UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 09-4160

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

v.

DARRICK MICHAEL JACKSON, a/k/a Abdul-Jalil Mohammed,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of 

Maryland, at Greenbelt. Deborah K. Chasanow, District Judge. 

(8:07-cr-00215-DKC-1)

Argued: September 24, 2010 Decided: October 29, 2010

Before WILKINSON, AGEE, and DAVIS, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion. 

ARGUED: Ebise Bayisa, OFFICE OF THE FEDERAL PUBLIC DEFENDER, 

Greenbelt, Maryland, for Appellant. David Ira Salem, OFFICE OF 

THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Greenbelt, Maryland, for Appellee. 

ON BRIEF: James Wyda, Federal Public Defender, Baltimore, 

Maryland, for Appellant. Rod J. Rosenstein, United States 

Attorney, Baltimore, Maryland, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
2

PER CURIAM:

I.

Darrick Michael Jackson (“Jackson”) appeals his conviction 

for making a false statement, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1001. 

On appeal, Jackson argues that the evidence was insufficient to 

sustain his conviction. For the reasons set forth below, we 

affirm the judgment of the district court.

II.

Jackson was charged in a superseding indictment with two 

counts of making a false statement, in violation of 18 U.S.C. 

§ 1001. Count One arose from Jackson’s submission of U.S. 

Government Standard Form 85P, “Questionnaire for Public Trust 

Position,” which he was required to submit in order to continue 

his employment at Andrews Air Force Base as a privately employed 

security guard. 

Question 2 on the Form 85P asked: “Have you ever used or 

been known by another name?” (J.A. 116.) Jackson responded “No”

to this question. (Id.) It is undisputed that Jackson did not 

disclose, in response to that question, an alias name that he 

used, Abdul-Jaleel Mohammad.1

 1 The indictment spelled Jackson’s other name as “AbdulJalil Mohammed.” Because the trial transcripts and the parties’ 

(Continued)
3

Count Two arose from Jackson’s subsequent interview with 

Philip Kroop (“Kroop”), who was a federal investigator 

responsible for conducting interviews of persons seeking 

security positions related to the federal government. Kroop 

conducted a follow-up interview of Jackson regarding Jackson’s 

Form 85P. It was during this interview that Jackson made the 

false statements charged in Count Two. 

During the interview, according to Kroop’s testimony at 

trial, Jackson was placed under oath. Kroop asked Jackson 

whether he had ever been known by another name and in response 

Jackson answered “no.” To ensure that Jackson understood the 

question, Kroop rephrased and repeated the question in different 

ways. Specifically, Kroop testified that he asked versions of 

the following questions: “Do your friends, family members, 

associates or any other individuals know you by any other name? 

Have you ever used or been known by any other name by anybody? 

Is there any name that you use for any other purpose?” (J.A. 

153.) Jackson answered “no” to each question. Additionally, 

Jackson did not ask Kroop any questions regarding his previous 

answer to Question 2 on Form 85P, nor did Jackson ask any 

 

briefs use the spellings “Jaleel” and “Mohammad,” however, we 

use the latter spellings herein.
4

questions about the meaning or proper interpretation of Question 

2 or the questions Kroop asked of him. 

The Government also presented evidence that Jackson had an 

email account with Yahoo, created in 1998, under the name 

“Jaleel99@yahoo.com.” Between January 2000 and May 2007, 

Jackson sent or received over 400 emails to and from his Yahoo 

account. These included signing up for accounts at NBA.com and 

EA.com using the name Abdul-Jaleel Mohammad, not Jackson. It is 

further undisputed that Jackson had set up a Juno internet 

service account using the name “Abdul-Jaleel Mohammad,” and that 

he also had an email account from Excite under the name 

“Jaleel99.” Additionally, one email sent from Jackson’s account 

to approximately 40 people included an essay with derogatory 

references to the United States government.2

 2 The essay was titled “Voting: Is It Halal or Haram?” 

(J.A. 238.) According to testimony at trial, “Halal” is an 

Islamic word meaning “permitted” and “Haram” is an Islamic word 

meaning “forbidden.” (Id.) Part of the email included the 

following passage: 

But if you think about it, are you supposed to be 

voting in this non-Islamic[,] corrupt[,] satanic 

Government? A system made for the servitude of man to 

man, not Allah, God. A system run by thieves, 

sodomites, racist[s], drug dealers and those who 

indulge in mass destruction against humanity and 

nature. 

(J.A. 239-40.)
5

 At trial, the government’s theory of the case was that 

Jackson purposefully did not provide his alias name because he 

did not want his email addresses or his connection to a 

controversial Mosque leader to be known to those investigating 

him for security purposes regarding his continued employment. 

The Government bolstered its position by pointing to 

Jackson’s post-arrest statement to an investigator almost one 

year after his OPM interview. Specifically, after the 

investigator told Jackson that he was under arrest for his 

failure to provide his other name on the Form 85P, Jackson 

nodded his head and stated, “[O]h, that’s what this is about. 

That’s what I thought.” (J.A. 322.) 

Jackson did not testify at trial. His defense focused 

largely on evidence that Jackson claimed showed he was not 

attempting to hide his views or his alias. Because he was not 

hiding his religious or political views, he argued, his failure 

to include his alias name could only be viewed as unintentional. 

Jackson pointed to evidence that, during his original 

application process, he sent his application from his yahoo 

account, communicated using his fax machine at his mosque, and 

listed associates from his mosque as personal references. He 

also relied on evidence that two of his co-workers (who were not 

federal employees) knew of his religious and political views and 

at least one of them knew he had another name. 
6

After a three-day jury trial, the jury returned a not 

guilty verdict as to Count One, but found Jackson guilty as to 

Count Two. That is, the jury found him guilty of making a false 

statement during his interview with Kroop.

The district court sentenced Jackson to two years of 

probation, a fine of $2300, and 80 hours of community service. 

Jackson noted a timely appeal. This Court has jurisdiction 

under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 18 U.S.C. § 3742. 

III.

Jackson argues that there was insufficient evidence to 

support his conviction. He contends that the Government failed 

to present evidence that his omission of his alias, Abdul-Jaleel 

Mohammad, was knowing and willful, rather than a simple mistake 

based on a misunderstanding of the questions Kroop asked him.

We disagree.

A conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 1001 requires the Government 

to prove: “(1) the defendant made a false statement to a 

governmental agency or concealed a fact from it or used a false 

document knowing it to be false, (2) the defendant acted 

‘knowingly or willfully,’ and (3) the false statement or 

concealed fact was material to a matter within the jurisdiction 

of the agency.” United States v. Ismail, 97 F.3d 50, 60 (4th 
7

Cir. 1996) (quoting United States v. Arch Trading Co., 987 F.2d

1087, 1095 (4th Cir. 1993)). 

Jackson contests only the second element of the crime, 

willfulness, and argues that his failure to disclose the 

additional name of Jaleel-Abdul Muhammad was simply an innocent 

mistake or done through inadvertence. 

A jury’s guilty verdict will be upheld if, viewing the 

evidence in the light most favorable to the Government, a 

rational factfinder could have found each element of the charged 

offense beyond a reasonable doubt. United States v. MadrigalValadez, 561 F.3d 370, 374 (4th Cir. 2009); United States v. 

Collins, 412 F.3d 515, 519 (4th Cir. 2005). An appellate court 

“may not weigh the evidence or review the credibility of the 

witnesses” because “[t]hose functions are reserved for the 

jury.” United States v. Wilson, 118 F.3d 228, 234 (4th Cir. 

1997). This Court “also assume[s] that the jury resolved all 

contradictions in the testimony in favor of the government.” 

United States v. Moye, 454 F.3d 390, 394 (4th Cir. 2006) (en 

banc) (citation omitted). In short, “[a] defendant challenging 

the sufficiency of the evidence faces a heavy burden.” United 

States v. Foster, 507 F.3d 233, 245 (4th Cir. 2007). 

We conclude that Jackson has not met that burden. 

Jackson’s primary argument before this Court is that there was 

no evidence of intent because there was no evidence that Jackson 
8

attempted to hide his alias name on any other occasion, and in 

fact disclosed his alias and his views to others, including two 

civilian co-workers. This argument, however, was made to the 

jury and obviously was rejected by the jury. 

Jackson, both in his brief and during argument, essentially 

asks this Court to consider the same argument and reach a 

different conclusion than did the jury. That we cannot do. In 

this appeal, we review the jury’s verdict only to determine 

whether substantial evidence supports it. 

Having done so, we conclude there was more than sufficient 

evidence from which a jury could have found that Jackson’s 

statements to Kroop during the interview violated 18 U.S.C. 

§ 1001. Jackson’s alias name was one he frequently used, not

only in religious circles, but also as a name in establishing 

website accounts and in email correspondence. There was 

evidence before the jury that Jackson frequently used the alias 

name before, during, and after his interview with Kroop. 

Additionally, the jury was entitled to credit Kroop’s testimony 

as to the version of questions he asked in the interview. Those 

questions were so broadly worded that Jackson’s failure to even 

inquire whether he should include his other name is evidence the 

jury could have relied on to determine Jackson’s statement was 

knowingly or willfully made. 
9

In short, there is no “clear failure” by the prosecution 

here. See Foster, 507 F.3d at 244-45. The jury’s verdict was 

supported by substantial evidence.3 

IV.

For the aforementioned reasons, we conclude that there was 

sufficient evidence to support the jury’s verdict and therefore 

affirm Jackson’s conviction and the judgment of the district 

court. 

AFFIRMED

 3 Jackson also refers to the jury’s verdict of acquittal on 

Count One as “inconsistent” with its guilty verdict as to Count 

Two. (Appellant’s Br. at 19.) We reject that argument both 

because Jackson failed to raise it as a separate issue and 

because it is without merit. In particular, we do not find any 

inherent inconsistency between the jury’s verdicts on the two 

counts. Additionally, even if there were some inconsistency, 

“it has long been settled that inconsistent jury verdicts do not 

call into question the validity or legitimacy of the resulting 

guilty verdicts.” See United States v. Green, 599 F.3d 360, 369 

(4th Cir. 2010) (citations omitted); see also United States v. 

Perry, 335 F.3d 316, 322 (4th Cir. 2003) (“[A] defendant cannot 

challenge his conviction merely because it is inconsistent with 

a jury’s verdict of acquittal on another count.”).