J-S42029-17

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA IN THE SUPERIOR COURT 

OF

PENNSYLVANIA

Appellee

v.

JAMES MARIO PRIDGEN

Appellant No. 1653 MDA 2016

Appeal from the PCRA Order September 9, 2016

In the Court of Common Pleas of Lancaster County

Criminal Division at No(s): CP-36-CR-0003471-1992

BEFORE: OLSON, J., MOULTON, J., and FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E.

MEMORANDUM BY MOULTON, J.: FILED NOVEMBER 15, 2017

James Mario Pridgen appeals, pro se, from the September 9, 2016 order 

entered in the Lancaster County Court of Common Pleas dismissing as 

untimely his serial petition filed under the Post Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”), 

42 Pa.C.S. §§ 9541-46. We affirm.

In a previous memorandum, we set forth the history of this case:

On July 22, 1993, a jury found [Pridgen] guilty of first 

degree murder[1]in connection with a shooting death in 

Lancaster in the early morning hours of November 8, 1992. 

At that time, [Pridgen] became embroiled in an argument 

over drug sales with one of his accomplices. [Pridgen] drew 

a handgun and attempted to shoot the other party, but that

person evaded the shot, which then struck another of 

[Pridgen]’s compatriots in the head. The young man died 

the following day. Judgment of sentence was imposed 

immediately following the verdict with [Pridgen] receiving a 

____________________________________________

1 18 Pa.C.S. § 2502(a).
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term of life imprisonment. This court affirmed the judgment 

of sentence on June 14, 1995, and our [S]upreme [C]ourt 

denied appeal on November 29, 1995.

On May 23, 1996, [Pridgen] filed his first collateral 

petition pursuant to the PCRA. Counsel was appointed and 

filed an amended petition. On April 10, 1997, a hearing was 

held, and on July 2, 1997, the court denied relief. This court 

affirmed the decision on appeal. Commonwealth v. 

Pridgen, 723 A.2d 235 (Pa.Super. 1998) (unpublished 

memorandum) appeal denied, 557 Pa. 653, 734 A.2d 866 

(1999).

Commonwealth v. Pridgen, No. 1962 MDA 2009, unpublished mem. at 1-2 

(Pa.Super. filed Aug. 16, 2010).

In the following years, Pridgen filed multiple unsuccessful PCRA petitions 

and requests for habeas corpus relief. On July 28, 2016, Pridgen filed the 

instant PCRA petition. On August 11, 2016, the PCRA court notified Pridgen 

of its intent to dismiss without a hearing, pursuant to Pennsylvania Rule of 

Criminal Procedure 907. Pridgen responded to the Rule 907 notice on August 

29, 2016. On September 9, 2016, the PCRA court dismissed Pridgen’s 

petition. On September 29, 2016, Pridgen filed a timely notice of appeal. 

Pridgen raises the following issues on appeal:

1. Whether the habeas corpus was the proper avenue to 

correct a matter of subject matter jurisdiction which can not 

[be] waived nor forfeited by the courts, because of the due 

process and equal protection clauses, and [E]ighth 

[A]mendment[.2]

____________________________________________

2 While Pridgen maintains habeas corpus relief is the proper avenue for 

his claims, the PCRA court properly treated his claims, which request relief 

from an illegal sentence and challenge the criminal information, as a request 
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2. Whether the trial court committed fraud upon itself by 

securing a conviction on essential elements of an offense 

not made subject in the criminal information[.]

3. Whether [Pridgen] was provided a[n] actual “judgment of 

sentence order” by the trial court citing the “statutory 

authority” to impose a “mandatory sentence”[.]

4. Whether [Pridgen] can factually raise a[n] allegation of 

an illegal sentence when there is no “statutory 

authorization” being cited within the sentencing order of 

what sentencing statute was utilized to justify the 

pronounced sentence[.]

Pridgen’s Br. at iv (some capitalization omitted).

Our standard of review from the denial of a PCRA petition “is limited to 

examining whether the PCRA court’s determination is supported by the 

evidence of record and whether it is free of legal error.” Commonwealth v. 

Ousley, 21 A.3d 1238, 1242 (Pa.Super. 2011).

It is well settled that “the timeliness of a PCRA petition is a jurisdictional 

requisite.” Commonwealth v. Brown, 111 A.3d 171, 175 (Pa.Super. 2015), 

____________________________________________

for PCRA relief. See 42 Pa.C.S. § 9542 (“The action established in this 

subchapter shall be the sole means of obtaining collateral relief and 

encompasses all other common law and statutory remedies for the same 

purpose that exist when this subchapter takes effect, including habeas corpus

and coram nobis.”); see also Commonwealth v. Hall, 771 A.2d 1232, 1235 

(Pa. 2001) (“The plain language of the statute above demonstrates quite 

clearly that the General Assembly intended that claims that could be brought 

under the PCRA must be brought under that Act. No other statutory or 

common law remedy ‘for the same purpose’ is intended to be available; 

instead, such remedies are explicitly ‘encompassed’ within the PCRA.”)

(emphasis omitted). Further, we addressed this claim thoroughly in our 

August 16, 2010 memorandum, see Pridgen, No. 1962 MDA 2009, 

unpublished mem. at 4-6, and more recently in Commonwealth v. Pridgen, 

No. 2121 MDA 2015, unpublished mem. at 4-5 (Pa.Super. filed Aug. 20, 

2016).
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app. denied, 125 A.3d 1197 (Pa. 2015). A PCRA petition “including a second 

or subsequent petition, shall be filed within one year of the date the judgment 

becomes final.” 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(1). A judgment is final “at the 

conclusion of direct review, including discretionary review in the Supreme 

Court of the United States and the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, or at the 

expiration of time for seeking the review.” 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(3).

The trial court sentenced Pridgen on July 22, 1993. On June 14, 1995, 

we affirmed Pridgen’s judgment of sentence. The Pennsylvania Supreme 

Court denied Pridgen’s petition for allowance of appeal on November 29, 1995. 

He did not file a petition for writ of certiorari with the United States Supreme 

Court. Therefore, Pridgen’s current petition, filed on July 28, 2016, is facially 

untimely. 

To overcome the time bar, Pridgen was required to plead and prove one 

of the following exceptions: (i) unconstitutional interference by government 

officials; (ii) newly discovered facts that could not have been previously 

ascertained with due diligence; or (iii) a newly recognized constitutional right 

that has been held to apply retroactively. See 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(1)(i)-

(iii). To invoke one of these exceptions, Pridgen must have filed his petition 

within 60 days of the date the claim could have been presented. See 42 

Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(2).
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Pridgen’s PCRA petition failed to plead or prove any exception to the 

one-year time bar. Therefore, because Pridgen’s petition was untimely, the 

PCRA court properly dismissed the petition.

Order affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 11/15/2017