PUBLISH 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT 

_________________________________ 

TEAM INDUSTRIAL SERVICES, INC., 

 Plaintiff - Appellant, 

v. 

ZURICH AMERICAN INSURANCE 

COMPANY; WESTAR ENERGY, INC.; 

ENDURANCE AMERICAN 

INSURANCE COMPANY; 

WESTCHESTER FIRE INSURANCE 

COMPANY, 

 Defendants - Appellees, 

and 

KELLI MOST, individually and as 

personal representative of the estate of 

Jesse Henson; CECILIA HENSON; 

DORIAN HENSON, 

 Defendants. 

No. 22-3275 

_________________________________ 

Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the District of Kansas 

(D.C. No. 2:19-CV-02710-HLT)

_________________________________ 

Nolan C. Knight, Munsch Hardt Kopf & Harr, P.C., Dallas, Texas for Appellant. 

 

Meredith A. Webster (joined by Larry D. Fields on the brief), Kutak Rock LLP, Kansas 

City, Missouri for Appellee Zurich American Insurance Company. 

FILED 

United States Court of Appeals 

Tenth Circuit 

November 29, 2023

Christopher M. Wolpert 

Clerk of Court

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John T. Bullock (joined by J. Eric Weslander and Kate M. Simpson on the briefs), Stevens 

& Brand LLP, Lawrence, Kansas for Appellee Westar Energy, Inc. 

Kevin Brooks, Baker Sterchi Cowden & Rice L.L.C., Kansas City, Missouri, Manuel 

Mungia and Chad Schreiber, Chasnoff, Mungia, Valkenaar Pepping & Stribling, LLP, San 

Antonio, Texas, and Sarah R. Smith, Lewis Brisbois Bisgaard & Smith, LLP, Houston, 

Texas, on the brief, for Appellee Westchester Fire Insurance Company. 

Brandon A. Howerton and Andrew D. Herold, Herold & Sager, Encinitas, California, on 

the brief, for Appellee Endurance American Insurance Company. 

_________________________________ 

Before HARTZ, MORITZ, and ROSSMAN, Circuit Judges. 

_________________________________ 

HARTZ, Circuit Judge. 

_________________________________ 

Plaintiff Team Industrial Services, Inc. (Team) suffered a $222 million 

judgment against it in a wrongful-death lawsuit arising out of a steam-turbine failure 

in June 2018 at a Westar Energy, Inc. (Westar) power plant. Team seeks coverage for 

this liability from Westar, Zurich American Insurance Company (Zurich), and two 

other insurance companies, arguing that it was, or should have been, provided 

protection by Westar’s Owner-Controlled Insurance Program (OCIP) through 

insurance policies issued by Zurich and the two other insurers.1

 Team’s claims derive 

from the fact that its liability for the failure at the Westar power plant arose from 

work that had previously been performed by Furmanite America, Inc. (Furmanite), 

1

 Zurich issued the primary liability policy, with Westchester Fire Insurance 

Company and Endurance American Insurance Company providing two layers of 

excess coverage. The excess-coverage policies “‘followed form’ to the Zurich Policy, 

meaning those policies were generally governed by the terms of the Zurich Policy,” 

and the parties agree that the excess carriers need not be treated separately. Aplee. 

Br. at 4; see Aplt. Br. at 37–38. 

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which did have coverage under Westar’s OCIP. The United States District Court for 

the District of Kansas granted summary judgment to Defendants, and Team appeals. 

Although Team vigorously presents its arguments for reversal, we are not persuaded. 

Exercising jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, we affirm. 

I. BACKGROUND 

The relevant facts are not disputed. In 2010 Westar entered into separate 

Master Services Agreements (MSAs) with Furmanite and Team to perform work at 

the Westar power plant and other sites. Team was to perform “pre-heat and stress 

relieving” services and Furmanite was to perform “valve maintenance” services. 

Team Indus. Servs., Inc. v. Zurich Am. Ins. Co. (Team Indus. Servs.), No. 2:19-CV02710-HLT, 2022 WL 16961237, at *2 (D. Kan. Nov. 16, 2022). Both MSAs state 

that Furmanite and Team are independent contractors required to procure their own 

liability insurance and to name Westar as an additional insured on the policies. They 

both also state that “Contractor shall not assign or transfer any of its rights or 

obligations . . . under this Contract without previous written consent of [Westar] 

which consent shall not unreasonably be withheld.” Aplt. App., Vol. 3 at 75, 174. 

In 2013 Westar instituted its OCIP, through which contractors and 

subcontractors could obtain insurance protection for work performed at covered 

locations. Westar had discretion to decide which contractors would be eligible to 

enroll in the OCIP. Eligible contractors had to complete enrollment forms to be 

considered for participation. During the time relevant to this dispute, insurance was 

provided by a Zurich policy, whose premiums were paid by Westar. According to 

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Zurich’s policy, an enrolled contractor’s “rights and duties under this policy may not 

be transferred without [Zurich’s] written consent.” Aplt. App., Vol. 15 at 5. 

With permission from Westar, Furmanite submitted an application seeking 

enrollment in the OCIP and was enrolled in 2013. Furmanite then obtained login 

credentials to an online portal operated by Westar’s insurance broker, Aon Risk 

Services Southwest, Inc. (Aon), where Furmanite was required to report payroll hours 

for each month. The payroll hours reported to Aon were used by Zurich to calculate 

the premium to be paid by Westar for the relevant policy period. Westar never made 

Team eligible to enroll in the OCIP, Team never submitted an enrollment application, 

and it was never enrolled. 

In February 2016 Team’s parent company acquired Furmanite’s parent 

company. Although Team and Furmanite became “sister companies,” they were 

distinct legal entities and never merged. In September 2017 Team and Westar 

executed Change Order No. 2 to the Team Contract, which, as discussed more fully 

below, consolidated the MSAs of Furmanite and Team, retiring the Furmanite MSA 

and providing that purchase orders that had been issued to Furmanite would be 

reissued to Team. After the execution of that change order, Team assumed 

Furmanite’s workload at the power plant. Furmanite’s insurance coverage under the 

Westar OCIP continued even though its service contract had been retired. See Team 

Indus. Servs., 2022 WL 16961237, at *3 (“Westar may have submitted a 2018 

re-enrollment on Furmanite’s behalf. . . . The bottom line is Furmanite’s coverage 

continued, even after it perhaps should have ended.”). A Team employee used 

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Furmanite’s login credentials to upload payroll hours to the Aon payroll portal, and, 

for a number of months beginning in June 2017, 0 hours and 0 payroll were logged in 

by a Team employee in Furmanite’s name for every month except April 2018. The 

parties stipulated that the hours Team logged in under Furmanite’s name for April 

2018 were for work by Team unrelated to the June 2018 accident. 

In the proceedings below, Team argued that it inherited Furmanite’s coverage 

under the OCIP via Change Order No. 2 and was therefore insured for the work it 

performed at the power plant. In the alternative, Team requested that the court reform 

the Zurich policy to list Team as an insured instead of Furmanite or enforce an 

insurance agreement through the doctrine of promissory estoppel against Westar and 

Zurich. Team also argued that Westar breached a fiduciary duty by failing to provide 

OCIP coverage for Team. Westar and Zurich moved for summary judgment, and the 

district court granted both motions. See Team Indus. Servs., 2022 WL 16961237, 

at *1. It ruled that Change Order No. 2 unambiguously retired Furmanite’s MSA and 

left Team’s MSA as the sole governing document. The court declined to reform the 

Zurich policy and rejected the promissory-estoppel, breach-of-contract, and breachof-fiduciary-duty claims. We affirm.2

 

2

 Team also appeals the denial of its request for a declaratory judgment. Our 

rejection of its appeal on the other causes of action also disposes of the request for 

declaratory judgment, which is predicated on the same claims. 

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II. DISCUSSION 

We review de novo a grant of summary judgment, applying the same legal 

standards that are to be used by the district court. See Merrifield v. Bd. Of Cnty. 

Comm’rs, 654 F.3d 1073, 1077 (10th Cir. 2011). A grant of summary judgment is 

appropriate if “the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material 

fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). 

On review, “[w]e examine the record and all reasonable inferences that might be 

drawn from it in the light most favorable to the non-moving party.” Merrifield, 

654 F.3d at 1077 (internal quotation marks omitted). The parties do not dispute the 

district court’s determination that Kansas law governs the substantive issues we 

address on appeal. We start with the claims that Zurich breached a contractual 

obligation to insure Team and that Westar breached a contractual obligation to 

continue Furmanite’s OCIP coverage for the benefit of Team. 

“The primary rule for interpreting written contracts is to ascertain the parties’ 

intent.” Osterhaus v. Toth, 249 P.3d 888, 896 (Kan. 2011). “If the terms of the 

contract are clear, the intent of the parties is to be determined from the language of 

the contract without applying rules of construction.” Id. Whether the contractual 

language is ambiguous is a matter of law for courts to decide. See Waste Connections 

of Kan., Inc. v. Ritchie Corp., 298 P.3d 250, 265 (Kan. 2013). 

Team contends that the amendment to Team’s MSA by Change Order No. 2 

unambiguously entitles it to Furmanite’s insurance coverage. We cannot agree. 

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To begin with, enrollment in Westar’s OCIP does not happen automatically. 

Westar alone designates which contractors are eligible, and eligible contractors must 

apply to enroll in the program, and then be accepted by Westar, in order to receive 

coverage. Also, under the express terms of the Zurich insurance policy, coverage 

cannot be transferred without Zurich’s consent. Yet Team never enrolled, or was 

even invited to enroll, in Westar’s OCIP. Nor did Zurich ever give written approval 

to a transfer of coverage from Furmanite to Team. The failure to satisfy these 

requirements would appear to be dispositive of Team’s breach-of-contract claims.

Team argues, however, that these failures were cured by Change Order No. 2, 

which states: 

Note: On February 29, 2016 Furmanite was acquired by TEAM 

Industrial Services, Inc. This change order will consolidate the two 

services contracts that Furmanite (902236) [Furmanite MSA] and 

TEAM (902228) [Team MSA] hold with Westar Energy and 

become effective as of September 1, 2017.

Furmanite Contract 902236 will be retired and all pending PO’s 

[purchase orders] under the previous FURMANITE supplier ID 

0000533098 will be reissued under TEAM INDUSTRIAL 

SERVICES, INC., supplier ID 0000431446 to be governed by the 

terms & conditions of Contract 902228 [Team MSA]. 

Aplt. App., Vol. 2 at 294. The argument is creative, but unpersuasive. 

The Change Order contains nary a mention of insurance coverage or the OCIP. 

There is no ambiguity in the language of the change order from which one could infer 

that Team would thereafter be provided insurance coverage through the Westar OCIP 

or otherwise. 

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Team nevertheless insists that all is resolved by the word consolidate in the 

first paragraph of the change order. It contends that consolidation of the Furmanite 

and Team service contracts necessarily results in coverage for Team by the insurance 

already provided to Furmanite. There are at least two fatal flaws in this argument. 

First, neither of the consolidated MSAs provides insurance coverage. Both 

unambiguously state that contractors must procure and maintain their own liability 

insurance. At most, the Furmanite MSA, as amended by what the parties referred to 

as “Change Order No. 1” (which we quote later in this discussion) notes the possible 

creation of the OCIP, but that change order does not even grant permission to 

Furmanite to seek enrollment in the OCIP, much less provide coverage. Thus, even if 

Team had been assigned the Furmanite MSA, it would not thereby obtain any 

insurance coverage. 

Second, Change Order No. 2 rendered the Furmanite MSA a nullity. It 

explicitly states that the Furmanite service contract is “retired.” Team contends that 

this unambiguous declaration in the change order cannot mean what it says because 

such a construction would contradict the consolidate language earlier in the change 

order. We disagree. We begin with the definition of consolidate adopted by the 

district court and endorsed by both parties. The court said: “The ordinary meaning of 

‘consolidate’ is ‘to join together into one whole: unite.’ Merriam-Webster.com 

Dictionary, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/consolidate . . . Black’s 

Law Dictionary defines consolidate as ‘To combine or unify (separate items) into one 

mass or body, esp. in order to make them more effective or easier to deal with.’ 

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Black’s Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019).” Team Indus. Servs., 2022 WL 16961237, 

at *7. The thrust of Team’s argument is that if the two service contracts are to be 

made “into one whole,” then the resulting whole must include the insurance coverage 

that had been provided to Furmanite (even though, as just discussed above, that 

coverage was not provided in the Furmanite MSA). But Team does not explain why 

the resulting whole must adopt a provision in one service contract that does not 

appear in the other. The short of the matter is that there are a number of ways in 

which the two service contracts could be consolidated so that the parties end up with 

a single contract. That is why the change order includes a second paragraph, which 

sets forth how the consolidation should be accomplished—by, among other things, 

retiring Furmanite’s service contract. One cannot infer from Change Order No. 2 that 

Team was to be protected by insurance coverage previously held by Furmanite. 

Team also appears to argue that it was, or should have been, covered by the 

OCIP because of (1) language in Change Order No. 1 to the MSA between Westar 

and Furmanite requiring Westar to maintain coverage for contractors participating in 

the OCIP and (2) language in the OCIP documents requiring Westar to give notice if 

coverage is being discontinued. Again, we are not persuaded. 

Change Order No. 1 states: “[Westar], at its sole option and cost, reserves the 

right to implement an Owner[] Controlled Insurance Program (OCIP), and, except as 

otherwise provided herein, maintain at all times during the performance of this 

Contract, the insurance specified in Attachment 4, Owner Controlled Insurance 

Program Requirements.” Aplt. App., Vol. 2 at 293. According to Team, since 

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Furmanite’s work for Westar was insured under the OCIP and that work was then 

continued by Team, Westar was required to maintain coverage for that work. 

This argument fails on at least two grounds. First, the Change Order does not 

require Westar to do anything. It says that Westar “at its sole option and cost, 

reserves the right to” implement an OCIP and maintain it during the contract. Id.

Second, the insurance policy was issued for contractors, not work. Coverage under 

the OCIP and the Zurich policy was for work conducted by a particular insured 

contractor. It made a difference who was doing the work. No contractor could 

participate in the OCIP unless Westar authorized the company to submit an 

application for enrollment and Westar approved the application. The MSAs stated 

that no rights or duties under the contract could be transferred by the contractor 

without Westar’s approval. See Aplt. App., Vol. 3 at 75, 174 (“Contractor shall not 

assign or transfer any of its rights or obligations . . . under this Contract without 

previous written consent of [Westar] which consent shall not unreasonably be 

withheld.”). And the Zurich policy said that rights under the policy could not be 

transferred without Zurich’s permission.3

 Further, Team does not explain how 

coverage would be implemented. Team had been performing, and would continue to 

3

 As Appellees point out in their brief, the absence of Zurich’s written consent 

was an independent basis for the district court’s rejection of the breach-of-contract 

claims. See Team Indus. Servs., 2022 WL 16961237, at *9, *11. But Team does not 

address that basis on appeal and therefore waived any challenge to those rulings. See 

Rivero v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of New Mexico, 950 F.3d 754, 763 (10th Cir. 2020) 

(“If the district court states multiple alternative grounds for its ruling and the 

appellant does not challenge all those grounds in the opening brief, then we may 

affirm the ruling.”). 

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perform, a good deal of work that had never been performed by Furmanite. Now that 

Team would be participating in the OCIP, would all its work be covered by the 

Zurich policy or just the work previously performed by Furmanite? Such potential 

complications are one reason why coverage would be contractor specific and not 

based solely on the work performed. Change Order No.1 gave Team no right to 

assume the insurance coverage provided to Furmanite. 

As for the OCIP, the language in the program documents relied on by Team is: 

“In the event [Westar], for any reason, is unable to furnish or after commencement of 

Work or Services elects not to furnish or to continue to furnish the insurance as 

specified . . . and upon 30 days written notice from [Westar] the following shall be 

required.” Aplt. App., Vol. 4 at 46. The document proceeds to state that those 

previously enrolled in the OCIP must obtain replacement insurance before the OCIP 

coverage terminates, with Westar covering the cost of additional premiums. We think 

it clear that the notice is to go only to contractors already covered by the OCIP, not 

contractors—like Team—who are not enrolled in the program. 

In sum, no contractual promise by Westar or Zurich entitled Team to coverage 

under the OCIP. The district court properly rejected Team’s claims for breach of 

contract. 

Team’s remaining claims can be readily disposed of. First, it seeks reformation 

of Westar’s OCIP insurance policy with Zurich, claiming that it was an error by 

Westar “that le[]d Zurich to issue coverage in the name of [Furmanite rather than 

Team].” Aplt. Br. at 53. “Reformation is that remedy by means of which a written 

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instrument is made or construed to express or conform to the real intention of the 

parties, when some error or mistake has been committed.” Liggatt v. Emps. Mut. Cas. 

Co., 46 P.3d 1120, 1128 (Kan. 2002) (internal quotation marks omitted). The law of 

reformation recognizes that “written contracts do not always accurately reflect the 

parties’ antecedent agreement,” and is available only in instances of “mutual mistake 

or fraud.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). “[W]hen a court determines an 

instrument does not reflect the terms intended by the parties to it, the court then 

revises the terms written in the instrument to reflect the intent of the parties.” Id. 

(cleaned up). Since Zurich was necessarily one of the parties to the insurance 

contract, reformation would require proof that Zurich intended to insure Team. But 

Team provides no argument, much less evidence, that Zurich intended to name Team 

as an insured. In any event, the Zurich policy explicitly protects Zurich from such 

claims by requiring any transfer of coverage to be approved by Zurich in writing. 

Aplt. App., Vol. 15 at 5 (“Your rights and duties under this policy may not be 

transferred without [Zurich’s] written consent.”). Even if Westar made a mistake with 

respect to Team’s coverage under the Zurich policy, reformation requires mistakes by 

both parties to the contract. 

Team also contends that Westar breached a fiduciary duty imposed by the 

OCIP to ensure that Team was covered by the OCIP or at least provide notice to 

Team if it was not to be covered for the work that had been performed by Furmanite. 

But even if we assume that this duty imposed on Westar was a fiduciary duty, it was 

not, as we explained above, a duty owed to Team because Team had never been 

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covered under the OCIP. It would have been a duty owed only to Furmanite. And 

because we have already rejected the argument that Team inherited Furmanite’s 

OCIP coverage, we also reject the argument that any fiduciary duty owed by Westar 

to Furmanite under the OCIP was automatically transferred to Team upon its 

assumption of Furmanite’s work duties. 

Finally, Team raises a perfunctory claim of promissory estoppel. Such a claim 

may arise if “(1) [t]he promisor reasonably expected the promisee to act in reliance 

on the promise, (2) the promisee acted as could reasonably be expected in relying on 

the promise, and (3) a refusal of the court to enforce the promise would sanction the 

perpetration of fraud or result in other injustice.” Mohr v. State Bank of Stanley, 770 

P.2d 466, 481 (Kan. 1989). As best we can tell, Team is asserting that Westar is 

estopped from denying that it was to provide coverage for Team under the OCIP 

because of promises made to Team. First, Team incorporates its previous arguments 

that Change Order No. 2 constituted a promise to cover Team under the OCIP. We 

need not repeat why we reject that argument. Second, Team points to its reporting of 

payroll data through the Aon portal after Team had taken over the work previously 

performed by Furmanite. But there is no allegation that Westar knew about this 

reporting, so it could hardly have expected to induce Team’s reliance. Nor was there 

any evidence of a promise by Zurich to provide insurance coverage to Team.4

4

 Because we rule in favor of Appellees on other grounds, we need not address 

their collateral-estoppel argument based on the judgment in the wrongful-death 

lawsuit. 

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III. CONCLUSION 

We AFFIRM the judgment of the district court. 

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