[Cite as State v. Spurling, 2021-Ohio-3056.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS 

FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT OF OHIO 

HAMILTON COUNTY, OHIO 

STATE OF OHIO, 

 Plaintiff-Appellee, 

 vs. 

JERMAINE SPURLING, 

 Defendant-Appellant. 

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APPEAL NOS. C-200322 

 C-200323 

TRIAL NOS. B-1905121 

 B-1905397 

 

 

 O P I N I O N.

 

Criminal Appeals From: Hamilton County Court of Common Pleas 

 

Judgments Appealed From Are: Affirmed

Date of Judgment Entry on Appeal: September 3, 2021 

Joseph T. Deters, Hamilton County Prosecuting Attorney, and Mary Stier, Assistant 

Prosecuting Attorney, for Plaintiff-Appellee, 

The Law Office of John D. Hill, LLC, and John D. Hill, Jr., for Defendant-Appellant. 
OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS 

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MYERS, Presiding Judge. 

{¶1} Defendant-appellant Jermaine Spurling appeals his convictions for 

trafficking in cocaine, possession of a fentanyl-related compound, and having a 

weapon while under a disability. In three assignments of error, Spurling challenges 

the validity of his guilty pleas, the effectiveness of his trial counsel, and the sentences 

imposed. Finding no merit to Spurling’s assignments of error, we affirm.

{¶2} In the case numbered B-1905121, Spurling was indicted for possession 

of a fentanyl-related compound, a fifth-degree felony, carrying a concealed weapon 

and improper handling of a firearm in a motor vehicle, both fourth-degree felonies, 

and having a weapon while under a disability, a third-degree felony. In exchange for 

Spurling’s guilty pleas to the fentanyl and weapon-under-disability charges, the state 

dismissed the remaining weapons charges. The trial court imposed prison terms of 

12 and 36 months respectively, and ordered them to run concurrently to each other.

{¶3} In the case numbered B-1905397, Spurling was indicted for two firstdegree felonies, possession of cocaine and trafficking in cocaine, and accompanying 

major-drug-offender specifications. In exchange for Spurling’s guilty plea to a 

reduced charge of trafficking in cocaine, a felony of the third degree, the state 

dismissed the possession count and the specifications for both offenses. The trial 

court imposed a 36-month prison term and ordered it to run consecutively to the 

sentence in the case numbered B-1905121, for an aggregate prison term of six years.

The Guilty Pleas 

{¶4} In his first assignment of error, Spurling argues that the trial court 

erred in accepting guilty pleas that were not made knowingly, intelligently, and 

voluntarily. 

{¶5} Before a trial court accepts a plea in a felony case, Crim.R. 11(C)(2) 

requires the court to ascertain that the plea is voluntary and entered with an 
OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS 

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understanding of the effect of the plea, the nature of the charges, and the maximum 

penalty that may be imposed. See Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(a) and (b). In addition, the court 

must inform the defendant, and determine that the defendant understands, that by 

pleading guilty, the defendant is waiving her or his constitutional rights (1) to a jury 

trial; (2) to confront witnesses against the defendant; (3) to have compulsory process 

for obtaining witnesses in the defendant’s favor; (4) to require the state to prove the 

defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt; and (5) to the privilege against selfincrimination. See Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(c); State v. Brinkman, Slip Opinion No. 2021-

Ohio-2473, ¶ 11. 

{¶6} In this case, Spurling concedes that the trial court complied with the 

requirements of Crim.R. 11(C)(2). However, he asserts that his guilty pleas were 

predicated on representations from counsel that the trial court would impose less 

than a six-year aggregate term, which the state had offered as part of a proposed plea 

bargain and which he had previously rejected. 

{¶7} Spurling concedes that his claim is based on information outside the 

record, which we cannot consider in deciding the appeal. See State v. Brooks, 1st 

Dist. Hamilton No. C-190549, 2021-Ohio-425, ¶ 10; State v. Ishmail, 54 Ohio St.2d 

402, 405-406, 377 N.E.2d 500 (1978). And, on the record before us, it is clear that 

Spurling understood that the state was seeking a six-year prison sentence, because 

defense counsel requested that sentencing be deferred so that he could provide 

mitigation information to convince the court that a sentence of less than six years 

was appropriate.

{¶8} Spurling also argues that he construed the trial court’s statement that 

he would receive “a very, very good deal” as an indication that the court would 

deviate downward from the previously rejected offer of an agreed six-year prison 

sentence. But this claim is equally unavailing. After the court accepted Spurling’s 
OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS 

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guilty pleas, defense counsel asked that Spurling be released on bond pending 

sentence. The court denied the request, stating:

[Defense counsel] has on a number of occasions asked that on your 

behalf. I am not going to do it. I appreciate you asking. You are going 

to get a very, very good deal at the end of the day. You got nicked with 

something that could have put you in jail for a long, long time. I think 

it is best at this point. You get credit for time, anyway. * * * I think it is 

best at this point to be where you are. I will overrule your request. 

{¶9} Spurling could not have relied on the court’s statement as an 

inducement to enter his guilty pleas because the statement was made after Spurling’s 

pleas were made and accepted, and the statement likely referred to the fact that 

defense counsel negotiated a favorable plea bargain for Spurling. Moreover, in 

entering his pleas, Spurling acknowledged that he had not received promises from 

the court or anyone else in order to get him to plead. 

{¶10} The trial court did not err in accepting Spurling’s guilty pleas. We 

overrule the first assignment of error.

Effective Assistance of Counsel 

{¶11} In his second assignment of error, Spurling argues that he was 

deprived of his constitutional right to the effective assistance of counsel. Counsel 

will not be considered ineffective unless counsel’s performance was deficient and 

caused actual prejudice to the defendant. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 

687, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984); State v. Bradley, 42 Ohio St.3d 136, 141-

142, 538 N.E.2d 373 (1989). Counsel’s performance will only be deemed deficient if 

it fell below an objective standard of reasonableness. Strickland at 688; Bradley at 

142. A defendant is only prejudiced by counsel’s performance if there is a reasonable 

probability that the outcome of the proceedings would have been different but for the 

deficient performance. Strickland at 694; Bradley at 142.
OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS 

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{¶12} Spurling argues that counsel induced him to enter guilty pleas with 

false assurances that the trial court would deviate downward from the six-year 

agreed sentence that the state had previously offered and he had rejected. But we are 

unable to determine on appeal whether ineffective assistance of counsel occurred 

where the allegations of ineffectiveness are, as Spurling admits here, based on facts 

outside the record. See State v. Giuggio, 1st Dist. Hamilton No. C-170133, 2018-

Ohio-2376, ¶ 10; State v. Coleman, 85 Ohio St.3d 129, 134, 707 N.E.2d 476 (1999). 

We overrule the second assignment of error.

Sentencing 

{¶13} In his third assignment of error, Spurling argues that the trial court’s 

imposition of a six-year aggregate sentence was not supported by the record and that 

it constituted cruel and unusual punishment.

{¶14} Pursuant to R.C. 2953.08(G)(2)(a), we may modify or vacate a 

defendant’s sentence only if we clearly and convincingly find that the sentence is 

contrary to law or that the record does not support the trial court’s findings under 

certain enumerated statutes, including R.C. 2929.13(B), R.C. 2929.13(D), R.C. 

2929.14(B)(2)(e), R.C. 2929.14(C)(4), and R.C. 2929.20(I). State v. Bronson, 1st 

Dist. Hamilton No. C-200151, 2021-Ohio-838, ¶ 2; State v. Jones, 163 Ohio St.3d 

242, 2020-Ohio-6729, 169 N.E.3d 649, ¶ 31, 37.

{¶15} Here, the trial court made the mandatory consecutive-sentences 

findings under R.C. 2929.14(C)(4) at the sentencing hearing and incorporated its 

findings into the sentencing entry. See State v. Bonnell, 140 Ohio St.3d 209, 2014-

Ohio-3177, 16 N.E.3d 659, ¶ 37; Bronson at ¶ 8. The court found that consecutive 

sentences are necessary to protect the public and to punish the defendant and are not 

disproportionate to the seriousness of the defendant’s conduct and the danger the 

defendant poses to the public. See R.C. 2929.14(C)(4). In addition, the court found 

that the aggravating factor in R.C. 2929.14(C)(4)(c) existed, finding that the 
OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS 

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defendant’s history of criminal conduct demonstrates that consecutive sentences are 

necessary to protect the public from future crime by the defendant.

{¶16} The trial court’s findings are supported by the record. At the 

sentencing hearing, the trial court noted that Spurling had prior felony convictions 

for trafficking in marijuana, aggravated robbery, possession of cocaine, trafficking in 

cocaine, carrying a concealed weapon, robbery, and having a weapon while under a 

disability. The court stated that Spurling had previously served three prison terms. 

The court noted that when Spurling was stopped by police, he possessed fentanyl and 

a loaded firearm. The court also noted that Spurling’s trafficking charge involved 

nearly 500 grams of cocaine, “all the trappings * * * that make up what constitutes a 

pretty major drug dealer.” The court remarked that a drug dealer with a gun posed a 

danger to the community. The record supports the imposition of consecutive 

sentences.

{¶17} Spurling concedes that the individual sentences imposed fell within 

the authorized ranges for the offenses and were not contrary to law. Rather, he 

argues that his six-year aggregate sentence was disproportionate to his conduct, 

amounting to cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the United States and 

Ohio Constitutions.

{¶18} The Supreme Court of Ohio has held that, for purposes of review under 

the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I, Section 9 of 

the Ohio Constitution, “proportionality review should focus on individual sentences 

rather than on the cumulative impact of multiple sentences imposed consecutively.” 

State v. Hairston, 118 Ohio St.3d 289, 2008-Ohio-2338, 888 N.E.2d 1073, ¶ 20. 

Therefore, if none of the individual sentences imposed on a defendant are “grossly 

disproportionate to their respective offenses, an aggregate prison term resulting 

from consecutive imposition of those sentences does not constitute cruel and 

unusual punishment.” Id.
OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS 

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{¶19} Each of Spurling’s individual prison terms fell within the statutory 

range for its respective offense, and “[a]s a general rule, a sentence that falls within 

the terms of a valid statute cannot amount to a cruel and unusual punishment.” See 

id. at ¶ 21, quoting McDougle v. Maxwell, 1 Ohio St.2d 68, 69, 203 N.E.2d 334 

(1964). Because the individual sentences imposed are within the range of penalties 

authorized by statute, “they are not grossly disproportionate or shocking to a 

reasonable person or to the community’s sense of justice and do not constitute cruel 

and unusual punishment.” See id. at ¶ 23. Consequently, Spurling’s aggregate sixyear prison term, which resulted from the consecutive imposition of individual 

prison terms, does not violate the Eighth Amendment to the United States 

Constitution or Article I, Section 9 of the Ohio Constitution. See id. 

{¶20} We overrule the third assignment of error, and we affirm the 

judgments of the trial court.

Judgments affirmed. 

CROUSE and BOCK, JJ., concur. 

Please note: 

 The court has recorded its own entry this date.