[Cite as State v. Taylor , 2021-Ohio-2701.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT GREENE COUNTY

STATE OF OHIO Plaintiff-Appellee

v. JACOB L. TAYLOR Defendant-Appellant : : : : : : : : : : Appellate Case No. 2021-CA-2

Trial Court Case No. 2020-CR-37 (Criminal Appeal from Common Pleas Court)

. . . . . . . . . . . O P I N I O N Rendered on the 6th day of August, 2021.

. . . . . . . . . . . MARCY A. VONDERWELL, Atty. Reg. No. 0078311, Assistant Prosecut ing Attorney, Greene County Prosecutor’s Office, 61 Greene Street, Suite 200, Xenia, Ohio 45385 Attorney for Plaintiff-Appellee HAL R. ARENSTEIN, Atty. Reg. No. 0009999, 114 East 8th Street, Cincinnati, Ohio 45202 Attorney for Defendant-Appellant

. . . . . . . . . . . . .

TUCKER, P.J.-2- {¶ 1} Appellant, Jacob L. Taylor, appeals from his conviction for pos session of cocaine. Taylor asserts that he was not brought to trial for p ossession of cocaine within the time prescribed by R.C. 2945.71(C)(2), and, as such, the tr ial court erred when it overruled his motion to dismiss the indictment on speedy trial grounds. Finding no merit to this argument, the trial cour t’s judgment will be affirmed. Facts and Procedural History {¶ 2} Taylor was a passenger in a vehicle involved in a single-car ac cident in February 2019. As a result of a police investigation of the ac cident, Taylor was charged soon thereafter with possession of marijuana and possession of drug paraphernalia, both misdemeanor offenses. These charges were adjudicated in the Fa irborn Municipal Court and are not part of the pending appeal. {¶ 3} Thereafter, Taylor was indicted by the Greene County grand jury for possession of cocaine in violation of R.C. 2925.11(A), a fifth- degree felony. The indictment resulted from suspected drugs recovered at the scene of the same singlevehicle accident. Taylor filed a motion to dismiss the indictm ent, arguing that the speedy trial time for the cocaine possession offense began to run when he was charged with the misdemeanor offenses and, thus, he was not brought to trial wit hin the 270-day period prescribed by R.C. 2945.71(B)(2). Taylor and the State submitt ed the following factual stipulations, on which the court could decide the motion to dis miss: * * * On February 23rd, 2019, the Defendant, Mr. Taylor, was a passenger in a car that was involved in a single-vehicle crash that occurred on Interstate 675 southbound to Colonel Glenn Highway. The dri ver was arrested for OVI. The Defendant was observed by law enforcemen t to-3- have a dry, white, powdery substance on his nostrils. The Defe ndant admitted smoking marijuana in the past and was found to be in p ossession of a pipe with brown residue.

The Defendant was not arrested at the scene. The Defendant wa s not cited for any violations of law while at the scene. [An] Officer located other evidence and drugs at the scene. T he evidence was sent to the Ohio State Highway Patrol Laboratory f or analysis. On March 1st, 2019, charges were filed against the Defendant, Mr. Taylor, in Fairborn Municipal Court for possession of marijuana [and] possession of marijuana paraphernalia, for conduct occurring on February 23rd, 2019. On June 27th, 2019, the Defendant pleaded guilty to these char ges[.]

* * * On July 1st, 2019, the Ohio State Highway Patrol Crime Laborat ory issued a report reflecting the results of their analysis of the other evidence found at the scene. This concluded that cocaine was present. On January 17th, 2020, the Defendant was indicted on this case [for possession of cocaine].

* * * {¶ 4} The trial court overruled Taylor ’s motion to dismiss, and Taylo r entered a no contest plea to the count of possession of cocaine. The trial court found Taylor guilty and sentenced him to a term of community control sanctions. Th is appeal followed. Assignment of Error-4- {¶ 5} Taylor’s sole assignment of error is as follows: THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN IT [DID NOT] DISMISS [TAYLOR’S INDICTMENT] BECAUSE HIS RIGHT TO A SPEEDY TRIAL WAS VIOLATED[.] Analysis {¶ 6} Taylor argues that the speedy trial time on the cocaine possess ion charge began to run on March 1, 2019, when he was issued misdemeanor c itations for the marijuana and drug paraphernalia offenses. Taylor is incorrect

. {¶ 7} The right to a speedy trial is guaranteed by the Sixth Amendmen t to the

United States Constitution. State v. Lackey , 2015-Ohio-5492, 55 N.E.3d 613 (2d Dist.), ¶ 21, citing State v. Adams , 43 Ohio St.3d 67, 68, 538 N.E.2d 1025 (1989). Section 10, Article I of the Ohio Constitution also protects the right to a speedy trial. Id. And the right to a speedy trial is statutorily enforced in Ohio by R.C. 2945.71 et seq. Id. Under R.C. 2945.71(C)(2), a defendant facing a felony charge must be brought to trial within 270 days of the commencement of the case, subject to any tollin g provisions set forth in

R.C. 2945.72. A criminal case is commenced on the date an indi ctment is returned, a bill of information is filed, a warrantless arrest is made, or a warrant, summons, or citation is issued, whichever first occurs. R.C. 2901.13(E). Thus, the dispositive issue is when the case for possession of cocaine commenced – on March 1, 2019 (the date the misdemeanor citations were issued) or on January 17, 2020 (the date of the indictment for cocaine possession). We conclude that the cocaine possessi on case commenced, and thus the speedy trial count began, on January 17, 2020. Gi ven this, Taylor’s-5- statutory speedy trial rights were not violated. 1 {¶ 8} In State v. Adams , the Ohio Supreme Court concluded that, when one case is commenced and thereafter a second case is commenced, the sec ond case is subject to the statutory speedy trial limitation of the first case when the cases “arise from the

same facts * * * and the state knows of such facts at the time of the initial [commencement]

* * * .” Adams at 68. In State v. Baker , 78 Ohio St.3d 108, 676 N.E.2d 883, the Supreme Court again reviewed the statutory speedy trial implications of separately-commenced cases arising from the same event. This review resulted in the conclusion that when a second case arises from the same events as the initial case, th ere are two scenarios that exempt the State from the statutory speedy trial limit of the f irst case. The two situations are (1) the second case, though having the same genesis as the first case, “arise[s] from facts different from the original charge[s],” or (2) “the state did not know of these facts at the time of the [commencement] of the initial [case.]” Id. at syllabus. Under either circumstance, the speedy trial time begins to run upon commence ment (by indictment or otherwise) of the second case. Id. at 112. {¶ 9} In State v. Dalton , 2d Dist. Greene No. 2003-CA-96, 2004-Ohio-3575, we applied Baker to facts relevant to the pending analysis. Dalton was arreste d for rape. A bag containing a white powder was discovered on Dalton’s pers on upon his arrest. Several hours after the arrest, the police searched Dalton’s ve hicle pursuant to a search warrant. The search resulted in the discovery of “several pill s, glassware, and chemicals that [the police] believed were contraband.” Id. at ¶ 5. The collected items were sent to

1 Taylor does not argue that his speedy trial rights were violate d if the speedy trial count began on January 17, 2020.-6- a lab for analysis. The analysis later revealed that the white powder was methamphetamine, that one of the pills was hydrocodone, and tha t the chemicals were used in the manufacture of methamphetamine. {¶ 10} While the lab results were pending, Dalton was indicted for rap e and related charges. Over six months later, Dalton was indicted on three d rug counts: two counts of aggravated possession of drugs (the methamphetamine and the hyd rocodone) and one count of illegal possession of chemicals for the manufacture of drugs. Dalton moved to dismiss the drug offenses, asserting that the speedy trial calc ulation on these counts “should run from the date of the rape indictment because [the d rug counts] arose from the same factual circumstances as the charges filed in the original indictment.” Id. at ¶ 10. We disagreed, explaining that the facts (the lab results) suppo rting the drug counts “were

not known to the State until after the initial indictment * * * [thus] * * * pursuant to Baker , the speedy trial timetable [did] not run from the [rape] indict ment date.” Id. at ¶ 13. We further explained that, although the drug-related indictment oc curred approximately five months after the State received the lab results, this, under Baker , was “irrelevant” to the beginning date of the speedy trial count because, under R.C. 29 01.13(E), the drug counts

were commenced on the date these counts were indicted. Id. at ¶ 14. We have similarly held that when a person is initially charged with a driving und er the influence offense (OVI), and, after the State’s receipt of a lab result reflectin g a prohibited concentration of alcohol, the person is then charged with a prohibited concentra tion OVI, the second charge is subject to a new speedy trial clock. See State v. Lekan , 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 16108, 1997 WL 351287 (June 27, 2997); State v. Cantrell , 2d Dist. Clark No. 2000- CA-95, 2001 WL 1018234 (Sept. 7, 2001). The rationale for thes e decisions was that,-7- since the prohibited concentration offenses were dependent upon lab results, the State

did not know the facts of the offenses until the lab results be came available. Lekan ; Cantrell

. {¶ 11} Based upon Baker , and our case law applying Baker in analogous circumstances, the speedy trial time in Taylor’s cocaine posses sion case began on January 17, 2020, the date of the cocaine possession indictment . Taylor’s assignment

of error is overruled.

Conclusion {¶ 12} Taylor’s sole assignment of error having been overruled, the ju dgment of the Greene County Common Pleas Court is affirmed.

. . . . . . . . . . . . .

WELBAUM, J. and EPLEY, J., concur.

Copies sent to: Marcy A. Vonderwell Hal R. Arenstein Hon. William H. Wolff, Jr., Visiting Judge