CONDITIONALLY GRANTED and Opinion Filed August 30, 2019 

# S

In The 

## Court of Appeals Fifth District of Texas at Dallas
No. 05-18-01533-CV IN RE FIRST CHRISTIAN METHODIS T EVANGELISTIC CHURCH, Relator Original Proceeding from the 134th Judicial District Court Dallas County, Texas Trial Court Cause No. DC-18-11718 

### MEMORANDUM OPINION Before Justices Schenck, P artida-Kipness, and Reichek Opinion by Justice Reichek The underlying proceeding involves a church’s termination of it s senior pastor. In this original proceeding, relator First Christian Methodist Evangeli stic Church (“the Church” or relator) seeks a writ of mandamus directing the trial court to vacate its order denying the Church’s plea to the jurisdiction and to grant the plea and dismiss the case. After reviewing the Church’s petition, the real party in interest’s response, the Church’s r eply, and the mandamus record, we conclude the Church is entitled to the relief requested because the ecclesiastical abstention doctrine applies as a matter of law to t he facts of this case and, as su ch, the trial court a bused its discretion by denying the plea to the jurisdiction. Background In August 2018, the Church terminated its Senior Pastor, John W ilson III (“the Senior Pastor”). The Senior Pastor filed suit against the Church and three church board members for breach of contract and specific performance, alleging that the Church terminated him without–2– cause and failed to pay him severance that he contends was requ ired to be paid under his employment contract. The Church and board members filed a plea to the jurisdiction. They argued that the Senior Pastor was terminated pursuant t o church policies and procedure s and was not entitled to severance pay because the termination was based on a finding of moral mis conduct. The Church maintains that the Senior Pastor’s position is inherently religious, and that his employment contract is subject to the laws and bylaws of the Church, which the Church asserts are “codified” in the Church’s Book of Discipline. The Book of Discipline sets forth “the law s, plans, polity and processes by which [the Church] governs itself and remains consistent” and “ reflects [the Church’s] understanding of the Church and expectations of its laity and c lergy . . . .” The Book of Discipline contains the Church Bylaws. According to the Church, to interp ret the employment contract, the fact-finder must interpret the Church’s Book of Discipline and the Church Bylaws. Further, the Church argues that the severance provisions of the employment c ontract are conditioned upon whether the Senior Pastor is terminated for moral misconduct. As such, the determination of whether the Senior Pastor is entitled to severance under the co ntract requires an analysis of the Church’s moral principles, which are set out in the Church’s Bo ok of Discipline, and a review of how the Church manages its internal affairs. The Church also argues that the t rial court lacked jurisdiction over the Senior Pastor’s case because the decision to terminate the Senior Pastor involved ec clesiastical matters and concerns issues into which a trial court may not delve. For example, pu rsuant to the laws of the Church, employment decisions concerning the Senior Pastor are restricte d to a vote by the Church Conference. Only members in good standing may vote to terminat e in the Church Conference, and the qualification of good sta nding is inherently religious pursuant to criteria set in the Church’s Book of Discipline. Membership qualifications include being ba ptized and promising to live a–3– Christian life, to always remain faithful members of Christ’s h oly Church, to be loyal to the Church, and to uphold the Church “by their prayers, their prese nce, their gifts, and their service.” According to the Church, any claims surrounding the Senior Past or’s employment are “not purely secular” and, therefore, the lawsuit must be dismissed pursuant to the ecclesiastical abstention doctrine. The Church presented evidence that the Church Confer ence voted to terminate the Senior Pastor’s employment “consistent with the internal policies and procedures of the Church.” Similarly, the Church argues that the question of severance pay is a determination of a minister’s salary and is also an effort by the Senior Pastor to right an a lleged wrong related to the firing or administration of clergy, both of which are meant to be decided outside of the secular court system. Finally, the Church maintains that the ecclesiastical abstentio n doctrine applies to this case because the termination of the Senior Pastor involves the Church’s deci sions in managing its affairs. The Church contends that the plea to the jurisdiction should have b een granted under the ecclesiastical abstention doctrine and the ministerial exception. In contrast, the Senior Pastor maintains that the underlying ca se is merely a contract dispute that can be decided under neutral legal principles. He asserts that the only questions to be answered are whether there was a valid employment contract, the terms of that contract, and whether the Church breached those terms by failing to pay him six months’ s everance. Specifically, he argues that section 5.4 of his employmen t contract required the Church to pay him six months’ severance if the Church terminated him unilaterally without cause upon a vote of the Church Conference:–4– The Senior Pastor maintains th at the Church’s August 14, 2018 t ermination letter established that his termination was a unilateral termination made at the “will” of the Church Conference and, as such, fell under section 5.4 as a matter of contract law:

The Senior Pastor argues that the trial court did not need to r eview church doctrine or policies to determine if the termination was a unilateral termination witho ut cause that required the Church to pay him six months’ severance pay. The Senior Pastor also a rgues that section 5.3 of the contract required the Church to give him a reasonable opportunity to rem edy any incompetence or inefficiency before he could be terminated for misconduct.–5– He maintains that the trial court can determine if he was given an opportunity to cure without reviewing the book of discipline, church bylaws, or any biblica l principles and without making any assessment of misconduct. The trial court granted the board members’ plea to the jurisdic tion and dismissed the board members from the lawsuit. But the trial court denied the Churc h’s plea without prejudice and authorized jurisdictional discovery concerning the formation an d creation of the employment contract, whether the termination was by mutual agreement, whet her the Senior Pastor was unilaterally terminated, whether the termination procedure util ized was according to the terms of the employment agreement, whether the employment agreement had expired, whether the Senior Pastor was an at-will employee, a nd whether the Senior Pastor h ad forfeited the contract. The Church filed this original proceeding. The Church maintain s that the trial court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over this case because the Senior P astor’s claims are constitutionally barred under the ministerial exception and the ecclesiastical a bstention doctrine.–6– Standard of Review Mandamus is warranted when the relator demonstrates a clear abu se of discretion and there is no adequate appellate remedy. E.g., In re St. Thomas High School , 495 S.W.3d 500, 506 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2016, or ig. proceeding). A trial cour t lacks discretion and must dismiss the case as a ministerial act when it lacks subject mat ter jurisdiction. Id. Mandamus is thus proper when a trial court acts without subject matter jurisdict ion. Id. “Lack of jurisdiction may be rai sed by a plea to the jurisdicti on when religious-liberty grounds form the basis of the jurisdictional challenge.” Westbrook v. Penley , 231 S.W.3d 389, 394 (Tex. 2007). We review de novo a plea to the jurisdiction ques tioning the trial court’s subject matter jurisdiction. See Texas Dep’t of Park s & Wildlife v. Miranda , 133 S.W.3d 217, 226 (Tex. 2004). In doing so, we focus first on the plaintiff’s petition to determine whether the pled facts affirmatively demonstrate that subject matter jurisdiction exis ts. Id. We construe the pleadings liberally in the plaintiff’s favor. Id. If a plea to the jurisdiction challenges the existence of jurisdictional facts, the trial c ourt may consider evidence bey ond the pleadings and must do so when necessary to resolve the jurisdictional issues raised. Id. at 227; Bland Indep. Sch. Dist. v.
Blue , 34 S.W.3d 547, 555 (Tex. 2000). The court must grant the plea as a matter of law if there is an incurable jurisdictional defect. St. Thomas , 495 S.W.3d at 506. Applicable Law The First Amendment of the United States Constitution provides, in part, that “Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or p rohibiting the free exercise thereof.”
U.S. C ONST . amend. I. The free exercise clause precludes, among other thi ngs, government action that burdens the free exercise o f religion “by encroaching on t he church’s ability to manage its internal affairs.” Torralva v. Peloquin , 399 S.W.3d 690, 695–96 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 2013, pet. denied) (quoting Westbrook v. Penley , 231 S.W.3d 389, 395) (Tex. 2007)). After the–7– ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment, the limitations on Co ngress in the First Amendment became equally applicable to state action abridging religious f reedom. See Everson v. Bd. of Educ. of Ewing Twp. , 330 U.S. 1, 15 (1947). To enforce this constitutional provisi on, federal and state courts have utilized the so-called “ecclesiastical abstention d octrine” and the “ministerial exception.” Reese v. General Assembly of Faith Cumberland Presbyterian Church in America , 425 S.W.3d 625, 627 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2014, no pet.). The broad ecclesiastical abstention doctrine prohibits civil co urts from exercising jurisdiction over matters concerning “theological controversy, church discipline, ecclesiastical government, or the conformity of the members of the church to t he standard of morals required of them.” Serbian E. Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich , 426 U.S. 696, 713–14 (1976); see also Patton
v. Jone s, 212 S.W.3d 541, 547–48 (Tex. A pp.—Austin 2006, pet. denied) (ecclesiastical abstention doctrine “prevents secular courts from reviewing many types of disputes that would require an analysis of ‘theological controversy, church discipline, eccles iastical government, or the conformity of the members of the church to the standard of mora ls required’”) (quoting Watson v.
Jones , 80 U.S. 679, 733 (1871)). “Although wrongs may exist in the e cclesiastical setting, and although the administration of the church may be inadequate to provide a remedy, the preservation of the free exercise of religion is deemed so important a princ iple it overshadows the inequities that may result from its liberal application.” Williams v. Gleason , 26 S.W.3d 54, 59 (Tex. App.— Houston [14th Dist.] 2000, pet. denied). Thus, courts accept as final and binding an ecclesiastical institution’s decisions on such matters. See Patton , 212 S.W.3d at 547. In that regard, the doctrine doe s not foreclose civil court sub ject matter jurisdiction over all disputes involving religious e ntities. Because churches, th eir congregations, and their hierarchies exist and function within the civil community, they are amenable to rules governing civil, contract, and property rights in appropriate circumstanc es. St. Thomas , 495 S.W.3d at 507.–8– “To determine whether the doctrin e applies, courts must analyze whether a particular dispute is ecclesiastical in nature or simpl y a civil dispute in which chu rch officials happen to be involved.” In re Episcopal Sch. of Dallas, Inc. , 556 S.W.3d 347, 353 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2017, orig. proceeding). The ecclesiastical abstention doc trine is routinely applied, ho wever, to bar civil disputes involving the termina tion of clergy or other church employees. For example, in Reese v. General Assembly of Faith Cumberland Presbyterian Church in America , Pastor Charles Reese entered into an employment agreement with Faith Cumberland Presbyterian Church in America and was ultimately terminated. 425 S.W.3d at 626. This Court held tha t the trial court correctly determined that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the pastor’s cl aims because “if the Court were to second guess the Church’s decision to terminate Reese it would deprive the Church of its right “to shape its own faith and mission” by “imposing an unwanted minis ter.” Id. at 628–29 (quoting Hosanna–Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church and Sch. v. E.E.O.C. , 132 S.Ct. 694, 709 (2012)). To reach this conclusion, this C ourt looked to the “substance a nd effect of [Reese’s] complaint to determine its ecclesiastical i mplication, not its emblemata.” Id. at 627–28.
In Kelly v. St. Luke Community United Methodist Church , we concluded the ecclesiastical abstention doctrine applied and prohibited the trial court from exercising jurisdiction over certain claims brought by a church’s for mer Director of Operations agai nst the church following her termination because “the substance of Kelly’s claims for neglig ence, fraud, misrepresentation, age and sex discrimination, and defamatory statements published wit hin the church community relates to internal matters of church governance and each of those clai ms is ‘inextricably intertwined’ with those internal matters.” Kelly v. St. Luke Cmty. United Methodist Church , No. 05-16-01171-CV, 2018 WL 654907, at *8 (Tex. App.—Dallas Feb. 1, 2018, pet. deni ed) (mem. op.). We noted that although “the elements of those claims can be ascertained using secular principles, the application–9– of those principles to impose civil liability on appellees woul d impinge upon the church's ability to manage its internal affairs.” Id. Similarly, in Jennison v. Prasifka , we applied the ecclesiastical abstention doctrine to an Episcopal priest’s claims of sla nder, tortious interference wit h a contractual relationship, and wrongful discharge against a church parishioner because those c laims were inextricably intertwined with the church’s investigation of his performance as a priest and the discipline imposed by the church for inadequate performance. 391 S.W.3d 6 60, 668 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2013, no pet.). As such, we concluded the substance of the suit related to internal matters of church governance and discipline and, ther efore, the trial court was c onstitutionally prohibited from exercising subject matter jurisdiction over the suit. Id. at 668.
In McClure v. Salvation Army , the Fifth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of a Title VII complaint for want of jurisdiction brought by Mrs. Billie McClu re against the Salvation Army. 460 F.2d 553, 560–61 (5th Cir. 1972). Mrs. McClure was an orda ined minister of the Salvation Army. Id. at 554. The Fifth Circuit concluded that “the application of t he provisions of Title VII to the employment relationship existing between The Salvation A rmy and Mrs. McClure, a church and its minister would result in an encroachment by the State i nto an area of religious freedom which it is forbidden to enter by the principles of the free ex ercise clause of the First Amendment.”
Id. at 560. In so holding, the McClure court explained as follows: The relationship between an organized church and its ministers is its lifeblood. The minister is the chief instrument by which the church seeks to f ulfill its purpose. Matters touching this relationship must necessarily be recogniz ed as of prime ecclesiastical concern. Just as t he initial function of selecti ng a minister is a matter of church administration and government, so are the functions w hich accompany such a selection. It is unavoida bly true that these include the determination of a minister’s salary, his place of assignment, and the duty he is to perform in the furtherance of the relig ious mission of the church. Id. at 558–59.–10– In Mouton v. Christian Faith Missionary Baptist Church , Roland Mouton, Jr. and Delorian Morgan Jones sued Christian Faith Missionary Baptist Church and its pastor, Corey Wilson, and other church members after Mouton and Jones were expelled from church membership and Wilson was elected as the church's pastor. 498 S.W.3d 143, 146 (Tex. A pp.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2016, no pet.). The trial court granted the church’s plea to the jurisdi ction based upon the ecclesiastical abstention doctrine and the appellate court affirmed. Id. In so holding, the Mouton court explained that courts “should not involve themselves in matters relating to the hiring, firing, discipline, or administration of clergy” because The relationships between an organized church and its ministers is its lifeblood and the minister is the primary agent by which a church seeks to fu lfill its purpose. Thus, courts may not attempt to right wrongs related to the hir ing, firing, discipline, or administration of clergy because while such wrongs may exist and be severe, and although the administration of the church may be inadequate to provide a remedy, the preservation of the free exercise of religion is de emed so important a principle it overshadows the inequities which may result from i ts liberal application. Accordingly, matte rs concerning this relationship must be recognized as of prime ecclesiastical concern. Id. at 150–51 (internal citations and quotations omitted). The co urt determined that “although appellants characterize their claims as purely secular because they rest on provisions of the church’s corporate documents, the trial court could not adjudic ate this case without interfering in inherently ecclesiastical matters of pastoral selection and chu rch discipline.” Id. at 152. As a result, the trial court lacked j urisdiction over the case. Id.
Discussion This case, like Reese, involves the termination of a minister. And, like Kelly , Jennison , Mouton , and McClure , this case involves questions s urrounding the termination of a church employee and allegations surrounding that termination. Like th e claims asserted in those cases, the Senior Pastor’s claims do not present purely secular issues of contract law first and foremost because he was not terminated from a secular position. Moreove r, the Senior Pastor was not–11– terminated based on secular rules or procedures. Rather, the C hurch presented evidence that the Church Conference, which is comp rised solely of members in good standing of the Church, voted to terminate the Senior Pastor’s employment “consistent with th e internal policie s and procedures of the Church.” As such, to determine if the Church was requir ed to pay the Senior Pastor severance under the contract, the trial court will be required to determine why the Senior Pastor was terminated and, if the term ination was for misconduct, the court will be required to determine if the Senior Pastor was properly terminated for misconduct as defined by the Church’s Book of Discipline and ecclesiastical rules. Each of these determinati ons will require the fact finder to engage in an analysis of the Chur ch’s internal governance, the reasons for the Church Conference’s vote to terminate the Senior Past or, and whether the Church Con ference followed the Church’s bylaws and rules. Even if the Senior Pastor is correct that th e Church Conference made a unilateral decision to terminate the Senior Pastor, to make that determina tion the trial court must consider the procedures and reasons for the Church Conference’s vote, bo th of which are either governed by or touched in part by the Church’s ecclesiastical teachings and rules. The ecclesiastical nature of the dispute cannot be severed f rom the contractual issues as serted by the Senior Pastor. Accordingly, we conclude that th e ecclesiastical abstention doc trine applies to the Senior Pastor’s claims and constitutionally barred the trial court fro m asserting jurisdiction over those claims. As such, the trial court abused its discretion by deny ing the Church’s plea to the jurisdiction. Having determined that the ecclesiastical absten tion doctrine applies here, we do not address whether the ministerial exception is also a jurisdictio nal bar to the Senior Pastor’s claims.–12– We conditionally grant the writ of mandamus and direct the tria l court to issue written rulings vacating the order denying t he Church’s plea to the jur isdiction and granti ng the Church’s plea to the jurisdiction within thirty days of the date of this opinion. The writ will issue should the trial court fail to comply.

181533F.P05 /Amanda L. Reichek/ AMANDA L. REICHEK JUSTICE