alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
Form of Amendment to Outstanding Non-Qualified Stock Option Agreement


 Exhibit 10.1 
 AMENDMENT 
 TO THE 
 NON-QUALIFIED STOCK OPTION AGREEMENT 
 WHEREAS, ARAMARK Holdings Corporation (the “Company”) has granted options to purchase common stock of the Company (“Options”) pursuant to that certain Non-Qualified Stock Option
Agreement (the “Option Agreement”) pursuant to the ARAMARK Holdings Corporation 2007 Management Stock Incentive Plan, as amended (the “Plan”), and all capitalized terms used but not otherwise defined herein shall have the meaning
set forth in the Option Agreement; and 
 WHEREAS, Article 10 of the Plan authorizes the Committee (as such term is
defined in the Plan) to amend the terms of outstanding Options so long as such amendment does not materially impair the rights of the holder of such Options; and 
 WHEREAS, the Company now desires to amend the Option Agreement to reduce the IRR required for certain events defined in the Option Agreement to trigger the vesting of unvested performance based
options; and 
 WHEREAS, the Company by resolution of the Board of Directors has duly approved such amendment set forth
below. 
 NOW, THEREFORE, the Option Agreement is hereby amended as follows: 
 1. All references to the requirement that the Sponsor IRR or the Special Termination IRR equal or exceed 22% for certain events to occur,
including a “Return-Based Vesting Event” and a “Qualified Partial Liquidity Event”, as such terms are defined in the Option Agreement, are hereby changed to the requirement that the Sponsor IRR and Special Termination IRR equal
or exceed 15%. 
 2. The Option Agreement, as amended as provided above, shall continue in full force and effect in accordance
with its terms. 
 3. This amendment is effective as of March 1, 2010. 
 IN WITNESS WHEREOF, this amendment is hereby executed on behalf of the Company on this 1st day of March, 2010. 
  

			
	ARAMARK HOLDINGS CORPORATION
		
	By:	 	 /s/ LYNN B. MCKEE

	Name:	 	Lynn B. Mckee
	Title:	 	 Executive Vice President,
 Human Resources
CHARLESTON.

#### State *ex rel.*Woodyard Publications *v.*County Court of Hardy County

(No. 6659)

Submitted November 7, 1929.

Decided November 12, 1929.

*Houston G. Young*and *John N. Cha/rnock,*for relator.

*W. D. McCauley*and *J. S. Zimmerman,*for respondents.

*167Litz, Judge:

Tbe petitioner, "Woodyard Publications, a corporation, seeks a peremptory writ of mandamus directed to tbe county court of Hardy county and tbe members thereof, commanding them to cause to be published in Tbe Hardy County News, a Republican newspaper owned and published in that county by petitioner, tbe financial statement of said county for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1929, in compliance with section 35 of chapter 39, Code, requiring tbe county court of every county within four weeks after tbe first session in each fiscal year to cause to be published for one week in at least two newspapers of opposite polities, if there be such published therein, the financial statement of the county for the previous fiscal year.

The first session of the county court in the fiscal year- beginning July 1st, was held on the 13th day of August, when it directed the publication of said financial statement in the Moorefield Examiner, the only Democratic newspaper published in Hardy county. No Republican newspaper was then being published in the county. The first issue of The Hardy County News did not make its appearance until August 30th. The right of the petitioner to the writ is challenged on the grounds (1) that The Hardy County News is not published in Hardy county, and (2) that it was not an established newspaper at any time within the period in which said financial statement was required to be published. It is printed in Mineral county and distributed from an office maintained by the petitioner in Hardy county. Although the first ground, in our opinion, is without merit, there is no definite proof showing the number of subscribers or the circulation of The Hardy County News in Hardy county by sample copies or otherwise within the period in which said financial statement was required to be published; nor is there evidence of any demand on the county court within said period to authorize the publication of said financial statement in The Hardy County News, or that-the county court then knew such newspaper was being promoted. It having been the duty of the county court to direct the publication of said financial state*168ment at its term on August 13th, wThicli it performed in tbe only way authorized under tbe statute, there was no obligation upon it, under tbe circustances, to reconvene and direct a further publication.

Upon consideration of tbe facts and circumstances, we are of opinion that tbe petitioner has not shown such clear legal right to tbe remedy which it seeks as the law requires. The writ is therefore denied.

*Writ denied.*
#### Mark A. Turley, Appellant, v State of New York, Respondent.

[719 NYS2d 380]

Spain, J.

Appeal from an order of the Court of Claims (Midey, Jr., J.), entered April 30, 1999, which granted the State’s motion to dismiss the claim.

After obtaining permission from the Court of Claims (Bell, J.) to file a late claim against the State, claimant served the claim on the Attorney General by ordinary mail. The State answered and thereafter moved to dismiss the claim based upon defective service. The Court of Claims granted the motion and this appeal by claimant ensued.

Ordinary mail is not one of the methods of service authorized by Court of Claims Act § 11 (a) and, “[generally, the use of ordinary mail to serve the claim upon the Attorney-General is insufficient to acquire jurisdiction over the State” *(Philippe v State of New York,*248 AD2d 827; *see, Hodge v State of New York,*213 AD2d 766). Although a defect in the manner of service is waived if the State fails to assert the defect in its answer or in a preanswer motion to dismiss *(see,*Court of Claims Act §11 [c]), here the State asserted the defect in its answer. Claimant’s contention that the State received actual notice of the claim and, therefore, was not prejudiced by his use of ordinary mail is unavailing, for “notice received by means other than those authorized by statute cannot serve to bring a defendant within the jurisdiction of the court” *(Feinstein v Bergner,*48 NY2d 234, 241). Accordingly, the claim was properly dismissed *(see, Commack Self-Serv. Kosher Meats v State of New York,*270 AD2d 687).

Cardona, P. J., Mercure, Carpinello and Rose, JJ., concur. Ordered that the order is affirmed, without costs.
Exhibit 23.3

  Netherland, Sewell & Associates, Inc.


            CONSENT OF INDEPENDENT PETROLEUM ENGINEERS AND GEOLOGISTS

         We hereby consent to the references to our firm in the form and context
in which they appear in the Annual Report on Form 10-K of Greka  Corporation for
the fiscal year ended December 31, 1999. We hereby further consent to the use of
information  contained  in our reserve  report,  as of January 1, 2000,  setting
forth the Greka Energy  Corporation  oil and gas reserves and revenue  estimates
properties located in the United States. We further consent to the incorporation
by reference thereof into Greka Energy Corporation's  registration statements on
Form S-3 (File Nos. 333-60621 and 333-78673) and Form S-8 (File No. 333-30402).

                                     NETHERLAND, SEWELL & ASSOCIATES, INC.

                                     By: /s/ Frederic D. Sewell
                                             -----------------------
                                             Frederic D. Sewell
                                             President

Dallas, Texas
April 14, 2000
EXHIBIT 32.2


                              CERTIFICATE PURSUANT TO
                              18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,
                               AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
                   SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002


      In connection  with the Quarterly  Report of Falcon Natural Gas Corp. (the
"Company") on Form  10-QSB/A for the quarter  ended  September 30, 2005 as filed
with the Securities and Exchange  Commission on the date hereof (the  "Report"),
I, Massimiliano  Pozzoni,  Principal Financial Officer of the Company,  certify,
pursuant to 18 U.S.C.  Section 1350,  as adopted  pursuant to Section 906 of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:

      (1)   The Report fully complies with the  requirements of Section 13(a) or
            15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

      (2)   The  information  contained in the Report  fairly  presents,  in all
            material respect,  the financial  condition and result of operations
            of the Company.

      A signed  original of this written  statement  required by Section 906 has
been  provided to the Company and will be retained by the Company and  furnished
to the Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff upon request.


/s/ Massimiliano Pozzoni
-------------------------------------
Name:  Massimiliano Pozzoni
Title: Principal Financial Officer
Date:  January 23, 2006
J-A16001-16 

*Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court. 

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION – SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P 65.37 

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, 

 Appellee 

 v. 

WILLIAM COATES, III, 

 Appellant 

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF 

PENNSYLVANIA 

 No. 247 WDA 2015 

 

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence January 13, 2015 

in the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County 

Criminal Division at No(s): CP-02-CR-0012614-2013 

BEFORE: SHOGAN, OLSON, and STRASSBURGER,* JJ. 

DISSENTING MEMORANDUM BY STRASSBURGER, J.: 

 FILED: September 28, 2016 

 Because I conclude that the facts of this case do not result in Appellant 

having waived his issues on appeal, I dissent. At sentencing, counsel for 

Appellant moved to withdraw, and the trial court stated that it would appoint 

counsel, and entered an order to that effect two days later. That order was 

not filed until five days after that, January 20, 2015.1 Thus, Appellant was 

effectively not represented by counsel for at least 7 of the 10 days available 

to him for filing timely a post-sentence motion. Accordingly, I conclude that 

this situation is sufficiently analogous to the situation in Commonwealth v. 

 

1

 Moreover, appointed counsel from the public defender represents that her 

office did not receive notice of this appointment until sometime in early 

February. 
J-A16001-16 

- 2 - 

Leatherby, 116 A.3d 73, 79 (Pa. Super. 2015);2 and constitutes a 

breakdown in the workings of the court. Thus, this Court is permitted to 

consider the issues raised in Appellant’s late-filed post-sentence motion. 

 

2

 While certain aspects are distinguishable, the principle in Leatehrby is 

applicable here. In that case, “the trial court did not appoint new counsel for 

Leatherby in time to preserve his post-sentence rights,” and he “was 

effectively abandoned by counsel.” 116 A.3d at 79.
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 15-41068

Conference Calendar

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee

v.

EMERICO DE LUNA-MAGALLON, also known as Jorge Trevino-Gonzalez,

Defendant-Appellant

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of Texas

USDC No. 5:15-CR-143-1

Before JONES, CLEMENT, and OWEN, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

The Federal Public Defender appointed to represent Emerico De LunaMagallon has moved for leave to withdraw and has filed a brief in accordance 

with Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), and United States v. Flores, 632 

F.3d 229 (5th Cir. 2011). De Luna-Magallon has not filed a response. We have 

reviewed counsel’s brief and the relevant portions of the record reflected 

therein. We concur with counsel’s assessment that the appeal presents no 

 

* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not 

be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH 

CIR. R. 47.5.4.

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

FILED

June 21, 2016

Lyle W. Cayce

Clerk

 Case: 15-41068 Document: 00513557563 Page: 1 Date Filed: 06/21/2016
No. 15-41068

2

nonfrivolous issue for appellate review. Accordingly, counsel’s motion for leave 

to withdraw is GRANTED, counsel is excused from further responsibilities 

herein, and the APPEAL IS DISMISSED. See 5TH CIR. R. 42.2.

 Case: 15-41068 Document: 00513557563 Page: 2 Date Filed: 06/21/2016
CHARLESTON.

#### Cline *v.*Star Coal & Coke Co.

(No. 6655)

Submitted April 22, 1930.

Decided April 29, 1930.

*L. Ebersole Gaines*and *Dillon, Mahan & Holt,*for plaintiff in error.

*T. A. Myles,*for defendant in error.

Maxwell, Judge:

This is an action for damages to the surface of land caused by the removal of coal from under the same. The defendant prosecutes this writ of error to a judgment of the trial court rendered upon a jury verdict.

Through inadvertence there was no plea nor joinder of issue. This is fatal error. *Coal & Coke Co.*v. *Cunninghame,*93 W. Va. 12, 116 S. E. 719, and many cases there cited.- This basic rule covering an indispensable element of procedure has been reiterated in the later cases of *Mining Co.*v. *Coal Co.,*96 W. Va. 11, 122 S. E. 286, and *Trust Co.*v. *Todd,*101 *W.*Va. 31, 131 S. E. 638.

It would be a vain thing to'undertake to discuss the merits *102of the ease when the whole trial in the circuit court was abortive. What we might say would be pure dictum.

We reverse the judgment, set aside the verdict, and remand the case for further proceedings.

*Reversed and remanded.*
Exhibit 31.1


                      CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO SECTION 302
                        OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

I, Kevin Halter Jr., certify that:

1. I have  reviewed  this  quarterly  report on Form 10-QSB/A of Rub A Dub Soap,
Inc.

2. Based on my  knowledge,  this  quarterly  report  does not contain any untrue
statement of a material fact or omit to state a material fact  necessary to make
the statements made, in light of the  circumstances  under which such statements
were made, not  misleading  with respect to the period covered by this quarterly
report.

3.  Based  on my  knowledge,  the  financial  statements,  and  other  financial
information  included in this quarterly  report,  fairly present in all material
respects the financial  condition,  results of operations  and cash flows of the
registrant as of, and for, the periods presented in this quarterly report.

4. I am responsible for  establishing  and maintaining  disclosure  controls and
procedures  (as  defined  in  Exchange  Act Rules  13a-14  and  15d-14)  for the
registrant and have:

         a.  Designed  such  disclosure  controls and  procedures to ensure that
material  information  relating to the  registrant,  including its  consolidated
subsidiaries, is made known to me by others within those entities,  particularly
during the period in which this quarterly report is being prepared;

         b. Evaluated the effectiveness of the registrant's  disclosure controls
and  procedures  as of a date  within 90 days prior to the  filing  date of this
quarterly report (the "Evaluation Date"); and

         c.  Presented  in  this  quarterly  report  my  conclusions  about  the
effectiveness  of the disclosure  controls and procedures based on my evaluation
as of the Evaluation Date.

5. I have disclosed,  based on my most recent  evaluation,  to the  registrant's
auditors and the audit committee of registrant's  board of directors (or persons
performing the equivalent functions):

         a. All significant  deficiencies in the design or operation of internal
controls  that  could  adversely  affect  the  registrant's  ability  to record,
process,  summarize  and  report  financial  data  and have  identified  for the
registrant's auditors any material weaknesses in internal controls; and

         b. Any fraud,  whether or not  material,  that  involves  management or
other  employees  who  have a  significant  role  in the  registrant's  internal
controls.

6. I have  indicated in this  quarterly  report  whether there were  significant
changes in internal controls or in other factors that could significantly affect
internal  controls  subsequent  to the  date  of  our  most  recent  evaluation,
including any  corrective  actions with regard to significant  deficiencies  and
material weaknesses.


Date:  November 13, 2006             /s/ Kevin Halter, Jr.
                                    --------------------------------------------
                                    Kevin Halter, Jr., President,
                                    Treasurer and Director (Principal
                                    Executive, Financial and Accounting Officer)
Anthony TABORN, Appellant, v. STATE of Missouri, Respondent.

WD 80540

Missouri Court of Appeals, Western District.

ORDER FILED: March 27, 2018

Steven B. Willibey, Kansas City, MO, for appellant.

Julia E. Neidhardt, Jefferson City, MO, for respondent.

Before Division Four: Mark D. Pfeiffer, Chief Judge, Presiding, Cynthia L. Martin, Judge and Edward R. Ardini, Jr., Judge

**ORDER**

Per curiam:

Anthony L. Taborn appeals the denial of his Rule 29.15 motion and argues that it was error to deny his claim that appellate counsel was ineffective when she failed to raise a claim of error on direct appeal involving the admission of uncharged misconduct evidence at trial. Because appellate counsel's strategic decision not to raise this issue on direct appeal was reasonable, we affirm. Rule 84.16(b).
form10k123109exh10pt5.htm


     

    


     

    


     

    Exhibit
10.5

     

    


     

    AMENDMENT
TO CHANGE LAPSE OF FORFEITURE RESTRICTIONS

     

    


     

    WHEREAS,
Alliant Energy Corporation, a Wisconsin corporation (the “Company”) and Eliot G.
Protsch (the “Employee”) entered into a Special Restricted Stock Agreement dated
July 11, 2005 (the “Agreement”) which granted the Employee 17,440 shares of
common stock, par value $0.01 per share of the Company subject to Forfeiture
Restrictions (as defined in the Agreement) (the “Restricted
Shares”);

     

    WHEREAS,
the only Restricted Shares that remain unvested are 8,720 shares, all of which
vest on July 11, 2010;

     

    WHEREAS,
the Employee announced plans to retire from the Company on January 2,
2010;

     

    WHEREAS,
the Compensation and Personnel Committee of the Board of Directors of the
Company, in Consent Resolutions dated November 18, 2009 (the “Consent Action”),
agreed to amend the Agreement to provide that the Forfeiture Restrictions shall
immediately lapse upon Mr. Protsch’s retirement from the Company, thus fully
vesting the remaining Restricted Shares; and

     

    WHEREAS,
the Company and the Employee desire to memorialize the Consent Action with this
Amendment pursuant to Section 13 of the Agreement.

     

    A
G R E E M E N T

     

    NOW,
THEREFORE, in consideration of the promises and of the covenants and
agreements herein set forth, the parties hereto mutually covenant and agree as
follows:

     

    
      	
              1.  

            	
              Section 2(c) of the
      Agreement is hereby amended by adding the following sentence to the end of
      Section 2(c):

            


    

     

    


     

    Notwithstanding the
forgoing, the Forfeiture Restrictions shall immediately lapse on upon Employee’s
retirement from the Company on January 2, 2010.

     

    


     

    
      	
              2.  

            	
              The remainder of the
      Agreement shall remain in full force and
effect.

            


    

     

     

    


     

    IN
WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties have caused this amendment to be effective
by signing below.

     

    
      	 
      	
              ALLIANT
      ENERGY CORPORATION

              (the
      "Company")

               

            


    

    


     

    
      	 
      	
              By:

            	 
      


    

    


     

    
      	 
      	
              Its:

            	 
      


    

    


     

    
      	 
      	
              EMPLOYEE:

            	 
      
	 	 	 
	 
      	 
      	 
      


    

    


    
      	 
      	
              Eliot G.
      Protsch
11TH COURT OF APPEALS

EASTLAND, TEXAS

JUDGMENT

Allen Glenn Thomas, * From the Justice Court

 of Jones County, Texas

Trial Court No. 2113.

Vs. No. 11-15-00144-CV * July 23, 2015

Texas Department of Criminal * Per Curiam Memorandum Opinion

Justice Officers, (Panel consists of: Wright, C.J.,

 Willson, J., and Bailey, J.)

 This court has inspected the record in this cause and concludes that the 

appeal should be dismissed for want of jurisdiction. Therefore, in accordance 

with this court’s opinion, the appeal is dismissed.
Exhibit 32.2

      CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350 AS ADOPTED PURSUANT
                TO SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

In connection with the quarterly  report of NuVim,  Inc. (the "Company") on Form
10-QSB for the quarterly period ended June 30, 2006 as filed with the Securities
and Exchange Commission on the date therein specified (the "Report"), I, Richard
P.  Kundrat,  Chief  Financial  Officer of the Company,  certify  pursuant to 18
U.S.C.  Section 1350, as adopted  pursuant to Section 906 of the  Sarbanes-Oxley
Act of 2002, that to the best of my knowledge:

1.   The Report fully complies with the  requirements  of Section 13(a) or 15(d)
     of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

2.   The information  contained in the Report fairly  presents,  in all material
     respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.

Date: August 14, 2006

/s/ Richard P. Kundrat
-----------------------
Richard P. Kundrat
Chief Financial Officer