1

06 - 03 38 - cr U ni t ed St at es v . A bad 1 UNITED STA TES COU RT OF AP PEALS 2 3 F OR THE S EC OND C IR C U IT 4 5 6 7 August Term, 2007 8 9 (Argued: November 28, 2007 Decided: January 30, 2008) 10 11 Do ck et N o. 06 -03 38 -cr 12 13 14 U NI TE D S TA TES OF A MERI CA , 15 16 Ap pe lle e , 17 18 –v.– 19 20 F RE DDY A BAD , 21 22 Defendant-Appell ant

. 23 24 25 26 Be fo re: 27 28 J ACOBS , Chief Judge , B.D. P ARKER and W ES LEY , Ci rcu it J ud ges . 29 30 Appeal from a judgm ent of conviction e ntered in t he United State s Distric t Court for the 31 Southern Distr ict of New York (Daniels, J. ), o n J anuary 1 8, 20 06 . W e co nc lud e th at Aba d’s 32 claim under the Speedy Tria l Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3162, is barred by t he Act’s waiverprovision, and 33 no t su

bje ct t o re vie w f

or p lai n e rro r un de r F ed era l R ule of Cr im ina l P roc ed

ure 52 (b) . Aba d’s 34 oth er c lai m s ar e w ith out m eri t. 35 36 A FF I RMED . 37 38 392 1 D AVI D M. R ODY (Celeste L. Koele veld, Assista nt United Stat es Attorney, of 2 co un sel ) for Mic ha el J . G arc ia, Un ite d S tat es A tto rne y f or t he So uth ern 3 Districtof New York, NewYork, New York, for Ap pe lle e . 4 5 G ER AL D J. M C M AHON (Joshua F. McMahon, on thebr ief ), New York, New York, 6 for Appellant

. 7 8 9 10 P ER C URI AM : 11 Defendant-Appellant Fr eddy Abad appeals from a judgment of conviction entered i n the 12 United States DistrictCourt for the Southern Dis trictof New York (Daniels, J. ), on January 18, 13 2006. The issues on appea l are – with one exception – cont rolled by es tablishe d precedent a nd 14 are dis pe ns ed

wi th b rie fl y b elo w. W e writ e to clarif y th at Aba d’s cla im

un de r th e S pe ed

y T ria l 15 Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3162, is barred by the Act ’s waiver pr ovision, and not s ubject to r eview for 16 pla in e rro r un de r F ed era l R ule of Cr im ina l P roc ed

ure 52 (b)

. 17 Background 18 Abad was convicted of armed robbery and the murder of one Hilari o DeJesus, a drug 19 dealer. Abad was the leader of a group of armed robbers who tar geted drug deal ers throughout 20 the New York City area, as well as New Jersey, be tween 1993 and 1996. In the summ er of 1996, 21 Abad and a mem ber of his gang, Hector Ort iz, robbed DeJesus at gunpoint. DeJes us retal iated. 22 W iththe aid

of a h alf do zen oth er m en , D eJe su s attem pte d to kid

na p Aba d; a ft er Aba d w as 23 fo rce d into a

car , D eJe su s threaten ed

to u se a “sa wi ng m ach ine ” o n h im . T he ab du cti on en de d 24 wh enAb ad

jum pe d f rom the m ov ingve hic le. 25 On

the ev en ingof

Se pte m be r 7, 19 96 , Aba d g ath ere d three acc om pli ces (in clu din g O rti z) 26 to r ob De Jes us ’s d rug op eratio n. At

Ab ad ’s d ire cti on , th eyco ve red the ir f ing ert ips wi th C raz y3 1 Glue to avoid le aving fingerpri nts. Abad armed the men with various weapons and carr ied a 2 machine gun him self. 3 On

the nig ht o f t

he cri m e, De Jes us wa s h os tin g a partyfo r hi s f

am ily . A ft er f

orc ingthe ir 4 way into the apar tment at gunpoint, Abad and his gang he rded the DeJesus fam ily into t he living 5 roo m . Aba d and

Or tiz the n to ok

De Jes us int o th e b ack

be dro om , whe re the y ti ed his hand s w ith 6 a phone cord. The robber s took turns gua rding DeJesus, watc hing the family and searching t he 7 apartment for cash and valuabl es. Eventuall y, Abad walked into the ba ck bedroom and fired a 8 machine gun into DeJesus’s r ight side. The a ssailant s then fled. Later , Abad bragged that he 9 had shot DeJesus se venteen ti mes. 10 Abad was captured in Nort h Carolina on April 12, 2002, and first appear ed before the 11 DistrictCourt on May 9, 2002. His tr ial began on November 29, 2004. Because his murder of 12 DeJesus made Abad eligible for the de ath penalt y, the Capital Case Unit of the Department of 13 Ju sti ce r ev iew ed

the cas e to de cid e whe the r th e g ov ernm ent w ou ld s eek the de ath pe na lty . In 14 Oc tob er 2 00 3, it d eci de d n ot t o d o s o. In J anuary 2 00 4 – ne arl y n ine tee n m onths af ter Ab ad ’s 15 first appear ance in court– Hector Ortiz made his first court appea rance after hi s capture by t he 16 government. Ortiz likewis e faced a possible death penalt y requiri ng Capital Case Unitreview; 17 he laterpled guilt y and was a cooperat ing witness atAbad’s tria l. 18 Af

ter a tr ial , Aba d w as c onvic ted on fi ve co unts: m

urd er i n a id o f r ack ete eri ng , in 19 violati on of 18 U.S.C. § 1959(a)(1); conspir acy to comm it Hobbs Act robbery, in violat ion of 18 20 U.S.C. § 1951; Hobbs Act robbery, in viola tion of 18 U.S.C. § 1951; use of a firearm during a 21 cri m e o f v iol en ce, in v iol ati on of 18 U. S. C. § 9 24 (c) ; an d u se o f a fi rearm to c om m it m urd erThe judgment entered by the Dist rict Courtincorrec tly cit ed 18 U.S.C. § 924(i). As the 1 government explains, § 924(i ) was a previous ly mislabeled versi on of 18 U.S.C. § 924(j). The m isl ab ele d v ers ion

wa s ev ide ntl y c ite d in

the ind ict

m ent an d re lie d u

po n b y th e D istric t C ourt. Those exclusions were made in the intere sts of justic e. Se e 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(8)(A). 2 Oc cas ion all y, the Di str ict Co urt no ted that ex clu sio ns in t

he int ere sts of

jus tic e w ere rel ate d to other rea sons for delay thatare also appropriat e considera tions under t he Speedy Trial Act– e.g. , to permit the filing of pret rial motions, see18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(1)(F), and bec ause of the involvement of a codefendant, see18 U. S. C. § 3 16 1(h )(7 ). 4 1 durin g a

cri m e o f v iol en ce, in v iol ati on of 18 U. S. C. § 9 24 (j)

. 1 2 Discussion 3 Abad asserts t hat he was denied a speedy tri al, in viol ation of his ri ghts under the Speedy 4 Tr ial Ac t, t

he sp eed y tr ial cla us e o f t he Si xth Am en dm ent, t

he Du e P roc ess Cl au se o f t he Fi ft h 5 Am en dm en t, and

the Cr ue l an d Unu su al P un ishm ent C lau se o f t he Ei gh th Am en dm ent. 6 Ba sed

on his rev iewof

the do ck et s he et, Ab ad

co unts 2 23 ela

ps ed (an d a lle ge dly 7 unexcused) days on hi s speedy tri al clock bet ween the date of his i nitial appearance, M ay 9, 8 2002, and the day his t rial bega n, Novem ber 29, 2004. The government, on the otherhand, 9 co unts o nly

thr ee s uc h d ay s o n th e sp eed y tr ial clo ck . T his dis cre panc y aris es b eca us e, at s ev era l 10 pre tri al c on fe ren ces , th e D istric t C ourt d id n ot r eco rd i ts e xc lus ion s o f t im e (m ad e p urs uant t o 11 the Speedy Trial Act ) on the docketsheet. The government has submitted the t ranscri pts of 2 12 tho se p retria l co nf ere nc es t o s ho w the Di str ict Co urt ’s e xc lus ion s o f t im e und er the Sp eed y T ria l 13 Ac t. 14 While the gove rnment’s position appe ars corr ect, it i s unnecessary for us to decide t he 15 factual issue because Abad failed t o file a timely pr etrial motion to dismiss the indictment, and 16 therefore waived hi s claim under the Speedy Tri al Act. The Act provi des that “[f]ailure of theThe Government’s argument in Sorrentino is all t he more perplexing in li ght of its cit ation 3 of Un ite d S

tates v . Patten , 826 F.2d 198, 199 (2d Cir. 1987). Se e Br ief of Ap pe lle e at

13 , Unit ed States v. Sorr entino, 72 F.3d 294 (2d Cir. 1995) (No. 95-1152). The government’s cit ation of that part icular pa ge of Patten to support t he government’s plain error argument in Sorrentino is odd in that t here is no di scussion of plain e rror re view there. I n fact, as noted ear lier, t hat page of Pa tte n dis cu sse d P att en ’s w aiv er o f h is S pe ed y T ria l A ct c lai m

un de r § 3 16 2(a )(2 ) du e to his failure to make a timely motion. Se e Patten , 8 26 F. 2d at 1 99 (“P att enne ve r m ad e a t im ely motion for relief under the Speedy Tri al Act. That Act expr essly provi des that ‘ [f] ailure of the de fe nd an t to m ov e f

or d ism iss al p rio r to tri al o r entryof a p lea of gu ilty o r no lo c onten de re s ha ll co ns tit ute a w aiv er o f t

he rig ht t o d ism iss al’ un de r th e A ct[ .] 18 U. S. C. § 3 16 2(a )(2 ) (1 98 2); see , e.g. , United States v. Balland , 7 79 F. 2d 28 7, 29 4 (5 th C ir. 19 86 ); Un ite d S tates v . D aly , 716 F.2d 14 99 , 1 50 6 & n . 5 (9t

h C ir. 19 83 ). N o s uc h m oti on wa s ev er m ad e h ere .” ). 5 1 de fe nd an t to m ov e f or d ism iss al p rio r to tri al o r entryof a p lea of gu ilty o r no lo c onten de re s ha ll 2 constitut e a waiver of the ri ght to dismissal underthis sect ion.” 18 U.S.C. § 3162(a)(2). 3 Accordingly, Abad waived hi s claim under the Speedy Tri al Act. Se e Un ite d S tates v . Patten , 4 82 6 F .2 d 1 98 , 1 99 (2d Ci r. 1 98 7) ( pe r cu

riam) (ci tin g w aiv er p rov isi on of § 3 16 2(a )(2 ) be cau se 5 defendant “never made a timely motion for relief under the Speedy Tr ial Act”)

. 6 The parties dispute, however, whet her the waiverprovision of § 3162(a) (2) appli es or 7 whether we should re view Abad’s failure t o make a tim ely Speedy Trial Act motion under the 8 “plain error” sta ndard of review of Federal Rule of Criminal Procedur e 52(b). The Government 9 advocates waive r, while Abad, rel ying upon United States v. Sorrentino , 72 F.3d 294, 297 (2d 10 Cir. 1995), argues that his unpr eserved spee dy trial claim should be reviewed for pla in error

. 11 Sorrentino ’s u se o f p lai n e rro r to rev iewa S pe ed y T ria l A ct c lai m , d esp ite the expli cit 12 waiver comm and of § 3162(a)(2), does not appear t o have been a deli berate r ejecti on of § 13 3162(a)(2) by this Court. This is clearfrom the opinion i n Sorrentino , whic h m ak es n o re fe ren ce 14 to § 31 62 (a) (2) , a s w ell as f rom the bri ef s o f t he parti es i n th at c ase , whic h d o n ot c ite it. Se e 3As is o ur p rac tic e, we cir cu lat ed thi s o pin ion

to t he act ive m em

be rs o f t his Co urt be fo re 4 filing. See United Stat es v. Brutus , 5 05 F. 3d 80 , 8 7 n .5 (2d

Ci r. 2 00 7).

6 1 Br ief

of Ap pe lle e Unit ed

St ate s G ov ’t at 13 , Unit ed St ate s v . S orr entin o, 72 F. 3d 29 4 (2 d C ir. 2 19 95 ) (N o. 95 -11 52 ). M ore ov er, the Sorrentino opinion makes no attempt to distingui sh our 3 prior anal ysis of § 3162(a)(2) in Un ite d S tates v . Patten , 826 F.2d 198, 199 (2d Cir. 1987). 4 Thus, Sorrentino ’s u se o f t he pla in e rro r st an dard a

pp ear s to have be en

lim ite d to the arg um ents 5 pre sented

bythe parti es and

do es n ot c ontro l th is c ase . A cco rdi ng ly, we tak e th is o pp ort un ityto 6 clarif

y th at, wh ile un

pre ser ve d c on sti tut ion al c lai m s ar e su bje ct t o re vie w f

or p lai n e rro r, 7 unpreserved Spee dy Trial Act cl aims are deemed waived, in accordance wit h § 3162(a)(2) and 8 Un ite d S

tates v . Patten . Sorrentino , to the exte nt it sugges ts otherwis e, is hereby ove rruled. 4 9 Abad’s constitutional spe edy trial claim fairs no betterthan his waived s tatutory claim. 10 Hi s co ns tit

uti on al s pe ed

y tr ial cla im

is g ov ern ed

bythe fo ur Barker v. Wingo factors: “Lengt h of 11 delay, the r eason for the dela y, the defendant’s a sserti on of his right, and pr ejudice t o the 12 de fe nd an t.” Barker v. Wingo , 4 07 U. S. 51 4, 53 0 (1 97 2); seeals o Ga rci a Mo nta lvo v. Un ite d 13 Sta tes , 862 F.2d 425, 426 (2d Cir. 1988) (percuriam) (applying Ba rke r ’s four-parttest). The 14 fi rst

of the se f act ors – th e le ng th o f d elay, 31 m onths – m ili tat es i n f av or o f A ba d; t he oth ers 15 weigh in the government’s favor. 16 As to the second factor , there were a number of valid reasons for the delay, not l east of 17 wh ich

wa s th e ti m e n eed ed

fo r th e C ap ita l C ase Un it t o d eci de wh eth er t o s eek the de ath pe na lty 18 against Abad or Hect or Ortiz, i ncluding ti me f or the defendants t o make m itigat ion submissions7 1 to t

he De partm ent of

Ju sti ce. Th e d elay w as a lso attrib uta ble to t he parti es’ rev iewof

dis co ve ry 2 materials, the fili ng of pretrial motions (including a suc cessful defense motion to preclude 3 ev ide nc e o f a

pri or b ad act co mm itt ed

byAb ad ), and

the ad dit ion

of Or tiz as a de fe nd ant in 4 January 2004. 5 As to the thir d factor, Abad (through c ounsel) ci ted his spee dy trial rights ata handful of 6 pre tri al c on fe ren ces . B ut A ba d d id s o o pp ort

un ist ica lly , ra isi ng his sp eed y tr ial rig ht whe n it 7 su ite d h is i nte res ts b ut n ot whe n th e d elay b en ef itt ed him . F or e xam

ple , at a p retria l co nf

ere nc e 8 on No ve m be r 7, 20 02 , Aba d e xp res sed his de sir e f

or a sp eed y tr ial . B ut l itt le m ore than a m onth 9 later, on Dece mber 20, 2002, defense counsel consented t o an exclusion of ti me under the 10 Speedy Trial Act unt il February 14, 2003 in order t o submit m itigat ion materials to t he 11 Department of Justice. Judge Daniel s asked Abad direc tly whether hi s concern abouta speedy 12 tri al h ad

be ensat isf

ied ; Aba d re sp on de d th at i t ha d. Ab ad pre sse d h is c on cer

ns ag ain in e arl y 13 20 04 aft erOrti z h adjo in edth e c as e a ndsl owe d i ts pr og re ss to wa rdtr ia l. Butth e s ame 14 considerat ions at is sue for Abad – a death penal ty determination and de fense counsel’s r eview of 15 discovery material s – were rais ed by Ortiz, and t he delay was ther efore warranted. 16 Finally, as t o the fourth factor, Abad point s to no prejudi ce. Rather, he cont ends that t he 17 de lay

all ow ed the go ve rnm ent to loc ate cer tai n “ ke y p ros ecutio n w itn ess es” : O rti z an d ano the r 18 cooperati ng witness, Flora Salas. But this is not the s ort of prejudic e contemplated by Ba rke r ’s 19 fourth factor. That pre judice is concerned with i mpedim ents to the abilit y of the defense to make 20 its own c ase ( e.g. , if defense witnesses ar e made unavailable due to t he government’s delay); the 21 op po rtunit

y f or t he pro sec uti on

to p rep are fo r tr ial do es n ot, on its own, am ount t o p rej ud ice to8 1 the defense. Se e Ba rke r , 4 07 U. S. at 5 32 (co ns ide rin g, as o ne of sev era l ki nd s o f p os sib le 2 prejudice to the defense, “t he inabili ty of a defendant adequatel y to prepare his case” t hat might 3 ari se “ [i ]f

wi tne sse s d ie o r di sap pe ar d uri ng a d elay, ” o r “i f d ef

en se w itn ess es are u

na ble to r eca ll 4 acc uratel y e ve nts of the dis tant pa st” ). 5 Accordingly, Abad’s s peedy tria l rights under the Sixt h Am endment were not violated. 6 Hi s ar gum ents r eg ard ingthe Fi ft h and Ei gh th Am en dm ents are w ith out m eri t. 7 II 8 Ab ad ’s r em ain ingarg um ents f all sh ort as a res ult of est ab lis he d p rec ed ent. 9 A. 10 Fi rst , Aba d argu es t hat hi s tr ial co un sel wa s in ef fe cti ve be cau se h is c ouns el f ail ed to 11 m ov e to dis m iss the ind ictm ent on sp eed y tr ial gro un ds , o bje ct t o th e g ov ernm ent’s “o the r 12 crimes” evidence, or de velop and prese nt a credi ble defense theory. 13 Th is c lai m is g ov ern ed

bythe tw o-p art Strickl and stand ard , whic h re qu ire s th at a cri m ina l 14 defendant show that his lawyer’s per form ance “fell bel ow an objective s tandard of 15 rea so na

ble ne ss” an d th at “ the re i s a r eas on ab le p rob ab ili ty t hat, b ut f or c ouns el’ s unp rof

ess ion al 16 err ors , th e re su lt o f t he pro cee din g w ou ld h av e b een dif fe rent.” Strickl and v. Washington , 466 17 U.S. 668, 688, 694 (1984). 18 There is no quest ion that Abad fails to satis fy the first prong of Strickl and . For reasons 19 expla ine d a

bo ve , Aba d’s statut ory

sp eed y tr ial cla im

wa s w aiv ed , and

ev enif it h ad no t be en 20 wa ive d, we fi nd

gre ate r m eri t in

the go ve rnm ent’s arg um ent th at Aba d’s statut ory sp eed y tr ial 21 rig hts we re n ot v iol ate d. Furth erm ore , a s ju st e xp lai ne d, Ab ad ’s c on sti tut ion al s pe ed y tr ial rig hts9 1 we re n ot v iol ate d. Thus , anyde fe ns e m oti on on eithe r a s tat

uto ry o r co ns tit

uti on al b asi s w ou ld 2 have be ende nie d b y th e D istric t C ourt. Ab ad ’s c ouns el c ou ld n ot t he ref ore have be en 3 ine ff

ect ive fo r f

ail ingto m ak e a m oti on

that w ou ld h av e b een

futil e. 4 Additionall y, the evidence of Abad’s prior bad act s was admissible as proof thatthe 5 charged rac keteeri ng enterpri se existe d and that Abad was one of its members. Se e Un ite d S tates 6 v. Coonan , 9 38 F. 2d 15 53 , 1 56 1 (2 d C ir. 19 91 ) (a ff irm ingthe adm iss ion

of “ev ide nc e [ that] wa s 7 certai nly probati ve of the existenc e of the charged ent erprise ”). It follows t hat a defense motion 8 to preclude such evidence l ikewise would have bee n denied. Lastl y, Abad cites sni ppets of the 9 trial transcr ipt as proof of his tr ial counsel ’s ineffectivenes s. Having reviewed t hese aspect s of 10 the tri al in conte xt, we conclude tha t Abad’s content ions are wit hout merit. 11 In any event, eve n assuming that Abad satisfied t he first prong of Strickl and , given the 12 str en gth

of the go ve rnm ent’s cas e, Ab ad canno t sh owthat he wa s p rej ud ice d b y h is c ouns el’ s 13 performance. The government’s case was strong. I t included t he testi mony of four cooperating 14 witnesses, var ious law enforcement witnesses, a nd two civili an eyewitnesse s to the DeJesus 15 robbery and murder, along with phys ical evi dence colle cted from the crime scene. And although 16 ne ith er o f t

he ey ew itn ess es c ou ld c on clu siv ely ide nti fy Ab ad as t he sh oo ter

of De Jes us , three 17 co op eratin g w itn ess es l ink ed Ab ad dir ect ly t o th e k ill ing of

De Jes us , and

als o te sti fi ed

that Aba d 18 bragged about i t afterwards. ( One cooperator t estified to wat ching Abad shoot DeJesus 19 num ero us tim es. ) A cco rdi ng ly, ev enif de fe ns e co un sel did

wh at Aba d argu es s ho uld have be en 20 do ne , th ere is n o “ rea so na ble pro ba bil itythat . . . th e re su lt o f t he pro cee din g w ou ld h av e b een 21 dif

fe rent.” Strickl and , 466 U.S. at 694.10 1 B. 2 Se co nd , Aba d argu es t hat th e ev ide nc e w as l eg all y in su ff ici ent bo th t o p rov e th at h is 3 murder was in aid of racketeer ing, and that he was the shooterof Hilario DeJesus. “A defendant 4 wh o c ha lle ng es h is c onvic tio n b ase d u po n th e su ff

ici en cyof the ev ide nc e b ear s a h eavy b urd en .” 5 Un ite d S

tates v . G rif

fit h , 284 F.3d 338, 348 (2d Cir. 2002). “Not only must the evi dence be 6 vie we d in

the lig ht m os t f

av ora ble to t he go ve rnm ent an d a ll p erm iss ibl e in fe ren ces drawn in i ts 7 favor, but if the evidenc e, thus construed, suffices to convince a ny rational trierof fact of the 8 de fe nd an t’s gu ilt

be yo nd a re aso na

ble do ub t, .

. . [t

he ] c onvic tio n m

us t st an d. ” Un ite d S

tates v . 9 Mar tin ez , 5 4 F .3 d 1 04 0, 10 42 (2d Ci r. 1 99 5) ( int ern al c itatio ns om itt ed ). F or r eas on s m entio ne d 10 ab ov e, the ev ide nc e w as m ore than s uf fi cie nt f or “ anyrational trierof fact [to] have found the 11 ess en tia l el em ents o f t he cri m e b ey on d a

rea so na ble do ub t.” Ja cks on v. Vi rg ini a , 443 U.S. 307, 12 31 9 (1 97 9). Ac co rdi ng ly, Ab ad ’s s uf fi cie nc y c ha lle ng e f

ail s. 13 Fi na lly , Aba d f ile d tw o b rie fs pro s e , ra isi ng a num be r of iss ue s co nc ern ingthe ev ide nc e 14 adm itt ed

at tria l an d h is c ouns el’ s p erf orm an ce. W e h av e re vie we d th os e cl aim s an d f ind the m 15 to b e w ith out m eri t. 16 Conclusion 17 For the foregoing re asons, the dis trictcourt’s j udgment of conviction entered i n the 18 United States DistrictCourt for the Southern Dis trictof New York (Daniels, J. ), on January 18, 19 2006 is hereby A FF I RMED .