MAINE	SUPREME	JUDICIAL	COURT Reporter	of	Decisions

Decision: 2021 ME	51

Docket: Cum-20-281

Argued: July	13,	2021

Decided: October	28,	2021

Panel: MEAD,	GORMAN,	JABAR,	HUMPHREY,	HORTON,	and	CONNORS,	JJ.

CHRISTOPHER	TOTO

v.

RAELYN	KNOWLES

HUMPHREY,	J.

[¶1]	 Christopher	Toto	appeals	from	a	summary	judgment	entered	by	the	

Superior	Court	(Cumberland	County,	Kennedy,	J.)	in	favor	of	Raelyn	Knowles	on	

Toto’s	complaint	alleging	that	he	was	injured	as	a	result	of	Knowles’s	negligent	

operation	of	a	motor	vehicle.		Because	we	conclude	that	the	summary	judgment	

record	 establishes	 a	 genuine	 issue	 of	 material	 fact	 regarding	 whether	

Knowles’s	 negligence	 caused	 Toto	 to	 suffer	injuries, we	 vacate	 the	 summary	

judgment and	remand	for	further	proceedings.

I.		BACKGROUND

[¶2]	 	 The	 following	 facts	 are	 drawn	 from	 the	 parties’	 supported	

statements	of	material	facts,	viewed	in	the	light	most	favorable	to	Toto	as	the	

nonprevailing	party.	 	See	Kurtz	&	Perry,	P.A.	v.	Emerson,	2010	ME	 107,	¶	 15,	
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8 A.3d	677.		While	stopped	in	traffic	behind	a	minivan,	Toto’s	vehicle	was	struck	

from	 behind	 by	 another	 vehicle,	 causing	 Toto’s	 vehicle	 to	 collide	 with	 the	

minivan.		After	 the	collision,	 Toto	complained	 of	a	loss	 of	consciousness	 and	

extreme	pain	on	the	top	of	his	head,	and	he	was	transported	to	a	hospital for	

evaluation.	 	 After	 the	 accident,	 he	 suffered headaches,	 balance	 issues,	 and	

impaired	vision,	none	of	which	he	suffered before the	accident.		

[¶3]	 	On	 August	 6,	 2018,	 Toto	 filed	 a	timely	 complaint	 for	 negligence	

against	 Knowles,	 alleging	 that	 Knowles	 was	 the	 operator	 of	 the	 vehicle	 that	

struck Toto’s	vehicle	from	behind.		On	December	13,	2019,	Knowles	moved	in	

limine	 to	 exclude	 testimony	 from an	 expert	 designated	 by	 Toto—an	

optometrist	 who	 would testify	 that	 the	 accident	 was	 the	 cause	 of	 “visual	

injuries”	suffered	by	Toto.		Knowles	argued	 that the	optometrist’s	deposition	

testimony	 revealed	 that	 he	 was	 not	 qualified	 to	 opine	that	 the	 accident	 had	

caused	 Toto	 to	 suffer	 what	 the	 optometrist	 called	 a	 “visual	 midline	 shift.”		

Knowles	further	argued	that	“visual	midline	shift” is	not	a	recognized	diagnosis	

in	the	medical	community.		

[¶4]		Anticipating	 that	 the	court	would	grant	her	motion	in	limine	and	

exclude	the	optometrist’s	testimony,	Knowles	moved	for	summary	judgment	in	

January	2020.		In	her	motion,	Knowles	argued	 that	without	expert	 testimony
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regarding	complex	medical	facts,	Toto	could	not	prove	that	the	collision	caused	

Toto	to	suffer a “visual	midline	shift.”		

[¶5]		Toto	admitted	Knowles’s	assertion	in	her	statement	of	material	facts	

that	his	“‘visual	injuries’ and	the	purportedly	related	symptoms”	were	his	only	

claimed	injuries.		However,	he	elaborated	on	his	injuries in both his	opposing	

statement	 of	 material	 facts	 and	 his	 statement	 of	 additional	 facts,	 with	

referenced	evidentiary	support from	his	deposition.		Specifically,	he	asserted

that in	 addition	 to	 impaired	 vision, he	 suffered	 from lost	 consciousness	

immediately	 after	 the	 accident, headaches, and	 balance issues.	 	 Knowles	

admitted	Toto’s	additional assertions	of	fact	without	qualification.		

[¶6]	 	In	 March	 2020,	 the	 court	 granted	 Knowles’s	 motion	 in	 limine to	

exclude the	 optometrist’s	anticipated expert	testimony,	 determining	 that the	

optometrist	was	not	qualified	to	opine	on	the cause	of	a	“visual	midline	shift.”		

See	M.R.	Evid.	702.	 The	court	denied	 the	motion	as	 to	 the	 optometrist’s	 fact	

testimony.1		The	court	simultaneously denied	Knowles’s	motion	for	summary	

judgment,	 concluding	 that	 Toto	 had	 presented	 sufficient	 evidence	 that	

 1		To	the	extent	that	Toto	challenged	the	ruling	on	the	motion	in	limine	in	his	brief,	he	clarified	at	

oral	argument	that	he	does	not	appeal	from	that	ruling,	and	we	do	not	discuss	the	issue	further.		
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Knowles’s negligent	operation	of	her	vehicle caused	him	to	suffer injuries for	

his	claim	to	survive	the	motion	for	summary	judgment.		

[¶7]		Knowles	moved for	reconsideration	of	the	court’s	order	denying	her	

motion	 for	 summary	 judgment,	 reiterating	 her	 argument	 that	 the	

determination	that	Toto	suffered	a	“visual	midline	shift”	was	based	on complex	

medical	facts	that	 require	 expert	 testimony	 and	 that, without	 it,	 Toto’s	 only	

remaining	evidence	of	proximate	causation	was an	insufficient	assertion	that	

Toto	 realized	 symptoms	 after	 the	 accident.	 	 On	 October	 7,	 2020,	 the	 court	

entered a	 judgment	 granting Knowles’s motion	 for	 reconsideration	 and	

entering	a summary	judgment in	her	favor.		The	court concluded	that	“visual	

midline	 shift” was	 the	 sole	 injury	 asserted by	 Toto	 and	 that,	 without	 expert	

testimony, Toto	could	not	establish	proximate	causation.		Toto	timely	appealed.		

See	14	M.R.S.	§	1851	(2021);	M.R.	App.	P.	2B(c)(1).		

II.		DISCUSSION

[¶8]	 We review	the	entry	of	a summary	judgment	de	novo,	“considering	

the	evidence	in	the	light	most	favorable	to	the	nonprevailing	party	to	determine	

whether	 the	parties’	 statements	 of	material	 facts	and	 the	 record	evidence	 to	

which	 the	 statements	 refer	 demonstrate	 that	 there	 is	 no	 genuine	 issue	 of	

material	fact and	the	moving	party	is	entitled	to	judgment	as	a	matter	of	law.”		
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Kurtz	&	Perry,	2010	ME	107,	¶	15,	8	A.3d	677 (quotation	marks	omitted).		“A	

material	 fact	 is	 one	 that	 can	 affect	 the	 outcome	 of	 the	 case,	 and	 there	 is	 a	

‘genuine	 issue’	 when	 there	 is	 sufficient	 evidence	 for	 a	 fact-finder	 to	 choose	

between	competing	versions	of	the	fact.”		Stewart-Dore	v.	Webber	Hosp.	Ass’n,	

2011	ME	26,	¶	8,	13	A.3d	773.		

[¶9]		“A	cause	of	action	 for	negligence	has	 four	elements:	(1)	a	duty	of	

care	 owed	 to	 the	 plaintiff;	 (2)	 a	 breach	 of	 that	 duty;	 (3)	 an	 injury;	 and	

(4) causation,	that	is,	a	finding	that	the	breach	of	the	duty	of	care	was	a	cause	of	

the	injury.”	 Est.	of	Smith	v.	Cumberland	Cnty.,	2013	ME	13,	¶	16,	60	A.3d	759.		

“When	the	defendant	is	the	moving	party,	[s]he	must	establish	that	there	is	no	

genuine	 dispute	 of	 fact	 and	 that	 the	 undisputed	 facts	 would	 entitle	 h[er]	 to	

judgment	as	a	matter	of	law.” Est. of	Cabatit	v.	Canders,	2014	ME	133,	¶	8,	105	

A.3d	439.		“It	then	becomes	the	plaintiff’s	burden	to	make	out	the	prima	facie	

case	and	demonstrate	that	there	are	disputed	facts.”		Id.		

[¶10]		At	issue	here	is	whether	 the	accident	proximately	caused	Toto’s	

injuries.		“Proximate	cause	is	an	action	occurring	in	a	natural	and	continuous	

sequence,	uninterrupted	by	an	intervening	cause,	that	produces	an	injury	that	

would	not	have	occurred	but	for	the	action.”	 Cyr	v.	Adamar	Assocs.	Ltd.	P’ship,	

2000	ME	110,	¶	6,	752	A.2d	603.		A	fact	finder	may	draw	reasonable	inferences	
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in	determining	issues	of	causation.		See,	e.g.,	Marcoux	v.	Parker	Hannifin/Nichols	

Portland	Div.,	2005	ME	107,	¶	26,	881	A.2d	1138	(holding	that	a	fact	finder	may	

infer	causation	without	speculation	from	supported	assertions	that	the	plaintiff	

fell	after	she	made	physical	contact	with	a	stain	on	the	floor).

[¶11]		Although	causation	in	a	vehicle	accident	case	is	usually	a	matter	to	

be	 resolved	by	 the	 fact	 finder,	 summary	judgment	may	be	appropriate	if	 the	

record	is	 completely	 devoid	 of	 evidence	 supporting	 causation.	 	Est.	 of	 Smith,	

2013	ME	13,	¶ 18,	60	A.3d	759.		Evidence	“submitted	in	opposition	to	summary	

judgment[] need	not	be	persuasive	at	that	stage,” but it	“must	be	sufficient	to	

allow	a	 fact-finder	 to	make	a	 factual	determination	without	speculating.”		Id.

¶ 19.

[¶12]		The amount or type of evidence required to prove causation may

turn on the complexity of the facts.		See Tolliver v. Dep’t of Transp., 2008 ME 83,

¶ 42, 948 A.2d 1223 (“Our	 precedents	 also	 indicate	 that	 in	 cases	 involving	

complex	facts	beyond	the	ken	of	the	average	juror,	.	.	.	more	substantial	evidence	

of	 proximate	 cause	 may	 be	 required.”).	 	 Although	 expert	 testimony	 may	 be	

required	if	 a	 party	is	 asserting	 complex	medical	 facts	 to	 establish	 causation,

see Merriam	v.	Wanger,	2000	ME	159,	¶¶	11-18,	757	A.2d	778, expert	testimony	

is	not	required	if	“the	negligence	and	harmful	results	are	sufficiently	obvious	as	
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to	 lie	 within	 common	 knowledge,” Patten	 v.	 Milam,	 480	 A.2d	 774,	 778	

(Me. 1984) (quotation	marks	omitted).

[¶13]	 	 Thus,	 “[w]here	 a	 plaintiff	 emerges	 from	 a	 sudden	 rear-end	

automobile	accident	with	a	hurt	neck,	it	is	permissible	for	the	jury	to	infer	that	

the	 injury	 was	 caused	 by	 defendant’s	 negligent	 driving	 where	 there	 was	 no	

evidence	of	a	pre-existing	neck	injury.” 1 Dan B. Dobbs	et	al.,	The	Law	of	Torts

§ 191	at	639	(2d	ed.	2011);	see,	e.g.,	Foddrill	v.	Crane,	894	N.E.2d	1070,	1074,	

1078	 (Ind.	Ct.	App.	2008)	 (finding	 the	causal	connection	between	a	 rear-end	

collision	and	neck	pain,	headaches,	and	other	injuries	was	“not	so	complex	that	

a	layperson	would	be	unable	to	comprehend	it	without	expert	testimony”	when	

there	 was	 no	 evidence	 that	 plaintiff	 suffered	 from	 prior	 neck	 injuries,	 the	

collision	 was	 forceful	 enough	 that	 plaintiff	 hit	 her	 head	 on	 the	 roof	 of	 her	

vehicle,	and	plaintiff	immediately	afterward	felt	pain	in	her	neck).	

[¶14]		Construing	the	supported	statements	of	material	facts	in	the	light	

most	favorable	to	Toto, as	we	must,	see MSR	Recycling,	LLC	v.	Weeks	&	Hutchins,	

LLC,	2019	ME	125,	¶	6,	214	A.3d	1,	we	conclude	that	there	is	a	genuine	issue	of	

material	 fact	as	 to	whether	 the	accident	caused	Toto	some	injury.2		Although	

 2		We	acknowledge	that	in	Toto’s	statements	of	material	 facts,	he	both	(1)	admitted	that	“[t]he	

‘visual	injuries’	and	the	purportedly	related	symptoms	[we]re	the	only	injuries”	he	was	claiming	that	

the	accident	caused	and	(2)	asserted	that	he	suffered	loss	of	consciousness,	headaches,	and	balance	

problems	 separate	 from	 his	 vision	 issues.	 	 To	 the	 extent	 that	 Toto	 contradicted	 himself	 in	 his	
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Toto did	not offer	admissible	evidence that	the	accident	proximately	caused	a	

“visual	midline	shift,”	see Merriam,	2000	ME	159, ¶¶	11-18, 757	A.2d	778,	he	

did	assert	and	offer	evidence	of	facts	sufficient	to	generate a	genuine	issue	of	

material	 fact as	 to	 whether	 the	 accident	 caused	 him	 harm. Using	 common	

knowledge and	drawing	reasonable	inferences,	a	 fact	 finder	could	determine	

that the	accident	caused some	injury	to	Toto.	 See Curtis	v.	Porter,	2001	ME	158,	

¶	9,	784	A.2d	18;	Foddrill,	894	N.E.2d	at	1074,	1078.

[¶15]		Because	Knowles’s motion	for	summary	judgment	must	therefore

be denied,	“facts	admitted	by	the	parties	solely	for	the	purpose	of	the	summary	

judgment	motion	shall	have	no	preclusive	effect	at	trial.”		See	also	CitiMortgage,	

Inc.	v.	Chartier,	2015	ME	17,	¶ 10	n.6,	111	A.3d	39	(stating	that	the	purpose	of	

Rule	 56(d)	 is	 “‘to	 make	 it	 unnecessary	 to	 controvert	 facts	 for	 purposes	 of	

summary	 judgment	 solely	 because	 of	 concern	 about	 the	 possible	 preclusive	

effect	 of	 any	 admission	 of	 fact	 at	 trial	 or	 in	 other	 subsequent	 proceedings’”	

(quoting	M.R.	Civ.	P.	56	Advisory	Note	– November	2011)).		As	 the	Advisory	

Note	to	the	November	2011	amendment	to	Rule	56	explains,	“The	amendment	

 

deposition	testimony	or	conveyed	his understanding	of	the	interrelatedness	of	his	symptoms	after

his	diagnosis	and	treatment,	it	is	for	a	fact	finder	to	weigh	the	evidence	and	determine	whether	to	

accept	or	reject	Toto’s	testimony	“in	whole	or	in	part.”		Sulikowski	v.	Sulikowski,	2019	ME	143,	¶	10,	

216	A.3d	893	(quotation	marks	omitted).
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to	Rule	56(d)	establishes	that	a	fact	admitted	or	not	opposed	by	any	party	solely	

for	 purposes	 of	 summary	 judgment	 is	 not	 deemed	 admitted	 for	 any	 other	

purpose	if	the	motion	for	summary	judgment	is	denied.”

[¶16]		Thus,	although	Knowles	may	eventually	attempt	to	impeach	Toto’s	

trial	testimony	with	statements	that	Toto	made	during	the deposition to	which	

the	parties	referred	in	their	statements	of	material	facts,	the	denial	of	a	motion	

for	summary	judgment	will	not	preclude	Toto	from	offering	fact	evidence	about	

his	post-accident	symptoms	at	trial.		See	M.R.	Civ.	P.	56(d).		The	ruling	on	the	

motion	in	limine	will,	however,	unless	modified	before	trial,	preclude	Toto	from	

offering	expert	 testimony	 from	 the	identified	 optometrist	about	 the	 accident	

having	caused	Toto	to	suffer	a	“visual	midline	shift.”		The	trial	court	on	remand	

may	be	called	upon	to	address	whether expert	testimony	is	necessary	to	prove	

causation	 of	 any	medically	 complex	injuries	 through	 other	 experts,	 but	 such	

issues	are	not	presently	before	us;	we	here	decide	only	that there	is	a	genuine	

issue	of	material	fact	on	the	element	of	causation.

[¶17]	 	 In	 sum,	 the	 court	 erred	 in	 entering	 a	 summary	 judgment	 in	

Knowles’s	favor.		We	vacate	the	summary	judgment	and	remand	the	matter	for	

further	proceedings.
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The	entry	is:

Summary	 judgment	 vacated.	 	 Remanded	 for	

further	proceedings.

David	 Kreisler,	 Esq.,	 and	 Gary	 Goldberg,	 Esq. (orally),	 Terry	 Garmey	 &	

Associates,	Portland,	for	appellant	Christopher	Toto

L.	 John	 Topchik,	 Esq. (orally),	 Law	 Offices	 of	 John	 B.	 Schulte,	 Portland,	 for	

appellee	Raeylyn	Knowles

Cumberland	County	Superior	Court	docket	number	CV-2018-354

FOR	CLERK	REFERENCE	ONLY