### IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF TENNESSEE AT JACKSON May 2000 Session
MERTIS JOHNSON v. WILLIE A. STEVERSON Direct Appeal from the Circuit Court for Shelby County No. 83855 T.D. John R. McCarroll, Jr., Judge

No. W1999-00627-COA-R3-CV - Decided August 30, 2000

This appeal arises from a dispute between Plaintiff Mertis Johnson and Defendant Willie A

. Steverson regarding an aut om obile accident involving Ms. Johnson and Virden Steverson, Mr. Steverson’s son. Ms. Johnson filed a complaint against Mr. Steverson alleging that the negligence of Vird en was the cause

of this accident a

nd seeking dama

ges for her pe

rsonal injuries.

At th e conclusion of a jury trial on the matter, Mr. Steverson made a motion for a directed verdict, which
was denied by the

trial court. The jury subsequently returne d a verdict

in favor of Ms. Johnson and awarded her damages in the amount of $14,000.0 0. Mr. S teverson filed a motion for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict or, in the alternative, for a new trial, which was also denied by the trial court. For the reasons set forth below, we affirm the ruling of the trial court. Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appe al as of Right; Judgme

nt of the Circuit Cour

t Affirmed; and Remanded

D AVID R. F ARMER , J., delivered the opinion of the cou rt, in whic h W. F RANK C RAWFORD , P.J., W.S. and A LAN E. H IGHERS , J, joined. Douglas R. Pierce and Doug las B. Janney

, III , Nash ville, Tenn essee, for the appellant, Willie A. Steverson. Kendra H. Armstrong, Cordova, Tennessee, for the appellee, Mertis Johnson.

OPINION
At the time of the accident that is the subject of the case at bar, Mr. Steverson and his wife Geraldine Steverson wereco-owners of a 1989 Cadillac. Virden, the Steverson’s eighteen y ear old son, drove a 1973 Cadillac, which was also titled in M r. Stevers on’s name. On July 3, 1995, Virden’s 1973 Cadil lac was in need of repair so he asked his mother for permission to use the Steversons’ 1989 Cadillac to run some errands. Mrs. Steverson gave Virden permission to use the1 Mr. Steverson died in Nove mber of 1995.
-2- vehicle. While runn ing his erra nds, Virden was in volved in an automo

bile accident wit

h Ms. Johnson.

In June of 1996, Ms. Johnson filed an action in

general sessio

ns court agains

tMr. Steverson seeking damages for

the injuries that she sustained as a result of the accident. Following an adverse ruling in gene

ral sessions cour

t, the administrato

r ad litem of Mr. Ste

verson’s estate 1 appealed the matter to circuit court and demanded a jury trial. Ms. Johnson filed an amended complaint with the circuit court naming Mr. Steverson as the only defendant in her lawsuit. The matter was heard by
a jury on May 24-26, 1999. At the conclusion of the proof, the administrator ad litem of Mr. Stev erson’s estate made a motion for a directed verdict, which was denied by the trial court. The court then submitted the caseto the jury, instructing them regarding the family purpose doctrine. The jury returned a verdict in favor of Ms. Johnson and awarded Ms. Johnson a jud gmen t in the amount of $14,000.00. The adminis trator ad litem of Mr. Steverson’s estate filed a motion for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict or, in the alternative, for a new trial, which was denied by the trial court. This appeal followed.
The issues raised

on appeal, as sta

ted by Mr. Ste

verson, are as f

ollows:
1. Whether

the trial court erred in not granting Appellant’s motion for a directed verdict and/or motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, and in instructing the jury to decide whether the family purpose doctrine applies to the facts of this case

. 2. Whether, even if

the family purpose doctrine does apply, the tr ial court’s instruction on the family purpose doctrine was inadequate as a matter of law.
Add iti ona lly, Ms. Johnson raises the issue of whether she should be awarded damages because Mr. Steverson’s appeal is frivolo us. In ruling

on a motion for a directed verdict, the court must take the strongest legitimate view of the evidence in favor of the nonmoving party and must accept as true all fact s and reasonable inferences which favor the opponent of the motion and disregard a n y evidence to the contrary. A directed verd ict is proper only

when there is

no issue as to any material fact and when the evid

ence presente

d is clear and there is only one inference that a reasonable pe rson exercising his or

her own judgment can make. See Conatser v. Clarksville Coca-Cola Bottling Co. , 920 S.W.2d 646 (Tenn. 199 5); Williams v. Brown , 860 S.W.2d 854, 857 (Tenn. 1993); and Holmes v. Wilson , 551 S.W.2d 682, 685 (Tenn. 1977).
In his motion for directed verdict and his motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict or, alternatively

, for a new trial,

the administrator adlitem of Mr. Steverson’s estate argued that the family purpose doctrine is inapplicable to the case at bar and, consequently, Mr. Steverson cannot be held liable for the neglig ence of his son Vir

den. Thus, as an in

itial matter, we mu

st conside r whether the trial co urt erred in denying t h ese motions and in allowing the jury to determine the applicability

of the family

purpose doctrine. The family purpose doctrine is a legal doctrine under2 There are no previous Tennessee cases in which an appellate court has determined whet

her a family

can have
more than one “

head of household” for purposes of the applica tion of the family purpose doctrine. This

exact issu

e was raised in Droussio tis , but the court declined to discuss the issue and decid ed the case on other gro unds. See Dro ussiotis , 958 S.W .2d at 131

. -3- whic h the head of a family may be held liable under the theory of respondeat superior for th e negligence

of another f amily member wh ile operati ng a motor vehicle. See Droussiotis v. Damron , 958 S.W.2 d 127, 131-32 (Ten n. Ct. App. 1997); Gray v. Amos , 869 S.W.2d 925, 926 (T enn. Ct. App. 1993). In ord

er for the family

purpose doctrine

to be applicable,

two requirements

must b e met. First, the head o

f the household must

maintain the motor v

ehicle for the pu

rpose of providing pleasure or comfort to his or her family. Additionally, the driver of the vehicle must have been using the motor vehicle in furtherance of that purpose and with the permission of the owner, either expressed or implied, at the time that negligence occurred. See Camper v. Minor , 915 S.W.2d 437, 447 (Tenn. 1996); Droussiotis , 958 S.W.2d at 131; Gray , 869 S.W.2d at 927.

It is undi sputed th at, at the time of the accident, Mr. Steverson was terminally ill and physically

incapacitated. Mrs. Steverson test ified at trial that , because of Mr.

Steverson’s illne

ss, she was the head of th

eir household. The

administ rator ad l item of Mr. Steverson’s estate thus argues on appeal that Ms. Johnson did no t sue the head of their household and, because Mr. Steverson was not the head of their household at the time of the accident, his est

ate cannot be he

ld liable under the family purpose doctrine for the negligence

of Virden. We disagree. Mr. Steverson
was the father

of the Stevers ons’ children and the co-owner of the 1989 Cadillac that Virden was driving on the day of

the accident.As such, Mr. Steverson had both the legal and parental authority to grant or deny any

request by Virden to use the vehicle. Although it is true that Mr. Steverson was suffering from an illness at the time of the accident that rendered him unable to perfor m most physical tasks, there is

no proof in the record suggesting that Mr. Steverson was mentally impaired in any w ay o r un able to communicate with his family. To the contrary, it is presume d that Mr. Steverson was mentally

fit during th

is period of time because, subsequent to the accident, Mr. Steverson was transported to a car dealership where he signed the papers necessary to purchase a nd finance a 1988 Oldsmobile for Virden. Simply because an individual becomes phy sical l y incapacitated

does not necessa

rily mean tha

t the individual is str

ipped of his

or her status as a head of his or her househo

ld. In the insta

nt c ase , Mr. and Mrs. Steverson were partners in marriage, partners in the rearing of the ir children, and c

o-owners of the 1 989 Cadillac. Thus, although Mrs. Steverson may have ta

ken on extra househ

oldduties as a result of Mr. Steverson’s illness, we think that both Mr. and Mrs. Steverson may be classified as a head of the their household. 2 We therefore reject the contention that Mr. Steversonwas not a head of the Steverson’s household at the time of the accident.
The a dministrator ad litem of Mr. Steverson’s estate next argues that the family pur pos e doctrine is inapplicable to the case at bar because Mr. Steverson did not maintain the 1989 Cadillac for the purpose of providing pleasure or comfort to his family. In support of this position, he notes t he undisputed fact that, each time Virden wanted to use the Steverson’s 1989 Cadillac, he wa s required to obtain specific permission from one of his parents. In Redding v. Barker , 230 S.W.2d-4-

202 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1950), this Court stated that “[t]he family purpose doctrine does not apply where the members of the fa

mily must obtain special permission on eachoccasion of the vehicle’s use by them.” Id. at 205 . In Harber v. Smith , 292 S.W.2d 468 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1956), this Court quoted withapproval the abo

ve language

from Redding

. See id. at

470-71. In Driver v. Smith , 339 S.W.2d 135 (Tenn. Ct. App. 195 9), this Court held th at the fami

ly pur pose doctrine was applicable even though the owners of thevehicle require d their daughte

r to obtain special permission each time she used the vehicle. See id. at 139. In rea ching this conclu

sion, this Court distinguished Redding and Harber as follows:

However, a study of

these two cases indicates to us that the language quoted above is broader thanthe facts of the two cases would justify. In the case of Redding
v. Barker, supra, the veh icle involved in the collision was a one and one-half ton truck d riv en b y t he 20-year old son of the defendant owner and ac companied by another son of the owner of the truck. The two boys were ret urning home from Jackson, Tennessee, where they had attended a picture show. The opinio n of Judge Anderson discussed the cases involvingthe Family Purpose Doctrine in Tennessee and the n made a finding

that the car was n

ot being furnishe

d by the owne

r for th e con ven ien ce of his fam ily a nd h ence , th e Fam ily P urp ose Doc tri ne d id n ot a ppl y.

. . . . In the case of Harber v. Smith, supra, the son was driving his father’s ca

r with special permission while on leave from the army. The

proof was that when the son hadlived at home he kept the key to the car and drove his father bac k and fo rth to work and occasionally used the automobile with the special permission of his father for his personal use. T

he court held that

the Family Pu

rpose Doctrine d

id notapp ly.

. . . . In our opinion, the . . . cases above referr ed to are readily an

d clearly distinguishable

from the case at

bar in that in each of these . . . cases the higher court found as a fact that the o wner of the vehicle involved in the accident had not furnishedthe same for t

he conve nience and pleasure of his family; whereas in the present case Mr. Driver unequivoc ally testifie

d that he furnishe

d the car for the

use andconvenience of

the members of his fam

ily including

his teen-age d

aughter, Gay

le Driver. Thus it clearly appears that the requirement of Mr. and Mrs. Driver that

their daughter, Gayle, have special permission each t

ime she used the au

tomobile had no bearing on the purpose for which the car was kept

and furnished but

related only

to thei r general pare

ntal supervision of

a teen-age da

ughter which is c

ertainl y commendable. Therefore, we hold that the Family Purpo

se Doctrine is app

licable to the present case.3 Our conclusion is consistent with the Comment to Section 12.42 o f the Tennessee Pattern J ury Instructions, which states in pertinent part as follows:

If the driver is req uired to obtain specif ic permissi

on for each use,

it may be less likely tha t the vehicle is maintained as

a family pur

pose vehicle, i

n which case the owner wi ll not be li

able unless t

he driver is found to be the owner’s agent, servant or employee under other principl es of respondeat superior.

. . . The requ

iring of specific per

mission for each use, howeve r, does not n ecessarily ma ke the family purpose doctrine ina pplicable

. In Driver v. Sm ith , 47 Tenn. App. 505, 339 S.W.2d 13 5, 139 (1959), the Court held the doct rine applicabl

e, noting t

hat the parent

s’ requirement

that their daught

er “have specialpermission each t ime she used the

automobile had no beari ng on the purpose for

which the car was kept and furnishe

d but related only to their general parental supervision of a teenage daughter . . .”

T.P.I.— CIVIL 1 2.42 cm t. -5- Id. at 137-39. More recently in Gray , this Court, relying on Redding

and Harber , again commented that the family purpose doctrine is inapplicable wh

en the driver of t

he vehicle

is required to obta

in special permission on each occasion that he or she uses the vehicle. See Gray , 869 S.W.2d at 926. This Court did not, however, discuss or attempt to distinguish its earlier ruling in Driver
. Furthermore, the driver of the vehicle in Gray was not required to seek permission before using his father’s vehicle. See id. at 927. Thus, the ab ove comment ma

de by thi s Court in Gray is merely dicta in that it did not have any effect on the ultimate conclusion of the case. We therefore conclude that the correct sta

tement of th

e law in Tennessee

with respect to thi

s matter, as deve

loped in Redding , Harber , and Driver , is thatalthough the fa ct that the driver

must obtain

special permission may suggest that the vehicle is not maintained by the owner for the plea sure a nd c omfort of the
own er’s fam ily, this fact is notconclusive and does not necessarily preclude the application of the family purpose doctrine. 3 With respect to

his argument tha

t Mr. Steverson did

furnish or maintain the 1989 Cadillac for the purpose of providing pleasure o r comfort to his family, the administrator ad litem of Mr. Steverson’s estate also conte nds that this

vehicle was maintained for the use of Mrs. Steverson and notfor the use of the entire family. Mrs. Steve rson testified that when she and Mr. Steverson purc hased the 1989 Cadillac, it was int ended only f

or their use but, by

the time of the acc

ident, Virden was using t he car with their permission approxima

tely one time

per week. Virde

n also testified that he drove the 1989 Cadillac approximately one time per week. Thus, there is evidence in the case at bar supporting the conclusion that the 1989 Cadillac w

as maintained sole

ly for Mrs. St everson’s use , as wel l as the con clu sio n th at t his veh icl e was mai nta ine d fo r us e by t he entir e Steverson family. Under such circumstances, it was for the trier of f ac t to determine whether the 1989 Cadillac was a fa

mily purpose vehicle. We there

fore conclude th

at the trial court

appropriately deniedthe administrator’s motion for a directed verdict and submitted the matter to t he jur y. Likewise, we con clude that the court properly denied the administrator’s motion for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict or, in the alternative, for a new trial.
Fin all y, the administrator ad litem of Mr. Stevers on ’s estate contends that the instruction givento the jury by the trial court was inadequa te as a matter of law. When reviewing jury4 The instruction given to the jury rega rding the fa mily pur pose doctrine is identical to Section 12.42 of the

Tennes see Pattern Jury Instruction

. See T.P.I.— CIVIL 12.42.
-6- instructions,

this Court must examine the challenged portion in the context of the entire instruction. See, e.g., Hunter v. Burke , 958 S.W.2d 751, 756 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1 997). If the i nstruction fairly defines the legal issues of the case and does not mislead the jury, the instruction will be upheld on appeal. See, e.g., id. With respect to the f amily purpos

e doctrine, the c

ourt in the case at bar instructed the jur

y as follows:
As I said before, the first issue you have to decide is whether or not the Family Purpose Doctrine applies to this case. The pla

intiff claims that t

he defendant, that is the estate of

Willie Steverson, is r

esposible for any

fault of Virden Steverson under the Family Purpose Doctrine. The defendant, the estate of Willie Steverson, den ied suc h res pon sib ili ty.
The Fami ly P urpose Doctrine applies when one,

a member of a fa

mily furnisheda motor vehicle for the general use, plea sure, and convenience of the fam ily; and two, a

person furnishing

the vehicle ga

ve specific

or general consent or permission, either express or implied, for a member or for members of the family to use it for that

family purp

ose; and three, a

t the time of the accident, the member of the family was driving the vehicle in connection with a family purpose. 4

The administrator ad litem of Mr. Steverson’s estate complains on appeal that the court should have substituted the words “the head of the hous ehold” for the words “a member of a family” in the instruction that was given to thejury. In an earlier portion of this opinion, we concluded that Mr. Steverson was, in

fact, a head of the Steverson household. Thus, even if the court had instructed the jury that the family purpose doctrine applies only when

a head of the hous

ehold furnished a

vehicle for the use of his or her family, this instruction w ould not have a ltered the ultimate conclusion reached by the jury. Assuming , the n, that the trial court erred in using the words “a member of a fam ily” rather than the words “the head of the household” in

the instruction, we

conclude that this error was harmless.

Ms. Johnson seeks damag es pursuant to

section 27-1-122 of the Tennessee Code Annotated, which provides that “[w]he n it appears to any

reviewing cour

t that the appeal f

rom a n y court of record was frivolous or taken solely for delay , the court may, either

upon motion of a party

or of its
own motion, award just damages against the appellant, which may include but need not be limited to, costs, interest on the judgment, and expenses incurred by the appellee as a result of the appeal.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 27-1-122 (1980). We do not think that this appeal is

frivolous or take

n solely for delay. Thus, in our discretion, we deny Ms. Johnson’s request for da mages under section 27-1- 122.-7-

Based on the foregoing, the ruling of the trial court is in all respects affirmed. The costs of this appeal are assessed to the estate o f Willie S teverson and its surety, for which execution may issue if necessary.

___________________________________ DAVID R. FARMER, JUDGE