*

 After an examination of the briefs and the record, we have concluded that

oral argument is unnecessary. Thus, the appeal is submitted on the briefs and the

record. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

Chicago, Illinois 60604

Submitted July 14, 2006*

Decided July 14, 2006

Before

Hon. RICHARD D. CUDAHY, Circuit Judge

Hon. MICHAEL S. KANNE, Circuit Judge

Hon. DIANE S. SYKES, Circuit Judge

No. 05-3954

GEORGE C. WELCH,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

BILL MCCREEDY et al.,

Defendants-Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District

Court for the Eastern District of

Wisconsin

No. 03-C-1076

Charles N. Clevert, Jr.,

Judge.

O R D E R

For more than four years the Wisconsin Department of Corrections treated

prisoner George Welch for complaints relating to his right shoulder. His treatment

included frequent doctor visits (including appointments with orthopedic specialists),

numerous diagnostic tests, physical therapy, and a variety of pain-control and antiinflammatory medication. Eventually he underwent a reportedly successful surgery

known as an open Bankart procedure, which treated recurrent shoulder joint

instability. Despite this care, Welch brought a claim pro se under 42 U.S.C. § 1983

UNPUBLISHED ORDER

Not to be cited per Circuit Rule 53
No. 05-3954 Page 2

alleging that various doctors and corrections officials were deliberately indifferent

to his condition. In a comprehensive 45-page order, the district court granted

summary judgment for the defendants and Welch appeals. We affirm.

Welch’s appellate brief recounts the undisputed facts of his treatment in

great detail but barely raises any legal challenge to the district court’s decision. See

Fed. R. App. P. 28(a)(9); Anderson v. Hardman, 241 F.3d 544, 545 (7th Cir. 2001). 

Generously construing his brief, we discern two issues. First, he seems to assert

that the district court erred by finding that the pain and deterioration of his

shoulder that he suffered during the four years preceding his surgery were not

evidence that the defendants consciously disregarded his serious medical condition. 

But Welch’s extensive treatment record shows that corrections officials and doctors

responded to his condition and, in addition to therapy and eventual surgery,

prescribed medication to alleviate his pain. As we have observed, “mere differences

of opinion among medical personnel regarding a patient’s appropriate treatment do

not give rise to deliberate indifference.” See Estate of Cole by Pardue v. Fromm, 94

F.3d 254, 261 (7th Cir. 1996). Here, the record does not suggest that the choice to

pursue therapy, even though some of Welch’s doctors recommended surgery earlier

than it was preformed, was a “substantial departure from accepted professional

judgment, practice, or standards.” Id. at 262. The district court therefore did not

err by denying Welch’s deliberate indifference claim.

Second, he argues that the district court erroneously denied his motion for

appointment of counsel, a denial that we review for abuse of discretion. See Gil v.

Reed, 381 F.3d 649, 656-57 (7th Cir. 2004). But as the district court observed, the

issues Welch raised were not complex enough to require the assistance of counsel,

see id., and thus the motion was properly denied. 

For substantially the reasons stated by the district court, we AFFIRM the

district court’s judgment.