alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
Document Headings

                    Document headings vary by document type but may contain                    the following:                  
                -                       the agency or agencies that issued and signed a document                    
                -                       the number of the CFR title and the number of each part                      the document amends, proposes to amend, or is directly                      related to                    
                -                       the agency docket number / agency internal file number                    
                -                       the RIN which identifies each regulatory action listed in                      the Unified Agenda of Federal Regulatory and Deregulatory                      Actions                    

                    See the                                          Document Drafting Handbook                                        for more details.                  

###### Department of Labor

###### Employment and Training Administration

          - [TA-W-64,839]

Pursuant to Section 221 of the Trade Act of 1974, as amended, an investigation was initiated on January 9, 2009 in response to a petition filed by a company official on behalf of workers of Sony Electronics, Inc., Sony Technology Center—Pittsburgh, TV Assembly Division, Pittsburgh Customer Satisfaction Service Center Division, Mt. Pleasant, Pennsylvania.

The petitioner has requested that the petition be withdrawn. Consequently, the investigation has been terminated.

Signed at Washington, DC, this 17th day of March 2009.

Linda G. Poole,

Certifying Officer, Division of Trade Adjustment Assistance.

[FR Doc. E9-7126 Filed 3-30-09; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 4510-FN-P
Frank B. ALLAIN, et al. v. EXXON MOBIL CORPORATION, Devon Louisiana Corporation, Samson Resources Company, Foster-Brown Operations, Incorporated, Bridas Energy USA, Inc. and Oleum Operating Company, L.C.

NO. 2017-CC-2099

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

February 9, 2018

Denied.
UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 14-6723

TROY RENALDO JONES,

 Petitioner – Appellant,

v.

JOHN S. WOLFE; THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE STATE OF 

MARYLAND,

 Respondents - Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of 

Maryland, at Baltimore. Catherine C. Blake, District Judge. 

(1:14-cv-00091-CCB)

Submitted: September 16, 2014 Decided: September 25, 2014

Before WILKINSON, KING, and GREGORY, Circuit Judges.

Dismissed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Troy Renaldo Jones, Appellant Pro Se. Edward John Kelley, OFFICE 

OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF MARYLAND, Baltimore, Maryland, for 

Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
2

PER CURIAM:

Troy Jones seeks to appeal the district court’s order 

dismissing as untimely his 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (2012) petition. 

The order is not appealable unless a circuit justice or judge 

issues a certificate of appealability. 28 U.S.C. 

§ 2253(c)(1)(A) (2012). A certificate of appealability will not 

issue absent “a substantial showing of the denial of a 

constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2) (2012). When the 

district court denies relief on the merits, a prisoner satisfies 

this standard by demonstrating that reasonable jurists would 

find that the district court’s assessment of the constitutional 

claims is debatable or wrong. Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 

484 (2000); see Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 336-38 

(2003). When the district court denies relief on procedural 

grounds, the prisoner must demonstrate both that the dispositive 

procedural ruling is debatable, and that the petition states a 

debatable claim of the denial of a constitutional right. Slack, 

529 U.S. at 484-85. 

We have independently reviewed the record and conclude 

that Jones has not made the requisite showing. Accordingly, we 

deny a certificate of appealability, deny leave to proceed in 

forma pauperis, and dismiss the appeal. We dispense with oral 

argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately 
3

presented in the materials before this court and argument would 

not aid the decisional process.

DISMISSED
EXHIBIT
31.3









Certification of Chief Executive
Officer

Pursuant to Securities Exchange
Act Rules 13a-14(a) and 15d-14(a)

as Adopted Pursuant to Section
302 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002







I, Daniel Bland, certify that:



| | 1. | I have reviewed this Amendment No. 1 to the Annual Report on Form 10-K of 5BARz International
Inc. for the year ended December 31, 2011; and
| | -- | --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



| | 2. | Based on my knowledge, this report does not contain any untrue statement of a material fact or
omit to state a material fact necessary to make the statements made, in light of the circumstances
under which such statements were made, not misleading with respect to the period covered by this report.
| | -- | ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------





Dated: September 13, 2012



By: /s/ Daniel Bland

Daniel Bland

Chief Executive Officer
Andrew O'Neal TEAGUE v. STATE

CR-15-0228

Court of Criminal Appeals of Alabama.

October 14, 2016

**DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION**

Affirmed.
<PAGE>

                                                                    EXHIBIT 32.2

                    CERTIFICATION OF CHIEF FINANCIAL OFFICER
  PURSUANT TO RULE 13A-14(B) OR 15D-14(A) UNDER THE SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT OF
   1934 AND SECTION 1350 OF CHAPTER 63 OF TITLE 18 OF THE UNITED STATES CODE

      In connection with the Quarterly Report of NGAS Resources, Inc., a British
Columbia corporation (the "Company"), on Form 10-QSB (the "Report") for the
quarter ended September 30, 2004 (the "Reporting Period"), as filed with the
Securities Exchange Commission on the date hereof under the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934, as amended (the "Exchange Act"), the undersigned, Michael P.
Windisch, Chief Financial Officer of the Company, certifies pursuant to Rule
13a-14(b) under the Exchange Act and Section 1350 of Chapter 63 of Title 18 of
the United States Code, that:

      1. The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) of the
Exchange Act; and

      2. The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all
material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the
Company as of the dates and for the periods reported therein.

/s/ Michael P. Windisch

Michael P. Windisch
Chief Financial Officer
November 9, 2004
EX PARTE Torrance BAILEY

CR-16-0027

Court of Criminal Appeals of Alabama.

December 7, 2016

**DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION**

Mand. pet. denied.
Valerie WALTERS, Appellant/Petitioner(s), v. PINE RUN ASSOCIATION, INC., Appellee/Respondent(s).

CASE NO.: 2D16-4590

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.

June 20, 2017

**DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION**

Dismissed.
* Pursuant to Local Rule 47.5, the court has determined that

this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except

under the limited circumstances set forth in Local Rule 47.5.4.

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

__________________

No. 96-11228

Summary Calendar

__________________

JAMES ALFRED GARY,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

versus

D.L. “SONNY” KEESEE, Sheriff of

Lubbock County, Texas; DON JOHNSON,

Jail Administrator for Sheriff’s Office,

Lubbock County, Texas, 

Defendants-Appellees.

______________________________________________

Appeal from the United States District Court for the

Northern District of Texas

(5:96-CV-185)

______________________________________________

June 4, 1997

Before HIGGINBOTHAM, WIENER, and BENAVIDES, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

Texas prisoner James Alfred Gary, No. 41121, appeals the

district court’s imposition of a sanction and dismissal of his

civil rights complaint on the grounds that the complaint contained
2

a perjurious statement, and Gary had failed to comply with a prior

sanction by the district court. Because Gary has failed to present

any appellate argument challenging the district court’s stated

reasons for dismissing his complaint and imposing a sanction, he

has abandoned those issues. See Yohey v. Collins, 985 F.2d 222,

224-25 (5th Cir. 1993).

On appeal, Gary argues that the State’s computation of his

sentence is improper. Gary did not raise this argument in the

district court, and he has failed to present any facts that suggest

that his sentence is plainly erroneous. Douglass v. United Servs.

Auto. Ass’n, 79 F.3d 1415, 1428 (5th Cir. 1996) (en banc).

The appeal is without arguable merit and thus frivolous.

Howard v. King, 707 F.2d 215, 219-20 (5th Cir. 1983). Because the

appeal is frivolous, it is DISMISSED. 5th Cir. R. 42.2. Gary’s

motions to supplement the record, to file a supplemental brief, and

for appointment of counsel are DENIED AS MOOT.

APPEAL DISMISSED; MOTIONS DENIED AS MOOT.
Dwayne WRIGHT, Appellant/Petitioner(s), v. STATE of Florida, Appellee/Respondent(s).

CASE NO.: 2D16-5159

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.

March 15, 2017

**DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION**

Denied.
#### Louis Cohen *v.*Isaac Smith *et al.*

(No. 7791)

Submitted April 10, 1934.

Decided April 17, 1934.

(Rehearing Denied June 13, 1934)

*J. 0. Henson,*for appellant.

*Hugh S. Byrer*and *Harry H. Byrer,*for appellee.

Hatcher, Judge:

Louis Cohen, desiring to purchase some trust property to be sold at public auction, employed Reuben Fine and Mrs. Lucile Noll to bid for him at the sale. The property was knocked down by the auctioneer to Isaac Smith. Fine at once demanded the benefit of Smith’s purchase (for his client, Cohen) upon the claim that Smith had bid for him. Smith denied Fine’s demand and this suit was brought immediately by Cohen to enforce the demand. The circuit court found in favor of Cohen, and Smith appealed.

The sole issue presented by the pleadings and the briefs is the agency of Smith. The bid which purchased the property was $1,925.00. Fine testified that he requested Smith to make that bid for him; that Smith then made the bid; that while the auctioneer was crying it the witness asked Smith “now is that my bid”, and Smith replied “Yes”. Mrs. Noll confirmed Fine’s testimony. Smith denied it. Some circumstances appear in the evidence which tend to discount the testimony of Fine and Mrs. Noll. Other circumstances are shown which tend to support their testi*814mony. A like situation exists in relation to Smith’s evidence. The circumstances are all argumentative rather than demonstrative. So, it would be useless to marshal them in this opinion. The trial chancellor resolved the conflicts in the evidence in favor of the plaintiff. His evidence is not inherently improbable. We cannot say that the finding of the chancellor is plainly wrong. Consequently, that finding will not be disturbed. *Roberts*v. *Roberts,*108 W. Va. 71, 150 S. E. 231.

The decree of the circuit court is affirmed.

*Affirmed.*
CHARLESTON.

#### Joseph B. Davis *v.*Harry Panetta

(No. 5799)

Submitted March 15, 1927.

Decided March 22, 1927.

Appeal and *Error*— Submitting *Pure Questions of Law to Jury is Not Cause for Reversal on Clear Showing of no Prejudice; in Action to Recover Value of Bond Certificate, Submitting to Jury Question Whether Certificate Was Negotiable Was Not Cause for Reversal.*

While it is generally error to submit pure questions of law to the jury, still such error does not call for reversal if it is clearly apparent that it has worked no prejudice to the party complaining.

(Appeal and Error, 4 C. J. § 3010; Trial, 38 Cyc. pp. 1611, 1530.)

(Note : Parenthetical references by Editors, C. J. — Cyc. Not part of syllabi.) ’

Error to Circuit Court, Harrison County.

Trespass on the case by Joseph B. Davis against Harry Panetta. Judgment for plaintiff, and defendant brings error.

*Affirmed.*

*Biagio Merendino*and *Steptoe, Maxwell é Johnson,*for plaintiff in error.

*A. M. Contrail*and W. *C. Stathers,*for defendant in error.

*409Litz, Judge:

This is an action of trespass on the case to recover the value of a certificate for a $1,000 French Government bond belonging to the plaintiff. To the judgment of the circuit court, entered upon a verdict for $951.80 in favor of plaintiff, the defendant prosecutes this writ of error.

The certificate in question was stolen from the safe of the plaintiff in his office at Ursina, Somerset county, Pennsylvania; and afterwards sold by the defendant through the Empire National Bank of Clarksburg, West Yirginia. The only defense offered by the defendant was that he bought the certificate in Clarksburg “of a man who stopped at his hotel for about four days”, without stating what, if anything, he gave for the instrument, or the circumstances of the alleged prirchase. Witnesses for the plaintiff testified to a statement, made by the defendant prior to the trial, that he had purchased the paper in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania.

The defendant complains of two instructions granted at the instance of the plaintiff on the ground that they submitted to the jury the issue of whether or not the certificate was negotiable, a question of law which should have been determined by the court. “While it is generally error to submit pure questions of law to the jury, still such error does not call for reversal, if it is clearly apparent that it has worked no prejudice to the party complaining.” *Runnion*v. *Morrison,*71 W. Va. 254. As the defendant did not offer appreciable evidence tending to show that he was a purchaser of the stolen instrument for value without notice, it would have been proper to grant a peremptory instruction in favor of the plaintiff. *Maryland Finance Corporation*v. *Peoples Bank of Keyser,*99 W. Va. 230; *Merchants Bank & Trust Company*v. *Peoples Bank of Keyser,*99 W. Va. 544. The defendant w;as therefore not injured by the instructions complained of.

The judgment of the circuit court is, therefore, affirmed.

*Affirmed.*
Bryant MCCALL, Appellant, v. STATE of Missouri, Respondent.

No. ED 106834

Missouri Court of Appeals, Eastern District, DIVISION ONE.

FILED: July 30, 2019

FOR APPELLANT, Christian E. Lehmberg, Woodrail Centre, 1000 West Nifong, Building 7, Suite 100, Columbia, MO 65203.

For Respondent, ERIC S. SCHMITT, Dora A. Fichter, P.O. Box 899, Jefferson City, MO 65102.

Before Roy L. Richter, P.J., Robert M. Clayton III, J., and Angela T. Quigless, J.

*ORDER*

PER CURIAM

*877Bryant McCall ("Movant") appeals from the motion court's judgment, after an evidentiary hearing denying his Rule 29.15 motion for post-conviction relief. Movant was convicted, following a jury trial, of two counts of robbery in the first degree (counts 1 and 5), in violation of Section 569.020 RSMo.; one count of attempted robbery in the first degree (count 3), in violation of Sections 569.020 and 564.011 ; three counts of armed criminal action (counts 2, 4, and 6), in violation of Section 571.015; one count of tampering with a motor vehicle in the first degree (count 7), in violation of Section 569.080; one count of unlawful use of a weapon (count 8), in violation of Section 571.030; and one count of resisting a lawful stop or detention (count 9), in violation of Section 575.150. Movant was found to be a prior and persistent offender, and sentenced to concurrent sentences of 25 years' imprisonment for counts 1-6, 15 years' imprisonment on count 7, 7 years' imprisonment on Count 8, and 1 year of imprisonment on count 9. This Court affirmed those convictions on appeal in *State v. McCall,*437 S.W.3d 821 (Mo. App. E.D. 2014).

We have reviewed the briefs of the parties and the record on appeal and find no error of law. No jurisprudential purpose would be served by a written opinion. However, the parties have been furnished with a memorandum for their information only, setting forth the facts and reasons for this order.

The judgment is affirmed pursuant to Rule 84.16(b).
| (1)   | The                Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d)                of                the Securities Exchange Act of 1934;                and |
|-----------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|

| (2)   | The                information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material                respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the                Company. |
|-----------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|

|                            |                                                                                                      |                                               |
|---------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------|
|                            |                                                                                                           |
|                       |                                                                                                 |                                          |
| DATE:              May 14, 2007 |                                                                                                 | /s/ Wade              R.              Bradley |
|                            | Wade                R. BradleyChief                Executive OfficerEAU                Technologies, Inc. |
|                            |                                                                                                           |

----
Rodney J. PUCKETT, Jr., Appellant, v. VALLENCOURT CONSTRUCTION COMPANY, INC. and Amerisure Insurance, Appellees.

CASE NO. 1D17-1004

District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.

Opinion filed October 10, 2017

**DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION**

AFFIRMED.
March 18, 1957

Hon. Paul Brashear, Chairman Opinion No. Ww-62 Military and Veterans' Affairs Committee House of Representatives Austin, Texas Re: Whether or not H.B, 416, 88 8mended, Will adversely affeot the issuance of bonds by theArmory Board.
Dear Mr. Breshear: The question presented is whether H.B. 416, as amended by Committee, will affect the power to issuebonds by the Texas National GuardArmory Board. The Armory Board was created by the 44th Legislature, 1935, General Laws, cle 589Ob. Chapter 184, and codifiedby Vernon asArtiThe Act prescribesboard membership; mode of qualification and certification;the.means for the expression of its official acts; constitutes the board "abody politi,c and corporate," outlines its duties and powers, including that ,of borrowing money, issuingand sellingbonds, debenturesand other evidences of indebtedness;and prescribes f,ormanagement and disposition of property acquired by the Board. Insofar as pertinent,H.B. 416, as proposed, would work certain changes in Section 1 of Article 5890%~.They follow In resume:

(a)The board remains the same numericallybut its personnel is to be changed as vacancies occur in the current membership.

(b)The current statute provides for a six-year membership term, while H.B. 416 contains no specific term of years..(c)Article 589Ob provides for an oath of offlce; H.B. 416 does not. Article XVI, Sections 30 and 3Oa, Constitution of Texas, place restrictions on terms of state offices. Section 30Hon. Paul Brashear - page 2 (WW-62)

provides that the duration of all offices not fixedby the Constitution shall never exceed two years and excepts the Railroad Commission. Section 30a specifiesa six-year term for named board members and a like term for "such boards as have been, or may hereafterbe, establishedby law

. . ." Generally, public officesmay be classifiedas those civil and military. 42Am,Jur., Public Officers, Sec. 17. The Supreme Court of Texas in Texas Net. GuardArmory Board v. McGraw, 132 Tex. 613, 126 S.W. 26 627 (1939),held that membership on the Texas NationalGuardArmory Board was a military office and, therefore, the constitutionalprovlsions (Article16, Sections 30, 30-2) are not applic8ble; consequently, the fact that H.B. 416 imposesno fixed yearterms on board membership has no bearing on the validity of the organization of the Board and its power to function. See also Ex parteArchie Dailey, 93 Tex. Cr. R. 68, 246 S.W. 91 (1922) 26AIR 138. The reasoning of the Court in the McGraw and Dailey cases, supra, excludes the necessity of the prospectivemembers of said Board from taking the usual constitutionaloath oft office (required,byArticle XVI, Section l), since that office is military and not civilby nature and therefore without the purview of said constitutionalproviso. The other changes affected by H.B. 416 are minor and inconsequential insofaras they might have any possiblebearing on the Board's bond issuingpowers. SUMMARY
H.B. 416, as proposed, will not adversely affect the issuance of bonds by the Texas NationalGuard Armory Board.

Very truly yours,

GW-s APPROVED: OPINION COMMITTEE
H. Grady Chandler, Chairman
**Docket Number FAA -**  **2012 -**  **0596**
Local Rule 47.5 provides: “The publication of opinions that

have no precedential value and merely decide particular cases on

the basis of well-settled principles of law imposes needless

expense on the public and burdens on the legal profession.”

Pursuant to that Rule, the Court has determined that this opinion

should not be published.

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

For the Fifth Circuit

No. 96-20023

Summary Calendar

CHARLES A. ATCHISON

Plaintiff-Appellant

VERSUS

HOUSTON LIGHTING & POWER COMPANY, INC;

HOUSTON INDUSTRIES INC; JIMMY SLEDGE

Defendants-Appellees

Appeal from the United States District Court

For the Southern District of Texas

June 13, 1996

Before HIGGINBOTHAM, DUHÉ, and EMILIO M. GARZA, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:1

Appellant, a thirty-year employee of Appellee Houston

Lighting, appeals the district court’s grant of summary judgment in

favor of Houston Lighting dismissing Plaintiff’s action against it

under Title VII of the Civil Rights of 1964 and the Texas law

concerning intentional infliction of emotional distress. We agree
2

with the district court that Plaintiff has failed to create an

issue of material fact as to either his federal or state claims and

we affirm.

Appellant’s claim of race discrimination fails because, as the

district court correctly found, Appellant failed to present any

summary judgment evidence demonstrating that he has suffered an

adverse employment action. Alternatively, we agree with the

district court that Appellant has failed to create an issue of fact

that any adverse employment action he may have suffered was

motivated by racial bias. Likewise, his racial harassment claim

fails because his evidence raisesf no issue of material fact that

the conduct of which he complains is either severe or perverse, or

creates a work environment that a reasonable person would find

either hostile or abusive. His retaliation claim likewise fails

because he has created no issue of fact that he has suffered an

adverse employment action. 

Plaintiff’s state law claim of intentional infliction of

emotional distress suffers a similar fate because Appellant’s

evidence does not raise issues of severe emotional distress nor

that Defendants’ conduct was extreme or outrageous or that

Appellant’s reaction to that conduct was severe. 

Accordingly, for the reasons stated by the district court, the

district court’s judgment is AFFIRMED.