[Cite as State v. Lazazzera, 2013-Ohio-2547.]

STATE OF OHIO, MAHONING COUNTY 

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS 

SEVENTH DISTRICT 

STATE OF OHIO, ) CASE NO. 12 MA 170 

) 

PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, ) 

) 

VS. ) O P I N I O N 

) 

DAVID LAZAZZERA, ) 

) 

DEFENDANT-APPELLANT. ) 

CHARACTER OF PROCEEDINGS: Criminal Appeal from Youngstown 

Municipal Court, Case No. 12TRC1527. 

JUDGMENT: Affirmed. 

APPEARANCES: 

For Plaintiff-Appellee: Attorney Dana Lantz 

Prosecuting Attorney 

Attorney Kathleen Thompson 

Assistant Prosecuting Attorney 

26 South Phelps Street, 4th Floor 

Youngstown, Ohio 44503 

For Defendant-Appellant: Attorney Rhys Cartwright-Jones 

42 North Phelps Street 

Youngstown, Ohio 44503-1130 

JUDGES: 

Hon. Joseph J. Vukovich 

Hon. Gene Donofrio 

Hon. Cheryl L. Waite 

Dated: June 17, 2013
[Cite as State v. Lazazzera, 2013-Ohio-2547.]

VUKOVICH, J. 

{¶1} Defendant-appellant David Lazazzera appeals from his conviction and 

sentence entered in Youngstown Municipal Court for operating a motor vehicle while 

under the influence of drugs or alcohol in violation of R.C. 4511.19(A)(1)(a), a first 

degree misdemeanor. Two issues are raised in this appeal. The first is whether the 

trial court’s advisement regarding the effect of the no contest plea complied with 

Traf.R. 10(D). The second issue is whether the 30 day sentence issued by the trial 

court is disproportionate to other sentences that were ordered for the same crime. 

{¶2} For the reasons expressed below, the trial court’s advisement on the 

effect of the no contest plea did not substantially comply with Traf.R. 10(D). That 

said, Lazazzera has failed to demonstrate prejudicial effect. Thus, we find that the 

plea was validly entered and, as such, there is no basis to vacate the plea. As to 

whether the sentence is disproportionate to other sentences issued for the same 

crime, we find no merit with this argument. Therefore, the judgment of the trial court 

is affirmed. 

Statement of Facts

{¶3} On May 26, 2012, at 12:52 a.m., Lazazzera was stopped for speeding 

in the City of Youngstown. Upon advising Lazazzera of why he was being stopped, 

Trooper Murphy noticed that Lazazzera’s eyes were glassy and bloodshot. He also 

detected an odor of alcohol. Lazazzera admitted to the trooper that he had been 

consuming wine. A breath test was performed on the Intoxilyzer 8000 and Lazazzera 

blew a .082. 

{¶4} As a result of the stop, Lazazzera was charged with speeding in 

violation of R.C. 4511.21; operating a vehicle with a concentration of eighthundredths of one gram or more but less than seventeen-hundredths of one gram by 

weight of alcohol per two hundred ten liters of the person’s breath in violation of R.C. 

4511.19(A)(1)(d); and operating a vehicle while under the influence of alcohol or 

drugs in violation of R.C. 4511.19(A)(1)(a). 

{¶5} The state and Lazazzera reached a plea agreement; Lazazzera entered 

a no contest plea to violating R.C. 4511.19(A)(1)(a) and the state dismissed the other 
-2-

two charges. Also, despite having previous OVI (operating a vehicle while under the 

influence) convictions, the state, in entering the plea agreement, agreed to amend 

the charge to a first offense. Tr. 3. 

{¶6} The trial court accepted the no contest plea, found Lazazzera guilty and 

sentenced him to 30 days in jail, a $500 fine and suspended his license for three 

years. 09/12/12 J.E. That same day, Lazazzera filed his notice of appeal and motion 

to stay his sentence pending appeal. 09/12/12 Notice of Appeal and Motion. The 

trial court granted the stay motion. 09/12/12 J.E. 

First and Second Assignments of Error

{¶7} “The trial court erred in failing to advise Mr. Lazazzera of the effect of 

his no contest plea.” 

{¶8} “The trial court erred in failing to inform Mr. Lazazzera of the 

constitutional rights he waived on entering his plea.” 

{¶9} The first and second assignments of error, in conjunction with each 

other, assert that the no contest plea was not knowingly entered. 

{¶10} Traf.R. 2(A) defines a “traffic case” as any proceeding, other than one 

that results in a felony indictment, that involves one or more violations of law 

governing the operation and use of vehicles. Thus, the case before us is considered 

a traffic case. 

{¶11} Traf.R. 10 governs the pleas and the advisements that must be given 

prior to accepting a plea in a traffic case. Here, we are dealing with a petty offense 

since a violation of R.C. 4511.19(A)(1)(a), a first degree misdemeanor, has a 

maximum confinement penalty of six months. Traf.R. 2(A)(D). Consequently, Traf.R. 

10(D) governs the advisements that were required to be made in this case. That rule 

provides: 

 In misdemeanor cases involving petty offenses, except those 

processed in a traffic violations bureau, the court may refuse to accept 

a plea of guilty or no contest and shall not accept such pleas without 

first informing the defendant of the effect of the plea of guilty, no 
-3-

contest, and not guilty. This information may be presented by general 

orientation or pronouncement. 

 The counsel provisions of Criminal Rule 44(B), (C) and (D) apply 

to this subdivision. 

Traf.R. 10(D). 

{¶12} The Ohio Supreme Court examined this rule and its requirements. 

State v. Watkins, 99 Ohio St.3d 12, 2003-Ohio-2419, 788 N.E.2d 635. In that case, 

the Court explained that the only advisement that is required under Traf.R. 10(D) is 

the effect of the plea being entered. Or in other words, the trial court is not required 

to advise the defendant of the constitutional and nonconstitutional rights he is waiving 

by entering a plea: 

 In felony cases, the Ohio and the United States Constitutions 

require that a defendant entering a guilty plea be “informed in a 

reasonable manner at the time of entering his guilty plea of his rights to 

a trial by jury and to confront his accusers, and his privilege against 

self-incrimination, and his right of compulsory process for obtaining 

witnesses on his behalf.” State v. Ballard (1981), 66 Ohio St.3d 473, 

378, 20 O.O.3d 397, 423 N.E.2d 115. Crim.R. 11(C) sets forth how a 

judge should explain those rights to a defendant. However, there are 

no such constitutionally mandated informational requirements for 

defendants charged with misdemeanors. The protections that the 

Criminal Rules provide to felony defendants should not be read into the 

Ohio Traffic Rules, which deal only with misdemeanor offenses. 

Accordingly, we find that where a defendant charged with a petty 

misdemeanor traffic offense pleads guilty or no contest, the trial court 

complies with Traf.R. 10(D) by informing the defendant of the 

information contained in Traf.R. 10(B). 

Id. at ¶ 28. 

{¶13} Therefore, since Lazazzera pled no contest, the trial court was only 

required to advise him of the effect of the no contest plea that is contained in Traf.R. 
-4-

10(B). State v. Jones, 116 Ohio St.3d 211, 2007-Ohio-6093, 877 N.E.2d 677, ¶ 20 

(trial courts only are required to advised of the effect of specific plea being entered). 

That provision provides: 

(B) Effect of guilty or no contest pleas 

With reference to the offense or offense to which the plea is 

entered: 

* * * 

(2) The plea of no contest is not an admission of defendant’s 

guilt, but is an admission of the truth of the facts alleged in the 

complaint and such plea or admission shall not be used against the 

defendant in any subsequent civil or criminal proceedings. 

Traf.R. 10(B)(2). 

{¶14} Traf.R. 10(B)(2) is identical to Crim.R. 11(B)(2), which discusses the 

effect of a no contest plea in the criminal setting. Thus, cases addressing 

compliance with Crim.R. 11(B)(2) are applicable when discussing what advisements 

Traf.R. 10(B)(2) requires. We have previously explained that there are three points 

of information in Crim.R. 11(B)(2) that must be conveyed about the effect of a no 

contest plea. State v. Dosch, 7th Dist. No. 08MA63, 2009-Ohio-6534, ¶ 12. First, 

that it is not an admission of guilt. Id. Second, that it is an admission of the truth of 

the facts alleged in the indictment, information, or complaint. Id. And, third, that the 

plea cannot be used against the defendant in any subsequent civil or criminal 

proceedings. Id.

{¶15} The test used to determine whether an advisement on the effect of the 

plea being entered was adequate is a substantial compliance standard. State v.

Griggs, 103 Ohio St.3d 85, 2004-Ohio-4415, 814 N.E.2d 51, ¶ 12. Under this 

standard, a slight deviation from the text of the rule is permissible as long as the 

totality of the circumstances indicates that “the defendant subjectively understands 

the implications of his plea and the rights he is waiving,” the plea may be upheld. 

State v. Nero, 56 Ohio St.3d 106, 108, 564 N.E.2d 474 (1990). 
-5-

{¶16} When the trial court does not substantially comply in regard to a 

nonconstitutional right, such as the effect of a no contest plea, reviewing courts must 

determine whether the trial court partially complied or failed to comply with the 

dictates of the rule in question. State v. Clark, 119 Ohio St.3d 239, 2008-Ohio-3748, 

893 N.E.2d 462, ¶ 32. If there is partial compliance, such as mentioning mandatory 

postrelease control without explaining it, the plea is only to be vacated if the 

defendant demonstrates a prejudicial effect. Id. The test for prejudice is “whether 

the plea would have otherwise been made.” Id. quoting Nero at 108, 564 N.E.2d 

474. However, if the trial court completely fails to comply with the rule, the plea must 

be vacated; a showing of prejudice is not needed to be demonstrated in that 

instance. Id. An example of complete failure to comply with the rule is failing to 

mention postrelease control at all during the plea colloquy even though it is 

applicable to the defendant. State v. Sarkozy, 117 Ohio St.3d 86, 2008-Ohio-509, 

881 N.E.2d, 1224, ¶ 22. See also State v. Clark, 119 Ohio St.3d 239, 2008-Ohio3748, 893 N.E.2d 462. 

{¶17} We now apply this test to the facts of this case. Here, the trial court 

gave the following advisement concerning the effect of the no contest plea: 

 THE COURT: This plea form says that you are pleading no 

contest to the charge that I just reviewed with you. Did you sign this? 

 MR. LAZAZZERA: Yes. 

 THE COURT: You discussed it with your lawyer? 

 MR. LAZAZZERA: Yes. 

 THE COURT: If you are pleading no contest, you are saying that 

you are not contesting this charge so you are allowing me to find that 

you are guilty of it without going through a trial and being proven guilty. 

Do you understand you are giving up your right to have a trial? 

 MR. LAZAZZERA: Yes. 

 THE COURT: Do you have any question about that? 

 MR. LAZAZZERA: No. 

 THE COURT: Then to this charge how do you plead, sir? 
-6-

 MR. LAZAZZERA: No contest. 

Tr. 4. 

{¶18} This advisement does not substantially comply with Traf.R. 10(B)(2) 

and (D) as it is not a slight deviation from the text of the rule. Specifically, this 

advisement does not inform the defendant that the no contest plea is not an 

admission of guilt or that the plea cannot be used against the defendant in any 

subsequent civil or criminal proceedings, the first or third points of information 

discussed in Dosch. 

{¶19} Thus, our analysis moves to whether or not this advisement partially 

complies with the Traffic Rule or whether it is a complete failure to comply. 

Lazazzera contends it is a complete failure to comply. 

{¶20} We disagree. This is not a situation where the trial court merely asked 

the defendant what his plea was and did not attempt to inform the defendant of the 

effect of the plea that was being entered. Thus, this case is not akin to Sarkozy

where the trial court did not even remotely mention the required advisement, i.e. in 

that case postrelease control. Mentioning the requirement and giving an incomplete 

advisement constitutes partial compliance. Here, the trial court did attempt to advise 

on the effect of the no contest plea. In fact, it appears from a reading of the 

advisement that the trial court was attempting to inform Lazazzera that his no contest 

plea is an admission of the facts and permits the trial court to find him guilty without 

going through a trial. The advisement given indicates that Lazazzera is admitting the 

truth of the facts and permitting the trial court to find him guilty without the opportunity 

to present a defense. This expresses not only the second point of information 

discussed in Dosch, but also the essence of a no contest plea “‘The essence of the 

“no contest” plea, is that the accused cannot be heard in defense.’” State ex rel. 

Stern v. Mascio, 75 Ohio St.3d 422, 424, 662 N.E.2d 370 (1996). Accordingly, 

considering the language of the advisement, we find that it constitutes partial 

compliance with the rule. 

{¶21} Therefore, in order for the plea to be vacated, Lazazzera must show 

prejudice. Clark, 2008-Ohio-3748 at ¶ 32. 
-7-

{¶22} Given the record in this case, we cannot find that the deficient 

advisement prejudiced Lazazzera for three reasons. 

{¶23} First, Lazazzera fails to assert that he was prejudiced or to argue how 

he was prejudiced. It is not the duty of this court to make appellant’s argument for 

him. Thus, we will not find prejudice without an argument. 

{¶24} Second, even if he did argue he was prejudiced, it is difficult to find 

prejudice considering the trial court’s advisement to Lazazzera. The primary goal in 

giving the plea advisement is to ensure that the offender is aware of all potential 

adverse effects of the plea. As is shown above, Lazazzera was advised of the 

negative effect of his no contest plea - that he could be found guilty without going 

through a trial and without presenting a defense. The deficiency in the advisement is 

the failure to advise Lazazzera of the beneficial effect of the plea - that it could not be 

used against him in any subsequent civil or criminal proceeding. If a person is not 

advised of a potential beneficial effect of the plea, it is difficult to imagine a scenario 

where such a defendant in a traffic case sustains any prejudice for such a failure. 

{¶25} Lastly, regardless of the failure to argue prejudice, given the information 

that was provided to Lazazzera during the plea colloquy, it is also difficult to conclude 

that the plea would not have otherwise been entered. For instance, the trial court 

asked whether Lazazzera discussed the no contest plea with his attorney. Lazazzera 

responded that he did. Tr. 4. Lazazzera was also informed that the charge carried a 

mandatory minimum three day jail term and that the maximum jail for the charge was 

six months. Tr. 3; 09/12/12 Plea Agreement form. He was advised that he was 

subject to a mandatory license suspension of six months to three years, that six 

points would be assessed against his license, and that he faced up to five years of 

community control. Tr. 3-4. Furthermore, the state indicated that part of the plea 

agreement was a recommendation of a $500 fine as well as an understanding that 

the “Court obviously can enhance the penalties.” Tr. 3. 

{¶26} Admittedly when reading through the plea colloquy, the transcript gives 

the impression that Lazazzera did not believe he would receive a jail term or would 

receive a suspended sentence: 
-8-

 THE COURT: Sure, you do. If you didn’t think it was a joke, you 

wouldn’t have driven drunk for the third time in three years. Sir, you 

have got 30 days in jail that starts today. You know what, you are 

killing me, you are killing me. You actually expected to walk out of here 

today, you are killing me. You ought to consider yourself lucky that’s 

not 180 days. 

 MR. LAZAZZERA: I guess I was just confused. 

Tr. 7-8. 

{¶27} His statement that he was confused is not an indication that the plea 

was not entered into knowingly. Rather, it is merely a statement that he did not think 

he would get a jail sentence even though he was aware that it was a possibility. 

{¶28} Consequently, for all of the above stated reasons we do not find 

prejudice. Therefore, even though the trial court’s advisement on the effect of the no 

contest plea did not substantially comply with Traf.R. 10(B)(2) and (D), we are not 

required to vacate the plea because Lazazzera has failed to show prejudice resulted 

from the deficiency. 

{¶29} At this point, it is separately noted that under the second assignment of 

error, Lazazzera starts to make an argument that in addition to being adequately 

advised of the plea, the trial court should have also advised him of the constitutional 

rights, i.e. right to trial, right to compulsory process, right to have state prove 

elements of offense by proof beyond a reasonable doubt, right to cross-examine 

witnesses against him, and right against self-incrimination, he was waiving by 

entering a no contest plea. The Ohio Supreme Court’s decision in Watkins, which is 

quoted above, clearly indicates that the trial court was not required to advise 

Lazazzera of the constitutional rights prior to accepting the no contest plea. Watkins, 

2003-Ohio-2419, ¶ 28. Therefore, any argument to the contrary fails. 

{¶30} In conclusion, the first and second assignments of error are meritless. 

Third Assignment of Error

{¶31} “The trial court abused its discretion in sentencing Mr. Lazazzera to 30 

days local confinement.” 
-9-

{¶32} Lazazzera asserts that his sentence is disproportionate to sentences 

imposed on other like offenses. In support of his argument he filed an appendix of 20 

unpublished judgments from Youngstown Municipal Court. Lazazzera admits that he 

did not raise this issue to the trial court and thus, he contends that we are to review 

this argument under a plain error analysis. 

{¶33} Our sister district, when addressing a disproportionality argument, 

explained the difficulty defendants have in making this type of argument and the 

difficulty appellate courts have in reviewing this type of argument: 

 We recognized that trial courts are limited in their ability to 

address the consistency mandate, and appellate courts are hampered 

in their review of this issue, by the lack of a reliable body of data upon 

which they can rely. State v. York, Champaign App. No. 2009–CA–03, 

2009-Ohio-6263, 2009 WL 4268577, ¶ 13. Although a defendant 

cannot be expected to produce his or her own database to demonstrate 

the alleged inconsistency, the issue must at least be raised in the trial 

court and some evidence, however minimal, must be presented to the 

trial court to provide a starting point for analysis and to preserve the 

issue for appeal. 

State v. Parker, 193 Ohio App. 3d 506, 2011-Ohio-1418, 952 N.E.2d 1159, ¶ 67-68 

(2d Dist.). 

{¶34} Here, it is undisputed that Lazazzera did not raise the disproportional 

sentencing issue with the trial court. Thus, the issue is waived. That said, it is within 

our discretion to review the argument under a plain error analysis. State v. Bradley, 

7th Dist. No. 11CO26, 2012-Ohio-5880, ¶ 47, citing Crim.R. 52 and State v. Noling,

98 Ohio St.3d 44, 2002–Ohio–7044, at ¶ 62. Notice of plain error under Crim.R. 

52(B) is to be taken with the utmost caution, under exceptional circumstances, and 

only to prevent a manifest miscarriage of justice. State v. Long, 53 Ohio St.2d 91, 

372 N.E.2d 804 (1978), paragraph three of the syllabus. In the interests of justice, 

we will review the disproportional sentencing argument and apply a plain error 

standard of review. 
-10-

{¶35} The majority of case law addressing arguments on disproportionate 

sentencing concerns felony sentencing. While felony sentencing is governed by 

different statutes than misdemeanor sentencing, the structure of the felony 

sentencing analysis to determine whether the sentence is disproportionate for 

similarly situated defendants can be applied to the misdemeanor setting. For felony 

sentencing, courts have explained that “[c]onsistent sentencing occurs when a trial 

court properly considers the statutory sentencing factors and guidelines found in R.C. 

2929.11 and 2929.12 in every case.” State v. Hyde, 6th Dist. WD-11-008, 2012-

Ohio-3616, ¶ 14. These statutes, respectively, govern the overriding purposes of 

felony sentencing and the factors to be considered when determining the appropriate 

sentence. While these statutes do not apply to misdemeanor sentencing, there are 

equivalent statutes that are applicable. They are R.C. 2929.21, which lists the 

overriding purposes of misdemeanor sentencing, and R.C. 2929.22, which lists 

factors to be considered when determining the appropriate misdemeanor sentence. 

State v. Brooks, 7th Dist. No. 05MA31, 2006-Ohio-4610, ¶ 17-19. A thorough 

reading of those statutes demonstrates that there are many considerations for 

determining the appropriate misdemeanor sentence, such as recidivism, the nature 

and circumstances of the offense, victim’s age, the need to protect the public and 

rehabilitate the offender. Therefore, in order for a court to find merit with an 

offender’s disproportionality argument, we can only consider offenders that are 

similarly situated to the offender making the argument. Consequently, merely 

knowing that other offenders were sentenced for the same offense and received a 

different sentence than the offender asserting that his sentence is disproportionate, is 

not sufficient to demonstrate that his disproportionate sentencing argument has merit; 

“appellant cannot support an assignment of error of disproportionate sentencing 

solely based upon references to sentences imposed in other cases where 

defendants were sentenced for the same offense.” Hyde, 2012-Ohio-3616 at ¶ 14. 

{¶36} Here, Lazazzera provides this court with 20 sentencing judgment 

entries from mostly OVI cases, although there are a couple physical control while 

under the influence cases. These judgment entries only provide the offense that 
-11-

these offenders were convicted of and the sentence that that offender received. 

These judgments do not contain criminal history, if the offender was charged with a 

different offense but entered a plea, or any other pertinent information to determine 

the basis for the sentence imposed. Thus, without more substantiated evidence 

concerning the facts of these cases, we are justified in holding that there is no merit 

with the argument presented. 

{¶37} That said, in the appellate brief, Lazazzera attempts to provide this 

court with some additional information about these cases. However, this additional 

information solely comes from statements in the brief; the additional information is not 

supported by any documentation. For that reason alone, we are not required to 

consider the additional information. 

{¶38} However, even if we were to consider the information, Lazazzera still 

fails to demonstrate that his sentence was disproportionate to similarly situated 

offenders. Thirteen of the cited cases show a defendant pleading to a first offense 

OVI or first offense physical control and receiving the minimum sentence. In these 

cases, there are no references to any priors. In the case sub judice, the trial court, in 

sentencing, acknowledged that the state had amended the OVI charge to a first 

offense. Tr. 3. However, the trial court had Lazazzera’s driving record before it when 

it sentenced him. Tr. 3. The trial court noted that this was Lazazzera’s third time in 

three years to driving while drunk; it noted that he had an OVI conviction in 2010 and 

a physical control conviction in 2011. Tr. 5-6, 7-8. The trial court could consider this 

information when determining the appropriate sentence for Lazazzera. R.C. 2929.21; 

R.C. 2929.22. Therefore, in these 13 cases where there is no mention of priors and 

merely an indication that the offender was pleading to a first offense, we cannot find 

that those offenders are similarly situated to Lazazzera. 

{¶39} There are only five cases cited where Lazazzera references priors. The 

first one is the second OVI offense and the offender received a 10 day sentence. 

The second case is an OVI with a refusal to take a breath test and one prior OVI. 

The defendant in that case received a 60 day sentence. The third case is a third 

offense OVI; only one of the two priors occurred within the last six years. That 
-12-

defendant received a 10 day sentence. The fourth case is a fourth offense OVI. Two 

priors occurred in 2010 and the other prior occurred within the last 6 years. That 

defendant received a 14 day sentence. The last case was a third offense OVI. That 

defendant has two priors although none of the priors occurred within the last six 

years and he received a 30 day jail sentence. 

{¶40} When considering these cases with the priors, the two that are the most 

analogous to the situation at hand are the third and fifth cases; both of these 

offenders, like Lazazzera, had two priors. Those two defendants respectively 

received a 10 day and a 30 day sentence. Here, Lazazzera received a 30 day 

sentence. Therefore, given the information that he has provided to us, we cannot find 

that his sentence is disproportionate to similarly situated offenders. In fact, his 

sentence is the same sentence as the offender in the fifth case received. 

{¶41} Therefore, for all the above reasons, this assignment of error lacks 

merit. 

Conclusion

{¶42} For the foregoing reasons, all assignments of error lack merit. The 

judgment of the trial court is hereby affirmed. 

Donofrio, J., concurs. 

Waite, J., concurs.