Significant irregular events impaired Coulter's right to a fair trial 

"A criminal defendant has a fundamental right to a fair trial 

secured by the United States and Nevada Constitutions." Watters v. State, 

129 Nev., Adv. Op. 94, 313 P.3d 243, 246 (2013) (internal quotations 

omitted). The district court has a duty to "protect the defendant's right to 

a fair trial" and to "provid[e] order and decorum in trial proceedings." 

Rudin v. State, 120 Nev. 121, 140, 86 P.3d 572, 584 (2004) (internal 

quotations omitted); see also United States v. Evanston, 651 F.3d 1080, 

1091 (9th Cir. 2011) (stating that the district court is to manage the trial 

so as to avoid causing "a significant risk of undermining the defendant's 

due process rights to a fair trial and impartial jury"). 

An occurrence that "[is] so intrinsically harmful [to the 

concept of a fair trial] [constitutes a structural error that] require[s] 

automatic reversal . . . without regard to their effect on the outcome [of the 

proceeding]." Knipes v. State, 124 Nev. 927, 934, 192 P.3d 1178, 1182-83 

(2008) (second and fifth alterations in original) (quoting Neder v. United 

States, 527 U.S. 1, 7 (1999)); see also Cortinas v. State, 124 Nev. 1013, 

1024, 195 P.3d 315, 322 (2008) (observing that a structural error "affect[s] 

the very framework within which the trial proceeds" (internal quotations 

omitted)). Thus, an incident or incidents that significantly undermine a 

defendant's right to a fair trial can be structural error and require 

automatic reversal of a conviction. 

In the present case, there were significant incidents that 

potentially affected the fairness of Coulter's trial. Specifically, several 

jury irregularities occurred, including a juror's outburst and contempt 

proceedings, a juror's conversation with unknown individuals at a bar 

about the other juror's contempt proceedings, and improper 

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communication between Ross's mother and a juror. In the most 

significant of these juror-related incidents, Ross's mother approached the 

assembled jurors in the morning before that day's trial proceedings and 

borrowed a juror's cell phone. Ross's mother then placed a call to a 

prospective witness in the presence of multiple jurors. Finally, Ross's 

mother attempted to pay the juror with one-half of a cigarette. The 

district court did not remove any juror for this incident. 

Subsequent to the incident involving Ross's mother, the 

district court confiscated the juror's cell phone and held a hearing outside 

of the jury's presence. During the hearing, the district court answered a 

call placed to the confiscated cell phone. This call originated from the 

number that Ross's mother had called, and the district court attempted to 

speak with the caller. The district court then detained Ross's mother and 

initiated contempt proceedings against her. 

While none of these irregularities may have individually 

impaired Coulter's right to a fair trial or the jury's ability to be fair and 

impartial, they collectively undermined Coulter's right to a fair trial to the 

point that they "affect[ed] the very framework within which the trial 

proceed[ed]." Cortinas, 124 Nev. at 1024, 195 P.3d at 322; cf. Valdez v. 

State, 124 Nev. 1172, 1195, 196 P.3d 465, 481 (2008) ("The cumulative 

effect of errors may violate a defendant's constitutional right to a fair trial 

even though errors are harmless individually." (internal quotations 

omitted)). Thus, because a series of irregularities occurred during 

Coulter's trial, we necessarily reverse and remand Coulter's convictions. 

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The district court abused its discretion by denying Coulter's motion to sever 

his and Ross's trials 

We review the district court's denial of Coulter's motion to 

sever his and Ross's trials for an abuse of discretion. See Chartier v. State, 

124 Nev. 760, 764, 191 P.3d 1182, 1185 (2008). Severance is appropriate 

"if there is a serious risk that a joint trial would compromise a specific 

trial right of one of the defendants, or prevent the jury from making a 

reliable judgment about guilt or innocence." Id. at 765, 191 P.3d at 1185 

(internal quotations omitted); see also NRS 174.165(1) (providing that 

severance is appropriate to prevent prejudice to a defendant or the State). 

One way that a joint trial may be prejudicial to a defendant is when 

"defenses [are] antagonistic to the point that they are 'mutually 

exclusive." Rowland v. State, 118 Nev. 31, 45, 39 P.3d 114, 122 (2002). 

"Defenses are mutually exclusive when the core of the codefendant's 

defense is so irreconcilable with the core of [the defendant's] own defense 

that the acceptance of the codefendant's theory by the jury precludes 

acquittal of the defendant." Marshall v. State, 118 Nev. 642, 646, 56 P.3d 

376, 378 (2002) (alteration in original) (internal quotations omitted). 

Here, Ross and Coulter each presented defenses based on the 

theories that each was respectively not at the scene of the crime and did 

not commit the crimes at issue. To support their respective theories, Ross 

and• Coulter each developed evidence that the other defendant was the 

person observed wearing a red beanie that was subsequently found near 

the crime scene. Ross also attempted to develop evidence suggesting that 

Coulter had possession of key pieces of physical evidence and was one of 

the men who committed the crimes. Specifically, Ross testified that on the 

day before the crimes, he lent his vehicle to Coulter and that Coulter did 

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not return the vehicle's keys until the morning after the crimes were 

committed. Ross's vehicle was found near the crime scene on the morning 

after the crimes occurred. Ross also testified that when lending his 

vehicle to Coulter, he advised Coulter that there was a handgun in the 

vehicle. Evidence developed at trial suggested that this handgun was 

used to murder Smalley. 

In addition, Ross attempted to introduce evidence of 

statements• purportedly made by Coulter in which Coulter admitted guilt 

and exonerated Ross. Thus, because both defendants developed evidence 

that the other was the person wearing the red beanie and Ross's theory of 

defense was based on evidence that Coulter admitted guilt, exonerated 

Ross, and had possession of the murder weapon and the vehicle found near 

the crime scene, Ross's and Coulter's defenses were so antagonistic as to 

be mutually exclusive. As a result, this mutual exclusivity caused "a 

serious risk that [the] joint trial would. . . prevent the jury from making a 

reliable judgment about guilt or innocence," Chartier, 124 Nev. at 765, 191 

P.3d at 1185 (internal quotations omitted), because the acceptance of 

Ross's theory would cause a risk that it would necessarily reject Coulter's 

theory of defense. Therefore, the district court abused its discretion by 

denying Coulter's motion to sever the trials. As a result, reversal is 

warranted, and we order the district court to sever Coulter's and Ross's 

trials on remand. 

Conclusion 

Multiple irregular events involving jurors and the district 

court significantly undermined Coulter's right to a fair trial and caused a 

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Saitta 

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structural error. In addition, the district court abused its discretion by 

refusing to sever Coulter's and Ross's trials. Therefore, we 

ORDER the judgment of conviction REVERSED AND 

REMAND this matter to the district court for proceedings consistent with 

this order. 2 

ige_gett , C.J. 

Hardesty 

Parraguirre 

—Ciaskt 

cc: Hon. Michelle Leavitt, District Judge 

Christopher R. Oram 

Attorney General/Carson City 

Clark County District Attorney 

Eighth District Court Clerk 

20n remand, we instruct the district court clerk to reassign this case 

to a different department. 

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