FI LED U.S. COURT OF APPEALS ELEV ENT H CI RCUI T MAY 1 7, 20 12
J OHN LEY CLERK [PUBLIS H]

IN THE UN ITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE ELE VENTH CIRCUIT

__ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __
No. 1 1- 10 55 2

__ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ Age nc y No. A0 95 -6 54 -3 62

HAMELT RODOLFO BEDOY A-MELENDEZ, a.k .a. Ham el t Ro do lfo Bed oya, a.k .a. Ham el t Be do y a,

Pet it io ne r,

ve rs us

U. S. ATT ORNEY GENE RAL,

Res po nd en t.

__ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __
Pet it io n fo r Rev ie w of a Deci si on of t he Bo ard of I m

m ig rat io n Ap pe al s

__ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ (Ma y 17 , 20 12 )

Befo re MAR CUS, COX, an d S ILER, Cir cu it Ju dg es

. *

COX, Cir cu it Ju dg e:

Honora ble Eug ene E. Siler, J r., United States Circuit J udg e for the Six th Circuit, sitti ng by * desig nation.Ham el t Ro do lfo Bed oya-Mel en de z se ek s rev ie w of th e de ci si on of th e Bo ard

of Im m ig rat io n App eal s th at he is no t el ig ib le fo r sp eci al ru le can cel la ti on of rem ov al

un de r § 24 0A of th e Im m ig rat io n a n d Nati on al it y Act (co di fie d at 8 U.S.C.

§ 12 29 b( b) (2 )). The Bo ard de ni ed Bed oya-Mel en de z’s pe ti ti on be cau se he fai le d to

sh ow th at he was “ ba tt ered or su bjec te d to ex tre m e cru el ty” by hi s Am eri can ci ti zen

sp ou se

. W e co nc lu de th at th e Bo ard ha s di sc ret io n to m ak e th is de te rm in at io n, an d

th eref or e we la ck juri sd ic ti on to rev ie w th e Bo ard ’s de ci si on th at Bed oya-Mel en de z

is no t a b at te red sp ou se

.

I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

The un de rlyin g fact s are la rg el y irr el ev an t to th is ap pe al

. W e st at e th em br ie fly

to pr ov id e co nt ex t fo r th is op in io n. Bed oya-Mel en de z, a Peru vi an ci ti zen , en te red th e

Uni te d St at es in 20 03 as a no ni m m ig ran t vi si to r. In 20 04 , h e m arri ed an Am eri can

ci ti zen , Nan cy Pi ne do

. A week la te r, sh e as ke d th e Uni te d St at es Ci t i z e n s h i p an d

Im m ig rat io n Serv ic e to ad

jus t Bed oya-Mel en de z’s im m ig rat io n st at us

. Bu t, whe n th e

ho ne y m oo n en de d, th e m arri ag e qu ic kl y so ur ed

. Bed oya

- M e l e nd ez al le ge s th at

Nan cy be ga n sl ap pi ng hi m whe n sh e be cam e up se t. And
, he al le ge s sh e al so fal se ly

le d hi m to be li ev e h e h a d H I V

. Less th an si x m on th s aft er th ey m arri ed
, Bed oyaMel en de z an d Nan cy se pa rat ed
, an d ev en tu al ly di vo rced

. Bed oya-Mel en de z al le ge s

th at Nan cy a n d h er fat he r th en br ou gh t se ve ral fri vo lo us la wsu it s ag ai ns t hi m

.

2M e a nwh il e, th e Ci ti zen sh ip an d Im m ig rat io n Serv ic e de cl in ed to ad jus t

Bed oya-Mel en de z’s im m ig rat io n st at us , a nd th e Dep art m en t of Hom el an d Secu rit y

so ug ht to rem ov e hi m

. At a he ari ng in la te 20 04
, Bed oya-Mel en de z ad m it te d th at he

was rem ov ab le , bu t p et it io ne d fo r as y lu m . He lat er wi th dr ew th at pe ti ti on

.

In 20 07
, Bed oya-Mel en de z fil ed a pe ti t i o n fo r sp eci al ru le can cel la ti on of

rem ov al
, c l a i ming th at he was a ba tt ered sp ou se un de r 8 U.S.C. § 12 29 b( b) (2 ). To

es ta bl is h h is eli gi bi li ty for t hi s re li ef, Bed oya-Mel en de z h ad to sh ow fi ve th in gs :
(i) (I) [h e ha d] be en ba tt ered or su bjec te d to ex tre m e cru el t y b y a sp ou se

. . . who is or wa s a Un it ed Sta te s ci ti zen . . .;

. . . (ii ) [h e h a d] be en ph y si cal ly pr es en t in th e Uni te d St at es fo r a

c o n t i nu ou s pe rio d of no t le ss th an 3 y ears im m ed ia te ly pr eced in g t h e da te of [ hi s] app li cat io n, . . .;
(ii i) [h e ha d] be en a pe rs on of go od m or al ch arac te r du rin g su ch
pe rio d . . .;

(iv ) [h e] is no t in ad m is si bl e [fo r cert ai n reas on s no t a p p l i c ab le to th is

cas e]; an d

(v ) th e rem ov al wou ld res ul t i n e xt rem e h ard sh ip to [hi m ]

. . . .

8 U.S.C. § 12 29 b( b) (2 )(A). Thi s ap pe al co nc ern s on ly th e fir st el em en t (h erea fte r th e

“ ba tt ered -s po us e de te rm in at io n ”). Befo re th e im m ig rat io n jud ge , Bed oya-Mel en de z

te st ifi ed ab ou t Nan cy ’s b e h a v i or

. The im m ig rat io n jud ge co nc lu de d th at Nan cy ’s

3act io ns di d no t m ak e Bed oya-Mel en de z a ba tt ered sp ou se un de r § 12 29 b( b) (2 ). His

pe ti ti on was de ni ed fo r th at reas on

. Bed oya-Mel en de z ap pe al ed to th e Bo ard
, bu t it

al so de ni ed hi s pe ti ti on , is su in g it s own de ci si on

. Bed oya-Mel en de z th en pe ti ti on ed

th is co ur t t o re vi ew th e Bo ard ’s dec is io n. 1

II. ISSUES ON APPEAL

Thi s app eal pr es en ts two is su es : (1) do es th e Bo ard ha ve di sc ret io n to de ci de

if an al ie n is a ba tt ered sp ou se un de r § 12 29 b( b) (2 ); an d (2 ) if th e an swe r to th e fir st

is su e is no , is Bed oya-Mel en de z a b at te red sp ou se un de r § 1 22 9b (b )(2 )?

III. CONTENTIONS OF THE PARTIES

It is un di sp ut ed th at we la ck ju r i s d ic ti on to rev ie w th e Bo ard ’s di sc ret io na ry

de ci si on s un de r § 12 29 b. Se e 8 U.S.C. § 12 52 (a)( 2) (B); Mar ti ne z v. U.S. Att ’y Gen

. ,

44 6 F.3 d 12 19
, 12 22 (1 1t h Ci r. 20 0 6)

. Bu t, it is al so un di sp ut ed th at we ha ve
juri sd ic ti on to rev ie w co ns ti tu ti on al cl ai m s an d qu es ti on s of l a w ari si ng un de r th at

pr ov is io n. Se e 8 U.S.C. § 12 52 (a) ( 2 )(D); Jea n- Pier re v. U.S. Att ’y Gen

. , 50 0 F.3 d

13 15
, 13 22 (1 1t h Ci r. 20 07 ). Bec au se § 12 52 (a)( 2) (B) & ( D) im po se st at ut or y

The i m m i g ration j udg e also conclude d that Be doy a-Me lendez had failed to show that he 1 would suffe r extreme hardship i f re m o v ed

. But the Boa rd did not consider this portion of the immigra tion judg e’s decision. I t ba sed its de nial solely on Be doy a-Me lendez’s fa ilure to meet the battere d-spouse require ment. “When the [Board] issues a decision, we revie w only that decision.” Lopez v. U.S. Att’y Gen.
, 504 F.3d 1341, 1344 (11th Cir. 2007). Be cause the Boa rd did not consider Be doy a-Me lendez’s failure to satisfy the extreme hardship require ment, that issue is not befor e us.

4co nd it io ns on ou r juri sd ic ti on , we m us t fir st de te r mine if th os e co nd it io ns are m et

.

Se e Bah ar

v. Ash cr of

t , 26 4 F .3d 13 09 , 13 11 (11 th Cir . 20 01 ).

Thi s co ur t ha s no t y et co ns id ered whe th er th e ba tt ered -s po u s e d et erm in at io n

un de r § 12 29 b( b) (2 ) is a q ue st io n of la w or a di sc ret io na ry de ci si on

. Bed oyaMel en de z co nt en ds th at it is a qu es ti on of la w. He rel ie s pr im ari ly on a Nin th Ci rcu it

cas e, Her na nd ez v. Ash cr of t , 34 5 F.3 d 82 4 (9 th Ci r. 20 03 ), whi ch he ld th at th e ph ras e

“ h a s b een ba tt ered or su bjec te d to ex tre m e cru el ty” es ta bl is he s an ob jecti ve le ga l

st an da rd to gu id e th e b at te red -s po us e d et erm in at io n u nd er § 12 29 b( b) (2 ).

The Att or ne y Gen eral co u nt ers th at fiv e ot he r ci rcu it s ha ve reac he d th e

op po si te co nc lu si on

. The se ci rcu it s reas o n e d t h a t th e ph ras e “ ha s be en ba tt ered or

su bjec te d to ex tre m e cru el ty” is no t se lf- ex pl an at or y an d th at reas on ab le m in ds co ul d

di ffer as to it s m ean in g. And
, be cau se Co ng res s di d no t de fin e th is ph ras e, it in te nd ed

to gr an t th e Att or ne y Gen eral di sc ret io n to m ak e th is de ci si on

. The se ci rcu it s al so

co nc lu de d th at 8 C.F.R. § 20 4.2 (c)( 1) (v i), whi ch in te rp ret s al m os t id en ti cal la ng ua ge

in a di ffer en t pr ov is io n of th e Im m ig rat io n an d Nati on al it y Act, do es no t es ta bl is h an

ob jecti ve le ga l st an da rd fo r th e ba tt ered -s po us e de te rm in at io n

. Fo r th e reas on s st at ed

be lo w, we agr ee wi th th e Att or ne y Gene ral an d t he m ajor it y of o ur si st er ci rcu it s.

5IV. DISCUSSI ON

O ur juri sd ic ti on ov er Bed oya-Mel en de z’s pe ti ti on tu rn s on whe th er t h e

ba tt ered -s po us e de te rm in at io n is a qu es ti on of la w or a d i s c r e t io na ry de ci si on

. A

q u e s ti on of la w in vo lv es “ th e ap pl ic at io n of an un di sp ut ed fact pa tt ern to a le ga l

st an da r d

. ” J

e a n

- Pier re , 50 0 F.3 d at 13 22

. Fo r ex am pl e, un de r § 12 29 b( b) (2 ), an

al ie n m us t be co nt in uo us ly pr es en t in th e Uni te d St at es fo r th ree y ears be fo re he can

fil e a pe ti ti on fo r can cel la ti on of rem ov al

. 8 U.S.C. § 12 29 b( b) (2 )(A)(i i). Co ng res s

de fin ed “ co nt in uo us ph y si cal pr es en ce” in § 12 29 b( b) (2 )(B)

. A co ur t ne ed on ly ap pl y

th is de fin it io n to th e un di sp ut ed fact s to de te rm in e if th is st at ut or y req ui rem en t is m et

.

Se e Na jj ar v. Ash cr of

t , 25 7 F.3d 12 62
, 12 98 (1 1t h Ci r. 20 01 ) (“ Eit he r th e pe ti ti on er

ha s be en co nt in uo us ly pr es en t in th e Uni te d St at es fo r [th ree] y ears or th e pe ti ti on er

ha s n ot .”) (q uo ti ng Ka la w v. INS , 13 3 F .3d 11 47 , 11 51 (9t h C ir. 1 99 7) ).

A di sc ret io na ry de ci si on , on th e ot he r ha nd
, req ui res an ad jud ic at or to m ak e a
jud gm en t call

. Fo r ex am pl e, un de r § 1 22 9b (b )(2 ), an ali en m us t sh ow th at rem ov al

w i l l “ res ul t in ex tre m e ha rd sh ip to [h im se lf].” § 12 29 b( b) (2 )(A)(v ). In Na jj ar v.

Ash cr of t , we ex am in ed a pr ev io us ve rs io n of § 12 29 b, whi ch al so co nt ai ne d th e
ph ras e “ ex tre m e ha rd sh ip .” 25 7 F.3 d at 12 98

. W e he ld th at th e Att or ne y Gen eral ha s

di sc ret io n to de te rm in e whe n an al ie n wil l face an “ ex tre m e ha rd sh ip ” up on rem ov al

.

Se e id

. at 12 97 ; se e al

so Gon za le

z- Oro pe za v. U.S. Att ’y Gen

. , 32 1 F.3 d 13 31
, 13 32

-

633 (1 1t h Ci r. 20 03 ) (h ol di ng th at th e ph ras e “ex c ep ti on al an d ex tre m el y un us ua l

ha rd sh ip ” in § 12 29 b( b) (1 ) gr an ts th e Att or ne y Gene ral di sc ret io n) . We b as ed ou r

ho ld in g, in pa rt, on th e Su pr em e Co ur t’s de ci si on in INS v. Jo ng Ha W an g , 45 0 U.S.

13 9, 10 1 S. Ct

. 10 27 (1 98 1)

. In W an g , th e Su pr em e Co ur t ex pl ai ne d th at th e ph ras e

“ ex tre m e ha rd sh ip ” is “ no t sel f-ex pl an at or y , an d reas on ab le m en co ul d eas il y di ffer

as to [it s] co ns tru ct io n.” Id

. at 14 4, 10 1 S

. C t

. at 10 31

. The Co ur t co nc lu de d th at

Co ng res s ha d ve st ed th e Att or ne y Gen eral wit h di sc ret io n to in te rp ret th e p h r as e

“ ex tre m e ha rd sh ip .” Se e id

. And
, th e Co ur t refu se d to su bs ti tu te it s jud gm en t fo r th at

of th e Att or ne y Gen eral

. Se e id

. ; se e al so W il mor e v. Gon z a l e s , 4 55 F.3 d 52 4, 52 7

(5 th Ci r. 20 06 ) (ci ti ng W an g fo r t h e p r o po si ti on th at a st at ut or y te rm co nf ers

di sc ret io n o n th e Att or ne y Gene ral when it is “ no t s el f-ex pl an at or y , and reas on ab le

m en co ul d e as il y

di ffer as t o [i ts ] co ns tru ct io n” ).

Oth er ci rcu it s ha ve ch arac te riz ed a di sc ret io na ry de ci si on as l ack in g an

“ al go rit hm ” or “ fo rm

ul a” on whi ch a co ur t can ba se it s rev ie w. Se e Pera le s- Cu mpe an

v. Gon za le

z , 42 9 F.3 d 97 7, 98 2 (1 0t h Ci r. 20 05 ) (“ Deci si on s th at in vo lv e a ‘j ud gm en t

cal l’ by th e ag en cy , or fo r whi ch th ere is ‘no al go rit hm ’ on w h i c h r e v i e w m ay be

b a s e d, are co ns id ered di sc ret io na ry

. . . .”); Ros ar io v. Hol de r , 62 7 F.3 d 58
, 62 (2 d

Ci r. 20 10 ) (“ W e as k whe th er th e BIA is ex pr es si ng le ga l d o c t r in e or whe th er it is

en ga ge d in th e fact fin di ng an d fact or -b al an ci ng th at are at th e co re of it s di sc ret io n.” )

7S e c t i o n 12 29 b( b) (2 )’s req ui rem en t th at an al ie n be “ ba tt ered or su bjec te d to

ex tre m e cru el ty” do es no t es ta bl is h an ob jecti ve le ga l st an da rd on whi ch a co ur t can

ba se it s re vi ew. The wo rd “ ba tt ered ” an d t he cla us e “ su bjec te d t o ex tre m e cru el ty”

are no t se lf- ex pl an at or y an d reas on ab le m in ds co ul d di ffer as to th ei r m ean in g in th is

pr ov is io n. Thu s, we ho ld th at th e ba tt ered -s po us e de te rm in at io n un de r § 12 29 b( b) (2 )

is a di sc ret io na ry de ci si on res erv ed to th e Att or ne y Gen eral

. Se e W an g , 45 0 U.S. at

14 4, 10 1 S. Ct

. at 10 31

. W e co ns id er th e m ean in g of th e wor d “ ba tt ered ” a n d th e

cl au se “ su bjec te d t o e xt rem e cru el ty” in tu rn

.

W e fir s t t u r n t o th e di ct io na ry de fin it io n of th e ve rb “ ba tt er.” The Oxf or d

Eng li sh Dict io na ry de fin es “ ba tt er” as “ t o b e a t co nt in uo us ly an d vi ol en tl y so as to

br ui se or sh at te r.” Oxf

or d Eng li sh Dict io na ry 10 05 (2 d ed
., 19 89 ). W eb st er’s Thi rd

New In te rn at io na l Dict io na ry pr ov id es a si m il ar de fin it io n: “ to be at wit h su cces si ve

bl ows : be at rep eat ed ly an d vi ol en tl y so as to br ui se , sh at te r, or de m ol is h.” W eb st er’s

Thi rd New In te rn at io na l Dict io na ry 1 8 7 ( 2 0 02 ). Fi na ll y , th e Am eri can Heri ta ge

Dict io na ry de fin es “ ba tt er” as “ to hi t he av il y an d rep eat ed ly w i t h vi ol en t bl ows .”

Am eri can Heri ta ge Dict io na ry 15 2 (5t h ed., 201 1)

. W hi le th es e de fin it io ns su gg es t

so m e bo un da rie s fo r th e wor d “ ba tt er ed ” in § 12 29 b( b) (2 ), th ey do no t es ta bl is h an

ob jecti ve le ga l st an da rd

. The wor ds “ co nt in uo us ly,” “ su cces si ve ,” an d “ rep eat ed ly”

are am bi gu ou s in th is co nt ex t. The se wor ds do no t te ll us ho w m an y bl ows an al ie n

8m

us t en du re be fo re on e be co m es a ba tt ered sp ou se

. N o r do th es e di ct io na ry

de fin it io ns cl earl y de fin e th e fo rce th es e bl ows m us t exer t. Thu s, reas on ab le m in ds

co ul d d iff er as to what an ali en m

us t en du re b efo re h e h as be en “ ba tt ered .”

Si m il arl y , th e cl au se “ su bjec te d to ex tre m e c ru el ty” do es no t pr es en t an

ob jecti ve le ga l st an da rd

. W eb st er’s Thi rd New In te rn at io na l Dict io na ry de fin es

“ cru el ty” as “ th e qu al it y or st at e of be in g cru el ,” whi ch m ean s “ di sp os ed to in fli ct

pa in

. . . .” W eb st er’s Thi rd New In te rn at io na l D i c t i o n a r y 54 6 (2 00 2)

. W eb st er’s

di ct io na ry al so in cl ud es a de fin it io n o f c ru el ty sp eci fic al ly ap pl ic ab le to do m es ti c

rel at io ns hi ps : “ co nd uc t of ei th er pa rty i n a di vo rce act io n th a t e n d an ge rs th e li fe or

he al th of th e ot he r.” Id

. The se de fin it io ns dr aw no br ig ht li ne s. Rea so na bl e m in ds

co ul d eas il y di ffer as to wha t co nd uc t sh ows a di sp os it io n “ to in fli ct pa in ” an d wha t

co nd uc t “ en da ng ers [a sp ou se ’s] li fe or he al th .” Mo reo ve r, a s o t h e r ci rcu it s ha ve

sa id
, th e ad

jecti ve “ ex tre m e” req ui res th e Att or ne y Gen eral to m ak e a jud gm en t cal l

ab ou t “ whe th e r t he cru el co nd uc t al le ge d is su ffi ci en tl y ex tre m e to im pl ic at e th e

pu rp os es of th e st at ut e.” Pera le s- Cu mpe an , 42 9 F.3 d at 98 2; se e W il mor e , 45 5 F.3 d

at 52 8 (c it in g Pera le s- Cu mpe an ).

The co nt ex t in whi ch Co ng res s ad op te d th e or ig in al ve rs io n of § 12 29 b( b) (2 )

r e in fo rces ou r co nc lu si on th at th is pr ov is io n do es no t es ta bl is h an ob jecti v e l e g a l

s t a n da rd

. Co ng res s en act ed th e or ig in al ve rs io n of § 12 29 b( b) (2 ) as pa rt of th e

9Vio le nc e Aga in st W om en Act of 19 94

. Se e Pu b. L. No. 10 4- 32 2 § 40 70 3, 10 8 St at

.

17 96
, 19 55 (1 99 4)

. Thi s Act so ug ht to ad dr es s ge nd er-m ot iv at ed vi ol en ce, in cl ud in g

do m es ti c vi ol en ce. Bec au se Co ng res s ad op t e d § 12 29 b( b) (2 ) in th is co nt ex t, th e

w or d “ ba tt ered ” an d th e cl au se “ su bjec te d to ex tre m e cru el ty” arg ua bl y refe r t o

do m es ti c vi ol en ce. Bu t, th a t c o n c l u s i on do es no t ge t us ve ry far be cau se do m es ti c

vi ol en ce do es no t ha ve a rig id de fin it io n

. Nor can we di sc ern fro m th e te xt of 2

§ 12 29 b( b) (2 ) in wha t m an ne r an d to wha t de gr ee th e wor d “ ba tt ered ” an d th e cl au se

“ su bjec te d t o e xt rem e cru el ty” rela te to do m es ti c v io le nc e. 3

I n 2006, Congr ess added § 40002 (codifie d at 42 U.S.C. § 13925) to the Violence Ag ainst 2
Women Act. Violence Ag ainst Women and Department of J ustice Reauthorization Act of 2005, Pub. L

. No. 109-162, § 3, 119 Stat. 2960, 2965 (2006). This pr ovision purpor ted to de fine sever al
terms used throug hout the Violence Ag ainst Women Act. Id. at 2964. Section 13925(a) (6) provides that:

The term “domestic violence” includes felony or misdemeanor crimes of violence committed by

a cur rent or former spouse of the victim, by a per son with whom the victim share s a child in common, by a person wh o is cohabitating with or has cohabitate d with the victim as a spouse, by a person simil arly situated to a spouse of
t h e victim under the domestic or family violence laws of t he jurisdi ction rec eivi n g g rant monies, or b y an y o ther person ag ainst an adult or y outh victim who is protec ted from that person’ s acts under the domestic or f amily violence laws of the jurisdiction.

42 U.S.C. § 13925(a) (6). This subsection does not define “domestic violence.” I t mere ly say s that this term “includes” cer

tain “cr imes of violence.” Id

. This subsection does n o t l i mit the term “domes t i c violence” to such crimes. I nstead, it leave s open the possibili ty that this term also includes other a

busive ac ts which are not “fe lony or misdemeanor

crimes of violence.”

Whil e we do not think the word “batter ed” in § 1229b(b)( 2) has an objective definition, we 3

can sa y what that word does not me an. “B attere d” does not r efe r to c ommon-law batter y

. But see Hernande z v. Ashcroft
, 345 F.3d 8 2 4 (9 t h Cir. 2003). At common law, an “unwe lcome kiss or

car ess” wa s a batter

y . Br y an A. Ga

rner , A Dictionar

y of Moder n L eg al Usag e 100 (2d e d., 1995).

10Bu t we do no t en d ou r an al y si s wit h th e te xt of § 12 29 b. Bo th th e Secr et ary of

Hom el an d Secu rit y an d th e A t to rn ey Gen eral ha ve au th or it y to craf t reg ul at io ns

in te rp ret in g th e Im

m ig rat io n an d Nati on al it y Act. Se e 8 U.S.C. § 11 03

. The se

r e gu la ti on s co ul d li m it th e Att or ne y Gen eral ’s di sc ret io n in way s th at m ak e th e

ba tte re d- sp ou se de te rm in at io n effe ct iv el y no nd is cret io na ry

. Cf

. Ca de t v. Bul

ge r , 377

F.3 d 1 17 3, 1 18 0– 81 (11 th Cir . 20 04 ) (fed eral reg ul at io ns de fin in g t or tu re cr eat ed a

le ga l st an da rd whi ch m ad e th e Bo ard ’s de ci si on su bjec t to rev ie w). Bed oyaMel en de z d ire ct s o ur

att en ti on to 8 C.F .R. § 2 04 .2(c )(1 )(v i), wh ic h p ro vi de s:

Fo r th e p ur

po se of t hi s cha pt er, the ph ras e “ was ba tt ered by or was th e

su bjec t of ex tre m e c r ue lt y ” in cl ud es , bu t is no t li m it ed to , be in g th e vi ct im of an y act or th reat en e d a c t o f vi ol en ce, in cl ud in g an y fo rcef ul de te nt io n, whi ch res ul ts or th reat en s to res ul t in ph y si cal or m en ta l in jury. Ps ycho lo gi cal or se xu al ab us e or ex pl oi ta ti on , in cl ud in g rap e,

m ol es ta ti on , in ces t (if th e vi ct im is a m in or ), or fo rced pr os ti tu ti on sh al l be co ns id ered act s o f vi ol en ce. Oth er ab us iv e act io ns m ay al so be act s of v i o l e n c e un de r cert ai n ci rcu m st an ces , in cl ud in g act s th at , in an d of
t h e ms e l v e s, m ay no t in it ia ll y ap pe ar vi ol en t bu t th at are a pa rt of a n

ov eral l p at te rn of v io le nc e.

8 C.F.R. § 20 4.2 (c)( 1) (v i). Bed oya-Mel en de z co nt en ds th at th is reg ul at io n

es ta bl is he s an ob

jecti ve le ga l sta nd ard fo r th e ba tt ered -s po us e de te rm in at io n un de r

§ 1 22 9b

.

I f “batter ed” means an unwelcome kiss or car ess, marrie d aliens could easily alleg e their elig ibilit y for relief under § 1229b(b)( 2 ). But the text and the history of §1229b(b)( 2) sug g est a differ ent result. Section 1229b(b)( 2) is, afte r all, a “spec ial rule” applicable only to battere d spouses. Aliens who are no t battere d spouses must seek canc ellation of remova l under § 1229b(b)( 1), which has more string ent elig ibilit y

require ments.

11W e reject th is co nt en ti on

. Sect io n 20 4.2 (c)( 1) (v i) was no t pr om ul ga te d un de r

§ 12 29 b an d do es no t ap pl y to th at st at ut or y pr ov is io n. In st ead
, it was pr om ul ga te d

un de r 8 U.S.C. §§ 11 54 & 12 55

. The se se ct io ns au th or iz e an al ie n to pe ti ti o n t he

Att or ne y Gen eral fo r an ad jus tm en t in hi s im m ig rat io n s t a t u s to th at of a la wfu l

pe rm an en t res id en t. An al ie n can fil e a pe ti ti on un de r th es e se ct io ns whe th er or no t

he is f a c i ng rem ov al

. Se e § 12 55 (“ [T]he st at us of [an ] al ie n ha vi ng an ap pr ov ed

pe ti ti on fo r cl as si fic at io n as [b at te red sp ou se ] m ay be ad jus te d by th e Att or ne y

Gen eral [if he fil es a pe ti ti on an d m eet s cert ai n ot he r req ui rem en ts ]. ”). Co nv ers el y ,
§ 12 29 b a p pl ie s sp eci fic al ly to al ie ns who m th e Att or ne y Gen eral ha s or de red

rem ov ed . § 1 22 9b (b )(2 )(A) (“ The Att or ne y Gene ral m ay

can cel rem ov al

. . . .”).

Add it io na ll y , § 20 4.2 ( c ) ( 1 )(v i) is lo cat ed in Tit le 8, Ch ap te r I of th e Co de of

Fed eral Reg ul at io ns , an d it sp eci fic al ly li m it s it s ap pl ic ab i l i t y t o th at ch ap te r. Se e

§ 20 4.2 (c)( 1) (v i) (s ta ti ng “ [f]or th e pu rp os e of th is ch ap te r

. . . .”). Bed oya-Mel en de z

ha s no t id en ti fie d (an d ou r res earc h ha s no t fo un d) an y reg ul at io n in Tit le 8, Ch ap te r I

whi ch ap pl ie s to th e ba tt ered -s po us e de te rm in at io n un de r § 12 29 b( b) (2 ). The Bo ard

di d no t be li ev e th at § 20 4

. 2 ( c )(1 )(v i) ap pl ie d to th e ba tt ered -s po us e de te rm in at io n

u n d e r § 1 2 2 9b (b )(2 ). (R. at 4– 5.) In st ead
, th e Bo ard sa id th at § 20 4.2 (c)( 1) (v i) i s

“ us efu l in as cert ai ni ng th e pa ram et ers of th e [p hr as e ‘bat te red or su bjec te d to ex tre m e

12cru el ty’ ] as ap pl ie d in th e co nt ex t o f c a n cel la ti on of rem ov al .” Id

. W e ag ree th at 4

§ 20 4.2 (c)( 1) (v i), whi ch in te rp ret s al m os t id e n ti cal la ng ua ge , co ul d be us efu l in

m ak in g th e ba tt ered -s po us e de te rm in at io n

. Bu t, th is reg ul at io n do es no t es ta bl is h a

bi nd in g l eg al st an da rd for th at de te rm in at io n. 5

And
, ev en if we were t o a ss um e th at 8 C.F .R. § 2 04 .2(c )(1 )(v i) app li es to th e

ba tt ered -s po us e de te rm in at io n un de r § 12 29 b( b) (2 ), th at reg ul at io n d oe s n ot crea te

a n ob jecti ve le ga l st an da rd

. In st ead
, § 20 4.2 (c)( 1) (v i) m erel y su gg es ts h o w t h e

Att or ne y Gen eral sh ou ld ex erci se hi s di sc ret io n. Fi rs t, th e reg ul at io n do es no t dr aw

a br ig ht li ne be twee n fact s w h i c h make on e pe rs on a ba tt ered sp ou se an d an ot he r

pe rs on no t a b at te red sp ou se . Th e reg ul at io n ex pr es sl y st at es th at “ was ba tt ered by

or was th e su bjec t of ex tre m e cru el ty” “ in cl ud es , b u t i s n o t li mit ed to ” cert ai n

co nd uc t. 8 C.F.R. § 20 4.2 (c)( 1) (v i) (em ph as is ad de d)

. The “ no t li m it ed to ” la ng ua ge

st ro ng ly sug ge st s t he Att or ne y Gene ral can ex erci se di sc ret io n i n e ach cas e.

The Boa rd’s opinion actua lly cites § 204.2(e) (1)( vi) (applica ble to battere d children) rathe r 4 than § 204.2(c) (1 )( vi) (applica ble t o battere d spouses). Howeve r, t hese provisions are identical.

The six other circ uits which have considere d this issue have assumed, without discussion, 5
that § 204.2(c) (1)( vi) applies to the battere d-spouse deter mination

. See Rosario v. Holder
, 627 F.3d 58 (2d Cir. 2010); Johnson v. U.S. Att’y Gen.
, 602 F.3d 508 (3d Cir. 2010); Stepanovic v. Filip
, 554 F.3d 673 (7th Cir. 2009); W ilmore v. Gonzalez
, 455 F.3d 524 (5th Cir. 2006); Perales-Cumpe an v. Gonzales
, 429 F.3d 977 (10th Cir. 2005); Hernande z v. Ashcroft
, 345 F.3d 824 (9th Cir. 2003). But, five of these six circ uits (all but the Ninth Circuit) conclude d that this reg ulation does not establish an objec tive leg al standar d for the ba ttered- spouse deter

mination.

13And th ou gh th e reg ul at io n cas ts a wid e ne t (cap tu rin g “ an y ” act or th reat en ed

act o f v i o l e n c e), we do no t kn ow wha t co nd uc t th at ne t wil l cat ch

. The “ act or

th reat en ed act of vi ol en ce” m us t “ res ul t[] or th reat en [] to res ul t in ph y si cal or m en ta l

in jury.” Id

. Bu t th e “ ph y si cal or m en ta l in jury” req ui rem en t is no t se lf- ex pl an at or y

an d reas on ab le m in ds co ul d di ffer ab ou t wha t th is cl au se m ean s. Bec au se th is cl au se

is im pr eci se , we do no t kn ow fro m th e te xt of th e reg ul at io n wha t co nd uc t is in cl ud ed

an d wh at co nd uc t i s n ot

.

Fi na ll y , § 20 4.2 (c)( 1) (v i) en co m pa ss es “ [o ]the r ab us iv e act io ns

. . . [th at ] m ay

no t in it ia ll y ap pe ar vi ol en t bu t th at are a pa rt of an ov eral l pa tt ern of vi ol en ce. ” The

reg ul at io n do es no t of

fer an y gu id an ce as to whi ch act s fal l in th is cat eg or y

. Th is

im pr eci si on st ro ng ly su gg es ts th a t th e Att or ne y Gen eral al so ret ai ns di sc ret io n to

m ak e th is de ci si on on a cas e-b y -cas e ba si s. Bec au se ne it he r th e st at ut or y te xt no r an

ap pl ic ab le reg ul at io n es ta bl is h an ob je c t i v e le ga l st an da rd on whi ch to ba se ou r

rev ie w, we ho ld th at th e ba tt ered -s po us e de te rm in at io n u n de r § 12 29 b( b) (2 ) is a

di sc ret io na ry

de ci si on res erv ed to th e Att or ne y Gene ral

.

Of th e si x ot he r ci rcu it s th at ha ve co ns id ered th is is su e, fiv e ha ve co nc lu de d

th at th e ba tt ered -s po us e de te rm in at io n is a di sc ret io na ry de ci si on

. Ros ar io v. Hol de r ,

62 7 F.3 d 58 (2 d Ci r. 20 10 ); Jo hn so n v. U.S. Att ’y Gen

. , 60 2 F.3 d 50 8 (3 d Ci r. 20 10 );

St ep an ov ic v. Fil ip
, 55 4 F.3 d 67 3 (7 th Ci r. 20 09 ); W il mor e v. Gon za le

z , 45 5 F.3 d 52 4

14(5 th Ci r. 20 06 ); Pera le s- Cu mpe an v. Gon za le s , 42 9 F.3 d 97 7 (1 0t h Ci r. 20 05 ). Onl y

th e Nin th Ci rcu it ha s reac he d a co nt rary co nc lu si on

. In Her na nd ez v. Ash cr of

t , t he

co ur t he ld t h a t th e ph ras e “ ba tt ered or su bjec te d to ex tre m e cru el ty” es ta bl is he s an

ob jecti ve le ga l st an da rd to de te rm in e if an al ie n is a vi ct im of do m es ti c vi ol en ce. 34 5

F.3 d 82 4, 83 4 (9 th Ci r. 20 03 ). Des p i t e th e co ur t’s pr on ou nc em en t th at do m es ti c

vi ol en ce (an d th us th e ph ras e “ ba tt ered or su bjec te d to ex tre m e cru el ty”) ha s a cl in ic al

de fin it io n, th e co ur t st ru gg le d to art ic ul at e th a t de fin it io n. Id

. at 83 4, 83 6– 39

.

In st ead
, th e co ur t rel ie d on 8 C.F.R. § 20 4.2 (c)( 1) (v i). Id

. at 83 9– 8 4 0

. B ut , as

ex pl ai ne d ab ov e, th is reg ul at io n do es no t es ta bl is h an ob jecti ve le ga l st an da rd fo r th e

ba tt ered -s po us e d et erm in at io n . We fin d Her na nd ez un pe rs ua si ve

.

V. CONCLUSION

Bec au se th e ba tt ered -s po us e de te rm in a t i o n un de r § 12 29 b( b) (2 ) is a

di sc ret io na ry de ci si on , we la ck juri sd ic ti on to rev ie w th e Bo ard ’s de ci si on th at

Bed oya-Mel en de z is no t a b at te red sp ou se

. Se e 8 U.S.C. § 12 52 (a)( 2) (B). Fo r th at

reas on , hi s p et it io n i s d is m is se d.

PETITION DISMIS SED.

15