2010 D e c i sion s O p inion s of the U nit e d S t at e s C our t of Appe al s for the Thir d C ir c uit 1-20-2010 

# Amgro Inc v

. Lincoln Ge ne ral Ins P r e c e de nt i al or N on-P r e c e de nt i al : N on-P r e c e de nt i al D ocke t N o . 08-3154

F o llow thi s and a dd it ion al work s at : http://d i git alc ommon s .l a w . vi ll anova . e du/thir dc ir c uit_2010

Thi s de c i sion i s br ou ght t o you for f r e e and ope n a c c e s s b y the O p inion s of the U nit e d S t at e s C our t of Appe al s for the Thir d C ir c uit at V i ll anova U nive r sity S choo l of L a

w Di git al Reposit ory

. It h as be e n a c c ept e d for inclusion in 2010 D e c i sion s b y an authori z e d a dmini s tr at or of V i ll anova U nive r sity S choo l of L a

w Di git al Reposit ory

. F or mor e inform at ion, p le as e c ont a ct Be n j amin . C arl s on@l a

w . vi ll anova . e du . Re c omme nde d C it at ion " Am gr o Inc v

. L inc o ln Ge ne r al In s " (2010). 2010 D e cisio n s . P ape r 2040. http://d i git alc ommon s .l a

w . vi ll anova . e du/thir dc ir c uit_2010/20401 NOT P RE CE DE NT I AL UN I TED STATES CO UR T OF A PP EALS F O R T H E T H IR D C IR C U IT

_____________ N o. 08- 3154

_____________ AM GRO, I NC. v. L I NC OL N GE NE RA L I NS UR ANC E CO M P ANY,

D efe ndant/ T hi r d- Par tyPl ai nt i ff

v. BA NC AR AS S OC I AT E S , I NC . , D/ B/A DAVI D M AC GR E GOR CO M P ANY; M A R K G R O S S B A R D ; N O R T H E R N F IN A N C IA L G R O U P , IN C .;

RI CH AR D PI SCAN E, T h ird -P a rtyD e f

e n d a n ts L i l n c o l n G e n e r a l I n s u r a n c e C o m p a n y,

A ppel l ant

_____________ N o. 08- 3303

_____________ AM GRO, I NC. v. L I NC OL N GE NE RA L I NS UR ANC E CO M P ANY,

D efe ndant/ T hi r d- Par tyPl ai nt i ff2 v. B A N C A R A S S O C IA T E S , IN C ., D /B /A D A V ID M A C G R E G O R C O M P A N Y ; M A R K G R O S S B A R D ; N O R T H E R N F IN A N C IA L G R O U P , IN C .;

RI CH AR D PI SCAN E, T h ird -P a rtyD e f

e n d a n ts B a n c a rA s s o c i a t e s , I n c . , d /b / a D a v i d M a c G r e g o rC o m p a n y;

M ark G r os s bar d, A p p e llan ts

O n A p p ea l from the U n it ed S tat es D istri ct C o u rt

forthe D i s tr i ctof N ew J er s ey D i s tr i ctC our tN o. 3- 06- cv- 00472 D istri ct Ju d g e: T h e H o n o rab le M aryL . C o o p er Subm i t t ed Pur s uantt o T hi r d C i r cui tL . A . R . 34. 1( a)

J anuary14, 2010 B e f o re : S C IR IC A , C hi ef

Judge , B A R R Y , a n d S M IT H , C i r cui tJudges ( Fi l ed: J anuary20, 2010) OP I NI ON S M IT H , C i r cui tJudge. T hi s cas e i s aboutm i s s i ng i ns ur ance pr emi um paym ent s . L i ncol n G ener al I ns ur ance C o. ( “Li ncol n G ener al ”) , an i ns ur ance company , neverr ece i ved i ns ur ance pr emi um paym ent s fr om cert ai n pol i cyhol der s ( the “Pol i cyhol der s ”) . A M G R O , I nc. (“A M G R O ”), an insur ance p rem i um fi nan ci ng com pan y , paid the P oli cyho l ders’W h o les a le in su ra n c e a g e n ts d o n o t se ll d ire c tlyto th e p u b lic. In ste a d , the yu se re tail 1 i nsurance b rokers t o co m m un i cat e w i th insur ance c ust om ers . 3 pr emi um s t o D avi d M acG r egorC o. ( “M acG r egor ”) , the Pol i cyhol der s ’ r et ai l i ns ur ance b ro k e r, w h ich re tain e d its a g re e d u p o n c o m m iss io n a n d th e n se n t th e re m a in in g f u n d s to N o rth e rn F in a n c ial G ro u p , In c . (“N o rth e rn F in a n c ial” ), L in c o ln G e n e ra l’s w h o les a le i ns ur ance agent forthe tr ans act i ons . U ndernor m al ci r cumst ance s , N or thern Fi nanci al 1 w o u ld th e n h a v e se n t p a ym e n t to L in c o ln G e n e ra l. B u t th e in su ra n c e p re m iu m p a ym e n ts n ev er a rri v ed at L inco ln G en era l and this l it igation en su ed . L inco ln G en era l, M ac G reg o r, and M acG r egor ’ s r i s k m anage m entcons ul t ant , M ark G r os s bar d, now s eek r evi ew of the D i s tr i ctC our t ’ s det erm i nat i ons of s ever al m ot i ons fors um m aryj udgm ent . A ft er rev iew ing the re co rd, w e c o n clud e tha t th e D istri ct C o u rtco rrectl yd ec ided the s u m m ary ju d g m e n t m o tio n s a n d w ill a f f irm its ju d g m e n t. T he D i s tr i ctC our thad j ur i s di ct i on overthi s cas e under28 U . S. C . § 1332( a) and w e re v iew it s g ran t of

su m m aryjud g m en t un d er 2 8 U . S . C . § 1 2 9 1 . W e e x erc ise “p lena ry re v ie w o v e r t h e D is tr ic t C o u rt ’s g ra n t o f s u m m a ry ju d g m e n t.” Shum an ex r el . Sher t z erv. P e n n Ma n o r S c h . D ist. , 4 2 2 F .3 d 1 4 1 , 1 4 6 (3 d C ir . 2 0 0 5 ) ( in te rn a l q u o ta tio n o m itte d ). A co u rtsh o u ld g ran t sum m aryjud g m en t “i f th e p lead ing s, the d isco v eryan d d iscl o su re m at er i al s on fi l e, and anyaff i davi t s s how thatther e i s no genui ne i s s ue as t o anym at er i al f a c t a n d th a t th e m o v a n t is e n title d to ju d g m e n t a s a m a tte r o f la w .” F e d . R . C iv . P . 5 6 (c ). I n appl y i ng thats t andar d, “a c our tm us tvi ew the fa ct s i n the l i ghtm os tfavor abl e t o theB ecause w e w ri t e on l yfor the p art i es, w e w i l l con ci sel yrecoun tthe fa ct s. 2 A n i ns ur ance bi nderi s a “t empora rycontr actof i ns ur ance . . . i nt ended t o gi ve the 3 appl i cantpr ot ect i on pendi ng the exe cut i on and del i veryof a f or m al w r i t t en pol i cy . ” 16 W il li ston o n C o n tr ac ts § 4 9 :53 (4th ed . 2 0 0 9 ). M acG r egorand N or thern Fi nanci al had ent er ed i nt o a “Pr oducerA gr eement ” on 4 O ctob er 1 1 , 2 0 0 2 , ap p rox im atelyo n e y ea r prior to the co n tr ac t betw ee n N o rth ern Fi nanci al and Li ncol n G ener al . T hatagr eementperm i t t ed M acG r egort o s el l i ns ur ance o n b eh alf o f N o rth ern F inan cial. M ac G reg o r’s sales o f L inco ln G en era l i n su ran ce w ere m a d e u n d e r th is a g re e m e n t. 4 nonm ovi ng partyand dr aw al l i nfer ence s i n thatparty ’ s favor . ” Shum an , 422 F. 3d at146 (i n terna l qu o tat ion o m itted). I. Fa c ts O n S e p tem b e r 2 3 , 2 0 0 3 , L in c o ln G e n e ra l en ter e d in to a n a g e n c ya g re e m e n t w ith N o rth ern F inan cial th at pe rm itted N o rth ern F inan cial t o sell L inco ln G en era l’ s co m m erc ial tru ck ing insu ran ce . U n d er the ag ree m en t, N o rth ern F inan cial w as to inf o rm 2 L inco ln G en era l of

(1) insu ran ce b ind ers i ti s s ued on beha l f of Li ncol n G ener al and ( 2) 3 p re m iu m f

in a n c in g tr a n s a c tio n s e n te re d in to in c o n n e c tio n w ith L in c o ln G e n e ra l p o lic ie s . N or thern Fi nanci al ent er ed i nt o an agr eementw i th M acG r egorw her ebyM acG r egor w oul d s el l i ns ur ance on i t s behal f, and ar ound February2004, M acG r egorbegan s el l i ng L i ncol n G ener al i ns ur ance forN or thern Fi nanci al . I n excha nge fors el l i ng the i ns ur ance , 4 M acG regor r ecei ved a t en p ercentcom m i ssi on on prem i um s generat ed b yi t s sal es. M a c Gr e g o rs o l d Li n c o l n Ge n e r a l i n s u r a n c e t o th e P o l i c yh o l d e r s a n d AM GRO pr ovi ded i ns ur ance pr emi um fi nanci ng forthos e tr ans act i ons . N or thern Fi nanci al i s s ued i ns ur ance bi nder s t o t he Pol i cyhol der s and Li ncol n G ener al l at eri s s ued the corr es pondi ng5

pol i ci es . M acG r egor , as i t s agr eementw i th N or thern Fi nanci al pr ovi ded, r et ai ned a t en percent com m i ssi on on prem i um s generat ed b ytho se sal es. A M G R O ’ s paym ent s t o M acG r egoron behal f of the Pol i cyhol der s w er e made th r o u g h a Dr a f

tAu th o r i z a t i o n Ag r e e me n tth a tp e r mi t t e d M a c Gr e g o rt o i s s u e AM GRO chec ks t o i t s el f t o paythe Pol i cyhol der s ’ i ns ur ance pr emi um s . U ndernor m al ci r cumst ance s , M acG r egorw oul d dr aftpaym entt o i t s el f fr om A M G R O , s ubtr acti t s t en p erc en t com m issi o n , an d then fo rw ard the re m ainin g p rem ium p ay m en t t o N o rth ern Fi nanci al . N or thern Fi nanci al w oul d then forw ar d paym entt o L i ncol n G ener al . T hi s w as n o t w h a t h a p p e n e d , h o w e v e r. S o m e w h e re a lo n g th e w a y , the p re m iu m p a ym e n ts di s appea r ed and Li ncol n G ener al neverr ece i ved them. A s a r es ul t , L i ncol n G ener al c a n c e lle d a ll th e P o lic yh o ld e rs ’ p o lic ie s f o r n o n -p a ym e n t o f

p re m iu m s . A ft erL i ncol n G ener al canc el l ed the pol i ci es , A M G R O s oughta r efund f r om L in c o ln G e n e ra l f

o r t h e p re m iu m p a ym e n ts it h a d m a d e o n b e h a lf o f th e P o lic yh o ld e rs . L i ncol n G ener al r efus ed t o r efund a nym oneyt o A M G R O beca us e i tneverr ece i ved the pr emi um paym ent s . T hi s l i t i gat i on ens ued. P rocedu ralHistory O n F e b ru a ry1 , 2 0 0 6 , A M G R O f iled su it ag a in st L in c o ln G e n e ra l f o r its re f u sa l to refund the p rem i um pay m ents A M G R O m ade o n b ehalf of t he P oli cyho l ders. O n A ug ust 23, 2006, L i ncol n G ener al fi l ed a thi r d- partycompl ai ntagai ns tG r os s bar d and M acG r egorN o rth e rn F in a n c ial a n d its C E O , R ich a rd P isa c a n e , w e re a lso n a m e d a s d e f e n d a n ts in 5 L i ncol n G ener al ’ s thi r d- partycompl ai nt . L i ncol n G ener al char ged N or thern Fi nanci al w i th b r e a c h o f

c o n tr a c ta n d u n

j u s te n r i c h m e n ta n d P i s a c a n e w i th f r a u d , c i v i l c o n s p i r a c y, and unj us tenr i chment . O n A ugus t8, 2005, L i ncol n G ener al had fi l ed a s i m i l arcompl ai nt i n the U nit ed S t at es D i stri ctC ou rtfor the M i dd l e D i stri ctof P enn sy l van i a against N or thern Fi nanci al , Pi s aca ne, G r os s bar d, and M acG r egor . T hatcompl ai ntchar ged N or thern Fi nanci al w i th br eac h of contr actand Pi s aca ne w i th fr aud, ci vi l cons pi r acyand u n ju st e n ric h m e n t. O n M a y2 5 , 2 0 0 6 , the U n ited S tate s D istric t C o u rt f o r th e M id d le D i s tr i ctof Penns y l vani a ent er ed def aul tj udgm ent s agai ns tN or thern Fi nanci al on the b re a c h o f

c o n tra c t cla im a n d P isa c a n e o n th e f ra u d c laim . O n Ju ly1 4 , 2 0 0 6 , the M id d le D i s tr i ctof Penns y l vani a ac t i on w as tr ans ferr ed t o the D i s tr i ctof N ew J er s eyand con sol i dated w i th the case now befo re us. 6 a lleg in g (1 ) to rtio u s in ter f e re n c e w ith c o n tra c t, (2 ) u n ju st e n ric h m e n t, an d (3 ) c iv il c o n s p i r a c y. 5 A M G R O m oved fors um m aryj udgm enton i t s cl ai m agai ns tL i ncol n G ener al for th e p re m iu m p a ym e n ts. T h a t m o tio n w a s g ra n ted a n d L in c o ln G e n e ra l w a s o rd e re d to re tu rn th e p re m iu m p a ym e n ts a n d p a yA M G R O a s ta tu to ry p e n a lty. N .J . S ta t. A n n . § 1 7 :2 9 C -4 .1 (p ro v id in g s ta tu to ry p e n a lty w h e re in s u re r r e ta in s u n e a rn e d p re m iu m s ). G ross b ard an d M ac G reg o r also m o v ed fo r sum m aryjud g m en t on L inco ln G en era l’ s cl ai m s of ci vil con spi racyagainstG ross bard, t ort i ou s i nter ference w i th co ntr actagainst M acG r egor , and unj us tenr i chmentagai ns tboth G r os s bar d and M acG r egor . T he D i s tr i ct C ou rtenter ed sum m aryj ud gm ent i n fav or of G ross bard on the civi l con spi racyand un j ust enr i chmentcl ai m s and i n favorof M acG r egoron the t or t i ous i nt er fer ence w i th contr act cl ai m . Itden i ed M acG regor’ s m oti on for sum m aryj ud gm ent on L i nco l n G eneral ’s un j ust enr i chmentcl ai m . Shor t l yaft erthe D i s tr i ctC our tdeci ded the s um m aryj udgm ent m ot i ons , the part i es ent er ed i nt o a C ons entO r derand Fi nal J udgm ent( the “ConsentT his sect i on , enti t l ed “R eturn of un earned p rem i um s; pen al ty , ” st at es: 6 W h en everan i ns ur ance pol i cyorcontr acti s canc el ed, the

i ns ur eron not i ce ther eof s hal l r eturn t o the insur ed, w i thi n a r eas onabl e t i m e not t o exce ed 60 day s of cance l l at i on ornot i ce, w hi cheve roccur s l as t , or6 0 d ay s aft erthe compl et i on of any payr ol l audi tnece s s aryt o det erm i ne the amountof pr emi um earned w hi l e the pol i cyw as i n for ce, o n a s hor tr at e bas i s the amount of gr os s unearned pr emi um s pai d; exce pt fora pol i cyor contr actforpr i vat e pas s engerau tomobi l e i ns ur ance , w hi ch am o u n t of

g ross u n ea rne d p rem ium sh all b e d eterm ined o n a p ro rat a basi s. In the event that the i nsurer fai l s t o return t he g ross unearned pr emi um s t o the i ns ur ed w i thi n the per i od pr ovi ded for herei n, the insur er s hall , a s a pena l ty , i n ad dit i on t o the gross unearned pr emi um , r eturn t o the i ns ur ed an a ddi t i onal amount equal t o 5% of the gr os s unearned p r emi um comput ed on a m o n th lyb a sis f

o r e a c h m o n th o r p a rt th e re o f p a st th e f

in a l d a te on w hi ch the r efund w as due. 7 O r der ”) . I n t he C ons entO r der , the part i es cl ar i fi ed the s cope of thei rappea l s and the amount s ats t ake i n t he l i t i gat i on. II. L inco ln G en era l app ea ls th e statuto ryp en altyaw ard ed to A M G R O an d the e n try o f su m m aryjud g m en t on it s torti o u s interfe ren ce w ith co n tr ac t cl aim ag ains t M ac G reg o r, and i t s unj us tenr i chmentand ci vi l cons pi r acycl ai m s agai ns tG r os s bar d. M acG r egor cr os s - appea l s the deni al of s um m aryj udgm enton L i ncol n G ener al ’ s unj us tenr i chment cl ai m agai ns ti t . E ach of thes e i s s ues w i l l be di s cus s ed i n turn.

A. L in c o ln G e n e ra l’s f

irst iss u e o n a p p e a l p e rta in s to th e sta tu to ryp e n a ltya w a rd e d to A M G R O underN . J . St at . A nn. § 17: 29C - 4. 1. T he D i s tr i ctC our thel d thatunderN ew 6N . J . St at . A nn. § 17: 29C - 4. 1.

T his sect i on , enti t l ed “A pp l i cat i on of u nearned prem i um s, ” st at es: 7 ( a ) W h e n e v e ra f i n a n c e d i n s u r a n c e c o n tr a c ti s c a n c e l e d , the i nsureron no t i ce of

such f i nan ci ng shal l return w hatever gr oss unearned pr emi um s ar e due unde r the i ns ur ance contr act t o the pr emi um fi nance companyforthe ac countof the i ns ur ed or i n s u r e d s wi th i n a r e a s o n a b l e t i me , n o tt o e x c e e d 6 0 d a y s a f t er the ef fec t i ve dat e of c ancellat i on, or60 day s aft erthe co mpl e t i o n o f a n y p a yr o l l a u d i t n e c e s s a ry t o d e t e r mi n e t he amount of pr emi um earned w hi l e the pol i cyw as i n for ce. Such a u d it sh a ll b e p e rf

o rm e d w ith in 3 0 d a y s a f ter th e e f f e c tiv e d a te of ca ncel l at i on. ( b) I n the eve ntthat the cr edi t i ng of r eturn pr emi um s t o the acc ountof the i ns ur ed r es ul t s i n a s urpl us over the amountdue fr om th e i n s u r e d , th e p r e mi u m f i n a n c e c o mpa n ys h a l l r e f und s uch exc es s t o the i ns ur ed pr ovi ded that no s uch r efund s hal l be r equi r ed i f i tamount s t o l es s than $1. 00. (c) In th e ev en t that the pre m ium fin an ce co m p an yfa il s to return the amountdue t o the i ns ur ed w i thi n the per i od des i gnat ed, the company s hal l , as a penal ty , i n addi t i on t o the amountdue t o the i ns ur ed, r eturn t o the i ns ur ed an addi t i onal amount equal t o 5% o f th e a m o u n t d u e to th e in su r e d c o m p u ted o n a m o n th lyb a sis foreac h m onth orpartther eof p ast the fi nal dat e on w hi ch the r efund w as due. N . J . St at . A nn. § 17: 16D - 14. 8 J er s eyl aw , L i ncol n G ener al m us tpaya pena l tyof fi ve per cent“of the gr os s unearned p re m iu m ,” c o m p u ted o n a m o n th lyb a sis f o r e a c h m o n th o r p a rt th e re o f p a st th e f

in a l d a te o n w h ic h th e re f

u n d w a s d u e . I

d. T h e D is tr ic t C o u rt a ls o lo o k e d to N .J . S ta t. A n n . § 17: 16D - 14( a) forconfi r m at i on thatN ew J er s eyl aw pl ace s the obl i gat i on of r eturni ng

7 u n ea rne d insu ran ce p rem ium s fo ll o w ing a p o li cyca n ce ll ati o n so lel yo n the in su rer.9

L i ncol n G ener al r ai s es thr ee a r gum ent s agai ns tthe s t atut orypenal ty : ( 1) thatthe tw o sta tu tes , N .J. S tat. A n n . § 1 7 :2 9 C -4 .1 a n d N .J. S tat. A n n . § 1 7 :1 6 D -1 4 , d o n o t ap p ly t o A M G R O , ( 2 ) th a tA M G R O i s e q u i t a b l y e s t o p p e d f r o m r e c e i v i n g th e s t a tu t o ry p e n a l ty, and ( 3) thatA M G R O w oul d be unj us t l yenr i ched bythe s t atut orypenal tybeca us e i tw as n o t d a m a g e d b yL in c o ln G e n e ra l’ s f a ilu re to re tu rn th e in s u ra n c e p re m iu m p a ym e n ts . N one of thes e ar gum ent s i s avai l i ng. 1. L in c o ln G e n e ra l ar g u e s th a t N .J. S tat. A n n . § 1 7 :2 9 C -4 .1 is in a p p lica b le b e c a u se it onl yappl i es t o pr emi um s pai d bythe i ns ur ed— notpr emi um s pai d bya pr emi um fi nanci ng companys uch as A M G R O . T hi s ar gum entfai l s . W hi l e the s t atut e i dent i fi es

“ th e in su re d ” a s th e e n tityp e rm itt e d to se e k sta tu to ryp e n a lti e s f ro m th e in su re r, N .J. S tat. A nn. § 17: 29C - 4. 1, an i ns ur ance “pr emi um fi nance company[m ay ] s t ep[] i n[t o] the s hoes of the i ns ur ed foral l paym ent s and s et offs [. ] ” Sheer an v. Si tr en , 40 3 A . 2d 53 , 58 (N . J. S u p e r. C t. L a w D iv . 1 9 7 9 ); s ee al s o i d. a t 6 1 (sta tin g th a t “u n e a rn e d p re m iu m s u lti m a tely bel ong t o [the] i ns ur eds . . . orthos e w ho s t and i n thei rs hoes , s uch as [i ns ur ance p re m iu m ] f

in a n c in g c o m p a n ies ” ). H e re , A M G R O c o n tra c ted f o r th e rig h t to “ a n ya n d a ll un earned p rem i um s . . . w hich m aybeco m e pay able und er the [P oli cyho l ders’ ] pol i ci es” in its f in a n c in g a g re e m e n ts w ith th e P o lic yh o ld e rs . See, e. g. , Q ual i fi ed Tra ns por t at i on & L ogi s t i cs Pr emi um Fi nance A gr eement¶ 1 ( as s i gni ng A M G R O “anyand al l unearned p re m iu m s” ). T h u s, A M G R O , sta n d in g in th e sh o e s o f th e P o licyh o ld e rs, w a s p ro p e rlyL in c o ln G e n e ra l als o a rg u e s th a t itd id n o t re c e iv e th e n o tice re q u ire d u n d e r N .J. S tat. 8 A n n . § 1 7 :16 D -14 (a) fo r th at st atute to b e inv o k ed b yA M G R O . B u t as th e D istri ct C o u rt corr ect l yob served , there i s no tem po ral l i m i t at i on on w hen no t i ce m ustbe p rovi ded . N . J. S tat . A n n . § 1 7 :16 D -14 (a) (pro v iding that insu rer “o n n o ti ce o f . . . fin an cing ” m u st r eturn unearned pr emi um s t o t he pr emi um fi nance company ) . E ven i f not i ce w as notpr ovi ded u n d e r N .J. S tat. A n n . § 1 7 :1 6 D -1 4 (a ), th e im p o rt o f th a t f a ilu re o n A M G R O ’s a b ili tyto se e k sta tu to ryp e n a lti e s u n d e r N .J. S tat. A n n . § 1 7 :2 9 C -4 .1 is n il. 10 p e rm itte d to s e e k th e s ta tu to ry p e n a lty p ro v id e d in N .J . S ta t. A n n . § 1 7 :2 9 C -4 .1 . Sheer an , 4 0 3 A .2 d a t 5 8 ; s ee al

s o i d. at61. A c c o rd in g to L in c o ln G e n e ra l, a n in te rp re ta tio n o f N .J . S ta t. A n n . § 1 7 :2 9 C -4 .1 thatperm i t s i ns ur ance pr emi um fi nance compani es t o s eek s t atut orypenal t i es undert hat sta tu te r e n d e rs N .J. S tat. A n n . § 1 7 :1 6 D -1 4 (a ) su p e rf lu o u s b e c a u se th o se c o m p a n ies c o u ld a lw a y s s e e k re lief

u n d e r N .J. S tat. A n n . § 1 7 :2 9 C -4 .1 a s a g e n ts o f th e in su re d . T h is arg u m en t i s b esid e the p o int. A M G R O ’s ab il ityto stan d in the sh o es o f th e P o li cy h o lders s t ems notfr om a s t atut oryi nt erpr et at i on of N . J . St at . A nn. § 17: 29C - 4. 1, buti ns t ead f r om th e a s s ig n m e n t o f

ri g h ts to th e u n e a rn e d p re m iu m s f ro m th e P o lic yh o ld e rs to A M G R O . See She er an , 4 0 3 A .2 d a t 5 8 ; A . J. A r m s tr ong C o. v. Janbur tE m br oi der y C or p. , 234 A . 2d 737, 743 ( N . J . Super . C t . L aw D i v. 1967) ( expl ai ni ng that“undergener al pr i nci pl es of law o f a ss ig n m e n t, th e a ss ig n e e su c c e e d s to a ll th e rig h ts o f h is a ss ig n o r” ); N

. J. Higher E duc. A s s is tance Auth. v. C ar l ock , 589 A . 2d 671, 673 ( N . J . Super . C t . L aw D i v. 1991) (sam e). 8 2. L i ncol n G ener al ar gues thatA M G R O s houl d be equi t abl yes t opped fr om r ece i vi ng s t atut orypenal t i es beca us e i tenabl ed N or thern Fi nanci al t o carryoutthe i ns ur ance11

pr emi um s cam byfai l i ng t o t i m el ynot i fyL i ncol n G ener al of i t s pr emi um fi nanci ng a rra n g e m e n ts w ith th e P o licyh o ld e rs a n d g ra n tin g c o n sid e ra b le a u th o rityto M a c G re g o r to dr aftchec ks . A ccor di ng t o L i ncol n G ener al ’ s br i ef, A M G R O “unj us t i fi abl yr el i ed upon [N or thern Fi nanci al ] orfai l ed t o t ake the nec es s arypr eca ut i ons t o avoi d s uffe r i ng fr om [N or thern Fi nanci al ’ s ] bad ac t s . ” Thus, L i ncol n G ener al ar gues , A M G R O s houl d be pu nis hed for i t s fai l ure t o “take the n ecessaryprecauti on s t o av oid sufferi ng dam age as a resu lto f th e b ad ac ts of an o ther p artyo f w h ich it sho u ld [ h av e] b e[ en ] aw are [.]” T he doctr i ne of e qui t abl e es t oppel i s “des i gned t o pr eventi nj us t i ce[ . ] ” Knor rv. Sm eal , 8 3 6 A . 2 d 7 9 4 , 7 9 9 (N . J. 2 0 0 3 ). H ere , L inco ln G en era l’ s ag en t, N o rth ern F in a n c ial, p ro f

ited f ro m its f ra u d u len t sc h e m e a t th e e x p e n se o f L in c o ln G e n e ra l and A M G R O . I ndeed, m os tof Li ncol n G ener al ’ s acc us at i ons agai ns tA M G R O coul d al s o be le v e le d a g a in s t its e lf. It , to o , f a ile d to s n if

f o u t N o rt h e rn F in a n c ia l’ s f ra u d u le n t s c h e m e . I n fac t , L i ncol n G ener al s etthe fr aud i n m ot i on byperm i t t i ng N or thern Fi nanci al t o actas i t s agent . U nderthes e ci r cumst ance s , i n thatA M G R O w as duped bya fr audul ent s c h e m e , w e c a n n o t s a yth a t e s to p p in g A M G R O ’s c la im w o u ld p re v e n t in ju s tic e . See i d. T her efor e, the doctr i ne of e qui t abl e es t oppel i s i nappl i cabl e. L i ncol n G ener al al s o ar gues thati tneed notr ei m bur s e A M G R O forthe comm i s s i ons thatM acG r egorkeptfr om the s al es of i ns ur ance pol i ci es t o the P o licyh o ld e rs. T h is a rg u m e n t f a ils f o r tw o re a so n s. F irst, L in c o ln G e n e ra l w a iv e d th is ar gum enti n t he C ons entO r der . I tagr eed thati t“w [oul d] notappea l [the] partof the [D i s tr i ct ] C our t ’ s O pi ni on and O r derconce rni ng [i t s ] obl i gat i on t o payA M G R O the12

u n e a rn e d p re m iu m s f

o r th e p o licie s a t issu e [ .]” C o n se n t O rd e r B a c k g ro u n d ¶ 5 ; se e Ke e fe v. P r udent i alP r op. & Cas. I ns . C o. , 203 F. 3d 218, 222- 23 ( 3d C i r . 2000) ( expl ai ni ng w aive r i n the c o n text o f c o n sen t j u d g m en ts) . L inco ln G en era l agre ed to return the e n ti re am o u n t of

the u n ea rne d p rem ium s, n o t th e u n ea rne d p rem ium s less M ac G reg o r’s c o m m iss io n s. S e c o n d , ev e n if th is a rg u m e n t w a s n o t w a iv e d , the sta tu te d e m a n d s f u ll paym entof “gr os s unearned pr emi um s ” bythe i ns ur er . N . J . St at . A nn. § 17: 29C - 4. 1. 3. L i nco l n G eneral argues that the st atutorypen al tyshou l d n ot appl ybecau se A M G R O di d nots uffe rdamages fr om i t s fai l ur e t o r eturn the i ns ur ance pr emi um paym ent s . A w ar di ng the s t atut orypenal ty , L i ncol n G ener al ar gues , w oul d unj us t l yenr i ch A M G R O . T he textof the st atute bel i es L i nco l n G eneral ’s assert i on that A M G R O m ust p ro d u c e e v id e n c e o f

d a m a g e s to a v a il its e lf

o f th e s ta tu to ry p e n a lty. N .J . S ta t. A n n . § 1 7 :29 C -4.1 (stati n g that “the insu rer sh a ll , as a pena l ty , . . . r eturn t o the i ns ur ed an a d d iti o n a l am o u n t eq u a l to 5 % o f th e g ro ss u n e a rn e d p re m iu m c o m p u ted o n a m o n th ly bas i s foreac h m onth orpartther eof pa s tthe fi nal dat e on w hi ch the r efund w as due”) ( emphasi s added) . T he us e of the w or d “s hal l ” i n a s t atut e “norm al l ycr eat es an obl i gat i on i m pervi ous t o j udi ci al di s cr et i on, ” Lexec on I nc. v. Mi l ber

g W eis s B ers had H ynes & Ler ach , 523 U . S. 26, 35 ( 1998) ( quot i ng A nders on v. Y ungkau , 329 U . S. 482, 4 8 5 (1 9 4 7 )), a n d L in c o ln G e n e ra l p ro d u c e s n o c o m p e lli n g a u th o ritysu g g e stin g th a t th is sta tu te s h o u ld b e in terp re ted o th e rw ise . A c c o rd in g ly , L in c o ln G e n e ra l’s a rg u m e n t f a ils b e c a u s e th e p la in m e a n in g o f th e s ta tu te d o e s n o t s u p p o rt its in te rp re ta tio n . R ubi n v.A cl ai m fort or t i ous i nt er fer ence w i th contr actual r el at i ons hi p r equi r es “( 1) the 9 exi s t ence of the contr act [; ] ( 2) i nt er fer ence w hi ch w as i nt ent i onal and w i th m al i ce; ( 3) t he l os s of the contr actorpr os pect i ve gai n as a r es ul tof the i nt er fer ence ; and ( 4) damages . ” V el op, I nc. v. Kaplan , 693 A . 2d 917, 926 ( N . J . Super . C t . A pp. D i v. 1997) ( ci t i ng P ri nti ngM

art -M orristow n v. Sh arp E l ecs. , 5 6 3 A . 2 d 3 1 , 3 7 -38 (N . J. 1 9 8 9 )). 13 U ni t ed Stat es , 44 9 U . S . 42 4, 43 0 (198 1). In sum , L i nco l n G eneral ’s argum ents against the s tatu toryp en altyaw ard are u n av ail ing an d w e c o n clud e tha t th e D istri ct C o u rt p r o p e r l y a w a r d e d A M G R O th e s t a tu t o ry p e n a l ty. B. L i ncol n G ener al chal l enges the D i s tr i ctC our t ’ s entryof s um m aryj udgm entfor M acG r egoron L i ncol n G ener al ’ s t or t i ous i nt er fer ence w i th contr actcl ai m . I tas s ert s t hat 9 M acG r egort or t i ous l yi nt er fer ed w i th i t s contr actw i th N or thern Fi nanci al byi s s ui ng unauthor i zed t empora r yi dent i fi cat i on car ds . A ccor di ng t o L i ncol n G ener al , had M ac G reg o r no t i ssu ed tho se c ard s itw o u ld h av e q u icklyd isco v ere d that N o rth ern F in a n c ial w a s n o t d e liv e rin g in su ra n c e b in d e rs a n d p re m iu m p a ym e n ts to it i n a tim e ly fas hi on. L in c o ln G e n e ra l h a s n o t sh o w n e v id e n c e th a t M a c G re g o r in ter f e re d w ith its contr actw i th N or thern Fi nanci al . A s the D i s tr i ctC our texpl ai ned, “[e ] ven i f M acG r egor di d[] as L i ncol n G ener al as s ert s [, ] . . . s uch conduc tm aycons t i tut e i nappr opr i at e or negl i gentbus i nes s pr act i ces buti ti n no w ay‘ i nt er fer ed’ w i th the contr actbetw een N o rth e rn F in a n c ial a n d L in c o ln G e n e ra l.” M o re o v e r, in e f f e c t, L in c o ln G e n e ra l se e k s to hol d M acG r egorr es pons i bl e forN or thern Fi nanci al ’ s non- paym entof pr emi um s and for“To est abl i s h unj us tenr i chment , a pl ai nt i ff musts how both thatdefe ndantr ece i ved a 10 benef i tand thatr et ent i on of thatbenef i tw i thoutpaym entw oul d be unj us t . ” V R G C or p. v. G K N R eal t y C or p. , 641 A . 2d 519, 526 ( N . J . 1994) . “The unj us tenr i chmentdoctr i ne re q u ire s th a t p lain tiff

sh o w th a t ite x p e c ted re m u n e ra tio n f ro m th e d e f

e n d a n t at th e tim e it per form ed orconfe r r ed a be nefi ton defe ndantand thatthe fa i l ur e of r emuner at i on enr i ched de fenda ntbey ond i t s contr actual r i ght s . ” I d. 14 thi s r eas on, i tm us tfai l : “[T] he rul e of t or t i ous i nt er fer ence w as notm eantt o ups etthe rul es governi ng the contr actual r el at i ons hi p i t s el f. ” Pr i n t i n gMa r t - Mo r r is t o wn , 563 A . 2d at38. “W her e a pe r s on i nt er fer es w i th the per form ance of hi s orherow n contr act , the l i abi l i tyi s governed bypr i nci pl es of contr actl aw . ” Id . H ere , L inco ln G en era l’ s al l egat i ons ar e es s ent i al l ybas ed on N or thern Fi nanci al ’ s non- paym entof i ns ur ance p re m iu m s — a n is s u e th a t is “ g o v e rn e d b yth e p ri n c ip le s o f c o n tr a c t la w ,” n o t to rt la w . I d. I n o th e rwo r d s , No r th e r n F i n a n c i a l wa s “ i n t e r f e r [ i n g ] wi th th e p e r f

o r ma n c e o f

[ i t s ] o wn c o n tr a c t” b ye n g a g in g in its f ra u d u le n t s c h e m e . I

d. E v e n if

M a c G re g o r in ter f

e re d w ith L i ncol n G ener al ’ s contr actw i th N or thern Fi nanci al , i t s act i ons do notr i s e t o the in te n tio n a l in f

lic tio n o f h a rm “ w ith o u t ju s tif

ic a tio n o r e x c u s e ” n e e d e d to s h o w m a lic e . V el op, I nc. , 693 A . 2d at926 ( quot i ng Pr i n t i n gMa r t - Mo r r is t o wn , 5 6 3 A .2 d a t 3 9 ). A ccor di ngl y , w e agr ee w i th t he D i s tr i ctC our tthatL i ncol n G ener al ’ s t or t i ous i nt er fer ence w ith c o n tra c t cla im c a n n o t su rv iv e su m m a ryju d g m e n t. C. L i ncol n G ener al al s o appea l s the D i s tr i ctC our t ’ s entryof s um m aryj udgm entfor G ro ss b a rd o n its u n

ju st e n ric h m e n t cla im a g a in st h im . It a p p e a rs th a t L in c o ln G e n e ra l is 10 ar gui ng thatG r os s bar d w as unj us t l yenr i ched both as an age ntof N or thern Fi nanci al andC iv il co n sp ira c yre q u ire s s h o w in g a “ c o m b in a tio n o f tw o o r m o re p e rso n s a c tin g in 11 conce r tt o comm i tan unl aw ful act , ort o comm i ta l aw ful actbyunl aw ful m eans , the pri ncipal el em ent of w hich i s an agreem ent betw een the part i es t o infl i cta w rong ag ai nst oran i nj uryupon another , and an ove r tactthatr es ul t s i n damage. ” LoB i ondo v. Sc h w a rtz , 9 7 0 A . 2 d 1 0 0 7 , 1 0 2 9 (N . J. 2 0 0 9 ) (i n terna l qu o tat ion o m itted). 15 i n hi s i ndi vi dual capa ci ty . U nderei thertheory , L i ncol n G ener al ’ s cl ai m fai l s t o s ur vi ve s um m aryj udgm ent . Fi r s t , t o t he ext entthatL i ncol n G ener al ’ s cl ai m i s bas ed on G r os s bar d’ s act i ons as a N or thern Fi nanci al offi cer , anys uch cl ai m w oul d be governed by th e e x p re s s c o n tr a c t b e tw e e n N o rt h e rn F in a n c ia l a n d L in c o ln G e n e ra l. S e e C. B. Snyder R eal t y C o. v. N

at ’ lN ew ark & Es s ex Banki ng C o. , 1 0 1 A .2 d 5 4 4 , 5 5 3 (N .J. 1 9 5 3 ); Mos er v. Mi lnerH

ot el s , I nc. , 7 8 A .2 d 3 9 3 , 3 9 3 (N .J. 1 9 5 1 ); W i ns l ow v. C or

por at e Expre s s , I

nc. , 8 3 4 A .2 d 1 0 3 7 , 1 0 4 6 (N .J. S u p e r. C t. A p p . D iv . 2 0 0 3 ). “I n lig h t o f th is e x p re ss c o n tra c t, ther e i s no bas i s . . . for[Li ncol n G ener al ] t o pur s ue a . . . cl ai m forunj us tenr i chment . ” W i ns l ow , 8 3 4 A .2 d a t 1 0 4 6 . A s f o r a n u n ju st e n ric h m e n t cla im a g a in st G ro ss b a rd in h is ind ividu al ca p ac ity , af

ter ex am ining the re co rd, an d in li g h t of L inco ln G en era l’ s fa il u re to ide n ti fyev iden ce su g g esti n g o therw ise, w e a g ree w ith the D istri ct C o u rt ’s d eterm ination that G ross b ard rec eive d n o b en ef itfro m L inco ln G en era l. G ross b ard c a n n o t b e h e ld lia b le f

o r u n ju s t e n ri c h m e n t w h e n h e re c e iv e d n o b e n e f it. V R G C or p. , 641 A .2 d a t 5 2 6 . T h u s, w e a g re e w ith th e D istric t C o u rt th a t su m m a ryju d g m e n t o n th is c laim w as p rop er. D. L i ncol n G ener al al s o appea l s the D i s tr i ctC our t ’ s entryof s um m aryj udgm entfor G r os s bar d on i t s ci vi l cons pi r acycl ai m . T hi s cl ai m fai l s t o s ur vi ve s um m aryj udgm ent 11G ro ss b a rd tes tifie d d u rin g h is d e p o sitio n th a t h e n e v e r h a d b u sin e ss d e a lin g s w ith 12 Pi s aca ne pr i ort o Pi s aca ne’ s i ntr oduct i on t o hi m bya col l eague :

Q : D id y o u h av e a n yfo rm o f b u sine ss relati o n sh ip [ b ef o re y o u r co ll ea g u e introd u ce d y o u to P isaca n e]? A : N o. Q : W er e y ou everi nvol ved i n any b u s i nes s deal i ngs tog ethe r— A : N o. G r os s bar d i nt er act ed w i th Pi s aca ne onl y“atthe verybegi nni ng and veryend” of the re latio n sh ip b e tw e e n M a c G re g o r a n d N o rth e rn F in a n c ial:

Q : O therthan R i ch P i s aca ne di d y ou everdeal w i th anybody else a t [N o rth ern F inan cial]? A : W ell , I ne v er rea ll yd ea ltw ith R ich e x ce p t fo r at th e v ery b e g in n in g a n d v e ry e n d . In t otal , G ross bard i nter act ed w i th P i sacane a h and ful of t i m es and n on e of those i nter act i on s suggest ed a co nspir at ori al agreem ent betw een the tw o indi vidual s. G ross bard t est i fi ed as fo l l ow s: 13 Q : N ow , dur i ng the ‘ 03- ‘ 04 t i m e per i od di d M acG r egor

co nt i nue t o underw r i t e bus i nes s for [ N o rth ern F inan cial]? A: F r o m w h a tI k n e w th e n o rwh a tI k n o w n o w? 16 beca us e Li ncol n G ener al nevers et s for th anyevi dence s how i ng thatG r os s bar d and Pi s aca ne ent er ed i nt o an “a gr eement. . . t o i nfl i cta w r ong agai ns t. . . another . ” LoB i ondo , 9 7 0 A .2 d a t 1 0 2 9 . “A n u n w itt in g p a rty [ , li k e G ro ss b a rd ,] m a yn o t b e liab le undera cons pi r acytheory . ” B a n c o P o p u la rN. A m. v. G andi , 87 6 A . 2d 25 3, 26 3 (N . J. 2005) . G r os s bar d’ s undi s put ed t es t i m onys how s thathe had e xtr emel yl i m i t ed i nt er act i ons w i th Pi s aca ne. H e had a l m os tno know l edge of the day - t o- daydeal i ngs 12 betw een M acG r egorand N or thern Fi nanci al . T hus , atbes t , G r os s bar d w as an 13Q : W haty ou knew then. A : I di dn’ tknow verym uch th en becaus e I don’ tgetthat i nv olved i n thi s aspectof the bu si ness. 17 “ u n w ittin g p a rt y ” to N o rt h e rn F in a n c ia l’ s f ra u d u le n t s c h e m e . S e e B a n c o P o p u la rN. A m. , 876 A . 2d at263. L i ncol n G ener al poi nt s t o nothi ng i n the r ecor d s ugges t i ng a cons pi r at or i al agr eementbetw een G r os s bar d and Pi s aca ne. A s s uch, w e agr ee w i th the D i s tr i ctC our tthatL i ncol n G ener al ’ s cons pi r acycl ai m agai ns tG r os s bar d cannots ur vi ve su m m a ryju d g m e n t. E. H aving dis po sed of

L i nco l n G eneral ’s app eal , w e no w turn t o M acG regor’ s cr ossa p p e a l o f th e D istric t C o u rt’s d e n ial o f its m o tio n f

o r su m m a ryju d g m e n t o n L in c o ln G ener al ’ s unj us tenr i chmentcl ai m agai ns ti t . M acG r egorar gues thati tl acke d a di r ect re la tio n s h ip w ith L in c o ln G e n e ra l a n d th e re f o re c o u ld n o t h a v e b e e n u n ju s tly e n ri c h e d . See Cal lano v. O akw ood P ark H om es C or

p. , 219 A . 2d 332, 335 ( N . J . Super . C t . A pp. D iv . 1 9 6 6 ). B u t M a c G re g o r’s o w n S tate m e n t o f U n d isp u ted M a ter ial F a c ts f iled in s uppor tof i t s m ot i on fors um m aryj udgm ents t at es otherw i s e:

• M acG r egorcont act ed Li ncol n G ener al di r ect l yw hen N or thern Fi nanci al “f ail ed to resp o n d to [ it s] ef fo rt s to p roc u re the fin al po li cy[f o r a P o li cy h o lder.]” S tat em en t of U n d ispu ted M aterial F ac ts i n S u p p o rto f M ark G ross b ard an d B an ca r A sso ciates, I n c. d/b/a D av id M ac G reg o r C o m p an y ’s M ot i on forSum m aryJ udgm ent¶ 107.

• M acG r egorand Li ncol n G ener al di r ect l ycomm uni cat ed t o r es ol ve d iscrep an cies in in su ran ce co v era g e c rea ted b yN o rth ern F inan cial’s a c tio n s. F o r e x a m p le, o n F e b ru a ry2 6 , 2 0 0 5 , M a c G re g o r w ro te L in c o ln G en era l, o u tl ining d iscrep an cies in c o v era g e b etw ee n N o rth ern F inan cial’s18 b in d e rs p u rp o rtin g to p ro v id e L in c o ln G e n e ra l in su ra n c e a n d L in c o ln G e n e ra l’ s a c tu a l in s u ra n c e p o lic ie s . I d. ¶ 1 1 5 . M a c G re g o r a sk e d L in c o ln G ener al t o “honorthe bi nder s i s s ued by[N or thern Fi nanci al ] . ” Id . “ M a c G re g o r [ a lso ]. . . se n t a n u m b e r o f su b se q u e n t lette rs to [ L in c o ln G ener al ] conce r ni ng pr obl ems w i th [N or thern Fi nanci al ] . ” I d. ¶ 117.

• L in c o ln G e n e ra l d ire c tlyc o n tac ted M a c G re g o r to in f o rm M a c G re g o r th a t it h a d n o t r e c e iv e d p re m iu m p a ym e n ts f ro m N o rt h e rn F in a n c ia l. I d. ¶ 1 2 1 . M a c G re g o r re sp o n d e d b yse n d in g L in c o ln G e n e ra l co p ies o f its c h e c k s to N o rt h e rn F in a n c ia l. I

d. ¶ 122.

• L i ncol n G ener al not i fi ed M acG r egorthati thad ca ncel l ed s ever al pol i ci es M a c G re g o r p ro c u re d f

o r i ts c lie n ts th ro u g h N o rt h e rn F in a n c ia l. I d. ¶ 1 2 3 . G i ven thes e fa ct s , the r el at i ons hi p betw een Li ncol n G ener al and M acG r egorw as su ff ici en t eno u g h fo r th e u n just en ri ch m en t cl aim ag ains t M ac G reg o r t o su rviv e su m m ary j udgm ent . U nl i ke the pl ai nt i ff i n C al lano , L i ncol n G ener al r epea t edl ycomm uni cat ed w i th M acG regor and b oth part i es r ecog nized that theyw ere i n som e form of b usi ness re la tio n s h ip . See Cal lano , 219 A . 2d at335. M acG r egorexpec t ed the Li ncol n G ener al po l i ci es t o b e i ssued t o it s cl i ents and L i nco l n G eneral exp ect ed to be p ai d fo r tho se p o licie s. W h ile b o th c o m p a n ies u n d o u b ted lyh a d re latio n sh ip s w ith N o rth e rn F in a n c ial, theyal s o had a r el at i ons hi p w i th eac h otherthatcoul d gi ve r i s e t o an obj ect i ve e x p e c tatio n th a t M a c G re g o r sh o u ld re tu rn th e c o m m iss io n s it e a rn e d in c o n n e c tio n w ith N o rt h e rn F in a n c ia l’ s f

ra u d . See I

ns ulat i on C ontr act i ng & Suppl y v. Kr avco , 507 A . 2d 754, 760 ( N . J . Super . C t . A pp. D i v. 1986) . M acG r egor ’ s r et ent i on of comm i s s i ons for s al es of pol i ci es thatw er e neve rdel i ver ed t o the Pol i cyhol der s coul d be vi ew ed as the re c e ip t o f

a n u n ju s t b e n e f

it. See C al lano , 219 A . 2d at334 ( “The keyw or ds ar e enr i ch and u n ju stly .”) ( e m p h a sis in o rig in a l). In d e e d , L in c o ln G e n e ra l’s a g re e m e n t to re tu rn a ll19

u n ea rne d p rem ium s to A M G R O , C o n sen t O rde r B ac k g rou n d ¶ 5 , m ak es M ac G reg o r’s re ten tio n o f

th e c o m m iss io n s s e e m u n ju st. T h e a m o u n t L in c o ln G e n e ra l h a s a g re e d to payi ncl udes the comm i s s i ons thatM acG r egorhas r et ai ned. I n otherw or ds , the C ons ent O rd e r re q u ire s L in c o ln G e n e ra l to re im b u rse A M G R O f o r th e c a sh th a t M a c G re g o r is r et ai ni ng as comm i s s i ons fors al es of i ns ur ance pol i ci es thatw er e neve rdel i ver ed. A ny r ecove ryL i ncol n G ener al w oul d r ece i ve fr om M acG r egorw oul d m er el yoffs etthe amount thati tm us tal r eadypayA M G R O . A s s uch, w e agr ee w i th the D i s tr i ctC our tand co n clud e tha t den ial o f su m m aryjud g m en t on this clai m w as p rop er. III . Li n c o l n Ge n e r a l h a s f

a i l e d t o s h o w t h a tth e s t a tu t o ryp e n a l tya wa r d e d t o AM GRO w a s im p ro p e r. E x c e p t f o r th e u n ju st e n ric h m e n t cla im a g a in st M a c G re g o r, L in c o ln G e n e ra l h a s a lso f

a iled to id e n tifyg e n u in e iss u e s o f m a ter ial f

a c t th a t w o u ld p e rm it i ts cl ai m s agai nstG ross bard an d M acG regor t o survi ve sum m aryj ud gm ent. F or these re a s o n s , w e w ill a f

f ir m th e D is tr ic t C o u rt ’s ju d g m e n t.