In the 

Missouri Court of Appeals 

Western District

STATE OF MISSOURI,

Respondent,

v.

REGINALD L. SINGLETARY JR.,

Appellant.

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WD77663

OPINION FILED: May 31, 2016

Appeal from the Circuit Court of Johnson County, Missouri

The Honorable R. Michael Wagner, Judge

Before Division One: Lisa White Hardwick, Presiding Judge, Thomas H. Newton, Judge 

and Cynthia L. Martin, Judge

Reginald Singletary, Jr. ("Singletary") appeals his convictions of first degree 

murder and armed criminal action following a jury trial. He claims the trial court erred in 

excluding testimony offered by three witnesses, in overruling a Batson1challenge to the 

State's peremptory strike of venire person number 32, and in refusing to select a jury 

from outside the Seventeenth Judicial Circuit. Finding no error, we affirm.

 

1Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986). 
2

Factual and Procedural Background

Blaine Whitworth ("Whitworth") was murdered on Saturday, September 1, 2012,

when he was shot three times outside his home in Warrensburg. Singletary does not 

challenge the sufficiency of the evidence to support his conviction of first degree murder 

and armed criminal action in connection with Whitworth's death. We view the evidence 

in the light most favorable to the verdict.

2

Whitworth owned two bars in Warrensburg. Singletary had worked as a bouncer 

in one of the bars until a few weeks before Whitworth's murder.

On the day of the murder, Singletary called his ex-wife, Mellissia Robinson 

("Robinson"), and arranged to meet her at around noon at the junction of I-70 and 

Highway 65. Because Singletary had recently missed a scheduled visitation, Robinson 

brought the couple's children to the meeting. Singletary was upset with Robinson for 

doing so, and had her follow him in her car to park behind an old fireworks stand. 

Singletary made Robinson turn off her cell phone and remove the battery. He proceeded 

to tell Robinson that he was in a lot of trouble, as he had gotten mixed up with the wrong 

people and had been asked to kill a man. Singletary told Robinson that he had to do so 

that night or his family would be killed. Singletary showed Robinson a black handgun, 

and claimed it had been given to him by the people who wanted him to kill the man. 

Singletary claimed he could not go to the police because they were "dirty." He told 

 

2

State v. Jones, 479 S.W.3d 100, 105 (Mo. banc 2016) (recognizing that the evidence in a criminal case is 

viewed to determine its sufficiency to support a verdict in the light most favorable to the verdict). 
3

Robinson that if she did not hear from him, she and the kids needed to disappear and 

change their names. Singletary hugged his family and then left.

Whitworth went to one of his bars that night around 7:00 p.m. As was his habit, 

Whitworth spent about an hour at the bar, and then left around 8:00 or 8:30 p.m. 

Ordinarily, Whitworth would return later in the evening to tend bar. However, he did not 

return to the bar that evening. Instead, some time prior to 9:30 p.m., Singletary parked 

down the street from Whitworth's house. After Whitworth arrived home, Singletary 

exited his car and approached and shot Whitworth three times with a .40-caliber Smith 

and Wesson Hi-Point JCP Holloway handgun. Singletary then fled the scene.

Police were called to the scene on a report of shots fired. They saw Whitworth 

lying motionless on the ground outside his truck. He was deceased. In processing the 

scene, a bullet hole was found in the rear passenger door of Whitworth's truck. A cash 

register drawer and bank bag, both full of money, and a laptop computer were found in 

the truck. A shell casing was recovered from the yard the next day.

After the meeting with Singletary, Robinson had decided to stay with a friend in 

Sedalia. At around 8:00 p.m., she reported her conversation with Singletary to the 

Sedalia police. Detective Jill Green ("Detective Green") met with Robinson to discuss 

the situation. During that meeting, Robinson received a call from Singletary saying "I 

will be there to open gifts. Don't worry. Everything is taken care of." When Robinson 
4

asked what Singletary meant, he said he would be there on Monday and that everything 

was taken care of.3

The next day, Singletary called Robinson at about noon. He asked her to call him 

back on a land line. Singletary then told Robinson that he needed her to say that he had 

been with her and the kids the previous day. Though reluctant to do so, Robinson agreed. 

Singletary called Robinson back a few minutes later telling her that she needed to say he 

had been with her and the kids from 2:00 p.m. to 8:00 p.m. the day before.

After talking to Singletary, Robinson and her friend searched the computer for 

information about murders in the Kansas City area. Robinson learned there had been a 

murder the night before in Warrensburg, and was concerned that Singletary was involved 

because he had recently worked as a bouncer in Warrensburg. She contacted Detective 

Green with the Sedalia Police Department who put Robinson in touch with the 

Warrensburg police. 

On Tuesday, September 4, Singletary and Robinson met outside a McDonald's in 

Sedalia. Robinson asked Singletary if she and the kids were safe and if Singletary had 

anything to do with the man killed in Warrensburg. Singletary responded, "Let's just say 

I found another way to have it done. Taken care of." He admitted that he had a "major 

part" in it, and that he did it to protect his family from "these people." Singletary told 

Robinson that everything was fine and again told her to say that he had been with her 

from 2:00 p.m. to 8:00 p.m. on September 1. Singletary also told Robinson that he had 

an alibi starting between 10:00 and 10:30 p.m. Robinson then told Singletary she was 

 

3A birthday party was scheduled for one of the couple's children on that day. 
5

going in to the restaurant to buy food for the kids, and to meet them at a nearby park. 

When Singletary got to his car, he was arrested.

Singletary was interviewed by the police. For the first half of the interview, 

Singletary would not answer questions, but kept asking questions to try to get 

information. Singletary repeatedly said that his life was over and that he was "done." He 

claimed that a group of people with power and money had threatened to kill him and his 

family. Later in the interview, he told the police that he had provided the gun for the 

murder and was at the scene of the murder to take evidence from the gunman. Later still 

in the interview, Singletary claimed that the other man did not show up, so he committed

the murder. 

Singletary told police during the interview that his roommate, Ziyad Abid 

("Abid"), was connected to a group of criminals in Kansas City and wanted to buy 

Whitworth's bars. Singletary claimed that he had spoken to Whitworth about selling the 

bars to Abid, but that Whitworth did not believe Abid had the money to buy the bars. 

Singletary told police that Abid pressured him into agreeing to seriously injure or kill 

Whitworth by framing him for a residential burglary and by threatening Singletary's life

and the lives of his family members. Throughout the interview, the police discounted 

Singletary's concerns about Abid, and characterized Abid as a "fake." 

At one point in the interview, Singletary told the police that he buried the gun used 

to murder Whitworth at a commuter parking lot at the junction of Highways 7 and 13 in 

Higginsville. By phone, Singletary directed an officer to the exact location where the gun 

was recovered. Subsequent tests established that the spent shell casing found in 
6

Whitworth's yard had been fired from the gun, and that the bullets recovered from 

Whitworth's body were consistent with having been fired from the gun.

At trial, Singletary's police interview was introduced into evidence and played for 

the jury.4 Singletary testified in his own defense, and claimed that he was framed for 

Whitworth's murder by Abid and his associates and that he had falsely confessed to the 

murder in order to protect his family from Abid. 

The jury convicted Singletary of first degree murder and armed criminal action. 

Singletary was sentenced to consecutive terms of life without the possibility of parole for 

murder and thirty years for armed criminal action. Singletary timely appealed.

Analysis

Singletary raises three claims of error. He argues in his first point on appeal that 

the trial court erroneously sustained the State's objection to admission of the testimony of 

three witnesses who would have testified about Abid. In his second point, Singletary 

argues that the trial court erroneously overruled his Batson challenge to the State's 

peremptory strike of venire person number 32. In his third point, Singletary argues that 

the trial court abused its discretion in refusing to impanel a jury drawn from outside the 

Seventeenth Judicial Circuit.

Point One

The trial court sustained the State's objections to the relevancy of testimony 

offered by Singletary from three witnesses, and in each case, Singletary made an offer of 

 

4

Portions of the interview were played for the jury during the State's case-in-chief. The entire interview 

was played for the jury during Singletary's case-in chief. 
7

proof. Officer Kevin Bundy ("Officer Bundy") would have testified that Abid had a 

wallet in his possession at the time of his arrest5that was designed to carry a police 

badge. Daniel Tuiono ("Tuiono") would have testified that Abid once asked him to beat 

up another person. Racheal McCurley ("McCurley") would have testified that she once 

lived with Abid, and that Abid frequently had information about the private contents of 

her cell phone. 

In response to the State's relevancy objections, Singletary argued the testimony of 

these three witnesses was relevant to establish Singletary's state of mind during the police 

interview when he confessed to murdering Whitworth. Because the police kept telling 

Singletary during the interview that Abid was not a real threat, Singletary argued the 

testimony established that Abid was a threat and supported his claim that he falsely 

confessed to Whitworth's murder out of fear of Abid. At the same time, however, 

Singletary made it clear to the trial court that he was not claiming that his statements to 

the police were made involuntarily or that he murdered Whitworth under duress. 

A trial court is vested with broad discretion to determine whether to admit 

evidence at trial, and its rulings will not be disturbed on appeal unless they constitute an 

abuse of discretion. State v. Johnson, 207 S.W.3d 24, 42 (Mo. banc 2006). An abuse of 

discretion requires a trial court's ruling to be clearly against the logic of the circumstances 

and so arbitrary and unreasonable as to indicate a lack of careful consideration. Id. at 40. 

"A rebuttable presumption of prejudice is created when admissible evidence is 

 

5Abid was arrested in connection with Whitworth's murder but was later released. 
8

improperly excluded in a criminal case." State v. Sanders, 126 S.W.3d 5, 23 (Mo. App. 

W.D. 2003) (citing State v. Barriner, 111 S.W.3d 396, 401 (Mo. banc 2003)). 

To be admissible, evidence must first be logically relevant. State v. Davis, 318 

S.W.3d 618, 639 (Mo. banc 2010). Logical relevance refers to evidence which tends to 

make the existence of a fact of consequence more or less probable, or which tends to 

corroborate other relevant evidence bearing on a principal issue in a case. Id. at 639-40. 

Singletary claims that the excluded testimony of Officer Bundy, Tuiono, and 

McCurley was logically relevant because it tended to prove his state of mind and his 

motivation for falsely confessing to Whitworth's murder. We disagree. Singletary's 

offers of proof did not establish that Singletary knew that Abid carried a wallet of the 

type used to hold a police badge, that Abid had asked Tuiono to hurt another person, or 

that McCurley suspected that Abid had suspicious access to the contents of her phone. In 

the absence of evidence that Singletary was aware of the subject matter of the excluded 

testimony at the time of his police interview, the excluded testimony was not logically 

relevant to establish Singletary's state of mind during his police interview. 

Singletary's reliance on State ex rel. Kemper v. Vincent, 191 S.W.3d 45 (Mo. banc 

2006), is unavailing. In Vincent, the Missouri Supreme Court held that it was error to 

exclude evidence that police falsely told an accused that she failed a lie detector test she 

actually passed, where the evidence had been offered by the accused to explain her 

confession. Id. at 49-50. The Court concluded that the evidence was admissible under 

the "rule of completeness" because it was evidence "of the circumstances of a writing, 

statement, conversation, or deposition [permitting] the jury [to] have a complete picture 
9

of the contested evidence." Id. Vincent is easily distinguished. Unlike the plainly false 

statement made by the police in Vincent, the excluded testimony in this case was not 

related to circumstances attendant to Singletary's statements to the police, as the subject 

matter of the testimony was not known to police or raised by the police during the 

interview.

In his Brief, Singletary makes the additional argument that the excluded testimony

proved that others had reason to be suspicious or fearful of Abid. However, Singletary 

did not offer the excluded testimony for this purpose at trial. And we are not persuaded 

that the excluded testimony would have been logically relevant if offered for this

purpose. The relevant fact in consequence for the jury to decide was whether Singletary's 

fear of Abid caused him to falsely confess to murdering Whitworth. The opinion held by 

others about Abid does not tend to prove or disprove that Singletary was afraid of Abid or 

that he falsely confessed to Whitworth's murder. 

The trial court did not abuse its discretion in sustaining the State's relevancy 

objections to the admission of testimony from Officer Bundy, Tuiono, or McCurley 

regarding Abid. Point one is denied.

Point Two

In his second point on appeal, Singletary argues that the trial court erroneously 

overruled his Batson challenge to the State's peremptory strike of venire person number 

32. Singletary argues that the State's expressed reason for striking venire person number 

32--because she was involved in pending civil litigation--was not logically related to 
10

Singletary's criminal case and was pretextual because the strike was inaccurately justified 

by a claim that other similarly situated venire persons had been stricken. 

The State is constitutionally prohibited from using peremptory challenges to strike 

potential jurors based solely on discriminatory criterion. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 

(1986). However, a trial judge is vested with considerable discretion in determining 

whether the State's rationale for a peremptory strike is not discriminatory. State v. Gray, 

887 S.W.2d 369, 384 (Mo. banc 1994). We will not reverse a trial court's determination

about whether a peremptory strike is discriminatorily motivated unless the decision is 

clearly erroneous. Id. 

To properly raise a Batson challenge, a defendant must first specifically object to 

the State's strike of a venire person by identifying the discriminatory criterion purportedly 

relied on to make the strike. State v. Parker, 836 S.W.2d 930, 939 (Mo. banc 1992). 

Here, that did not occur. After the State announced its peremptory strikes, Singletary 

stated as follows:

We have received the State's strike list and that includes Juror Number 32, 

and I am making a Batson challenge.

Singletary never identified the discriminatory criterion he alleged the State had relied on 

to strike venire person number 32. Arguably, Singletary thus failed to preserve his

Batson challenge. 

It appears from the transcript, however, that the State and the trial court 

understood Singletary's Batson challenge to have been based on race, though that specific 

claim was not expressed. We thus treat Singletary's Batson challenge as preserved. 
11

Once a Batson challenge based on race is properly invoked, the burden shifts to 

the State to provide a race-neutral reason for the strike that is more than an 

unsubstantiated denial of discriminatory purpose. Parker, 836 S.W.2d at 939. Here, in 

response to Singletary's Batson challenge, the State advised:

The State struck Number 32 in response to questioning is there anybody 

here currently involved in a pending action. She raised her hand. She is 

involved in a pending civil action, and I think she used the word "suer." 

Having used that word, she is currently involved in a pending civil 

litigation, and at this point, judge, all of the other folks that had mentioned 

at all that they were involved in either civil litigation or criminal litigation 

has [sic] been struck. So that is the reason the State is striking Juror 

Number 32.

Once the State articulated a race-neutral basis for the strike, the burden shifted back to 

Singletary to show that the State's explanation for the strike of venire person number 32 

was pretextual. Parker, 836 S.W.2d at 939. Singletary responded to the State's 

explanation as follows:

I believe that the follow-up question was she could be fair and impartial as 

well based upon that, so I believe there is no cause there that the State has 

announced. They just stated she made that statement and then she said she 

could be fair and impartial.

Singletary's response to the State's explanation for striking venire person number 32 did 

not establish that the explanation was pretextual. Rather, the response confused a strike 

for cause with a peremptory strike. The trial court so noted:

They are peremptory strikes. I believe it's a race neutral reason. These are 

the factors that I look at, it's race neutral. It's related to the case. It was 

clear and specific, which I believe it was, and legitimate, and so I don't 

believe the State acted with any illegal discriminatory motive. It sounds 

like they struck other people for the same reason for having lawsuits or a 

legal action pending. 
12

Singletary did not sustain his burden to demonstrate that the State's expressed race neutral 

reason for striking venire person number 32 was pretextual.

It is true that after the trial court's ruling on his Batson challenge, Singletary asked

the State to identify who else it had struck based on pending lawsuits. The State advised 

that it was not obligated to disprove pretext, that it would have to go back over its notes 

to answer Singletary's question, but that "at least three people involved in pending civil 

actions and civil litigation" had been similarly struck. The trial court repeated its ruling 

that it did not believe the strike of venire person number 32 was discriminatory. 

On appeal, Singletary argues that the State's explanation for striking venire person 

number 32 was pretextual because the State inaccurately reported to the trial court that 

other similarly situated venire persons had been struck. According to Singletary, only 

one other venire person, number 79, advised of an involvement in pending civil litigation, 

and by the time peremptory strikes were exercised, that venire person was no longer 

under consideration, as the final jury was selected from venire persons up through 

number 55. According to Singletary, only one venire person, number 32, was actually 

struck because of pending civil litigation. 

The record supports an alternative interpretation. Venire person number 79, who 

reported involvement in litigation, had been stricken for cause before the eligible venire 

panel was reduced to 55 jurors. Another venire person, number 99, identified herself as a 

paralegal who worked for "many" civil attorneys. Though venire person number 99 was 

not stricken for cause, she was effectively stricken because the size of the eligible panel 

was reduced. Though by the time peremptory strikes were exercised, there were no 
13

longer any remaining jurors who were "similarly situated" to venire person number 32,

we cannot say that the State's characterization that others similarly situated jurors had 

been stricken was meaningfully or purposefully inaccurate. 

In any event, it was Singletary's burden to show that the State's explanation for the 

strike of venire person number 32 was pretextual. Singletary had equal access to the 

responses provided by venire persons during voir dire. If Singletary contested the State's 

representation that other similarly situated persons had been stricken, it was up to 

Singletary to make that argument to the trial court--and not to wait to make that argument 

on appeal. 

More to the point, it is plain from the record that the trial court accepted the State's 

explanation for the strike of venire person number 32 for several other reasons not 

challenged by Singletary. The trial court expressly found that the stated reason for the 

strike was race neutral, clear and specific, legitimate, and related to the case. Singletary 

made no argument to the contrary at trial, and makes no argument to the contrary on 

appeal. 

The trial court's decision that the State's peremptory strike of venire person 

number 32 was not racially motivated, which was expressly based on several factors 

other than the State's purportedly mistaken statement that other similarly situated jurors 

had been stricken, was not clearly erroneous. Point two is denied. 

Point Three

In his third point on appeal, Singletary argues that the trial court erred in 

overruling his objection to the selection of a jury from residents of Cass County. 
14

Singletary claims that he withdrew an application to change venue after reaching an 

agreement with the State and the trial court that his jury would be selected from outside 

the Seventeenth Judicial Circuit,

6

and that he later rejected a plea offer from the State and 

insisted on going to trial in reliance on the agreement.

Singletary was charged in Johnson County on October 9, 2012. Singletary filed an 

application for change of venue on January 22, 2013, which claimed a right to a change 

of venue pursuant to Rule 32.02. The application did not allege that Singletary would be 

unable to receive a fair trial in Johnson County, and alleged only that "the parties agree to 

the venue change." 

Rule 32.02 provides in pertinent part that:

If the parties file a stipulation agreeing upon the transfer of a criminal 

proceeding triable by jury to a designated court of competent jurisdiction, 

the court shall order the criminal proceeding transferred to such court. The 

stipulation shall be filed not later than ten days after the initial plea is 

entered. . . . Thereafter, no change of venue or change of judge shall be 

granted to any party stipulating to the change except as provided in Rule 

32.09(c) or Rule 32.10. In lieu of transferring the case to the stipulated 

county, the court may secure a jury from another county as provided by 

law.

Singletary's application did not comply with Rule 32.02. First, although the application

represents that a change of venue has been agreed upon, the application is not a 

stipulation signed by both Singletary and the State. Second, even if deemed a stipulation, 

the application does not identify "a designated court of competent jurisdiction" to which a 

change of venue has been stipulated. Third, the application was filed more than three 

months after Singletary entered his initial plea. By the plain language of Rule 32.02, 

 

6The Seventeenth Judicial Circuit is comprised of two Missouri counties: Johnson and Cass. 
15

unless a change of venue stipulation is filed within ten days of the initial plea, the trial 

court has no power to grant the change of venue except as provided in Rule 32.09(c) or 

32.10. The application made no reference to either Rule, and neither is relied on by 

Singletary in this appeal.

7

Although the application did not afford the trial court the authority to change 

venue, the trial court nonetheless had the authority pursuant to Rule 32.02 to secure a jury 

from another county in lieu of changing venue. That is precisely what occurred here. A 

jury was secured from Cass County. 

Singletary now claims that he had understood the jury would be secured from 

outside the Seventeenth Judicial Circuit. His understanding is not supported by the 

record. During a January 22, 2013 hearing on Singletary's application for change of 

venue, the State advised the trial court that it was not opposed to a change of venue even 

though the stipulation was "after the statutory limit."

8

 The State explained that it had also 

discussed with Singletary's counsel the possibility of leaving the case in Johnson County 

and bringing in "a jury from somewhere else," but that if Singletary persisted with respect 

to wanting a change of venue, the State would not oppose sending the case to Cass 

County. Ultimately, Singletary agreed to withdraw his application, "if we are all in 

agreement that we can get a jury from another county." The trial court specifically asked 

 

7Rule 32.09(c) provides that Rules 32.01 through 32.09 do not "prohibit a judge from ordering a change of 

venue or change of judge when fundamental fairness so requires or pursuant to Rule 32.10." Singletary's application 

for change of venue did not allege that fundamental fairness required a change of venue. Rule 32.10 addresses the 

right to a change of judge and is not at issue in this case. 

8An official transcript from the January 22, 2013 hearing was not provided as a part of the record on appeal. 

However, a copy of the hearing transcript is attached as an exhibit to Singletary's March 17, 2014 application to 

reconsider jury panel selection location. [L.F. 27-34] 
16

the parties if they had discussed which county. The State responded that no agreement 

had been reached on that subject. Singletary's counsel agreed. Although there was some 

discussion about the possibility that the jury could be drawn from a county other than 

Cass, no agreement was reached on that point. In fact, the trial court expressly stated, 

"we will plan on bringing a jury in from another county yet to be determined." 

Singletary's contention on appeal that he withdrew his application for change of venue 

because an agreement was reached to select a jury from outside the Seventeenth Judicial 

Circuit is not supported by the record. 

Singletary concedes that venire persons who had knowledge of Whitworth's

murder, and who had formed an opinion about his case, were removed from the venire 

panel. [Appellant's Brief, p. 63] Singletary concedes that he was not "subjected to a 

biased and partial jury." [Appellant's Brief, p. 63] Singletary claims only that he was 

deprived of the benefit of an agreement that was never reached, and that he made a 

strategic decision to refuse a plea offer in reliance on an agreement that was never 

reached. Point three is denied.

Conclusion

The trial court's judgment is affirmed.

__________________________________

Cynthia L. Martin, Judge

All concur
17