alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
Fourth Court of Appeals

San Antonio, Texas

August 15, 2016

No. 04-16-00415-CV

Walter Ray SIMPSON, Jr.,

Appellant

v.

AUTO INJURY SOLUTIONS, INC.,

Appellee

From the 150th Judicial District Court, Bexar County, Texas

Trial Court No. 2016-CI-03713

Honorable Michael E. Mery, Judge Presiding

O R D E R

On May 26, 2016, the trial court signed an order granting appellee Auto Injury Solutions, 

Inc.’s motion to dismiss under Rule 91a. See TEX. R. CIV. P. 91A (“Dismissal of Baseless 

Causes of Action”); In re Nationwide Ins. Co. of Am., No. 15-0328, 2016 WL 3537206, at *3 

(Tex. June 24, 2016). Appellant’s notice of appeal was due on June 27, 2016, and a motion for 

extension of time to file a notice of appeal was due on July 11, 2016. See TEX. R. APP. P. 26.1, 

26.3. 

On July 5, 2016, after the deadline to file the notice of appeal, Appellant filed a notice of 

appeal. See generally Verburgt v. Dorner, 959 S.W.2d 615, 617 (Tex. 1997) (“[A] motion for 

extension of time is necessarily implied when an appellant acting in good faith files a [notice of 

appeal] beyond the time allowed by Rule [26.1], but within the fifteen-day period in which the 

appellant would be entitled to move to extend the filing deadline under Rule [26.3].” (emphasis 

added)). 

We ORDER Appellant to SHOW CAUSE in writing within TEN DAYS of the date of 

this order why this appeal should not be dismissed for want of jurisdiction. See TEX. R. APP. P.

10.5(b) (requirements for a motion for extension of time); id. R. 42.3(a) (dismissal for want of 

jurisdiction). If Appellant fails to respond within the time provided, this appeal will be 

dismissed. See id. R. 42.3(c) (dismissal for failure to comply with court order). 
All other appellate deadlines are SUSPENDED pending further order of this court.

_________________________________

Patricia O. Alvarez, Justice

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of the said 

court on this 15th day of August, 2016.

___________________________________

Keith E. Hottle

Clerk of Court
* Pursuant to 5 TH C IR . R. 47.5, the court has determined

that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5 TH C IR . R. 47.5.4. IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 01-40444 Conference Calendar

LESLIE WAYNE JOHNSON, Plaintiff-Appellant,

versus
SHAWN TOLLEY, Officer; MITCH WOODS, Sheriff; DAVID MOORE, Major, Defendants-Appellees.

-------------------- Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Texas

USDC No. 1:01-CV-76

-------------------- April 10, 2002 Before SMITH, DeMOSS, and PARKER, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM: * Leslie Wayne Johnson (TDCJ # 108329) appeals the dismissal as frivolous of his civil rights complaint wherein he alleged that his constitutional rights were violated in connection with his arrest and the subsequent revocation of his probation. We DENY Johnson’s motion for leave to file a supplemental brief. A prisoner’s in forma pauperis (IFP) civil rights complaint shall be dismissed if the district court determines that the action is frivolous or fails to state a claim upon which reliefNo. 01-40444 -2- may be granted. Black v. Warren , 134 F.3d 732, 733 (5th Cir. 1998); see 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). We review the dismissal of a complaint as frivolous for an abuse of discretion. See Berry v. Brady , 192 F.3d 504, 507 (5th Cir. 1999). "[I]n order to recover damages for [an] allegedly unconstitutional conviction or imprisonment ... a § 1983 plaintiff must prove that the conviction or sentence has been reversed on direct appeal ... or called into question by a federal court’s issuance of a writ of habeas corpus[.]" Heck v. Humphrey , 512 U.S. 477, 486-87 (1994). Heck also applies to proceedings that call into question the fact or duration of probation. Jackson v. Vannoy , 49 F.3d 175, 177 (5th Cir. 1995). Johnson does not allege that the probation-revocation proceeding has been reversed or otherwise called into question, and a judgment in his favor would necessarily imply the invalidity of the proceedings. His appeal is without arguable merit and is therefore frivolous. See Howard v. King , 707 F.2d 215, 220 (5th Cir. 1983). Because the appeal is frivolous, it is
DISMISSED. See 5 TH C IR . R. 42.2. The district court’s dismissal of Johnson’s action as frivolous counts as a "strike" for purposes of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). See Adepegba v. Hammons , 103 F.3d 383, 385-87 (5th Cir. 1996). The dismissal of the instant appeal also counts as a strike under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). Johnson is WARNED that if he accumulates three strikes pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g), he may not proceed IFP in any civil action or appeal filed while he isNo. 01-40444 -3- incarcerated or detained in any facility unless he is under imminent danger of serious physical injury. See id

. APPEAL DISMISSED; MOTION DENIED; STRIKE WARNING ISSUED.
UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT No. 00-6432

CARLTON L. STEPHENSON, Petitioner - Appellant, versus RONALD ANGELONE, Director, Virginia Department of Corrections, Respondent - Appellee.Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, at Norfolk. Robert G. Doumar, Senior District Judge. (CA-99-705-2) Submitted: June 15, 2000 Decided: June 23, 2000Before NIEMEYER and MOTZ, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior Circuit Judge. Dismissed by unpublished per curiam opinion. Carlton L. Stephenson, Appellant Pro Se. Robert H. Anderson, III, OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF VIRGINIA, Richmond, Virginia, for Appellee. Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See Local Rule 36(c).* Although the district court’s order is marked as “filed” on March 10, 2000, the district court’s records show that it was entered on the docket sheet on March 13, 2000. Pursuant to Rules 58 and 79(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, it is the date that the order was entered on the docket sheet that we take as the effective date of the district court’s decision. Wilson v. Murray, 806 F.2d 1232, 1234-35 (4th Cir. 1986). 2 PER CURIAM: Carlton L. Stephenson seeks to appeal the district court’s order denying relief on his petition filed under 28 U.S.C.A. § 2254 (West 1994 & Supp. 2000). We have reviewed the record and thedistrict court’s opinion accepting the recommendation of the magistrate judge and find no reversible error. Accordingly, we deny acertificate of appealability and dismiss the appeal on the reasoning of the district court. See Stephenson v. Angelone , No. CA-99- 705-2 (E.D. Va. Mar. 13, 2000). * We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

DISMISSED
James SMITH, Appellant, v. STATE of Missouri, Respondent.

No. ED 106839

Missouri Court of Appeals, Eastern District, DIVISION FOUR.

Filed: April 23, 2019

Steven Kratky, 1010 Market St. Ste. 1100, St. Louis, MO 63101, For Movant/Appellant.

Richard A. Starnes, P.O. Box 899, Jefferson City, MO 65102, For Defendant/Respondent.

Before Kurt S. Odenwald, P.J., Gary M. Gaertner, Jr., J., and Colleen Dolan, J.

***ORDER***

PER CURIAM.

*595James Smith ("Movant") appeals the motion court's judgment denying the post-conviction relief claims asserted in his amended Rule 29.15 motion. Movant asserts two points on appeal. Finding that Movant has failed to demonstrate that the motion court clearly erred in denying his Rule 29.15 motion, we affirm the judgment of the motion court.

No jurisprudential purpose would be served by a written opinion. However, we have provided the parties a memorandum setting forth the reasons for our decision. The judgment of the motion court is affirmed under Rule 84.16(b).