IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 18-20260

Summary Calendar

CECIL MAX-GEORGE,

Plaintiff-Appellant

v.

HOUSTON POLICE DEPARTMENT; OFFICER C. A. MYRICK; OFFICER D. 

W. DUVAL; OFFICER J. MEJIA; OFFICER L. MATTHEWS,

Defendants-Appellees

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of Texas

USDC No. 4:17-CV-2264

Before KING, SOUTHWICK, and ENGELHARDT, Circuit Judges. 

PER CURIAM:*

Cecil Max-George filed a pro se civil rights lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. 

§ 1983 and Texas tort law in district court alleging that the individual 

defendants, who were officers in the Houston Police Department (HPD), 

violated his constitutional rights by using excessive force on him after he was 

pulled over for an open warrant for his arrest. In addition to seeking 

 

* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not 

be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH 

CIR. R. 47.5.4.

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

FILED

May 2, 2019

Lyle W. Cayce

Clerk

 Case: 18-20260 Document: 00514940370 Page: 1 Date Filed: 05/02/2019
No. 18-20260

2

declaratory, compensatory, and punitive relief, he asked for “immediate 

injunction[s]” against the individual defendants and HPD based on his claims 

that they were engaging in racial profiling of African-American males and 

using excessive force against African-American males. He also filed two 

motions for service of process and a motion for recusal. The district court 

issued an interlocutory order in which it (1) denied Max-George’s request in 

his complaint for preliminary injunctive relief; (2) dismissed Max-George’s 

claims for monetary relief against Officer D. W. Duval because they were 

barred under Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994); and (3) denied MaxGeorge’s motions for recusal and for service of process.

As a threshold matter, we must consider whether we have jurisdiction to 

consider Max-George’s appeal of the district court’s order. See Mosley v. Cozby, 

813 F.2d 659, 660 (5th Cir. 1987). The district court did not resolve all of MaxGeorge’s claims, direct entry of a final judgment, or designate the order as 

immediately appealable. We therefore lack jurisdiction to consider the district 

court’s dismissal of Max-George’s claims for monetary relief against Duval and 

denial of Max-George’s motions for recusal and service of process because none 

of those matters fit into any of the relevant qualifying categories. See Martin 

v. Halliburton, 618 F.3d 476, 481-82 (5th Cir. 2010); United States v. Powell, 

468 F.3d 862, 863 (5th Cir. 2006). 

We do have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a) to consider the 

district court’s denial of Max-George’s request for preliminary injunctive relief. 

See E.E.O.C. v. Kerrville Bus Co., 925 F.2d 129, 131 (5th Cir. 1991). However, 

rather than challenging the denial of preliminary injunctive relief directly, 

Max-George argues only that the district court misconstrued his request, 

which he now asserts was for permanent injunctive relief. He has not shown 

that the district court’s construal of his request for “immediate injunction[s]” 

 Case: 18-20260 Document: 00514940370 Page: 2 Date Filed: 05/02/2019
No. 18-20260

3

as seeking preliminary injunctive relief was erroneous. Moreover, if the 

proceedings below reach the appropriate stage, Max-George may have the 

opportunity to pursue his request for permanent injunctive relief.

Max-George’s motions to supplement the record are DENIED. We 

DISMISS Max-George’s appeal in part for lack of jurisdiction and AFFIRM the 

district court’s decision as to preliminary injunctive relief.

 Case: 18-20260 Document: 00514940370 Page: 3 Date Filed: 05/02/2019