### ALD-159 NOT PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

___________ No. 18-3020

___________ MIAN SHAHID, Petitioner

v. ATTORNEY GENERAL UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Respondent

___________________ _________________

On Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration Appeals

(Agency No. A090 669 564) Immigration Judge: Honorable Kuyomars Golparvar

___________________ _________________ Submitted on Motion to Dismiss fo r Lack of Jurisdic tion or, Alternativel y, to Summarily Deny the Petition for Review April 11, 2019 Before: MCKEE, SHWARTZ a nd BIBAS, Circuit Judges (Opinion filed: June 18, 2019)

___________

OPINION *



### ___________ PER CURIAM

* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not constitute binding precedent.2 

### Mian Shahid petitions for review of a decision of the Bo ard of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) dismissing his appeal of a decision of an Immigration Judge (“IJ”) denying his applications for relief from remova l. For the reasons that follow, we grant the Government’s motion to summarily deny the petition for review.

Shahid is a native and citizen of Pakistan . He entered the United States in 1985 and adjusted his status to a lawful permanent resident in 1990. Shah id was convicted of a firearms offense in 1994 and of unlawfully tr ansferring a Social Secu rity card in 2004. Removal proceedings were brou ght in 2006 based on the fi rearms offens e and Shahid was released on bond. In 2009, he was convi cted of wire fraud, identity fraud, and other crimes and sentenced to nine years in pris on. Shahid’s immigra tion proceedings were administratively closed as a result. In 2014, the Government f iled additional removal charges based on Shahid’s other convictions . It charged that he had committed an aggravated felony and two crim es involving moral turpitude. The case was ultimately recalendared and an IJ sustai ned the removal charges. Shahid sought relief from removal a nd applied for asylum, withholding of removal, and relief under the Convention Agai nst Torture (“CAT”). He also sought a waiver of inadmissibility pursuant to 8 U. S.C. § 1182(h) in connection with an application to readjust his status. The IJ found Shahid inelig ible for asylum and withholding of removal, found him not cred ible, and denied his remaining claims for relief based on the adverse credibility finding. The IJ also denied a waiver and deferral of removal under the CAT even assuming he was credible.3 

### On appeal, the BIA affirmed the advers e credibility determination. The BIA

found that the record supported the inconsistencies cited by the IJ regarding incidents in Pakistan upon which his claim was based. 1 

### The BIA also agreed w ith the IJ that Shahid’s testimony about his criminal history conflic ted with the documentary evidence. In addition, the BIA affirmed the denial of a waiv er and the IJ’s decisi on that Shahid did not meet his burden of proof for deferr al of removal under the CAT. Shahid filed a petition for review. The Go vernment moves to dismiss the petition for lack of jurisdiction or, altern atively, to summarily deny it. We have jurisdiction to review a final order of removal pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a). Our jurisdiction here is limited to constitutional claims and questions of law

because Shahid was found removable for havi ng committed an aggrav ated felony. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(C),(D). Th e Government asserts that Shahid has not presented a

colorable constitutional claim or legal question for our review. We conclude that the

issues raised in his brief are sufficient to invoke our jurisdiction, but th at these issues are

without merit.

Shahid contends that the BI A applied an unauthorized standard in upholding the IJ’s adverse credibility determination. He asse rts that the REAL ID Act allows a trier of fact to base a credibility determination on, among other things, “the inherent plausibility of the applicant’s or witness’s account,” 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)( iii), and that the only reasonable interpretation of this provision is that the applicant must have personal

1 The BIA explained that Shahid’s testimony conflicted with his wife’s testimony as to the timing of a visit when she and their children were held hostage in Pakistan, and as to an incident that occurred when his wife visited Pakistan in 2015. The BIA also stated that Shahid’s testimony about the 2015 incident was inconsistent with a police report.4 

### knowledge of the facts to wh ich he testifies. Shahid states that the IJ relied on inconsistencies between his testimony and his wife’s testimony about harm his wife suffered in Pakistan of which he has no person al knowledge. He states that his testimony may have been unreliable, but it does not sup port a finding that he is not credible. As the Government asserts, the consistency of an applicant’s statements with other

evidence of record is a factor upon which a credibility dete rmination may be based. 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii). The BIA found th e inconsistencies noted by the IJ supported by the record and, while it re cognized Shahid’s assertion that he was not personally

involved in the incident s, it stated that it found no error in the IJ’s determination that it was reasonable to expect him to have a ge neral understanding of these events. Shahid has not shown that the BIA applied an impr oper legal standard in relying on the inconsistent testimony. 2 

### Shahid also contends that his due proc ess rights were violated. Although his argument is somewhat unclear, he asserts that the BIA improperly rejected all of his testimony because it believed that he “had a pervasive history of being untruthful in criminal court proceedings over the span of nearly 20 years.” Pet’r’s Brief at 20. He

asserts that the Federal Rules of Evidence are instructive, that they allow a person’s criminal history to be used for impeachmen t purposes, but that there are limits on the admission of convictions over 10 years old. He argues that the BIA improperly used

2 Because our jurisdiction is limited to the review of constitutional claims and legal questions, we do not consider whether the record supports the adverse credibility finding. See Chen v. Gonzales, 434 F.3d 212, 216 (3d Cir. 2005) (adverse credibility decisions are factual findings).5 

### convictions that were more than 10 year s old to support the adverse credibility

determination. The BIA, however, merely agreed with the IJ that Shahid’s credibility was undermined because he gave misleading te stimony at his hearing about his criminal history. The BIA stated that Shahid tried to downplay the significance of his criminal proceedings in 2000 for human smuggling, th at he tried to evade responsibility when asked about his fraud convictions, and that hi s misleading testimony was consistent with a decision reflecting that he had lied in federal court in the past. The BIA agreed with the

IJ that he lacked candor. Shahid has not shown a due pr ocess violation based on the BIA’s decision that this testimony sup ports an adverse credibility finding. Shahid also contends that the agency’s reliance on testimony that was not based on his personal knowledge violated his due proce ss rights. As discussed above, Shahid has not shown a legal error in this regard. In addition, Shahid provi ded his testimony, his wife’s testimony, and the police report to sup port his claim for relief from removal. He has not shown a due process violation based on the determination that inconsistencies in the evidence support an advers e credibility finding. Finally, Shahid argues that the BIA’s reliance on a flawed adverse credibility determination compromised how it assessed his claim for relief under the Convention Against Torture. He contends that, due to the adverse credibility finding, the BIA refused to consider past events in determining wh ether he met his burden of proof. The BIA stated that, in light of its affirmance of the adverse credibility finding, it was not persuaded that the IJ failed to sufficiently consider evidence of past harm. Shahid has not6 

### shown that the adverse credib ility determination is flawed. In addition, the BIA also upheld the denial of CAT relief on the grou nd that Shahid had no t pointed to objective evidence supporting his claim. Accordingly, we grant the Government’s motion to the extent it seeks the summary denial of the petition for review because the petition does not present a substantial question. See 3d Cir. L. A.R. 27.4; 3d Cir. I.O.P. 10.6.