Filed 12/27/23 In re A.C. CA2/5

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions 

not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion 

has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION FIVE

In re A.C., a Person Coming 

Under Juvenile Court Law.

_______________________________

LOS ANGELES COUNTY 

DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN 

AND FAMILY SERVICES,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

J.H.,

Defendant and Appellant;

A.C.,

Respondent.

 B321960 c/w B326226

 (Los Angeles County Super.

Ct. No. 22CCJP00122B)

APPEAL from orders of the Superior Court of Los Angeles 

County, Nancy Ramirez, Judge. Affirmed.

Michelle D. Pena, under appointment by the Court of 

Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.

Liana Serobian, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, 

for Respondent.
2

Dawyn R. Harrison, County Counsel, Kim Nemoy, 

Assistant County Counsel, and Stephen Watson, Deputy County 

Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

_____________________

INTRODUCTION

Father appeals from the juvenile court’s order removing 

daughter (A.C.) from his custody and the court’s exit order 

granting him monitored visitation. Respondents Department of 

Children and Family Services (Department) and mother contend 

that father does not have standing to appeal the custody order. 

Mother also argues that father’s appeal is moot. Finally, mother 

contends the juvenile court’s exit order was within its 

discretion.1

We conclude the appeal is not moot. As to father’s 

standing we will assume, but not decide, that he may pursue the 

appeal, but we hold that father suffered no prejudice from the 

custody order. We also hold that the visitation order was not an 

abuse of discretion. We affirm both orders.

1 The Department takes no position on the propriety of the 

exit order.
3

DISCUSSION2

On January 10, 2022, the Department filed a section 300 

petition asking the juvenile court to assert jurisdiction over A.C. 

based on allegations that mental problems and aggressive 

behavior of A.C.’s half-brother limited mother’s ability to care for 

A.C. and her two other half siblings.

3

On May 19, 2022, the juvenile court sustained an amended 

petition. At the June 30, 2022, dispositional hearing, the juvenile 

court ordered A.C., then 12 years old, “removed” from father’s 

custody. On January 4, 2023, the juvenile court terminated its 

jurisdiction over A.C. and issued an exit order with sole legal and 

physical custody to mother and monitored visits to father. Father 

appeals both orders.

1. Removal Order 

Father contends the June 30, 2022, removal order was 

unnecessary and not supported by substantial evidence.

A. Standing and Mootness

As a threshold matter, the Department and mother urge 

that father lacks standing to appeal the removal order because 

(1) he did not have custody at the time of the order and (2) he is 

merely the biological, not the presumed, father and, therefore,

not entitled to custody. We will assume for the purposes of 

2 The parties are familiar with the facts and procedural 

history, and this opinion does not meet the criteria for publication 

(Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.1105(c)). We therefore resolve this 

appeal by memorandum opinion under Standard 8.1 of the 

Standards of Judicial Administration.

3 The half-brother is mother’s son and was born in 2009. 

None of A.C.’s half siblings is a party to this appeal.
4

further discussion that father has standing. As for mother’s 

argument that the appeal is moot, we find mother has failed to 

demonstrate that the appeal itself is moot as no intervening 

events have occurred to render the appeal moot. (See Committee 

for Sound Water & Land Development v. City of Seaside (2022) 

79 Cal.App.5th 389, 405 [moot cases are those in which an actual 

controversy did exist but, by the passage of time or a change in 

circumstances, ceased to exist].)

B. Any Error in the Court’s Removal Order Was 

Harmless 

Father contests the juvenile court order removing A.C. from 

his custody. We conclude that, if the juvenile court erred (a point 

we do not decide), any error was harmless under father’s own 

theory of the case. Father urges that the juvenile court erred in 

removing A.C. from his custody because father “was noncustodial, 

making the removal order unnecessary.” The Department 

concedes the point. Instead, the Department argues that, by 

father’s own words, the error is harmless because, when the 

proceedings started, he did not have custody and, therefore, no

error in purporting to remove custody from father could have 

prejudiced him. We agree. Father’s custody status was not 

changed by the court’s order. On the unique facts of this case,

before the order father did not have custody of A.C., and after the 

order he did not have custody of A.C. An error in state law 

“ ‘generally does not warrant reversal unless there is a 

reasonable probability that in the absence of the error, a result 

more favorable to the appealing party would have been 

reached.’ ” (In re Christopher L. (2022) 12 Cal.5th 1063, 1073.)

Here, father’s status as a noncustodial parent was unchanged, 

and father suffered no prejudice.
5

2. The Exit Order Granting Father Monitored Visitation

Was Within the Court’s Discretion

On January 4, 2023, the juvenile court terminated its 

jurisdiction over A.C. with an exit order granting sole legal and 

physical custody to mother and monitored visits to father. The 

order set the duration and frequency of the visits. Father argues 

that the juvenile court abused its discretion by not providing a 

way to “ensure enforceability” of father’s right to monitored 

visitation with A.C. and by not specifying in the exit order how 

father could request unmonitored visits from the family court. 

A. Enforceability of Visitation Orders

When a juvenile court terminates jurisdiction, it has broad 

discretion to make exit orders concerning visitation. (§ 362.4; In 

re J.M. (2023) 89 Cal.App.5th 95, 112-113 (J.M.).) These orders 

remain in effect until modified or terminated by order of the

family court. (§ 362.4, subd. (b); J.M., at p. 112.) When a 

juvenile court makes an exit order, the juvenile court must look 

to the best interests of the child and consider the totality of the 

circumstances. (In re Nicholas H. (2003) 112 Cal.App.4th 251, 

268; In re Chantal S. (1996) 13 Cal.4th 196, 201.) We review the 

juvenile court’s exit orders for abuse of discretion (In re J.P. 

(2019) 37 Cal.App.5th 1111, 1119; In re Alexandria M. (2007) 

156 Cal.App.4th 1088, 1095 (Alexandria M.)), and thus determine 

whether the juvenile court’s order “ ‘ “exceeded the bounds of 

reason.” ’ ” (In re Stephanie M. (1994) 7 Cal.4th 295, 318; 

Alexandria M., at pp. 1095-1096.)

Father contends the court erred in not including some kind 

of enforcement mechanism in its exit order granting father 

visitation. Father’s stated concern was that A.C. had steadfastly

refused to speak with father, even in the face of prior visitation 
6

orders. At the outset, father has forfeited the argument. Father 

did not request an enforcement mechanism in the juvenile court; 

he asked for and received a visitation order. “Absent a request, it 

is not the court’s burden to sua sponte come up with a solution to 

the intractable problem of a child’s steadfast refusal to visit a 

parent.” (In re Sofia M. (2018) 24 Cal.App.5th 1038, 1046.) 

“ ‘[D]ependency courts “simply do not have the time and 

resources to constantly fine tune an order in response to the 

progress or lack thereof in the visitation arrangement, or in 

reaction to physical or psychological conduct which may threaten 

the child’s well-being.” ’ ” (Ibid., quoting In re Julie M. (1999) 

69 Cal.App.4th 41, 51.) 

Nor does father identify on appeal any particular 

enforcement mechanism the juvenile court should have included 

in its exit order. Father’s failure to raise the point below and his 

failure to develop it on appeal forfeits his argument. 

If we were to consider the merits of father’s argument, he 

would fare no better. The juvenile court does not have the 

authority or discretion to impose a condition on the family court’s 

ability to modify an exit order. (In re Cole Y. (2015) 

233 Cal.App.4th 1444, 1456; but see In re D.B. (2020) 

48 Cal.App.5th 613, 627.) On the contrary, parties may seek the 

assistance of the family court to enforce dependency visitation 

orders. (In re Chantal S. (1996) 13 Cal.4th 196, 208 [“courts are 

often placed in the position of enforcing orders of other courts, 

even though the enforcing court could not have made the order in 

the first instance”].)

B. Adequacy of Information in the Exit Orders

Father argues that the juvenile court was required to, but 

did not, “explain the circumstances” that led to its exit order 
7

providing father only with monitored visitation. Observing that a 

family court must find “there has been a significant change of 

circumstances” before modifying a juvenile court’s visitation 

order (§ 302, subd. (d)), father urges that this lack of information 

is prejudicial insofar as it may preclude him from proving “a 

substantial change of circumstances to obtain expanded 

visitation rights at a later time.” Accordingly, father argues that 

the exit order must be reversed “with directions to order joint 

custody or at least clarify that [f]ather was nonoffending and 

provide directions for [f]ather and family court with specificity as 

to how he can prove a substantial change in circumstances.” We 

disagree.

Although the juvenile court might not have expressly 

stated why it was ordering monitored visitation for father, we see 

no error in its failure to do so. Father again cites no authority for 

this proposition, instead relying on cases in which the juvenile 

court gave too much discretion to third persons to change 

visitation orders. The juvenile court at least implicitly found that 

the visitation it awarded was in A.C.’s best interests, and “the 

record is clear as to the circumstances” that warranted this 

finding. (See In re Marriage of McHugh (2014) 231 Cal.App.4th 

1238, 1248 [in the absence of a request for specific trial court 

findings “appellate courts . . . must presume the trial court made 

all factual findings necessary to support the judgment for which 

there is substantial evidence”]; In re Jennifer R. (1993) 

14 Cal.App.4th 704, 714 [no prejudice from lack of specificity of 

exit order given that the record showed the circumstances 

warranting it].) 

The record shows that father lacked any significant 

relationship with A.C. and A.C. had continuously expressed her 
8

desire to avoid contact with father. From this record, a family 

court will be able to discern whether there has been any future

change in circumstances that warrants a modification of the 

visitation order.4

DISPOSITION

The June 30, 2022, and the January 4, 2023, orders are

affirmed. 

RUBIN, P. J.

WE CONCUR:

BAKER, J.

KIM, J.

4 Father cites In re Anna T. (2020) 55 Cal.App.5th 870 in 

passing, but the case is distinguishable. The juvenile court in 

that case declined to enter a proper exit order and instead 

purported to “revert[] to [an] original family law order,” with 

some modifications as stated in a minute order. (Id. at pp. 874-

875.) Here, the juvenile court issued a proper exit order.