2021 WI App 15

COURT OF APPEALS OF WISCONSIN

PUBLISHED OPINION

Case No.: 

2019AP224-CR

2019AP225-CR

2019AP226-CR

Complete Title of Case: 

STATE OF WISCONSIN,

 PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT,

 V.

JAMES A. JONES,

 DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.

Opinion Filed: February 17, 2021

Submitted on Briefs: December 16, 2019

Oral Argument: 

JUDGES: Stark, P.J., Hruz and Seidl, JJ.

Concurred:

Dissented:

Appellant

ATTORNEYS: On behalf of the defendant-appellant, the cause was submitted on the 

briefs of William J. Donarski of Law Office of William J. Donarski, 

Green Bay. 

Respondent

ATTORNEYS: On behalf of the plaintiff-respondent, the cause was submitted on the 

brief of Joshua L. Kaul, attorney general, and Robert G. Probst, 

assistant attorney general. 
2021 WI App 15

COURT OF APPEALS

DECISION

DATED AND FILED

February 17, 2021

Sheila T. Reiff

Clerk of Court of Appeals

NOTICE

This opinion is subject to further editing. If 

published, the official version will appear in 

the bound volume of the Official Reports. 

A party may file with the Supreme Court a 

petition to review an adverse decision by the 

Court of Appeals. See WIS. STAT. § 808.10 and 

RULE 809.62. 

Appeal Nos. 2019AP224-CR

2019AP225-CR

2019AP226-CR

Cir. Ct. Nos. 2016CF687

2016CF736

2017CF852

STATE OF WISCONSIN IN COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF WISCONSIN,

 PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT,

 V.

JAMES A. JONES,

 DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.

APPEALS from judgments and an order of the circuit court for 

Outagamie County: MARK J. McGINNIS, Judge. Reversed in part and cause 

remanded with directions. 

Before Stark, P.J., Hruz and Seidl, JJ. 

¶1 HRUZ, J. James Jones appeals judgments of conviction and, 

primarily, an order denying his postconviction motion seeking the return of bond 
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2

monies that were posted by other persons.1 The bond monies were posted in 

connection with two cases that were dismissed but read in at sentencing as part of a 

global plea agreement encompassing five cases. Jones contends the circuit court 

lacked statutory authority to order the use of bond monies from the dismissed but 

read-in cases to pay restitution in the cases to which Jones pled no contest as part of 

the plea deal. We agree with Jones that WIS. STAT. § 969.03(5) (2017-18)2requires 

that any bond money posted shall be returned to the payor once a complaint against 

the defendant is dismissed, even if the underlying offenses comprising that criminal 

action are read in at sentencing for a different case. Accordingly, we reverse in part 

the judgments and the postconviction order and remand so that the circuit court may 

grant Jones’s postconviction motion and order the refund of the appropriate monies.

BACKGROUND

¶2 This appeal involves numerous offenses and underlying criminal 

cases arising from a series of thefts throughout Outagamie County. First, on January 

27, 2016, Jones was charged in Outagamie County case No. 2016CF52. The 

complaint alleged that on the previous day, Jones was found in a vehicle bearing 

incorrect license plates. The police observed that Jones was in possession of a 

crowbar, a screwdriver, bolt cutters, a hammer, and numerous other license plates 

(one of which had been reported as stolen), along with two empty radio scanner 

boxes and other electronic merchandise. Jones was ultimately charged in case 

 

1

 The parties use the terms “bail” and “bond” interchangeably, and we do as well in this 

opinion. Any technical distinction between these terms is immaterial to the disposition of these 

appeals. 

2

 All references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 2017-18 version unless otherwise 

noted.
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No. 2016CF52 with possession of burglarious tools and misdemeanor 

receiving/concealing stolen property, both charges as a repeater. We will refer to 

this case as “the burglary tools case.” 

¶3 Second, on August 10, 2016, Jones was charged in Outagamie County 

case No. 2016CM761 with misdemeanor retail theft as a repeater. The complaint 

alleged that on January 22, 2016, Jones entered a Radio Shack store and shoplifted 

two empty radio scanner boxes and an electrician’s multi-meter. The radio scanner 

boxes matched the boxes that were found with Jones when he was arrested in 

relation to the burglary tools case, and Jones matched the description of the suspect 

in the theft. We will refer to case No. 2016CM761 as “the Radio Shack case.”

¶4 Also on August 10, 2016, Jones was charged in Outagamie County 

case No. 2016CF687. The complaint alleged that on January 22, 2016, Jones had 

entered a sporting goods store along with an accomplice. Jones was alleged to have 

taken four trail cameras worth almost $2,000 while his accomplice distracted 

employees. Jones was charged with a single count of felony retail theft, as a 

repeater. This case will be referred to as “the trail cameras case.” 

¶5 Finally, on August 25, 2016, Jones was charged in Outagamie County 

case No. 2016CF736. The complaint alleged that on January 12, 2016, Jones, along 

with two accomplices, burglarized a laundromat that contained gaming machines. 

The crew was alleged to have broken into the building, after which they sawed open 

the fronts of several gaming machines and stole the money inside them. Jones was 

charged with a single count of burglary of a building or dwelling as a party to a 

crime and as a repeater. We will refer to this case as “the laundromat case.”
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¶6 On June 7, 2016, Jones’s mother posted a $2,500 cash bond in the 

burglary tools case. Later, on September 27, 2016, a friend of Jones, Vincent Udo, 

paid $1,200 for the total bail ordered in the other three cases, comprising $200 in 

the Radio Shack case and $500 each in the trail cameras and laundromat cases. Even 

though the $1,200 was paid as one lump sum, it was designated to each separate 

case. The bail/bond forms each contained the same language, including a warning 

that “[a]ny restitution ... or costs imposed against the defendant shall be paid out of 

the bail/bond without further notice.” 

¶7 The State and Jones ultimately reached a plea agreement involving all 

of the above-referenced cases. In the trail cameras case, Jones agreed to plead no 

contest to the felony retail theft charge, but without the repeater enhancer. In the 

laundromat case, the single charge of burglary as a repeater was amended to three 

reduced charges to which Jones pled no contest.3 Meanwhile, the parties agreed that 

the charges in the Radio Shack case and the burglary tools case would be dismissed 

and read in at sentencing. In addition, Jones would plead no contest to a yet-to-befiled charge of operating a motor vehicle without the owner’s consent—later filed 

as Outagamie County case No. 2017CF852—with the State agreeing to recommend, 

on that charge, a sentence concurrent to any time served on the above charges. We 

will refer to case No. 2017CF852 as “the OMVOC case.” 

¶8 As part of the global plea agreement, Jones agreed to pay restitution 

on the charges to which he pled no contest. The plea questionnaire/waiver of rights 

form that Jones signed also stated that he understood he “may be required to pay 

 

3

 The amended charges were for possession of burglary tools, felony theft, and criminal 

damage to property. 
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restitution on any read-in charges,” which is a correct statement of the law. See 

WIS. STAT. § 973.20(1g)(a), (1r). 

¶9 The cases proceeded to a combined plea hearing and sentencing. 

Jones first entered a plea to the single count in the OMVOC case.4 The OMVOC 

case and the two other cases still remaining—i.e., the trail cameras and laundromat 

cases—then proceeded to sentencing. As relevant here, the circuit court ordered 

that restitution be paid in two of the cases. First, it imposed $1,999.96 of restitution 

to the sporting goods store for the stolen trail cameras, plus costs and surcharges. It 

also imposed $1,200 of restitution, plus costs and surcharges, to be paid to the owner 

of the vehicle involved in the OMVOC case. The court did not specify on the record 

that the bond money was to be used toward restitution, but it did require that Jones 

“pay court costs and supervision fees in a timely manner, and that you pay the 

restitution as requested.” There was no restitution claimed, nor ordered, in the two 

cases that were dismissed and read in—i.e., the burglary tools and Radio Shack 

cases—or in the laundromat case.

¶10 On November 9, 2018, Jones filed a motion for postconviction relief. 

As relevant here, the motion asked the circuit court to “correct the distribution and 

application of the monies posted for bond.” Specifically, Jones argued that the clerk 

improperly “applied bond monies posted on dismissed and read-in cases to amounts 

owed for restitution and costs on the cases Jones was convicted of.” According to 

Jones, no statutory authority permitted the clerk to use the bond monies posted in 

the cases involving the dismissed but read-in counts to pay his restitution obligations 

in the trail cameras and OMVOC cases. Indeed, Jones argued that WIS. STAT.

 

4

 Jones had earlier entered his no-contest pleas in the trail cameras and laundromat cases. 
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§ 969.03(5) specifically required that the bond money deposited in connection with 

the dismissed but read-in counts in those separate cases be returned to Jones’s 

mother and to Udo—i.e., the persons who posted them. 

¶11 Additionally, Jones pointed to WIS. STAT. § 969.03(4)’s language 

stating that when “a judgment of conviction is entered in a prosecution in which a 

deposit had been made,” “the balance of the deposit ... shall be applied first to the 

payment of any restitution ordered ... and then ... to the payment of the judgment.” 

Jones asserted that because there was no judgment of conviction entered on the 

complaints that included the charges that were dismissed but read in from the 

burglary tools and Radio Shack cases, § 969.03(4)’s directive to first apply bond 

money to restitution did not apply. 

¶12 A hearing was held on Jones’s postconviction motion, after which the 

circuit court denied the portion of the motion regarding the application of the bond 

monies.5 The court opined that WIS. STAT. § 969.03(5) does not “answer[] what 

happens in dismissed and read[-]in cases clearly” because that statute only mentions 

dismissed cases, not cases that are dismissed but include read-in counts. The court 

rejected Jones’s argument that the word “prosecution” in § 969.03(4) refers only to 

a single criminal action; rather, the court reasoned that Jones’s cases were all one 

“prosecution.” As the court noted, Jones’s plea agreement resolved five pending 

cases against him at once (in addition to a sixth offense not relevant to the issues 

here, which was a criminal traffic case that was dismissed outright). The court 

pointed out that all of the cases were prosecuted by the same assistant district 

attorney and defended by the same defense attorney. Accordingly, the court viewed 

 

5

 The circuit court did partially grant relief by ordering the restitution owed in the trail 

cameras case to be joint and several with Jones’s co-defendant. That portion of the court’s order

is not at issue on appeal.
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all six cases resolved by the global plea agreement as a single “prosecution” under 

§ 969.03(4), such that it was appropriate to apply the bond posted in the dismissed 

cases with read-in charges to the restitution owed in the cases to which Jones pled 

no contest.

¶13 The circuit court also concluded that WIS. STAT. § 969.03(5) 

distinguishes between cases that are dismissed outright and cases that are dismissed 

and read in, and subsec. (5) applies only to the former. The court noted the parties 

had agreed to dismiss outright the traffic case (rather than dismissing and reading it 

in) before sentencing, leading the court to conclude that the parties themselves, by 

their handling of the various matters, had been drawing a distinction between the 

two types of dismissals. The court concluded that § 969.03(5) specifically 

mentioned only two types of cases: those that are “dismissed” and those of which 

“the defendant has been acquitted.” Thus, in the court’s view, “the fact that the 

legislative branch did not include dismissed and read[-]in [cases] in [§] 969.03(5) 

may be indicative that it was not their intention to include dismissed and read[-]in 

[cases] with that statute.” 

¶14 The circuit court then concluded that WIS. STAT. § 973.20, 

Wisconsin’s restitution statute, supported its interpretation of WIS. STAT. § 969.03. 

The court noted that the restitution statute specifically defines “a crime considered 

at sentencing” to include “any crime for which the defendant was convicted and any 

read-in crime.” See § 973.20(1g)(a). Because the counts in the burglary tools and 

Radio Shack cases were dismissed but read in “for purposes of 973.20(1g),” the 

court concluded that it was “appropriate to consider [them] for purposes of 

restitution.” Thus, the court reasoned, it was “appropriate and lawful and within the 

statute to allow restitution to be paid from a case where Mr. Jones had it dismissed 
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and read in and that that case was part of a package deal that involved cases that led 

to convictions with restitution amounts due and owing.” 

¶15 Jones now appeals, asserting that, for the reasons explained in his 

postconviction motion, the bond monies posted in connection with the dismissed 

and read-in cases—i.e., the burglary tools and Radio Shack cases—must be returned 

to the individuals who posted those monies under WIS. STAT. § 939.03(5).6

DISCUSSION

¶16 One procedural matter requires attention before we reach the issue 

Jones raises regarding the bond monies paid in connection with the dismissed and 

read-in cases. The State argues that Jones lacks standing to challenge the 

distribution of the bond monies because they were posted by other individuals on 

his behalf. The State urges us to affirm the circuit court’s decision on this alternative 

rationale. See Blum v. 1st Auto & Cas. Ins. Co., 2010 WI 78, ¶27 n.4, 326 Wis. 2d 

729, 786 N.W.2d 78. Whether a party has standing is a question of law that we 

review de novo. Krier v. Vilione, 2009 WI 45, ¶14, 317 Wis. 2d 288, 766 N.W.2d 

517.

¶17 The State’s argument consists of a general application of the factors 

articulated by the lead opinion in Foley-Ciccantelli v. Bishop’s Grove 

Condominium Ass’n, 2011 WI 36, ¶5, 333 Wis. 2d 402, 797 N.W.2d 789. But there 

is no need for such a factor-by-factor analysis, as a prior case has directly addressed 

the State’s argument here. In State v. Iglesias, 185 Wis. 2d 117, 517 N.W.2d 175 

(1994), our supreme court held that a defendant “has a sufficient ‘personal stake’ in 

 

6

 By order of this court, the three appeals at issue were consolidated for the purposes of 

briefing and decision. 
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the terms of her own bail and sentence so as to give her standing” regardless of who 

actually posted the bail. Id. at 132-33. “[U]nder Wisconsin law, money posted for 

bail, irrespective of its source, is conclusively presumed to be the defendant’s 

money.” Id. at 130-31 (citations omitted). We therefore proceed to consider the 

merits of Jones’s arguments. 

¶18 Jones’s claims on appeal largely follow those made in his 

postconviction motion. See supra ¶¶10-11. Generally, he argues that the dismissed 

and read-in charges from the burglary tools and Radio Shack cases constituted 

“dismissed” complaints under WIS. STAT. § 969.03(5), and therefore the monies 

posted for bond in connection with those two cases were required to be returned to 

their respective depositors. Resolving this argument requires us to interpret and 

apply § 969.03 and related statutes. Statutory interpretation and application are 

questions of law that we review de novo. Langlade Cnty. v. D.J.W., 2020 WI 41, 

¶25, 391 Wis. 2d 231, 942 N.W.2d 277. 

¶19 “[T]he purpose of statutory interpretation is to determine what the 

statute means so that it may be given its full, proper, and intended effect.” State v. 

Braunschweig, 2018 WI 113, ¶12, 384 Wis. 2d 742, 921 N.W.2d 199 (quoting State 

ex rel. Kalal v. Circuit Ct. for Dane Cnty., 2004 WI 58, ¶45, 271 Wis. 2d 633, 681 

N.W.2d 110). When interpreting a statute, we begin with its language. State v. 

Neill, 2020 WI 15, ¶21, 390 Wis. 2d 248, 938 N.W.2d 521. If the meaning of the 

statute is plain, we go no further. Id. “Statutory language is given its common, 

ordinary, and accepted meaning, except that technical or specially-defined words or 

phrases are given their technical or special definitional meaning.” Id. 
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¶20 When an individual is arrested for a criminal offense, Wisconsin law 

permits the circuit court to make him or her eligible for release “under reasonable 

conditions designed to assure his or her appearance in court, protect members of the 

community from serious bodily harm, or prevent the intimidation of witnesses.” 

WIS. STAT. § 969.01(1). In a felony case, a judge may release the defendant with a 

number of conditions, including by requiring “the execution of an appearance bond 

with sufficient solvent sureties, or the deposit of cash in lieu of sureties.” WIS.

STAT. § 969.03(1)(d). 

¶21 Jones’s statutory argument is straightforward. In pertinent part, WIS.

STAT. § 969.03(5) requires that “[i]f the complaint against the defendant has been 

dismissed or if the defendant has been acquitted, the entire sum deposited [under 

§ 969.03(1)(d)] shall be returned.” Jones contends that the burglary tools and Radio 

Shack cases against him were “dismissed” for purposes of § 969.03(5), even though 

the counts that were part of those cases were read in at his sentencing. In other 

words, Jones claims that, under subsec. (5), “there is no difference between 

‘dismissed and read-in’ and ‘dismissed,’” and the bond monies should therefore be 

returned. 

¶22 The State’s argument is more nuanced. It contends that WIS. STAT.

§ 969.03(5) refers to a complaint that is dismissed outright—not to particular 

offenses charged in a complaint that are later dismissed and read in at any 

sentencing. The State reaches this conclusion by referring to the circumstances 

surrounding the legislature’s enactment of a different provision: § 969.03(4). 

Subsection (4) states as follows:

If a judgment of conviction is entered in a prosecution in 

which a deposit had been made in accordance with sub. 

(1)(d), the balance of the deposit, after deduction of the bond 
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costs, shall be applied first to the payment of any restitution 

ordered under s. 973.20 and then, if ordered restitution is 

satisfied in full, to the payment of the judgment.[7]

The State contends that subsec. (4) permitted the circuit court clerk to apply the 

bond monies posted in connection with the burglary tools and Radio Shack cases to 

the restitution ordered in the other cases that were resolved as part of the global plea 

agreement, under the theory that all of the cases formed one “prosecution.” 

¶23 The State further contends that its argument is supported by the 

restitution statute, WIS. STAT. § 973.20, which is cross-referenced in WIS. STAT.

§ 969.03(4). Under § 973.20(1r), a circuit court is authorized when imposing a 

sentence to “order the defendant to make full or partial restitution ... to any victim 

of a crime considered at sentencing.” A “crime considered at sentencing” describes 

not only the crime of conviction, but also any read-in crime. Sec. 973.20(1g)(a). 

And § 973.20(1g)(b) further defines a “read-in crime” as “any crime that is 

uncharged or that is dismissed as part of a plea agreement, that the defendant agrees 

to be considered by the court at the time of sentencing” and that is actually 

considered by the court during sentencing for the crime of conviction. This 

language describes all of the offenses charged in the burglary tools and Radio Shack 

cases. 

¶24 Accordingly, whether the bond posted in those cases can be applied 

to the restitution ordered in the trail cameras and OMVOC cases depends on the 

treatment of the burglary tools and Radio Shack cases under WIS. STAT. § 969.03. 

We must determine whether the criminal complaints in the burglary tools and Radio 

 

7

 WISCONSIN STAT. § 969.02(6) contains a similar provision relating to misdemeanor 

offenses.
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Shack cases were “dismissed” under § 969.03(5), thereby necessitating the return 

of the bond monies posted in those cases. Or does the global plea agreement make 

all of the cases a single “prosecution in which a deposit had been made,” such that 

the bond monies posted for the burglary tools and Radio Shack cases—both of 

which consisted entirely of dismissed but read-in charges—may be applied to the 

judgment of conviction containing the restitution ordered in the other cases? 

¶25 As an initial matter, and regarding the meaning of WIS. STAT.

§ 969.03(5) itself, we reject the notion that any weight should be given to the 

omission of a specific reference to read-in charges or complaints. It is 

charges/crimes that are read in for sentencing purposes, not complaints or cases per 

se, even though the common vernacular is to refer to cases, complaints, crimes and 

charges all as being “dismissed.” See State v. Straszkowski, 2008 WI 65, ¶58 & 

n.33, 310 Wis. 2d 259, 750 N.W.2d 835 (discussing the nomenclature used in 

various cases). A complaint necessarily is “dismissed” either when the charges 

within it are dismissed “outright” or when they are dismissed “and read in.” Indeed, 

it is a logical fallacy to conclude, as the State does, that a dismissed complaint is not 

“dismissed” merely because charges constituting that complaint are “read in” for 

sentencing purposes in a wholly unrelated, separate case. Accordingly, and contrary 

to the State’s argument, it is the State—not Jones or this court—that is reading into 

the statute a meaning inconsistent with its plain language. 

¶26 We also conclude that the State’s interpretation of WIS. STAT.

§ 969.03(4) is incomplete and does not accurately describe what occurred in these 

cases. While the State focuses on the phrase “any restitution ordered under 

s. 973.20,” it fails to adequately account for limiting language earlier in the single 

sentence that is § 969.03(4). In particular, subsec. (4) requires the entry of a 
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judgment of conviction “in a prosecution in which a deposit had been made.” No 

judgment of conviction was entered in either the burglary tools case or the 

Radio Shack case.8 To accept the State’s argument, one has to view the judgments 

of conviction in the trail cameras, laundromat and OMVOC cases as being part of 

the same “prosecution” as the burglary tools and Radio Shack cases in which the 

deposits were made. We find this interpretation untenable.

¶27 The term “prosecution” in WIS. STAT. § 969.03(4) is not defined 

anywhere in WIS. STAT. ch. 969. The State argues that what constitutes a single 

“prosecution” should be determined by a number of factors, including whether there 

was a single plea agreement, whether the resolution of the charges occurred in a 

single proceeding, and whether there was a single sentencing hearing, most of which 

occurred here.9 The circuit court also noted that all of Jones’s cases resolved in the 

underlying proceedings were prosecuted by the same assistant district attorney and 

defended by the same attorney. We disagree that these factors—and the potential 

happenstances by which they would occur—should alter the plain reading of 

§ 969.03(4) and (5) as contemplating a “prosecution” as being defined by a single 

complaint and resultant criminal action. 

¶28 Nothing in WIS. STAT. § 969.03(4) suggests that the kind of analytical 

complexity the State endorses is necessary. In common, ordinary and accepted 

 

8

 The absence of a judgment of conviction in the burglary tools and Radio Shack cases 

bears emphasis. WISCONSIN STAT. § 969.03(4) requires the applicable bond money to be applied 

first to restitution, then to the payment of the judgment. This sequencing directive cannot work 

without a judgment of conviction.

9

 This last suggestion by the State is somewhat odd, as the plea in the OMVOC case was 

not handled at the same time as the pleas in the other cases. In fact, the OMVOC case had not yet 

been charged at the time the parties agreed to resolve all the cases. 
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parlance, a “prosecution” is simply a pending criminal proceeding against a person 

in which one or more criminal charges have been levied. As Jones notes, each 

criminal case has its own complaint, preliminary hearing, conditions of release 

(including possibly a bond), and, perhaps most relevant here, judgment of 

conviction; and each case gives rise to separate—and important—procedural rights 

on the defendant’s part. Even the State appears to accept the notion that each 

criminal case against Jones was a separate prosecution, at least initially, because it 

posits that they only became one prosecution at the time the global plea agreement 

was formed. But under the disposition resulting from that plea deal, there still was 

no “judgment of conviction ... entered in” the burglary tools and Radio Shack cases 

“in which [the] deposit[s]” at issue “had been made in accordance with sub. 

(1)(d).”10 See § 969.03(4).

¶29 Contrary to the State’s argument, viewing each criminal case as its 

own prosecution is fully consistent with our canons of statutory interpretation. We 

interpret statutory language in the context in which it is used; not in isolation but as 

part of a whole; in relation to the language of surrounding or closely related statutes; 

and reasonably, to avoid absurd results. Braunschweig, 384 Wis. 2d 742, ¶13. The 

State correctly observes that the restitution statute, WIS. STAT. § 973.20(1r), permits 

a circuit court to order restitution on a dismissed but read-in count as part of the 

 

10

 We further observe the particular language in WIS. STAT. § 969.03(1)(d), as well as in 

the remainder of § 969.03. Subsection (1) begins by couching all of what follows as happening 

after “[a] defendant [has been] charged with a felony,” and throughout § 969.03 there are references 

to “an appearance bond,” to “a charge [that] is pending,” to “the complaint,” and to “a deposit of 

cash,” “the cash deposit,” or “a deposit.” Such language gives further credence to our conclusion 

that the legislature intended § 969.03 as referring, at all times, to a single criminal case, as the 

legislature plainly contemplated that a “prosecution” encompasses the processes triggered by the 

filing of an individual criminal complaint. As a result, the meaning of a “prosecution” does not 

change depending on subsequent events, such as a plea agreement that covers several cases. 
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judgment for the crime of conviction. The statute does not, however, dictate 

whether or how bond money should be applied to reduce the amount of those 

obligations. That matter is addressed by WIS. STAT. § 969.03. The mere fact that 

charges that are dismissed outright are treated differently under § 973.20 than those 

that are dismissed and read in for restitution purposes does not mean they are treated 

differently for purposes of § 969.03 and the return of bond money, at least given the 

absence of any language in the latter statute to suggest as much.11 As a result, the 

State’s observation that a defendant may not again be charged with a dismissed and 

read-in offense is true, but it is of no consequence—at least when the circuit court 

does not order any restitution for any read-in charge in that dismissed case.12 See 

State v. Frey, 2012 WI 99, ¶43, 343 Wis. 2d 358, 817 N.W.2d 436. 

¶30 The State’s policy argument is also misdirected. It is true that WIS.

STAT. § 969.03(4) was plainly meant to prioritize the compensation of crime 

victims. See State v. Madlock, 230 Wis. 2d 324, 332, 602 N.W.2d 104 (Ct. App. 

1999). But even the State must acknowledge certain limitations to that principle. 

For example, had Jones been acquitted of the charges in the burglary tools or Radio 

Shack cases, there is no doubt the circuit court clerk could not apply the bond money 

posted in connection with those cases to the ordered restitution in the remaining 

cases. See WIS. STAT. § 969.03(5). There is an equally plain legislative purpose 

 

11

 Indeed, it should be noted that the definitional terms in WIS. STAT. § 973.20 upon which 

the State relies, see supra ¶23, specifically apply only “[i]n this section”—that is, § 973.20, not

WIS. STAT. § 969.03.

12

 Given the facts of these cases, we need not address whether the same result obtains when 

the circuit court does order restitution for a dismissed and read-in offense from a separate criminal 

case that is resolved as part of a global plea agreement. 
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codified in § 969.03(5) to return bond money that is part of a prosecution for which 

no judgment of conviction is ultimately entered. And here, the State does not 

explain how individuals who posted bond for Jones in the burglary tools and Radio 

Shack cases—perhaps under the belief that he was not guilty of those offenses—

could reasonably expect that those funds would be applied to the restitution Jones 

owed for entirely different crimes for which he was convicted.13

¶31 Contrary to the complex interpretive efforts necessary to reach the 

State’s conclusion, Jones offers a straightforward and sensible interpretation of WIS.

STAT. § 969.03(5), which we adopt. When all of the counts in a criminal complaint 

are dismissed and read in, and no restitution is ordered on any of those counts at the 

sentencing for the crime or crimes of conviction in separately charged cases, that 

complaint has been “dismissed” for purposes of § 969.03(5). This interpretation 

harmonizes the relevant statutes and achieves a reasonable result in which funds that 

are placed at risk to secure the defendant’s appearance in a particular case may be 

applied toward restitution on that case, but not toward other, unrelated cases. 

¶32 Accordingly, the $2,500 bond posted in connection with the burglary 

tools case and the $200 bond posted in connection with the Radio Shack case must 

be returned. There was no restitution ordered in the laundromat case, and Jones 

acknowledges the bonds posted in connection with the trail cameras and OMVOC 

cases could be properly applied toward the restitution ordered as part of the 

judgments of conviction. We reverse the portions of the judgments directing that 

the bond monies in the burglary tools and Radio Shack cases be used to satisfy 

 

13

 We do not find compelling the State’s observation that the bond forms notified the payor 

that any restitution would be paid out of the bond. In our view, the form does not clearly inform 

the reader, merely by its oblique reference to “any restitution,” that the bond may be used to pay 

for restitution owed in other cases. 
Nos. 2019AP224-CR

2019AP225-CR

2019AP226-CR

17

Jones’s restitution obligations and remand so that the circuit court may grant Jones’s 

motion and order the refund of the appropriate monies.

By the Court.—Judgments and order reversed in part and cause 

remanded with directions.