[DO NOT PUBLISH]

In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Eleventh Circuit

____________________

No. 22-10711

Non-Argument Calendar

____________________

JOSEPH MODESTE, 

Petitioner-Appellant,

versus

SECRETARY, FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, 

ATTORNEY GENERAL, STATE OF FLORIDA, 

Respondents-Appellees.

____________________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Middle District of Florida

D.C. Docket No. 6:20-cv-01360-CEM-LHP
2 Opinion of the Court 22-10711

____________________

Before JORDAN, LAGOA, and ABUDU, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:

Joseph Modeste, a Florida prisoner, appeals the district 

court’s denial of his petition for a writ of habeas corpus filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. We granted a certificate of appealability 

(“COA”) as to: (1) whether the state trial court unreasonably applied Florida v. Powell, 559 U.S. 50, 53 (2010), when it found that the 

Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), warnings Modeste received 

adequately informed him of his right to have counsel present during his police interrogation; and (2) whether the district court erred 

in finding that his trial counsel was not ineffective in failing to investigate and present evidence regarding the history and reputation for violence of one of Modeste’s victims because Modeste 

could not show he was prejudiced by such omission. After review, 

we affirm.

I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND & PROCEDURAL 

HISTORY

In 2004, a state grand jury indicted Modeste with two counts 

of first-degree murder with a firearm stemming from the deaths 

of Arthur and Betty Williams. After his arrest, police officers Sergeant Tony Nova and Detective Torrance Slaughter interrogated 

Modeste. At the beginning of the interrogation, Sergeant Nova 

stated:
22-10711 Opinion of the Court 3

I mean you have the right to remain silent. . . . I’m 

sure you know all these . . . rights. . . .

You know anything you say can be used held against 

you in a court of law. . . . You’re entitled to talk to an 

attorney and if you want one you can ask for an attorney. If you can’t afford one, you know, they can appoint you one. . . . Of course you . . . you can talk to 

an attorney first before talking to us. You know I . . . 

can tell you that. . . we’ll start talking after you . . . 

you understand these things, . . . Torrance is . . . he’s 

straight up when he talks to you that way. Understand what I’m saying?

Modeste replied, “Alright,” and Sergeant Nova continued:

If at any time you feel uncomfortable or think we’re 

trying to persuade you to say something you stop 

talking bro. This is all on you. We’re gonna give you 

. . . we’re giving you an opportunity to, you know, to 

say what you gotta say. . . . You . . . understand what 

those things are . . . the things . . . I told you? Okay. 

. . . do you understand that we’re not trying to force 

you to talk either.

Modeste replied, “Right,” and Sergeant Nova stated, “That 

is totally up to you.” Modeste again replied, “Alright.” Then, Sergeant Nova asked, “So I’m gonna ask you straight up . . . do you 

wanna talk to us?” To which Modeste replied, “I ain’t got no problem.” Officers then handed Modeste a form outlining his Miranda 

rights. Modeste expressed that he had dyslexia, and officers verbally confirmed with Modeste that he understood his rights, asking 
4 Opinion of the Court 22-10711

him if he understood that he had the right to remain silent. Modeste stated, “Right.” Sergeant Nova stated, “and you did . . . you do 

say you wanna talk to us, you can sign this and that’s all it says is 

that you wanted to talk to us. It’s up to you.” Modeste stated, “I 

don’t think I have a problem with it,” and signed the Miranda form. 

Sergeant Nova checked the boxes on the Miranda form indicating 

that Modeste understood his rights and that Modeste wanted to 

speak to officers, and Modeste again verbally confirmed that he understood the Miranda form.

Modeste continued speaking with the officers and told them 

that he rented an apartment to Arthur and his wife Betty, but they 

stopped paying rent, so Modeste tried to evict them. The day of 

the incident, Arthur and Betty invited Modeste over to the apartment under the guise that they would pay their past due rent, but 

when Modeste entered the apartment, Arthurthrew a machete and 

a bar stool at him as Betty yelled at him. Modeste then showed the 

couple the firearm that he regularly carried with him, explaining 

that he had been attacked and shot in the past, and always carried 

a firearm for protection. Modeste stated that after Arthur threw 

the bar stool at him, Betty handed Arthur a knife, prompting Modeste to begin shooting toward the couple to protect himself. During the initial shooting, Betty fell and Arthur escaped the apartment 

through a broken window. Modeste followed Arthur outside and 

continued shooting at him. When officers asked why Modeste kept 

shooting at Arthur as he ran away, Modeste explained that he 

thought that he and his family would have died if Arthur and Betty 
22-10711 Opinion of the Court 5

survived because of Arthur’s criminal history of being involved 

with gangs and selling drugs on the property.

Modeste later moved to suppress the statements he made to 

police, arguing that the officers did not clearly inform him that he 

was entitled to counsel during the interrogation, in violation of Miranda. The trial court initially granted Modeste’s motion to suppress on that basis. The state appealed this decision, and Florida’s 

Fifth District Court of Appeal (hereinafter, “Florida appellate 

court”) reversed the trial court, finding that Modeste’s Miranda

warnings were sufficient. State v. Modeste, 987 So. 2d 787 (Fla. 5th 

Dist. Ct. App. 2008). Modeste appealed and the Florida Supreme 

Court reversed, agreeing with the trial court that Modeste’s Miranda warnings were inadequate. Modeste v. State, 4 So. 3d 1217 

(Fla. 2009). In so finding, the Florida Supreme Court relied on its 

then-precedent in State v. Powell, 998 So. 2d 531 (Fla. 2008), where 

the court concluded that a defendant’s Miranda warnings were insufficient where officers did not explicitly inform the defendant that 

he had a right to have counsel present during questioning.

As a result, the Florida appellate court vacated its prior opinion and affirmed the trial court’s order granting Modeste’s motion 

to suppress. Meanwhile, the Supreme Court of the United States 

granted a petition for writ of certiorari to review the Powell decision. This prompted the state to move the Florida appellate court 

to withdraw its mandate and hold the case in abeyance until Powell 

had been resolved. The Florida appellate court granted the state’s 

motion.
6 Opinion of the Court 22-10711

Then, in 2010, the Supreme Court reversed the Powell decision. Florida v. Powell, 559 U.S. 50 (2010). The Court held that an 

officer’s statement to a suspect during an interrogation that he had 

the right to consult an attorney before answering any questions, 

and that the suspect could invoke that right at any time during the 

interview, satisfied Miranda. Id. at 53. Following this decision, the 

Florida appellate court reversed the trial court’s order granting 

Modeste’s motion to suppress and directed the trial court to reconsider the motion in light of the new Powell1 decision. State v. Modeste, 66 So. 3d 386 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2011).

Upon remand, the trial court denied Modeste’s motion to 

suppress, reasoning that he was adequately informed that he was 

entitled to an attorney and that he could speak to his attorney before and during the interrogation. Relying on Powell, the court 

found that the Miranda warnings given to Modeste did not suggest 

a limitation on his right to an attorney, but instead conveyed that 

his right to an attorney became effective prior to questioning.

Modeste’s case proceeded to a jury trial in January 2014. At 

trial, Modeste testified that when he started renting to Arthur, he 

was concerned about the fact that Arthur had just been released 

from prison. He stated that although he was bothered by that fact, 

he did not want to turn his back on someone in need, and Arthur 

ultimately seemed like a nice guy. Once Arthur and Betty moved 

in, Modeste felt that his relationship with the couple began to 

1 Moving forward, references to Powell in this opinion refer to the Supreme Court decision, rather than the now overturned Florida decision.
22-10711 Opinion of the Court 7

deteriorate. According to Modeste, Arthur stopped paying rent 

and began selling drugs at the apartment, which prompted Modeste to begin eviction paperwork. Modeste also stated that he discovered Arthur siphoning electricity from another apartment into 

his apartment, causing Modeste to call the police and have Arthur 

arrested. On one occasion, Arthur threatened to kill Modeste if he 

came onto the property. 

Modeste also called St. George Philogene to testify. Philogene helped Modeste with his apartment’s roofing needs. On 

one day, he and another individual went to finish a roofing job at 

Modeste’s apartment. Philogene borrowed Modeste’s van to go to 

the apartment, and when he and his assistant began setting up his 

equipment on the roof, a man appeared on the roof with a gun in 

his hand. Philogene stated the man came up the ladder, stood on 

the roof and looked around, and then left all while holding a gun. 

Philogene and his assistant left the roof and refused to finish the 

job, and told Modeste it was too dangerous for them to continue 

working. Philogene could not confirm the identity of this man after looking at an autopsy picture of Arthur.

Ultimately, the jury found Modeste guilty of the lesser included offenses of second-degree murder on both counts. In April 

2014, the trial court sentenced him to 55 years’ imprisonment for 

each offense, to be served concurrently.

Modeste appealed, arguing that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress because his Maranda warnings did not 

convey that he had the right to have an attorney present during his 
8 Opinion of the Court 22-10711

interrogation. The Florida appellate court affirmed Modeste’s convictions and sentences in an unelaborated per curiam opinion in 

March 2016. Modeste filed a petition for a writ of certiorari with 

the Supreme Court, which the Court denied. Modeste v. Florida, 580 

U.S. 845 (2016). 

Following other filings not relevant to the current appeal, 

Modeste filed a Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850 motion 

for post-conviction relief. He argued, among other things, that his 

trial counsel was ineffective for failing to introduce evidence of Arthur’s propensity for, and specific acts of, violence in order to present an adequate self-defense theory. He contended that his trial 

counsel failed to adequately investigate Arthur’s prior history of 

drug use, drug dealing, and violence, and that such failure prejudiced his defense. The post-conviction court denied most of Modeste’s claims but granted him an evidentiary hearing, in relevant 

part, on his claim that his trial counsel failed to investigate Arthur’s 

history of violence.

An evidentiary hearing was held in March 2019. There, 

Modeste’s daughter testified that, on one occasion, she heard Modeste and Arthur arguing. Because she was in a car and not physically with Modeste, she only heard Arthur yelling, and although 

she could not hear specific words, it sounded negative. 

Next, Gaveale Hansley testified that he used to sell crack-cocaine to tenants in Modeste’s apartments, including Arthur. He 

witnessed Modeste and Arthur arguing outside the apartment on 
22-10711 Opinion of the Court 9

one occasion about unpaid rent, and he heard Arthur threaten to 

cut off Modeste’s legs.

Modeste also testified that, prior to trial, he discussed with 

his attorney the fact that Arthur had recently been released from 

prison. When Modeste rented the apartment to Arthur, he did not 

know that Arthur had such a long criminal record, and he did not 

learn about Arthur’s fourteen felony convictions for drug-related 

offenses until after the trial. However, while Arthur lived in the 

apartment, he told Modeste that he had quit his job with a moving 

company and was going to make money selling drugs. Modeste 

told Arthur that he could not sell drugs on the property, and Arthur

told Modeste that, if he ever came back to the apartment, he would 

cut Modeste’s legs off. Modeste also knew that Arthur had a machete. He explained that he spoke to his attorney about his interactions with and fear of Arthur before trial.

On cross-examination, the state asked Modeste what prior 

acts of violence he believed his trial counsel should have introduced 

at trial. Modeste pointed to an incident in which Arthur chased a 

roofer at the apartment complex with a gun. However, Modeste 

confirmed that the jury did hear evidence of that incident.

Finally, the state called Modeste’s trial counsel to testify, who 

stated that he researched Arthur’s background and knew Arthur 

was a convicted felon, but he was not aware of any prior violent 

criminal acts Arthur committed that could have been introduced at 

trial. On cross-examination, he stated that he did not believe 
10 Opinion of the Court 22-10711

Arthur’s prior drug convictions were relevant to the issue of selfdefense.

After the evidentiary hearing, the post-conviction court denied Modeste’s remaining claims. The court determined that Arthur’s prior, non-violent drug convictions were not relevant to a 

theory of self-defense and, in any event, Modeste did not have 

knowledge of specific acts of violence committed by Arthur beyond those Modeste already testified to at trial. Thus, Modeste’s 

counsel did not perform deficiently nor could Modeste demonstrate prejudice. Modeste appealed the denial of his Rule 3.850 motion, and the Florida appellate court affirmed in an unelaborated 

per curiam opinion. 

Modeste then filed the present 28 U.S.C. § 2254 habeas petition, in which he argued, among other things, that: (1) his constitutional rights were violated when officers did not properly apprise 

him of his right to have counsel present during questioning, in violation of Miranda and Powell; and (2) his trial counsel performed 

ineffectively for failing to investigate and introduce evidence about 

Arthur’s prior history of violence. The state opposed Modeste’s 

petition. 

Ultimately, the district court denied Modeste’s habeas petition. The court first found that the trial court’s denial of Modeste’s 

motion to suppress was not an unreasonable application of Miranda or Powell because the warnings given to Modeste could reasonably be understood to establish the time at which his right to 

have an attorney present became effective, and the warning could 
22-10711 Opinion of the Court 11

not be understood as a restriction upon Modeste’s right to counsel 

during questioning. Thus, the state court’s denial was not objectively unreasonable, an unreasonable application of Miranda or 

Powell, nor was it an unreasonable determination of the facts.

To Modeste’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim, the district court ruled that the state court’s denial of the claim was not 

contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), or an unreasonable determination of 

the facts. It noted that no evidence was presented at the evidentiary 

hearing demonstrating that Arthur had any prior violent felony 

convictions, and Modeste himself did not learn about Arthur’s 

fourteen prior drug convictions until after trial. Moreover, Modeste’s counsel did present evidence that Arthur had been released 

from prison shortly before renting an apartment from Modeste 

and had threatened Modeste before the incident. Thus, Modeste 

could not establish deficient performance or prejudice. As a result, 

the court denied the petition and declined to issue a COA. 

Modeste moved this Court for a COA, which this Court 

granted with respect to whether the police’s interrogation of Modeste violated Miranda and Powell, and whether Modeste’s trial counsel performed ineffectively for failing to investigate and present evidence regarding Arthur’s history and reputation for violence on 

the basis that such evidence was barred by Florida law. 

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

We review de novo the district court’s denial of a § 2254 habeas petition, ineffective assistance of counsel claims, and the 
12 Opinion of the Court 22-10711

district court’s determination that the state court acted in accordance with federal law, reasonably applied federal law, and made

reasonable factual findings. Williams v. Allen, 598 F.3d 778, 788 

(11th Cir. 2010). It is the petitioner’s burden to establish his entitlement to habeas relief. Id. 

Pursuant to the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty 

Act (“AEDPA”), a federal court may only grant habeas relief with 

respect to a claim adjudicated in state court if the state court’s decision was: (1) “contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States,” or (2) “based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in 

the State court proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).

A state court’s decision is “contrary to clearly established 

federal law if it confronts a set of facts that are materially indistinguishable from a decision of the Supreme Court of the United 

States and nevertheless arrives at a result different from its precedent.” Reese v. Sec’y, Fla. Dep’t of Corr., 675 F.3d 1277, 1286 (11th 

Cir. 2012) (internal quotation marks omitted). A state court unreasonably applies clearly established federal law if it identifies the appropriate legal rule but unreasonably applies it to the facts of the 

case, or when it unreasonably extends or declines to extend, a legal 

principle from a Supreme Court case to a new context. Id. 

“[C]learly established law” under § 2254(d) refers to the holdings of 

the Supreme Court at the time of the relevant state court decision. 

Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 U.S. 652, 660-61 (2004). Where the 
22-10711 Opinion of the Court 13

Supreme Court has not given a clear answer to the question presented, the state court cannot be said to have unreasonably applied 

clearly established federal law. Wright v. Van Patten, 552 U.S. 120, 

126 (2008). Essentially, the state court’s decision “must be so obviously wrong that its error lies beyond any possibility of fairminded 

disagreement.” Pye v. Warden, Ga. Diagnostic Prison, 50 F.4th 1025, 

1034 (11th Cir. 2022) (en banc) (internal quotation marks omitted).

A state court’s factual findings are presumed correct. Williams, 598 F.3d at 788. The petitioner can only overcome this presumption of correctness by rebutting it with clear and convincing 

evidence. Id. As such, our review of a state court’s factual findings 

is even more deferential than a clear error standard of review. Id.

“The question under AEDPA is not whether a federal court 

believes the state court’s determination was incorrect but whether 

that determination was unreasonable—a substantially higher 

threshold.” Schriro v. Landrigan, 550 U.S. 465, 473 (2007). “A state 

court’s determination that a claim lacks merit precludes federal habeas relief so long as fairminded jurists could disagree on the correctness of the state court’s decision.” Franks v. GDCP Warden, 

975 F.3d 1165, 1176 (11th Cir. 2020) (internal quotation marks 

omitted). Even when left with a “firm conviction” that the state 

court’s decision was incorrect, we cannot grant a habeas relief unless the state court’s decision was “objectively unreasonable.” 

Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 75-76 (2003) (quotation marks and 

citations omitted).
14 Opinion of the Court 22-10711

When the final state court to adjudicate the merits of a petitioner’s claim affirms or denies a lower court’s decision without 

explaining its reasoning, the federal habeas court should “look 

through” the unelaborated decision to the last reasoned state court 

decision that provides relevant reasonings. Wilson v. Sellers, 138 S. 

Ct. 1188, 1192 (2018). Then, the federal habeas court should assume that the unexplained decision adopted that same reasoning. 

Id.

III. ANALYSIS

A. The State Court Did Not Act Contrary to, or Unreasonably Apply, Miranda or Powell.

Before the start of a custodial interrogation, an individual 

must be given their Miranda warnings, which includes the right to 

have an attorney present during questioning. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 

479. Law enforcement officers must clearly inform the individual 

that “he has the right to consult with a lawyer and to have the lawyer with him during interrogation.” Id. at 471. After receiving 

these warnings and having the opportunity to exercise his rights, 

“the individual may knowingly and intelligently waive these rights 

and agree to answer questions or make a statement.” Id. at 479. 

However, “unless and until such warnings and waiver are demonstrated by the prosecution at trial, no evidence obtained as a result 

of interrogation can be used against him.” Id. 

There is no exact formulation of the Miranda warnings that 

must be given and reviewing courts “need not examine Miranda 

warnings as if construing a will or defining the terms of an 
22-10711 Opinion of the Court 15

easement.” Duckworth v. Eagan, 492 U.S. 195, 203 (1989). Rather, 

in evaluating the sufficiency of a Miranda warning, courts should 

determine whether the warnings reasonably convey to a suspect 

his Miranda rights. Id. 

In Powell, police gave the following warnings to the defendant: “You have the right to talk to a lawyer before answering any 

of our questions. If you cannot afford to hire a lawyer, one will be 

appointed for you without cost and before any questioning. You 

have the right to use any of these rights at any time you want during this interview.” 559 U.S. at 53-54. The Supreme Court determined that the police’s statement that the defendant had a right to 

talk to an attorney before answering questions, taken together with

the second statement that the defendant had the right to exercise 

his rights at any time during the interrogation, “reasonably conveyed” to the defendant his “right to have an attorney present, not 

only at the outset of interrogation, but at all times.” Id. at 62. The 

Court noted that, under these warnings, it would be counterintuitive for a defendant to believe that his attorney would not be present throughout the interrogation because that would require him 

to exit and reenter the interrogation room between each question 

to seek his attorney’s advice. Id. at 62-63.

Moreover, the Court determined that the term “before” in 

the warnings “merely conveyed when [the defendant’s] right to an 

attorney became effective—namely, before he answered any questions at all,” and did not indicate any restriction on counsel’s presence once the questioning began. Id. at 63. Instead, the warnings 
16 Opinion of the Court 22-10711

stated that the defendant could seek his attorney’s advice before 

responding to “any of the officers’ questions” and “at any time . . . 

during the interview,” and therefore, they properly “communicated 

that the right to counsel carried forward to and through the interrogation.” Id. (brackets omitted).

On appeal, Modeste argues that the state court unreasonably applied Powell when it determined he was properly informed of 

his right to have counsel present during his interrogation, as required by Miranda. He argues that the warnings given by police in 

this case were not analogous to those given in Powell because the 

warnings in this case did not include a “catch-all” phrase, and the 

use of the word “before” in this case could only be read as a limitation upon his right to counsel during the interrogation.

Here, we conclude that the state court did not act contrary 

to, or unreasonably apply, clearly established federal law when it 

concluded that Modeste was adequately informed of his right to 

have counsel present during his interrogation. Officers gave Modeste the following warnings: “Of course you . . . you can talk to an 

attorney first before talking to us. . . . we’ll start talking after 

you . . . you understand these things, . . . If at any time you feel 

uncomfortable or think we’re trying to persuade you to say something you stop talking bro. This is all on you. . . . do you understand that we’re not trying to force you to talk either.” Under Powell, it was not objectively unreasonable for the state court to conclude that the use of the words “first” and “before” in Modeste’s

Miranda warnings informed him that his right to counsel attached 
22-10711 Opinion of the Court 17

before the interrogation began and was not limited thereafter. 

When reading these statements collectively, it was not unreasonable for the state court to conclude that Modeste had been reasonably apprised of his right to counsel during the interrogation. Duckworth, 492 U.S. at 203; Powell, 559 U.S. at 53-54, 62-63.

Although Modeste’s warning did not contain a “catch-all” 

provision identical to that in Powell, the officers informed Modeste 

that he could stop questioning at any time and indicated that they 

would only question him “after” he understood his rights. The 

warnings could not be read as a restriction upon Modeste’s right to 

counsel. Powell, 559 U.S. at 63. Thus, the state court’s decision was 

not objectively unreasonable, and habeas relief on this ground is 

unwarranted. Lockyer, 538 U.S. at 75-76.

B. Modeste’s Counsel Did Not Provide Ineffective Assistance.

To establish ineffective assistance, a petitioner must show 

that: (1) “counsel’s performance was deficient;” and (2) “the deficient performance prejudiced the defense.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at

687. Counsel’s performance is presumed reasonable, and to overcome this presumption, the petitioner must demonstrate “that no 

competent counsel would have taken the action that his counsel”

took. Chandler v. United States, 218 F.3d 1305, 1315 (11th Cir. 2000) 

(en banc). Prejudice occurs when “there is a reasonable probability 

that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694. 
18 Opinion of the Court 22-10711

Importantly, when analyzing a claim of ineffective assistance under § 2254(d), our review is “doubly” deferential to counsel’s performance. Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 105 (2011). 

Thus, under § 2254(d), “the question is not whether counsel’s actions were reasonable. The question is whether there is any reasonable argument that counsel satisfied Strickland’s deferential 

standard.” Id.

We have explained that “state courts are the final arbiters of 

state law, and federal habeas courts should not second-guess them 

on such matters.” Herring v. Sec’y, Dep’t of Corr., 397 F.3d 1338, 1355 

(11th Cir. 2005) (internal quotation marks omitted). Although an 

ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim is a federal constitutional 

claim, when the validity of the claim that counsel failed to raise 

turns on state law, we must defer to the state’s construction of its 

own law. Pinkney v. Sec’y, Dep’t of Corr., 876 F.3d 1290, 1295 (11th 

Cir. 2017). Importantly, trial counsel cannot be deemed ineffective 

for failing to raise meritless arguments. Bolender v. Singletary, 16 

F.3d 1547, 1573 (11th Cir. 1994).

Under Florida law, a defendant may introduce evidence of 

the victim’s character to show that the victim of the crime was the 

aggressor and that the defendant acted in self-defense. Hedges v. 

State, 667 So. 2d 420, 422-23 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1996). To 

properly introduce such evidence at trial, the defendant must have 

known “of the victim’s violent acts or of his violent reputation at 

the time of the alleged offense.” Id. The “defendant’s knowledge 

of a victim’s specific acts of violence is a precondition to 
22-10711 Opinion of the Court 19

admissibility.” Antoine v. State, 138 So. 3d 1064, 1076 (Fla. 4th Dist. 

Ct. App. 2014).

On appeal, Modeste contends the district court erred in 

denying his ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim because the 

character evidence he wanted to introduce was not barred under 

Florida law and the failure to present such evidence prejudiced his 

defense. To the issue of prejudice, he contends that Arthur’s propensity for violence was the crux of his self-defense theory, and the 

failure to explore and explain that issue to the jury negatively impacted his defense to the jury. He also asserts that the district court 

made two erroneous factual findings: (1) that no evidence presented at the evidentiary hearing demonstrated that Arthur had violent felony convictions and that Modeste did not learn of Arthur’s 

felony convictions until after the shooting, and (2) that Modeste’s

counsel did present evidence of Arthur’s past violence.

Here, the district court did not err in finding that Modeste’s 

trial counsel was not ineffective. As an initial matter, the district 

court did not make independent factual findings, but instead deferred to the state court’s factual findings, as required under the 

AEDPA. Williams, 598 F.3d at 788. The record clearly reflects that 

Modeste did not know if Arthur had violent felony convictions and

did not know that Arthur had fourteen felony drug convictions until after trial, and trial counsel introduced evidence at trial of the 

threats Arthur made toward Modeste. Thus, Modeste’s challenge 

against the district court’s factual findings, or reliance on the state 

court’s factual findings, is meritless.
20 Opinion of the Court 22-10711

Additionally, the district court did not err in concluding that 

the state court’s denial of Modeste’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim was not contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, 

Strickland. First, Modeste’s counsel did present evidence of Arthur’s violent tendencies through the testimony of Philogene and 

Modeste. Modeste also mentioned Arthur’s recent release from 

prison and sale of drugs on the property. Additionally, had Modeste’s counsel moved to introduce any additional evidence of Arthur’s violent tendencies, such motion would have been denied. 

The record evidence shows that Modeste did not know of Arthur’s 

fourteen felony convictions until after trial, and he did not have any 

knowledge of any other of Arthur’s alleged violent tendencies. 

Modeste’s knowledge of Arthur’s specific acts of violence is a precondition to admissibility, meaning Modeste’s counsel could not 

have made a meritorious argument at trial to bring in this purported evidence. Antoine, 138 So. 3d at 1076. As such, Modeste’s 

counsel cannot be deemed ineffective for not raising a meritless argument. Bolender, 16 F.3d at 1573.

For the same reasons, Modeste cannot establish prejudice. 

The jury heard evidence of Arthur’s past violent behavior, and 

Modeste cannot establish that, had the jury heard more, the outcome of his proceedings would have been different. Strickland, 466 

U.S. at 694. Thus, habeas relief on this ground is not warranted.

IV. CONCLUSION

For the reasons outlined above, we AFFIRM the district 

court’s denial of Modeste’s § 2254 habeas petition.