IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE

IN AND FOR NEW CASTLE COUNTY

)

STATE OF DELAWARE )

) I.D. No. 1211021787

v. )

)

ROBERT J. HOHN III )

)

Defendant )

Submitted: November 18, 2014

Decided: January 21, 2015

On Defendant’s Motion for Postconviction Relief.

SUMMARILY DISMISSED.

ORDER

Victoria Witherell, Esquire, Deputy Attorney General, Department of 

Justice, Wilmington, Delaware, Attorney for the State

Robert J. Hohn III, Wilmington, Delaware, pro se

COOCH, R.J.

This 21st day of January, 2015, upon consideration of Defendant’s 

First Motion for Postconviction Relief, it appears to the Court that:

1. Defendant Robert J. Hohn III pled guilty in September 2013 to

Assault in the Second Degree and Misdemeanor Endangering 

the Welfare of a Child. Defendant was then sentenced to a total 

of nine years years at Level V, suspended after six years and 

one month for two years at Level IV, suspended after six 

months for two years and eleven months are Level III 
2

probation.

1

 The Delaware Supreme Court affirmed 

Defendant’s conviction and sentence on appeal.

2

2. Defendant filed the instant motion on November 13, 2014. 

Defendant asserts three grounds for relief in his motion, all of 

which are listed here in toto:

(1) Ineffective Assistance of Counsel – “Counsel did not make full 

magnitude of plea known and thus involuntary. Counsel did not 

make mention of Bench Trial. Counsel did not file for suppression 

of evidence. Counsel did not fully explain my rights. Counsel 

ignored important evidence in favor of defen[s]e. Counsel refused 

to present counter plea offer. Counsel did not state or explain plea 

was an open plea. Counsel did not request supporting evidence 

from co-defendant’s counsel. Counsel refused request for trial.”

(2) Coercion of Guilty Plea – “Counsel refused to go to trial (“I think 

you are going to have to take this plea.”). Counsel used fear tactics 

(“look at all the time you face if you lose.”). Counsel used codefendant as leverage (“Shannon has already signed her plea and 

wants you to sign yours.”).

(3) Unfulfilled Plea Agreement – “Counsel stressed repedativly [sic] 

the presumptive sentencing guidelines. Counsel gave false hope of 

time served (“I don’t see you doing any more time.”). Counsel 

stressed favorable results if trial was waived. Counsel stressed 

leanency for not making the victim take the witness stand. Counsel 

stressed favorable outcome for a first offen[s]e with no prior 

history.”3

3. Defendant’s Motion for Postconviction Relief is controlled by 

the recently amended Superior Court Criminal Rule 61.

4

 Under 

Superior Court Criminal Rule 61(i), a Motion for 

Postconviction Relief can be potentially procedurally barred for 

time limitations, successive motions, procedural defaults, and 

former adjudications.5 Before addressing the merits of this 

 1 Sentence Order, D.I. #15 (Dec. 6, 2013).

2 See Hohn v. State, 100 A.3d 1021, 2014 WL 4050183 (Del. Aug. 14, 2014) (ORDER).

3 Def.’s Mot. for Postconviction Relief at 3, D.I. #28 (Nov. 13, 2014).

4 The most recent set of amendments to Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61 took effect on June 4, 

2014. 

5 Super. Ct. Crim R. 61(i)(1)-(4).
3

Motion for Postconviction Relief, the Court must address any 

procedural requirements of Rule 61(i).6

 

4. Rule 61(i)(1) provides that a motion exceeds time limitations if 

it is filed more than one year after the conviction is finalized, or 

if the motion asserts a newly recognized, retroactively applied 

right more than one year after it is first recognized.7

5. Rule 61(i)(2) provides that a motion is successive if it is the 

second or subsequent motion made under this Rule, and such 

successive motions are prohibited unless the pleading 

requirements of 61(d)(2)(i) or (ii) are met.8

6. Rule 61(i)(3) bars consideration any ground for relief “not 

asserted in the proceedings leading to the judgment of 

conviction,” unless the movant can show “cause for relief from 

the procedural default” and “prejudice from violation of the 

movant’s rights.”9

 

7. Rule 61(i)(4) bars consideration of any ground for relief 

formerly adjudicated in the case, including “proceedings 

leading to the judgment of conviction, in an appeal, in a 

postconviction proceeding, or in a federal habeas corpus 

hearing.”10 

8. If any of the above procedural bars exist, the Court will not 

consider the merits of the claims unless the Defendant can show 

that the exception found in Rule 61(i)(5) applies.

11 

9. Rule 61(i)(5), as recently amended, provides that consideration 

of otherwise procedurally barred claims is limited to claims that 

the Court lacked jurisdiction, or claims that satisfy the new 

 6 Younger v. State, 580 A.2d 552, 554 (Del. 1990).

7 Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i)(1).

8 See Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i)(2). For further discussion of the pleading standards 

articulated in the newly amended Rule, see infra. 9 Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i)(3).

10 Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i)(4).

11 Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i)(5).
4

pleading standards set forth in 61(d)(2)(i) and (ii).12 The new 

pleading standards require that the Motion either:

(i) Pleads with particularity that new evidence 

exists that creates a strong inference that the 

movant is actually innocent in fact of the acts 

underlying the charges of which he was 

convicted; or

(ii) Pleads with particularity a claim that a new 

rule of constitutional law, made retroactive to 

cases on collateral review by the United States 

Supreme Court or the Delaware Supreme 

Court, applies to the movant’s case and 

renders the conviction . . . invalid.13

10. This Court finds that Defendant’s Motion was timely filed and is 

not otherwise procedurally barred.

14 However, “[i]f it plainly 

appears from the motion for postconviction relief and the record 

of prior proceedings in the case that the movant is not entitled to 

relief, the judge may enter an order for its summary dismissal 

and cause the movant to be notified.”15 A movant must support 

his or her assertions with ‘concrete allegations of actual 

prejudice, or risk summary dismissal.’”16 Sufficiently developed 

allegations are required in support of all grounds for relief, 

including claims of ineffective assistance of counsel.17 This 

Court “will not address Rule 61 claims that are conclusory and 

unsubstantiated.”18 

 12 Id. 

13 Super Ct. Crim R. 61(d)(2)(i). 14 The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant’s conviction in August of 2014 and the instant 

motion followed three months later. Defendant is within the one-year filing window 

articulated by the Rule. 

15 Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(d)(5).

16 State v. Chambers, 2008 WL 4137988, at *1 (Del. Super. Aug. 25, 2008) (quoting 

State v. Childress, 2000 WL 1610766, at *1 (Del. Super. Sept. 19, 2000)). 

17 See, e.g., State v. Robbins, 1996 WL 769219, at *1 (Del. Super. Dec. 18, 1996).

18 State v. Owens, 2002 WL 234739, at *1 (Del. Super. Jan. 11, 2002).
5

11. Defendant alleges ineffective assistance of counsel, but does 

not set forth sufficient evidence to survive either prong of 

Strickland. To successfully articulate an ineffective assistance 

of counsel claim, a claimant must demonstrate: 1) that 

counsel’s performance was deficient, and 2) “that there is a 

reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s errors, he would 

not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to 

trial.”19 To prove counsel’s deficiency, a defendant must show 

that counsel’s representation fell below an objective standard of 

reasonableness.20 Moreover, a defendant must make concrete 

allegations of actual prejudice and substantiate them or risk 

summary dismissal.21 Defendant makes only one-sentence 

claims regarding counsel’s alleged deficiencies and nothing 

more. This Court finds such claims are insufficient to survive 

the Strickland standard.

12. Defendant also makes numerous unsupported allegations 

regarding the propriety of his plea and the circumstances under 

which it was entered into. This Court finds that all of 

Defendant’s claims are without merit. A guilty plea entered 

voluntarily “constitutes a waiver or any alleged errors or defects 

occurring prior to the entry of the plea.”22 Moreover, 

Defendant acknowledged on his truth-in-sentencing guilty plea 

form that he read and understood the information on the form, 

including the maximum penalties to which he was subject.

Defendant also indicated on the form that no one had threatened 

or forced him to enter the plea.23 Finally, a lengthy plea 

colloquy was conducted during which this Court determined 

 19 Albury v. State, 551 A.2d 53, 60 (Del. 1988) (citing Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52 

(1985)) (applying second prong of Strickland analysis in the context of a guilty plea); See 

also Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688 (1984).

20 Albury, 551 A.2d at 60. 21 Wright v. State, 671 A.2d 1353, 1356 (Del. 1996).

22 Bentley v. State, 27 A.3d 550, 2011 WL 3793779, at *2 (Del. 2011) (TABLE) (citing 

Downer v. State, 543 A.2d 309, 311-13 (Del. 1988)).

23 See Plea Agreement and Truth-in-Sentencing Guilty Plea Form, D.I. #12 (Sept. 16, 

2013).
6

that Defendant was entering his plea knowingly, intelligently, 

and voluntarily.24

13. After review of the record, this Court finds no basis upon which 

to conclude that Defendant’s guilty plea was involuntary or was 

entered into based upon a misunderstanding or mistake as to 

Defendant’s legal rights.

14. Despite the timeliness of Defendant’s Motion, it plainly appears 

from the contents of the Motion that Defendant’s claims should 

be summarily dismissed. In Defendant’s Motion, he sets forth a 

bare-bones list of broad, conclusory statements with no 

underlying facts or law to support his claims. This Court 

declines to address Defendant’s Rule 61 claims further, 

consistent with Rule 61(d)(5). Summary Dismissal is the 

appropriate disposition of Defendant’s Motion for 

Postconviction Relief.

Therefore, Defendant’s Motion for Postconviction Relief is SUMMARILY 

DISMISSED.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

______________________

Richard R. Cooch, R.J.

oc: Prothonotary

cc: Investigative Services 

 24 See Transcript of Plea Colloquy, D.I. # 18 (Feb. 14, 2014).