2004 D e c i sion s O p inion s of the U nit e d S t at e s C our t of Appe al s for the Thir d C ir c uit

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Thi s de c i sion i s br ou gh t t o you for f r e e a nd ope n a c c e s s b y the O p inion s of the U nit e d S t at e s C our t of Appe al s for the Thir d C ir c uit at V i l l a no va U nive r sit y S choo l of L a

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IN T HE UNI TED ST ATES C OURT OF

APPEALS FO R T HE TH IRD CIR CU IT

____________
Nos. 03-2801 & 03-3282

EL INO R F . MA RS HA LL ; HA RR IET FE NT ON PA RK S; CAROLL D. KNOTT; LIN DS AY DR YD EN , III; RA ND OL PH FE NT ON , JR.; GLENN THO RNTON; SYNDI E THORNT ON SMI TH; HE AT HE R T HO RN TO N; MA TTH EW C. FE NT ON , III THOMAS T. FENTO N,
Ap pellan ts

v.
BRUCE LEA LAURIAULT; MERCAN TILE- SAFE DEPOSIT &

TRUST COMPANY; K. DONALD PROCTOR; ELIZABETH CHANDLER LAURIAULT PI ERSON; SALLY VAUGHN LAURIAULT

____________ Appeal from the United State s District

Cou rt For the Dist

rict of New Jersey D.C. No.: 02- cv-05945 Dist ri ctJudg e: Honor abl e Anne E. Thompson ____________ Argued: April21, 2004

Be for e: S CIR ICA , Chief Judge , RO SE NN and GR EE NB ER G, Circu it

Judges

. (Fil ed: June 15, 2004)

Marvin J. Braut

h, Esq. ( Argued) Wil en tz , G ol dma n & Sp itze r, P. A. 90 Woodbridge Center Dri ve P.O. Box 10 Woodbridge, NJ 07095 Co unse l For App ellants
Gerard G. Brew, Esq. (Argued) Ro ber t A. M intz, E sq. Tammy L. Meyer, Esq. McCart er & Eng li sh, LLP 100 Mulberry Street Newark, NJ 07102 Counsel For Appell ees

____________
OPINI ON OF THE COURT

____________

RO SE NN , Circuit

Judge

. This appeal pr esents an u nusual chall enge to the action of the Unit ed State s Distr ict Court in refusing t o declar e the State of New Jersey’ s adult adoption statute unconsti tuti onal for l ack of a notic e provisi on. Other diffi cult que sti ons posed relate to the Dist r ict Co urt’s div ersity juri sdiction to hear a

chall enge to an adult adoption on state law grounds.
M aria Fenton (“Maria ”), now2

deceased, was one of

ten benefi ciari es of a trustcreat ed by her

unc le, Foster T. Fent on, in Maryl and in 1966. Several years before her death, Maria adopted her four adult c ousins through a pro ceed ing in New Jersey

state court. The other bene ficiarie s s oug ht dec laratory relief in the United S tates District Court fo r t h e Distri ct of

New Jersey to have the New Jersey adult a doption sta tute de clare d invali d and Maria’s adopt ion procee dings declar ed null and void. The District Cou rt grantedMaria’s moti on to d ismis s the acti on under Fed. R. Civ. P . 12(b)(6). We affirm in part, revers e in part , and remand for further proceedings.

I.
Plaintif fs/A ppella nts are surviving benefici aries of a revocabl e tru st (t he “Trust”) creat ed by Foster T. Fent on (“ Fenton”) in the St ate of Mary land on November 29, 1 9 66. The Trust provides that after the death of Fenton’s wife, the balanc e o f the Trust

would inure to the bene fit of Fenton’ s broth ers an d their wives. After the deaths of t he brothers and

w ives, the Trust

provides for the a nnu a l in come to b e paid t o each of Fenton’ s ten nieces and n e phews during their remaining lifeti mes. Upon t he death of anyniece or nephe w, his or h er des ignate d on e-tenth share of income from the Trust i s to be paid to the decea sed niece o r nephew ’s “issu e,” as the case may be. If t here are no livi ng issue, the share is t o be p aid, per sti rpes , to the s urvivi ng ni ec es orne phe ws
or their livin g is sue. The Trust t erminat es twenty -one years after the death of the last of the ten named nieces and nephew s. At that time, the princip al is to be dist ributed among the indi viduals entitled to receive the Trust i ncome at the date of termination.
The Trus t specif ically provides that “an adopted child and su ch ado pted child’s lawful blo od descendants sh all be considered in this i nstrument as la wful blood desc e ndants of t

he adopti ng parent

or parents .” The Trust does not i nclude any spec ific pro vision pertain ing to ind ivid uals ado pted as a dul ts.
M aria file d a Com plaint in July 1991 in th e S up er io r C ou rt o f N ew Je rse y, Chan cery D ivision - Fam il y Part , Hunterdon County, to lega lly adopt four adults. The adoptees were t he chil dren of Maria’ s first

cousin, who recentl y had died. The S uperior C ourt gr anted the adoptionpursuant

to the New Jersey ad ult adoptionstatute, N.J.S.A. 2A :22-1 et seq

. Ap pellan ts claim that

neithe r they , nor t

he trustees, recei ved notic e of the a doption pro cee din g.
Pr iorto completing the a doption, Ma ria’s att orne y, James W . Lan ce, w rote in 1990 to the Trust’s corporate t rus tee, Mercant il e-Sa fe De posit & Trus t C om pa ny, inform ing the trustee th at M aria intende d to adopt her four cousins. The letter inqu ir e d wh ether, in the trustee’s opinion, the ad ult ado ption w ould enab le the adoptees to inherit Ma ria’s share of t he Trus t. The trustee re spon ded to the inquiry offering an unquali fied op i nion that the adoption wo uld en able th e ado ptees to inherit Ma ri a’ s sh are o f the Tru st, per sti rpes

. Upon completion of t he adopti on,3

Ma ria’s at to rney delive red the a mended bi rth certi ficat es of the a doptees and t he Order of Adoption to the corporate trus tee.
M aria died in 2002. Upon her death, th ree of her a dopted chi ldren (c ol lec tiv ely, “the A doptees”) a ss erted an interest in th e T rust a s M aria’ s “iss ue.” 1 In respo nse, the Ap pellan ts, wh o are a ll benefici aries und er the T rust, fi led the complaint

at bar in the U .S. District Court for the D istrict o f New Jersey . The comp laintraise d two clai ms fo r declaratory relie f se ekin g, inte r al ia , a judgmentthat would ( 1) declar e the 1991 New Jers ey adoption de cree i nvalid i nsofar

as it created rights o r interests in the Trust for the adul t Adoptees; (2) declare that t he adult Adoptees have no rights to or i nterest in th e i nco me or pri ncipal of the Trust; and (3) di re ct t he tru ste es no t to pa y a n y porti on of the i ncome or princ i pal of the Trust to the adult Adoptees. Although both counts in the complaint

seek ident

ical rel ief, they are based on diff eren t lega l theo ries. The first count allege s that M aria’s fa ilure to provide notice of the adoption procee ding to the Appell ants “pr ejudi ce d” the ir interests in the Trust, thereby invali dating the adop tion ins ofar a s it wo uld af fect th eir interest s. The b asis for the cl aim of “prejudi ce” is not

completel y cl ear fr o m the language of th e c omp la in t, an d we inter pretit as a chall enge to the validi ty of the adop tions b ased on th e app licable s tate la w. See Davis v. Ohio Barge L ines, Inc. , 697 F.2 d 54 9, 5 52 (3d Cir. 19 83) (“ in passing on a motion to dismiss o n th e gr ound , inter alia , of la ck of juri sdiction

o ver the subj ect matter, t he all egati ons of the complaint sh oul d be constr ued favorably to t

he pleader”). Thus, we read the claim to allege, as the A ppellants assert in their brief, tha t the adop tions were inva li d under the New Jers ey l aw of adoptions, and that

the Ne w Jersey adoptiondecr ees s hou ld no t be giv en fu ll faith and cr ed it

und erMar y la nd l aw, wh ich g ove rns th e T rust.
Th e seco nd co unt all ege s alterna tively t h at becaus e the New Jersey adult adoption stat

ute, N.J. S. A. 2 A:2 2-1 , et seq ., does notprovide for notice to pers ons
or entiti es whose interests maybe affecte d by the adoption, t

he stat ute is invali d under the Four te ent h Amen dme nt to the United Sta tes Con stitution and the N ew Jers e y Sta te C ons titutio n.
In January o f 2003, theDistri ct Cou rt granted Ap pellants a temp orary restraini ng order, pro h ibiting the Adopte es from fili ng an acti on in Maryl and s tate court to claim their interestin the Trust. In March of 2 003 , the D istrict Co urt de nied th e Ap pellants’ motion for a prelimina ry injunct ion and va cated the tem porary restraini ng order. Once the rest raini ng orderwas lifted, the Ad optee s filed a claim in Maryland s tate court ( “the Mary land

ca s e”) seek ing to c om pel the trustees to make distr i butions from the Trust to the

1 M aria’s ad opted daug hter V irginia Lewis Lauriaul t predec eased Ms. Fenton.4

Adoptees. 2 The Adoptees als o file d an acti on in the Superior Cour t of New J er se y, Ch ance ry Divisio n, Pro bate P art, Hunterdon Co unty , (“the New Jers ey
ca se”) seeking a de claratoryjudgment certi fyi ng th at t he N ew Je rse y a dopt ion decree is valid for al l purposes. 3

On May 27, 2003, the Dis tri ct Cou rt gran ted the Ad optee s’ mo tion to dismiss the co mp lain t pur suantto Fed . R. Civ. P. 1 2(b)(6 ). The appe llants tim ely appealed. 4

II.
The Ap pell ants cla ime d juri sdiction for their un derlyi ng suit as a matter aris ing under t

he Constit

ution of t he United States pursuant to 28 U.S .C. § 1331, and as a dive rsit y sui t pursuant to 28 U .S .C. § 1332. This c ourt maint ains appe llate jurisdicti on u nde r 28 U.S .C. § 1291. As a n appeal fr om the District Cou rt’s grant of

a mo tion to dismis s under Fed. R. C iv. P . 1 2(b)(6), our revi ew is de

novo

. Jordan v. Fox, Rothschi ld, O’Bri en & Fr a nkel , 20 F.3d 1 250, 126 1 (3d C ir. 1 994). Upon a m otion to dismiss , w e
co nst rue the complai nt liberall y, and

as sum e all factu al a llegations in the complaint

to b e tru e. Wilson v. Rac km ill , 878 F.2d 772, 775 ( 3d Cir. 1989) . The dismis sal will be uphe ld i f we a gree w ith the Distri ct Court t

hat the Appellant s can prov e no s et of f acts tha t wo uld en title them to rel ief. Conley v. Gibson , 355 U. S. 41, 45-46 (1957).
The Distric t Cou rt held th at it did not have jurisdictio n to hear anyof the Plaintiff’s clai ms based o n state law, and considered only the chal lenge t o the Ne w Jers ey adult a doption s tatut e o n
c o nsti tuti onal due process grounds

. Regarding the chal lenge t o the v al idit y of the New Jerse y st ate court adopti on decree, the Dist

rict Cou rt cite d to Distri ct of Columbia Court of Appeal s v. Fel dman , 460 U.S. 46 2 (1983 ) for the pro posit ion that fede ral distric t cou rts do not have juri sdiction to hear a

chall enge to st atecourt decisio ns, ev en ift he chall enge rais es a consti tuti on a l claim. As to t he claim for a d eclara tory ju dgme nt that the Adoptees have no interestin the Trust, the Distri ct Co urt held that it could not as sum e juri sdiction over that

issue unde r the 2 The Maryland cas e is capt ioned In the Matter

of the Marit al Trust

Created Under the Rev ocable Deed of T rust Executed byFoster T. Fenton as Settlor and Hilary

W. Gans and Mercantile -Safe Deposit and Trus t Companies as Trustees , Case N o. 24-T-0 3-0000 74 (Cir. Ct. B altim ore Cty.).

3 The New Jersey cas e is capt ioned In th e Matte r o f the Es ta te of MariaB. Fenton, de ceased . The Adoptees di d not prov ide a c ase n um ber cita tion to th is

cour t.

4 In addition to M aria Fenton ’s adopted chi ldren, Mercantil e-Safe De posit & Trus t Com pany, K . Do nald Proctor , Matthew C. Fenton and Trustees were also named as no minal appellees.5

prob ate excepti on to diver sity j urisdi ction. 5 Fi na lly, although t

he District Court

did not ad dress this issue, the Adoptees argue d before the District Cou rt and a gain in their appe llate br ie f that

th is Co urt shou ld abstain from deciding the Appellants’ claims. We therefore turn to each of these jurisdict ional issues.

A.
In dismissing fo r l a ck of juri sdiction the chal lenge to the va lidi ty of the New Jersey adopt ion decre e, the Distri ct Court noted t

he gener a l princip le tha t federal dist

rict courts may not s it as appe llate cour ts to rev iew s ta te court decisions. Althou gh the Di stri ctCo u rt cite d only to Distri ct of Columbia Court of Ap peals v. Feldm an , this prin ciple is

com mo nly known as the Rooker-Fel dman doctri ne. See Ro oker v. Fide lity Trust Co. , 263 U.S. 41 3 (1923 ). The D istrict Court

correc tly stat ed the gener al princi ple under Rooker-Feldman, but fai led to recog n ize

an impo rta nt factor in the do ctrine’s applic ation. Under the Rooker-Fel dman doctri ne, “a party losi ng in state co urt is barred from seeking what in substanc e
wo uld be appell ate re v ie w o f the sta te judgment i n a United States district co urt, based on the los ing pa rty 's clai m that the state judgment i tsel f vi olat es th e lo se r's federal right s.” Johnson v. DeGrandy , 512 U.S. 997, 100 5-1 00 6 (19 94) (e mp hasis added ). In this case, the A ppellants w ere not a part y to the ad option proc eedin g in New Jer sey , and they are not chal lenging

an adv er se ju dgme ntaga in st th em. Rather, the Ap pellan ts mount a coll atera l att ack on the valid ity

of the New Jerseyadoption decree. Therefore, we h old t hat the Distr ictCourt’s f

inding of no j urisdi ction

over a claim of a n on-p arty to state litigatio n beca use o f Ro oker -Feld man to be in error. The Rooker-Feldman doct rine does not ap ply to this case, and the Dist rict Cour t could , in theo ry, assert div ersity juri sdiction over thi s coll atera l att ack t o the N ew Jers ey ad opt ion dec ree.

B.
The Distri ct Court f

ound that

it did not have juri sdiction to dec lare t hat the Adoptees have no right or interest

in the Trust due to the pro bate e xcep tion to divers ity jurisdictio n. Th e D istr ictCou rt did not conduc t any ana ly sis of t his i ssue, but simplycite d to Princess Lida of Thurn and Taxis v. Thompso n , 305 U.S. 456 (1939), t o s up po r t i t s p os i t i on

. We

c onclude again that the Distri ct Cou rt’ s hold ing in this matter wa s incorrect. In Princess Lida , the Suprem e Cou rt was call ed upon to resol ve a dispute between a federaldistrict court and the P enns ylvania Cou rt of Co mmo n Pleas , wh ere bo th

cour ts had clai med juris dicti on over a trust matter and h a d issued orders re straining the parti es from procee ding in t he other

cou rt. 305 U.S . a t 4 61. The S upr eme Cou rt determi ned that

the cl aims in th at

case we re no t brou ght in pe rs ona m to determi ne the ri gh ts of any per son in the trust. Id. at 46 6-4 67. Had the clai ms been br ought under diver sity j urisdi ction i n pe rsonam , th e Co ur t’ s a na ly si s wo uld hav e 5 See infra Part I I.B for a de scri ption of the origin a nd sc ope o f the p roba te excepti on.6

been diff eren t. Id. Rather , t he c la ims

were quasi i n rem , as t hey r elat ed to th e administ rati on and rest orati on of the corpus of a tr u st. Id. at 467. Therefore, the Supreme Court hel d that t he state court maintai ned exclusi ve juri sdiction overthe corpus of the trust, and the feder al dis tri ct court could exer cise no juri sdiction. Id. at 468. The differenc es between Pr i ncess Lida and the cas e athand are st ark. First, there is no confl ict

between the federaland state co urts r egardi ng juri sdict ion. 6 Second, the case at bar deals p r imarily with a determinati on of righ ts in the Trust among the pa rties; there is no c laim in rem requiring the feder al cou rt to ma intain jurisdictio n ov er the c orpu s of th e trust.
A determ ination of w heth er the prob ate exce ption to divers ity juri sdiction applie s requir es a much m or e comprehensive analy sis t han that offered by the Dist

rict Court. Seve ral of our si ster circuit courts have discus sed the l imit s of the probate e x c e ption, o fte n acknowledging its dif ficu lt con tou rs. See , e.g. , M ang ieri v

. M angieri , 226 F.3 d 1, 2 (1 st Cir. 2000) (noti ng t hat “the precise

sc ope of the probate exception has no t been cl ea rl y es tabl is he d” ). Howe ver, the Supreme C ourt an d the s evera l circuit

cour ts have suffic ientl y cl arifi ed the doctrine’s guiding princi ples to res olve the issu e pr ese nted in th is ca se. Ge nerally speaking , the Judiciary Act of 178 9 conferred e quity juri sdiction upon the f

ed eral c ourts, which did not include probate j urisdi ction. Markham v. Allen , 326 U.S. 490, 494 ( 1946) (noting that the Eng lish Court of Chan cery in 1789 did not have j urisdi ction ov er prob ate matters). Thus, feder al cour ts do not have juri sdiction to probate wills or adminis ter estates. Id. However, federalcourts do h ave juri sdiction to entertai n suit s rai sed by cred itors , heir s and other c laima nts against an estate as long as the fe deral court “doe s not in terfere with the prob ate proceedi ngs or assu me g enera l ju ris dicti on of the probate or

controlof the prop erty in the custodyof the st ate court.” Id. See also Moore v. Graybea l , 843 F.2d 706, 709 (3d Cir. 1988) . In Markham , t he S upr eme Cou rt uph eld a d istr ictcourt j udgment declaring that a p etitioner wa s “en titled to recei ve the net

estate of [the d eced ent] in dist ribution” because the judgmentdid not distu rb the admini stra tion of t h e decede nt’s estate, but rather “decre e[ d] peti tio ner’s right

in the propertyto be dist ributed after its a dm in is tration.” 326 U.S. at 495.
In the ca ses fol lowing Markham , th e ci rcuit

courts have further refi ned the prob ate e xcepti on to diver sity j urisdi ctions explai ning general ly that t he juri sdictional questi on can be decide d by determining whether the a ction c ould be brought in a state court of g eneral jurisdiction w here the fed eral c our t sits. Foste r v. Ca rlin , 200 F.2d 943 , 9 47 ( 4th Ci r. 195 2) . H owe ver , whe re a ma tte r d oes n ot ord inarily fall with in the pro bate e xcep tion to d iversity juri sdiction, the exce pt ion may not be 6 The Appellees s tipul ated at oral argum ent that the M aryland state court has stayed t

he proceedings in the case brought bythe Adoptees pe nding resolu tion of this app eal.7

expanded or fede ral juri sdiction denie d because state law wo uld allo w th e matter to be a ssig ned to a p rob ate c our t. See , e.g. , Waterman v . Canal- Louisiana Bank & Trust Co. , 215 U.S . 33, 4 3-4 4 (1 909 ). Turning to the cas e a t h an d, we conclude that the Distric t Cou rt erred in determ inin g that the prob ate ex ceptio n to divers ity jurisdicti on a pplies to thi s case. Fenton establish ed the Trus t at issue in this

case pri or to his deat

h, and there is no current or pending matter r egarding t he Trust to be adm i nistered in the sta te prob ate court. To this Court ’s knowledge,

no state pro bate court exercise d juri sdiction over the Trust pri or to t he appe llants filing th e pres ent su it

. Therefore, the fe deral c ourt is not as ked to interfere with anyprobate pr oce edin g or
as sum e controlover property in probate. Thus, the Distri ct Cou rt possess es div ersity juri sdiction over this cl ai m in pe rs ona m to determi ne the ri ghts of the parti es in t he Tru st.
To further

r ei nf or ce th e p oi nt , w e
no te t hat the clai m brought by the Adoptees to est ablis h their right s in the Trust was ap propri ately rai sed in Mary land Circu it Co urt, th e state court of general juri sdiction. 7 In that

acti on, the Maryland court would presumpti velyconsider the

sa me issues p resen tly before this cou rt, includi ng whe th erMar y la nd l aw r equ ires recognit ion of th e Ne w J e rseyadoption decree and a gran t of fu ll faith an d cred it for all purposes. B ecause the se issues are appr opriate for the Mary land state court of general juri sdiction, a nd not the Mary land prob ate court, the feder al court’s divers ity juri sdiction, co ns eq ue nt ly, is not disturbed by the probate excepti on. 8

C.
The Ado ptees argue that this Court shou ld abstai n from decidi ng this case, ba se d on severalrecogniz ed abstent ion doc trines. In order to weigh the appropriateness of ab stention , it is helpful t o sum mariz e the p arties’ po sitio n s regardi ng the s ta te law issues before us. Ap pellan ts concede that the T rust is governed by Maryland l aw, but argue that t he New Jersey adopt ion decre e is not entitled to full faith and credi t in Mary land because it is the re sult of an inv alid judici al rul ing. Appel lants cite to a series of New Jersey ca ses for the propos iti on

7 Under the Maryl and consti tuti on, the courts and legi slat

ure have vested pro bate juris dicti on i n th e or pha n’s c our t. See Radcliff v. Vance , 757 A.2d 812, 816 (M d. 200 0). Be caus e the T rust is governed byMaryland l aw, and onlythe Maryland c ourts c ould asse rt any potential probate j urisdicti on, the case brought bythe Adoptees i n New Jersey does not af fect th e pro bate e xcep tion to diversity jurisdict ion analysi s.

8 It i s worth noti ng that e ven if the Maryland c ase is posture d in rem , the federalcourt wil l not be s tri pped of jurisdictio n bec ause the state cour t claim

wa s filed a fter the fede ral in personam claim

. See Reichm an v. Pittsburgh Nat’l Bank , 465 F.2d 16, 18 (3d Cir. 1972 ).8

that in New Jersey , adul t adopti ons entered for th e purpose of inheriting fro m a third partyor “str anger to t

he adopti on” are not valid. 9 Had the Appellant s been provi ded notice of the adoption procee ding, t hey suggest that t

hey would have informed the Ne w Jersey

court of Mari a’s “i nval id ” purpose in the adoption (i .e. arrangi ng for her cousi ns t o inh erit from the third party Trus t) and prevent ed the court from app rov ing the a dop tion

. The Adopt ee s argue that New Jersey l aw does not p rohib it adult adoptions simplybecause the y involve,

amon g ot her

th in gs, in herit anc e fr om a third pa rty passing t

hrough the adopt

ive paren t. Adoptee s a ssert that t he adopti on is valid b ecau se they co mp lied w ith every requir ement of the N ew Jers ey a dult adoption stat

ute, N.J.S. A. 2A:22-1 etseq ., and that Mary land la w explici tly states that adult adoptees will be considered “issu e ”

en t itl ed to the s ame right s as natural childr en in mat ters govern ing th e dis position of a trust

. See Evans v

. McCoy , 436 A .2d 436 (M d. 1981).
As noted above, once the Dist rict Cou rt resol ved its temporary restraini ng order, the A do ptees fi led the Maryland

case seeking di stribution of t h eir intere st in the Trust funds , and the New Je rsey case seeking decla ratory relie f to establ ish the vali dity of the adoption. Thes e pending state cou rt

cl ai ms f

or m th e basis for the Adoptees’ r equest for

abstention.
The Adoptees rel y on two different lines of ca ses to su ppo rt their req uest f o r abstention. First , under Railroa d Com m’n of Texas v. Pul lman Co. , 312 U.S. 496 (1941) an d i ts p ro ge ny, the Suprem e Cou rt acknowledged that

the feder al court s may exercise their

“wise dis creti on” to abs tain from a case if a parallelst ate s uit may resolv e the feder al question. 312 U.S. at 501. Su b sequent ca ses ref ined the Pullman abstention doctrine, warning that absten tio n is onl y appr opriat e i n

“ excepti onal circumst ances.” Mose s H. Cone M em ’l H os p. v . M er cu ry Co nstr. , 460 U.S . 1, 14 (1 983 ) (citin g C olorado River Water Conservati on Dist. v. Unite d States , 424 U .S. 800, 813 (1976)). Th e approp r iateness of abstent ion shoul d be reached by bal ancing factor s such as “inc onv enience of the feder al forum; the desira bili ty of avoidi ng piecemea l litigati on; an d the order in which juri sdiction was obt ained by the c oncurrent for um s.” Moses H. Cone , 460 U. S. at 1 5 (cit ation omitted). Yet, none of these factors will be de terminative, a nd the balance is “ he av ily w eighte d in favor of the exerci se of jurisdi ction .” Id. at 16 (cita tion om itted ). 9 See Matter of Duke , 305 N .J. Super. 408, 702 A.2d 1008 (N.J . Super. Ct. Ch. Div . 1995 ); Matter of the Action of M for the Ad option of P , an A dult , 193 N.J. Su per . 33, 4 71 A .2d 1 220 (N .J. Su per

. Ct. L aw Div . 1983 ); Ma tter of Nicol’s Estate , 152 N.J. Super. 303, 377 A.2d 1201 (N . J. Super. Ct. Ap p. Div. 197 7); Matter of Gri swold’s Est ate , 140 N.J. Sup er. 35, 3 54 A .2d 71 7 (M orris C oun ty Ct. 19 76); In re C om ly’s Estate , 90 N.J. Super. 498, 218 A.2d 175 (Gloucester Co unt y Ct. 1 966 ).9

The Supr em e Co urt als o acknowledged that “ [g] ene rally, a s between state and federalcourts , the rule is that ‘the pende ncy of anaction in the sta te court is no bar

to procee dings concerning the sam e ma tter in the Fed eral c ou rt having juri sdiction . . . .’ ” Colorado River , 424 U.S. at 817 ( citi ng McClellan v. Carland , 217 U.S. 268, 282 (191 0)). In fact, when a judgmentsoug ht is strictly in per son am, bo th state a nd f edera l courts with concurrent

juri sdiction may p roceed until judg men t is obtain ed in one of t hem. Princess Lida , 305 U. S. at 465-466. See also In re D i et Drugs , 282 F.3d 220, 234 (3d Cir. 2002) (explai ning that parall el in pe rs ona m ac t ions m ay proce ed in federal and state courts , with principl es of

res judica ta resolv ing the effe ct of a jud gm ent in one cou rt up on t he o ther ).
Under these circumstance s, we do not believe that t

his case re quires applic ation of Pullman absten tion. Firs t, deferri ng the state law is sues to the state

cour ts would not likel y r esolve t he federal consti tuti ona l que sti on present ed. Second,

we se e n o i ss ue s i n the se st at e l aw claim s that creat e the “excepti onal circum stances” required fo r Pullman abstention.
How ever, Adoptees als o argue for abstention un de r a n a lte rn ate th eo ry. De spite the strong antipat hy t o abstention, the Supreme Cour t a cknowledged a spec ific situationthat a llows feder al cour ts greate r d efe rence i n decidi ng whether abstention is appr opriate. In Brill hart v. Excess Ins. Co. of America , 316 U. S. 491, 494-95 (1942), the C ourt held that when a federal suit is bro ugh t under the Federa l Declarato ry Judg me nt s Act , 2 8 U. S. C. § 400 , prese nting onl y ques tions of local laws, the court is und er “no com pulsio n to exercise [] j uris diction ” if a p arallel state court proceedi ng would address t he matters in controversy between the parties. In Wilto n v. S even Falls , 51 5 U .S . 277 (1995), the Court reaffirmed the distric t courts’ broad d iscre t ion for abs tenti on when entertaining claims for declara tor y judg men t. “Since i ts i ncepti on, the Declarato ry Judgment A ct has bee n underst ood to confer

on federal cour t s unique and s ubsta ntial d is cretion in decidi ng whether to de clare the righ ts of litiga nts.” Id. at 286. Thus, co ur ts are permitted to avoid gra tuitous interf er ence with state court matter s by abstai ning from clai ms for decl arator y j udgment , spec ifically if the state court proce edings

wo uld add re ss “the same issue s, not governed by fed er al la w, b et ween th e s ame partie s.” Wilton , 515 U.S. at 282 (ci ting Brillhart , 316 U .S. at 495). Therefore, if the federal co urt belie ves that the state law ques tions in controver sy be tween the parties are better suit ed for res oluti on in state court, then the federalcourt may properlyabst a in from decidi ng a dec larat ory jud gm ent c laim

. Id. Although the A dop tees inf orm ed this Cou rt of th ei r p end in g cl ai ms in Maryl and and N ew Jersey , thos e complaint s are not in the record before us. Without re viewing the complaint s, we cannot ve rifywhether those state claim s will adeq uately address

a ll of the i ssues pr esented i n this case. Thus, we will remand this issue f or further consider ation by the District Court and applic ation of the Brillhart absten tio n10

doctri ne should the District Court then deem such acti on appropri ate.

III.
The se co nd c oun t i n the Ap pellan ts ’ complaint

alle ges tha t the New Jers ey adult ad option stat

ute, N.J .S.A . 2A :22 -1, et seq ., is i nval id u nder the F ourtee nth Amendmen t o f the U.S. Constit ution and the New Jersey St ate Constituti on because it “does not pr ovide fornot ice t o persons
or entities in terested in or w hose interests may be affecte d by the adopt i on.” Because th is cl ai m, on its face, appe ars to be a facialchall enge to the New Jersey adult adop tion statu te, this C ourt not ed that Fed. R. C iv. P. 24 (c) req uires th at t he Dis tri ct Court noti fy t he state att orney general of the cl aim, pr oviding the state an opp ortun it y to intervene t o defend the stat ute. Although Rule 24( c) plac es the resp onsib ility on the court to provi de

n otice to the s tate , it

also warns t

ha t th e party challe ngin g the s tatute “sho uld” c all the matter

to the attent

ion of the cour t. In this case, the rec ord does not indicate any acknowledgment from the Dist rict Co urt

or th e A pp ell an ts o f it s R ul e 2 4( c) du ty. We request e d that t

he parti es addres s the consequences of the failure to com ply with Ru le 24(c). The Ap pellan ts explai ned that their clai m was no t actually a facial ch all enge to the statute, but rather a chall enge to the statut e as applied in these cir cumstances. Because thi s is an appea l of a dism issal un der R ule 12(b )(6), w e w ill acceptthe Ap pellants’ c ustomizi ng o f their cl ai m, despit e the othe rwis e clear language in the c om plain t. Th erefore, we will not take any ac tion wit

h respect to a potential failure to f ollow Rule 24(c ), we willtreat

the cl a im as a chal lenge t o the st atute as applie d, a nd t urn to t he merit s of the dism issal

. Appellants’ prefac e their a bility to collatera lly atta ck the adoption dec ree on the Restatement(Second) of Judgm ents § 31(2 ) (198 2). Th at sectio n states that:

[a] judgment i n an acti on whose purp ose is to determi ne or change a person’ s stat us is conclusi ve with res pect t o that s tatus upon all other p erson s, with th e foll owing qualif ication s:

(a) If a pers on ha s, und erap pl ic ab le la w,
an interest i n such status such that he is entitled to contest

its existence, t

he jud gme nt is not co nclus ive up on h im unless he w as aff orde d an o ppo rtunit y to be a party t o the actions.

Comm ent (f) to the Res tatem ent § 31(2 ) furth er exp lains tha t: [r]u les governing pr oceedings t o adjud icate stat

us often desig nate those w ho must be made parti es to, or given notice of, the proceedings. . . . In some instances,

a legal interest i n the st atus su fficien t to conferth at a ut ho rity h as be en fo und to existas a m atter of Co nstitution al law

. B eyondthis , appl icabl e stat utoryand decisi onal law determines the pe rsons who have such an inte rest.11

Alth o ugh the N ew Jersey co urts have n ot explored t

his t opic, the Dist

rict Cou rt correctly found that the New Jersey adult adop ti on sta tute on its face only requir es that c onsent, and there fore noti ce, of an adu lt adoption pro ceedi ng be given to the spouse of the ado pting pare nt

. N. J. S. A. 2A:22 -1. There is no statutory requir ement for notice to thi rd parties. Therefore, the A pp ellants must show that their protected interest in the adoption proceedi n g is derived from ei ther t he federal or stat e constituti ons. The Distri ct Cou r t dis missed the Appellants’ due process cl ai m on two grounds. First , the Court explained that

none of th e ca se law cited by t he Ap pellan ts supp orted th eir claim that, as a party whose mon etary interest in the Trust could be tan ge nt ial ly a ffec ted bythe adoption, theywere enti tled to no tice of the adoption proceed i ng. Second, the Cou rt stat ed that

the di sposi tion of t

he Trust itself w ould prov ide the Ap pellan ts with an opportuni ty to de fen d their inter ests, t her eby sa tisfyin g du e pr oce ss.
A consti tuti onal anal ysi s begins with a p r esum ption th at a statu te or its applic ation is const

itutional, and t h e chall enger bears the burden of proving that

a statute is unco nstitution al. See I.N.S. v. Chadha , 462 U. S. 919, 944 (1983). How ever, we are not persu aded that a party’s failure to cite suffici ent supporting

case law is an ade quate ground f o r dism is sal und er Ru le 12(b )(6); it is poss ible that

a party co uld raise a s cena rio not yet recogn ized in p rior c ase law . A court should only grant a motion to di smiss if it is convinced that the plaint iff can prove no set of fac ts warranting relie f. Conley v. Gibson , 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957). On the o ther han d, the D ist rict Cou rt’s second ground fo r d ismissa l, find ing that the Appellants’ due process rights wo uld b e satisfie d by their a bility to defe nd their righ ts in the Tr us t proceedings, strikes c loser to the targ et. We turn now to a more c omplete an alysis of this issue.
At the outs et, we note that due pro ces s is a fl exible doctri ne, requiring procedures as the s itu ati on demands and depend ent upon the c ircumst ances

. Morrisseyv. Brewer , 408 U.S. 471, 481 (197 2); see M arinca s v. Le wis , 92 F.3d 195, 203 (3d Cir. 1996 ). An y challen ge to

a state law , or the ap pl ic atio n of th e l aw,
on due pr oc es s g ro und s b eg in s wi thtwo inquiries: (1) “w hethe r the S ta te has deprivedthe cla iman t of a p rote cte d prop erty interest, ” and (2) “whether the St a te’s procedures comport with due pro ces s.” Lu jan v . G & G Fire Sprinklers, Inc. , 532 U .S. 189, 195 (2001). Ap pellan ts argue that t

hey have a legi timat e pr o perty interest in Maria’s one tenth share of the Trust because the Trust specifi call y st ates that if Ma ria died witho ut issue, her share

wo uld be divide d among the m as the remaini ng benefici ari es. However , assuming arguendo the Appellant s’

a ssertion of a p rope rty interest in M aria ’ s
one tenth sh are of the T rust, 10 we do not

10 As will be di scussed bel ow, the Ap pellan ts had no p rope rty interest in Maria Fenton’s share of t he Trust at

the12

belie ve that t

he State ’s action in gr anting the adop tions ac tually wo rked to d eprive the cla iman ts of a p rope rty interest.
To support t

heir argument, the Ap pellan ts cite to a li ne of Supreme Cou rt

cases ac kno wledg ing that natural fathe rs have a due process right to n otice of adoption proceedi ngs if thos e proceedi ngs
wo uld extingui sh thei r parent al righ ts. See A rmst rong v. Manzo , 380 U.S. 545, 550 (1965) (recogni zing a na tur al father’s liberty interest i n a paren tal relation ship and requiring notic e of a n ado ption to sati sfy the father’s du e process righ ts); Lehr v. Robert son , 463 U .S. 248, 264 (1983) (holdi ng that a

state may sat

isfydue process through a putative father’s

re gi str y, which place s the fa ther’s rig ht to notic e with in his co ntrol). A ppella nts

wo uld have thi s Court i nterpr et the se cases to establish a rule that parties whose

econ om ic interest maybe affecte d by an adoption are entitl ed to ei ther notice of the proceedi ng or an alternati ve mechanism to assert their r ight to notice. Yet, these

cases are dis tingu is hed f rom the sce nario before us because i n both Armstrong and Lehr , the ad option proc eedin g it se lf extingui shed the natural fathers ’ l iberty interest in t heir pa rental sta tus. In th is
case, the New Jersey

adoption proceeding did not purport to or

actual ly determi ne the Appellants’ interest in the Trust. Ra ther, the adoption proceeding si mply created a parenta l relat

ionshi p between Maria and her se co nd co us in ad op tee s. W ha t, if an y, effectth e adop tion ha d on the inte rests in the Trus t of the other beneficiaries was a matter for the t

ruste es and the Maryland

cou rts.
“The fundamental requirement of due process is the o pportunity to be hea rd ‘ata meaningful t

ime and in a meani ngful

mann er.’" Matthews v. Eldridge , 424 U. S. 319, 333 (1976) (quot ing Arms tr ong v. M anzo , 380 U.S . 545 , 552 (19 65) ). Th e Appellants’ clai m of a prop erty interest in Mar ia’s one- tenth sh are of the T rust w ill be determi ned by t

he t r ustees , based on their inter

pretat ion o f the re quirem ents specifi ed in the Trust itself, or by a court deci ding th e i ss ue und erMar y la nd l aw. The New Jersey co urt , bygranti ng the ad options, exerci sed no jurisdi ction o r autho rity ov er any pr opertyinterest i n the Trus t. Therefore, the “meaningf ul ti me” for the Appellant s to be heard will occ ur when eithe r the Dis tri ct Court on remand elects to addres s the st ate l aw claim under divers ity jurisdictio n, or ab sta ins , le aving the issu e to the M aryland s tate co urt.
The Supr e me Court’s r ecent opinion in Lujan v. G & G Fire Sprinklers, Inc. , 532 U.S. 189 (200 1) fu rther su ppo rts

our conclusi on that t

he Appellant s did not have a due process right to notice in this

case. In Lujan , a Ca lifornia agency , acting under state law, withh e ld pay ments to a

cons truction contrac tor becaus e the agenc y alle ge d that t

he contra ctor had vi olate d state minimum wag e l aws . 532 U.S. at 191. The contractor com plaine d that t he withholdi ng violated its due proc ess righ ts because the st ate di d not provi de notic e or time of the adoptions, but onlyan interest in a pote ntialclai m if cert ain condi tions were met at t

he time of Maria ’s death.13

a hearing be fore wi thho lding th e payments. The Court explai n ed that the state’s acti ons did not deprive the contrac t or of

any pro perty ove r wh ich it could exerci se p resent ownershi p dominion; the contractor s’ inter est was limi ted to a future claim for pay ment under

a contra ct with the st ate. Id. at 196. Therefore, the C ourt h eld tha t “if Calif ornia makes ordinary j udicial process

av a ilable to resp ond ent fo r resolv ing its contrac tual disput e, that proce s s is due process. ” Id. at 19 7. Applyi ng the Lujan holding to the

case at bar, it is cle ar that the Appellants’ potenti al clai m to Maria’s interest i n the Trust at the time of t

he adopti on was not based on present

ownership domini on. The poten tial claim to Maria’s share of the Trus t re m ain ed to be de ter m in ed by t h e trustees or th e M arylan d co urts. W e ho ld, theref ore, that the App ellants, as third parti es, had no due process ri ght to notice of the New Jerseyado ptio n proceedings. The Ap pellan ts’ ability to pu rsue th eir claim in the approp riate state court at the ti me of the Trus t dispo sition p rovid es all t he process t

hat is due them underth e Fou rteenth Amend men t of the United Sta tes C ons titutio n. The New Jersey Suprem e Cou rt has noted that Article 1, paragr aph 1 of the New Jersey

Constit ution enc ompasses the same due proc ess righ ts guarante ed under the Federal Constitution. Montville Tp. v. Block 69, Lot 10 , 376 A.2d 909, 917 (N.J. 1977). Although the New Jers ey Supreme Cou rt has inter

preted t he state consti tuti on in a few areas t o prov ide gre ater righ ts than the f ed eral c onsti tuti on, it

has never

a nnounced such a pos ition tha t wo uld encompass the due process rights to noti ce of t he adopt ion reques ted bythe Ap pella nts in this c ase

. See , e.g. , State v. John son , 346 A.2d 66 (N.J. 1975) (announcing state co nstitution al rights in the context of search an d seizure); Burlington County N.A.A.C. P. v. Twp. of Mount Laurel , 336 A.2d 713 (N.J . 1975) (announcing state co nstitution al rights in the context

of zoning) . T he re fo re , w e belie ve th at

th e Ne w Je rsey Suprem e Cou rt

wo uld reach the same conclus ion underthe New Jersey

Constit ution as we have

reac h ed under the f

ederal consti tuti onal analysi s. A cc or di ng ly, the District Cou rt’s dismis sal of t

he due proc ess cla im will be affirmed. 11

11 The Ad optee s raise tw o altern ate arg um ents to su ppo rt the ir po sition

. First, they assert that when M aria’s attorney i nformed the t

ruste es in 1990 of her intention to adopt her c ousins and sought an opi nion on whether t he adoption would e ntitle her a dopted children to inhe rit

from the Trust , she provided cons tructive noti ce to the beneficiaries satisfyi ng any due process requirements. Second, the Adoptees argue that lac hes bars t

his sui t, gi ven that the A ppella nts learn ed of the ad option in 1991 but waite d to chal lenge the ado ptio n un til afte r M aria’ s de ath. Bec ause we hold that the Ap pellan ts did not have a due pr ocess ri ght to notice of the adoption procee ding, we need not reach these issues.14 IV.
Beca use we hold that

the Dist rict Cou rt erred in its finding of no juri sdiction to hear the Appellants’ clai ms base d on state law g roun ds, w e w ill vac ate the dismis sal of tho se claim s. How ever, because the Appell ants se ek d ecl aratory judgmenton st at e l aw cl ai ms which seem to address t h e same state law iss ues
curren tly pending in s tate court, abstention

on these cl aims may be appropri ate under Brillhart

. This case wil l be reman ded to the Distric t Cou rt with d irection s to va cate its orders to dism iss, re view the st ate l aw claims, an d de te rmi ne wh e ther i n the exercise of its discr etion, it will abstain. In the even t that t he Distri ct Court doe s not abstai n, it shou ld decid e the g erma ne state law claim s. Fina lly , th e District Cou rt’s ordergranti ng d ef enda nts’ m otion to dismiss the Appellant s’ due proc ess cla im is herebyaffirmed. Each sid e to be ar its own costs.