Appeal from Spartanburg County 

R. Keith Kelly, Post-Conviction Relief Judge 

 

THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE 

CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING 

EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR. 

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA 

In The Supreme Court 

Jerod Keykendall Harris, Petitioner, 

v. 

State of South Carolina, Respondent. 

Appellate Case No. 2014-002693 

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI

Memorandum Opinion No. 2018-MO-011 

Submitted September 15, 2017 – Filed February 28, 2018 

REVERSED 

Appellate Defender Laura Ruth Baer, of Columbia, for 

Petitioner. 

Attorney General Alan McCrory Wilson and Assistant 

Attorney General Valerie Garcia Giovanoli, both of 

Columbia, for Respondent. 

PER CURIAM: In this post-conviction relief (PCR) action, Jerod Keykendall

Harris contends the PCR court erred by allowing him to represent himself at his PCR
trial without first obtaining a valid waiver of his right to counsel. We agree and 

reverse. 

Harris appeared in PCR court and requested that his court-appointed attorney be 

relieved, stating, "I wanted to go ahead and get me a paid attorney." When the court

asked when Harris planned to hire an attorney, Harris responded that "it should be 

soon." After assuring Harris he would not receive another appointed attorney, the 

court granted his request and continued the hearing to allow him time. The court 

stated, "You'll either have to hire [an attorney] or you will be representing yourself." 

Seven months later Harris again appeared in PCR court, this time before a different 

judge. The PCR court asked Harris: 

Court: Okay. You're going to represent yourself in 

this matter? 

Harris: Yes, sir. I'm going to have to, sir. 

Court: Okay. 

Harris: I was told I had to. 

Court: All right.

The State then explained the events that occurred at the prior PCR hearing: 

Your Honor, just to clarify. He had an attorney that had 

been appointed in our last term. He asked for that attorney 

to be relieved. And [the judge] informed him that, if he 

wanted to relieve his appointed attorney, he would not be

allowed to have another appointed attorney, but he could 

retain an attorney and proceed pro se. 

The PCR court immediately asked Harris about his claims and proceeded with the 

trial, without any attempt to seek a waiver from Harris of his right to counsel. 

In Whitehead v. State, 310 S.C. 532, 426 S.E.2d 315 (1992), we held that "when a 

PCR application is not dismissed before a hearing is held, the PCR judge must 

appoint counsel or obtain a knowing and intelligent waiver of that right by the
applicant." 310 S.C. at 535, 426 S.E.2d at 316; see also Richardson v. State, 377 

S.C. 103, 105-06, 659 S.E.2d 493, 494-95 (2008) (discussing the two requirements 

for a valid waiver of counsel in a PCR proceeding). Under Richardson and 

Whitehead, the PCR court clearly erred by failing to seek from Harris a valid waiver 

of his right to counsel. See Hilton v. State, Op. No. 27772 (S.C. Sup. Ct. filed Feb.

28, 2018) (Shearouse Adv. Sh. No. 9 at 94) (holding "the PCR court clearly erred by 

failing to ensure Hilton understood the dangers and disadvantages of selfrepresentation before granting the motion to relieve his appointed attorney" (citing 

Whitehead, 310 S.C. at 535, 426 S.E.2d at 316-17)). We remand for the appointment 

of counsel and a new PCR trial. 

REVERSED. 

BEATTY, C.J., KITTREDGE, HEARN, FEW and JAMES, JJ., concur.