Present: Carrico, C.J., Compton, Stephenson, Hassell, Keenan, 

and Koontz, JJ., and Whiting, Senior Justice 

JAMES S. GILMORE, III, 

ATTORNEY GENERAL OF VIRGINIA 

v. Record No. 961014 OPINION BY JUSTICE BARBARA MILANO KEENAN 

 November 1, 1996 

WILLIAM E. LANDSIDLE, 

COMPTROLLER OF VIRGINIA, ET AL. 

UPON A PETITION FOR A WRIT OF MANDAMUS 

 This is an original petition for a writ of mandamus brought 

by the Attorney General of Virginia, James S. Gilmore, III (the 

Attorney General), against the Comptroller of Virginia, William 

E. Landsidle (the Comptroller). Bruce F. Jamerson, the Clerk of 

the House of Delegates and Keeper of the Rolls of the 

Commonwealth (the Clerk), was permitted to intervene as a party 

respondent. 

 The issue in this case concerns the constitutionality of 

House Bill 29, an appropriation bill enacted by the General 

Assembly in 1996. In a May 15, 1996 letter to the Attorney 

General, the Comptroller expressed doubt concerning the validity 

of House Bill 29. The Comptroller alleged that the Clerk failed 

to enroll and present to the Governor the entire bill passed by 

the General Assembly. The Comptroller also contended that 

certain spending instructions in House Bill 29 were inconsistent 

with Chapter 853 of the Acts of the Assembly of 1995, and that to 

the extent those provisions in the 1996 bill were inconsistent 

with Chapter 853, he would not make payments until this Court 

adjudicated the validity of the bill. Pursuant to Code § 8.01-
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653,1

 the Attorney General filed a petition for a writ of 

mandamus in this Court directing the Comptroller to comply with 

the provisions of Chapter 966 of the Acts of Assembly of 1994, 

the original appropriation act for the 1994-96 biennium, as 

amended by Chapter 853. The petition requested this Court to 

declare House Bill 29 unconstitutional. 

 Since the Constitution of Virginia was amended in 1971, 

three different types of budget bills have been enacted. The 

original budget bill for a biennium is introduced in evennumbered years. An "interim budget bill" is introduced in the 

odd-numbered year of the biennium, and contains a Governor's 

recommendations for amendments to the original budget bill. 

Finally, a "caboose bill," including a Governor's recommendations 

for changes to the appropriation act, as amended, may be 

introduced in the next even-numbered year for the remaining 

months of the biennium. 

 On January 10, 1996, House Bill 29, a "caboose bill," was 

 1Code § 8.01-653 provides, in relevant part, that when the 

Comptroller notifies the Attorney General that he has doubt with 

respect to the validity of an act of the General Assembly 

appropriating money out of the Commonwealth's treasury, the 

Attorney General may file a petition for a writ of mandamus in 

this Court directing the Comptroller to pay such money as may be 

proper. 
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introduced in the General Assembly containing the 1996 amendments 

to Chapter 966 of the Acts of Assembly of 1994, as amended by 

Chapter 853 of the Acts of Assembly of 1995 (collectively, the 

existing appropriation act). As introduced, House Bill 29 set 

forth the existing appropriation act, in addition to certain 

proposed amendments. House Bill 29 was titled 

 [a]n Act to amend and reenact Chapter 966 of the Acts 

of Assembly of 1994, as amended by Chapter 853 of the 

Acts of Assembly of 1995, and which appropriated the 

public revenues for the two years ending, respectively, 

on the thirtieth day of June, 1995, and the thirtieth 

day of June, 1996. 

The bill, as introduced, contained an enactment clause providing 

for the amendment and reenactment of 15 so-called "sections" of 

the existing appropriation act, and for continuation of the 

appropriation for the biennium, as amended. 

 After undergoing further amendment by the House of 

Delegates and the Senate, House Bill 29 proceeded to the Joint 

Conference Committee, which recommended that the bill be adopted 

as introduced, with the committee's proposed amendments. The 

Joint Conference Committee report was adopted by both houses, and 

the Clerk enrolled House Bill 29 for presentation to the 

Governor. 

 Enrolled House Bill 29 contained an enactment clause 

providing for the amendment and reenactment of specified portions 

of the existing appropriation act which were designated as 

"items" and "sections." The clause also provided for the 

addition of certain so-called "items" and continued the 
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appropriation for the biennium, as amended. 

 The enrolled bill consisted of 142 pages and contained those 

provisions listed in the enactment clause which had been amended 

or added during the 1996 session. The enrolled bill excluded 

those "items" in the existing appropriation act which were not 

amended by House Bill 29. By contrast, House Bill 29, as 

introduced, contained 456 pages, setting forth the amended 

provisions listed in the enactment clause in the context of the 

existing appropriation act. 

 The Governor informed the General Assembly that, because 

House Bill 29 had been enrolled to include only the items added 

or amended during the 1996 session, he concluded that the bill 

was not properly enrolled under Article IV, Section 12 and 

Article V, Section 6 of the Constitution of Virginia. The 

Governor alleged that his acceptance of the enrolled bill would 

destroy his ability to protect the public purse through his 

exercise of the item veto. 

 On May 16, 1996, the Governor informed the General Assembly 

that he considered House Bill 29 a "legal nullity" because it was 

not properly enrolled and presented. He also advised the 

legislature that the Attorney General would commence an action in 

this Court, with the Governor's concurrence, to address this 

issue. 

 House Bill 29 became law pursuant to Article V, Section 6 of 

the Constitution, which provides, in part, that if a Governor 
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does not act on a bill within thirty days after the adjournment 

of the reconvened General Assembly session, the bill becomes law 

without his signature. The Attorney General filed the present 

petition for a writ of mandamus on May 16, 1996, and presented 

the following questions for our review. 

 A. When an act appropriating the public revenue 

of the Commonwealth is amended, may the bill 

effecting those amendments be enrolled and 

presented to the Governor setting out less 

than the full budget act, together with any 

amendments? 

 B. If less than the full budget act may be 

enrolled and presented, what portions of the 

budget must be enrolled so as to (i) comply 

with Article IV, Sections 11 and 12 of the 

Virginia Constitution, and (ii) not 

impermissibly encumber the Governor's 

authority, granted in Article V, Section 6(d) 

of the Virginia Constitution, to veto an item 

of the bill? 

 C. Where a provision of an appropriation bill 

does not effectively qualify the amount or 

purpose of an appropriation, and is 

separable, is such provision susceptible to 

the gubernatorial veto granted in Article V, 

Section 6(d)? 

 In determining whether the writ of mandamus should be 

granted, we first consider the issue whether enrolled House Bill 

29 is the same bill passed by the General Assembly. The Attorney 

General contends that House Bill 29 reenacted all unamended 

portions of the existing appropriation act, as well as the 

amendments. The Attorney General advances three related 

arguments based on that assertion: (1) that enrolled House Bill 

29 violates the requirement of Article IV, Section 11 that the 
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bill enrolled and signed be the same bill that "has been passed 

by both houses," (2) that enrolled House Bill 29 violates Article 

V, Section 6, which requires the General Assembly to present to a 

Governor every bill "which passes the Senate and House of 

Delegates," and (3) that the Clerk of the House of Delegates 

failed to enroll the entire bill pursuant to Code § 30-14, which 

requires enrollment of "all acts of the General Assembly." 

 In response, the Clerk asserts that only the so-called 

"sections" and "items" listed in the enactment clause of House 

Bill 29 were reenacted by that bill. Thus, the Clerk contends 

that the unamended items of the existing appropriation act were 

not reenacted in House Bill 29, and that the Attorney General has 

failed to establish that enrolled House Bill 29 is a different 

bill than that passed by the General Assembly. We agree with the 

Clerk. 

 The title of an act is not part of the act itself. 

Commonwealth v. Gaines, 4 Va. (2 Va. Cas.) 172, 180 (1819). The 

purpose of the title is to state the general subject covered by 

the act, and the content of the title may be broader than the 

legislation specifically enacted. See Town of Narrows v. Giles 

County, 128 Va. 572, 583, 105 S.E. 82, 85 (1920). 

 In contrast, the enactment clause is part of the body of the 

act which states the precise action taken by the legislature, 

thereby establishing the jurisdiction and the authenticity of the 

act. See 1A Norman J. Singer, Sutherland on Statutory 
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Construction § 19.01 (5th ed. 1993). The enactment clause also 

secures uniformity of identification, thus preventing 

inadvertence, possible mistake, and fraud. See Joiner v. State, 

155 S.E.2d 8, 10 (Ga. 1967); State v. Patterson, 4 S.E. 350, 352 

(N.C. 1887); State v. Burrow, 104 S.W. 526, 529 (Tenn. 1907). 

 The Constitution of Virginia does not contain a provision 

requiring that legislative acts contain an enactment clause. 

Webster v. Commonwealth, 141 Va. 589, 597, 127 S.E. 377, 380 

(1925). However, when an act does contain such a clause, this 

Court may rely on the clause to determine the precise content of 

legislation. See District Road Board v. Spilman, 117 Va. 201, 

205, 84 S.E. 103, 104 (1915). In Spilman, this Court relied on 

an act's enactment clause in determining the particular action 

taken by the legislature, and whether publication of the single 

amended section of a multi-section act met the constitutional 

requirement of publication "at length." Id. at 205, 84 S.E. at 

104. 

 We place equal reliance on the enactment clause of enrolled 

House Bill 29. The clause did not state that any unamended items 

were "reenacted." Moreover, the clause used the word "reenacted" 

with reference only to designated "items" and "sections."2

 Thus, 

 

 2We also note that the enactment clause of House Bill 29, as 

introduced, did not state that any unamended items were 

"reenacted." Like the enactment clause in enrolled House Bill 

29, the enactment clause in the bill, as introduced, used the 
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we conclude that enrolled House Bill 29 did not provide for the 

reenactment of unamended items, and that the record before us 

does not show that the Clerk enrolled a different bill than 

actually was passed.3

 In effect, the Attorney General asks us to assume that the 

Clerk enrolled, and the presiding officers of both houses signed, 

a different bill from the one enacted by the Senate and House of 

Delegates, contrary to the duties imposed by Article IV, Section 

11 and Article V, Section 6 of the Constitution of Virginia, as 

well as Code § 30-14. However, we are not permitted to make such 

an assumption. In the absence of clear evidence to the contrary, 

this Court must presume that a public officer has properly 

discharged his official duties. Murdock v. Nelms, 212 Va. 639, 

(..continued) 

word "reenacted" only with reference to designated portions 

identified as "sections." Thus, House Bill 29, as introduced, 

did not purport to reenact any unamended items. 

 3The fact that the legislative staff of the General Assembly 

provided to the Department of Budget and Planning a copy of the 

entire appropriation act, with all unamended and amended 

provisions, does not establish that the General Assembly 

reenacted the unamended items. We will not speculate whether the 

legislative staff submitted the entire act to that Department due 

to the nature of the review the Department performs, or whether 

the staff took this action for any other particular reason. 
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642, 186 S.E.2d 46, 49 (1972); Robertson v. Commonwealth, 12 Va. 

App. 854, 856-57, 406 S.E.2d 417, 418 (1991); see Smith v. 

Commonwealth, 219 Va. 554, 559, 248 S.E.2d 805, 808 (1978). 

Applying this principle to the record before us, we conclude that 

enrolled House Bill 29 is the same bill passed by the General 

Assembly. 

 We now consider Question A: 

 When an act appropriating the public revenue of the 

Commonwealth is amended, may the bill effecting those 

amendments be enrolled and presented to the Governor 

setting out less than the full budget act, together 

with any amendments? 

 Since Code § 8.01-653 requires that all questions presented 

under that section relate to the constitutionality or 

interpretation of a particular appropriation act, we answer 

Question A with reference to the provisions of House Bill 29. 

Further, we examine the question in the context of our conclusion 

above that enrolled House Bill 29 is the same bill as that passed 

by the General Assembly. Thus, we consider the issue whether the 

Clerk was required to enroll the entire biennial appropriation 

act in House Bill 29 when only specified portions of the existing 

appropriation act were amended in the current legislative 

session. 

 Article IV, Section 12 of the Constitution of Virginia 

provides: 

 No law shall embrace more than one object, which shall 

be expressed in its title. Nor shall any law be 

revived or amended with reference to its title, but the 

act revived or the section amended shall be reenacted 

and published at length. 
- 10 - 

 The publication requirement of Article IV, Section 12 is a 

provision that is common to many state constitutions. The 

primary purpose of such a provision is to prevent the legislature 

from accidentally or intentionally misleading the public 

regarding the precise action taken in a given enactment. See

Sinclair Refining Co. v. Brumett, 267 P.2d 576, 578 (Okla. 1954); 

State v. Lawson, 82 P. 750, 751 (Wash. 1905). 

 This requirement is a corollary provision to the "one 

object" requirement of the same section. Other purposes 

underlying both requirements include the prevention of careless 

amendment of a bill and the provision of clear notice to those 

affected by an enacted bill. See State Board of Health v. 

Chipphenham Hosp., 219 Va. 65, 74, 245 S.E.2d 430, 435-36 (1978). 

 The issue whether House Bill 29 was enrolled and published in a 

manner that satisfies the requirements of Article IV, Section 12 

must be considered in the framework of these constitutional 

purposes. 

 We first decide whether House Bill 29 is an "act revived" or 

a "section amended" within the meaning of Article IV, Section 12. 

 Although the Attorney General does not argue that House Bill 29 

is an "act revived" under that section, we nevertheless must 

consider this question in determining whether the bill was 

published in compliance with Article IV, Section 12. 

 The primary construction of the word "revive" is 

 'to give life to again.' If it is a creative act to 

give life to dead matter once, it is no less a creative 
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act to give life again to the same matter when it 

becomes dead. The syllable 're' in the word indicates 

the use of old matter, and the syllable 'vive' means to 

'give life to,' which is one of the primary meanings of 

the word 'create.' The quality of the act inheres in 

the giving of life, not in the material that is to be 

vivified. Nor is the quality of the act changed by 

repetition. 

Ballentine's Law Dictionary 1115 (3rd ed. 1969); see also Black's 

Law Dictionary 1321 (6th ed. 1990). 

 The plain, ordinary meaning of the word "revive" comports 

with the above definition. That meaning is "'to return to 

consciousness or life: recover life, vigor, or strength.'" 

Webster's Third New International Dictionary 1944 (1993). 

 A "reviving act" is an act "which restores legal existence 

and force to a statute that has been expressly or impliedly 

repealed." 1A Singer, Sutherland on Statutory Construction

§ 22.26. The term "reviving act" also includes the restoration 

of an act that has expired. 

 Applying the above definitions, we conclude that House Bill 

29 is not an "act revived" within the meaning of Article IV, 

Section 12. Chapter 966 of the Acts of Assembly of 1994 remained 

in continuous effect through June 30, 1996, except as it was 

amended by Chapter 853 of the Acts of Assembly of 1995 and by 

House Bill 29. Thus, the appropriation act for the 1994-96 

biennium was not repealed and did not expire until it was 

supplanted by the 1996-98 biennial appropriation act. 

 Since House Bill 29 is not an "act revived" under Article 

IV, Section 12, the meaning of the term "section amended" 
- 12 - 

controls the issue before us. The word "section" is generally 

defined as the smallest distinct subdivision of a legislative 

act. See Black's Law Dictionary 1353. 

 In District Road Board v. Spilman, this Court held that 

publication of only the amended section of a multi-section act 

satisfied the publication requirement of the predecessor 

provision of Article IV, Section 12. We stated that publication 

of the single amended section met "both the letter and spirit of 

the Constitution." Id. at 206, 84 S.E. at 104. The fact that 

Spilman involved an amendment of a single section, rather than of 

multiple sections, is not a distinction of constitutional 

significance, because the notice function of Article IV, Section 

12 is satisfied when the public is provided notice of every 

change made to a law. 

 Most courts which have construed similar constitutional 

provisions have held that if one or more sections of an act are 

amended, and constitute less than the entire act, the 

constitutional requirement is satisfied if the amended sections 

are set forth alone, without setting out the entire act. See, 

e.g., Crocher v. Abel, 180 N.E. 852, 854 (Ill. 1932); Allphin v. 

Ohio River Co., 306 S.W.2d 94, 95 (Ky. 1957); Sinclair Refining 

Co., 267 P.2d at 578; Lawson, 82 P. at 751. However, this Court 

has not construed the term "section amended" in the context of an 

appropriation act. 

 The Attorney General argues that the word "section" in 
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Article IV, Section 12 refers to either (1) the entire provision 

designated as a "section" by the General Assembly which contains 

an amended item, or (2) the entire appropriation act, including 

its unamended provisions. The Attorney General contends that one 

of the above definitions is necessary to secure the purposes of 

Article IV, Section 12 and the Governor's item veto power under 

Article V, Section 6. We disagree. 

 We consider and define the word "section" in its fixed 

constitutional sense, rather than by reference to the structural 

organization of a given appropriation act. See Brault v. 

Holleman, 217 Va. 441, 449, 230 S.E.2d 238, 243-44 (1976). We 

find no merit in the Attorney General's argument that a "section 

amended" refers to the General Assembly's designation of a 

"section" in an appropriation act. That designation is not 

determinative of this issue because the Constitution, rather than 

the General Assembly, controls the question of what portions of a 

budget act must be enrolled and presented to a Governor. See id.

 Moreover, that designation does not constitute the smallest 

distinct subdivision of an appropriation act. 

 We likewise reject the Attorney General's contention that a 

"section amended" constitutes the entire appropriation act, as 

amended by House Bill 29. Such an interpretation plainly exceeds 

the express language of House Bill 29, in which only certain 

specified portions were amended and reenacted or added to the 

existing appropriation act. 
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 The words "section" and "item" are not synonymous. In 

Dodson v. Commonwealth, 176 Va. 281, 296, 11 S.E.2d 120, 127 

(1940), we defined the word "item" in the context of an 

appropriation act as an "indivisible sum of money dedicated to a 

stated purpose." Under this definition, an item is the smallest 

distinct unit of an appropriation act. However, in order to 

fulfill the notice function of Article IV, Section 12, a "section 

amended" must include not only "an indivisible sum of money 

dedicated to a stated purpose" which has been amended, added, or 

deleted in the current legislative session, but also the 

conditions and restrictions pertaining to that indivisible sum. 

 In addition, appropriation acts may include provisions that 

do not themselves constitute an appropriation of funds and are 

unrelated to any item in the act. This type of provision which 

is added or amended in the current legislative session also must 

be included in the definition of "section amended" to ensure the 

public policy purposes underlying Article IV, Section 12. 

 Therefore, in the appropriation context, we conclude that, 

at a minimum, a "section amended" includes (1) an amended item 

with all pertaining conditions and restrictions; (2) an added 

item with all pertaining conditions and restrictions; (3) a 

deleted item with all pertaining conditions and restrictions; and 

(4) a provision that is unrelated to any item,4 which has been 

 

 4The issue whether a Governor can veto any such unrelated 

provision is not before us in Question A. Thus, while this type 
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amended or added to the biennial appropriation act in the current 

legislative session. 

 Under this definition of "section amended," House Bill 29 

complies with both the letter and spirit of Article IV, Section 

12. The General Assembly reenacted, enrolled, and presented to 

the Governor the "sections amended" in their entirety. 

Enrollment and publication of the complete biennial budget was 

not necessary, because each amended or added item referred to 

something which could be eliminated from the bill without 

affecting the enactment's other purposes or provisions. See

Brault, 217 Va. at 447, 230 S.E.2d. at 242. 

 We find no merit in the Attorney General's argument that 

enrollment of the entire biennial appropriation act was necessary 

to preserve the Governor's item veto power under Article V, 

Section 6 of the Constitution of Virginia. That section 

provides, in part, that "[e]very bill which passes the Senate and 

House of Delegates, before it becomes law, shall be presented to 

the Governor." 

 Article V, Section 6 also details a Governor's powers with 

respect to the legislation presented, including his power to veto 

or recommend amendments to a bill. The section further states 

(..continued) 

of provision falls within the meaning of "section amended," as 

defined above, we do not address whether this type of provision 

is subject to a Governor's item veto power. 
- 16 - 

that a Governor has the authority to veto "any particular item or 

items of an appropriation bill." 

 Here, the Governor's constitutional right of item veto was 

preserved, because the Governor could have vetoed any item which 

had been amended or added in the current legislative session. 

Each amended or added item was capable of being assessed by the 

Governor on its own merits, because its removal would not have 

altered any other indivisible sum in the budget or have affected 

the enactment's other purposes or provisions. See Brault, 217 Va. 

at 447, 230 S.E. 2d at 242. 

 Under Article V, Section 6, once a Governor has signed a 

bill, it becomes law. Thus, when the Governor signed Chapter 966 

of the Acts of Assembly of 1994, and Chapter 853 of the Acts of 

Assembly of 1995, the provisions contained in those acts became 

law. Since House Bill 29 did not amend and reenact the vast 

majority of those provisions, they were not subject to the 

Governor's item veto power. 

 The Attorney General's position would allow a Governor to 

veto provisions in an appropriation law which have been in effect 

for one year or more, even though those provisions have not been 

amended in the current legislative session. Thus, under that 

position, a Governor could veto an appropriation that has already 

been spent, or an appropriation that has been committed in a 

contract binding the Commonwealth. Such results could adversely 

affect the Commonwealth's financial standing, and we reject the 
- 17 - 

 

arguments on which they are based. 

 We also find no merit in the Attorney General's argument 

that the Clerk was required to enroll the entire biennial 

appropriation act in House Bill 29 to guarantee that no item was 

partially enrolled. This alleged problem of "partial enrollment" 

of items in House Bill 29 is illusory under a proper construction 

of "section amended," because all conditions and restrictions 

pertaining to each amended or added item were enrolled along with 

the item in question.5

 Further, in determining whether to veto a 

particular amended or added item, the Governor could have 

compared that item to the unamended provisions of the existing 

appropriation law. 

 5In his argument on Question A, the Attorney General cites 

three examples of a type of "general" provision which he alleges 

are conditions or restrictions. He asserts that the General 

Assembly improperly insulated these provisions from the 

Governor's item veto by not enrolling all items allegedly related 

to those provisions. Yet, in Question C, the Attorney General 

has argued that this very type of "general" provision is 

separable from any item, and thus is subject to the Governor's 

item veto. Since the Attorney General has advanced inconsistent 

arguments regarding this type of provision, and since we do not 

reach the merits of Question C, we do not further consider these 

arguments. 
- 18 - 

 Enrollment of the entire biennial appropriation act also was 

not necessary to preserve the Governor's responsibility under 

Article X, Section 7 to ensure that expenses for the biennium do 

not exceed revenues. If the Governor believed that any item 

which had been added or amended created a potential revenue 

deficit for the biennium, he could have vetoed that item. 

Alternatively, the Governor could have returned an objectionable 

item to the house in which it originated with recommendations for 

its amendment. See Article V, Section 6. 

 Therefore, in response to Question A, we answer that Article 

IV, Section 12 and Article V, Section 6 of the Constitution of 

Virginia did not require enrollment of items of the existing 

appropriation act which had not been amended in the current 

legislative session. 

 We next consider Question B: 

 If less than the full budget act may be enrolled and 

presented, what portions of the budget must be enrolled 

so as to (i) comply with Article IV, Sections 11 and 12 

of the Virginia Constitution, and (ii) not 

impermissibly encumber the Governor's authority, 

granted in Article V, Section 6(d) of the Virginia 

Constitution, to veto an item of the bill? 

 The principles set forth in our discussion of Question A are 

directly applicable here. As stated above, Code § 8.01-653 

requires that the question presented relate to the 

constitutionality or interpretation of a particular appropriation 

act. Thus, we answer Question B with reference to House Bill 29. 

Under the above definition of "section amended," the Clerk was 
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required to enroll every added or amended item,6

 with all 

pertaining conditions and restrictions, to comply with Article 

IV, Section 12 of the Constitution of Virginia, and to preserve 

the Governor's item veto power under Article V, Section 6 of the 

Constitution of Virginia. Further, since House Bill 29 does not 

contain any provision that is unrelated to any item, we expressly 

do not state whether such a provision would be subject to the 

Governor's item veto power. 

 We turn now to Question C: 

 Where a provision of an appropriation bill does not 

effectively qualify the amount or purpose of an 

appropriation, and is separable, is such provision 

susceptible to the gubernatorial veto granted in 

Article V, Section 6(d)? 

 We do not reach the merits of this question, however, 

because it does not come within the defined scope of questions 

permitted under Code § 8.01-653. That section provides, in 

relevant part: 

 In any such [mandamus] proceeding the court shall 

consider and determine all questions raised by the 

Attorney General's petition pertaining to the 

constitutionality or interpretation of any such act, 

even though some of such questions may not be necessary 

to the decision of the question of the duty of such 

Comptroller and Treasurer of the Commonwealth to make 

payment of the moneys appropriated or directed to be 

paid. 

Id. (Emphasis added.) 

 Question C does not pertain to "the constitutionality or 

 

 6There were no deleted items in House Bill 29. 
- 20 - 

interpretation of any such act" but merely states a hypothetical 

question. Further, in his petition, the Attorney General has not 

asked us to consider the constitutionality or interpretation of 

any particular provision of a given act, but merely has asked us 

to provide general guidance regarding future enactments. We are 

precluded from considering such a hypothetical question. 

Conclusion

 For these reasons, we conclude that enrolled House Bill 29 

is the same bill enacted by the General Assembly, that the bill 

was published "at length" within the meaning of Article IV, 

Section 12 of the Constitution of Virginia, and that the bill did 

not impair the Governor's item veto power or his ability to 

ensure that expenses for the biennium did not exceed revenues. 

Accordingly, the writ of mandamus requested by the petitioners 

will be denied. 

Writ denied.

CHIEF JUSTICE CARRICO, JUSTICE COMPTON, and JUSTICE STEPHENSON 

concur in the result.