### IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE AT JACKSON Assigned on

Briefs N ovember 2, 2004
STATE OF TENN ESSEE v. STEVE SKIN NER
Direct Appeal from the Criminal Court for Shelby County No. 00-05699-005700 Joseph B. Dailey, Judge

No. W2003-00887-CCA-R3-CD - Filed F ebruary 28, 2005

The defenda

nt, Ste ven Sk inner, was convicted by jury of two counts of first degree premeditated murder for which he received consec utive sentence s of life imprisonment with the possibility of parole. On appeal, he contends that (1) the evidence is insufficient to sustain his convict ion s because there is no proof connecting him to t he crime s other than uncorroborated accomplice te st im on y, and (2) the trial court erred i n sentenc ing the d

efenda nt to two consecutiv e life se ntences

. Upon rev iew of the record and the pa

rties’ br iefs, we affirm t he judg ments of the trial c ourt. Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgments of the Criminal Court Affirmed

J.C. M C L IN , J., delivered the opi nion of the court, in which J ERRY L. S MITH and R OBER T W. W EDEMEYER , JJ., joined. Charles E. Waldman, Memphis, Tennessee, for the appellant, Steve Skinner.

Paul G. Su mm er s, At to rn ey G en er al an d R ep or te r; J. Ro ss Dye r, As si st an t A tt or ne y G eneral ; Williams L. Gibbons, District Attorney General; Robert Carter, and Jennifer Nichols, Assistant District Attorneys Gene

ral, for the appellee, State of Tennessee

.

OPINION

I. Proof at Trial

The defendant, Steven Skinner, was convicted by jury of first degree premeditated murder of Sid Towns and

Omar Stokes. Proof presented at trial established that Towns and Stokes drove to Houston, Texas with approximately $53,0 00 t o purcha se drug s for Mar cus Boy d, Calvin Wardlow, and the defendant – members of

a Memphis gang known as the Gang ster Disciples. Upon arriva l, Towns and Stokes were tricked into delivering the money to La nail Allen, an acquaintance of Stokes. Previously, Allen had told Stokes that he knew of a c ocai ne supplier who would

sell Stokes a large quantity

of cocaine. However, unknown to Stokes or Towns, Allen was not in contact with any cocaine supplier but planne d to steal t

he mo ne y u nder the pretense of conducting a drug-2-

transaction. After

some negotiation, Allen ask ed Towns t

o drive hi m to an apa

rtment complex to complete the transaction. Allen directed Towns t o drop him off and took the money into the apartment complex to me et the fic titious s upp lier while Towns waited in his Suburban outside. Allen never r eturn ed from the bu ildi ng. Realizing th at Al le n h ad “s tu ng th em ou t o f t he mo ne y” Towns and Stokes attempted to find Allenand get the money

back. However, they

quickly ga

ve up, realizing that

they would never

find Allenin Houston. Towns then called Marcus Boy d and told him what happened. After making several phone calls, Towns and Stokes decided to leave Houston and drove ba ck to Memphis. On Sa tu rd ay, March 13 , 1999, in the early morning hours, Towns and Stokes wer e shot and kil led outside a n auto-bo dy shop owned

and oper ated by Towns.

William Ware, a neighbor living across the stre et from the auto-body shop, awoke to the sound of gunshots fired. Peaking out of his window, Ware saw two men get into a white car and drive off. Ware called the police to report wha t he heard and observed.

Around 6:00 a.m., Police Officer Moulty responded to a dispatch c all advising him of shots fired in his area of

patrol. While en route, Officer Moulty noticed two men crossing an intersection and decided to stop them and ask a few questions. Upon aski ng the two men to come over t o his police cruiser, the two men bolted and r an. Office r Moulty chased a fter the m and eve

ntually apprehended

on e of them , Michael Brown. After searc hing Brown, Officer Moulty discovered a Smith and Wesson 659 in a holster strappe d to the sma

ll of Brown’s back. Officer Moulty noted that the gun was completely empty

of bullets. The gun was inventoried and later identified a s one of the guns use d to shoot Towns and Stokes.

At the crime scene, police of fic ers identified the bodies of Towns and Stokes. From the crimescene, officers retrieved se veral spent shell casings, bullet fragme nts, and a black baseball cap. The officers thoroughly

documented the crime scene, taking ove r 100 photographs of the location and position of the evidence found at the scene. Some of the shell casings and bullet fragments we re later identifie d as those

fired fr om a Smith an

d Wesson 659 , nine-mil limete r semi-aut omatic handgu n. An auto

psy reveal ed that bo th Towns a nd Stokes d

ied from m

ultiple g un shot wou

nds.

A. Accomplice te stimony

1. Michael

Brown

Two witnesses identified by the c ourt as accomplices testified for the prosecution about the events surrounding the murder of Towns and Stokes. The first, Michae l Brown, testified that he had shotand killed Towns and Stokes and was currently

servinglife sent

ences in federa l prison fo r those murders

. He was testifying against the defendant in exchange for the dismissal of the murder charges pending

in state c ourt. According to Brown, he had be en a member of Gangster Disciples since age tw elve and

his ra nk within the gang was Chief of Security . On March 13, around 3:00 a.m., Brown received a call fr om Marcus Boy

d and the defendant. During the conversation, Brown1 According t o Brown’s te sti mony the des igner hat, found at the cri me sce ne, had beenworn by the defendant earli er in t

he eveni ng before t

he murder of Towns and Stokes took place. The hat was e ntered into evid ence as Ex hibit 8.
-3- was to ld to ge t s om e g un s. Af te r m ee ti ng wi th Ca lv in Bo yd, he an d C al vi n B oyd retrievedtwo ninemillimeter

guns, clips, and ammunition from Boy d’s grandfather’shouse, and waited to be picked up by M ar cu s B oyd . La te r, Ca lv in Bo yd a nd Br ow n w er e p ic ke d u p b y M arcus Boyd who w as driving his Lexus truck. Wardlow and the defendant we re also present in the truck. Marcus Bo yd thendrove the truck to a house on Modder Street. Upon arrival, Brown g ot out of the truck, went into the house and woke up Jason Coleman. After arriving at the house, B rown began cleaning and loading the guns. While in the house, Brown overheard Marcus B oyd make the stateme nt “Whack them.” Then Brown heard the defenda nt respond, stating “[w]hack them . . . Make sure don’t nobody move. Make sure both of them dead.” I n agreement, Wardlow reiterate d the defendant’s statement to make sure both Towns and Stokes were dead. According to Brown , the plan was to have h im and Calvi n Boyd do t he sho otin g.
Brown testified that after a brief discussion, he, Marcus B oyd, Calvin Boy d, Wardlow, and the defendant, went to find a second car to use in the killing o f Towns a

nd Stokes. While driving around, the group came across Kevin Harris and Robert Ta ylor who had just stolen a white Chry sler Sebri ng. Marcus Boy

d paid f or th e stolen Sebring, and Wardlow drove it back to the house on Modder Street. Upon arriving at the house, the defenda nt told Brown

that “he wanted

us to kill ‘em put‘em in the trunk, and take ‘em to the expressway.” In response, Br

own told the defendant that the plan would take too much time and be too dan

gerou s. Thereafter, Wardlow sugg ested that the group, “get them at the body shop,” and this plan was agreed upon. According

to Brown , the gr

oup th en split up and left the house on Modder Street. The defenda nt, Marcus Boy

d, and Wardlow left in the Lexus truck, driven by Marcus Boy d. Brown, Calvin Boyd, and C olema n left in th e stol en Seb ring. Previously, Brown ha d woke Coleman up and told him t o “a sk n o qu est

ion s. Ju st get up and come drive the car.” Brown the n gave Coleman directions to the auto-body shop. After reaching the shop, Brown and Calvin Boyd hid on

each side of the building and waited. Coleman drove the car across the street and waited. Once situated, Brown heard a Suburban pull up and then saw the Lexus truck pull up to the front of the body shop. Br ownobserved Marcus Boy d and Wardlow get out of the truck and go inside the shop while t h e defendant remaine d insid e the truck. Once Marcus Boy d and Wardlow entered the building, the defendant exited the t

ruck. As th e defendant got ou

t of the truck, his designer hat fell off in the parkinglot. 1 After ap proaching Br own and Calvin Boyd, the defendant instructed them to take actionwhen they we

re signaled by

a flash of the Lexus truck lights. Acc ording to Brown, the defendant gave the instructions and stated “Fuck wha t Marcus and Wardlow

say, I’ m asking you

– I’m tell ing you

to do this, a

nd when I

flash the lights, I want y ou to do it.”

Upon maki

ng this statemen t, the defe ndant mad

e a ge sture ind

icating to Brown that doing

this would g et him “a l ittle taste of money.” Af

ter waiting for about

forty-five

minutes, Marcus Boy

d and Wardlow exited the buil ding. Brown sa

w Marcu s Boy

d give a signal w hich mea nt “[d]on’t worry

about it. Leave.” However, shortly after Ma rcus Boy d’s signal, Brown saw

the lights flash, whereu

pon he an d Calvin-4-

Bo yd shot both Towns and Stokes ab out “t wenty-five ” times. Brown blamed the defendant for flashing the lights, and s tate d that if he had not seen the flashing lights, he would not have shot Towns and Stokes. Brown testified that he was arrested by

the police later that morning while try ing to escape.

Oncross-examination, Brown admitted that on March 13, 1999, he was highly intoxicated from drinking alcohol, smoking marijuana, and coc aine, but maintained that

he was alert as to the events that led up to the murder of Towns and Stokes. Also, Brown indicated that Marcus Boy

d was considered

high rank in the Gangster Disciples and out ranked the defendant. However, Brown insistedthat Marcus Boy d chose not to be in charge the n ight of the murders. Additional inconsistencies concerning Col e man’s inv olvement were a lso broug ht to ligh t during the defe nse counsel’s cross-examination of Brown. Brown stated that he believed that Coleman was “affiliated with the Gangster Disciples.” Moreover, B rown could not e

xplain why

he told the

police in March of 1999 that Coleman met the group at Vaal Street, but now testified that Coleman was awaken from sleep at the house

on Modder

Street.
Resp onses to cross-examination questions revealed that Brown’s testimony regarding the defendant’s involveme

nt in the mur

der was inconsiste

nt with previous written s tatement s made to police after h is arrest. Brown admitted that in his March 13th statement to police, he did n o t implicate Wardlow in

the murde

rs beca use at the time the information had slipped his mind. Brown al so ad mi tt ed th at hi s M ar ch 13 th st at em en t i mp li ca te d M ar cu s B oyd as the person who asked for the killing of Stokes and Towns not the defendant. Brown f urther admitted that his testimony regarding the defendant’s exit of the Lexus truck to give Brown inf ormation about the signal, and statement “Fuck what Marc us and Wardlow say, I ’m asking y ou – I’m telling y

ou to do this, and when I fla sh the lig

hts, I want

you to do it” wa s not indic ated in e ither of h is previo us stateme

nts to the police. Ra

ther, B rown con

ceded that in his March 13 th stateme nt, he told the police that before “[the defendant] and

Marcus B oyd

pulled up, they

flashed the ligh ts three times for me

and Calvin to come from on this side of the building and kill Omar Stokes

and Sid Tow

ns, and that’s what we did.” During cross-examination, Brown acknowledged tha t he did not actually know whe n the defendant lost his hat, but speculated that it fell off as the defendant was getting out of the truck. Alth ough Brown agreed with the def ense counsel that his memory was “a lot clearer on

theseevents three ye ars ag o,” Brown contin ued to ass ert that he simply did not re me mber every detail of the events surrounding the murders at the time he made those statements, and that some of the facts he swore to in the statements were not true, but told to the police in haste to “get the he at off.”

Onre-direct Brown insisted that his testimony was n ot inconsistent but rather he was testifying to certain things not asked during the course of giving the statements to the police. Brown also pointed to his statement on March 15, 1999 where he indicated t hat the defendant gave the signal. Brown contended that his testi mony was truthful and empha sized that had the lights not flashed he would not have killed Towns and Stokes. On re-cross examination, it was emphasized that Brown a lso admitted t

hat he tol d the polic e taking his statemen

t that “Ma rcus and Carlos [g ot]-5-

into the truck

with Steve and gave us the signal.” However, Brown a sserted that this statement was not correct because he saw “ the lights [flash] before Marcus [Boy d] got in the driver’s seat.”

2. Carlos Wardlow

Carlos Wardlow, t

he secon d accomp lic e, tes tified that he had recently entered a plea agreement

to serve twenty y

ears in the federal system for his involvement in the murder of Towns and Stokes. As part

of the plea agreement, Wardlow agreed t o test ify agains t the d efenda nt in exch ange for the dismissal of similar charges pending in state court. Ac cording to Wardlow, he, Brown, Marcus Boy

d, Calvin Boyd, and the de fendant were all members of the Gang ster Disciples. Omar Stokes, one of the victims, was also a member.

Wardlow explained how each member ranked within the Gang ster Disciple organization. Marcus B oyd ’s d esignated position was “Overseer,” which gave him control over almost all other Gangster Disciples in Memphis. Wardlow, himself, was a “Governor” and cont rolled Sout h Memphis. The def

endant w as an “A ssist ant Governor ” and sup ervised part of So

uth Memphi s. Brown acted a s “Chief o f Securi t y” for the

Sou th Memphis a

rea, an d Calvin B oyd

worked w

ith Br ow n a s p ar t o f s ec ur it y.
Wardlow testified that he, Marcus Boy d, and the defenda

nt were i nvolved in

dealing drugs. Marcu s Boy d was responsible for purchasing the drug s while Wardlow and the defendant were responsi ble for distribution. As partners, the profits from the sale of t he d rug s we re s pl it equ all y. In late 1998, the three partners were forced to look for new suppliers because their previous suppliers had been arrested and incarc erated. Consequently, the three pa rtners approached Omar Stokes and Sid Towns and requested help in finding new drug suppliers. It was Stokes responsibility to find and make the connections with the drug suppliers, and it was Towns responsibility to transport the drugs inhis Suburban. On or about March 10, 1999, Marcus Boy d went to Town’s home and dropped off
a lar ge q uan ti ty of

mo ney i n a b row n pa per bag . It was understood that Towns and Stoke s were to go to C hicago to pu rchase a large quantity of drug s for Marcus Boy d, Wardlow, and the defenda nt.
Wardlow testified that on March 12, 1999, around 9:00 p.m., he, Marcus Boy d, Calvin Boyd, Coleman, and a few

others were hanging out making rap music

when Mar

cus Boy d recei ved a ca ll
onthis cell phone. Wardlow observed that the phone call agitated Mar cus Boyd. A fter hanging out for a while, Wardlow left and went to his grandmother’s house. About 40 minutes later, Wardlow received a call from Marcus B oyd telling him to come

out of the

house and take a r

ide with hi

m in his Lexus truck. After picking Wardlow up, Marcus Boy

d went to pick up the defendant. Once the defendant was picked up, Marcus Boy d told Wardlow and the defendant that Towns and Stokes had lost their money in Texas.

Wardlow testified that

all three partners were a

ngry with Towns

and Stoke s for losin

g their
mo ne y. Consequently, all three pa rtners “came to the conclusion that [Towns and Stokes] would have to be killed for the money that was missing. ” Accor ding to Wa

rdlow, the

initial pla

n was to kil l-6-

Towns and Stokes “right after they got off the h ighway

and co me back into town.” Wardlow explained:

Skinner [the defendant] had agreed to kill them, and while we w a s

riding aroun d, we w as loo king for a l ocation t o kill them a

t, and Mar

cus, Skinner, and myself ca

me to the conclusion

that Skinner would do it ata gas station at Mallory

and Third

Street. [H owever ,] at that time, Skinne r said that he didn’t think that would be a good place to kill them at.

. . . The next idea came from Marcus. Marcu s said that he didn’t want StevenSkinner to

do it; that he would have somebody else do it. And we rode around and he came to the conclusion that he would have Calvin Boy d an d Michael Brown kill ‘em. . . . Michael Brown and Ca lvin Boyd, they

were supposed to go and hide beh

ind the cu stom shop th at Sid [Town s] owns.

Wardlow then rel ate d how th e new plan to kill Towns and Stokes came to fruition. After picking up Brown and Calvin Boy d, the group came u

pon two men, who were known to be car thieves, st ri pp in g a st ol en ca r. Af te r p ayi ng fo r t he st ol en ca r, Ma rc us Bo yd told him to drive the car to the house on Mod der St reet wh ere Co leman was sl eepin g. Upon arrival, Wardlow got out of the
car and followed Marcus Boy d into the house where he observed Marcus Boyd wa

ke Coleman up. According

to Wardlow , after

waking Coleman up , Marcus

Boy d asked Co leman todrive Brown and Calvin Boyd to the auto-

body shop. After

Coleman, B rown and

Calvin Boyd lef t, Wardlow, Marcus Bo yd and the defendant drove to Sid Town’s house to speak with him about the lost mo ney. The three of them then

had a conversation with Towns. During the conversation, Towns blamed Stokes for choosing to go to Texas instead of Chicago and losing the money. Marc

us Boyd re sponde d to Town’s statement by

telling Towns to bring Stokes to the auto-body shop. Although Towns objected to bringing

Stok es to h is sh op, t he defe ndant gave Tow ns an u ltim atum s tati ng, “[e]ither you bring him to the shop, or we’re gonna kill both of y ou all.” Towns agreed to bring Stokes to the shop.

While en route to the auto-body shop, Wardlow tried to talk Marcus Boy d out of killing Towns and Stokes that night because he thought the police would c heck Marcus Boy

d’s telepho n e record s. According to Wardlow, the defendant later voiced his disagre ement with Wardlow’s earlier advice, and state d th at “they sh ould be killed.” However, as they pulled up to the auto body shop, Marcus agreed with Wardlow that he was right about the phone records. There fore, upon arrival at the auto-body shop, Wardlow let the window down a nd yelled out

to where he believed

Brown and Calvi nBoy

d were h iding, te lling the

m not to kill T owns and St okes and that the h

it was off

. Moments later, Towns and Stokes arrived in the Suburban. According

to Wardlow , the def

endant stayed in theback seat of the Le xus truck while he Marcus, Towns and Stokes entered into the body shop. Onc e i ns id e, Wa rd lo w a nd Ma rc us Bo yd que stioned

Stokes as to what happened to the money , and what he planned to do to get the mon e y back. Stokes insisted that his hookup betrayed him, and ha d walked off

with the money . After t

his conversation, all f

our me n walked out of the building and headed for their ve hicles. Wardlow-7-

explained that he and the others were walking out the door to the body

shop w hen he saw “t he high beams on the Lexus flash on and off/on and off/ on an d o ff .” Th at is wh en he sa w C al vi n B oyd sneakingup behind Stokes. Calvin Boyd had a ski mask c overing his face and was ar med. Imm ed ia te ly, Wardlow ran to the L exus Tru ck and g ot into the f ront pass enger

side. At the same time, Marcus Boy

d had reached the truc k and go t i nto the driver’s seat. As Wardlow got into the truck, he observed the defendant sitting in the back of the truck. Wardlow stated that he heard a lot of gunshots as the three partners left the dr iveway of the

auto-body shop.

After fleeingthe scene , the defendant said, “Man, I dropped my hat outside – outside the truck.” Wardlow responded, “Turn around, let’s go ba ck an d g et hi s h at .” Ho we ve r, Ma rc us Bo yd told Wardlow to “forget the hat.” The group then hea

ded to Na shville. A

couple ho

urs later, Calvin Bo yd and Colema

n met up wit

h them at Ma

rcus Boyd’ s house in N ashville. Accord ing to Wardlow, the defendant

was the only

individua

l that did not appear upset about the “hit” that just took place. Rather, the defendant was “very hyperac tive.” In fact, Wardlow hea r d the de fendant make the statement “[t]hem niggers . . . got what they hadcoming to them.” Wardlow also said that the defendant told the group that “Calvin w as holding his compos

ure bett er than he did on his

first killing.” After

spending a few hours in Nashville, Wardlow, the defenda nt, and Marcus Boy

d drove back to Me

mphis.

Oncross-examination, Wardlow admitted that in addition to having all state criminal charges dismissed, he could potentially rec eive a reduc ed fede ral sente nce if he cooperated with the State and testified against the defendant. Wardlow also explained why Towns and Stokes were asked to find additional drug su

ppliers. Omar Stokes was believed to be a board member of the Gangster Disciples inChica go. Ch icago was the world headquarters of the Gang ster Disciples. Therefore, Stoke’s status
as a board member of the Chicago Gang ster Disciples demanded respect. Sid Towns had outfitted his Suburban with a special secret compartment in order to tra ns port drug s back to Memphis. As
owner of the Suburban, Towns was designated as the drive r in charge of the drug

transpo rtati on. However, Towns and Stokes were supposed to go to Chicago not Texas to pick up coca ine. When the three partners learned

that Town s and Stoke s lost their money they

became angry

and upset. They believe d they

had bee n “rippe d off” a

nd disres pected by Stokes.

Wardlow acknowledged during cr os s-exa mination that he was not sure where Brown and Calvin Boyd we

re hiding when h e shouted out the window that the hit was off. Moreover, he admitted that he did not get out of the car to make sure that Brown and Calvin Boy d heard him. As Wardlow explained, he did not have time to personally re late the message because the Suburba n had pulled into the pa rking lot and he did no t want to indicate to Stokes that a “hit” had been planned. However, Wardlow testified that when he yelled out the win

dow, the d

efenda nt did not ob

ject to him calling the hit o ff. In fact, War dlow stated that he believed he was speaking f or every body in the truck when he shouted out the window.

Additional responses to cross-examination questions revealed that although War dlow saw the Lexus truck lights flash, it meant nothing to him. Wardlow emphasized that he did not know of any-8-

discussion involving any sig nal whatsoever. Wardlow also reiterated that the defendant did not ge t out of the Lexus truck or go into the building with him and Marc us Boyd.

B. Other Witnesses

1. Jason Coleman

Jason Coleman testified for the prosecution. Coleman denied being a member of the Gangst er’s Discip les. Coleman explained that he had met Ma

rcus Boyd w

hile play ing bask etball
onthe campus of Tennessee State University . At the time, Coleman was nineteen y ears old, living i nNashville , and atte

nding TSU . Beca

use of simi lar inter

ests in the

rap music

in dustry an d basketba ll, Coleman became friends with Marcus Boy d. Althoug

h friend s, Coleman did not know that Marcus Boy

d was a gang member.

March of 1 99 9, Co le ma n w as ou t f or sp ri ng br ea k a nd tr av el ed to Me mp hi s o n T hu rs da y, March 11 in order to see his girlfriend and her family . After spending the night at his girlfr iend’s house, Coleman went

to a commu

nity center to play basketba ll. After play ing bask etball until 8:00 p.m., Coleman was unable to convince his girlfriend to pick hi m up because he was in a bad neighborhood

and it was

late. As a

result, Coleman walked to Marcus Boy d’s grandfather’s house. There, Col eman me t up with Ma rcus Boyd. Coleman a sked Mar cus Boy d to drive

him to his girlfriend’s h ouse, h owever, Marcus Boy d did not want to drive that far and instead dropped Colem an off a t the h ouse o n Modd er Str eet wer e Cole man en ded up sleep ing. According

to Coleman he was woken up by Marcus B oyd early Saturday morning . Marcus Boyd shook Coleman and said, “[g]et your ass up . . . The se mother-fuckers took my money. Get your ass up.” Still sleepy, Coleman heard Marcus B oyd

say “I need y ou to drop them

off.” B ecause Brown an d C al vi n B oyd we re st an di ng be hi nd Ma rc us Bo yd in the bed

room, Coleman understood that Marcus Boy

d wanted him to drop them off. Co le ma n d id no t a rg ue wi th Ma rc us Bo yd because Marcus B oyd had neverput him in je opardy , nor done

any thing “t erribly wrong” in the pas t. Coleman emphasized that he had no idea what was going on or what was about to happen.

After getting dressed, Coleman went outside to the drivewa y where he observed the

Lexus truck and a white Sebring. Although Coleman did not want to drive, Brown told him to drive and drop them off at an

unspecified location. Coleman did not argue, got into the driver’s sea t, and drove the Sebri ng. Alt hough Coleman w as not told what the d

estination was, Brown gave him directions until they rea

ched a building. Coleman was directed to park the car behind the building . As Brown and Calvin Boyd exited

the Sebring, Brown

told Coleman to wait because they would be right back. Colemanstated that he did not know Brown or Calvin Boy d were carry

ing guns because he had

not seen the m.
As Col eman waited in the Sebring, he saw the Lexus truck and a Suburban drive pa st an d park in front o f the build

ing. See ing the v ehicles , Coleman got out of the Sebring and watched Marcus Boyd and

Wardlow exitthe Lexus truck, and two other men exit the Suburban. All four men-9-

thenentered the building. Brown and Calvin B oy d were nowhere to be seen. I n an effort to find Brown and Calvin

Boy d, Coleman

walked a round the building calling their na mes. However, no one ap pe ar ed . A ga in , C ol em an ca ll ed ou t f or Br ow n a nd Ca lv in Bo yd to show themselves but no one respo nded, and Co leman , not seein g anybody, went back t o the S ebrin g.
Afte r sitting in the Sebring for about ten minutes, Coleman exited the car and walke d to a building overhang and stood there watching the front of the building. From the overhang, Coleman
was able to observe Wardlow exit the building along with the two other men. However, Coleman did not see Marcus Boy

d leave the building. As Coleman explained, he was now able to identify one of the men as Sid Towns, whom he had previously met at a wedding in Memphis. As Coleman watched Towns and th e othe r man l eave th e buil ding, he saw a shadow step behind one of the men and heard gunshots fired. Hear ing “non-stop gunfire,” Coleman ra n back to the car. According

to Coleman, he reached the Sebring about th e s am e t im e B ro wn an d C al vi n B oyd did. Once in the car, B rown ag ain told Coleman to drive. However, after making a f ew turns, the
car died. Coleman testified that when the car stalled, he did not try to park it but jumped outof the
car andtook off running. Coleman continued to run and hide until he reache d Marcus Boy d’ s grandfather’shouse and called Marcus Boyd. Mar cus Boyd told Coleman to wait at the house w here he would be picked up.

Colemanstated that he was eventually picked up by Calvin Boyd a

nd two gi rls and ta ken to Nashville. Once in Nashvil le, Colema n and CalvinBoyd met up with Marc us Boyd, Wardlow, and the defendant at Marcus Boyd’s home. A ccording to Coleman, the defendant appea red happy about what just took place while every one else looked worried

or scared. As Coleman explained, no one
was talking because they had all learned that Brown had been c aught by police. Howev er, the defendant asked Ca lvin Boy d to show every

one how he shot Towns and Stokes. Whereupon, Calvin Bo yd demonstrated

for the group how he shot the two men. After watching the demonstration, the defendant also made the statement “[w]e wha cked t hem – we whacked them. We killed them mother-f uckers. They

got what they

deserved. We whack

ed them. We ’re gonna hurt t he town wi

th this.” Later, as the g

roup prepared

t o leave and drive back to Memphis, Coleman heard the defe ndant telling Marcus Boy

d to get an alibi worked out. Six months later, Colem an wa s apprehended as a suspect in the murders and was interviewed by law enforcement.
On cross-examination, Coleman reiterated that it was Marcus Boy

d who woke him up and asked him t o driv e the s tolen Sebri ng. Coleman underscored the fact that Marcus Boy

d, Wardlow, and the defendant got into the Le xu s Truck a nd left the

house whi le he drove Brow n and Calvin Bo yd in the Sebring. Coleman also indicated that he had observed the defendant sitting in the back seat of the Lexus truck.

Also emphasized on cross-ex amination was the fact that Coleman did not know what the group was planningto do. Though Coleman admitted that he realized the Sebring was stolen whi le waiting for Brown and Ca

lvin Boyd to re

turn. However, being in an unfamiliar part of M emphis, Colemanstated that he was uncomfortable leaving. Colemanalso asserted that he was in a good-10-

position to see the front door of the building. Yet, he admitted that he did not see any f

lash of light be fore hearin g t he gunfire. Finally, Coleman stated the fact that he saw Wardlow get into the passenger side of the L exus truck.

2. Randall Jackson

A s a witnes s for the prosecution, Randall Jackson testified that he was a friend of the defenda nt, and that sometime in March of 1999, the defendant offered him $10,000 to take care of
some business. According to Jackson, the defe

ndant wa nted Jacks on to take ca

re of some busines s because a Gang ster Disc iple took money from him. H owever , the def endant w as not spe cific as to what business he wanted taken care of. Jackson testified that later on during the day , the defendant told Jackson that he wanted

“so mebody to kill some folks.” At this time, Jackson, Wardlow, and defendant were in the defendant’s car, heading to meet Marcus Boy

d. After meeting at the rendevous point, eve

ryone got into Marc

us Boy d’s L exus truck

whereu pon the de fendant

told Marcus Boyd “[t]he

bitch won’t fuck.” Jackson testified that he believed the defendant’s statement was in re ferenc e to his re fusal to ta ke care of busine ss for the

defenda nt.

Oncro ss- exa

mina tion , Ja ckson admitted that he gave a statement concer ning his conversation with the defendant to the police on May 21, 1999. At the time, Jackson was in custody for federal criminal charges unrelated to the murder of Stok es and Towns. The statement was given afte r Jackson had pled g

uilty to the charges but before he was sentenced. Althoug h Jackson admitted that his felony cha

rges were reduced at the sentencing hearing, he denied mentioning the stateme nt at any time during his sentencing in an effort to re duce his sentence. Jac kson also ad mitted that he was
curren tly in custody facing

pending charges. However, Jackson asser ted that no promises had been offere d for tes tify

ing at th e defen

dant’s tr ial.
Responses to cross-examination questions indicate d that Jackson gave a statement conc ernin g his conversation with the defendant to detectives three months afte r the murder o f Towns a

nd Stokes. Also, co nt ra di ct in g e ar li er te st im on y, Jackso n stated that the conversation between him and the defendant occurr ed in late April or e arly

May not in Mar

ch. Jackson also admitted that his May 21 statement indicated that the conversation with the defendant occur red on Thursday

afternoon before Towns and Stokes were killed. Moreover, Jackson acknowledg ed that his May 21 statement did not
c ontain any ref erence to the defendant’s statement “[t]he bitch won’t fuck.” Finally, J ackso n acknowledged

that he had heard that Towns and Stokes had been killed from the re ports on television and new s from the street.

Onre-direct examination, Jackson emphasized that his May 21 statement corroborated the fact that the d efenda nt offer ed him mone

y to take ca re of some busines s, the defendant and Marcus Bo yd wanted to kill a guy

who was a Gangster

Disciple, and this related to some money that the Gangster Disciple had taken from them. Jackson aver red that his May 21 stateme nt was true.-11-

The defenda

nt chose not to put on any proof

at trial. At the conclusion of the trial, the jury convicted the defendant of

two count s of first degree murder. At the se ntencing hearing, the trial
co ur t o rd er ed th e d ef

en da nt to se rv e h is tw o l if e s en te nc es co ns ec ut iv el y.
II. Analysis: Sufficiency of the Evidence

Onappeal, the defendant argues that the evidenc e is insufficient to sustain his convictions becaus e there is no proof connecting him to the murders other than unc orroborated accomplice te st im on y. Specifically, the de fendant argues that (1) Jason Coleman was an accomplice as a matter of law, and therefore, his testimony required corrobor ation; and ( 2) the State failed to provide sufficient evidenc e to corroborate the accomplice testimony . The State argues that theevidenc e is sufficient to support

the convi ctions be cause ( 1) Jason Cole man was not an acc ompli ce and his testimony corroborates the accomplice testimony and (2) the accomplice testimony was suff iciently corroborated by

independent evidence.

Our review on appeal

begins with the well-established rule that once a jury finds a defendant gu il ty, his or h e r presum

ption of in

nocenc e is remov ed and re placed w ith a pre sumption of

guilt. State v. Black , 815 S.W.2d 166, 175 (Tenn. 1991). Therefore, on appeal, the convicted defendant has the burden of demonstrating to this Court why the evidence will not

support th e jury ’s verdi ct. Stat e v. Carruthers , 35 S.W.3d 51 6, 557–58 ( Tenn. 200 0); State v. Tu ggle , 639 S.W.2d 913, 914 (Tenn. 1982). To meet this burden, the defendant must estab lish that no

“reasonabletrier of

fact” could have found the essential elements of the crime bey ond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virgini a , 443 U.S. 30 7, 319 (19 79); St ate v. Evans , 108 S.W.3d 23 1, 236 (Te nn. 2003) ; Tenn. R. App. P. 13(e).

Incontrast, the jury’ s verdict approve d by

the trial judge a ccredi ts the States’ witnesses and resolves all conf

licts in favor of the State. State v. H arris , 839 S.W.2d 5 4, 75 (Te nn. 1992) ; State
v. Sheffie ld , 676 S.W.2d 542, 547 (Tenn. 1984). The State is entitled t o the st ronge st legiti

mate view of the evidence and all reasonable inf ere nces which may

be from that evidence. State v. Carruthers , 35 S.W.3d 516 , 557–58 ( Tenn. 200 0); State v. Tu ggle , 639 S.W.2d 913, 914 (Tenn. 1982). Questions concerning the credibility of the witne sses, conflicts in trial testimony, the weig ht and value to be given

the evidence, and all factual issues raised by the evidence areresolved by the trier of fact and not this Court. St ate v. B la nd , 958 S.W.2d 651, 659 (Tenn. 1997). We do not attempt to re-weigh or re-eva

luate the evidence, nor do we substitute our inferenc es drawn from the circumstantial evidence for those drawn by t he trier of fact

. State v. Elkins , 102 S.W.3d 581, 582 (Tenn. 2003); State v. Re id , 91 S.W.3d 24 7, 277 (Te nn. 2002) ; State v. Bland , 958 S.W.2d 651, 659 (Tenn. 1997).

A. Acco mplice Status

InTennessee, a conviction may not be based sole ly upon the uncorroborated testimony of an accomplice. State v. Bane , 57 S.W.3d 41 1, 419 (Te nn. 2001) ; State v. Shaw , 37 S.W.3d 900, 903 (Tenn. 2001) (c itations om itted). Furthermo

re, accomplices cannot corroborate e ach other. State-12-

v. Boxley , 76 S.W.3d 381, 386 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2001). “An accomplice is one wh o k no wi ng ly,
vo lu nt ar il y, and with co mmon intent unites with the principal offender in the commission of a crime.” S ta te v. Allen , 976 S.W.2d 661, 666 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1997). Typically , the test for determining whether

a witness is an acc omplice is whethe r he himself could have been convicted for the offense. Id ; State v. Lawson , 794 S.W.2d 363, 369 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1990).

The question of who determines whe the r a witness is an accomplice depends upon the evidence introduced during the course of a trial. Bethan y v. State , 565 S.W.2d 900, 903 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1978). When the undisputed evidence clearly establishes the witness is an accomplice
as a matter of law, the trialcourt, not the jury, must decide this issue. State v. Lawson , 794 S.W.2d 363, 369 (Tenn. Crim. Ap p. 1990). On the other hand, if the evidence adduce d at trial is unclear, conflic ts, or subject to different inferences, the jury , as the trier of fact , is to dec ide if the

witness is
an accompl i ce. Id. If the jury finds ac complice

status, the

n the issue

of wheth er the wi

t ness' s testimony has been sufficiently

corroborated becomes a m atter en tr usted to the jury as the trier of fact. State v. Bigbee , 885 S.W.2d 797, 803 (Tenn. 1994).

Initi ally the rec ord ref

lects tha t the tria l court, th

roug h its charge, identified witnesses Michael Brown a

nd Carlos Wa

rdlow as a

ccomplic es to the c

rimes. Th e trial c ourt t hen defined accomplice status and

instructed the jury to consider accomplice testimony only if the testimony was supporte d an d corroborated by independent evidence. Although Brow n and Wardlow were recognized

as accomplices in the jury instructions, Jason Coleman was not. Nonetheless, the jury instructions were accurate and c omplete on the issue of accomplice testimony and how it should be weighed. From

the record, we cannot find any evidence where the defendant requested tha t the jury instructions include Coleman as an accomplice. Absent such a request for a ccomplice instruction, the issue is waived on

appeal. State v. Robinson , 146 S.W.3d 4 69, 489 (T enn. 2004 ); See State v. Anderson , 985 S.W.2d 9, 17 (Tenn. Cr im. App. 19 97) (“om

issions in the jury

charg e must

be called to the trial judge's attention or be reg arded as waived.”) (citations omitted).

Ad di ti on al ly, and perhaps more important

ly, the rec ord does n

ot support

th e defenda

nt’s contentionthat Jason Co leman wa s an acc omplice a s a matter of law. Coleman’s testimony regarding his involvement clearly plac es his accomplice status in dispute. Although Coleman’s testimony indicates that he was in close proximity to the perpe tration of the murders, his testimony also suggests that he did not knowingly, voluntarily , and with common intent unite with the principal offenders to commit the crimes. Whatever evide n ce implic ating Co leman as an accomplice co

nflicts with evidence indicating

his ignorance and innocence of the events surrounding the criminal acts. For example, Co leman’s t

estimony indicates that he unwittingly c omplied with Marcus Boy d’s request to dr iv e B ro wn an d C al vi n B oyd to someunknown location. His testimony also revea ls that he was neve

r appris ed of the

plan to kill

Towns and Stokes. The evidenc e simply does not e stablish that Colemanwas an accomplice to the murders of Towns and Stokes. As such, the issue of whether Colemanwas an accomplice was a factual question to be determined by the jury and

it was with

in their province to ei th er cr ed it or di sc re di t h is te st im on y. Accordingly , the defendant's argume nt that Coleman w as an ac complice as a matte

r of law i s without me

rit.-13- B. Corro boration o f Accomplice Test imony

Ou r s up re me co ur t h as he ld th at in or de r t o p ro pe rl y co rr ob or at e a cc om pl ic e t es ti mo ny [t]here must be some

fact tes tified to, entirely independ

ent of th e a ccomp lice's te st im on y, wh ich, taken by itself, lea ds to the inference, not only that a crime has been committed, but also that the defendant is implica

ted in it; and this independent corroborative testim ony mus t also inclu de som e fact e stabl ishi ng the d efenda nt's id en ti ty. This co rrobora tive evidence may be direct or entirely

circumstantial, and it need not be a dequate, in and of itself , to suppor

t a conviction; it is suf

ficient t o meet the requirements of the rule if it fairly and legitimately

tends to connect the defendant with the c ommission of

the crime

charg ed. I

t i s not ne cessary

that the
corr obor ation extend to every

part of the acc ompli ce' s [tes timon

y]

. Shaw , 37 S. W.3d at 903 (quot ing Bigbee , 885 S.W.2d at 803). Furthermore, independent evidence, thou gh slight and entitled to little weight when standing alone, is sufficient to corr ob orat e accomplice testimony

. S tate v. He flin , 15 S.W.3d 519, 524 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1999). However, evidence that merely ca sts suspicion on th e accused is inadequate to corrobora te an accomplice’s te st im on y. Boxley , 76 S.W.3d at 387 (citations omitted). The sufficie ncy of the corrobora

tion is a determination for the jury

. Shaw , 37 S.W.3d at 903.

From our review of

the record, we note that both accomplices, Brown and Wardlow, testified that the defendant

played an integ

ral part in planning and ordering the murder of Towns a

nd Stokes. Brown’s testimony indicated that the defendant participated in the murders by telling him and the other gunman to sh oot wh en sign aled b y the flas h of th e Lexus truck headl igh t s. Wardlow’s testimony revealed that the defendant had a motive to kill Towns and Stokes. As a p artn er in the drug trafficking business, the defendant lost money when Towns and Stoke s lost the pa rtners’ drug
mo ne y. According to Wardlow, the defendant convince d Towns to bring Stokes to the auto-body shop by i ntimidatin

g him with

a death threat. Wardlow’s testimony also indicate d the defendant’s attitude and demeanor before and af ter the murders.

As corroborative evidence, Jason Colem an’s testimony indicates that early Saturday mo rning, Towns and Stokes were shot. In addition, Coleman testified that he overhear d the defendant make the statements “[w]e killed them mother-fuckers. They got what they

deserved. We wacked them We’re gonna hurt the town with this.” Coleman further related that the defendant appeared happy that the murders had taken place. Thus, Coleman’s testimony corrobora tes the accomplice testimony with regard to the fact that Towns and Stokes we re murd ered and

connects the defendant to the crimes committed.

Randall Jackson’ s testimony also implicates the defenda nt in the murder of Towns and Stokes. Jackson’s testimony indicates that the defendant offered to give him $10,000 to take care of business for him. According to Jackson, the defendant then mentioned that a Gang ster Disc iple-14-

took some money from him. Jackson related tha t he believed

the defe ndant off ered him the $10,000 because the defendant wanted him to kill somebody

. Beyond the testimony of Coleman a nd Jackson, the State

introduc ed a blac

k designer base

ball hat into evidence. The hat was found at the cr ime sc ene and further corroborate s the accomplice te st im on y. Both accomplices testified to the fact that the defendant was wearing a black designer basebal l hat the morning of the murders. Brown testified that the defendant’s hat fell off in the parkinglot as the de fendan t got o ut of t he tru ck. Acc ordin g to Brown , the defendant had left the truck to instruct him and Ca

lv in Boyd on wha

t do when they saw the

Lexus truck lights flash. Wardlow testified that while fleeing the crime scene, the defendant ac knowledged the fact

that he had dropped his hat outside. As previo usly stated, evidence independent of accomplice testimony, though slight and circumst antial, is sufficient to corroborate accomplice testimony

. Consequently, after reviewing the record, we conc lude that sufficie nt corro borative evidence exists to uphold the defendant’s convictions.
C. Overall Sufficiency of the Evidence

Inthe present

case, the defendant was convicted of two counts of first degree murder. First degre e murder

is defined

inpertinent part as the "premeditated and intentional killing of a nother." Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-202(a) (1). ‘Int entional ’ refe

rs to a pe rson who a

cts intent ionally with
res pect to the nat

ure of th e conduct or to a re sult of the conduct w

hen it is the

person' s c onsciou s objective or desir

e to eng age in t

he condu ct or ca use the result.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-11-302 (a). Premeditationrefers to "an act done after the exercise of reflection and judgment." Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-202(d). Moreover, premeditation “means that the intent to kill must have been formed prior to the act itself. It is not necessary that the purpose to kill pre-exist in the mindof the accused for any definite pe

riod of time.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-202(d).

The jury in this cas e was not

only instructed onthe elements of first degree murder and lessor included offenses, but also on the theory of c

riminal responsibility for the conduct of a nother. “A person is crimina

lly r esponsibl e as a pa

rty to an offe nse if

the of fense i s comm itte d by the pe rson's
ownconduct, by t

he condu ct of ano ther for

which the

person is criminal ly

responsible, or by both.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-11-401(a). One is criminally responsible for an offense committed by another when, "[acting

with inten

t to promote

or assist t

he commiss io n of the of

fense , or to benefit in the proceeds or resul

ts of the offense, the person solicits, directs, aids, or attempts to aid another person to commit the offense." Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-11-40 2(2). Cri minal res ponsibility

is not a se

parate crimebut"solely

a theory by w hich the St

ate may prove the de fendant's guilt of the allege d offense,

. . . based upon the con duct of anot her person." State v. Dickens , 123 S.W.3d 355, 389-90 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2003) (quoting State v. Lummoxes , 996 S.W.2d 166, 170 (Tenn.1999)). Under a theory of criminal responsibility, an individual's pre sence and compani onship wit h the perpetrator of a felony before and after the commission of an offe nse are circu

m stances from which his or her participation

in the crime may be

inferred. See State v. Ba ll , 973 S.W.2d 2 88, 293 (T enn. Crim.-15-

App. 1998). No particular act need be shown, and the de fendant need not have taken a phy sical part inthe crime in order to be held criminally responsible. See id. To be criminally re sponsible for the acts of anothe

r, the de fendant

must “in so me way

associa te himself

with the ve

nture, a ct with knowl edge that an of

fense is to be comm

itted, and share i

nthe criminal intent of the principal in the first degree.” State v. Mamey , 898 S.W.2d 756, 757 ( Tenn. Cri m. App.1 994) ( quot ing Hombre v

. State , 546 S.W.2d 235, 239 (Tenn. Crim. App.1976)) (internal quotations omitted). Viewingthe evidence in a l ight m ost favorable to the State, the proof established that the murder of Omar Stokes and Sid Tow ns was bot

h premeditated and intentional and that the defendant knowing ly

participated in their murders. The defendant, Mar cus Boyd, a

nd Wardlow were drug dealers who gav e money

to Towns and

Stokes to pu

rchase drugs. When Towns and Stokes lost the
mo ne y, the defen dant an d his partners were angry and agreed that Towns and Stokes were to be killed. The defendant initiated the planning stage of the murd e rs by

offerin g $10,00 0 to Randa

ll Jackson to kill them . When Jacks on refus ed to acc ept the de fendant ’s offe r, the de fendant

and his partners came up with another plan. Th e t hr ee of th em ag re ed th at Mi ch ae l B ro wn an d C al vi n B oyd would kill Towns and Stokes at the auto body shop.

Proof also esta blished th at it

was the defenda

nt who thre atened t

o kill Town s if he fa

iled to bring Stokes with him to the auto-body shop. More over, it

was the defendant who instructed Brown and Calvin Boyd to shoot

Towns and Stokes when they sa w the Lexus truck headlights flash. The defendant gave the signal by f

lashing the headlights, and Browns and Calvin Boyd shot and killed Towns and Stokes.

Ad di ti on al ly, the defe

ndant’s own statements implic ated him as a knowing participant in the murders. In the planning stages, the defendant told one of the gunmen that he wa

nted him to “

kill ‘em, put ‘em in the trunk, and take ‘em to the expresswa

y.” The def endant f urther e xpressed h

is murderous intent saying, “ Whack them. . . . Make sure don’t nobody move. Make sure both of them dead.” Later, after Towns and S toke s wer e kill ed, t

he de fend

ant ma de th e sta

tements, “ [w]e whacked them . . . . We killed them mother-fuckers. They got what they

deserved. We whacked them. We’re gonna hurt the town with this.”

Inthis case, the jury he ard all of the evidence, weighed the cre dibility of the witnesses, and found the defendant guilty

of first degree murder. Moreover, the jury was properly

instructed

as to the eleme nts o f firs t degr ee mur der, lessor included offenses, and the theory of criminal responsi bility for the conduct of another. Consequently, we conclud e t hat the evidence presented at trial was sufficient to support the defendant’s convictions for first de gree murder.

III. Analysis: Se ntencing

We now consider the defendant’s argument that the trial cour t erred in ordering him to serve his life sentences consecutively

.-16-

Ini ti al ly, we note that if a defendant is convicted of more than one criminal offense, a trial court may impose consec

utive sentencing upon a determination by a preponderance of the evidenc e that one or mor

e of the c riteria set forth in Tenne ssee Code

Annotate d section

40-35-11 5(b) exists

. Below is the statutory c

riteria relevant to this case. (1) The d efe ndant is a professional criminal who has knowingly devoted such defendant's life to criminal acts as a major sour ce of livelihood; (2) The defendant is an offender whose record of criminal activity is extensive;

. . . . (4) The defendant

is a dang erous of

fender whosebehavior indicates little or no regard for human life , and no he sitation a bout commit

t ing a crime in w

hich the r isk to human life is high;

Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-115. If the trial cour t concludes that

the defendant is a dangerous off ender under Tenn essee Code Annotated section 40-35-115(b)(4), it must also find that the consecutive sentencingreasonably

relates to the severity

of the offense committed

and is nec essary

to protect the pu blic from further serious criminal conduct by the defendant. State v. Cli fford Rogers, No. W2003-01375-CCA-R3-CD, 2004 WL 725281, a t *5 (Tenn . Crim. App ., at Ja ckson, April 1, 2004); State v. Imf

eld , 70 S.W.3d 698 , 708 (Te nn. 2002) ; State v. Wilkerson , 905 S.W.2d 933, 939 (Tenn. 1995). However, such specific factual f indings ar e un necessa

ry for the o ther cr

iteria lis ted in Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-35-115(b). State v. Lane , 3 S.W.3d 456, 461 (Tenn. 1999). Further, the statutory criteria set forth in Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-35-11 5 are sta

ted in the alterna

tive; ther efore, only

one nee d exist to supp ort the appropriateness of consecutive sentencing.

Inorder ing the cons ecutive sentenc es, the tr

ial cour t found tha

t the def endant w as a professional criminal, a dangerous offe nder, and had an extensive criminal history

. Regarding

the defendant’s professional criminal status, the trial court found that the defendant was twenty-eig

htyears old a

nd had a ninth gradeeducation. The defendant’s employ ment information suggested that he only worked a

t temporary a

genc ies. However, the defendant could not verify employment by

identifying e

ven one temporary

agency . The defendant had an extensive criminal history consisting of thef

t, drug deali ngs, an

d robber ies, “the typ es of off

enses tha t one woul d commit if one needed

money.” The

defendant’s livelihood was provided through larg e, high-dollar drug sa les that a llowed the

him to own two expensive vehicle s.

T he trial court also found the defendant to be a dang erous offender. The trial cou r t artic ulate d its findi ngs st ating:

There ar e homici des and then there are homi cides. There ar e some tha

t in which the defendant’s conduct is more revealing about his attitude and lack o f-17-

hesitation in killing

the victim s. And this c ase is a classic example of that. . . . [T]he proof was that [the defe ndant] fla shed the l ights in the vehicl e and ga ve the sig nal to start the shooting, and that his conduct in the vehicle as they were driving over there,

. . . and his statements and conduct wh en they dr ove to Nashville and . . . at that apartment in Nashville would all show that he was the type of individual who he didn’thave to be dragged into this plan. He didn’t ha v e to be pers uaded to particip ate in this. He

didn’t exhib it any sort of c oncern o r fear or remorse afte

r it happened.

. . . [His conduct

indicated an individual who had absolutely no hesitation at all about committing this offense and was an active and willing a nd even anxious participa nt b ased on w

hat the pr

oof showe d both bef

ore, dur ing, and after

these killings.

The trial cou

rt additionally

found the defendant’s record of criminal history to be extensive. According

to the trial court, the presentence report indicate d that the def end ant had been arrested
numerous times for misdemeanors, driving offenses, criminal trespa ss, thefts, drug cases , an d robbery.

Based on our review, we conclude tha t the t rial court did not err in imposing consecutive sentenc es. First, th e prese ntence r eport, w hich the t rial cou rt relie d upon, is not in

the record before
us. Without the presentence report, we have no way of reviewing thetrial court's findings and must presume that its findings were correct. Second, the sentencing hearing transc ript reveals that the trial court properl y ma de fact ual f ind ings relative to the statutory criteria set forth in Tennessee Code Annotated

section 40-35-115(b). Therefore , the e viden ce in t he reco rd sup ports the tr ial co urt's determination

that the defendant was a professional criminal, a da ngerous offender, and had a record of extensive criminal history. According ly, the imposition o f cons ecutive sentencing was appropriate.

IV. Conclusion Based on the foregoing

review, the judgments of the trial court are affirmed.

___________________________________ J.C. McLIN, JUDGE