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### STATE OF MICHIGAN

COURT OF APPEALS

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,

Plaintiff-Appellee, UNPUBLISHED November 12, 2015

v No. 322882 Kent Circuit Court MONICA ONETTE ROBERTSON, LC No. 12-010112-FH

Defendant-Appellant.

Before: M ARKEY , P.J., and O WENS and B OONSTRA , JJ.

P ER C URIAM

. Defendant was convicted of two counts of attempted welfare fra ud, failure to inform, in an amount of $500 or more, MCL 400.60(2). The trial court sent enced defendant to six months in jail and five years’ probati on. It also ordered defendant t o pay $371,033.47 in restitution. Defendant appeals by delayed l eave granted the June 14, 2014 re stitution order. We affirm.

Defendant argues that the trial court erred in ordering her to pay restitution in the amount of $363,409.66 for billing the Department of Human Services (DH S) 1 for daycare that she did not provide. Defendant also ar gues that the trial court erred in ordering her to pay restitution in the amount of $7,623.81 for underrepresenting her self-employme nt income on applications for Medicaid benefits.

An order of restitution is subjec t to the following standard o f review:

Whether and to what extent a loss must be compensated is a mat ter of statutory interpretation; and this Court reviews de novo the pr oper interpretation of statutes. However, this C ourt reviews the findings underlyi ng a trial court’s restitution order for clear error. A finding is clearly errone ous if this Court is left with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been mad e. [ People v

1 We recognize that DHS has been merged with the Department of C ommunity Health to create the Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS) but we refer to DHS in this opinion because that was the department that was in existence during th e course of the proceedings.-2- Allen , 295 Mich App 277, 281; 813 NW2d 806 (2011) (internal citation s omitted).]

Crime victims have a constitutional right to restitution that is governed by statute. See People v Garrison , 495 Mich 362, 367; 852 NW2d 45 (2014); Allen , 295 Mich App at 281-282. MCL 769.1a, part of the Code of Cri minal Procedure, provides in pertinent part:

(2) Except as provided in subsection (8), when sentencing a de fendant convicted of a felony, misdemeanor, or ordinance violation, the court shall order, in addition to or in lieu of any other penalty authorized by la w or in addition to any other penalty required by law, that the defendant make full restitution to any victim of the defendant’s course of conduct that gives rise to the conviction or to the victim’s estate.

Similarly, MCL 780.766(2), in the Crime Victim’s Rights Act, MC L 780.751 et seq. , provides:

Except as provided in subsection (8), when sentencing a defend ant of a crime, the court shall order, in addition to or in lieu of any other penalty authorized by law or in addition to any other penalty required by law, that the defendant make full restitution to any victim of the defendant’ s course of conduct that gives rise to the convict ion or to the victim’s estate. .

. . The goal of statutory interpretation is to ascertain and give effect to the intent of the Legislature. People v Peltola , 489 Mich 174, 181; 803 NW2d 140 (2011). Statutory language that is clear and unambiguous must be enforced as written, People v Dowdy , 489 Mich 373, 379; 802 NW2d 239 (2011), because it is presumed that the Legislatur e intended the statute’s plain meaning, Peltola , 489 Mich at 181. Nothing may be read into an unambiguous sta tute that is not within the manifest intent of the Legislature as derived from t he words of the statute itself. People v Breidenbach , 489 Mich 1, 10; 798 NW2d 738 ( 2011). Under the plain languag e of the two restitution statutes, a tria l court is required to order fu ll restitution, i.e., restitution that is maximal and complete, for the loss caused by the defendant’s cr iminal conduct. Garrison , 495 Mich at 373; Allen , 295 Mich App at 281, n 1. In ordering restitution, a “defend ant’s ability to pay is irrelevant; only the victim’s actual losses from the cri minal conduct are to be considered.” In re Lampart , 306 Mich App 226, 233; 856 NW2d 192 (2014).

When there is a dispute as to the amount of restitution, the p rosecutor bears the burden of establishing the proper amount by a preponderance of the eviden ce. MCL 780.767(4); People v Fawaz , 299 Mich App 55, 65; 829 NW2d 259 (2012). A preponderance of the evidence is that which when weighed with the evidence that opposes it has “more convincing force and the greater probability of truth.” People v Cross , 281 Mich App 737, 740; 760 NW2d 314 (2008).

In arguing that the trial court erred in ordering restitution, defendant relies on the rule, which is recited in several cases from this Court, that restitu tion should only encompass those losses which are easily ascerta ined and measured, and which are a direct result of the defendant’s criminal acts. See, e.g., People v Byard , 265 Mich App 510, 513; 696 NW2d 783 (2005); People v Tyler , 188 Mich App 83, 89; 468 NW2d 537 (1991). This rule comes fr om People v Heil , 79 Mich App 739, 748-749; 262 NW2d 895 (1977), a case that was dec ided before the adoption of-3- Const 1963, art 1, § 24, and the current statutory scheme requi ring “full restitution to any victim of the defendant’s course of conduct that gives rise to the con viction . . . .” MCL 769.1a(2); MCL 780.766(2); Garrison , 495 Mich at 367-368, 372-373. Thus, the rule on which defend ant relies does not originate from the plain language of the curren t restitution statut es and, because we must enforce the plain language of those statutes, we declin e to base our analysis of the trial court’s restitution order on the Heil rule.

We conclude that the trial court did not clearly err in findin g that $363,409.66 was the amount of loss suffered by DHS for defendant ’s criminal conduct of billing DHS for daycare that she did not provide. MCR 2.613(C); Allen , 295 Mich App at 281. The trial court relied on the testimony of Lori Hernandez, a senior agent with the Office of the Inspector General for DHS, who based her estimate of the amount defendant overcharged for daycare on the sign in and sign out sheets that defendant provided of children attending her ce nter. Hernandez testified that the sign in and sign out sheets were the most reliable records of d aycare services provided because DHS required defendant to keep them and because the sheets had to be signed by defendant and the child’s parent. Based on He rnandez’s testimony, as well as the testimony of defendant’s witness, Robert Schellenberg, a certified public accountant, th at the other records defendant kept were so disorganized that they only created chaos, we are not l eft with a definite and firm conviction that the trial court made a mistake in choosing to c redit Hernandez’s computation of the amount defendant collected from DHS for daycare that she di d not provide. Hernandez’s testimony established that defendant failed to keep sign in and sign out sheets that complied with the requirements of DHS, i.e., that both defendant and the chil d’s parent sign stating the arrival and departure time of the child. Hernandez also testified that when she requested records from defendant she only received the sign in and sign out sheets. D efendant did not give Hernandez any records from which Hernandez could attempt to ascertain whe n a child who was signed in for a particular day but never signed out actually left defenda nt’s care. Under these circumstances, we are not left with a definite and firm convict ion that the trial court made a mistake in deeming, as did Herna ndez, that defendant overbilled DHS for an entire day when a child was never signed out. Id. We affirm the trial court’s fi nding regarding the amount of l oss suffered by DHS as a result of defendant’s conduct of billing D HS for care not provided was $363,409.66. The prosecution establi shed this amount by a prep onderance of evidence.

We also find no clear error in the trial court’s determination of the amount of restitution for defendant’s conduct of underrepresenting her income on the applications for Medicaid benefits. Findings of fact are sufficient as long as it appear s that the trial court was aware of the issues and correctly applied the law. People v Legg , 197 Mich App 131, 134; 494 NW2d 797 (1992). The trial court relied heavily on the testimony of Her nandez regarding her calculations as to both restitution amounts. The report of Hernandez docume nting her calculations was also admitted in evidence at the restitution hearing. Schellenberg disputed Hernandez’s calculations regarding the Medicaid overpayme nt on the basis of his assertio n that the percentage deducted from gross income for expenses w as too low. Although he did no t prepare them, did not examine all of defendant’s records, and acknowledged that what records defendant had kept were so disorganized that they only created chaos, Schellenberg opin ed that defendant’s tax returns were accurate and showed that defendant’s income was much less than Hernandez calculated.

Although the trial court’s disc ussion on the record regarding the Medicaid restitution was minimal, it is clear that the court found Hernandez credible, a nd also found the method she used-4- in making her calculations was both fair and reasonable. Thus, at least implicitly, trial court found that Hernandez’ method of cal culating the Medicaid overpa yment was more credible and deserved more weight than Sche llenberg’s testimony or defendant ’s tax returns. Defendant essentially questions the weight of the evidence and witness cr edibility. But this Court will not interfere with the factfinder’s role of determining the weight of the evidence or the credibility of witnesses. People v Passage , 277 Mich App 175, 177; 743 NW2d 746 (2007). Consequently, we are not left with the definite and firm conviction that the trial court made a mistake in finding that the overpayment of Medicaid benefits was $7,623.81. Allen , 295 Mich App at 281.

We affirm.

/s/ Jane E. Markey /s/ Donald S. Owens /s/ Mark T. Boonstra