Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 79A04-1611-CR-2636 | May 10, 2017 Page 1 of 11

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), 

this Memorandum Decision shall not be 

regarded as precedent or cited before any 

court except for the purpose of establishing 

the defense of res judicata, collateral 

estoppel, or the law of the case.

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT

Timothy P. Broden

Lafayette, Indiana

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE

Curtis T. Hill, Jr.

Attorney General of Indiana

Ian McLean

Deputy Attorney General

Indianapolis, Indiana

IN THE

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

Jermaine A. Broussard,

Appellant-Defendant,

v.

State of Indiana,

Appellee-Plaintiff.

May 10, 2017

Court of Appeals Case No.

79A04-1611-CR-2636

Appeal from the Tippecanoe 

Superior Court

The Honorable Steven P. Meyer, 

Judge

Trial Court Cause No.

79D02-1510-F4-12

Riley, Judge.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 79A04-1611-CR-2636 | May 10, 2017 Page 2 of 11

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

[1] Appellant-Defendant, Jermaine A. Broussard (Broussard), appeals his sentence 

following an open guilty plea to unlawful possession of a firearm by a serious 

violent felon, a Level 4 felony, Ind. Code § 35-47-4-5(c); operating while 

intoxicated with a prior conviction, a Level 6 felony, I.C. § 9-30-5-2(a); and 

being a habitual offender, I.C. § 35-50-2-8(a).

[2] We affirm.

ISSUES

[3] Broussard presents us with two issues on appeal, which we restate as: 

(1) Whether the trial court abused its sentencing discretion by imposing 

consecutive sentences; and 

(2) Whether Broussard’s sentence is inappropriate in light of the nature of 

the offense and his character. 

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

[4] In the early morning hours of October 11, 2015, thirty-seven-year-old 

Broussard, who had been drinking alcoholic beverages, lost control of his 

vehicle and ran off the road in Tippecanoe County, Indiana. After concerned 

citizens notified the police, police officers found Broussard unresponsive behind 

the wheel of his vehicle, with a loaded .38 caliber revolver tucked in the 

waistband of his pants. After medics awakened Broussard, he admitted that the 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 79A04-1611-CR-2636 | May 10, 2017 Page 3 of 11

possession of the handgun was unlawful due to a prior felony conviction. Later 

testing verified that Broussard’s blood alcohol level was .194. 

[5] On October 15, 2015, the State filed an Information, charging Broussard with 

Count I, unlawful possession of a firearm by a serious violent felon, a Level 4 

felony; Count II, carrying a handgun without a license, a Class A 

misdemeanor; Count III, carrying a handgun by a convicted felon, a Level 5 

felony; Count IV, operating a vehicle while intoxicated, a Class C

misdemeanor; Count V, operating a vehicle with at least 0.15 gram of alcohol, a 

Class A misdemeanor; Count VI, operating a vehicle while intoxicated with a 

prior conviction, a Level 6 felony; Count VII, operating a vehicle with at least 

0.15 gram of alcohol with a prior conviction, a Level 6 felony. On January 8, 

2016, the State amended the Information to include Count VIII, which alleged 

Broussard to be a habitual offender. 

[6] On September 16, 2016, Broussard entered an open guilty plea to Counts I and 

VI, and admitted to being a habitual offender, with all other Counts being 

dismissed. On October 20, 2016, the trial court conducted a sentencing 

hearing. During the hearing, the trial court took note of Broussard’s criminal 

history, which began in 1995 when he was convicted of two felonies in Illinois, 

i.e., aggravated vehicle hijacking/dangerous weapon and aggravated 

battery/public place. He received seven years of incarceration. Charges of 

disorderly conduct and burglary were later filed in Cook County, Illinois, but 

were dismissed. Broussard admitted that during this time he was a member of 

the Gangster Disciples, which he claimed was disbanded in 1997. In 2001 and 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 79A04-1611-CR-2636 | May 10, 2017 Page 4 of 11

2005 respectively, he was sentenced for two instances of felony aggravated 

unlawful use of a weapon with a previous conviction in Cook County. In 2006, 

Broussard moved to Tippecanoe County, Indiana, where he was convicted of 

resisting law enforcement as a Class A misdemeanor and for which he received 

probation. In 2009, he was arrested for public intoxication as a Class B 

misdemeanor, but the case was later dismissed. Also in 2009, he was arrested 

for domestic battery, which was dismissed as part of a plea agreement in 

another cause where he was convicted of dealing cocaine. Pursuant to this plea 

agreement, Broussard received twelve years’ imprisonment, with two years to 

be served through community corrections. Within a year of this sentence, the 

trial court granted Broussard’s request for a modification and commuted one 

year to placement at Home for Hope. Upon his release from incarceration, 

Broussard committed operating with a blood alcohol content of .08% or more. 

In April 2014, Broussard’s two-year placement for the dealing cocaine charge 

was revoked and the court imposed sixty days executed to be served 

consecutively to the operating charge. Eighteen months after his release, 

Broussard committed the present offenses.

[7] During the hearing, Broussard offered his version of the offense and claimed 

that he had been at a party that evening where a shooting had taken place. An 

unidentified man carrying a handgun approached Broussard and requested a 

ride to the hospital because he had been shot. Broussard claimed to have taken

the man for medical help since his designated driver—who had driven 

Broussard’s car to the party because Broussard was already intoxicated—could 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 79A04-1611-CR-2636 | May 10, 2017 Page 5 of 11

not be found. Prior to seeking medical attention, Broussard insisted that the 

man handed him his handgun. After dropping off the injured man at the 

hospital, he took some other guests from the party home. While returning to 

his residence, Broussard admittedly passed out behind the wheel and drove off 

the road. He claimed to be “shocked” to find the handgun in his waistband 

when the police woke him up in his car. (Tr. p. 39). 

[8] At the close of the evidence, the trial court found as aggravating factors: the 

nature and seriousness of the offense; Broussard’s high level of intoxication 

while possessing a loaded gun during the commission of the offense; 

Broussard’s criminal history; his failed prior attempts at rehabilitation and 

community corrections; and the repetitive nature of the crime. As a mitigating 

circumstance, the trial court noted Broussard’s guilty plea, he took 

responsibility for his actions, and Broussard’s “alcohol and drug problems 

however diminished by failed attempts at rehabilitation.” (Appellant’s App. 

Vol. II, p. 11). The trial court imposed a sentence of eleven years for the serious 

violent felon charge, enhanced by seven years for his habitual offender 

adjudication, and two years for his repeat operating while intoxicated offense. 

The trial court ordered the sentences to run consecutively 

[b]ased on the nature of the [operating while intoxicated charge] 

and the fact that he ran off the road while intoxicated with a 

loaded gun, causing, creating a very serious situation that could 

have caused injury to others. I know that the element of the 

[operating while intoxicated charge] is endangerment. However, 

in this particular case, he ran off the road while in possession of a 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 79A04-1611-CR-2636 | May 10, 2017 Page 6 of 11

loaded gun, and I think that, that’s enough of an aggravator to 

cause those two to run consecutive.

(Tr. pp. 64-65). Broussard’s aggregate sentence was twenty years, of which the 

trial court ordered eighteen years executed with two years suspended to 

supervised probation.

[9] Broussard now appeals. Additional facts will be provided as necessary.

DISCUSSION AND DECISION

I. Consecutive Sentences

[10] Broussard contends that the trial court abused its discretion by ordering his 

sentences to run consecutively as “it essentially does nothing more than cite the 

statutory elements of the offenses to which Broussard pled guilty.” (Appellant’s 

Br. p. 7).

[11] Sentencing decisions rest within the sound decision of the trial court and we 

review only for an abuse of discretion. Anglemyer v. State, 868 N.E.2d 482, 490 

(Ind. 2007), clarified on reh’g, 875 N.E.2d 218 (Ind. 2007). An abuse of 

discretion occurs if the decision is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts 

and circumstances before the court or the reasonable, probable, and actual 

deductions drawn therefrom. Id. We review for an abuse of discretion the 

court’s finding of aggravators and mitigators to justify a sentence, but we 

cannot review the relative weight assigned to those factors. Id. at 490-91. 

When reviewing the aggravating and mitigating circumstances identified by the 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 79A04-1611-CR-2636 | May 10, 2017 Page 7 of 11

trial court in its sentencing statement, we will remand only if “the record does 

not support the reasons, or the sentencing statement omits reasons that are 

clearly supported by the record, and advanced for consideration, or the reasons 

given are improper as a matter of law.” Id. 

[12] In order to impose consecutive sentences, a trial court must find at least one 

aggravating circumstance. Sanquenetti v. State, 727 N.E.2d 437, 442 (Ind. 2000). 

Aggravating circumstances may include, but are not limited to, any of several 

statutorily enumerated factors. I.C. § 35-38-1-7.1. A single aggravating 

circumstance may support the imposition of consecutive sentences. Lavoie v. 

State, 903 N.E.2d 135, 140 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009). Although a trial court is 

required to state its reasons for imposing consecutive sentences, it may rely on 

the same reasons to impose a maximum sentence and also impose consecutive 

sentences. Id. 

[13] Here, in explaining its reasons for imposing consecutive sentences, the trial 

court referred to the extenuating circumstance of Broussard’s possession of a 

loaded gun while inebriated to the point of passing out. Although the trial 

court acknowledged that the charge of operating a vehicle while intoxicated 

included an element of endangerment, here, the surrounding circumstances of 

the charge alluded to more than merely an element of the offense. To be 

convicted of a serious violent felon, Broussard was only required to possess a 

firearm. I.C. § 35-47-4-5(c). To be convicted of an operating while intoxicated

charge, Broussard was required to operate a motor vehicle while intoxicated in 

a manner that endangered a person. I.C. § 9-30-5-2(b). In fashioning its 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 79A04-1611-CR-2636 | May 10, 2017 Page 8 of 11

consecutive sentence, the trial court was clearly referencing the danger 

component surrounding the nature of the charge, i.e., the carrying of a loaded 

handgun while driving a car and passing out from an overindulgence in alcohol

with a blood alcohol content well over twice the allowable limit. His conduct 

clearly exceeded the elements of the offense and posed a significant danger to 

the general public. “Generally, the nature and circumstances of a crime is a 

proper aggravating circumstance.” Gomillia v. State, 13 N.E.3d 846, 853 (Ind. 

2014). Accordingly, we find that the trial court properly explained and 

supported the imposition of consecutive sentences.

II. Appropriate Sentence

[14] Pursuant to Indiana Appellate Rule 7(B), we may “revise a sentence authorized 

by statute if, after due consideration of the trial court’s decision, the Court finds 

that the sentence is inappropriate in light of the nature of the offense and the 

character of the offender.” Under this rule, the question is not whether another 

sentence is more appropriate, but whether the sentence imposed is 

inappropriate. King v. State, 894 N.E.2d 265, 268 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008). The 

principal role of appellate review is to “leaven the outliers;” it is “not to achieve 

a perceived correct result in each case.” Cardwell v. State, 895 N.E.2d 1219, 

1225 (Ind. 2008). The appropriateness of the sentence turns on this court’s 

“sense of the culpability of the defendant, the severity of the crime, the damage 

done to others, and a myriad other factors that come to light in a given case.” 

Id. at 1224. The defendant carries the burden of persuading this court that his 

sentence is inappropriate. Childress v. State, 848 N.E.2d 1073, 1080 (Ind. 2006). 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 79A04-1611-CR-2636 | May 10, 2017 Page 9 of 11

The defendant must show that his sentence is inappropriate in light of both his 

character and the nature of the offense. Williams v. State, 891 N.E.2d 621, 633 

(Ind. 2006). 

[15] When considering the nature of the offense, the advisory sentence is the starting 

point to determine the appropriateness of a sentence. Anglemyer, 868 N.E.2d at 

494. The sentencing range for a Level 4 felony is between two and twelve 

years, with the advisory sentence being six years; while the sentencing range for 

a level 6 felony is between six months and two and one half years, with the 

advisory sentence being one year. See I.C. §§ 35-50-2-5.5; -7. The sentence for 

an habitual offender charge for a person convicted of a Level 1 through Level 4 

felony is an additional fixed term of between six and twenty years. See I.C. § 

35-50-2-8(i). Here, the trial court sentenced Broussard to a sentence of eleven 

years for the serious violent felon charge, enhanced by seven years for his 

habitual offender adjudication, and two years for his operating while 

intoxicated offense. With respect to the nature of these offenses, we reiterate 

that Broussard carried a loaded handgun while heavily intoxicated and barely 

able to drive a vehicle.

[16] Turning to Broussard’s character, we echo the trial court’s disbelief in 

Broussard’s explanation of the circumstances put forward during the sentencing 

hearing.

Your attorney indicated that the nature of this offense was not 

that bad if you consider the fact that you were trying to assist and 

take someone to the hospital and that this guy just handed the 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 79A04-1611-CR-2636 | May 10, 2017 Page 10 of 11

gun to you. This is the first time that I’ve heard that story. You 

didn’t offer up that story at the time of your arrest. You didn’t 

offer up that story to the probation, when you were given an 

opportunity to give a statement to the [c]ourt and this is the first 

time it’s been offered. There’s been no collaborating evidence 

presented to support that. What I do see here, by your own 

admission, is someone who [is] extremely intoxicated, who has 

prior related offenses of [] unlawfully carrying a gun. You’re 

driving the streets of this community extremely intoxicated and 

you’re caught with a loaded gun in your possession after you 

drove the car off the road.

(Tr. p. 61). 

[17] Broussard’s criminal history is lengthy. The instant offense is “the third time” 

in the last twelve years that Broussard has been caught unlawfully carrying a 

gun. (Tr. p. 50). He continued committing crimes despite repeated displays of 

lenient sentencing and correctional alternatives by Indiana courts. Although he 

has amassed numerous convictions, Broussard habitually minimizes his own 

culpability. He blamed his Illinois weapons convictions in 1994, 2000, and 

2004 on his gang membership. Broussard elaborated that his dealing cocaine 

conviction resulted from an attempt “to protect” his spouse. (Tr. p. 36). Even 

before the trial court pronounced sentence, he was placing blame on everyone 

except on himself. He blamed heavy drinking and “some bad decisions” he had 

made in “hanging around with the wrong people.” (Tr. p. 51). The trial court 

found that Broussard had failed alternative sentencing in the past: he had been 

involved in community corrections on “four different occasions” and was now 

back again before the court. (Tr. p. 64). As such, the trial court was “not that 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 79A04-1611-CR-2636 | May 10, 2017 Page 11 of 11

convinced that community corrections would be helpful or successful[.]” (Tr. 

p. 64). In light of the evidence before us, we conclude that Broussard failed to 

persuade us that the nature of the crime and his character provide a reason to 

revise his sentence.

CONCLUSION

[18] Based on the foregoing, we conclude that the trial court properly sentenced 

Broussard.

[19] Affirmed.

[20] Najam, J. and Bradford, J. concur