### IN THE COURT OF CRIMI NAL AP PEALS OF TENNES SEE AT JAC KSON Marc h 1, 200 5 S es sio n
STATE OF TENNESS EE v . ALLEN J EAN STEPH ENS

Direc t Appeal from the Circ uit Court for Weakley County No. CR 125- 2003 William B. Acr ee, Jr ., Judge

No. M2004- 00531-CCA -R3-C D - F iled Jun e 23, 2005

Following a jury

trial, Def en d an t , Al len J ean Stephe ns, was convic ted of one count of possession of more than .5 g rams of coca ine wit h intent to sell, a Class B fe lony , and one c ount of possession
o f d ru g p ar ap h e r n a l i a , a

C l a s s A m i s d e m e a n o r
. T h e t r i a l c o u rt s e n t e n c e d D e f e n d a n t a s a R a n g e III , pe rs ist e nt of

fe nd e r, to tw e nty -thr e e y e ars fo r the fe lon y dr ug c on vic tio n, a nde le ve n mo nth s, tw e nty nine day s for his misdemeanor conviction. The tria l court o rd ere d Def endant’ s sentence s to run c on c ur re ntl y , f or a n e ff e c tiv e se nte nc e of tw e nty -thr e e y e ars
. De fe nd a nt do e s no t app e a l the le ng th of his sentenc es or the sufficie ncy of the convicting evidenc e. De fenda nt arg ues howe ver, tha t the t r i a l c o u r t e rr e d i n d e n y i n g D e f e n d a n t ’ s m o t i o n t o s u p p r e s s t h e c r a c k c o c a i n e f o u n d a t hi s h ou se du ri ng the e xec uti on of

a se arc h w arr a nt; a ndthat th e tr ia l c ou rt e rr e d in ru lin g a dmi ssi ble c e rt a in evidenc e about a

prior sale of cr ack c ocaine , an off ense f or which D efe nd an t wa s n ot char g ed. F oll ow ing a

re vie w o f the re c or d, we a ff ir m th e jud g me nts of

the tr ia l c ou rt

. Tenn. R. App . P . 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgme nts of

the Circ uit Court Aff

irm ed

T H O M A S T. W O O D A LL , J ., delivere d the opinion of the court, in which J A M ES C UR WO OD W I TT , J R ., a ndJ.C. M C L IN , J J ., joined.

J. Col in M or

ri s, Jac ks on , T e nn e sse e , f or the app e lla nt, Al le n Jea n St e ph e ns
. Paul G. Summers, Attorney Gene ral and Reporter ; B rent C. Cherry , Assistant Attorney Gene ral; and Thomas A. Thomas, District Attorne y Gene ral, for

the appe llee, the State of Tenne ssee.
OP IN ION

I. Bac kgr ound

L ieutenant Sammy

L iles with the Martin P o l i ce De partment met with De Andre Butler , a c on fi de nti a l in fo rm a nt, aro un d n oo n o n July 11 , 20 03 . Lie ute na nt Lile s se arc he d M r. B utl e r a ndhis
ve hic le , f ur nis he d h im a wi re le ss tr a ns mit te r, a nd g a ve him $2 00 .0 0 ma

rk e d mo ne y

wi th w hic h to-2-

purcha se coc aine f

rom Def endant. Lieutenant Liles followed Mr. B utler as he drove to De fenda nt’s house. Mr. B utler exited his vehicle and knocked on Def endant’ s front door. Mr . Butler completed the purcha se transa ction, and he a nd L ieutenant Liles drove ba ck to their mee ting plac e. Lieutenant L iles sear ched Mr. Butler and his ve hicle, and Mr. Butler g ave L ieutenant L iles the coca ine he ha d pu rc ha se d f

ro m D e fe nd a nt.

L ieutenant L iles secur ed a sear ch war rant for Def

endant’ s person and his reside nce ba sed on the drug sale to Mr. Butler

. He and other poli ce office rs arrived at De fenda nt’s house ar ound 5:20 p.m. on J uly 11, 2003. Def endant was standing in the front y ard when t he officer s arrived. A sea rch of De f e n d an t’ s p e r s o nr e v e aled a pproxi mately

$750.00 in Defe ndant’s bac k pocket. Lieutenant Liles
c on fi rm e d tha t a por tio n of the c a sh ($ 15 0. 00 ) w a s a pa rt of the mark e d b ill s th a t ha d b e e n g ive n to Mr. B utler to purcha se drug s from De fenda nt. I nside Def endant’ s house, L ieutenant Liles found 1.5 g rams of c ocaine , approximately $1,300.00 in the po cket of one of De fenda nt’s shirts, and three small bag g ies similar to those used to packa g e drug s for sale

. On c ro ss- e xami na tio n, L ie ute na nt Lile s sai d tha t Mr. B utl e r wa s sen t to pu rc ha se a n “ 8- ba ll” of coc aine f

rom De fenda nt, an amount which g ener ally weig hs in ex cess of

three g rams, or approximately

one-e ighth of

one ounce
. Pa tty Cho a ti e, a

fo re ns ic sc ie nti st w ith the Te nn e sse e B ur e a u o f Inv e sti g a tio n’ s c ri me labora tory , testified that the substance which Mr. B utler purc hased fr o m Def endant wa s cra ck
coca ine and we ighe d 1.6 g rams. Ms. Choatie conf irmed t h at t h e s ubstance found in Def endant’ s ho us e wa s a lso c ra c k c oc a ine a ndwe ig he d 1 .5 g ra ms.
II. M ot ion to Suppr e ss
Def endant a rg ues that the sea

rch w arr ant which led to the discovery of drug s in his house was invalid because t h e af

fidavit supporting issuance of the war rant c ontained fa lse and misleading statements. I n Sta te v . Li ttl e , 5 60 S.W. 2d40 3 ( Te nn . 1 97 8) , o ur Sup re me Cou rt

he ld tha t:
there are two circ umstances that authorize the impeac hment of an a ffidavit suff icient
on its fa ce, (1) a false statement made with intent to de ceive the Co u rt , wh ether
ma te ri a l or

imm a te ri a l to th e is su e of pr ob able c a us e , a nd(2 ) a fa lse state me nt, essential to the establishment of probable cause, recklessly made. Recklessne ss may be e sta bli sh e d b y

sh ow ing that a

state me nt wa s f

a lse wh e n ma de a ndthat a ff ia nt d id not have r easona

ble g rounds for be lieving it at the time.

Id . at 407.

I n his affida vit, L ieutenant Liles stated:

The informant has provided information t o aff iant which has be en cor

robora ted and led to th e arr e s t a n d c o n v ic ti o n o f in d iv id u a ls in v o lv e d in c r im in a l a c ti v it y . The-3-

c o n f i d e n t i a l i n f

o r m a n t [ i s ] k n o w n t o a f

f i a n t t o h a v e m a d e a

p u r c h a s e o f

S c h e d u l e II
cra ck coc aine f

rom [Defenda nt’s residenc e] from [Defenda nt] within the past 72 hours. The a ffiant se arc hed the informant befor e an d af t er the transa ction. The transac tion was monitored via wire less transmitter. As the basis of his knowledg e, Lieutenant Liles stated that “said informant has been in the
sa id re sid e nc e (5 37 No rth M c Combs ) a ndwi tne sse d th e po sse ssi on of a nddis tr ibu tio n o f S c he du le Two controlled substanc e (c rac k coca ine) within the past 72 hours.” At the hearing on his moti on to suppress, Def endant a rg ued that Mr. B utler did not g o inside Def end an t ’s h o u se whe n he boug ht the drug s. L ieutenant Liles testified at the he aring that Mr. B utl e r “s te pp e d into the do or way ” of De fe nd a nt’ s hou se to make the pu rc ha se . L ie ute na nt L ile s sa id that he believe d that when Mr. B utler “w ent into th e d o orway , he wa s inside the residenc e.” H e conce ded, howe ver, tha t he did not see Mr. B utler g o any further inside the house.

At the conc lusion of the hearing, the trial court found that the phrase “in the said re sidence ” was not misleading beca

use the a ffidavit did not state that the informant saw an y d ru gs i n side of Def endant’ s house ot her than what the informant bought. The trial court denied D efe ndant’s motion t o s u p p re s s s t at i n g:
The Court is satisfied that the sea rch w arran t is in accor dance with the law. The re is sufficient basis of knowledg e, and also sufficie nt description of the ve rac ity of the informant to satisfy

the re quirements of t he law. Furthermor e, the Court is of the opinion that it does not make any differ ence whether or not the buy described in the
wa rr a nt was ma de a t th e do or of the ho us e or

ins ide of the do or . I

do n’ t se e that it
make s a ny

dif fe re nc e . I

thi nk that th e fact it wa s ma de a t [De fe nd a nt’ s] ho us e is sufficie nt, a nd I think it could be inter prete d if one is at the f

ront, he is in the house.

The trial c ourt’s denia l of Def endant’ s motion to s uppress will be uphe ld unless the evidenc e preponde rate s ag ainst the trial court’s finding s. S ta te v
. Odom , 9 28 S.W .2d 18, 23 (Tenn. 1996)

. The a pplication of the law to the fac ts found by the trial court, howeve r, is a question of law which thi s c ou rt re vie ws de novo

. State v. Crutcher , 989 S.W .2d 295, 299 (Tenn. 1999)

. Under both the fede ral a nd Tenne ssee c onstitut ions, “no war rant is to be issued except upon probable cause .” Sta te v . No rri s , 47 S.W .3d 457, 469 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2000) (citations omitted). “A showing of proba

ble cause re quires, g ener ally , rea sonable g rounds for suspicion, supporte d by circ umstances i n d i cative of an illeg al ac t.” State v. Stev ens , 989 S.W .2d 290, 293 (Tenn. 1999)

. “[A] findi ng of proba

ble cause supporting issuance of a sea rch w arr ant must be based upon e vidence included in a writt en and sworn affida vit.” State v. He nning , 975 S.W .2d 290, 294 (Tenn. 1998)

. To establish probable cause , “an aff idavit must set forth fac ts f rom which a rea sonable c onclusion may be drawn that the c ontraba nd will be found in the plac e to be se arc hed pursua nt to the warr ant.” Nor ris , 4 7 S. W. 3 d a t 4 7 0

. A s e ar c h w arr a n t w il l b e r e n d e r e d in v a li d , a n d th e s u b s e quent sea rch illega l, if the sear ch wa

rra nt “was issued upon e vidence consisting in materi al part of w illful or-4-

rec kless misrepre sentations of the ap p l i ca n t to the issuing mag istrate, re sulting in a fr audulent procur ement.” T enn. R. Crim. P. 41(f)(3).

Wit h these princ iples in mind, we find that the evidenc e does not preponde rate ag ainst the trial court’ s finding that L ieutenant Liles’ af fid av i t contained suf

ficient proba

ble cause to support the issuance of a sear ch war rant. When the source of information for an aff idavi t establishing probable cause for a sear ch warra nt is a criminal informant, we must use the two- prong ed Ag uil ar
Sp ine lli test adopted by

the Tenne ssee Supre me Court in Sta te v . J ac um in , 7 78 S.W .2d 430, 436 (Tenn. 1989). Under this test, the aff idavit must demonstrate (1) a basis for t h e i n fo rm ant’s knowledg e, and ( 2) a ba sis establishing the informant’s cr ed i b i lityor a ba sis establishing that the informant’s information is reliable. State v. Y eomans , 10 S.W .3d 293, 296 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1999) (citations omitted).

The a ffidavit indi cate s that the confidential informant was reliable beca use he ha d provided info rm atio n in the pa st w hic h w a s c or ro bo rate d a ndle d to the arr e st o f i nd ivi du a ls i nv olv e d in criminal ac tivity

. Secondly , the i nformant had purcha sed drugs from Def endant within the past 72 hours. The use of t he conf idential informant for

the purposes of

substantiating the se arc h war rant was prope r. The phra se “in the s aid residence” may not have be en the be st choice of words to re flec t wher e the informant was standing when he observe d Def endant’ s possession of the drug s, and Def endant’ s distributi on of the drug s to him. There is no evidence , howeve r, that Lieutenant Liles made the sta tement fra

udulently or in rec kless disreg ard f or the truth. I f the c halleng ed stateme nt is not a “false statement made with intent to dece ive t he C ourt,” in order to gr ant Def

endant r elief, the fa lse s t at ement, re cklessly made, must be “ essential to the esta blishment of probable c ause.” Litt le , 5 60 S.W. 2da t 40 7. I n ord e r to be “ e sse nti a l to the e sta bli sh me nt of

pr ob a ble c a us e ,” the fa lse statement must be the only basis for pr obable c ause. Sta te v . Ti dm ore , 604 S.W .2d 879, 882 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1980). Ther efor e, eve n if this statement was re cklessly made, the informant’ s claim that he bo ug ht dru g s f

ro m D e fe nd a nt at D e fe nd a nt’ s h ou se wi thi n th e app ro pr ia te tim e fr a me independe ntly

establishes proba

ble cause. De fenda nt is not entit led to relief on this iss ue.
III . P r e ju dic ial Effec t o f Evid e nc e of P r ior Sal e of C oc ain e
Def endant a rg ues that the trial c ourt err ed in admit ting e vidence of Mr. B utler’s purc hase of
coca ine from De fenda nt. Defe ndant contends that because he w as not indicted for this offense, ref ere nce to the sa le should have be en excluded as “ propensity ” evidenc e under Rule 404(b) of the Tenne ssee Rules of Evide nce. T he State ar g ues that the e vidence was re levant to prove Def endant’ s intent to possess drug s for re sale, whic h was a n es s en t i al element of the offe nse with which Def endant wa s char ged

. Alterna tively , Def endant a rg ues that the probative value of the evidenc e is outweig hed by

its unfair pre

judice.

Te nn e sse e Rul e of

Ev ide nc e 40 4( b) pr ov ide s th a t:-5-

Evidence of other c rimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the c hara cter of
a person or to show action in conf ormity with the char acte r trait. It may , howeve r be admissible for other

purposes.. The co nditions which must be satisfied befor e allowing such evide nce a re: (1) The court upon re quest must hold a hearing outside the jury ’s pre sence ; (2) The court must determine that a material issue exis ts other than conduc t conforming with a c hara cter trait and must upon reque st state on t he re cord the mater ial issue, the ruling , and the r easons f or admitting the evidenc e; (3) The court must find proof of the crime, wrong or a ct t o be cle ar a nd convincing ; and (4) The court must ex clude the e vidence if its probative value is outweig hed by the dang er of

unfair pr ejudice.

B e c a us e the tr ia l c ou rt

su bs ta nti a lly

c omp lie d w ith the re qu ir e me nts of Rul e 40 4( b) , th is C ou rt

wi ll revie w the trial c ourt’s dete rminations for an a buse of discr etion.

After a leng thy hearing outside the prese nce of the jury , the trial court found that the proof of the prior

sale of c ocaine was c l ea r an d co nvincing , and the e vidence of De fenda nt’s sale of
coca ine to Mr

. Butler was probative of Def endant’ s intent to possess drugs f or re sale, a

materia l issue oth e r tha n s ho wi ng c on du c t c on fo rm ing to a c e rt a in c ha

ra c te r t ra it. Although Rule 404( b) does not e x plicitly list the exceptions unde r which e vidence of prior
c ri me s, wr on g s o r a c ts ma y be a dmi tte d, ou r co urts h a ve he ld tha t su c h e vid e nc e ma y be a dmi ssi ble to show motive, intent, guilty knowledg e, i d en t i t y

of the de fenda nt, absenc e of mistake, or the exis tence of a c ommon scheme. Se e , e .g ., Col lar d v . S tat e , 526 S.W. 2d11 2, 11 4 ( Te nn . 1 97 5) ; see als o Neil P. Cohen, et al., Tennessee Law of Evidenc e § 4 .0 4 [8] (4 ed. 20 00 ). Spe c if ic a lly , th is th Court has previously

“view[ed] the pattern of

prior drug sales as being probative of the def endant’ s knowledg e and intent to possess coca ine for resa le

. . . .” Sta te v . J oh nn y W ay ne Till e ry , No. 01C01- 9506-CC-00182, 1998 WL 148326, at *6 (Tenn. Crim. App., Nashville, Mar. 30, 1 9 9 8), pe rm . to app. denied

(Tenn. 1998) ; see also State v. Little, 854 S.W .2d 643, 649 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1992)

. Th e tr ia l c ou rt

fu rthe r s ta te d o n th e re c or d th a t th e pro bat iv e value of the e vid e nc e to Def endant’ s intent outwe ighe d the dang er of unfair pr ejudice. D efe ndant contends othe rwise a nd arg ues that the e vidence was unfa irly prejudicia l because he w as not charg ed with selling coca ine to Mr. Butl er
. “F ac tors in weig hing the probative va lue include the pr osecution’s ne ed for the evidenc e, the likelihood the def endant c ommitt ed the other crimes, and the degr ee of its releva ncy .” State v. Edwards , 868 S.W .2d 682, 691 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1993)

. During the Rule 404(b) hearing, the State said that Def endant wa s not charg ed with selling
c oc a ine to M r. B utl e r b e c a us e the pro secu tor d id n ot w a nt t o d isc los e Mr . B utl e r’ s r ole a s a confide ntial informant. The State arg ued that Offic er L iles’ and Mr. Butler’ s testimonyconce rning the pr ior sa le wa s th e on ly

e vid e nc e the Sta te c ou ld p re se nt a s to De fe nd a nt’ s in te nt.-6-

During closing arg ument at the trial, De fendant’s counsel a rg ued that although De fenda nt may have sold coca ine t o Mr. B utler, the re maining c ocaine found in his house was f or De fenda nt’s own per sonal consumption.

I n Litt le , the def

endant a rg ued that his ac complice’ s testimonyconc er n i n g o ther drug transac tions in which the defe ndant participated wa s inadmissible be cause he was not c harg ed for those crimes. Litt le , 8 54 S.W. 2da t 64 9. Th is C ou rt fo un d th a t th e tr ia l c ou rt didno t a bu se its dis c re tio n in a dmi tting the e vid e nc e un de r R ule 40 4( b) “ a s it re la te d to [the de fe nd a nt’ s] in te nt t o commit the crimes for which he was under i ndictment,” notwithstanding the fa ct the State did not bring any char g es ag ainst the defe ndant for those acts. Id.

Ba sed on our revie w of the re cord, w e ag ree with the trial court’ s finding that the probative
va lue of the e vid e nc e ou tw e ig he d a da ng e r of un fa ir pr e

jud ic e to De fe nd a nt. Th e tr ia l c ou rt pr op e rl y instructed the jury

that it could only

consider the evidenc e of Def endant’ s prior criminal conduct “f or the limited purpose of dete rmining w hether it provides the [D] efe ndant’s intent,” a nd not as evidenc e “to prove his disposi tion to commit a crime.” J urors are presumed to follow the instructions of the trial court. State v. Robinson , 14 6 S.W. 3d46 9, 49 4 ( Te nn . 2 00 4) (c itatio ns omi tte d) ; se e als o Li ttl e , 854 S.W .2d at 649.

We find that the evidenc e was admitted in c onformity with Rule 404(b). De fenda nt is not entitled to relief on this issue.
CO NC LU SION

F oll ow ing a

re vie w o f the re c or d, we a ff ir m th e jud g me nt o f the tr ia l c ou rt

.

___________________________________ THOMAS T. WOODAL

L , J UDGE