J-S03020-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

v.

GERARD GETHERS 

Appellant

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 912 EDA 2022

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered February 3, 2022

In the Court of Common Pleas of Montgomery County Criminal Division 

at No(s): CP-46-CR-0000845-2021

BEFORE: BOWES, J., McCAFFERY, J., and SULLIVAN, J.

MEMORANDUM BY McCAFFERY, J.: FILED MAY 23, 2023

Gerard Gethers (Appellant) appeals from the judgment of sentence 

imposed in the Montgomery County Court of Common Pleas following his jury 

conviction of first-degree murder1 and related charges for the November 3, 

2020, shooting death of Jerry White. On appeal, he challenges three 

evidentiary rulings, as well as the sufficiency and weight of the evidence 

supporting his convictions. As we discuss infra, we vacate the sentence 

imposed on Appellant’s firearms conviction and remand for resentencing on 

the offense; in all other respects, we affirm.

____________________________________________

1 18 Pa.C.S. § 2502(a).
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I. FACTS & PROCEDURAL HISTORY

The trial court summarized the evidence presented at Appellant’s jury 

trial as follows: 

[Appellant] shot and killed Jerry White on November 3, 

2020, at approximately 3:35 p.m., in front of West Cali Tattoo at 

518 West Marshall Street in Norristown, Montgomery County. At 

the time, White was the sole eyewitness against [Appellant] in a 

pending[, unrelated] aggravated assault case, a fact known to 

[Appellant] when he killed White.

In the aftermath of the shooting of White, law enforcement 

collected video surveillance from more than a dozen nearby 

businesses and residences, constituting hours of footage from 

both before and after the shooting. The footage, when viewed in 

chronological order, showed [Appellant] leave a residence at 518 

West Lafayette Street in Norristown at approximately 3:24 p.m. 

He was wearing a black Nike jacket with a zipper front. He had 

the hood pulled tight around his face and was wearing a “Covid” 

mask. He also wore black pants with three stripes down the side 

and white high top sneakers.3

__________

3 Further analysis of the surveillance video footage would 

reveal that [Appellant] wore a large-faced watch on his left wrist 

and had a distinctive tattoo on his left hand.

_________

The surveillance footage showed [Appellant] walk from West 

Lafayette Street to the corner of Chain and Marshall Streets. At 

the time, White and four other males4 were standing nearby, 

outside of West Cali Tattoo. Rather than continue to walk toward 

them, thereby being seen, [Appellant] turned around and went 

back down Chain Street, then up Haws Alley, which runs behind

West Marshall Street. [Appellant] came back around to West 

Marshall Street at 3:35 p.m., such that the was able to approach 

the males more surreptitiously.5 He then pulled out a .380 caliber 

pistol and fired three shots in the direction of White. The four 

other males standing nearby scattered, but White, having been 

hit by at least two of the bullets, took a few steps before collapsing 

into the street, almost being struck by a passing vehicle. White 

suffered gunshot wounds to his left armpit, left forearm and back.
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The bullet that entered White’s back pierced several organs and 

his aorta, resulting in White’s rapid death. 

__________

4 Jayden Guidici, Quadir Miller, Stephon Windbush and an 

unidentified bystander.

5 Norristown Police Detective Brian Saxon testified that he 

is familiar with the route [Appellant] walked from West Lafayette 

Street to the tattoo shop and that it is reasonable given the pace 

observed that . . . it would take approximately 11 minutes.

__________

After firing the fatal shots, [Appellant] returned on foot to 

the West Lafayette Street residence he had left earlier in the 

afternoon. Nearby surveillance footage showed him follow a 

woman into the residence at 3:41 p.m.6

__________

6 Detective Saxon testified that [Appellant] took a more 

direct route back to West Lafayette Street and that it was 

reasonable for this return trip to take about six minutes. The

woman who entered the residence with [Appellant] would be 

identified as Jackie McNelly, who lives at the property. She 

testified that [Appellant] is a family friend who came to her house 

on the afternoon of the day of the shooting. [Appellant] left for a 

while and returned later that afternoon. She identified [Appellant]

as the man who followed her into her house. At some point during 

her encounter with [Appellant] that day, McNelly saw him sitting 

in a black four-door vehicle, which was parked in an alley near her 

house. Surveillance video of [Appellant] outside of McNelly’s

house, compared with footage of the shooter, not only showed 

similar clothing but also revealed an identical scuff mark on the 

right sneaker and identical sneaker tread. 

__________

No one at the scene of the shooting identified the shooter.

Detective Charles Leeds of the Norristown Police Department 

immediately thought of [Appellant], however, upon hearing that 

White had been killed. Detective Leeds had known White for many 

years and knew he was an eyewitness against [Appellant] in 

connection with [Appellant’s] alleged non-fatal shooting of Rodney 

Harris on May 12, 2019, in Norristown.7 Because Harris had 

refused to cooperate with police after he had been shot, White 

was the lone witness against [Appellant]. Indeed, [Appellant] was 
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charged with aggravated assault for the shooting of Harris after 

White had identified [him] from a photo array and had given a 

statement to police. [Appellant] was arrested in that case in 

October 2019 and held on cash bail. At his preliminary hearing 

on November 6, 2019, he learned that White, whom [Appellant]

knew as “Spider,” was a witness against him.

__________

7 A subsequent check of law enforcement databases 

indicated that White, at the time of his death, was not involved as 

a party or a witness in any other criminal cases pending in 

Norristown or Philadelphia.

__________

The following day, during a recorded prison telephone call, 

the person speaking with [Appellant] asked when [Appellant]

would get his discovery so he could find out who was snitching.

[Appellant] responded that he had found out the day before and 

that he was going to “pin” that person. In a second prison. 

telephone call that same day, [Appellant] referenced “Spider,” and 

described him as hanging out at the tattoo shop all the time. He

also said that the person “would be gone” if [Appellant] ever

caught him. 

At a bail hearing on July 31, 2020, [Appellant’s] thenattorney argued in favor of his release by suggesting the case was 

weak because, inter alia, someone identified as “Spider” was the 

only witness against [Appellant]. [Appellant] was released on bail 

that day, but reincarcerated on September 1, 2020. He was 

released again, this time on house arrest with electronic 

monitoring, on October 8, 2020, and eventually began working at 

a local Wendy’s restaurant. He did not appear for his scheduled 

shifts, however, on November 2 and November 3, 2020. 

Electronic monitoring also showed [Appellant] did not return to his 

residence by the approved time of 2:00 a.m., on November 3.8

_________

8 [Appellant] subsequently removed his electronic 

monitoring device and was not wearing it when he was arrested 

in this case.

__________

Instead, [Appellant] arrived at some point on November 2 

to the Lafayette Hill, Montgomery County, home of Demesha 

Bruce, the mother of his young child. Bruce saw [Appellant]

driving a black car that day and believed it to be a Cadillac. 
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[Appellant] left Bruce’s house on the morning of November 3 and 

arrived at McNelly’s house at approximately 2:52 p.m. He then 

left McNelly’s house on foot at 3:24 p.m. The shooting occurred

at 3:35 p.m., and [Appellant] reentered McNelly’s house at

approximately 3:41 p.m. The black Cadillac drove away from the 

area at 3:46 p.m. [Appellant] then returned in the vehicle9to 

Bruce’s house around 5:50 p.m.10

__________

9 Law enforcement subsequently located the black Cadillac 

in Bucks County. The vehicle was registered to Todd Green, who 

previously had agreed to sell the vehicle to [Appellant] and had 

allowed [Appellant] to have possession of it. A subsequent search 

of the vehicle revealed [Appellant’s] Wendy’s uniform. 

10 During police questioning, Bruce identified [Appellant]

from still photos of surveillance footage and indicated that 

[Appellant] had a similar looking jacket, pants, sneakers and 

watch. Law enforcement obtained a video Bruce had received on 

her cell phone from [Appellant] on October 13, 2020, which 

showed [him] wearing a similar jacket as the shooter and bearing 

a similar tattoo on his left hand. They were aware from 

[Appellant’s] arrest in the underlying aggravated assault case that 

[Appellant] had a distinctive tattoo on his left hand. A still photo 

of [Appellant] taken in August 2020 and retrieved from Bruce’s

cell phone depicted him wearing pants and sneakers similar to 

those worn by the shooter.

Trial Ct. Op., 6/2/22, at 1-6 (record citations & some footnotes omitted). The 

Commonwealth also presented the following evidence regarding Appellant’s 

actions after the shooting:

[Appellant] walked out of Bruce’s residence in Lafayette Hill in the 

early morning hours of November 4 and the Cadillac is seen 

driving away. At approximately 5:45 a.m. that same morning, a 

black Cadillac is seen parked in front of 1225 Route 313 in Bucks 

County. Around the same time and near the same location, 

[Appellant] got into a white van and drove to the Cadillac. He 

stopped briefly to retrieve some items before getting back in the 

van and driving to Norristown. At approximately 6:45 a.m., 

[Appellant] parked the van in the same general area as where the 
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Cadillac had been parked in Norristown the day before and entered 

McNelly’s house.

Id. at 10-11 (record citations omitted).

Appellant was subsequently arrested and charged with first-degree 

murder, third-degree murder, intimidation of a witness (two counts), 

retaliation against a witness, persons not to possess firearms, possession of a 

firearm without a license, possessing an instrument of crime (PIC), and 

recklessly endangering another person (REAP) (four counts).

2

On May 24, 2021, the Commonwealth filed a motion in limine seeking 

to introduce, at trial, evidence of Appellant’s prior bad acts pursuant to Pa.R.E. 

404(b).3 First, the Commonwealth sought to present evidence Appellant was 

charged with aggravated assault for an unrelated shooting, and that the victim

herein, White, was the sole witness against Appellant in that pending

proceeding. It requested the court admit the following evidence: (1) 

testimony of a witness who heard Appellant state he intended to “get even” 

with White;4 (2) White’s written police statement in the unrelated case; (3) 

testimony by detectives in the aggravated assault case confirming that White 

____________________________________________

2 18 Pa.C.S. §§ 2502(c), 4952(a)(1), (3), 4953(a), 6105(a)(1), 6106(a)(1), 

907(a), and 2705, respectively.

3 Pa.R.E. 404(b) prohibits admission of a defendant’s prior bad acts to prove 

the defendant’s character, unless such evidence is admitted for other 

purposes. See Pa.R.E. 404(b)(1)-(2).

4 Although the trial court subsequently ruled this evidence was admissible, the 

witness in question died of an overdose before trial. See N.T., 6/9/21, at 57-

60; N.T., 1/31/22, at 12-13. Therefore, this testimony was not presented at 

trial.
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identified Appellant as the shooter; and (4) testimony from Appellant’s bail 

hearing in the aggravated assault case that his attorney stated the only 

witness against Appellant was “Spider,” White’s nickname. See

Commonwealth’s Motion in Limine to Introduce Evidence of Appellant’s Other 

Bad Acts, 5/24/21, at 15-16. The Commonwealth argued the evidence was

necessary to prove the witness intimidation and retaliation charges, and

admissible to establish Appellant’s motive for the murder and to present a 

complete story of the incident, i.e., res gestae evidence. Id. at 14-15, 17.

Second, the Commonwealth sought to introduce evidence that Appellant 

was incarcerated on the unrelated aggravated assault charge from October

17, 2019, until October 8, 2020, when he was released on house arrest, and 

that he absconded from supervision on November 3, 2020, the day of White’s 

shooting. See Commonwealth’s Motion in Limine to Introduce Evidence of 

Appellant’s Other Bad Acts at 20-21. It maintained this evidence was 

admissible pursuant to the “identity, opportunity, absence of mistake or 

accident, and ‘res gestae’ exceptions under Rule 404(b).” Id. at 21.

Four days later, Appellant filed a motion in limine, seeking to preclude 

certain evidence, including, inter alia: (1) White’s verbal and written 

statements to police in the unrelated aggravated assault case; and (2) the 

Commonwealth’s edited version of the surveillance video purporting to show 

the shooter’s movements, which included zooming, pausing, and captions. 

See Appellant’s Motion in Limine, 5/28/21, at 2-3 (unpaginated). With regard 

to White’s statements, Appellant argued that the statements constituted 
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hearsay, and their admission would violate his Confrontation Clause rights 

under both the United States and Pennsylvania Constitutions. See id.

The trial court conducted a pretrial hearing on June 9, 2021, to consider

the competing motions in limine. With regard to the surveillance video, the 

parties agreed that the zooming and pausing of the video was admissible, so 

long as the Commonwealth also showed the video at full speed and removed 

all captions. See N.T., 6/9/21, at 12-13; see also Order, 1/18/22. Appellant 

also orally objected to the admission of dash cam video from a van he 

allegedly drove on the day after the murder. See N.T., 6/9/21, at 71-72. He 

maintained the video depicted the van being driven recklessly throughout the 

night. See id. The court ruled that evidence Appellant abandoned a Cadillac

(the vehicle purportedly driven by the shooter) in Bucks County, and drove 

the van back to Norristown “with some of his possessions in it . . . seem[ed]

relevant and appropriate[.]” Id. at 98. However, the court questioned the 

relevancy of video allegedly showing Appellant’s reckless driving and indicated 

that the Commonwealth could edit out that part of the video. See id. at 97-

98. 

With regard to the evidence establishing White was a witness against 

Appellant in the unrelated aggravated assault case, the court found this 

evidence was “extremely relevant” to establish Appellant’s motive, 

identification and absence of mistake, as well as to show the “natural 

development of the facts” of the case. See N.T., 6/9/21, at 96-97. The court 

also determined the probative value of the evidence “highly outweigh[ed] any 
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prejudicial impact[.]” Id. at 96. Thus, the court stated it intended to 

“generally admit[ ]” that evidence, but wanted to further consider Appellant’s 

“confrontation issue.” Id. at 97. 

The case proceeded to a jury trial commencing on January 31, 2022. 

Prior to the start of testimony, Appellant again challenged the relevancy of the 

video evidence showing him retrieving items from the Cadillac, parked in 

Bucks County, and driving back to Norristown in the van. See N.T., 1/31/22, 

at 5-7. Appellant’s counsel argued that the Cadillac did not need to be a part 

of the case because none of the video or witness testimony established 

Appellant drove the Cadillac on the day of the shooting. See id. at 7-8. The 

Commonwealth asserted, however, that the evidence concerning the Cadillac 

helped corroborate the testimony of their other witnesses. Id. at 8. The court 

agreed, and admitted the evidence a trial. Id.

On February 3, 2022, the jury returned a verdict of guilty on the charges 

of first-degree murder, intimidation of a witness (two counts), retaliation

against a witness, PIC, possession of a firearm without a license, and REAP 

(four counts). The charges of third-degree murder and persons not to possess 

are firearm were nol prossed by the Commonwealth. 

The trial court sentenced Appellant that same day to the mandatory 

minimum term of life imprisonment.5 Appellant filed a timely post-sentence

____________________________________________

5 The court also imposed concurrent sentences of 6 to 12 years’ imprisonment 

for the witness intimidation charges, 2 to 4 years’ imprisonment for retaliation 

(Footnote Continued Next Page)
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motion challenging the sufficiency and weight of the evidence supporting his 

convictions. The trial court denied the motion on March 2, 2022, and this 

timely appeal follows.6 

II. ISSUES ON APPEAL

Appellant presents five issues for our review:

1. Whether the [t]rial [c]ourt abused its discretion when it 

granted the Commonwealth’s Motion in Limine to Introduce 

Evidence of Appellant’s Prior Bad Acts, including evidence of 

written and verbal statements of . . . White from the May 12, 

2019 alleged [a]ggravated [a]ssault charges, pursuant to 

Pa.R.E. 404(b)[?]

2. Whether the [t]rial [c]ourt abused its discretion when it denied 

Appellant’s Motion in Limine to preclude the written and verbal 

statements of . . . White in reference to the May 12, 2019 

alleged [a]ggravated [a]ssault charge as hearsay in that the 

____________________________________________

against a witness, 4 to 8 years’ imprisonment for the firearms offense, and 6 

to 24 months’ imprisonment for each of the REAP charges. 

As the trial court notes in its opinion, the sentence of 4 to 8 years’ 

imprisonment imposed on the charge of possession of a firearm without a 

license is beyond the statutory maximum term permitted by law. See Trial 

Ct. Op. at 1 n.1. Because that crime is graded as a third-degree felony, the 

maximum permissible sentence is seven years’ incarceration. See 18 Pa.C.S. 

§§ 1103(3), 6106(a)(1). The trial court requests this Court “amend by 

agreement” the sentence imposed on the firearms offense to a term of 3 to 6 

years’ imprisonment, concurrent to the life sentence for first-degree murder. 

See Trial Ct. Op. at 1 n.1. Appellant “joins in this specific request of the trial 

court.” Appellant’s Brief at 21 n.1. Thus, we vacate the sentence on the 

firearms offense, and remand for the court to impose the new, agreed-upon 

sentence.

6 Appellant complied with the trial court’s order to file a Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) 

concise statement of errors complained of on appeal.
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Commonwealth did not prove that said statements met the 

hearsay exception of Pa.R.E. [ ] 806(b)(6)[?]

3. Whether the [t]rial [c]ourt abused its discretion when it denied 

Appellant’s Oral Pre-trial Motion to exclude a portion of the 

Commonwealth’s proposed video exhibit which showed a van 

being driven by Appellant from Bucks County to Norristown, PA 

on the day after the alleged murder as irrelevant as said portion 

of the video failed to establish a material fact, make a fact at 

issue more or less probable, or support a reasonable inference 

supporting a material fact and the probative value of its 

inclusion was outweighed by the likelihood of unfair prejudice 

against Appellant[?]

4. Whether the evidence presented at trial was insufficient to 

support a conviction on all charges in that there was not proof 

beyond a reasonable doubt that Appellant was the individual 

who shot . . . White[?]

5. Whether the [t]rial [c]ourt abused its discretion in denying 

Appellant’s Post-Sentence Motion requesting a new trial as the 

jury’s verdict was against the weight of the evidence in that 

there was not proof beyond a reasonable doubt that Appellant

was the individual who shot . . . White[?]

Appellant’s Brief at 5-6.7

III. EVIDENTIARY RULINGS

In his first three issues, Appellant challenges the trial court’s evidentiary 

rulings. When considering these claims, we must bear in mind the following:

[The a]dmission of evidence is within the sound discretion of the 

trial court and will be reversed only upon a showing that the trial 

court clearly abused its discretion. An abuse of discretion is not 

merely an error of judgment, but is rather the overriding or 

misapplication of the law, or the exercise of judgment that is 

____________________________________________

7 Despite being granted two extensions of time, the Commonwealth has not 

filed an appellee brief in this matter.
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manifestly unreasonable, or the result of bias, prejudice, ill-will or 

partiality, as shown by the evidence of record.

Commonwealth v. Dula, 262 A.3d 609, 626 (Pa. Super. 2021) (citation 

omitted), appeal denied, 273 A.3d 985 (Pa. 2022). 

We begin with the general rule that “[a]ll relevant evidence is 

admissible[.]” Pa.R.E. 402. Evidence is deemed relevant if: “(a) it has any 

tendency to make a fact more or less probable than it would be without the 

evidence; and (b) the fact is of consequence in determining the action.” 

Pa.R.E. 401(a)-(b). Regardless of relevancy, however, the Pennsylvania Rules 

of Evidence generally preclude the two types of evidence alleged to be at issue 

herein: (1) evidence of a defendant’s prior crimes or bad acts and (2) hearsay. 

See Pa.R.E. 404(b)(1), 802. 

Pa.R.E. 404(b)(1) prohibits evidence of a defendant’s prior crimes or 

bad acts simply to prove their bad character. See Pa.R.E. 404(b)(1). 

However, such evidence may be admissible when offered for another purpose, 

such as to prove motive, intent, identity, or absence of mistake, or pursuant 

to the res gestae exception, that is, where it is “part of the history of the case 

and form[s] part of the natural development of the facts.” Pa.R.E. 404(b)(2); 

Commonwealth v. Ivy, 146 A.3d 241, 251 (Pa. Super. 2016). “In a criminal 

case, this evidence is admissible only if the probative value of the evidence 

outweighs its potential for unfair prejudice.” Id. 

Rule 802 generally precludes the admission of hearsay testimony. See

Pa.R.E. 802. Hearsay is defined as “an out of court statement offered for the 

truth of the matter asserted[.]” Commonwealth v. Manivannan, 186 A.3d 
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472, 482 (Pa. Super. 2018) (citation omitted). See also Pa.R.E. 801(a)-(c). 

However, an out-of-court statement that is not offered for its truth, but rather 

for another reason ─ such as to “establish motive” or to “complete the story”

─ is admissible as non-hearsay. See Manivannan, 186 A.3d at 482-83 

(citations & quotation marks omitted). Moreover, Rule 804 provides 

exceptions to the rule against hearsay when, as here, the declarant is 

unavailable as a witness. See Pa.R.E. 804(a)(4) (stating “[a] declarant is 

considered to be unavailable as a witness if the declarant . . . cannot be 

present or testify . . . because of death”). Rule 804(b)(6) sets forth the 

exception known as “forfeiture by wrongdoing.” See Pa.R.E. 804(b)(6); 

Commonwealth v. Morales, 91 A.3d 80, 94 (Pa. 2014). It permits the 

admission of an unavailable declarant’s statement when it is “offered against 

a party that wrongfully caused . . . the declarant’s unavailability as a witness, 

and did so intending that result.” Pa.R.E. 804(b)(6). 

(a) Evidence related to May 2019 shooting 

With these general rules in mind, we consider Appellant’s first two issues 

on appeal. Both claims challenge the trial court’s pretrial ruling admitting 

prior bad acts evidence related to Appellant’s purported involvement in a May 

2019 shooting, including oral and written statements victim White provided to 

police implicating Appellant in that crime.

First, Appellant argues the trial court abused its discretion when it 

granted the Commonwealth’s motion in limine to introduce evidence of the 

unrelated aggravated assault case when the Commonwealth failed to produce 
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any evidence at the pretrial hearing to support that ruling. See Appellant’s 

Brief at 27. Indeed, he contends that the Commonwealth sought to present, 

inter alia, the following evidence at trial to prove his motive for the murder of 

White was retaliation for White’s cooperation with police in the aggravated 

assault case: (1) White’s written statement to police implicating Appellant as 

the May 2019 shooter; and (2) the testimony of a detective confirming White 

identified Appellant as the May 2019 shooter. See id. at 26. However, 

Appellant argues the Commonwealth “never produced a copy of [White’s] 

written statement . . . as an exhibit at the June 9, 2021, hearing[,]” nor 

presented testimony from the police detective who recorded White’s 

identification of Appellant.

8

 Id. at 27. Thus, he insists there was “insufficient 

evidence presented . . . for the trial court to weigh, examine or consider” 

before rendering its decision to admit this Rule 404(b) evidence. See id. at 

30.

Appellant also contends the trial court abused its discretion when it 

determined that this prior bad act evidence was admissible pursuant to the 

“identity” and res gestae exceptions. See Appellant’s Brief at 30, 32-33. He 

insists the “identity” exception requires proof that the prior and present crime 

were “so nearly identical in method as to earmark them as the handiwork of 

____________________________________________

8

In fact, the only prior bad acts “evidence” the Commonwealth presented at 

the pretrial hearing related to the proposed testimony of the witness who 

heard Appellant state he wanted to get even with White. See N.T., 6/9/21, 

at 17-48. Unfortunately, as noted above, that witness died before trial and 

none of the evidence concerning her proposed testimony was admitted.
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the accused[,]” and here there was no evidence of a “signature” crime. Id.

at 30-32 (citation & quotation marks omitted). Moreover, Appellant maintains 

the Commonwealth failed to establish that the May 2019 shooting “was part 

of a chain, sequence, or natural development of events which formed the 

history of the case” so as to satisfy the res gestae exception. Id. at 33 

(quotation marks omitted). He argues the inclusion of White’s statements in 

the prior shooting case was “highly prejudicial” considering “the weakness of 

[White’s] identification of Appellant in [that case] and the lack of supporting 

evidence to conclude he was the shooter on May 12, 2019.” Id.

In his second, related claim, Appellant contends the trial court abused 

its discretion when it denied his motion in limine to preclude White’s prior 

statements as hearsay. Appellant’s Brief at 33. He insists the statements 

were not admissible pursuant to the “forfeiture by wrongdoing” exception at

Pa.R.E. 804(b)(6) because the Commonwealth “failed to show by a 

preponderance of the evidence that [he] was involved in, or responsible, for 

the procuring the unavailability of [ ] White and that [he] acted with the intent 

of procuring [ ] White’s unavailability as an actual or potential witness.” Id.

at 35-36.

We conclude Appellant is entitled to no relief. First, we reject Appellant’s 

argument concerning the “lack of an evidentiary record” at the pretrial 

hearing. See Appellant’s Brief at 30. Appellant was well aware of White’s 

written police statement implicating him in the May 2019 shooting, as well as 

White’s identification of Appellant in a police photo array ─ in fact, he sought 
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to preclude this same evidence in his competing motion in limine. At the 

pretrial hearing, the Commonwealth detailed the evidence it sought to 

introduce at trial, which included “the written statement that . . . White gave 

to Norristown Police in reference to the aggravated assault case[, and] 

testimony from detectives regarding . . . White picking [Appellant] out of a 

photo array . . . and identifying him as the man who shot the victim” in May 

2019. N.T., 6/9/21, at 78. Appellant provides no authority for his assertion

that the Commonwealth was required to introduce the statement at issue into 

evidence or present the testimony of the detective at the pretrial hearing. 

Further, he does not argue that the evidence the Commonwealth later 

produced at trial was different than the evidence described at the pretrial 

hearing. Indeed, Appellant lodged no objection when White’s written 

statement was read to the jury, or when Detective Leeds testified that White 

identified Appellant as the May 2019 shooter from a photo array. See N.T., 

2/1/22, at 95-105. Thus, his first argument fails.

Next, while Appellant challenges the admission of evidence concerning 

his involvement in the May 2019 shooting pursuant to the identity and res 

gestae exceptions, he fails to address the primary reason this evidence was 

admitted ─ to establish his motive for the murder of White. At the conclusion 

of the pretrial hearing, the trial court opined:

[T]he fact that [ ] White was a witness in a potential aggravated 

assault case, pending aggravated assault case, is extremely 

relevant and the probative value highly outweighs any prejudicial 

impact to [Appellant]. Clearly, there is the importance of the 

motive, to establish his motive, to establish his identification, and 
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to establish absence of mistake or accident. It really is the basis 

for this case in the sense that it really is the keystone of the whole 

case. And the jury must hear the natural development of the facts 

in this case to understand it and the res gestae part of that is 

extremely important. So I’m generally admitting that.

N.T., 6/9/21, at 96-97.

We agree. White’s identification of Appellant as the May 2019 shooter, 

combined with evidence that Appellant was aware White was the 

Commonwealth’s only witness in that case, was relevant to establish 

Appellant’s motive to murder White on the day in question. See 

Commonwealth v. Collins, 70 A.3d 1245, 1252 (Pa. Super. 2013) (prior bad 

acts evidence that defendants in murder prosecution were rival drug dealers 

of victims relevant to establish motive and “link[ ]” victims to defendants). 

Appellant does not challenge this ruling ─ which we agree was correct ─ and, 

thus, he is entitled to no relief.9 

Moreover, we emphasize that Appellant was also charged with both 

intimidation of a witness and retaliation against a witness because White was 

a witness against Appellant in the aggravated assault case. See 18 Pa.C.S. 

§§ 4952(a)(1), (3), 4953(a); Bill of Information, 4/22/21, Counts 3-5. Thus, 

White’s statements to police implicating Appellant in the May 2019 shooting

were clearly relevant to prove these other charges. 

____________________________________________

9 We note Appellant emphasizes the “weakness of [White’s] identification” of 

him as the shooter in the May 2019 aggravated assault case. See Appellant’s 

Brief at 33. However, the strength or weakness of White’s identification is 

irrelevant ─ the fact that White named Appellant as the culprit provides a 

motive for Appellant to seek retribution against White.

 
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Appellant’s hearsay argument also fails. White’s written and oral 

statements to police identifying Appellant as the May 2019 shooter do not

constitute hearsay. “Generally, our appellate courts have held that out-ofcourt statements by homicide victims are admissible when the statements are 

relevant for some other purpose, such as proof of motive or malice.” 

Commonwealth v. Luster, 71 A.3d 1029, 1041 (Pa. Super. 2013) (en banc). 

Here, the statements were not offered for their truth ─ that is, to establish 

that Appellant was, in fact, the May 2019 shooter. Rather, White’s statements

were offered to establish that Appellant had a motive to murder White ─ 

whether true or not, White identified Appellant as the shooter in the May 2019 

case and was the Commonwealth’s sole witness in that case. Thus, White’s

out-of-court statements are not hearsay.

Lastly, we note that the trial court provided the following limiting 

instruction to the jury:

You have heard evidence to the effect that [Appellant] was 

charged with aggravated assault in connection with . . . [a May 

2019] shooting in Norristown.

. . . [H]e is not on trial for that. Is that understood? . . .

This evidence is before you for a limited purpose. That is, 

for the purpose of tending to show motive, intent, and 

identification.

This evidence must not be considered by you in any other 

way that for the purpose I just stated. You must not regard this 

evidence as showing that [Appellant] is a person of bad character 

or criminal tendencies from which you might be inclined to infer 

guilt. Is that understood?
J-S03020-23

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N.T., 2/3/22, at 75-76. A jury is “presumed to follow the court’s instruction[.]” 

Commonwealth v. Cash, 137 A.3d 1262, 1273 (Pa. 2016). Thus, 

Appellant’s first two evidentiary challenges fail.

(b) Video evidence regarding Cadillac

In his third issue, Appellant challenges the trial court’s evidentiary ruling 

admitting the Commonwealth’s video exhibit showing Appellant retrieving 

items from a black Cadillac in Bucks County, putting them in a van, and driving 

the van back to the area of the murder. See Appellant’s Brief at 37. He 

maintains the video was “irrelevant” because the Commonwealth failed to 

prove the Cadillac was used in the commission of the murder ─ there was no 

video showing Appellant driving the Cadillac to or from the murder scene. See 

id. at 37-38. Appellant also insists this evidence was unfairly prejudicial. Id.

at 40.

Preliminarily, we note that Appellant’s issue as framed in his brief is 

different from the claim he raised in his Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) statement. In the 

Rule 1925(b) statement, Appellant asserted the trial court abused its 

discretion when it denied his oral motion “to exclude a portion of the 

Commonwealth’s proposed video exhibit which shows a Cadillac being

driven from Buck County to Norristown, PA on the day after the 

alleged murder as irrelevant[.]” Appellant’s Statement of Matters 

Complained of on Appeal, 4/19/21, at 1 (unpaginated) (emphasis added). As 

the trial court noted in its opinion, it “scoured the trial record and [did] not 

recall evidence of a Cadillac being driving from Bucks County to Norristown on 
J-S03020-23

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the day after the shooting.” Trial Ct. Op. at 10. As explained above, Appellant 

does not elaborate on this claim in his brief, but rather, addresses a different 

issue entirely, focusing on video of him retrieving items from the abandoned 

Cadillac in Bucks County, putting them in a van, and driving the van back to 

Norristown on the day after the murder. See Appellant’s Brief at 37. Thus, 

because Appellant’s present claim was not preserved in his court-ordered Rule 

1925(b) statement, it is waived for our review.10 See Pa.R.A.P. 

1925(b)(4)(vii) (“Issues not included in the Statement and/or raised in 

accordance with the provisions of this paragraph (b)(4) are waived.”).

Nevertheless, we note the trial court addressed the relevancy of the 

evidence Appellant now challenges in its opinion. The court opined:

[E]vidence presented by the Commonwealth demonstrated that 

[Appellant] walked out of Bruce’s residence in Lafayette Hill in the 

early morning hours of November 4 and the Cadillac is seen 

driving away. At approximately 5:45 a.m. that same morning , a 

black Cadillac is seen parked in front of 1225 Route 313 in Bucks 

County. Around the same time and near the same location, 

____________________________________________

10 We note, too, that the issue raised in Appellant’s brief cannot be 

characterized as a subsidiary issue of the claim he raised in his Rule 1925(b) 

statement. See Commonwealth v. Price, 284 A.3d 165, 171 (Pa. 2022) 

(explaining that in determining whether one issue is a subsidiary of another, 

“the question is whether resolution of the two issues is sufficiently connected 

to each other such that the resolution of one may depend in some respect 

upon resolution of the other”). Indeed, in the Rule 1925(b) statement, he 

challenged video evidence of “a Cadillac being driven from Bucks County to 

Norristown . . . on the day after the alleged murder[,]” while in his brief, he 

challenges video of him retrieving items from a Cadillac in Bucks County, 

entering a van, and driving the van back to Norristown. See Appellant’s 

Statement of Matters Complained of on Appeal at 1 (unpaginated); Appellant’s 

Brief at 37.
J-S03020-23

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[Appellant] got into a white van and drove to the Cadillac. He 

stopped briefly to retrieve some items before getting back in the 

van and driving to Norristown. At approximately 6:45 a.m., 

[Appellant] parked the van in the same general area as where the 

Cadillac had been parked in Norristown the day before and entered

McNelly’s house.

This evidence plainly is relevant to demonstrate 

[Appellant’s] connection to the Cadillac seen in Norristown on the 

day of the shooting. Additionally, and although not raised in the 

oral pre-trial motion made before this court, the evidence was not 

unfairly prejudicial to [Appellant] and he received a fair trial.

Trial Ct. Op. at 10-11 (record citations omitted).

We agree with the court’s analysis. Appellant asserts that any evidence 

regarding the Cadillac is irrelevant because there was no video footage or 

witness testimony placing him as the driver of the black Cadillac seen on 

surveillance video arriving in the area of McNelly’s residence just before the 

murder and leaving shortly after the murder. However, direct evidence is not 

required. Rather, the Commonwealth provided circumstantial evidence 

connecting Appellant to the black Cadillac, including testimony that he arrived 

and left the area of the murder in a black Cadillac, and corroborating 

surveillance video of that black Cadillac. See N.T., 2/1/22, at 34, 42-43 

(McNelly testified Appellant was operating a black four-door car on the day of 

the murder, which was parked in the alley next to her house); 168-69 (Bruce 

testifying Appellant drove a black Cadillac to her residence on November 2, 

2020, the day before the murder); N.T., 2/2/22, at 46-49, 54-55 (surveillance 

video of the black Cadillac in the area of the murder and Bruce’s home). 

Moreover, we emphasize the actual evidence Appellant now contests was 

admitted via stipulation. The parties stipulated that: (1) before 6:00 a.m. on 
J-S03020-23

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the morning after the murder, Appellant retrieved items from a black Cadillac 

parked in Bucks County; (2) that Cadillac was registered to Todd Green, who 

stated he agreed to sell it to Appellant and allowed Appellant to take 

possession of the car; and (3) a search of the Cadillac uncovered Appellant’s 

work uniform. See N.T., 2/1/22, at 232-33. Accordingly, we conclude the 

trial court did not abuse its discretion when it admitted the evidence at issue.

IV. SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE

Appellant’s fourth claim presents a challenge to the sufficiency of the 

evidence supporting his convictions. Rather than addressing the individual 

elements of each offense, Appellant broadly asserts there was insufficient 

evidence for the jury to conclude he was the perpetrator of the crime. See 

Appellant’s Brief at 41-42. He emphasizes the following: (1) the shooter, 

who was masked at all times, was never positively identified by any witness; 

(2) none of the shooter’s clothes, or any firearm, was recovered from 

Appellant’s home or car; (3) there was no video of Appellant driving the black 

Cadillac to or from Norristown on the day of the shooting; (4) the 

Commonwealth’s FBI analyst could not positively match any of the evidence 

from the shooting to Appellant; and (5) the only link between Appellant and 

White was the May 2019 shooting, and Appellant denied his involvement in 

that case. See id. 42-44. Appellant also noted that there was evidence 

presented at trial that “someone else besides Appellant may have had a 

motive” to harm White. See id. at 50. 
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Preliminarily, we note the trial court found Appellant’s sufficiency claim 

waived because his Rule 1925(b) statement did not specify “the elements of 

the offenses he is challenging on appeal.” See Trial Ct. Op. at 12. Rather, 

Appellant simply asserted the evidence “was insufficient to support the jury’s 

verdict of guilty” on all of his charges, without providing any detail. See

Appellant’s Statement of Matters Complained of on Appeal at 2 (unpaginated).

This Court has consistently held:

[T]o “preserve a sufficiency claim, the Rule 1925(b) statement 

must specify the element or elements upon which the evidence 

was insufficient.” Commonwealth v. Widger, 237 A.3d 1151, 

1156 (Pa. Super. 2020). If the appellant does not specify such 

elements, the sufficiency claim is deemed waived. 

Commonwealth v. Roche, 153 A.3d 1063, 1072 (Pa. Super. 

2017). 

Commonwealth v. McFarland, 278 A.3d 369, 381 (Pa. Super. 2022), appeal 

denied, 2023 WL 368601 (Pa. Jan. 24, 2023). Moreover, “[s]uch specificity 

is of particular importance in cases where, as here, [A]ppellant was convicted 

of multiple crimes each of which contains numerous elements that the 

Commonwealth must prove beyond a reasonable doubt.” See 

Commonwealth v. Garland, 63 A.3d 339, 344 (Pa. Super. 2013). See also 

Commonwealth v. Stiles, 143 A.3d 968, 982 (Pa. Super. 2016) (Appellant 

waived sufficiency argument challenging two counts of first-degree murder 

and two firearms offenses when Rule 1925(b) statement claimed convictions 

were based on “insufficient evidence because the circumstantial inferences 

drawn from the evidence were unwarranted and unreliable”).
J-S03020-23

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In the present case, Appellant’s generic Rule 1925(b) statement failed 

to specify which of his 10 convictions he was challenging, and, more 

importantly, which elements of those convictions the Commonwealth failed to 

prove. To the extent he asserts the claim he intended to raise was “clear from 

both his defense put forth at trial as well as his Post-Sentence Motion[,]”11 we 

remind Appellant that compliance with a court-ordered Rule 1925(b) 

statement is mandatory, and the trial court is not required to scour the record 

to determine Appellant’s specific claim on appeal.12 Thus, we agree with the 

trial court that this issue is waived.

Nevertheless, as Appellant asserts, he did argue in his post-sentence 

motion that the evidence was insufficient to prove he was the person who 

shot and killed White. See Appellant’s Post-Sentence Motion, 2/11/22, at 2-

3 (unpaginated). However, even if we were to consider this claim, we would 

conclude he is entitled to no relief.

Our review of a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence is wellsettled:

[We must determine] whether viewing all the evidence admitted 

at trial in the light most favorable to the verdict winner, there is 

____________________________________________

11 See Appellant’s Brief at 42 n.2.

12 We note that in his statement of questions presented in his brief, he properly 

framed his sufficiency argument, claiming “there was not proof beyond a 

reasonable doubt that Appellant was the individual who shot [ ] White.” 

Appellant’s Brief at 6. Had he presented this claim in his Rule 1925(b) 

statement, the trial court could have properly addressed the issue in its 

opinion.
J-S03020-23

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sufficient evidence to enable the fact-finder to find every element 

of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. In applying [this] test, 

we may not weigh the evidence and substitute our judgment for 

a fact-finder. In addition, we note that the facts and 

circumstances established by the Commonwealth need not 

preclude every possibility of innocence. Any doubts regarding a 

defendant’s guilt may be resolved by the fact-finder unless the 

evidence is so weak and inconclusive that as a matter of law no 

probability of fact may be drawn from the combined 

circumstances. The Commonwealth may sustain its burden of 

proving every element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt by 

means of wholly circumstantial evidence. Moreover, in applying 

the above test, the entire record must be evaluated and all 

evidence received must be considered. Finally, the [trier] of 

fact[,] while passing upon the credibility of witnesses and the 

weight of the evidence produced, is free to believe all, part or none 

of the evidence.

Commonwealth v. Williams, 255 A.3d 565, 578–79 (Pa. Super. 2021)

(citation omitted).

As noted above, Appellant insists there was insufficient evidence to 

support the jury’s determination that he was the person who murdered White. 

With regard to identification evidence, we must bear in mind the following:

In addition to proving the statutory elements of the crimes 

charged beyond a reasonable doubt, the Commonwealth must 

also establish the identity of the defendant as the perpetrator of 

the crimes. Evidence of identification need not be positive and 

certain to sustain a conviction. [A]ny indefiniteness and 

uncertainty in the identification testimony goes to its weight. 

Direct evidence of identity is, of course, not necessary and a

defendant may be convicted solely on circumstantial 

evidence.

Commonwealth v. Strafford, 194 A.3d 168, 175–76 (Pa. Super. 2018)

(citations, quotation marks & paragraph break omitted; emphasis added).

Appellant’s argument focuses on the lack of a positive identification that 

he was the masked shooter, the lack of any evidence definitively connecting 
J-S03020-23

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him to the crime, and the possibility of an alternate suspect. See Appellant’s 

Brief at 42-44, 50. However, as summarized by the trial court in its opinion, 

the circumstantial evidence presented by the Commonwealth was more than 

sufficient to support Appellant’s convictions. See Trial Ct. Op. at 1-6. 

Appellant had a motive to shoot White, was identified by witnesses as being 

near the scene of the crime at the time of the crime, generally matched the 

description of the masked shooter and was known to have a tattoo similar to

the shooter’s, failed to report to work on the day of the shooting and was 

subsequently arrested without his ankle monitor, and was connected to a 

black Cadillac similar to a vehicle present near the scene of the crime. 

Moreover, we note Appellant emphasizes that the Commonwealth’s FBI 

forensic analyst, George Skaluba, could not definitively match the jacket worn 

by the shooter, the tattoo on the shooter’s arm, or the Cadillac seen on 

surveillance video to a jacket owned by Appellant, Appellant’s tattoo, and the 

Cadillac recovered in Bucks County. See Appellant’s Brief at 48. However, 

he fails to acknowledge that the analyst was unable to do so based on the 

quality of the images he examined, and, in fact, testified he also could not 

eliminate any of the matches. See N.T., 2/1/22, at 269-72, 279-80. 

Furthermore, the evidence suggesting another person may have had a motive 

to murder White was rejected by the jury, as was its prerogative. See 

Williams, 255 A.3d at 579. Thus, even if Appellant’s sufficiency claim was 

not waived, we would conclude he is entitled to no relief.
J-S03020-23

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V. WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE

In his final claim, Appellant contends the verdicts were against the 

weight of the evidence presented at trial.13 He argues the evidence identifying 

him as White’s murderer was “tenuous, vague and uncertain.” Appellant’s 

Brief at 52. He details testimony and evidence supporting his assertion that 

he was not the shooter, which he claims the trial court “failed to adequately 

address.” Id. at 52-53. See also id. at 53-63 (none of the witnesses to the 

shooting identified Appellant, or saw a tattoo on his hand; the detective who 

compiled the video of the shooter’s path thought the shooter was not wearing 

a mask when he left the West Lafayette residence; the evidence demonstrated 

the shooter could have been aiming at any of the witnesses and not White; 

McNelly’s testimony was “filled with contradictions;” White’s identification of 

Appellant as the May 2019 shoot was “extremely weak;” Bruce did not 

recognize Appellant in any photos obtained from the video footage; no 

firearm, or clothing worn by the shooter was recovered from the Cadillac; the 

Commonwealth’s expert analyst could not conclude definitively that the jacket 

worn by the shooter matched a jacked owned by Appellant, the tattoo seen 

on the shooter matched Appellant’s tattoo, or that the Cadillac in the videos 

matched a Cadillac sold to Appellant; and there was evidence White’s murder 

____________________________________________

13 Appellant preserved his weight of the evidence claim in a timely filed postsentence motion. See Pa.R.Crim.P. 607(A)(3).
J-S03020-23

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could have been related to his drug dealing or threatening texts he had 

received a month before the murder).

Our review of a weight of the evidence claim is well-established:

The weight of the evidence is a matter exclusively for the finder 

of fact, who is free to believe all, part, or none of the evidence 

and to determine the credibility of the witnesses. A new trial is 

not warranted because of a mere conflict in the testimony and 

must have a stronger foundation than a reassessment of the 

credibility of witnesses. Rather, the role of the trial judge is to 

determine that notwithstanding all the fact[s], certain facts are so 

clearly of greater weight that to ignore them or to give them equal 

weight with all the facts is to deny justice. 

On appeal, our purview is extremely limited and is confined to 

whether the trial court abused its discretion in finding that the jury 

verdict did not shock its conscience. Thus, appellate review of a 

weight claim consists of a review of the trial court’s exercise of 

discretion, not a review of the underlying question of whether the 

verdict is against the weight of the evidence.

Williams, 255 A.3d at 580 (citation omitted & paragraph break added).

In rejecting Appellant’s weight of the evidence claim, the trial court 

opined:

[T]he evidence . . . amply supports the jury’s verdict and does not 

shock the conscience of this court, which presided over the jury 

trial. Rather, the overwhelming evidence presented by the 

Commonwealth demonstrates [Appellant] went to the tattoo

parlor on West Marshall Street where he knew White hung out, 

and killed White by shooting him in vital areas of the body with an 

unlicensed firearm. At the time, [Appellant] knew White was the 

lone eyewitness against him in a pending aggravated assault case. 

As a result of [Appellant] killing White, the charges in that 

underlying case remain unresolved. [Appellant] also recklessly 

endangered the four others who were standing near White when 

[Appellant] fired three bullets at him.

Trial Ct. Op. at 13.
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Upon our review, we detect no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s 

ruling denying Appellant’s weight of the evidence challenge. As explained 

supra, our review is limited to whether the trial court abused its discretion in 

determining the jury’s verdict did not shock the court’s conscience. See 

Williams, 255 A.3d at 580. Appellant fails to convince this Court otherwise. 

His summary of the evidence focuses solely on testimony which appears to 

support his assertion that the identity of the shooter could not be determined

beyond a reasonable doubt. However, he ignores the substantial 

circumstantial evidence connecting him to the crime. The jury, as fact finder, 

was the sole judge of credibility, and was free to believe all, some or none of 

the evidence presented. See id. at 578-79, 580. In its discretion, the jury 

credited the circumstantial evidence presented by the Commonwealth which 

led to the identification of Appellant as the culprit. See Strafford, 194 A.3d 

at 175-76 (“Direct evidence of identity is, of course, not necessary and a 

defendant may be convicted solely on circumstantial evidence.”). Neither the 

jury’s verdict, nor the trial court’s denial of Appellant’s weight claim, shock’s 

the conscience. Thus, Appellant is entitled to no relief.

VI. CONCLUSION

As noted supra, both Appellant and the trial court agree that the 

sentence imposed on Appellant’s firearms offense is illegal. See supra n.5. 

Accordingly, we vacate the judgment of sentence imposed on Appellant’s 

conviction of possession of a firearm without a license, and remand for 
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resentencing on that offense. In all other respects, we affirm the judgment 

of sentence.

Judgment of sentence affirmed in part and vacated in part. Case 

remanded for proceedings consistent with this memorandum. Jurisdiction 

relinquished.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 5/23/2023