DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF FLORIDA

SECOND DISTRICT

STATE OF FLORIDA,

Appellant,

v.

ANTHONY LEVERN WAITERS,

Appellee.

No. 2D21-1477

September 23, 2022

Appeal from the Circuit Court for Manatee County; Lon S. Arend, 

Judge.

Ashley Moody, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Peter N. 

Koclanes, Assistant Attorney General, Tampa; Lindsay Danielle 

Turner, Assistant Attorney General, Tampa (substituted as counsel 

of record); and Taylor A. Schell (substituted as counsel of record), 

for Appellant. 

Larry L. Eger, Public Defender, and Layron Jamie Gaither, Assistant 

Public Defender, Bradenton, for Appellant.

LaROSE, Judge.

For want of a nail the shoe was lost.

For want of a shoe the horse was lost.
2

For want of a horse the rider was lost.

For want of a rider the message was lost.

For want of a message the battle was lost.

For want of a battle the kingdom was lost.

And all for the want of a horseshoe nail.

Benjamin Franklin, Poor Richard's Almanac 275 (G.P. Putman's 

Sons eds. 1889) (1758). In Mr. Franklin's tale, a lone lost nail leads 

to a lost kingdom. This attenuated chain of events highlights the 

pitfalls of employing "but for" causation in the context of criminal 

liability and, as relevant here, immunity from prosecution.

The State appeals the trial court's order finding that "but for" 

causation immunized Anthony Levern Waiters from prosecution for 

drug-related offenses under the 911 Good Samaritan Act, 

§ 893.21(2), Fla. Stat. (2020). See ch. 12-36 § 1, Laws of Fla. We 

have jurisdiction. See Fla. R. App. P. 9.030(b)(1)(A); 9.140(c)(1)(A). 

Because the contraband was not obtained as a proximate, or direct, 

result of Mr. Waiter's seeking medical assistance, we reverse.

I. Factual and Procedural Background

The relevant facts are not in dispute. Mr. Waiters used crack 

cocaine. He then began acting erratically, running around inside 

his sister's home, screaming, and grasping at his chest. Alarmed, 

his sister called 911.
3

Emergency medical services (EMS) personnel arrived in 

response to a possible drug overdose. Later, law enforcement 

officers arrived and evaluated Mr. Waiters under the Marchman 

Act1 to determine whether he needed to be taken into protective 

custody. EMS concluded that Mr. Waiters could be released 

without hospitalization. In fact, Mr. Waiters signed a release 

declining further medical attention. 

Mr. Waiters provided his name and date of birth to the 

attending EMS personnel and law enforcement officers. Running 

this information through dispatch, the law enforcement officers 

learned that Mr. Waiters had an outstanding felony arrest warrant.

Upon concluding that Mr. Waiters did not meet the Marchman 

Act criteria, and after he had declined further medical attention, the 

law enforcement officers arrested him. Before patting down Mr. 

Waiters and putting him in the patrol car, the law enforcement 

officers asked if there was anything on his person that posed a 

danger of sticking/poking the officers. Mr. Waiters admitted having 

a broken crack pipe stem and a piece of crack rock in his pocket. 

Thereafter, the State charged Mr. Waiters with possession of a 

1

 §§ 397.301-.998, Fla. Stat. (2020).
4

controlled substance and possession of drug paraphernalia. 

§§ 893.13(6)(a), .147(1), Fla. Stat. (2020).

Mr. Waiters moved to dismiss the charges pursuant to section 

893.21. He claimed that he was immune from prosecution because 

the contraband was "obtained as a result of [his] . . . seeking 

medical assistance." After an evidentiary hearing, the trial court 

granted the motion: 

I'm going to go back to the language of [subsection] 

(2). It says, "If the evidence for such offense was obtained 

as a result of the person seeking medical assistance," I do 

find that that would -- the drugs [and] paraphernalia 

would not have been found on Mr. Waiters but for the 

call for help, in that the whole purpose of this statute I 

still find is to give people the safety and security where 

the family will call for them if they're clutching their 

chest for him to call on his own.

(Emphasis added). After the trial court rendered a written "Order 

on Defense Motion to Dismiss," the State appealed.2

2

 The order from which the State originally appealed simply 

granted Mr. Waiters immunity from prosecution. The order did not 

dismiss the information. It was, therefore, not an appealable order. 

See State v. Odom, 24 So. 3d 1266, 1267-68 (Fla. 1st DCA 2009) 

(concluding that the State was not authorized to appeal the trial 

court's order granting defendants' motions to dismiss as the order 

did not actually dismiss the indictment or any count thereof). After 

we relinquished jurisdiction, the trial court rendered an appealable 

order dismissing the charges.
5

II. Standards of Review

We employ two standards in reviewing the trial court's order. 

First, we apply de novo review to the trial court's interpretation of 

the statute. Johnson v. State, 78 So. 3d 1305, 1310 (Fla. 2012) 

("Judicial interpretations of statutes are pure questions of law 

subject to de novo review." (citing State v. Sigler, 967 So. 2d 835, 

841 (Fla. 2007))). 

To that end, "[l]egislative intent guides statutory analysis, and 

to discern that intent we must look first to the language of the 

statute and its plain meaning." Tasker v. State, 48 So. 3d 798, 804 

(Fla. 2010) (alteration in original) (quoting Fla. Dep't of Child. & 

Fam. Servs. v. P.E., 14 So. 3d 228, 234 (Fla. 2009)); Calabro v. 

State, 995 So. 2d 307, 314 (Fla. 2008) ("This Court has held from 

time immemorial that we must primarily determine the effect and 

purpose of statutes and rules of court by first examining the actual 

words used in the statute or rule and determine the plain meaning 

of those words."); see also Bautista v. State, 863 So. 2d 1180, 1185 

(Fla. 2003) ("Our purpose in construing a statutory provision is to 

give effect to legislative intent. Legislative intent is the polestar that 

guides a court's statutory construction analysis." (citing State v. 
6

J.M., 824 So. 2d 105, 109 (Fla. 2002))). "When the statutory 

language is clear or unambiguous, [we] need not look behind the 

statute's plain language or employ principles of statutory 

construction to determine legislative intent." English v. State, 191 

So. 3d 448, 450 (Fla. 2016).

"If the statutory text is ambiguous, however, we turn to rules 

of statutory construction to determine its meaning." State v. 

Kwitowski, 250 So. 3d 210, 213 (Fla. 2d DCA 2018). "Statutory 

language is ambiguous when it could be reasonably understood as 

meaning two—or potentially more—different things." Id.; see 

Forsythe v. Longboat Key Beach Erosion Control Dist., 604 So. 2d 

452, 455 (Fla. 1992) ("Ambiguity suggests that reasonable persons 

can find different meanings in the same language."); Houston v. City 

of Tampa Firefighters & Police Officers' Pension Fund Bd. of Trs., 303 

So. 3d 233, 240 (Fla. 2d DCA 2020) ("Statutory language is 

ambiguous when it is reasonably susceptible of more than one 

interpretation."). We are mindful that we should not seek out 

ambiguity when it does not exist. There is, after all, "a difference 

between ambiguity and unexpressed intention." Forsythe, 604 So. 

2d at 455. 
7

Second, we utilize a mixed standard of review when 

determining whether an individual is entitled to statutory 

immunity:

The question of entitlement to immunity under the Stand 

Your Ground law "is a mixed question of law and fact 

because to answer it one must determine the governing 

law as stated in the statute, find the operative facts, and 

apply the law to those facts." This court reviews the 

lower court's findings of fact for competent, substantial 

evidence, and we review the court's conclusions of law de 

novo.

Huckelby v. State, 313 So. 3d 861, 865 (Fla. 2d DCA 2021) (quoting 

and citing Bouie v. State, 292 So. 3d 471, 479 (Fla. 2d DCA 2020)). 

With these ground rules in place, we begin by identifying the 

issues before us. After that, we will proceed with our analysis of the 

statutory language. Then, we will review Mr. Waiters' entitlement to 

statutory immunity.

III. Section 893.21(2) and the issues before us

Under section 893.21(2),

[a] person who experiences, or has a good faith belief that 

he or she is experiencing, an alcohol-related or a drugrelated overdose and is in need of medical assistance may 

not be arrested, charged, prosecuted, or penalized for a 

violation of [section] 893.147(1) or [section] 893.13(6), 

excluding paragraph (c), if the evidence for such offense 

was obtained as a result of the person's seeking medical 

assistance.
8

The parties invite us to discern the meaning of "as a result of." 

Id. Essentially, we must determine whether an intervening cause 

(the outstanding arrest warrant) leading to the discovery of the 

contraband is sufficient to break the causal chain. If so, the 

discovered evidence falls outside the ambit of Mr. Waiters' seeking 

medical assistance.3 In other words, we first must determine 

whether "as a result of" calls for "but for" or proximate causation. 

Next, because the facts are not in dispute and our review is de 

novo, we then apply the proper test of causation to the undisputed 

facts. 

IV. Analysis 

A. The statutory language

The statute does not define the phrase "as a result of."4 See 

Newberger v. State, 641 So. 2d 419, 420 (Fla. 2d DCA 1994) ("The 

3

 Because resolution of this issue is dispositive of our case, we 

do not reach the remaining issue the State raises on appeal.

4

 Other states have adopted similar laws; however, the 

statutory language in some is more explicit. See, e.g., Ga. Code 

Ann. § 16-13-5(b) (West 2014) ("Any person who is experiencing a 

drug overdose and, in good faith, seeks medical assistance for 

himself or herself or is the subject of such a request shall not be 

arrested, charged, or prosecuted for a drug violation if the evidence 

for the arrest, charge, or prosecution of such drug violation resulted 

solely from seeking such medical assistance." (emphasis added)); 
9

rules of statutory construction require that courts give statutory 

language its plain and ordinary meaning, unless the words are 

defined in the statute."). Consequently, "the plain and ordinary 

meaning of [a] word can be ascertained by reference to a 

dictionary." Sieniarecki v. State, 756 So. 2d 68, 75 (Fla. 2000) 

(quoting Green v. State, 604 So. 2d 471, 473 (Fla. 1992)). 

"Result" is defined as "[a] consequence, effect, or conclusion"; 

or [t]hat which is achieved, brought about, or obtained, esp[ecially] 

by purposeful action." Black's Law Dictionary 1509 (Deluxe 10th 

ed. 2014). Elsewhere, "result" is defined as "something that results 

as a consequence, issue, or conclusion" and "something obtained by 

calculation or investigation." Result, Merriam-Webster Dictionary, 

Md. Code Ann., Crim. Proc. § 1-210(b) (West 2016) ("A person who, 

in good faith, seeks, provides, or assists with the provision of 

medical assistance for a person reasonably believed to be 

experiencing a medical emergency after ingesting or using alcohol 

or drugs shall be immune from criminal arrest, charge, or 

prosecution for a violation of § 5-601, § 5-619, § 5-620, § 10-114, § 

10-116, or § 10-117 of the Criminal Law Article if the evidence for 

the criminal arrest, charge, or prosecution was obtained solely as a 

result of the person's seeking, providing, or assisting with the 

provision of medical assistance." (emphasis added)); N.H. Rev. Stat. 

Ann. § 318-B:28-b (2021) (creating a defense to enumerated drug 

possession charges "if the evidence for the charge was gained as a 

proximate result of the request for medical assistance or the report 

to law enforcement" (emphasis added)).
10

https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/result (last visited 

Aug. 16, 2022). "Result" is also defined as "something that happens 

or exists because of something else" and "as a result of something." 

Result, Cambridge Dictionary, https://dictionary.cambridge.org 

/us/dictionary/english/result (last visited Aug. 16, 2022). These 

definitions are not helpful. In contrast, each party offers a 

reasonable, albeit different, interpretation of what "result" means, 

supported by out-of-state cases. Compare State v. Miller, 141 

N.E.3d 604, 612-13 (Ohio Ct. App. 2019), with State v. W.S.B., 180 

A.3d 1168, 1179 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2018). Thus, we resort 

to the rules of statutory construction.

"[I]f the statutory intent is unclear from the plain 

language of the statute, then 'we apply rules of statutory 

construction and explore legislative history to determine 

legislative intent.' " [Koile v. State, 934 So. 2d 1226, 

1231 (Fla. 2006) (quoting BellSouth Telecomms., Inc. v. 

Meeks, 863 So. 2d 287, 289 (Fla. 2003))]. Among the 

basic principles of statutory construction is that statutes 

relating to the same subject matter must be read 

together, or in pari materia. Fla. Dep't of State v. Martin, 

916 So. 2d 763, 768 (Fla. 2005) ("The doctrine of in pari 

materia is a principle of statutory construction that 

requires that statutes relating to the same subject or 

object be construed together to harmonize the statutes 

and to give effect to the Legislature's intent.").

Fla. Dep't of Highway Safety & Motor Vehicles v. Hernandez, 74 So. 

3d 1070, 1074-75 (Fla. 2011). 
11

The original version of the statute provided as follows:

A person who experiences a drug-related overdose 

and is in need of medical assistance may not be charged, 

prosecuted, or penalized pursuant to this chapter for 

possession of a controlled substance if the evidence for 

possession of a controlled substance was obtained as a 

result of the overdose and the need for medical 

assistance.

§ 893.21(2), Fla. Stat. (2012). We know that "[b]ecause there is no 

stated exclusion from being charged, prosecuted or penalized for a 

person who has committed any other offenses or who has an 

outstanding arrest warrant, such an exclusion should not be 

presumed." Fla. S. Crim. Just. Comm., S.B. 278 (2011) Staff 

Analysis 5 (Oct. 19, 2011), available at https://www.flsenate.gov 

/Session/Bill/2012/278/Analyses/2012s0278.cj.PDF; Fla. S. 

Health Regul. Comm. S.B. 278 (2011) Staff Analysis 5 (Jan. 21, 

2012), available at https://www.flsenate.gov/Session/Bill 

/2012/278/Analyses/2012s0278.hr.PDF (same).

Apparently, the legislature did not intend to immunize 

individuals seeking medical assistance for a drug overdose from 

arrest pursuant to an outstanding arrest warrant. It would 

certainly be incongruous, then, for an individual to evade criminal 

liability under section 893.21(2) for any contraband discovered 
12

pursuant to an arrest on an outstanding warrant.5 Cf. State v. 

Frierson, 926 So. 2d 1139, 1144 (Fla. 2006) (observing that an 

"outstanding arrest warrant [i]s a judicial order directing the arrest 

of respondent whenever the respondent [i]s located"); see generally 

United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 224 (1973) ("It is well 

settled that a search incident to a lawful arrest is a traditional 

exception to the warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment."). 

Were we to accept the trial court's "but for" causation test, an 

individual would enjoy immunity beyond that intended by the 

statute. According to Mr. Waiters, an arresting officer must turn a 

blind eye to any contraband discovered pursuant to a search 

incident to arrest on an outstanding warrant because the series of 

events leading to that discovery began with Mr. Waiters' need for 

medical assistance for a suspected drug overdose. This is, indeed, 

a strained reading of the statute; it ignores the legislative intent 

reflected in section 893.21(2)'s staff analysis. 

5

 As noted above, the operative version of the statute in this 

case is from 2020. The statute was amended in 2019. See ch. 19-

81 § 2, Laws of Fla. However, there is nothing in the language of 

section 893.21(2) or in the legislative history of the 2019 

amendment to indicate that the legislature intended otherwise.
13

Moreover, when we read section 893.21 in pari materia with 

other sections of the "Florida Comprehensive Drug Abuse 

Prevention and Control Act," §§ 893.01-.30 and related statutory 

provisions, we conclude that the legislature intended to employ 

proximate causation as the test for legal liability. See Heart of 

Adoptions, Inc. v. J.A., 963 So. 2d 189, 199 (Fla. 2007) ("[R]elated 

statutory provisions must be read together to achieve a consistent 

whole, and . . . '[w]here possible, courts must give full effect to all 

statutory provisions and construe related statutory provisions in 

harmony with one another.' " (alterations and omission in original) 

(quoting Woodham v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, Inc., 829 So. 2d 891, 

898 (Fla. 2002))).

For instance, section 782.04(1)(a)3, Florida Statutes (2020), 

classifies as a capital felony the distribution of multiple controlled 

substances enumerated under section 893.03 "when such 

substance or mixture is proven to be the proximate cause of the 

death of the user." Faced with section 893.21(2)'s ambiguity, and to 

maintain consistency with these related statutory provisions, we 

read section 893.21 to also require proximate causation. 
14

Construing these related statutory provisions differently hazards 

anomalous and inconsistent results. 

B. Proximate cause versus but-for cause

Because we conclude that proximate cause is the appropriate 

test, we apply that test to the relevant, undisputed facts. 

After EMS personnel found no health emergency with Mr. 

Waiters, the law enforcement officers arrested him on the 

outstanding warrant. Only after they had arrested him did they 

find the contraband. In our view, the outstanding warrant was an 

intervening, superseding cause severing any causal connection to 

Mr. Waiters' seeking medical assistance. See Frierson, 926 So. 2d 

at 1143-44.

Section 893.21 requires that the request for medical 

assistance be the cause of the discovery of the evidence ("as a 

result"). Cf. Reaves v. State, 979 So. 2d 1066, 1069 (Fla. 1st DCA 

2008) ("Proximate causation, or a causal connection between the 

defendant's reckless driving and the victim's death, is an essential 

element of vehicular homicide."). The statute is necessarily 

discussing proximate causation, rather than the weak "but for" type 

of causation, which is inherently speculative and inconsistent with 
15

the legislature's intent to limit immunity to contraband discovered 

as a direct and proximate result of an individual's seeking medical 

assistance for a drug overdose. Cf. Jones v. Utica Mut. Ins. Co., 463 

So. 2d 1153, 1156-57 (Fla. 1985) ("We reject the view that the 

legislature intended strict liability for dog owners in every instance 

where the actions of a dog are a factor in an injury. Clearly the 

rules of ordinary causation should apply. Thus, an affirmative or 

aggressive act by the dog is required. This 'affirmative act' 

requirement is a reasonable safeguard insofar as it forbids the 

imposition of liability in cases in which the animal is merely a 

passive instrumentality in a chain of events leading to injury. Even 

a strict liability statute should not reach that far. This 

interpretation is consistent with the general notion of proximate 

causation, since other factors would constitute superceding [sic] or 

overwhelming causes when the dog is merely passive or 

retreating."). 

If we adopted a "but for" test for section 893.21, an individual 

would be immune from prosecution for any evidence discovered 'but 

for,' or as an indirect result of, a person's request for medical 

assistance. This would be true no matter how indirectly or 
16

unexpectedly the evidence is discovered, or regardless of how long 

after the request the contraband is obtained, because there would 

be a never-ending "but for" chain of causation.

Although Mr. Waiters' request for medical assistance may be 

the "but for" cause of the contraband's discovery, that request was 

not a direct, or proximate, cause of that discovery. Cf. Eversley v. 

State, 748 So. 2d 963, 966-67 (Fla. 1999) ("Causation consists of 

two distinct subelements. . . . [B]efore a defendant can be convicted 

of a crime that includes an element of causation, the State must 

prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant's conduct was 

(1) the 'cause in fact' and (2) the 'legal cause' (often called 

'proximate cause') of the relevant harm."); Tyus v. State, 845 So. 2d 

318, 321 (Fla. 1st DCA 2003) ("The two questions that must be 

considered in establishing legal causation are: (1) whether the 

prohibited result of the defendant's conduct is beyond the scope of 

any fair assessment of the danger created by the defendant's 

conduct and (2) whether it would be otherwise unjust, based on 

fairness and policy considerations, to hold the defendant criminally 

responsible for the prohibited result." (citing Eversley, 748 So. 2d at 

966)).
17

In matters of restitution, itself a criminal sanction, "the Court 

has required both a 'but for' causation requirement and a 

'significant relationship' requirement." Schuette v. State, 822 So. 2d 

1275, 1282 (Fla. 2002); State v. Castro, 965 So. 2d 216, 218 (Fla. 

3d DCA 2007) ("Restitution, unlike civil damages, is a criminal 

sanction." (citing Kirby v. State, 863 So. 2d 238, 242 (Fla. 2003))). 

This "test for causation resembles the test for proximate cause in a 

civil tort case." State v. Harris, 327 P.3d 1276, 1280 (Wash. Ct. 

App. 2014) (citing Schuette, 822 So. 2d at 1282). Florida courts 

"ha[ve] equated the 'significant relationship' test with the 

requirement of proximate causation between the criminal act and 

the resulting damages because the Court has required both a 'but 

for' causation requirement and a 'significant relationship.' " 

Schuette, 822 So. 2d at 1282. In applying this causation test, the 

Florida Supreme Court has concluded that an "existing 

circumstance" that does not cause the damages or loss is 

insufficient to support a restitution award:

[I]n this case there has been an insufficient relationship 

between the act of driving with a suspended license and 

damages or loss resulting from the accident to allow for 

restitution. What is missing in this case is a causal 

relationship between the act of driving without a license 

and the accident that resulted in damages. The 
18

suspension of the license was an existing circumstance, 

rather than a cause of the accident. Although it is 

undisputed that Schuette was driving illegally by driving 

with a suspended license, the State failed to present any 

evidence of a relationship-much less prove by a 

preponderance of the evidence-to establish that the 

accident and resulting damages were caused by, or 

related to, Schuette's act of driving without a license.

Id. at 1283. Similarly, here, there was an outstanding warrant for 

Mr. Waiters' arrest. And it was this existing circumstance that led 

to the discovery of the contraband, not the effort to seek medical 

assistance. 

Moreover, we surmise that section 893.21 does not bar 

prosecution for contraband that is discovered due to independent, 

superseding causes. The warrant was such an independent cause. 

We find further support for our conclusion in the context of 

searches and seizures. See Amend. IV, U.S. Const.; art. I, § 12, Fla. 

Const. Courts do not use "but for" causation in this legal arena. 

See Frierson, 926 So. 2d at 1143 ("Wong Sun[ v. U.S., 371 U.S. 471 

(1963)] is, of course, the seminal case from the Supreme Court in 

respect to the issue of whether statements and other evidence 

obtained after an illegal arrest or search should be excluded. The 

Court in Wong Sun ruled that a defendant's statement and 

contraband taken from another defendant were the fruits of a law 
19

enforcement officer's illegal action and should have been excluded. 

The Court, however, declined to adopt a 'but for' or 'per se' 

rule . . . ."). Generally, "[t]he fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine[,] a 

court-made exclusionary rule . . . 'forbids the use of evidence in 

court if it is the product or fruit of a search or seizure or 

interrogation carried out in violation of constitutional rights.' " 

Hatcher v. State, 834 So. 2d 314, 317 n.4 (Fla. 5th DCA 2003) (first 

quoting Craig v. State, 510 So. 2d 857, 862 (Fla. 1987); and then 

citing United States v. Cruz, 581 F.2d 535, 537 (5th Cir. 1978) (en 

banc), overruled on other grounds by United States v. Causey, 834 

F.2d 1179, 1184-85 (5th Cir. 1987)). 

However, as with many things in the law, there are exceptions. 

See generally Moody v. State, 842 So. 2d 754, 759 (Fla. 2003) 

("Although the stop was illegal, the fruit of the poisonous tree 

doctrine does not automatically render any and all evidence 

inadmissible. A court may admit such evidence if the State can 

show that (1) an independent source existed for the discovery of the 

evidence[;] or (2) the evidence would have inevitably been discovered 

in the course of a legitimate investigation[;] or (3) sufficient 

attenuation existed between the challenged evidence and the illegal 
20

conduct." (citations omitted)). Clearly, as part of the Fourth 

Amendment's causation analysis, courts must evaluate whether 

there are intervening circumstances, or if sufficient attenuation 

exists, between the illegal police conduct and the illegally obtained 

evidence sufficient "to purge the primary taint of the [police 

misconduct]." Wong Sun, 371 U.S. at 486. 

Here, attenuation is key. Frierson is instructive. 926 So. 2d at 

1144. There, the court held that a police officer's discovery of an 

outstanding arrest warrant was an intervening circumstance which 

dissipated the taint of an illegal traffic stop, such that the firearm 

seized during the search incident to arrest was not subject to 

suppression. Id. Crucial to the court's holding was the intervening 

circumstance of the discovery of the outstanding warrant; "the 

search was incident to the outstanding warrant and not incident to 

the illegal stop. The outstanding arrest warrant was a judicial order 

directing the arrest of respondent whenever the respondent was 

located." Id. The court observed that "[t]he illegality of the stop 

does not affect the continuing required enforcement of the court's 

order that respondent be arrested." Id. Thus, as the foregoing 

makes clear, if an initial illegal search is sufficiently "attenuated" by 
21

an independent causal factor—such as a break in the chain of 

illegality, or by the inevitable discovery doctrine—a subsequent 

search may be upheld.6 The same rationale holds here. Although 

Mr. Waiters would be immune from prosecution for any contraband 

uncovered as part of his seeking medical assistance, once the 

medical assistance ceased and law enforcement officers discovered 

(and were required to execute) the active arrest warrant, section 

893.21 did not immunize Mr. Waiters from prosecution. 

In W.S.B., 180 A.3d at 1179, a case of first impression in New 

Jersey, the court noted that under a similar New Jersey law, each of 

the immunity provisions explicitly limits the statute's protection to 

criminal charges that are based on evidence "obtained as a result of 

the seeking of medical assistance." (quoting N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2C:35-

30 (West 2013)). Therefore, the W.S.B. court reasoned, 

"incriminating evidence that law enforcement officials obtain by 

other means, such as the fruits of a search warrant or a 

constitutional warrantless search, unconnected from someone's 

attempt to seek medical assistance for an individual perceived to be 

6

 We do not mean to suggest that there was any illegality or 

impropriety on the part of law enforcement officers, here.
22

experiencing a drug overdose, is beyond the immunity's reach." Id.

(emphasis added); see generally Robinson, 414 U.S. at 224 (1973) 

("It is well settled that a search incident to a lawful arrest is a 

traditional exception to the warrant requirement of the Fourth 

Amendment."). 

Any concerns as to Mr. Waiters' medical well-being were 

resolved after he had been evaluated and released. Then, law 

enforcement officers arrested him on the outstanding warrant. Cf. 

State v. Silliman, 168 So. 3d 245, 247 (Fla. 5th DCA 2015) (holding 

that section 893.21 was inapplicable because the defendant "was 

not experiencing a drug overdose and did not need medical 

assistance. Instead, the deputy believed that Silliman was impaired 

and took him into custody under the Marchman Act."). 

We cannot conclude that the legislature intended a strict "but 

for" causation test in the statute. Certainly, if this was the 

legislature's intent, it could have easily said so. See State v. 

Hubbard, 751 So. 2d 552, 562 (Fla. 1999). Instead, the statute's 

test of causation, according to the legislative history, as well as 

under both common sense and generally accepted concepts of 

causation, must be proximate cause. The statute, here, requires 
23

that the evidence be discovered "as a result" of the request for 

medical assistance, which simply means the request for assistance 

must be the direct and proximate cause of the discovery of the 

contraband. 

V. Conclusion

The trial court erred in utilizing "but for" causation to 

immunize Mr. Waiters from prosecution under section 893.21. 

Because law enforcement officers' discovery of the contraband was 

a proximate result of the search incident to Mr. Waiters' arrest on 

the outstanding warrant, we reverse the trial court's order. 

Reversed.

CASANUEVA and LABRIT, JJ., Concur.

Opinion subject to revision prior to official publication.