### IN THE COURT OF CRIMI NAL AP PEALS OF TENNES SEE AT NAS HVILLE A ssi gne d on Br ie fs N ove m be r 18, 200 3

STA TE OF TEN NES SEE v. RO BER T D ENN IS HEISIN GER

Direc t Appeal from the Circ uit Court for Montgom ery C ounty

No. 35738 John H. Peay, Special Judge

No. M2002- 01217-CCA -R3-C D - F iled March 16, 2004

Th e a pp e lla nt, Rob e rt De nn is He isi ng e r, wa s con vic te d by a jur y of on e c ount of the ft

of pr op e rt y valued at $10,000 or more but less than $60,000. He was se ntence d as a Rang e I Ioffe nder to a n

e ig ht- y e a r s e nte nc e in t

he Te nn e sse e De pa

rtme nt of Cor

re c tio n. On a

pp e a l, he c ha lle ng e s th e le ng th of his sentenc e and the failure of the t rial court to gr ant him alternative sentenc ing. We a ffirm the judgme nt of the trial cour t.

Te nn. R . A pp. P . 3 App e al a s o f Rig ht ; J udgm e nt of t he Tr ial Co ur t i s A ffirm e d.

J ER R Y L. S MI TH , J ., deliver ed t h e opinion of the court, in which J OS EP H M. T I PTON , J
., joined and R OB E R T W. W EDEMEYER , J

. , n o tp ar t i ci p at i n g.

Gre g ory D. Smith, C larksville, Tenne ssee, f or the a ppellant, Robert De nnis Heisinge r.
Paul G. Summers, Attorney Gene ral & Reporter ; Thomas E

. W i l l iams, I I I , Assistant Attorney Gene ral; John C arne y , District Attorney Gene ral; and C. Daniel Br ollier, Assistant District Attorney Gene ral, for

the appe llee, State of Te nnessee

.

OP IN ION

Fa ctual B ackg round

I n 1 99 4, the a

pp e lla nt w a s c ha

rg e d w ith fo ur c ounts of the ft of pr op e rt y

. Th e a pp ro xima te amount of prope rty

involved was $50,000. He was plac ed on pre -trial diversion, but in August of 1997, pled g uilty

to two counts in the indictment including one cou n t o f theft of pr operty over $1,000, a Class D fe lony , and one c ount of theft of pr op er t y o v er $10,000, a Class D fe lony . The appellant rec eived a three -y ear sentenc e for the theft of proper ty over $1,000 and a f

o ur-y ear sentenc e on the thef

t of proper

ty over $10,000, to be serve d concur rently with the three -y ear-2-

se nte nc e . In tot a l, the a

pp e lla nt w a s o rd e re d to pa

y ov e r $ 30 ,0 00 in r e sti tut ion . T he a pp e lla nt d id not serve his sente nce in inca rce ration; he wa s relea sed on probation pursuant to an Octobe r 31, 1997 order

.

I n September of

1999, the appe llant was indicted on two c ounts of theft of prope rty valued at $10,000 or more but less than $60,000. As a re sult of the pending indictment and the fa ilure of the appe llant to pay

court orde red r estitution, a violation of probation repor t was f iled ag ainst the appellant on the 1994 c harg es.

The 1999 char g es st emmed from the appellant’ s activity as a r epre sentative of Mor ningsta r Deve lopment. I n Fe bruar y of 1999, Danny and Terri W hite contra cted with the appellant, actingas

a re pr e se ntativ e of

Mo rn ing sta

r D e ve lop me nt, fo r t

he c on str uc tio n o f a log ho me fr om a “ logho me kit” in Clarksville, Ten n es s ee

. T he Whites paid the appe llant an initial inst allment of $22,500 toward a final price of $73,432, for the log h o m e. T h e co n trac t provided that the home w ould be completed within 120 day s.

The a ppellant did not cre dit the $22,500 in Mor ningsta r’s books as pay

ment toward the price of construc ting the home . Fur ther, th e ap p ell ant did not inform Morning star’s bookke eper of the signe d contra ct with the Whites unti l almost three y ear s after it was signe d. The log hom e kit was not delivere d to the home site until October of 1999, approximately eig ht months after the c ontrac t

was e ntere d int o , b u t co n struction on the home neve r beg an. The appellant did not offe r any explanation or offe r to retur n the initial inst allment of $22,500 to the Whites.

The a ppellant was indicte d in Septe mber of 1999 by a Montgome ry County Gra nd J ury on two counts of thef

t of proper

ty valued at $10,000 or more but le ss than $60,000. Following a jury
t ri al
, t h e ap p el l an twa s co n v i ct edo n o n e c o u n to f t h ef t

. T h e t ri al co u rt h el d

a s en t en ci n g h ea ri n g, du r in g w h ic h it

h e a r d te s ti mo n y

f r o m v a r io u s w it

n e s s e s

. A s a

r e s u lt
, th e tr ia l c o u rt o r d e r e d the

a p p e l l a n t t o s e r

v e a n e i g h t

- y e a r s e n t e n c e i n t h e T e n n e s s e e D e p a rt m e n t o f C o r r e c t i o n a s a

R a n g e II of fe nd e r, c on se c uti ve to t

he fo ur -y e a r e ff

e c tiv e se nte nc e on

the 19 94 c ha

rg e s. Th e tr ia l c ourt

a lso violated the appe llant’s probation, orde red the appellant to pay restitution in the amount of $22,500 and imposed a $1,000 f

ine. The a

ppellant appe als, cha lleng ing the leng th of the se n t en ce and the failure of the trial c ourt to awa rd an a lternative se ntence

.

Sentencing

“When revie wing sentenc ing issues

. . . , the appellate court shall conduct a de novo revie w on the re cord of

such issues. Such re view shall be c onducted with a pr esumption that the deter minations made by

the cour t from which the a

ppeal is take n are corr ect.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-401( d). “H oweve r, the pre sumption of corr ectne ss which ac companies the trial court’ s action is conditioned upon the aff irmative sho wi n g i n the re cord that the trial court c onsidered the

s entenc ing pr inciples and a ll releva nt fac ts and circ umstances.” State v. Ashby , 823 S.W .2d 166, 169 (Tenn. 1991) . I n conducting our re view, we must consider the de fenda nt’s potential for reha bilitation, t he trial a

nd sentenc ing he aringevidenc e, the pr e-se ntence re port, the sentenc ing-3-

principles, sente ncing alternative arguments, the nature and chara cter of t he offense, the enhanc ing and mitigating f

actor s, and the de fenda

nt’s statements. Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 40- 35-103(5) , -210(b) ; Ashby , 823 S.W .2d at 169. We are to also rec og nize that the defe ndant bea rs “the bur den of demonstrating that the sentenc e is improper.” Ashby , 823 S.W .2d at 169.

I n balanc ing the se conc erns, a trial court should st art at the presumptive sentenc e, enha nce the se nte nc e wi thi n th e ra

ng e fo r e xistin g e nh a nc e me nt f a c tor s, and

the n r e du c e the se nte nc e wi thi n the ra ng e for exis ting mitiga

ting f actor s. Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-210( e). No particular weig ht fo r e a c h f a c tor is p re sc ri be d b y

the statut e

. Se e Sta te v. Santi a g o, 91 4 S. W.2 d 1 16 , 1 25 (T e nn . Cr im. Ap p. 19 95 ). Th e we ig ht g ive n to e a c h f a c tor is l e ft to t he dis c re tio n o f t

he tr ia l c ourt

a s lo nga s it comports with the sentenc ing pr inciples and purpose s of our c ode and a s lon g as i t s fi ndings a re supported by

the re cord. I d.

Turning more spec ifically to the fac ts of this case, the a ppellant was co nvicted of the ft of pr op e rt y ov e r $ 10 ,0 00 bu t le ss t

ha n $ 60 ,0 00 . B e c a

us e thi s is a Cla ss C fe lony , a nd the a pp e lla nt i s a Rang e I IOffe nder, the rang e of punishment is six to ten y ear s at 35%. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 40- 35 -1 12

. F ur

the rm or e , the pr e su mpt ive se nte nc e wo uld be the min imum se nte nc e in that range if there are no enhanc ing a

nd mitigating fac tors prese nt. Tenn. Code Ann. § 40- 35-210(c ).

I n imposing the appellant’ s sentenc e, the trial court found the exis tence of seve ral statutory enhanc ement fa ctors, including : (1) the a ppellant’s prior history o f cr iminal conduct, Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-114( 2); (2) the exis tence of m ultiple victims , Tenn. Code Ann. § 40- 35-114(4) ; (3) the appellant’ s previous unwillingness to c omply with the conditions of a non-inc arc erative sentenc e, Te nn . Code Ann. § 40- 35 -1 14 (9 ); a nd (4 ) t he a pp e lla nt’ s c omm iss ion

of the pr e se nt o ff

e ns e wh ile on probation, Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-114( 14).

On appe al, the appe llant arg ues that the sente nce g iven was “excessive under the fac ts and circ umstances of this case .” Specif ically , the appe llant challeng es the trial c ourt’s application of the enhanc ement fa ctors and f ailure of the t ri al court to apply

any mitigating fac tors. Fur

ther, the

a pp e lla nt a rgue s th a t th e tr ia l c ourt

e rr e d b y fa ili ngto g ra

nt an alt erna tive se nte nc e . T he State counter s that the evidenc e does not pr eponder ate ag ainst the trial court’s deter minat i o n o f t he appellant’ s sentence

. Prior to imposi ng the sentenc e, the tria l court stated:

I ’v e c on sid e re d th e purp os e s and the se nte nc ingc on sid e ratio ns se t out in the statut e

conce rning criminal histories and r ehabilitation. The sente nce . . . de serve d under the fac t of the ca se and the sentenc e cir cumstance s. I ’ve a lso considere d sentenc ing consid e r a ti o n s , w h e th e r o r n o t c o n f in e me n t is n e c e s s a r

y , th e s e r io u s n e s s o f the offe nse, whe ther less re strictive measur es have been tr ied in the p ast and fa iled or

wer e unsucc essfu l

. I ’v e considere d the evidenc e I hear d at trial, the e vidence here today , and I ’ve r ead the pre- senten ce re p o rt , which wa s made a n exhibi t. And, of

course , the ar g uments of Counsel. The nature and circ umstances of the conduc t, Of-4-

c ours e , th e se pe ople - - t his on e name d v ic timlos t ov e r - - n e a r $ 20 ,0 00 a nd it i s obviously a ser ious offense

.

The trial c ourt started w ith the minim um sentence of six y ear s and en h an ced the sentenc e based on the appellant’ s prior history of cr iminal conduct, namely the two g uilty

pleas fr om the 1994

c ha rg e s. Se e Te nn

. Cod e Ann. § 40 -3 5- 11 4( 2)

. Th e tr ia l c ourt no te d that it g a ve lit tle we ig ht t o th is fac tor, but that the rec ord supported its a pplication. The trial court next enha nced t h e a p p ell ant’s sentenc e bec ause the re w ere multipl e victims. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-114( 4). Althoug h the appellant wa s only

convicted on one count of the i ndictment, theft of proper ty valued at more than $10,000 but less than $60,000 from Terr i Whi te, the trial c ourt found that the testimony and evide nce demonstrated that the contract for the construction of t he home was with Da nny and Te rri White and that the m oney stolen was the common proper ty of both Danny

and Te rri White. Thirdly , the trial court found that the appellant ha d previously demonstrated a

n unwillingness to c o m p l y wi th the conditions of a non-inc arc erative sentenc e bec ause the rec ord showed that the appe llant was re voked from pre -trial diver sion for fa iling to adhe re to the r ules and re gu l at i o n s of his memorandum of understanding . See Te nn. Code Ann. § 40-35- 114(9). Finally , the trial cour t found that the appe llant committed the prese nt of

fense s while on probation. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-114( 14). Ba sed

on the a pp lic a tio n of the se fo ur e nh a nc e me nt fa c tor s, the tr ia l c ourt e nh a nc e d the se nte nc e fr om s ix
y ear s to eig ht y ear s.
Turning to the mitigating fac tors, the appe llan t ad m i t s t h at he did not file a notice of mitigating fac tors prior to sentenc ing, but a rg ues that the trial c o u rt s h o u l d have a pplied the fo llo wi ngmit ig a tin g fa c tor s to re du c e his se nte nc e : (1 ) the c ri me inv olv e d no thr e a t of bo dil y ha rm , Tenn. Code Ann. § 40- 35-113(1) ; ( 2) the appe llant acted unde r strong provocation, Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-113( 2); (3) substantial g rounds exist tending to excuse or j u s t i fy the appe llant’s criminal conduct, thoug h failing to establish a def ense, Te nn. Code Ann. § 40-35- 11 3 (3 ); (4) the a ppellant was motivated by

a desire to provide nec essities for his family or himself, Tenn. Code Ann. § 40- 35- 113(7); and (5) the appe llant’s ag e, fa milial relationships and friendships, Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35- 11 3( 13 ). He a rgue s th a t th is C ourt sh ou ld r e du c e his se nte nc e fr om e ig ht y e a rs to s ix y e a rs du e to the tr ia l c ourt ’s fa ilure to a pp ly the se mit ig a tin g fa c tor s. Speci fi cal ly , h e argue s, re fe rr ingto mit ig a tin g fa c tor s ( 2) , ( 3) , a nd (7 ), tha t hi s se nte nc e me ri te d r e du c tio n b e c a us e of his “ e xtre me financ ial troubles” a

nd that “strong provocation” motivated him to commit the offe nse. In support of that c la im, the a

pp e lla nt c ite s to te sti mony a t tr ia l wh e re in it wa s sh ow n th a t a c omp a ny pa rt ia lly

ow ne d b y the a pp e lla nt h a d a low ba lanc e in its ba nk a c c ount. F ur

the r, the a pp e lla nt a rgue s th a t hi s 27-y ear marria g e, strong fam i l y t i es , and good wor k ethic should mitigate his sentence under the
catc h-all fa ctor. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 40- 35-113(13)

. We disag ree . The e vidence at trial showed no motive f or the c ommissi on of the pre sent

o ff en s es o t h er

t h an p er s o n al b en ef

i t

. T h e n at u re an d d

u ra t i o n o f t h e o ff

en s e, en t er i n g i n t o a l o n gterm contra ct with home buy ers, doe s not sugg est “strongprovocation” to commit a crime. The re

was no e vidence that the appellant’s family was in dire straits. Fur ther, the appellant’ s past criminal

re c or d d e mon str ate d that his ma rr ia g e and

fa mil y tie s h a d n ot d e te rr e d h im f ro m c ri min a l a c tiv ity in the y ear s leading up to the conviction.-5-

Whil e the tria l court did not spe cifica lly addre ss a ny of the mitigating f

actor s raised by

the appellant on a

ppeal, the court noted its re sponsibili ty to lowe r a se ntence based upon the application of any mitigating fac tors which existed. Consequently , it ap p ea rs that the trial cour t considere d mitigating fac tors, but chose to g ive them little, if any , weig ht

. Again, the weig ht give n to eac h fac tor is left to the discretion of the trial court a s long a s it comports with the sentencing principles and purpose s of our c ode and a s long a s its findings ar e suppo rt ed b y t he re cord. Santiag o, 914 S.W .2d at 125.

After revie wing the application of the prec edingenhanc ement and m i t i gating fac tors, we conclude that the evidenc e does not pre ponderate ag ain s t t h e t ri al court’s decision to impose an eig ht-y ear sentenc e on the a

ppellant’s thef

t of proper

ty conviction. Acc ording ly , we a ffirm the
sentenc e imposed by

the trial cour

t.

Alternative Sentencing

A d e f e n d a n t“ w h o i s a n e s p e c i a l l y mitigated offender or standard offender

convicted of

a Class C, D, or E felony

is presumed to be a

favor able c andidate f

or alter native s en t en ci n g in the absenc e of e vidence to the contra ry .” (Empha sis suppli ed) Te nn. Code Ann. § 40-35-102(6). Although the State i n i t s b ri ef c oncede s that the appe llant is presumptively entitled to alternative
sentenc ing beca

use he has been convicted of a Class C fe lony , the State appa rently overlooks the f

act that the appe llant’s status as a Rang e I Ioffe nder de prives him of that pre sumption.

Al tho ug h n ot e nti tle d to the pr e su mpt ion in f a vo r o f a lte rn a tiv e se nte nc ing , th e a pp e lla nt i s

never thel es s el igible f

or such. In choosing among possible sentencingalternatives, the trial cour t sh ou ld a lso c on sid e r T e nn e s s e e C o d e A n n o t a t e d s e c t i o n 4 0

- 3 5

- 1 0 3( 5) , w hic h s ta te s, in p e rt ine nt p a rt , “The potential or lack of potential for the re habilitation or treatment of a def endant should be considere d in determining the sentenc e alter native or leng th of a term to be imposed.” I d. § 40-35- 103(5); State v. Dowdy , 894 S.W

. 2 d 3 0 1 , 305 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1994) . The trial c ourt may consid e r a d e f e n d a n t’ s u n tr

u th f u ln e s s a n d

la c k o f c a n d o r a s th e y r e late to th e p o te n ti a l f or

re ha bil itation. S ee Sta te v. Nunle y , 2 2 S. W.3 d 2 82 , 2 89 (T e nn . Cr im. Ap p. 19 99 ); se e a lso State

v. B un c h, 64 6 S. W.2 d 1 58 , 1 60 -6 1 (T e nn

. 19 83 ); Sta te v. Z e oli a , 9 28 S.W. 2d 45 7, 46 3 ( Te nn . Cr im. App. 1996); State v. Wil liamson, 919 S.W .2d 69, 84 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1995) ; Dowdy , 894 S.W .2d at 305-06.

I n the ca se her ein, the appe llant claims that the trial cour t erre d in denying him any form of alternative sentenc e bec ause the trial court “ did not specifica lly cite Te nn. Code Ann. Sec. 40- 36-101

e t se q. to e xpla in w hy

. . . [th e a pp e lla nt] co uld no t be pla c e d o n Co mmunit y Cor re c tio ns .” Th e Sta te argues that “a

revie w of the r ecor d and applicable authority

. . . demonstrates that the evidence doe s not preponde rate ag ainst the trial cour t’s deter mination.”

The trial c ourt, in making its sentencing deter mination, stated that it c onsidered “ whether or not confineme nt is necessa ry ” as w ell as “w hether

less res t ri cti ve mea sures have bee n tried in the pa st a nd fa ile d o r w e re un su c c e ssf ul. ” Th e tr ia l c ourt

a lso fo un d th a t-6- [t ]he Defe ndant do es h ave a history of unwillingne ss to comply with the conditions of a sente nce w ith relea se in t h e co m m u n ity . And this felony was committed w hile he was on probation for the two prior convictions on which he had -

- wa s on probation for the prior convic tions. He, of co u rs e, h ad been re lease d previous to that on pre trial diversion, and that was terminate d.

. . . . Now, if I

could [wave] a wand for probation I ’d be happy to do it. But Idon’t think that’s - - I rea lly don’t think that’s a possibilit y in this case. And I ’ve

c on sid e re d th e se nte nc ingpr inc ipl e s f or re le a se in t

he c omm un ity . A nd

Ithi nk in t his particula r ca se its been trie d; it did not work. I think the other people that might be in the same situation as t hese vic tims m ight f all victim to thi s Defe ndant in the future. So, I

don’t bel i ev e t h at I can in g ood [conscience ] gra nt him any

ty pe of rele ase in the c ommunity . Ijust thi nk that’s - - it’s too late f or that.

The re cord doe s not preponde rate ag ainst the trial cour t’s finding s. Furthe r, the a ppellant has failed to c arr

y the burde n of demonstrating his suitability for pr obation. I t was unconte sted that he committed the prese nt offense while on probation for two simil ar, if not identica l offense s involving differ ent victims. The trial court proper ly denied a lternative se ntencing when it was shown that the

a pp e lla nt f a ile d at re ha

bil itatio n with le ss re str ic tiv e me tho ds a nd wh e n co nf ine me nt wa s show n to be nec essar

y to avoid depre ciating the seriousne ss of the off ense. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 40- 35- 103(1). Ac cording ly , we a ffirm the tria l court’s de nial of an a lternative se ntence

.

Conclusion

After a thoroug h revie w of the re cord, w e conc lude that there was no re versible e rror , and, there fore aff

irm the judg ment of the trial c ourt.

___________________________________ J ERRY L . SMI TH, JUDGE