J-A30031-16

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

Appellee

v.

KEITH AUBREY BROOKIN II

Appellant No. 588 MDA 2016

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence entered March 31, 2016

In the Court of Common Pleas of Dauphin County

Criminal Division at No: CP-22-CR-0005005-2015

BEFORE: BOWES, OLSON, and STABILE, JJ.

MEMORANDUM BY STABILE, J.: FILED APRIL 07, 2017

Appellant, Keith Aubrey Brookin II, appeals from the judgment of 

sentence the Court of Common Pleas of Dauphin County entered on March 

31, 2016. Appellant argues the trial court erred in finding the arresting 

officer had reasonable suspicion to believe Appellant was involved in criminal 

activity. We disagree. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of sentence.

The trial court summarized the relevant factual background as follows:

On June 24, 2015, Officer Patrick Walsh of Swatara Township 

Police Department was on patrol with his car window down. It 

was sometime around 1 a.m. when he saw a beige Buick parked 

in front of 920 High Street. As he drove past, he saw a man 

talking to the driver and heard a woman yelling and screaming. 

The woman seemed agitated, she was seated in the front 

passenger seat and seemed to be yelling at someone inside the 

car. 

[Officer Walsh] circled the block and approached the car again to 

stop and make sure everything was ok. As he pulled up behind 
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the vehicle, without lights, three people fled: the male talking to 

the driver, the female passenger who had been yelling and a 

male who had been sitting in the back seat. Based on the 

yelling, Officer Walsh [] stopped to make sure there was no 

domestic [violence] situation happening.

[Officer] Walsh did not even have time to exit his car before 

everyone started leaving. As soon as the three people left, the 

car also began pulling away and the car stopped about 100 feet 

from where it had been.

[Officer] Walsh approached the driver to inquire about the 

female who had been yelling and upon contact with him, he 

noticed a strong odor of alcohol. He asked Appellant if he had 

been drinking and Appellant indicated he had two beers earlier 

that evening. Other officers arrived between five and [ten] 

minutes later and [Officer] Walsh explained to them what had 

happened.

When those officers inquired, Appellant indicated he had been at 

Hungry Dog’s Bar and Grill earlier that evening where he had 

been drinking, but he hadn’t had anything to drink after that, 

which was about 10:00 p.m.

[Officer] Walsh performed field sobriety tests which Appellant 

performed unsatisfactorily and so Appellant was placed under 

arrest for suspicion of driving under the influence. The 

subsequent blood test indicated a BAC of .171 as well as traces 

of THC.

Officer Walsh never spoke with the female in the car, but 

Appellant admitted that she had been yelling at him. 

Trial Court Opinion, 5/11/16, at 1-2 (citations to record and footnote 

omitted). 

We conduct our review according to the following authorities: 

Our standard of review in addressing a challenge to the denial of 

a suppression motion is limited to determining whether the 

suppression court’s factual findings are supported by the record 

and whether the legal conclusions drawn from those facts are 

correct. Because the Commonwealth prevailed before the 
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suppression court, we may consider only the evidence of the 

Commonwealth and so much of the evidence for the defense as 

remains uncontradicted when read in the context of the record 

as a whole. Where the suppression court’s factual findings are 

supported by the record, we are bound by these findings and 

may reverse only if the court’s legal conclusions are erroneous. 

Where, as here, the appeal of the determination of the 

suppression court turns on allegations of legal error, the 

suppression court’s legal conclusions are not binding on an 

appellate court, whose duty it is to determine if the suppression 

court properly applied the law to the facts. Thus, the 

conclusions of law of the courts below are subject to our plenary 

review. 

Commonwealth v. Jones, 988 A.2d 649, 654 (Pa. 2010) (internal citations 

and quotation marks omitted). We limit our review to the evidence 

produced at the suppression hearing. In re L.J., 79 A.3d 1073 (Pa. 2013). 

The Commonwealth bears the burden of producing evidence and establishing 

that it did not violate the defendant’s rights in gathering evidence. 

Pa.R.Crim.P. 581(H). 

As noted above, Appellant argues the officer did not have reasonable 

suspicion to believe he was involved in criminal activity. Accordingly, 

Appellant argues the officer illegally stopped him. 

In Commonwealth v. Brown, 996 A.2d 473 (Pa. 2010), our 

Supreme Court explained:

While warrantless seizures such as a vehicle stop are generally 

prohibited, they are permissible if they fall within one of a few 

well-delineated exceptions. One such exception allows police 

officers to detain individuals for a brief investigation when they 

possess reasonable suspicion that criminal activity is afoot. 

Reasonable suspicion is a less stringent standard than probable 

cause necessary to effectuate a warrantless arrest, and depends 

on the information possessed by police and its degree of 
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reliability in the totality of the circumstances. In order to justify 

the seizure, a police officer must be able to point to specific and 

articulable facts leading him to suspect criminal activity is afoot. 

In assessing the totality of the circumstances, courts must also 

afford due weight to the specific, reasonable inferences drawn 

from the facts in light of the officer’s experience and 

acknowledge that innocent facts, when considered collectively, 

may permit the investigative detention. 

Id. at 476-77 (quotation marks and internal quotations omitted).

The trial court found that reasonable suspicion existed in this case, 

reasoning as follows:

Officer Walsh specifically testified that while on patrol he 

[became] concerned about a possible domestic [violence] 

situation because he heard a woman yelling from a car. Upon 

approaching the vehicle, the woman and two men fled while the 

vehicle pulled away. In that moment, he decided to stop the 

vehicle rather than pursue the three people on foot. Part of a 

patrol officer’s duty is to investigate suspicious activity. A loud 

argument, in the middle of the night, where everyone leaves 

when police approach is certainly a situation where a reasonable 

man would be suspicious of criminal activity. [Officer] Walsh 

even testified that he was concerned that the criminal activity 

was a domestic violence situation. While that was not ultimately 

what occurred, it was enough for him to stop the vehicle to 

investigate. He did question Appellant about the argument, but 

as he smelled the odor of alcohol and Appellant admitted to 

drinking earlier, the investigation quickly turned from a possible 

domestic violence situation into a DUI investigation. 

Trial Court Opinion, 5/11/16, at 3-4. We agree with the trial court’s analysis 

and conclusions that, under the totality of circumstances, Officer Walsh had 

reasonable suspicion to stop Appellant. 

In his brief, Appellant also argues that the officer’s concerns about the 

safety for the woman were unsupported by his actions following the 

interaction with the group. Appellant seems to argue that the officer is not 
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credible because had he been concerned with the woman’s safety, the officer 

should have pursued the woman, not Appellant. If he is so arguing, 

Appellant is not entitled to relief. As a reviewing court, we do not make 

credibility determinations or reweigh witnesses’ testimony. See

Commonwealth v. Angel, 946 A.2d 115, 117 (Pa. Super. 2008). 

Additionally, Appellant argues the officer essentially misunderstood or 

misconstrued the facts leading to the stop. In Appellant’s view, there was 

nothing suspicious or concerning about a woman yelling at somebody else, 

while they were in a stopped vehicle on a public road at 1 a.m., who then 

fled upon being approached by a marked police vehicle. In Appellant’s view, 

these facts merely showed innocent activity by Appellant insufficient to 

support a detention. 

Appellant ignores that “[w]hen considering the totality of the 

circumstances, we need not limit our inquiry to only those facts that clearly 

and unmistakably indicate criminal conduct. Instead, even a combination of 

innocent facts, when taken together, may warrant further investigation by 

the police officer.” Commonwealth v. Caban, 60 A.3d 120, 129 (Pa. 

Super. 2012) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). Thus, the 

mere fact Appellant’s actions may have had an innocent explanation does 

not undermine the officer’s reasonable determination that those facts 

warranted further investigation. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Riley, 715 

A.2d 1131, 1135 (Pa. Super. 1998) (“Merely because a suspect’s activity 
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may be consistent with innocent behavior does not alone make detention 

and limited investigation illegal.”). The question whether the detention is 

supported by reasonable suspicion to detain for investigation must be 

determined in light of the information the officer had at the time of the stop, 

giving “due weight to the specific inferences the police officer is entitled to 

draw from the facts in light of his experience.” Commonwealth v. Rogers, 

849 A.2d 1185, 1189 (Pa. 2004) (quotation marks, brackets, and citation 

omitted). We also note “that the police have a duty to respond seriously to 

reported[1] domestic conflict situations, and in doing so, they must be 

accorded some latitude in making on-the-spot judgments as to what actions

to take and what actions are reasonably necessary to protect themselves 

and potential victims of abuse.” Commonwealth v. Davido, 106 A.3d 611, 

623-24 (Pa. 2014). 

Here, considering the facts, as recounted above, in light of the 

aforementioned authorities, we conclude the trial court did not err in denying 

Appellant’s motion to suppress. 

Judgment of sentence affirmed.

Judge Olson joins this memorandum.

____________________________________________

1 We are aware there was no outstanding report of possible domestic 

violence situation here. However, the underlying facts are even stronger. 

Indeed, the officer personally heard the woman yelling, which, coupled with 

the other circumstances noted above, led him to believe he had to 

investigate the matter on a suspicion of domestic violence in progress. 
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Judge Bowes files a dissenting memorandum.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 4/7/2017