IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE

AT KNOXVILLE

February 25, 2020 Session

STATE OF TENNESSEE v. DOYLE WAYNE MASON, JR.

Appeal from the Criminal Court for Knox County

No. 109267 Steven W. Sword, Judge

No. E2019-00174-CCA-R3-CD

The Defendant, Doyle Wayne Mason, Jr., was convicted by a jury of one count each of

aggravated sexual battery, solicitation of a minor, and sexual battery by an authority figure; 

and eleven counts each of statutory rape by an authority figure, incest, and rape. The trial 

court imposed an effective sentence of fifty-two years’ incarceration. On appeal, the 

Defendant argues that (1) the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions for

aggravated sexual battery, solicitation of a minor, and rape; (2) a material and prejudicial 

variance existed between the bill of particulars and the State’s election relative to the 

aggravated sexual battery count; (3) the court “took on the role of the prosecutor” by 

questioning the victim and inadvertently conveyed to the jury that the court found the 

victim credible; (4) the court erred by admitting hearsay evidence that the victim reported 

the abuse to others; and (5) the sentence imposed by the court was excessive. After a 

thorough review of the record and applicable law, we affirm. 

Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgments of the Criminal Court Affirmed

D. KELLY THOMAS, JR., J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which JAMES CURWOOD 

WITT, JR., and ROBERT H. MONTGOMERY, JR.,JJ., joined.

Mark E. Stephens, District Public Defender, and Jonathan Harwell, Assistant Public 

Defender (on appeal); and Michael L. Debusk (at trial) Knoxville, Tennessee, for the 

appellant, Doyle Wayne Mason, Jr.

Herbert H. Slatery III, Attorney General and Reporter; Garrett D. Ward, Assistant Attorney 

General; Charme P. Allen, District Attorney General; and Rachel Russell and Joanie 

Stewart, Assistant District Attorneys General, for the appellee, State of Tennessee.

OPINION

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

08/25/2020
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This case arises out of the Defendant’s sexually abusing his minor stepdaughter, 

A.L.,

1

from 2012 to 2016, when A.L. was between eleven and fifteen years old and the 

Defendant was between thirty-two and thirty-five years old. In June 2016, A.L. disclosed 

the abuse to her mother and grandmother. Thereafter, the November 2016 term of the 

Knox County Grand Jury indicted the Defendant on the following charges: one count of 

aggravated statutory rape; one count of solicitation of a minor; three counts of sexual 

battery by an authority figure; and eleven counts each of statutory rape by an authority 

figure, incest, and rape. See Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 39-13-503(a)(1); -13-504(a)(4); -13-

527(a); -13-528(a)(8); -13-532(a)(3)(A); -15-302(a)(1).

1. Contextual Evidence

At trial, A.L and her mother, R.M., testified regarding their family history and the 

context in which the abuse occurred. A.L. was born in Illinois in May 2001; R.M. separated 

from A.L.’s father about one year later; and R.M., A.L.’s older half-brother, and A.L.

subsequently relocated to Virginia. R.M. met the Defendant there in 2004, when A.L. was 

almost three years old. The Defendant lived with the family for two years before he and 

R.M. married in April 2006. Both R.M. and A.L. stated that the Defendant was a father 

figure to A.L. and that A.L. only saw her father during visits to Illinois in the summer and 

at the Christmas holidays. 

In August 2007, R.M. and the Defendant bought a house in Knoxville and moved

there. The family house had three bedrooms and two bathrooms. A.L. slept in the smallest 

bedroom; A.L.’s half-brother slept in the second bedroom; and R.M. and the Defendant 

shared the master bedroom. 

The Defendant worked at a Knoxville tire shop, where R.M. also obtained 

employment. The Defendant and R.M. reported to work at 5:00 a.m.; R.M. left work 

between two and four o’clock each day, but the Defendant generally worked until later in 

the afternoon. R.M. stated that three days per week, another employee worked until 4:00 

p.m. and that on the remaining two days per week, the Defendant was alone after R.M. left. 

In the summers of 2012 and 2013,2 A.L. remained in Knoxville and was at the tire 

shop during the day; A.L. stayed in the office building in the room that overlooked the tire 

shop. R.M. noted that they created a bedroom for A.L. in the office, including a recliner 

and an air mattress. 

 

1

It is the policy of this court to refer to minors and victims of sexual offenses by their initials. To further 

protect A.L.’s privacy, we will also refer to her mother, R.M., by her initials. 

2 These years correspond to R.M.’s description, which was that A.L. spent both summers at the tire shop 

between fifth and sixth grade and sixth and seventh grade. 
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R.M. testified that after A.L. began middle school, their relationship deteriorated; at 

the same time, A.L. began growing closer to the Defendant. A.L. characterized her 

relationship with R.M. as “[n]ot very good” and stated that she “felt pretty alone” because 

R.M. was not “there for [her]” as much as she should have been. R.M. testified that she 

believed A.L.’s distancing herself was typical teenage behavior. Both A.L. and R.M. 

affirmed that R.M. enjoyed a close relationship with A.L.’s half-brother, that A.L. felt as 

though R.M. treated him better than A.L., and that A.L. felt neglected by R.M. A.L. 

acknowledged that R.M. came to one of her softball practices intoxicated and that A.L. was 

embarrassed. A.L. agreed that she felt estranged from R.M. due to R.M.’s conduct. 

R.M. testified that she first became suspicious of the nature of the Defendant’s 

relationship with A.L. after R.M. and the Defendant separated in May 2015; however, R.M. 

also stated that when A.L. was about twelve years old, A.L.’s father “swore up and down 

that she was being sexually active because the way she was on her phone.” As a result, 

R.M. took A.L. to a gynecologist, who told R.M. that “everything was fine and intact, that 

she hadn’t had sexual intercourse.” R.M. took A.L. to a similar appointment when she was 

fourteen years old with the same result. A.L. denied being sexually active at both 

appointments; she testified that she believed the doctor referred only to “actual sex,” 

meaning vaginal intercourse. 

R.M. testified that when A.L. was in sixth grade, R.M. began returning to the house 

unannounced to determine whether anything inappropriate was occurring between the 

Defendant and A.L. R.M. stated that the front door was typically locked with a dead bolt 

or a “slide lock” such that R.M. had to “beat on the door” to enter the house. R.M. asked 

the Defendant multiple times if he was cheating on her. The Defendant swore that “nothing 

was ever going on,” even though he had long telephone conversations with other women. 

According to R.M., during A.L.’s visit to Illinois in the summer of 2014, A.L. told 

R.M. that she wanted to stay with her grandmother instead of her father. A.L. complained 

to R.M. that she did not have her own bedroom at her father’s house and that her father had 

“walked in on her” while she was taking a shower. A.L. stated that she had no privacy and 

felt trapped there. R.M. affirmed that the previous summer, A.L. and her father had a 

“pretty big argument.” 

A.L. also testified regarding an argument with her father in which he confronted her 

about her relationship with the Defendant. A.L. stated that her father was angry and that 

she was scared and unsure what to do. A.L. did not disclose the abuse at that juncture

because she was “scared and confused, and [the Defendant] told [her] never to tell anyone.” 

After that summer, A.L. began to stay with her grandmother. 

R.M. testified that although she inspected the family’s cell phone records and saw 

documentation of calls and text messages between the Defendant and A.L., R.M. never 
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found corresponding messages on either cell phone. R.M. opined that the Defendant 

deleted his messages and that A.L. deleted call logs and text messages before handing R.M. 

her cell phone. R.M. stated that A.L. placed a password lock on her cell phone in eighth 

grade; although R.M. was generally able to guess the Defendant’s password, after they 

separated, he never “let his phone out of his sight.” 

The Defendant and R.M. separated in 2015; R.M. remained in the marital home for 

financial reasons, and the Defendant told R.M. that he wanted to stay in the home until 

A.L. graduated from high school. Although R.M. began a romantic relationship with 

another man, she and the Defendant shared the master bedroom until A.L.’s half-brother 

moved out in January 2016. However, A.L. testified that R.M. moved out of the Knoxville 

house on A.L.’s fourteenth birthday in May 2015. R.M. stated that she “very occasionally” 

spent the night at her boyfriend’s house during the week and that she and her boyfriend

went to Virginia most weekends to renovate the house R.M. and the Defendant still owned 

there. 

R.M. testified that she “beg[ged]” A.L. to come to Virginia with her and that A.L. 

refused, citing the lack of internet and television at the Virginia home and A.L.’s desire to 

be in Knoxville where her “life” was. R.M. said that she understood A.L.’s position and 

that she believed A.L. was safe and happy at home with the Defendant. 

R.M. testified that her relationship with the Defendant was friendlier after they 

separated and that she brought up the possibility of reconciling. According to R.M., the 

Defendant was not interested and told her that he wanted to wait before discussing 

reconciliation, citing his satisfaction with their improved dynamic and his desire that R.M. 

have the opportunity to fully explore her relationship with her new boyfriend. 

R.M. also testified, though, that she became suspicious of the Defendant’s 

relationship with A.L. during this time and that she noticed “a difference in” A.L. R.M. 

gave examples of A.L.’s behavior, including A.L.’s sitting “literally . . . right up on top of” 

the Defendant on the couch; spending more time at the tire shop; being willing to go to the 

grocery store and other places with the Defendant but not with R.M.; being “more involved 

in what [the Defendant] was doing versus what she should have been doing”; being 

disinterested in spending time with friends and doing “teenage things”; and being “locked 

to her phone” when she spent time with R.M. When R.M. asked A.L. with whom she was 

communicating, A.L. said a person named “D.J.”3 

 R.M. testified that on one weeknight in early 2016, she went to the Knoxville house

from her boyfriend’s house before reporting to work. When R.M. entered the front door 

 

3 A.L. testified that she called the Defendant “D.J.”; the police investigator also referred to the Defendant 

as D.J. during his interview.
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around 3:30 a.m., she saw A.L. coming out of the master bedroom, where the Defendant 

was still sleeping. R.M. stated that A.L. was wrapped in a large blanket. R.M. confronted 

both A.L. and the Defendant; A.L. claimed that she was sleeping on the couch, heard a 

sound, and went into the master bedroom to look out the front window. R.M. stated that 

A.L. never fell asleep on the couch and always slept in her own bed. 

R.M. testified that when she asked A.L. and the Defendant about “what was going 

on between the two” of them, they told her that she was crazy for thinking they would “do 

something together,” and that they just had a close relationship because A.L. was not close 

with her father. R.M. recounted multiple instances in which she questioned A.L. and the 

Defendant about their behavior, and R.M. accepted their innocent explanations. 

R.M. acknowledged that she and the Defendant were in the process of divorcing and 

that she and the Defendant had fought about money during the proceedings. R.M. denied 

telling the Defendant that he would “regret” not reconciling with her or that she would take 

everything he had. 

2. A.L.’s Testimony

A.L. testified that she confided in the Defendant, told him secrets, and discussed 

things with him about which she was uncomfortable speaking to R.M. She stated that she 

spent time alone with the Defendant when she was growing up, that she trusted the 

Defendant more than she trusted R.M., and that she looked up to the Defendant. A.L. stated 

that she wanted “just a dad” because she did not see her father often and that she did not 

anticipate having a romantic relationship with the Defendant. A.L. testified that her 

relationship with the Defendant began to change when she was about eleven years old, and 

she described two “games” that the Defendant played with her when they were alone at 

home. 

a. Picture Game

The first game, which A.L. called the “picture game,” occurred when she was in 

sixth grade.4 The game consisted of one person’s taking a photograph of a body part in the 

bathroom using a handheld Nintendo device; the other person would view the photograph 

in the living room and guess which part it was. The players could not photograph a body 

part twice. Eventually, the Defendant showed A.L. a photograph of his penis. At some 

point thereafter, A.L. ran out of obvious body parts to photograph. The Defendant told her, 

“You know, there’s something else that you haven’t taken a picture of.” A.L. understood 

 

4 Upon questioning by the trial court, A.L. stated that she was in eleventh grade at the time of trial in January 

2018, and that she would turn seventeen in May 2018. She had never repeated a grade. As a result, A.L. 

was eleven years old during her sixth grade year until May, when she turned twelve.
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the Defendant’s statement to mean that he wanted her to photograph her breasts. As a 

result, A.L. photographed her bare breasts and showed the photograph to the Defendant. 

A.L. stated that the incident made her feel “[v]ery uncomfortable” but that she did not 

discuss it with the Defendant. 

When asked why she took the photograph, A.L. said, “I wasn’t sure what was going 

on and I didn’t really know much about it.” According to A.L., the Defendant looked at 

the photograph and never indicated that it was not what he wanted or that he “did not want 

[her] to reciprocate in this fashion.” 

b. Shower Game

A.L. testified that the second game she and the Defendant played was called the 

“shower game”; A.L. described it as “hide and go seek and tag put together.” A.L. stated 

that on one occasion when she was eleven or twelve years old, she was taking a shower 

when the Defendant came in and grabbed her without warning. She said that she felt “very 

confused and kind of violated[.]” She said that as time progressed, she came to understand 

the “rules of the game,” although the Defendant never articulated them explicitly. After 

the first time, the Defendant would ask if she was “ready” and come in and “try to grab one 

of [her] body parts in the shower”; one of the rules was that the Defendant could not look 

inside the shower curtain. A.L. stated that the shower game only happened “on[c]e in a 

while.” A.L. said that the shower game began after the picture game in which she showed 

the Defendant a photograph of her breasts. 

A.L. testified that during the shower game, the Defendant sometimes grabbed her 

arm or leg, but that on more than one occasion, he grabbed A.L.’s breast. A.L. stated that 

when the Defendant grabbed her breast, it was not the first time the game occurred. The 

Defendant said, “I got you,” walked out, and did not apologize or indicate that the touching 

was accidental. A.L. did not believe the Defendant’s grabbing her breast was accidental; 

however, because the Defendant was not supposed to look behind the shower curtain, A.L. 

could not be certain that the Defendant acted intentionally. A.L. noted that the shower 

game “stopped and then turned into something more than that as [she] got older.” She said 

that she was about twelve years old when the game stopped. A.L. noted that initially, she 

was unsure whether she and the Defendant were in a relationship. 

c. Kissing and Sexual Touching

A.L. testified that after the shower game ended and when she was twelve or thirteen 

years old, the Defendant began kissing her on the lips; however, A.L. also testified that the 

kissing started when she was eleven or twelve years old. According to A.L., they were 

usually in the living room when the Defendant kissed her, and this sometimes occurred 

when she sat next to the Defendant on the couch while they watched television. During
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this time period, the Defendant conveyed to A.L. that they were boyfriend and girlfriend 

and that being boyfriend and girlfriend meant they “were supposed to do sexual things 

together.” A.L. stated that she “wasn’t sure, but [she] just did it because that’s what he told 

[her].” A.L. affirmed that she trusted the Defendant and that he was like a father to her. 

A.L. testified that when she and the Defendant started kissing, the Defendant told 

her to keep their relationship secret because he would get in trouble if anyone found out 

about it. A.L. stated that she trusted the Defendant and thought “what he was telling [her] 

was all right, and that it was okay, ‘cause [she] wasn’t really sure about anything ‘cause 

[she] was so young.” She stated that she wanted to tell others and thought it was “odd” 

that she could not; she said, though, that she “was so used to the fact of him being around, 

[she] couldn’t think of him not being around. It was hard to think about.” 

When asked whether A.L. understood the significance of the dates of the sexual 

incidents, A.L. responded, “Yes, but it’s very hard for me to remember because it’s been 

almost two years and I have tried to forget[,] . . . and it happened so much that I can’t 

remember like exactly. That’s why I have to give such a big time frame.” She 

acknowledged her statement to the Child Help interviewer that the first “sexual stuff” 

began when the Defendant kissed her, that the kiss was a “peck on the lips,” and that she 

was uncertain whether it occurred before her thirteenth birthday. When asked whether, in 

light of her statement to Child Help, “everything else had to [have] occur[ed]” after she 

turned thirteen, A.L. responded that the “games started first,” then “it evolved to kissing 

and then other sexual things[.]” A.L. reiterated that the shower game and the kissing 

occurred before she turned thirteen. 

A.L. further testified that when she was twelve or thirteen years old and in seventh 

grade, she and the Defendant “started doing sexual things.” A.L. stated that the first sexual 

activity was A.L.’s manually stimulating the Defendant’s penis until he ejaculated and that 

this type of activity occurred about three times. A.L. stated that all three incidents occurred 

during the school year; she could not recall whether any of them occurred after her 

thirteenth birthday in May. 

A.L. testified that on the first occasion, she was sitting on the floor in the living 

room and the Defendant was on the couch. She said that the Defendant “kind of just pulled 

his penis out, and [she] reached over and put [her] hand on it[.]” A.L. noted that the 

Defendant grabbed her wrist and “kind of guided [her]” movements because she had never 

touched a penis before and did not know what to do. A.L. saw the Defendant ejaculate; 

she said that during this type of incident, the Defendant typically went to the bathroom, 

cleaned himself, and returned to watch television with A.L. 

A.L. testified that the first time the Defendant touched her breasts after the shower 

game incidents was a “little bit before” he began to touch her vaginal area. She stated that 
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the Defendant touched her breasts in the living room when she was in sixth grade on an 

occasion when they were “making out” on the larger couch. The Defendant touched A.L.’s 

breast over her clothes, then put his hand underneath her clothing and touched her bare 

breast. 

She stated that “[e]very once in a while when [they] were doing things” after she 

turned thirteen, the Defendant touched her breast. She noted that when they were in the 

living room, the Defendant would kiss down her neck to her breasts while touching her 

breasts, that sometimes things would “stop there,” and that sometimes “other things would 

happen too.” A.L. agreed that on some occasions, the touching would accompany fellatio 

and that other times, the touching would occur without fellatio because her mother arrived 

home. 

A.L. recalled a specific incident after she turned thirteen when the Defendant 

touched her breasts. A.L. and the Defendant were watching television in the living room 

at nighttime; the Defendant was touching A.L.’s breasts; R.M. was supposed to be traveling 

to Virginia but came home unexpectedly; A.L. and the Defendant heard a car door slam 

outside; and the Defendant got up, looked out the window, and said, “Your mom’s home.”

d. Digital Penetration/Fellatio/Cunnilingus

i. Incidents in the House

A.L. testified that after the Defendant began to touch her breasts, he began to rub 

her vagina with his hand. She stated that the Defendant never rubbed her vagina over her 

clothing, that it was always “skin to skin,” and that he never only touched the outside of 

her vagina. 

A.L. explained that the first time the Defendant touched her vagina, she was in 

seventh grade between the time during which she manually stimulated the Defendant’s 

penis and the time she began fellating him. She did not recall the Defendant’s saying 

anything to her beforehand. A.L. was sitting beside the Defendant on the couch watching 

television, and no one else was home. A.L. was wearing pajamas or “loose clothes,” and 

the Defendant reached inside her clothes and touched her vagina until A.L. reached orgasm. 

She reiterated that the Defendant’s fingers always went inside her vagina. 

A.L. stated that the Defendant also touched her vagina in the living room or in her 

bedroom. She recalled two particular incidents when the Defendant touched her vagina 

while she was in bed. 

A.L. testified that after the manual stimulation occurred three times, the Defendant 

“said that it wasn’t doing enough for him” and that as a result, they “moved on” to fellatio. 
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The instances of fellatio began when A.L. was still in seventh grade. A.L. testified that the 

fellatio usually occurred in the living room, but that it also occurred in the Defendant’s 

shower, on “a couple” of occasions in A.L.’s bedroom when she was trying to sleep, at the 

Defendant’s workplace, and in the Defendant’s truck. 

A.L. stated that the first incident of fellatio occurred in the living room. A.L. denied 

that the Defendant said anything to her before the fellatio started. She stated that she was 

“very confused,” that the Defendant showed her a video of people engaging in fellatio, and 

that the Defendant put his hand on the back of A.L.’s head and “tried to guide [her] how to 

do it” by moving her head up and down while his penis was inside her mouth. A.L. stated 

that the Defendant ejaculated into a napkin, went to the bathroom, and returned to watching

television. A.L. said that the fellatio occurred almost three times per week for about three 

years until she disclosed the abuse. 

A.L. testified that she remembered an occasion after she turned thirteen during 

which the Defendant got up from the living room and retrieved napkins from the kitchen 

before A.L. performed fellatio on him. They did not kiss before the fellatio on this 

occasion. She stated that this incident happened during the daytime between “morning and 

lunchtime,” that the Defendant complained that A.L. was “not giving [fellatio] to him 

enough[,] . . . and [that she] would eventually give him [fellatio] just to make him happy.” 

A.L. testified that on one occasion when she was fourteen or fifteen, the Defendant 

performed cunnilingus on her in the living room. A.L. recalled that during this incident,

“apparently there [were] church people” who came to the door and that the people left a 

pamphlet or other materials on the fence. A.L. stated that the Defendant later asserted that 

the church people “heard [A.L.] and that’s why they . . . didn’t continue to knock on the 

door.” 

ii. Incidents in the Shower

A.L. stated that she began showering in the larger bathroom in seventh or eighth 

grade because the Defendant wanted to do “[s]exual things” in the shower and his shower 

was larger than the one A.L. used. A.L. said that when R.M. was not at home, A.L. would 

get into the shower first; the Defendant would get into the shower with A.L.; they would

kiss; the Defendant sometimes rubbed A.L.’s vagina with his hand; and A.L. would fellate 

the Defendant. A.L. estimated that the fellatio occurred fifteen to twenty times and that 

the Defendant rubbed her vagina five to ten times. 

Specifically, A.L. recounted one incident of fellatio in the shower that was

consistent with the pattern she described, during which the Defendant ejaculated down the 

shower drain. A.L. recalled a second incident in the shower, which occurred in seventh or 

eighth grade and was otherwise consistent with the pattern she described. A.L. stated that 
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during the incident, she and the Defendant kissed, she performed fellatio on the Defendant, 

and then the Defendant rubbed her vagina with his hand. A.L. affirmed that the 

Defendant’s fingers went inside “the lips of [her] vagina.” A.L. recalled a third incident 

occurring after her thirteenth birthday when she was in eighth grade, during which she 

fellated the Defendant while he was standing up in the shower and she was kneeling; she 

stated that afterward, he dried her off with a towel. A.L. noted that it was nighttime and 

that they were alone in the house. 

A.L. recalled a fourth incident in which the Defendant rubbed her vagina while both 

she and the Defendant were standing in the shower. A.L. recalled a fifth incident in which 

the Defendant rubbed her vagina; however, on this occasion, she was standing in the 

shower while the Defendant stood outside the shower. She affirmed that the Defendant’s 

fingers went inside her “vaginal area” on both occasions.

iii. Incidents at the Tire Shop

When A.L. began high school, the Defendant decided that her behavior and grades 

were such that she did not have to ride the school bus; instead, the Defendant or R.M. drove 

A.L. to school, and the Defendant picked up A.L. after school. On the days that A.L. had 

no softball-related activities, the Defendant took A.L. back to work with him.

A.L. testified that beginning in eighth grade, she went to the Defendant’s workplace 

after school. She stated that other employees left within thirty minutes of her arrival, 

including R.M. A.L. said that generally, she sat in the break room at a lunch table and that 

after the other employees left, the Defendant went to the bathroom, cleaned his penis, and 

collected napkins from the kitchen area. A.L. noted that the Defendant was not 

circumcised5and that as a result, the folds of his penis smelled bad. A.L. stated that after 

she complained to the Defendant, he began to clean his penis before fellatio. 

A.L. stated that she knelt on the floor and that the Defendant sat in a chair during 

the fellatio. A.L. noted that even though they were alone in the tire shop, the Defendant 

generally locked the break room door. A.L. stated that the fellatio occurred in the break 

room between fifteen and thirty times. 

A.L. described a particular incident that was consistent with the pattern she 

described, which occurred on a day she did not have softball practice. She stated that the 

Defendant ejaculated into a napkin and threw it into a garbage can. 

A.L. testified that on between three and five occasions when she was in eighth or 

ninth grade, the Defendant performed cunnilingus on her in the tire shop break room. A.L. 

 

5 R.M. confirmed that the Defendant was not circumcised. 
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said that on an occasion when she was in eighth grade, she had finished performing fellatio 

on the Defendant and laid back on the floor; the Defendant then pulled down her pants and 

underwear and licked her vagina. A.L. stated that the Defendant’s tongue went inside the 

lips of her vagina. The Defendant stopped when A.L. reached orgasm. A.L. went to the 

bathroom and cleaned herself up. A.L. stated that generally, after the sexual encounter, 

they would leave or the Defendant would resume working. 

A.L. testified that when she was in the office space above the tire shop, she fellated 

the Defendant between five and ten times while he sat on the couch and that he performed 

cunnilingus on her between three and five times while she was on the air mattress. 

Although A.L. could not recall how old she was during these incidents, she stated that it 

was summertime, that her half-brother had moved out of the home, and that she was too 

young to stay home alone. A.L. said that the Defendant would come upstairs during his 

lunch break or after the other employees left, that he brought napkins with him, and that he 

would sit on a chair and pull out his penis while A.L. knelt on the ground. A.L. denied that 

anyone could see them through the window overlooking the tire shop. A.L. stated that the 

Defendant performed cunnilingus on her after the employees left in the afternoon because 

there was not time for this activity during the Defendant’s lunch break. She agreed that he 

locked the door when the sexual activity occurred. She noted that she was typically 

wearing pajamas because the Defendant and R.M. reported to work very early in the 

morning. 

A.L. testified that on one occasion, after she fellated the Defendant, she laid down 

on the air mattress and the Defendant pulled down her pants and underwear before

performing cunnilingus on her. She affirmed that the Defendant’s tongue went inside the 

lips of her vagina. A.L. said that after it was over, she went to the bathroom in the break 

room and they went home. A.L. stated that once or twice, the Defendant performed 

cunnilingus on her in the tire shop office. 

A.L. stated that one of the times she performed fellatio on the Defendant in the tire 

shop break room, she was in eighth grade; it happened after school on a day she did not 

have softball practice; and she went home afterward. 

A.L. testified that when she performed fellatio on the Defendant in the upstairs 

office, she was in eighth grade; she had turned fourteen; and she had already performed 

fellatio on the Defendant in the living room at this time. She agreed that it occurred during 

the Defendant’s lunch break; he locked the door; he brought napkins with him; other 

employees were present in the tire shop; none of the people in the tire shop could see A.L. 

performing fellatio; the Defendant ejaculated into a napkin; and when it was over, the 

Defendant returned to the tire shop. A.L. did not recall whether the Defendant cleaned 

himself up afterward; she noted that she did not watch him walk back into the tire shop and 
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that she could not see the downstairs bathroom from the office window overlooking the 

shop. 

A.L. testified that on one occasion when the Defendant performed cunnilingus on 

her in the upstairs office, she did not go to the tire shop bathroom afterward because another 

employee was present. She stated that she had napkins in the office and used those to clean 

herself up before throwing them away in a garbage can inside the office. 

iv. Incidents in the Defendant’s Truck

A.L. testified, and R.M. confirmed, that the Defendant became a coach for A.L.’s 

recreational league softball team and that he drove A.L. to and from the practices and 

games. R.M. sometimes attended A.L.’s softball games, but the Defendant always 

transported A.L. separately.

A.L. testified that when she was in eighth grade, she fellated the Defendant between 

five and ten times in his truck while they drove home from her softball practices. She 

agreed that the Defendant was coaching her team during the time. A.L. stated that 

generally, the Defendant would stop at a gas station; clean his penis in the bathroom and 

keep a paper towel; drive down “back roads where it was darker”; pull out his penis while 

driving; and A.L. would perform fellatio on him. 

A.L. recalled one specific incident that occurred at night. She was fellating the 

Defendant on a “really dark road” with sharp turns, and when the Defendant turned the car, 

his penis would go deeper into A.L.’s mouth. A.L. stated that she believed the Defendant 

took sharp turns intentionally because “it felt better for him.” She said, though, that they 

did not discuss it. The Defendant would generally ejaculate into a paper towel or napkin 

from the gas station and throw it out the truck’s window. 

e. Anal Penetration

A.L. testified that when she was fourteen but “very close” to her fifteenth birthday, 

the Defendant anally penetrated her with his penis. She stated that this occurred between 

five and ten times. A.L. said that the Defendant had “talked about it a lot” and had “always 

wanted to do it.” While they were in the living room, A.L. knelt on the floor with her 

elbows leaning on the big couch. The Defendant bought a condom and personal lubricant, 

“put the condom on and . . . put lube everywhere,” and began to anally penetrate A.L. 

A.L. stated that on the first occasion, she felt the penetration, but she “didn’t know the 

feeling or anything and it was something new.” She noted that neither she nor the 

Defendant “knew like what was going on” and that the penetration lasted only two minutes. 

A.L. said that after two attempts, the Defendant stopped using condoms because “he 

thought it would make it easier.” She stated that he continued to use lubricant. A.L. said 
-13-

that she felt “[s]cared and nervous” and “didn’t like it at all.” She stated that she told the 

Defendant about her feelings and that he continued to anally penetrate her until she went 

to Illinois to visit her family. A.L. identified a bottle of personal lubricant entered into 

evidence as the one the Defendant used. 

A.L. testified that the first time the Defendant anally penetrated her, it was about 

two weeks before her fifteenth birthday; he told her that he was going to use a condom to 

avoid his semen’s “accidentally slip[ping]” into A.L.’s vagina and getting her pregnant; 

and that she heard him open the condom wrapper, although she did not watch him put it 

on. A.L. noted that the Defendant told her he would get “in really big trouble” if A.L.

became pregnant because she was not eighteen years old. A.L. stated that the anal 

penetration hurt. 

A.L. testified regarding a specific incident in which anal penetration occurred and 

the Defendant did not wear a condom. She stated that it occurred after her fifteenth 

birthday in the living room during a weekend when R.M. was out of town, that she and the 

Defendant were positioned similarly to the first time it happened, that the Defendant used 

lubricant, and that they watched television beforehand. A.L. said that the Defendant kept 

the lubricant in his top dresser drawer in his bedroom. 

A.L. testified that she and the Defendant never had vaginal intercourse because the 

Defendant wanted to avoid getting in trouble for having sex with a minor. A.L. noted that 

she “had gotten checked a lot from the doctors” and that she was under the impression that 

“it could have gotten . . . tracked back to him if anyone would have found out.” A.L. agreed 

that the Defendant discussed that he “wasn’t allowed to do it.” 

A.L. testified that she and the Defendant discussed their future and “what was going 

to happen” after A.L. turned eighteen. She stated that the Defendant told her they would 

have their own house, build a life together, and have two children, whom they named 

Jarayiah and William. A.L. said that she was skeptical “because [she] didn’t think at that 

young of an age [that she] should already have [her] life planned out[.]” A.L. noted that 

she did not believe she had lived enough life to think about “that stuff.” When asked 

whether the Defendant’s plan was what she wanted, A.L. replied, “Not really.” However, 

A.L. believed that if she had not disclosed the relationship before she turned eighteen, the 

events in the Defendant’s plan would have occurred. 

When A.L. realized that R.M. had proof that could “get [the Defendant] in trouble,” 

A.L. decided to tell her grandmother and R.M. about the abuse. A.L. noted that she “finally 

had someone to talk to about it and [she] could finally open up and realize what all in the 

wrong [sic] was going on.” A.L. stated that after she disclosed the abuse, she made a 

statement to police in Illinois and later at Child Help in Knoxville. She stated that she told 
-14-

the interviewer the truth to the best of her ability and averred that her trial testimony was 

truthful. 

A.L. testified that at the time of the trial, she had a “very healthy relationship” with 

R.M. and her father. She stated that since she disclosed the abuse, her relationship with 

both of her parents had improved; she agreed that the improved relationship with her 

parents was “what [she] wanted.” 

3. Exhibits

Several exhibits were introduced into evidence documenting the Defendant’s 

relationship with A.L., including drawings and notes from a computer tablet, two rings, 

photographs of text message conversations, condoms, and two bottles of personal lubricant. 

R.M. gave the respective pieces of evidence to Knoxville Police Investigator Patricia 

Tipton during her investigation.

i. “Love me forever” drawing, tablet messages

A photograph depicted an electronic note on a computer tablet, which was in pink 

lettering that appeared to have been written with a finger or stylus, read, “Love me

forever[,] no one else[,] Doyle Jr[.] [A.L.] Jarayiah William Mason family[.]” R.M. 

identified A.L.’s handwriting in the photograph. A.L. identified the note and agreed that 

it contained the names of her potential children with the Defendant. 

Another photograph showed what appeared to be a screen shot from a video call. 

R.M. and A.L. identified the Defendant in the screen shot; the Defendant was “puckering” 

his lips and making a sideways “v” with his fingers framing his mouth. A.L. and R.M. 

identified A.L. in a small box in the corner of the screen, which reflected the other person 

on the video call. A.L. explained that she and the Defendant would video chat while they 

were alone in the house. 

A.L. identified yet another screen shot, which contained a note dated December 3, 

2015. A.L. stated that she wrote the note on the Defendant’s computer tablet when he went 

on a business trip and that the note contained their future children’s names. The note read 

as follows:

just wanted u to know I’m missing you bunches and I wanted to leave u this 

to6. . . u smile because I love you thAt much I know ur probably getting tired 

of mom and stress7 out but just remember jariah and William parents under 

 

6 A word was cut off at the margin of the photograph.

7 Letters were cut off at the margin of the photograph.
-15-

the same roof8. . . women at home to keep u happy and put food in that belly 

I love u so and I’m mis9 u bunches love u infinity and beyond -A

ii. Rings

R.M. testified that in summer 2014, she went to Illinois to visit A.L., and the 

Defendant asked her to give a pair of tennis shoes to A.L. Upon closer examination, R.M. 

discovered a ring wrapped in a tissue inside one of the shoes; the ring “said ‘love’ with a 

little diamond in the O part.” Upon questioning by R.M., the Defendant said that he wanted 

A.L. to have the ring and that he intended to tell R.M. about it when A.L. returned home. 

R.M. stated that the ring was the first piece of jewelry the Defendant had ever bought for 

A.L. and that she and the Defendant argued about it. R.M. stated that she gave the ring to 

A.L. and that A.L. told R.M. “it was just so that she knew somebody loved her.” 

A.L. testified that the Defendant bought her two rings; she received the first ring 

when she was thirteen or fourteen years old. A.L. affirmed that the Defendant told her to 

look for it inside the shoes R.M. brought her. A.L. understood the ring to be a “promise 

that [they] would be together forever.” A.L. wore it every day until it broke, then the 

Defendant replaced it. A.L. stated that she understood the second ring to have the same 

significance as the first, and she wore it every day until she disclosed the abuse. 

R.M. stated that the first ring broke about one month before Christmas and that 

around Christmastime, she was in Virginia when the Defendant called and told her that he 

took A.L. to buy a second ring. R.M. stated that she “didn’t like the whole thing of it” and 

that the ring was “a single diamond,” which looked “more like a promise ring or 

engagement ring, especially for a teenager.” R.M. questioned A.L. about why the ring did 

not resemble her old one, and A.L. stated that she preferred the new one. 

A December 17, 2015 Marks & Morgan Jewelers receipt reflected that the 

Defendant purchased a “Fashion Diamond RG” for $99.00.10 R.M. and A.L. identified the 

Defendant’s handwriting in a photograph of a handwritten note, which reflected the 

following:

Subject Ring

 

8 A word was cut off at the margin of the photograph.

9 Letters were cut off at the margin of the photograph.

10 A January 11, 2015 Kay Jewelers receipt with the Defendant’s name was also received as an exhibit, but 

it was unclear from the testimony whether the purchase was related to A.L.
-16-

I bought you a promise ring because we can’t get engaged due to reasons you 

already know. this has been a rough month for me but I still want all the 

things this ring stands for. I do still love you with all my heart. If you put 

this ring on you are saying you will not kiss, touch, flirt or do anything with 

any11 other male and will not let them do anything with you. this also means 

you give your love, body, and mind to me. You need to show your affection 

to me let me know you are happy with your man want him, his heart and 

body. this also means I will have the same loyalty to you. If you do not want 

me, love me or if you are just saying this to play me do not take my ring. 

This is real not a game will you accept my ring. 

iii. Tire Shop Photograph

A photograph of an image on a computer tablet showed A.L. sitting at a table in the 

tire shop break room and facing away from the camera. A.L. was wearing a long-sleeved 

red top, blue jeans, and boots, and her legs were tucked underneath her such that her rear 

end was turned toward camera and prominently featured. 

A.L. testified that the Defendant took the photograph on his iPad and showed it to 

her. She noted that the Defendant “said that he liked how good [her] butt looked in [her] 

jeans that [she] was wearing.” A.L. stated that she knew the photograph was taken when 

she was fourteen years old and a freshman in high school because she had dyed her hair at 

that time and was wearing a school uniform top. 

iv. Rubber Inc. Poem

Another photograph showed a handwritten note on “Rubber-Inc.” letterhead; A.L. 

and R.M. identified the Defendant’s handwriting. The note read as follows:

The grass is usually green

The sky is usually blue

All day long I have thought of you

I see your smiling face hear you laugh

Thinking of our past present future

How I loved you before you started to mature

R.M. testified that in 2014, she also found the poem on the Defendant’s desk at 

work. When confronted, the Defendant claimed he “was doodling for a friend” but did not 

say for whom he wrote it. R.M. noted that the Defendant had written her poems during 

their relationship and that she suspected several times that the Defendant was cheating on 

 

11 This word was circled in the note.
-17-

her. R.M. said that she would have interpreted the poem as evidence the Defendant was 

cheating on her except for the inclusion of the line “before you began to mature.” R.M. 

stated that the poem gave her no indication of the identity of the person with whom the 

Defendant was cheating. She photographed the note using her cell phone, and she noted 

that the physical copy went missing.

A.L. identified the poem as a note the Defendant slipped into her backpack. When 

A.L. arrived at home, she found the note, and the Defendant asked her if she received it. 

v. Text Messages12

R.M. testified that during one of A.L.’s summer visits to Illinois, she noticed more 

telephone calls occurring between A.L. and the Defendant. When R.M. checked the 

family’s cell phone records, she saw that the Defendant and A.L. had exchanged between 

six hundred and eight hundred text messages in one month. 

R.M. testified that late on the evening of June 19, 2016, she and the Defendant 

arrived home after dropping off A.L. at her grandmother’s house for the summer. After 

the Defendant fell asleep, R.M. took the Defendant’s cell phone and searched it. R.M. 

averred that she was looking for evidence of the Defendant’s talking to other women to 

determine if a possibility of reconciliation existed. 

R.M. testified that the call log and text messages were “wiped clean” of exchanges 

R.M. had noted in the cell phone records as potentially being from other women. R.M.

stated that she continued searching the phone because she was curious about the 

Defendant’s communications with A.L. By this time, A.L. had “cut [R.M.] out” and 

refused to tell R.M. any details about her life. R.M. was aware that A.L. told the Defendant 

everything, but the Defendant would not convey any information to R.M., instead stating 

only that that A.L. was “fine.” 

Ultimately, R.M. found “well over a thousand” text messages exchanged between 

A.L. and the Defendant from April 13, 2016, to June 19, 2016. R.M. identified a “very, 

very small portion” of the text messages she found on the Defendant’s cell phone; the first 

message was dated April 13 at 12:58 p.m., and the last message was time-stamped “Sunday 

at 11:16 p.m.”13 R.M. gave the Defendant’s cell phone to Investigator Tipton at 9:00 a.m. 

 

12 The majority of the text messages contain spelling or grammatical errors, as well as slang and 

abbreviations. We have not corrected errors or replaced abbreviations when the message’s meaning is 

otherwise clear.

13 R.M. stated that June 20, 2016, was a Monday and that as a result, the time-stamp on the final messages 

referred to Sunday, June 19, 2016. 
-18-

on June 20. R.M. denied altering the text messages or their dates, averring that the 

Defendant had a “Windows” cell phone, a system with which she lacked familiarity.

A.L. affirmed that the photographs and time-stamps accurately reflected messages 

she and the Defendant exchanged. A.L. stated that she and the Defendant sent text 

messages to one another “[a]lmost all the time that [they] weren’t together” beginning

when she was a freshman in high school. 

The April 13, 2016 conversation consisted of the Defendant’s reminding A.L. that 

she would be released early from school and questioning whether she “forgot [him]” 

because she did not respond. A.L. replied that she had not had a chance to respond and 

that she had seen his messages. The next message from the Defendant read, “I really hope 

u r not lying I really do want us to make it. I hope your not as heartless as u mom and 

screw me over. I am a good man to u.” A.L. replied, “I’m not o want go make it to I’m 

not like her I know u are.” The Defendant replied, “I liked that u answered the whole text 

thx if I put this behind us u have to promise it wont come out to be true later and when I 

ask for stuff then u will give it I want this and our issues to be gone forever.” A.L. 

responded “They will be it will all be fine.” 

The Defendant replied, “U going to give me stuff when I ask for it?” After a few 

minutes, the Defendant wrote, “No response?” A few minutes later, A.L. replied, “Yes.” 

The Defendant sent a smiling emoji. 14 A.L. wrote, “Not everything I ask for.” The 

Defendant wrote, “No takebacks u said yes [smiling emoji].” A.L. wrote, “Oh hush.” The 

Defendant sent a screen-shot of their text message conversation, and A.L. responded with 

illegible emojis. 

On April 14, A.L. sent the Defendant a message that she loved him. The Defendant 

replied, “Love u bunches hope yesterday meant something to u it did to me.” A.L. 

responded, “it did love u.” The Defendant said, “At least u can say u make church folks 

leave stuff on the fence.” A.L. responded, “Lol ok.” The Defendant replied, “they heard 

u screaming and moaning lmao.” A.L. responded, “Shut up.” The Defendant responded, 

Hope u have a great day I truly do love u

15 and hope u . . . [k]eep your promise and stay 

true. No lies and no cheating.” A.L. testified that the Defendant referred to the “church 

people” cunnilingus incident in these messages. 

 

14 Merriam-Webster defines “emoji” as “various small images, symbols, or icons used in text fields in 

electronic communication . . . to express the emotional attitude of the writer, convey information succinctly, 

[or] communicate a message playfully without using words[.]” MERRIAM-WEBSTER DICTIONARY ONLINE, 

https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/emoji (last visited July 30, 2020). 

15 The photograph was cut off here; R.M. testified regarding the last line of the message.
-19-

On April 22, the Defendant sent a “poem” to A.L. that described fellatio. A.L. 

replied, “Wow that one was dirty lol” followed by emojis of a laughing face and smiling

face.

On another occasion, the Defendant sent a photograph of A.L. to her with the 

message, “This is my BAe16 and I love her so much. She is pretty nice and all mine,” 

followed by a smiling emoji. 

On May 4, the Defendant sent A.L. a “poem” describing cunnilingus. The poem’s 

last two lines read, “Its not about sex but the family and future I need[,] Although I can’t 

wait until I get inside u and plant the seed.” A.L. replied, “Oh wow that was sexual 

[surprised emoji].” A.L. testified that “plant[ing] the seed” referred to A.L.’s having the 

Defendant’s children, which the Defendant discussed often. 

On May 10, the Defendant sent the following message to A.L.:

Missing u thinking of my sweetheart

Hope your having a great day and hope we don’t part

She is awesome and great this girl of mine

I know I will love her for all time

She is [A.L.] my one and true

My friend lover and will be my kids mother to

On May 11, the Defendant sent the following message to A.L.:

Her smile her face I love it all

She cant really help she is 5 feet tall

We laugh we love and we r there for each other

She is the one for me I wouldn’t want another

4 years ago we started with a game

Who would have known from that nothing would be the same

A.L. testified that Defendant’s reference to a game was to the shower and picture games. 

On June 14 at 2:22 a.m., the Defendant sent a message to A.L. that read, “U woke 

me to [perform cunnilingus]; didn’t wake me to say sorry or to tell me u love me. You 

never even kissed me today. I will let u get your sleep so u rested for tomorrow.” A.L. 

replied, “Ok well I’m sorry goodnight love you.” The Defendant responded, “Night love 

u not suppose to go to bed mad.” The Defendant sent another message a few minutes later 

 

16 Merriam-Webster defines “bae” as a slang term for “baby” or “sweetheart.” MERRIAM-WEBSTER 

DICTIONARY ONLINE, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/bae (last visited July 30, 2020). 
-20-

that read, “U could have fixes us I don’t feel u wanted to and u could have came to my 

room to say goodnight but didn’t. Last one had to say that.” A.L. replied, “Ok we will talk 

about it tomorrow.” About twenty minutes later, A.L. sent another message that read, “So 

even after all of this you don’t love me anymore.” Later that day at 3:14 p.m., the 

Defendant sent A.L. a message that read, “I miss u a bunch and am sorry for yesterday. I 

was hoping u would fix it but still hate we didn’t have fun and fought.” 

On June 15, the Defendant sent a message that read, “Tv down please love u 

bunches,” followed by emojis of kissing lips, a groom, a heart, and a bride. Later that 

morning, the Defendant and A.L. exchanged text messages about which of them loved the 

other more. 

On June 18, the Defendant sent A.L. a message that read, “We still in your town u 

mom went to her brothers then we sat and talked at clock tower shell. She still saying I 

cheated on her.” A.L. replied, “Yea ik she won’t ever stop saying that idk.” The Defendant 

responded, “I just hope u always know we r the only thing I did. How is your stay so far.” 

A series of messages marked as sent on “Sunday” in the early morning hours reflected a 

groom emoji, heart emoji, and bride emoji from the Defendant, and two baby emojis from 

A.L. 

A.L. testified that when the Defendant sent emojis of a bride and groom, they 

symbolized A.L. and the Defendant, respectively. A.L. stated that when she sent two baby 

emojis, it symbolized their two future children.

Later that night, the Defendant sent A.L. a message reading, “Just glad to be home 

and just hope u come home stay true and that your not playing with me.” A.L. responded, 

“Yea ik I’m doing everything right.” The Defendant replied, “Hope so [groom emoji, heart 

emoji, bride emoji] night.” A.L. responded, “[Two baby emojis] Night.”

In response to the contents of the text messages, R.M. went to the police department 

and was told to photograph the messages and return in the morning. R.M. testified that she 

also sent A.L. photographs of some of the messages, called her, and asked for an 

explanation; A.L. did not respond. R.M. spoke to A.L.’s grandmother on the telephone 

and conveyed her belief that the Defendant was abusing A.L. R.M. stated that A.L.’s 

grandmother “stayed on” A.L. and asked her more questions; after about thirteen minutes, 

A.L. disclosed the abuse to her grandmother and R.M., who was still on the telephone. 

R.M. denied threatening A.L.; she stated that she told A.L. that she was a victim, that she 

did nothing wrong, and that the Defendant was at fault. 
-21-

5. The Defendant’s Police Interview

Investigator Tipton testified that on June 20, 2016, and June 29, 2016, she 

interviewed R.M. Investigator Tipton also observed A.L.’s forensic interview. On June 

29, 2016, R.M. gave Investigator Tipton the first ring the Defendant gave A.L. On July 1, 

2016, R.M. brought Investigator Tipton the second ring, condoms, and two bottles of 

personal lubricant. R.M. testified that she had previously seen one of the bottles of personal 

lubricant in the Defendant’s dresser drawer, but that when she searched the house after 

A.L. disclosed the abuse, the bottle was in the garbage can. R.M. stated that she and the 

Defendant never used condoms or lubricant when they were sexually active. 

On June 29, 2016, Investigator Tipton went to the Defendant’s house and 

interviewed him. The Defendant’s audio-recorded police interview was received as an 

exhibit. In the recording, the Defendant stated that he had worked at the tire shop for 

twelve years and that he ran the “retread shop.” The Defendant noted that A.L. was with 

her grandmother and that R.M. was with her mother, both of whom lived in Illinois. 

In the recording, the Defendant stated his belief that Investigator Tipton was there 

because R.M. stole his cell phone. The Defendant did not know why R.M. stole the phone

but guessed it had to do with “suspicion.” The Defendant affirmed that R.M. had “always” 

thought he was cheating on her during their twelve-year relationship. The Defendant said 

that R.M. moved out all her belongings on A.L.’s fourteenth birthday after an argument 

with A.L.’s half-brother, leaving both her children with the Defendant. The Defendant 

stated that A.L.’s half-brother and R.M. had never gotten along and that they fought about 

R.M.’s refusing to pick up his high school class ring. 

In the recording, the Defendant stated that A.L.’s father “left” the previous July after 

an argument with A.L. about her talking to the Defendant on the telephone. The Defendant 

stated that “they” had accused the Defendant of having sex with A.L. for “years.” The 

Defendant denied having had sex with A.L. and noted that A.L. had been examined by a 

doctor when she was age twelve and fourteen and that A.L.’s hymen was intact. When 

asked why R.M. and A.L.’s father thought the Defendant would have sex with A.L., the 

Defendant responded, “The way [A.L.] acts.” He stated that A.L. sent him text messages 

“all the time” and that in R.M.’s opinion, A.L. tried not to anger the Defendant; the 

Defendant noted that he did not agree with that assessment. 

The Defendant denied that either A.L. or her half-brother viewed him as a father 

figure, stating that neither one called him “dad” and that their respective fathers were

involved in their lives. The Defendant said that he did not understand why R.M. and A.L.’s 

father were “seeing stuff” based upon A.L.’s behavior. The Defendant agreed that A.L. 

had “[s]omewhat” of a “school-girl crush” on him and that she had “said things” to him

about wanting to marry the Defendant and have sex with him when she was older. He 
-22-

further agreed that A.L. wanted him to leave R.M. The Defendant said, “I told her[,] once 

she is eighteen . . . . I ain’t going to jail and losing everything I got.” 

In the recording, the Defendant acknowledged that he was separated from R.M. and 

that she had a boyfriend. He stated that “Junior,” referring to A.L.’s half-brother, was a 

rebellious teenager who did not like the Defendant’s rules and had moved out. The 

Defendant stated that two weeks previously, R.M. was not “clean” and that she told him 

she was “on pills.” The Defendant did not know what kind of pills R.M. took; he stated 

that he had seen her drink alcohol and become intoxicated in front of A.L. He noted that 

“[w]hen she left she got in a real bad way and . . . got with a bunch of different guys[.]” 

The Defendant agreed that after the separation, R.M. left A.L. with him “a lot of 

[the] time” on weekends. The Defendant stated that he “tried to make up for” A.L.’s 

parents; he cited as an example his giving A.L. money at an arcade. The Defendant noted 

that R.M. chastised him and believed he gave A.L. money “to make [R.M.] look bad.” The 

Defendant noted that his own mother left when he was four years old and that the “void 

was never filled.” 

The Defendant recounted that on A.L.’s fourteenth birthday, R.M. called him and 

asked if he would pick up A.L. from school. R.M. told him that she was “done” and that 

she had removed her things from the house. The Defendant stated that he picked up A.L. 

and told her that R.M. left. The Defendant said that A.L. cried while they sat on the couch 

and that they eventually went out to dinner with R.M. for A.L.’s birthday. The Defendant 

noted that the event reminded him of his own mother’s leaving and that he knew how A.L. 

felt but could do nothing to stop it from happening. 

The Defendant stated that R.M. thought that he “pushed” A.L. away from R.M., 

which the Defendant denied. He stated that he urged A.L. to communicate with R.M. but 

that A.L. did not want to talk to R.M. because she left. The Defendant said that he told 

A.L. she was a “better person than that.” The Defendant agreed that R.M. resented A.L. 

He stated that R.M. had a bad childhood, did not “have anything,” and fought with her 

mother because R.M. did not know her father’s identity. The Defendant opined that R.M. 

was jealous of A.L.

The Defendant described A.L. as “an awesome kid” who was happy every day. He 

said that he drove A.L. to and from school and that he sometimes took her to the tire shop. 

When asked why R.M. did not pick up A.L., the Defendant stated that he did not know. 

He recounted an incident in which R.M. picked up A.L.’s half-brother and his girlfriend at 

school but refused to pick up A.L. at the same time. The Defendant stated that A.L. was 

upset that her mother was picking up her “new daughter” instead of A.L. When asked if 

A.L. “cri[ed] to” the Defendant often, he responded negatively. 
-23-

The Defendant stated that R.M. told A.L. that she was “going to the authorities” 

regarding the Defendant’s relationship with A.L. The Defendant opined that R.M. wanted 

money from their divorce because she was in debt after spending a large sum of money 

during their separation. The Defendant claimed that R.M. told him that if he loved A.L., 

he would agree for their house to be sold. The Defendant stated that he would do anything 

for A.L., protect her, get her things she needed, and “fix” her emotional pain.

In the recording, Investigator Tipton opined that A.L. was “hurting” because she

was proud of her romantic relationship with the Defendant; Investigator Tipton stated that 

A.L. questioned whether the Defendant was proud of her because she was not allowed to 

tell anyone about the relationship in spite of the Defendant’s saying he loved her and 

wanted to have children with her. The Defendant responded, “After she’s eighteen.” The 

Defendant stated that everything A.L. told Investigator Tipton was false. 

The Defendant asked if “she” gave Investigator Tipton his cell phone, and 

Investigator Tipton answered affirmatively. The Defendant stated that “a lot of things on 

that phone . . . ain’t [sic] true.” The Defendant denied knowing what was on the cell phone, 

although he also said that “different things” were on the phone. Investigator Tipton 

referenced the poem in which the Defendant stated, “I can’t wait to place my seed inside 

of you and start our family together.” The Defendant responded, “But that’s after the age 

of eighteen. That’s not now.” 

The Defendant stated that he was “not one to do anything that [Investigator Tipton 

would] arrest [him] for” and that “[m]ost of” what was on the cell phone was “not reality.” 

The Defendant denied that references to “hand jobs” were on the cell phone and stated that 

he knew of “two poems” that would “cause problems.” He then stated that there were 

“several other poems” and that he “just sent poems.” The Defendant said that the poems 

did not reference “stuff she had done or hadn’t done” and that he sent the poems to make 

A.L. laugh. The Defendant acknowledged that two of the poems referenced “the oral stuff” 

and explained that he wrote them after A.L. watched a horror movie that was “a little 

provocative”; he noted that he stopped the movie and did not allow A.L. to finish it. 

The Defendant stated that he did not want to risk losing his job and that although he 

would do anything for A.L., if he lost his job or went to prison he could not do anything 

for her “and she [knew] that.” The Defendant stated that R.M. made it known that she was 

going to “turn the phone over” and that he called two attorneys because he did not want 

things he said in the cell phone messages to “get turned around.” The Defendant said that 

he was worried about what the police thought had happened. The Defendant stated that he 

raised A.L., that A.L. made poor grades in school when R.M. lived with them, that the 

Defendant punished A.L. by taking away her electronics, and that A.L.’s grades had 

improved. 
-24-

The Defendant agreed that A.L. believed that she and the Defendant lived together 

as husband and wife. However, the Defendant denied that he and A.L. “[got] intimately”

with one another. When asked whether he was calling A.L. a liar, the Defendant responded 

negatively. When Investigator Tipton stated that the Defendant and A.L. were in a “dating 

relationship” involving fellatio, cunnilingus, and A.L.’s manually stimulating the 

Defendant’s penis, the Defendant responded, “These are things you read on the phone.” 

When Investigator Tipton referred to A.L.’s ring, the Defendant denied that the ring 

was meant to represent a committed dating relationship. He explained that he bought the 

ring because he found notes from A.L.’s friends in her backpack in which the friends 

encouraged her not to hurt herself or “give up on life” even though R.M. treated A.L. poorly 

and her father did not care for her. The Defendant stated that the ring was meant to 

symbolize that someone loved A.L. and that “life’s always worth living.” The Defendant 

stated that he also bought pearl earrings for A.L. as a Christmas gift. 

The Defendant stated that he knew A.L. had a “crush” on him. When Investigator 

Tipton said, “Ok. You do not feel that way about her,” the Defendant responded, “I didn’t 

say that.” The Defendant stated that he would be willing to “have a life” with A.L. once 

she was eighteen years old if it was what she wanted, but he added, “What’s the odds of 

that happening?” The Defendant admitted that he and A.L. had kissed on the lips, but

specified that it was not “a lip-locked-passionate” kiss. He denied that he kissed A.L.’s 

neck or that he touched A.L.’s breast. The Defendant noted that it was impossible for 

anyone to kiss down A.L.’s neck because she “cringe[d] all over” when girls blew on the 

back of her neck at softball practice.

The Defendant admitted that A.L. touched his penis. When Investigator Tipton 

asked whether A.L. touched the Defendant’s penis “skin to skin,” the Defendant responded, 

“I worry if I answer all of these questions . . . it’s going to be worser [sic].” The Defendant 

stated that one attorney had advised him not to answer any questions. The Defendant 

expressed concern that Investigator Tipton would “trick” him and distort his words; he 

stated that it did not matter if A.L. had lied and that he did not want Investigator Tipton to 

tell A.L. she was a liar. The Defendant said that A.L. had “been through a lot.” 

When Investigator Tipton stated that she knew A.L. was “saving herself vaginally” 

for the Defendant when she turned eighteen, the Defendant responded, “[H]ow’s that 

wrong if I’ve not done anything with her?” When Investigator Tipton said that it “sp[oke] 

highly of” the Defendant that A.L. knew he was not in the relationship purely for sexual 

reasons, the Defendant stated that “the law [was] gonna make it look [like] something else.” 

The Defendant said that R.M. wanted money and to have him “out of the picture.” 

Investigator Tipton conveyed that A.L. had given a description of the Defendant’s “very 

distinct” penis, and the Defendant asked if he needed to call a lawyer. Investigator Tipton 

stated that the Defendant was not under arrest.
-25-

In response to Investigator Tipton’s commenting that A.L. was fifteen years old and 

not a child, the Defendant stated that A.L. was still a minor and that a person could not 

have sex with a minor. The Defendant stated that it did not matter how many times a 

person had sex with a minor, “the fact is [the person] did it[.]” The Defendant 

acknowledged that his cell phone contained “some bad things.” The Defendant stated that 

Investigator Tipton was going to believe A.L. no matter what he said. He noted that R.M. 

had taken A.L. away for the past two weeks. 

The Defendant stopped responding to Investigator Tipton’s questions regarding 

“different games” he played with A.L., stating that he knew “how this work[ed]” and that 

the police were “already working on . . . warrants and all that stuff.” He stated that “the 

lawyer” told him how “this” worked. The Defendant continued,

. . . I’m gonna have to come up with bail money and everything else just 

cause of—I don’t care what teenage girl goes in there and says you done this 

that or the other. You’re getting arrested if they go in there and say it whether 

that’s true or not. Man [sic] don’t stand a chance in the world between 

women and gays and . . . [.]

The Defendant stated that Investigator Tipton only had the side of the story “that’s been 

with [R.M.] for a week and a half.” He said that R.M. had “blocked” A.L.’s cell phone and 

that no one aside from R.M. was allowed to speak to A.L. 

When asked why A.L. would lie about having sex with the Defendant, he responded 

that A.L. wanted R.M. “back in her life more than anything in the world. Even though she 

acts like she don’t [sic].” The Defendant denied, though, that A.L. lied to get R.M. back 

in her life; he stated that A.L. had been “coached a lot.” 

The Defendant acknowledged that he kept “some condoms” but that he knew the 

police did not get condoms from his house. Investigator Tipton stated that she could “get 

ya’lls [sic] DNA [off] of the couches” in order to obtain evidence of sexual activity. 

The Defendant stated that it was “bull that a woman leaves her kid here” and 

questioned why R.M. left A.L. with the Defendant for one year if he “was so terrible, if . . 

. all this stuff was supposed to be going on.” Investigator Tipton noted that they had 

questioned R.M. about her reasoning in light of R.M.’s acknowledgment that she had 

suspicions prior to reporting the abuse. The Defendant noted that no problems had arisen

while the Defendant was financially supporting A.L.; he claimed that R.M. kept child 

support meant for A.L. He opined that R.M. was “wanting to come up with all this BS” 

because she had “all this debt.” 
-26-

Relative to the incident when R.M. saw A.L. coming out of the Defendant’s 

bedroom, the Defendant stated that he could not “tell [Investigator Tipton] the truth” 

because he did not know with certainty what happened. The Defendant recalled going to 

bed around 2:00 a.m.; he noted that A.L. sometimes slept on the couch and that she was 

watching television when he went to bed. The Defendant said that he woke up around 7:00 

a.m. to the house alarm’s sounding, that he walked to the front door, that A.L. was standing 

at the alarm panel to disarm it, and that R.M. was at the door. The Defendant noted that he 

woke up alone, but he could not say whether A.L. was in the room while he was asleep. 

He stated that after R.M. arrived, he went back to bed and that A.L. walked in with a blanket 

wrapped around her. The Defendant said that he asked A.L. what she was doing in his 

bedroom and told her to leave because he was going back to sleep. The Defendant stated 

that R.M. later asked him what A.L. was doing and that he told her to ask A.L. because he 

did not know. He said that R.M. noted A.L.’s bed being “cold”; the Defendant told her

that A.L. may have fallen asleep on the couch. 

The Defendant admitted that A.L. had slept in his bed “a few times,” but he averred 

that no sexual activity occurred there. He said that on those occasions, he and A.L. had 

separate blankets and that they were fully clothed. The Defendant said, “They told me all 

of this was gonna happen.” He explained that his boss told him, “[Y]ou better get away 

from it. You know [R.M.] will do anything.” The Defendant said that his best friend and 

people on his baseball team also warned him. 

The Defendant stated that a difference existed between “doing stuff right and doing 

stuff wrong.” He opined that it was not wrong “talking to a girl about a future.” The 

Defendant described an occasion during which A.L. almost dated a boy at school, but 

ultimately rejected him after following the Defendant’s advice on how to determine 

whether the boy was only interested in A.L. for sex. The Defendant said that he told A.L. 

that boys kept lists of the girls with whom they had sex and that virgins were a “plus” and 

kept on a separate list.

The Defendant stated that he sometimes took A.L. back to work with him after 

school and that she would sit in the break room and play on her computer tablet. The 

Defendant denied that his boss was concerned about the Defendant’s behavior with A.L., 

and he told Investigator Tipton that she could ask anyone at work or “the ballpark” about 

his relationship with A.L. The Defendant denied that A.L. fellated him in the upstairs 

office during the summer. The Defendant stated that the allegations “[weren’t] just [R.M.]. 

This [was R.M.], her Meemaw, and her aunt. All three of them [had] been hammering this 

girl for two weeks.” The Defendant noted that A.L. was going to “say whatever they [told] 

her to say to get them to get off of her back.” Investigator Tipton commented that in her 

opinion, A.L.’s report was not consistent with having been coached because of the level of 

detail A.L. gave. After hearing some of the details, the Defendant responded that he would 
-27-

not place a sexual partner on the floor and that if he wanted to be alert to other people’s 

entering the house, he would stay in his bedroom, which had a large window, as opposed 

to the living room. 

The Defendant admitted that A.L. had seen his penis. He explained that on one 

occasion two years previously when R.M. was not home, he took a shower and caught A.L. 

watching him while hiding in a closet. He noted that “[q]uite a few times,” A.L. looked at 

the Defendant’s reflection in the mirror while he was in the bathroom. The Defendant 

maintained that he could not see A.L. when this occurred and that he thought she could not 

see him either. The Defendant stated that he informed R.M. about the spying and told her 

that he could not shower while A.L. was alone in the house with him and that they needed 

to determine why she was “doing this.” He stated that around the same time, they 

discovered that when A.L. visited her father, she slept in the same bedroom as her father 

while her stepmother slept downstairs. A.L. told R.M. and the Defendant that several

times, she awoke to find her father standing over her as she slept. A.L. also reported that

after her father and brother showered, they walked naked down the hallway past A.L.’s 

bedroom. A.L. also complained that her father and brother walked in on her showering

because the bathroom had a curtain instead of a door. The Defendant noted that R.M. went 

to family court regarding the incidents at A.L.’s father’s house and that because of these 

issues, A.L. stayed with her grandmother. 

The Defendant indicated that he masturbated alone on the living room couch, in his 

bed, and in the shower. The Defendant stated that the lawyer with whom he had spoken

made him feel like “y’all gonna screw me over” and that he had said more than he was 

“supposed to say.” The Defendant noted that if he had not spoken to the lawyer, he 

“probably would’ve answered all of [Investigator Tipton’s] questions.” The Defendant 

noted that he had an appointment to see the attorney because the Defendant “admit[ted] 

that there [was] a lot of stuff on [his] phone but . . . [i]t’s not real.” 

The Defendant averred again that any of his acquaintances would tell Investigator 

Tipton “everything [was] fine.” He stated that he had told people that R.M. thought that 

A.L. and the Defendant had a romantic relationship. The Defendant noted that R.M. and 

A.L.’s father had been telling A.L. for three years that she was in love with the Defendant. 

He stated that if “all [she] hear[d]” was that she was in love with the Defendant and both 

her mother and father left, A.L. was “probably gonna go exactly right [to what] they 

preached at her for three years.” The Defendant denied that his relationship with A.L.

“[went] to the next level.” 

The Defendant stated that R.M. told the Defendant’s mother and a friend that she 

was going to give his cell phone to the police. The Defendant said that he told his boss that 

he “sent some text[s he] shouldn’t have sent.” The Defendant repeatedly stated that 

Investigator Tipton came into the interview already believing A.L. and R.M. 
-28-

After the interview recording was played, Investigator Tipton testified that although 

she mentioned to the Defendant using a “black light” and testing for DNA in the home, she 

ultimately did not order the testing because the victim did not report the Defendant’s having 

ejaculated on the couch. In addition, the possibility existed that the Defendant might have

deposited DNA while masturbating alone. 

6. Defense Proof

The Defendant presented one witness, Rebecca Mayes, who testified that she was 

an assistant coach and “ball mom” for A.L.’s softball team. Ms. Mayes never saw 

inappropriate behavior between the Defendant and A.L. Ms. Mayes noted that although 

she was close with A.L. and discussed R.M. and A.L.’s father with her, A.L. never reported 

the abuse to her. Ms. Mayes affirmed that the Defendant and A.L. appeared to have a close 

relationship and spent a lot of time together. Ms. Mayes said that R.M. attended about five 

of eighteen games per season and that R.M. came to one of A.L.’s practices so intoxicated

that she could not stand. Ms. Mayes said that A.L. was embarrassed and concerned.

7. State’s Elections

At the close of the proof, the State dismissed Counts 3 and 5, sexual battery by an 

authority figure, and made the following elections: 

Count Event

1 (aggravated sexual battery) When A.L. was in sixth grade, sitting on the 

big couch with the Defendant and “he placed 

his hand on top of her shirt and then went 

underneath her clothing and inside her bra to 

touch her breast.”

4 (sexual battery by an authority figure) “[T]he time when [the Defendant] touched 

the breast of [thirteen] year old [A.L.] in the 

living room of the family residence when the 

two were making out and [R.M.] returned 

home unexpectedly.” 

6 (statutory rape by an authority figure)

17 (incest)

28 (rape)

When thirteen-year-old A.L. “performed 

fellatio on [the Defendant] in the living room 

of the family residence during the daytime, 

when the parties had not engaged in any 

kissing before the fellatio and [the 

Defendant] cleaned himself with napkins he 

had obtained before the sexual act.” 
-29-

7 (statutory rape by an authority figure)

18 (incest)

29 (rape)

When thirteen-year-old A.L. performed 

fellatio on the Defendant in the shower of the 

“big bathroom” at night when no one else 

was at home. 

8 (statutory rape by an authority figure)

19 (incest)

30 (rape)

When thirteen-year-old A.L. performed 

fellatio on the Defendant in his truck after 

softball on “a curvy dark backroad [sic], 

after he had cleaned his penis at a gas 

station. [The Defendant] took sharp turns 

that caused his penis to go further in [A.L.’s] 

mouth. [The Defendant] threw napkins 

containing ejaculate out the truck window 

after the act.”

9 (statutory rape by an authority figure)

20 (incest)

31 (rape)

When thirteen-year-old A.L. performed

fellatio on him in the break room at his work 

on a day after school when she had no 

softball. 

10 (statutory rape by an authority figure)

21 (incest)

32 (rape)

When thirteen-year-old A.L. performed 

fellatio on the Defendant in the upstairs room 

when he was on his lunch break. The 

Defendant was sitting in a chair, and A.L. 

was kneeling on the floor. The Defendant 

locked the door before the act. 

11 (statutory rape by an authority figure)

22 (incest)

33 (rape)

The Defendant inserted his finger into 

thirteen-year-old A.L.’s “genital opening” 

while she was inside the shower and he was 

standing outside the shower in the larger 

bathroom. 

12 (statutory rape by an authority figure)

23 (incest)

34 (rape)

The Defendant inserted his finger into 

thirteen-year-old A.L.’s “genital opening” 

while they were both standing inside the 

shower in the larger bathroom. 

13 (statutory rape by an authority figure)

24 (incest)

35 (rape)

The Defendant performed cunnilingus on 

A.L. in the living room, and the “church 

note” was left on the fence the next day. 

A.L. was fourteen or fifteen years old.17

 

17 We note that relative to Count 35, rape, the State had to prove that A.L. was “less than” fifteen years old. 

See Tenn. Code Ann. 39-13-501(1) (defining coercion). However, the text message in which the Defendant

referenced the “church people” incident was dated April 14, 2016, which was before A.L.’s fifteenth 

birthday. The record reflects that the jury was properly instructed regarding the definition of coercion.
-30-

14 (statutory rape by an authority figure)

25 (incest)

36 (rape)

The Defendant performed cunnilingus on 

A.L. while she was lying on the break room

floor in the Defendant’s workplace. A.L. 

used the women’s restroom on the same 

floor. A.L. was in eighth grade.

15 (statutory rape by an authority figure)

26 (incest)

37 (rape)

The Defendant performed cunnilingus on

A.L. on the bed in the upstairs room at the 

Defendant’s workplace, and one other person 

was in the building. A.L. cleaned herself 

with napkins that were already upstairs. This 

occurred the summer after A.L. turned 

thirteen.

16 (statutory rape by an authority figure) A.L. turned fifteen and the Defendant 

“placed his lubricated penis in [A.L.’s] anal 

opening . . . while not wearing a condom, in 

the living room of the family residence, 

while both were in the floor.” 

27 (incest)

38(rape)

The first time the Defendant anally 

penetrated A.L. a short time before her 

fifteenth birthday while wearing a condom, 

in the living room of the family residence 

while A.L. was on her knees in front of the 

couch and the Defendant was on his knees 

behind her.

During closing arguments, the State explained to the jury that it did not need to make an 

election as to Count 2, solicitation of a minor, which referred to the Defendant’s asking 

A.L. to photograph her breasts after he sent her a photograph of his penis. The State also 

argued that the rape charges were based upon coercion by use of parental, custodial, or 

official authority over a child less than fifteen years old. The prosecutor stated, 

This was her step-dad. She didn’t say anything because she trusted him. She 

was confused. He used the fact that he was her dad in order to accomplish 

this. I would submit to you that . . . if they didn’t have that relationship, that 

he would not have been able to engage in this particular activity.

8. Verdict, Sentence, and Appeal 

The jury found the Defendant guilty as charged. At the sentencing hearing, Eileen 

Mason, the Defendant’s stepmother; Lonnie Mason, the Defendant’s brother; Barbara 

Copland, the Defendant’s mother; and Doyle Mason, the Defendant’s father, testified 
-31-

regarding the Defendant’s good character. Each of them stated that they had never 

observed inappropriate behavior between the Defendant and girls in their family. The elder 

Doyle Mason noted his disbelief that the incidents in this case occurred. 

Deanna Houser, the Defendant’s girlfriend, testified that she was twenty-one years 

old and that she had been dating the Defendant for almost two years. Ms. Houser stated 

that she suffered from severe mental health issues, including anorexia and bipolar disorder,

and that she was “mentally disabled.” She said that the Defendant ensured she kept 

doctor’s appointments and took her medication. Ms. Houser averred that the Defendant 

was the first man she had ever trusted, that she had experienced sexual, physical, and 

mental abuse in the past, and that the Defendant never forced her to do anything she did 

not want to do. She stated that she was initially afraid of the Defendant, physically abused 

him, left him six times, and obtained an order of protection against him. Ms. Houser stated 

that she lied about the Defendant’s physically abusing her in order to obtain the order of 

protection. Ms. Houser said that she found suitable housing for herself and the Defendant 

if he were released on probation.

The presentence report reflected that the Defendant had no previous criminal record 

and that the Defendant denied drinking alcohol or using drugs except for tasting alcohol on 

two occasions in his twenties and smoking marijuana once as a teenager. The Defendant’s 

Strong-R assessment indicated a high risk for violence.

A.L. submitted a written victim impact statement, which stated that she had 

nightmares and “flashbacks,” but that they had stopped when the Defendant was 

incarcerated. A.L. stated that the Defendant hurt her “in ways that [she] did not know 

[were] possible.” A.L. stated that she was improving because she “learned how to work 

through the pain[.]” A.L. requested that the Defendant be sentenced to life in prison, stating 

that she would “never be able to forget the things he did . . . . No money, counseling, or 

jail time [would] take back what he did.” A.L. noted that living with the Defendant was 

“like living in prison, never seeing [her] friends, never having a real boyfriend. [She] had 

prison at home and then [her] second life at school.” A.L. concluded that she was happy 

now and “finally g[o]t to enjoy life now that [she was] finally free” but that she would carry 

this experience with her for the rest of her life.

The Defendant submitted a written statement to the trial court, which averred that 

the Defendant was “a very caring person” and that he understood that there were “a lot of 

charges and fines against [him.]” He apologized for “the inconvenience [he had] caused 

the court, [his] family or [A.L.] and her family.” The Defendant stated that he always 

“tr[ied] to put others before [him]self” and requested to prove to the court that he was a 

good person. The Defendant noted that he had not attempted to contact A.L. or her family 

and stated that he would obey all conditions of probation because he did not want to go 

back to jail, which was “the hardest thing [he had] ever done.” The Defendant said that he 
-32-

could not pay his fines in prison and that he was willing to pay fines “indefinitely.” The 

Defendant averred that he had “never run from [his] problems” and requested the court to 

consider his support system and the restrictions he would face as a probationer, including 

those related to registering as a sex offender. The Defendant stated that if he were granted 

probation, he “would not pursue appeals” because he wanted to move forward and did not 

want A.L. to “have to worry about appeals or going through courts again.” The Defendant 

concluded by stating, “There is no winner in this case but hopefully we all can get it behind 

us.” 

The trial court stated that it considered the presentence report, the principles of 

sentencing, the testimony of the defense witnesses, the Defendant’s and A.L.’s statements, 

and the arguments presented relative to mitigating and enhancement factors. The court 

noted that Count 1, aggravated sexual battery, was a nonprobatable offense. The court 

found that the Defendant was a Range I, standard offender. The court found relative to the 

probatable offenses that the Defendant was “not a good candidate” based upon the 

seriousness of the offenses and that probation would depreciate the seriousness of the 

offenses. 

Relative to the length of the sentence, the trial court noted that Count 1, aggravated 

sexual battery, and Counts 28-38, rape, were Class B felonies and that the remaining counts 

were Class C felonies. The court declined to apply enhancement factor (1), that the 

Defendant had a history of uncharged criminal behavior based upon A.L.’s testimony 

regarding other incidents of penetration before she turned thirteen. See Tenn. Code Ann. 

§ 40-35-114(1). The court noted that “it would not be appropriate to consider that 

testimony [for purposes of] enhancement” because “that was really more due to the fact 

that the [S]tate did not have a good understanding of when the penetration began[.]” The 

court also declined to apply enhancement factor (4), that the victim was particularly 

vulnerable due to her age, finding that no proof supported “something particular about that 

child’s age . . . that made [her] particularly vulnerable.” See Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-

114(4). The court applied enhancement factor (7), that the Defendant committed the 

offense to gratify his desire for pleasure or excitement, only relative to the convictions for 

statutory rape, rape, and incest. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-114(7). The court declined 

to apply enhancement factor (8), that the Defendant failed to comply with the conditions 

of a sentence involving release into the community, because the Defendant only failed to 

comply with bond conditions.18 See Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-114(8). 

The trial court applied enhancement factor (14), that the Defendant abused a 

position of private trust, and gave it “a great deal of weight.” See Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-

 

18 The record reflected that one of the Defendant’s bond conditions was not to have contact with minor

children. The State presented social media photographs taken during the Defendant’s release on bond, 

which showed the Defendant at an amusement park with Ms. Houser, another woman, and a child.
-33-

35-114(8). The court noted relative to the rape convictions that “it’s sort of a narrow 

definition between coercion and what happened here.” The court found, though, that “there 

is a degree of abuse of a private trust above and beyond in this particular case what was 

necessary to coerce her into the act[.]” The court stated that this case was “the most 

emotionally manipulative case [the court had] ever seen where [the Defendant] clearly 

created in this young girl’s mind this idea that she was being courted by [the Defendant] 

and that they were going to eventually . . . have this life together.” The court stated that 

this was “really how he was able to accomplish this beyond what would be necessary for 

coercion.” 

Relative to consecutive sentencing, the trial court noted that any consecutive 

sentencing was discretionary based upon the convictions. The court noted that one factor 

it considered was that the Defendant was convicted of two or more offenses involving

sexual abuse of a minor; the court further noted that multiple aggravating circumstances 

applied. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-115(b)(5). The court stated that the Defendant and 

A.L. had a “very close relationship,” that she considered him to be her father, and that the 

Defendant was “living his life” in a father-figure role. The court found that the Defendant 

had controlled and manipulated A.L. by telling her that he wanted to marry her and have 

children with her. The court found that a familial relationship existed as well as a “very 

emotionally connected, sort of a dating relationship” that was “extreme and aggravated[.]” 

The trial court found that the time span of the abuse was an aggravating factor, 

noting that “[t]he grooming, so to speak, probably began before age [ten], but at age [ten] 

we start[ed] to see this relationship turn into what it would become and went on for a 

number of years[.]” The court found that the nature and scope of the sexual abuse was 

aggravated, that “every type of penetration imaginable” occurred, and that the residual 

physical and mental damage to A.L. was aggravated. The court noted the victim’s trial 

testimony and victim impact statement, finding that the victim suffered nightmares and 

flashbacks, that she felt like she lived in a prison for years, and that she would have to 

“carry this” with her for the rest of her life. 

The trial court found that justification for consecutive sentencing existed and noted 

the statutory factors supporting a sentence to be served in confinement. The trial court 

noted that it sought to order a sentence that was “justly deserved in relation to the 

seriousness of the offense.” The court found that the offenses were “extremely serious” 

and that the facts of the case involved extreme emotional and mental damage to A.L. 

 Relative to mitigating factors, the trial court found that the Defendant had no prior 

criminal convictions and gave this factor “a good bit of consideration.” See Tenn. Code 

Ann. § 40-35-113(13). The court noted the character witnesses’ testimony that the 

Defendant was a hard worker, but the court did not “think that one carrie[d] a lot of weight.” 

The court found that the Defendant’s employment history, which spanned most of his adult 
-34-

life, in conjunction with his lack of criminal history “support[ed] his mitigation.” The court 

found that the character witnesses’ testimony about the Defendant’s treating his family 

members well did not “serve as mitigation.” 

The trial court considered Ms. Houser’s testimony and stated that in the court’s 

opinion, Ms. Houser was “really another young emotionally troubled young lady who was 

taken advantage of by the [D]efendant in this case[.]” The court found that Ms. Houser 

was a young, vulnerable woman and that her testimony did not mitigate the Defendant’s 

behavior “at all.” The court noted its “great concern” that the Defendant exhibited “more 

predatory behavior.” The court said that Ms. Houser’s testimony contained “some 

interesting statements, including [that] he didn’t force anything on her. When he wanted 

to do things she didn’t want to do, he said no. That was very troubling to the court.” The 

court stated that it was not “holding it against” the Defendant, but that the testimony did 

not “work” as mitigation.

The trial court noted the jury’s “strong message” by setting maximum fines, stating 

that although the jury had “no role in sentencing,” the court was “mindful” that the jury 

felt the Defendant’s behavior warranted maximum fines. The court found that the 

enhancement factors “largely outweigh[ed]” the mitigating factors and that sentences 

“toward the top of the range” were appropriate. The court commented that it believed 

neither maximum sentences run consecutively nor all concurrent sentences were 

appropriate.

The trial court ordered a “hybrid sentence with partial consecutive sentencing,” 

which was as follows: 

Count Conviction Felony 

Class Sentence

1 Aggravated Sexual Battery B 12 years

2 Solicitation of a Minor C

6 years

Concurrent with Count 1

4 Sexual battery by authority figure C

6 years

Concurrent with Count 1

6 Statutory rape by authority figure C

19 6 years

Concurrent with Count 28

 

19 Statutory rape by an authority figure was a Class C felony until July 1, 2016, when amended legislation 

took effect. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-532(b)(2014). The period specified in the indictment relative 

to statutory rape by an authority figure was May 1, 2014, until June 30, 2016. 
-35-

7 Statutory rape by authority figure C

6 years

Concurrent with Count 28

8 Statutory rape by authority figure C

6 years

Concurrent with Count 28

9 Statutory rape by authority figure C

6 years

Concurrent with Count 28

10 Statutory rape by authority figure C

6 years

Concurrent with Count 28

11 Statutory rape by authority figure C

6 years

Concurrent with Count 33

12 Statutory rape by authority figure C

6 years

Concurrent with Count 33

13 Statutory rape by authority figure C

6 years

Concurrent with Count 35

14 Statutory rape by authority figure C

6 years

Concurrent with Count 35

15 Statutory rape by authority figure C

6 years

Concurrent with Count 35

16 Statutory rape by authority figure C

6 years

Concurrent with Count 38

17 Incest C

6 years

Concurrent with Count 28

18 Incest C

6 years

Concurrent with Count 28

19 Incest C

6 years

Concurrent with Count 28

20 Incest C

6 years

Concurrent with Count 28

21 Incest C

6 years

Concurrent with Count 28

22 Incest C

6 years

Concurrent with Count 33

23 Incest C

6 years

Concurrent with Count 33

24 Incest C

6 years

Concurrent with Count 35

25 Incest C

6 years

Concurrent with Count 35

26 Incest C

6 years

Concurrent with Count 35
-36-

27 Incest C

6 years

Concurrent with Count 38

28 Rape (fellatio) B

10 years

Consecutive to Count 1

29 Rape (fellatio) B

10 years

Concurrent with Count 28

30 Rape (fellatio) B

10 years

Concurrent with Count 28

31 Rape (fellatio) B

10 years

Concurrent with Count 28

32 Rape (fellatio) B

10 years

Concurrent with Count 28

33 Rape (digital) B

10 years

Consecutive to Counts 1 and 

28

34 Rape (digital) B

10 years

Concurrent with Counts 33 and 

28

35 Rape (cunnilingus) B

10 years

Consecutive to Counts 1, 28, 

33

36 Rape (cunnilingus) B

10 years

Concurrent with Count 33

37 Rape (cunnilingus) B

10 years

Concurrent with Count 33

38 Rape (anal) B

10 years

Consecutive to Counts 1, 28, 

33, 35

The total effective sentence was fifty-two years at one hundred percent service. The 

trial court reduced the fine imposed to $38,000 in light of the lengthy sentence in 

confinement. Thereafter, the public defender was appointed as appellate counsel and filed 

the motion for a new trial, which was denied. The Defendant timely appealed. 

ANALYSIS

On appeal, the Defendant argues (1) that the evidence was insufficient to support 

some of his convictions; (2) that there was a material and prejudicial variance between the 

bill of particulars and the State’s election relative to Count 1; (3) that the trial court “took 

on the role of the prosecutor” by questioning the victim and by doing so, conveyed to the 

jury that the court found the victim credible; (4) that the court erred by admitting hearsay
-37-

evidence that the victim reported the abuse to others, including her grandmother, her 

mother, and a forensic interviewer; and (5) that the sentence imposed by the court was 

excessive. We will address each issue in turn. 

I. Sufficiency of the Evidence

The Defendant contends that the evidence was insufficient to sustain his convictions

in Count 1, aggravated sexual battery, relative to A.L.’s age; in Count 2, solicitation of a 

minor, relative to the Defendant’s belief that A.L. would produce a lascivious exhibition 

of her breasts; and in Counts 28-38, rape, relative to coercion by use of parental authority 

on a child younger than age fifteen.

20

 The State responds that the evidence is sufficient. 

An appellate court’s standard of review when a defendant questions the sufficiency 

of the evidence on appeal is “whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable 

to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the 

crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979). This 

court does not reweigh the evidence; rather, it presumes that the jury has resolved all 

conflicts in the testimony and drawn all reasonable inferences from the evidence in favor 

of the State. See State v. Sheffield, 676 S.W.2d 542, 547 (Tenn. 1984); State v. Cabbage, 

571 S.W.2d 832, 835 (Tenn. 1978). Questions regarding witness credibility, conflicts in 

testimony, and the weight and value to be given to evidence were resolved by the jury. See

State v. Bland, 958 S.W.2d 651, 659 (Tenn. 1997).

A guilty verdict “removes the presumption of innocence and replaces it with a 

presumption of guilt, and [on appeal] the defendant has the burden of illustrating why the 

evidence is insufficient to support the jury’s verdict.” Id.; see State v. Tuggle, 639 S.W.2d 

913, 914 (Tenn. 1982). The standard of proof is the same whether the evidence is direct 

or circumstantial. State v. Dorantes, 331 S.W.3d 370, 379 (Tenn. 2011). Likewise, 

appellate review of the convicting evidence “is the same whether the conviction is based 

upon direct or circumstantial evidence.” Id. (quoting State v. Hanson, 279 S.W.3d 265, 

275 (Tenn. 2009)). The duty of this court “on appeal of a conviction is not to contemplate 

all plausible inferences in the [d]efendant’s favor, but to draw all reasonable inferences 

from the evidence in favor of the State.” State v. Sisk, 343 S.W.3d 60, 67 (Tenn. 2011).

A. Aggravated Sexual Battery

The Defendant contends that the A.L.’s age was not sufficiently proven in Count 1, 

in which the State elected the incident when the Defendant touched A.L.’s breasts while 

“making out” on the big couch when she was younger than age thirteen. The Defendant 

argues that “rule of cancellation” dictates that A.L.’s testimony regarding the timing of the 

 

20 The Defendant does not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence in Counts 4-27. 
-38-

incident “can be given no weight” because she made inconsistent statements under oath. 

Alternatively, the Defendant argues that A.L.’s testimony cannot be reconciled to produce 

a timeline in which this specific incident occurred before her thirteenth birthday. The State 

responds that any inconsistencies in A.L.’s testimony were explained and that the evidence 

was sufficient to establish her age.

Aggravated sexual battery is defined, in relevant part, as the “unlawful sexual 

contact with a victim by the defendant or the defendant by a victim . . . [when the] victim 

is less than thirteen (13) years of age.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-504(a). The indictments 

in this case reflect that the State elected A.L.’s age as the basis for the aggravated sexual 

battery charge. 

Tennessee courts have recognized the rule of law “that contradictory [sworn] 

statements made by a witness as to the same fact can cancel each other out.” State v.

Caldwell, 977 S.W.2d 110, 118 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1997) (citing Taylor v. Nashville 

Banner Publ’g Co., 573 S.W.2d 476, 482 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1978)). The “rule of 

cancellation” addresses circumstances in which “the proof of [a] fact lies wholly with one 

witness, and he both affirms and denies it,” resulting in no “evidence at all to prove the 

fact.” State v. Matthews, 888 S.W.2d 446, 449-50 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1993) (quoting 

Johnston v. Cincinnati N.O. & T.P. Ry. Co., 240 S.W. 429, 436 (Tenn. 1922)). “However, 

this rule applies only when inconsistency in a witness’s testimony is unexplained and when 

neither version of his testimony is corroborated by other evidence.” Caldwell, 977 S.W.2d 

at 118.

In this case, any inconsistencies in A.L.’s testimony were explained by the passage 

of time and the continuous nature of the abuse. See State v. Finch, 465 S.W.3d 584, 604 

(Tenn. Crim. App. 2013) (concluding that “any inconsistencies in [the witness’s] testimony 

were explained by the fact that these events had occurred two years before the trial. [The 

witness] testified that he had trouble remembering the exact dates and how he gave the 

UPS Store receipts to the [d]efendant due to the passage of time” ), overruled on other

grounds by State v. Menke, 590 S.W.3d 455 (Tenn. 2019). During cross-examination, 

defense counsel elicited testimony regarding A.L.’s trial preparation with the prosecutor. 

When asked by counsel whether she knew the significance of her age relative to the 

charges, A.L. stated the following: “Yes, but it’s very hard for me to remember because 

it’s been almost two years and I have tried to forget[,] . . . and it happened so much that I 

can’t remember like exactly. That’s why I have to give such a big time frame.” As a result, 

A.L. “provided an explanation that the jury heard and could evaluate” regarding any 

inconsistency in her testimony. State v. Daniel Pottebaum, No. M2007-02108-CCA-R3-

CD, 2008 WL 5397848, at *11 (Tenn. Crim. App. Dec. 30, 2008)
-39-

In addition, we disagree with the Defendant’s argument that A.L.’s testimony 

directly conflicts with itself. The testimony in this case was voluminous—in part because 

the abuse was continuous and occurred over a period of years, and in part due to the 

structure of questioning on both direct and cross-examination. The end result was that the 

questioning—and consequently the testimony—did not follow a clear timeline. Our review 

of A.L.’s testimony indicates that any inconsistencies were indirect and able to be resolved 

by the finder of fact. 

For example, the Defendant emphasizes in his appellate brief that A.L. “was directly 

asked whether the time [the Defendant] ‘touched [her] breasts’ occurred before age 

thirteen, and she said only[,] ‘In the shower, yes.’” The Defendant argues that A.L.’s 

answer indicates that the couch incident occurred after age thirteen or that she did not recall 

whether she was twelve or thirteen, both of which would directly conflict with A.L.’s 

earlier testimony. 

However, the Defendant takes A.L.’s answer out of context in this regard. In 

reference to “kissing and . . . sexual things,” defense counsel asked A.L. if “all that 

occurred” after age thirteen, except for the shower game. A.L. responded, “Shower and 

the kissing.” Defense counsel asked, “And the shower incident, you say that occurred 

before age [thirteen]; is that correct?” A.L. answered affirmatively. Defense counsel

stated, “All right. And that would – did that include the time he touched your breasts?” 

A.L. responded, “In the shower, yes.” A.L.’s confining her response to the shower incident 

was appropriate given the scope of the immediately preceding question; in short, her 

testimony did not necessarily conflict with her other testimony about the timing of the 

incident in Count 1. 

A.L. first gave general information regarding the progression of her “relationship” 

with the Defendant, then refined her answers relative to specific incidents when requested. 

A.L. testified that when she was in sixth grade, the Defendant began kissing her on the lips 

and told her that they were boyfriend and girlfriend, which meant that they were supposed 

to engage in sexual activities together. A.L. said that she and the Defendant began doing 

“sexual things” when she was in seventh grade and between twelve and thirteen years old. 

The first sexual activity she named was manual stimulation, which happened after the 

shower game ended but before fellatio began. She did not recall whether any instances of 

manual stimulation occurred after she turned thirteen. She stated that after the manual 

stimulation occurred and when she was in seventh grade, the Defendant began to touch her 

vaginal area. A.L. stated that the Defendant began to touch her breasts a “little bit before” 

he began touching her vagina. Relative to the facts underlying Count 1, A.L. specifically 

testified that the incident on the couch when the Defendant touched her breast on top of 

her shirt and under her bra occurred when she was in sixth grade, which would have made 

her twelve years old at most. Because A.L. never testified whether the breast touching 
-40-

happened before or after the manual stimulation, which occurred in seventh grade, and she 

also testified that the vaginal touching occurred in seventh grade, a possible inconsistency 

exists with her later testimony that the Defendant touched her breast in sixth grade. 

However, this type of indirect inconsistency or gap in the testimony is not the type of

conflict the rule of cancellation seeks to address. As we noted above, A.L. explained the 

reason for any conflicts in her testimony. 

Likewise, the Defendant cross-examined A.L. regarding her statement during the 

forensic interview that the first sexual activity was kissing and that she was uncertain 

whether it occurred before her thirteenth birthday.21 After being asked whether, in light of 

her forensic interview, all sexual touching had to have occurred after she turned thirteen, 

A.L. responded by stating that the shower game and “the kissing” occurred before she 

turned thirteen. Any difficulty A.L. had in distinguishing “kissing” from “making out” 

was not an inconsistency of such a degree that this court would disregard her testimony. 

A.L.’s testimony was not clearly inconsistent and the reason for any inconsistencies was 

explained; the Defendant is not entitled to relief on this basis. 

The Defendant’s remaining sufficiency issue in Count 1 relates to the weight of the 

evidence and A.L.’s credibility. In the light most favorable to the State, A.L. testified 

generally regarding the time when the kissing and sexual touching started, and later she 

was asked to recall specific incidents of abuse. Although the Defendant correctly notes 

that A.L. said she was “twelve or thirteen” when the kissing and sexual touching began, 

relative to the incident elected for Count 1, A.L. specifically stated that it happened when 

she was in sixth grade, meaning that she was between eleven and twelve years old. It was 

the province of the jury to reconcile inconsistencies in the testimony. See Bland, 958 

S.W.2d at 659. The jury, by its verdict, credited A.L.’s statement that the incident occurred 

when she was in sixth grade when she was younger than thirteen years old; we note that 

the jury was free to credit portions of A.L.’s testimony while rejecting others. See State v.

Winters, 137 S.W.3d 641, 658 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2003) (concluding that “the jury’s role 

as the trier of fact is to determine which portions of the evidence are illustrative of the truth 

relative to disputed events”). The evidence was sufficient relative to A.L.’s age in Count 

1, and the Defendant is not entitled to relief on this basis. 

B. Solicitation of a Minor

The Defendant contends relative to Count 2, solicitation of a minor, the evidence 

was insufficient to establish that by asking A.L. to photograph her breasts, he attempted to 

induce A.L. to engage in conduct that, if completed, would have constituted especially 

aggravated sexual exploitation of a minor; that is, production of child pornography. He 

argues that the evidence established only that he requested a photograph depicting “mere 

 

21 We note that A.L.’s forensic interview was not a sworn statement for purposes of the rule of cancellation. 
-41-

nudity” and that as a result, the photograph he intended to receive did not contain “sexual 

activity” as contemplated by the statute. The Defendant further argues that without the 

photograph itself or detailed evidence describing it, it was impossible for the trier of fact 

to determine “whether [the Defendant]: subjectively intended for [A.L.] to produce a 

photograph that would qualify as child pornography.” The State responds that the 

circumstances surrounding the photograph’s production provided adequate proof of a 

lascivious exhibition. 

The indictment in Count 2, solicitation of a minor, specified that the Defendant “did 

unlawfully and intentionally, by means of oral communication, directly, attempt to induce, 

a person, to-wit: [A.L.], the same being a person that [the Defendant] did know or should 

have known to be less than eighteen (18) years of age, to engage in conduct that, if 

completed, would constitute a violation by [the Defendant] of the offense of Especially 

Aggravated Sexual Exploitation of a Minor[.]” See Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-528(a)(8). 

Especially aggravated sexual exploitation of a minor, known in common parlance 

as production of child pornography, occurs, in relevant part, when a person “knowingly 

promote[s or assists]” a minor in participating in the production of “material that includes 

the minor engaging in . . . [s]exual activity.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-17-1005. Sexual 

activity includes the “[l]ascivious exhibition of the female breast[.]” Tenn. Code Ann. § 

39-17-1002(8)(G). Our supreme court has noted that “mere nudity” is not sufficient to 

constitute a lascivious exhibition for purposes of the sexual exploitation of a minor 

offenses. See, e.g. State v. Hall, --- S.W.3d ---, M2015-02402-SC-R11-CD, 2019 WL 

117580, at *9 (Tenn. Jan. 7, 2019) (quoting State v. Whited, 506 S.W.3d 416, 441 (Tenn. 

2016)). 

We disagree with the Defendant’s assertion that the photograph or a detailed 

description of it was necessary to the jury’s determination relative to solicitation of a minor. 

Unlike a conviction for especially aggravated exploitation of a minor, which hinges on 

whether the resulting material was a lascivious exhibition, a solicitation conviction, like a

conviction for attempt, centers on the Defendant’s subjective intent in the moment he asked 

A.L. to photograph her breasts; put another way, the jury must determine whether the 

Defendant intended for A.L. to produce a lascivious exhibition of her breasts, and not one 

depicting mere nudity. A.L.’s response to the request is irrelevant; as a result, the absence 

of the resulting photograph or a description thereof does not necessarily lead to a 

conclusion that the evidence was insufficient to support the solicitation conviction. 

Conversely, the context in which the Defendant made the request is highly relevant to his

intent in soliciting the photograph, even though it would not be relevant to a determination 

of whether the resulting photograph was, in fact, lascivious. See Hall, 2019 WL 117580, 

at *13 (“Certainly we agree that criminal attempt necessarily focuses on the defendant’s 

state of mind and not whether the completed video was actually lascivious”) (citing United 
-42-

States v. Sims, 708 F.3d 832, 835 (6th Cir. 2013); United States v. Vanderwal, 533 F. 

App’x 498, 502 (6th Cir. 2013)).

Our supreme court’s opinions in Hall and Whited provide this court with guidance 

regarding some of the circumstances that may evince an intent to produce lascivious 

content. In Hall, the defendant hid a camera inside the victim’s bedroom; the fully-clothed 

victim discovered the camera almost immediately upon reentering her bedroom after 

showering. 2019 WL 117580, at *1. The recording showed that the defendant had entered 

the bedroom, placed the camera such that a person’s torso was visible from mid-thigh to 

shoulder, milled about, and left. Id. at *2. The court noted that the camera was not zoomed 

in such that the focal point of the shot was clearly a genital or intimate body part. Id. at 

*13. Because it was not clear that the defendant intended to capture more than mere nudity, 

the evidence was insufficient to establish that he attempted to produce a lascivious 

exhibition. Id. at *19. Likewise, in Whited, the defendant succeeded in recording his 

minor daughter and her friend in his daughter’s bedroom and a bathroom in various states 

of undress. 506 S.W.3d at 419. However, our supreme court found that the evidence was 

insufficient to support his conviction for especially aggravated exploitation of a minor

because the girls, who were unaware of the filming, did not engage in sexual activity or do 

anything more than shower or change clothes. Id. at 447. The Hall court discussed the 

factual similarities of that case with Whited, citing in particular the wide angle of the 

camera, the absence of sexual activity, and the victims’ lack of awareness of the camera. 

2019 WL 117580, at *13. The court also noted that “nudity combined with other factors—

such as the nature of the nudity depicted, emphasis or focus on private body areas, [or] 

posing or coaching of the minor by the defendant . . . could be sufficient to make the 

depiction a lascivious exhibition.” Id. at *9.

In this case, the Defendant sent or showed A.L. a photograph of his penis; when he 

told her that there was a body part she had not yet photographed, A.L. clearly understood 

that the Defendant was requesting a photograph specifically of her breasts. The 

Defendant’s conduct was different than that of the defendants in Hall and Whited, who 

simply placed a hidden camera in the hope of capturing passing nudity. Given the context 

in which the request occurred, the fact that a direct request was made, and A.L.’s role in 

the photography, the evidence was sufficient for a rational juror to conclude beyond a 

reasonable doubt that the Defendant attempted to induce A.L. to produce a lascivious 

exhibition of her breasts. The Defendant is not entitled to relief on this basis. 

C. Rape

Relative to the eleven rape convictions, the Defendant’s sole sufficiency issue 

relates to proof of coercion. The Defendant argues that without evidence that he ordered

A.L. to comply with the sexual penetration because he was her stepfather or that he 
-43-

threatened to punish her, there is insufficient evidence that he used his parental authority 

to accomplish the rapes. The State responds that the victim testified that she complied with 

the Defendant’s requests because he told her to do so and that she did not report the abuse 

because the Defendant told her he would get into trouble.

Rape is defined, in relevant part, as the “unlawful sexual penetration of a victim by 

the defendant or of the defendant by a victim [when] . . . [f]orce or coercion is used to 

accomplish the act.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-503(a)(1). “Sexual penetration” means 

“sexual intercourse, cunnilingus, fellatio, anal intercourse, or any other intrusion, however 

slight, of any part of a person’s body or of any object into the genital or anal openings of 

the victim’s [or] the defendant’s . . . body, but emission of semen is not required.” Tenn. 

Code Ann. § 39-13-501(7). “Coercion” is defined, in relevant part, as “the use of parental, 

custodial, or official authority over a child less than fifteen (15) years of age[.]” Tenn.

Code Ann. § 39-13-501(1).

A review of similar cases in this court indicates that for purposes of coercion, the 

use of parental authority can be proven without the explicit commands the Defendant 

argues are necessary. See, e.g., State v. Rodney Darnell Robinson, No. M2019-00303-

CCA-R3-CD, 2020 WL 1923152, at *21 (Tenn. Crim. App. Apr. 21, 2020) (concluding 

that rape by coercion using parental authority was sufficiently proven when the defendant 

was the custodian of two fourteen-year-old girls; the defendant digitally penetrated them 

after asking to examine their genital areas for educational purposes or hygiene; and it was 

“undisputed that, during this time period, [the d]efendant had custodial authority over [the 

victims]”); State v. Perry Lewis Sisco, No. M-2017-01202-CCA-R3-CD, 2018 WL 

1019870, at *12 (Tenn. Crim. App. Feb. 21, 2018) (concluding, in relevant part, that rape 

by coercion using parental authority was sufficiently proven when the defendant asked his 

thirteen-year-old daughter to lie on his bed, penetrated her, and stopped when she objected; 

as well as when the defendant pulled down the victim’s shorts as she slept, penetrated her, 

and did not stop when she objected, noting that the defendant had in both instances “used 

force or coercion through his parental authority”); State v. Delbert Lee Harris, No. 01C01-

9705-CC-00177, 1998 WL 670403, at *3 (Tenn. Crim. App. Sept. 30, 1998) (noting 

relative to coercion that “[t]he defendant, the stepfather of the victim, penetrated her once 

when she was thirteen years old” and that “[t]he victim lived in his residence at the time 

and qualified as being in his custody”). 

We think that this court’s opinion in State v. Tarrants Chandler, No. M2013-00279-

CCA-R3-CD, 2014 WL 3055972 (Tenn. Crim. App. July 7, 2014), is particularly 

instructive. In Chandler, the defendant was convicted of ten counts of rape relative to his 

girlfriend’s minor daughter. 2014 WL 3055972, at *1. The defendant sometimes lived 

with the family and initially had a stepfather-type relationship with the victim. Id. at *6. 

However, when the victim was between thirteen and fourteen years old, the defendant 
-44-

cultivated a dating relationship with the victim that alienated her from her mother. Id. at 

*2, *6. The defendant began sexually abusing the victim when she was fourteen years old. 

Id. at *6. The defendant told the victim that after she turned eighteen, they would have a 

family, and he referred to her as his “Future Son’s Mother.” Id. at *6, *9. The victim 

denied that the defendant ever used violence to accomplish the sexual contact. Id. at *10. 

On appeal, the defendant argued both that he did not have parental or custodial authority 

over the victim and that the proof was insufficient to establish that he used any such 

authority to accomplish the rapes. Id. at *17. After concluding that the defendant had 

custodial authority over the victim, this court discussed the proof relative to coercion as 

follows: 

As the trial court noted at the sentencing hearing, there was no question that 

the defendant “had become kind of the father of this family, primarily a stayat-home father, and used his position of trust in order to kind of put that 

wedge between [the victim] and her mother.” While the victim testified that 

at the time the abuse was occurring she viewed the defendant as a boyfriend 

and enjoyed the sexual activity, she developed this view only because the 

defendant had been spending time with her as a father figure. As the trial 

court observed, while the victim was “mature, she was still a minor and [the 

defendant] was able to manipulate fully her emotions.” There is no merit to 

the defendant’s claim that he did not use his custodial relationship to 

facilitate the sexual activity. The defendant was a father figure to the victim 

and exploited this relationship to begin a sexual relationship with the victim

. . . . [A] rational trier of fact could have found that a custodial relationship 

existed and was used to effectuate a sexual relationship.

Id.

In this case, there was no dispute that the Defendant had parental authority over 

A.L. The Defendant raised A.L. from the time she was three years old, and he was the only 

full-time parent in the home for at least one year after R.M. began spending time with her 

new boyfriend and traveling to Virginia on the weekends. The Defendant described in his 

police interview that he chastised A.L. for making poor grades in school and would punish 

her for falling asleep without turning off the television. A.L. agreed that she was not close 

with her father and that she viewed the Defendant as a second father. R.M. was able to 

leave A.L. in the family home while she pursued other interests because R.M. trusted the 

Defendant to take care of A.L. A.L. confided in the Defendant and trusted him because he 

was a father figure. 

The Defendant abused his parental authority—a position of extraordinary trust—

and began to groom A.L. to become a sexual partner at the age of eleven, if not earlier. He 
-45-

gradually began to test the extent to which A.L. would tolerate sexual activity by playing 

the picture game and shower game when R.M. was not home—an opportunity he would 

not have had but for his parental relationship with A.L. A.L. cooperated with the 

Defendant’s assertion that they were in a romantic relationship because “that’s what he told 

[her]” and because the Defendant was, for all intents and purposes, her father. After 

convincing his minor stepdaughter that she was his “girlfriend,” the Defendant similarly 

exploited the parental relationship to have sexual contact with A.L. at the tire shop after he 

picked her up from school, in the upstairs office during the summer, in his truck after 

softball games, and in multiple locations in the family home. 

The trial court correctly noted that the Defendant engaged in “extreme emotional 

manipulation” to convince A.L. that she was in a healthy dating relationship, when in fact 

she was abused and controlled by the Defendant such that she felt her home to be a 

“prison.” In short, the Defendant’s unfettered access to A.L. arose from his parental 

authority over her and, therefore, he used his parental authority to manipulate A.L. and

accomplish the numerous incidents of rape for which he was convicted. The evidence 

relative to coercion was sufficient, and the Defendant is not entitled to relief on this basis. 

 

II. Bill of Particulars/State’s Election

The Defendant contends that a prejudicial and material variance exists between the 

State’s bill of particulars and its election in Count 1, aggravated sexual battery. The 

Defendant acknowledges that no objection was raised during trial and requests plain error 

relief. The State responds that the variance was not prejudicial or material. 

Prior to trial, the Defendant filed a motion for a bill of particulars. Relevant to the 

issues on appeal, the State responded by specifying that in Count 1, it referred to an incident 

in which the “Defendant touched the victim’s breasts while she was in the shower in their 

home.” The time period specified in the indictment was November 1, 2012-April 30, 2014. 

At trial, the State’s election relative to Count 1 specified the incident in which A.L. was in 

sixth grade and the Defendant “placed his hand on top of her shirt and then went underneath 

her clothing and inside her bra to touch her breast” while sitting on the big couch in the 

living room. 

The doctrine of plain error applies when all five of the following factors have been 

established:

(a) the record must clearly establish what occurred in the trial court;

(b) a clear and unequivocal rule of law must have been breached;

(c) a substantial right of the accused must have been adversely affected;

(d) the accused must not have waived the issue for tactical reasons; and

(e) consideration of the error must be “necessary to do substantial justice.”
-46-

State v. Page, 184 S.W.3d 223, 230-31 (Tenn. 2006) (quoting State v. Terry, 118 S.W.3d 

355, 360 (Tenn. 2003)) (internal brackets omitted). “An error would have to [be] especially 

egregious in nature, striking at the very heart of the fairness of the judicial proceeding, to 

rise to the level of plain error.” Id. at 231. Even if all five factors are present, “the plain 

error must be of such a great magnitude that it probably changed the outcome of the trial.” 

State v. Martin, 505 S.W.3d 492, 505 (Tenn. 2016).

This court has previously held that the purpose of a bill of particulars “is to provide 

the accused with sufficient information about the offense alleged in the indictment to 

permit the accused (a) to prepare a defense, (b) to avoid prejudicial surprise at trial, and (c) 

to enable the accused to preserve a plea of double jeopardy.” State v. Shropshire, 45 

S.W.3d 64, 71 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2000). A variance between a bill of particulars “and the 

evidence presented at trial is not fatal unless it is both material and prejudicial.” Id. “A 

material variance occurs only if the prosecutor has attempted to rely upon theories and 

evidence at the trial that were not fairly embraced in the allegations made in the charging 

instrument.” State v. Shropshire, 45 S.W.3d 64, 71 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2000) (citing State

v. Mayes, 854 S.W.2d 638, 640 (Tenn. 1993) (citations omitted); State v. Ealey, 959

S.W.2d 605, 609 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1997)). A variance does not prejudice the defendant 

(1) if the indictment sufficiently informs the defendant of the charges against him so that 

he may prepare his defense and not be misled or surprised at trial, and (2) if the variance is 

not such that it will present a danger that the defendant may be prosecuted a second time 

for the same offense. State v. Moss, 662 S.W.2d 590, 592 (Tenn. 1984).

This court has previously concluded that differences between a bill of particulars 

and a State’s election of offenses do not constitute a material and prejudicial variance so 

long as the proof “substantially corresponded” with the information in the bill of 

particulars. State v. Osborne, 251 S.W.3d 1, 16 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2007) (concluding in

the context of a motion for a mistrial that no material and prejudicial variance existed when 

the numbering of the bill of particulars differed from the State’s election, but the bill of 

particulars substantially corresponded to the conduct alleged at trial; for example, one child 

victim testified that a certain incident occurred in the living room rather than a bedroom). 

Likewise, in State v. Sanders, discrepancies existed between the bill of particulars 

and the State’s election of offenses relative to several counts of the indictment. No. 

M2011-00962-CCA-R3-CD, 2012 WL 4841545, at *14 (Tenn. Crim. App. Oct. 9, 

2012), aff’d, 452 S.W.3d 300 (Tenn. 2014). In Count 6, the bill of particulars alleged that 

the defendant touched the victim’s breast with his hand, but the State’s election and the 

proof reflected that the defendant touched the victim’s genital area over her clothing; in 

Counts 7 and 8, the bill of particulars alleged that the defendant digitally penetrated the 

victim’s vagina, but the State’s election and the proof reflected that the defendant 
-47-

penetrated the victim’s vagina with his penis. Id. When considering the discrepancies, this 

court reasoned as follows:

We conclude that despite the inconsistencies between the bill of 

particulars and the State’s elections, the State provided [the defendant] with 

enough details of the offenses to allow him to prepare a defense. In light of 

the statutory definitions of the offenses, both the bill of particulars and the 

State’s elections encompassed conduct that constitutes aggravated sexual 

battery and rape of a child. [The defendant] was protected from unfair 

surprise at trial. Finally, [the defendant] cannot be prosecuted twice for the 

same offenses alleged in this case. Double jeopardy prohibits subsequent 

prosecution of [the defendant] for offenses against the victim occurring 

within the time frame the State alleged in the indictment. State v. Jones, 953 

S.W.2d 695, 700 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1996); State v. Anderson, 748 S.W.2d 

201, 203 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1985). The bill of particulars provided [the 

defendant] the necessary protections to ensure due process.

. . . .

[The defendant] failed to demonstrate either during or after trial that he was 

prejudiced by the prosecution’s election of offenses that involved different 

means of aggravated sexual battery or unlawful penetration than that 

described in the bill of particulars. See State v. Speck, 944 S.W.2d 598, 601 

(Tenn. 1997). [The defendant] categorically denied the charges in his 

statement to law enforcement. He did not offer a defense geared toward those 

specific acts. See id. “Similarly, [the defendant] did not offer any defenses 

post-trial that he would have used at trial were it not for the specific [acts] 

set forth in the bill of particulars.” Id.; see also . . . Ealey, 959 S.W.2d [at]

605 . . . (holding that [the defendant] “failed utterly” to demonstrate how he 

suffered prejudice by not offering on this appeal any defenses that may have 

been available to him were it not for the variances between the bill of 

particulars and the State's proof). Accordingly, we conclude that [the 

defendant] has failed to demonstrate that he was prejudiced in his defense at 

trial. He is not entitled to relief on this issue.

Sanders, 2012 WL 4841545, at *14.

The Defendant’s case is analogous to the one in Sanders. The allegations in the bill 

of particulars relative to Count 1 placed the Defendant on notice that A.L. had reported that

he had touched her breast in the family home; the indictment in Count 1 gave an 

approximate time period, and the aggravated sexual battery was based upon A.L.’s being 

less than thirteen years old. The State elected a different set of facts, but the elected proof, 

the couch incident, still alleged that an aggravated sexual battery occurred when the 
-48-

Defendant touched A.L.’s breast when she was younger than thirteen. The Defendant was 

protected from subsequent prosecution related to the shower incident because the conduct 

occurred during the period specified in the indictment.

Given the lengthy time period involved and the details included in the bill of 

particulars, the Defendant cannot say that he was unfairly misled or surprised by A.L.’s 

testimony or the State’s election. He similarly does not specify how his defense, which 

consisted of a general denial that he engaged in any of the conduct alleged, was hampered 

because he was not informed that the aggravated sexual battery would be based upon the 

couch incident instead of the shower incident. The Defendant, therefore, has failed to prove 

that an unequivocal rule of law was violated, and he is not entitled to plain error relief. 

III. Trial Court’s Questioning A.L.

The Defendant contends that the trial court impermissibly commented on the 

victim’s credibility by acting in the “role of the prosecutor” when it questioned her 

regarding specific incidents of sexual touching, thereby “step[ping] in and assist[ing] the 

State in presenting its evidence.” The Defendant added at oral argument that he did not 

dispute the propriety of the court’s clarifying the testimony or even acting to “fill[] in the 

gaps” in the testimony; rather, the Defendant’s issue related to the court’s “sending a 

message to the jury” that it found A.L. to be credible. The Defendant acknowledges that 

no contemporaneous objection was made, and he requests plain error relief. The State 

responds that the Defendant is not entitled to plain error relief.

Near the end of A.L.’s direct examination, the State requested a recess in order to 

“go back over some of these counts and make sure that we’re okay.” The State noted that 

it needed to “[shore] up a couple dates[,]” and the trial court noted that “[t]he sexual battery 

by authority figure things need to be distinguished too.” After the recess, questioning 

resumed, and the prosecutor began to ask A.L. how old she was when certain incidents 

occurred. A.L.’s answers varied between specific incidences and patterns of what 

generally would occur. The trial court interrupted, and the following exchange occurred:

THE COURT: I need to clarify that. So was there ever a time after you 

turned [thirteen] where you were in the living room and he was kissing you 

and touched your breasts that it didn’t progress to something else, that it just 

stopped there, or did it always—

THE WITNESS: Some—sometimes, yes.

THE COURT: Sometimes it stopped there?

THE WITNESS: Yes. Yes.
-49-

THE COURT: So is there any time in particular that you can think of where 

it just stopped there, like I remember one time . . . [a] certain TV show was 

on and he was touching my breasts and that’s all he did, or I remember one 

time I was wearing a red sweater . . . and he did it and it didn’t go any further?

THE WITNESS: There would be–my mom would come home and it would 

just–

THE COURT: It would stop.

THE WITNESS: It would stop, yeah.

THE COURT: So you remember a time your mom came home and –

THE WITNESS: Yeah. 

THE COURT: --and it didn’t go any further?

THE WITNESS: Yeah.

THE COURT: And was—did that happen more than one time that your mom 

came home and it stopped, or just one time that you can remember?

THE WITNESS: There was a couple of times.

THE COURT: Couple of times. All right. Between those two times, is there 

anything that makes you think of one different than the other, like . . . I 

remember one time it was still light out and we didn’t expect her to be home, 

or something like—anything like that that can help you distinguish one 

particular time. 

THE WITNESS: That one particular time, yes.

THE COURT: What is it about that time that –

THE WITNESS: Oh, it was dark out and my mom was supposed to be going 

to Virginia and then she—I don’t really know what happened. She either 

changed her mind or she decided to come home and it was nighttime and we 

were sitting on the couch watching TV when it happened, and then . . . we 

heard a car door slam, and then he got up and looked and was like, “Your 

mom’s home.”

THE COURT: And he would try to touch your breasts at that time?
-50-

THE WITNESS: That we were making out and he was touching my breasts 

at that time.

THE COURT: Okay. And nothing else happened that time.

THE WITNESS: No, nothing.

THE COURT: And that was after you turned [thirteen]?

THE WITNESS: Yes.

THE COURT: Okay. Go ahead, General. 

We conclude that the Defendant has not proven that a substantial right was affected 

by the questioning. See Page, 184 S.W.3d at 230-31. Unlike other cases in which a trial 

court’s extensive or hostile questioning was found to be prejudicial in light of scanty 

evidence of guilt,22 A.L.’s testimony was corroborated by a large quantity of physical 

evidence documenting the Defendant’s relationship with A.L., including text messages, 

notes, and poems with references to explicit sexual acts and future planned children, as 

well as the Defendant’s incriminating statements made during the police interview. 

Although A.L.’s credibility was an important issue, the record does not support the 

Defendant’s argument that the case turned “entirely” on A.L.’s credibility. The evidence 

at trial was more than sufficient to establish the Defendant’s guilt. We note that the relevant 

questioning comprised less than three pages of A.L.’s 118-page testimony and that the 

language of the court’s questions did not reveal any animus toward the Defendant or 

sympathy toward the victim; likewise, the Defendant does not argue that the court’s tenor 

or demeanor conveyed an emotion not evident in the transcript. Because the Defendant 

has not established that his substantial rights were affected, we conclude that he is not 

entitled to plain error relief on this basis. 

IV. Hearsay

The Defendant contends that the trial court erred by allowing indirect hearsay in the 

form of testimony that A.L. reported the abuse to other people, including R.M., A.L.’s 

grandmother, and the forensic interviewer. The Defendant acknowledges that no 

 

22 See, e.g., Collins v. State, 416 S.W.2d 766, 767 (Tenn. 1967) (holding that the trial court’s improper 

questioning of the defendant was both lengthy and so hostile as to constitute a “quite rigid crossexamination”; our supreme court also noted that evidence of the defendant’s guilt was “vague”).
-51-

contemporaneous objection was made and requests plain error review. The State responds 

that the testimony was not indirect hearsay.

The Defendant argues that although “explicit questions about the details of [A.L.’s] 

conversation with others were precluded by objection,” the “jury was still informed that 

[A.L.] had told them the substance of her allegations” and that this constituted indirect 

hearsay. The Defendant cites as examples R.M.’s testimony that she questioned A.L. for 

thirteen minutes about the text messages before obtaining “an answer,” which implied an 

affirmative answer; A.L.’s testifying that she told her mother and grandmother about the 

abuse; and A.L.’s testimony about telling the forensic interviewer “what had happened” 

and her affirmation that she told the truth. 

 At the outset, we note that “rarely will plain error review extend to an evidentiary 

issue.” State v. Jonathan Mitchell Grimes, No. W2014-00786-CCA-R3-CD, 2015 WL 

3929694, at *10 (Tenn. Crim. App. June 26, 2015) (quoting State v. Ricky E. Scoville, No. 

M2006-01684-CCA-R3-CD, 2007 WL 2600540, at *2 (Tenn. Crim. App. Sept. 11, 2007)). 

Here, plain error relief is not warranted because the Defendant has failed to demonstrate 

that the decision not to object was not tactical and that his substantial rights were affected. 

Relative to tactics, defense counsel could have reasonably chosen not to object to 

R.M.’s testifying about A.L.’s giving her “an answer”; part of the defense theory was that 

A.L. fabricated the allegations in order to please R.M., and allowing proof that A.L. only 

gave an affirmative answer after thirteen minutes of intense questioning furthered that 

theory. Likewise, relative to A.L.’s testimony that her statement to Child Help was truthful, 

defense counsel utilized inconsistencies from A.L.’s forensic interview on crossexamination to impeach her testimony regarding her age at the time of some of the 

incidents. Counsel could reasonably have allowed A.L. to aver that both her interview and 

trial testimony were true in order to discredit A.L. on cross-examination. 

In any event, A.L. testified and was cross-examined regarding her version of events; 

the evidence of the Defendant’s guilt was substantial and did not depend on A.L.’s having 

disclosed the abuse to R.M. and her grandmother. Any implication that A.L. had 

previously disclosed some unspecified version of events was harmless in light of the 

overwhelming evidence of the Defendant’s guilt. Therefore, the Defendant has not proven 

that his substantial rights were affected by the admission of the statements. The Defendant 

is not entitled to plain error relief.

V. Sentencing

The Defendant contends that the trial court imposed an excessive sentence, arguing 

that the court improperly found that the Defendant was “taking advantage” of Ms. Houser, 

which “doomed any efforts to obtain leniency.” He also argues that because the Defendant 
-52-

did not kill anyone and had no criminal history, a sentence “roughly equivalent to a 

sentence imposed for first-degree murder” was “far greater than deserved.” The State 

responds that the sentence is not excessive.

The Sentencing Reform Act was enacted in order “to promote justice” by ensuring 

that every defendant “be punished by the imposition of a sentence justly deserved in 

relation to the seriousness of the offense.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-102. In order to 

implement the purposes of the Sentencing Reform Act, trial courts must consider several 

sentencing principles. The sentence imposed for an offense “should be no greater than that 

deserved for the offense committed” and “should be the least severe measure necessary to 

achieve the purposes for which the sentence is imposed.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-103(2), 

(4). Thus, before a trial court imposes a sentence upon a convicted criminal defendant, it 

must consider: (a) the evidence adduced at the trial and the sentencing hearing; (b) the 

presentence report; (c) the principles of sentencing and arguments as to sentencing 

alternatives; (d) the nature and characteristics of the criminal conduct involved; (e) 

evidence and information offered by the parties on the enhancement and mitigating factors 

set forth in Tennessee Code Annotated sections 40-35-113 and 40-35-114; (f) any 

statistical information provided by the Administrative Office of the Courts as to Tennessee 

sentencing practices for similar offenses; and (g) any statement the defendant wishes to 

make in the defendant’s own behalf about sentencing. Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-210(b). 

When an accused challenges the length and manner of service of a sentence, this 

court reviews the trial court’s sentencing determination under an abuse of discretion 

standard accompanied by a presumption of reasonableness. State v. Bise, 380 S.W.3d 682, 

707 (Tenn. 2012). This court will uphold the trial court’s sentencing decision “so long as 

it is within the appropriate range and the record demonstrates that the sentence is otherwise 

in compliance with the purposes and principles listed by statute.” Id. 709-10. Moreover, 

under such circumstances, appellate courts may not disturb the sentence even if we had 

preferred a different result. See State v. Carter, 254 S.W.3d 335, 346 (Tenn. 2008). The 

burden of showing that a sentence is improper is upon the appealing party. See Tenn. Code 

Ann. § 40-35-401, Sentencing Comm’n Cmts.; see also State v. Arnett, 49 S.W.3d 250, 

257 (Tenn. 2001).

In this case, the record reflects that the trial court weighed the appropriate factors 

and evidence when imposing the Defendant’s sentence. We note that the court specifically 

discussed its careful consideration of the length of the Defendant’s sentence, including its 

concern that the sentence be “justly deserved in relation to the seriousness of the offense,”

and that the court believed neither maximum consecutive sentences nor fully concurrent 

sentences were appropriate.

The trial court correctly applied two enhancement factors—that the Defendant 

committed the offense to gratify his desire for pleasure or excitement, which only applied 
-53-

to the offenses for which it was not an element, and that the Defendant abused a position 

of private trust. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-114(7), (14). The court applied “a great 

deal of weight” to factor (14), finding that the degree of abuse, which involved “the most 

emotionally manipulative case [the court] had ever seen,” went “above and beyond” that

necessary to prove coercion relative to the rape convictions. The court declined to apply 

enhancement factors (1), (4), and (8), that the Defendant had a history of uncharged 

criminal behavior, that the victim was particularly vulnerable due to her age, and that the 

Defendant failed to comply with the conditions of previous community release. See Tenn. 

Code Ann. § 40-35-114(1), (4), (8). 

Relative to mitigating factors, the trial court found that the Defendant had no prior 

criminal convictions, which it gave “a good bit of consideration,” and that the Defendant 

had a good employment history, which the court found “support[ed] his mitigation.” See

Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-113(13). The court found that the testimony regarding the 

Defendant’s family relationships and work ethic did not mitigate his culpability in these 

offenses. 

After hearing Ms. Houser’s testimony, the court found that Ms. Houser was an 

“emotionally troubled young lady who was taken advantage of by the [D]efendant[.]” The 

court cited with concern the phrasing of part of Ms. Houser’s statement, including that 

when the Defendant “wanted to do things she didn’t want to do,” the Defendant “didn’t 

force anything on her.” The court was troubled that the Defendant exhibited “predatory 

behavior” in choosing another romantic partner who was very young and emotionally 

vulnerable, and the court found that Ms. Houser’s testimony did not serve as mitigating 

evidence. However, the court also stated that it did not consider Ms. Houser’s testimony

“against” the Defendant as evidence supporting enhancement. 

As a preliminary matter, insomuch as the Defendant impliedly argues that the trial 

court used Ms. Houser’s testimony to enhance the sentences or, alternatively, decline to 

apply more weight to the mitigating factors, a trial court’s application or misapplication of 

an enhancement or mitigating factor in sentencing does not invalidate the sentence 

imposed. Bise, 380 S.W.3d at 706. 

In any event, if the trial court improperly considered Ms. Houser’s testimony as 

proof of the Defendant’s risk to reoffend, any error was minimal in light of the ample 

support in the record for the court’s determination that maximum, in-range sentences were 

proper. The court otherwise complied with all procedural requirements, including finding 

that multiple enhancement factors and two mitigating factors applied, as well as one factor 

supporting consecutive sentencing. The record reflects that the court carefully considered 

the purposes and principles of sentencing and that it based its decision to order a lengthy 

sentence in confinement upon the egregious circumstances of the offenses. 
-54-

Although the Defendant does not explicitly raise a challenge to the court’s 

imposition of partially consecutive sentencing, his general complaint relative to the length 

of the sentence indirectly implicates the decision to order consecutive sentencing. 

When reviewing a trial court’s imposition of consecutive sentences, “the 

presumption of reasonableness applies,” which gives “deference to the trial court’s exercise 

of its discretionary authority to impose consecutive sentences if it has provided reasons on 

the record establishing at least one of the seven grounds listed in Tennessee Code 

Annotated section 40-35-115(b).” State v. Pollard, 432 S.W.3d 851, 861 (Tenn. 2013). 

“Any one of [the] grounds [listed in section 40-35-115(b)] is a sufficient basis for the 

imposition of consecutive sentences.” Id. at 862 (citing State v. Dickson, 413 S.W.3d 735 

(Tenn. 2013)). 

The trial court correctly found that the Defendant was convicted of two or more 

offenses involving the sexual abuse of a minor; the court noted that the relationship 

between A.L. and the Defendant was “extreme and aggravated,” that the abuse went

undetected for years, that the Defendant was A.L.’s father figure from a young age, that 

the Defendant used his position of trust to accomplish the abuse through control and 

manipulation, that the abuse involved multiple types of sexual penetration, and that 

“extreme” damage to the victim’s mental and emotional health resulted, noting that she 

would carry the abusive experience for the rest of her life. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-

115(b)(5). We note that in addition, the Defendant’s thirty-six felony convictions in the 

present case would have been enough, standing alone, to find that he had an extensive 

criminal record. Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-115(b)(2); see, e.g., State v. Cummings, 868 

S.W.2d 661, 667 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1992) (holding that relevant to partial consecutive 

service, a defendant with no prior criminal history had an extensive criminal history due to 

eight felony convictions in that case). 

Indeed, the trial court would have been justified in ordering full consecutive 

sentences in this case given the numerous aggravating circumstances and multiple Pollard

factors present; we note that a fifty-one year sentence for a Range I offender is not 

unprecedented in child sexual abuse cases. See, e.g., State v. Nance, 393 S.W.3d 212, 235 

(Tenn. Crim. App. 2012) (affirming the trial court’s imposition of consecutive sentences 

in a case involving the sexual abuse of the ten or eleven-year-old victim by the victim’s 

mother’s “ex-fiancé” during the span of seven months, resulting in an effective sentence of 

sixty-four years; the defendant had one previous criminal conviction for assault); State v.

James Allen Perry, No. E2015-01227-CCA-R3-CD, 2016 WL 2901817 (Tenn. Crim. App. 

May 13, 2016) (affirming the trial court’s imposition of partial consecutive sentences in a 

case involving the years-long sexual abuse and exploitation of the minor victim, who was 

between ten and thirteen years old, by a family friend, resulting in an effective sentence of 

106 years; the defendant had one previous drug-related conviction and one conviction for 
-55-

violating a protective order); State v. Ricky Allen Hickman, No. M2013-02390-CCA-R3-

CD, 2014 WL 4557626 (Tenn. Crim. App. Sept. 16, 2014) (affirming the trial court’s 

imposition of consecutive sentences in a case involving the sexual abuse of a six or sevenyear-old victim by her grandfather on three occasions, resulting in an effective sentence of 

forty-seven years; the defendant had no prior convictions other than one decades-old 

shoplifting charge). The court did not abuse its discretion in imposing partial consecutive 

service; the length of the Defendant’s effective sentence is not excessive; and he is not 

entitled to relief on this basis. 

CONCLUSION

Upon consideration of the foregoing and the record as a whole, the judgments of the 

trial court are affirmed.

_________________________________ 

D. KELLY THOMAS, JR., JUDGE