[J-19-2016] 

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA 

EASTERN DISTRICT 

SAYLOR, C.J., EAKIN, BAER, TODD, DONOHUE, DOUGHERTY, WECHT, JJ. 

FREEDOM MEDICAL SUPPLY, INC., 

INDIVIDUALLY AND ON BEHALF OF ALL 

OTHERS SIMILARLY SITUATED, 

 Appellant 

 v. 

STATE FARM FIRE AND CASUALTY 

COMPANY; STATE FARM MUTUAL 

AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE COMPANY, 

 Appellees 

No. 8 EAP 2015 

Appeal from Certification of Question of 

Law from the United States Court of 

Appeals for the Third Circuit at No. 14-

1628 

ARGUED: September 9, 2015 

RESUBMITTED: January 20, 2016 

OPINION 

MADAME JUSTICE TODD DECIDED: February 16, 2016 

Section 1797(a) of the Motor Vehicle Financial Responsibility Law (“MVFRL”)1

states that a provider of medical products to automobile accident victims is entitled to 

reimbursement from automobile insurers, and where, as here, there is no federallydetermined Medicare fee for a product, reimbursement is limited to “80% of the 

provider’s usual and customary charge.” 75 Pa.C.S. § 1797(a). The MVFRL does not 

define the phrase “usual and customary charge,” but the Pennsylvania Department of 

Insurance (“Department”) has promulgated regulations defining it as “[t]he charge most 

often made” by similarly-situated providers, 31 Pa. Code § 69.3, adding that: 

In calculating the usual and customary charge, an insurer 

may utilize the requested payment amount on the provider's 

 

1

 75 Pa.C.S. § 1701 et seq.
[J-19-2016] - 2 

bill for services or the data collected by the carrier or 

intermediaries to the extent that the data is made available.2

31 Pa. Code § 69.43(c) (emphasis and footnote added). In this matter presented on 

certification from the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, we consider 

whether this latter language requires insurers to calculate a provider’s usual and 

customary charge for a product predicated on the two bases provided for therein, or 

merely permits using those bases, among others. After careful review, we hold that it 

permits, but does not require, insurers to do so. 

From 2010 to 2012, Appellant Freedom Medical Supply, Inc. (“Freedom”), 

provided electrical muscle stimulators (“EMSs”) and portable whirlpools to automobile 

accident victims covered by Appellee State Farm Fire and Casualty Company and/or 

State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company (collectively, “State Farm”). 

Notably, although Freedom purchased these items for relatively little cost, it applied 

significant markups. As found by the United States District Court for the Eastern District 

of Pennsylvania herein, Freedom purchased the EMSs for approximately $20 to $30 

each, yet charged approximately $1,525 to $1,600 each, and purchased the whirlpools 

for approximately $40 each, yet charged approximately $525 each. Because neither 

the EMSs nor portable whirlpools have a federally-determined Medicare fee, Freedom 

sought reimbursement from State Farm for 80% of the foregoing charges. 

 

2

 The “carrier” is not an insurance carrier, but, rather, an organization that contracts with 

the federal Health Care Financing Administration (“HCFA”) to process Medicare Part B 

claims, and the “intermediaries” are organizations that contract with the HCFA to 

process Medicare Part A claims. 31 Pa. Code § 69.3. These federal contractors collect 

data “on Medicare procedure codes and Medicare payments,” which insurers may 

obtain at cost. See 31 Pa. Code § 69.41. The HCFA is now known as the Centers for 

Medicare & Medicaid Services. See https://www.cms.gov. 
[J-19-2016] - 3 

State Farm, viewing Freedom’s charges as excessive, conducted its own review 

of the usual and customary charges for the products and used its findings therein to 

calculate reimbursements. As described by the district court in this matter: 

First, [State Farm] conducted an individualized inquiry for 

each device by researching the make and model of the EMS 

and [w]hirlpool being dispensed. In connection with this 

review, [it] contacted . . . providers located in the 

Philadelphia area to determine their prices for both products. 

[It] learned that EMS models for which State Farm was being 

billed by providers were all of a like kind and quality, and 

were priced similarly. 

Next, [it] purchased EMS[s] and [w]hirlpools from providers 

in Berks, Bucks, Chester, Delaware, Montgomery, and 

Philadelphia counties in Pennsylvania, and Camden and 

Gloucester counties in New Jersey, to determine an average 

price for these devices. For the EMS[s], [State Farm] based 

[its] average price on the purchase of five different models 

from ten different sellers, including internet sources, which 

ranged from $93.95 to $246.95. [It] then added a six percent 

Pennsylvania sales tax. [State Farm] concluded that the

average price for the EMS is $151.10 with 80% of that

charge being $120.88. For the [w]hirlpool, [State Farm] 

based [its] average price on the purchase of devices from 

eight different providers, with prices ranging from $54.79 to 

$106.65. Again, [it] added a six percent Pennsylvania sales 

tax. [State Farm] determined that the average price for the 

[w]hirlpool is $97.19, with 80% of that charge being $77.75. 

Beginning in June 2010, State Farm began paying 

[Freedom] $120.88 and $77.75 respectively as the 

reimbursable amount for the EMS and [w]hirlpool, which is 

80% of the usual and customary charge for each device 

based on [State Farm’s] research and calculations. 

Freedom Medical Supply, Inc. v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 2014 WL 626430 at *2 

(E.D. Pa. filed Feb. 18, 2014) (citations omitted). 

On February 3, 2012, Freedom filed a class action on behalf of itself and 

similarly-situated providers in the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County, 
[J-19-2016] - 4 

arguing, as pertinent herein, that State Farm had violated the MVFRL and 31 Pa. 

Code § 69.43 because its calculation of Freedom’s reimbursements was not predicated 

on either of the two bases provided for in the regulation: (1) Freedom’s requested 

payment amount on its bill for services; or (2) data collected by the carrier or 

intermediaries.3 State Farm removed the case to United States District Court for the 

Eastern District of Pennsylvania, where it argued that Section 69.43(c) merely permitted

it to make a calculation predicated on the bases provided for therein, but did not require

it to do so, so long as its calculation was consistent with the MVFRL’s other provisions 

and Section 69.3’s definition of the “usual and customary charge” for a product. 

Ultimately, the district court agreed with State Farm, and granted State Farm’s 

motion for summary judgment on that basis. See Freedom Medical Supply, supra.4 

Observing that no Pennsylvania court had yet determined whether Section 69.43(c) was 

permissive or mandatory, the court found the regulation’s plain language demonstrated 

that it was permissive. Specifically, the District Court found that the Department’s use 

of “may,” rather than “shall,” in the last clause of Section 69.43(c) clearly imparted 

discretion on an insurer as to whether or not to make its calculation of usual and 

customary charges predicated on the bases provided for therein: 

Since the word “may” is not synonymous with the word 

“shall,” which would make the use of one of the two methods 

 

3

 Freedom also argued that State Farm’s methodology otherwise violated the MVFRL 

and 31 Pa. Code § 69.3’s definition of the “usual and customary charge” for a product 

on the ground that State Farm had selectively excluded certain similarly-situated 

providers who had similar charges for the products and had improperly included nonsimilarly-situated providers who had significantly lower charges for the products. 

Freedom further contended State Farm’s conduct in this regard constituted negligence. 

4

 The district court also found that State Farm’s methodology did not otherwise violate 

the MVFRL and Section 69.3 or constitute negligence. Specifically, the court found that 

State Farm had properly considered market data in the Greater Philadelphia area and 

arrived at an average market price for the products at issue. Id. at *5-9. 
[J-19-2016] - 5 

mandatory, under a plain reading of Section 69.43, State 

Farm is permitted to use one of the two methods noted, but it 

is not required to do so. Rather, State Farm has the option 

to look to other provisions of the Pennsylvania Code for 

guidance on what is a “usual and customary charge,” and is

not restricted to the two means provided in Section 69.43. 

Id. at *5. 

Freedom appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, 

which, noting that no Pennsylvania court or agency has addressed the question, sought 

to certify it to this Court. We granted certification to answer the following question: 

May an insurer use methods not specifically identified in [the 

MVFRL] to calculate the “usual and customary” charge for 

devices and services not listed on the Medicare Fee 

Schedule for purposes of determining the amount to be paid 

to providers of those devices and services? 

Freedom Medical Supply, Inc. v. State Farm Fire and Casualty Co., ___ A.3d ___, 6 EM 

2015 (Pa. filed Mar. 9, 2015) (order). Because the certified question is one of statutory 

and regulatory interpretation, a pure question of law, our standard of review is de novo

and our scope of review is plenary. Bowling v. Office of Open Records, 75 A.3d 453, 

466 (Pa. 2013). 

We begin our inquiry with a brief history of recent Pennsylvania law as it pertains 

to the scope of a medical product provider’s entitlement to reimbursement from insurers 

under our motor vehicle insurance laws. In 1974, the General Assembly supplanted the 

extant system of providing medical treatment via a fault-based insurance system, 

enacting the Pennsylvania No-fault Motor Vehicle Insurance Act (“No-Fault Act”), Act of 

July 19, 1974, P.L. 489, No. 176. The General Assembly declared the Act’s purpose as 

establishing “at reasonable cost to the purchaser of insurance, a Statewide system of 

prompt and adequate basic loss benefits for motor vehicle accident victims and the 

survivors of deceased victims.” Id. § 102(b). Pursuant to the No-Fault Act, automobile 
[J-19-2016] - 6 

accident victims were entitled to a certain level of coverage for “[a]llowable expense,” 

defined as “reasonable charges incurred for, or the reasonable value of” “reasonably 

needed” medical and rehabilitative care. Id. §§ 103, 202. Thus, under the No-Fault Act, 

costs of medical products were reimbursable to providers by no-fault insurance only 

where their services were “reasonably needed and used” for medical purposes and only 

to the degree the providers’ charges were “reasonable.” Id. 

In 1984, however, the General Assembly repealed the No-Fault Act and replaced 

it with the first version of the MVFRL, Act of Feb. 12, 1984, P.L. 26, No. 11 § 3, as 

amended by Act of Feb. 12, 1984, P.L. 53, No. 12 (codified at 75 Pa.C.S. §§ 1701 et 

seq.). The MVFRL abandoned the term “allowable expense” in favor of the term 

“[m]edical benefit,” defined as “[a]ll reasonable and necessary expenses for medical 

treatment and rehabilitative services, including, but not limited to . . . medical supplies.” 

75 Pa.C.S. § 1712(1) (1984). Additionally, the MVFRL provided that a provider “shall 

not make a charge for . . . products . . . in excess of the amount” it “customarily charges 

for like . . . products . . . in cases involving no insurance.” Id. § 1797(a) (1984). Thus, in 

repealing the No-Fault Act and enacting the first version of the MVFRL, the General 

Assembly retained the requirement that a provider’s products be reasonably necessary 

and reasonably priced, and further provided that a provider could not charge a higher 

price under the MVFRL than it did on the open market.

 Finally, in 1990, the General Assembly enacted a series of amendments to the 

MVFRL commonly referred to as “Act 6,” Act of Feb. 7, 1990, P.L. 11, No. 6, amending 

Section 1712(1) to redefine “medical benefit” as follows: 

Subject to the limitations of section 1797 (relating to

customary charges for treatment), coverage to provide for 

reasonable and necessary medical treatment and 

rehabilitative services, including . . . medical supplies. 
[J-19-2016] - 7 

75 Pa.C.S. § 1712(1) (1990). Moreover, Act 6 modified Section 1797(a) into its current 

form, which reads as follows: 

§ 1797. Customary charges for treatment 

(a) General rule.--A person or institution providing . . . 

products . . . to an injured person . . . shall not . . . request 

. . . payment for the . . . products . . . in excess of . . . 110% 

of the applicable fee schedule . . . or the provider's usual 

and customary charge, whichever is less. The General 

Assembly finds that the reimbursement allowances 

applicable in the Commonwealth under the Medicare 

program are an appropriate basis to calculate payment for 

. . . products . . . for injuries . . . . Future changes or 

additions to Medicare allowances are applicable under this 

section. If the commissioner determines that an allowance 

under the Medicare program is not reasonable, he may 

adopt a different allowance by regulation, which allowance 

shall be applied against the percentage limitation in this 

subsection. If a . . . fee schedule . . . has not been calculated 

under the Medicare program for a particular . . . product . . . 

the amount of the payment may not exceed 80% of the 

provider's usual and customary charge. 

75 Pa.C.S. § 1797(a) (emphasis added). As referred to above, the MVFRL does not 

define the term “usual and customary charge.” See 75 Pa.C.S. § 1702. However, the 

Department promulgated a regulation defining that term as “[t]he charge most often 

made by providers of similar training, experience and licensure for a specific . . . product 

or service in the geographic area where the . . . product or service is provided.” 31 Pa. 

Code § 69.3. Furthermore, Section 69.43(c) provides: 

An insurer shall pay the provider's usual and customary 

charge for services rendered when the charge is less than 

110% of the Medicare payment or a different allowance as 

may be determined under § 69.12(b) (relating to exemption 

from payment limitations). An insurer shall pay 80% of the 

provider's usual and customary charge for services rendered

if no Medicare payment exists. In calculating the usual and 
[J-19-2016] - 8 

customary charge, an insurer may utilize the requested 

payment amount on the provider's bill for services or 

the data collected by the carrier or intermediaries to the 

extent that the data is made available. 

31 Pa. Code § 69.43(c) (emphasis added). 

 Against this backdrop, the parties’ arguments are relatively straightforward. As a 

textual matter, and in contrast to the district court’s view, Freedom argues that Section 

69.43(c) provides an either/or proposition: that reimbursements must be calculated 

either on the basis of a provider’s requested amount in its bill or on the basis of data 

from the carrier or intermediaries. It contends that reading Section 69.43 as merely 

permitting calculations predicated on these bases, but not excluding others that might 

otherwise comply with the MVFRL and Section 69.3, renders Section 69.43(c)’s 

language mere surplusage. Furthermore, Freedom submits that the General 

Assembly, in enacting Act 6, sought to depart from the uncertainty of assessing a 

provider’s charges for “reasonableness,” as under earlier statutes, and to replace it with 

“an objective method”: “[t]reatments for which a price is found on the Medicare fee 

schedule are to be reimbursed at 110% of the Medicare fee schedule amount, and NonMedicare Treatments are reimbursed at ‘80% of the provider’s usual and customary 

charge.’” Freedom’s Brief at 5 (quoting 75 Pa.C.S. § 1797(a)). Freedom suggests that, 

unless that objective method prevails, insurers will be able to engage in flawed and/or 

bad faith calculations of reimbursements, and providers will lack the certainty the 

legislature sought to provide.5 Freedom asserts that State Farm’s calculations herein 

 

5

 Freedom also argues that the Department’s interpretation of Section 1797(a) via 

Section 69.43 was upheld by the Commonwealth Court in Hospital Ass’n, Inc. v. Foster, 

629 A.2d 1055 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1993), and that “[e]mbedded in the . . . interpretation is the 

determination that the charge most often made by similar providers was to be 

established by an independent entity — the Medicare contractor. Had it been 

appropriate for the insurance company to make the determination, it would not have 

established the carrier’s data as the alternative to the specific billed amount.” 

(continuedT) 
[J-19-2016] - 9 

are evidence of such phenomenon, noting that its calculations led it to pay “11 different 

amount[s] to providers” for the subject medical products between June 2010 and 

January 2011, and that its reimbursement amounts counteract what it deems the 

MVFRL’s purpose in creating “non-volatile pricing” of medical products. Freedom’s 

Brief at 23.6

 State Farm, by contrast, argues that Section 69.43(c) merely illustrates two 

possible methods of calculation. State Farm claims that the term “may” imparts 

discretion, particularly in contrast to the Department’s use of “shall” in Section 69.43(c)’s 

two earlier clauses. In any event, State Farm contends that interpreting Section 

69.43(c) as merely illustrative furthers the MVFRL’s goals of providing coverage to 

automobile accident victims and containing insurance costs. State Farm’s Brief at 19-

20 (citing Sturkie v. Erie Ins. Co., 595 A.2d 152 (Pa. Super. 1991) (noting the MVFRL’s 

primary aim is providing coverage to injured claimants); Pittsburgh Neurosurgery 

Assocs., Inc. v. Danner, 733 A.2d 1279 (Pa. Super. 1999) (noting the MVFRL’s goal of 

containing automobile insurance costs)). State Farm submits that the potential for 

insurance industry chicanery is relatively low insofar as insurers must still comply with 

Section 69.3’s definition of “usual and customary charge” — specifically, “[t]he charge 

most often made by providers of similar training, experience and licensure for a specific 

. . . product or service in the geographic area where the . . . product or service is 

 

(Tcontinued) 

Freedom’s Brief at 11. Freedom’s argument in this regard is question-begging: the 

Department’s intent in promulgating Section 69.43 — i.e., what is “embedded” in its 

interpretation — was not addressed in Foster and is the open question before this 

Court. 

6

 We note that, although Freedom’s argument is relevant in considering the proper 

interpretation of Section 69.43, the validity of State Farm’s methodology and the legality 

of its payments are not before this Court. 
[J-19-2016] - 10 

provided.” 31 Pa. Code § 69.3. Finally, State Farm notes that a ruling that Section 

69.43 provides mandatory methods for reimbursement calculation could permit 

providers of products for which no Medicare fee applies, and for which no Medicare 

data has been collected, to engage in price gouging by requiring insurers to pay 

whatever amount such providers have billed. 

The object of statutory and regulatory interpretation “is to ascertain and 

effectuate the intention of the General Assembly.” 1 Pa.C.S. § 1921(a); id. § 

1502(a)(1)(ii) (providing that the Statutory Construction Act applies to “[e]very document 

codified in the Pennsylvania Code except legislative, judicial, and home rule charter 

documents”). 

Because “[g]enerally, the best indicator of legislative intent is the plain language of the 

statute,” Com., Ofc. of Governor v. Donahue, 98 A.3d 1223, 1237 (Pa. 2014), we begin 

by considering the plain language of the statutes or regulations at issue. See 1 Pa.C.S. 

§ 1921(b) (“When the words of a statute are clear and free from all ambiguity, the letter 

of it is not to be disregarded under the pretext of pursuing its spirit.”); id. § 1502(a)(1)(ii). 

In determining whether the language of the statutes and regulations is clear or 

ambiguous, we construe words and phrases “according to their common and approved 

usage” or, as appropriate, according to their “peculiar and appropriate” or statutorily 

provided meanings. 1 Pa.C.S. § 1903. 

With regard to whether Section 69.43(c) permits or requires calculations of 

reimbursement be predicated on one of the two bases provided therein, we find the 

regulations at issue reasonably capable of both constructions offered by the parties. 

Although, as the district court reasoned, the word “may,” as used in Section 69.43(c), 

clearly imparts discretion, the parties’ dispute concerns the objects of that discretion. 

Freedom contends State Farm has the discretion to choose between the provided 
[J-19-2016] - 11 

bases. State Farm, on the other hand, contends it has the discretion, at its option, to 

choose one of those bases, or others. It notes, as the district court apprehended, that 

the Department could clearly have used the term “shall,” as it did in the prior two 

clauses of Section 69.43, to unambiguously require State Farm to use one of the two 

bases provided for in Section 69.43, but did not. Nevertheless, the Department’s use of 

“may” to confer discretion does not definitively detail the scope of that discretion, and 

nothing in the statutes or regulations at issue affirmatively forecloses either party’s 

construction, as we find both to be reasonable views as to what Section 69.43 provides. 

Thus, as the language is reasonably capable of either construction, we find that it is 

ambiguous in this regard. Accord Meyer v. Community College of Beaver County, 93 

A.3d 806, 814 (Pa. 2014). 

 Where statutory or regulatory language is ambiguous, this Court may resolve the 

ambiguity by considering, inter alia, the following: the occasion and necessity for the 

statute or regulation; the circumstances under which it was enacted; the mischief to be 

remedied; the object to be attained; the former law, if any, including other statutes or 

regulations upon the same or similar subjects; the consequences of a particular 

interpretation; and administrative interpretations of such statute. 1 Pa.C.S. § 1921(c). 

In doing so, we liberally construe statutes and regulations “to effect their objects and 

promote justice,” 1 Pa.C.S. § 1928(c), and we presume to be erroneous any 

interpretation that leads to an absurd or unreasonable result, or which renders the 

statute ineffective or uncertain, or which favors private interests over the public interest, 

1 Pa.C.S. §§ 1922(1), (4), & (5). 

 In our view, State Farm’s argument is more persuasive. As an initial matter, we 

note that, since the General Assembly adopted the No-Fault Act, the law in this area 

consistently implicated two major policy goals: providing coverage for injured persons 
[J-19-2016] - 12 

and providing it at a reasonable cost to the purchaser. See No-Fault Act, § 102(b) (“[I]t 

is hereby declared to be the policy of the General Assembly to establish at reasonable 

cost to the purchaser of insurance, a Statewide system of prompt and adequate basic 

loss benefits for motor vehicle accident victims and the survivors of deceased victims.”); 

see also Pittsburgh Neurosurgery Assocs., Inc., 733 A.2d at 1282 (noting that Act 6 and 

its amendments to 75 Pa.C.S. § 1797(a) were intended to contain medical costs so as 

to reduce the rising cost of purchasing motor vehicle insurance “and the resultant 

increase in the number of uninsured motorists driving on public highways” (internal 

quotation marks omitted)). Contrary to these aims, Freedom’s suggested interpretation 

of Section 69.43 as providing exclusive methods of calculating reimbursements would 

permit providers of medical goods and services not contained on a Medicare fee 

schedule or the subject of the Medicare contractors’ data to set their prices and seek 

reimbursement for essentially any amount they choose to bill. See 31 Pa. Code § 

69.43(c) (providing that an insurer “may utilize the requested payment amount” or 

carrier data). That is, in the absence of a Medicare fee schedule or carrier data, an 

insurer would have no other option other than relying on the provider’s bill. In our view, 

such a result could lead to the unjustified inflation of charges for medical products, 

exhausting accident victims’ coverage limits, and potentially depriving them of benefits 

for further necessary medical expenses, as well as increasing automobile insurance 

rates.7 In this regard, we find Freedom’s interpretation beneficial to a few private 

interests to the detriment of the public interest, contrary to our rules of construction. Cf. 

1 Pa.C.S. §§ 1921(c), 1922(1), (4), & (5). 

 

7

 Although we note, as detailed supra, that Freedom has applied an exorbitant markup 

in its charges for the EMSs and portable whirlpools at issue herein, given the procedural 

posture of this case and the purely legal nature of the certified question before us, the 

propriety of this markup is not before us. 
[J-19-2016] - 13 

 Freedom’s interpretation is also inconsistent with the Department’s definition, in 

Section 69.3, of “usual and customary charge” as the “charge most often made” by 

similar providers. As noted, under Freedom’s construction of Section 69.43(c), in the 

absence of a Medicare fee or carrier data, reimbursements would have to be calculated 

based on the particular provider’s bill. Of course, a particular provider’s bill may be well 

below or well above the charge most often made by similarly-situated providers in the 

geographic region. Accordingly, the only way to bring Section 69.3 and Section 

69.43(c) into harmony is to read the latter as permitting insurers to “utilize” the 

provider’s bill or data from the carrier as a relevant, but not controlling, measure of the 

appropriate “usual and customary charge” for the product at issue. 

 Freedom’s statutory history argument is also unpersuasive. As an initial matter, 

although Freedom appears to be correct that the legislature’s adoption of Act 6 signaled 

a move from calculating reimbursements based on a general “reasonableness” inquiry 

toward one based on more objectively verifiable data, it does not follow that it potentially 

mandated an assessment based on whatever providers deemed an appropriate amount 

to bill. Indeed, although Act 6 adopted some degree of reliance on federally-provided 

Medicare standards (where such standards exist), nothing in the text or purpose of Act 

6 indicates that, in the absence of those standards, it sought to leave insurers at the 

whim of providers. Indeed, the General Assembly’s use of the language “usual and 

customary,” in Section 1797, suggests that market data and industry custom will come 

to bear on the appropriate amount of reimbursement. 

 Finally, we find dubious Freedom’s proposition that permitting insurers to conduct 

a review of market data in calculating reimbursements will lead to insurance industry 

chicanery and market uncertainty. As State Farm notes, even if it is not bound to 

calculate reimbursements predicated on the bases provided in Section 69.43(c), it must 
[J-19-2016] - 14 

nevertheless comply with the remainder of the MVFRL and the Department’s 

regulations, including Section 69.3.8 In any event, given the effects of interpreting 

Section 69.43(c) as potentially granting providers the right to set their own rates of 

reimbursement, we find Freedom’s insurer manipulation concern of minor weight in 

comparison. 

 In light of the foregoing, and in answer to the question submitted, we hold that 

Section 69.43(c) permits, but does not require, that reimbursements be calculated 

predicated on the provider’s bill for services or the data collected by the carrier. 

Question answered. Jurisdiction relinquished. 

Mr. Justice Eakin did not participate in the consideration or decision of this case. 

Mr. Chief Justice Saylor, Mr. Justice Baer, Madam Justice Donohue and Messrs. 

Justice Dougherty and Wecht join the opinion. 

 

8

 As noted supra, the question of whether State Farm has abided by the remaining 

provisions of the MVFRL, and particularly Section 69.3’s definition of “usual and 

customary charge,” is not before this Court, and we offer no view as to whether State 

Farm has done so.