Filed 6/13/22 ; Modified and Certified for Publication 6/29/22 (order attached)

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION SEVEN

In re M.B. , a Person Coming Under the J uvenile Court Law. B 312789

(Los Angeles County Super. Ct. No. 18CCJP 0 3577A

) LOS ANGELES COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN AND FAMILY SERVICES,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

LIAH B.

,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from orde rs of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, Debra R. Archuleta, Judge. Affirmed in part, reversed in part and remanded with directions.2 Elizabeth C. Alexander, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Dawyn R. Harriso n, Acting County Counsel, Kim Nemoy, Assistant County Counsel, and Jane E. Kwon, Principal Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

___________________________ Liah B., the mother of six

- year

- old M.B., appeals the August 31, 2021 order termina ting her parental rights, contending the Los Angeles County Department of Children and Family Services failed to adequately investigate her claim of Indian ancestry through interviews with maternal relatives and
the notices sent to the Blackfeet T ribe fail ed to include the
birthdates of M.B.’s maternal grandfather and great

- grandfather as required by federal regulations implementing the Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978 (ICWA) (25 U.S.C. § 1901 et seq.) and related
California law. 1 Without challenging Liah’ s claims of error, the Department

argues that Liah’s appeal of the adequacy of its investigation has been mooted by further interviews with maternal relatives and
that any omission of required information from the ICWA

- 030
notices sent to the Blackfeet T ri be was harmless because its post

1 Liah separately appealed a May 13

, 2021 order summarily d enying her petition pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 388 to reinstate family reunification services or return M.B. to her care. We granted Liah’s motion to consolidate the two appeals. Liah’s briefs in this court, however, present no

arg uments directed to the section 388 order, and we deem that aspect of her appeal abandoned. (See Jones v. Superior Court (1994) 26 Cal.App.4th 92, 99 ; Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.204(a)(1)(B) .)3

appeal investigation established ICWA notices were not required. In support of its moot ness /harmless error arguments the Department has moved for “judicial notice of post

- judgment
evidence”

— a last minute information report filed in the juvenile court on April 4, 2022.
A s did our colleagues in Division Three of the Fourth Appellate District in In re K.M. (2015) 242 Cal.App.4th 450 ( K.M. ) , which involved a similar effort by the child protective services agency to remedy its d eficient ICWA investigation while an order terminating parental rights was on appeal, we reject the argument that evidence of postjudgment ICWA inquiries moots the issue, conditionally reverse the order terminating Liah’s parental rights and remand the mat ter for full compliance with the inquiry and notice provisions of ICWA and related California
law.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

1. The Dependency Proceedings The events leading to the Department’s filing of a dependency petition, M.B.’s removal from Liah after the juvenile court sustained a single count pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 300, subdivision (b)(1), 2 concernin g Liah’s substance abuse, and the dependency proceedings through the juvenile court’s November 7, 2019 order summari ly denying Liah’s petition for modification of its March 6, 2019 order terminating reunification services are detailed in our opinion affirming the November 7, 2019 order. ( In re M.B. (Mar. 15, 2021, B302837) [nonpub. opn.].)

2 Statutory references are to this code unless otherwise
stat ed.4 The section 366.26 selection and implementation hearing, originally scheduled for July 3, 2019, was ultimately held on August 31, 2021 . At the hearing the juvenile court found by clear and convincing evidence M.B. was adoptable and found no exception to termination of parental rights applied, specifically rejecting Liah’s argument based on the parent

- child

- relationship exception. (§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(B)(i).) 3 The court terminated Liah’s parental rights and transferred care, custody and control
of M.B. to the Department for adopti ve planning and placement. Shenika B., a maternal great

- aunt living in New Jersey

, was identified by the Department as M.B.’s prospective adoptive
parent. 4

2. The ICWA Investigation and Notice
In the Indian Chil d Inquiry Attachment (ICWA

- 010(A))
filed June 5, 2018 with the original dependency petition, the Department’s social worker checked the box stating , “T he child may have Indian ancestry,” and explained, “Mother stated child has Indian ancestry.” The detention report filed on the same
date similar ly stated, “The Indian Child Welfare Act does or may apply

, ” and elaborated, “On 6/1/2018, mother, Liah B[.] stated that American Indian heritage does apply as to the paternal side

3 The court found Liah had not maintained regular visitation and had not established a bond with M.B

.

4 In its section 366.26 report the Department explained New Jersey, where the maternal great

- aunt lives, requires an order terminating parental righ ts before it will complete an adoption home study pursuant to a referral under the Interstate Compact for the Placement of Children

. The court ordered M.B. placed with Shenika B. on December 17, 2021.5

of father, Terrell W[.],” identified by Liah as M.B.’s biological
father. 5 On June 6 , 201 8 , in connection with the detention hearing, in her Parental Notification of Indian Status (ICWA

- 020) Liah checked the box indicating she may have Indian ancestry, writing “Blackfoot (MGGF Lonnie B[.]).” Asked by the court at the hearing ab out M.B.’s Indian ancestry, Liah responded

, “[Terrell] did tell me he was Indian. I’m not exactly sure what tribe, but I know on my dad’s side, my grandfather is definitely Indian.” Liah explained she was estranged from her father’s side of the family an d did not have contact information for Lonnie B., Sr., M.B.’s great

- grandfather, and, while she knew he was born in Camden, New Jersey, she did not know his date of birth. She told the court she would try to obtain that information. The court
found there was no reason to know ICWA applied to Terrell but ordered the Department to investigate Liah’s Indian ancestry and provide a supplemental report regarding the investigation to the court that included “the details of who was interviewed, dates and places o f birth of the relatives as far back as can be ascertained.” In addition, the court ordered the Department to provide notice to the appropriate tribes and to the Bureau of
Indian Affairs. In its jurisdiction/disposition report filed July 5, 201 8 , the
De partment summarized its social worker’s i nterview with Liah

5 The whereabouts of Terrell, subsequently designated as M.B.’s alleged father by the court, remained unknown throughout the proceedings. Liah said Terrell never had any contact with M.B. On April 12, 2019 the court found the Department’s due diligence search had been completed and authorized notice of the section 366.26 hearing be provided to Terrell by publication.6

concerning her possible Indian ancestry. Liah provided the names and dates and places of birth, if known, of various maternal relatives. As to Lonnie B., Sr., Liah again said he was
born in Camd en , and Liah did not know his date of birth ; she did not know if he was still living. Liah provided the same information as to Lonnie B., Jr., M.B.’s maternal grandfather

— he
was born in Camden on an unknown date

, and she did not know
if he was still alive

. The Department reported it had recently
sent ICWA notices to Blackfeet tribal bands , the Bureau of Indian Affairs and the Secretary of the Interior. The report does not indicate any further investigation had been conducted by the Department. At the jur isdiction hearing on July 19 , 2018 the Department reported it ha d sent ICWA notices and suggested the court set a progress hearing to evaluate any responses that might be received. The court scheduled a nonappearance progress hearing for September 7, 2018

. A last minute information for the court, filed September 5, 2018, the Department reported it had no confirmation its notices to the Bureau of Indian Affairs and the Secretary of the Interior
had been received and no response to the notices. A

represen tative of the Blackfeet Tribe of Montana confirmed the Department had used the correct mailing address, but the Department had been unable to reach the Tribe’s ICWA division. The court granted the Department’s request to continue the progress hearing to D ecember 6, 2018.
A December 4, 2018 last minute information explained the Department had resubmitted a notice to the Blackfeet Tribe of Montana but its efforts, via voicemail, to obtain a letter of ICWA eligibility/noneligibility had been unsuccessful. O n December 6,7

2018 the juvenile court, after noti ng 60 days had elapsed since notices had been sent and no responses had been received, found it had no reason to know ICWA applied to the case. In her appeal from the juvenile court’s November 7, 2019
order denying her section 388 petition , Liah argued the Department and the juvenile court had not complied with their duties of inquiry and notice under ICWA before the court made
its no

- ICWA finding in December 2018. On October 29, 2020, while that appeal was pending, the juvenile court directed the Department to conduct further inquiry regarding Liah’s possible Blackfeet ancestry and to send all appropriate ICWA notices prior to the next hearing, which was then scheduled for January 4, 2021. Liah conceded, a nd we agreed, the order for additional investigation mooted the ICWA issue at that time. (See In re M.B.

, supra , B30283 7 , fn. 1. ) In a supplemental report filed December 29, 2020 the Department advised the court it had interviewed Lonnie B., Sr.,
who den ied any Indian ancestry, including with the Blackfeet Tribe, and sai d Lonnie B., Jr. was not a registered member of the Blackfeet Tribe. He declined to provide the name of Lonnie B., Jr.’s mother (M.B.’s maternal great

- grandmother). 6 Lonnie B.,
Sr. said he had no contact with Lorrie H., M.B.’s maternal grandmother. A maternal aunt, Tiarra H., who had received a Department contact letter, responded by email that she had no knowledge of any Indian ancestry in the family. The Department’s efforts to interv iew Lonnie B., Jr., whose whereabouts were unknown, and Lorrie H. were unsuccessful.

6 Lonnie B., Sr.’s current wife is Lonnie B., Jr.’s stepmother.8 The Department sent new notices to the Blackfeet Tribe of Montana, the Bureau of Indian Affairs and the Secretary of the
Interior. The notices did not include birthdates for Lonnie B., Sr. or Lonnie B., Jr., which Lonnie B., Sr. had declined to provide. In a letter dated January 28, 2021 the Blackfeet Tribe of Montana responded to the notice, stating M.B. was not listed on the tribal rolls and was not eligible for enrollm ent in the tribe. After receiving that letter, the court at a May 4, 2021 hearing found it
had no reason to know M.B. was an Indian child as defined under ICWA, a finding repeated in the Department’s report for the selection and implementation hearing tha t was finally conducted on August 31, 2021.

3. The Department’s Post

- appeal Remedial Efforts and Motion for Judicial Notice In Liah’s opening brief on appeal, filed February 16, 2022,
she explained the Department had failed to seek critical information ( including Lonnie B., Sr.’s and Lonnie B., Jr.’s dates of birth) from accessible maternal relatives, among them M.B.’s prospective adoptive parent, Shenika B., Lonnie B., Jr.’s sister.
Liah argued the Department’s violation of its ICWA duty of inquiry requ ired a conditional reversal of the August 31, 2021
order terminating parental rights, with a remand directing the Department to comply with the inquiry and notice requirements
of ICWA and related California law

. As reflected in an April 4, 2022 last minu te information report for the court, during the last 10 days of March 2022

, in response to Liah’s appellate brief

, t he Department reinterviewed Lonnie B., Sr., interviewed Shenika B. and unsuccessfully attempted to contact several other maternal relatives

, including9

M.B.’s maternal grandmother. The report also indicated
Lonnie B., Jr. had died in 2020. On April 7, 2022, concurrently with the filing of its respondent’s brief, the Department moved, pursuant to California Rules of Court, rule 8.252 and Evide nce Code sections 452 and 459, for judicial notice of the April 4, 2022 last minute information for the court. The Department explained the report “demonstrates that DCFS interviewed or attempted to interview available maternal relatives while the appeal was pending” and thus supported the argument advanced in its respondent’s brief that Liah’s appeal was moot. Liah filed an opposition memorandum, objecting to judicial notice of the report.

DISCUSSION

1. ICWA and the Duties of Inquiry and Notice

ICWA a nd governing federal regulations (25 C.F.R. § 23.101 et seq. (2022)) set minimal procedural protections for state courts to follow before removing Indian children and placing them in foster care or adoptive homes. ( In re Y.W. (2021)

70 Cal.App.5th 542, 55 1.) The statute authorizes states to provide “‘a higher standard of protection’” to Indian children, their families and their tribes than the rights provided under ICWA. ( In re T.G. (2020) 58 Cal.App.5th 275, 287

- 288;

see 25 U.S.C. § 1921.) In addition to significantly limiting state court actions concerning out

- of

- family placements for Indian children (see In re T.G. , at pp. 287

- 288), ICWA permits an Indian child’s tribe to intervene in or, where appropriate, exercise jurisdiction over a child custody p roceeding (see 25 U.S.C. § 1911(c); In re Isaiah W. (2016) 1 Cal.5th 1, 8). To ensure Indian tribes may exercise their rights in dependency proceedings as guaranteed by ICWA and related10

state law, investigation of a family member’s belief a child may
hav e Indian ancestry must be undertaken and notice provided to the appropriate tribes. (§ 224.2, subd. (a) [imposing on the court and child protective services agencies “ an affirmative and continuing duty to inquire whether a child .

. . is or may be an
Indi an child”]; see In re Charles W. (2021) 66 Cal.App.5th 483, 489.) The duty to inquire “begins with initial contact (§ 224.2, subd. (a)) and obligates the juvenile court and child protective agencies to ask all relevant involved individuals whether the
chi ld may be an Indian child. ” ( In re T.G

., supra , 58 Cal.App.5th at p. 290; accord, In re Antonio R. (2022) 76 Cal.App.5th 421, 429; see § 224.2, subds. (a)

- (c).) In addition, section 224.2, subdivision (e), imposes a duty of further inquiry regarding the possible Indian status of the child “[i]f the court, social worker, or probation officer has reason to believe that an Indian child is involved in a proceeding, but does
not have sufficient information to determine there is reason to
know that the child i s an Indian child.” California Rules of Court, rule 5.481(a)(4) provides that further inquiry must be
conducted if the social worker “knows or has reason to know or believe that an Indian child is or may be involved.” F urther inquiry includes, “but is no t limited to,” interviewing, as soon as practicable, extended family members, contacting the Bureau of Indian Affairs and contacting “ the tribe or tribes and any other person that may reasonably be expected to have information regarding the child’ s members hip, citizenship status, or eligibility. ” ( § 224.2, subd. (e)(2).) If those inquiries result in reason to know the child is an Indian child, notice to the relevant tribes is required. (25 U.S.C. § 1912(a); Welf. & Inst. Code, § 224.3; see In re J.S. (2 021)11

62 Cal.App.5th 678, 686; In re T.G.

, supra , 58 Cal.App.5th at

p. 290 .) The g overning federal regulations require ICWA notices to include, if known, the names, birthdates, birthplaces and tribal
enrollment information of all direct lineal ancestors of the child. (25 C.F.R. § 23.111(d)(3) (2022).) State law mandates inclusion of

“ [a]ll names known of the Indian child ’ s biological parents, grandparents, and great

- grandparents, or Indian custodians, including maiden, married, and former names or aliases , as well as their current and former addresses, birth dates, places of birth and death, tribal enrollment information of other direct lineal ancestors of the child, and any other identifying information, if
known .” (§ 224.3, subd. (a)(5)(C); s ee In re A. M. (2020)

47 Cal.App.5th 303, 317 [“‘If the notice duty is triggered under ICWA, the notice to a tribe must include a wide range of information about relatives, including grandparents and great

grandparents, to enable the tribe to properly identify the
chi ldren ’ s Indian ancestry. [Citation.] Any violation of this policy requires the appellate court to vacate the offending order and remand the matter for further proceedings consistent with ICWA requirements ’”]. )

2. T he April 4, 2022 Last Minute Informatio n Does Not Moot Liah’s Appeal The Department’s effort to moot Liah’s appeal by conducting further interviews while her appeal wa s pending fails
for several reasons

, separate from the general rule cited by Liah in her opposition to the motion for judicial n otice, that “‘an appeal reviews the correctness of a judgment as of the time of its rendition, upon a record of matters which were before the trial
court for its consideration.’” ( In re Zeth S. (2003) 31 Cal.4th 396,

405

. ) First, “‘ w hile courts are free to take judicial notice of the12

existence of each document in a court file, including the truth of results reached, they may not take judicial notice of the truth of hearsay statements in decisions and court files. ’ ” ( In re Vicks (2013) 56 Cal.4th 274, 314 ; accord, Copenbarger v. Morris Cerullo World Evangelism, Inc. (2018) 29 Cal.App.5th 1, 14

- 15 [“‘[w] hile judicial notice may be taken of court records [citation]

, the truth
of matters asserted in such documents is not subject to judicial
notice ’ ” ]; see K.M

. , supra , 242 Cal.App.4th at p. 456.) Thus, while

we grant the Department’s motion for judicial notice and acknowledge the existence of the last minute information, the

contents of that report

— the substance of the postjudgment
interviews conducted by the Department and its description of
unsuccessful efforts to reach other maternal family members

—

are not properly before us in this appeal.
Code of Civil Procedure section 909, unlike a motion for judicial notice, permits an appellate court to take additional
evidence and make independent factual findings on appeal. 7
Such postjudgment evidence may, in appropriate cases, be
considered to determine whether an issue on appeal is moot. (See In re Josiah Z. (2005) 36 Cal.4th 664, 676 [ “the beneficial

consequences of motions to dismiss, where granted, will be to ‘expedit[e] the proceedings and promot[e] the finality of the juvenile’s court’s orders and judgment’ [citation]

— precisely the

7 Code of Civil Procedure section 909 provides , “In all cases where trial by jury is not a matter of right . . . the review ing court may make factual determinations contrary to or in addition to those made by the trial court. . . . The reviewing court may for the purpose of making the factual determinations or for any other purpose in the interests of justice, take additional evidence of or concerning facts occurring at any time prior to the decision of the appeal.”13

policy advanced by our ruling in Zeth S

. ” ].) Deeming the Department’s motion f or judicial notice a motion to consider new evidence under Code of Civil Procedure section 909, however,
would not solve the fundamental problem with the argument the postjudgment interviews moot Liah’s appeal.
As discussed, after the juvenile court’s init ial finding it had

no reason to know ICWA applied, while Liah’s prior appeal was pending, the court ordered the Department to investigate further
and resend notice to the Blackfeet Tribe. Following the Blackfeet
Tribe’s response, as a predicate for the se ction 366.26 order terminating parental rights, the court again found ICWA did not apply to M.B

. It is that order

— and the inquiry and notice on which th e necessary no

- ICWA finding is grounded

— that is at
issue in t his appeal and that the Department was att empting to reinforce through its additional ICWA interviews

. Yet s ection 366.26, subdivision (i)(1), 8 expressly deprives the juvenile court of jurisdiction to modify or revoke an order terminating parental rights once it is final as to that court

. Accord ingly, as the court of appeal explained in K.M.

, supra , 242 Cal.App.4th 450, a child protective services agency cannot remedy a defective ICWA investigation by conducting further interviews while the
termination order is being reviewed on appeal. ( K.M.

, a t pp. 457

- 458.)

8 Section 366.26, subdivision (i)(1), with a limited exception not applicable in this case, provides, “Any order of the court permanently terminating parental ri ghts under this section shall be conclusive and binding . . . . After making the order, the juvenile court shall have no power to set aside, change

, or modify it .”14 The mother in K.M. had informed the juvenile court at her first court appearance that she may have Indian ancestry. Although the juvenile court ordered the Orange County Social Services Agency (SSA) to investigate, the agency failed to con duct any interviews, while asserting in its reports to the court that ICWA did not apply. ( K.M.

, supra , 242 Cal.App.4th at p. 453.) Both parents appealed after the court terminated their parental rights, raising the issue of ICWA violations in their open ing briefs. ( Ibid. ) Concurrently with its respondent’s brief, SSA filed a motion to augment the record, to take additional evidence and to dismiss the appeal as moot. The motion papers included documentation relating to SSA’s renewed efforts regarding IC WA inquiry and
notice and a further minute order from the juvenile court with a n additional finding that ICWA did not apply. ( K.M.

, supra , 242 Cal.App.4th at pp. 45 3

- 454.) The court of appeal granted the motion to take additional evidence, but held the evidence did not render the appeal moot “because the juvenile court lacked jurisdiction to rule on any collateral dispute of the termination order.” ( K.M.

, supra , 242 Cal.App.4th at p. 457.) After quot ing section 366.26,
subdivision (i)(1), the court exp lained, “[T]he juvenile court lacked jurisdiction to consider SSA’s belated remedial ICWA
efforts because it was in substance a collateral attack on the termination order. Compliance with the ICWA is required before terminating parental rights. [Citation .] Moreover, if the new evidence revealed K.M. was an Indian child, as defined by the ICWA, the juvenile court would have been required to invalidate prior orders taken in violation of the ICWA, i.e., reverse the termination of parental rights. [Citation .] Section 366.26,15

subdivision (i), clearly states juvenile courts lack jurisdiction to modify or revoke an order terminating parental rights.” ( K.M

., at

p. 458.) “SSA’s new evidence and the juvenile court’s postjudgment order,” the K.M. court concluded , “have no relevance to the subject of this appeal, i.e. review of the
termination order.” ( Id. at p. 459.) Rather, once SSA’s ICWA errors had been pointed out in the parents’ opening briefs, the court wrote, the most expeditious and efficient way to hav e solved the problem w ould have been for the parties to stipulate to a limited reversal and an expedited remittitur . ( Id

. at p. 458.) Other than the Department’s attempt to use a motion for judicial notice rather than a motion to take evidence pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 909 to present its postjudgment ICWA efforts as grounds for dismissing the appeal as moot, t he
case at bar differs from K.M. only because the Department, unlike SSA, did not ask the juvenile court to review the last
minut e information and determine whether “proper and adequate further inquiry and due diligence” had been conducted

, as required by section 224.2, subdivision (i)(2), for a finding that ICWA does not apply. (See In re Y.W

., supra , 70 Cal.App.5th at p. 552 ; see also In re K.R. (2018) 20 Cal.App.5th 701, 709 [ “ the court has a responsibility to ascertain that the agency has conducted an adequate investigation and cannot simply sign off on the notices as legally adequate without doing so ” ] .) Omitting
that statutor y step does not justify a different outcome. The purpose of the Department’s further interviews of M.B.’s
maternal relatives , like the additional efforts in K.M

., was to correct errors in the earlier ICWA investigation. If information
had been developed that required new notices be sent to the
Blackfeet Tribe or the Bureau of Indian Affairs

— for example,16

because the Department learned the birthdates of Lonnie B., Sr., whom Liah had identified as “definitely Indian,” or the maternal grandfather, Lonnie B., Jr.

— the juvenile court would have
confronted the same dilemma identified by the K.M. court: An order made in violation of ICWA would be invalid; yet, by virtue of section 366.26, subdivision (i)(1), the juvenile court lacked jurisdiction to vacate its ord er terminating parental rights in order to permit ICWA compliance. Rather than attempt to moot Liah’s appeal by belatedly conducting the investigation required by section 224.2

, the Department’s proper course of action was to stipulate to a
conditional rev ersal with directions for full compliance with the inquiry and notice provisions of ICWA and related California
law

— a procedure the Department has used in many ICWA appeals pending before us.

3. The Department Failed To Conduct an Adequate Inquiry into M.B.’s Possible Indian Ancestry As the Department implicitly conceded by conducting
additional interviews with several of M.B.’s maternal relatives after Liah filed her opening brief on appeal and by arguing in its respondent’s brief only that those furthe r interviews mooted Liah’s ICWA claims, rather than contending its inquiries before the section 366.26 hearing satisfied its obligations under ICWA and California law, the Department failed to conduct an adequate inquiry into M.B.’s possible Indian ancestr y before the court terminated Liah’s parental rights. In particular, as Liah argued, the Department failed to contact M.B.’s maternal grandmother, did not determine whether the maternal grandfather was
available for an interview and did not ask ICWA

- relat ed questions of the maternal great

- aunt (the maternal grandfather’s17

sister) who had been identified as M.B.’s prospective adoptive
parent. Although notices were sent to the Blackfeet Tribe of Montana, the Bureau of Indian Affairs and the Secretary of the Interior, as ordered by the juvenile court, those notices were missing required information, including Lonnie B., Sr.’s
birthdate

— information that may well have been av ailable from

a ccessible maternal relatives (including Lonnie B., Sr.’s daughter Shenika)

, even if Lonnie B., Sr. declined to provide it. For its part, the juvenile court failed to ensure the Department adequately investigated M.B.’s Indian ancestry, passively accepting the Department’s reports as fulfilling its statutory obligations without q uestioning the extent of the
interviews conducted or the nature of the follow

- up, if any, pursued by Department personnel. Far more is required. (See, e.g., In re T.G., supra, 58 Cal.App.5th at p. 293 [“[t]he court here fulfilled its initial obligation t o ask about Tamara’s possible Indian ancestry; it failed, however, to ensure the Department complied with its duty of further inquiry based on the responses the court had received from Tamara and Loretta S.”]; In re N.G. (2018) 27 Cal.App.5th 474, 482 .)18 DI SPOSITION The May 13, 2021 order denying Liah’s section 388 petition is affirmed. The August 31, 2021 section 366.26 order terminating Liah ’ s parental rights is conditionally affirmed . The matter is remanded to the juvenile court for full compliance with the inquiry and notice provisions of ICWA and related California law and for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.

PERLUSS, P. J.
We concur:

SEGAL , J.

F EUER , J.Filed 6/29/22 CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION SEVEN

In re M.B. , a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law. B 312789

(Los Angeles County Super. Ct. No. 18CCJP03577A ) LOS ANGELES COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN AND FAMILY SERVICES,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

LIAH B.

,

Defendant and Appellant. ORDER MODIFYING OPINION AND CERTIFYING OPINION FOR PUBLICATION (NO CHANGE IN APPELLATE JUD G MENT)

THE COURT: The request for modification, filed by plaintiff and respondent, is granted in part. It is ordered that the opinion filed
herein on June 13, 2022 be modified as follows: 1. On page 1, “ Affirmed in part, reversed in part and
remanded with directions ” is deleted and the following is insert ed in its place:

Affirmed in part, conditionally affirmed in part and
remanded with directions.2 2. O n page 3, in the first full paragraph, a period and the word “We” is inserted after the word “issue,” and the word “reverse” is changed to “affirm

, ” so the paragraph reads:

As did our colleagues in Division Three of the Fourth Appellate District in In re K.M. (2015) 242 Cal.App.4th 450 ( K.M. ), which involved a similar effort by the child protective services agency to remedy its deficient ICWA investigation while an order terminating parental rights was on appeal, we reject the argument that evidence of

pos tjudgment ICWA inquiries moots the issue . We conditionally affirm the order terminating Liah’s parental rights and remand the matter for full compliance with the inquiry and notice provisions of ICWA and related
California law. 3. On page 13, at the end of the full paragraph “( K.M.

, supra , at pp. 457

- 458.)” is deleted and following is
inserted in its place: ( K.M.

, supra , at pp. 457

- 458 ; contra
, In re Allison B. (2022)

79 Cal.App.5th 214 [finding appeal from order terminating parental rights moot based on postappeal evidence that agency had belated ly made the required ICWA inquiries].)

The opinion in this case filed June 13, 2022 was not certified for publication. It appearing the opinion meets the standards for publication specified in Californ ia Rules of Court, rule 8.1105(c),
the request by appellant’s counsel pursuant to California Rules of Court, rule 8.1120(a) for publication is granted. IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that the opinion meets the standards for publication specified in California Rules of Court, rule 8.1105(c); and
ORDERED that the words “Not to be Published in the Official Reports” appearing on page 1 of said opinion be deleted

an d the opinion herein be published in the Official Reports.3 There is no change in the appellate judgment.

____________________________________________________________ PERLUSS, P. J. SEGAL, J. FEUER, J.