alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
Bundesministerium 

fi.ir Verkehr und 

digitale lnfrastruktur 

Bundesministerium fUr Verkehr und digitale lnfrastruktur • Postfach 20 01 00, 53170 Bonn 

Mr. Paul Gretch 

Director Office of International Aviation 

U.S. Department of Transportation 

1200 New Jersey Avenue, S.E. 

Washington D.C. 20590 

U.S.A. 

Email: Paul.Gretch@dot.gov 

Subject: Statement of Reciprocity 

Charter flights by K5-A viation GmbH 

Our ref.: LF12/61869.8/1 and 61867.3/1 

Date: Bonn, 24 October 201 4 

Page 1 of 1 

The German air carrier ,K5-Aviation GmbH", Katharinazell 5, 

85408 Gammelsdorf, has informed the Federal Ministry of Transport 

and Digital Infrastructure, that it intends to conduct international nonscheduled (charter) flights to/from the United States of America with 

the following aircrafts: 

• Airbus ACJ319 Corporate Jet, registration mark OE-LGS, 

• Airbus ACJ319 Corporate Jet, registration mark D-ALXX, 

• Bombardier Global XRS BD700, registration mark D-ARKO, 

• Bombardier Global Express BD700, registration mark D-AEGV 

and 

• Bombardier Global Express BD700, registration mark OE-IGS. 

In case of similar requests by U.S. air carriers to/from the Federal Republic of Germany, the Federal Ministry of Transport and Digital Infrastructure herewith confirms that it will consider and approve, on the 

basis of reciprocity, the same number of seventh freedom passenger 

non-scheduled (charter) operations by such U.S. carriers, which are 

not covered by the EU-US Air Transport Agreement of 25/30 April 

2007, as amended by Protocol of 24 June 2010. This statement is valid 

until 23 April 2015. 

Sincerely yours 

For the Federal Ministry of Transport and Digital Infrastructure ~ I 1/C"-r 

enjamin Albert 

Assistant Head of Division International Air Transport 

HAUSANSCHRIFT 

Robert-Schuman-Piatz 1 

53175 Bonn 

POSTANSCHRIFT 

Postfach 20 01 00 

53170 Bonn 

TEL +49 (0)228 99-300-4533 

FAX +49 (0)228 99-300-1499 

Ref-LF12@bmvi.bund.de 

www.bmvi.de 

Zertiflkat selt 2009 

audit berufundfamilie
John M. GRIFFIN, Appellant, v. STATE of Missouri, Respondent.

WD 80461

Missouri Court of Appeals, Western District.

Filed: July 10, 2018

Natalie H. Hoge, Kansas City, for appellant.

Richard A. Starnes, Jefferson City, for respondent.

Before Division Two: Karen King Mitchell, C.J., and Alok Ahuja and Edward R. Ardini, JJ.

**ORDER**

PER CURIAM:

*585Appellant John Griffin was found guilty of driving while intoxicated and driving while revoked following a jury trial in the Circuit Court of Jackson County. After we affirmed his convictions on direct appeal, *State v. Griffin* , 464 S.W.3d 576 (Mo. App. W.D. 2015) (*mem.* ), Griffin filed a motion for post-conviction relief under Supreme Court Rule 29.15. The circuit court denied relief following an evidentiary hearing. Griffin appeals, arguing that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to certain statements made by the prosecution during closing argument. We affirm. Because a published opinion would have no precedential value, we have provided the parties an unpublished memorandum setting forth the reasons for this order. Rule 84.16(b).
Court of Appeals of the State of Georgia Clerk's Office, Atlanta, July 31, 2018. I certify that the above is a true extract from the minutes of the Court of Appeals of Georgia. Witness my signature and the seal of said court hereto affixed the day and year last above written. , Clerk. 

# Court of Appeals of the State of Georgia
ATLANTA, July 31, 2018 The Court of Appeals hereby passes the following order A18A2067. WILLIAM EARL SMITH III v. THE STATE.
Upon consideration of the APPELLANT'S motion FOR PERMISSION TO WITHDRAW THE APPEAL in the above styled case, it is ordered that the motion is hereby GRANTED.
<page>                                              EXHIBIT 31.02
CERTIFICATIONS

I, Kevin Perry, Chief Financial Officer of Demeter Management
Corporation ("Demeter"), the general partner of the registrant,
certify that:

1.	I have reviewed this quarterly report on Form 10-Q of the
registrant;

2.	Based on my knowledge, this report does not contain any
untrue statement of a material fact or omit to state a
material fact necessary to make the statements made, in
light of the circumstances under which such statements were
made, not misleading with respect to the period covered by
this report;

3.	Based on my knowledge, the financial statements, and other
financial information included in this report, fairly
present in all material respects the financial condition,
results of operations and cash flows of the registrant as
of, and for, the periods presented in this report;

4.	The registrant's other certifying officer and I are
responsible for establishing and maintaining disclosure
controls and procedures (as defined in Exchange Act Rules
13a-15(e) and 15d-15(e)) for the registrant and have:

a)	Designed such disclosure controls and procedures, or
caused such disclosure controls and procedures to be
designed under our supervision, to ensure that material
information relating to the registrant, including its
consolidated subsidiaries, is made known to us by others
within those entities, particularly during the period in
which this report is being prepared;

b)	Evaluated the effectiveness of the registrant's disclosure
controls and procedures and presented in this report our
conclusions about the effectiveness of the disclosure
controls and procedures, as of the end of the period
covered by this report based on such evaluation; and

c)	Disclosed in this report any change in the registrant's
internal control over financial reporting that occurred
during the registrant's most recent fiscal quarter (the
registrant's fourth fiscal quarter in the case of an
annual report) that has materially affected, or is
reasonably likely to materially affect, the registrant's
internal control over financial reporting; and



<page>
5.	The registrant's other certifying officer and I have
disclosed, based on our most recent evaluation of internal
control over financial reporting, to the registrant's
auditors and the audit committee of Demeter's board of
directors (or persons performing the equivalent functions):

a)	All significant deficiencies and material weaknesses in
the design or operation of internal control over financial
reporting which are reasonably likely to adversely affect
the registrant's ability to record, process, summarize and
report financial information; and

b)	Any fraud, whether or not material, that involves
management or other employees who have a significant role
in the registrant's internal control over financial
reporting.




Date:  August 16, 2004        /s/Kevin Perry
                                 Kevin Perry
                                 Chief Financial Officer,
                                 Demeter Management Corporation,
**Exhibit 32.1**

**CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO**

**18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350, AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO**

**SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002**

The undersigned, Barry Lamperd, President and a director of Lamperd Less Lethal Inc. (Principal Executive Officer), hereby certifies, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:

(1)  the quarterly report on Form 10-QSB/A of Lamperd Less Lethal Inc. for the interim period ended September 30, 2006 (the “Report”) fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

(2)  the information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of Lamperd Less Lethal Inc.

Dated:  December 12, 2006

 

/s/ Barry Lamperd                        

Barry Lamperd

President and Director

(Principal Executive Officer)

A signed original of this written statement required by Section 906, or other document authenticating, acknowledging, or otherwise adopting the signature that appears in typed form within the electronic version of this written statement required by Section 906, has been provided to Lamperd Less Lethal Inc. and will be retained by Lamperd Less Lethal Inc. and furnished to the Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff upon request.
```

[Federal Register Volume 74, Number 52 (Thursday, March 19, 2009)]
[Notices]
[Page 11763]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: E9-5905]

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

DEPARTMENT OF LABOR

Employment and Training Administration

[TA-W-65,029]

Comau Automation; Novi, MI; Notice of Termination of 
Investigation

    Pursuant to Section 221 of the Trade Act of 1974, as amended, an 
investigation was initiated on January 29, 2009 in response to a 
petition filed by the Wiseman Automation Employees Association on 
behalf of workers of Comau Automation.
    The petitioner has requested that the petition be withdrawn. 
Consequently, the investigation has been terminated.

    Signed at Washington, DC, this 10th day of March 2009.
Linda G. Poole,
Certifying Officer, Division of Trade Adjustment Assistance.
 [FR Doc. E9-5905 Filed 3-18-09; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4510-FN-P
```
#### Rochelle Shaw et al., Appellants, v Board of Education of the City of New York et al., Respondents.

[772 NYS2d 573]

In an action to recover damages for personal injuries, etc., the plaintiffs appeal from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Kings County (R. Rivera, J.), dated September 3, 2002, which, upon a jury verdict, and upon the denial of their motion pursuant to CPLR 4404 (a) to set aside the verdict as against the weight of the evidence, and for a new trial, is in the favor of the defendants and against them.

Ordered that the judgment is reversed, on the law and the facts, the motion is granted, and the matter is remitted to the Supreme Court, Kings County, for a new trial, with costs to abide the event.

A jury verdict is entitled to great deference and should be set aside as against the weight of the evidence only when it could not have been reached on any fair interpretation of the evidence *(see Bendersky v M & O Enters. Corp.,*299 AD2d 434, 435 [2002]). Proof of a defendant’s negligence does not compel a finding that such negligence was a proximate cause of the accident. However, where a jury verdict with respect to negligence and proximate cause is irreconcilably inconsistent, that verdict must be set aside as against the weight of the evidence. Under the circumstances of this case, the verdict with respect to proximate cause, that the defendant Board of Education of the City of New York was negligent, but that the negligence was not a substantial factor in causing the accident, was inconsistent and unsupported by a fair interpretation of the evidence *(see Dellamonica v Carvel Corp.,*1 AD3d 311 [2003]; *Bustamante v Westinghouse El. Co.,*195 AD2d 318 [1993]). Therefore, the plaintiffs’ motion pursuant to CPLR 4404 (a) to set aside the verdict should have been granted, and we remit the matter to the Supreme Court, Kings County, for a new trial. Prudenti, P.J., Altman, Luciano and Adams, JJ., concur.
Exhibit 32.1




       CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,
              AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO SECTION 906 OF
                THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002


In connection with the Quarterly Report of Oxford Technologies, Inc. (the
"Company") on Form 10-QSB for the period ending March 31, 2005, as filed
with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the
"Report"), I, Jasinta Sit, President of the Company, certify, pursuant to
18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-
Oxley Act of 2002, that:

     (1)  The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a)
or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

     (2)  The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all
material respects, the financial condition and result of operations of the
Company.



/s/ Jacinta Sit
--------------------------------
Jasinta Sit, President
(principal executive officer and
principal accounting officer


May 12, 2005
I 

109TH CONGRESS 

2D SESSION H. R. 5310 

To amend the National Labor Relations Act to establish deadlines for the 

National Labor Relations Board to render decisions, and for other purposes. 

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

MAY 4, 2006 

Mr. SHAYS (for himself, Mr. LOBIONDO, Mr. SIMMONS, Mr. GERLACH, Mr. 

ENGLISH of Pennsylvania, Mr. LAHOOD, Mr. MCHUGH, Mr. WALSH, Mr. 

WELDON of Pennsylvania, Mr. BOEHLERT, Mr. SCHWARZ of Michigan, 

Mr. MURPHY, and Mr. MCCOTTER) introduced the following bill; which 

was referred to the Committee on Education and the Workforce 

A BILL 

To amend the National Labor Relations Act to establish 

deadlines for the National Labor Relations Board to 

render decisions, and for other purposes. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 

3 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. 

4 This Act may be cited as the ‘‘National Labor Rela5 tions Board Reform Act’’. 

6 SEC. 2. FINDINGS. 

7 Congress finds that— 


cchase on PROD1PC60 with BILLS
2 

•HR 5310 IH

1 (1) in 2005 the median time from a pre-election 

2 regional hearing to a decision by the National Labor 

3 Relations Board was 13.3 months; and 

4 (2) in election cases, the length of time for 

5 cases pending a Board decision was 18.9 months. 

6 SEC. 3. TIMETABLE FOR NLRB DECISIONS. 

7 (a) ISSUES OF REPRESENTATION AND ELECTIONS.— 

8 Section 9(c)(1) of the National Labor Relations Act (29 

9 U.S.C. 159(c)(1)) is amended by striking the last sentence 

10 and inserting the following: ‘‘If the Board finds upon the 

11 record of such hearing that such a question of representa12 tion exists, it shall, not later than 6 months after a peti13 tion is filed, direct an election by secret ballot and shall 

14 certify election results not later than 12 months after a 

15 petition is filed, unless both the employer and the em16 ployee, group of employees, or labor organization acting 

17 on their behalf, shall mutually agree to waive such a dead18 line.’’. 

19 (b) UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES.—Section 10(c) of 

20 the National Labor Relations Act (29 U.S.C. 160(c)) is 

21 amended by inserting after ‘‘Provided,’’ the following: 

22 ‘‘That any such order shall be issued by the Board not 

23 later than 6 months after the date on which the initial 

24 complaint was served pursuant to subsection (b), unless, 

25 in the opinion of the Board the evidence or testimony 


cchase on PROD1PC60 with BILLS
3 

•HR 5310 IH

1 raises a novel question of law, in which case the Board 

2 shall have an additional 6 months in which to issue an 

3 order, or unless the complainant and the person so com4 plained of shall mutually agree to waive such a deadline: 

5 And provided further,’’. 

6 SEC. 4. TERMS OF BOARD MEMBERS. 

7 Section 3(a) of the National Labor Relations Act (29 

8 U.S.C. 153(a)) is amended by inserting after the third 

9 sentence the following: ‘‘Any member may continue to 

10 serve on the Board after the expiration of the term of such 

11 member until a successor has been appointed.’’. 

Æ 


cchase on PROD1PC60 with BILLS
David HAIGHT, et ux., Respondents, v. DRIVETIME CAR SALES COMPANY, LLC d/b/a DriveTime, Appellant.

WD 81164

Missouri Court of Appeals, Western District.

ORDER FILED: May 29, 2018 Motion for Transfer to Supreme Court Denied July 3, 2018 Application for Transfer Denied September 25, 2018

Bryce B. Bell and Mark W. Schmitz, Kansas City, MO, Attorneys for Respondents.

Brian A. Jackson, Michael J. Cappo, and Molly S. Carella, Kansas City, MO, Attorneys for Appellant.

Before Division IV: Mark D. Pfeiffer, Chief Judge, and Gary D. Witt and Anthony Rex Gabbert, Judges

**Order**

Per Curiam:

*479DriveTime Car Sales Company, LLC appeals from the ruling of the Circuit Court of Jackson County, Missouri, denying its motion to compel David and Gifty Haight to arbitrate their claims against DriveTime for malicious prosecution, abuse of process, and violation of the Missouri Merchandising Practices Act. Because a published opinion would have no precedential value, a memorandum of law has been provided to the parties. The Circuit Court's ruling is affirmed. Rule 84.16(b).
Court of Appeals of the State of Georgia Clerk's Office, Atlanta, January 05, 2017. I certify that the above is a true extract from the minutes of the Court of Appeals of Georgia. Witness my signature and the seal of said court hereto affixed the day and year last above written. , Clerk. 

# Court of Appeals of the State of Georgia
ATLANTA, January 05, 2017 The Court of Appeals hereby passes the following order A17D0209. IN THE INTEREST OF: A. E. W. A CHILD (MOTHER).
Upon consideration of the Application for Discretionary Appeal, it is ordered that it be hereby GRANTED. The Appellant may file a Notice of Appeal within 10 days of the date of this order. The Clerk of Juvenile Court is directed to include a copy of this order in the record transmitted to the Court of Appeals.
LC NUMBERS: 05116J
## COURT OF APPEALS

SECOND DISTRICT OF TEXAS

FORT WORTH

NO. 02-15-00416-CR

Joshua Golliday

v.

The State of Texas §

§

§

§

§

§ From the 371st District Court

of Tarrant Coun ty (1379815D)

July 27, 2017

Opinion by Justice Dauphinot

Dissent by Chief Justice Livingston

(p)



### JUDGMENT ON THE STATE’S MOTION FOR EN BANC

RECONSIDERATION

We withdraw our October 13, 2016 op inion and judgment and substitute

the following. This court ha s again considered the record on appeal in this case

and holds that there was error in the trial court’s judgmen t. It is ordered that the

judgment of the trial court is reversed and this case is remanded to the trial court

for retrial.

SECOND DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

By _/s/ Lee Ann Daup hinot______

________ Justice Lee Ann Dauphinot
Olympia Address : PO Box 40442 Olympia , WA 98504-0442 

## Washington State Senate Senator Doug Ericksen 42nd L egis lative District (360) 786-7682 FAX: (360) 786- 1 3 23 E-mail : Do u g.Ericksen @ leg.wa.gov December 19, 2014 

### RECEIVEO O N

: 

# f

Dennis McLerran , Regional Administrator U.S. EPA Region 10 1200 Sixth Avenue, Suite 900 Seattle, WA 981 01 Dear Regional Administrator McLerran, I am writing in response to your recent announcement that EPA Region 1 0 will undertake rulemaking to adopt human health criteria for Washington's water quality standards. You have proposed a highly unusual situation ofparallel rulemaking , where both state and federal agencies will propose potentially competing standards for the same policy. I believe that your chosen course of action will add unnecessa ry confusion to the policymaking process , and that it will severely detract from any state efforts to develop a rule that fits Washington's particular needs. Moreover, this is the third time in recent months that I have written to you expressing my concern that EPA is disregarding important flexibility that should be provided as a foundation for the process of developing state water quality standards. Because you intend to push forward with setting rule s for Washington, I would like to know the answers to the following questions.

() R ecyc led (1) Is EPA currently developing water quality rules for other states in Region 1 0 ? If so, what rules are being developed, and for which states? (2) Is EPA currently developing water quality rules for states in other EPA Regions? If so, what rules are being developed, and where do those rules apply? (3) In the last six years, has EPA proposed to take control of the water quality rule development proces s in other states? If so, in which states, and has EPA followed through on any such proposals ? (4) What, specifically, will EPA do to ensure ample public participation in its development of water quality standards for Washington, and how can the public participate in the process ? (5) Who , specifically, within EPA is authorized to make a final determination to adopt human health criteria for Washington's water quality standards?

### ' (

' \:if ,,- 

### ,.

s.-.- /' ', .. ,,/.Page two
(6) What is the particular basis for EPA's view that Washington's current water quality standards are deficient? I appreciate your prompt response to these questions. Sincerely,

# C10**-s: P~**  Senator Doug EriCS en, Chair Energy , Environment & Telecommunications Committee DE:slrI I
Record of Discussion 

Docket No. FAA- Directorate Identifier: -AD 

With whom outside the FAA has this AD action been discussed (i.e., Design Approval Holder, 

manufacturer, ATA, NBAA, RAA, AOPA, ALPA, GAMA, etc)? 

ORGANIZATION PERSON CONTACTED DATE TOPICS DISCUSSED 

Boeing_ Steve Chapman Various Fleet Status, Root Cause, 

Boeing Ron Tropple Various Service Bulletins 

Other/ Additional Information:
#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Roy Hicks, Appellant.

[719 NYS2d 244]

Judgment, Supreme Court, New York County (Joan Sudolnik, J., at hearing; Daniel FitzGerald, J., at jury trial and sentence), rendered April 27, 1999, convicting defendant of three counts of robbery in the first degree, two counts of criminal possession of a weapon in the second degree, and two counts of criminal possession of a weapon in the third degree, and sentencing him, as a persistent violent felony offender, to a term of 25 years to life consecutive to concurrent terms of 25 years to life, 25 years to life, 20 years to life, 20 years to life, 15 years to life and 15 years to life, unanimously affirmed.

Defendant’s suppression motion was properly denied. There is no basis upon which to disturb the court’s credibility determinations, which are supported by the record. The court properly found that, under the particular circumstances, the police did not “stop” or otherwise seize the cab in which defendant was a passenger when they ordered the driver of the already stopped cab to pull over to the curb *(see, People v Ocasio,*85 NY2d 982). The cab' driver had stopped his cab in the middle *333of a bridge, forcing other traffic to stop, and would not move his cab when an officer identified himself and waved at the driver to move on. At this point, the police were, at the very least, entitled to direct the cab to pull over in order to permit traffic to flow. In any event, even if this action constituted a seizure, it was based on reasonable suspicion of criminality. Prior to ordering the driver to pull over, the police approached the cab and observed the driver’s terrified demeanor, along with defendant’s furtive gesture, appearing to place an object on the floor. These facts, coupled with the driver’s unusual behavior in stopping and refusing to move his car, created reasonable suspicion that a robbery was in progress. All the ensuing police conduct was properly found to be lawful.

The verdict was not against the weight of the evidence. There is no basis upon which to disturb the jury’s determinations concerning identification.

We perceive no basis for reduction of sentence. Concur— Nardelli, J. P., Williams, Tom, Wallach and Friedman, JJ.