IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

US Airways, Inc. and Sedgwick : Claims Management Services, Inc., : Petitioners :

: v. : No. 612 C.D. 2017
: Submitted: September 29, 2017 Workers’ Compensation Appeal : Board (Bockelman), : Respondent :

BEFORE: HONORABLE P. KEVIN BROBSON, Judge

HONORABLE MICHAEL H. WOJCIK, Judge HONORABLE J. WESLEY OLER, JR., Senior Judge

OPINION BY JUDGE BROBSON FILED: February 22, 2018

US Airways, Inc. (Employer) petitions for review of an order of the Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board (Board), dated April 19, 2017. The Board affirmed the order of a Workers’ Compensation Judge (WCJ), granting the claim petition of Betty Bockelman (Claimant) based upon the finding that Claimant was injured in the course and scope of her em ployment as required by Section 301(c)(1) of the Workers’ Compensation Act (Act). 1 We now affirm

.

Claimant worked for Employer as a Philadelphia

- based flight attendant. In order to get to work, Claimant drove her own vehicle to the airport and par ked in one of the two designated employee parking lots. Both parking lots are owned, operated, and maintained by the City of Philadelphia/D ivision of Aviation (DOA) , for the use of all airport employees, not just those of Employer. A ll airport

1 Act of June 2, 1915, P.L. 736, as amended , 77 P.S. § 411(1).2

employees a re required to get a secured identification display area (SIDA) badge in order to park in these lots. The DOA issues SIDA badges . Employe r pays a one

time administrative fee at the time of an employee’s hire to process the background check for the employee to receive a SIDA badge. After an employee parks, a shuttle bus transports the employee from the employee parking lot to the airport te rminal (and vice versa). Employer does not own or exercise control over the shuttle buses. Further, Employer does not require employees to use the airport employee parking
lots. Employer gi ve s its employees no directive whatsoever in terms of how they

s hould commute to work.

On January 23, 2015, Claimant parked her car in the employee parking lot and rode the employee shuttle bus to the terminal to report for work. (Reproduced Record (R.R.) at 24a

- 26a.) Employer scheduled Claimant to work a one

- da y trip from Philadelphia to Miami and back. ( Id. at 24a.) Claimant’s return flight from Miami landed in Philadelphia at approximately 9:47 p.m., and , after a brief
disc ussion with a co

- worker, Claimant departed the terminal to the employee shuttle
bus st op. ( Id. at 28a, 42a.) After Claimant boarded the shuttle bus, she attempted to lift her suitcase onto the luggage racks. ( Id. at 27a.) While trying to place her luggage on the racks, Claimant stepped in water on the floor, causing her right foot
to sl ide out from underneath her. ( Id. ) Claimant’s left knee buckled, causing her to fall backwards, crushing her left foot under her. ( Id. ) Claimant felt something rip in her left foot. ( Id. ) Other passengers had to assist Claimant from the floor to a

se at. ( Id. ) On June 2, 2015, Claimant filed a claim petition , alleging that she
sustained work

- related injuries to her lef t foot from her January 23, 2015 slip and
fall . ( Id. at 4a.) Employer filed a timely answer, denying that Claimant was within3

the scope of her employment at the time of her injury. ( Id. at 9a.) The WCJ held a hearing on October 28, 2015. ( Id. at 84a.)

In support of her petition, Claimant testified by deposition and presented documentary evidence. In opposition, Employer presen ted the testimony
of Anthony Stanley (Stanley) , Director of Planning and Administration for Employer, and documentary evidence.

By decision dated April 27, 2016, the WCJ concluded that Claimant sustained injuries in the course and scope of her employmen t. (WCJ Decision, attached to Petitioner’s brief as “Ex. 1.”) Specifically, the WCJ concluded: (1) the injury occurred on Employer’s p remises; (2) Claimant’s presence on the shuttle bus was required by the nature of her employment; and (3) the injury wa s cause d by the condition of the premises. ( Id. ) E mployer appealed to the Board, and, by opinion dated April 19, 2017, the Board affirmed. (Board Decision, attached to Petitioner’s
brief as “Ex. 2.” ) Employer then petitioned this Court for review

.

On appeal, 2 Employer essentially argues that the Board erred as a matter of law in concluding that Claimant was in the course and scope of her employment at the time of her injury. Specifically, Employer argues tha t the Board erred in concluding that Claiman t’s injury occurred on Employer’s premises
, because Employer did not own, lease, or control the shuttle bus and parking lot, and they were not integral to Employer’s business. Employer also argues that the Board erred in concluding that Claimant’s presenc e on the bus was required due to her

2 This Court ’ s standard of review is limited to determining whether constitutional rights were violated, whether an error of law was committed, or whether necessary findings of fact are supported by substantial evidence. Section 704 of the Admini strative A gency Law, 2 Pa. C.S. § 704

.4

employment status , because Employer never required Claimant to use the shuttle
bus. Pursuant to Section 301(c)(1) of the Act, an injury is compensable if it “(1) arises in the course of employment and (2) is causally r elated thereto.” U.S. Airways v. Wo rkers’ Comp. Appeal Bd. (Dixon) , 764 A.2d 635, 640 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2000), appeal denied , 788 A.2d 382 ( Pa. 2001). Injuries may arise in the course of employment in two distinct situations:

(1) where the employee is injured on or off the employer’s premises, while actually engaged in furtherance of the employe r’s business or affairs; or (2) where the employee, although not actually engaged in the furtherance of the employer’s business or affairs, (a) is on the premises occup ied or under the control of the employer, or upon which the employer’s business or affairs are being carried on, (b) is required by the nature of his employment to be present on the employer’s premises, and (c) sustains injuries caused by the condition of the premises or by operation of the employer’s business or affairs thereon.

Id

. As there is no dispute that Claimant was not actually engaged in the furtherance of Employer’s business, Claimant’s injury is compensable under the Act
if she establishes th at (1) the injury o ccurred on Employer’s premises, (2) Claimant’s presence thereon was required by th e nature of her employment, and ( 3) the injury was caused by the condition of the premises or by operation of Employer’s business thereon. See Workmen’s C omp. Appeal Bd. (Slaugenhaupt) v. United States Steel Corp. , 376 A.2d 271 , 273 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1977)

. It is undisputed that Claimant has established the third prong of the Slaugenhaupt

test

.5 First , we address Employer’s argument that focuses on the dispute d first prong of the Slaugenhaupt test

— that the injury occurred on Employer’s premises

. Employer contends that Claimant cannot establish that she was injured on Employer’ s premises because (1) Employer never owned, leased, maintained, or
controlled the sh uttle bus, and (2 ) the shuttle bus does not comprise an integral part of Employer’s business because Employer did not cause Claimant to be there.

In construing the term “premises” a s contemplated by
Section 301(c)(1) of the Act, the determinative question is whether the site of the
accident is so connected with the employer’s business as to form an integral part
thereof. Epler v. N. Am. Rockwell Corp

. , 393 A.2d 1163, 1166

- 67 (Pa. 1978). In this analysis, “t he critical factor is not the employer’s title to or control over the area, but rather the fact that . . . [the employer] had caused the area to be used by

. . . employees in performance of their assigned tasks.” 3 Id. at 1167. F urther, this Court
has hel d that reasonable means of access to the workplace is considered an integral part of the employer’s business, and, therefore, is part of the employer’s “premises.”
Newhouse v. Workmen’s Comp. Appeal Bd. (Harris Cleaning Serv., Inc.) , 530 A.2d 545, 546

- 47 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1987), appeal denied , 538 A.2d 879 ( Pa. 1988). Thus, Employer’s contention that the shuttle bus could not be part of its premises because it did not own, lease, maintain, or control the shuttle bus is not dispositive of whether
the shuttle bu s was part of Employer’s premises.

Our courts have held that an employer’s premises includes reasonable means of access to the workplace, whether or not the employer owns the land. See
Newhouse , 530 A.2d at 546

- 47. Further, an employer’s premises is pro perty that

3 While the question of whether an employer required a claimant to be at the location of injury constitutes a separate and distinct prong of the Slaugenhaupt test , it may also be a factor considered when determining whether an area is part of an employer’s premises.6

“could be considered an integral part of the employer’s business.” Ortt v. Worker s’ Comp. Appeal Bd. (PPL Servs. , Corp.) , 874 A.2d 1264, 1267 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2005). Property becomes integral to an employer’s business when the employer causes employees to be in the area. Epler , 393 A.2d at 1167.

A means of access customarily used by employees for ingress and egress can be such an integral part of an employer’s business as to be considered part of the premises. In Interstate United Corporation v. Workmen’s Compensation Appeal Board , 424 A.2d 1015 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1981), the claimant worked as a cafeteria worker inside of a plant. The employer leased the cafeteria from the plant

owner. Interstate United Corp. , 424 A.2d at 1016. The claimant sustained injuries after falling on the steps of a footbridg e that connected the plant to a public street.
Id. The plant owner, not the employer, owned and controlled the footbridge. Id. This Court, in concluding that the footbridge comprised the employer’s premises for the purposes of the Act, opined:

[T] he re cord shows that [employer’s] cafeteria was located in the interior of the . . . plant, that employees customarily crossed the footbridge the claimant was injured on to enter and exit the cafeteria area, and that [employer] was aware of this fact. In numero us cases Pennsylvania Courts have held that a reasonable means of access to the situs of an employer ’ s business operation is such an integral p art of an employer’ s business as to be encompassed within the definition of “premises” as that term is used in Se ction 301(c)(1) of the Act

. Id. at 1017.
Also instructive to our analysis is this Court’s holding in Fashion Hosiery Shops v. Workmen’s Compensation Appeal Board , 423 A.2d 792 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1980). In Fashion Hosiery Shops , a claimant sustained injuries af ter she fell while approaching an entrance to her workplace. Fashion Hosiery Shops ,7

423 A.2d at 794. The employer had three separate points of entry and indicated no preference to claimant as to which entry point to utilize. Id. at 793

- 94. The employer did not own, lease, or control the walkway upon which the claimant fell. Id. at 797. On appeal to this Court, the employer essentially argued that the claimant’s injury did not occur on employer’s premises because the claiman t had multiple means of

entr y to the workplace, and the employer did not instruct her to utilize any specific

one. Id. at 794. In determining that the walkway comprised the employer’s premises, we found no significance in the fact that the employer did not require
claimant to use a specific entry to the workplace. Id. at 797. In so holding, we opined: Given the relational nature of the area in question to the

employer ’ s place of business, it must be concluded that the claimant was injured on an entranceway that was available and i ntended for her use; and as such, it c onstituted part of the employer’ s premises, regardless of its not being owned or controlled by the employer. N or does the availability of alternative entrances nullify that conclusion. Each of the three available and intended ways of ingress to Fashi on’s shop was a part of Fashion’ s “premises” for purposes of Section 301(c) of the Workmen ’ s Compensation Act.

Id. The instant case is analogous to both Interstate United Corp oration and Fashion Hosiery Shops . Claimant us ed the airport parking lot and shuttle bus to enter and exit the workplace. (R.R. at 11a

- 12a.) It is undisputed that Employer does not own or exercise control over the parking and shuttle services. Claimant uses the
shuttle bus as a customary means of i ngress and egress, much like the claimant s in Interstate United Corporation and Fashion Hosiery Shops utilized the footbridge and walkway

. Claimant used her vehicle as her means of transportation to work,
and the airport provided employees who work at the airport, including Claimant,8

with parking at no cost in employee parking lots designated by the airport. ( Id. at 73a.) In order to get from the parking lot to the terminal , Claimant rode the shuttle
bus provided by the airport to transport employees to and from its parking lots and
terminal

. As part of doing business with the airport, Employer underst ood that the airport would transport Employer’s employees who drove to work

. Thus, Employer
also underst ood that , in order to arrive at their work area to start their shift, employees who drive to work invariably board the shuttle bus after their commute to the airport. Similarly, Employer also understood that, in order to leave their work
area at the end of their shift , employe es who drive to work invariably board the
shuttle bus to return to their vehicle

. Accordingly, the shuttle bus is such an integral part of Employer’s business as to be part of the premises , in addition to being a customary means of ingress and egress , and the WCJ correctly concluded as such.

Having concluded that Claimant met the first prong of the Slaugenhaupt test

— that the injury occurred on Employer’s premises , we now turn our focus to the disputed second prong of the Slaugenhaupt test

— that the natur e of
Claimant’s employment required her to be on Employer’s premises where she was injured

. Employer essentially argues that Claimant’s presence on the shuttle bus was not required, as Employer gave her no directive on where to park , and, accordingly, Emp loyer did not require Claimant to boa rd the shuttle bus.

In ICT Group v. Workers ’ Compensation Appeal Board (Churchray

- Woytunick) , 995 A.2d 927 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2010), this Court considered
whether a claimant who sustained an injury from slipping on ice on he r employer’s premises when leaving for her lunch break was injured within the course of her employment. With regard to the second prong of the Slaugenhaupt test, t he employer argued that the nature of the claimant’s employment did not require her to9

be pr esent in the parking lot during her lunch break , and, therefore, she was not injured in the course and scope of her employment. The employer took this position
because the claimant had started her lunch break and had independently decided to
leave the employer’s premises at that time . W e placed no significance on the fact that the claimant had “independently” decided to leave the building during her lunch
break when we concluded that the claimant’s presence was required by the nature of her employment

. In reaching that conclusion , we applied the same rule applicable to situations where the employee is arriving at the workplace to commence the workday or departing from the workplace at the completion of the workday

— that “any injury occurring to an empl oyee up until the time he leaves the premises of the employer, provided that it is reasonably proximate to work hours, is compensable.” ICT Group , 995 A.2d at 932 (quoting Epler , 393 A.2d at 1166 ). We observed that “[t]he rationale behind this rule is th at ‘ once an employee is on the [ e ] mployer’s premises, actually getting to or leaving the employee’s work station is a necessary part of employee’s employment. ’ ” 4 Id. (quoting Allegheny Ludlum Cor p. v. Worker s ’ Comp. Appeal Bd. (Hines) , 913 A.2d 345, 349 ( Pa. Cmwlth. 2006), appeal
denied , 932 A.2d 77 (Pa. 2007) )

. Because the c laimant was still in the process of walking from her work station to her car at the time of her injury , the Court
determined that “ her presence on [the e] mployer ’ s premises remained s o connected

4 Pennsylvania courts have found that a claimant’s presence is not “required” on an employer’s premises if her presence does not occur within a reasonable time before or after her work shift or if the claimant is in an area unrelated to her work. See Heverly v. Workmen’s Comp. Appeal Bd. (Ship N Shore) , 578 A.2d 575 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1990) ( holding claimant’s presence not required for the purposes of Section 301(c)(1) of the Act after leaving work for the day and sustaini ng an injury upon returning later to retrieve her eyeglasses); see also Giebel v. Workmen’s Comp. Appeal Bd. , 399 A.2d 152 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1979) ( holding claimant’s presence not required in different part of department store from part in which she worked). T he instant case, however, does not implicate Heverly or Giebel

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to the employment relationship that it was required by the nature of her employment. ” Id.

Here, Claimant’s presence on the shuttle bus was a necessary part of her employment, because it was the means by which she traversed between her work station ( i.e. , the terminal) and the parking lot designated for airport employees. As found by the WCJ, the shuttle bus is “specifically designated as an employee bus to travel from the terminal to the [employee] parking lot.” 5 (WCJ Decision, attached

to Petitioner’s brief as “Ex. 2.”) Claimant’s utilization of the shuttle bus service was expected, so long as she elected to drive to work. Claimant’s presence on the shuttle bus, therefore, was so connected to her employment relationship that it was requi red by the nature of her employment , and the WCJ did not err in concluding as such. The absence of a directive by Employer instructing Claimant to utilize the shuttle bus does not alter this analysis, just as the fact that the claimant in I C T Group indepe ndently decided to leave the building during her lunch break, without instruction or a directive by employer, did not al ter the analysis in that case.

5 We also note that there is no record evidence to indicate that Claimant would have been able to walk from the airport termina l to the employee parking lot. Even if such evidence existed, it would not alter the outcome of this matter.11 Accordingly, the order of the Board is affirmed.

P. KEVIN BROBSON, JudgeIN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

US Airways, Inc. and Sedgwick : Claims Management Services, Inc., : Petitioners :

: v. : No. 612 C.D. 2017
: Workers ’ Compensation Appeal : Board (Bockelman), : Respondent :

O R D E R

AND NOW, this 22nd day of February , 2018, the order of the Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board, is AFFIRMED

.

P. KEVIN BROBSON, Judge