Filed 6/13/22; Modified and Certified for Publication 6/29/22 (order attached)

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION SEVEN

In re M.B., a Person Coming 

Under the Juvenile Court Law.

 B312789

 (Los Angeles County

 Super. Ct. No. 

 18CCJP03577A) 

LOS ANGELES COUNTY 

DEPARTMENT OF 

CHILDREN AND FAMILY 

SERVICES,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

LIAH B.,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from orders of the Superior Court of Los Angeles 

County, Debra R. Archuleta, Judge. Affirmed in part, reversed in 

part and remanded with directions. 
2

Elizabeth C. Alexander, under appointment by the Court of 

Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. 

Dawyn R. Harrison, Acting County Counsel, Kim Nemoy, 

Assistant County Counsel, and Jane E. Kwon, Principal Deputy 

County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent. 

___________________________

Liah B., the mother of six-year-old M.B., appeals the 

August 31, 2021 order terminating her parental rights, 

contending the Los Angeles County Department of Children and 

Family Services failed to adequately investigate her claim of 

Indian ancestry through interviews with maternal relatives and 

the notices sent to the Blackfeet Tribe failed to include the 

birthdates of M.B.’s maternal grandfather and great-grandfather 

as required by federal regulations implementing the Indian Child 

Welfare Act of 1978 (ICWA) (25 U.S.C. § 1901 et seq.) and related 

California law.1

Without challenging Liah’s claims of error, the Department 

argues that Liah’s appeal of the adequacy of its investigation has 

been mooted by further interviews with maternal relatives and

that any omission of required information from the ICWA-030 

notices sent to the Blackfeet Tribe was harmless because its post1 Liah separately appealed a May 13, 2021 order summarily 

denying her petition pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code 

section 388 to reinstate family reunification services or return 

M.B. to her care. We granted Liah’s motion to consolidate the 

two appeals. Liah’s briefs in this court, however, present no 

arguments directed to the section 388 order, and we deem that 

aspect of her appeal abandoned. (See Jones v. Superior Court

(1994) 26 Cal.App.4th 92, 99; Cal. Rules of Court, 

rule 8.204(a)(1)(B).)
3

appeal investigation established ICWA notices were not required. 

In support of its mootness/harmless error arguments the 

Department has moved for “judicial notice of post-judgment 

evidence”—a last minute information report filed in the juvenile 

court on April 4, 2022.

As did our colleagues in Division Three of the Fourth 

Appellate District in In re K.M. (2015) 242 Cal.App.4th 450

(K.M.), which involved a similar effort by the child protective

services agency to remedy its deficient ICWA investigation while 

an order terminating parental rights was on appeal, we reject the 

argument that evidence of postjudgment ICWA inquiries moots 

the issue, conditionally reverse the order terminating Liah’s 

parental rights and remand the matter for full compliance with 

the inquiry and notice provisions of ICWA and related California 

law.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

1. The Dependency Proceedings

The events leading to the Department’s filing of a 

dependency petition, M.B.’s removal from Liah after the juvenile 

court sustained a single count pursuant to Welfare and 

Institutions Code section 300, subdivision (b)(1),2 concerning 

Liah’s substance abuse, and the dependency proceedings through 

the juvenile court’s November 7, 2019 order summarily denying 

Liah’s petition for modification of its March 6, 2019 order 

terminating reunification services are detailed in our opinion 

affirming the November 7, 2019 order. (In re M.B. (Mar. 15, 

2021, B302837) [nonpub. opn.].)

2 Statutory references are to this code unless otherwise 

stated.
4

The section 366.26 selection and implementation hearing, 

originally scheduled for July 3, 2019, was ultimately held on 

August 31, 2021. At the hearing the juvenile court found by clear 

and convincing evidence M.B. was adoptable and found no 

exception to termination of parental rights applied, specifically 

rejecting Liah’s argument based on the parent-child-relationship 

exception. (§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(B)(i).)3 The court terminated 

Liah’s parental rights and transferred care, custody and control 

of M.B. to the Department for adoptive planning and placement. 

Shenika B., a maternal great-aunt living in New Jersey, was 

identified by the Department as M.B.’s prospective adoptive 

parent.4 

2. The ICWA Investigation and Notice

In the Indian Child Inquiry Attachment (ICWA-010(A)) 

filed June 5, 2018 with the original dependency petition, the 

Department’s social worker checked the box stating, “The child 

may have Indian ancestry,” and explained, “Mother stated child 

has Indian ancestry.” The detention report filed on the same 

date similarly stated, “The Indian Child Welfare Act does or may 

apply,” and elaborated, “On 6/1/2018, mother, Liah B[.] stated 

that American Indian heritage does apply as to the paternal side 

3 The court found Liah had not maintained regular visitation 

and had not established a bond with M.B.

4 In its section 366.26 report the Department explained 

New Jersey, where the maternal great-aunt lives, requires an 

order terminating parental rights before it will complete an 

adoption home study pursuant to a referral under the Interstate 

Compact for the Placement of Children. The court ordered M.B. 

placed with Shenika B. on December 17, 2021.
5

of father, Terrell W[.],” identified by Liah as M.B.’s biological 

father.5

On June 6, 2018, in connection with the detention hearing, 

in her Parental Notification of Indian Status (ICWA-020) Liah 

checked the box indicating she may have Indian ancestry, writing 

“Blackfoot (MGGF Lonnie B[.]).” Asked by the court at the 

hearing about M.B.’s Indian ancestry, Liah responded, “[Terrell] 

did tell me he was Indian. I’m not exactly sure what tribe, but I 

know on my dad’s side, my grandfather is definitely Indian.”

Liah explained she was estranged from her father’s side of the 

family and did not have contact information for Lonnie B., Sr., 

M.B.’s great-grandfather, and, while she knew he was born in 

Camden, New Jersey, she did not know his date of birth. She 

told the court she would try to obtain that information. The court 

found there was no reason to know ICWA applied to Terrell but 

ordered the Department to investigate Liah’s Indian ancestry 

and provide a supplemental report regarding the investigation to 

the court that included “the details of who was interviewed, dates 

and places of birth of the relatives as far back as can be 

ascertained.” In addition, the court ordered the Department to 

provide notice to the appropriate tribes and to the Bureau of 

Indian Affairs. 

In its jurisdiction/disposition report filed July 5, 2018, the 

Department summarized its social worker’s interview with Liah 

5 The whereabouts of Terrell, subsequently designated as 

M.B.’s alleged father by the court, remained unknown throughout 

the proceedings. Liah said Terrell never had any contact with 

M.B. On April 12, 2019 the court found the Department’s due 

diligence search had been completed and authorized notice of the

section 366.26 hearing be provided to Terrell by publication. 
6

concerning her possible Indian ancestry. Liah provided the 

names and dates and places of birth, if known, of various 

maternal relatives. As to Lonnie B., Sr., Liah again said he was 

born in Camden, and Liah did not know his date of birth; she did 

not know if he was still living. Liah provided the same 

information as to Lonnie B., Jr., M.B.’s maternal grandfather—he 

was born in Camden on an unknown date, and she did not know 

if he was still alive. The Department reported it had recently 

sent ICWA notices to Blackfeet tribal bands, the Bureau of 

Indian Affairs and the Secretary of the Interior. The report does 

not indicate any further investigation had been conducted by the 

Department.

At the jurisdiction hearing on July 19, 2018 the 

Department reported it had sent ICWA notices and suggested the 

court set a progress hearing to evaluate any responses that might 

be received. The court scheduled a nonappearance progress 

hearing for September 7, 2018. 

A last minute information for the court, filed September 5, 

2018, the Department reported it had no confirmation its notices 

to the Bureau of Indian Affairs and the Secretary of the Interior 

had been received and no response to the notices. A 

representative of the Blackfeet Tribe of Montana confirmed the 

Department had used the correct mailing address, but the 

Department had been unable to reach the Tribe’s ICWA division. 

The court granted the Department’s request to continue the 

progress hearing to December 6, 2018. 

A December 4, 2018 last minute information explained the 

Department had resubmitted a notice to the Blackfeet Tribe of 

Montana but its efforts, via voicemail, to obtain a letter of ICWA 

eligibility/noneligibility had been unsuccessful. On December 6, 
7

2018 the juvenile court, after noting 60 days had elapsed since 

notices had been sent and no responses had been received, found 

it had no reason to know ICWA applied to the case. 

In her appeal from the juvenile court’s November 7, 2019 

order denying her section 388 petition, Liah argued the 

Department and the juvenile court had not complied with their 

duties of inquiry and notice under ICWA before the court made 

its no-ICWA finding in December 2018. On October 29, 2020, 

while that appeal was pending, the juvenile court directed the 

Department to conduct further inquiry regarding Liah’s possible 

Blackfeet ancestry and to send all appropriate ICWA notices 

prior to the next hearing, which was then scheduled for

January 4, 2021. Liah conceded, and we agreed, the order for 

additional investigation mooted the ICWA issue at that time.

(See In re M.B., supra, B302837, fn. 1.)

In a supplemental report filed December 29, 2020 the 

Department advised the court it had interviewed Lonnie B., Sr., 

who denied any Indian ancestry, including with the Blackfeet 

Tribe, and said Lonnie B., Jr. was not a registered member of the 

Blackfeet Tribe. He declined to provide the name of Lonnie B., 

Jr.’s mother (M.B.’s maternal great-grandmother).6 Lonnie B., 

Sr. said he had no contact with Lorrie H., M.B.’s maternal 

grandmother. A maternal aunt, Tiarra H., who had received a 

Department contact letter, responded by email that she had no 

knowledge of any Indian ancestry in the family. The 

Department’s efforts to interview Lonnie B., Jr., whose 

whereabouts were unknown, and Lorrie H. were unsuccessful.

6 Lonnie B., Sr.’s current wife is Lonnie B., Jr.’s stepmother. 
8

The Department sent new notices to the Blackfeet Tribe of 

Montana, the Bureau of Indian Affairs and the Secretary of the 

Interior. The notices did not include birthdates for Lonnie B., Sr. 

or Lonnie B., Jr., which Lonnie B., Sr. had declined to provide. In 

a letter dated January 28, 2021 the Blackfeet Tribe of Montana 

responded to the notice, stating M.B. was not listed on the tribal 

rolls and was not eligible for enrollment in the tribe. After 

receiving that letter, the court at a May 4, 2021 hearing found it 

had no reason to know M.B. was an Indian child as defined under 

ICWA, a finding repeated in the Department’s report for the 

selection and implementation hearing that was finally conducted 

on August 31, 2021. 

3. The Department’s Post-appeal Remedial Efforts and 

Motion for Judicial Notice

In Liah’s opening brief on appeal, filed February 16, 2022, 

she explained the Department had failed to seek critical 

information (including Lonnie B., Sr.’s and Lonnie B., Jr.’s dates 

of birth) from accessible maternal relatives, among them M.B.’s 

prospective adoptive parent, Shenika B., Lonnie B., Jr.’s sister. 

Liah argued the Department’s violation of its ICWA duty of 

inquiry required a conditional reversal of the August 31, 2021 

order terminating parental rights, with a remand directing the 

Department to comply with the inquiry and notice requirements 

of ICWA and related California law.

As reflected in an April 4, 2022 last minute information 

report for the court, during the last 10 days of March 2022, in 

response to Liah’s appellate brief, the Department reinterviewed 

Lonnie B., Sr., interviewed Shenika B. and unsuccessfully 

attempted to contact several other maternal relatives, including 
9

M.B.’s maternal grandmother. The report also indicated 

Lonnie B., Jr. had died in 2020.

On April 7, 2022, concurrently with the filing of its 

respondent’s brief, the Department moved, pursuant to California 

Rules of Court, rule 8.252 and Evidence Code sections 452 and 

459, for judicial notice of the April 4, 2022 last minute 

information for the court. The Department explained the report 

“demonstrates that DCFS interviewed or attempted to interview 

available maternal relatives while the appeal was pending” and 

thus supported the argument advanced in its respondent’s brief 

that Liah’s appeal was moot. Liah filed an opposition 

memorandum, objecting to judicial notice of the report. 

DISCUSSION

1. ICWA and the Duties of Inquiry and Notice

ICWA and governing federal regulations (25 C.F.R. 

§ 23.101 et seq. (2022)) set minimal procedural protections for 

state courts to follow before removing Indian children and placing 

them in foster care or adoptive homes. (In re Y.W. (2021) 

70 Cal.App.5th 542, 551.) The statute authorizes states to 

provide “‘a higher standard of protection’” to Indian children, 

their families and their tribes than the rights provided under 

ICWA. (In re T.G. (2020) 58 Cal.App.5th 275, 287-288; 

see 25 U.S.C. § 1921.) In addition to significantly limiting state 

court actions concerning out-of-family placements for Indian 

children (see In re T.G., at pp. 287-288), ICWA permits an Indian 

child’s tribe to intervene in or, where appropriate, exercise 

jurisdiction over a child custody proceeding (see 25 U.S.C. 

§ 1911(c); In re Isaiah W. (2016) 1 Cal.5th 1, 8). 

To ensure Indian tribes may exercise their rights in 

dependency proceedings as guaranteed by ICWA and related 
10

state law, investigation of a family member’s belief a child may 

have Indian ancestry must be undertaken and notice provided to 

the appropriate tribes. (§ 224.2, subd. (a) [imposing on the court 

and child protective services agencies “an affirmative and 

continuing duty to inquire whether a child . . . is or may be an 

Indian child”]; see In re Charles W. (2021) 66 Cal.App.5th 483, 

489.) The duty to inquire “begins with initial contact (§ 224.2, 

subd. (a)) and obligates the juvenile court and child protective 

agencies to ask all relevant involved individuals whether the 

child may be an Indian child.” (In re T.G., supra, 58 Cal.App.5th 

at p. 290; accord, In re Antonio R. (2022) 76 Cal.App.5th 421, 429; 

see § 224.2, subds. (a)-(c).) 

In addition, section 224.2, subdivision (e), imposes a duty of 

further inquiry regarding the possible Indian status of the child

“[i]f the court, social worker, or probation officer has reason to 

believe that an Indian child is involved in a proceeding, but does 

not have sufficient information to determine there is reason to 

know that the child is an Indian child.” California Rules of 

Court, rule 5.481(a)(4) provides that further inquiry must be 

conducted if the social worker “knows or has reason to know or 

believe that an Indian child is or may be involved.” Further 

inquiry includes, “but is not limited to,” interviewing, as soon as 

practicable, extended family members, contacting the Bureau of 

Indian Affairs and contacting “the tribe or tribes and any other 

person that may reasonably be expected to have information 

regarding the child’s membership, citizenship status, or 

eligibility.” (§ 224.2, subd. (e)(2).) 

If those inquiries result in reason to know the child is an 

Indian child, notice to the relevant tribes is required. (25 U.S.C. 

§ 1912(a); Welf. & Inst. Code, § 224.3; see In re J.S. (2021) 
11

62 Cal.App.5th 678, 686; In re T.G., supra, 58 Cal.App.5th at 

p. 290.) The governing federal regulations require ICWA notices 

to include, if known, the names, birthdates, birthplaces and tribal 

enrollment information of all direct lineal ancestors of the child. 

(25 C.F.R. § 23.111(d)(3) (2022).) State law mandates inclusion of 

“[a]ll names known of the Indian child’s biological parents, 

grandparents, and great-grandparents, or Indian custodians, 

including maiden, married, and former names or aliases, as well 

as their current and former addresses, birth dates, places of birth 

and death, tribal enrollment information of other direct lineal 

ancestors of the child, and any other identifying information, if 

known.” (§ 224.3, subd. (a)(5)(C); see In re A.M. (2020) 

47 Cal.App.5th 303, 317 [“‘If the notice duty is triggered under 

ICWA, the notice to a tribe must include a wide range of 

information about relatives, including grandparents and greatgrandparents, to enable the tribe to properly identify the 

children’s Indian ancestry. [Citation.] Any violation of this 

policy requires the appellate court to vacate the offending order 

and remand the matter for further proceedings consistent with 

ICWA requirements’”].)

2. The April 4, 2022 Last Minute Information Does Not 

Moot Liah’s Appeal

The Department’s effort to moot Liah’s appeal by 

conducting further interviews while her appeal was pending fails 

for several reasons, separate from the general rule cited by Liah 

in her opposition to the motion for judicial notice, that “‘an appeal 

reviews the correctness of a judgment as of the time of its 

rendition, upon a record of matters which were before the trial 

court for its consideration.’” (In re Zeth S. (2003) 31 Cal.4th 396, 

405.) First, “‘while courts are free to take judicial notice of the 
12

existence of each document in a court file, including the truth of 

results reached, they may not take judicial notice of the truth of 

hearsay statements in decisions and court files.’” (In re Vicks

(2013) 56 Cal.4th 274, 314; accord, Copenbarger v. Morris Cerullo 

World Evangelism, Inc. (2018) 29 Cal.App.5th 1, 14-15 [“‘[w]hile

judicial notice may be taken of court records [citation], the truth

of matters asserted in such documents is not subject to judicial

notice’”]; see K.M., supra, 242 Cal.App.4th at p. 456.) Thus, while

we grant the Department’s motion for judicial notice and

acknowledge the existence of the last minute information, the

contents of that report—the substance of the postjudgment

interviews conducted by the Department and its description of

unsuccessful efforts to reach other maternal family members—

are not properly before us in this appeal.

Code of Civil Procedure section 909, unlike a motion for

judicial notice, permits an appellate court to take additional

evidence and make independent factual findings on appeal.7 

Such postjudgment evidence may, in appropriate cases, be

considered to determine whether an issue on appeal is moot. 

(See In re Josiah Z. (2005) 36 Cal.4th 664, 676 [“the beneficial

consequences of motions to dismiss, where granted, will be to

‘expedit[e] the proceedings and promot[e] the finality of the

juvenile’s court’s orders and judgment’ [citation]—precisely the

7 Code of Civil Procedure section 909 provides, “In all cases 

where trial by jury is not a matter of right . . . the reviewing court 

may make factual determinations contrary to or in addition to 

those made by the trial court. . . . The reviewing court may for 

the purpose of making the factual determinations or for any other 

purpose in the interests of justice, take additional evidence of or 

concerning facts occurring at any time prior to the decision of 

the appeal.” 
13

policy advanced by our ruling in Zeth S.”].) Deeming the

Department’s motion for judicial notice a motion to consider new

evidence under Code of Civil Procedure section 909, however,

would not solve the fundamental problem with the argument the

postjudgment interviews moot Liah’s appeal.

As discussed, after the juvenile court’s initial finding it had

no reason to know ICWA applied, while Liah’s prior appeal was

pending, the court ordered the Department to investigate further

and resend notice to the Blackfeet Tribe. Following the Blackfeet

Tribe’s response, as a predicate for the section 366.26 order

terminating parental rights, the court again found ICWA did not

apply to M.B. It is that order—and the inquiry and notice on

which the necessary no-ICWA finding is grounded—that is at

issue in this appeal and that the Department was attempting to

reinforce through its additional ICWA interviews. Yet section

366.26, subdivision (i)(1),8 expressly deprives the juvenile court of

jurisdiction to modify or revoke an order terminating parental

rights once it is final as to that court. Accordingly, as the court of

appeal explained in K.M., supra, 242 Cal.App.4th 450, a child

protective services agency cannot remedy a defective ICWA

investigation by conducting further interviews while the

termination order is being reviewed on appeal. (K.M., at pp. 457-

458.)

8 Section 366.26, subdivision (i)(1), with a limited exception 

not applicable in this case, provides, “Any order of the court 

permanently terminating parental rights under this section shall 

be conclusive and binding . . . . After making the order, the 

juvenile court shall have no power to set aside, change, or 

modify it.”
14

The mother in K.M. had informed the juvenile court at her 

first court appearance that she may have Indian ancestry. 

Although the juvenile court ordered the Orange County Social 

Services Agency (SSA) to investigate, the agency failed to conduct 

any interviews, while asserting in its reports to the court that 

ICWA did not apply. (K.M., supra, 242 Cal.App.4th at p. 453.) 

Both parents appealed after the court terminated their parental 

rights, raising the issue of ICWA violations in their opening 

briefs. (Ibid.)

Concurrently with its respondent’s brief, SSA filed a motion 

to augment the record, to take additional evidence and to dismiss 

the appeal as moot. The motion papers included documentation 

relating to SSA’s renewed efforts regarding ICWA inquiry and 

notice and a further minute order from the juvenile court with an 

additional finding that ICWA did not apply. (K.M., supra, 

242 Cal.App.4th at pp. 453-454.) 

The court of appeal granted the motion to take additional 

evidence, but held the evidence did not render the appeal moot 

“because the juvenile court lacked jurisdiction to rule on any 

collateral dispute of the termination order.” (K.M., supra, 

242 Cal.App.4th at p. 457.) After quoting section 366.26, 

subdivision (i)(1), the court explained, “[T]he juvenile court 

lacked jurisdiction to consider SSA’s belated remedial ICWA 

efforts because it was in substance a collateral attack on the 

termination order. Compliance with the ICWA is required before 

terminating parental rights. [Citation.] Moreover, if the new 

evidence revealed K.M. was an Indian child, as defined by the 

ICWA, the juvenile court would have been required to invalidate 

prior orders taken in violation of the ICWA, i.e., reverse the 

termination of parental rights. [Citation.] Section 366.26, 
15

subdivision (i), clearly states juvenile courts lack jurisdiction to 

modify or revoke an order terminating parental rights.” (K.M., at 

p. 458.) “SSA’s new evidence and the juvenile court’s 

postjudgment order,” the K.M. court concluded, “have no 

relevance to the subject of this appeal, i.e. review of the 

termination order.” (Id. at p. 459.) Rather, once SSA’s ICWA 

errors had been pointed out in the parents’ opening briefs, the 

court wrote, the most expeditious and efficient way to have solved 

the problem would have been for the parties to stipulate to a 

limited reversal and an expedited remittitur. (Id. at p. 458.) 

Other than the Department’s attempt to use a motion for 

judicial notice rather than a motion to take evidence pursuant to 

Code of Civil Procedure section 909 to present its postjudgment 

ICWA efforts as grounds for dismissing the appeal as moot, the 

case at bar differs from K.M. only because the Department, 

unlike SSA, did not ask the juvenile court to review the last 

minute information and determine whether “proper and adequate 

further inquiry and due diligence” had been conducted, as 

required by section 224.2, subdivision (i)(2), for a finding that 

ICWA does not apply. (See In re Y.W., supra, 70 Cal.App.5th at 

p. 552; see also In re K.R. (2018) 20 Cal.App.5th 701, 709 [“the 

court has a responsibility to ascertain that the agency has 

conducted an adequate investigation and cannot simply sign off 

on the notices as legally adequate without doing so”].) Omitting 

that statutory step does not justify a different outcome. The 

purpose of the Department’s further interviews of M.B.’s 

maternal relatives, like the additional efforts in K.M., was to 

correct errors in the earlier ICWA investigation. If information 

had been developed that required new notices be sent to the 

Blackfeet Tribe or the Bureau of Indian Affairs—for example, 
16

because the Department learned the birthdates of Lonnie B., Sr., 

whom Liah had identified as “definitely Indian,” or the maternal 

grandfather, Lonnie B., Jr.—the juvenile court would have 

confronted the same dilemma identified by the K.M. court: An 

order made in violation of ICWA would be invalid; yet, by virtue 

of section 366.26, subdivision (i)(1), the juvenile court lacked 

jurisdiction to vacate its order terminating parental rights in 

order to permit ICWA compliance.

Rather than attempt to moot Liah’s appeal by belatedly 

conducting the investigation required by section 224.2, the 

Department’s proper course of action was to stipulate to a 

conditional reversal with directions for full compliance with the 

inquiry and notice provisions of ICWA and related California 

law—a procedure the Department has used in many ICWA 

appeals pending before us. 

3. The Department Failed To Conduct an Adequate Inquiry 

into M.B.’s Possible Indian Ancestry

As the Department implicitly conceded by conducting 

additional interviews with several of M.B.’s maternal relatives 

after Liah filed her opening brief on appeal and by arguing in its 

respondent’s brief only that those further interviews mooted 

Liah’s ICWA claims, rather than contending its inquiries before 

the section 366.26 hearing satisfied its obligations under ICWA 

and California law, the Department failed to conduct an adequate 

inquiry into M.B.’s possible Indian ancestry before the court 

terminated Liah’s parental rights. In particular, as Liah argued, 

the Department failed to contact M.B.’s maternal grandmother, 

did not determine whether the maternal grandfather was 

available for an interview and did not ask ICWA-related 

questions of the maternal great-aunt (the maternal grandfather’s 
17

sister) who had been identified as M.B.’s prospective adoptive 

parent. Although notices were sent to the Blackfeet Tribe of 

Montana, the Bureau of Indian Affairs and the Secretary of the 

Interior, as ordered by the juvenile court, those notices were 

missing required information, including Lonnie B., Sr.’s 

birthdate—information that may well have been available from 

accessible maternal relatives (including Lonnie B., Sr.’s daughter 

Shenika), even if Lonnie B., Sr. declined to provide it.

For its part, the juvenile court failed to ensure the 

Department adequately investigated M.B.’s Indian ancestry, 

passively accepting the Department’s reports as fulfilling its 

statutory obligations without questioning the extent of the 

interviews conducted or the nature of the follow-up, if any, 

pursued by Department personnel. Far more is required. 

(See, e.g., In re T.G., supra, 58 Cal.App.5th at p. 293 [“[t]he court 

here fulfilled its initial obligation to ask about Tamara’s possible 

Indian ancestry; it failed, however, to ensure the Department 

complied with its duty of further inquiry based on the responses 

the court had received from Tamara and Loretta S.”]; In re N.G.

(2018) 27 Cal.App.5th 474, 482.)
18

DISPOSITION

The May 13, 2021 order denying Liah’s section 388 petition 

is affirmed. The August 31, 2021 section 366.26 order 

terminating Liah’s parental rights is conditionally affirmed. The 

matter is remanded to the juvenile court for full compliance with

the inquiry and notice provisions of ICWA and related California 

law and for further proceedings not inconsistent with this 

opinion.

PERLUSS, P. J.

We concur:

SEGAL, J.

FEUER, J. 
Filed 6/29/22

CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION SEVEN

In re M.B., a Person Coming 

Under the Juvenile Court Law.

 B312789

 (Los Angeles County

 Super. Ct. No. 

 18CCJP03577A) 

LOS ANGELES COUNTY 

DEPARTMENT OF 

CHILDREN AND FAMILY 

SERVICES,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

LIAH B.,

Defendant and Appellant.

ORDER MODIFYING 

OPINION AND 

CERTIFYING OPINION 

FOR PUBLICATION

(NO CHANGE IN 

APPELLATE JUDGMENT)

THE COURT: 

The request for modification, filed by plaintiff and 

respondent, is granted in part. It is ordered that the opinion filed 

herein on June 13, 2022 be modified as follows: 

1. On page 1, “Affirmed in part, reversed in part and 

remanded with directions” is deleted and the following is inserted

in its place: 

Affirmed in part, conditionally affirmed in part and

remanded with directions. 
2

2. On page 3, in the first full paragraph, a period and the 

word “We” is inserted after the word “issue,” and the word 

“reverse” is changed to “affirm,” so the paragraph reads: 

As did our colleagues in Division Three of the Fourth 

Appellate District in In re K.M. (2015) 242 Cal.App.4th 450 

(K.M.), which involved a similar effort by the child 

protective services agency to remedy its deficient ICWA 

investigation while an order terminating parental rights 

was on appeal, we reject the argument that evidence of 

postjudgment ICWA inquiries moots the issue. We

conditionally affirm the order terminating Liah’s parental 

rights and remand the matter for full compliance with the 

inquiry and notice provisions of ICWA and related 

California law.

3. On page 13, at the end of the full paragraph 

“(K.M., supra, at pp. 457-458.)” is deleted and following is 

inserted in its place: 

(K.M., supra, at pp. 457-458; contra, In re Allison B. (2022) 

79 Cal.App.5th 214 [finding appeal from order terminating 

parental rights moot based on postappeal evidence that 

agency had belatedly made the required ICWA inquiries].) 

The opinion in this case filed June 13, 2022 was not certified 

for publication. It appearing the opinion meets the standards for 

publication specified in California Rules of Court, rule 8.1105(c), 

the request by appellant’s counsel pursuant to California Rules of 

Court, rule 8.1120(a) for publication is granted. 

IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that the opinion meets the 

standards for publication specified in California Rules of Court, 

rule 8.1105(c); and 

ORDERED that the words “Not to be Published in the 

Official Reports” appearing on page 1 of said opinion be deleted 

and the opinion herein be published in the Official Reports.
3

There is no change in the appellate judgment. 

____________________________________________________________

PERLUSS, P. J. SEGAL, J. FEUER, J.