IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

US Airways, Inc. and Sedgwick :

Claims Management Services, Inc., :

Petitioners :

:

v. : No. 612 C.D. 2017

: Submitted: September 29, 2017

Workers’ Compensation Appeal :

Board (Bockelman), :

Respondent :

BEFORE: HONORABLE P. KEVIN BROBSON, Judge

HONORABLE MICHAEL H. WOJCIK, Judge

HONORABLE J. WESLEY OLER, JR., Senior Judge

OPINION BY JUDGE BROBSON FILED: February 22, 2018

US Airways, Inc. (Employer) petitions for review of an order of the 

Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board (Board), dated April 19, 2017. The Board 

affirmed the order of a Workers’ Compensation Judge (WCJ), granting the claim 

petition of Betty Bockelman (Claimant) based upon the finding that Claimant was 

injured in the course and scope of her employment as required by Section 301(c)(1) 

of the Workers’ Compensation Act (Act).1 We now affirm.

Claimant worked for Employer as a Philadelphia-based flight attendant. 

In order to get to work, Claimant drove her own vehicle to the airport and parked in 

one of the two designated employee parking lots. Both parking lots are owned, 

operated, and maintained by the City of Philadelphia/Division of Aviation (DOA),

for the use of all airport employees, not just those of Employer. All airport

 

1 Act of June 2, 1915, P.L. 736, as amended, 77 P.S. § 411(1). 
2

employees are required to get a secured identification display area (SIDA) badge in 

order to park in these lots. The DOA issues SIDA badges. Employer pays a onetime administrative fee at the time of an employee’s hire to process the background 

check for the employee to receive a SIDA badge. After an employee parks, a shuttle 

bus transports the employee from the employee parking lot to the airport terminal 

(and vice versa). Employer does not own or exercise control over the shuttle buses.

Further, Employer does not require employees to use the airport employee parking 

lots. Employer gives its employees no directive whatsoever in terms of how they 

should commute to work. 

On January 23, 2015, Claimant parked her car in the employee parking 

lot and rode the employee shuttle bus to the terminal to report for work. (Reproduced 

Record (R.R.) at 24a-26a.) Employer scheduled Claimant to work a one-day trip 

from Philadelphia to Miami and back. (Id. at 24a.) Claimant’s return flight from 

Miami landed in Philadelphia at approximately 9:47 p.m., and, after a brief 

discussion with a co-worker, Claimant departed the terminal to the employee shuttle 

bus stop. (Id. at 28a, 42a.) After Claimant boarded the shuttle bus, she attempted to 

lift her suitcase onto the luggage racks. (Id. at 27a.) While trying to place her 

luggage on the racks, Claimant stepped in water on the floor, causing her right foot 

to slide out from underneath her. (Id.) Claimant’s left knee buckled, causing her to 

fall backwards, crushing her left foot under her. (Id.) Claimant felt something rip 

in her left foot. (Id.) Other passengers had to assist Claimant from the floor to a 

seat. (Id.)

On June 2, 2015, Claimant filed a claim petition, alleging that she 

sustained work-related injuries to her left foot from her January 23, 2015 slip and 

fall. (Id. at 4a.) Employer filed a timely answer, denying that Claimant was within 
3

the scope of her employment at the time of her injury. (Id. at 9a.) The WCJ held a 

hearing on October 28, 2015. (Id. at 84a.) 

In support of her petition, Claimant testified by deposition and 

presented documentary evidence. In opposition, Employer presented the testimony 

of Anthony Stanley (Stanley), Director of Planning and Administration for 

Employer, and documentary evidence. 

By decision dated April 27, 2016, the WCJ concluded that Claimant 

sustained injuries in the course and scope of her employment. (WCJ Decision, 

attached to Petitioner’s brief as “Ex. 1.”) Specifically, the WCJ concluded: (1) the 

injury occurred on Employer’s premises; (2) Claimant’s presence on the shuttle bus 

was required by the nature of her employment; and (3) the injury was caused by the 

condition of the premises. (Id.) Employer appealed to the Board, and, by opinion 

dated April 19, 2017, the Board affirmed. (Board Decision, attached to Petitioner’s 

brief as “Ex. 2.”) Employer then petitioned this Court for review.

On appeal,2 Employer essentially argues that the Board erred as a 

matter of law in concluding that Claimant was in the course and scope of her 

employment at the time of her injury. Specifically, Employer argues that the Board 

erred in concluding that Claimant’s injury occurred on Employer’s premises,

because Employer did not own, lease, or control the shuttle bus and parking lot, and 

they were not integral to Employer’s business. Employer also argues that the Board 

erred in concluding that Claimant’s presence on the bus was required due to her 

 

2 This Court’s standard of review is limited to determining whether constitutional rights 

were violated, whether an error of law was committed, or whether necessary findings of fact are 

supported by substantial evidence. Section 704 of the Administrative Agency Law, 2 Pa. 

C.S. § 704.
4

employment status, because Employer never required Claimant to use the shuttle 

bus.

Pursuant to Section 301(c)(1) of the Act, an injury is compensable if it 

“(1) arises in the course of employment and (2) is causally related thereto.” U.S. 

Airways v. Workers’ Comp. Appeal Bd. (Dixon), 764 A.2d 635, 640 

(Pa. Cmwlth. 2000), appeal denied, 788 A.2d 382 (Pa. 2001). Injuries may arise in 

the course of employment in two distinct situations:

(1) where the employee is injured on or off the employer’s 

premises, while actually engaged in furtherance of the 

employer’s business or affairs; or (2) where the employee, 

although not actually engaged in the furtherance of the 

employer’s business or affairs, (a) is on the premises 

occupied or under the control of the employer, or upon 

which the employer’s business or affairs are being carried 

on, (b) is required by the nature of his employment to be 

present on the employer’s premises, and (c) sustains 

injuries caused by the condition of the premises or by 

operation of the employer’s business or affairs thereon.

Id. 

As there is no dispute that Claimant was not actually engaged in the 

furtherance of Employer’s business, Claimant’s injury is compensable under the Act 

if she establishes that (1) the injury occurred on Employer’s 

premises, (2) Claimant’s presence thereon was required by the nature of her 

employment, and (3) the injury was caused by the condition of the premises or by 

operation of Employer’s business thereon. See Workmen’s Comp. Appeal Bd. 

(Slaugenhaupt) v. United States Steel Corp., 376 A.2d 271, 273 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1977). 

It is undisputed that Claimant has established the third prong of the Slaugenhaupt

test. 
5

First, we address Employer’s argument that focuses on the disputed first

prong of the Slaugenhaupt test—that the injury occurred on Employer’s premises. 

Employer contends that Claimant cannot establish that she was injured on 

Employer’s premises because (1) Employer never owned, leased, maintained, or 

controlled the shuttle bus, and (2) the shuttle bus does not comprise an integral part 

of Employer’s business because Employer did not cause Claimant to be there.

In construing the term “premises” as contemplated by 

Section 301(c)(1) of the Act, the determinative question is whether the site of the 

accident is so connected with the employer’s business as to form an integral part 

thereof. Epler v. N. Am. Rockwell Corp., 393 A.2d 1163, 1166-67 (Pa. 1978). In 

this analysis, “the critical factor is not the employer’s title to or control over the area, 

but rather the fact that . . . [the employer] had caused the area to be used by . . . 

employees in performance of their assigned tasks.”3 Id. at 1167. Further, this Court 

has held that reasonable means of access to the workplace is considered an integral 

part of the employer’s business, and, therefore, is part of the employer’s “premises.” 

Newhouse v. Workmen’s Comp. Appeal Bd. (Harris Cleaning Serv., Inc.), 530 A.2d 

545, 546-47 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1987), appeal denied, 538 A.2d 879 (Pa. 1988). Thus, 

Employer’s contention that the shuttle bus could not be part of its premises because 

it did not own, lease, maintain, or control the shuttle bus is not dispositive of whether 

the shuttle bus was part of Employer’s premises.

Our courts have held that an employer’s premises includes reasonable 

means of access to the workplace, whether or not the employer owns the land. See 

Newhouse, 530 A.2d at 546-47. Further, an employer’s premises is property that 

 

3 While the question of whether an employer required a claimant to be at the location of 

injury constitutes a separate and distinct prong of the Slaugenhaupt test, it may also be a factor 

considered when determining whether an area is part of an employer’s premises.
6

“could be considered an integral part of the employer’s business.” Ortt v. Workers’ 

Comp. Appeal Bd. (PPL Servs., Corp.), 874 A.2d 1264, 1267 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2005). 

Property becomes integral to an employer’s business when the employer causes 

employees to be in the area. Epler, 393 A.2d at 1167. 

A means of access customarily used by employees for ingress and 

egress can be such an integral part of an employer’s business as to be considered 

part of the premises. In Interstate United Corporation v. Workmen’s Compensation 

Appeal Board, 424 A.2d 1015 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1981), the claimant worked as a 

cafeteria worker inside of a plant. The employer leased the cafeteria from the plant 

owner. Interstate United Corp., 424 A.2d at 1016. The claimant sustained injuries 

after falling on the steps of a footbridge that connected the plant to a public street. 

Id. The plant owner, not the employer, owned and controlled the footbridge. Id. 

This Court, in concluding that the footbridge comprised the employer’s premises for 

the purposes of the Act, opined:

[T]he record shows that [employer’s] cafeteria waslocated 

in the interior of the . . . plant, that employees customarily 

crossed the footbridge the claimant was injured on to enter 

and exit the cafeteria area, and that [employer] was aware 

of this fact. In numerous cases Pennsylvania Courts have 

held that a reasonable means of access to the situs of an 

employer’s business operation is such an integral part of 

an employer’s business as to be encompassed within the 

definition of “premises” as that term is used in Section 

301(c)(1) of the Act.

Id. at 1017.

Also instructive to our analysis is this Court’s holding in Fashion 

Hosiery Shops v. Workmen’s Compensation Appeal Board, 423 A.2d 792 

(Pa. Cmwlth. 1980). In Fashion Hosiery Shops, a claimant sustained injuries after 

she fell while approaching an entrance to her workplace. Fashion Hosiery Shops, 
7

423 A.2d at 794. The employer had three separate points of entry and indicated no 

preference to claimant as to which entry point to utilize. Id. at 793-94. The employer

did not own, lease, or control the walkway upon which the claimant fell. Id. at 797. 

On appeal to this Court, the employer essentially argued that the claimant’s injury 

did not occur on employer’s premises because the claimant had multiple means of 

entry to the workplace, and the employer did not instruct her to utilize any specific 

one. Id. at 794. In determining that the walkway comprised the employer’s 

premises, we found no significance in the fact that the employer did not require 

claimant to use a specific entry to the workplace. Id. at 797. In so holding, we 

opined:

Given the relational nature of the area in question to the 

employer’s place of business, it must be concluded that the 

claimant was injured on an entranceway that was available 

and intended for her use; and as such, it constituted part of 

the employer’s premises, regardless of its not being owned 

or controlled by the employer. Nor does the availability 

of alternative entrances nullify that conclusion. Each of the 

three available and intended ways of ingress to Fashion’s 

shop was a part of Fashion’s “premises” for purposes of 

Section 301(c) of the Workmen’s Compensation Act.

Id.

The instant case is analogous to both Interstate United Corporation and 

Fashion Hosiery Shops. Claimant used the airport parking lot and shuttle bus to 

enter and exit the workplace. (R.R. at 11a-12a.) It is undisputed that Employer does 

not own or exercise control over the parking and shuttle services. Claimant uses the 

shuttle bus as a customary means of ingress and egress, much like the claimants in 

Interstate United Corporation and Fashion Hosiery Shops utilized the footbridge

and walkway. Claimant used her vehicle as her means of transportation to work, 

and the airport provided employees who work at the airport, including Claimant, 
8

with parking at no cost in employee parking lots designated by the airport. (Id. at 

73a.) In order to get from the parking lot to the terminal, Claimant rode the shuttle 

bus provided by the airport to transport employees to and from its parking lots and 

terminal. As part of doing business with the airport, Employer understood that the 

airport would transport Employer’s employees who drove to work. Thus, Employer 

also understood that, in order to arrive at their work area to start their shift, 

employees who drive to work invariably board the shuttle bus after their commute 

to the airport. Similarly, Employer also understood that, in order to leave their work 

area at the end of their shift, employees who drive to work invariably board the 

shuttle bus to return to their vehicle. Accordingly, the shuttle bus is such an integral 

part of Employer’s business as to be part of the premises, in addition to being a 

customary means of ingress and egress, and the WCJ correctly concluded as such. 

Having concluded that Claimant met the first prong of the 

Slaugenhaupt test—that the injury occurred on Employer’s premises, we now turn 

our focus to the disputed second prong of the Slaugenhaupt test—that the nature of 

Claimant’s employment required her to be on Employer’s premises where she was 

injured. Employer essentially argues that Claimant’s presence on the shuttle bus 

was not required, as Employer gave her no directive on where to park, and, 

accordingly, Employer did not require Claimant to board the shuttle bus.

In ICT Group v. Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board 

(Churchray-Woytunick), 995 A.2d 927 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2010), this Court considered 

whether a claimant who sustained an injury from slipping on ice on her employer’s 

premises when leaving for her lunch break was injured within the course of her 

employment. With regard to the second prong of the Slaugenhaupt test, the 

employer argued that the nature of the claimant’s employment did not require her to 
9

be present in the parking lot during her lunch break, and, therefore, she was not 

injured in the course and scope of her employment. The employer took this position 

because the claimant had started her lunch break and had independently decided to 

leave the employer’s premises at that time. We placed no significance on the fact 

that the claimant had “independently” decided to leave the building during her lunch 

break when we concluded that the claimant’s presence was required by the nature of 

her employment. In reaching that conclusion, we applied the same rule applicable 

to situations where the employee is arriving at the workplace to commence the 

workday or departing from the workplace at the completion of the workday—that 

“any injury occurring to an employee up until the time he leaves the premises of the 

employer, provided that it is reasonably proximate to work hours, is compensable.” 

ICT Group, 995 A.2d at 932 (quoting Epler, 393 A.2d at 1166). We observed that 

“[t]he rationale behind this rule is that ‘once an employee is on the [e]mployer’s 

premises, actually getting to or leaving the employee’s work station is a necessary 

part of employee’s employment.’”

4

 Id. (quoting Allegheny Ludlum Corp. v. 

Workers’ Comp. Appeal Bd. (Hines), 913 A.2d 345, 349 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2006), appeal 

denied, 932 A.2d 77 (Pa. 2007)). Because the claimant was still in the process of 

walking from her work station to her car at the time of her injury, the Court 

determined that “her presence on [the e]mployer’s premises remained so connected 

 

4 Pennsylvania courts have found that a claimant’s presence is not “required” on an 

employer’s premises if her presence does not occur within a reasonable time before or after her

work shift or if the claimant is in an area unrelated to her work. See Heverly v. Workmen’s Comp. 

Appeal Bd. (Ship N Shore), 578 A.2d 575 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1990) (holding claimant’s presence not 

required for the purposes of Section 301(c)(1) of the Act after leaving work for the day and 

sustaining an injury upon returning later to retrieve her eyeglasses); see also Giebel v. Workmen’s 

Comp. Appeal Bd., 399 A.2d 152 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1979) (holding claimant’s presence not required 

in different part of department store from part in which she worked). The instant case, however, 

does not implicate Heverly or Giebel. 
10

to the employment relationship that it was required by the nature of her 

employment.” Id.

Here, Claimant’s presence on the shuttle bus was a necessary part of 

her employment, because it was the means by which she traversed between her work 

station (i.e., the terminal) and the parking lot designated for airport employees. As 

found by the WCJ, the shuttle bus is “specifically designated as an employee bus to 

travel from the terminal to the [employee] parking lot.”5 (WCJ Decision, attached 

to Petitioner’s brief as “Ex. 2.”) Claimant’s utilization of the shuttle bus service was 

expected, so long as she elected to drive to work. Claimant’s presence on the shuttle 

bus, therefore, was so connected to her employment relationship that it was required 

by the nature of her employment, and the WCJ did not err in concluding as such. 

The absence of a directive by Employer instructing Claimant to utilize the shuttle 

bus does not alter this analysis, just as the fact that the claimant in ICT Group

independently decided to leave the building during her lunch break, without 

instruction or a directive by employer, did not alter the analysis in that case.

 

5 We also note that there is no record evidence to indicate that Claimant would have been 

able to walk from the airport terminal to the employee parking lot. Even if such evidence existed, 

it would not alter the outcome of this matter. 
11

Accordingly, the order of the Board is affirmed. 

 

 P. KEVIN BROBSON, Judge
IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

US Airways, Inc. and Sedgwick :

Claims Management Services, Inc., :

Petitioners :

:

v. : No. 612 C.D. 2017

:

Workers’ Compensation Appeal :

Board (Bockelman), :

Respondent :

O R D E R

AND NOW, this 22nd day of February, 2018, the order of the Workers’ 

Compensation Appeal Board, is AFFIRMED.

 

 P. KEVIN BROBSON, Judge