1 United States Court of Appeals,

Fifth Circuit.

No. 93-7750.

Beatrice HOUSTON, Annie Ruth Manning, Mary Ann Williams,

Plaintiffs-Appellants,

v.

LAFAYETTE COUNTY, MISSISSIPPI, et al., Defendants-Appellees.

May 4, 1995.

Appeal from the United States District Co urt for the Northern

District of Mississippi.

Before KING, EMILIO M. GARZA and DeMOSS, Circuit Judges.

EMILIO M. GARZA, Circuit Judge:

Residents of Lafayette County, Mississippi, appeal from the

district court's dismissal of their vote dilution challenge under

§ 2 of the Voting Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (1988), to the

redistricting plan for county supervisor elections as submitted by

the County to the United States Department of Justice for

preclearance. The district court found that the plaintiff

residents had failed to prove that the black population was

geographically compact, that black voters exhibited political

cohesion, and that white voters voted in bloc to defeat minority

candidates. 841 F.Supp. 751. We vacate the district court's

judgment, and remand for clarification.

I

County supervisors in Lafayette County are elected from five

single-member election districts. Black residents constitute

approximately one-quarter of the voting-age population and1 Bivariate ecological regression generates predictions of

the correlation between election results and the race of the

residents voting in the election. Statisticians use the

correlations to estimate the percentages of black residents' and

white residents' support for particular candidates. Extreme case

analysis evaluates the actual election choices of voters in

precincts whose residents are predominantly—80-90%-plus—of one

race. Both methods of analysis utilize correlation coefficients

and measures of statistical significance to determine the degree

of confidence with which to view the estimates and predictions

produced by the methods.

2 currently reside throughout the five districts. No black resident

has ever been elected to the office of county supervisor. Black

residen ts have been elected to sub-county positions such as

constable and board of education member.

At trial, plaintiff residents used expert t estimony and

reports to prove their vote-dilution case. Plaintiffs' expert,

Victoria Cari d as, testified that black residents in Lafayette

County could be placed in a majority-minority district, that is, a

district where minority residents constituted a majority of the

eligible voters. To demonstrate the feasibility of such placement,

she submitted two alternative plans that would achieve a 54-56%

black voting-age majority in one district.

Plaintiffs' expert Dr. Allan Lichtm an testified that black

residents of Lafayette County exhibit political cohesion and that

white residents of Lafayette County vote as a bloc to defeat

minority candidates. In support of these conclusions, Dr. Lichtman

testified that he used two statistical methods to analyze Lafayette

County election data: bivariate ecological regression and extreme

case analysis. 1 Dr. Lichtman analyzed fourteen primary elections

using ecologi cal regression and five primary elections using2 The district court described the plaintiff residents' plan

as a "geographic game of gymnastics."

3 extreme case analysis.

The County's expert, Dr. Ronald Weber, also performed

ecological regression and extreme case analysis on Lafayette County

election data, although he did not analyze the same elections as

Dr. Lichtman had. Based on his analysis, Dr. Weber concluded that

racial polarization—that is, that black resid ents vote for black

candidates and white residents vote for white candidates—does not

occur in Lafayette County.

The district court found that the plaintiff residents had not

shown that black residents were sufficiently geographically compact

to allow formation of a majority-minority district. 2 The court

also found that black residents did not exhibit political cohesion

and that white residents did not vote as a bloc to defeat minority

candidates. Alternatively, the district court found that, even if

the plaintiff residents had proved geographical compactness, black

political cohesion, and white bloc voting, th ey had failed

nonetheless to prove that the totality of the circumstances showed

that the County's plan diluted minority voting strength. Plaintiff

residents appeal the district court's decision, challenging each of

the above findings.

II

Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act provides that: "No voting

qualification or prerequisite to voting or standard, practice, or

procedure shall be imposed or applied by any State or political4

subdivision in a manner which results in a denial or abridgement of

the right of any citizen of the United States to vote on account of

race or color...." 42 U.S.C. § 1973; s ee also Thorn burg v.

Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 47, 106 S.Ct. 2752, 2764, 92 L.Ed.2d 25

(1986) ("The essence of a § 2 claim is that a certain electoral

law, practice, or structure interacts with so cial and historical

conditions to cause an inequality in the opportunities enjoyed by

black and white voters to elect their preferred representatives.").

In order to prove a § 2 viol ation, a plaintiff must

demonstrate three preconditions:

First, the minority group must be able to demonstrate that it

is sufficiently large and geographically compact to constitute

a majority in a single-member distr ict. ... Second, the

minority group must be able to show that it is politically

coh esive.... Third, the minority group must be able to

demonstrate that the white majority votes sufficiently as a

bloc to enable it—in the absence of special circumsta nces, such as the minority candidate running unopposed ...—usually

to defeat the minority's preferred candidate.

Gingles, 478 U.S. at 50-51, 106 S.Ct. at 2766-67. Although G ingles

concerned at-large election districts, these preconditions also

apply to challenges to single-member districting schemes. G rowe v.

Emison,

--- U.S. ----, ----, 113 S.Ct. 1075, 1084, 122 L.Ed.2d 388

(1993) (extending Gingles preconditions to single-member district

cases). If a plaintiff demonstrates the G ingles preconditions, the

district court determines whether , under the totality of the

circumstances, the plaintiff has proven the existence of vote

dilution under the challenged plan. In doing so, the district

court applies factors identified by the Senate Judiciary Committee

Report accompanying the 1982 amendments to § 2. G ingles, 478 U.S.3 These factors are:

1. the extent of any history of official discrimination

in the state or political subdivision that touched the

right of the members of the minority group to register,

to vote, or otherwise to participate in the democratic

process;

2. the extent to which voting in the elections of the

state or political subdivision is racially polarized;

3. the extent to which the state or political

subdivision has used unusually large election

districts, majority vote requirements, anti-single shot

provisions, or other voting practices or procedures

that may enhance the opportunity for discrimination

against the minority group;

4. if there is a candidate slating process, whether the

members of the minority group have been denied access

to that process;

5. the extent to which members of the minority group in

the state or political subdivision bear the effects of

discrimination in such areas as education, employment

and health, which hinder their ability to participate

effectively in the political process;

6. whether political campaigns have been characterized

by overt or subtle racial appeals;

7. the extent to which members of the minority group

have been elected to public office in the jurisdiction.

Additional factors that in some cases have had

probative value as part of plaintiffs' evidence to

establish a violation are:

whether there is a significant lack of responsiveness

on the part of elected officials to the particularized

needs of the members of the minority group.

whether the policy underlying the state or political

subdivision's use of such voting qualification,

prerequisite to voting, or standard, practice or

procedure is tenuous.

S.Rep. No. 417, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 28-29, reprinted in

1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 177, 206-07, quoted in Gingles, 478 U.S.

5 at 36-37, 106 S.Ct. at 2759. 3at 36-37, 106 S.Ct. at 2759.

6 We review the district court's findings with respect to the

Gingles preconditions and the totality of the circumstances factors

for clear error. S ee Westwego Citizens for Better Government v.

City of Westwego, 946 F.2d 1109, 1118 (5th Cir.1991) ( Westwego III

) (reviewing findings in § 2 case for clear error); C ampos v. City

of Baytown, Tex., 840 F.2d 1240, 1243 (5th Cir.1988) (same), cert.

denied, 492 U.S. 905, 109 S.Ct. 3213, 106 L.Ed.2d 564 (1989). "[A]

finding is "clearly erroneous' when although there is evidence to

support it, the reviewing court on the entire evidence is left with

the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made."

A nderson v. City of Bessemer City, N.C., 470 U.S. 564, 573 , 105

S.Ct. 1504, 1511, 84 L.Ed.2d 518 (1985) (quoting United States v.

United States Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364, 395, 68 S.Ct. 525, 542, 92

L.Ed. 746 (1948)).

A

Plaintiff residents contend that the district court clearly

erred in concluding that the black population of Lafayette County

was not sufficiently geographically compact to allow the formation

of a majority-minority district. They argue that our decision in

Clark v. Calhoun County, Miss., 21 F.3d 92 (5th Cir.1994), mandates

reversal.

Plaintiff residents challenge the district court's reasoning

that "[t]he potential for increased minority influence that a

majority composition of blacks within one district ma y afford is

necessarily offset by the significantly diminished power of those7

left behind in the overwhelmingly white supervisor districts." We

agree with the plaintiff's contention. As we stated in Clark:

[T]he di strict court's suggestion that the formation of

plaintiffs' proposed district would dilute the voting strength

of black citizens in the remaining districts does not support

its conclusi on that the black population in [the county] is

not sufficiently geographically compact. Whenever a

majority-black district is created to remedy a § 2 violation,

the number of black voters in the other districts must

necessarily be reduced. Indeed, without this phenomenon, no

majority-black districts would ever be created. Because the

record in this case reflects no loss of influence that is not

found in every § 2 case, the district court erred in finding

that the loss of influence supported its conclusion that the

black population in [the county] was not sufficiently

geographically compact.

Clark, 21 F.3d at 95; s ee also Campos, 840 F.2d at 1244 ("The fact

that there are members of the minority group outside the minority

district is immaterial.... Just because not all of the minorities

in [the city] are in the district does not mean that Gingles' first

par t is not satisfied."). Accordingly, the district court's

reasoning cannot support its finding that the black population is

not geographically compact.

In Clark, as in this case, the district court rejected the

plaintiffs' proffered districting plan as being too oddly shaped.

Compactness, however, is not as narrow a standard as the district

court construed it to be. "The first G ingles precondition does not

require some aesthetic ideal of compactness, but simply tha t the

black population be sufficiently compact to constitute a majority

in a single-member district." Id. at 95. Moreover, the question

is not whether the plaintiff residents' proposed district was oddly

shaped, but whether the proposal demonstrated that a geographically

compact district could be drawn. See id. ("[P]laintiffs' proposed4 Plaintiff residents explain in their brief that their

proposed plans used existing census block lines, which "lend

themselves to irregular shapes."

8 district is not cast in stone. It was simply presented to

demonstrate that a majority-black distri ct is feasible in [the]

county. If a § 2 violation is found, the county will be given the

first opportunity to develop a remedial plan." (citations

omitted)) . Thus, although the edges of the plaintiff residents'

p roposed district look ragged in places, this does no t

automatically mean failure to meet the first Gingles precondition. 4

As in Clark, the plaintiff residents' proposed district is not

nearly as "bizarre" as those rejected in Shaw v. Reno,

--- U.S.

---

-, 113 S.Ct. 2816, 125 L.Ed.2d 511 (1993), criticized in Growe,

---

U.S. at ---- - ----, 113 S.Ct. at 1085-85, or invalidated in Vera

v. Richards, 861 F.Supp. 1304, 1 345 (S.D.Tex.1994) (three-judge

panel), appeal filed, 63 U.S.L.W. 3388 (U.S. Oct. 31, 1994). See

Shaw,

--- U.S. at ----, 113 S.Ct. at 2826 (disapproving of

reapportionment p lan "so highly irregular that, on its face, it

rationally cannot be unde rstood as [being] anything other than

[race-based].") Indeed, the compactness of the district in the

plaintiff residents' proposed plan resembles that of many districts

considered constitutionally acceptable by other courts. S ee, e.g.,

Vera, 861 F.Supp. at 1345 (approving districts the shape of which

was "at least not highly irregular apart from the small racially

distinct appendages"); s ee also Richard G. Pildes & Richard G.

Niemi, Expressive Harms, "Bizarre Districts," and Voting Rights:

Evaluating Election District Appear ances After Shaw v. Reno, 929

Mich.L.Rev. 483, 542 fig. 2(d), 544 fig. 2(e), 545 fig. 3(a), 547

fig. 3(d) (1993) (explaining that districts of similar compactness

to that proposed in this case satisfy the first G ingles

precondition). Lastly, the district in the plaintiff residents'

proposed plan is not substantially less compa ct than

districts—which the County asserts are compact—in the County's 1982

and 1991 plans. S ee Defendants' Exhibits 1(a), 1(b), 10, 16 (1982

and 1991 C ounty redistricting maps). The district court should

have focused on the size and concentratio n of the minority

population, rather than only on the shape of the districts in the

plaintiff residents' specific proposals. Accordingly, we hold that

the district court clearly erred in finding that th e black

population of Lafayette County was not sufficiently geographically

compact, based on its articulated rationale. Accordingly, we

reverse and remand to the district court for further findings on

this precondition.

B

Plaintiff residents further cont end that the district court

clearly erred in concluding that they had failed to satisfy the

second and third Gingles preconditions because voting in Lafayette

County does not exhibit signs of racial polarization. The

plaintiffs' expert, Dr. Lichtman, used both b ivariate ecological

regression an d extreme case analysis to show black political

cohes ion and white bloc voting. The district court, however,

viewed the plaintiff residents' proof on these elements as limited

t o the extreme case analysis, stating that "[t]o determine vo ter5 Lafayette County has no 80%-plus black-majority precincts.

10 preference, ... Lichtman relied on extreme case analysis."

The district court criticized Lichtman's analysis because

Lichtman could use extreme case analysis only on 80%-plus

white-majority precincts. 5 In the district court's view,

"[w]ithout containing any heavily black precincts, Plaintiffs'

analysis is incomplete: it sheds no light on and offers little

proof of either black political cohesiveness or the preferred

candidate of blacks." The district court's commentary on

Lichtman's ecological regression consists merel y of a statement

that such studies are "nondemonstrative of a minority vote dilution

claim" and "did not encompass other factors and variables that

provide further insight to votin g behaviors and patterns." The

district court favored the statistics of Dr. Weber, the defendants'

expert, because he "incorporated other acceptable research methods

associated with history, and the political and social sciences."

Plain t iff residents correctly state that we vacated this

district court's similar approach in Teague v. Attala Cou nty, 17

F.3d 796 (5th Cir.1994). In T eague, the district court rejected

the plaintiffs' statistics summarily, and we vacated the judgment

because the district court had neithe r addressed the statistical

evidence nor provided this court with sufficiently particularized

findings such that we could conduct a proper appellate review.

"[I]n making its intensely fact-specific inquiry here, the district

court ought to have discussed appellants' statistical evidence more

thoroughly because that was the principal evidence they offered and6 See also Clark, 21 F.3d at 96 ("The district court, of

course, is not obliged to accept plaintiffs' statistical evidence

as conclusive on the question of whether racially polarized

voting exists in [the county].... However, when the statistics

are the principal evidence offered by plaintiffs and when the

statistics have at least surface plausibility, the district court

must ensure that it thoroughly discusses its reasons for

rejecting that evidence."); Monroe v. City of Woodville, 897

F.2d 763, 764 (5th Cir.) ("Statistical proof of political

cohesion is likely to be the most persuasive form of evidence,

although other evidence may also establish this phenomenon....

Nevertheless, courts must carefully examine statistical evidence

of racial bloc voting to determine its relevance and

11 because their statistics had at least surface plausibility." Id.

at 798.

We conclude that the district court's findings in this case

suffer the same flaws as its find ings in T eague. First, the

district court should have considered Lichtman's ecological

regression probative of the issues of black political cohesion and

white bloc voting. S ee Gingles, 478 U.S. at 52-53, 61- 63, 106

S.Ct. at 2767, 2772-73 (approving of use of extreme case analysis

and biv ariate ecological regression analysis to prove racially

polarized voting). Second, the district court should not have

rejected summarily the plaintiff residents' sta t istics on the

grounds that they "look[e d] strictly at how, rather than why,

people vote the way they do." S ee Gingles, 478 U.S. at 63-64, 106

S.Ct. at 2773 (explaining the "irrelevance to a § 2 inquiry of the

reasons why black and white voters vote differently" because race

is often connected to other socioeconomic factors). The statistics

the plaintiff residents offered have facial plausibility, and

therefore the district court should have considered them. T eague,

17 F.3d at 798. 6probativeness [sic] to a finding of political cohesiveness."

(citation omitted)), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 822, 111 S.Ct. 71,

112 L.Ed.2d 45 (1990); Westwego Citizens for Better Gov't v.

Westwego, 872 F.2d 1201, 1203-04 (5th Cir.1989) ( Westwego I )

(criticizing district court for failing to note substantial

contrary evidence and failing to "specify on which evidence it

relied in support of its conclusions"); Velasquez v. City of

Abilene, 725 F.2d 1017, 1020 (5th Cir.1984) ("Although the trial

court is not required to recount and discuss every bit of

evidence offered to it, it is required to discuss all the

substantial evidence contrary to its opinion.").

7 Indeed, at least half of the analysis section of the

district court's opinion in this case is identical to that in

Teague.

8 See also Westwego I, 872 F.2d at 1204 ("The district

court's findings are stated in a conclusory fashion, with

virtually no reference to the evidence presented at trial. While

the district court may in fact have evaluated the evidence

critically, the court's assessment of the evidence cannot be

discerned from the record before us."); Velasquez, 725 F.2d at

1021 ("It may be that the court below did not consider such

evidence substantial or did not credit its validity, but we are

unable to determine from a silent record the thought processes of

12 Moreover, as in Teague, the district court's findings are too

general to allow us to conduc t our appellate review. I d. at 798

("This court is unable to discharge our appellate function in

voting rights cases without more guidance by the trial court

concerning its credibility choices on the welter of evidence before

it."). 7 Although the district court may ultimately decide that the

defendants' evidence wins this battle of statistics, the district

court must at the very least thoroughly discuss its choices with

specific references to the evidence proffered. S ee Teague, 17 F.3d

at 798 (remanding for further clarification because "the district

court findings on the subjects of racial polarization and minority

political cohesion are broad and general and not explicitly tied to

the testimony, although many witnesses were called in the case"). 8the court below.").

9 Because we remand for additional findings, we do not

address plaintiffs' challenges to the district court's comments

on multiple minority candidate races and crossover voting.

13 Accordingly, we vacate the district court's decision and remand for

clarification of the racial-polarization and bloc-voting issues. 9

C

Given that we remand for further findings on the second and

third Gin gles preconditions, we also vacate the district court's

alternative holding that the plaintiff residents did not show that,

under the totality of the circumstances, the districting scheme in

Lafayette County diluted minority votes. S ee Clark, 21 F.3d at 97

(vacating and remanding alternative holding bec ause findings on

underlying preconditions were vacated). On remand, if the district

court determines that the plaintiff residents satisfy the Gingles

preconditions, it should then evaluate their claim un der the

totality of the circumstances. See Johnson v. DeGrandy, --- U.S.

----, ----, 114 S.Ct. 2647, 2657, 129 L.Ed.2d 775 (1994)

(explaining that proof of Gingles preconditions i s necessary but

not sufficient to establish a § 2 violation). We note that a

totality of the circumstances discussion must contain more than the

analysis provided in th e opinion we have reviewed here.

Specifically, the district court must consider and analyze each of

the Senate Re port factors and incorporated in G ingles. E ast

Jefferson Coalition for Leadership & Dev. v. Parish of Jefferson,

926 F.2d 487, 491 (5th Cir.1991) ("In evaluating the totality of

the circumstances , the court should consider the [Senate Report]14

factors listed...."); s ee also supra note 1 and accompanying text

(explaining and enumerating Senate Report factors).

III

For the foregoing reasons, we VACATE the judgment of the

district court with respect to the G ingles preconditions and the

totality of the circumstances factors. We therefore REMAND for

additional findings consistent with this opinion.