NUMBER 13-09-00264-CR

COURT OF APPEALS

THIRTEENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS

CORPUS CHRISTI - EDINBURG 

 

SAMUEL TORRES, Appellant,

v.

THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee.

 

On appeal from the 107th District Court 

of Cameron County, Texas.

 

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Before Justices Yañez, Rodriguez, and Garza1 

Memorandum Opinion by Justice Rodriguez

 

1 The Honorable Linda Reyna Yañez, former Justice of this Court, did not participate in this opinion 

because her term of office expired on December 31, 2010; therefore, this case, which was argued before 

the panel on May 26, 2010, will be decided by the two remaining justices on the panel. See TEX. R. APP. P. 

41.1(b) (―After argument, if for any reason a member of the panel cannot participate in deciding a case, the 

case may be decided by the two remaining justices.‖).
2

Pursuant to a plea bargain agreement with the State, appellant Samuel Torres 

pleaded guilty to five counts of possession of child pornography and was sentenced to 

four years‘ confinement for each count to run concurrently. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 

43.26 (Vernon 2003). By two issues, Torres contends that the trial court erred in denying 

his motion to suppress evidence because (1) the magistrate had no authority to sign the 

warrant, and (2) there was no probable cause. We affirm.

I. BACKGROUND

Magistrate Valerie Garcia of the Harlingen Municipal Court issued a search 

warrant for Torres‘s residence on December 19, 2006. Attached to the search warrant is 

Detective Rebecca Cruz‘s sworn affidavit stating that a person who wished to remain 

anonymous had called the police department reporting that another unnamed female had 

informed the anonymous person that ―Anna Sanchez‖ found sexually explicit material 

involving children stored on Torres‘s home computer and tape recordings of Torres 

having sex with teenage girls. Detective Cruz‘s affidavit states:

IT IS THE BELIEF OF AFFIANT [Detective Cruz], AND AFFIANT HEREBY 

CHARGES AND ACCUSES THAT:

1. On December 16, 2006, at approximately 10:00 p.m., Detective 

Sergeant Steve Meyer was contacted by Patrol Sergeant Daniel 

Villarreal reference [sic] a call that came in regarding child 

pornography and sexual assault of a child.

2. A person who wished to remain anonymous called the Harlingen 

Police Department to provide information relating to possible 

offenses specified in the Texas Penal Code including Sexual 

Assault of a Child and Possession of Child Pornography. The 

source of information insisted on remaining anonymous due to fear 

of destroying the trust between herself and another female who 

provided the anonymous source with the information. The source 

alleges that a female named Anna Sanchez (24-25 years old) found 
3

recordings in her residence of her common-law husband having sex 

with girls who appeared to be eleven to fifteen years of age. It is 

alleged that Anna Sanchez also found child pornography stored 

within the home computer. It is also alleged that Anna Sanchez 

located a journal in a room that is occupied by Anna‘s common law 

father-in-law whose name is unknown at this time. The journal 

details offenses of child molestation. The common law spouse of 

Anna was said to be a local pediatrician at the time of the first 

information. The anonymous caller advised Sergeant Daniel 

Villarreal that when Anna Sanchez viewed the Child Pornography 

she recognized an undetermined number of victims at that time as 

she went [sic] to school with them when she was younger. That is 

to say, Anna Sanchez recognized the girls in the video(s) as 

classmates from school. (Your affiant reports to the magistrate 

reviewing this Search Warrant that the information contained in this 

affidavit was provided through third party source. Your affiant as of 

this time has not been able to contact with the second party or Anna 

Sanchez even though lengthy surveillance has been conducted at 

the residence since the initial call came was received in an effort to 

contact Anna Sanchez in person.)

2. On December 17, 2006, Detective Sergeant Steve Mayer and 

Detective Robert Gonzalez looked into this. Anna Sanchez resides 

with her common law spouse Samuel Torres and her common law 

father[-]in[-]law (unknown name) on 1909 S. Palm Ct. Drive in 

Harlingen, Texas. There is a black 2006 Chrysler 4-door vehicle 

parked in front of the residence bearing Texas license plates 

884DLX. Detective Robert Gonzalez and Detective Robert Salinas 

conducted surveillance from noon to 6:00 p.m. The only reported 

activity is that Samuel Torres went outside of his residence to 

smoke a cigarette and he took a white heavy looking bag out of his 

vehicle and took it inside his residence.

3. Samuel Torres is a Registered Nurse at Valley Baptist Medical 

Center. It is unknown at this time what section of the hospital 

Samuel is assigned to. Samuel does have a twin brother that is a 

pediatrician.

4. On December 18, 2006, I received a tip from a second party alleging 

that Anna had been in a fight with her common law spouse Samuel 

Torres when she confronted him about what she found in their 

household. There was a knife involved and the two had a long 

heated argument. It is unknown if either of the two were injured. 

Anna was not answering her phone and there was concern for 
4

Anna‘s well being. This second party provided me the same 

information that the third party had mentioned December 16, 2006. 

(Your affiant reports to the magistrate reviewing this Search Warrant 

that the information contained in this affidavit was provided through 

second source. Your affiant as of this time has not been able to 

contact Anna Sanchez even though lengthy surveillance has been 

conducted at the residence since the initial call came was received in 

an effort to contact Anna Sanchez in person.)

Pursuant to the warrant, the Harlingen Police Department executed a search of Torres‘s 

residence and seized computer equipment, CDs, DVDs, diskettes, VHS tapes, and digital 

cameras. After reviewing some of the CDs seized by police, Dr. Stanley Fisch of 

Harlingen Pediatrics Clinic identified seventy-two images as child pornography.2

After Torres was indicted with possession of child pornography, he filed a motion to 

suppress the evidence. Detective Cruz testified at the motion to suppress hearing that 

she received a call from a person who wanted to remain anonymous and who was 

concerned about Anna Sanchez. Detective Cruz explained that the caller stated that the 

caller‘s sister received a call from Sanchez claiming that Torres had child pornography 

and a ―log of underaged girls that he had been having sexual contact with.‖ According to 

Detective Cruz, the caller and her sister wanted police to ―follow up on this welfare 

concern.‖3 Detective Cruz testified that the anonymous caller‘s identity is Elizabeth 

Gonzalez and her sister‘s identity is Cynthia Flues. Detective Cruz clarified that 

Sanchez saw the pornographic material in Torres‘s possession and that neither Gonzalez 

 

2

A detailed description of each image was documented in an incident report generated by 

Detective Cruz. According to the report, the images included children from the ages of five or six to 

seventeen.

3 On cross-examination, Detective Cruz clarified that she received two calls from two separate 

anonymous tipsters who ―both affirmed that this is—that there was a knife involved and a heated argument 

. . . . ‖
5

nor Flues witnessed the possession of the child pornography. Detective Cruz did not 

speak with Sanchez.4

On cross-examination, Detective Cruz stated that, pursuant to the search warrant, 

the police seized a journal from Torres‘s residence. According to Detective Cruz, the tip 

she received was vague concerning the journal and there was nothing indicating who had 

written the journal. Detective Cruz stated that although the journal found in Torres‘s 

residence contained writings, it did not contain ―anything illegal.‖

Detective Cruz claimed that she had corroborated several things that Gonzalez 

told her, such as Torres‘s address and his occupation. However, on cross-examination, 

Detective Cruz admitted that she did not include those facts in her affidavit. When asked 

by defense counsel if she ―put anything in this affidavit that would have indicated to the 

judge that this anonymous tip was a reliable tip,‖ Detective Cruz replied, ―No, sir, I did 

not.‖ On redirect examination, however, the State asked Detective Cruz to read portions 

of the affidavit that included Detective Cruz's corroborations that Torres was a nurse and 

that his twin brother was a pediatrician.

The trial court denied Torres‘s motion to suppress; however, it did suppress the 

journal found in his residence. Then, pursuant to a plea bargain agreement with the 

State, Torres pleaded guilty to five counts of possession of child pornography. The trial 

court sentenced Torres to four years‘ confinement for each count, with the sentences to 

run concurrently. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 43.26. This appeal ensued.

 

4 Detective Cruz stated that her partner, J.M. Villarreal, spoke to Sanchez when she was located. 

According to a document in the record generated by Detective Cruz, Sanchez went to the police department 

on December 19, 2006 and provided a sworn statement denying that she was involved in an argument with 

Torres and stating that she had only seen pictures of topless adult women on Torres‘s computer.
6

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Whether the trial court properly denied a defendant‘s motion to suppress is 

reviewed under a bifurcated standard of review. St. George v. State, 237 S.W.3d 720, 

725 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007); Scardino v. State, 294 S.W.3d 401, 405 (Tex. App.–Corpus 

Christi 2009, no pet.). We give almost total deference to the trial court‘s determination of 

historical facts and review de novo the trial court‘s application of law to facts not turning on 

credibility and demeanor. Scardino, 294 S.W.3d at 405; see Ford v. State, 158 S.W.3d 

488, 493 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005). When, as in this case, the trial court makes no explicit 

findings of historical fact, the evidence must be viewed in the light most favorable to the 

trial court‘s ruling. St. George, 237 S.W.3d at 725. We must uphold the trial court‘s 

ruling if it is correct under any theory of law applicable to the case. State v. Dixon, 206 

S.W.3d 587, 590 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006); Estrada v. State, 154 S.W.3d 604, 607 (Tex. 

Crim. App. 2005). ―Absent a clear abuse of discretion, the ruling on the admissibility of 

evidence will not be disturbed.‖ Fonseca v. State, 881 S.W.2d 144, 149 (Tex. 

App.–Corpus Christi 1994, no pet.) (citing Rivera v. State, 808 S.W.2d 80, 96 (Tex. Crim. 

App. 1991)).

III. DISCUSSION

A. Did the Magistrate Have Authority to Issue the Search Warrant?

By his first issue, Torres contends that the magistrate did not have the authority to 

sign an evidentiary search warrant under article 18.02(10) of the code of criminal 

procedure. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 18.02(10) (Vernon 2005). The State 

concedes that the magistrate who issued the search warrant in this case was not a court 
7

of record, and therefore, it did not have the authority to issue an evidentiary search 

warrant pursuant to article 18.02(10). See id. However, the State asserts that the

search warrant was not an evidentiary search warrant and that the magistrate had the 

authority to issue the search warrant pursuant to articles 18.02(8) and 18.02(9). See id.

art. 18.02(8)-(9) (Vernon 2005).

1. Applicable Law

A ―search warrant‖ is a written order issued by a magistrate commanding a peace 

officer to search for and seize certain items. Id. art. 18.01(a) (Vernon Supp. 2010). 

Article 18.02 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure lists the items that may be included 

in a search warrant. Id. art. 18.02 (Vernon 2005); Mullican v. State, 157 S.W.3d 870, 872 

(Tex. App.–Fort Worth 2005, pet. ref‘d) (―Search warrants may issue for any of the nine 

items listed in sections one through nine of article 18.02.‖). Article 18.02(8) allows a 

search warrant to be issued for ―any property the possession of which is prohibited by 

law.‖ TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 18.02(8). Article 18.02(9) provides for the 

search and seizure of the ―implements or instruments used in the commission of a crime.‖ 

Id. art. 18.02(9). Subsection ten of article 18.02 allows a search warrant, referred to as 

an ―evidentiary warrant,‖ to be issued for items not listed in subsections one through nine. 

Scott v. State, 868 S.W.2d 430, 432 (Tex. App.–Waco 1994, pet. ref‘d); see TEX. CODE 

CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 18.02(10). In other words, subsection ten is a ―catch-all section‖ 

that only applies when the other sections do not. State v. Young, 8 S.W.3d 695, 698 

(Tex. App.–Fort Worth 1999, no pet.). Importantly, ―[o]nly judges of municipal courts of 

record licensed as attorneys, statutory county or district judges, or judges from the Court 
8

of Criminal Appeals or Supreme Court may issue evidentiary warrants under article 

18.02(10).‖ Scott, 868 S.W.2d at 432; see Zarychta v. State, 44 S.W.3d 155, 164 (Tex. 

App.–Houston [14th Dist.] 2001, pet. ref‘d); see also TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 

18.02(10). A search warrant is considered an ―evidentiary warrant‖ only if it is issued 

pursuant to subsection ten. See Young, 8 S.W.3d at 698 (concluding that the search 

warrant was not an evidentiary warrant because it had been properly issued pursuant to 

article 18.02(9)).

2. Analysis

In this case, both sides agree that the magistrate was not a court of record and did 

not have the authority to issue an evidentiary search warrant. Therefore, we can affirm 

the trial court‘s denial of Torres‘s motion to suppress only if the search warrant was

authorized under subsection one through nine of article 18.02.

Possession of child pornography is prohibited by law. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 

43.26. And although possession of computers, floppy disks, and CDs is not prohibited 

by law, images of child pornography that they store, if any, are illegal; thus, a warrant 

under article 18.02(8) may be properly issued. See Elardo v. State, 163 S.W.3d 760, 

771 (Tex. App.–Texarkana 2005, pet. ref‘d) (concluding that, because the images of child 

pornography stored on the computers, floppy disks, and CDs are illegal, the warrant 

issued for the property was not an evidentiary warrant but was properly issued under 

article 18.02(8)); Mullican, 157 S.W.3d at 873 (stating that pornographic photographs 

seized from appellant‘s computer ―constituted  ̳property the possession of which is 

prohibited by law,‘ which may be the subject of a warrant issued under article 18.02(8)‖); 
9

see also TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 18.02(8). Furthermore, the items in this case 

that were identified in Detective Cruz‘s affidavit and sought in the search warrant—items

capable of storing images of child pornography—could be implements or instruments 

used in the commission of a crime. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 18.02(9).

Detective Cruz stated in her affidavit that she received a tip that Torres had child 

pornography ―stored within the home computer‖ and ―recordings‖ of Torres having sex 

with young girls. Detective Cruz also stated that it was her belief that Torres was in 

possession of and was concealing ―documentation, evidence or instruments of a crime 

pertaining to the aforesaid offense [child pornography] that may be discovered and seized 

by Affiant and/or representatives of the Harlingen Police Department . . . .‖ Detective 

Cruz believed Torres possessed and was concealing at his residence in violation of the 

laws of Texas the following items: (1) computer hardware consisting of equipment 

capable of collecting and storing data; (2) computer software defined as digital 

information that can be interpreted by a computer and is stored in electronic, magnetic, 

optical, or other digital form; (3) computer related documents such as ―written, recorded, 

printer, or electronically stored material which explains or illustrates how to configure or 

use computer hardware, software, or other related items‖; and (4) ―[c]omputer passwords 

and other data security devices which are designed to restrict access to or hide computer 

software, documentation, or data.‖

From the information provided in the affidavit, the magistrate could have 

concluded that the items sought—including, among other things, computer hardware, 

computer software, and related documents that stored child pornography—were items, 
10

the possession of which is prohibited by law, or were implements or instruments used in 

the commission of the crime of possession of child pornography. See TEX. CODE CRIM.

PROC. ANN. art. 18.02(8), 18.02(9). Accordingly, we conclude that the magistrate issued 

the search warrant pursuant to subsections eight and nine; thus, the warrant was not an 

evidentiary search warrant pursuant to subsection ten. See id. art. 18.02(10); Young, 8 

S.W.3d at 698; Scott, 868 S.W.2d at 432; see also Elardo, 163 S.W.3d at 771. Because 

we conclude that the search warrant in this case was not an evidentiary search warrant, 

the magistrate had the authority to issue it. See Elardo, 163 S.W.3d at 771; Mullican, 

157 S.W.3d at 873. Therefore, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by concluding 

that the magistrate had the authority to issue the warrant. We overrule all arguments in 

Torres‘s first issue addressing the magistrate‘s authority to issue the warrant.

B. Was There Probable Cause to Issue the Warrant?

By a sub-issue in his first issue and by his second issue, Torres contends that 

there was no probable cause to issue the warrant in this case. Specifically, Torres 

argues that the affidavit contains double hearsay and that the trial court failed to analyze 

whether each level of hearsay was reliable.

1. Applicable Law

In Texas, a warrant must be supported by a sworn affidavit with sufficient facts that 

probable cause exists for the warrant‘s issuance. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 

18.01(b) (Vernon Supp. 2010). Moreover, the Fourth Amendment requires that a 

magistrate find probable cause to believe that a particular item will be found at a particular 

location before it may issue a search warrant. Rodriguez v. State, 232 S.W.3d 55, 60 
11

(Tex. Crim. App. 2007). ―Probable cause exists if, under the totality of the circumstances 

presented to the magistrate, there is at least a  ̳fair probability‘ or  ̳substantial chance‘ that 

contraband or evidence of a crime will be found at the specified location.‖ Id. (citing 

Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238, 243 n.13 (1983)).

We determine whether there is probable cause to support the issuance of the 

warrant from the ―four corners‖ of the affidavit alone. Hankins v. State, 132 S.W.3d 380, 

388 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004); Burke v. State, 27 S.W.3d 651, 654 (Tex. App.–Waco 2000, 

pet. ref‘d). ―We do not engage in a de novo review of the affidavit‘s sufficiency.‖ 

Ashcraft v. State, 934 S.W.2d 727, 733 (Tex. App.–Corpus Christi 1996, pet. ref‘d); see 

also Athey v. State, No. 13-06-129-CR, 2007 Tex. App. LEXIS 6739, *11 (Tex. 

App.–Corpus Christi 2007, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (―Rather 

than applying a de novo review of a magistrate‘s probable cause finding, which is a 

question of law, we must pay great deference to a magistrate‘s finding of probable cause 

 ̳to encourage police officers to use the warrant process rather than making a warrantless 

search and later attempting to justify their actions by invoking some exception to the 

warrant requirement.‘‖). The proper standard of review requires us to affirm the 

magistrate‘s decision to issue the warrant if the affidavit demonstrates a substantial basis 

for concluding that a search would uncover evidence of wrongdoing. Swearingen v. 

State, 143 S.W.3d 808, 810 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004). We give great deference to the 

magistrate‘s determination of probable cause. Id. at 811 (providing that a magistrate‘s 

determination to issue a search warrant is subject to the deferential standard of review 

articulated in Gates—requiring a deferential standard of review of a magistrate‘s 
12

determination that an affidavit is sufficient rather than a de novo review). ―If in a 

particular case it may not be easy to determine whether an affidavit demonstrates the 

existence of probable cause, the resolution of such doubtful or marginal cases should be 

largely determined by the preference to be accorded warrants.‖ State v. Walker, 140 

S.W.3d 761, 765 (Tex. App.–Houston [14th Dist.] 2004, no pet.) (citing Lopez v. State, 

535 S.W.2d 643, 647 (Tex. Crim. App. 1976)).

We must interpret the affidavit in a commonsensical and realistic manner and 

recognize that the magistrate is permitted to draw reasonable inferences from facts and 

circumstances alleged in the affidavit. Rodriguez, 232 S.W.3d at 61. We should not 

invalidate search warrants by interpreting affidavits in a hyper-technical manner. Id. at 

59.

The duty of a reviewing court, including a reviewing trial court, is simply to 

ensure that the magistrate had a substantial basis for concluding that 

probable cause existed. Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. at 238. This 

―substantial basis‖ standard of review ―does not mean the reviewing court 

should be a rubber stamp but does mean that the magistrate‘s decision 

should carry the day in doubtful or marginal cases, even if the reviewing 

court might reach a different result upon de novo review.‖ W. LaFave, 

Search and Seizure: A Treatise on the Fourth Amendment § 11.7(c) at 452 

(4th ed. 2004 & Supp. 2009-2010) (internal punctuation omitted) (citing 

cases).

Flores v. State, 319 S.W.3d 697, 702 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010). When viewing the 

affidavit, hearsay-upon-hearsay will support issuance of a warrant ―as long as the 

underlying circumstances indicate that there is a substantial basis for crediting the 

hearsay at each level.‖ Hennessy v. State, 660 S.W.2d 87, 91 (Tex. Crim. App. 1983); 

see also Gish v. State, 606 S.W.2d 883, 886 (Tex. Crim. App. 1980) (determining that 

observations reported to the affiant by other officers engaged in investigation can 
13

constitute reliable basis for issuing a warrant).

2. Analysis

Here, the magistrate could have determined from within the four corners of the 

affidavit that: (1) Detective Cruz had been a police officer for six years and had training 

in the law of search and seizure including the ―authoring of search warrants‖; (2) Torres 

lived with Sanchez in the home described in the search warrant; (3) a person called police 

and informed them that Sanchez had witnessed that Torres possessed child 

pornography; (4) a second person concerned with Sanchez‘s well-being called police; (5) 

the second person informed police that Sanchez said that she and Torres were in an 

altercation involving a knife; (6) the second person stated that Sanchez was ―frantic‖ 

when she told the second caller about the altercation; (7) the second person explained 

that the altercation occurred after Sanchez ―confronted‖ Torres about the child 

pornography; (8) Sanchez told both of the callers that she had observed child 

pornography on Torres‘s computer files and had found video tapes containing child 

pornography; and (9) the second person stated that since Sanchez told her about the 

altercation, Sanchez was not answering her phone. Furthermore, from the information 

provided in the affidavit, the magistrate could have reasonably inferred that: (1) Sanchez 

may have been in a dangerous situation; (2) the second person did not wish for her name 

to appear on the affidavit for fear of retribution; (3) the callers were citizens who were 

concerned with the safety and well-being of Sanchez; (4) both callers knew Sanchez; (5) 

the second caller was Sanchez‘s friend; (6) the second caller had some familiarity with 

Sanchez‘s affairs; (7) Sanchez had familiarity with Torres‘s affairs; and (8) the callers had 
14

some familiarity with Torres‘s affairs.

Although the affidavit in this case stated the callers were anonymous, it was 

reasonable for the magistrate to infer that these particular callers were concerned citizens 

performing their civic duty of reporting what they considered a potentially dangerous 

situation. Furthermore, at the suppression hearing, Detective Cruz testified that both 

callers were actually known to her and that although their names were not included in the 

affidavit, ―everything‖ had been explained to the magistrate concerning why the names 

were not included in the affidavit.

We conclude that, in this case, although the affidavit described the two callers as 

being anonymous, they were actually concerned citizens who could be held accountable 

for their actions.5 Accordingly, because both callers‘ identities were easily ascertainable, 

the callers‘ reports in this case exhibited ―heightened indicia of reliability.‖ See Mitchell v. 

State, 187 S.W.3d 113, 117-18 (Tex. App.–Waco 2006, pet. ref‘d); State v. Stolte, 991 

S.W.2d 336, 341 (Tex. App.–Fort Worth 1999, no pet.); see also Martinez v. State, 318 

S.W.3d 24, 28 (Tex. App.–San Antonio 2009, pet. granted) (explaining that a tipster is not 

considered anonymous if that person can be held accountable for the information 

provided and the information provided is ―inherently‖ reliable); Bilyeu v. State, 136 S.W.3d 

691, 696 (Tex. App.–Texarkana 2004, no pet.) (providing that the information provided by 

a person whose identity was easily ascertained was ―significantly more reliable than a 

 

5 Cf. Flores v. State, 287 S.W.3d 307, 312 (Tex. App.–Austin, 2009), aff’d, 319 S.W.3d 697, 703 

(Tex. Crim. App. 2010) (stating that information provided to the police by an anonymous informant ―must 

contain some indicia of reliability or be reasonably corroborated by the police before it can be used to justify 

a search. The information corroborated must provide a substantial basis for crediting the informer's 

hearsay; corroboration of details that are easily obtainable at the time the information is provided will not 

support a finding of probable cause‖).
15

simple anonymous telephone call‖).6 Therefore, because the reports to police were 

given by sources that exhibited heightened indicia of reliability, there was a substantial 

basis for the magistrate to conclude that a search would uncover evidence of wrongdoing, 

despite the double hearsay.

Giving great deference to the magistrate‘s determination, we conclude that under 

the totality of the circumstances, the magistrate had a substantial basis for concluding 

that probable cause existed to issue the search warrant. See Swearingen, 143 S.W.3d 

at 811; Walker, 140 S.W.3d at 765. Therefore, the trial court did not abuse its discretion 

by denying Torres‘s motion to suppress. We overrule Torres‘s second issue and the 

sub-issue in his first issue that addresses probable cause.

IV. CONCLUSION

We affirm the trial court‘s denial of Torres‘s motion to suppress.

NELDA V. RODRIGUEZ

Justice

Do not publish.

TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(b).

Delivered and filed the 27th

day of January, 2011.

 

6

But see Elardo v. State, 163 S.W.3d 760, 771-72 (Tex. App.–Texarkana 2005, pet. ref'd)

(concluding that even if the magistrate could infer that the anonymous tipster was a family member or

friend, there were insufficient facts to find that the tipster was merely a private citizen who could be held 

accountable for his report).