NO T R EC OM M EN DE D F OR F UL L- TEX T P UB LIC AT ION F ile Nam e: 09a0266n.06 F iled: April 7, 2009 No. 08-3844 UN ITED STA TES C OU RT OF AP P EA LS F OR THE SI XT H C IR CU IT
HECTOR GARCI A, Pla int if f- Ap pe lla nt,
v. DAI ML ER CHRYSL ER CORP ., UNI TED AUT O WO RK E RS L O CA L N O
. 1 2 , a nd DAN HENNEMA

N, De fe nd ants -A

pp e lle e s. ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ON APP EAL FROM THE UN I TE D ST AT ES D I STR I CT CO UR T F OR

TH E N OR THE RN D IS T R IC T O F O H IO

B EF OR E: KE I TH , SU TT ON , a nd GR I F F I N, Cir c uit

Judg e s. GRI FF I N, Circuit J udg e. Af te r a lle g e dly

ov e rh e ari ng a har a ssi ngc omm e nt m a de by on e un ion ize d e mpl oy e e to another , plaintiff Hec tor Gar cia r eporte d the incident by sending letters to his employ er a nd to the ho me a dd re sse s o f v ari ou s u ni on of fi c ia ls. Ga

rc ia lie d a bo ut h owhe ob ta ine d th e pr ivate ho me contac t information, and def endant Da imler Chry sler suspende d h i m pending an investig ation. Plaintiff sued his employ er , t h e u n i o n , and the union cha irman for reta liation. The district court g rante d summary

judgme nt in favor of

defe ndants, and we aff

irm. I.No. 08-3844

Ga rc ia v . D aim le r Ch ry

sle r Co rp ., e t al

.

- 2 - Gar cia is an hour ly

employ ee of

defe ndant Daimler Chry sler Corporation and a member of defe n d ant United Auto Workers L ocal No. 12 ( “UAW” or “Union”) . Gar cia wor

ks in Chry sler’s Toledo, Ohio plant as a

“floater,” meaningthat he is assig ned to var ious positions within the plant de pe nd ingon

the c omp any ’s ne e ds
. F loate rs are fr e qu e ntl y tr ans fe rr e d to dif fe re nt de pa

rtme nts to
c ov e r for perm ane nt e mpl oy e e s w ho are sic k o r o n v a c a tio n, or to f ill oth e r t e mpo ra

ry va c a nc ie s. Be cause of the tempora

ry nature of their work, these employ ees c annot use their se niority to displace perma nent worke rs who ar e re turning to their perma nent positions. Due to a pr evious injury , Gar cia ha s a permanent medical restric tion that preve nts him from perf orming activities requir ing “ repe titive gr ipping” or from doing much lifting with his rig ht hand. As a re sult of his inj ury , Gar cia wa s place d within Chry sler’s “ PQX” sy stem, meaning that he wa s phy sically

qualified with re strictions and could only be assig ned to jobs tha t h e wa s ca p able of perf orming with his restrictions. I f an employ ee within the PQX sy stem was assig ned to a job that he believe d violated his medical re striction, he could re quest that the pl an t d o ct o r m ake a n evaluation. Chry sler, not the Union, wa s in charg e of making PQX a ssignments. Th e c on tr ov e rs y

le a din g to t

he ins tant c a se be g an o n Augus t 19, 200 4, wh e n G arc ia a lle g e dly
ov e rh e ard a c on ve rs a tio n b e tw e e n U nio n s e c re tary /tr e a sure r M ark

Ep le y and e mpl oy e e Connie Ramir e z that oc c ur

re d in the br e a k ro om. Ac c or din g to pla int if f, Ep le y tol d Ramir e z that he wo uld send her to a Hispanic c onfer ence in Chicag o if she would spen d a n i ght with him i n a hotel and another night with def

endant Da n Henne man, cha irman of the U AW J eep unit. Bob Morrissey and Richard L ott, both of whom were Union officia ls, were also in the brea k room.No. 08-3844

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- 3 - Ga rc ia re po rt e d the c on ve rs a tio n to Unio n ste wa rd B ill Mc Cul lou g h, wh o s a id t hat he wo uld tell UAW Vice Chairman D ary l Peterson. McCullough asked R amirez about the conve rsation. She did not confirm or deny it; she mere ly “put her head down,” a g esture that McCullo u gh as sumed meant that it either ha

ppened or that she wa s embar

rasse d. McCullough told Gar cia that ther e wa s nothing he could do if Ramirez was not g oing to c omplain, and he late r told Ramire z that if she had been se x ually

hara ssed, or if she wer e to be se x ually hara ssed i n the future , that she should tell the person to stop and then te ll an advisor, Union re prese ntative, or someone in labor re lations. Plaintiff alleg es t hat he told Br uce Ba umhower, the UAW President, about the incident a nd Ba umhower b el i eved him. Baumhowe r disputes this and testified that he c alled Epley about the Ramir e z co nv e rs a tio n, Ep le y de nie d it , a

nd B a umh ow e r r e po rt e d th is de nia l to Ga rc ia
. Ga rc ia a lso claims to ha

ve contac ted Dan Twiss, UAW’s I nternational Represe ntative, althoug h Twiss denies that he wa s contac ted. Gar cia mailed a

letter to Thomas Maxon, the S en i o r M an ag er of Human Resourc es at the Chry sler plant, and to the home a ddresse s of a number of Union re prese ntatives. Gar cia obtaine d the a dd re sse s f ro m F re d M uir , h is unio n s te wa rd . T he le tte r s ta te d: L abor Relations, and UAW Union L ocal 12 Iwould like to f

ile char g es ag ainst Union Br other Mar k Epley , for using his job as a tool for se x ual har

rassment [sic]. M ark Eple y needs to be remove d from his Union job, and discipline [si c]. On Aug ust 19, 2004 Iwent on my b re ak bec ause I

knew Connie Ramire z was wo rk ingin t

he c omm itt e e ro om. She wa s a t the c of fe e po t, and

did no t se e me wa lk in. Mark Epley

was sitting in his offic e with the doo r o p en . Ihear d Mark Eple y discussing a

tr i p to Chicag o for the H ispanic conf ere nce w ith her. He said I ’ll payNo. 08-3844

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The orig inal letter was written entirely in c apital letters. For the sake of rea dability , we have 1 chang ed the c ase. - 4 - y our room for

3 day s, and I ’ll pay y our expenses, but he said you have to spe nd one night in a r oom with me beca use I ’m sending y ou to Chicag o. She walked ba ck to her desk and sat down. I looked at her and she shook her head. Iro lle d my

c ha ir ov e r t o h e r a

nd wh isp e re d that Ma

rk Ep le y ha d no ri g ht ta lki ngto her like that. She said, Hec tor, I j u s t came ba ck to work a nd I ’m only

part time, I might loose [si c] my job. I said it doe sn’t matter if y ou are full time or part time, y ou are not a whore and he c an not use his job for se x . By that time my

brea k was ove r and I went bac k to work. On O ct o b er 1 , 2004 Iapproa ched U nion Rep. Dan Twiss about the matter, and he sa id w hy are y ou te lli ngme the re is n oth ingIc an d o? I sto pp e d and th ou gh t to my self, he doesn’t want to help a minorit y beca use anote r [sic] Union Br other Rep. was involved. At this point I wiil [ sic] file charg es with labor r elations at work a nd with the Hispanic Council. Mark Ep le y sh ou ld b e re mov e d f

ro m hi s U nio n jo b for tr y in g t o us e his po we r t o h a v e s e x. L ocal 12 Me mber, Hispanic Member He c tor Ga rc ia 1 Gar c ia d id n o t m e n ti o nan y

th in g a b o u t H e n n e ma

nin th e le tt e r b e c a u s e , u n li k e E p le y , h e b e li e ved th a t H e n n e ma

n“ w a s n ’ t a p e r s o n li k e th a t, ” me an in g a p e r s o nw h o w o u ld

ta k e a d v an ta g e o f

Ra mi r e z. Gar cia ’s l et t er w as the fir st tim e that he notifie d Chry sler mana g ement about Eple y ’s
c omm e nts . Anumbe r o f U nio n r e pr e se ntativ e s w e re c on c e rn e d th a t G arc ia ma ile d h is l e tte r t o th e ir ho me a dd re sse s b e c a

us e , in many c a se s, the ir

ho me a dd res ses we re no t pu bli c inf or ma tio n. B oth Chry sler and the UAW ke pt the se addre sses confide ntial to prevent the r epre sentatives fr om being hara ssed at home a

nd to protect their pr ivacy . Disclosure of such information viola tes companyNo. 08-3844

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- 5 - policy ; abuse of pr ivate information had rec ently resulted in episo d es o f i d entity theft. Chry sler policy allows it to discipli ne employ ees “ up to and including discharg e” f or fa ilure to provide information or for

providing false inf

ormation. Chry sler for

med an investigative team compr ised of Maxon, labor re lations supervisor Jean Hathaw ay , and Henne man. The investigation team interviewe d Ramirez, who denied that she had been se x ually

hara ssed and provided a written statement to that effe ct. The te am also interview ed L ott and Morrissey , both of whom denied that Epley had harassed Ramirez. The team questioned Gar cia a bout how he obtained the addre sses. At Gar cia’ s reque st, his union represe ntative, Raul L edesma , was pre sent. Gar cia g ave c onflicting explanations reg ardinghow he o b t ai n ed the
a dd re sse s. Hi s ans we rs ra

ng e d f rom find ingthe m on

the int e rn e t, t o d

ri vin g to t

he ind ivi du a ls’ houses, to claiming that his wife found the m. Eventually Gar cia a d m i t t ed t hat he obtaine d the
a dd re sse s f ro m Mu ir . M a xon de sc ri be d his co nf us ion fo llo wi ng thi s d isc us sio n w ithGa rc ia : “ Isti ll to thi s day do n’ t know wh e re the y c a me fr om. ” Th e te a m th e n q ue sti on e d M uir

a bo ut t he a dd re sse s, to which he r epeatedly

responde d, “I

plead the F ifth.” Chry sler suspended Gar cia without pay pending its investigation into how he obtained the addre sses. Maxon later explained that he believe d the s uspension was ne cessa ry beca use of Ga rcia ’s
c on fl ic tin g e xplanatio ns : [W ]e had such a dif

ficult time – an d I ’l l b e very candid with y ou, Idon’t have any clue, didn’t at the tim e as t o wh at was true and what wasn’t. So it had taken a n inordinate amount of t ime and there was more that was going to have to take place , so his suspensi o n wa s nece ssary in my opinion so that we could continue w ith the investigation.No. 08-3844

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- 6 - Henne man conf

ronted Ga rcia about the Epley incident and called him a li ar. Pl aintiff alleg es that Henne man also swore at him. G ar c i a f i l e d a g r i e v an c e w i t h t h e U A W , an d C h r ys l e r r e i n s t a t e d h i m w i t h b a c k p a y. Neve rtheless, he filed a discr imination complaint with t he EEOC, a lleg ing that Chr y s l er and the UAW retaliate d ag ainst him for repor ting Eple y ’s conve rsation with Ramirez. Two wee ks later, Chry sler Are a Manag er Br ian Tring ali transfe rre d Gar cia f rom the mater ial handling depar

tment back to his home depa rtment bec ause the materia l handling de partment “ was
over r oll,” meaningthat it had mo re em p l o y ees tha n it needed. H e wa s sent home on seve ral
occa sions be cause there was no work for him. He returne d to work but was a ssigne d to a position that vi olate d h is m e dic a l r e str ic tio ns , s o Ch ry sle r t ra ns fe rr e d h im b a c k to his pr e vio us jo b a s a forklift oper ator. The EEO C issued a deter mination letter stating that it f ound sufficie nt e vidence to support
a re taliation claim. Gar cia then broug ht the pre sent ac tion in the United States District Court for the Norther n District of Ohio, cla iming re taliation in violation of Titl e VI Iand O HI O R EV . C ODE § 4112. The district cour

t ultim ately

g rante d summary judgme nt in favor of def endants, a nd Gar cia a

ppeale d. II. We reviewa district cour t’s g rant of a motion for summary judgme nt de novo. W

illiamson v. Aetna Li

fe Ins. Co. , 4 8 1 F
. 3 d 3 6 9 , 3 7 4 ( 6 th Ci r . 2 0 0 7 )
. Summ ar y ju d g me n t is p r o p e r “ if the pleading s, the discover

y and disclosure materia ls on file , and any aff idavits show that there is no g enuine issue as to a

ny materia l f

act and that the movant is entitled to judgment a s a matter of law.”No. 08-3844

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Ohio courts apply

Title VI Ijurisprudenc e to the interpr etation of O HI O R EV . C ODE § 4112. 2 Ohio Civ. Rights Comm’n v. Dav id Richard Ingram, D.C., Inc

. , 630 N.E.2d 669, 674 (Ohio 1994). - 7 - F ED . R. C IV . P. 56( c). The moving party has the burden of proving the absenc e of g enuine issues of materia l fac t and it s entitlement to judgment a s a matter of law. Ce lot e

x Cor p. v . Ca tre tt , 4 77 U. S. 317, 323 (1986). When dete rmining w h et h er t h e m o v ant has met thi s burden, we must view the evidenc e in the lig ht most favorable to the nonmoving pa rty
. Smith W

holesale Co. v. R.J

. Rey nolds Tobacco Co. , 477 F.3d 854, 861 ( 6th Cir. 2007). III
. Ga rc ia argue s th at def

e nd ants re ta liate d ag a ins t him for re po rt ingEp le y ’s c on ve rs a tio n w ith Ramir e z. To e sta

bli sh a pr ima fa c ie c la im of re ta liatio n un de r Ti tle VI I and Oh io law, Ga rc ia mus t 2 show that: (1) he eng ag ed in protec ted ac tivity ; (2) def endants kne w that he e ng ag ed in the protec ted
a c tiv ity ; ( 3) de fe nd ants su bje c te d h im t o a

n a dv e rse empl oy

me nt a c tio n; a

nd (4 ) t he a dv e rs e employ ment action wa s causa lly connec ted t o the protec ted ac tivity
. Lad d v . G ra nd

Tru nk W este rn R.R., Inc

. , 552 F.3d 495, 502 ( 6th Cir. 2009). I f plaintiff c an establish a prima f acie case , the burde n sh if ts t o d e fe nd ants to a

rt ic ulate a

“ le g iti ma te , n on dis c ri min a tor y reas on ” for th e ir

a c tio ns . McD onnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, , 4 11 U. S. 7 92 , 8 02 (1 97 3) ; Russell v. Univ. of Toledo , 537 F.3d 59 6, 60 4 ( 6th

Cir . 2 00 8) . I f d e fe nd ants make thi s sh owin g, th e burd e n s hif ts b a c k to pla int if

f t o show that defe ndants’ prof fer ed re ason is mere ly

“a pr etext to hi de unlawf ul disc ri m i nation.” Ru sse ll , 537 F.3d at 604. A.No. 08-3844

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- 8 - Plaintiff argues that Chry s l er r etaliated a g ainst him by suspending him pending a n inv e sti g a tio n into ho w he ob ta ine d the a dd re sse s and by tr ans fe rr ing him to a job that vi olate d h is medical r estrictions. 1. Gar cia a sserts that he met the prima fac ie eleme nts of a re taliation claim reg ardingChry sler’s suspension of him pending its investigation. Chry sler ar g ues that plaintiff ha s failed to esta blish a
causa l connec tion between the p rot ecte d act a nd the suspension pending investigation. However , we ne ed not re solve this matter bec ause, e ven assuming that plaintiff m et hi s prima fa cie c ase, he
c ann ot s ho w that Ch ry sle r’ s su sp e ns ion of him wa s a pre te xt fo r re ta liatio n. Thus , he ha s f a ile d to
car ry his ulti mate burde n of per suasion in a manner that would allow for a rea sonable juror to find in his favor. See Ladd , 55 2 F .3 d at 50 2 ( c on c lud ingthat it wa s unn e c e ssa

ry to a na ly ze a pr ima fa c ie
case when a

plaintiff ca

nnot establish pretext). Assuming a

rg uendo that plaintiff c ould e stablish a prima fac ie case , the burden of produc tion shifts to Chry sler to of

fer a non-re taliatory rea son for the adver se employ ment action. Id . Chry sler
a sse rt s th a t it s n on -r e ta liator y purp os e fo r s us pe nd ingGa rc ia wa s h is d ish on e sty

and e va sio n in
answe ring questions reg ardinghow he obtaine d the addr esses. I n order to preva il, Garc ia must show that th is p ro ff

e re d r e a so n e ith e r: “ (1 ) h a s n o b a sis in f a c t; ( 2) did

no t ac tua lly mot ivate the a dv e rs e employ ment action; or (3) was insuffici en t t o war rant the a dverse action.” Id
. (c i t i n g Manzer v

. Diamond Shamrock

Chems. Co. , 2 9 F .3 d 1 07 8, 1084 (6t h Cir. 1 99 4) ). Pla int if f c ann ot m a ke thi s showing
.No. 08-3844

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- 9 - Gar cia c oncede s that Chry sler’s proffe red reason for sus pending him had a basis in fac t; he
a dmi ts that he wa s no t tr uth fu l in re sp on din g to qu e sti on s a bo ut ho w he ob ta ine d the addre sse s. Plaintiff offer s no admissible evidence that his evasive ness di d not motivate his suspension or that it wa s insu ff

ic ie nt to warr ant a sus pe ns ion . Pl a int if f a rgue s f ur the r t hat Ch ry sle r r e ta liate d a g a ins t him, not only

by suspending him during its investig ation, but b y t h e mere ac t of conduc ting a n investigation. We disa g ree . Gar cia cannot cre ate the need f or an inve stigation by

his own evasive
c o n d u c t an d th e n c la im th a t th e inv e s ti g a ti o n it s e lf w a s r e ta lia tory
. S ee Driggers v. City of Owensboro, Ky. , 11 0 F
. Ap p’ x 4 99 , 50 8 (6 th Cir
. 20 04 ) ( ho ldi ngthat an inve sti g a tio n in to t he fa c ts
surr ound ing pla int if

f’ s c omp la int s d id n ot c on sti tut e imp ro pe r c on du c t) . T he dis tr ic t c ourt pr op e rl y g rante d summary

judgme nt in favor of

Chry sler on this issue. 2. Gar cia’ s claim that Chry sler re taliated ag ains t h i m by transfe rringhim to a differ ent depar tment fails for similar re asons. Chry sler asser ts that it transfe rre d Gar cia, a floater , beca use the depar tment he was wor

king in “ was ove r roll, meaningthat it had more e mploy ees tha n nece ssary t o f i l l t h e a v a i l a

b l e p o s i t i o n s . ” P l a i n t i f

f h a s f a i l e d t o p r e s e n tan y ad

mi ssi bleevidenc e to show that Ch r y s le r ’ s e xp la

n a ti o n la c k e d a b a s is in f a c t, d id n o t a c tu a ll y mo ti v a te th e tr ansfer , or wa s insufficient to wa

rra nt the transfe r. Ga

rcia proff ers t wo rea sons – L edesma ’s statement a nd the EE OC le tte r – bu t ne ith e r is a dmi ssi ble fo r purp os e s of op po sin g a mot ion fo r s umm ary

jud g me nt. L edesma , whom plaintiff desc ribes as “a tried and true union of ficial,” stated that he “ can’ t think of any

other re ason” f

or Chry sler’s a ction other than reta liation. Gar cia argues that “L edesma ’sNo. 08-3844

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- 10 - te sti mony wa s b a se d o n p e rs on a l kn ow le dg e . H e kn e w f ro m e xpe ri e nc e ho w p e op le are no rm a lly
rea ssigne d.” The district court re jected the testimony beca use L edesma

admitted that his testimony was ba sed on his “impression” of the eve nts, rather than on s pecif ic information. We ag ree with the district court. Rule 56 re quires “pe rsonal knowledg e,” and a state ment that one ca nnot “think of any oth e r r e a so n” is n ot t

he same a s a

state me nt t

hat one a c tua lly kn e w of

the re a so n. Ev e n if

L e de sma knew “ how people a

re nor mally rea ssigne d,” Ga

rcia has not shown that L edesma knew a ny thing about this particula

r reassig nment. Gar cia a

rg ues fur ther that L edesma ’s statement is admissible as a stateme nt by

a p ar t y opponent. Howe ver, e ven if L edesma ’s statement c ould be imputed to the Un ion , G arci a ha s n ot s ho wn ho w i t c ou ld b e imp ute d to Chr y sle r. Th e dis tr ic t c ourt

pr op e rl y excluded this statement. Reg ardingthe admissibilit y of the EEO C letter, Gar cia relies upon the Ninth Circuit case of Gifford v. Atchison, Topeka &Santa Fe Ry. Co. , 6 8 5 F
. 2 d 1 1 4 9 ( 9 th Ci r. 1982). I n Gi ffo rd , the Ni nth Cir c uit he ld that an EE OC inv e sti g a tio n int o wh e the r the pla int if f h a d b e e n tr e a te d d if

fe re ntl y than her male cow orker s was suff icient to cre ate a

n issue of fa ct in that case
. Id . at 1156. Howe ver, Gar cia ha s not identified any case s wher e the Six th Circuit has m ade a similar deter mination. See W ill iam s v . Na sh v ill e Ne two rk, 132 F .3 d 112 3, 11 29 (6 th C ir . 1 99 7) (r uli ngthat a

dis tr ic t c ourt

did
no t a bu se its dis c re tio n in re fu sin g to a dmi t an EE OC pr ob a ble c a us e de te rm inatio n le tte r) . G a rc ia argues that the trial c ourt has broa der d i s cr et i o n to exclude an EEOC letter at trial than at the summary judgme nt stag e, but offe rs no leg al support for this proposition.No. 08-3844

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- 11 - Gar cia ha s not shown that Chry sler’s r ea s o n for tra nsfer ring him was a pre text for illeg al reta liation. B. Gar cia a lleg es that the Union re taliated ag ainst him b y encour ag ing Chry sler’s suspension of him and c on c ur ri ngin h is tra

ns fe r. Th e Un io n argues that it c ou ld n ot h a ve re ta liate d a g a ins t p l a i n t i f f b y s u s p e n d i n g h i m b e c a u s e i t w a s C h r

y s l e r , n o tt h e U n i o n , t h a ti s s u e d t h e s u s p e n s i o n . In fac t, it was Henneman, on behalf of t he Union, who persuaded Chry sler to reimburse Gar cia f or the time that he was suspe nded. Eve n if, for the sake of ar gu m en t , t h e Union was re sponsible for suspending plaintiff, Gar cia’ s claim of reta liatory suspension fails when applied to t he Union for the
same re ason that i t fails as applied to Chry sler. Gar cia’ s evasive ness when questioned about how he ob ta ine d th e a dd

re sse s p re ve nts him

fr om b e inga

ble to s ho w that the su sp e ns ion wa s p re te xtua l. Plaintiff has also fa iled to show that the Union, as opposed to Chry sler, wa s responsible for his transfer , other than by

proff eringL edesma ’s statement, whic h we have alr eady deter mined to be inadmissible. Ho we v er , even if the Union’s role in the tr ansfe r wa s coterminous with Chry sler’s role, Ga rcia is stil l unable to show that t he reason given for t he tra nsfer – his department be ing “ over roll” – wa s pretextual. The district court ruled that plaintiff’s claim ag ainst the Union for retaliatory transfe r fa iled, bu t it ba se d it s c on c lus ion

on Ga rc ia ’s ina bil ity to m a ke his pr ima

fa c ie c a se, rat her than

on his inability to establish pretext. Specifica lly , the district court de termined that Ga rcia could not show that his transfer

“wa s causa lly

connec ted to his report a s o p p o s ed t o overstaf fing in the stockNo. 08-3844

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- 12 - d epartment.” Holding that Gar cia’ s claim fails bec ause he cannot show that his transfer was
c on ne c te d to his re po rt , o r ho ldi ng that it fa ils be c a

us e he c ann ot s ho w that be ing“ ov e r r oll ” wa s a pr e te xt fo r r e ta liatio n, are sim ply tw o w ay s o f s ay ingthe same thi ng : Ga rc ia c a nn ot s uc c e e d o n h is claim ag ainst the Union bec ause he cannot show that it retaliated a g ainst him. W hether we hold that Gar cia ca n n o t demonstrate the elements for his prima fac ie ca se, or show that the proff ere d nondiscriminatory

rea son was pre text ual, the re sult is t he same . Thus, we a ffirm the district c ourt’s g rant of summar

y judgme nt in favor of

the Union. C. Gar cia a rg ued in his complaint and in his oppositi on to summary judgm en t b el ow that de fe nd ants e ng a g e d in

re ta liator y ha ra ssm e nt a g a ins t hi m. H ow e ve r, he did no t r a ise thi s is su e in his opening brief on a

ppeal. I n his r eply brief, he argued that the va rious incidents about which he complained in his opening brief amounted t o reta liatory hara ssment in their totality . He a lso arg ued, appar ently

for the f irst time, that “the leg al re view for reta liation and reta lia t o ry h ar assm ent ar e
near ly the same.” We have held that “[a]n arg ument raised f or the fir st tim e in a r eply brief w ill not be considere d by

this Court.” Ove rstreet v. Lex ington-Fayette U rban County Gov’t , 305 F.3d 566, 578 (6 t h C i r. 2 0 0 2 ) ( ci t i n g W r ig h t v
. H o lbrook , 79 4 F. 2d

11 52 , 1 15 6 ( 6th

Cir . 1 98 6) ); W

u v. Tyson Foods, Inc. , 1 89 F . App ’x 37 5, 38 1 ( 6th Cir . 2 00 6) (r e fu sin g to con si der an iss ue no t r a ise d in
a pp e lla nt’ s ope nin g br ie f ev e n thou g h th e iss ue wa s p re e mpt ive ly ra ise d in a pp e lle e ’s br ie f) . G a rc iaNo. 08-3844

Ga rc ia v . D aim le r Ch ry

sle r Co rp ., e t al

.

- 13 - did not raise this issue in his opening brief a nd has cited no a

uthority that would excuse this waiver
mere ly beca use the issue is “ne arly

the same” as one that he did raise.

D. Garcia a sse rt s, wi tho ut c itatio n to a uth or ity , th a t th e dis tr ic t c ourt vio la te d h is Se ve nth Amendment rig ht to a trial by jury
. He argues that “[i] n this c ase, wher e var ious witnesses disag ree d with eac h other a

bout key fac ts and wher e af

fidavits wer e s u bmitted at summary judgme nt specific ally to c halleng e fac ts se t f orth by Gar cia, the lower court should not have ignor ed the constitutional mandate to a llow a jury to tr y Gar cia’ s claims.” This is nothing more than an attempt to rec y cle Ga

rcia ’s summary

judgme nt arguments as somehow be ing Seve nth A m en d m ent arguments. Garc ia does not cite a ny authority supporting his Seventh Amendment ar g ument, and the per functory

manner with which he ha s addre ssed this issue amoun t s t o a wa i v er . See U nited St a tes v. Villareal , 491 F.3d 605, 611 ( 6th Cir. 2007) (“[I ]t is a settled appe llate rule that issues adver ted t o in a perfunctor

y manner , unacc ompanied by some eff ort at deve loped ar g umentation, are deeme d waived.” ) (c itation omit ted). I V. Finally , Gar cia sue d Henne man under both Title VI I and O HI O R EV . C ODE § 4112.02(I ). The district court cited W

athen v. Ge n. Elec. Co. , 115 F.3d 400, 405 (6th Cir. 1997), for the proposition t h a t a p l a i n t i f

f “ c an n o t h o l d ani n d i v i d

u a l l i a b l e f o r i l l e g a l r e t a l i a t i o nu n d e r

T i t l e V II
. ” A c c o r d i n g l y, the district court dismissed the claims ag ainst Henne man. On appeal, Garcia doe s not challeng e the dism is sal of

the Ti tle VI Ic la im a g a ins t H e nn e man b ut a rgue s th a t th e dis tr ic t c ourt e rr e d inNo. 08-3844

Ga rc ia v . D aim le r Ch ry

sle r Co rp ., e t al

.

- 14 - dis mis sin g the state la

w cl a im a g a ins t hi m. P la int if f c ite s Genaro v. Cent. Transp., Inc. , 703 N.E.2d 782 (Ohio 1999) f

or the proposition that Ohio law a llows liabili ty to attach to individuals. I n Ge na ro , the Ohio Supreme Court he l d that “individual supervisors a nd manag ers a

re
acc ountable for their own discr iminatory conduct oc curr ing in the w orkplac e envir onment.” 703 N.E.2d at 787. The court ba sed its de cision on the lang uag e of O HI O R EV . C ODE § 4112.01(A)( 2), which def ines the term “employ er” as: “the state, any political subdivision of the state, any person employ ing f

our or more persons within the state, a nd any person acting direc tly or indirec tly

in the interest of a

n employ er.” Thus, in order f or liability

to attach to He nneman, the loc al UAW leade r, Gar cia would have to show that He nneman met the statutory definition of “e mploy er.” Even if plaintiff could make this showing , Ge na ro do e s n ot c re a te a se pa rate lia bil ity sta nd ard ; it me re ly state s th a t “ fo r p ur

po se s of [§ 41 12 ], a supe rv iso r/ mana g e r may be he ld j oin tly and/or seve rally

liable with her/his employ er f or discriminatory

conduct . . . .” 703 N.E.2d at 787-88. Under Ge na ro , a

su pe rv iso r’ s li a

bil ity is j oin t and

se ve ra l w ithhis e mploy er. Th erefo re , b e c a us e
ne ith e r C hr

y sle r n or the Un ion

are lia ble fo r t he re a so ns e xpla ined abo ve, ther e is n o li a bil ity to attach jointly

or seve rally

to Hennema

n. V. For these re asons, we a ffirm the judg ment of the district cour t.