1 Andr ews was also re ferr ed t o by t he mi ddle nam e “Mari e” at tim es i n the di strict

co ur t . S he was sued “i

ndi vi dually and as purported tru stee o f an all eged LCS Tru st” but, because he r noti ceof ap pe al d o es no t men t io n he rca pa cit y as t rus t ee , t his ap pe al is t ak en o nly in he r ind ivid ua l ca pa cit y. 

### TEXA S COU RT O F AP PEAL S, THIR D DISTRIC T, AT AU STIN

44444444444

4444 NO. 03-01-00402-CV

44444444444

4444 Des sie Ma ri a Andr

ewsand Da n Par

khur st, App el lan ts v. Timothy C. Smith, Independent Executor of the E state of

Will iam F . Baska, De cease d, Appellee

FROM THE DISTRICT CO URT OF BURNET COUNTY, 33RD JUDICI AL DISTRICT NO. 20,80 8 HONORA

BLE GUILF ORD L. JON ES, III, JUD GE PR

ESIDING
De ss ie Mari a An

drews 1 and Dan

Parkhurst appeal

fr o m a defau lt jud gment favo ring Timot hy C. Sm i th , the i n de pen den t ex ecutor of th e E sta te of Wi ll ia m F . Baska. Parkhurst hasnot fi le d a b rief ; h e h as th er eb y wai v ed al l com pl ai n ts . See Tex. R. App. P. 38.8(a)(3). An drews contends that the

di stri ct courtlacke d jur isdict ion, er re d b y f i n di n g th at A n dr ew s h ad a f i du ci ar y du ty to Sm i th , a n d erre d b

y aw ardi n g p rop er ty to Sm i th . We af f i rm th e j udgm

en t. BACKGROUND Baska di ed on Marc h 25 , 2001 a

t hi s home

i n Sp i cewood, B urn et Coun ty, Te xa s. In his wi l l , Baska n

am ed Sm i th h i s sol e h ei r and the i nde pen den t exe cutor of h

i s estate.2 The original petition stat ed that “Pl ain tiff is th e E sta

te of Wi ll ia m F . Baska, Deceased, repre sentedhe re in by and thr ou gh T IMO TH Y C. SMI TH , I ndep ende nt Exe cut or . . . . ” Smit h, ac t ing a s ind ep end ent exe cu t o r fo r t he E st at e, lat er re pla ce d t he E st at e a s na med pla int iff. 2 Baska’s estate2 sue d P ar khur st and And re ws, individually and aspur porte d tru ste e of t he al le ged LCS Trust, seekin g recovery of

mone y, property, and l

and that Smi th all eged they had taken im pr op er ly be fore and a fter Bas ka’s deat h. Smith all eged t hat Andrew s, act ing as Baska’s fi nan ci al adv i sor, b re ach ed

a f i du ci ar y du ty to Bask a b y str uc turi n g b an k acc oun ts so t ha t she co uld transfer f unds f rom Baska’ s accounts i

nto accounts she controlle d as part of the LCS Trust, whi ch Sm i th al l eg es to b e a f i cti on . Sm i th further al le ged that appe l l an

ts c on v er ted th e p er son

al pr operty of Ba sk a b y re mov i n g th e p rop er ty from hi s hom e after hi s death. Smi

th sought to set asi de a

deed t ra nsferr ingrea l e state from Baska to the LCS Trust; Smi th all eged the deed sh

ould be set asi de because the LCS Trust did not exi st, Baska was not men tall y c ompetent when

he si gned the deed, t he LC S Tru st d

i d n ot pa y con si de rati on f ort he de ed , an d t he T rus t o bt ain ed t he de ed in vi ol ati on of Andrews’s fiduci ar y dut y as a financial co nsult ant . S mith so ught exemplar y damage s and att or ney’s f ees , as w el

l as a tem porary i nj unc tion requi ri ng th e return of personal

propert y a

nd m oney and the n on-in terference wi

th Smi th’s use of

the real e state. On May 10 , 2 001 , a fte r a hear ing at which all part ies a ppea red, th e di stri ct court granted a te m por ar y i n j un cti on . It r es trai n ed A n dr ew s a n d P ar kh ur st f r o m dis po sin g, s el

l i ng , or hi di ng an y of t he pe rso nal pr op er t y li

st ed in S mith’s p et itio n. It rest rain ed them from transferri ng, dis posin g, convey in g, or movin

g fun ds hel d in the nam e of LCS Trust whi

ch origi nated from

Baska. It also re st ra ined t hem fro m tak ing po sses sion o f, exe rc ising contro l ove

r, tr ansf errin g, or co nveying t he re al est at e. The court ordered t hem t o su rr en de rBa sk a’ s p er so na l pr o pe r t y t o Smit h in h is r o le3

as executor by

May 11, 2001, an

d ordere d S m

i th t o pr es er ve t he pr o pe r t y du r ing t he pe nd en cy o f t his su i t. It also ordered An

drews to acco unt, by

May 24, 200 1, for all of Bas ka’ s funds dep os ited in the account s. Al leging tha t An dre wsdi d n ot com pl y wi th th e ord er to tu rn ove r th e p ers on a l pr o pe r t y, Smi

th so u ght to enf

orce the injunction. A

fter she f ai le d to appear at the June 14, 2001 heari ng, the di stri ct c ourt on

Ju ne 21, 200 1 s i gned

an orde r of atta ch men t of he r pe rs on f ora hea ring on Jul y 2, 2001 reg ard

i ng con tem pt c ha rge s. On J

une 2 9, 2 001 , h owe ve

r, A nd rew s f i l ed a n oti ceof i n ter l ocu tory appe al f rom th e J un e 2 1 order of

atta ch men t. While he r in terlocuto ry appea l of the order o f attachm

ent was pendi

ng, the di strict courtproceeded to consider the meri ts of the underl

yi ng cause. The j udgment re ci tes th at b oth An drews an d P ar kh ur st we r e d uly and properl

y noti f i ed of the tri al , but n ei ther a ppea red. The di strict court rendered a def

aul t judgm ent in fav or o f Sm ith. The c ourt found the f oll owing:

< that t he LC S Trust was null and v oid an d did n ot exi st by

la w;

< that And r ew s w as in

a fiduciar y relat ionship w ith Ba ska and t hat she comm itted constructive f

raud by breach in g that relations

hi p;

< tha t Andr ews and Par khur st co nvert ed pe rso nal pro per ty belonging t o B aska ;

< that an y pr o pe r t y held in t he na me of th e L CS Tru st th

at or i gi n al l y b el on ge d to Ba ska w as

ac tua l l y su bj ec t to the

l eg al con trol of Smi th, as execut or of Baska’s estate;

< t hat a po wer of a t t or ney fro m Bask a held by Andr ews was void ; and

< that an

y doc um en ts b y wh i ch A n dr ew s pur

por te d to use that power t o convey Baska’s propert y were void.4

The court accordin

gly set aside t he de ed t ra nsferr ing re al est at e fro m Bask a t o t he LCS Tr ust and decl ared a l is t o f persona

l property (that the court had previ ously ordered A

n dr ew s a n d P ar kh ur st to surrender to Smi th as in dependen t executor) bel

onged to t he Estate. The court ordered A n dr ew s to pay $47 ,3 32. 44 t o S mith as inde pend ent exec ut or . I t awa rd ed S mith, as i ndepen dent executor, $8400 in attorn ey ’s f ee s ow ed j oi ntl y by A nd rew s a nd Par kh urst, wi th a ddi ti ona l f ee s f orappeals. The

court awarded Smi th, as in dependen t executor, $200,000 from A ndrews an

d $10,000 f

rom Pa r kh ur st in exem pl ar y da mag es . Th

e j udgm en t also c on tai n ed v ari ous pr ov i si on s f or i ts e n f orc em en t. An drews and Park hur st then f i l ed n otice s of appe al f rom th e f i na l j udgm en t. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS Ge ne r ally, a mo t io n fo rne w t r ial is a pr er eq uis it e t o ch alle ng ing a p o st - an sw er de fau lt j udgm en t. SeeTex . R. Ci

v. P. 324(b )( 1). In that motion, the defe ndan t must show (1) that her failure t o a ppe ar at t rial was not intent ional, or t he r es ult of consci ous in dif feren ce on her part, but was due to a m

is take or accident; (2) that she h as a m eritorious de f

en se ; a nd (3) tha t the gra nti ng of her motion wil l occas i on n

o delay or otherwise w ork an

i nj ury to the pl ai ntif f . American Paging of Tex., Inc. v. E

l Paso Paging, Inc. , 9 S.W.3d 237, 240 (T ex. App .—E l Paso 199 9, no pet .) ; see also Cl iff v. Huggins , 724 S.W.2d 778, 778 (Tex . 19 87) ; Craddock v. Sunshine Bus Lines, Inc. , 133 S.W.2d 124 , 12 6 (T ex . 19 39) . The c l erk ’s rec ord i n th i s c as e doesnot c onta

i n a moti on f ornew trial di rected at the d ef aul t ju dgm en t. The reporter’s recor d from the trial does contain

a signed recei

pt of certif ie d ma il contain in g noticein

form in g An drews of the trial

setting. An

drews does not att em

pt to prov e th

at h er f ai l ur e to a pp ea r a t th e tr i al setti n g w as du e to m i sta ke or a cc i den

t. An drews inste ad c hallenges t he j uri sdi cti on of the d i stri ct court. Such f

undam ental errors can be rai sed f or the f i rst ti me on a ppea l . See Central Educ. Agency v. Burke , 711 S.W.2d7,5

8 (Tex. 1986). Andrewsco nt ends t hat Smith’s claims wer e incident t o a n est at e and t ha t ac co r din gly the p robate c ourt, not the di stri ct court, ha

d j uri sdi cti on ove r the Es tate’s clai m s. But f or th e i n v ol v em en t of th e E sta te , t he dist rict co ur t undisp ut edly wo uld have j urisd i cti on an d w oul d b e the p rope

r cou rt f or thi s acti on. “ Di stri

ct C ourt j urisd

i cti on c ons i sts

of excl usi ve, appell ate, and origin

al j urisdiction of all

actions, pro ceedings, and rem edies, except i

n cases wh ereexcl

usi ve, appel la te, or o rigi

nal jurisdi ction m

ay be conf erredby this Constitution or ot her law on som e oth er cou rt, tribun al , or ad mi

ni strative b ody.” Tex. Const. art. 5, § 8. The Texas Consti tution c onfers e xc lus ive jur isd ict io n o n ju st ice co ur t s fo rsu it s in w hic h t he amo un t in co nt roversy

i s $20 0 or l ess . SeeT ex . Co nst . ar t . 5, § 1 9. T his le av es t he dis t r ic t co ur t s w it h j urisd i cti on o ve rsu it s inwhi ch

the a mount i n c ontrove

rsy i s m ore than $200. See Arteaga v. Jackson , 994 S.W.2d 342, 342 (Tex. App.—T exarkana 1999, pet. deni ed). The dis trict court cl early

had subj ect matte

r j uri sd i cti on ov er th e s ui t. The questi on is

whether t he fili ng o f the will fo rpr o ba t e in t he co unt y cou rt made t he co unt y cou rt t he exc lusive for um for all act ions r elat ed t o t he prob ateof t he will. Th e L eg i sl atu re h ascon f erred on cou n ty cou rtsth e g en

er al j uri sd i cti on of a p rob ate co ur t. Tex. Prob. Code Ann. § 4 (West Supp. 2002). T he county court “sh

al l . . . tran sact al l busi ness ap pe r t ain ing t o es t at es su bje ct t o ad minist r at io n, inc lud ing t he se t t le m en t, par t itio n, a nd di stri bu ti on of such estates.” Id. In

cou n ty co ur t s, “a ppe rt aining

t o e st at es” includes “all claim s by oragai nst an estate. ” Id. § 5A (a). In coun tie s su ch as B urn et i

n w hi ch there i s n o statutory c ourt exer cisingprobate juri sdi ction, “al l a ppli cations, pe ti ti on s, a nd mo t ions r ega rd ing pr oba t e and administr at ions shal

l b e fi le d and he ar d in t he co unt y cou rt ,” exce pt when t he cou n ty cou rt e l ec ts to transfer contested pro ceedi

ngs to a distri ct court. See id. § 5(b ). Te st at or s ap po inting inde pend ent6

ex ecutorsma

y do as Ba ska did and dire ct t hat no a ct ion be ha d in co unt y cou rt in relat ion t o t he set t lement o f t he e st at e o t her t han t he p ro bat ing a nd r ec o rd ing o f t he w ill and t he r et ur n o f a statutory i nv en tory, a pprai sem en t, and l i st of c l ai

m s of the e state. See id. § 14 5(b). Th at s ec ti on goe s on to prov i detha t, wh en an i nd ep en de nt e xe cu tor h asbe en

ap poi nte d, “ f urth er a cti on o f an y nat ur e s ha ll not be had in the c ou nt y cou rt exce pt wher e t his Co de s pec ifi cally and ex plic it ly pr o vid es fo rso me action i n the county

court .” Id. § 145(

h). We ha ve i nterpreted t he Co de t o mea n t hat t he dist rict and c ou nt y cou rt s have co ncur re nt j uri sd

i cti on , w i th the c ounty

court ha vi ng d omi na nt j uri sdi cti on. SeeGreen v. Watson , 860 S.W.2 d 238, 2 42-43 (Tex . Ap p.— Austin 1993 , no pet .) (c ons ider ing st at ut or y cou nt y and pr ob ate courts). But see Es tate of Torr ance v. Sta te , 8 12 S .W. 2d 3 93, 396 (T ex. Ap p. —E l Paso 1991, n o wr

i t) (n o con cu rre n t j uri sd i cti on b etw een di str i ct a n d c oun ty cou rtsf or m atte rs de al i n g w i th proba te). Wh en face d with s im

il ar assertions tha

t th e d i str i ct c our t l ac ke d j uri sd

i cti on to ad j udi ca te a dis pute because of the pen denc y of a p ro bat e pr oc eed ing in a co nst itu t ional co unt y cou rt , t he Corpus Ch

ri sti courthe l d tha

t the distri ct court ha

d j uri sdi cti on. See Car

roll v. Ca rroll, 893 S.W.2d 62, 66 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christ i 199 4, no pet.) ( origi nal sui t regarding l

and title appropriately

fi le d in distr ict co urt ); Cf. Herbst v. Shepp ard , 995 S.W.2d 310, 313-14 (T ex. App.—Corpus Chri sti 1999, pe t. de nie d) ( su it r eg ar din g c laim agai nst estate tri ed i

n di stri ct court af

ter trans f er f rom c ounty

court not ba rred b y Proba te Code s ection 145 ). Becaus e th i s s

ui t wa s f i l ed i n th e d i str i ct c our t an d p er tai n ed to th e e sta

te be in g ind ep en de nt ly

adm in is tered in the c ounty court, t he co unty court had d ominant jurisd ictio n. T he dis trict cou rt al so h ad j urisd i cti on, bu t m i gh t ha ve ha d to de f er to th e c oun ty cou rt’ s do minant3 Thi s i s true, even th oug h th e c oun ty cou rt c oul d h av e transf er re d th e p roc ee di

n g b ac k to t he di stri ct c ourt u nd er P rob ateCode s ec ti on

5(b ) a n d m i gh t h av e h ad to tra n sf er i t un der Pr ob ate Co de se ct io n 1 45 ( b) in o r de rfo rt he ca se t o co me t o t r ial. 7 jurisdi ction ha

d a pl ea i n ab atemen

t asserting s

uch b een fi le d i n th i s s ui t. 3 See Curtis v. Gibbs , 511 S.W.2d 263 , 2 67 ( Te x. 197 4) . U nder t he do ct rine o f do minant jur isdict ion, “[a] ny su bse qu en t su it involvingt he sa me par t ies and t he sam e controversy m

ust be di sm

is sed if a party to th at suit calls the sec ond c ourt ’s attention to the pendency of the prior suit by a plea in abatement .” Id. ( emp ha sis adde d). There i s no pl ea

in abatem ent in the cl erk’s record. Even assum in g that the county court had do minantj uri sdi

cti on ove r thi s su i t, the distri ct courtdid no t er r by exercisi ng i ts jurisdi ction because A n dr ew s n ev er i n v oke d th e c oun ty cou rt’ s d om i n an t j uri sd i cti on b y f i l i n g a pl ea i n ab atemen

t. An drews al so argues that t he court never obt ained p ow er ove r t he pro pert y b ecause it wa s ow n ed b y th e L CS Tru st, wh

i ch wa s n ot a p ar ty to t his suit . As dis cussed ab ove, the district courthad s ubject -mat t er jurisd ictio n. V enu e was pr ope r i n B urn et C oun ty ba se d on the l oca ti on al le ged for t he r eal est at e, t he co nver sion, and the b reach of f i duci ary duty . SeeTex . Ci

v. Pra c. & Re m. Co de Ann . §§ 15 . 00 2( a) ( 1) ( “law su it s s ha ll be b r o ug ht : ( 1) in t he co un t y in wh ich all or a substantial

part o f the ev

ents or omis si ons gi

vi ng ri se to t he cl

ai m occurred”) & 15.011 (“ A cti ons f or recovery of real propert y or an es

tate o r in terest in real

pr o pe r t y . . . to remove

en cu m br an ce s f rom t he titl e to real property . . . shal l be broug ht i n the coun

ty i n w hi ch al l or a part of t he pr o pe r t y is located.”) (West Supp. 2002). The removal of the personal

propert y f

rom Burnet

Co unt y pur sua nt t o t he alle ge d w r o ng do ing did no t inva lida t e v en ue in Burnet County. The district court in Burnet Cou n ty had jur isdict ion and wa s th e p rop er v en ue . C on tra ry to An drews’s contention, the distri ct court acc ordi

ngl y had j uri sdi

cti on to i ssue a tem

porary restrai ni ng order.4 The def in ition of personal

representative i

ncl udes indepe ndent ex ecutor. SeeTe x. P ro b. Code A nn . § 3(aa ) (We st Supp . 2002) . 8 An drews argues thatth e s

ub sti tuti on of Sm i th for the Est ate in the style of the case dis mi ssed the Estate. An

estate, h owev er, cann

ot sue or be sued ex

cept thro ugh i

ts representative. Price v. Estate of Anderson , 522 S.W.2d 690, 691 (Tex. 1975). Smi th partici pated from the outset of t he case in his ca pa cit y as ex ec ut o ro f t he E st at e, va lida t ing t he inc ep t io n a nd co nd uc t o f t he su it by the Esta te; the res ty l i ng of the ca se mere l y ad opte d the p rop er s tyl

e. See Dueitt v. Du eitt , 802 S.W.2d 859, 861 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1991, no pet.). The replacem ent of the Estate as a pa r t y by S mit h in h is r ep r es en t at ive ca pa cit y in t he st yle o f t he ca se did not, as Andrews contends, ne gate th e ca

use of a cti on. An drews argu es that Smi

th lacked st anding to make claims on Baska’s beh alf. Sm i th was not maki

ng cl ai ms as an i ndi vi dual , but as the representativ e of Baska’ s estate. As personal re pr ese nt at iveof the estate, 4 Smi th was requi

redto “use ordi

nary dil ige nce to coll ect all claim

s and de b ts du e th e e sta te a n d to rec ov er

pos se ss i on

of al l pr ope rty of the es tate to whi

ch i ts owne rs have cla im or t itle.” Te x. P ro b. Code Ann . § 233(a) (West Supp. 2002). The Code al so provides that “[s] uit s for t he re cov

er y of pers on al pr ope rty , de b ts, or d am

ag es an d sui ts f or ti tl e or p oss es si

on of l an dsor f or an y righ t atta ch ed to orgrowi

ng out of the sa me or f or i n j ur y or d am ag e don e th

er eto ma y be i ns ti tuted by executors

oradm in is trat ors appointed i

n thi s state . . . .” Id. § 23 3A . Sm i th n ot o nly ha d s t an din g t o mak e c laims o n be ha lf of Bas ka ’s

es tate , hi s rol e a s i

nd ep en de nt e xe cu tor required that he do so under the ci rcumstances he

percei ved. Smi th’s role a s i

nd ep en de nt e xe cu tordefea ts Andrews’ s clai

m that she c ou ld no t be liable to hi m b ecause sh

e had n o fiduci ary duty

to ward hi m. Sm ith does n ot cl ai m that An drews owed9

hi m a d uty . He cl ai m s on be ha l f of Ba sk a’ s e sta te th at A n dr ew s b re ach ed a f i du ci ar y du ty owe d to Baska, and thereb

y de priv ed Baska (and acco rdingly

the est ate ) o f prop ert y. Andrews’s cl ai m that she owe s a

f i du ci ar y du ty only to the ben

efi ci ary of the estate may

be true withi

n he rrole as trustee; that do es no t pr ev en t he rfr o m als o ha ving ha d a fidu cia ry res pon si bi li ty to Baska as his f

in anci al adv i sor. An

drews qu es t io ns w he t he rt he affid av it pr es en ted to the c ourt supported

a tem porary re st ra ining

order (“TRO”). This ch al le nge i s m oot becau se the tem

po ra ry re st ra ining or der is no longe ri n e f f ect. See Hermann Hosp. v. Tran , 730 S.W.2d 56, 57 (Te x. A pp. —H ous ton

[14th D i st.] 1987, no writ) (TRO expi redby its own ter ms rendered m oo t). The district cour t signed the TRO on A pri l 25 , 20 01 . Th

e T ROwa s s et to ex

pi re u pon f urth er or de r of the court or o peration of l aw; such orders l ast onl y f ourteen day s un l ess the c ourt exten

ds the ti me. SeeTex. R. C i

v. P. 680 . T he court d id n o t ex t en d t he t ime. Ra t he r , t he co ur t he ld a he ar ing an d, o n Ma y 10 , 20 01 , sig ned a tem porary in jun ction. That

injunct ion co nt inued in effec t unt il f ur t her or der of t he cour t. On August 6, 2001, th

e court h el d a trial an d, o n Septem b er 28 , 20 01 , the c our

t si gn ed th e f i n al j udgm en t. The tem porary injunct ion ac co rd ingly i s moo t . And re ws d oe s no t asse rt t hat any harm fro m the tem porary restraini ng order persists; she n

ever com pli ed wit h it o r t he t empo ra ry injunct ion. Because subs equ ent o r de r s, su pp o r t ed by evi denc e, sup plant ed t he T RO, Andr ews ’s co mplaint abo ut t he ev i den ti ar y su pp ort f or th e T ROi s m

oot. An drews also a sk s w

h eth er th e L CS Tru st h

as cl ai m ov er th e p rop er

ty su perior to Sm i th ’s cl ai m . To prove c on

v er si on , a pl ai n ti f f m us t prov e th

at (1) t he pla int iff o wn ed o rha d le ga l pos se ss i on of th e p rop er

ty or en ti tl em en t to po sses sion; (2 ) t he de fendant unlawfu lly and w itho ut aut hor izat ion as sumed and exerci sed dom i n i on an d c on trol ov er th e p rop er

ty to t he exc lusion o f, o r inco nsist ent10

wi th the plai ntif f' s rights as a

n ow ner ; (3 ) t he plaint iff

demand ed r et ur n of t he property ; a

nd (4) the def endan t ref use d to return th

e proper ty. AppleIm port s, I nc. v. Koole , 9 45 S .W. 2d 8 95, 899 (T ex. App. —Aus t in 199 7, wr it d enied) . T he conv ersi on ca use of a cti on af f ects on l y the p erson

al property, i

nc l udi ng a truck, s ev eral

f i rearm s, a com puter, and possi

bl y other it ems ; it do es no t pe r t ain to the fun ds, whi ch are covered b

y the breach of fiduciar y dut y claim

, o r t he claim tha t t he de ed t o t he r eal pr op er t y shou ld be se t as ide . Smit h al le ged that, after Baska’s death, A ndrews an

d Parkhurst went to Baska’s house and re moved t he li stedpropert y. A

ndrews testif

ie d and presen

ted a do cum

en t at the heari

ng on the tem porary i njun cti on purport in g to show that Ba sk

a s ol d al l pers on al pr ope rty to th e L CS Tru st f

or $ 10 0. S m

i th testifi ed that he bel

ie ved that the signature on the documen t was forge d. By f

ai l i n g to res pon d to re qu ests for admissio n, And re ws is d eemed t o ha ve ad mitt ed t hat she f orged th e si

gna ture. SeeTe x. R. Civ. P. 19 8. 2( c) . Sh e is als o de eme d t o ha ve ad mit t ed t ha t Ba sk a o wn ed t he pr o pe r t y un t il his de ath and that Smi

th was en ti tl ed to i n h eri t i t. A f ter Ba sk a’ s dea th , then , the p rop er

ty b el on ge d to his estate. Th

e ev i den ce s upports the court’ s con

cl usi on tha t An drews conv erted the Es ta te’s pr o pe r t y. As discussed ab ove, Smi th, as in dependen t executor, was enti

tled an d required to att em

pt to re co ver t his pro per t y. Bas ed o n t he judg ment, t he E st at e’s r ight t o p os sess t he personal pr operty i s su peri or to that of th e LC S Trust. Andrew s al so q

ue sti ons whether th

e j udg men t on th e c onv ers i on c au se

of ac ti on enriched Smi th. She argues th at a

cou rt c an n ot award j udgm

en t b oth for propert y a

nd f or t he val ue of the p roperty . The j udgme nt in this case does not do t hat. The m oney judgm ent for $47,332.44 relatest o fu nds t ra nsferr ed in bank acc ou nt s. T he mone y judgment is not co mpensa t ion fo r t he personal propert y tha

t t he court or dered An

drews to ret urn to t he Es tate . S mith’s claim t hat t he11

fun ds and the property taken by An drews bel ong to the E st at e wa s unr ebutted because A ndrews chose not t o a ppe ar at t he t rial t o r ebut his evidenc e. The courtha s n ot awarde d a doub l e rec overy f ort he pr op er t y. Altho ugh t he judgm ent ma y e ven tuall y i ncrease Sm

ith’ s weal th, it does not enrich hi m unjustl y und er the evi den ce pre sen ted. An drews argues i

n the concl

udin g paragraph

of h er b rief th at B aska

de eded pr operty to the LC S Trust begi

nn i ng i n 1997bas ed on an

agreem ent negotiated b

y Sm i th’ s a ttor ney. S he contends that Baska di si

nhe rited Sm ith af ter Smi th denied Baska acce ss to a t ruck Baska ha d assi gned to hi m. The se contentions

are not support ed by

the record. Because An

drews fa il ed to appear at t he t rial, t he o nly evidence in t he re cord suppor ts th e j udgm en t re ga rd i n g th e p rop er ty of th e E sta te. W e r es ol

v e a l l i ss ue s i n f av or of th e j udgm

en t. W e a f f i rm th e j udgm

en t.

Jan P. Patterson, Justice Be f ore J us ti ceK i dd, Ye akel

an d Pa tters on Af fi rmed File d: March 28, 2002 Do No t Publis

h