J-A21023-18

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

RONALD SCOTT HANGEY AND 

ROSEMARY HANGEY H/W 

Appellant

v.

HUSQVARNA PROFESSIONAL 

PRODUCTS, INC., HUSQVARNA 

GROUP, HUSQVARNA U.S. HOLDING, 

INC., HUSQVARNA AB, AND 

TRUMBAUER'S LAWN AND 

RECREATION, INC.

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 3298 EDA 2017

Appeal from the Order September 7, 2017

In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Civil Division at 

No(s): No. 1015 March Term, 2017

BEFORE: PANELLA, J., OLSON, J., and McLAUGHLIN, J.

MEMORANDUM BY McLAUGHLIN, J.: FILED APRIL 01, 2019

Ronald Scott Hangey and Rosemary Hangey, husband and wife, appeal 

from the order sustaining the preliminary objections to venue filed by 

Husqvarna Professional Products, Inc. (“HPP”), Husqvarna Group, and 

Trumbauer’s Lawn and Recreation, Inc., and transferring the case to Bucks 

County. We conclude the trial court abused its discretion in finding HPP’s 

contacts with Philadelphia did not satisfy the quantity prong of the venue 

analysis under Pennsylvania Rule of Civil Procedure 2179(a)(2). We therefore 

reverse.
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The trial court summarized the factual and procedural history of the 

case:

[The Hangeys] commenced this action on March 13, 

2017 by filing a Complaint. The Amended Complaint, filed 

April 10, 2017, alleges that in May 2013, Plaintiff Ronald 

Hangey purchased a Husqvarna riding lawnmower from 

Defendant Trumbauer’s Lawn and Recreation, Inc. in 

Quakertown, Bucks County. On August 5, 2016, Ronald 

Hangey was maimed when he fell off his lawnmower and the 

lawnmower ran over his legs while the blades were still 

engaged; the accident occurred at [the Hangeys’] property 

in Wayne County. The Amended Complaint named five 

defendants—[HPP], Husqvarna Group, Husqvarna U.S.

Holding, Inc., Husqvarna AB, and Trumbauer’s Lawn and 

Recreation, Inc.—and sounds in negligence, strict liability, 

and loss of consortium.

All Defendants filed Preliminary Objections. Defendants 

Husqvarna U.S. Holdings, Inc. and Husqvarna AB filed 

Preliminary Objections which, inter alia, challenged personal

jurisdiction. Defendants [HPP], Husqvarna Group, and

Trumbauer’s Lawn and Recreation, Inc., filed Preliminary 

Objections arguing, inter alia, improper venue. This Court 

permitted the parties to take discovery relevant to the 

issues of personal jurisdiction and venue.

[The Hangeys’] venue-related discovery revealed the 

following. Husqvarna Group is a nonexistent entity that acts 

as a marketing device for a number of Husqvarna-branded 

corporate entities, including HPP. Deposition of John 

Stanfield, 55:14-56:9 (August 30, 2017). John Trumbauer, 

sole shareholder of Defendant Trumbauer’s Lawn and

Recreation, Inc., produced an affidavit in which he averred 

Defendant Trumbauer’s Lawn and Recreation, Inc.’s 

principal place of business was in Quakertown, PA, that 

Philadelphia did not fall within their target market area, and 

they did not regularly conduct business in Philadelphia.

Defendant Trumbauer’s Lawn and Recreation, Inc.’s 

Preliminary Objection at Ex. “B.” HPP is a Delaware 

corporation with a principal place of business located in 

Charlotte, North Carolina. See Defendants’ Ex. “C” Affidavit 

of Jordan Baucom. In 2016, [HPP] had approximately $1.4 
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billion[1]in sales revenue in the United States, of which 

$75,310.00 came from direct sales in Philadelphia County. 

See [HPP’s] monetary sales data from 2014-2016, 

submitted to the Court under Seal pursuant to the Order 

dated September 12, 2017. Of the $75,000 in sales made 

in Philadelphia in 2016, roughly $69,700 came from a single 

Husqvarna authorized dealer, DL Electronics, Inc. Id.

Approximately 0.005% of [HPP’s] 2016 United States sales 

revenue resulted from direct sales in Philadelphia County. 

Sales data from 2014 and 2015 is substantially similar, with 

approximately 0.005% of Husqvarna’s annual United States 

sale revenue resulting from direct sales within Philadelphia 

County. Id. These sales figures do not include the revenue 

generated by selling Husqvarna products at “big box” 

retailers such as Home Depot, Lowe’s, or Sears. In the case 

of “big box” retailers, John Stanfield, the corporate 

representative for [HPP], testified that [HPP] delivers its 

products to the retailers’ distribution centers, none of which 

are located in Philadelphia County. See e.g. Stanfield Dep. 

31:17-34:20 (testifying that sales to Lowe’s would be 

delivered to the Lowe’s distribution center in either Pottsville 

or Pittstown, Pennsylvania). Once the Husqvarna products 

are delivered to the retailers’ distribution centers, the 

retailers retain sole discretion as to where the products will 

be offered for sale, including stores located in Philadelphia 

County. See Affidavit of John Stanfield at 19.

Following oral argument, this Court dismissed 

Defendants Husqvarna U.S. Holdings, Inc. and Husqvarna 

AB due to want of personal jurisdiction and transferred the 

case against Defendants [HPP], Husqvarna Group, and 

Trumbauer’s Lawn and Recreation, Inc. to Bucks County 

because venue was improper in Philadelphia County. [The 

Hangeys] filed a timely notice of appeal challenging this 

Court’s finding of improper venue; however, they did not 

appeal the dismissal of Defendants Husqvarna U.S. 

Holdings, Inc. and Husqvarna AB. See Notice of Appeal, 

docketed September 26, 2017 (stating Plaintiffs appeal from 

____________________________________________

1 The trial court placed certain sales data that HPP considers confidential under 

seal, and we subsequently sealed the trial court’s opinion in this matter. In 

order to preserve the confidentiality, and because we write for the parties, 

who are well aware of the figures, we redact the data from our decision.
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the orders “transferring venue of this matter to the Court of 

Common Pleas of Bucks County, Pennsylvania”).

Trial Court Opinion, filed Mar. 2, 2018, at 1-3 (“1925(a) Op.”).

In finding venue in Philadelphia was not proper, the trial court found 

HPP’s contacts satisfied the quality prong of the venue analysis, but did not 

satisfy the quantity prong. The court reasoned that only .005% of HPP’s 

national revenue came from sales in Philadelphia and concluded that because 

this amount was “de minimis,” HPP’s contact with Philadelphia was not general 

and habitual. Id. at 6.

The Hangeys raise the following issue on appeal:

Did the trial court err as a matter of law, and thereby abuse 

its discretion, in holding that [HPP] does not regularly 

conduct business in Philadelphia County, merely because 

the overwhelming majority of its sales in the United States 

have occurred elsewhere, thereby overlooking the 

undisputed continuous, ongoing, and regularly recurring 

sales of Husqvarna consumer products in Philadelphia

County?

Hangeys’ Br. at 8.

We review an order granting or denying preliminary objections asserting 

improper venue for abuse of discretion. Zampana-Barry v. Donaghue, 921 

A.2d 500, 503 (Pa.Super. 2007). “A [p]laintiff’s choice of forum is to be given 

great weight, and the burden is on the party challenging the choice to show it 

was improper.” Fritz v. Glen Mills Schools, 840 A.2d 1021, 1023 (Pa.Super.

2003) (quoting Jackson v. Laidlaw Transit, Inc. & Laidlaw Transit PA, 

Inc., 822 A.2d 56, 57 (Pa.Super. 2003)). “However, a plaintiff’s choice of 

venue is not absolute or unassailable.” Id. (quoting Jackson, 822 A.2d at 
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57). “[I]f there exists any proper basis for the trial court’s decision to grant 

the petition to transfer venue, the decision must stand.” Krosnowski v. 

Ward, 836 A.2d 143, 146 (Pa.Super. 2003) (en banc) (quoting Estate of 

Werner v. Werner, 781 A.2d 188, 190 (Pa.Super. 2001)).

We must determine whether the trial court abused its discretion in 

finding that venue as to HPP was improper in Philadelphia.2If venue is proper 

as to HPP, then the Hangeys may maintain their “action to enforce . . . joint

and several liability against” not only HPP, but also Husqvarna Group and 

Trumbauer’s Lawn and Recreation, Inc. See Pa.R.C.P. 1006(c)(1) (“an action 

to enforce a joint or joint and several liability against two or more defendants 

. . . may be brought against all defendants in any county in which the venue 

may be laid against any one of the defendants”).

Rule 2179 of the Pennsylvania Rules of Civil Procedure provides that 

venue is proper against a corporation or similar entity in a county where it 

“regularly conducts business.” Pa.R.C.P. 2179(a)(2). When determining 

whether venue is proper, “each case rests on its own facts,” Purcell v. Bryn 

Mawr Hosp., 579 A.2d 1282, 1286 (Pa. 1990), and “[t]he question is whether 

the acts are being ‘regularly’ performed within the context of the particular 

business.” Monaco v. Montgomery Cab Co., 208 A.2d 252, 256 (Pa. 1965). 

Further, in the venue context, “regularly” does not mean “principally,” and a 

____________________________________________

2 The Hangeys do not challenge the trial court finding that venue in 

Philadelphia is not proper as to Husqvarna Group and Trumbauer’s Lawn and 

Recreation, Inc.
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defendant “may perform acts ‘regularly’ even though these acts make up a 

small part of its total activities.” Canter v. Am. Honda Motor Corp., 231 

A.2d 140, 142 (Pa. 1976). 

In determining whether venue is proper under this rule, courts “employ 

a quality-quantity analysis.” Zampana-Barry, 921 A.2d at 503. “The term 

‘quality of acts’ means those directly, furthering, or essential to, corporate 

objects; they do not include incidental acts.” Monaco, 208 A.2d at 256

(quoting Shambe v. Delaare & Hudson R.R. Co., 135 A. 755, 757 (Pa. 

1927)). To satisfy the quantity prong of this analysis, acts must be “sufficiently 

continuous so as to be considered habitual.” Zampana-Barry, 921 A.2d at

504.

Pennsylvania appellate courts have often considered the percentage of 

overall business a defendant company conducts in a county to determine if 

the quantity prong was met. In Canter, the Supreme Court found that a 

company whose employees drove cars into Philadelphia “to demonstrate cars 

and to consummate sales” met the quality test for venue, and that the 

contacts also met the quantity test where one to two percent of the company’s 

gross sales occurred in Philadelphia. 231 A.2d at 143. In Canter, the company 

had gross sales of 3.7 million in 1964 and 4.1 million in 1965. Id. at 141. In

Monaco, the Supreme Court found that a taxicab company based in 

Montgomery County conducted regular business in Philadelphia where five to 

ten percent of its business was from passengers it took into Philadelphia. 208 

A.2d at 256. It reasoned that the cab company’s acts of driving into 
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Philadelphia and collecting fares were regularly performed. Id. Further, in

Zampana-Barry, this Court found venue proper in Philadelphia where a law 

firm based in Delaware County derived three to five percent of its income from 

cases litigated in Philadelphia. 921 A.2d at 506.

As these cases establish, courts often consider whether the percentage 

of a defendant’s business is sufficient to constitute “habitual” contact. 

However, no court has stated that the percentage of a defendant’s business

is the sole evidence relevant to the “quantity” analysis. Rather, courts must 

determine whether all the evidence presented, including the scope of the 

defendant’s business, viewed in the context of the facts of the case, establish 

that a defendant’s contacts with the venue satisfy the quantity prong. See 

Mathues v. Tim-Bar Corp., 652 A.2d 349, 351 (Pa.Super. 1994) (finding 

trial court did not abuse discretion in finding quantity prong not satisfied where 

evidence established only one or two sales occurred in county); Monaco, 208 

A.2d at 256 (noting “[t]he question is whether the acts are being ‘regularly’ 

performed within the context of the particular business”).

Where this Court concluded that conducting a small percentage of a 

business in a venue did not satisfy the quantity prong, the Court’s core finding 

was that the contacts failed the quality prong of the venue test and the cases 

often addressed defendants who were small and/or local companies, not 

multi-billion-dollar corporations. For example, in Singley v. Flier, 851 A.2d 

200, 202-03 (Pa.Super. 2004), we found that the contacts that the plaintiff 

alleged Villanova University had with Philadelphia—three graduate courses
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offered in Philadelphia, practical experience for nursing students in 

Philadelphia hospitals, a history course entitled “Tours of Philadelphia,” and 

volunteer and athletic opportunities—did not satisfy the quality prong of the 

venue analysis. We also found that the three graduate courses also failed the 

quantity prong “when viewed in light of the University’s entire academic 

program, which includes several graduate degrees, as well as a law school. 

Id.

Further, in PECO Energy Co. v. Philadelphia Suburban Water Co., 

this Court found that Philadelphia Suburban Water Company’s contacts with 

Philadelphia, which included approximately one mile of pipeline running 

through Philadelphia and a one-time purchase of water from Philadelphia, 

were “minimal and incidental, at best.” 802 A.2d 666, 670-71 (Pa.Super. 

2002). We concluded that the contacts were not essential to defendant’s 

business and were “far less in quantity, as well as quality, than the contacts 

cited” in prior cases. Id. at 670-71. Further, in Battuello v. Camelback Ski 

Corp., 598 A.2d 1027, 1029-30 (Pa.Super. 1991), this Court discussed the 

plaintiff’s claim that venue in Philadelphia was proper due to Camelback Ski 

Corporation’s relationship with eastern Tours, which transported 

Philadelphians to Camelback. We concluded the relationship was “tenuous,” 

noting that Cambelback’s sending of brochures and quoting prices did not 

meet the quality prong of the venue analysis, Philadelphians purchased tickets 

only after they arrived at Camelback, and the business generated, which was 
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less than one percent of Cambelback’s business, was “far too small to qualify 

as ‘general or habitual.’” Id.

Because courts must consider each case on its own facts, and the venue 

analysis must be viewed within the context of the defendant’s business, the 

percentage of small or local businesses should not be viewed as the same as 

the percentage of business of a large corporation. The percentage of sales a 

multi-billion-dollar company makes in a particular county will often be a tiny 

percentage of its overall sales. Courts should not consider percentages alone. 

Rather, courts must determine whether the defendant’s business activities in 

the county were regular, continuous, and habitual.

Here, HPP is a multi-billion-dollar corporation. It had at least one 

authorized dealer located in Philadelphia to which it delivered products for 

sale. Although HPP’s sales through authorized dealers in Philadelphia 

constituted only 0.005% of HPP’s national sales, the dollar figure of those 

sales in 2016 was $75,310.

3 The number and dollar figure of sales in 

Philadelphia, and that HPP has an authorized dealer in Philadelphia to sell its 

products, is relevant to the determination of whether HPP’s contacts with 

Philadelphia satisfied the “quantity” prong of the venue analysis. Therefore, 

we conclude the trial court erred in relying almost exclusively on evidence of 

____________________________________________

3 Ronald and Rosemary Hangey presented evidence that additional sales 

occurred through Lowe’s stores located in Philadelphia. Although there was no 

evidence as to the quantity of sales at Lowe’s, there was evidence that such 

sales occurred. However, as we conclude that venue is proper without 

reference to the sales from Lowe’s and similar stores, we decline to determine 

whether such sales can be considered in the venue analysis. 
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the percentage of defendant’s business occurred in Philadelphia when 

addressing the quantity prong. 

Further, based on the totality of the evidence, HPP’s contacts satisfied 

the quantity prong of the venue test, in that the contacts, which include selling 

$75,310 worth of products in 2016 through an authorized dealer located in 

Philadelphia, are “sufficiently continuous so as to be considered habitual.” See 

Zampana-Barry, 921 A.2d at 504.

We next address the quality prong. The trial court found there was “no 

question” that “HPP’s activities in Philadelphia satisfy the ‘quality’ prong of 

the” venue analysis. 1925(a) Op. at 5. It reasoned HPP was in the “business 

of distributing consumer outdoor products . . . to retailers, who in turn sell the 

products to consumers.” Id. It found HPP furthered its business objective by 

distributing products to two Philadelphia retailers. Id. We agree, and find the 

trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding the quality prong satisfied. 

The trial court therefore abused its discretion in sustaining HPP’s 

preliminary objection to venue. 

Order reversed. Case remanded. Jurisdiction relinquished.

President Judge Panella joins the Memorandum.

Judge Olson files a Dissenting Memorandum.
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Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 4/1/19