## In the Court of Appeals Second Appellate District of Texas

at Fort Wo rth

________________________ ___ No. 02

- 18

- 00400

- CV

___________________________

On Appeal from th e 158th District Court D enton County, Texas Trial Court No. 2013

- 20522

- 158
Concurring Memorandum Opinion by Chief Justice Sudderth 

### I N THE 

### I NTEREST OF 

### A.S. AND 

### C.S., C HILDREN2 CONCURRING M EMORANDU M OPINION
I realize that , generally speaking, trial judges do not prepare t he orders that they sign. B ut that does not relieve judges of the obligation to read proposed orders before signing them

. It is clear from the record here that the judgment in qu estion was a non

appealabl e order and that the trial judge did not intend it to be final . Yet, the j udge signe d an order stating, “ T his judgment is fina l and appea lable. ”
We have held that it is incumbent for attorneys, like their clients, to read and
und erstand what they sign : Words matter, in life but especially in law. Wor ds are the essential tools of the legal profession. Because ca ses turn on the meaning of words, legal professionals understand that word choices have consequences. Accordingly, it i s a standard of our pro fession to use words carefully and with preci sion. Abiding by this principle leads to the consistenc y , certain ty, and predictability that we expect from the law.

. . . .

. . . It is well established that parties are held responsi ble for reading and understanding what they sign

. We see no reason to ho ld attorneys to a lesser standard.
In re Esta te of Nielsen , No. 02

- 17

- 00251

- CV, 2018 WL 4625531 , at *6 ( Tex. App.

— Fort
Worth Sept. 27, 2018 , pet. denied ) (mem. op.) (c itat ions omitte d)

. Nor should j udges be held to a lesser standard

. Indeed, judges mus t employ greater vigilance b ecause ju dicial order s affect life, liberty , and property in permanent and significant ways

. Doing so will not only foster respect for th e law and the3

jud ici ary but also s ave the parties (and the taxpayers ) from the burden and expense of

u nn ecessary appeals.
I wholeh eartedly agree with the majority ’ s assessment that “ [d] espite the intent
of Lehmann to full y address the issue of finality, the problem, as e vid en t in this case, persists. ” See , e.g. , In re L.T. , No. 02

- 19

- 00161

- C V, 2019 WL 3334618 , at *1

– 2 (Tex. App.

— Fort Worth July 25, 2019 , no pet.) (per curiam) (mem. op.) (dismissing appea l
of self

- co ntradi ctory order ent

itled “ Interlocutory Final [ 1 ] Order ” ). But t he solution to this problem is a si mple one. Judges need to re ad orders before they sign them

.
/s/ Bonnie Sudderth
Bonnie Sudder th Ch ief Justice
De livered: November 14 , 2019

1 “ Interlocutory ” and “ final ” are mutually exclusive terms. An interlocutory order is one that is not final. Interl ocutory , Bl ack ’ s Law Dictionary (5 th ed. 1979) (defining “ in terlocutory ” as “ [p]rovisional; interim; temporary; not final ” )

. A f inal ord er is one that is not i nterlocutory. Final , Black ’ s Law Dictionary (5th ed. 1979) (de fining “ final ” as “ [l]ast ; conclusive; de cisive; definit ive; terminated; completed , ” and st at ing that in its use in reference to legal actions, “ this word is generally contras ted with ‘ interlocutory ’ ” )

.