J-S10027-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

v.

STEVEN MILLER 

Appellant

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 1316 EDA 2022

Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered May 10, 2022

In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Criminal Division at 

No(s): CP-51-CR-0011715-2014

BEFORE: PANELLA, P.J., LAZARUS, J., and STABILE, J.

MEMORANDUM BY LAZARUS, J.: FILED MAY 23, 2023

Steven Miller appeals from the order, entered in the Court of Common 

Pleas of Philadelphia County, dismissing his petition filed pursuant to the Post 

Conviction Relief Act (PCRA), 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-9546. Upon review, we 

affirm.

This Court previously set forth the following factual and procedural 

history of this case as follows:

On October 6, 2013, [Miller], an inmate at Curran-Fromhold 

Correctional Facility in Philadelphia, was using a phone in 

the prison’s telephone bank.[1] Khayree Murray, a fellow 

inmate, approached [Miller] and asked to use one of the 

phones. Correctional Officers Denise Irving and Eddie Rosa 

and Correctional Sergeant Joyce Cooper observed [Miller] 

____________________________________________

1 Miller was in prison on pre-trial incarceration due to an unrelated case in 

which Miller was charged with third-degree murder. See Commonwealth v. 

Miller, 131 A.3d 83 (Pa. Super. 2015) (Table). Relevantly, in that case, Miller 

was later convicted of third-degree murder, prior to sentencing in the instant 

case. Id.
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attack Murray. [Miller] stabbed Murray several times with 

“a sharp long screw rigged with sharp ridges and a rubber 

band wrapped in a ripped T-shirt” in the head, back, and 

ear. Officer Rosa immediately intervened, separated the 

two men with the help of Officer Irving, and used pepper 

spray to subdue [Miller]. Officers recovered the makeshift 

weapon from the ground after [Miller] dropped it. Officer 

Rosa testified that Murray was in shock and that he did not 

observe Murray strike [Miller prior to Miller attacking 

Murray].

Murray attempted to downplay his injuries, and told officers 

that he fell down some stairs. Murray sustained lifethreatening injuries, which included three stab wounds to 

the back, two puncture wounds to the base of the neck, 

wounds to his back, back of the head, and left hand, and 

lacerations to this ear and cheek. Murray’s injuries required 

eight sutures. Sergeant Cooper decided to transport Murray 

to the hospital for treatment. [Miller] had no injuries, but 

he was treated for pepper spray in his eyes and placed in 

solitary confinement.

While walking with Officer Rosa through the prison shortly 

after the stabbing, [Miller] stated, “If you didn’t pepper 

spray, you would have been the next victim.” In recorded 

prison phone calls, [Miller] subsequently made several 

inculpatory statements boast[ing] of his violent reputation 

in the prison as a result of the attack, and repeated a rumor 

that there was a bounty on Murray’s head because he was 

such a snitch.

[Miller] proceeded to a jury trial. Murray refused to testify 

at trial and the trial court held him in contempt. [Miller] 

testified and claimed that he acted in self-defense. Although 

[Miller] claimed that Murray attacked him first with the 

weapon, [Miller] admitted that he never feared that Murray 

would kill him.
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On June 25, 2015, the jury convicted [Miller] of 

[a]ggravated [a]ssault,[2] [s]imple [a]ssault,[3] and 

possessing an instrument of crime.

[4]

 On that same day, 

the trial court imposed an aggregate term of 8 to 20 years’ 

incarceration. [Miller] filed a [p]ost-[s]entence [m]otion,

which the trial court denied on October 2, 2015.

Commonwealth v. Miller, 172 A.3d 632, 638 (Pa. Super. 2017).

[Miller filed a timely direct appeal to this Court, raising eight 

claims.] We deemed the first seven issues meritless and affirmed 

[the] judgment of sentence on that basis, but we determined 

[that] remand was necessary to allow the trial court to consider 

the final issue, in which [Miller] raised an after-discovered 

evidence claim. Id. at 650-51. 

* * *

On May 23, 2018, the trial court conducted an evidentiary hearing 

pursuant to [our remand]. By its [o]rder of May 30, 2018, the 

[trial] court denied [Miller’s after-discovered evidence claim] due 

to lack of merit.

Commonwealth v. Miller, 224 A.3d 787 (Pa. Super. 2019) (Table) (some 

citations and quotations omitted).

Miller filed a timely notice of appeal, and this Court affirmed the trial 

court’s May 30, 2018 order. See id. Miller filed a timely petition for allowance 

of appeal to our Supreme Court, which was denied on May 27, 2020. See id., 

234 A.3d 407 (Pa. 2020) (Table). Miller did not seek review in the United 

States Supreme Court.

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2 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2702.

3 Id. at § 2701.

4 Id. at § 907.
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On May 18, 2021, Miller, pro se, filed the instant PCRA petition, his first. 

The PCRA court appointed counsel, who filed an amended PCRA petition on 

December 15, 2021. On March 3, 2022, the PCRA court filed notice of its 

intent to dismiss Miller’s PCRA pursuant to Pa.R.Crim.P. 907. Miller did not 

file a response, and on May 10, 2022, the PCRA court dismissed Miller’s 

petition.

Miller filed a timely notice of appeal. The PCRA court did not order a 

Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) concise statement of errors complained of on appeal, and 

Miller did not file such a statement.

Miller now raises the following claims for our review:

(1) [Direct appeal] counsel was ineffective for failing to raise the 

issue of recorded prison phone [calls] being admitted.

(2) Trial counsel was ineffective by failing to file a [m]otion to 

[r]econsider [s]entence.

(3) The PCRA court erred by failing to conduct an evidentiary 

hearing.

Brief for Appellant, at 7 (reordered).

When reviewing the [dismissal] of a PCRA petition, our scope of 

review is limited by the parameters of the [PCRA]. Our standard 

of review permits us to consider only whether the PCRA court’s 

determination is supported by the evidence of record and whether 

it is free from legal error. Moreover, in general we may affirm the 

decision of the [PCRA] court if there is any basis on the record to 

support the trial court’s action; this is so even if we rely on a 

different basis in our decision to affirm.

Commonwealth v. Heilman, 867 A.2d 542, 544 (Pa. Super. 2005) 

(quotations and citations omitted).
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For ease of disposition, we address Miller’s claims of ineffectiveness first. 

Generally, counsel is presumed to be effective, and “the burden of 

demonstrating ineffectiveness rests on [the] appellant.” Commonwealth v. 

Rivera, 10 A.3d 1276, 1279 (Pa. Super. 2010).

To satisfy this burden, an appellant must plead and prove by a 

preponderance of the evidence that: (1) his underlying claim is 

of arguable merit; (2) the particular course of conduct pursued by 

counsel did not have some reasonable basis designed to effectuate 

his [client’s] interests; and, (3) but for counsel’s ineffectiveness[,] 

there is a reasonable probability that the outcome of the 

challenged proceeding would have been different. Failure to 

satisfy any prong of the test will result in rejection of the 

appellant’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim.

Commonwealth v. Holt, 175 A.3d 1014, 1018 (Pa. Super. 2017) (internal 

citations omitted). 

In his first claim, Miller contends that his direct appeal counsel rendered 

ineffective assistance by failing to challenge the trial court’s admission of the 

prison phone calls. See Brief for Appellant, at 16-17. Miller asserts that the 

prison phone calls were not relevant to the Commonwealth’s asserted basis of 

establishing motive. Id. at 17. Instead, Miller argues that the phone calls 

establish that Miller was attempting to find out who attacked him. Id. Miller 

further argues that, therefore, the probative value of the phone calls was

outweighed by their prejudicial impact. Id. Miller is entitled to no relief.

When we review a trial court’s ruling on admission of evidence, 

we must acknowledge that decisions on admissibility are within 

the sound discretion of the trial court and will not be overturned 

absent an abuse of discretion or misapplication of law. In addition, 

for a ruling on evidence to constitute reversible error, it must have 

been harmful or prejudicial to the complaining party. An abuse of 
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discretion is not merely an error of judgment, but if in reaching a 

conclusion the law is overridden or misapplied, or the judgment 

exercised is manifestly unreasonable, or the result of partiality, 

prejudice, bias[,] or ill-will, as shown by the evidence or the 

record, discretion is abused.

Commonwealth v. Talley, 236 A.3d 42, 55 (Pa. Super. 2020) (citations 

omitted). “The threshold inquiry with admission of evidence is whether 

evidence is relevant.” Commonwealth v. Collins, 888 A.2d 564, 577 (Pa. 

Super. 2005). Evidence is relevant if “it has the tendency to make a fact more 

or less probable than it would be without the evidence” and “the fact is of 

consequence in determining the action.” Pa.R.E. 401(a)-(b). “Evidence is 

relevant if it logically tends to establish a material fact in the case, tends to 

make a fact at issue more or less probable[,] or supports a reasonable 

inference or presumption regarding a material fact.” Commonwealth v. 

Drumheller, 808 A.2d 893, 904 (Pa. Super. 2002). “All relevant evidence is 

admissible, except as otherwise provided by law. Evidence that is not relevant 

is not admissible.” Pa.R.E. 402. “The court may exclude relevant evidence if 

its probative value is outweighed by a danger of one of more of the following: 

unfair prejudice, confusing the issues, misleading the jury, undue delay, 

wasting time, or needlessly presenting cumulative evidence.” Pa.R.E. 403. 

Instantly, at trial, trial counsel objected to the admission of the phone 

call recordings, which the trial court overruled. See N.T. Jury Trial, 6/24/15, 

at 89-91 (trial court noting several objections to phone calls and transcripts); 

id. at 104 (trial counsel reiterating prior objections to phone calls and 
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transcripts). On appeal, rather than challenging the relevance of the phone 

calls, direct appeal counsel challenged the trial court’s decision to permit the 

jury to take a transcript of the phone call recordings to the jury room for 

deliberations. See Miller, 172 A.3d at 648. This Court concluded that, if 

Miller had intended to challenge the relevance of the phone calls on appeal, 

Miller had waived the claim by failing to cite to relevant authority. Id. at n.7

(noting Miller’s claim “suggests that the trial court erred in admitting this 

evidence at all,” but Miller failed to cite authorities). 

However, the trial court, in its original Rule 1925(a) opinion, addressed 

the relevancy of these phone calls as follows:

[Miller] called the same persons that he had been on the telephone 

with at the time he attacked [Murray]. [Miller]’s counsel 

objected[,] claiming that the taped conversations were irrelevant 

and unduly prejudicial because [Miller] peppered his speech with 

offensive words.

The trial court listened to the prospective recorded testimony and 

determined that the conversations were contextually relevant 

because [they] specifically provided [Miller’s] motivation for the 

attack upon [Murray], whom [Miller] specifically named in the 

telephone call to the same person(s) he had been on the 

telephone [with] at the time of the attack. [Miller] revealed that 

he had not known [Murray] before the assault[,] but he had 

been aware that there had been a price on the head of

“K[ha]yree Murray” for snitching on someone else in the 

prison. [Miller] also bragged that he was considered to be a 

[“]top dog[”] imbued with certain respect within his prison pod by 

the other inmates because of the assault. [Miller] never 

claimed he was acting in self-defense when freely 

conversing [with] his friends. . . . [Miller] . . . was keenly 

aware that the telephone conversations were recorded. The fact 

that [Miller] utilized colorfully offensive words at times concretely 

illuminated his perspective. As such, [Miller]’s language was not 
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so unusually prejudicial as to outweigh the significant probative 

value of this evidence. The evidence was properly admitted.

PCRA Court Opinion, 7/7/22, at 8-9, quoting Trial Court Opinion, 6/10/16, at 

14-15 (emphasis added).

After reviewing the record, we agree with the PCRA court that these 

phone calls were relevant and properly admitted. See Talley, supra. 

Moreover, with respect to any prejudice as a result of the language Miller used 

in the phone calls, his trial counsel sought a cautionary instruction “about the 

language,” and the trial court issued the requested cautionary instruction. 

See N.T. Jury Trial, 6/24/15, at 95-96 (trial counsel stating requesting 

cautionary instruction, and trial court issuing requested instruction). 

Therefore, Miller cannot and has not established that his ineffective assistance 

of counsel claim has arguable merit, and he is afforded no relief on this claim. 

See Rivera, supra; Holt, supra. 

In his second claim, Miller argues that his trial counsel rendered 

ineffective assistance by failing to file a post-sentence motion challenging the 

discretionary aspects of his sentence. See Brief for Appellant, at 18-19. 

Preliminarily, we observe that “[c]hallenges to the discretionary aspects 

of sentencing are not cognizable under the PCRA.” Commonwealth v. 

Fowler, 930 A.2d 586, 593 (Pa. Super. 2007). However, when a petitioner 

advances such a claim under the purview of ineffective assistance of counsel, 

it does fall under the PCRA’s jurisdiction. See Commonwealth v. Watson, 

835 A.2d 786, 801 (Pa. Super. 2003) (“[A] claim regarding the discretionary 

aspects of [the defendant’s] sentence, raised in the context of an 
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ineffectiveness claim, would be cognizable under the PCRA.”). Accordingly, 

Miller’s challenge is cognizable under the PCRA.

Nevertheless, Miller’s brief contains only bald assertions of 

ineffectiveness for failing to raise this claim. His entire argument is less than 

one-and-a-half pages and contains no citations to the record, and only 

boilerplate citations to authority. See Brief for Appellant, at 18-19; see also 

Pa.R.A.P. 2119(a) (requiring “discussion and citation of authorities as are 

deemed pertinent”); Commonwealth v. Johnson, 985 A.2d 915, 924 (Pa. 

2009) (“[W]here an appellate brief fails to provide any discussion of a claim 

with citation to relevant authority[,] or fails to develop the issue in any other 

meaningful fashion capable of review, that claim is waived.”); id. at 925 (“It 

is not the role of this Court to formulate [an a]ppellant’s arguments for him.”). 

Accordingly, this claim is waived.

For the above reasons, the PCRA court did not err in dismissing Miller’s 

PCRA petition, and, thus, we affirm the court’s order. See Commonwealth 

v. Hanible, 30 A.3d 426, 452 (Pa. 2011) (PCRA court may dismiss petition 

without hearing when satisfied “that there are no genuine issues concerning 

any material fact, the defendant is not entitled to post-conviction collateral 

relief, and no legitimate purpose would be served by any further proceedings”)

(citation omitted).

Order affirmed.
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Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 5/23/2023