2004 Decisions

Opinions of the United

States Court of Appeals

for the Third Circuit

6-15-2004

Marshall v. Lauriault

Precedential or Non-Precedential: Precedential

Docket No. 03-2801

Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2004

This decision is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit at Villanova

University School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in 2004 Decisions by an authorized administrator of Villanova

University School of Law Digital Repository. For more information, please contact Benjamin.Carlson@law.villanova.edu.

Recommended Citation

"Marshall v. Lauriault" (2004). 2004 Decisions. Paper 554.

http://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2004/554
PRECEDENTIAL

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF

APPEALS

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

____________

Nos. 03-2801 & 03-3282

ELINOR F. MARSHALL; 

HARRIET FENTON PARKS; 

CAROLL D. KNOTT;

LINDSAY DRYDEN, III; 

RANDOLPH FENTON, JR.; 

GLENN THORNTON;

SYNDIE THORNTON SMITH;

HEATHER THORNTON; 

MATTHEW C. FENTON, III

THOMAS T. FENTON,

 Appellants

 v.

BRUCE LEA LAURIAULT;

MERCANTILE-SAFE DEPOSIT &

TRUST

COMPANY; K. DONALD PROCTOR;

ELIZABETH CHANDLER

LAURIAULT

PIERSON; SALLY VAUGHN

LAURIAULT

 ____________

Appeal from the United States District

Court

For the District of New Jersey

D.C. No.: 02-cv-05945

District Judge: Honorable Anne E.

Thompson

____________

Argued: April 21, 2004

Before: SCIRICA, Chief Judge,

ROSENN and GREENBERG, Circuit

Judges.

(Filed: June 15, 2004)

Marvin J. Brauth, Esq. (Argued)

Wilentz, Goldman & Spitzer, P.A.

90 Woodbridge Center Drive

P.O. Box 10

Woodbridge, NJ 07095

 Counsel For Appellants

Gerard G. Brew, Esq. (Argued)

Robert A. Mintz, Esq. 

Tammy L. Meyer, Esq.

McCarter & English, LLP

100 Mulberry Street

Newark, NJ 07102

Counsel For Appellees

____________

OPINION OF THE COURT

____________

ROSENN, Circuit Judge.

This appeal presents an unusual

challenge to the action of the United States

District Court in refusing to declare the

State of New Jersey’s adult adoption

statute unconstitutional for lack of a notice

provision. Other difficult questions posed

relate to the District Court’s diversity

jurisdiction to hear a challenge to an adult

adoption on state law grounds.

Maria Fenton (“Maria”), now
2

deceased, was one of ten beneficiaries of a

trust created by her uncle, Foster T.

Fenton, in Maryland in 1966. Several

years before her death, Maria adopted her

four adult cousins through a proceeding in

New Jersey state court. The other

beneficiaries sought declaratory relief in

the United States District Court for the

District of New Jersey to have the New

Jersey adult adoption statute declared

invalid and Maria’s adoption proceedings

declared null and void. The District Court

granted Maria’s motion to dismiss the

action under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). We

affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand

for further proceedings.

I.

Plaintiffs/Appellants are surviving

beneficiaries of a revocable trust (the

“Trust”) created by Foster T. Fenton

(“Fenton”) in the State of Maryland on

November 29, 1966. The Trust provides

that after the death of Fenton’s wife, the

balance of the Trust would inure to the

benefit of Fenton’s brothers and their

wives. After the deaths of the brothers and

wives, the Trust provides for the annual

income to be paid to each of Fenton’s ten

nieces and nephews during their remaining

lifetimes. Upon the death of any niece or

nephew, his or her designated one-tenth

share of income from the Trust is to be

paid to the deceased niece or nephew’s

“issue,” as the case may be. If there are no

living issue, the share is to be paid, per

stirpes, to the surviving nieces or nephews

or their living issue. The Trust terminates

twenty-one years after the death of the last

of the ten named nieces and nephews. At

that time, the principal is to be distributed

among the individuals entitled to receive

the Trust income at the date of

termination.

The Trust specifically provides that

“an adopted child and such adopted child’s

lawful blood descendants shall be

considered in this instrument as lawful

blood descendants of the adopting parent

or parents.” The Trust does not include

any specific provision pertaining to

individuals adopted as adults. 

Maria filed a Complaint in July

1991 in the Superior Court of New Jersey,

Chancery Division - Family Part,

Hunterdon County, to legally adopt four

adults. The adoptees were the children of

Maria’s first cousin, who recently had

died. The Superior Court granted the

adoption pursuant to the New Jersey adult

adoption statute, N.J.S.A. 2A:22-1 et seq.

Appellants claim that neither they, nor the

trustees, received notice of the adoption

proceeding. 

Prior to completing the adoption,

Maria’s attorney, James W. Lance, wrote

in 1990 to the Trust’s corporate trustee,

Mercantile-Safe Deposit & Trust

Company, informing the trustee that Maria

intended to adopt her four cousins. The

letter inquired whether, in the trustee’s

opinion, the adult adoption would enable

the adoptees to inherit Maria’s share of the

Trust. The trustee responded to the inquiry

offering an unqualified opinion that the

adoption would enable the adoptees to

inherit Maria’s share of the Trust, per

stirpes. Upon completion of the adoption,
3

Maria’s attorney delivered the amended

birth certificates of the adoptees and the

Order of Adoption to the corporate trustee.

Maria died in 2002. Upon her

death, three of her adopted children

(collectively, “the Adoptees”) asserted an

interest in the Trust as Maria’s “issue.”1 

In response, the Appellants, who are all

beneficiaries under the Trust, filed the

complaint at bar in the U.S. District Court

for the District of New Jersey. The

complaint raised two claims for

declaratory relief seeking, inter alia, a

judgment that would (1) declare the 1991

New Jersey adoption decree invalid insofar

as it created rights or interests in the Trust

for the adult Adoptees; (2) declare that the

adult Adoptees have no rights to or interest

in the income or principal of the Trust; and

(3) direct the trustees not to pay any

portion of the income or principal of the

Trust to the adult Adoptees.

Although both counts in the

complaint seek identical relief, they are

based on different legal theories. The first

count alleges that Maria’s failure to

provide notice of the adoption proceeding

to the Appellants “prejudiced” their

interests in the Trust, thereby invalidating

the adoption insofar as it would affect their

interests. The basis for the claim of

“prejudice” is not completely clear from

the language of the complaint, and we

interpret it as a challenge to the validity of

the adoptions based on the applicable state

law. See Davis v. Ohio Barge Lines, Inc.,

697 F.2d 549, 552 (3d Cir. 1983) (“in

passing on a motion to dismiss on the

ground, inter alia, of lack of jurisdiction

over the subject matter, the allegations of

the complaint should be construed

favorably to the pleader”). Thus, we read

the claim to allege, as the Appellants assert

in their brief, that the adoptions were

invalid under the New Jersey law of

adoptions, and that the New Jersey

adoption decrees should not be given full

faith and credit under Maryland law,

which governs the Trust. 

The second count alleges

alternatively that because the New Jersey

adult adoption statute, N.J.S.A. 2A:22-1, et

seq., does not provide for notice to persons

or entities whose interests may be affected

by the adoption, the statute is invalid under

the Fourteenth Amendment to the United

States Constitution and the New Jersey

State Constitution. 

In January of 2003, the District

Court granted Appellants a temporary

restraining order, prohibiting the Adoptees

from filing an action in Maryland state

court to claim their interest in the Trust. In

March of 2003, the District Court denied

the Appellants’ motion for a preliminary

injunction and vacated the temporary

restraining order. Once the restraining

order was lifted, the Adoptees filed a claim

in Maryland state court (“the Maryland

case”) seeking to compel the trustees to

make distributions from the Trust to the

 

1

 Maria’s adopted daughter Virginia

Lewis Lauriault predeceased Ms. Fenton.
4

Adoptees.2 The Adoptees also filed an

action in the Superior Court of New

Jersey, Chancery Division, Probate Part,

Hunterdon County, (“the New Jersey

case”) seeking a declaratory judgment

certifying that the New Jersey adoption

decree is valid for all purposes.3

On May 27, 2003, the District

Court granted the Adoptees’ motion to

dismiss the complaint pursuant to Fed. R.

Civ. P. 12(b)(6). The appellants timely

appealed.4

II.

The Ap pell ants cla imed

jurisdiction for their underlying suit as a

matter arising under the Constitution of the

United States pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §

1331, and as a diversity suit pursuant to 28

U.S.C. § 1332. This court maintains

appellate jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §

1291. As an appeal from the District

Court’s grant of a motion to dismiss under

Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), our review is de

novo. Jordan v. Fox, Rothschild, O’Brien

& Frankel, 20 F.3d 1250, 1261 (3d Cir.

1994). Upon a motion to dismiss, we

construe the complaint liberally, and

assume all factual allegations in the

complaint to be true. Wilson v. Rackmill,

878 F.2d 772, 775 (3d Cir. 1989). The

dismissal will be upheld if we agree with

the District Court that the Appellants can

prove no set of facts that would entitle

them to relief. Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S.

41, 45-46 (1957).

The District Court held that it did

not have jurisdiction to hear any of the

Plaintiff’s claims based on state law, and

considered only the challenge to the New

Jersey adult adoption statute on

constitutional due process grounds.

Regarding the challenge to the validity of

the New Jersey state court adoption

decree, the District Court cited to District

of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman,

460 U.S. 462 (1983) for the proposition

that federal district courts do not have

jurisdiction to hear a challenge to statecourt decisions, even if the challenge

raises a constitutional claim. As to the

claim for a declaratory judgment that the

Adoptees have no interest in the Trust, the

District Court held that it could not assume

jurisdiction over that issue under the

 

2

 The Maryland case is captioned In

the Matter of the Marital Trust Created

Under the Revocable Deed of Trust

Executed by Foster T. Fenton as Settlor

and Hilary W. Gans and Mercantile-Safe

Deposit and Trust Companies as

Trustees, Case No. 24-T-03-000074 (Cir.

Ct. Baltimore Cty.). 

 

3

 The New Jersey case is captioned In

the Matter of the Estate of Maria B.

Fenton, deceased. The Adoptees did not

provide a case number citation to this

court.

 

4

 In addition to Maria Fenton’s

adopted children, Mercantile-Safe

Deposit & Trust Company, K. Donald

Proctor, Matthew C. Fenton and Trustees

were also named as nominal appellees.
5

probate exception to diversity jurisdiction.5

Finally, although the District Court did not

address this issue, the Adoptees argued

before the District Court and again in their

appellate brief that this Court should

abstain from deciding the Appellants’

claims. We therefore turn to each of these

jurisdictional issues.

A.

In dismissing for lack of

jurisdiction the challenge to the validity of

the New Jersey adoption decree, the

District Court noted the general principle

that federal district courts may not sit as

appellate courts to review state court

decisions. Although the District Court

cited only to District of Columbia Court of

Appeals v. Feldman, this principle is

commonly known as the Rooker-Feldman

doctrine. See Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co.,

263 U.S. 413 (1923). The District Court

correctly stated the general principle under

Rooker-Feldman, but failed to recognize

an important factor in the doctrine’s

application. Under the Rooker-Feldman

doctrine, “a party losing in state court is

barred from seeking what in substance

would be appellate review of the state

judgment in a United States district court,

based on the losing party's claim that the

state judgment itself violates the loser's

federal rights.” Johnson v. DeGrandy, 512

U.S. 997, 1005-1006 (1994) (emphasis

added). In this case, the Appellants were

not a party to the adoption proceeding in

New Jersey, and they are not challenging

an adverse judgment against them. Rather,

the Appellants mount a collateral attack on

the validity of the New Jersey adoption

decree. Therefore, we hold that the

District Court’s finding of no jurisdiction

over a claim of a non-party to state

litigation because of Rooker-Feldman to

be in error. The Rooker-Feldman doctrine

does not apply to this case, and the District

Court could, in theory, assert diversity

jurisdiction over this collateral attack to

the New Jersey adoption decree. 

B.

The District Court found that it did

not have jurisdiction to declare that the

Adoptees have no right or interest in the

Trust due to the probate exception to

diversity jurisdiction. The District Court

did not conduct any analysis of this issue,

but simply cited to Princess Lida of Thurn

and Taxis v. Thompson, 305 U.S. 456

(1939), to support its position. We

conclude again that the District Court’s

holding in this matter was incorrect. In

Princess Lida, the Supreme Court was

called upon to resolve a dispute between a

federal district court and the Pennsylvania

Court of Common Pleas, where both

courts had claimed jurisdiction over a trust

matter and had issued orders restraining

the parties from proceeding in the other

court. 305 U.S. at 461. The Supreme

Court determined that the claims in that

case were not brought in personam to

determine the rights of any person in the

trust. Id. at 466-467. Had the claims been

brought under diversity jurisdiction in

personam, the Court’s analysis would have

 

5

See infra Part II.B for a description

of the origin and scope of the probate

exception.
6

been different. Id. Rather, the claims

were quasi in rem, as they related to the

administration and restoration of the

corpus of a trust. Id. at 467. Therefore,

the Supreme Court held that the state court

maintained exclusive jurisdiction over the

corpus of the trust, and the federal district

court could exercise no jurisdiction. Id. at

468. The differences between Princess

Lida and the case at hand are stark. First,

there is no conflict between the federal and

state courts regarding jurisdiction.6

Second, the case at bar deals primarily

with a determination of rights in the Trust

among the parties; there is no claim in rem

requiring the federal court to maintain

jurisdiction over the corpus of the trust.

A determination of whether the

probate exception to diversity jurisdiction

applies requires a much more

comprehensive analysis than that offered

by the District Court. Several of our sister

circuit courts have discussed the limits of

the probate e x c e ption, o fte n

acknowledging its difficult contours. See,

e.g., Mangieri v. Mangieri, 226 F.3d 1, 2

(1st Cir. 2000) (noting that “the precise

scope of the probate exception has not

been clearly established”). However, the

Supreme Court and the several circuit

courts have sufficiently clarified the

doctrine’s guiding principles to resolve the

issue presented in this case. 

Generally speaking, the Judiciary

Act of 1789 conferred equity jurisdiction

upon the federal courts, which did not

include probate jurisdiction. Markham v.

Allen, 326 U.S. 490, 494 (1946) (noting

that the English Court of Chancery in 1789

did not have jurisdiction over probate

matters). Thus, federal courts do not have

jurisdiction to probate wills or administer

estates. Id. However, federal courts do

have jurisdiction to entertain suits raised

by creditors, heirs and other claimants

against an estate as long as the federal

court “does not interfere with the probate

proceedings or assume general jurisdiction

of the probate or control of the property in

the custody of the state court.” Id. See

also Moore v. Graybeal, 843 F.2d 706, 709

(3d Cir. 1988). In Markham, the Supreme

Court upheld a district court judgment

declaring that a petitioner was “entitled to

receive the net estate of [the decedent] in

distribution” because the judgment did not

disturb the administration of the

decedent’s estate, but rather “decree[d]

petitioner’s right in the property to be

distributed after its administration.” 326

U.S. at 495.

In the cases following Markham,

the circuit courts have further refined the

probate exception to diversity jurisdictions

explaining generally that the jurisdictional

question can be decided by determining

whether the action could be brought in a

state court of general jurisdiction where

the federal court sits. Foster v. Carlin, 200

F.2d 943, 947 (4th Cir. 1952). However,

where a matter does not ordinarily fall

within the probate exception to diversity

jurisdiction, the exception may not be

 

6

 The Appellees stipulated at oral

argument that the Maryland state court

has stayed the proceedings in the case

brought by the Adoptees pending

resolution of this appeal.
7

expanded or federal jurisdiction denied

because state law would allow the matter

to be assigned to a probate court. See,

e.g., Waterman v. Canal-Louisiana Bank

& Trust Co., 215 U.S. 33, 43-44 (1909). 

Turning to the case at hand, we

conclude that the District Court erred in

determining that the probate exception to

diversity jurisdiction applies to this case.

Fenton established the Trust at issue in this

case prior to his death, and there is no

current or pending matter regarding the

Trust to be administered in the state

probate court. To this Court’s knowledge,

no state probate court exercised

jurisdiction over the Trust prior to the

appellants filing the present suit.

Therefore, the federal court is not asked to

interfere with any probate proceeding or

assume control over property in probate.

Thus, the District Court possesses diversity

jurisdiction over this claim in personam to

determine the rights of the parties in the

Trust. 

To further reinforce the point, we

note that the claim brought by the

Adoptees to establish their rights in the

Trust was appropriately raised in Maryland

Circuit Court, the state court of general

jurisdiction.7 In that action, the Maryland

court would presumptively consider the

same issues presently before this court,

including whether Maryland law requires

recognition of the New Jersey adoption

decree and a grant of full faith and credit

for all purposes. Because these issues are

appropriate for the Maryland state court of

general jurisdiction, and not the Maryland

probate court, the federal court’s diversity

jurisdiction, consequently, is not disturbed

by the probate exception.8

C.

The Adoptees argue that this Court

should abstain from deciding this case,

based on several recognized abstention

doctrines. In order to weigh the

appropriateness of abstention, it is helpful

to summarize the parties’ positions

regarding the state law issues before us.

Appellants concede that the Trust is

governed by Maryland law, but argue that

the New Jersey adoption decree is not

entitled to full faith and credit in Maryland

because it is the result of an invalid

judicial ruling. Appellants cite to a series

of New Jersey cases for the proposition

 

7

 Under the Maryland constitution, the

courts and legislature have vested

probate jurisdiction in the orphan’s court. 

See Radcliff v. Vance, 757 A.2d 812,

816 (Md. 2000). Because the Trust is

governed by Maryland law, and only the

Maryland courts could assert any

potential probate jurisdiction, the case

brought by the Adoptees in New Jersey

does not affect the probate exception to

diversity jurisdiction analysis.

 

8

 It is worth noting that even if the

Maryland case is postured in rem, the

federal court will not be stripped of

jurisdiction because the state court claim

was filed after the federal in personam

claim. See Reichman v. Pittsburgh Nat’l

Bank, 465 F.2d 16, 18 (3d Cir. 1972).
8

that in New Jersey, adult adoptions entered

for the purpose of inheriting from a third

party or “stranger to the adoption” are not

valid.9 Had the Appellants been provided

notice of the adoption proceeding, they

suggest that they would have informed the

New Jersey court of Maria’s “invalid”

purpose in the adoption (i.e. arranging for

her cousins to inherit from the third party

Trust) and prevented the court from

approving the adoption. 

The Adoptees argue that New

Jersey law does not prohibit adult

adoptions simply because they involve,

among other things, inheritance from a

third party passing through the adoptive

parent. Adoptees assert that the adoption

is valid because they complied with every

requirement of the New Jersey adult

adoption statute, N.J.S.A. 2A:22-1 et seq.,

and that Maryland law explicitly states that

adult adoptees will be considered “issue”

entitled to the same rights as natural

children in matters governing the

disposition of a trust. See Evans v.

McCoy, 436 A.2d 436 (Md. 1981).

As noted above, once the District

Court resolved its temporary restraining

order, the Adoptees filed the Maryland

case seeking distribution of their interest in

the Trust funds, and the New Jersey case

seeking declaratory relief to establish the

validity of the adoption. These pending

state court claims form the basis for the

Adoptees’ request for abstention.

The Adoptees rely on two different

lines of cases to support their request for

abstention. First, under Railroad Comm’n

of Texas v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496

(1941) and its progeny, the Supreme Court

acknowledged that the federal courts may

exercise their “wise discretion” to abstain

from a case if a parallel state suit may

resolve the federal question. 312 U.S. at

501. Subsequent cases refined the

Pullman abstention doctrine, warning that

abstention is only appropriate in

“exceptional circumstances.” Moses H.

Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr.,

460 U.S. 1, 14 (1983) (citing Colorado

River Water Conservation Dist. v. United

States, 424 U.S. 800, 813 (1976)). The

appropriateness of abstention should be

reached by balancing factors such as

“inconvenience of the federal forum; the

desirability of avoiding piecemeal

litigation; and the order in which

jurisdiction was obtained by the concurrent

forums.” Moses H. Cone, 460 U.S. at 15

(citation omitted). Yet, none of these

factors will be determinative, and the

balance is “heavily weighted in favor of

the exercise of jurisdiction.” Id. at 16

(citation omitted). 

 

9

See Matter of Duke, 305 N.J. Super.

408, 702 A.2d 1008 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch.

Div. 1995); Matter of the Action of M

for the Adoption of P, an Adult, 193 N.J.

Super. 33, 471 A.2d 1220 (N.J. Super. 

Ct. Law Div. 1983); Matter of Nicol’s

Estate, 152 N.J. Super. 303, 377 A.2d

1201 (N. J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1977);

Matter of Griswold’s Estate , 140 N.J.

Super. 35, 354 A.2d 717 (Morris County

Ct. 1976); In re Comly’s Estate, 90 N.J.

Super. 498, 218 A.2d 175 (Gloucester

County Ct. 1966). 
9

The Supreme Co urt also

acknowledged that “[g]enerally, as

between state and federal courts, the rule is

that ‘the pendency of an action in the state

court is no bar to proceedings concerning

the same matter in the Federal court

having jurisdiction . . . .’” Colorado River,

424 U.S. at 817 (citing McClellan v.

Carland, 217 U.S. 268, 282 (1910)). In

fact, when a judgment sought is strictly in

personam, both state and federal courts

with concurrent jurisdiction may proceed

until judgment is obtained in one of them.

Princess Lida, 305 U.S. at 465-466.

See also In re Diet Drugs, 282 F.3d 220,

234 (3d Cir. 2002) (explaining that parallel

in personam actions may proceed in

federal and state courts, with principles of

res judicata resolving the effect of a

judgment in one court upon the other). 

Under these circumstances, we do

not believe that this case requires

application of Pullman abstention. First,

deferring the state law issues to the state

courts would not likely resolve the federal

constitutional question presented. Second,

we see no issues in these state law claims

that create the “exceptional circumstances”

required for Pullman abstention.

However, Adoptees also argue for

abstention under an alternate theory.

Despite the strong antipathy to abstention,

the Supreme Court acknowledged a

specific situation that allows federal courts

greater deference in deciding whether

abstention is appropriate. In Brillhart v.

Excess Ins. Co. of America, 316 U.S. 491,

494-95 (1942), the Court held that when a

federal suit is brought under the Federal

Declaratory Judgments Act, 28 U.S.C.

§ 400, presenting only questions of local

laws, the court is under “no compulsion to

exercise [] jurisdiction” if a parallel state

court proceeding would address the

matters in controversy between the parties.

In Wilton v. Seven Falls, 515 U.S. 277

(1995), the Court reaffirmed the district

courts’ broad discretion for abstention

when entertaining claims for declaratory

judgment. “Since its inception, the

Declaratory Judgment Act has been

understood to confer on federal courts

unique and substantial discretion in

deciding whether to declare the rights of

litigants.” Id. at 286. Thus, courts are

permitted to avoid gratuitous interference

with state court matters by abstaining from

claims for declaratory judgment,

specifically if the state court proceedings

would address “the same issues, not

governed by federal law, between the same

parties.” Wilton, 515 U.S. at 282 (citing

Brillhart, 316 U.S. at 495).

Therefore, if the federal court

believes that the state law questions in

controversy between the parties are better

suited for resolution in state court, then the

federal court may properly abstain from

deciding a declaratory judgment claim. Id.

Although the Adoptees informed this

Court of their pending claims in Maryland

and New Jersey, those complaints are not

in the record before us. Without reviewing

the complaints, we cannot verify whether

those state claims will adequately address

all of the issues presented in this case.

Thus, we will remand this issue for further

consideration by the District Court and

application of the Brillhart abstention
10

doctrine should the District Court then

deem such action appropriate.

III.

The second count in the Appellants’

complaint alleges that the New Jersey

adult adoption statute, N.J.S.A. 2A:22-1, et

seq., is invalid under the Fourteenth

Amendment of the U.S. Constitution and

the New Jersey State Constitution because

it “does not provide for notice to persons

or entities interested in or whose interests

may be affected by the adoption.”

Because this claim, on its face, appears to

be a facial challenge to the New Jersey

adult adoption statute, this Court noted that

Fed. R. Civ. P. 24(c) requires that the

District Court notify the state attorney

general of the claim, providing the state an

opportunity to intervene to defend the

statute. Although Rule 24(c) places the

responsibility on the court to provide

notice to the state, it also warns that the

party challenging the statute “should” call

the matter to the attention of the court. In

this case, the record does not indicate any

acknowledgment from the District Court

or the Appellants of its Rule 24(c) duty.

We requested that the parties address the

consequences of the failure to comply with

Rule 24(c). The Appellants explained that

their claim was not actually a facial

challenge to the statute, but rather a

challenge to the statute as applied in these

circumstances. Because this is an appeal

of a dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6), we will

accept the Appellants’ customizing of their

claim, despite the otherwise clear language

in the complaint. Therefore, we will not

take any action with respect to a potential

failure to follow Rule 24(c), we will treat

the claim as a challenge to the statute as

applied, and turn to the merits of the

dismissal. 

Appellants’ preface their ability to

collaterally attack the adoption decree on

the Restatement (Second) of Judgments §

31(2) (1982). That section states that:

[a] judgment in an action whose purpose is

to determine or change a person’s status is

conclusive with respect to that status upon

all other persons, with the following

qualifications: 

(a) If a person has, under applicable law,

an interest in such status such that he is

entitled to contest its existence, the

judgment is not conclusive upon him

unless he was afforded an opportunity to

be a party to the actions.

Comment (f) to the Restatement §

31(2) further explains that: 

[r]ules governing proceedings to

adjudicate status often designate those who

must be made parties to, or given notice

of, the proceedings. . . . In some instances,

a legal interest in the status sufficient to

confer that authority has been found to

exist as a matter of Constitutional law.

Beyond this, applicable statutory and

decisional law determines the persons who

have such an interest.
11

Although the New Jersey courts

have not explored this topic, the District

Court correctly found that the New Jersey

adult adoption statute on its face only

requires that consent, and therefore notice,

of an adult adoption proceeding be given

to the spouse of the adopting parent.

N.J.S.A. 2A:22-1. There is no statutory

requirement for notice to third parties.

Therefore, the Appellants must show that

their protected interest in the adoption

proceeding is derived from either the

federal or state constitutions.

The District Court dismissed the

Appellants’ due process claim on two

grounds. First, the Court explained that

none of the case law cited by the

Appellants supported their claim that, as a

party whose monetary interest in the Trust

could be tangentially affected by the

adoption, they were entitled to notice of

the adoption proceeding. Second, the

Court stated that the disposition of the

Trust itself would provide the Appellants

with an opportunity to defend their

interests, thereby satisfying due process. 

A constitutional analysis begins

with a presumption that a statute or its

application is constitutional, and the

challenger bears the burden of proving that

a statute is unconstitutional. See I.N.S. v.

Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 944 (1983).

However, we are not persuaded that a

party’s failure to cite sufficient supporting

case law is an adequate ground for

dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6); it is

possible that a party could raise a scenario

not yet recognized in prior case law. A

court should only grant a motion to dismiss

if it is convinced that the plaintiff can

prove no set of facts warranting relief.

Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46

(1957). On the other hand, the District

Court’s second ground for dismissal,

finding that the Appellants’ due process

rights would be satisfied by their ability to

defend their rights in the Trust

proceedings, strikes closer to the target.

We turn now to a more complete analysis

of this issue.

At the outset, we note that due

process is a flexible doctrine, requiring

procedures as the situation demands and

dependent upon the circumstances.

Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481

(1972); see Marincas v. Lewis, 92 F.3d

195, 203 (3d Cir. 1996). Any challenge to

a state law, or the application of the law,

on due process grounds begins with two

inquiries: (1) “whether the State has

deprived the claimant of a protected

property interest,” and (2) “whether the

State’s procedures comport with due

process.” Lujan v. G & G Fire Sprinklers,

Inc., 532 U.S. 189, 195 (2001). Appellants

argue that they have a legitimate property

interest in Maria’s one tenth share of the

Trust because the Trust specifically states

that if Maria died without issue, her share

would be divided among them as the

remaining beneficiaries. However,

assuming arguendo the Appellants’

assertion of a property interest in Maria’s

one tenth share of the Trust,10 we do not

 

10 As will be discussed below, the

Appellants had no property interest in

Maria Fenton’s share of the Trust at the
12

believe that the State’s action in granting

the adoptions actually worked to deprive

the claimants of a property interest.

To support their argument, the

Appellants cite to a line of Supreme Court

cases acknowledging that natural fathers

have a due process right to notice of

adoption proceedings if those proceedings

would extinguish their parental rights. See

Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 550

(1965) (recognizing a natural father’s

liberty interest in a parental relationship

and requiring notice of an adoption to

satisfy the father’s due process rights);

Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 264

(1983) (holding that a state may satisfy due

process through a putative father’s

registry, which places the father’s right to

notice within his control). Appellants

would have this Court interpret these cases

to establish a rule that parties whose

economic interest may be affected by an

adoption are entitled to either notice of the

proceeding or an alternative mechanism to

assert their right to notice. Yet, these

cases are distinguished from the scenario

before us because in both Armstrong and

Lehr, the adoption proceeding itself

extinguished the natural fathers’ liberty

interest in their parental status. In this

case, the New Jersey adoption proceeding

did not purport to or actually determine the

Appellants’ interest in the Trust. Rather,

the adoption proceeding simply created a

parental relationship between Maria and

her second cousin adoptees. What, if any,

effect the adoption had on the interests in

the Trust of the other beneficiaries was a

matter for the trustees and the Maryland

courts. 

“The fundamental requirement of

due process is the opportunity to be heard

‘at a meaningful time and in a meaningful

manner.’" Matthews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S.

319, 333 (1976) (quoting Armstrong v.

Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 552 (1965)). The

Appellants’ claim of a property interest in

Maria’s one-tenth share of the Trust will

be determined by the trustees, based on

their interpretation of the requirements

specified in the Trust itself, or by a court

deciding the issue under Maryland law.

The New Jersey court, by granting the

adoptions, exercised no jurisdiction or

authority over any property interest in the

Trust. Therefore, the “meaningful time”

for the Appellants to be heard will occur

when either the District Court on remand

elects to address the state law claim under

diversity jurisdiction, or abstains, leaving

the issue to the Maryland state court.

The Supreme Court’s recent

opinion in Lujan v. G & G Fire Sprinklers,

Inc., 532 U.S. 189 (2001) further supports

our conclusion that the Appellants did not

have a due process right to notice in this

case. In Lujan, a California agency, acting

under state law, withheld payments to a

construction contractor because the agency

alleged that the contractor had violated

state minimum wage laws. 532 U.S. at

191. The contractor complained that the

withholding violated its due process rights

because the state did not provide notice or

time of the adoptions, but only an interest

in a potential claim if certain conditions

were met at the time of Maria’s death.
13

a hearing before withholding the

payments. The Court explained that the

state’s actions did not deprive the

contractor of any property over which it

could exercise present ownership

dominion; the contractors’ interest was

limited to a future claim for payment under

a contract with the state. Id. at 196.

Therefore, the Court held that “if

California makes ordinary judicial process

available to respondent for resolving its

contractual dispute, that process is due

process.” Id. at 197. 

Applying the Lujan holding to the

case at bar, it is clear that the Appellants’

potential claim to Maria’s interest in the

Trust at the time of the adoption was not

based on present ownership dominion.

The potential claim to Maria’s share of the

Trust remained to be determined by the

trustees or the Maryland courts. We hold,

therefore, that the Appellants, as third

parties, had no due process right to notice

of the New Jersey adoption proceedings.

The Appellants’ ability to pursue their

claim in the appropriate state court at the

time of the Trust disposition provides all

the process that is due them under the

Fourteenth Amendment of the United

States Constitution. 

The New Jersey Supreme Court has

noted that Article 1, paragraph 1 of the

New Jersey Constitution encompasses the

same due process rights guaranteed under

the Federal Constitution. Montville Tp. v.

Block 69, Lot 10, 376 A.2d 909, 917 (N.J.

1977). Although the New Jersey Supreme

Court has interpreted the state constitution

in a few areas to provide greater rights

than the federal constitution, it has never

announced such a position that would

encompass the due process rights to notice

of the adoption requested by the

Appellants in this case. See, e.g., State v.

Johnson, 346 A.2d 66 (N.J. 1975)

(announcing state constitutional rights in

the context of search and seizure);

Burlington County N.A.A.C.P. v. Twp. of

Mount Laurel, 336 A.2d 713 (N.J. 1975)

(announcing state constitutional rights in

the context of zoning). Therefore, we

believe that the New Jersey Supreme Court

would reach the same conclusion under the

New Jersey Constitution as we have

reached under the federal constitutional

analysis. Accordingly, the District Court’s

dismissal of the due process claim will be

affirmed.11

 

11 The Adoptees raise two alternate

arguments to support their position. 

First, they assert that when Maria’s

attorney informed the trustees in 1990 of

her intention to adopt her cousins and

sought an opinion on whether the

adoption would entitle her adopted

children to inherit from the Trust, she

provided constructive notice to the

beneficiaries satisfying any due process

requirements. Second, the Adoptees

argue that laches bars this suit, given that

the Appellants learned of the adoption in

1991 but waited to challenge the

adoption until after Maria’s death. 

Because we hold that the Appellants did

not have a due process right to notice of

the adoption proceeding, we need not

reach these issues.
14

IV.

Because we hold that the District

Court erred in its finding of no jurisdiction

to hear the Appellants’ claims based on

state law grounds, we will vacate the

dismissal of those claims. However,

because the Appellants seek declaratory

judgment on state law claims which seem

to address the same state law issues

currently pending in state court, abstention

on these claims may be appropriate under

Brillhart. This case will be remanded to

the District Court with directions to vacate

its orders to dismiss, review the state law

claims, and determine whether in the

exercise of its discretion, it will abstain. In

the event that the District Court does not

abstain, it should decide the germane state

law claims. Finally, the District Court’s

order granting defendants’ motion to

dismiss the Appellants’ due process claim

is hereby affirmed. Each side to bear its

own costs.