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STATE OF MICHIGAN 

COURT OF APPEALS 

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN, 

 Plaintiff-Appellee, 

UNPUBLISHED 

April 21, 2016 

v No. 325983 

Oakland Circuit Court 

ANTONIO DEVLE SMITH, LC No. 2014-250336-FH 

 Defendant-Appellant. 

Before: JANSEN, P.J., and SERVITTO and M. J. KELLY, JJ. 

PER CURIAM. 

 Defendant, Antonio Devle Smith, appeals by delayed leave granted the trial court’s 

sentence after he pleaded guilty to possessing a controlled substance with intent to deliver, MCL 

333.7401(2)(b)(ii), and possessing marijuana, MCL 333.7403(2)(d). The trial court sentenced 

him as a third habitual offender, MCL 769.13, to serve 16 months to 14 years in prison for the 

controlled substance conviction and to serve one year in prison for the possession of marijuana 

conviction. Because Smith has not demonstrated that the trial court erred, we affirm. 

 Smith contends that the trial court erred when it denied his motion to correct the 

judgment of sentence because it was invalid, see MCR 6.429(A), or, in the alternative, there was 

a mistake, see MCR 6.435. This Court reviews de novo a trial court’s interpretation and 

application of statutes and court rules. Brecht v Hendry, 297 Mich App 732, 736; 825 NW2d 

110 (2012). 

 Smith pleaded guilty to violating MCL 333.7401, and, as part of his plea, he agreed that 

he possessed the controlled substance with the intent to “share . . . with other people, either 

friends or acquaintances . . . .” He contends that the judgment of sentence contains a clerical 

error because the shorthand label for his crime lists delivery instead of possession with intent to 

deliver. Additionally, he argues that the Prosecuting Attorneys Coordinating Council (PACC) 

code of “333.74012B-A” listed on the judgment of sentence should be changed to MCL 

333.7401(2)(b)(ii) to “more accurately reflect” his plea. He maintains this is necessary to show 

his actual crime to any prospective employer, company, person, court or law enforcement 

agency, and states that an accurate description might also affect parole. 

 It is undisputed that possession with the intent to deliver encompasses possession with 

the intent to “share.” See MCL 333.7105(1); People v Steele, 429 Mich 13, 25-26; 412 NW2d 

206 (1987). Accordingly, when Smith agreed that he possessed the substance with the intent to 
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share it, he admitted that he possessed the substance with the intent to deliver contrary to MCL 

333.7401. See MCR 6.302(D)(1). Nevertheless, Smith would have this Court divide the statute 

into separate specific parts and require trial courts to fashion separate labels to reflect all the 

ways that a person might violate the statute. However, he has not identified the legal or factual 

basis for this argument. An appellant “may not merely announce their position and leave it to 

this Court to discover and rationalize the basis for their claims; nor may they give issues cursory 

treatment with little or no citation of supporting authority.” Vanderwerp v Plainfield Charter 

Twp, 278 Mich App 624, 633; 752 NW2d 479 (2008). Consequently, he has abandoned this 

argument on appeal. In any event, the label used on the judgment of sentence correctly describes 

the crime to which Smith pleaded guilty, even if it does not reflect the specific factual basis for 

his particular violation. Under MCR 6.427(3), the judgment of sentence must include “the crime 

for which the defendant was convicted,” but the crime can be identified without identifying the 

specific subset of facts giving rise to the conviction. 

 Smith has also failed to show that the judgment of sentence requires correction under 

MCR 6.429(A) or MCR 6.435. He has not demonstrated that the judgment of sentence was 

invalid. See People v Whalen, 412 Mich 166, 169-170; 312 NW2d 638 (1981). Further, Smith 

has not demonstrated that the judgment of sentence or the presentence investigation report 

contained inaccurate information, or that the judge misspoke, or the clerk made a typing error, or 

that there was a clerical error. People v Miles, 454 Mich 90, 96-97; 559 NW2d 299 (1997); 

MCR 6.435(A). 

 We also do not agree that the judgment of sentence must be corrected because it uses a 

PACC code to identify the crime, or because the code appears in the box that could be used for a 

citation to the compiled laws. PACC codes are routinely used in sentencing, and a review of 

PACC 333.74012B-A shows that it applies to the possession of a controlled substance with the 

intent to deliver contrary to MCL 333.7401(2)(b)(ii). There is no need for clarification where the 

conviction is clearly designated by the PACC code. See People v Kuchciak, 467 Mich 873; 651 

NW2d 67 (2002). 

 The trial court did not err when it denied Smith’s motion to correct the judgment. 

 Affirmed. 

/s/ Kathleen Jansen 

/s/ Deborah A. Servitto 

/s/ Michael J. Kelly