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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON

Inthe Matter ofthe Personal Restraint of: NO.84 7 53-3 GARTH SNIVELY, Petitioner. ENBANC

Filed: 

### MAR 20 2014

----------------- PER CURIAM-In 

### In re Personal Restraint of Adams, 178 Wn.2d 417, 309 P.3d 451 (2013), we held that a facially invalidjudgment and sentence does not create abroad exceptionpermitting apersonal restraintpetitionerto assert a claimthat is otherwise not exempt from the one-year limit on collateral review under RCW 10.73.100. Here, the Court ofAppeals allowed Garth Snively to withdraw his plea of guilty to indecent liberties because ofa facially invalid sentence. Because Snively's sole remedy for the sentencing error is correction ofthejudgment and sentence, we
reverse the Court ofAppeals as to that issue.No. 84753-3 PAGE2 FACTS In 1993 Snively pleaded guilty to a single count ofindecent liberties and two counts offirst degree child molestation. Relying on the plea agreement, the trial court imposed two years ofcommunityplacement on each conviction. But community placementwas not authorized for indecent liberties. See former RCW 9.94A.120(8)(b) (1990). Snively did not appeal, making thejudgment and sentence final when it was filed inthe trial court. RCW 10.73.090(3)(a). In 2003 the State relied on the 1993 convictions in filing apetition alleging that Snivelywas a sexually violentpredator subjectto civil commitmentunder chapter 71.09 RCW. In 2006 ajury found Snively to be a sexually violent predator, resulting inhis current civil commitment. In 2010 Snively filed a personal restraint petition in the Court ofAppeals, challenging his civil commitment by way of collaterally attacking his 1993 convictions. He claimed specifically that he was entitled to withdraw his guilty pleas due to the erroneous communityplacementterm. The State concededthatthe sentence

was facially invalid as to the indecent liberties conviction so as to allow Snively to avoid the one-year limit on collateral attack as to that portion ofthe judgment and sentence. RCW 10.73.090(1). In an unpublished opinion the Court of Appeals accepted the State's concession and relying on In re Personal Restraint of Isadore, 151 Wn.2d 294, 301-02, 88 P.3d 390 (2004), and State v. Mendoza, 157 Wn.2d 582, 584, 141 P.3d 49 (2006), the court held that Snively was entitled to withdraw his guilty plea to the indecent liberties conviction because he was misinformed ofthe community custody term, a direct consequence ofsentencing. In re Pers. Restraint of Snively, noted at 154 Wn. App. 1044 (2010). But the court also held that Snively's collateral challenge to his other two convictions were time barred because theNo. 84753-3 PAGE3 sentences for those crimes were valid. The court further held that invalidity ofthe indecent liberties conviction didnot affect the validity ofSnively's civil commitment. Snively sought discretionary review in this court, and the State sought review ofthe Court ofAppeals invalidation ofSnively's indecent liberties conviction. The court initially stayed consideration ofthe matter pending this court's decision in In re Personal Restraint ofCoats, 173 Wn.2d 123, 267 P.3d 324 (2011), and then againpendingIn re PersonalRestraintofToledo-Sotelo, 176 Wn.2d 759, 297 P.3d 51 (2013), and finally pendingAdams, 178 Wn.2d 417, which is now final. We now deny Snively's motion for discretionary review, grant review of the issue raised by the State, andreversethe Court ofAppeals for reasons explainedbelow. ANALYSIS Snively's objective is to invalidate his current civil commitment by way of withdrawing his 1993 guilty pleas. But because Snively filed his personal restraint petition more than one year after his 1993 judgment and sentence became final, his collateral challenge is time barred unless he demonstrates that the judgment and sentence was entered without competent jurisdiction or is facially invalid, or he asserts only grounds for reliefthat are exempt from thetime limit. RCW 10.73.090(1), 

### .100; Coats, 173 Wn.2d at 131. A judgment and sentence 1s facially invalid if the trial court lacked authority to impose the challenged sentence. Coats, 173 Wn.2d at 136. Thetrial court here lacked statutory authority to impose community placement on the indecent liberties conviction. Thus, the Court ofAppeals correctlyheldthat Snively'sjudgment and sentence is facially invalid solely as to the indecent liberties conviction. But in allowing Snively to withdraw his guilty plea, the Court ofAppeals erred in relying on Mendoza, 157 Wn.2d 582, a direct appeal, and Isadore, 151No. 84753-3 PAGE4 Wn.2d 294, a personal restraint petition filed within the one-year limit. 1 Although Snively avoids the time bar so as to allow him to challenge the facially invalid sentence, his claim that his plea was involuntary due to misinformation as to sentencing is not by itselfan exempt ground for reliefunder RCW 10.73.100. ToledoSotelo, 176 Wn.2d at 770; In re Pers. Restraint ofClark, 168 Wn.2d 581, 587, 230 P.3d 156 (2010). Snively may notrely on the existence ofa facial sentencing error to assert other time barred claims. Adams, 178 Wn.2d at 424-25. Snively's sole remedy is correction ofthe sentence.2

### Id. at427. The Court ofAppeals decision allowing Snivelyto withdrawhis guilty plea is reversed.

1 Ourprecedent concerning "facial invalidity" has developed significantly since the Court ofAppeals entered its decision on Snively's personal restraintpetition. See generally Coats, 173 Wn.2d 123; In re Pers. Restraint ofCarrier, 173 Wn.2d 791, 272 P.3d 209 (2012); In re Pers. Restraint ofScott, 173 Wn.2d 911, 271 P.3d 218 (2012); State v. Chambers, 176 Wn.2d 573, 293 P.3d 1185 (2013); Toledo-Sotelo, 176 Wn.2d 759; In re Pers. Restraintof Finstad, 177 Wn.2d 501, 301 P.3d 450 (2013);Adams, 178 Wn.2d417. 2 Snively does not ask for correction ofthe sentence but seeks only to withdraw his plea and ultimately be released from civil commitment. Our decision today does not preclude Snively from requesting correction ofthejudgment and sentence inthetrial court.