### IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 13

- 50189 Summary Calendar

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA , Plaintiff

- Appellee

v. HARMON CHESTER STRUNK, JR., also known as Butch Grimes , Defendant

- Appellant

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Texas USDC No. 5:10

- CR

- 718

- 1

Before JOLLY, SMITH, and CLEMENT, Circuit Judges. PER CURIAM: * Harmon Chester Strunk, Jr., challenges his jury trial conviction s for engaging in the business of dealing in firearms without a license and for selling a firearm to a felon. See 18 U.S.C. § § 922(a)(1)(A) , (d); 923(a) ; 924(a)(1)(D) , (a)(2) . We affirm. We reject Strunk ’ s claim that there was insufficient evidence that he was engaged in the business of selling firearms . To convict a defendant of illegal ly

* Pursuant to 5 TH C IR

. R. 47.5 , the court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited ci rcumstances set forth in 5 TH C IR

. R. 47.5.4. United States Court of Appeals Fifth Circuit 

### FILED January 14, 2014

Lyle W. Cayce Clerk Case: 13-50189 Document: 00512499853 Page: 1 Date Filed: 01/14/2014No. 13

- 50189
dealing in firearms, the Government must prove that he was not a licensed importer, manufacturer, or dealer of firearms and that he wilfully engaged in the business of importing, manufacturing, or dealing in firearms. §§ 922(a)(1)(A), 924(a)(1)(D); Bryan v. United States , 524 U .S. 184, 187

- 88 & n.2 (1998). The evidence showed that Strunk did not have a license , that he engaged in a regular course of selling firearms that were not part of his personal collection , and that he retained money collected on the sale of others’ firearms. Strunk has failed to show that no rational trier of fact could have found that the evidence “established guil t beyond a reasonable doubt.” Jackson v. Virginia , 443 U.S. 307, 318 (1979). Additionally, we find no merit to the c laim that the legislation making it a crime to engage in the business of selling firearms without a license is unconstitutionally vague because it did not furnish fair notice as to what conduct was allowed and what conduct was proscribed. Strunk, without being licensed, sold firearms entrusted to him by others for the purpose of sale. Such conduct is unquestionably prohibited by the legislation’s text. Strunk cannot, therefore, attack the legislation on the basis that it is vague because it does
not esta blish a bright

- line rule to guide and protect others. See Parker v. Levy , 417 U.S. 733, 756 (1974)

. We reject also the contention that here was insufficient evidence that Strunk knew or had reason to know that Carlos Roque , to whom he sold a firearm, was a felon. Strunk asserts primarily that a close examination of the recordings and transcripts presented to the jury reveals that the jury misconstrued the evidence. Even if his descriptions of the recordings and transcripts are taken as true, however, th ey demonstrate at best that Strunk disagrees with the way the jury construed the evidence, not that the jury’s

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construction was unreasonable. See United States v. Mitchell , 484 F.3d 762, 768 (5th Cir. 2007). AFFIRMED.

3 Case: 13-50189 Document: 00512499853 Page: 3 Date Filed: 01/14/2014