OPINIONS OF THE SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 

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 Felty, Appellee, v. AT&T Technologies, Inc. et al., 

Appellants. 

 [Cite as Felty v. AT&T Technologies, Inc. (1992), Ohio 

St.3d .] 

Workers' compensation -- Decision by Industrial Commission not 

 to suspend an employee's claim under R.C. 4123.53 and Ohio 

 Adm.Code 4123-3-12 is not appealable to the court of 

 common pleas -- Decisions appealable under R.C. 4123.519. 

1. Only decisions reaching an employee's right to participate 

 in the workers' compensation system because of a specific 

 injury or occupational disease are appealable under R.C. 

 4123.519. 

2. Once the right of participation for a specific condition is 

 determined by the Industrial Commission, no subsequent 

 rulings, except a ruling that terminates the right to 

 participate, are appealable pursuant to R.C. 4123.519. 

 (Afrates v. Lorain [1992], 63 Ohio St.3d 22, 584 N.E.2d 

 1175, followed.) 

 (No. 91-1710 -- Submitted September 22, 1992 -- Decided 

December 16, 1992.) 

 Appeal from the Court of Appeals for Franklin County, Nos. 

90AP-1294 and 90AP-1341. 

 This case focuses on whether an Industrial Commission 

decision to deny an employer's request to suspend an employee 

from participation in the workers' compensation system is 

appealable to the common pleas court. 

 Appellee, Pearl Felty, an employee of appellant AT&T 

Technologies ("AT&T"), suffered a work-related injury in 

January 1976. The Industrial Commission ("commission") 

recognized Felty's workers' compensation claim and AT&T, a 

self-insured employer, paid compensation and related benefits. 

Immediately after the injury, for a period of approximately one 

year, Felty was treated by Dr. Alan Longert. 

 In September 1985, some years after she stopped seeing 

Longert, Felty filed a request with the Bureau of Workers' 

Compensation to change her treating physician to Dr. Walter 

Hauser. AT&T wrote to Hauser to notify him that it accepted 

the change and asked that he send to AT&T a report of his 
medical findings and a proposed course of treatment. AT&T sent 

a copy of the letter to Felty's attorney, Stanley R. Jurus. 

Jurus wrote back to AT&T to ask that the company "not 

correspond" with Hauser. Felty wrote to the commission and 

expressly revoked all prior medical releases she had executed. 

When AT&T wrote to Jurus to ask that Felty sign a new medical 

release, Jurus refused. 

 AT&T responded by filing a motion with the commission to 

"indefinitely suspen[d]" Felty's participation in the workers' 

compensation system "pursuant to 4121-3-12, Industrial 

Commission Rules and Section 4123.53, Rev. Code pending the 

claimant's willingness to abide by" the requirements now found 

in Ohio Adm.Code 4123-19-03(L)(4). The district hearing 

officer suspended Felty's claim and the regional board of 

review affirmed. 

 Felty appealed the regional board's decision to the 

commission. The commission vacated the regional board's order 

and denied AT&T's motion requesting suspension of Felty's 

claim. In doing so, the commission cited this court's decision 

in State ex rel. Holman v. Dayton Press, Inc. (1984), 11 Ohio 

St.3d 66, 11 OBR 256, 463 N.E.2d 1243. 

 AT&T then filed a notice of appeal to the Franklin County 

Court of Common Pleas pursuant to R.C. 4123.519. Felty filed a 

motion to dismiss AT&T's appeal; she argued that the court did 

not have subject matter jurisdiction because the commission's 

decision was not appealable under R.C. 4123.519. The court 

denied Felty's motion and granted summary judgment in favor of 

AT&T. The court ruled that the commission's reliance on the 

Holman case was erroneous and ordered the commission to suspend 

Felty's claim. 

 The court of appeals reversed. It held that the 

commission's decision was not appealable pursuant to R.C. 

4123.519. The court wrote that once a claim is allowed, the 

question of whether a claim should be suspended until a 

claimant complies does not go to the employee's right to 

participate. The cause was remanded to the trial court to be 

dismissed. 

 The cause is now before this court upon the allowance of 

motions to certify the record. 

 

 Michael J. Muldoon, for appellee Pearl Felty. 

 Porter, Wright, Morris & Arthur and Charles J. Kurtz III, 

for appellant AT&T Technologies, Inc. 

 Lee I. Fisher, Attorney General, Gerald H. Waterman and 

Cordelia A. Glenn, Assistant Attorneys General, for appellant 

Administrator, Bureau of Workers' Compensation. 

 

 Wright, J. This appeal concerns the question of which 

Industrial Commission decisions may be appealed to the courts 

of common pleas. R.C. 4123.519(A) provides that a claimant or 

an employer "may appeal a decision of the industrial commission 

or of its staff hearing officer * * * in any injury or 

occupational disease case, other than a decision as to the 

extent of disability, to the court of common pleas * * *." We 

have interpreted this provision narrowly to mean that "[t]he 

only decisions reviewable pursuant to R.C. 4123.519 are those 

decisions involving a claimant's right to participate or to 
continue to participate in the [State Insurance] [F]und." 

Afrates v. Lorain (1992), 63 Ohio St.3d 22, 584 N.E.2d 1175, 

paragraph one of the syllabus. 

 The issue in this case is whether a decision by the 

commission not to suspend an employee's claim under R.C. 

4123.53 and Ohio Adm.Code 4123-3-12 is appealable to the court 

of common pleas. We hold that it is not. 

 I 

 This is another in a line of cases in which this court has 

struggled to explain litigants' right to judicial review of 

decisions by the Industrial Commission. Since 1955, when R.C. 

4123.519 was enacted by the General Assembly, this court has 

decided dozens of cases directly involving R.C. 4123.519. 

Recently three of these cases have been overrruled in 

well-intentioned attempts to settle the law. See State ex rel. 

Evans v. Indus. Comm. (1992), 64 Ohio St.3d 236, 594 N.E.2d 609 

(overruling Gilbert v. Midland-Ross Corp. [1981], 67 Ohio St.2d 

267, 21 O.O.3d 168, 423 N.E.2d 847); Afrates v. Lorain, supra 

(overruling State ex rel. O.M. Scott & Sons Co. v. Indus. Comm. 

[1986], 28 Ohio St.3d 341, 28 OBR 406, 503 N.E.2d 1032, and 

Seabloom Roofing & Sheet Metal Co. v. Mayfield [1988], 35 Ohio 

St.3d 108, 519 N.E.2d 358). Regrettably, even these attempts 

have failed to provide the workers' compensation bar with the 

clear direction it must have to effectively and efficiently 

conduct its practice.1 Hence, we attempt to clarify our recent 

decisions in light of the present controversy. 

 II 

 Litigants may seek judicial review of commission rulings 

in three ways: by direct appeal to the courts of common pleas 

under R.C. 4123.519,2 by filing a mandamus petition in this 

court or in the Franklin County Court of Appeals,3 or by an 

action for declaratory judgment pursuant to R.C. Chapter 

2721.4 Which procedural mechanism a litigant may choose 

depends entirely on the nature of the decision issued by the 

commission. Each of the three avenues for review is strictly 

limited; if the litigant seeking judicial review does not make 

the proper choice, the reviewing court will not have subject 

matter jurisdiction and the case must be dismissed. 

 The most limited form of judicial review of commission 

decisions is by direct appeal to the common pleas court. 

Because the workers' compensation system was designed to give 

employees an exclusive statutory remedy for work-related 

injuries, "a litigant has no inherent right of appeal in this 

area * * *." Cadle v. Gen. Motors Corp. (1976), 45 Ohio St.2d 

28, 33, 74 O.O.2d 50, 52, 340 N.E.2d 403, 406. Therefore, a 

party's right to appeal workers' compensation decisions to the 

courts is conferred solely by statute. Id. 

 R.C. 4123.519 states that only two parties, claimants and 

employers, may appeal decisions of the commission. These two 

parties may appeal a decision rendered in "any injury or 

occupational disease case, other than a decision as to the 

extent of disability * * *." R.C. 4123.519(A). Read 

literally, the statute leads to the overbroad rule pronounced 

in O.M. Scott & Sons Co.: "any order of the commission may be 

appealed to the court of common pleas by either party unless 

the order pertains to the extent of disability." Id., 28 Ohio 

St.3d at 343, 28 OBR at 408, 503 N.E.2d at 1034 (overruled by 
Afrates, supra). This rule, however, improperly expanded the 

limited role the courts are to have in the workers' 

compensation system. This was in large part because the role 

of the commission and the system itself became far more complex 

than the drafters of R.C. 4123.519 could have foreseen. "Clear 

though [R.C. 4123.519] may have seemed to the drafters thereof, 

the myriad complications of industrial injury, and legislative 

and administrative efforts to justly cope therewith" led 

litigants from the commission to the courts "to resolve ensuing 

conflicts and uncertainties." State ex rel. Campbell v. Indus. 

Comm. (1971), 28 Ohio St.2d 154, 155, 57 O.O.2d 397, 397-398, 

277 N.E.2d 219, 220. 

 The courts simply cannot review all the decisions of the 

commission if the commission is to be an effective and 

independent agency. Unless a narrow reading of R.C. 4123.519 

is adhered to, almost every decision of the commission, major 

or minor, could eventually find its way to the common pleas 

court. Thus, a long line of cases, with only a few deviations 

along the way,5 led to the formulation of this now-settled 

precept: The only decisions of the commission that may be 

appealed to the courts of common pleas under R.C. 4123.519 are 

those that are final and that resolve an employee's right to 

participate or to continue to participate in the State 

Insurance Fund. Afrates, supra, paragraph one of the syllabus; 

Zavatsky v. Stringer (1978), 56 Ohio St.2d 386, 10 O.O.3d 503, 

384 N.E.2d 693, paragraph one of the syllabus. This narrow 

rule is consistent with the goal of creating a workers' 

compensation system that operates largely outside the courts. 

See Nackley, Ohio Workers' Compensation Claims (1991) 162-163 

("[p]ublic policy" favors this interpretation because otherwise 

"common pleas courts could be burdened with de novo review--if 

not full-blown jury trials--on every ministerial order in every 

claim"). 

 Notwithstanding the seemingly clear rule of Afrates and 

Zavatsky, questions persisted concerning the types of decisions 

that are appealable. The difficulty was the precise meaning of 

the term "right to participate." See Harris, Ohio Supreme 

Court Opinions, 7 Workers' Comp.J. of Ohio (Mar./Apr.1992) 33 

("there remains a great deal of confusion surrounding the 

language 'claimant's right to participate, or to continue to 

participate'"). The meaning of this term was specifically 

addressed in State ex rel. Evans v. Indus. Comm., supra. 

 In Evans, an employee aggravated an existing work-related 

injury in a second accident not related to work. The 

commission granted temporary total disability compensation for 

the period leading up to the second accident, but denied 

compensation for medical bills incurred after the second 

accident. The employee filed a complaint in mandamus in the 

court of appeals to challenge the commission's decision and the 

court of appeals granted a writ. This court reversed. We held 

that because the order of the commission "permanently 

foreclose[d] Evans from receiving any further benefits under 

the claim he filed," the order was appealable under R.C. 

4123.519; the extraordinary remedy of mandamus was not 

available because Evans had a remedy at law. Evans, 64 Ohio 

St.3d at 240-241, 594 N.E.2d at 612. The rule we followed was 

stated in paragraph one of the syllabus: "An Industrial 
Commission decision does not determine an employee's right to 

participate in the State Insurance Fund unless the decision 

finalizes the allowance or disallowance of the employee's 

claim." Thus, the commission's decision to deny Evans the 

right to participate after a certain date because of an 

intervening accident was a final appealable decision on the 

employee's claim. Id. at 241, 594 N.E.2d at 612. 

 The rule articulated in Evans requires further 

clarification. The confusion involves the meaning of the word 

"claim" in the above-quoted syllabus of Evans. A "claim" in a 

workers' compensation case is the basic or underlying request 

by an employee to participate in the compensation system 

because of a specific work-related injury or disease. A 

decision by the commission determines the employee's right to 

participate if it finalizes the allowance or disallowance of an 

employee's "claim." The only action by the commission that is 

appealable under R.C. 4123.519 is this essential decision to 

grant, to deny, or to terminate the employee's participation or 

continued participation in the system. 

 Thus, an order allowing a claim for one injury but denying 

a claim for two other injuries arising out of the same accident 

is appealable. Zavatsky, supra. A ruling that the claimant 

did not sustain any disability as a result of a work-related 

accident is also appealable. Keels v. Chapin & Chapin, Inc. 

(1966), 5 Ohio St.2d 112, 34 O.O.2d 249, 214 N.E.2d 428. And a 

decision by the commission that a claimant's right to 

participate is not barred by the limitations period prescribed 

by R.C. 4123.52 is appealable. State ex rel. Consolidation 

Coal Co. v. Indus. Comm. (1985), 18 Ohio St.3d 281, 18 OBR 333, 

480 N.E.2d 807. These cases illustrate the rule that an appeal 

to the common pleas court is limited to one decision: whether 

an employee is or is not entitled to be compensated for a 

particular claim. 

 In contrast, requests by a litigant for additional 

activity in a case, for temporary suspension of a claim, or for 

one of the myriad interlocutory orders the commission may issue 

in administering a case are not "claims." For example, a 

decision by the commission to allow or deny additional 

compensation for a previously allowed condition when there is 

no new condition is not appealable because it goes to the 

extent of the injury--there is no new claim. State ex rel. 

Roope v. Indus. Comm. (1982), 2 Ohio St.3d 97, 2 OBR 649, 443 

N.E.2d 157 (mandamus held to be the proper remedy). An order 

determining the employer's right to offset disability payments 

against future compensation is not appealable. State ex rel. 

McGinnis v. Indus. Comm. (1991), 58 Ohio St.3d 81, 568 N.E.2d 

665 (mandamus held to be the proper remedy). Nor is a 

claimant's request that permanent partial disability and 

permanent total disability be paid concurrently appealable 

under R.C. 4123.519. State ex rel. Murray v. Indus. Comm. 

(1992), 63 Ohio St.3d 473, 588 N.E.2d 855 (mandamus held to be 

the proper remedy). 

 An example highlights the distinction between appealable 

and non-appealable decisions. An employee is involved in an 

accident at work and injures her legs. She is totally disabled 

and files an application for benefits. A decision by the 

commission allowing or disallowing her claim is clearly 
appealable under R.C. 4123.519. See Zavatsky, supra; Keels, 

supra. Later, the employee develops severe depression as a 

result of her injury. Again she applies for benefits, this 

time to cover her treatment for depression. A decision by the 

commission to allow or disallow this condition is also 

appealable under R.C. 4123.519 for the reason that the 

development of such a secondary condition would present a new 

"claim" by the employee to participate in the fund. See 

Weisenburger v. Central Foundry Div., Gen. Motors Corp. (1979), 

60 Ohio St.2d 178, 14 O.O.3d 412, 398 N.E.2d 568; Davis v. 

Connor (1983), 13 Ohio App.3d 174, 13 OBR 209, 468 N.E.2d 774. 

The employer then attempts to offset its payments of total 

disability compensation against the employee's disability 

pension. The employee files a motion with the Bureau of 

Workers' Compensation to prevent the employer from doing this. 

This is not a "claim." The decision to grant the employee's 

motion and deny the employer's right to offset is not 

appealable to the common pleas court because it does not go to 

the employee's right to participate in the fund. See Miraglia 

v. B.F. Goodrich Co. (1980), 61 Ohio St.2d 128, 15 O.O.3d 163, 

399 N.E.2d 1234. 

 As this example demonstrates, only those decisions that 

finalize the allowance or disallowance of a claim -- in the 

sense of a claim for a specific injury or occupational 

disease--are appealable. Once the right of participation for a 

specific condition is determined by the commission, no 

subsequent rulings, except a ruling that terminates the right 

to participate, are appealable pursuant to R.C. 4123.519. 

 III 

 This case does not involve a decision by the commission on 

Pearl Felty's right to participate in the workers' compensation 

system. The commission decision that spawned this appeal was 

the denial of AT&T's November 20, 1985 motion to "indefinitely 

suspen[d]" Felty's claim because she refused to allow AT&T 

access to her medical records. AT&T did not ask the commission 

to terminate Felty's nine-year participation in the system. 

The decision by the commission was merely a response to AT&T's 

request for action on the case; it was not a ruling on Felty's 

right to participate. A decision not to suspend a claim is not 

the same as a decision to grant or deny a claim. State ex rel. 

Anderson v. Dept. of State Personnel (1979), 60 Ohio St.2d 106, 

108, 14 O.O.3d 339, 340, 397 N.E.2d 1199, 1201. 

 Our judgment in this case is guided by our recent decision 

in Afrates, supra. In Afrates, the administrator provisionally 

allowed the employee's claim, stating that any objection must 

be made within ten days of receipt of the order. The employer 

did not object within ten days, but argued that it had not 

received statutorily required notice of the administrator's 

order. The commission ruled that the employer had not received 

notice and granted the employer leave to file an objection. We 

held that an appeal from this decision was improper because the 

commission's ruling "was in no way one which finalized the 

allowance (or disallowance) of Afrates's claim." 63 Ohio St.3d 

at 27, 584 N.E.2d at 1179. 

 In this case, as in Afrates, the commission's decision did 

not concern the allowance or diallowance of the employee's 

claim. The case can be resolved through the use of a simple 
syllogism: Only decisions reaching an employee's right to 

participate in the system because of a specific injury or 

occupational disease are appealable under R.C. 4123.519. The 

Industrial Commission's decision not to suspend employee 

Felty's claim does not reach Felty's right to participate in 

the fund. Therefore the commission's decision is not 

appealable. 

 IV 

 The judgment of the court of appeals that the trial court 

lacked subject matter jurisdiction is affirmed. We express no 

opinion on the merits of the commission's decision not to 

suspend Felty's claim. The cause is remanded to the Franklin 

County Court of Common Pleas to be dismissed. 

 Judgment affirmed 

 and cause remanded. 

 Moyer, C.J., Sweeney, Holmes and H. Brown, JJ., concur. 

 Douglas and Resnick, JJ., concur in the syllabus and 

judgment only. 

 

FOOTNOTES: 

 1 See State ex rel. Evans v. Indus. Comm. (1992), 64 Ohio 

St.3d 236, 241, 594 N.E.2d 609, 613 (Resnick, J., dissenting) 

(stating that the majority opinion "further confuse[s] this 

area of the law"); Harris, Ohio Supreme Court Opinions, 7 

Workers' Comp. J. of Ohio (Mar./Apr. 1992) 33 (stating that "a 

great deal of confusion" remained after the Afrates decision). 

All three attorneys who participated in oral arguments in this 

case (each representing one of the three interested parties in 

a workers' compensation case: claimants, employers, and the 

Administrator) told the court of continuing uncertainty on this 

issue. 

 2 See State ex rel. Consolidation Coal Co. v. Indus. 

Comm. (1985), 18 Ohio St.3d 281, 18 OBR 333, 480 N.E.2d 807. 

 3 See State ex rel. Stafford v. Indus. Comm. (1989), 47 

Ohio St.3d 76, 547 N.E.2d 1171; State ex rel. Eaton Corp. v. 

Lancaster (1988), 40 Ohio St.3d 404, 534 N.E.2d 46; State ex 

rel. Cook v. Zimpher (1983), 11 Ohio App.3d 187, 11 OBR 281, 

463 N.E.2d 1274 (proper venue for mandamus action against 

commission lies exclusively in Franklin County). 

 4 See State ex rel. Marks v. Indus. Comm. (1992), 63 Ohio 

St.3d 184, 586 N.E.2d 109. 

 5 See, e.g., State ex rel. O.M. Scott & Sons Co. v. 

Indus. Comm. (1986), 28 Ohio St.3d 341, 28 OBR 406, 503 N.E.2d 

1032; Seabloom Roofing & Sheet Metal Co. v. Mayfield (1988), 35 

Ohio St.3d 108, 519 N.E.2d 358.