REVISED JUNE 3, 2010

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 09-40685

MARIA SANTOS LOPEZ DOMINGUEZ, individually and A.N.F. to K.L.,

M.L., I.L. and Estate of Omar Guajardo Andrade; SANDRA PATRICIA

PACHEO ROSADO, individually and as representative of the Estate of

Leonardo M. Hernandez Pozo; TAYDE M. POZO ROBLE, parent of Leonardo

M. Hernandez Pozo; JULISSA BOVIO CHAGOYA, individually and A.N.F. to

D.B., J.B. and M.B. on behalf of the Estate of Miguel Angel Solis Rodriguez;

CARLOS BLAS CORTAZAR; SERGIO ROSADO CORTES; EUDOCIA A.

JACOME GOMEZ; ALDO ANTONIO LOPEZ LORENZO; JORGE GUZMAN

MARTINEZ; JESUS I. SUAREZ MATIAS; JUAN ANTONIO PALAFOX

NAVARETTE; PASTOR GARCIA OCANA; OSCAR ROMERO ORTEGA;

SERGIO SOLIS PONCE; JOSE PEDRO COBO QUIROZ; FERNANDO A.

CERVERA RAMIREZ; JORGE A. JIMENEZ RANGEL; MARTIN ZUNIGA

SALAZAR; GABRIEL GONZALEZ TORA; TEODOSIO RUEDA DE LEON;

MIGUEL HERNANDEZ CHAN, parent of Leonardo M. Hernandez Pozo,

deceased; ANTONIO MONTERO HERNANDEZ; LEONEL FERNANDEZ

RIVERA; HERMILLO JIMENEZ CEPEDA; ALL PLAINTIFFS,

Plaintiffs-Appellants

v.

GULF COAST MARINE & ASSOCIATES, INC.; GLEN CARTER;

HALLIBURTON COMPANY; SCHLUMBERGER TECHNOLOGY

CORPORATION; MATTHEWS-DANIEL COMPANY, 

Defendants-Appellees

Appeal from the United States District Court for the 

Eastern District of Texas (Lufkin Division)

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

F I L E D

May 28, 2010

Lyle W. Cayce

Clerk
No. 09-40685

2

Before BENAVIDES, STEWART, and SOUTHWICK, Circuit Judges.

FORTUNATO P. BENAVIDES, Circuit Judge:

In this case, we are asked to review the dismissal of an action seeking

redress for injuries suffered in a deadly maritime accident off the coast of

Mexico. However, at this time, we forego a ruling on the merits of the dismissal

of this case for forum non conveniens. After plaintiffs filed this appeal, the

district judge who presided over this case recused himself, calling into question

the continued validity of his dismissal. Given the incomplete information in the

record regarding the circumstances of the judge’s recusal, we remand this case

to the district court for the limited purpose of addressing whether the dismissal

of this case should be set aside.

I.

On October 23, 2007, an unusually strong storm blew across the Gulf of

Campeche, where the mobile drilling rig USUMACINTA was positioned over the

oil production platform KAB-101, approximately ten miles north of the Mexican

coast. As hurricane force winds battered the vessels, the USUMACINTA allided

with the KAB-101, damaging the platform and causing oil and gas to leak from

one of its wells. The workers onboard on the KAB-101 were unable to stop the

leak and had to evacuate the platform. They boarded two lifeboats called

mandarinas, both of which eventually capsized in the rough waters. Twenty-two

workers drowned, along with two rescuers called to the accident.

The plaintiffs in this case are relatives of the workers who perished in the

accident, representatives of their estates, and survivors of the accident. Each

plaintiff is a resident of Mexico, and all of the individuals whose deaths or

injuries are the subject of this lawsuit worked for Mexico’s state-owned oil

company Petróleos Mexicanos (“Pemex”) or Perforadora Central (“Perforadora”),

a Mexican company that assists Pemex in oil exploration. At the time of the
No. 09-40685

1 Plaintiffs initially filed suit against Pemex, but later voluntarily dismissed these

claims. Since they filed this appeal, plaintiffs have also dismissed their claims against three

other defendants: Battelle Memorial Institute, Vetco Gray, Inc., and Baker Hughes, Inc.

3

accident, Pemex owned the KAB-101 platform and was leasing the

USUMACINTA rig from Perforadora.

In 2008, a year after the accident, plaintiffs initiated the present suit in

federal district court in Lufkin, Texas, asserting negligence, gross negligence,

and products liability claims. Neither Pemex nor Perforadora are defendants in

this suit.1Instead, plaintiffs have filed suit against four Texas companies, Gulf

Coast Marine & Associated, Inc. (“Gulf Coast”), Schlumberger Technology

Corporation, Halliburton Energy Services, Inc., and Matthews-Daniel Company.

They have also filed suit against Glen Carter, an alleged employee of Gulf Coast

and U.S. citizen resident in Louisiana. Plaintiffs allege that defendants are

collectively responsible for the accident that occurred on October 23, 2007.

After limited discovery, on May 29, 2009 the district court issued an order

dismissing this case for forum non conveniens, contingent on several conditions.

Specifically, the order provided that:

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Defendants’ Motions to

Dismiss for Forum Non Conveniens . . . shall be CONDITIONALLY

GRANTED subject to a return jurisdiction clause under the

following conditions:

1) Defendants’ agreementto appear and submitthemselves to

the jurisdiction of the Mexican courts, waiving any

jurisdictional defenses they might normally possess;

2) Defendants’ waiver of any statute of limitations or

laches-related defenses that they did not possess at the time

the Plaintiffs originally filed in this court; and

3) Defendants’ agreement to submit to discovery in the

Mexican forum in accordance with the procedural rules of the

Mexican court.

The dismissal of this case from this court’s docket shall

become effective once the Defendants have tendered a written

statement assenting to be bound by the foregoing conditions.

Should the Defendants fail to do so by June 26, 2009, their forum
No. 09-40685

4

non conveniens motions will be considered waived, and this case will

proceed to trial in this court. 

Should the courts of Mexico refuse to accept jurisdiction for

reasons other than Plaintiffs’ refusal to pursue an action or to

comply with the procedural requirements of Mexican courts, this

court may reassertjurisdiction upon timely notification ofthe same.

On June 26, 2009, defendants met the district court’s deadline for filing a

statement agreeing to return jurisdiction, submitting a stipulation with terms

very similar to those mandated by Judge Clark. Three days later, on June 29,

plaintiffs filed a notice appealing the court’s May 29 order, as plaintiffs were

concerned that the order could be construed as final and the thirty-day deadline

for appeal had arrived. See Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(1)(A) (“In a civil case, . . . the

notice of appeal . . . must be filed . . . within 30 days after the judgment or order

appealed from is entered.”). Two days later, plaintiffs objected to defendants’

stipulation, as defendants had only agreed to submit to jurisdiction in Mexico

City. Shortly thereafter, defendants submitted a revised stipulation on July 6

and plaintiffs withdrew their objection, prompting the court to enter an order

formally dismissing this case on July 7.

A week later, on July 13, 2009, Judge Clark convened a teleconference

with counsel for all parties and informed them that he had just discovered that

he owned stock in the parent company of a defendant in this case. As a result,

he announced that he was recusing himself, explaining that:

This is something that I probably should have figured out before,

namely, at our last hearing when we went through the questions

about Schlumberger. But all of a sudden—in the middle of the night

a couple of days ago, I all of a sudden—it suddenly clicked, and I

started looking. . . . [R]ecently, due to the death of my mother, I had

acquired some Schlumberger Limited stock, not a great deal. But

under the Code of Judicial Ethics, just one share is enough to

disqualify me from any case involving Schlumberger Limited. And

under the rulings dealing with Federal judicial conduct and the

Committee on Codes of Conduct, it is something that cannot be

waived by the parties because it is just the appearance. So, I’m not
No. 09-40685

2 Plaintiffs also challenge the merits of the district court’s forum non conveniens

dismissal, but for the reasons explained below, we do not review this issue today.

5

even going to ask about that. And then there is the fact that since

Schlumberger Tech is owned by and its parent is Schlumberger

Limited, then Schlumberger Limited has an interest in what

happens to Schlumberger Tech. I wish I had thought of this before

I issued my first opinion, which evidently is now on appeal out of an

abundance of caution, I understand, by plaintiffs because—and I

agree it’s sometimes very difficult to tell exactly when the final

order comes and when you have to appeal. But I think the only

thing I can do is, in effect, withdraw this last order. And I still—it

is within ten days. I think I can do that. It’s what I considered the

final order to be; although, the first one where I conditionally

granted the transfer may have been the final one—and then notify

the circuit court as to what I’ve done so they can decide what they

want to do with it. I mean, I don’t know that another judge would

come up with a different decision; but I feel it’s just simply

inappropriate to let this stand or hope that nobody notices later on.

That just isn’t—I mean, that’s not how we do business.

Accordingly, later that day, Judge Clark entered separate orders vacating his

July 7 order dismissing this case and recusing himself. The chief judge of the

Eastern District of Texas then reassigned this case to Judge T. John Ward.

II.

Before addressing the effect of Judge Clark’s recusal on the merits of this

appeal, we must first assure ourselves of our jurisdiction. We may only exercise

jurisdiction over appeals from “final decisions.” 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (2006). One of

the oddities produced by the unusual procedural posture of this case is that

plaintiffs ask us to dismiss their own appeal for lack of jurisdiction,2so that they

may return to the district court for Judge Ward to determine whether Judge

Clark’s dismissal is still valid. Specifically, plaintiffs contend that we lack

jurisdiction because (i) they appealed from Judge Clark’s May 29 order, (ii) that

order was not final, and (iii) as an interlocutory order, it merged with the final

dismissal order issued on July 7, which was later vacated by Judge Clark on
No. 09-40685

3 Defendants point to several cases that they claim indicate that the May 29 order was

final and immediately appealable. In a number of cases, this Court has held that conditional

forum non conveniens dismissals are final, despite the fact that “the orders may literally

appear to have more typically nonfinal characteristics . . . [b]ecause they are conditional.” Koke

v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 730 F.2d 211, 216 (5th Cir. 1984), overruled on other grounds by

Trivelloni-Lorenzi v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc. (In re Air Crash Disaster near New Orleans),

821 F.2d 1147, 1163 n.25 (5th Cir. 1987) (en banc); see also Newball v. Offshore Logistics Int’l,

803 F.2d 821, 826 (5th Cir. 1986). For example, in Koke, this Court held that a dismissal order

was final, even though it “was conditioned on three requisites: (1) that all defendants consent

to jurisdiction in a single appropriate foreign forum; (2) that all defendants waive any defense

regarding the statute of limitations; and (3) that all defendants consent to satisfying any

judgment rendered by such court.” 730 F.2d at 214. These cases seem to be animated at least

in part by a concern that interpreting conditional forum non conveniens dismissals to be

nonfinal would be unfair to plaintiffs—if such dismissals were not final, plaintiffs would not

be able to appeal an order directing them to litigate abroad withoutfirst commencing litigation

abroad.

We note that this case is distinguishable from cases like Koke—Judge Clark’s dismissal

was not solely conditioned on defendants submitting to jurisdiction abroad, but also on

defendants filing a stipulation in his court by June 26, less than a month after entry of his May

29 order. In these circumstances, Judge Clark’s May 29 order might reasonably be read as

being nonfinal when entered, but we do not reach this issue today. 

6

July 13. However, plaintiffs are mistaken; we have jurisdiction over this appeal.

Even if Judge Clark’s dismissal did not become final until July 7, plaintiffs’ June

29 notice of appeal relates forward to the date when the dismissal became final.

At that point, jurisdiction vested in this Court, meaning that Judge Clark’s July

13 vacatur of his July 7 final order is void.

This appeal is from Judge Clark’s May 29 order, and the parties primarily

focus their arguments on whether the May 29 order was final when entered,

suggesting that if it were not final when entered, we would lack jurisdiction.3

This is incorrect; even if plaintiffs’ June 29 notice of appeal were filed

prematurely, before the district court’s dismissal of this case became final, we

could still have jurisdiction, as premature notices of appeal may sometimes

relate forward to the date when dismissal of a case becomes final. Federal Rule

of Appellate Procedure 4(a)(2) establishes that“[a] notice of appeal filed after the

court announces a decision or order—but before the entry of the judgment or

order—is treated as filed on the date of and after the entry.” 
No. 09-40685

7

The leading case interpreting this rule is FirsTier Mortgage Co. v.

Investors Mortgage Insurance Co., 498 U.S. 269 (1991). In FirsTier, a district

court announced that it was granting a defendant’s motion for summary

judgment, but asked the defendant to submit proposed findings of fact and

conclusions of law. The court also stated that it would allow the plaintiff to file

objections to the proposed findings. Id. at 270-71. However, before the court

entered the final judgment, the plaintiff appealed. Id. at 272. The Supreme

Court concluded that although the judge “did not explicitly exclude the

possibility that he might change his mind” before entering a final order, the

plaintiff’s notice of appeal could “relate forward to judgment and serve as an

effective notice of appeal from the final judgment.” Id. at 273, 275. The Court

held that “Rule 4(a)(2) permits a notice of appeal from a nonfinal decision to

operate as a notice of appeal from the final judgment only when a district court

announces a decision that would be appealable if immediately followed by the

entry of judgment.” Id. at 276.

In this case, Judge Clark structured his May 29 order such that once

defendants filed their stipulation, he did not need to take any further action,

other than simply entering a short order formally dismissing the case. Indeed,

once defendants filed a satisfactory stipulation and plaintiffs withdrew their

objection, that is what he did. Thus, on May 29, Judge Clark announced “a

decision that would be appealable if immediately followed by the entry of

judgment,” FirsTier, 498 U.S. at 276, and therefore plaintiffs’ notice of appeal

from the May 29 order can relate forward to the date it became final. 

In similar circumstances, other circuit courts have also found that notices

of appeal can relate forward. The Second and Seventh Circuits have held that

when “the district court states that if a certain event does not happen by a

particular date the court’s order will become a final judgment, and the event

does not happen, a notice of appeal filed after the court’s statement but before
No. 09-40685

4 See Slayton v. Am. Express Co., 460 F.3d 215, 224 (2d Cir. 2006) (“A dismissal with

leave to amend is a non-final order and not appealable. . . . However, an appellant can render

such a non-final order ‘final’ and appealable by disclaiming any intent to amend.”); Otis v. City

of Chicago, 29 F.3d 1159, 1168 (7th Cir. 1994) (en banc) (approving of “an appeal from a

conditional order of dismissal after the time to satisfy the condition has expired”).

8

the specified date is covered by Rule 4(a)(2).” 16A Charles Allen Wright et al.,

Federal Practice and Procedure § 3950.5 (4th ed. 2008).4 This case is effectively

the same, except that finality was not triggered by the failure of a party to take

a certain action, but rather by defendants’ submission of their stipulation to the

court. Despite this distinction, since Judge Clark did not need to take any

further action after the satisfaction of his condition precedent to dismissal,

plaintiffs’ notice of appeal can relate forward. Thus, jurisdiction vested in this

Court at the latest on July 7, when Judge Clark entered an order formally

dismissing this case.

Finally, Judge Clark’s July 13 order vacating his dismissal of this case

does not disturb our jurisdiction, as we had already acquired jurisdiction by July

7 at the latest. We have previously held that when a notice of appeal transfers

jurisdiction to this Court, district courts lose the ability to vacate or amend their

orders that have been appealed. See, e.g., Winchester v. U.S. Attorney for S. Dist.

of Tex., 68 F.3d 947, 948-49 (5th Cir. 1995); Offshore Logistics Servs., Inc. v. Mut.

Marine Office, Inc., 639 F.2d 1168, 1170 (5th Cir. 1981). Therefore, plaintiffs’

contention that the district court’s July 13 vacatur order deprives this Court of

appellate jurisdiction is incorrect. Of course, this is not to say that the district

court was stripped of all jurisdiction once plaintiffs’ notice of appeal became

effective. “The district court maintains jurisdiction as to matters not involved

in the appeal, such as the merits of an action when appeal from a preliminary

injunction is taken, or in aid of the appeal, as by making clerical corrections.”

Farmhand, Inc. v. Anel Eng’g Indus., Inc., 693 F.2d 1140, 1145 (5th Cir. 1982).

Consequently, it was still appropriate for Judge Clark to recuse himself, insofar
No. 09-40685

9

as he retained certain residual jurisdiction over this case. Also, his recusal could

be viewed as being in aid of this appeal, as it brings to our attention serious

questions concerning the propriety of the dismissal that is now on appeal.

III.

Having confirmed our jurisdiction, we now address the effect of Judge

Clark’s ownership of Schlumberger Limited stock on this appeal. Plaintiffs ask

us to grant them leave to file a motion with the district court pursuant to

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b), which has been used previously as a

means for vacating judgments issued by judges who should have recused

themselves. See Liljeberg v. Health Servs. Acquisition Corp., 486 U.S. 847, 863

(1988). Specifically, the Rule provides that “[o]n motion and just terms, the

court may relieve a party or its legal representative from a final judgment, order,

or proceeding for . . . any . . . reason that justifies relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(6).

Plaintiffs assert that they cannot file a Rule 60(b) motion in the district court

until this Court has granted them leave to do so, as their notice of appeal

stripped the district court of jurisdiction. Conversely, defendants contend that

plaintiffs’ request is not properly before this Court because plaintiffs never

sought Rule 60(b) relief in the district court. We find that plaintiffs have not

complied with the usual procedures for seeking relief from a judgment under

Rule 60(b) while an appeal is pending. Nevertheless, we also conclude that a

partial remand is appropriate under these unusual circumstances, so that Judge

Ward may assess in the first instance the continued validity of Judge Clark’s

dismissal of this case.

Defendants are correct that plaintiffs have not followed the usual

procedures for seeking relief under Rule 60(b). This Court has provided

extremely clear guidance to litigants on how to proceed with a Rule 60(b) motion

after a notice of appeal has been filed. Although an effective notice of appeal

strips district courts of jurisdiction to grant a Rule 60(b) motion, it does not
No. 09-40685

5

Indeed, this procedure has become so widely accepted that it has now been codified

into the Federal Rules, in a provision that became effective on December 1, 2009, just weeks

after plaintiffs submitted their reply brief. Specifically, new Rule 62.1 provides that:

(a) Relief Pending Appeal. If a timely motion is made for relief that the court

lacks authority to grant because of an appeal that has been docketed and is

pending, the court may:

(1) defer considering the motion;

(2) deny the motion; or

(3) state either that it would grant the motion if the court of appeals

remands for that purpose or that the motion raises a substantial issue.

(b) Notice to the Court of Appeals. The movant must promptly notify the circuit

clerk under Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 12.1 if the district court states

that it would grant the motion or that the motion raises a substantial issue.

(c) Remand. The district court may decide the motion if the court of appeals

remands for that purpose.

Fed. R. Civ. P. 62.1.

10

prevent litigants from filing them in the district court while an appeal is

pending. Instead, “[t]he district court retains jurisdiction to consider and deny

[Rule 60(b)] motions, and if it indicates that it will grant the motion, the

appellant [may] then make a motion in the Court of Appeals for a remand of the

case in order that the district court may grant such motion.” Winchester, 68

F.3d at 949 (quoting Ferrell v. Trailmobile, Inc., 223 F.2d 697, 699 (5th Cir.

1955)) (internal brackets and ellipses omitted).5 Plaintiffs have not heeded this

guidance—they seek a remand but have not already filed a Rule 60(b) motion

with Judge Ward.

However, plaintiffs’ failure to file a Rule 60(b) motion with the district

court does not slip a blindfold over our eyes, letting us ignore that the judgment

we are reviewing was entered by a judge subject to recusal. The statute

governing the recusal of Judge Clark in this case is 28 U.S.C. § 455, and the

Supreme Court has explained that since § 455 “neither prescribes nor prohibits

any particular remedy” for recusal violations, “Congress has wisely delegated to

the judiciary the task of fashioning the remedies that will best serve the purpose

of the legislation.” Liljeberg, 486 U.S. at 862. Courts have previously exercised

this authority on appeal, even when remedies for recusal violations were not
No. 09-40685

11

first sought in the district court. For example, in Davis v. Xerox, the Ninth

Circuit considered whether rulings made by a district judge subject to recusal

had to be vacated, despite the fact the issue was raised for the first time on

appeal. 811 F.2d 1293, 1296 (9th Cir. 1987) (“Only on appeal did [the plaintiff]

obtain copies of the first judge’s reports and bring them to the attention of a

court. [His] objection is still timely.”). Similarly, in Potashnick v. Port City

Construction Co., we remanded a case for determination of whether a judge

should have recused himself, after attorneys discovered grounds for the judge’s

recusal following the conclusion of a trial. 609 F.2d 1101, 1106, 1115 (5th Cir.

1980). We opted not to rule on the merits of the appeal in Potashnick until after

the recusal issue had first been heard by the district court. Id. at 1107; see also

Russell v. Lane, 890 F.2d 947, 948 (7th Cir. 1989) (remanding without

addressing merits to allow pro se litigant to file Rule 60(b) motion challenging

orders entered by judge who had recused himself). Therefore, the failure of

plaintiffs to file a Rule 60(b) motion below, while regrettable, does not deprive

us of authority to craft a remedy for Judge Clark’s possible violation of § 455.

That said, itis true thatin some cases, when appellants have raised issues

properly considered under Rule 60(b) for the first time on appeal, we have

refused to consider these issues. For example, in Leasehold Expense Recovery,

Inc. v. Mothers Work, Inc., the appellant asked for the first time on appeal that

the summary judgment entered in favor of the appellee be vacated, as the

appellant claimed that the appellee had withheld certain documents during

discovery. 331 F.3d 452, 463 (5th Cir. 2003). We found that this request was

“properly styled” as a motion to set aside summary judgment for fraud,

misrepresentation, or misconduct under Rule 60(b)(3) and refused to consider

the issue, partially affirming the district court. Id. at 463-64. 

However, the instant case arises under exceptional circumstances,

different from those before us in Leasehold Expense Recovery. Plaintiffs do not
No. 09-40685

12

speculatively claim for the first time on appeal that Judge Clark should have

recused himself; instead, Judge Clark sua sponte recused himself after a notice

of appeal had already become effective. All parties agree his recusal was proper,

and no one disputes that he owned Schlumberger Limited stock while he

presided over this case. Furthermore, the situation below was complicated by

Judge Clark’s July 13 order vacating his July 7 dismissal order. On this appeal,

we have rejected plaintiffs’ argument that Judge Clark’s vacatur of his July 7

order was valid and had the effect of vacating his May 29 order. Before we

reached this conclusion, however, it would have been unusual for plaintiffs to

have asked Judge Ward to set aside the May 29 order, while simultaneously

arguing on appealthat Judge Clark had already effectively vacated it. Plaintiffs

should have filed a Rule 60(b) motion with Judge Ward out of an abundance of

caution, but we have previously explained that the procedures for filing postappeal Rule 60(b) motions are not “a judicial tightrope to be walked at peril.”

Lairsey v. Advance Abrasives Co., 542 F.2d 928, 932 (5th Cir. 1976). Instead,

“[w]here the litigant has timely initiated procedure for relief, he should not be

penalized for choice of the ‘wrong’ procedure.” Id. In these circumstances, we

cannot review the merits of Judge Clark’s forum non conveniens dismissal as if

we had no knowledge of his recusal.

IV.

Although we have the authority to address any violation of § 455 that

occurred in this case, we find that it would be inappropriate for us to do so at

this stage, given the limited information in the record concerning Judge Clark’s

acquisition of Schlumberger Limited stock. The Supreme Court has explained

that “§ 455(a) can be violated based on an appearance of partiality, even though

the judge was not conscious of the circumstances creating the appearance of

impropriety.” Liljeberg, 486 U.S. at 858. As a result, if Judge Clark’s ownership

of Schlumberger Limited stock creates an appearance of impartiality, then his
No. 09-40685

13

dismissal of this case while owning the stock would have violated § 455(a), even

if he lacked knowledge of his ownership at the time. However, the record does

not reveal how much stock Judge Clark acquired, its value, or when he acquired

it. The record is also silent on whether Judge Clark reviewed what stock he had

inherited during the same period he was considering motions indicating

Schlumberger Limited’s interest in this case. Additionally, the parties have not

extensively discussed § 455 in their briefing, nor whether vacatur is the proper

remedy for any violation of the statute that occurred. See 486 U.S. at 862

(explaining that vacatur of judgments does not automatically follow from every

violation of § 455). 

Given these considerations, we remand this case in part to allow Judge

Ward to indicate to us whether he is inclined to grant a Rule 60(b) motion

vacating Judge Clark’s dismissal ofthis case. If he is so inclined, we will remand

this case in full so that Judge Clark’s dismissal can be vacated and his forum

non conveniens ruling relitigated. However, for the moment, we retain

jurisdiction so that if Judge Ward denies the motion and plaintiffs appeal his

denial, we will be able to review both the denial of the Rule 60(b) motion and the

merits of Judge Clark’s forum non conveniens dismissal. See Potashnick, 609

F.2d at 1106-07 (remanding for limited purpose of determining whether judge

should have recused himself and then consolidating appeal of recusal ruling with

initial merits appeal); 11 Wright et al., supra, § 2873 (2d ed. Supp. 2010)

(explaining that appellant may appeal “the denial of the [Rule 60(b)] motion and

often the appellate court can consider that appeal together with the appeal from

the original judgment”). The district court may issue orders and conduct and

regulate any proceedings necessary for the proper disposition of the limited

remand provided for herein.
No. 09-40685

14

V.

Consequently,this case is REMANDED for further proceedings consistent

with this opinion.