NOT RECOMMENDED F OR F ULL-TEXT PUBLICATION F ile Nam e: 13a0435n.06 No. 12-6018 UNITED STAT ES COURT OF AP P EALS F OR THE S IXTH CIRCUIT GA RY COLYER,

Plaintif f-Appellant ,

v. TRAVELER’S INSURANCE COMP ANY, a foreign corporation; TRAVELER’S LIFE AND ANNUITY COM P ANY, a foreign cor poration,

Defendants, and
TRAVELER’S INDEMNITY COMP ANY, a foreign corporation,

Defendant - Appellee

. ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ON APPEALFROM THE UNI TED STATES DI STRI CT COURT FOR THE E ASTERN DI STRI CT OF KE NTUCKY O P I N I O N

BEFORE: CLAY and COOK, Cir cuit Judges; and OLIVER, District Judge. *

S O LOMON OLIVER, JR., Chief District Judge. Plaintiff-Appellant Gar y Col y er (“Coly er” ) appeals t he order of the di strict court deny ing him summary judgme nt on his claim of brea ch of settlement ag ree ment and g ranting summary judgme nt to Def endants Trave lers I nsuranc e Company , T ra veler s L ife and Annuity Company , and Trave lers I ndemnity Company (tog ether , “Tra veler s”) on the same claim. For the following rea sons, we AF F IRM the decision of the district
court.

T h e Honora

ble Solomon Oliver, J r., Chief J udg e, United States District Court for th e * Norther n District of Ohio, sitting by desig nation.I. BACKG ROUND AN D P ROCEDURAL HISTORY

A. P roce dural Hi story On J une 28, 2010, Plaintiff filed suit in the United Stat es District Court for the Easter n District of Ke ntucky

ag ainst Trave lers. Plaintiff’s Amende d Complaint asserts a cla im for bre ach of a settlement ag ree ment ag ains t Trave lers, and brea ch of annuity contra ct ag ainst MetL ife
I nsuranc e Company of Connecticut (“Me tL ife” ), who was added as a defe ndant on October 7, 2010. On Dec ember 13, 2010, the district court in these proce eding s enter ed defa ult j u d gm ent ag ainst
MetL ife upon Plaintiff’s motion beca use MetL ife had alleg edly failed to plead or otherwise defe nd

as provided by the Fe dera l Rules of Civil Procedur e. (De fault J

. Orde r, Dist. Ct. Dkt, ECF No. 19.)
MetL ife then moved to set aside the entry of defa ult, which the court g rante d. (Orde r, Dist. Ct. Dkt., ECF No. 31.) On J uly 30, 2012, the United States District Court for the Easter n District of Kentucky
g rante d all Def

endants’ motions for summary judgme nt on all claims, and denied Plaintiff summary judgme nt on all claims. (Orde r and Judgment, Dist. Ct. Dkt, ECF Nos. 66, 67.) The district court g rante d De fe n d an t Trave lers’ motion in reg ard to the brea ch of the settlement ag ree ment claim, finding that Trave lers did not brea ch its ag ree ment with Coly er when it did not challeng e a state court’s o rd er o f garnishment of an annuity , pay able to Coly er, that
Trave lers had purcha sed as part of the settlement ag ree ment. ( Id. at 8.) The district court also found that Trave lers did not have a duty to challeng e the g arnishment order under Kentucky law, and that in g ener al a g arnishee may not claim an exemption to a g arnishment order under Kentucky law. ( Id.
at 6.) The court found that, contra ry to Plaintiff- Appellant’s asser tion, the case of J.G. W

entworth

v. Jones , 28 S.W .3d 309 (Ky

. Ct. App. 2000), did not control in this case , and did not “stand for the proposition that the owner of an annuity has a duty or obliga tion, either imp l i ed o r expressed, to

2asser

t the defe nses aff

orded a judgme nt debtor.” ( Id. at 8.) The court also found that Trave lers had not br eac hed its settlement with Coly er when they did not intervene to stop the g arnishment of the annuity

. ( Id. at 9.) Finally , the court noted t h at t h e gar nishment order s wer e reg ular in form, and that if Coly er believed that the annuity was not subject to a p ro p er gar n i s h ment order , the court would not ha

ve jurisdiction to revie w the g arnishment order s under the Rooke r-Feldman doctrine. ( Id. at 10.) On Aug ust 28, 2012, Plaintiff timely appea led the district cour t’s Orde r g ranting summary judgme nt to Trave lers and Metlife. On November 9, 2012, MetL ife was dismiss ed from the appea l upon stipulation of the parties.
B. Fac tual History 1. The Settlement Ag ree ment Plaintiff, a former resident of Kentucky , was seriously injured in an automobile acc ident in
No v em b er 1 9 9 0 in Pulaski County , Kentucky

. (Appe llant Br

. at 3.) Plaintiff sued the tortfea so r driver and his insurance company , Def endant Trave lers I nsuranc e Company , in the L ondon Division of the United States District Court for the Easter n District of Kentucky

. (

Id. ) The suit was settled, and Plaintiff ag ree d to a structure d settlement with Trave lers I nsuranc e Company that was to pay him

one thousand dollars ($1,000.00) for life or a maxi mum of thirty y ear s (the “Settlement Ag ree ment”

or “Agree m en t ”). (

Id. ) As part of the Settlement Ag ree ment, Trave lers I nsuranc e Company was allowed to purcha se an annuity to fund its o b l i gati on to Plaintiff. ( Id. ) The specific contra ctual provision reg arding the annuity stated, in rele vant par

t: Trave lers shall be the owner of any such annuity policy and shall have a ll rights of owner ship. The principal benef iciary of s u ch an nuity policy shall be the plaintiff Gar y Coly er a lthough he shall not be the owne r of the policy

.
3...Trave lers shall have the annuity car rier mail pay

ments direc tly to the plaintiff Gar y Coly er, if living, or if dece ased, then to such per son or entity as shall be e ntitled to them.
I n the event that Trave lers purcha ses an annui ty contra ct pursuant to the previous para g raph, then Trave lers shall rema in liable for, and g uara ntee the pay

ments of, all amounts due under

this ag ree ment until all amounts have bee n paid in full. The plaintiff Gar

y Coly er here by acknow ledg es that the periodic pay ments descr ibed above cannot be acc eler ated, defe rre d, incre ased or decr ease d nor shall plaintiff Gar y Coly er, or any pay ee h ave the power to sell, mortg ag e, encumbe r or anticipate the periodic pa

y ments, or any

part ther eof, by

assig nment or otherw ise. ( Id. at 4.) Trave lers exercised this option, and purcha sed an annuity from Trave lers L ife and Annuity Company to be paid acc ording to the terms of the Settlement Ag ree ment. ( Id. ) The pay

ments beg an 1
in J anuar y 1993. ( Id. ) 2. The Walk N Vision Case
I n 1988, Plaintiff partne red with former Kentucky Gover nor J ulian Carroll (“Ca rr o l l”) to form W al k N Vision, I nc., a softwar e company targ eting video adver tising at shopping mall
customers. (Appe llee Br

. at 7.) The company was soon failing , and Carroll signe d nine separ ate promissory notes g uara

nteeing Walk N Vision’s debt. ( Id. ) At Carroll’s demand, Coly er also signe d

a promissory note g uara

nteeing half of any debt incurre d by Wa l k N Vi s i o n . ( Id. ) Coly er later moved awa

y from Kentucky , leaving Carroll liable for the entirety of Walk N Vision’s corpor ate debt. ( Id. ) Walk N Vision failed four m onths later, leaving a tot al corporate debt of $158,782.56. ( Id. at 8.) Car

roll satisfied the entire debt using persona l funds. ( Id. )

The annuity was purcha sed from Trave lers L ife and Annuity Company , which was at that 1 time a part of Trave lers. Trave lers L ife and Annuity Company was later acquir ed by MetL ife, and then merg ed into MetL ife, along with Trave lers I nsuranc e Company

. After the merg er, the annuity beca me MetL ife’s oblig ation. 4I n Fe bruar y 1993, Carroll sued Coly er in Fr anklin Circuit Court, Kentucky , seeking damag es for half of Walk N Vision’s corpor ate debt. ( Id. at 9.) After a bench trial, the Fr anklin Circuit Court
enter ed judgme nt for Carroll, g ranting h im $79,391.28 in damag es, with interest. ( Id. ) Carroll subsequently filed for a writ of g arnishment ag ainst Coly er’ s annuity pay ments, and t h e Fr anklin Circuit Court issued a gar nishment order for the same a mount and serve d it on Travele rs L ife and Annuity Company on Aug ust 22, 1995. ( Id. ) The order require d annuity pay ments of $1,000 to be made direc tly to Carroll. ( Id. at 9–10.) Trave lers L i fe an d Annuity Company complied with the order

. ( Id. at 10.) The g arnishment order included a leg al notice sent to C o l y er , as the judgme nt debtor, which stated t hat if any funds wer e exempt from g arnishment, he w as to “c laim and prove
any applicable exemption.” ( Id. ) Coly er did not challeng e the g arnishment order at the time. ( Id. ) 3. The Ga rnishment Orde r I n Aug ust 2006, Coly er moved the Fr anklin Circuit Court to set aside the g arnishment order , which the court did. (

Id. at 11.) At this point, Me tL ife was the issuer of the annuity , and it made a $1,000 pay

ment to Coly er in September 2006. ( Id. ) Carroll then moved to reinstate the g arnishment. ( Id. ) I n response , MetL ife withheld further annuity pay ments until the Fr anklin Circuit Court could addre ss Carroll’s motion. ( Id. ) Nea rly a y ear afte r Carroll’s motion, the court reinstated the
g arnishment, but at a reduc ed rate of $650 a month. ( Id. ) I n November 2008, the court reduc ed the
g arnishment fur

ther, this time to $250 a month. ( Id. )
I n May 2009, MetL ife was still withholding pay ments, so Coly er and Carroll rea ched a settlement over the annuity pay ments withheld by MetL ife between October 2006 and J une 2009. ( Id. ) Pursuant to that settlement, MetL ife made lump sum pay ments of $16,000 to both Coly er and Carroll. ( Id. ) Coly er and Carroll also ag ree d to an arr ang ement by which MetL ife was to pay Coly er

5$700 a month and Carroll $300 a month from the annuity until either Coly er ’s death or Fe bruar y 2033, whicheve r ca

me first. ( Id. )
II. ST ANDAR

D OF REVIEW We revie w a district court’s g rant of summary judgme nt de novo . Mazur v. Y oung , 507 F.3d 1013, 1016 (6th Cir. 2007). Summary judgme nt is appropr iate wher e “ther e is no g enuine issue as
to any materia l fac t and .

. . the m oving party is en t i t l ed t o j u d gm ent as a matter of law.” Fe d. R. Civ. P. 56(c)

. As t h e m o v i n g parties, Def endants bear the burden of showing the absenc e of a
g enuine issue of materia l fac t as to at least one essential element on eac h of Plaintiffs’ claims. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett , 477 U.S. 317, 324 (1986). Plaintiffs, as the non-moving parties, must then
prese nt sufficie nt evidenc e from whi ch a jury could rea sonably find for them. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc ., 477 U.S. 242, 252 (1986). The court must then deter mine “whe ther the evidenc e
prese nts a sufficie nt disag ree ment to require submissi on to a jury or whether it is so one-sided that
one par ty must prevail as a matter of law.” Id. at 251–52. I n making this determination, the cour t
must draw all rea sonable infere nces in favor of Plaintiffs. See Nat’l Enters., Inc. v. Smith , 114 F.3d 561, 563 (6th Cir. 1997).
III. LAW AND ANALYSIS A. Jurisdiction
Trave lers contends that the d i s t ri ct court lacke d subject matter jurisdiction over the case below beca

use Coly er soug ht revie w of a final judgme nt of a state court. (Appe llee Br

. at 17.) Under the Rooke r-Feldman doctrine, “a United States District Court has no authority to revie w final j u d g ments of a state court in judicial proce eding s.” District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman , 460 U.S. 462, 482 (1983). I n Exx on Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Industries Corp. , 544 U.S.

6280 (2005), the Supreme Court clar ified that the Rooke r-Feldman doctrine divested a United States

district court only in “limited circ umstances.” Exx on Mobil , 544 U.S. at 291. The Court emphasized that Rooke r-Feldman does not “stop a district court from ex er ci s i ng subject-matter jurisdiction simply beca

use a party attempts to litigate in fede ral court a matter previously litigated in state court.” Id. at 293. Since Exx on Mobil , our court has “t i gh t ened the scope of Rooke r-Feldman .”
Kovacic v. Cuyahoga County Dep’ t of Children & Family Servs. , 606 F.3d 301, 309 (6th Cir. 2010) (citations omitted). I n Kovacic , we ree mphasized that “the pertinent inquiry afte r Exx on is whether the ‘sourc e of the injury ’ upon which plaintiff bases his fede ral claim is the state court judgme nt, not simply whether the injury complained of is ‘inextrica b ly in te rtwined’ with the state-c ourt judgme nt.”
Kovacic , 606 F.3d at 309 (citing McCormick v. Braverm an , 451 F.3d 382, 393–95 (6th Cir. 2006)). Def endants state that the district court “held” that Rooke r-Feldman meant it did not have subject matter jurisdiction over this case . (Appe llee Br

. at 17.) This is incorre ct. The district court

m er el y stated at the end of its order that “if Coly er believes ‘[t] he annuity was not subject t o
g arnishment, and the order was invalid on its fa ce,’ then he is better off making such arg uments in
state court beca

use ‘a United S tates District C ourt has no authority to revie w final judgme nts of a
state court in judicial proce eding s.’” (Orde r, Dist. Ct. Dkt, ECF No. 66 (citing Feldman , 460 U.S.
at 482)). The district court included this stateme nt to explain that if Coly er wanted relief from the
g arnishment order itself, such relief was not available in t h e d i s t ri ct court. The g rava men of the district court’s order was that Trave lers had not brea ched the Settlement Ag ree ment, and that it did
not have a duty to intervene ag ainst the g arni s h ment order and claim an exemption for Coly er. Coly er’ s suit was a brea ch of contra ct claim, and not an “appe al” from the state court’s g arnishment

7order

. There fore , the Rooke r-Feldman doctrine did not bar the district court from hear ing Plaintiff’s

claims. Def

endants also contend that the district court did not have jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s suit becau s e P l ai ntiff did not at any time state that the fede ral court “re tained jurisdiction” under the Settlement Ag ree ment. (Appe llee Br. at 20.) Def endant s rely on Kokkone n v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of America , 511 U.S. 375 (1994), in which the Supreme Court held that a settlement ag ree ment leading to dismiss al of a case in fede ral court could onl y be enforce d in a st ate cou rt , u n l ess t here

rema ined an “indepe ndent basis for jurisdiction” or the settlement contained a “re taining jurisdiction” clause

. Kokkone n , 511 U.S. at 376–77, 381. Howeve r, we have previously explained that Kokkone n does not divest fede ral courts of jurisdiction over the enfor ceme nt of such settlements wher e there is diversity jurisdiction over the settlement enfor ceme nt. Limbright v. Hofmeister , 566 F.3d 672, 676 (6th Cir. 200 9 ) (“ Gi v en this context, Kokkone n ' s failure to consider diversity jurisdiction expli citly likely ref lects the obvious lack of the requi re d amount in controve rsy (the enfor ceme nt action at issue sought only the re turn of ce rtain files), not a hidden intent to prec lude
summary enfor ceme nt based on diversity jurisdiction.”). The district court had diversity jurisdiction

o v er t his case under 28 U.S.C. § 1332, as it is undisputed that Coly er and Trave lers are from differ ent states (F lorida and Kentucky , respe ctively ), and the amount in controve rsy was g rea ter than $75,000. Plaintiff stated as much in his Complaint. (Compl, Dist. Ct. Dkt, ECF No. 1.) Def endants have raised no issues reg arding diversity jurisdiction. There fore , Def endants’ arg ument that the Settlement Ag ree ment did not contain a ‘r etaining jurisdiction clause’ is of no c onsequenc e.

8B. Breach of S ett lem ent Agr eem ent

Plaintiff contends that Trave lers brea ched the Settlement Ag ree ment when he did not rec eive the ag ree d-upon pay

ments as require d. (Appe llant Br

. at 8.) Plaintiff focuse s on the lang uag e of the
ag ree ment , which states that appellee “ shall have the annuity car rier mail pay

ments direc tly to appellant.” (

Id. ) (e mphasis added.) Plaintiff contends that this was a “ mandatory duty ” under

the Ag ree ment, and that the only exception to this duty was Plaintiff’s death, which has not happene d. ( Id. ) Plaintiff also points to lang uag e in the Ag ree ment stating that appellee “ shall rema in liable for, and g uara ntee the pay

ments of all am o u n t s d u e under the Settlement Ag ree ment until all such
amounts have been paid in full.” ( Id. at 9.) Aga i n , P l ai n t i ff contends that his was a “manda tory duty ” under

the Ag ree ment. (

Id. ) Def endants arg ue in response that Trave lers rese rved the rig ht under the Ag ree ment to purcha se an annuity to fund its obliga tion to Plaintiff, which it did. (Appe llee Br

. at 35.) They state that the Settlement Ag ree ment and the Annuity wer e “inextricably linked,” and that they had no duty under the Ag ree ment to stop the pay ments to Carroll pursuant to the g arnishment order

. ( Id. at 36) The district court corr ectly found that Trave lers continued to uphold its end of the Settlement
A g ree ment. Trave lers boug ht the annuity from Trave lers L ife and Annuity Company ( la te r M e tL if e ) , and wa s the owner

of the a nnuity . When the Fr anklin Circuit Court issued the g arnishment order , MetL ife was obliga ted to compl y wi t h it. Under Kentucky L aw, when a person complies with a valid court order , compliance is privileg ed an d d o es not result in liability “so long as that person exercises rea sonable car e to g ive timely notice to the owner of that proper ty , so that the owner may have the opportunity to protec t his interests.” American States Ins. Co. v. Citi zens Fidelity Bank &
Trust Co. , 662 S.W .2d 851, 853 (Ky

. Ct. App. 1983). A valid court order require s three things: “(1)

9it must be reg ular in form, (2) it must be is sued by a court having authority to is s u e t h e p ar t i cular

order and having jurisdiction over the persona l proper ty descr ibed in it, and (3) all proce eding s require d for its proper issuance must have duly taken place .” Id

. Her e, Plaintiff has not put forwa rd
any evidenc e that the g arnishment order was not a valid court order

. Fur ther, Plaintiff had notice of the order from t h e Fr an klin Circuit Court. There fore , MetL ife proper ly complied with the
g arnishment orde r, and Tr avele rs did not brea ch its Ag ree ment with Coly er by ref using to c omply with the order

. C. Duty to Claim Exem ption Plaintiff next arg ues that even if Trave lers did not brea ch the Ag ree ment, it had a duty to stop the g arnishment of the MetL ife annuity by claiming an exemption under Ky

. Rev. Stat. § 425.501. Plaintiff relies on J.G. W

entworth for his arg ument, stating that the case stands for the propositions: “(1) that tort victims reta in no interest susceptible of assig nment in structure d settlement an n u i t y
pay ments; (2) that such pay

ments by insurance companies are e x empt from gar nishment pursuant
t o s tate code and public policy ; and (3) an insurer issuing such an annuity fac es a just i ci ab l e
controve rsy and as such has standing to asser t that the annuity proce eds are exempt from execution.” (Appe llant Br

. at 10.) Fr om this, P l ai n t i ff ar gu es, Trave lers had a duty to asser t that the annuity
proce eds ar e exempt from execution of the g arnishment orde r. Def endants arg ue that while they may have had standing to asser t the exemptions under Ky

. Rev. Stat. § 425.501 and J.G. W entworth , they did not have a duty to do so. (Appe llee Br

. at 27.) Primarily , Def

endants maintain that the law in Kentucky has alway s been that only a judgme nt debtor, in this case Coly er, ma y claim such a

n exemption. (

Id. at 24.)

10Under Ky

. Rev. Stat.§ 425.501, a judgme nt debtor “may appea r and claim the exemption of
any proper

ty or debt that is exempt from execution, and on proof of exemption the g arnishment shall be discha rg ed as to the e x empt proper ty or debt.” Ky . Rev. Stat. § 425.501(4). F urther, [i ]f the court finds that the g arnishee was, at t h e t i m e o f service of the order upon him, possessed of any proper ty of the judgme nt debtor, or was indebted to him, and the proper

ty or debt is not exempt from execution, the court shall order the proper ty or the proc eeds of

the debt applied upon the judgme nt. Ky

. Rev. Stat. 425.501(5). Annuities pay able to judgme nt debtors are exempt from g arnishment at

a rate of up to $350 per month. Ky

. Rev. Stat. § 304.14-330(b)

. I f the annuity pay ments total more than $350 per

month, then the court may order such annuitant to pay a judgme nt cre ditor or app l y on the judgme nt, in installments, such portion of such excess benef its as to the court may appea r just and proper afte r due reg ard for the rea sonable require ments of the judgme nt debtor and his family , if depende nt upon him, as we l l as any pay ments require d to be made by

the annuitant to other c reditors unde r prior c ourt order s. Ky . Rev. Stat. § 304.14-330(c)

. Kentucky courts have g ener ally interpre ted Ky

. Rev. Stat. § 4 2 5.501 to mean that exemptions
to g arnishment order s may only be claimed by the judgme nt debtor and “not by another for his benef it.” Central Supply of Virginia, Inc. v. Commonwealth Life Ins. Co. , 787 S.W .2d 273, 274 (Ky

. Ct. App. 1990). I n J.G. W entworth , howeve r, the Kentucky Court of Appeals held t hat t he owner of an annuity , pay able to a judgme nt debtor, had standing to claim an exemption under Ky

. Rev. Stat. § 425.501 and § 304.13-330 on behalf of the judgme nt debtor. J. G. W entworth , 28 S.W .3d at 316.
I n that case , the court distinguished Central Supply of Virginia ’s rule on standing beca use the owner of the annuity was not fac ed with a single pay m en t o f insurance but an “ong oing barr ag e of continuing g arnishments.” Id. J.G. W entworth may stand for the proposition that Travele rs could

11have standing to claim an exemption from the g arnishment of the annuity pay ments to Coly er in this

case . Thoug h the fac ts of J.G. W entworth are vastly differ ent than in this case , Trave lers would have been subject to “continuing g arnishments ” o ver the time it would have taken for Coly er’ s debt to Carroll to be paid back. Howeve r, we need not decide this issue. Plaintiff’s arg u m en t d o es not simply ask the court to hold that Trave lers had standing to claim an exemptio n on his behalf

. Plaintiff insists that a g arnishee ’s having standi n g to claim an exemption to a g arnishment order

cre ates a duty

to claim such an e x emption. (Appe llant Re ply Br

. at 7.) Howeve r, having standing
to a ssert a claim does not cre ate a duty to asser t tha t c laim. Plaintiff of

fer s no supporting case s for his proposition, but implies that one follows from the other. We have not found any Kentucky law standing for this proposition. Nothing in the J.G. W entworth opinion indicates that the court in that

case intended to cr eate such a duty

. I n addition, Plaintiff arg ues in reply that even if Trave lers did not have a d u t y t o claim an exemption on his behalf

, it did have a duty to deter mine whether the proper

ty soug ht to be g arnished belong ed to him in t h e fi rst place

. ( Id. at 8.) Howeve r, Plaintiff ag ain offe rs no support for this proposition. Acc ording ly , we aff irm the district court’s g ra n t i n g of summary judgme nt to Def endants on the issue of whether Trave lers had a duty to claim an exemption to the g arnishment of his annuity

pay ments. D. Dam ages Plaintiff finally

asks the cour

t to compute the amount of da mag es and inter est he is owed. As we hold tha t the district court corr ectly g rante d summary judgme nt to Def endants, we need not addre ss this i ssue.

12IV. CONCLUSION

For the fore g oing rea sons, we AF F IRM the decision of the district court with respe ct to its
g ranting of summary

judgme nt to Defe ndants on all claims.

13