An unpublished opinion of the North Carolina Court of Appeals does not constitute 

controlling legal authority. Citation is disfavored, but may be permitted in accordance 

with the provisions of Rule 30(e)(3) of the North Carolina Rules of Appellate Procedure.

NO. COA14-737

NORTH CAROLINA COURT OF APPEALS

Filed: 17 February 2015

STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA

v. Craven County

No. 01 CRS 53730

RICKY DARNELL WHITEHEAD,

Defendant.

Appeal by defendant from order entered 6 September 2013 by 

Judge Kenneth F. Crow in Craven County Superior Court. Heard in 

the Court of Appeals 5 November 2014.

Attorney General Roy Cooper, by Special Deputy Attorney 

General Joseph Finarelli, for the State.

Ryan McKaig for defendant-appellant.

DIETZ, Judge.

After serving his sentence for a second-degree rape

conviction, the trial court ordered Defendant Ricky Darnell 

Whitehead to submit to satellite-based monitoring for a period 

of ten years. Whitehead appeals from that order, arguing that 

the trial court’s findings do not support imposition of 

satellite-based monitoring, the strictest form of supervision 

and monitoring for convicted sex offenders. 
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For the reasons discussed below, we hold that the trial 

court properly considered the facts underlying Whitehead’s 

conviction in making its findings and that those findings 

support imposition of satellite-based monitoring under our 

precedent. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s order.

Facts and Procedural History

On 29 January 2002, Whitehead pleaded guilty to seconddegree rape in exchange for dismissal by the State of a 

statutory rape charge. At the time of the underlying offense, 

Whitehead was thirty-six years old. The victim was a thirteenyear-old foster child who lived with Whitehead’s aunt. 

Whitehead, who had obtained the status of a habitual felon, was 

sentenced to an active term of imprisonment of 133 to 169 

months.

More than ten years later, on 16 January 2013, Whitehead 

received a notice from the North Carolina Department of Public 

Safety requiring him to attend a hearing to determine whether he 

was eligible to submit to satellite-based monitoring. In 

conjunction with this hearing, on 11 February 2013, Whitehead 

completed a STATIC-99 evaluation, a test created by the 

Department of Correction to assess a sex offender’s risk of 

reoffending. The STATIC-99 considers such factors as the 
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offender’s age, number of prior sex offenses, other convictions 

for violent offenses, and whether any of the victims were 

strangers or unrelated to the defendant. Whitehead received a 

score of 3 on the assessment, placing him in the “Moderate-Low” 

range for risk of reoffending. 

At the 22 April 2013 hearing in the Craven County Superior 

Court, the parties contested the admissibility of a pre-sentence 

diagnostic report that had been prepared in 2002. This report 

included facts about Whitehead’s education, employment, mental 

health, and family background, along with information about his

conduct while incarcerated. The State asked the trial court to 

consider from this report the age disparity between Whitehead 

and the victim, as well as the fact that the victim was a foster 

child living in the home of Whitehead’s aunt at the time of the 

offense. Defense counsel did not object to the introduction of 

this particular evidence from the report, and acknowledged that 

such facts were indeed “relevant in this case.” 

After the hearing, on 6 September 2013, the court

determined that Whitehead was eligible to enroll in satellitebased monitoring. In addition to finding that Whitehead was 

convicted of an offense involving the physical, mental, or 
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sexual abuse of a minor, the trial court made the following 

findings of fact:

1) Age difference between the defendant 

and the victim at the time of the crime. 

The victim was thirteen (13) and the 

defendant was thirty-five (35);

2) The defendant was aware the victim was 

in foster care at his Aunt’s home and took 

advantage of the victim.

The court incorporated by reference the STATIC-99 report placing 

Whitehead in the “Moderate-Low” range, the 2002 pre-sentencing 

report, and the information in the notice of hearing. The court 

then concluded that Whitehead “requires the highest possible 

level of supervision and monitoring” and ordered him to enroll 

in the satellite-based monitoring program for a period of ten 

years. Whitehead appeals from this order. 

Analysis

On appeal from a satellite-based monitoring order, “we 

review the trial court’s findings of fact to determine whether 

they are supported by competent record evidence, and we review 

the trial court’s conclusions of law for legal accuracy and to 

ensure that those conclusions reflect a correct application of 

law to the facts found.” State v. Kilby, 198 N.C. App. 363, 

367, 679 S.E.2d 430, 432 (2009) (citation and internal quotation 

marks omitted). The trial court is statutorily required to make 
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findings of fact to support its legal conclusions. Id. at 366, 

679 S.E.2d at 432; see also N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-208.40B (2013). 

Moreover, where a defendant receives a low to moderate score on 

the risk assessment, the trial court must make additional 

findings of fact before ordering the defendant to submit to 

satellite-based monitoring, which is the highest level of 

supervision and monitoring. Kilby, 198 N.C. App. at 369-70, 679 

S.E.2d at 434. 

Here, the trial court found that Whitehead qualified for 

supervision and monitoring and also made additional findings 

supporting imposition of ten years of satellite-based 

monitoring. Whitehead first argues that the trial court’s 

additional findings supporting satellite-based monitoring are 

impermissible because “the additional findings all related to 

the facts of the particular offense for which Mr. Whitehead was 

initially convicted and which made him subject to satellitebased monitoring.” Whitehead contends that trial courts cannot 

consider the facts of the underlying conviction itself as part 

of the “additional findings” necessary to impose satellite-based 

monitoring.

This argument is precluded by our decision in State v. 

Green, 211 N.C. App. 599, 710 S.E.2d 292 (2011). In Green, this 
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Court held that “the trial court may properly consider evidence 

of the factual context of a defendant’s conviction when making 

additional findings as to the level of supervision required of a 

defendant convicted of an offense involving the physical, 

mental, or sexual abuse of a minor.” Id. at 603, 710 S.E.2d at 

295.1 We therefore held “that it was not error for the trial 

court to consider the factual context of [a defendant’s]

conviction in making its additional findings” and imposing 5 

years of satellite based monitoring. Id. Because it is 

permissible for a trial court to consider the facts underlying a 

defendant’s conviction in making the additional findings 

necessary to impose satellite-based monitoring, we reject 

Whitehead’s argument.

Whitehead next argues that the “additional findings” by the 

trial court do not support imposition of the highest level of 

supervision and monitoring. Whitehead contends that the two 

findings—the disparity in age between Whitehead and the victim 

and the fact that Whitehead took advantage of the victim, whom 

he knew to be a foster child living in his aunt’s home—do not 

adequately support the legal conclusion that he must enroll in 

 

1 Whitehead does not dispute on appeal that he was convicted of 

“an offense involving the physical, mental, or sexual abuse of a 

minor.”
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satellite-based monitoring for ten years. Again, we conclude 

that this argument is precluded by our precedent.

In State v. Jarvis, 214 N.C. App. 84, 99, 715 S.E.2d 252, 

261 (2011), this Court held that findings nearly 

indistinguishable from those in this case supported imposition 

of satellite-based monitoring. In Jarvis, the trial court made 

two findings that this Court held to be supported by competent 

evidence: (1) “[t]hat the defendant took advantage of his 

position of trust noting that the victim looked upon him as a 

father figure”; and (2) “[t]hat the defendant took advantage of 

the victim's vulnerability when at the time the victim had a 

strained relationship with her father and looked to the 

defendant for support and comfort.” Id. at 95, 715 S.E.2d at 

259. This Court then held that a third finding was not 

supported by competent evidence, and that a fourth finding

required further consideration by the trial court. Id. at 95-

99, 715 S.E.2d at 259-61.

Because this Court held that one finding was unsupported by 

the evidence and that a second required more detailed 

explanation, it was necessary to remand the case to the trial 

court for a new hearing. Id. But in doing so, this Court held 

that evidence concerning the victim’s young age and 
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vulnerability, and defendant’s position of trust, “could support 

findings of fact which could lead to a conclusion that ‘the 

defendant requires the highest possible level of supervision and 

monitoring.’” Id. at 99, 715 S.E.2d at 261 (emphasis in 

original). In other words, this Court held that findings on 

those two grounds, standing alone, could support imposition of 

satellite-based monitoring. It remanded the matter for 

additional explanation of a third finding and to reconsider the 

duration and other specific details of the monitoring in light 

of the changed findings.

Under Jarvis, we must affirm the trial court’s imposition 

of satellite-based monitoring in this case. Here, as in Jarvis, 

the trial court found that the Defendant had abused a position 

of trust to take advantage of a vulnerable juvenile victim. 

Specifically, the trial court found that there was a significant 

age disparity between Whitehead and the victim and that 

Whitehead “was aware the victim was in foster care at his Aunt’s 

home and took advantage of the victim.” This Court held that 

nearly identical findings could support imposition of satellitebased monitoring in Jarvis. One panel of this Court cannot 

overturn another, In re Civil Penalty, 324 N.C. 373, 384, 379 
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S.E.2d 30, 37 (1989), and thus we are bound by the Jarvis

holding and must affirm the trial court’s order in this case.

AFFIRMED.

Judges BRYANT and DILLON concur.

Report per Rule 30(e).