J-S10003-18

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

THE BANK OF NEW YORK MELLON 

FKA THE BANK OF NEW YORK AS 

TRUSTEE

v.

ROBERT J. HENRY AND ANNA MARIE 

HENRY 

Appellants

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 2630 EDA 2017

Appeal from the Judgment Entered February 28, 2017

In the Court of Common Pleas of Chester County Civil Division at No(s): 

15-09694

BEFORE: BOWES, J., OLSON, J., and NICHOLS, J.

MEMORANDUM BY BOWES, J.: FILED SEPTEMBER 11, 2018

Robert J. Henry and Anna Marie Henry appeal the in rem judgment of 

mortgage foreclosure entered against them on February 28, 2017.

1

 We 

affirm. 

In 2005, Appellants executed an adjustable rate note (“the Note”) in 

the amount of $725,167.00, payable in monthly installments of principal and 

interest of $2,332.42, on their residential property located at 210 Richards 

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1 Appellants purport to appeal from the order entered on June 30, 2017

denying their motions for post-trial relief. Ordinarily, an appeal properly lies

from the entry of judgment, not from the order denying post-trial motions. 

See Johnston the Florist, Inc. v. TEDCO Constr. Corp., 657 A.2d 511

(Pa.Super. 1995). Accordingly, we deem this appeal as taken from the 

February 28, 2017 judgment.
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Way in Avondale, Chester County, Pennsylvania (“the Property”). The lender 

under the Note was America’s Wholesale Lender, and the Note was indorsed 

in blank by Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., a New York Corporation Doing 

Business as America’s Wholesale Lender. Appellants also executed a 

mortgage (hereinafter “the Mortgage”) on the Property as security for 

payment of the Note. The Mortgage was executed in favor of Mortgage 

Electronic Systems, Inc., as nominee for America’s Wholesale Lender. 

In December 2009, Appellants defaulted on the Mortgage. In 2011, 

the Mortgage was assigned to The Bank of New York Mellon, f/k/a The Bank 

of New York, as trustee (CWALT 2005-82) (hereinafter “BNYM”), and the 

assignment was duly recorded. In 2014, BNYM initiated the instant 

mortgage foreclosure proceedings seeking an in rem judgment against 

Appellants. Following a non-jury trial, the trial court entered an in rem

judgment in mortgage foreclosure in favor of BNYM on February 28, 2017. 

Appellants timely filed a motion for post-trial relief and an amended motion 

for post-trial relief, both of which were denied on June 30, 2017. Appellants 

filed a timely notice of appeal, and a court-ordered Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) 

concise statement of errors complained of on appeal. 

Appellants raise the following issues for our review:

1. Whether the trial court erred as a matter of law and 

abused its discretion in finding that [BNYM] was the holder 

in due course of the Note and entitled to enforce the Note 

indorsed in blank by a different corporate entity than the 

prior Noteholder was based on insufficient evidence and 

against the weight of the evidence to support that finding. 
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2. Whether the trial court erred as a matter of law and 

abused its discretion in failing to make a finding that the 

two corporate entities appearing on the Note were 

separate and distinctly named corporations with no 

evidence of any relationship between the two was against 

the weight and sufficiency of the evidence.

3. Whether the trial court erred as a matter of law and 

abused its discretion and the court’s award was against the 

weight of the evidence by failing to dismiss [BNYM’s] 

complaint because [BNYM] was unable to meet its burden 

in showing it was the legal Noteholder and real party in 

interest and the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction. 

Appellant’s brief at vii. 

When reviewing the verdict from a bench trial, our standard of review

is as follows:

we must review the evidence of record in the light most

favorable to the verdict winner to determine whether competent

evidence supports the trial court’s findings and whether it erred

in reaching its conclusions of law. We afford the same weight to

the trial court’s findings of fact as we do a jury's verdict. We will

only reverse if the trial court’s findings of fact are unsupported

by competent evidence or if it erred as a matter of law.

Newman Dev. Grp. of Pottstown, LLC v. Genuardi's Family Mkt., Inc.,

98 A.3d 645, 652 (Pa.Super. 2014) (en banc) (internal citations omitted).

Each of Appellant’s issues are premised upon the same essential 

argument. They contend that BNYM is not entitled to enforce the Note

because the endorsement in blank is invalid for the sole reason that the 

entity identified as the indorser on the Note bears a different name than the 

entity identified as the lender on the Note.

.

 Specifically, Appellants claim 

that the Note was not validly indorsed in blank because the lender is 
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identified as “America’s Wholesale Lender,” whereas the indorsement in 

blank was made by “Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., a New York Corporation 

Doing Business as America’s Wholesale Lender.” Based on the difference in 

the phrasing of the names of the lender and indorser, Appellants posit that 

the trial court was “left to speculate as to whether or not there was a 

relationship between the two corporate entities named on the Note.” 

Appellants’ brief at 8. Appellants contend that, because BNYM did not

demonstrate a connection between “America’s Wholesale Lender” and 

“Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., a New York Corporation Doing Business as 

America’s Wholesale Lender,” the evidence is insufficient as a matter of law 

to establish that BNYM is a holder in due course of the Note, and the trial 

court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the matter.

The holder of a mortgage has the right, upon default, to bring a

foreclosure action. Bank of Am., N.A. v. Gibson, 102 A.3d 462, 464

(Pa.Super. 2014). A person foreclosing on a mortgage, however, also must 

own or hold the note. See Gerber v. Piergrossi, 142 A.3d 854 859 

(Pa.Super. 2016). This is so because a mortgage is only the security 

instrument that ensures repayment of the indebtedness under a note to real 

property. Id. Under the Pennsylvania Uniform Commercial Code, the note 

securing a mortgage is a negotiable instrument. J.P. Morgan Chase Bank,

N.A. v. Murray, 63 A.3d 1258, 1266 (Pa.Super. 2013). A note indorsed in

blank is a “bearer note,” payable to anyone on demand regardless of who
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previously held the note. 13 Pa.C.S. §§ 3109(a), 3301; see also Gibson,

supra at 466; PHH Mortg. Corp. v. Powell, 100 A.3d 611, 621 (Pa.Super.

2014) (“Evidence that some other entity may be the “owner” or an

“investor” in the [n]ote is not relevant to this determination, as the entity

with the right to enforce the note may well not be the entity entitled to

receive the economic benefits from payments received thereon.”).

Here, Appellants do not dispute that they executed the Note and the 

Mortgage, or that they defaulted on their payments due under the Mortgage. 

Appellants concede that the Mortgage was properly assigned to BNYM, and 

that it is the holder of the Mortgage. Appellants do not dispute that BNYM

presented the original Note indorsed in blank at trial. Rather, they claim 

that the Note’s indorsement in blank is invalid because the lender is 

identified as “America’s Wholesale Lender,” whereas the indorsement in 

blank was made by “Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., a New York Corporation 

Doing Business as America’s Wholesale Lender.” Appellants posit that, due 

to this difference in names, the lender and indorser are two separate 

entities, thereby invalidating the indorsement in blank.

Appellants provide no relevant authority to support their assertion that 

the addition of “doing business as” in a signature operates to bind only the 

signing entity and not the designated entity. The use of “doing business as”

is commonly understood to alert interested parties to the fact that the 

person or entity so designated, is known for business purposes under 
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another or fictitious name. See Black’s Law Dictionary (10th ed. 2014) (The 

abbreviation “d/b/a” “signals that the business may be licensed or 

incorporated under a different name.”). As such, “doing business as” carries 

no implication of representative capacity of a former individual or entity to 

act on behalf of a latter entity; rather, akin to “a/k/a” (“also known as”), 

“doing business as” identifies an equivalency or single identity between the 

appellations. Hazer v. Zabala, 26 A.3d 1166, 1170 (Pa.Super. 2011). 

Because the law recognizes “Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., a New 

York Corporation Doing Business as America’s Wholesale Lender” as a single 

entity identifiable under either appellation, we find no merit to Appellants 

arguments that it is an entirely different entity than “America’s Wholesale 

Lender.” See id. For this reason, Appellants claim that the indorsement in 

blank is invalid must fail. The record in this case reveals that BNYM holds 

the Note validly indorsed in blank, and the mortgage. As holder of the Note 

and mortgage, BNYM has standing to pursue this foreclosure action as the 

proper party in interest. Gibson, supra at 466. Appellant’s assertions to 

the contrary are baseless.

Judgment affirmed. 
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Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 9/11/18