alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
Exhibit 10.17


WATTS
WATER TECHNOLOGIES, INC.


 


Non-Employee
Director Compensation


 


The annual
compensation payable by Watts Water Technologies, Inc. to non-employee
Directors as determined by the Board of Directors of the Corporation on December 14,
2009 and effective as of January 1, 2010 is as follows:


 


·                  $60,000 annual retainer;


 


·                  Annual grant of restricted stock under the Corporation’s 2004 Stock
Incentive Plan with a fair market value on the date of grant equal to $60,000
and which shall vest in full on the first anniversary of the date of grant and
shall be subject to such other terms and conditions as shall be determined by
the Board;


 


·                  The Chairman of the Board shall receive an additional annual retainer
of $20,000;


 


·                  The Chairman of the Audit Committee shall receive an additional annual
retainer of $15,000;


 


·                  The Chairman of the Compensation Committee shall receive an additional
annual retainer of $10,000;


 


·                  The Chairman of the and the Nominating and Corporate Governance
Committee shall receive an additional annual retainer of $5,000; and


 


·                  There shall be no additional compensation paid for participation in
Board or committee meetings.
** **

**Exhibit 32.1**

** **

**CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350**

**AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACTOF 2002**

 

 

**               **In connection with thequarterly report on Form 10-Q of United Wisconsin Grain Producers, LLC (the “Company”)for the quarter ended September 30, 2007, as filed with the Securities andExchange Commission on the date hereof (the “Report”), I, J. F. Robertson,Chief Executive Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002,that:

 

1.                                       The Reportfully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of theSecurities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended; and

 

2.                                       The informationcontained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, thefinancial condition and results of operations of the Company.

 

 

 
|   | /s/ J. F. Robertson       |
|--------|---------------------------|
|   | J. F. Robertson           |
|   | *Chief Executive Officer* |
|   |                      |
|   | Dated: November 14, 2007  |

 

----
exhibit10-20.htm


    
      	
              EXHIBIT
      10.20

            


    

    


    PEOPLES
BANCORP INC. ANNUAL REPORT ON FORM 10-K

    FOR
FISCAL YEAR ENDED DECEMBER 31, 2009

    


    


    SUMMARY OF PERQUISITES FOR
EXECUTIVE OFFICERS

    OF PEOPLES BANCORP
INC.

    


    


    Based on
business need, on a case-by-case basis, the Compensation Committee of the Board
of Directors  (the “Committee”) of Peoples Bancorp Inc. (“Peoples”)
grants the use of a company-paid automobile and country club membership to
selected executive officers of Peoples to further business development on behalf
of Peoples.  Expenses relating to personal use of the country club
amenities are either reimbursed to Peoples or paid by the executive
officer.  Expenses relating to personal use of company automobiles are
reported as income to the executive officer.  On December 17, 2009,
the Board of Directors discontinued company-paid country club memberships for
executive officers effective January 1, 2010.

     

    On
January 12, 2006, the Committee approved the adoption of an Executive Health
Program for the executive officers.  The Executive Health Program
provides an opportunity for each named executive officer to participate in a
comprehensive medical screening annually at the expense of
Peoples.  Participation is voluntary.  The objective of the
Executive Health Program is the early identification of potential health
problems and the prompt, expert treatment of any medical problems detected,
which could negatively impact Peoples’ financial performance or current
management succession plans.
STATE of Missouri, Respondent, v. Forrest RUSSELL, Appellant.

No. ED 105842

Missouri Court of Appeals, Eastern District, DIVISION TWO.

Filed: August 14, 2018

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT: Casey A. Taylor, 1000 West Nifong, Bldg. 7, Suite 100, Columbia, MO 65203.

ATTORNEYS FOR RESPONDENT: Joshua D. Hawley, Attorney General, Robert J. Bartholomew, Jr., Asst. Attorney General, P. O. Box 899, Jefferson City, MO 65102-0899.

Before Philip M. Hess, P.J. and Robert G. Dowd, Jr. and Mary K. Hoff, JJ.

**ORDER**

PER CURIAM.

*890Forrest Russell ("Defendant") appeals from the judgment and sentence, entered on his convictions after a jury trial, in which he was found to be a persistent offender and sentenced as such. His sole claim of error is that no charging document pleading that he was a persistent offender was ever filed, although he concedes the State presented sufficient evidence of his status at the outset of the trial. The State has filed a supplemental legal file, which includes a second information in lieu of indictment. That second information was filed on the date of the trial and contains allegations regarding Defendant's status as a persistent offender. Defendant has not disputed the contents of the supplemental legal file or otherwise challenged the existence or accuracy of that charging document. In fact, counsel for Defendant has filed a "motion to clarify the record on appeal" explaining that the second information in lieu of indictment did not appear in the trial court record at the time the original legal file was prepared and that counsel was not attempting to deceive the court or opposing counsel with the original legal file. The only relief requested in the motion is that the record be clarified to reflect counsel's explanation therein. The motion is granted.

This appeal has no merit. The judgment is affirmed. An extended opinion would have no precedential value nor serve any jurisprudential purpose. *See* Rule 30.25(b).
Materials Not Included in

Airworthiness Directive (AD) Docket

Docket Number: FAA- 2011-0219

Directorate Identifier: 2010NM228AD

757-25-0298 --- 10/16/08

757-25-0182 IN 01 --- 5/4/10

757-25-0298 IN 01--- 12/18/08

757-25-0298 IN 02 --- 1/8/10

Name/Description of Item(s) Not Included in FDMS Docket and Maintained in the 

Supplemental AD Docket

MAY BE VIEWED AT: Federal Aviation Administration

Transport Airplane Directorate

Rules Docket

1601 Lind Ave. SW.,

Renton, WA 98057

425.227.1221

DURING THE HOURS OF: 9 a.m. and 3 p.m., Monday through Friday,

except Federal holidays.

Form Date: 03/05/2008
II 

Calendar No. 575 

109TH CONGRESS 

2D SESSION H. R. 5540 

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES 

JUNE 20, 2006 

Received; read twice and referred to the Committee on Homeland Security and 

Governmental Affairs 

AUGUST 1, 2006 

Reported by Ms. COLLINS, without amendment 

AN ACT 

To designate the facility of the United States Postal Service 

located at 217 Southeast 2nd Street in Dimmitt, Texas, 

as the ‘‘Sergeant Jacob Dan Dones Post Office’’. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 

3 SECTION 1. SERGEANT JACOB DAN DONES POST OFFICE. 

4 (a) DESIGNATION.—The facility of the United States 

5 Postal Service located at 217 Southeast 2nd Street in 

6 Dimmitt, Texas, shall be known and designated as the 

7 ‘‘Sergeant Jacob Dan Dones Post Office’’. 


ycherry on PROD1PC64 with BILLS
2 

•HR 5540 RS

1 (b) REFERENCES.—Any reference in a law, map, reg2 ulation, document, paper, or other record of the United 

3 States to the facility referred to in subsection (a) shall 

4 be deemed to be a reference to the ‘‘Sergeant Jacob Dan 

5 Dones Post Office’’. 


ycherry on PROD1PC64 with BILLS

ycherry on PROD1PC64 with BILLS
Calendar No. 575 

109TH CONGRESS 

2D SESSION H. R. 5540 

AN ACT 

To designate the facility of the United States PostDones Post Office’’. Dimmitt, Texas, as the ‘‘Sergeant Jacob Dan al Service located at 217 Southeast 2nd Street in 

AUGUST 1, 2006 

Reported without amendment 


ycherry on PROD1PC64 with BILLS
I 

109TH CONGRESS 

1ST SESSION H. R. 53 

To suspend temporarily the duty on chloroneb. 

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

JANUARY 4, 2005 

Mrs. CAPITO introduced the following bill; which was referred to the 

Committee on Ways and Means 

A BILL 

To suspend temporarily the duty on chloroneb. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 

3 SECTION 1. CHLORONEB. 

4 (a) IN GENERAL.—Subchapter II of chapter 99 of 

5 the Harmonized Tariff Schedule of the United States is 

6 amended by inserting in numerical sequence the following 

7 new heading: 

‘‘ 9902.05.33 Chloroneb (CAS No. 2675– 

77–6) (provided for in subheading 2931.00.30) ............ Free Free No change On or before 

12/31/2008 ’’. 

8 (b) EFFECTIVE DATE.—The amendment made by 

9 subsection (a) applies with respect to goods entered, or 
2 

•HR 53 IH 

1 withdrawn from warehouse for consumption, on or after 

2 the 15th day after the date of the enactment of this Act. 

Æ
#### Mary Ellis v. City of Peru.

*Municipal Corporations—Defective*Sidetoalk—Instructions.

Where one goes upon a sidewalk which he knows to be out of repair, and is injured while in. the exercise of ordinary care, he may have a right of action.

[Opinion filed May 27, 1887.]

In error to the Circuit Court of La Salle Comity; the Hon. Charles Blanchard, Judge, presiding.

Messrs. Fowler Brothers, for plaintiff in error.

Messrs. Duncan *&*O’Connor and H. T„ Gilbert, for defendant in error.

Welch, J.

This was a suit brought by the plaintiff in error against the defendant in error to recover damages for an injury claimed to have been caused by the negligence of defendant in error in not keeping its sidewalks in a reasonably safe condition. The evidence establishes that the condition of the sidewalk upon which the plaintiff in error fell and was injured, was in an unsafe and dangerous condition, and had been so for some time, and that the defendant in error knew of its unsafe condition. The trial resulted in a verdict and judgment for the defendant in error—from which this writ of error is prosecuted. Various errors are assigned. In the view we take of this case, the only error that we deem well assigned is that taken to the fourth instruction for the defendant in error. That instruction in effect denied the right to plaintiff in error to recover if she knew of the unsafe condition of the sidewalk, .and had reasonable ground to apprehend that in passing along said walk at the point where she *36fell, she would run the risk of serious bodily injury, and this though this walk was the shortest and most convenient to reach the point df her destination. Justice Baker, in City of Joliet v. Maria Conway, 17 Ill. App. 577, says: “ One may go upon a sidewalk known to be out of repair and dangerous, and yet if injured, may have a right of recovery if ordinary and reasonable care is used.” Bloomington v. Chamberlain, 104 Ill. 268, 271; Aurora v. Dale, 90 Ill. 46; Aurora v. Hillman, 90 Ill. 61; Lovenguth V. Bloomington, 71 Ill. 238.

The evidence in this case shows that this walk was in daily and constant use by the public; that many persons passed over it daily : such being the ease it was not like the walk in the City of Centralia v. Krouse, 64 Ill. 19.

The degree of care which the law required the plaintiff to exercise was ordinary care; under all the circumstances of the case, the plaintiff’s knowledge as to the condition of the sidewalk would be one of such circumstances to be considered by the jury, in determining whether there had been the exercise of ordinary care.

For the error herein indicated the judgment is reversed and cause remanded.

*Judgment reversed.*
IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS

OF TEXAS

NO. WR-79,972-01

EX PARTE RICARDO ROMERO, Applicant

ON APPLICATION FOR A WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS

CAUSE NO. 52,802-C IN THE 89th DISTRICT COURT

FROM WICHITA COUNTY

Per curiam.

O P I N I O N

Pursuant to the provisions of Article 11.07 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure, the

clerk of the trial court transmitted to this Court this application for a writ of habeas corpus. Ex parte

Young, 418 S.W.2d 824, 826 (Tex. Crim. App. 1967). Applicant was convicted of kidnapping and

sentenced to ten years’ imprisonment. He did not appeal his conviction. 

Applicant contends that his plea was involuntary because he pled guilty under the erroneous

belief that he would be eligible to attend boot camp. 

Based on the record in this case, the trial court finds, and the State agrees, that Applicant’s

plea in this case was rendered involuntary due to a subsequent determination by prison officials that

Applicant was not eligible to attend boot camp. Applicant is entitled to relief. Ex parte Huerta, 692
2

S.W.2d 681 (Tex. Crim. App. 1985).

Relief is granted. The judgment in Cause No. 52,802-C in the 89th District Court of Wichita

County is set aside, and Applicant is remanded to the custody of the Sheriff of Wichita County to

answer the charges as set out in the indictment. The trial court shall issue any necessary bench

warrant within 10 days after the mandate of this Court issues.

Copies ofthis opinion shall be sent to the Texas Department of Criminal Justice–Correctional

Institutions Division and Pardons and Paroles Division.

Delivered: August 21, 2013

Do not publish
---



EXHIBIT 23.1



CONSENT OF INDEPENDENT REGISTERED PUBLIC ACCOUNTING FIRM

We consent to the incorporation by reference in Registration Statements Nos. 333-71077 and 333-106878 on Form S-3, and Nos. 333-73391, 333-106880, 333-106881 and 333-132665 on Form S-8 of our reports, dated March 12, 2008, relating to the financial statements of First Cash Financial Services, Inc., and to the effectiveness of internal control over financial reporting, appearing in this Annual Report on Form 10-K of First Cash Financial Services, Inc., for the year ended December 31, 2007.



Hein & Associates LLP
Dallas, Texas 
March 12, 2008
EXHIBIT 32.2CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,
AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO SECTION 906
OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002In connection with the Annual Report of First Cash Financial Services, Inc. (the Company) on Form 10-K for the year ended December 31, 2010, as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the Report), I, R. Douglas Orr, Chief Financial Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that to my knowledge: (1)The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Act of
1934, as amended; and(2)The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.
 Date:  February 25, 2011/s/ R. Douglas OrrR. Douglas OrrChief Financial Officer
#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Shawn Bonadie, Appellant.

[718 NYS2d 861]

Appeal by the defendant from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Kings County (Martin, J.), rendered October 3, 1996, convicting him of manslaughter in the first degree and criminal possession of a weapon in the second degree, upon a jury verdict, and imposing sentence. The appeal brings up for review the denial, after a hearing, of those branches of the defendant’s omnibus motion which were to suppress identification testimony, physical evidence, and statements he made to law enforcement officials.

Ordered that the judgment is affirmed.

The hearing court properly concluded that the police officers’ initial stop and subsequent arrest of the defendant were lawful *(see, People v Benjamin,*51 NY2d 267, 270-271; *People v O’Neal,*248 AD2d 561; *People v Sledge,*225 AD2d 711).

The defendant’s challenge to the admission of testimony that he made a threatening gesture to a prosecution witness one week before trial is unpreserved for appellate review, and, in any event, without merit *(see,*CPL 470.05 [2]; *People v Heide,*84 NY2d 943; *People v Herrera,*245 AD2d 12). Krausman, J. P., Friedmann, H. Miller and Feuerstein, JJ., concur.
Court of Appeals

Sixth Appellate District of Texas

J U D G M E N T

Robert Daugherty, Appellant

No. 06-18-00054-CV v.

Dianne Sprague, Appellee

Appeal from the 62nd District Court of 

Lamar County, Texas (Tr. Ct. No. 85954). 

Opinion delivered by Chief Justice Morriss, 

Justice Moseley and Justice Burgess

participating.

As stated in the Court’s opinion of this date, we find no error in the judgment of the court 

below. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

We note that the appellant, Robert Daugherty, has adequately indicated his inability to 

pay costs of appeal. Therefore, we waive payment of costs.

RENDERED DECEMBER 21, 2018

BY ORDER OF THE COURT

JOSH R. MORRISS, III

CHIEF JUSTICE

ATTEST:

Debra K. Autrey, Clerk
Steve Duane MOXLEY, Appellant, v. STATE of Missouri, Respondent.

WD 80716

Missouri Court of Appeals, Western District.

ORDER FILED: March 27, 2018

Mark A. Grothoff, Assistant Public Defender, Columbia, MO, Attorney for Appellant.

Joshua D. Hawley, Attorney General, and Evan J. Buchheim, Assistant Attorney General, Jefferson City, MO, Attorneys for Respondent.

Before Division IV: Mark D. Pfeiffer, Presiding Judge, and Cynthia L. Martin and Edward R. Ardini, Jr., Judges

**Order**

Per Curiam:

*84Mr. Steve Moxley appeals from the Judgment of the Circuit Court of Boone County, Missouri, denying his Rule 29.15 amended motion for post-conviction relief after an evidentiary hearing. Mr. Moxley claims that his trial counsel was ineffective in the cross-examination of a state's witness. Because a published opinion would have no precedential value, a memorandum of law has been provided to the parties. The judgment is affirmed. Rule 84.16(b).
FIRST AMENDMENT TO THE

                      FIRST FEDERAL BANK, A F.S.B.
           EXECUTIVE SUPPLEMENTAL RETIREMENT INCOME AGREEMENT

         Pursuant to rights reserved under Section XI of the First Federal Bank,
A F.S.B.  Executive  Supplemental  Retirement Income Agreement (the "Agreement")
entered into as of July 1, 1993 by First Federal Bank, A F.S.B. (the "Bank") and
Mary Lynn  Stenftenagel  ("Executive")  hereby  agree to amend  Section 1.17 and
Section 1.18 of the  Agreement  effective  as of October 1, 1996 to provide,  in
their entirety, as follows:


           1.17       "Supplemental  Retirement  Income Benefit" means an annual
                      amount equal to Thirty- Five  Thousand  Nine Hundred Seven
                      Dollars  ($35,907).  This total shall be divided by twelve
                      (12) and paid in equal monthly  installments  for a period
                      of one hundred eighty (180) months.


           1.18       "Survivor's   Benefit"  means  Thirty-Five  Thousand  Nine
                      Hundred Seven Dollars  (35,718) per year to be paid in one
                      hundred eighty (180) equal monthly installments.


         This  First   Amendment  has  been  entered  into  this  25th  day  of
March 1997.



                                      FIRST FEDERAL BANK, A F.S.B.



                                      By:  /s/ Frank D. Baracani
                                           ------------------------------------
                                               Frank D. Baracani, President


                                            /s/ Mary Lynn Stenftenagel
                                            ----------------------------------
                                               Mary Lynn Stenftenagel, Executive
_______________________________________ __ Michigan Supreme Court 

# Order

Lansing, Michigan

May 31, 2006 Clifford W. Taylor, Chief Justice
130414 Michael F. Cavanagh Elizabeth A. Weaver Marilyn Kelly Maura D. Corrigan EVELYN WHITE, Plaintiff-Appellant, Robert P. Young, Jr. Stephen J. Markman, Justices

v SC: 130414 COA: 264622 WCAC: 04-000327 CRIME PREVENTION SECURITY SPECIALISTS and ACCIDENT FUND INSURANCE COMPANY, Defendants-Appellees.

________________ _______________ __________/

On order of the Court, the application fo r leave to appeal the January 3, 2006 order of the Court of Appeals is considered, and it is DENIED, because we are not persuaded that the question presented should be reviewed by this Court.

C AVANAGH , J., would remand this case to the Court of Appeals for consideration as on leave granted.

K ELLY , J., would grant leave to appeal.

t0524 I, Corbin R. Davis, Clerk of the Mi chigan Supreme Cour t, certify that the foregoing is a true and complete copy of the order entered at the direction of the Court.

May 31, 2006

Clerk
#### Stuart Podolsky, Appellant, v Citation Abstract, Inc., Defendant, and Alan Polsky et al., Respondents.

[719 NYS2d *560694]

In an action to recover for unjust enrichment, the plaintiff appeals from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Suffolk County (D’Emilio, J.), entered March 30, 2000, which, after a nonjury trial, and upon an order of the same court dated February 7, 2000, dismissed the complaint insofar as asserted against the defendants Alan Polsky and Narnoc Corp., d/b/a St. James Lumber Company. The plaintiffs notice of appeal from the order is deemed a premature notice of appeal from the judgment *(see,*CPLR 5520 [c]).

Ordered that the judgment is reversed, on the law, with costs, the order dated February 7, 2000, is vacated, and the matter is remitted to the Supreme Court, Suffolk County, for entry of an appropriate amended judgment in accordance herewith.

Contrary to the conclusion of the Supreme Court, the evidence presented at trial established that the respondents were not entitled to retain money released to them from an escrow fund in which the plaintiff had placed $20,000, and that they were unjustly enriched thereby *(see, Miller v Schloss,*218 NY 400, 407; *Wolf v National Council,*264 AD2d 416; *cf., State of New York v Barclays Bank,*76 NY2d 533, 540). The respondents, a subcontractor and its attorney, claimed the right to obtain the release of money held in escrow, pursuant to a mechanic’s lien filed against the plaintiffs property for materials provided by the defendant, Narnoc Corp., d/b/a St. James Lumber Company (hereinafter Narnoc), to the general contractor who developed the plaintiffs property. This Court, however, discharged that mechanic’s lien in 1993 *(see, Matter of Podolsky v Narnoc Corp.,*196 AD2d 593). Furthermore, the evidence at trial indicated that the plaintiff had neither agreed to pay for the materials provided by Narnoc, nor had he guaranteed the general contractor’s performance to pay for the materials; therefore, the plaintiff cannot be held liable for the payment thereof *(see, M. Paladino, Inc. v Lucchese & Son Contr. Corp.,*247 AD2d 515; *Sybelle Carpet & Linoleum v East End, Collaborative,*167 AD2d 535; *Perma Pave Contr. Corp. v Paerdegat Boat & Racquet Club,*156 AD2d 550 [the owner’s mere consent to and acceptance of improvements to his property by the subcontractor, without more, does not render him liable to the subcontractor]; *Contelmo’s Sand & Gravel v J & J Milano,*96 AD2d 1090). Under the circumstances, the respondents were unjustly enriched by retaining moneys which were disbursed from the escrow fund, and the Supreme Court improperly granted judgment in their favor.

It was undisputed at trial that the principal sum retained by *561the respondents was $15,800.67. Accordingly, the matter is remitted to the Supreme Court for entry of an amended judgment in favor of the plaintiff and against the respondents, reflecting the appropriate damages. Ritter, J. P., S. Miller, Luciano and Smith, JJ., concur.