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 This Court, with the concurrence of all judges participating in the case, may affirm, reverse or modify the

actions of the trial court by memorandum opinion when a formal opinion would have no precedential value. When a case

is decided by Memorandum opinion it shall be designated "MEMORANDUM OPINION", shall not be published, and

shall not be cited or relied on for any reason in any unrelated case.

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF TENNESSEE

AT JACKSON

April 24, 2003 Session

MARY NELL JONES SACCOMANNO v. MELVIN FRANK

SACCOMANNO

A Direct Appeal from the General Sessions Court for Hardin County

No. 5196 The Honorable Daniel L. Smith, Judge

No. W2002-01267-COA-R3-CV - Filed May 28, 2003

This is an appeal from a Final Order, granting the parties a divorce and dividing the marital

property. Wife appeals and asserts that the division of marital property is inequitable. We affirm.

Tenn. R. App. P. 3; Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the General Sessions Court Affirmed

W. FRANK CRAWFORD, P.J., W.S., delivered the opinion of the court, in which ALAN E. HIGHERS,J.

and HOLLY KIRBY LILLARD, J., joined.

Chadwick G. Hunt, Savannah, For Appellant, Mary Nell Jones Saccomanno

Mary Jo Middlebrooks and Betty Stafford Scott, Jackson, For Appellee, Melvin Frank Saccomanno

MEMORANDUM OPINION1

Mary Nell Jones Saccomanno (“Ms. Saccomanno,” “Wife,” “Plaintiff,” or “Appellant”)

and Melvin Frank Saccomanno (“Mr. Saccomanno,” “Husband,” “Defendant,” or “Appellee”)

were married on December 2, 2000. Prior to their marriage, the parties had lived together on and

off since 1993. Seven months after their marriage, on July 30, 2001, Ms. Saccomanno filed a

Complaint for Divorce, alleging grounds of inappropriate marital conduct and irreconcilable

differences. The Complaint for Divorce specified the following as marital property subject to

division by the court: home and real property located at 255 Yeager Lane, Counce, Tennessee,
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 Mr. Saccomanno’s Counterclaim also alleged grounds of inappropriate marital conduct and irreconcilable

differences. The Counterclaim included a request that the Judge make a just and equitable property settlement.

3

 Exhibit 3 lists property in Plaintiff’s possession as follows: radar detector, steam carpet cleaner, set of four

tires (which were awarded to Plaintiff), and two cellular phones.

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12,500 shares of stock, 2000 Toyota Celica, 1994 Nissan 4x4 pick-up truck, 1993 Nissan Sentra,

three (3) desktop computers, three (3) laptop computers, three (3) computer desks, as well as the

normal accumulation of household furniture, appliances, and other items of marital property. On

September 1, 2001, Mr. Saccomanno filed an Answer and Counterclaim,2

 wherein he made the

following admissions and allegations:

...[T]he 12,500 shares of stock do not exist. There are only 2,500

shares of stock. Also, the home located at 255 Yeager Lane, Counce,

Tennessee was owned by the Defendant prior to the marriage; the

1993 Nissan Sentra is owned solely by the Plaintiff; and there was

only one (1) laptop computer purchased during the marriage. The

other laptop computers and computer desks were owned by the

Defendant prior to the marriage.

The matter was heard on January 24, 2002. Following the hearing, the trial court made

the following relevant statements from the bench:

I’m making a finding that the parties have the following marital assets

and values: There’s a 2000 Toyota Celica valued at $13,650. These

include the tires; in addition, there’s a 1994 Nissan valued at $1,615;

there’s a note payable from a Greg Jones of $2,000; there’s an

Ameritrade account valued at $176.85; there’s a whirlpool tub $500;

washing machine of 90; security cameras with monitors at 75; DVD

player 75; plus there is another computer that was purchased during

the marriage that’s valued at $400.

Basically I’m going to divide the property in this way...taking

into consideration all the factors in Tennessee Code Annotated 36-4-

121, Section C.... [T]he plaintiff in this case will be awarded the car

of $13,650, plus that would include the tires that were–that are on the

car that are enumerated on Exhibit 3.

Mr. Saccomanno will receive the remaining assets that we

have here. He will also–as far as the assets on Exhibit 3, there will be

a–I’m not awarding any monetary amount. I will authorize any type

of execution or garnishment to obtain those items. I’m going to

declare they are separate assets, and he can take whatever steps

necessary to collect those items; that she would owe him if he’s

unable to get those items, except for the tires.3

 The tires go with the

car.
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* * *

I understand in making my ruling going through the factors that the

division of marital assets is probably unequal in value, but yet I’ve

taken into consideration all the other factors in there and feel like that

is an equitable division of the property.

The court issued its Final Order on April 29, 2002, which reads, in pertinent part, as

 follows:

IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND

DECREED by the Court that:

1. The parties are hereby awarded a divorce from the other on

the grounds of inappropriate marital conduct, and are hereby restored

to all the rights and privileges of unmarried persons.

2. Plaintiff is awarded the 2000 Toyota Celica and set of four

tires, and shall pay any indebtedness on the aforementioned items and

hold Defendant harmless therefor.

3. Defendant is awarded the 1994 Nissan pickup, note

payable from Greg Jones, Ameritrade Account, whirlpool tub,

computer, washing machine, security cameras and monitors, DVD

player and disks, radar detector, steam carpet cleaner, and two cellular

phones, and shall pay any indebtedness on the aforementioned items

and hold Plaintiff harmless therefor for which execution may issue.

Ms. Saccomanno appeals from this Final Order and raises one issue for our review, as

stated in her brief: “Whether the trial court erred and abused its discretion in making its division

of marital property by awarding almost the entire marital estate to the Appellee husband.”

Although there is a presumption that marital property is owned equally, there is no

presumption that marital property should be divided equally. Bookout v. Bookout, 954 S.W.2d

730, 731 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1997). Thus, an equitable division of marital property need not be an

equal division of the property. Id. A trial court is afforded wide discretion when dividing the

marital property, and its distribution will be given “great weight” on appeal. Ford v. Ford, 952

S.W.2d 824, 825 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1997). Guidelines for the equitable division of marital property

are set forth in T.C.A. § 36-4-121(c)(Supp. 2001). That statute provides, in relevant part:

(c) In making equitable division of marital property, the court shall

consider all relevant factors including:
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(1) The duration of the marriage;

(2) The age, physical and mental health, vocational skills,

employability, earning capacity, estate, financial liabilities and

financial needs or each of the parties;

(3) The tangible or intangible contribution by one (1) party to the

education, training or increased earning power of the other party;

(4) The relative ability of each party for future acquisitions of capital

assets and income;

(5) The contribution of each party to the acquisition, preservation,

appreciation, depreciation or dissipation of the marital or separate

property, including the contribution of a party to the marriage as

homemaker, wage earner or parent, with the contribution of a party

as homemaker or wage earner to be given the same weight if each

party has fulfilled its role;

(6) The value of the separate property of each party;

(7) The estate of each party at the time of marriage;

(8) The economic circumstances of each party at the time the division

of property is to become effective;

(9) The tax consequences to each party, costs associated with the

reasonably foreseeable sale of the asset, and other reasonably

foreseeable expenses associated with the asset;

(10) The amount of social security benefits available to each spouse;

and

(11) Such other factors as are necessary to consider the equities

between the parties.

We note that the Appellant does not dispute the trial court’s finding of what assets

constituted marital and separate property, but only disputes the equity of the division of the

marital property. From our review of the entire record in this case, we find that the evidence

does not preponderate against the trial court’s findings nor does the evidence indicate that the

trial court abused its discretion in making a division of the marital property. In fact, the

evidence indicates that Ms. Saccomanno came into the marriage with a 1993 Nissan Sentra and

her clothes. She leaves this brief marriage with a 2000 Toyota Celica, replete with a set of new

tires. The total valuation of the marital property in this case is approximately $18,881.85. The

Toyota Celica and tires amount to $13,950, or 74%, of that total. Although Mr. Saccomanno

received a larger number of items in the division, he only received 26% of the total valuation of

marital property. Consequently, we find that Ms. Saccomanno has received a very just settlement

in this matter. 

Accordingly, the trial court's final order is affirmed. Appellee has moved this Court for a

finding that this appeal is frivolous and for damages pursuant to T.C.A. § 27-1-122 (2000). 

Based on the record of this case, we agree that the appeal had no reasonable chance of success. 

Issues of fact were involved, and there was clearly a preponderance of evidence in favor of the
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trial judge’s findings. Therefore, we hold that the appeal is frivolous, and the case is remanded

to the trial court for determination of damages pursuant to T.C.A. § 27-1-122 (2000). Costs of

the appeal are assessed to the Appellant, Mary Nell Jones Saccomanno, and her surety.

__________________________________________

W. FRANK CRAWFORD, PRESIDING JUDGE, W.S.