UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 11-4019

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff – Appellee, 

v. 

MICHAEL LLOYD STEVENS, 

Defendant - Appellant. 

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern 

District of West Virginia, at Charleston. Thomas E. Johnston, 

District Judge. (2:09-cr-00222-11) 

Submitted: November 21, 2011 Decided: November 29, 2011

Before WILKINSON, DUNCAN, and WYNN, Circuit Judges. 

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion. 

Jacqueline A. Hallinan, HALLINAN LAW OFFICES, PLLC, Charleston, 

West Virginia, for Appellant. R. Booth Goodwin, II, United 

States Attorney, Steven I. Loew, Assistant United States 

Attorney, Charleston, West Virginia, for Appellee. 

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. 
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PER CURIAM: 

Michael Lloyd Stevens appeals his conviction following 

a jury trial on one count of conspiracy to retaliate against a 

person cooperating with law enforcement, in violation of 

18 U.S.C.A. § 1513(b)(2), (f) (West Supp. 2011). He argues on 

appeal that the district court erred in allowing the Government 

to introduce as evidence in its case-in-chief a stipulation of 

facts establishing that he and his confederates believed the 

intended victim of their planned retaliation was cooperating 

with federal law enforcement officials. We affirm. 

Following his indictment, Stevens entered into a plea 

agreement with the Government, in which he agreed to plead 

guilty to the conspiracy charge. Attached to the plea agreement 

was a stipulation of facts indicating that Stevens had conspired 

with others to retaliate against an intended victim for his 

cooperation with federal authorities concerning a federal 

offense by assaulting him. 

The plea agreement also contains a provision waiving 

Stevens’ rights under Fed. R. Evid. 410. Specifically, Stevens 

agreed that if he withdrew from the plea agreement or proceeded 

to trial on the conspiracy charge, the Government was permitted 

to use the stipulation of facts as evidence in its case-inchief. Stevens ultimately proceeded to a jury trial. In turn, 

the Government introduced the stipulation of facts as evidence 
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against Stevens in its case-in-chief at trial. On appeal, 

Stevens argues that the district court erred in allowing such 

admission. 

Rule 410 of the Federal Rules of Evidence provides 

that any statements made by a defendant in the course of plea 

discussions that do not result in a guilty plea are thereafter 

not admissible against him. Fed. R. Evid. 410. Because Rule 

410 is an exception to the general principle that all relevant 

evidence is admissible at trial, its limitations are to be 

construed narrowly. United States v. Roberts, ___ F.3d ___, 

No. 10–1230–cr, 2011 WL 4489813, at *5 (2d Cir. Sept. 29, 2011). 

Moreover, its protections are waivable. United States v. 

Mezzanatto, 513 U.S. 195, 205 (1995) (holding that Rule 410, in 

effect, creates “a privilege of the defendant, and, like other 

evidentiary privileges, this one may be waived or varied at the 

defendant’s request” (internal quotation marks and citation 

omitted)); accord United States v. Mitchell, 633 F.3d 997, 

1001-06 (10th Cir. 2011) (upholding validity of Rule 410 waiver 

and allowing defendant’s plea statements into evidence as part 

of the Government’s case-in-chief); United States v. Sylvester, 

583 F.3d 285, 289-91 (5th Cir. 2009) (same and citing decisions 

from the Eighth and District of Columbia Circuits supporting the 

proposition that statements made during plea negotiations can be 
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waived for use as affirmative evidence of the defendant’s 

guilt). 

Whether a valid waiver of rights occurred is a 

question of law reviewed de novo. United States v. Young, 223 

F.3d 905, 909 (8th Cir. 2000) (addressing a waiver under Rule 

410); accord United States v. Singleton, 107 F.3d 1091, 1097 n.3 

(4th Cir. 1997) (stating that waiver of the right to counsel is 

a question of law reviewed de novo). We review the district 

court’s evidentiary ruling admitting statements into evidence 

for abuse of discretion. United States v. Blake, 571 F.3d 331, 

350 (4th Cir. 2009). A district court does not abuse its 

discretion unless its decision to admit evidence is arbitrary or 

irrational. United States v. Weaver, 282 F.3d 302, 313 

(4th Cir. 2002). 

Absent fraud, coercion, or some affirmative indication 

that the agreement was entered into unknowingly or 

involuntarily, an agreement to waive the exclusionary provisions 

of Rule 410 is valid and enforceable. Mezzanatto, 513 U.S. at 

210. On appeal, Stevens does not suggest the presence of any 

fraud or coercion and makes no claim that he entered into the 

plea agreement involuntarily. Rather, he suggests that his 

agreement to waive Rule 410 was not made knowingly because he 

did not know at the time he entered into the plea agreement that 

the Government would be required to prove that the law 
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enforcement officials with whom the victim cooperated were 

federal officials. 

We reject this argument because Stevens utterly fails 

to explain how any such lack of knowledge affected his ability 

to enter into the plea agreement in a knowing fashion. We 

further reject as without merit Stevens’ assertion that 

information about the federal character of the victim’s 

cooperation was unknown to him at the time he entered into the 

plea agreement. 

Because the waiver was valid and enforceable, the 

district court properly allowed to Government to introduce the 

stipulation of facts as evidence in its case-in-chief. 

Mitchell, 633 F.3d at 1001-06; Sylvester, 583 F.3d at 289-91. 

We reject Stevens’ assertion that the stipulation served “no 

fact finding purpose,” as it was relevant to and probative of 

Stevens’ criminal culpability on the conspiracy charge. As 

such, its admission into evidence enhanced the reliability of 

the fact-finding process. See Sylvester, 583 F.3d at 294 (“If 

anything, to ignore relevant evidence of culpability simply 

because that evidence was discovered during the course of plea 

negotiations would arguably undermine the truth-seeking function 

of our criminal justice system.”). 

Stevens also asserts that the stipulation “improperly 

prejudiced the jury” against him. Insofar as Stevens is making 
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an argument under Fed. R. Evid. 403, it, too, is without merit. 

“Rule 403 only requires suppression of evidence that results in 

unfair prejudice — prejudice that damages an opponent for 

reasons other than its probative value, for instance, an appeal 

to emotion, and only when that unfair prejudice substantially 

outweighs the probative value of the evidence.” United States 

v. Mohr, 318 F.3d 613, 619-20 (4th Cir. 2003) (emphasis added) 

(internal quotation marks, emphasis, and alteration omitted). 

Stevens, however, fails to point to anything in the record to 

support the conclusion that the admission of the stipulation of 

facts was unfairly prejudicial. 

Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s judgment. 

We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal

contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the 

court and argument would not aid the decisional process. 

AFFIRMED