Supreme Court

In the Matter of George Philip. No. SU

- 2017

- 47

- M.P.

O R D E R This matter is before the Court pursuant to a petition for reciprocal discipline filed by this Court’s Disciplinary Counsel in accordance with Article III, Rule 14 of the Supreme Court Rules of Disciplinary Procedure. The respondent, George Philip, was ad mitted to the practice of law in
this s tate on November 24, 1997, and is presently an active member of the bar. He was also admitted to the practice of law in the Commonwealth of Massachusetts. On January 12, 2016 , a single justice of the Supreme Judicia l Court of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts entered an order disbarring the respondent from the practice of law in the Commonwealth effective February 12, 2 016. A certified copy of that o rder was
forwarded t o counsel on February 9, 2016. Rule 14 , entitl ed “Reciprocal discipline , ” provides, in pertinent part: “(a) * * * Upon notification from any source that a lawyer within the jurisdiction of the [Disciplinary] Board has been disciplined in another jurisdiction, Counsel shall obtain a certified copy of t he disciplinary order and file it with the court.”
On Febr uary 16, 2016, Disciplinary Counsel filed a copy of the o rder with this C ourt along with a petition requesting that we impose reciproca l identical discipline in this s tate. On the following day, the respondent notified this Court and Disciplinary Counsel that he had filed an appeal to the full Supreme Judicial Court and that his appeal had been docketed. Accordingly, we issued an order to the respondent directing him to show cause why reciprocal

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-discipline should not be imposed in this s tate, but deferred his obligation to do so pending the
resolution of his appeal. On September 15, 2016, the respondent’s appeal was dismissed due to his failure to timely file a brief and/or appendix. The respondent took no further action to pursue his appeal. We directed the respondent to appear before this Court at its conference on December 15, 2016,
to sho w cause why identical reciprocal discipline should not be imposed. He appeared before

us, pro se , and advised the C ourt that he had no objection to the imposition of identical reciprocal discipline. However, he requested that he be give n a brief period o f time to notify his clients and arrange for new counsel for them before any such order becomes effective. The facts giving rise to the respondent’s disbarment in the Commonwealth are briefly
summarized as follows. 1 In late 2008, the respondent was invo lved in a group drive of automobile enthusiasts in Massachusetts. Tragically, the driver of the vehicle immediately in front of the respondent’s vehicle struck and killed a pedestrian

. The r espondent was a potentially

ne cessary witness in any future civi l or c riminal action that could ensu e from this incident, and may also have been subj ect to possible civil liability due to his participation in the group drive. Despite these glaring conflicts, the respondent offered to provide legal representation to the other driver, and failed to obtain his informed consent to the conflicts. The other driver was subsequently criminally charged for his actions leading to the death of the ped estrian. The respondent, who had limited experience representing defendants in criminal cases, provided woefully inadequate legal representation, including improperly advising the client and failing to timely obtain an opinion from an accident reconstruct ion expert. Moreover, the respondent made

1 The facts were set forth in a memorandum prepared by the Board of Bar Overseers which Disciplinary C ounsel appended to his petition for reciprocal discipline. The respondent did not contest the accuracy of that memorandum.

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-misrepresentations to the cl ient regarding the nature of his legal fee, payments to the expert, and the payment of fees to co

- counsel. The respondent intentionally misused approximately $17,500
that he had obtain ed on behalf of the client. He also entered into an improper business arrangement with t his client relating to an agreement to repair and either lease or rent the client’s

car. The Massachusetts Board of Bar Overseers and the Massachusetts Supreme Judici al Court concluded that the respondent’s conduct violated a host of the Rules of Professional conduct, including, but not limited to Rules 1.1 (competence): 1.3 (neglect); 1.5 (excessive fees); 1.7 and 1.8 (conflicts); 1.15 (safekeeping client funds); and 8.4(c) (misrepresentation). Our review of the record supports those conclusions, and we concur with Disciplinary C ounsel’s recommendation that identical reciprocal discipline is warranted. Accordingly, the respondent, George Philip, is hereby disbarred f r om the practice of law
in this s tate, effective thirty days from the da te of this o rder.
Entered as an Order of this Court this 7 th day of February.

By Order,

___________ /s/

________________ Clerk

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-STATE OF RHODE ISLAND AND PROVIDENCE PLANTATIONS

SUPREME COURT

– CLERK’S OFFICE
ORDER COVER SHEET

Title of Case In the Matter of George Philip.
Case Number SU

- 2017

- 47

- M.P.

Date Order Filed February 7, 20 17

Justices Suttell, C.J., Goldberg, Flaherty, Robinson, and Indeglia, JJ. Source of Appeal N/A

– Court Order

Judicial Officer From Lower Court N/A

– Court Order

A ttorney(s) on Appeal For Petitioner: David D. Curtin, Esq. Disciplinary Coun sel For Respondent: George Philip, Pro Se

SU

- CMS

- 02B (revised November 2016)