Filed 8/22/22 P. v. Youngs CA4/1

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COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

STATE OF CALIFORNIA

THE PEOPLE,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

ALBERT CHANCELLOR YOUNGS, 

JR.,

Defendant and Appellant.

 D079542

 (Super. Ct. No. FVI20003103)

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San Bernardino 

County, Tony Raphael, Judge. Affirmed.

Gerald J. Miller, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for 

Defendant and Appellant.

Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Daniel Rogers, Acting Assistant Attorney 

General, Alana Cohen Butler and Adrian R. Contreras, Deputy Attorneys 

General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

A jury convicted Albert Chancellor Youngs, Jr. of attempted forcible

oral copulation (Pen. Code, §§ 664, 287, subd. (c)(2)(A); count 4) and simple 

battery (Pen. Code, § 242; count 2), a lesser included offense of forcible oral 
2

copulation. The jury found him not guilty of misdemeanor sexual battery

(Pen. Code, § 243.4(e)(1); count 5), and the court dismissed the two sexual 

battery by restraint charges (Pen. Code, § 243.4(a), counts 1 & 3) In a 

bifurcated proceeding, Youngs admitted a serious felony allegation. The 

court sentenced him to 13 years in state prison. 

Youngs contends the trial court prejudicially erred by (1) denying his

mistrial motion; and (2) admitting under Evidence Code1 sections 1109 and 

352 testimony about his prior acts of domestic violence. We affirm.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Youngs does not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence to support his 

convictions; therefore, we merely summarize the facts to provide context for 

his claims of prejudicial error.

S.F.’s Testimony

S.F. testified that she considered Youngs her stepfather because he had 

been married to her mother. One day in October 2020, when Youngs

temporarily lived with S.F., she, a male friend, and Youngs were watching a 

movie in her bedroom. She was wearing pajamas and a pair of shorts. After 

the friend left, Youngs suddenly touched the back of S.F.’s neck. She saw 

him masturbating on the bed next to her. Youngs then grabbed her breast 

and the back of her neck and pulled her toward his penis, which her lips 

touched. She pushed off, sat up, and yelled at Youngs to stop because he was 

her stepfather. Youngs again pulled her neck toward his penis, but she 

pushed him off. S.F. hid in the bathroom for several minutes. When her

friend returned, she left with him.

S.F.’s best friend learned about the incident and reported it to police, 

who interviewed S.F. three days after the incident.

1 Undesignated references are to the Evidence Code.
3

Youngs’s Testimony

Youngs testified on direct examination that he was in the bedroom with 

S.F. during the incident, and after S.F.’s friend left, he “reached” for S.F., and 

touched her “waist area.” She protested that he was her stepfather, and ran 

and got dressed. Youngs denied exposing his penis to S.F. or forcing her head 

towards his genitals.

On cross-examination, the prosecutor questioned Youngs regarding his 

interview with police officers following the incident:

“[Prosecutor:] At some point in that interview where [two deputies] 

were asking you, ‘Okay. So [S.F.] said no to what,’ and you responded, ‘To my

advances,’ right?

“[Youngs:] Yes, sir.

“[Prosecutor:] And another question was, ‘To your [‘]advances[’]? So 

what is it? So clarify to us, because maybe we can make a different 

determination if you would clarify with us what are your [‘]advances[’]? Then 

your response was, ‘I—I just—I—I—like well, one night I had my arms 

around her. We were laying there in bed. No, I wasn’t really ‘trying to do 

anything. I left it alone. And then—and then this night we were laying 

there, and yeah, homeboy left, and yeah, I tried to get with her, and she said 

no.’ You said that, right?

“[Youngs:] Yes, sir.

“[Prosecutor:] And another question during that conversation with the 

deputies was, ‘What do you mean? What, [‘]I tried to get with her[’]? So 

define that.’ Your response was, ‘I was laying there in her bed, and—and, uh,

she was in her—her night—her nighty thing, the like.’ You said that, right?

“[Youngs:] Yes, sir.
4

“[Prosecutor:] And the next question was, ‘Pajamas or something?’ You 

responded, ‘Yeah. Uh, so I—I just kind of assumed, and—and I reached for 

her, but I didn’t—there was never—I didn’t force myself on her. Like she 

said no.’ You said that, right?

“[Youngs:] Yes, sir.”

I. Mistrial Motion

Youngs contends the trial court erroneously denied his motion for a 

mistrial following an unauthorized communication between a deputy sheriff,

who was a witness as well as the People’s designated investigator, and some

jurors. 

A. Background

At the start of trial, the court instructed the jurors to avoid speaking 

with nonjurors about the trial.

On the first day of trial, the investigating deputy testified he had 

interviewed S.F. in the days following the incident, and later detained 

Youngs for questioning.

Following a recess that first day, defense counsel notified the court 

about potential juror misconduct involving the deputy. Outside of the jury’s 

presence, the deputy testified that during a recess, several jurors were in the 

hallway talking among themselves about their not being paid for their time 

at the courthouse. Unbidden, the deputy jokingly told them they were 

getting paid for jury duty. A juror said they were not, and they all laughed.

The deputy told them something like he had just finished a 20-hour 

graveyard shift. 

The court next asked each juror individually about the conversation 

with the deputy. Eight jurors said they had heard the deputy talk to a group 

of jurors, and corroborated the deputy’s account of the topic discussed. All 
5

jurors stated the incident would not affect their ability to be fair and 

impartial, and they agreed to follow the court’s instruction not to consider the

interaction with the deputy in reaching a verdict. 

Defense counsel moved for a mistrial: “I’d ask that every juror who 

either heard that conversation or was a part of that conversation be excused.

And by my math, that’s about 11 people, which leaves us with five jurors. [¶]

So on that basis, I’d ask for a mistrial. I think this is inexcusable conduct by 

somebody who is trained and knows better and who’s trying to improperly

curry favor with the jury. So I think there’s been prejudice here. I think Mr. 

Youngs is irreparably prejudiced by [the deputy’s] conduct.”

The prosecutor responded that a mistrial was unnecessary since the 

deputy did not discuss the facts of the case with the jurors, who all said they 

could set that incident aside and be fair and impartial. 

The court denied the motion, ruling that that although the deputy’s 

conduct was “highly inappropriate,” the misconduct did not prejudice Youngs

because the jurors said they could limit their verdict to the evidence 

presented in court. The court ordered the deputy excluded from the 

remainder of the trial. 

The court reminded the jurors to disregard anything they observed 

outside of the courtroom. They indicated they could follow that instruction.

The court instructed them to walk away if any party, attorney, or witness 

approached them to talk. The court further instructed them that the 

deputy’s conduct was “inappropriate.”

Before closing arguments, the court instructed the jurors with 

CALCRIM No. 222 that they “must disregard anything [they] saw or heard 

when the court was not in session, even if it was done or said by one of the 

parties or witnesses.” It further instructed them to disregard what they saw 
6

or heard during the incident with the deputy and not consider it for any 

reason. 

B. Applicable Law

Penal Code section 1122, subdivision (a)(1) prohibits jurors from 

conversing “among themselves, or with anyone else, conduct research, or 

disseminate information on any subject connected with the trial.” “[A]ny 

unauthorized communication between a juror and a nonjuror regarding the 

matter pending before the jury is misconduct and presumptively prejudicial.” 

(People v. Merriman (2014) 60 Cal.4th 1, 98.) The prosecution must rebut the 

presumption by demonstrating “there is no substantial likelihood that any 

juror was improperly influenced to the defendant’s detriment.” (People v. 

Clair (1992) 2 Cal.4th 629, 668.)

“A mistrial should be granted if the court is apprised of prejudice that it 

judges incurable by admonition or instruction. [Citation.] Whether a 

particular incident is incurably prejudicial is by its nature a speculative 

matter, and the trial court is vested with considerable discretion in ruling on 

mistrial motions.” (People v. Haskett (1982) 30 Cal.3d 841, 854.) “A motion 

for a mistrial should be granted when ‘ “ ‘a [defendant’s] chances of receiving 

a fair trial have been irreparably damaged.’ ” ’ ” (People v. Collins (2010) 49 

Cal.4th 175, 198–199.) On appeal, we apply the abuse of discretion standard 

in reviewing a trial court’s denial of a motion for mistrial. (People v. Davis

(2005) 36 Cal.4th 510, 553;.)

C. Analysis

We agree with the trial court that the deputy’s conduct was “highly 

inappropriate.” The misconduct in this case is akin to that in People v. 

Stewart (2004) 33 Cal.4th 425, 510, in which a juror asserted in a declaration: 

“2. During a break in the testimony of witness Jackie Coghlan, I saw Ms. 
7

Coghlan in the ladies restroom; [¶] 3. While in the restroom, I said to Ms. 

Coghlan something to the effect of [¶] ‘I know we’re not suppose[d] to have 

any contact but I just wanted to tell you’re [sic] a very nice looking (or 

attractive) lady.’ [¶] 4. I have no idea what she said after that because I 

walked out the door. I know she said something back but I didn’t hear it 

because I went out the door. [¶] 5. This brief contact did not in any way 

affect my ability to be fair and impartial in this case.” The California 

Supreme Court described that misconduct as “a juror’s technical violation of 

the court’s admonition not to discuss the case with nonjurors [that] was 

‘ “trifling’ misconduct” ’ that could not have prejudiced the defendant.” 

(People v. Merriman, supra, 60 Cal.4th at p. 98.)

We conclude the court did not err by denying the mistrial motion 

because the prosecution rebutted the presumption of prejudice from juror 

misconduct. The court thoroughly investigated the incident by interviewing

the deputy and each juror separately, and ascertained that the misconduct 

involved a brief conversation about a trifling topic unrelated to the merits of 

the case, between the deputy and some jurors. The court reminded the jurors 

of its instruction to base their decision solely on the evidence received in court 

and avoid talking to nonjurors during trial. We presume the jury followed 

the instructions. (People v. Frederickson (2020) 8 Cal.5th 963, 1026.) All

jurors confirmed that the incident would not affect their ability to be fair and 

impartial. The court additionally removed the investigating officer from that 

role for the remainder of the trial, thus minimizing any prejudice to Youngs.

None of the cases Youngs cites lead us to a contrary conclusion because 

they either involved prejudicial misconduct, or the presumption of prejudice 

remained unrebutted: (In re Hitchings (1993) 6 Cal.4th 97, 123 [concluding a 

juror’s “intentional concealment on voir dire of material information, as well 
8

as her discussing the case with [a nonjuror] while a sitting juror, constituted 

jury misconduct and raised a presumption of prejudice that stands 

unrebutted by the evidence presented at the evidentiary hearing”]; People v. 

Pierce (1979) 24 Cal.3d 199, 207 [concluding that, “in derogation of his oath 

and his specific promise on voir dire not to engage in any such conversations,”

a juror discussed the merits of the case with the witness police officer who 

had investigated the case during trial]; People v. Holloway (1990) 50 Cal.3d 

1098, 1106, 1110–1112 [finding prejudicial misconduct because during trial a 

juror had read a newspaper article stating that defendant was on parole from 

prison after having served time for assaulting a woman with a hammer]; 

People v. Loot (1998) 63 Cal.App.4th 694, 698 [concluding that although a 

juror committed misconduct in discussing the prosecutor’s personal life, the 

resulting presumption of prejudice was rebutted].)

II. Prior Offenses Testimony

Youngs contends that under sections 1109 and 352, the trial court erred 

by admitting (1) an officer’s testimony regarding Youngs’s prior domestic 

violence against victim A.A. and (2) S.F.’s statement repeating her mother’s 

claim Youngs gave her mother a black eye in 2009-2010. Youngs adds that 

“the prior incidents were entirely dissimilar from the present alleged

offenses, because they involved pure, generalized violence, rather than an 

actual or attempted sexual assault. As a result, the prior incidents had no 

relevance to and did not show any alleged “propensity” by [him] to engage in 

the kind of sexually predatory conduct alleged in this case. Further, evidence

regarding the type of generalized violence alleged in the prior cases, in which 

[S.F.’s mother] received a black eye, and [Youngs] allegedly attacked [A.A.]

with the leg of a table, was highly inflammatory and likely to prejudice 
9

jurors.” Youngs argues the incident involving S.F.’s mother was remote, as it

occurred over a decade earlier. 

A. Background

1. Motions in Limine

The prosecutor moved in limine to admit evidence of Youngs’s prior 

domestic violence incidents with a woman named A.A., with whom he was in 

a two-year relationship, arguing they showed Youngs’s propensity for 

inflicting domestic violence.

As to that incident, which occurred in June 2019, the People argued

that a police officer responded to a residence regarding domestic violence. 

The officer observed A.A. with bruises on her shin, shoulder, and chin, and 

marks on her nose and forearm. A.A. shook and cried. The officer arrested 

Youngs for inflicting injury on a cohabitant. Youngs told police he and A.A. 

had an ongoing argument; however, he did not know how she got her bruises. 

He denied using a wooden table leg as a weapon. Youngs pleaded guilty of 

attempted false imprisonment. 

Defense counsel argued the court should exclude evidence of this 

“dissimilar” incident, pointing out it was not a sex offense, unlike the charged 

offenses in the instant case. He also argued the evidence was overly 

prejudicial: “I think the [incident] was a crime of pure violence, just 

standard, no sex violence, whereas what Mr. Youngs is charged with is a 

purely sexual violent case, and the dissimilarities I think are too great under 

[section] 352.”

The court granted the prosecutor’s motion to admit evidence of this 

incident, finding Youngs, in the course of the false imprisonment of A.A.,

used the same type of “control” behavior as when he pushed S.F.’s face down 

during the alleged sexual assault. The court found this prior incident was 
10

not remote; would not involve undue consumption of time because only two 

witnesses would testify; there was no risk of unfair prejudice because the 

charged offenses were more serious than Youngs’s attempted false 

imprisonment; and the jury would not be confused because the uncharged 

incident involved a different victim. Accordingly, the officer testified 

regarding Youngs’s 2019 domestic violence incident as set forth above.

S.F.’s testimony regarding the other domestic violence incident came to 

light after she was asked on direct examination why she did not call 911 after 

the incident with Youngs. She replied she was afraid, embarrassed and hurt. 

She feared that Youngs would do it again or hurt her if she told anyone. To 

provide context for that fear, the court allowed her to testify that one day in 

2009 or 2010, she saw her mother with a black eye, and her mother said that 

following an altercation, Youngs had hit her. 

During S.F.’s trial testimony about her mother’s black eye, the court 

instructed the jurors that her mother’s statement merely explained S.F.’s 

decision not to contact police: “[It is not] coming in for the truth of the 

matters asserted but to explain the subsequent conduct of the witness, S.F., 

as she explained earlier. You are only to consider it for that purpose and no 

other.”

The court instructed the jury with CALCRIM No. 303: “During the 

trial, certain evidence was admitted for a limited purpose. You may consider

that evidence only for that purpose and for no other.” It also instructed the 

jury with CALCRIM No. 852A that if the jury found the prior act with A.A.

occurred then it may, but was not required to, conclude that Youngs was 

predisposed to commit domestic violence: “If you conclude that the defendant 

committed the uncharged domestic violence, that conclusion is only one factor 

to consider along with all the other evidence. It is not sufficient by itself to 
11

prove that the defendant is guilty of [the charged crimes]. The People must 

still prove each charge beyond a reasonable doubt.”

2. The Parties’ Closing Arguments

The prosecutor argued to the jury that the uncharged incident with 

A.A. proved Youngs was predisposed to commit acts of domestic violence to 

dominate his partners and force them to do his wishes. He argued S.F.’s 

mother’s statement about the black eye caused S.F. to fear Youngs, and 

explained why S.F. did not initially report Young’s sexual aggression to law 

enforcement. 

Defense counsel argued the jury should base its verdict on the evidence 

of the charged offenses and not merely on his past convictions. He argued 

Youngs pleaded guilty to his prior crimes and took responsibility for his past 

mistakes. Defense counsel argued the previous domestic violence offense did 

not involve sexual violence, and S.F. was not afraid of Youngs, considering 

she had let him live with her. 

B. Applicable Law 

“Ordinarily, propensity evidence—evidence that a defendant committed 

an uncharged offense—is inadmissible to prove the defendant’s disposition to 

commit the charged offense. (§ 1101, subd. (a).) Evidence that the defendant 

committed uncharged crimes or other acts, however, is admissible to prove 

relevant facts other than disposition, such as motive, intent, and absence of 

mistake or accident. (. . . § 1101, subd. (b).)” (People v. Kerley (2018) 23 

Cal.App.5th 513, 531.) Section 1109 is yet another legislative carveout to this 

general rule against admitting propensity evidence and provides an exception 

in domestic violence cases. It states: “[I]n a criminal action in which the 

defendant is accused of an offense involving domestic violence, evidence of the 

defendant’s commission of other domestic violence is not made inadmissible 
12

by [s]ection 1101 if the evidence is not inadmissible pursuant to [s]ection 

352.” (§ 1109, subd. (a)(1).) “As a result, section 1109 ‘permits the admission 

of defendant’s other acts of domestic violence for the purpose of showing a 

propensity to commit such crimes.’ ” (Kerley, at p. 531.)

“[T]he California Legislature has determined the policy considerations 

favoring the exclusion of evidence of uncharged domestic violence offenses are 

outweighed in criminal domestic violence cases by the policy considerations 

favoring the admission of such evidence.” (People v. Johnson (2000) 77 

Cal.App.4th 410, 420.) Section 1109 thus “ ‘reflects the legislative judgment 

that in domestic violence cases . . . similar prior offenses are “uniquely 

probative” of guilt in a later accusation.’ ” (Kerley, supra, 23 Cal.App.5th at 

p. 531.) 

Under section 352, the court must first determine whether the 

“probative value [of the evidence is] substantially outweighed by the 

probability that its admission will (a) necessitate undue consumption of time 

or (b) create substantial danger of undue prejudice, of confusing the issues, or 

of misleading the jury.” (§§ 352, 1109.) The trial judge is in the best position 

to evaluate the evidence. (People v. Hernandez (2011) 200 Cal.App.4th 953, 

966.) 

“We review a challenge to a trial court’s decision to admit [this] 

evidence for abuse of discretion.” (People v. Johnson (2010) 185 Cal.App.4th 

520, 531.) “A trial court’s exercise of its discretion under section 352 ‘ “must 

not be disturbed on appeal except on a showing that the court exercised its 

discretion in an arbitrary, capricious or patently absurd manner that resulted 

in a manifest miscarriage of justice.” ’ ” (People v. Brown (2000) 77 

Cal.App.4th 1324, 1337.) 
13

In applying section 352, “ ‘prejudicial’ ” is not synonymous with 

“ ‘ “damaging.” ’ ” (People v. Karis (1988) 46 Cal.3d 612, 638.) Rather, 

evidence is unduly prejudicial under section 352 only if it “uniquely tends to 

evoke an emotional bias against the defendant as an individual and . . . has 

very little effect on the issues” (ibid.), or if it invites the jury to prejudge “ ‘a 

person or cause on the basis of extraneous factors.’ ” (People v. Harris (1998) 

60 Cal.App.4th 727, 737.) “Painting a person faithfully is not, of itself, 

unfair.” (Ibid.; People v. Johnson, supra, 185 Cal.App.4th at p. 534.)

C. Analysis

We conclude the court did not abuse its discretion under section 352 by 

admitting into evidence both S.F.’s testimony regarding her mother’s black 

eye or the officer’s testimony regarding the A.A. domestic violence incident. 

As it was required to do, the court analyzed the testimony for prejudice. It 

did not err in concluding the testimony did not involve undue consumption of 

time or prejudice to Youngs, and it was not confusing or misleading to the 

jury.

We also point out the court instructed the jury regarding the fact the 

testimony alone would not suffice to convict Youngs, and the scope of the 

jury’s use of it. Accordingly, “ ‘Any prejudice that the challenged information 

may have threatened must be deemed to have been prevented by the court’s 

limiting instruction to the jury. We presume that jurors comprehend and 

accept the court’s directions.’ ” (People v. Gutierrez (2018) 28 Cal.App.5th 85, 

91.)

We are unpersuaded by Youngs’s attempts to argue the prior crimes 

and the charged ones were dissimilar, and to distinguish them on the

grounds that the former involve “generalized violence,” making their 

admission into evidence prejudicial because they would inflame the jury more 
14

than the crimes against S.F. As the court ruled, both the prior and the 

charged crimes demonstrated that Youngs sought to control women 

physically, as he did in the A.A. incident for which he pleaded guilty to false 

imprisonment and as he did when he pulled S.F. by the neck and forced her 

head towards his penis. The Legislature in permitting the use of propensity 

evidence pointed out, “Not only is there a great likelihood that any one 

battering episode is part of a larger scheme of dominance and control, that 

scheme usually escalates in frequency and severity.” (See People v. Johnson, 

supra, 77 Cal.App.4th at p. 419.) We conclude Youngs’s actions in the S.F. 

incident were arguably more impactful to the jury, as the victim herself

testified Youngs used his position of age, trust, and authority as a stepfather 

to expose his genitals and perpetuate acts of sexual aggression against his 

stepdaughter. To protect herself, she had to escape to the bathroom in her 

own home, and only emerged when her friend returned. She was so scared 

she did not call police.

We conclude the court did not err by admitting S.F.’s statement about 

her mother’s black eye for the limited purpose of showing the effect of that 

incident on S.F.’s decision not to report to the police Youngs’s crimes against 

her. Her testimony was brief, not admitted for its truth, and no details 

beyond the fact of the altercation and Youngs’s causing the mother’s black 

eye were admitted. Thus the jury was unlikely to be prejudicially inflamed 

against Youngs. 

As to Youngs’s claim that the incident with S.F.’s mother, which 

occurred about a decade before the charged crime, was remote, we point out 

this evidence was not admitted under section 1109 subdivision (e), which

provides that “[e]vidence of acts occurring more than 10 years before the 
15

charged offense is inadmissible under this section, unless the court 

determines that the admission of this evidence is in the interest of justice.”

In any event, although section 1109 establishes a presumption that 

domestic violence acts committed 10 years before the charged conduct is 

inadmissible, the statute also “clearly anticipates that some remote prior 

incidents will be deemed admissible and vests the courts with substantial 

discretion in setting an ‘interest of justice’ standard.” (People v. Johnson

(2010) 185 Cal.App.4th 520, 539.) “[T]he ‘interest of justice’ exception is met 

where the trial court engages in a balancing of factors for and against 

admission under section 352 and concludes that the evidence was ‘more 

probative than prejudicial.’ ” (Johnson, at pp. 539–540.) “To the extent a 

higher degree of scrutiny is called for, it is the conclusion drawn from the 

balancing test, not the process itself, that must change under subdivision (e).”

(Id. at p. 539.) Thus, under the “interest of justice” exception, evidence is 

admissible when the “probative value [of the prior acts] weighs more heavily 

on [the] same scales [as section 352].” (Ibid.) Accordingly, even if the 

subdivision (e) interest of justice exception applies, it is met here.

Youngs argues this was a close case, pointing out the jury acquitted 

him of one count, and the court dismissed two others. We interpret that 

result differently. It reflects the jury did not convict Youngs purely based on 

prejudice resulting from the prior incident with A.A.; rather, it reached its 

mixed verdict by carefully applying the law, including the jury instructions,

to the facts. (People v. Robertson (2012) 208 Cal.App.4th 965, 995.) 
16

DISPOSITION

The judgment is affirmed.

O’ROURKE, J.

WE CONCUR:

HUFFMAN, Acting P. J.

DO, J.