12836 Federal Register / Vol. 74, No. 56 / Wednesday, March 25, 2009 / Notices 

RETRIEVABILITY: 

Delete and replace with the following 

language: 

‘‘Staff producing statistical products 

will have access only to data sets from 

which Social Security Numbers have 

been deleted and replaced by unique 

non-identifying codes internal to the 

Census Bureau. Fewer than ten sworn 

Census Bureau staff, who work within a 

secure restricted-access environment, 

will be permitted to retrieve records 

containing Social Security Numbers.’’ 

SAFEGUARDS: 

Delete and replace with the following 

language: 

‘‘Each project must be approved by an 

in-house Project Review Board to ensure 

that data relating to the project will be 

used only for authorized purposes. All 

uses of the data will be only for 

statistical purposes, which by definition 

means that uses will not directly affect 

any individual. Once the Project Review 

Board has approved a project, 

construction of statistical extracts with 

information from one or more of the 

source data sets may occur. Extract data 

sets will be based on unique nonidentifying codes and will only be 

released to designated sworn Census 

Bureau staff with a need-to-know. The 

data in the extracts for these projects 

will not be made publicly available. 

Any publications based on the StARS 

will be cleared for release under the 

direction of the Census Bureau’s 

Disclosure Review Board, which will 

confirm that all the required disclosure 

protection procedures have been 

implemented. No information will be 

released that identifies any individual. 

All employees are subject to the 

restrictions, penalties, and prohibitions 

of 13 U.S.C. 9 and 214; 5 U.S.C. 

552a(b)(4); 18 U.S.C. 1905; 26 U.S.C. 

7213; and 42 U.S.C. 1306. When 

confidentiality or penalty provisions 

differ, the most stringent provisions 

apply to protect the data. Employees are 

regularly advised of the regulations 

issued pursuant to 13 U.S.C. 9 and 214 

and other relevant statutes governing 

confidentiality of the data. For example, 

13 U.S.C. 214 provides for penalties of 

up to five years in prison, and 

applicable criminal statutes could 

impose fines up to $250,000, for releases 

of confidential data. The restrictedaccess environment has been 

established to limit the number of 

Census Bureau employees with direct 

access to the personal identifiers in this 

system, so as to protect the 

confidentiality of the data and to 

prevent unauthorized use or access. 

These safeguards provide a level and 

scope of security that meet the level and 

scope of security established by the 

Office of Management and Budget in 

OMB Circular No. A–130, Appendix III, 

Security of Federal Automated 

Information Resources. Furthermore, the 

use of unsecured telecommunications to 

transmit individually identifiable 

information is prohibited.’’ 

RETENTION AND DISPOSAL: 

Delete and replace with the following 

language: 

‘‘Records are to be retained in 

accordance with the unit’s Records 

Control Schedule, which is based on 

separate agreements with each source 

entity. Retention is not to exceed 10 

years, unless, by agreement with the 

source entity, it is determined that a 

longer period is necessary for statistical 

purposes. At the end of the retention 

period or upon demand, all original data 

sets, extracts, and paper copies, from 

each source entity will be returned or 

destroyed as mandated by the 

agreements.’’ 

SYSTEM MANAGER AND ADDRESS: 

Delete and replace with the following 

language: 

‘‘Associate Director for Demographic 

Programs, U.S. Census Bureau, 4600 

Silver Hill Road, Washington, DC 

20233–8000.’’ 

NOTIFICATION PROCEDURE: 

Delete and replace with the following 

language: 

‘‘For the Census Bureau’s records, 

information may be obtained from: 

Assistant Division Chief for Data 

Management, Data Integration Division, 

Demographic Directorate, U.S. Census 

Bureau, 4600 Silver Hill Road, 

Washington, DC 20233–8100.’’ 

Add the following information: 

RECORD ACCESS PROCEDURES: 

See ‘‘Record Notification Procedure’’ 

above. 

Add the following information: 

CONTESTING RECORD PROCEDURES: 

‘‘None.’’ 

RECORD SOURCE CATEGORIES: 

Delete and replace with the following 

language: 

‘‘Individuals covered by selected 

administrative record systems and 

Census Bureau censuses and surveys.’’ 

EXEMPTIONS CLAIMED FOR SYSTEM: 

Delete and replace with the following 

language: 

‘‘Pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 552a(k)(4), this 

system of records is exempted from the 

notification, access, and contest 

requirements of the agency procedures 

(under 5 U.S.C. 552a(c)(3), (d), (e)(1), 

(e)(4)(G), (H), and (I), and (f)). This 

exemption is applicable as the data are 

maintained by the Bureau of the Census 

solely as statistical records, as required 

under Title 13 U.S.C., and are not used 

in whole or in part in making any 

determination about an identifiable 

individual. This exemption is made in 

accordance with agency rules published 

in the rules section of this Federal 

Register.’’ 

Dated: March 19, 2009. 

Brenda Dolan, 

Department of Commerce, Freedom of 

Information/Privacy Act Officer. 

[FR Doc. E9–6557 Filed 3–24–09; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 3510–07–P 

DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE 

Bureau of Industry and Security 

Action Affecting Export Privileges; 

Balli Group PLC; Balli Aviation; Balli 

Holdings; Vahid Alaghband; Hassan 

Alaghband; Blue Sky One Ltd.; Blue 

Sky Two Ltd.; Blue Sky Three Ltd.; 

Blue Airways; Mahan Airways; Blue 

Airways FZE 

In the matter of: 

Balli Group PLC, 5 Stanhope Gate, London, 

UK, W1K 1AH; 

Balli Aviation, 5 Stanhope Gate, London, UK, 

W1K 1AH; 

Balli Holdings, 5 Stanhope Gate, London, 

UK, W1K 1AH; 

Vahid Alaghband, 5 Stanhope Gate, London, 

UK, W1K 1AH; 

Hassan Alaghband, 5 Stanhope Gate, London, 

UK, W1K 1AH; 

Blue Sky One Ltd., 5 Stanhope Gate, London, 

UK, W1K 1AH; 

Blue Sky Two Ltd., 5 Stanhope Gate, London, 

UK, W1K 1AH; 

Blue Sky Three Ltd., 5 Stanhope Gate, 

London, UK, W1K 1AH; 

Blue Airways, 8/3 D Angaght Street, 376009 

Yerevan, Armenia; 

Mahan Airways, Mahan Tower, No. 21, 

Azadegan St., M.A. Jenah Exp. Way, 

Tehran, Iran; Respondents; 

and 

Blue Airways FZE, a/k/a Blue Airways, #G22 

Dubai Airport Free Zone, P.O. Box 393754 

DAFZA, Dubai, UAE; 

Blue Airways, Riqa Road, Dubai 52404, UAE; 

Related Persons. 

Order Renewing Order Temporarily 

Denying Export Privileges 

Pursuant to Section 766.24 of the 

Export Administration Regulations, 15 

CFR Parts 730–774 (2008) (‘‘EAR’’ or the 

‘‘Regulations’’), I hereby grant the 

request of the Bureau of Industry and 

Security (‘‘BIS’’) to renew for 180 days 

the Order Temporarily Denying the 

Export Privileges of Respondents Balli 

Group PLC, Balli Aviation, Balli 


PWALKER on PROD1PC71 with NOTICES
Federal Register / Vol. 74, No. 56 / Wednesday, March 25, 2009 / Notices 12837 

1The Related Persons Order was issued in 

accordance with Section 766.23 of the Regulations, 

15 CFR § 766.23, and was published in the Federal 

Register on July 24, 2008. 

2The September 17, 2008 Renewal Order was 

published in the Federal Register on October 1, 

2008. 

3Engaging in conduct prohibited by a denial 

order violates the Regulations. 15 CFR 764.2(a) and 

(k). 

Holdings, Vahid Alaghband, Hassan 

Alaghband, Blue Sky One Ltd., Blue Sky 

Two Ltd., Blue Sky Three Ltd., Blue 

Airways and Mahan Airways 

(collectively, ‘‘Respondents’’) and Blue 

Airways FZE and Blue Airways 

(collectively the ‘‘Related Persons’’), as 

I find that renewal of the TDO is 

necessary in the public interest to 

prevent an imminent violation of the 

EAR. However, I do not renew the TDO 

against Blue Sky Four Ltd., Blue Sky 

Five Ltd., and Blue Sky Six Ltd., who 

were each Respondents in the initial 

TDO and the September 17, 2008 

Renewal Order. 

I. Procedural History 

On March 17, 2008, the Assistant 

Secretary of Commerce for Export 

Enforcement (‘‘Assistant Secretary’’) 

signed an Order Temporarily Denying 

the Export Privileges of Balli Group 

PLC, Balli Aviation, Balli Holdings, 

Vahid Alaghband, Hassan Alaghband, 

Blue Sky One Ltd., Blue Sky Two Ltd., 

Blue Sky Three Ltd., Blue Sky Four Ltd., 

Blue Sky Five Ltd., Blue Sky Six Ltd., 

Blue Airways and Mahan Airways for 

180 days on the grounds that its 

issuance was necessary in the public 

interest to prevent an imminent 

violation of the Regulations (‘‘TDO’’). 

The TDO was issued ex parte pursuant 

to Section 766.24(a), and went into 

effect on March 21, 2008, the date it was 

published in the Federal Register. On 

July 18, 2008, the Assistant Secretary 

issued an Order adding Blue Airways 

FZE and Blue Airways, both of Dubai, 

United Arab Emirates, as Related 

Persons to the TDO in accordance with 

Section 766.23 of the Regulations.1 On 

September 17, 2008, the TDO was 

renewed for an additional 180 days in 

accordance with Section 766.24 of the 

Regulations, and was effective upon 

issuance.2 The TDO would expire on 

March 16, 2009, unless renewed in 

accordance with Section 766.24 of the 

Regulations. 

On February 24, 2009, BIS, through its 

Office of Export Enforcement (‘‘OEE’’), 

filed a written request for renewal of the 

TDO against each of the Respondents 

and Related Persons for an additional 

180 days, and served a copy of its 

request on the Respondents and Related 

Persons in accordance with Section 

766.5 of the Regulations. On the evening 

of March 9, 2009, Balli Group PLC, Balli 

Aviation, Balli Holdings, Vahid 

Alaghband, Hassan Alaghband, Blue 

Sky One Ltd., Blue Sky Two Ltd., Blue 

Sky Three Ltd., Blue Sky Four Ltd., Blue 

Sky Five Ltd., and Blue Sky Six Ltd. 

(collectively, ‘‘Balli’’ or the ‘‘Balli 

Respondents’’) submitted an opposition 

to the renewal request. As part of its 

opposition, the Balli Respondents 

submitted a request for a copy of the 

TDO renewal request exhibits. On 

March 12, 2009, I issued an Order 

granting discovery to the Balli 

Respondents of a copy of all of the 

exhibits referenced in OEE’s renewal 

request, and a copy of the exhibits was 

provided to Balli that same day. No 

opposition to renewal of the TDO was 

received from Respondents Blue 

Airways or Mahan Airways. 

II. Discussion 

A. Legal Standard 

Pursuant to section 766.24(d)(3) of the 

EAR, the sole issue to be considered in 

determining whether to continue a TDO 

is whether the TDO should be renewed 

to prevent an ‘‘imminent’’ violation of 

the EAR as defined in Section 766.24. 

‘‘A violation may be ’imminent’ either 

in time or in degree of likelihood.’’ 15 

CFR 766.24(b)(3). BIS may show ‘‘either 

that a violation is about to occur, or that 

the general circumstances of the matter 

under investigation or case under 

criminal or administrative charges 

demonstrate a likelihood of future 

violations.’’ Id. As to the likelihood of 

future violations, BIS may show that 

‘‘the violation under investigation or 

charges is significant, deliberate, covert 

and/or likely to occur again, rather than 

technical and negligent[.]’’ Id. A ‘‘lack of 

information establishing the precise 

time a violation may occur does not 

preclude a finding that a violation is 

imminent, so long as there is sufficient 

reason to believe the likelihood of a 

violation.’’ Id. 

B. The TDO and BIS’s Request for 

Renewal 

OEE’s request for renewal of the TDO 

was based upon the facts underlying the 

issuance of the initial TDO, as well as 

evidence developed over the course of 

this investigation indicating a clear 

willingness on the part of the Balli 

Respondents to disregard U.S. export 

controls and engage in a pattern of false 

and deceptive statements. The initial 

TDO was issued as a result of evidence 

that showed that the Respondents 

engaged in conduct prohibited by the 

EAR by knowingly re-exporting to Iran 

three U.S.-origin aircraft, specifically 

Boeing 747s (‘‘Aircraft 1–3’’), items 

subject to the EAR and classified under 

Export Control Classification Number 

(‘‘ECCN’’) 9A991.b, without the required 

U.S. Government authorization. Further 

evidence submitted by BIS indicated 

that Respondents were attempting to reexport three additional U.S.-origin 

Boeing 747s to Iran (‘‘Aircraft 4–6’’), and 

had ignored a re-delivery order for these 

additional three aircraft issued by BIS in 

accordance with Section 758.8(b) of the 

Regulations. 

As more fully discussed in the 

September 17, 2008 TDO Renewal 

Order, evidence presented with BIS’s 

August 28, 2008 renewal request and 

Balli’s September 10, 2008 opposition 

and ‘‘supplemental disclosure’’ 

indicated that Aircraft 1–3 continued to 

be flown on Mahan Airways’ routes 

after issuance of the TDO, in violation 

of the Regulations and the TDO itself.3

It also showed that Aircraft 1–3 had 

been and continued to be flown in 

further violation of the Regulations and 

the TDO on the routes of Iran Air, an 

Iranian Government airline. The Balli 

Respondents also made unsubstantiated 

and unpersuasive assertions concerning 

their level of knowledge of the potential 

unlawfulness of their actions, including 

long denying any involvement by 

Mahan Airways with Aircraft 1–3 and 

ignoring warnings from both BIS and 

Boeing concerning their lease and 

operation, and concerning their level of 

cooperation with BIS and efforts to 

recover the aircraft. 

At the time of the TDO, the Balli 

Respondents had failed to produce any 

documents concerning payments for the 

leases of Aircraft 1–3, which Balli 

maintained only involved Blue Airways. 

As part of its renewal request, OEE has 

presented evidence that the Aircraft 1– 

3 were financed by Mahan Air and 

evidence of contracts between Balli and 

Mahan Airways regarding the 

acquisition and operation of the aircraft 

that were signed by Balli’s Chief 

Executive Officer (‘‘CEO’’) Hassan 

Alaghband. OEE has also produced 

documents showing that more than one 

Iranian bank was used by the 

Respondents to facilitate the 

transaction. OEE argues that the 

contracts and agreements between Balli 

and Mahan Airways provide further 

evidence of Mahan’s involvement with 

the lease and operation of Aircraft 1–3, 

as well as the false and misleading 

nature of multiple statements by Balli 

during this investigation that it had no 

knowledge its actions were in violation 

or potential violation of the Regulations 

and that it was unaware of Mahan’s role 

in the acquisition and use of the aircraft. 


PWALKER on PROD1PC71 with NOTICES
12838 Federal Register / Vol. 74, No. 56 / Wednesday, March 25, 2009 / Notices 

4The record indicates that Aircraft 4–6 have been 

repossessed by the lender. This information is only 

relevant to Respondents Blue Sky Four Ltd., Blue 

Sky Five Ltd. and Blue Sky Six Ltd. 

As noted above, OEE also is 

requesting the TDO be renewed against 

Blue Airways and Mahan Airways based 

on their participation in the violations 

discussed in the initial and renewed 

TDOs, as well as additional unlawful 

actions since the TDO was renewed on 

September 17, 2008. Specifically, in 

October 2008, Mahan Airways and Blue 

Airways deregistered Aircraft 1–3 from 

the Armenian civil aircraft registry and 

subsequently registered the aircraft in 

Iran. The aircraft have been relocated to 

Iran and have been issued Iranian tail 

numbers, including EP–MNA and EP– 

MNB, and continue to be operated on 

Mahan Airway flights in violation of the 

Regulations and the TDO. 

On February 10, 2009, almost one 

year after the initial TDO was issued, 

the Balli Respondents for the first time 

acknowledged the existence of a side 

letter agreement between Balli, Mahan 

Airways and other parties which 

included certain drafted and undated 

bills of sales allowing ownership of 

Aircraft 1–3 to be transferred to Mahan 

Airways. However, this partial 

acknowledgment, contained in one of 

Balli’s court filings in the United 

Kingdom, fails to explain the full scope 

and involvement of Mahan Airways in 

this transaction. 

C. The Respondents’ Opposition to the 

Renewal Request 

The Balli Respondents, through 

counsel, oppose renewal of the TDO on 

three grounds: (1) None of the six 

aircraft4 in the initial TDO are currently 

subject to the control of the Balli 

Respondents, and specifically that 

Aircraft 1–3 ‘‘were subject to 

unauthorized release by Blue Airways 

and conversion in October 2008, as set 

forth in documents submitted to OEE 

investigators on February 10, 2009[,]’’ 

Balli Opposition, at 3; (2) Balli is 

engaged in on-going efforts to produce 

documents and information requested 

by OEE; and (3) Balli is engaged in ongoing litigation in the United Kingdom 

against Blue Airways and Mahan 

Airways regarding ownership and 

possession of the aircraft. 

D. Findings 

In determining whether to renew the 

TDO in order to prevent imminent 

violation of the Regulations, I have 

reviewed the entire record, including 

OEE’s and Balli’s current and prior 

submissions and related evidence. I find 

that violations of the Regulations have 

occurred and continue to occur 

involving the unlicensed re-export of 

Aircraft 1–3 to Iran. Moreover, Aircraft 

1–3 are currently located in Iran and are 

registered and/or operated by the 

Respondents in violation of the 

Regulations and the TDO. In addition, 

the Balli Respondents have engaged in 

a repeated pattern of making false and 

deceptive statements to BIS in order to 

both conceal the true nature of their 

activities and to seek termination of the 

TDO against them. Contrary to Balli’s 

previous submissions and efforts to 

mislead BIS, OEE’s investigation has 

obtained evidence that Balli was dealing 

directly with Mahan Airways officials to 

obtain financing and to negotiate and 

enter agreements pertaining to the 

purchase and lease of three Boeing 747 

aircraft (Aircraft 1–3). Moreover, the 

record shows that more than one Iranian 

bank was used by Balli and Mahan 

Airways to transfer funds for the 

acquisition of the aircraft. 

This evidence directly calls into 

doubt the veracity of prior submissions 

by the Balli Respondents to the 

Assistant Secretary and BIS. For 

example, by letter dated October 10, 

2007, BIS warned Balli, via its English 

counsel, that ‘‘[i]t has come to BIS’s 

attention there is evidence that during 

this lease agreement Blue Airways 

operated the three 747s aircraft by or for 

the benefit of an Iranian entity, 

specifically Mahan Air.’’ Despite the 

fact that Balli Respondent and CEO 

Hassan Alaghband signed contracts with 

Mahan Airways in May of 2007, Balli 

stated in its September 10, 2008 

submission that the Balli Respondents 

had ‘‘failed to focus on the underlying 

substantive legal concerns associated 

with Boeing and BIS communications,’’ 

because they believed they were targets 

of a ‘‘disinformation campaign’’ 

orchestrated by ‘‘Iranian expatriate 

groups that have a long history of 

hostility to Balli interests and the 

Alaghband family[,]’’ including 

‘‘militant opposition groups hostile to 

Iran, including the Mujahedin-e-Khalq.’’ 

BIS and Boeing’s communications 

involved warnings to Balli that the 

aircraft were being operated in violation 

of the Regulations and were being flown 

by or for the benefit of Mahan Airways. 

Balli’s production of requested 

documents and information has been 

delayed, limited and halting at best, and 

its repeated pattern of false and 

misleading statements further 

undermines its assertions concerning 

complete, good faith cooperation with 

BIS. 

Balli’s opposition asserts that Aircraft 

1–3 ‘‘were subject to unauthorized 

release by Blue Airways and conversion 

in October 2008, as set forth in 

documents submitted to OEE 

investigators on February 10, 2009.’’ 

Balli Opposition, at 3. Balli also has 

asserted that Blue Airways and Mahan 

Airways ‘‘have previously fabricated 

documents—in the offices of Mahan 

Airlines in Teheran, Iran—which were 

used to unlawfully effect transfer of 

control of the subject aircraft for use in 

Iran.’’ Id., at 2. These assertions feed 

into the Balli Respondents’ remaining 

arguments that the TDO should be 

terminated against them on the grounds 

that they no longer control Aircraft 1– 

3 and are litigating with those entities 

in England, with an expected July 2009 

trial date. 

I find Balli’s argument that it is 

currently in litigation against Mahan 

Airways and Blue Airways in England 

to be an unpersuasive and insufficient 

basis to terminate the TDO against Balli, 

particularly in light of recent evidence 

that, contrary to prior statements and 

submissions to BIS and the Assistant 

Secretary, Balli negotiated directly with 

Mahan Air regarding the financing and 

operation of the aircraft. However, I find 

based upon the entire record before me, 

including submissions from OEE and 

Balli, that Aircraft 4–6 have been 

physically and legally repossessed by 

the lender, which is not a respondent in 

this action. Therefore, the TDO shall not 

be renewed as to Respondents Blue Sky 

Four Ltd., Blue Sky Five Ltd., and Blue 

Sky Six Ltd. 

Unlike the facts involving Aircraft 4– 

6, Balli’s argument based on the asserted 

ground that Aircraft 1–3 are not 

currently under its control due to the 

alleged conversion—which Balli asserts 

resulted (as referenced above) in the 

transfer of control of the subject aircraft 

‘‘for use in Iran’’—is unpersuasive and 

insufficient. Although the Balli 

Respondents refused until September 

10, 2008, to admit or acknowledge 

Mahan Airway’s involvement, the 

record indicates that Aircraft 1–3 were 

already in use in Iran under the leases 

between Balli and, at least nominally, 

Blue Airways. Moreover, the record 

before me contains evidence indicating 

that the Balli Respondents knowingly 

arranged for the financing of the aircraft 

with Mahan Airways. This evidence 

may well explain why the Balli 

Respondents were unable to produce 

evidence demonstrating any lease 

payments by Blue Airways. In any 

event, the fact that Balli is now involved 

in an apparent contractual dispute with 

its co-conspirators involving items reexported in violation of the Regulations 

is simply not a proper basis to let the 

TDO expire, especially in light of Balli’s 

pattern of false and misleading 

statements to BIS. 


PWALKER on PROD1PC71 with NOTICES
Federal Register / Vol. 74, No. 56 / Wednesday, March 25, 2009 / Notices 12839 

I have considered all of Balli’s 

arguments and with the exception of the 

argument involving Aircraft 4–6 find 

them without merit. I find that the 

evidence presented by BIS convincingly 

demonstrates that the Respondents have 

violated the EAR and the TDO involving 

re-exports of aircraft to Iran, that such 

violations have been significant, 

deliberate and covert, and that there is 

a likelihood of future violations. As 

such, a TDO is needed to give notice to 

persons and companies in the United 

States and abroad that they should 

continue to cease dealing with the 

Respondents in export transactions 

involving items subject to the EAR. 

Such a TDO is consistent with the 

public interest to prevent or preclude 

violations of the EAR. 

Accordingly, I find pursuant to 

Section 766.24, that renewal of the TDO 

for 180 days against Balli Group PLC, 

Balli Aviation, Balli Holdings, Vahid 

Alaghband, Hassan Alaghband, Blue 

Sky One Ltd., Blue Sky Two Ltd., Blue 

Sky Three Ltd., Blue Airways and 

Mahan Airways and both Related 

Persons is necessary in the public 

interest to prevent an imminent 

violation of the EAR. 

III. Order 

It is therefore ordered: 

First, that the Respondents, BALLI 

GROUP PLC, 5 Stanhope Gate, London, 

UK, W1K 1AH; BALLI AVIATION, 5 

Stanhope Gate, London, UK, W1K 1AH; 

BALLI HOLDINGS, 5 Stanhope Gate, 

London, UK, W1K 1AH; VAHID 

ALAGHBAND, 5 Stanhope Gate, 

London, UK, W1K 1AH; HASSAN 

ALAGHBAND, 5 Stanhope Gate, 

London, UK, W1K 1AH; BLUE SKY 

ONE LTD., 5 Stanhope Gate, London, 

UK, W1K 1AH; BLUE SKY TWO LTD., 

5 Stanhope Gate, London, UK, W1K 

1AH; BLUE SKY THREE LTD., BLUE 

AIRWAYS, 8/3 D Angaght Street, 

376009 Yerevan, Armenia; and MAHAN 

AIRWAYS, Mahan Tower, No. 21, 

Azadegan St., M.A. Jenah Exp.Way, 

Tehran, Iran (each a ‘‘Denied Person’’ 

and collectively the ‘‘Denied Persons’’), 

and BLUE AIRWAYS FZE, a/k/a Blue 

Airways, #G22 Dubai Airport Free Zone, 

P.O. Box 393754 DAFZA, Dubai, United 

Arab Emirates and BLUE AIRWAYS, 

Riqa Road, Dubai 52404, United Arab 

Emirates (each a ‘‘Related Person’’ and 

collectively the ‘‘Related Persons’’) may 

not, directly or indirectly, participate in 

any way in any transaction involving 

any commodity, software or technology 

(hereinafter collectively referred to as 

‘‘item’’) exported or to be exported from 

the United States that is subject to the 

Export Administration Regulations 

(‘‘EAR’’), or in any other activity subject 

to the EAR including, but not limited to: 

A. Applying for, obtaining, or using 

any license, License Exception, or 

export control document; 

B. Carrying on negotiations 

concerning, or ordering, buying, 

receiving, using, selling, delivering, 

storing, disposing of, forwarding, 

transporting, financing, or otherwise 

servicing in any way, any transaction 

involving any item exported or to be 

exported from the United States that is 

subject to the EAR, or in any other 

activity subject to the EAR; or 

C. Benefiting in any way from any 

transaction involving any item exported 

or to be exported from the United States 

that is subject to the EAR, or in any 

other activity subject to the EAR. 

Second, that no person may, directly 

or indirectly, do any of the following: 

A. Export or reexport to or on behalf 

of the Denied Persons or Related 

Persons any item subject to the EAR; 

B. Take any action that facilitates the 

acquisition or attempted acquisition by 

the Denied Persons or Related Persons 

of the ownership, possession, or control 

of any item subject to the EAR that has 

been or will be exported from the 

United States, including financing or 

other support activities related to a 

transaction whereby the Denied Persons 

or Related Persons acquires or attempts 

to acquire such ownership, possession 

or control; 

C. Take any action to acquire from or 

to facilitate the acquisition or attempted 

acquisition from the Denied Persons or 

Related Persons of any item subject to 

the EAR that has been exported from the 

United States; 

D. Obtain from the Denied Persons or 

Related Persons in the United States any 

item subject to the EAR with knowledge 

or reason to know that the item will be, 

or is intended to be, exported from the 

United States; or 

E. Engage in any transaction to service 

any item subject to the EAR that has 

been or will be exported from the 

United States and which is owned, 

possessed or controlled by the Denied 

Persons or Related Persons, or service 

any item, of whatever origin, that is 

owned, possessed or controlled by the 

Denied Persons or Related Persons if 

such service involves the use of any 

item subject to the EAR that has been or 

will be exported from the United States. 

For purposes of this paragraph, 

servicing means installation, 

maintenance, repair, modification or 

testing. 

Third, that, after notice and 

opportunity for comment as provided in 

section 766.23 of the EAR, any other 

person, firm, corporation, or business 

organization related to any of the 

Denied Persons by affiliation, 

ownership, control, or position of 

responsibility in the conduct of trade or 

related services may also be made 

subject to the provisions of this Order. 

Fourth, that this Order does not 

prohibit any export, reexport, or other 

transaction subject to the EAR where the 

only items involved that are subject to 

the EAR are the foreign-produced direct 

product of U.S.-origin technology. 

In accordance with the provisions of 

Section 766.24(e) of the EAR, the 

Respondents may, at any time, appeal 

this Order by filing a full written 

statement in support of the appeal with 

the Office of the Administrative Law 

Judge, U.S. Coast Guard ALJ Docketing 

Center, 40 South Gay Street, Baltimore, 

Maryland 21202–4022. 

In accordance with the provisions of 

Section 766.24(d) of the EAR, BIS may 

seek renewal of this Order by filing a 

written request not later than 20 days 

before the expiration date. The 

Respondents may oppose a request to 

renew this Order by filing a written 

submission with the Assistant Secretary 

of Commerce for Export Enforcement, 

which must be received not later than 

seven days before the expiration date of 

the Order. 

A copy of this Order shall be served 

on the Respondents and the Related 

Persons and shall be published in the 

Federal Register. 

This Order is effective immediately and 

shall remain in effect for 180 days. 

Entered this 16th day of March 2009. 

Kevin Delli-Colli, 

Acting Assistant Secretary of Commerce for 

Export Enforcement. 

[FR Doc. E9–6607 Filed 3–24–09; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 3510–DT–P 

DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE 

National Oceanic and Atmospheric 

Administration 

RIN: 0648–XO35 

Gulf of Mexico Fishery Management 

Council; Public Meetings 

AGENCY: National Marine Fisheries 

Service (NMFS), National Oceanic and 

Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), 

Commerce. 

ACTION: Notice of public meetings. 

SUMMARY: The Gulf of Mexico Fishery 

Management Council (Council) will 

convene public meetings. 

DATES: The meetings will be held April 

14–17, 2009. 


PWALKER on PROD1PC71 with NOTICES