ALD-159 NOT PRECEDENTIAL 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 

___________ 

No. 18-3020 

___________ 

MIAN SHAHID, 

 Petitioner 

v. 

ATTORNEY GENERAL UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

 Respondent 

____________________________________ 

On Petition for Review of an Order of the 

Board of Immigration Appeals 

(Agency No. A090 669 564) 

Immigration Judge: Honorable Kuyomars Golparvar 

____________________________________ 

Submitted on Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction or, Alternatively, to Summarily 

Deny the Petition for Review 

April 11, 2019 

Before: MCKEE, SHWARTZ and BIBAS, Circuit Judges 

(Opinion filed: June 18, 2019) 

___________ 

OPINION*

___________ 

PER CURIAM 

                                                            

* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not constitute binding

precedent.
2

 Mian Shahid petitions for review of a decision of the Board of Immigration 

Appeals (“BIA”) dismissing his appeal of a decision of an Immigration Judge (“IJ”) 

denying his applications for relief from removal. For the reasons that follow, we grant 

the Government’s motion to summarily deny the petition for review. 

Shahid is a native and citizen of Pakistan. He entered the United States in 1985 

and adjusted his status to a lawful permanent resident in 1990. Shahid was convicted of a 

firearms offense in 1994 and of unlawfully transferring a Social Security card in 2004. 

Removal proceedings were brought in 2006 based on the firearms offense and Shahid 

was released on bond. In 2009, he was convicted of wire fraud, identity fraud, and other 

crimes and sentenced to nine years in prison. Shahid’s immigration proceedings were 

administratively closed as a result. In 2014, the Government filed additional removal 

charges based on Shahid’s other convictions. It charged that he had committed an 

aggravated felony and two crimes involving moral turpitude. The case was ultimately recalendared and an IJ sustained the removal charges. 

 Shahid sought relief from removal and applied for asylum, withholding of 

removal, and relief under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). He also sought a 

waiver of inadmissibility pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1182(h) in connection with an 

application to readjust his status. The IJ found Shahid ineligible for asylum and 

withholding of removal, found him not credible, and denied his remaining claims for 

relief based on the adverse credibility finding. The IJ also denied a waiver and deferral 

of removal under the CAT even assuming he was credible. 
3

On appeal, the BIA affirmed the adverse credibility determination. The BIA 

found that the record supported the inconsistencies cited by the IJ regarding incidents in 

Pakistan upon which his claim was based.1

 The BIA also agreed with the IJ that Shahid’s 

testimony about his criminal history conflicted with the documentary evidence. In 

addition, the BIA affirmed the denial of a waiver and the IJ’s decision that Shahid did not 

meet his burden of proof for deferral of removal under the CAT. 

Shahid filed a petition for review. The Government moves to dismiss the petition 

for lack of jurisdiction or, alternatively, to summarily deny it. 

We have jurisdiction to review a final order of removal pursuant to 8 U.S.C. 

§ 1252(a). Our jurisdiction here is limited to constitutional claims and questions of law 

because Shahid was found removable for having committed an aggravated felony. See 8 

U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(C),(D). The Government asserts that Shahid has not presented a 

colorable constitutional claim or legal question for our review. We conclude that the 

issues raised in his brief are sufficient to invoke our jurisdiction, but that these issues are 

without merit. 

Shahid contends that the BIA applied an unauthorized standard in upholding the 

IJ’s adverse credibility determination. He asserts that the REAL ID Act allows a trier of 

fact to base a credibility determination on, among other things, “the inherent plausibility 

of the applicant’s or witness’s account,” 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii), and that the only 

reasonable interpretation of this provision is that the applicant must have personal 

                                                            

1

The BIA explained that Shahid’s testimony conflicted with his wife’s testimony as to the timing of a visit when she

and their children were held hostage in Pakistan, and as to an incident that occurred when his wife visited Pakistan

in 2015.  The BIA also stated that Shahid’s testimony about the 2015 incident was inconsistent with a police report.  
4

knowledge of the facts to which he testifies. Shahid states that the IJ relied on 

inconsistencies between his testimony and his wife’s testimony about harm his wife 

suffered in Pakistan of which he has no personal knowledge. He states that his testimony 

may have been unreliable, but it does not support a finding that he is not credible. 

As the Government asserts, the consistency of an applicant’s statements with other 

evidence of record is a factor upon which a credibility determination may be based. 8 

U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii). The BIA found the inconsistencies noted by the IJ supported 

by the record and, while it recognized Shahid’s assertion that he was not personally 

involved in the incidents, it stated that it found no error in the IJ’s determination that it 

was reasonable to expect him to have a general understanding of these events. Shahid 

has not shown that the BIA applied an improper legal standard in relying on the 

inconsistent testimony.2

Shahid also contends that his due process rights were violated. Although his 

argument is somewhat unclear, he asserts that the BIA improperly rejected all of his 

testimony because it believed that he “had a pervasive history of being untruthful in 

criminal court proceedings over the span of nearly 20 years.” Pet’r’s Brief at 20. He 

asserts that the Federal Rules of Evidence are instructive, that they allow a person’s 

criminal history to be used for impeachment purposes, but that there are limits on the 

admission of convictions over 10 years old. He argues that the BIA improperly used 

                                                            

2

Because our jurisdiction is limited to the review of constitutional claims and legal questions, we do not consider

whether the record supports the adverse credibility finding.  See Chen v. Gonzales, 434 F.3d 212, 216 (3d Cir. 2005)

(adverse credibility decisions are factual findings).
5

convictions that were more than 10 years old to support the adverse credibility 

determination. 

The BIA, however, merely agreed with the IJ that Shahid’s credibility was 

undermined because he gave misleading testimony at his hearing about his criminal 

history. The BIA stated that Shahid tried to downplay the significance of his criminal 

proceedings in 2000 for human smuggling, that he tried to evade responsibility when 

asked about his fraud convictions, and that his misleading testimony was consistent with 

a decision reflecting that he had lied in federal court in the past. The BIA agreed with the 

IJ that he lacked candor. Shahid has not shown a due process violation based on the 

BIA’s decision that this testimony supports an adverse credibility finding. 

Shahid also contends that the agency’s reliance on testimony that was not based on 

his personal knowledge violated his due process rights. As discussed above, Shahid has 

not shown a legal error in this regard. In addition, Shahid provided his testimony, his 

wife’s testimony, and the police report to support his claim for relief from removal. He 

has not shown a due process violation based on the determination that inconsistencies in 

the evidence support an adverse credibility finding. 

Finally, Shahid argues that the BIA’s reliance on a flawed adverse credibility 

determination compromised how it assessed his claim for relief under the Convention 

Against Torture. He contends that, due to the adverse credibility finding, the BIA refused 

to consider past events in determining whether he met his burden of proof. The BIA 

stated that, in light of its affirmance of the adverse credibility finding, it was not 

persuaded that the IJ failed to sufficiently consider evidence of past harm. Shahid has not 
6

shown that the adverse credibility determination is flawed. In addition, the BIA also 

upheld the denial of CAT relief on the ground that Shahid had not pointed to objective 

evidence supporting his claim. 

Accordingly, we grant the Government’s motion to the extent it seeks the 

summary denial of the petition for review because the petition does not present a 

substantial question. See 3d Cir. L.A.R. 27.4; 3d Cir. I.O.P. 10.6.