IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF NEW MEXICO 1 STATE OF NEW MEXICO, 2 Plaintiff-Appellee, 3

v. NO. 28,300 4 JOEL COURTNEY, 5 Defendant-Appellant. 6

APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF BERNALILLO COUNTY 7 Kenneth Martinez, District Judge 8 Gary K. King, Attorney General 9 Santa Fe, NM 10 for Appellee 11 Hugh W. Dangler, Chief Public Defender 12 Nancy M. Hewitt, Appellate Defender 13 Santa Fe, NM 14 for Appellant 15 MEMORANDUM OPINION 16 FRY, Chief Judge. 17 Defendant appeals the denial of his moti on to withdraw a plea of guilty to first18 degree Kidnapping and second-degree Criminal Sexual Penetration. We proposed to 19 affirm in a calendar notice, and Defe ndant has responded with a memorandum in 20 opposition. We are not persua ded by Defendant’s arguments, and therefore we affirm. 212 In our calendar notice, we noted that Defendant refused to cooperate for 1 purposes of the court-ordered forensic evaluation, but De fendant was eventually found 2 to be competent. [RP 123; 143] The di strict court found, “Defendant’s lack of 3 communication with [his] counsel is not the result of . . . Defendant being 4 incompetent.” [RP 143] We also notedthat the plea agr eement states that 5 Defendant’s counsel explained the agreement to Defendant in detail, Defendant agreed 6 that he understood the agreement and th e rights he was giving up by signing the 7 agreement, and the district court accepted the agreement between Defendant and the 8 State. [RP 168-72] 9 Defendant unsuccessfully filed a motion to withdraw his plea. The motion was 10 sealed in the district court, and not madepart of the record on appeal. Defendant 11 claims that, in his motion, he argued that he was coerced into entering a guilty plea 12 based on the media coverage of the crimes , his inability to communicate with trial 13 counsel, and his paranoia about trial counsel ’s representation based on the fact that 14 trial counsel lived and worked near the area where the crimes took place. As we 15 stated in our calendar notice, the grant ordenial of a motion to withdraw a plea is 16 within the discretion of the district court, and the denial of such a motion amounts to 17 error when the “undisputed facts estab lish that the plea was not knowingly and 183 voluntarily given.” State v. Hunter , 2006-NMSC-043, ¶ 11, 140 N.M. 406, 143 P.3d 1 168 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 2 Media Coverage 3 As discussed in our calendar notice, there may be prejudice as a result of media 4 coverage, but only in extreme cases such as when a community is saturated with 5 inflammatory and biased information near the time of trial. See , e.g. , State v. House , 6 1999-NMSC-014, ¶ 58, 127 N.M. 151, 978 P.2d 967. In this cas e, the jury panel was 7 questioned about the media cove rage in order to ensure th at prospective jurors had not 8 been exposed to reports by the media. In addition, Defendant di d not provide specific 9 details as to how he was prejudiced by media coverage. In his memorandum in 10 opposition, Defendant claims that he was “c oerced” into pleading guilty due to his 11 mental problems and because he “feared th e media coverage would be seen by his 12 children’s classmates,” [MIO 2] becau se it was mentioned in the reports that 13 Defendant was wanted in Ore gon in connection with the mu rder of a college student, 14 and because the media “hinted” that Defe ndant was a serial rapist and murderer. 15 [MIO 2] 16 Again, Defendant makes only general alle gations that the coverage was 17 prejudicial to his case because of his fear that classmates would see the reports, and 184 his claim that the media “hinted” th at he was a murderer and rapist. See In re Ernesto 1 M., Jr. , 1996-NMCA-039, ¶ 10, 121 N.M. 562, 915 P.2d 318 (“An assertion of 2 prejudice is not a showing of prejudice.”). Defendant does not pr ovide anything other 3 than assertions of prejudice. In addition, the district court found that Defendant made 4 “intentional attempts to delay the trial,” and was “malingering to feign mental illness.” 5 [MIO 3] We reject Defendant’s claim that the media coverage prejudiced him by 6 “coercing” him to plead guilty to the charges. 7 Inability to Communicate With Trial Counsel 8 As discussed in our calendar notice, the trial court, and medical doctors who 9 examined Defendant, determined that Defe ndant’s inability to communicate with his 10 counsel was caused by Defendant’s repeated attempts to delay trial and the fact that 11 he was malingering “to feign mental illne ss.” Defendant claimed that a later 12 evaluation demonstrated that he “had r eal issues that affected his ability to 13 communicate” with counsel. [DS 4] However, the district court was free to reject that 14 argument. We find no abuse of discretion by the district court in determining that 15 Defendant’s plea of guilty was not involunt arily or unknowingly entered due to mental 16 health issues or an inability to communicate with trial counsel. 17 Paranoia About Trial Counsel’s Representation 185 Defendant continues to claim that hewas paranoid because of his counsel’s 1 close proximity to the scene of the alleged crimes and, as a result, he involuntarily 2 entered a plea of guilty. As we pointed out in the calendar no tice, Defendant was 3 aware that his counsel lived and worked n ear the scene of the crimes from “early on 4 in” counsel’s representation of Defendant. Trial counsel’s representation of 5 Defendant began on May 19, 2006, and Defendant did not enter his plea of guilty until 6 September 11, 2007. Therefore, the information was not new to Defendant at the time 7 he moved to withdraw his plea. Although he was aware for almost sixteen months 8 of trial counsel’s close proximity to the s cene, Defendant did not inform trial counsel 9 about his concerns, and he said nothing about his concerns at the time he entered his 10 plea. See In re Aaron L. , 2000-NMCA-024, ¶ 27, 128 N.M. 641, 996 P.2d 431 (“This 11 Court will not consider . . . matters not of r ecord[.]”). We hold that the trial court did 12 not abuse its discretion in re jecting Defendant’s argument that his paranoia about trial 13 counsel caused him to involuntarily enter into a plea. 14 We acknowledge that appellate counsel refers to se veral propositions of law in 15 the memorandum in opposition, including legal propositions with regard to ineffective 16 assistance of counsel, and failure to informa defendant about the consequences and 17 penalties of a plea of guilty. [MIO 5-8] However, appellate c ounsel does not provide 186 any facts pertaining to this case which woul d be applicable to those legal propositions. 1 Therefore, we do not address those claims. 2 CONCLUSION 3 For the reasons discussed in this opinion and in our calendar notice, we hold 4 that the district court did not abuse its discretion when it denied Defendant’s motion 5 to withdraw his guilty plea. 6 IT IS SO ORDERED. 7

8 CYNTHIA A. FRY, Chief Judge 9 WE CONCUR: 10

11 JAMES J. WECHSLER, Judge 12

13 RODERICK T. KENNEDY, Judge 14