[Cite as State v. Conn , 2016-Ohio-1001.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS TWELFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT OF OHIO WARREN COUNTY

STATE OF OHIO, : Plaintiff-Appellee, : CASE NO. CA2015-07-061 : O P I N I O N - vs - 3/14/2016 : ANTHONY CONN, : Defendant-Appellant. :

CRIMINAL APPEAL FROM WARREN COUNTY COURT OF COMMON PLEAS Case No. 13 CR 25904

David P. Fornshell, Warren County Prosecuting Attorney, Michael Greer, 500 Justice Drive, Lebanon, Ohio 45036, for plaintiff-appellee Thomas W. Kidd, Jr., 8913 Cincinnati Dayton Road, West Chester, Ohio 45069, for defendant-appellant

RINGLAND, J. {¶ 1} Defendant-appellant, Anthony Conn, appeals his sentence from the Warren County Court of Common Pleas fo r trafficking in drugs and illegal manufacture of drugs. {¶ 2} Following an investigation conducted by the Warren County Drug Task Force, appellant was indicted on numerous counts involving the trafficking, possession, and illegal manufacture of steroids. In January 2014, appellant pled guilty to two counts of trafficking inWarren CA2015-07-061

- 2 - drugs in violation of R.C. 2925.03(A)(1), four counts of trafficking in drugs in violation of R.C. 2925.03(A)(2), one count of child endangering in violation of R.C. 2919.22(B), and one count of illegal manufacture of drugs in violation of R.C. 2925.04(A) . On March 24, 2014, appellant was sentenced to an aggregate prison term of five years, three of which were mandatory, through of a combination of cons ecutive and concurrent sentences. {¶ 3} Appellant appealed his convictions and sentence. On appeal, this court reversed as to the imposition of consecutive sentences but affirmed the balance of the trial court's decision. State v. Conn , 12th Dist. Warren Nos. CA2014-04-059, CA2014-04-061, and CA2014-06-084, 2015-Ohio-1766 ( Conn I) . Specifically, this court found "appellant's individual prison terms were proper" but the "impos ition of consecutive sentences is contrary to law" because the trial court failed to make the required statutory findings under R.C. 2929.14(C)(4). This court stated, We therefore vacate appellant 's consecutive sentences and remand this matter to the trial court for resentencing. On remand, the trial court shall consider whether consecutive sentences are appropriate under R.C. 2929.14(C)(4), and if so, shall make the required statutory findings on the record at resentencing and incorporate its findings into a sentencing entry. {¶ 4} Upon remand, a different judge presided ov er appellant's resentencing hearing than the judge who originally sentenced appellan t. In an entry dated July 1, 2015, the court resentenced appellant to serve concurrent sentences and modified the individual prison terms on many of his charges, resulting in an aggregate prison sentence of four mandatory
years. {¶ 5} Appellant now appeals, asserting a sole assignment of error: {¶ 6} THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN IMPERMISSIBLY SENTENCING THE MR. CONN TO AN INCREASED SENTENCE OF 4 YEARS AS TO COUNTS 15, 23, 31, 43, AND
50.Warren CA2015-07-061

- 3 - {¶ 7} Appellant challenges his sentence on rem and. Appellant argues the trial court erred and violated this court's limited remand instruction when it modified the prison terms of his individual sentences in addition to correct ing the consecutive sentencing error at the resentencing hearing. A ppellant also maintain s his due process rights were violated because the trial court vindictively imposed a harsher sentence on re mand. We will address these arguments in turn. Scope of Resentencing Hearing {¶ 8} The "law of the case" doctrine provides that the decision of a reviewing court in a case remains the law of that case on the legal questions involved for all subsequent proceedings at both the trial and reviewing levels. Nolan v. Nolan , 11 Ohio St.3d 1, 3 (1984). Therefore, absent extraordinary circumstances, such as an intervening decision by the supreme court, an inferior court has no discretion to disregard the mandate of a superior court in a prior appeal in the same case. Id. at syllabus. {¶ 9} In Conn I , this court found error only as to the imposition of consecutive sentences. Specifically, while we affirmed all of appellant's individual prison terms, we vacated the trial court's order that the s entences be served consecutively and remanded the matter to the trial court to consider whet her consecutive sentenc es are appropriate under R.C. 2929.14(C)(4), and if so, make the required statutory findings. On remand, instead of limiting itself to correcting the consecutive sentencing error, the trial court conducted a de novo resentencing hearing. The court modified the individual prison terms of several of appellant's charges and ordered the terms to be served concurrently, resulting in an aggregate sentence of four mandatory years in prison instead of five years in prison, three of which were mandatory. {¶ 10} In State v. Wilson , 129 Ohio St.3d 214, 2011-Ohio-2669, the Ohio Supreme Court addressed the limited scope of resentencing hearings. The Supreme Court held thatWarren CA2015-07-061

- 4 - when there is an allied-offenses error, on re mand a trial court must hold a new sentencing hearing on those offenses affected by the error. Id. at ¶ 13. However, the Supreme Court commented that while "[a] remand for a new sentencing hearing generally anticipates a de novo sentencing hearing * * * a number of di scretionary and mandatory limitations may apply to narrow the scope of a particular resentencing hearing." Id. at ¶ 15. For example, when a case is remanded based only on an allied-offens es sentencing error "the guilty verdicts underlying a defendant's sentences remain the law of the case and are not subject to review. * * * Further, only the sentences for the offenses that were affected by the appealed error are reviewed de novo; the sentences for any offenses that were not affected by the appealed error are not vacated and are not subject to review." Id. {¶ 11} In this case, we found error only to t he imposition of cons ecutive sentences, vacated the consecutive sentenc es, and remanded the matter to the trial court solely on the basis to correct the consecutive sentences erro r. On remand, the trial court should not have conducted a de novo sentencing hearing but in stead should have held a sentencing hearing limited to considering whether consecut ive sentences are appropriate under R.C. 2929.14(C)(4), and if so, make the required statutory findings. Therefore, we find the trial court erred in conducting a de novo sentencing hearing on remand and modifying several of the individual prison terms. See State v. Nia , 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 99387, 2014-Ohio2527, ¶ 20-22 (resentencing hearing to correct consecutive sentence error limited to consecutive sentences; trial court is not to conduct de novo sentencing hearing); State v. Saxon , 109 Ohio St.3d 176, 2006-Ohio-1245, ¶ 9. The trial court had no authority to extend or vary the scope of our remand order and therefore erred in modifying the individual prison
terms. See State v. Clay , 12th Dist. Madison No. CA2011-12-016, 2012-Ohio-5011, ¶ 24; State v. Carsey 

### , 4th Dist. Athens No. 14CA5, 2014-Ohio-3682, ¶ 10. As the trial court erredWarren CA2015-07-061

- 5 - in conducting a de novo resent encing hearing on remand, we va cate appellant's July 1, 2015 four-year prison sentence he received on remand. Vindictive Sentencing {¶ 12} The United States Supreme Court has held that a trial court violates due process of law when, motivated by retaliation or vindictiveness for a defendant's successful appeal, the court resentences a def endant to a harsher sentence. North Carolina v. Pearce , 395 U.S. 711, 724, 89 S.Ct. 2072 (1969). A presumption of vindictiveness arises only when circumstances establish a "reasonable likelihood" that an increased sentence is the product of vindictiveness

. Alabama v. Smith , 490 U.S. 794, 799, 109 S.Ct. 2201 (1989). "Where there is no such reasonable likelihood, the burden remains upon the defendant to prove actual vindictiveness ." Id. , citing Wasman v. United States , 468 U.S. 559, 569, 104 S.Ct. 3217 (1984). {¶ 13} There is no presumption of vindictiveness when the trial court that imposes the second sentence is different from the original sentencing judge. Texas v. McCullough , 475 U.S. 134, 106 S.Ct. 976 (1986). Instead, "it may often be that the [second sentencer ] will impose a punishment more severe than that received from the [first]. But it no more follows that such a sentence is a vindictive penalty for seeking a [new] trial than that the [first
sentencer ] imposed a lenient penalty." Id. at 140, quoting Colten v. Kentucky , 407 U.S. 104, 117, 92 S.Ct. 1953 (1972). {¶ 14} We begin by noting that appellant's argument that the sentence imposed on remand was vindictive is moot. As discussed above, the sentence appellant received on remand is vacated because the trial court erred in conducting a de novo resentencing hearing. However, even if appellant's argument was not moot, we do not find appellant's sentence was vindictive. In this case, appellant was sentenced by two different trial judges. Therefore, there is no presumption that appellant's new sentence is a product ofWarren CA2015-07-061

- 6 - vindictiveness because a different judge presi ded over appellant's resentencing hearing. See State v. Wisby , 12th Dist. Clermont No. CA2012-06-049, 2013-Ohio-1307, ¶ 26. Consequently, appellant must demonstrate vindictiveness from the record. Appellant has made no attempt to show actual vindictiveness, and we do not see any evidence of it. Accordingly, the trial court did not violated appellant's due process rights in imposing a new sentence of four mandatory years in prison. Conclusion {¶ 15} Consequently, the trial court erred in conducting a de novo resentencing hearing on remand. Therefore, we vacate appellant's four-year prison sentence imposed on July 1, 2015. The trial court's original sentencing entry journalized on March 24, 2014 remains valid in regards to the individual prison terms for each of appellant's offenses, however, the trial court's imposition of cons ecutive sentences remains contrary to law pursuant to our prior holding in Conn I , and is vacated. We remand this matter to the trial court for resentencing. On remand, the trial court is limited to determining whether consecutive sentences are appropriate under R. C. 2929.14(C)(4), and if so, shall make the required statutory findings on the record at resentencing and incorporate its findings into a sentencing entry. State v. Bonnell , 140 Ohio St.3d 209, 2014-Ohio-3177, ¶ 29, 37. {¶ 16} Appellant's sole assignment of error is sustained in part and overruled in part. {¶ 17} Judgment reversed and cause remanded to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

M. POWELL, P.J., and HENDRICKSON, J., concur.