In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

No. 00-2442

United States of America,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

Anton Tittjung,

Defendant-Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the Eastern District of Wisconsin.

No. 89-C-1068--John W. Reynolds, Judge.

Argued November 9, 2000--Decided December 15, 2000

 Before Flaum, Chief Judge, and Ripple and Kanne,

Circuit Judges.

 Flaum, Chief Judge. On December 14, 1990, the

District Court for the Eastern District of

Wisconsin determined that Anton Tittjung’s

position as a Nazi concentration camp guard

during World War II invalidated his previously

issued visa. Therefore, the court revoked

Tittjung’s citizenship and cancelled his

certificate of naturalization. This Court

affirmed that decision. On March 24, 1994, the

Immigration Court ordered the deportation of

Tittjung, pursuant to the Holtzman Amendment, 8

U.S.C. sec. 1227(a) (4)(D) (formerly 8 U.S.C.

sec. 1251(a)(4)(D)). The Board of Immigration

Appeals ("BIA") affirmed the Immigration Court’s

decision, and this Court affirmed the decision of

the BIA. On January 10, 2000, almost six years

after his deportation was first ordered, Tittjung

filed a motion to dismiss, pursuant to

Fed.R.Civ.P. 60(b)(4), seeking to vacate the

district court’s 1990 order. The district court

denied Tittjung’s motion to dismiss. For the

reasons stated herein, we affirm the district

court’s decision.

I. BACKGROUND

 Anton Tittjung was born in Erdud, Yugoslavia on

November 17, 1924. Beginning in October of 1942,

and for the duration of World War II, Tittjung

served in the Waffen SS, an organization of the
Nazi government. Specifically, Tittjung was a

member of the Totenkopf-Sturmbann (Death’s Head

Battalion), where he operated as an armed guard

at the Mauthausen concentration camp and its

subcamp Gross Raming./1 

 In 1952, Tittjung applied for and obtained a

visa to enter the United States pursuant to the

Displaced Persons Act of 1948 ("DPA"). At no

point during the application process did Tittjung

disclose his association with the SS Death’s Head

Battalion nor his participation in Nazi

persecution as a concentration camp guard.

Tittjung applied for naturalization in 1973, once

again concealing his Nazi wartime service. On

January 9, 1974, Tittjung was naturalized and

became a citizen of the United States.

 On September 1, 1989, the government filed a

complaint against Tittjung asking the District

Court for the Eastern District of Wisconsin to

revoke Tittjung’s citizenship. The request for

revocation was based on evidence which revealed

Tittjung’s history as a member of the Waffen SS

and an armed concentration camp guard at

Mauthausen and Gross Raming. The government moved

for summary judgment, arguing that Nazi

concentration camp guards were ineligible for

visas under the DPA, and that as a result,

Tittjung’s citizenship was illegally procured. On

December 14, 1990, the district court granted the

government’s motion. See Tittjung, 753 F.Supp. at

251. The court held that as a concentration camp

guard, Tittjung had assisted in the persecution

of persons because of their race, religion, or

national origin. Because the DPA, as amended in

1950, made all persons who assisted Nazi Germany

in the persecution of civilian populations of

countries ineligible for visas, Tittjung was

ineligible for a visa when he entered the United

States. To be eligible for naturalization, a

person must have been lawfully admitted into the

United States with a valid immigration visa. See

8 U.S.C. sec. 1427(a)(1). The court determined

that because Tittjung’s visa was invalid, he was

never lawfully admitted into the United States.

Since Tittjung had not satisfied the

prerequisites for naturalization, the court

revoked his citizenship, set aside its January 9,

1974 order admitting Tittjung to citizenship, and

cancelled Tittjung’s certification of

naturalization. See Tittjung, 753 F. Supp. at

256-57. Because Tittjung’s guard service required

his denaturalization as a matter of law, the

district court did not address allegations that

Tittjung misrepresented his World War II service

to visa officials and thereby entered the United

States by means of fraud. Id. at 257. This Court

affirmed the district court’s order in an opinion

dated November 14, 1991, 948 F.2d 1292 (7th Cir.
1991), and the Supreme Court thereafter denied

certiorari, 505 U.S. 1222 (1992).

 As a result of the district court’s 1990

decision, Tittjung reverted to alien status and

was thus removable. On May 11, 1992, the

government commenced deportation proceedings

against Tittjung. The Immigration Court, on March

24, 1994, ordered Tittjung’s deportation pursuant

to the Holtzman Amendment./2 Tittjung appealed

the decision of the Immigration Court to the BIA.

On August 13, 1997, the BIA affirmed the

deportation order and dismissed Tittjung’s

appeal. Tittjung then filed a motion for

reconsideration, which the BIA denied on August

27, 1998. On December 2, 1999, this Court

affirmed the BIA’s decision. Tittjung v. Reno,

199 F.3d at 393, reh’g denied, No. 98-3407 (Feb.

9, 2000). On June 29, 2000, the Supreme Court

denied certiorari. ___ U.S. ___, 120 S.Ct. 2746.

 Faced with an imminent deportation, Tittjung

filed a motion with the District Court for the

Eastern District of Wisconsin, seeking to vacate

the 1990 denaturalization judgment and dismiss

the complaint. Tittjung argued that the 1990

judgment was void under Fed.R.Civ.P. 60(b)(4) on

the ground that the district court lacked subject

matter jurisdiction. On April 27, 2000, that

motion was denied by the district court. Tittjung

now appeals, arguing that: (1) there is no

Article III jurisdiction to redetermine visa

eligibility, and on that basis find that Tittjung

was not lawfully admitted when he was granted

citizenship; (2) it is an unconstitutional

encroachment into an executive function for the

judiciary to redetermine visa eligibility; (3)

since the DPA is no longer in effect, the

district court cannot make a finding of visa

ineligibility and unlawful admission based on

that law; (4) the court had to make certain

factual findings, including that Tittjung made a

misrepresentation in order to obtain a visa,

before it could hold that he illegally obtained

a visa and was thus not "lawfully admitted."

II. DISCUSSION

A. Rule 60(b)(4) Standard of Review

 Tittjung’s present motion challenges the

jurisdiction of the District Court for the

Eastern District of Wisconsin to determine that

he was visa ineligible when he entered the United

States in 1952. No court may decide a case

without subject matter jurisdiction, and neither

the parties nor their lawyers may stipulate to

jurisdiction or waive arguments that the court

lacks jurisdiction. See Christianson v. Colt

Indus. Operating Corp., 486 U.S. 800, 818 (1988);

Indiana Gas Co. v. Home Ins. Co., 141 F.3d 314
(7th Cir. 1998); see also United States v. County

of Cook, Ill., 167 F.3d 381, 387-88 (7th Cir.

1999). To further that end, "It is the duty of

this court to ’satisfy itself not only of its own

jurisdiction, but also that of the lower courts

in a cause under review.’" EEOC v. Chicago Club,

86 F.3d 1423, 1428 (7th Cir. 1996) (citing

Mitchell v. Maurer, 293 U.S. 237, 244 (1934)).

Therefore, if the parties neglect the subject, a

court must raise the jurisdictional question on

its own. Christianson, 486 U.S. at 818. However,

in unexceptional circumstances, a party that has

had an opportunity to litigate the question of

subject matter jurisdiction may not reopen that

question in a collateral attack following an

adverse judgment. See Insurance Corp. of Ireland,

Ltd. v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 456

U.S. 694, 702 n.9 (1982). 

 The exception to the general rule barring

collateral attacks on subject matter jurisdiction

flows from Fed.R. Civ.P. 60(b)(4)./3 Yet that

exception is narrowly tailored, such that a lack

of subject matter jurisdiction will not always

render a final judgment "void." Only when the

jurisdictional error is "egregious" will courts

treat the judgment as void. In re Edwards, 962

F.2d 641, 644 (7th Cir. 1992). To be egregious,

and thus void under Rule 60(b)(4), the error must

involve a clear usurpation of judicial power,

where the court wrongfully extends its

jurisdiction beyond the scope of its authority.

See O’Rourke Bros., Inc. v. Nesbitt Burns, Inc.,

201 F.3d 948, 951 (7th Cir. 2000); Edwards, 962

F.2d at 644; Kansas City S. Ry. v. Great Lakes

Carbon Corp., 624 F.2d 822, 825 (8th Cir. 1979).

"If it is not egregious, the courts say that the

court that issued the judgment in excess of its

jurisdiction had jurisdiction to determine

jurisdiction, and its jurisdictional finding,

even if erroneous, is therefore good against

collateral attack, like any other erroneous but

final judgment." Edwards, 962 F.2d at 644. Here,

the district court did not find any

jurisdictional errors let alone egregious ones.

We review de novo the denial of a motion to

vacate a judgment as "void" under Fed.R.Civ.P.

60(b)(4). Federal Election Comm’n v. Al Salvi for

Senate Comm., 205 F.3d 1015 (7th Cir. 2000).

B. Tittjung’s Jurisdictional Arguments

1. The District Court’s Jurisdiction to Review a

Visa

 Tittjung’s overarching claim on appeal is that

a district court lacks subject matter

jurisdiction to review a visa eligibility

determination and on that basis vacate an order

of naturalization. We note at the outset that

Tittjung’s status as visa eligible has been at
issue in Article III proceedings for

approximately eleven years to date. To say that

Tittjung has had ample opportunity to raise this

issue is to understate the matter. Moreover,

Tittjung has previously admitted that the courts

do have jurisdiction to examine his visa

eligibility. The original complaint, filed in

1989, specifically alleged that the district

court had jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. sec.

1345 (original jurisdiction over all civil

actions brought by the government) and 8 U.S.C.

sec. 1451(a) (jurisdiction to revoke

citizenship). Tittjung admitted that allegation,

and has never challenged the district court’s

determination that it had jurisdiction, either in

this Court or in the Supreme Court. Therefore,

unless an error of the aforementioned egregious

nature has been made, res judicata bars

Tittjung’s claim. See County of Cook, Ill., 167

F.3d at 388.

 We begin with 8 U.S.C. sec. 1451(a). That

statute expressly confers jurisdiction upon

district courts to decide suits brought to revoke

citizenship illegally procured. Specifically, the

statute reads in relevant part that:

It shall be the duty of the United States

Attorney for the respective districts, upon

affidavit showing good cause therefor, to

institute proceedings in any district court of

the United States in the judicial district in

which the naturalized citizen may reside at the

time of bringing suit, for the purpose of

revoking and setting aside the order admitting

such person to citizenship and cancelling the

certificate of naturalization on the ground that

such order and certificate of naturalization were

illegally procured or were procured by

concealment of a material fact or by willful

misrepresentation, and such revocation and

setting aside of the order admitting such person

to citizenship and such canceling of certificate

of naturalization shall be effective as of the

original date of the order and certificate,

respectively. . ."

Tittjung argues that 8 U.S.C. sec. 1451(a) is

inapplicable to his situation, as he did not

illegally procure his citizenship. According to

Tittjung, if any illegality took place, it was at

the visa procurement phase, when Tittjung did not

disclose his service as a concentration camp

guard. Yet those actions, he urges, are in effect

shielded from review, as he claims that his

certificate of naturalization was based on

compliance with all applicable provisions. Thus,

when the district court in 1990 determined

Tittjung to be visa ineligible and therefore

revoked his citizenship, the court, he suggests,
traveled beyond the scope granted by 8 U.S.C.

sec. 1451(a).

 We do not believe, nor have we found any case

law to suggest that a certificate of

naturalization acts as a tabla rosa, thereby

precluding us from examining the validity of the

visa upon which that certificate was granted. To

begin with, Supreme Court precedent forecloses

that argument. In Fedorenko v. United States, the

Court was called upon to decide whether

Fedorenko’s citizenship was illegally procured,

and therefore subject to revocation. 449 U.S. 490

(1981). As in the case of Tittjung, Fedorenko

entered the United States under the DPA, was

naturalized years later, and was having his

citizenship challenged on the basis that his

service as a concentration camp guard rendered

him visa ineligible. See id. at 508-09 ("[T]he

Government [was] seeking to revoke petitioner’s

citizenship because of the alleged unlawfulness

of his initial entry into the United States.").

After the Court determined that Fedorenko’s World

War II service made him ineligible for a visa, it

perceived the resolution of the case to be

"fairly straightforward." Id. at 514. Justice

Marshall, writing for the Court noted that

Supreme Court "cases have established that a

naturalized citizen’s failure to comply with

statutory prerequisites for naturalization

renders his certificate of citizenship revocable

as ’illegally procured’ under 8 U.S.C. sec.

1451(a)." Id. The Court observed that the

statutory prerequisites required that the

individual be lawfully admitted to the United

States for permanent residence, 8 U.S.C. sec.

1427, and that "lawful admission for permanent

residence in turn required that the individual

possess a valid unexpired immigrant visa." Id. at

514-15; see also 8 U.S.C. sec. 1181(a). Because

the DPA excluded from the definition of displaced

persons eligible for immigration to this country

those who had "assisted the enemy in persecuting

civil[ians]" or had "voluntarily assisted the

enemy forces . . . in their operations," Pub. L.

No. 87-774, ch. 647, 62 Stat. 1009, amended by

Pub. L. No. 81-555, ch. 262, 64 Stat. 219 (1950),

Fedorenko’s visa, granted under the DPA, was

invalid at the time of issuance. Thus, the Court

found that 8 U.S.C. sec. 1451(a) provides a

federal court with jurisdiction to make a

determination of visa eligibility at the time of

entrance into the United States and revocation of

citizenship based on a finding of visa

ineligibility.

 We find that Supreme Court precedent controls

and forecloses the type of claim that Tittjung

now raises. In addition, though we have not to

this point expressly addressed this type of
jurisdictional argument, we find our previous

decisions upholding the revocation of

naturalization certificates based on visa

ineligibility to be de facto confirmation that

Tittjung’s argument is meritless. As stated

above, "[i]t is the duty of this court to

’satisfy itself not only of its own jurisdiction,

but also that of the lower courts in a cause

under review,’" EEOC 86 F.3d at 1428, such that

if the parties neglect the subject, a court must

raise the jurisdictional question on its own,

Christianson, 486 U.S. at 818. In United States

v. Schmidt, 923 F.2d 1253 (7th Cir. 1991), as

well as in United States v. Ciurinkas, 976 F.

Supp. 1167 (N.D. Ind. 1997), aff’d, 148 F.3d 729

(7th Cir. 1998) and United States v. Hajda, 963

F. Supp. 1452 (N.D. Ill. 1997), aff’d 135 F.3d

439 (7th Cir. 1998), we were faced with

denaturalization orders based on determinations

of visa ineligibility. That we reached the merits

in those cases casts into doubt any suggestion

that we do not believe there is jurisdiction to

find visa ineligibility and thus revoke a

certificate of naturalization./4 

 As we have just noted, this specific subject

matter jurisdiction argument has been resolved

repeatedly. However, to the extent that previous

decisions of this Court may have left the matter

unclear, we now state unequivocally that Article

III courts have jurisdiction to vacate an order

of naturalization when that order is based on an

illegally obtained visa. Here, Tittjung’s status

as a former concentration camp guard made him

ineligible to receive a visa. Fedorenko, 449 U.S.

at 511, 514. Therefore, when Tittjung entered

this country, he did so with an invalid visa. By

entering this country with an invalid visa,

Tittjung failed to gain lawful admission to the

United States. See 8 U.S.C. sec. 1181(a)(1);

Fedorenko, 449 U.S. at 514-15. Because Tittjung

could not be naturalized until he had first been

lawfully admitted for permanent residence, see 8

U.S.C. sec. 1427(a)(1), his citizenship was

illegally procured. Thus, the district court had

the power to revoke his certificate of

naturalization and cancel his citizenship. See 8

U.S.C. sec. 1451(a). Consequently, we agree with

the court below that there was no jurisdictional

error, let alone an egregious one, in the 1990

actions of the district court.

2. Separation of Powers and Jurisdiction

 In addition to the primary subject matter

jurisdiction contention set forth above, Tittjung

presents a number of arguments which he believes

negate any federal jurisdiction conferred by 8

U.S.C. sec. 1451(a). Tittjung’s first such

argument is that the district court’s
redetermination of visa eligibility and

declaration that admission was unlawful "is an

unconstitutional judicial encroachment into an

exclusive Executive function . . . and it

violates the constitutional doctrine of

Separation of Powers." For support to his

argument, Tittjung looks to language in the

Immigration and Nationality Act of 8 U.S.C. sec.

1101 et seq. ("1952 Act"). Under Section

1103(a)(1) "The Attorney General shall be charged

with the administration and enforcement of this

chapter and all other laws relating to the

immigration and naturalization of aliens. . ."

Additionally, Tittjung cites to Section 1103(c),

which empowers the Commissioner of Immigration

with any and all responsibilities of the Attorney

General that the Attorney General delegates to

her, and Section 1104(a), which charges the

Secretary of State with the administration and

enforcement of the Act and other laws "except

those powers, duties, and functions conferred

upon the consular officers relating to the

granting and refusal of visas." Thus, Tittjung

puts forth that Article III courts are without

jurisdiction to proceed in reviewing visas and

cancelling certificates of naturalization based

on their findings of visa ineligibility. 

 Tittjung’s argument is without merit. While

Tittjung is correct that our system does delegate

specific powers to specific branches of

government, he fails to acknowledge that ours is

a system of checks and balances. Under Article 1,

Section 8 of the United States Constitution,

Congress is empowered to establish standards for

immigration. The 1952 Act delegates to the

Executive Branch, and specifically the Attorney

General, the powers of administration and

enforcement. In such a situation, "[t]he courts,

when a case or controversy arises, can always

’ascertain whether the will of Congress has been

obeyed’ and can enforce adherence to statutory

standards." See Immigration and Naturalization

Service v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 954 (1983)

(citing Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414, 425

(1944) and Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer,

343 U.S. 579, 585 (1952)). The Court in Fedorenko

acknowledged this mandated interplay between the

branches as well as the power of Article III

courts to review "lawful admissions." Justice

Marshall, writing for the Court noted "This

judicial insistence on strict compliance with the

statutory conditions precedent to naturalization

is simply an acknowledgment of the fact that

Congress alone has the constitutional authority

to prescribe rules for naturalization, and the

courts’ task is to assure compliance with the

particular prerequisites to the acquisition of

United States citizenship by naturalization

legislated to safeguard the integrity of this
priceless treasure." Fedorenko, 449 U.S. at 506-

07 (internal quotation omitted).

 We stated above that Article III courts do have

the power, in the course of determining whether

the statutory prerequisites for naturalization

have been met, to examine visa eligibility. Were

we to hold that separation of powers bars

examination of visa eligibility by Article III

courts, we would be substantially limiting the

impact of 8 U.S.C. sec. 1451. Contrary to

Tittjung’s assertion, the fact that Congress

delegated authority to the Executive to oversee

matters of immigration does not mean that the

Attorney General was provided with exclusive

control for the entire area. Section 1451(a)

allows for the district courts to, among other

things, revoke or set aside certificates of

naturalization (which are based on compliance

with statutory prerequisites such as a valid

visa). Furthermore, Congress recognized that the

Judiciary and the Executive would both make

denaturalization decisions. It is for that reason

that 8 U.S.C. sec. 1451(h) provides that "Nothing

contained in this section shall be regarded as

limiting, denying, or restricting the power of

the Attorney General to correct, reopen, alter,

modify, or vacate an order naturalizing the

person." Given this limitation on the power of

the Judiciary, the district court was correct to

determine that the 1990 revocation of Tittjung’s

naturalization does not substantially or

unconstitutionally infringe on the Attorney

General’s authority./5 Thus we find no

jurisdictional defect, egregious or otherwise in

the 1990 district court’s actions.

3. Expiration of the DPA and Jurisdiction

 Tittjung next argues that the district court

lacked jurisdiction to consider his unlawful

entry in 1952 because the Immigration Act of 1924

and the DPA (the laws pursuant to which he was

granted his visa) were no longer in effect at the

time of his naturalization in 1974. Specifically,

Tittjung claims that because these statutes did

not exist and were not considered when the

Milwaukee court entered its citizenship order in

1974, it was nonsensical for the district court

to reference and apply those laws during the

denaturalization proceedings./6 In support of

his position, Tittjung cites to Ex Parte

McCardle, where the court determined that the

passage of a bill repealing the portion of a

statute that conferred appellate jurisdiction on

the Supreme Court over habeas proceedings meant

that the Court no longer had jurisdiction to hear

McCardle’s appeal. 74 U.S. 506 (1868). 

What, then, is the effect of the repealing act
upon the case before us? We cannot doubt as to

this. Without jurisdiction the court cannot

proceed at all in any cause. Jurisdiction is

power to declare the law, and when it ceases to

exist, the only function remaining to the court

is that of announcing the fact and dismissing the

cause. And this is not less clear upon authority

than upon principle.

Id. at 514.

 Tittjung’s position lacks merit. Throughout his

argument, Tittjung goes to great lengths to

suggest that his naturalization should not be

tied to whether he lawfully procured his visa.

Rather, he suggests the relevant factor to be

that he complied with the statutory prerequisites

to naturalization. While we have noted that the

district court had jurisdiction to revoke

Tittjung’s certificate of naturalization after

determining that he was visa ineligible as a

matter of law, we have never wavered from our

understanding that the basis for the

determination that Tittjung was removable was

that he was never lawfully admitted to this

country, a required prerequisite to

naturalization under 8 U.S.C. sec. 1427. That

statute, which is ultimately the relevant one for

purposes of determining naturalization, was in

effect in 1974 when Tittjung was naturalized as

well as when this denaturalization case was

brought and decided./7 

 In addition, the Supreme Court’s analysis in

Fedorenko makes clear that lawful admission is

based on circumstances as they existed at the

time of initial entry. The Court, in

denaturalizing Fedorenko, looked to the law that

existed when he first entered the United States.

"Lawful admission for permanent residence in turn

required that the individual possess a valid

unexpired immigrant visa. At the time of

petitioner’s initial entry into this country,

sec. 13(a) of the Immigration and Nationality Act

of 1924, ch. 190, 43 Stat. 153, 161 (repealed in

1952), provided that ’[n]o immigrant shall be

admitted to the United States unless he (1) has

an unexpired immigration visa . . . .’"

Fedorenko, 449 U.S. at 514-15. Applying

Tittjung’s present argument would mandate the

conclusion that the Court in Fedorenko erred by

revoking a naturalization because the law that

allowed for the initial entry of the defendant

was no longer in effect at the time of the

denaturalization. We do not believe it would be

proper to reach such a conclusion.

 Not only would granting Tittjung’s argument

require us to challenge Supreme Court precedent,

but doing so would also erode a large portion of
18 U.S.C. sec. 1451(a). The DPA was in existence

for four years from 1948-1952. The statutory

prerequisite for naturalization is five years of

continuous legal residence in the United States.

8 U.S.C. sec. 1427. Therefore, no person could

have been admitted to the United States under the

DPA and been naturalized within the period of the

law’s existence. As such, according to Tittjung’s

position, denaturalization proceedings under 8

U.S.C. sec. 1451(a) could never be brought

against one who entered under the DPA. Given that

the DPA was "intended to prevent those who

contributed to the Nazi persecution of innocent

civilians from obtaining visas to enter the

United States as refugees," Schmidt, 923 F.2d at

1259, it would seem anomalous that the law

provides uncontestable permanent residence for

those who illegally circumvented it. For these

reasons, we conclude that the district court

committed no error in cancelling Tittjung’s

naturalization which was based on illegal entry

under the DPA.

4. Factual Findings as Prerequisites to

Jurisdiction

 Tittjung posits that even if this Court does

not agree that his previous arguments negate

federal jurisdiction, the district court’s

omission of certain factual findings precludes a

determination that Tittjung illegally procured

his citizenship. The court below found this

argument to be "a substantive one which is

precluded by res judicata and cannot be grafted

upon a motion to dismiss for lack of subject

matter jurisdiction." Yet, in support of the

proposition that certain factual findings are

within the scope of a Rule 60(b)(4) review on

subject matter jurisdiction, Tittjung cites to

language in Fedorenko which states that "In the

lexicon of our cases, one of the jurisdictional

facts upon which the grant [of citizenship] is

predicated, was missing at the time petitioner

became a citizen." 449 U.S. at 515-16 (internal

quotation omitted). As we noted above, the term

jurisdiction has so many uses that it is

commonplace for confusion to ensue regarding the

term. See United States v. Krilich, 209 F.3d 968,

971 (7th Cir. 2000); see also Steel Co., 523 U.S.

at 90. While we express doubt that this argument

of Tittjung’s is jurisdictional such that it

properly comes within the scope of our review of

a motion to dismiss for lack of subject-matter

jurisdiction, we assume arguendo that it does and

proceed to analyze the claim.

 Tittjung asserts that the district court was

required to find that "Tittjung made a material

misrepresentation under DPA sec. 10," and "that

the invalid visa resulted in an unlawful
admission," in order to find that Tittjung

illegally procured his citizenship. We do not

dispute that the language of sec. 10 of the DPA

states that "Any person who shall willfully make

a representation for the purposes of gaining

admission into the United States as an eligible

displaced person shall thereafter not be

admissible into the United States." Nor do we

contest that Fedorenko makes clear that under

sec. 13(a) of the Immigration and Nationality Act

of 1924, "a visa obtained through a material

misrepresentation [is] not valid." 449 U.S. 515.

However, we do not read sec. 10 of the DPA and

sec. 13(a) of the 1924 Act as establishing an

exclusive basis for visa ineligibility. To adopt

Tittjung’s reasoning, we would be forced to

ignore the plain language of sec. 13(a) of the

DPA as amended in 1950, something we cannot do.

That Section states that "No visas shall be

issued under the provision of this Act, as

amended . . . to any person who advocated or

assisted in the persecution of any person because

of race, religion, or national origin." Section

13(a) does not contain a fraud element, but

rather provides wholly independent grounds for

denaturalization. The district court in 1990 was

well within its authority to find that Tittjung’s

service as an armed concentration camp guard

meant that he had assisted in the persecution of

persons because of their race, religion or

national origin,/8 and that his "assistance in

persecution" rendered him visa ineligible. Once

that determination was made, the court did not

and was under no obligation to assess whether

Tittjung had made misrepresentations in order to

procure his visa.

 Requiring a finding of misrepresentation in

order to determine illegal procurement would not

only be inconsistent with the plain meaning of

the DPA, but would be in direct conflict with

previous federal case law on the matter. The

approach taken in Tittjung, that once a

determination of visa ineligibility is made on

"assistance in persecution" grounds there is no

need to address a possible "misrepresentation"

basis for ineligibility, has been continually

applied. For example, in Schmidt, after

determining that the defendant had assisted in

persecution thus making him ineligible for a visa

and mandating his denaturalization, the district

court found it unnecessary to decide whether he

also entered unlawfully by misrepresenting such

service to immigration authorities. See United

States v. Schmidt, No. 88 C 9475, 1990 WL 6667 at

*2 (N.D. Ill. Jan 3, 1990). Similarly, in

Leprich, the court noted that the visa of a

concentration camp guard "would have been

illegally procured under [DPA] Section 13 even if

he had secured it without making
misrepresentations." 666 F. Supp. at 969. See

also United States v. Kairys, 600 F. Supp. 1254,

1265-66 (N.D. Ill. 1984) (Kairys was visa

ineligible even though there was insufficient

proof of misrepresentation.). In light of this

consistent approach, as well as because of the

plain meaning of sec. 13(a) of the DPA, we hold

that the district court was able to find that

Tittjung illegally procured his citizenship

without making the suggested factual finding. To

the extent that Tittjung urges that the factual

finding of misrepresentation was "jurisdictional"

we see no jurisdictional error, let alone an

egregious one, in the method employed by the

district court in its 1990 decision.

5. Tittjung’s Additional Arguments 

 Finally we note that Tittjung’s brief contains

factual arguments, many of which were presented

in the district court. The fact issues

surrounding Tittjung’s cases have already been

determined, and are therefore outside the scope

of review of a collateral attack on subject

matter jurisdiction. In an effort to have this

court address these claims Tittjung labels these

arguments "jurisdictional." However, Tittjung

cannot bring his arguments on the merits within

this Rule 60(b)(4) review simply by relabelling

them "jurisdictional." Therefore, we do not

address these arguments. 

III. CONCLUSION

The principle that jurisdictional defects may be

noticed at any time is limited . . . by the

equally important principle that litigation must

have an end. After a case has become final by

exhaustion of all appellate remedies, only an

egregious want of jurisdiction will allow the

judgment to be undone by someone who, having

participated in the case, cannot complain that

his rights were infringed without his knowledge. 

In re Factor VIII or IX Concentrate Blood Prod.

Lit., 159 F.3d 1016, 1019 (7th Cir. 1998). We

have examined Tittjung’s claims extensively,

recognizing the gravity of the ramifications of

our decision. Our exhaustive inspection leads us

to conclude that those claims have no merit. As

such, it is time for the principle that

"litigation must have an end" to prevail. We

believe that now, more than ten years since these

proceedings began and approximately 48 years

since the illegal entry occurred, the time has

come for the Immigration Court’s order of

deportation to be carried out. We see no reason

for further delay.

 For the foregoing reasons, we Affirm the decision
of the district court.

/1 The facts concerning Tittjung’s service during

World War II are laid out in greater detail in

our prior decision affirming the BIA’s denial of

Tittjung’s motion for reconsideration, Tittjung

v. Reno, 199 F.3d 393, 395 (7th Cir. 1999), as

well as in the opinion by the District Court for

the Eastern District of Wisconsin, cancelling

Tittjung’s certificate of naturalization, United

States v. Tittjung, 753 F.Supp. 251, 252-55 (E.D.

Wis. 1990). As Tittjung’s present motion is a

collateral attack on subject matter jurisdiction,

we need not revisit those facts.

/2 The Holtzman Amendment requires the deportation

of aliens found to have "assisted or otherwise

participated in the persecution of persons

because of race, religion, national origin, or

political opinion under the direction of, or in

association with, the Nazi government of

Germany." 8 U.S.C. sec. 1251 (a)(4)(D) (now

codified as 8 U.S.C. sec. 1227(a)(4)(D)).

/3 Rule 60(b)(4) states in relevant part:

On motion and upon such terms as are just, the

court may relieve a party or a party’s legal

representative from a final judgment, order, or

proceeding for the following reasons: . . . (4)

the judgment is void.

/4 We further note that other federal courts

applying 8 U.S.C. sec. 1451(a) have similarly

held that entry with an unlawfully obtained visa

renders naturalized citizenship illegally

procured. See, e.g. United States v. Stelmokas,

100 F.3d 302 (3rd Cir. 1996); United States v.

Koziy, 728 F.2d 1314 (11th Cir. 1984); United

States v. Linnas, 527 F. Supp. 426 (E.D.N.Y.

1981).

/5 Tittjung cannot contest that under 8 U.S.C. sec.

1201(i) a visa once granted can be revoked at any

time, and that under 8 U.S.C. sec. 1227(a)(1)(A)

and (B) an alien found to have unlawfully

obtained a visa is subject to deportation. Yet,

as he did above, Tittjung attempts to argue that

the further illegal act of exploiting an invalid

visa in order to obtain citizenship somehow

immunizes the illegal entrant from punishment for

her first violation, and actually rewards the

second indiscretion by making denaturalization

unavailable. We cannot conclude that Congress

intended to establish such a system where

compounded illegality is rewarded. 

/6 We note that this argument, at best, is

tangentially related to federal jurisdiction. The

basis for the court’s determination that Tittjung
was not lawfully admitted into the United States

does not implicate federal court jurisdiction (in

the usual sense), which we have previously noted

is granted by 8 U.S.C. sec. 1451(a). The Supreme

Court has described the term "jurisdiction" as "a

word of many, too many meanings," Steel Co. v.

Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 90

(1998), which has led to much confusion

surrounding what is appropriately considered in

a Rule 60(b)(4) motion. It is because of this

uncertainty, as well as our desire to provide a

measure of finality to these proceedings, that we

nonetheless proceed cautiously, assume arguendo

that the claim is jurisdictional in nature, and

address it. 

/7 Additionally, we note that to the extent that

this is a jurisdictional argument, the fact that

the Supreme Court in Fedorenko was not troubled

with the removal of the defendant in light of the

fact that the DPA was no longer in effect lends

support to our present stance. 

/8 The proposition that an armed concentration camp

guard "assisted in persecution" (as is understood

in the DPA) cannot be disputed. In Schmidt, we

stated "it is clear that service as an armed

concentration camp guard constitutes assisting in

persecution under the DPA." 923 F.2d at 1258.

Additionally we noted in Schellong v. INS, that

"Nazi concentration camps were places of

persecution; individuals who, armed with guns,

held the prisoners captive and prodded them into

forced labor with threats of death or capital

punishment cannot deny that they aided the Nazis

in their program of racial, political, and

religious oppression." 805 F.2d 655, 661 (7th

Cir. 1986). See also Fedorenko, 449 U.S. at 513-

16; United States v. Leprich, 666 F. Supp. 967,

969 (E.D. Mich. 1987) ("[B]ecause Leprich was a

concentration camp guard, he was ineligible for

the visa he received and his citizenship was

illegally procured.").