No. 83-508 

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA 

1984 

JOHN M. MORLEY, 

Claimant and Appellant, 

-vsTHE ANACONDA COMPANY, Employer, 

and 

THE ANACONDA COMPANY, 

Defendant and Respondent. 

APPEAL FROM: The Workers' Compensation Court, The Honorable 

Timothy Reardon, Judge presiding. 

COUNSEL OF RECORD: 

For Appellant: 

R. Lewis Brown, Jr., Butte, Montana 

For Respondent: 

Andrew J. Utick, Helena, Montana 

Submitted on Briefs: July 10, 1984 

~ecid~d: August 30, 1984 

-- Clerk 
Mr. Justice Frank B. Morrison, Jr. delivered the Opinion 

of the Court. 

John M. Morley's claim for benefits related to an 

industrial injury sustained while employed by The Anaconda 

Company was heard before the Workers' Compensation Court on 

January 21, 1982. The Workers' Compensation Court judgment 

of October 17, 1983 denied claimant's claim and dismissed his 

petition. Claimant appeals. We affirm. 

The following chronology of accidents, industrial and 

non-industrial-, are operative in our discussion of claimant's 

appeal. Claimant testified that he sustained an upper back 

injury on March 20, 1979 while working within the scope of 

his employment for respondent. He was mixing slurry with a 

long-handled paddle when the handle dislodged and hit him 

between the shoulder blades. Claimant claims his second 

industrial accident and the one here involved, occurred on 

June 17, 1979 when a six-inch, high-pressure water hose 

surged with pressure and knocked him backward onto a piece of 

angle iron protruding from the cement floor. He injured his 

middle back just below the rib cage. He promptly reported 

this accident to his supervisor and the safety office but 

returned to work on his next shift. The claimant missed no 

work as a result of these two industrial accidents. 

On August 17, 1979, due to a faulty respirator, claimant 

was exposed to arsenic and sulphur dioxide gases. Claimant 

claims that his acute sinusitis condition was aggravated by 

exposure to these toxic fumes. 

Early in October 1979, the claimant injured his lower 

back while logging with his brother. According to a claim 

form to a private insurance carrier dated June 2, 1980, the 

claimant sustained another back injury on June 1, 1980 during 

a wrestling match. The records of claimant's physical 
therapist document his third non-industrial injury on August 

25, 1981 when he hit his head on the cab of a pickup. 

During this course of events, the claimant was under 

the regular care of several doctors. Dr. Elbert had 

administered chiropractic treatments to the claimant since 

March 1979. Drs. Perez and Natividad, general practitioners, 

routinely treated claimant for his chronic sinus problem. 

Daryl Dodd was his physical therapist. In this action, 

claimant was examined for respondent by Dr. Davidson, an 

orthopedic surgeon. 

The claimant was also undergoing treatment for his 

mental health. Dr. Timothy J. Casey, a staff counseling 

psychologist at Warm Springs State Hospital, evaluated 

claimant's mental condition to establish whether claimant's 

"traumatic neurosis" was casually related to any accidents. 

Dr. Stanley Moisey, a psychiatrist, examined the claimant in 

connection with claimant's application to the Veteran's 

Administration for benefits under the delayed post-traumatic 

stress syndrome disorder associated with his service in 

Vietnam. 

In July, 1981 claimant petitioned the Workers' 

Compensation Court seeking workers' compensation benefits for 

back injuries which he alleges were caused by the June 17, 

1979 industrial accident. Claimant attempted to show 

through depositions of medical experts that his psychological 

instability was also exacerbated, if not caused by, the 

industrial accident. Claimant appeals from the judgment of 

the Workers ' Compensation Court denying him benefits and 

dismissing his petition. 

He presents the following issues: 

1. Whether the Workers' Compensation Court erred in 

dismissing claimant's petition. 
2. Whether the Workers1 Compensation Court erred in 

concluding that claimant did not sustain his burden of 

establishing that the accident of June 17, 1979 was the 

proximate cause of his resulting physical condition. 

3. Whether there is substantial evidence to support the 

decision of the Workers1 Compensation Court. 

4. Whether the Workers' Compensation Court erred in 

finding that claimant's present physical condition is due to 

a non-industrial accident rather than to his industrial 

injury of June 17, 1979. 

5. Whether the Workers1 Compensation Court erred in 

failing to find that claimant's present physical condition is 

due to "traumatic neurosis" resulting from the accident of 

June 17, 1979. 

We agree with respondent that there is one dispositive 

issue in this appeal: Whether there is substantial credible 

evidence to support the decision of the Workers1 Compensation 

Court denying workers' compensation benefits to the claimant. 

The standard of review in cases appealed from the 

Workers1 Compensation Court is: 

"Our function in reviewing a decision of the 

Workers1 Compensation Court is to determine whether 

there is substantial evidence to support the 

findinas and conclusions of that court. We cannot 

substitute our judgment ---- for that of the trial court 

--- as to the weight of the evidence on questions of --- . - - . - - 

fact. Where there is substantial evidence to 

support the findings of the Workers' Compensation 

Court, this Court cannot overturn the decision." 

Steffes v. 93 Leasing Co., Inc. (U.S.F.&G.) (1978) 

177 Mont. 83, 86-7, 580 P.2d 450, 452. (emphasis 

added) 

This case involves lengthy medical history and disputed 

facts. Respondent contends that the Workers1 Compensation 

hearing examiner went to great lengths to review the entire 

record and adopted detailed findings of fact and conclusions 
of law supported by extensive citations to the record for 

each critical fact. We agree. 

The facts established by the lower court are that the 

claimant had his industrial injury of June 17, 1979 but that 

such back injuries were not serious, and healed. Thereafter 

the claimant left work due to his chronic sinus problem, so 

that his loss of income is attributable to his sinusitis and 

not the industrial injury. Thereafter, claimant suffered a 

back injury from the non-industrial accident in early 

October. The claimant never mentioned the serious back pain 

upon which he bases his petition for workers' compensation 

benefits until immediately after this non-industrial accident 

in October 1979. 

Dr. Perez' deposition confirms that the claimant was in 

his office on July 10, July 20, July 24 and August 7, 1979, 

complaining of sinus and throat problems. The doctor's notes 

during this period make no mention of back pain. The first 

time the claimant indicated he was suffering from back pain 

to either Dr. Perez or Dr. Natividad was on October 12, 1979. 

The physical therapist, Daryl Dodd, noted that on 

October 16, 1979 the claimant was helping lift a beam and 

felt his back "pop" all the way up. 

Dr. Elbert stated he "had treated claimant for his March 

1979 back problems and concluded that they were resolved." 

In December 1979 Dr. Elbert diagnosed a bilateral lumbar 

strain. After five treatments Dr. Elbert discharged the 

patient noting that the back problem "was resolved and the 

patient is apparently symptom free at termination of 

treatment." From December of 1979 until June of 1980 (date 

of his second non-industrial accident) the claimant received 

no treatment for his back. 
On. June 2, 1980, the claimant returned to Dr. Elbert 

with back complaints and received a total of 66 chiropractic 

treatments to his lower back continuing up to September of 

1-981. The claimant submitted a claim on June 2, 1980 for 

disability benefits to a private insurance carrier which does 

not cover industrial injuries, stating that he had injured 

his back while wrestling with his brother. 

Dr. Davidson testified that he examined the claimant on 

January 12, 1982 and diagnosed a mild paravertebral spasm in 

the upper back and a "bizarre" loss of sensation in both 

upper arms which he attributed to the patient's "functional 

overlay". He concluded that the claimant could do most of 

his regular work except for the "functional overlay". 

Pursuant to a detailed analysis of all the medical and 

trial testimony, the hearing examiner stated in finding No. 

". . . While claimant's brief argues that the 

depositions of Drs. Perez and Elbert and of Daryl 

Dodd 'show conclusively' that claimant has been in 

continual pain since August of 1979, a thorough 

study of these depositions shows nothing of the 

sort. There is a crucial gap, from June to October 

of that year, which none of these witnesses can 

fill." 

The trial court concluded that the incident with the 

hose on June 17, 1979 was a "tangible happening of a 

traumatic nature from an unexpected cause" and thus satisfied 

the first element of the statutory definition of an injury, 

section 39-71-119(1), MCA. The statute further requires that 

the "tangible happening" results in "physical harm". Any 

injury related to the "tangible h.appeningl' in this case was 

found to produce no harm for no time was lost from work, no 

medical expense incurred, and no disability or impairment of 

any kind was found causally related to the industrial 
accident. There is record support for the lower court's 

conclusion. 

The claimant contends that in addition to the back 

injury he sustained a psychic injury or "traumatic neurosis" 

as a result of his industrial accidents. Dr. Casey, the 

psychologist defined the claimant's "personality disorder" as 

"a maladaptive manner of coping with the problems that one 

encounters in day-to-day life." 

Both Dr. Casey, the psychologist, and Dr. Moisey, the 

psychiatrist, state that the claimant's emotional 

disturbances did not originate from any specific industrial 

or non-industrial accident. Dr. Casey explained: 

"The personality, the traits of a character 

disorder are clear or evident by adolescence. They 

are not something that come on. The responses to 

the personality disorder can crop up and become 

more severe as time goes on but the basic 

personality structure - - the bricks are laid by 

the time adolescence comes on." 

Claimant also suffers from "functional overlay". Dr. 

Casey explained that the claimant expresses his personal 

mental disturbances physically rather than emotiona.lly. 

"Functional overlay" was simply defined by Dr. Davidson 

as follows: " . . . that the patient is suffering in his mind 

much more than he is suffering objectively." Dr. Davidson 

characterized the claimant's "functional overlay" as 

"marked". 

The evidence was in conflict regarding cause of 

claimant's psychological condition. The lower court decision 

denying compensability is supported by the record. 

Affirmed. 
We concur: