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Cite as 26 Neb. App. 289

Ronald J. Clark, appellant, 

Nori D. Clark, now know

Nori D. Carter, appellee

___ N.W.2d ___

Filed September 4, 2018. No. A-17-852.

1. Statutes: Appeal and Error. Statutory interpretation presents a question of law, on which an appellate court has an obligation to reach 

an independent conclusion irrespective of the decision made by the 

court below.

2. Child Support: States. The general purpose of the Uniform Interstate 

Family Support Act is to unify state laws relating to the establishment, 

enforcement, and modification of child support orders.

3. ____: ____. The goal of the Uniform Interstate Family Support Act is 

to streamline and expedite interstate enforcement of support decrees 

and to eliminate the problems arising from multiple or conflicting support orders from various states by providing for one tribunal to have 

continuing and exclusive jurisdiction to establish or modify a child support order.

4. ____: ____. The Uniform Interstate Family Support Act provides a 

system where only one child support order may be in effect at any 

one time.

5. ____: ____. Following the adoption of the Uniform Interstate Family 

Support Act, there should not exist multiple or conflicting support 

orders and only one tribunal shall have continuing and exclusive jurisdiction to establish or modify a child support order.

6. ____: ____. The Uniform Interstate Family Support Act’s provisions 

may only be used to enforce an existing support order, establish a support order where no order has previously been established, or modify an 

existing support order.

7. Jurisdiction: Waiver. Generally speaking, the filing of a general 

appearance which does not preserve an objection to personal jurisdiction constitutes a waiver of personal jurisdiction.

Nebraska Supreme Court Online Library

www.nebraska.gov/apps-courts-epub/

09/11/2018 01:08 AM CDT
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8. Statutes: Equity: Jurisdiction. When a statute provides an adequate 

remedy at law, equity will not entertain jurisdiction, and a party must 

exhaust the statutory remedy before it may resort to equity.

Appeal from the District Court for Lancaster County: Lori A

Maret, Judge. Reversed and remanded for further proceedings.

Mark T. Bestul, of Legal Aid of Nebraska, for appellant.

No appearance for appellee.

Moore, Chief Judge, and Arterburn and Welch, Jud

Welch, Judg

INTRODUCTION

Ronald J. Clark (Clark) appeals from an order issued by 

the Lancaster County District Court dismissing his request 

to (1) vacate or modify a Nebraska child support order originally issued in August 1999 and modified starting in April 

2002 or (2) make a determination regarding whether the 

Nebraska order or a concurrent Wisconsin child support order 

is the controlling order. We reverse, and remand for further 

proceedings.

STATEMENT OF FACTS

In September 1985, Nori D. Clark, now known as Nori D. 

Carter (Carter), a resident of Wisconsin, gave birth to the parties’ son. At the time of the son’s birth, Carter was not married; 

however, 4 days later, she married Clark, who admitted he was 

the father. Because there were outstanding birth expenses paid 

by the State of Wisconsin, Wisconsin commenced a paternity 

action against Clark to recover those expenses. On March 

2, 1989, the “State of Wisconsin[,] Circuit Court[,] Family 

Division[,] Milwaukee County,” entered an order in case No. 

80-641 finding that Carter gave birth to the parties’ son in 

September 1985, that Clark was the father, that Carter and 

Clark were married 4 days later, and that Clark must pay the 
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State of Wisconsin $2,130 in birth expenses payable at the rate 

of $43 per month.

Also provided in the record is a document entered by the 

“State of Wisconsin[,] Circuit Court[,] Family Court Branch[,] 

Milwaukee County,” in case No. 900-426. This document 

purports to be “In re the Marriage of: State of Wisconsin 

Nori Clark . . . Petitioner, and Ronald Clark . . . Respondent.” 

The document also reads “FINDINGS AND ORDER” but 

then recites matters apparently occurring on different dates. 

The top section of the document references an “ACTION TO 

COMPEL SUPPORT” as of March 22, 1990, identifies that 

Clark appeared “in person” but not Carter, and provided that 

Clark was to pay “SUPPORT” of $152 per month to be payable 

at the rate of $35 per week commencing April 1, 1990. This top 

section of the document is not signed.

The lower section of the same document, bearing the date 

April 3, 1990, states as follows:

ADJOURNED TO: 5-24-90 at 11:15 [and] both TO 

APPEAR IN PERSON[.]

FINDINGS: THE FOLLOWING FINDINGS ARE 

MADE: Parties have been separated two years. Child 

was born 4 days before parent’s [sic] marriage; husband 

acknowledges paternity[.]

Mother works for Am[erican] Airlines, earning $500/

mo[nth] gross working part time but she’s been off work 

3-4 months and just went back. She says she is going 

off [Aid to Families with Dependent Children]. She had 

child in a Montessori school but had to take child out 

because of financial problems.

Order for support is based on husband’s income from 

one job: wife claims he’s working a second job, but 

he denies it. Husband is extremely antagonistic and 

doesn’t want to pay support but he’s going to have to 

do that. . . .

ORDER: BASED ON THESE FINDINGS, THE 

FOLLOWING ORDERS ARE MADE: Suspend and 
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hold open past support and birth expense payment in 

case P80-641.

Matter adjourned to 5-24-90 at 11:15 for review on 

support; both parties to produce income tax returns for 

1989 and YTD statement of current income.

. . . .

This assignment super[s]edes any other assignment 

in a case between these parties, including the one in 

Case P80-641.

The second page of this document is signed by “Lucy Cooper 

(Deputy/Asst.) Family Court Commissioner.”

In September 2007, these two Wisconsin cases were 

consolidated by the “State of Wisconsin[,] Circuit Court[,] 

Milwaukee County.” The court’s “EXPARTE ORDER FOR 

CONSOLIDATION” provided that “[a]ny credit or debt balances owed on the former case(s) shall be removed from the 

former case(s) and added to the new case.”

Separately, the record contains the parties’ Nebraska divorce 

decree from the Lancaster County District Court dated August 

24, 1999. On that date, the district court issued a decree governing the marriage of Carter and Clark, dissolved their marriage, divided their property, provided Clark with reasonable 

visitation of Carter and Clark’s “minor child” (not named in the 

decree), and ordered Clark to pay $395 per month in child support for “one (1) minor child” commencing September 1. This 

order was modified by the district court on March 29, 2002, 

to reduce Clark’s child support obligation to $300 per month 

starting April 1.

In October 2016, Clark filed a lawsuit in the Lancaster 

County District Court claiming that he was the obligor on two 

separate decrees governing the same obligee and the same 

child, entered in two separate states, and requesting that the 

“child support be reduced or modified retroactively to $0 per 

month or that the original decree and subsequent modification be vacated as to the provisions in said orders related to 

child support and for such other and further relief as the 
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Court deems just and equitable.” After being served with the 

complaint, Carter wrote a letter to the district court in which 

she chastised Clark for serving her at her recently deceased 

mother’s home and for not paying child support, expressing 

confusion as to why she was being sued in court. Carter did not 

appear or testify at trial.

At trial, Clark testified that he was formerly married to 

Carter; that he was the father of their son, who was now 

an adult; and that he and Carter separated long before their 

divorce. He testified that neither Carter nor their son ever lived 

in Nebraska, but that he had moved to Nebraska and sought 

the divorce from the Lancaster County District Court in 1999 

in order to get that part of his life resolved. He also testified 

that at the time of his divorce, he was aware of the State of 

Wisconsin’s original paternity order, but not the separate child 

support order. He then testified that he was asking the court to 

resolve the discrepancy so that he could take care of the arrearages and “move on” with his life.

In connection with the Lancaster County child support order, 

Clark offered, and the district court received into evidence, a 

“Payment History Report” from the Nebraska Department of 

Health and Human Services showing Clark’s payment history, including both the arrears balance and interest balance 

on the obligation. The court also received into evidence a 

State of Wisconsin payment summary from “Milwaukee Co. 

Child Support Services,” which references an “[o]rder established 4/1/90 @ $152 per month” showing both a “Principle 

[sic] Ending Balance” as of 2016 and an “AFFIDAVIT OF 

ARREARS” to the “Circuit Court[,] Milwaukee County” certifying Clark’s arrears to the State of Wisconsin and custodial 

parent governing the consolidated case.

 Following the trial, upon Clark’s motion, the district 

court allowed Clark to amend his complaint to add the substantive allegations and prayer that “this court enter and 

[sic] order making a determination under NEB. REV. STAT. 

§ 42-711 [(Reissue 2016)] as to which child support order 
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is the controlling order” and “for any such other and further 

relief as the Court deems just and equitable.”

After reviewing the evidence, the district court held:

The Court finds that [Clark] fails to provide the Court 

with the necessary evidence and information to make 

a determination between competing cases in differing 

jurisdictions. In order to make such determination, the 

Court lacks the present authority to effectuate the relief 

requested as it does not have jurisdiction over the out-ofstate matter. The Amended Complaint is hereby overruled 

and the matter is dismissed.

Clark has timely appealed that final order of dismissal to 

this court.

ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR

Clark’s assignments of error, consolidated and restated, are 

that the district court erred (1) in determining that it did not 

have jurisdiction over the Wisconsin matter for the purpose of 

determining which state’s order is the controlling child support 

order, (2) in determining that there was insufficient evidence 

and information to make a determination as to which of the 

concurrent Wisconsin and Nebraska child support orders was 

the controlling child support order, and (3) in failing to vacate 

or modify his Nebraska child support obligation.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

[1] Statutory interpretation presents a question of law, on 

which an appellate court has an obligation to reach an independent conclusion irrespective of the decision made by the court 

below. TransCanada Keystone Pipeline v. Nicholas Family, 

299 Neb. 276, 908 N.W.2d 60 (2018).

ANALYSIS

Jurisdicti

We first address the district court’s finding that it lacked 

jurisdiction over the out-of-state matter in order to effectuate 
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the relief requested by Clark. This case involves a request 

by a Nebraska resident to have a Nebraska court determine 

which of two child support orders, issued in different states, 

is the “controlling” child support order. As framed by the 

amended complaint, the case fits squarely within the terms of 

the Uniform Interstate Family Support Act (UIFSA), Neb. Rev. 

Stat. §§ 42-701 to 42-751.01 (Reissue 2016).

[2-4] The Nebraska Supreme court had occasion to discuss 

the general purpose of the UIFSA in Hamilton v. Foster, 260 

Neb. 887, 620 N.W.2d 103 (2000). In Hamilton, the Nebraska 

Supreme Court held:

UIFSA, as its name implies, deals with the interstate 

enforcement and modification of support orders. The 

general purpose of UIFSA is to unify state laws relating to the establishment, enforcement, and modification 

of child support orders. Groseth v. Groseth, 257 Neb. 

525, 600 N.W.2d 159 (1999); Kasdan v. Berney, 587 

N.W.2d 319 (Minn. App. 1999). The goal of UIFSA 

is to streamline and expedite interstate enforcement of 

support decrees and to eliminate the problems arising 

from multiple or conflicting support orders from various 

states by providing for one tribunal to have continuing 

and exclusive jurisdiction to establish or modify a child 

support order. See, OCSE v. Clemmons, 65 Ark. App. 

84, 984 S.W.2d 837 (1999); Reis v. Zimmer, 263 A.D.2d 

136, 700 N.Y.S.2d 609 (1999); In re Marriage of Zinke, 

967 P.2d 210 (Colo. App. 1998); Cowan v. Moreno, 903 

S.W.2d 119 (Tex. App. 1995). UIFSA provides a system 

where only one child support order may be in effect 

at any one time. See Unif. Interstate Family Support 

Act, Prefatory Note, 9IB U.L.A. 241 (1999). See, also, 

Linn v. State Child Support Enforcement, 736 A.2d 954 

(Del. 1999).

260 Neb. at 899, 620 N.W.2d at 114.

[5] It is clear from this general purpose statement that, 

following the adoption of the UIFSA, there should not exist 
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multiple or conflicting support orders and that only one tribunal shall have continuing and exclusive jurisdiction to 

establish or modify a child support order. It is also clear 

that both Nebraska and Wisconsin have adopted versions 

of the UIFSA. See Wis. Stat. Ann. ch. 769 (West 2009 & 

Cum. Supp. 2017). But Clark is not asking the district court 

to establish or modify an order; he is asking the district 

court to determine which child support order is controlling. 

Assuming, without deciding, that courts in both Wisconsin and 

Nebraska have issued two conflicting child support orders, 

we must first determine whether the district court has jurisdiction to determine which child support order is controlling. The district court held that it did not have jurisdiction 

to make a determination governing the Wisconsin court’s 

order. We disagree.

Section 42-711(c) provides:

If two or more child support orders have been issued for 

the same obligor and the same child, upon request of a 

party who is an individual or that is a support enforcement agency, a tribunal of this state having personal 

jurisdiction over both the obligor and the obligee who is 

an individual shall determine which order controls under 

subsection (b) of this section. The request may be filed 

with a registration for enforcement or registration for 

modification pursuant to sections 42-736 to 42-747.04 or 

may be filed as a separate proceeding.

(Emphasis supplied.) Section 42-711(b) provides, in pertinent part:

If a proceeding is brought under the [UIFSA] and two 

or more child support orders have been issued by tribunals of this state, another state, or a foreign country with 

regard to the same obligor and the same child, a tribunal 

of this state having personal jurisdiction over both the 

obligor and individual obligee shall apply the following 

rules and by order shall determine which order controls 

and must be recognized:
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(1) If only one of the tribunals would have continuing, 

exclusive jurisdiction under the [UIFSA], the order of that 

tribunal controls.

(2) If more than one of the tribunals would have continuing, exclusive jurisdiction under the [UIFSA]:

(A) an order issued by a tribunal in the current home 

state of the child controls; or

(B) if an order has not been issued in the current 

home state of the child, the order most recently issued 

controls.

[6] Notably, the Nebraska Supreme Court stated that the 

“UIFSA’s provisions may only be used to enforce an existing 

support order, establish a support order where no order has previously been established, or modify an existing support order. 

See §§ 42–714 and 42–733.” Hamilton v. Foster, 260 Neb. 

887, 900, 620 N.W.2d 103, 114 (2000).

When read together with § 42-711(b) and (c), this means 

that in order for Clark to bring this action, the action must 

constitute one to enforce, establish, or modify a support order, 

and in connection therewith, if two or more child support 

orders have been issued, one of which has been issued in this 

state, he can request a tribunal in this state, if it has personal 

jurisdiction, to determine which order controls. Although this 

case is unusual in the sense that Clark is the obligor bringing 

the action, we hold that the action represents a claim by Clark 

to enforce a child support order wherein he properly requested 

the district court, under the UIFSA, to determine the controlling order.

That said, although the district court has subject matter 

jurisdiction to hear the controversy, it can only do so if it 

has “personal jurisdiction over both the obligor and individual obligee,” see § 42-711(b). Here, Clark is a Nebraska 

resident filing the action and subjecting himself to the jurisdiction of the district court to resolve this controversy. 

Conversely, Carter is a nonresident of Nebraska residing in 

Wisconsin.
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Section 42-705 provides, in relevant part:

(a) In a proceeding to establish or enforce a support 

order or to determine parentage of a child, a tribunal of 

this state may exercise personal jurisdiction over a nonresident individual or the individual’s guardian or conservator if:

. . . .

(2) The individual submits to the jurisdiction of this 

state by consent in a record, by entering a general appearance, or by filing a responsive document having the 

effect of waiving any contest to personal jurisdiction;

. . . .

(8) There is any other basis consistent with the constitutions of this state and the United States for the exercise 

of personal jurisdiction.

The record reflects that neither Carter nor the parties’ son, 

now in his thirties, have ever lived in Nebraska. That said, 

after Clark filed this lawsuit and served Carter in Wisconsin, 

Carter sent a document addressed to the District Court of 

Lancaster County, Nebraska, referencing “Ronald J. Clark v. 

Nori D. Clark” and included both the case number assigned to 

this action (“Case ID: CI 98 9026904”) and the case number 

governing the 1999 divorce action (“Old Case ID: 576589”). 

In that document, Clark generally directed that all future 

documents be sent to her at a different address; generally 

asked why she was being sued despite Clark’s failure to consistently pay child support over the years; generally provided 

that she and her mother have funded the parties’ son over the 

years, including his education; and expressed her disbelief that 

Clark will ever make good on his child support obligations. 

Carter signed the document, and the clerk of the district court 

filed the document. In the document, Carter never objected 

to the suit’s being brought in Nebraska nor mentioned anything that could be reasonably construed as contesting personal jurisdiction.
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[7] Generally speaking, the filing of a general appearance 

which does not preserve an objection to personal jurisdiction 

constitutes a waiver of personal jurisdiction. See Friedman 

v. Friedman, 290 Neb. 973, 863 N.W.2d 153 (2015). Section 

42-705(a)(2) appears to provide an even broader grant of personal jurisdiction over a nonresident individual if that individual files “a responsive document having the effect of waiving 

any contest to personal jurisdiction.” After reviewing the document filed by Carter in this matter, we believe the language of 

that document is sufficient to have effected a waiver of any 

contest to personal jurisdiction. In so finding, we note that 

Carter’s written response made reference to both the pending 

action and the parties’ divorce action—where she apparently 

waived any objection to personal jurisdiction, which action 

resulted in the child support order that is now part of the dispute. Under these facts, we hold that the district court had a 

basis to exercise personal jurisdiction over Carter pursuant to 

§ 42-705.

Because we hold that Clark did properly file a claim under 

the UIFSA where the district court had subject matter jurisdiction to resolve the controversy and rightfully acquired 

personal jurisdiction over Carter to enforce a support order, 

we now turn to the district court’s holding that it lacked “the 

necessary evidence and information to make a determination 

between competing cases in differing jurisdictions.”

Insufficient Evidence and

to Determine Contro

Child Support Ord

As we previously described, § 42-711 governs proceedings brought under the UIFSA where two or more support 

orders have been issued in this state and others. When a court 

in this state is called upon to “determine which order controls and must be recognized,” pursuant to § 42-711(b), the 

individual must follow the remaining directives in § 42-711. 

Those directives include: “A request to determine which is 
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the controlling order shall be accompanied by a copy of every 

child support order in effect and the applicable record of payments. The requesting party shall give notice of the request 

to each party whose rights may be affected by the determination.” § 42-711(d).

The record appears to contain copies of the alleged conflicting orders and record of payments, and it is difficult to 

determine from the district court’s order the specific bases 

of the district court’s determination that it lacked “the necessary evidence and information to make a determination 

between competing cases in differing jurisdictions.” But the 

UIFSA appears to provide for matters of uncertainty in connection with these claims. In addition to the special rules of 

evidence and procedure contained in § 42-729, the UIFSA 

contemplates, and includes a provision for, direct communication between courts of different jurisdictions. Specifically, 

§ 42-730 provides:

A tribunal of this state may communicate with a tribunal outside this state in a record or by telephone, 

electronic mail, or other means to obtain information concerning the laws, the legal effect of a judgment, decree, 

or order of that tribunal, and the status of a proceeding. A 

tribunal of this state may furnish similar information by 

similar means to a tribunal outside this state.

Additionally, § 42-731 provides: “A tribunal of this state may: 

(1) request a tribunal outside this state to assist in obtaining 

discovery; and (2) upon request, compel a person over which 

it has jurisdiction to respond to a discovery order issued by a 

tribunal outside this state.”

We additionally note that § 42-714 provides:

(a) Except as otherwise provided in the [UIFSA], sections 42-714 to 42-732 apply to all proceedings under 

the [UIFSA].

(b) An individual petitioner or a support enforcement 

agency may initiate a proceeding authorized under the 

[UIFSA] by filing a petition in an initiating tribunal 
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for forwarding to a responding tribunal or by filing a 

petition or a comparable pleading directly in a tribunal 

of another state or a foreign country which has or can 

obtain personal jurisdiction over the respondent.

The UIFSA then provides in § 42-717:

(a) Upon the filing of a petition authorized by the 

[UIFSA], an initiating tribunal of this state shall forward 

the petition and its accompanying documents:

(1) to the responding tribunal or appropriate support 

enforcement agency in the responding state; or

(2) if the identity of the responding tribunal is unknown, 

to the state information agency of the responding state 

with a request that they be forwarded to the appropriate 

tribunal and that receipt be acknowledged.

(b) If requested by the responding tribunal, a tribunal 

of this state shall issue a certificate or other document and 

make findings required by the law of the responding state. 

If the responding tribunal is in a foreign country, upon 

request the tribunal of this state shall specify the amount 

of support sought, convert that amount into the equivalent 

amount in the foreign currency under applicable official 

or market exchange rate as publicly reported, and provide 

any other documents necessary to satisfy the requirements 

of the responding foreign tribunal.

Accordingly, because of the statutory powers authorized by 

the legislatures of the respective states to cooperate and obtain 

or provide information necessary to resolve these controversies, we reverse the district court’s decision and remand the 

cause to the district court—which tribunal we have held has 

jurisdiction of this matter—to forward the complaint to the 

appropriate responding tribunal within the State of Wisconsin, 

to obtain from the Wisconsin tribunal all information deemed 

necessary by the district court to “determine which order controls and must be recognized,” to make all relevant findings 

under § 42-711(f), and to otherwise comply with the terms of 

the UIFSA.
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[8] Upon remand, we note that, as it relates to counsel’s 

claim during oral argument that his claim is grounded in both 

the UIFSA and equity, when a statute provides an adequate 

remedy at law, equity will not entertain jurisdiction, and a 

party must exhaust the statutory remedy before it may resort 

to equity. See Bock v. Dalbey, 283 Neb. 994, 815 N.W.2d 530 

(2012). See, also, State on behalf of B.M. v. Brian F., 288 Neb. 

106, 846 N.W.2d 257 (2014) (equitable remedies are generally not available where there exists adequate remedy at law); 

Ganser v. County of Lancaster, 215 Neb. 313, 317, 338 N.W.2d 

609, 611 (1983) (“suit in equity will not lie when the plaintiff 

has a plain and adequate remedy at law”).

Failure to Vacate or Modify Nebra

Child Support Obligat

Having determined that the order of the district court must 

be reversed and the cause remanded for further proceedings, 

we do not reach Clark’s assigned error that the district court 

erred in failing to vacate or modify his Nebraska child support obligation.

CONCLUSION

The district court had jurisdiction over this matter, and 

the UIFSA provides the court with powers authorized by the 

legislatures of the respective states to cooperate and obtain or 

provide information necessary to resolve controversies such 

as those presented in the instant case. Accordingly, we reverse 

the order of the district court and remand the cause for further proceedings.

 Reversed and remande

further proceeding