UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

Tenth Circuit

Byron White United States Courthouse

1823 Stout Street

Denver, Colorado 80294

(303) 844-3157

Patrick J. Fisher, Jr. Elisabeth A. Shumaker

Clerk Chief Deputy Clerk

December 2, 1999

TO: ALL RECIPIENTS OF THE OPINION

RE: No. 98-6276, Payne v. Claredon Nat’l Ins. Co. (In re: Sunset Sales, Inc.)

Filed on October 26, 1999

The court’s slip opinion contains a typographical error on page one. The

bankruptcy court case number is corrected to read: “Bankr. No. 92-16745-BH.”

A corrected copy of page one is attached.

Sincerely,

Patrick Fisher, Clerk of Court

By: Keith Nelson

Deputy Clerk

encl.
F I L E D

United States Court of Appeals

Tenth Circuit

OCT 26 1999

PATRICK FISHER

Clerk

PUBLISH

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

TENTH CIRCUIT

In re:

SUNSET SALES, INC., doing

business as K&R Coal Company,

doing business as Sans Bois Coal

Company,

Debtor.

DAVID PAYNE,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

CLARENDON NATIONAL

INSURANCE COMPANY; U.S.

CAPITAL INSURANCE, COMPANY;

VAN AMERICAN INSURANCE CO.,

INC.,

Defendants-Appellants.

No. 98-6276

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY APPELLATE PANEL

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT

(BAP No. WO-97-100)

(Bankr. No. 92-16745-BH)

(Adv. No. 95-1012-BH)
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Submitted on the briefs:

G. Patrick Garrett, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, for Defendants-Appellants.

Lyle S. Vaughn, Karen Eby of Lyle S. Vaughn, P.C., Oklahoma City, Oklahoma,

for Plaintiff-Appellee.

Before BALDOCK , BARRETT , and BRORBY , Circuit Judges.

BALDOCK , Circuit Judge.

After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined

unanimously to grant the parties’ request for a decision on the briefs without oral

argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(f); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore

ordered submitted without oral argument.

This appeal arises out of the efforts of the liquidating trustee in the

Chapter 11 bankruptcy of Sunset Sales, Inc., to avoid as preferential transfers

various payments made to Clarendon National Insurance Co., U.S. Capital

Insurance Co., and Van-American Insurance Co. (collectively, “the Bonding

Companies”) by Sunset’s predecessor in interest, K&R Coal Co. The bankruptcy

court determined that the transfers at issue were avoidable under 11 U.S.C.

§ 547(b), and entered judgment in favor of the trustee and against the Bonding

Companies. The Bonding Companies appealed the bankruptcy court’s judgment

to the Tenth Circuit Bankruptcy Appellate Panel (“the BAP”), which affirmed. 
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See Payne v. Clarendon Nat’l Ins. Co. (In re Sunset Sales, Inc.) , 220 B.R. 1005,

1022 (B.A.P. 10th Cir. 1998). The Bonding Companies now appeal to this court,

arguing that the bankruptcy court erred in finding that the transfers were

preferential and avoidable.

The Motion for Stay

Before considering the merits of the Bonding Companies’ appeal, we must

first address their request for a stay pending appeal. On February 18, 1998, while

their appeal of the bankruptcy court’s judgment was pending with the BAP, the

Bonding Companies posted a supersedeas bond with the bankruptcy court and

received a stay of that court’s judgment. Although the conditions of the bond

contemplated an appeal to both the BAP and to this court, the bankruptcy court’s

stay order apparently did not stay its judgment beyond an appeal to the BAP.

The BAP issued its opinion affirming the bankruptcy court on June 4, 1998,

and issued its mandate on June 22, which the bankruptcy court received on

June 25. On June 26, the Bonding Companies filed with the BAP an “Emergency

Motion for Stay of Judgment Pending Appeal Combined with Motion for Recall

or Stay of Mandate Pending Appeal,” in which they sought a stay of the BAP’s

judgment and its mandate pending appeal to this court. The Bonding Companies

argued that the BAP had jurisdiction to grant the stay under Fed. R. Bankr. P.

8017 even though it had already issued its mandate and that the supersedeas bond
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previously posted in the bankruptcy court was sufficient to protect the trustee’s

interests during an appeal to this court. The Bonding Companies asked that the

BAP also recall or stay its mandate.

On July 8, 1998, the BAP entered an order denying the motions. See Payne

v. Clarendon Nat’l Ins. Co. (In re Sunset Sales, Inc.) , 222 B.R. 914, 918 (B.A.P.

10th Cir. 1998). The BAP concluded that it did not have jurisdiction to enter

a stay pursuant to Bankruptcy Rule 8017 unless it first recalled its mandate. 

Id. at 917. The BAP considered the standards for recalling a mandate expressed

by this and other circuit courts, and concluded that the facts of the case before it

did not justify recalling the mandate. Id. at 917-18. Therefore, the BAP denied

the motions to recall the mandate and to enter a stay, and noted that the Bonding

Companies could seek a stay pending appeal from the Tenth Circuit. Id. at 918.

On July 13, 1998, the Bonding Companies filed a motion with this court

seeking a stay pending appeal and approval of a supersedeas bond. They argued

that the BAP erred in concluding that it had no jurisdiction to enter a stay unless

it first recalled its mandate. The Bonding Companies asked that we so rule and

then permit them to renew their stay motion before the BAP. In the event we

agreed with the BAP that it had no jurisdiction to enter a stay, the Bonding

Companies asked that we grant them a stay under Fed. R. App. P. 8(a).
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On August 19, 1998, we entered an order granting the Bonding Companies

a temporary stay and directing the parties to submit supplemental briefs

addressing the BAP’s authority to grant a stay pending appeal after it had issued

its mandate. Based upon our review of the parties’ supplemental briefs and the

pertinent law, we conclude that the BAP correctly determined it had no

jurisdiction to enter the stay unless it first recalled its mandate.

The Bonding Companies contend that the BAP should be treated like

a district court and imbued with the same power to enter a stay pending appeal to

a higher court as a district court has under Fed. R. Civ. P. 62. Although a district

court and a BAP serve some similar functions, they have distinct differences, the

chief of them being that a district court is also a court of original jurisdiction. 

The BAP is exclusively an appellate court, however, and is therefore more

analogous to a circuit court.

While the Bonding Companies are correct that the Bankruptcy Rules

incorporate Fed. R. Civ. P. 62, they do so in Part VII of the rules, which relates

solely to adversary proceedings at the trial level (i.e., the bankruptcy court or the

district court acting in its trial capacity). See Fed. R. Bankr. P. 7062. Thus, when

the Bonding Companies posted their supersedeas bond and secured a stay pending

appeal from the bankruptcy court, they did so under Fed. R. Bankr. P. 7062.
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The rules governing appeals to and from intermediate tribunals (i.e., the

BAP or the district court acting in its appellate capacity) are contained in Part

VIII of the Bankruptcy Rules. Bankruptcy Rule 8005 governs stays pending

appeal to an intermediate appellate tribunal. Like Fed. R. App. P. 8, relating to

stays pending appeal to a circuit court, Bankruptcy Rule 8005 contemplates that

the trial court will be the primary court to stay a matter pending appeal. 

Bankruptcy Rule 8005 expressly recognizes the trial court’s power to enter

a stay pursuant to Bankruptcy Rule 7062, and it gives the intermediate appellate

tribunal power to enter a stay or to terminate or modify one entered by the

bankruptcy court.

Stays pending appeal from an intermediate appellate tribunal are governed

by Bankruptcy Rule 8017. It provides that the judgment of the intermediate

appellate tribunal shall automatically be stayed for ten days after entry, unless

otherwise ordered by the court. Fed. R. Bankr. P. 8017(a). This gives a party

time in which to decide whether to pursue an appeal, akin to Fed. R. Civ. P. 62(a),

which automatically stays enforcement of district court judgments in civil cases

for ten days, and Fed. R. App. P. 41(a), which provides that the mandate of the

circuit court shall not issue for a certain period of time. See Fed. R. Bankr. P.

8017 advisory committee’s note. Bankruptcy Rule 8017(b) empowers the

intermediate appellate tribunal to enter a further stay of its judgment pending
1 The Bankruptcy Rules do not specifically address the issuance of the BAP’s

mandate. Therefore, the subject is governed by local rule. See Fed. R. Bankr. P.

8018(b).

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appeal to a higher court. The advisory committee note explains that

subdivision (b) gives the district courts and the BAPs the same authority that

Fed. R. App. P. 41(b) gives the circuit courts to stay their judgments pending

appeal, thereby indicating that the stay provisions of Bankruptcy Rule 8017(b)

are modeled after those governing circuit courts, rather than those governing

district courts.

Indeed, the rules governing the BAP’s issuance of the mandate and entry

of a stay pending further appeal parallel those governing similar acts of a circuit

court. The Tenth Circuit’s BAP must issue its mandate seven days after the

expiration of the time for filing a motion for rehearing. 10th Cir. BAP L.R.

8016-3(a). 1

 A party has ten days from the entry of judgment to file a motion for

rehearing, see Fed. R. Bankr. P. 8015, so if no petition for rehearing is filed, the

BAP’s mandate must issue seventeen days after entry of judgment. “Issuance of

the mandate formally marks the end of appellate jurisdiction. Jurisdiction returns

to the tribunal to which the mandate is directed, for such proceedings as may be

appropriate . . . .” Johnson v. Bechtel Assocs. Professional Corp. , 801 F.2d 412,

415 (D.C. Cir. 1986). A party has thirty days in which to file a notice of appeal

to the circuit court, however. See Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(1) and 6(b)(1). Therefore,
2 Of course, if the mandate required the bankruptcy court to take further

significant proceedings in the case, the BAP’s judgment would not be appealable

to the circuit court anyway. See, e.g., Cascade Energy & Metals Corp. v. Banks

(In re Cascade Energy & Metals Corp.) , 956 F.2d 935, 937 (10th Cir. 1992).

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unless the party obtains a stay of the BAP’s mandate, the mandate could issue and

the bankruptcy court could act on it before the party has an opportunity to file

a timely appeal. 2

 Bankruptcy Rule 8017(b) permits a party to obtain a stay of the

BAP’s judgment pending appeal to the circuit court, but it limits the length of the

stay, unless a timely appeal is filed during the pendency of the stay. If the BAP

refuses to enter a stay, the party may seek a stay from the circuit court pursuant

to Bankruptcy Rule 8017(c) and Fed. R. App. P. 8.

Similarly, a circuit court must issue its mandate seven days after the time

to file a petition for rehearing has expired or within seven days after a timely

petition for rehearing is denied. See Fed. R. App. P. 41(b). Therefore, if no

petition for rehearing is filed, the court’s mandate must issue either twenty-one

or fifty-two days after entry of judgment, depending on whether the U.S. is

a party in the case. See Fed. R. App. P. 40(a)(1) and 41(b). A party has

ninety days from the entry of judgment to file a petition for certiorari, see

Sup. Ct. R. 13, so unless the party obtains a stay of the circuit court’s mandate,

the mandate could issue and the lower court could act on it before the party has

an opportunity to file a timely petition for certiorari. A party may move for a stay
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of the circuit court’s mandate pending the filing of a petition for certiorari to the

Supreme Court under Fed. R. App. P. 41(d)(2). As in Bankruptcy Rule 8017(b),

the length of the stay is limited unless the party files a timely petition for

certiorari during the pendency of the stay. See Fed. R. App. P. 41(d)(2) . If the

circuit court refuses to enter a stay, the party may seek a stay from the Supreme

Court. See, e.g., John Doe Agency v. John Doe Corp. , 488 U.S. 1306, 1310

(Marshall, Circuit Justice 1989) (granting Solicitor General’s motion to recall and

stay Second Circuit’s mandate and to stay order of district court enforcing that

mandate pending certiorari); Cities Serv. Gas Co. v. Mobil Oil Corp. , 486 U.S.

1051, 1051 (1988) (granting application to recall and stay Tenth Circuit’s

mandate pending Court’s action on petition for certiorari).

Thus, both sets of rules create a gap between the time the court’s mandate

must issue and the time the party must seek redress from a higher court, and both

sets of rules permit a party to obtain a stay pending appeal to a higher court. Both

sets of rules are silent, however, as to what happens if the party does not seek the

stay until the gap period. Cases addressing a party’s attempt to secure a stay from

a circuit court after it has issued its mandate establish that the circuit court must

first recall its mandate before it can enter the stay. See, e.g., United States v.

Holland , 1 F.3d 454, 455 (7th Cir. 1993) (Ripple, J.) (holding that party who

sought stay after mandate had issued first had to show that mandate ought to be
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recalled and then had to show that recalled mandate should be stayed); Faulkner

v. Jones , 66 F.3d 661, 662 (4th Cir. 1995) (denying motion to recall and stay

mandate). The parties have not cited any cases addressing a party’s attempt to

obtain a stay from the BAP after it has issued its mandate, and our research has

revealed none. Nonetheless, the parallelism between the rules relating to the two

courts counsels that the BAP also must recall its mandate before it can issue a

stay.

The Bonding Companies contend that the BAP did not need to recall its

mandate before entering a stay because (1) Bankruptcy Rule 8017(b) does not

contain a time limit in which a stay motion must be filed; and (2) courts retain the

power to grant injunctive relief to maintain the status quo during the pendency of

an appeal. We are not persuaded by either of these arguments. As to the first,

although Bankruptcy Rule 8017(b) does not provide a time limit within which

a party must seek a stay pending appeal, the same is true of Fed. R. App. P. 41, on

which Rule 8017(b) is based. Nonetheless, as we discussed above, when a party

seeks a stay under Fed. R. App. P. 41 after the circuit court has already issued its

mandate, the circuit court must recall its mandate before it can grant the stay. As

to the second argument, even if we assume the BAP has the same power as a

circuit court to enter orders necessary to preserve the status quo pending appeal to

a higher court, that power simply provides the authority for the BAP (or circuit
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court) to recall its mandate once issued. See Hawaii Housing Auth. v. Midkiff ,

463 U.S. 1323, 1324 (Rehnquist, Circuit Justice 1983) (concluding that because

“a court retains the power to grant injunctive relief to a party to preserve the

status quo during the pendency of an appeal,” circuit court had authority to recall

its mandate and stay proceedings pending further clarification even after appeal

filed with Supreme Court). Recalling the mandate is still a prerequisite

to entering a stay.

We conclude that the BAP, like a circuit court, must possess the mandate

before it can act. Therefore, the BAP properly concluded that it had to recall its

mandate before it could issue a stay pending appeal to this court. The Bonding

Companies do not challenge the BAP’s determination that the circumstances of

this case did not warrant recalling its mandate. The only issue still before us,

then, is whether to grant a stay pending appeal pursuant to Fed. R. App. P. 8. 

We have already entered a temporary stay until further order of the court, and

we are now prepared to rule on the merits of the appeal, below. Therefore,

no further stay is necessary, and the motion for stay pending appeal is moot.
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The Merits

The Bonding Companies raise six challenges to the bankruptcy court’s

judgment. They assert that the payments at issue were not avoidable as

preferential transfers under 11 U.S.C. § 547(b) because the trustee failed to prove: 

(1) that the transfers were of an interest of the debtor in property; (2) that the

transfers were for or on account of an antecedent debt owed by the debtor before

the transfers were made; (3) that the transfers were made while the debtor was

insolvent; or (4) that the transfers made more than ninety days but less than one

year before the filing of the bankruptcy petition benefitted an insider creditor. 

The Bonding Companies further argue that, even if the transfers were avoidable

under § 547(b), they had a defense to avoidability under § 547(c)(1) and (c)(4),

because the transfers were contemporaneous exchanges for new value and they

were exceeded by subsequent advances of new value.

The BAP considered and rejected each of these arguments in a detailed and

well-reasoned opinion. Based upon our review of the record, the parties’ briefs,

and our independent research, we conclude the BAP properly rejected the

Bonding Companies’ arguments. Therefore, we affirm the judgment of the

bankruptcy court for substantially the same reasons set forth by the BAP in its

opinion in Payne v. Clarendon National Insurance Co. (In re Sunset Sales, Inc.) ,

220 B.R. 1005 (B.A.P. 10th Cir. 1998).
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The judgment of the Tenth Circuit Bankruptcy Appellate Panel is

AFFIRMED, and appellants’ Application for Stay of Judgment Pending Appeal

is DENIED as moot.