alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
**EXHIBIT 31.1**
**Rule 13a-14(a) CERTIFICATION**
I, Donald L. Denney, certify that:
 1.  I have reviewed this quarterly report on Form 10-Q of Monarch Community Bancorp, Inc.;  2.  Based on my knowledge, this report does not contain any untrue statement of a materialfact or omit to state a material fact necessary to make the statements made, in light ofthe circumstances under which such statements were made, not misleading with respect to theperiod covered by this report;  3.  Based on my knowledge, the financial statements, and other financial informationincluded in this report, fairly present in all material respects the financial condition,results of operations and cash flows of the registrant as of, and for, the periodspresented in this report;  4.  The registrant’s other certifying officers and I are responsible for establishing andmaintaining disclosure controls and procedures (as defined in Exchange Act Rules 13a-15(e)and 15d-15(e)) for the registrant and have;
 a.  Designed such disclosure controls and procedures, or caused suchdisclosure controls and procedures to be designed under our supervision, to ensurethat material information relating to the registrant, including its consolidatedsubsidiaries, is made known to us by others within those entities, particularlyduring the period in which this report is being prepared;  b.  Evaluated the effectiveness of the registrant’s disclosure controls andprocedures and presented in this report our conclusions about the effectiveness ofthe disclosure controls and procedures as of the end of the period covered by thisreport based on such evaluations; and  c.  Disclosed in this report any change in the registrant’s internal controlover financial reporting that occurred during the registrant’s most recent fiscalquarter that has materially affected, or is reasonably likely to materially affect,the registrant’s internal control over financial reporting.
 5.  The registrant’s other certifying officers and I have disclosed, based on our mostrecent evaluation of internal control over financial reporting, to the registrant’sauditors and the audit committee of registrant’s board of directors (or persons performingthe equivalent functions):
 a.  All significant deficiencies and material weaknesses in the design oroperation of internal controls over financial reporting which are reasonably likelyto adversely affect the registrant’s ability to record, process, summarize andreport financial information; and  b.  Any fraud, whether or not material, that involves management or otheremployees who have a significant role in the registrant’s internal control overfinancial reporting.    Date:July 13, 2005 By: /s/ Donald L. Denney       Donald L. Denney   President and Chief Executive Officer
I 

109TH CONGRESS 

2D SESSION H. R. 5589 

To direct the Secretary of Homeland Security to transfer to United States 

Immigration and Customs Enforcement all functions of the Customs 

Patrol Officers unit operating on the Tohono O’odham Indian reservation. 

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

JUNE 12, 2006 

Mr. SOUDER (for himself, Mr. SHADEGG, and Mr. KING of Iowa) introduced 

the following bill; which was referred to the Committee on Homeland Security 

A BILL 

To direct the Secretary of Homeland Security to transfer 

to United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement 

all functions of the Customs Patrol Officers unit operating on the Tohono O’odham Indian reservation. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 

3 SECTION 1. SHADOW WOLVES TRANSFER. 

4 (a) TRANSFER OF EXISTING UNIT.—Not later that 

5 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the 

6 Secretary of Homeland Security shall transfer to United 

7 States Immigration and Customs Enforcement all func8 tions (including the personnel, assets, and liabilities attribVerDate Aug 31 2005 22:06 Jun 13, 2006 Jkt 049200 PO 00000 Frm 00001 Fmt 6652 Sfmt 6201 E:\BILLS\H5589.IH H5589

jlentini on PROD1PC65 with BILLS
2 

•HR 5589 IH

1 utable to such functions) of the Customs Patrol Officers 

2 unit operating on the Tohono O’odham Indian reservation 

3 (commonly known as the ‘‘Shadow Wolves’’ unit). 

4 (b) ESTABLISHMENT OF NEW UNITS.—The Sec5 retary is authorized to establish within United States Im6 migration and Customs Enforcement additional units of 

7 Customs Patrol Officers in accordance with this section, 

8 as appropriate. 

9 (c) DUTIES.—The Customs Patrol Officer unit trans10 ferred pursuant to subsection (a), and additional units es11 tablished pursuant to subsection (b), shall operate on In12 dian lands by preventing the entry of terrorists, other un13 lawful aliens, instruments of terrorism, narcotics, and 

14 other contraband into the United States. 

15 (d) BASIC PAY FOR JOURNEYMAN OFFICERS.—A 

16 Customs Patrol Officer in a unit described in this section 

17 shall receive equivalent pay as a special agent with similar 

18 competencies within United States Immigration and Cus19 toms Enforcement pursuant to the Department of Home20 land Security’s Human Resources Management System 

21 established under section 841 of the Homeland Security 

22 Act (6 U.S.C. 411). 

23 (e) SUPERVISORS.—Each unit described in this sec24 tion shall be supervised by a Chief Customs Patrol Officer, 

25 who shall have the same rank as a resident agent-inVerDate Aug 31 2005 22:06 Jun 13, 2006 Jkt 049200 PO 00000 Frm 00002 Fmt 6652 Sfmt 6201 E:\BILLS\H5589.IH H5589

jlentini on PROD1PC65 with BILLS
3 

•HR 5589 IH

1 charge of the Office of Investigations within United States 

2 Immigration and Customs Enforcement. 

Æ 


jlentini on PROD1PC65 with BILLS
Terrell E. REYNOLDS, Appellant, v. STATE of Missouri, Respondent.

WD 81074

Missouri Court of Appeals, Western District.

ORDER FILED: OCTOBER 23, 2018

Lisa M. Stroup, Saint Louis, MO, Counsel for Appellant.

Gregory L. Barnes, Jefferson City, MO, Counsel for Respondent.

Before Division Three: Anthony Rex Gabbert, Presiding Judge, Victor C. Howard, Judge, Alok Ahuja, Judge

**ORDER**

Per Curiam:

Terrell Reynolds appeals the circuit court's denial of his Rule 29.15 motion for post-conviction relief after an evidentiary hearing. We affirm. Rule 84.16(b).
#### Mary Agnes DISMUKE, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. ARKANSAS-BEST FREIGHT SYSTEMS, INC., Defendant-Appellee.

No. 16030.

United States Court of Appeals Sixth Circuit.

May 25, 1965.

Charles G. Black, Memphis, Tenn., (Charles C. Burch, Memphis, Tenn., on the brief), for appellant.

Robert M. Burton, Memphis Tenn., (Leo Bearman, Memphis, Tenn., on the brief), for appellee.

Before MILLER and EDWARDS, Circuit Judges, and MACHROWICZ, District Judge.

PER CURIAM.

This appeal is taken from a judgment for defendant entered by a United States District Judge. Jurisdiction is founded on diversity of citizenship.

Plaintiff-appellant is the widow of an employee of defendant (William Dismuke) who was murdered by a fellow employee (Joe Rose). She sought death benefits under the Workmen’s Compensation Act of Tennessee, T.C.A. §§ 50-901 et seq., alleging that the death of her husband arose out of and in the course of his employment.

The murder is undisputed, as is the fact that it occurred on defendant’s premises during working hours. It is also undisputed that it followed an episode where Rose had attempted an affair at a motel with a married woman, had nearly been caught by her irate husband, and had discovered (or thought he had) that Dismuke had tried to frame him.

Plaintiff-appellant’s testimony tended to show that antagonism related to their job relationship had built up during the preceding year between Dismuke and Rose, and that the motel episode was merely a culminating spark. Defendantappellee’s testimony tended to establish that the men were on a friendly basis prior to the motel episode.

After testimonial hearing Judge Marion Boyd entered detailed findings of fact which described the motel episode. The last such finding was: “The violent emotion of Joe Rose, which erupted on May 15, 1961, had its inception in the belief that Dismuke had framed him in the illicit love affair aforesaid.”

Judge Boyd then entered conclusions of law, including the following:

> “The death of William Dismuke was the result of an assault by a co-employee. The assault was preceded by an emotional outburst which was triggered by the realization or belief by Rose, the assailant, that Dismuke had framed him in an alleged illicit love affair. Since the origin of the injury lay in heated emotions aroused over the aforementioned love affair, the assault was of a purely personal nature and therefore. non-compensable, there being no causal connection between any duty of employment and the assault. Me*146Connell v. Lancaster Bros., 42 S.W.2d 206, 163 Tenn. 194 (1931).”

Our review of this record indicates that while there was testimony to support plaintiff-appellant’s theory of the case, there was also substantial evidence to support the findings of fact of Judge Boyd. Drinnon v. Pope, 202 Tenn. 684, 308 S.W.2d 424 (1957).

We certainly cannot say that his findings were “clearly erroneous.” Rule 52 (a) Fed.R.Civ.P.; Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Duberstein, 363 U.S. 278, 80 S.Ct. 1190, 4 L.Ed.2d 1218 (1960).

Affirmed.
8/26/2015

LEIJA-BALDERAS, OSVALDO Tr. Ct.No. F13-32837-W

On this day, the Appellant's Pro Se petition for discretionary review has been

refused.

Abel Acosta, Clerk

OFFICIAL NOTICE FROM COURT OFCRIMINAL APPEALS OFTEXAS

OFF

STATE

PENALTY FOR • go i&& PRIVATE USE *' S» [^

<fi s

rt

P

f-43B 7973

OSVALDO LEIJA-BALDERAS

TDC# 1920722

$ 000.275

^OA°^1o4.Wl^0P0n6l^1R

PD-0428-15
* Pursuant to 5th C I R

. R. 47.5, the court has determined that

this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except

under the limited circumstances set forth in 5th C IR

. R. 47.5.4.

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 96-40979

Summary Calendar

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Plaintiff-Appellee,

versus

FERNANDO TREVINO-RODRIGUEZ,

Defendant-Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the

Southern District of Texas

(M-95-CR-228-1)

August 1, 1997

Before JOHNSON, WIENER, and DENNIS, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: *

Fernando Trevino-Rodriguez appeals his sentence following his

convictions for conspiracy to possess with the intent to distribute

and possession with the intent to distribute more than 50 kilograms

of marijuana. He argues that the district court erred in assessing

a two-level en hancement pursuant to United States Sentencing

Guidelines section 3B1.1(c). Specifically, Trevino-Rodriguez claims

that the district court improperly determined that he played a1 The sentencing range for Trevino-Rodriguez without the

section 3B1.1 enhancement is 57 to 71 months. While the present

sentence of 70 mon ths falls within this range, it was the lowest

possible term in the range (70-87 months) for the base offense

level of 26 applied at the district court level. This indicates

the district court’s intent to impose the least harsh sentence

available. Furthermore, the record is devoid of evidence that the

district court would have imposed the same sentence absent the

error. S ee United States v. Williams

, 503 U.S. 193, 203-04 (1992).

Thus, we will remand the case for resentencing rather than affirm

for harmless error. S ee

, e.g.

, U nited States v. Tello

, 9 F.3d

1119, 1130-31 (5th Cir. 1993).

2 leadership role in the offense.

A district court’s finding tha t a defendant is a leader

pursuant to United States Sentencing Guidelines section 3B1.1 is a

fact finding that is reviewed for clear error. See United States

v. Valencia

, 44 F.3d 269, 272 (5th Cir. 1995). After thoroughly

reviewing the record in the present case, we determine that

insufficient evidence exists indicating that Trevino-Rodriguez was

a “leader” for purposes of enhancement under section 3B1.1(c). S ee

United States v. Jobe

, 101 F.3d 1046, 1065 (5th Cir. 1996),

petition for cert. filed

, (U.S. June 25, 1997); United States v.

Ronning

, 47 F.3d 710, 711-13 (5th Cir. 1995). Therefore, the

sentence imposed by the district court was clearly erroneous and is

VACATED. The case is REMANDED 1 to the district court for

resentencing.

VACATED AND REMANDED.
[DO NOT PUBLISH]

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

________________________

No. 14-15040

Non-Argument Calendar

________________________

D.C. Docket No. 5:14-cr-00117-LSC-SGC-2

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

 Plaintiff-Appellee,

 versus

MATTHEW DAVID AYERS, 

 Defendant-Appellant.

________________________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of Alabama

________________________

(September 3, 2015)

Before ED CARNES, Chief Judge, JULIE CARNES and FAY Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: 

Case: 14-15040 Date Filed: 09/03/2015 Page: 1 of 2 
2

W. Scott Brower, appointed counsel for Matthew David Ayers in this direct 

criminal appeal, has moved to withdraw from further representation of the 

appellant and filed a brief pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 87 S.Ct. 

1396, 18 L.Ed.2d 493 (1967). Our independent review of the entire record reveals 

that counsel’s assessment of the relative merit of the appeal is correct. Because 

independent examination of the entire record reveals no arguable issues of merit, 

counsel’s motion to withdraw is GRANTED, and Ayers’s convictions and total 

sentence are AFFIRMED.

Case: 14-15040 Date Filed: 09/03/2015 Page: 2 of 2
Gary L. SCHELLERT and Joan C. Schellert, Respondents, v. Robert F. LEPPING and Judith K. Lepping, Trustees of the Lepping Family Trust, Dated 9/6/12, and Robert F. Lepping and Judith K. Lepping, Individually, Appellants.

No. ED 106430

Missouri Court of Appeals, Eastern District, NORTHERN DIVISION.

Filed: December 11, 2018

FOR APPELLANT: Jerome Wallach, 6614 Clayton Road, #375, St. Louis, MO 63117.

FOR RESPONDENT: Jesse A. Granneman, 20 Manor Drive, Troy, MO 63379.

Before Lisa P. Page, C.J., Lawrence E. Mooney, J., and Robert M. Clayton III, J.

*ORDER*

PER CURIAM.

*180Robert F. Lepping and Judith K. Lepping, as trustees of the Lepping Family Trust dated September 6, 2012, and Robert F. Lepping and Judith K. Lepping, individually, appeal the judgment entered after a bench trial in favor of Gary L. Schellert and Joan C. Schellert ("Plaintiffs") as to Plaintiffs' claim for a partition of three properties jointly owned by the parties. We find no error has occurred.

No jurisprudential purpose would be served by a written opinion. We have, however, provided the parties a memorandum setting forth the reasons for our decision. The judgment of the trial court is affirmed under Rule 84.16(b).
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5

<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   12-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-2000
<PERIOD-END>                               DEC-31-2000
<CASH>                                         252,876
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                  605,680
<ALLOWANCES>                                  (41,660)
<INVENTORY>                                  6,921,014
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                             7,902,815
<PP&E>                                       9,799,975
<DEPRECIATION>                             (3,810,806)
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                              15,797,872
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                      (8,803,210)
<BONDS>                                              0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                     6,817,613
<OTHER-SE>                                     177,049
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                15,797,872
<SALES>                                      6,716,857
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                             6,716,857
<CGS>                                        3,532,401
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                3,532,401
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                             2,775,782
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                             547,216
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                 34,657
<INCOME-TAX>                                    19,595
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                             15,062
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                    15,062
<EPS-BASIC>                                        .00
<EPS-DILUTED>                                      .00


</TABLE>
Michael D. BIRMINGHAM, Appellant, v. STATE of Missouri, Respondent.

WD 81129

Missouri Court of Appeals, Western District.

Order filed: October 23, 2018

Annette M. Wallace, for Appellant

Evan J. Buchheim, Jefferson City, for Respondent

Before Division Four: Karen King Mitchell, Chief Judge, Victor C. Howard, Judge and George E. Wolf, III, Special Judge

***ORDER***

PER CURIAM:

Michael Birmingham appeals from the judgment denying his Rule 24.035 motion for post-conviction relief without an evidentiary hearing after pleading guilty to two counts of money laundering and one count of failure to file a tax return. He contends that the motion court clearly erred in denying the post-conviction motion because the factual basis for his pleas to both offenses was insufficient and plea counsel was ineffective for failing to advise that his alleged acts did not constitute the crime of money laundering. Because a published opinion would have no precedential value, a memorandum has been provided to the parties. The judgment is affirmed. Rule 84.16(b).
#### H. C. White *v.*W. E. Morton, *Sheriff, etc.*

(No. 7689)

Submitted September 6, 1933.

Decided September 12, 1933.

(Rehearing denied December 11, 1933.)

*30
      *Emmett Koran, B. J. Pettigrew*and *Wolverton & Ayres,*for relator.

*G. Dana Harold,*Prosecuting Attorney, and *A. N. Breck-inridge,*and *Homer A. Holt,*Attorney General, for Intervener Fred L. Fox, State Tax Commissioner.

Hatoher, Judge:

In payment of state, county and district taxes for the year 1932, the petitioner presented to the sheriff of Nicholas County orders for that year drawn on the general county fund. That fund was greatly overdrawn at the time of the offer. The sheriff refused to accept the orders in full, but proposed to accept so much thereof as would be properly accredited to the general county fund. The proposal ivas rejected and petitioner seeks in this proceeding a mandamus to require the sheriff to accept his drafts in payment in full of his entire taxes.

The petitioner relies on Code 1931, 7-5-10, as applied in the cases of *State v. Melton,*62 W. Va. 253, 57 S. E. 729, and *State v. Davis,*74 W. Va. 261, 82 S. E. 207. The basic part of the above statute was adopted from the Virginia Code of 1860 and appears in the West Virginia Code of 1868, chapter 41, section 16. The statute in its present form requires a tax collector to receive in payment of taxes “any county or school order or draft drawn on him pursuant to law, which is then due and payable, if the person offering the same in payment be the person entitled thereto at the time it is offered. ’ ’ The *Melton*case was decided in 1907 and the *Davis*case in 1914; *31and both upheld the statute literally. Since those decisions, another statute has been enacted, to-wit, section 12, article 8, chapter 11, of the Official Code of 1931, which modifies the effect of those decisions. The later statute reads as follows: ‘‘ Any funds derived from levying of taxes under or pursuant to the provisions of this article shall be expended for the purposes for which levied and no other.” The obvious purpose of the statute is to prevent the raiding of one fund for the benefit of another. Unpaid taxes are not “funds derived” under a strict definition of the phrase, but they are potential funds. If a draft on an overdrawn fund is accepted in payment in full of unpaid taxes, the other funds embraced in the taxes are raided to that extent. The taxes in question were levied for the benefit of the county road fund, the school fund, the state fund and other special funds as well as for the general county fund. The acceptance of drafts on the general county fund in full of the taxes would deplete the other funds of the several sums which they would receive if the taxes were paid in cash. Thus indirectly would be done what the statute forbids to be done directly.

Construing the two statutes together as we must, we hold that when a taxpayer presents to the sheriff in payment of his taxes an order on a fund which is overdrawn, the taxpayer shall receive credit thereon for only so much of his taxes as is properly allocated to that fund.

The peremptory writ is accordingly refused.

*Writ refused.*
Wilma PENNINGTON-THURMAN, Appellant, v. BANK OF AMERICA, N.A., Respondent.

No. ED 105981

Missouri Court of Appeals, Eastern District, Division Three.

Filed: May 22, 2018 Motion for Rehearing and/or Transfer to Supreme Court Denied June 27, 2018 Application for Transfer Denied September 25, 2018

FOR APPELLANT: Wilma Pennington-Thurman, Acting Pro Se, P.O. Box 771201, St. Louis, MO 63177.

FOR RESPONDENT: Brian C. Walsh, Tiffani L. Lightle, One Metropolitan Square, 211 North Broadway, Ste. 3600, St. Louis, MO 63102.

Before Gary M. Gaertner, Jr., P.J., Robert M. Clayton III, J., and Angela T. Quigless, J.

*ORDER*

PER CURIAM.

*69Wilma Pennington-Thurman ("Appellant"), acting pro se, appeals the judgment denying her motion to reopen two actions for fraud and wrongful foreclosure, both of which were finally decided in 2010. We find no error has occurred.

No jurisprudential purpose would be served by a written opinion. We have, however, provided the parties a memorandum setting forth the reasons for our decision. The judgment of the trial court is affirmed under Rule 84.16(b).
_______________________________________ __ Michigan Supreme Court 

# Order

Lansing, Michigan



### October 29, 2007 Clifford W. Taylor, Chief Justice


### 134638 Michael F. Cavanagh Elizabeth A. Weaver Marilyn Kelly Maura D. Corrigan 

### PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN, Plaintiff-Appellee, Robert P. Young, Jr. Stephen J. Markman, Justices



### v SC: 134638 COA: 267566 Muskegon CC: 05-051640-FC JALVELYN MICHAEL LEE, Defendant-Appellant.

________________ _______________ __________/

On order of the Court, the application for leave to appeal the June 19, 2007 judgment of the Court of Appeals is consid ered, and it is DENIED, because we are not persuaded that the questions presented s hould be reviewed by this Court.

p1022 I, Corbin R. Davis, Clerk of the Mi chigan Supreme Cour t, certify that the foregoing is a true and complete copy of the order entered at the direction of the Court.

October 29, 2007

Clerk
P.1 

OAR Box 1830 

Prepped by Ollie Stewart 

Document Number: 

130) IV-C-96 

Docket Number: 

A-87-11 

Printed 11/13/2008 7:20:58 AM Sheet 130 of 232 
E i 

ft 

mttm 

»r» ?«erf« Parter 

Aesociato fcdninietrator for fnforooMnt 

Hationar «i*h*ay Traffic Safety Ada*niatration 

40* Savant* Street, SV 

Washington, DC 20599 

Deer Hr* Parkers 

On January 22 1988 I wrote ta yoa reqoeetina inforaation 

on tha classification of the) 30 recalla which PTHTSA han 

identified aa relevant to onboard contrda. Specifically, X 

reqoeeted your division of tht recalla anong tho following 

thraa broad categorieet 

(1) Tboee recalla uniquely associated vith evaporative 

control eye tent components. 

(2) Those recalla involving other fuol ayatam conponentn 

vhich yon believe say ho affected hy onboard control 

hardware* 

f-3) Thooo recalla related to fool quality (o«g«, 

volatility) or other fact eystea problems. 

Tn oy original letter I indicated that thia information 

v*s important to ua in understanding your approach to th*5« 

recalls, hovever, T have not yet received a reply to thia 

regaeet. ?hank you in advance for your help in thia matter. 

Sincerely youra. 

Cheater J* France, Chief 

Standards Developaent and Support Branch 
t lUvu l V i-W 

ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION 

AOFNCY 

APR I 2 B p 

CENTRAL DOCKET