J-S79004-17

J-S79005-17

J-S79006-17

- 1 -

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

v.

HASAN BROWN 

Appellant

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 1609 EDA 2017

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence March 31, 2016

In the Court of Common Pleas of Delaware County

Criminal Division at No(s): CP-23-CR-0000591-2012

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

v.

HASAN BROWN 

Appellant

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 1610 EDA 2017

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence March 31, 2016

In the Court of Common Pleas of Delaware County 

Criminal Division at No(s): CP-23-CR-0003551-2012

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

v.

HASAN BROWN 

Appellant

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 1611 EDA 2017
J-S79004-17

J-S79005-17

J-S79006-17

- 2 -

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence March 31, 2016

In the Court of Common Pleas of Delaware County 

Criminal Division at No(s): CP-23-CR-0003546-2012

BEFORE: GANTMAN, P.J., LAZARUS, J., and OTT, J.

MEMORANDUM BY OTT, J.: FILED MARCH 26, 2018

Hasan Brown appeals nunc pro tunc from the judgments of sentence 

imposed on March 31, 2016, in the Court of Common Pleas of Delaware 

County, at Docket Nos. 591-2012, 3551-2012, and 3546-2012, respectively,

upon revocation of parole/probation.

1, 2

 Brown’s revocation sentences stem 

from a new arrest, upon which Brown was convicted and sentenced on 

____________________________________________

1 Brown filed a separate appeal from the March 31, 2016, judgment of 

sentence imposed at each docket. A Rule to Show Cause was issued by this 

Court as to why the appeals at 1610 EDA 2017 and 1611 EDA 2017 should 

not be dismissed as duplicative of the appeal at 1609 EDA 2017. Brown did 

not file a response. Ultimately, a discharge order was entered on the Rule to 

Show Cause. Brown later filed an application to consolidate the appeals, which 

was denied without prejudice to file a new application with the merits panel. 

The cases were listed consecutively and the parties were directed to file one 

brief. 

Although Brown has not filed a new application to consolidate, we sua 

sponte consolidate these appeals pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 513 (“Where there is 

more than one appeal from the same order, or where the same question is 

involved in two or more appeals in different cases, the appellate court may, 

in its discretion, order them to be argued together in all particulars as if but a 

single appeal.”).

2 On May 5, 2017, pursuant to the Post Conviction Relief Act (PCRA), 42 

Pa.C.S. §§ 9541-9546, Brown was granted the right to file a nunc pro tunc

direct appeal, following dismissal of his direct appeal due to counsel’s failure 

to file a brief. 
J-S79004-17

J-S79005-17

J-S79006-17

- 3 -

September 8, 2014, at Philadelphia County Docket No. 4046-2013, to 12 to 

24 years’ imprisonment. Thereafter, on March 31, 2016, the trial court held 

a Gagnon II3 hearing, revoked Brown’s parole/probation and sentenced 

Brown as follows: At Docket No. 591-2012, to serve back time of 656 days 

at a state correctional institution, consecutive to the sentence imposed in 

Philadelphia County at Docket No. 4046-2013; At Docket No. 3551-2012, to 

serve back time of 551 days in a state correctional institution, to run 

consecutive to Docket No. 591 and the sentence imposed in Philadelphia 

County at Docket No. 4046-2013; At Docket No. 3546-2012, to serve a one 

year term of probation, concurrent to the sentence imposed at Docket No. 

591-2012. See N.T., 3/31/2016, at 9-10. Brown contends his constitutional 

rights were violated when the revocation hearing was held in excess of three 

years from the date a warrant was issued in Delaware County based upon his

new arrest. For the following reasons, we affirm.

The background of this case is fully summarized in the opinion of the 

trial court and, therefore, we do not restate it here. See Trial Court Opinion, 

8/10/2017, at 1-7. Briefly, on March 4, 2016, Brown was charged with 

violation of parole/probation at Docket Nos. 591-2012, 3551-2012, and 3546-

2012. The charges arose as a result of a new arrest on January 23, 2013, for 

____________________________________________

3 Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778 (1973).
J-S79004-17

J-S79005-17

J-S79006-17

- 4 -

attempted murder, at Philadelphia County Docket No. 4046-2013. On January 

30, 2013, the trial court issued a bench warrant for Brown. Thereafter, on

September 8, 2014, in the Philadelphia case, Brown was convicted and 

sentenced to a term of 12 to 24 years’ imprisonment. Brown’s Gagnon II

hearing was held 18 months later, on March 31, 2016. The trial court revoked 

Brown’s parole/probation at Dockets No. 591-2012, 3551-2012, and 3546-

2012, and sentenced Brown as stated above.

Brown contends the delay in holding his revocation hearing was 

unreasonable and prejudiced him. Specifically, Brown contends:

Had the Gagnon II hearing taken place prior in a timely manner, 

and prior to the [s]entence imposed by the Courts in Philadelphia 

County, the cumulative effect of [s]entences imposed against 

[Brown], both in Philadelphia and Delaware Counties very well 

could have been different. Had [Brown] enjoyed his Constitutional 

right to a speedy Gagnon Hearing, subsequent sentence[s]

imposed by Courts in different jurisdictions may have well run 

their sentence concurrent to the Delaware County sentence and 

not consecutive.

Brown’s Brief, at 10-11. 

Brown’s claim is predicated on Rule 708 of the Pennsylvania Rules of 

Criminal Procedure, which provides:

Rule 708. Violation of Probation, Intermediate 

Punishment, or Parole Hearing and Disposition

(A) A written request for revocation shall be filed with the 

clerk of the courts.

(B) Whenever a defendant has been sentenced to probation 

or intermediate punishment, or paced on parole, the 
J-S79004-17

J-S79005-17

J-S79006-17

- 5 -

judge shall not revoke such probation, intermediate 

punishment, or parole as allowed by law unless there 

has been:

(1) A hearing held as speedily as possible at 

which the defendant is present and 

represented by counsel; and

(2) A finding of record that the defendant violated 

a condition of probation, intermediate 

punishment, or parole.

Pa.R.Crim.P. 708.

With respect to Rule 708, this Court has stated: 

The language “speedily as possible” has been interpreted 

to require a hearing within a reasonable time. Rule 708 

does not establish a presumptive period in which the 

Commonwealth must revoke probation; but instead, the 

question is whether the delay was reasonable under the 

circumstances of the specific case and whether the 

appellant was prejudiced by the delay.

* * *

In evaluating the reasonableness of a delay, the court 

examines three factors: the length of the delay; the 

reasons for the delay; and the prejudice resulting to the 

defendant from the delay.

Commonwealth v. Woods, 2009 PA Super 19, 965 A.2d 1225, 

1227 (Pa. Super. 2009) (quoting Commonwealth v. Clark, 2004 

PA Super 97, 847 A.2d 122, 123-24 (Pa. Super. 2004).

The measure of delay extends from the defendant’s date of 

conviction or entry of a guilty plea on the new charges to the date 

the court holds the revocation hearing. Commonwealth v. 

Bischof, 420 Pa. Super. 115, 616 A.2d 6, 8 (Pa. Super. 1992). 

This Court has previously held delays of fifteen months, two years, 

and four years are not “intrinsically reasonable.” Woods, supra

at 1228; Clark, supra at 124; Bischof, supra.
J-S79004-17

J-S79005-17

J-S79006-17

- 6 -

Commonwealth v. Christmas, 995 A.2d 1259, 1262-63 (Pa. Super. 2010)

(citations omitted).

Here, the length of delay is measured from the date of Brown’s 

conviction and sentence on the Philadelphia charges, September 8, 2014, to 

the date of the revocation hearing, March 31, 2016; an 18-month period of 

delay. See Christmas, supra. Furthermore, the Commonwealth has not 

offered any explanation or justification for this delay. Consequently, we 

proceed to Brown’s argument, set forth above, that he was prejudiced as a 

result of the delay. 

We find, however, that Brown’s argument is the very same argument 

that was rejected by this Court in Commonwealth v. Woods, 965 A.2d 1225 

(Pa. Super. 2009). In Woods, this Court opined:

Appellant reasons that he was prejudiced because, had a VOP

[violation of probation] hearing been held prior to sentence being 

imposed on the new charges on December 12, 2006, the VOP 

sentencing judge would not have directed that his September 17, 

2007 sentence be served consecutively to the December 12, 2006 

sentence. That is, Appellant contends that if his probation would 

have been revoked and sentence imposed prior to December 12, 

2006, then there would have been no “new” sentence to which his 

probation revocation sentence could be made to run 

consecutively. This argument does not warrant relief.

Appellant’s argument ignores the fact the trial court was permitted 

to postpone Appellant’s VOP hearing until sentence was imposed 

on his new convictions. This Court has expressly held that such is 

reasonable. [Commonwealth v.] Dickens, [475 A.2d 141, 143 

(Pa. Super. 1984)]. Moreover, Appellant’s speculative argument 

ignores the fact that, had he been sentenced with regard to the 

probation violation first, the sentencing court was permitted to 

direct that his sentence on the new robbery and rape charges run 
J-S79004-17

J-S79005-17

J-S79006-17

- 7 -

consecutively to the probation violation sentence. Simply put, 

Appellant[’s] speculative contention does not constitute “actual 

prejudice.” See Dickens, supra.

Id., 965 A.2d at 1229. Therefore, pursuant to Woods, Brown’s claim of 

prejudice based on what might have happened had the Delaware County 

revocation hearing taken place before the Philadelphia sentencing hearing is 

speculative and warrants no relief. 

Accordingly, we affirm.

Judgments of sentence affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 3/26/18