Filed 5/31/22 Whatley v. Johnson CA2/8

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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION EIGHT

YAUNTANELL K. WHATLEY,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

MELVIN VAN WHITTICKER 

JOHNSON, JR.,

Defendant and Appellant.

 B310249

 Los Angeles County

 Super. Ct. No. 18CHRO00997

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los

Angeles County, Timothy M. Weiner, Judge. Affirmed.

The Mines Law Firm and Jasmine A. Mines for Defendant 

and Appellant.

Jeff Lewis Law, Jeffrey Lewis and Sean C. Rotstan for 

Plaintiff and Respondent.

____________________
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The trial court granted Yauntanell K. Whatley’s petition to 

renew a domestic violence protective order against Melvin Van 

Whitticker Johnson, Jr. Johnson appeals this order.

Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code. 

I

We recount the facts in the light favorable to the order.

Whatley and Johnson had a daughter in late August 2017.

On September 23, 2017, Whatley tried to end her 

relationship with Johnson. When Johnson left her house, 

Whatley locked the door and texted him not to return. Johnson 

broke down Whatley’s doors and chased and yelled at her. He 

took her cell phone from her and threatened to kill her and leave 

her in a ditch. She ran outside and cried for help from neighbors.

Johnson dragged her back inside. Whatley held their infant 

daughter in her arms during these events. Johnson eventually 

left when Whatley’s neighbors said they had called the police.

The court granted Whatley’s petition for a temporary 

protective order. It then held a hearing on Whatley’s petition for 

a domestic violence protective order under the Domestic Violence 

Prevention Act (Fam. Code, § 6200 et seq.). The trial court 

granted the protective order for a year, which it later extended to 

two years.

In September 2018, police arrested Johnson. An 

information charged him with manufacturing an assault weapon 

(§ 30600, subd. (a)), possessing an assault weapon (§ 30605), and 

possessing a firearm in violation of a protective order (§ 29825).

The prosecutor dismissed the first count, and Johnson pleaded 

nolo contendere to the other two counts.

Whatley petitioned the court to renew the protective order.

At the hearing, Whatley testified that Johnson continued to call 
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and text her from blocked numbers and from family and friends’ 

numbers. She submitted records showing many calls from the 

same blocked number, as well as texts from blocked numbers or 

Johnson’s relatives’ numbers. She said she had seen him drive 

by or parked on her street at least twice after the court granted 

the protective order. A neighbor and cousin similarly testified 

they had seen Johnson on the street in front of Whatley’s house 

after the protective order was in effect.

Whatley also testified and submitted court documents 

showing Johnson had been arrested and convicted of violating the 

protective order and possessing an assault weapon. She stated 

Johnson had shown her pictures of an AR-15 assault rifle with 

multiple magazines and tools, as well as threatened to kill her.

She further stated he called her and said “Bitch I know it was 

you” after police arrested him. When counsel asked Johnson 

about his arrest and convictions, he invoked his Fifth 

Amendment right not to testify.

After hearing testimony and argument from counsel, the 

trial court granted the renewal for five years. The court found 

Whatley had met her burden of showing she had a reasonable 

apprehension of future abusive conduct. The court “specifically 

ma[d]e that finding based on the violation of the restraining 

order with regard to the possession of a weapon.”

Johnson appealed. 

We grant Johnson’s motion to augment the record to 

include records filed in the trial court and identified in his 

designation that did not appear in the record in this court. We 

deny his motion to supplement the record with court documents 

relating to later events. We deny Whatley’s motion to strike as 

moot.
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II

Johnson incorrectly argues the order lacks substantial 

support. 

The parties agree we review a court’s renewal of a 

protective order for abuse of discretion and uphold factual 

findings supported by substantial evidence.

The parties diverge on the application of the substantial 

evidence review standard to this case. Johnson argues because 

the trial court only mentioned the possession of firearms in 

violation of the protective order in its ruling, that is the only 

evidence we can consider on appeal. This misunderstands 

substantial evidence review.

Substantial evidence review is a highly deferential 

standard. In applying this standard, we review the record as a 

whole and accept all evidence supporting the order. We disregard 

contrary evidence. We draw all inferences in favor of the order.

We do not reweigh evidence. (Schmidt v. Superior Court (2020) 

44 Cal.App.5th 570, 581.) This is true both for implicit and 

explicit factual findings. Lack of specificity does not undermine a 

finding if the record reveals rational support. (Letgolts v. David 

H. Pierce & Associates, PC (2021) 71 Cal.App.5th 272, 286.) If 

substantial evidence supports the trial court’s findings, they 

govern our review. (Schmidt, at p. 581.) We review the trial 

court’s decision, not its reasoning. (Kokubu v. Sudo (2022) 76 

Cal.App.5th 1074, 1082.)

A court should grant a petition to renew a domestic 

violence protective order where the protected party has a 

reasonable apprehension of future abusive conduct. (Ritchie v. 

Konrad (2004) 115 Cal.App.4th 1275, 1279 (Ritchie).) 
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Substantial evidence supports the trial court’s finding that 

Whatley met this burden. Whatley testified Johnson repeatedly

violated the original protective order. He called and texted her in 

violation of the no-contact provision. Whatley further testified 

she had seen Johnson in front of her house at least twice. A 

neighbor and a cousin also testified they had seen Johnson in 

front of Whatley’s house.

Whatley said she had told multiple authorities that 

Johnson retained weapons after the imposition of the original 

protective order and that she was extremely concerned for the 

safety of her family. He sent her images of assault rifles.

Johnson called her after his arrest and said, “Bitch I know it was 

you.”

Courts properly consider the circumstances that led to the 

original protective order in determining whether to grant a 

renewal. (Ritchie, supra, 115 Cal.App.4th at 1290.) Here, those 

circumstances included Johnson physically breaking down 

Whatley’s door, chasing her around her house while she held 

their infant daughter, threatening her, and grabbing and 

dragging her.

Resolving all conflicts in the evidence and drawing all 

inferences in favor of the judgment, the record contains sufficient 

evidence to support the trial court’s finding Whatley had a 

reasonable apprehension of future abusive conduct. The trial 

court did not abuse its discretion. 

Johnson contends the trial court’s consideration of his 

convictions violated section 1016, subdivision (3). That section 

prevents the use of a misdemeanor nolo contendere plea or any 

admissions made in connection with the plea from being used as 

admissions against the defendant in later civil suits based upon 
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the same conduct. Johnson argues the domestic violence 

protective order hearing was a later civil suit and it was therefore 

improper for the court to consider his plea as an admission that 

he possessed a firearm in violation of the protective order.

Johnson forfeited this issue by not raising it below.

Johnson also argues his trial counsel was ineffective. 

Whatley’s opposition points out the doctrine about ineffective 

assistance of counsel applies only to criminal cases and thus is 

irrelevant to this appeal. Johnson’s reply cites four cases. None 

mentions the doctrine of ineffective assistance of counsel. (See 

People v. Yartz (2005) 37 Cal.4th 529, 534–542; Watson v. Dept. of 

Transportation (1998) 68 Cal.App.4th 885, 889–895; Reyes v. 

Liberman Broadcasting, Inc. (2012) 208 Cal.App.4th 1537, 1543–

1560, review granted and opinion superseded by Reyes v. 

Liberman Broadcasting, Inc. (2012) 149 Cal.Rptr.3d 675, review 

dismissed and remanded by Reyes v. Liberman Broadcasting, Inc. 

(2014) 176 Cal.Rptr.3d 265; In re Marriage of Priem (2013) 214 

Cal.App.4th 505, 509–513.) 

This presentation offers no authority for reversing the 

judgment.

In his reply, Johnson asks us to exercise our discretion to 

address the issue because it is purely legal. We decline to decide 

this unnecessary question. 
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DISPOSITION

We affirm and award costs to Whatley. 

WILEY, J.

We concur: 

STRATTON, P. J. 

GRIMES, J.