alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### Argyle Capital Management Corporation, Appellant, v Glenn Randall et al., Respondents.

[719 NYS2d 849]

Order, Supreme Court, New York County (Ira Gammerman, J.), entered February 9, 2000, which, at the close of plaintiffs case, *inter alia,*granted defendants’ motion to dismiss the complaint, unanimously affirmed, with costs.

Although plaintiff alleged that the Randall defendants were its agents in connection with its purchase of certain antiques and that those antiques, in breach of the terms of the alleged agency, were sold by the Randall defendants to a third party, defendant Mallet & Sons, at trial plaintiff wholly failed to adduce proof of such agency relationship. In light of that failure of proof, there was no rational process by which the jury could have found for plaintiff. Accordingly, defendants’ motion to dismiss the complaint at the close of plaintiffs case was properly granted *(see, Prince v City of New York,*21 AD2d 668).

While there was some proof that the Randall defendants had consented to act as the agent of one Robert Olins to bring about Olins’ acquisition of the disputed antiques, Olins was never joined as a party plaintiff and, although Olins was a principal of plaintiff Argyle, there was no evidence that Olins had acted in any but an individual capacity in his dealings with the Randall defendants. Concur — Williams, J. P., Mazzarelli, Lerner, Rubin and Buckley, JJ.
Michigan Supreme Court

Lansing, Michigan

Robert P. Young, Jr.

, Chief Justice

Michael F. Cavanagh

Stephen J. Markman

Mary Beth Kelly

Brian K. Zahra

Bridget M. McCormack

David F. Viviano

, Justices

I, Corbin R. Davis, Clerk of the Michigan Supreme Court, certify that the

foregoing is a true and complete copy of the order entered at the direction of the Court.

_________________________________________ Clerk April 1, 2013

s0325 

# Order

April 1, 2013

146209

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,

Plaintiff

- Appellee,

v SC: 146209

COA: 311775

Van Buren CC: 12

- 610762

- AR

MELANIE MARIE NOVAK,

Defendant

- Appellant.

_________________________________________/

On order of the Court, the application for leave to appeal the September 26, 2012

order of the Court of Appeals is considered, and it is DENIED, because we are not

persuaded that the question presented should be reviewed by this Court.
Exhibit 32.1

CERTIFICATIONS OF CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER AND CHIEF FINANCIAL OFFICER

PURSUANT TO

18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,

AS
ADOPTED PURSUANT TO

SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

I, Stephen J. Fanning, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that
the Quarterly Report of Solta Medical, Inc. on Form 10-Q for the quarterly period ended June 30, 2009 fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and that information contained in
such Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q fairly presents in all material respects the financial condition and results of operations of Solta Medical, Inc.



|                     |  |  |  |  |  |        |  |                                      
|-------------------- |  |  |  |  |  | ------ |  | -------------------------------------
|Date: August 4, 2009 |  |  |  |  |  | By:    |  | /s/    Stephen J. Fanning            
|                     |  |  |  |  |  | Name:  |  | Stephen J. Fanning                   
|                     |  |  |  |  |  | Title: |  | President and Chief Executive Officer

I, John F. Glenn, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to
Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that the Quarterly Report of Solta Medical, Inc. on Form 10-Q for the quarterly period ended June 30, 2009 fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 and that information contained in such Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q fairly presents in all material respects the financial condition and results of operations of Solta Medical, Inc.



|                     |  |  |  |        |  |                        
|-------------------- |  |  |  | ------ |  | -----------------------
|Date: August 4, 2009 |  |  |  | By:    |  | /s/    John F. Glenn   
|                     |  |  |  | Name:  |  | John F. Glenn          
|                     |  |  |  | Title: |  | Chief Financial Officer
[No. 30318-3-II.

Division Two.

June 2, 2004.]

#### The State of Washington, *Respondent,*v. Dewey K. Faifai, *Appellant.*

Appeal from a judgment of the Superior Court for Clark County, No. 02-1-02153-1, Edwin L. Poyfair and Roger A. Bennett, JJ., entered April 25, 2003. *Affirmed*by unpublished opinion per Quinn-Brintnall, C.J., concurred in by Morgan and Houghton, JJ.
NO. 12-19-00359-CV

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS

TWELFTH COURT OF APPEALS DISTRICT

TYLER, TEXAS

PHILIP J. EMERSON, JR., 

APPELLANT

V.

JERRY E. PARKER,

APPELLEE

§

§

§

APPEAL FROM THE 402ND 

JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT

WOOD COUNTY, TEXAS

MEMORANDUM OPINION

PER CURIAM

This appeal is being dismissed for failure to comply with the Texas Rules of Appellate 

Procedure and a court order. See TEX. R. APP. P. 42.3(c).

A party who is not excused by statute or the appellate rules from paying costs must pay--

at the time an item is presented for filing--whatever fees are required by statute or Texas Supreme 

Court order. TEX. R. APP. P. 5. An appellate court may enforce Rule 5 by any order that is just. 

Id. After giving ten days’ notice, an appellate court may dismiss when the appellant failsto comply 

with a requirement of the appellate rules, a court order, or a notice from the clerk requiring a 

response or other action within a specified time. TEX. R. APP. P. 42.3(c).

On November 14, 2019, Appellant, Philip J. Emerson, Jr. filed a statement of inability to 

afford costs, to which the Wood County District Clerk filed a contest. On March 12, 2020, the 

Honorable Lauren Parish, Senior Judge of the 115th District Court in Upshur County, signed an 

order concluding that Emerson has the ability to afford payment of court costs. Emerson filed a 

motion with this Court, in which he challenged Judge Parish’s order. 

On April 8, this Court issued an order denying Emerson’s request to proceed without costs 

and we ordered that Emerson pay the filing fee on or before April 15. The order warned that failure 

to remit the filing fee on or before April 15 would result in the Court taking appropriate action, 
2

including dismissal of the appeal without further notice. The April 15 deadline expired, and 

Emerson has not paid the required filing fee. 

Because Emerson failed, after notice, to comply with Rule 5 and an order of this Court, the 

appeal is dismissed. See TEX. R. APP. P. 42.3(c).

Opinion delivered April 22, 2020.

Panel consisted of Worthen, C.J., Hoyle, J., and Neeley, J.
COURT OF APPEALS

TWELFTH COURT OF APPEALS DISTRICT OF TEXAS

JUDGMENT

APRIL 22, 2020

NO. 12-19-00359-CV

PHILIP J. EMERSON, JR.,

Appellant

V.

JERRY E. PARKER,

Appellee

Appeal from the 402nd District Court 

of Wood County, Texas (Tr.Ct.No. 2019-327)

THIS CAUSE came to be heard on the appellate record; and the same being 

considered, it is the opinion of this Court that this appeal should be dismissed.

It is therefore ORDERED, ADJUDGED and DECREED by this Court that this 

appeal be, and the same is, hereby dismissed; and that this decision be certified to the court below 

for observance.

By per curiam opinion. Panel consisted of Worthen, C.J., Hoyle, J. and Neeley, J.
STATE OF LOUISIANA 

COURT OF APPEAL, FIRST CIRCUIT ' 

JENNIFER MOWERY 

VERSUS 

NO. 2023 CW 0444 

SPIKES TRUCKING, LLC, DEXTER 

GRAVES AND PRIME INSURANCE 

COMPANY 

MAY 10, 2023 

In Re: 

BEFORE: 

Prime Insurance Company, applying for 

writs, 21st Judicial District Court, 

Tangipahoa, No. 20210000357. , 

GUIDRY, C.J., WOLFE AND MILLER, JJ. 

STAY DENIED; WRIT DENIED. 

EW 

SMM 

supervisory 

Parish of 

Guidry, J., concurs. The criteria set forth in Herlitz I 

Construction Co., Inc. v. Hotel Investors of New Iberia, Inc., 

396 So.2d 878 (La. 1981) (per curiam) ate not met. 

COURT OF APPEAL, FIRST CIRCUIT 

DEPUTY CLERK OF COURT 

FOR THE COURT
```

[Congressional Bills 109th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.R. 5619 Introduced in House (IH)]

109th CONGRESS
  2d Session
                                H. R. 5619

To extend the patent term for the badge of the American Legion, and for 
                            other purposes.

_______________________________________________________________________

                    IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                             June 14, 2006

  Mr. Cannon introduced the following bill; which was referred to the 
                       Committee on the Judiciary

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
To extend the patent term for the badge of the American Legion, and for 
                            other purposes.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. PATENT TERM EXTENSION FOR THE BADGE OF THE AMERICAN LEGION.

    The term of a certain design patent numbered 54,296 (for the badge 
of the American Legion) is renewed and extended for a period of 14 
years beginning on the date of enactment of this Act, with all the 
rights and privileges pertaining to such patent.
                                 <all>
```
<PAGE>

                                                                    Exhibit 32.1

                            CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
                             18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,
                             AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
                  SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

I, Gregory E. A. Morrison, President and Chief Executive Officer of Platinum
Underwriters Holdings, Ltd., hereby certify to the best of my knowledge and
belief that this Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q/A fully complies with the
requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934
(15 U.S.C. 78m(a) or 78o(d)) and that the information contained in this
Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q/A fairly presents, in all material respects, the
financial condition and results of operations of Platinum Underwriters Holdings,
Ltd.


September 21, 2005                      /s/ GREGORY E.A. MORRISON
                                        ----------------------------------------
                                        By: Gregory E.A. Morrison
                                        President and Chief Executive Officer


                                      -55-
UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 97-6260

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

versus

LEON G. SPRUILL,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, at Norfolk. J. Calvitt Clarke, Jr., Senior

District Judge. (CR-94-151, CA-96-827-2)

Submitted: May 15, 1997 Decided: May 29, 1997

Before RUSSELL, HALL, and HAMILTON, Circuit Judges.

Dismissed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Leon G. Spruill, Appellant Pro Se. William David Muhr, OFFICE OF

THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Norfolk, Virginia, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

See Local Rule 36(c).
2

PER CURIAM:

Appellant seeks to appeal the district court's orders denying

his motion filed under 28 U.S.C.A. § 2255 (West 1994 & Supp. 1997),

his motions for reconsideration of that order, and his motion for

reduction of sentence. We have reviewed the record and the district

court's opinions and orders and find no reversible error. Accordingly, we deny a certificate of appealability and dismiss the appeal substantially on the reasoning of the district court. United

States v. Spruill, Nos. CR-94-151; CA-96-827-2 (E.D. Va. Nov. 4,

1996; Dec. 17, 1996; Jan. 13, 1997; and Jan. 30, 1997). We dispense

with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are

adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument

would not aid the decisional process.

DISMISSED
<PAGE>   1

                                                                    EXHIBIT 23.2


Netherland, Sewell & Associates, Inc.


           CONSENT OF INDEPENDENT PETROLEUM ENGINEERS AND GEOLOGISTS

     We hereby consent to the references to our firm in the form and context in
which they appear in the Annual Report on Form 10-K/A of Greka Energy
Corporation for the fiscal year ended December 31, 2000. We hereby further
consent to the use of information contained in our reserve report, as of
December 31, 2000, dated March 28, 2001 setting forth the Greka Energy
Corporation oil and gas reserves and revenue estimates properties located in the
United States. We further consent to the incorporation by reference thereof into
Greka Energy Corporation's Registration Statement on Form S-3 (File Nos.
333-60621, 333-78673, 333-49098 and 333-49134) and Form S-8 (File No.
333-30402).


                                       NETHERLAND, SEWELL & ASSOCIATES, INC.

                                      By:    /s/ DANNY D. SIMMONS
                                         -----------------------------------
                                                 Danny D. Simmons
                                               Senior Vice President

Dallas, Texas
May 15, 2001
Order entered February 6, 2013

In The

 ̄ ,ourt of p eaIS

No. 05-12-00576-CV

EX PARTE: JESSE P. SKINNER

On Appeal from the Criminal District Court No. 4

Dallas County, Texas

Trial Court Cause No. X11-1264-K

ORDER

Before the Court is appellant’s February 1, 2013 motion for objection to the supplemental

clerk’s record filed in this Court on January 25, 2013. Appellant complains that the Dallas

County Respondents’ Motion for Summary Judgment contained in the supplemental clerk’s

record does not contain the clerk’s seal. Appellant attaches to his motion his own copy of the

motion for summary judgment that contains the District Clerk’s seal certifying that it ~s a true

and correct copy of the document. Page fifteen of the supplemental clerk’s record contains the

District Clerk’s certification that all documents in the supplemental clerk’s record are true and

correct cop~es. Accordingly, we DENY appellant’s motion to the extent that it requests that the

Court order the original document.

To the extent appellant asks that the Court return to him his copy of the documents
attached to his motion, we DEFER that determination to the submissions panel.

/s/ CAROLYN WRIGHT

CHIEF JUSTICE
[Federal Register Volume 74, Number 55 (Tuesday, March 24, 2009)]
[Notices]
[Page 12386]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: E9-6308]



[[Page 12386]]

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

DEPARTMENT OF LABOR

Employment and Training Administration

[TA-W-65,417]


Virage Logic Corporation, Hampton, NJ; Notice of Termination of 
Investigation

    Pursuant to Section 221 of the Trade Act of 1974, as amended, an 
investigation was initiated on February 27, 2009 in response to a 
worker petition filed on behalf of workers at Virage Logic Corporation, 
Hampton, New Jersey.
    The petitioner has requested that the petition be withdrawn. 
Consequently, the investigation has been terminated.

    Signed at Washington, DC this 11th day of March 2009.
 Elliott S. Kushner,
Certifying Officer, Division of Trade Adjustment Assistance.
[FR Doc. E9-6308 Filed 3-23-09; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4510-FN-P
#### State *ex rel.*County Court of Nicholas County *v.*E. L. Morrison, *Receiver, et al.*

(No. 8091)

Submitted April 17, 1935.

Decided June 8, 1935.

*A. N. Breckinridge, Steptoe & Johnson*and *Stanley G. Morris,*for plaintiff in error.

*Emmett Horan,*for defendant in error.

Kenna, Judge :

This is the second writ of error in which this ease has been before this Court. The opinion in the first is reported in 115 W. Va. 18, 174 S. E. 562. That opinion settled all questions in the case excepting the question of the interest rate that should govern, both before and after judgment. This *404question was not raised on the former writ of error. This writ of error is restricted to it.

In entering judgment, interest was calculated at 6% to the date of the judgment and judgment was entered for the sum so ascertained “with interest until paid.” The action was on a depository bond, and since, under section 55, chapter 39 of the Code of 1923, the interest rate on deposits of public funds is fixed at 3%, it is contended that the interest on the amount of the recovery, both before and after judgment, should have been restricted to the rate prescribed by law for the contractual indebtedness under which the interest arose. Under the West Virginia cases of *Shipman*v. *Bailey,*20 W. Va. 140; *Pickens*v. *McCoy,*24 W. Va. 344; *Morris*v. *Baird,*72 W. Va. 1, 78 S. E. 371, Ann. Cas. 1915 A, 1273; and *Watson-Loy Coal Co.*v. *Monroe Coal Mining Co.,*85 W. Va. 645, 102 S. E. 485, the question presented has been well settled in this state to the effect that “the contract rate must govern until the end.” The judgment of the circuit court of Nicholas County is, therefore, reversed, and the case remanded with directions to enter judgment based upon interest calculated at the rate of 3%, and in the judgment to award interest at the rate of 3% upon the amount of the judgment, until paid.

*Reversed and remanded.*
EX-10.1







Exhibit 10.1



NOTE




	 	 	 	 	 
	Date:
	 	December 13, 2007
	Maker:
	 	Claimsnet.com, Inc.
	Payee:
	 	National Financial Corporation
	Place for Payment:
	 	14860 Montfort Dr., Suite 250, Dallas, TX  75254
	Principal Amount:
	 	One Hundred Thousand U.S. dollars (USD$100,000.00)






Annual Interest Rate on Unpaid Principal from Date of Funding: Seven percent (7%)



Terms of Payment: Principal and interest shall be due and payable January 31, 2008, interest being
calculated on the unpaid principal balance to the date of each installment paid, and the payment
made credited first to the discharge of interest accrued and the balance to the reduction of the
principal. Accrued and unpaid interest shall be computed on the basis of the actual days elapsed
in a year consisting of 365 days on the principal.



Annual Interest Rate on Demanded, Unpaid Amounts: The highest rate allowed by law.



Security for Payment: None



Maker promises to pay to the order of Payee at the place for payment and according to the terms of
payment the principal amount plus interest at the rates stated above. All unpaid amounts shall be
due upon demand.



On default in the payment of this note or in the performance of any obligation in any instrument
securing or collateral to it, this note and all obligations in all instruments securing or
collateral to it shall become immediately due at the election of Payee. Maker and each surety,
endorser, and guarantor waive all demands for payment, presentations for payment, notices of
intention to accelerate maturity, notices of acceleration of maturity, protest, and notices of
protest.



If this note or any instrument securing or collateral to it is given to an attorney for collection
or enforcement, or if suit is brought for collection or enforcement, or if it is collected or
enforced through probate, bankruptcy, or other judicial proceeding, then Maker shall pay Payee
reasonable attorney’s fees in addition to other amounts due. Reasonable attorney’s fees shall be
10.0% of all amounts due unless either party pleads otherwise.



Nothing in this note shall authorize the collection of interest in excess of the highest rate
allowed by law.



Maker reserves the right to prepay the outstanding principal balance of this Note, in whole or in
part, at any time and from time to time, without premium or penalty. Any such pre-payment shall be
made together with payment of interest accrued on the amount of principal being prepaid through the
date of such prepayment, and shall be applied to the installments of principal due hereunder in the
inverse order of maturity.



Each Maker is responsible for the entire amount of this note.



The terms Maker and Payee and other nouns and pronouns include the plural if more than one.



Maker shall not be deemed to be in default of this note unless and until Maker shall have been
given seven (7) days written notice and opportunity to cure such default, via certified mail return
receipt requested.



Claimsnet.com, Inc.



By: /s/ Don Crosbie 


Don Crosbie, CEO


MAKER
EXHIBIT 99.1 

 

CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO

18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,

AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO

SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

In connection with the Quarterly Report of Sinewire Networks, Inc. (the "Company") on Form 10-QSB for the period ending March 31, 2003 as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the "Report"), I, Patrick J. Ward, Principal Executive Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. ss. 1350, as adopted pursuant to ss. 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that, to the best of my knowledge and belief: 

- The Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and
- The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and result of operations of the Company.

 

/s/ Patrick J. Ward

___________________________

Patrick J. Ward

Principal Executive Officer

May 19, 2003
1 In The 

### C ourt of Appeals Ninth District of Texas at Beaumont

_________________ _____ NO. 09
- 19
- 00347
- CR

______________________ CESAR ANTONIO SERMENO , Appellant
V.
THE STATE OF TEXAS , Appellee

________________________________________________________________ On Appeal from the 397th District Court Grayson County, Texas Trial Cause No. 069462

_________________________________________________________________ ORDER Appellant’s counsel filed a motio n to withdraw supported by a brief concluding that the instant appeal is frivolous. See Anders v. California , 386 U.S. 738, 744 (1967). Appellant’s counsel certified that counsel provided copies of the motion and brief to a ppellant, advised appellant of appellant’s right to examine the appellate record and file a pro se response, and supplied a ppellant with a form motion for pro se access to the appellate record. See Kelly v. State , 436 S.W.3d 313, 319

- 20 (Tex. Crim. App. 20 14). This Court affirmed the trial court’s judgment on November2 18, 2020. See Sermeno v. State , No. 09

- 19

- 00347

- CR, 2020 WL 6749937, at *1 (Tex. App.

— Beaumont Nov. 18. 2020, no pet. h.) (mem. op., not designated for publication). The Court of Criminal Appe als granted an extension of time to file a petition for discretionary review until February 16, 2021. On January 25, 2020, a ppellant requested access to the appellate record with this Court. We hereby direct the clerk of the trial court to provide access to a paper copy of the reporter’s record and clerk’s record to appellant, and to provide written verification to this Court of the date and manner in which the appellate record was provided, on or before M onday , March 1 , 2021. See Kelly , 436 S.W.3d at 32 1

- 22. Any add i t io nal extension s of time to file a petition for discretionary review must be requested from the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals. See Tex. R. App. P. 68.2(c). ORDER ENTERED January 29, 2021

. PER CURIAM Before Golemon , C.J., Kreger a nd Horton, JJ.