alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION WASHINGTON, DC
MANSFIELD HELIFLIGHT, INC.



### v. CITY OF BURLINGTON, VERMONT Complainant,

Resnondent FAA Docket No. 16-14-06

NOTICE OF EXTENSION OF TIME This matter is before the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) based on the above-referenced complaint, filed in accordance with FAA Rules of Practicefor FederallyAssistedAirportEnforcementProceedings, 14 CFRPart 16. Pursuant to 14 CFRPart 16, subpart B, the date by which the Director's Determination will be issued in this matter is hereby extended to January 16, 2017. An extension oftime is necessary and appropriate for a fair and complete determination in this case.

C. Willis, Director ofAirport Compliance an Management Analysis 

# )2---15-lt DateCERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I HEREBY CERTIFY that on December 15, 2016, I caused to be placed inthe United States mail (first class mail, postage paid) a true copy ofthe foregoing document addressed to: FORRESPONDENT Pablo 

### 0. Nuesch Anjali G. Patel Spiegel and McDiarmid, LLP 1875 Eye Street, N.W. Suite 700 Washington, DC 20006 FOR COMPLAINANT Benjamin H. Klein Gross & Klein LLP Pier 9, Suite I00 SanFrancisco, CA 94111 Copy to: FAAPart 16 Airport Proceedings Docket, AGC-600 FAA Airport Compliance and Field Operations, ACO-l00 FAARegional Office, ANE

Claudia Roberts Office ofAirport Compliance

and Management Analysis
## In The Court of Appeals Seventh District of Texas at Amarillo

No. 07 - 14 - 00368 - CR ALBERTO RUIZ, APPELL ANT V. THE STATE OF TEXAS, APPELLEE On Appeal from the 69th District Court Moore County, Texas Trial Court No. 4976, Honorable Ron Enns, Presiding



### March 4 , 2015 MEMORANDUM OPINION Before CAMPBELL and HANCOCK and PIRTLE, JJ. Before the court is a motion for voluntary dismissal, filed by counsel for appellant Alberto Ruiz. In its certification of appellant’s right of appeal pursuant to appellate rule 25.2(a)(2), the trial court stated that appellant’s case was a plea - bargain c ase and appellant had no right of appeal. By letter of February 26, 2015, we notified counsel that unless an amended certificate indicating appellant had the right of appeal was filed by March 17, the appeal would be dismissed.2

The motion for voluntary dismissal is signed only by appellant’s counsel. The motion states appellant was deported, remains outside the United States and thus is unable to sign the motion for voluntary dismissal, as required by appellate rule 42.2(a). In the motion, counsel ackn owledges that appellant is unable to obtain a certification he has a right of appeal. The motion continues by stating that since involuntary dismissal is imminent under rule 25.2(d), counsel requests for purposes of expediency that we invoke appellate rule 2, suspend rule 42.2(a)’s requirement that appellant sign the motion, and dismiss the appeal. The requirement that the appellant in a criminal case sign a motion for voluntary dismissal of the appeal is expressly stated in the rules that govern our prac tice, and we do not lightly suspend it. We decline to do so in this case. The motion before us gives no indication appellant is aware of its filing or authorizes dismissal of his appeal. We therefore deny the motion for voluntary dismissal. However, bec ause appellant has not obtained an amended certificate indicating a right of appeal, and has acknowledged his inability to do so, we will dismiss the appeal under appellate rule 25.2(d) . See T EX . R. A PP . P. 25.2(d) (“The appeal must be dismissed if a cert ification that shows the defendant has the right of appeal has not been made part of the record under these rules”); Chavez v. State, 183 S.W.3d 67 5, 680 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006) (“ A court of appeals, while having jurisdiction to ascertain whether an appella nt who plea - bargained is permitted to appeal by Rule 25.2(a)(2), must dismiss a prohibited appeal without further action, regardl ess of the basis for the3

appeal” ) ; T EX . R. A PP . P. 43.2(f) (a court of appeals may render judgment dismissing the appeal) . For that reason, the appeal is dismissed.
James T. Campbell Justice Do not publish.
* P ursuant to 5 TH C IR

. R. 47.5, the Court has determined

that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5 TH C IR

. R. 47.5.4. UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

_____________________

No. 97-51091 Summary Calendar

_____________________ LAWRENCE T. DALY, Individually and as Next Friend of Lawrence T. Daly, Jr.; LISA DALY, Individually and as Next Friend

of Lawrence T. Daly, Jr.,

Plaintiffs-Appellants,

versus

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, ET AL.,

Defendants,

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Defendant-Appellee.

_________________________________________________________________

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Texas

(SA-97-CV-184)

_________________________________________________________________
November 12, 1998

Before KING, BARKSDALE, and STEWART, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: *

In this medical ma lpractice action under the Federal Tort

Claims Act, Appellants contest the su mmary judgment granted the

United States and the denial of their motion for reconsideration.

The parties consented to proceed before a magistrate judge.- 2 -

Appellants state that Lawrence T. Daly died in December 1997,

but they have not moved to substitute his representative. Because

we conclude that summary judgment was appropriate, there is no need

to delay a decision for the formality of substitution of the

deceased’s representative. See F ED

. R. A PP

. P. 43(a).

Appellants contend that the Uni ted States was negligent in

failing to diagnose Law rence T. Daly’s cancer before it

metastasiz ed and became inoperable. Based upon our required d e

novo review of the record, we AFFIRM essentially for the reasons

stated by the magistrate judge. S ee Daly v. United States
, No. SA97-CV-184 (W.D. Tex. Nov. 5, 1997 & Dec. 9, 1997). In sum,

Appel lants offered no expert evidence raising a genuine issue of

materi al fact with respect to causation of Mr. Daly’s injuries.

See Rodriguez v. Pacificare of Texas, Inc.
, 980 F.2d 1014, 1020

(5th Cir.), cert. denied

, 508 U.S. 956 (1993); Tilotta v. Goodall

,
752 S.W.2d 160, 161 (Tex. App. 1988, writ denied).

It is quite arguable that Appellants have failed to properly

b rief the issue concerning the motion to reconsider. S ee F ED

. R

.

A PP

. P. 28(a)(6 ). In any event, although the magistrate judge

applied an ov erly stringent standard in considering Appellants’

motion for reconsideration (filed within 10 days of e ntry of

judgment; therefore, F ED

. R. C IV

. P. 59(e) applied), see Lavespere

v. Niagara Mach. & Tool Works, Inc. , 910 F.2d 167, 174 (5th Cir.

1990) (applying abuse of discretion standard of revie w to motion

for reconsideration under Rule 59(e)), the ruling—even if the- 3 -

motion had been granted, the potential additional evidenc e would

not have affected the judgment—was not an abuse of discretion.

AFFIRMED
Filed 5/27/21 P. v. Sandoval CA6

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for 

publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication 

or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SIXTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

THE PEOPLE,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

SEBASTIAN ESTEBAN SANDOVAL,

Defendant and Appellant.

 H048640

 (Santa Clara County

 Super. Ct. No. C2009969)

In July 2020, defendant Sebastian Esteban Sandoval was charged by felony 

complaint with two counts of possession of a firearm by a felon (Pen. Code, § 29800, 

subd. (a)(1)) and one count of misdemeanor resisting an officer (Pen. Code, § 148, 

subd. (a)(1)). The record contains no indication of the facts of his offenses because he 

waived preliminary examination, and the probation report was a waived referral.

Defendant entered no contest pleas to all three counts in response to an indicated 

sentence of 16 months to resolve both this case and his pending probation violation case. 

The court imposed a 16-month term for one of the firearm counts, a concurrent term for 

the other firearm count, and a concurrent 90-day term (which was deemed served) for the 

resisting count. The court ordered that a $300 restitution fund fine be “impose[d]” and 

“stay[ed]” “until it’s demonstrated you have the ability to pay.” It ordered that a 

$300 parole revocation fine be “impose[d] and suspend[ed].” The court “waive[d] all of 

the remaining fines and fees.” The abstract of judgment did not note the stay of the 

restitution fund fine. Defendant timely filed a notice of appeal from the judgment.
2

Appointed appellate counsel has filed an opening brief that states the case and the 

facts but raises no issues. Defendant was notified of his right to submit written argument 

on his own behalf but has failed to avail himself of the opportunity. Pursuant to People v. 

Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436, we have reviewed the entire record and have concluded that 

there are no arguable issues on appeal. However, we note the clerical error in the abstract 

and direct the trial court to correct it.

DISPOSITION

The judgment is affirmed and the trial court is directed to correct the abstract of 

judgment so that it notes the stay of the $300 restitution fund fine.
_______________________________

ELIA, ACTING P. J.

WE CONCUR:

_____________________________

BAMATTRE-MANOUKIAN, J.

_____________________________

DANNER, J.

People v. Sandoval

H048640
J.O., a juvenile, Appellant, v. The STATE of Florida, Appellee.

No. 3D17-292

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.

Opinion filed October 18, 2017.

**DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION**

Affirmed.
----

JUDGMENT OF THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

of 26 April 2005

in Joined Cases T-110/03, T-150/03 and T-405/03 Jose Maria Sison v Council of the European Union (1)

(Access to documents - Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001 - Documents relating to Council decisions concerning the fight against terrorism - Exceptions relating to the protection of the public interest - Public security - International relations - Partial access - Statement of reasons - Rights of the defence)

(2005/C 171/26)

Language of the case: English

In Joined Cases T-110/03, T-150/03 and T-405/03: Jose Maria Sison, residing in Utrecht (Netherlands), represented by J. Fermon, A. Comte, H. Schultz and D. Gurses, lawyers, against Council of the European Union, represented by M. Vitsentzatos, M. Bauer and M. Bishop — applications for annulment of the three Council decisions of 21 January, 27 February and 2 October 2003 refusing access to documents relating to Council Decisions 2002/848/EC, 2002/974/EC and 2003/480/EC of 28 October 2002, 12 December 2002 and 27 June 2003 respectively implementing Article 2(3) of Regulation (EC) No 2580/2001 on specific restrictive measures directed against certain persons and entities with a view to combating terrorism and repealing Decisions 2002/460/EC, 2002/848/EC and 2002/974/EC respectively — the Court of First Instance (Second Chamber), composed of J. Pirrung, President, N.J. Forwood and S. Papasavvas, Judges; J. Plingers, Administrator, for the Registrar, gave a judgment on 26 April 2005, in which it:

----

(1)OJ C 146 of 21.6.2003.

----
### IN THE UNI TED STAT ES COURT OFAPPEALS FOR THE FIF TH CIRCU IT

No. 11-40319 Summary Calendar

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff-Appellee

v. SHANNON THOMAS PITTS, Defendant-Appellant

Appeals from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Texas USDC No. 4:10-CR-124-1

Before SMITH, GARZA, and DeMOSS, Circuit Judges. PER CURIAM: * Shannon Thomas Pitts pleaded guilty, pursuant to a written agreement, to one count of bank ro b b e ry a nd was sentenced to a 71-month term of impri s o n m e n t and to a three-year term of supervised release. As part of the agreement, Pitts broadly waived his right to appeal his conviction and sentence, reserving only the right to appeal any punishment imposed in excess of the statutory maximum and the right to appeal based on a claim of i n e f f e c t ive assistance of counsel that affects the validity of the waiver or the plea itself. U n i te d S ta te s C o u rt o f A p p ea l s

F i ft h C i rc u i t 

### F I L E D Sep tem ber 2 7, 2 011 Lyle W . Cayce Clerk

Purs uant to 5 T H C IR

. R. 47.5 , the cour t hasd ete rm inedt hat this op inion sho uld not * be publ ish ed and is not pr ece dent excep t unde r the lim ite d cir cum st ance s se t forth in 5 T H C IR

. R. 47.5 .4. Case: 11-40319 Document: 00511614393 Page: 1 Date Filed: 09/27/2011No. 11-40319

On appeal, Pitts contends that the district court erred in imposing a twolevel enhancement under U.S.S.G § 2B3.1(b)(2) (F)

. Th e G overn m e nt ar gues that the appeal is barred by the appeal waiver provision of the plea agre e m e nt. A defendant may waive his right to appeal if the waiver is made knowingly and voluntarily. United States v. McKinney , 406 F.3d 744, 746 (5th Cir. 2005). To determine whether an appeal of a sentence is barred by a n a p p e a l waiver provision in a plea agreement , t h is court conducts a two-step inquiry: (1) whether the waiver was knowing a n d v o l untary and (2) whether the waiver applies to the circumstances at hand, based on t h e p l a i n language of the agreement. United States v. Bond , 414 F.3d 542, 544 (5th Cir. 200 5). A defendant’s waiver is knowing and voluntary if he indicates that he has read and understood the plea a greement, which contains an “explicit, unambiguous waiver of appeal.” McKinney , 406 F.3d at 746. District courts must ascertain that defendants understand provisions in plea a greements waiving the right to appeal. F E D
. R. C R I M
. P. 11(b)(1)(N). The record reflects that the magistrate judge explained the appeal waiver provision to Pitts at the change of plea hearing. Pitts indicated that he had read the plea agreement and that he understood the waiver of appellate rights. In view of the foregoing, Pitts’s appeal is barred by the waiver provision of the plea agreement. See Bond , 414 F.3d at 544. AFFIRMED.

2 Case: 11-40319 Document: 00511614393 Page: 2 Date Filed: 09/27/2011
EX PARTE James LEDBETTER

CR-15-1131

Court of Criminal Appeals of Alabama.

December 7, 2016

**DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION**

Mand. pet. denied.
Ranard Tyree ROLLE, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.

No. 4D16-4023

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.

[December 14, 2017]

**DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION**

Affirmed.
STATE of Missouri, Respondent, v. James Edward DUDLEY, Appellant.

WD 81107

Missouri Court of Appeals, Western District.

Filed: September 18, 2018

Katharine P. Curry, Columbia for appellant.

Christine K. Lesicko, Columbia for respondent.

Before Division Three: Anthony Rex Gabbert, P.J., and Victor C. Howard and Alok Ahuja, JJ.

**ORDER**

PER CURIAM:

*128After a bench trial in the Circuit Court of Boone County, Appellant James Dudley was found guilty of domestic assault in the third degree, in violation of § 565.074, RSMo. The charge stemmed from Dudley's June 29, 2014 assault of his then-girlfriend in Columbia. Dudley appeals, arguing that the State presented insufficient evidence at trial that he knowingly caused contact with the victim knowing that she would regard the contact as offensive. We affirm. Because a published opinion would have no precedential value, we have provided the parties an unpublished memorandum setting forth the reasons for this order. Rule 30.25(b).
Exhibit 32.2



CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350



The undersigned hereby certifies that the Form 10-Q Quarterly Report of Circus and Eldorado Joint Venture and Silver Legacy
Capital Corp. (collectively, the Company) for the quarterly period ended March 31, 2004 filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission (the Report) fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and that the information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.



|                    |  |     |  |                                                                                                            
|------------------- |  | --- |  | -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
|Dated: May 13, 2004 |  | By: |  | /s/    BRUCE C. SEXTON                                                                                     
|                    |  |     |  | Bruce C. Sexton, Chief Financial Officerof Circus and Eldorado Joint Ventureand Silver Legacy Capital Corp.
---

Exhibit 32.2

# CERTIFICATION PURSUANT
TO 18 U.S.C SECTION 1350,
AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
SECTION 906 OF THE
SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

In connection with the Quarterly
Report of Cognos Incorporated (the Company) on Form 10-Q for the period ended
November 30, 2003 as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof
(the Report), I, Tom Manley, Senior Vice President Finance &
Administration and Chief Financial Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C.
section 1350, as adopted pursuant to section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that
to the best of my knowledge:

(1)       
          The Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of the
          Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended; and

(2)       
          The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material
          respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.

|January 9, 2004 |  | /s/ Tom Manley                                                             | 
|--------------- |  | -------------------------------------------------------------------------- | 
|                |  |                                                                            | 
|Date            |  | Tom Manley                                                                 | 
|                |  | Senior Vice President, Finance &Administration and Chief Financial Officer | 
|                |  | (Principal Financial Officer and Chief Accounting Officer)                 | 

This certification is being submitted
solely for the purpose of complying with Section 1350 of Chapter 63 of Title 18 of the
United States Code. This certification is not to be deemed filed for purposes
of Section 18 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 or otherwise subject to the liability
of that section, nor will the certification be deemed incorporated by reference in to any
filing under the Securities Act of 1933 or the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, except to
the extent that the registrant specifically incorporates it by reference.

56
UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT No. 98-7560

DAVID L. SNYDER, Petitioner - Appellant, versus MARK HENRY, Warden; FEDERAL BUREAU OF PRISONS, Respondents - Appellees. Appeal from the United States District Court for the District ofMaryland, at Greenbelt. Peter J. Messitte, District Judge. (CA98-1569-PJM) Submitted: April 29, 1999 Decided: May 4, 1999 Before WILLIAMS, TRAXLER, and KING, Circuit Judges. Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.David L. Snyder, Appellant Pro Se. George Levi Russell, III, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Baltimore, Maryland, for Appellees. Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See Local Rule 36(c).* Although the district court’s order was signed on September 23, 1998, and was stamp dated on September 28, 1998, the district court’s records show that the order was entered on the docket sheeton September 29, 1998. Pursuant to Rules 58 and 79(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, it is the date that the order was entered on the docket sheet that we take as the effective date of the district court’s decision. See Wilson v. Murray, 806 F.2d 1232, 1234-35 (4th Cir. 1986). 2 PER CURIAM: David L. Snyder appeals the district court’s order denying relief on his 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (1994) petition. We have reviewed the record and the district court’s opinion and find no reversible error. Accordingly, we affirm substantially on the reasoning of the district court. See Snyder v. Henry , No. CA-98-1569-PJM (D. Md. Sept. 29, 1998); * see also Pelissero v. Thompson , F.3d , Nos. 97-6156, 97-6221 (4th Cir. Mar. 12, 1999). We dispense withoral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED
# Fourth Court of Appeals
**San Antonio, Texas**

June 19, 2018

No. 04

- 18

- 00348

- CV

ANDERSON

- JENKINS SIGNATURE HOMES, LTD.
and Anderson

- Jenkins Signature Homes GP, LLC

, Appellant s

v.

Benjamin Randolph ALLEN , III and Kelley P. Allen, Appellee s

From the 451st Judicial District Court, Kendall County, Texas
Trial Court No. 17

- 148
Honorable Bill R. Palme r, Judge Presiding



### ORDER

This is an accelerated appeal in which the clerk’s record was due June 4, 2018. On June 5, 2018, the district clerk filed a notification of late record, requesting an extension of time to file the record on or before June 22, 2018. After consideration, we GRANT the district clerk’s request and ORDER the district clerk to file the clerk’s record on or before June 22, 2018

.

_________________________________ Marialyn Barnard, Justice

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affi xed the seal of the said
court on this 19th day of June, 2018

.

___________________________________ KEITH E. HOTTLE

, Clerk of Court
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###### Department of Energy

###### Federal Energy Regulatory Commission

          - [Docket No. EL09-40-000]

                    On March 19, 2009, the Commission issued an order that initiated a proceeding in Docket No. EL09-40-000, pursuant to section 206 of the Federal Power Act (FPS), 16 U.S.C. 824e (2005), to determine the justness and                           ( print page 13429)                        reasonableness of certain language in section 2.2 of Southwest Power Pool, Inc's. existing Open Access Transmission Tariff.                

                    The refund effective date in Docket No. EL09-40-000, established pursuant to section 206(b) of the FPA, will be the date of publication of this notice in the                     **Federal Register**                    .                

Kimberly D. Bose,

Secretary.

[FR Doc. E9-6870 Filed 3-26-09; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE