The Honor able Solomon Oliver, Jr., United St ates District Judge f or the Nor

thern District * of Ohio, sitting by

desig nation. NO T R EC OM M EN DE D F OR F UL L- TEX T P UB LIC AT ION F ile Nam e: 06a0792n.06 F iled: October 24, 2006 No. 05-6136 UN ITED STA TES C OU RT OF AP P EA LS F OR THE SI XT H C IR CU IT
ST E PH E N L
. U PS H A W, Pla int if f- Ap pe lla nt,
v. ME TR OP OL I TA N N ASH VI L L E A I RPO RT AUTHO RI TY; PAULREGAL ADO; and I FTI KHAR AHMAD, De fe nd ants -A

pp e lle e s. ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) OnA p p e a l f

r o m t h e U n it e d St ates Di str ict Court

fo r t he Mid dle District of Tenne ssee

Be fore : BO GGS, Chief J udg e; MARTI N, Circuit J udg e; and OL I VER, District J udg e. * PER CU RI AM . St e ph e n Ups ha w, a fo rm e r e mpl oy e e of

the Me tr op oli tan N a sh vil le Airport Authority

(“MNA A”) , broug ht suit for wrong ful dischar g e under state law, a n d for deprivation of du e p ro cess and equal pr otection of the la ws under 42 U .S.C. § 1983 and § 1985. Up sh aw a lle g e s th a t th e e lim inatio n o f his po sit ion a s p art of an a ir po rt re or g anizatio n w a s a

“ sh a m” desig ned to s trip him of his civil-service protec tions and improperly terminate him without cause
. Th e dis tr ic t c ourt g ra

nte d summ ary jud g me nt in f a vo r o f t he de fe nd ants , a

nd Up sh aw n owa

pp e a ls the dismissal of his § 1983 claim. W e af firm the district cour

t’s order
. INo. 05-6136

Up sh aw v . MNA A, e t a l.

- 2 - Pursuant to Tenne ssee statute, the M NAA is oper ated by a B oard of

Commi ssioners under its own c ivi l se rv ic e pla

n, the Pe rs on ne l Ma

na g e me nt Plan (“ PMP” ), wh ic h w a s a do pte d und e r i ts bylaws . T e nn . Code Ann. § 42- 4- 11 0( a ). Te nn e sse e statut e mand a te s tha t c e rt a in p ro vis ion s w ill be included in the PMP, including a provision for “[s]uspensions , d em o t i ons or dischar g e of
e mpl oy e e s fo r c a

us e on ly wi th the ri g ht of no tic e and re vie w” and fo r “ [r]e vie w by the bo ard , o r i ts desig nee . . . , a

t the reque st of the employ ee in que stion and afte r n o t i ce and public hea ring of disciplinary

actions, including . . . discharg e of a ny employ ee.” Id. § 42-4- 1 1 0 (a )( 6 ), (11). The statute also per

mits t he P MP to make c erta in positi ons exempt from the civil-service protec tions of the plan. Id. at § 42-4-110( b). The PMP its elf spec ifies that “[t] he Authority rese rves the rig ht and mana g ement pre rog ative to assign a

nd control i ts work force s. The P resident [ of t he MNAA] s hall staff the Authority at the le ve l w hic h ma

ke s a pp ro pr iate , e c on omi c a l, and effecti ve a llo c a tio n o f w or k b e tw e e n Auth or ity
e mp l o ye e s an d

i n d e p e n d e n tc o n t r a c ts e r v i c e s , ” a n d p r o v i d e s f

o r i mp l e m e n t i n g t h e s t a tu t o r i l ype rm itt e d e xemp tio ns fr om the pla n. Am on g the pr ov isi on s d e a lin g wi th e mpl oy e e ri g hts , th e PMP specifie s that “[e]m ploy ees subjec t t o a re duction-in-for ce w ill rece ive notification of suc h action at least two we eks prior to the e ffe ctive date .” Reg ardingemploy ee disc iplinary actions and terminations, the PMP provides t h at “[ n ] o empl oy ee sha ll be the subject of a disciplinary

action wit h o u t cause ,” and spe cifies r ules for disciplinar

y proce dures. In case s involving potential de mot ion or dis c ha rg e , th e PMP p ro vid e s th a t th e he ari ng be hel d by the Pr e sid e nt. Th e PMP require s written notification of the he aring ’s outcome within ten day s , wh i ch m ust advise the
e mpl oy e e of

the ri g ht t o a

pp e a l “ dis c ha

rg e s, de mot ion s and su sp e ns ion s in e xce ss o f f ive (5 ) d ay s”No. 05-6136

Up sh aw v . MNA A, e t a l.

- 3 - to the MNAA B oard of

Commi ssioners, who ar e re quired to hea r the a ppeal within 90 day s of the final dec ision or refe r the matter to an administrative law judg e. I n November

2002, roug hly

a y ear afte r initiating a

reor g anization of the MNAA, Pre sident Paul Reg alado hire d I ftikhar Ahma d as Vice President in char g e of t h e P l an ning, D esig n, and Construction department ( “PDC”), a nd reque sted his re c o mm endations for the re org anization of that depar t m en t
. Among Mr. Ahmad’ s rec ommendations was the e limination of the two Airport Eng ineer positions–one of which wa s held by Upshaw–a

nd the Airport Ar chitect position, and the
cre ation of seve ral ne w positions withi n PDC, including Project Eng ineer for Construction, which, unlike the Airport Eng ineer positions, would require Profe ssional Eng ineer (“P.E.”) licensing , and
wo uld be e xemp te d f

ro m th e PMP’ s c ivi l- se rv ic e pr ov isi on s. I n D e c emb er 20 02, A hma d me t w ithUp sh aw a nd Al Cop e , th e oth e r A ir

po rt En g ine e r, to discuss job perfor

mance issues, and pre sented them with a l et t er of re primand; shortly afte rwa rds Upshaw lef

t w o r k o np a id me d ic a l l e a v e , o nw h ic h h e r e ma in e d u n ti l h is te r

mi n a ti o n . I nJanu ary 2003, he wa s informed of the decision to eliminate hi s position, and was offe red a one-y ear contra ct for one of the ne w Project Eng ineer positions, on the condition that he obtain a P.E. license dur ing that period, at MNA A’ s ex p en se. Afte r a numbe r of e x chang es, Upshaw ultimately

declined the offe r, and Mr
. Reg alado sent him a “N otice of Intent to Terminate pur suant to MNAA’s Per sonnel Manag ement Plan,” e x plaining that he was be ing te rminated be cause his posit ion had bee n eliminated and he had dec lined the new position. The letter informed Upshaw of his right to appea l t h e d ec i s i o ni na h ea ri n g b ef o re R ega l ad o , wh i ch Up s h aw re qu es t edan d re ce i v ed
. Af

t er t h e h ea ri n g, Reg alado c oncluded that Upsha w’s ter mination was based on the elimination of his positi on as par tNo. 05-6136

Up sh aw v . MNA A, e t a l.

Upshaw a sserts in his brief that “[t] his is a section 1983 and 1985(3) case ,” but makes no 1 f u rt h e r r e f e r e n c e t o h i s § 1 9 8 5 c l a i m , m u c h l e s s d e v e l o p anar g u m e n ti ns u p p o rto f i t
. A c c o r d i n g l y, we de em the § 1985 cla im waived. Dillery v. City of Sandusky , 398 F.3d 562, 569 ( 6th Cir. 2005). - 4 - of the PDC re or ganiz a tio n. Up sh aw a pp ro a c he d th e MN AAB oa rd of Com mis sio ne rs and

its
c ha ir man to re qu e st a he ari ng on Re g a la do ’s de c isi on , but wa s inf or me d th a t he wa s n ot e nti tle d to fu rt he r a pp e a l. Upshaw f iled an ac tion ag ainst MNAA, Mr. Reg alado, a nd Mr. Ahmad, alleg ing de nial of h i s d u e proce ss rig hts “by terminating him in direct contravention of his rig hts as a civil servic e employ ee,” in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983; conspiracy to deprive him of e qual protec tion under the law in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1985; and wrong ful dischar g e under Tenne ssee law . The district court gran t ed t h e defenda nts’ motion for summary judgme nt, dismi ssing the § 1983 a nd § 1985 claims with prejudice and dismissing the state law claims without pr ejudice, f or lac k of jurisdiction. Up sh aw n owa

pp e a ls h is § 19 83 c la im. 1 II Th is c ourt re vie ws a g ra nt o f s umm ary

jud g me nt de novo
. Turner v

. City of T aylor , 412 F.3d 629, 637 (6th Cir. 2005). I n evaluating a g rant of summar y judgme nt, “the mer e existence of some alleg ed fa ctual dispute betwe en the pa rties will not defeat an otherw ise proper ly supported motion for summary

judgme nt; the require ment is that there be no genuine issue of ma te ria l fac t.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc

. , 477 U.S. 242, 247-48 (1986).No. 05-6136

Up sh aw v . MNA A, e t a l.

- 5 - III I n o rd e r t o s us ta in h is § 19 83 c la im fo r de pr ivatio n of du e pr oc e ss, Up sh aw mus t e sta bli sh that he ha d a

c on sti tut io nal ly

pr ote c te d p ro pe rt

y int e re st a nd that he wa s d e pr ive d o f t he int e re st without adequate proce ss. Bo ar d o f Rege nts of S

tate Col le ge s v . R oth , 408 U.S. 564, 576 (1972). This court has obse rved that “[p] roper ty interests do not derive from the Constitution, but rathe r ar e
cre ated a nd define d by

‘exi sting rule s or under standing s that stem from independe nt sources suc h as state law

. . . .’” Silberstein v . City of Dayton , 4 4 0 F. 3 d 3 0 6 , 3 1 1 (6 t h C i r. 2 0 0 6 ) ( qu o t i n g Roth, 408 U.S. at 577). A civil-service classification sy stem, cre ated under st ate statute, that provides for termination only

with cause cre ates such a constitutionally

protec ted prope rty

interest. Cleveland Bd . o f E du c . v . Lo ud

e rm ill , 470 U.S. 532, 541 (1985). A The pa rties do not dispute that Upshaw’ s Airport Eng ineer position was classified unde r the MNAA’s PMP, cre ated pur suant to Tennesse e statute, a nd do not a

ppear to dispute that, had Upshaw be e n te rm inate d f

or c a us e , the pr op e rt

y int e re st thu s c re a te d wo uld have e nti tle d h im t o d ue pr oc e ss. Howeve r, the MNAAclaims that, bec ause U pshaw’s position was e l i m i n ated a s part of a
reor g anization of airport pe rsonnel, the due proce ss require ments that would apply in a termination for c ause do not a

pply here . T h i s co u rt has not spec ifically addre ssed the extent–if any –of the proce ss due a c lassified employ ee w hose position is elim inated. A number o f o t h er jurisdictions have reco g nize d a

g e ne ra l “ re or g anizatio n e xce pti on ” to c ivi l se rv ic e -d e ri ve d d ue pr oc e ss require ments, rooted in public policy considerations. See, e .g., Misek v. City of Chicago, 783 F.2d 98 , 10 1 (7 th Cir. 1986 ); Du ffy v . S arau lt , 8 92 F .2 d 1 39 , 1 47 (1 st C ir . 1 99 5) ; Hartman v. City ofNo. 05-6136

Up sh aw v . MNA A, e t a l.

- 6 - Providenc e , 636 F. Supp. 1395, 1410 (D.R.I . 1986) ( co l l ec ting c ases) . Courts have noted, f or example, that where an employ ee’ s termination is unrelated to his job perf ormanc e, an y

kind of proce ss me ant to evaluate that per formanc e would be supe rfluous. Digiacinto v. Harford County, Md. , 818 F. Supp. 903, 906 (D. Md. 1993) . Others have noted that r equiringdue proc es s in the context of a reor g anization would amount to an unrea sonable hindr an ce for gove rnment entities seekingto adapt their staf

fing needs to c hang ing c onditions. Se e Go lds mi th v . M ay or & City Cou nc il of B alt im or e , 845 F.2d 61, 65 (4th Cir. 1988). This case , howeve r, does not re quire us to consider whether a g ener al re org anization ex ception permits Upshaw’ s termination without due proce ss: the nature of the spec ific property rig ht that Upshaw enjoy ed in his position did not extend to protection from elimination of his position i n the context of a re org anization. Although the Airport’s PMP and the state law pursua nt to which it was implemented vested Upshaw w ith a proper

ty interest in his position, its prec ise nature must be determined by ref ere nce to the i nstruments that cre ated it. See, e .g. , Silbe rste in , 44 0 F .3 d a t 31 1. He re , the te rm s o f t he PMP and state la

w do nothing to sug g est that Upshaw’ s proper ty interest extended bey ond protec tion from termination for c ause w ithout due proce ss. First, s tate law specifie s that “suspensions, demotions or dischar g e”–a ll of which the statute chara cter izes as “disciplinary actions”–be only for c ause, a

nd
on ly a ft e r n oti c e and

re vie w. Te nn . Co de Ann. § 4 2-4 -11 0(a )( 6) , ( 11 ). Se c on d, the PMP i tse lf specifie s the resp o n s i b i lity of the Preside nt to assign the MN AA’s wor k forc e and sta ff it at the appropr iate leve l, and provides that “ [e] mploy ees su b j ec t to a re duction-in-for ce w ill rece ive
no tif ic a tio n o f s uc h a c tio n at le a st two we e ks pr ior to t he e ff e c tiv e date .” Th e e ff

e c t of the se provisions is to create a prope rty interest relating specific ally to disc iplinary actions; in the ca se ofNo. 05-6136

Up sh aw v . MNA A, e t a l.

- 7 - termination as a r esult of re org anization or reduction in forc e, the PM P establishes no rig hts bey ond prior notice, r ece ipt of which Upshaw does not dispute. On i ts fac e, in other w ords, the civil servic e plan that cr eate d Upshaw’ s proper ty interest explicitly

contemplated the possibili ty that positions
wo uld be e lim inate d w ith ou t ne c e ssi tatin g the du e pr oc e ss p ro te c tio ns that di sc ha rg e for c a us e require s. See H

artman , 636 F . Supp . at 140 8- 09 (n oti ng that re le va nt ci vil -s e rv ic e pr ov isi on s o nly addre ssed “dismissal,” and thus “a t best, [create d] a property interest in the job s o l o n g as the job
e xiste d. ” ) T o th e e xten t, t he n, that Ups ha

w’ s p os iti on

wa s e lim inate d a s p art

of a le g iti mate
reor g anization, MNA A’s ref usal to e ntertain an appea l of his pr e-te rmination hear ing–wh i ch the PMP r e qu ir e d o nly

wh e re the te rm inatio n wa s fo r c a us e –c ann ot c on sti tut e a

de nia l of du e pr oc e ss. The rig ht to appeal a

decision to eliminate a position (eve n if MNAA offe red such a he aring ) wa s
ne ve r a pa rt of Up sh aw’ s p ro pe rt

y int e re st. B Upshaw c ontends, howeve r, that the re org anization was a mere “sham,” a pretext designe d to d isc ha rg e him wi tho ut t he pr oc e ss t

hat sh ou ld hav e been due . U ps ha w m ay be c or re c t th a t a

“ sh a m” re or g anizatio n s ho uld no t pr ote c t an em

plo y e r fr om f

ulf ill ingwh a t w ou ld o the rw ise be its due proc ess obliga

tion: “To hold otherwise would a llow gove rnment off ic ia ls to c r y ‘re org anization’ in order to c ircumvent the c ons t i t u t i o n al and statutory protec tions gua

rante ed . . . employ ees.” Misek, 783 F.2d at 101. However, Up s h aw h as failed to show that the question of whe ther the
reor g anization was a sham involves a ny g enuine issue of materia l f act. On the contra

ry , the re cord is clear that, on the evidenc e Upsha w has off

ere d, no rea sonable jury co u l d co nclude that the
re or g anizatio n w a s me re pr e te xt.No. 05-6136

Up sh aw v . MNA A, e t a l.

- 8 - Upshaw doe s not dispute that Reg alado had begun a restructuring of the MNAAover a y ear befor e his position was eliminate d , a nd that the stated purpose of the re org anization was streamlining
and inc re a se d c os t- e ff

e c tiv e ne ss. He do e s n ot d isp ute that MN AAc ou ld i nc lud e a P.E . li c e ns e
a mon g the job re qu ir e me nts fo r t he ne w Pr oje c t Eng ine e r fo r Con str uc tio n pos iti on s, no r that it c ou ld
e xemp t th e ne w p os iti on s f ro m c ivi l se rv ic e c la ssi fi c a tio n. Hi s only su bs tanti ve dis pu te s a

pp e ar t o
conce rn the re asons for which Reg alado c laimed MNAA w as eliminating his positi on. During Upshaw’ s pre- termination hear ing, Reg alado indicated t hat MNAA w anted to make the cha ng e in orde r to secur e funds more easily fo r the salar ies of the ne w positions from fede ral g rant prog rams, and to e liminate the cost of consultants re quired by not having licensed e ng ineer s in-house. In an attempt to impeac h these a ssertio n s , Up s h aw of fer s the deposition testimony of MNAA’s Chief

Financ ial Offic er, D oug Wolfe, that his Airport Enginee r posi tion could have been fede ra l l y funded, a

nd the testimony

of Reg alado that, e ven af ter the c reation of the new Projec t En g ine e r p os iti on s, the a ir po rt ha d n ot e lim inate d it s u se of c on su lta nts . T hu s, Up sh aw c on c lud e s, Reg alado’ s asserte d motivations for eliminating his position were me rely prete x tual. More g eneral l y , Upshaw nowclaims that the fa ct that the number of MNAA e mploy ees ( and PDC employ ees in pa

rticular) has i ncre ased since hi s termination undermines Rega lado’s claim that the
reor g anization as a whole w as under taken to strea

mline operations (though in the proc eeding s below he conc eded this motivation, Plaintiff’s Response t o Def endants’ Statement of Undisput ed Mate rialNo. 05-6136

Up sh aw v . MNA A, e t a l.

Upshaw a ppear s to claim, on appea l, that he was deprive d of due proce ss in Dec ember 2002 2 as we ll as upon his termination in April 2003 , i n s ofar as the letter

of re primand wa s not prece ded b y t h e n o t i ce re qu i re d b y t h e P M P
. Up s h aw , h o we v er , fa i l edt o as s er tt h i s cl ai m i nt h e p ro ce ed i n gs below, and w e ther efor e nee d not c onsider it he re. Barner v. Pilkington North America, I nc. , 399 F.3d 745, 749 ( 6th Cir. 2005)
. I n any case , it is well established that constitutionally require d due proce ss is not e quivalent to the proce ss r equire d by s t at e l aw, Lou de rm ill , 470 U.S. at 541, and without a showing that the Dec ember 2002 proce eding was part of his dischar g e, Upsha w ca nnot d em o n s trate that the letter of r eprimand a mounted to a depr ivation of any proper ty interest that wo uld e nti tle him

to d ue pr oc e ss. - 9 - F a c ts ¶ 11 , JA 9 1) . Fi na lly , Ups ha w sug g e sts that his De c e mbe r 200 2 lette r of re pr ima nd po int s to the ac tual foundation for

MNAA’s e limination of his pos ition. 2 These a ssertions do not amount, as a matter of law, to a

g enuine dispute of material fa ct requiringresolution at trial. At most, Upshaw’s a ssertions serve to c ast doubt on the qu ali ty of the
reor g anization plan–the likelihood th at i t would achie ve the r esults MNAA cla imed to hope for. Wit hout offer ing a

ny evidenc e t o p rovi de af firmative support f

or the notion that MNAA’ s
re or g anizatio n w a s me re ly a ba d- fa ithe ff

or t to dis c ha

rg e him , Ups ha

w c ann ot p ro ve , o n th e ba sis of this asser

ted i neff ectivene ss, that the entire eff ort was a sham. See, e .g. , Mandel v . Allen , 8 89 F. Sup p. 85 7, 87 5 ( E. D. Va . 1 99 5) (“Ne ith e r f e de ra l no r s tate law p ro hib its a state fr om a g oo d f

a ith
e ff or t to c on du c t its af

fa ir s mor e e ff

ic ie ntl y , an d the state is not re qu ir e d to justi fy su c h e ff or ts w ith proof that the e fficie ncies a re w orking .”). F urthermor e, the e x istence of a prior disc iplinary

action ag ainst Upshaw, c annot, in itself, serve to prove that the entire proce ss was a subter fug e desig ned t o el i m i n ate him; “[o] therwise, the para dox ical re sult would follow that a g ener al re org anization could be c halleng ed by

any one with a que stionable work r ecor d (but not by a person whose rec ord is bey ond repr oach) .” Di gia c into , 818 F. Supp. at 906.No. 05-6136

Up sh aw v . MNA A, e t a l.

- 10 - Upshaw ha s offe red no e vidence to suppor t the notion that MNAA’s decision was “ person direc ted” r ather

than “position directe d,” beyond the exist ence of a pr ior disciplinary action. See Hartman , 6 36 F . Su

pp . at 14 10 . T his do e s n ot p ro vid e a ba sis fr om whic h a re a so na ble jur or c ou ld conclude that the MNAA’s actions wer e prete x tual; inde ed, the fac t that MNAA off ere d Upshaw a contra ct for the new Project Eng ineer position, and offer ed to pay his licensing e x penses, r ender s h i gh l y i mp l a u s i b l e t h e n o t i o nt h at t h i s wa s al l an el ab o ra t e r u s e t o t erm i n at e h i m . I nev al u at i n g a motion fo r s u m m ary

judgme nt, “[t] he mer e existence of a scintilla of evidenc e in support of the pla int if f' s p os iti on

wi ll b e ins uf

fi c ie nt; the re mus t be e vid e nc e on wh ic h th e jur

y c ou ld r e a so na

bly fi nd fo r t he pla int if

f, ” and th e op posin g pa

rt y “ mus t do mor e tha

n s imp ly sh owthat th e re is s ome metaphy sical doubt a s to the materia l fac ts.” Liberty Lobby , 4 7 7 U. S
. at 2 5 2 (q u o t i n g Ma tsu sh ita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp. , 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986)) . Upshaw ha s failed to mee t thi s b ur de n. Ac c or din g ly , th e or de r o f t he dis tr ic t c ourt

is AF F IRM ED
.