COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 

Present: Judges Willis, Annunziata and Overton 

Argued at Richmond, Virginia 

GENERAL TRADING CORPORATION 

 OPINION BY 

v. Record No. 2785-97-4 JUDGE ROSEMARIE ANNUNZIATA 

 SEPTEMBER 1, 1998 

MOTOR VEHICLE DEALER BOARD 

FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF FAIRFAX COUNTY 

Arthur B. Vieregg, Judge 

 Joel S. Aronson (Harold G. Belkowitz; Ober, 

Kaler, Grimes & Shriver, on brief), for 

appellant. 

 Eric K.G. Fiske, Assistant Attorney General 

(Mark L. Earley, Attorney General, on brief), 

for appellee. 

 General Trading Corporation ("General Trading") appeals the 

circuit court's decision upholding the Motor Vehicle Dealer 

Board's ("the Board") decision denying General Trading's claim 

for compensation from the Virginia Motor Vehicle Dealer Board 

Transaction Recovery Fund ("the Fund"). Finding no error, we 

affirm. 

 On February 9, 1993, General Trading, an automobile 

wholesaler, sold an automobile to Darrell Ley, Charlie Suqua, and 

Sunnyside Auto Sales for $1,925. On February 1, 1995, General 

Trading sold two automobiles to Tom Lawson and Coeburn Auto Mart 

for a total of $7,460. In both transactions, the purchasers paid 

by check, and the checks were returned for insufficient funds. 

 On February 24, 1997, General Trading obtained a judgment 

against Darrell Ley for $1,925 and a judgment against Tom Lawson 
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for $7,460. On April 16, 1997, General Trading filed with the 

Board separate Judgment Claim Requests for each claim. In these 

Judgment Claim Requests, General Trading sought compensation from 

the Fund for the judgments it had obtained. 

 The Board denied both of General Trading's claims on the 

basis that General Trading was not eligible for compensation 

under Code § 46.2-1527.3. General Trading appealed the Board's 

decisions to the Circuit Court of Fairfax County. After hearing 

oral argument, the circuit court affirmed the Board's decisions, 

reasoning that Code § 46.2-1527.3 "does not protect the seller, 

but, rather, only the purchasers." 

 General Trading contends the Board erred in interpreting 

Code § 46.2-1527.3 to limit recovery to persons who buy or 

acquire possession of motor vehicles, and to deny recovery to 

wholesale sellers of motor vehicles. "[W]hen, as here, the 

question [presented] involves a statutory interpretation issue, 

'little deference is required to be accorded the agency decision' 

because the issue falls outside the agency's specialized 

competence." Sims Wholesale Co. v. Brown-Forman Corp., 251 Va. 

398, 404, 468 S.E.2d 905, 908 (1996) (quoting Johnston-Willis, 

Ltd. v. Kenley, 6 Va. App. 231, 246, 369 S.E.2d 1, 9 (1988)). 

"In sum, pure statutory interpretation is the prerogative of the 

judiciary." Id. (citing Hampton Roads Sanitation Dist. Comm'n v. 

City of Chesapeake, 218 Va. 696, 702, 240 S.E.2d 819, 823 

(1978)). 
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 "'When the wording of a statute is clear and unambiguous, 

its plain meaning is to be accepted without resort to rules of 

interpretation.'" Kossman v. Commonwealth, Dept. of Motor 

Vehicles, 24 Va. App. 762, 766, 485 S.E.2d 643, 645 (1997) 

(quoting Commonwealth, Dep't of Mines, Minerals & Energy v. May 

Bros., 11 Va. App. 115, 118, 396 S.E.2d 695, 696 (1990)). Code 

§ 46.2-1527.3 provides as follows: 

 Whenever any person is awarded a final 

judgment in a court of competent jurisdiction 

in the Commonwealth for (i) any loss or 

damage in connection with the purchase of a 

motor vehicle by reason of any fraud 

practiced on him or fraudulent representation 

made to him by a licensed or registered motor 

vehicle dealer or one of a dealer's 

salespersons acting for the dealer or within 

the scope of his employment, or (ii) any loss 

or damage by reason of the violation by a 

dealer or salesperson of any of the 

provisions of this chapter in connection with 

the purchase of a motor vehicle, on or after 

January 1, 1989, the judgment creditor may 

file a verified claim with the Board, 

requesting payment from the Fund of the 

amount unpaid on the judgment. The claim 

shall be filed with the Board no sooner than 

thirty days and no later than twelve months 

after the judgment becomes final. 

 On or after the effective date of this 

act, the Board shall only consider for 

payment claims submitted by retail purchasers 

of motor vehicles, and for purchases of motor 

vehicles by licensed or registered motor 

vehicle dealers who contribute to the Fund. 

 To bring itself within the ambit of the protections of the 

statute, General Trading argues that the word "purchases," as 

used in the phrase "the Board shall only consider for payment 

claims submitted . . . for purchases of motor vehicles by 
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licensed or registered motor vehicle dealers who contribute to 

the Fund," authorizes recovery by either the buyer or the seller 

and that we should hold that a "purchase[]" involves both 

parties. We reject this analysis in light of the well-settled 

principles applicable in determining the legislature's intent in 

enacting law. 

 "'It is our duty to take the words which the legislature has 

seen fit to employ and give to them their usual and ordinary 

signification, and having thus ascertained the legislative 

intent, to give effect to it . . . .'" Commonwealth v. 

Sanderson, 170 Va. 33, 38-39, 195 S.E. 516, 519 (1938) (quoting 

Saville v. Virginia Railway & Power Co., 114 Va. 444, 453, 76 

S.E. 954, 957 (1913)). In the absence of any specific indication 

to the contrary, words used in a statute will be given their 

common, ordinary, and accepted meaning. Woolfolk v. 

Commonwealth, 18 Va. App. 840, 847, 447 S.E.2d 530, 533 (1994) 

(citing Huffman v. Kite, 198 Va. 196, 199, 93 S.E.2d 328, 331 

(1956)). 

 The statute allows recovery only for claims submitted for 

"purchases of motor vehicles by licensed or registered motor 

vehicle dealers who contribute to the Fund." The ordinary 

definition of "purchase" is "the acquiring of title to or 

property in anything for a price." Webster's Third New 

International Dictionary 1845 (1981). Giving the term "purchase" 

its usual and ordinary meaning, we hold that the legislature 
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intended to limit the protections of the statute to those who 

acquire the property in question by purchase. This holding is 

consistent with the Supreme Court's explanation of the General 

Assembly's intent in enacting the statute: "to afford uniform 

protection to those who purchase vehicles at wholesale auctions, 

for the ultimate benefit of consumers who would purchase the 

vehicles at retail." Fredericksburg Auto Auction, Inc. v. 

Department of Motor Vehicles, 242 Va. 42, 46, 406 S.E.2d 23, 26 

(1991) (emphasis added).1

 General Trading argues in the alternative that the word 

"purchase" as used in Code § 46.2-1527.3 is ambiguous, requiring 

this Court to apply the rules of statutory construction to 

determine its meaning. "Language is ambiguous if it admits of 

being understood in more than one way or refers to two or more 

things simultaneously." Brown v. Lukhard, 229 Va. 316, 321, 330 

S.E.2d 84, 87 (1985) (citing Lincoln Nat'l Life Ins. Co. v. 

Commonwealth Corrugated Container Corp., 229 Va. 132, 136-37, 327 

S.E.2d 98, 101 (1985)). We reject this argument because we find 

 

 1The issue before the Court in Fredericksburg Auto Auction, 

242 Va. at 45, 406 S.E.2d at 25, was a due process challenge to 

the 1988 amendments to the statute. The Supreme Court of 

Virginia reviewed the purposes of the statutory scheme as a 

necessary part of its reasoning that the statute was rationally 

related to its legitimate legislative objectives. Id. at 47, 406 

S.E.2d at 26. We find that the amendments to the statute 

following the Supreme Court's decision in Fredericksburg Auto 

Auction did not alter the statutory purpose; if anything, the 

amendments strengthened the purposes articulated by the Supreme 

Court. See 1995 Va. Acts, ch. 767, 816; 1994 Va. Acts, ch. 478; 

1991 Va. Acts, ch. 654. 
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that the plain meaning of the statute is capable of only one 

interpretation. 

 Given our interpretation of the plain meaning of Code 

§ 46.2-1527.3, General Trading is ineligible to recover; General 

Trading was the seller rather than the purchaser in the 

transactions at issue here. The agency and circuit court 

properly denied compensation from the Fund. 

 Affirmed.