Appeal from Spartanburg County R. Keith Kelly, Post-C onviction Relief Judge THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDEN TIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE

CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRE CEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING

EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA In The Supreme Court

Jerod Keykendall Harris, Petitioner,

v.

State of South Carolina, Respondent.

Appellate Case No. 2014-002693

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI

Memorandum Opinion No. 2018-MO-011 Submitted September 15, 2017 – Filed February 28, 2018

REVERSED

Appellate Defender Laura Ruth Baer, of Columbia, for

Petitioner.

Attorney General Alan McCrory Wilson and Assistant Attorney General Valerie Garcia Giovanoli, both of Columbia, for Respondent.

PER CURIAM: In this post-conviction relie f (PCR) action, Jerod Keykendall

Harris contends the PCR court e rred by allowing him to represen t himself at his PCRtrial without first obtaining a valid waiver of his right to co unsel. We agree and

reverse.

Harris appeared in PCR court a nd requested that his court-appointed attorney be relieved, stating, "I wanted to go ahead and get me a paid atto rney." When the court asked when Harris planned to hire an attorney, Harris responded that "it should be

soon." After assuring Harris he would not receive another appo inted attorney, the court granted his request and continued the hearing to allow hi m time. The court stated, "You'll either have to h ire [an attorney] or you will b e representing yourself."

Seven months later Harris again appeared in PCR court, this tim e before a different judge. The PCR cour t asked Harris:

Court: Okay. You're going to represent yourself in

this matter?

Harris: Yes, sir. I'm going to have to, sir.

Court: Okay.

Harris: I was told I had to.

Court: All right.

The State then explained the even ts that occurred at the prior PCR hearing:

Your Honor, just to clarify. He had an attorney that had been appointed in our last term. He asked for that attorney

to be relieved. And [the judge] informed him that, if he wanted to relieve his appointed attorney, he would not be allowed to have another appointed attorney, but he could retain an attorney a nd proceed pro se.

The PCR court immediately asked Harris about his claims and pro ceeded with the trial, without any attempt to see k a waiver from Harris of his right to counsel.

In Whitehead v. State , 310 S.C. 532, 426 S.E.2d 315 ( 1992), we held that "when a PCR application is not dismissed before a hearing is held, the PCR judge must appoint counsel or obtain a knowing and intelligent waiver of t hat right by theapplicant." 310 S.C. at 535, 426 S.E.2d at 316; see also Richardson v. State , 377

S.C. 103, 105-06, 659 S.E.2d 493, 494-95 (2008) (discussing the two requirements

for a valid waiver of counsel in a PCR proceeding). Under Richardson and

Whitehead , the PCR court clearly erred by failing to seek from Harris a valid waiver of his right to counsel. See Hilton v. State , Op. No. 27772 (S.C. Sup. Ct. filed Feb. 28, 2018) (Shearouse Adv. Sh. No. 9 at 94) (holding "the PCR co urt clearly erred by failing to ensure Hilton unders tood the dangers and disadvantag es of selfrepresentation before granting the motion to relieve his appoin ted attorney" (citing

Whitehead , 310 S.C. at 535, 426 S.E.2d at 316-17)). We remand for the a ppointment

of counsel and a new PCR trial.

REVERSED.

BEATTY, C.J., KITTRED GE, HEARN, FEW and JAMES, JJ., concur.