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The Honorable Harry F. Barnes, United States District Judge for the Western

District of Arkansas, adopting the report and recommendations of the Honorable

Barry A. Bryant, United States Magistrate Judge for the Western District of Arkansas.

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

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No. 10-2610

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Tommy D. Hall, *

*

Appellant, *

* Appeal from the United States

v. * District Court for the

* Western District of Arkansas.

Officer Nick Elrod, Texarkana *

Police Department, Texarkana, * [UNPUBLISHED]

Arkansas; Officer Jeremy Gordon, *

Texarkana Police Department; Sgt. *

Devin Warner, Texarkana Police *

Department, *

*

Appellees. *

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Submitted: October 25, 2010

Filed: October 28, 2010

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Before WOLLMAN, MELLOY, and GRUENDER, Circuit Judges.

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PER CURIAM.

Arkansas inmate Tommy Hall appeals from the district court’s1

 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915A dismissal with prejudice of his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 complaint against three
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police officers. In his complaint, Hall alleged that the officers had conducted an

unlawful search and seizure in August 2004; that they filed a police report regarding

his arrest and specific events after his arrest which was deliberately false and based

upon fabricated information; that they attempted to bring a false felony drug charge

against him; and that they falsely testified against him during proceedings on the

felony drug charge, which was eventually dismissed. Hall also later asserted that

defendants had engaged in an unlawful conspiracy regarding the felony drug charge.

We review the dismissal de novo. See Cooper v. Schriro, 189 F.3d 781, 783

(8th Cir. 1999) (per curiam) (§ 1915A dismissal reviewed de novo). As to Hall’s

claims based upon the alleged unlawful search and seizure and defendants’ alleged

falsification of a police report, we note the inapplicability of the deferred-accrual rule

in Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994), see Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384, 393

(2007) (Heck rule for deferred accrual is called into play only when there is extant

conviction, rather than anticipated future conviction), and we conclude that these

claims, filed in July 2009, were time-barred, see Miller v. Norris, 247 F.3d 736, 739

(8th Cir. 2001) (Arkansas three-year personal injury statute of limitations applies to

§ 1983 action); see also Wallace, 549 U.S. at 387-88 (federal law looks to law of State

in which cause of action arose for statute of limitations, while accrual date of § 1983

cause of action is question of federal law); Eidson v. State of Tenn. Dept. of

Children’s Servs., 510 F.3d 631, 635 (6th Cir. 2007) (statute of limitations on § 1983

claim ordinarily starts to run when plaintiff knows or has reason to know of the injury

which is the basis of the action); Johnson v. Johnson County Comm’n Bd., 925 F.2d

1299, 1301 (10th Cir. 1991) (claims arising out of police action, such as search and

seizure, are presumed to have accrued when actions actually occurred).

We also agree with the district court that Hall failed to state a claim against

defendants for engaging in an unlawful conspiracy, see Nelson v. City of McGehee,

876 F.2d 56, 59 (8th Cir. 1989) (allegations of conspiracy must be pleaded with

sufficient specificity and factual support to suggest defendants had meeting of minds
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directed toward unconstitutional action), for testifying falsely against him, see Briscoe

v. LaHue, 460 U.S. 325, 329-46 (1983) (witnesses are absolutely immune from § 1983

suit), and for bringing a false criminal charge against him, see State v. Murphy, 864

S.W.2d 842, 844 (Ark. 1993) (choice of which charges to file against accused is

matter entirely within prosecutor’s discretion).

Accordingly, the judgment is affirmed. See 8th Cir. R. 47B.

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