IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Township of Cranberry :

:

v. :

:

Randy J. Spencer, : Nos. 568, 569 & 570 C.D. 2022

Appellant : Submitted: April 28, 2023

BEFORE: HONORABLE RENÉE COHN JUBELIRER, President Judge

HONORABLE CHRISTINE FIZZANO CANNON, Judge

HONORABLE LORI A. DUMAS, Judge

OPINION NOT REPORTED

MEMORANDUM OPINION 

BY JUDGE FIZZANO CANNON FILED: August 30, 2023

In these consolidated cases, Randy J. Spencer (Spencer) appeals from 

orders of the Court of Common Pleas of Venango County (trial court) dated May 

10, 2022, denying Spencer’s post-trial motions following the trial court’s imposition 

of the maximum statutorily authorized fines against Spencer for his longstanding 

violations of ordinances of the Township of Cranberry (Township). Upon review, 

we affirm the trial court’s orders.

I. Background

Spencer owns several parcels of real property in the Township on which 

he stores a large number of junk vehicles. See Reproduced Record (RR) at 139a

1

(2016 bid proposal for removal of “117 cars, 11 box trailers [“(some with brakes 

1 The reproduced record page numbers are followed by a capital “A.” We use a small “a” 

here as directed by Rule 2173 of the Pennsylvania Rules of Appellate Procedure, Pa.R.A.P. 2173.
2

frozen up & flat tires)”], 7 motorhomes, [and] 8 travel trailers . . .”).

2

 The Township 

has been trying for over a quarter century to induce Spencer to remove the junk 

vehicles. See, e.g., id. at 135a (2016 letter from Spencer to the Township 

acknowledging the Township’s expenditure of “large amounts of funds for legal 

fees, costs and expenses over the past 20 years” and asserting that “Spencer has 

likewise expended large amounts of funds for legal fees . . .”). Spencer paid a fine 

for violations in 2007. See id. at 143a-44a (2018 letter from Spencer to the Township 

proposing a resolution that would include reimbursement by the Township for the 

2007 fine). However, the junk vehicles remained on the properties thereafter.

In 2019, the Township’s zoning officer issued citations to Spencer for 

zoning violations in operating junkyards on six properties. Twp. of Cranberry v. 

Spencer, 249 A.3d 9, 11 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2021) (Spencer I). The citation notices 

informed Spencer that he must remove the junk vehicles or appeal the citations 

within 30 days. Id. at 12. Spencer did neither. Id.

Thereafter, the Township filed separate civil enforcement complaints

regarding the six properties with a magisterial district judge (MDJ), who imposed 

fines and costs of $609.25 for each property. Spencer I, 249 A.3d at 12. Spencer 

appealed the MDJ’s judgments to the trial court, where the Township filed de novo

2

In Township of Cranberry v. Spencer, 249 A.3d 9 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2021) (Spencer I), 

Spencer testified that he tried to “work with the Township” to resolve his zoning violations in 

2016. Id. at 13. That effort consisted of a proposal to the Township in which Spencer offered to 

move the junk vehicles if the Township would pay relocation costs estimated at over $100,000, 

issue him two junkyard licenses for the proposed relocation sites, provide all necessary zoning and 

code approvals “automatically granted without the necessity of application,” allow him 12 months 

to complete the relocation, and reimburse him for his legal costs and previous fines. RR at 134a40a. Spencer also submitted a proposal in 2018 in which he again demanded reimbursement of a 

fine he paid in 2007, along with two junkyard licenses, 180 days to move the junk vehicles from 

specified properties, and an indefinite time thereafter to move the junk vehicles from the remaining 

properties, subject also to delays based on future weather events and any potential health problems 

he might suffer. Id. at 143a-44a.
3

complaints requesting fines of $500 per day for ongoing violations, totaling $21,200

at that point, plus costs and legal fees. Id. After a joint evidentiary hearing, the trial 

court concluded that Spencer was improperly using each of the six properties as a 

junkyard; however, the trial court treated certain contiguous tracts as single 

properties and thereby reduced the amounts of some of the fines imposed by the 

MDJ. Id. at 12-14. The trial court filed its order under each of the six case dockets. 

Id. at 14. 

Notwithstanding the trial court’s separate entry of judgment on each 

docket, Spencer filed a single notice of appeal listing all six trial court docket 

numbers, with a checkmark next to one of them. Spencer I, 249 A.3d at 15. This 

Court quashed the appeal as to the other five cases. Id. at 18. We cited the Official 

Note to Rule 341 of the Pennsylvania Rules of Appellate Procedure, which requires 

“separate notices of appeal” where one or more orders are entered resolving issues 

on more than one docket. Pa.R.A.P. 341, Official Note.3 We also relied on our 

3 The Official Note to Rule 341 provides, in its entirety:

A party needs to file only a single notice of appeal to secure review 

of prior non-final orders that are made final by the entry of a final 

order, see K.H. v. J.R., 826 A.2d 863, 870-71 (Pa. 2003) (following 

trial); Betz v. Pneumo Abex LLC, 44 A.3d 27, 54 (Pa. 2012) 

(summary judgment). Where, however, one or more orders resolves 

[sic] issues arising on more than one docket or relating to more than 

one judgment, separate notices of appeal must be filed. Malanchuk 

v. Tsimura, 137 A.3d 1283, 1288 (Pa. 2016) (“[C]omplete 

consolidation (or merger or fusion of actions) does not occur absent 

a complete identity of parties and claims; separate actions lacking 

such overlap retain their separate identities and require distinct 

judgments[.]”); Commonwealth v. C.M.K., 932 A.2d 111, 113 & n.3 

(Pa. Super. 2007) (quashing appeal taken by single notice of appeal 

from order on remand for consideration under Pa.R.Crim.P. 607 of 

two persons’ judgments of sentence).

Pa.R.A.P. 341, Official Note (italics added).
4

Supreme Court’s decision in Commonwealth v. Walker, 185 A.3d 969 (Pa. 2018), in 

which the Court held that in future cases, “when a single order resolves issues arising 

on more than one lower court docket, separate notices of appeal must be filed. The 

failure to do so will result in quashal of the appeal.” Spencer I, 249 A.3d at 17

(quoting Walker, 185 A.3d at 977) (additional quotation marks omitted). As we 

observed in Spencer I, the rule announced in Walker is a “bright-line mandatory 

instruction to practitioners to file separate notices of appeal.” Spencer I, 249 A.3d 

at 17 (quoting Walker, 185 A.3d at 976-77) (additional quotation marks omitted).

As for the sixth notice of appeal in Spencer I, this Court found that the 

single notice of appeal included an attachment that identified the appeal as relating 

to a specific docket concerning the tract designated as the Deep Hollow Property. 

249 A.3d at 18. Therefore, while we were constrained to quash the other five 

appeals, we concluded that the appeal concerning the Deep Hollow Property had 

been properly preserved. Id. at 18-19.

On the merits, Spencer argued, in pertinent part, that the trial court erred 

in the amount of the fine it imposed, in the absence of evidence concerning the 

zoning violations. This Court rejected that argument, concluding that once the 

Township offered evidence of Spencer’s failure to appeal the zoning officer’s 

determination, “the trial court possessed discretion to determine the fines.” Spencer 

I, 249 A.3d at 20. Observing that “Spencer has not cooperated with the Township” 

in resolving the violation and that the trial court had reduced the amount of the fine 

imposed by the MDJ, we found no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s 

determination of the amount of the fine. Id. This Court ultimately affirmed the trial 

court’s order regarding the Deep Hollow Property. Id. at 23.
5

Despite the finality of this Court’s decision in Spencer I, Spencer 

persisted in failing or refusing to remove the junk vehicles from the properties at 

issue. Accordingly, in July 2021, the Township filed three new civil enforcement 

actions

4 with the MDJ seeking to collect additional fines for the period after our 

Spencer I decision. Following a hearing in September 2021, the MDJ entered a 

judgment in the jurisdictional maximum of $12,000 plus costs, a total of $12,331.25,

in each of the three cases. See 42 Pa.C.S. § 1515(a)(3) (conferring jurisdiction on 

MDJs over civil actions where the maximum amount sought is $12,000 exclusive of 

interest and costs).

The violations themselves had been finally adjudicated in Spencer I, 

and Spencer still had not removed the junk vehicles. Thus, he had no substantive 

defense against the Township’s enforcement complaints. Nonetheless, Spencer 

chose to appeal the MDJ’s judgments to the trial court,5thereby exposing himself to 

a potential maximum judgment of $500 per day, plus costs and legal fees, for each

property, as statutorily authorized by Section 617.2(a) of the Pennsylvania 

Municipalities Planning Code (MPC),6 an amount far in excess of the MDJ’s 

maximum jurisdiction. See 53 P.S. § 10617.2(a). After a de novo trial, the trial court 

imposed the maximum fine, which by that time had reached $92,500 in each of the 

4 Presumably, the Township filed three complaints rather than five in recognition of the 

trial court’s decision in Spencer I treating some contiguous tracts as single properties for purposes 

of calculating fines.

5 Spencer also claims to have tried, unsuccessfully, to settle with the Township. As the 

Township had already obtained a final judgment against him in Spencer I such that he had no 

substantive defense to the zoning violations, it is unclear what inducement Spencer could have 

offered the Township that would have made any settlement attractive.

6 Act of July 31, 1968, P.L. 805, as amended, 53 P.S. §§ 10101-11202. Section 617.2 of 

the MPC was added by the Act of December 21, 1988, P.L. 1329.
6

three complaints, for a total of $277,500. The trial court also imposed ongoing daily 

fines in the maximum amount of $500 in each case.

Spencer filed motions for post-trial relief. The trial court modified its 

decision to eliminate the ongoing daily fines, but otherwise denied the post-trial 

motions. These consolidated appeals followed.

II. Issues

In its order dated October 18, 2022, consolidating Spencer’s appeals, 

this Court also questioned the propriety of filing a post-trial motion in a summary 

appeal, citing Rule 720(D) of the Pennsylvania Rules of Criminal Procedure,

Pa.R.Crim.P. 720(D), and observing that Spencer’s appeal might be untimely. We 

directed the parties to address that issue in their briefs, along with the merits of the 

appeal. In response to this Court’s directive to address the timeliness of his appeal, 

Spencer argues that, notwithstanding the trial court’s inaccurate reference to this 

case as a summary appeal, the Rules of Criminal Procedure are inapplicable here 

because this is purely a civil proceeding. Hence, Spencer maintains that his appeal 

within 30 days after the trial court’s order denying his post-trial motions was timely. 

The Township took no position on this issue.

On the merits, Spencer argues that the trial court abused its discretion,

7

in that the trial judge showed ill will, bias, and hostility (designated collectively as 

bias hereafter) toward him in various ways, including imposing the maximum 

7

“In an appeal from a trial court’s decision in a zoning enforcement proceeding, our review 

is limited to determining whether the trial court committed an abuse of discretion or error of law.” 

Spencer I, 249 A.3d at 19 n.12 (quoting Loganville Borough v. Godfrey, 58 A.3d 1149, 1151 n.2 

(Pa. Cmwlth. 2012) (additional quotation marks omitted)).
7

statutory fine and not considering Spencer’s alleged efforts to mitigate his zoning 

violations.8

III. Discussion

A. Timeliness of Spencer’s Appeal

As described above, Spencer asserts that this case is a purely civil 

enforcement proceeding, not an appeal of a summary criminal fine. Accordingly, he 

contends that the post-trial proceedings are governed by civil rules, including the 

requirement for a post-trial motion and the determination of the applicable appeal 

deadline. We agree.

Section 617.2(a) of the MPC provides, in pertinent part, that “[a]ny 

person . . . who . . . has violated . . . the provisions of any zoning ordinance enacted 

under this act or prior enabling laws shall, upon being found liable therefor in a civil 

enforcement proceeding commenced by a municipality, pay a judgment of not more 

than $500[9] plus all court costs, including reasonable attorney fees incurred by a 

municipality as a result thereof.” Borough of Bradford Woods v. Platts, 799 A.2d 

984, 989 n.7 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2002) (quoting 53 P.S. § 10617.2(a)) (additional 

quotation marks omitted). The record indicates that this is an appeal in a civil 

enforcement matter and that the fines at issue were imposed under the authority of 

Section 617.2(a) of the MPC.

8

In his reply brief, Spencer also asserts that “[t]he trial court abused its discretion by 

imposing the maximum fine in the absence of harm to the Township.” Spencer’s Reply Br. at 1. 

However, it is well settled that an issue raised for the first time in an appellant’s reply brief is 

waived. Commonwealth v. Walter, 119 A.3d 255, 264 n.7 (Pa. 2015), cert. denied sub nom. Walter 

v. Pennsylvania, 577 U.S. 1119 (2016); Commonwealth v. Fahy, 737 A.2d 214, 218 n.8 (Pa. 1999). 

Accordingly, we will not consider that argument.

9 There is no dispute that the fine is imposed per violation and that each day the violation 

continues is a separate violation. See 53 P.S. § 10617.2(a).
8

Pursuant to Rule 1007(A) of the Pennsylvania Rules of Civil Procedure 

Governing Actions and Proceedings Before Magisterial District Judges, Spencer’s

de novo appeal to the trial court from the MDJ’s judgment was governed by the 

Pennsylvania Rules of Civil Procedure. See Pa.R.Civ.P.M.D.J. 1007(A).10 Under 

Rule 227.1(b) of the Pennsylvania Rules of Civil Procedure, a post-trial motion must 

be filed to preserve an issue for appeal. Pa.R.Civ.P. 227.1(b). Thereafter, under 

Rule 903(a) of the Pennsylvania Rules of Appellate Procedure, an appeal is timely 

if the notice of appeal is filed within 30 days after the trial court rules on the posttrial motion. Pa.R.A.P. 903(a); see also Ross v. Se. Pa. Transp. Auth., 714 A.2d 

1131, 1133 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1998) (explaining that “[i]t is the order of the trial court 

disposing of a motion for post-trial relief that has been reduced to judgment which 

comprises the final order in the case from which an appeal must be filed within [30]

days”) (italics omitted).

There is no dispute that Spencer filed his notice of appeal within 30 

days after the trial court’s disposition of his post-trial motion. Accordingly, we agree 

that his appeal is timely.

B. Spencer’s Allegations of Bias

As Spencer correctly observes, “[a]n abuse of discretion is not merely 

an error of judgment but is rather the overriding or misapplication of the law, or the 

exercise of judgment that is manifestly unreasonable, or the result of bias, prejudice, 

ill-will or partiality, as shown by the evidence of record.” Spencer’s Br. at 25-26 

(quoting Commonwealth v. Carter, 861 A2.d 957 (Pa. Super. 2004) (en banc)) 

10 Rule 1007(A) provides, in full: “The proceeding on appeal shall be conducted de novo

in accordance with the Rules of Civil Procedure that would be applicable if the action was initially 

commenced in the court of common pleas.” Pa.R.Civ.P.M.D.J. 1007(A).
9

(emphasis added) (additional quotation marks omitted). Spencer argues that the trial 

court’s decision should be overturned for abuse of discretion because the trial judge 

based his decision solely on a bias against Spencer. We disagree.

Spencer first alleges that the trial judge exhibited bias against him by 

scheduling the trial with too little notice and while the pleadings were open, then 

granting the Township’s continuance request, and then falsely stating, in response 

to Spencer’s statement of errors complained of on appeal, that the trial date “was set 

months in advance and the parties knew and understood the scheduling.” Spencer’s 

Br. at 23.

Our review of the trial court’s docket reveals that Spencer filed an 

answer to the Township’s complaint on December 13, 2021. RR at 3a. On January 

10, 2022, the trial court issued an order scheduling a “hearing” on February 2, 2022. 

Id. On January 13, the Township filed an answer to Spencer’s new matter. Id. On 

February 1, 2022, the trial court issued an order rescheduling the “hearing” for 

March 1, 2022. Id. On February 22, 2022, the Township filed a motion for a 

continuance, which the trial court granted on the same day, rescheduling the 

“hearing” for March 29, 2022. Id. On March 3, after a motion to reschedule was 

filed on March 2, 2022,11 the trial court issued an order moving the “hearing” up to 

March 14, 2022, on which date the trial was apparently held. See id.

Noticeably absent from the docket, and from Spencer’s argument, is 

any indication that he filed a motion seeking a continuance at any time. See RR at 

3a. Having failed to file any written request to extend the trial date, Spencer is in no 

position to complain after the fact that the trial court’s timetable was too short. 

Moreover, he has neither averred nor demonstrated any prejudice arising from the 

11 The docket does not identify the filer of the motion to reschedule. See RR at 3a.
10

trial court’s scheduling of the trial. The most he alleges in his brief is that the trial 

court refused to continue oral argument on his post-trial motions so that he could 

wait for the outcome of his application for a junkyard permit. That assertion is 

discussed below, but it has no relevance to any order scheduling the trial.

Next, Spencer suggests that the fine was excessive as a result of the trial 

judge’s bias. Spencer claims that the trial judge demonstrated that bias by ignoring 

Spencer’s mitigating evidence of his efforts to correct his zoning violations and

rejecting his evidence of such efforts as not credible, without sufficient basis. He

alleges that he removed the junk vehicles from one property. He claims that the 

Township offered insufficient evidence that his ongoing zoning violations were 

intentional, and he implies that the trial judge was biased in crediting such evidence

because the Township based its argument solely on the imposition of a previous fine 

in Spencer I. According to Spencer, “[t]hat citation involved six tax parcels of land, 

including the Deep Hollow Road property . . . . The Deep Hollow Road property, it 

is not disputed, has been fully remediated. How the Township can argue that the 

Defendant has not undertaken remedial efforts is difficult to understand.” Spencer’s 

Br. at 24. The fatal flaw in this argument is evident on its face: the previous citation 

related to six properties, and even crediting Spencer’s assertion,12 he subsequently

remediated only one of them.

Notably, in Spencer I, we upheld the amount of the MDJ’s fine based 

in part on our observation that “Spencer ha[d] not cooperated with the Township” in 

resolving his zoning violation. 249 A.3d at 20. Spencer continued to violate the 

12

 The Township disputes Spencer’s averment and maintains that the property referenced 

by Spencer was the subject of this Court’s decision in a separate action, Twp. of Cranberry v. 

Spencer (Pa. Cmwlth., No. 201 C.D. 2020, filed March 24, 2021) (Spencer II). Thus, the Township 

contends that Spencer’s removal of the vehicles from that property had no connection to the 

separate zoning violations at issue here, which related to different properties.
11

zoning ordinance thereafter. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding 

that Spencer’s removal of junk vehicles from only one property did not constitute a 

mitigating effort at compliance with the zoning ordinance. Spencer’s ongoing 

violations on the other five properties, which continued even after this Court’s 

affirmance of the 2019 citations in Spencer I, weighed against a finding that Spencer 

made a good faith effort to mitigate the violations.

Spencer similarly charges that the trial judge displayed bias by ignoring 

Spencer’s evidence of his offers to remedy his zoning violations. This argument is 

likewise unavailing. As noted above, the record documents two written offers of 

compliance by Spencer. In both, he demanded unreasonable concessions by the 

Township. In 2016, Spencer offered to move the junk vehicles only if the Township 

would pay relocation costs estimated at over $100,000, issue him two junkyard 

licenses for the proposed relocation sites, provide all necessary zoning and code 

approvals “automatically granted without the necessity of application,” allow him 

12 months to complete the relocation, and reimburse him for his legal costs and 

previous fines. RR at 134a-40a. In 2018, he dropped his demand for relocation 

costs but again demanded reimbursement of the fine he paid in 2007, and again 

demanded the issuance of two junkyard licenses; he also demanded that the 

Township give him 180 days to move the junk vehicles from specified properties 

and an indefinite time thereafter to move the junk vehicles from the remaining 

properties, subject, moreover, to indefinite delays based on possible weather events 

and any potential health problems he might suffer – in other words, no firm deadline 

for compliance. Id. at 143a-44a. The Township could not reasonably have been 

expected to accept such conditions. The trial court’s rejection of this evidence as 

insufficient to prove mitigation efforts did not constitute a display of bias.
12

Spencer also alleges bias because the trial judge excluded evidence 

concerning Spencer’s then-pending application for a junkyard permit on the basis 

that no permit had been issued and there was no evidence that it was likely to be 

issued. We see no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s rejection of such evidence, 

which was speculative. Accord Shao Bao Guan v. Phila. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment 

(Appeal of Ford) (Pa. Cmwlth., No. 1546 C.D. 2014, filed June 17, 2015),13 slip op. 

at 12 (concluding that the zoning hearing board abused its discretion by denying a 

special exception, where the opponents’ testimony about future adverse results was 

speculative and not supported by any evidence); Evers v. Clarks Summit 

Borough/Borough Council (Pa. Cmwlth., No. 871 C.D. 2010, filed Sept. 22, 2011), 

slip op. at 21-22 (concluding that the common pleas court did not abuse its discretion 

by rejecting evidence opposing a conditional use, where the testimony at issue 

asserted speculative potential future events “without any evidentiary support that 

such an event had any reasonable likelihood of occurring”).

In short, Spencer spent a quarter century resisting the Township’s 

zoning enforcement efforts – much of that time after having already been cited and 

fined. We cannot say the trial court abused its discretion or demonstrated bias by

finding that Spencer’s token eleventh hour compliance efforts and empty offers of 

cooperation lacked credibility as evidence of mitigation. 

Spencer further asserts that the trial judge displayed bias by refusing to 

delay argument on his post-trial motions pending the outcome of his application for 

a conditional use permit for a junkyard. Spencer maintains that obtaining a 

conditional use permit would have corroborated his testimony that he intended to 

13 Pursuant to Commonwealth Court Internal Operating Procedure Section 414(a), 210 Pa. 

Code § 69.414(a), unreported panel decisions of this Court issued after January 15, 2008, may be 

cited for their persuasive value.
13

remedy the zoning violations. However, Spencer did not present the trial court with 

any evidence that he was likely to receive such a permit. Moreover, there is no 

record evidence that he ever succeeded in obtaining a conditional use permit.14 

Spencer cites no authority, and this Court is aware of none, to support the proposition 

that a court commits reversible error by refusing, as speculative, evidence of an 

uncertain future event.

Spencer also argues that the trial court showed bias by imposing an 

illegal interest rate on the judgment against him in the form of ongoing daily fines, 

which it subsequently vacated. According to Spencer, the improper interest rate

indicated an “abuse of discretion infecting this proceeding” that was not cured by 

vacating the ongoing fines. Spencer’s Br. at 22. However, Spencer does not allege 

that he ever paid any of the improperly imposed fines, which were vacated by the 

trial court in ruling on Spencer’s post-trial motions. We fail to discern any prejudice 

to Spencer from an error in an order that was vacated. Moreover, as we have found 

no other display of bias by the trial court, we cannot conclude that this one error, 

which the trial court promptly corrected, constitutes such an abuse of discretion as 

to show bias infecting the entire proceeding.

Finally, Spencer further insists that the trial judge had no factual basis 

for positing that Spencer could afford to pay the maximum fine by selling or 

14 Spencer asserts in a footnote in his brief that the Township has since issued him a 

“permit.” Spencer’s Br. at 28 n.9. He does not state whether the alleged permit was a conditional 

use permit or some other kind of permit, such as a business permit, to operate a junkyard. See id. 

More importantly, Spencer fails to point to anywhere in the record where supporting evidence for 

this assertion can be found. A bare averment of fact in a brief is not record evidence. See

Hollingsworth v. Unemployment Comp. Bd. of Rev., 189 A.3d 1109, 1113 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2018) 

(stating that “mere allegations are no substitute for record evidence . . . ” and, therefore, “this Court 

cannot consider the averments of fact in [a party’s] brief . . .”).
14

mortgaging some property,15 and therefore, imposition of the maximum fine 

“amounted to a judicial curb stomping of [Spencer] and was not motivated by a 

desire for justice or undertaken in an effort to improve the lives of [] Township 

residents, but simply to vindicate his dislike of [Spencer].” Spencer’s Br. at 24. 

However, Spencer has failed to preserve this argument for appeal.

In order to preserve an issue for appeal, it must be raised at every stage 

of the proceedings. See Commonwealth v. Barnes, 151 A.3d 121, 124 (Pa. 2016) 

(stating that “an appellant waives any claim that is not properly raised in the first 

instance before the trial court and preserved at every stage of his appeal”). Spencer 

asserted in his post-trial motions that the trial court erred by failing to consider 

whether he could pay the maximum fine; however, he did not claim that failure 

resulted from bias. See RR at 93a-95a. In submitting a statement of issues for appeal

pursuant to Rule 1925(b) of the Pennsylvania Rules of Appellate Procedure 

(Statement), Spencer did not renew his assertion of error in the trial court’s failure 

to consider his ability to pay the maximum fine; what is more, he again neglected to 

assert bias as the cause of that failure. See id. at 146a. The Statement, in its entirety, 

set forth the following issues for appeal:

1. Whether the [trial court] abused its discretion in 

imposing the maximum possible penalty and attempting to 

impose post-judgment interest at the rate of 197% (which 

was later withdrawn) in light of [Spencer’s] comtinued

[sic] attempts to resolve the issue with the Township that 

led to the ligitation [sic].

15 We note, however, that in a separate action relating to a property not at issue in this case, 

Spencer insisted the vehicles parked on that property were not “junk” vehicles, but rather, were 

worth “over six figures.” Spencer II, slip op. at 6.
15

2. Whether the Court abused its discretion in refusing to 

consider evidence of [Spencer] clearing another property 

of vehicles.

3. Whether the Court abused its discretion in failing to 

consider [Spencer’s] application for a zoning permit.

Id. 

Although the Statement did not have to be detailed, it had to be 

sufficiently specific to provide notice to the trial court of all issues fairly subsumed 

within it. Rule 1925(b)(4)(i)-(ii) and (v)-(vii) provides, in pertinent part: 

(4) Requirements; waiver.

(i) The Statement shall set forth only those errors that the 

appellant intends to assert.

(ii) The Statement shall concisely identify each error that 

the appellant intends to assert with sufficient detail to 

identify the issue to be raised for the [trial] judge. The 

[trial] judge shall not require the citation to authorities or 

the record; however, appellant may choose to include 

pertinent authorities and record citations in the Statement.

. . . .

(v) Each error identified in the Statement will be deemed 

to include every subsidiary issue that was raised in the trial 

court . . . .

(vi) If the appellant in a civil case cannot readily discern 

the basis for the [trial] judge’s decision, the appellant shall 

preface the Statement with an explanation as to why the 

Statement has identified the errors in only general terms. 

In such a case, the generality of the Statement will not be 

grounds for finding waiver.

(vii) Issues not included in the Statement and/or not raised 

in accordance with the provisions of this paragraph (b)(4) 

are waived.

Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b)(4)(i)-(ii) & (v)-(vii). 
16

Spencer did not preface his Statement with any assertion that he could 

not readily discern the basis for the trial judge’s decision, so that was not a 

justification for his identification of the errors in only general terms. See Pa.R.A.P. 

1925(b)(4)(vi). We cannot determine from the bare and general averments in the 

Statement that Spencer was identifying as an issue that the trial court’s imposition 

of the maximum statutory fine without considering Spencer’s ability to pay was the 

result of bias. Further, Spencer had not raised the bias issue previously in the trial 

court,16 so bias could not be deemed an included subsidiary issue under Rule 

1925(b)(4)(v). Therefore, we conclude that the Statement failed to identify alleged 

bias with sufficient detail to identify it as an issue for the trial judge as required by 

Rule 1925(b)(4)(ii).

The purpose of requiring inclusion of all issues in the Statement is to 

allow the trial court an opportunity to address the issues in an opinion so that this 

Court has a basis for meaningful review on appeal; as such, it is a “crucial component 

of the appellate process.” Commonwealth v. Lord, 719 A.2d 306, 308 (Pa. 1998), 

superseded by statute on other grounds as stated in Commonwealth v. Burton, 973 

A.2d 428, 431 (Pa. Super. 2009). Similarly, “[o]ne of the main purposes of the 

waiver doctrine is to ensure that the appellate court is provided with the benefit of 

the trial court’s reasoning.” Commonwealth v. Metz, 633 A.2d 125, 127 n.3 (Pa. 

1993). Spencer’s insufficient Statement deprived the trial court of the opportunity 

to address the issue of bias in its failure to consider Spencer’s ability to pay the 

maximum fine; in doing so, Spencer likewise deprived this Court of the benefit of 

16 In that regard, we note that “[t]he purpose of [Rule] 1925(b) is not to give appellants one 

last opportunity to raise issues they failed to raise previously before the trial court. This rule simply 

allows the trial court to seek a clarification as to which of the issues already raised will be pursued 

upon appeal.” Rutledge v. Dep’t of Transp., 508 A.2d 1306, 1307-08 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1986).
17

the trial court’s reasoning, and thus, of a basis for meaningful review of the issue.17 

Accordingly, we conclude that Spencer waived this issue.

IV. Conclusion

Spencer’s entire abuse of discretion argument consists of an 

impassioned, hyperbolic criticism of the trial judge’s alleged bias, even accusing the 

trial judge of “curb stomping” him. Spencer’s Br. at 24. Spencer maintains that his 

“claims of bias, prejudice, ill-will or partiality . . . appear on a dispassionate review 

of the record.” Id. at 26. However, this Court’s dispassionate review of the record 

has revealed no such bias, prejudice, ill-will, or partiality on the part of the trial 

judge. Accordingly, we find no abuse of discretion. The orders of the trial court are 

affirmed.

__________________________________

CHRISTINE FIZZANO CANNON, Judge

17 In this Court’s view, Spencer likewise did not identify bias sufficiently for the trial court 

with regard to any of the other issues on appeal. Although all issues on appeal were arguably 

waived as a result, we considered the other issues because the record was nonetheless sufficient to 

allow us to provide meaningful review of those issues. See Commonwealth v. Laboy, 936 A.2d 

1058, 1060 (Pa. 2007) (declining to find waiver despite an unspecific statement pursuant to Rule 

1925(b) of the Pennsylvania Rules of Appellate Procedure where the issues presented on appeal 

were “relatively straightforward” and the common pleas court had provided sufficient analysis to 

allow meaningful review on appeal).
IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Township of Cranberry :

:

v. :

:

Randy J. Spencer, : Nos. 568, 569 & 570 C.D. 2022

Appellant :

O R D E R

AND NOW, this 30th day of August, 2023, the orders of the Court of 

Common Pleas of Venango County dated May 10, 2022 are AFFIRMED.

__________________________________

CHRISTINE FIZZANO CANNON, Judge