COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA

Present: Judges Bray, Elde r and Senior Judge Overton

SONYA P. BRUNDIDGE MEMORANDUM OPINION * v. Record Nos. 1457 -00-1 and PER CURIAM 1830-00-1 JANUAR Y 30, 2001 LAWRENCE A. BRUNDIDGE

FROM THE CIRCUIT CO URT OF YORK COUNTY Prentis Smiley , Jr., Judge (Sonya P. Brundi dge, on briefs), pro se . (Roy H. Lasris ; Lasris & Vann an, P.C., on brief), for appellee.

* Pursuant to Code § 17.1-413, this opinion is not designated for publication. In Record No. 1457-0 0-1, Sonya P. Brundidg e, wife, appeals an equitable distri bution award of th e trial court. She contends the trial court erred by: (1) includ ing the Langley Federal Credit Union checking accoun t as marital proper ty, valuing it at pre-separation amount s, and accepting Lawr ence A. Br undidge's (husband's) ev idence for these amounts; (2) "not attributing the correct amounts fo r property during the equitable di stribution hearing"; and (3) finding that the pilot bonus annuit y could not be included in proper ty for equitabl e distribution, then including it as part of husban d's income for support calculation purposes.In Record No. 1830-00-1, wife appeals an order of the trial court concerning child and spousal support. On ap peal, she argues the trial court erred in: (4) finding that the pilot bonus annuity was incl uded as part of husb and's income , but not providing "a specific timeframe for said amount to be paid until a certain dollar figure was realized"; (5) attributing the pilot annuity as income, "y et there is no re flection of that attribution"; (6) decreasing wi fe's support paym ents although husband's income increased; (7) not re quiring husb and to pay support paymen ts in arrears; (8) not al lowing wife to have a payroll deductio n order effectuated through the military pay center; (9) not gi ving wife the op portunity to note her objections on orders before they were signed by the trial court; (10) not addressing child cust ody in the final decr ee or post-decree orders; (11) awarding husband attorney 's fees; (12) not making wife designated benefi ciary of the military Survivor Benefit Plan and not giving her the opportunity to mainta in the policy; (13) accepting post-decree amendm ents without notice or evidence to "confirm calculations"; (14) not ordering hu sband to maintain a life insurance policy for the chil dren and to maintain the children as bene ficiaries; (15) not ordering husband to pay uninsured medica l and dental expenses for the children that exceed $100 per year; and (1 6) giving husband ev ery Christma s holiday with the children. Up on reviewing th e record and briefs of the parties, we conclude that these arguments are wi thout merit. - 2 -Accordingly, we su mmarily affirm the decisionof the tria l court. Rule 5A:27. "Under familiar pr inciples, we view th e evidence and all reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the prevailing party below . . . ." Lutes v. Alexander , 14 Va. App. 1075, 1077, 42 1 S.E.2d 857, 859 (1992). "The burden is on the party who alleges reversible error to show by the record that reversal is the remedy to which he is entitled." We are not the fact-finders and an appeal should not be resolved on the basis of our supposition that one set of facts is more probable than another. Id. (citations omitted). BACKGROUND The parties were married in 1988 and se parated in 1998. The parties have three ch ildren. The trial co urt ordered an equal division of the marital proper ty based on husb and's requ est. However, the trial cour t found that an over all analysis of the factors favored hu sband. The tria l court awarded custody of the children to wife withvisitation to husband. In addition, the trial court awar ded wife monthly chil d support an d spousal support. More deta iled facts are recite d where the specific issues are addressed in this opinion. RECORD NO. 1457-00-1 I. Wife contends the trial court erre d by includin g the Langley Federal Credit Union ch ecking account as pr operty for equitable

- 3 -distribution and valuin g this account at pre- separation amounts. She also asserts that the trial court erred in accept ing husband's testimony concer ning the amount of money in the acco unt. However, the trial judge's notes indicate that at the April 13, 2000 hearing, the parties agre ed wife withdrew $7,0 00 from this account prior to the parties' separation and in anticipation of the parties' separation. Husband later wi thdrew the rema ining $3,650 after the parties separated. Thus , contrary to wi fe's assertion, the record does not in dicate that th e trial court ac cepted only husband's evid ence as to the value of the account. Rather, the parties agreed to the amount of mone y in the account. Furthermore, wife ad mits in her ob jections to the equitable distribution order th at the account was a "common checking account" used to pa y for "living expenses" and "b ills." The record contains no ev idence that the acco unt was the separate property of either party. Theref ore, the money in the account was properly classified as marital property to be distri buted as part of the equitable di stribution award. Proper ty is presumed to be marital if it wa s "acquired by ei ther spouse duri ng the marriage, and before the last se paration of th e parties," unle ss evidence proves that the property is sepa rate. Code § 20-107.3(A)(2). Furthermore, "waste " is defined as the "dissipation of marital funds in anticipation of divorce or separation for a purpose unrelate d to the marriage and in derogation of the marital relationship at a time when the marriage is in jeopardy." Booth - 4 -v. Booth , 7 Va. App. 22, 27, 371 S.E. 2d 569, 572 (1988). "Once the aggrieved sp ouse shows that marita l funds were either withdrawn or used after the breakd own, the burden rests with the party charged with dissipation to prove th at the money was spent for a proper purpose." Clements v. Clements , 10 Va. App. 580, 586, 397 S.E.2d 257, 261 (1990). "When wa ste has occu rred, the court must include the wasted assets as mari tal property and must consider the waste as a factor in dete rmining the mone tary award." Booth , 7 Va. App. at 28-29, 371 S.E.2d at 57 3. Expend itures for living expenses and co unsel fees in the divorce do not constitute waste. Id. at 28, 371 S.E.2d at 573. The reco rd indicates that wife failed to prove she used the $7,000 fo r living expenses. Accordingly, the trial court did not err in includ ing the $7,000 in the equitable di stribution award. In addition, the re cord contains no ev idence from wife concerning what she claims the value of the account was at the time of the evid entiary hearin g. The only evid ence presented to the trial court wa s that wife wi thdrew $7,000 from the joint account prior to the parties' separation and that husband later withdrew the remaining $3,650 and closed the account. Based on this record, we cannot say the trial court abused its discretion in choosing a valuat ion date other thanthe date of the evidentiary hearing. See Code § 20-107.3(A).

- 5 -II. Wife contends the trial court erre d in "not at tributing the correct amounts fo r property" duri ng the equitabl e distribution hearing. In her argument, wi fe states, "Thi s [equitable distribution] order had inaccura te amounts attrib uted to various investment accounts." However, wife fa ils to specify the "investment ac counts" to which she is referring. "Statements unsupported by argument , authority, or citations to the record do not merit appellat e consideratio n. We will not search the record for errors in or der to interpret appell ant's conten tion [nor] correct defici encies in a brief." Buchanan v. Buchanan , 14 Va. App. 53, 56, 415 S.E. 2d 237, 239 (1992). Wife also asserts that, for "fur ther clarific ation," the final equitable di stribution order "should state that [wife] is awarded her USAA IRA account and [h usband] is awarde d his USAA IRA account." Upon our re view of the fi nal equitable distribution order, we find that the order clearl y specifies th at wife was awarded her USAA IRA account and hu sband was awarde d his USAA IRA account. Acco rdingly, wife's argume nt is with out merit. III. Wife argues that the trial court erred in ruling that the pilot bonus annu ity could not be includ ed as property for equitable dist ribution, then addi ng the pilot annu ity as part of husband's income for support calc ulation purp oses. However, the record does not in dicate that wife argued to the trial court that - 6 -the pilot bonus sh ould be part of the equitable di stribution award. The record contains no transc ripts and no wr itten statement of facts. Indeed, the trial court rejected wife 's proposed written statem ent of facts, finding that it wa s inaccurate and contained desc riptions of events that occurred outside of the courtroom. As appell ant, wife had the bu rden of pr oviding a record which subs tantiates her clai ms of error. See Jenkins v. Winchester Dep't of Soc. Servs. , 12 Va. App. 1178, 1185, 409 S.E.2d 16, 20 (1991). We are unable to determine from this record the arguments made by wife and the trial court's rulings concerning whether the pilot bonus annuities should be part of the equitable distribution award. [O]n appeal the judgment of the lower court is presumed to be correct and the burden is on the appellant to present to us a sufficient record from which we can determine whether the lower court has erred in the respect complained of. Justis v. Young , 202 Va. 631, 632, 119 S.E.2d 255, 256-57 (1961). Furthermore, the trial court correctly ruled that the pilot bonuses were a part of husband's gross income for purposes of calculating support awards. In computing a party's gross income for child support purposes, Code § 20-108.2(C) requires the inclusion of "all income from all sources." Such income "shall

- 7 -include, but not be limited to, income from salaries, wages, commissions, [and] bonuses . . . ." Code § 20-108.2(C). Wife appears to make an argument concerning calculation errors related to the bonuses. However, she points to no specific errors of the trial court, she advances no argument in support of her contention, and she cites no legal authority for her contention. Therefore, we will not address this argument. See Buchanan , 14 Va. App. at 56, 415 S.E.2d at 239. RECORD NO. 1830-00-1 IV. and V. Wife argues the tr ial court erre d in attribut ing the pilot bonus annuity as part of husband's gross income , yet "no attribution was ma de and no timefr ame was given for this amount to be paid until a ce rtain dollar amou nt was realized." As addressed above, the trial cour t correctly attr ibuted the pilot bonus as part of husband' s gross income. Furthermor e, by order entered on August 23, 2000, the trial court in cluded in hu sband's gross income calculation th e $6,640 pilot bonus husband rece ived on September 1, 1999. Th e trial court th en recalculated husband's spousal and chil d support obli gations, prospectively and retroactively to July 1, 2000. The ev idence included only the amount of husban d's 1999 pilot bonus. The trial cour t could not speculate as to the amount of fu ture bonuses husb and may receive, if any. Accord ingly, the trial court prop erly included the 1999 pilot bonus in husband's gross income calculation. - 8 -VI. Wife contends the tr ial court erred in decreasing the amount of support she re ceives because husband di d not request a decrease and because the tr ial court lacked jurisd iction to modify the awards. Wife appears to be argu ing that the tria l court erred in making permanent spousa l and child supp ort awards in amounts that were less than the amount s awarded to her in prior pendente lite support orders. The record indicates that on January 7, 2000, the trial court awarded wife $1,425 per month in child su pport. Th e monthly spousal support aw ard in the order was $1 ,548 per month. The final divorce de cree entered on Apri l 18, 2000 reserved jurisdiction to make further determinat ions as to child and spousal suppor t. By order en tered on July 12 , 2000, the trial court awarded wife $1,131 per month in pe riodic child support and $1,150 per month in peri odic spousal support. However, on August 23, 2000, the tr ial court entere d an amended or der to correct clerical errors in th e permanent child support award. In this order, the trial court awarded wife $1,248 pe r month in periodic child support. Although the permanen t periodic support awar ds were less than the support amount s awarded in the January 7, 2000 pendente lite court order, permanen t support is separate and distinct from pendente lite support. See Weizenbaum v. Weizenbaum , 12 Va. App. 899, 903-04, 407 S.E.2d37, 39-40 (199 1). Factors wh ich the court - 9 -must consider prior to an award of perm anent suppor t are not required to be consider ed before an award of pendente lite support. Cf. Code §§ 20-107.1 and 20-1 03. The record indicates the trial court co nsidered all of the factors requir ed under Code §§ 20-107.1 and 20-1 08.1 concerning th e support awards. Accordingly, we reject wife's argument that the trial court erred in determining th e amount of the support awards. Furthermore, the reco rd does not in dicate wife argued to the trial court that it lacked jurisdiction to make the permanent support awards. See Rule 5A:18. VII. Wife makes no argument for th is issue. Thus , we will not address it. Buchanan , 14 Va. App. at 56, 415 S.E.2d at 239. VIII. Wife argues the tr ial court erre d in not allowing her to receive support through payroll deduction from the military payment center. Code § 20-79.1 pr ovides that the trial court has discretion whether to require an involuntary payroll dedu ction for support payments . Furthermore, Code § 20-79.1 provides circumstances under which the trial court shall or der such income deductions. None of these circum stances apply here . Accordingly, based on this re cord, we find that the trial court di d not abuse its discretion inrefusing to require husband to pay support through a mand atory payrol l deduction.

- 10 -IX. Wife argues the tr ial court erre d in not allowing her the opportunity to no te her objections on court orde rs before the trial court signed them. However, the re cord is re plete with wife's objections to the trial court' s orders. Wife either noted her objections inwriting on the court' s orders, or she filed separate documents with the co urt noting her objections. Therefore, we fi nd wife was not denied the opport unity to object to any of the tria l court's orders. Wife also contends she was not given the op portunity to object to the final decree in th is case. Howeve r, the record indicates othe rwise. The fina l divorce decree, entered on April 18, 2000, contains handwritten comm ents by wife regarding items she wanted added to the decree. In addition, wife filed a separate document entitl ed Motion Concerning Final Decree in which she raised numerous co ncerns and objections regarding the final divorce decree. Accord ingly, we find that the trial court did not deny wife the op portunity to voic e her objections. X. Wife argues the tr ial court erre d in not addressing child custody in the final de cree or post-decree order. In the final divorce decree, en tered on April 18, 2000, the trial co urt ordered that all prior orders of the court remainin effect until modified, and the trial court specif ically reservedjurisdiction to make further determinations related to child cust ody. The - 11 -trial court ha d previously entered a pendente lite order addressing child cust ody issues. On July 12, 2000, the trial court entered the Spousal and Child Support Order and Attorney's Fees Order, again addr essing child custody ma tters. Th e July 12, 2000 court order provid ed for the main tenance, support, care and custody of the childrenpursuant to Code § 20-79. Be cause the child custody issu es were addresse d in this order, and because the final divorce decr ee had specifical ly reserved ju risdiction to address these is sues at a later da te, we find no er ror. "A court speaks . . . throug h its orders." Cunningham v. Smith , 205 Va. 205, 208, 135 S.E.2d 770, 773 (1 964). It is no t necessary to repeatedly address all the issues in a case in ever y order entered in the case. XI. Wife contends the trial court ab used its discretion in ordering her to pay $7,000 in husband' s attorney's fees. "An award of attorn ey's fees is a matt er submitted to the trial court's soun d discretion and is reviewable onappeal only for an abuse of discretion. The key to a pr oper award of counsel fees is reasonable ness under all the circumstances." Brooks v. Brooks , 27 Va. App. 314, 319, 498 S.E.2d 461, 463-64 (1998) (citations omitted). On April 3, 2000, the trial cour t entered an order finding wife in contempt of court for intent ionally frustrating husband's contact with the childr en and for denying hi m visitation ordered - 12 -by the trial cour t. The trial co urt ordered wife to spend thirty minutes in jail, and it suspended wife's spousal supp ort until further order of the court. The record also indica tes wife failed to timely comply withdiscovery orde rs. Therefore, based on the issues involved and wi fe's conduct during the proceedi ngs, the award was reason able, and the tr ial court did not abuse its discretion in ma king the award. Wife also argues in her brief that th e trial cour t lacked jurisdiction to aw ard attorney's fe es pursuant to Rule 1:1. On the contrary, th e record shows that th e trial cour t retained jurisdiction over the case at th e time it entere d the award of fees. XII. Wife contends the trial court er red in not making her the beneficiary of husband' s military survivor benefit plan. Under Code § 20-107.3(G)(2), the trial court may order that a spouse be designated as ir revocable bene ficiary of a surviv or benefit plan. Therefore, the trial co urt has discreti on in deciding whether to order the designat ion of wife as an irre vocable bene ficiary. Based on this re cord and the facts of th is case, no evidence supports a finding that the trial cour t abused its discretion in refusing to orde r husband to designate wi fe as an irrevocable beneficiary.

- 13 -XIII. Wife contends the tr ial court erred in signing th e August 23, 2000 amended post-dec ree order "wit hout having the proper evidentiary do cuments to confirm calculat ions." In her argument, wife asserts that th e trial court vi olated Rule 1:1 when it entered the order more than twenty-one days after the entry of the July 12, 2000 order. The August 23, 2000 order is entitled, "Ame nded Order On Post Decree Motions to Corr ect Clerical Errors." This order corrects clerical errors contai ned in the July 28, 20 00 court or der related to monthly spou sal and child su pport payments. Code § 8.01-4 28(B) provides: Clerical Mistakes. --Clerical mistakes in all judgments or other parts of the record and errors therein arising from oversight or from an inadvertent omission may be corrected by the court at any time on its own initiative or upon the motion of any party and after such notice, as the court may order. On this record, we cannot say the trial co urt erred in amending the July 28, 2000 order. Moreover , we note that the clerical corrections were beneficial to wife. XIV. Wife argues the tria l court erred in fail ing to order husband to maintain an ex isting life insu rance policy for his children and to name them as benefi ciaries. Code § 20-1 08.1(D) prov ides that the trial court:

- 14 -shall have the authority to order a party to (i) maintain any existing life insurance policy on the life of either party provided the party so ordered has the right to designate a beneficiary and (ii) designate a child or children of the parties as the beneficiary of all or a portion of such life insurance . . . . On this record, we fi nd that the trial co urt acted wi thin its statutory auth ority based up on the evidence presented. XV. Wife argues the tria l court erred in not ordering husband to pay for uninsured medical and dent al expenses fo r the children that exceed $100 pe r year. As wife co rrectly states, the pendente lite order provided that husband was to pay on e hundred pe rcent of any uninsured medi cal and dental bills for the children. Although the final Spousa l and Child Su pport Order did not address uninsured medi cal and dental bi lls, the order st ates that "all previous orders regard ing the support, [and] care" of the children "are continued in full force and effe ct," with the exception of child support paym ents. Accordingly, husb and is required to pay the uninsured me dical and dental expens es of the children. Therefore, wife's argu ment is wi thout merit. XVI. Wife argues the tr ial court erred in awarding a visitation schedule in whic h husband spends the Christmas ho liday with the children. She conten ds the trial court's order bars her from sharing the ho liday with her children.

- 15 -Determination of visi tation rights is a matter of judicial discretion. See Eichelberger v. Eichelberger , 2 Va. App. 409, 412, 345 S.E.2d 10, 11 (1986). We will no t set aside the trial court's decisi on on visitation unless plainly wrong or without evidence to support it. Farley v. Farley , 9 Va. App. 326, 328, 387 S.E.2d 794, 795 (1990). The trial court awarded wife so le custody of the children. The trial cour t entered a pendente lite order allowing husband "reasonable vi sitation" with the children . By order entered on January 7, 2000, the tr ial court found that wife co mmitted acts "specifically designed to frustrate the pendente lite order" and "deliberately and intentiona lly aimed at denyin g" husband contact with his children. Th e trial court th en ordered th e visitation schedule that pr ovided husband would have visitation with the children from "C hristmas Day at 12:00 noon and ending on New Year's Day at 12:00 no on." The orde r clearly provid es that wife will spend Christmas Day with the children until 12:00 noon. Therefore, she is no t denied the opport unity to spend the Christmas holi day with the children. Furthermore, under these circumstances, we cannot say the trial court abusedits discretion in ordering the vi sitation schedule. Accordingly, the decision of the trial cour t is summarily affirmed. Affirmed.

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