THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA 

In The Court of Appeals 

Wendy Brawley, Respondent/Appellant, 

v. 

Richland County, South Carolina, Appellant/Respondent. 

Appellate Case No. 2020-001135 

Appeal From Richland County 

DeAndrea G. Benjamin, Circuit Court Judge 

Opinion No. 6090 

Heard May 7, 2024 – Filed September 25, 2024 

AFFIRMED IN PART, REVERSED IN PART, AND 

REMANDED 

Jenkins M. Mann and Shaun C. Blake, both of Mann 

Blake & Jackson, of Columbia, for 

Respondent/Appellant. 

Andrew F. Lindemann, of Lindemann Law Firm, P.A., of 

Columbia, for Appellant/Respondent. 

HEWITT, J.: This cross-appeal concerns the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA). 

In 2014, Wendy Brawley sent four FOIA requests to Richland County (the County) 

regarding the "Lower Richland Sewer Project."1 The County had recently applied 

1 After initiating this litigation, Wendy Brawley served as a representative in the 

South Carolina legislature. For consistency with the circuit court proceedings, we 

refer to Former Representative Brawley as Brawley throughout the opinion. 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

for a federal grant and loan to fund the project. In one of her requests, Brawley 

sought the loan application for the project and any supporting documentation. After 

the County provided Brawley with a response she deemed inadequate, Brawley filed 

suit. 

The County produced the loan application and a trove of additional documents 

related to the sewer project prior to any significant adversarial proceedings. Years 

later, a one-day bench trial resulted in a finding that the County violated FOIA and 

an award to Brawley of roughly $81,000 in attorney's fees and costs. 

There is sufficient evidence in the record to affirm the circuit court's finding that the 

County violated FOIA. Though we agree with the circuit court that Brawley 

partially prevailed and is entitled to an award of reasonable fees, there are material 

errors affecting Brawley's award. We regret prolonging this already lengthy 

litigation, but these errors necessitate reversal and a remand. 

BACKGROUND 

Sometime between the years 2010 and 2013, the County applied for a loan and grant 

from the U.S. Department of Agriculture Rural Development office (the USDA) to 

fund the Lower Richland Sewer Project. The project involved expanding the 

County's sewer service. 

In September 2014, Brawley submitted four separate FOIA requests to the County 

related to this project. In one of those requests—the one at issue here—Brawley 

sought "a copy of the application and supporting documentation" that the County 

submitted to the USDA. The County responded by letter, stating that it was 

researching Brawley's request and that it would release the information. 

About one week later, the County produced six pages of documents. This production 

included a one-page, signed but undated application for federal assistance. Brawley 

understandably did not believe this was a full response; the loan request was for 

several million dollars. Brawley filed suit in March 2015. 

The first cause of action in Brawley's lawsuit sought declaratory relief. As relevant 

here, Brawley sought declarations that the County failed to fully respond to her 

FOIA requests; that she was entitled to full and complete responses; and that she was 

entitled to costs and reasonable attorney's fees. Brawley's second cause of action 

was for temporary and permanent injunctive relief. There, Brawley asked the court 

to enjoin the County from taking several actions related to the project. 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

The lawsuit resulted in Brawley receiving a significant number of additional 

documents in relatively short order. In June 2015, about three months after Brawley 

filed suit, the County produced fifty-five pages of supplemental materials beyond 

the six-page FOIA response. These documents included a 2012 application 

requesting federal assistance for the sewer project. The application was signed by 

Andy Metts, the then-director of the County's utilities department. 

The County also offered Brawley the opportunity to review its entire project file, 

and she accepted the offer about eight months later in February 2016. The file was 

apparently quite large and filled several feet of bankers' boxes. Brawley identified 

roughly 120 pages of additional documents during this inspection that she claimed 

were relevant to her FOIA request. 

There was little court involvement in this case until long after the County's 

supplemental productions. In due time, however, the circuit court dismissed 

Brawley's injunctive claims because the requested relief—things like enjoining the 

County from contacting residents about the project or enjoining the County from 

going forward with the project—was not authorized under FOIA. The circuit court 

also dismissed a co-plaintiff from the case and granted partial summary judgment in 

favor of the County on three of Brawley's four FOIA requests because there was no 

dispute that those requests were fully resolved. The co-plaintiff and the reasons for 

its dismissal are not relevant to this appeal. As this paragraph's opening advertised, 

the point of this description is that the scope of the case significantly narrowed not 

long after the case was filed and that the bulk of the court activity in the case occurred 

well after the County's supplemental document productions. 

The only FOIA request that was not resolved on summary judgment was the request 

at issue here—the request for the loan application and supporting documentation. 

The one-day bench trial on that request occurred roughly three years after the 

summary judgment order. Three witnesses testified: Brawley; Sara Salley, who 

worked in the County's administration office at the time of the FOIA request; and 

Metts. 

The trial focused on whether the County had conducted a diligent search for 

responsive documents before sending Brawley the six pages of materials as its FOIA 

response. Salley testified that she did not take part in completing the loan application 

for the sewer project and that she did not maintain a file on the project. Metts 

testified, however, that the six pages of documents the County initially provided to 

Brawley came from Salley's office. Metts explained that when he was unable to 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

locate a copy of any applications in the utilities department, he or his staff contacted 

Salley for assistance. 

The circuit court issued an order finding the County had violated FOIA by not 

conducting a reasonable investigation for all relevant documents before responding 

to Brawley. The order also included an injunction requiring the County to conduct 

an additional search and to produce any responsive documents within fifteen days. 

The County filed a post-trial motion that, among other things, argued the circuit 

court could not order the production of additional documents because a prior circuit 

court order dismissed Brawley's cause of action seeking injunctive relief. The circuit 

court agreed with this argument in an amended order. 

Both the original order and the amended order addressed attorney's fees by ruling 

that Brawley was entitled to fees but leaving the amount of fees open. Brawley filed 

an "affidavit as to attorney's fees and costs." The circuit court initially awarded 

Brawley roughly $81,000 in fees and costs, which was the exact amount Brawley 

requested. After the County asked the circuit court to reconsider, the court reduced 

the award by about $400. 

ISSUES 

The County asserts that the circuit court erred in finding a FOIA violation. The 

County also argues that the court erred in awarding Brawley attorney's fees and costs 

because the court lacked jurisdiction to determine fees, or, in the alternative, because 

Brawley prevailed only in part. 

Brawley contends the circuit court erred in removing the injunction requiring the 

County to search for and produce additional documents. 

STANDARD OF REVIEW 

"A declaratory judgment action under . . . FOIA to determine whether certain 

information should be disclosed is an action at law." Miramonti v. Richland Cnty. 

Sch. Dist. One, 438 S.C. 612, 616, 885 S.E.2d 406, 408 (Ct. App. 2023) (quoting 

Campbell v. Marion Cnty. Hosp. Dist., 354 S.C. 274, 280, 580 S.E.2d 163, 165 (Ct. 

App. 2003)). "As to questions of law, this court's standard of review is de novo." 

Id. (Citizens for Quality Rural Living, Inc. v. Greenville Cnty. Plan. Comm'n, 426 

S.C. 97, 102, 825 S.E.2d 721, 724 (Ct. App. 2019)). "Our standard of review extends 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

to correct errors of law, but we will not disturb the trial court's factual findings as 

long as they have reasonable support in the record." Id. 

"The decision on whether to award attorney's fees [under FOIA] is discretionary in 

nature." Campbell, 354 S.C. at 289, 580 S.E.2d at 170. We will not disturb this 

decision unless the circuit court abused its discretion. Sloan v. Friends of Hunley, 

Inc. (Friends II), 393 S.C. 152, 156, 711 S.E.2d 895, 897 (2011). "An abuse of 

discretion occurs when the conclusions of the trial court are either controlled by an 

error of law or are based on unsupported factual conclusions." Id. (quoting 

Kiriakides v. Sch. Dist. of Greenville Cnty., 383 S.C. 8, 20, 675 S.E.2d 439, 445 

(2009)). 

FOIA VIOLATION 

For the reasons described below, there is sufficient evidence in the record to support 

the circuit court's finding that the County violated FOIA. See Campbell, 354 S.C. at 

280, 580 S.E.2d at 166 ("[T]he trial court's factual findings will not be disturbed on 

appeal [of a declaratory judgment action under FOIA] unless a review of the record 

discloses that there is no evidence which reasonably supports the judge's findings."). 

"The purpose of FOIA is to protect the public by providing a mechanism for the 

disclosure of information by public bodies." Sloan v. Friends of Hunley, Inc. 

(Friends I), 369 S.C. 20, 26, 630 S.E.2d 474, 478 (2006). "[FOIA] must be construed 

so as to make it possible for citizens, or their representatives, to learn and report fully 

the activities of their public officials at a minimum cost or delay to the persons 

seeking access to public documents or meetings." S.C. Code Ann. § 30-4-15 (2007). 

There have been significant amendments to FOIA in the time since Brawley's FOIA 

requests. See Act 67, 2017 S.C. Acts 311. Throughout this opinion, we rely on the 

2014 version of the act, which controls this litigation. 

The County's main argument against the circuit court's finding of a FOIA violation 

is that the County supposedly requested and received certain documents from the 

USDA after this case commenced. The County contends these documents were not 

in its possession at the time of Brawley's request and thus the documents cannot 

support a finding of a FOIA violation. 

We agree with the County that FOIA does not require public bodies to seek 

documents from third parties or recreate documents in order to respond to FOIA 

requests. See Kissinger v. Reps. Comm. for Freedom of the Press, 445 U.S. 136, 152 

(1980) (stating FOIA "does not obligate agencies to create or retain documents; it 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

only obligates them to provide access to those which it in fact has created and 

retained"); see also, e.g., Ballard v. Newberry County, 432 S.C. 526, 534, 535, 854 

S.E.2d 848, 852 (Ct. App. 2021) (reversing the circuit court's finding of a FOIA 

violation because the record showed that at the time of the FOIA request, "the 

documents in question did not exist and were not in [Newberry] County's 

possession"). 

However, we respectfully disagree with the County's argument that any responsive 

documents Brawley obtained through this lawsuit were documents that the County 

received by virtue of its own request to the USDA. The only "evidence" presented 

to show that any of the later-produced documents came from the USDA was the 

County's own discovery response making that same assertion. 

The circuit court found, based on witness testimony, that the County possessed 

additional responsive documents beyond the six pages originally produced and that 

the County failed to diligently search for and disclose the later-produced documents 

prior to Brawley filing this case. While we agree with the County that many of the 

documents Brawley identified in the project file do not qualify as responsive to her 

request for "the application and supporting documentation," other documents 

Brawley recovered through this litigation were plainly responsive to her request. 

At minimum, the following documents, which were obtained through the February 

2016 review but were not within the initial production or June 2015 production, were 

responsive to Brawley's FOIA request: 

a. Plaintiff's Exhibit 9, RC-0167–RC-0168, and Plaintiff's Exhibit 10, 

RC-0286, what appears to be a signed, 2010 certification to the 

USDA from the County's then-administrator; and 

b. Plaintiff's Exhibit 23, a letter from Metts on behalf of the County to 

the USDA providing additional requested information, including a 

tentative timeline for the project. 

In addition, and again, at minimum, the following documents from the June 2015 

production are documents that the circuit court could well conclude the County 

almost certainly retained and had in its possession when Brawley submitted her 

FOIA request: 

a. Plaintiff's Exhibit 5, RC-0001, a signed application dated July 18, 

2012; 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

b. Plaintiff's Exhibit 5, RC-0003–RC-0005, signed and dated budget 

and cost estimation sheets; 

c. Plaintiff's Exhibit 5, RC-0010–RC-0014, a signed 

"CERTIFICATION OF OUTSTANDING DEBTS" along with 

supporting documents; 

d. Plaintiff's Exhibit 5, RC-0022, a signed and dated "BALANCE 

SHEET," which references "integral" accompanying notes that we 

believe to be Exhibit 5, RC-0023–RC-0026; and 

e. Plaintiff's Exhibit 5, RC-0045–RC-0052, documents discussing 

"assumptions" for the project, showing maps of the project, and 

providing a user rate comparison sheet. 

Though Metts claimed he conducted a search for Brawley's FOIA request, this 

testimony is not definitive and is contradictory to his statement that the utilities 

department's practice was to not shred or destroy anything related to ongoing 

projects. Accordingly, the responsive documents described above and the witness 

testimony support the circuit court's finding that the County did not diligently 

investigate Brawley's FOIA request. 

Because the circuit court's findings are reasonably supported by the record, and there 

was no admissible evidence presented to the circuit court to show the responsive 

documents Brawley procured in litigation came solely from the USDA, we affirm. 

We need not reach any remaining arguments on this issue because the foregoing 

conclusions are dispositive. See Futch v. McAllister Towing of Georgetown, Inc., 

335 S.C. 598, 613, 518 S.E.2d 591, 598 (1999) (ruling it is unnecessary for an 

appellate court to address remaining issues when its resolution of a prior issue is 

dispositive). 

PREVAILING PARTY 

A party who prevails in an action to enforce FOIA "may be awarded reasonable 

attorney fees and other costs of litigation." S.C. Code Ann. § 30-4-100(b) (2007). 

A prevailing party is defined as "one who successfully prosecutes an action or 

successfully defends against it, prevailing on the main issue, even [if] not to the 

extent of the original contention[,] [and] is the one in whose favor the decision or 

verdict is rendered and judgment entered." Friends II, 393 S.C. at 156, 711 S.E.2d 

at 897 (third alteration in original) (quoting Heath v. County of Aiken, 302 S.C. 178, 

182–83, 394 S.E.2d 709, 711 (1990)). 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

We have no difficulty determining Brawley partially prevailed in this action and is 

thus entitled to reasonable fees. As described above, one of the reasons Brawley 

brought this lawsuit was because she believed the County's initial response to her 

FOIA request was incomplete. Her lawsuit resulted in the County producing a 

substantial number of additional documents. While we agree with the County that 

many of the documents Brawley identified in its project file do not qualify as 

responsive to Brawley's request, that does not change the fact that some were plainly 

responsive. 

Our supreme court previously deemed a plaintiff to have prevailed when a lawsuit 

"prompted [a public body] to do what a series of FOIA letter-requests could not 

accomplish—produce the requested documents." Id. at 158, 711 S.E.2d at 898; see 

also id. at 157, 711 S.E.2d at 897 ("When a public body frustrates a citizen's FOIA 

request to the extent that the citizen must seek relief in the courts and incur litigation 

costs, the public body should not be able to preclude prevailing party status to the 

citizen by producing the documents after litigation is filed."). The same is true here. 

Accordingly, we affirm Brawley's status as a prevailing party. 

AMOUNT OF FEES 

Once a party is deemed prevailing, the next step is to determine a "reasonable" 

award. See Burton v. York Cnty. Sheriff's Dep't, 358 S.C. 339, 357, 594 S.E.2d 888, 

898 (Ct. App. 2004). That calculation generally rests within the circuit court's 

discretion, and we will not disturb an award absent an abuse of discretion. Horton 

v. Jasper Cnty. Sch. Dist., 423 S.C. 325, 330, 815 S.E.2d 442, 444 (2018). 

Two problems prevent us from affirming the fee award in this case. First, we cannot 

discern how the circuit court came to the amounts in the original or amended awards. 

Brawley requested $81,264.96 in fees and costs. The court's original order was a 

brief three pages, did not explicitly review the time submitted by Brawley's 

attorneys, and then awarded the requested fees in full. The court's amended order 

modified the award by claiming to deduct the time devoted to Brawley's 

unsuccessful injunctive relief claim, the County's successful motions to dismiss, 

appellate matters, and a fifty-percent reduction for certain work to account for tasks 

Brawley's counsel performed on behalf of the co-plaintiff dismissed at the case's 

beginning. All of these claimed deductions somehow resulted in a new award of 

$80,845.71, which was only $419.25 less than the original award. We find it 

impossible to see how the above-described deductions totaled only $400. 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Our second issue is that we strain to find justification for an award of roughly 

$80,000 in fees and costs for a FOIA case where there was minimal discovery and 

where the public body never argued that any of the materials Brawley requested were 

exempt from disclosure. Cf. Horton, 423 S.C. at 327–28, 331, 815 S.E.2d at 443– 

44, 445 (awarding roughly $35,000 in fees and $1,000 in costs in a case in which the 

public body refused to turn over the requested records, produced some records after 

the FOIA requester filed suit, and the circuit court ultimately had to order the public 

body to produce all necessary records). To this same point, the order awarding fees 

included a finding that Brawley secured responsive documents after several 

hearings, "extensive discovery," and a number of pre- and post-trial motions. This 

directly contradicts the record in a number of respects. The additional responsive 

documents were provided relatively early in the litigation without any significant 

adversarial proceedings. 

For these reasons, we reverse the fee award. See id. at 331–32, 815 S.E.2d at 445 

(explaining that the law requires a trial court to base fee awards "on a sound 

evidentiary basis" and to "adequately explain[ the award] with specific findings," or 

else the fee award will constitute an abuse of discretion warranting reversal). 

Precedent explains the circuit court should consider six factors in setting an award 

of fees. Those factors are: 

(1) the nature, extent, and difficulty of the case; (2) the 

time necessarily devoted to the case; (3) professional 

standing of counsel; (4) contingency of compensation; (5) 

beneficial results obtained; and (6) customary legal fees 

for similar services. 

Burton, 358 S.C. at 358, 594 S.E.2d at 898. For each factor, the court "should make 

specific findings of fact on the record." Id. 

We were not able to locate a binding precedent that establishes a more detailed 

framework for deciding a request for fees under FOIA. During oral argument in this 

court, the parties agreed that Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424 (1983), a prominent 

federal case, provides useful guidance. 

Hensley explains, "The most useful starting point for determining the amount of a 

reasonable fee is the number of hours reasonably expended on the litigation 

multiplied by a reasonable hourly rate." Id. at 433. "This calculation provides an 

objective basis on which to make an initial estimate of the value of a lawyer's 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

services." Id. But hours "not 'reasonably expended'" should be "exclude[d] from 

this initial fee calculation." Id. at 434 (citation omitted). This includes "hours that 

are excessive, redundant, or otherwise unnecessary." Id. 

A review of the results obtained is a particularly important consideration, especially 

"where a plaintiff is deemed 'prevailing' even though he succeeded on only some of 

his claims for relief." Id. 

In this situation[,] two questions must be addressed. First, 

did the plaintiff fail to prevail on claims that were 

unrelated to the claims on which he succeeded? Second, 

did the plaintiff achieve a level of success that makes the 

hours reasonably expended a satisfactory basis for making 

a fee award? 

Id. "[T]he most critical factor is the degree of success obtained." Id. at 436. 

The degree of Brawley's success is difficult to evaluate. This litigation resulted in 

Brawley securing responsive documents that she had not secured before, but her 

cause of action for injunctive relief was dismissed early in the litigation, and the 

circuit court granted partial summary judgment to the County because, at the time 

of the summary judgment hearing, there was no dispute that the County fully 

responded to three of her four FOIA requests. The record is not clear what issues 

remained in the case following this partial summary judgment order. 

Brawley argues in her cross-appeal for the reinstatement of the circuit court's order 

compelling the County to reinvestigate the FOIA request and produce any further 

responsive documents. For reasons discussed later in this opinion, that argument is 

procedurally barred. Even so, we interpret the trial transcript as showing Brawley 

was focused on the County's actions at the time of her FOIA request, not any time 

thereafter. Put differently, the trial proceeded as though the parties were litigating a 

past FOIA violation, not a continuing FOIA violation. 

In one sense, it is difficult to understand the need for a trial on the County's diligence 

in its initial document search when it appears Brawley had been given access to all 

of the documents the County possessed three years before the trial occurred. This 

calls to mind past cases where our supreme court found there not to be a viable FOIA 

claim. In one such case, the court held that there was "no continuing violation" for 

the trial court to issue a declaratory judgment because the information the plaintiff 

sought had been disclosed. Friends I, 369 S.C. at 26, 630 S.E.2d at 478. In another, 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

the court concluded that the FOIA violation claim was mooted when the information 

was produced. Sloan v. S.C. Dep't of Revenue, 409 S.C. 551, 555, 762 S.E.2d 687, 

689 (2014) ("Indeed, Sloan acknowledges that his claim for injunctive relief was 

mooted when he received the documents. Sloan contends, however, that the claim 

for declaratory relief remained viable. We disagree, for 'the information Sloan 

sought has been disclosed, [and] there is no continuing violation of FOIA upon 

which the trial court could have issued a declaratory judgment.'" (alteration in 

original) (quoting Friends I, 369 S.C. at 26, 630 S.E.2d at 478)). 

But in another sense, it seems obvious that unless the County was willing to stipulate 

that its initial search for responsive documents was not reasonable, Brawley was 

entitled to take her claim for a declaratory judgment on that issue to trial. On top of 

that, and even though she was granted access to the County's entire project file, 

Brawley has not conceded that she has received all responsive information. The lack 

of such a concession makes this case different from the cases discussed in the 

previous paragraph. Cf. Friends I, 369 S.C. at 26, 630 S.E.2d at 477–78 ("In the 

instant case, Sloan concedes that Friends has provided all documents requested 

pursuant to FOIA."); Sloan, 409 S.C. at 554, 762 S.E.2d at 688 ("Three weeks after 

Sloan filed suit, DOR provided Sloan with the documents he had requested. The 

trial court held a hearing at which Sloan conceded that his request for injunctive 

relief was mooted by DOR's production of documents."). Still, this case did not 

result in Brawley receiving any prospective relief. 

A reasonable fee award must include only "reasonably expended" hours and must 

be proportional to the degree of success obtained. While Brawley is undoubtedly 

entitled to fees for securing additional documents responsive to her FOIA request, it 

is important to ensure her award is reasonable. Precedent explains, "Decisions as to 

the amount of attorneys' fees should ordinarily be made by trial courts[,]" and 

"[w]hen a trial court's decision is made on a sound evidentiary basis and is 

adequately explained with specific findings—as the law requires—we defer to the 

trial court's discretion." Horton, 423 S.C. at 331, 815 S.E.2d at 445 (emphasis 

added). Here, there is no adequate explanation of the amount originally granted or 

the deductions made in the amended order, and the amount awarded is difficult to 

justify. Consequently, we reverse the award and remand for proper consideration. 

ADDITIONAL ARGUMENTS CONCERNING FEES 

The parties raise a number of additional arguments related to attorney's fees. We 

address these in turn both for completeness and with the earnest hope that doing so 

will assist the proceedings on remand. 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Appellate Matters 

We agree with the County that certain fees and costs related to appellate matters 

were not appropriate for the circuit court to award in this case. Rule 222(e), SCACR 

("Costs on appeal shall be taxed only in the appellate court."); Rule 222(b), SCACR 

(specifying the appellate costs and fees recoverable under Rule 222, including filing 

fees for notices of appeal and costs for ordering transcripts and printing briefs and 

records); Belton v. State, 313 S.C. 549, 554–55, 443 S.E.2d 554, 557 (1994) (finding 

it error for the circuit court to assess fees and costs pursuant to Rule 222 because 

"costs on appeal may only be taxed in the [a]ppellate [c]ourt"); but see Muller v. 

Myrtle Beach Golf & Yacht Club, 313 S.C. 412, 416, 438 S.E.2d 248, 250 (1993) 

("Rule 222 'does not preempt an award of attorney's fees to which one is otherwise 

entitled.'" (quoting McDowell v. S.C. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 304 S.C. 539, 543, 405 

S.E.2d 830, 833 (1991))). 

We could not determine what appellate-related costs the circuit court actually 

deducted here, if any. Though the circuit court said it was deducting such costs, the 

court did not specify what amounts were deducted. On remand, the circuit court 

should make deductions consistent with this opinion and specify those deductions. 

Fees for Paralegal Work 

The County argues that an award of fees and costs in a FOIA case may not include 

fees incurred by paralegals and support staff. It relies on our decision in O'Shields 

v. Columbia Auto., LLC, 435 S.C. 319, 867 S.E.2d 446 (Ct. App. 2021), aff'd, 443 

S.C. 29, 902 S.E.2d 375 (2024). 

O'Shields does not control on this issue because that case turned on North Carolina 

law. We have not found a South Carolina FOIA case that is binding on this point, 

but there are several South Carolina cases upholding the inclusion of paralegal fees 

within reasonable fee awards. See Layman v. State, 376 S.C. 434, 459–62, 658 

S.E.2d 320, 333–35 (2008) (modifying an award of fees pursuant to the state action 

statute but keeping the inclusion of paralegal and law clerk fees in the award); 

Charleston Lumber Co. v. Miller Hous. Corp., 318 S.C. 471, 483–84, 458 S.E.2d 

431, 438–39 (Ct. App. 1995) (including paralegal fees in an award pursuant to a 

contract, which "provide[d] for 'reasonable attorney's fees' without specifying a rate 

or amount, [thereby leaving] the amount of the fees to be awarded to the discretion 

of the court" (emphasis added)); Hayduk v. Hayduk, 436 S.C. 411, 433–34, 872 

S.E.2d 847, 858–59 (Ct. App. 2022) (upholding an award of fees in a family court 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

matter that included paralegal tasks, when "Wife's attorney . . . attested she charged 

an hourly rate of $200 per hour for attorney tasks and $100 per hour for paralegal 

tasks [and] [t]he billing statement show[ed] Wife's attorney billed for 21.8 hours at 

the $200 rate and 25.4 hours at the $100 rate[; therefore t]he attorney's fee 

affidavit . . . established the time necessarily devoted to the case, the professional 

standing of counsel, and customary legal fees for similar services"). 

Skilled paralegals and support staff are an indispensable part of practicing law and 

allow attorneys to reduce the time (and thus the fees) devoted to a case. It would be 

counterproductive to discourage the reduction of fees and costs that occurs when a 

lawyer uses support staff for work that contributes to the litigation and is billed at 

less than the lawyer's standard rate. See Missouri v. Jenkins, 491 U.S. 274, 288 n.10 

(1989) ("It has frequently been recognized in the lower courts that paralegals are 

capable of carrying out many tasks, under the supervision of an attorney, that might 

otherwise be performed by a lawyer and billed at a higher rate."). 

"'[P]urely clerical or secretarial tasks[, however,] should not be billed' at the same 

rate as pure legal work." Nat'l Lab. Rels. Bd. v. Bannum, Inc, 102 F.4th 358, 366 

(6th Cir. 2024) (first alteration in original) (quoting Jenkins, 491 U.S. at 288 n.10); 

id. ("Pure clerical work . . . does not require legal knowledge."); id. (listing examples 

of clerical and secretarial tasks as described by other federal circuit courts). This is 

true even if an attorney performs the clerical or secretarial acts himself. See Jenkins, 

491 U.S. at 288 n.10 ("[N]on-legal work may command a lesser rate. Its dollar value 

is not enhanced just because a lawyer does it." (citation omitted)). 

We accordingly hold a circuit court may include paralegal and support-staff fees in 

a computation of reasonable fees and costs so long as they are billed at appropriate 

and reasonable rates and that the tasks involved contribute to the litigation. 

OTHER ISSUES 

There are two remaining issues we must resolve. First, Brawley argues that the 

circuit court erred in removing the injunction from its original order finding the 

County violated FOIA. The original order required the County to search for 

additional responsive documents and deliver them within fifteen days. Second, the 

County argues that the circuit court lost jurisdiction to award attorney's fees when 

Brawley's counsel did not file a formal motion requesting fees within ten days of the 

circuit court's original order. 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

We need not address Brawley's argument regarding the removal of injunctive relief. 

This argument is not preserved for our review. Brawley did not provide any 

counterargument when the County asked the circuit court to remove the injunction 

from its original order. Brawley did not file any motion or memorandum opposing 

the County's request, and there was no hearing on the matter. As a result, the 

arguments in Brawley's cross-appeal were never presented to the circuit court and 

are thus not preserved. Wilder Corp. v. Wilke, 330 S.C. 71, 76, 497 S.E.2d 731, 733 

(1998) ("It is axiomatic that an issue cannot be raised for the first time on appeal, 

but must have been raised to and ruled upon by the trial judge to be preserved for 

appellate review."). 

We reject the County's argument that the circuit court did not retain jurisdiction to 

award fees. The County is completely correct that post-trial motions must typically 

be filed within ten days of a final judgment. See Overland, Inc. v. Nance, 423 S.C. 

253, 256, 815 S.E.2d 431, 433 (2018) (reiterating "the ten-day deadline in Rule 

59(e)[, SCRCP,] is an absolute deadline"); Rutland v. Holler, Dennis, Corbett, 

Ormond & Garner (L. Firm), 371 S.C. 91, 96, 637 S.E.2d 316, 318–19 (Ct. App. 

2006) (applying the ten-day limitation on post-trial motions to a motion for attorney's 

fees and costs). But the circuit court's initial order and its amended order specifically 

invited future proceedings on the issue of fees. Thus, we conclude that the circuit 

court properly "reserved" jurisdiction over the issue. See Leviner v. Sonoco Prod. 

Co., 339 S.C. 492, 494, 530 S.E.2d 127, 128 (2000) (explaining that, "absent a 

'reservation' of jurisdiction[,]" a circuit court will lose jurisdiction once the post-trial 

motion deadline has passed); see also, e.g., Coker v. Cummings, 381 S.C. 45, 53, 

671 S.E.2d 383, 387 (Ct. App. 2008) ("[A]lthough the form order did not mention 

the full order would follow, the master instructed one of the defendants' attorneys to 

draft the longer order. Therefore, the master reserved jurisdiction and could enter 

the full order."); Glassmeyer v. City of Columbia, 414 S.C. 213, 218, 225, 777 S.E.2d 

835, 838, 841 (Ct. App. 2015) (noting, in affirming an award of fees, that the circuit 

court had "held the record open for [the FOIA requester] to submit an affidavit for 

attorney's fees"). 

We also reject the County's argument that Brawley's "affidavit as to attorney's fees 

and costs" did not qualify as a proper motion. "The substance of the relief sought," 

not the form, is typically what matters. Standard Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Mungo, 

306 S.C. 22, 26, 410 S.E.2d 18, 20 (Ct. App. 1991). Brawley's affidavit clearly set 

forth the grounds for her request and the relief sought. See Rule 7(b)(1), SCRCP 

(requiring a motion to, among other things, state its grounds and the relief sought). 
 

 

 

 

As to any remaining arguments, we decline to address them given the controlling 

issues outlined throughout this opinion. See Futch, 335 S.C. at 613, 518 S.E.2d at 

598 (ruling it unnecessary for an appellate court to address remaining issues when 

its resolution of a prior issue is dispositive). 

CONCLUSION 

We affirm the circuit court's finding that the County violated FOIA. As to the fee 

award, we affirm Brawley's status as a prevailing party but reverse and remand the 

award for proper consideration consistent with this opinion. 

AFFIRMED IN PART, REVERSED IN PART, AND REMANDED. 

GEATHERS and VINSON, JJ., concur.