1 Th is Co urt, w ith t he concurrence of all judges parti cipating i n the case, may af firm, rever se or modify the actions of the trial court by memorandum opinion wh en a forma l opinion wo uld have no preced ential value. W hen a case is deci ded by Memorandum opinion it shall be designa ted "M EM ORA ND UM OPIN ION ", shall not be published, and shall not be ci ted or rel ied on for any rea son in a ny unr elat ed case. 

### IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF TENNESSEE

AT JACKSON April 24, 2003 Session

MARY NELL JONES SACCOMANNO v. MELVIN FRANK

SACCOMANNO
A Direct Appeal from the Gener al Sessions Court for Hardin County No. 5196 The Honorable Daniel L. Smith, Judge

No. W2002-01267-COA-R3-CV - Filed May 28, 2003

This is an appeal from a Final Order, granting the parties a divorce and dividing the marital property. Wife

appealsand asse

rts that the division

of marita l proper ty isinequita

ble. We af

firm.

Tenn. R. App. P. 3; Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the General Sessions Court Affirmed

W. F RANK C RAWFORD , P.J., W.S., delivered the opinion of the court, in which A LAN E. H IGHERS ,J. and H OLLY K IRB Y L ILLARD , J., joined.
Chadwick G. Hunt, Savannah, For Appellant, Mary Nell Jones Saccomanno
Mary Jo Middlebro oks and B etty Staffor d Scott, Jackson, For Appellee, Melvin Frank Saccomanno

MEMORAN

DUM OP

INION 1
Mary Ne ll Jones Saccomanno (“Ms. Saccomanno,” “Wife,” “Plaintiff,” or “Appe llant”) and Melvin Frank Saccomanno (“Mr. Sacc omanno,” “Husband,” “Defendant,”or “Appellee”) were married on December 2, 2000. Prior to their marriage, the parties had lived tog ether on and off since 1993. Seven months after their marriag e, on July 30, 2001, Ms. Saccomanno filed a Complaint f

or Divorc e, alleg

ing gr ounds of in appropr

iate mar ital cond uct and ir reconc ilable differe nces. The Complain

t for Divo rce specified th

e following as ma

rital pro perty subject to division by the court: home and rea l property loca

ted at 255 Yeager L

ane, Counce, Tennessee,2 M r. Sac com anno ’s Cou ntercla im also all eged grou nds o f inapp rop riate ma rital con duc t and irre con cilable

differen ces. T he C ounte rclaim includ ed a r equ est that the J udge make a just an d eq uitable pro perty se ttlemen t.

3 Exh ibit 3 list s property in Plaint iff ’s possessi on as follows: r adar detector, steam carpet cleaner, set of f our tires (which were awa rded to P laintiff), and two ce llular phones.
-2- 12,500 shares of stock, 2000 Toy ota Celica, 1994 Nissan 4x4 pick-up truck, 1993 Nissan Sentra, three (3) desktop computers, three (3) laptop computers, three (3) computer desks, as well as the normal accumulation of household furniture, appliances, and other items of marital property. O n Septembe r 1, 2001, Mr. Sacc omanno filed an An swer and Counter claim, 2 wherein he made the following admissionsand alle gations :
...[T]he 12,500 shares of stock do not exist. There are on ly 2 ,500 shares of stock. Also, the home located at 255 Yeager

Lane, Counce, Ten nes see was owned by the Defendant prior to the marriage ; the 1993 Nissan Sentra is owned solely by the Plaintiff; and there was

on lyone (1 ) laptop computer purchased during the mar riage. The other lap top computers and computer desks were owned by the Defendant prior to the marriage

. The matter was heard on January 24, 2002. Following the hearing, the trial cour t made the following relevant statements from the bench:

I’m making a finding

that the p arties ha

ve the fo llowing marital a ssets andvalues: T

here’sa 2000 Toy

ota Celic a valued

at $13,65 0. These include the tires ; in additio n, there ’s a 1994 Nissan valued at $1,615; there’s a note paya

ble from a Greg Jon e s of $2,000; there’s an Ameritrade account valued at $176.85; there’s a whirlpool tub $500; washing machine of 90; security cameras with monitors at 75; DVD player 75; plus there

is another computer that was purchased during the marriage that’s valued at $400. Basica lly I’m going

to divide the propert

y in this way...taking into consideration all the factors in Tennessee Code Annotated 36-4- 121, Section C.... [T]he plaintiff in this case will be awarded the car of $13,650, plus that would

include the tires that were–that are on the car that are enumerated on Exhibit 3. Mr. Saccoma

nno wil l r eceive the remaining assets that we have here. He will also–as far as the assets on Exhibit 3, there will be a–I’m notawarding any

monetar y a mount. I will authorize any type of execution

or gar nishment to obtain those ite ms. I’ m going

to declarethey are

s ep arate assets, and he can take wha tever steps
necessar yto collect those items; that she would owe him if he’s unable to get those item s, except f

or the tir es. 3 The tires go with the

car.-3- * * *

I understa nd in making my

ruling g oing thr

ough the factors t hat the division of marital assets is probably une qual in value, but yet I ’ve taken into consideration all the other factors in there and feel like that is an eq ui ta bl e d iv is io n o f t he pr op er ty.
The court issued its Final Order on April 29, 2002, which reads, in per tinent part, as follows:

IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND

DECREED by

the Court t

hat:

1. The parties are hereby

awarded a divorce

from the other on the grounds of inappropriate marital conduct, and a re hereby r

estored to all the r

ights and privileges of unma rried pe rsons.

2. Plaintiff is awarded the 2000 Toy ota Celica and set of four tires, and shall

pay any indebted ness on the aforementioned items and hold Defendant harmless therefor.

3. Defen da nt is awar

ded the 19 94 Nissan

pickup, n ote payabl e from Greg Jones, Ameritrade Account, whirlpool tub, computer, washing machine, securi ty cameras and monitors, DVD player and disks, radar d

etector , steam c arpet cl eaner, and two cellular phones, and shall

pay any indebted ness on the

aforem entioned items and hold Plaintiff harmless therefor for which execution may issue.
Ms. Saccomanno appeals from this Final Order and ra ises one issue for our review, as stated in her brief: “Whether the trial court erred and abused its discretion in making its division of marital property

by awar ding almost the entire marital estate to the Appellee husband.”
Although there is a presumption that marital property is owned equally, ther

e is no presumption that marital property should be divided equally. Bookout v. Bookout , 954 S.W.2d 730, 731 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1997). Thus, an equitable division of marital property need not be an equal division of the property

. Id. A trial court is afforded wide discretion when dividing the marital property, a

nd its distribution will be given “great weight” on a ppeal. Ford v. Ford

, 952 S.W.2d 824, 8 25 (Tenn . Ct. App. 1 997). Gui delines f or the eq uitable d ivision of marital pr

operty are set forth in T .C.A. § 36- 4-121(c )(Supp. 2 001). Tha t statute p rovides, in relev ant part :
(c) In maki ng equi ta ble division of marit al prope rty , the cour

t shall consi der all releva nt fact ors in cludi ng:-4- (1) The duration of the marriage ; (2) The age, phy sical and mental health, vocational ski lls , em pl oya bi li ty, earn ing capacity , estate, financial liabilities and financi al needsor each

of the pa rties; (3) The tang

ible or int

a ngib le contribution by one (1) pa rty to the ed uc at io n, tr ai ni ng or in cr ea se d e ar ni ng po we r o f t he ot he r p ar ty; (4) The relative ability of each pa rty for future

acquisitions of capital assets and income; (5) The contribution of each party to the acquisition, preserv ati on, appreciation, depreciation or di ssi pation of the marit

al or sep arate pr op er ty, including the contribution o f a par ty to the marriag e as homemaker, wage earner o r parent, with the c ontribution of a par ty
as homemaker or wage ea rner to be given the same weig ht if each party has fulf

illed its role; (6 ) T he va lu e o f t he se pa ra te pr op er ty o f e ac h p ar ty; (7) The estate of each party at the time of marriage; (8) The economic circumstances of each party at the time

the division of property is to bec ome effective; (9) The tax con sequenc es to eac h party , costs associated with the

reasona bly foreseeable sale of the asset, and oth er rea sonably forese eable e

xpenses as sociate d with the a sset; (10) The amount

of socia l securit y be nefits av ailable t

o each spouse; and (11) Such othe

r facto rs as ar e neces sary

to consider the equities betwee n the par ties.

We note tha

t the Appe

llant doe s not disput

e the tria l court’sfinding

of what a ssets constituted marital and separate property , but only disputes the equity of the division of the marital property. F

rom our review of the entire record in this ca se, we find that the evidence does not preponderate against the trial cour t’s findings nor does the evidence indicate that the trial court abused its discretion in making a division of the marital property . In fact, the evidence indicates that Ms. Saccomanno came into the marr iage with a 1993 Nissan Sentra and her clothes. She leaves this brief marriag e with a 2000 Toyota Celica , replete with a set of new tires. The total valuation of the marital property in this case is approximately $18,881.85. The Toyota Celica a

nd tires amount to $13,950, or 74%, of that total. Although Mr. Saccomanno received a larger

number of items in the division, he only rece ived 26% of the total valuation of marital property. Conseque ntly, we find that Ms. Saccomanno ha s received a very just settlement in this matter.
Accordingly , the trial court's final order is affirmed. A ppellee has moved this Court for a finding that this appeal is frivolous and for damage s pursuant to T.C.A. § 27-1-122 (2000). Based on the record of this case, we agree that the appeal had no r easonable chance of succe ss. Issues of fact we

re involved, and there was clearly a preponderance of evidenc e in favor of the-5-

trial judge’s findings. Therefore , we hold that the appeal is frivolous, and the case is remanded to the trial court for determination of damages pur suant to T.C.A. § 27-1-122 (2000). Costs of th e a pp ea l a re as se ss ed to th e A pp el la nt , M ar y Ne ll Jo ne s S ac co ma nn o, an d h er su re ty.

__________________________________________ W. FRANK CR

AWFORD, PRE SIDI

NG JUDGE, W. S.