1 Filed 8/29/13 Ehrlich v. Ruiz CA1/3 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION THREE

JAKE W. EHRLICH, III., Plaintiff and Respondent,.

v. HUMBERTO RUIZ, JR., Defendant and Appellant. A136460
(San Francisco County Super. Ct. No. CCH-12-573254)

This is an appeal from a civil hara ssment restraining or der entered against
defendant Humberto Ruiz on July 13, 2012 for the protection of plaintiff Jake W. Ehrlich. Entry of this order followed an uncontested he aring at which plaintiff testified as to the veracity of his statements desc ribing defendant’s harassment as set forth in his request for restraining order under penalty of perjury, an d defendant failed to appear or to otherwise offer opposition. We affirm. 1

FACTUAL AND PROCED URAL BACKGROUND On March 27, 2007, plaintiff filed in Sa n Francisco Superior Court a Request for Civil Harassment Restraining Order seeking protection from defendant for himself and his live-in girlfriend, Erica Scott-Kurjanowicz. According to plain tiff’s request form, he
and defendant were close friends from 1983 to 2003. 2 However, shortly thereafter, for

1 Plaintiff declined to file a respondent’s brief.

2 The request filed by plaintiff was comple ted on Mandatory Judicial Form CH-100.2 unidentified reasons, their relationship s oured, with defendant beginning in 2003 a continuous course of conduct directed at plai ntiff that including stalking, threatening and otherwise harming plaintiff a nd his girlfriend. In partic ular, plaintiff averred that
defendant had more than once threatened to kill him, telli ng him, “You deserve a bullet in your head,” and leaving him a voicemail on March 26, 2012 “saying something about ‘bullet to my face.’ ” In addition to these de ath threats, plaintiff averred that defendant had, among other things, sent him threatening text and voicemail messages at all hours of the day and night, stolen his identity to ap ply for credit cards and to gain access to pornographic websites, broken a window of hi s home, attempted to break into his home, and spread false rumors about him. All of plaintiff’s averments were made under penalty of perjury. The day after plaintiff’s request was file d in court, a temporary restraining order was issued against defendant and a notice of hearing was filed sett ing a court date of April 18, 2012. This temporary restraini ng order was subsequently reissued and the hearing date continued several times until, finally, on July 13, 2012, the court ordered that the matter would be heard despite defendant’s absence. 3 On July 13, 2012, the trial court issued a permanen t Civil Harassment Restraining Order After Hearing against defendant for plain tiff’s protection with an expiration date of July 13, 2015. Pursuant to this order, defe ndant was required to stay at least 50 yards away from plaintiff, his girlfriend (Ms. Scott- Kurjanowicz), his vehicle, his residence and his workplace. In addition, defendant was prohibited from harassing, attacking, striking, threatening, assaulting, hitting, following, st alking, destroying personal property, keeping under surveillance, blocking movement, contacting, telephoni ng, emailing, mailing, or taking any action, directly or i ndirectly, to obtain the addre ss or location of plaintiff or Ms. Scott-Kurjanowicz.

3 Defendant telephoned the court on July 13 , 2012 to say he would not appear due to illness. In addition, at th e previously scheduled heari ng on June 29, 2 012, defendant appeared and requested a continuance to obta in counsel. Although defendant’s request was granted, no counsel appeared on his behalf at the July 13, 2012 continued hearing.3 On September 4, 2012, defendant filed a notice of appeal of this order.

DISCUSSION Defendant challenges the civil harassment restraining order entered against him on July 13, 2012 pursuant to Co de of Civil Procedure sectio n 527.6 on the ground that the order was not supported by competent, clear and convincing evidence. 4 For reasons discussed below, we disagree. To obtain a civil harassment restraining order pursuant to section 527.6, a plaintiff must show by clear and convincin g evidence that he or she has been “harassed,” meaning subjected to “a knowing and willf ul course of conduct directed at a specific person which seriously alarms, annoys, or harasses th e person, and which serves no legitimate purpose.” Further, the identified course of co nduct must be such that a reasonable person would, as a result, suffer substantial emo tional distress, and must actually cause the plaintiff to suffer substantial emotional distress. (§ 527.6, subds. (a), (b), (d).) 5 “ ‘Section 527.6 was passed to supple ment the existing common law torts of invasion of privacy and inte ntional infliction of emotiona l distress by providing quick
relief to harassment victims thr eatened with great or irrepara ble injury. [Citation.] It was

4 Unless otherwise stated, all statutory c itations herein are to the Code of Civil Procedure.

5 For purposes of section 527.6, the fo llowing definitions a pply: “Course of conduct” is a “pattern of co nduct composed of a series of acts over a period of time, however short, evidencing a continuity of purpose, including following or stalking an individual, making harassing te lephone calls to an indivi dual, or sending harassing correspondence to an individu al by any means, including, but not limited to, the use of public or private mails, inte roffice mail, facsimile, or comput er email . . . .”; “Credible threat of violence” is “a know ing and willful statem ent or course of conduct that would place a reasonable person in fear for his or her safety, or the safety of his or her immediate family, and that serves no legitim ate purpose;” “Harassment” is “unlawful violence, a credible threat of violence, or a knowing and willful course of conduct directed at a specific person that seriously alarms, annoys, or harasses the person, and that serves no legitimate purpose . . . ;” and “Unlawful violence” is “any assault or battery, or stalking as prohibited in Section 6 46.9 of the Penal Code, but shall not include lawful acts of self-defense or defense of ot hers.” (§ 527.6, subd. (b).) Constitutionallyprotected activity is not included within the meaning of “course of conduct.” ( Ibid .)4 enacted to protect the individual’s right to pursue safety, happiness and privacy as guaranteed by the California Co nstitution. [Citation.]” ( Nebel v. Sulak (1999) 73 Cal.App.4th 1363, 1369.) “ ‘S ection 527.6 has been used where the victim has been stalked, threatened or otherwise seriously harassed. [Citations.]’ [Citation.]” ( Ibid .) A trial court’s decision to grant a restrain ing order or other permanent injunction is
a matter left to its sound discretion and will not be disturbed on appe al absent a showing of clear abuse of discretion. ( Shapiro v. San Diego City of Council (2002) 96 Cal.App.4th 904, 912.) On appeal, “[w]e reso lve all factual conflicts and questions of credibility in favor of the pr evailing party and in dulge in all legitimate and reasonable inferences to uphold the finding of the trial co urt if it is supported by substantial evidence which is reasonable, credible and of solid value.” ( Schild v. Rubin (1991) 232 Cal.App.3d 755, 762.) Here, the trial court granted the injunctio n prohibiting defendant from engaging in a wide-range of harassing activities and from be ing within 50 yards of plaintiff, his girlfriend, vehicle, residence an d workplace, for a period of three years. In doing so, the trial court accepted plaintiff’s description of defendant’s past and ongoing harassment, as set forth in the request for rest raining order, after plaintiff, a sworn witness, confirmed in open court that all of the information in his request form “is true and correct.” No further showing was required. Given this su bstantial evidence of a course of harassing conduct that would cause a reasonable person to suffer substantial emotional distress, and did cause plaintiff to suffer su ch distress, the trial court’s decision to grant plaintiff’s request for a restraining order was proper. (§ 527.6, subds. (a), (b), (d)); see also Greenwich S.F., LLC v. Wong (2010) 190 Cal.Ap p.4th 739, 767-768 [a single witness’s statements may constitute s ubstantial evidence].) In reaching this conclusion, we note that , at no time before the trial court did defendant, who was absent from and unrepresented by counsel at the hearing, object to5 any statement or information in plai ntiff’s request for restraining order. 6 As such, plaintiff has forfeited any right on appeal to challenge the trial court’s admission of this
evidence. “To obtain reversal based on the erroneous admission of evidence, the record must show a timely objection making clear th at specific ground. ([Evid. Code] § 353; In
re C.B . (2010) 190 Cal.App.4t h 102, 132 . . . [hearsay objec tions ‘waived by the failure to object below’].) Lack of such objection de prives the proponent of the evidence an opportunity to establish a bette r record or some alternativ e basis for admission. (See People v. Waidla (2000) 22 Cal.4th 69 0, 717 . . . .)” ( Duronslet v. Kamps (2012) 203 Cal.App.4th 717, 726.) Indeed, the statutor y procedures under se ction 527.6 are quite straightforward: “ ‘[I]f it is o ffered, relevant oral testimon y must be taken from available witnesses, and the trial court cannot issu e an injunction unless it finds, by clear and convincing evidence, that unlawful harassment already exis ts in fact.’ [Citation.] . . . [A]t a hearing to obtain an injunction pursuant to section 527.6, ‘ [b]oth sides may offer evidence by deposition, affidavit, or oral te stimony, and the cour t shall receive such
evidence , subject only to such reasonable limita tions as are necessary to conserve the expeditious nature of the harassment proc edure set forth by . . . section 527.6.’ ” [Citation.]; see Kaiser Foundation Ho spitals v. Wilson (2011) 201 Cal.App.4th 550, 556 . . . . [trial court properly c onsidered hearsay evid ence when deciding whether to issue a restraining order pursuant to Code Civ. Pr oc., § 527.8, former subd. (f), which permitted the court to ‘receive any testimony that is re levant’ when issuing an injunction preventing workplace violence].)” ( Duronslet v. Kamps (2012) 203 Cal.App. 4th 717, 729, quoting
Schraer v. Berkeley Property Owners’ Assn . (1989) 207 Cal.App.3d 719, 733 [italics added]; see also § 527.6, subd. (h) [“res pondent may file a re sponse that explains, excuses, justifies, or denies the alleged hara ssment or may file a cross-petition under this section”].) As such, where, as here, the defendant fails to offer any evidence of his own

or to object to the evidence o ffered by his opponent, in wr iting or in person, and then
offers no justification for his failure to act, the defe ndant has no grounds upon which to

6 As mentioned above, defendant requested and was granted a continuance to secure representation at the previous hearing, yet no counsel appeared on his behalf.6 complain on appeal. To the co ntrary, under these circumstances, we stand by the trial court’s decision to accept as credible the unchallenged and sworn testimony and statements of the person se eking protection that substan tial harassment has occurred and continues to occur. ( Schild v. Rubin, supra, 232 Cal.App.3d at p. 762.)

DISPOSITION The July 13, 2012 civil harassmen t restraining order is affirmed.

_ ____________ ____________ Jenkins, J.

We concur:

_____________ ____________ McGuiness, P. J.

_____________ ____________ Pollak, J.