In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit ____________________

No. 16-3970

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

DAJUAN KEY,

Defendant-Appellant.

____________________

Appeal from the United States District Court for the

Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.

No. 13 CR 726 — Virginia M. Kendall, Judge.

____________________

ARGUED FEBRUARY 6, 2018 — DECIDED MAY 14, 2018

____________________

Before WOOD, Chief Judge, and KANNE and HAMILTON, Circuit Judges.

KANNE, Circuit Judge. DaJuan Key was convicted by a jury

of trafficking a minor across state lines with the intent that the 

minor engage in prostitution. On appeal, he argues the district court should have suppressed evidence allegedly seized 

in violation of the Fourth Amendment. He also claims the district court erred when instructing the jury. We conclude that 
2 No. 16-3970

no error occurred, and therefore affirm the judgment of the 

district court.

I. BACKGROUND∗

On September 10, 2013, the Romeoville Police Department 

received a call from a Wisconsin mother. The mother told the 

officer that her 15-year-old daughter (referred to as April) left 

Wisconsin with an unknown man and called her from a motel 

crying and saying she wanted to come home. The Department 

promptly sent officers to the motel, which the officers knew

had a reputation for prostitution and drug problems. Upon 

arrival at the motel, the officers searched the parking lot for 

vehicles with Wisconsin license plates and found only one—

a rental vehicle. The officers entered the lobby of the motel, 

and a clerk informed them that there was one guest from Wisconsin. The clerk showed the officers a photocopy of that 

guest’s identification.

The officers proceeded to the room registered to that 

guest. When they arrived, the door was propped open. The 

officers knocked and Key—who matched the identification 

provided by the clerk—answered. The officers asked Key 

about the missing 15-year-old female from Wisconsin. Key 

did not deny knowing her, but said she had gone to a nearby 

restaurant. The officers then asked if they could check the 

room for the girl; Key consented.

Inside the room, the officers saw a tablet on the dresser 

open to the website backpage.com, which they knew to be 

 ∗ These facts are taken from district court’s memorandum opinions

and orders denying the defendant’s motion to suppress. (R. 99; R. 140.) 

Neither party argues the district court made any erroneous factual findings in the opinion.
No. 16-3970 3

commonly used to post prostitution advertisements. They 

also noticed a large number of prepaid credit cards, used and 

unused condoms, and multiple cellphones. Dache Crayton, 

another young woman, was also in the room. When asked for 

her identification, she said it was in the car. An officer then 

escorted Crayton to the car, where Crayton told the officer 

that she and April were prostituting and that Key was their 

pimp. The officer and Crayton then walked to the nearby restaurant where they found April. Key was taken into custody. 

Following the arrest, the officers seized the tablet, prepaid 

credit cards, cellphones, and other evidence from the motel 

room. They also searched for and seized evidence from Key’s

car.

Key moved to suppress the evidence discovered in the 

motel room and in the car. Initially, the district court denied 

the motion to suppress evidence recovered from the car and 

granted in part the motion to suppress evidence recovered 

from the motel room. Upon reconsideration, the district court 

denied in whole the motion to suppress evidence discovered 

in the motel room. 

At trial, the defense solicited testimony tending to show 

that April was in control of her own actions the entire time. 

The district court instructed the jury that voluntary participation by the victim was not a defense to the charged crime. 

The jury returned a guilty verdict. Key filed a post-trial 

motion for acquittal or alternatively a motion for a new trial 

alleging that the district court committed various errors, including denying his motion to suppress the evidence seized 

from his motel room and instructing the jury that consent is 

not a defense. The district court denied the motions, and Key 

appeals. 
4 No. 16-3970

II. ANALYSIS

On appeal, Key continues to argue the district court erred 

when it denied his motion to suppress the evidence found in 

the motel room and when it instructed the jury. When reviewing the denial of a motion to suppress, we review the district 

court’s factual findings for clear error and issues of law de 

novo. United States v. Schmidt, 700 F.3d 934, 937 (7th Cir. 2012).

We also review de novo whether a jury instruction fairly and 

accurately summarizes the law, and we review the district 

court’s decision to give a particular instruction for abuse of 

discretion. United States v. Carter, 695 F.3d 690, 694 (7th Cir. 

2012).

A. The district court did not err when it denied Key’s motion to 

suppress.

Generally, a warrantless search within a home violates the 

Fourth Amendment, even when law enforcement has probable cause to believe that a felony has been committed by the 

occupant. Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177, 181 (1990); Payton 

v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 586 (1980). For Fourth Amendment 

purposes, a motel room is given the same level of privacy protection as a person’s home. Stoner v. California, 376 U.S. 483, 

490 (1964). The officers in this case did not have a warrant to 

search Key’s motel room. 

They did, however, have his permission. The officers 

asked if they could check the room for the missing 15-yearold and Key said yes. Thus, the officers had a right to search 

the room, but only so far as was necessary to see if a 15-yearold female was in the space. United States v. Breit, 429 F.3d 725, 

730 (7th Cir. 2005) (“As this court has recognized, ‘[g]overn-
No. 16-3970 5

ment agents may not obtain consent to search on the representation that they intend to look for only certain specified 

items and subsequently use that consent as a license to conduct a general exploratory search.’” (alteration in original) 

(quoting United States v. Dichiarinte, 445 F.2d 126, 129 (7th Cir. 

1971))). While conducting that search, the officers could seize 

materials in their plain view, so long as the incriminating nature of the material was immediately apparent. Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128, 136 (1990); United States v. Raney, 342 F.3d 

551, 558–59 (7th Cir. 2003).

Key contends that the officers exceeded the scope of his 

permission, because the search for a 15-year-old would not 

naturally entail looking at tablets, telephones, or other 

handheld items. These items, however, were in the plain view 

of the officers and, in their testimony, the officers explained 

how the incriminating nature of each of the items was immediately apparent to them. 

The officers testified that the tablet was open to backpage.com, a website well known for hosting prostitution advertisements. Multiple cell phones, prepaid credit cards, and 

condoms are all things typically used for prostitution. The officers also testified that the motel was known to them to be 

one used frequently for prostitution and that rental cars are 

often used in prostitution and drug trafficking. 

When looking at the totality of these circumstances, the officers’ testimony that they immediately recognized these 

items as incriminating is credible. So the discovery and subsequent seizure of the evidence was permissible under the 

plain view doctrine. The district court, therefore, did not err 

in denying the defendant’s motion to suppress. 
6 No. 16-3970

B. The district court did not err when it instructed the jury regarding the defense of consent.

Key was convicted of transporting a minor across state 

lines with the intent that the minor engage in prostitution. At 

trial, Key’s theory of the case was that he drove April to Illinois from Wisconsin without intending for her to engage in 

prostitution. He presented evidence tending to show that 

April was in control of her own actions and consented to engage in prostitution.

The court instructed the jury that, to find the defendant 

guilty, it must find that the government proved each element 

of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt:

“1. The defendant knowingly transported April in interstate 

commerce; and 

2. April was less than eighteen at the time; and 

3. The defendant intended that April engage in prostitution.”

(R. 161 at 17.) The court then instructed the jury as follows: 

“Whether or not April consented to being transported or to 

traveling in interstate commerce for the purpose of prostitution, or otherwise voluntarily participated, is irrelevant. 

The consent or voluntary participation of April to travel to 

engage in prostitution is not a defense to the charges.”

(R. 161 at 23.)

Key challenges the second instruction as an inaccurate 

summary of the law. See United States v. Jones, 808 F.2d 561, 

565 (7th Cir. 1986). We disagree. That the minor consents to 

engaging in prostitution is not a defense to the crime of trafficking a minor for purposes of prostitution. The instruction 

makes clear that Key should be found guilty of the trafficking 
No. 16-3970 7

offense even if April consented to engaging in prostitution, so 

long as Key intended for April to engage in prostitution when 

he transported her across the border. 

That said, we recognize that the jury instruction could 

have been clearer. If read out of context, the phrase “or otherwise voluntarily participated” is unclear. But when read in 

connection with the rest of the instruction, we find the instruction is legally accurate. And because Key presented evidence 

suggesting April voluntarily participated in prostitution, it 

was reasonable for the district court to try to clarify that her 

consent to prostitution could not be a defense to the crime 

charged in this case. Therefore, the district court did not abuse 

its discretion when giving the instruction. 

III. CONCLUSION

For the reasons above, we AFFIRM the district court’s decision.