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Cite as 310 Neb. 160

State of Nebraska, appellee, v. 

Amandah K. Chase, appellant.

___ N.W.2d ___

Filed September 17, 2021. No. S-20-789.

1. Judgments: Speedy Trial: Appeal and Error. Generally, a trial court’s 

determination as to whether charges should be dismissed on speedy 

trial grounds is a factual question that will be affirmed on appeal unless 

clearly erroneous.

2. Judgments: Appeal and Error. Under a clearly erroneous standard of 

review, an appellate court does not reweigh the evidence but considers 

the judgment in a light most favorable to the successful party, resolving 

evidentiary conflicts in favor of the successful party, who is entitled to 

every reasonable inference deducible from the evidence.

3. Statutes: Appeal and Error. Statutory interpretation presents a question of law, for which an appellate court has an obligation to reach 

an independent conclusion irrespective of the decision made by the 

court below.

4. Speedy Trial: Final Orders. The denial of a motion for discharge under 

the speedy trial statutes is a final order under Neb. Rev. Stat. § 25-1902 

(Cum. Supp. 2020).

5. Speedy Trial: Appeal and Error. An appeal from the denial of a motion 

for discharge under the speedy trial statutes presents a relatively simple 

mathematical computation of whether the 6-month speedy trial clock, as 

extended by statutorily excludable periods, has expired before the commencement of trial and does not require any showing of prejudice.

6. Speedy Trial. To calculate the time for speedy trial purposes, a court 

must exclude the day the complaint was filed, count forward 6 months, 

back up 1 day, and then add any time excluded under Neb. Rev. Stat. 

§ 29-1207(4) (Reissue 2016) to determine the last day the defendant can 

be tried.

7. Speedy Trial: Misdemeanors: Warrants: Arrests. For misdemeanor 

offenses where an “intimate partner” is an element of the offense, the 

Nebraska Supreme Court Online Library

www.nebraska.gov/apps-courts-epub/

11/05/2021 01:08 AM CDT
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6-month period within which an accused is to be brought to trial commences the date the defendant is arrested on a complaint filed as part of 

a warrant for arrest.

8. Speedy Trial: Proof. The burden of proof is upon the State to show by 

a preponderance of the evidence that one or more of the excluded time 

periods under Neb. Rev. Stat. § 29-1207(4) (Reissue 2016) are applicable when the defendant is not tried within 6 months.

9. Speedy Trial: Good Cause. Judicial delay, absent a showing by the 

State of good cause, does not toll the speedy trial statute.

10. ____: ____. When a trial court relies on Neb. Rev. Stat. § 29-1207(4)(f ) 

(Reissue 2016) to exclude time from the speedy trial calculation, it 

must make specific findings as to the good cause which resulted in 

the delay.

11. Appeal and Error. Where an appellant’s brief contains conclusory 

assertions unsupported by a coherent analytical argument, the appellant 

fails to satisfy the requirement that the party asserting the alleged error 

must both specifically assign and specifically argue it in the party’s initial brief.

12. Motions for Continuance: Waiver. The statutory requirements of Neb. 

Rev. Stat. § 25-1148 (Reissue 2016) can be waived by a defendant’s 

failure to timely object.

13. Motions for Continuance. A trial court’s sua sponte decisions to delay 

trial are not governed by Neb. Rev. Stat. § 25-1148 (Reissue 2016).

14. Speedy Trial: Good Cause. Evidence of good cause is properly presented at the hearing on the motion for absolute discharge and need not 

be articulated at the time of the court’s sua sponte order delaying trial.

15. Speedy Trial: Good Cause: Waiver. Without a motion for absolute 

discharge under Neb. Rev. Stat. § 29-1208 (Reissue 2016), a defendant 

waives the statutory right to a trial within 6 months and no evidentiary 

showing of good cause is necessary at all.

16. Good Cause: Words and Phrases. Good cause is a substantial reason 

that affords a legal excuse.

17. Speedy Trial: Good Cause: Appeal and Error. In determining whether 

the trial court clearly erred in finding good cause after a hearing on a 

motion for discharge, an appellate court looks not just to the evidence 

presented at the hearing on the motion for discharge, but to the whole of 

the record.

18. Speedy Trial. The only timing requirement implicit in Neb. Rev. Stat. 

§ 29-1207(4)(f ) (Reissue 2016) is that the substantial reason affording a 

legal excuse objectively existed at the time of the delay.

Appeal from the District Court for Douglas County, Gary 

B. Randall, Judge, on appeal thereto from the County Court 
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for Douglas County, Sheryl L. Lohaus, Judge. Judgment of 

District Court affirmed.

Thomas C. Riley, Douglas County Public Defender, and 

Rebekah S. Keller for appellant.

Douglas J. Peterson, Attorney General, and Stacy M. Foust 

for appellee.

Miller-Lerman, Cassel, Stacy, Funke, Papik, and 

Freudenberg, JJ.

Freudenberg, J.

INTRODUCTION

The defendant appeals from the district court sitting as 

an appellate court, which affirmed the county court’s denial 

of her motion for absolute discharge based on her statutory 

right to a speedy trial. She asserts the county court’s failure 

to articulate its reasoning at the time of its sua sponte contin

uances of the trial date rendered untimely the evidence of good 

cause ultimately adduced by the prosecution at the hearing on 

her motion for discharge. The defendant argues that because 

of the untimeliness of the reasoning and evidence supporting 

good cause for the judicial delays, we must reverse the district 

court’s determination that the county court did not clearly err 

in finding the delays attributable to its sua sponte orders were 

for good cause and therefore excludable. We disagree and 

affirm the judgment of the district court.

BACKGROUND

The underlying charges against Amandah K. Chase are two 

counts of misdemeanor domestic violence assault in the third 

degree in violation of Neb. Rev. Stat. § 28-323(4) (Reissue 

2016). The charges were filed in county court on October 2, 

2019. Chase was arrested on January 21, 2020. A probable 

cause hearing was held that same date. The court set bond and 

appointed Chase defense counsel.
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March 13, 2020

A pretrial hearing was held on March 13, 2020, before Judge 

Sheryl Lohaus, in which defense counsel asked to set a hearing for “cleanup” and voir dire. The court set a hearing for 

March 26.

March 26, 2020

At the hearing on March 26, 2020, again before Judge 

Lohaus, defense counsel informed the court that Chase intended 

to pursue a jury trial. The court scheduled a jury trial status 

check for May 28. The journal entry provides, “Case continued 

to 5/28/2020 at 10:30 AM on motion of Defense.”

May 28, 2020

The status check hearing on May 28, 2020, was held before 

Judge Jeffrey Marcuzzo. Defense counsel informed the court 

that Chase “is ready to set this for a jury trial.”

Defense counsel continued, “I’m not sure when Judge 

Lohaus is setting hers or if she’s requiring another cleanup.” 

Judge Marcuzzo stated that he was “not quite sure myself,” and 

he continued matters for a couple of weeks, scheduling another 

pretrial status check in front of Judge Lohaus so she could tell 

Chase “how she intends on handling these matters.” Defense 

counsel responded, “Okay.”

The journal entry stated, “Case continued to 6/11/2020 at 

10:30 AM on motion of the Court.” It further stated, “Case 

continued. Defendant asking to be set for trial at further hearing. No objection by State’s Attorney.”

June 11, 2020

At the jury trial status check before Judge Lohaus on June 

11, 2020, Chase reiterated her request for a jury trial and stated, 

“I’m not sure when the Court is going to be able to schedule 

those, but we’d like to have it set if possible.”

The court replied, “Probably September.” Defense counsel responded, “Okay.” Discussion was had in which defense 
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counsel expressed willingness to be scheduled as a “backup” 

in order to be tried as soon as possible. Judge Lohaus explained 

that in such a case, the trial could end up being “bumped,” 

because “we have other cases that have priority, which is district court.” Defense counsel stated, “We’ll take what we can 

get, Your Honor.”

The journal entry provided, “Case continued to 8/10/2020

. . . for Jury Trial.”

June 25, 2020

A journal entry reflects that another hearing was held on 

June 25, 2020, but there is no bill of exceptions for that hearing. The journal entry states, “Case continued to 8/03/2020 . . . 

on motion of the Court . . . for Jury Trial - Voir Dire.”

Motion for Discharge and Hearing

The transcript contains a motion for absolute discharge 

with a certificate of service dated July 27, 2020. The motion 

claimed violations of Chase’s statutory and constitutional rights 

to a speedy trial. The parties agreed that, absent tolling, the 

6-month statutory period would have run on July 21, 2020.

At the hearing on the motion, the county court set forth that 

the State carried the burden to show the periods of delay were 

excludable. The State offered into evidence, and asked the 

county court to take judicial notice of, 11 exhibits containing 

administrative orders and other documents of the Nebraska 

Supreme Court and Douglas County relating to the COVID-19 

pandemic. Chase did not object to the exhibits, and they 

were received.

The exhibits included an affidavit of the clerk of the district court, who averred on March 17, 2020, that due to 

the COVID-19 pandemic, he would be unable to notify and 

impanel the required prospective jurors.

The exhibits also included an administrative order on 

April 27, 2020, by Judge Shelly Stratman, the presiding district court judge, continuing for good cause all jury trials 
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scheduled for the jury panels beginning June 8 through 22. 

Judge Stratman explained that the court could not conduct jury 

trials within the social distancing guidelines for protection of 

the public during the pandemic. Even if the court could assemble a willing venire, Judge Stratman explained, there was no 

way to ensure a jury’s deliberations would be unaffected by 

conflicting health and safety concerns.

The State argued the delays were all on the court’s own 

motion for good cause due to the COVID-19 pandemic. But it 

also pointed out that defense counsel did not object to the May 

28 continuance, but instead responded “[o]kay” after the court 

announced it would be continuing matters.

Defense counsel argued that when a court continues trial on 

its own motion, it must, at the time of the continuance, make 

specific findings of good cause based on evidence adduced by 

the State. She argued that it was too late for the State to prove 

and the court to find good cause based only on evidence presented at the hearing on the motion for discharge.

In a journal entry on July 30, 2020, the county court found 

that the continuances on March 26, May 28, and June 11 were 

on the court’s own motion and that 96 days associated with 

these continuances were excludable. The court elaborated that 

the exhibits offered by the State at the hearing on the motion 

for discharge proved by a preponderance of the evidence the 

trial was delayed for good cause pursuant to Neb. Rev. Stat. 

§ 29-1207(4)(f ) (Reissue 2016), because of a “nationwide 

pandemic of Novel Coronavirus and COVID-19 disease.” The 

court specifically noted the affidavit of the clerk of the district 

court and Judge Stratman’s administrative order in support of 

its finding.

Appeal to District Court

Chase appealed the July 30, 2020, order denying her statutory 

right to a speedy trial to the district court. The court affirmed 

the county court’s order denying the motion for discharge on 

the ground that the judicial delays were for good cause.
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ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR

Chase assigns that the district court erred in affirming the 

order of the county court denying her motion for absolute discharge under § 29-1207, because the State failed to meet its 

burden to show that good cause existed sufficient to toll her 

speedy trial rights.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

[1,2] Generally, a trial court’s determination as to whether 

charges should be dismissed on speedy trial grounds is a factual question that will be affirmed on appeal unless clearly 

erroneous. 1 Under a clearly erroneous standard of review, an 

appellate court does not reweigh the evidence but considers 

the judgment in a light most favorable to the successful party, 

resolving evidentiary conflicts in favor of the successful party, 

who is entitled to every reasonable inference deducible from 

the evidence. 2

[3] Statutory interpretation presents a question of law, for 

which an appellate court has an obligation to reach an independent conclusion irrespective of the decision made by the 

court below. 3

ANALYSIS

[4,5] This case presents an appeal from the denial of Chase’s 

motion for discharge, which was affirmed by the district court. 

The denial of a motion for discharge under the speedy trial 

statutes is a final order under Neb. Rev. Stat. § 25-1902 (Cum. 

Supp. 2020). 4 An appeal therefrom presents a relatively simple mathematical computation of whether the 6-month speedy 

trial clock, as extended by statutorily excludable periods, 

1 State v. Jennings, 308 Neb. 835, 957 N.W.2d 143 (2021).

2 State v. Coomes, 309 Neb. 749, 962 N.W.2d 510 (2021).

3 County of Cedar v. Thelen, 305 Neb. 351, 940 N.W.2d 521 (2020).

4 See State v. Williams, 277 Neb. 133, 761 N.W.2d 514 (2009).
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has expired before the commencement of trial and does not 

require any showing of prejudice. 5

[6-8] To calculate the time for speedy trial purposes, a court 

must exclude the day the complaint was filed, count forward 

6 months, back up 1 day, and then add any time excluded 

under § 29-1207(4) to determine the last day the defendant 

can be tried. 6 Although the speedy trial statutes expressly refer 

to indictments and informations, we have held that they also 

apply to prosecutions commenced by the filing of a complaint 

in county court. 7 For misdemeanor offenses, such as this, where 

an “intimate partner” is an element of the offense, the 6-month 

period in which an accused is to be brought to trial commences 

the date the defendant is arrested on a complaint filed as part 

of a warrant for arrest. 8 The burden of proof is upon the State 

to show by a preponderance of the evidence that one or more 

of the excluded time periods under § 29-1207(4) are applicable 

when the defendant is not tried within 6 months. 9

Section 29-1207(4)(b) designates as excluded in computing the time for trial “[t]he period of delay resulting from 

a continuance granted at the request or with the consent of 

the defendant or his or her counsel.” Section 29-1207(4)(c) 

designates as excluded the period of delay resulting from a 

continuance granted at the request of the prosecuting attorney 

for two reasons. Those reasons, as set forth in the statute, 

are as follows: (1) if the continuance is granted because of 

the unavailability of evidence material to the State’s case, 

when the prosecuting attorney has exercised due diligence 

to obtain such evidence and there are reasonable grounds to 

believe that such evidence will be available at the later date, 10

5 See id.

6 State v. Chapman, 307 Neb. 443, 949 N.W.2d 490 (2020).

7 See id.

8 See State v. Lebeau, 280 Neb. 238, 784 N.W.2d 921 (2010).

9 See State v. Chapman, supra note 6.

10 § 29-1207(4)(c)(i).
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and (2) if the continuance is granted to allow the prosecuting attorney additional time to prepare the State’s case and 

additional time is justified because of the exceptional circumstances of the case. 11

[9,10] Section 29-1207(4) does not specifically describe a 

“continuance” by the court’s own motion or judicial delay, but 

§ 29-1207(4)(f ) presents a catchall that designates as excluded 

in computing the time for trial “[o]ther periods of delay not 

specifically enumerated in this section, but only if the court 

finds that they are for good cause.” We have explained that 

judicial delay, absent a showing by the State of good cause, 

does not toll the speedy trial statute. 12 And when a trial court 

relies on § 29-1207(4)(f ) to exclude time from the speedy trial 

calculation, it must make specific findings as to the good cause 

which resulted in the delay. 13

The county court specifically found that 96 days were 

associated with continuances at the court’s own motion and 

that those days were excludable for good cause pursuant to 

§ 29-1207(4)(f ), because of a “nationwide pandemic of Novel 

Coronavirus and COVID-19 disease.” An appellate court will 

give deference to such factual findings unless they are clearly 

erroneous. 14 Since the statutory 6-month period ran on July 21, 

2020, and the motion for discharge was on July 27, we, like 

the district court, will affirm the county court’s order denying 

the motion if the record supports that the district court did not 

clearly err in finding at least 7 days were excludable.

[11] Chase does not specifically argue that the evidence in 

the record pertaining to the COVID-19 pandemic, entered into 

evidence at the hearing on the motion for discharge, failed to 

provide good cause for the delays resulting from the court’s 

sua sponte orders. Chase’s challenge on appeal is instead to 

11 § 29-1207(4)(c)(ii).

12 State v. Baird, 259 Neb. 245, 609 N.W.2d 349 (2000).

13 See State v. Kinstler, 207 Neb. 386, 299 N.W.2d 182 (1980).

14 See State v. Feldhacker, 267 Neb. 145, 672 N.W.2d 627 (2004).
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the timing of the presentation of the evidence supporting good 

cause and the lack of any articulation on the record by the 

court concurrently with its orders as to why the court believed 

at that time the delays were for good cause. While Chase 

asserts in a conclusory fashion that the evidence was insufficient to meet the preponderance of the evidence standard, she 

fails to elaborate on this assertion other than challenging the 

timing of the presentation of the evidence. Where an appellant’s brief contains conclusory assertions unsupported by a 

coherent analytical argument, the appellant fails to satisfy the 

requirement that the party asserting the alleged error must both 

specifically assign and specifically argue it in the party’s initial brief. 15

Relying on State v. Vela-Montes 16 and statutory requirements 

for applications for continuances by the parties to an action, 

Chase asserts it was untimely for the prosecution to present the 

evidence supporting good cause at the hearing on the motion 

for absolute discharge. Chase also argues the county court’s 

failure to articulate any reasoning at the time of the contin

uances makes it impossible for the prosecution to support good 

cause later.

In Vela-Montes, the prosecution had failed to support its 

application for a continuance with a contemporaneous affidavit 

as required by Neb. Rev. Stat. § 25-1148 (Reissue 2016). Neb. 

Rev. Stat. § 29-1206 (Reissue 2016) provides that “[a]pplications for continuances shall be made in accordance with section 25-1148”; § 25-1148, in turn, contemplates that a hearing 

will be held on the application for a continuance and states 

that “[w]henever application for continuance or adjournment is 

made by a party or parties to any cause or proceeding pending 

in the district court of any county, such application . . . shall 

be supported by the affidavit or affidavits of person or persons 

15 See Dycus v. Dycus, 307 Neb. 426, 949 N.W.2d 357 (2020).

16 State v. Vela-Montes, 19 Neb. App. 378, 807 N.W.2d 544 (2011).
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competent to testify as witnesses . . . .” The prosecution in 

Velz-Montes had supported its application for a continuance 

with only an unsworn statement to the court that one of the 

victims was unavailable, and the trial court had granted the 

continuance after overruling the defendant’s objection that it 

was not supported. At the hearing on the defendant’s subsequent motion for absolute discharge, the State adduced the 

testimony of the victim, whose unavailability had promoted 

the motion to continue. The trial court overruled the defend

ant’s objection that this testimony was untimely and denied the 

motion for absolute discharge, rejecting the defendant’s argument that the period of delay could not be excluded from the 

speedy trial calculation because the prosecution had failed to 

support its application for continuance with a contemporaneous affidavit.

The Nebraska Court of Appeals affirmed the denial of absolute discharge, concluding that the State’s failure to comply 

with the dictates of § 25-1148 with respect to the timing of the 

presentation of the evidence in support of its application for a 

continuance deprived the defendant of a mere technical right, 

which did not warrant reversal. 17 The Court of Appeals rejected 

the defendant’s attempt “to bootstrap a substantial right to the 

mere technical right actually affected” of the timing of the evidentiary support for the applications for a continuance. 18 The 

Court of Appeals explained that the trial court did not deprive 

the defendant of a substantial right by receiving evidence to 

support the prior continuance at the later hearing on the motion 

for discharge for two reasons: (1) there was “precise conform

ity” between the prosecution’s proffered justification at the 

time of the motion for the continuance and the later evidence 

presented by the prosecution at the hearing on the motion for 

discharge and (2) the law generally permits courts to consider 

evidence relevant to earlier proceedings, which is adduced 

17 See id.

18 Id. at 386-87, 807 N.W.2d at 551.
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during the hearing on the motion for discharge. 19 The Court 

of Appeals said, however, that “had there been any significant 

variance [between the prosecution’s proffered justification at 

the time of the motion and the evidence later presented at the 

hearing on the motion for discharge], we could not reach the 

same conclusion” that the failure to comply with § 25-1148 did 

not affect a substantial right. 20

Chase asserts that, unlike in Vela-Montes, a substantial 

right was affected by the timing of the evidence in this case. 

She explains there is a significant variance between the proffered reason for the court’s sua sponte delay at the time of its 

order and the evidence presented at the motion for discharge, 

because the court proffered no reason for its delay at all. 

Chase argues that because the county court failed to articulate 

on the record any reasoning at the time of its sua sponte continuances of her trial, the evidence presented at the hearing 

on the motion for discharge was an impermissible attempt to 

“fabricate ‘good cause’ after the fact” 21 and improperly “put 

words in the county court’s mouth.” 22 We find no merit to 

these arguments.

[12,13] Chase did not object at the time of the continuances, 

and the statutory requirements of § 25-1148 can be waived by a 

defendant’s failure to timely object. 23 But more fundamentally, 

a trial court’s sua sponte decisions to delay trial are not governed by § 25-1148. While judicial delays might be characterized as continuances by the court, they are not “[a]pplications

for continuances” as described by § 29-1206. (Emphasis suppied.) They accordingly need not be in conformance with the 

requirements of § 25-1148, which describes a hearing on the 

19 Id. at 388, 807 N.W.2d at 551.

20 Id.

21 Brief for appellant at 12.

22 Id. at 13.

23 See, State v. Shipler, 17 Neb. App. 66, 758 N.W.2d 41 (2008); State v. 

Roundtree, 11 Neb. App. 628, 658 N.W.2d 308 (2003).
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application and the necessary form of support for applications 

for continuances or adjournment “made by a party or parties.” 

Chase’s reliance on Vela-Montes is therefore misplaced.

[14,15] When a trial court’s sua sponte decision to delay 

trial implicates statutory speedy trial rights, the exclusion of 

the period attributable to such delay is governed by a showing 

on the record of good cause as described by § 29-1207(4)(f ). 

Evidence of good cause is properly presented at the hearing 

on the motion for absolute discharge and need not be articulated at the time of the court’s sua sponte order delaying trial. 

Without a motion for absolute discharge under Neb. Rev. Stat. 

§ 29-1208 (Reissue 2016), a defendant waives the statutory 

right to a trial within 6 months and no evidentiary showing of 

good cause is necessary at all.

[16-18] Good cause is a substantial reason that affords a 

legal excuse. 24 A showing of good cause is not an attempt to 

put words in the trial court’s mouth, because there is no legal 

principle that requires the good cause shown to be consistent 

with the court’s prior, contemporaneous rationale. Indeed, we 

have said that trial court’s articulation of its reasoning, including its knowledge of docket congestion, is not competent evidence to support a finding of good cause, 25 because, by statute, 

the judge presiding at the trial may not testify as a witness. 26

The burden under § 29-1207(4)(f ) is simply that there be “good 

cause.” In determining whether the trial court clearly erred in 

finding good cause after a hearing on a motion for discharge, 

we look not just to the evidence presented at the hearing on 

the motion for discharge, but to the whole of the record. 27 The 

only timing requirement implicit in § 29-1207(4)(f ) is that the 

substantial reason affording a legal excuse objectively existed 

at the time of the delay.

24 See State v. Kolbjornsen, 295 Neb. 231, 888 N.W.2d 153 (2016).

25 See, e.g., State v. Baird, supra note 12.

26 Neb. Rev. Stat. § 27-605 (Reissue 2016).

27 See State v. Soltis, 11 Neb. App. 61, 644 N.W.2d 160 (2002).
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The State did not fabricate good cause that did not exist at 

the time of the court’s sua sponte orders delaying trial. Rather, 

at the hearing on the motion for discharge, the State presented 

competent evidence that conditions relating to the COVID-19 

pandemic were present at the time of the judicial delays. Chase 

does not contest that those conditions provided good cause.

In summary, we find no merit to Chase’s argument on appeal 

that she was deprived of her statutory right to a speedy trial 

because the evidence supporting good cause for the judicial 

delays was adduced at the hearing on the motion for discharge 

and the court did not articulate its reasoning at the time those 

delays were ordered. We need not determine whether Chase 

consented to the court’s continuances on May 28 and June 11, 

2020, by responding “[o]kay” to the court’s statements from 

the bench about when trial could be scheduled.

CONCLUSION

We affirm the judgment of the district court, which affirmed 

the order of the county court denying Chase’s motion for absolute discharge.

Affirmed.

Heavican, C.J., not participating.