61540 Federal Register / Vol. 82, No. 248 / Thursday, December 28, 2017 / Notices 

1The Regulations are currently codified in the 

Code of Federal Regulations at 15 CFR parts 730– 

774 (2017). The violations alleged occurred in 

2012–2013. The Regulations governing the 

violations at issue are found in the 2012–2013 

version of the Code of Federal Regulations, 15 CFR 

parts 730–774 (2012–2013). The 2017 Regulations 

govern the procedural aspects of this case. 

2 50 U.S.C. 4601–4623 (Supp. III 2015). Since 

August 21, 2001, the Act has been in lapse and the 

President, through Executive Order 13222 of August 

17, 2001 (3 CFR, 2001 Comp. 783 (2002)), which 

has been extended by successive Presidential 

Notices, the most recent being that of August 15, 

2017 (82 FR 39005 (Aug. 16, 2017)), has continued 

the Regulations in effect under the International 

Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701, 

et seq.) (2012). 

addition, Section 750.8 of the 

Regulations states that the Bureau of 

Industry and Security’s Office of 

Exporter Services may revoke any 

Bureau of Industry and Security (‘‘BIS’’) 

licenses previously issued pursuant to 

the Export Administration Act (‘‘EAA’’ 

or ‘‘the Act’’), or pursuant to the 

Regulations in which the person had an 

interest at the time of his/her 

conviction. 

BIS has received notice of Faal’s 

conviction for violating Section 38 of 

the AECA, and has provided notice and 

an opportunity for Faal to make a 

written submission to BIS, as provided 

in Section 766.25 of the Regulations. 

BIS has not received a submission from 

Faal. 

Based upon my review and 

consultations with BIS’s Office of 

Export Enforcement, including its 

Director, and the facts available to BIS, 

I have decided to deny Faal’s export 

privileges under the Regulations for a 

period of ten (10) years from the date of 

Faal’s conviction. I have also decided to 

revoke all licenses issued pursuant to 

the Act or Regulations in which Faal 

had an interest at the time of his 

conviction. 

Accordingly, it is hereby ordered: 

First, from the date of this Order until 

May 12, 2026, Papa Faal, with a last 

known address of 6308 Decatur Avenue 

North, Brooklyn Park, MN 55428, and 

when acting for or on his behalf, his 

successors, assigns, employees, agents 

or representatives (‘‘the Denied 

Person’’), may not, directly or indirectly, 

participate in any way in any 

transaction involving any commodity, 

software or technology (hereinafter 

collectively referred to as ‘‘item’’) 

exported or to be exported from the 

United States that is subject to the 

Regulations, including, but not limited 

to: 

A. Applying for, obtaining, or using 

any license, license exception, or export 

control document; 

B. Carrying on negotiations 

concerning, or ordering, buying, 

receiving, using, selling, delivering, 

storing, disposing of, forwarding, 

transporting, financing, or otherwise 

servicing in any way, any transaction 

involving any item exported or to be 

exported from the United States that is 

subject to the Regulations, or engaging 

in any other activity subject to the 

Regulations; or 

C. Benefitting in any way from any 

transaction involving any item exported 

or to be exported from the United States 

that is subject to the Regulations, or 

from any other activity subject to the 

Regulations. 

Second, no person may, directly or 

indirectly, do any of the following: 

A. Export or reexport to or on behalf 

of the Denied Person any item subject to 

the Regulations; 

B. Take any action that facilitates the 

acquisition or attempted acquisition by 

the Denied Person of the ownership, 

possession, or control of any item 

subject to the Regulations that has been 

or will be exported from the United 

States, including financing or other 

support activities related to a 

transaction whereby the Denied Person 

acquires or attempts to acquire such 

ownership, possession or control; 

C. Take any action to acquire from or 

to facilitate the acquisition or attempted 

acquisition from the Denied Person of 

any item subject to the Regulations that 

has been exported from the United 

States; 

D. Obtain from the Denied Person in 

the United States any item subject to the 

Regulations with knowledge or reason 

to know that the item will be, or is 

intended to be, exported from the 

United States; or 

E. Engage in any transaction to service 

any item subject to the Regulations that 

has been or will be exported from the 

United States and which is owned, 

possessed or controlled by the Denied 

Person, or service any item, of whatever 

origin, that is owned, possessed or 

controlled by the Denied Person if such 

service involves the use of any item 

subject to the Regulations that has been 

or will be exported from the United 

States. For purposes of this paragraph, 

servicing means installation, 

maintenance, repair, modification or 

testing. 

Third, after notice and opportunity for 

comment as provided in Section 766.23 

of the Regulations, any other person, 

firm, corporation, or business 

organization related to Faal by 

ownership, control, position of 

responsibility, affiliation, or other 

connection in the conduct of trade or 

business may also be made subject to 

the provisions of this Order in order to 

prevent evasion of this Order. 

Fourth, in accordance with Part 756 of 

the Regulations, Faal may file an appeal 

of this Order with the Under Secretary 

of Commerce for Industry and Security. 

The appeal must be filed within 45 days 

from the date of this Order and must 

comply with the provisions of Part 756 

of the Regulations. 

Fifth, a copy of this Order shall be 

delivered to Faal and shall be published 

in the Federal Register. 

Sixth, this Order is effective 

immediately and shall remain in effect 

until May 12, 2026. 

Issued this 19th day of December 2017. 

Karen H. Nies-Vogel, 

Director, Office of Exporter Services. 

[FR Doc. 2017–28004 Filed 12–27–17; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE P 

DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE 

Bureau of Industry and Security 

[17–BIS–0002] 

In the Matter of: Saeid Yahya 

Charkhian, Villa 5, Street 1, Arabian 

Ranches, Dubai, United Arab Emirates, 

and Caspian Industrial Machinery 

Supply LLC, No. 2509 Churchill 

Executive Tower, Business Bay, Dubai, 

United Arab Emirates, Attention: Saeid 

Yahya Charkhian; Respondents; Order 

Relating to Saeid Yahya Charkhian and 

Caspian Industrial Machinery Supply 

LLC 

The Bureau of Industry and Security, 

U.S. Department of Commerce (‘‘BIS’’), 

has notified Saeid Yahya Charkhian, of 

Dubai, United Arab Emirates 

(‘‘Charkhian’’), and Caspian Industrial 

Machinery Supply LLC of Dubai, United 

Arab Emirates (‘‘Caspian’’) (collectively 

the ‘‘Respondents’’), that it has initiated 

an administrative proceeding against 

Respondents pursuant to Section 766.3 

of the Export Administration 

Regulations (the ‘‘Regulations’’),1 and 

Section 13(c) of the Export 

Administration Act of 1979, as amended 

(the ‘‘Act’’),2 through the issuance of a 

Charging Letter to Respondents that 

allege that Charkhian committed four (4) 

violations of the Regulations and 

Caspian committed three (3) violations 

of the Regulations. Specifically, the 

charges are: 

As to both Charkhian and Caspian: 

Charges 1–3 15 CFR 764.2(e)—Acting 

With Knowledge 

1. On at least three occasions between on 

or about March 27, 2012, and on or about 

October 5, 2013, Charkhian and Caspian 

(collectively, the ‘‘Respondents’’) transferred, 


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Federal Register / Vol. 82, No. 248 / Thursday, December 28, 2017 / Notices 61541 

3Title 15 CFR 772.1 defines ‘‘knowledge’’ as 

‘‘[k]nowledge of a circumstance (the term may be 

a variant, such as ‘‘know,’’ ‘‘reason to know,’’ or 

‘‘reason to believe’’) includes not only positive 

knowledge that the circumstance exists or is 

substantially certain to occur, but also an awareness 

of a high probability of its existence or future 

occurrence. Such awareness is inferred from 

evidence of the conscious disregard of facts known 

to a person and is also inferred from a person’s 

willful avoidance of facts. 

4 ‘‘EAR99’’ is a designation for items subject to 

the Regulations but not listed on the Commerce 

Control List. 15 CFR 734.3(c). 

5 31 CFR part 560 (2012–2013). The ITSR 

formerly were known as the Iranian Transactions 

Regulations (‘‘ITR’’). On October 22, 2012, OFAC 

renamed the ITR as the ITSR and reissued them in 

relevant part. See 77 FR 64664 (Oct. 22, 2012). 

6Also known as National Iranian Oil Company or 

‘‘NIOC.’’ NIOC was designated a Specially 

Designated National (‘‘SDN’’) by OFAC on 

December 4, 2008, but was removed from the SDN 

List on January 16, 2016, as part of the Joint 

Comprehensive Plan of Action (‘‘JCPOA’’). 

7Also known as the National Iranian Drilling 

Company or ‘‘NIDC.’’ 

forwarded, ordered, bought and/or sold items 

subject to the Regulations and exported or to 

be exported from the United States to Iran, 

via the Netherlands and the United Arab 

Emirates (‘‘UAE’’), with knowledge 3 that a 

violation of the Regulations had occurred or 

was about or intended to occur in connection 

with the items. Specifically, the Respondents 

acted with knowledge of a violation of the 

Regulations when they sold, transferred and/ 

or forwarded to, and/or ordered or bought 

for, end users in Iran items that the 

Respondents procured from the United States 

through an intermediary company located in 

the Netherlands. These U.S.-origin items, 

including masking wax, lithium batteries, 

and zirconia crucibles, were designated 

EAR99 under the Regulations 4 and valued in 

total at nearly $190,000. 

2. The Respondents’ actions violated the 

long-standing and widely-known U.S. 

embargo against Iran. Under Section 746.7 of 

the Regulations, BIS prohibits the export or 

reexport to Iran of any item subject to both 

the Regulations and the Iranian Transactions 

and Sanctions Regulations (‘‘ITSR’’), if the 

transaction is prohibited by the ITSR and has 

not been authorized by the U.S. Department 

of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets 

Control (‘‘OFAC’’), which administers the 

ITSR.5 At all times pertinent hereto, the ITSR 

prohibited, inter alia, the unauthorized 

exportation, reexportation, sale or supply, 

directly or indirectly, from the United States 

to Iran of any goods, technology, or services. 

This broad prohibition included restrictions 

on the exportation, reexportation, sale or 

supply of any goods, technology, or services 

from the United States to a third country, 

such as the Netherlands or the UAE, 

undertaken with knowledge or reason to 

know that they were intended for supply, 

transshipment, or reexportation, directly or 

indirectly, to Iran. 31 CFR 560.204. As set 

further below, the Respondents knew that the 

items at issue were ultimately destined for 

Iran and they knew of the U.S. embargo 

against Iran, but they did not seek or obtain 

the required U.S. Government authorizations 

in connection with any of the exports or 

reexports described herein. 

3. Charkhian, an Iranian national, 

personally participated in each of the 

transactions at issue and, in addition, was 

Managing Director and part owner of 

Caspian, a UAE trading company, at all times 

pertinent hereto. Upon information and 

belief, Charkhian has, in fact, been Managing 

Director of Caspian since in or about May 

2001, when Caspian was formed in the UAE. 

Through the Respondents’ many years of 

business in the UAE, they were aware of the 

U.S. embargo against Iran at the times of the 

transactions at issue in 2012–2013. Moreover, 

the Respondents had specifically 

acknowledged the existence of the embargo, 

for example, when they completed an enduser agreement with a European subsidiary of 

a U.S. company that included statements 

related to the need for compliance with ‘‘U.S. 

Export Administration Regulations.’’ 

4. Despite this knowledge, the Respondents 

sought to procure for and supply to 

customers in Iran U.S.-origin items without 

the required U.S. Government authorization 

and did so through transactions that they 

structured to conceal from U.S. suppliers the 

Respondents’ actual role in the transactions 

and that the items were ultimately destined 

for Iran. On or about March 27, 2012, the 

Respondents transferred or forwarded 

masking wax, an item subject to the 

Regulations and the ITSR and valued at 

$2,570, from the UAE to Iran without the 

required U.S. Government authorization. The 

events leading to this knowing violation 

began in or about November 2011, when the 

Respondents received an inquiry from an 

Iranian entity seeking masking wax, a 

protective, strippable coating used in 

electroplating, for capping ends of tubing, 

and for sealing the ends of electric cables. 

The Respondents provided the request to a 

company in the Netherlands, which 

indicated that it ‘‘only [had a] source in USA 

for this product’’ but that the product was 

‘‘on stock in the U.S.’’ and could be delivered 

in about two weeks. The Respondents’ 

Iranian customer Mavadkaran Jahed Noavar 

Company (‘‘Mavadkaran’’), which is part of 

the Iran-based conglomerate the MAPNA 

Group, subsequently issued a purchase order 

on or about February 13, 2012, to the 

Respondents for 100 lbs. of masking wax, 

which the Respondents then purchased from 

the United States through the Dutch reseller. 

Payment information indicates that the 

Respondents sold the items to Mavadkaran 

on or about February 21, 2012. The items 

were exported from the United States on or 

about February 23, 2012. After arriving in the 

Netherlands, the items were transshipped on 

or about March 14, 2012, to the Respondents 

in the UAE. On or about March 27, 2012, the 

Respondents then transferred or forwarded 

the items to Iran. 

5. On a second occasion, between in or 

about July 2012, and in or about October 

2012, the Respondents similarly ordered and 

bought lithium batteries from the United 

States through the same Dutch intermediary 

company and then sold, transferred and/or 

forwarded the batteries to an end user in Iran. 

The lithium batteries were subject to the 

Regulations and the ITSR and were valued in 

total at $75,000. In or about January 2012, the 

Respondents had asked the Dutch company 

to provide a quote for six orders of 1,000 

batteries which the Respondents’ customer 

had tested and sought for a pending project 

in Iran. After receiving pricing information 

from the Dutch company, the Respondents 

bought or ordered the 1,000 lithium batteries 

on or about July 15, 2012, which was 

followed by a pro forma invoice from the 

Dutch company to the Respondents for the 

1,000 batteries about one month later. On or 

about October 3, 2012, the U.S. supplier, 

which had not been informed that the items 

were to be transshipped to Iran, filed an 

Automated Export System (‘‘AES’’) record 

indicating that 1,000 lithium batteries were 

being exported from the United States for the 

ultimate destination of the Netherlands. As 

part of email correspondence between on or 

about October 15–17, 2012, following the 

transshipment of the items from the 

Netherlands to the Respondents in the UAE, 

the Dutch company provided the 

Respondents a certificate of origin from the 

U.S. company confirming the items were of 

U.S.-origin, as well as an invoice identifying 

the items as manufactured in the United 

States. A Caspian invoice and packing list 

dated October 17, 2012, indicated that the 

Respondents were selling, transferring and/or 

forwarding 1,000 lithium batteries to a buyer 

in Tehran, Iran, that was related to the Iran 

National Oil Company 6 and Iran National 

Drilling Company,7 both of which are 

Iranian-Government owned corporations. 

The invoice also confirmed that the items 

were of U.S.-origin. A few days later, in an 

email dated on or about October 29, 2012, an 

Iranian party confirmed that it had received 

the 1,000 lithium batteries from the 

Respondents. 

6. Finally, on a third occasion, between in 

or about August 2013, and in or about 

October 2013, the Respondents ordered and 

bought approximately 196 flat bottom 

zirconia crucibles from the United States 

through the same Dutch intermediary 

company and then sold, transferred or 

forwarded the crucibles to an end user in 

Iran. The crucibles are subject to the 

Regulations and the ITSR, can be used in 

nuclear material casting, such as casting 

uranium, and were valued at $112,000. The 

events leading up to this knowing violation 

began when the Respondents received an 

order request from Iranian company 

Mavadkaran on or about April 23, 2013. 

Mavadkaran requested that the purchase 

order be issued to Mapna International F.Z.E. 

(‘‘Mapna’’), a related company in the UAE, 

which was listed as the buyer instead of 

Mavadkaran. The Respondents’ pro forma 

invoice dated April 23, 2013, indicated that 

the items would be of U.S.-origin. On or 

about May 9, 2013, the Respondents 

forwarded the order request to the Dutch 

company, and approximately one week later 

the Respondents received a price quote for 

the items. On or about June 3, 2013, Mapna 

issued a purchase order to the Respondents 

stating that the items were to be delivered by 

vessel to Iran and that the Respondents 

should provide a certification of origin 

confirming the items were of U.S.-origin, 

certified by the local chamber of commerce. 

After the Dutch company placed a 


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61542 Federal Register / Vol. 82, No. 248 / Thursday, December 28, 2017 / Notices 

corresponding order with a U.S. supplier at 

the Respondents’ request, the zirconia 

crucibles were exported from the United 

States to the Netherlands on or about August 

20, 2013. The Dutch company transshipped 

the items to the UAE on or about September 

17, 2013. An email dated on or about October 

5, 2013, from Charkhian to a customs broker 

indicated that the Respondents had 

forwarded or transferred the items for 

delivery to Iran. 

7. In so doing, the Respondents committed 

three (3) violations of Section 764.2(e) of the 

Regulations and are jointly and severally 

liable for those violations. 

As to Charkhian only: 

Charge 4 15 CFR 764.2(g)—False or 

Misleading Statement 

8. On or about December 16, 2014, 

Charkhian made a false or misleading 

statement to BIS and other U.S. Government 

officials in connection with an action subject 

to the Regulations and/or in connection with 

effecting an export, reexport or other activity 

subject to the Regulations. While being 

interviewed by BIS on that date as part of a 

post-shipment verification (unrelated to 

Charges 1–3 above), Charkhian represented 

that he had never conducted any business 

with Iran at any time since 2001, and had not 

purchased anything from the United States 

during that time period. These statements 

contradicted the transactions and related 

transaction documents and correspondence 

detailed in Charges 1–3 above, which clearly 

indicate that at least on three occasions 

during 2012–2013, Charkhian and his 

company, Caspian, knowingly procured 

items from the United States or of U.S.-origin 

for Iranian customers through an 

intermediary party in the Netherlands. 

9. Pursuant to Section 764.2(g) of the 

Regulations, no person may make any false 

or misleading representation or statement, or 

falsify or conceal any material fact, either 

directly or indirectly to BIS or any official of 

any other U.S. Government agency in 

connection with an action subject to the 

Regulations as set forth in (g)(1)(i) or in 

connection with effecting an export, reexport 

or other activity subject to the Regulations as 

set forth in (g)(1)(iii). 

10. In so doing, Charkhian committed one 

(1) violation of Section 764.2(g) of the 

Regulations. 

Whereas, BIS and Respondents have 

entered into a Settlement Agreement 

pursuant to Section 766.18(b) of the 

Regulations, whereby they agreed to 

settle this matter in accordance with the 

terms and conditions set forth therein; 

and 

Whereas, I have approved of the terms 

of such Settlement Agreement; it is 

therefore ordered: 

FIRST, that for a period of twelve (12) 

years from the date of this Order, Saeid 

Yahya Charkhian, with a last known 

address of Villa 5, Street 1, Arabian 

Ranches, Dubai, United Arab Emirates, 

and Caspian Industrial Machinery 

Supply LLC, No. 2509 Churchill 

Executive Tower, Business Bay, Dubai, 

United Arab Emirates, and when acting 

for or on their behalf, their successors, 

assigns, directors, officers, employees, 

representatives, or agents (each a 

‘‘Denied Person’’ and collectively the 

‘‘Denied Persons’’), may not, directly or 

indirectly, participate in any way in any 

transaction involving any commodity, 

software or technology (hereinafter 

collectively referred to as ‘‘item’’) 

exported or to be exported from the 

United States that is subject to the 

Regulations, or in any other activity 

subject to the Regulations, including, 

but not limited to: 

A. Applying for, obtaining, or using 

any license, license exception, or export 

control document; 

B. Carrying on negotiations 

concerning, or ordering, buying, 

receiving, using, selling, delivering, 

storing, disposing of, forwarding, 

transporting, financing, or otherwise 

servicing in any way, any transaction 

involving any item exported or to be 

exported from the United States that is 

subject to the Regulations, or engaging 

in any other activity subject to the 

Regulations; or 

C. Benefitting in any way from any 

transaction involving any item exported 

or to be exported from the United States 

that is subject to the Regulations, or 

from any other activity subject to the 

Regulations. 

SECOND, that no person may, directly 

or indirectly, do any of the following: 

A. Export or reexport to or on behalf 

of a Denied Person any item subject to 

the Regulations; 

B. Take any action that facilitates the 

acquisition or attempted acquisition by 

a Denied Person of the ownership, 

possession, or control of any item 

subject to the Regulations that has been 

or will be exported from the United 

States, including financing or other 

support activities related to a 

transaction whereby a Denied Person 

acquires or attempts to acquire such 

ownership, possession or control; 

C. Take any action to acquire from or 

to facilitate the acquisition or attempted 

acquisition from a Denied Person of any 

item subject to the Regulations that has 

been exported from the United States; 

D. Obtain from a Denied Person in the 

United States any item subject to the 

Regulations with knowledge or reason 

to know that the item will be, or is 

intended to be, exported from the 

United States; or 

E. Engage in any transaction to service 

any item subject to the Regulations that 

has been or will be exported from the 

United States and which is owned, 

possessed or controlled by a Denied 

Person, or service any item, of whatever 

origin, that is owned, possessed or 

controlled by a Denied Person if such 

service involves the use of any item 

subject to the Regulations that has been 

or will be exported from the United 

States. For purposes of this paragraph, 

servicing means installation, 

maintenance, repair, modification or 

testing. 

THIRD, that, after notice and 

opportunity for comment as provided in 

Section 766.23 of the Regulations, any 

person, firm, corporation, or business 

organization related to a Denied Person 

by affiliation, ownership, control, or 

position of responsibility in the conduct 

of trade or related services may also be 

made subject to the provisions of the 

Order. 

FOURTH, all licenses issued pursuant 

to the Act or Regulations in which any 

of the Respondents had an interest as of 

the date of this Order are revoked. 

FIFTH, Respondents shall not take 

any action or make or permit to be made 

any public statement, directly or 

indirectly, denying the allegations in the 

Charging Letter or the Order. The 

foregoing does not affect Respondents’ 

testimonial obligations in any 

proceeding, nor does it affect its right to 

take legal or factual positions in civil 

litigation or other civil proceedings in 

which the U.S. Department of 

Commerce is not a party. 

SIXTH, that the Charging Letter, the 

Settlement Agreement, and this Order 

shall be made available to the public. 

SEVENTH, that this Order shall be 

served on Respondents, and shall be 

published in the Federal Register. 

This Order, which constitutes the 

final agency action in this matter, is 

effective immediately. 

Issued this 21st day of December, 2017. 

Richard R. Majauskas, 

Deputy Assistant Secretary of Commerce for 

Export Enforcement performing the nonexclusive functions and duties of the 

Assistant Secretary of Commerce for Export 

Enforcement. 

[FR Doc. 2017–28112 Filed 12–27–17; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE P 

DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE 

National Oceanic and Atmospheric 

Administration 

Availability of Final Evaluation 

Findings of State Coastal Programs 

and National Estuarine Research 

Reserves 

AGENCY: Office for Coastal Management 

(OCM), National Ocean Service (NOS), 

National Oceanic and Atmospheric 

Administration (NOAA), Department of 

Commerce (DOC). 


sradovich on DSK3GMQ082PROD with NOTICES