# FILED

April 21, 1997 Cecil Crowson, Jr. Appellate C ourt Clerk IN THE COURT OF CRIMI NAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE

AT KNOXVILLE JANUARY 1997 SESSION

BILLY GROOMS, ) ) Appellant, ) No. 03C01-9603-CC-00136

) ) Cocke County v. ) ) Honorable W illiam R. Holt, Jr., Judge ) STATE OF TENNESSEE, ) (Post-Conviction) ) Appellee. )
For the Appellant : For the Appellee : Billy Grooms, Pro Se John Knox Walkup # 101022 Attorney General of Tennessee S.T.S.R.C.F. and Route 4, Box 600 Eugene Honea Pikeville, TN 37367-9243 Assistant Attorney Gener al of Tennessee 450 James Robertson Parkwa y Nashville, TN 37243-0493 Alfred C. Schmutzer, Jr. District Attorney General 301 Sevier County Courthouse Sevierville, TN 3

7862 and James B. Dunn Assistant District A

ttorney General 339A East Main Street Newport, TN 37821

OPINION FILED:____________________

AFFIRMED Joseph M. Tipton Judge2 O P I N I O N

The petitioner, Billy G rooms, appeals as of right from t he Cocke County Circuit Court’s denial of his third petition for post-conviction relief which he filed in September 1994. He is presentl y in the custody of the De partment of Correction serving concurrent

life sentences resulting from his 1986 convictions o n two counts of first degree murder. The conv ictions and sentences wer e affirmed on appeal. State v. Billy Gr ooms , No. 107, Cocke County ( Tenn. Crim. App. Mar. 26, 1986) , app. denied (June 30, 1986). The petitioner contends (1) that his petiti on is not barred by the threeyear statute of limitations then existing for post- conviction claims and ( 2) that he may still raise constitutional violations that were previously unknown to him at the time of his earlier post-convic

tion litigation. We disagree.

In substance, the present petiti on contends (1) that his ri ght to confrontation was viol ated when hearsay statements of a nontestifying codefendant were admitted at trial, (2) that due process was violated by the admission of his statements by the codefendant aft er they unsuccessfully sought a severance because of incompatible defenses, (3) that his trial, appe llate and post-conviction counsel were ineffective by failing to preserve and present v arious issues, and (4) t hat his removal from safety valve early parole eligibility violated due process and constituted ex post facto enhancement of punishment. His asser ted reason for not raising the trial issues before is his ignorance and reliance upon attorneys w ho were ineffective. The tri al court ruled that the petitio n seeking relief from his 1986 convictions was ti me barred and that it had no jurisdict ion over the petitioner’ s parole complaints.

At the times in issue, there was a three-year s tatute of limitations for the filing of post-convicti on actions. See T.C.A. § 40-30-102 (repealed 19 95). The3

exceptions were quite limited, essentially dealing with there being no reasonable opportunity existin g during the limitati ons period to file a claim on th e ground raised. See , e.g. , Burford v. State , 845 S.W.2d 204 (Tenn. 1994); Watkins v. State , 903 S.W.2d 302 (Tenn. 1995) (petitioner insane duri ng limitations period) ; Wooden v. State , 898 S.W.2d 752 (Te nn. Crim. App. 1994) (delayed disclosure of exculpatory evidence withheld by state). However, a petiti oner’s mere claim of ignora nce of the facts or issues does not toll the statute of limitations even if that ignoran ce stems from reliance upon counsel’s advice r elative to post-conv

iction claims. See State v. Phillips , 904 S.W.2d 123 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1995). In any ev ent, a claim of ineffective assis tance of prior post-convicti on counsel presents no excu se for not raising exi sting constitutional claims. See House v. State , 911 S.W.2d 705, 71 2 (Tenn. 1995). Thus, when viewed in the context of having thr ee previous review

s of his convictions, tw

o being by means of post-conviction actio ns, the petitioner’s clai ms of ignorance and reliance up on ineffective counsel are for naug ht relative to tolli ng the statute of limitations. The
statute of limita tions app lies so as t o bar the p ost-convi ction pet ition in t his case re lative to the murder convictions.

As for the petitioner’s claim that he was wrongfully stripped of his early parole eligibility

under the safety valv

e statute, the trial court was correct in concl uding that it was without jurisdiction to determine the claim. Issues inv

olving Department of Correction prisoner release computations are not cognizable in a post-conviction case and must be pursued under the Adminis trative Procedure Act. See Slagle v. Reynol ds , 845 S.W.2d 167 (Tenn. 1992). Moreover, w e note that the early rele ase eligibility issue raised by the petitioner has been rejected relativ e to another prisoner. See Kaylor v. Bradley , 912 S.W.2d 728 (Te nn. Ct. App. 1995). In any event, it is not a justiciable issue in this case.4 In consideration of the foregoing and the record as a whole , the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

____________________________ Joseph M. Tipto n, Judge CONCUR:

__________________________ Gary R. Wad e, Judge

__________________________ William M. Barker, Judge