NUMBER 13-13-00181-CV

COURT OF APPEALS

THIRTEENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS

CORPUS CHRISTI - EDINBURG

BELINDA VALLEJO, APPELLANT

v.

CAMERON COUNTY, APPELLEE.

On appeal from the 103th District Court

of Cameron County, Texas.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Before Justices Rodriguez, Garza, and Perkes

Per Curiam Memorandum Opinion

Appellant, Belinda Vallejo appeals an order granting Cameron County’s plea to 

the jurisdiction. We dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction.

By written order signed on February 22, 2013, the trial court sustained the 

County’s plea and dismissed the cause. On March 22, 2013, appellant filed her notice 

of appeal.
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On April 8, 2013, the Clerk of this Court notified appellant that it appeared the 

appeal was not timely perfected. Appellant was advised that, if the defect was not 

corrected within ten days from the date of receipt of this Court’s letter, the appeal would 

be dismissed. To date, no response has been received from appellant.

Section 51.014(a)(8) of the civil practice and remedies code permits an 

interlocutory appeal from an order that grants or denies a plea to the jurisdiction by a 

governmental unit. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 51.014(a)(8) (Vernon 

2008). Appeals from interlocutory orders, when allowed by statute, are accelerated 

appeals. TEX. R. APP. P. 28.1. In order to perfect an accelerated appeal of an 

interlocutory order, the party is required to file a notice of appeal “within 20 days after 

the judgment or order is signed.” Id. at R. 26.1(b). The filing of a motion for new trial, 

request for findings of fact and conclusions of law, or any other post-judgment motion, 

except for a motion for extension of time filed under Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 

26.3, “will not extend the time to perfect an accelerated appeal.” Id. at R. 26.3, 28.1(b).

The trial court’s order was signed on February 22, 2013. Under the civil practice 

and remedies code, the order was subject to an accelerated interlocutory appeal. See

TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 51.014(a)(8). Accordingly, appellant was required 

to file her notice of accelerated appeal within twenty days of the trial court’s February 

22, 2013 order. The record does not reflect that appellant filed a motion for extension of 

time under Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 26.3. See id. at R. 26.3; see also 

Houser v. McElveen, 243 S.W.3d 646, 646-47 (Tex. 2008) (stating that a notice of 

appeal should be considered timely if filed within fifteen days after the filing deadline 
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and accompanied by a motion for extension of time with a reasonable explanation for 

the delay). 

We are to construe the rules of appellate procedure reasonably and liberally so 

that the right to appeal is not lost by imposing requirements not absolutely necessary to 

effectuate the purpose of a rule. See Verburgt v. Dorner, 959 S.W.2d 615, 616-17 (Tex. 

1997). Nevertheless, we are prohibited from enlarging the scope of our jurisdiction by 

enlarging the time for perfecting an appeal in a civil case in a manner not provided for 

by rule. See TEX. R. APP. P. 2; In re T.W., 89 S.W.3d 641, 642 (Tex. App.–Amarillo 

2002, no pet.). 

The Court, having examined and fully considered the documents on file, 

appellant’s failure to timely perfect her appeal, and appellant’s failure to respond to this 

Court’s notice, is of the opinion that the appeal should be dismissed for want of 

jurisdiction. Accordingly, the appeal is hereby DISMISSED FOR WANT OF 

JURISDICTION. See TEX. R. APP. P. 42.3(a)(c).

PER CURIAM

Delivered and filed the

30th day of May, 2013.