*Under 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the Court has determined that this

opinion should not be published and is not precedent except in the

limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

For the Fifth Circuit

No. 97-31306

Summary Calendar

JUDY M. DEBOSE,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

VERSUS

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY; ET AL,

Defendants,

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY, MPW Stone, Secretary, 

in his official capacity

Defendant-Appellee

__________________________________________________________________

JUDY M. DEBOSE,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

versus

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY, Togo D West, Jr. Secretary,

Defendant-Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court

For the Eastern District of Louisiana

(92-CV-2774-E)

July 24, 1998

Before WISDOM, WIENER, and DENNIS, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

Judy M. DeBose, an African-American woman formerly employed by

the New Orleans District of the Army Corps of Engineers, filed a
2 Armstrong v. City of Dallas, 997 F.2d 62, 65 (5th Cir.

1993).

3 See Leckelt v. Board of Commissioners of Hospital District

No. 1, 909 F.2d 820, 825 (5th Cir. 1990).

2

suit against the United States Department of the Army in which she

alleged that the defendant subjected her to several forms of

unlawful employment discrimination. The magistrate judge entered

partial summary judgment for the defendant on the ground that

DeBose had failed to raise a genuine issue of material fact with

respect to her retaliation and handicap discrimination claims.

After conducting a bench trial, the magistrate dismissed DeBose’s

remaining claims that she was subjected to a hostile work

environment and wrongfully discharged on the basis of her race.

The district court adopted the magistrate judge’s factual findings

and legal conclusions. DeBose timely filed a notice of appeal from

this final judgment. We affirm.

We review de novo the magistrate judge’s grant of partial

summary judgment in the Army’s favor.2 We agree with the

magistrate judge and the district court; DeBose’s handicap

discrimination and retaliation claims cannot survive the

defendant’s motion for summary judgment. DeBose simply did not

raise a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the defendant

discriminated against her solely on the basis of her alleged

physical impairments.3 Neither did DeBose raise a genuine issue of

material fact as to whether the defendant retaliated against her
4 See Mattern v. Eastman Kodak Co., 104 F.3d 702, 705 (5th

Cir. 1997).

5 Migis v. Pearle Vision, Inc., 135 F.3d 1041, 1044 (n. 1)

(5th Cir. 1998).

6 EEOC v. Clear Lake Dodge, 60 F.3d 1146, 1151 (5th Cir.

1995).

7 See Grimes v. Texas Dep’t of Mental Health and Mental

Retardation, 102 F.3d 137, 140 (5th Cir. 1996).

3

for filing a discrimination complaint. We are not persuaded that

any adverse employment action she suffered was causally related to

her decision to file a discrimination complaint.4

We review for clear error the district court’s post-trial

dismissal of DeBose’s wrongful discharge and hostile work

environment claims.5 “A finding is clearly erroneous when although

there is evidence to support it, the reviewing court on the entire

evidence is left with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake

has been committed.”6 The district court’s findings are not

clearly erroneous. The record amply supports both the magistrate

judge’s and the district court’s conclusion that any employment

action directed to DeBose by the defendant was not motivated by

racial animus. The defendant articulated a legitimate,

nondiscriminatory reason for taking the challenged employment

action.7

AFFIRMED.