UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 16-4516

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

v.

ARNIEL LAMONT CARLTON,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern 

District of Virginia, at Newport News. Arenda L. Wright Allen, 

District Judge. (4:15-cr-00031-AWA-DEM-1)

Submitted: March 21, 2017 Decided: March 29, 2017

Before WILKINSON and THACKER, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, 

Senior Circuit Judge.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Scott W. Putney, SCOTT W. PUTNEY, P.C., Norfolk, Virginia, for 

Appellant. Dana J. Boente, United States Attorney, Amy E. 

Cross, Assistant United States Attorney, Newport News, Virginia, 

for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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PER CURIAM:

Arniel Lamont Carlton was sentenced to 48 months’ 

imprisonment upon entering a conditional guilty plea to being a 

felon in possession of a firearm, in violation of 18 U.S.C. 

§ 922(g)(1) (2012). Carlton reserved the right to appeal the 

district court’s denial of his motion to suppress evidence 

obtained in a warrantless entry into and search of his home by 

police and Carlton’s subsequent statements. On appeal, Carlton 

contends that police lacked probable cause, that exigent 

circumstances did not justify the warrantless entry and search, 

and that any statements attributable to him were tainted by the 

initial search. We affirm.

When considering the denial of a motion to suppress, “[w]e 

review de novo a district court’s rulings with respect to 

reasonable suspicion and probable cause.” United States v. 

Palmer, 820 F.3d 640, 648 (4th Cir. 2016). “Absent clear error, 

we will not disturb factual findings made by a district court 

after an evidentiary hearing on suppression issues.” Id. 

Because the Government prevailed on the suppression issue below, 

“we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the 

government.” Id.

“Searches and seizures inside a home without a warrant are 

presumptively unreasonable.” Kentucky v. King, 563 U.S. 452, 
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459 (2011) (internal quotation marks omitted). But exigent 

circumstances may justify warrantless entry. Id. at 460. To 

rely on exigent circumstances, police “need only possess a 

reasonable suspicion that such circumstances exist at the time 

of the search or seizure in question.” Figg v. Schroeder, 312 

F.3d 625, 639 (4th Cir. 2002) (internal quotation marks 

omitted). “[C]ourts should not engage in unreasonable secondguessing of the officers’ assessment of the circumstances that 

they faced.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).

Exigencies that may justify a warrantless entry or 

protective sweep include concern for officer safety and the need 

to preserve evidence. Id. “With respect to officer 

safety, . . . the protection of police officers is of particular 

concern in cases” involving firearms and drugs. United 

States v. Watson, 703 F.3d 684, 693 (4th Cir. 2013). “[P]olice 

officers need to be assured that the persons with whom they are 

dealing are not armed with, or able to gain immediate control 

of, a weapon that could unexpectedly and fatally be used against 

[them].” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). With respect 

to evidence preservation, officers may enter without a warrant 

where they “reasonably believe that evidence may be destroyed or 

removed before they could obtain a warrant.” United States v. 

Moses, 540 F.3d 263, 270 (4th Cir. 2008) (internal quotation 
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marks omitted). In determining whether exigent circumstances 

exist, a court should consider:

(1) the degree of urgency involved and the amount of 

time necessary to obtain a warrant; (2) the officers’ 

reasonable belief that the contraband is about to be 

removed or destroyed; (3) the possibility of danger to 

police guarding the site; (4) information indicating 

the possessors of the contraband are aware that the 

police are on their trail; and (5) the ready 

destructibility of the contraband. 

United States v. Yengel, 711 F.3d 392, 397 (4th Cir. 2013) 

(internal quotation marks omitted). The inquiry focuses on the 

officers’ reasonable belief rather than “concrete proof” of the 

exigency. Moses, 540 F.3d at 270 (internal quotation marks 

omitted).

Here, the officers had probable cause at the time of their

entry into Carlton’s home. Although the underlying offense of 

brandishing a firearm is a misdemeanor under Virginia law, Va. 

Code Ann. § 18.2-282 (2014), the circumstances here involved 

“violence or threats of it,” Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 744, 

751 (1984).

We conclude that Carlton has shown no error in the district 

court’s ruling that exigent circumstances justified the 

officers’ warrantless entry into Carlton’s home, subsequent 

protective sweep, and seizure of the shotgun. The officers’ 

concerns for safety and evidence preservation were objectively 

reasonable under the circumstances. See Moses, 540 F.3d at 270. 
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Consideration of the Yengel factors confirms the existence of

exigent circumstances. See Yengel, 711 F.3d at 397. 

Additionally, contrary to Carlton’s argument, the record reveals 

that the exigencies were not officer-created. See King, 563 

U.S. at 461 (precluding reliance on exigent circumstances 

exception where officers manufactured exigency). The officers 

did not engage or threaten to engage in conduct violative of the 

Fourth Amendment, id. at 462, and “[f]aulting the police for 

failing to apply for a search warrant at the earliest possible 

time after obtaining probable cause imposes a duty that is 

nowhere to be found in the Constitution,” id. at 467. Moreover, 

the officers took only a quick look around Carlton’s home to 

verify that no one else was present, a reasonable, limited 

intrusion for officer safety purposes that did not offend the 

Fourth Amendment. See Maryland v. Buie, 494 U.S. 325, 336-37 

(1990); Watson, 703 F.3d at 693.

Absent a Fourth Amendment violation, any statements 

attributable to Carlton were not “fruit of the poisonous tree.” 

Moreover, Carlton admitted that he was apprised of his Miranda

rights before he made the inculpatory statements, and that he 

understood those rights. Therefore, we conclude denial of 

Carlton’s suppression motion was proper in all regards. 
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Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s judgment. We 

dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal 

contentions are adequately presented in the materials before 

this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED