COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 

Present: Judges Coleman, Bumgardner and Lemons 

Argued at Salem, Virginia 

RONALD GILES, JR. 

 OPINION BY 

v. Record No. 1374-97-3 JUDGE SAM W. COLEMAN III 

 DECEMBER 1, 1998 

COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 

FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF ROCKINGHAM COUNTY 

Porter R. Graves, Jr., Judge 

 A. Gene Hart, Jr. (A. Gene Hart, Jr., P.C., 

on briefs), for appellant. 

 Daniel J. Munroe, Assistant Attorney General 

(Mark L. Earley, Attorney General, on brief), 

for appellee. 

 Ronald Giles, Jr. was convicted by a jury of robbery and use 

of a firearm in the commission of a felony. The sole issue on 

appeal is whether the trial court erred in denying Giles's motion 

to suppress his confession. Giles contends police officers 

obtained his confession in violation of his Fifth Amendment right 

to counsel. For the reasons that follow, we affirm the trial 

court's conviction. 

I. BACKGROUND

 Giles was arrested for armed robbery of a motel. After 

Giles's arrest, Investigator Knott, intending to interrogate 

Giles, advised him of his Miranda rights. Giles asked to speak 

with an attorney, whereupon Knott terminated the interview. 

Immediately thereafter, Knott took Giles into an adjoining room 

and turned him over to Officer Royer for booking. Officer Knott 

said to Royer, "He's ready to go," and Knott then left the 
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building. 

 As the booking began, Officer Royer asked Giles if he had 

spoken with the investigator about the charges; Giles responded: 

 "Yes, but I don't understand, I'm confused." Royer explained to 

Giles that he had an arrest warrant for robbery and was being 

"booked" for robbery. Giles expressed further confusion and 

exclaimed, "Robbery?" At that point, Officer Royer asked Giles 

if he wanted Investigator Knott to "come back over and talk to 

[him]." Royer further stated: "Investigator Knott, he could 

come back over here and talk to you, they want to talk to you. 

They can clear you up from the matter, or if you know anything 

about it, they'd like to talk to you about it." Giles responded, 

"Yeah, I'll talk to them." 

 Approximately ten minutes after Officer Knott left, he was 

summoned to return to the station. Upon return, Knott again 

advised Giles of his Miranda rights, including his right to 

counsel, and obtained from Giles a signed written waiver. 

Thereafter, Giles made incriminating statements that were 

introduced at trial. 

II. ANALYSIS

 The Fifth Amendment guarantees that "[n]o person . . . 

shall be compelled to be a witness against himself." U.S. 

Const., amend. V. The United States Supreme Court has recognized 

that "an inability to protect the right [against 

self-incrimination] at one stage of a proceeding may make its 
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invocation useless at a later stage." Michigan v. Tucker, 417 

U.S. 433, 440-41 (1974). Prior to the Miranda decision, whether 

a confession was voluntary turned upon a factual determination of 

whether the statement had been knowingly and freely given. A 

court would examine the totality of the circumstances surrounding 

an accused's interrogation to determine whether the resulting 

confessions had been given voluntarily and of the accused's own 

free will. See id. at 441. However, in Miranda the Court 

expressly declared, for the first time, that the privilege 

against self-incrimination applied directly to station house 

interrogations "and that a defendant's statements might be 

excluded at trial despite their voluntary character under 

traditional principles." Id. at 443. Miranda addressed the 

interrogations of four defendants performed in isolated rooms in 

various police stations while the defendants were held 

incommunicado. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 491-98. 

The Court described the station house atmosphere as generating 

"`inherently compelling pressures which work to undermine the 

individual's will to resist and to compel him to speak where he 

would not otherwise do so freely.'" Illinois v. Perkins, 496 

U.S. 292, 296 (1990) (quoting Miranda, 384 U.S. at 467). The 

prophylactic Miranda protections apply to all interrogations 

where the degree of restraint is equivalent to arrest or a 

station house confinement. See Duckworth v. Eagan, 492 U.S. 195, 

203 (1989) (citing Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 291 
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(1980)). 

 Among the prophylactic measures Miranda grants an accused is 

the right to counsel during a custodial interrogation. See 

Miranda, 384 U.S. at 470-79. 

 [T]he Lawyer is the one person to whom 

society as a whole looks as the protector of 

legal rights of [the accused] in his dealings 

with the police and the courts. For this 

reason, the Court fashioned in Miranda the 

rigid rule that an accused's request for an 

attorney is per se an invocation of his Fifth 

Amendment rights, requiring that all 

interrogation cease. 

Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707, 719 (1979). 

 Recognizing that police may exploit the inherently coercive 

environment of a custodial interrogation in order to obtain a 

facially voluntary waiver from an accused who has previously 

asserted his right to counsel, the Supreme Court formulated the 

"Edwards Rule." See Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 484-87 

(1981); Quinn v. Commonwealth, 25 Va. App. 702, 710-11, 492 

S.E.2d 470, 474-75 (1997). Under Edwards, once an accused 

asserts the right to counsel, all interrogation must cease until 

counsel is present, or until the accused initiates further 

discussion or interrogation. See Arizona v. Roberson, 486 U.S. 

675, 680-82 (1988); Quinn, 25 Va. App. at 711, 492 S.E.2d at 475. 

 Once an accused asserts his or her right to counsel, 

subsequent waiver of that right is not sufficient to make 

admissible any incriminating statements thereafter obtained, even 

if investigators have re-Mirandized the accused, unless the 
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statements are initiated by the defendant and shown to be based 

on a knowing, intelligent, and voluntary waiver. See Edwards, 

451 U.S. at 484-87 (holding that although officers advised him of 

his rights immediately prior to the interrogation, Edwards's 

waiver of his previously invoked right was invalid); Roberson, 

486 U.S. at 678-82 (finding an invalid waiver where the accused, 

who had invoked his right to counsel, made incriminating 

statements when he was later approached by another officer and 

fully advised of his rights). Once an accused invokes his right 

to counsel 

 then it is presumed that any subsequent 

waiver that has come at the authorities' 

behest, and not at the suspect's own 

instigation, is itself the product of the 

"inherently compelling pressures" and not the 

purely voluntary choice of the suspect. As 

JUSTICE WHITE has explained, "the accused 

having expressed his own view that he is not 

competent to deal with the authorities 

without legal advice, a later decision at the 

authorities' insistence to make such a 

statement without counsel's presence may 

properly be viewed with skepticism." 

Michigan v. Mosely, 423 U.S. 96, 110, n.2 

(1975) (concurring in result). 

Roberson, 486 U.S. at 681. Only if the accused initiates further 

"communication, exchanges, or conversations with the police," and 

only if those communications result in the accused changing his 

or her mind and freely and voluntarily waiving the right to 

counsel, may the police resume interrogation without violating 

the Edwards rule. See id. at 682. 

 We have recognized and applied a three-part analysis to 
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evaluate the admissibility of a statement under the Edwards rule. 

See Quinn, 25 Va. App. at 712, 492 S.E.2d at 475. First, the 

trial court must determine whether the accused "unequivocally" 

invoked his or her right to counsel. Second, the trial court 

must determine whether the accused, rather than the authorities, 

initiated further discussions or meetings with the police. 

Third, if the accused did initiate further discussions or 

conversations with police, the trial court must then ascertain 

whether the accused knowingly and intelligently waived the 

previously invoked right to counsel. See id.; Smith v. Illinois, 

469 U.S. 91, 94-95 (1984). 

 In reviewing the trial court's denial of the motion to 

suppress, we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the 

Commonwealth, granting to it all reasonable inferences deducible 

therefrom. See Shears v. Commonwealth, 23 Va. App. 394, 398, 477 

S.E.2d 309, 311 (1996). Although we review the trial court's 

findings of historical fact only for "clear error," we review de

novo the trial court's application of defined legal standards to 

the facts of the case. See id. Whether the defendant invoked 

his or her right to counsel, and thereafter knowingly and 

voluntarily waived that right, requires that we apply defined 

legal standards to the historical facts. See Quinn, 25 Va. App. 

at 712-13, 492 S.E.2d at 475-76. 

 Because the Commonwealth concedes that Giles properly 

invoked his right to counsel, the first element of the Edwards
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inquiry is not at issue. Therefore, we determine de novo

whether, under the facts viewed in the light most favorable to 

the Commonwealth, Giles initiated the discussion which resulted 

in this confession and whether after the initiation he freely and 

voluntarily waived his right to counsel. 

 First, Giles argues that the police failed to terminate the 

interrogation after he asserted his right to counsel. Giles 

contends the police have a duty to inform other officers of an 

accused's invocation of his right to counsel, that the Edwards

rule requires they ascertain, prior to interrogation, whether the 

accused has invoked his or her Miranda rights, and that an 

officer's ignorance does not relieve the officer from the duty to 

comply with the Edwards rule. See Quinn, 25 Va. App. at 716-17, 

492 S.E.2d at 477-78. The evidence shows that Investigator Knott 

stopped interrogating Giles immediately after Giles invoked his 

right to counsel. Giles contends, nevertheless, that Officer 

Royer's subsequent query -- "did you speak with the 

investigator?" -- constituted a virtually seamless continuation 

of Knott's interrogation and that Royer failed to honor his 

request for counsel. 

 We agree that, despite Officer Royer's lack of knowledge 

concerning Giles's request for counsel, Royer was obliged to 

comply with the Edwards prohibition on interrogation. However, 

we find that the first question Royer posed did not qualify as 

interrogation. Edwards does not prohibit routine communications 
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between the police and the accused. See Foster v. Commonwealth, 

8 Va. App. 167, 174, 380 S.E.2d 12, 16 (1989); Oregon v. 

Bradshaw, 462 U.S. 1039, 1045 (1983); see also Timbers v. 

Commonwealth, 28 Va. App. 187, 197-99, 503 S.E.2d 233, 237-38 

(1998) (discussing routine booking exceptions). In Bradshaw, the 

Court held that the accused's question, "well what's going to 

happen to me now?" initiated further conversation by the accused 

and, therefore, his subsequent waiver of his Miranda rights was 

valid. See Bradshaw, 462 U.S. at 1045-47. However, the Court 

cautioned that not every statement by an accused or an officer 

would constitute such an initiation. 

 While we doubt that it would be desirable to 

build a superstructure of legal refinements 

around the word "initiate" in this context, 

there are undoubtedly situations where a bare 

inquiry by either a defendant or by a police 

officer should not be held to "initiate" any 

conversation or dialogue. There are some 

inquiries, such as a request for a drink of 

water or a request to use a telephone, that 

are so routine that they cannot be fairly 

said to represent a desire on the part of the 

accused to open up a more generalized 

discussion relating directly or indirectly to 

the investigation. Such inquiries or 

statements, by either an accused or a police 

officer, relating to routine incidents on the 

custodial relationship, will not generally 

"initiate" a conversation in the sense in 

which the word was used in Edwards. 

Id. at 1045. Accordingly, Officer Royer's question, "did you 

speak with the investigator?" was not an impermissible 

continuation of Officer Knott's interview. The question was not 

coercive in nature and merely inquired about the status of the 
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investigation. It was a question arising out of and during the 

routine incidents of the custodial relationship. 

 For the same reason, we reject Giles's second argument that 

Officer Royer, by asking the question concerning the status of 

the investigation, re-initiated the properly terminated 

interrogation. As previously stated, Officer Royer's query 

regarding whether Giles had spoken with Investigator Knott did 

not go beyond the routine communications permitted by Edwards. 

Similarly, because Officer Royer's explanation to Giles of the 

warrant for robbery was properly characterized as a routine 

"booking" communication, it also does not violate the Edwards

standard. 

 Having addressed Officer Royer's initial statements, the 

next question is whether Giles's statements initiated the meeting 

with Knott. The analysis depends on whether his statements 

"represent[ed] a desire . . . to open up a more generalized 

discussion relating directly or indirectly to the investigation." 

Id.; see also Correll v. Commonwealth, 232 Va. 454, 462-64, 352 

S.E.2d 352, 356-58 (1987) (applying the Bradshaw analysis). 

 Giles stated that he was confused, that he did not 

understand, and then expressed surprise that he was being charged 

with robbery. These utterances by Giles fairly constituted an 

invitation for Officer Royer to discuss with Giles his situation. 

 Giles's surprise at the charges indicated a "desire on the part 

of the accused to open up a more generalized discussion relating 
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. . . to the investigation." Moreover, Giles's comments were not 

necessary inquiries incidental to the booking and custodial 

relationship. In response to Giles's expressed confusion, Royer 

asked if Giles wished to resume the discussion and interrogation 

with Officer Knott. At that point, Giles indicated a desire to 

meet with Knott. 

 Previously, we recognized that under certain circumstances 

"`police legitimately may inquire whether a suspect has changed 

his mind about speaking to them without an attorney.'" Foster, 8 

Va. App. at 174, 380 S.E.2d at 16 (quoting Justice Powell's 

concurrence in Edwards, 451 U.S. at 490). In Foster, the accused 

properly invoked his right to counsel but continued talking to 

the investigator. We found that despite his request for counsel, 

the accused in Foster made apparent his intention to continue a 

dialogue with the officers and as such the accused "`evinced a 

willingness and a desire for a generalized discussion about the 

investigation.'" Foster, 8 Va. App. at 174, 380 S.E.2d at 16 

(quoting Bradshaw, 462 U.S. at 1045-46). 

 In view of the interaction between Giles and Royer, Royer's 

statement was a legitimate inquiry as to whether Giles had 

changed his mind. Admittedly, after Giles initiated further 

discussion, Royer's response may have had a persuasive or coaxing 

effect on Giles: "[T]hey want to talk to you. They can clear 

you up from the matter, or if you know anything about it, they'd 

like to talk to you about it." However, Giles had already 
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expressed a willingness to discuss the investigation and because, 

as a result of that conversation, he expressly agreed to meet 

with Knott, we find that Giles initiated the meeting with Knott. 

 Finally, we "`determine if the defendant knowingly and 

intelligently waived the right [to counsel] he had invoked.'" 

Quinn, 25 Va. App. at 712, 492 S.E.2d at 475 (quoting Smith, 469 

U.S. at 95). "His waiver must be evaluated in view of the 

totality of circumstances, including his background and 

experience and the conduct of the police." Correll, 232 Va. at 

464, 352 S.E.2d at 357. "'[A]ny evidence the accused was 

threatened, tricked or cajoled into a waiver will, of course, 

show that the defendant did not voluntarily waive his 

privilege.'" Foster, 8 Va. App. at 173, 380 S.E.2d at 16 

(quoting Miranda, 384 U.S. at 476). 

 No evidence suggests that the officers failed to honor 

Giles's request for counsel. Officer Knott ceased the interview 

immediately after Giles invoked his right to counsel. By 

expressing surprise at the charge of robbery, Giles initiated the 

dialogue with Royer that resulted in his agreement to resume the 

interview with Officer Knott. When Royer asked whether Giles 

wanted to meet with Knott, despite the fact that Royer's comments 

during the discussion may have influenced Giles's request to 

resume the interview, Royer's comment did not initiate the 

discussion and, furthermore, it did not constitute an attempt to 

trick, threaten, or cajole Giles. Only after Giles expressed a 
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willingness to waive his right to counsel and to speak with 

Officer Knott did Officer Royer, instead of proceeding with 

interrogation, recall Knott and remand Giles to his custody. 

Knott again advised Giles of his right to remain silent and right 

to counsel and obtained a signed written waiver. We find that 

Knott obtained a valid waiver from Giles of his right to counsel 

during their second meeting. 
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 Accordingly, we affirm the convictions. 

 Affirmed.