2024 UT App 61

THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF UTAH,

Appellee,

v.

MARTIN ALEX SALAZAR-LOPEZ,

Appellant.

Opinion

No. 20230194-CA

Filed April 25, 2024

Third District Court, Salt Lake Department

The Honorable Vernice S. Trease

No. 201908458

W. Andrew McCullough, Attorney for Appellant

Sean D. Reyes and Connor Nelson,

Attorneys for Appellee

JUDGE JOHN D. LUTHY authored this Opinion, in which

JUDGES GREGORY K. ORME and RYAN M. HARRIS concurred.

LUTHY, Judge:

¶1 Martin Alex Salazar-Lopez pled guilty to multiple sexual 

offenses against a child, offenses he committed when he was still

a minor. As part of Salazar-Lopez’s sentence, the district court 

ordered a period of probation during which Salazar-Lopez must, 

among other things, comply with the sex offender Group A 

conditions created by the Utah Department of Corrections. 

Salazar-Lopez appeals that part of his sentence, asserting that 

because the court was statutorily prohibited from requiring him 

to register as a sex offender, it erred by ordering him to comply 

with the sex offender Group A conditions. We mostly disagree 

with Salazar-Lopez, and we affirm the district court’s imposition 

of all but one of the Group A conditions as part of Salazar-Lopez’s 

probation.
State v. Salazar-Lopez

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BACKGROUND

¶2 In 2020, when Salazar-Lopez was twenty-two years old, the 

State charged him with four counts of sodomy on a child, two 

counts of sexual abuse of a child, and two counts of lewdness 

involving a child, all based on conduct he had allegedly engaged 

in some years earlier—between January 1, 2015, and January 1, 

2017—when Salazar-Lopez was occasionally babysitting a girl 

who was nine to eleven years old at the time. Salazar-Lopez 

ultimately agreed to plead guilty to one count of sodomy on a 

child and one count of sexual abuse of a child, and the State 

agreed to drop the remaining charges.

¶3 As part of the plea agreement, the date range for the 

charged conduct was changed slightly so that Salazar-Lopez 

would be pleading guilty only to conduct that occurred before his 

eighteenth birthday. The parties agreed that Salazar-Lopez would 

“not be subject to registration as a sex offender” due to his status 

as a minor at the time of the charged conduct. This understanding 

was reflective of a then-current law that provided, with limited 

exceptions, that “if an individual [was] convicted in district court

of a qualifying sexual offense and, at the time of the offense, the 

individual was at least 14 years old, but under 18 years old,” then 

“the individual [was] not, based on the conviction, subject to the 

registration requirements described in Title 77, Chapter 41, Sex 

and Kidnap Offender Registry.” Utah Code § 76-3-209(3) (2022).1

1. Utah Code section 76-3-209 was later amended—effective May 

3, 2023—to remove this specific provision. See Act of Feb. 9, 2023, 

ch. 123, § 1, 2023 Utah Laws 1341, 1341. At the same time, the 

legislature enacted Utah Code section 77-41-114, which now

addresses registration requirements for persons convicted of sex 

crimes that they committed as minors. See Act of Feb. 9, 2023, 

ch. 123, § 15, 2023 Utah Laws 1341, 1352. The other Utah Code 

sections cited herein have not been amended in ways that impact

this appeal, so we cite the current versions of those statutes. 
State v. Salazar-Lopez

20230194-CA 3 2024 UT App 61

The parties also agreed that no prison sentence would be 

imposed. However, the plea agreement stated, “There will be a 

presentence report, and the parties will be free to argue over a jail 

sentence. The State will request a psycho-sexual evaluation and 

treatment.”

¶4 The district court thereafter sentenced Salazar-Lopez to 

sixty days in jail and 120 months of probation, and it imposed 

several requirements on Salazar-Lopez during his probation. One 

of those requirements was that Salazar-Lopez would have to 

“[a]bide by sex offender Group A conditions.” The Utah 

Department of Corrections lists its Group A conditions as follows:

a. THERAPY: Enter into, participate in and 

successfully complete sex offender therapy as 

determined by the treating facility, therapists and the 

Utah Department of Corrections. 

b. CURFEW: Enter into and successfully complete 

established progressive curfews or electronic 

monitoring where available, when required by Adult 

Probation and Parole. 

c. VICTIM CONTACT: Have no direct or indirect 

contact with victim(s) or victim’s family without prior 

approval from Adult Probation and Parole. 

d. CHILDREN UNDER 18: Have no contact or 

association with children under the age of 18 without 

prior written approval of Adult Probation and Parole. 

e. NOT DATE: Not date persons with children 

residing at home under the age of 18 without prior 

written approval of Adult Probation and Parole. 

f. CHILDREN CONGREGATE: Not enter places or 

events where children congregate including, but not 
State v. Salazar-Lopez

20230194-CA 4 2024 UT App 61

limited to: schools, playgrounds, parks, arcades, 

parties, family functions, holiday festivities or any 

other place or function where children are present or 

reasonably expected to be present without prior 

written approval from Adult Probation and Parole or 

without the supervision of a responsible adult 

previously approved by Adult Probation and Parole. 

g. SEX STIMULUS MATERIAL: Not have in my 

possession or under my control any material that acts 

as a sexual stimulus for my particular deviancy(s) 

including, but not limited to: computer programs, 

computer links, photographs, drawings, video tapes, 

audio tapes, magazines, books, literature, writings, etc. 

without the written approval from Adult Probation 

and Parole. 

h. EXPLOIT MATERIAL: Not have in my possession 

or under my control any material that describes or 

depicts human nudity, the exploitation of children, 

consensual sex acts, non-consensual sex acts, sexual 

acts involving force or violence including, but not 

limited to: computer programs, computer links, 

photographs, drawings, video tapes, audio tapes, 

magazines, books, literature, writings, etc. without 

prior approval from Adult Probation and Parole.

i. ENTERTAIN/LURE: Not have in my possession or 

under my control any items or materials either 

designed for, or used to, entertain, lure or attract the 

attention of children under the age of 18 without prior 

written approval from Adult Probation and Parole.

j. POLYGRAPH: Submit to random polygraph 

examinations.
State v. Salazar-Lopez

20230194-CA 5 2024 UT App 61

k. EMPLOYMENT: Employment must be approved 

by Adult Probation and Parole.

l. RESIDENCE: Residence and residence changes 

must be approved by Adult Probation and Parole.

m. INTERSTATE COMPACT: Execute and adhere to 

the terms of the Interstate Compact Waiver and 

Agreement if probation or parole is served outside the 

state of Utah.

n. REGISTRATION/DNA: Comply with requirements

of the Utah Sex Offender Registration and DNA 

specimen requirements.

Utah Dep’t of Corr., Sex Offender Group A Conditions, 

https://corrections.utah.gov/wp-content/uploads/2022/03/MicrosoftWord-Program-A-03-14-22.pdf [https://perma.cc/W4LN-XRL9].

¶5 Salazar-Lopez objected to the imposition of the Group A 

conditions and moved to amend his sentence. He objected 

generally to the imposition of the Group A conditions on the basis 

that by statute he was not required to register as a sex offender, 

arguing:

It is obvious that [sex offender registration]

requirements do not apply to [Salazar-Lopez] because 

he cannot be, and will not be, required to comply with 

those requirements. It is only common sense that he is 

also not required to comply with the other 

requirements directed at those who are registered sex 

offenders and who therefore are subject to these rules.

Salazar-Lopez also brought to the court’s attention the specific 

impact of some of the Group A conditions on his family, saying:
State v. Salazar-Lopez

20230194-CA 6 2024 UT App 61

[Group A conditions] really have no relevance to 

[Salazar-Lopez] and his situation. The [c]ourt was 

well aware that [Salazar-Lopez] is now 24 years old, 

and that he is married and has a young son. The 

[c]ourt made no comment at his sentencing on his 

living arrangements, which obviously includes 

living with his wife and son.

¶6 In response, the district court amended Salazar-Lopez’s 

sentence to allow him to have contact with his own son, but it did 

not remove the requirement that Salazar-Lopez otherwise abide 

by the Group A conditions while on probation.

¶7 Salazar-Lopez timely appealed. He also moved for a stay 

pending appeal of the requirement that he abide by the Group A 

conditions, and the district court granted that request.

ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW

¶8 Salazar-Lopez contends that the district court erred by 

imposing the Utah Department of Corrections’ sex offender 

Group A conditions as part of his probation despite the fact that,

due to his age at the time of the crimes, he “is not subject to 

registration as a [s]ex [o]ffender” and “is not required to abide by 

the conditions of that registration.” The parties disagree as to the 

standard of review we should apply in addressing SalazarLopez’s argument. The State argues that the district court’s 

sentence should not be overturned absent an abuse of discretion, 

while Salazar-Lopez contends that we are to review the primary 

issue before us for correctness.

¶9 The State is correct that, “[g]enerally, we will reverse a trial 

court’s sentencing decision only if it is an abuse of the judge’s 

discretion.” State v. Helms, 2002 UT 12, ¶ 8, 40 P.3d 626. However,

“a trial court abuses its discretion if its decision is premised on 

flawed legal conclusions.” State v. Boyer, 2020 UT App 23, ¶ 18, 
State v. Salazar-Lopez

20230194-CA 7 2024 UT App 61

460 P.3d 569 (cleaned up), cert. denied, 466 P.3d 1075 (Utah 2020). 

And that is the nature of the argument Salazar-Lopez makes 

here—that the district court reached a flawed legal conclusion 

when it decided that it could impose the sex offender Group A 

conditions as part of Salazar-Lopez’s probation even though the 

court was statutorily prohibited from requiring Salazar-Lopez to 

register as a sex offender. Because “we review the district court’s 

legal conclusions for correctness,” we afford no deference to its 

legal conclusion regarding its ability to impose Group A 

conditions as part of Salazar-Lopez’s probation. State v. Lusk, 2001 

UT 102, ¶ 10, 37 P.3d 1103. The correct interpretation of the 

applicable statute is likewise a question of law that we review for 

correctness. See State v. Larsen, 865 P.2d 1355, 1357 (Utah 1993).2

2. Because the State mistook Salazar-Lopez’s argument as an 

assertion that the district court abused its discretion by imposing 

certain probation conditions under the facts of this case, it argues

that a transcript of the sentencing hearing, which Salazar-Lopez 

initially failed to provide, is “vital” to show “how the court 

weighed relevant factors when deciding to impose Group A 

conditions.” In response, Salazar-Lopez submitted, as an 

addendum to his reply brief, a sentencing hearing transcript, 

which the State moved to strike. Salazar-Lopez then filed a motion

to supplement the record with the transcript, which motion the 

State opposed. Record supplementation generally “may not be 

done by simply including the omitted material in [a] party’s 

addendum.” State v. Pliego, 1999 UT 8, ¶ 7, 974 P.2d 279. Moreover, 

record supplementation is appropriate only when “anything 

material is omitted.” Id. (emphasis added). Our review of the legal 

question Salazar-Lopez raises—namely, whether as a matter of 

law the district court could impose the sex offender Group A 

conditions as part of Salazar-Lopez’s probation—is not impacted 

by the availability of the sentencing hearing transcript. The 

transcript is therefore not material to this appeal. For this reason, 

(continued...)
State v. Salazar-Lopez

20230194-CA 8 2024 UT App 61

ANALYSIS

¶10 Salazar-Lopez contends that because he is statutorily 

exempt from the requirement to register as a sex offender, it was 

error, as a violation of statute, for the district court to impose the 

Department of Corrections’ sex offender Group A conditions as 

part of his probation. In other words, he asserts that because he 

was not required to register as a sex offender, it was “common 

sense” that he cannot be “required to comply with the other 

requirements directed at those who are registered sex offenders.”

¶11 Salazar-Lopez’s argument rests on Utah Code section 76-3-

209, which, as it existed at the time of sentencing, provided that 

individuals convicted in district court of certain qualifying sexual 

offenses committed when they were not yet eighteen years old 

were “not . . . subject to the registration requirements described in 

Title 77, Chapter 41.” Utah Code § 76-3-209(3) (2022).3 SalazarLopez was sixteen or seventeen years old at the time of the 

charged conduct, and his convictions are for qualifying sexual 

offenses, see id. § 76-3-209(1) (2023) (defining a “qualifying sexual 

offense” as including “an offense described in Chapter 5, Part 4, 

Sexual Offenses”); id. § 76-5-403.1 (sodomy on a child); id. § 76-5-

404.1 (sexual abuse of a child). Thus, this provision is applicable 

to him, and he is therefore not subject to the sex offender 

registration requirements of Title 77, Chapter 41. This appeal thus 

turns on a proper understanding of what are and are not the sex 

offender registration requirements of Title 77, Chapter 41.

¶12 Title 77, Chapter 41 defines the term “[r]egister” as 

meaning “to comply with the requirements of this chapter and 

we grant the State’s motion to strike and deny Salazar-Lopez’s 

motion to supplement the record.

3. This provision contained certain exceptions, which are not 

relevant to this case. See Utah Code § 76-3-209(3), (4) (2022).
State v. Salazar-Lopez

20230194-CA 9 2024 UT App 61

administrative rules of the department made under this chapter.” Id.

§ 77-41-102(15) (emphasis added). According to this definition, 

the sex offender registration requirements of Title 77, Chapter 41

include only (1) the requirements imposed by Title 77, Chapter 41

itself and (2) any requirements imposed by rules promulgated by 

the Department of Corrections under the rulemaking authority 

granted in Title 77, Chapter 41. See id. And we do not see that the 

Group A conditions generally fall into either of these categories. 

They generally are not requirements imposed by that chapter of 

the code, and they are not requirements imposed by any 

administrative rule promulgated by the Department of 

Corrections under authority granted in that chapter; indeed, 

Salazar-Lopez points to no link between the provisions in Title 77, 

Chapter 41 and the existence of the Group A conditions. Thus, 

section 76-3-209 generally did not prohibit the district court from 

requiring Salazar-Lopez to abide by Group A conditions.

¶13 Salazar-Lopez apparently presumes that because he is not 

“subject to the registration requirements described in Title 77, 

Chapter 41,” see id. § 76-3-209(3)(a) (2022), he is also not subject to 

any other restriction that might apply to sex offenders. But that 

presumption is not supported by the statutory language, which 

by its terms provides only that certain specific registration 

requirements do not apply to a person in Salazar-Lopez’s 

position. See id. Moreover, even if we were to agree with his 

assertion that through section 76-3-209 “the legislature 

acknowledged that a young person should not be branded as a 

sex criminal and scarred for life,” requiring him to abide by Group 

A conditions for the limited period of his probation does no such 

thing.

¶14 The district court is granted considerable latitude in 

crafting conditions of probation and may impose “terms and 

conditions the court considers appropriate to ensure public safety 

or increase a defendant’s likelihood of success on probation.” Id.

§ 77-18-105(6)(a)(ix) (2023). And should such terms overlap with 
State v. Salazar-Lopez

20230194-CA 10 2024 UT App 61

conditions frequently imposed on registered sex offenders, we see 

no legal error in their imposition, so long as they are not 

“registration requirements described in Title 77, Chapter 41,” id.

§ 76-3-209(3)(a) (2022).4

¶15 This leads us to the one aspect of the district court’s order 

that we determine requires reversal: condition n of the Group A 

conditions (Condition N), which requires an individual to 

“[c]omply with requirements of the Utah Sex Offender 

Registration and DNA specimen requirements.” Utah Dep’t of

Corr., Sex Offender Group A Conditions, https://corrections.utah.gov/

wp-content/uploads/2022/03/Microsoft-Word-Program-A-03-14-

22.pdf [https://perma.cc/W4LN-XRL9]. While the Group A 

conditions generally do not amount to “registration requirements 

described in Title 77, Chapter 41,” see Utah Code § 76-3-209(3)(a)

4. Salazar-Lopez takes issue with the State presenting arguments 

on appeal where it failed to file any opposition to several of his 

motions below. He suggests that by its silence on this front, the 

State essentially waived its appellate arguments: “If the 

[d]efendant, upon appeal, has a duty to show the appellate court 

that he presented his case fully to the trial court, does not the State 

have some duty to show that it provided reasons to the district 

court to support the trial court’s ruling?” The answer to this 

question is no. While Salazar-Lopez is correct that “[a]s a general 

rule, claims not raised before the trial court may not be raised on 

appeal,” State v. Holgate, 2000 UT 74, ¶ 11, 10 P.3d 346, the State 

has raised no issues on appeal. Rather, Salazar-Lopez, as the 

appellant, has raised issues for our review, and the State, as the 

appellee, is free to make arguments in response to those issues—

even if those arguments were not advanced below. See Gressman 

v. State, 2013 UT 63, ¶ 45, 323 P.3d 998 (“Issues must be preserved, 

not arguments for or against a particular ruling on an issue raised 

below.”); Cochegrus v. Herriman City, 2020 UT 14, ¶ 36, 462 P.3d 

357 (“It is within our discretion to affirm a judgment on an 

alternative ground if it is apparent in the record.” (cleaned up)).
State v. Salazar-Lopez

20230194-CA 11 2024 UT App 61

(2022), the specific requirements listed within Condition N are

such requirements, see id. § 77-41-105 (2023) (setting forth sex 

offender registration requirements); id. § 77-41-105(7)(g) 

(requiring sex offenders to provide “a DNA specimen” to the 

Department of Corrections “or the registering entity”). Thus, 

Salazar-Lopez is not subject to the registration requirement or the 

requirement to provide a DNA specimen, and those requirements 

may not be a part of the conditions of his probation. We therefore 

reverse the district court’s inclusion of Condition N as part of

Salazar-Lopez’s probation conditions.

CONCLUSION

¶16 Because Condition N of the sex offender Group A 

conditions mandates compliance with certain registration 

requirements of Title 77, Chapter 41, and because Salazar-Lopez 

is exempt from such compliance, we reverse the district court’s 

imposition of Condition N as a condition of his probation. We 

otherwise affirm the court’s imposition of Group A conditions as 

part of his probation, as they are not registration requirements of 

Title 77, Chapter 41 of the Utah Code.