NOT RECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION File Name: 17a0335n.06
No. 16-4312 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT

VALERIE D. MASON-COLWELL, Plaintiff-Appellant,

v. COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY, Defendant-Appellee. ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO

BEFORE: COOK, KETHLEDGE, and DONALD, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM. Valerie D. Mason-Colwell appeals the district court’s judgment affirming the denial of her applications for disability insurance be nefits and supplemental security income benefits. In 2013, Mason-Colwell filed applications for disability insurance benefits and supplemental security income benefits, allegi ng that she became disabled on July 15, 2005. After the Social Security Administration denied the applications, Mas on-Colwell requested a hearing before an administrative law judge (A LJ). The ALJ conducted a hearing and denied Mason-Colwell relief. The App eals Council declined to review the case. The district court affirmed the denial of Ma son-Colwell’s applications.No. 16-4312, Mason-Colwell v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec.

- 2 - On appeal, Mason-Colwell raises three arguments: (1) the ALJ erred by giving significant weight to the opinion of an examining psychologist bu t ignoring critical portions of the opinion; (2) the ALJ erred by failing to includ e certain restrictions in her residual functional capacity; and (3) substa ntial evidence does not support the AL J’s determination concerning her ability to walk, climb ramps and stairs, kneel, stoop, and balance. “Our review of the ALJ's decision is limited to whether the ALJ applied the correct legal standards and whether the findings of the AL J are supported by substantial evidence.” Blakley v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. , 581 F.3d 399, 405 (6th Cir. 2009). S ubstantial evidence exists if a reasonable mind might accept the relevant eviden ce as adequate to support a conclusion. Id. at 406. We review de novo the district court’s conclusions on each issue. Id

. Mason-Colwell first argues that the ALJ erred in weighing the medical opinion of examining psychologist Brithany Pawloski. In he r narrative evaluation, Dr. Pawloski concluded that Mason-Colwell’s self-reported data and pres entation appeared to be reliable and that she would have some limitation in her ability to understand and carry out instructions, complete complicated tasks, and engage with coworkers a nd supervisors. Dr. Pawloski further concluded that Mason-Colwell “would have difficulties appr opriately coping with exposure to work and would be at risk for further me ntal deterioration.” In her f unctional assessment, Dr. Pawloski concluded that Mason-Colwell has marked lim itation in her ability to carry out complex instructions and make judgment s on complex work-related decisions , but that she is otherwise able to function satisfactorily, including in her ability to respond appropriately to usual work situations and changes in a routine work setting, despite having some impairments. MasonColwell contends that the ALJ erred by giving signi ficant weight to Dr. Pawloski’s opinion whileNo. 16-4312, Mason-Colwell v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec.

- 3 - ignoring her conclusions that Ma son-Colwell’s self-reports were reliable and that exposure to work could damage Mason-Colwell’s mental health. Substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s we ighing of Dr. Pawloski ’s opinion. The ALJ was not required to accept Dr. Pawloski’s determination that Mason-Colwell is credible; that issue is reserved to the Commissioner, see Allen v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. , 561 F.3d 646, 652 (6th Cir. 2009), and the ALJ could r easonably credit Dr. Pawloski’s conclusions concerning MasonColwell’s functional limitations without accepting as cr edible all of Mas on-Colwell’s reports concerning her impairments. In addition, the ALJ reasonably acc ounted for all of the significant work-related functional limitations specifically id entified by Dr. Pawloski by restricting MasonColwell to routine work involving only simp le work-related decisions and only occasional changes in the work routine. Mason-Colwell next argues that the ALJ e rred by failing to include in her residual functional capacity the need to ta ke additional breaks, limitations on her ability to be exposed to noise, and additional limitations regarding her ability to sit and stand. Substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s declining to include the add itional restrictions because: (1) no medical opinions of record conclude that such restri ctions are warranted; (2) the objective medical evidence does not compel a conclusion that the additional limitations are necessary; and (3) the ALJ discounted Mason-Colwell’s su bjective complaints on the basi s that she both inconsistently reported her symptoms, and alleged functiona l limitations unsupported by the record medical evidence. Finally, Mason-Colwell argues that substantial evidence does not support the ALJ’s determination that she could walk three hours in an eight-hour workday and occasionally climb ramps and stairs, kneel, stoop, and balance. S ubstantial evidence does s upport the limitations atNo. 16-4312, Mason-Colwell v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec.

- 4 - issue, given the uncontradicted opinions of ex amining physician Dr. Babatunde Onamusi, who assessed the same limitations, and reviewing p hysicians Dr. Dimitri Teague and Dr. Rannie Amiri, who assessed less restrictive walking an d postural limitations, and the lack of objective medical evidence supporting additi onal, necessary restrictions. Accordingly, we AFFIRM the district court’s judgment.