NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

JOSEPH LANCE WHEELER, 

Plaintiff-Appellant, 

 v. 

MICROBILT CORPORATION, 

Defendant-Appellee.

No. 16-55595 

D.C. No. 2:15-cv-03438-R-E 

MEMORANDUM*

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Central District of California

Manuel L. Real, District Judge, Presiding

Submitted October 5, 2017**

Pasadena, California

Before: MOTZ,*** M. SMITH, and NGUYEN, Circuit Judges.

Joseph Wheeler appeals the district court’s dismissal of his complaint alleging 

claims under the Fair Credit Reporting Act and the California Consumer Credit 

 

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent 

except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision 

without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

*** The Honorable Diana Gribbon Motz, United States Circuit Judge for 

the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, sitting by designation.

FILED

NOV 1 2017

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
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Reporting Agencies Act. We review de novo, Johnson v. Federal Home Loan 

Mortgage Corp., 793 F.3d 1005, 1007 (9th Cir. 2015), and affirm in part and reverse 

in part.

I.

Wheeler alleges that when he attempted to rent an apartment, the landlord 

purchased a consumer credit report from Defendant-Appellee MicroBilt Corp., a 

consumer reporting agency. The report stated that a civil judgment had been entered 

against Wheeler in connection with an eviction proceeding in Pennsylvania when, 

in fact, the judgment concerned another person. Swanson initially denied Wheeler’s 

rental application, but after Wheeler successfully cleared his name, he was able to 

rent the property.

Wheeler then filed this action against MicroBilt, alleging violations of the Fair 

Credit Reporting Act (“FCRA”) and the California Consumer Credit Reporting 

Agencies Act (“CCRAA”). The district court dismissed the complaint with 

prejudice, holding that Wheeler failed to allege any facts to suggest that he suffered 

actual damages from MicroBilt’s erroneous report. The court reasoned that Wheeler 

“simply ma[d]e a conclusory allegation that . . . damages were suffered, without 

pleading any facts.” Wheeler appeals.

II.

We first address Wheeler’s claim for actual damages. “To survive a motion 
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to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to 

‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 

678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)).

Under the heightened pleading standards of Twombly and Iqbal, a plaintiff 

must give the defendant “fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon 

which it rests,” and plead “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on 

its face.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 570 (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 

47 (1957)); see also Starr v. Baca, 652 F.3d 1202, 1216 (9th Cir. 2011) (“[T]he 

factual allegations that are taken as true must plausibly suggest an entitlement to 

relief, such that it is not unfair to require the opposing party to be subjected to the 

expense of discovery and continued litigation.”). Wheeler alleges that he suffered 

economic harm (loss of work time and denial of a rental opportunity) and 

reputational harm. Yet, as the district court recounts, Wheeler “not only fails to 

allege any facts supporting these conclusory allegations, but rather admits that he 

obtained the desired apartment, despite the initial confusion.” Although a complaint 

need not contain “detailed factual allegations,” a plaintiff must plead at least enough 

facts to put the defendant on notice of the claim against it. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678

(quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). Wheeler has not done so here.

Wheeler also alleges that he suffered embarrassment and humiliation as a 

result of Microbilt’s conduct. He claims that he was “embarrassed and humiliated 
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by” the erroneous report, “given that [he] has never been evicted from an apartment.” 

These allegations are insufficient to survive a motion to dismiss. While a plaintiff 

need not provide “objective evidence of emotional distress,” Grigoryan v. Experian 

Information Solutions, Inc., 84 F. Supp. 3d 1044, 1086 (C.D. Cal. 2014), Wheeler’s 

allegations rest on mere conclusions for which he provided no support. We therefore 

affirm the district court’s dismissal of Wheeler’s claim for actual damages.

III.

Next, we turn to Wheeler’s claims for statutory damages and punitive 

damages. Under the FCRA, statutory damages and punitive damages may be 

awarded for a willful violation even when a plaintiff does not show any actual 

damages. 15 U.S.C. § 1681n(a); see Syed v. M-I, LLC, 853 F.3d 492, 503 (9th Cir. 

2017). The CCRAA allows for the recovery of punitive damages for a willful 

violation. Cal. Civ. Code § 1785.31.

Wheeler seeks statutory and punitive damages based on his allegations that 

MicroBilt willfully violated the FCRA and the CCRAA. The district court did not 

address these damages claims in its order dismissing Wheeler’s Second Amended 

Complaint with prejudice. We therefore reverse and remand to the district court to 

permit Wheeler the opportunity to amend his complaint to state with sufficient 

specificity his claims for statutory and punitive damages for a willful violation of 

the FCRA and the CCRAA.
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Accordingly, the judgment of the district court dismissing Wheeler’s 

complaint is 

AFFIRMED in part REVERSED in part and REMANDED.