NOT RECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION 

File Name: 17a0335n.06 

 No. 16-4312 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT 

VALERIE D. MASON-COLWELL, 

 Plaintiff-Appellant, 

v. 

COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY, 

 Defendant-Appellee. 

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ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED 

STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR 

THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF 

OHIO 

 BEFORE: COOK, KETHLEDGE, and DONALD, Circuit Judges. 

 PER CURIAM. Valerie D. Mason-Colwell appeals the district court’s judgment 

affirming the denial of her applications for disability insurance benefits and supplemental 

security income benefits. 

In 2013, Mason-Colwell filed applications for disability insurance benefits and 

supplemental security income benefits, alleging that she became disabled on July 15, 2005. 

After the Social Security Administration denied the applications, Mason-Colwell requested a 

hearing before an administrative law judge (ALJ). The ALJ conducted a hearing and denied 

Mason-Colwell relief. The Appeals Council declined to review the case. The district court 

affirmed the denial of Mason-Colwell’s applications. 
No. 16-4312, Mason-Colwell v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec.

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On appeal, Mason-Colwell raises three arguments: (1) the ALJ erred by giving 

significant weight to the opinion of an examining psychologist but ignoring critical portions of 

the opinion; (2) the ALJ erred by failing to include certain restrictions in her residual functional 

capacity; and (3) substantial evidence does not support the ALJ’s determination concerning her 

ability to walk, climb ramps and stairs, kneel, stoop, and balance. 

“Our review of the ALJ's decision is limited to whether the ALJ applied the correct legal 

standards and whether the findings of the ALJ are supported by substantial evidence.” Blakley v. 

Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 581 F.3d 399, 405 (6th Cir. 2009). Substantial evidence exists if a 

reasonable mind might accept the relevant evidence as adequate to support a conclusion. Id.

at 406. We review de novo the district court’s conclusions on each issue. Id.

Mason-Colwell first argues that the ALJ erred in weighing the medical opinion of 

examining psychologist Brithany Pawloski. In her narrative evaluation, Dr. Pawloski concluded 

that Mason-Colwell’s self-reported data and presentation appeared to be reliable and that she 

would have some limitation in her ability to understand and carry out instructions, complete 

complicated tasks, and engage with coworkers and supervisors. Dr. Pawloski further concluded 

that Mason-Colwell “would have difficulties appropriately coping with exposure to work and 

would be at risk for further mental deterioration.” In her functional assessment, Dr. Pawloski 

concluded that Mason-Colwell has marked limitation in her ability to carry out complex 

instructions and make judgments on complex work-related decisions, but that she is otherwise 

able to function satisfactorily, including in her ability to respond appropriately to usual work 

situations and changes in a routine work setting, despite having some impairments. MasonColwell contends that the ALJ erred by giving significant weight to Dr. Pawloski’s opinion while 
No. 16-4312, Mason-Colwell v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec.

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ignoring her conclusions that Mason-Colwell’s self-reports were reliable and that exposure to 

work could damage Mason-Colwell’s mental health. 

Substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s weighing of Dr. Pawloski’s opinion. The ALJ 

was not required to accept Dr. Pawloski’s determination that Mason-Colwell is credible; that 

issue is reserved to the Commissioner, see Allen v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 561 F.3d 646, 652 (6th 

Cir. 2009), and the ALJ could reasonably credit Dr. Pawloski’s conclusions concerning MasonColwell’s functional limitations without accepting as credible all of Mason-Colwell’s reports 

concerning her impairments. In addition, the ALJ reasonably accounted for all of the significant 

work-related functional limitations specifically identified by Dr. Pawloski by restricting MasonColwell to routine work involving only simple work-related decisions and only occasional 

changes in the work routine. 

Mason-Colwell next argues that the ALJ erred by failing to include in her residual 

functional capacity the need to take additional breaks, limitations on her ability to be exposed to 

noise, and additional limitations regarding her ability to sit and stand. Substantial evidence 

supports the ALJ’s declining to include the additional restrictions because: (1) no medical 

opinions of record conclude that such restrictions are warranted; (2) the objective medical 

evidence does not compel a conclusion that the additional limitations are necessary; and (3) the 

ALJ discounted Mason-Colwell’s subjective complaints on the basis that she both inconsistently 

reported her symptoms, and alleged functional limitations unsupported by the record medical 

evidence. 

Finally, Mason-Colwell argues that substantial evidence does not support the ALJ’s 

determination that she could walk three hours in an eight-hour workday and occasionally climb 

ramps and stairs, kneel, stoop, and balance. Substantial evidence does support the limitations at 
No. 16-4312, Mason-Colwell v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec.

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issue, given the uncontradicted opinions of examining physician Dr. Babatunde Onamusi, who 

assessed the same limitations, and reviewing physicians Dr. Dimitri Teague and Dr. Rannie 

Amiri, who assessed less restrictive walking and postural limitations, and the lack of objective 

medical evidence supporting additional, necessary restrictions. 

Accordingly, we AFFIRM the district court’s judgment.