United States Court of Appeals

for the Fifth Circuit ____________

No. 24-10432

____________

Palo Pinto County Conservatives; Grass Roots Mineral 

Wells PAC; Johanna Miller, 

Plaintiffs—Appellants, 

versus

Shane Long, in his official capacity as Palo Pinto County Judge; 

Gary Glover, in his official capacity as Palo Pinto County commissioner; 

Mike Reed, in his official capacity as Palo Pinto County commissioner; 

Jeff Fryer, in his official capacity as Palo Pinto County commissioner; 

Jim Pollock, in his official capacity as Palo Pinto County commissioner, 

Defendants—Appellees. 

______________________________

Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the Northern District of Texas

USDC No. 4:24-CV-328

______________________________

Before Haynes,† Willett, and Oldham, Circuit Judges.

Per Curiam:*

_____________________

† Judge Haynes concurs in this opinion except for § III(A)(ii) and the related 

part of the judgment. Her partial dissent is included at footnote four. 

* This opinion is not designated for publication. See 5th Cir. R. 47.5.

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

FILED

August 15, 2024

Lyle W. Cayce

Clerk

Case: 24-10432 Document: 86-1 Page: 1 Date Filed: 08/15/2024
No. 24-10432

2

In April 2024, the Palo Pinto County Commissioners Court enacted a 

set of electioneering regulations (“Regulations”) that restrict where, when, 

and how people are permitted to electioneer on Palo Pinto County property. 

Two local grassroots organizations and one citizen subsequently sued, 

claiming the Regulations violate the First Amendment. The district court 

denied the plaintiffs’ motion for a preliminary injunction. For the reasons 

herein, we VACATE the district court’s order, GRANT a preliminary 

injunction of the Regulations in their entirety, and REMAND for further 

proceedings consistent with this opinion. 

I. Background

The Palo Pinto County Annex (“Annex”) is the main early voting and 

election day polling location in Palo Pinto County, Texas. The Annex is a 

square building with a small parking lot on its east side, a larger parking lot 

divided into thirds on its west side, and grassy areas on its north and south 

sides. A public street separates the western parking lot from the Annex. The 

property surrounding the Annex (hereinafter, “Annex Property”) also 

includes several sidewalks. In addition to serving as a polling location, the 

Annex houses a number of county offices. 

Primary elections took place in Texas on March 5, 2024. In Palo Pinto 

County, the ballot included a race for State Representative between 

incumbent Glenn Rogers and challenger Mike Olcott. A larger-than-normal 

crowd gathered in the parking lot of the Annex. The crowd included some 

members of the Palo Pinto County Conservatives—a grassroots organization 

of conservative citizens—who waved signs and approached voters to 

encourage them to vote for Olcott. According to Johanna Miller, who leads 

the Palo Pinto County Conservatives, the group was peaceful and complied 

with state regulations regarding electioneering near polling places. 

Nevertheless, according to Palo Pinto County Judge Shane Long, some 

Case: 24-10432 Document: 86-1 Page: 2 Date Filed: 08/15/2024
No. 24-10432

3

voters expressed frustration about having to pass through the crowd to reach 

the polling location. Judge Long also reported that at least one disabled 

citizen did not vote because he did not know if he could pass through the 

parking lot into the building. At one point, the police responded to a call for 

service at the Annex parking lot because of electioneering problems, although 

the details of that incident are not clear. 

Approximately one month later, the Commissioners Court in Palo 

Pinto County enacted a set of “Electioneering Regulations” to “govern the 

time, place, and manner of electioneering within [c]ounty-owned property.” 

The Regulations include several sections and subsections. The first section

establishes the purpose and scope of the Regulations. The second section

includes six subsections restricting where, when, and how “political signs” 

may be placed at the Annex, as well as limiting the size of such signs. See 

Regulations §§ 2(a)–(f). The last subsection in § 2 provides for the 

confiscation and recovery of any political signs violating the Regulations. Id.

§ 2(g). The third section of the Regulations establishes a “Designated Area 

for Electioneering” covering two portions of the west parking lot, as depicted 

in the following image appended to the Regulations:

Case: 24-10432 Document: 86-1 Page: 3 Date Filed: 08/15/2024
No. 24-10432

4

The second and third subsections in § 3 specifically prohibit “loiter[ing] or 

electioneer[ing] on sidewalks or driveways” outside of that area and 

“post[ing] or plac[ing] political signs in public easements or rights-of-way,” 

respectively. Id. §§ 3(b)–(c). The fourth section makes violating the 

Regulations a Class “C” Misdemeanor. 

Shortly thereafter, Palo Pinto County Conservatives, Miller, and 

Grass Roots Mineral Wells PAC (“Plaintiffs”) sued the members of the Palo 

Pinto County Commissioners Court (“County”), claiming the Regulations 

violate the First Amendment and seeking declaratory and injunctive relief. 

Plaintiffs filed a Motion for a Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary 

Injunction. The district court denied the temporary restraining order. After 

holding a preliminary injunction hearing, the district court also denied the 

preliminary injunction and later entered a memorandum opinion and order 

explaining the denial. Plaintiffs timely appealed the denial of the preliminary 

injunction. Plaintiffs also filed an Emergency Motion for Injunction Pending 

Appeal, which we granted in part and denied in part. 

II. Jurisdiction & Standard of Review

The district court had jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331. We 

have jurisdiction over the denial of Plaintiffs’ motion for a preliminary 

injunction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1). 

We review a district court’s denial of a preliminary injunction for an 

abuse of discretion. Women’s Med. Ctr. of Nw. Hous. v. Bell, 248 F.3d 411, 

418–19 (5th Cir. 2001). “As to each element of the district court’s

preliminary-injunction analysis, the district court’s findings of fact are 

subject to a clearly-erroneous standard of review, while conclusions of law 

are subject to broad review and will be reversed if incorrect.” Janvey v. 

Alguire, 647 F.3d 585, 592 (5th Cir. 2011) (internal quotation marks and 

citation omitted). 

Case: 24-10432 Document: 86-1 Page: 4 Date Filed: 08/15/2024
No. 24-10432

5

III. Discussion

To be entitled to a preliminary injunction, Plaintiffs must show:

(1) a substantial likelihood that they will prevail on the merits; 

(2) a substantial threat that they will suffer irreparable injury if 

the injunction is not granted; (3) their substantial injury 

outweighs the threatened harm to the party to be enjoined; and 

(4) granting the preliminary injunction will not disserve the 

public interest. 

Voting for Am., Inc. v. Steen, 732 F.3d 382, 386 (5th Cir. 2013) (quotation 

omitted). Factors three and four “merge when the Government is the 

opposing party.” See Nken v. Holder, 556 U.S. 418, 435 (2009). 

A. Likelihood of Success on the Merits

Electioneering laws present a “particularly difficult reconciliation: the 

accommodation of the right to engage in political discourse with the right to 

vote.” Minn.Voters All. v. Mansky, 585 U.S. 1, 23 (2018) (quotation omitted). 

Here, the question is whether Plaintiffs are likely to succeed in showing that 

the County’s attempt to balance these two interests on its own property 

violates the First Amendment. 

The Regulations include nine subsections restricting speech in the 

form of “political signs” or “electioneering.” See Regulations §§ 2(a)–(f), 

3(a)–(c). The Regulations are therefore content based, as both parties agree. 

See Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191, 197–98 (1992) (plurality opinion)

(stating a statute restricting political speech near polling places was facially 

content based). But the Regulations are also viewpoint neutral because they 

“make[] no distinction based on the speaker’s political persuasion.” See 

Mansky, 585 U.S. at 13. On their face, the Regulations apply only to property 

owned by Palo Pinto County. See Regulations § 1(b). 

Case: 24-10432 Document: 86-1 Page: 5 Date Filed: 08/15/2024
No. 24-10432

6

The Supreme Court has adopted a “forum analysis” to “evaluate 

[whether] government restrictions on purely private speech that occurs on 

government property” violate the First Amendment. Walker v. Tex. Div., 

Sons of Confederate Veterans, Inc., 576 U.S. 200, 215 (2015). The parties 

disagree about what forum classification—and thus, what level of scrutiny—

applies here. According to Plaintiffs, the Annex Property is a traditional or 

designated public forum, so any content-based regulations “must be 

narrowly drawn to effectuate a compelling state interest.” See Perry Educ. 

Ass’n v. Perry Loc. Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 45–46 (1983). But the 

County argues that the Annex Property is a nonpublic or limited public 

forum, meaning the Regulations are constitutional as long as they are 

“(1) reasonable in light of the purpose served by the forum and (2) do[] not 

discriminate against speech on the basis of viewpoint.” See Freedom From 

Religion Found., Inc. v. Abbott, 955 F.3d 417, 426–27 (5th Cir. 2020). We need 

not settle that dispute today.

For the reasons below, Plaintiffs are likely to succeed in showing that 

all of the Regulations are unreasonable. Because the Regulations cannot meet 

the lower standard of reasonableness, they also fail the higher bar of strict 

scrutiny. Accordingly, we conclude the Regulations fail constitutional 

muster regardless of the forum classification. 

i. Regulations §§ 2(a), 2(c), 2(e), 2(f), and 3(c)

“The reasonableness of the Government’s restriction of access to a 

nonpublic forum must be assessed in the light of the purpose of the forum 

and all the surrounding circumstances.” Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & 

Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 809 (1985). In Mansky, the Supreme Court 

assessed the reasonableness of a state’s ban on political apparel in a nonpublic 

forum under a two-prong inquiry: (1) whether the state was “pursuing a 

permissible objective,” and (2) whether the state could “articulate some

Case: 24-10432 Document: 86-1 Page: 6 Date Filed: 08/15/2024
No. 24-10432

7

sensible basis for distinguishing what may come in from what must stay out.” 

585 U.S. at 13, 16. 

According to the County, the Regulations’ purpose is to “provide 

voters access to the polling location, free from undue harassment and undue 

influence.” That is a permissible objective for the County to pursue. See 

Burson, 504 U.S. at 199 (“[A] State has a compelling interest in protecting 

voters from confusion and undue influence.”); Mansky, 585 U.S. at 13–16 

(concluding the state’s wish to set aside a polling place as “an island of calm 

in which voters can peacefully contemplate their choices” was a permissible 

objective). Nonetheless, the use of the word “political” in §§ 2(a), 2(c), 

2(e), 2(f), and 3(c)—without definition or limiting principle—ultimately 

renders those sections unreasonable and thus unconstitutional. 

In Mansky, the Minnesota statute at issue prohibited “wearing a 

‘political badge, political button, or other political insignia’” but did not 

define the term “political.” 585 U.S. at 17. The Court noted that “the word 

[political] can be expansive” and expressed concern about the lack of a 

limiting principle. Id. Ultimately, the Court concluded that the statute was 

unreasonable on that basis and thus violated the First Amendment even in a 

nonpublic forum. Id. at 22. 

After Mansky, we upheld portions of the Texas Election Code that 

prohibit posting political signs within 100 feet of a door to a polling place, see 

Tex. Elec. Code §§ 61.003, 85.036, and wearing political apparel in a 

polling place, see id. § 61.010. Ostrewich v. Tatum, 72 F.4th 94, 107 (5th Cir. 

2023), cert. denied, 144 S. Ct. 570 (2024) (mem.). Contrary to the 

“unmoored use of the term ‘political’” in Minnesota’s unconstitutional law, 

see Mansky, 585 U.S. at 16, the Texas Election Code specifies that prohibited 

political signs include only those that are “for or against any candidate, 

measure, or political party.” Ostrewich, 72 F.4th at 106 (quoting Tex. Elec. 

Case: 24-10432 Document: 86-1 Page: 7 Date Filed: 08/15/2024
No. 24-10432

8

Code §§ 61.003, 85.036). We concluded that this specification “cabined 

[the prohibition] by a limiting principle that meets Mansky’s standard.” Id. 

Similarly, Texas’s political apparel ban “only prohibits Texans from wearing 

apparel related to a candidate, measure, or political party ʻappearing on the 

ballot,’ thereby remedying the Mansky Court’s concerns about overbroad or 

vague electioneering restrictions.” Id. at 105 (quoting Tex. Elec. Code

§ 61.010); cf. Mansky, 585 U.S. at 22 (stating that the Texas statute at issue 

in Ostrewich “proscrib[ed] displays (including apparel) in more lucid terms” 

than the statute at issue in Mansky). These additional specifications in the 

Texas Election Code draw the requisite line between permitted and 

prohibited political content that was lacking in Mansky. See Ostrewich, 72 

F.4th at 105–07. 

Here, the Regulations do not define the term “political.” Nor has the 

County provided any definition or limiting principle. Cf. Mansky, 585 U.S. 

at 17 (stating the Court will consider “a State’s authoritative constructions 

in interpreting a state law” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)). 

Indeed, when asked at the preliminary injunction hearing whether a 

hypothetical sign would be prohibited, Judge Long responded: “I don’t know 

what someone might think about that. I can’t answer that question, what 

would be in someone’s mind, whether they would know they could or 

couldn’t.” Although Judge Long ultimately concluded that the sign was 

likely permissible, his own struggle articulating where to draw the line 

exemplifies the problem with the Regulations’ ambiguous use of the term 

“political.” Mansky requires more for a regulation to be reasonable. See id.

at 16–22. 

Case: 24-10432 Document: 86-1 Page: 8 Date Filed: 08/15/2024
No. 24-10432

9

The County generally asserts that it intended the Regulations to be 

consistent with the Texas Election Code,1 but that does not remedy the 

problem. As a preliminary matter, the Texas Election Code’s restrictions on 

political signs only apply “within 100 feet of an outside door through which 

a voter may enter the building in which a polling place is located.” Tex. 

Elec. Code § 61.003(a); see also id. § 85.036(a) (nearly identical quote). 

The state statutes are thus much more circumscribed than the Regulations, 

which extend to all corners of the Annex Property and cover multiple parking 

lots, sidewalks, and grassy areas. In other words, significantly more political 

speech is suppressed under the Regulations than under state law. We 

concluded in Ostrewich that Texas’s restrictions on political signs in the 100-

foot buffer zone struck a constitutional balance between “the right to engage 

in political discourse [and] the right to vote.” See 72 F.4th at 103, 107 

(quoting Mansky, 585 U.S. at 23). But we are concerned that the Regulations’ 

extension of similar restrictions to a much larger area disrupts that careful 

balance. 

Moreover, the fact that both the Regulations and the Texas Election 

Code use the term “political” does not help the County—in fact, contrasting 

the state statute with the Regulations exposes the Regulations’ constitutional 

infirmity. Unlike the statutes upheld in Ostrewich, the Regulations do not 

include any language limiting “political” signs to only those related to issues 

“appearing on the ballot” or “for or against any candidate, measure, or 

_____________________

1 For example, at the preliminary injunction hearing, Judge Long was asked, “Did 

Palo Pinto County intend the references to posting political signs in these regulations to be 

consistent with the Texas Election Code?” to which he answered, “Yes.” Similarly, when 

asked to define the word “political” at oral argument, counsel for the County stated, inter 

alia, “At some point, you just got to use the words that everybody’s using. . . . We’re just 

using the words that the statute that’s been deemed constitutional contains.” Oral Arg. at 

35:27-37. 

Case: 24-10432 Document: 86-1 Page: 9 Date Filed: 08/15/2024
No. 24-10432

10

political party.” Cf. 72 F.4th at 105–06 (quotations omitted). Moreover, the 

County apparently knew how to reference definitional language in state 

statutes: § 2(a) of the Regulations refers to “the voting period of a particular 

election, as defined in Section 61.003 (b)(2) of the Texas Elections Code” 

(emphasis added). Yet the Regulations do not similarly refer to any statutory 

definition of “political.”2 

The Regulations thus restrict a substantial amount of speech beyond 

the 100-foot zone, and they do not provide any limiting principle regarding 

the prohibited “political” activity. Without such specification, the County 

has failed to articulate any sensible basis for what signs are restricted under 

§§ 2(a), 2(c), 2(e), 2(f), and 3(c). See Mansky, 585 U.S. at 22. Accordingly, 

Plaintiffs are likely to succeed in showing those subsections violate the First 

Amendment regardless of the forum in which they apply.3

_____________________

2 The last sentence in § 2(a) states that “[a]ll political signs shall comply with all 

state and federal requirements, including Texas Election Code, Chapters 255 and 259 and 

Section 61.003.” But this broad compliance statement cannot serve to define an otherwise 

undefined category of speech, particularly given the numerous and varying definitions of 

“political” in state and federal law. Unlike the sentence in § 2(a) that adopts a specified 

statutory definition of “voting period,” nothing in the Regulations tells a potential speaker 

that the Regulations only limit signs “for or against any candidate, measure, or political 

party.” See Tex. Elec. Code §§ 61.003(a)(2), (b)(1). Importantly, the County itself 

does not seem to believe the Regulations’ restrictions on “political signs” are limited to 

the definition in § 61.003: at oral argument, counsel for the County said “common sense” 

dictates that the word political is defined as “the issues that are being addressed and 

decided . . . within the confines of that election period,” Oral Arg. at 27:18-25, but that 

definition is both narrower and broader than the definition in § 61.003. Thus, the general 

compliance statement in § 2(a) of the Regulations does not provide any limiting principle 

for the term “political.” 

3 Although not cited at all in the County’s brief, our decision in Schirmer v. 

Edwards, 2 F.3d 117 (5th Cir. 1993), served as a lodestar for the County at oral argument. 

That reliance was misplaced. Schirmer was a context-specific assessment under which a 

more narrowly tailored statute had previously failed to achieve the state’s compelling 

interest. 2 F.3d at 122 (rejecting “the application of the exit-polling cases [in which smaller 

Case: 24-10432 Document: 86-1 Page: 10 Date Filed: 08/15/2024
No. 24-10432

11

ii. Regulations §§ 2(b) and 2(d)

Two subsections of the Regulations implicate additional compelling 

government interests, and thus we address them separately.

First, § 2(b) prohibits posting “political signs using posts that may 

damage subterranean water and electrical lines.” Judge Long testified at the 

preliminary injunction hearing that there is no sprinkler system in the parking 

lot area of the Annex Property, but there are electrical lines. According to 

Judge Long’s testimony, “the intent [of § 2(b)] was to not damage county 

property,” which is a reasonable and permissive objective. See, e.g., Boardley 

v. U.S. Dep’t of Interior, 615 F.3d 508, 519 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (endorsing 

undisputed argument that protecting national park property from damage 

was a substantial government interest). 

Second, § 2(d) prohibits posting “a political sign in any location that 

obstructs vision for traffic entering, exiting, or driving in, on or around” the 

Annex Property, which furthers the County’s legitimate interest in 

eliminating potential safety hazards. See City of Cincinnati v. Discovery 

Network, Inc., 507 U.S. 410, 416 (1993) (stating the city had a legitimate 

interest in maintaining the safety of its streets and sidewalks). 

But again, the problem for the County is the use of the word 

“political”—without any definition or limiting principle—to identify the 

activity prohibited by these subsections. Under Mansky’s two-prong test, 

_____________________

restrictions around polling areas were invalidated] to the present context because the 

underlying state interests differ in each case”). More important, however, is the Supreme 

Court’s intervening decision in Mansky, which explicitly requires something more than an 

“unmoored use of the term ‘political’” to define prohibited speech. 585 U.S. at 16. To 

the extent that Schirmer states otherwise, we are bound to follow Mansky. See Campos v. 

United States, 888 F.3d 724, 737–38 (5th Cir. 2018) (“[U]nder this Circuit’s rule of 

orderliness, a prior opinion remains binding except to the extent of the Supreme Court’s 

change in the law.”).

Case: 24-10432 Document: 86-1 Page: 11 Date Filed: 08/15/2024
No. 24-10432

12

that failure “to articulate some sensible basis for distinguishing what may 

come in from what must stay out” is fatal regardless of the admirable 

government objectives that may underly the prohibitions. See 585 U.S. at 13–

22 (concluding Minnesota had a permissible objective underlying the statute, 

but the statue was nevertheless unreasonable because of its “unmoored use 

of the term ‘political’”). Moreover, a non-political sign can cause the same 

safety issues or property damage as a political sign, yet Judge Long testified 

that the County does not currently regulate non-political signs on County 

property. The Regulations’ content-based distinction is thus not a rational 

way to pursue objectives related to safety and preventing property damage. 

Accordingly, we conclude that Plaintiffs are likely to succeed in showing that 

§§ 2(b) and 2(d) also fail the reasonableness inquiry.4

iii. Regulations §§ 3(a) and 3(b)

Two subsections of the Regulations restrict “electioneering” but do 

not use the term “political” at all: § 3(a) creates a “Designated 

Electioneering Area for electioneering,” and § 3(b) prohibits “loiter[ing] or 

electioneer[ing] on sidewalks or driveways and interfer[ing] with citizen 

access to polling locations” outside of the Designated Electioneering Area. 

Like the rest of the Regulations, these subsections pursue the permissible 

objective of protecting voters from undue influence. See Burson, 504 U.S. at 

199. The reasonableness inquiry thus turns on whether the restrictions on 

_____________________

4 Judge Haynes: I would not grant the injunction on these two subsections because 

they directly address true safety issues. While the majority opinion notes that using the 

word “political” is a problem, because it concludes that term is broad, I think these 

subsections of the regulation are properly focused on safety such that the injunction should 

not be granted.

Case: 24-10432 Document: 86-1 Page: 12 Date Filed: 08/15/2024
No. 24-10432

13

“electioneering” are “cabined by a limiting principle that meets Mansky’s 

standard.” See Ostrewich, 72 F.4th at 106.

We conclude they are not. The Regulations do not define the term 

“electioneering,” nor do they refer to any statutory definition of 

“electioneering.” At the preliminary injunction hearing, Judge Long 

testified that he could not provide a “legal definition” of electioneering. He 

later testified that he would “defer to the Texas Election Code for a 

definition of electioneering.” As we discussed in Ostrewich, the Texas 

Election Code’s restrictions on electioneering “prohibit people from 

deploying political signs or literature ‘for or against any candidate, measure, 

or political party.’” Id. (emphasis added) (quoting Tex. Elec. Code

§ 85.036). But, contrary to that statutory definition, Judge Long testified that 

the Regulations criminalize distributing outside of the Designated Area for 

Electioneering a nonpartisan pamphlet that only provides information about 

candidates without taking any position on their candidacy. 

As the Supreme Court has repeatedly stated, “[p]erfect clarity and 

precise guidance have never been required even of regulations that restrict 

expressive activity.” Mansky, 585 U.S. at 21 (quoting Ward v. Rock Against 

Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 794 (1989)). But the Regulations provide no definition 

of “electioneering” at all, and the County’s vague and contradictory 

explications only add to the confusion. That is particularly alarming “when

the whole point of the exercise is to prohibit the expression of political 

views.” Id. Plaintiffs are thus likely to succeed in showing that §§ 3(a) and 

3(b) are unreasonable. 

* * *

The Regulations are unreasonable because of their vague use of the 

terms “political” and “electioneering” without definition or limiting 

principle. See id. at 22. This lack of clarity is even more concerning given 

Case: 24-10432 Document: 86-1 Page: 13 Date Filed: 08/15/2024
No. 24-10432

14

that violating the Regulations is a criminal offense. See, e.g., Reno v. ACLU, 

521 U.S. 844, 872 (1997) (stating that the “increased deterrent effect [of 

criminal sanctions], coupled with the risk of discriminatory enforcement of 

vague regulations, pose[d] greater First Amendment concerns than those 

implicated by [a previously reviewed] civil regulation” (internal quotation 

marks omitted)). Moreover, we are concerned about the Regulations’ scope, 

which extends far beyond Texas’s 100-foot electioneering-free zone upheld 

in Ostrewich. See 72 F.4th at 98, 107. 

We thus conclude that all of the Regulations restricting speech in the 

form of “political signs” or “electioneering” violate the First Amendment. 

See Regulations §§ 2(a)–(f), 3(a)–(c).5

 Because the other portions of the 

Regulations serve only to implement or enforce those restrictions on speech,6

Plaintiffs have demonstrated a substantial likelihood of success in showing 

that the Regulations are invalid in their entirety. See Alaska Airlines, Inc. v. 

Brock, 480 U.S. 678, 684 (1987) (stating that severance is inappropriate 

where the remainder of the law “is incapable of functioning independently”). 

_____________________

5 We express no opinion regarding whether the Regulations would survive 

constitutional scrutiny if the County revised them to add further specification regarding 

the definition of “political” or “electioneering.” Even with those additions, there may still 

be questions regarding the Regulations’ constitutionality, particularly because the 

Regulations are much farther reaching than the Texas Election Code’s restrictions on 

electioneering within the 100-foot zone. However, the question before us is only whether 

Plaintiffs are likely to succeed in showing that the Regulations—as currently written—

violate the First Amendment. We conclude that the Regulations are likely unconstitutional 

for the reasons herein.

6 Specifically, § 2(g) is only an enforcement mechanism allowing the County to 

remove “political sign[s] in violation of” the Regulations and thus does not appear to 

impose any independent restrictions on speech. Similarly, § 4 serves only to establish 

criminal liability for a violation of the Regulations. Those provisions, along with § 1 

(regarding the purpose and scope of the Regulations) and § 5 (regarding the effective date), 

are purposeless without §§ 2(a)–(f) and 3(a)–(c).

Case: 24-10432 Document: 86-1 Page: 14 Date Filed: 08/15/2024
No. 24-10432

15

B. Threat of Irreparable Injury to Plaintiffs

“The loss of First Amendment freedoms, for even minimal periods of 

time, unquestionably constitutes irreparable injury.” Roman Cath. Diocese of 

Brooklyn v. Cuomo, 592 U.S. 14, 19 (2020) (per curiam) (quoting Elrod v. 

Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 373 (1976) (plurality opinion)). Accordingly, we have 

previously concluded that a plaintiff satisfies the “substantial threat of 

irreparable injury” prong simply by showing that the challenged statute 

“represents a substantial threat to his First Amendment rights.” See 

Ingebretsen ex rel. Ingebretsen v. Jackson Pub. Sch. Dist., 88 F.3d 274, 280 (5th 

Cir. 1996). As detailed in the previous section, Plaintiffs have made such a 

showing here, and thus this factor weighs in their favor. 

C. Harm to Government and Disservice to Public Interest

The County does not assert any threatened harm it will face as a result 

of a preliminary injunction in this case. On the contrary, we have stated that 

“injunctions protecting First Amendment freedoms are always in the public 

interest.” Texans for Free Enter. v. Tex. Ethics Comm’n, 732 F.3d 535, 539 (5th 

Cir. 2013) (quotation omitted). The third and fourth factors therefore favor 

granting Plaintiffs’ requested preliminary injunction. 

IV. Conclusion

For the reasons herein, we conclude that the district court erred in 

denying Plaintiffs’ motion for a preliminary injunction. We thus VACATE

the district court’s judgment and order, GRANT a preliminary injunction 

of the Regulations in their entirety, and REMAND for further proceedings 

consistent with this opinion. 

Case: 24-10432 Document: 86-1 Page: 15 Date Filed: 08/15/2024