The Honor able Stefa n R. Underhill, United States District J udg e for the District of 1 Connecticut, sitting by

desig nation. 1 07-1136- CV Bonime v. Avaya, Inc . 1 UN ITED STA TES COURT OF AP P EA LS 2 F OR THE S E COND C IR C U IT 3

_____________________ 4 5 August Term, 2007 6 7 (Argued: Marc h 12, 2008 Dec ided: October 31, 2008) 8 9 Docke t No. 07-1136-c v 10 11

_____________________ 12 13 H AR OL D B ON I ME , Individually and 14 on behalf of all others similarly

situated 15 Plaintif f-Appellant , 16 17 — v .— 18 19 A VAYA , I NC ., 20 Defendant- Appellee

. 21 22

___________________ 23 24 Be fore : C A LA BR ESI , B.D

. P ARKE R , Circuit Judges , 25 and U N D ER H I LL , District Judge

. 1 26 27

___________________ 28 29 Appea l from a judg ment of the United States District Court for the Easter

n District of 30 New Y ork (Amon, J .) dis mis sin gc la ims br ou g ht u nd e r t he Te le ph on e Con sume r P ro te c tio n A c t, 31 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3). A ffirme d. J udg e Calabr esi conc urs in a sepa rate opinion.2 1

___________________ 2 3 T ODD C. B ANK , Kew G arde ns, N.Y., for Plain tiff4 Appellant

. 5 6 G L EN N C. C OL TON (Tonia Oue llette Klausner , on the brief ), 7 Wil son Sonsini Goodrich & Rosati, P.C ., New 8 York, N.Y ., for Defendant- Appellee

. 9 10

___________________ 11 12 B AR R I NGTON D. P ARKE R , Circuit Judge : 13 Har old Bonime brought a putative cla ss action in fede ral c ourt in New Y ork alleg ing 14 violations of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act, 47 U.S.C § 227(b)( 1)(C) ( “TCPA”). 15 Fe dera l jurisdiction was g rounded in diver sity of citizenship. See28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(2). The 16 district court dismissed the complaint beca use Ne w York la

w does not per

mit private ac tions for 17 violations of the TCPA to be broug ht as class a ctions. SeeNew Y ork Civil P rac tice L aw a nd 18 Rules 901(b). We agree that N.Y. C.P.L .R. 901(b) applies to such suits, eve n when a plaintiff 19 has invoked fe dera l diversity jurisdiction. 20 BACK GR OUND 21 Bonime, a citizen of New Y ork, appe als from a judgme nt of the United States District 22 Court for the Ea stern District of N ew Yor k (Amon, J

.) dismissing for la ck of subjec t matter 23 jurisdiction his claim under a pr ovision of the TCPA, which, amongother thing s, regulates 24 unsolicited fac simil e communications. See B onime v. A vaya, I nc ., 06 CV 1630 (CBA) , 2006 25 U.S. Dist. L EXI S 91964 (E.D.N.Y. De c. 20, 2006). A ppellee A vaya, Inc., a c itiz en of D elawa re 26 and Ne w J erse y , is a telec ommunications company that sells its goods and se rvice s throug h aSe c tio n 2 27 (b )( 1) (C ) p ro vid e s th at it is unla wf ul: 2 to use any

telephone f

acsimile mac hine, computer , or other de vice to send, to a telep ho ne fa c sim ile ma c hin e , a n uns oli c ite d a dv e rt ise me nt, un le ss— (i) the unsolicited adver

tisement is f

rom a sender wi t h an es tablished business relationship with the rec ipient; ( ii) the sender obtained the number of t h e telephone fa csimile machine through— (I ) the voluntary communication of such numbe r, within the context of such established bu sin e ss re latio ns hip , fr om the re c ipi e nt of the un so lic ite d a dv e rt ise me nt, or ( I I ) a d ir e c to r y , a dv e rti s e me n t, o r

s it e o nth e In te r

n e t t o w h ic hthe rec ipient voluntarily

ag ree d to make ava ilable its f ac s i m i le number f

or public distribution, ex cept that this clause shall not apply in the case of an un solicit e d a dv e rt ise me nt t hat is se nt b a se d o n a

n e sta bli sh e d b us ine ss re latio ns hip wi th t

he re c ipi e nt that wa s in e xiste nc e be fo re July 9, 20 05 , if the sende r possessed the fac simil e mac hine number of the re cipient bef

ore su c h d ate of

e na c tme nt; and

(i ii) th e un so lic ite d a dv e rt ise me nt c on ta ins a notice mee ting the r equire ments under pa ragraph ( 2 )(D), except that the exception under c lauses (i) and (ii) shall not apply with respec t to an unsolicited adver

tisement sent to a telephone fac simil e mac hine by a sende r to whom a re quest has bee n m ade not to send f uture unsolicited adver tisements to such telephone f acsimile mac hine that complies with the require ments under pa

ragraph ( 2)(E)

. . . .

3 1 ne tw or

k o f r e se lle rs . B on ime a lle g e s th at D JJ Sa le s A sso c iate s Inc ., a re se lle r o f A va

y a pr od uc ts 2 that po sse sse d “ a c tua l a uth or ity to a c t on be ha lf of [Av ay a ],” “ tr ans mitte d a fa c sim ile to 3 [B on ime ] that a dv e rt ise d th e c omm e rc ia l ava ila bil ity or qu a lity of [Av ay a ’s ] g oo ds and

se rv ic e s” 4 without Bonime’s pe rmission. 5 Bonime a lleg es that the tra nsmissi on of the fa csimile violated section 227(b) (1)( C) of the 6 TCPA which makes it unlawful “ to use any telephone f

acsimile mac hine, computer , or other 7 device to send, to a telephone fac simil e mac hine, an unsolicited a dvertisement.” Section 2 8 227(b)( 3) allows a pe rson or e ntity to, “if otherw ise permitted by the laws or r

ules of cour

t of aSe c tio n 2 27 (b )( 3) pr ov ide s: 3 Pr ivate ri ght of a c tio n. A p e rs on or e nti ty may , if oth e rw ise permitted by

th e la w s o r r u le s o f c o urt o f a St ate , b r in gin

an appropr iate cour

t of that State— (A) an ac tion based on a violation of this s u b s ec tion or the regulations prescr ibed under this subsection to enjoin such vi olation, (B ) an a ction to rec over for a ctual monetary loss from such a viol ation, or to rec eive $500 in d ama g e s f

or e a c h s uc h v iol atio n, wh ic he ve r i s g re ate r, or (C ) bo th s uc h a c tio ns . I f t he cou rt fi nd s th at th e de fe nd ant w ill fu lly or kn ow ing ly vio late d th is s ub se c tio n o r t he re g ulatio ns pr e sc ri be d und e r t his subsection, the cour

t may , i n i t s d iscretion, incr ease the amount of the a war d to an amount equa l to not more than 3 times the amount available under subpa ragraph ( B) of this para g raph. 4 1 State, bringin an appr opriate c ourt of that State,” a private a ction for a

violation of the TCPA, 2 and

se c tio n 2 27 (b )( 3) (B ) a llo ws a pla int if f who re c e ive s a

n uns oli c ite d f

a x or i s o the rw ise 3 harme d by

an ac tion that violates the TCPA to recover damag es for

actua l monetary

loss or $500, 4 whicheve r is g reater. 3 5 Bonime soug ht to repre sent a purpor ted class, unde r F ed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) and 23( b)(3) , 6 consisting of

“all per sons. . . to whom [ Avaya’s] ag ents transmitted one or mor e fa csimiles 7 a dv e rt isi ng[Av ay a ’s ] g oo ds and se rv ic e s w ith out th e re c ipi e nt h avin gg ive n . . . e xpre ss 8 invitation or permission” for a period be g inning f

our y ear s prior to the commenc ement of the 9 s u i t . Ac co rd i n g t o th e c o mp l ai n t , Av ay a’ s “b u s i n es s p artn er s tra n s m i t t edfa cs i m i l es ad v ert i s i n g . 10

. . [Av ay a ’s ] g oo ds and se rv ic e s to mor e tha

n 1 0, 00 0 r e c ipi e nts ” wi tho ut t he re c ipi e nts ’ 11 permission. Bonime a sserts that the amount in controve rsy is theref ore greater than $5,000,0005 1 exclusive of interests and c osts and that the fe dera l courts conse quently have jur isdiction under 2 the Class Action Fa irness Ac t, 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(2) (“ CAFA” ). The CAF A provides that 3 “ dis tr ic t c ourt s sh a ll h ave or ig ina l juri sd ic tio n o f a ny c ivi l a c tio n in

wh ic h th e matte r i n 4 c on tr ov e rs y

e xce e ds the sum or

va lue of $5 ,0 00 ,0 00 , e xclu siv e of int e re st a nd c os ts, and

is a 5 class ac tion in which— (A) a ny member of

a cla ss of plaintiffs is a citizen of a State diff ere nt 6 from any

defe ndant.” 7 The district cour t dismi ssed the complaint for lack of subject matter jur isdiction, 8 re a so nin gthat “ B on ime may no t a sse rt

a c la ss a c tio n f

or statut or y dama g e s und e r t

he TCP A i n 9 New Y ork state a

nd there fore may

not utili ze CAFA to establish diversity jurisdiction.” Bonime , 10 20 06 U. S. D ist . L EX I S 91 96 4, at *3 . B on ime a pp e a le d a nd we a ff ir m. 11 12 DI SCU SSIO N 13 14 Bonime’ s lawsuit sits at the intersection of two proc edura lly unusual laws— the TCPA, 15 which cr eate s a fe dera l claim desig ned to be br oug ht in state court, and the CAFA, which g ives 16 fe de ra l c ourt s o ri g ina l juri sd ic tio n o ve r c e rt a in c la ss a c tio ns br ou g ht u nd e r s tate law. Th e ke y

to 17 deter

mining whe ther we have jur isdiction, however, lies in unde rstandingthe TCPA. 18 Congr ess’s stated pur pose in ena ctingthe TCPA was to “prote ct the priva cy interests of 19 re sid e nti a l te le ph on e su bs c ri be rs by

pla c ingre str ic tio ns on

un so lic ite d, a

uto mate d te le ph on e c a lls 2 0 to th e h o me an d

to f a c il it ate inte r s tate c o mm e r c e b y r e s tr ic ti n gc e rta in

u s e s o f f a c s im il e ( f

a x) 21 ma c hin e s and

a uto matic dia le rs .” S. Re p. No . 1 02 -1 78 , at 1 ( 19 91 ). Whil e mor e tha n f or ty state 22 leg islatures pre viously enac ted measur es re stricting unsolicited te lemarke ting, “ these ha d limit ed6 1 eff ect be cause States do not have jurisdiction over inter state ca lls.” See id . at 3. The le g islative 2 history

of the TCPA “indicates that Congr ess intended the T CPA to provide interstitial law 3 preve nting e vasion of state la w by callingacr oss state lines.” Go ttl ie b v . Ca rn iv al C or p ., 436 4 F.3d 335, 342 ( 2d Cir. 2006) (interna l quotation marks omitted). 5 Th e pr ivate ri g ht o f a c tio n c re ate d b y the TCP A a llo ws a

pe rs on or e nti ty to, “ if oth e rw ise 6 permitted by

the laws or r

ules of cour

t of a State, bringin an appr opriate c ourt of that State,” a n 7 action for

a violation of the TCPA. See 4 7 U

. S

. C

. § 2 2 7 ( b ) ( 3 )

. InFo x ha ll R e alt

yLaw O ffi c es, 8 Inc. v . Telecomm s. Premium Se rvs ., Ltd ., 156 F.3d 432, 435 ( 2d Cir. 1998), we inter prete d 9 section 227(b) (3) to mea n that “Cong ress intende d to confe r exclusive state cour t jurisdiction 10 over pr ivate rig hts of action under the TCPA.” See also Gottlieb , 436 F.3d at 340 (holding that 11 the TCPA cre ated “ a private rig ht of ac tion over which f eder al cour

ts lack fe dera l question 12 jurisdiction”). “Cong ress thus soug ht to put the TCP A on the same footing as state law , 13 essentially

supplementing state law where there wer e per ceive d jurisdictional ga ps.” Gottlieb , 14 436 F.3d at 342. 15 Congr ess’s innovation in cre atinga fe dera l claim which beha ved like state la

w by 16 allowingindividuals to sue in st ate c ourts under the TCPA “if otherwise permitted by the laws or 17 rules of c ourt of a State,” require d this Court to decide a novel proc edura l question: whether a 18 claim g ener ated by a fe dera l law, but require d to be broug ht in state court under the “law s or 19 rules of c ourt of a State,” is gove rned by 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a), whic h g ives fede ral c ourts orig inal 20 jurisdiction over civil ac tions where the re is diver sity of citizenship and the7 1 amount-in-contr oversy require ment is satisfied? In other wor ds, should a claim cr eate d by 2 section 227(b) (3) be treated like a state cause of ac tion when the jurisdiction of the fe dera l court 3 is gr ounded in diversity under se ction 1332(a) ? In Gottlieb , we a nswere d that question in the 4 aff

irmative, conc luding that “ Congr ess did not divest the fede ral c ourts of diversity jurisdiction 5 ov e r p ri vate a c tio ns un de r t he TCP A” sin c e “ no thi ngin § 13 32 ind ic ate s th at di ve rs ity 6 jurisdiction does not ex ist where f eder ally -cr eate d cause s of ac tion are c oncer ned.” Gottlieb, 436 7 F.3d at 336, 340. 8 Th e se ru lin g s, ho we ve r, do no t r e so lve the iss ue pr e se nte d b y thi s a pp e a l. Wh ile B on ime 9 br ou g ht h is T CPAa c tio n in fe de ra l c ourt , h e did

no t invo ke se c tio n 1 33 2( a ), the g e ne ra l di ve rs ity 10 statute. Instead, B onime based jurisdiction on sec tion 1332(d)(2)( A) of the CAFA. Sec tion 11 1332(d)( 2)(A) , of cour se, is part of subse ction (d), whic h is an add-on to the dive rsity jurisdiction 12 statute. See Es tate of P e w v . Ca rd ar e lli , 527 F.3d 25, 30 ( 2d Cir. 2008) (“CAF A amends the 13 diversity

jurisdiction statute by

adding§ 1332(d), whic h confe rs orig inal fede ral jurisdiction over 1 4 an y c l a s s a c t i o nw i thm i n i m a l d i v e r s i ty ( e.g. , wher e at lea st one plaintiff and one defe ndant ar e 15 citizens of differ ent states) a nd an ag g reg ate amount in controversy of at lea st $ 5 mil lion 16 (exclusive of intere st and costs).”)

. 17 New Y ork law a dds another la y er of complexit y . As previously noted, sec tion 227(b)(3) 18 allows a pe rson or e ntity “if other wise per mitted by the laws or r

ules of cour

t of a State,” to sue 19 in state court f

or a violation of the T CPA. As the district court corr ectly noted, “a class ac tion 20 for statutory

damag es under

the TCPA is not actionable in NewYork state c ourt.” Bonime , 2006Under Er ie , “fe dera l courts sitting in diversity apply state substantive law a

nd fede ral 4 proce dural law .” Gasperini v. Ctr. for Humanities, Inc. , 518 U.S. 415, 427 (1996). “T he line betwee n ‘substance ’ and ‘ proce dure’ shifts as the leg al context chang es.” Hanna v. Plume r , 380 U. S. 4 60 , 4 71 (1 96 5) ; cf. Mistretta v. United States , 488 U.S. 361, 392 (1989) (“ [W ]e have re c og nize d th at th e F e de ra l Ru le s o f C ivi l Pr oc e dure re g ulate matte rs fa lli ngwi thi n th e un c e rt a in are a betwe en substance and proc edure , [and] are rationally capa ble of c lassification as e ither . . . .”) ( internal quotation marks omitted).

8 1 U.S. Dist. L EXI S 91964, at *5. Plainti ff’ s inability to bring such a c lass action stems from N.Y

. 2 C.P.L .R. 901(b), which pr ovides that “Unle ss a statute cr eatingor imposing a penalty , or a 3 minimum measure of re cover y specific ally

authorizes the re cover

y there of in a c lass action, an 4 action to re cover

a pena lty , or minimum m easur e of r ecove ry cre ated or

imposed by

statute may 5 not be maintained a s a cla ss action.” B eca use the TCPA does not spec ifically authorize rec overy 6 of statutory

damag es in a c lass action, Ne w York state courts have held that C.P.L .R. 901(b) bar s 7 class ac tions for statutory damag es under

the TCPA. See, e .g. , Le

y sev . F lag sh ip C ap ita l Se rv

s. 8 Cor

p ., 22 A. D. 3d

42 6, 42 6 ( 1s t D e p’ t 20 05 ); Ru dg ay ze r &Gratt

v . Ca peCan av e ra l To ur

& 9 Travel, Inc ., 22 A. D. 3d 14 8, 14 9 ( 2d

De p’ t 20 05 ); W

eber v . Rainbow Softw are, Inc ., 21 A.D.3d 10 411, 411 (2d De p’t 2005). 11 Bonime’ s decision to bringa putative c lass action in fe dera l court under section 12 13 32 (d )( 2) (A ) i s und ou bte dly mot ivate d b y

his de sir e to a

vo id t he ba rr ie r e re c te d b y

C.P. L .R. 13 90 1( b) . T his ta c tic , whil e inv e nti ve , f a ils . B on ime make s tw o ma jor po int s in su pp or t of his 14 position: (1) the doc trine of Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins , 3 04 U. S. 6 4 ( 19 38 ), un de r whic h s tate 4 15 su

bs tanti ve law a

pp lie s to state law c la ims in f e de ra l c ourt , d oe s n ot a

pp ly to h is T CPAc la ims9 1 beca

use TCPA claims arise unde r fe dera l and not state law, a nd (2) that, e ven if Erie d i d a p p l y, 2 C.P. L .R. 90 1( b) is p ro c e dura l, n ot s ub sta nti ve , a nd the re fo re do e s n ot a

pp ly to T CPAc la ims 3 broug ht in feder al cour t. Bonime’s a

rguments fail for two inde pendent r easons. 4 F ir st, it i s c or re c t th at th e Sup re me Court ’s Er iedoctrine doe s not apply direc tly to the 5 TCPA because it is a feder al law. Er ieregulates the ba lance of powe r betwe en the state and 6 fede ral c ourts. As J ustice Ha rlan wr ote, Er ieis “one of the modern c orner stones of our 7 fede ralism, expressing policie s that profoundly touch the allocation of judicial power be tween the 8 state and f

eder al sy stems.” Hanna v. Plume r , 380 U.S. 460, 474 (1965) (H arla n, J ., concur ring ); 9 s e e als o S

alv e Re gin a Co lle

gev . R us se ll, 499 U.S. 225, 239 (1991) (ide ntifying “ cooper ative 1 0 j u d i ci al fe d er al i s m ” a s o n e o f t h e p ri n ci p l es “u n d er l yi n g Er ie ”). The scheme of state a nd fede ral 11 judicial integ ration and c ooperation cre ated by Er iedo e s n ot d ir e c tly

imp lic ate the TCP A 12 beca

use it is feder al law a

nd Er iewas dire cted to state- law cla ims. Se e Er ie , 304 U.S. at 78 13 (“Except in matters g overne d by the Fe dera l Consti tution or by acts of Cong ress, the la

w to be 14 applied in any

case is the law of the state.”)

. 15 Bonime’ s argument is essentially beside the point, howe ver, be cause Congr ess direc ted 16 that the TCPA be applied a s if it were a state la w. See G ottlieb , 436 F.3d at 342-43. In other 17 words, Cong ress dra fted the TCPA so that it would interac t with the fede ral a nd state judicial 18 sy stems as would a state la w. While the TCPA is not state law, Cong ress ha s clea rly indicated 19 that th e c ourt s sh ou ld t re at it a s th ou g h it

we re . A nd

so , f or our p ur po se s, it b e have s li ke state 20 law. B eca

use the TCPA functionally operates as state la

w, we must apply

the Erie do c tr ine to10 1 the TCPA, though the r equire ment to do so derives fr om Congre ssional instruction, and not from 2 the Supreme Court’s de cision in Erie. 3 Ap p l yi n g Er ieleads to the c onclusion that fede ral c ourts must apply C.P.L .R. 901(b) 4 when f

ace d with putative New Y ork cla ss actions broug ht under the TCPA eve n when a plaintiff 5 has invoked fe dera l diversity jurisdiction. As the Supreme Court explained, the twin aims of the 6 Er ierule a

re the “discoura g ement of f orum-shoppingand avoida nce of inequitable administration 7 of the law s.” Hanna , 3 80 U. S. at 46 8. Ap ply ingC.P. L .R. 90 1( b) fu

rt he rs bo th o f t

he se 8 ob je c tiv e s. Ne w Y or

k s tate c ourt s a

pp lyingC.P. L .R. 90 1( b) have re pe ate dly re je c te d T CPA 9 claims broug ht as putative cla ss actions. See, e .g. , J. A. W eitzman, Inc. v . Lerner, Cumbo & 10 Assocs., Inc ., 46 A. D. 3d 75 5, 75 6 ( 2d

De p’ t 20 07 ); Le

y se , 2 2 A .D .3 d at 42 6; Ru dg ay ze r &Gratt , 11 22 A. D. 3d

at 14 9; W

eber , 2 1 A .D .3 d at 41 1. I f f e de ra l c ourt s h e ari ngtho se same c a se s in 12 diversity

permitted them to proce ed as c lass actions, this result would cre ate a predic table and 13 fore seea

ble outcome- deter

minative differ ence that would strong ly encour ag e for

um shopping a

nd 14 c re ate ine qu ita

ble a dmi nis tr atio n o f t

he laws — th e tw o p ro ble ms Erie soug ht to avoid. See 15 Hanna , 3 80 U. S. at 46 8. F or the se re a so ns , w e ho ld t

hat f e de ra l c ourt s sh ou ld a

pp ly C.P. L .R. 16 90 1( b) to p utativ e Ne w Y or k c la ss a c tio ns br ou g ht f

or a lle g e d T CPAvio latio ns . T his wi ll 17 pr e ve nt t

he un fa ir ne ss t hat e ns ue s w he n th e “ c ha ra c te r o r r e su lt o f a

lit ig atio n” dif

fe rs mate ri a lly 18 simply

beca use a pla intiff sues in fede ral, a s opposed to state, cour t . Id. at 467. 19 A sec ond, independe nt rea son reinfor ces this conc lusion. The private r ight of action 20 cre ated by

the TCPA allows a per son or entity to, “if otherwise permitted by the laws or rules of11 1 c ou rt o

f a S tate , bringin an appr opriate c ourt of that State,” a n action for

a violation of the 2 TCPA. See 47 U.S.C.§ 227(b)(3) ( emphasis adde d). This statutory languag e is unambiguous — 3 a cla im under the TCPA ca nnot be broug ht if not permitted by state law. “ In deter

mining the 4 proper

interpre tation of a statute, this court will look first to the plain languag e of a statute and 5 interpre t it by

its ordinary , common meaning . I f the statutory terms ar e unambiguous, our re view 6 g ener ally

ends and the statute is construed a ccor ding to the pla in meaningof its words.” Tyler v. 7 Douglas , 280 F.3d 116, 122 ( 2d Cir. 2001) (interna l citations, quotation marks, and alter ation 8 omitted). This provision constitut es an e x press limitation on the TCP A which f eder al cour

ts are 9 require d to respec t. 10 11 CO NC LU SION 12 13 The judg ment of the District Court is aff irmed. 14 1512 1 CAL AB RESI , J. , co n cu rr i n g: 2 Although I ag ree with the majority ’s judg ment in this case, I write sepa

rate ly beca use I 3 join only

in the second inter

pretation identified by

the majority

for its conc lusion. (Ante at 10- 4 11.) 5 Whatever the ir merits, our ca ses make c lear that, althoug h fede ral c ourts may not 6 enter

tain suits under the TCPA based on f eder al question jurisdiction, Foxhall Realty Law 7 Offices, Inc . v. Telec omms. Prem ium Servs., Ltd. , 156 F.3d 432, 435 ( 2d Cir. 1998), fede ral c ourt 8 jurisdiction ex ists where the re a re othe r base s for jurisdiction. See G ottlieb v. Carnival Corp. , 9 436 F.3d 335, 342- 43 (2d Cir. 2006). But see Brill v. Countrywide HomeLoans, Inc. , 427 F.3d 10 446, 450 (7th Cir. 2005) (c riticizi ngour dec ision in Fo x ha ll and c on te nd ingthat “ if

state 1 1 ju

r is d ic ti o nr e a ll y

is ‘ e xc lu s iv e , ’ th e nit

kn o c k s o u t [ 2 8 U

. S. C. ] § 1 3 3 2 a s w e ll a s [2 8 U

. S. C. ] § 12 1331”). L ike diversity jurisdiction, which we a ddresse d in Gottlieb , o th e r f o r m s o f p arty13 identity -base d fede ral c ourt jurisdiction ought a lso to give r ise to fede ral c ourt jurisdiction over 14 TCPA claims. Thus, suits involving as pa rties, inte r a lia , the United States (28 U.S.C. §§ 1345, 15 13 46 (s uit s, re sp e c tiv e ly , b y and a g a ins t th e Un ite d St ate s) ), dip lom ats ( 28 U. S.C. § 1 35 1 ( su its 16 ag ainst consuls, vice c onsuls, and members of diplomatic missi ons)), or c orporations orga nized 17 under f

eder al law ( 28 U.S.C. § 1349 (suits by and ag ainst such cor

porations)), should be 1 8 g o v e r

n e d b y Gottlieb , n ot Fo

x ha ll

. 19 He re , App e lla nt B on ime br ing s su it und e r d ive rs ity jur isd ic tio n. B ut h is i s n ot a 20 traditional diversity action. Rather , Bonime r elies on CAFA ’s diversity -jurisdiction provision, 21 see 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(2)( A), a nd attempts to bring a

class ac tion suitunder CAF A that, under 22 New Y ork law, he cannot br ing in Ne w York state court. See C.P.L .R. 901(b). The que stion13 1 befor e this Court, then, is whether a party may bringa TCPA claim in fede ral c ourt wher e the 2 same c laim would be bar red in state c ourt. 3 Th e TCP A’ s r ig ht o f a c tio n is c re ate d b y fe de ra l la w, and so fe de ra l su

bs tanti ve law mus t 4 apply

. See M

aternally Y

ours, Inc. v . Y

our Maternity Shop, Inc

. , 234 F.2d 538, 541 n.1 ( 2d Cir. 5 1956) (“ [D] espite re peate d statements imply ing the contra ry , it is t he sourc e of the rig ht sued 6 upon, and not the g round on which f eder al jurisdiction over the c ase is founde d, which 7 de te rm ine s th e g ov e rn inglaw. ” ); ac c or d A c htm an v . Ki rb

y , M c In e rn e y&Sq uire, LLP , 464 F.3d 8 32 8, 33 7 n .4 (2 d Ci r. 20 06 ). As su c h, B on ime is c or re c t th at Erie does not apply to his claim. 9 See F

elder v . Casey , 487 U.S. 131, 151 (1988) (de scribingthe Erie principle a s providing that 10 “whe n a fe dera l court exercise s diversity or pende nt jurisdiction over state-law claims , the 11 outcome of the litigation in the fe dera l court should be substantially the same, so f

ar a s leg al 12 rules dete rmine the outcome of a litig ation, as it would be if tried in a State court” ) (inter

nal 13 qu otatio n ma

rk s o mitte d) (e mph a sis a dd e d) . T he ma jor ity in a se ns e a g re e s, wr iti ng , “ I t is 14 c or

re c t th at th e Sup re me Court ’s Erie do c tr ine do e s n ot a pp ly dir e c tly to t he TCP A b e c a

us e it i s a 15 fede ral law . . . . The sche me of state a nd fede ral judicial integration and c oopera tion created by 16 Erie does not implicate the TCPA bec ause it is a fe dera l law and Erie was dire cted to state- law 17 claims.” (Ante at 9.) 18 Ibelieve that the majority missteps, however, in c oncludingthat the Erie doctrine a pplies 19 any

way , if only

indirectly , as a matter of “ Congr essional instruction.” (Ante at 9.) I do not think 20 we ne ed to turn to Erie at all, and that doingso confuse s matters. Instead, I would focus our 21 atte nti on

to t he langua g e of

the statut e and

wh at it sa y s a bo ut t his fe de ra l cause of ac tion. The 22 TCPA, in relevant pa rt, descr ibes the private rig ht of ac tion it create d as follows: a pe rson or14 1 e n t i ty “ m ay, if o the rwi sepe rm itte d b

ythelaw s o r ru le s o f c ou rt o f a S tate ,” bring“an a ction.” 2 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3) ( emphasis adde d). 3 L ike Gottlieb , this case pr esents a que stion of statutory construction. And statutory 4 construction beg ins with statutory text and its plain meaning

. See A uburn Hous. Auth. v. 5 Martinez , 277 F.3d 138, 143 ( 2d Cir. 2002). Under well-e stablished rules of inter pretation, the 6 languag e of the “if other wise per mitted” clause modifies and limits t he wor d “may .” See, e .g. , 7 United States v. Kerley , 416 F.3d 176, 180 ( 2d Cir. 2005) (followingthe “we ll-established rule” 8 that “a limiting c lause or phr ase . . . should ordina rily be re ad as modify

ing only the noun or 9 phrase that it imm ediately follows”) ( internal quotation marks a nd citation omitted). A state law 10 that bars suit in state cour t, like C.P .L .R. 901(b), thus eff ectively eliminates the ca

use of a ction 11 cre ated unde r the TCPA bec ause it eliminates the “ may” and the rest of the phrase that follows 12 (“br ing . . . a

n action”) . Fe dera l law (the TCPA’s c ause of action) dire cts courts to look to “the 13 laws” a

nd “rule s of cour

t” of a state. Thus, whe n a state r efuse s to recognize a cause of ac tion, 1 4 th e r e r e m a i n s n o c a u s e o f a c t i o nt o w h i c han y

g r an to f f e d e r a l c o urtj ur i s d i c t i o nc o u l d at t a c h

. It 15 follows that Bonime’ s suit mus t fail bec ause B onime lacks a cause of ac tion on which to bring 16 su it. 17 This result derive s inevitably from our c ases, a lthough it nee d not flow from e very 18 possible interpretation of the TCPA. The Seventh Circuit, for instanc e, has he ld that fede ral 19 courts may

exercise f

eder al question jurisdiction over TCPA suits. Br ill , 4 27 F .3 d at 45 1. In s o 20 doing, that court has r ead the languag e of se ction 227(b)( 3) re g ardingstate law a nd state cour

ts as 21 mere ly

cre atingan alter

native for um, rather

than as for eclosingjurisdiction or relief in fede ral 22 court. Indeed, the Seventh Circuit opined in Br ill that it s r e a din gwa s r e qu ir e d b e c a us e15 1 “other

wise whe re w ould victims go if a state elec ted not to enterta in these suits? ” Id. On the 2 Seventh Circuit’s interpre tation of the TCPA’s private r ight of action, Appe llant’s suit mi g ht 3 well be pe rmissible. 4 This Court, contrary to the Seventh Circuit, has re jected attempts to i nterpre t section 5 227(b)( 3)’s see mingly state-law cente red la

ng uag e as only

cre atingan alter

native for um for a 6 cause of ac tion that was—on the Seventh Circuit’s view —fede rally

meant to be c reated 7 ind e pe nd e ntl y

and via ble ind e pe nd e ntl y , r e g ard le ss o f a state ’s wi sh e s. Ins te a d, our d e c isi on in 8 Fo x ha ll , rea ffirme d in Gottlieb , interpre ted the statute’s state -ce ntere d languag e as ha ving 9 substantive content—conte nt that deprived us of fede ral que stion jurisdi ction. Fo x ha ll , 156 F.3d 10 at 43 5. Ha

vin gg ive n th e “ if

oth e rw ise pe rm itt e d” c la us e su c h c on te nt, we c ann ot n owig no re its 11 instruction in construing the TCPA. W e, ther efor e, must hold that the TCPA’s cause of action 12 do e s n ot s ur

viv e state law d e te rm inatio ns that ba r i t. 13 Erie is not necessa ry or helpful to the r esolution of this case. I there fore join in the 14 jud g me nt o f t

he ma jor ity and its se c on d g ro un d o f d e c isi on , b ut, mos t r e sp e c tf ull y , n ot i ts 15 rea soning r eg ardingthe indirec t application of Er ie

. 16