alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5
<MULTIPLIER> 1,000
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   3-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          NOV-30-1997
<PERIOD-START>                             DEC-02-1996
<PERIOD-END>                               MAR-02-1997
<CASH>                                          10,133
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                   92,099
<ALLOWANCES>                                     6,984
<INVENTORY>                                     37,363
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                               149,892
<PP&E>                                         159,770
<DEPRECIATION>                                  37,590
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                 715,453
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                          101,171
<BONDS>                                        356,400
<COMMON>                                           295
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<OTHER-SE>                                     193,989
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                   715,453
<SALES>                                        168,904
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                               168,904
<CGS>                                           96,014
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                   96,014
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                     0
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                   602
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                               6,801
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                  6,352
<INCOME-TAX>                                     3,164
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                              3,188
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                  2,030
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                     1,158
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                     0.04
<EPS-DILUTED>                                     0.04
        

</TABLE>
[No. 30807-0-II.

Division Two.

June 2, 2004.]

#### Deana Howland, et al., *Appellants,*v. Maybeth A. Grout, *Respondent.*

Appeal from a judgment of the Superior Court for Pierce County, No. 02-2-12952-3, Brian M. Tollefson, J., entered August 29, 2003. *Affirmed*by unpublished opinion per Hunt, J., concurred in by Quinn-Brintnall, C.J., and Morgan, J. Now published in part at 123 Wn. App. 6.
EXHIBIT 32.1

                            CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
                             18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,
                             AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
                  SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

In connection with the Annual Report of SeaOspa, Inc. (the "Company") on Form
10-K for the period ended December 31, 2009, as filed with the Securities and
Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the "Report"), the undersigned, as the
Chief Executive Officer of the Company, hereby certifies pursuant to 18 U.S.C.
Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of
2002, that, to my knowledge:

(1)  The Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d)
     of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

(2)  The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material
     respects, the financial condition and result of operations of the Company.

Dated: March 3, 2010
                                     /s/ Yakov Terner
                                     -------------------------------------------
                                     Yakov Terner
                                     Principal Executive and Principal Financial
                                     and Principal Accounting Officer
Exhibit 31.2

**CERTIFICATIONS**

I, Greg Holsted, hereby certify that:

(1) I have reviewed this quarterly report on Form 10-QSB/A for the period ended June 30, 2007 (the “report”) of Environmental Energy Services, Inc.;

(2) Based on my knowledge, this report does not contain any untrue statement of a material fact or omit to state a material fact necessary to make the statements made, in light of the circumstances under which such statements were made, not misleading with respect to the period covered by this report;

(3) Based on my knowledge, the financial statements, and other financial information included in this report, fairly present in all material respects the financial condition, results of operations and cash flows of the small business issuer as of, and for, the periods presented in this report;

(4) The small business issuer's other certifying officers and I are responsible for establishing and maintaining disclosure controls and procedures (as defined in Exchange Act Rules 13a-15(e) and 15d-15(e)) for the small business issuer and have:

(a) Designed such disclosure controls and procedures, or caused such disclosure controls and procedures to be designed under our supervision, to ensure that material information relating to the small business issuer, including its consolidated subsidiaries, is made known to us by others within those entities, particularly during the period in which this report is being prepared;

(b) [omitted]

(c) Evaluated the effectiveness of the small business issuer's disclosure controls and procedures and presented in this report our conclusions about the effectiveness of the disclosure controls and procedures, as of the end of the period covered by this report based on such evaluation; and

(d) Disclosed in this report any change in the small business issuer’s internal control over financial reporting that occurred during the small business issuer’s most recent fiscal quarter (the small business issuer’s fourth fiscal quarter in the case of an annual report) that has materially affected, or is reasonably likely to materially affect, the small business issuer’s internal control over financial reporting; and 

(5) The small business issuer's other certifying officers and I have disclosed, based on our most recent evaluation of internal control over financial reporting, to the small business issuer's auditors and the audit committee of small business issuer's board of directors (or persons performing the equivalent functions):

(a) All significant deficiencies in the design or operation of internal control over financial reporting which are reasonably likely to adversely affect the small business issuer's ability to record, process, summarize and report financial information; and

(b) Any fraud, whether or not material, that involves management or other employees who have a significant role in the small business issuer's internal control over financial reporting.
John MERGENHAGEN, Appellant, v. S & V ENTERPRISES OF GAINESVILLE, INC., a Florida Profit Corporation, Appellee.

CASE NO. 1D16-4019

District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.

Opinion filed October 17, 2017

**DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION**

AFFIRMED.
KPMG LLP
    Telephone
    
    (604) 691-3000Chartered Professional
      Accountants
    Fax
    
    (604) 691-3031PO Box 10426 777 Dunsmuir Street
    Internet
    
    www.kpmg.caVancouver BC V7Y 1K3Canada


Consent of Independent Registered Public
Accounting Firm

The Board of Directors Ballard
Power Systems Inc.

We consent to the use of our reports,
each dated March 1, 2017, with respect to the consolidated financial statements
and the effectiveness of internal control over financial reporting included in
this annual report on Form 40-F.

We also consent to the incorporation by
reference of each of the above reports into the Companys Registration Statements (No. 333-156553 and 333-161807) on Form S-8 and No.
333-211780 on Form F-10/A of Ballard Power Systems Inc.

Chartered Professional Accountants

March 1, 2017 Vancouver, Canada

KPMG LLP is a Canadian limited liability partnership and a member firm of the KPMG network of independent member firms affiliated with KPMG International Cooperative (KPMG International), a Swiss entity.
KPMG Canada provides services to KPMG LLP.


---
----

Reference for a preliminary ruling from the Conseil d'État (France), acting in its judicial capacity, by order of that court of 10 January 2005 in Ministre de l'Économie, des Finances and de l'Industrie v Gillan Beach

(Case C-114/05)

(2005/C 115/25)

Language of the case: French

Reference has been made to the Court of Justice of the European Communities by order of the Conseil d'Etat (France), acting in its judicial capacity, of 10 January 2005, received at the Court Registry on 8 March 2005, for a preliminary ruling in the proceedings between Ministre de l'Economie, des Finances and de l'Industrie and Gillan Beach, a company, on the following question:

Whether an overall service provided by an organiser to exhibitors at a fair or in an exhibition hall falls within the scope of the first indent of Article 9(2)(c) of the Sixth Council Directive 77/388 of 17 May 1977 (1), Article 9(2)(a) of that directive or within any other of the categories of supply of services referred to in Article 9(2) of the directive.

----

(1)OJ L 145 of 13.6.1977, p. 1.

----
Joshua MILLER, Appellant, v. STATE of Missouri, Respondent.

WD 81481

Missouri Court of Appeals, Western District.

Order filed: June 18, 2019

Natalie H. Hoge, for Appellant

Dora Fichter, Jefferson City, for Respondent

Before Division One: Victor C. Howard, Presiding Judge, Lisa White Hardwick, Judge and Gary D. Witt, Judge

***ORDER***

PER CURIAM:

Joshua Miller appeals the judgment denying his Rule 24.035 amended motion for post-conviction relief following an evidentiary hearing. In his sole point on appeal, Miller claims the judgment of convictions for burglary in the first degree and violation of an order of protection put him in jeopardy twice for the same crime. Because a published opinion would have no precedential value, a memorandum has been provided to the parties. The judgment is affirmed. Rule 84.16(b).
Subject: Notice of Communication:

(Docket: DOT

- OST

- 2015

- 0075 ) Date: June 4 , 2015

From: Jill Laptosky

, Attorney

- Advisor

To: Chief, Dockets

On March 4, 2015, Access Services (“Access”) , an Americans with Disabilitie s Act

(ADA) complementary paratransit provider for Los Angeles County, submitted a petition

for rulemaking to the U.S. Department of Transportation ( “ DOT ” or “ the Department ” ) to

request an amendment to DOT’s regulations implementing the ADA with respect t o

paratransit fares at 49 C.F.R. § 37.131(c). Those regulations require that the fare for a

trip charged to an ADA paratransit eligible user shall not exceed twice the fare that would

be charged to an individual paying full fare on a comparable fixed

- rout e trip. On June 3

, 2015, D epartment staff met with officials from Access, who provide d an update on its

recent efforts to come into complia nce with the ADA regulation that they have petitioned

the Department to change. Access also received clarification regarding the Department’s

process for handling a petition for rulemaking. The General Counsel explained that there

is no statutory or regulatory deadline for responding to a petition, and the Department is

considering whether to grant, deny, or seek comm ent on how the Department should

proceed

. Although the Department has not yet decided whether it will grant or deny the

petition, we are posting this memorandum in the docket in the interest of full disclosure.

The meeting participants were:

Kathryn Th omson DOT General Counsel

Judy Kaleta DOT, Deputy General Counsel

Jill Laptosky DOT, Office of General Counsel

Bryna Helfer DOT, Office of the Assistant Secretary for Policy

Carolyn Flowers Federal Transit Administration

John Day Federal Transit A dministration

Shelly Verrinder Access Services

Andre Colaiace Access Services

Leonard S. Simon Simon and Company
[Federal Register Volume 74, Number 57 (Thursday, March 26, 2009)]
[Notices]
[Page 13192]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: E9-6799]


-----------------------------------------------------------------------

DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE

International Trade Administration


University of Colorado, et al.; Notice of Consolidated Decision 
on Applications for Duty-Free Entry of Electron Microscopes

    This is a decision consolidated pursuant to Section 6(c) of the 
Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Materials Importation Act of 1966 
(Pub. L. 89-651, as amended by Pub. L. 106-36; 80 Stat. 897; 15 CFR 
part 301). Related records can be viewed between 8:30 A.M. and 5:00 
P.M. in Room 3705, U.S. Department of Commerce, 14th and Constitution 
Avenue., NW, Washington, D.C.
    Docket Number: 08-041. Applicant: University of Colorado, Denver, 
CO 80217. Instrument: Vitrification Robot. Manufacturer: FEI Company, 
The Netherlands. Intended Use: See notice at 74 FR 7394, February 17, 
2009.
    Docket Number: 08-052. Applicant: University of Washington, 
Seattle, WA 98105-6698. Instrument: CTD Chain III. Manufacturer: ADM 
Electronik, Germany. Intended Use: See notice at 74 FR 7395, February 
17, 2009.
    Docket Number: 08-056. Applicant: Argonne National Laboratory, 
Lemont, IL 60439. Instrument: Isobar Separator System. Manufacturer: 
Bruker Biospin S.A., France. Intended Use: See notice at 74 FR 7395, 
February 17, 2009.
    Comments: None received. Decision: Approved. No instrument of 
equivalent scientific value to the foreign instrument, for such 
purposes as these instruments are intended to be used, was being 
manufactured in the United States at the time the instruments were 
ordered. Reasons: Each foreign instrument is an electron microscope and 
is intended for research or scientific educational uses requiring an 
electron microscope. We know of no electron microscope, or any other 
instrument suited to these purposes, which was being manufactured in 
the United States at the time of order of each instrument.

    Dated: March 19, 2009.
Chris Cassel,
Acting Director, Subsidies Enforcement Office, Import Administration.
[FR Doc. E9-6799 Filed 3-25-09; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 3510-DS-S
Stephen COLLINS, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.

Case No. 2D16-3833

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.

Opinion filed August 30, 2017

**DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION**

Affirmed.
SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK

Appellate Division, Fourth Judicial Department

531 

CA 13-01665 

PRESENT: CENTRA, J.P., PERADOTTO, LINDLEY, AND WHALEN, JJ. 

 

 

SUSAN ANGONA, AS GUARDIAN AD LITEM OF 

BENJAMIN ANGONA AND SUSAN ANGONA, INDIVIDUALLY, 

PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT, 

V MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

CITY OF SYRACUSE, DEFENDANT-RESPONDENT, 

CONMED CORP., KATECHO, INC., DEFENDANTS-APPELLANTS, 

ET AL., DEFENDANTS. 

(APPEAL NO. 2.) 

 

SANOCKI NEWMAN & TURRET, LLP, NEW YORK CITY (DAVID B. TURRET OF

COUNSEL), FOR PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT. 

HANCOCK ESTABROOK, LLP, SYRACUSE (ASHLEY D. HAYES OF COUNSEL), FOR

DEFENDANT-APPELLANT CONMED CORP. 

MACKENZIE HUGHES LLP, SYRACUSE (W. BRADLEY HUNT OF COUNSEL), FOR

DEFENDANT-APPELLANT KATECHO, INC.

HISCOCK & BARCLAY, LLP, SYRACUSE (ROBERT A. BARRER OF COUNSEL), FOR

DEFENDANT-RESPONDENT. 

 

Appeals from an order of the Supreme Court, Onondaga County

(Brian F. DeJoseph, J.), entered August 13, 2013. The order granted

the motion of defendant City of Syracuse for renewal of its summary

judgment motion and, upon renewal, granted the motion for summary

judgment and dismissed the amended complaint and all cross claims

against the City of Syracuse. 

It is hereby ORDERED that the order so appealed from is

unanimously affirmed without costs.

Same Memorandum as in Angona v City of Syracuse ([appeal No. 1]

___ AD3d ___ [June 13, 2014]). 

Entered: June 13, 2014 Frances E. Cafarell

Clerk of the Court
In the

Court of Appeals

Second Appellate District of Texas

at Fort Worth

___________________________

No. 02-18-00400-CV

___________________________

On Appeal from the 158th District Court

Denton County, Texas

Trial Court No. 2013-20522-158

Concurring Memorandum Opinion by Chief Justice Sudderth

IN THE INTEREST OF A.S. AND C.S., CHILDREN
2

CONCURRING MEMORANDUM OPINION

I realize that, generally speaking, trial judges do not prepare the orders that they 

sign. But that does not relieve judges of the obligation to read proposed orders 

before signing them. 

It is clear from the record here that the judgment in question was a nonappealable order and that the trial judge did not intend it to be final. Yet, the judge

signed an order stating, “This judgment is final and appealable.”

We have held that it is incumbent for attorneys, like their clients, to read and 

understand what they sign:

Words matter, in life but especially in law. Words are the essential tools 

of the legal profession. Because cases turn on the meaning of words, 

legal professionals understand that word choices have consequences. 

Accordingly, it is a standard of our profession to use words carefully and 

with precision. Abiding by this principle leads to the consistency, 

certainty, and predictability that we expect from the law.

. . . . 

. . . It is well established that parties are held responsible for 

reading and understanding what they sign. We see no reason to hold 

attorneys to a lesser standard.

In re Estate of Nielsen, No. 02-17-00251-CV, 2018 WL 4625531, at *6 (Tex. App.—Fort 

Worth Sept. 27, 2018, pet. denied) (mem. op.) (citations omitted). 

Nor should judges be held to a lesser standard. Indeed, judges must employ 

greater vigilance because judicial orders affect life, liberty, and property in permanent 

and significant ways. Doing so will not only foster respect for the law and the 
3

judiciary but also save the parties (and the taxpayers) from the burden and expense of 

unnecessary appeals. 

I wholeheartedly agree with the majority’s assessment that “[d]espite the intent 

of Lehmann to fully address the issue of finality, the problem, as evident in this case, 

persists.” See, e.g., In re L.T., No. 02-19-00161-CV, 2019 WL 3334618, at *1–2 (Tex. 

App.—Fort Worth July 25, 2019, no pet.) (per curiam) (mem. op.) (dismissing appeal 

of self-contradictory order entitled “Interlocutory Final[1] Order”). But the solution to 

this problem is a simple one. Judges need to read orders before they sign them. 

/s/ Bonnie Sudderth

Bonnie Sudderth

Chief Justice

Delivered: November 14, 2019

 

1“Interlocutory” and “final” are mutually exclusive terms. An interlocutory 

order is one that is not final. Interlocutory, Black’s Law Dictionary (5th ed. 1979)

(defining “interlocutory” as “[p]rovisional; interim; temporary; not final”). A final 

order is one that is not interlocutory. Final, Black’s Law Dictionary (5th ed. 1979)

(defining “final” as “[l]ast; conclusive; decisive; definitive; terminated; completed,”

and stating that in its use in reference to legal actions, “this word is generally 

contrasted with ‘interlocutory’”).
CERTIFICATION OF PERIODIC REPORT



I, Carlton Parfitt, Chief Financial Officer of Avalon Energy Corporation Ltd. a Nevada Corporation (the "Company"), certify, pursuant to Section 302 of the Sarbanes- Oxley Act of 2002, 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, that:



1.      I have reviewed this quarterly report on Form 10-QSB for the period ended June 30, 2006 of Avalon Energy Corporation;



2.      Based on my knowledge, this quarterly report does not contain any untrue statement of a material fact or omit to state a material fact necessary to make the statements made, in light of the circumstances under which such statements were made, not misleading with respect to the period covered by this annual report;



3.      Based on my knowledge, the financial statements, and other financial information included in this quarterly report, fairly present in all material respects the financial condition, results of operations and cash flows of the registrant as of, and for, the periods presented in this quarterly report;



4.      The registrant's other certifying officers and I are responsible for establishing and maintaining disclosure controls and procedures (as defined in Exchange Act Rules 13a - 14 and 15d - 14) for the registrant and we have:



a.      designed such disclosure controls and procedures to ensure that material information relating to the registrant, including its consolidated subsidiaries, is made known to us by others within those entities, particularly during the period in which this quarterly report is being prepared;



b.      evaluated the effectiveness of the registrant's disclosure controls and procedures as of a date within June 30, 2005 prior to the filing date of this quarterly report (the "Evaluation Date"); and



c.      presented in this quarterly report our conclusions about the effectiveness of the disclosure controls and procedures based on our evaluation as of the Evaluation Date;



5.      The registrant's other certifying officers and I have disclosed, based on our most recent evaluation, to the registrant's auditors and the audit committee of registrant's board of directors (or persons performing the equivalent function):



a.      All significant deficiencies in the design or operation of internal controls which could adversely affect the registrant's ability to record, process, summarize and report financial data and have identified for the registrant's auditors any material weaknesses in internal controls; and



b.      Any fraud, whether or not material, that involves management or other employees who have a significant role in the registrant's internal controls; and



6.      The registrant's other certifying officers and I have indicated in this quarterly report whether or not there were significant changes in internal controls or in other factors that could significantly affect internal controls subsequent to the date of our most recent evaluation, including any corrective actions with regard to significant deficiencies and material weaknesses.



Date: August 14, 2006



/s/ Carlton Parfitt

--------------

Carlton Parfitt

Director and Chief Financial Officer
Khiry D. SUMMERS, Appellant, v. STATE of Missouri, Respondent.

WD 81532

Missouri Court of Appeals, Western District.

ORDER FILED: JUNE 28, 2019

Tyler P. Coyle, Columbia, MO, Counsel for Appellant.

Shaun Mackelprang, Jefferson City, MO, Counsel for Respondent.

Before Division Three: Thomas H. Newton, Presiding Judge, Anthony Rex Gabbert, Judge, Edward R. Ardini, Jr., Judge

**ORDER**

Per Curiam:

Appellant Khiry Summers appeals the circuit court's denial of his Rule 29.15 motion for post-conviction relief. We affirm. Rule 84.16(b).
H. Res. 321 

In the House of Representatives, U. S., 

April 25, 2023. 

Resolved, That on such date as the Speaker of the House 

of Representatives may designate, official photographs of the 

House may be taken while the House is in actual session. 

Payment for the costs associated with taking, preparing, and 

distributing such photographs may be made from the applicable accounts of the House of Representatives. 

Attest: 

Clerk.
Clarence FOY, Appellant, v. STATE of Missouri, Respondent.

WD 81636

Missouri Court of Appeals, Western District.

Order filed: March 26, 2019

Amanda Langenheim, for Appellant.

Julia E. Rives, for Respondent.

Before Division Two: Edward R. Ardini, Jr., Presiding Judge, Alok Ahuja, Judge and Gary D. Witt, Judge *633***ORDER***

PER CURIAM:

Clarence Foy waived his right to counsel and pleaded guilty to tampering in the first degree and resisting a lawful stop in the Circuit Court of Platte County. He was sentenced to a total of eleven years in the Department of Corrections. Foy filed a timely Rule 24.035 motion for post-conviction relief alleging that his waiver of counsel was not unequivocal, voluntary, and intelligent. The Circuit Court denied Foy's motion following an evidentiary hearing. Foy appeals from that judgment. We affirm. Because a published opinion would have no precedential value, we have provided the parties an unpublished memorandum setting forth the reasons for this order. Rule 84.16(b).
Electronically FiledIntermediate Court of AppealsCAAP-10-000011412-MAY-201108:38 AM