SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY

APPELLATE DIVISION

DOCKET NO. A-3748-16T1

M.R.,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

F.B., deceased, and

K.B., legal guardian

for S.R.,

Defendants-Respondents.

_______________________________

Submitted March 8, 2018 – Decided July 13, 2018

Before Judges Haas and Gooden Brown.

On appeal from Superior Court of New Jersey, 

Chancery Division, Family Part, Somerset 

County, Docket No. FM-18-0003-11.

Villani & Deluca, PC, attorney for appellant 

(Benjamin M. Hoffman, on the brief).

Respondents have not filed a brief.

PER CURIAM

In this post-judgment matrimonial case, plaintiff (father) 

appeals from a March 24, 2017 Family Part order denying his motion 

to terminate or modify his support obligation for his then twentyNOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." 

Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the 

parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
2 A-3748-16T1

five-year-old autistic son, S.R.,1 and awarding attorney's fees 

based on plaintiff's bad faith. We affirm in part and reverse in 

part.

We glean the following facts from the record. Plaintiff and 

defendant (mother) married in 1989. Two children were born of the 

marriage, J.R., born September 1990, and S.R., born February 1992. 

The parties divorced in New York in 1997. Defendant moved to New 

Jersey with the two children shortly thereafter, and plaintiff 

moved into a house in Brick, New Jersey, which he had purchased

prior to the parties' marriage. 

On September 21, 2009, plaintiff moved to register the New 

York Judgment of Divorce (JOD) in New Jersey and to reduce his 

child support obligation, which the JOD initially set at $485 per 

week, with built-in increases over the ensuing years. Defendant 

filed a cross-motion to enforce the JOD and enter a judgment 

against plaintiff for unpaid child support as well as other relief. 

On November 13, 2009, the trial court entered an order 

domesticating the foreign judgment and, on April 20, 2010, 

following a plenary hearing, reduced plaintiff's child support 

obligation to $327 per week from September 21, 2009 to December 

31, 2009, with a further reduction to $305 per week beginning 

 

1 We use initials to protect the children's privacy.
3 A-3748-16T1

January 1, 2010. The court also fixed plaintiff's total arrears 

as of September 21, 2009, at $110,956, entered judgment in favor 

of defendant in that amount, and ordered plaintiff to pay $120 per 

week on arrears, for a combined total of $425 per week, effective 

January 1, 2010. 

In granting the reduction, the court determined that the 

decline in plaintiff's financial circumstances and J.R. becoming 

a full-time residential college student since the JOD was entered 

"constitute[d] a change in circumstances, requiring that child 

support be recalculated." According to the court, when the JOD 

was entered, child support was based on plaintiff earning $80,000 

and defendant earning $51,000 per year. Shortly after the divorce, 

plaintiff declared bankruptcy and switched careers, while 

defendant's income increased, resulting in "some degree of a 

reversal in fortunes."

Nonetheless, finding plaintiff's "continued failure to be 

gainfully employed . . . unacceptable," the court imputed to 

plaintiff an income of $77,000 for 2009 and $65,000 for 2010, 

based largely on the operation of a parking lot leasehold he 

purchased in 2008, while defendant earned $121,703 in 2009 and 

$114,000 in 2010. In recalculating plaintiff's child support 

obligation, the court added to the Child Support Guidelines

(Guidelines) $350 in weekly extraordinary expenses to be 
4 A-3748-16T1

apportioned between the parties for S.R.'s specialized care as 

S.R. had a "constant need for a [full-time] care provider."

Subsequently, plaintiff moved to emancipate J.R. and 

terminate his child support, and to recalculate child support for 

S.R. based on the parties' financial circumstances at the time. 

Defendant cross-moved to: (1) find plaintiff in violation of 

litigant's rights for failure to pay child support in accordance 

with the April 20, 2010 order; (2) depose plaintiff as to his 

"current assets, income, and liabilities"; (3) update the existing 

judgment against plaintiff for child support arrears; (4) compel 

plaintiff to sell his home in Brick to pay his arrears; and (4) 

obtain counsel fees and costs.

On May 27, 2016, with defendant's consent, the court

emancipated J.R., effective July 1, 2015. The court then 

recalculated child support for S.R., imputing annual income to 

plaintiff of $65,000 and utilizing defendant's reported annual 

income of $135,000 for 2015, to reduce plaintiff's child support 

obligation to $264 per week, with arrears of $120 per week. The 

court rejected plaintiff's claim that he earned significantly less 

than the amount imputed to him in 2010, finding plaintiff's Case 

Information Statement (CIS) and "related financial documents and 

testimony as to [his] current lifestyle to be at best 

mischaracterized, and at worst misrepresented." 
5 A-3748-16T1

Based on plaintiff's "persistent and pervasive pattern of 

non-compliance with [c]ourt [o]rders and history of delinquency 

in the payment of child support," the court also entered an updated

judgment in favor of defendant totaling $148,324.73 for child 

support arrears. Additionally, the court awarded defendant $3200 

in counsel fees pursuant to Rule 5:3-5(c), Rule 4:42-9, and R.P.C.

1.5(a), and ordered plaintiff to provide the requested discovery 

and submit to a deposition. The court, however, denied without 

prejudice defendant's motion to compel plaintiff to sell his Brick 

home. 

Plaintiff moved for reconsideration of the child support and 

counsel fee awards, which motion was denied on August 25, 2016. 

The court determined that plaintiff's reconsideration motion was 

"[p]rocedurally . . . out of time" and 

"[s]ubstantively . . . failed to present any new, relevant and 

material facts that were not already disclosed and considered by 

the [c]ourt." 

On September 20, 2016, defendant died from cancer, leaving 

her daughter, K.B., to serve as executor of her estate and S.R.’s 

legal guardian. Prior to her death, defendant had filed another 

motion to compel the sale of plaintiff's Brick home to satisfy the 

arrears judgment. In her capacity as S.R.'s legal guardian, K.B. 
6 A-3748-16T1

pursued the motion on S.R.'s behalf,

2 certifying, in accordance 

with Rule 4:59-1(d), that her efforts to execute against 

plaintiff's personal property were unsuccessful because plaintiff 

had no assets other than the Brick home. K.B. certified further 

that through her own investigation, she discovered that plaintiff 

had misrepresented the equity and the value of the property. K.B. 

also sought counsel fees in connection with the motion, totaling 

$3327.50. 

Plaintiff opposed the motion and cross-moved for a 

recalculation of his child support obligation for S.R. pursuant 

to Rule 4:50-1. Plaintiff asserted the May 27, 2016 child support 

order should be vacated or modified in light of the new law, 

N.J.S.A. 2A:17-56.67, terminating child support by operation of 

law at age nineteen, but no later than age twenty-three.

Additionally, plaintiff certified the judge erred because he 

"used the . . . Guidelines to calculate child support for [S.R.]," 

instead of "the factors set forth under N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23." 

Accordingly, plaintiff sought all expenses associated with S.R.'s 

care in order to assess his needs as well as "any and all documents" 

regarding defendant's Will and estate to determine whether S.R. 

 

2 In a subsequent order, the judge replaced all references to 

defendant with K.B. as the real party in interest, pursuant to 

Rule 4:26-1.
7 A-3748-16T1

was the beneficiary of any life insurance policy or asset in 

defendant's estate. 

In the alternative, plaintiff argued that if the Guidelines 

applied, then he should receive a credit "for 156 overnights per 

year" based on his increased parenting time since defendant's 

death. Plaintiff asserted that the increased parenting time 

constituted "a change of circumstances," justifying a 

modification. 

K.B. disputed plaintiff's contention that the Guidelines did 

not apply because S.R., then twenty-four years old, was "nonverbal and [had] behavioral issues and cognitive limitations that 

will require him to receive care the rest of his life." According 

to K.B., unlike "an unemancipated college student who lives on 

campus or away from his custodial parent's home," S.R. "will never 

be emancipated or live away from home," rendering N.J.S.A. 2A:34-

23 inapplicable. K.B. further asserted the new law did not apply 

because it did not go into effect until February 1, 2017, and, in 

any event, would not apply to S.R. because he was disabled prior 

to reaching the age of nineteen and required continued support.

K.B. also disputed plaintiff's claim of increased parenting 

time since defendant's death, certifying that plaintiff had not 

had any overnight visits with S.R. since December 2016, when S.R. 

returned home with a black eye after being in plaintiff's care,
8 A-3748-16T1

and S.R.'s caregivers determined "that [p]laintiff should only be 

allowed supervised parenting time." K.B. asserted plaintiff's 

motion was really yet another motion for reconsideration of the 

May 27, 2016 order. 

On January 6, 2017, after oral argument, the court granted 

K.B.'s motion to compel the sale of plaintiff's Brick home "to 

satisfy [p]laintiff's child support arrears" and awarded K.B. 

"sole authority to list, market, negotiate, [and] sell the 

property, and execute all [necessary] documents." After 

determining the Rule 5:3-5(c) factors predominantly "weigh[ed] in 

[d]efendant's favor," the court awarded K.B. counsel fees because,

despite the absence of bad faith, the "fees were incurred in part 

to enforce a previous [c]ourt order" for which K.B. "should not 

solely bear the cost." Additionally, according to the judge, 

counsel's "[c]ertification of [s]ervices [was] reasonable." 

In rejecting plaintiff's argument that N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23 

applied instead of the Guidelines, the court determined that S.R. 

attended a special needs school, which constituted "'other'

secondary education" under the Guidelines. The court ruled further 

that N.J.S.A. 2A:17-56.67 did not apply because the law became 

effective in February 2017, subsequent to plaintiff's application. 

Additionally, the court concluded that "even under the new law 

[S.R.] would be entitled to continued child support" because of 
9 A-3748-16T1

the law's special provision for children with preexisting physical 

or mental disabilities requiring continued support. Finally, the 

judge rejected plaintiff's request for a modification based on 

changed circumstances, finding that plaintiff failed to meet his 

burden of proof based on K.B.'s undisputed claim that plaintiff 

no longer exercised overnight parenting time following the 

physical abuse incident.

When defendant died on September 20, 2016, Probation placed 

a hold on defendant's child support account, pending closure. K.B. 

filed a motion, seeking continued weekly child support from 

plaintiff, her designation as the beneficiary on the Probation 

account, and Probation's enforcement of any child support arrears

accumulating since defendant's death. In support, K.B. certified 

that, as the sole caretaker of S.R., she required child support 

to meet his needs because his Social Security Income (SSI) was 

insufficient. 

In opposition, plaintiff asserted that the Guidelines did not 

apply to children over the age of eighteen, and K.B. had refused 

to supply him with documentation regarding the income and expenses 

associated with S.R. to establish a support figure. He averred 

that since defendant's death, S.R.'s social security benefit 

increased from $362.48 to $1879 per month. In addition, he 

certified that S.R. had a part-time job, earning minimum wage. He 
10 A-3748-16T1

argued that without information concerning state and federal aid 

received by S.R. for schooling and other needs, any life insurance 

proceeds or death benefits S.R. received when defendant died, or

the balance of a special needs trust established in S.R.'s name, 

there was no way to justify the claim that S.R.'s needs were not 

being met. Plaintiff asserted that the requested information may 

reveal a change of circumstances occasioned by defendant's death 

and resulting increase in S.R.'s social security benefit, 

warranting a modification of child support. 

In reply, K.B. urged the court to deny plaintiff's request 

as resolved or moot. K.B. certified that she had already provided 

proof from Social Security Administration, evidencing S.R.'s

increased monthly benefit amount. According to K.B., S.R.'s only 

additional government benefit was Medicaid, which paid for his

school that he had attended since he was a young child. She 

averred further that there were no bank statements for S.R.'s 

special needs trust because no bank account was ever opened in 

conjunction with the creation of the trust.

On February 10, 2017, after oral argument, the court

determined that pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2A:17-56.67(b), as of 

February 1, 2017, the effective date of the statute, child support 

could no longer be collected for S.R. through Probation because 

he was over twenty-three years of age. As a result, Probation 
11 A-3748-16T1

could only collect and enforce arrears. However, the judge ordered 

plaintiff to pay a financial maintenance award of $264 per week 

directly to K.B. for S.R.'s ongoing care as permitted by N.J.S.A. 

2A:17-56.67(e). Further, the judge ordered Probation to designate 

K.B. as the obligee on the child support account in order to 

collect and enforce arrears from September 2016 to February 1, 

2017. 

As to plaintiff's request for information, the court noted 

that while defendant's death would constitute a changed 

circumstance entitling him to the information, plaintiff did not 

dispute K.B.'s certification that she had provided the information 

and did not point to any other specific omitted documentation. 

Accordingly, the court denied plaintiff's request as moot.

Prior to the entry of the February 10, 2017 order, plaintiff 

moved for reconsideration of the provisions of the January 6, 2017 

order compelling the sale of his Brick house, denying modification 

of child support, and awarding counsel fees. Additionally, 

plaintiff moved for a modification of his child support obligation 

based upon the new law as well as a substantial change of 

circumstances, including S.R.'s receipt of Social Security 

Disability (SSD) benefits. Plaintiff also requested any support 

obligation be deemed as financial maintenance in accordance with 

the new law. Further, plaintiff sought an order compelling K.B. 
12 A-3748-16T1

to provide a CIS as it related to S.R.'s needs and monthly 

expenses, all documents regarding defendant's Last Will and 

Testament as it related to whether S.R. was a beneficiary of any 

life insurance policy or other assets of defendant's estate, and 

all federal and state financial aid documents evidencing S.R.'s 

receipt of benefits.

In support of the motion, as to counsel fees, plaintiff 

certified that he had no ability to pay legal fees. As to child 

support, plaintiff certified the judge failed to address the fact 

that S.R. was receiving $1879 per month in SSD, rather than the 

$362.48 monthly SSI he received before defendant's death, and the 

SSD was never included in the child support calculation. Plaintiff 

averred further that the court failed to consider whether S.R. 

received any life insurance proceeds or other assets as a result 

of defendant's death that may have defrayed his expenses. 

Plaintiff also stated that because of the new law, his payments 

could no longer be considered child support payable through 

Probation but rather, financial maintenance.

K.B. objected to the motion and cross-moved for other relief, 

including an award of counsel fees in connection with the 

underlying motion. To support her cross-motion, K.B. certified 

that plaintiff paid neither the $3327.50 nor $3200 in counsel fees

awarded in the January 6, 2017 and May 27, 2016 orders, 
13 A-3748-16T1

respectively. She asserted that plaintiff continued to act in bad 

faith by filing "frivolous [m]otions that [had] already been 

adjudicated" and "meritless requests for reconsideration."

Additionally, K.B. asserted that plaintiff's contentions 

regarding child support were moot because the judge had already 

considered S.R.'s $1879 SSD benefit and converted child support 

to financial maintenance in the February 10, 2017 order. Moreover, 

K.B. averred that plaintiff failed to show changed circumstances

to warrant a modification, failed to provide a complete and updated 

CIS, and misrepresented his income. 

On March 24, 2017, after oral argument, the court denied all 

but one of plaintiff's applications. As to the prior counsel fee 

awards, the court determined that plaintiff failed to allege that 

the court erred or failed to consider probative or competent 

evidence as required by Rule 4:49-2. In awarding K.B. additional 

counsel fees for the underlying motion, the court explained that 

plaintiff's claim that he lacked the financial ability to pay 

counsel fees was not a consideration because "[p]laintiff [had] 

acted exclusively in bad faith" by failing to comply with virtually 

every court order, including his failure to pay child support, 

obtain life insurance, and cooperate with the sale of his Brick 

home. 
14 A-3748-16T1

Moreover, according to the court, K.B. had "incurred 

substantial legal fees in connection with this matter," her fees 

"were incurred in part to enforce a previous [c]ourt [o]rder," and 

she had been "more successful" than plaintiff in obtaining the 

relief sought. Applying the Rule 5:3-5(c) factors,3 the court

found that factors three, four, five, seven, and eight weighed in 

K.B.'s favor; factors one, two, and six did not support an award 

of fees; and factor nine had no weight. Therefore, the court 

concluded, "the factor[s] that . . . favor[ed] an award 

outweigh[ed] the ones that [did] not." After scrutinizing K.B.'s 

counsel's certification of services in accordance with Chestone 

v. Chestone, 322 N.J. Super. 250 (App. Div. 1999), the court

 

3 Under Rule 5:3-5(c), a court should consider the following 

factors when determining a counsel fee award:

(1) [T]he financial circumstances of the 

parties; (2) the ability of the parties to pay 

their own fees or to contribute to the fees 

of the other party; (3) the reasonableness and 

good faith of the positions advanced by the 

parties both during and prior to trial; (4) 

the extent of the fees incurred by both 

parties; (5) any fees previously awarded; (6) 

the amount of fees previously paid to counsel 

by each party; (7) the results obtained; (8) 

the degree to which fees were incurred to 

enforce existing orders or to compel 

discovery; and (9) any other factor bearing 

on the fairness of an award.
15 A-3748-16T1

reduced the requested amount to the "compensable" fees and awarded 

$2020.75, which was reduced to a judgment. 

As to child support, the court denied plaintiff's request to 

reconsider the prior ruling applying the Guidelines to calculate 

child support instead of the factors set forth in N.J.S.A. 2A:34-

23. The court determined that "[p]laintiff [had] not advanced any 

new argument why the . . . Guidelines should not apply, nor [had] 

he alleged the [c]ourt erred in the January 6, 2017 [o]rder." 

Turning to plaintiff's request to modify the child support 

obligation based on changed circumstances, the court noted that 

"[p]laintiff's application lack[ed] his prior CIS as required by 

[Rule 5:5-4(a)], and this alone would be a basis to deny the 

application." "Setting [that] aside," the court determined that 

a "substantial increase" in S.R.'s social security benefit 

"constitute[d] a substantial change in circumstances warranting 

modification of child support." 

However, after applying the Guidelines, the court found that 

"[p]laintiff's new financial maintenance obligation would be $568 

per week, because neither [d]efendant's income nor [S.R.'s] SSI 

benefits [could] be factored into the . . . Guidelines." Thus, 

plaintiff's obligation under the Guidelines "would more than 

double his [existing] obligation." The court noted further that 

"whether [S.R.'s] income [was] SSD or SSI, it [did] not appear to 
16 A-3748-16T1

work a downward modification of child support in [plaintiff's]

favor." 

Acknowledging that "the [c]ourt may deviate or disregard the 

Guidelines where it finds good cause to do so" and to avoid "an 

injustice," the court determined that deviation from the 

Guidelines was warranted to avoid "an unjust result." Accordingly, 

the court denied plaintiff's request and ordered him to continue 

to pay $264 per week as financial maintenance directly to K.B. 

Relying on the February 10, 2017 order, the court denied "as moot" 

plaintiff's request that the court "deem[] any future support 

payments as financial maintenance" in accordance with the new law, 

N.J.S.A. 2A:17-56.67. 

The court also denied plaintiff's request that the court 

order K.B. to provide a CIS "listing [S.R.'s] needs and monthly 

expenses," noting that a CIS was not necessary because S.R.'s 

needs were taken into account when child support was calculated 

with the Guidelines. Moreover, according to the court, a CIS 

"would only be relevant for purposes of income[,] and [defendant]

[was] deceased and no longer [had] an income." 

As to plaintiff's request for documents regarding "all 

financial aid both federal and state that [K.B.] [was] receiving 

on behalf of [S.R.]," relying on the February 10, 2017 order, the 

court found that K.B. had "already produced all documents that 
17 A-3748-16T1

exist[ed]," and plaintiff had "not advanced any new argument or 

provided any objective proof" disputing K.B.'s claim. However, 

over K.B.'s objection, the court determined that plaintiff was 

entitled to "a copy of [defendant's] Last Will and Testament and 

her life insurance policy, or a [c]ertification memorializing the 

fact that they [did] not [exist]" to determine whether S.R. 

received "significant funds" to render him "independently selfsupporting" and obviate the need for child support. The judge 

entered a conforming order, and this appeal followed. 

On appeal, plaintiff raises the following points for our 

consideration: 

POINT I

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN 

DENYING . . . PLAINTIFF'S REQUEST TO MODIFY 

HIS CHILD SUPPORT OBLIGATION BASED UPON [S.R.] 

RECEIVING [SSD] WHICH CONSTITUTED A 

SUBSTANTIAL CHANGE OF CIRCUMSTANCES AND 

WARRANTED A PERIOD OF DISCOVERY AND 

[RECALCULATION] OF SUPPORT.

POINT II

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN 

DENYING . . . PLAINTIFF'S REQUEST TO 

RECONSIDER, VACATE, OR MODIFY HIS CHILD 

SUPPORT OBLIGATION SET FORTH IN THE MAY 27, 

2016 ORDER, BASED UPON THE . . . GUIDELINES NO 

LONGER APPLYING GIVEN THE AGE OF THE 

PARTIES['] SON BEING [TWENTY-FOUR], THE NEW 

LAW IN THE STATE OF NEW JERSEY AS IT RELATES 

TO CHILD SUPPORT, AND BASED UPON THE FACTORS 

OF N.J.S.A. 2A:34–23.
18 A-3748-16T1

POINT III

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING THE 

PLAINTIFF'S REQUEST TO MODIFY HIS CHILD 

SUPPORT OBLIGATION BASED UPON THE MOST RECENT 

LAW REGARDING CHILD SUPPORT IN THE STATE OF 

NEW JERSEY UNDER [N.J.S.A. 2A:56.67] AND BASED 

UPON SAME SHOULD HAVE TERMINATED THE 

APPROPRIATE FINANCE MAINTENANCE FOR [S.R.].

POINT IV

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN AWARDING ADDITIONAL 

ATTORNEY FEES TO . . . DEFENDANT AS THE TRIAL 

COURT DID NOT TAKE INTO CONSIDERATION ALL THE 

FACTORS SET FORTH UNDER RULE 5:3-5(C) AND 

FURTHER DETERMINED BAD FAITH 

ON . . . [PLAINTIFF] WHEN SAME DID NOT EXIST 

AS WELL AS LACKED INFORMATION TO MAKE A PROPER 

COUNSEL FEE DETERMINATION.

Clear standards guide our limited review. "We 'do not disturb 

the factual findings and legal conclusions of the trial judge 

unless we are convinced that they are so manifestly unsupported 

by or inconsistent with the competent, relevant and reasonably 

credible evidence as to offend the interests of justice.'" 

Llewelyn v. Shewchuk, 440 N.J. Super. 207, 213 (App. Div. 2015) 

(quoting Rova Farms Resort, Inc. v. Invr's Ins. Co. of Am., 65 

N.J. 474, 484 (1974)). "Also, '[b]ecause of the family courts' 

special jurisdiction and expertise in family matters, appellate 

courts should accord deference to family court factfinding.'" 

Ibid. (quoting Cesare v. Cesare, 154 N.J. 394, 413 (1998)). 

"Accordingly, when a reviewing court concludes there is 
19 A-3748-16T1

satisfactory evidentiary support for the trial court's findings, 

'its task is complete and it should not disturb the result, even 

though it has the feeling it might have reached a different 

conclusion were it the trial tribunal.'" Id. at 213-14 (quoting 

Beck v. Beck, 86 N.J. 480, 496 (1981)).

However, we confer no special deference upon a trial court's 

interpretation of the law, which is subject to plenary review. 

See Manalapan Realty, L.P. v. Twp. Comm. of Manalapan, 140 N.J. 

366, 378 (1995). We may also exercise more extensive review of 

trial court findings that do not involve a testimonial hearing or 

the opportunity to assess witness credibility. Cf. N.J. Div. of 

Youth & Family Servs. v. G.M., 198 N.J. 382, 396 (2009) (stating 

that deference to Family Court conclusions is not required where 

"no hearing takes place, no evidence is admitted, and no findings 

of fact are made"). Nevertheless, "[r]eversal is reserved only 

for those circumstances when we determine the factual findings and 

legal conclusions of the trial judge went 'so wide of the mark 

that a mistake must have been made.'" Llewelyn, 440 N.J. Super. 

at 214 (quoting N.J. Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v. M.M., 189 

N.J. 261, 279 (2007)).

Furthermore, when a trial court denies a party's motion for 

reconsideration, we overturn the denial only in the event the 

trial court abused its discretion. See Marinelli v. Mitts & 
20 A-3748-16T1

Merrill, 303 N.J. Super. 61, 77 (App. Div. 1997). In determining 

whether such an abuse has taken place, we are mindful that a party 

should not utilize reconsideration just because of 

"dissatisfaction with a decision of the [c]ourt." Capital Fin. 

Co. of Del. Valley v. Asterbadi, 398 N.J. Super. 299, 310 (App. 

Div. 2008) (alteration in original) (quoting D'Atria v. D'Atria, 

242 N.J. Super. 392, 401 (Ch. Div. 1990)).

Rather, trial courts should grant motions for reconsideration 

"only under very narrow circumstances." Fusco v. Bd. of Educ., 

349 N.J. Super. 455, 462 (App. Div. 2002). Such circumstances 

arise when "either (1) the [c]ourt has expressed its decision 

based upon a palpably incorrect or irrational basis, or (2) it is 

obvious that the [c]ourt either did not consider, or failed to 

appreciate the significance of probative, competent evidence." 

Ibid. (quoting D'Atria, 242 N.J. Super. at 401); see also R. 4:49-

2.

Turning to the legal principles applicable to child support 

awards, in determining child support, "the trial court has 

substantial discretion." Gotlib v. Gotlib, 399 N.J. Super. 295, 

308 (App. Div. 2008). "When reviewing decisions granting or 

denying applications to modify child support, we examine whether, 

given the facts, the trial judge abused his or her discretion." 

J.B. v. W.B., 215 N.J. 305, 325-26 (2013) (quoting Jacoby v. 
21 A-3748-16T1

Jacoby, 427 N.J. Super. 109, 116 (App. Div. 2012)). "The trial 

court's 'award will not be disturbed unless it is manifestly 

unreasonable, arbitrary, or clearly contrary to reason or to other 

evidence, or the result of whim or caprice.'" Id. at 326 (quoting 

Jacoby, 427 N.J. Super. at 116). 

The gravamen of plaintiff's contention is that the court 

erred by relying on the Guidelines and not applying N.J.S.A. 2A:17-

56.67 to his application. According to plaintiff, N.J.S.A. 2A:17-

56.67 terminated his child support obligation by operation of law 

because S.R. was over twenty-three years old, and any future 

payments would be deemed financial maintenance, which the court 

should have calculated using the factors enunciated in N.J.S.A. 

2A:34-23, none of which were considered by the court. "[G]iven 

the fact that [S.R.] [was] [twenty-four] years of 

age, . . . receiving [SSD], working part-time, attend[ing] a 

school . . . paid for through either [f]ederal or [s]tate aid and 

it [was] completely unknown what his exact expenses [were] and 

what specific [f]ederal and state aid [S.R.] [was] receiving," 

plaintiff urges us to vacate the trial court's order and remand 

the matter "for a period of discovery as well as an analysis of 

[S.R.'s] needs to determine a proper financial maintenance 

obligation." 
22 A-3748-16T1

N.J.S.A. 2A:17-56.67, which became effective on February 1, 

2017, provides that, generally, "a child support obligation shall 

terminate by operation of law without order by the court when a 

child reaches [nineteen] years of age." N.J.S.A. 2A:17-56.67(a). 

However, if "the child has a physical or mental 

disability . . . that existed prior to the child reaching the age 

of [nineteen] and requires continued child support," the child's 

custodial parent "may submit a written request . . . seeking the 

continuation of child support beyond the date the child reaches 

[nineteen] years of age." N.J.S.A. 2A:17-56.67(b)(1).

"Notwithstanding the provisions of this section, the 

obligation to pay child support shall terminate by operation of 

law when a child reaches [twenty-three] years of age," unless 

"upon application of a parent," the court converts "a child support 

obligation to another form of financial maintenance for a child 

who has reached the age of [twenty-three]" "due to exceptional 

circumstances including, . . . a mental or physical disability." 

N.J.S.A. 2A:17-56.67(e). Pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23, 

The obligation to pay support for a child 

who has not been emancipated by the court 

shall not terminate solely on the basis of the 

child’s age if the child suffers from a severe 

mental or physical incapacity that causes the 

child to be financially dependent on a parent. 

The obligation to pay support for that child 

shall continue until the court finds that the 
23 A-3748-16T1

child is relieved of the incapacity or is no 

longer financially dependent on the parent.

However, in assessing the parent's financial obligation for 

a child who suffers from a severe mental or physical incapacity,

the court shall consider the following factors:

(1) Needs of the child;

(2) Standard of living and economic 

circumstances of each parent;

(3) All sources of income and assets of each 

parent;

(4) Earning ability of each parent, including 

educational background, training, employment 

skills, work experience, custodial 

responsibility for children including the cost 

of providing child care and the length of time 

and cost of each parent to obtain training or 

experience for appropriate employment;

(5) Need and capacity of the child for 

education, including higher education;

(6) Age and health of the child and each 

parent;

(7) Income, assets and earning ability of the 

child;

(8) Responsibility of the parents for the 

court-ordered support of others;

(9) Reasonable debts and liabilities of each 

child and parent; and

(10) Any other factors the court may deem 

relevant.

[N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23(a).]
24 A-3748-16T1

Additionally, "the court shall consider . . . the child’s 

eligibility for public benefits and services for people with 

disabilities and may make such orders, including an order involving 

the creation of a trust, as are necessary to promote the wellbeing of the child." Ibid.

Here, the court correctly determined in the January 6, 2017 

order that N.J.S.A. 2A:17-56.67 did not apply to plaintiff's 

application because the law did not become effective until February 

1, 2017. The court further determined that "even under [N.J.S.A. 

2A:17-56.67] [S.R.] would be entitled to continued child support" 

under the provision for continued support for children with 

physical or mental disabilities that existed prior to the age of

nineteen. On plaintiff's motion to reconsider that order, the 

court denied the motion, finding no error in the ruling. As to 

that finding, we discern no abuse of discretion and affirm that 

provision of the March 24, 2017 order. 

However, in denying plaintiff's new modification request, in 

its March 24, 2017 order, the court incorporated its prior

conclusions regarding the new law, without further analysis, and 

denied plaintiff’s request, reasoning that plaintiff's obligation 

under the Guidelines would be higher than his existing obligation. 

The court also noted that its February 10, 2017 order had already 
25 A-3748-16T1

converted the weekly child support payment to financial 

maintenance payments payable directly to K.B. in accordance with 

N.J.S.A. 2A:17-56.67. However, the court simply adopted the award 

previously calculated with the Guidelines, rather than 

recalculating a financial maintenance obligation utilizing the 

N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23 factors, including S.R.'s eligibility for public 

benefits and services for people with disabilities. In so doing, 

we agree with plaintiff that the court erred, and we reverse that 

provision of the order and remand to the trial court for 

consideration of the N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23 factors. In light of our 

decision, we need not address plaintiff's other contentions 

relating to the child support award. 

Turning to plaintiff's challenge to the trial court's award 

of counsel fees, "[w]e will disturb a trial court's determination 

on counsel fees only on the 'rarest occasion,' and then only

because of clear abuse of discretion." Strahan v. Strahan, 402 

N.J. Super. 298, 317 (App. Div. 2008) (quoting Rendine v. Pantzer, 

141 N.J. 292, 317 (1995)). Here, we find no clear abuse of 

discretion and uphold the court's counsel fee award substantially 

for the reasons set forth in the court's statement of reasons, 

which analyzed all of the factors under Rule 5:3-5(c). Although 

our decision affords plaintiff limited relief, it does not 
26 A-3748-16T1

overshadow the court's finding of "bad faith" on plaintiff's part 

by failing to comply with virtually every court order. 

Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for further 

proceedings consistent with this opinion. We do not retain 

jurisdiction.