[DO NOT PUBLISH]

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

________________________

No. 16-16021

________________________

D.C. Docket No. 7:15-cv-00124-WLS-TQL

MARQUISE ROBBINS, 

 Plaintiff-Appellant,

versus

WILLIAM ROBERTSON, 

Food Service Director, Valdosta State Prison, 

VALDOSTA SP WARDEN, 

 Defendants-Appellees,

JOHN AND OR JANE DOE,

 Defendants.

________________________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Middle District of Georgia

________________________

(July 23, 2019)

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Before ED CARNES, Chief Judge, JULIE CARNES, and CLEVENGER,

* Circuit 

Judges.

JULIE CARNES, Circuit Judge: 

Plaintiff Marquise Ali Robbins, a Muslim inmate previously incarcerated at 

Valdosta State Prison (“Valdosta Prison” or “the prison”), filed a pro se 42 U.S.C. 

§ 1983 complaint against Warden Marty Allen and Food Service Director William 

Robertson, alleging that they forced him to choose between violating his religious 

dietary restrictions or suffering malnutrition. Their actions, Plaintiff claims, 

violated his rights under the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act 

(“RLUIPA”), the First Amendment, and the Eighth Amendment. The district court 

dismissed each of the above three claims as failing to state a claim, and it denied 

Plaintiff’s motion to file a second amended complaint. On appeal, Plaintiff 

challenges these rulings. After careful review, and with the benefit of oral 

argument, we dismiss in part, affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand for further 

proceedings.

I. BACKGROUND

In his original § 1983 complaint, Plaintiff sued Warden Allen, Food Service 

Director Robertson, and “John or Jane Doe,” asserting RLUIPA, First Amendment, 

and Eight Amendment claims, as well as state-law negligence claims. After a 

 *

 The Honorable Raymond C. Clevenger, United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, 

sitting by designation.

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magistrate judge screened the complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, the 

district court dismissed, without objection, Plaintiff’s negligence claims and all 

claims against the fictitious defendants. Plaintiff then amended his complaint as a 

matter of course. His first-amended complaint supplemented his original 

complaint, adding Valdosta Prison as a defendant and clarifying his allegations. 

Liberally construing his pleadings, Plaintiff alleged the following. 

Plaintiff’s Islamic faith prohibits him from consuming meat or any animal products 

without knowing how the food product was prepared. Accordingly, when he 

arrived at Valdosta Prison, he opted to receive the prison’s “restricted”1 vegan 

meals. These meals, however, were “meager,” “improperly prepared,” “at times 

inedible,” “diluted,” “stretched,” “unbalanced,” and “unwholesome.” More 

importantly, Plaintiff alleged that the restricted vegan meals contained insufficient 

“nutritional value,” “lacked sufficient calories,” containing only half the nutritional 

value of the wholesome food distributed to other prisoners, and provided less than 

a total of 95 grams of protein daily. All inmates received three meals daily on 

Monday through Thursday, and two meals daily on Friday through Sunday, but 

Plaintiff was unable to eat anything on Saturdays because the prison served only 

 1 The record does not clarify the difference between a “restricted” vegan meal and an 

“unrestricted” vegan meal, but we will continue to repeat the terminology the parties use, 

assuming that a “restricted vegan meal” is intended to be consistent with the dictates of Islamic 

dietary rules.

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peanut butter sandwiches with jelly, and the jelly contained gelatin, which is a pork 

ingredient that his religion forbids. 

He alleged that the prison sometimes failed to observe its own regulations, 

which were designed to ensure that inmates on restricted diets received appropriate 

meals. Contrary to their own regulations, prison officials prepared under-portioned 

meals that lacked sufficient protein, placed vegan meals next to non-vegan meals 

on food carts, and served vegan meals on food trays that did not hold enough food 

or were not properly color-coded, and therefore did not assure an inmate that his 

meal was a restricted vegan meal. Warden Allen also determined that inmates 

would receive only two, rather than three, meals on Fridays. Further, the meals 

were unsanitary and contaminated, as officers served food items while wearing 

gloves that frequently came into contact with rusty food slots; food remnants could 

be seen on the food trays; dishwashing chemicals sometimes polluted the coffee;

beverage pitchers were also used for cleaning; and the ice cooler produced ice

containing insects, dirt, and food crumbs.

Plaintiff alleged that, as a result of nutritionally inadequate meals, he

suffered “physical, mental, and emotional anguish,” including “throbbing 

headaches, constant fatigue from lack of energy, abdominal pains produced from 

constant hunger pangs, dizziness in the late night hours that prevented sleep, lack 

of concentration that prevented [his] ability to focus on simple daily routines such 

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as reading, writing, and exercising, and frequent weakness in [his] extremities,” as 

well as weight loss. Plaintiff sought medical treatment due to his “prolonged 

nutritional condition,” and on March 24, 2015 Nurse Seleska examined him. 

When he informed her that he had symptoms from lack of food, she said “oh 

you[’re] just on a Marty Allen’s diet,” which Plaintiff believed “indicate[d] that 

Warden Marty Allen [was] well aware of the preparation and servings of the food 

trays, yet, he condone[d] the unbalanced nutrition of the meals.” Nurse Seleska 

prescribed multivitamins and drew blood for further examination. A week or two 

later, Plaintiff was prescribed an additional medical nutritional meal supplement, 

which consisted of a meat sandwich, milk, and an apple or orange. The meat 

sandwich and milk were not consistent with a vegan diet, so he refused to ingest 

them, and for over two months prison officials disregarded his request for a peanut 

butter sandwich and soymilk. 

Plaintiff alleged that he wrote letters to Food Service Director Robertson, 

who was responsible for the food service operations, and informed him that the 

inadequate diet was causing him to suffer from various ailments. He and other 

prisoners also filed grievances with Warden Allen, who was ultimately responsible 

for prison operations and inmate welfare. But “no action was taken,” even though 

the prisoners had explained that the religious meals were inadequate. Plaintiff

alleges that he faced “a Hobson’s choice”—either eat the regular prison meals 

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forbidden by his religious beliefs or eat the restricted vegan diet in accordance with 

his religious tenets, but suffer from starvation and malnutrition. 

According to Plaintiff, his restricted vegan diet was inadequate from January 

2015, when he first received these meals, through April 2015. In apparent 

response to his various complaints, the meals temporarily improved from April 

2015 through June 2015, but the meals again became unsatisfactory after that, from 

“6/15 and ongoing.”2

 Plaintiff sought damages and injunctive relief. 

Defendants moved to dismiss Plaintiff’s first-amended complaint. Plaintiff 

opposed the motion and moved for leave to file a second-amended complaint that 

would replace the original John and Jane Doe defendants with a generic group of 

defendants: “VSP Kitchen Supervisors.” According to the proposed secondamended complaint, the kitchen supervisors “knowingly with callous indifference 

improperly applied the restricted vegan menu to all the inmates who consumed the 

meals in the segregation unit,” “failed to enact mandated standard operating 

procedures (SOP) and ensure [that the] directives and master menu [were] 

thoroughly complied with—and failed to adequately supervise inmate worker’s 

preparation and service of meals that caused Plaintiff’s injuries.” 

 2

 Plaintiff was transferred from Valdosta Prison to Hays State Prison on September 21, 2016. 

Thus, he is alleging that inadequate meals resumed from June 2015–September 21, 2016. 

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A magistrate judge issued a report and recommendation (“R&R”), 

recommending that the district court deny Plaintiff’s motion to file a secondamended complaint because he had delayed in identifying the prison kitchen 

supervisor defendants and had not alleged any specific facts regarding how many 

supervisors there were or how their conduct affected his original claims. The 

magistrate judge also recommended that the district court grant Defendants’ 

motion to dismiss. The magistrate judge concluded that Plaintiff had not stated a 

claim for monetary relief under RLUIPA because that statute did not create a cause 

of action for monetary relief against prison officials in their individual capacities, 

and, as to any official capacity claim, the prison enjoyed sovereign immunity as a 

state agency. As for Plaintiff’s RLUIPA injunctive-relief claim and his First 

Amendment claim, the magistrate judge held that Plaintiff had not pled a 

“substantial burden” on his religious beliefs because he relied on labels and 

conclusions, failed to explain how the food preparation impinged upon his 

religious beliefs, and did not describe food-preparation practices that rose above 

mere inconveniences. The magistrate judge also concluded that Plaintiff failed to 

state an Eighth Amendment claim because he had not alleged facts showing that 

Defendants knowingly provided less than reasonably adequate food or that the 

meals presented an unreasonable risk of serious harm, particularly because Plaintiff

admitted that the prison provided supplements with the meals. 

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Over Plaintiff’s objections, the district court adopted the R&R and dismissed 

Plaintiff’s complaint. The district court denied Plaintiff’s motion to file a secondamended complaint, agreeing with the magistrate judge that the amendment 

contained only conclusory and speculative allegations against an unknown number 

of kitchen supervisors. The court also agreed with the magistrate judge that 

Plaintiff’s RLUIPA and First Amendment claims relied on mere labels and 

conclusions. Finally, regarding the Eighth Amendment claim, the court found that 

Plaintiff did not plausibly allege that the restricted vegan meals failed to provide a 

reasonably adequate diet of sufficient nutritional value to preserve health, or that 

Defendants acted with a culpable state of mind in depriving Plaintiff of an 

adequate diet. 

II. DISCUSSION 

On appeal, Plaintiff acknowledges that he was transferred from Valdosta 

Prison to Hays State Prison in September 2016. Nevertheless, he argues that his 

transfer does not moot his claim for injunctive relief against Valdosta Prison. He 

also argues that the district court erred in dismissing his complaint and abused its 

discretion in denying his motion to file a second-amended complaint. We discuss 

each issue in turn.

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A. Mootness of Injunctive Relief

Citing Hardwick v. Brinson, 523 F.2d 798 (5th Cir. 1975), Plaintiff contends 

that his transfer from Valdosta Prison to Hays State Prison did not moot his request

for injunctive relief because “Defendants have not assured the court that he will not 

be transferred back to [Valdosta Prison],” which he says is one of the few Georgia 

state prisons that can accommodate his religious dietary preferences. Moreover he 

says he has complained about the same issues at Hays State Prison. 

We review de novo whether a case is moot. Haynes v. Hooters of Am., LLC, 

893 F.3d 781, 784 (11th Cir. 2018). When a case becomes moot on appeal, “we 

are divested of jurisdiction,” Ethredge v. Hail, 996 F.2d 1173, 1175 (11th Cir. 

1993), and “must dismiss the appeal, vacate the district court’s judgment, and 

remand with instructions to dismiss as moot,” Thomas v. Bryant, 614 F.3d 1288, 

1294 (11th Cir. 2010) (quotation marks omitted).

Our precedent forecloses Plaintiff’s argument that his claim for injunctive 

relief is not moot. “The general rule is that a prisoner’s transfer or release from a 

jail moots his individual claim for declaratory and injunctive relief” even when 

“there is no assurance that he will not be returned to the jail.” McKinnon v. 

Talladega Cty., Ala., 745 F.2d 1360, 1363 (11th Cir. 1984). Plaintiff has not 

shown that an exception to this rule applies. There is no indication that Defendants 

attempted “to evade the jurisdiction of the court” by transferring him, id., and 

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Plaintiff has made no showing that his complaints are capable of repetition, yet 

evade review. See United States v. Sanchez-Gomez, 138 S. Ct. 1532, 1540 (2018) 

(“A dispute qualifies for that exception only ‘if (1) the challenged action is in its 

duration too short to be fully litigated prior to its cessation or expiration, and 

(2) there is a reasonable expectation that the same complaining party will be 

subjected to the same action again.’”).

Further, Hardwick, on which Plaintiff primarily relies, does not support his 

argument. In Hardwick, an inmate who had been transferred within the Georgia 

state prison system filed lawsuits in the Northern, Southern, and Middle Districts 

of Georgia, challenging the prison system’s mail-censorship policies. Hardwick, 

523 F.2d at 799–800. The inmate requested injunctive relief in the Southern and 

Middle Districts. Id. Importantly, the lawsuit in the Middle District, where the 

inmate was then incarcerated, named as a defendant the head of the state prison 

system, meaning that an injunction would bind all of the defendants in the three 

lawsuits if the inmate ultimately prevailed there. Id. at 800–01. Under these

circumstances, the former Fifth Circuit held that the inmate’s transfer from the 

Southern District to the Middle District did not moot his request for injunctive 

relief, but that he was entitled to pursue his injunctive-relief claim only in the 

district where he was currently incarcerated, namely, the Middle District of 

Georgia. Id. 

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Hardwick is not analogous to the present case. Plaintiff has not sued the 

head of the Georgia state prison system for a policy implemented systemwide, but 

instead seeks an injunction against two individuals who have authority only over 

Valdosta Prison—a place where he no longer resides. Thus, an injunction 

directing these officials to provide Plaintiff with an adequate vegan diet would be 

an empty order, as these officials no longer have any ability to provide Plaintiff 

with any food—nutritional or otherwise. Nor is Plaintiff’s argument that a live 

controversy exists strengthened by the fact that he has brought “a similar suit 

against Hays State.” See McKinnon, 745 F.2d at 1363 (rejecting similar arguments 

based on Hardwick). Indeed, that Plaintiff has filed a similar suit against the 

prison in which he resides—Hays State Prison—indicates that this is the institution 

where injunctive relief has the potential to provide effective relief. See Hardwick, 

523 F.2d at 800–01. 

In short, given Plaintiff’s transfer to Hayes State Prison, an injunction 

directing his former prison officials to provide Plaintiff with a particular diet would 

provide Plaintiff with no relief. See Flanigan’s Enterprises, Inc. of Ga. v. City of 

Sandy Springs, Ga., 868 F.3d 1248, 1255 (11th Cir. 2017) (en banc) (“[T]he 

Supreme Court has routinely cautioned that a case becomes moot if an event 

occurs while a case is pending on appeal that makes it impossible for the court to 

grant any effectual relief whatever to a prevailing party.” (quotation marks 

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omitted)), cert. denied sub nom. Davenport v. City of Sandy Springs, Ga., 138 S. 

Ct. 1326 (2018).

Because Plaintiff’s request for injunctive relief is moot, we lack jurisdiction 

to review his injunctive-relief claim. Ethredge, 996 F.2d at 1175. Accordingly, 

we dismiss his appeal to the extent that Plaintiff appeals the dismissal of his 

injunctive-relief claim, vacate that portion of the district court’s order, and remand. 

Thomas, 614 F.3d at 1294. On remand, the district court shall dismiss Plaintiff’s 

request for injunctive relief as moot.3

B. Dismissal for Failure to State a Claim

Plaintiff challenges the district court’s determination that he failed to state a 

claim under the First and Eighth Amendments.

4

 “We review the district court’s 

grant of a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim de novo, accepting the 

allegations in the complaint as true and construing them in the light most favorable 

 3

 We note that, on appeal, Plaintiff characterizes his request for injunctive relief as arising from 

his RLUIPA claim, even though his complaint did not specify which claim supported such relief. 

To be clear, our mootness ruling applies equally to Plaintiff’s RLUIPA, First Amendment, and 

Eighth Amendment claims to the extent that Plaintiff seeks an injunction based on these claims. 

4 We conclude that he has abandoned on appeal any challenge to the district court’s

determination that he failed to state a claim for damages, as opposed to injunctive relief, under 

RLUIPA. See GeorgiaCarry.Org, Inc. v. Georgia, 687 F.3d 1244, 1250 n.10 (11th Cir. 2012) 

(concluding that the plaintiffs had abandoned an argument not contained in their appellate brief). 

In any event, the district court correctly concluded that RLUIPA does not create a cause of action 

against state officials in their individual capacities, Smith v. Allen, 502 F.3d 1255, 1275 (11th 

Cir. 2007), abrogated on other grounds by Sossamon v. Texas, 563 U.S. 277 (2011), and 

sovereign immunity bars RLUIPA claims for money damages against state officials in their 

official capacities, Sossamon, 563 U.S. at 280, 293.

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to the plaintiff.” Hunt v. Aimco Props., L.P., 814 F.3d 1213, 1221 (11th Cir. 

2016). “To withstand a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), a complaint must 

include ‘enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Id.

(quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). “A ‘claim has 

facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to 

draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct 

alleged.’” Id. (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)). “Plaintiff’s 

allegations must amount to ‘more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic 

recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.’” Id. (quoting Twombly,

550 U.S. at 555). “A document filed pro se is to be liberally construed, and a pro 

se complaint, however inartfully pleaded, must be held to less stringent standards 

than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 

(2007) (citations omitted) (quotation marks omitted).

1. First Amendment Claim

Plaintiff has alleged that when the Valdosta Prison Warden and the Food 

Service Director provided him with food that complied with the dietary laws of his

religion, this compliant food was often so nutritionally inadequate that it caused 

Plaintiff to become ill. He also alleges that when these prison officials provided 

him with nutritionally adequate food, the food often failed to comply with his 

Islamic religious beliefs. For example, Plaintiff points to weekend meals of peanut 

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butter and jelly sandwiches, which were perhaps nutritionally adequate, but were 

nonetheless non-compliant with his religious dietary laws because jelly contains 

gelatin obtained from pigs. Plaintiff argues that, as a result of this months-long 

conduct by the Warden and Food Service Director, he faced “a Hobson’s choice” 

between eating meals that violated his religious beliefs or suffering from 

malnutrition.

To state a claim under the First Amendment’s Free Exercise Clause, a 

plaintiff must plead facts showing a “substantial burden” on a sincerely held 

religious belief. See GeorgiaCarry.Org, 687 F.3d at 1256 (“First Amendment Free 

Exercise Clause precedent is clear: a plaintiff must allege a constitutionally 

impermissible burden on a sincerely held religious belief to survive a motion to 

dismiss.”); see also Hernandez v. Comm’r, 490 U.S. 680, 699 (1989) (“The free 

exercise inquiry asks whether government has placed a substantial burden on the 

observation of a central religious belief or practice . . . .”). A “substantial burden,” 

however, involves something more than an incidental effect or inconvenience on 

religious exercise and “is akin to significant pressure which directly coerces the 

religious adherent to conform his or her behavior accordingly.” Midrash Sephardi, 

Inc. v. Town of Surfside, 366 F.3d 1214, 1227 (11th Cir. 2004). In Holt v. Hobbs, 

the Supreme Court held that a policy substantially burdens a prisoner’s religious 

exercise if it forces him to choose between engaging in conduct that seriously 

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violates his religious beliefs or facing a serious penalty. 135 S. Ct. 853, 862 (2015) 

(holding that a prison’s grooming policy substantially burdened a Muslim 

prisoner’s sincerely held religious belief that he must grow a beard).5

Applying the above principles, we agree with Plaintiff that the district court 

erred in dismissing his First Amendment free-exercise claim for failure to plead 

facts plausibly showing a “substantial burden” on his religious exercise. For sure, 

many of Plaintiff’s allegations were conclusory, and we do not fault the district 

court for so characterizing them. For example, Plaintiff’s allegations that his 

restricted vegan meals were “meager,” “at times inedible,” “improperly prepared,” 

“diluted,” “stretched,” “unbalanced,” and “unwholesome” constitute mere labels 

and conclusions that would be insufficient on their own to state a claim for relief. 

Hunt, 814 F.3d at 1221. 

But Plaintiff also made some non-conclusory allegations that plausibly

supported his claim that the Islamic-compliant vegan meals were so nutritionally 

deficient that he was forced to choose between abandoning his religious precepts

(by eating religiously non-compliant food that was nutritionally adequate) or 

 5

 We have applied similar definitions of “substantial burden” when assessing claims under both 

RLUIPA and the Free Exercise Clause. See Midrash Sephardi, 366 F.3d at 1226 (“The Supreme 

Court’s definition of ‘substantial burden’ within its free exercise cases is instructive in 

determining what Congress understood ‘substantial burden’ to mean in RLUIPA.”). Because the 

parties have encouraged us to apply the same definition of “substantial burden” to Plaintiff’s 

RLUIPA and First Amendment claims, we assume without deciding that the term has an 

identical meaning in both contexts for purposes of this appeal.

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suffering serious health consequences (by eating nutritionally inadequate food that 

was religiously compliant). Specifically, Plaintiff alleged that: (1) his meals 

lacked enough calories and protein, containing only half the nutritional value of 

normal meals served at the prison; (2) he could not eat any of the meals served on 

Saturdays; (3) as a result of his diet, he experienced an assortment of serious 

ailments, including throbbing headaches, abdominal pains from hunger pangs, 

dizziness that prevented sleep, weakness in his extremities, and weight loss;

(4) after hearing of his ailments and performing bloodwork, prison medical 

personnel were concerned enough to prescribe vitamin and meal supplements to 

remedy inadequacies in Plaintiff’s diet; and (5) for over two months, he could not 

eat the majority of the medical meal supplements that the prison provided. 

Defendants are correct that Plaintiff could have pled additional details by, 

for example, specifying what food he was served at each meal and explaining how 

he arrived at a conclusion that his meals contained only half the calories of a 

regular prison diet. And if Plaintiff had alleged only that his food was nutritionally 

inadequate, this bare assertion—with no supporting details—would be vulnerable 

to an argument that such a statement was little more than a label or conclusion, 

dressed up to mimic a plausible allegation. But here Plaintiff alleged more. His 

allegation that he was being served food that was nutritionally inadequate was 

bolstered by his additional allegation that he had manifested symptoms of 

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deteriorating health serious enough to warrant a conclusion by prison medical 

professionals that intervention and a change in diet were needed. 

This additional allegation pushes over the plausibility line what might 

otherwise be deemed conclusory allegations. Thus, construing Plaintiff’s 

allegations in the light most favorable to him, Plaintiff has asserted that he was 

forced to choose between his religion and his health, meaning that he has made a 

plausible claim that the named prison officials substantially burdened the exercise 

of his religious belief. Accordingly, we reverse the district court’s dismissal of 

Plaintiff’s First Amendment claim.6

 6

 The parties have focused primarily on Plaintiff’s contention that the meals served to him were 

so lacking in nutrition that he was forced to choose between malnutrition or his religious beliefs. 

We have addressed the same issue in this opinion. Plaintiff’s complaint, however, also includes 

a variety of allegations concerning such things as the lack of sanitation in meal preparation and 

violations of prison policies concerning the way in which his meals were to be served. For 

example, the complaint asserts that Plaintiff’s meals included contaminated coffee and unsterile

ice cubes, that staff members wore unsanitary gloves, and that his vegan meals were sometimes 

“placed on food carts adjacent to the non-vegan meals . . . which resulted in an immediate 

contamination.” Obviously, that a prison violates its own policies does not mean that it has 

violated a prisoner’s constitutional rights. Further, it is not self-evident how the incidents 

described by Plaintiff impacted his compliance with the dietary tenets of his faith, nor does 

Plaintiff’s complaint specify the frequency of these incidents. Indeed, even assuming an impact, 

the complaint fails to articulate how these practices created a substantial burden, as opposed to a 

mere incidental impact, on the exercise of his religious beliefs. See Midrash Sephardi, 366 F.3d 

at 1227.

Nevertheless, because the case is being remanded to litigate Plaintiff’s claim regarding the 

nutritional inadequacy of his vegan meals and because, if adequately pled, some of these 

miscellaneous grievances could conceivably affect the ultimate decision as to whether Plaintiff’s 

First Amendment rights were violated, the district court shall give Plaintiff an opportunity to 

amend his pleading to state a plausible First Amendment claim based on the sanitation issues and 

violations of prison policies identified in his existing complaint. 

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2. Eighth Amendment Claim

The Eighth Amendment prohibits the infliction of cruel and unusual 

punishment by the government. To successfully plead an Eighth Amendment 

claim against a government actor, a prisoner must allege facts that meet both an 

objective and a subjective standard. See Chandler v. Crosby, 379 F.3d 1278, 1289 

(11th Cir. 2004) (addressing the standard for proving an Eighth Amendment claim 

on the merits). In an imprisonment context, when the “punishment” at issue is 

alleged to be abusive conditions of confinement, the objective standard looks to 

whether those conditions were severe enough to rise to the level of cruel and 

unusual punishment. The Supreme Court has recognized that prisons must provide 

basic life necessities, such as “adequate food, clothing, shelter, and medical care,” 

Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832 (1994), as well as “reasonable safety,” 

Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 33 (1993). But only “extreme” deprivations of 

those basic life necessities constitute Eighth Amendment violations. Hudson v. 

McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 8–9 (1992). Thus, a prisoner must plead facts showing that 

the condition in question was objectively “extreme,” meaning that it “poses an 

unreasonable risk of serious damage to his future health or safety” that “society 

considers . . . to be so grave that it violates contemporary standards of decency to 

expose anyone unwillingly to such a risk.” Chandler, 379 F.3d at 1289 (alteration 

accepted) (emphasis in original) (quotation marks omitted). 

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As to the subjective standard, the prisoner must demonstrate that the 

government actor accused of the abusive conduct was aware that he was acting 

cruelly. Thus, to satisfy this component, the prisoner must plead facts showing 

that the defendant prison official acted with deliberate indifference, meaning that 

“the official kn[ew] of and disregard[ed] an excessive risk to inmate health or 

safety.” Id. at 1289–90 (quotation marks omitted).

a. Objective Component

In the litigation below, as well as here, Plaintiff based the objective 

component of his Eighth Amendment claim on the same factual allegations he used 

to support his First Amendment claim: specifically, even if compliant with the 

dictates of his religion, the vegan diet he was provided was so nutritionally 

inadequate that he risked serious damage to his health by persisting with that diet 

in lieu of standard, but non-compliant, prison fare that was in fact nutritionally 

adequate.

Having concluded that Plaintiff’s allegations of malnutrition were too 

conclusory to constitute a plausible First Amendment claim, the district court 

likewise concluded that these same allegations were too conclusory to support an 

Eighth Amendment claim. Specifically, as to the objective component of the latter 

claim, the court stated: “Plaintiff failed to assert any factual allegations that the 

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restricted vegan meals were less than ‘reasonably adequate food of sufficient 

nutritional value to preserve health’ . . . .” 

Clearly, if the requirements for finding an Eight Amendment violation in 

regard to a prisoner’s diet are coterminous with those applicable to a First 

Amendment violation, then Plaintiff’s allegation of a plausible claim under the 

latter would mean that he has also alleged a plausible claim under the former. And 

because the parties and the district court below apparently operated under the 

assumption that those standards are the same, a conclusion that Plaintiff plausibly 

alleged a First Amendment violation—by asserting that the only way he could 

comply with the dictates of his religion was to accept a nutritionally inadequate 

diet—logically suggests that this same assertion would give rise to an Eighth 

Amendment claim. That being so, and having reversed the district court’s 

dismissal of the First Amendment claim, we are also obliged to reverse the 

dismissal of the Eighth Amendment claim. 

But we clarify that, in so ruling, we are not necessarily accepting the premise 

that a First Amendment violation based on a prison’s failure to provide meals 

compliant with the dietary rules of a prisoner’s faith necessarily gives rise to an

Eighth Amendment violation as well. Assume, for example, that a prison makes 

no effort to provide food that complies with a prisoner’s particular religious 

practice, but that it nonetheless provides non-compliant food that well exceeds 

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nutritional standards. On such facts, a prisoner would clearly have a First 

Amendment claim, but it is much less obvious that the prisoner would also have an 

Eighth Amendment claim, as the prison has offered him nutritionally adequate 

food.7

In fact, recognizing that the objective component of an Eighth Amendment 

claim is satisfied when prison officials “fail to provide prisoners with reasonably 

adequate food,” Hamm v. DeKalb Cty., 774 F.2d 1567, 1572 (11th Cir. 1985), we 

have held that “[a] well-balanced meal, containing sufficient nutritional value to 

preserve health, is all that is required.” Id. at 1569–70, 1575 (quotation marks 

omitted) (affirming a district court’s bench-trial order finding no Eighth 

Amendment violation, where jailhouse food occasionally contained foreign 

objects, was sometimes served cold, and often failed to meet certain foodpreparation standards, but inmates received three meals daily, totaling 2,600 

calories). Neither we nor the Supreme Court have ever held that the Eighth 

Amendment requires prison officials to indulge inmates’ dietary preferences—

regardless of whether those preferences are dictated by religious, as opposed to

non-religious, reasons.

8

 See LaFevers v. Saffle, 936 F.2d 1117, 1120 (10th Cir. 

 7

 Given Plaintiff’s allegation that the prison distributed “wholesome food” to prisoners not on a 

religious diet, there does not appear to be any dispute that adequate non-religious food was 

available to Plaintiff. 

8

 In Harris v. Ostrout, 65 F.3d 912 (11th Cir. 1995), we suggested that a vegetarian inmate’s 

allegation that the prison provided an “inadequate diet . . . state[d] a valid constitutional claim” 

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1991) (holding that “the mere denial of a [Seventh Day Adventist’s] requested 

vegetarian diet is insufficient to establish a cognizable Eighth Amendment claim” 

because he was not entitled “to obtain the diet of his choice” (quotation marks 

omitted)); McEachin v. McGuinnis, 357 F.3d 197, 199–201 (2d Cir. 2004) 

(affirming the dismissal of an inmate’s Eighth Amendment claim that his prison 

had served him a non-religious diet for one week, where the district court found, 

among other things, that the plaintiff had not alleged that the non-religious food 

was nutritionally inadequate). 

Plaintiff’s counsel acknowledges on appeal that, as opposed to the First 

Amendment, the applicability of the Eighth Amendment here is perhaps less clearcut, when she noted in her brief that food is “arguably inadequate” under the 

Eighth Amendment if it does not conform to an inmate’s religious dietary 

restrictions and stated at oral argument that the Eighth Amendment question is 

“more open.” Further, Plaintiff cites only First Amendment free-exercise cases9 in 

support of the Eighth Amendment claim.

 

under the Eighth Amendment. Id. at 918. But we had no occasion to decide whether an 

inadequate vegetarian diet, as opposed to an inadequate diet generally, could establish a viable 

Eighth Amendment claim, because we affirmed the district court’s summary judgment order 

based on the defendant’s unrebutted evidence showing that the vegetarian diet provided was 

adequate. Id.

9

 Eason v. Thaler, 14 F.3d 8, 10 (5th Cir. 1994) (vacating a dismissal of an inmate’s claim that 

“prison officials violated his right to the appropriate exercise of his Muslim religion by providing 

him only pork to eat during the lockdown” because “[p]rison officials have a constitutional 

obligation to provide reasonably adequate food and, absent some legitimate penological interest 

preventing the accommodation of a prisoner’s religious restrictions, food which is anathema to 

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Ultimately, though, whether Plaintiff’s allegations can properly state an 

Eighth Amendment claim is not a question that is before us because Defendants 

did not challenge this claim on that ground in their motion to dismiss. Instead, for 

purposes of a motion to dismiss, the parties and district court assumed that a 

determination that Plaintiff had adequately alleged a First Amendment claim 

would lead to the same conclusion regarding his Eighth Amendment claim—at 

least as to the objective prong of that claim. We follow the same approach here, 

with the caveat that we express no opinion on the correctness of its underlying 

assumption. For the above reasons, we reverse the district court’s ruling on the 

objective component of Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment claim. 

b. Subjective Component

Assuming once again that Plaintiff had a right to religious meals under the 

Eighth Amendment, Plaintiff adequately pled the subjective component of his 

claim, alleging facts that plausibly showed Defendants’ knowledge of, and 

disregard for, the risk of malnutrition. First, Plaintiff alleged that he and many 

 

an inmate because of his religion is at least arguably inadequate” (footnotes omitted)); Barnes v. 

Mann, 12 F.3d 211, at *1 (6th Cir. 1993) (unpublished) (affirming a dismissal of a First 

Amendment free-exercise claim and noting that a prison “is only required to prepare a diet 

sufficient to keep prisoners in good health, or in the case of Muslims, a diet which provides them 

with adequate nourishment without the consumption of pork” (citations omitted)); Hall v. Sutton, 

581 F. App’x 580, 582–83 (7th Cir. 2014) (unpublished) (noting in the context of a free-exercise 

discussion that “many cases confirm inmates’ Eighth Amendment right to adequate nutrition that 

meets dietary laws of their religion,” but citing for support only First Amendment free-exercise 

cases).

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other prisoners filed grievances with Defendants, complaining that the food was 

inadequate. While this allegation standing alone does not necessarily support an 

inference that Defendants believed that these grievances indicated the existence of 

a serious health risk, Plaintiff also alleged that the restricted vegan meals 

temporarily improved in response to his grievances, suggesting that Defendants 

knew about his complaints and considered them significant enough to warrant 

responsive action. See Goebert v. Lee Cty., 510 F.3d 1312, 1327 (11th Cir. 2007) 

(noting that the defendant “was obviously aware of the contents of [the inmate’s] 

complaint because he responded to it”). Further, Plaintiff alleged that the meals 

reverted back to their prior, unsatisfactory state, suggesting that, although 

Defendants had been placed on notice of the nutritional deficits, they subsequently 

acted with deliberate indifference to Plaintiff’s nutritional needs when they once 

again began serving deficient meals.

10 Thus, assuming that the Cruel and Unusual 

Punishment Clause requires prisons to provide adequate religious meals, Plaintiff 

sufficiently pled deliberate indifference to a serious health need, which satisfies the 

requirement for pleading the subjective component of this claim. Both the 

 10 In her opening brief, Plaintiff’s appellate counsel argued that Nurse Seleska’s “Marty Allen’s 

diet” comment indicated that Warden Allen was on notice that the religious meals were deficient. 

But in her reply brief, and with commendable candor, counsel concedes that this fact merely 

showed that the medical unit was familiar with similar complaints and believed that Warden 

Allen had designed the diet. We likewise do not interpret the nurse’s comment as suggesting

that Warden Allen acted with deliberate indifference.

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objective and subjective component having been adequately pled, we reverse the 

district court’s dismissal of Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment claim. 

C. Motion to File a Second-Amended Complaint

“[W]e review the denial of a motion to amend a complaint for abuse of 

discretion,” but “[t]he underlying legal conclusion of whether a particular 

amendment to the complaint would have been futile is reviewed de novo.” 

Corsello v. Lincare, Inc., 428 F.3d 1008, 1012 (11th Cir. 2005).

On appeal, Plaintiff argues that the district court denied his motion to file a 

second-amended complaint naming Valdosta Prison kitchen supervisors as 

defendants because it already had dismissed his complaint for failure to state a 

claim. Accordingly, Plaintiff contends that we should reverse the court’s denial of 

his motion to amend if we reverse its dismissal of his claims. The record belies 

Plaintiff’s characterization of the district court’s order.

Although Plaintiff is correct that the district court denied his motion to 

amend on futility grounds, he is incorrect that the district court found that 

amendment was futile based on its dismissal of his claims. Instead, the district 

court independently concluded that the proposed second-amended complaint did 

not state a plausible claim against the Valdosta Prison kitchen supervisors because 

“Plaintiff did very little to show that his amendment raised enough factual 

allegations ‘above the speculative level’ against the unknown number of 

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individuals in the [Valdosta Prison] Kitchen Supervisor group.” Plaintiff has 

abandoned on appeal any argument that the district court erred in this assessment.

In any event, the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying 

Plaintiff’s motion to amend. Amendment is futile, and denial of leave to amend is 

justified, when a proposed amended pleading would not survive a motion to 

dismiss. Burger King Corp. v. Weaver, 169 F.3d 1310, 1320 (11th Cir. 1999). 

Here, Plaintiff’s proposed amendment was futile because it lacked sufficient 

factual content to state a plausible claim for relief against the Valdosta Prison

kitchen supervisors. As the district court correctly recognized, Plaintiff’s 

allegations were conclusory and speculative. He merely alleged that unspecified 

individuals who worked as kitchen supervisors acted with “callous indifference” 

and failed to “enact mandated standard operating procedures,” ensure that 

“directives and [the] master menu w[ere] thoroughly complied with,” and 

“adequately supervise” meal preparation. Plaintiff alleged no facts supporting any 

of these assertions. Nor did he allege any facts suggesting that any kitchen 

supervisors consciously disregarded an excessive risk to inmate health, in violation 

of the Eighth Amendment, Chandler, 379 F.3d at 1289–90, or caused his restricted 

vegan meals to be nutritionally inadequate, thus substantially burdening his 

religious exercise in violation of the First Amendment, Holt, 135 S. Ct. at 862.

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Accordingly, the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying

Plaintiff’s motion for leave to file a second-amended complaint.

III. CONCLUSION

We DISMISS Plaintiff’s appeal from the dismissal of his injunctive-relief 

claim and REMAND with instructions that the district court dismiss his request for 

an injunction as moot. We AFFIRM the denial of Plaintiff’s motion for leave to 

file a second-amended complaint, AFFIRM the dismissal of his RLUIPA damages 

claim, and REVERSE the dismissal of his First Amendment and Eighth 

Amendment claims. This case is REMANDED for further proceedings consistent 

with this opinion.

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