PUBLISH 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

TENTH CIRCUIT 

JEREMY C. MYERS, 

Plaintiff – Appellant/ CrossAppellee, 

v. 

BRIAN KOOPMAN, Detective in the 

Loveland, Colorado Police Department, in 

his individual capacity, 

Defendant – Appellee/ CrossAppellant. 

Nos. 12-1482, 12-1487 

Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the District of Colorado 

(D.C. No. 1:09-CV-02802-REB-MEH) 

Joseph Paul Fonfara of Fonfara Law Offices, Fort Collins, Colorado, (Randall Meyers of 

Law Office of Randall R. Meyers, Fort Collins, Colorado, with him on the briefs) for 

Plaintiff – Appellant/Cross-Appellee. 

Kent N. Campbell of Wick & Trautwein, LLC, Fort Collins, Colorado, for Defendant – 

Appellee/Cross-Appellant. 

Before BRISCOE, Chief Circuit Judge, O'BRIEN and PHILLIPS, Circuit Judges. 

PHILLIPS, Circuit Judge. 

FILED 

United States Court of Appeals 

Tenth Circuit 

December 20, 2013

Elisabeth A. Shumaker 

Clerk of Court
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 Jeremy Myers challenges the district court’s dismissal of his § 1983 maliciousprosecution claim alleging violations of his Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights. In 

his complaint, he asserted that Detective Brian Koopman obtained an arrest warrant by 

fabricating facts to create the illusion of probable cause. As a result, Myers spent three 

days in custody. 

 Exercising jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, we conclude that the district court 

rightly dismissed Myers’ Fourteenth Amendment claim because an adequate state remedy 

existed, but we conclude that the district court improperly dismissed Myers’ Fourth 

Amendment malicious prosecution claim as untimely after recasting it as a claim for false 

imprisonment. In fact, Myers correctly styled his Fourth Amendment claim as one for 

malicious prosecution because he was seized after the institution of legal process. The 

malicious prosecution claim is timely. Accordingly, we reverse the dismissal of that 

claim. 

BACKGROUND 

Because the district court entered judgment on the pleadings for Koopman, we 

accept Myers’ allegations as true. See Estes v. Wyo. Dep't of Transp., 302 F.3d 1200, 1203 

(10th Cir. 2002). Treated as true, Myers’ allegations paint a compelling picture of 

overzealous police work: Detective Koopman falsified an affidavit to obtain a search 

warrant for Myers’ property. Acting under authority of the warrant, law enforcement 

officers searched his property and a nearby sugar-beet laboratory. Investigators 

discovered a jar containing a white substance. Field tests incorrectly identified the 
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substance as methamphetamine. The police hailed the seizure as “a lot of dope,” and the 

media portrayed Myers as a meth manufacturer. App. vol. 1, at 56–57, 64. 

According to Myers’ allegations, Koopman then fabricated facts in an affidavit to 

obtain an arrest warrant. A judicial officer granted the warrant, and Myers surrendered on 

Friday, September 7, 2007, intending to post bond under an agreement between his 

attorney and Koopman. Myers claims that when he arrived at the police station, 

Koopman told the officer on duty to detain Myers because Koopman intended to file 

additional charges. Myers remained in custody until he bonded out on Monday, 

September 10. 

The district attorney then filed criminal charges, and Myers appeared for all 

hearings. Ultimately, further testing of the samples recovered from the raid revealed that 

they were not controlled substances. On November 15, 2007, the district attorney 

dropped all charges. 

Myers filed his complaint on November 5, 2009.1

 In 2012, the district court 

granted Koopman’s motion for judgment on the pleadings, dismissing Myers’ Fourteenth 

Amendment claim because an adequate state remedy existed, and further dismissing his 

Fourth Amendment claim as untimely. Myers now appeals those rulings. Koopman crossappeals, arguing that he is entitled to qualified and absolute immunity. 

 

1

 Myers originally filed in state court. Koopman removed the case to federal court 

on December 1, 2009. 
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DISCUSSION 

We review the district court’s decision to enter judgment on the pleadings for 

Koopman under the same standard applicable to a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss. See

Aspenwood Inv. Co. v. Martinez, 355 F.3d 1256, 1259 (10th Cir. 2004). Under that 

standard, we apply de novo review and will uphold the dismissal only if Myers’ 

allegations fail to “state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. 

Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). 

I. The Fourteenth Amendment Claim 

The district court rightly rejected Myers’ Fourteenth Amendment maliciousprosecution claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 because Colorado law provides an adequate 

remedy. The Fourteenth Amendment protects individuals against deprivations of liberty 

without due process of law. U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1. If a state actor’s harmful 

conduct is unauthorized and thus could not be anticipated pre-deprivation, then an 

adequate post-deprivation remedy—such as a state tort claim—will satisfy due process 

requirements. Becker v. Kroll, 494 F.3d 904, 921 (10th Cir. 2007) (citing Parratt v. 

Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 535–44, (1981), overruled on other grounds by Daniels v. 

Williams, 474 U.S. 327 (1986)). 

Here, Myers alleges that Koopman conjured up facts to create the illusion of 

probable cause for an arrest warrant and subsequent prosecution. Such lawlessness could 

not have been anticipated or prevented pre-deprivation, but a post-deprivation maliciousprosecution claim serves as an effective antidote. Colorado law provides that remedy. 
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See, e.g., Hewitt v. Rice, 154 P.3d 408, 411 (Colo. 2007) (outlining the elements of a 

malicious-prosecution claim under Colorado law). The existence of the state remedy 

flattens the Fourteenth Amendment peg on which Myers now tries to hang his § 1983 

malicious-prosecution claim. 

Myers pitches two replies: First, he argues that his Fourteenth Amendment claim 

is cognizable, despite the state remedy, because the claim also rests on a violation of the 

Fourth Amendment. For this position he offers no affirmative argument—legal or logical. 

Instead, Myers tries to distinguish Becker v. Kroll, on which the district court relied. But 

Becker itself relied on Supreme Court precedent, which has clearly held that postdeprivation state tort remedies satisfy due process requirements. See 494 F.3d at 921 

(citing Parratt, 451 U.S. at 544). Myers offers no authority suggesting that the existence 

of an underlying Fourth Amendment violation alters the analysis. Second, Myers 

contends that in his case the state tort remedy is inadequate because it is now time-barred. 

We reject that argument as well. The Fourteenth Amendment guarantees the provision of 

an adequate remedy, but that remedy need not run in perpetuity. Myers had an adequate 

remedy. He let it wither. Due process has been duly satisfied. 

II. The Fourth Amendment Claim 

The district court wrongly dismissed as untimely Myers’ Fourth Amendment 

claim under § 1983. Section 1983 creates a “species of tort liability” that provides relief 

to persons deprived of rights secured to them by the Constitution. Carey v. Piphus, 435 

U.S. 247, 253 (1978) (quotations omitted). The first step “is to identify the specific 
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constitutional right allegedly infringed.” Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 271 (1994). 

Courts then look to common-law torts as analogies to determine the contours—including 

the accrual date—of § 1983 claims. See Pierce v. Gilchrist, 359 F.3d 1279, 1286 (10th 

Cir. 2004). Here, the district court fixed false imprisonment as the proper analogy for 

Myers’ § 1983 claim—even though his complaint asserted malicious prosecution. In fact, 

Myers correctly styled his claim as one for malicious prosecution because he was seized 

after the institution of legal process. 

The applicable statute of limitations is two years for both false imprisonment and 

malicious prosecution,2

 but the two claims do not accrue simultaneously. A claim of false 

imprisonment accrues when the alleged false imprisonment ends. Wallace v. Kato, 549 

U.S. 384, 389 (2007). A claim of malicious prosecution does not accrue until the criminal 

proceedings have terminated in the plaintiff’s favor. See Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 

477, 489 (1994); Robinson v. Maruffi, 895 F.2d 649, 654–55 (10th Cir. 1990). Myers 

filed his complaint on November 5, 2009—within two years of the malicious prosecution 

accrual date, but not within two years of the false imprisonment accrual date. 

What separates the two claims?—the institution of legal process. Unreasonable 

seizures imposed without legal process precipitate Fourth Amendment false 

 

2

 Claims under § 1983 are governed by the forum state’s statute of limitations. 

Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384, 387 (2007). The forum state in this case, Colorado, 

provides a two-year statute of limitations for personal injury claims. Colo. Rev. Stat. § 

13-80-102(1)(a). Federal law determines the date on which the claim accrues and, 

therefore, when the limitations period starts to run. Wallace, 549 U.S. at 388. 
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imprisonment claims. See Wallace, 549 U.S. at 389 (concluding that false imprisonment 

was the proper analogy where defendants did not have a warrant for the plaintiff’s arrest 

and thus detention occurred without legal process). Unreasonable seizures imposed with 

legal process precipitate Fourth Amendment malicious-prosecution claims.3 See Heck, 

512 U.S. at 484 (where detention occurs with legal process the “common-law cause of 

action for malicious prosecution provides the closest analogy”). Like rain and snow, the 

claims emanate from the same source, but under different conditions. 

 In Wilkins v. DeReyes, we employed the legal-process distinction. 528 F.3d 790 

(10th Cir. 2008). DeReyes allegedly obtained an arrest warrant for Wilkins based on 

fabricated evidence gathered by using coercive interrogation techniques. Id. at 793–94. 

This Court said that where detention occurs after the institution of legal process, a 

plaintiff can claim that the legal process itself was wrongful, and thereby state a “Fourth 

Amendment violation sufficient to support a § 1983 malicious prosecution cause of 

action.” Id. at 799.4

 

 

3

 Unreasonable seizures that occur after the institution of legal process can also 

form the basis for Fourteenth Amendment malicious-prosecution claims where an 

adequate state remedy does not exist. See Mondragon v. Thompson, 519 F.3d 1078, 1082 

(10th Cir. 2008). 

4 See also Nieves v. McSweeney, 241 F.3d 46, 54 (1st Cir. 2001) (concluding that a 

§ 1983 Fourth Amendment claim involving an arrest pursuant to a warrant is akin to a 

claim for malicious prosecution based upon the common-law distinctions between the 

torts of false imprisonment and malicious prosecution); Singer v. Fulton Cnty. Sheriff, 63 

F.3d 110, 117 (2d Cir. 1995) (same); Whiting v. Traylor, 85 F.3d 581, 583–86 & n.8 

(Continued . . .) 
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Here, the district court did not consider whether Myers had been imprisoned 

before or after the institution of legal process. Instead, apparently overlooking Wilkins, it 

simply assumed that because Myers premised the claim on a violation of the Fourth 

Amendment it was “in the nature of false imprisonment” and accrued on the date of his 

release. App. vol. 1, at 32–33. 

In fact, here, as in Wilkins, detention occurred after the institution of legal process. 

Myers was arrested pursuant to a validly issued—if not validly supported—arrest 

warrant. “[T]he issuance of an arrest warrant represents a classic example of the 

institution of legal process.”5 Wilkins, 528 F.3d at 799. Myers’ suit, then, challenges the 

probable-cause determination that generated the legal process. As we said in Wilkins, 

“This link supplies the necessary connection between the malicious prosecution cause of 

action and Plaintiffs’ Fourth Amendment allegations.” Id. 

Koopman attempts to repurpose Wilkins. He contends that even if this is a 

malicious-prosecution claim, it accrued upon the institution of legal process. To do so, he 

plucks one statement from Wilkins: “[D]etention was thus preceded by the institution of 

legal process, triggering the malicious prosecution cause of action.” Id. Read in context, 

 

(11th Cir. 1996) (distinguishing malicious prosecution and false arrest based on whether 

detention occurred before or after the institution of legal process). 

5 See Restatement (Second) of Torts § 654 cmt. c (1977) (“Criminal proceedings 

are usually instituted by the issuance of some form of process, generally a warrant for 

arrest, the purpose of which is to bring the accused before a magistrate in order for him to 

determine whether the accused shall be bound over for further action by a grand jury or 

for trial by a court.”). 
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however, it is clear the institution of legal process “triggers” a malicious-prosecution 

claim only in the sense that a claim before (or without) the institution of legal process 

would be for false imprisonment. Id. at 798–99. Koopman’s reading would set this Court 

against the “the standard rule that [accrual occurs] when the plaintiff has a complete and 

present cause of action.” Wallace, 549 U.S. at 388 (alteration in original) (quotations 

omitted). A malicious-prosecution claim is not cognizable until all the elements are 

satisfied, and one of the elements is that the original action terminated in favor of the 

plaintiff. Wilkins, 528 F.3d at 799. As such, this Court has held that a maliciousprosecution claim does not accrue until proceedings terminate in the plaintiff’s favor. 

Mondragon, 519 F.3d at 1083. 

The district court adopted the wrong analogy because it overlooked a pivotal 

detail—Myers’ detention occurred after the institution of legal process. In fact, Myers 

properly stated a Fourth Amendment claim for malicious prosecution, which accrued on 

November 15, 2007, when the proceedings resolved in his favor. He timely filed his 

complaint within two years on November 5, 2009. 

CONCLUSION 

For the reasons discussed above, we affirm the district court’s dismissal of Myers’ 

Fourteenth Amendment claim and reverse the district court’s dismissal of Myers’ Fourth 

Amendment claim. Accordingly, the judgment of the district court is reversed, in part, 

and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. Koopman’s 

arguments regarding absolute and qualified immunity should be addressed in the first 
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instance by the district court.6

Case number 12-1482 is AFFIRMED in part, REVERSED in part, and 

REMANDED. 

Case number 12-1487, the cross-appeal, is DISMISSED for lack of jurisdiction. 

 

 

6

 This Court does not have jurisdiction over Koopman’s cross-appeal because he 

prevailed fully below and the district court’s judgment did not leave open the possibility 

of future litigation. See Deposit Guar. Nat. Bank v. Roper, 445 U.S. 326, 333 (1980). 

Thus, we grant Myers’ motion to dismiss Koopman’s cross-appeal. We decline to 

consider his immunity arguments as alternative grounds for affirmance because he did 

not propose them as such until his reply brief. See M.D. Mark, Inc. v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 

565 F.3d 753, 768 n.7 (10th Cir. 2009).