IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA 

THE STATE OF NEVADA, 

Appellant, 

vs. 

TARIQ MANSON, 

Respondent. 

No. 82038 

LE 

SEP 1 2 2022 

ORDER OF AFFIRMANCE 

This is an appeal from a district court amended decision and 

order dismissing the case against respondent without prejudice. Eighth 

Judicial District Court, Clark County; Linda Marie Bell, Judge. 

Respondent Tariq Manson was charged in 2018 with sexual 

assault of a minor under 14 years of age and three counts of lewdness with 

a child under the age of 14. Manson was initially found not competent to 

stand trial twice. After undergoing competency restoration treatment, 

three doctors from the Stein Forensic Facility eventually deemed him 

competent. Dr. Jones-Forrester, a clinical neuropsychologist hired by 

Manson, evaluated him and reported that Manson's longstanding 

intellectual disability and neurocognitive deficits rendered him 

incompetent without the possibility of restoration. Manson challenged the 

competency determination and, after a competency hearing, the district 

court concluded that Manson was incompetent without the possibility of 

restoration, relying heavily on Dr. Jones-Forrester's findings, and dismissed 

the case against Manson without prejudice. While the district court found 

that Manson was incompetent without the "possibility" of restoration, that 

standard is higher than the statutory standard, which expresses the test in 

terms of "no substantial probability of attaining competency in the 

foreseeable future." NRS 178.460(4)(d); see also NRS 178.425(5). 

?Z. Z 041SSUPREME COURT 

OF 

NEVADA 

101 1947A A311, 
Nonetheless, the district court's finding of no "possibility" of restoration 

necessarily means that the statutory standard of a "substantial probability" 

was not met either. So, we will analyze whether the district court erred by 

finding no substantial probability of restoration. 

The State argues that the district court abused its discretion by 

finding that Manson was incompetent and could not be restored to 

competency. Specifically, it asserts that the district court (1) applied a 

competency test that expects too much of criminal defendants, (2) accorded 

insufficient weight to evidence of Manson's competency and restorability, 

and (3) failed to account for possible accommodations. 

The Fourteenth Amendment dictates that a defendant who is 

more likely than not incompetent may not be criminally tried. Cooper v. 

Oklahoma, 517 U.S. 348, 350, 355-56 (1996). A defendant may be 

incompetent for any number of reasons, including intellectual disability—

the assessment of which in the competency context is an especially 

"complicated task," United States v. Pervis, 937 F.3d 546, 554, 558 (5th Cir. 

2019), cert. denied, Gray u. United States, U.S. , 141 S. Ct. 2788 

(2021), as is restorability, e.g., Colleen Morrison, Note, The Continued 

Indefinite Incarceration of Indiana's Incompetent Defendants Post-Jackson, 

54 Ind. L. Rev. 719, 732 (2021) ("Referred to as the 'quandary of 

unrestorability,' forensic psychiatry encounters great difficulty predicting 

whether efforts to restore a defendant's competency will be successful . . . .") 

(quoting George F. Parker, The Quandary of Unrestorability, 40 J. Am. 

Acad. Psychiatry L., 171, 171 (2012)). 

A district court deciding if a defendant is competent asks if "the 

defendant has sufficient present ability to consult with his lawyer with a 

reasonable degree of rational understanding, and whether he has a rational 

and factual understanding of the proceedings against him." Jones v. State, 

2 

SUPREME COURT 

OP 

N EVA DA 

MI I 947A AVID 
107 Nev. 632, 637, 817 P.2d 1179, 1182 (1991).' The question of competency 

"is not concerned with the defendant's responsibility but rather with his 

ability to participate in the proceedings in a meaningful way." 1 Wayne R. 

LaFave, Substantive Criminal Law § 8.1(a) (3d ed. 2018); see also Drope v. 

Missouri, 420 U.S. 162, 171 (1975) (providing that a defendant must be able 

"to assist in preparing his defense"); Price v. Thurmer, 637 F.3d 831, 833-34 

(7th Cir. 2011) (stating that a defendant must "be able to follow the 

proceedings and provide the information that his lawyer needs in order to 

conduct an adequate defense, and to participate in certain critical 

decisions"); United States v. Hoskie, 950 F.2d 1388, 1392 (9th Cir. 1991) 

(explaining that the competency inquiry asks if a defendant can "participate 

effectively in his trial"). 

In answering these questions, "the district court may consider 

various sources of evidence, 'including ... its own observations of the 

defendant's demeanor and behavior; medical testimony; and the 

observations of other individuals that have interacted with the defendant." 

Pervis, 937 F.3d at 554 (quoting United States v. Porter, 907 F.3d 374, 380 

(5th Cir. 2018) (internal quotation marks omitted)); see also Calvin v. State, 

122 Nev. 1178, 1183, 147 P.3d 1097, 1100 (2006) ("Accuracy is best served 

when the district court and any appointed experts consider a wide scope of 

relevant evidence at every stage of the competency proceeding . . . ."). 

"When there is conflicting psychiatric testimony at a competency hearing," 

lThis test is derived from Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402 (1960), 

and has been codified in Nevada law in NRS 178.400(2). We interpret this 

statute "as consistent with [the Dusky] standard." Calvin v. State, 122 Nev. 

1178, 1182, 147 P.3d 1097, 1100 (2006). 

SUPREME COURT 

OF 

NEVADA 

(( >i 1947A <44Prm 

3 
SUPREME COURT 

OF 

NEVADA 

it is for the trier of fact to resolve. Ogden v. State, 96 Nev. 697, 698, 615 

P.2d 251, 252 (1980). 

A district court's competency determination "is entitled to 

deference on review" and "will not be overturned if it is supported by 

substantial evidence." Calvin, 122 Nev. at 1182, 147 P.3d at 1099 (2006). 

"Substantial evidence is that which a reasonable mind might consider 

adequate to support a conclusion." Steese v. State, 114 Nev. 479, 488, 960 

P.2d 321, 327 (1998). "It is not our task, as an appellate court, to relitigate 

the battle of the experts." United States v. Simpson, 645 F.3d 300, 306 (5th 

Cir. 2011). But we are to ensure that the district court's decision is not 

"arbitrary or capricious," and does not exceed the bounds of law or reason. 

Jackson v. State, 117 Nev. 116, 120, 17 P.3d 998, 1000 (2001). 

Here, the district court held a hearing at which the doctors 

testified, and the parties and the court questioned them. Of note, the State 

did not challenge the qualifications of Dr. Jones-Forrester, who is 

competency certified in Nevada. The court evaluated the evidence that had 

both been subject to adversarial testing and admitted without objection, 

applied the Dusky standard, and found that Manson was incompetent with 

no possibility, much less a substantial probability, of attaining competency 

in the foreseeable future based on his lifelong intellectual and 

neurocognitive deficits. Although the State argues that the district court 

applied the wrong test for competency, setting the competency bar higher 

than where it should be, we do not perceive legal error, given that the 

district court explicitly applied the Dusky standard, and the disagreement 

is essentially about whether it was met. 

As to that, the record does not reveal that the State presented 

such strong evidence of competency or restorability as to render the district 

court's contrary finding reversible error. See Ogden, 96 Nev. at 698, 615 

4 

OA I ,M7A 
P.2d at 252 (indicating that the trier of fact resolves conflicting psychiatric 

testimony). Moreover, the evidentiary picture was far from clear as to what 

accommodations were possible and what effect they would have. And while 

the district court did not make detailed factual findings to support its 

decision regarding restorability, the State does not challenge that on 

appeal, and the district court's findings regarding competency support its 

conclusion regarding restorability—thus, we choose to only consider the 

arguments the State did make. See, e.g., Greenlaw v. United States, 554 

U.S. 237, 243 (2008) (noting that courts "follow the principle of party 

presentation," which requires the litigants to frame the issues). Because 

the district court's finding of incompetency without the substantial 

probability of restoration is supported by substantial evidence, and the 

district court did not abuse its discretion, we 

ORDER the judgment of the district court AFFIRMED. 

J. 

Stiglich 

“.

4 J. 

Cadish 

o 

J. 

Silver 

SUPREME COURT 

OF 

NEVADA 

(01 19.17A 

5 
J. 

Parraguirre 

HERNDON, J., with whom PARRAGUIRRE, C.J., and HARDESTY, J., 

agree, concurring in part and dissenting in part: 

I agree that the district court did not abuse its discretion in 

deciding that Manson was not competent to proceed; however, I respectfully 

disagree and dissent on the issue of the possibility of competency 

restoration. Although these two concepts can be related and can involve the 

evaluation of some of the same evidence, they are two separate judicial 

determinations and the court must treat them as such by explaining each 

ruling individually. The district court's finding regarding the possibility of 

competency restoration was summary and conclusory without much 

individualized analysis as to Manson. The conclusion was also an almost 

verbatim recitation of the possibility of restoration finding made earlier in 

the related case of State v. Adams, Docket No. 81782. Such summary 

findings prevent this court from conducting an appropriate review on 

appeal. For these reasons, although I concur as to the competency 

determination, I respectfully dissent as to the possibility of restoration 

determination and I would reverse and remand to the district court for it to 

conduct a proper analysis and enter adequate findings of fact and 

conclusions of law. 

Herndon 

Hardesty 

SUPREME COURT 

OF 

NEVADA 

(0) 1947A cdSrsp 

6 
cc: Hon. Linda Marie Bell, Chief Judge 

Attorney General/Carson City 

Clark County District Attorney 

Clark County Public Defender 

Special Public Defender 

Washoe County District Attorney 

Washoe County Public Defender 

Federal Public Defender/Las Vegas 

Eighth District Court Clerk 

SUPREME COURT 

OF 

NEVADA 

(DV I 947À 

7