UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA 

ALLISON FROMM 

as Qualified Beneficiary, et al., 

 Plaintiffs, 

 v. Civ. Nos. 19-1121 (EGS) 

 19-1124 (EGS) 

JAMES P. DUFFY, III 

as Trustee of the 

Gary Fromm Family Trust 

 Defendant. 

MEMORANDUM OPINION 

Plaintiffs Allison Fromm, Elizabeth Fromm, and K.I.F., Ms. 

Allison Fromm’s minor daughter, bring this lawsuit against James 

P. Duffy, III, Independent Trustee of the Allison Fromm Family 

Trust. Plaintiffs seek to remove Mr. Duffy as Independent 

Trustee pursuant to the Uniform Trust Code § 19-1301, et seq. 

(“UTC”) which grants a court the authority to remove a trustee 

when, among other things, the trustee has committed a serious 

breach of trust. D.C. Code § 19-1307.06. 

Pending before the Court are plaintiffs’ motion to remand 

for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, or, in the alternative, 

to strike defendant’s notice of removal and to remand back to 

the Superior Court of the District of Columbia; and defendant’s 

motion to dismiss, or, in the alternative, to transfer venue to 

the Eastern District of New York. Upon consideration of the 
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motions, the responses and replies thereto, the applicable law, 

and the entire record, the Court will GRANT IN PART plaintiffs’ 

motion for remand, and DENY defendant’s motion to dismiss or in 

the alternative to transfer venue. 

I. Background 

 Defendant James P. Duffy is the sole Independent Trustee of 

the Allison Fromm Family Trust (“Trust”). Compl., ECF No. 1-1 ¶ 

11.1 Plaintiff Allison Fromm is the Individual Trustee of the 

Trust and has served in that capacity since March 22, 1985. Id.

¶ 8. Ms. Fromm, and her daughter K.I.F., are the lifetime 

discretionary beneficiaries of the Trust. Id. ¶ 7. The purpose 

of the Trust is to provide for the welfare of Ms. Fromm during 

her lifetime, future members of her family following her death, 

and to “provide a vehicle whereby all monies coming to [Ms. 

Fromm] by and through her family are, to the fullest extent 

practicable, preserved intact and transmitted to future 

generations of [Ms. Fromm’s] family.” Id. ¶ 12. The Trust assets 

are managed by BNY Mellon Wealth Management (“BNY”), which 

provides services such as investment, day-to-day management of 

the Trust’s assets, and information management. Id. ¶ 13. 

 

1 Mr. Duffy has also removed a related case to this Court that is 

docketed as Civil Action No. 19-cv-1124 (EGS). The parties have 

filed nearly identical motions in each case, and the complaints 

are also nearly identical. Unless otherwise noted the Court 

refers to the Complaint and motions filed in Civil Action No. 

19-cv-1124 (EGS).
3 

Mr. Duffy also provides “professional services” in 

connection to the Trust for which he charges fees in excess of 

$24,000 per year. Id. ¶ 14. These services include review and 

consideration of the Trust’s month end statements from BNY, and 

review and consideration of various communications received from 

BNY. Id. In 2010, BNY advised Mr. Duffy that the Fromm family 

wanted him to resign because his fees were excessive. Id. ¶ 15. 

Mr. Duffy refused, citing among other reasons, the lack of a 

suitable replacement as Independent trustee. Id. 

The Trust was drafted by Mr. Duffy in the mid-1980’s, who, 

at the time, was a licensed attorney admitted to practice law in 

New York State. Id. ¶ 6. For reasons unrelated to the pending 

motions, Mr. Duffy was disbarred from the practice of law in 

April of 2014. Id. ¶ 16. In May and June 2014, BNY and the Fromm 

family resumed discussions related to appointing a different 

Independent Trustee. Id. ¶ 17. Four years later, in the last 

quarter of 2018, BNY discovered that Mr. Duffy was disbarred. 

Id. ¶ 20. In a letter dated January 16, 2019, BNY informed Mr. 

Duffy that its policies required him to either resign as 

Independent Trustee or remove the Trust account from BNY’s 

management. Id. On that same date, plaintiffs, through their 

attorney Mr. Peter D. Randolph, wrote to Mr. Duffy requesting 

that he resign as Independent Trustee and that he appoint Mr. 

Randolph as his successor. Id. ¶ 24. Approximately three weeks 
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later, plaintiffs’ attorney emailed Mr. Duffy and again 

requested his resignation and the appointment of Mr. Randolph. 

Id. ¶ 26. Mr. Duffy did not respond to the two January 16 

letters or to the February 8 email, nor did he communicate to 

Ms. Fromm or her attorneys since receipt of the January 16 

letters. Id. ¶¶ 21, 25–26. 

Unable to come to a resolution with Mr. Duffy, plaintiffs 

filed suit in the Superior Court of the District of Columbia, 

Probate Division on March 12, 2019. See Not. Of Removal, ECF No. 

1 ¶ 1. Seeking to remove Mr. Duffy as Independent Trustee, 

plaintiffs brought suit under the Uniform Trust Code which 

provides a Court with the authority to remove a trustee where 

(1) “[t]he trustee has committed a serious breach of trust;” (2) 

“[l]ack of cooperation among cotrustees substantially impairs 

the administration of the trust;” (3) “[b]ecause of unfitness . 

. . the court determines that removal of the trustee best serves 

the interests of the beneficiaries;” or (4) “removal is 

requested by all of the qualified beneficiaries, the court finds 

that removal of the trustee best serves the interests of all the 

beneficiaries and is not inconsistent with a material purpose of 

the trust, and a suitable co-trustee or successor trustee is 

available.” District of Columbia Code § 19-1307.06(b). 

Mr. Duffy, appearing pro se, removed the Superior Court 

action to this Court. See Not. of Removal, ECF No. 1 ¶ 1. His 
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alleged basis for removal was 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a) which provides 

a federal court with jurisdiction when the parties are from 

different states and the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000. 

Id. ¶ 3. Soon after removing the case, Mr. Duffy filed a motion 

to dismiss, or in the alternative, transfer venue. Def.’s Mot., 

ECF No. 5. Plaintiffs have opposed Mr. Duffy’s motion and have 

also filed a motion to remand for lack of subject matter 

jurisdiction, or, in the alternative, motion to strike the 

notice of removal. Pls.’ Mots., ECF Nos. 4, 6. Both parties’ 

motions are opposed and ripe for disposition. 

II. Legal Standard 

A case filed in state court may be removed to a federal 

court if the case could have originally been brought there. 28 

U.S.C. § 1441(a). The subject matter jurisdiction of federal 

district courts is limited and is set forth generally at 28 

U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1332. Absent a federal question, diversity 

jurisdiction is required to establish that the case could have 

originally been filed in federal court. See Caterpillar Inc. v. 

Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 392 (1987). A federal court has 

diversity jurisdiction when: (1) there is complete diversity of 

citizenship among the parties--meaning no plaintiff is a citizen 

of the same state as any defendant; and (2) the “amount in 

controversy” is greater than $75,000. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a). 
6 

“The party opposing a motion to remand bears the burden of 

establishing that subject matter jurisdiction exists in federal 

court.” Int'l Union of Bricklayers & Allied Craftworkers v. Ins. 

Co. of the W., 366 F. Supp. 2d 33, 36 (D.D.C. 2005)(citations 

omitted). Because the removal statue is to be strictly 

construed, any ambiguities “concerning the propriety of removal” 

shall be construed in favor of remand. Cefarrati v. JBG 

Properties, Inc., 75 F. Supp. 3d 58, 63 (D.D.C. 2014). 

III. Analysis 

A. Motion to Remand for Lack of Subject Matter Jurisdiction 

Plaintiffs move to remand this case for lack of subject 

matter jurisdiction, arguing that Mr. Duffy fails to meet the 

requirements of 28 U.S.C. § 1332. Specifically, plaintiffs argue 

that the amount in controversy in this case does not exceed 

$75,000 as required under the statute. Pls.’ Mot., ECF No. 4 at 

6.2 A court typically may dismiss a case for lack of jurisdiction 

based on an insufficient amount in controversy only if it 

“appear[s] to a legal certainty that the claim is really for 

less than the jurisdictional amount.” Bronner v. Duggan, 249 F. 

Supp. 3d 27, 37 (D.D.C. 2017)(citation omitted). However, when a 

case has been removed to federal court, the Court must resolve 

 

2 When citing electronic filings throughout this Memorandum 

Opinion, the Court cites to the ECF header page number, not the 

original page number of the filed document.
7 

any ambiguities as to whether the jurisdictional requirement is 

met in favor of remand. Cefarrati, 75 F. Supp. 3d at 63. 

Plaintiffs seek to remove Mr. Duffy as trustee pursuant to 

D.C. Code § 19-1301, and therefore this case concerns injunctive 

relief. The value of injunctive relief for determining the 

amount in controversy can be calculated as either the benefit to 

the plaintiff “or the cost to the defendant.” Wexler v. United 

Air Lines, Inc., 496 F. Supp. 2d 150, 154 (D.D.C. 2007)(citing

Comm. For GI Rights v. Callaway, 518 F.2d 466, 472–73 (D.C. Cir. 

1975)(“the amount in controversy may be measured either by the 

‘value of the right sought to be gained by the plaintiff or the 

cost of enforcing that right to the defendant.”)). 

Plaintiffs point out that the basis for the jurisdictional 

amount in the Notice of Removal is Mr. Duffy’s statement that 

“the assets of the Allision Fromm Family Trust are substantially 

in excess of [$75,000].” Pls.’ Mot., ECF No. 4 at 6. Plaintiffs 

argue that because the amount of the Trust is not at issue in 

this case, the Trust amount is not an appropriate measure for 

determining the amount in controversy. Id. Mr. Duffy’s response 

is not entirely clear, but he points to the fact that Ms. Fromm 

in her Complaint stated that she feared that Mr. Duffy would 

leave the country with the assets in the Trust. Def.’s Opp’n, 

ECF No. 8 at 2 (citing Compl., ECF No. 1-1 ¶ 41.). Because of 

this allegation, Mr. Duffy argues, plaintiffs have 
8 

“acknowledge[d] there is substantially more than $75,000 at 

issue” in this case. Id. Mr. Duffy also points to the $24,000 

per annum commission he receives for his services vis-à-vis the 

Trust, which he stands to lose should plaintiffs’ claims be 

resolved against him, as an alternative reason for why this suit 

clears the $75,000 hurdle. Id. at 2–3. 

The Court agrees with plaintiffs that the amount in the 

Trust is not an adequate measure for the jurisdictional amount. 

An entitlement to the amount in the Trust is not disputed in 

this case, rather this case concerns solely Mr. Duffy’s legal 

title as Independent Trustee. In other words, “[since] the 

equitable ownership of trust property is not at issue . . . 

plaintiffs’ injunctive request does not place [that] amount in 

controversy.” In re Corestates Tr. Fee Litig., 39 F.3d 61, 66 

(3d Cir. 1994)(“The mere request for removal of a trustee does 

not place the entire trust corpus into controversy.”). The Court 

does not find persuasive Mr. Duffy’s argument that since 

plaintiffs have stated that they are concerned that he may 

abscond with the funds in the Trust, the amount in the Trust 

should be considered. The resolution of this case simply has no 

bearing on the amount of money in the Trust, and those funds are 

not at issue in this case. 

That is not the end of the inquiry, however. In his 

opposition to plaintiffs’ motion, Mr. Duffy has argued that the 
9 

amount in profits he stands to lose should plaintiffs prevail 

well exceeds the statutorily required amount. Def.’s Opp’n, ECF 

No. 8 at 2–3. Future loss profits may serve as a measure for the 

jurisdictional amount provided the loss profits are supported by 

adequate documentation and are not speculative. Cf. Wexler, 496 

F. Supp. 2d at 153 (holding diversity jurisdiction not 

established when defendant failed to submit supporting 

declaration or affidavits establishing cost of enforcement of 

injunction). Mr. Duffy has provided an affidavit swearing that 

he receives a minimum of $24,000 per year in commissions related 

to the Trust, and expects to receive these commissions for the 

foreseeable future. See ECF No. 8-1 ¶ 8. Indeed, Ms. Fromm in 

her complaint has confirmed that amount. Compl., ECF No. 1-1 ¶ 

14. Therefore, the value of the “object of the litigation” in 

this case, Mr. Duffy’s legal right to be Independent Trustee and 

the attendant commission, exceeds the amount in controversy 

requirement. See Hunt v. Washington State Apple Advertising 

Commission, 432 U.S. 333, 347 (1977)(stating that in a suit for 

injunctive relief, “the amount in controversy is measured by the 

value of the object of the litigation.”). Because the cost to 

Mr. Duffy in this case is adequately supported by Mr. Duffy’s 

affidavit, and that cost exceeds $75,000, the Court concludes 

that there is no ambiguity as to whether the amount in 

controversy requirement has been met. Accordingly, plaintiffs’ 
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motion to remand for lack of subject matter jurisdiction is 

DENIED. 

B. Motion to Strike Notice of Removal and Remand to the 

Superior Court of the District of Columbia 

Plaintiffs move, in the alternative, to strike Mr. Duffy’s 

notice of removal and to remand this case back to the Superior 

Court of the District of Columbia. See Pl.’s Mot., ECF No. 4 at 

9–11. Plaintiffs move to strike Mr. Duffy’s notice of removal on 

the basis that he is not a licensed attorney and therefore was 

not authorized to file the notice. See Pl.’s Mot., ECF No.4 at 

9–11. In support of this argument, plaintiffs cite to 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1654 which states that, in federal court, a non-attorney party 

may represent itself personally but may not represent another 

individual. Id. 

Mr. Duffy does not contest the argument that a non-attorney 

may not represent the Trust, but argues that [r]ather than 

burden the Trust[] with the payment of additional legal fees, 

[he] has chosen to proceed pro se.” Def.’s Opp’n, ECF No. 8 at 

2. He further argues that although the complaint characterizes 

his behavior as a breach of fiduciary duty, the allegations are 

personal in nature and therefore he represents himself 

personally and not on behalf of the Trust. Id. at 4 Therefore, 

Mr. Duffy argues, it is proper for him to proceed pro se. Id.
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Plaintiffs are correct that Mr. Duffy may not represent the 

Trust in federal court since he is not a licensed attorney. It 

is undisputed that Mr. Duffy is not licensed to practice law. 

See id. at 2 (conceding disbarment). It is also undisputed that, 

at least in federal court, a trust can only be represented by a 

licensed attorney. 28 U.S.C. § 1654 provides: “In all courts of 

the United States the parties may plead and conduct their own 

cases personally or by counsel as, by the rules of such courts, 

respectively, are permitted to manage and conduct causes 

therein.” Courts have interpreted this statute to preclude a 

non-attorney from appearing on behalf of another person or an 

entity such as a corporation, partnership, or trust. See 

Georgiades v. Martin-Trigona, 729 F.2d 831, 835 (D.C. Cir. 

1984)(stating individual who was not a member of the bar of any 

court may appear pro se, but is not qualified to appear as 

counsel for others); see also Casares v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 

2015 WL 13679889 at *2 (D.D.C. May 4, 2015)(stating “plaintiff, 

who is proceeding pro se, cannot represent the trust in federal 

court, even as the trustee, as he is not a licensed attorney”). 

The Court agrees with plaintiffs that Mr. Duffy may not 

proceed as the attorney for the Trust in this case. Mr. Duffy’s 

arguments that he is not representing the Trust in this case, 

but rather himself personally, is belied by the nature of this 

action. Plaintiffs sue Mr. Duffy in his capacity as Independent 
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Trustee of the Trust. See Compl., ECF No. 1-1. Plaintiffs invoke 

the UTC which allows removal of a trustee if, among other 

things, there is: (1) a serious breach of trust by the trustee; 

(2) unfitness of the trustee; or (3) unanimous request of 

removal by beneficiaries if there is a finding of the court that 

the removal of the trustee serves the interest of all 

beneficiaries and is not inconsistent with the material purpose 

of the trust. D.C. Code § 19-1307.06. In light of the fact that 

the resolution of the claims in this case require the Court to 

consider Mr. Duffy’s alleged actions in relation to the Trust, 

the Court cannot agree that this case solely concerns his 

personal actions such that he could proceed pro se. Furthermore, 

any decision rendered by this Court affects not just Mr. Duffy’s 

interests but the interests of all stakeholders of the Trust. 

Cf. Guest v. Hansen, 603 F.3d 15, 21 (2d Cir. 2010)(stating nonattorney could appear pro se on behalf of an estate with no 

creditors or beneficiaries when the non-attorney was the only 

party affected by disposition of the suit). 

Because Mr. Duffy is unable to proceed in federal court, 

the Court will remand this case back to Superior Court. The 

Court notes that it relies solely on 28 U.S.C. § 1654, which 

limits the type of persons who may file pro se cases, solely to 

parties conducting their own cases. Mr. Duffy is unable to 

“plead and conduct” this suit on behalf of the Trust, because he 
13 

is not a licensed attorney. 28 U.S.C. § 1654. Accordingly, this 

case is REMANDED back to the Superior Court of the District of 

Columbia.3 

IV. Conclusion 

 For the foregoing reasons the Court DENIES defendant’s 

motion to dismiss and GRANTS IN PART plaintiff’s motion to 

dismiss or in the alternative motion to strike. An appropriate 

Order accompanies this Memorandum Opinion. 

SO ORDERED 

Signed: Emmet G. Sullivan 

United States District Judge 

January 9, 2020 

 

3 Court will also DENY Mr. Duffy’s motion to dismiss, or in the 

alternative transfer venue, since he was unauthorized to file 

either motion under 28 U.S.C. § 1654.