IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 13-50189

Summary Calendar

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee

v.

HARMON CHESTER STRUNK, JR., also known as Butch Grimes,

Defendant-Appellant

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Western District of Texas

USDC No. 5:10-CR-718-1

Before JOLLY, SMITH, and CLEMENT, Circuit Judges. 

PER CURIAM:*

Harmon Chester Strunk, Jr., challenges his jury trial convictions for 

engaging in the business of dealing in firearms without a license and for selling 

a firearm to a felon. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(a)(1)(A), (d); 923(a); 924(a)(1)(D),

(a)(2). We affirm.

We reject Strunk’s claim that there was insufficient evidence that he was 

engaged in the business of selling firearms. To convict a defendant of illegally

* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not 

be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH 

CIR. R. 47.5.4.

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

FILED

January 14, 2014

Lyle W. Cayce

Clerk

 

 Case: 13-50189 Document: 00512499853 Page: 1 Date Filed: 01/14/2014
No. 13-50189

dealing in firearms, the Government must prove that he was not a licensed 

importer, manufacturer, or dealer of firearms and that he wilfully engaged in 

the business of importing, manufacturing, or dealing in firearms. 

§§ 922(a)(1)(A), 924(a)(1)(D); Bryan v. United States, 524 U.S. 184, 187-88 & 

n.2 (1998). The evidence showed that Strunk did not have a license, that he 

engaged in a regular course of selling firearms that were not part of his 

personal collection, and that he retained money collected on the sale of others’ 

firearms. Strunk has failed to show that no rational trier of fact could have 

found that the evidence “established guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.” 

Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 318 (1979). 

Additionally, we find no merit to the claim that the legislation making it 

a crime to engage in the business of selling firearms without a license is 

unconstitutionally vague because it did not furnish fair notice as to what 

conduct was allowed and what conduct was proscribed. Strunk, without being 

licensed, sold firearms entrusted to him by others for the purpose of sale. Such 

conduct is unquestionably prohibited by the legislation’s text. Strunk cannot, 

therefore, attack the legislation on the basis that it is vague because it does 

not establish a bright-line rule to guide and protect others. See Parker v. Levy, 

417 U.S. 733, 756 (1974).

We reject also the contention that here was insufficient evidence that 

Strunk knew or had reason to know that Carlos Roque, to whom he sold a 

firearm, was a felon. Strunk asserts primarily that a close examination of the 

recordings and transcripts presented to the jury reveals that the jury 

misconstrued the evidence. Even if his descriptions of the recordings and 

transcripts are taken as true, however, they demonstrate at best that Strunk 

disagrees with the way the jury construed the evidence, not that the jury’s 

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No. 13-50189

construction was unreasonable. See United States v. Mitchell, 484 F.3d 762, 

768 (5th Cir. 2007).

AFFIRMED.

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 Case: 13-50189 Document: 00512499853 Page: 3 Date Filed: 01/14/2014