J. 391, 421 (2004)); see also State v. Blake, 444 N.J. Super. 285, 294 

(App. Div. 2016). The decision to proceed without an evidentiary hearing is 

reviewed for abuse of discretion. State v. Brewster, 429 N.J. Super. 387, 401 

(App. Div. 2013) (citing State v. Marshall, 148 N.J. 89, 157-58 (1997)). A 

"[d]efendant must demonstrate a prima facie case for relief before an evidentiary 

hearing is required, and the court is not obligated to conduct an evidentiary 

hearing to allow defendant to establish a prima facie case not contained within 

the allegations in his PCR petition." State v. Bringhurst, 401 N.J. Super. 421, 

436-37 (App. Div. 2008). 

It is virtually axiomatic that in order for defendant to obtain relief based 

on ineffective assistance grounds, he is obliged to show not only the particular 

manner in which counsel's performance was deficient, but also "that there is a 

reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of 

the proceeding would have been different." Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 

668, 694 (1984); accord State v. Fritz, 105 N.J. 42, 58 (1987). A defendant must 

make those showings by presenting "more than bald assertions that he [or she] 
11 A-3317-18

was denied the effective assistance of counsel." State v. Cummings, 321 N.J. 

Super. 154, 170 (App. Div. 1999). We are persuaded that the alleged 

deficiencies here clearly fail to meet either the performance or prejudice prongs 

of the Strickland test.

Defendant's argument that counsel failed to adequately prepare him to 

decide whether to accept a plea offer is belied by the record. At the plea hearing, 

both the prosecutor and the judge informed defendant of the recommended

sentence he faced under the terms of the plea agreement:

[PROSECUTOR]: Judge, I would note the

recommendation on this case is [eight] years[s] New 

Jersey State Prison over a [thirty-six]-month period of 

parole ineligibility pursuant to Brimage guidelines, 

N.J.S.A. 2C:43-6[(f)], on [c]ount [six], concurrent to all 

other counts in this indictment. 

[4T5:7-11.]

[THE COURT]: Okay. Additionally, [the prosecutor], 

on behalf of the State, is recommending to the [c]ourt 

at the time of sentencing that you receive on this charge 

an [eight]-year New Jersey State[] Prison sentence with 

a [thirty-six]-month parole ineligibility on [c]ount [six] 

concurrent to all other counts in this indictment and that 

it is . . . open[-]ended to the second-degree trial verdict 

for the eluding charge without any sentence 

recommendation.

Do you understand all of that?

[DEFENDANT]: Yes.
12 A-3317-18

Q: Any questions about that at all?

A: No.

. . . . 

Q: Okay. Now you've had enough time over the period 

that we've been dealing with these cases to talk to 

[defense counsel]; is that correct?

A: Yes.

Q: And you've gone over in this case all of the 

discovery and the evidence in this case with her; 

correct?

A: Yes.

Defendant's bald assertion that he was inadequately counseled about his 

decision to plead guilty to the drug charges is clearly unsupported, and, in fact,

contradicted by the record. 

Similarly, the record is fatal to defendant's bald assertion that his trial 

counsel pressured him to waive his right to testify. Significantly, prior to his 

waiver, the trial judge afforded defendant seventy-five minutes to confer with 

trial counsel regarding his decision. When defendant returned, the judge 

conducted the following colloquy:

THE COURT: And, [defendant], have you made a 

conscious decision with respect to testifying in this 

case?

[DEFENDANT]: Yes.
13 A-3317-18

THE COURT: All right. And did you have a full and 

fair opportunity to make that decision after discussing 

this with your attorney, [defense counsel]?

[DEFENDANT]: Yes, I did.

THE COURT: You do understand, as I explained to 

you before, that you have a constitutional right not to 

testify at this hearing?

DEFENDANT: I do.

. . . .

THE COURT: Has anyone threatened you or forced 

you in making your decision as to whether you want to 

testify?

[DEFENDANT]: No.

THE COURT: You're doing so of your own free will?

[DEFENDANT]: Yes, I am.

THE COURT: All right. And what, if I [may] ask, 

what is your decision as far as your giving testimony or 

not giving testimony?

[DEFENDANT]: To waive my right to testify.

The record clearly illustrates that defendant made a knowing and

voluntary decision not to take the stand. See State v. Ball, 381 N.J. Super. 545, 

557 (App. Div. 2005) (rejecting a Strickland claim where, "regardless of whether 

defendant was advised by counsel, the trial judge fully explained defendant's 
14 A-3317-18

right to testify, the possible consequences of his choice and the option to have 

the jury instructed to draw no inference from defendant's choice not to testify").

Defendant's argument that his trial counsel failed to introduce evidence of 

his intoxication on Seroquel at the time of the eluding offense, allegedly 

rendering him unaware the officer was attempting to pull him over, is another 

bald assertion, unsupported by medical or other evidence, that does not warrant 

discussion in a written opinion. R. 2:11-3(e)(2).

Affirmed.