The Town of Forest Heights v. The Maryland-National Capital Park and Planning Commission, et al. , No. 21, September Term, 2018. Opinion by Getty, J. [MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS — CREATION, ALTERATION, EXI STENCE, AND DISSOLUTION – TERRITORIAL EXTENT AND SUBDIVISIO NS, ANNEXATION, CONSOLIDATION, AND DIVISION – ANNEXATIO N OR DETACHMENT OF TERRITORY FOR SPECIAL PURPOSES] The Court of Appeals held a municipal corporation’s legislative body is not required to obtain consent from owners of tax-exempt property w ithin a proposed annexation area to effectuate such an annexation pursuant to the 25% c onsent requirement of Local Government Article § 4-403(b)(2).

[MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS — CREATION, ALTERATION, EXI STENCE, AND DISSOLUTION – TERRITORIAL EXTENT AND SUBDIVISIO NS, ANNEXATION, CONSOLIDATION, AND DIVISION – ANNEXATIO N OR DETACHMENT OF TERRITORY FOR SPECIAL PURPOSES] The Court of Appeals held the circuit court erred i n determining that an annexation plan attempted to usurp law enforcement jurisdiction ove r certain lands owned and managed by Maryland—National Capital Park and Planning Commiss ion where the annexation plan indicated that policing of the land would be perfor med “as permitted by law.”Circuit Court for Prince George’s County

Case No. CAL16-29110 Argued: October 4, 2018 IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF MARYLAND

No. 21 September Term, 2018

THE TOWN OF FOREST HEIGHTS

v. THE MARYLAND-NATIONAL CAPITAL PARK AND PLANNING COMISSION, ET

AL.

Barbera, C.J. Greene, *Adkins, McDonald, Watts, Hotten, Getty, JJ.

Opinion by Getty, J. Adkins, Watts, and Hotten, JJ., dissent.

Filed: April 5, 2019 *Adkins, J., now retired, participated in the hearing and conference of this case while an active member of this Court; after being recalled pursuant to Maryland Constitution, Article IV, Section 3A, she also participated in the decision and adoption of this opinionIn the present appeal, we are asked to determine wh ether a proposed municipal

annexation, that encompasses an area consisting ent irely of tax-exempt properties, requires consent from the owners of such properties pursuant to Local Government Article (“LG”) § 4-403(b)(2). Additionally, we are asked to deter mine whether the proposed annexation plan of the Town of Forest Heights (“Forest Heights ”) attempts to usurp law enforcement jurisdiction over certain lands contained within th e proposed annexation area that are owned and operated by the Maryland—National Capital Park and Planning Commission (“MNCPPC”).

In its writ of certiorari, the Town of Forest Heights pres ents us with the following questions for review:

1. Did the circuit court err when it invalidated two r esolutions of the Town of Forest Heights that, collectively, annexed into the Town approximately 737 acres of land without the consent of the owners of 25% of the assessed value of the lands annexed by each resolution, where all the ann exed lands were tax-exempt, and where, consistent with City of Salisbury v. Banker’s Life , 21 Md. App. 396 (1974), the owners of the lands were not required t o provide their consents to the annexation?

2. Did the circuit court err when it determined that a portion of the Town’s Annexation Plan violates Md. Code, Local Gov’t § 4- 104(b) and Land Use § 17- 303(a), and, as a result, ordered that the Town may not exercise law enforcement on any land owned by Maryland-National Park and Pla nning Commission? We answer both questions in the affirmative, findin g first that the 25% property owner consent requirement of LG § 4-403(b)(2) does not encompass tax-exempt property owners. Second, we conclude that the language cont ained within the annexation plan was appropriately conditioned as to avoid any attempted divestment, duplication, or usurpation of law enforcement jurisdiction over certain proper ties owned and managed by MNCPPC.2 BACKGROUND Petitioner, Forest Heights is a municipal corporati on located within Prince George’s County that spans 306 acres of land southeast of Ma ryland’s border with the District of Columbia. In terms of municipal services, the Town provides road maintenance, street lighting, garbage collection, police, and code enfo rcement to its residents. Within the borders of Forest Heights are two public parks owne d and maintained by Respondent,

MNCPPC. Since its incorporation in 1949, Forest Heights ha s extended its corporate limits five times excluding the annexations at issue within thi s appeal. On April 20, 2016, the Town Council of Forest Heights introduced two annexation resolutions titled annexation

resolutions No. 01-2016 and 02-2016. 1 The proposed extensions are comprised of several tax-exempt properties owned by MNCPPC, Prince Georg e’s County, the Board of Education of Prince George’s County, the State of M aryland, the United States, and the

Oxon Hill Methodist Church. 2 Annexation resolution No. 01-2016 encompasses 446.8 8 acres of land located west of Forest Heights that extends to the boundary line of Washington, D.C. The proposed

annexation area of resolution No. 01-2016 includes land owned by the federal government,

1 Forest Heights refers to these annexation resoluti ons No. 01-2016 and 02-2016 as extensions six and seven, collectively. The term e xtension is a colloquialism for an annexation, because annexations typically extend a municipality’s corporate boundaries.

2 The property located within the annexation area ow ned by the church is a cemetery and not the church itself.3

under the jurisdiction of the National Park Service , including Oxon Cove Park and Oxon Hill Farm, 3 and land owned by MNCPPC. Annexation resolution 02-2016 encompasses 289.97 a cres of land located to the south of Forest Heights. The land falling within t he proposed annexation area is owned by Prince George’s County, the Board of Education of P rince George’s County, MNCPPC, the State of Maryland, the federal government, and the Oxon Hill Methodist Church. Specifically, the annexation includes Oxon Hill Man or, the Potomac Vista Recreational Area, Betty Blume Neighborhood Park, Southlawn Loca l Park, John Hanson Montessori School, Oxon Hill High School, several undeveloped lots, and portions of the Washington Circumferential Highway, commonly known as the Capi tal Beltway (i.e. Interstates 95 and 495). Together, the two annexation resolutions encompass an area of 736.85 acres which would more than double the corporate limits of Fore st Heights. The proposed annexation area contains no residential properties and no regi stered voters reside therein. Forest Heights did not obtain consent from any of the prop erty owners because the Town believed that – pursuant to LG § 4-403 – such consent was no t required because all of the property owners enjoyed tax-exempt status. In total, MNCPPC owns seven properties within the proposed annexation area and Prince George’s County owns one. All properties involved in the proposed annexations are located within a sp ecial district for planning and zoning

3 These properties constitute a national historic di strict, listed on the National Register of Historic Places and include park facilities and a l iving history farm museum.4

demarcated as the “Maryland-Washington Regional Dis trict.” 4 In addition, the properties also fall within a largely overlapping special dist rict for managing parklands known as the “Maryland-Washington Metropolitan District.” In 2014, Forest Heights attempted to annex the sam e properties at issue within the instant appeal. Although the State and federal gov ernments did not object to the prior annexation attempt, Prince George’s County (“the Co unty”) and MNCPPC opposed the annexation and spearheaded a judicial challenge in response. In that case, the attempted annexation was invalidated due to certain procedura l deficiencies. 5 On April 20, 2016, Forest Heights adopted annexati on plans for annexation resolutions No. 01-2016 and 02-2016. A public hear ing regarding the two annexation resolutions was held on June 6, 2016, and the resol utions were passed. On the same day,

4 A special district “means a special tax area or di strict, sanitary district, park, or planning district . . . or public agency exercising specific powers in a defined area that does not exercise general municipal functions.” LG § 4-104( a). Special districts are generally protected from certain municipal action, including but not limited to municipal tax exemption and zoning. See LG § 4-104(c), (e)(1). These special districts wer e first established by the Regional District Act (“RDA”), w hich is now codified as Division II (Titles 14-27) of the Land Use Article. This Court has previously summarized that the RDA regulates “planning and zoning within the Regio nal District, which includes most of Prince George's and Montgomery Counties. To execute this delegation, the RDA divides broadly authority related to zoning, planning, and other land use matters between the county (district) councils, the [MNCPPC], and the c ounty planning boards.” Cty. Council of Prince George’s Cty. v. Zimmer Dev. Co. , 444 Md. 490, 525 (2015). The Act also regulates the authority of MNCPPC. Id. at 526-27. See also infra note 20 (detailing MNCPPC’s statutory powers and responsibilities).

5 The attempted annexation in 2014 was ultimately de clared a nullity because Forest Heights failed to formally notify the Prince George ’s County Executive, as required by statute and failed to include a particular lot in t he notice of annexation.5

both MNCPPC and Prince George’s County submitted le tters of opposition to Jacqueline Goodall, the Mayor of Forest Heights, requesting th at the properties under their jurisdiction

be removed from the annexation areas. Over a month later, MNCPPC and the County filed a complaint for declaratory judgment in the Circuit Court for Prince George’s C ounty challenging both annexations and seeking a declaratory judgment that the annexat ion resolutions were a nullity. The complaint against Forest Heights joined as parties the State of Maryland and the federal government. On August 25, the State of Maryland fi led a notice of voluntary dismissal pursuant to Maryland Rule 2-506(a) to be excluded f rom the matter. Similarly, on November 21, the United States government filed a s tipulation of dismissal. The circuit court granted both motions for dismissal. 6 Forest Heights filled a Motion to Dismiss or for Su mmary Judgment on October 31, 2016 and renewed this Motion on April 10, 2017. Nine days later, MNCPPC filed a response to Forest Heights’ motion accompanied by i ts own motion for summary judgment. After a hearing held on June 21, 2017, the circuit court issued a written opinion and order dated January 29, 2018, in which it found the annex ation resolutions to be null and void. Specifically, the court found the Town’s failure to obtain consent from the property owners

6 With the State and federal government dismissed fr om the action, Respondents consist of MNCPPC, Prince George’s County, Prince George’s Cou nty Board of Education, and Oxon Hill Methodist Church. However, MNCPPC alone filed briefs and argued on behalf of Respondents.6

fatal to the annexation and determined the annexati on plan impermissibly attempted to divest law enforcement jurisdiction from MNCPPC. A notice of appeal of the circuit court’s judgment was filed on February 23, 2018, by Forest Heights. While the appeal was pending bef ore the Court of Special Appeals, Forest Heights filed a petition for writ of certior ari with this Court, which we granted on June 1, 2018. Town of Forest Heights v. Md.—National Capital Park and Planning

Comm’n , 459 Md. 400 (2018). Additional facts will be pro vided throughout our analysis.

STANDARD OF REVIEW In cases where the focus is statutory interpretatio n, this Court’s primary goal is to ascertain the purpose and intention of the General Assembly when they enacted the statutory provisions. Washington Gas Light Co. v. Maryland Pub. Serv. Com m’n , 460 Md. 667, 682 (2018) (citing Shealer v. Straka , 459 Md. 68, 84 (2018)). We have previously commented that within the context of statutory inte rpretation [t]his Court provides judicial deference to the pol icy decisions enacted into law by the General Assembly. We assume that the legislatu re’s intent is expressed in the statutory language and thus our statutory interpret ation focuses primarily on the language of the statute to determine the purpose an d intent of the General Assembly. We begin our analysis by first looking to the norma l, plain meaning of the language of the statute, reading the statute as a whole to e nsure that no word, clause, sentence or phrase is rendered surplusage, superfluous, mean ingless or nugatory. If the language of the statute is clear and unambiguous, w e need not look beyond the statute’s provisions and our analysis ends. Occasi onally we see fit to examine extrinsic sources of legislative intent merely as a check of our reading of a statute’s plain language. In such instances, we may find use ful the context of a statute, the overall statutory scheme, and archival legislative history of relevant enactments.

Brown v. State , 454 Md. 546, 550–51 401 (2017) (citing Phillips v. State , 451 Md. 180, 196-197 (2017)). Additionally, we have indicated t hat, in situations where “the plain7

language of a statute is ‘subject to more than one reasonable interpretation, the statutory language is ambiguous.’” Koste v. Town of Oxford , 431 Md. 14, 29 (2013) (quoting

Lockshin v. Semsker , 412 Md. 257, 276 (2010)). Further, [w]here the words of a statute are ambiguous and su bject to more than one reasonable interpretation, or where the words are c lear and unambiguous when viewed in isolation, but become ambiguous when read as part of a larger statutory scheme, a court must resolve the ambiguity by searc hing for legislative intent in other indicia, including the history of the legisla tion or other relevant sources intrinsic and extrinsic to the legislative process.

Gardner v. State , 420 Md. 1, 9 (2011) (quoting State v. Johnson , 415 Md. 413, 421-22 (2010)). In addition, this Court’s inquiry is not limited to the particular statutory provisions at issue on appeal. Rather, as we have recently no ted, “[t]his Court may also analyze the statute’s ‘relationship to earlier and subsequent l egislation, and other material that fairly bears on the fundamental issue of legislative purpo se or goal, which becomes the context within which we read the particular language before us in a given case.’” Blackstone v.

Sharma , 461 Md. 86, 114 (2018) (quoting Kaczorowski v. Mayor & City Council of

Baltimore , 309 Md. 505, 515 (1987)).

DISCUSSION Article 11E of the Maryland Constitution, commonly referred to as the “Municipal Home Rule Amendment” was enacted by act of the Gene ral Assembly and ratified by voters in November 1954. 1954 Md. Laws ch. 53; Leg is. Council of Md., Report to the8

General Assembly of 1955 , 217. 7 This constitutional amendment granted specific ho me rule powers to municipalities. Md. Const., art. 11 E. After the ratification of Article 11E, it was necessary for the General Assembly to pass n ew legislation to create a statutory scheme to implement this home rule authority. Legi s. Council of Md., Report to the General Assembly of 1955 , 308. In 1955, the General Assembly enacted the predecess or to the current Subtitle 4 of the Local Government Article. Article 23A § 19, (1 955 Md. Laws ch. 423; Legis. Council of Md., Report to the General Assembly of 1955 , 3, 217). In their report to the General Assembly, the Legislative Council of Maryland expla ined that the legislation proposed for introduction in 1955 was a companion to the 1954 Co nstitutional Amendment and was necessary for the newly established municipal home- rule powers by “establishing procedures to be followed in amending town charters , repealing town charters, [and] annexing territory to towns[.]” 8 Legis. Council of Md., Report to the General Assembly of

1955 , 217.

7 The Legislative Council of Maryland was created in June 1939 and existed through 1975. Maryland State Law Library, Scanned Collections , https://www.lawlib.state.md.us/collections/scannedc ollections.html [https://perma.cc/7ESY-KY6Z]. It was statutorily r equired to hold meetings at least once every three months. Hugh A. Bone, Maryland’s Legislative Council in Action , Nat’l Mun. Rev. Vol. XXXI, No. 3 Mar. 1942 at 2-5. Primarily, the Council heard witness testimony on potential problems, researched issues facing the General Assembly during legislative interims, and drafted legislation. Id . The Council’s reports summarized proposed legislation, provided minutes of the Council’s meet ings, and provided copies of bills developed by the Council. Id.

8 The Legislative Council of Maryland noted, “[a]s t o the method of annexing territories, Mr. Johnson stated that, should the Home Rule Amend ment pass, the General Assembly would be prohibited from passing legislation on thi s subject and thus there would have to9

Although the power of annexation was not constitut ionally granted to municipalities by the 1954 Constitutional Amendment , the statute passed the following year granted municipalities the authority to annex real property to expand their corporate

limits. 1955 Md. Laws ch. 423. See generally LG § 4-401 (empowering municipalities to annex lands that are “contiguous and adjoining” to the borders of the municipality, not contained within another municipality, and which wi ll not create an “enclave” – an unincorporated area surrounded on all sides by land within a municipality); LG § 4-403 (imposing certain limits on the annexation powers o f a municipal corporation). Primarily, there are two ways through which a munic ipality may initiate an annexation – by petition or through municipal legis lative enactment. LG § 4-415(d). See

also LG §§ 4-404, 4-403. First, an annexation may be in itiated by petition if it is signed by a certain percentage of registered voters residi ng within the proposed annexation area and a certain percentage of those owning property w ithin the area. LG § 4-404(a). Next, the presiding officer of a municipality’s legislati ve body must verify that the petition meets the statutory requirements and then must introduce a related annexation resolution before the municipal legislative body. LG § 4-404(b), (c)

. The second method, which was used by Forest Height s in the present appeal,

commences with an annexation resolution introduced before the appropriate municipal

be some new procedure set up.” Legis. Council of M d., Report to the General Assembly of 1955 , 308. The Council further noted that if procedure s regulating such issues were not codified into statute promptly, the authority to dr aft procedures relating to these areas of municipal governance would fall to municipal corpor ations themselves. Id. at 355.10

legislative body. Such resolution must be filed in accordance with the procedure for municipal legislative enactments and amendments app licable to the municipality’s charter. LG § 4-403(a). A municipality’s ability to annex t erritory is limited by certain consent requirements, which – in some circumstances – requi re the municipality to obtain a certain level of consent from any registered voters residin g within the area and from those who own property within the area. See LG § 4-403(b). An annexation resolution must desc ribe the area intended to be annexed and provide a “deta iled description of the conditions and circumstances that apply to: (i) the change in boun daries; and (ii) the residents and property in the area to be annexed.” LG § 4-403(c).

A. The 25% Consent Requirement of LG § 4-403(b)(2) Doe s Not Require Consent from the Owners of Tax-Exempt Property. While LG § 4-401 is the primary source of authority through which a municipality may annex territories and expand its corporate boun daries, LG § 4-403(b) limits such annexation powers by requiring the consent of both registered voters and property owners in the manner provided by the statute which, in per tinent part, provides the following: (b) Before an annexation resolution is introduced, the legislative body shall obtain consent from: (1) at least 25% of the registered voters who are r esidents in the area to be annexed; and (2) the owners of at least 25% of the assessed valu ation of the real property in the area to be annexed. LG. § 4-403(b). For the annexation proposed by For est Heights, no registered voters resided within the areas encompassed by annexation resolutions 01-2016 and 02-2016. Thus, our primary focus is the 25% consent requirem ent of LG § 4-403(b)(2) and whether the consent of tax-exempt property owners is mandat ed. Put narrowly, our analysis will11

focus on the term “assessed valuation” as utilized within LG § 4-403(b)(2) and whether tax-exempt properties contribute to and constitute part of the assessed valuation of a proposed annexation area. Prior to 1971, tax-exempt property was not assesse d for taxation. Legis. Council of Md., Report to the General Assembly of 1955 , at 209-10 (1954); City of Salisbury v. Banker’s Life , 21 Md. App. 396, 404 (1974). Consequently, tax-e xempt property included within an area that a municipality intended to anne x prior to 1971 did not have an “assessed valuation” and, therefore, municipalities were not required to obtain consent from such property owners. In 1971, the General Assembly enacted a statute tha t requires that tax-exempt property be assessed. 1971 Md. Laws ch. 361 § 1; Banker’s Life , 21 Md. App. at 403-04. Initially codified as Article 81, § 232B, these sta tutory provisions are currently § 7-106 of the Tax – Property Article (“TP”) and provide the f ollowing: (a) Except for real property owned by the federal g overnment, real property that is exempt by law from the property tax shall be assess ed under this article and in the manner required by the Director. (b) The assessments of exempt real property shall b e maintained in the records of the Department and of the supervisor in each county in which the exempt property is located. (c) For the purpose of distributing State funds, th e assessments of exempt property may not be included in the total assessment of all property. 9

9 Since the original enactment of the statute, the s tatutory language has been modified to some degree. As initially enacted, Article 81, § 2 32B stated the following: Notwithstanding the provisions of § 9 of this artic le excluding exempt property from assessment for purposes of ordinary taxation and ex cepting the property of the United States from this section, all real property and any improvements thereon12

In the present appeal, Forest Heights and Amicus Cu riae, Maryland Municipal League, Inc. (“MML”), argue that the General Assemb ly’s enactment of Article 81, § 232B created ambiguity into the overarching statutory sc heme regulating annexations. Primarily, they argue that this ambiguity was an unintended co nsequence which left one unable to discern, purely based on reference to LG § 4-403, w hether the owners of tax-exempt properties ought to be included in consideration of the 25% consent requirement of LG § 4-403(b)(2). On the other hand, MNCPPC asserts that the statute is not ambiguous and, under its plain language, municipalities must obtain consent from the owners of tax-exempt properties. In contrast, Forest Heights and MML re ly upon the Court of Special Appeals’

decision in Banker’s Life which held that, pursuant to Art. 23A, § 19(b), a municipality is not required to obtain consent from the owners of t ax-exempt properties to effectuate an annexation. Having established the relevant facts, the parties’ respective arguments and the underlying statutory framework, we must now emb ark upon our journey of statutory

located in the State and exempted from the payment of any ordinary taxes on July 1, 1971 or becoming exempt at any time thereafter b y any provisions of law shall be valued and assessed from time to time as may be necessary and as directed by the Director of the Department according to the met hod prescribed by this article by persons authorized by the Director to perform such valuations. These valuations shall be maintained in the records of the Departmen t and of each county and Baltimore City in which exempt property is located, in the manner required by the Director. None of such valuations shall be include d in the total assessment of all property subject to State, county or city ordinary taxation for the purpose of distribution of State moneys under any provision of law. Md. Code (1957, 1973 Repl. Vol.), Art. 81 § 232B.13

interpretation – an expedition that commences with a determination of whether the language of LG § 4-403(b)(2) is ambiguous. In accordance with the principles of statutory inte rpretation mentioned above, we begin our inquiry by looking to the plain language of the statute to discern whether any ambiguity exists. On its face, LG § 4-403(b)(2) is confusing because although the term “assessed valuation” likely was intended to mean th e value assessed to a particular property for taxation purposes, the term is not defined with in the Local Government Article. The “assessed valuation” of residential or commercial p roperties in the context of municipal annexations is easily understood. However, within the context of tax-exempt properties, the statute’s meaning is uncertain because such pro perties are not subject to taxation. Thus, we must determine whether a tax-exempt property is assessed and valued for tax purposes by looking beyond the plain language of LG § 4-403. There are potentially two different interpretations of the provision at issue. Forest Heights and MML interpret the term “assessed valuat ion” as excluding tax-exempt property and, therefore, contend that the consent o f tax-exempt property owners is not required under the statute. Conversely, MNCPPC arg ues that the statutory language is clear on its face and “assessed valuation” encompas ses tax-exempt property and therefore mandates that an annexation requires consent from s uch property owners

. Ambiguity is present in situations where there are multiple reasonable, yet differing, interpretations of the same statutory provision. Koste , 431 Md. at 29. See also Gardner , 420 Md. at 9. In terms of the provision at issue, no statutory definitions within the Local Government Article aid in determining the meaning o f “assessed valuation.” As previously14

mentioned, the introduction of TP § 7-106 complicat ed Maryland’s statutory framework surrounding municipal annexations. Prior to its pa ssage in 1971, it is clear that tax-exempt property was not assessed and could not be subject to the 25% consent requirement of LG § 4-403(b)(2). While the words “assess(ed)” and “valuation” are no t defined within the Local Government Article, the Tax – Property Article does contain definitions for the terms

“assess” and “assessment.” See TP § 1-101. The definition of “assess” differs dep ending upon whether the property in question is real or pe rsonal property. In terms of real property, the statute defines “assess” as “determin [ing] the phased-in full cash value or use value to which the property tax rate may be applied [.]” TP § 1-101(b). Similarly, for real property, the statute defines the term “assessment” as meaning “the phased-in full cash value or use value to which the property tax rate m ay be applied.” TP § 1-101(c). Based on these statutory definitions, it is evident that the word “assessment” is an estimate of the value of a property which is then u sed to determine the overall tax liability due on that particular property. Tax-exempt proper ty is assessed but not taxed. Forest Heights notes that tax-exempt property is “not subj ect to... the burdens of supporting a municipal government,” and, therefore, does not appear on the tax roll. See TP § 7-210(a) (exempting from property tax any lands owned by fed eral, State, county, municipal corporation, or an agency or instrumentality of the preceding entities). As defined by the Tax – Property Article, an “asses sment roll” is “the official listing of assessments of property required under § 2-202(3 ) of this article.” TP § 1-101(d). TP § 2-202(3) provides that the Director of the State Department of Assessments and Taxation15

has the power “to direct that the Department enter all taxable property on the assessment rolls, and regardless of whether the property is ow ned by an individual, corporation, or some other person, to value alike all property of a like kind.” TP § 2-202(3). Additionally,

the Article defines a “tax roll” as “the assessment roll to which the property tax rate has been applied and on which the property tax on each property is shown.” TP § 1-101(nn). Therefore, these two distinct types of rolls exist that reinforce the distinction

between assessment and taxation. The assessment ro lls contain the list of all properties that are assessed; in contrast, tax rolls are a spe cific type of assessment roll – one to which the tax rate is applied to calculate the tax burden associated with a particular property. Taxexempt properties are assessed and appear on an ass essment roll yet do not appear on a tax roll. Prior to the enactment of Art. 81, § 232B in 1971, tax exempt properties were not

assessed and there was no distinction between tax a nd assessment rolls. Clearly, at the time, tax exempt properties were not considered rel ative to the 25% consent requirement. Banker’s Life , 21 Md. App. at 402-3. 10 The Legislative Council’s Report to the General As sembly of 1971 provides the following explanation for the adoption of Art. 81, § 232B: This legislation offered by the Committee on Taxati on and Fiscal Matters is related to the property tax rearrangement legislation. Alt hough it arose from 1970 bills requiring the making of payments-in-lieu of taxes f or some kinds of tax exempt property, the Committee found that it was impossibl e to consider those bills properly because tax exempt property is not valued and asses sed. The Committee feels that

10 Maryland’s system of municipal annexations has und ergone few modifications since 1971. For a brief overview of municipal annexation procedure prior to the recodification of the Maryland Code, see Christopher Burlee Kehoe, Annexation Procedures in Maryland at 3-20 (MICPEL 1989).16

the lack of any valuation for tax exempt property i s an oversight in the State’s property and assessment laws which needs to be corr ected . This information will provide a basis for consideration of payments- in-lieu proposals and also for evaluation of property tax exemptions. The bill below provides that exempt property will b e valued, as the Department of Assessments and Taxation directs, by teams of asses sors and completed by January 1, 1973. The valuations will be maintained separat ely and will not affect any assessable base on which State aid is computed. Legis. Council of Md., Report to the General Assembly of 1971 , 253 (emphasis added). Clearly, in drafting Art. 81, § 232B, the General A ssembly had intended to solve the policy issue that the State lacked any methodology of dete rmining the potential value of taxexempt properties for calculating payment-in-lieu o f taxes proposals. Accordingly, the Legislative Council’s Report of 19 71 indicates that the policy supporting the assessment of tax-exempt properties is to “provide a basis for consideration of payments-in-lieu proposals and also for evaluati on of property tax exemptions.” Id. Although payments in lieu of taxes (“PILOTs”) have been broadly expanded in present times, 11 they were historically interrelated to attempts to reduce the financial impact of State or federal tax exemptions on localities. For example, in the 1960s, the statute governing the enumeration of taxable property, e.g. Art. 81, § 8, contained a provision

11 For example, Maryland provides PILOTs, for certain tax-exempt properties, to counties and municipalities by statute. See Md. Code (1977, 2016 Repl. Vol.), Transportation § 6- 308(c) (establishing payments in lieu of taxes betw een the Maryland Port Administration and counties to compensate those counties for the e conomic impact caused by the taxexemption of Maryland Port Administration propertie s located within a county’s borders). See also Md. Code (1974, 2018 Repl. Vol.), Natural Resource s (“NR”), §§ 5-212, 5-212.1 (providing that the State will make payments to cou nties, in which State forests or parks are located, a certain percentage of revenues deriv ed from these lands to offset the economic impact counties experience by virtue of th ese properties’ tax-exempt status).17

under which individuals who leased or borrowed cert ain lands from the federal government for specific for-profit purposes, 12 were subject to taxation as if they were the owner of the property. Art. 81, § 8(e). However, this provisio n did not apply to “federal or State property for which negotiated payments are made in lieu of taxes.” Id. Because property held by such entities was tax exempt, local governm ents would have difficulty determining the sufficiency of an entity’s payment in lieu of t ax relative to the value of property the entity held. As indicated by the Council’s report, this was the foremost and primary reason the General Assembly enacted 1971 Md. Laws ch. 361 § 1. The General Assembly did not express an intention t o modify the statutory framework surrounding municipal annexations because it never referenced the relevant statutory provisions regarding municipal home rule. Accordingly, we conclude that the General Assembly’s introduction and enactment of 19 71 Md. Laws ch. 361 § 1 was aimed at solving “an oversight in the State’s property an d assessment laws” and the General Assembly had no intention of modifying the statutor y framework surrounding municipal annexations. Legis. Council of Md., Report to the General Assembly of 1971 , 253-54

. The General Assembly intended only to modify and improv e the State’s ability to account for tax-exempt properties existing within the State. Mo reover, this legislative history is devoid

12 The statute is limited to those engaging in a for- profit business on leased or otherwise occupied federal land and it exempts certain public facilities such as airports, parks, markets, and fairgrounds if they are available for use by the general public. Md. Code (1957, 1965 Repl. Vol.), Art. 81, § 8.18

of any indication that the General Assembly intende d to alter the 25% consent requirement or amend municipal annexations generally. Id. Although counties and certain planning agencies do not have a statutory right to veto municipal annexations, the General Assembly ha s provided to them certain procedural leverage over the annexation process. The relevant statute was enacted in 1975, (1975 Md. Laws ch. 693 (H.B. 534)), and is currently codified in Title 4 of the Local Government Article. First, LG § 4-406 provides that a municip ality must provide notice of an annexation to the governing body of the county in w hich the municipality is located and any regional or State planning agencies with jurisd iction within the county. LG § 4-406(c). Second, county, State, and regional planning agenci es possess the “first right to be heard” at public annexation hearings. LG § 4-406(d). Thi rd, a county’s governing body by a twothirds vote may require that the annexation be put to referendum within the proposed annexation area. LG § 4-410. This essentially hal ts a municipality’s annexation resolution pending a successful referendum. Both Forest Heights and MML argue that even though counties enjoy the right to petition a proposed annexation to referendum, the l egislative history of H.B. 534 indicates that the General Assembly did not intend to grant c ounties the authority or ability to veto a proposed municipal annexation. When attempting t o ascertain legislative intent, this Court focuses on the specific intent of the General Assembly and not the intent of witnesses supporting or opposing a particular piece of propos ed legislation. Anne Arundel County v. City of Annapolis , 352 Md. 117, 128 n.4 (1998).19

However, witness testimony contributes to statutory interpretation because “[a]lthough the comments of those witnesses do not reflect legislative intent directly, they do help indirectly by identifying the issues the Le gislature sought to address.” Id. In his testimony on H.B. 534, Jon Burrell (at that time Ex ecutive Director of MML) stated that MML had historically opposed granting counties the authority to force an annexation to referendum but that a compromise was reached betwee n MML and the Maryland Association of Counties (“MACo”). 13 See Bill File to H.B. 534, Testimony – Statement of Jon Burrell, MML, in support of H.B. 534 (1975). Mr. Burrell testified that the introduction of the two-thirds referendum requirement was intend ed merely to protect counties from municipal annexations in situations where a municip al corporation had not provided the county with an adequate justification. 14 Id. Specifically, he testified that the referendum provision

13 Regarding the provisions of H.B. 534, Judge Hotten writes, “[t]his expansion of county annexation rights implies the General Assembly’s in tent to provide counties, a tax-exempt entity, with authority over annexations initiated b y municipalities.” Dissenting Opinion at 13-14 (Hotten, J. dissenting). However, under the compromise forged in the General Assembly between MML and MACo, the power granted to counties to force a referendum is distinctly limited and does not extend to an aut hority to consent or deny municipal annexations. See LG § 4-410(a). A county is merely empowered to for ce the annexation to a referendum, where citizens residing within the area ultimately determine the fate of that annexation. Id.

14 Judge Hotten’s Dissenting opinion takes the positi on that counties and similarly situated entities have an “inherent right . . . to participa te in municipal annexations.” Dissenting Opinion at 14 (Hotten, J. dissenting). However, th is position conflates a right to participate with a right to unilaterally halt certain municipal annexations, i.e. those consisting of entirely tax-exempt property. Moreover, as the pro visions of H.B. 534 make clear, counties have a limited role in the annexation process and t he ultimate power to halt a referendum lies with those residing in the area not with a cou nty itself. As the Attorney General has20

would give assurance to the county government that, if they felt a referendum was not held because of lack of sufficient knowledge of [the effects] of annexation or because the petition fell just short of the requisi te number of signatures, they then would have a remedy to force a referendum in the ar ea to be annexed while drawing attention to their reasons for defeating the propos ed annexation.

Id. In addition to the above testimony, the Attorney Ge neral has issued several opinions regarding the interplay between a property’s tax-ex empt status and municipal annexation. Although opinions by the Attorney General are merel y persuasive and not binding upon this Court, they are afforded considerable weight w ithin the context of statutory interpretation. State v. Crescent Cities Jaycees Foundation, Inc. , 330 Md. 460, 470 (1993); Read Drug & Chem. Co. v. Claypoole , 165 Md. 250, 257 (1933). In considering opinions by the Attorney General, this Court has previously commented that “[t]he Legislature is presumed to be aware of the Attorney General’s stat utory interpretation and, in the absence of enacting any change to the statutory language, t o acquiesce in the Attorney General’s

construction.” Chesek v. Jones , 406 Md. 446, 463 (2008) (citing Read Drug & Chemical

Co. , 165 Md. at 257-58); Crescent Cities Jaycees Foundation, Inc. , 330 Md. at 470. In 1981, the Attorney General provided an unpublis hed opinion to Lawrence E. Speelman, the county attorney for Frederick County, regarding a county’s ability to veto a proposed municipal annexation. 15 66 Op. Att’y Gen. Md. 267 (1981). The synopsis

consistently opined, absent specific statutory lang uage, tax-exempt properties are not included in the 25% consent requirement of LG § 4-4 03(b)(2).

15 Although the opinion itself was not published, a s ynopsis of the opinion was printed in 66 Op. Att’y Gen. Md. 267 (1981). Opinion of the A ttorney General Op. No. 81-020 addressed to Lawrence E. Speelman County Attorney, Frederick County Commissioners21

printed in the published volumes of the Attorney Ge neral summaries the opinion as

follows: Under Article 23A, § 19, counties do not have the p ower to consent to or to veto a municipal annexation of territory, even where count y-owned land is located in that territory. However, counties do have the right to be notified of the proceedings, to be heard first at a public hearing, to receive an o utline for the extension of services and public facilities to the territory to be annexe d, and to petition the annexation resolution to a public referendum of the residents in that territory.

Id. A subsequent opinion by the Attorney General consid ered whether the City of Havre

de Grace could annex an uninhabited island located in the Susquehanna River. 87 Md. Att’y Gen. Op. 161 (2002). In a footnote, the Atto rney General indicated that Maryland has “a policy against a county referendum or veto.” Id. Further, in distinguishing between a county’s ability to veto by forcing an annexation to a county-wide referendum, the Attorney General opined, “[t]his amendment was the result of deliberations by representatives of the Maryland Municipal League an d the Maryland Association of Counties. The purpose of the legislation was to en hance the role of the counties without abandoning the policy against a county-wide referen dum or county government approval requirement.” Id. The policy underlying this enactment, as explained by the Attorney General, largely mirrors that advanced by Forest Heights and MML in this case. In sum, this policy

(Sept. 18, 1981). In this letter, the Attorney Gen eral cites to Banker’s Life , 21 Md. App. at 404, for the proposition that the consent of tax-ex empt property owners within a proposed annexation area is not required to effectuate a mun icipal annexation. Id.22

underscores that a county or other similarly situat ed tax-exempt entity was never intended to have the ability to block or veto a municipal an nexation and supports the position that the 25% consent requirement of LG § 4-403(b)(2) exc ludes the owners of tax-exempt property. 16 Both parties in this case urge this Court to turn t o the decision in Banker’s Life for guidance. Forest Heights and MML argue that Banker’s Life was correct and, although not binding upon this Court, should guide our analysis because it properly ascertained the legislative intent behind the pertinent statutes th at have been followed for over forty years in shaping Maryland’s procedure for municipal annex ations. In contrast, MNCPPC responds that Banker’s Life is distinguishable from the instant appeal or was incorrectly decided, because the controlling statutory authorit y is clear and unambiguous.

In Banker’s Life , the Court of Special Appeals considered a propose d annexation by the City of Salisbury that encompassed both publicl y and privately-owned lands. Banker’s Life , 21 Md. App. at 400. Of primary import, the decis ion in Banker’s Life considered the first question presented before this Court, i.e. wh ether the present day 25% consent

16 As demonstrated, this situation is not limited spe cifically to counties. This also encompasses land owned by the State, the United Sta tes, and regional planning agencies, such as MNCPPC, all of which are exempt from proper ty taxes pursuant to TP § 7-210. The term “count(ies)” will be momentarily used to r epresent any of these similarly situated entities for simplicity’s sake within the limited c ontext of this particular argument.23

requirement of LG § 4-403(b)(2) required municipali ties to obtain consent from the owners of tax-exempt lands. 17 Id. at 400-01. One such publicly-owned property that the City of S alisbury attempted to annex was owned by the Wicomico County Board of Education and was tax-exempt due to its status as an educational property. Id. at 399-400

. In contrast to the instant appeal, the City of Salisbury obtained consent from the Wicomico Cou nty Board of Education and counted the Board’s consent towards the 25% property owner consent threshold of Art. 23A, § 19(b). Id. at 400-01. In response, four property owners chall enged the annexation on the basis that the Wicomico County Board of Education’s property was tax-exempt and should

not be included in a determination of whether the C ity of Salisbury had satisfied the 25% property owner consent threshold. Id. at 400. Without the consent of the Wicomico County Board of Education, the City of Salisbury’s propose d annexation fell short of the 25% consent requirement. Id. at 401. Ultimately, after determining that Art. 81, § 232B (currently LG § 4-403) was ambiguous, the Court of Special Appeals briefly con sidered the legislative history and concluded that the General Assembly did not intend the 25% property owner consent requirement to require consent from the owners of t ax-exempt properties contained within a proposed annexation area. Id. at 404-05. It concluded that “the Legislature neve r departed from an intent that only those who were to bear the financial burdens of a city

17 Banker’s Life was decided at a time before the recodification of Art. 81, 232B as LG § 4-40.24

government by the payment of real property taxes we re to be allowed a voice in the annexation of real property to the municipal corpor ation.” Id. at 404. Therefore, the intermediate appellate court voided the City of Sal isbury’s annexation resolution because, excluding the consent of the Wicomico County Board of Education, the City fell short of the 25% consent required by statute. Overall, we find MNCPPC’s arguments to overturn the policy articulated in Banker’s Life unavailing. Although MNCPPC avers that there is no ambiguity and the plain language of LG § 4-403 controls, we agree wit h the Court of Special Appeals that ambiguity exists as to whether the statutory consen t requirement includes tax-exempt properties. As noted, both MNCPPC’s and Forest Hei ghts’ interpretations of LG § 4- 403(b) are reasonable and we have no basis for dete rmining which interpretation is preferable; therefore, ambiguity exists and needs t o be remedied. See Koste , 431 Md. at

29. Although MNCPPC argues that the instant case is dis tinguishable from Banker’s Life , we do not find these arguments persuasive. MNCPP C contends that, if correctly decided, Banker’s Life is distinguishable because the Court of Special App eals merely determined that the consent of a tax-exempt propert y owner such as the Wicomico County

Board of Education should not contribute towards th e 25% consent requirement. MNCPPC also contends that the procedural posture is differ ent in the present case because the taxexempt property owners are not attempting to consen t to municipal annexation. Here, the tax-exempt property owners are attempting to prohib it a municipal annexation by withholding consent. However, our independent revi ew of the legislative intent for both25

TP § 7-106 and LG § 4-403(b) is consistent with the decision in Banker’s Life

. 18 Our review confirms that the General Assembly had no in tention of modifying the annexation procedures required of municipalities when it enact ed TP § 7-106. The General Assembly intended for only those subject to municipal taxati on to participate in the consent requirement of the annexation proceedings. 21 Md. App. 396, 404 (1974). Additionally, MNCPPC contends that Banker’s Life is distinguishable because it did not address situations in which proposed annexa tion areas consist of entirely taxexempt properties. However, on prior occasions, this Court has conside red cases concerning annexations consisting of entirely tax-e xempt land without noting or invoking a prohibition against the annexation of entirely ta x-exempt property. See Koste , 431 Md. at 19-21. Therefore, proposed annexation areas con sisting of entirely tax-exempt properties have previously succeeded and this fact has not historically been detrimental to municipal annexations and should not stand to under mine the municipal annexation underlying the instant appeal. In addition to the above considerations, a holding requiring the consent of tax-exempt property owners to permit a municipal annexation would create the potential of gross inequities between the State , federal, and county governments and their authority to block or veto municipal annexati on proceedings. 19

18 The conclusion of Judge Watt’s Dissenting opinion suggests an override of Banker’s Life based upon a plain meaning analysis. Dissenting Op inion at 1 (Watts, J. dissenting). However, based on our review of the legislative his tory of the surrounding statutes, we determine that Banker’s Life was correctly decided and should not be overruled s imply based upon the statute’s plain language. 19 Judge Hotten’s Dissenting opinion distinguishes th is case from Banker’s Life on the basis that the tax-exempt properties should be treated di fferently depending upon whether owners of the tax-exempt property are attempting to accept or oppose the annexation.26

As noted by Judge Hotten’s Dissent, MNCPPC occupies a unique statutory role that distinguishes it from the Wicomico County Board of Education, the entity involved in Banker’s Life . Dissenting Opinion at 14-16 (Hotten, J. dissenti ng). This necessitates a brief discussion of MNCPPC, its role, and its assoc iated powers. 20 MNCPPC is a state

Dissenting Opinion at 17-18 (Hotten, J. dissenting) . Such a distinction would result in an untenable position where the owners of tax-exempt p roperties can oppose annexation proceedings but cannot approve them. Judge Hotten’ s Dissenting opinion also offers a plain meaning analysis of LG § 4-403(b)(2) that wou ld include tax-exempt property in the 25% consent requirement. See Dissenting Opinion at 13-14 (Hotten, J. dissenting)

. However, pursuant to TP § 7-106(a), property owned by the federal government is not assessed and therefore does not constitute part of the assessed valuation of a proposed annexation area. The result is a contradictory int erpretation of LG § 4-403(b)(2), which would take into account the consent of the State or a county but would specifically exclude consent of the federal government, because the latt er is not assessed. Therefore, holding that the plain language of LG § 4-403(b)(2) require s consent from all owners of tax-exempt property is inherently impractical. From a policy perspective, it would be unlikely that the General Assembly intended this dichotomy between th e treatment of federal and State taxexempt property for municipal annexations.

20 Primarily, MNCPPC’s relevant unique statutory power s involve: (1) enforcing certain sections of the Capper-Cramton Act which regulates the acquisition of parklands within the metropolitan district; and (2) acquiring intere sts in real property for preservation purposes or for public recreation. LU § 15-302(3). NR § 5-1202. See also LU §§ 17-101; 17-108. The Commission holds such property for the general benefit of the State citizenry, particularly those living in the metropolitan distr ict. LU § 17-201. MNCPPC is statutorily authorized to transfer any property no longer requi red for public use and may sell or exchange any such land if the proceeds are used to construct, acquire, or improve other MNCPPC properties. LU §§ 17-205, 17-206, 15-302(1) . Any such property acquired or held by MNCPPC is tax exempt. LU § 17-203. MNCPPC has some additional powers not relevant to the instant appeal. See Zimmer Dev. Co. , 444 Md. at 526-28. In terms of zoning, the County Councils of particular counties (i.e. Mo ntgomery and Prince George’s Counties) act as district councils over land owned and maintained by MNCPPC and such district councils maintain the authority to regulat e zoning. LU §§ 22-101; 22-104(a). As noted, Forest Heights does not regulate its lands t hrough zoning.27

agency established by § 15-101 of the Land Use Arti cle (“LU”). It acts as a representative of the state and the municipal home rule article of the Maryland Constitution (Article 11E) does not apply to MNCPPC. See LU § 14-202. However, there is no indication with in the associated statutory framework that municipal annex ation of MNCPPC property would interfere with any of these responsibilities, nor a re there any provisions that would grant MNCPPC special status to veto a municipal annexatio n. Simply put, the Attorney General’s discussion of a county’s inability to vet o a municipal annexation applies equally

to MNCPPC and there is no worthwhile distinction wh ich would warrant granting this ability to MNCPPC. 21 Further, we note that after the Banker’s Life decision, the Attorney General’s Office reaffirmed its prior opinions stating that consent from the owners of tax-exempt property is not required under municipal annexation statutes . In 1986, former Assistant Attorney General Richard E. Israel replied to an inquiry fro m Elroy G. Boyer, the town attorney for

the Town of Betterton. Letter from Richard E. Isra el, Assistant Attorney General, to Mr. Elroy Boyer, Town Attorney for Betterton, (Apr. 10, 1986). The Town of Betterton had

21 T he entire statutory framework is devoid of any lang uage that grants authority to MNCPPC over municipal annexations. In summation, a lthough MNCPPC is tasked with the unique role of managing preservation and recrea tional properties, there is no indication in the statute that annexation of MNCPPC properties by a municipal corporation would in any way affect these unique responsibilities. Alth ough Judge Hotten’s Dissent points out that MNCPPC’s role is unique, this unique role does not distinguish MNCPPC from a County to the extent that it would warrant providin g MNCPPC with the ability to veto a municipal annexation, especially considering the lo ngstanding prohibition against a county’s ability to veto a municipal annexation. See Dissenting Opinion at 14 (Hotten, J. dissenting).28

sought advice regarding a proposed annexation of an area of uninhabited land adjacent to

the town. 22 Id. Specifically, the Town of Betterton sought advice regarding the 25% property-owner consent requirement and in response the Attorney General indicated that “there was no initial consent requirement for annex ation proceedings commenced by a legislative body.” Id. The Attorney General opined that, based on the Co urt of Special Appeals’ holding in Banker’s Life , obtaining consent from a non-resident owner, who was a registered voter, was not necessary. Id. Therefore, the Attorney General has consistently advised on the consent standard both prior and subs equent to the Court of Special Appeals’

decision in Banker’s Life . We find no basis to conclude that the Attorney G eneral’s advice

was erroneous. In summation, our review of the statute’s legislati ve history and relevant sources clearly reveals that the General Assembly did not i ntend LG § 4-403(b)(2) to require consent from the owners of tax-exempt properties. There is insufficient evidence to support MNCPPC’s claim to the contrary and, therefo re, we find MNCPPC’s calls to

overrule Banker’s Life unpersuasive. Accordingly, we hold that the 25% c onsent requirement of LG § 4-403(b)(2) is not applicable t o the owners of tax-exempt properties and the circuit court’s conclusion to the contrary was erroneous.

22 This advice was made prior to the introduction of the Local Government Article when Art. 23A § 19 controlled.29

B. Forest Heights’ Annexation Plan Does Not Attempt to Divest, Usurp, or Duplicate Law Enforcement Jurisdiction over Lands Owned and M anaged by MNCPPC. The circuit court found certain provisions of Fores t Heights’ annexation plan invalid as an improper usurpation of MNCPPC’s law enforceme nt jurisdiction over lands that it owns and operates. Specifically, the circuit court concluded that if Forest Heights were to exercise police jurisdiction over MNCPPC property i t would contravene both LG § 4- 104(b) and LU § 17-303(a). Based upon these conclu sions, the circuit court ordered that Forest Heights shall not exercise law enforcement j urisdiction over MNCPPC property. Forest Heights contends such findings are an erron eous interpretation of the annexation plan for resolution No. 01-2016. Altern atively, Forest Heights asserts that the circuit court lacked a present justiciable controve rsy to support its conclusion on this point because the court had already invalidated its annex ation resolutions and, therefore, a determination based upon its annexation plan was un necessary. MNCPPC responds that the circuit court properly precluded Forest Heights from exercising law enforcement jurisdiction on MNCPPC property. Under the statutes controlling municipal annexation s, a municipal corporation must devise an annexation plan and adopt such plan throu gh an annexation resolution. See generally LG § 4-415. Annexation plans are separate from and do not constitute a part of the annexation resolution. LG § 4-415(a). An anne xation plan must describe the intended land use of the proposed annexation area, set forth a schedule regarding municipal services, and describe how a municipality plans to finance an y extensions of municipal services to the proposed annexation area. LG § 4-415(b). Addi tionally, an annexation plan must “be30

presented so as to demonstrate the available land f or public facilities that may be considered reasonably necessary for the proposed us e, including facilities for schools, water or sewage treatment, libraries, recreation, o r fire or police services.” LG § 4-415. Several statutory provisions regulate and limit sha red law enforcement jurisdiction between MNCPPC, counties, and municipalities. Firs t, LG § 4-104(b)(1) provides, “[e]xcept as provided in paragraph (2) of this subs ection, a municipality located in a special district may not exercise, divest, or duplicate in the municipality’s corporate limits any special power or duty conferred on the special dist rict.” 23 Second, pursuant to LU § 17- 303, park police and Prince George’s County police have concurrent jurisdiction over particular areas under MNCPPC’s jurisdiction. 24 Third, MNCPPC and municipal corporations are permitted to enter into mutual aid agreements under which park or municipal police may act outside of their jurisdict ion and within the jurisdiction of the other entity. Md. Code (2001, 2018 Repl. Vol.), Cr im. Proc. (“CP”) § 2-105(e)(1). 25

23 In its brief, MNCPPC attempts to argue that the Co mmission “enjoys enhanced authority on its property arising out of jurisdiction over zo ning administration and park stewardship, therefore express consent was required.” However, as Forest Heights notes, the Town does not “approve subdivisions, plan for future land use s or regulate the use of land through zoning regulations[.]” Therefore, MNCPPC’s argumen t on this point is unavailing.

24 Municipal corporations do not share concurrent jur isdiction with MNCPPC over areas within MNCPPC’s jurisdiction. The statute explicit ly limits the concurrent jurisdiction between MNCPPC, Prince George’s, and Montgomery Cou nty police. See LU § 17- 303(a). Therefore, Forest Heights has no independe nt authority to exercise police jurisdiction over the lands in question.

25 The statute controlling mutual aid agreements read s, in pertinent part, [t]he governing body of a county or municipal corpo ration or the Maryland— National Capital Park and Planning Commission may m ake a reciprocal agreement for the period that it considers advisable with the District of Columbia or a county,31

Fourth, a municipality cannot “exercise its powers of annexation or incorporation as to affect the power of . . . [MNCPPC] relating to zoni ng[.]” LG § 4-104(e). Overall, the circuit court erred in determining tha t Forest Heights’ annexation plan attempted to divest or duplicate law enforcement ju risdiction from MNCPPC. The annexation plan for annexation resolution No. 01-20 16, which the circuit court invalidated, includes the following provision: Police Service. The Annexation property is served by the U.S. Park Police and Maryland National Capital Park Police, and also, as permitted by law, may be further served by the Forest Heights Police Departm ent on a limited basis for purposes of police protection. Certain services may also be provided by the Prince George’s County Police Department pursuant to a Mem orandum of Understanding regarding jurisdictional police services entered in to between the Town and the County governments. Such services may commence aft er annexation, using existing personnel and equipment, at the same time or similar level of service now being provided to the Town in areas where police pr otective services are provided on a concurrent basis with another police agency. (Emphasis added). The annexation plan’s language is hypothetical, ind efinite, and narrowly tailored. The plan indicates the proposed annexation area is currently policed by U.S. Park Police and Maryland National Capital Park Police. However , it provides that Forest Heights may

municipal corporation, or the Maryland—National Cap ital Park and Planning Commission, within or outside the State, and establ ish and carry out a plan to provide mutual aid by providing its police officers and other officers, employees, and agents[.] CP § 2-105(e)(1). Such mutual aid agreements may a lso empower park police to exercise jurisdiction outside of park property. See LU § 17-303(a). In certain situations, police may also act outside their jurisdiction if in response to a request by another officer, part of a joint investigation, or in response to an emergency . CP § 2-102(b).32

exercise law enforcement jurisdiction over the area “as permitted by law[.]” As is evident from the statutory framework explained above, Fores t Heights has no default authority to exercise police jurisdiction over lands contained w ithin the proposed annexation area. The primary manner through which Forest Heights could e xercise police jurisdiction over these lands, notwithstanding the limited exceptions in CP § 2-102(b), involves entering into a mutual aid agreement with MNCPPC authorizing such a ction. See supra note 25. Therefore, the annexation plan does not expressly i ndicate that Forest Heights intends to exercise law enforcement jurisdiction on the lands in question. Quite simply, the annexation plan tentatively indicates that Fore st Heights may exercise law enforcement jurisdiction on the properties to the extent cognizable under th e law. A mutual aid agreement is the appropriate avenue through which t his end may be achieved. Thus, the

circuit court’s conclusion that the annexation woul d, in fact, usurp law enforcement jurisdiction from MNCPPC was unduly speculative and erroneous. Indeed, the annexation plan does not purport to gra nt to Forest Heights immediate unilateral authority to police land owned by MNCPPC . Interpreted fairly, the plain language of the annexation plan suggests that Fores t Heights would likely acquire a mutual aid agreement setting forth an agreement between th e Town and MNCPPC with respect to policing the proposed annexation area. 26 It is quite clear that this is the only method

26 Based on the text of the annexation plan, we presu me that if Forest Heights and MNCPPC were unable to come to an agreement regardin g joint policing of the associated properties then Forest Heights would be unable to e xercise police jurisdiction over the lands, because a mutual aid agreement between the t wo parties is the primary method33

through which Forest Heights could acquire law enfo rcement jurisdiction over land owned and managed by MNCPPC. See CP § 2-105(e). It is possible that Forest Heights’ annexation plan could have purported to divest or d uplicate the law enforcement jurisdiction of MNCPPC, but this would require more direct and less hypothetical language in the annexation plan – language indicating that F orest Heights intends to exercise law enforcement jurisdiction on MNCPPC land but without a clause indicating that the Town intends to exercise law enforcement jurisdiction on ly to the extent legally permissible. While annexation plans must be devised alongside an nexation resolutions, they are separate documents and distinct from annexation res olutions. See LG § 4-415(a) (“In addition to, but not as part of, an annexation reso lution, the legislative body of the municipality shall adopt an annexation plan for the area to be annexed.”). Pursuant to LG § 4-415, annexation plans, among other things, must describe the area intended to be annexed, set forth a schedule regarding municipal s ervices, describe financing, and must be made available for public inspection and discuss ion at a subsequent public hearing. LG § 4-415(b). Prior to the public hearing on the ann exation resolution, the annexation plan must be provided to: (i) any county governing bodie s; (ii) the Department of Planning; and (iii) all regional or state planning agencies with jurisdiction within that county. LG § 4- 415(f). Additionally, the annexation plan must be presented and open to p ublic review at the public hearing regarding the annexation resolut ion. LG § 4-415(g)(1).

through which Forest Heights could exercise jurisdi ction over the lands “as permitted by law.”34

The above provisions highlight the role of annexat ion plans, as an informative planning document, largely intended to satisfy cert ain notice and informational requirements. The purpose of this document is seco ndary to that of an annexation resolution, which is the primary document through w hich annexation procedure is initially

undertaken. See generally LG §§ 4-403, 4-407. Further underlining this disti nction between annexation resolutions and annexation plans is the fact that amendments to an annexation plan do not require amendments to the un derlying annexation resolution or a re-initiation of annexation proceedings. LG § 4-41 5(g)(2). In short, annexation resolutions and annexation pl ans are distinct and separate documents with distinct and separate effects. The circuit court’s decision fails to recognize this distinction in two respects. First, assuming arguendo that Forest Heights’ annexation plan impermissibly attempted to divest or duplicate law enforcement jurisdiction from MNCPPC, this would not constitute independent groun ds upon which to invalidate Forest Heights’ annexation resolution. See LG § 4-415(g)(2). As evident from the secondary relationship between annexation plans and annexatio n resolutions, once the circuit court invalidated the annexation resolution, then invalid ating the annexation plan had no effect and was unnecessary. Rather, the annexation plan c ould simply be amended and this would not necessitate amendment of the underlying annexat ion resolution. See LG § 4-415. In sum, we conclude that Forest Heights’ annexatio n plan did not attempt to divest or duplicate law enforcement jurisdiction over land s owned and managed by MNCPPC. Our conclusion is based on the language of Forest H eights’ annexation plan which only specified the exercise law enforcement jurisdiction over the lands “as permitted by law”35

that, as noted, could be accomplished through a mut ual aid agreement. Moreover, the circuit court’s determination regarding Forest Heig hts’ annexation plan and its ultimate effect on Forest Heights’ annexation resolution was inappropriate based on the distinct and separate nature of annexation resolutions and plans . Accordingly, we hold that the circuit court erred with respect to its determination that Forest Heights’ annexation plan sought to divest, usurp or duplicate law enforcement jurisdic tion over the MNCPPC’s lands.

CONCLUSION The General Assembly intended to exclude the conse nt of tax-exempt property owners from the 25% requirement of LG § 4-403(b)(2) . The legislative history of the statute and opinions of the Attorney General confir m this interpretation and the record is entirely devoid of any indication that the General Assembly intended the 25% consent requirement of LG § 4-403(b)(2) to include tax-exem pt property owners. In addition, the circuit court erred in its determ ination that Forest Heights’ annexation plan attempted to usurp law enforcement jurisdiction from MNCPPC. The annexation plan is a separate document to the under lying annexation resolution and thus should not affect the validity of an annexation res olution itself. Moreover, the language contained within the annexation plan indicating tha t Forest Heights would exercise law enforcement jurisdiction “as permitted by law” is a ppropriately conditioned and therefore too speculative to constitute any form of usurpatio n of MNCPPC’s law enforcement jurisdiction over certain properties it owns and ma nages.36

Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the circuit court and remand for further proceedings in accordance with this opinion.

JUDGMENT OF THE CIRCUIT COURT REVERSED, AND THE CASE IS REMANDED TO THAT COURT FOR FURTHER PROCEEDINGS CONSISTENT WITH THIS OPINION. COSTS IN THIS COURT AND THE COURT OF SPECIAL APPEALS TO BE PAID BY RESPONDENT.IN THE COURT OF APPEALS

OF MARYLAND

No. 21 September Term, 2018

______________________________________ THE TOWN OF FOREST HEIGHTS

v. THE MARYLAND-NATIONAL CAPITAL PARK AND PLANNING COMMISSION, ET

AL.

______________________________________

Barbera, C.J. Greene *Adkins McDonald Watts Hotten Getty,

JJ.

______________________________________ Dissenting Opinion by Watts, J., which Adkins,

J., joins.

______________________________________

Filed: April 5, 2019 *Adkins, J., now retired, participated in the hearing and conference of this case while an active member of this Court; after being recalled pursuant to Maryland Constitution, Article IV, Section 3A, she also participated in the decision and adoption of this opinion. Circuit Court for Prince George’s County Case No. CAL16-29110 Argued: October 4, 2018Respectfully, I dissent. I would hold that the pla in language of Md. Code Ann.,

Local Gov’t (2013) (“LG”) § 4-403(b)(2) (Proposal f or annexation—Initiation by legislative body) requires a municipality, prior to propounding an annexation resolution, to

obtain the consent of the owners of at least 25% of all real property in the area to be annexed, regardless of whether the real property is tax-exempt. 1 LG § 4-403(b) provides that before an annexation resolution may be introdu ced in a municipality’s legislative body, a municipality “shall obtain consent from: (1) at l east 25% of the registered voters who are residents in the area to be annexed; and (2) the owners of at least 25% of the assessed valuation of the real property in the area to be an nexed. ” LG § 4-403(b) (emphasis added). The phrase “assessed valuation of the real propert y in the area to be annexed” in LG § 4-403(b)(2) is not ambiguous and it is not subjec t to more than one reasonable interpretation. The phrase “assessed valuation of the real property in the area to be

annexed” includes the assessed valuation of all rea l property in the area to be annexed regardless of whether the real property is tax-exem pt. The term “tax-exempt” does not appear anywhere in the Annexation Subtitle, let alo ne within LG § 4-403(b)(2). There is no distinction between the owners of taxable real p roperty and the owners of tax-exempt real property in the plain language of LG § 4-403(b )(2). Put simply, the plain language of the statute requires municipalities to obtain the c onsent of the owners of taxable real

1 Given that I would conclude that the Town’s annexat ion resolutions are void because the Town did not fulfill the consent requir ements of LG § 4-403(b)(2), I would not reach a conclusion with respect to the Annexation P lan associated with the annexation resolution.- 2 -

property and the owners of tax-exempt real property alike. The only distinction that the plain language of LG § 4-403(b)(2) draws is between real property that can be “assessed” and real prope rty that cannot be “assessed.” Md. Code Ann. Tax-Prop. (1986, 2012 Repl. Vol.) (“TP”) § 7-1 06(a) provides that “real property that is exempt by law from the property tax shall be assessed under this article[.]” (Emphasis added). Accordingly, because the value of tax-exem pt property shall be assessed pursuant to TP § 7-106(a), LG § 4-403(b)(2) requires municip alities to obtain consent from the owners of taxable real property located in the area to be annexed as well as the owners of tax-exempt real property located in the area to be annexed. Given the plain language of the statute, a resort to legislative history as a c onfirmatory process is unnecessary. Based on the plain language of LG § 4-403(b)(2), I would conclude, as the Circuit Court of Prince George’s County did, that the conse nt of owners of at least 25% of all real property to be annexed includes the consent of owne rs of real property that is tax exempt. For the above reasons, respectfully, I dissent. Judge Adkins has authorized me to state that she jo ins in this opinion.Circuit Court for Prince George’s County

Case No. CAL16-29110 Argued: October 4, 2018 IN THE COURT OF APPEALS

OF MARYLAND

No. 21 September Term, 2018

__________________________________ THE TOWN OF FOREST HEIGHTS

v. THE MARYLAND-NATIONAL CAPITAL PARK AND PLANNING COMMISSION, ET AL.

__________________________________ Barbera, C.J., Greene, *Adkins, McDonald, Watts, Hotten, Getty,

JJ.

__________________________________ Dissenting Opinion by Hotten, J.

__________________________________ Filed: April 5, 2019 *Adkins, J., now retired, participated in the hearing and conference of this case while an active member of this Court; after being recalled pursuant to the MD. Constitution, Article IV, Section 3A, she also participated in the decision and adoption of this opinion.Respectfully, I dissent and would affirm the judgme nt of the Circuit Court for Prince

George’s County.

At issue is whether the two annexation Resolutions by the town of Forest Heights (“the Town”) to enlarge its boundaries by annexing approximately 736.85 acres of real property, without the consent of the owners of 25% of the assessed value of that property, resulted in a legal nullity that was not consistent with the relevant provisions of the Maryland Code, Local Government Article or Land Use Article, or otherwise consistent

with the case of Salisbury v. Banker’s Life , 21 Md.App. 396, 319 A.2d 865 (1974). I shall explain.

ANNEXATION RESOLUTIONS 01-2016 AND 02-2016 Annexation Resolutions 01-2016 and 02-2016 (“2016 Resolutions”) are substantially similar to the Town’s Annexation Reso lutions 01-2014 and 02-2014 (“2014 Resolutions”). The 2014 Resolutions similarly soug ht to annex what the Town refers to as the Sixth and Seventh Extensions of the corporate b oundaries of Forest Heights. The Maryland-National Capital Park and Planning Com mission (“MNCPPC”) and Prince George’s County (“the County”) challenged th e 2014 Resolutions and on January 29, 2016, the Circuit Court for Prince George’s Cou nty determined that the 2014 Resolutions were a legal nullity and void for sever al procedural errors. The Maryland National Capital Park and Planning Commission v. Th e Town of Forest Heights , Circuit Court for Prince George’s County, Case No.: CAL15-0 4255; Opinion and Order of the Court dated January 29, 2016 (“Forest Heights I”). On or about February 16, 2016, the2

Town noted an appeal to the Court of Special Appeal s (No. 2711, September Term, 2015), but voluntarily dismissed the appeal on or about No vember 22, 2016. The 2016 Resolutions at issue sought to annex tax-e xempt property owned by six different entities: MNCPPC, the County, the State o f Maryland, the United States of America, the Prince George’s County Board of Educat ion, and the Oxon Hill Methodist Church (cumulatively, “Plaintiff-Appellees”). 1 The Sixth Extension encompasses 446.88

acres, 2 while the Seventh Extension encompasses 289.97 acr es. 3 In total, the 2016 Resolutions sought to annex 736.85 acres, which wou ld more than double the land area of the Town. All of the annexation properties are sit uated within two different special districts created by the General Assembly. One district was c reated for planning and zoning and is denominated as the “Maryland-Washington Regional Di strict.” All of the subject properties are also situated in a second, largely o verlapping special district for managing park land and public recreation and is denominated as the “Maryland-Washington Metropolitan District.” There are no registered vot ers in the areas sought to be annexed.

1 The primary opposition to the Town’s annexation pl an did not come from the State of Maryland or the United States of Ameri ca, neither of which consented to the annexations, but both of which were voluntar ily dismissed. (E. 38)

2 The Sixth Extension to the west encompasses all bu t five acres of National Park Service land that includes Oxon Cove Park and Oxon Hill Farm.

3 The Seventh Extension is comprised of federal, Sta te and County-owned land, as well as properties owned by the County Board of Edu cation, the historic Oxon Hill Manor owned by MNCPPC and the Oxon Hill Methodist Church. These properties include several highway rights-of-way including a portion o f the Capital Beltway near Woodrow Wilson Bridge, a public high school campus, a churc h cemetery, a historic manor house, park land, and several undeveloped lots or open spa ces.3

The Town seeks to proceed with its annexation plan despite Plaintiff-Appellees’ assertion that the Town did not abide by Md. Code, Local Government Article § 4-403(b),

discussed infra

. CIRCUIT COURT PROCEEDING AND BANKER’S LIFE PRECEDENT After the Town enacted the 2016 Resolutions, MNCPPC and the County filed a Complaint for Declaratory Relief, seeking to nullif y the resolutions. Maryland Code, Courts & Judicial Proceedings Article, §§ 3-403, 3- 406, 3-409. On January 31, 2018, after a series of filings from both parties, the Circuit Court for Prince George’s County filed its opinion, granting declaratory relief in favor of th e MNCPPC and the County and nullifying

the 2016 Resolutions. Before the circuit court, MNCPPC and the County con tended that the Town failed to seek or obtain the consent of property owners of 25% of the assessed value of real property in the area to be annexed, in violation of Md. Code, Local Government Article (“Local Gov’t”) § 4-403(b), which states: (b) Before an annexation resolution is introduced, the legislative body shall obtain consent from: (1) at least 25% of the registered voters who are r esidents in the area to be annexed; and (2) the owners of at least 25% of the assessed valu ation of the real property in the area to be annexed. Because both parties agreed that there are no regis tered voters in the area to be annexed under the 2016 Resolutions, Local Gov’t § 4 -403(b)(1) is inapplicable. The provision at issue was Local Gov’t §4-403(b)(2). T he Town conceded that it did not seek the consent of Plaintiff-Appellees under § 4-403(b) (2), but asserted that it did not have to4

pursuant to City of Salisbury v. Banker’s Life , 21 Md.App. 396, 319 A.2d 865 (1974), which held that, in ascertaining whether the requis ite 25% consent has been obtained for agreeing to an annexation, one does not consider co nsent from tax-exempt property

owners. The circuit court wrote: Normally, the court would look to the language of t he statute as instructed by the Court of Appeals. The Court of Special Appea ls has already looked at the annexation statutes and their relationship to t he requirement that property be valued, even if exempt from taxation, and theref ore, this court will need to analyze this case in light of the opinion in Banker’s Life

. The Maryland National Capital Park and Planning Com mission v. The Town of Forest Heights , Circuit Court for Prince George’s County, Case No .: CAL16-29110; Opinion and Order of the Court dated January 31, 20 18 (“Forest Heights II”) (footnote omitted).

In Banker’s Life , the Council for the City of Salisbury introduced an annexation resolution to enlarge its corporate boundaries. 21 Md.App. at 400, 319 A.2d at 867. Several private property owners in the annexed area attacked the validity of the resolution, contending that it was “invalid because the [city] [c]ouncil had not obtained the consent of

the owners of 25% of the assessed valuation of the real property in the annexed area.” Forest Heights II at 4 (citing 21 Md.App. at 400, 3 19 A.2d at 867). The property owners asserted that the city council should not have included the Wicomico County Board of Education (“Board”) as a party for the requisite co nsent because the Board was exempt from assessment and ordinary taxation. Banker’s Life , 21 Md.App. at 400, 319 A.2d at5

867. Without consent from the Board, the city coun cil did not have the requisite consent for annexation under Local Gov’t § 4-403(b)(2). Id . at 400-01, 319 A.2d at 867. The Court of Special Appeals “conced[ed] that the c ourt normally looks to the ‘plain meaning rule’ in construing statutes, [but] found t he need ‘to look to the legislative intent. . . .’” due to the enactment of Article 81, § 232B, discussed infra

. Forest Heights II at 5 (quoting Banker’s Life , 21 Md.App. at 402, 319 A.2d at 868). The Court of Special Appeals noted that, at the tim e municipalities were granted the right to annex property, there was no requirement t hat property exempt from taxation be

valued or assessed. Banker’s Life , 21 Md.App. at 402-03, 319 A.2d at 868. Therefore , tax-exempt properties were not considered in the re quisite 25% mandated by Local Gov’t § 4-403(b)(2). Id. at 403, 319 A.2d at 868. In 1971, the General Asse mbly enacted § 232B, which required that all property, even if exempt fr om taxation, be assessed and valued for the purpose of “provid[ing] a basis for considerati on of payments-in-lieu [of taxes] and also for evaluation of property tax exemptions.” Id. at 404, 319 A.2d at 869 (quoting

L EGISLATIVE C OUNCIL OF M ARYLAND , Report to the General Assembly (1971)). The City Council of Salisbury argued that passage of § 232B meant that owners of tax exempt property were to be counted in determining whether the requisite 25% consent had been obtained, since all property was now assessed and v alued. The [Court of Special Appeals] disagreed with the C ity, finding that the legislative history showed ‘that the General Assemb ly had no intention whatsoever that the Act in any way alter the requir ements for the annexation of real property by a municipal corporation. Befor e passage of [§] 232B, qualification to give consent was limited to owners of property subject to6

taxation in the area proposed to be annexed. We bel ieve[ ] that [§] 232B did not change this.’ Forest Heights II at 5 (quoting Banker’s Life , 21 Md.App. at 404, 319 A.2d at 869). Thus, the Court of Special Appeals held that the Bo ard should not be included in determining the requisite consent for annexation. The circuit court distinguished the case at bar fro m Banker’s Life , writing: Since it was issued on May 24, 1974, Banker’s Life has never been cited by either the Court of Appeals or the Court of Special Appeals in any reported decision. The decision is very fact-specific—it in volved a proposed annexation of both taxable and tax-exempt property and it holds only that the consent of the Wicomico County Board of Education w as not to be included in determining whether the owners of 25% of the ass essed valuation of the real property had consented to the annexation. The Court of Special Appeals never expressly addressed whether or not St ate property could be annexed without consent –it simply stated in dicta that ‘only those who were to bear the financial burdens of a city govern ment by the payment of real property taxes were to be allowed a voice in t he annexation of real property to the municipal corporation.’ [21 Md.App. at 404, 319 A.2d at 869]. Banker’s Life . . . does not . . . answer the question of what t he court is to do where all the annexed property [Extension Six] or a lmost all the annexed property [Extension Seven, which also contains a pr ivate church] is owned by a county or state planning agency. Banker’s Life served as a shield to keep municipalities from expanding their boundaries ; here the Town attempts to use it as a sword to gain more land. Forest Heights II at 5-6 (emphasis added). As a res ult of the distinct facts of Banker’s Life , the circuit court held that the Town had not annexe d property in accordance with Local Gov’t § 4-403(b)(2) and therefore, the annexation w as unlawful.7 DISCUSSION I agree with the rationale advanced by the circuit court, finding that the Town’s annexation was unlawful, based on several statutory provisions and the distinct facts of Banker’s Life

. A. Statutory Authority

1. MD Code, Local Government Article § 4-403, Proposal for Annexation. Local Gov’t § 4-403(b)(2) dictates that, before an annexation resolution is introduced, the legislative body of the municipalit y proposing the annexation must obtain

consent from the owners of at least 25% of the asse ssed valuation of the real property in

the area to be annexed. The issue at the center of this case is the definition of “assessed valuation.” In considering statutory interpretatio n, one examines the intent of the General Assembly and begins with the plain meaning of the l anguage of the statute. Lockshin v.

Semsker , 412 Md. 257, 274, 987 A.2d 18, 28 (2010) (citatio ns omitted). The inquiry ends at a plain meaning analysis when the language of th e statute is “unambiguous and clearly consistent with the statute’s apparent purpose[.]” Id. at 275, 987 A.2d at 28 (citations omitted). “[O]nly when the language or terminology used in a statute is unclear or ambiguous may the court construe its meaning by res orting to evidence of custom or usage in light of the legislative intent and purpose.” Perdue v. State Department of Assessments

and Taxation , 264 Md. 228, 235, 286 A.2d 165, 169 (1972) (citat ion omitted). Maryland law disfavors a modification of a statute’s plain m eaning unless an irreconcilable conflict or repugnancy emerges absent such modification. City of Bowie v. Washington Suburban Sanitary Comm’n , 249 Md. 611, 618, 241 A.2d 396, 400 (1968).8

In conceptualizing the plain meaning of the term “assessed valuation,” the Town contends that MNCPPC properties have no “assessed v alue” within the meaning of Local Gov’t § 4-403(b)(2). However, the Town does not di spute that MNCPPC’s properties are indeed assessed. All Commission-owned real propert ies are “subject to assessment” and “actually assessed,” even though they are exempted from property taxes. See Md. Code, Tax-Property Article (“Tax-Prop.”) § 6-101(a)(1) (s tating that: “Except as otherwise provided in this article, all property located in t his State is subject to assessment and property tax and is taxable to the owner of the pro perty.”); see also Tax-Prop. § 7-106(a) (stating that: “Except for real property owned by t he federal government, real property that is exempt by law from the property tax shall b e assessed under this article and in the manner required by the Director.”) (emphasis ad ded). Furthermore, the terms “assess” and “assessment,” as defined in Tax-Prop. § 1-101, inherently attribute value to the assessed property. 4 As such, the term “assessed valuation” has an una mbiguous meaning

4 Tax Prop. §1-101 provides the following definition s for “assess” and “assessment:” (b) “Assess” means: (1) for real property, to determine the phased-in f ull cash value or use value to which the property tax rate may be applied ; and (2) for personal property, to determine the value t o which the property tax rate may be applied. (c) “Assessment” means: (1) for real property, the phased-in full cash valu e or use value to which the property tax rate may be applied; and (2) for personal property, the value to which the p roperty tax rate may be applied.9

that is applicable to MNCPPC-owned lands that the T own seeks to annex. We should not generate an ambiguity in a statute where none exist s. The plain-meaning analysis of the statute’s clear language reveals that the Town was required to obtain consent from the owners of at least 25% of the property, which it di d not do, in violation of Local Gov’t § 4-403(b)(2).

2. Article 81, § 232B, Assessment of Exempt Properties

. The Town contends that a plain-meaning approach is not applicable to the case at bar, because the General Assembly’s passage of Arti cle 81, § 232B in 1971, now codified as Tax-Prop. § 7-106, created an ambiguity regardin g what constitutes “assessed valuation” in § 4-403(b)(2). Tenets of statutory construction require reading be yond a plain meaning approach when terminology in the statute is unclear or ambig uous, or if the intention of the General Assembly is doubtful. Giant v. State’s Attorney , 267 Md. 501, 511, 298 A.2d 427, 433 (1973) (“[W]e cannot disregard the natural import o f statutory language unless some

Note that even though the terms “assess” and “asses sment” associate value with taxation, it is undisputed that MNCPPC lands are assessed. A s such, any argument that the taxexempt status of MNCPPC lands implicate their asses sment is meritless. Rather, the definitions of “assess” and “assessment” reveal tha t the properties at issue have value. Per Tax-Prop. § 6-101(a)(1) and § 7-106(a), tax-exempt properties are assessed. Given the MNCPPC lands at issue have value that is assessed, there is an “assessed valuation” of them. The majority’s distinction between “tax rolls” and “assessment rolls” does not detract from the contention that tax-exempt lands have “ass essed valuation.” See slip op. at 14- 15.10

imperative reason is found in the statute for enlar ging or restricting its meaning.”); see also

Schmeizl v. Schmeizl , 186 Md. 371, 375, 46 A. 2d 619, 621 (1946) (“Wher e there is ambiguity in the provisions of a statute, or the in tention of the [General Assembly] is doubtful, the Court may look to the consequences[.] ”). In Banker’s Life , the Court of Special Appeals stated that the passage of §232B re quired an analysis of the General Assembly’s intent. 21 Md.App. at 402, 319 A.2d at 868 (“We think the application of Art. 81, § 232B to [Local Gov’t § 4-403(b)(2)] is not cl ear and unambiguous, and that we are obliged to look to the legislative intent and to th e consequences.”). Article 81, § 232B, as amended, provided in pertine nt part: Notwithstanding the provisions of s 9 [of chapter 3 50] [5] of this article excluding exempt property from assessment for purpo ses of ordinary taxation and excepting the property of the United S tates from this section all real property and any improvements thereon located in the State and exempted from the payment of any ordinary taxes on July 1, 1971 or becoming exempt at any time thereafter by any provi sions of law shall be valued and assessed from time to time as may be necessary and as direc ted by the Director of the Department according to the method prescribed by this article by persons authorized by the Director to pe rform such valuations. These valuations shall be maintained in the records of the Department and of each county and Baltimore City in which exempt prop erty is located, in the manner required by the Director. None of such valu ations shall be included in the total assessment of all property subject to State, county or city ordinary taxation for the purpose of distribution of State m oneys under any provision of law. . . . Banker’s Life , 21 Md.App. at 399-400, 319 A.2d at 866-67 (emphas is added). According

to the Court in Banker’s Life , prior to passage of Article 81, § 232B, tax exemp t properties,

5 S 9 of chapter 350 is now recodified in parts of t he Maryland Code, Tax-Property Article, Title 7.11

including those owned by municipalities, were exemp t from assessment and valuation. Id. at 398, 319 A.2d at 866. However, given the passag e of § 232B, an ambiguity was created relative to the legislative intent for including ne wly-assessed tax exempt properties as part of the requisite 25% in Local Gov’t §4-403(b)(2). Based on its analysis of legislative intent, the Banker’s Life Court concluded that the General Assembly’s amendment to the Tax Code, v ia passage of § 232B, had no bearing on the Annexation Statute. The Court asser ted that: The only conclusion reasonably to be drawn from the language of [§] 232B and its history is that the General Assembly had no intention whatsoever that the Act in any way alter the requirements for the a nnexation of real property by a municipal corporation. Before the passage of [§] 232B, qualification to give consent was limited to owners of property subj ect to taxation in the area proposed to be annexed. We believed that [§] 232B did not change this. Looking to the consequences, we believe that the [General Assembly] never departed from an intent that only those who were to bear the financial burdens of a city government by the payment of real property taxes were to be allowed a voice in the annexation of real pro perty to the municipal corporation

. 21 Md.App. at 404, 319 A.2d at 869 (emphasis added) . Somehow, the Banker’s Life Court determined that only those property owners subject to taxation could fall within the category of people required to provide consent to a nnexation pursuant to Local Gov’t § 4- 403(b)(2). According to the Court, even if tax-exe mpt properties were now subject to “assessed valuation” within the plain meaning of Lo cal Gov’t § 4-403(b)(2), they were not capable of providing consent to annexation. The Cou rt analyzed the original statute, a 1972 re-enactment, and a Report to the General Assembly for 1971 by the Legislative Council of Maryland to arrive at its conclusion. Id. at 398-400, 403-04, 319 A.2d at 866-67, 869.12

Though the Court’s legislative analysis demonstrate d that § 232B in no way implicated taxation on exempt properties, the analysis did not establish a nexus to the Court’s ultimate

conclusion that only taxed entities could provide consent to annexation. Therefore, t he Banker’s Life Court improperly created a nexus between taxation a nd consent to

annexation where one did not exist. In the face of the General Assembly’s silence about whether to impart a consistent meaning of “assessed valuation” as between the Tax Code and the Annexation Statute, the Court imparted two separate meanings to the term despite the lack of any substantive proof of legislative in tent to do so. As such, the Banker’s Life Court miscategorized the effect of § 232B because t he amendment to the Tax Code applied

to the Annexation Statute: any lands with “assessed valuation” were subject to the consent provisions of Local Gov’t § 4-403(b)(2) regardless of whether or not those lands were

taxed.

3. House Bill (HB) 534, Annexation by Municipal Corpor ations. The Majority contends that HB 534, enacted in 1975, provides greater support for its argument that tax-exempt entities are not a consideration for the requisite 25% consent under Local Gov’t § 4-403(b)( 2). HB 534 amended the Annexation Statute and represented a compromise agr eement between municipalities and counties. Bill File to H.B. 534 , Testimony – Statement of Jon Burrell, MML, in support of H.B. 534 (1975). The a greement provided greater authority to counties for annexation purposes, part ially through the first right of13

counties to notice (currently codified in Local Gov ’t §4-406 6 ) and through counties’ referendum authority (currently codified in Local Gov’t § 4-410 7 ). Despite acknowledging that HB 534 granted greater c ounty authority, the Majority states “that the General Assembly did not intend to grant counties the authority or ability to veto a proposed municipal annexation.” Slip op. at 18. Though the legislative history of HB 534 is interesting, it pr ovides no answers to the central issue of this case. HB 534 was simply a compromise agreement, and if anything,

it expanded the right of counties to annexation, rather than li miting it. This expansion of county annexation rights implies the General Assembly’s intent

6 Local Gov’t §4-406 reads, in pertinent part:

Notice to county and planning agencies (c) Immediately after the first publication of the public notice [for annexation], the municipality shall provide a copy of the public notice to: (1) the governing body of the county in which the m unicipality is located; and (2) any regional or State planning agency with juri sdiction in the county. First right to be heard (d) The county and any regional or State planning a gency with jurisdiction in the county has the right to be heard before the public at the hearing on the proposed annexation. (emphasis in original).

7 Local Gov’t §4-410 reads: (a) At any time within 45 days after enactment of an an nexation resolution, the governing body of the county or counties in whi ch the municipality is located, by at least a two-thirds majority vote, ma y petition the chief executive and administrative officer of the municip ality for a referendum on the resolution.14

to provide counties, a tax-exempt entity, with auth ority over annexations initiated by municipalities. The current provisions of HB 534, codified as Local Gov’t §§ 4-406 and 4-410, provide voice to counties, contrary to the T own’s assertion that counties do not have significant voice in the annexation process due to their tax-exempt status. 8 The Town’s analysis of HB 534 neglects to consider the inherent right of governmental, tax-exempt owners to participate in m unicipal annexations. Beyond the statutory analysis of Local Gov’t § 4-40 3(b)(2), the facts of the case at

bar are distinct from those of Banker’s Life . These distinctions will be discussed infra

. B. Distinctions from Banker’s Life

1. MNCPPC, as opposed to the Board in Banker’s Life , is a unique entity with specified roles and responsibilities as evidenced b y a designated portion of the Maryland Code. The Maryland Code has a designated portion specifi cally related to MNCPPC, which is codified in Titles 14-27 of the La nd Use Article (“Land Use”). MNCPPC is an agency and representative of this Stat e for purposes designated by statute and was created by chapter 448 of the laws of Maryland of 1927. Land Use §§ 15-101(b), 15-302, Capper-Cramton Act, Public La w 71–284, 46 Stat. 482 (1930) (as amended in 1946 and 1958). The agency u ses the properties it owns for

8 The Majority supports its interpretation of HB 534 by pointing to several Attorney General opinions. These opinions largely reiterate the rationale advocated in Banker’s Life , which I have concluded was a mistaken interpretatio n of the Annexation Statute.15

the general benefit of Maryland residents, particul arly those in the metropolitan

district. 9 Land Use §17-201(a). MNCPPC has the authority to procure property for p ublic recreation and to acquire property in the metropolitan district for p urposes of establishing parks, forests, roads and other public ways, grounds, and spaces. Land Use § 17-101. MNCPPC is also entitled to dispose of certain prope rties that it acquires only after determining that a property is no longer needed for park purposes or other purposes authorized by statute. Land Use § 17-205. In addition, MNCPPC is responsible for protecting lands under the CapperCramton Act, which was enacted by Congress in 1930 to “protect land on both sides of the Potomac River as an integrated park an d parkway system known as the George Washington Memorial Parkway.” Surina Si ngh, Protecting Capper-

9 Land Use § 19-101 defines the “metropolitan distr ict” as follows: The area in Montgomery County and Prince George’s County within the boundaries specified in this title is known as the Maryland-Washington Metropolitan District.” Land Use § 19-101(a). The m etropolitan district is the authority of the Commission for the purposes [d escribed by statute]. Land Use § 19-101(b). Land Use § 19-102 specifies the boundaries of the M etropolitan District: The boundaries of the metropolitan district are the same as existed on October 1, 2012, with the exclusion of: (1) any property annexed into the City of Rockville , the City of Gaithersburg, or the Town of Washington Grove under Chapter 429 of the Acts of the General Assembly of 2007; and (2) the City of Greenbelt as it existed on July 1, 2016.16

Cramton Parks , N ATIONAL C APITAL P LANNING C OMMISSION , https://www.ncpc.gov/news/item/45/, archived at https://perma.cc/KX2C-G7K8 (last visited Apr. 4, 2019)

. Land Use § 15-302(3) provides MNCPPC with the authority to act as the representative of this Stat e in fulfilling the mandate of the Capper-Cramton Act in Maryland. The Act enables MN CPPC to enter into agreements with the National Capital Park and Plann ing Commission (“NCPPC”) for extending and developing protected lands in Mar yland. Therefore, the CapperCramton Act provided for cooperation between NCPPC and MNCPPC, enabling MNCPPC to act as administrator over preserved lands . The Town’s annexation properties are in the immediate vicinity of lands s pecified for MNCPPC oversight in the Capper-Cramton Act with respect to the “Oxon Run Parkway.” See T HE

T OWN OF F OREST H EIGHTS , M ARYLAND A NNEXATION P LAN (Sixth & Seventh Extensions, 2016). The Town has strategically crafted its annexations to bypass seeking consent from any registered voters (Local Gov’t § 4-403(b)( 1)). Its annexations also acquire government property that runs exceedingly c lose to preserved lands. The

Town seeks to use Banker’s Life to more than double its property without any oversight or consent from the entities that own the annexed lands. The Court of Special Appeals’ analysis of legislative intent in Banker’s Life did not contemplate such unchecked annexation authority, nor did it con sider the implications of annexing lands from a tax-exempt entity having stat ewide statutory authority. In Banker’s Life , the Court’s consideration was limited to the Wico mico County17

Board of Education—a local entity with limited auth ority. In contrast to the Wicomico County Board of Education, MNCPPC, the ent ity in primary opposition to the Town’s annexation plan, has statutory respon sibilities bound to its role as a landowner that it cannot simply discharge. I do no t contend that MNCPPC has unique annexation authority, but only that it shoul d have a right to consent to annexation under Local Gov’t § 4-403(b)(2) particul arly due to its unique statutory

role.

2. Banker’s Life addressed a tax-exempt entity’s acceptance of anne xation, as opposed to a tax-exempt entity’s opposition to anne xation.

In Banker’s Life , the Court of Special Appeals held that the Board’ s acceptance of the city council’s plan to annex prop erty did not apply as part of the requisite 25% of § 4-403(b)(2). 21 Md.App. at 404, 319 A.2d at 869. Banker’s Life did not address the implications of § 4-403(b)(2) if the Board had been opposing the annexation. In Banker’s Life , had the court considered the Board as part of the requisite 25%, it would have stacked th e vote of a governmental entity against those of private property owners who challe nged the city’s annexation of their property. Permitting the Board to serve as p art of the requisite 25% would have enabled the city to annex land from private pr operty owners—an unjust result. In contrast, the case at bar considers governmental entities’ interest in opposing an annexation—preserving the status quo in current lan d ownership, whether public or private. I do not contend that the requisite pr ocess of annexation looks different based on whether a tax-exempt entity is consenting or opposing annexation, but18

simply, point out a distinction. Banker’s Life did not address the issue of the consent required if no taxable property was involve d in the annexation. The Court did not contemplate the Board’s rights with respect to its consent to annexation because the Board had already consented. In the ca se at bar, injustice results when landowners, tax-exempt entities but assessed in val uation nevertheless, are not permitted any say in the annexation of their proper ty. Further, Banker’s Life considered the annexation of both taxable and taxexempt property, so there was some measure of lando wner’s consent that resulted in accepting the annexation. In contrast, the Town ’s annexations are in areas without voters, so the Town’s reading of the annexa tion statutes would enable annexation with the consent of absolutely no one. 10 Surely Banker’s Life did not intend to establish the dangerous precedent of comp letely abolishing the right to voice opposition to an annexation for tax-exempt en tities.

I conclude that Banker’s Life is not the antidote for this occasion. I am not persuaded that the General Assembly expressly inten ded to exclude the consent of tax-

10 The Majority writes that “on prior occasions, thi s Court has considered cases concerning annexations consisting of entirely tax-e xempt land without noting or invoking a prohibition against the annexation of entirely ta x-exempt property.” Slip Op. at 25. The Majority cites to Koste v. Town of Oxford , 431 Md. 14, 63 A.3d 582 (2013) to support its proposition. In Koste , the town of Oxford sought to introduce a resoluti on annexing acres of submerged lands adjacent to the Town’s boundaries. Id. at 17, 63 A.3d at 584 (emphasis added). For one, the annexation of submerged lands poses a distinction from the case at bar. The County lands at issue house recreational areas and preserved lands. Secondly, the issue in Koste pertained to the electorate’s right to a referendu m, id. , a completely separate issue from that presented in the instant c ase.19

exempt property owners from the 25% requirement of Local Gov’t § 4-403(b)(2). Based on the analysis of Local Gov’t § 4-403(b) and the s ubsequent amendment to the tax code through Article 81, § 232B, in addition to the dist inct facts of Banker’s Life , I would affirm the judgment of the Circuit Court for Prince George ’s County. Accordingly, I dissent.