ANTHONY J. ROVILLARD, P la in t if f,
v. UNITED STAT ES CAPITOL P OLICE BOARD, Defendan t.
CARLTON P ERRY, P la in t if f,
v. UNITED STAT ES CAPITOL P OLICE BOARD, Defendan t.

UNITED STAT ES DIS TRICT COURT F OR THE D ISTRIC T OF CO LU M BIA

Ci vi l A cti on 09 -00 68 2 (H HK)

Ci vi l A cti on 09 -00 68 3 (H HK)

M EM OR

AN DU M OP IN ION Plaintiffs in these separ ate but re lated ca ses, Anthony Rovill ard a

nd Carlton Perry (collec tively

“plaintiffs” ), bringthese a ctions ag ainst the United States Capitol Pol ice B oard (“Police B oard” or “B oard” ) alleg ing a g e discrimination in violation of the Ag e Discr imination in Employ

ment Act (“ ADEA” ), 29 U.S.C. § 621 et seq. , and the United States Constitution. Plaintiffs’ near ly

identical complaints ar ise from the me rg er of the L ibrary

of Cong ress Police For ce ( “L ibrary

Police”) a

nd the United States Capitol Poli ce ( “Capitol Poli ce” ). Rovillard and Perry wer e both offic ers of

the L ibrary

Police at the time Cong ress a uthorized this m erg er a

nd2

both are ineligible to be come membe rs, rather than c ivilian employ ees, of the Capitol Pol ice beca use of their

ag es. Be fore the Court are the Police B oard’ s motions for partial dismissal and for summary judgme nt in Rovi llard’s [#6] and Perr y ’s [#6] case s. Upon consider ation of the motions, the oppositions t here to, and the re cord of this case, the Court c oncludes that the motion in eac h action should be g rante d. I. BACKG ROUND In Jan ua ry 20 08 , Co ng re ss e na c te d th e “ U. S. Ca pit ol P oli c e and

L ibr ary of Con g re ss Pol ic e Me rg e r Impl e me ntatio n A c t of 20 07 ” (“ Me rg e r A c t” ). Pub . L . N o. 11 0- 17 8, 12 1 St at. 2546 (2008). The Merg er A ct re quired tra nsfer of all L ibrary

Police employ ees to the Capitol Police. Id. § 2(a) , 121 Stat. at 2546. Office rs of the L ibrary Police “shall bec ome either a member or

civilian employ ee of

the Capitol Pol ice.” Id. § 2(a) (1). To be elig ible to become a Capitol P olice off

icer rathe r than a

civilian employ ee, a

L ibrary Police office r must be “e ntitled to an annuity

for immediate r etireme nt” bef ore turningsix ty

y ear s old, id. § 2 (b )( 1) (A )( i) ; in
o th e r w o r d s , th e o f

f i c e r mu s tb e a

b l e t o at t a i ntw e n ty ye ar s o f s e r v i c e b e f o r e r e a c h i n ga g e s i x ty, see id. ; 5 U.S.C. §§ 8336(b), 8412(b). In addition, an offic er must succ essfully complete tra ining and mee t qualifications spec ified by the Chief of the Capitol P olice. Mer g er A ct § 2(b)( 1)(A) (ii), (iii). The L ibrary

Police do not have a

mandatory

retire ment ag e, but a long standingstatutory provision mandates that a ll members of the Capitol Police “be separ ated f rom the ser

vice” upon
re a c hin ga g e fi ft

y -s e ve n w itha

po ssi bil ity

of e xten sio n to a g e sixty . 5 U. S.C. § 8 33 5( c ); se e als o Riggin v. Office of SenateFair Employme nt Practices , 61 F.3d 1563 ( Fe d. Cir. 1995) (desc ribingTh e c omp la int s in the se c a se s e a c h c onta in o nly on e c ount. Th e te xt imme diate ly 1 un de r t he he a din g“ CO UN T O NE ” in e a c h c omp la int state s, ho we ve r, that th e c ount a lle g e s a violation of the ADEA a

nd Title VI Iof the Civil Ri g hts Act of 1964. Th e Court

no te s f ir st that th e Pol ic e B oa

rd ha s a ssume d in

its mot ion s to dis mis s and for summary judgme nt that plaintiffs have e ach a lleg ed a c onstitut ional violation in addition to b ri ng ingstatut or

y c la ims . B e c a

us e pla int if

fs do no t c onte st t

his a ssumpt ion , th e Court wi ll treat it as corre ct.

W i thr e s p e c tt o an y

a s s e rt i o no f

a c l a i mb a s e d

o na v i o l at i o no f

T i t l e V II, ho we ve r, the Court

no te s th at ne ith e r c omp la int inc lud e s f

a c tua l a sse rt ion s r e latin gto discrimination based on a fac tor other than a g e and none of the filing s by either pa rty ref ere nce a claim other tha

n ag e discrimination. Ther efor e, the Court will not addre ss either plaintiff’ s cursor y ref ere nce to a

violation of Title VI I
. See Duncan’ s Point Lot

Owners Ass’n, Inc . v. FERC , 522 F.3d 371, 377 ( D.C. Cir. 2008). In any event, be cause the complaints do not prese nt 3 the history

of mandatory

retire ment for f

eder al law e nforc ement off icer s and notingthat the
curr ent provision reg ardingCapitol P olice off icer s was ena cted in 1994 (c iting Pub. L . No. 103- 283, § 307, 108 Stat. 1423, 1441-42 (1994))) . A L ibrary Police office r who be comes a civilian employ ee, r ather

than an of

fice r, of the Ca

pitol P olice may

continue to serve past the mandatory
re tir e me nt a g e if

he is n ot e lig ibl e fo r a

re tir e me nt a

nnuit y up on re a c hin git. Me rg e r A c t § 2(b)( 2), 121 Stat. at 2547. Rovill ard a

nd Perry filed their a ctions ag ainst the Police Boa rd, which is the ove rsig ht entity for the Ca

pitol P olice, in April 2009. At that time, they wer e off icer s of the L ibrary

Police. Rovill ard, a g e fifty -four

at the time he f

iled his complaint, joined the L ibrary Police in 2000; Pe rr y , a g e fi ft y -n ine , jo ine d in

19 92 . Pl a int if

fs we re no t invit e d to the tr a ini ngre qu ir e d f or a ll L ibrary Police office rs who we re to be come Capitol Police offic ers be cause they would both have
rea ched a g e six ty

befor e attainingtwenty

y ear s of servic e. Plaintiffs alleg e that this decision
c on sti tut e s a g e dis c ri min atio n a nd ha rm s th e m f

or a va ri e ty of re a so ns , in c lud ingthat th e y wi ll lose the bene fits associated w ith retiringas fe dera l law enf orce ment office rs, in violation of the ADEA a nd the U.S. Constit ution. 1any

fa c tua l a lle g atio ns re g ard ingdis c ri min atio n b a se d o n a ny fa c tor oth e r t ha n a g e , a ny c la im other than a g e discrimination would be subjec t to dism issal. Se e Be ll A tl. Cor p. v . Two mb ly , 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007).

Summary judgme nt may

be g rante d only

wher e “the pleading s, the discover y and 2 disclosure mate rials on file, a nd any aff idavits show that there is no g enuine issue a s to any mate ri a l f a c t and that th e mov ant i s e nti tle d to jud g me nt a s a matte r o f l aw. ” F e d. R. C iv. P. 56 (c )( 2) ; se e als o B ur

k e v . G ou ld , 286 F.3d 513, 517 ( D.C. Cir. 2002). The Police B oard f

irst seeks dismissal of Rovill ard a nd Perry ’s ADEAclaims for 3 lack of jurisdiction. The Boa

rd ar gues that Cong ress ha s only waived immunity

from ADE A actions, via the Cong ressional Ac countability Act, 2 U.S.C. § 1301 et seq. , for e mploy ees of the Capitol P olice; bec ause Rovillard a nd Perry wer e still employ ees of

the L ibrary

of Cong ress at the time they

filed their suits, the B oard r easons, they are not cover ed by

the Act. Plaintiffs ar g ue in response that beca

use they wer e denie d entry

to the trainingfor of

fice rs “tra nsitioni ng ” fr om the L ibrary

Police to the Capitol P olice, they are applicants to be of

fice rs of the Capitol Police and ther efor e ar e cove red. The Court declines to re solve this issue because even a ssuming that pla int if fs are e lig ibl e to b ri ngc la ims un de r t he AD EA , th os e c la ims ne ve rt he le ss m us t f a il. Al l r e fe re nc e s to the pa

rt ie s’ fi lin g s h e re in a

pp ly to t he c or re sp on din g , n e arl y 4 identical docume nts in each pla intiff’s ca se. 4 II. AN AL YSI S The Police B oard r equests summary judgme nt as to plaintiffs’ ADEAclaims and
c on sti tut ion a l c la ims
. 2 A. P laintif

fs’ ADEA Claim s F ail Because Mandatory Re tire m ent Age s for Fe deral Law Enf orce m ent Off

icer s Are Exem pt from the ADEA. The Police B oard a

rgues that the Mer g er A ct’s application of the mandatory retire ment
a g e of Ca pit ol P oli c e to L ibr ary

Pol ic e is n ot s ub

je c t to a c ha lle ng e un de r t

he AD EA be c a

us e 3
a g e lim its fo r l aw e nf

or c e me nt o ff

ic e rs “ are e xemp te d f

ro m th e statut e ’s c ov e ra g e .” De f. ’s Mo t. t o Di s m i s s at1 8 (qu o t i n g Kim e l v Fl . B d. of R e

ge nts , 528 U.S. 62, 69 (2000)). Plaintiffs do not 4 respond to this argument but instead rea ssert that the Mer g er A ct “a nd the conduc t of Def

endant impose a mandatory

retire ment upon Plaintiff which constitutes unlawful discr imination basedSection 8331(20) pr ovides, in releva nt part, that “‘ law enf

orce ment office r’ mea

ns 5 an employee, the duties of whose position are primarily the investig ation, appre hension, or detention of individuals suspected or convicted of

offe nses ag ainst the criminal laws of the United States.” 5 U.S.C. § 8331(20). 5 on ag e in violation of [the ADEA]” and desc ribe e vidence alleg edly supporting that claim. Pl.’s Opp’n to De f.’s Mot. to Dismiss (“Pl.’s Opp’n”) a t 7-9, 16-24. The Police B oard is cor

rec t. By fede ral statute, “ [t ]he head of a ny ag ency may deter mine and fix the mini mum and maxi mum lim its of ag e within which an or igina l appointment may be
ma de to a po sit ion a s a law e nf or c e me nt o ff

ic e r . . . a s d e fi ne d b y

se c tio n 8 33 1( 20 ) .
. . of

thi s title.” 5 U.S.C. § 3307(d). The D.C. Circuit held, in consider ing a challeng e to maxim um entry 5 ag es for Bur eau of

Prisons employ ees, that “sec tion 3307(d) is an exception to the ADEA.” Ste war t v . S

mi th , 673 F.2d 485, 490- 94 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (c onsideringat leng th the conflict betwee n section 3307(d) and the AD EA and c oncludingthat to apply the ADEA“would re quire us to adopt a straine d rea ding of section 3307(d) and to ig nore Cong ress’ c lear intent to employ maxi mum entry

ag es as a means towa

rds sec uringa ‘youngand vig orous’ wor k forc e of la

w
e nf or c e me nt o ff

ic e rs ” ); see also Dunning v. Q uander , 5 08 F .3 d 8 , 1 0 ( D. C. C ir . 2 00 7) (n oti ngin d i ct a t h at“f

ed er al l aw au th o ri z es th e u s e o f a ge l i m i t s fo r l aw en fo rc em en tp o s i t i o n s ” ( ci t i n g 5 U. S.C. § 3 30 7( d) ; Ste war t , 673 F.2d at 493-94)). The Supreme Court evide ntly ag ree s. See Kimel , 5 28 U. S. at 68 -6 9 ( no tin gin d ic ta that “ [u]nd e r t

he c ur re nt A DE A, mand ator

y a g e lim its for law enfor ceme nt office rs and f irefighters—at f

eder al, state, a

nd local leve ls—are e x empted from the statute’ s cover ag e” ( citing 5 U .S.C. § 3307(d), (e) ; 29 U.S.C. § 623(j))). A l th o u g hth e s e c a s e s h av e n o ta d dr e s s e d th e L i b r ar

y o r C a p i t o l P o l i c e f

o r c e s s p e c i f

i c a l l y, plaintiffs have not offer ed any rea son why

the L ibrary

or Capitol Poli ce do not f all within sectionAdditionally , althoug h section 3307(d) ref ers to ag e re quirements imposed by 6 “[t] he hea d of any

ag ency ,” 5 U.S.C. § 3307(d), the Court c an only conclude that the exemption from the AD EA for

law enf orce ment office rs applies with equa l force to ag e re quirements the Chi e f o f t he Ca pit ol P oli c e imp os e s p ur su ant t o a ins tr uc tio n f ro m Co ngre ss. 6 3307(d)’ s definition of “lawenfor ceme nt office r.” This Court holds t hat they do. Be cause the 6 mandatory

retire ment scheme to which plaintiffs objec t is ex empted fr om the ADEA, the Court
c on c lud e s th at no mate ri a l f a c ts r a ise a

g e nu ine iss ue a s to wh e the r, a s a matte r o f l aw, pla int if

fs ’ ADEA c laims can succ eed. B eca use the AD EA cla ims mustfail, the Court shall g rant the Police B oa rd ’s re qu e st f

or summa ry jud g me nt a s to tho se c la ims
. B. P laintif

f’s Eq ual Pr otec tion Claim F ails Because the Me rgerAct ’s Application of Mandatory Re tire m ent Age s to F orm er Library P olice is Rationally Related to a Legitim ate Stat e Inter est. Al tho ug h Ro vil lard

and Pe rr y ’s c omp la int s f

a il t o ma ke c le ar what c on sti tut ion a l c la im pla int if fs a dv anc e , it

is a pp are nt f ro m th e pa

rt ie s’ su bs e qu e nt f

ili ng s th at pl a int if

fs int e nd to argue that the Me rg er A ct’s provision pre ventingolder L ibrary Police office rs from be coming Capitol P olice off

icer s violates their rig ht to equal protec tion of the laws. The fede ral g overnme nt must adhere to the E qual Protection Clause of the Four teenth Amendme nt by

virtue of the Due Process Clause of the Fif th Amendment. See B olling v. Sharpe , 347 U.S. 497, 498-99 (1954). Th e law g ov e rn inge qu a l pr ote c tio n c ha lle ng e s to c la ssi fi c atio ns by a g e is c le ar. B e c a

us e

“ a g e is n ot a

su sp e c t c la ssi fi c atio n und e r t he Eq ua l Pr ote c tio n Cl a

us e ,” a statut e do e s n ot v iol ate the Con sti tut ion

by “ dis c ri min at[in g ] on t

he ba sis of

a g e . . . if the a g e c la ssi fi c atio n . . . is rationally related to a leg itimate state interest.” Kimel , 5 2 8 U. S
. at8 3 (c i t i n g Gregory v
. As hc ro ft , 5 01 U. S. 4 52 , 4 70 (1 99 1) ; Vancev. Bradley , 4 40 U. S. 9 3, 97 (1 97 9) ; Mass. Bd. of7

Re tir e me nt v . M

ur gia , 4 27 U. S. 3 07 , 3 13 -1 4 ( 19 76 )) . Und e r r atio na l- ba sis re vie w, a c ourt “ wi ll not overturn suc h [gover

nment action] unless the vary ing tr eatment of

differ ent g roups or pe rsons is s o unr e late d to the a c hie ve me nt o f a ny c omb inatio n o f l e g iti mate purp os e s th at w e c an o nly conclude that the [gove rnment’s] actions wer e irra tional.” Id. at8 4 (qu o t i n g Bradley , 440 U.S. at 97 ) ( int e rn a l qu otatio n ma rk s o mitte d) (a lte ratio ns in o ri g ina l) . T his c a se is a na log ou s to on e in wh i ch th e U
. S
. S u

p re m e C o urtu

p h el d a s t at e l aw m an d at i n g re t i re m en to f p o l i ce o ff i ce rs atage fifty ag ainst an equa l protection cha lleng e. Se e Mu rg ia , 427 U.S. 307. The Court noted that

“ un de r t he ratio na l- ba sis sta

nd ard ,” a le g isl atur e ’s “ dr awi ngof lin e s th at c re ate dis tin c tio ns ” is

“ pr e sume d to be va lid ” and c on c lud e d th at ma

nd ator y re tir e me nt o f p oli c e of

fi c e rs wa s “ c le arl y rationally related” to the leg islative g oal of “ protec t[ ing] the public by assuringphy sical prepa redne ss of its uniformed police.” Id. at 314-15. R o v i l l ar d an d P erry d o n o td i s p u t e t h atth ey

b ea r t h e b urd en o f p ro v i n g th atth e a ge discrimination in question is notrationally related to any

leg itimate gove rnment intere st. Pl .’s Op p’ n at 10 ; see also Kimel , 5 28 U. S. at 84 (“ [B ]ec a us e an a g e c la ssi fi c atio n is pr e sumpt ive ly
ratio na l, t he ind ivi du a l c ha lle ng ingits c on sti tut ion a lity be ars the burd e n o f p ro vin gthat th e ‘f a c ts on which the c lassification is appar ently based c ould not reasona

bly be conc eived to be tr

ue by th e go v ern m en t al d ec i s i o n m ak er . ’” (qu o t i n g Bradley , 440 U.S. at 111)). Instead, they argue that the Court’s re view ca

n only take into ac count rationales that appe ar in the le g islative rec ord of the statut e be ingc ha lle ng e d. Th is r e a so nin gis p la inl y inc or re c t. T he c a se pla int if

fs c ite to support their proposition, Citi zens to Preserv e Ov erton Park, Inc . v. Volpe , 401 U.S. 402 (1971), descr ibes the appr opriate me thod of revie w of a g ency decisions pursuant to the Administrative Procedur e Ac t, 5 U.S.C. § 701 et seq. Se e Ov e rto n Par k, 401 U.S. at 416, 419 (desc ribingthe8

defe rential standa

rd of r eview in Administrative Proc edure Act ca ses and notingthat “‘post-hoc ’
ratio na lizatio ns ” ba se d o n e vid e nc e outsi de the a dmi nis tr ativ e re c or d a re no t an a

pp ro pr iate ba sis for r eview)
. As the Pol ic e B oa

rd argue s in re ply , th e se ttl e d d oc tr ine in e qu a l pr ote c tio n c a se s is qu ite differ ent: “a le g islature that cr eate s” cla ssifications alonglines subject to rational-ba sis review “nee d not ‘ac tually

articulate at any

time the purpose or

rationale supporting its cla ssification.’” Heller v . Doe e

x rel. Doe , 5 0 9 U. S
. 3 1 2 , 3 2 0 (1 9 9 3 ) ( qu o t i n g Nordlinger v. Hahn , 505 U.S. 1, 15 (1 99 2) ). Gi ve n th e Sup re me Court pr e c e de nt c ite d a

bo ve , it is c le ar t hat a ratio na l ba sis su

pp or ts the Merg er A ct. Amongother possible explanations, it is rational to desire a “youngand vigor ous law enf

orce ment depar

tment.” Def

.’s Mot. to Dismis s at 15. Be cause the Merg er A ct’s provisions decliningto except L ibrary Police from the r etireme nt ag e of Capitol Police withstand rational-ba sis review, the Police Boa rd is entitled to judgment a s to plaintiffs’ equa l protection
c la ims
. IV . C ON CL USI ON For the fore g oing r easons, the Court c oncludes that the Police B oard’ s motion i n eac h
c a se [##6 , 6 ] sha ll b e g ra

nte d. An a pp ro pr iate or de r a c c omp anie s th is m e mor and um o pin ion

in
e a c h o f t he a bo ve -c a pti on e d c a se s.

Henr y H. Kenne dy , J r. United States District Court