1 

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA 

________________________________ 

 )

EUGENE NYAMBAL, )

 )

Plaintiff, )

 ) 

v. ) Civil Action No. 15-2238 (EGS) 

 )

STEVEN MNUCHIN, in his official )

capacity as Secretary of the )

United States Treasury and )

United States Governor at the )

International Monetary Fund, )

 )

Defendant.1 )

________________________________) 

MEMORANDUM OPINION

 When Eugene Nyambal worked for the International Monetary 

Fund (“IMF”) as a Senior Advisor to one of the IMF’s Executive 

Directors he raised concerns within the IMF regarding funding 

the IMF planned to provide for a mining project in Cameroon. Mr. 

Nyambal alleges that as a result of raising those concerns he 

was subjected to a campaign of retaliation perpetrated by the 

IMF. That retaliation included termination of his employment at 

the IMF. The IMF has steadfastly refused to arbitrate Mr. 

Nyambal’s claims of whistleblower retaliation. Accordingly, Mr. 

Nyambal petitions the Court, pursuant to the Administrative 

Procedure Act (“APA”), 5 U.S.C. § 701 et seq., and the mandamus 

 

1 Steven Mnuchin has been substituted as the named defendant 

pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 25(d). 
2 

statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1361, to compel the Secretary of the 

Treasury to comply with a particular provision of the 

Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2012 and thereby require the 

IMF to implement whistleblower protections, including the 

convening of an external arbitration to adjudicate Mr. Nyambal’s 

claims of whistleblower retaliation. The Secretary has moved to 

dismiss Mr. Nyambal’s complaint for lack of subject matter 

jurisdiction and for failure to state a claim upon which relief 

can be granted. Upon consideration of that motion, the response 

and reply thereto, the applicable law, and for the reasons 

discussed below, the Secretary’s motion is GRANTED. 

I. Background

 Mr. Nyambal was employed by the IMF as Senior Advisor to 

Executive Director Laurean Rutayisire, who represented 24 

African nations on the IMF’s Executive Board. Second Am. Compl. 

(“SAC”), ECF No. 5 ¶ 8.2 As part of his role as Senior Advisor, 

Mr. Nyambal was responsible for advising IMF member countries in 

the course of economic aid negotiations and for safeguarding IMF 

resources. Id. In 2009, the government of Cameroon sought $60 

 

2 Mr. Nyambal filed a first amended complaint, see First Am. 

Compl. (“FAC”), ECF No. 3, and then filed the SAC, but still 

appears to rely upon the FAC. See, e.g., Pl.’s Opp. to Def.’s 

Mot. to Dismiss, ECF No. 11 at 1. The Court will rely upon the 

SAC for purposes of this Memorandum Opinion. In any event, even 

if it relied upon the FAC, the Court’s conclusions would not 

change. 
3 

million in IMF funding, plus additional IMF credit, for a mining 

project. Id. ¶ 10. Pursuant to his responsibilities as Senior 

Advisor, Mr. Nyambal “concluded that Cameroon was not supplying 

adequate information to allow for a proper assessment of the 

project.” Id. Specifically, Cameroon had not provided 

information regarding the identity of the Cameroonian 

stakeholders in the mining project. Id. That lack of information 

gave rise to Mr. Nyambal’s “concerns” as to “the fraudulent 

nature” of the mining project. See id. ¶ 14. Accordingly, Mr. 

Nyambal “raised” his concerns about lack of transparency and 

potential corruption as to the mining project. Id. ¶ 2. But on 

June 25, 2009——“a few months after the IMF’s approval of funding 

for the mining project” and within 24 hours of having raised his 

concerns regarding that project——Mr. Nyambal’s employment at the 

IMF was “terminated without notice or explanation by Mr. 

Rutayisire.” Id. ¶¶ 2, 11. The funding about which Mr. Nyambal 

raised concerns went forward “without adequate oversight” and 

“most of the $60 million in funding was eventually 

misappropriated through a complex money laundering scheme 

involving Geovic Mining Corp[oration],” id. ¶ 10, while Mr. 

Nyambal was left without a job at the IMF and, upon his 

termination, “was immediately denied access to his office,” 

where his personal belongings were confiscated. Id. ¶ 11. Soon 

after his termination, while doing some banking at the Credit 
4 

Union located at the IMF, security guards “ejected [him] from 

the bank in full view of the public.” Id. About four years 

later, on July 23 and October 9, 2013, Mr. Nyambal was denied 

access to a World Bank building. Id. ¶ 17. The World Bank denied 

Mr. Nyambal entry to its facilities based on its honoring of the 

IMF’s “Do Not Admit” list, on which Mr. Nyambal had been 

included. See id. ¶ 21. 

 Mr. Nyambal alleges that the abrupt termination of his 

employment at the IMF and his subsequent ejections from IMF and 

World Bank facilities constitute “a campaign of retaliation” 

against him perpetrated by the IMF because he raised concerns 

within the IMF regarding the funding for the Cameroonian mining 

project. Id. ¶ 2. Between 2009 and 2011, the IMF conducted two 

investigations related to the mining project, id. ¶ 12, but it 

has never permitted Mr. Nyambal to assert his claims of 

whistleblower retaliation in an external arbitration. See id. ¶¶ 

4, 17, 19-20. Seeking to have those claims adjudicated in an 

external arbitration, Mr. Nyambal petitions this Court, pursuant 

to the APA, id. at 1 (citing 5 U.S.C. §§ 555(b), 706(1), 

706(2)(A), 706(2)(C), 706(2)(D)) and the mandamus statute, id.

(citing 28 U.S.C. § 1361), to issue a writ of mandamus 

compelling the Secretary of the Treasury to comply with a 

particular provision of the Consolidated Appropriations Act of 

2012 and thereby order the Secretary to, in turn, “require the 
5 

IMF to implement whistleblower protections, including the 

convening of an independent adjudication of [Mr. Nyambal’s] 

complaints.” Id. at 15. The provision of the Consolidated 

Appropriations Act of 2012 on which Mr. Nyambal relies states in 

full: 

The Secretary of the Treasury shall seek to 

ensure that the IMF is implementing best 

practices for the protection of whistleblowers 

from retaliation, including best practices for 

legal burdens of proof, access to independent 

adjudicative bodies, results that eliminate 

the effects of retaliation, and statutes of 

limitation for reporting retaliation. 

Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-74, 

div. I, tit. VII, § 7071(c), 125 Stat. 786, 1255 (hereinafter 

“section 7071(c)”). 

 The Secretary has moved to dismiss this case on various 

grounds under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) for lack 

of subject matter jurisdiction or, in the alternative, under 

Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim upon which relief can 

be granted. See generally Def.’s Mot. to Dismiss, ECF No. 9; 

Def.’s Mem. in Supp. of Mot. to Dismiss (“Def.’s Mem. Supp.”), 

ECF No. 9. Mr. Nyambal has opposed that motion, see generally

Pl.’s Opp. to Def.’s Mot. to Dismiss (“Pl.’s Opp.”), ECF No. 11, 

and, subsequent to the filing of the Secretary’s reply brief, 

has filed a “supplement” to his opposition to the Secretary’s 

motion to dismiss. See generally Pl.’s Suppl. to Opp., ECF No. 
6 

13. The Secretary has moved to strike Mr. Nyambal’s supplemental 

filing. See generally Def.’s Mot. to Strike, ECF No. 14. These 

motions are ripe for the Court’s adjudication.

II. Analysis

A. Motion to Strike

The Secretary has moved to strike Mr. Nyambal’s 

“supplement” to his opposition to the Secretary’s motion to 

dismiss on the ground that it is an improper and unauthorized 

surreply. Def.’s Mem. in Supp. of Mot. to Strike, ECF No. 14 at 

1. Specifically, the Secretary argues that Mr. Nyambal never 

sought the required leave of the Court before filing his 

surreply and, in any event, even if Mr. Nyambal had sought leave 

of the Court, the surreply should be stricken because it merely 

puts forth legal arguments and factual allegations that were 

already put forth in Mr. Nyambal’s opposition or that could have 

been put forth in that opposition. Id. at 1-3. Mr. Nyambal 

counters that the Secretary has mischaracterized his 

supplemental filing as a surreply. Pl.’s Opp. to Mot. to Strike, 

ECF No. 15 at 1. He argues that his supplemental filing does not 

put forth any new legal arguments that were not made in his 

opposition and, instead, merely “adds factual context” so that 

the Court can assess subject matter jurisdiction. Id. at 1-2. 

The Secretary has not mischaracterized Mr. Nyambal’s 

supplemental filing: Because it was filed after the Secretary’s 
7 

reply brief with the purpose of supplementing the opposition to 

the motion to dismiss, it is a surreply.3 See Schmidt v. Shah, 

696 F. Supp. 2d 44, 59 (D.D.C. 2010) (“Because these submissions 

were filed after Defendant submitted his reply brief, they are 

surreplies not authorized by the Local Rules.”). “[B]efore 

filing a surreply, a party must request the Court’s permission 

to do so, and must show that the reply filed by the moving party 

raised new arguments that were not included in the original 

motion.” Gebretsadike v. Travelers Home & Marine Ins. Co., 103 

F. Supp. 3d 78, 86 (D.D.C. 2015) (internal quotation marks and 

citations omitted). Because Mr. Nyambal has not satisfied either 

of these requirements, the Court GRANTS the Secretary’s motion 

to strike his supplemental filing. 

 B. Motion to Dismiss 

 The Secretary has moved to dismiss for a variety of 

reasons, arguing that: (1) Mr. Nyambal lacks standing under 

Article III of the Constitution because the Secretary’s actions 

did not cause Mr. Nyambal’s injury and because any action that 

the Court could compel the Secretary to take would not be likely 

 

3 In fact, it is Mr. Nyambal who has mischaracterized his own 

supplemental filing. In his opposition to the Secretary’s motion 

to strike, Mr. Nyambal asserts that his supplemental filing is 

devoid of any legal argument that was not already raised in his 

opposition. Pl.’s Opp. to Mot. to Strike, ECF No. 15 at 1. That 

is inaccurate. See, e.g., Pl.’s Suppl. to Opp., ECF No. 13 at 

23-24 (making a legal argument relying on the Take Care Clause 

of the Constitution that does not appear in the opposition). 
8 

to redress Mr. Nyambal’s injury, Def.’s Mem. Supp., ECF No. 9 at 

10-13; (2) Mr. Nyambal’s claim is nonjusticiable under the 

political question doctrine, id. at 14-16; (3) the mandamus 

relief that Mr. Nyambal seeks is unavailable because he has not 

demonstrated that he has a clear right to relief or that the 

Secretary has a clear duty to act, id. at 16-18; (4) Mr. Nyambal 

has failed to state a claim under the APA because the conduct 

that he challenges is not subject to judicial review and because 

the action he seeks to compel is not legally required, id. at 

18-22; and (5) the Secretary is immune from legal process in his 

capacity as United States Governor of the IMF. Id. at 22. The 

Court concludes that Mr. Nyambal lacks Article III standing. 

Accordingly, his complaint will be dismissed on that basis, and 

the Court need not reach the Secretary’s alternative arguments.

 1. Standard of Review

 A motion to dismiss for lack of standing is properly 

considered a challenge to the Court’s subject matter 

jurisdiction and should be reviewed under Rule 12(b)(1). See 

Haase v. Sessions, 835 F.2d 902, 906 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (“[T]he 

defect of standing is a defect in subject matter 

jurisdiction.”). To survive a Rule 12(b)(1) motion to dismiss, 

“the plaintiff bears the burden of establishing jurisdiction by 

a preponderance of the evidence.” Moran v. U.S. Capitol Police 

Bd., 820 F. Supp. 2d 48, 53 (D.D.C. 2011) (citing Lujan v. 
9 

Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 561 (1992)). Because Rule 

12(b)(1) concerns a court’s ability to hear a particular claim, 

the court “must scrutinize the plaintiff’s allegations more 

closely when considering a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 

12(b)(1) than it would under a motion to dismiss pursuant to 

Rule 12(b)(6).” Schmidt v. U.S. Capitol Police Bd., 826 F. Supp. 

2d 59, 65 (D.D.C. 2011). In so doing, the court must accept as 

true all of the factual allegations in the complaint and draw 

all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff, but the 

court need not “accept inferences unsupported by the facts

alleged or legal conclusions that are cast as factual 

allegations.” Rann v. Chao, 154 F. Supp. 2d 61, 64 (D.D.C. 

2001). In reviewing a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 

12(b)(1), the court “may consider such materials outside the 

pleadings as it deems appropriate to resolve the question 

whether it has jurisdiction in the case.” Scolaro v. D.C. Bd. Of 

Elections & Ethics, 104 F. Supp. 2d 18, 22 (D.D.C. 2000); see 

also Jerome Stevens Pharms., Inc. v. FDA, 402 F.3d 1249, 1253 

(D.C. Cir. 2005). 

 2. Mr. Nyambal Lacks Standing 

Standing “is an essential and unchanging predicate to any 

exercise of . . . jurisdiction” by an Article III court. See Am. 

Chemistry Council v. Dep’t of Transp., 468 F.3d 810, 814 (D.C. 

Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks omitted). “[T]he 
10

irreducible constitutional minimum of standing contains three 

elements.” Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560. “First, the plaintiff must 

have suffered an injury in fact——an invasion of a legally 

protected interest which is (a) concrete and particularized, and 

(b) actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical.” Id.

(internal quotation marks and citations omitted). “Second, there 

must be a causal connection between the injury and the conduct 

complained of——the injury has to be fairly traceable to the 

challenged action of the defendant, and not the result of the 

independent action of some third party not before the court.” 

Id. (internal quotation marks and alterations omitted). “Third, 

it must be likely, as opposed to merely speculative, that the 

injury will be redressed by a favorable decision.” Id. at 561 

(internal quotation marks omitted). 

 For purposes of his motion to dismiss, the Secretary has 

assumed that Mr. Nyambal has suffered an injury in fact and, 

accordingly, has focused his arguments on the causation and 

redressability prongs of the standing inquiry. See Def.’s Reply, 

ECF No. 12 at 3 & n.3. The injury that the Secretary has assumed 

that Mr. Nyambal has suffered is “the effects of alleged IMF 

retaliation.” Def.’s Mem. Supp., ECF No. 9 at 11. If that were 

the relevant injury in fact, it would be clear that Mr. Nyambal 

would fail to carry his burden as to the causation prong of the 

standing inquiry: The effects of the retaliation——i.e., the 
11

alleged destruction of Mr. Nyambal’s “career, financial 

standing, employability and reputation,” SAC, ECF No. 5 ¶ 27——

can only be traced to the IMF’s, not the Secretary’s, actions of 

terminating Mr. Nyambal’s employment and preventing him from 

accessing IMF and World Bank facilities. Having failed to 

satisfy one of the three independent elements of standing, the 

Court would have no need to carry its standing analysis any 

further. See Newdow v. Roberts, 603 F.3d 1002, 1010 (D.C. Cir. 

2010) (“The absence of any one of the[ ] three elements defeats 

standing.”).

 Although the alleged financial- and career-related injury 

is certainly the underlying substantive injury that Mr. Nyambal 

ultimately seeks to address, for purposes of his request that 

this Court issue a writ of mandamus compelling the Secretary to 

take certain actions——namely, (1) to comply with section 7071(c) 

and (2) to require the IMF to resolve Mr. Nyambal’s claims of 

retaliation in an external arbitration, see SAC, ECF No. 5 at 

15——the relevant injury appears to be more procedural in nature: 

that Mr. Nyambal has not been permitted to adjudicate his 

retaliation claims against the IMF in an external arbitration. 

But even taking that absence of arbitral process as the relevant 

injury in fact, Mr. Nyambal is still unable to establish that he 

has standing because he fails to satisfy the redressability 
12

element of the relevant inquiry.4 He fails to satisfy that 

element for two reasons. 

 First, “[t]o satisfy this element, a plaintiff must show in 

the first instance that the court is capable of granting the 

relief sought.” Love v. Vilsack, 908 F. Supp. 2d 139, 144-45 

(D.D.C. 2012) (citing Newdow, 603 F.3d at 1010-11; Swan v. 

Clinton, 100 F.3d 973, 976 (D.C. Cir. 1996)). Here, part of the 

relief that Mr. Nyambal seeks is a writ of mandamus compelling 

the Secretary to “require the IMF to implement whistleblower 

protections, including the convening of an independent 

adjudication of [Mr. Nyambal’s] complaints.” SAC, ECF No. 5 at 

15. But the Court lacks the authority to compel the Secretary to 

take those actions. Mandamus relief is only permissible when a 

plaintiff demonstrates “(1) a clear and indisputable right to 

relief, (2) that the government agency or official is violating 

a clear duty to act, and (3) that no adequate alternative remedy 

exists.” Am. Hosp. Ass’n v. Burwell, 812 F.3d 183, 189 (D.C. 

Cir. 2016). Here, the provision on which Mr. Nyambal relies 

merely directs that the Secretary “shall seek to ensure that the 

 

4 The Court assumes, without deciding, that the causality element 

of the standing inquiry could be satisfied. See Newdow, 603 F.3d 

at 1010 (“We will assume, without holding, that plaintiffs’ 

claimed injury is an injury in fact and that it can be fairly 

traced to the conduct of the defendants. It is in the third 

element, redressability, where we find two problems with 

plaintiffs’ case for standing.”).
13

IMF is implementing best practices for the protection of 

whistleblowers from retaliation, including best practices for . 

. . access to independent adjudicative bodies.” § 7071(c) 

(emphasis added). When “seek” is followed by “to” and an

infinitive, as it is here, it means “to make an attempt” or to 

“try.” Seek, Merriam-Webster Dictionary Online, 

https://www.meriam-webster.com/dictionary/seek (last visited 

March 27, 2017). Thus the Secretary’s only clear duty under 

section 7071(c) is to try to get the IMF to implement best 

practices for getting whistleblower retaliation claimants access 

to independent adjudicative bodies. That limited duty forecloses 

this Court from issuing a writ of mandamus compelling the 

Secretary to “require the IMF to implement whistleblower 

protections, including the convening of an independent 

adjudication of [Mr. Nyambal’s] complaints.”5 See SAC, ECF No. 5 

 

5 The Court is similarly foreclosed from granting this portion of 

the relief requested under the APA. See Citizens for 

Responsibility & Ethics in Washington v. SEC, 916 F. Supp. 2d 

141, 151 (D.D.C. 2013) (“The standards for APA relief under § 

706(1) and for mandamus here are identical . . . .”); see also 

Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. Brennan, 571 F. Supp. 2d 1105, 

1124 (N.D. Cal. 2007) (“Where the relief the plaintiff is 

seeking is identical under either the APA or the mandamus 

statute, proceeding under one as opposed to the other is 

insignificant.”) (citing Indep. Mining Co. v. Babbitt, 105 F.3d 

502, 507 (9th Cir. 1997)). To the extent that the Court’s 

analysis here veers into a merits inquiry, see People for the 

Ethical Treatment of Animals v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 797 F.3d 

1087, 1097 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (describing the assessment of 

whether an agency “has a policy of non-enforcement that 

constitutes agency action unlawfully withheld, in violation of 
14

at 15 (emphasis added). Accordingly, because this Court lacks 

the authority to grant a portion of the relief that Mr. Nyambal 

has requested, he fails to satisfy the redressability prong of 

the standing inquiry. See Lozansky v. Obama, 841 F. Supp. 2d 

124, 132-33 (D.D.C. 2012) (holding that “[p]laintiffs . . . lack 

standing because the Court cannot issue the requested writ of 

mandamus, and thus cannot redress the [alleged] injury”).

 Second, the Court does not doubt its authority to provide 

the other portion of the mandamus relief that Mr. Nyambal 

requests——namely, compelling the Secretary to “comply with 

[section 7071(c)]” by trying to ensure that the IMF implements

best practices for the protection of whistleblowers from 

retaliation, including best practices for access to independent 

adjudicative bodies, see SAC, ECF No. 5 at 15——but this relief 

is not likely to redress Mr. Nyambal’s alleged injury of not 

having been given arbitral process by the IMF. See Newdow, 603 

F.3d at 1011 (the plaintiffs’ “second redressability problem is 

that declaratory and injunctive relief against the defendants . 

. . would not prevent the claimed injury”). “Redressability 

 

section 706(1) of the APA” as a “non-jurisdictional question”), 

and thus improperly fails to “assume the merits of [Mr. 

Nyambal’s] claim when determining whether standing exists,” West 

Virginia ex rel. Morrisey v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human 

Servs., 827 F.3d 81, 84 (D.C. Cir. 2016), the Court’s analysis 

would remain the same under a Rule 12(b)(6) lens: Mr. Nyambal’s 

claims pursuant to the APA and the mandamus statute would be 

dismissed for failure to state a claim. 
15

examines whether the relief sought, assuming that the court 

chooses to grant it, will likely alleviate the particularized 

injury alleged by the plaintiff.” West v. Lynch, 845 F.3d 1228, 

1235 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (internal quotation marks omitted). “The 

key word is ‘likely.’” Id. (quoting Lujan, 504 U.S. at 561). 

Thus Mr. Nyambal must show that it is “likely, as opposed to 

merely speculative,” that his injury——not having access to an 

arbitral forum for his retaliation claims against the IMF——will 

be redressed by a favorable decision. See Lujan, 504 U.S. at 561 

(internal quotation marks omitted). In this case of third-party 

causation——where Mr. Nyambal “seeks to change the [Secretary’s] 

behavior only as a means to alter the conduct of a third party, 

not before the court, who is the direct source of [Mr. 

Nyambal’s] injury,” see Common Cause v. Dep’t of Energy, 702 

F.2d 245, 251 (D.C. Cir. 1983)——“it is ‘substantially more 

difficult’ to establish redressability.” Talenti v. Clinton, 102 

F.3d 573, 577 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (quoting Lujan, 504 U.S. at 562). 

It is substantially more difficult because “standing to 

challenge a government policy cannot be founded merely on 

speculation as to what third parties will do in response to a 

favorable ruling.” Renal Physicians Ass’n v. U.S. Dep’t of 

Health & Human Servs., 489 F.3d 1267, 1274 (D.C. Cir. 2007). 

When those third parties can exercise “broad and legitimate 

discretion the courts cannot presume either to control or to 
16

predict,” a court is generally unable to redress the alleged 

injury and, accordingly, standing is found wanting. See Talenti, 

102 F.3d at 577 (internal quotation marks omitted). 

 As explained above, the most the Court can compel the 

Secretary to do is to try to ensure that the IMF implements best 

practices for the protection of whistleblowers from retaliation, 

including best practices for access to independent adjudicative 

bodies. If the Court were to order the Secretary to engage in 

the efforts called for by section 7071(c), reaching the 

conclusion that those efforts would bear the relief that Mr. 

Nyambal seeks——that the third-party IMF would actually implement 

best practices for access to independent adjudicative bodies and 

then would arbitrate Mr. Nyambal’s retaliation claims——would 

require sheer speculation as to how the IMF would exercise its 

broad and legitimate discretion in response to the Secretary’s 

efforts. When such “conjecture is necessary, redressability is 

lacking.” West, 845 F.3d at 1237 (citing Simon v. E. Ky. Welfare 

Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 43-44 (1976)). 

 Mr. Nyambal asserts that the United States is the only 

country in the IMF equipped with “a veto power”; that the 

Secretary is on the Board of Governors, which is the “highest 

decision-making body of the IMF”; that the Secretary’s role is 

“to ensure that the IMF complies with applicable laws”; that the 

Secretary appoints a “U.S. Executive Director of the IMF to 
17

oversee day-to-day operations”; and that that Executive Director 

“has authority to request any investigation pertaining to the 

IMF’s governance.” Pl.’s Opp., ECF No. 11 at 5-6. Assuming that 

all of these assertions are true, the United States wields 

significant authority at the IMF. Nevertheless, even with that 

significant authority there is hardly a high likelihood that if 

the Secretary were to make efforts to ensure that the IMF 

implements best practices for the protection of whistleblowers 

from retaliation that those best practices would actually be 

implemented by the IMF and that Mr. Nyambal would get his 

sought-after arbitration. Mr. Nyambal suggests that the 

Secretary could use the United States’ veto power or the United 

States’ votes in elections for the position of IMF Managing 

Director to coerce the IMF into implementing best practices for 

the protection of whistleblowers. See SAC, ECF No. 5 ¶ 5. But 

even if the Secretary took these actions, Mr. Nyambal has 

provided no explanation as to how such actions would likely

result in the IMF’s implementation of best practices for the 

protection of whistleblowers. The omission of that explanation 

is particularly problematic given that there is “considerable 

uncertainty” as to whether the actions that Mr. Nyambal suggests 

the Secretary could take to coerce the IMF into implementing 

best practices for the protection of whistleblowers “would aid 

[him] . . . or would tend to drive [the IMF] into even greater 
18

intransigence.” See Talenti, 102 F.3d at 578 (internal quotation 

marks omitted). That explanation is one Mr. Nyambal was required 

to provide. See Nat’l Wrestling Coaches Ass’n v. Dep’t of Educ., 

366 F.3d 930, 938 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (explaining that when 

redressability hinges on the independent choices of a regulated 

third party, “it becomes the burden of the plaintiff to adduce 

facts showing that those choices have been or will be made in 

such manner as to . . . permit redressability of injury”)

(internal quotation marks omitted). Without it, the Court must 

conclude that Mr. Nyambal has not satisfied the redressability 

element and, accordingly, lacks the standing needed to pursue 

his claim. Accordingly, the Court GRANTS the Secretary’s motion 

to dismiss. 

III. Conclusion

For the reasons stated above, the Secretary’s motion to 

strike and motion to dismiss are GRANTED, and this case is 

dismissed with prejudice. An appropriate Order accompanies this 

Memorandum Opinion. 

 SO ORDERED. 

Signed: Emmet G. Sullivan 

 United States District Judge 

 March 29, 2017