If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to 

revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports.

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S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N

C O U R T O F A P P E A L S

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,

Plaintiff-Appellee

UNPUBLISHED

November 21, 2019

v No. 344886

Wayne Circuit Court

JAYLEN MAURICE MASON, LC No. 18-000777-01-FH

Defendant-Appellant.

Before: CAMERON, P.J., and CAVANAGH and SHAPIRO, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

Defendant appeals as of right his bench trial conviction of unarmed robbery, MCL 

750.350, arguing that the trial court relied on insufficient evidence to support his conviction 

because two of the witnesses—Davon West (West) and Elexis Johnson (Johnson)—did not 

provide credible testimony of defendant’s identity. We affirm.

I. UNDERLYING FACTS

At about 10:30 p.m. on September 29, 2017, West was walking home after having spent 

the evening with his girlfriend—Johnson—at her home. West wore a pair of black and white 

“Jordan Baron 11s” basketball shoes and spoke with Johnson on his cellular telephone—a gray 

iPhone SE—after leaving Johnson’s home. As he walked, West noticed defendant approaching 

him from a parking lot on West’s left-hand side. West began to walk faster, so the two would 

not run into each other, and defendant passed behind him. As defendant passed West, a 

streetlight illuminated defendant and West was able to see defendant’s face for about five 

seconds.1

 1 Although unsure of defendant’s name at the time, West recognized defendant as someone he 

had seen in the neighborhood and in a Facebook picture he had seen the previous week.
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Defendant then began to follow West. Defendant and West walked in the same direction 

until defendant passed West, providing West with another opportunity to see defendant’s face. 

After passing West, defendant stopped about 30 feet away and began to speak to another man.

2

 

Because there were no streetlights nearby, West did not see the other man’s face. West 

continued to walk toward the two men as he talked to Johnson on his cellular telephone. As he 

approached defendant, West noticed defendant was wearing gray Nike Foamposite shoes with 

lime-green colored soles, black pants, and a silver-gray jacket.

Immediately after passing defendant and the other man, West was struck from behind on 

the right side of his neck. As West attempted to turn to see who had hit him, he was struck again 

and dropped his cellular telephone. West fell to the ground, where defendant and the other man

kicked and punched him several times while West attempted to protect his face from the blows. 

Then either defendant or the other man placed his foot on West’s neck and directed the other 

man to remove West’s shoes. The robbers took West’s shoes and his gray iPhone SE before 

running away. As they ran off, West identified defendant by his clothing—gray Foamposite 

shoes, black pants, and a gray jacket—the same clothes West had seen defendant wearing 

immediately before the robbery. West could also see the bottom of defendant’s shoes and they 

had lime-green colored soles.

West’s telephone call to Johnson remained active during the course of the robbery. 

During their conversation West stopped speaking and Johnson heard what she believed to be 

West’s cellular telephone falling to the ground. After West stopped talking, Johnson heard other 

people talking and one of them said “Yeah, I got it.” When West failed to call her back after the 

telephone call disconnected, Johnson left the house to search for West. As she was leaving the 

housing complex—about five minutes after the telephone call ended—Johnson saw defendant 

walk past her in one of the complex’s courtyards. Defendant was wearing a gray jacket and 

black pants. Johnson also noticed defendant was carrying shoes—a pair of “foams” she had seen 

him wear before—and he was wearing a pair of black and white “Jordans”—shoes like those 

West had been wearing when he left Johnson’s house earlier in the evening. Johnson began to 

walk up the service drive when she received a telephone call from West, who was at the gas 

station using a telephone he had borrowed from a police officer. West told Johnson he had been 

robbed and that he was at the gas station. In response, Johnson told West that defendant had 

walked by her wearing West’s shoes.

Johnson arrived at the gas station approximately five minutes later. When she arrived, 

West was speaking with Detroit Police Officer William Cook (Officer Cook). While at the gas 

station, Johnson told Officer Cook she had just seen defendant wearing West’s stolen shoes.3

Johnson told Officer Cook she recognized defendant from the neighborhood; she saw defendant 

every day because they shared mutual friends. Johnson repeated her belief that defendant had 

taken West’s shoes.

 2 The evidence at trial showed defendant committed the robbery with a conspirator. However, 

the conspirator was not a party at trial, nor is he a party to this appeal.

3 Johnson identified defendant using his street name “J Money.”
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Several days after the robbery, West returned to Johnson’s housing complex and saw 

defendant playing basketball on the complex’s basketball court. Defendant was wearing the 

same type of shoes as those stolen from West. West noticed the bottoms of the shoes were still 

white and not discolored, indicating they were brand new, and the shoes looked too big for 

defendant. Further, the shoelaces were knotted in the distinctive way West used on all of his 

shoes. These three factors led West to believe defendant was wearing West’s stolen shoes.

On October 6, 2017, West gave a statement describing the men who robbed him to 

Detective Lawrence Mitchell (Detective Mitchell). West provided physical descriptions of 

defendant and the other man, as well as a description of what they were each wearing the night 

of the robbery. West also told Detective Mitchell he had seen defendant in several Facebook 

posts. On the basis of this information, Detective Mitchell created two photographic lineups, 

each consisting of six photographs. West identified defendant in the first photographic lineup 

and he identified the other man in the second lineup. After his identifications, West wrote a 

handwritten note on the photographic lineups indicating that he was accusing defendant and the 

other man of hitting him and stealing his shoes and iPhone.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

A challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence in a bench trial is reviewed de novo. 

People v Ventura, 316 Mich App 671, 678; 894 NW2d 108 (2016). The evidence is considered 

in the light most favorable to the prosecution to determine whether the trial court could have 

found the essential elements proved beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. Circumstantial evidence and 

reasonable inferences arising from the evidence may constitute satisfactory proof of the elements 

of the offense. People v Muhammad, 326 Mich App 40, 60; 931 NW2d 20 (2018) (quotation 

marks and citations omitted). And we “will not interfere with the trier of fact’s role of 

determining the weight of the evidence or the credibility of witnesses.” People v Kanaan, 278 

Mich App 594, 619; 751 NW2d 57 (2008). Furthermore, we will not set aside a trial court’s 

finding of fact in a bench trial unless clearly erroneous. People v Lanzo Constr Co, 272 Mich 

App 470, 473; 726 NW2d 746 (2006). “A finding is clearly erroneous when, although there is 

evidence to support it, the reviewing court is left with a definite and firm conviction that a 

mistake has been made.” Id.

III. ANALYSIS

Defendant argues that the evidence was insufficient to prove his identity as one of the 

unarmed robbers because the testimony provided by West and Johnson was not credible. We 

disagree.

Clearly, identity is an element of every offense. People v Yost, 278 Mich App 341, 356; 

749 NW2d 753 (2008). That is, the prosecution must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that a 

specific defendant was the person who committed the alleged crime. People v Hampton, 407 

Mich 354, 368; 285 NW2d 284 (1979). Either direct testimony or inferences drawn from 

circumstantial evidence can be sufficient evidence to prove this element. People v Bass, 317 

Mich App 241, 264; 893 NW2d 140 (2016); People v Kern, 6 Mich App 406, 409; 149 NW2d 

216 (1967). And “positive identification by witnesses may be sufficient to support a conviction 

of a crime.” People v Davis, 241 Mich App 697, 700; 617 NW2d 381 (2000).
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Defendant argues that West and Johnson were not credible witnesses and could not 

establish that defendant stole West’s shoes and iPhone. But, again, issues of the weight and 

credibility of evidence, including witness testimony, are questions for the trier of fact. Kanaan, 

278 Mich App at 619. This principle also applies to identification testimony. Davis, 241 Mich 

App at 700. As a question for the trier of fact, the credibility of identification testimony is not 

one a reviewing court may “resolve anew.” Id. Further, when a defendant challenges his 

conviction on the basis of the sufficiency of the evidence, all conflicts in the evidence are 

resolved in the prosecution’s favor. Kanaan, 278 Mich App at 619. As a result, when reviewing 

defendant’s conviction of unarmed robbery, we must resolve any inconsistencies or conflicts in 

the evidence in the prosecution’s favor and may not revisit the issue of the credibility of West or 

Johnson.

Sufficient evidence supported defendant’s conviction. The evidence demonstrated that 

West saw defendant’s face and clothing before the robbery. Although he did not see defendant

while being physically beaten, West saw defendant run away after the robbery and identified 

defendant by his clothing. Further, in the days after the robbery, West saw defendant wearing 

West’s stolen shoes. West also positively identified defendant through a photographic lineup 

and at trial—indicating in the latter instance he was “100% sure” defendant robbed him. 

Similarly, Johnson saw defendant, minutes after the robbery, wearing West’s shoes. While there 

were inconsistencies in West’s testimony, and Johnson’s testimony was uncorroborated, such 

discrepancies must be resolved in the prosecution’s favor. Under this deferential standard, the 

identifications West and Johnson made of defendant, and the inferences drawn from the 

circumstantial evidence provided by their testimony, provided sufficient evidence for the trial 

court to find beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant committed the unarmed robbery. 

Consequently, we also reject defendant’s due process argument. See People v Breck, 230 Mich 

App 450, 456; 584 NW2d 602 (1998).

Defendant also argues that the trial court’s findings of fact and conclusions of law failed 

to adequately address the inconsistencies between Johnson’s testimony and that of Officer Cook. 

Under MCR 6.403, when a defendant waives his right to a jury trial, the trial court must “find the 

facts specially, state separately its conclusions of law, and direct entry of the appropriate 

judgment.” The trial court must also “state its findings and conclusions on the record . . . .” Id. 

“Factual findings are sufficient as long as it appears the trial court was aware of the issues in the 

case and correctly applied the law. The court need not make specific findings of fact regarding 

each element of the crime.” People v Legg, 197 Mich App 131, 134; 494 NW2d 797 (1992)

(citations omitted). “A judge’s failure to find the facts does not require remand where it is 

manifest that he was aware of the factual issue, that he resolved it and it would not facilitate 

appellate review to require further explication of the path he followed in reaching the result as, 

for example, where the only factual issue is identification.” People v Jackson, 390 Mich 621,

627 n 3; 212 NW2d 918 (1973).

In this case, the trial court fulfilled the requirements under MCR 6.403. Because 

defendant waived his right to a jury trial, the trial judge assumed the task of assessing and 

weighing issues of witness credibility as the finder of fact at trial. When delivering the verdict, 

the trial judge noted, on the record, that she had instructed herself on the relevant law concerning 

identification and the several factors she needed to consider when assessing identification 
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evidence. The trial judge also stated that she was applying these factors to the identifications

West and Johnson made of defendant.

As defendant notes, the trial judge did acknowledge two specific issues with West’s 

testimony when making her factual findings. First, West’s testimony that the photographic 

lineup consisted of black and white photographs, as opposed to the color photographs presented 

in evidence at trial. Second, West’s statement that Johnson told him defendant ran by her while 

wearing West’s shoes was inconsistent with Johnson’s testimony that defendant walked by her. 

Defense counsel had argued that these two inconsistencies in West’s testimony undermined the 

credibility of West and Johnson as witnesses. Further, the trial judge acknowledged that she did 

not know if West’s testimony, on its own, would have been sufficient to prove guilt beyond a 

reasonable doubt. The trial judge’s analysis, however, did not end there. The trial judge found 

that West had several opportunities to observe defendant, both before and after the robbery, and 

recognized defendant as one of his assailants by defendant’s clothing. The trial judge stated that 

she found Johnson to be “very credible.” Thus, the trial judge found that Johnson’s testimony,

when considered with West’s testimony, proved defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.

In summary, while the trial judge did not directly address any inconsistencies between the 

testimonies of Johnson and Officer Cook, she provided an explanation for her guilty verdict by 

stating that she found Johnson’s testimony and identification of defendant to be credible. A 

review of the record shows the trial judge was aware of the factual issues about the witnesses’

identification of defendant, examined and applied the relevant law, and resolved these issues—

ultimately finding defendant guilty. Thus, we reject defendant’s argument that the trial court 

failed to meet the requirements of MCR 6.403.

Affirmed.

/s/ Thomas C. Cameron

/s/ Mark J. Cavanagh

/s/ Douglas B. Shapiro