alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
EXHIBIT 23.2


           CONSENT OF INDEPENDENT REGISTERED PUBLIC ACCOUNTING FIRM


 We consent to the incorporation by reference in Registration Statements Nos.
 333-71077 and 333-106878 on  Form S-3, and  Nos. 333-73391, 333-106880,  and
 333-106881 on Form S-8 of our reports, dated March 13, 2006, relating to the
 financial  statements  of  First  Cash  Financial  Services,  Inc.,  and  to
 management's report on the effectiveness of internal control over  financial
 reporting, appearing  in this  Annual  Report on  Form  10-K of  First  Cash
 Financial Services, Inc., for the year ended December 31, 2005.



 Hein & Associates LLP
 Dallas, Texas
 March 13, 2006
Michigan Supreme Court

Lansing, Michigan

Robert P. Young, Jr., Chief Justice

Stephen J. Markman

Mary Beth Kelly

Brian K. Zahra

Bridget M. McCormack

David F. Viviano

Richard H. Bernstein, Justices

I, Larry S. Royster, Clerk of the Michigan Supreme Court, certify that the

foregoing is a true and complete copy of the order entered at the direction of the Court.

 May 29, 2015

t0526

Order 

Clerk

May 29, 2015

147675

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v SC: 147675

COA: 309245 

Livingston CC: 10-018981-FH

GORDON BENJAMIN WILDING,

Defendant-Appellant. 

_________________________________________/

On April 2, 2014, the Court heard oral argument on the application for leave to 

appeal the July 16, 2013 judgment of the Court of Appeals. By order of March 25, 2015, 

we directed supplemental briefing. On order of the Court, the application is again 

considered. MCR 7.302(H)(1). In lieu of granting leave to appeal, we VACATE those 

parts of the Court of Appeals judgment holding that offense variable 8 (MCL 

777.38(1)(a)) and offense variable 10 (MCL 777.40(1)(a)) were scored correctly, and that 

trial counsel was not ineffective for failing to object to the scoring of those variables. We 

REMAND this case to the Livingston Circuit Court for an evidentiary hearing, pursuant 

to People v Ginther, 390 Mich 436 (1973), as to whether the defendant’s trial counsel 

was ineffective for failing to object to the scoring of OVs 8 and 10. In all other respects, 

leave to appeal is DENIED, because we are not persuaded that the remaining questions 

presented should be reviewed by this Court.

We do not retain jurisdiction.
First Amendment to 401(k) Savings and Profit Sharing Plan



 Exhibit 10.3 
 FIRST AMENDMENT 
 OF 
 ENTEGRIS, INC. 
 401(k) SAVINGS AND PROFIT SHARING PLAN 
 (2005 Restatement) 
 WHEREAS, Entegris, Inc. (the “Principal Sponsor”) has heretofore established and maintains a 401(k) and profit sharing plan which
was amended and restated in a document effective August 5, 2005, and entitled “ENTEGRIS, INC. 401(k) SAVINGS AND PROFIT SHARING PLAN, (2005 Restatement)” (the “Plan Statement”); and 
 WHEREAS, The Principal Sponsor has reserved to itself the power to make further amendments of the Plan Statement. 
 NOW, THEREFORE, The Plan Statement is hereby amended as follows: 
 1. LOAN ROLLOVERS. Effective for Vested Total Accounts distributed on or after January 1, 2006, Section 7.5.4 of the Plan Statement is hereby amended to read in full as follows:

 7.5.4. Distribution in Cash. Except as provided in Appendix F, distribution of a Participant’s Vested Total
Account shall be made in cash. If, however, the Vested Total Account: 
  

	 	(a)	consists in whole or in part of a Participant’s unpaid promissory note and the distributee elects distribution in kind pursuant to a direct rollover to another
tax-qualified plan, or 

  

	 	(b)	is in whole or in part invested in an individual Subfund under Section 4.1.2 and the distributee elects distribution in kind (to the extent the investment provides
for in-kind distributions), 

 the Trustee shall cause distribution of that portion of the Vested Total Account to be made in
kind. 
 2. LOAN ROLLOVERS. Effective for Vested Total Accounts distributed on or after January 1, 2006, Section 7.5.4 of the Plan
Statement is hereby amended to read in full as follows: 
  

	 	(h)	 Event of Default. Subject to subsection (i) below, nonpayment within ten (10) days after the due date shall be an event of default,
unless the loan’s promissory note is distributed in kind in connection with Section 7.5.4. If a payment is not made by payroll deduction, then payment shall be considered made for this purpose only when the personal check, cashier’s
check, certified check or money order is received in fact by the Trustee or the Committee as agent for the Trustee. Upon the occurrence of an event of











	 	 
default, the Participant’s Vested Accounts in the Plan given as security shall be offset by the amount of the then outstanding balance of the loan in default (including, to the extent
required under the Code, interest on the amount in default from the time of the default until the time of the offset). In the case of a Participant who has not had an Event of Maturity, however, this offset shall be deferred until an Event of
Maturity as to such Participant, but, in the interim, it shall not be possible to cure the default. Such offset shall be automatic. No notice shall be required prior to offset. 


 3. SAVINGS CLAUSE. Save and except as hereinabove expressly amended, the Plan Statement shall continue in full force and effect. 
  

 2
Justin Lee DOUGAN, Appellant, v. STATE of Missouri, Respondent.

WD 80648

Missouri Court of Appeals, Western District.

ORDER FILED: April 24, 2018

Jeannie M. Willibey, Kansas City, MO, for appellant.

Shaun Mackelprang and Christine K. Lesicko, Jefferson City, MO, for respondent.

Before Division Three: Victor C. Howard, Presiding Judge, Cynthia L. Martin, Judge and Gary D. Witt, Judge

**ORDER**

Per curiam:

Appellant Justin Dougan ("Dougan") appeals the motion court's denial of his Rule 24.035 post-conviction motion. Dougan pleaded guilty to second-degree felony *328murder and unlawful use of a weapon and was sentenced to concurrent sentences of life imprisonment. Following an evidentiary hearing, the motion court denied his claim. For reasons explained more fully in a memorandum provided to the parties, we affirm. Rule 84.16(b).
TEXAS COURT OF APPEALS, THIRD DISTRICT, AT AUSTIN

NO. 03-05-00151-CV

Russell J. Verney, Appellant

v.

Carole Keeton Strayhorn, as Comptroller of Public Accounts of the State of Texas;

Greg Abbott, Individually and as Attorney General of the State of Texas;

and Reagan E. Greer, Individually and as Executive Director

of the Texas Lottery Commission, Appellees

FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF TRAVIS COUNTY, 126TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT

NO. GN404078, HONORABLE STEPHEN YELENOSKY, JUDGE PRESIDING

M E M O R A N D U M O P I N I O N

The parties have requested that we abate the appeal in this cause, 03-05-00151-CV,

pending the resolution of the appeal in cause number 03-05-00064-CV, the pending appeal from the

grant of two pleas to the jurisdiction, as that case may control the disposition and render moot the

appeal in the instant cause. Accordingly, we grant the motion and abate the appeal in cause number

03-05-00151-CV pending our resolution of cause number 03-05-00064-CV. The appeal in 03-05-

00151-CV will be reinstated on the date that our opinion is handed down in cause number 03-05-

00064-CV.

 

W. Kenneth Law, Chief Justice

Before Chief Justice Law, Justices B. A. Smith and Puryear

Filed: May 12, 2005
I 

109TH CONGRESS 

2D SESSION H. R. 5426 

To designate the facility of the United States Postal Service located at 

326 South Main Street in Princeton, Illinois, as the ‘‘Congressman 

Owen Lovejoy Post Office Building’’. 

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

MAY 19, 2006 

Mr. WELLER (for himself, Mr. RUSH, Mr. JACKSON of Illinois, Mr. LIPINSKI, 

Mr. GUTIERREZ, Mr. EMANUEL, Mr. HYDE, Mr. DAVIS of Illinois, Ms. 

BEAN, Ms. SCHAKOWSKY, Mr. KIRK, Mr. COSTELLO, Mrs. BIGGERT, Mr. 

JOHNSON of Illinois, Mr. MANZULLO, Mr. EVANS, Mr. LAHOOD, Mr. 

SHIMKUS, and Mr. HASTERT) introduced the following bill; which was referred to the Committee on Government Reform 

A BILL 

To designate the facility of the United States Postal Service 

located at 326 South Main Street in Princeton, Illinois, 

as the ‘‘Congressman Owen Lovejoy Post Office Building’’. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 

3 SECTION 1. CONGRESSMAN OWEN LOVEJOY POST OFFICE 

4 BUILDING. 

5 (a) DESIGNATION.—The facility of the United States 

6 Postal Service located at 326 South Main Street in PrinceVerDate Aug 31 2005 22:19 May 22, 2006 Jkt 049200 PO 00000 Frm 00001 Fmt 6652 Sfmt 6201 E:\BILLS\H5426.IH H5426

cchase on PROD1PC60 with BILLS
2 

•HR 5426 IH

1 ton, Illinois, shall be known and designated as the ‘‘Con2 gressman Owen Lovejoy Post Office Building’’. 

3 (b) REFERENCES.—Any reference in a law, map, reg4 ulation, document, paper, or other record of the United 

5 States to the facility referred to in subsection (a) shall 

6 be deemed to be a reference to the ‘‘Congressman Owen 

7 Lovejoy Post Office Building’’. 

Æ 


cchase on PROD1PC60 with BILLS
Peter Byron SOCHA, Appellant, v. STATE of Missouri, Respondent.

No. ED 105136

Missouri Court of Appeals, Eastern District, Division Five.

Filed: May 15, 2018

Jedd Christian Schneider, Clayton, MO, for appellant.

Joshua Hawley, Evan Joseph Buchheim, Jefferson City, MO, for respondent.

Before James M. Dowd, C.J., Lawrence E. Mooney, J., and Jason M. Sengheiser, Sp. J.

*ORDER*

PER CURIAM

Peter Socha appeals the denial without an evidentiary hearing of his Rule 24.035 motion for post-conviction relief based on allegations of ineffective assistance of counsel. He claims that the motion court clearly erred because he made averments-among them that counsel forced him to enter an *Alford* plea-which, if true, would entitle him to relief. We disagree and affirm because we find that the motion court did not clearly err in determining that Socha's ineffective-assistance claims were refuted by the record or, even if presumed true, would not warrant relief.

The judgment of the trial court is based on findings of fact that are not clearly erroneous. An extended opinion would have no precedential value. The parties have been furnished with a memorandum for their information only, setting forth the reasons for this order pursuant to Rule 84.16(b).
PHANTOM3 

(STANDARD) 

SAFETY GUIDELINES 

AND DISCLAIMER 

(V1.2) 2015.9 

• 

,.
Exhibit 99.1

                    CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
                     18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,
                      AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
          SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002


In connection with the Annual Report of Imagenetix, Inc. (the "Company") on
Form 10-KSB for the year ending March 31, 2003, as filed with the Securities
and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the "Report"), We, William P.
Spencer, Chief Executive Officer, President and Director and Debra L. Spencer,
Secretary/Treasurer, Chief Financial Officer, Principal Accounting Officer and
Director of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as
adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:

     (1) The Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or
15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

     (2)  The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all
material respects, the financial condition and result of operations of the
Company.


Date: 7/14/03                         /s/William P. Spencer
                                      William P. Spencer
                                      Chief Executive Officer
                                      President and director


Date: 7/14/03                         /s/Debra L. Spencer
                                      Debra L. Spencer
                                      Secretary/Treasurer, Chief Financial
                                      Officer, Principal Accounting Officer
                                      and director
<PAGE>
EXHIBIT 32.2




               CERTIFICATION OF CHIEF FINANCIAL OFFICER
                  PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350
   AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002


In connection with the Quarterly Report on Form 10-QSB of Weston Technologies
Corp. (the "Company") for the quarter ended March 31, 2005, as filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the "Report"), I, Isaacs
K. Li, Chief Financial Officer of the Company, hereby certify, pursuant to 18
U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley
Act of 2002, that, to my knowledge:

  (1) The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d)
of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended; and

  (2) The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material
respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.


Date:  June 22, 2005



By: /s/ Isaacs K. Li
-------------------------------------
Isaacs K. Li, Chief Financial Officer
Docket No: FAA-2015-0491 Dir ID: 2015-NM-019-AD
IN the INTEREST OF: J.M. and C.D.; Respondents,

Juvenile Officer, Respondent, v. D.B. (Mother), Appellant.

WD 80905

Missouri Court of Appeals, Western District.

ORDER FILED: April 3, 2018

Lauren Langan, Kansas City, MO, Counsel for Respondents, J.M. and C.D.

Mitchell Widener, Kansas City, MO, Counsel for Respondent, Juvenile Officer.

Before Division One: Thomas H. Newton, P.J., Victor C. Howard, and Karen King Mitchell, JJ.

**ORDER**

Per Curiam:

Mother, D.B., appeals a Jackson County Circuit Court judgment terminating her parental rights. For reasons stated in the memorandum provided to the parties, we affirm. Rule 84.16(b).
STATE of North Carolina v. Dwuan Rashawn BYRD, Defendant.

No. COA18-1028

Court of Appeals of North Carolina.

Filed: August 6, 2019

NO ERROR.
OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF TEXAS 

AUSTIN 

Iionor~blc J. T. :JcZllin 

Deputy Canking Cozx;Lssioner 

DopxtLsent of Dankin~ 

Austin, Tcsns 

Dam Xr. :iciii.llin: 

this applic2tion 

on was ra30 by ma 

ter nnking tkts 

report to the Dankrtor a.5 oppU.02 for. Uoothe charter 03s Over dollvrink or its incor>orntors a-xl no 

P Authotity was ever issuecl or 

delivered. I m arklscd that tho bzuR!Z never 

opomd for business end iucurrod no liabili-. 

tics cscopt those list& in the attachM afffi- 

&wit, which liabilities have boon relcsscd 

as &om by the ottaohod letter siznkl by the 

crctitors nhmo(l. 

"The stoc:&olr?crs of tlio ban!: h7.v~ ur,ani- 

~ouely ogro,ti not to accept tPs clxmtar as 
. . -. 

AL

Kanorable J. T. AicXillin - Page 2 

@%ntcil mcl hnvc roqxstcd that the resolution of the B&n; Board bo rcscindocl. 

*It is the p~~rposo of tho incorporators 

to apply for a batii chartor under the National Id&in:: Act and it is their dccirc, if 

possibl0, to avoid liquidating prococdings 

3s provlcloci for umler Articlw 638, mil 540. 

*In view of the abovo facts, please Ulpig3 ac chcthcr or not it ‘is wXt!;in the legal 

authority of the 3kan:ini; Coard to r=scinC Its 

rmolution ,granting SUCh cixxter, imcl thereby 

rovoko such chartw and enable the incor;;oratore to recover the caI&tal paid in by the= 

unclcr tho application for charter.a 

It is our opinion that the Banizin~ Boarrl Coos 

hnva the authority to rosoiti its action in authorizing 

the chzrtor for the Croa&my Wnk, Alaz~o iIci@~ts, Texas, 

un4er ths facts statad by you. 

Ordinarily, the official action of cn cxcutivo 

or a&dni.stratlvo officer or board of the Strte c:zy be 

Eo&fied or men rescinda& by such funotionary, in the 

absence of som vcstd right having attached by ro;Lson 

of ouch act. It is oitiy vhcre rifits of @vat3 pnrtiee 

have bccoue vested t&t such agencies or successors in 

office are forbiddon to revoke such action. L3iCIlW nros. 

v. mrr'6, 273 Se V. 7SO. The executed instrments rofcrpea to by you ss being attached m-e not attzdzcd; honever, 

we are assuming the Pacts to be as stated by you. 

A~FROVED JAN 22, 1941 Vary truly yaws 

JWL'ORNEX GF;NZ,RAL OF TX."" 

&&i-&k/ (, 

,ATTORIiEY GEXZRAL BY 

Ocic && L) or 

Bssistant 

OS-LiR
Anthony T. GRAVES, Appellant, v. STATE of Missouri, Respondent.

WD 80709

Missouri Court of Appeals, Western District.

Order filed: April 24, 2018

Ellen H. Flottman, for Appellant

Evan J. Buchheim, Jefferson City, for Respondent

Before Division Three: Victor C. Howard, Presiding Judge, Cynthia L. Martin, Judge and Gary D. Witt, Judge

***ORDER***

PER CURIAM:

Anthony Graves appeals the denial of his Rule 29.15 motion for post-conviction relief following an evidentiary hearing. He claims the trial court clearly erred because reasonably competent counsel would have investigated and presented evidence that the victim was killed by a shot fired by someone other than Graves and that would have changed the outcome of Graves's trial. Because a published opinion would have no precedential value, a memorandum has been provided to the parties. The judgment is affirmed. Rule 84.16(b).
N.C. DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY, Division of Waste Management v. TRK DEVELOPMENT, LLC

No. 184P18

Supreme Court of North Carolina.

August 14, 2019

T. Hill Davis, III, Assistant Attorney General, For NC Department of Environmental Quality Division of Waste Management

Andrew Thomas Cornelius, Attorney at Law, Concord, Austin Entwistle, III, Attorney at Law, For TRK Development, LLC

***ORDER***

Upon consideration of the petition filed on the 19th of June 2018 by Respondent in this *72matter for discretionary review of the decision of the North Carolina Court of Appeals pursuant to G.S. 7A-31, the following order was entered and is hereby certified to the North Carolina Court of Appeals:

"Denied by order of the Court in conference, this the 14th of August 2019."

Davis, J. recused
#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Jose Fiol, Appellant.

[718 NYS2d 867]

Appeal by the defendant from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Queens County (Naro, J.), rendered January 11, 1999, convicting him of attempted rape in the first degree, sexual abuse in the first degree (three counts), assault in the second degree, and unlawful imprisonment in the second degree, upon a jury verdict, and imposing sentence.

Ordered that the judgment is affirmed.

The defendant contends that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction of attempted rape in the first degree. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution *(see, People v Contes,*60 NY2d 620), we find the evidence was legally sufficient to establish the defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Moreover, upon the exercise of our factual review power, we are satisfied that the verdict of guilt was not against the weight of the evidence *(see,*CPL 470.15 [5]).

Additionally, the defendant’s argument that the charge to *478the jury constituted reversible error is without merit. Under the circumstances of this case, the use of the phrase “substantial step” rather than “dangerously close” in the court’s definition of attempt “did not effect a cognizable legal error, warranting a new trial” *(People v Hernandez,*93 NY2d 261, 272; *see also, People v Slater,*270 AD2d 925).

The defendant’s remaining contention is unpreserved for appellate review. Ritter, J. P., S. Miller, Luciano and Smith, JJ., concur.
```

[Congressional Bills 109th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.R. 5508 Introduced in House (IH)]

109th CONGRESS
  2d Session
                                H. R. 5508

 To amend title XIX of the Social Security Act to increase the Federal 
 medical assistance percentage for the District of Columbia under the 
                    Medicaid Program to 75 percent.

_______________________________________________________________________

                    IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                              May 25, 2006

  Ms. Norton introduced the following bill; which was referred to the 
                    Committee on Energy and Commerce

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
 To amend title XIX of the Social Security Act to increase the Federal 
 medical assistance percentage for the District of Columbia under the 
                    Medicaid Program to 75 percent.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

    This Act may be cited as the ``District of Columbia Medicaid 
Reimbursement Act of 2006''.

SEC. 2. INCREASING THE MEDICAID FEDERAL MEDICAL ASSISTANCE PERCENTAGE 
              FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA TO 75 PERCENT.

    (a) In General.--Section 1905(b)(3) of the Social Security Act (42 
U.S.C. 1396d(b)(3)) is amended by striking ``70 percent'' and inserting 
``75 percent''.
    (b) Effective Date.--The amendment made by subsection (a) shall 
apply to calendar quarters beginning on or after October 1, 2006.
                                 <all>
```
Pursuant
to 18 U.S.C. 1350


(Section
906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002)








I, Hua
Meng, Chief Financial Officer, and Principal Accounting Officer, of Dahua, Inc.
(the "Registrant") do hereby certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350 as
adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that, to the
best of our knowledge, based upon a review of the Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q
for the period September 30, 2010 of the Registrant, as filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the
"Report"):








(1)  The
Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and





(2)  The
information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects,
the financial condition and result of operations of the Company.








/s/ 
      Hua MengHua
      Meng, Chief Financial Officer(principal
      financial officer andprincipal
      accounting officer)Date:  November
      15, 2010
**Exhibit 21**

 

 
|                                      |   |     |                              |
|-------------------------------------------|--------|----------|-----------------------------------|
| **GRANITE SUBSIDIARIES**                  |   |     | **JURISDICTION  OF ORGANIZATION** |   |
|                                      |   |     |                              |
| Granite Response Television, Inc.         |   | Delaware |                              |
| KBJR License, Inc.                        |   | Delaware |                              |
| KNTV License, Inc.                        |   | Delaware |                              |
| KNTV Television, Inc.                     |   | Delaware |                              |
| KBWB License, Inc.                        |   | Delaware |                              |
| KSEE License, Inc.                        |   | Delaware |                              |
| KBWB, Inc.                                |   | Delaware |                              |
| Queen City Broadcasting of New York, Inc. |   | New York |                              |
| KBJR,Inc.                                 |   | Delaware |                              |
| KSEE Television, Inc.                     |   | Delaware |                              |
| WEEK-TV License, Inc.                     |   | Delaware |                              |
| WKBW-TV License, Inc.                     |   | Delaware |                              |
| WPTA-TV License, Inc.                     |   | Delaware |                              |
| WPTA-TV, Inc.                             |   | Delaware |                              |
| WTVH License, Inc.                        |   | Delaware |                              |
| WTVH, LLC                                 |   | Delaware |                              |
| WXON License, Inc.                        |   | Delaware |                              |
| WXON, Inc.                                |   | Delaware |                              |
| Channel 11 License, Inc.                  |   | Delaware |                              |
|                                           |        |          |                                   |  |

 

 

----