U.S. Department of Transportation

FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION Office of Aviation Policy and Plans Washington, D.C. 20591

FINAL REGULATORY EVALUATION
FINAL RULE FLIGHTCREW ALERTING 14 CFR PART 25.1322
OFFICE OF AVIATION POLICY AND PLANS REGULATORY ANALYSIS DIVISION George A. Euring, Jr. May 4, 2010Table of Contents

I. Introduction......................................................................1 II. Changes From The Initial Regulatory Evaluation...........................2 III. Overview of Assumptions and Analysis Period.............................3 IV. Benefits...........................................................................4
V. Costs...............................................................................8 VI. Comparison of Benefits and Costs.............................................9

Endnotes...........................................................................10

iI. Introduction This Final Rule amends the flightcrew alerting airworthiness standards for newly certificated transport category airplanes. The purpose of alerting func tions on airplanes is to gain the attention of the flightcrew, inform them of specific airplane system conditions and certain operational events that require their awareness, and make them aware of actions to address the condition.

The current design requirements do not ade quately address the flightdeck display technology in use today. The requirements in th is final rule will enab le certification of recent technological advances in the flight deck. These new design requirements will address requirements for definitions, prioritization, color requirements, and performance for flightcrew alerting.

The requirements contained in this Final Rule are based upon Aviation Rulemaking Advisory Committee (ARAC) recommendations. The changes to § 25.1322 will expand and update the current § 25.1322 from addressing only visual alerting lights to including all flightcrew alerting functions. These flightcrew aler ting functions include not only visual alerting lights but also aural, tactile, other visual display alerting methods, and integrated smart flightcrew alerting systems. The title of existing § 25.1322 will change from “Warning, caution, an d advisory lights” to “Flight crew alerting.” This new title encompasses all of the cha nges included in the final rule.

1II. Changes From The Initial Regulatory Evaluation

The final rule was changed as a result of comments received on the proposed rule. However, the changes were not significant in terms of the Regulatory Evaluation. Therefore, the conclusions of the Initial Regulatory Evaluation were not changed as a result of comments received on the proposed rule.

Comments were received on the Regulatory Flexibility Analysis and the Unfunded Mandates Assessment. The comment s regarding the Regulatory Flexibility Analysis are addressed in the Final Regulatory Analysis . The Unfunded Mandates Act requires a written statement of any Federal mandate where such a mandate exceeds $100 million or more in 1995 dollars. The FAA estimates the cost of this fi nal rule to be less than $10 million and thus, the requirements of the Unfunded Mandates Act do not apply.

No comments were received on the Initi al Regulatory Evaluation. Therefore no changes were made to the Initial Regulatory Evaluation as a result of comments received.

2III. Overview of Assumptions And Analysis Period The FAA assumed that the requirements contained in the NPRM and this Final Rule would become effective in 2010. The requirements apply only to new type certificates, new amended type certificat es, and new STCs for transport category airplanes. The analysis period for this final regula tory evaluation begins in 2010 and ends twenty years later in 2029. It is likely that new airplane designs will occur over time and we used a uniform distribution to estimate both costs and benefits during the analysis period. The FAA used twenty years of historical type certificate information to estimate the design costs for future new airplane certifications. For th e benefits, the FAA examined the history of flightcrew alerting events.

3IV. Benefits The final requirements will increase flight safety by setting standards for alerting elements in future flightdecks, including cueing by more than one sense, information content, ease and immediacy of det ection, and alert intelligibility.

Industry representatives provi ded the FAA with examples of events that support the need for revising the current design standa rd. The representatives informed us that the final requirements (if implemented during the aircraft design) co uld have eliminated or mitigated these events. We have summar ized below some of the events provided by industry. These accidents deal primaril y with ineffective crew alerting.
1. On February 19th, 1985, a Boeing 727 took off from Madrid-Barajas Airport and was scheduled to land at Bilbao Airport. There was a fatal accident that resulted in 141 passenger and 7 crewmember deaths. The investigations revealed that the ca use of the accident was the altitude alert system and the misinter pretation of its warnings. [1] The requirements in this rule will clarify the warnings, thereby decr easing the probability of this type of accident occurring. 2. On August 16, 1987, a DC 9-82 (flight 255) crashed shortly after taking off from Detroit Metropolitan Wayne C ounty Airport, Romulus, Michigan. The aircraft was a regularly scheduled passenge r flight en route to Phoenix, Arizona, with 149 passengers and 6 crew members. On board, 148 passengers and 6 crew members were killed; 1 passenger, a 4-year -old child, was injured seriously. On the ground, 2 persons were killed, 1 person wa s injured seriously, and 4 persons suffered minor injuries. The National Transportation Safety Bo ard (NTSB) determined that one contributing factor was the airplane takeoff warning sy stem, which failed to warn the flightcrew that the airp lane was improperly configured for takeoff. This failure was due to the absence of electrical power. Specifically, the NTSB determined that the disabled warning system was a factor in the accident. Analysis led to a pulled, but not failed circuit breaker. The NTSB considered the possibility that the circuit breaker was used as a switch and

4intentionally opened to disable the w arning system. This might occur if the flightcrew were annoyed or di stracted by nuisance alerts. During the public hearing, nearly every pilot witness testified that periodically throughout their careers, they had regained the use of a system or component by opening and resetting the applicable circuit breaker. The requirements contained in this Fi nal Rule will require manufacturers to have a reliable alerting system and mi nimize nuisance alerts. These design requirements will also allow the crew to suppress an undue warning without deactivating the whole system. 3. This rule will also mitigate the type of accident that occurred on February 5, 1987, when a Learjet 55 crashed in Cameroon. An intermittent anemometric failure occu rred in cruise and caused an undue overspeed warning. To silence this fals e but very intrusive warning, the crew reduced speed to maneuver the aircraft out of overspeed. When the aircraft slowed to the point of triggering a valid stall warning—a much less intrusive aural alert called a nudger—the crew failed to recognize or react to it. The ai rplane then stalled and crashed. The accident report showed that the crew was primarily focused on stopping an extremely intrusive warning alarm, wh ich hampered their ability to correctly analyze the situation. Typical ly, overspeed is not consid ered a catastrophic failure condition, especially in cruise. 4. On November 23, 1997, a serious inci dent occurred involving an MD83. [2] The pilot was not aware of the airplane’s very low altitude when he performed the go-around. During the descen t, the pilot lost vertical positional awareness and did not hear the ground proximity warning system (GPWS), altitude and autopilot disconnect alarms. There were multiple wa rnings that occurred simultaneously during the descent and caused confusion in the cockpit. 5. On August 14, 2005, the crew members of a Cypriot airliner near Athens became confused by a series of alarms as the plane ascended. At 10,000 feet, the cabin pressure warning went off as desi gned to indicate that the plane would not pressurize. However, officials said that th e crew members had mistaken the alert to be a takeoff warning, which is triggered wh en the controls were improperly set for takeoff. Both conditions use the same alert . [3] This misinterpretation resulted in 121 deaths. [4]

Industry representatives familiar with th e aforementioned events have indicated that these events could have been prevented if the requirements in this final rule had been effective during the design and certifi cation of the accident airplanes. [5]

5Although most events were catastrophic, there w ere also non-catastrophic events that could have been prevented with the requirements contained in this final rule. One such event occurred on September 20, 1999.

A part 25 airplane operating in part 121 service executed an unnecessary escape maneuver after the GPWS inaccurately activ ated. The airplane was not damaged; however, 2 flight attendants received seri ous injuries and 2 ot hers received minor injuries. The NTSB indicated that this airplane’s GPWS system had a long standing history of intermittent faults, nui sance warnings, and erratic behavior. Had the final requirements (specifically mi nimizing nuisance alerts) been in effect during initial certification and aircraft devel opment, this event could have been averted. Although only four people were injured in this event, many more individuals could have been seriously injured or killed, depending on the phase of flight and other circumstances.

By examining the historical data, we ha ve demonstrated that both fatal and nonfatal events have occurred which could ha ve been prevented by the requirements contained in this Final Rule. The potential se verity of an event is demonstrated by the August 16, 1987 accident that resulted in 154 deaths.

To quantify the benefits of this final ru le, we performed a "threshold" analysis. Threshold or "break-even" analysis answers the question, "How sma ll could the value of the benefits be before the rule w ould yield zero net benefits?" [6]

Our threshold analysis demonstrates that these final requirements need only prevent a total of 10 serious injuries (val ued at $830,000 per injury ) over the analysis

67 period. The total corresponding benefits would be at least $8.3 million ($4.4 million present value). Given the accident history pr esented above, the FAA has determined that at least 10 serious injuries are likel y to be prevented by this rule.V. Costs To estimate the certificati on costs, the FAA examined the number of new part 25 airplane designs for the 20-year period 1987-2006. During this time frame, 11 new type certificates were issued to pa rt 25 manufacturers. The FAA us ed this historical data to estimate the average annual number of new pa rt 25 airplane designs. The eleven new designs over a 20 year period equated to 0.55 new airplane designs annually. [7] The FAA obtained compliance cost estim ates from three part 25 airplane manufacturers and two designers of alerting systems. The two alerting system designers stated that there would be no additional cost. Although the manufacturers stated there were no additional manufacturing or operating cost s that would occur as a result of this proposal, they indicated there would be a dditional design and cer tification costs. The FAA averaged the three estimates from the part 25 airplane manufacturers and arrived at an average cost estimate of $0.7 million per new aircraft. When the average cost per new aircraft certification ($0.7 million) is multiplied by the estimated annual number of new certifications (0.55), the FAA arrived at annual costs of $385,000. When summed over the analysis period the total estimated costs were $7.7 million ($4.1 million present value). In the event of future STCs, the FAA estimates that the STC cost would be less than $700,000 per airplane. Anyone who would purch ase the STC would value the STC at $700,000 or more or there would be no transaction.

8VI. Comparison of Benefits and Costs The FAA believes that these final requirements will prevent at least 10 serious injuries over the analysis period, resulting in estimated benefits of $8.3 million ($4.4 million present value). The total estimated costs are $7.7 million ($4.1 million present value). Accordingly, the estimated benefits of the final rule justify the costs of the final rule.

9ENDNOTES

1. Technical Report A-009/1985

2. http://www.bea-fr.org/do cspa/1997/f- mc971123a.pdf

3. International Herald Tr ibune, September 7, 2005.

4. http://aviation-safety.net/ database/record.php? id=20050814-0

5. In addition to these events that were provided by industry repr esentatives, there were other accidents and incidents where the warning systems seemed to be working properly but the crew for some reason did not pay attention to the warning. It is possible that the alerts did not have th e attention getting properties that would be required by the requirements contained in this final rule. There were other situations wher e alerts were triggered pr operly, but the crews did not understand the alerts. In these cases, th e crews might have dismissed them as nuisance alerts.

6. OMB Circular A-4, September, 2003

107. Annual Part 25Certifications
Year Model
1993 A340
1995 B777
1996 EMB 134-145
1996 Cessna750
1997 Lear 45

1998 A330
2003 A318-321

2004 Embraer 170

2004 Cessna 680

2006 ERJ-190

2006 A380

11