Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 49A02-1509-JV-1372 | May 27, 2016 Page 1 of 6

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT

Deborah Markisohn

Marion County Public Defender Agency

Appellate Division

Indianapolis, Indiana

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE

Gregory F. Zoeller

Attorney General of Indiana

J.T. Whitehead

Deputy Attorney General

Indianapolis, Indiana

IN THE

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

J.B.,

Appellant-Defendant,

v.

State of Indiana,

Appellee-Plaintiff.

May 27, 2016

Court of Appeals Case No.

49A02-1509-JV-1372

Appeal from the Marion Superior 

Court

The Honorable Marilyn A. 

Moores, Judge

The Honorable Scott Stowers, 

Magistrate

Trial Court Cause No.

49D09-1506-JD-1015

49D09-1405-JD-1331

49D09-1209-JD-2586

49D09-1209-JD-2615

49D09-1209-JD-2653

May, Judge.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 49A02-1509-JV-1372 | May 27, 2016 Page 2 of 6

[1] The trial court ordered J.B., a juvenile, to pay restitution in two cases. It 

reduced the restitution orders to civil judgments and added civil judgment fees. 

J.B. appealed the civil judgment order and corresponding fees. The State 

concedes there was error and remand is appropriate. During the pendency of 

this appeal, the trial court rescinded the challenged order, making moot the 

issue J.B. raised on appeal.1 Because the issue is likely to recur and is of public 

importance, we address whether the trial court had authority to impose a civil

judgment as part of a restitution order. It did not. 

Facts and Procedural History

[2] The trial court determined J.B. violated his probation in causes 49D09-1209-

JD-2653 (Cause 2653), 49D09-1209-JD-2615 (Cause 2615), 49D09-1209-JD2586 (Cause 2586), and 49D09-1405-JD-1331 (Cause 1331). On August 14, 

2015, the trial court held a disposition hearing where it ordered J.B. to pay 

restitution of $500.00 in Cause 2586 and $500.00 in Cause 2653. 

[3] The trial court reduced the restitution orders to civil judgments and added civil 

judgment fees of $252.50 and $315.63, respectively (“August 14 Orders”). On 

August 17, 2015, the trial court entered a separate judgment ordering J.B. to 

 

1 On April 1, 2016, J.B. filed a “Verified Motion to Address Issue Presented Under the Public Interest 

Exception to the Mootness Doctrine.” (Motion at 1.) In it, J.B. references a trial court order dated March 1, 

2016, in which the trial court rescinded its August 17 Order and ordered J.B. to complete the “Restitution 

Work Program.” (Motion Exhibit A at 3.) As we address the issues presented in J.B.’s appeal under the 

public interest exception to the mootness doctrine, we grant J.B.’s motion contemporaneously with this 

opinion.
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pay $500.00 in restitution for Cause 2586 and $500.00 in restitution for Cause 

2653 and assessed a civil judgment fee of $250.00 (“August 17 Order”). 

[4] On August 20, 2015, J.B. filed a “Motion to Correct Error and to Rescind 

Order for Civil Judgement [sic] Fee.” (App. at 533.) He asked the trial court to 

clarify whether the August 17 Order superseded the August 14 Orders and to 

rescind the civil judgment fees2 assessed in both orders. On August 25, 2015, 

the trial court rescinded the August 14 Order but denied J.B.’s “request to not 

assess civil judgment fees.” (Id. at 556.) The August 17 Order remained in 

effect, and thus J.B. owed a civil judgment of $1,250.00.

Discussion and Decision

[5] After J.B filed this appeal, the trial court rescinded the August 17 Order that is 

the subject of this appeal. Thus, the issue J.B. raises is moot. A case should be 

 

2 In its brief, the State notes:

What remains to determine is whether the trial court’s denial of J.B.’s request not to 

assess civil judgment fees was made in order to impose court costs normally associated 

with the imposition of restitution, but simply mis-named. Put another way, there can be 

no “civil judgment” fees where there is no longer any civil judgment. If the costs are the 

correct amounts for court costs associated with the imposition of restitution, and the 

juvenile court simply intended to waive all other costs excepting those accompanying the 

restitution order, then the order is simply wrong semantically. If the costs are indeed and 

in fact and in effect civil judgment costs, then they have remained despite the fact that 

restitution cannot be reduced to a “civil judgment.” Clarification on this point, and by 

extension remand, appears necessary.

(Br. of Appellee at 14.)

During the dispositional hearing, the trial court stated, “Show restitution reduced to civil judgment. The 

remaining Court fees will be waived.” (Tr. at 97.) It is unclear from the record what the “civil judgment fee” 

referenced in the August 14 Orders and the August 17 Order encompasses, especially since the amount is 

different in each order. In addition, we were unable to locate, and the parties did not direct us to, statutory 

authority to assess a civil judgment fee. 
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dismissed as moot when no effective relief can be rendered to the parties before 

the court. W.R.S. v. State, 759 N.E.2d 1121, 1122-23 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001). 

However, a public interest exception to the mootness doctrine allows us to 

review issues of great public importance. Id. at 1123. The public interest 

exception is usually recognized in cases that involve issues likely to recur. Id. 

Whether a juvenile court may reduce a restitution order to a civil judgment has 

not been addressed in any published Indiana opinion. We accordingly address 

that issue. 

[6] To determine the trial court’s authority, we interpret the relevant statutes:

Statutory interpretation is a question of law and is reviewed de 

novo, or without deference to the trial court’s interpretation. 

Curley v. Lake Cnty. Bd. of Elections & Registration, 896 N.E.2d 24, 

34 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008), trans. denied. “When a statute has not 

previously been construed, our interpretation is controlled by the 

express language of the statute and the rules of statutory 

construction.” State v. Prater, 922 N.E.2d 746, 748 (Ind. Ct. App. 

2010), trans. denied. “If a statute is unambiguous, that is, 

susceptible to but one meaning, we must give the statute its clear 

and plain meaning.” Curley, 896 N.E.2d at 34 (quotations 

omitted). “If a statute is susceptible to multiple interpretations, 

we must try to ascertain the legislature’s intent and interpret the 

statute so as to effectuate that intent.” Id. (quotation omitted). 

“We review the statute as a whole and presume the legislature 

intended a logical application of the language used in the statute, 

so as to avoid unjust or absurd results.” Prater, 922 N.E.2d at 

748. “[W]e must consider not only what the statute says but 

what it does not say.” Curley, 896 N.E.2d at 37. In other words, 

“we are obliged to suppose that the General Assembly chose the 

language it did for a reason.” Prater, 922 N.E.2d at 750.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 49A02-1509-JV-1372 | May 27, 2016 Page 5 of 6

M.M. v. State, 31 N.E.3d 516, 519 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015). 

[7] Ind. Code § 31-37-19-5(b)(4) permits the trial court to “[o]rder the child to pay 

restitution if the victim provides reasonable evidence of the victim’s loss, which 

the child may challenge at the dispositional hearing.” By contrast, a restitution 

order imposed in addition to any sentence for a felony or misdemeanor

committed by an adult is a judgment lien3 that:

(1) attaches to the property of the person subject to the order;

(2) may be perfected;

(3) may be enforced to satisfy any payment that is delinquent 

under the restitution order by the person in whose favor the order 

is issued or the person’s assignee; and

(4) expires;

in the same manner as a judgment lien created in a civil 

proceeding.

Ind. Code § 35-50-5-3. There is no judgment lien provision in the juvenile 

statute, and we decline to read into the juvenile code a provision not explicitly 

stated. See Peele v. Gillespie, 658 N.E.2d 954, 958 (Ind. Ct. App. 1995) (we may 

not read into a statute that which is not the expressed intent of the legislature), 

 

3 An order of restitution under Ind. Code § 35-50-5-3 “substitutes for the civil judgment which is normally the 

basis for a judgment lien.” Wininger v. Purdue Univ., 666 N.E.2d 455, 458 (Ind. Ct. App. 1996), reh’g denied, 

trans. denied.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 49A02-1509-JV-1372 | May 27, 2016 Page 6 of 6

reh’g denied, trans. denied. The trial court therefore did not have authority to 

order J.B. to pay the restitution owed to his victims as a civil judgment.

Conclusion

[8] A trial court may not order a juvenile to pay restitution as a civil judgment 

because Ind. Code § 31-37-19-5(b)(4) does not permit it to do so. However, 

since the trial court has rescinded the August 17 Order, we will not disturb the 

proceedings of the trial court.

[9] Remanded.

Baker, J., and Brown, J., concur.