Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-MI-32 | October 24, 2019 Page 1 of 10

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), 

this Memorandum Decision shall not be 

regarded as precedent or cited before any 

court except for the purpose of establishing 

the defense of res judicata, collateral 

estoppel, or the law of the case.

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT

Christopher Cooper

Griffith, Indiana

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE

Alfredo Estrada

Merrillville, Indiana

IN THE

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

Guy Mikulich,

Appellant-Plaintiff,

v.

Lake County, Indiana,

Appellee-Defendant.

October 24, 2019

Court of Appeals Case No.

19A-MI-32

Appeal from the Lake Superior 

Court

The Honorable John R. Pera

Trial Court Cause No.

45D10-1801-MI-2

Tavitas, Judge.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-MI-32 | October 24, 2019 Page 2 of 10

Case Summary

[1] Guy Mikulich appeals the trial court’s dismissal of his complaint for judicial 

review against Lake County, Indiana (“Lake County”), and denial of his 

motion to vacate the trial court’s dismissal. We affirm.

Issue

[2] Mikulich raises several issues. We find one issue dispositive, which we restate 

as whether the trial court properly dismissed Mikulich’s petition for judicial 

review as moot.

Facts

[3] On July 10, 2016, Mikulich, “while acting in his official capacity as a Lake 

County Sheriff’s Department police officer, was working security at the Gary 

Air Show in Gary, Lake County, Indiana.” Appellant’s App. Vol. II p. 60. 

Mikulich drove his police vehicle off the roadway and struck a minivan 

belonging to Derrick Dircks. Dircks was loading items into the trunk of his 

vehicle at the time. Mikulich also struck Dircks, “causing [Dircks] to strike his 

head on the windshield of the police car and be thrown approximately twenty 

feet.” Id. Dircks suffered serious injuries, and Mikulich fled the scene. A few 

minutes later, Mikulich was stopped by another officer. Mikulich’s blood 
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alcohol concentration exceeded 0.08. On July 10, 2016, the State charged 

Mikulich with four felonies and nine misdemeanors as a result of the incident.1

 

[4] On July 14, 2016, Mikulich was served with a notice of discipline, which 

alleged that he was in violation of numerous merit board rules and sought

Mikulich’s termination. On July 20, 2016, the Lake County Sheriff’s 

Department relieved Mikulich “of duty without pay based upon” the pending 

criminal charges pursuant to Merit Board Rule 4-6-4. Appellee’s App. Vol. II p. 

204. Merit Board Rule 4-6-4 provides:

When a police officer is relieved from active duty, by the Sheriff, 

under this section, for the reason that said Police Officer has been 

charged with the commission of a felony, then, and in that event, 

the Police Officer may be relieved of duty and/or suspended, 

without pay and benefits, effective the date of the filing of the 

criminal information or indictment, or at any date subsequent, 

thereto, as determined by the Sheriff, with approval of the Merit 

Board at its next meeting.

Appellee’s App. Vol. II p. 206. The Merit Board approved Mikulich’s removal 

from duty without pay on July 21, 2016. 

[5] The two-day administrative hearing was held on June 6, 2017, and June 7, 

2017. On July 20, 2017, the Merit Board found that Mikulich violated: (1)

1 The charges included: leaving the scene of an accident, a Level 3 felony; leaving the scene of an accident, a 

Level 6 felony; two counts of operating a motor vehicle while intoxicated, Level 6 felonies; leaving the scene 

of an accident, a Class A misdemeanor; four counts of operating while intoxicated, Class A misdemeanors; 

three counts of operating while intoxicated, Class C misdemeanors; and leaving the scene of an accident, a 

Class B misdemeanor.
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“Merit Board Rule, Schedule A, No. 1 by violating State Law;” (2) “Merit 

Board Rule, Schedule A, No. 6, by intoxication on or off duty;” (3) “Merit 

Board Rule, Schedule A, No. 8, by committing conduct unbecoming an 

officer;” (4) “Merit Board Rule, Schedule A, No. 24, by unauthorized use of 

property of the Department;” (5) “Merit Board Rule, Schedule A, No. 28, by 

violation of Department Rules and Regulations regarding equipment;” (6) 

“Merit Board Rule, Schedule A, No. 28, by violation of Department Rules and 

Regulations rules of conduct 7.07.07 (Use of alcohol to be intoxicated on 

duty);” (7) “Merit Board Rule, Schedule A, No. 28, by violation of Department 

Rules and Regulations by use of vehicles 9.00.04 (Operation of county owned 

vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating beverages);” and (8) Merit 

Board Rule, Schedule A, No. 29, by committing acts which bring or tend to 

bring the individual or the Lake County Sheriff’s Department into disrepute.”

Appellant’s App. Vol. II pp. 118-120. On August 17, 2017, the Merit Board 

held a hearing regarding the penalty and terminated Mikulich’s employment as 

a police officer.

[6] On September 15, 2017, Mikulich filed a complaint for judicial review 

regarding the Merit Board’s decisions and alleged numerous due process 

violations. Mikulich filed an amended complaint on October 25, 2017. Lake 

County filed the Merit Board’s record of proceedings with the trial court on 

February 23, 2018, and the trial court held a hearing on February 26, 2018. 

The trial court then set deadlines for the parties to file their memoranda of law 

and proposed findings. Before the briefing schedule was completed, on May 
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14, 2018, Mikulich pleaded guilty but mentally ill to leaving the scene of an 

accident with serious bodily injury, a Level 6 felony, and operating a motor 

vehicle with an ACE of 0.08 or more resulting in serious bodily injury, a Level 

6 felony. 

[7] On May 25, 2018, Lake County filed a motion to dismiss Mikulich’s complaint 

for judicial review. Lake County argued: (1) Mikulich’s complaint was subject 

to dismissal because Mikulich failed to file his memorandum of law and 

proposed findings; (2) Mikulich’s complaint was moot because he “admitted to 

the conduct for which he was charged and found liable by the Merit Board;” (3) 

Mikulich’s complaint is moot because, as a result of his guilty plea, “there is no 

effective relief that can be rendered to Plaintiff;” and (4) Mikulich’s complaint 

should be dismissed because, pursuant to Indiana Code Section 5-8-1-38, he 

was removed from “his public office of a Lake County Sheriff’s police officer by 

operation of law and is no longer qualified to hold the position.” Appellant’s 

App. Vol. II pp. 50-52. 

[8] Mikulich responded to Lake County’s motion to dismiss and argued: (1) he 

opted to rely on his complaint rather than file a memorandum or findings, 

which he is statutorily allowed to do; (2) the trial court should review 

Mikulich’s due process arguments because, if successful on the arguments, he 

“would be entitled to back pay and benefits;” and (3) Indiana Code Section 5-8-

1-38 “does not moot the administrative review action.” Id. at 72. 

[9] On July 17, 2018, the trial court issued the following order:
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Subsequent to Mikulich’s plea of guilty, Defendant Lake County 

filed an amended reply in support of the Motion to dismiss. Lake 

County asserts that Mikulich no longer qualifies to hold the 

public office of Police Officer by operation of law. Lake County 

cites Indiana [C]ode “§ 5-8-1-38 (b) Any public officer convicted 

of a felony during the public officer’s term of office shall: (1) be 

removed from office by operation of law when: (C) in a guilty 

plea hearing, the person pleads guilty. . . to a felony . . .”. The 

Court record reveals that Mikulich pled guilty and was found 

guilty, but Mentally Ill, by the Court, of two separate felonies.

Plaintiff has not responded to the Lake County reply brief nor 

indicated an intention to file any responsive brief or motion. 

Therefore, the Court, being duly advised in the premises finds 

that the Mikulich appeal of the administrative determination of 

Lake County is moot inasmuch as Mikulich’s termination of his 

position as a Lake County Police Officer is terminated by 

operation of law.

Id. at 4-6.

[10] On September 28, 2018, Mikulich filed a motion to vacate the July 17, 2018 

order. Mikulich argued that his counsel did not receive the July 17, 2018 order 

until September 26, 2018, and that Mikulich had, in fact, responded to Lake 

County’s motion to dismiss. On December 18, 2018, the trial court issued the 

following order:

The Court accepts the filing of Plaintiff’s Motion to Vacate the 

July 17, 2018 Order of the Court and his Supplemental Motion to 

Vacate the July 17, 2018 Order/Opinion of the Court. Though 

the Court finds it to be the error of Plaintiff’s counsel that 

Plaintiff was not timely made aware of the Court’s Order of July 

17, 2018, the Court will not penalize Plaintiff for his counsel’s
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mistake in this case, and, rather, chooses to rule on Plaintiffs [sic] 

Motions based on their merits.

In his Supplemental Motion to Vacate the July 17, 2018 

Order/Opinion of the Court, Plaintiff argues on the basis that 

Plaintiff did file a Response. This Court recognizes that Plaintiff

did, in fact, file a Response in Opposition to Defendant’s Motion 

to Dismiss and an Amended Response.

However, having examined Judge Webber’s Court Order of July 

17, 2018, this Court is not convinced that the Order suggests that 

Plaintiff did not respond to the Motion to Dismiss. The Court 

Order states: “Plaintiff has not responded to the Lake County 

reply brief nor indicated an intention to file any responsive brief 

or motion . . .” (emphasis added.) The Court’s file reflects that 

Defendant filed its Motion to Dismiss and supporting Brief on 

May 25, 2018. On June 25, 2018, Plaintiff filed his Response in 

Opposition to Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss. On June 27, 

2018, Plaintiff filed his Amended (June 27, 2018) Plaintiff’s

Response in Opposition to Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss. On 

July 10, 2018, Defendant filed its Reply Brief in Support of 

Motion to Dismiss.

Thus, at the time of Judge Webber’s ruling on July 17, 2018, the 

Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss was fully briefed.

THEREFORE, having considered the parties’ written 

submissions, as well as the argument presented by counsel, the 

Court hereby DENIES Plaintiff’s Motions and affirms Judge 

Webber’s Court Order entered July 17, 2018.

Appellant’s App. Vol. II pp. 2-3. Mikulich now appeals.
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Analysis

[11] Mikulich appeals the trial court’s denial of his motion to vacate the July 17, 

2018 grant of the motion to dismiss filed by Lake County. “Our standard of 

review in evaluating a trial court’s reconsideration of its prior ruling is abuse of 

discretion. Mitchell v. 10th & The Bypass, LLC, 3 N.E.3d 967, 970 (Ind. 2014). 

“An abuse of discretion occurs when the trial court’s decision is against the 

logic and effect of the facts and circumstances before it.” Id. A trial court also 

abuses its discretion when it misinterprets the law. Id.

[12] In its motion to dismiss, Lake County argued that Mikulich’s complaint should 

be dismissed because his claims were moot. “The long-standing rule in Indiana 

courts has been that a case is deemed moot when no effective relief can be 

rendered to the parties before the court.” T.W. v. St. Vincent Hosp. & Health Care 

Ctr., Inc., 121 N.E.3d 1039, 1042 (Ind. 2019) (citing Matter of Lawrance, 579 

N.E.2d 32, 37 (Ind. 1991)). “When the controversy at issue has been ended or 

settled, or somehow disposed of so as to render it unnecessary to decide the 

question involved, the case will be dismissed.” Id. “‘Indiana recognizes a 

public interest exception to the mootness doctrine, which may be invoked when 

the issue involves a question of great public importance which is likely to 

recur.’” Id. (quoting Matter of Tina T., 579 N.E.2d 48, 54 (Ind. 1991)).

[13] Lake County argues that, when Mikulich pleaded guilty but mentally ill to 

various charges related to the incident, his request for judicial review of his 

termination became moot. Mikulich contends:
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Although Mikulich pled guilty, the abuse of discretion by the 

Board is not militated or consequential. While no court can 

order Mikulich reinstated (because of his felony conviction), a 

court can issue a finding that the Board abused its discretion. 

The effect would be nothing more than monetary compensation 

to Mikulich predicated on back-pay owed for the period for which he 

was suspended.

Appellant’s Br. p. 8 (emphasis added). As a result of his felony convictions, 

Mikulich does not argue that he is entitled to reinstatement of his employment. 

Rather, Mikulich’s main complaint on appeal seems to be that we should 

address his due process arguments because, if his due process rights were 

violated by the Merit Board, he would be entitled to back pay. The time period 

for which Mikulich believes he would be entitled to back pay is unclear. We 

presume Mikulich means that he is entitled to back pay from the time he was 

suspended to the time of his guilty plea.

[14] Mikulich, however, ignores the fact that, on July 20, 2016, Lake County 

relieved Mikulich “of duty without pay based upon” the pending criminal 

charges pursuant to Merit Board Rule 4-6-4. Appellee’s App. Vol. II p. 204

(emphasis added). The Merit Board approved Mikulich’s removal from duty 

without pay on July 21, 2016. Mikulich has not challenged this order removing 

him from duty without pay. Consequently, even if, due to the Merit Board’s 

alleged violation of his due process rights, Mikulich was improperly terminated

on August 17, 2017, Mikulich would not qualify for back pay during his 

suspension period. No effective relief could have been rendered to Mikulich by 

the trial court, and the case was moot. We, further, do not find that the issues 
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here involve a question of great public importance which is likely to recur. As 

such, we decline to address Mikulich’s due process arguments. The trial court 

properly dismissed Mikulich’s complaint for judicial review and did not abuse 

its discretion by denying Mikulich’s motion to vacate the July 17, 2018 order. 

Conclusion

[15] The trial court properly dismissed Mikulich’s complaint for judicial review. We 

affirm.

[16] Affirmed.

Brown, J., and Altice, J., concur.