UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 14-1426

ANDRE J. MCSWAIN,

 Plaintiff – Appellant,

v.

LAURENE POWELL JOBS; APPLE INC; GOOGLE INC.,

 Defendants - Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle 

District of North Carolina, at Greensboro. Catherine C. Eagles, 

District Judge. (1:13-cv-00890-CCE-JLW)

Submitted: September 25, 2014 Decided: September 29, 2014

Before WILKINSON and AGEE, Circuit Judges, and DAVIS, Senior 

Circuit Judge.

Affirmed in part, dismissed in part by unpublished per curiam 

opinion.

Andre J. McSwain, Appellant Pro Se. William Andrew Copenhaver, 

Ronald R. Davis, James Aaron Dean, WOMBLE CARLYLE SANDRIDGE & 

RICE, PLLC, Winston-Salem, North Carolina; Rodrick John Enns, 

ENNS & ARCHER, LLP, Winston-Salem, North Carolina; Jacqueline 

Elizabeth Young, PERKINS COIE LLP, San Francisco, California, 

for Appellees.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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PER CURIAM:

Andre McSwain appeals the district court’s order 

dismissing his complaint for failure to state a claim and 

denying his self-styled motions to strike, its order denying his 

motions to alter or amend and for sanctions, and its order 

denying his motion for recusal of the magistrate judge and 

district judge assigned to his case. For the reasons that 

follow, we affirm in part and dismiss in part. 

First, we conclude that we lack jurisdiction over the 

district court’s underlying dismissal order, because McSwain’s 

notice of appeal was not timely as to that order. See Fed. R. 

App. P. 4(a)(1)(A), (a)(5), (a)(6). “[T]he timely filing of a 

notice of appeal in a civil case is a jurisdictional 

requirement.” Bowles v. Russell, 551 U.S. 205, 214 (2007).

McSwain’s motion for reconsideration, appropriately construed as 

a Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b) motion, see In re Burnley, 988 F.2d 1, 3 

(4th Cir. 1992), was not effective to toll the appeal period 

from the underlying judgment. See Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(4)(A). 

Accordingly, we dismiss this portion of the appeal for lack of 

jurisdiction.

Turning to the denial of McSwain’s post-judgment 

motions, we limit appellate review to those issues raised in the 

informal brief. 4th Cir. R. 34(b). We conclude that the 

district court did not abuse its discretion in determining that 
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McSwain failed to make the requisite showing for Rule 60(b) 

relief or for recusal. See Cent. Tel. Co. of Va. v. Sprint 

Commc’ns Co. of Va., 715 F.3d 501, 515 (4th Cir.) (standard of 

review for recusal decisions), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 423 

(2013); Aikens v. Ingram, 652 F.3d 496, 501 (4th Cir. 2011) (en 

banc) (standard of review for Rule 60(b) motions); Belue v. 

Leventhal, 640 F.3d 567, 572-74 (4th Cir. 2011) (discussing 

requirements for judicial recusal); Dowell v. State Farm Fire & 

Cas. Auto. Ins. Co., 993 F.2d 46, 48 (4th Cir. 1993) (describing 

requirements for relief under Rule 60(b)). Accordingly,

although we grant leave to proceed in forma pauperis, we affirm 

the district court’s rulings in these orders. We dispense with 

oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are 

adequately presented in the materials before this court and 

argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED IN PART;

DISMISSED IN PART