J-S36003-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

v.

IRENA SHIE 

Appellant

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 2971 EDA 2022

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered October 18, 2022

In the Court of Common Pleas of Delaware County Criminal Division at 

No(s): CP-23-SA-0000409-2022

BEFORE: BOWES, J., NICHOLS, J., and KING, J.

MEMORANDUM BY BOWES, J.: FILED OCTOBER 18, 2023

Irena Shie appeals pro se from the judgment of sentence imposed 

following her conviction of the summary offense of harassment. We affirm. 

In short, the facts of this case are as follows. Appellant was unhappy 

with the accommodations Garnett Valley Elementary School provided to her 

daughter related to her mental health diagnoses. She directed her displeasure 

at the school’s principal, Katelyn Jones, sending dozens of emails to Ms. Jones 

and various other members of the school’s staff about Ms. Jones’s purported 

misdeeds, including being a bully, a child abuser, and a murderer. See N.T. 

Trial, 10/18/22, at 14-15, 18, 25-28. After she was prohibited from coming 

onto school grounds for any reason other to drop off or pick up her daughter, 

Appellant lingered outside Ms. Jones’s office window on fifteen or twenty 

occasions after the pick-up, making Ms. Jones feel uncomfortable. See N.T. 
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Trial, 10/18/22, at 29. Appellant additionally posted about Ms. Jones online, 

accusing her of being a mentally ill child abuser and murderer who “has no 

hesitation to put children at risk, or even push children into committing 

suicide[,] so long as she could protect her reputation, salary, and position.” 

Commonwealth’s Exhibit 3. 

Based upon this conduct towards Ms. Jones, Appellant was charged with 

one count of summary harassment pursuant to 18 Pa.C.S. § 2709(a)(3) (“A 

person commits the crime of harassment when, with intent to harass, annoy 

or alarm another, the person: . . . engages in a course of conduct or repeatedly 

commits acts which serve no legitimate purpose[.]”). She was initially tried 

and convicted by the magisterial district judge. At a de novo trial before the 

court of common pleas, Appellant represented herself. As English is not her 

first language, the trial court offered Appellant the services of a translator, but 

she declined. See N.T. Trial, 10/18/22, at 42. Instead, Appellant, who 

indicated that she has difficulty hearing and processing speech, proceeded 

with a stenographer who utilized equipment that enabled Appellant to read 

everything that was said in the courtroom. Id. at 3-4. When it came time for 

her to testify, the trial court offered to give Appellant a continuance so that 

she could write out her testimony and read it to the court, but Appellant 

declined. Id. at 41-42. 

Appellant’s defense was, in essence, that the communications were 

warranted because Ms. Jones harassed Appellant and her children, causing 
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Appellant, her daughter, and her son to become suicidal. Id. at 62. The trial 

court permitted Appellant to testify at length about her concerns with Ms. 

Jones and the services her children received from the school. Id. at 42-82. 

However, the trial court precluded Appellant’s son from offering: (1) hearsay 

testimony about what a therapist said to Appellant, and (2) testimony it 

deemed irrelevant concerning his experience at the district’s high school. Id. 

at 59-61. 

Ultimately, the trial court found Ms. Jones to be credible and rejected 

Appellant’s defense, concluding that “[n]o matter how upset and frustrated 

Appellant may have been about her daughter’s situation,” that “did not justify 

her unreasonable and threatening behavior towards Ms. Jones[.]” Trial Court 

Opinion, 4/4/23, at 18. Accordingly, it convicted Appellant of violating 

§ 2709(a)(3) and sentenced her to a $300 fine. 

This timely appeal followed the trial court’s denial of Appellant’s motion 

for reconsideration. The court ordered Appellant to file a concise statement 

of errors complained of on appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b), Appellant 

timely filed a statement, and the trial court authored a Rule 1925(a) opinion. 

Therein, the court opined that Appellant arguably waived all of her appellate 

issues by filing a Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) statement that failed to properly identify 

her claims of error. See Trial Court Opinion, 4/4/23, at 8. It contended that 

it had to guess what issues Appellant was attempting to raise in authoring its 

opinion, and advocated for a finding of waiver. Id. at 9 (citing, inter alia, 
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Commonwealth v. Heggins, 809 A.2d 908, 912 (Pa.Super. 2002) (“Even if 

the trial court correctly guessed the issues Appellant brings before this Court, 

the vagueness of Appellant’s Concise Statement renders all issues raised 

therein waived.”)). 

It is axiomatic that an appellant’s failure to comply with the dictates of 

Rule 1925(b) will result in waiver. See, e.g., Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b)(4)(ii) (“The 

Statement shall concisely identify each error that the appellant intends to 

assert with sufficient detail to identify the issue to be raised for the judge.”); 

Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b)(4)(vii) (“Issues . . . not raised in accordance with the 

provisions of this paragraph (b)(4) are waived.”). Accordingly, before we turn 

to Appellant’s questions on appeal, we examine the sufficiency of Appellant’s 

Rule 1925(b) statement. Therein, she alleged the following errors, which we 

have re-ordered for ease of discussion:

a. The court erred, as a matter of law when the court rejected 

to provide a court appointed attorney considering that the 

Appellant suffered from a disability which impedes speech, 

hearing and communication overall. Appellant’s civil, legal, 

and human rights were violated because of which many 

aspects of the hearing from the appellant side were not 

carried out properly[.]

b. The court erred as a matter of law because Appellant wasn’t 

afforded the reasonable accommodations guaranteed by the 

Title II of American with Disabilities Act. As the result, 

Appellant could not participate meaningfully at the 

hearing[.]

c. Appellant was not in a position to accurately address any 

statements made against them due to their disability 

affecting their communication[.]
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d. The court erred as a matter of law when the court rejected 

[her] testimony as irrelevant before Appellant was able to 

finish the entire testimony to summarize relevancy 

considering their disability[.]

e. The court abused its discretion by letting a witness stay in 

the court room while it was known that witnesses would

have to be sequestered while also aware of the Appellant’s 

disability[.]

f. The court abused its discretion for its failure to include 

incorporate [sic] common sense. Appellant has parental 

rights that were violated by [Ms. Jones1] and the Garnet 

Valley School District and there is legitimate reason for 

every and each Appellant’s communication with and conduct 

at the Garnet Valley School District. [Ms. Jones]’s 

unceasing, unwanted and unwelcomed harassment and 

abuse against children with disabilities and their family 

despite multiple cease and desist letters issued by Appellant 

against defendant could eventually result in tragedy where 

children might commit suicide.

g. Appellant felt that there was a hostile environment being 

created for them to provide their statements and felt 

unsafe[.] 

Concise Statement, 11/29/22, at unnumbered 1-2 (cleaned up).

We agree with the trial court that the final issue (g) is too vague to alert 

the trial court to the nature of the alleged error.2 However, as for the rest, 

we do not find the articulated errors to be so defective that all issues stated 

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1 Appellant here referred to Ms. Jones as “the defendant,” as if Appellant were 

litigating one of her civil claims against the school, rather than defending a 

criminal prosecution. See N.T. Trial, 10/18/22, at 10-11 (Ms. Jones indicating 

that Appellant has filed discrimination claims against the district “in multiple 

settings”). 

2

In any event, Appellant appears to have abandoned this issue on appeal.
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therein are waived. Instead, we shall compare the issue included in the Rule 

1925(b) statement with the questions presented on appeal to ascertain 

whether the claims of error were preserved in the latter, and thereafter decide 

waiver on an issue-by-issue basis.3 

The questions presented in Appellant’s brief in this Court, which we also 

have opted to re-order, are as follows:

[1]. Whether the Appellant’s rights were violated where the trial 

court imposed [a] fine on the Appellant without providing an 

opportunity to the Appellant for appointing an interpreter as 

English is not first language of the Appellant, without taking 

into consideration all and entire evidence while deciding the 

fate of the matter and without giving the opportunity to the 

Appellant to be represented by an attorney during the trial 

and hearings?

[2]. Was the disability accommodation provided in the trial 

sufficient for Appellant to meaningfully participate in the 

hearing?

[3]. Did the trial court err and abuse its discretion by refusing 

Appellant to continue testifying due to the judge’s 

inaccurate perception of being irrelevant?

[4]. Did the trial court erred [sic] by not taking into consideration 

cogent and sufficient evidence produced by the Appellant[?]

[5]. Did the trial court fall in [sic] erred and abused its discretion 

by not letting the witness testify?

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3 The Commonwealth advocates for dismissal of this appeal based upon 

defects in Appellant’s brief, asserting that she has opted “to use her brief as 

an outlet for personal grievances as opposed to an opportunity to develop 

substantive legal arguments[.]” Commonwealth’s brief at 11. As with the 

trial court’s assertion of complete waiver, we decline to render a wholesale 

rejection of Appellant’s questions, but rather will adjudge waiver issue by 

issue. 
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[6]. Did the trial court abuse its discretion by placing reliance on 

false testimony and hearsay of the witness [Ms.] Jones . . . 

and without corroborating such testimony[?]

[7]. Did the court abuse its discretion and err for harassment 

conviction based on emails which [Ms. Jones] was not the 

recipients and a social media post that was asking for help 

against unceasing harassment, child abuse and murder 

attempts by [Ms. Jones]? Moreover, it was [Ms. Jones]

stalking social media that was not shared with her.

Appellant’s brief at 6-7 (cleaned up).

We first address Appellant’s contention that her right to counsel was 

violated. The docket reflects that Appellant was represented by different 

privately-retained attorneys during the course of the litigation. However, by 

the time of the de novo trial, she was proceeding pro se “because there was 

not an attorney that w[as] willing to go against the School District.” N.T. Trial, 

10/18/22, at 42. 

While this issue was preserved in Appellant’s Rule 1925(b) statement, 

and is included in Appellant’s statement of questions and statement of the 

scope and standard of review, she fails to develop it with argument and 

citation to pertinent authorities elsewhere in her brief. In any event, as the 

trial court noted, Appellant neither made a request for appointed counsel at 

trial, nor was she entitled to such appointment because the court determined 

prior to commencing trial that Appellant did not face imprisonment. See Trial 

Court Opinion, 4/4/23, at 13-14 (citing Commonwealth v. Blackham, 909 

A.2d 315, 318 (Pa.Super. 2006)). See also Pa.R.Crim.P. 122(A)(1) 

(providing that counsel shall be appointed “in all summary cases, for all 
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defendants who are without financial resources or who are otherwise unable 

to employ counsel when there is a likelihood that imprisonment will be 

imposed”). 

Since Appellant did not face imprisonment and she was not in fact 

sentenced to confinement, the issue would merit no relief even if it were 

properly presented. Cf. Commonwealth v. Soder, 905 A.2d 502, 504 

(Pa.Super. 2006) (vacating and remanding for a new trial because the 

defendant received a sentence of imprisonment following a trial that took 

place without the court first determining whether the defendant was indigent 

or otherwise unable to employ counsel). 

Appellant also contends that her rights were violated because the trial 

court did not appoint an interpreter for her. That issue is not included in her

Rule 1925(b) statement and is therefore waived. We note, however, that the 

trial court, before starting the trial, expressly asked Appellant whether she 

spoke English or needed a translator. See N.T. Trial, 10/18/22, at 3. 

Appellant declined the translator and thereafter participated in the trial in 

fluent English. Accordingly, the absence of a translator gives us no cause to 

disturb her conviction or sentence. See In re Garcia, 984 A.2d 506, 511–12 

(Pa.Super. 2009) (affirming decision to proceed without an interpreter where 

the defendant did not request one and the court had no reason to believe he 

had difficulty understanding English). 
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Appellant’s second question, and the remaining portion of her first one,

assail the sufficiency of disability accommodations provided to her at trial. 

These issues were preserved in Appellant’s Rule 1925(b) statement and are 

argued in her brief. In particular, Appellant maintains that she suffers from 

hearing impairment as well as an autism spectrum disorder (“ASD”), and that 

the trial court did not follow proper procedures for accommodating her 

disabilities, in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”). See

Appellant’s brief at 64-75. 

Pursuant to the ADA, “no qualified individual with a disability shall, by 

reason of such disability, be excluded from participation in or be denied the 

benefits of the services, programs, or activities of a public entity, or be 

subjected to discrimination by any such entity.” 42 U.S.C. § 12132. However, 

the ADA “does not require States to employ any and all means to make judicial 

services accessible or to compromise essential eligibility criteria for public 

programs.” Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509, 531-32 (2004). “It requires 

only ‘reasonable modifications’ that would not fundamentally alter the nature 

of the service provided, and only when the individual seeking modification is 

otherwise eligible for the service.” Id. at 532.

As for the portion of Appellant’s claims that the trial court violated her 

rights under the ADA, concerning her purported ASD, our review of the record 

reveals that the first time Appellant asserted that she suffers from ASD was 

in her post-sentence motion for reconsideration. At trial, Appellant indicated 
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that her son has autism, and asserted that children who have autism are at 

increased risk of suicide. See N.T. Trial, 10/18/22, at 57, 64. However, the 

only disabilities she claimed for herself were ADHD, hearing impairment, and 

that she processes auditory information slowly. Id. at 3, 41-42. The trial 

court cannot be expected to accommodate a disability of which it has no 

reason to be aware. Accord Stultz v. Reese Bros., Inc., 835 A.2d 754, 761 

(Pa.Super. 2003) (“To trigger an employer’s duty to participate in the 

interactive process, the disabled individual must put the employer on notice 

that he/she has a disability and, based on such notice, the employer must be 

able to reasonably deduce a request for accommodation has been made.”); 

Sharnese v. California, 547 Fed.Appx. 820, 823 (9th Cir. 2013) (“Because 

he cannot show that any court employee took actions ‘by reason of’ a disability 

of which they were unaware, the ADA claim was properly dismissed.”).

The trial court addressed its accommodations of Appellant’s expressed 

disabilities at the October 18, 2022 trial as follows, which we have confirmed 

is fully supported by the certified record:

1) At the start of the hearing, the trial court asked Appellant 

if she speaks English and if she requires a translator in which she 

responded that she does speak English and does not need a 

translator. 

2) A stenographer was requested for the hearing to sit next 

to Appellant and type every spoken word so that Appellant may 

view everything being said in court through a closed-caption 

(CART) system.
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3) Upon Appellant taking the stand to testify, while she was 

appreciative for the accommodations made, she specked that she 

has difficulty hearing and prefers to communicate in writing. 

4) In response, the trial court asked Appellant if she would 

like a continuance of the hearing in order to write out what she 

would like to say and her side of the story, so she can come back 

another day and read what she wrote. 

5) After Appellant rejected the idea of a continuance, the 

court again explained that she would be able to write out anything

that she would like to say in advance to testifying and further 

advised Appellant that if she does agree to go forward today then 

she is waiving any right that she would have to appeal this issue. 

6) The court informed Appellant that she was being offered 

the opportunity to cure the defect being alleged. 

7) Appellant responded that this option was difficult because 

her son was present to testify at the hearing. 

8) The trial court then offered that Appellant’s son could still 

testify at the October 18, 2022 hearing while he is present, and 

Appellant could come back on a later date to read her writing of 

her side of the story. 

9) Appellant responded that she has prepared some written 

statements, so she could read them at the October 18, 2022 

hearing. 

10) Before proceeding with Appellant’s testimony, the trial 

court reminded Appellant that if she chooses to proceed with her 

testimony in the hearing, Appellant would not be able to later 

allege that she was denied the opportunity for a continuance. 

11) Appellant affirmed that she understood and accepted 

before proceeding with her testimony. 

The trial court properly afforded Appellant a meaningful 

opportunity to be heard as to the charge of harassment and 

provided her with ample opportunities to cure the alleged defects.

Trial Court Opinion, 4/4/23, at 10-11 (cleaned up). 
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Appellant provides no authority to suggest that the trial court’s 

accommodations were legally insufficient to address her stated disabilities. 

Instead, she baldly claims that it failed to follow the proper procedures, laws, 

and rules without specifying any desired accommodation that should have 

been provided but was not. See Appellant’s brief at 69-71. She then supplies 

brief descriptions of non-existent decisions without even explaining how the 

fictional authorities entitled her to more than what she received. See

Appellant’s brief at 71-74.4 The trial court provided the accommodations 

Appellant requested, and even offered her more.5 No relief is warranted on 

this baseless claim. 

In her two next issues, Appellant challenges evidentiary rulings made at 

trial. In this vein, we note that the admissibility of evidence “is committed to 

the sound discretion of the trial court, and a trial court’s ruling regarding the 

admission of evidence will not be disturbed on appeal unless that ruling 

reflects manifest unreasonableness, or partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill-will, or 

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4 We have searched Westlaw using both the case names and citations 

proffered by Appellant and determined that either no case by the proffered 

caption exists or that a case by the listed name exist but did not hold as 

Appellant represents in her brief.

5 We further observe that after allowing Appellant to read her testimony into 

evidence, the trial court denied the Commonwealth’s request to crossexamine Appellant. See N.T. Trial, 10/18/22, at 82. Hence, Appellant was 

not required to provide oral answers to adverse questioning. 
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such lack of support to be clearly erroneous.” Commonwealth v. Ivy, 146 

A.3d 241, 250 (Pa.Super. 2016) (cleaned up). 

Appellant first contends that the trial court improperly truncated her 

testimony upon deeming it irrelevant. Appellant has not identified by 

reference to the certified record at what point she was wrongfully precluded 

from offering relevant testimony. Nor has she provided any meaningful 

development of this claim. Consequently, we agree with the trial court that 

this vague and overbroad claim of error is waived. See Trial Court Opinion, 

4/4/23, at 12. 

Moreover, from our review of the trial transcript, the trial court liberally 

allowed Appellant to present evidence supporting her defense that the 

communications underlying the Commonwealth’s charges were intended to 

advocate for her daughter rather than to harass or annoy Ms. Jones. The 

court on more than one occasion overruled the Commonwealth’s objections to 

the relevance of such evidence, indicating that it was for the court to decide 

whether Appellant’s actions were appropriate “in light of what’s going on with 

her daughter.” N.T. Trial, 10/18/22, at 52. Rather than stymie Appellant’s 

efforts to prove her defense, the court repeatedly permitted her to testify at 

length about the harassment she believed Ms. Jones had inflicted upon her, 

and repeatedly inquired as to whether Appellant had anything else she wished 

to say before it concluded the trial, without subjecting Appellant to cross-
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examination. Id. at 45, 48, 50, 51, 52, 64, 72, 74, 76, 77, 78, 79, 81. We 

discern no abuse of discretion.

Appellant next asserts that the trial court erred in failing to allow her 

son to testify. The trial court addressed this claim as follows:

In addressing the proposed testimony of Appellant’s son as 

a witness, the trial court found that the testimony will be violative 

of the rule against hearsay. The following dialogue occurred 

between [Appellant] and the [trial] court at the October 18, 2022 

hearing:

THE COURT: So, [Appellant], that would 

mean that you have to tell me what it is that your son 

would testify to that would be relevant to the 

harassment charge.

[APPELLANT]: He will testify to Ms. 

Jones[’s] contacts with some of my private 

independent mental health providers. And that was 

the reason why I needed to write those emails 

because she wouldn’t stop.

THE COURT: All right. So that is the clear 

definition of hearsay. Because how would your son 

know what Ms. Jones allegedly said to a therapist.

[APPELLANT]: Because my son was there 

when one of the therapists came to our house and told 

us Ms. Jones called them for the reason —

THE COURT: So that’s hearsay on hearsay. 

That’s double hearsay.

Appellant sought to have her son testify to the therapist’s 

out-of-court statement, which was being offered to prove the truth 

of his/her statement, that Ms. Jones contacted Appellant’s 

therapists.

Additionally, Appellant argued that her son would testify as 

to his experience as a student at Garnet Valley High School. She 

offered that he could testify that the high school would not provide 
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him with transportation via school bus for months, and he had to 

take Uber to get to and from school. The trial court properly found 

this proposed testimony to be irrelevant to the charge of 

harassment. Appellant argued that her son could testify as to how 

she was removed from their home and taken to the hospital, and 

he had to take care of his siblings, which caused emotional 

distress. These allegations are not of consequence in determining 

Appellant’s harassment charge. 

Trial Court Opinion, 4/4/23, at 12-13 (cleaned up). We discern no error of 

law or abuse of discretion by the trial court in precluding the irrelevant and 

hearsay testimony of Appellant’s son. Hence, Appellant’s evidentiary 

challenges fail.

In her remaining issues, Appellant appears to unartfully challenge the 

sufficiency and/or the weight of the evidence. She both (1) asserts that the 

trial court should have credited her testimony and rejected the uncorroborated 

testimony of Ms. Jones, and (2) seems to suggest that the verdict was faulty 

because the harassing emails were not sent to Ms. Jones directly.6 See

Appellant’s brief at 75-76. Neither challenge is valid.7 

First, our standards of review for both sufficiency and weight challenges 

prohibit this Court from disturbing the fact-finder’s credibility determinations 

____________________________________________

6 To the extent that Appellant also claims that the court should not have relied 

upon hearsay testimony given by Ms. Jones, that claim of error was not 

included in her Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) statement, and is therefore waived. 

7 Appellant supplies summaries for cases that she contends support these 

arguments on pages 76 to 78 of her brief. As with her ADA cases discussed 

earlier, not a single one of her citations is legitimate. This Court is left to 

guess whether this counterfeit authority is the product of a chatbot, or if there 

is a more nefarious explanation for the misinformation. 
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and reweighing the evidence. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Haahs, 289 

A.3d 100, 104 n.2 (Pa.Super. 2022) (sufficiency standard of review); 

Commonwealth v. Arias, 286 A.3d 341, 352 (Pa.Super. 2022) (weight 

standard of review). Second, “the uncorroborated testimony of a single 

witness is sufficient to sustain a conviction for a criminal offense, so long as 

that testimony can address and, in fact, addresses, every element of the 

charged crime.” Commonwealth v. Johnson, 180 A.3d 474, 481 (Pa.Super. 

2018). Here, Ms. Jones’s testimony, credited by the trial court, was sufficient 

to prove that Appellant, with the “intent to harass, annoy or alarm” Ms. Jones,

“engage[d] in a course of conduct or repeatedly commit[ed] acts which 

serve[d] no legitimate purpose[.]” 18 Pa.C.S. § 2709(a)(3). As the trial court 

explained:

The credible evidence presented at the hearing proved 

beyond a reasonable doubt that Appellant committed the offense 

of harassment. It is undeniable that public social media posts 

unreasonably accusing another individual, specifically an 

elementary school principal, of abusing and murdering children is 

harassing behavior. . . . Despite Appellant’s belief that her child 

was not being treated fairly by the school district, Appellant’s 

behavior was unacceptable and inappropriate. The credible 

evidence presented satisfied the elements of harassment and 

proved beyond a reasonable doubt that Appellant committed 

harassment. 

Trial Court Opinion, 4/4/23, at 18-19 (cleaned up). Moreover, the harassment 

statute does not require direct communication of the offending statements to 

the target of the harassment. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Cox, 72 A.3d 

719, 722 (Pa.Super. 2013) (finding evidence established harassment where 
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Facebook posts defaming victim were made available to the defendant’s 

friends and friends of friends).

Finally, Appellant waived her weight claim by not clearly asserting a 

challenge to the weight of the evidence in the trial court. Consequently, the 

court did not have cause to provide this Court with the assessment necessary 

for our review of such a claim. See Arias, supra at 352 (explaining that 

appellate review of a weight claim examines the trial court’s exercise of 

discretion in rejecting the claim in the first instance, not the underlying 

question of whether the verdict was against the weight of the evidence). 

In sum, Appellant’s issues are all either waived, meritless, or both. 

Therefore, we have no cause to disturb her judgment of sentence.

Judgment of sentence affirmed. 

Date: October 18, 2023