FILED U.S. COURT OF AP P E A LS E LE V EN T HC IRC U IT JULY 11, 2008 THOMAS K. KAH

N CLERK [ DO NO T P UB L I S H] I N THE UN I TE D STATE S C OU RT OF APPE ALS F O R T H E E L E V E N T H C IR C U IT

________________________ N o. 07- 13818

________________________ D. C. Do c k e tNo . 0 4 - 2 0 0 3 7 - CV- J LK E U T I Q U I O E L O Y , P la in tif f - A p p e lla n t, v ersu s O F F I C E R G U I L L O T , D e f e n d a n t- A p p e lle e , M A Y O R O F M I A M I - D A D E C O U N T Y , C H I E F O F P O L I C E , D e f e n d a n ts .

________________________ A pp ea l fr om the U ni t ed S t at es D i stri ctC ou rt f orthe S outhe r n D i s tr i c tof F l or i da

_________________________ ( Ju l y 11, 2008)Honora ble Eug ene E . Siler, Jr., United States Circuit Judg e for the Six th Circuit, sitting * by designation. 2 B efo re A N D E R S O N , H U L L an d S IL E R , C i rcu i tJu d g es. * H U L L , C i rc ui tJudg e: In thi s 42 U . S . C . § 1 98 3 act i on , P l ai nt i ff -A pp el l antE ut i qu i o E l oy al l eges thatD ef endant -A pp el l ee O ff

i ce r J ea n P aul G ui l l otfabri ca t ed evi dence and pl ant ed c r a c k c oc a i ne i n or de rt o a r r e s thi m on publ i c dr i nki ng, di s or de r l y i nt oxi c a t i on, r e s is tin g a r r e s t, a n d c o c a in e c h a r g e s , a n d s u e s f o rf a ls e a r r e s t, f

a ls e im p r is o n m e n t, a n d m a lic io u s p r o s e c u tio n . T h e d is tr ic t c o u r t g r a n te d s u m m a r y ju d g m e n t to G ui l l otbase d o n q ual i fi ed i m m un i ty. A ft erre vi ew and o ra l ar gu m ent , w e a ff i rm th e d is tr ic t c o u r t’s o r d e rin p a r t a n d r e v e r s e in p a r t. I . B AC KG RO UN D I n M a y 2001, E l oy w a s a r r e s t e d f ora tt e m pt e d m ur de rbutr e l e a s e d on pretri al bo nd . T hi s c as e i nv ol ves E l oy’ s s ub se qu entarre st s on u nrel at ed charges w hi l e he w a s outon bond. W e r e f e r e nc e the a tt e m pt e d m ur de rc ha r ge a tdi f f e r e nt p o in ts b e c a u s e it im p a c ts E lo y ’s c la im s f o rd a m a g e s . A . F ab ri cate d A rr es ts O n F ebruary8, 20 02 , D ef endantG ui l l ot , a M i am i po l i ce offi ce r, arre st ed P l ai n t i ff E l o y fo r p u b l i c d ri n k i n g , d i so rd erl y i n t o x i cat i o n , an d resi st i n g arrest w i thoutvi ol e nc e . G ui l l ot ’ s a r r e s ta f f i da vi ta l l e ge d tha t : ( 1) G ui l l otobs e r ve d E l oy“ Ev e n th ough th e‘f a c ts, ’ a s a c c epte d at th esumma ry judgment s tag eof

theproc e e ding s, 1 may no t bethe‘ac tual’ fac ts o f t hec a se , o ur

analysis fo r pur

po se s o f s umm ary

judgment m

us t beg in with a description of the fac ts in the light most favora ble to the plaintiff.” D avis v. Wil liams, 451 F.3d 759, 763 (11th Cir. 2006) (quotation marks and citations omitted). 3 dr i nki ng f

r om a c a n of

be e r ; ( 2) E l oy ’ s br e a th ha d “ a s tr ong odorof a l c ohol ” ; a nd ( 3 ) w h e n G u illo t p la c e d E lo y in c u s to d y , E lo y “b e g a n to r e s is t a n d to y e ll profani t i es . ” H o w e v e r , E lo y w a s n o t d r in k in g th a t d a y , a n d d id n o t c u r s e o rs tru g g le w ith G ui l l ot . W hen E l oy as ked G ui l l otw hy he w as bei ng arre st ed, G ui l l otre spon ded

1 w i th a c rude phr a s e of

S pa ni s h s l a ng tha tl oos e l y tr a ns l a t e s t o “ be c a us e I f e l tl i ke it.” G u illo t a ls o s a id h e a r r e s te d E lo y “b e c au s e [ G u illo t’s ] s u p e r v is o rs a id s o .” G ui l l otha ndc uf

f e d E l oy , f

r i s ke d hi m , a nd puthi m i n the ba c ks e a tof G ui l l ot ’ s pol i ce ca r. O n the w ay t o the po l i ce st at i on , G ui l l otst op ped atan i nt er se ct i on and E l oy began t o yel l ou tthe w i nd ow t o p as se rs by thathe w as a r r e s te d f

o rn o r e a s o n . G u illo t r e m o v e d E lo y f r o m th e c a ra n d h a d h im s ta n d w ith hi s ba c k t o the c a r . A f e w m i nut e s l a t e r , G ui l l otbr oughtE l oy ba c k a nd ope ne d the door . I ns i de the c a rw a s a c l e a rpl a s t i c ba g c ont a i ni ng c r a c k c oc a i ne . G ui l l ot pe r f or m e d a f

i e l d t e s t , w hi c h w a s pos i t i ve f orc oc a i ne . G ui l l otthe n putE l oy i n a di f f e r e ntpol i c e c a rt o be t a ke n t o the pol i c e s t a t i on. G ui l l otpr e pa r e d a nothe ra r r e s ta f f i da vi ttha tc ha r ge d E l oy w i th pos s e s s i on of cocai ne and p osse ss i on of cocai ne w i th i nt entt o sel l . G ui l l ot ’ s a ff i davi taverre dEloy ’s brief s do not identify

the ar raignment date on the misdeme anor charg es, and the 2 rec ord contains conflictingevidenc e as to the a rraignment date. TheWaiver of Ar raignment form indicate s that arraignment occur red on Ma

rch 25, 2002, thesame date that the misdemeanor charg es were dropped. However, theprosecutor in Eloy ’s attempted murder and cocaine possession case s testified that Eloy was a rraigne d on the misdemeanor charg es on Februar y 12, 2002. For

purposes of this opinion, we ne ed not re solve this factual dispute.

4 thatE l oy had t osse d the bag o f c ocai ne on t o the fl oo rboard w hen G ui l l otop ened the ba c k doorof

the c a r . B utE l oy di d notpos s e s s a ny c oc a i ne , a nd the c oc a i ne w a s n o t in th e c a ru n til G u illo t b r o u g h t h im b a c k to th e c a r . B. Bo nd R e v o c a t i o n a nd Pr o s e c ut i o ns A s a r e s ul tof

the F e brua r y 8, 2002 f

a br i c a t e d a r r e s t s , E l oy ’ s pr e tr i a l bond w as re vo ked i n the att em pt ed m urder ca se on F ebruary11 , 20 02 . E l oy w as a r r a i gne d on the m i s de m e a norc ha r ge s of publ i c dr i nki ng, di s or de r l y i nt oxi c a t i on, and res i st i ng arre stw i tho utvi ol ence . T ho se char ges w er e nol l e pross ed on M ar ch 25 , 20 02 . O n M ar ch 1, 20 02 , E l oy w as arra i gn ed on the tw o fel on y c ocai ne-

2 r e la te d c h a r g e s a r is in g f r o m th e F e b ru a r y 8 , 2 0 0 2 a r r e s ts . E l oy di d n otpo stbo nd for hi s F ebruary8, 20 02 arre st s. F rom hi s F ebruary 11, 2002 bond r e voc a t i on unt i l J une 13, 2002, E l oy r e m a i ne d i nc a r c e r a t e d, a w a itin g a tr ia l o n th e a tte m p te d m u r d e rc h a r g e . O n J u n e 1 3 , 2 0 0 2 , th e ju r y c o n v ic te d E lo y in th e a tte m p te d m u r d e rc a s e . T he s t a t e c our ts e nt e nc e d E l oy t o tw e nty - f i ve y e a r s i n pr i s on, w i th c r e di tf orthe t i m e he s e r ve d i n pr i s on f r om F e brua r y 11, 2002 ( the bond r e voc a t i on) t o J une 13,It is undisput ed that Eloy was de tained upon his arrests of F ebrua ry 8, 2002. Moreover, 3 El oy ’s§ 1 98 3 f

alseimp ri so nment c laim a ri se s mere ly

from “ [a] d e tenti on

on theba sis of

a false arrest.” Or

teg a v. Christian, 85 F.3d 1521, 1526 ( 11th Cir. 1996). Under thefac ts of this case, there fore , Eloy ’s false imprisonment claim is functionally indisti nct from his false arrest claim. F or sim pli c ity, o ur

dis c us sio n w illsu

bs umeEl oy ’sfalseimp ri so nment c laim w ith in his f alse arrest claim, and refer only to the latter. 5 2 0 0 2 ( th e d a te o f

c o n v ic tio n ) . H e is c u r r e n tly s e r v in g th a t s e n te n c e . O n January 29 , 20 03 , prosec ut ors nol l e pross ed the tw o cocai ne-r el at ed c h a r g e s . C . S e c t i on 1983 A c t i on I n 2004, E l oy f

i l e d a § 1983 c om pl a i nta ga i ns tG ui l l ot . E l oy ’ s c om pl a i nt al l eged thatG ui l l otpl ant ed the cocai ne and l i ed i n h i s a rr es taf fi davi t s, and sued f orf a l s e a r r e s t , f

a l s e i m pr i s onm e nt , a nd m a l i c i ous pr os e c ut i on i n vi ol a t i on of E l oy’ s c on st i tut i on al ri gh t s. G ui l l otm ov ed for s um m ary j ud gm ent , as se rt i ng that 3 qua l i f i e d i m m uni ty ba r r e d E l oy ’ s c l a i m s . T he di s tr i c tc our tde ni e d the m ot i on, a nd G ui l l otf i l e d a n i nt e r l oc ut or y appe a l , w hi c h thi s C our tdi s m i s s e d. S e e E l oy v. G ui l l ot , N o. 05 -155 06 , sl i p o p. at5 (11 th C i r. A ug . 18 , 20 06 ). T hi s C ou rt c onc l ude d tha tthe di s tr i c tc our t ’ s or de rde ni e d s um m a r y j udgm e ntbe c a us e the c a s e r e q u ir e d m o r e f

a c tu a l d e v e lo p m e n t a n d th u s w a s n o t a n ap p e a lab le f in a l o r d e r . I d . a t 4 - 5 . O n rem an d , th e p art i es en g ag ed i n m o re d i sco v ery, an d G u i l l o tren ew ed h i s“We review de novo thedistrict court’s disposition of a summary judgment motion 4 based on qualified immunity , resolvingall issues of material fac t in favor of Plaintiff[ ] and then answeringthe leg al question of whether De fenda nt[ ] [ is] entitled to qualified immunity under that version of thefac ts.” West v. Till man, 496 F.3d 1321, 1326 ( 11th Cir. 2007). 6 m ot i on f ors um m a r y j udgm e nt , w hi c h the di s tr i c tc our tgr a nt e d. E l oy appe a l e d. 4 I I . DI S CUS S I ON A . Q u al i fi ed Im m u n i ty “Q u a lif ie d im m u n ity o f

f e r s c o m p le te p r o te c tio n f o rg o v e r n m e n t o f

f ic ia ls s u e d in th e irin d iv id u a l c ap a c itie s if th e irc o n d u c t d o e s n o t v io la te c le a r ly e s tab lis h e d s ta tu to r y o rc o n s titu tio n a l r ig h ts o f w h ic h a r e a s o n a b le p e r s o n w o u ld ha ve know n. ” V i ny a r d v. W i l s on, 311 F . 3d 1340, 1346 ( 11th C i r . 2002) ( quot a t i on m ark s o m i tt ed ). A g o v ern m en to ffi ci al cl ai m i n g q u al i fi ed i m m u n i ty m u stfi rst es t abl i sh thathe w as ac t i ng w i thi n h i s di sc re t i on ary autho ri ty. C ot t on e v. Je nn e, 326 F . 3d 1352, 1357 ( 11th C i r . 2003) . I f s o, the pl a i nt i f

f be a r s the bur de n of sh o w i n g th atq u al i fi ed i m m u n i ty i s i n ap p ro p ri at e. Id . at1 3 5 8 . A tw o -p artt est e n s u e s : F ir s t, th e c o u r t m u s t d e te r m in e “w h e th e r[ th e ] p la in tif f’s a lle g a tio n s , if tru e , e s tab lis h a c o n s titu tio n a l v io la tio n .” V in y a r d , 3 1 1 F .3 d a t 1 3 4 6 ( a lte r a tio n in or i gi na l ) ( quot a t i on m a r ks om i tt e d) . S e c ond, i f unde rthe pl a i nt i f

f’ s ve r s i on of

the f a c t s a c ons t i tut i ona l vi ol a t i on di d oc c ur , “ the ne xt. . . s t e p i s t o a s k w he the rthe r ig h t w a s c le a r ly e s tab lis h e d .” I d . ( q u o ta tio n m a r k s o m itte d ) . I t is u n d is p u te d th a t G u illo t w a s a c tin g w ith in h is d is c r e tio n a r y a u th o r ityTo overc ome a policeofficer’s qualified immunity , the standard is whether a rguable, not 5 actual, probable c ause e x isted based on the inf ormation known to the def endant of ficer at the 7 w he n he a r r e s t e d E l oy . H e nc e , w e e xa m i ne w he the rE l oy ha s e s t a bl i s he d a v io la tio n o f

h is c o n s titu tio n a l r ig h ts a n d , if s o , w h e th e rth e la w w a s c le a r ly e s tab lis h e d . B . F a l s e Ar r e s t Cl a i m

“ A w a r r a nt l e s s a r r e s tw i thoutpr oba bl e c a us e vi ol a t e s the C ons t i tut i on a nd pr ovi de s a ba s i s f

ora s e c t i on 1983 c l a i m . ” K i ngs l a nd v. C i ty of M i a m i , 382 F . 3d 1220, 1226 ( 11th C i r . 2004) ( c i t i ng M a r x v. G um bi nne r , 905 F . 2d 1503, 1505 ( 11th C i r . 1990) ) . M or e s pe c i f i c a l l y , a n a r r e s tm a de w i thoutpr oba bl e c a us e runs a f oul of the F our th A m e ndm e nt ’ s pr ohi bi t i on of unr e a s ona bl e s e a r c he s a nd s e iz u r e s . S k o p v . C ity o f A tla n ta , 4 8 5 F .3 d 1 1 3 0 , 1 1 4 3 ( 1 1 th C ir . 2 0 0 7 ) . I t is u n d is p u te d th a t o n F e b ru a r y 8 , 2 0 0 2 , G u illo t a r r e s te d E lo y w ith o u t a w a r r a nt . M or e ove r , unde rE l oy ’ s ve r s i on of the f a c t s , he di d nothi ng t o gi ve G u illo t p r o b a b le c a u s e to a r r e s t h im . E lo y w a s n o t d r in k in g , d id n o t r e s is t h is a r r e s t, a n d d id n o t p o s s e s s a n y c r a c k c o c a in e . I n s te a d , G u illo t in te n tio n a lly lie d in the a r r e s ta f

f i da vi t s a nd f

a br i c a t e d e vi de nc e be c a us e G ui l l ota nd/ orhi s s upe r vi s or w a n te d to a r r e s t E lo y , w h o h a d m a d e b o n d o n h is a tte m p te d m u r d e rc h a r g e . T he r e f or e , E l oy ’ s ve r s i on of

the f a c t s e s t a bl i s he s a w a r r a nt l e s s a r r e s tw i thout pr oba bl e c a us e a nd thus a F our th A m e ndm e ntvi ol a t i on. 5tim e . Jon e s v . Ca nn on , 1 74 F .3 d 1 27 1, 12 83 &nn .3 -4(1 1th Cir . 1 99 9) . Theargua

bleprob a ble causestandard a

pplies in the “cle arly

established law”prongof the qualified immunity analysis. See Draper

v. Rey nolds, 369 F.3d 1270, 1276 n.7 (11th Cir. 2004) (“ Given our c onclusion that Rey nolds had ac tual probablecauseand no constitutional violation occurred, weneed not a dd re ss t heargua bleprob a blec a us edo c trineand

wh e ther a

law enf orc e ment o ff

ic e r re a so na

bly could havebelieved that probable c ause e x isted for purpose s of deter mining the se cond prongof the qualified immunity

test.”). See supra note 2. 6 See Slicker v. Jackson, 215 F .3d 1225, 1229-30 (11th Cir. 2000) (stating that 7 “compensatory

damag es under

§ 1983 may

be aw arde d only

based on actual injuries ca used by 8 A s w i th an y co n st i tu t i o n al t o rt , h o w ev er, th e p l ai n t i ff m u stal so est ab l i sh c a us a t i on a nd da m a ge s i n or de rt o r e c ove r . S e e J a c ks on v. S a ul s , 206 F . 3d 1156, 1 1 6 8 ( 1 1 th C ir . 2 0 0 0 ) ; J o n e s v . C a n n o n , 1 7 4 F .3 d 1 2 7 1 , 1 2 8 7 ( 1 1 th C ir . 1 9 9 9 ) . A f a l s e a r r e s tc l a i m “ c ove r [ s ] the t i m e of de t e nt i on up unt i l i s s ua nc e of pr oc e s s or a r r a ig n m e n t, b u t n o t m o r e .” H e c k v . H u m p h r e y , 5 1 2 U .S . 4 7 7 , 4 8 4 , 1 1 4 S . C t. 23 64 , 23 71 (199 4) (quo t at i on m arks om i tt ed). T here fore , the po t ent i al dam ages peri od for E l oy’ s f

al se arre stcl ai m op er at es fr om the dat e of hi s a rr es t s–F ebruary 8 , 2 0 0 2

– u n t i l th e d at e o f h i s arrai g n m en t s o n th e fab ri cat ed ch arg es. 6 G u illo t c o n te n d s th a t E lo y c a n n o t s h o w a n y a c tu a l in ju r ie s d u r in g a n y o f

th is peri od because he w as si m ul t aneousl y i ncar ce ra t ed on the att em pt ed m urder char ge. H ow ever , G ui l l ot ’ s a rgum entw ho l l y i gn ores the three -day p e r io d

– F e b ru a r y 8 to 1 1

– in w h ic h E lo y w a s ja ile d o n ly f o rth e f a b r ic a te d c h a r g e s . T hu s, E l oy has avi abl e c om pensat ory dam ages cl ai m base d o n actual i nj uri es a r i s i ng f r om a nd c a us e d by hi s f a l s e a r r e s tf

r om F e brua r y 8 t o 11, 2002. 7th ed e f

e n d ant , ”e xp l ai n i n gth atc o mp e n s at o r y d am ag e s m ay i n c lu d em o reth andi re c tm o n e t ar y, out-of-poc ket loss and other mone tary harms, and discussing diff erences between c ompensatory and nominal damag es in § 1983 claims). Cf. Kelly v. Curtis, 21 F.3d 1544, 1557 (11th Cir. 1994) (statingplaintiff ca nnot show 8 actual injuries and re cover compensatory

damag es “merely

by showingthat he wa s incarc erated on one illeg itimate charg e; he would also have to show that, but for that illegitimate cha rg e, he w o u l d h av eb e e nr e l e a s e d ” ) . Un d e r E l o y’ s v e r s i o no f

th ef a c t s , b utf o r th ef a b ri c at e d F eb r u ar y 8 charg es, he w ould have remained f reeon pretrial bond.

9 F ur the r m or e , the F e brua r y 11 r e voc a t i on of E l oy ’ s pr e - tr i a l bond on the att em p t ed m u rd er ch arg e w as so l el y d u e t o th e fab ri cat ed ch arg es. In o th er w o rd s, butf orthe f a br i c a t e d c ha r ge s , E l oy w oul d ha ve r e m a i ne d f r e e on pr e - tr i a l bond on the att em pt ed m urder char ge. T hu s, un der the part i cul arfa ct s her e, w e r ej ec t 8 G ui l l ot ’ s a rgum entthatE l oy’ s F ebruary11 bo nd re vo ca t i on on the att em pt ed m urder char ge bars hi s c l ai m for c om pensat ory dam ages occurri ng af t erF ebruary 11. T he m ore di ff

i cul ti ss ue, ho w ever , i s the ef fe ctof the un di sput ed fa ctthat E lo y s u b s e q u e n tly r e c e iv e d ja il c r e d it o n h is a tte m p te d m u r d e rs e n te n c e f o rh is i ncar ce ra t i on fr om F ebruary11 , 20 02 t o Jun e 13, 20 02 , the dat e of hi s a tt em pt ed m ur de rc onvi c t i on. W hi l e the F e brua r y 8 f a br i c a t e d c ha r ge s c a us e d the r e voc a t i on of E l oy ’ s pr e - tr i a l bond, the y di d notc a us e hi s a tt e m pt e d m ur de rs e nt e nc e a nd, in d e e d , a r e u n r e la te d to th a t s e n te n c e . B e c au s e a s o f F e b ru a r y 1 1 E lo y e f

f e c tiv e ly w a s s e r v in g a 2 5 - y e a rs e n te n c e o n h is a tte m p te d m u r d e rc o n v ic tio n , E lo y is u n a b le t o s how a ny a c tua l i nj ur i e s a r i s i ng f r om orc a us e d by the f

a br i c a t e d c ha r ge s f

ortheThereis no indication in the record that Eloy was g iven credit toward his attempted 9 murder s e ntenc efo r t

hethre eda

ys h esp e nt in jail b e tw e e n h is F ebr ua ry 8, 20 02 arre sts and

his bond revoc ation. There fore , Eloy ’s attempted murder convic tion and sentenc e does not a ffe ct his false a rre st claim for the time period of F ebrua ry 8 to 11, 2002. Section 1983 itself provides no substantive rights, but only serve s as a vehicle “f

or 10 vindicatingfederal rights elsewhere conf erred.” A lbright, 510 U.S. at 271, 114 S. C t. at 811 (quotation marks omitted). TheSupreme Court held that substantive dueproce ss could not serve as the ba sis for a § 1983 malicious prose cution claim, but left open thequestion whether the Four th Amendment could do so. I d. at 275, 281, 286, 114 S. Ct. at 813-14, 817, 819. 10 t i m e pe r i od a f

t e rF e brua r y 11. I n othe rw or ds , the a c t i ons of the j ur y ( i n c onvi c t i ng E l oy of the unr e l a t e d a tt e m pt e d m ur de rc ha r ge ) a nd the j udge ( i n c r e di t i ng a l l of E l oy ’ s pos t - r e voc a t i on t i m e i n j a i l t ow a r d hi s 25- y e a rs e nt e nc e ) br oke the c ha i n of 9 causat i on thatform er l y l i nk ed G ui l l ot ’ s f abri ca t ed charges t o E l oy’ s a l l eged i nj ur i e s . S e e K e l l y v. C ur t i s , 21 F . 3d 1544, 1557 ( 11th C i r . 1994) ( “ [ A ] bs e ntpr oof of a s pe c i f i c , a c tua l i nj ur y c a us e d by the de f e nda nt s ’ c onduc t , [ pl a i nt i f f ] i s not e n title d to c o m p e n s a to r y d a m a g e s .” ) . T here fore , w e c on cl ud e thatun der hi s ver si on of the fa ct s, E l oy has e s tab lis h e d a § 1 9 8 3 f

a ls e a r r e s t c la im a n d m a y s e e k c o m p e n s a to r y d a m a g e s f o rh is in ju r ie s d u r in g th e tim e f

r a m e f r o m F e b ru a r y 8 , 2 0 0 2 u n til F e b ru a r y 1 1 , 2 0 0 2 . C . M a lic io u s P r o s e c u t io n C la im F or any § 19 83 cl ai m for m al i ci ou s prose cut i on , there m ustexi stan i nd ependentsource for the fe dera l ri gh tal l egedl y vi ol at ed. S ee A l bri gh tv. O l i ver, 51 0 U . S . 26 6, 27 1, 11 4 S . C t . 80 7, 81 1 (19 94 ) ( pl ural i ty opi ni on ). T hi s C ou rthas 1011

c onc l ude d tha tthe F our th A m e ndm e ntc a n s e r ve a s the ba s i s f ora § 1983 m al i ci ou s prose cut i on cl ai m w here the pl ai nt i ff , as partof the com m ence m entof a c r im in a l p r o s e c u tio n , is u n la w f u lly a n d f

o r c ib ly d e ta in e d , s ta tin g th a t: [ l ] a be l i ng . . . a s e c t i on 1983 c l ai m a s one f ora “ m a l i c i ous pr os e c ut i on ” can be a s hor tha nd w a y of de s c r i bi ng a ki nd of l egi t i m at e s ec t i on 1 9 8 3 clai m : the ki nd of cl ai m w here the pl ai nt i ff , as partof the com m ence m entof a c ri m i nal proc ee d ing, has bee n u n la w f u lly a n d f

o r c ib l y r e s tr a in e d in v io la tio n o f th e F o u r th A m e n dm e nta nd i nj ur i e s , due t o tha ts e i z ur e , f ol l ow a s the pr os e c ut i on goe s a he a d. W h itin g v . T r a y lo r , 8 5 F .3 d 5 8 1 , 5 8 4 ( 1 1 th C ir . 1 9 9 6 ) . W h e n a § 1 9 8 3 p la in tif f is unl a w f ul l y s e i z e d, a nd tha ts e i z ur e f ol l ow s a nd de r i ve s f

r om a c r i m i na l pr os e c ut i on i t s e l f , the F our th A m e ndm e ntvi ol a t i on f orw hi c h the pl a i nt i f

f s e e ks r e dr e s s “ i s of the ki nd m aki ng a s ec t i on 19 83 cl ai m base d o n the vi ol at i on anal og ou s t o the t ort of m al i ci ou s prose cut i on , ” a nd the “ i nj uri es caused by the un l aw ful se i zure m ay i nc l ude thos e a s s oc i a t e d w i th the pr os e c ut i on. ” I d. a t585- 86. I n or de rf orthe s e iz u r e to d e r iv e f

r o m th e p r o s e c u tio n , th e p la in tif f m u s t s h o w h e w a s s e iz e d “in r e la tio n to ” th e m a lic io u s p r o s e c u tio n . S e e K in g s la n d , 3 8 2 F .3 d a t 1 2 3 5 . A cc ordi ng l y, t o p re vai l on a § 19 83 m al i ci ou s prose cut i on cl ai m , a pl ai nt i ff m us tpr ove ( 1) the e l e m e nt s of the c om m on l a w t or tof m a l i c i ous pr os e c ut i on, ( 2) a n unl a w f

ul s e i z ur e i n vi ol a t i on of hi s F our th A m e ndm e ntr i ght s , a nd ( 3) tha tthe un l aw ful se i zure w as “ i n rel at i on t o the prosec ut i on . ” K i ng sl and, 38 2 F . 3d atUnder Florida law, which g overns here, there a re six elements to a common law 11 malic iou s p ro se c uti on

c laim: (1) a n orig inal judicial proce edingag ainst the pre s en t plaintiff was c ommenced or co nt i nu ed ; (2 ) th e pr es ent d ef en d ant wa s th e le gal cau s e o f th e o ri gi n al p ro ce ed i n g; (3) the termination of the orig inal proce eding constituted a bona fide termination of that proc e e dingin f

avo r o f t hepre sent p laintif

f; (4 ) t herewa s a

n a bs e nc eof prob a ble causefor the origi n al p roce eding ; (5) there wa s malice on the pa rt of the present defendant; and (6) the plaintiff suff ere d damag es as a

result of the original proce eding . King sland, 382 F.3d at 1234. In King sla

nd , th eplaintif

f b rought, int e r alia , a

§ 1 98 3 malic iou s p ro se c uti on c laim, 12 alleg ing that the defendant police of ficers had f

abric ated evidenceused to prosecute her for DUI . 382 F.3d at 1225, 1234. Kingsla nd was re lease d on bond the day after her arrest; therea fter she was not inca

rcerate d, but she was oblig ated to appe ar in c ourt at her arraignment and at two subsequent hea

ring s. I d. at 1235. We held that these f acts did not constitute a suff icient seizure in re latio n tothepros e c uti on . I d. at 12 36 . In c ontra st, El oy wa s jaile d at th etim eof

his Februar y 8 arrest, never posted bond on the f abric ated c harg es, and remained in jail throughout the time period in issue. F urther, there w as no evidence to support the prosecution other tha n the defendant Guillot’s fabric ated evidenceand af fidavits. 12 1 2 3 4 - 3 5 . O ne e l e m e ntof

a c om m on l a w m a l i c i ous pr os e c ut i on c l a i m i s the co m m en cem en to r co n t i n u at i o n o f a j u d i ci al p ro ceed i n g . T h u s, th e earl i est 11 E l oy ’ s m a l i c i ous pr os e c ut i on c l a i m c oul d be gi n i s the da t e of hi s a r r a i gnm e nt s on the fabri ca t ed F ebruary8, 20 02 char ges. F urtherm ore, un l aw ful i ncar ce ra t i on af t er arra i gn m enton fabri ca t ed charges w ou l d q ual i fy as an un l aw ful se i zure . 12 H ow e ve r , E l oy m us ts t i l l e s t a bl i s h thi s r e qui r e m e nt : tha thi s “ i nj ur i e s , due to th a t s e iz u r e , f

o llo w a s th e p r o s e c u tio n g o e s a h e a d .” W h itin g , 8 5 F .3 d a t 5 8 4 . A § 1 98 3 m al i ci ou s- prosec ut i on pl ai nt i ff’ s i nj uri es “ m ay i ncl ud e tho se as soci at ed w ith th e p r o s e c u tio n ,” b u t r e g a r d le s s , th e y m u s t b e c a u s e d b y th e u n la w f u l s e iz u r e .See supra note 2. 13 We also rejec t Guillot’s argument that Eloy ’s malicious prosecution claim is barre d by 14 Hec k v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 114 S. C t. 2364 (1994). See Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S . 247, 248, 266-67, 98 S. Ct. 1042, 1044, 1053-54 (1978) 15 (e xplainingno min al da

mag e s and

statingtha

t a § 1 98 3 p laintif

f n ot s uf feringan ac tual in

jur y is 13 I d . a t 5 8 6 . F u r th e r m o r e , th e y m u s t b e c a u s e d b y th e n a m e d d e f e n d a n ts in th e c a s e . S e e i d. a t586 n. 10 ( “ R e c ove r y of da m a ge s i s l i m i t e d t o thos e i nj ur i e s pr ove d t o be c a u s e d b y th e d e f

e n d a n ts .” ) ( e m p h a s is o m itte d ) . A s di s c us s e d e a r l i e r , a s of F e brua r y 11, 2002 E l oy w a s e f f e c t i ve l y s e r vi ng a 25- y e a rs e nt e nc e on hi s a tt e m pt e d m ur de rc onvi c t i on. T he a r r a i gnm e nt s on the f a b r ic a te d c h a r g e s a ll o c c u r r e d a f te rth a t F e b ru a r y 1 1 d a te . T h u s , E lo y is u n a b le 13 to s h o w a c tu a l in

ju r ie s a r is in g f

r o m o rc a u s e d b y th e m a lic io u s p r o s e c u tio n . W i thouttha tc a us a l l i nk, E l oy c a nnotpr ove c om pe ns a t or y da m a ge s f l ow i ng f r om hi s pos t - F e brua r y 11 a r r a i gnm e nt s a nd pr os e c ut i on. N e v e r th e le s s , E lo y ’s f

a ilu r e to s h o w s u c h a n a c tu a l in ju r y d o e s n o t e n title G u i l l o tt o su m m ary j u d g m en to n E l o y’ s m al i ci o u s p ro secu t i o n cl ai m . B ecau se E l oy has s ho w n the m al i ci ou s prose cut i on vi ol at ed hi s c on st i tut i on al ri gh t s und er hi s ver si on of the fa ct s, he m ay st i l l se ek no m i nal dam ages even tho ug h h e s uffe re d n o c o m p e n s a b le in

ju r y . S e e K e lly , 2 1 F .3 d a t 1 5 5 7 ( “W h e n c o n s titu tio n a l r ig h ts 14 a r e vi ol a t e d, a pl a i nt i f

f m a y r e c ove rnom i na l da m a ge s e ve n though he s uf f e r s no com pensabl e i nj ury. ”) . 15not entitled to recover substantial non-punitive damag es for a constitutional violation, but i nstead may be aw arde d “a nominal sum” of money “not to exceed onedollar”) ; Sli cker , 215 F.3d at 1229 (statingthat “in the absence of actual injury

entitling the plaintiff to c ompensatory damag es, a § 1983 plaintiff whose c onstitut ional rights are violate d by the def endant is entitled to nominal damag es”) . Whil e this opinion addresses Eloy ’s claims for compensatory

and nominal damag es, which a re suf ficient for the summary

judgment to be reversed, wedo not reach the issue of

punitive damag es and le ave that to the district court. 14 T here fore , w e c on cl ud e thatun der hi s ver si on of the fa ct s, E l oy has es t abl i shed a § 19 83 m al i ci ou s prose cut i on cl ai m and m ay se ek no m i nal dam ages for the t i m e f

ra m e f rom the dat es of hi s a rr ai gn m ent s on the fabri ca t ed charges u n til th e d a te s th o s e c h a r g e s w e r e d is m is s e d . E . C l e ar l y E s t ab l i s h e d L aw H a vi ng de t e r m i ne d tha tE l oy ha s de m ons tr a t e d, f ors um m a r y j udgm e nt purpos e s , a c ons t i tut i ona l vi ol a t i on on hi s f a l s e a rr e s ta nd m a l i c i ous pr os e c ut i on c l a i m s , w e now tur n t o the f i na l s t a ge of

qua l i f i e d i m m uni ty a na l y s i s : w he the rthe l a w w a s c l e a r l y e s t a bl i s he d. “ T he r e l e va nt , di s pos i t i ve i nqui r y i n de t e r m i ni ng w h e th e ra r ig h t is c le a r ly e s tab lis h e d is w h e th e rit w o u ld b e c le a rto a r e a s o n a b le of f i c e rtha thi s c onduc tw a s unl a w f ul i n the s i tua t i on he c onf r ont e d. ” V i ny a r d, 311 F .3 d a t 1 3 5 0 ( e m p h a s is o m itte d ) . P u t a n o th e rw a y , th e d e f e n d a n t m u s t h a v e f

a ir not i c e of hi s c onduc t ’ s unc ons t i tut i ona l i ty , w hi c h de r i ve s f r om one of

the fol l ow i ng source s: (1) the ob vi ou s c l ar i ty of c on st i tut i on al or st atut ory l angu age; ( 2 ) b r o a d h o ld in g s o rs ta te m e n ts o f p r in c ip le in c a s e la w th a t a r e n o t tie d to p a r tic u la r iz e d f

a c ts ; o r( 3 ) f

a c t- s p e c if

ic ju d ic ia l p r e c e d e n ts th a t a r e n o t f a ir ly15

di s t i ngui s ha bl e . I d. a t1350- 52. F orc a s e l a w , w e l ook onl y t o de c i s i ons of the U n ite d S ta te s S u p r e m e C o u r t, th is C o u r t, o rth e h ig h e s t c o u r t o f th e r e le v a n t s ta te th a t w e r e is s u e d a s o f

th e d a te o f

th e c o n d u c t in q u e s tio n . I d . a t 1 3 5 1 - 5 2 & n .2 2 . U nd erE l oy’ s ver si on of the fa ct s, G ui l l otkn ew thatthere w as no teven a r g u a b le p r o b ab le c a u s e to a r r e s t E lo y , b u t in te n tio n a lly lie d in th e a r r e s t a f f id a v its a n d f a b r ic a te d e v id e n c e in o r d e rto e f f e c t E lo y ’s a r r e s ts a n d p r o s e c u tio n a n y w a y . T he unc ons t i tut i ona l i ty of s uc h c onduc tw a s c l e a r l y e s t a bl i s he d a s of F e brua r y 8, 2 0 0 2 . S e e , e .g ., J o n e s , 1 7 4 F .3 d a t 1 2 8 5 ( “[ T ]h e la w w a s c le a r ly e s tab lis h e d in 1 9 9 3 th atth e C o n st i tu t i o n p ro h i b i t s a p o l i ce o ffi cer fro m k n o w i n g l y m ak i n g fal se s ta te m e n ts in a n a r r e s t a f f id a v it ab o u t th e p r o b a b le c a u s e f o ra n a r r e s t in o r d e rto det ai n a ci t i ze n . . . i f s uch fal se st at em ent s w er e nec es sa ry t o the prob abl e c ause . ”) ; R ile y v . C ity o f

M o n tg o m e r y , 1 0 4 F .3 d 1 2 4 7 , 1 2 5 3 ( 1 1 th C ir . 1 9 9 7 ) ( h o ld in g , in th e c o n t e x to f

a p l a i n t i f

f’ s § 1 9 8 3 a n d s t a t e l a w ma l i c i o u s p r o s e c u t i o n c l a i ms a g a in s t p o lic e o f

f ic e r s w h o a lle g e d ly p la n te d c o c a in e in h is c a r , th a t “[ i]t w a s w e ll es t abl i shed i n 1 98 9 thatfabri ca t i ng i ncri m i nat i ng evi dence vi ol at ed const i tut i on al r ig h ts ” ( c itin g , in te ra lia , W h itin g v . T r a y lo r ) ) . T he r e f or e , w e c onc l ude tha tG ui l l ot , a tthe s um m a r y j udgm e nts t a ge , i s not ent i t l ed t o q ual i fi ed i m m un i ty a s t o E l oy’ s f al se arre stcl ai m for c om pensat ory da m a ge s f

r om F e brua r y 8 t o 11, ora s t o E l oy ’ s m a l i c i ous pr os e c ut i on c l a i m f or16

n o m i n al d am ag es. I I I . CONCL US I ON F orthe r e a s ons s e tf

or th a bove , w e r e ve r s e the di s tr i c tc our t ’ s or de rt o the ex t en tth ati tg ran t s su m m ary j u d g m en tt o G u i l l o to n E l o y’ s § 1 9 8 3 fal se arrest c l a i m f orc om pe ns a t or y da m a ge s f orthe t i m e pe r i od be tw e e n F e brua r y 8 t o 11, 20 02 , bu totherw i se af

fi rm as t o the fa l se arre stcl ai m . W e r ever se the di stri ct co u rt ’ s o rd er t o th e ex t en ti tg ran t ed su m m ary j u d g m en tt o G u i l l o to n E l o y’ s § 1 9 8 3 m a lic io u s p r o s e c u tio n c la im f o rn o m in a l d a m a g e s , b u t o th e r w is e a f f ir m a s to the m a l i c i ous pr os e c ut i on c l a i m . W e r e m a nd thi s c a s e t o the di s tr i c tc our tf or f ur the rpr oc e e di ngs c ons i s t e ntw i th thi s opi ni on. AF F I RME D I N P AR T , RE V E RS E D I N P AR T , AN D R E MAND E D.