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STATE OF MICHIGAN 

COURT OF APPEALS 

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN, 

 Plaintiff-Appellee, 

UNPUBLISHED 

April 12, 2016 

v No. 325610 

Wayne Circuit Court 

JAWANTA DERIN COVINGTON, LC No. 13-007478-FC 

 Defendant-Appellant. 

Before: GLEICHER, P.J., and CAVANAGH and FORT HOOD, JJ. 

PER CURIAM. 

 Defendant appeals as of right his jury convictions of armed robbery, MCL 750.529, 

conspiracy to commit armed robbery, MCL 750.529; MCL 750.157a, possession of burglary 

tools, MCL 750.116, and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony (felonyfirearm), MCL 750.227b. We affirm defendant’s convictions, but remand for possible 

resentencing. 

 Defendant’s convictions arise from the robbery of Mike’s Detroit Jewelry in Hamtramck 

on August 1, 2013. One of the people participating in the robbery, Frank Jackson (Jackson), was 

killed by a security guard at the jewelry store. 

 Defendant first argues that the record evidence was insufficient to support his conviction 

of felony-firearm under an aiding and abetting theory because the prosecutor did not prove that 

he performed acts or gave encouragement with the intention of assisting his accomplices in 

keeping possession of their firearms. We disagree. 

 This Court reviews de novo a defendant’s challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence. 

People v Bailey, 310 Mich App 703, 713; 873 NW2d 855 (2015). We view the evidence 

presented in the light most favorable to the prosecution and determine whether a rational trier of 

fact could have found, including through reasonable inferences from the evidence, that the 

essential elements of the crime were proven beyond a reasonable doubt. People v Taylor, 275 

Mich App 177, 179; 737 NW2d 790 (2007). The standard of review for a claim challenging the 

sufficiency of the evidence is deferential. Bailey, 310 Mich App at 713. 

 To convict a defendant of felony-firearm, the prosecution is required to prove “that the 

defendant possessed a firearm during the commission of, or the attempt to commit, a felony.” 

Taylor, 275 Mich App at 179 (citation omitted). In this case, defendant was charged with 
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felony-firearm under an aiding and abetting theory. In People v Moore, 470 Mich 56, 58-59; 679 

NW2d 41 (2004), our Supreme Court considered the language of both the felony-firearm statute 

and the aiding and abetting statute, and ultimately held, in pertinent part: 

 [T]he prosecutors must demonstrate that defendants specifically aided the 

commission of felony-firearm. Establishing that a defendant has aided and 

abetted a felony-firearm offense requires proof that a violation of the felonyfirearm statute was committed by the defendant or some other person, that the 

defendant performed acts or gave encouragement that assisted in the commission 

of the felony-firearm violation, and that the defendant intended the commission of 

the felony-firearm violation or had knowledge that the principal intended its 

commission at the time that the defendant gave aid and encouragement. [People 

v] Carines, 460 Mich 750,] 768; 597 NW2d 130 (1999)]. In determining whether 

a defendant assisted in the commission of the crime, the amount of advice, aid, or 

encouragement is not material if it had the effect of inducing the commission of 

the crime. People v Smock, 399 Mich 282, 285; 249 NW2d 59 (1976). It must be 

determined on a case-by-case basis whether the defendant “ ‘performed acts or 

gave encouragement that assisted,’ ” Carines, supra at 768; 597 NW2d 130, 

quoting People v Turner, 213 Mich App 558, 568; 540 NW2d 728 (1995), in the 

carrying or possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony. [Moore, 

470 Mich at 70-71 (footnote omitted).] 

The Moore Court also observed that the phrase “aids or abets” in the aiding and abetting statute 

“is used to describe any type of assistance given to the perpetrator of a crime by words or deeds 

that are intended to encourage, support, or incite the commission of [a] crime.” Id. at 63. 

 In this case, the evidence was sufficient for the jury to convict defendant of felonyfirearm under an aiding and abetting theory. First, defendant’s accomplices, Jackson and 

codefendant Darnell Eric Redmond (Redmond), possessed guns during the armed robbery. See 

id. at 70. Jackson held a gun to the store’s security guard’s head and Redmond had a .45 caliber 

handgun in his waistband that was recovered by the police right after the armed robbery. 

Second, there was ample evidence that defendant engaged in acts that assisted Jackson and 

Redmond in the commission of felony-firearm. See id. For example, trial testimony included 

that defendant entered the jewelry store several moments before his accomplices and wandered 

about the store in a suspicious manner. From this evidence, the jury could have reasonably 

inferred that defendant was “casing” the jewelry store before his accomplices entered, and acting 

as a decoy, distraction or diversion to the staff employed there. Defendant was also carrying a 

hammer and a pillowcase, leading to an inference that he was ready to secure and carry away the 

fruits of the armed robbery. 

 And, third, the evidence was sufficient for the jury to conclude that defendant intended 

the commission of the felony-firearm offense or knew that Redmond and Jackson intended its 

commission at the time that he engaged in the acts that provided aid and encouragement. See id. 

at 70-71. Defendant entered a jewelry store carrying supplies to commit an armed robbery, and 

was joined shortly thereafter by accomplices wielding handguns. The jury could have 

reasonably inferred that he intended the commission of the felony-firearm offense. Further, as 

the prosecution argues, an aider and abettor’s knowledge of the principal’s intent may be inferred 
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from the facts and circumstances giving rise to the criminal offense. People v Bennett, 290 Mich 

App 465, 474; 802 NW2d 627 (2010). Defendant’s fingerprints and palm prints, as well as 

Redmond’s fingerprints, were found on a stolen Jeep that quickly left the area of the jewelry 

store after being sighted by the police, and sped away when pursued by the police. Together 

with the carrying of the implements of the armed robbery and his diversionary and distracting 

behavior, there was ample evidence to allow the jury to conclude that defendant knew of 

Jackson’s and Redmond’s intentions to carry guns during the commission of the armed robbery. 

In sum, defendant’s felony-firearm conviction was sufficiently supported by the evidence. 

 Defendant next contends that the trial court erred in scoring Offense Variable (OV) 3 

because the evidence did not support a conclusion that his conduct in the commission of the 

charged offenses was a cause of Jackson’s death. We disagree. 

 In People v Hardy, 494 Mich 430; 835 NW2d 340 (2013), our Supreme Court set forth 

the standard of review for a sentencing guidelines scoring issue: 

 Under the sentencing guidelines, the circuit court’s factual determinations 

are reviewed for clear error and must be supported by a preponderance of the 

evidence. Whether the facts, as found, are adequate to satisfy the scoring 

conditions prescribed by statute, i.e., the application of the facts to the law, is a 

question of statutory interpretation, which an appellate court reviews de novo. 

[Id. at 438 (footnotes omitted).] 

“Clear error exists when the reviewing court is left with a definite and firm conviction that a 

mistake was made.” People v McDade, 301 Mich App 343, 356; 836 NW2d 266 (2013). 

 MCL 777.33, provides, in pertinent part: 

(1) Offense variable 3 is physical injury to a victim. Score offense variable 3 by 

determining which of the following apply and by assigning the number of points 

attributable to the one that has the highest number of points: 

(a) A victim was killed ...................................................... 100 points 

(b) A victim was killed ...................................................... 50 points 

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(2) All of the following apply to scoring offense variable 3: 

(a) In multiple offender cases, if 1 offender is assessed points for death or 

physical injury, all offenders shall be assessed the same number of points. 

(b) Score 100 points if death results from the commission of a crime and homicide 

is not the sentencing offense. 

As noted in People v Laidler, 491 Mich 339; 817 NW2d 517 (2012), the language of MCL 

777.33(2)(b) makes it “clear that the defendant’s criminal actions must constitute a factual cause 
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of a death for purposes of OV 3.” Id. at 345. The question that must be considered is: “‘but for’

defendant’s commission of a crime, would his coperpetrator’s death have occurred?” Id. 

 In Laidler, the defendant and his accomplice attempted to break into a person’s home, 

and the prosecution’s theory was that the defendant “had boosted [the accomplice]” up to the 

window of the home, six feet off of the ground. Id. at 342. The homeowner saw the 

accomplice’s hand extend inside the window after hearing glass shatter and shot the accomplice, 

who subsequently died. Id. at 341. The defendant was assessed 100 points under OV 3. Id. at 

342. The Court concluded that the assessment of 100 points was not error, where “[b]ut for the 

instant criminal activity that defendant coperpetrated, and but for defendant’s specific assistance 

in enabling his coperpetrator to reach into the window of the home being invaded, there would 

have been no need for the homeowner to respond to the invasion of his home . . . .” Id. at 345. 

The Court also recognized that but for the defendant’s commission of a crime, his accomplice 

would not “have been placed in the position in which he was shot and killed.” Id. Further, the 

fact that the homeowner’s gunshot killed the accomplice did not alter its conclusion; the 

language of MCL 777.33 did not speak to only a single cause of death and a coperpetrator is a 

“victim” for purposes of assessing points under OV 3. Laidler, 491 Mich at 346-347. 

 The trial court’s decision to assess 100 points for OV 3 was supported by a 

preponderance of the evidence, and we are not left with a definite and firm conviction that the 

trial court made a mistake. Defendant entered the jewelry store and spent several moments 

“casing” the establishment in a suspicious manner before his accomplices, Jackson and 

Redmond, joined him. Accordingly, it was reasonable to infer that defendant acted as a decoy 

and diversion to distract the security guard’s attention, which allowed Jackson to be in a position 

to draw a gun and hold it to his head. But for the criminal activity that defendant coperpetrated, 

and but for defendant’s “specific assistance” in “casing” the jewelry store and providing a 

distraction for the security guard so Jackson could hold a gun to his head, there would have been 

no need for the security guard to respond by shooting Jackson. See Laidler, 491 Mich at 345. 

We conclude that defendant’s criminal actions were a factual cause of Jackson’s death, and that 

Jackson’s death “resulted from” defendant’s criminal actions as contemplated by MCL 

777.33(2)(b). See id. at 345-347. 

 Defendant next contends that the trial court impermissibly engaged in judicial factfinding to assess 100 points for OV 3 by concluding that defendant’s criminal actions resulted in 

Jackson’s death. The prosecution concedes that remand is necessary pursuant to People v 

Lockridge, 498 Mich 358; 870 NW2d 502 (2015). We agree. Because defendant did not raise 

this challenge in the trial court, our review is for plain error affecting his substantial rights. Id. at 

392. 

In Lockridge, our Supreme Court concluded that, to the extent Michigan’s sentencing 

guidelines require judicial fact-finding beyond facts admitted by a defendant or necessarily found 

by the jury, they are constitutionally deficient. Lockridge, 498 Mich at 364. To address the 

constitutional infirmity, the Court severed MCL 769.34(2) where it made the sentencing 

guidelines range as scored on the basis of impermissible judicial fact-finding mandatory. Id. As 

relevant to this appeal, the Lockridge Court held: 
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 We conclude that all defendants (1) who can demonstrate that their 

guidelines minimum sentence range was actually constrained by the violation of 

the Sixth Amendment and (2) whose sentences were not subject to an upward 

departure can establish a threshold showing of the potential for plain error 

sufficient to warrant a remand to the trial court for further inquiry. We reach this 

conclusion in part on the basis of our agreement with the following analysis from 

United States v Crosby, 397 F3d 103, 117-118 (CA 2, 2005): 

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. . . [I]n cases in which a defendant’s minimum sentence was established by 

application of the sentencing guidelines in a manner that violated the Sixth 

Amendment, the case should be remanded to the trial court to determine whether 

that court would have imposed a materially different sentence but for the 

constitutional error. If the trial court determines that the answer to that question is 

yes, the court shall order resentencing. Id. at 118. [Id. at 395, 397.] 

This procedure has become known as a Crosby remand. Id. at 397. The Lockridge Court then 

set forth a procedure for the trial court to follow on remand: the defendant must have an 

opportunity to avoid resentencing and, in determining whether the trial court would have 

imposed a different sentence but for the unconstitutional constraint, the court should consider 

only the circumstances that existed at the time of the original sentence. Id. at 398. 

 In this case, defendant was assessed 5 points for OV 2, 100 points for OV 3, and 10 

points for OV 9, for a total of 115 points. Defendant’s Prior Record Variable score was 20 

points, placing defendant in the C-VI cell of the Class A sentencing grid, and calling for a 

minimum sentence range of 135 to 225 months. MCL 777.62. On appeal, defendant only 

challenges the assessment of points for OV 3. The trial court assessed 100 points, concluding 

that Jackson’s “death result[ed] from the commission of a crime and homicide is not the 

sentencing offense,” MCL 777.33(2)(b). These facts were not admitted by defendant or 

necessarily found by the jury beyond a reasonable doubt, given that defendant was convicted of 

armed robbery, conspiracy to commit armed robbery, possession of burglary tools, and felonyfirearm. He was acquitted of assault with intent to commit murder. Without the 100 points 

assessed for OV 3, defendant would have been placed in the C-I cell of the Class A sentencing 

grid, which calls for a minimum sentence range of 42 to 70 months. MCL 777.62. Accordingly, 

defendant has established that his guidelines minimum range was “actually constrained by the 

violation of the Sixth Amendment” and has made a “threshold showing of the potential for plain 

error sufficient to warrant a remand to the trial court for further inquiry.” Lockridge, 498 Mich 

at 395. Therefore, this matter is remanded to the trial court for possible resentencing in 

accordance with the Crosby procedure. See id. at 397-398. 

 Finally, defendant argues that exculpatory evidence was withheld from him in violation 

of his due process rights because the police and the prosecution did not investigate cellular phone 

records. After review for plain error, because this issue was not raised in the trial court, we 

disagree. See People v Carines, 460 Mich 750, 763-764; 597 NW2d 130 (1999). 
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 In People v Chenault, 495 Mich 142, 149-150, 155; 845 NW2d 731 (2014), our Supreme 

Court discussed the requirements for a defendant to establish that the prosecution has violated 

the rule set forth in Brady v Maryland, 373 US 83; 83 S Ct 1194; 10 L Ed 2d 215 (1963): 

 The Supreme Court of the United States held in Brady that “the 

suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused upon request 

violates due process where the evidence is material either to guilt or to 

punishment, irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution.” Brady, 

373 US at 87. In identifying the essential components of a Brady violation, the 

[United States] Supreme Court has articulated a three-factor test: 

The evidence at issue must be favorable to the accused, either 

because it is exculpatory, or because it is impeaching; that 

evidence must have been suppressed by the State, either willfully 

or inadvertently; and prejudice must have ensued. [Strickler v 

Greene, 527 US 263, 281-282; 119 S Ct 1936; 144 L Ed 2d 286 

(1999).] 

Stated differently, the components of a “true Brady violation,” are that: (1) the 

prosecution has suppressed evidence; (2) that is favorable to the accused; and (3) 

that is material. Id. [Chenault, 495 Mich at 149-150.] 

This Court has recognized that due process does not require the prosecution to seek and find 

exculpatory evidence. People v Coy, 258 Mich App 1, 21; 669 NW2d 831 (2003). 

 Here, as an initial matter, we note that it does not appear defendant had requested cellular 

telephone records from the prosecution. In any event, in support of his argument, defendant 

refers to evidence that the police, when searching Jackson’s home, found what appeared to be a 

recently paid cellular telephone bill. Defendant also notes that a cellular telephone was 

recovered by police from the area where defendant was standing in the jewelry store. Defense 

counsel questioned Detective George about why the police did not investigate defendant’s and 

Jackson’s cellular telephone records. Detective George testified that the police investigation did 

not yield a “working” cellular telephone for Jackson and he did not believe such action was 

necessary where he had enough evidence “for this crime to connect everything together.” 

Specifically, Detective George concluded he had ample evidence to connect defendant to 

Jackson and Redmond where defendant’s palm prints and fingerprints were on the stolen Jeep, 

which was characterized as the “getaway car,” and where an anonymous telephone caller 

contacted the Hamtramck Police Department to inquire about both defendant and Redmond. 

 Defendant has not met the requirements set forth in Chenault, 495 Mich at 149-150. The 

prosecution did not suppress exculpatory evidence. And there is nothing in the record to suggest 

that further investigation into Jackson’s and defendant’s alleged telephone records may have 

been in some way favorable or exculpatory to defendant or material to his guilt or innocence. 

Finally, as noted above, the prosecutor is not under any obligation to seek and secure evidence 

exculpatory to defendant. Coy, 258 Mich App at 21. Accordingly, defendant has not established 

a violation of the Brady rule and his claim of error is without merit. 
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 We affirm defendant’s convictions, but remand to the trial court for possible resentencing 

in accordance with the Crosby procedure. We do not retain jurisdiction. 

/s/ Elizabeth L. Gleicher 

/s/ Mark J. Cavanagh 

/s/ Karen M. Fort Hood