IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 18-30790

Summary Calendar

CLAIMANT ID 100257128, 

 Requesting Party - Appellant

v.

BP EXPLORATION & PRODUCTION, INCORPORATED; BP AMERICA 

PRODUCTION COMPANY; BP, P.L.C., 

 Objecting Parties - Appellees

Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the Eastern District of Louisiana

USDC No. 2:18-CV-4957

Before KING, SOUTHWICK, and ENGELHARDT, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

This appeal concerns an application of the Deepwater Horizon Economic 

and Property Damages Settlement Agreement. The district court denied 

discretionary review of the appeal panel’s decision in this case. We AFFIRM.

In 2013, Claimant ID 100257128 (“Claimant”) sought compensation for 

business economic losses from the claims administrator under the settlement 

 

* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not 

be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH 

CIR. R. 47.5.4.

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

FILED

February 1, 2019

Lyle W. Cayce

Clerk
No. 18-30790

2

agreement. The claims administrator initially awarded Claimant $320,386.51 

for its losses, but then backtracked prior to payment and redesignated the 

claim as one for “Failed Business Economic Loss.” Section 38.68 of the 

settlement agreement defines a failed business as 

a business Entity that commenced operations prior to November 

1, 2008 and that, subsequent to May 1, 2010 but prior to December 

31, 2011, either (i) ceased operations and wound down, or (ii) 

entered bankruptcy or (iii) otherwise initiated or completed a 

liquidation of substantially all of its assets, as more fully described 

in Exhibit 6.

Any entity designated as a failed business must seek compensation under the 

failed-business framework. 

After reevaluating the claim under this framework, the claims 

administrator denied Claimant’s request. Claimant sought reconsideration 

from the claims administrator, and its claim was once again denied. Claimant

appealed to an appeal panel, as provided under the settlement agreement, 

alleging that the claims administrator had erred in designating it a failed 

business. The appeal panel affirmed. Claimant then sought discretionary 

review in the district court, which denied review. Claimant now appeals. 

Claimant argues that it is not a failed business under the terms of the 

settlement agreement. According to Claimant, it filed for bankruptcy on April 

20, 2010, prior to the timeframe articulated in § 38.68. Claimant argues that 

the claims administrator’s redesignation of it as a failed business was therefore 

erroneous and ought to have been overturned by the district court. 

We interpret the settlement agreement in accordance with general 

maritime law, whereby a contract “should be read as a whole and its words 

given their plain meaning unless the provision is ambiguous.” Holmes Motors, 

Inc. v. BP Expl. & Prod., Inc., 829 F.3d 313, 315 (5th Cir. 2016) (quoting Breaux 

v. Halliburton Energy Servs., 562 F.3d 358, 364 (5th Cir. 2009)). Looking at the 
No. 18-30790

3

settlement agreement as a whole, we conclude that the claims administrator’s 

designation was not in error. Although Claimant does not fall within the 

bounds of § 38.68, other portions of the settlement agreement suggest that 

Claimant is not entitled to business-economic loss. First, the failed-business 

framework, appended as an exhibit to the settlement agreement, provides that 

a business may not receive compensation under that framework if it “was in 

default prior to May 1, 2010 under any existing financing agreement.” 

Claimant does not appear to dispute that it was in default prior to May 1, 2010. 

It is highly unlikely that the settlement agreement would deny a claimant

failed-business compensation, but nonetheless award economic-loss 

compensation. Accordingly, the failed-business framework provides good

reason to believe that Claimant is not entitled to economic-loss compensation. 

Moreover, Policy 506, the policy implementing the business-economic-loss 

framework, provides that “[a] claimant” that “entered bankruptcy . . . prior to 

December 31, 2011, will not be deemed eligible to file a General Business 

Economic Loss (‘General BEL’) claim.” Claimant seeks only economic-loss 

compensation, but Policy 506 makes it plain that Claimant cannot receive such 

compensation. We therefore find that the claims administrator did not err in 

designating Claimant a failed business for purposes of the settlement 

agreement.

Alternatively, even if the administrator’s decision were in error, it was 

not an abuse of discretion for the district court to refuse review of the decision. 

It is established that the settlement agreement “gives the district court 

discretion to decide whether it will review an award at all. Thus, the district 

court’s denials of review are reviewed for abuse of discretion.” Lake Eugenie 

Land & Dev., Inc. v. BP Expl. & Prod., Inc. (In re Deepwater Horizon), 785 F.3d 

1003, 1011 (5th Cir. 2015). This court has also held that it “is wrong to suggest 

that the district court must grant review of all claims that raise a question 
No. 18-30790

4

about the proper interpretation of the Settlement Agreement.” Holmes Motors,

829 F.3d at 316.

What Claimant alleges is a single misapplication of the settlement 

agreement. A refusal to review so isolated an error, were one to exist here,

cannot constitute an abuse of discretion. A contrary holding would “turn[] the 

district court’s discretionary review into a mandatory review [and] would

frustrate the clear purpose of the Settlement Agreement to curtail litigation.”

Id. (quoting In re Deepwater Horizon, 785 F.3d 986, 999 (5th Cir. 2015)). 

Instead, our reversals have been limited to cases involving pressing issues of 

the settlement agreement’s interpretation that are either likely to recur or 

have split the appeal panels. See, e.g., In re Deepwater Horizon, 632 F. App’x 

199, 203 (5th Cir. 2015) (unpublished) (finding abuse of discretion where 

district court refused to review decision involving issues that “have and will 

come up repeatedly” and upon which “[t]he Appeal Panels are split.”). Claimant 

makes no argument that such circumstances are present here, and it does not 

appear they are: these facts are unique, and we are aware of no contrary 

decisions by an appeal panel. Accordingly, the district court did not abuse its 

discretion in denying review. 

The judgment of the district court is therefore AFFIRMED.