### IN THE COURT OF APP EALS OF TENNESS EE AT JAC KSON Ja nuary 22, 200 9 S es sio n
RODNEY MARRA
v. BANK OF NEW YORK, TRUSTE E, AND 

### PHIL IP M . K LEIN SMITH , T RU STEE
An Appeal from the C hancery Court for Faye tte County No. 14216 William C. Cole, Chancellor

No. W2008-00773-C OA-R3-C V - Filed August 4, 2009

Th is a pp e a l in vo lve s a cou rt c le rk ’s fe e fo r fa c ili ta tin g a for e c los ur e sa le

. Th e de fe nd a nt b a nk he ld

a fore closure sale of the plaintiff’s home without giving the plaintiff pr oper notice . The plaintiff the n filed this action and the sa le was se t aside. The trial court ordere d that the prope rty be re -auc tioned and appointed the cler

k and master

of the chanc ery court as a spe cial commissioner to fa cilitate the sale. At the se cond sale , the plaintiff purc hased the property. T he trial court or dere d that the cler k be aw arde d 5% of the pur chase price as his fee for se rvice s rende red in c onnection with the sale

. The bank objected, arguing t hat t he clerk’s fee was exce ssive. The trial court conducted a hearing and held that the f

ee to the c lerk wa s rea sonable. The bank appe aled, na ming the court cle rk as a n appelleein the notice of a ppeal, but failing to fil e a motion to add him as a party. The appea l was dismiss ed for lack of a final order

. On remand, the court clerk f iled a motion asking the trial court to c on fi rm

that he wa s im mun e fr om s uit a ndthat di sb ur se me nt o f his fe e wa s pr op e r. Th e c le rk a lso sought Rule 11 sanctions in the fo rm o f ap pellate attorney’s fe es against the bank’s attorne y for naming h i m as a party in the notice of a ppeal without prope rly adding him. The bank f iled two cross-motions for sanctions. The trial c ourt held that the c lerk wa s im m une fr om suit and that disbursement of the f

ee to the c lerk wa s proper

. T h e cl er k ’s m o t ion for Rule 11 sanc tions was grante d, and the ba nk’s two cr oss-motions for sanctions wer e denied. The ba nk and its attorney now appea l. We hold that the state ment of the e vidence filed by the a ppellants and not objected to by the appellee s or ruled o n b y t he trial c ourt is deemed a pproved unde r T.R.A.P. 24. Addressing the merits, we r ever se the trial c ourt’s aw ard of appellate attorney’ s fee s as sanc tions under Rule 11. All other dec isions by the trial court ar e af firmed.

Te nn. R . A pp. P . 3 App e al a s o f R igh t; Judg me nt of th e Cha nc e r y C our t i s Affir med in Part and Rever sed in Part

H OL LY M. K I RBY , J., d eli vere d the opinion of the Court, in which D AVI D R. F ARMER , J. , a ndJ. S TE VE N S TA FF O RD , J., joined.T h is a d v ic e w a s a p p a re n tly b a se d o n th e p re m ise th a t t h e p ro p e rty h a d a fa ir m a rk e t v a lu e o f $ 3 7 5 ,0 0 0 , w h ile 1

t he m or t gage ba l anc e due w as l es s t han $300, 000.

T he B ank se nt m ai l er s er r on eousl y adv er t i s i ng t hat t he s al e w ou l d t ake pl ace on A pri l 4, 200 6, w hi l e t he no t i ce 2
in a lo c a l n e w sp a p e r c o rr e c tly re p o rte d th a t t h e sa le w o u ld tak e p la c e o n A p ril 6

.

W i l s on & A s s oci at es , PLL C, w as a l s o n am ed a s a de f enda nt , but i t w as di s m i s s ed f r om t he l aws ui t by 3

ag ree m en t o f t h e p arti es.

K l ei n sm i t h , an at t o rney , ha s at al l t i m es du ri n g t h ese pro ceed i n g s represen t ed t h e B an k an d him sel f. 4

-2- Phili p M. Kleinsmith, Colorado S prings, Colorado, appe llant, pr o s e , and for

the appe llant, Bank of New Y ork.

Sam F. C ole, Jr., Memphis, Tenne ssee, f or the a ppellee, Rodne y Marr a.

William S. R hea, Somer ville, Tennesse e, for the appe llee, Vip D. Le wis.

OP IN ION

F ACT S AND P R OC EDU R A L B ACKG ROUND In May 2004, Plaintiff Rodney Mar ra ( “Marra ”) an d his wife, Jentri Ma rra , obtained a $275,000 mortgage on pr operty located at 50 Bree zy Mea dows Cove in Eads, Te nnessee (“Bre ezy Meadow s Property”) . The mortgage was later assigned to Defe ndant/Appellee Bank of Ne w York (“the Bank”). Ma

rra ’s name w as not on the dee d to the property.

On Ja nu ary 26 , 2 00 5, Ma rr a ’s wi fedie d. Af

te r h e r d e a th, Ma

rr a wi sh e d to be c ome the so le
owner of the Bre ezy Meadows Property. To this end, the Bank advised Mar ra to stop making the monthly mo r tg a g e p a y me n ts , a ll o w th e p r o p e r ty to g o in to f o r e c lo s u r e , a n d th e n p u r c h a s e the property at the ensuing for eclosuresale for the amount of the b al an ce of the mortgage plus the fore closure e xpenses. Marr a agr eed to this plan. 1

Due to an e rror

by the Bank’s attorney, Ph ilip M. Kleinsmi th (“Kle insmit h”), Ma rra was
err oneously informed that the fore closure sa le would t ake place on April 4, 2006. Marr a appe are d 2 at the courthouse on that date to purc hase the property, but no sale took plac e. Two days later, on April 6, 2006, the for eclosuresale o ccur red w ithout Marra pr esent, a nd the Bank purc hased the property for $285,974.66. A trustee’ s deed to that effe ct was r ecor ded. On June 23, 2006, the Bank filed a f orcible e ntry and de tainer ( “FED”) action to evict Ma rra from the pr operty.

On Ju ly 6 , 2 00 6, Ma

rr a fi le d th is la ws uit a ga ins t the Ba nk , a s trus te e , a nd Kl e ins mith, in h is capa c ity a s th e Ban k ’ s r e p r e s e n tati v e , to s e t a s id e th e f o r e c lo s u r e o f th e tr

u s t d e e d o n th e Breez y Meadow s Property and to obta in injunctive relief and other damage s. The Bank c oncede d that the 3 fore closure sa le was void for lack of proper notice to Marr a, and on November 21, 2006, the Bank filed a “De clar ation of Void Successor Trustee ’s Sale” to that e ffe ct. The trial court ord er ed the 4-3-

property to be re- sold by the Clerk and Master of the Chance ry Court, V ip D

. Lewis (“ Lewis”) , as the Special Commissioner, and it order ed and dir ecte d the publication o f th eju d ic ial fore closure sa le. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 35- 5-101 (2007)

.
Th e c ou rt -o rd e re d s a le of

the Br e e z y M e a do ws Pr op e rty w a s h e ld o n Mar c h 8, 200 7. Le wi s, as the Spec ial Commi ssioner, fa cilitated the sale . Marr a wa s the succe ssful bidder at t h e auc tion, purcha sing the property for $289,000. Pursuant to an or der e ntere d by the trial court on Mar ch 20, 2007, the proc eeds of

the sale w ere to be dis tributed as follows: $510 in costs, $14,450 (5% of the sale pric e) a s a fe e for

Special Commissi oner Le wis, and the ba lance of $274,050 to the Bank.
On April 9, 2007, the B ank filed an objection to the S pecia l Commi ssioner’s fee of $14,450, arguing that the f

ee “ is under these circ umstances totally unre asonable and unconstitutional.” The Bank attac hed to t he objec tion the affida vit of Phil lip Jones, a Tenne ssee attorney, who stated that he had a cted a s both attorney and tr ustee for fore closures on ma ny occa sions and that his fee for suc h service s was $550 to $750. On April, 13, 2007, the trial c ourt conduc ted a he aring on the Bank’ s objection. Afte r the he aring, the tria l cou rt conclude d that the Special Commissioner’s fe e wa s proper . The re cord on appea l does not include a transcript of t he hearing. On the same day, the trial court enter ed an order to disburse court sale funds, direc ting the disbursement of the proce eds of the sale, including the Spec ial Commi ssioner’s fe e. On May 1, 2007, the Bank f iled the first appe al in this matter. The Bank n am ed Lewis as

a n a pp e lle e in the no tic e of app e a l, in the c os t bo nd , a ndin the de sig natio n o f the re c or d f ile d w ith the trial court. Howeve r, the Bank did not file a motion to add Lewis as an appellee

. See Marra v. Bankof Ne w Yo rk , No. W2007- 01044-COA-R3-CV ( Tenn. Ct. App. Sept. 18, 2007). On May 21, 2007, t h e B an k fi led in the trial court a “Notice of No Obje ction by Appellee to Appellant’s Statement of the Evidenc e and Re quest that Chance llor Approve Same and Authe nticate the Re cord
on Appea l.” Marr a and Lewis both filed briefs in the first appea l in which both reque sted attorney’ s fee s and dama ges re sulting from the Bank’s frivolous appea l. On August 3, 2007, the Bank filed a
mo t i o n wi t h t h e appellate court reque sting that Lewis be adde d as an a ppellee, that the appea led order be declare d final, and that the reque st for attorne y’s fe es by Mar ra and Lewis be de nied. On September 18, 2007, this Court dismiss ed the Bank’s first appea l for failure to appe al a f inal order , be c aus e the tr ia l c ou rt

ha d n ot a dd re sse d th e iss ue of Ma rr a ’s da ma ge s. Th e de c isi on didno t a dd re ss the re quest for attorney’s fees by Marr a and Lewis, nor did it addre ss the Bank’s motion to include Le wi s a s a n a

pp e lle e . T he c a se wa s th e n r e ma nd e d to the tria l c ou rt

.
Af te r r e ma nd , o n N ov e mbe r 2 , 2 00 7, Le wi s f ile d a “ Mo tio n to Con fi rm Th a t V ip D . L e wi s is not a Party to the Action and to Disburse Fees.” He argued that, as S pecia l Commi ssioner, he was acting in a qua si-judicial capa city and wa s, there fore , immune from sui t and could not be added a s a party. He asked t he trial court to confirm that his fee c ould properly be distributed in accor dance with the trial court’s April 13, 2007 order . In ac cordance w ith the notice provisions of Rule 11 of the Tenne ssee Rules of Civil Procedure , Lewis noti fied Kleinsmit h that he planned to file a motion for sanctions aga inst him persona lly under Rule 11 bec ause Kleinsmith had named Lew is as an appelleein the first appe al “by methods he knew to be false, de ceptive, and abusive pra ctices and through nonsensica l underha nded mane uvers.” Lewis cla imed that he had “ expende d a great deal of tim e , e ff ort a nde xp e ns e de fe nd ing the fa lse , misle a din g, a nd frivo lou s ac tio n, wh ic h w a s to ta llyO n S e p te m b e r 4 , 2 0 0 8 , t h e tria l c o u rt e n te re d a n a m e n d e d o rd e r t h a t c o n fo rm e d to th e re q u ire m e n ts in R u le 5
58 of t he T enness ee R ul es of C i vi l Procedure

. For r eas on s un cl ear i n t he r ecor d, C hancel l or W i l l i am C

. C ol e pr es i ded

o v e r th e m o tio n to a lter o r a m e n d a n d e n te re d th e fin a l o rd e r o n a p p e a l.
-4- improper a nd cause d immense delay and needle ss c osts of litigation.” On November 30, 2007, as promised, Lew is filed the motion for s anctions against Kleinsmith. Attache d to the m otion was the aff idavit of Lewis’s c ounsel, stating that Lewis had incur red $3,300 in attorney’s fee s in defending the first appe al.

On thesa me day that Le wi s fi le d his mot ion fo r Rul e 11 sa nc tio ns , the Ba nk fi le d a c ro ssmotion for R u l e 1 1 s an cti ons against Lew is’s counsel’s law firm and its attorneys. TheBank’s cross-motion asserted that Lew i s ’s m o t ion to confirm was not wa rra nted by existing law and w as pr e se nte d f

or a n impr op e r pu rp os e

. Atta c he d to the Ba nk ’s c ro ss- mot ion wa s K le ins mith’ s a ff ida vit showing that he had a ccr ued $1
, 3 7 5 in attorney’s f ees f or dra fting and filing the motion for sanctions, or $1,875 including the t wo hours he expected to spend at the anticipated he aring on the mot ion . I n a dd iti on , o n th a t day, theBa nk ma ile d to Lew is a se c on d moti on fo r sa nc tio ns a ga ins t Lewis’s c ounsel’s law f

irm and its attorneys, alleging t h at sanctions wer e wa rra nted against them based on Le wis’s motion for sanctions, bec ause it had no legal or fac tual basis and was filed for an improper pur

pose. Upo n n o tification that the Lew is did not i ntend to withdraw his motion for sanctions, t he Bank filed the second motion for Rule 11 sa nctions on approximately De cembe r 6, 2007. Attache d to this second motion for sanctions was Kleinsmith’s aff idavit showing that he had

a c c ru e d $ 1, 25 0 ina tto rn e y’ s f e e s in dr a ft ing a ndfi lin g h is s e c on d mo tio n f or sa nc tio ns

.
O n D e c e mb e r

1 4 , 2 0 0 7 , th e tria l j u d g e , th e H o n o r ab le M ar th a B. Br a s f ie ld , c o n d ucted a hearing on all outstanding mot ions — Lewis’s motion to confirm, Lewis’s motion for sanctions, and the Bank’s two c ross-motions for sanc tions. The appellate rec ord does not include a transcript of that hearing.

On Fe br ua ry 1, 20 08 , th e tria l c ou rt e nte re d a n order

gr a nti ng Le wi s’ s mo tio n to c on fi rm , authorizing disburseme nt of the $14,450 fe e to Lew is as Special Commissi oner a n d finding that Lewis wa s immune from suit because he wa s acting as a judicial office r. The trial court also granted Lewis’s motion for Rule 11 sanctions, finding that Kleinsmith’s a ct of naming Lewis as an a ppellee in the first appe al without filing a motion t o add him as a pa rty “wa s false, misleading, a nd dece ptive.” For this offense , the trial court a war ded Le wis $4,365 in attorney’s f ees a s damage s for being re quired to def

end himself in t he first appea l. In l ight of the trial c ourt’s holdings in favor of Lewis on his two motions, the trial court denied the Bank’s two cr oss-motions for sanctions.

On February 21, 2008, Lewis filed a motion asking the trial court to enter a fina l judgment as to all claims perta ining to him. The Bank filed a motion to alter or amend the Febr

uary 1, 2008 order , asking the trial court to consider additional testimony and make further findings of f act. The Bank filed no objec tion to the entry of a f inal order as to all issues perta ining to Lewis. On Marc h 20, 2008, the trial court entere d an order denying the Bank’s motion to alter or ame nd and dire cting the entry of

a fina l judgment as to al l cl ai m s p ertaining to Lewis, pursuant to Rule 54.02 of the Tenne ssee Rules of Civil Procedure

. The Bank a nd Kleinsmith now appea l this order. 5A l t ho ug h t he order added K l ei nsm i t h as an ap pel l ant and L ew i s as an appel l ee, t he s t yl e of t he cas e r em ai ned 6
uncha nged.
-5- On Ma y 5 , 2 00 8, theBa nk a nd Kl e ins mith (c oll e c tiv e ly, “ Ap pe llants ” ) fi le d a mot ionin this Court to “Drop Parties and to Add Parties” pu rsuant to R ule 19(e ) of the T ennesse e Rules of Ap pe llate Pr oc e du re , r e qu e sti ng that th is C ou rt dr op Ma rr a a s a n a pp e lle e , a ddKl e insm it h in his individual capac ity as an appellant, and add Lewis as a n appellee . On August 12, 2008, this Court

e nte re d a n ord e r pe rm itt ing Le wi s to be ad de d as an app e lle e , but de ny ing the Ap pe llants ’ r e qu e st to dr op Ma

rr a a s a n app e lle e

. In a dd iti on , thi s Cou rt gr a nte d the Ap pe llants ’ re qu e st to d esignate Kleinsmith as an appe llant in his i ndividual capa city. 6

I S S UE S ON AP PE AL

Th e iss ue s o n a

pp e a l r a ise d b y th e Ap pe llants area s f oll ow s:
(1 ) W he the r the tr ia l c ou rt ’s a wa rd of a $1 4, 45 0 fe e to Le wi s wa s re a so na ble , w ith in

so un d ju dic ia l di sc re tio n, a ndwh e the r s uc h a wa rdwa s c on sti tut ion a l? (2) W hether

Lewis’s f

ee is a bsolute ly incontestible in any court ba sed on judicial immunit y? (3) W hether

the trial court’s denial of the Bank’s first m o t i o n for sa nctions was la wf ul? (4 ) W he the r the tr ia l c ou rt ’s sa nc tio ns imp os e d a ga ins t K le ins mith w a s la wf ul? (5) W hether

the trial court’s denial o f t h e Bank’s se cond motion for sanc tions was la wf ul? (6) W hether

this cou rt s h o u l d explain its denial of the A ppellants’ motion to drop Marr a?

A N A L Y SIS

Statem ent of the Evid ence

As a pr e lim ina ry ma tte r, Le wi s a ndMa

rr a (c oll e c tiv e ly, “ A p p e l l e e s” ) a rg ue that th e app e llate
re c or d s ub mit te d b y th e Ap pe lla nts c on ta ins no State me nt o f the Ev ide nc e in a c c or da nc e wi th R ule 24 (c ) of th e Ten ness e e Rul e s o f A pp e llate Pr oc e du re . Co ns e qu e ntl y, the y c on te ndthat w e mus t presume that the evi d en ce p rese nted to the trial court, even if taken and preserved, would have

su pp orte d th e tr ia l cou rt ’s fi nd ing s and the e xe rc ise of its so un d disc re tio n. Th e Ap pe lle e s c or re c tly
no te that, b e c aus e thi s Co urt ha s a pp e llate jurisd ic tio n o nly , “o ur re vie w p ow e r i s li mit e d to tho se fac tual and lega l issues f

or which an adequate legal rec ord has been pr eserved.” Trusty v. Robins on , No . M 20 00 -0 15 90 -C OA -R 3- CV , 2 00 1 W L 96 04 3, a t *1 (T e nn . Ct . A pp . Fe b. 6, 20 01 ); see Sherrod
v . W ix , 84 9 S.W .2 d 7 80 , 7 83 (T e nn . Ct . A pp . 1 99 2) ; Irv in v . Ci ty of Cla rk sv ill e , 767 S.W.2d 649, 65 3 (T e nn . Ct. App . 1 98 7) ; Daniel v . M e tro po lit an Gov ’t of Na shv ill e , 696 S.W.2d 8, 9-10 (Te nn. Ct. A p p

. 1 9 8 5 ). It is the duty of the appe llant to prepar e an a dequate rec ord in order to allow
me a nin gf ul re vie w on app e a l. Te nn

. R. Ap p. P. 2 4( b) ; McDonald v. Onoh , 772 S.W.2d 913, 914 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1989).Thi s doc um ent i s c apt i oned as i f i t w er e i s s ued f

r om t hi s Cour t , but i t i s s i gned by t he t r i al c our t j udge. The 7

co p y i n clu d ed i n t h e t ec h n i ca l rec o rd d o es no t h av e a “fil ed ” st am p o n i t

. F o r t h e sa k e o f d i scu ssi o n , w e ig n o re th ese (c o n tin u e d ...)
-6- The Te nnessee Rules of Appellate Procedur e re quire a n appellant to f ile a tra nscript of the trial court pr ocee dings under review. Wher e no such transc ript is available, Rule 24(c ) direc ts the appellant to pre pare a stateme nt of the evide nce:
(c ) S ta te me nt

of th e Evid en ce Wh en No Re por t, Re c it al, orTr ans c r ipt Is Available. If no stenogr aphic r eport, substantially verbatim recital or transcript of the evidenc e or pr ocee dings is available, the a pp el l an t s h all prepa

re a statement of the evidenc e or proce edings from the best available means, including the a ppellant’s
rec ollection. The statement should c onvey a fair, acc urate and complete acc ount of what tra nspired with re spect to those issues that ar e the bas es o f ap p ea l. The state me nt, c e rt if

ie d b y the a

pp e llant .

. . a s a n a c c ur a te a c c ou nt o f the pr oc e e din gs , shall be filed with the cler k of the trial court within 60 days afte r filing the notice of appea l. Upon filing the statement, the appellant shall simult aneously serve notice of the filing on the appe llee, ac companied by a short and plain dec laration of the issues the app el l an t i n t en ds to present on a ppeal. Proof of

service shall be filed with the cler k of the trial c ourt with the filing of the statement. I f the a ppellee ha s objections to the statement as f

iled, the appe llee shall file objections there to with the clerk of the trial court within fiftee n days af ter service of the declaration and noti ce of the filing of the state me nt. An y dif

fe re nc e s re ga

rd ing the state me nt sh a ll be se ttl e d a s se t f orth in subdivisi on (e) of this rule.

Te nn . R. Ap p. P. 24 (c ). If a state me nt o f the e vid e nc e is f ile d w iththetr ia l c ou rt , th e tr ia l ju dg e is to approve the statement of the evidenc e af ter objec tions have bee n considere d and adjudicate d. If no objections are filed wit hin the t ime limit , and the tria l court does not rule on the statement of the evidenc e within thirty days afte r t he expiration of t he ti me t o file objec tions, then the statement of the e vid e nc e “ sh a ll b e de e me d to ha ve be e n a pp ro ve d a ndsh a ll b e so c on sid e re d b y th e app e llate court . .

. .” Tenn. R. App. P . 24(f) . If an appellant intends to file ne ither a transcript nor a statement of the e vidence , the appellant is require d to “file with the clerk of the trial c ourt and serve upon the appelleea notice that no transcript or statement is to be filed . . . .” T enn. R. App. P. 24(d).

In this case , the re cord c o n tains sever al filings relating to the re quirements of Rule 24( c). On April 9, 2008, the Appellants filed a document entitl ed “Designation of Rec ord on Appe al; Issues on Appea l, and; [sic] St atement of the Unre ported Evidenc e.” T his document does not desc ribe the evidenc e submitted at the hea ring below; instead, it appe ars to summarize the trial court’s ruling. On April 17, 2008, Lew is filed an objec tion to the Appellants’ designation of the rec ord; there is no indication in the rec ord that Lewis’s objection was addre ssed by the t rial court. On or ar ound May 15, 2008, the trial judge signed a document entitled “Court’ s Statement of the Evidenc e,” quoting a portion of the trial court’s order stating that Lewis’s “f ee w as automatica lly calculate d at 5% of the sale pric e of rea l estate . . . .” On May 19, 2008, the A ppellants filed a doc ument entitled “Rule 24, 7(

. . . cont i nued) 7
i rreg u l arit i es b ec au se th ey d o n o t affe ct o u r an aly si s.

O n D ec em ber 12, 2008, t he A ppel l ant s fi l ed a m ot i on f or dam age s i n t hi s Cour t pur s uant t o Tenne s s ee Code 8
A n n o t at ed § 27-1- 122, a r gui ng t hat t he A ppel l ee s ’ oppos i t i on t o t he appe al ba s ed on t he l ac k of a s t at em ent of

t he

e v id e n c e w a s fr iv o lo u s. T h is m o tio n is n o n m e rito rio u s a n d is h e re b y d e n ie d

. -7- TRCP Designations,” notifying the court and the opposing parties that no transcript of the tria l court proce edings existed, and that the Appellants had “ no statement of the e vidence to submit .”
Notwithstanding the Appellants’ notice that no stateme nt of the evide nce w ould be filed, on June 4, 2008, the Appe llants filed a “(A) St atement of the Evidence or Proce eding and ( B) Issues,” purporting to “ame nd” or “ supplement” their initial filing. This Stateme nt of the Evidenc e derived from Kleinsmith’s “re collection fr om being a participant in all of this c ase’ s Trial Court proce edings and fr om his file copies there of.” This doc ument essentially sets out the bac kground fa cts of the

case , deli n ea tes the series of filings in the case , sets out the trial court’ s ruling, and identifies the issues raised on a

ppeal by the A ppellants. Regar ding the evidenc e submitt ed at the he aring on the
rea sonablene ss of Lewis’s f ee, the document asse rts that the Bank’s objec tion to Lewis’s fee was supported by the affidavit of attorney Phill ip Jones. In t he same document, the Appellants set out fac ts related to the trial court’s de cision on sanctions.

W e mus t f

ir st d e te rm inewh e the r the re c or d is suffi cie nt fo r this Cou rt to c on du c t a
me a nin gf ul r e vie w o f the iss ue s o n a pp e a l. A s w e have s ta te d, the Ap pe llants ma y s ub mit a statement of the evidenc e instead of a transcript unde r Rule 24(c)

. Howeve r, in or der to be a use ful substitut e for

a trial tra nscript, the stateme nt must “convey a fair, acc urate , and complete a ccount of what tra nspired [in the tria l court] with re spect to those issues that are the bases of appea l.” Tenn. R. App. P. 24(c). Neither allegations contained in plea dings, recitations of the f acts c ontained in a brief, nor argume nts of counsel qua lify as evidenc e for purposes of a

statement of the e vidence

. Sta te v . Ro be rts , 755 S.W.2d 833, 836 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1988)

.
From our revie w of the doc uments filed in this recor d, we f ind that the only document that satisfies any portion of the re quirements of Rule 24( c) is the Appe llants’ amende d Statement of the Evidence , filed in the trial court on June 4, 2008. We note that this filing was not signed by either the trial judge or c ounsel for the Appellee s. Neve rtheless, there is no indication in the rec ord that the Appellee s filed an objec tion to thi s document, and no indication that the trial court appr oved or reje cted this document as an acc urate statement of the evidenc e. Acc ording to Rule 24(f) , thirty days

a ft e r the tim e fo r o bje c tio ns ha d e xp ir e d, the a me nd e d Stat e me nt of the Ev ide nc e wa s “ de e me d to have be en appr oved.” See Richards v. Richards , No. E2005-02924- COA-R3 -CV, 2007 WL 187932, at *4 (Te nn. Ct. App. Jan. 25, 2007). There fore , to the rathe r limit ed extent to which the Statement of the Evidenc e re counts evidenc e bef ore the trial court, we wil l utilize it to address the iss ue s o n a

pp e a l. 8
Reasonableness of Special Commissioner Fee-8-

We f irst addre ss whether

the trial court abused its discretion in awa rding Lewis a

$14,450 fee for his services a s Special Commissi oner in c onducting the s econd forec losure. The trial c ourt
ma de the fo llo wi ng fi nd ing s:

Th e pa rt ie s a gr e e d that the Cle rk & Ma ste r of the Chanc e ry Cou rt of Fa ye tte Cou nty , T e nn e sse e , M r. Vi p D . L e wi s, wo uldse ll the re a l e state thr ou gh the c ou rt

. He a dvertised the pr operty, he contac ted potential buyers, he conducte d the sale, he collecte d the sale procee ds, and he disbursed all of t he procee ds exce pt his fee . The Clerk & Master pe rformed all of his duties in a prope r and le gal m an n er , and he

c on du c te d a

sa le that w a s va lid a nd le ga l. Th e re we re no ob je c tio ns by a ny pa

rty to the manner

in which the Clerk & Master perf ormed his duties. The Court appr oved the sale of

the re al estate and appr oved the f ees and expens es , wh ich included a $1 4, 45 0 f

e e to the Cle rk

& Ma ste r f

or thepe rf orma nc e of

his du tie s. Mr. Lew is was named as a Spec ial Commi ssioner to sell this property; he perf ormed his duties and wa s awa rded his fee s pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann § 8-21- 401(b)( 45) [sic] and Te nn. Code Ann. § 8-21- 801 et seq. The fe e wa s mathematica lly calculate d at 5% of t he sale price of t he real estate, $289,000.000 .

. . .

... Th is C ou rt

ga ve lit tle c re de nc e to th[ e ] a ff ida vit [o f P hil lip Jo ne s] be c aus e Mr. Jones was acting as an attorney and trustee in a fore closure sa le. He did not say that heha d e ve r a c te d a s a Spe c ia l Co mmi ssi on e r a

pp oin te d b y a

c ou rt to c on du c t a sale of r eal estate t hrough t he court. The duti es of a S pecia l Commi ssioner ar e much
more c omplicated and involved than that of a simple trustee

. The D e f e n d a n ts o b

je c te d to th e a mo u n t o f f e e s to th e Cl e rk & M a ster as Spe c ia l Co mmi ssi on e r. Th e De fe nd a nts app e a le d the a mou nt of the fe e s g rante d to the Clerk & Master

to the Court of Appea ls. At that tim e, Mr. Kle insmit h filed
sever al documents, such a s “Notice of Appe al,” “ Bond for Appe llee’s Cost on Appea l,” and “De signation of Record on Appea l, I ssue on Appea l, and Statement of the Ev ide nc e , a nd oth e r do c ume nts in bo th the tr ia l c ou rt a ndtheCou rt

of Ap pe a ls. He named Mr. Le wis as the Appe llee as though he was a party to this action. * * * It is t he amo un t of

the fe e s a wa

rd e d to Mr . L e wi s th a t Mr . K le ins mith opposes, not the perf

ormanc e by Mr. Lew is of his duties as Special Commissi oner. Th e fe e s a re su bje c t to thedis c re tio n of the Cou rt a nd are le ga l and va lid pu rs ua nt t o the statutes set out a

bove. Mr. Lewis did not write a chec k to himself for the fe es due to the appea l filed in this matter. M r

. K le in s mi thar g u e s th a t, b e c au s e M r

. L e w is d idn o t o b je c t t o th e r e c o rd at the Appe llate Leve l, he automatica lly becomes a p arty. This i s simply not the

case . Mr. Kleinsmith has never filed a proper mot ion to reque st that Mr. Lewis be made a party to this action, and, ther efor e, Mr. Le wis is not a party to this action. The Court finds that t he C lerk & Master, Mr. Vip D. Lewis, is not and cannot be made a party to this lawsuit. As a judicial off icer , he is immune from sui t. The Co u r t f in d s th a t h e is e n ti tl e d to h is f e e o f $ 1 4 , 4 5 0

. 0 0

. T h e a mo u n t was set a t theThe s t at ut e ci t ed by t he t r i al c our t , T enne s s ee C ode A nnot at ed § 8-21- 401( b) ( 45) , i s an ea r l i er ver s i on of t he 9

a p p lica b le sta tu te

. See T e n n . C o d e A n n . § 8 -2 1 -4 0 1 (b )( 4 5 ) (1 9 9 3 ).
-9- discretion of

th e Co u r t an d is w ith inth e li mi ts o f th e s tatu te s s e t o u t a

b o v e

. The Clerk & Master is her eby authorized to disburse the fee

.
Th e app lic ablestatut e re ga rd ing a fe e fo r the sa le of

re a l pr op e rty p ro vid e s: (7) For selling re al or pe rsonal prope rty under de cre e of court, and r ece iving, collecting, and paying out the proce eds, a commission not to e xcee d ten pe rce nt (10%) on the amount of sales up to six thousand dollars ($6,000), and an additional

a mou nt t o b e fi xe d w ith in s uc h li mit s, in the dis c re tio n of thec ou rt . T he c le rk

sh a ll collect th e s h e r if

f ’ s f e e , p lu s th e s h e r if

f ’ s f e e f o r e a c h a d d it io n a l d e f

e n d a n t, in a proce eding to sell rea l estate.

Tenn. Code Ann. § 8-21-401( i)(7) (2002). Though not the prover bial model of clarity, we rea d the 9 statute as authorizing a 10% f ee on the amount of a sale of property up to $6,000, plus an additional amount to be dec ided by the trial c ourt in its dis cre tion “within such limi ts,” or within 10%.

Because the statute state s that the amount of the f ee is discr etionary with the trial court, we revie w the fee awa

rd under an abuse of discre tion standard. A tria l court abuse s its dis cre tion “when its decision is not supported by the evidenc e, when it a pplies an incorre ct legal standard, [ or] whe n it r e a c he s a

de c isi on wh ic h is a ga ins t lo gic or re a so nin g th a t c aus e s a n in jus tic e to the pa

rty co m p l ai n ing.” Ow e ns v . O we ns , 241 S.W.3d 478, 496 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2007) ( citing Bi scan v. Bro wn , 160 S.W.3d 462, 468 (Tenn. 2005) ).

The trial c ourt established Lewis’s fee at 5% of the pur chase price of the prope rty at issue. This was withi n the parameter s of Section § 8-21- 401(i)(7) . In cha llenging the amount of this fee , the Bank bea

rs the burde n of proving that the tria l court abuse d its discret ion under the

c ir c ums ta nc e s. Ac c or din g to the a me nd e d St a te me nt o f the Ev ide nc e , th e Ba nk so ug ht t o c arry th is burden by submitting the affida vit of attorn ey P h i l i p J ones, who stated that the fee s for attorneys acting as truste es conduc ting forec losure sale s under § 35- 5-101ff wer e $550 to $750, far below the $1 4, 45 0 f e e a wa rd e d to Le wi s. Th e tr ial co urt st a te d s pe c if ic a lly that it

“ ga ve lit tle c re de nc e ” to Jones’s af fidavit, bec ause he “wa s acting as an atto rn ey and tr ustee in a f

orec losure sale . . . . The du tie s o f a

Spe c ia l Co mm is sione r a re muc h mo rec omp lic a te d a ndinv olv e d th a n th a t of a simple trustee.”
The Appe llants argueth at t h etr ial court’s r ejec tion of Jones’s af fidavit testimony as evidenc e that Lewis’s fee was unre asonable and constituted an a buse of discr etion beca

use no counte rvailing evidenc e wa s submitt ed to re but Jones’s af fidavit, nor wa s evidenc e s u b m i t t ed re garding the purportedly “ complicated” nature of t he sale conducte d by Lewis. They claim that the trial court was obligated to base its de cision on fac ts in the rec ord. Because no fa cts wer e prove n to show that the ta sk s p e rf orme d b y L e wi s w arr a nte d s uc h a su bs ta nti a l f

e e , th e y c la im, thetr ial cou rt erred in

app ro vin g it

.-10-

We r espec tfully disagree . The a pplicable statute gives the trial court the authority to awa rd a fe e to the cler

k and master

for his services, with the a mount to be within the trial court’s discre tion, so long as the fe e is within the statutory parameters. He re, the trial court c hose to awa rd Lew is 5% of the purc hase price of

the sale, w ell wi t hin the10% authoriz ed under the statute. The trial court
was not obliged to c redit the e xpert testimony by Jones in his affida vit. See A irlin e C onstr., I nc. v . Ba rr , 807 S.W .2 d 247 , 264 , 270 (T e nn . Ct. App . 199 0) (s ta tin g tha t an ex pe rt op ini on is m e re ly advisory, and the trial court is bound to decide the issue based on its own fair judgment). Her e, the trial court a

ppointed Lewis as a Special Commi ssioner to conduct a sa le of prope rty, afte r the initial fo re c los ur e sa le wa s mi sh a nd le d b y th e Ba nk . I n re je c tin g Jo ne s’ s te sti mon y, the tria l c ou rt fair ly noted that Jones’s opinion re lated to a sale by a trustee in an ordinary fore closure, not to the type of

sa le that to ok

pla c e in this c a se . T he tr ia l cou rt too k f urthe r n ote of

the un dis pu te d f

a c ts that L e wi s

“ a dv e rt ise d th e pr op e rty, he c on ta c te d p ote nti a l bu ye rs , h e c on du c te d th e sa le , he c oll e c te d th e sa le pr oc e e ds , a ndhe dis bu rs e d a ll o f the pr ocee ds e xc e pt h is f e e .” Th e pa

rt ie s a gr e e d th a t L e wi s “performed a ll of his duties in a proper and legal manne r, and he conducte d a sale that was va lid and legal. The re w ere no objections by any pa rty to the manner in which [Le wis] per formed his duties.” Once Jones’s expe rt testimony was reje cted as inapplicable, this left no cre dible evidenc e that the 5% fe e wa s inapp ro pria te

. Th e tria l c ou rt the re fo rec on c lud e d th a t th e Ba nk ha d f a ile d to c arry it s burden of showing that the fee was unrea sonable. Under these circ umstances, we cannot f ind that the trial court abused its discr etion in a war ding L ewis a 5% fee , which was in the middle of the ra nge of fe es authoriz ed by the statute.
The Appe llants also argue that the fe e aw arde d to Lewis co nstitut ed an unc onstitut ional deprivation of due proc ess, that the fee “shocks the consc ience ,” and that the fee is “a de nial of the
un ive rs a l se ns e of

jus tic e .” Fr om our re vie w of the state me nt of the e vid e nc e , it

app e ars that th e se argume nts were neither r aised nor a djudicated in the tria l court p ro ce ed i n g s . Any ar gument not raised in the trial court may not be first raised on appe al. Se e Ta y lor v . Be ar d , 104 S.W.3d 507, 511 (Tenn. 2003) . Moreove r, as noted a bove, the f

ee a war ded to Lew is w as well within the para meters
se t f orth i n th e app lic ablesta

tut e . Co ns e qu e ntl y, the se arg ume nts arewi tho ut m e ri t.
The Appe llants argue that the trial court e rre d in determining that Lewis’s f ee w as not contestable based on his quasi-judicia l immuni ty as a S p ec ial Commi ssioner and the Clerk and Ma ste r. Th e tr ia l c ou rt

he ld that L e wi s “ is n ot andc a nnot be ma de a pa rty to thi s la ws uit . A s a jud ic ia l of

fi c e r, he is i mmu ne fr om s uit .” Th e Ap pe llants c on c e de that Lew is is im mun e fr om s uit for hi s a c tio ns in c on du c tin g th e fo re c los ur e sa le , a ndthat hec a nn ot b e su e d f or wr on gd oin g in perf orming those acts. See Miller v. Niblack , 942 S.W.2d 533, 537-41 (Te nn. Ct. App. 19 9 7). They c laim, however , that the trial court improperly extended Le wis’s immunit y from suit to the fee

a wa rd e d to him , e sse nti a lly ins ulatin g th e fe e a ndmakin g it “ inc on te sta

ble .” Un de r the se circ umstances, they a

rgue, the trial court e rre d in relying on judicial immunit y. This argument mischa ra ct erizes the trial c ourt’s holding. The trial c ourt did not, as the Appel l an ts suggest, hold that Lewis’s immunit y rende red the fee incontestible. The tria l court

c le arl y r e c og niz e d th a t “ [i ]t is the a mou nt o f the fe e s awarde d to Mr . L e wi s th a t Mr . K le ins mith opposes, not the per formanc e by Mr. Lewis of his duties as Special Commissi oner.” Although the trial court r efuse d to add Lew is as a party defe ndant, i t fully addre ssed t he reasonable ness of the fe e, taking evidenc e and ultimately finding that the fe e wa s rea sonable. The trial court found that it wasT h o u g h th e A p p e llan ts h a v e filed a jo in t b rie f in th is a p p e a l, it a p p e a rs th a t o n ly K le in sm ith p e rs o n a lly 10 appeal s t he t r i al court ’ s gra nt of L ew i s ’ s m ot i on f or s anct i on s agai nst h i m , an d t hat onl y t he B ank rai s es t he i s s ues
re g a rd in g th e d e n ia l o f its m o tio n s fo r sa n c tio n s.
-11- not nece ssary to add Le wis as a party in order to addre ss the reasonablene ss of hi s fee , rega rdless of his immunity f

rom suit, a nd we do not disagre e. The ref ore, w e re ject the Appe llants’ argume nt that the tr ia l c ou rt ’s ho ldi ng sh ou ld b e re ve rs e d o n th is b a sis

.
Rul e 11 Sanc ti ons

The rem ai n i ng issues raised by the Appellants re late to the trial c ourt’s dec isions on the parties’ cross-motions for Rule 11 sanctions. The Appellants argue that the trial court erre d in (1) granting Lew is’s motion for Rule 11 sanctions aga inst Kleinsmit h for naming Lewis as an a ppellee in the first appe al, (2) denying the Bank’s motion for Rule 11 sa nctions against Lew is’s counsel’s law firm a nd its attorneys for filing the motion to confirm, and (3) denying the Bank’s motion for Rule 11 sanctions aga inst Lewis’s counsel’ s law firm a nd its att o rn ey s for f iling the moti on for sanctions aga inst Kleinsmit h. 10

Rule 11.02 of the Tennessee Rules of Civil P roce dure pr ovides that, by prese nting a pleading to the tr ia l c ou rt , a n atto rn e y c e rt if ie s th a t:
(1 ) [ the ple a din g] is n ot b e ing pr e se nte d f or a ny imp ro pe r p ur

po se , s uc h a s to ha

ra ss or to cause unnec essary delay or needle ss increa se in the cost of litigation; (2) the claims, defe nses, and other legal contentions there in are war rante d by existing law or b y a nonfrivolous argume nt for the e xtension, modification, or re versa l of existing law or the e stablishment of new law ;
(3 ) the a lle gatio ns a ndoth e r f a c tua l c on te nti on s h ave e vid e nti ary su pp ort or , if sp e c if ic a lly so ide nt if

ied , ar e lik e ly t o h a ve e vid e nti a ry su pp ort a ft e r a

re a so na ble opportunity for further investigation or discove ry; and (4 ) the de nia l of fa c tua l con te nti on s ar e wa rr a nte d o n th e e vid e nc e or , if sp e c if ic a lly so identified, ar e re asonably ba sed on a la ck of information or belief.

Tenn. R. Civ. P. 11.02. Rule 11.03 authorize s the trial court to impos e sanc tions “[i]f, a fter notice and a re as onable opportunity to respond, the court de termines that subdivision 11.02 has been violated . . . .” The noti ce require ments of t he R ule provide that the motion for sanc tions “shall not be filed w ith or prese nted to the court unless, within 21 days after service of t h e m o t i o n

. . . , the

c ha lle ng e d p ape r, c la im, de fe ns e , c on te nti on , a lle gatio n, or de nia l is no t w ith dr a wn or app ro pria te ly
corr ecte d.” Te nn. R. Civ. P . 11.03(1)( a).

In determining whe ther an attorne y’s conduc t is sanctionable under Rule 11, the trial court must determine if such c onduct was r easona ble at the time the document was signed. Krug v . Krug , 838 S.W.2d 197, 205 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1992) ( quoting Andr e ws v . Bi ble , 812 S.W.2d 284, 288 (Tenn. 1991)). “ [T]he question of whethe r a Rule 11 violation has oc curr ed requires the trial court to m akeT h e statute p ro v i d es: 11

W hen i t a ppea r s t o a ny r evi ewi ng c o u rt that t he appe al f r om a ny c our t of

r ec or d w as f

r i vol ous or t ak en so l ely fo r d elay , t h e c o u rt m ay , eit h er u p o n m o t i o n o f a p arty o r o f i t s o w n m o t i o n , aw ard j u st dam age s a gai ns t t he appe l l ant , w hi ch m ay i ncl u d e but ne ed not be l i m i t ed t o, c os t s , i nt er es t on t he ju d g m e n t, a n d e x p e n se s in c u rr e d b y th e a p p e llee a s a re su lt o f th e a p p e a l.

T e n n . C o d e A n n . § 2 7 -1 -1 2 2 (2 0 0 0 ).
-12- hig hly fa c t- int e ns ive det erm inatio ns re ga rd ing the re a so na

ble ne ss o f the a tto rn e y’ s ( a ndc lie nt’ s) conduct.” Bo

y d v . P r im e Fo c us, In c. , 8 3 S.W.3d 761, 765 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2001). A s such, we revie w a tria l c ourt’s ruling on a Rule 11 motion for a n abuse of discretion. Krug , 838 S.W.2d at 205.

Sanc tio ns Ag ain st K le insm ith

We f irst addre ss whether

the trial court abused its discretion in granting Lewis’s motion for sanctions aga inst Kle insmit h. The trial c ourt grante d Lewis’s motion for sa nctions in its F ebrua ry 1, 2008 order , afte r the fir st appea l ha d been dismiss ed and the case was re manded. The trial court found that “the action of Mr . Kleinsmith in naming Mr. Lewis as an Appe llee in t he Court of Appea ls when he w as not a pa rty, and without filing a motion giving M r. Lew is [notice] that he wanted to na me him a party to the action, was f alse, mi s l eading, and dece ptive.” The trial court noted that Kleinsmith wa s given the opportunity to dismiss Lewis as an appellee , but he did not do

so . T he tr ia l c ou rt

a lso state d th a t, “ a tto rn e ys c a n a nddo com mit a c tio ns wh ic h a

resa nc tio na

ble which cannot be cor

rec ted. Unfortunately, Mr. Kleinsmith finds himself in this position.” Thus, the trial court gr anted the motion for Rule 11 sanctions against Kleinsm ith and aw arde d Lewis $4,365 in attorney’s f

ees e xpended in de fending the f irst appea l.

In this second a

ppeal, Kle insmit h argue s that the trial court abused its discre tion in granting Lewis’s motion for sa n ct i o n s b ec ause Rule 11 of the Tenne ssee Rules of Civil Procedure applies
on ly t o tria l c ou rt pr oc e e din gs , no t to app e llate pr oc e e din gs . T he app ro pria te re me dy , K le ins mith argue s, is set out in Tennessee Code Annotated § 27- 1-122, which pr ovides that a re viewing court may awa rd dama ges against appellants for filing an appeal that “w as frivolous or taken for delay.” 11 Te nn . Co de An n. § 2 7- 1- 12 2 ( 20 00 ). Th ou gh su c h d a ma ge s w e rere qu e ste d b y L e wi s in thefi rs t appea l, Kleinsmith poi nts out, the appellate c ourt dismissed the a ppeal without r esolving the issue, and Le wis did not ask the appellate court to rec onsider aw arding such damages. Kle insmit h further argue s that the trial court err ed in a war ding Rule 11 sanctions against him be cause Lewis’s motion for sa nctions was not filed until after the ca se wa s rem an d ed, at a time when the of fending documents could not be w ithdrawn or c orre cted. Bec ause Rule 11 c lear ly co n t emplates a notice period during whic h an attorne y would have the opportunity to withdraw the offe nding ple ading, he argue s, t he trial c ourt err ed in imposing sanctions under the c ircumstance s prese nted her e, whe re there was no such opportunity.M a rr a ’s b rie f d id n o t ad d re ss th e se issu e s, b e c a u se h e “ d id n o t t a k e p a rt in th e p ro c e e d in g s o n th e se issu e s.” 12

T h i s C o u rt h as he l d t h at R u l e 1 1 san cti o n s d o n o t ap p l y t o arg u m en t s m ad e i n t h e C o u r t o fA p p ea l s. 13
Ver m i l l i on v . Ver m i l l i on , 892 S. W

. 2d 829, 833 ( Tenn. Ct

. A pp. 1994) (a r gum ent s m ade i n t he Cour t of A ppea l s c annot

se rv e a s th e b a sis fo r R u le 1 1 sa n c tio n s in th e tr ia l c o u rt). I n th is c a se , m a n y o f th e o ff e n d in g p le a d in g s n a m in g L e w is

a s a n a p p e llee – th e n o tice o f a p p e a l, th e c o st b o n d , e tc ., – w e re in f a c t f iled in th e tr ia l c o u rt, n o t i n th e a p p e llate c o u rt. (c o n tin u e d ...)
-13- In re sp on se , Le wi s ma int a ins that sa nc tio ns a ga ins t Kl e ins mith we re app ro priat e becaus e Kl e ins mith wa s giv e n pr op e r no tic e of the mot ion , a ndhe re fu se d to take c or re c tiv e a c tio n. Le wi s

12 argue s that the trial court properly f ound that naming him as an appe llee in the post-judgment filings without first making a m o tion to add him was false, misleading, and dece ptive. In addition, he po int s o ut that th e tr ia l c ou rt ’s e xe rc ise of its dis c re tio n mu st b e a ff or de d g re a t de fe re nc e a ndmus t be upheld a

bsent evidenc e that the tria l court abused its discretion. There fore , Lewis asse rts, the trial court’s a war d of attorne y’s fe es as Rule 11 sanc tions against Kleinsmith shoul d be af firmed.

We r efe r to the outline in the Statement of the Evidenc e of the proce edings in the trial court be low . T he State me nt of the Ev ide nc e state s tha t K le ins mith, on be ha lf of the Ba nk , n a me d L e wi s
as an a ppellee in its post-judgment filings without making a motion to add Lewis as an appellee , and that the Bank admitted that doing so was e rror . Lewis did not ask the Bank to w ithdraw its appea l

a t a ny tim e du ri ng thepe nd e nc y o f the fi rs t app e a l. I n h is a pp e llate brie f in the fi rs t app e a l, L e wi s reque sted attorney’ s fee s for a frivolous appe al pursuant to Te nnessee Code Annotated § 27- 1-122, on the basis that the appe al was pr emature ly filed, and that Lewis was named a s an appe llee without

a pr op e r m oti on a ndor de r a dd ing him a s a pa rty. On Au gu st 3 , 2 00 7, the Ba nk fi le d a mot ionwi th the appe llate court to add Lewis as an a ppellee. T he motion was not adjudicated bec ause this Court dismiss ed the first appea l for lack of a final judgment. Lewis did not further pur sue the re quest for damage s in this Court for a f rivolous appea l, pursuant to Section 27-1-122. On N ovember 2, 2007, Lewis mailed his Rule 11 motion for sanc tions to Kleinsmith, i dentifying the off ending pleadings as those filed in the first appea l naming him as the appellee . The motion for Rule 11 sanc tions was filed with the trial court on November 30, 2007. We a re mindful of the defe rential standard with which we must review the trial court’s decision to awa

rd Lew is Rule 11 sanctions against Kleinsmith. The trial court ha s wide discre tion in such matters, a nd its decision will not be reve rsed absent evidenc e of an abuse of that discre tion. One manne r in which a

trial court may be found to have abused its discre tion is when the trial court applies an inc orre ct legal standa rd. See E ldridge v. Eldridge
, 42 S.W.3d 82, 85 (Tenn. 2001). In gr a nti ng Le wi s’ s mo tio n f or sa nc tio ns , th e tria l c ou rt

f o u n d th at Kle ins mith’ s a c tio n inna min g L e wi s
as an appellee when he had not been pr operly made a party was “f alse, misleading, and de ceptive,” and that Le wis “is not and cannot be made a party to this lawsuit” based on quasi-judicial immunity. Ho we ve r, t h e o f

f e n d i n g p l e a d i n g s t h a t w e r e t h e s u b j e c t o f L e w i s ’ s m o t i o n f

o r s a n c t i o n s w e re a ll po st- jud gme nt m ot io ns fi led fo r the pu rp os e of ini tiatin g th e fi rs t app e a l. W e mus t a gr e e wi th Kleinsmith that Lewis’s motion for sanctions was in e ssence a motion for appe llate attorne y’s fe es pursuant to Tenne ssee Code A n n o tated § 27-1- 122 for the f iling of a frivolous appe al. Under Se c tio n 2 7- 1- 12 2, the de c isi on on wh e the r to a wa rd da ma ge s fo r the fi lin g of a frivo lou s a pp e a l r e sts
so le ly i n th e dis c re tio n o f the app e llate c ou rt , a nd it w a s impr oper for

the tria l c ou rt

to e sse nti a lly grant a ppellate attorney’s fe es to Lewis unde r Rule 11. Se e Wha lum v . M ar sha ll , 224 S.W.3d 169, 13(

. . . cont i nued) 13
A l l of t he of f endi ng pl ea di ngs , how eve r , w er e fi l ed i n conne ct i on w i t h t he appe al , a nd f or t he pur pos e of i ni t i at i ng t he appeal

. Th e f ees genera t ed f r om t ho s e pl eadi ng s w ou l d ha v e b ee n in cl ud ed i n any r equest f or fees on app eal und er S ec t i o n 2 7 -1 -1 2 2

. S u ch p o st -jud g m en t fi l l i n g s are i n ap p ro p riat e a s a su b j ec t fo r R u l e 1 1 san cti o n s.
-14- 180-81 (Te nn. Ct. App. 2006) (stating that whet h er to awar d damage s for a frivolous appe al is an issue that lies solely with the appellate c ourt).

For these re asons, w e m u s t co n clude that the trial court a bused its discretion in granting Lewis’s motion for Rule 11 sanc tions and awa rding appe llate attorne y’s fe es to Lewis for Kl e ins mith’ s f

ili ng of ple a din gs in c on ne c tio n w ith the fi rs t app e a l. Le wi s’ s mo tio n w a s e sse nti a lly

a mot ionfo r d a ma ge s for a frivo lou s app e a l pur su a nt to Sec tio n 27- 1- 12 2, a nd su c h moti on s ar e to be addr essed solely by the appe llate court. There fore , the trial court’s awa rd of Rule 11 sanc tions is rever sed.

This conclusion does not end our inquiry. In this appea l Lewis h as asked f or dama ges pu rs ua nt t o Se c tio n 27- 1- 12 2, a ga in re qu e sti ng a tto rn e y’ s fe e s on app e a l. We c on str ue thi s r e qu e st
as enc ompassing damages ( fee s) incurre d in de fending the first premature appea l in this matter. To reiter ate, the c onduct for which Lewis see ks damage s is Kleinsmit h’s naming Lew is as an appe llee without formally adding him as a pa rty. Unfortunately fo r L ew i s , we ha ve held that Le wis is an

app ro pria te p art y to this a pp e a l. K le ins mith h a d f ile d a mot ionwi th this Cou rt

to h a ve Le wi s fo rm a lly a dd e d, bu t that mot ion wa s no t a dju dic a te d b y th is C ou rt . I n li gh t of thi s h old ing a nda ll other surr ounding circumstanc es, we find that Kleinsmith’s c onduct did not warrant damages and
we de c lin e to a wa

rdLe wi s atto rn e y’ s f

e e s f or de fe nd ing thefi rs t app e a l.-15- Bank ’s Cro ss- Mo tio ns f

or Sanc tio ns

The Bank a

rgues that the trial court e rre d in d en y i n g i ts two cross-motions for Rule 11 sanctions against Lewis’s counsel’ s law firm and its attorneys. The first motion for sanctions allege d that Lewis’s motion to confirm was improper, because it was unnecessa ry and was based upon no fac tual or lega l grounds. The sec ond motion for sanctions alleged that Lewis’s motion for Rule 11 sanctions was imprope r bec ause L ewis’s re quest for a ppellate attorney’s fe es should have be en direc ted to the appe llate court, as set out above. T he trial c ourt denied both of the se motions in li ght of its other holdings in favor of the Appellee s. With respe ct to the trial court’s denial of the Bank’s first mot ion for Rule 11 sanc tions, we fi nd no ab u s e o f

d i s c r e t i o n

. L e w i s ’ s m o t i o n t o c o n f i r mw a s n e i t h e r

u n n e c e s s ar y n o r

m e r itl e ss. Af te r thi s Co urt r e ma nd e d th e c a se fo llo wi ng the fi rs t app e a l, L e wi s f ile d th e mot ionto c on fi rm to place the re levant issues squar ely bef ore the trial court in orde r to resolve the immunit y issue and to o btain d isb ur se me nt o f h is f e e . T hu s, the Ba nk ’s fi rs t mo tio n for Rul e 11 sa nc tio ns wa s me ri tle ss
a ndthe tr ia l c ou rt

didno t e rr

in d e ny ing it.

We also find no abuse of discretion in the trial c ourt’s denia l of the Bank’s se cond motion for Rule 11 sanct i o n s

. As outlined above, w e have determined that Lewis’s motion for Rule 11 sanctions should not have be en granted. This does not, howeve r, mea n that the filing of the motion
was sanc tionable. Rule 11 sanctions are not justified simpl y beca use the off

ending motion turns out to be nonmeritorious. See State ex rel. Thompson v. Walker , No. 01A01-9311-CR-00486, 1994 W L 1 64 14 4, a t *4 (T e nn . Ct . A pp . M a y 4 , 1 99 4) (h old ing that th e failu reof the mer it s of a

c la im do es no t mak e it f

ri vo lou s pe r se ). In f

act, in addr essing a motion for Rule 11 sanc tions, the trial

c ou rt sh ou ld r e fr a in f

ro m pa ssi ng jud gme nt o n th e me ri ts o f the un de rl yin g a cti on , and a ll d ou bts

s h o u l d b e resolved in f

avor of the signer of

the pleading. See Berger v . Ratn er , N o

. 6 2 4 3 1 T

. D., 1997 WL 170327, at *5 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 11, 1997). Under the circumstances of this case , we fi ndno abu se of

dis c re tio n in the tr ia l c ou rt ’s de c isi on to d e ny bo th o f the Ba nk ’s mot ion s f or Rul e 11 sa nc tio ns a ga ins t L e wi s’ s c ou ns e l’ s la w f ir m a ndits a tto rn e ys

. Partie s to the Appeal
The Appe llants request that this Court r econside r its de cision to r etain Marr a as an Appellee in this appeal. We adher e to our initial decision to reta in Marra as an A ppellee.

Le wi s a rg ue s th a t this Cou rt sh ou ld re c on sid e r its d e c isi on to a ddhim a s a n A pp e lle e in this

a c tio n b e c aus e of

his qu a si- jud ic ia l imm un ity

. It is un dis pu te d that Le wi s e njo ys immun ity fr om s uit based on his pe rformance of judicial or qua si-judicial functions. See Miller v. Niblack
, 942 S.W.2d 533, 537-41 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1997). T his appea l, however , challenge s the feeawa rded to Le wis by the trial court. The t rial court’s awa rd of a fee was authorize d by statute, with the amount of t he fe e within the discretion of the tria l court. As such, the exer cise of the trial court’ s discretion is subject to r e vie w on ap pe a l. Th e pr op ri e ty of the se rv ic e s p e rf orme d b y L e wi s a

rebe yo ndc ha lle ng e be c aus eThi s i s not unl i ke a cha l l enge t o t he f ee of ot her c our t

- appoi nt ed of fi ce r s , s uch as gua r di ans a d l i t em or 14

sp e c ia l m a ste rs

. See, e. g. , P enni ngt on v. Bo und r y, I nc. , N o. M 2006- 02650- CO A

- R3- CV , 2008 W L 1923110, a t *9- 10 (T en n

. C t

. A p p

. M ay 1, 20 0 8 ) ( ci t i n g cases ).
-16- of his i m m u n i t y , b u t the fe e aw arde d to him is not. Lewis, the pe rson to whom the fe e wa s 14

awa rded, is name d as an Appellee only to the extent that he would seek to defe nd his fee, w hich he has done w ith full participation in this appeal. This C o u rt m ay ad d parties “ on such terms a s are just.” Tenn. R. App. P. 19(e) . Thus, we a dhere to our initial decision to add Lewis as an A ppellee in these proc eedings.

C ONCL US I ON The pa rties will bear

the cost of their

own attorne y’s fees on appe al. The holdings above pr e te rm it a ny oth e r i ssu e s r a ise d o n a pp e a l. A ll o uts ta nd ing mot ion s f ile d b y th e part ies in this appea l that are not specifica lly addresse d here in are denied.

W e a ff ir m in pa rt a nd re ve rs e in pa

rt the de c isi on of the tr ia l c ou rt

. Cos ts o n a pp e a l are to be ta xe d on e ha lf to Ap pe lla nts Ba nk of Ne w Y or k, Phi lip Kl e ins mith, a ndthe ir su re ty, a ndon e ha lf to Appellees Rodney Ma

rra and Vip D. Le wis, for whic h exec ution may issue, if nece ssary.

____________

_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ____________ HOL L Y M. KI RBY, JUDGE