### In The C ou rt o f A p p ea ls Si x t h Appe l l at e Di st r i c t o f Te x as a t Te x ar ka na

______________________________ No . 0 6- 07 -0 00 76 -C V

______________________________ MI CHAEL

A. FRENCH A

ND WI FE, MI STI MI CH EL L E F REN CH , App e lla nts V. B R IA N J A M E S G ILL A

N D G IU S E P P E V

. R IC C IO D/B/A TI GERS TRUCKI NG COMPANY, Appe llees

On Appea l from the 402nd Judi cial District Court

Wood C ounty , Texas Trial Court No. 2004-261

B e f o r e M o r r i s s , C

. J. , C a

rt e r an d M o s e l e y , JJ. Opinion by

J ustice MoseleyFr e nc h v . G ill , 206 S.W .3d 737 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2006, no pet.). 1 2 O P I N I O N Th is appeal inv olv e s a

su mma ry jud g me nt g ra

nte d a g a ins t Mi c ha e l A . a nd Mis ti M ic he lle F re nc h in a su it b ro ug ht b y

the m ag a ins t Br ian J a me s Gill and Gu ise pp e V. Ric c io, do ingbu sin e ss

a s T ig e rs Tr

uc kin g Com

pa ny . T he same su it a

nd ve ry c los e ly -r e la te d q

ue sti on s w e re pr e vio us ly appea led by

the Fr enche s to this Court; a summary judgme nt r ender ed ag ainst them was re verse d and

re mand e d f

or fu rt he r p ro c e e din g s. 1 The c ontrolling issue in both of these appea ls is the impact of l imitations on the claim of the Fr enche s ag ainst Gill and Riccio. I. F ac tu al a nd P r oc e dur al B ac kgr ound The claims of t he Frenc hes arose as the result of a motor- vehicle c ollisi on which occ urre d J anuar y 29, 2002. I nitially , the Fr enche s filed suit i n Marc h 2003 in fede ral c ourt ag ainst sever al defe ndants (not including Gill or Riccio), all of whom we re c itiz ens of state s other than Te x as. See 28 U. S.C. A. § 1 33 2( a ) ( Wes t 20 06 ) ( g ra nti ng fe de ra l juri sd ic tio n in c a se s w he re c omp le te div e rs ity of citizenship ex ists). On J anuar

y 14, 2004, the Frenc hes filed an amended pleading in the pendingfede ral c ourt action, see king pe rmission to j oin Gill and R iccio (Texas residents); an order was then e ntere d on J anuar y 28, 2004, which per

mitt ed t h e fi ling of

that amendment to the plea dings. H oweve r, the fede ral c ourt rec onsidered that order and withdre w its consent for the joinder of Gill and Ricc io by3

order enter ed on Mar ch 4, 2004. S uit was then filed by the Frenc hes ag ainst Gill and Riccio in the district court of Wood County , Texas, on April 29, 2004. II. The Rul e on Li m it at ion s On Janu ary 29 , 2 00 4 ( be tw e e n th e date the F re nc he s ha d b e e n g ra nte d le a ve to i nc lud e Gi ll and Riccio in the fe dera l lawsuit and the date of the e ntry of the orde r which w i t h d re w that permission), the two-y ear anniver sary

of the c ollisi on occur

red. The t wo -y ear

anniver sary

of the collision i s signific ant; afte r then, this kind of tort claim would be ba rre d under Te x as' s two-y ear statute of limitations. See T EX . C IV . P R AC . & R EM . C ODE ANN . § 16.003(a) (Ve rnon Supp. 2007). A. Tol ling Exc e pt ion to th e Rul e Although r ecove ry

on most tort actions would be barred after the ex piration of t wo y ear s, an exception to that rule provides t h at a t o lling of the statute of limitations t akes pla ce if a par ty has filed a pr evious suit in a differ ent court and that action wa s dismis sed bec ause of lack of jurisdiction, provided that the par

ty ref iled the suit in a court of pr oper jurisdiction within six ty day s after

such dis mis sa l. T EX . C IV . P R AC . & R EM . C ODE ANN . § 16 .0 64 (V e rn on 19 97 ); Cla ry Cor

p. v . S mi th , 949 S.W. 2d 45 2, 46 1 ( Te x. Ap p. —F or t Wor th 1 99 7, wr it d e nie d) . T he c a se s a lso no te that th e statut e is to be liberally

construed to e ffe ctuate its objec tive—relief from pena lty

of li m i t ati on bar to one who has mistakenly

broug ht hi s ac t i o n in the wrongcourt. T EX . C IV . P R AC . & R EM . C ODE ANN . § 1 6. 06 4; Clary Corp. , 949 S.W .2d at 461. Th e F re nc he s ma int a in t hat be c a us e the y ha d f ile d th e ir4

claim in fede ral c ourt within two y ear s of the collision, this tol ling of the statute of limita t i ons

occur red. B. The Exception to the Exception Howeve r, Gill and Riccio conte st the application of that toll ing statute by pointing out an exception to that ex ception. The tol ling pr ovision of Section 16.064 of the Texas Civil P rac tice and Rem ed i es C o d e d o es not apply if the initial filing wa s done with intentional disreg ard of proper jurisdiction. Parker v . Cumming , 216 S.W .3d 90 5 , 9 0 9

– 1 0 ( T e x. App.—Eastland 2007, pe t. denied). Un de r t hat e xce pti on , if

the re c or d e sta

bli sh e s int e nti on a l dis re g ard and that jur isd ic tio n did no t li e in the tribunal in which the proc eedingwas orig inally filed, the orig inal lawsuit did not, as a matter of law, se rve to toll limit ations. There fore , Gill a nd Riccio maintain, if those conditions e x ist, and

un de r t he se fa c ts, the F re nc he s w ou ld b e ti me- barr ed fr om m a int a ini ngthe ir a c tio n in state c ourt
. See T EX . R. C IV . P. 1 66 a ; see also Parke r , 216 S.W .3d 908. III. What is the Diff

ere nce Between This Case and the F irst One? I n the first judg ment and appe al, appe llees/defe ndants argued bef ore the trial court a

nd here that collater al estoppel or the full faith and c redi t clause ended the action. Gill and Riccio ha d

c o n v in c e d th e tr ia l c o u rt a t th e f ir s t s u mm ar

y ju d g me n t h e ar in g to f

in d th a t r u li n g s b y the fe dera l court (which included a statement that "T he additional Def endants that the Plaintiffs wish to add a re

no t i nd is pen sab le a ndwere cl earl y add ed sol ely for th e pu rpo ses of defeat in g div ers it y ju ri sd ict io n") conclusively

proved that the saving s clause of Section 16.064 of the Te x as Civil P rac tice and5

Remedi es C o d e did not toll li mitations. W e found to the c ontrary and re verse d the summary judgme nt gr anted Gill and Ricc io. I n th e pr e se nt ap pe a l, t

he so le iss ue is o ne that w e me nti on e d in our p re vio us op ini on

in t his

case but could not then address: Whether the F renc hes' statements in their fe dera l pleading seeking to add Gill and R iccio preclude the Fre nches f rom seekingto apply

the exception to the limit ations statute in the s tate lawsuit. I n other words, when they filed t heir pleading s in fede ral c ourt, did they ple a d th e mse lve s r ig ht o ut o f c ourt ? Another motion for s u m m ar y j u dg ment was filed by Gill and Riccio and this motion was g ra nte d. Th e va lid ity

of that summa

ry jud g me nt i s n owbe fo re us . IV. Stand ard of Review Summary judgme nt is proper whe n the movant establishes that ther e is no g enuine issue of materia l f act and that he is entitled to judgme nt as a matter of law. T EX . R. C IV . P. 1 66 a (c ); City of Houston v. Clear Creek

Basin Auth. , 5 8 9 S

. W

. 2 d 6 7 1 ( T e x. 1 9 7 9 ) ; Ba ub les & Be ad s v . Lo uis Vuitton, S.A. , 766 S.W .2d 377 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 1989, no writ). When re viewing a summary jud g me nt, we take a s tr

ue a ll ev ide nc e fa

vo ra ble to t he no nmo va

nt a nd ind ulg e in e ve ry

re a so na ble infere nce a

nd resolve a

ny doubts in the nonmovant's f avor. Limestone Prods. Distrib., Inc. v. Mc Nam ara , 7 1 S. W.3 d 3 08 , 3 11 (T e x. 20 02 ); Rhone-P oulenc, I nc. v. Ste el , 997 S.W .2d 217, 223 (Tex. 1999).6

When the m o v an t seeks summary judgme nt based on the e x piration of limitations, t he movant must c onclusively prove the bar of

limit ations. J

e nn ing s v . B ur ge ss , 917 S.W .2d 790, 793 (Tex. 1996). The question on appea l is not whether the summary judgme nt proof ra ises a fa ct issue with refe renc e to the esse ntial elements of the plaintiff' s cause of ac tion, but whether the summar y judgme nt proof esta

blishes the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of la

w. Gonzalez v. Mission Am. Ins. Co. , 795 S.W .2d 734, 736 (Tex. 1990). Be cause the m ovant bears the burde n of proof, a ll conflicts in the evidenc e are disreg arde d, evidenc e favorable to the nonmovant is taken as tr ue , and a ll do ub ts a s to the g e nu ine iss ue s of ma te ri a l f a c t are re so lve d in

fa vo r o f t he no nmo va

nt. Nixon v. Mr. P rop. Mgmt. Co. , 690 S.W .2d 546 (Tex. 1985). I f the nonmovant a sserts that the statute of limitations has been tolled, it becomes the movant' s burden to " conclusively neg ate the tolling provision' s application" befor e summary judgme nt may

be aw arde d. A l l en v. Intercapital Lod ge Ltd . P 'shi p , 66 S.W .3d 351, 353 (Tex. App.—Houston [14t h Dist.] 2001, pet. denied)

. A. Basis Up on Whi ch Thi s Su m m ary Judgm ent Re sts Gi ll a nd Ric c io' s mo tio n f

or su mma ry jud g me nt s pecif

ic a lly state s th a t th e y

are e nti tle d to summary judgme nt based on limitations because the time had run on the Fr enche s' lawsuit and that due to the stateme nts contained in the F renc hes' pleading s in the fede ral suit, th e s t at utory tolling pr ov isi on did no t a pp ly .7

B. Summ ary Judgm ent Evidence Gi ll and Ric c io atta c he d a numbe r o f d oc ume nts a s summa ry jud g me nt e vid e nc e , b ut r e ly larg ely on the fe dera l pleading : "Plaintiffs' Second Amende d Orig inal Complaint." Th a t do c ume nt w a s f

ile d b y the F re nc he s in fe de ra l court Janu ary 28 , 2 00 4. I n r e le va

nt p art , it r e a ds a s f

oll ow s: 6. The r e will no lon ge r be div e r sit y of c it iz e nshi p be tw e e n th e pa rt ie s to thi s [federa l] civil action with the joinder of Def endants, Br ian J ames Gill and Giuseppe V. Riccio, d/b/a Tig ers Tr ucking Co. The amount in controve rsy , exclus ive of interest and costs, exceeds SEVENTY -F I VE THOU SAND AND N O/100 DO L L AR S ( $7 5, 00 0. 00 ). Jurisd ic tio n w ill no lon g e r e xist p ur su ant t o 2 8 U .S. C. § 1 39 2 a nd the Pla int if

fs re qu est th at th is pr oc e e din g be tr ans fe rr e d to the State Di str ic t Co ur

t in Woo d Co un ty , T e xas. An o t h er p i ec e o f G i l l an d

R i cc i o 's s u m m ary

j u d gm en tev i d en ce i s t h e f ed er al d i s t ri ct co u rt 's "O rder Striking Plaintiffs' Second Amended C omplaint." I n rele vant par t, that document includes the following lang uag e:

On J anuar y 14, 2004, the Plaintiffs filed a motion for lea ve to file their sec ond amende d complaint. The Court inadve rtentl y gra n t ed said motion befor e the De fe nd ants in the c a se ha d a de qu a te tim e to f ile the ir re sp on se . T he Court ' s Order (Doc ket No. 24) allowed the Plaintiffs le ave to a dd Br ian J ames Gill and Giuseppe V. Riccio d/b/a Tig ers Tr ucking Co. as Def

endants in this matter. On J anuar

y 30, 2004, the Def

endants fi l ed the inst ant motion to st rike the Pla i n t i ffs' second a

mended c omplaint, noting that they [Defenda

nts] wer e not aff orded a n opportunity

to respond. Bec ause the Court ruled on the Plaintiffs' motion be fo re the ex pi ration

of the De fe nd ants ' de a dli ne to r e sp on d, the Court wi ll rec onsider the De fenda

nts' motion to strike as if it we re their orig inal response to the Plaintiff's motion for le ave to amend.8 After rec onsidering the Plaintif fs' motion for leave to amend and the Def endants['] motion to st rike, it is clear to the Court that the former should be denied. The additional Def endants that the Plaintiffs wish to ad d are not ind isp e ns a

ble and we re c le arl y

a dd e d s ole ly fo r the purp os e s o f d e fe a tin g div e rs ity jurisdictio n . Fu rt h er, there ha s alrea dy been e x tensive discover y in this case: the Plaintiffs and Def

end an t Omanghave se rved a nd responde d to interrog atories a nd reque sts for produ ct i o n; Defe ndant Omanghas ser ved depositions on written questions to 17 of the Plaintiffs' healthca re pr oviders, all of w hich have been answe red; De fenda

nt Omang has ser

ved a de position on writte n q u es t i o ns to the Plaintiffs' f

ormer e mploy er

a n d h a s filed discover

y pleading s reg ardingsame with the Court ; th e Pla int if

fs and Om ang have ma de no t on ly the ir I nit ia l D isc los ur e s, bu t a lso their Expert Disclosures, including production of a ll ex pert re ports and other ma te ri a ls. As an e quitable matter, the Plaintiffs chose to se ek damag es from Omangand Mr. Hende r s o n . T h e y a ls o c h o s e to p u r s u e th e ir c la im s in th is F e d e r a l Co u rt. T o jus tif y the ir 10 -m on th- lon g de lay in a dd ing the se no nd ive rs e , d isp e ns a ble pa rt ie s to the ir laws uit , th e Pla int if

fs c la im the y

jus t no w dis cov e re d th a t th e y ne e d to joi n Mr. Gill and his e mploy er, Giuseppe V. Riccio d/b/a Tig ers Trucking Co. Howeve r, the Plaintiffs and their c ounsel have known of Mr. Gil l, and all other witnesses to the acc ident, since Jan uary

30, 2002. I n the subsequent two- y ear period, the Plaintiffs and the ir c ou ns e l mad e no e ff

or t to c on ta c t Mr . G ill or

his e mpl oy e r, muc h le ss j oin them in this case. Me anwhile, De fenda nt Omang has expended a signific ant amount of tim e and re so ur c e s in

dis c ov e ry

fo r t his c a se and

in p re pa ri ng it s defe ns e to t

his case . Finally , the Plaintiffs have not shown that they will be pre judiced or howthey wi ll b e de nie d a

n a de qu a te jud g me nt o r a n a de qu a te re me dy

of th eir cla ims if Mr . G ill and his e mpl oy e r ar e no t join e d as De fe nd ants . Ac c or din g ly , th e Court wi ll now vac ate its previous orde r g ranting the Plaintiffs leave to amend. C. The F r e nc he s' R e spo nse to th e M ot ion for Sum m ar y J udgm e nt As its pr ima

ry su mma ry jud g me nt e vid e nc e , c ouns e l f or the F re nc he s f

ile d h is o wn

a ff ida vit in w hic h h e state d in

re le va nt p art a s f oll ow s:9 12. "A s Istated duringthe ora l argument on the MSJ prior to the appe al in t his c a se , I did no t add Gi ll and Ricc io t o d e fe a t juri sd ic tio n. I n f a c t, I ha d o nly rec ently lear ned of the ir involvement and needed to file suit ag ainst them to toll the statute of limitations and preser ve Plaintiffs' rig hts." 13

. " F ur

the r, the c a se a g a ins t G ill and Ric c io w a s b a se d on th e same nu c le us of

op e rativ e fa c ts a s the on e a g a ins t H e nd e rs on and Om angand

Iso ug ht t o a vo id p ie c e me a l li tig a tio n o f t his ma tte r. F ili ngit i n f e de ra l c ourt , wh e the r i t defe ated jurisdiction or not, wa s to keep the c ase a s one." 14. "Mor eover , Idid not add Gill a nd Riccio to de feat fede ral jurisdiction. Ichose to file this ca se initially in fede ral c ourt as ther e wa s diversi t y o f t he initial pa rt ie s. Iwo uld

no t se e k to int e nti on a lly dis re g ard the pr op e r jur isd ic tio n in a c a se Ifi led in fede ral cou rt ." 15. "I nitially , I thought that if jurisdiction wa s defe ated, that the e n tire case would be tra

nsfer red to Wood C o u n ty . Iwas re ly ing upon the Fr e e po rtMcM oRan, Inc. v . KN Energy case and thought that the fe dera l court mig ht have be en able to re tain jurisdiction ha d it wa nted to, but that the decision would be up to the fe de ra l c ourt . In th e e ve nt t he fe de ra l tr ia l c ourt deci ded it d id n ot w ant t o r e ta in jurisdiction, I reque sted a tra nsfer to state court." 16

. " Ind e ed, in Pla int if fs ' Re joi nd e r t o D e fe nd ants ' Re ply to P la int if

fs ' Response to Def

endants' Motion forSummary J udg ment, Plaintiffs arg ued that diversity was not de feated as it wa s deter mined at the time of filing a lawsuit, based on the same interpr etation of Freeport-M cMoran, Inc. v. K N Energy, Inc

. , 4 98 U. S. 426, 111 S.Ct . 858, 860 (1991). My interpre tatio n wa s n o t an unre asonable one. Even the tre atise O'Connor' s Fede ral Rules * Civil T

rials (2003) states, re ly ing upon Freeport-M

cMoran that ' Di ve rs ity

is d e te rm ine d a s o f t

he date the a c tio n is com men ced. ' See p age 83, a cop y of w hi ch i s at tac hedhere to as E x hi bi t A -5. [ "] 17

. " I did no t, i n a ny e ve nt, purp os e ly

ig no re jur isd ic tio n b y

fi lin g in fede ral court. That is w here the case was pending orig inally and since the se cond set of De fe nd ants to b e a dd e d w e re inv olv e d in the same a c c ide nt, it onl y ma de se ns e to a dd the m to the laws uit

e xistin g a t th e tim e , whe the r t hat me ant t

he c a se wo uld rema in in feder al cour

t or be tra nsfer red to state c ourt."10 18. "I reque sted a tra

nsfer to state co u rt in the event the f eder al cour

t de te rm ine d th a t juri sd ic tio n w a s n o lo ng e r a pp ro pr ia te in f

e de ra l c ourt . Thi s w a s to conser ve judicial re source s and kee p the ca se, which ha d alre ady been on file for 10 months and for whic h most of the discovery was c ompleted." 19. Def

endants make the following statement in their Motion for Sum mary Judg me nt at pa g e 2 w hic h is pate ntl y fa lse and wi th ou t basis in fa c t: ' Clearly , P l ai n t i ffs a dded Mr. Gill and Mr. Ricc io to destroy diversity jurisdiction.' Def endants do not ci t e t o an y evidenc e to support this statement. Fur ther, a s e xpla ine d a

bo ve , th is i s il log ic a l si nc e Pla int if fs we re the on e s w ho c ho se to f ile in the fe dera l court to beg in with. I t does not make sense that some 10 months later, well into the lawsuit, that Plaintiffs would then s eek to de stroy the jurisdiction they chose."

. . . . 21

. " Judg e Ste g e r' s com me nt, wh ic h w a s dic ta , that Plaintiff's a ddition of Mr. Gill a nd Mr. Riccio was ' for the purposes of de feating diver sity jurisdiction,' wa s no t ba se d o n a

ny fi nd ing s o f fac t. N o te sti mony wa s ta ke n a nd the re wa s n o b a sis upon which to make this comment. As de monstrated above , this is i llogica l." D. The F r e nc he s' A r gum e nt The F renc hes ar g ue that the languag e that they chose to use i n their motions to the feder al court did not conclusively show that they intentionally disreg arde d proper jurisdiction whe n t hey filed the fir st lawsuit. As previously discussed, under that exception to the application of the tolling statute, if the re cord a ffirmatively establishes that jurisdiction did not lie in the tribunal in w hich the pr oc e e din g wa s or ig ina lly fi le d, the or ig ina l laws uit did no t, a s a ma tte r of law, s erve to tol l lim itatio ns . T he re fo re , th e F re nc he s we re tim e -b arr e d f ro m r e c ov e ri ngfr om G ill and Ric c io i n s ta te

c ourt
.11

Th e re are thr e e se pa

rate a sp e c ts t o th e F re nc he s' argume nt: 1) The pleading s in the fede ral case cannot be classified as "judicia l a dmissions "; thus, the pleading s are not conclusive proof that the Fr enche s were awa re of the impact of w hat t hey

wer e doing. A s a re sult, summ ary judgme nt was there fore improper. 2) Th e re is " re lia

ble a uth or ity " to sup po rt the F re nc he s' c ouns e l' s b e lie f t hat di ve rs ity

wo uld

no t be de str oy e d b y

a dd ingthe tw o n on div e rs e pa rt ie s. 3) The F renc hes provided summar y judgme nt ev i dence in which their c ounsel stated that they did not intentionally

file the c ase in the w rong court in an e ffor t to destroy

jurisdiction. 1. Wa s The r e a J udic ialAdm iss ion ? I nitially , we will look at whethe r the doc ument itself constitutes a judicial admission. The g e ne ra l la ngua g e inv olv ingjud ic ia l a dmi ssi on s st a te s th a t: Assertions of fa ct, n o t p l ea d i n the alter native, in the live plea dings of a par ty are reg arde d as fo rm al j udicial admissions. A judicial admission that is clear a nd unequivoca l has conc lusive eff ect a nd bars the a dmitti ng party from later disputing the admitted fa ct. Ho ly Cro ss C hu rc h o f G od in C hr ist v . W olf , 44 S.W .3d 562, 568 (Tex. 2001) (citations omitted). I n a more t y

p i ca l s cenario, cour

ts acknowle dg e that althoug h pleading s g ener ally do not constitute summary judgme nt pr oof, if a plaintiff' s pleading s contain judicial admissions neg ating

a c a us e of a c tio n, su mma

ry judgm ent may

pr op e rl y be g ra nte d o n th e ba sis of

the ple a din g s. Commercial Structures &I n teriors, Inc. v. Liberty Educ . Ministries, Inc. , 1 9 2 S. W. 3 d 8 2 7 , 8 3 5 ( T e x.12

App.—For

t Worth 2006, no pet.); see B r o o ks v. Ctr. for Healthcare Servs ., 981 S.W .2d 279, 283 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1998, no pet.). All of those situations, however, e x plain the use of ple ading s by a par ty in the suit in which they wer e filed. This situation is, howeve r, diffe rent. The pleadingis not from this case. I t is not be ingus e d to pr ov e or

dis pr ov e the c a

us e of a c tio n ba se d o n th e F re nc he s' a lle g a tio ns or state me nts of fa c t a bo ut t he c a us e of a c tio n. I t is us e d b y

the F re nc he s to pr ov e that th e re wa s a pr ior c a se in which the ne w def

endants ha d been sue d; thus, when those d ef en d ants wer e droppe d, the tolling provision allowed the F renc hes t o bring suit in st ate c ourt. I t is then used by Gill and Riccio as proof that the Fr enche s knew that their a ddition of Gill and Riccio as new de fenda nts would destroy div e rs ity and ne ve rt

he le ss ad de d the m in; the re fo re , th e e xce pti on to t he tol lin g pr ov isi on

a pp lie s,

and the F re nc he s' state laws uit is unti me ly

br ou g ht. As Gi ll and Riccio point out, a number of f acts we re ple d by

the Fr enche s in the fede ral

c omp la int , in c lud ingthe name s and c iti zen sh ip o f t

he de fe nd ants . B a se d o n th os e fa c tua l st a te me nts , the Fr enche s then stated that no diver sity of citizenship would continue to exis t betwee n the par ties and aske d the fe dera l court to transfe r the proc eedingto state district court. Th e statem ent th at dive rs ity wo uld be de str oy e d is no t a

fa c tua l st a te me nt. Ra the r, it i s a leg al statement or conclusion based on state d fac ts. As such, it does not fit within t he def inition of a judicial admission.13

T h e F re n ch es ' co u n s el go es fu rt h er t o m ai n t ai nt h at t h e s t at em en ti nfe d er al co u rt p l ea d i n gs could not possibly

be a judicia l admission because it is not a live plea ding ( in this l awsuit). That aspec t of his argument is not persuasive. The fac ts state d in the pleading are not c ontested and w ere not part of a lternative ple ading s. The fa ct that the fe dera l la wsuit is no long er be ing pur sued is not

a re ason to conc lude that the fa cts stated have no further usefulness to prove the Fr enche s' intent and knowledg e whe n causingthem to be filed. I n a pp lyingthi s p a

rt ic ula r s ta tut e , a s p oin te d o ut b y Gi ll a nd Ric c io, o ne pr ima

ry wa y to prove intentional disreg ard is by looking at the face of the pl eading s filed i n the first lawsuit. See Go r d o n v. Staudt , N o . 0 3

- 0 2

- 0 0 7 6 8

- C V , 2 0 0 4 T e x. A p p . L E X I S 1 6 8 5 , a t* 9 ( T e x. A p p . — A u s t in F e b. 20 , 200 4, pe t. d e nie d) ; Parker , 2 16 S.W. 3d a t 91 0; W illiamson v. John Dee re Co. , 708 S.W .2d 38 , 3 9–40 (T e x. Ap p. —T y le r 1 98 6, no wr it) (a ll u sin g the ple a din g s f rom the pr ior

laws uit s to deter mine limit ations—and the a pplication of the e x ceptions—under this section). Acc ording ly , althoug h it does ap p ea r t h at the plea ding did make cer tain formal judicial admissions of fac t, the part upon which Gill a nd Riccio rely is not an admission of fac t; it is, rather , a state me nt o f t

he a pp lic a tio n o f t

he law t o th os e fa c ts. I t is very clea r, howe ver, that the pleading is a statement by the Fr enche s' counsel re flec ting h i s u n d e r s t an d i n g t h a t h i s a c t i o n i n i n c l u d i n g G i l l an d R i c c i o a s d e f

e n d an t s w o u l d

d e s t r o y d i v e r s i t y;Gill and Riccio point out that the Frenc hes never ar g ued to the trial c ourt that the plea ding 2 could not b e c o n s id e r e d

a s s u mm ar

y ju d g me n t p r o o f

an d a ls o p o in ts to o u r

o p in io nin

th e e ar lier appea l, in which we a lso pointed out that the Fr enche s had off ere d the documents for

the summary judgme nt proce eding s, and dec lining to "rew ard the Fr enche s for complaining the trial court e rre d by con si deri ng th e very

evi den ce t hey

ori ginal ly

off eredandcert if

i ed as aut hen ti c." French , 206 S.W .3d at 741. 14 the c a se the re a ft e r l a c kin g div e rs ity of pa rt ie s, the jur isd ic tio n o f t

he fe de ra l c ourt

to h e ar t he su it would be destroy ed. 2 Although the statement is not a "f act" as to a ctual jurisdictional a uthority , it may well be a

" fa c t" a s to wh e the r t

he F re nc he s f

ile d th e ir a c tio n a gains t Gill and

Ric c io i n f

e de ra l c ourt

wi th intentional disreg ard of

its jurisdi ction to hear

the ca se. E. De te r m ining Int e nt Even thoug h the pleadingfiled by the Fr enche s in fede ral court is not a judicial admission, i tn o n et h el es s p ro v i d es s u m m ary j u d gm en t ev i d en ce o f m u ch m o re t h an s i mp l y t h e d at e o f i t s fi l i n g. The que stion before us i s whether the Fr enche s' counsel' s unequivoca l and clea r statement that

a dd ingthe ne w p lay e rs wo uld de fe a t juri sd ic tio n c on c lus ive ly sh ow s th a t he ma de the f ili ngwi th intentional disreg ard of

the prope r jurisdiction. On its fa c e , it

do e s. Th e fi lin g of

the pe tit ion

wh ic h in c lud e d n on div e rs e pa rt ie s c le arl y

se ts out the fac ts defea

ting diversity and then corr ectly states t he lega l impact of those fa cts. I t then g oes on to, based on the te rmination of the cour t's jurisdiction, re quest t h e fe d er al court to transfer the pr oc e e din g to s ta te c ourt
.Parker , 216 S.W .3d at 910. 3 15 Th e F re nc he s argue tha

t be c a us e the y have pr ov ide d su mma

ry jud g me nt e vid e nc e by

the ir

c ouns e l' s a ff

ida vit , th e y have su ff

ic ie ntl y e xpla ine d th e mot ive fo r f ili ngin f e de ra l c ourt

to e na ble them to avoid summary

judgme nt. L ooking at counsel' s aff idavit critically , it states that he did not intend to a dd

the a dd iti on a l pa

rt ie s in an e ff or t to de fe a t juri sd ic tio n; r a the r, that he did so to t oll lim itatio ns and

that he had tho ug ht t

hat if jur isd ic tio n w a s d e fe a te d, the fe de ra l c ourt c ou ld

no ne the le ss e ith e r t

ra ns fe r t he c a se to s ta te c ourt

or re ta in j ur isd ic tio n. He state s r e pe a te dly in multipl e par ag raphs that he did not ignore jurisdiction. The F renc hes' counsel' s aff idavit does not directly

addre ss the dispositi ve issue. I t answer s

an o t h er an d d i ff er en tqu es t i o n : wh et h er h e h adt h e i n t en t i o nt o d ef ea tj u ri s d i c t i o n . C o u n s el 's aff idavit states that he did not intend to defe at jurisdiction. Th e qu e sti on

he re is n ot w he the r h e int e nd e d to de fe a t juri sd ic tio n but whe th er h e fi le d in

c on sc iou s d isr e g ard

of pr op e r j ur isd ic tio n. Th os e are dif fe re nt p ro po sitio ns . Al tho ug h th e se arguments bear

some rea l simi larity , they do not intersect. The F renc hes' counsel' s aff idavit also stated that he had believe d that the fe dera l court mig ht have be e n a

ble to re ta in jur isd ic tio n ove r the e nti re ty ha d it c ho se n to do so. Th a t wa s a mi sta ke in

an understanding of the law, not a mistake of fac t. As pointed out by the Eastland cour t in Parker , the iss ue fo c us e d o n th e qu e sti on of wh e the r t he re c or d sh ow e d that c la ima nt ha d ma de " a

g oo d f a ith mistake" by

initially filing in a (fe dera l) court without jurisdiction over the claim. The c ourt found 3N. Laramie Land Co. v. Hoffman , 268 U.S. 276, 283 (1925); Greater Houston Transp. Co. 4 v. Phillips , 801 S.W .2d 523, 525 n.3 (Tex. 1990)

. I t is a max im that all persons are presumed to know the law. Greater Houston Transp. Co. , 5 8 0 1 S

. W

. 2 d

at 5 2 8 n . 3 (c i t i n g E.H. St afford Mfg. Co. v. W ichita Sch. Supply Co. , 118 Tex. 650, 23 S

. W

. 2 d 695, 697 (1930))

. A par allel maxim is that ignora nce of the law is no excuse. Ch e r okee W ate r Co . v . F

or de rh ause , 727 S.W .2d 605, 615 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 1987), rev'd on other gr ounds , 74 1 S .W.2d

37 7 ( Te x. 19 87 ); Go ss v . B ob by D. As so c s. , 9 4 S. W. 3 d

6 5 , 6 9 ( T e x. App.—Tyler 2002, no pe t.).

16 that the claimant ha d not acted in g ood faith (r ecog nizi ng that the par ty ' s fac tual complaint, if taken as true, a ffirmatively

established that the other tr i b u n al h ad no jurisdiction) and that it was not

nece ssary for the de fenda

nts to prove that Parke r " consciously appre ciated this bec ause he r kn owl edge of

th e la w i s i mp ut ed. " Parker , 216 S.W .3d at 910. Th e court c oncluded that a bsent some evidenc e of a ccide nt or mistake of fact, the filing of a suit with a plea ding w hich, on its face , establishes the c ourt' s lack of jur isdiction does not invoke the tolling provision. I n its analy sis, the Parker court re cog nized that Parker ' s construction of the section that he claimed pr ovided jurisdiction was incorr ect, a nd that whether

Parker wa s conscious of this was imm a te ri a l, d

ue to t he fa c t th a t a ll p e rs on s are pr e su me d to kn owthe law a nd are c ha rg e d w ith kn ow le dg e of

statut or y pr ov isi on s. Id. at 911; Virtual Healthcare Serv s., Ltd. v. Laborde , 193 4 S.W .3d 636, 644 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2006, no pet.). All a re pr esumed to know the la w. Redmon

v . G rif fit h , 202 S.W .3d 225, 238 (Tex. App.—Ty ler 2006, pe t. denied). 5 I n this case , the Fr enche s' counsel a rg ues that he misunder stood the import of the law, a nd that a question of f

act ex i s t s as to whether

he simply

made a mistake or intended to de feat the17

jur isd ic tio n o f t

he fe de ra l c ourt
. We c on c lud e that thi s is a dis tin c tio n w ith ou t a

dif fe re nc e . H e is char g ed with knowledg e of the law, and the re is no sug g estion that there wer e any mistaken understanding s of fact (such as the re sidence of the pa rties or the situs in which an e vent occ urre d) that could support any

sug g estion of mistaken application of that law. The only evidenc e on point thu s sh ow s th a t hi s f

ili ngwa s ma de in int e nti on a l dis re g ard of the jur isd ic tio n o f t

he fe de ra l c ourt
. Be cause there was intentional di sreg ard of the j urisdiction, the tolling does not oc cur a nd limit ations ba rr e d th e pr os e c uti on

of the laws uit

. We a ff ir m th e jud g me nt o f t

he tr ia l c ourt
.

Ba iley C. Moseley J ustice Date Submitted: April 2, 2008 Date D ecide d: April 16, 2008