If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to 

revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports.

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S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N

C O U R T O F A P P E A L S

In re ESTATE OF FREDERICK L. DECHOW.

EDWARD J. DECHOW,

Appellant,

UNPUBLISHED

October 22, 2019

v No. 346203

Leelanau Probate Court

MARY ELLEN MEACHUM and ANN K. 

DECHOW,

LC No. 16-012480-DA

Appellees.

Before: STEPHENS, P.J., and SERVITTO and RONAYNE KRAUSE, JJ. 

PER CURIAM. 

Edward J. Dechow appeals as of right the probate court’s order denying a petition filed 

by the independent personal representative of the estate of Frederick L. Dechow, deceased, to 

disburse or release a portion of the decedent’s coins to Edward, and instead ordering that the 

disputed coins be retained by or returned to Mary Ellen Meachum. We affirm. 

I. FACTS 

In November 1993, the decedent and his wife executed a will and trust agreement. Under 

the trust provisions, all assets were to be divided evenly among their descendants after the 

grantors’ deaths. At the time of his death, the decedent’s surviving heirs were his five children:

Edward J. Dechow, Ann K. Dechow, Mary Ellen Meachum, Frederick J. Dechow and Gilberta 

L. Dechow.

1

 The decedent executed a codicil on June 17, 2015, purporting to dispose of a parcel 

of real property to Edward and Ann. However, on May 1, 2016, the decedent executed a second 

will. The May 2016 will changed the distribution of the decedent’s estate to his surviving 

 1 We will refer to the parties by their first names for convenience. 
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children, by increasing the amount of the estate Ann received and, in turn, decreasing the 

remaining four heirs’ distribution of the estate and revoking the June 2017 codicil. The May 

2016 will also appointed Ann as the estate’s personal representative. The 2016 will contained 

the following language concerning the disposition of certain personal property: 

Note: any other assets held jointly between myself and my children (e.g., coins, 

investments, vehicles, checking and savings accounts) are not part of the 

“TRUST” and are bequeathed to the joint holder. 

The will did not identify or define “joint holder.” 

The decedent died on June 11, 2016. At a family meeting on July 16, 2016, Edward

distributed coins in his possession that he and the decedent collected together. Edward believed 

that he and the decedent were the only joint holders of the coins and that the distribution carried 

out the decedent’s verbally expressed wishes. According to Edward’s affidavit, Ann provided 

the family with a copy of the May 2016 will at the same meeting. Edward’s affidavit indicates 

that he disbelieved the validity of the May 2016 will, but apparently he took no further action 

regarding the will or the coins at that time. 

Ann submitted the May 2016 will to probate in November 2016. Edward contested the 

May 2016 will, which led to a settlement between Edward and Ann. At the time of the 

settlement, the court appointed an independent attorney as the estate’s personal representative. 

The court order also required all interested parties to return their portions of the decedent’s estate 

assets identified in the May 2016 will to the personal representative. The court granted Edward’s 

attorney 120 days to complete discovery regarding the May 2016 will’s validity. 

Pursuant to the court’s order, Mary Ellen returned to the personal representative most of 

the coins Edward distributed to her in July 2016. Mary Ellen claimed she had distributed the 

unreturned coins to her children. She sent the personal representative a check for $4,000 in those 

coins’ stead. The check was never deposited or cashed, and it eventually expired.2 Ann also 

returned her portion of the coins to the personal representative. The personal representative later 

filed a petition to distribute Mary Ellen and Ann’s coins to Edward, on the basis Edward and the 

decedent were the two joint holders of the coins at the time of the decedent’s death. Mary Ellen 

objected to this petition. Following a hearing, the probate court found that Edward’s prior 

actions of distributing the coins to his siblings and his statements about executing his father’s 

verbal wishes refuted his contention that he was a joint holder of the coins. The court entered an 

order that denied the personal representative’s request to disburse the coins, ordered that Mary 

Ellen could retain any coins in her possession, and ordered the personal representative to return 

to Mary Ellen any coins she had returned. Edward appeals that decision. Ann has not 

participated in this appeal. 

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW 

 2 Because the trial court eventually ruled that Mary Ellen could retain the coins distributed to her, 

the check and its expiration were rendered moot. 
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We review the probate court’s interpretation of the will de novo. In re Raymond Estate,

483 Mich 48, 57; 764 NW2d 1 (2009). However, we give deference to the probate court’s 

factual findings regarding the will, and will reverse the probate court’s decision only for clear 

error. Id. To the extent the probate court’s decision sounded in equity, “an appellate court will 

set aside a trial court’s factual findings only if they are clearly erroneous, but whether equitable 

relief is proper under those facts is a question of law that an appellate court reviews de novo.” 

McDonald v Farm Bureau Ins Co, 480 Mich 191, 197; 747 NW2d 811 (2008). 

“The primary goal of the Court in construing a will is to effectuate, to the extent 

consistent with the law, the intent of the testator.” In re Edgar Estate, 425 Mich 364, 378; 389 

NW2d 696 (1986); see also In re McPeak Estate, 210 Mich App 410, 412; 534 NW2d 140 

(1995). “[I]t is the duty of the courts to carry out as nearly as possible the intent of a testator or 

testatrix as to the distribution of an estate in so far as such intent has been expressed in the lawful 

provisions of a will.” In re Howlett’s Estate, 275 Mich 596, 600-601; 267 NW 743 (1936). The 

court must effectuate the will by the “drafter’s intent as indicated in the plain language of the 

will,” so verbal intent is irrelevant. In re Raymond Estate, 483 Mich at 52. Furthermore,

“[a]bsent an ambiguity, the court is to glean the testator’s intent from the four corners of the 

testamentary instrument.” In re McPeak Estate, 210 Mich App at 412. The probate court must 

read a will incorporating all of the will’s components, and must harmonize those components 

with the testator’s expressed intent. In re Raymond Estate, 483 Mich at 52.

III. ANALYSIS 

We agree with Edward’s assertion that he is the joint holder of the coins. However, as 

we will discuss, we conclude that the probate court arrived at the correct outcome.

As noted above, the will does not identify the joint holder of the coins. However, when 

ambiguity exists in a will, parties can introduce parol evidence to explain ambiguities and to 

support their arguments regarding a will’s interpretation. Shay v Aldrich, 487 Mich 648, 672 

(2010). Circumstantial evidence, and reasonable inferences therefrom, may be used to establish 

a disputed fact. Skinner v Square D Co, 445 Mich 153, 164-165; 516 NW2d 475 (1994). “Joint” 

is defined in relevant part as “united, joined, or sharing with another.” Merriam-Webster’s 

Collegiate Dictionary (11th ed). Black’s Law Dictionary (11th ed),3 defines “joint property” as 

“[r]eal or personal property held by two or more persons with a right of survivorship.” Similarly,

Black’s Law Dictionary defines “joint interest” as “[a]n interest that is acquired at the same time 

and by the same title as another person’s.” “Joint ownership” is defined as an “[u]ndivided 

ownership shared by two or more persons.” Id. 

The plain language of the May 2016 will shows that the decedent understood himself to 

be a joint owner of various assets, including the coins, with at least one of his children. The 

evidence shows by unambiguous and necessary inference that Edward must have been the sole 

joint owner of the coins. Specifically, the evidence indicates that none of the other children had 

 3 There is no specific entry for “joint owner” or “joint holder” in Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate 

Dictionary. 
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physical possession of any portion of the coin collection at the time of the decedent’s death, nor 

did any of the other children share the decedent’s long-standing interest in the coins. The 

probate court erred by relying on Edward’s conduct of distributing the coins. Irrespective of 

what the distribution may imply about Edward’s understanding, Edward’s conduct after the 

decedent’s death cannot have any relevance to the decedent’s understanding and intent when the 

2016 will was drafted.4 See In re Cullmann Estate, 169 Mich App 778, 787-789; 426 NW2d 811 

(1988). At the time the May 2016 will was drafted, the decedent unambiguously expected and 

intended at least one of his children to be a joint holder of the coins. Edward was the only 

person whose actions proved him to be the joint holder of the coin collection. Under the plain 

language of the will, Edward was entitled to the coins. The probate court erred in holding to the 

contrary. 

We nevertheless conclude that the probate court properly refused to order the coins 

returned to Edward, because we conclude that his distribution in July 2016 was a gift to his 

family members. For this reason, Mary Ellen and Ann may retain the share of the coins they 

returned to the personal representative. Furthermore, Mary Ellen is not required to issue a new 

check for $4,000 to replace the expired check she gave to the personal representative. 

“In order for a gift to be valid, three elements must be satisfied: (1) the donor must 

possess the intent to transfer title gratuitously to the donee, (2) there must be actual or 

constructive delivery of the subject matter to the donee, unless it is already in the donee’s 

possession, and (3) the donee must accept the gift.” Davidson v Bugbee, 227 Mich App 264, 

268; 575 NW2d 574 (1997) (internal quotes omitted). “Acceptance is presumed if the gift is 

beneficial to the donee.” Id. (internal quotes omitted). Once the donor of the object executes all 

elements of gift-giving, the object’s title transfers from the donor to the donee. Edward’s 

distribution of the coins satisfies all of the elements of a gift but one: whether his intent to 

transfer title was “gratuitous.” 

First, Edward was not legally obligated to comply with the decedent’s verbally expressed 

wishes regarding the coins. Testamentary intent must be expressed in a will. See MCL 

700.2101. Historically, Michigan permitted certain properly-witnessed oral statements to 

constitute nuncupative wills. See R.S. 1846, Title XVI, Ch 68, §§ 5-6; former MCL 702.5-

702.6. Nuncupative wills were abolished by 1978 PA 642, enacting the former Revised Probate 

Code, MCL 700.1 et seq. See former MCL 700.993(1). Thus, testamentary intent must now be 

in writing. MCL 700.2502, MCL 700.2503. Oral expressions may only be used to explain an 

ambiguity, not to craft an unwritten bequest or devise. See Waldron v Waldron, 45 Mich 350, 

353-354; 7 NW 894 (1881). Furthermore, Edward’s reference to the decedent’s “wishes,” as 

opposed to an instruction or directive, suggests merely precatory language that would also be 

insufficient to create a bequest or devise. See Crisp v Anderson, 204 Mich 35, 39-40; 169 NW 

 4 In any event, the most that can be directly inferred from Edward’s distribution of the coins is 

that he believed he had the right to make that distribution. This does not necessarily imply that 

he believed himself to be the joint holder at the time, but the distribution is not inconsistent with 

such a belief. 
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855 (2018). The decedent’s verbally expressed wishes to Edward were, therefore, not legally 

binding upon him. 

“Gratuitous” merely means without obligation or consideration. See Fultz v UnionCommerce Assoc, 470 Mich 460, 464; 683 NW2d 587 (2004); Assoc of Prof and Technical 

Employees v City of Detroit, 154 Mich App 440, 444; 398 NW2d 436 (1986); Schenk v Mercury 

Marine Div, Lowe Indus, 155 Mich App 20, 25-26; 399 NW2d 428 (1986). An act “in 

consideration of natural love and affection” is voluntary. Cummings v Freer, 26 Mich 128, 136 

(1872). Likewise, a moral obligation does not, by itself, create a legal duty. People v Beardsley, 

150 Mich 206, 209, 212-215; 113 NW 1128 (1907). The evidence shows that Edward was not 

under any actual obligation to make the distribution, and it fails to show that Edward subjectively 

believed himself to be obligated to make the distribution. The evidence shows only that Edward 

distributed the coins because he believed doing so was proper. Furthermore, given Edward’s 

description of the vastness of the decedent’s estate, making the distribution of his own accord, 

without going through the probate process, is only consistent with a belief that he was the sole 

owner of the coins and could dispose of them at his discretion. Therefore, Edward cannot ask for 

the coins’ return, because he gave the coins as gifts, which transferred title of the coins. 

IV. CONCLUSION 

The probate court arrived at the correct outcome, albeit based on incorrect reasoning. 

The May 2016 will establishes that Edward was the joint holder of the coins, and so, Edward was 

solely entitled to receive the coins. However, Edward, in his capacity as joint holder of the 

coins, executed all of the elements of giving a gift when he distributed the coins to his siblings. 

Because Edward acted through his own volition to give the coins to Mary Ellen and Ann as gifts,

Edward cannot require Mary Ellen and Ann to return the gifts of coins to him. Furthermore, 

Mary Ellen is not required to issue a replacement check for the $4,000 worth of coins she did not 

return to the personal representative. 

Affirmed. Appellee Mary Ellen Meachum, being the prevailing party participating in this 

appeal, may tax costs. MCR 7.219(A). 

/s/ Cynthia Diane Stephens 

/s/ Deborah A. Servitto 

/s/ Amy Ronayne Krause