Present: All the Justices 

JOYCE S. FRITTS, ET AL. 

 OPINION BY 

v. Record No. 002120 JUSTICE LAWRENCE L. KOONTZ, JR. 

September 14, 2001 

CAROLINAS CEMENT COMPANY, GP, 

 T/A ROANOKE CEMENT COMPANY, ET AL. 

FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF WARREN COUNTY 

John E. Wetsel, Jr., Judge 

This appeal arises out of a petition by certain landowners, 

filed in the trial court, for a writ of certiorari to review a 

decision by a local board of zoning appeals. At issue is the 

trial court’s affirmance of the board’s decision permitting the 

construction of a nearby industrial facility as a by-right use 

under the applicable zoning ordinance. 

BACKGROUND

In August 1999, Carolinas Cement Company, GP, trading as 

Roanoke Cement Company (Carolinas Cement), began negotiations to 

purchase a parcel of land containing approximately seven acres 

and located in the Kelley Industrial Park in Warren County from 

the Warren County Economic Development Authority (EDA). 

Carolinas Cement intended to construct a bulk cement and flyash 

terminal on this property. Kelley Industrial Park is the site 

of several industrial operations including a DuPont chemical 

manufacturing facility and “other industrial-type buildings and 

structures.” The DuPont facility includes several storage 
silos, at least one of which is over one hundred feet in height. 

The Norfolk Southern Railroad borders the southeastern edge of 

the industrial park. 

East of the railroad is a residential community that was 

developed after the establishment of the industrial park. Joyce 

S. Fritts and Tommy R. Fritts (collectively, the Fritts) own a 

home located a short distance from the railroad and about onehalf mile away from Carolinas Cement’s proposed terminal. 

The proposed terminal primarily consists of two 75-foot 

storage buildings, described by the parties as “silos,” 

connected to a small office building and a concrete parking lot. 

The terminal is designed to function so that, essentially, dry 

cement is shipped to the facility by rail, unloaded through 

sealed pipes into the silos, and subsequently transferred from 

the silos into tanker trucks for delivery to customers. 

As a result of its initial negotiations with the EDA, 

Carolinas Cement modified the facility’s design and incurred 

development expenses totaling $11,700 before finally reaching an 

agreement with the EDA in late August 1999 to purchase the 

property for $75,000. Carolinas Cement and the EDA did not 

complete a formal contract of sale at that time, however, 

because the agreement was subject to final approval by the EDA’s 

board at its September 3, 1999 public meeting. 

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On September 15, 1999, Carolinas Cement filed a by-right 

use application with the Warren County Department of Planning 

and Zoning for approval to build the proposed terminal.1 

Carolinas Cement asserted that the terminal qualified as a 

“[w]arehousing and distribution” facility, a by-right use, under 

§ 180-28(B)(10) of the Warren County Zoning Ordinance. On 

October 8, 1999, the Warren County Deputy Zoning Administrator 

gave initial approval to the by-right use application finding 

that the proposed terminal “fits the definition of a 

distribution facility.” On October 13, 1999, the Warren County 

Planning Commission affirmed this determination. 

The Fritts appealed the Planning Commission’s decision to 

the Warren County Board of Zoning Appeals (BZA). The Fritts 

maintained that the proposed terminal was not a by-right use, 

but rather was a storage yard that would require a conditional 

use permit under the zoning ordinance. During the hearing on 

that appeal, the BZA received expert testimony presented by 

witnesses for the Fritts and Carolinas Cement. On April 5, 

2000, the BZA determined that the proposed terminal, including 

 1

 This application was signed by Carolinas Cement as the 

applicant and by the EDA as the owner of the property at that 

time. On November 12, 1999, the EDA’s board formally voted to 

approve the sale of the property to Carolinas Cement. The delay 

in the final approval of the sale resulted from legal 

proceedings challenging the sale of the property. Those 

proceedings have been settled and, thus, are not related here 

because they are not pertinent to our resolution of this appeal. 

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its “silos,” constituted a warehousing and distribution facility 

and, thus, was a by-right use under the zoning ordinance. 

The Fritts filed a petition in the Circuit Court of Warren 

County (the trial court) for a writ of certiorari to review the 

BZA’s decision. On May 26, 2000, the trial court heard the 

parties’ arguments and examined the records of the BZA 

proceeding. In an order dated May 31, 2000, the trial court 

found that the BZA correctly determined that the “[cement] 

storage and distribution facility proposed to be built by 

[Carolinas Cement] is clearly a ‘warehousing and distribution’ 

facility within the meaning of Warren County Zoning Ordinance 

§ 180-28.” The trial court emphasized that “[t]he BZA correctly 

focused its analysis on the proposed use of the property, which 

was to receive, store, and distribute cement,” rather than “on 

the physical characteristics of the structures housing the use.” 

By an order dated January 17, 2001, we awarded the Fritts this 

appeal. 

DISCUSSION 

Initially, we reject the argument made by the Fritts that 

Carolinas Cement lacked standing to apply for a by-right use 

permit because it did not have a vested property right in the 

proposed development site. The Fritts asserted this contention 

before the BZA and then the trial court, and reassert it on 

appeal. We hold that, under the specific facts of this case, at 

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the time its application was filed Carolinas Cement had more 

than a mere expectation that it would be able to acquire the 

property from the EDA and that it thus had sufficient interest 

in the property to begin the application process. Cf. Hoffman 

Family, L.L.C. v. Mill Two Associates Partnership, 259 Va. 685, 

693-94 529 S.E.2d 318, 323-24 (2000). Moreover, Carolinas 

Cement became the contract purchaser of the property on November 

12, 1999, well before the BZA decision on April 5, 2000. In 

this regard, the trial court correctly determined that any lack 

of standing by Carolinas Cement was “cured” for purposes of the 

proceedings conducted by the BZA. 

The dispositive issue in this appeal is whether the trial 

court correctly ruled that Carolinas Cement’s proposed terminal 

fell within the meaning of the phrase “[w]arehousing and 

distribution facilities” as used in § 180-28(B)(10) of the 

zoning ordinance. The principles relevant to the construction 

of a zoning ordinance, whether by a court or by a board of 

zoning appeals, are well-established. “The words of the 

ordinance are to be given their plain and natural meaning [and 

the] purpose and intent of the ordinance should be considered.” 

Donovan v. Board of Zoning Appeals, 251 Va. 271, 274, 467 S.E.2d 

808, 810 (1996); accord Higgs v. Kirkbride, 258 Va. 567, 573, 

522 S.E.2d 861, 864 (1999); see also Hanover County v. Bertozzi, 

256 Va. 350, 354, 504 S.E.2d 618, 620 (1998). 

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The Fritts contend that the “silos” that will constitute 

the principal structures of the terminal are not “warehouses” 

and, thus, the property as a whole would not be used as a 

“warehousing and distribution” facility. Since the zoning 

ordinance does not define “warehouse,” the term must be given 

its “plain and natural meaning.” A warehouse is “a structure or 

room for the storage of merchandise or commodities.” Webster’s 

Third New International Dictionary 2576 (1993). 

While Carolinas Cement’s proposed terminal would, in 

principal part, take the form of two silos, the determinative 

factor is that these silos are structures used to store cement, 

which is a commodity. We agree with the trial court’s analysis 

that, generally, the function, rather than the form of a 

structure, is relevant to defining the use under the zoning 

ordinance. Accordingly, we hold that the proposed terminal 

would be used for “warehousing” as that term is contemplated in 

the zoning ordinance. 

The Fritts further contend that even if the proposed 

terminal satisfies the “warehousing” portion of the ordinance, 

it must also serve as a “distribution” facility. The ordinance, 

in § 180-8, defines a distribution facility as “[a]n 

establishment engaged in the receipt, storage and distribution 

of goods, products, cargo and materials, including transshipment 

by rail, air or motor vehicle.” The proposed terminal clearly 

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satisfies this definition as it would be used to receive, store, 

and distribute dry cement by rail and tanker trucks. 

Accordingly, we need not determine whether the Fritts’ 

interpretation of the zoning ordinance as requiring a 

warehousing and distribution facility to serve both functions in 

order to qualify as a by-right use is correct, because in this 

instance Carolinas Cement’s proposed terminal would do so. 

CONCLUSION 

 For these reasons, we hold that the trial court did not err 

in ruling that Carolinas Cement’s proposed cement and flyash 

terminal is a warehousing and distribution facility, permitted 

by right under the Warren County Zoning Ordinance. Accordingly, 

the judgment of the trial court will be affirmed.2

Affirmed. 

 2

 Because of our resolution of the dispositive issue, we 

need not address the issues raised by Carolinas Cement on crosserror. 

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