Filed 4/7/21 In re Douglas S. CA4/1

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for 

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or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. 

COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

STATE OF CALIFORNIA

In re DOUGLAS S., a Person 

Coming Under the Juvenile Court 

Law.

THE PEOPLE,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

DOUGLAS S.,

Defendant and Appellant.

 D076943

 (Super. Ct. No. J239877)

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of San Diego County, 

Browder Willis, Judge. Affirmed and remanded with directions.

Sheila O’Connor, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for 

Defendant and Appellant.

Xavier Becerra, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant 

Attorney General, Julie L. Garland, Assistant Attorney General, Michael P. 

Pulos and Joy Utomi, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and 

Respondent.
2

I.

INTRODUCTION

The juvenile court found that Douglas S. (Douglas), a minor, committed 

a felony assault by means of force likely to produce great bodily injury (Pen. 

Code, § 245, subd. (a)(4))1 and personally inflicted great bodily injury on the 

victim (§ 12022.7, subd. (a)). At the disposition hearing, the juvenile court 

committed Douglas to the Youthful Offender Unit Program (YOU) at East 

Mesa Juvenile Detention Facility.

On appeal, Douglas contends that there is not substantial evidence in 

the record to support the juvenile court’s finding that he inflicted great bodily 

injury on the victim. We conclude that the record contains substantial 

evidence to support the great bodily injury enhancement finding.

While this appeal was pending, we requested supplemental briefing as 

to whether the juvenile court erred in failing to calculate Douglas’s maximum 

period of confinement. (See Welf. & Inst. Code, § 726, subd. (d)(1) [“If the 

minor is removed from the physical custody of his or her parent or guardian

as the result of an order of wardship made pursuant to Section 602, the order 

shall specify that the minor may not be held in physical confinement for a 

period in excess of the maximum term of imprisonment which could be 

imposed upon an adult convicted of the offense or offenses which brought or 

continued the minor under the jurisdiction of the juvenile court”].) As both 

parties acknowledge in their supplemental briefs, the juvenile court erred in 

failing to calculate Douglas’s maximum period of confinement and to indicate 

that period of confinement in the record.

1 Unless otherwise specified, all subsequent statutory references are to 

the Penal Code.
3

Accordingly, we remand the matter to the juvenile court to permit that 

court to calculate Douglas’s maximum period of confinement and to indicate 

that period of confinement in the record. In all other respects, the disposition 

order is affirmed.

II.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

One afternoon in October 2019, the victim2 was visiting with three 

friends outside an apartment complex. Douglas and a minor named D.L. 

passed the group in a vehicle. The victim had previously been friends with 

D.L., and the victim also knew Douglas.

Douglas got out of the car and approached the victim in an aggressive 

manner. Douglas accused the victim of betraying him and his gang. During 

the confrontation, D.L. also approached the victim. After Douglas finished 

confronting the victim, he began to walk away.

After Douglas walked away, D.L. slapped the victim across her face, 

hitting her nose. The victim responded by attempting to punch D.L., but she 

was unable to strike D.L. because the victim’s friends were restraining her. 

D.L. began to walk away from the victim.

After the victim’s friends released her, the victim ran after D.L. to 

confront her. By this time, D.L. was walking near Douglas. As the victim 

approached D.L., Douglas punched the victim in the face, hitting her below 

her right eye and on her nose. The force of the punch knocked the victim to 

the ground. The victim was unable to brace herself as she fell, and her head 

hit the concrete. Douglas and D.L. left the area.

After the incident, the victim walked a short distance to her residence. 

The victim’s father drove the victim and the victim’s stepmother to D.L.’s 

2 The victim was 16 at the time of Douglas’s adjudication hearing.
4

house, which was also nearby. While outside of D.L.’s residence, the victim’s 

parents called the police.

Police officers responded to D.L.’s residence and spoke with the victim. 

After the victim spoke with the officers, paramedics arrived and took her to 

the hospital in an ambulance.

As a result of the incident, the victim suffered a facial contusion, a 

facial laceration,3 a rib contusion, some knee pain, and, as discussed in 

greater detail in part III, post, a nasal fracture.

III.

DISCUSSION

A. There is substantial evidence to support the trial court’s finding that 

Douglas inflicted great bodily injury on the victim

Douglas claims that there is not substantial evidence in the record to 

support the trial court’s finding that Douglas inflicted great bodily injury on 

the victim (§ 12022.7, subd. (a)). According to Douglas, the victim’s “injury 

was only minor, [and] the evidence did not sufficiently support the great 

bodily injury [finding].”

1. The juvenile court’s great bodily injury finding

After finding that Douglas committed the charged offense of assault by 

means of force likely to produce great bodily injury (§ 245, subd. (a)(4)), the 

juvenile court found that Douglas inflicted great bodily injury on the victim 

(§ 12022.7, subd. (a)) during the commission of that offense. The juvenile 

court stated in relevant part:

“With regard to the [great bodily injury] allegation, I find 

that the only [great bodily injury] would be the fracture. 

There are two indications of the fracture. First, on page 

[three] [of the victim’s medical records], that they 

3 The laceration left a small scar under the victim’s eye.
5

performed the diagnostic testing and found the right-sided 

nasal bone fracture. And then when you go to page 47 [of 

the medical records]: findings. [‘]right-sided nasal bone 

fracture as seen. No other orbital or mandible fractures.[’]

“[S]o it is clear that there was a nose fracture. [T]hat is 

[great bodily injury] [¶] . . . [¶] The court finds beyond a 

reasonable doubt that there is a true finding as to count 1 

and the [great bodily injury] allegation.”

2. Relevant law

a. Standard of review

In determining the sufficiency of the evidence to support a conviction, 

“the relevant question is whether, after viewing the evidence in the light 

most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found 

the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” (Jackson v. 

Virginia (1979) 443 U.S. 307, 319 (Jackson), italics omitted.) “[T]he court 

must review the whole record in the light most favorable to the judgment 

below to determine whether it discloses substantial evidence—that is, 

evidence which is reasonable, credible, and of solid value—such that a 

reasonable trier of fact could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable 

doubt.” (People v. Johnson (1980) 26 Cal.3d 557, 578.)

A challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence supporting a true finding 

on a great bodily injury enhancement (§ 12022.7, subd. (a)) is governed by the 

same substantial evidence standard of review. (People v. Escobar (1992) 

3 Cal.4th 740, 750 (Escobar)); see, e.g., People v. Saez (2015) 237 Cal.App.4th 

1177, 1189.) As the Escobar court explained:

“It is well settled that the determination of great bodily 

injury is essentially a question of fact, not of law. 

‘ “Whether the harm resulting to the victim . . . constitutes 

great bodily injury is a question of fact for the jury. 

[Citation.] If there is sufficient evidence to sustain the 
6

jury’s finding of great bodily injury, we are bound to accept 

it, even though the circumstances might reasonably be 

reconciled with a contrary finding.” ’ [Citations.]” 

(Escobar, supra, at p. 750.)

The standard of review of an insufficiency claim in juvenile cases is the 

same as in adult criminal cases. (In re Matthew A. (2008) 165 Cal.App.4th 

537, 540.) In both instances, the reviewing court must “ ‘presume in support 

of the judgment the existence of every fact the trier of fact could reasonably 

deduce from the evidence’ ” and “ ‘make all reasonable inferences that 

support the finding of the juvenile court.’ ” (In re Babak S. (1993) 

18 Cal.App.4th 1077, 1089.)

b. Substantive law

Section 12022.7, subdivision (a) provides, “Any person who personally 

inflicts great bodily injury on any person other than an accomplice in the 

commission of a felony or attempted felony shall be punished by an additional 

and consecutive term of imprisonment in the state prison for three years.”

“Great bodily injury is defined in section 12022.7, subdivision (f), as 

‘significant or substantial physical injury.’ However, ‘the injury need not be 

so grave as to cause the victim “permanent,” “prolonged,” or “protracted” 

bodily damage.’ [Citation.] ‘Proof that a victim’s bodily injury is “great” . . . is 

commonly established by evidence of the severity of the victim’s physical 

injury, the resulting pain, or the medical care required to treat or repair the 

injury.’ ” (People v. Woods (2015) 241 Cal.App.4th 461, 486 (Woods).)

3. Application

The record in this case contains each type of evidence that the Woods

court stated is commonly used to establish the existence of great bodily 

injury. With respect to the severity of the injury, the People presented 

evidence that Douglas punched the victim in the face, below her right eye, on 
7

the bridge of her nose. The force of the punch “knocked [the victim] to the 

ground,” causing her to hit her head on the concrete. She suffered a “[r]ightsided nasal bone fracture,” from the punch.

The People also presented evidence that the victim suffered significant 

pain from the blow. When asked to describe the amount of a pain that she 

suffered from the punch on a scale of one to ten, with ten representing “an 

extreme amount of pain,” the victim estimated her pain as being at an 

“eight.” The victim also stated that Tylenol that she took on the day of the 

injury did “not really” alleviate her pain.

The People also presented evidence that the victim received medical 

care to diagnose and treat her injury. Medical records offered in evidence 

demonstrated that the victim underwent numerous diagnostic tests, 

including “CT Facial Bones w/o Contrast,” “CT Spine Cervical w/o Contrast,” 

and “CT Head w/o Contrast.” The scan of her facial bones revealed a nasal 

fracture. A report from the emergency room stated:

“Patient states she did fall backwards, she does not know 

[if] she lost consciousness or if she hit her head. Patient 

states she has significant pain, rates an 8 out of 10 over the 

right cheek, there is a laceration and swelling. Patient also 

complains of right shoulder pain, left knee pain and leftsided rib pain. Patient describes all the pain is throbbing. 

Patient does admit to mild lightheadedness.”

Hospital personnel applied ice to the victim’s face, and provided her 

with 650 milligrams of Tylenol.

In sum, the juvenile court could have reasonably relied on evidence in 

the record of “ ‘the severity of the victim’s physical injury, the resulting pain, 

[and] the medical care required to treat or repair the injury’ ” (Woods, supra, 

241 Cal.App.4th at p. 486), in finding that Douglas inflicted great bodily 

injury during the commission of the charged offense.
8

Douglas’s arguments in support of his contention that the record lacks 

substantial evidence of great bodily injury are unpersuasive. Douglas’s 

primary argument is that “[w]hile historically, a fracture alone was found to 

be a significant injury, courts have since found that an analysis of the specific 

facts of each case must take place.” (See People v. Nava (1989) 

207 Cal.App.3d 1490, 1497–1498 (Nava) [“a bone fracture does not qualify 

automatically as a great bodily injury”]; but see People v. Villarreal (1985) 

173 Cal.App.3d 1136, 1140–1141 [concluding that jury was properly 

instructed “ ‘[a] bone fracture constitutes a substantial and significant 

physical injury within the meaning of . . . [s]ection 12022.7’ ”].)

Even assuming that a bone fracture does not constitute great bodily 

injury as a matter of law (see Nava, supra, 207 Cal.App.3d at pp. 1497–1498), 

in performing a sufficiency analysis, we must view the “evidence in the light 

most favorable to the prosecution.” (Jackson, supra, 443 U.S. at p. 319.) 

Thus, case law such as Nava does not establish that evidence of the victim’s 

bone fracture does not constitute substantial evidence to support the trial 

court’s great bodily injury finding. (See People v. Quinonez (2020) 

46 Cal.App.5th 457, 464–465 [“While ‘every bone fracture’ is not great bodily 

injury as a matter of law, a jury ‘very easily’ could find a broken nose 

constitutes great bodily injury as a matter of fact if it ‘results in a serious 

impairment of physical condition,’ ” quoting Nava, supra, at pp. 1497–1498].) 

In this case, based on evidence in the record as to the nature of the victim’s 

injury, her resulting pain, and the medical treatment that she received (see 

ante), the juvenile court could reasonably find that the victim’s nasal fracture 

constituted great bodily injury.

We are not persuaded by Douglas’s contention that the juvenile “court 

ignored the testimony of the victim.” To begin with, there is nothing in the 
9

record to support Douglas’s assertion as to how the juvenile court weighed 

the victim’s testimony that he maintains was favorable to him. And even if 

the juvenile court did disregard the victim’s testimony, “it is the exclusive 

province of the trial judge or jury to determine the credibility of a witness and 

the truth or falsity of the facts upon which a determination depends.” (People 

v. Maury (2003) 30 Cal.4th 342, 403.) Moreover, Douglas mischaracterizes 

the victim’s testimony pertaining to her injuries in two key respects. First, 

Douglas contends that “when asked whether her nose had any pain, [the 

victim] replied ‘a little bit, I guess. Not really.’ ” However, in so testifying, 

the victim was distinguishing the pain from her “nose” injury with that 

related “to [her] eye,” which the victim rated as an “eight.” In addition, 

Douglas states that the “[victim] admitted that although her head hit the 

concrete, she did not lose consciousness.” In fact, the victim testified that she 

could not remember whether she had lost consciousness.4

In sum, we conclude that there is substantial evidence in the record to 

support the trial court’s finding that Douglas inflicted great bodily injury on 

the victim.

B. The juvenile court erred in failing to calculate Douglas’s maximum period 

of confinement and to indicate in the record that maximum period of 

confinement

When a minor is removed from the custody of his or her parents 

pursuant to a wardship order, the juvenile court is required to indicate the 

maximum period of physical confinement. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 726, subd. 

4 The relevant testimony is as follows:

“[The prosecutor:] . . . [D]o you remember whether you lost 

consciousness or got knocked out at all?

“[The victim:] No.”
10

(d)(1); In re Julian R. (2009) 47 Cal.4th 487, 497.) The maximum period of 

confinement must be reflected in the court’s minutes and may be orally 

stated. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 5.795(b); In re Julian R., supra, at p. 497.)

The juvenile court declared Douglas a ward of the court and removed 

him from his parents’ custody. However, the juvenile court did not note the 

maximum period of confinement in its minute order as required under 

California Rules of Court, rule 5.795(b), nor did it orally state the maximum 

period of confinement.

Accordingly, we remand the matter for the juvenile court to calculate a 

maximum period of confinement and indicate that period of confinement in 

the record, as required.

IV.

DISPOSITION

The matter is remanded for the juvenile court to calculate Douglas’s 

maximum period of confinement and to indicate that period of confinement in 

the record. In all other respects, the disposition order is affirmed.

AARON, J.

WE CONCUR:

HALLER, Acting P. J.

GUERRERO, J.