In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit ____________________ 

No. 22-2003 

ANDREW STACY, 

Plaintiff-Appellant, 

v.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Defendant-Appellee. 

____________________ 

Appeal from the United States District Court for the

Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.

No. 1:19-cv-00301 — Matthew F. Kennelly, Judge. 

____________________ 

ARGUED FEBRUARY 7, 2023 — DECIDED JUNE 2, 2023 

____________________ 

Before HAMILTON, BRENNAN, and JACKSON-AKIWUMI,

Circuit Judges. 

BRENNAN, Circuit Judge. A restitution order in a criminal 

case requires Andrew Stacy to pay the government more than

one million dollars. But the government also owes Stacy 

$75,000 from a Federal Tort Claims Act settlement. The government plans to offset the FTCA settlement against Stacy’s 

restitution debt, to which he objects. The district court rejected 

Stacy’s challenge to the government’s use of offset, and we 
2 No. 22-2003 

affirm. Federal law authorizes the government to offset

Stacy’s settlement award against his restitution debt. 

I. Background

Stacy’s restitution obligations arose from a 2014 conviction 

for bank fraud. The district court sentenced him to a term of 

imprisonment and ordered restitution. In total, the court ordered Stacy to pay $1,495,689.60 jointly and severally with a 

codefendant. Though payable to the United States, the government forwards collected money to Stacy’s victims. 

Stacy’s time in prison eventually led to an FTCA claim. 

When Stacy entered federal custody in 2015, he suffered from 

pain and limited range of motion in his hip. Those problems 

worsened while incarcerated, and he sought treatment 

through the prison medical system. A consulting orthopedic 

surgeon recommended a prompt hip replacement. But Stacy 

did not receive the procedure while incarcerated—it was performed only after his release in 2016. Stacy filed suit against 

the United States in 2019, alleging the federal prison was negligent in failing to procure his hip replacement surgery. The 

United States settled with Stacy in 2021, not admitting liability 

but agreeing to pay him $75,000. 

While the settlement concluded the FTCA claim, it did not 

resolve what would happen with the settlement funds. The 

parties differed on whether the money could be offset against 

Stacy’s outstanding restitution obligations, and they memorialized that dispute in the settlement agreement. The government expected the Treasury Department “to offset the entire 

$75,000 settlement amount ... for application to Stacy’s criminal judgment debt.” Stacy disagreed and preserved the right 

to “file a motion before the district court seeking to prevent 
No. 22-2003 3

the United States Department of the Treasury from performing an offset.” The parties executed the agreement, and Stacy 

moved in the district court to preclude the offset. The district 

court rejected Stacy’s arguments and held that the government can offset his settlement money. Stacy appeals. 

II. Jurisdiction

We determine first whether we have jurisdiction and 

whether sovereign immunity shields the government’s offset 

use from judicial challenge. See generally Avila v. Pappas, 591 

F.3d 552, 553 (7th Cir. 2010); Lipsey v. United States, 879 F.3d 

249, 253 (7th Cir. 2018). Resolution of both issues turns on 

interpretation of the FTCA, which “waive[s] the sovereign immunity of the United States for certain torts committed by federal employees” and confers federal court jurisdiction over 

qualifying claims. FDIC v. Meyer, 510 U.S. 471, 475–76 (1994) 

(citing 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b)). The parties agree the district court 

had jurisdiction over Stacy’s negligence claim against the 

United States, but they dispute whether 28 U.S.C. § 1346(c) 

confers federal court jurisdiction over Stacy’s offset challenge. 

That provision says, “The jurisdiction conferred by this 

section includes jurisdiction of any set-off, counterclaim, or 

other claim or demand whatever on the part of the United 

States against any plaintiff commencing an action under this 

section.” § 1346(c). Stacy argues this waives sovereign immunity and confers federal court jurisdiction over his challenge to the government’s use of offset here. The government 

disagrees. It reads § 1346(c) narrowly, arguing federal courts 

in FTCA cases have “jurisdiction over a set-off or other claim 

only when that other claim is brought by the United States 

against the plaintiff, not the other way around.” Because Stacy 

challenges offset here, the government asserts § 1346(c) fails 
4 No. 22-2003 

to waive sovereign immunity or grant jurisdiction. Per the 

government, “The court in an FTCA case can award damages, 

but there is nothing in the FTCA that gives courts the power 

to say what happens to the money.” The district court resolved this issue in Stacy’s favor, holding that § 1346(c) “is 

written broadly and includes all cases, like this case, where 

the United States claims a set-off against an FTCA plaintiff.” 

“We review de novo a determination of subject matter jurisdiction.” Nichols v. Longo, 22 F.4th 695, 697 (7th Cir. 2022) (citing Big Shoulders Cap. LLC v. San Luis & Rio Grande R.R., Inc., 

13 F.4th 560, 567 (7th Cir. 2021)). 

The plain language of § 1346(c) confers jurisdiction here.

Stacy is a “plaintiff commencing an action under [the FTCA],” 

and he is challenging a “set-off ... on the part of the United 

States” being used against him. § 1346(c). Resisting this conclusion, the government asks us to read “on the part of the 

United States against any plaintiff” as a one-way conferral of 

jurisdiction applicable only when the government seeks an 

offset—not when an FTCA plaintiff seeks to enjoin an offset. 

We disagree with the government’s reading. Section 1346(c) 

grants subject matter jurisdiction over “any set-off ... whatever 

on the part of United States” against an FTCA plaintiff. Id.

(emphasis added). The instigating party’s identity does not

matter. Even though Stacy was the movant below, the United 

States still seeks to use offset against an FTCA plaintiff. Accordingly, jurisdiction exists to hear this case. 

III. Discussion

We turn to the merits of Stacy’s appeal. He presents four 

main arguments for why the government is not authorized to 

offset his FTCA settlement award against his restitution debts.

First, he asserts that the statute governing criminal restitution 
No. 22-2003 5

procedure, 18 U.S.C. § 3664, outright prohibits use of offset to 

enforce restitution obligations. Second, he argues that offset is 

improper because offset only applies to funds owed to the 

government and, per Stacy, his debt is “owed” to his victims. 

Third, Stacy contends that offset is only appropriate for delinquent debts, and he claims to be current on his obligations.

Fourth, Stacy asserts that nothing in his restitution order mandates that “settlements or other forms of large funds received 

by [the] plaintiff ... be applied toward his restitution.” 

The government responds that through his criminal plea 

agreement, Stacy waived his challenge to offset. Beyond 

waiver, the government asserts an offset is authorized by statute and consistent with the district court’s restitution order. 

Because the government’s ability to offset turns on statutory 

interpretation, our review is de novo throughout. United 

States v. Miller, 883 F.3d 998, 1003 (7th Cir. 2018). 

We start with this last point, the government’s contention 

that Stacy may not challenge offset. When Stacy pleaded 

guilty, he “agree[d] that the United States may enforce collection of any fine or restitution imposed in this case pursuant to 

Title 18, United States Code, Sections 3572, 3613, and 3664(m), 

notwithstanding any payment schedule set by the Court.” 

The government reads that provision to mean that Stacy has 

waived “any challenge to the United States’ administrative 

offset rights.” We see it differently. Stacy agreed the government could use 18 U.S.C. §§ 3572, 3613, and 3664(m). But neither § 3572 nor § 3613 deal directly with offset. Section 3664 

authorizes enforcement of restitution by “all other available 

and reasonable means,” but whether “all other available and 

reasonable means” includes offset is one of the questions 
6 No. 22-2003 

Stacy raises on appeal. § 3664(m)(1)(A)(i)–(ii). So, nothing in 

the agreement forecloses Stacy’s challenge to the offset.

Turning to Stacy’s four arguments, we begin with whether 

§ 3664—which outlines procedures for enforcing restitution 

orders—bars the use of offset. Stacy argues that statute does, 

and he directs our attention to subsection (c), which states, 

“The provisions of this chapter, chapter 227, and Rule 32(c) of 

the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure shall be the only 

rules applicable to proceedings,” meaning restitution proceedings, “under this section.” Stacy interprets § 3664(c) to 

mean that the government cannot enforce a restitution order

using tools, like offset, housed elsewhere in the Code. But this 

interpretation ignores § 3664(m)(1)(A), which reads “(i) An order of restitution may be enforced by the United States in the 

manner provided for in subchapter C of chapter 227 and subchapter B of chapter 229 of this title; or (ii) by all other available 

and reasonable means.” Id. (emphasis added). By its plain text, 

§ 3664 authorizes the government to enforce restitution orders not just through a stipulated set of mechanisms but also 

through “all other available and reasonable means.” Id. Offset, as a collection tool available to the United States, is such a 

means of enforcement. See 31 U.S.C. §§ 3728, 3711, 3716. 

Perhaps recognizing this issue, Stacy suggests that 18 

U.S.C. § 3664(n) changes the equation. That provision requires an individual who “receives substantial resources ... 

including ... settlement ... during a period of incarceration” 

to apply the value of those resources to outstanding restitution debts. § 3664(n). For Stacy, the fact that subsection (n) requires incarcerated individuals to apply settlement money to 

their restitution debt means non-incarcerated individuals 

need not do so. But this argument fails in view of § 3664(m), 
No. 22-2003 7

which authorizes the United States to enforce restitution orders using all its available and reasonable means. We do not 

read § 3664(n) to constrain a co-equal statutory provision.

As a final point, Stacy agrees that the United States can enforce restitution orders but argues § 3664 “does not say an order of settlements or judgments received may be enforced by the 

United States.” So, Stacy contends that “[r]estitution ordered 

by a court in a criminal proceeding is separate to any 

settlements received in a civil suit.” This argument reflects a 

mistaken understanding of restitution, which creates a debt 

obligation that may be satisfied from qualifying defendant assets. United States v. Kollintzas, 501 F.3d 796, 802 (7th Cir. 2007) 

(“An order for payment of restitution becomes a lien on all 

property and rights to property of the defendant upon entry 

of judgment ... .”); 18 U.S.C. § 3613(c) (stating that a restitution order creates a lien in favor of the United States). A settlement award is one such asset, so restitution and settlement 

funds are not separate as Stacy contends. Nor does the government enforce a settlement agreement or civil judgment 

merely by capturing the qualifying proceeds. In sum, § 3664 

does not prevent the government from using offset. 

Second to consider is whether, in this context, offset is otherwise authorized. For that, we briefly review federal offset

statutes. 

Title 31 U.S.C. § 3728 addresses situations, like here, where 

a plaintiff wins a judgment against the United States but already owes the government money. In that case, § 3728 commands that “[t]he Secretary of the Treasury shall withhold 

paying that part of a judgment against the United States Government presented to the Secretary that is equal to a debt the 

plaintiff owes the Government.” § 3728(a). It then describes 
8 No. 22-2003 

the government’s next steps for dealing with the money: the 

government can offset the judgment amount if the plaintiff 

agrees, or it can “have a civil action brought if one has not 

already been brought.” § 3728(b); see also 31 C.F.R. § 256.22. 

Different offset rules are housed in 31 U.S.C. § 3711 and 

§ 3716.1 Section 3711(a)(1) requires executive, judicial, or 

legislative agency heads to try to collect claims “of the United 

States Government for money or property.” It also provides 

that an agency head is not to discharge any outstanding debt 

until all appropriate collection steps have been taken, 

“including (as applicable)—(A) administrative offset.” 

§ 3711(g)(9)(A). For its part, § 3716(a) addresses what happens 

when an agency head’s collection efforts are not successful: 

“After trying to collect a claim from a person under section 

3711(a) of this title, the head of an executive, judicial, or 

legislative agency may collect the claim by administrative 

offset.” That same section also requires federal agencies owed 

a “legally enforceable nontax debt that is over 120 days 

delinquent” to notify the Secretary of the Treasury “for 

purposes of administrative offset.” § 3716(c)(6)(A).

We pause to highlight the relevant distinctions between 

the two offset statutes at play, § 3728 and § 3716. The first is 

that § 3728 is more specific than § 3716. Whereas § 3728 deals 

precisely with judgments won against the United States,

§ 3716 covers a broad swath of debts owed to the government. 

Cf. §§ 3728(a); 3716(a). Second, offset under the two provisions takes place at different points in the payment timeline. 

1 Section 3716 refers to offset as “administrative offset,” while § 3728 

uses the term “setoff.” For sake of consistency, we describe operation of 

both statutes as “offset.” 
No. 22-2003 9

Section 3728 offset occurs “prior to payment certification,” 

while § 3716 offset happens after certification but before disbursement. Compare 31 C.F.R. § 256.21, with §§ 285.1(m)(1), 

and 285.5(d)(6), (e)(1). Given its more specific application, 

§ 3728 appears to control offset in this context. Nonetheless, 

we examine both § 3728 and § 3716 for any indication that the 

United States may not offset Stacy’s settlement.2

Looking to this statutory framework, Stacy argues that 

offset is authorized only for debts owed to the United States. 

Offset cannot apply to him, he says, as restitution is owed to 

victims, not the United States. Stacy is partially correct. Indeed, offset applies only to debts owed to the government. 

Sections 3716 and 3711 both refer to the government collecting “claims,” with “claim” statutorily defined as “any amount 

of funds or property that has been determined by an appropriate official of the Federal government to be owed the United 

States.” 31 U.S.C. § 3701(b)(1) (emphasis added). Section 

3728(a), likewise pertains to “debt[s] the plaintiff owes to the 

Government.” § 3728(a) (emphasis added). But Stacy is incorrect that his restitution debt is not “owed” to the United States 

for purposes of offset—it is. The statutory scheme for payment of restitution debt makes this clear.

To start, Stacy’s restitution is paid directly to the United 

States, not the victims. Under 18 U.S.C. § 3612(c), the Attorney 

General is responsible for collecting unpaid restitution. That 

strongly signals restitution debt is a debt owed to the government. Moreover, § 3612(c) provides that “[a]n order of restitution ... does not create any right of action against the United 

2 A comparison of these two offsets can be found here: https://fiscal.treasury.gov/judgment-fund/offsets.html. 
10 No. 22-2003 

States by the person to whom restitution is ordered to be 

paid.” So, the victims are not authorized to sue the United 

States if the government fails to disburse the restitution it collects from offenders. This further confirms that restitution is a 

debt owed to the government. And for offset under 31 U.S.C. 

§ 3716, the definitions section lends additional clarity. As discussed above, § 3716 refers to the government collecting 

“claims.” For purposes of § 3716, the meaning of “claim” or 

“debt” “includes, without limitation ... any amount the 

United States is authorized by statute to collect for the benefit 

of any person.” § 3701(b)(1)(D). Restitution is a debt collected 

by the government for the benefit of another person, so it 

qualifies under that definition as a “debt” or “claim” subject 

to offset.

For these reasons, Stacy’s argument that his restitution 

debt is not owed to the United States lacks statutory support. 

At least one other circuit court similarly reads these offset statutes. See United States v. Whitbeck, 869 F.3d 618, 620 (8th Cir. 

2017) (“An order of restitution ... is based on the victim’s 

losses, but it is an obligation owed to the government.”) (citation omitted). 

Third, Stacy argues that offset is authorized only for 

“delinquent” financial obligations and emphasizes that he is 

current on his monthly restitution payments. This position 

apparently relies on language from the offset statutes and regulations indicating that only delinquent or past due debt qualifies. See § 3711(g)(9)(A) (instructing that agency heads must 

make appropriate efforts “[b]efore discharging any delinquent debt”); 31 C.F.R. § 285.5(d)(3)(i) (“A debt submitted to 

Fiscal Service for collection by centralized offset must be: (A) 

Past-due in the amount stated by the creditor agency ... .”). 
No. 22-2003 11

Assuming without deciding3 that offset applies only to delinquent debt, this contention does not help Stacy. Contrary to 

his arguments, his debt is delinquent. When the sentencing 

court ordered Stacy to pay restitution, it included instructions 

in a “Schedule of Payments” document. There, the court ordered that Stacy’s restitution was to be made in a “lump sum 

payment ... due immediately.” The court provided further information in a “special instructions” section, where it ordered: “The financial obligations are due immediately from 

any non-exempt assets. Otherwise, during imprisonment, Defendant shall make payments through the BOP’s Inmate Financial Responsibility Program. Any balance remaining upon 

release shall be paid while on supervised release in an amount 

that is equal to 10% of Defendant’s net monthly income.” 

Notwithstanding the first sentence repeating that restitution is “due immediately,” Stacy reads the special instruction 

as creating distinct, severable obligations. For Stacy, the first 

sentence means that “if the person owing a criminal restitution has all the funds available immediately, then it is to be 

paid.” But, because his non-exempt assets fell short, Stacy 

contends his obligations changed. He believes he was required to make payments through the Inmate Financial Responsibility Program while incarcerated and, now that he has 

been released, is responsible for paying monthly 10% of his 

net monthly income. Based on this interpretation, Stacy argues his restitution debt is not past due or delinquent.

We read the district court’s sentencing order differently.

The schedule of payments sheet lists various options from 

3 Nothing in 31 U.S.C. § 3728 or its accompanying regulations suggests that only delinquent debt may be offset against a judgment award.
12 No. 22-2003 

which the district court can choose. Though several involve 

installment payments, in Stacy’s case the district court selected “[l]ump sum payment.” By doing so, the court ordered 

Stacy to make a lump sum payment “due immediately.” The 

court provided additional detail in a special instructions section: “The financial obligations are due immediately from any 

non-exempt assets.” Given that language, Stacy’s restitution 

was due in full on the date his sentence was imposed. Stacy 

has not satisfied the entire amount, so it is delinquent.

Stacy responds that the sentencing order lays out an installment schedule, such that his restitution is current as long 

as he keeps making his 10% net monthly income payments. 

Contrary to Stacy’s interpretation, though, the court’s implementation of minimum monthly payments does not modify 

the underlying tardiness of his restitution debt. When we interpret restitution orders, we consider any conditions of supervised release. See United States v. Fariduddin, 469 F.3d 1111, 

1113 (7th Cir. 2006) (“The [sentencing] form must be read harmoniously with the statute and the special condition of supervised release ... .”). Doing so here confirms the function of 

Stacy’s special payment instructions. One of Stacy’s special 

conditions of supervised release commands, “The balance of 

any financial obligation shall be paid in monthly payments 

during supervised release at a rate of ten percent of the defendant’s net monthly income.” Given that condition, Stacy’s 

monthly payments do not mean his debt, which was due immediately as a lump sum, is current. Rather, the monthly payments serve as a minimum threshold above which Stacy must 

remain to avoid violating his sentencing order and potentially 

returning to prison. Those minimum payments are merely a 

“floor” which Stacy must maintain. See id. (identifying no contradiction in a sentence that required defendant to pay full 
No. 22-2003 13

restitution immediately but also ordered monthly payments 

of at least $150 because failure to pay monthly minimum 

would violate a condition of supervised release and “[a] floor 

under payments differs from a schedule”).

Regulations pertaining to § 3716 offset and debts owed to 

the Department of Justice accord with this conclusion. See 31 

C.F.R. § 285.5(b) (“Delinquent or past-due refers to the status 

of a debt and means a debt has not been paid by the date specified in the agency’s initial written demand for payment, or 

applicable agreement or instrument ... .”); 28 C.F.R. § 11.11(b) 

(“Judgment debts remain past due until paid in full.”). Accordingly, Stacy’s restitution debt is delinquent.

Fourth, Stacy argues that the restitution order “definitely 

does not indicate that any settlements and judgments are to 

be paid toward the restitution immediately.” Per Stacy, “[i]f 

this were the case, the language would indicate so.” Building 

on this idea, Stacy contends that if the restitution debt is due 

“immediately” it “would also mean that any sums of money 

Plaintiff encounters (such as inheritance, gifted money, winnings, etc.) should be paid straight toward his owed restitution.” 

We need not opine on which of Stacy’s conceivable assets 

the government may collect through offset to satisfy his restitution debt. The asset at issue here is a judgment against the 

United States, and 31 U.S.C. § 3728 authorizes the government to use offset for that type of settlement award. § 3728(a) 

(“The Secretary of the Treasury shall withhold paying that 

part of a judgment against the United States Government presented to the Secretary that is equal to a debt the plaintiff owes 

the Government.”) (emphasis added). Further, a restitution 

order need not identify which of defendant’s assets restitution 
14 No. 22-2003 

is to be paid from, as statutory law provides those rules. For

example, 18 U.S.C. § 3613(c) provides that “an order of restitution ... is a lien in favor of the United States on all property 

and rights to property of the person fined as if the liability of 

the person fined were a liability for a tax assessed under the 

Internal Revenue Code of 1986.” That authorizes the government to capture a variety of Stacy’s property, the details of 

which are not important here. See, e.g., United States v. Wykoff, 

839 F.3d 581, 582 (7th Cir. 2016) (holding that the government 

was empowered to garnish defendant’s pension despite language in the restitution order that he was to pay “not less than 

10% of [his] gross monthly income” towards restitution). 

Stacy demands unnecessary detail from the restitution order. 

One related question: At oral argument, counsel for Stacy 

suggested that Stacy’s plea agreement constitutes a written 

agreement to repay the restitution debt which, for counsel, 

“obviate[d] the ability of the government to invoke ... the administrative offset.” Oral Arg. at 4:20–6:00. This argument apparently grows out of certain procedural requirements for 

§ 3716 offset. See, e.g., 31 U.S.C. § 3716(a)(4) (“The head of the 

agency may collect by administrative offset only after giving 

the debtor ... an opportunity to make a written agreement ... 

to repay the amount of the claim.”). For Stacy, his plea agreement is a written agreement already in place describing how 

the restitution debt is to be paid. The existence of that agreement, he says, bars the government from using offset. Oral 

Arg. at 4:44–5:15. To the extent raised at all in Stacy’s briefing, 

this argument first appears in his reply brief, so it is waived. 

See Stechauner v. Smith, 852 F.3d 708, 721 (7th Cir. 2017) (citation omitted). 
No. 22-2003 15

Even on its merits, this reasoning fails. The restitution 

order—not the plea agreement—defines how Stacy is to pay 

restitution. The district court entered that order after the plea 

agreement, where it mandated that restitution be paid 

immediately. Stacy’s restitution obligation was not incurred 

until that order. The plea agreement was executed to resolve 

Stacy’s federal criminal charges, so it cannot be fairly 

recharacterized as an agreement to repay a debt. Further, § 

3728—which likely controls here—contains no “written 

agreement” procedural component. We therefore see no legal 

basis for using the plea agreement as a means around offset. 

A final issue remains. According to Stacy, even if he cannot access the settlement award, a portion of the settlement 

funds should be set aside to pay his attorneys. To him, allowing full offset here—with no carve out for his attorneys—

would “ignore[] the principles of quantum meruit.” This is because his attorneys’ efforts created benefits for him and “the 

victim creditors,” and he believes that his attorneys should be 

paid accordingly. But no legal basis exists here for a quantum 

meruit award. Recovery under that theory requires Stacy to 

show, at a minimum, that the United States requested his attorneys’ services. See Lindquist Ford, Inc. v. Middleton Motors, 

Inc., 557 F.3d 469, 477–78 (7th Cir. 2009). Obviously, that did 

not occur. The United States did not ask Stacy’s attorneys to 

sue the United States. 

Beyond quantum meruit, Stacy argues “there is no statutory provision indicating that attorney’s fees are subject to an 

offset.” This point is unpersuasive because in a case like this, 

applicable federal statutes specifically subordinate attorney’s 

fees to restitution debt. The interaction of 18 U.S.C. § 3613(c) 

and 26 U.S.C. § 6323(b)(8) shows this. As mentioned, § 3613(c) 
16 No. 22-2003 

states that a restitution order creates a “lien in favor of the 

United States on all property and rights to property for the 

person fined” coextensive with that of a tax liability. In turn, 

§ 6323 identifies certain types of liens that may take priority 

against federal tax liens. Subsection (b)(8) gives an attorney’s 

lien a sort of “superpriority” over federal tax liens, see United 

States v. Ripa, 323 F.3d 73, 80–81, 83 (2d Cir. 2003), but with a 

critical exception applicable here. The superpriority 

§ 6323(b)(8) grants to attorney’s liens does “not apply to any 

judgment or amount in settlement of a claim or of a cause of 

action against the United States to the extent that the United 

States offsets such judgment or amount against any liability 

of the taxpayer to the United States.” Stacy’s settlement arose 

from a claim against the United States itself, which seeks to 

offset that settlement against his restitution debt. So, we are 

not free to grant Stacy’s attorney’s lien priority over the government’s offset here. 

The same goes for offset under both § 3728 and § 3716. Section 3728 allows the United States to offset an entire judgment 

without mention of attorney’s fees. Offset under § 3716 is similarly broad. In fact, the Supreme Court has held that even 

statutorily authorized attorney’s fees are subject to complete 

offset under § 3716. See Astrue v. Ratliff, 560 U.S. 586, 593 

(2010) (concluding that statutorily awarded fees are the property of the litigant—not counsel—which “subjects them to a 

federal administrative offset if the litigant has outstanding 

federal debts”). We thus see no basis for sheltering a portion 

of Stacy’s settlement from offset to pay his counsel first.4

4 Stacy also criticizes offset here as bad policy possibly violating the 

Eighth Amendment. But this is a nonstarter given that Stacy never alleged 

the prison violated his constitutional rights. Stacy asserts, “Without just 
No. 22-2003 17

IV. Conclusion

The government is entitled to offset Stacy’s settlement 

award—including any amount that might have been used to 

compensate counsel—against his outstanding restitution 

debt. Stacy’s restitution is owed to the United States, and it 

has been past due since the time of sentencing. The judgment 

of the district court is AFFIRMED. 

compensation for provided services, no attorneys [will] be willing to accept Federal Tort Claims Act cases for an abused inmate who still owes 

restitution.” We understand this concern, but “[o]nly Congress may 

change the law in response to policy arguments, courts may not do so.” 

Env’t Def. Fund, Inc. v. City of Chi., 985 F.2d 303, 304 (7th Cir. 1993).