NOTE: This disposition is nonprecedential. 

United States Court of Appeals 

for the Federal Circuit 

__________________________ 

DOUGLAS E. GRIFFIN, 

Claimant-Appellant, 

v. 

ERIC K. SHINSEKI, SECRETARY OF VETERANS 

AFFAIRS, 

Respondent-Appellee. 

__________________________ 

2012-7012 

__________________________ 

Appeal from the United States Court of Appeals for 

Veterans Claims in case no. 09-4167, Judge Lawrence B. 

Hagel. 

__________________________ 

Decided: April 6, 2012 

__________________________ 

DOUGLAS E. GRIFFIN, of Longwood, Florida, pro se. 

MICHAEL GOODMAN, Trial Attorney, Commercial Litigation Branch, Civil Division, United States Department 

of Justice, of Washington, DC, for respondent-appellee. 

On the brief were TONY WEST, Assistant Attorney General, JEANNE E. DAVIDSON, Director, TODD M. HUGHES, 
GRIFFIN v. DVA 2

Deputy Director, and MEREDYTH COHEN HAVASY, Trial 

Attorney. Of counsel on the brief was DAVID J. BARRANS, 

Deputy Assistant General Counsel. 

__________________________ 

Before RADER, Chief Judge, PLAGER, and WALLACH, 

Circuit Judges. 

PER CURIAM. 

Douglas E. Griffin seeks review of a decision of the 

United States Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims 

(“Veterans Court”).1 In that decision the Veterans Court 

affirmed a November 5, 2009, decision of the Board of 

Veterans’ Appeals (“Board”) that denied service-connected 

disability benefits for Mr. Griffin’s human immunodeficiency virus (“HIV”) infection. The issue on appeal is 

whether the Department of Veterans Affairs (“VA”) was 

required as a matter of law to contact Government agencies other than the National Personnel Records Center 

(“NPRC”) in its attempt to obtain the result from one of 

Mr. Griffin’s in-service HIV tests. Because the Veterans 

Court properly interpreted the VA’s duty to assist under 

38 U.S.C. § 5103(A), we affirm. 

BACKGROUND

Mr. Griffin served on active duty in the United States 

Navy from July 1985 through July 1991. In April 1999, 

he sought VA benefits for HIV infection. Mr. Griffin’s 

service medical records indicate that he was tested for 

HIV in 1986, 1988, 1989, and 1991. The first three tests 

yielded negative results, but Mr. Griffin’s records contain 

 1 Griffin v. Shinseki, memorandum decision, No. 

09-4167 (Vet. App. Aug. 3, 2011). 
3 GRIFFIN v. DVA

no result for the 1991 test. Mr. Griffin contends the 1991 

test was positive. 

The VA Regional Office (“RO”) sought to obtain the 

result of Mr. Griffin’s 1991 test from the NPRC. After 

two unsuccessful attempts due to administrative errors of 

one kind or another, in response to the RO’s third, more 

specific request, the NPRC stated that all available 

information regarding the tests was contained in Mr. 

Griffin’s service medical records which had been sent to 

the RO in October 1999. Joint Appendix (“JA”) at 46. 

Over a decade after Mr. Griffin filed his claim, and after several remands from the Board and one from the 

Veterans Court, the RO ultimately denied Mr. Griffin’s 

claim for service connection, and the Board affirmed. Mr. 

Griffin appealed to the Veterans Court arguing, inter alia, 

that the VA had failed to adequately assist him in obtaining the result of his 1991 HIV test. According to Mr. 

Griffin, the VA should have contacted other government 

entities besides the NPRC to locate the missing result. 

The Veterans Court disagreed, noting that Mr. Griffin’s only support for his argument that another Government entity might have the test result was that: 

Due to the nature of HIV infection and 

AIDS, it is logical to assume that the results of any positive tests . . . could have 

been submitted to other governmental 

agencies for statistical or other purposes. 

Griffin v. Shinseki, No. 09-4197, 2011 WL 3319398, at *3 

(Vet. App. Aug. 3, 2011). Because Mr. Griffin failed to 

provide any evidence that he had consented to the disclosure of his test result or that circumstances would have 
GRIFFIN v. DVA 4

warranted such disclosure without his consent, the Veterans Court held that “the Board’s determination that VA 

satisfied its duty to assist Mr. Griffin is not clearly erroneous.” Id. at *1. 

Mr. Griffin now appeals to this court. We have jurisdiction under 38 U.S.C. § 7292(c). 

DISCUSSION

This court’s review of Veterans Court decisions is 

strictly limited by statute. Unless an appeal presents a 

constitutional issue, we may not review challenges to 

factual determinations or challenges to a law or regulation as applied to the facts of a particular case. 38 U.S.C. 

§ 7292(d)(2). Thus, the Government is correct that an 

“application of section 5103A [the duty to assist] to the 

facts of Mr. Griffin’s case is outside this Court’s jurisdiction to consider.” Resp’t-Appellee’s Informal Br. (“Government Br.”) at p. 10. 

Another way to look at it, however, is whether the 

Veterans Court correctly interpreted 38 U.S.C. § 5103A by 

holding that the VA was not required to contact other 

Government agencies besides the NPRC in its attempt to 

obtain the result from Mr. Griffin’s 1991 in-service HIV 

test. We review statutory interpretation by the Veterans 

Court without deference. Golz v. Shinseki, 590 F.3d 1317, 

1320 (Fed. Cir. 2010). 

Thus this case is another illustration of the jurisprudential conundrum created by the standard of review 

Congress has mandated for these appeals. In the interest 

of fairness to Mr. Griffin in his pro se appeal and because 

the ultimate result is the same, we will reject the Government’s argument that we dismiss for lack of jurisdic-
5 GRIFFIN v. DVA

tion and review the merits of his appeal, which the Government addresses in its brief. 

According to Mr. Griffin, the VA’s duty to assist under 

38 U.S.C. § 5103A requires the department to make “as 

many requests as are necessary to obtain records from 

Federal agencies . . . .” JA at 25. As a result, Mr. Griffin 

contends that the VA should have contacted the CDC and 

any other Government agency that might possess his 

1991 test result. 

The Government responds that under 38 U.S.C. 

§ 5103A, the “VA is required only to ‘make reasonable

efforts to assist a claimant,’ not unlimited efforts.” Government Br. at p. 10 (emphasis in original). According to 

the Government, it would not have been reasonable for 

the VA to contact agencies other than the NPRC because 

“if the test result is not within Mr. Griffin’s service medical records or any other records maintained by the 

[NPRC], it does not exist.” Id. 

As we have elsewhere observed, “[t]he duty to assist is 

not boundless in its scope.” Golz, 590 F.3d at 1320. The 

language of the statute is explicit: the VA “is not required 

to provide assistance to a claimant . . . if no reasonable 

possibility exists that such assistance would aid in substantiating the claim.” 38 U.S.C. § 5103A(a)(2). To 

conclude that the VA is required to make virtually unlimited requests to various agencies to obtain records the 

existence of which is open to question would vitiate section 5103A(a)(2) from the statute. See TRW Inc. v. Andrews, 534 U.S. 19, 31 (2001) (“It is a cardinal principle of 

statutory construction that a statute ought, upon the 

whole, to be so construed that, if it can be prevented, no 

clause, sentence, or word shall be superfluous, void, or 

insignificant.”) (internal citations omitted). 
GRIFFIN v. DVA 6

Thus, the Veterans Court did not err as a matter of 

law when it determined that the VA had met its duty to 

assist Mr. Griffin under 38 U.S.C. § 5103A. The court 

reviewed the Board’s decision under the correct legal 

standard—whether a reasonable possibility exists that 

additional assistance would aid in substantiating Mr. 

Griffin’s claim—and concluded, based among other reasons on the lack of evidence that Mr. Griffin had authorized disclosure of his test result to other agencies or that 

the Navy was otherwise authorized to disclose the result 

without Mr. Griffin’s permission, that further investigation was not required. 

As we cautioned in Goltz, in close or uncertain cases, 

the VA should be guided by the principles underlying our 

uniquely pro-claimant system for veteran’s benefits. Id.

590 F.3d at 1323. As long as there is a reasonable possibility that records exist to substantiate a veteran’s claim, 

the VA is required to assist the veteran in obtaining those 

records. But the duty to assist “is not a license for a 

‘fishing expedition’ to determine if there might be some 

unspecified information which could possibly support a 

claim.” Canlas v. Nicholson, 21 Vet.App. 312, 317 (2007) 

(citing Gobber v. Derwinski, 2 Vet.App. 470, 472 (1992)). 

Thus, when a veteran has failed to establish a reasonable 

possibility that certain records exist, the VA has no duty 

to assist the veteran in a random search for such records. 

CONCLUSION

Because the Veterans Court correctly interpreted the 

VA’s duty to assist as found in 38 U.S.C. § 5103A, the 

decision of the Veterans Court is affirmed. 

AFFIRMED