IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 19-30734

SHARON KIM BEAZLEY, individually & on behalf of minor child, LMB; 

LILLIAN MARIE BEAZLEY, JORDON KALE BEAZLEY; JAKE LYNFIELD 

BEAZLEY,

 Plaintiffs - Appellants

v.

METROPOLITAN LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY; SCHLUMBERGER 

TECHNOLOGY CORPORATION,

 Defendants - Appellees

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Western District of Louisiana

USDC No. 6:16-CV-1188

Before STEWART, DENNIS, and HAYNES, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

Plaintiffs, survivors of decedent Greg Lynfield Beazley (Mr. Beazley), 

brought suit against Defendants, Metropolitan Life Insurance Company 

(“MetLife”) and Schlumberger Technology Corporation (“STC”), alleging that 

Defendants unlawfully denied a claim for life insurance benefits due under 

* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not 

be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH 

CIR. R. 47.5.4.

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

FILED

May 27, 2020

Lyle W. Cayce

Clerk

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policies Mr. Beazley had purchased while an employee of STC. The policies 

were issued by MetLife as part of an employee welfare plan (“Plan”) STC had 

established, and the Plan is governed by the Employee Retirement Income 

Security Act (“ERISA”), 29 U.S.C. § 1001 et seq. In a thorough opinion, the 

district court determined that MetLife, the insurer and claims administrator

for the Plan, did not abuse its discretion in denying Plaintiffs’ claim. Beazley v. 

Metro. Life Ins. Co., 413 F. Supp. 3d 535, 538 (W.D. La. 2019). We affirm.1

I.

We review the district court’s decision de novo, “applying the same 

standards as the district court” in this ERISA case. Schexnayder v. Hartford

Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 600 F.3d 465, 468 (5th Cir. 2010); see Swenson v. United

of Omaha Life Ins. Co., 876 F.3d 809, 810 (5th Cir. 2017). “Because the Plan 

gave [MetLife] discretionary authority to determine eligibility for benefits as 

well as to construe the Plan’s terms, we review [MetLife]’s denial of benefits 

for an abuse of discretion.” Schexnayder, 600 F.3d at 468.

II.

On appeal, Plaintiffs first contend that MetLife had an inherent conflict 

of interest as both the Plan’s insurer and claims administrator. It is true that 

the Supreme Court has stated that a conflict of interest exists where, as here, 

the plan administrator both evaluates and pays claims. Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. 

Glenn, 554 U.S. 105, 114 (2008). However, the Court has also explained that 

this conflict does not per se change the standard of review from “deferential to 

de novo.” Id. Rather, the “conflict should be weighed as a factor in determining 

1 In the district court, defendants named Jared Beazley, a biological child of Mr. 

Beazley, as a defendant in interpleader. Because of the district court’s conclusion that 

MetLife did not abuse its discretion in denying plaintiffs’ benefits claim, the district court did 

not determine whether Jared Beazley would have been a proper beneficiary under the 

benefits policies at issue, and Jared Beazley did not participate in this appeal. 

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whether there is an abuse of discretion.” Id. at 115 (internal quotation marks 

and citation omitted). “A reviewing court may give more weight to a conflict of 

interest, where the circumstances surrounding the plan administrator’s 

decision suggest ‘procedural unreasonableness.’” Schexnayder, 600 F.3d 465, 

469 (5th Cir. 2010) (quoting Glenn, 554 U.S. at 118). 

In Schexnayder v. Hartford Life & Acc. Ins. Co., the district court found 

such procedural unreasonableness, and, ultimately, an abuse of discretion by 

the plan administrator; we affirmed. Id. at 467, 471. There, the plaintiff had

been covered by an employer-sponsored disability insurance plan that was

administered and insured by Hartford Life Group Insurance Co. (“Hartford”). 

Id. at 467. Based on recurrent pain in the plaintiff’s back and extremities, the

Social Security Administration (“SSA”) determined that he was “totally

disabled,” thereby authorizing him to receive SSA disability payments. Id. at

467-68. Despite this determination, Hartford, which had been making

disability payments to the plaintiff, re-evaluated him and concluded he did not

“remain disabled from any occupation” and thus terminated its benefits

payments. Id. Plaintiff sued, and we affirmed the district court’s

determination that Hartford abused its discretion in terminating his disability

benefits. Id. Our ruling was based on the fact that “Hartford did not address 

the SSA award” in its decision to deny benefits. Id. at 471. Its failure to even 

“acknowledge an agency determination that was in direct conflict with its own 

determination” showed that “the method by which it made the decision [to 

terminate benefits] was unreasonable.” Id.

Here, by contrast, Plaintiffs merely make the conclusory argument that

“MetLife’s method in making its benefits decision . . . was unreasonable.” They

entirely fail to identify how or why MetLife’s decision-making was

unreasonable, other than the fact that MetLife has a conflict of interest. But

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without showing how “that conflict is . . . a significant factor in this case,” we

cannot conclude that MetLife abused its discretion. Holland v. Int’l Paper Co.

Ret. Plan, 576 F.3d 250 (5th Cir. 2009); see Glenn, 554 U.S. at 114. 

Plaintiffs next argue that the district court erred because MetLife 

supposedly delayed mailing a notice to Mr. Beazley of his option to convert or 

port his policies following his termination from STC and thus the termination 

of his policies. Plaintiffs contend that it “seems unfair” for MetLife to “avoid 

responsibility” for sending this notice to Mr. Beazley twenty-three days after 

STC terminated him. However, they identify neither caselaw nor any 

statutory, regulatory, or Plan provision imposing a duty on MetLife to provide 

notice to Mr. Beazley of his option to convert or port his policies beyond that 

already contained in the Plan. Because Plaintiffs fail to identify such a duty, 

they do not demonstrate that MetLife abused its discretion by mailing notice 

of the right to convert or port in a dilatory manner.

Plaintiffs further contend that the Plan does not address the 

consequences of an insured dying within the time period in which coverage can 

be ported.2 However, the Plan’s terms are clear. Under the Plan, since MetLife 

sent written notice to Mr. Beazley of his option to port “more than 15 days after 

but within 91 days” of the end of his insurance, Mr. Beazley had 45 days from 

the termination of his employment to request, in writing, to port. And it is 

undisputed that Mr. Beazley did not request to port his coverage during the 37 

days from when his life insurance ended on May 6, 2014 until his death on 

June 12, 2014. 

2 Mr. Beazley had both basic and supplemental life insurance. Per the Plan, only the 

supplemental life insurance policy was eligible for porting. 

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The Plan also expressly provides that if (1) an insured dies “within 31 

days” of when his life insurance ends and (2) MetLife has “not received” an 

application to port, the insured’s beneficiaries may still receive payment under 

the policy, provided MetLife receives a benefits claim accompanied by a proof 

of death. However, Mr. Beazley died after the lapse of this 31-day period, and 

thus Plaintiffs cannot avail themselves of this provision.

Plaintiffs final argument is that MetLife acted unreasonably by not 

immediately providing Donna Latiolais, a Beazley family friend, with 

information on porting coverage when, at the request of Mr. Beazley’s widow,

Latiolais contacted the company to inquire about Mr. Beazley’s coverage. But 

Plaintiffs do not cite any legal duty MetLife had to provide Latiolais with 

information on porting coverage. Plaintiffs also provide no support for their 

contention that MetLife abused its discretion by not allowing Mr. Beazley’s 

beneficiaries to port his insurance coverage. Accordingly, Plaintiffs have not 

shown that MetLife abused its discretion in denying their claims.

* * *

For these reasons, the judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.

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