T h e trial c o u rt g ra n te d c o -d e fen d a n t M a g w e ll’ s m o tio n fo r j u d g m e n t o f a c q u itt a l at the e n d o f t h e S ta te ’s 1

p ro o f. 

### IN THE COURT OF CRIMI NAL AP PEALS OF TENNES SEE AT NAS HVILLE Se pte m be r 20, 200 5 S es sio n
STA TE OF TEN NES SEE v. GA BRIA L A YU EL

Direc t Appeal from the Cr im inal Cou rt for Davidson Coun ty

No. 2002-A- 345 Seth Norm an, Jud ge

No. M2004- 02087-CCA -R3-C D - F iled Dece m ber 5, 2005

The de fenda nt, Gabria l Ayuel, was convicted by a Da vidson Countyjury

of attempted f

irst-deg ree murder and sentenc ed to twenty y ear s as a Rang e I

standard of

fende r. On a

p p ea l
, the def

endant raises f iv e is s u e s : ( 1 ) ju r o r

mi s c o n d u c t; ( 2 ) p r o s e c u to r ia l m is c o n d u c t; ( 3 ) e rr o n e o u s e v id e n tiary
ru li n g s ; ( 4 ) imp r o p e r d is c lo s u r e o f u n r e late d
, o u ts tan d in g w arr a n ts ; a n d ( 5 ) s u f f ic ie n c yof the

c on vic tin g e vid e nc e . F oll ow ing ou r r e vie w, we a ff ir m th e jud g me nt o f the tr ia l c ou rt

. Tenn. R. App . P . 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgme nt of th e Cr im inal Cou rt A ff irm ed

J.C. M C L IN , J ., delivere d the opinion of the court, in which D AVI D H. W EL L ES and N OR MA M C G EE O G LE , J J ., joined.

Kathl e e n G . M or

ri s, Na sh vil le , T e nn e sse e , f or theapp e lla nt, Ga

bria l A yue l.

Paul G . Su mme rs , A tto rn e y Ge ne ra l a ndRe po rt e r; El iza be th B . M arn e y , A ssi stant A tt o rn e y G e ne ra l; Vi c tor S. Joh ns on , I

II , D i s t ri c t A tt o rn e y Ge ne ra l; a ndRe ne e Er

b, As sis ta nt D ist

ri c t A tto rn e y

Ge ne ra l, for the a ppellee, State of

Tenne ssee.

OP IN ION

I. F AC TS

The de fenda nt was cha

rg ed with four c ounts of ag g ravated assault and one coun t o f att e mpte d first-deg ree murder a

rising out of

a shooting at the Sahar a Club in N as h v i l l e i n the ea rly morning hours of Septembe r 22, 2001. The de fendant was broug ht to trial on the char g es, along with a code fe nd a nt, Ma du t Ma g we ll. At tr ia l, Of fi c e r John ny

L a wr e nc e of

the c ri me sc e ne un it w a s th e fi rs t 1 to t e sti fy for th e Sta te . O ff ic e r L a wr e nc e te sti fi e d a s to the pla c e me nt o f thr e e .2 5 c a lib e r s he ll-2-

c a sin g s a ndtw o le a d p ro

je c til e s r e c ov e re d f

ro m th e sc e ne . A di agr a m andpic tur e s o f the c ri me
s c e n e w e r e a l s o i n tr o d u c e d i n t o e v i d e n c e d u r i n g h i s t e s t i m o n y.

One of the victims, Bernard Rog an, a bounc er at t h e cl u b
, was the ne x t to testify . Rogan testified that the nigh t of the shooting was his first nig ht on the job. Accor ding to Rog an, the defe ndant and Ma g well ar rived with a c ouple and Ma g well proc eede d to enter into the c lub. Roga n hear d a commotion at th e d o o r, he assumed ove r Mag well re fusing to pay , and he notice d the defe ndant hea ding dow n the s i d ew al kaway from the c lub. Roga n testified that the def endant

r e tu r n e d w ith a

h a n d g u n a n d s h o t hi m in th e lo w e r c h e s t a n d le f t th ig h

. Ro g a n r e c a ll e d th a t th e xray s reve aled a bullet in his c hest but no bullet c ould be found. Rogan also rec alled that the bullet in h is thig h w e nt “ thr ou g h a nd thr ou g h. ” Rog a n sai d h e wa s h os pit a lize d f or tw o to thr e e mon ths

. After being rele ased f

rom the hospi tal, Roga n went to the pol ice station and identified the defe ndant as the shooter

out of a photog raphic line-up.

On c ro ss- e xami natio n, de fe ns e c ou ns e l qu e sti on e d Ro g a n a bo ut i nc on sis te nc ie s in his te s ti mo n y

. Co u n s e l q u e s ti o n e d Ro g a n r e g ar d in g h is te s ti mo n y a t th e p r e li mi n ar y h e ar in g

. At the hearing, Rog an stated that he had wor ked at the cl u b fo r fo ur or f ive months at the time of the shooting. Also, Rog an’s pr eliminary hearing te stimony indicated that he was hospitaliz ed for two to three w eeks, but the medical records indicated onl y three day s. On re- direc t, Roga n explained that he did no t re a lly un de rs ta nd me dic a l re c or ds ve ry we ll. I n a dd iti on to ans we ri ng qu e sti on s o n c ro ssexamination reg arding inconsistencies, Rogan testified that he did not punch or push the de fenda nt p ri o r t o t h e s h o o t i n g.

Another vic tim, P eter

L ang oy a, whose family

owned thec lub , testified that the def endant ha d previously

been told he w as banned from the club. L ang oy a stated that he told Rog an to w atch f or the def endant. L ang oy a testifie d t h at h e hear d shouting at the door, saw the defe ndant shoot, but did not see Rogan g e t s h o t. L a n g o y a s tate d th a t h e w a s h it

inth e le g b y

a b u ll e t f ir e d f r o m the defe ndant’s g un. Acc ording to L ang oy a, the de fendant ran inside t h e cl u b s h ooting; howe ver, defe nse c o u nsel pointed out that at the pre liminary hearing L ang oy a testified that the de fendant never enter ed the building. On cross-examination, L ang oy a denie d that he initially told the police that the shooter had lig ht skin and a g ap in his front tee th.

Fr anco O’Ke llo testified that he saw Rogan stop Mag well from e ntering the club. He then saw the de fenda nt run to a car , walk bac k towards the c lub entranc e, and sta rt shooting. Ac cording to O’Ke llo, after the shooting the de fendant left in a Nissan Maxima. O’Ke llo testified that he identified the de fenda nt as the shooter f rom a photog raphic line-up.

Pasto Odwar, disc jockey and b arte nder at the club, testified that he w as in the outside parking lot a t t h e t ime of the shooting . Odwar noticed that the de fendant was involved in an arg ument at the fr ont door; after which, the de fendant ran to a c ar and return ed s h o o t i n g. Odwar testified he c ould not see what the defendant retrieve d from the car , but noticed that the defendant looked suspicious w hen he returne d to the club’s entra nce. On cr oss-examination, Odwar state d that he first saw Stacy J ohns escort the defe ndant down the sidew alk, then saw the def endant g o to a ca

r-3-

and re turn to the club

. W h en counsel questioned Odwa r about the shooter

leaving in a g ree n Mitsubis hi, Odwar

stated that eve rything happene d so fast that he was not sur e which c ar the shooter left in.
Stacy

J ohns, disc jockey

and sec urity

at the club, testified that he was in the DJ booth when he wa s called to g o to the front door beca use Roga n was ha ving a

problem with the def

endant. Johns said that Rogan was in a stanc e to “swipe” at the def endant so he told Rogan to g o back in the c lub and he e scorted the defe ndant down the sidew alk. Acc ording to Johns, he thought the defe ndant had calmed dow n so he turned to g o back to the club. Howeve r, t o J ohns surprise, the de fendant ran by him, knocking him off

balanc e. Johns s aw the de fendant pull a gun out of his pocket and he ard shots. W hen questioned on c ross-examination, J ohns denied t el ling a n investigator that Rogan
a c tua lly hit Ma g we ll a ndthe de fe nd a nt.

Homicide De tective JohnnyCrumby testified about the polic e p roce dure f or conduc ting ph oto g ra ph ic lin e -u ps . D e te c tiv e Crumb y e xpla ine d th a t Rog a n, L a ng oy a , O’ Ke llo , a ndOd wa r a ll identified the de fenda nt as the shooter f rom an a rray of six individuals. On cross-e x ami nation, Detec tive Crumby

admitted that he d i d not interview the de fendant and volunteer ed that the defe ndant was a

rre sted on an outstanding war rant unre lated to this case.

At the c los e of

the Sta te ’s pr oo f, the c ou rt dis mis se d tw o c ou nts of a g g ra vate d a ssa

ult broug ht ag ainst the defendant upon the S tate’s request. Also, the trial court ordere d the def endant’ s acquittal on count thre e, the a g g ravated assault of St acy J ohns. Howeve r, t he trial c ourt allowed the jury to consider the remaining counts of ag g ravated assault of L ang oy a and attempted first-deg ree murder of Roga n.

Former c o-def

endant, Ma dut Ma g well, testified that as he was lea ving the club, he sa w the defe ndant in a line outs ide waiting t o enter . Mag well said that he sa w the def endant talking with a

security g uard, then he saw the security g uard push the defe ndant. Acc ording to Mag well, af ter the g ua rdpu sh e d th e de fe nd a nt, the de fe nd a nt p ull e d a g un ou t a ndsh ot the se c urity g ua rd . O n c ro ssex am i n at i o n , M agw el l d en i ed k n o wi n g t h e d ef en d an tp ri o r t o t h e s h o o t i n g.

The de fenda nt testified on his own behalf. A ccor di n g t o t h e defe ndant, he wa s walking towards the c lub entranc e whe n he over hear d Mag well asking for his m oney back. When he aske d “what’s g oing on,” Roga n jumped up and pushed him aw ay , m ak ing him fa ll. The defe ndant

re c a lle d th a t he tol d Ro g a n n ot t o p us h h im a nymor e . T he de fe nd a nt s ta te d th a t he wa s ta lki ng to Stacy J ohns outside when Rog an hit him in the fac e. Roga n then tried to jump down on him, s o he pu lle d th e g un ou t of

his po c ke t a ndsh ot h im.

The de fenda nt testified that he had the g un in his pocket the entire time and he neve r we nt ba c k to the c ar. Th e de fe nd a nt e xpla ine d th at h e was scar ed whe n Ro g a n p us he d a ndhit him beca use one of

his cousins was killed in a similar manner . He sa id that he car ried a g un beca

use he lived in the “proje cts” and was afra id of getting jumped. The defenda nt testified that he thre w the g un away afte r the shooting and that he did not mea n to shoot L ang oy a. On cr oss-examination, the-4-

defe ndant said that he did not try to sell a g un to Mr. Ba ssilis . The prose cutor a lso questioned the defe ndant about whe ther he wa s banned f rom the club for

causing trouble, to which the de fenda nt
answe red he had neve r bee n told he was not allowe d in the club.

The S tate called J ohn Ba ssilis as a rebuttal witness. Ba ssilis testified that the def endant wa s not the one who trie d to sell him a gun but wa s with the person who trie d to sell it. However, Ba ssilis said he he ard the defe ndant say “I am the o n e who shoot.” The prosec utor also aske d B a ssi lis if he tol d a p ol ic e of

fi c e r that th e de fe nd a nt a dmi tte d s ho oti ng the g un , to wh ic h B a ssi lis replied “ [t ]hi s is what I ’m say ing now .”

Detec tive Crumby

was a lso called a s a re b uttal witness for the State. De tective Crumby te s ti f ie d th a t w h e n h e in te r v ie w e d M a g w e ll
, M a g w e ll n e v e r me n ti o n e d th a t h e w it n e ssed a f ight be tw e e n th e se c urity

g ua rda ndthe de fe nd a nt. De te c tiv e Crumb y fu rthe r state d th a t Ma g we ll cl ai m ed t o k n o w n o t h i n g ab o u tt h e s h o o t i n g. Following the proof and closing arg ument s , t h e j u ry found the de fendant not guilty of the ag g ravated assault of Pete r L ang oy a but g uiltyof the attempted first-deg ree murd er of Be rnar d Roga n. The de fenda nt filed a motion for a new tria l, which the tria l court denied. The de fenda nt appea led.

II. AN AL YSI S
On appe al, t he defenda nt raises five errors. Specifica lly
, he allege s that: (1) juror misconduct tainted the ver dict; (2) prose cutorial misconduct de nied h i m of his rig ht to a fair trial; (3) the tria l court made err oneous evide ntiary ruling s; (4) the S tate im proper ly disclosed t hat he wa s arr ested on an outstanding unrelated war rant, de ny ing him his rig ht to a fair trial; an d (5 ) t he evide nce w as insufficient to support a c onviction of attempted fir st-deg ree murder.

JUROR MISCONDU CT

The de fenda nt’s first issue is that juror misconduct tainted the ve rdict, denying him the right to a fa ir trial. The defe ndant alleg es misconduct on the part of Steven Sloan, who ultimately serve d

as j u ryfo re m an

. T h e d ef en d an ts u b m i t s t h at d u ri n g v oir dire all jurors we re as k ed whe ther they adhered t o t h e l eg al principle of innocent until proven g uiltybey ond a re asonable doubt. Sloan indicated that he subscribed to this principle. Howeve r, Patricia Sny der, a criminal defense attorney and member

of the jury

pool, reve aled a fter the t ri al t h at Sloan commented to her during a bre ak d u ri n g v oir

dire “ that th e po lic e do no t arres t in no c e nt p e op le a ndthat “ the de fe nd a nt i n th is c a se must be g uiltybeca

use he ha d been a

rre sted.”

The trial court hear d testimony from both Sloan and Sny der at a hea ring on the def

endant’ s mot ion fo r a

ne w t ri a l. S loan te sti fi e d th a t he ne ve r sa id that the po lic e do no t arr e st inn oc e nt p e op le

a ndthat he lis te ne d to a ll the e vid e nc e be fo re re a c hin g a ve rd ic t of g uil t. Slo a n e la bo rate d th a t hi s
conver satio n with Sny der c enter ed on his opinion that it would be difficult to defend someone he-5-

be lie ve d wa s g uil ty . Sl oa n te sti fi e d th a t he a ns we re d a ll v oir dire qu e sti on s truth fu lly a nd wa s a fair jur or in d e c idi ng the c a se . F oll ow ing the he ari ng , th e tr ia l c ou rt c omm e nte d th a t:

Mr . Sl oa n h a s b e e n a s c a nd id a s a ny wi tne ss I ’v e e ve r s e e n in this ca se

. I pe rs on a lly have a fee ling that the police do not arre st innocent people, but that doesn’t mea n that I do n’ t li ste n to the pr oo f and I ’m no t g oin g to make a de c isi on on the ma tte r u nti l I have he ard the proof, a nd that is exactly what thi s g entleman said he did.

. . . I have that op ini on , s o w hat? Ilis te n to the pro of andthat is e xac tly wh a t Mr . Sl oa n s a id he did.

I nit ia lly , w e no te that th e tr ia l cou rt ’s fi nd ing s re g ard ing a jur or ’s imp art ia lit y are e nti tle d to a pre sumption of corre ctness bec ause the se finding s involve a determination of a juror’ s demea nor and cr edibility . State v. Smit h, 993 S.W .2d 6, 29 (Tenn. 1999); State v. Alley , 776 S.W .2d 506, 518 (Tenn. 1989) . There fore , the burde n rests on t h e d ef endant to establish byclea r and c onvincing

e vid e nc e that the tr ia l c ou rt ’s de te rm inatio ns we re e rr on e ou s. I d. Th e fo rm a tio n o f an o pin ionwi ll not disqualify

a juror if he can lay

aside his opinion and re n d er a v er d i ct based on the evidenc e prese nted in court. See State v. Sammons, 656 S .W.2d 862, 869 (Te nn. Crim. App. 1982) ; Tenn. R. Crim. P. 24, Advisory Commi ssion Comments. There is, howeve r, a pr esumption of prejudice if a juror w illfullyconce als or fa ils to di sclose information on voir dire which ref lects on the juror’ s lack of impartiality . State v. Akins, 867 S.W .2d 350, 355 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1993)

.
After our re view of the rec ord, we find no indication that Sloan conce aled a ny information ref lecting a possible bias or partiality so as to r aise the presumption in A kins. We a re of the view that the def

endant ha s not proven juror misconduct. Sloan indicated that he could follow the law as applied to th e p r e s e n t c a s e

. A f te r o b s e r v in g Sl o a n ’ s d e me a n o r a t th e d e f

e n d a n t’ s mo ti o n f

o r n ew tr ia l, the tr ia l c ou rt

a c c re dit e d his te sti mon y in ev e ry re sp e c t. Th e de te rm inatio n of imp art ia lit y re sts within the trial cour t ’s d i s cre tion, and the re cord r efle cts no abuse of that discretion in the trial

c ou rt ’s fi nd ing that Slo a n w a s a fair jur or . A c c or din g ly , th e iss ue is w ith ou t me ri t.

P ROSECUTORIAL MIS CONDUCT

Next, the defenda nt alleg es t hree instances of prosec utorial misconduct, depriving him of a fair trial. The defe ndant arg ues that the prosec utor elicited fa lse testimony from Rog an, misstated

e vid e nc e du ri ng c los ing arg ume nt, a ndwi thh e ld B ra dy ma te ri a l so the de fe ns e could n ot u se it eff ectively during trial.

F als e Te st im ony and C los ing Ar gum e nt

The de fenda nt argues that the prosec utor enc ourag ed fa lse testimony from B erna

rd Rog an reg arding the leng th of his hospital stay and the e x tent of his injuries. The de fendant also arg ues that the prosec utor misstated the evidenc e by say ing that a bull et remained l odg ed in Rogan’s chest and that J ohn Ba ssilis said the def endant trie d to sell him a handg un shortly afte r the incident at the club.-6-

To be g in, we no te that “ [i]t is un pro fes si on a l c on du c t f or the pr os e c uto r i nte nti on a lly to misstate the evidenc e or mislead the jury as to the infe re n ces it m ay draw .” State v. Goltz, 111 S.W .3d 1, 6 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2003). I n determining whether statements made by the prosec utor constitute reve rsible er

ror, it is nece ssary

to determine w hether

the statements wer e improper a nd, if so, whether

the im p ro priety

aff ecte d the ver dict. State v. Sutton, 562 S .W.2d 820, 823 (Tenn. 1978); Har

ring ton v. State, 385 S.W .2d 758, 759 (Tenn. 1965) . We are g uided by such fa ctors as the intent of the prose cutor in lig ht of the fa cts and c ircumst an ce s of the ca se, the stre ng th or

we akn e ss o f the e vid e nc e , th e c ur a tiv e me a su re s, if a ny , un de rt ake n b y

the tr ia l c ou rt

in r e sp on se to the conduc t, and t he cumulative eff ect of the conduct. J udg e v. S tate, 539 S.W.2d 340, 344 (Tenn. C ri m

. Ap p

. 1 9 7 6 ). Ou r su p re m e co u rt h as o b s er v ed t h at “a rgu m en t o f co u n s el i s a v al u ab l e p ri v i l ege that sh ou ld n ot b e un du ly

re stric te d. Smith v

. State , 52 7 S.W. 2d 73 7, 73 9 (T e nn . 1 97 5) . O ur c ou rt s seek to g ive g reat latitude to c ounsel in e x pressing their views of the ca se to the jury .” I d. at 739;

se e a lso Sta te v. B ig be e , 8 85 S.W. 2d79 7, 80 9 ( Te nn . 1 99 4) . T he a c tio n o f a tr ial judg e in controlling arg uments of counse l will not be reve rsed a bsent an a

buse of discr etion. Smit h, 527 S.W .2d at 739.

Th e de fe nd a nt p oin ts t o tw o o c c ur re nc es w he re the pr os e c uto r a lle g e dly e lic ite d f

a lse testimony from Roga n. First, the medic al re cords of fer ed into evidenc e by

the State indicated that Roga n spent three to four day s in the hospital. However , on direc t examination R og an testified that he spent two or thr ee months in the hospital. Def ense c ounsel ques t i o n ed R o gan about the inconsistency

on cross-e x amination. On re- direc t e x amination, the prosec utor asked Rog an whe ther he un de rs too d me dic a l r e c or ds ve ry we ll a ndif

he kn ew whe th er di scha rg e me a nt f

ro m th e un it, hospital or the doctor. Second, the medical rec ords also indicated that Roga n had two bullet wounds

on his le ft thi g h a ndon e wo un d o n h is c he st. Whe n X -r a y s d id n ot r e ve a l a bu lle t in Rog a n’ s c he st, the doctor perf

ormed an exploratory surg ery but f ound no bullet. Howeve r, Rog an testified on dire ct examination that a bullet remained in his che st.

After our revie w of the tria l transcript, we conc lude that the prose cutor’s line of questioning was not improper . The d ef endant was g iven the opportunity to cross-e x amine Rog an on the di scr e pa nc ie s b e tw e e n h is t e sti mon y a ndthe me dic a l r e c or ds . T he re a ft e r, the c re dib ili ty determination was for the jury . The prose cutor’s que stioning on re -direc t appea rs t o b e aimed at pointing out that R og an did not understand medical records, not foster f alse testimony . Furthermore
, the def endant supports his c ontention that prosecutorial misconduct deprive d him of a fa ir trial by argu i n g t he State cannot knowingly use fa lse testimony

to convict an a ccuse d. Howeve r, the defe ndant has failed to show, and we fail to see, how Rogan’s confusion or e x ag g eration over how long he was h o s p i t al i zed served to de prive the de fendant of a fair trial. I f anything, Rog an’s confusion or e x ag g eration likelyhelped the de fense discredit his testimony

. Next, the defenda nt arg ues that the prose cutor e ng ag ed in two instance s of m is c o n d u c t during closing arg ument. The de fenda nt first ta k es issue with a statement in the prose cutor’s r ebuttal

arg ume nt a sse rt ing that Ro g a n w a s sh ot mor e than onc e

. Th e pr os e c uto r’ s sta te me nt is as f oll ow s:-7-

Prosecutor: The re is [sic] three ca s ings lying on the g round. Two bullets we nt throug h and throug h

. On e through [Be rnar d Rogan’s] leg and one throug h Peter L ang oy a’s leg . Where is the other bullet, it’s insi de of B erna rd Rog an. Following our re view, we conclude the prosec utor’s statement was improper beca use of the

ev i d en ce i n R o gan ’s m ed i ca l re co rd s t h at t h e d o ct o r d i d n o t fi n d a b u l l et i n R o gan ’s ch es t

. Al t h o u gh improper, the e rror was harmless in that it did not eff ect the outc ome of the tria l in light of the other

overw helming e videnceag ainst the defe ndant. The prosecutor’ s statement wa s single and isolated,

a ndwe do no t se e ho w the e rr or pr e jud ic e d th e de fe nd ant or inf e c te d th e tr ia l w ith un fair ne ss. Furth er m o re, we note that the de fendant did not object to this statement. It is well settled that witho u t a contemporane ous objection to a prose cutor’s state ment, the er ror is wa ived. State v. Fa rmer, 927 S.W .2d 582, 591 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1996); State v. Sutton, 562 S.W .2d 820, 825 (Tenn. 19 78 ). Ac c or din g ly , th is i ssu e is w ith ou t me ri t.

Th e ne xt portio n o f the pr os e c uto r’ s clo sin g arg ume nt the de fe nd a nt a lle g e s is e rr on e ou s is

a s f oll ow s:

Prosecutor: Now , caug ht in a very simple, simple misstatement, and I used the wor d misstatement g ener ously
, just plain not t elling the truth that he threw that g un away and then that g uy , Mr. B assilis comes in here and testifies, trying to g et rid of i t

. . .
De fe ns e Cou ns e l: O bje c tio n, Yo ur Ho no r. I no rm a lly

do n’ t ob je c t in a n a

rg ume nt, but that’s not what that witness said.

C o u r t : O v e rru l e d

. T h a t ’ s a q u e s t i o n f

o r t h e j u r y.

Prosecutor: You w ill have to decide what he [Mr. Ba ssilis ] said, but I thought that’ s what he sa id. . . .

After our re view of the rec ord and the applicable law, we conclude the prosec utor’s re marks

we re wi thi n th e g re a t la titud e g ive n to c ou ns e l du ri ng c los ing arg ume nt. Ar g ume nt o f c ou ns e l is a valu ab l e privileg e contr olled by the discre tion of the trial court. The trial court commented that interpre ting B assilis ’ t es t i m ony was for the jury and it was not an a

buse of discr etion for the trial court to g ive bo th parties f ull opportunityto arg ue their respe ctive int erpr etations of the e vidence

. Acc ording ly , this iss ue is without merit.
Brady Mater ial

The de fenda nt also alleg es that the prose cutor de lay ed in producing a statement by

Peter L ang oy a that the shooter

was a light-skinned man and a statement by Pasto Odwar that the shooter

came from a g ree n Mitsubis hi with chrome rims when other evide nce indica ted the def

endant wa s in a re d car

.-8-

We beg in our review bysetting out the e lements in Tennesse e nec essary to make a suc cessf

ul due proc ess claim under Br ady v. Mary land, 373 U.S. 83 (1963). The defe ndant must establish that he re quested the information, the State withheld the information, and the withheld information was both favora

ble and mate rial to the def ense. State v. Edg in, 902 S.W .2d 387, 389 (Tenn. 1995) . The defe ndant has the burden of proving a constitutional violation by a preponde ranc e of the e vidence

. State v. Spurlock, 874 S.W .2d 602, 610 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1993)

.
The de fenda nt insist s that the State should have f urnished the state ments, char acte rized by him as Br ady

materia l, prior to trial. I n sum, the defe ndant arg ues the stateme nts were both material

a nde xcu lpatory

a nd ha d th e y be e n p ro vid e d e arl ie r, he c ou ld h a ve be e n mo re effect iv e in c ro ssexamining L ang oy a and O dwar

.
I t is ou r v ie w that th e state me nts in qu e sti on are no t B ra dy ma te ri a l f

or tw o r e a so ns . F ir st, the state me nts are no t e xcu lpatory . Se ve ra l e y e wi tne sse s id e nti fi e d th e de fe nd a nt a s th e sh oo te r i n photogr aphic line- ups and the de fenda nt admitted that he was the s hooter but soug ht to just ify the shooting unde r a the ory of self- defe nse. Thus, any statements re g arding vehicle or shooter description do not ex culpate the defe ndant in light of t h e d ef endant’s own admission and the testimonyof seve ral other witness es

. S econd, the statements ar e not material. The mate riality of the e vid e nc e fo c us e s o n th e iss ue of g uil t or inn oc e nc e rathe r tha n o n th e de fe nd a nt’ s a bil ity to prepa re f or trial. See U nited States v. Ag urs, 427 U.S

. 97, 112 n. 20 (1976). The statements ar e not
ma te ri a l be c a us e the y

be ar n o re le va nc y to the de fe nd a nt’ s inno c e nc e , b ut r a the r w ou ld h a ve a t mo st aided the de fenda nt in cross-examination. Accor dingly , this iss ue is without merit.

EV ID EN TI ARY RUL IN GS

The de fenda nt next arg ues t hat t he trial court made err oneous evide ntiary ruling s reg arding his “ prior ba d a c ts. ” Spe c if

ic a lly , th e de fe nd a nt a

rg ue s th a t th e tr ia l c ou rt e rr e d by : (1 ) d e la y ing its ruling on his motion in limine to exclude mention of his prior bad ac ts, thereby allowing ref

ere nce t o gu n s i n cl u b s d u ri n g v oir dire , a n d ( 2 ) a l l o w i n g t h e p r o s e c u t o r t o q u e s t i o n h i mo n c r o s sex am i nation about his being banned f rom the club for

car ry ing a g un without ruling on the materia lityor re levanc y

of the e vidence

.
I n Tenne ssee, e vidence that a criminal defe ndant has committed some other c rime or ba d act ind e pe nd e nt o f that f

or wh ic h he is c ha

rg e d is g e ne ra lly

ina dmi ssi ble . T e nn . R. Ev id. 40 4( b) ; State v. Howell, 868 S.W.2d 238, 254 (Tenn. 1993). How ever , if evidenc e that a de fendant has committed

an ac t separate and a

part fr om the one for

which the defe ndant is on trial is r eleva nt to some material

ma tte r at is su e in the c a se on tr ial a ndif its pr ob a tiv e va lue is n ot o utw e ig he d b y the da ng e r o f i ts prejudicia l effe ct, the evide nce may be admitted. Tenn. R. Evid. 404(b); Howell, 868 S.W .2d at 254. Furthermore , beca

use of the risk of unfair prejudice to the defendant, Rule 404(b) establishes spec ial proce dures whic h must be followed bef ore e vidence of prior bad acts may be admitted. See Te nn. R. E vid . 4 04 (b ), Ad vis ory Com mit te e Co mm ents . I f the tr ia l c ou rt de te rm ine s th e e vid e nc e is

a dmi ssi ble , it

mus t, u po n r e qu e st, state on the re c or d the m ate ri a l is su e to w hic h th e e vid e nc e is rele vant and th e co u rt ’s reasons for a dmitti ng the evidenc e. I d. at 404(b)( 2). When a trial c ourt-9-

substantially

complies wi t h t h e proce dural re quirements of the rule, its determination will not be overturne d absent a n ab u se of discr etion. State v. DuB ose, 953 S.W.2d 649, 652 (Tenn. 1997). Ad dit ion a lly , c ro ss- e xami ning a de fe nd a nt a bo ut s pe c if

ic ins ta nc e s o f c on du c t w he n th e de fe ns e opens the door to c hara cter evidenc e has be en allowe d. See, e.g ., State v. Nichols, 877 S.W .2d 722 (Tenn. 1994) ; State v. Patton, 593 S .W.2d 913 (Tenn. 1979).

First, the de fenda nt arg ues t hat t he trial court erre d by delaying its ruling on his “prior ba d act” motion in l imine until right before L ang oy a’s testimony

. Be fore L ang oy a testified, the trial court he ld a jury -out 404(b) he aring to determine whether it would allow t estimony conce rning the defe ndant being banned f

rom the club for

causing trouble and bring ing in g uns. The trial c ourt noted

“ fr om w hat I ’v e he ard[L a ng oy a ] sa y , I wi ll a llo w y ou to a sk him if [the de fe nd a nt w a s] a llo we d in the c lub a ndhe c a n .

. . a ns we r n o, a ndthat’ s a s f ar a s I ’l l a llo w y ou to go wi th r e g ardto h is testimony .”

I t is the defendant’s position t hat the State was able to pr esent the alleg ation that he had be en b an n ed fr o m t h e cl u b fo r c arry i n g a gu n d u ri n g v oir dire b ec au s e o f t h e t ri al co u rt ’s d el ay ed ru l i n g. The de fenda nt claims that these alleg ations were prese nted in the following fashion:

Prosecutor: So what if a club owner say s we don’t like g uns [i n] our club or our bar
, we a sk people not to bring g uns in there, do y ou think that’s rea sonable?

. . . . Prosecutor: So of cour se the ba r owne r is being rea sonable sa y ing w e don’t want
w e ap o n s i n h e r e , y o u ’ r e n o ta l l o w e d t o h a v e t h e ma n d a l s o w e d o n ’ tw a n tt h e m ?

Fr om the indictments a lone, the potential jurors could tell the case involved a handg un in a club. Acc ording ly , a fa ir rea ding of the tran s cr i p t i s that the prosec utor’s inquiries we re mode led afte r this particular

night in question, not some pre vious occurr ence . After our thoroug h revie w of the v oir dire tr a ns c ri pt, we fail to see a ny imp ro prie ty in the pr os e c uto r’ s q ue sti on ing . T his iss ue is without merit.

Se c o n d
, th e d e f

e n d a n t ar g u e s th a t it w a s e rr o n e o u s f o r th e tria l c o u r t to n o t f o ll ow the pr oc e du re s se t ou t in Te nn e sse e Rul e of Ev ide nc e 40 4( b) wh e n it a llo we d th e pr os e c uto r t o a sk L ang oy a on cr oss-examination about the defe ndant’s p ri o r b ad acts. On cross- examination, the defe ndant testified that he ha d never been told he was not allowed in the c lub. After w hich, the prosec utor asked the court for permission to cross-e x amine the de fendant about being banned f rom the c lub fo r h a vin g a g un a ndso ug ht t o h a ve L a ng oy a br ou g ht b a c k inc a se the de fe nd a nt d e nie d it

. Def ense c ounsel interjec ted that “Mr. L ang oy a has alre ady testified and I

don’t think that would be in rebuttal.”

We a re of t he vi ew th at ther e are tw o r e a so ns the tr ia l c ou rt didno t e rr

in a llo wi ng c ro ssexamination of the defe ndant about h i s d en y i n g that he wa s banned f rom the club. F irst, the de fe nd a nt fa ile d to mak e a c on te mpo rane ou s obje c tio n to the Sta te ’s re qu e st t o c ro ss- e xami ne him thus waiving the issue. See Te nn. R. App. P. 36(a). De fense counsel’s inter jection foc used on re

--10-

calling L ang oy a as a

rebuttal witness, not on the propriety of t he S tate’s right to cross-examine the defe n d an t

. Second, eve n if the def endant ha d objected, he failed to re quest a sec ond jury -out he ari ng

. Th e tr ia l c ou rt ha d a lr e a dy c on du c te d a he ari ng a s r e qu ir e d b y Rul e 40 4( b) a ndha d p ro pe rl y lim ite d the a dmi ssi bil ity

of the e vid e nc e . Se e Te nn . R. Ev id. 40 4( b) . T he de fe nd a nt i s se e min g ly claiming that the trial court should have had another jury -out hearing and made another finding as to the rele vancy

of the evidenc e, but he did not of fer any support in his brief for

the proposition that the court should have su a s po nte he ld this se c on d h e ari ng . T he de fe nd ant op e ne d th e do or to
c ro ss- e xami natio n o f h is p ri or ba d a c ts w he n he re pe a te dly de nie d b e ing tol d h e wa s n ot a llo we d in the club; there fore he is not entitled to relief on this issue.

UN RE LA TED AR RE STS

Next, the defenda nt argue s that the State improperly disclosed he wa s arr ested on a n outstandi ng war

rant unre lated to the cha rg es in this case. The disclosure oc curr ed during the de fe nd a nt’ s c ro ss- e xami natio n o f O ff ic e r Joh nn y

Cr umb y . T he c oll oq uy

is a s f oll ow s:

D e f e n s e Co u n s e l: D idy o u in te r v ie w [t h e d e f e n d a n t] ?

Wit ness: No, ma’a m, I d id not. He was a rre sted on outstanding w arr ants cha rg ed wi th an u nr e la te d v iol a tio n u nr e la te d to thi s ca se a nd he did no t ma ke a state me nt t o
me.

Def ense Counsel: Oka y . Thank y ou.
We note, the def

endant f ailed to object or

ask the c ourt to strike Off icer Cr umby ’s answe r and has the ref

ore w aived the issue on a

ppeal. See Tenn. R. App. P

. 36(a) . Howeve r, the de fenda nt arg ues that we should determine the disc losure constitutes plain er ror. The re a

re five fac tors which

mus t be pr e se nt f

or a c ou rt to d e te rm ine “ plain e rr or ” e xists : (a ) the re c or d mu st c le arl y e sta bli sh wh a t oc c ur

re d inthe tr ia l c ou rt ; (b ) a c le ar andun e qu ivo c a l rule of la w m us t ha ve be e n b re a c he d; (c ) a su bs ta nti a l r ig ht o f the a c c us e d mu st h a ve be e n a dv e rs e ly a ff e c te d; (d) the a ccuse d did not waive the issue f or tac tical re asons; and (e) consideration of the err or is “nec essary to do substantial just ice.”

State v. Smit h, 24 S.W .3d 2 7 4 , 2 8 2 (Tenn. 2000) (citing Adkisson, 899 S.W .2d at 641-42). Co mp le te c o n s id e r a ti o n o f a ll f iv e f a c to r s is u n n e c e s s ar y if a t le a s t o n e is ab s e n t. I d

. at 283. F urthe rm or e , th e plain erro r mu st be suc h th a t it pr ob ably c ha ng e d th e ou tc ome of the tr ia l. Adkisson, 899 S.W .2d at 642.

I n h is brief, the de fenda nt failed to articulate exactly how Off icer Crumby ’s statement

am o unts to plain error. T he def endant’ s entire plain e rror arg ument consists of “[a]pply ing e ach fac tor to [t he def

endant’ s] case, this Court should find each e lement met. .

. .” We fail to see how Offic er Crumby ’s unre sponsive answe r amoun t s t o plain err or. I n our view, the only fac tor-11-

app lic able to the de fe nd a nt’ s a rg ume nt i s th a t th e re c or d e sta bli sh e d w hat oc c ur

re d at tria l. There fore the issue is without merit.

SUF F ICIENCY OF THE E VIDENCE

F i n a l l y, t h e d e f

e n d a n tc h a l l e n g e s t h e s u f f i c i e n c y o f

t h e c o n v i c t i n g e v i d e n c e

. S p e c i f i c a l l y, he ar g ues that the State failed to prove the el em en t o f preme ditation. Our revie w beg ins with the well-e stablished rule that once a j ury finds a def

endant g uilty , his or her pr esumption of innocenc e is removed a nd repla ced w ith a presumption of g uilt. S tate v. Evans, 838 S.W.2d 185, 191 (Tenn. 1992). Ther efor e, on appe al, the convic ted def endant ha s the burden of

demonstrating to this C ourt why the evidenc e will not support the jury ’s ver di ct

. State v. Carruthe rs, 35 S.W.3d 516, 557-58 (Tenn. 2000) ; State v. Tug g le, 639 S.W.2d 913, 914 (Tenn. 1982). To mee t this burden, the defe ndant must establish that no “rational trie r of f act” could have found the e ssential elements of the c ri me be y on d a

re a so na ble do ub t. Jac ks on v. Vi rg ini a , 44 3 U. S. 30 7, 31 9 (1 97 9) ; State v. Ev a ns , 108 S.W .3d 231, 236 (Tenn. 2003); Tenn. R. App. P. 13(e) . I n contra st, the jury ’s ver dict approve d by the tr ia l ju dg e a c c re dit s the Sta te ’s wi tne sse s a nd re so lve s a ll c on fl ic ts i n f a vo r o f the Sta te . St a te v. Har ris, 839 S.W .2d 54, 75 (Tenn. 1992). The State is e ntitled to the strong est leg itimate view of the evidenc e and all rea sonable infere nces which may be draw n from that evide nce. Ca rruther s, 35 S.W. 3da t 55 8; T ug g le , 6 39 S.W. 2da t 91 4. Qu e sti on s c on c e rn ing the c re dib ili ty of the wi tne sse s, conflicts in trial testimony , the weig ht and value to be g iven the eviden ce, and all fa ctual issues raised by the evidence are resolved by the t rier of fac t and not this Court. State v. Bland, 958 S.W.2d 651, 659 (Tenn. 1997). We do not attempt to re- weig h or re -eva luate the e vidence . State v. Reid, 91 S.W .3d 247, 277 (Tenn. 2002); Bla nd, 958 S.W .2d at 659. Likewise, we do not replac e the jury ’s infere nces dr awn f

rom the circ umstantial evidence with our own infer ence s. See State v. Elkins, 102 S.W .3d 581, 582 (Tenn. 2003) ; Reid, 91 S.W .3d at 277.
A pre meditated killing is one “ done af ter th e ex erc ise of re flec tion and judgme nt.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13- 202(d). To be preme ditated, the intent to kill must have bee n formed be fore the act itself, a nd the ac cused must be suff iciently fre e fr om excitement and passion in or d er to be preme ditated. I d . An intentional act r equire s that the person ha ve the de sire to eng ag e in the

c o n d u c t

. Id

. § 3 9

- 1 1

- 1 0 6 ( a ) ( 1 8 )

. W h e t h e r p r e m e d i t a t i o n i s p r e s e n ti s a q u e s t i o n o f

f a c tf o r t h e j u r y, and it may be inferre d from the circ umstances surrounding the murder . Bla nd, 958 S.W .2d at 660; Sta te v. An de rs on , 835 S.W. 2d 60 0, 60 5 (T e nn . Crim . App . 199 2)

. I n p art ic ula r, the us e of

a de a dly

wea pon upon an unarmed victim is evidence of pre meditation. See B land, 958 S.W.2d at 660.

Af te r c on sid e ri ng the e vid e nc e in the lig ht m os t f a vo ra bl e to th e Sta te , w e c on c lud e that a rational jury

could have found t he defenda nt g uiltyof attempted f irst-deg ree murder. T o sustain the defe ndant’s convic tion, the State was require d to pr ove that the defe ndant intentionally and af ter the exercise of

ref lection and judgme nt attempted to kill Be rnar d Roga n. See Te nn. Code Ann. §§ 39- 12-101, 39-13- 202. At trial, the evidenc e established that afte r g etting into a n alterc ation with Roga n
a t th e e ntr a nc e to the c lub , the de fe nd a nt wa lke d aw a y a nd re tr ie ve d a g un fr om the c ar, hidit i n h is po c ke t, w a lke d b a c k to the c lub e ntr a nc e a ndsh ot R og a n at poin t- bl a nk rang e . T he re c or d is undisputed that Roga n was una rmed a nd, other than the defe ndant’s testimony , there is no evidence-12-

that Roga n threatened or

intimi dated the defe ndant. We a re awa re that there was some c onflicting t e s t i m o n y a ttr i a l
, b u ta s s e s s i n g t h e c r e d i b i l i t y o f w i t n e s s e s i s t h e s o l e p r o v i n c e o f t h e j u r y. Acc ording ly , we c onclude the e vidence suppo rt s all the nec essary elements for

the def endant’ s attempted first-de g ree murder c onviction.

III . C ON CL USI ON

Af te r o ur re vie w of the re c or d an d the pa rt ie s bri e fs , we a ff

ir m the jud g me nt o f the tr ia l c ou rt

.

___________________________________ J .C. McL I N, J UDGE