NOTE: This disposition is nonprecedential.

United States Court of Appeals 

for the Federal Circuit ______________________ 

WOODROW DIGGS,

Claimant-Appellant

v.

DAVID J. SHULKIN, SECRETARY OF VETERANS 

AFFAIRS,

Respondent-Appellee

______________________ 

2016-2243

______________________ 

Appeal from the United States Court of Appeals for 

Veterans Claims in No. 14-2017, Judge Alan G. Lance, Sr.

______________________ 

Decided: July 14, 2017

______________________ 

JOHN F. CAMERON, Montgomery, AL, argued for 

claimant-appellant.

REBECCA SARAH KRUSER, Commercial Litigation 

Branch, Civil Division, United States Department of 

Justice, Washington, DC, argued for respondent-appellee. 

Also represented by TANYA KOENIG, BENJAMIN C. MIZER, 

ROBERT E. KIRSCHMAN, JR., SCOTT D. AUSTIN; CHRISTINA 

LYNN GREGG, Y. KEN LEE, Office of General Counsel, 
2 DIGGS v. SHULKIN

United States Department of Veterans Affairs, Washington, DC.

______________________ 

Before MOORE, O’MALLEY, and REYNA, Circuit Judges.

REYNA, Circuit Judge. 

Woodrow Diggs appeals a decision of the Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims. Mr. Diggs argues that the 

Veterans Court erred by applying an improper legal 

standard in concluding that Mr. Diggs had not filed a 

substantive appeal. Because the Veterans Court applied 

the correct legal standard, we affirm. 

BACKGROUND

1. Mr. Diggs’ Military Service

In June 1970, Mr. Diggs entered active duty military 

service. In July 1970, Mr. Diggs was admitted to the U.S. 

Army Hospital, Fort Polk, Louisiana for psychiatric 

evaluation. J.A. 76–79. The treating physician diagnosed 

Mr. Diggs with schizophrenia and neutropenia.1 

During his hospitalization, Mr. Diggs told a military 

psychiatrist, Dr. Ulmer, that he had shot a drill instructor. J.A. 77. Although he apparently believed he had shot 

his instructor, he had not. J.A. 104. Dr. Ulmer’s notes 

reflect that Mr. Diggs provided a history that he “claims 

to both hear and see devil [for] 11⁄2 years.” J.A. 77. Subsequent treatment notes reflect that Mr. Diggs stated that 

he had been convicted of grand larceny at 13, suspended 

or expelled from school three times, and was fired from 

about eight different jobs. J.A. 77.

 

1 Neutropenia is an abnormally low concentration 

of neutrophils (a type of white blood cell) in the blood. 

Petitioner’s neutropenia diagnosis is not at issue on 

appeal.
DIGGS v. SHULKIN 3

In November 1970, Mr. Diggs was discharged from 

the army after a Medical Evaluation Board found that he 

was unfit for further military service. J.A. 3, 148. 

Following his discharge, Mr. Diggs was hospitalized 

multiple times for psychiatric problems. During a 1972 

hospitalization at the VA Medical Center in Miami, 

Dr. Wainer noted that Mr. Diggs was hospitalized “while 

on active duty, after shooting his drill [sergeant] because 

he was continuously bugging him. It was most probable 

that at that time, he had an acute psychotic break.” J.A. 

225. During a 1973 hospitalization at the same facility, 

Dr. Herrero noted that Mr. Diggs had “a history of a 

psychotic break while in active duty and also has a history of use of different hallucinogenic drugs.” J.A. 236. 

During his incarceration in 1976, Dr. Parado noted that 

Mr. Diggs stated that he “has been hearing voices since he 

was in the U.S. Army.” J.A. 329.

2. Mr. Diggs’ Veterans Claims

Immediately following his discharge, Mr. Diggs filed a 

series of claims for disability seeking service connection 

for schizophrenia. All of the claims were denied. His 

repeated requests for reconsideration were also denied. 

In 1978, the Board of Veterans Appeals denied Mr. Diggs’ 

appeal for service connection. The Board found that 

despite the usual presumption of soundness for veterans, 

given the detailed clinical history in this case, Mr. Diggs’ 

schizophrenia “clearly and unmistakably predated his 

service induction.” J.A. 649. The Board also found no 

“aggravation of the condition in issue.” Id. The Board 

found that there was “no persuasive evidence that there 

was an advance in the basic underlying psychopathology 

during his period of active duty”; rather, it saw the evidence as reflecting only continuance during service of Mr. 

Diggs’ preservice psychiatric problems, including hallucinations. Id. The Board also found that “any change in 
4 DIGGS v. SHULKIN

his condition was within the limits of normal progression 

of the preservice defect.” Id. 

From 1978 to 1995, Mr. Diggs repeatedly requested to 

reopen his claim for service connection. Each request was 

denied for failure to furnish new and material evidence. 

Following a claim he made in 1994, Mr. Diggs filed a 

timely Notice of Disagreement (“NOD”). On November 3, 

1994, in response to the NOD, the Regional Office issued 

its Statement of the Case (“SOC”), continuing its denial of 

service connection because Mr. Diggs’ claim was “not 

supported by the official service medical records nor is 

there evidence of treatment for a nervous condition while 

the veteran was in service.” J.A. 1515–20. 

On March 3, 1995, a VA employee wrote a Field Examination Report for fiduciary purposes concerning who 

should be the payee of Mr. Diggs’ VA pension benefits. 

J.A. 1538–41. That document also included a statement, 

under the “Entitlement To Other Benefits” section, that 

“[t]he veteran does not appear to be in need of either aid 

and attendance or housebound benefits. He has no VA 

life insurance. He is aware of medical benefits. He has 

filed a claim for service connection regarding his mental 

disorder.” J.A. 1539 (emphasis added). Another Field 

Examination Report in May 1995 considered Mr. Diggs’ 

capacity to manage funds and concluded that Mr. Diggs’ 

VA benefits should continue to be sent to his wife. J.A. 

1542–46. The report also stated, in the “Entitlement To 

Benefits” section, that “[t]he veteran also mentioned to me 

that he has a claim pending for service-connection for his 

mental condition and his claim is presently in the Veterans Court of Appeals.” J.A. 1545 (emphasis added). 

In November 1997, Mr. Diggs again requested to reopen his claim for service connection. J.A. 4. The Regional 

Office denied service connection in July 1999, but on 

appeal, the Board sought a medical opinion regarding 

whether Mr. Diggs’ condition worsened during service. 
DIGGS v. SHULKIN 5

On May 8, 2003, Mr. Diggs received a medical examination from the VA, and the VA subsequently granted 

Mr. Diggs service connection in 2004. J.A. 1923–28; 

1994–98. Mr. Diggs’ service connection for schizophrenia

was granted effective the date of his 1997 claim.

Mr. Diggs challenged that 1997 effective date both on 

direct appeal, and through an assertion of clear and 

unmistakable error (“CUE”) in the 1978 board decision.2 

On direct appeal, Mr. Diggs argued that he was entitled 

to an earlier date because he had earlier claims for service 

connection that remained unadjudicated. J.A. 3176. 

Specifically, Mr. Diggs argued that his March 1995 

statement to the VA as recorded in the VA examiner’s 

report constituted a timely substantive appeal of the 

November 1994 SOC. This argument was rejected by the 

Board in an April 17, 2014 decision, finding that the 

report did not indicate disagreement with any VA decision 

or contain any of the information contemplated by 38 

U.S.C. § 7105(d)(3). J.A. 21. Mr. Diggs appealed to the 

Veterans Court, which affirmed the Board’s decision. The 

Veterans Court held “that the Board properly found that 

the March 1995 report does not meet the criteria to be 

construed as a Substantive Appeal, as it does not reflect 

any disagreement with or desire to appeal the November 

1994 SOC.” J.A. 8 (citing Gibson v. Peake, 22 Vet. App. 

11, 15 (2007); 38 U.S.C. § 7105(d)(3); 38 C.F.R. § 20.202). 

This appeal followed.

DISCUSSION

1. Standard of Review and Jurisdiction

This court may review a Veterans Court decision 

“with respect to the validity of a decision of the Court on a 

rule of law or of any statute or regulation.” 38 U.S.C. 

 

2 Mr. Diggs has withdrawn his CUE argument and 

therefore it is no longer at issue for this appeal. 
6 DIGGS v. SHULKIN

§ 7292(a). This court may not, however, “review the 

Veterans Court’s factual findings or its application of law 

to facts absent a constitutional issue.” Singleton v. 

Shinseki, 659 F.3d 1332, 1334 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (citations 

omitted).

In reviewing a Veterans Court decision, this court 

may decide “all relevant questions of law, including 

interpreting constitutional and statutory provisions.” 38 

U.S.C. § 7292(d)(1). This court “reviews de novo statutory 

and regulatory interpretations relied upon by the Veterans Court.” Mayfield v. Nicholson, 499 F.3d 1317, 1321 

(Fed. Cir. 2007).

As a preliminary matter, the government contends 

that we must dismiss this appeal for lack of jurisdiction. 

The Secretary argues we lack jurisdiction to hear the 

appeal because the appeal is not directed to a question of 

law, but rather to application of law to facts. We disagree. Both parties agree that the facts are undisputed. 

Mr. Diggs argues on appeal that the Veterans Court failed 

to apply the controlling rule of law in Rivera v. Shinseki, 

654 F.3d 1377 (Fed. Cir. 2011), and applied an improper 

legal standard in adopting the Board’s four-corners test. 

These questions concern whether the correct rule of law 

was applied and invoke questions of law that are reviewable by this court. Willsey v. Peake, 535 F.3d 1368, 1372 

(Fed. Cir. 2008). This court, therefore, has jurisdiction to 

review the Veterans Court decision raised in this appeal. 

2. Applicability of Rivera v. Shinseki

A core issue that was before the Veterans Court concerns a March 1995 report prepared by a VA field examiner. J.A. 7, 1538–41. Mr. Diggs did not file it himself, 

and it merely notes that Mr. Diggs “has filed a claim for 

service connection regarding his mental disorder.” J.A. 

1539. The record also shows a second VA field examination report from May 1995, which states that “the veteran 

also mentioned to [the examiner] that he has a claim 
DIGGS v. SHULKIN 7

pending for service-connection for his mental condition 

and his claim is presently in the Veterans Court of Appeals.” J.A. 1545.

Mr. Diggs argued that the March 1995 report constituted an appeal of the November 1994 SOC. The Veterans Court disagreed, holding “that the Board properly 

found that the March 1995 report does not meet the 

criteria to be construed as a Substantive Appeal, as it 

does not reflect any disagreement with or desire to appeal 

the November 1994 SOC.” J.A. 8 (citing Gibson v. Peake, 

22 Vet. App. 11, 15 (2007); 38 U.S.C. § 7105(d)(3); 38 

C.F.R. § 20.202). Specifically, the Veterans Court noted 

the Board’s finding that the March 1995 report does not 

contain any of the information contemplated by 38 U.S.C. 

§ 7105(d)(3). J.A. 7. That subsection states:

The claimant will be afforded a period of sixty

days from the date the statement of the case is 

mailed to file the formal appeal. This may be extended for a reasonable period on request for good 

cause shown. The appeal should set out specific 

allegations of error of fact or law, such allegations 

related to specific items in the statement of the 

case. The benefits sought on appeal must be clearly identified.

38 U.S.C. § 7105(d)(3). 

On appeal, Mr. Diggs argues that the Veterans Court 

failed to apply the controlling rule of law in Rivera v. 

Shinseki, 654 F.3d 1377 (Fed. Cir. 2011). In Rivera, we 

held that “Section 7105(d)(3) does not prescribe a particular format for the veteran’s appeal or a particular degree 

of specificity that must be provided.” Id. at 1381. “[L]ess

specificity is necessary when the regional office’s decision 

turns on only a single issue and the nature of the claimed 

error with respect to that issue is obvious from the decision itself.” Id. “In fact, when the regional office decides 

only one issue and references only one issue in the state-
8 DIGGS v. SHULKIN

ment of the case, the veteran’s expression of a desire to 

appeal from the regional office’s decision effectively identifies the issue to be decided by the Board.” Id. 

Mr. Diggs argues that his statements to the VA examiner expressed a desire to appeal, and that those statements under Rivera were sufficient to constitute an 

expression to appeal. Mr. Diggs argues that the Veterans 

Court erred when it relied on Gibson, rather than Rivera. 

We disagree. The Veterans Court cited Gibson for the 

correct legal proposition that to qualify as an appeal, the 

veteran’s statement must reflect disagreement. 22 Vet. 

App. at 15. Although Rivera holds that “the veteran’s 

expression of a desire to appeal from the regional office’s 

decision” might itself be a sufficient appeal in some cases, 

654 F.3d at 1381, the Board found that the March 1995 

report “does not reflect any disagreement with or desire to 

appeal the November 1994 SOC.” J.A. 8. The Veterans 

Court affirmed the Board’s conclusion that “[t]here is no 

indication of disagreement with any VA decision contained within the report.” J.A. 8, 21. The Veterans 

Court, therefore, did not need to address Rivera. 

Mr. Diggs argues that in reaching this conclusion, the 

Board and the Veterans Court improperly confined their

analysis and consideration to the four corners of Mr. 

Diggs’ March 1995 document and ignored all other documents in his claims file. 

Mr. Diggs notes that 38 C.F.R. § 20.202 requires the 

Board to read filings by claimants in a liberal manner. 

Mr. Diggs also cites Douglas v. Derwinski, 2 Vet. App. 

435, 439 (1992), which found that the Board’s review is 

not limited to the four corners of a Form 1-9 substantive 

appeal, and that the Board must consider all the evidence 

of record.

In this case, however, there was no appeal filed in 

1995. Mr. Diggs did not make any sort of filing in 1995, 

and the oral statements he did make did not include a 
DIGGS v. SHULKIN 9

request for an appeal. There is no requirement that the 

Board interpret filings liberally where no filings were 

made. Douglas does not apply in this case because the 

claimant in Douglas had actually filed an appeal. 

We find that the Veterans Court did not err in refusing to apply a “four-corners” test. We affirm the Veterans 

Court’s decision.

3. Notice to Mr. Diggs

Finally, Mr. Diggs argues that the Board failed to 

provide him notice of the inadequacy of his 1995 “appeal” 

as required under 38 C.F.R. § 20.203 (1994). The Veterans Court did not address this issue in its opinion as it 

was never raised by Mr. Diggs. 

Notwithstanding, the Veterans Court found there was 

no substantive appeal filed and, as such, it did not need to 

reach the issue of whether the Board should have provided notice of that nonexistent appeal’s inadequacy. Therefore, Mr. Diggs’ argument that the Board failed to provide 

him notice is unpersuasive. 

CONCLUSION

Because the Veterans Court applied the correct rule of 

law, we affirm the Veterans Court’s decision.

AFFIRMED

COSTS

No costs.