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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF NEW MEXICO

Opinion Number: __________

Filing Date: September 16, 2014

Docket No. 32,990

STATE OF NEW MEXICO,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

CLINTON SKIPPINGS,

Defendant-Appellant.

APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF LEA COUNTY

Gary L. Clingman, District Judge

Gary K. King, Attorney General

Santa Fe, NM

Jacqueline R. Medina, Assistant Attorney General

Albuquerque, NM

for Appellee

The Law Offices of the Public Defender

Jorge A. Alvarado, Chief Public Defender

Karl Erich Martell, Assistant Appellate Defender

Santa Fe, NM

for Appellant

OPINION

WECHSLER, Judge.

{1} Defendant Clinton Skippings appeals the district court’s denial of his motions to

suppress evidence, having reserved the issue of whether his motions were properly denied

in his conditional plea agreement. Defendant argues that police officers lacked reasonable

suspicion to stop him based on a confidential informant’s tip and also asserts that he was

subject to a de facto arrest without probable cause, tainting Defendant’s consent and making
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the evidence discovered fruit of an illegal search. Accordingly, Defendant asks this Court

to reverse the district court’s denial of his motions to suppress. We conclude that

Defendant’s motions were properly denied and therefore affirm the district court.

BACKGROUND

{2} The factual context in this case is central to the resolution of this appeal and is

established by the testimony of Defendant and Lea County Drug Task Force (Task Force)

Agents Byron Wester and Keith Clayton at the hearings on Defendant’s motions to suppress

evidence. On August 29, 2012, Agents Wester and Clayton were working with a

confidential informant in Hobbs, New Mexico. With the officers present, the informant set

up a purchase of crack cocaine with Defendant in a cell phone conversation. The informant

provided the following details regarding the deal: (1) Defendant immediately would be in

the parking lot of Big Lots with the crack cocaine; and (2) Defendant would be in one of two

vehicles that he was known to drive (either a white passenger car or a gold-colored pickup).

The Drug Task Force had used this confidential informant on numerous past occasions, and

the confidential informant had provided reliable information that led to multiple arrests and

convictions.

{3} Upon receiving the informant’s tip, Agent Wester proceeded to the Big Lots parking

lot, where he observed Defendant and a female passenger in a white vehicle, as described

by the informant. Agent Wester watched Defendant drive across the street to an apartment

complex, at which time he briefly lost sight of the vehicle; Defendant returned shortly

thereafter in the same vehicle but without the female passenger. Defendant then exited the

parking lot and drove south on Dal Paso Street. At that time, Agent Wester requested that

the Hobbs Police Department stop Defendant. The parties stipulated below that the sole

purpose of the stop was to further the agents’ investigation of Defendant based on the

informant’s information.

{4} Hobbs police officers stopped Defendant at approximately 7:25 p.m., when there was

still daylight. Agent Wester arrived at the scene within a few minutes, at which time he

observed Defendant standing outside his vehicle with a police officer. Agent Wester

approached Defendant, explained who he was, and told Defendant that he was not under

arrest but being detained for investigative purposes. Agent Wester patted down Defendant

for weapons. Defendant was then handcuffed and read his Miranda rights. Defendant

indicated his willingness to talk with the agent, he and Agent Wester sat down on a curb, and

Agent Wester engaged Defendant in a conversation. Agent Wester testified that Defendant

was handcuffed for safety purposes because Defendant had a history of violence. Several

other officers were present, but they did not engage in conversation with Defendant. Agent

Wester told Defendant about the investigation into his alleged trafficking of crack cocaine.

{5} Within ten minutes of the initial stop, while speaking to Agent Wester, Defendant

told Agent Wester that he was willing to consent to a search of his vehicle. At that time,

Defendant’s handcuffs were removed so that he could sign a consent form. Agent Clayton
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read the consent form to Defendant and gave it to Defendant to sign. The handcuffs were

not placed back on Defendant; Defendant was in handcuffs no more than ten minutes. After

signing the consent form, Defendant and Agent Wester resumed sitting on the curb and

conversing, while other agents performed the search of Defendant’s vehicle. As soon as the

agents opened the door of Defendant’s vehicle, the agents discovered marijuana.

{6} During the search, Agent Wester and Defendant continued to sit on the curb and talk

about Defendant’s alleged involvement in narcotics activity in the area. Agent Wester also

talked to Defendant about whether he would be willing to do some work for the Task Force

and various other topics, including Defendant’s addiction to narcotics. Agent Wester

maintained a professional and non-threatening tone of voice throughout his conversation

with Defendant. After the search of the vehicle was complete, Agent Wester asked

Defendant “if he had anything on him” and asked for consent to search his person, which

Defendant gave. Agent Wester found approximately $1200 and a plastic bag of crack

cocaine on Defendant. By that time, approximately forty-five minutes had passed since the

stop. Defendant was then arrested for trafficking a controlled substance contrary to NMSA

1978, Section 30-31-20 (2006).

{7} Defendant moved to suppress all contraband found and seized by the Task Force,

asserting that (1) the agents lacked reasonable suspicion to initiate an investigatory detention

based on a confidential informant’s tip, and (2) Defendant was subjected to a de facto arrest

requiring probable cause and tainting his consent to search his vehicle and his person. The

district court denied his motions, and Defendant entered a conditional plea in which he

reserved the right to appeal the denials of the motions. Defendant renews both arguments

on appeal.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

{8} “[R]eview of a district court’s ruling on a motion to suppress involves a mixed

question of fact and law.” State v. Rowell, 2008-NMSC-041, ¶ 8, 144 N.M. 371, 188 P.3d

95 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). We review factual questions under a

substantial evidence standard and the application of law to facts de novo. State v. Pacheco,

2008-NMCA-131, ¶ 3, 145 N.M. 40, 193 P.3d 587. We recognize that “the district court has

the best vantage from which to resolve questions of fact and to evaluate witness credibility.

Accordingly, we review the facts in the light most favorable to the prevailing party”

provided that substantial evidence exists to support the factual findings. State v. Sewell,

2009-NMSC-033, ¶ 12, 146 N.M. 428, 211 P.3d 885 (internal quotation marks and citation

omitted). Finally, we “review the application of the law to those facts, making a de novo

determination of the constitutional reasonableness of a search or seizure.” Id.

LEGALITY OF THE INITIAL STOP

{9} It is well established that “stopping an automobile and detaining its occupants

constitute a seizure under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments.” State v. Werner, 1994-
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NMSC-025, ¶ 11, 117 N.M. 315, 871 P.2d 971 (alteration, internal quotation marks, and

citation omitted); State v. Funderburg, 2008-NMSC-026, ¶ 13, 144 N.M. 37, 183 P.3d 922.

However, only unreasonable searches and seizures are proscribed. Werner, 1994-NMSC025, ¶ 11. Under New Mexico and federal case law, “[p]olice may make an investigatory

stop in circumstances that do not rise to the level of probable cause for an arrest if the

officers have a reasonable suspicion that the law has been or is being violated.” State v.

Alderete, 2011-NMCA-055, ¶ 15, 149 N.M. 799, 255 P.3d 377 (internal quotation marks and

citation omitted); see Werner, 1994-NMSC-025, ¶ 11 (“Under Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S.

1 . . . (1968), and its progeny, police officers may stop a person for investigative purposes

where, considering the totality of the circumstances, the officers have a reasonable and

objective basis for suspecting that particular person is engaged in criminal activity.” (internal

quotation marks and citation omitted)). “A valid investigatory stop allows an officer to

detain suspects briefly to verify or quell that suspicion.” Sewell, 2009-NMSC-033, ¶ 13.

{10} To justify a stop based on reasonable suspicion, there must be “specific and

articulable facts that, together with the rational inferences from those facts, reasonably

warrant the intrusion.” Alderete, 2011-NMCA-055, ¶ 15 (internal quotation marks and

citation omitted). This Court’s case law establishes that information supplied by a

confidential informant may support a reasonable suspicion, thereby justifying an

investigatory detention. See, e.g., id. ¶¶ 2, 18-20 (upholding a traffic stop based in part on

information from a confidential informant that the house from which the vehicle had

departed was being used as a stash house for large quantities of marijuana); State v. Robbs,

2006-NMCA-061, ¶¶ 2-4, 12-19, 139 N.M. 569, 136 P.3d 570 (holding that a tip received

from a confidential informant that accurately described the vehicle, route, and time of

movement, supplied reasonable suspicion justifying a traffic stop); State v. De JesusSantibanez, 1995-NMCA-017, ¶¶ 11-13, 119 N.M. 578, 893 P.2d 474 (upholding a traffic

stop based on a “Be-On-the-Lookout” alert premised on information supplied by a

confidential informant, who had supplied a description of the vehicle, time and direction of

travel, route, and the origin of the vehicle’s license plate).

{11} Because “[r]easonable suspicion depends on the reliability and content of the

information possessed by the officers[,]” Robbs, 2006-NMCA-061, ¶ 13, we look to the

information processed by the agents in this case. The agents were working with an

informant that the Task Force had used on numerous occasions and who had proven to be

a reliable source of information. The agents were present when the informant telephonically

arranged the drug deal with Defendant. The informant supplied the agents with specific

information, including a description of the vehicle that Defendant would be in, the type of

drug Defendant would be selling, and the time and location of the drug deal. The informant

was able to predict Defendant’s future behavior, indicating that the informant had access to

reliable information about the person’s illegal activities. See id. ¶ 14.

{12} This case is similar to Robbs, in which the informant (1) told detectives that the

defendant would be delivering methamphetamine to an address in a city in New Mexico, and

(2) described the defendant’s vehicle with a personalized license plate. Id. ¶ 2. In that case,
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we concluded that the tip was enough to support reasonable suspicion necessary for the

investigatory stop of the defendant’s vehicle. Id. ¶ 19. The informant in this case provided

a similar level of detail, and the agents verified the information when the movements of

Defendant accorded with the informant’s tip. Under the totality of the circumstances,

specific and articulable facts supported the agents’ suspicion that Defendant was engaged

in drug trafficking.

{13} To the extent that Defendant argues the stop was “pretextual” under State v. Ochoa,

we do not agree; the issue in this case is one of reasonable suspicion, not whether officers

engaged in an unreasonable, pretextual stop. 2009-NMCA-002, ¶¶ 39-42, 146 N.M. 32, 206

P.3d 143; see id. ¶ 25 (“A pretextual traffic stop is a detention supportable by reasonable

suspicion or probable cause to believe that a traffic offense has occurred, but is executed as

a pretense to pursue a ‘hunch,’ a different more serious investigative agenda for which there

is no reasonable suspicion or probable cause.”). Having determined that reasonable

suspicion supported the agents’ decision to have Defendant stopped, we turn to the second

issue: whether the lawful investigatory detention became a de facto arrest requiring probable

cause.

INVESTIGATORY DETENTION AS A DE FACTO ARREST

{14} While an investigatory detention supported by reasonable suspicion is permitted, an

arrest requires probable cause. State v. Wilson, 2007-NMCA-111, ¶ 18, 142 N.M. 737, 169

P.3d 1184. “When an officer with reasonable suspicion but without probable cause detains

an individual in an unreasonable manner, the detention may amount to a de facto arrest,

rather than an investigatory detention.” Id. There is no bright-line test for evaluating when

an investigatory detention becomes invasive enough to become a de facto arrest. Werner,

1994-NMSC-025, ¶ 13. However, there are several factors that we consider, including (1)

“the government’s justification for the detention,” (2) “the character of the intrusion on the

individual,” (3) “the diligence of the police in conducting the investigation,” and (4) “the

length of the detention.” Robbs, 2006-NMCA-061, ¶ 21. We are also guided by the

circumstances in other cases in which investigative detentions have been held to be de facto

arrests or impermissibly invasive. Pacheco, 2008-NMCA-131, ¶ 22.

{15} The State points out, and the facts when viewed in the light most favorable to the

prevailing party indicate, that contraband was discovered within ten minutes from the time

the agents made contact with Defendant, but did not then result in an arrest. If the ten minute

detention of Defendant was impermissibly invasive, Defendant’s consent to search his

vehicle and his person would be tainted, and the evidence should have been suppressed. See

State v. Jutte, 1998-NMCA-150, ¶ 14, 126 N.M. 244, 968 P.2d 334 (“[I]f [the defendant’s]

detention constituted a de facto arrest prior to the search, then that arrest was unlawful and

it may have tainted his consent to the search.”). If, however, the ten minute detention was

a valid investigatory detention, at the point that the agents found contraband, they had

probable cause to arrest Defendant for possession of a controlled substance contrary to

NMSA 1978, Section 30-31-23 (2011) and to search his person. See State v. Weidner, 2007-
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NMCA-063, ¶¶ 18-20, 141 N.M. 582, 158 P.3d 1025 (explaining the “search incident to

arrest” exception to the warrant requirement and concluding that even if a search occurs

before formal arrest, it is lawful if the evidence discovered was not necessary to justify the

arrest). Thus, we focus our inquiry on the time between Defendant’s stop and the discovery

of the marijuana.

{16} In support of his argument that he was subject to a de facto arrest, Defendant 

states that “officers swarmed the scene and demanded his identity” and that he was removed

from his car, handcuffed, patted down, seated on the ground, and read his Miranda rights.

Defendant asserts that, based on the duration and circumstances of his detention, his consent

was invalid and the contraband discovered should have been suppressed. For the following

reasons, we do not agree.

{17} With regard to the first factor—the government’s justification for intrusion— we

have explained that “[i]f the nature and extent of the detention minimally intrude on an

individual’s Fourth Amendment interests, opposing law enforcement interests can support

a seizure based on less than probable cause.” Robbs, 2006-NMCA-061, ¶ 20 (internal

quotation marks and citation omitted). The government has a significant interest in

preventing the use and distribution of drugs like cocaine. See Pacheco, 2008-NMCA-131,

¶ 20 (explaining that prevention of use and distribution of methamphetamine was a

significant governmental interest); Robbs, 2006-NMCA-061, ¶ 22 (same). Therefore,

“[i]nsofar as [the agents] had a reasonable, articulable suspicion that drug-related criminality

was afoot, the justification for the intrusion was substantial.” Pacheco, 2008-NMCA-131,

¶ 20.

{18} The second factor—the character of the intrusion—requires careful parsing in this

case. While Defendant was only detained for ten minutes and told he was not under arrest,

he was handcuffed and given his Miranda rights. There exists no New Mexico case

addressing this unique set of circumstances; accordingly, we examine, in light of the

authority that we do have, where on the continuum this case falls. Those cases that conclude

that an initially lawful investigatory detention became a de facto arrest all present

circumstances in which the defendant was detained for at least one hour. See, e.g., Werner,

1994-NMSC-025, ¶¶ 11-20 (holding that when the defendant was told that he was not free

to leave and detained for one hour, including forty-five minutes in the back of a patrol car

while awaiting identification, it was a de facto arrest); see also Jutte, 1998-NMCA-150, ¶¶

14-20 (holding that one-hour detention at an inspection checkpoint ripened into an improper

de facto arrest when the officers had exhausted the means of investigation by which they

could confirm or dispel their suspicions quickly); State v. Hernandez, 1997-NMCA-006, ¶

22, 122 N.M. 809, 932 P.2d 499 (concluding that a nearly two-hour detention in a trailer at

a checkpoint while waiting for a female agent who had to be summoned from another

location to search the female defendant after search of vehicle turned up no contraband,

constituted a de facto arrest); State v. Flores, 1996-NMCA-059, ¶¶ 4, 15, 122 N.M. 84, 920

P.2d 1038 (holding that a two- to three-hour detention in handcuffs at a police warehouse

after a one-hour roadside detention constituted a de facto arrest). Although the duration of
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detention is not dispositive, as we note below, it is an important consideration as evidenced

by our case law.

{19} Perhaps even more helpful to our analysis are those cases in which investigative

detentions were held not to have become de facto arrests. See, e.g., Sewell, 2009-NMSC033, ¶¶ 15-25 (holding that a ten minute detention during which time officers questioned the

defendant outside his vehicle about possible drug trafficking and performed search of his

vehicle after obtaining consent was not a de facto arrest); see also Pacheco, 2008-NMCA131, ¶¶ 19-25 (holding that thirty minute roadside detention was not impermissively invasive

or extended); Robbs, 2006-NMCA-061, ¶¶ 29-30 (holding that thirty-five to forty minute

detention while awaiting a canine unit to perform a narcotics investigation was reasonable);

State v. Lovato, 1991-NMCA-083, ¶¶ 23-32, 112 N.M. 517, 817 P.2d 251 (holding that the

defendants were not arrested when they were pulled over, ordered to get out of the vehicle

at gunpoint, and handcuffed prior to questioning). While at first glance this case appears to

be analogous to Sewell, when examined more carefully, the circumstances in this case were

more invasive. Although Defendant was only detained for ten minutes, he was also patted

down for weapons, handcuffed, and read his Miranda rights. Nevertheless, even these

circumstances do not indicate that Defendant’s lawful investigatory detention had become

a de facto arrest.

{20} The evidence indicates that Defendant was patted down for weapons and handcuffed

because of Agent Wester’s concern for officer safety because Defendant had a history of

violence. The defendant in Flores, in which we concluded the defendant was subject to a

de facto arrest, was handcuffed; however, he was detained for two to three hours and

handcuffed for most of that time. 1996-NMCA-059, ¶ 15. Additionally, he was “faced with

heavy weaponry in a hostile environment, while subjected to a second search that differed

significantly in scope and location from the first.” Id. ¶ 26. In Lovato, the defendants were

handcuffed upon exiting their vehicle, and we concluded that the level of force did not

convert the investigatory detention into an arrest. 1991-NMCA-083, ¶¶ 24-27, 32.

Therefore, while we consider the fact that Defendant was handcuffed, it is not determinative.

See Wilson, 2007-NMCA-111, ¶ 19 (“[I]n the context of the Fourth Amendment, without

transforming a seizure from an investigatory detention to a de facto arrest, courts have

upheld the use of handcuffs . . . and other measures of force.” (internal quotation marks and

citation omitted)); see also In re David S., 789 A.2d 607, 614 (Md. 2002) (“[A]n

investigatory stop is not elevated automatically into an arrest because the officers handcuffed

the suspect.”). In this case, as in Lovato and unlike in Flores, Defendant was handcuffed due

to his known history of violence and consequent officer safety concerns. Agent Wester

testified that upon removing the handcuffs, Defendant remained calm and was no longer a

safety concern and was therefore not recuffed. Based on the foregoing and viewing the facts

most favorable to the prevailing party, the agents did not act unreasonably in dealing with

the risk that they faced and were not unreasonable in patting down and handcuffing

Defendant; therefore, the fact that Defendant was handcuffed does not transform the

detention into an arrest. See Lovato, 1991-NMCA-083, ¶¶ 26-27 (explaining that officers

may adopt precautionary measures, including performing a protective frisk and handcuffing,
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based on reasonable fears).

{21} We pause to note that we reach this conclusion with very limited evidence before us.

There was little testimony at the suppression hearing regarding Defendant’s alleged “history

of violence.” By comparison, in Lovato, 1991-NMCA-083, ¶¶ 24-32, the basis for the use

of handcuffs was apparent, and we determined that the use of force was reasonable because

the officers stopped a vehicle carrying suspects in a drive-by shooting that had been

committed minutes before. This case is not as clear. However, we must view the facts in

the light most favorable to the prevailing party (here, the State), and Defendant failed to

present any evidence to the contrary or to challenge the reasonableness of the use of

handcuffs under these circumstances either below or on appeal. We avoid “unrealistic

second-guessing of police officers’ decisions in this regard” and do not require that they use

the least intrusive means, only reasonable ones. United States v. Melendez-Garcia, 28 F.3d

1046, 1052 (10th Cir. 1994) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Thus, because

there was uncontroverted evidence that Defendant was known to be violent, we cannot

conclude that handcuffing Defendant was unreasonable. The evidence presented at the

suppression hearing indicates that the agents relied on their knowledge of Defendant’s

history of violence in determining that he needed to be handcuffed; thus, while the State

bears the burden in proving the reasonableness of the detention, we cannot say that the

agents’ fears were unfounded without evidence to the contrary. It is also significant that

Defendant’s handcuffs were removed within ten minutes and he was not recuffed, because,

according to Agent Wester’s testimony, Defendant’s calm demeanor during the detention

led him to believe that Defendant did not pose a safety threat any longer.

{22} We are likewise not convinced that the fact Defendant was given his Miranda rights

turned the detention into a de facto arrest. Miranda warnings are designed to safeguard Fifth

Amendment protections. Cotton v. State, 872 A.2d 87, 97 (Md. 2005).

Although the giving of those warnings may be considered along with more

relevant factors as part of all that occurred, it should have no special

significance in determining whether a temporary detention constitutes an

arrest for Fourth Amendment purposes because it may well be required even

when there is clearly no arrest.

Id.; see Wilson, 2007-NMCA-111, ¶ 20 (“[I]f police officers take highly intrusive steps to

protect themselves from danger, they must similarly provide protection to their suspects by

advising them of their constitutional rights.” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted));

accord United States v. Perdue, 8 F.3d 1455, 1465 (10th Cir. 1993). In Wilson, 2007-

NMCA-111, ¶ 21, we rejected the argument that “Miranda warnings are never required

during an investigatory detention.” Relying on federal case law, we explained that “‘[i]f a

motorist who has been detained pursuant to a traffic stop thereafter is subjected to treatment

that renders him ‘in custody’ for practical purposes, he will be entitled to the full panoply

of protections prescribed by [Miranda].’” Id. ¶ 20 (quoting Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S.

420, 421 (1984)). In other words, during an investigatory detention, a defendant may also
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be subject to a custodial interrogation, and, if that is the case, Miranda warnings need to be

given. Cotton, 872 A.2d at 97 (“Miranda warnings need to be given whenever there is a

custodial interrogation, and a custodial interrogation can arise from a pure Terry stop that

never crosses into an arrest.”). As a result, a “cautious or gratuitous recitation of Miranda

warnings” is not determinative of whether a defendant has been subject to a de facto arrest.

Id. In Cotton, the court explained,

[I]f the police proceed to interrogate a person seized and temporarily

detained pursuant to Terry and do not give Miranda warnings, any

incriminating evidence revealed by that interrogation may, depending on the

circumstances, be held inadmissible as the product of a custodial

interrogation and thereby doom the validity of an ensuing arrest based on that

evidence. The law should encourage police to give those warnings when

questioning a suspect, not discourage them by regarding the warnings as

converting a good Terry stop into a bad arrest.

Id.

{23} In Wilson, we concluded that “in deciding whether a defendant is in Miranda

custody, the question is not whether he or she is being questioned as a part of an

investigatory detention.” 2007-NMCA-111, ¶ 20. Whether Miranda rights are violated and

whether a defendant is subject to an investigatory detention are different inquiries.

However, whether a defendant is given Miranda rights can and should be considered, along

with all the other circumstances in a case, in determining whether a defendant was subject

to a de facto arrest. In this case, Defendant was read his Miranda rights before Agent Wester

began asking him questions about his alleged involvement in trafficking cocaine. The

reading of his rights did not convert the investigatory detention into an arrest. See Perdue,

8 F.3d at 1463 (concluding that when officers employ force normally associated with an

arrest during an investigative detention, Miranda warnings are required).

{24} Finally, we turn to the duration of the detention and the diligence of the agents’

investigation. See Pacheco, 2008-NMCA-131, ¶ 19 (addressing duration and diligence

prongs together because they “both rest on the same underlying premise, an impermissibly

protracted detention”). “A valid investigatory stop allows an officer to detain suspects

briefly to verify or quell . . . suspicion.” Sewell, 2009-NMSC-033, ¶ 13. The evidence in this

case, when viewed in the light most favorable to the prevailing party, indicates that, in the

first ten minutes of the detention before the discovery of contraband, Defendant was stopped,

patted down, given Miranda rights, and handcuffed. Agent Wester then talked to Defendant

for a short time to investigate his suspicion. At that point, after removing Defendant’s

handcuffs, explaining the consent form, and allowing Defendant to sign it, the search of

Defendant’s vehicle began and contraband was discovered almost immediately. The length

of the detention (ten minutes) was reasonably limited to the time required to perform all of

these activities. There is nothing to indicate that the agents delayed the investigation or were

otherwise unreasonable in conducting the investigation. Under these circumstances, the
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agents were diligent in their investigation and detained Defendant no longer than necessary

to verify or quell their suspicion.

{25} While “[t]emporal duration is neither the controlling nor the only factor” to consider,

our Supreme Court remarked in Sewell, “we have found no reported case in which a New

Mexico court has ever held that a ten minute detention was impermissibly long in any set of

circumstances where there was reasonable suspicion to make a roadside drug stop.” 2009-

NMSC-033, ¶¶ 17, 18. That statement is still true, and, taking into account duration and all

of the other factors, this case does not present circumstances in which a ten minute detention

turned into a de facto arrest. Because Defendant was not subject to a de facto arrest, “the

ensuing consensual search of the vehicle [and his person] was not tainted.” Pacheco, 2008-

NMCA-131, ¶ 25.

CONCLUSION

{26} The agents in this case had reasonable suspicion to conduct an investigatory

detention, and that detention did not become a de facto arrest prior to the agents’ discovery

of contraband. Therefore, the district court properly denied Defendant’s motions to

suppress. We affirm.

{27} IT IS SO ORDERED.

____________________________________

JAMES J. WECHSLER, Judge

WE CONCUR:

____________________________________

RODERICK T. KENNEDY, Chief Judge

____________________________________

M. MONICA ZAMORA, Judge