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STATE OF MICHIGAN 

COURT OF APPEALS 

CYNTHIA JONES, 

 Plaintiff-Appellant, 

UNPUBLISHED 

May 10, 2016 

v No. 327304 

Calhoun Circuit Court 

MUSASHI AUTO PARTS MICHIGAN, INC., LC No. 2014-000825-CZ 

 Defendant-Appellee. 

Before: HOEKSTRA, P.J., and O’CONNELL and MURRAY, JJ. 

PER CURIAM. 

 Plaintiff, Cynthia Jones, appeals as of right the trial court’s order granting summary 

disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(10) to defendant, Musashi Auto Parts (Musashi), on her claims 

of retaliatory employment discrimination. We affirm. 

I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND 

 Jones began employee training at Musashi in January 2008. As part of her training, she 

signed a document acknowledging that she had received the handbook of policies, which 

included the respectful workplace policy. Musashi’s respectful workplace policy prohibits 

verbal bullying, which includes “[a]busive or offense remarks towards another associate and/or 

their family; [and] spreading rumors or gossiping about another associate and/or their 

family . . . .” 

 Over the course of her employment, Jones took multiple leaves under the Family and 

Medical Leave Act (FMLA), 29 USC 2601, et seq, because of various health conditions. 

Musashi approved her requests for leave in March 2009, April 2009, and July 2009, May 2010, 

and September 2010. After Jones requested to return to work in April 2011, Musashi placed her 

in the environmental health and safety department to accommodate her light duty restrictions. 

 Jones stated that she told the human resources director, Malcolm Satterfield, that she had 

smelled liquor on her supervisor’s breath. According to Jones, she heard from colleagues that 

management was angry with her, and her employment was terminated shortly thereafter. Jones 

provided a recording of a conversation in which, during a discussion about how Jones was 

required to wear her hair, she stated to Satterfield that it was petty and unfair that hers were the 

only offenses being addressed and that she did not “run up here” when her supervisor asked her 

for Halls “to cover up that liquor on his breath.” 
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 Jones admitted that she received corrective actions in August 22, 2012, for 

insubordination and distracting other associates, and that she was issued a “Final Warning” in 

January 2012. Rhonda Robinson, Musashi’s human resources manager, testified that in 

December 2012, a coworker complained that Jones was spreading gossip by making negative 

remarks about another coworker’s decision to date a man of another race. Robinson investigated 

and discovered that several other employees stated that Jones engaged in gossip. Based on 

Jones’s previous disciplinary history and the investigation, Robinson decided that she did not 

need to speak with Jones about the allegations. She typed up her notes, shared them with 

Satterfield, and recommended that he terminate Jones’s employment relationship. Satterfield 

testified that he signed off on Jones’s termination. The termination letter indicates that Jones 

was terminated for “spreading gossip, speaking about your coworkers in a derogatory tone and 

becoming argumentative with your supervisor,” which was “a violation of our Respectful 

Workplace policy and cannot be tolerated.” 

 In March 2014, Jones filed her complaint in this action, alleging claims of retaliatory 

disability, FMLA, workers’ compensation discrimination, and claiming that her termination was 

a “public policy violation.” In December 2014, Musashi filed a motion for summary disposition 

under MCR 2.116(C)(10), contending that it had a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for 

terminating Jones’s employment and that Jones had not identified a clearly mandated public 

policy to support her claims. Jones responded that there was evidence that Musashi treated 

similarly situated employees differently and that her termination was temporally connected to the 

resolution of a workers’ compensation matter. After reviewing the evidence, the trial court 

granted summary disposition, determining that Jones had not provided evidence showing a 

genuine issue of material fact regarding whether Musashi’s stated reason for terminating her 

employment was a pretext for discrimination. 

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW 

 This Court reviews de novo the trial court’s decision on a motion for summary 

disposition. Gorman v American Honda Motor Co, Inc, 302 Mich App 113, 115; 839 NW2d 223 

(2013). A party is entitled to summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(10) if “there is no 

genuine issue as to any material fact, and the moving party is entitled to judgment . . . as a matter 

of law.” The trial court must consider all the documentary evidence in the light most favorable 

to the nonmoving party. MCR 2.116(G)(5). A genuine issue of material fact exists if, when 

viewing the record in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, reasonable minds could 

differ on the issue. Gorman, 302 Mich App at 116. 

III. RETALIATION AGAINST PUBLIC POLICY 

 Jones contends that the trial court erred by concluding that she had not provided the basis 

for a claim of retaliatory discharge against public policy. We disagree. 

 Even an at-will employee may not have his or her employment terminated for a reason 

that is against public policy. Suchodolski v Mich Consol Gas Co, 412 Mich 692, 695; 316 NW2d 

710 (1982). “Most often these proscriptions are found in explicit legislative statements 

prohibiting the discharge, discipline, or other adverse treatment of employees who act in 

according with a statutory right or duty.” Id. The Michigan Occupational Safety and Health Act 
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(MIOSHA) requires an employer to “[f]urnish each employee, employment and a place of 

employment that is free from recognized hazards that are causing, or are likely to cause, death or 

serious physical harm to the employee.” MCL 408.1011. MIOSHA prohibits an employer from 

discharging an employee “because the employee filed a complaint or instituted or caused to be 

instituted a proceeding under or regulated by this act . . . .” MCL 408.1065. 

 Other than conclusory assertions that a supervisor having alcohol on his breath “clearly” 

creates a health and safety risk, Jones failed to identify any particular provision of MIOSHA that 

prohibits any consumption of alcohol. While such provisions are commonly against an 

employer’s internal politics, “[t]he code of ethics of a private association does not establish 

public policy.” Suchodolski, 412 Mich at 696. Jones has also failed to support how her brief 

verbal report, made in the middle of an argument about unrelated matters, constituted filing a 

complaint. Because Jones failed to support her claim that her discharge was against public 

policy, we conclude that the trial court properly granted summary disposition. 

IV. PRETEXT FOR DISCRIMINATION 

 Next, Jones contends that the trial court erred by granting summary disposition on her 

various retaliatory discharge claims because she established a genuine question of material fact 

regarding whether Musashi’s stated reason for terminating her employment was pretextual. 

Again, we disagree. 

 MCL 37.1102 provides that “[t]he opportunity to obtain employment . . . without 

discrimination because of a disability is . . . a civil right.” To prevail on a discrimination claim, 

the plaintiff must show that he or she (1) is disabled, (2) the disability is unrelated to his or her 

ability to perform job duties, and (3) he or she has been impermissibly discriminated against. 

Peden v Detroit, 470 Mich 195, 204; 680 NW2d 857 (2004). The Worker’s Disability 

Compensation Act, MCL 418.801 et seq, and the FMLA also provide that an employer shall not 

discharge an employee for exercising their rights under those acts. MCL 418.301(13); 29 USC 

2615(b). 

 Indirect evidence of employment discrimination exists if: (1) the plaintiff has shown a 

prima facie case of employment discrimination, and (2) the employer cannot articulate a 

legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its employment decision, or (3) the employer has 

articulated such a reason, but the plaintiff has shown that the employer’s reason is merely a 

pretext. Lytle v Malady (On Rehearing), 458 Mich 153, 172-174; 579 NW2d 906 (1998). Once 

the employee has established a prima facie case, the employer has the burden to articulate 

legitimate reasons for terminating the employee’s employment. Id. If the employer does so, the 

employee must demonstrate that the employer’s reason was merely a pretext for unlawful 

discrimination. Id. at 174. A party proves that the employer’s reason for termination is 

pretextual “(1) by showing that the reason(s) had no basis in fact, (2) by showing that they were 

not actual factors motivating the decision, or (3) if the reason(s) were motivating facts, by 
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showing that they were jointly insufficient to justify the decision.” Meagher v Wayne State 

Univ, 222 Mich App 700, 712; 565 NW2d 401 (1997).1

 

 In this case, Musashi stated a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for terminating 

Jones’s employment—that Jones violated Musashi’s respectful workplace policy by spreading 

gossip after Musashi gave Jones a final warning about such behavior. Jones asserted that 

Musashi’s stated reason was pretextual because Musashi treated similarly situated employees 

differently and because the resolution of her workers’ compensation claim was temporally 

connected to her termination. 

 To create an inference of discrimination on the basis of disparate treatment, a plaintiff 

must show that all the relevant aspects of employment between the plaintiff and another 

employee were “nearly identical,” but the plaintiff was treated differently. Town v Mich Bell Tel 

Co, 455 Mich 688, 700; 568 NW2d 64 (1997). Jones alleged that Musashi treated two other 

employees more leniently because they both had received more discipline than Jones. However, 

the other employees’ offenses were not identical to Jones’s—both employees had multiple 

offenses for attendance and poor quality work, but neither had any offenses for violating the 

respectful workplace policy. Additionally, Robinson named several other specific employees 

that Musashi fired for violating the respectful workplace policy. One of them was fired on a first 

offense. We conclude that the trial court properly determined that Jones did not establish a 

question of fact regarding whether disparate treatment supported an inference of discrimination. 

 Additionally, temporal proximity between an action and retaliatory act may establish that 

the action had a discriminatory basis. Rymal v Baergen, 262 Mich App 274, 303; 686 NW2d 

241 (2004). However, “[s]omething more than a temporal connection between protected conduct 

and an adverse employment action is required to show causation where a discrimination-based 

retaliation is claimed.” West v Gen Motors Corp, 469 Mich 177, 186; 665 NW2d 468 (2003). A 

close temporal relationship may support a claim, but it may not be the sole basis of the claim. Id. 

at 186-187. 

 Contrary to Jones’s assertion, the trial court did not require temporal proximity evidence; 

it merely stated that “the law is clear that ‘temporal proximity’ alone seldom proves causation,” 

which is an accurate statement. The trial court went on to note that even considering temporal 

proximity, Jones did not provide evidence to support an inference. Like in West, Jones did not 

show any evidence that Musashi was upset by her repeated requests for leave, disability claims, 

or accommodation. See West, 469 Mich at 187 (stating that “plaintiff has not shown any reaction 

or conduct on the part of his supervisor that reasonably suggests that they were upset by the fact 

that plaintiff reported an assault to the police.”) To the contrary, Jones’s testimony and the 

documentary evidence both indicate that Musashi repeatedly accommodated Jones’s disability 

leaves, and Robinson testified that Musashi facilitated Jones’s workers’ compensation claims 

because it did not have a basis to contest them. Jones’s evidence of disparate treatment failed, 

 

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 This burden-shifting framework also applies to retaliation claims under the Worker’s Disability 

Compensation Act, see Cuddington v United Health Servs, Inc, 298 Mich App 264, 276-277; 826 

NW2d 519 (2013), and the FMLA, see Edgar v JAC Prods, Inc, 443 F3d 501, 508 (CA 6, 2006). 
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and Jones offered no further evidence of discrimination. Even presuming that the resolution of 

Jones’s workers’ compensation claim was temporally close to her termination, that evidence 

alone did not support Jones’s claim. 

 The trial court did not err in concluding that Jones did not produce evidence that 

Musashi’s decision was a pretext for unlawful discrimination. Jones produced no evidence that 

there was a lack of factual basis for the decision, that Musashi was not actually motivated by 

articulated reason, or that these reasons were insufficient to support terminating her employment. 

Though Jones argues that the investigation into her conduct relied heavily upon the word of 

others, this does not in any way call into question Musashi’s conclusion that there were 

complaints that Jones was gossiping about coworkers in the workplace. Although Jones argues 

that under Kocsis v Multi-Care Management Inc, 97 F3d 876, 883 (CA 6, 1996), pretext can be 

shown by evidence that the employer never before used the motivating reason for a prior 

termination, Kocsis says no such thing and Jones has provided no other law to support her 

theory. 

 We conclude that the trial court did not err by determining that Jones failed to show that 

similarly situated employees were treated differently or that Jones had failed to establish an 

inference of discrimination from temporal proximity. The trial court properly granted summary 

disposition because Jones had failed to show a genuine issue of material fact regarding whether 

Musashi’s reason was a pretext. 

 We affirm. 

/s/ Joel P. Hoekstra 

/s/ Peter D. O’Connell 

/s/ Christopher M. Murray