J-S33034-18

____________________________________

* Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

v.

JELANI SONDARI 

Appellant

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 2939 EDA 2017

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence August 10, 2017

In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Criminal Division at 

No(s): CP-51-CR-0007327-2013

BEFORE: OTT, J., McLAUGHLIN, J., and STEVENS*, P.J.E.

MEMORANDUM BY STEVENS, P.J.E.: FILED JUNE 05, 2018

Appellant Jelani Sondari appeals from the judgment of sentence of two 

years’ probation entered in the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County 

on August 10, 2017, following his conviction of resisting arrest.

1

 We affirm. 

The trial court set forth the relevant procedural and factual history 

herein as follows: 

Procedural History

On August 10, 2017, Appellant [ ] proceeded to trial before 

this [c]ourt, sitting without a jury. The [c]ourt found Appellant 

guilty of resisting arrest, only. Appellant was sentenced

that same date to two years probation[.]

A timely Notice of Appeal was filed on September 8, 2017[.]

On September 31, 2017, the [c]ourt entered an order 

directing the filing of a Statement of Matters Complained of on 

Appeal, pursuant to Pa. R. A. P. 1925(b)[.]

A timely Statement pursuant to Pa.R A P 1925(b) was filed 

on October 6, 2017.

____________________________________________

1 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 5104. 
J-S33034-18

- 2 -

Factual History

The evidence adduced at trial, viewed in the light most 

favorable to the Commonwealth as the verdict winner, established 

the following:

On the afternoon of Wednesday, November 23, 2012, police 

officers were in the vicinity of 4100 Germantown Avenue 

investigating a narcotics transaction, involving entry into a parked

white van[.] N.T. 8/10/17, pp 8-9[.] As the officers attempted to 

stop the two men, they fled and the officers gave chase. Crack 

cocaine was recovered from one male, while the second discarded

several dozen Percocets and Xanax pills. N T 8/10/17, pp. 9-11[.]

Because of the possible involvement of the van, the officers 

sought to secure it for investigation[.] N.T. 8/10/17, pp. 10, 12. 

Upon returning to the van, the officers observed Appellant enter 

the van and sit in the driver's seat[.] [T]here was a three-yearold child, identified as Appellant's son, [ ] in the back seat[.] N T 

8/10/17, pp 13, 39[.]

Officer Strubinger explained to Appellant that the van was 

being held for investigation, then requested that Appellant exit the 

van[.] N.T 8/10/17, pp 12, 40, 51. Appellant refused to exit the 

vehicle. N.T. 8/10/17, pp. 12-13[.] Officer Russel[] drew his taser 

and directed Appellant to exit the vehicle, which he refused to 

do[.] N T 8/10/17. pp. 40, 42, 46. Instead Appellant pulled the 

child into his lap. N T. 8/10/17, pp. 14-15, 26, 40, 45.

After a few minutes of Officer Strubinger attempting to 

convince Appellant to leave the vehicle, Officer Waltman stepped 

up and open[ed] the passenger door to pull Appellant from the 

vehicle as Officer Russel attempted to get Appellant's attention[.]

N.T. 8/10/17, pp 13-14, 33-34, 42. As Officer Waltman grabbed 

Appellant, Appellant turned and punched Officer Waltman in the 

jaw, snapping his head back. N T. 8/10/17, pp. 13-14, 48[.]

Officer Waltman suffered a laceration to his chin from being 

punched[.] N.T. 8/10/17, pp 30-32, 41, 49, 53; Exhibit D -2(a) 

and (b)[.] At that point, Officer Russell, who was standing at the 

open front passenger window of the van, discharged his taser at 

Appellant. N T 8/10/17, pp. 14-15[.] Appellant fell from the 

vehicle, [was] handcuffed and transported to the hospital. N.T. 

8/10/17, pp 15. 28, 32-33.

Trial Court Opinion, filed 10/19/17, at 1-2. 
J-S33034-18

- 3 -

In his brief, Appellant presents the following “Statement of the 

Questions Involved”: 

Did the lower court violate Appellant’s state and federal 

constitutional rights to confront his accuser by improperly 

curtailing trial counsel’s cross-examination of both 

Commonwealth witnesses while attempting to show that the 

witnesses had a bias, motive to lie and were offering inaccurate 

and deceitful testimony[?]

Brief for Appellant at 3. 

The Sixth Amendment guarantees a criminal defendant the right 

to confront witnesses against him, which includes the right to 

cross-examine witnesses. However, it is well settled that it is 

within the discretion of the trial court to determine the scope and 

limits of cross-examination and that an appellate court cannot 

reverse those findings absent a clear abuse of discretion or an 

error of law.

Commonwealth v. Whiting, 668 A.2d 151, 157 (Pa.Super. 1995) (citations 

and internal quotations omitted), appeal denied, 544 Pa. 629, 675A.2d 1247 

(1995). Although “the allowance or disallowance of questions on crossexamination is normally left to the sound discretion of the trial judge[,] where 

limitations imposed by the court upon cross-examination are such as plainly 

inhibit the ability of the accused to obtain a fair trial, the general rule is 

manifestly inapplicable.” Commonwealth v. Spiewak, 533 Pa. 1, 13, 617 

A.2d 696, 702 (1992).

Appellant maintains that the trial court’s act of curtailing defense 

counsel’s cross-examination violated his right to confront witnesses against 

him secured by the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States 
J-S33034-18

- 4 -

Constitution and Article 1, Section 9 of the Pennsylvania Constitution in that 

it prohibited counsel from “assessing the officers’ bias, motivation to lie, 

imperfections of perception, memory and narration.” Brief for Appellant at 

11. Appellant highlights the following exchanges to support his argument: 

During cross-examination, trial counsel attempted to elicit 

from the testifying officers that their conduct-and in particular 

Officer Russel's conduct-ran directly counter to the Philadelphia 

Police Department's directives regarding the use of tasers. As 

soon as trial counsel mentioned the directives-and without 

objection from the Commonwealth-the lower court stated: "I just 

want to make sure we're going to try this like a criminal case and 

not a civil rights case-which I would love to hear one day-but 

that's not where we are." (id. at 18-23).

After trial counsel elucidated from Officer Strubinger that it 

was counter to the department's directives to draw a taser on a 

suspect who is merely passively resisting, counsel asked, "[i]f 

somebody had pulled out their taser ahead of time, before the 

punch, that would not be appropriate, correct?" Again, without 

objection from the Commonwealth, the lower court jumped in 

prior to the officer answering the question and the following 

exchange occurred:

THE COURT: We're going to stop it here, see, because 

this is what happens when we get into directives, we get 

into speculation of how they should be applied. How they 

should be applied is really up to the fact finder, whether 

it be a panel or a CP judge in a criminal trial. I've heard 

the facts from his perspective, and I'm happy to hear 

anything else. Just, I'm done with the directives.

TRIAL COUNSEL: Well, Your Honor, that's what we're 

-- when they're allowed to use this force and when they 

are not. If an officer breaks a directive, it's reasonable 

to think that he may not be honest down the road to 

cover up, especially in a situation like that where there 

were multiple officers who have since been promoted.

THE COURT: Again, you've established his 

understanding of what the directives are. He's told you 

what happened in his mind.
J-S33034-18

- 5 -

TRIAL COUNSEL: Fair enough.

THE COURT: Let's move on.

(id. at 23). Later, when trial counsel began cross-examining 

Officer Waltman along the same lines, counsel was again shut 

down (id. at 46).

During cross-examination of the same witness, trial counsel 

asked whether any officer documented who the toddler was 

released to or anything else about the child. The lower court 

indicated "[t]hat might be the subject of a discovery motion in 

which case I would rule as to whether or not you need that. We're 

at trial. This is not a discovery dep[osition] or anything like 

that[.]" (id. at 35).

In addition, during cross-examination of Officer Waltman, 

trial counsel asked, "I'm assuming, given what's going on, the 

child was pretty hysterical, pretty upset?" Again without a 

Commonwealth objection, the lower court prohibited that line of 

questioning and stated, "I'm done talking about that" (id. at 51). 

Prior to that question, there had been no questions or discussion 

regarding the child's demeanor throughout the trial.

Brief for Appellant at 7-9. 

A review of the record reveals that Appellant did not request a sidebar 

or otherwise act to preserve his claim that his right to confrontation under 

both the state and federal constitutions was violated when the trial court made 

its rulings. Rather, the record reflects that Appellant continued crossexamination by pursuing other lines of questioning. Additionally, Appellant 

failed to preserve the issue he now attempts to raise in a post-trial motion. In 

fact, Appellant stated in his notice of appeal filed on September 8, 2017, that 

“[n]o post-sentence motions were filed.” Therefore, Appellant has waived this 

issue on appeal. See Pa.R.A.P. 302(a) (issues not raised in the lower court 

are waived and cannot be raised for the first time on appeal); see also 
J-S33034-18

- 6 -

Commonwealth v. Sanchez, 623 Pa. 253, 297, 82 A.3d 943, 969 (2013) 

(same). 

Even assuming arguendo that Appellant properly preserved this claim

for appellate review, he fails to demonstrate how the trial court’s controlling 

the scope of the officers’ cross-examination plainly inhibited Appellant's ability 

to obtain a fair trial. Contrary to Appellant’s assertions, the trial court did not 

forbid counsel from exploring the question of whether the officers violated the 

police department’s regulations. Indeed, Appellant admits “the 

Commonwealth’s case showed that Officer Russel violated Philadelphia Police 

Department Directive 10.3.” Brief for Appellant at 15. Moreover, Appellant 

acknowledges “the Commonwealth and Appellant presented incompatible 

accounts through competent evidence. The primary question to be resolved 

by the finder of fact was a question of credibility- who to believe.” Id. at 19. 

The trial court acted as fact finder, and the record supports its 

conclusions that it had provided Appellant’s counsel significant leeway to 

cross-examine police officers on police department directives and policy. The 

trial court stressed that Officer Geoffrey Strubinger was examined regarding 

taser training and procedures, and Officer Ryan Waltman answered similar 

questions as well as discussed his familiarity with taser use. The trial court 

explained it limited Officer Strubinger’s testimony only after defense counsel 

had posed sixteen questions pertaining to taser training and even thereafter 

permitted an additional five interrogatories on this point before counsel 
J-S33034-18

- 7 -

“drifted off point.”2 The court further stated it did not permit examination 

regarding the use of an ASP3 or other type of baton, because no such

instrument was involved in the instant matter. Trial Court Opinion, 10/19/17, 

at 3-5 (citing N.T., 8/10/17, at 18-25, 46, 53). 

In addition, the trial court pointed out it allowed defense counsel to 

cross-examine officers regarding documentation and paperwork they 

prepared during the course of their investigation. The court noted it sustained 

the Commonwealth’s objection to defense counsel’s questioning of Officer 

Strubinger concerning who picked up Appellant’s son after Appellant’s arrest

as it deemed it to be irrelevant to the charge of resisting arrest. Trial Court 

Opinion, 10/19/17, at 5 (citing N.T., 8/10/17, at 35). The trial court added 

that despite Appellant’s claims to the contrary, it permitted defense counsel 

ample leeway in questioning the officers about their treatment of the child at 

the time of Appellant’s arrest. While defense counsel asked twenty-one 

questions in this regard, the only objection the trial court sustained was that 

____________________________________________

2 The trial court indicated it would allow questions concerning the procedure 

followed in this case “with limitations” and maintained that in its view 

“someone can act wrongfully even if they’re [sic] in compliance with directives 

and vice versa.” N.T., 8/10/17, at 20. 

3 An ASP collapsible baton is a metal weapon that extends to approximately 

30 inches in length and is used by law enforcement and marketed to the public 

as a self-defense weapon.
J-S33034-18

- 8 -

which followed the query regarding the child’s demeanor. Id. at 6 (citing N.T., 

8/10/17, 18, 26, 27, 29, 43, 35, 44, 45, 47, 49, 50, 51-52). 

Following our review of the record and in light of the foregoing, had 

Appellant’s issue not been waived on appeal, we would find that it lacks merit,

because he has entirely failed to demonstrate how the trial court abused its 

discretion or otherwise inhibited his ability to obtain a fair trial by restricting 

his cross-examination of the officers. Therefore, we affirm Appellant’s 

judgment of sentence.

4

 Judgment of sentence affirmed. 

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 6/5/18

____________________________________________

4 This Court is not bound by the rationale of the lower court, and we may

affirm it on any basis. Commonwealth v. Williams, 73 A.3d 609, 617 

(Pa.Super. 2013), appeal denied, 624 Pa. 690, 87 A.3d 320 (2014).