# United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit Chicago, Illinois 60604

Submitted February 10
, 2020

Decided February 11 , 20 20

Before

MICHAEL S. KANNE
, Circuit Judge

DIANE S. SYKES
, Circuit Judge

AMY J. ST. EVE
, Circuit Judge

No. 1 9

- 2294

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
, Plaintiff

- Appell ee ,

v

.

CHRISTOPHER E. SOURS
, Defendant

- Appell an t

. Appeal from the United States District Court for the Central District of Illinois

.

No. 1 2

- cr

- 40083

- 001

Sara Darrow
, Chief Judge

.

O R D E R

After serving a 51

- month term of imprisonment for wire fraud, 18 U.S.C. § 1343, Christopher Sours began serving a three

- year term of supervised release. A little over a year later, the district court revoked Sours’ s supervision because he admitted to using methamphetamine

. The judge sentenced him to a year and a day in prison, to be followed by a nearly two

- year term of supervised release. Sours completed the new prison term, b ut while on supervised release
, he once again admitted to drug use

. ( H e had used cocaine on three different occasions

. ) T he judge again revoked his supervised release, this time sentenc ing him to 18 months in p rison with out further supervision

. Sours filed a notice of appeal, but his counsel asserts that the appeal is frivolous and moves to withdraw. Sours has not responded to counsel’s motion. See 7 TH C IR . R. 51(b). Because Sours does not have an unqualified constitutional right to counsel on an appeal NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION To be cited only in accordance with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1No. 19

- 2294 Page 2

of a revocation order, see Gagnon v. Scarpelli , 411 U.S. 778, 790

– 91 (1973), the safeguards of Anders v. Californi a , 386 U.S. 738 (1967)
, need not govern our review. Nonetheless, our practice is to follow them. See United States v. Brown , 823 F.3d 392, 394 (7th Cir. 2016). Because counsel’s analysis appears thorough, we limit our review to the subjects he addresses

. S ee United States v. Bey , 748 F.3d 774, 776 (7th Cir. 2014)

.

Counsel first considers whether Sours could challenge the district court ’s authority to revoke his term of supervised release because the term had expired

. S ee United States v. Block , 927 F.3d 978, 981 (7th Cir. 2019)

. B ut as counsel correctly explains, Sours’ s second term was revoked in June 2019
, two months before it expir ed

. Accordingly, the court retained authority to revoke Sours’s term of supervision, and any challenge on this basis w ould be frivolous.

Counsel next considers whether the revocation was procedurally improper and correctly concludes it was not. Before r evoking a term of supervised release and sentencing a defendant , the judge “is required to consider the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines policy statements and relevant sentencing factors.” United States v. Ford
, 798 F.3d 655, 663 (7th Cir. 2015)

. The judge did so here. She followed the c hapter 7 policy statement s when classifying , correctly, Sours’s cocaine possession a s a class B felon y

. See U.S.S.G. § 7B1.1(a). Given this classification and Sours’s criminal

- history category of IV , his policy

- statement range was 12 to 18 months i n prison. Se e id. § 7B1.4(a). Further, the judge complied with 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e) (governing re vocations of supervised release) and considered the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors

. The judge addressed the seriousness of Sours’s noncompliance ( noting that the violated condition was a part of his sentence for the underlying crime , “which was a serious one” ) ; the need for deterrence ( of “individuals who are similarly situated on supervised release”) ; and the need to protect the public (stressing his recidivism and the seriousness of t h e underlying offense). Counsel has identified no procedural er ror or misstep, nor do we

see one.

Finally, counsel considers whether Sours could challenge the revocation sentence

as substantively unreasonable and rightly concludes he could not. A sentence like this

one that falls within the Guidelines policy statemen t range is presumptively reasonable,

see United States v. Jones , 774 F.3d 399, 404 (7th Cir. 2014), and nothing in the record rebuts that presumption here

. The judge properly calculated the reimprisonment range, considered the Guidelines c hapter 7 policy statements, applied the § 3553(a) factors, and rejected Sours’ s argument s in mitigation t hat his original sentence was too long
, hisNo. 19

- 2294 Page 3

criminal

- history category IV overstated his risk of recidivism
, his cocaine use ha d not been consistent
, an d he has been attempting to find work.

W e GRANT counsel’s motion to withdraw and DISMISS the appeal.