Third District Court of Appeal

State of Florida 

Opinion filed October 12, 2022.

Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.

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No. 3D21-0896

Lower Tribunal No. 14-0522

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Marie Polynice,

Appellant,

vs.

Burger King Corporation,

Appellee.

An Appeal from the Circuit Court for Miami-Dade County, Mavel Ruiz, 

Judge.

Law Offices of Sina Negahbani, and Sina Negahbani; Ross & Girten, 

and Lauri Waldman Ross and Theresa L. Girten, for appellant.

Beasley, Demos & Brown, LLC, and Christopher D. Brown and 

Jennifer Perez Alonso, for appellee.

Before FERNANDEZ, C.J., and LINDSEY, and LOBREE, JJ. 

PER CURIAM.
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Marie Polynice, the prevailing party below in a jury trial against Burger 

King Corporation, appeals an order granting Burger King’s motion for a new 

trial. We affirm.

A new trial order based on a verdict that is against the manifest weight 

of the evidence “should not be disturbed except upon a clear showing of 

abuse.” Brown v. Estate of Stuckey, 749 So. 2d 490, 496 (Fla. 1999). The 

mere fact that “there may be substantial, competent evidence in the record 

to support the jury verdict does not” demonstrate an abuse of discretion. Id.

at 498. To determine whether the trial court has abused its discretion the 

reviewing court applies a reasonableness test, according to which, if 

reasonable persons could differ on the outcome, there can be no abuse of

discretion in granting a new trial. Id.; Ford v. Robinson, 403 So. 2d 1379, 

1383 (Fla. 4th DCA 1981).

In R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. Prentice, 290 So. 3d 963, 967-68 (Fla. 

1st DCA 2019), our sister court explained the standard of review applicable 

to a motion granting a new trial after a jury verdict when there are multiple 

claims, stating:

We begin by observing the discretion vested in an appellate court 

to direct a new trial on one or more issues. See Tracey v. Wells 

Fargo Bank, N.A., 264 So. 3d 1152 (Fla. 2d DCA 2019) 

(discussing the principles governing an appellate court’s 

authority when reversing a trial court judgment). Section 59.35, 

Florida Statutes (2017), provides:
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An appellate court may, in reversing a judgment of a 

lower court brought before it for review by appeal, by 

the order of reversal, if the error for which reversal is 

sought is such as to require a new trial, direct that a 

new trial be had on all the issues shown by the record 

or upon a part of such issues only.

Thus, remand directions are within the discretion of the 

appellate court. Tracey, 264 So. 3d at 1161 (“Remand directions

. . . seem always to turn upon some basic postulate of fairness, 

which is, in turn, an exercise of a court’s discretion.”); see also

Yates v. St. Johns Beach Dev. Co., 122 Fla. 141, 165 So. 384, 

385 (Fla. 1935) (“It is a long-standing legal principle that 

appellate courts have broad powers to [‘]make such disposition 

of the case as justice requires.[’]”).

But that discretion is not without limits. Id. For example, 

after granting a new trial on one issue, an appellate court must 

order retrial of other issues when the issues are “inextricably 

intertwined.” See Gasoline Prods. Co. v. Champlin Refining Co., 

283 U.S. 494, 51 S.Ct. 513, 75 L.Ed. 1188 (1931). This is so 

because if the trial court “were to retry only one of two such 

intertwined issues to a second jury, while maintaining the vitality 

of the first jury’s findings on the other issue, it would cause 

confusion and uncertainty and, thus, an unfair trial.” Morrison 

Knudsen Corp. v. Fireman’s Fund Ins. Co., 175 F.3d 1221, 1255-

56 (10th Cir. 1999). Courts have found issues of liability and 

damages to be inextricably intertwined when a trial on damages 

alone would require the jury to consider the same evidence as a 

trial on both liability and damages. See Lawson v. Swirn, 258 So. 

2d 458, 459 (Fla. 1st DCA 1972) (after reversing on damages, 

directing new trial on damages and liability “because the 

evidence as to both issues is so inextricably interlaced that the 

new jury should be allowed to consider and determine both 

issues”); Equitable Life Assurance Soc’y of U.S. v. Fairbanks, 

400 So. 2d 550, 553 (Fla. 4th DCA 1981). Courts have also found 

issues of liability and comparative fault to be inextricably 

intertwined. See, e.g., Lenhart v. Basora, 100 So. 3d 1177 (Fla. 

4th DCA 2012) (“To parse out the comparative negligence of the 

parties, the trier of fact must hear the ‘totality of fault’ of each 
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side.”); Currie v. Palm Beach Cty., 578 So. 2d 760, 764 (Fla. 4th 

DCA 1991) (“One of the issues tried to the jury was whether 

[plaintiff] was comparatively negligent. Evidence on this issue 

necessarily impacts both liability and damages.”).

The claims here are all intertwined such that were we to find no error 

in granting a new trial as to just one of the claims tried, such is sufficient to 

support the trial court’s grant of a new trial as to all. Accordingly, because 

we find no abuse of discretion, we are compelled to affirm.

Affirmed.