Filed 12/11/15 SCC Acquisitions v. Superior Court CA4/3

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for 

publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication

or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. 

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION THREE

SCC ACQUISITIONS, INC.,

 Petitioner,

v.

THE SUPERIOR COURT OF ORANGE 

COUNTY,

 Respondent;

WESTERN ALBUQUERQUE LAND 

HOLDINGS, LLC,

 Real Party in Interest.

 G050546

 (Super. Ct. No. 30-2012-00574257)

 O P I N I O N

Original proceedings; petition for a writ of mandate to challenge an order of 

the Superior Court of Orange County, Timothy J. Stafford, Judge. Petition denied. 

Motion to dismiss appeal. Denied.

Miller Barondess, Louis R. Miller, Amnon Z. Siegel and Mira Hashmall for 

Petitioner.

No appearance for Respondent.

K&L Gates and Kevin S. Asfour for Real Party in Interest.

* * *
2

INTRODUCTION

Western Albuquerque Land Holdings, LLC (Western), is the judgment 

creditor of a $47 million judgment against SCC Acquisitions, Inc. (SCC). As part of its 

efforts to enforce the judgment, Western propounded requests for production of 

documents to SCC pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 708.030

1

(further code 

references are to the Code of Civil Procedure unless otherwise specified) and later 

brought a motion to compel SCC to respond further to those requests. The trial court 

granted Western’s motion to compel as to requests Nos. 14, 21, 22, 23, and 37. SCC 

appeals from the order granting Western’s motion to compel.

Western has moved to dismiss the appeal on the ground the order granting 

its motion to compel is not an appealable postjudgment order under section 904.1, 

subdivision (a)(2). We exercise our discretion to treat the appeal as a petition for writ of 

mandate and deny it. The trial court did not err by granting Western’s motion to compel. 

We conclude the trial court had authority under section 708.030 to compel SCC to 

produce documents in its possession or control regarding third parties, and we reject 

SCC’s contentions that requests Nos. 14, 21, 22, 23, and 37 violate the privacy rights of 

third parties and that requests Nos. 21, 22, 23, and 37 are overbroad. 

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

I. Background

In June 2012, Barclays Capital Real Estate Inc. (Barclays) obtained a civil 

judgment against SCC in the amount of $47,186,985.38 in a New York State court. 

 

 

1

 Under Code of Civil Procedure section 708.030, subdivision (a), “[t]he judgment 

creditor may demand that any judgment debtor produce and permit the party making the 

demand . . . to inspect and to copy a document that is in the possession, custody, or 

control of the party on whom the demand is made in the manner provided in [the Civil 

Discovery Act (Code Civ. Proc., § 2016.010 et seq.)], if the demand requests information 

to aid in enforcement of the money judgment.” While section 708.030 speaks of 

demands to inspect and copy documents, Western and SCC use the term “requests for 

production of documents,” and so shall we.
3

Barclays filed an application in Orange County Superior Court for entry of judgment on a 

sister-state judgment. The superior court entered judgment on the application. In 

November 2012, Barclays assigned the judgment to Western. 

In January 2014, Western obtained an order to conduct the judgment debtor 

examination of SCC through its corporate secretary, Bruce Cook. During the judgment 

debtor examination, Cook testified, among other things, that SCC was once a real estate 

acquisition company but had not been viable since about September 2008, when Lehman 

Brothers filed bankruptcy and the real estate market collapsed. According to Cook, SCC 

has no money or meaningful assets. 

During Cook’s examination, a dispute arose over the issue of whether he 

should have to answer questions relating to various nonparty entities. Cook, who is an 

attorney, asserted the attorney-client privilege. During a recess in the examination, 

counsel contacted the presiding judicial officer, who asked for briefing on the issue. The 

precise issue presented was, “[s]hould the creditor be permitted to examine this witness 

who they designated as to third party entities when he is an attorney and may be called 

upon to disclose attorney/client privileged materials?” In April 2014, after reviewing the 

parties’ briefs and hearing oral argument, the court issued a ruling resolving that issue as 

follows: “No. The creditor cannot compel a witness of a debtor to disclose[] privileged 

material [p]ertaining to 3rd parties when he is there to testify regard[ing] matters of the 

debtor, SCC.” The court denied the request to examine Cook about the third party 

entities for which he was the attorney.

II. The Requests for Production

Western propounded requests for production of documents on SCC 

pursuant to section 708.030. SCC objected to many of Western’s requests but also 

produced some 217 pages of documents. SCC objected to requests for production 

Nos. 14, 21, 22, 23, and 37 and declined to produce any documents in response to them. 

Those five requests for production read as follows: 
4

Request for Production No. 14: “Any and all DOCUMENTS sufficient to 

show the name and address of each business in which each of [SCC’s] current or former 

officers, shareholders, and/or directors now has an interest and the nature of each such 

person’s interest in each such business.” 

Request for Production No. 21: “Any and all DOCUMENTS 

CONCERNING ASSETS owned by any entities that currently are or previously were a 

subsidiary or affiliate of [SCC].” 

Request for Production No. 22: “Any and all DOCUMENTS 

CONSTITUTING BANK AND BROKERAGE RECORDS of any entities that currently 

are or previously were a subsidiary or affiliate of [SCC].”

Request for Production No. 23: “Any and all DOCUMENTS 

CONSTITUTING FINANCIAL RECORDS of any entities that currently are or 

previously were a subsidiary or affiliate of [SCC].” 

Request for Production No. 37: “The name(s) of any of YOUR current or 

former subsidiaries or affiliates that have been involved in any bankruptcy, insolvency, or 

receivership proceeding, the case number and court of each such proceeding, and the date 

on which each such proceeding was filed.” 

SCC objected to those requests on these grounds: (1) the requests sought 

documents of third parties, (2) the requests sought documents protected by the right of 

privacy, (3) the requests were vague and ambiguous, and (4) the requests were 

burdensome and unduly expansive because the terms “DOCUMENTS,” “ASSETS,” 

“BANK AND BROKERAGE RECORDS,” and “FINANCIAL RECORDS” were too 

broadly defined. 

III. Motion to Compel

Counsel for Western initiated the meet and confer process on March 24, 

2014, by sending an e-mail to counsel for SCC. In the e-mail, counsel asserted that 

SCC’s responses to requests Nos. 14, 21, 22, 23, and 37 were “deficient,” SCC had made 
5

“impermissible boilerplate general objections,” and, from the responses and objections, 

Western could not tell whether SCC was withholding responsive documents. Western’s 

counsel proposed extending the deadline for bringing a motion to compel until after the 

trial court ruled on a pending motion that might determine the permissible scope of 

judgment debtor discovery. On March 25, SCC’s counsel, responding by e-mail, agreed 

to the extension of time. 

On May 7, 2014, counsel for Western resumed the meet and confer process 

by sending an e-mail to SCC’s counsel, regarding requests for production Nos. 14, 21, 

22, 23, and 37. In addition to reiterating points made in the March 24, 2014 e-mail, 

counsel stated in the May 7 e-mail: “[S]everal of the requests at issue seek documents 

pertaining to SCC’s current or former subsidiaries. [Western] plainly has the right to 

discovery regarding such matters—indeed, in the recent briefing submitted to the court, 

you represented that you have no objection to responding to inquiries ‘about entities in 

which SCC has had an interest.’” Counsel for SCC responded with an e-mail asking for 

additional time to respond to the points raised in the May 7 e-mail and agreeing to an 

extension of time to bring a motion to compel. 

SCC thereafter retained new counsel, who sent to Western’s counsel a letter 

dated May 14, 2014, stating, in regard to requests for production Nos. 14, 21, 22, 23, and 

37: “There are a number of deficiencies with the RFPs, and SCC stands by its 

objections.” In the letter, SCC’s counsel asserted the requests for production 

impermissibly sought documents from third parties, were overbroad, and used “a number 

of undefined terms (e.g., subsidiary or affiliate) that make it impossible for SCC to know 

what documents [Western] is requesting.” SCC’s counsel also asserted that request 

No. 14 “violates the privacy rights of third party individuals.” 

Western moved to compel further responses to all of its requests for 

production (the motion to compel). The trial court granted the motion to compel as to 
6

requests Nos. 14, 21, 22, 23, and 37, and denied the motion to compel as to the remainder 

of the requests. SCC timely appealed from the order granting the motion to compel. 

APPELLATE JURISDICTION

We first address our jurisdiction to hear this matter. Western has filed a 

motion to dismiss the appeal on the ground the order granting its motion to compel is not 

an appealable order under section 904.1, subdivision (a). SCC argues in response the 

order granting the motion to compel is appealable under section 904.1, subdivision (a)(2) 

as a postjudgment order. 

Under section 904.1, subdivision (a)(2), an appeal may be taken from an 

order made after an appealable judgment. Despite the broad language of section 904.1, 

subdivision (a)(2), not all postjudgment orders are appealable. (Lakin v. Watkins 

Associated Industries (1993) 6 Cal.4th 644, 651.) To be appealable, a postjudgment 

order must satisfy two requirements: (1) the issues raised by the appeal from the order 

must be different from those arising out of the appeal from the judgment and (2) the order 

must affect, enforce, or stay execution of the judgment. (Id. at pp. 651-652.) 

Postjudgment orders that are nonappealable tend to fall into two categories: (1) orders 

that are preliminary to a later judgment, at which time they can be challenged by appeal,

and (2) orders that pertain to preparation of a record for use in a later appeal. (Id. at 

pp. 652-653.) “[P]ostjudgment orders making a final determination of rights or

obligations of parties” are appealable even if they do not “add to or subtract from the 

judgment.” (Id. at p. 653.) 

Several cases have considered whether postjudgment discovery orders are 

directly appealable. In Rogers v. Wilcox (1944) 62 Cal.App.2d 978, 979, the Court of 

Appeal held an order denying a motion to quash an order for the appearance of the 

judgment debtor was not appealable. The court explained: “Neither an order for 

appearance of a judgment debtor nor the order for his examination is in itself an end. 
7

Each is merely a step reviewable only after a final order has been made. It adjudicates no 

rights; it establishes no liabilities. [Citation.] It is not a special order made after final 

judgment though made subsequent to entry of the judgment. [Citation.] It bears no 

relation to the judgment. It is a separate proceeding in an original action which is a 

substitute for the creditor’s bill. [Citation.]” (Id. at pp. 979-980.)

The postjudgment order under consideration in Roden v. 

AmerisourceBergen Corp. (2005) 130 Cal.App.4th 211, 214-215 (Roden), was, as in this 

case, to compel production of documents under section 708.030. The Court of Appeal 

concluded the order was not appealable because it made no final determination of the 

rights and obligations of the parties. (Roden, supra, at p. 216.) The underlying judgment 

adjudicated the plaintiff’s rights to employment benefits arising out of an employment 

contract but did not quantify all of those benefits, and the trial court had retained 

jurisdiction to resolve the remaining issues regarding benefits at a later time. (Id. at 

pp. 216-217.) The postjudgment order granting the motion to compel was, therefore, “a 

prelude” to a later order adjudicating the amount of benefits owing. (Id. at p. 217.) Once 

the order adjudicating the amount of benefits had been entered, an appeal from that order 

might include a challenge to the discovery order. (Ibid.)

In Macaluso v. Superior Court (2013) 219 Cal.App.4th 1042, 1044-1045 

(Macaluso), a panel of the Court of Appeal, Fourth District, Division One, addressed 

whether a postjudgment order compelling a third party to comply with a subpoena duces 

tecum and produce documents at a judgment debtor examination was appealable. The 

court concluded the order was appealable because the subpoena was issued to “a 

previously uninvolved third party for purely investigative purposes.” (Id. at p. 1049.) 

The court distinguished Roden on the ground the order in that case “resolved disputes 

between parties to an ongoing lawsuit preparatory to a later ruling that would become 

encompassed in a later final judgment.” (Macaluso, supra, at p. 1050.) In contrast, the 

order at hand was not preparatory to a later determination from which the third party 
8

could appeal, but itself was a final determination that the third party had to produce 

certain documents in response to a subpoena. (Ibid.)

On the heels of Macaluso, a different panel of the Court of Appeal, Fourth 

District, Division One, reached a different conclusion in Fox Johns Lazar Pekin & 

Wexler, APC v. Superior Court (2013) 219 Cal.App.4th 1210 (Fox). Although Fox was 

an appeal from an order for a third party judgment debtor examination under 

section 708.120, the Court of Appeal, citing Rogers v. Wilcox, supra, 62 Cal.App.2d 978, 

held the order was not appealable because it was just one step in the course of a 

proceeding to obtain information about the judgment debtor’s assets. (Fox, supra, at 

p. 1215.) The court found the circumstances of the matter to be extraordinary and 

exercised its discretion to treat the appeal as a petition for writ of mandate. (Id. at 

p. 1218.) As to Macaluso, the Fox court stated: “We are aware of the recent opinion 

from this court issued after oral argument here, wherein the court held that a third party 

may appeal an order overruling all of the third party’s objections to the subpoena and 

granting a motion to compel compliance with the subpoena. [Citation.] We think the 

better approach here, on the unique facts before us where it is not clear if the superior 

court will be issuing further orders regarding the very discovery at issue, is to treat the 

appeal like a petition for writ of mandate.” (Fox, supra, at p. 1218, fn. 4.)

These authorities are inconclusive as to whether the order granting the

motion to compel is appealable. Certainly the issues raised by the appeal from that order 

are different from those that would arise out of an appeal from the underlying judgment. 

(See Lakin v. Watkins Associated Industries, supra, 6 Cal.4th at p. 651.) The order, like 

those in Rogers v. Wilcox and Fox, is just one step in the course of a proceeding to obtain 

information about the judgment debtor’s assets. Unlike the situation in Macaluso, the 

order does not compel a third party to comply with a subpoena. Roden dealt directly with 

an order granting a postjudgment motion to compel, and yet, unlike the situation in 

Roden, the order granting the motion to compel does not appear to be preliminary or 
9

preparatory to a later determination from which an appeal can be taken. Western has not 

identified what any future determination might be. The underlying judgment in this case 

fully adjudicated the parties’ rights and obligations. 

We have the power to treat the appeal as a petition for writ of mandate, and 

do so here. (Morehart v. County of Santa Barbara (1994) 7 Cal.4th 725, 744-747; Olson 

v. Cory (1983) 35 Cal.3d 390, 401.) In Olson v. Cory, supra, 35 Cal.3d at pages 398, 

400-401, the Supreme Court found it appropriate to treat an appeal from a nonappealable 

order as a petition for writ of mandate because there was an inadequate remedy at law, 

the records and briefs in substance included the elements necessary for proceeding as a 

writ of mandate, there was no indication the trial court would appear as a party in the writ 

proceedings, the appealability of the challenged order was not clear, and the parties urged 

the court to decide the issue rather than to dismiss the appeal. Dismissing the appeal 

instead of exercising the court’s discretion to reach the merits through a writ of mandate 

proceeding would be “‘“unnecessarily dilatory and circuitous.”’” (Id. at p. 401.) 

The conditions identified in Olson v. Cory are, with one exception, present 

in this case. SCC has no adequate legal remedy if the order granting the motion to 

compel is not appealable. While SCC in theory can challenge the order in an appeal from 

a later judgment or order that is appealable, it is not certain such a judgment or order 

would ever be made. SCC contends the documents subject to the order granting the 

motion to compel are subject to the right of privacy. An appeal from a later judgment or 

order, made after the documents are produced, would not adequately protect that right. 

The briefs and appellate record are thorough and meet the needs for writ review, and 

there is no indication the trial court would be any more than a nominal party to the writ 

proceeding. As we have explained, whether the order granting the motion to compel is 

appealable is far from clear. Although Western seeks dismissal of the appeal, this one 

exception is insignificant. 
10

DISCUSSION

I. Standard of Review

“The standard of review for a discovery order is abuse of discretion.” 

(People ex rel. Harris v. Sarpas (2014) 225 Cal.App.4th 1539, 1552.) “‘The appropriate 

test for abuse of discretion is whether the trial court exceeded the bounds of reason. 

When two or more inferences can reasonably be deduced from the facts, the reviewing 

court has no authority to substitute its decision for that of the trial court.’ [Citation.] [¶] 

‘The abuse of discretion standard . . . measures whether, given the established evidence, 

the act of the lower tribunal falls within the permissible range of options set by the legal 

criteria. . . .’” (Bank of America, N.A. v. Superior Court (2013) 212 Cal.App.4th 1076, 

1089.) The scope of the trial court’s discretion is limited by law governing the subject of 

the action taken. (Ibid.) An action that transgresses the bounds of the applicable legal 

principles is deemed an abuse of discretion. (Ibid.)

II. The Trial Court Had Authority to Compel SCC to 

Produce Documents Relating to Third Parties.

The trial court granted the motion to compel further responses to request 

No. 14, which asked for documents concerning SCC’s “current or former officers, 

shareholders, and/or directors,” and requests Nos. 21, 22, 23, and 37, which asked for 

documents concerning entities that are or were a SCC “subsidiary or affiliate” or SCC 

“subsidiaries or affiliates.” SCC argues the trial court lacked statutory authority to grant 

the motion to compel because section 708.030 does not authorize a judgment creditor to 

compel production of a third party’s documents. 

We independently review issues of statutory construction. (Smith v. 

Superior Court (2006) 39 Cal.4th 77, 83.) The fundamental task of statutory 

interpretation is to ascertain the Legislature’s intent to effectuate the statute’s purpose. 

(Ibid.) We do so first by considering the language of the statute itself, giving the words 
11

used their ordinary meaning. (Ibid.) If the statutory language is unambiguous, the plain 

meaning controls and consideration of extrinsic sources to determine the Legislature’s 

intent is unnecessary. (Kavanaugh v. West Sonoma County Union High School Dist.

(2003) 29 Cal.4th 911, 919.) We read the statute as a whole to harmonize and give effect 

to all parts. (Ste. Marie v. Riverside County Regional Park & Open-Space Dist. (2009) 

46 Cal.4th 282, 289.)

A judgment creditor may conduct discovery directly against the judgment 

debtor by means of a judgment debtor examination (§ 708.110), written interrogatories 

(§ 708.020), and requests for production of documents (§ 708.030). Section 708.030, 

subdivision (a) provides: “The judgment creditor may demand that any judgment debtor 

produce and permit the party making the demand, or someone acting on that party’s 

behalf, to inspect and to copy a document that is in the possession, custody, or control of 

the party on whom the demand is made in the manner provided in [the Civil Discovery 

Act], if the demand requests information to aid in enforcement of the money judgment. 

The judgment debtor shall respond and comply with the demand in the manner and 

within the time provided by [the Civil Discovery Act].”

In contrast to discovery directed to the judgment debtor, discovery directed 

to a third party is limited to an appearance before the court or a referee by the third party

to answer questions about property or debt in which the judgment debtor has an interest. 

(§ 708.120.) The first sentence of section 708.120, subdivision (a) reads: “Upon ex parte 

application by a judgment creditor who has a money judgment and proof by the judgment 

creditor by affidavit or otherwise to the satisfaction of the proper court that a third person 

has possession or control of property in which the judgment debtor has an interest or is 

indebted to the judgment debtor in an amount exceeding two hundred fifty dollars ($250), 

the court shall make an order directing the third person to appear before the court, or 

before a referee appointed by the court, at a time and place specified in the order, to 

answer concerning such property or debt.”
12

Section 708.030, subdivision (a) is unambiguous. In plain terms, it places 

but two limitations on the scope of requests for production of documents. First, the 

document requested must be “in the possession, custody, or control of the party on whom 

the demand is made.” (Ibid.) Second, the document requested must have “information to 

aid in enforcement of the money judgment.” (Ibid.) If the document requested is “in the 

possession, custody, or control of the party on whom the demand is made” and has 

“information to aid in enforcement of the money judgment,” then the document is subject 

to discovery under section 708.030, regardless whether the document relates to the 

judgment debtor or to third parties.

SCC argues such a reading of section 708.030 permits a judgment creditor 

to obtain indirectly from the judgment debtor documents which it cannot obtain directly 

from the third party and “renders Section 708.120’s requirements meaningless.” There 

is, however, a difference between discovery about a third party and discovery from a 

third party. Documents that are in the possession, custody, or control of the judgment 

debtor are not third party documents: they are judgment debtor documents, and 

discovery aimed to obtain them is not third party discovery. Section 708.030 does not 

permit the judgment creditor to obtain documents that are not in the possession, custody, 

or control of the judgment debtor. Nor does section 708.030 permit the judgment creditor 

to obtain an order compelling a third party to appear before the court or referee to answer 

questions about property or debt in which the judgment debtor has an interest. If the 

judgment creditor wants to discover such information directly from the third party, then 

the procedures of section 708.120 must be followed. But that was not the situation here. 

The trial court compelled production of documents in the possession, custody, or control 

of SCC, the judgment debtor, an outcome authorized by section 708.030. 

SCC relies on Fox, supra, 219 Cal.App.4th 1210, for the proposition that 

third party judgment debtor discovery is limited to the procedure of section 708.120. In 

Fox, the Court of Appeal explained: “Simply put, the purpose of section 708.120 is to 
13

provide a tool that allows a judgment creditor to find property or money that is owed to 

the judgment debtor. To this end, it allows the judgment creditor to obtain an order to 

examine a third party who it believes possesses the judgment debtor’s property or owes 

the judgment debtor a debt over $250. . . . [T]he statute clearly provides that the third 

party is to answer questions regarding the subject property or debt. Section 708.120 does 

not allow for a more expansive examination.” (Fox, supra, at p. 1221.) As Fox

recognizes, section 708.120 limits the scope of discovery against a third party. 

Section 708.120 does not, however, apply to discovery against the judgment debtor.

SCC also suggests that the trial court’s ruling on the scope of Cook’s 

examination constituted an order barring any third party discovery. The court ruled only 

that Cook could not be made to disclose information protected by the attorney-client 

privilege. The court said nothing about whether SCC could be compelled to produce 

documents in its possession, custody, or control, pertaining to other entities. The court 

stated in its ruling: “A judgment creditor may employ a debtor’s exam process to explore 

possible alter ego theories and to aid in enforcing a judgment. [Citation.] [¶] However, 

a different rule applies to examination of 3rd parties in the judgment enforcement 

context. Under CCP 708.120, the exam is limited to exploring the 3rd party’s possession 

of the judgment debtor’s property and the debt owed.” The trial court correctly stated the 

rule. Requests Nos. 14, 21, 23, and 37 did not constitute an examination of a third party, 

but instead sought documents from the judgment debtor (SCC) to explore possible alter 

ego theories. Thus, the ruling on the motion to compel was consistent with the ruling on 

the scope of Cook’s examination.

2

 

 

 

2

 Our disposition of this matter would not be different if the order granting the motion 

to compel was inconsistent with the order regarding Cook’s testimony. The order 

regarding Cook’s testimony was interlocutory and therefore could be modified or 

retracted at any time before entry of a final judgment. (See Yeboah v. Progeny Ventures, 

Inc. (2005) 128 Cal.App.4th 443, 449.)
14

III. The Requests for Production Did Not Violate Privacy 

Rights of Third Parties and Were Not Overbroad.

Having determined the trial court had the authority to make an order 

granting the motion to compel, we turn to the issue whether the order was correct. It was. 

The trial court did not abuse its discretion by ordering SCC to respond to requests 

Nos. 14, 21, 22, 23, and 37.

A. Request No. 14

Request No. 14 asked for documents “sufficient to show the name and 

address of each business in which each of [SCC’s] current or former officers, 

shareholders, and/or directors now has an interest and the nature of each such person’s 

interest in each such business.” 

SCC argues request No. 14 violates the privacy rights of its current and 

former officers, shareholders, and directors. The right of privacy is an “‘inalienable 

right’” secured by article I, section 1 of the California Constitution. (Valley Bank of 

Nevada v. Superior Court (1975) 15 Cal.3d 652, 656.) The right of privacy protects 

against the unwarranted, compelled disclosure of private or personal information and 

“extends to one’s confidential financial affairs as well as to the details of one’s personal 

life.” (Ibid.) “‘Personal financial information comes within the zone of privacy 

protected by article I, section 1 of the California Constitution.’” (Harris v. Superior 

Court (1992) 3 Cal.App.4th 661, 664; see In re Marriage of Burkle (2006) 135 

Cal.App.4th 1045, 1063 [“The right to privacy extends to one’s personal financial 

information.”].)

The constitutional right of privacy does not provide absolute protection 

“‘but may yield in the furtherance of compelling state interests.’” (People v. Wharton

(1991) 53 Cal.3d 522, 563.) “[C]ourts must balance the right of civil litigants to discover 

relevant facts against the privacy interests of persons subject to discovery.” (Vinson v. 

Superior Court (1987) 43 Cal.3d 833, 842.) “In determining whether disclosure is 
15

required, the court must indulge in a ‘careful balancing’ of the right of a civil litigant to 

discover relevant facts, on the one hand, and the right of the third parties to maintain 

reasonable privacy regarding their sensitive personal affairs, on the other. [Citation.] 

The court must consider the purpose of the information sought, the effect that disclosure 

will have on the affected persons and parties, the nature of the objections urged by the 

party resisting disclosure and availability of alternative, less intrusive means for obtaining 

the requested information. [Citation.] Based on an application of these factors, the more 

sensitive the nature of the personal information that is sought to be discovered, the more 

substantial the showing of the need for the discovery that will be required before 

disclosure will be permitted. [Citations.]” (Hooser v. Superior Court (2000) 84 

Cal.App.4th 997, 1004.)

Obtaining information to collect on a judgment is “a valid significant 

interest.” (Hooser v. Superior Court, supra, 84 Cal.App.4th at p. 1007.) Having been 

assigned a substantial money judgment against SCC, Western has a right to discover facts 

about the nature and location of assets to make that judgment more than a scrap of paper. 

The information sought by Western’s discovery is financial in nature and a protective 

order could be issued, if necessary, to safeguard privacy rights of third parties. SCC has 

not identified other sources from which the information sought by the discovery can be 

obtained. 

B. Requests Nos. 21, 22, 23, and 37

1. Privacy

SCC argues requests Nos. 21, 22, 23, and 37 sought documents protected 

by the right of privacy. Unlike request No. 14, requests Nos. 21, 22, 23, and 37 sought 

documents from business entities. “‘The extent of any privacy rights of a business entity 

is unsettled.’” (S.B.C.C., Inc. v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. (2010) 186 Cal.App.4th 

383, 396, fn. 6.) Some opinions hold that the California Constitution protects only the 

privacy rights of human beings, other opinions hold that business entities have zones of 
16

privacy rights, and others assume without deciding that corporations enjoy a 

constitutional right of privacy. (See Nativi v. Deutsche Bank National Trust Co. (2014)

223 Cal.App.4th 261, 314, fn. 16 [comparing cases without deciding issue].) 

We conclude corporations do not have a right of privacy protected by the 

California Constitution.

3

 Article I, section 1 of the California Constitution protects the 

privacy rights of “people” only.4 “‘[T]he constitutional provision simply does not apply 

to corporations.’” (Ameri-Medical Corp. v. Workers’ Comp. Appeals Bd. (1996) 42 

Cal.App.4th 1260, 1287, quoting Roberts v. Gulf Oil Corp. (1983) 147 Cal.App.3d 770, 

791; see Zurich American Ins. Co. v. Superior Court (2007) 155 Cal.App.4th 1485, 1504 

[corporation acknowledged that it had no right of privacy under the California 

Constitution].) While corporations do have a right to privacy, it is not a constitutional 

right. The corporate right to privacy is a lesser right than that held by human beings and 

is not considered a fundamental right. (Ameri-Medical Corp. v. Workers’ Comp. Appeals 

Bd., supra, at pp. 1287-1288.)

Because the corporate privacy right is not constitutionally protected, the 

issue presented in determining whether Western’s requests for production infringe that 

right is resolved by a balancing test. The discovery’s relevance to the subject matter of 

the pending dispute and whether the discovery “‘appears reasonably calculated to lead to 

the discovery of admissible evidence’” is balanced against the corporate right of privacy. 

(Hecht, Solberg, Robinson, Goldberg & Bagley LLP v. Superior Court (2006) 137 

Cal.App.4th 579, 595.) Doubts about relevance generally are resolved in favor of 

permitting discovery. (Ibid.) 

 

 

3

 During oral argument, counsel for SCC conceded that corporations do not enjoy a 

constitutionally protected right of privacy.

 

4

 Article I, section 1 of the California Constitution states: “All people are by nature free 

and independent and have inalienable rights. Among these are enjoying and defending 

life and liberty, acquiring, possessing, and protecting property, and pursuing and 

obtaining safety, happiness, and privacy.” 
17

Requests Nos. 21, 22, 23, and 37 are relevant to determining whether other 

entities could and should be added as judgment debtors under section 187 as alter egos of 

SCC. With the motion to compel, Western submitted evidence that SCC intermingled 

records, equipment, personnel, and resources with other parties, and that SCC’s 

accounting records reflected a large volume of transactions flowing through SCC that 

were not reflected on its bank statements, including payments to third parties. As 

Western seeks only documents in the possession or control of SCC, any privacy rights of 

third party entities already have been compromised if not altogether waived. A protective 

order can be issued, if necessary, to safeguard any remaining privacy rights. 

2. Breadth

SCC argues requests Nos. 21, 22, 23, and 37 are so broad in scope that they

are abusive. Specifically, SCC argues (1) those requests constitute an impermissible 

“blanket request for generalized categories of documents,” and (2) Western failed to 

clarify the meaning of the term “former or current ‘subsidiaries or affiliates.’” 

Requests Nos. 21, 22, 23, and 37 are not overbroad but seek specific, 

identifiable categories of documents from SCC. Requests for production Nos. 21, 22, 23,

and 37 sought documents regarding entities that “currently are or previously were a 

subsidiary or affiliate of [SCC].” Request No. 21 sought “DOCUMENTS 

CONCERNING ASSETS,” request No. 22 sought “DOCUMENTS CONSTITUTING 

BANK AND BROKERAGE RECORDS,” request No. 23 sought “DOCUMENTS 

CONSTITUTING FINANCIAL RECORDS,” and request No. 37 sought the name of any 

such subsidiaries or affiliates that had been involved in a bankruptcy, insolvency, or 

receivership proceeding, the case number and court of each proceeding, and the date on 

which such proceeding was filed. 

SCC cites Calcor Space Facility, Inc. v. Superior Court (1997) 53 

Cal.App.4th 216, 218 (Calcor), in which a panel of this court held that a subpoena duces 

tecum placed an unreasonable burden on the responding party by making what amounted 
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to a “[g]eneralized demand[].” Calcor arose out of a contract between the defendant and 

the plaintiff for the plaintiff to manufacture gun mount systems. (Id. at p. 219.) The 

defendant claimed the gun mounts manufactured by the plaintiff did not meet the 

designated specifications, refused to accept the gun mounts, and contracted with a third 

party to supply them. (Ibid.) The plaintiff sued the defendant on various theories and in 

the course of the litigation served a third party with a subpoena duces tecum that included 

32 requests for production of documents, “expanded by 6 pages of ‘definitions’ and 

‘instructions.’” (Id. at pp. 219-220.) The Court of Appeal concluded that the requests for 

production, “[a]lthough facially detailed and particularized” (id. at p. 220), in effect 

required the third party to produce everything in its possession which had anything to do 

with gun mounts for the previous 10 years (id. at p. 219.) In addition, the definitions and 

instructions were “particularly obnoxious” and turned each of the 32 requests “into a 

complicated ‘category’ described in more than 6 pages.” (Id. at p. 223.)

Calcor does not help SCC. Its claim of overbreadth is directed only to four 

requests for production (Nos. 21, 22, 23, and 37), each of which asked for a discrete 

category of documents. The definitions included with the requests for production, though 

lengthy, do not make the requests overbroad, and do not turn them into blanket or 

generalized demands. The definition of “DOCUMENT,” for example, does not broaden 

the scope of the requests, but provides particularity as to the types of documents and 

things being sought. Extensive definitions often are necessary to prevent incomplete or 

evasive responses.

SCC asserts the words “subsidiary” and “affiliate” suffer from lack of any 

definition. The words “affiliate” and “affiliated” are defined in section 151 of the 

Corporations Code, and the word “subsidiary” is defined in section 189 of the 

Corporations Code. Because the Corporations Code definitions would naturally and 

automatically apply to the requests for production, Western did not need to supply 

definitions, and Western fully complied with its meet and confer obligations before 
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bringing the motion to compel against SCC. If SCC were at all confused, it should have 

produced documents in accordance with the statutory definitions. 

DISPOSITION

The petition for a writ of mandate is denied. Western shall recover costs

incurred in this proceeding.

FYBEL, J.

WE CONCUR:

BEDSWORTH, ACTING P. J.

IKOLA, J.