It i s al so no t the f i rs t lawsui t he ha s f

i l ed m aki ng t he same cha l l enges and argum ent s ab o ut cam p ai gn f i nanci ng. 1 

### IN THE COURT OF APP EALS OF TENNESS EE

AT NAS HVILLE Se pte m be r 13, 200 5 S es sio n JO HN J AY HOOK ER v. PHI L BREDES EN, ET AL 

### . Appeal f romthe Chancer y Court for Davidson Cou nty No. 04-405-III Ellen Hobb s Lyle, Chancellor

No. M2004- 02185-COA-R 3-CV - F iled October 25, 2005

P ATR I C I A J. C O T T RE LL , J., d iss e nti ng in p art

. The trial c ourt specif

ically found that t h e complaint her ein was “ duplicative of matters alre ady settled and litigated by ruling s of superior courts.” Nonethele ss, the court de cided sanctions we reno t a

pp ro priate du e to the a mbi g uity c re a te d b y

theSpe c ia l Ma ste r’ s det erm inatio n th e c a se could proce ed under the order limit ing the case s filed by the plaintiff. The majority opinion ag ree s t h at t h e la ws u i t ’s cl eara n ce u n d er t h e sc re en i n g o rd er an d t h e At t o rn eyGe n er al ’s fa i l u re t o ch al l en ge the re sult of that scre ening justify the refusal t o impose sanctions. Thus, the t est applied by the trial court and the majority

of this court is whether

the complaint complied with the scr eening order

. I n my op ini on , th a t is no t th e qu e sti on a nd , c on se qu entl y , I re sp e c tf ull y dis a g re e wi th m y colleag ues. Whether or

not sanctions should ha ve bee n imposed here in can only be dete rmined by application of the ap p ro p ri at e leg al principles that a re r elevant to any

Rule 11 case . Every

other la wy e r o r l iti g a nt is su bje c t to there qu ir e me nts of Te nn . R. Civ . P. 11 . T he sc re e nin g me c ha nis m imp os e d by the Da vid so n Cou nty tria l c ou rt s ne ith e r re lie ve s Mr

. Ho ok e r of theob lig a tio n to c omp ly with Rule 11 nor protects him from sanctions if he doe s not. Even if this were the first lawsuit Mr. Ho o k er ever f

iled, which it clea

rly is not, his signing and filing the complaint would have been

1 subject to the re quirements of Rule 11. One of those requir ements is that the claims and othe r leg al contentions in the complaint be wa rranted by

exis ting l aw or by

a nonfrivolous arg ument for the modification or re versal of exist ing la w. Tenn. R. Ci v. P. 11.02(2). Applying a test of objective rea sonablene ss, the question is w hether , under all the circ umstances, the c omplaint was based on “ a plausible view of the law.” An dre ws v. Bi ble , 812 S.W .2d 284, 288 (Tenn. 1991) . This test was not applied to the complaint her ein.
T h e s c r e e n i n g o r d e r

w a s p u ti n p l a c e b e c a u s e o f p r i o r ab u s e o f t h e l i t i g a t i o n p r o c e s s
. It cannot ha ve bee n intended to provide g reater prote ction to Mr. Hooker than is provided to other lit ig a nts a nda tto rn e y s w ho ha ve no t be e n th e su bje c t of su c h o rd e rs
.-2-

Be causethe trial court did not apply the re levant standa

rds under Rule 11 and did notmake the fa ctual finding s relevant thereto, I would vacate the orde r of the trial court and remand for consideration under the corr ect applicable leg al principles. See Eldridge v. Eldridge , 42 S.W .3d 82, 8 5 (T en n . 2001) (holding that a trial c ourt abuses its discre tion when it applies incorr ect leg al principles).
I c on c ur in the ma jority op ini on on theme ri ts o f M r. Ho ok e r’ s a pp e a l.

____________________________________ PATRI CI A J . COTTRELL , J UDGE