2013 Decisions

Opinions of the United

States Court of Appeals

for the Third Circuit

10-21-2013

USA v. Terrell Hampton

Precedential or Non-Precedential: Non-Precedential

Docket No. 12-1425

Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2013

This decision is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit at Villanova

University School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in 2013 Decisions by an authorized administrator of Villanova

University School of Law Digital Repository. For more information, please contact Benjamin.Carlson@law.villanova.edu.

Recommended Citation

"USA v. Terrell Hampton" (2013). 2013 Decisions. Paper 67.

http://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2013/67
NOT PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

_____________

No. 12-1425

_____________

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

v.

TERRELL HAMPTON,

 Appellant 

_______________

On Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania

(D.C. No. 11-cr-325-001)

District Judge: Hon. Stewart Dalzell

_______________

Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)

October 18, 2013

Before: RENDELL, JORDAN and LIPEZ*, Circuit Judges.

(Filed: October 21, 2013)

_______________

OPINION OF THE COURT 

_______________

JORDAN, Circuit Judge.

Terrell Ross Hampton appeals his conviction by the United States District Court 

for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, arguing that the evidence was insufficient to 

_______________

* Honorable Kermit V. Lipez, United States Court of Appeals Senior Judge for the 

First Circuit, sitting by designation.
2

sustain the jury’s verdict of possession of a firearm by a convicted felon. For the reasons 

that follow, we will affirm. 

I. Background1

On May 12, 2011, Secret Service agents arrested Hampton at the residence of 

Roxanne Mason at 5357 Delancey Street (“the Delancey House”) in Philadelphia, 

Pennsylvania. When the agents entered the Delancey House after announcing their 

presence, they found Hampton looking “very disheveled,” as if he had “just woke[n] up,” 

standing at the top of the stairs on the second floor. (J.A. at 73-74, 106, 144.) The agents 

did not find Hampton with a firearm, but they did find a fully-loaded Springfield Armory, 

model XD, .40 caliber pistol hidden between the mattress and box-spring in the bedroom 

where he acknowledged he had been sleeping with Mason. The agents also recovered 

Hampton’s shoes and cellular phone from that same bedroom. Mason admitted that she 

and Hampton had been the only individuals in that bedroom, and she asserted that the 

pistol did not belong to her. 

Prior to Hampton’s arrest, the Secret Service had obtained a photograph from his

Facebook page that showed him with a pistol of the same make and model as the one 

recovered from the Delancey House. Hampton admitted that the photo was of him, 

stating “I cannot deny that that is me in the picture.” (J.A. at 314.) A copy of that same 

photograph was also found on Hampton’s cellular telephone, indicating that the 

photograph was taken on May, 2, 2011, ten days before the Secret Service agents seized 

 

1

In accordance with our standard of review, see infra note 3, we set forth the facts 

in the light most favorable to the government. Additionally, because we write solely for 

the parties, we set forth only those facts necessary to our analysis.
3

the firearm during Hampton’s arrest. The cellular phone’s memory card also contained, 

as a deleted file, a second photograph of Hampton holding a black, semiautomatic pistol 

of a type consistent with the recovered pistol. That photograph had been taken on 

April 3, 2011. 

At the close of a one-day jury trial,

2 Hampton moved for a judgment of acquittal, 

pursuant to Rule 29 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, which the District Court 

denied. The following day, he was found guilty of possession of a firearm by a felon, in 

violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). 

Hampton then filed this timely appeal. 

II. Discussion3

Hampton argues that the evidence, even when viewed in the light most favorable 

to the government, was insufficient to sustain his conviction because the government 

failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he actually or constructively possessed the 

Springfield Armory, model XD, .40 caliber pistol. We disagree. 

Hampton puts forth four arguments to rebut the government’s claim of 

constructive possession: (1) that the government offered no physical evidence, including 

 

2

That was Hampton’s second jury trial on the present indictment. The first ended 

in a mistrial after a jury was unable to agree on a verdict.

3

The District Court had subject matter jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 3231. We 

exercise jurisdiction over Hampton’s appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review the 

denial of a motion for judgment of acquittal de novo, viewing the evidence in the light 

most favorable to the government. United States v. Flores, 454 F.3d 149, 154 (3d Cir. 

2006). A jury verdict will be upheld if “any rational trier of fact could have found the 

essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” Jackson v. Virginia, 443 

U.S. 307, 319 (1979). 
4

no fingerprints, to directly link Hampton to the firearm; (2) that “there [were] 2 other 

adult individuals who were present in the house to whom the gun may have belonged” 

(Appellant’s Br. at 16); (3) that the gun was found in a bedroom “that was plainly 

occupied by 2 very young children” (id.); and (4) that, although the firearms from the 

April 3 and May 2 photographs look similar to the firearm seized from the Delancey 

House, there is no evidence that they are one and the same. In addition, Hampton 

contends that failure to satisfy “proof requirements of possession for either time period 

(April 3 to May 11 or May 12) would be fatal to a guilty verdict.” (Id. at 17.) 

Those arguments are unpersuasive for two fundamental reasons. First, Hampton

misconstrues the felon-in-possession statute. As the government notes, we have recently 

held that being a felon-in-possession is a continuing offense. United States v. Benjamin, 

711 F.3d 371, 378 (3d Cir. 2013). The government is therefore not required to prove that 

Hampton possessed the firearm during both “time periods” (Appellee’s Br. at 16), as 

Hampton claims, but only that he possessed the firearm at some point, and that he had a 

continuing possessory interest in it: that is the essence of an offense being continuing. 

Benjamin, 711 F.3d at 378; see also United States v. Rivera, 77 F.3d 1348, 1351 (11th 

Cir. 1996) (“Proof of possession of a firearm as a convicted felon on one day within an 

alleged continuous possession is sufficient to support a conviction.”). 

Second, while Hampton correctly cites the standard of review that we must apply, 

he ignores the inferences that are most favorable to the government and instead draws

inferences that are most favorable to him. His arguments that “2 other adults” were 

present at the time the firearm was discovered and that the evidence was ultimately 
5

insufficient to confirm that the firearms in the photographs were indeed the same as the 

one seized are, at bottom, inconsequential in light of what a reasonable jury could find.

A person is considered to constructively possess a thing when, “although not in actual 

possession, [that person] knowingly has both the power and the intention at a given time 

to exercise dominion or control over [the] thing, either directly or through another person 

or persons.” United States v. Blackston, 940 F.2d 877, 883 (3d Cir. 1991) (citing Black’s 

Law Dictionary 1047 (5th ed. 1979)). Here, Hampton was sleeping on the mattress

which had the firearm hidden under it. While we have held that dominion and control 

cannot be established by “mere proximity” to the prohibited item, United States v. Brown, 

3 F.3d 673, 680 (3d Cir. 1993) (citations omitted), or “mere knowledge” of the prohibited 

item’s existence, United States v. Garth, 188 F.3d 99, 112 (3d Cir. 1999), proximity and 

knowledge can rightly be combined with evidence of ownership to prove possession. Cf. 

United States v. Booker, 436 F.3d 238, 242 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (“Although mere proximity 

to a gun is insufficient to establish constructive possession, evidence of some other factor 

– including connection with a gun, proof of motive, a gesture implying control, evasive 

conduct, or a statement indicating involvement in an enterprise – coupled with proximity 

may suffice.”). The jury was shown two photographs from different dates in which 

Hampton was holding a firearm that is consistent with the firearm that was recovered. 

Upon viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the government, a jury could 

easily conclude that the firearms were one and the same. Fingerprints were not necessary 

to find Hampton guilty, given the evidence already arrayed against him. 
6

In sum, a jury could and did properly find beyond a reasonable doubt that 

Hampton was a felon in possession of a firearm, and the motion to acquit was thus 

without merit. 

III. Conclusion

Accordingly, we will affirm the District Court’s judgment.