PRESENT: All the Justices 

WILLIAM P. JENKINS, SR., ET AL. 

v. Record No. 021993 OPINION BY JUSTICE BARBARA MILANO KEENAN 

 June 6, 2003 

BAY HOUSE ASSOCIATES, L.P. 

FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF NORTHUMBERLAND COUNTY 

Harry T. Taliaferro, III, Judge 

 This appeal involves a challenge to a decree in which the 

chancellor held that a plaintiff, who owns property lying 

beneath a pond opening to the Chesapeake Bay, also owns the 

waters of the pond. The chancellor enjoined certain owners of 

land abutting the pond from trespassing on the pond's waters and 

from placing piers or other structures reaching into the water. 

The dispositive issue before us is whether this holding and the 

award of injunctive relief were permitted under the allegations 

and prayers for relief in the plaintiff's pleadings. 

 We state the evidence in the light most favorable to the 

plaintiff, Bay House Associates, L.P. (Bay House), the 

prevailing party in the trial court. City of Richmond v. Holt, 

264 Va. 101, 103, 563 S.E.2d 690, 691 (2002); Tashman v. Gibbs, 

263 Va. 65, 68, 556 S.E.2d 772, 774 (2002). In April 1998, Bay 

House acquired by deed a 78.5-acre tract of land submerged 

beneath the waters of Gaskins Pond, a naturally occurring "salt 

pond" in Northumberland County. 
Bay House's predecessors in title acquired the submerged 

land by deed from Claude A. Swanson, in his capacity as Governor 

of the Commonwealth of Virginia, in February 1909. At that 

time, the pond was completely separated from the waters of the 

Chesapeake Bay by a small strip of land, or isthmus, on the 

pond's eastern border. However, in recent years, a narrow 

"opening" in the isthmus has created an "outlet" connecting the 

waters of the pond to the waters of the Chesapeake Bay. 

 Since this opening was created, several owners of land 

adjoining the pond have constructed piers extending from their 

property into the pond that are affixed to Bay House's 

underlying land. In August 1998, George B. Little, a partner of 

Bay House, sent a letter to one of these adjoining landowners, 

William P. Jenkins, Sr., alleging that Jenkins had trespassed on 

Bay House's property by erecting a pier that was secured to the 

pond bed. In the letter, Little requested that Jenkins "remove 

all but the floating portion of [his] pier immediately." Little 

informed Jenkins that if he did not comply with Little's 

request, Little would seek an injunction prohibiting him from 

trespassing "on any portion of the bottom of Gaskins Pond." 

Jenkins did not comply with Little's demand. 

 In December 1998, Bay House's counsel sent letters to four 

other property owners whose land abuts the pond, advising them 

that Bay House owned "the land beneath Gaskins Pond" and that 

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Bay House had "not given permission to anyone to construct a 

dock on its property." Bay House informed the property owners 

that it would request injunctive relief if they did not remove 

their docks from Bay House's land by a certain date. None of 

these property owners complied with Bay House's request. 

 Bay House filed a bill of complaint in the circuit court 

against Jenkins and the four other property owners 

(collectively, the defendants). The bill of complaint alleged, 

among other things, that Bay House owned the "submerged land 

lying beneath the waters of Gaskins Pond" and that the 

defendants' failure to remove their docks from Bay House's 

"land" constituted acts of trespass. Bay House requested that 

the chancellor order the defendants to remove their docks and 

enjoin the defendants "from trespassing on the land of Bay House 

by constructing or causing to be constructed, or by placing or 

causing to be placed any thing on the land of Bay House." Bay 

House also asked that the chancellor grant "such other, further 

and general relief as the nature of the case may warrant or to 

equity shall seem meet." 

 At an ore tenus hearing, Bay House presented expert 

testimony from three witnesses who addressed various issues, 

including the question whether the pond had become a navigable 

body of water that could be traversed by boats entering and 

exiting the pond's opening to the Bay. The defendants did not 

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present any evidence to the chancellor. However, they argued, 

among other things, that they had riparian rights to use the 

waters and pond bed once the pond became open to the Bay. 

 The chancellor held that Bay House has "a fee simple 

ownership in the bed and waters of Gaskins Pond," and that the 

water opening between the pond and the Bay "did not in any way 

diminish" Bay House's ownership interest. Further holding that 

the defendants did not have any right to use the bed or waters 

of the pond, the chancellor enjoined the defendants from 

"trespasses upon the bed and waters of Gaskins Pond" and 

directed them to disassemble and remove their piers from the 

pond. 

 In their appeal, the defendants do not challenge the 

portion of the chancellor's decree holding that Bay House owns 

the land beneath the pond and is entitled to an injunction 

prohibiting the defendants from trespassing on Bay House's land. 

Instead, the defendants argue that the chancellor erred in 

awarding Bay House relief not requested in its pleadings by 

holding that Bay House owns the pond's waters and by enjoining 

the defendants from constructing or retaining any piers in those 

waters. The defendants observe that Bay House's bill of 

complaint, including its prayer for specific relief, asserted 

only an exclusive right to use the land beneath the pond, not 

the pond's waters. Thus, the defendants contend that Bay 

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House's bill of complaint did not provide them notice that they 

needed to defend their claimed right to use those waters, and 

that the disputed portion of the chancellor's decree was 

rendered without any allegations in the pleadings supporting 

such relief. 

 In response, Bay House argues that the portion of the 

chancellor's decree enjoining the defendants from use of the 

pond's waters was proper because this relief was "not 

inconsistent" with the specific relief Bay House requested 

concerning the defendants' trespass on Bay House's land. Bay 

House asserts that, therefore, its prayer for general relief 

permitted the chancellor to award the additional unrequested 

relief regarding use of the pond's waters. We disagree with Bay 

House's arguments. 

 A litigant's pleadings are as essential as his proof, and a 

court may not award particular relief unless it is substantially 

in accord with the case asserted in those pleadings. Brooks v. 

Bankson, 248 Va. 197, 206, 445 S.E.2d 473, 478 (1994); Gwinn v. 

Collier, 247 Va. 479, 484, 443 S.E.2d 161, 164 (1994); Ted 

Lansing Supply Co. v. Royal Aluminum & Constr. Corp., 221 Va. 

1139, 1141, 277 S.E.2d 228, 229 (1981). Thus, a court is not 

permitted to enter a decree or judgment order based on facts not 

alleged or on a right not pleaded and claimed. Hensley v. 

Dreyer, 247 Va. 25, 30, 439 S.E.2d 372, 375 (1994); Harrell v. 

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Woodson, 233 Va. 117, 121, 353 S.E.2d 770, 773 (1987); Ted 

Lansing Supply Co., 221 Va. at 1141, 277 S.E.2d at 229; see

Ainslie v. Inman, 265 Va. 347, 356, 577 S.E.2d 246, 251 (2003); 

Smith v. Sink, 247 Va. 423, 425, 442 S.E.2d 646, 647 (1994). 

 The rationale supporting this basic rule is plain. As we 

have stated, "[e]very litigant is entitled to be told by his 

adversary in plain and explicit language what is his ground of 

complaint or defense. . . . The issues in a case are made by 

the pleadings, and not by the testimony of witnesses or other 

evidence." Ted Lansing Supply Co., 221 Va. at 1141, 277 S.E.2d 

at 230 (quoting Potts v. Mathieson Alkali Works, 165 Va. 196, 

207, 181 S.E. 521, 525 (1935)). 

 The pleadings in the present case did not contain any 

assertions that the defendants committed a trespass on waters 

owned by Bay House. Instead, Bay House's bill of complaint 

alleged only that Bay House owned the land beneath the pond, and 

that the defendants had committed acts of trespass by affixing 

their piers to Bay House's submerged land. In accordance with 

these facts alleged, Bay House requested that the defendants be 

enjoined from such trespasses on "the land of Bay House." 

Based on these allegations, the case pleaded by Bay House 

was limited strictly to its ownership of the land and to the 

defendants' encroachment on that land. The total absence from 

these pleadings of any claim that Bay House owned the pond's 

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waters and that the defendants were committing a continuing 

trespass thereon precluded the chancellor from determining 

ownership of the waters and from imposing a remedy based on such 

facts not alleged. See Sink, 247 Va. at 425, 442 S.E.2d at 647; 

Hensley, 247 Va. at 30, 439 S.E.2d at 375; Harrell, 233 Va. at 

121, 353 S.E.2d at 773. 

The chancellor's contrary decision permitted Bay House to 

obtain relief without providing the defendants notice in the 

bill of complaint of any claim regarding their use of the pond's 

waters. This absence of notice in the pleadings was especially 

detrimental to the defendants because their right to use the 

pond's waters rested on the issue whether the waters were 

navigable, and the defendants bore the burden of proof on that 

issue. See Boerner v. McCallister, 197 Va. 169, 175, 89 S.E.2d 

23, 27 (1955). Thus, the defendants were placed in the 

untenable position of bearing the burden of proof on an issue 

that Bay House did not identify in its pleadings. 

We also find no merit in Bay House's assertion that its 

general prayer for relief permitted the chancellor to issue an 

injunction regarding the defendants' use of the pond's waters. 

When a party prays for both special and general relief and no 

relief may be granted under the special prayer, a court of 

equity may grant proper relief under the general prayer that is 

consistent with the case stated in the bill of complaint. 

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Johnson v. Buzzard Island Shooting Club, Inc., 232 Va. 32, 36, 

348 S.E.2d 220, 222 (1986); Winston v. Winston, 144 Va. 848, 

858-59, 130 S.E. 784, 787 (1925); see Sink, 247 Va. at 425, 442 

S.E.2d at 648; Wright v. Castles, 232 Va. 218, 222, 349 S.E.2d 

125, 128 (1986). However, a general prayer will support relief 

only for those matters placed in controversy by the pleadings 

and, thus, any relief granted must be supported by allegations 

of material facts in the pleadings that will sustain such 

relief. See Johnson, 232 Va. at 36, 348 S.E.2d at 222; Parks v. 

Wiltbank, 177 Va. 461, 465-66, 14 S.E.2d 281, 282 (1941); Dobie 

v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 164 Va. 464, 475, 180 S.E. 289, 293 

(1935). This rule reflects the principle that although the 

power of an equity court is broad, that power does not permit a 

court to adjudicate claims that the parties have not asserted. 

See Sink, 247 Va. at 425, 442 S.E.2d at 647. 

Here, the failure of Bay House's pleadings to put ownership 

of the pond's waters at issue, or to allege a trespass to those 

waters by the defendants, placed these issues beyond the reach 

of Bay House's general prayer for relief. Therefore, the 

absence of such charges and facts from the bill of complaint 

excluded those issues from the scope of the relief that the 

chancellor was permitted to consider. Accordingly, we hold that 

under the particular pleadings in this case, the chancellor 

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erred in awarding Bay House any relief regarding the pond's 

waters and the defendants' use of those waters. 

For these reasons, we will affirm that portion of the 

chancellor's decree holding that Bay House owns the bed of 

Gaskins Pond and enjoining the defendants from trespassing on 

the pond bed. We will reverse the portion of the decree 1) 

holding that Bay House owns the pond's waters; 2) enjoining the 

defendants from future construction of piers or other structures 

in those waters and from other further trespasses to the pond's 

waters; and 3) directing the removal of existing piers and 

structures that do not touch the pond bed. We will enter final 

judgment in the case. 

 Affirmed in part,

reversed in part,

and final judgment.

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