United States 

Department of 

Agriculture

Marketing and 

Regulatory 

Programs

Animal and 

Plant Health 

Inspection 

Service

Proposed Rulemaking 

for the Status of the 

European Union 

Regarding Virulent 

(Exotic) Newcastle 

Disease (END) and 

Highly Pathogenic Avian 

Influenza (HPAI)

Environmental Assessment,

July 2010
Proposed Rulemaking for the 

Status of the European Union 

Regarding Virulent (Exotic) 

Newcastle Disease (END) and 

Highly Pathogenic Avian 

Influenza (HPAI)

Environmental Assessment,

July 2010

Agency Contact for the Proposed Rulemaking

Mr. Javier Vargas

Case Manager

National Center for Import and Export

Veterinary Services

Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service

U.S. Department of Agriculture

4700 River Road, Unit 38

Riverdale, MD 20737

The U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) prohibits discrimination in all 

its programs and activities on the basis of race, color, national origin, sex, 

religion, age, disability, political beliefs, sexual orientation, and marital or family 

status. (Not all prohibited bases apply to all programs.) Persons with 

disabilities who require alternative means for communication of program 

information (Braille, large print, audiotape, etc.) should contact USDA’s 

TARGET Center at (202) 720–2600 (voice and TDD).

To file a complaint of discrimination, write USDA, Director, Office of Civil 

Rights, Room 326–W, Whitten Building, 1400 Independence Avenue, SW, 

Washington, DC 20250–9410 or call (202) 720–5964 (voice and TDD). 

USDA is an equal opportunity provider and employer. 
Table of Contents

 

 I. Need for the Proposed Action............................................... 1 

 II. Alternatives............................................................................. 2 

III. Potential Environmental Impacts.......................................... 5 

IV. Agencies Contacted ............................................................ 19 

 V. References............................................................................ 20

Appendix A. Threatened and Endangered Birds Federally 

Listed in the United States and Its Territories 
1

I. Need for the Proposed Action

The United States Department of Agriculture (USDA), Animal and Plant 

Health Inspection Service (APHIS) regulates the importation of animals 

and animal products into the United States to guard against the 

introduction of animal diseases. APHIS’ regulations allow for the 

importation of live birds and poultry (including hatching eggs), poultry 

meat and poultry products from regions considered as free of or low risk 

for virulent (Exotic) Newcastle Disease (END) and Highly Pathogenic 

Avian Influenza (HPAI) under specified conditions. APHIS evaluated the 

END and HPAI risk associated with importation into the United States of 

live birds and poultry (including hatching eggs), poultry meat and poultry 

products from the 25 Member States of the European Union (EU) which 

constituted the EU in the year 2006, collectively referred to as the 

European Union-251 (EU-25). 

APHIS’ evaluation of the EU-25 found that this region meets the 

requirements for being recognized as a region free of END and HPAI. 

The proposed action is needed to allow the importation of live birds and 

poultry (including hatching eggs), poultry meat and poultry products from 

the EU-25 because there is no scientific basis for trade restriction. 

Allowing the trade of these commodities would be consistent with 

internationally recognized standards as found in the 2009 World 

Organization for Animal Health (commonly referred to as the Office of 

International des Epizooties (OIE)) Terrestrial Animal Health Code for 

END (10.13) and HPAI (10.4) (OIE, 2009a; OIE, 2009b). 

In response to this proposed rule amendment, APHIS analyzed the 

potential disease risks (in “APHIS Risk Considerations on Importation of 

Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza (HPAI) and Virulent (Exotic) 

Newcastle Disease (END) Virus from a European Union Region of 

Twenty-five Member States” (USDA–APHIS, 2009)) and environmental 

effects associated with this action. This environmental assessment (EA) 

addresses potential environmental impacts related to the amendment of 

APHIS’ regulations to include the EU-25 as a region free of END and 

HPAI with regard to the importation of live birds and poultry (including 

hatching eggs), poultry meat and poultry products from that region to the 

United States. 

This EA has been prepared to comply with the provisions of the National 

Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA) (42 United States Code 

(U.S.C.) 4321, et. seq.) as prescribed in implementing regulations adopted 

 

1 European Union-25 (EU-25) was defined as including the Member States: Austria, Belgium, 

Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, 

Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Slovakia, Slovenia, 

Spain, Sweden, and the United Kingdom.
2

by the Council on Environmental Quality (Title 40 Code of Federal 

Regulations (CFR) §§ 1500–1508), USDA’s NEPA regulations (7 CFR 

part 1b), and APHIS’ NEPA implementing procedures (7 CFR part 372). 

The Council on Environmental Quality NEPA implementing regulations 

requires that environmental documents are made available to agencies and 

persons who may be interested or affected. 

II. Alternatives

The two alternatives considered in this EA include: (1) the no action 

alternative in which the current regulations would remain unchanged, 

continuing to omit the EU-25 from the list of regions considered as free of 

END and HPAI, and, therefore, would not allow the importation of live 

birds and poultry (including hatching eggs), poultry meat, and poultry 

products from that region to the United States; and (2) the rule amendment 

of 9 CFR part 94, which would designate the EU-25 as free of END and 

HPAI and would, therefore, allow the importation of live birds and poultry 

(including hatching eggs), poultry meat, and poultry products from the 

EU-25 under certain conditions. 

A. No Action

 

Currently, APHIS regulation (9 CFR § 94.6) restricts the importation of 

poultry carcasses, meat, parts or products of poultry carcasses, and eggs 

(other than hatching eggs) into the United States from regions where END 

or any subtype of HPAI is considered to exist, allowing only cooked 

products or consignment directly to an approved establishment in the 

United States. These conditions were considered to present a low disease 

risk with negligible environmental effects (USDA–APHIS, 2009). 

APHIS regulations for the importation into the United States, from regions 

where END or HPAI is considered to exist, allow importing poultry 

carcasses and parts and products of poultry carcasses only if they have 

been cooked throughout to reach a minimum internal temperature of 

74 o

C. In regions where HPAI is considered to exist, APHIS requires that 

carcasses and parts or products of carcasses, including meat, of poultry, 

game birds, or other birds may be imported if they are accompanied by a 

certificate that is signed by a full-time, salaried veterinarian of the 

government agency responsible for animal health in the region, and that 

specifies that the articles were cooked to this specification (USDA–

APHIS, 2009). 

Carcasses of game birds may not be imported from regions where any 

subtype of HPAI is considered to exist, except for those consigned to a 

museum, educational institution or other establishment which has 
3

provided evidence that it has the equipment, facilities, and capabilities to 

store, handle, process, or disinfect such articles so as to prevent the 

introduction or dissemination of HPAI into the United States, as approved 

by the Administrator (USDA –APHIS, 2009). 

Eggs (other than hatching eggs) of poultry, game birds, or other birds from 

regions where END exists may be imported into the United States only 

if— 

(1) the eggs are accompanied by a health certificate regarding the flock of 

origin, and meet certain other conditions; 

(2) the eggs are consigned directly to an approved establishment for 

breaking and pasteurization; 

(3) the eggs are imported under permit for scientific, educational, or 

research purposes; or 

(4) the eggs are imported under permit and have been cooked or 

processed and will be handled in a manner that prevents the 

introduction of END into the United States. 

Table eggs from END-affected regions may only enter the United States if

accompanied by official certification verifying that— 

• the flock was visited within the last 90 days, 

• the eggs were packed and sealed, 

• the cull birds were tested, and 

• there is no indication of the presence of the disease within 

50 kilometer (km) for the last 90 days (USDA–APHIS, 2009). 

Recently, APHIS added an alternative pathway for the importation of table 

eggs from regions where END is considered to exist based on testing and 

certification by the competent national veterinary authority. The 

certification must state that within the last 90 days the flock-of-origin was 

inspected and no evidence of communicable diseases of poultry was 

found, and that the eggs were packed and sealed with a seal of the 

competent veterinary authority. Certification must also be made that the 

flock of origin of the eggs was free of END based on a testing regimen 

using virus isolation from cull birds, and verification that the weekly cull 

rate did not exceed 0.1 percent. Egg drop syndrome must be a notifiable 

disease in the region of origin, and certification must indicate that in the 

past 90 days there were no reports of egg drop syndrome in the flock(s) of 

origin or within a 50-km radius of the flock of origin (USDA–APHIS, 

2009). 

Legal entry of live birds into the United States is allowable under permit 

and controlled through existing quarantine and testing measures in 

quarantine facilities operated or approved by APHIS (9 CFR 93.205). In 

addition, live birds or poultry, including hatching eggs, must be 
4

accompanied by official certification that, as far as it has been possible to 

determine, during the 90 days prior to movement, the poultry were not 

exposed to communicable diseases of poultry, including END and HPAI, 

and the premises were not within a quarantine area for such disease. The 

birds must not be vaccinated with a vaccine for the H5 or H7 subtype of 

avian influenza or transit regions where END or HPAI of any subtype is 

considered to exist or where vaccination for H5 or H7 subtypes of AI is 

used for disease control. All birds are subject to appropriate testing for 

END and HPAI prior to their release from quarantine (USDA–APHIS, 

2009). 

It must also be certified that the hatching eggs were not derived from birds 

vaccinated for either H5 or H7 subtypes of AI. Hatching eggs from 

regions not designated in 9 CFR 94.6 as free of END and HPAI must be 

quarantined upon arrival. Imported hatching eggs are required to be 

transported from the port of entry to the hatchery in a vehicle sealed by 

USDA, and hatched and brooded under the supervision of the Area 

Veterinarian in Charge (AVIC) in the State of destination. The poultry 

hatched from these eggs must remain in quarantine for at least 30 days 

following hatching. The hatchery must meet specific biosecurity 

standards, and be inspected and approved by the AVIC prior to issuance of 

the import permit. During quarantine, the hatching eggs and poultry from 

such eggs are subject to inspection and diagnostic testing to verify that 

they are free of END and HPAI. Hatching eggs from regions APHIS 

considers free of END and HPAI must be accompanied by official 

certification, but do not undergo quarantine (USDA–APHIS, 2009). 

Hatching eggs imported from any part of the world must be accompanied 

by a veterinary health certificate issued by a national government

veterinarian of the exporting country and a USDA import permit. 

Certification includes statements that the flock of origin was free of 

communicable disease, and the premises were not in an area under 

quarantine (USDA–APHIS, 2009). 

The no action alternative would leave the current importation regulations 

unchanged. Under this alternative, the EU-25 would continue not to be 

listed as a region free of END and HPAI and, therefore, would not be 

allowed to export live birds and poultry (including hatching eggs), poultry 

meat, and poultry products to the United States. The status in the EU-25 

as free of END and HPAI is not reflected in the current import regulations. 

The continuance of such unsupported trade restrictions would be contrary 

to U.S. obligations under international trade agreements. 

B. Proposed Rule Amendment

APHIS–Veterinary Services (VS) evaluated the risk of END and HPAI 
5

from the EU- 25. Based on our evaluation of representative Member 

States and the European Commission regulation and implementation, 

APHIS is proposing to recognize the EU-25 as free of both END and 

HPAI. APHIS is now proposing to recognize the EU-25 as a single region 

for which import requirements will be uniformly applied in the EU Poultry 

Trade Region (USDA–APHIS, 2009). The region contains all of the 

European Union (EU) Member States (MS) which constituted the EU in 

the year 2006 that we collectively refer to as the European Union-25 (EU25). 

APHIS based the evaluation of the END and HPAI status of the EU-25 on 

the performance measures found in Title 9 CFR 92.2 using the 

documentation submitted by the European Commission (EC), Food and 

Veterinary Office reports, EC legislation, reports to World Organization 

for Animal Health (OIE) and the site visit. The April 2008 VS site visit to 

the EC in Brussels and five representative EU Member States (Cyprus, 

Denmark, Germany, the Netherlands and Poland) was conducted to 

evaluate their avian disease status and how uniformly EC legislation is 

implemented and enforced throughout the EU-25 (USDA–APHIS, 2009). 

The rule amendment alternative would amend the current regulations to 

add the EU-25 to the list of regions APHIS considers as free of END and 

HPAI. In doing so, this alternative would allow the importation of live 

birds and poultry (including hatching eggs), poultry meat, and poultry 

products under specified conditions from the EU-25. The rule amendment 

would add the EU-25 to the list of END- and HPAI- free regions in 

9 CFR 94.6 and apply the movement restrictions found in 9 CFR 92.3. 

Title 9 CFR 92.3 recognizes the quarantine measures and movement 

restrictions implemented by the EC for certain diseases, and bans the 

importation into the United States of animals and animal products that are 

prohibited movement in the EU as a result of the quarantine (USDA–

APHIS, 2009). 

 

III. Potential Environmental Impacts

The diseases of concern, with regard to allowing the importation of live 

birds and poultry (including hatching eggs), poultry meat and poultry 

products from 25 Member States of the EU, are END and HPAI. APHIS 

prepared a risk assessment, “APHIS Risk Considerations on Importation 

of Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza (HPAI) and Virulent (Exotic) 

Newcastle Disease (END) Virus from a European Union Region of 

Twenty-five Member States,” to evaluate the risk of both END and HPAI 

introduction to the United States as a result of allowing importation of 

these commodities from the EU-25 (USDA–APHIS, 2009). APHIS 

evaluated the status of the EU-25 with regard to its infrastructure and 
6

control measures in place for these diseases, including an assessment of 

disease surveillance measures, import practices, laboratory capacity, 

emergency response procedures, and other factors that could influence the 

risk of disease introduction into the United States. 

APHIS concluded that the overall risk of introducing either END or HPAI 

into the United States through the import of live birds, poultry carcasses, 

parts or products of poultry carcasses, and eggs of poultry, game birds, or 

other birds from the EU-25 to be extremely low. However, APHIS 

recognizes that limited END and HPAI outbreaks are likely to continue to 

occur in the region. Therefore, APHIS intends to apply the conditions 

found in 9 CFR 92.3 in the event of future outbreaks of either END or 

HPAI in the “APHIS-defined poultry trade area.” The restriction areas 

will include all protection, surveillance, and buffer zones established 

around END or HPAI outbreaks in domestic poultry, and the infected 

zones established around outbreaks of END or HPAI in wild birds and 

pigeons held in captivity (including pigeons held for racing, exhibition, 

breeding, and fattening). APHIS will require the competent veterinary 

authority of the individual EU-25 Member State to certify that the live 

birds or poultry, including hatching eggs, exported to the United States, or 

the poultry from which exported poultry meat and poultry products 

originated in the EU-25 and had never resided in a region under 

restrictions for the presence of END or HPAI in domestic poultry for the 

last 90 days. In the case of movement restrictions put in place following 

the detection of END or HPAI in wild birds or domestic (racing) pigeons, 

APHIS will recognize the duration of restrictions as imposed by the EC 

upon the infected zone (USDA–APHIS, 2009). 

A. Background 

END is caused by an avian paramyxovirus. Paramyxoviruses isolated 

from avian species have been classified by serological testing into nine 

serotypes designated APMV-1 through APMV-9; Newcastle disease virus 

(NDV) has been designated APMV-1. Since its recognition in 1926, END 

is regarded as being endemic in many countries. Prophylactic vaccination 

is practiced in all but a few of the countries that produce poultry on a 

commercial scale (OIE, 2002a; OIE, 2009b; OIE, 2009d). 

NDV can be a human pathogen causing transient, usually localized 

infections. Reported infections have been non-life threatening and usually 

not debilitating for more than a day or two. The most frequently reported 

and best substantiated clinical signs in human infections have been eye 

infections, usually consisting of unilateral or bilateral reddening, excessive 

tear production, edema (abnormal accumulation of fluid beneath the skin) 

of the eyelids, conjunctivitis (swelling, inflammation, or infection of the 

membrane lining the eyelids), and sub-conjunctival hemorrhage (bleeding 
7

underneath the eye). Although the effect on the eye may be quite severe, 

infections are usually transient and the cornea is not affected. Reports of 

other clinical symptoms in humans infected with NDV are less well 

substantiated, but suggest a more generalized infection may sometimes 

occur resulting in chills, headaches, and fever, with or without 

conjunctivitis. There is evidence that both vaccinal and virulent (for 

poultry) strains of NDV may infect and cause clinical signs in humans. 

There is no evidence of human-to-human spread (OIE, 2009d). 

Avian influenza (AI) is caused by infection with viruses of the family 

Orthomyxoviridae, placed in the genus influenzavirus A. Influenza A 

viruses are the only orthomyxoviruses known to affect birds and many 

species of birds have been shown to be susceptible to infection with 

influenza A viruses. Aquatic birds are a major natural reservoir of these 

viruses, but the overwhelming majority of isolates have been of low 

pathogenicity for chickens and turkeys. Influenza A viruses are classified 

into subtypes on the basis of their haemagglutinin (H) and neuraminidase 

(N) antigens. At present, 16 H subtypes (H1–H16) and 9 N subtypes (N1–

N9) are recognized. To date, the highly virulent influenza A viruses that 

produce acute clinical disease in chickens, turkeys, and other birds of 

economic importance have been associated only with the H5 and H7 

subtypes; however, most viruses of H5 and H7 subtype isolated from birds 

have been of low virulence for poultry. Due to the risk of a H5 or H7 

virus of low virulence becoming virulent by mutation, all H5 and H7 

viruses have been identified as notifiable avian influenza (NAI) viruses 

(OIE, 2009a). 

Depending on the species, age, specific characteristics of the viral strain 

involved, environmental factors and co-infection, the highly pathogenic 

disease, in fully susceptible birds, may vary from one of sudden death with 

little or no overt clinical signs to a more characteristic disease with 

variable clinical presentations including respiratory signs, such as eye and 

nasal discharges, coughing, and dyspnea (difficult breathing), swelling of 

the sinuses and/or head, apathy, reduced vocalization, marked reduction in 

feed and water intake, cyanosis (discoloration of skin) of the unfeathered 

skin, wattles, and comb, incoordination and nervous signs and diarrhea. In 

laying birds, additional clinical features include a marked drop in egg 

production usually accompanied by an increase in numbers of poor quality 

eggs. Typically, high morbidity is accompanied by high and rapidly 

escalating unexplained mortality. However, none of these signs can be 

considered distinctively characteristic of a particular disease. In addition, 

low pathogenicity avian influenza (LPAI) viruses, which may cause mild 

or no clinical disease, or may produce a spectrum of clinical signs the 

severity of which may approach that of highly pathogenic avian influenza, 

particularly if exacerbating conditions or co-infections are present (OIE, 

2002b; OIE, 2009a; OIE, 2009c). 
8

Avian influenza viruses are subject to official control and the virus has a 

high risk of spread from the laboratory; consequently, a risk assessment 

should be carried out to determine the level of biosecurity needed for 

laboratory diagnosis and chicken inoculation; characterization of the virus 

should be conducted at biocontainment level 32

, at least. Countries 

lacking access to such a specialized national or regional laboratory should 

send specimens to an OIE Reference Laboratory (OIE, 2009c). 

The potential for impacts on the human environment from the importation 

of live birds and poultry (including hatching eggs), poultry meat and 

poultry products from the EU-25 are dependent upon the ability of 

mitigation measures or mitigative factors to prevent the introduction of 

END or HPAI via the biological pathways of transmission of the diseases. 

This section addresses the potential environmental impacts that could 

occur under the alternatives considered. 

B. No Action

The no action alternative would not allow live birds and poultry (including 

hatching eggs), poultry meat, and poultry products to be imported from the 

EU-25; that is, it would maintain the current rules governing the 

importation of these commodities. This alternative would have no 

potential effect on human health or the environment. This alternative, 

however, is inconsistent with our commitments under international trade 

agreements.

C. Proposed Rule Amendment Alternative

The proposed rule amendment alternative would allow the importation of 

live birds and poultry (including hatching eggs), poultry meat, and 

products from the EU-25 under specific conditions designed to prevent the 

introduction of END and HPAI into the United States. Any potential for 

impacts to the human environment would be the result of exposure to the 

END and/or HPAI virus via a breakdown in these requirements designed 

to mitigate the risk of exposure to the virus by United States poultry. 

Animal health, the physical environment, and public health are addressed 

as components of the human environment in the United States that have 

the potential to be impacted in the event that the END or HPAI virus were 

to be introduced to United States poultry as a result of the rule amendment 

 

2 A biosafety level is the level of the biocontainment (or laboratory biosafety) precautions required to 

isolate dangerous biological agents in an enclosed facility. The levels of containment range from the 

lowest biosafety level 1 to the highest at level 4. In the United States, the Centers for Disease 

Control and Prevention (CDC) have specified these levels. In the European Union, the same 

biosafety levels are defined in a directive. Biocontainment level 3 is applicable to clinical, diagnostic, 

teaching, research, or production facilities in which work is done with indigenous or exotic agents 

(including bacteria and viruses) which may cause serious or potentially lethal disease after inhalation.
9

to list the EU-25 as free of END and HPAI and, therefore, allowing 

importation of live birds and poultry (including hatching eggs), poultry 

meat and poultry products. Also, other environmental review 

considerations for the protection of the human environment are addressed 

in this section of the EA. 

a. Virulent (Exotic) Newcastle Disease (END)

END is a disease caused by avian paramyxovirus type 1 viruses. END is 

known to affect more than 250 bird species, with varying levels of 

mortality. In general, the END viruses are separated into five pathotypes 

based on the clinical signs seen in chickens, ranked from asymptomatic to 

highly pathogenic types. In some bird species, the less virulent END 

viruses do not cause clinical signs or mortality (OIE, 2002b; OIE, 2009b; 

OIE, 2009d). 

Chickens are known to be particularly susceptible to the strains of the 

virus causing virulent END. In chickens, mortality rates resulting from 

virulent END infection can be as high as 100 percent. In the field 

definitive diagnosis of END in chickens is difficult because the clinical 

signs exhibited by infected chickens can vary widely and a combination of 

clinical signs and laboratory tests must be used to confirm the presence of 

the disease (OIE, 2002b; OIE, 2009b; OIE, 2009d). 

Infected birds shed the END virus in respiratory secretions and in feces so 

that END viruses are spread between birds by either the ingestion or 

inhalation routes. Depending on the pathotype of the END virus in 

question, the average incubation period ranges from 2 to 15 days (USDA–

APHIS, 2009).

In general, live birds are thought to be a higher risk for introduction of 

END than hatching eggs or poultry meat or poultry products (USDA–

APHIS, 2009). Biosecurity measures are generally effective in preventing 

END introduction and spread. If END is not present in poultry flocks, 

biosecurity measures that significantly lower the potential for introduction 

of the disease include:

• preventing contact between existing flocks and any live birds or 

poultry with unknown health status, pet birds, and wild or feral 

birds, such as gulls, pigeons or cormorants; 

• quarantine for at least 30 days of all newly acquired birds of 

species with the potential to transmit END; 

• vaccination of chickens, aviary birds, birds in breeding farms, and 

birds in zoos; 

1. Animal 

 Health
10

• routine surveillance measures, including the use of sentinel3

• maintaining good biosecurity. 

 birds 

to monitor vaccinated flocks; and

Vaccination of poultry may prevent development of clinical signs, but 

does not completely prevent the END virus from replicating or being shed 

by infected birds (Alexander 2003). 

If an outbreak of END were to be discovered, implementation of 

appropriate biosecurity and quarantine measures could prevent the further 

spread of the infection (USDA–APHIS, 2009). These measures, in 

addition to those discussed above, include: 

• establishing a protective zone around the area that includes the 

infected flock(s), and a larger surveillance zone around the 

protective zone, with appropriate surveillance and restrictions on 

the movement of poultry and poultry products; 

• depopulation of all infected and potentially exposed birds; 

• identification of any animals moved into the flock and monitoring 

of their source; 

• identification and monitoring of any flock or individual birds in 

contact with birds recently moved from the infected flock; 

• appropriate disposal of carcasses and associated animal 

products; and 

• extensive cleaning and disinfection of premises following 

depopulation of infected flock(s) with appropriate disinfectant 

products. 

Because of the potentially high mortality in infected birds and the need to 

depopulate infected animals, the animal health consequences of the 

introduction of END resulting in an outbreak of the disease in the United 

States are significant. The primary environmental impacts from the 

mitigation and control measures described above result from the disposal 

of large numbers of contaminated carcasses and associated animal 

products, such as feces or animal litter, from an outbreak of END. 

The impact of such disposal activities would be proportionate to the size 

of the outbreak. However, the likelihood of introduction of END into the 

United States as a result of the legal importation of live birds or poultry 

and poultry products for the EU-25 was found to be negligible. Further, 

APHIS has in place broad and effective disease control measures that

would be undertaken to minimize the potentially high animal health 

impacts from an END introduction and a subsequent outbreak. 

 

3 Sentinels are unvaccinated fully susceptible animals used to monitor for the presence of a disease 

agent. 
11

For the proposed rule amendment alternative being considered for the 

EU-25 in this document, all of the above preventive and disease 

containment measures are followed. All of the measures described above 

are required by the 25 EU countries with respect to the surveillance for, 

prevention of, and control of outbreaks of END through the harmonized 

measures established by the EC. These measures are compatible with OIE 

Terrestrial Animal Code in terms of biosecurity, monitoring, and other 

restrictions, and the periods of time for which the conditions must be 

maintained in order for a region to be classified as END free (OIE, 

2009b). 

USDA–APHIS prepared a risk considerations document that accompanies 

this environmental assessment (USDA–APHIS, 2009). The conclusion in 

this document is that, assuming all relevant guidelines and requirements 

from the regulations are followed, while the impacts of an outbreak of 

END would be potentially substantial, the risk of introduction of END into 

the United States, or the risk of an outbreak as a result of the proposed rule 

amendment for 25 EU countries importing live birds and poultry 

(including hatching eggs), poultry meat and poultry products is low.

 

b. Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza (HPAI)

HPAI is a disease caused by influenzavirus A genus viruses. Influenza A 

virus types also include viruses that cause influenza in humans, horses, 

pigs, and dogs. While it is typical for an influenza virus to infect only a 

host-specific species (i.e., equine influenza in horses or canine influenza in 

dogs), occasionally these viruses will infect other species. Influenza 

viruses can also change often through mutation, shift, or drift, causing the 

emergence of new types of viruses with differing pathogenicity (Swayne 

2003). 

Of the three general categories of influenza viruses (A, B, and C), only 

type A is known to infect avian species. Avian influenza viruses are 

classified as either high or low pathogenicity. In general, all avian 

influenza viruses are highly contagious and cause different effects in 

infected avian species depending on the strain with which the bird is 

infected and the species of bird infected. Additional factors such as the 

immune status of the infected animal, environmental conditions and 

secondary infections can also influence effects on infected birds. Low 

pathogenicity viruses generally cause mild disease in poultry, while high 

pathogenicity viruses can result in 90 to 100 percent mortality in infected 

flocks. Isolation and identification of the virus and its pathotype in the 

laboratory are required for definitive diagnosis of HPAI (OIE, 2002b; 

OIE, 2009a). 
12

HPAI viruses are primarily spread within infected flocks through contact 

with feces, saliva, and nasal secretions. HPAI viruses have been detected 

in large quantities in fecal matter. HPAI can also be transmitted through 

contaminated feed, water, clothing, broken eggs, or other fomites4

. The 

average incubation period of HPAI is reported to be 3 to 5 days (OIE, 

2002b). For purposes of establishing the guidelines for monitoring and 

control of HPAI, OIE considers the incubation period to be 21 days (OIE, 

2009a). 

All avian species should be considered to be susceptible to infection by 

avian influenza viruses (OIE, 2002b; Perkins and Swayne, 2001). The 

measures for controlling the introduction of HPAI into uninfected flocks 

are similar to the measures described above for END. In general, these 

methods include: 

• preventing contact between healthy birds and birds of unknown 

health status that could potentially transmit HPAI;

• quarantine of newly acquired birds for at least 30 days before 

introduction into an existing flock; 

• practicing good biosecurity; and

• routine disease surveillance.

If an HPAI outbreak were to be detected, measures for controlling the 

spread of the outbreak are also similar to the measures used for controlling 

END outbreaks. In general, these measures include: 

• immediate quarantine of suspect flocks; 

• epidemiologic investigation; 

• establishing protective and surveillance zones around infected 

flock(s);

• depopulation of infected and potentially exposed birds; 

• appropriate disposal of carcasses and associated animal products; 

and, 

• extensive cleaning and disinfection of affected premises.

Because of the potentially high mortality in infected birds and the need to 

depopulate infected animals, the animal health consequences of the 

introduction of HPAI resulting in an outbreak of the disease in the United 

States are significant. The primary environmental impacts from any of the 

mitigation and control measures described above would result from the 

disposal of large numbers of contaminated carcasses and associated 

animal products, such as feces or animal litter, from an outbreak of HPAI. 

 

4 A fomite is an object that may be contaminated with infectious organisms and serve in their 

transmission.
13

The impact of such disposal activities would be proportionate to the size 

and duration of the outbreak. However, the likelihood of introduction of 

HPAI into the United States as a result of the legal importation of live 

birds or poultry and poultry products from the EU-25 was found to be 

extremely low. Further, APHIS has in place broad and effective disease 

control measures that would be undertaken to minimize the potentially 

high animal health impacts from HPAI introduction and any subsequent 

outbreak that would be no different than that of an outbreak of domestic 

origin. 

All of the animal health control measures described above are required by 

the 25 EU countries with respect to the surveillance for, prevention of, and 

control of outbreaks of HPAI through the harmonized measures 

established by the EC. These measures are compatible with the OIE 

Terrestrial Animal Code including the appropriate standards that must be 

met for biosecurity, monitoring, quarantine and movement restrictions, 

and other conditions that must be met in order for a country to be 

classified as HPAI free (OIE, 2009a). 

USDA–APHIS prepared a risk considerations document that accompanies 

this environmental assessment (USDA–APHIS, 2009). The conclusion in 

this document is that, assuming all relevant guidelines and requirements 

from the regulations are followed, although the impacts of an outbreak of 

HPAI would be potentially substantial, the risk of introduction of HPAI 

into the United States, or the risk of an outbreak as a result of the proposed 

rule amendment for 25 EU countries importing live birds and poultry 

(including hatching eggs), poultry meat and poultry products is extremely 

low.

The H5 and H7 influenza viruses have the potential to change from a low 

pathogenic virus into a highly pathogenic virus capable of causing death in 

most infected poultry. The “Asian” strain of H5N1 avian influenza virus 

has been transmitted from infected birds to mammals. In addition to wild 

birds and domestic poultry, infection with this H5N1 virus has been found 

in domestic cats, tigers, leopards, dogs, swine, and humans. This H5N1 

virus has the potential to kill the infected subjects. 

Avian influenza virus can survive in physical environments (such as water 

and manure) for many days depending on the environmental conditions. 

Humans are the primary spreaders of avian influenza virus between flocks 

through clothing, footwear, hands, and equipment (Trampel, 2006). 

END is transmitted through direct contact between healthy birds and the 

bodily discharges of infected birds, specifically feces and secretions from 

the nose, mouth, and eyes. It spreads rapidly among birds in confinement, 

2. Physical 

Environment
14

such as commercially raised chickens. Like HPAI, END can be spread by 

feed, water, tools, premises, human clothing and shoes, from an infected 

flock to a healthy flock. Often it is spread by vaccination and debeaking 

crews, manure haulers, rendering-truck drivers, feed-delivery personnel, 

poultry buyers, egg-service workers, and poultry farm owners and 

employees (Seal et al, 2000; USDA–APHIS, 2003). 

If an introduction of HPAI or END into United States poultry were to 

occur, potential impacts to the physical environment could result from 

disposal of carcasses due to death from disease and depopulation of 

poultry herds or disposal of contaminated bedding and manure. USDA’s 

authority, under the Animal Health Protection Act, provides for the control 

and eradication of serious foreign animal disease agents; typically, these 

efforts include depopulation and disposal of affected or exposed livestock, 

and of domestic commercial birds. Because of its statutory authorities for 

protection of human health and the environment, the U.S. Environmental 

Protection Agency (EPA) (both State and local authorities) could be 

consulted by USDA–APHIS for technical assistance regarding poultry 

carcass disposal. 

Similar to EPA’s support role to USDA in providing technical assistance 

and guidance on carcass disposal options, the U.S. Department of the 

Interior (DOI) would coordinate the Federal government’s surveillance of 

wild migratory birds for the presence of highly pathogenic avian influenza 

and coordinate Federal surveillance with related surveillance activities of 

State fish and wildlife agencies. The U.S. DOI is also the primary Federal 

department responsible for addressing avian influenza matters in wild, 

free-ranging bird species. 

Disposal methods for poultry carcasses include rendering, landfill, 

incineration, and on-farm burial or burning. If not handled properly, 

disposal of infected animals and materials could impact air, water, and soil 

quality, and potentially release the live END or HPAI virus into the 

environment. Factors influencing proper disposal methods include the 

volume of infected animals and contaminated materials, geographic 

features of the area (e.g. water resources and soil type), other physical 

environment considerations (such as weather and temperature), and 

available funds, equipment, and personnel. 

The use of disinfectants to prevent the transfer of the END or HPAI virus 

from surfaces could impact the physical environment. If not used 

properly, disinfectants could end up in sewage systems and potentially 

impact aquatic systems, impact air quality or terrestrial ecosystems during 

use, and cause health problems, such as dermal or respiratory impacts to 

workers using them. As part of an animal disease eradication program, 

disinfection of equipment, transport vehicles, and/or premises where 
15

infected poultry were maintained would be necessary to prevent 

mechanical transfer of the HAPI or END virus. Disinfectants used for 

such purposes would have to be registered for specific use with EPA and 

used according to label requirements. Label instructions for a disinfectant 

would be provided for its proper application to prevent potential 

environmental impacts associated with the use of the registered product 

(EPA, 2008; Pollard et al., 2008). 

END can be considered a human pathogen, producing transient, usually 

localized, infection. Reported infections have been non-life threatening 

and usually not debilitating for more than a day or two. The most 

frequently reported and best substantiated clinical signs in human 

infections have been the result of accidental exposure to the agent in a 

laboratory setting resulting in eye infections usually consisting of 

unilateral or bilateral reddening, excessive tear production, edema 

(abnormal accumulation of fluid beneath the skin) of the eyelids, 

conjunctivitis (swelling, inflammation, or infection of the membrane 

lining the eyelids) and sub-conjunctival hemorrhage (bleeding underneath 

the eye). Although the effect on the eye may be quite severe, infections 

are usually transient and the cornea is not affected. Reports of other 

clinical symptoms in humans infected with the virus that causes END are 

less well substantiated, but suggest a more generalized infection may 

sometimes occur resulting in chills, headaches, and fever, with or without 

conjunctivitis. There is evidence that both vaccinal and virulent (for 

poultry) strains of the virus that cause END may infect and cause clinical 

signs in humans. There is no evidence of human-to-human spread 

(USDA–APHIS, 2009). 

The risk from avian influenza is generally low to most people, because the 

viruses do not usually infect humans. However, confirmed cases of 

human infection from several subtypes of avian influenza infection have 

been reported since 1997. Most cases of avian influenza infection in 

humans have resulted from direct contact with infected poultry (e.g., 

domesticated chicken, ducks, and turkeys) or surfaces contaminated with 

secretions or excretions from infected birds. The spread of avian influenza 

viruses from one ill person to another has been reported very rarely, and 

has been limited, inefficient, and unsustained. During an outbreak of 

avian influenza among poultry, there is a possible risk to people who have 

contact with infected birds, birds that died from the disease or surfaces 

that have been contaminated with secretions or excretions from infected 

birds (USDA–APHIS, 2009). 

Symptoms of avian influenza in humans have ranged from typical human 

influenza-like symptoms (e.g., fever, cough, sore throat, and muscle 

aches) to eye infections, pneumonia, severe respiratory diseases (such as 

acute respiratory distress), and other severe and life-threatening 

3. Public 

Health
16

complications. The symptoms of avian influenza depend on the strain of 

the virus that caused the infection (USDA–APHIS, 2009). 

The World Health Organization (WHO) has reported cases of the “Asian” 

strain of H5N1 avian influenza in humans in Asia, Africa, the Pacific, 

Europe, and the Near East. Indonesia, Egypt and Vietnam have reported 

the highest number of human H5N1 cases, to date, with mortalities of up 

to 60 percent, especially in cases where patients were hospitalized late in 

the illness. Despite the high mortality, human cases of H5N1 remain rare 

to date. The most significant risk factor for human H5N1 infection is 

direct contact with sick or dead poultry or wild birds (USDA–APHIS, 

2009). 

In North America, there have been two reports of AI transmission to 

humans, in Canada and New York. However, in the most extensive 

outbreak of avian influenza (HPAI H5N2) to occur in the United States5

there were no cases of transmission to humans. In November 2003, a 

patient with serious underlying medical conditions was admitted to a 

hospital in New York with respiratory symptoms but recovered after a few 

weeks. Initially laboratory tests identified the influenza A virus as H1N1; 

however, subsequent confirmatory tests showed that the patient had been 

infected with an H7N2 avian influenza A virus. However, no contact with 

infected birds or poultry could be documented in this case. 

In February 2004, the Canadian Food Inspection Agency announced an 

outbreak of avian influenza A (H7N3) in poultry in the Fraser Valley 

region of British Columbia. Health Canada reported two human cases of 

laboratory confirmed influenza A (H7), one in a person involved in culling 

operations and one in a poultry worker with close contact with infected 

poultry. Both patients developed conjunctivitis (eye infection) and other 

flu-like symptoms and their illnesses resolved after treatment with 

antiviral medication. Another group of approximately 10 other poultry 

workers exhibited conjunctival and/or upper respiratory symptoms after 

having contact with poultry; however laboratory testing did not confirm 

infection. 

Should a substantial foreign animal disease outbreak occur in the United 

States, farmers and their families could suffer psychologically from the 

loss of animals, including blood lines maintained over many generations, 

the loss of control over their business due to animal movement 

restrictions, disruptions in community life, and from stress over their 

financial future. Further, these losses would affect the farming community 

as a whole.

 

5 This outbreak occurred in February 2004 in Texas. 
17

a. Environmental Executive Orders 

Some executive orders such as Executive Order 13045 (Protection of 

Children From Environmental Health Risks and Safety Risks), and 

Executive Order 12898 (Federal Actions to Address Environmental Justice 

in Minority Populations and Low-Income Populations), and departmental 

or agency directives require special environmental reviews in certain

circumstances. In considering these additional environmental review 

requirements, no circumstance that would trigger the need for special 

environmental reviews is involved in implementing the proposed action 

considered in this document. The proposed rule amendment alternative 

presents no risk to the health or safety of children, and will not result in 

disproportionately high and adverse human health and/or environmental 

effects on any minority populations and/or low-income populations in the 

United States. 

b. Endangered Species Act 

Section 7 of the Endangered Species Act and its implementing regulations 

require Federal agencies to ensure that their actions are not likely to 

jeopardize the continued existence of threatened or endangered species or 

result in the destruction or adverse modification of critical habitat. APHIS 

considered the potential effects of the proposed action on threatened and 

endangered species and designated critical habitat. All federally listed 

bird species in the United States and its Territories (appendix A) may be 

susceptible to END and HPAI, although susceptibility of different types of 

birds may be variable. 

APHIS conducted a risk analysis that concluded the overall risk of 

introducing either END or HPAI into the United States through the import 

of live birds or poultry, poultry carcasses, parts or products of poultry 

carcasses, and eggs of poultry, game birds, or other birds from the EU-25 

to be extremely low (USDA–APHIS, 2009). This determination is based 

on the following for the EU-25 (USDA–APHIS, 2009): 

• the region has an effective veterinary infrastructure capable of 

identifying and applying control measures to eradicate incursions 

of END or HPAI in domestic poultry; 

• the region has a comprehensive legislative framework in place to 

ensure consistent implementation of EC legislation by all EU-25 

Member States. EC services provide resources to review and 

inspect for compliance; 

• END and HPAI are notifiable (reportable) diseases in the region; 

• appropriate surveillance is in place with the capacity to effectively 

and quickly detect the presence of END or HPAI, even in the 

4. Additional 

Environmental 

Review 

Considerations
18

absence of clinical signs; 

• laboratory confirmation capabilities are effective, and laboratory 

testing procedures are well documented and standardized; 

• END and HPAI eradication programs include implementation of 

appropriate quarantine and surveillance zones, with monitoring of 

those zones and movement restrictions. Procedures for 

establishing and lifting quarantines are sufficient to prevent further 

spread of disease; and, 

• contingency plans, standard operating procedures, and biosecurity 

measures for emergency response are well documented, and 

relevant personnel are well resourced and trained. 

Based upon the low likelihood that END or HPAI would become

established in the United States as a result of poultry imports from the 

EU-25, and the effectiveness of the movement restrictions included in 

9 CFR 92.3, the effect of an END or HPAI outbreak on federally listed 

endangered or threatened birds, birds proposed for listing as threatened or 

endangered, or designated critical habitat would be no different than a 

domestic outbreak of either disease such that the implementation of the 

proposed rulemaking is expected to have no effect. 
19

IV. Agencies Contacted

U.S. Department of Agriculture 

Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service

Policy and Program Development 

Environmental and Risk Analysis Services

4700 River Road, Unit 149 

Riverdale, MD 20737–1238 
20

V. References

Alexander, D. J., 2003. “Newcastle Disease.” In Diseases of Poultry, 11th 

ed. Saif, Y. M., H. J. Barnes, A. M. Fadly, et al (Eds). Iowa, Blackwell 

Publishing: 64 -87. 

EPA—See U.S. Environmental Protection Agency. 

FWS—See U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service

OIE—See World Organization for Animal Health. 

Perkins, L.E.L., and Swayne, D.E., 2001. Pathobiology of 

A/Chicken/Hong Kong/220/97 (H5N1) Avian influenza virus in seven 

gallinaceous species. Vet Pathol 38: 149–164. 

Pollard, S.J.T., Gordon, A.W., Hickman, P.I., Rupert, L., Hough, 

D.M., Gauntlett, S.F., Howson, A.H., Gayford, P., and Gent, N., 2008. 

Exposure assessment of carcass disposal options in the event of a 

notifiable exotic animal disease: Application to avian influenza virus

Environ. Sci. Tech., 42, 3145–3154. 

Seal B. S., King, D.J., and Sellers, H.S., 2000. The avian response to 

Newcastle disease virus. Developmental and Comparative Immunology 24 

(2000) 257-268. 

Swayne, D. E., and Halvorson, D. A., 2003. “Influenza” in Diseases of 

Poultry, 11th ed. Saif, Y. M., H. J . Barnes, A. M. Fadly, et al (Eds). Iowa, 

Blackwell Publishing: 135-106. 

Trampel, D.W., 2006. Manure disposal following an outbreak of avian 

influenza on a commercial poultry farm. Odor and Nutrient Management, 

Summer 2006 EDC-129-32, Vol. 9, Issue 2. 

USDA–APHIS—See U.S. Department of Agriculture, Animal and Plant 

Health Inspection Service. 

U.S. Department of Agriculture, Animal and Plant Health Inspection 

Service (USDA–APHIS), 2009. APHIS Risk Considerations on 

Importation of Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza (HPAI) and Exotic 

Newcastle Disease (END) Virus from a European Union Region of 

Twenty-five Member States (May, 2009). 
21

U.S. Department of Agriculture, Animal and Plant Health Inspection 

Service, 2003. Exotic Newcastle Disease: A deadly disease that affects 

poultry and pet birds. Program Aid No. 1739, Issued March 2003. 

[Online.] Available: http://www.aphis.usda.gov/lpa/pubs/pub_ahend.html 

[2009, Aug. 26.] 

U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, 2008. Frequently asked 

questions: Pandemic flu. [Online.] Available: 

http://www.epa.gov/pandemicflu/faq.htm [2009, Aug. 26.] 

U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, Threatened and Endangered Species 

System. [Online.] Available: 

http://ecos.fws.gov/tess_public/pub/SpeciesReport.do 

World Organization for Animal Health (OIE), 2002a. Newcastle Disease,

Animal Diseases Data; Technical Disease Card. [Online.] Available: 

http://www.oie.int/eng/maladies/fiches/a_A160.htm [2009, July 27.]

World Organization for Animal Health (OIE), 2002b. Highly Pathogenic 

Avian Influenza, Animal Diseases Data; Technical Disease Card. 

[Online.] Available: http://www.oie.int/eng/maladies/fiches/a_A150.htm 

[2009, July 27.]

World Organization for Animal Health (OIE), 2009a. Terrestrial Animal 

Health Code, Chapter 2.7.12: Avian Influenza. [2009, July 27.] 

World Organization for Animal Health (OIE), 2009b. Terrestrial Animal 

Health Code, Chapter 10.13: Newcastle Disease. [Online.] Available: 

http://www.oie.int/eng/normes/mcode/en_chapitre_1.10.13.htm

[2009, July 29.]

World Organization for Animal Health (OIE), 2009c. Chapter 2.3.4: 

Avian Influenza. [Online.] Available: 

http://www.oie.int/eng/Normes/mmanual/2008/pdf/2.03.04_AI.pdf 

[2009, Aug. 26.] 

World Organization for Animal Health (OIE), 2009d. Terrestrial 

Diagnostic Manual, Chapter 2.3.14: Newcastle Disease. Available: 

http://www.oie.int/eng/normes/mmanual/A_summry.htm [2009, July 29.] 
1

Appendix A. Threatened and Endangered Birds 

Federally Listed in the United States and 

Its Territories (USFWS–TESS, 2009).
2

Threatened and Endangered Birds Federally Listed in the United States and Its Territories 

(USFWS–TESS, 2009).

Scientific Name Common Name Critical Habitat (Y/N) Listing Status*

Accipiter striatis venator Puerto Rican sharp-shinned 

hawk N E 

Acrocephalus familiaris kingi Nihoa millerbird N E

Acrocephalus luscinia Nightingale reed warbler N E

Aerodramus vanikorensis 

bartschi

Mariana gray swiftlet N E 

Agelaius xanthomus Yellow-shouldered blackbird Y E

Amazona vittata Puerto Rican parrot N E

Ammodramus maritimus 

mirabilis

Cape Sable seaside sparrow Y E 

Ammodramus savannarum 

floridanus

Florida grasshopper sparrow N E 

Amphispiza belli clementeae San Clemente sage sparrow N T

Anas laysanensis Laysan duck N E

Anas wyvilliana Hawaiian (=koloa) duck N E

Aphelcoma coerulescens Florida scrub-jay N T

Brachyramphus marmoratus Marbled murrelet Y T

Branta (=Nesochen) 

sandvicensis

Hawaiian goose N E 

Buteo platypterus 

brunnescens

Puerto Riacn broad-winged hawk N E 

Buteo solitarius Hawaiian (=’Io) hawk N E

Campephilus principalis Ivory-billed woodpecker N E

Caprimulgus noctitherus Puerto Rican nightjar N E

Charadrius alexandrinus 

nivosus

Western snowy plover Y T 

Charadrius melodus Piping plover Y E; T

Chasiempis sandwichensis 

ibidis

Oahu elepaio Y E 

Colinus virginianus ridgwayi Masked bobwhite (quail) N E

Columba inornata wetmorei Puerto Rican plain pigeon N E

Corvus hawaiiensis Hawaiian (=’alala) crow N E

Corvus kubaryi Mariana (=aga) crow Y E

Corvus leucognaphalus White-necked crow N E

Crax alberti Blue-billed curassow N PE

Dendroica chrysoparla Colden-cheeked warbler N E

Dendroica kirtlandii Kirtland’s warbler N E

Empidonax traillii extimus Southwestern willow flycatcher Y E

Falco femoralis septentrionalis Northern aplomado falcon N E; XN

Fulica americana alai Hawaiian coot N E

Gallinula chloropus guami Mariana common moorhen N E

Gallinula chloropus 

sandvicensis

Hawaiian common moorhen N E 

Grallaria milleri Brown-banded antpitta N PE

Grus americana Whooping crane Y E; XN
3

Grus canadensis pulla Mississippi sandhill crane Y E

Gymnogyps californianus California condor Y E; XN

Halcyon cinnamomina 

cinnamomina

Guam Micronesia kingfisher Y E 

Haliaeetus leucocephalus Bald eagle (Sonoran Desert 

Distinct Population Segment) N T 

Hemignathus lucidus Nukupu’u (honeycreeper) N E

Hemignathus munroi Akiapola’au (honeycreeper) N E

Hemignathus procerus Kauai akailoa (honeycreeper) N E

Himantopus mexicanus 

knudseni

Hawaiian stilt N E 

Lanius ludovicianus mearnsi San Clemente loggerhead shrike N E

Loxioides bailleui Palila (honeycreeper) Y E

Loxops caeruleirostris Akekee N PE

Loxops coccineus ochraceus Maui akepa (honeycreeper) N E

Loxops coccineus coccineus Hawaii akepa (honeycreeper) N E

Megapodius laperouse Micronesian megapode N E

Melamprosops phaeosoma Po’ouli (honeycreeper) N E

Moho braccatus Kauai ‘o’o (honeyeater) N E

Myadestes lanaiensis rutha Molokai thrush N E

Myadestes myadestinus Large Kauai (=kamao) thrush N E

Myadestes palmeri Small Kauai (=puaioho) thrush N E

Mycteria americana Wood stork N E

Numenius borealis Eskimo curlew N E

Oreomystis bairdi Kauai creeper N PE

Oreomystis mana Hawaiian creeper N E

Palmeria dolei Crested honeycreeper N E

Paroreomyza flammea Molokai creeper N E

Paroreomyza maculata Oahu creeper N E

Pelecanus occidentalis Brown pelican N E

Phoebastria (=Diomedea) 

albatrus

Short-tailed albatross N E 

Phoenicoparrus andinus Andean flamingo N PE

Picoides borealis Red-cockaded woodpecker N E

Pipilo crissalis eremophilus Inyo California towhee Y T

Polioptila californica californica Coastal California gnatcatcher Y T

Polyborus plancus audubonii Audobon’s crested caracara N T

Polysticta stelleri Steller’s eider Y T

Pseudonestor xanthophrys Maui parrotbill (honeycreeper) N E

Psittirostra psittacea ‘O’u (honeycreeper) N E

Pterodroma phaeopygia 

sandwichensis

Hawaiian dark-rumped petrel N E 

Puffinus auricularis newelli Newell’s Townsend’s shearwater N T

Puffinus heinrothi Heinroth’s shearwater N PT

Rallus longirostris levipes Light-footed clapper rail N E

Rallus longirostris obsoletus California clapper rail N E

Rallus longirostris yumanensis Yuma clapper rail N E
4

Rallus owstoni Guam rail N E; XN

Rostrhamus sociabilis 

plumbeus

Everglade snail kite Y E 

Somateria fischeri Spectacled eider Y T

Sterna antillarum Least tern N E

Sterna antillarum browni California least tern N E

Sterna dougallii dougallii Roseate tern N E; T

Strix occidentalis caurina Northern spotted owl Y T

Strix occidentalis lucida Mexican spotted owl Y T

Telespyza cantans Laysan finch (honeycreeper) N E

Telespyza ultima Nihoa finch (honeycreeperP N E

Tympanuchus cupido attwateri Attwater’s greater prairie-chicken N E

Vermivora bachmanii Bachman’s warbler N E

Vireo atricapilla Black-capped vireo N E

Vireo bellii pusillus least Bell’s vireo Y E

Zosterops conspicillatus 

conspicillatus

Bridled white-eye N E 

Zosterops rotensis Rota bridled white-eye Y E

*E = Endangered; T = Threatened; PE = Proposed for listing as Endangered; PT = Proposed for listing as Threatened 

XN = Experimental population