[DO NOT PUBLISH]

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

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No. 14-12047

Non-Argument Calendar

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D.C. Docket No. 1:13-cv-00258-CB-B,

Bkcy No. 11-bkc-00096-WWS

In Re: RICHARD D. HORNE,

 PATRICIA NELSON HORNE,

 Debtors.

_________________________________________________________

MARY BETH MANTIPLY, 

 Plaintiff–Appellant 

 Cross-Appellee,

versus

PATRICIA NELSON HORNE, as personal representative

of the Estate of Richard D. Horne, and individually, 

 Defendant–Appellee

 Cross-Appellant.

________________________

Appeals from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of Alabama

________________________

(October 28, 2015)

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Before HULL, ROSENBAUM and JULIE CARNES, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:

A bankruptcy court denied Plaintiff Mary Beth Mantiply’s motion for 

recusal. The district court affirmed, and Plaintiff now appeals. Defendants

Patricia Nelson Horne and Richard D. Horne1 cross appeal the district court’s order 

denying them appellate attorney’s fees. Defendants also filed a motion with this 

Court seeking attorney’s fees for the present appeal. 

I. BACKGROUND

Defendants filed for Chapter 7 bankruptcy on January 10, 2011. This 

triggered an automatic stay of any litigation against Defendants under 11 U.S.C.

§ 362.2

 Notwithstanding the automatic stay, Plaintiff filed a civil action against 

Mr. Horne in state court. Defendants were discharged from bankruptcy on May 

10, 2011. Plaintiff ignored requests to voluntarily dismiss the civil suit against Mr. 

Horne and maintained the action until it was dismissed in November 2011, more 

than 200 days after she initially filed her complaint. 

Defendants filed a motion in bankruptcy court seeking damages from

Plaintiff for violating the automatic stay provision of the bankruptcy code, 

 1 Richard Horne died during the pendency of this lawsuit. Although Patricia Nelson Horne was 

substituted as his personal representative, this order uses “Defendants” for ease of exposition.

2 Section 362 states that a bankruptcy petition operates as a stay of, among other things, “the 

commencement or continuation . . . of a judicial, administrative, or other action or proceeding 

against the debtor . . . .” 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(1).

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11 U.S.C. § 362. They later amended their motion to add a request for damages

for Plaintiff’s violation of the discharge injunction provision of the bankruptcy 

code, 11 U.S.C. § 524.

3 The bankruptcy court granted Defendants’ amended 

motion and awarded them $81,714.31 in damages, including $41,714.31 in

attorney’s fees. 

Plaintiff appealed the bankruptcy court’s damages award, but the district 

court affirmed that award. The district court subsequently denied Plaintiff’s

motion for rehearing and awarded Defendants $34,551.28 in attorney’s fees for 

defending the appeal. Plaintiff then filed two identical motions for recusal of the 

bankruptcy court judge: one in district court and one in bankruptcy court. Plaintiff

sought recusal on the basis of “newly discovered evidence” that the bankruptcy 

judge was biased. Specifically, the judge’s courtroom deputy is the sister of a 

paralegal for Defendants’ bankruptcy counsel. The paralegal had offered affidavit 

testimony during the trial that contradicted Plaintiff’s testimony. According to 

Plaintiff, the judge credited the paralegal’s testimony over Plaintiff’s. Plaintiff

alleged that the connection between the courtroom deputy and the paralegalwitness at least gave the appearance of partiality and therefore warranted recusal 

and vacatur. 

 3 Section 524 states that a discharge from bankruptcy “operates as an injunction against the 

commencement or continuation of an action . . . to collect, recover, or offset any [discharged]

debt as a personal liability of the debtor.” 11 U.S.C. § 524(a)(2).

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The bankruptcy court denied Plaintiff’s motion for recusal. Plaintiff

appealed that ruling and moved to consolidate it with her appeal of the bankruptcy 

court’s damages award.

4 The district court granted Plaintiff’s motion to 

consolidate and affirmed the bankruptcy judge’s ruling on Plaintiff’s motion for 

recusal. 

Plaintiff then appealed various district court orders to this Court. We 

considered our jurisdiction to review the orders sua sponte and held that Plaintiff

could appeal only the district court’s order concerning recusal. Defendants cross 

appealed a second district court order that denied them appellate attorney’s fees for 

defending against Plaintiff’s appeal of the bankruptcy court’s recusal order. 

II. RECUSAL

The district court first concluded that recusal was not necessary under the

federal judge recusal statute, 28 U.S.C. § 455(a). The district court then 

determined that, even assuming for the sake of argument the need for recusal under 

§ 455(a), reversal for failure to recuse would not have been required under 

Liljeberg v. Health Servs. Acquisition Corp., 486 U.S. 847 (1988). We review the 

district court’s order concerning recusal for abuse of discretion. In re Walker, 532 

F.3d 1304, 1308 (11th Cir. 2008). 

 4 A final judgment had not been entered on Plaintiff’s earlier appeal of the damages award. 

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A. Recusal was not required under §455(a).

Under § 455(a), a federal judge “shall disqualify himself in any proceeding 

in which his impartiality might reasonably be questioned.”5

 28 U.S.C. § 455(a). 

The purpose of § 455(a) is “to promote confidence in the judiciary by avoiding 

even the appearance of impropriety whenever possible.” Liljeberg, 486 U.S. at 

865. Recusal is thus warranted “only if an objective, disinterested, lay observer

fully informed of the facts underlying the grounds on which recusal was sought

would entertain a significant doubt about the judge’s impartiality.” United States 

v. Amedeo, 487 F.3d 823, 828 (11th Cir. 2007) (internal quotation marks and 

citation omitted). We do not consider the perceptions of idiosyncratic, 

hypersensitive, and cynical observers. See Sensley v. Albritton, 385 F.3d 591, 599 

(5th Cir. 2004).

We agree with the district court that recusal is unwarranted.

6

 To begin with, 

there is no evidence of a direct connection between the bankruptcy judge and the 

courtroom deputy’s sister. And like the district court, we are unable to locate any

 5 Plaintiff sought recusal on the basis of § 455(a) alone. Section 455(b) sets forth several other 

grounds for recusal. Because Plaintiff relied exclusively on § 455(a), we do not consider other 

possible bases for recusal under § 455(b).

6 Plaintiff’s main argument for recusal is that the bankruptcy judge had an undisclosed 

connection to a witness. We address this argument below. Plaintiff also cites numerous adverse 

rulings by the bankruptcy court judge that allegedly evidence his bias. As the district court 

noted, “judicial rulings alone almost never constitute a valid basis for a bias or partiality 

motion.” Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540, 555 (1994). The district court was correct, and 

we readily reject Plaintiff’s argument that the bankruptcy judge’s adverse rulings warrant 

recusal.

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cases suggesting that a judge’s administrative employee’s relationship with a 

witness is grounds for the judge’s recusal. To the contrary, recusal is warranted on 

the basis of a judicial employee’s relationships only when the employee has (or 

appears to have) a role in the substantive decision-making process. See Byrne v. 

Nezhat, 261 F.3d 1075, 1100–02 (11th Cir. 2001) (explaining that the district court 

did not abuse its discretion by determining that a law clerk’s prior employment 

with a law firm representing a party in the case did not call into question the 

judge’s impartiality and thus did not warrant recusal), abrogated on other grounds 

as recognized by Nurse v. Sheraton Atlanta Hotel, ___ Fed. App’x ___, 2015 WL 

4153677, at *3 (11th Cir. July 10, 2015); Parker v. Connors Steel Co., 855 F.2d 

1510, 1523–25 (11th Cir. 1988) (concluding that an appearance of impropriety 

existed because a law clerk’s father was a partner in the law firm that represented 

the defendant, the law clerk held a hearing in the judge’s absence, and the judge 

credited the law clerk in a footnote of the opinion); Hunt v. Am. Bank & Trust Co. 

of Baton Rouge, 783 F.2d 1011, 1015–16 (11th Cir. 1986) (per curiam) (holding 

that recusal was not required when two of the judge’s law clerks had accepted 

employment offers from the law firm representing the defendants while the case 

was pending, or because the case had been assigned to one of those law clerks as a 

“ministerial” matter before the law clerk was screened from it). The record does 

not indicate that the courtroom deputy had a role in the bankruptcy judge’s 

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decision-making process. Consequently, recusal was not required.

In addition to our own Court’s authority concerning recusal, we find a recent 

case from the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals particularly relevant and persuasive. 

See Mathis v. Huff & Puff Trucking, Inc., 787 F.3d 1297 (10th Cir. 2015). In that 

case, the husband of the trial judge’s law clerk had been hired by the defendant’s 

insurer to monitor the trial. Id. at 1304. The Tenth Circuit held that the judge did 

not err in declining to recuse himself because the law clerk did not have continuing 

substantial participation in the case, the insurer was not the defendant, the law 

clerk performed only ministerial acts at trial, and she did not participate in drafting 

post-trial findings and conclusions. Id. at 1312–13. As mentioned above, the 

record here is devoid of evidence that the courtroom deputy had any substantive 

role in the bankruptcy judge’s decision. Moreover, the deputy’s sister was merely 

an affiant, not the defendant. These facts lead us to agree with the district court 

that recusal was not warranted and indeed would have been inappropriate. See 

United States v. Greenough, 782 F.2d 1556, 1558 (11th Cir. 1986) (“[A] judge, 

having been assigned to a case, should not recuse himself on unsupported, 

irrational, or highly tenuous speculation.”).

In sum, recusal is not required merely because the movant can “draw[ ] a 

line . . . connecting a person within chambers to a person or firm related, no matter 

how remotely, to a party in the case.” Mathis, 787 F.3d at 1312 ) (internal 

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quotation marks omitted) (citing Hamid v. Price Waterhouse, 51 F.3d 1411, 1417 

(9th Cir. 1995). Because Plaintiff has done no more than identify a relationship 

between the courtroom deputy and a witness in the case, we affirm the district 

court’s holding that recusal was not required.

B. The absence of a § 455(a) violation ends our inquiry.

The district court was not required to go further in its analysis once it 

concluded that recusal was unnecessary under § 455(a). Nevertheless, the court 

considered whether, assuming arguendo that recusal had been warranted under 

§ 455(a), reversal would have been appropriate under Liljeberg. Because the 

district court did not abuse its discretion in making its recusal determination, we do 

not analyze whether, in a counter-factual world in which a § 455(a) violation had 

occurred, vacatur would be appropriate under Liljeberg.

III. APPELLATE ATTORNEY’S FEES

Defendants cross appeal the district court’s order denying them appellate 

attorney’s fees incurred during Plaintiff’s unsuccessful appeal of the bankruptcy 

court’s recusal order.

7

 The district court’s order states that because the underlying 

appeal “involve[d] violation of the discharge injunction,” attorney’s fees are “not 

authorized.” By that statement, the court was perhaps explaining that attorney’s 

 7 Defendants seek a total of $14,918.60 in fees associated with the district court proceedings

concerning recusal. 

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fees for litigation dealing with violations of the discharge injunction are 

discretionary. See 11 U.S.C. § 105; In re Hardy, 97 F.3d 1384, 1389–91 (11th 

Cir. 1996). If so, the court was presumably exercising its discretion not to award 

attorney’s fees for Defendants’ expenses during the appeal. 

A problem with that analysis arises, however, due to the fact that the district 

court cites 11 U.S.C. § 362(k), which provides that “an individual injured by any 

willful violation of a stay . . . shall recover actual damages, including costs and 

attorneys’ fees” (emphasis added), which presumably means that an award of 

attorney’s fees is mandatory for a stay violation, albeit only discretionary for a 

discharge violation. The district court declined to explain why Plaintiff’s recusal 

motion did not involve the litigation over her stay violation, as well as her 

discharge violation. Instead, the court cites its order that ruled on the merits of the 

recusal appeal. But that order provides no help here. It says only that “[Plaintiff]

admits that she violated the automatic stay and seeks reversal only as to the 

violation of the discharge injunction.” 

The district court does not provide a citation or other support for the above 

statement. We have combed the more than 3,000 page record and are no more

enlightened. Plaintiff’s various motions and briefs suggest that she seeks a new 

trial for all issues litigated before the bankruptcy court, including the stay 

violation. For example, Plaintiff’s motion for recusal alleges that as a result of the 

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bankruptcy judge’s alleged bias, Plaintiff’s “credibility as to all other issues and 

areas of her testimony was damaged.” Her reply brief in defense of her recusal 

appeal at the district court states that “[i]t is obvious that [Plaintiff] is entitled both 

to a new trial and vacatur” and “reversal and vacatur of [the bankruptcy judge’s] 

prior decisions is mandated, recusal ordered, and a new bankruptcy judge 

appointed.” In sum, Plaintiff does not appear to have limited her motion for 

recusal and vacatur to the discharge injunction litigation.

8

At times even the district court seems not to construe Plaintiff’s motion for 

recusal so narrowly. In its order addressing Plaintiff’s appeal of the bankruptcy 

court’s denial of her motion for recusal, the district court writes: “[Plaintiff] argues 

that . . . application of the correct legal standard [for recusal] should result in [the 

bankruptcy judge’s] disqualification and vacatur of the sanctions award.” Notably, 

Defendants’ sanctions award included damages for Plaintiff’s violation of both the 

stay and the discharge injunction.

 8 However, during the course of her appeal to this Court, Plaintiff has changed her tune, 

ultimately adopting the district court’s conclusion. Plaintiff’s first brief argues that “[Plaintiff] 

has substantial grounds for remand for a new trial and to vacate the tainted judgments based on 

the appearance of impropriety under Section 455(a).” Plaintiff does not focus on the judgment 

for the discharge injunction violation but on the entire damages award, including the award 

based on her stay violation. Even in her brief in response to Defendants’ brief, Plaintiff suggests 

that she was originally seeking “vacatur of the entire sanctions judgment affirmed in the first 

appeal,” including both “the discharge injunction and the automatic stay” decisions. But in her 

response to Defendants’ amended motion for attorney’s fees, Plaintiff writes that “Appellees 

have cross-appealed the district court’s denial of attorneys fees as they relate to the violation of 

the discharge injunction only.” Nevertheless, as far as we can tell, when the issue of attorney’s 

fees for Plaintiff’s appeal of the recusal order was before the district court, Plaintiff did not 

construe her appeal as concerning only the trial of the discharge injunction.

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Perhaps the district court judge’s thought process was as follows: Plaintiff is 

alleging bias because the bankruptcy judge credited the courtroom deputy’s 

sister’s testimony over Plaintiff’s. That testimony was relevant to the discharge 

injunction. Therefore, Plaintiff seeks recusal only with respect to the discharge 

injunction judgment.

But even if Plaintiff is challenging the bankruptcy judge’s impartiality based 

on his treatment of her testimony concerning the discharge injunction, Plaintiff has 

not so limited her recusal motion, as amply demonstrated in the foregoing 

paragraphs.

9

 She apparently seeks to have the entire damages award vacated and 

retried. In any event, we cannot ascertain a basis in the record for the district 

court’s conclusion that the recusal appeal involved only the discharge violation and 

not the stay violation. We therefore remand this cross appeal to the district court 

with instructions to reconsider the Defendants’ motion for appellate attorney’s fees 

in light of a substantiated recitation of the facts and application of the law to those 

facts.

 9 As noted, Plaintiff has, in her latest brief, suggested that the recusal order pertained only to the 

discharge injunction violation and not the stay violation. This after-the-fact adoption of the 

district court’s framing of the issue does not control whether Plaintiff’s recusal appeal concerned 

the stay violation. Plaintiff’s and the district court’s contemporaneous statements are relevant 

and telling.

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IV. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM the district court’s ruling on 

Plaintiff’s motion for recusal and REMAND Defendants’ cross appeal of the 

district court’s order denying appellate attorney’s fees for Plaintiff’s appeal of the 

bankruptcy court’s recusal decision. Having remanded Defendants’ motion for 

appellate attorney’s fees incurred in the district court, we DENY without prejudice 

Defendants’ amended motion for appellate attorney’s fees incurred in the present

appeal before our Court.

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