COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 

Present: Judges Bray, Annunziata and Overton 

LOIS V. RUCKER 

v. Record No. 1449-95-3 MEMORANDUM OPINION*

 PER CURIAM 

BACOVA GUILD, LTD. NOVEMBER 21, 1995 

AND 

ASSOCIATED INDEMNITY CORPORATION 

FROM THE VIRGINIA WORKERS' COMPENSATION COMMISSION 

 (Leslie Ann Shaner; O'Keefe & Spies, on brief), for 

appellant. 

 (Christopher M. Kite; Monica L. Taylor; Gentry, Locke, 

Rakes & Moore, on brief), for appellees. 

 Lois V. Rucker ("claimant") contends that the Workers' 

Compensation Commission erred in finding that she failed to prove 

that the osteoarthritis of her right wrist and hand and her 

right-sided carpal tunnel syndrome were causally related to her 

employment. Upon reviewing the record and the briefs of the 

parties, we conclude that this appeal is without merit. 

Accordingly, we summarily affirm the commission's decision. Rule 

5A:27. 

 A claimant must prove the existence of an occupational 

disease by a preponderance of the evidence. Virginia Dep't of 

State Police v. Talbert, 1 Va. App. 250, 253, 337 S.E.2d 307, 308 

(1985). "Whether a disease is causally related to the employment 

and not causally related to other factors . . . is a finding of 

 

 *Pursuant to Code § 17-116.010 this opinion is not 

designated for publication. 
 2 

fact." Island Creek Coal Co. v. Breeding, 6 Va. App. 1, 12, 365 

S.E.2d 782, 788 (1988). Unless we can say as a matter of law 

that claimant's evidence sustained her burden of proof, the 

commission's findings are binding and conclusive upon us. Tomko 

v. Michael's Plastering Co., 210 Va. 697, 699, 173 S.E.2d 833, 

835 (1970). 

 An occupational disease is one "arising out of and in the 

course of employment." Code § 65.2-400(A). "A disease shall be 

deemed to arise out of the employment" when the evidence 

establishes six elements. Code § 65.2-400(B). Elements (2) and 

(6) require evidence showing "[a] direct causal connection 

between the conditions under which work is performed and the 

occupational disease" and that the disease "had its origin in a 

risk connected with the employment and flowed from that source as 

a natural consequence. . . ." Code § 65.2-400(B)(1) and (B)(6). 

 The commission found that claimant failed to establish a 

compensable occupational disease under the requirements of Code 

§ 65.2-400.1

 

 At best, Dr. Charles F. Andersen, claimant's treating 

orthopedic surgeon, opined that her employment aggravated her 

pre-existing osteoarthritis and carpal tunnel syndrome; he could 

not state with any degree of reasonable medical certainty that 

 

 1Because there was no evidence that claimant's conditions 

may have resulted from substantial exposure outside of her 

employment, the commission properly analyzed her application 

under Code § 65.2-400. See Wells v. Commonwealth, Dep't of 

Transp., 15 Va. App. 561, 565, 425 S.E.2d 536, 538 (1993). 
 3 

her employment caused her conditions. A disease that is merely 

aggravated by the employment does not establish causation and is 

not an occupational disease. Ashland Oil Co. v. Bean, 225 Va. 1, 

3-4, 300 S.E.2d 739, 740 (1983). In addition, Dr. Hugh J. Hagan, 

III, who examined claimant at employer's request, could not 

render an opinion to a reasonable degree of medical certainty 

that claimant's conditions were caused by her work. 

 Based upon the absence of any medical opinion that 

claimant's work caused her carpal tunnel syndrome or 

osteoarthritis, claimant did not prove as a matter of law a 

compensable occupational disease pursuant to the requirements of 

Code § 65.2-400. Thus, the commission did not err in denying her 

application based upon a finding that she did not prove that her 

conditions were caused by her employment or that they had their 

origins in a work connected risk. 

 Accordingly, we affirm the commission's decision. We need 

not address the "disease" issue as our ruling on the causation 

issue disposes of this appeal. 

 Affirmed.