### IN THE S UP REME COURT OF TENNESS EE A T ME MP H IS N ove m be r 4, 200 8 S es sio n DEREK DAVI S v
. SHE LBY COUNTY SH ERI FF’S DEPARTMENT Appeal by p erm ission from the Court of Appeals, Wester n Section

Chancery Court

for Sh elby County No. CH-3-0295- 2 Arnold B. Goldin , Chancellor

No. W2007-01077-SC- R11-CV- F iled Fe bruary 20, 2009

Th e iss ue in t

his a pp e a l is wh e the r t

he She lby

Cou nty Civ il Se rv ic e Me ri t B oa rd ha d c a us e to te rm inate De re k Da

vis ’ e mpl oy

me nt fo r vio latin gthe De pa rtme nt’ s d

ru g -f re e wo rk pla c e pr ogra

m. Up on re vie w, we fi nd

that: ( 1) the Court of App eal s app lie d th e inc or re c t st and ard

of re vie w i n revie wingthe Boa

rd’s decision; (2) the positive urine spec imen test result was a dmissibl e evide nce for the B oard to c onsider; and (3) t he Board’ s decision t o terminate Mr. Davis’ employ ment was not arb itr ary or c a pr ic iou s and

wa s su pp or te d by evid e nc e that is bo th s ub sta nti a l and mate ri a l. Ac c or din g ly , we re ve rs e the de c isi on of the Cou rt of Ap pe a ls a

nd re ins tate the tr ia l c ourt ’s jud g me nt.
Te nn . R . A pp . P . 1 1 A pp e a l b yP e r m is s io n; J ud g m e nto f t he C o ur to f Appeals Rever sed; Judgme nt of th e Trial Court Re instated
C OR NE L I A A. C LARK , J ., delivere d the opinion of the cour t, in which J ANI CE M. H OL DER , C.J ., and G AR Y R. W ADE , W I L L I AM C. K O CH , J R ., and S HAR ON G. L EE , J J ., joined.
Martin W. Zummac h, Assistant Shelby County Attorney , for the a ppellant, Shelby

County Sheriff’ s De pa rtme nt. Wil liam M. Monroe (at trial), Memphis, Tenne ssee, a nd L eslie A. Miller (on a

ppeal) , Somerville, Te nn e sse e , f

or the a pp e lle e , D e re k D avis

. OP IN ION

Fa c tua l &Proc e du ra l H

ist or y Der ek Davis was a patrol office r for the Shelby

Co u nty Sh e rif f ’ s D ep a r tm e nt ( “ D epar

tment”). On or a bout J uly 25, 2001, the Depa

rtment i n s t i tuted the DrugFr ee Workplac e Prog ram (“Program” ). On August 17, 2001, Mr

. Davis signe d an “Ac knowledg ment of Rece ipt of DrugFr ee Workplace Program - Policy and Proce dure” form, ac knowledg ing that he re ceive d, rea d, andT h e ac t u al pol i ci es a n d pr oce du r es of t h e Prog r am ar e n ot c on t ai n ed i n t h e r ec or d. 1

“M e d L a b ” is t h e to x ic o lo g y lab fo r M e tho d ist H e a lthc a re
. 2

M r. D a v is tes tif

ie d tha t he ha d ne v e r m e t M s. R e n fro e b e fo re A u g u st 2 0

. 3

M ed La b ’ s p roce ss es f o r co nd uct i ng d rug screens were not eas i l y dis cerni b l e f rom t he reco rd. T heref o re, t he 4 “u su a l p ro c e d u re s” a re a p a tc h w o rk o f t h e sp a rs e re c o rd p ro v id e d

.

T h e D epa r t men t c on t en ds t h at M r
. D av i s s i g n ed t h e doc u men t a f t er pr ov i di n g t h e s ampl e. T h e l an g u ag e of 5 t he d o cum ent cl earl y i nt end s t hi s t o b e t he case. M r. D avi s, how ever, argues t hat he s i gned t he d o cum ent be f o re gi vi ng a u r i ne s amp l e. -2- understood the Program’s policie s and procedure s. As part of the Prog ram, De partment e mploy ees 1 are randomly

chosen to provide urine samples, f rom which use of

illega l drug s can be detec ted. On August 20, 2002, Mr. Davis and other Sheriff’ s deputies wer e ra ndomly chosen to be drug te ste d. Th at mo rn ing , dur ing “ ro ll ca ll, ” Mr . Davis wa s inf or me d that he ne e de d to go to “ Jail -E a st at 3 p
. m. ” f

o r a d r u gs c r e e n in g
. T h e dr

u gs c r e e n in gw a s c o n d

u c te d b y M e d L a b , In c o r p orate d ( “ M e d L a b ” )

. A f t e r ar r i v i n g at “ J a i l

- E a s t , ” M r
. D av i s t e s t i f i e d th ath e w a s d i r e c t e d

i n t o th e l o b b y, 2 wher e he notice d Suz anne Re nfroe , a human r esourc es off icer for the D epar

tm en t , “c h ecking of

f name s. ” Mr . D avis inf

or me d M s. Re nf

ro e that he wa s “he re to take a dr ug te st. ” She dir e c te d h im 3 to stand in a line “a g ainst the wall.” Mr . Davis testified that he was in uniform duringthe test and that his name is embroider ed on his uniform shirt. The testimony

indicates that the “ usual proce dure” for dr ugtesting is as follows. A collec tor 4 acc ompanies a donor to the bathroom wher e a specimen is taken. The donor is obser ved supplying the spec imen. After the collector rec eives the urine specimen cup from the donor, a lid is placed on the cup, a nd a tamper -proof

adhesive label is place d acr os s t h e t o p of the lid. The de signations “donor’ s initi als” a

nd “date ” appe ar on the tamp er -proof adhesive la bel. The donor

aff ix es his or her init ials and the date on the l abel. Also on the specimen c ontainer is a la bel that contains a

bar code a nd chain of

custody number. The chain of custody number and bar code are used to link the sp e c ime n to the do no r; sp e c if ic a lly the c ha in o f c us tod

y numbe r a nd ba r c od e link th e sp e c ime n to the donor’s pa

perw ork, which c ontains the identical c hain of c ustody number and bar code. A fter the containe r has be en prope rly labeled a nd initi al ed , t he conta iner is place d in a sea led bagand prepa red f or transpor

tation to the laboratory

for testing . On the conta iner at issue in this case, the initials “DD” a

nd the date “ 8-20” a

ppear on the tamper -proof

adhesive label.
In addition to providing a urine sample, Mr. Davis also filled out paper work. Either bef

ore or af ter providinga urine sample, Mr. Davis sig ned a Me dL ab “c hain of c ustody ” docume nt. In the 5 top left and bottom rig ht corne rs of the doc ument appea rs the co l l ection identification number “0312131.” Par

t one of the document c ontains the contac t person for and location of the Depa rtment. Part t wo of the doc ument, titled “ TO BE COMPL ETED BY COL L EC TO R OR EMPL OYER REPRESEN T A T I VE ,” contains: the rea son for the drug test – “ra ndom”; the ty

pe of drug scre en – “volume”; a

nd the condition of the drug scre en – “obser

ved.” Additionally , the box “photo I .D.”In the C o u rt o f A p p e a ls’ o p inio n , d isc u ssio n o f t h is issu e is ad d re sse d this w a y: 6

M r. D avi s
. . . s ub m i t s t hat the t est i ng form whi ch i s requir ed t o be s i gned by t he co l l ect o r of t he uri ne samp l e ap p ears t o have b een si gned by a M ic h e ll e Sw an, and t hat M r. [G ary ] H o ust o n[, t he M ed La b m anager, ] t est i f i ed t hat no o ne named M i che l l e Swan was wor ki ng f or [ M edLab] i n Aug us t 200 2 and t hat he di d not kn ow a per s on by t hat na me.

. . . It a p p e a rs to us
. . . t h a t t h e fo rm w a s sig n e d n o t b y a “M ic h e lle S w a n ,” b u t b y a “M ic h e lle S w u n i” o r “M ic h e lle S e e u n i,

. . . .”

D avi s v. Lut t rel l , N o
. W 2 0 0 7

- 0 1 0 7 7

- C O A

- R 3

- C V , 20 0 7 W L 4 3 7 4 0 2 8 , at * 2

- 3 (T enn. C t

. A p p
. D ec. 17 , 20 0 7 ).

T et rahy d roca nnab i no l (“ T H C ”) i s a m ari juana m et ab o l i t e t hat i s st o red i n f at cel l s and can b e d et ect ed i n t he 7 body u p t o t h i r t y day s af t er s mok i n g mar i

j u an a. I n t er s t at e M ec h

. Cont r ac t or s , I n c. v
. M cI n t os h , 229 S. W

. 3d 674, 677 (T e n n . 2 0 0 7 ).

A t s om e poi nt i n t he dru g s cr een i ng proces s , t he ur i ne s amp l e i s separ at ed i nt o t wo di f f er ent pl as t i c s peci men 8 cont ai ner s : one c ont ai ner t o be t es t ed i mm edi at el y and a s econd, back

- up cont ai ner t o be us ed i f a r ech eck i s r eques t ed
or n ee ded t o v er i f

y t h e r es u l t s of t h e f

i r s t t es t

. I t i s u n cl ea r f

r om t h e r ec or d wh et h er t h e s ampl e i s s epa r at ed i n f r on t of t he d o no r o r whet her t hi s separat i o n oc curs af t er t he samp l e has been t rans p o rt ed t o t he l ab o rat o ry f o r t est i ng. A s M r. D avi s ha s not ch al l eng ed t he means by wh i ch t he s amp l e wa s s epar at ed or t hat i t was se p a r a te d inc o rr e c tly, it is -3- is chec ked af

ter the state ment “Donor

I dentification Verified B y :.”
Part three of the doc ument, titled “ DONOR S EC TI ON , ” c o n t ai n s th e f o l l o wi n g:
Iauthorize the collec tion of this specimen for the purpose of a drugscre en. I acknow ledg e that the spe cimen conta iner(s) was/we re se aled with tamper -proof seal(s) in my

prese nce; a

nd that th e i n fo rmation provided on this form a nd on the label(s) aff

ix ed to the spec imen container (s) is cor rec t. Iauthorize to relea se the results of the test to the c ompany identified on this form or its desig nated a g ents.
Be neath this c lause are three space s: one space for “ ( PR I NT ) D ONOR ’ S N AM E ( FI RST , MI , LAST ),” one space for “ D O N O R SS# OR E MP
. I D#,” and one spac e for “S I G N A T U RE O F D ONOR .” On the doc ument a pp e ars Mr . D avis ’ p ri nte d n ame , h is e mpl oye e ide nti fi c atio n numb e r, and his signatur e . M r. Da vis does not dispute that he si g ned thi s document. He does dispute, howeve r, that he wrote his printed name a nd identification number.
Part four of

the document is titled “ TO B E C OMPL ETE D B Y C OL L EC TOR .” In thi s section appea rs t he name (in print), date , and sig nature of the c ollector of the specimen. Asecond signature o f th e s am e c o l l e c t o r

a p p e ar s i nth e s am e p arta f t e r th e s t at e m e n t“ S e a l e d

S p e c i m e n , P l a c e d

In Security Pouch Im mediately

After Collection, and Tra

nsfer red to Courier

For Transpor

t To L aboratory

By :.” The na

me of the c ollector, howe ver, is uncle ar f rom the re cord. 6 Approxim ately

one we ek af

ter the dr ugtest, on August 26, 2002, a medical r eview of fice r from MedL ab noti fied Mr. Davis t hat hi s urine specimen tested positive for T HC or marijuana . At 7 thi s ti me , M r. Da

vis re qu e ste d that his ba c k- up sa mpl e be te ste d. Th e ba c k- up sampl e wa s se nt t o 8u n n e c e ssa ry fo r th is C o u rt to kn o w w h e n the us u a l se p a ra tio n p ro c e d u re o c c u rs
. It i s uncl ear f

rom t he reco rd what “ A D O ” st and s f o r. 9

M r
. H ous t on t es t i f

i ed: “ A di l ut ed s peci men mean s t hat t he s peci men has been t es t ed and has been det er mi ned 10 to b e d ilute d , w h e the r it’ s inte n tio n a l o r un inte n tio n a l. T h is m e a n s tha t the d ru g s, if the re w [e re ] d ru g s p re se n t, [th e y] coul d po s s i bl y be di l ut ed do wn t o under t he cut

- of f l eve l s t o wher e t hey ’ r e n ot det ect ed. ”

T h e t er m “ Lou der mi l l h ea r i n g ” der i v es f r om t h e U n i t ed St at es Su pr eme Cour t dec i s i on Cl ev el an d B oar d of 11 Educ at i on v
. Lou der mi l l , 470 U

. S. 532 ( 1985)

. T h e Lou der mi l l Cour t h el d t h at a pu bl i c emp l o y ee who ca n be d isc h a rg e d o n ly f

o r c a u se m u st b e g iv e n n o ti c e a n d a n o p p o rtu n ity to re sp o n d to the c h a rg e s a g a ins t him p rio r to t er mi n at i on
. Lou der mi l l , 470 U

. S. a t 546.

A s set f ort h i n t he t r ans cr i pt o f M r
. D avi s ’ L oudermi l l hear i ng , t he s t andar d of p r oo f and r ul es of

ev i dence 12 ap p l i ca b l e to t his hea ring are as f o l l o w s:
St andar d of

P r oo f - T he pres umpt i on of

i nn ocenc e a pp l i cabl e i n a cr i mi nal pros ecu t i on i s not appl i cabl e i n a n a d m inistra tive he a rin g . N e v e rth e le ss, in b rin g ing th e c h a rg e s the d e p a rtm e n t ha s the b u rd e n o f p re se n ting it ’s [ s i c] ca s e pr i or t o t he def ens e s t at i ng i t s ca s e. I n or der t o be uphel d on ap peal , an y di s ci pl i nar y ac t i ons i mp ose d
mu s t be s u ppor t ed by a t l ea s t s u bs t an t i al e v i den ce
. T h e u s u al s t an dar d i n cr i mi n al ca s es i s t h at g u i l t mu s t be p roved be yo n d a reas o nab l e d o ub t

. I n an ad m i ni st rat i ve heari ng, how ever, t he st and ard i s l o wer. P rep o nd era nc e o f

ev i d en ce i s t he m i nim al st an d ard i n int ern al ca ses.
T he R ul es of

E vi d ence - In general s t ri ct ad herence t o t he rul es o f evi d ence i s no t requir ed i n an ad m i ni st rat i ve h e a rin g . T h e re fo re , a d e p a rtm e n ta l he a rin g b o a rd is f re e to c o n sid e r h e a rs a y e v id e n c e a n d /o r e x p e rt tes tim o n y, an d n ee d n ot r equ i r e t h e l ay i n g of a n y f ou n dat i on fo r re c e ip t o f t h e e v id e n c e
. -4- a dif fe re nt la bo rator y , Ame ri c an Med ic a l L a

bo ra tor ie s, fo r te sti ng . T his se c on d s ampl e a lso c ame back positive.
After beingnotified of Mr. Da

vis’ positive drugtest, the Depa rtment relieve d Mr. Davis of du t y “w ith pay , pendinga re view by the ADO.” Two day s later, on August 28, Mr. Davis had a

9 second, inde pendent test c onducted at his own ex pense. This test came back a s neither positive nor neg ative for

THC beca

use the urine had bee n either intentionally or unintentionally

diluted. 10 On September

10, 2002, an admini s tra t i v e Lou d erm i l l (du e p ro ce s s ) h eari n g wa s conducte d. 11 David Wing, Chief Inspector for the Depa rtment, preside d over the hear ing. D uringthe hea ring , Mr. Wing hea rd testimony

from Ms. Renfr oe and Mr . Davis. Mr. Davis asserte d that the positive urine specimen w as not his. Mr. Davis ar gued that MedL ab erred in labelinghis specimen. To support this argument, Mr. Davis testified, “ [The collector] g ave me a cup, I walked over a nd peed; ha

nded [t he cup] to him and left. I didn’t watch any thing else afte r t hat. I left and went back t o work.” Mr. Davis asserted that he did not remember initialing“DD” on the spec imen container , that he did not rea d the cha in of custody form, and that he sig ned the c hain of c ustody form bef ore, not a fter, providinghis urine sample. After considering this testimony , Mr. Wing deter mined that it was Mr. 12 Davis’ ur ine that tested positive for ma rijuana, a nd as such, his employ

ment should be terminated for violatingthe Prog ram’s policie s. Mr. Davis’ e mploy ment was terminated effec tive September 12, 2 0 0 2

. On S eptember 13, 2002, Mr. Davis submitted to another dr ugtest throug h his secondO n the p a p e rw o rk us e d b y K ro g e r a n d the tes ting lab o ra to ry, it sta te s: “N o n -D O T T e st re su lt: P A S S .” 13

T h e xe ro x c o p y o f t h e lab e l at issu e is i n c lud e d i n t h e r e c o r d

. G ive n the p o o r q u a lit y o f t h e c o p y, i t i s 14 i mp oss i bl e t o det er mi ne whe t her t he s econd t o l as t di gi t i n t he s eve n- di gi t ch ai n of cu s t od y nu mb er i s a “ 2” or a “ 3. ” Imp o rt ant l y , we no te th a t n e ither pa rt y present ed evi d ence co ncerni ng a po t ent i al al t ernat i ve o wner of t he 15

s amp l e i n que s t i on. T hu s not hi ng i n t he r ecor d i dent i f i es t o whom, i f

an y one, t he cha i n of

cu s t od y nu mb er 031 21 21 was as s i g n ed on Au g u s t 20, 2002. N ei t h er does t h e r ec or d r ef l ec t wh et h er an y on e el s e wi t h t h e i n i t i al s “ D D ” wa s t es t ed on t he sam e d ay as M r. D av i s. -5- e mpl oye r, Kr og e r C or

po ratio n. Mr . D avis “ pa sse d” the dr ugte st. 13
Mr. Davis a

ppeale d to the Shelby County Civil Service Merit Boa rd (“B oard” ). A hea

ring be fo re the thr e e -m e mbe r B oa rd wa s he ld on De c e mbe r 3, 20 02 . D ur ingthe he ari ng , M r. Da vis a g a in a sse rt e d th at th e po sit ive ur ine sp e c ime n in qu e sti on wa s no t his

. In a dd iti on to a rguin gthat he did not remembe r initialing the tamper-pr oof adhe sive label on the specimen container and did not r ead the cha in of custody

form bef ore signing it, Mr. Da

vis asserted that the chain of custody number located on the container m ight not match the chain of custody number found on the chain of custody fo rm . Sp e c if

ic a lly , M r. Da

vis asse rt e d th at th e c ha in o f c us tod y numbe r o n h is p a

pe rw or k is 0312131. Concurre ntly , he asse rted that the xerox copy of the labe l containingthe cha in of custody number a nd bar c ode, ente red into evide nce dur ing the Boa rd’s he aring , did not conclusively show that the cha in of custody

number wa s 0312131. Instead, as M r. Davis ar gued, the number on the copy could be e ither “0312121” or “0312131.” 14 When questioned about t he x erox copy of the c hain of c ustody number, Ga

ry Houston, the Me dL a b ma na g e r, a c kn ow le dg e d that, g ive n th e qu a lity of the c op y , th e se c on d to la st d ig it c ou ld be either a “2” or a “ 3.” He continued: “B ut, howeve r, you are looking at a copy . You’re not looking at the orig inal bottle. Y o u ’re not looking at the or igina l specimen.” Additionally , Chief Wing, who pre sided over Mr . Davis’ L oudermill hear ing, te stified during the Board’ s hear ing that he examined the ac tual specimen c ontainer, inc luding the c hain of custody number, prior to making his re c omm e nd atio n to te rm inate Mr . D avis ’ e mpl oy me nt. 15
Mr. Davis fur

ther argued that he ne ver pr esente d photo identification when he repor ted for his drugtest. Mr. Davis did agree , howeve r, t hat hi s name appear ed on the unifor m he wore during the test. Finally , Mr. Davis argued that the Depa rtment never explained the discrepa ncy betwee n the fa c t th at Mr . D avis a sse rt e d th at hi s c oll e c tor wa s a ma le y e t the c oll e c tor ’s signatur e on the c ha in of c us tod y fo rm a pp e are d to be that of

a fe ma le , “ Mic he lle Swa in o r S wa n. ” Mr . D avis argue d th at, beca use the De partment ne ver pr esente d Ms. Swain or Swan and ne ver ide n t ified which Me dL ab collector actua lly signe d the cha in of cu stody form, ther e we re “ serious flaw s” with the cha in of custody of the positive urine specimen, such that the test result should be inadmissible evidence , and wi tho ut whic h th e B oa

rd wo uld have no e vid e nc e to supp ort a de c isi on to t e rm inate Mr . D avis ’ e mpl oy me nt.
On or a bout Dece mber 18, 2003, the B oard issued its finding s, uph o lding Chief Wing ’sA c o p y o f t h e B o a rd ’s f ind ing s is no t i n c lud e d in the re c o rd . In M r. D a v is’ p e tit io n fo r w rit o f ce rtio ra ri to 16
t he Shel by Co un t y Chanc er y Co ur t he as s er t ed, “ T he C i vi l Ser vi ce M er i t B oard i s s ued a f i ndi ng on or about D ece mb er 1 8 , 2 0 0 2 , a c o p y o f wh ic h is atta c h e d he re to a s E x h ib it A .” “E x h ib it A ” is also no t i n c lud e d in the re c o rd o n a p p e a l.

O n A ugust 19 , 2 0 0 3 , M r. D avi s f i l ed a M o t i o n t o A m end C o m p l ai nt i n t he t ri al co urt

. T he D ep art m ent 17 resp o nd ed t o t his m o t i o n o n Se p t em b er 3 , 2 0 0 3

. T he t rial co urt d i d no t ad d ress thi s m o t i o n b efo re d en yi ng M r. D av i s’ p et i t i o n f

o r wr i t of cert i o rari on June 28 , 20 0 6

. A f t er M r. D avi s f

iled a n o tice o f a p p eal t o t he C o urt of A p p eal s, t he Cour t of Appea l s di s mi s s ed t h e a ppea l f or f ai l u r e t o a ppea l a f

i n al j u dg men t or or der

. Su bs equ en t l y , on Apr i l 23, 2007, th e t r ia l co u rt e n te re d a n o rd e r “R e ins ta ting C a se fo r E n try o f O rd e r D e n ying [M r. D a v is’] M o tio n to A m e n d .” Su bs equ en t l y , M r
. D av i s f i l ed a s ec on d n ot i ce of

a ppea l t o t h e Cour t of

Appea l s on M ay 17, 2007. -6- deter mination that Mr. Davis’ empl oy ment should be terminated f or violatingthe Depa

rtment’s drug policies. Mr. Davis a

ppeale d to the Ch an cer

y Court for Shelby

County , filing f

or a Petition for 16 Writ of Certiorar i Statutory Appea l, and Complaint for Depr ivation of Civil R ights. A he aringwas held on April 6, 2006, and the court rule d orally from the be nch. De terminingthat it was constra ined by the standar d of revie w provisions found in Tenne ssee Code Annotated sec tion 4-5-322(h)( 1)-( 5), the tr ia l c ourt

state d th at “ [i]f the re ’s any ba sis on wh ic h th [e o pin ion of the B oa rd ] ca n b e up he ld . . . then I rea lly fee l like my

hands ar e tied.” O n J une 28, 2006, the tria l court ente red a n order denying Mr . Davis’ pe tition, t hus aff irming the Boa

rd’s de cision.
Mr . D avis fi le d a

n a pp e a l to the Court

of App eal s on Ma

y 17 , 2 00 7, arguin g , a s h is s ole

17 issue, that the B oard’ s decision to terminate Mr . Davis’ e mploy ment was not based on substantial and mater ial evidenc e bec ause the decision wa s “base d upon an inadmis sible drug test result.” He asser ted that the standa

rd of r eview is that aff

orded by the common law writ of ce rtiorar i. Relying on the same argume nts ra ise d in the tr ia l c ourt , M r. Da

vis a sse rt e d th at th e De pa rtme nt f a ile d to sh owthe ne c e ssa

ry c ha in o f c us tod

y tha t w ou ld a llo w the ur ine sp e c ime n te st r e su lt t o b e a dmi ssi ble evidenc e and thus, that ther e wa s no material e vidence to support the Boa rd’s de cision.
In it s De c e mbe r 17 , 20 07 , o pin ion , th e Court of Ap pe a ls a g re e d w ithMr . D avis a s to bo th the standar d of re view and the outcome. It deter mined “that the de cision to terminate [Mr. Davis’] employ ment was a

rbitrar y wher e the De partment wa s unable to present any evidenc e to establish that the spec imen at issue in this case belong ed, in fa ct, to Mr. Davis.” Davis, 2007 WL4374028, at *4. The Court of Appe als continued:
We are not ins en s itive to the chanc ellor’s de termination that, to a larg e extent, the Boa rd’s de cision was base d on a dete rmination of cr edibility with respec t to the “D” initials on t he spec imen. Additionally , Mr. Davis’ c ontention that he did not rea d the MedL ab for

m before signingit is not, w ithout more , sufficie nt to ex cuse him fr om its repre sentations. Howeve r, the De partment’s ina bility to establish that the sp e c ime n [c ha in o f c us tod y numbe r] m atc he d th e Me dL a b f or m si g ne d b y

Mr . D avis , co up l ed with the complete a bsence of any

testimony

or evide nce r eg ardingthe proce dures f

ollowed on August 20 an d t h e u n known identity of the my sterious Michelle Swan or Swani or S wuni or S eeuni, simply rende rs the [Boar d’s] decision b a s e d o nth e e v i d e n c e o f

th e r e c o r d

ar b i tr ar y.T h is se c tio n w a s o rig ina lly c o d ifi e d a s T e n n e sse e C o d e A n n o ta te d se c tio n 2 7 -9 1 4 . S e e T e n n . C o d e A n n . § 18 2 7 -9 1 4 (1 9 5 6 ). -7- I d. Ac c or din g ly , th e Court of Ap pe a ls r e ve rs e d th e B oa rd and tr ia l c ourt . T he De pa

rtme nt t ime ly filed an application for permission to a ppeal to this Court on J anuar y 24, 2008, arguing that the Court of Ap pe a ls ap pl ied an in a pp ro pr iate sta

nd ard of re vie w i n r e ve rs ingthe B oa rd ’s de c isi on

to terminate.
Ana lys is Standard of Review
We acc epted this ca se primar ily to reiterate the applica

bility of the UAPA standard of

revie w in case s involving the Shelby County Civil Service Merit Board. In its opini on, enter ed De cembe r 17, 2007, the Court of Appe als stated that “[t]he court’s re view . . . is lim ited to whether the infer ior board or tribunal exceede d its jurisdi ction or a c te d il le g a lly , arbitra

rily , or fr audulently .” Davis, 2007 WL4374028, at *1 (c iting McCallen v. City of Memphis, 786 S.W .2d 633, 640 (T enn. 1990) (addr essingthe appr opriate standa rd of r eview of the M emphis City Counsel’s approva l of a zoning ordinanc e)) . This standard of revie w has be en def

ined as “ revie w under

the common l aw wr it of cer tiorari.” T idwell v. City

of Memphis, 193 S.W .3d 555, 559-60 (Te nn. 2006). Un d ercommon law wr it of cer

tiorari revie w, a board’ s deter mination is arbitra

ry and void if it is unsupported by any materia l evidence

. Watts v. Civil Serv. Bd. for Col umbia, 606 S.W .2d 274, 276-77 (Te nn. 1980).
Prio r to Ja n u a r y 1 , 1 9 8 9 , T e nn e s s e e Code Annotated se ction 27-9-114 provided, in per tinent 18 pa rt : No cour

t of rec ord of this state shall ente rtain any proce eding involving the civil service status of a c ounty or m unicipal employ ee when such pr ocee ding is in the natur e of an a pp e a l f ro m a ru lin g of a c ity or c ounty of fi c ia l or bo ard wh ic h a ff

e c ts the employ

ment status of a county or city employee, except such proce edingbe one of c omm on law c e rt ior ari

. Acc ording ly , under this sec tion, review of administrative deter minations affe ctingthe employ ment status of c ounty e mpl oye e s, inc lud ingB oa rd de c isi on s, wo uld

have be e n und e r com mo n law wri t of cer tiorari revie w. See Huddleston v. City of Murfre esboro, 635 S.W .2d 694, 695-96 (Te nn. 1982) (holding that section 27-9-114 is the “exclusive reme dy for judicial review o f a d m i nistrative deter minations respec ting the e mploy ment status of such employees” ).
Howeve r, in 1988, the Ge nera l A ssembly amende d the languag e of section 27-9-114 to re ad, in p e rt ine nt p art , “ Judic ia l r e vie w o f d e c isi on s b y c ivi l se rvi ce bo ards o f a

c ounty or mun ic ipa lity wh ic h a ff e c ts the e mpl oy

me nt s tatus of

a c ounty or c ity c ivi l se rv ic e e mpl oye e sh a ll b e in c on fo rm ity with the judicial revie w standar ds under Te nness ee C o d e Annotate d, Section 4-5-322, of the-8-

[UAPA] .” 1988 Te nn. Pub. Acts, ch. 1001. Thus, t h e l eg islature dele ted the provision re quiring common law wr it of cer

tiorari re view and r eplac ed it with the curr ent provision providingfor judicial revie w under the UAPA. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 27-9-114( b)(1) (Supp. 2008). This subsection has not been subseque ntly

amende d.
In o ur vie w, no do ub t shou ld ev e r have e xiste d that th e She lby County Civ il Se rv ic e Me ri t Boa rd is just that – a “civil s er v i ce boa rd.” A ccor dingly , since January 1, 1989, the B oard’ s decisions s h o u ld

h a v e b e e n r e v ie w e d in a c c o rdanc e with Tenne ssee Code Annotated sec tion 4-5-322. In most case s the correc t standard of revie w has be en applied. E .g ., City of Memphis v. Civil S erv. Comm’n of Memphis, 216 S.W .3d 311, 315-16 (Tenn. 2007) ; County of Shelby

v. Tompkins, 241 S.W .3d 500, 505 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2007); Gleave s v. Shelby County , No. W2007-02259-COA-R3- CV, 2008 WL 4 6 4 8 3 5 4 , at * 5 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oc t. 21, 2008); L og an v. Civil S erv. Comm’n of Memphis, No. W2007-00324-COA-R3-CV, 2008 WL 7 1 5 2 2 6 , a t * 5 ( T e nn
. Ct

. App. Mar. 18, 2008) ; K in gv
. Sh e lb y

Co un ty G ov’t Civil Se r

v
. M e r it B d

. , N o
. W2 0 0 6

- 0 2 5 3 7

- CO A

- R3

- CV , 2 0 0 7 WL 1695404, at * 3 (Tenn. Ct. App. June 13, 2007). Ther e have been c ases, howe ver, where the int e rm e diate a

pp e llate c ourt

ha s r e ve rt e d to the old

c omm on law wri t of

c e rt ior ari re vie w. E. g ., Ca se v. Shelby County Civil Serv. Mer i t Bd., 98 S.W.3d 167, 172 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2002) (a pplying common law wr it of certiorar i revie w i n acc ordanc e with Tenne ssee Code Annotated se ction 27-8- 101); Hollimon v. Shelby County Gov’t, No. W2004-01111-COA-R3-CV, 2005 WL 736725, at *2 (T e nn . Ct . App . M ar. 31 , 2 00 5) (a pp lyingc omm on

law wri t of

c e rt ior ari re vie w i n a c c or da nc e wi th Tenne ssee Code Annotated sec tion 27-8-101). T h es e ca s es do not ref lect the c orre ct standar d of re vie w. We the re fo re take thi s op po rt un ity to r e ite ra te that, b e c a

us e the B oa

rd ’s de c isi on

“ a ff e c ts the e mpl o y

m e n t s t atu s o f a c o un ty o r c i ty c i v i l s e r v i c e e mp l o y e e , ” j u d i c i a l r e v i e w “ s h a l l be in confor mity with the judicial revie w standar ds under .

. . § 4 -5 -322.” Te nn. Code Ann. § 27-9-114( b)(1)

. In clar ifying the application of Tenne ssee Code Annotated section 27-9-114 to this Boa rd, a fina l issue ne eds to be addre ssed. In Shelby County Sheriff’ s Dep’t v. L owe, No. W2008-00433- COA-R3-CV, 2008 WL5191295, at *3 (Te nn. Ct. App. Dec. 11, 2008) (appl. pe rm. appe al filed, J an. 21, 2009), the Court of Appea ls posed this que stion: “Whether section 4-5- 322 g overns judicial revie w of c ivil service boa rds not g overne d by section 27-9-114( a)( 1)”? Although this Court has not p r e v i o u s l y a d dr e s s e d

th i s i s s u e , u

p o nr e v i e ww e f

i n d th ats e c t i o n4

- 5

- 3 2 2 d o e s a p p l y. Pursuant to Tennesse e Code Annotated sec tion 27-9-114(a )(1) (Supp. 2008):
Conte ste d c a se he ari ng s b y c ivi l se rv ic e bo ard s o f a c ounty or mun ic ipa lity which af fec t t h e empl oy

ment status of a c ivil service e mploy ee sha ll be conducte d in conformity

with contested c ase procedur es under the Uniform Administrative Procedur es Ac t, compiled in titl e 4, cha pter 5, pa rt 3.
In c ontr a st, Te nn e sse e Cod e Anno tate d s e c tio n 2 7- 9- 11 4( a )( 2) (S up p. 20 08 ) s tate s:

The provisions of subdivi sion (a)( 1) per taining to he aring s by

civil service-9-

boards sha ll not apply to municipal utilit ies boards or civil service boards of counties org anized under a

home rule c harte r for

m of g overnme nt. Shelby County is a home rule jur isdiction, and as such, Te nnessee Code Annotated Sec tion 27-9-114( a)( 2) exem p t s the B oard f rom the UAPA’s c ontested ca se hea ringproce dures. See id. Howeve r, rea ding subsections 27-9-114( a) & (b) in p ar i m ate ria , we do not find that subsec tion 27- 9-114(a )(2) chang es or a ffe cts judicial revie w of the B oard’ s decisions under subse ction 27-9- 114(b)( 1), wh i ch p ro v ides: “Judi cial re view of de cisions by civil service boards of

a county or municipality

which affec ts the employ ment status of a c ounty

or city civil service employ ee sha ll be in c on fo rm ity

wi th t he jud ic ia l r e vie w s tand ard s und e r t he Un if or m A dmi nis tr ativ e Pr oc e dure s A c t, § 4-5-322.” Unlike subsection 27-9- 114(a) , wher e the Ge nera l Assembly clea rly expressed its intent to exclude “civil service boards of counti es orga

nized under a home rule c harte r for m of g overnme nt” from c ompliance with the c ontested ca se proce dures of the UAPA, the same e x clusion does not a ppear in subse ction 27-9-114( b). There fore , applying the plain and or dinary meaningof Te nn e sse e Cod e Anno tate d s e c tio n 2 7- 9- 11 4( b) (1 ), thi s c a se c le arl y in vo lves re vie w o f a c ivi l service merit board de cision which “a ffe cts the employ ment s t atus of a c ounty

. . . civil service e mpl oye e .” Ac c or din g ly , e ve n th ou g h th e B oa rd did no t ha ve to c on du c t it s h e ari ng“ in c on fo rm ity with [ the] contested ca se proc edure s under the [UAPA],” id. § 27-9-114( a)( 1), t he B oard’ s decision must be review ed “in confor mity with the judicial revie w standards under the [UAPA] , § 4-5-322.” I d. § 27-9-114( b)(1)

. Ha vin gde te rm ine d th at th e Court of Ap pe a ls a

pp lie d the inc or

re c t st and ard

of re vie w i n th is c a se , h ow e ve r, do e s n ot r e so lve a ll o f t he iss ue s. Ins te a d, we mus t a dd re ss, u nd er the UA PA standard of revie w, the is sue Mr. Davis raised befor e the Court of A ppeals: whe ther the B oard e rre d in finding that Mr. Davis violated the D epar tment’s drug policy when the only evidenc e pre sented to support this finding was a contested dr

ugtest result? Although our revie w of the Boa rd’s fa ctual finding s is confined to the provisions of Te nnessee Code Annotated section 4-5-322, our re view of matters of la

w is de novo with no presumption of cor rec tness. T enn. R. App. P. 13(d); Cumulus Br oad. Inc. v. Shim, 226 S.W .3d 366, 373 (Tenn. 2007)

. TheBo ar d’ s D e c isi on to T

e rm ina teMr. D av is Through th e U AP A, T en n es s ee C o d e A nn o t at eds ec t i o n4 -5 -322 (2005) provides, in per tinent pa rt : (a )( 1) A p e rs on wh o is a gg ri eved b y

a fi na l de c isi on

in a c onte ste d c a se is e nti tle d to j ud ici al r e vie w und e r t his c ha pte r, wh ic h s ha ll b e the on ly ava ila ble method of judicial re view.

. . . (h) T h e c o urt ma

y a f f ir m th e d e c is io n o f th e a g e n c y o r r e ma n d th e ca se for further proce eding s. The cour

t may reve rse or

modify the dec ision if the rights of the-10-

p e t i t i o n e r h av e b e e np r e

j u d i c e d b e c a u s e th e a dm i n i s tr at i v e f

i n d i n g s , i n f

e r e nc e s, conclusions or de cisions are : (1 ) I n v iol atio n o f c on sti tut ion a l or statut or y pr ov isi on s; ( 2 ) In e x c e s s o f

th e s t atut o r

y a uth o r i ty o f

th e a g e n c y; (3) Ma de upon unlawf

ul proce dure; (4 ) Ar bit ra ry or c a pr ic iou s or c ha

ra c te ri zed by a

bu se of dis c re tio n o r c le arl y unwar rante d exercise of

discretion; or (5)( A) Unsuppor

ted by evidenc e that is both subst antial and mate rial in light of the e ntire re cord. (B ) I n d e te rm ini ngthe su

bs tanti a lity

of e vid e nc e , th e c ourt

sh a ll t ake int o acc ount whateve r in the rec ord fa irly detra cts from its weight, but the court shall not substitut e it s judgme nt for that of the ag ency as to the we ight of

the evidenc e on qu e sti on s o f f

a c t. Applying this standar d of re view, a r eviewing court may reve rse the Boa rd’s decision only if one or more of the five enumer ated gr ounds for r ever sal is present. I d. § 4-5-322( h). This scope of revie w is the same for

the t ri al court, interme diate appe llate cour t, and this Court. Gluck v. Civil Serv. Comm’n, 15 S.W .3d 486, 490 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1999). On appe al, Mr. Davis actually attacks the sufficie ncy

of the e vidence relied up o n b y the Boa rd base d on his belief that the positive urine spe cimen test re sult is i nadmissible. A s this Court rec ently stated in City

of Memphis, 216 S.W .3d at 316, “only the last two [ s t atutory

g rounds for reve rsal, Te nnessee Code Annotated subsections 4-5-322( h)(4) -(5) ,] re late to the sufficie ncy of the evidenc e.” T here fore , in order to r esolve the issue raised by Mr. Davis, we must determine whe ther the B oar d ’s finding s were “(4) [a] rbitrar y or ca pricious or c hara cter ized by abuse of discretion or c le arl y unwa rr ante d e xcis e of

dis c re tio n[,] o r ( 5) (A ) [u ]nsu pp or ted by e vid e nc e that is bo th s u b s t an t i a l an d

m at e r i a l i nth e l i g h to f

th e e n t i r e r e c o r d

. ” T e nn
. C o d e A nn
. § 4

- 5

- 3 2 2 ( h ) ( 4 )

- ( 5 )

. In revie wingthe B oard’ s findings, w e take into a ccount whateve r in the rec ord fairly detra cts from the weight of the evide nce, but we may not substitute our own judg ment o n questions of fac t by re -w e ig hin gthe e vid e nc e . Se e id. § 4 -5 -3 22 (h )( 5) (B ). We may re je c t th e B oa

rd ’s de c isi on

on ly if a re a so na ble pe rs on wo uld ne c e ssa ri ly re a c h a dif

fe re nt c on c lus ion ba se d on the e vid e nc e
. Mart in v. Siz emore , 78 S.W .3d 249, 276 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2001). It is not e noug h that the fa cts could support a diffe rent c onclusion. I d.
Mr. Davis c ontends that t h e p o sitive urine spec imen test result was inadmissible evidenc e fo r t he B oa rd to c on sid e r. With out th e te st r e su lt, Mr . D avis be lie ve s th e B oa rd ha d n o c a

us e to terminate his employ

ment for violatingthe Prog ram’s policie s, thus making the Bo ar d’s dec ision “ar bitrary and ca pricious” a

nd “[u] nsupported by

evidenc e that is both substa n t i al and mater ial.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 4- 5-322(h) (4)- (5). B efor e this Court, Mr

. Davis’ attorney agree d, howeve r, that if the Court finds that the positive urine spec imen t es t re s u l t was admissible then the B oard’ s dec i s i o nwa s n ei th er

ar b i tra ry n o r c ap ri ci o u s an d

wa s s u p p o rt edb y

s u b s t an t i al an d

m at er i al evidenc e.O n e of t h e e x pr es s prov i s i on s of t h e Ci v i l Ser v i ce M er i t A ct i s t h at empl oy ee s ma y on l y be t er mi n at ed f or 19 j u s t c au s e. 1971 T en n
. Pr i v
. Act s c h

. 110, § 22. -11- Acc ording ly , if this Court determines that the positive ur ine specimen te st result was admissible, our analy sis ends there a

nd the dec ision of the Boa rd will be af

firmed.
Ad mi ssi bil ity of t hePo sit iv eUr ineSp e c im e n Te st R esu lt Notwithstanding which standar d of re view the C o u r t o f A p peals should have utiliz ed, the r eal iss ue in t his c a se is the a dmi ssi bil ity of the re su lts of

the Au gus t 20 , 2 00 2, ur ine te st. To su pp or t it s introduction of the test re sult, the Depart m ent offe red: (1) a cha in of custody form conta ining the chain of cu stody

number 0312131; (2) the sig nature of Mr. Da vis certify

ing that the “spec imen container (s) was/we re seale d with tamper-pr oof seal(s) in my prese nce; and th at t h e information provided on this form and on the label(s) aff ix ed t o the spec imen container (s) is cor rec t;” (3) a photocopy

of the tampe r-pr oo f l ab el , with the initials “DD,” that wa s aff ix ed to the lid of the specimen c ontainer; (4) the testimony of Chief Wing t h at h e i nspecte d the label on the spe cimen container containingthe chain of custody number prior to re commendingtermination; and (5) the positive drugtest result. On t he other side, Mr. Davis testified that: (1) he did not re ad the c hain of custody document bef

ore signing it; (2) he signe d the document be fore he provide d a urine speci men; (3) he did not r emember writing the initials “D D” on the tamper- proof adhesive label; (4) he did not observe how the spec imen was handled afte r he g ave the specimen to the c ollector; (5) the number that appea

rs on the xerox copy

of the labe l containingthe cha in of custody number c ould be either 0312131 or 0312121; and (6) the name of the collec tor who sig ned the c hain of c ustody document w a s un kn o w n
. M r
. D av i s a l s o o f f e r e d th e r e s u l t s o f tw o o th e r dr u g t e s t s
. O n e t e s t , t ak e ne i g h td ays a ft e r t he or ig ina l te st, wa s d e e me d in c on c lus ive be c a us e of dil uti on of the sampl e
. Th e se c on d te st, taken twe nty -four

day s after

the orig inal test, showed that Mr. Da vis “passed” a n o n -DOT dr ug scre en. Af te r c on sid e ri ngthe te sti mony of Mr

. Da vis , Mr

. Ho us ton , and Chi e f Wing , a nd the e xhibi ts pr e s e n t e d , th e B o ar d d e t e r m i n e d th at M r
. D av i s w a s f i r e d f o r c a u s e i n a c c o r d an c e w i th the Civ il Service Merit Act. Given that Mr. Davis’ testimony direc tly conflicte d with the evidenc e pre sented 19 by the Depa rtment, the B oard c lear ly reso l v ed issues of cr edibility ag ainst Mr. Davis. I ssues of cre dibilit y

are for the tr i er o f fa ct, and this Court must give c onsiderable defe renc e to the trier of fac t’s fac tual finding s. Seals v. Eng land/Corsair Upholstery Mfg

. Co., 984 S.W .2d 912, 915 (Tenn. 1999). Mr. Davis, howe ver, a rgues that the issue be fore the B oard was not one of c redibility , but instead, one of ad m i s s i b i l i t y of evide nce. A s Mr. Davis ar gues, the c hain of c ustody of the urine specimen is “ so inhere ntly flawe d as to r ender the test results inadmissible.” Mr. Davis argues that ha d th e B oa

rd c or re c tly a pp lie d th e ru le s o f e vid e nc e and the g e ne ra l r

ule s r e g ard in gthe a dmi ssi bil ity of evide nce, the urine spec imen test result would have been de emed inadmissible.
As su pp or t f or his argume nt, Mr. Dav is re lie s u po n th e le g a l pr inc ipl e s se t f or th i nT h e T e n n e sse e R u le s o f E v id e n c e “w e re ra tif ie d a n d a p p ro v e d in 1 9 8 9 H o u se R e so lu ti o n 1 0 a n d S e n a te 20 R eso l uti o n 4 ” a nd b ec am e e f f ec t i ve Ja nu ary 1 , 1 9 9 0

. T en n. R

. E vid

. C o m p i l er’s N o t es.
1971 T en n
. Pr i v
. Act s , c h

. 110, § 23 ( “ T h e boar d s h al l

. . . c ommen ce a he ar i n g t h er eon a n d s h al l t h er eu pon 21 f ul l y hear and d et erm i ne t he m at t er and shal l ei t her af f i rm, mo d i f

y , or revoke s uch ord er of dis ci p l i ne. T he ap p el l ant s hal l be en t i t l ed t o appear p er s onal l y , p r od uce evi dence , and t o hav e couns el and t o a p ubl i c hear i ng
. ”)

. Cf

. M et r op ol i t an G over nment of

N as hv i l l e & D avi dson C ount y , T enn es s ee, Ci vi l Ser vi ce C om mi s s i on, Ci vi l Ser vi ce P ol i ci es , P ol i cy 6 .8 A -1 (L ) D isc ip lina ry & G rie v a n c e A p p e a l P ro c e e d ing s, 8 8 , av a ilab le at h ttp :// w w w .na sh v ill e .go v /c ivil_ se rv ic e /c ivil_
se rv ic e

_ p o licie s.p d f (e x p licitly stating w h a t stan d a rd s fo r ad m issib ili ty a p p ly in he a rin g s b e fo re the D a v id so n C o u n ty C i vil S erv i ce C o m m i ssi o n) (“A t all co ntested ca se he aring s, t he t esti m o ny o f wit ne sses sha l l b e take n in o p en he aring s. A t t h e d isc re tio n o f t h e C o m m issio n , o r a t t h e m o tio n o f an y p a rty, w itne sse s m a y b e e x c lud e d p rio r to the ir tes tim o n y. T he st and ard f

o r adm i ss i b i l i t y i s set f o rt h i n T

. C

. A

. 4-5- 3 1 3

. ”).

-12- Tenne ssee’ s Rules of Evidence rele vant to the admission of phy sical evide nce. See Tenn. R. Evid. 9 0 1

. S tri ct adh er en ce t o th e T en n es s ee R u l es o f E v i d en ce , h o we v er , i s n o tre qu i re d i np ro ce ed i n gs be fo re the B oa

rd . B y the ir own te rm s, the Te nn e sse e Rul e s o f E vid e nce d o no t app ly to adm in is tr ativ e he ari ng s, but r athe r t o c ourt a pp e ara nc e s. Te nn . R. Ev id. 10 1 ( “ Th e se ru le s sh a ll g overn e vidence ruling s in all trial c ourts of Tenne ssee except as otherwise pr ovided by statute or rules o f t h e Supreme Court of Te nnessee .”). The ref ore, the Tenne ssee Rules of Evide nce do not apply unless the B oard e nacted a ru l e to adopt them. S ee G oodwin v. Metro. B d. of He alth, 656 S.W .2d 383, 388 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1983) (“[N]either the technica lities of the Civil Rules of Procedur e no r t he c omm on

law ru le s o f e vid e nc e ne c e ssa ri ly a pp ly be fo re no nju dic ia l bo die s unless the rules 20 of t ha t body so re qu ire .” ) ( e mph a sis a dd e d) (c iti ngB igF or k M ini ngCo. v. Te nn . Wate r Q ua lity Control Bd., 620 S.W.2d 515 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1981); L& NRailroad Co. v. Fow ler, 271 S.W.2d 188 (Tenn. 1954) ). In this instance, the Civil Service Merit Act doe s not provide that B oard he aring s are s u b j e c tt o th e T e nn e s s e e R

u l e s o f E v i d e n c e
. 1 9 7 1 T e nn
. P r i v
. A c t s , c h

. 1 1 0 , § 2 3

. A c c o r d i n g l y,

21 in review ing de cisions from these “ less than leg ally formal he aring s,” appe llate cour ts are guided, not by the Rules of Evidenc e, but instead “ by a sense of fa ir pl ay an d t h e av o i d ance of undue prejudice to either side of the controve rsy and [m ust de termine] whether . . . the ac tion of the hea

ring Boa rd in admitting or ex cl uding e vidence was unre asonable or ar bitrary .” Goodwin, 656 S.W.2d at 388.
In thi s c a se , Mr

. Da

vis wa s p ro vid e d th e op po rt un ity to atta c k th e po sit ive te st r e su lt a nd to proff er e vidence supporting h i s argument that the sample wa s not his and that he did not have marijuana in his sy stem at the t ime the t est was administ ere d. The B oard, how ever , did not find Mr. Da vis ’ a rgume nt c re dib le and

a dmi tte d th e sampl e
. We c ann ot s ay that th e a dmi ssi on

of the sampl e was unduly

prejudicia l, unrea sonable, or a rbitrar y
. Even if the T ennesse e Rules of Evidenc e we re a pplicable dur ing the Bo ar d ’s h ea ri ng , we find the necessar

y chain of custody was sufficiently , if minimally , established to justify admission of the po sit ive ur ine sp e c ime n. “ Th e c ha in o f e vid e nc e me tho d o f id ent ific atio n is a wi de ly re c ognize d c on c e pt i n b oth c ivi l and c ri min a l la

w. ” She ll v. L aw, 93 5 S. W.2 d 4 02 , 4 09 (T e nn . Ct

. App. 1996) (quoting Ritt er v. State, 462 S.W .2d 247, 249 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1970)). “ In most cases it is notpossible to establish the i d en t i t y o f an exhibi t in question by a sing le witness. Sever al persons have usually handled the specimen before its analy sis.” Ritt er, 462 S.W.2d at 249 (citingO n t he b o t t o m of t he chai n of cust o d y f o rm, i n a sect i o n d esi gnat ed , “ FO R LA B U SE O N LY , ” ap p ears t he 22

s i gn at ur e of

t he l ab t ech ni ci an who “ R ece i ved I n T oxi col ogy f r om C our i er , R emo ved From P ouch And P l ace d i n Lock ed R oo m T emp
. St orag e B y :
. ” Add i t i onal l y , on t he back of t he f orm a pp ear s t he s i gn at ur es of t wo addi t i onal “ Lab As s oci at es ” wh o h an dl ed t h e pos i t i v e u r i n e s pec i men
. W i t h ea ch s i g n at u r e a ppea r s t h e “ Rea s on For H an dl i n g ” an d a
s pace f or “ D at e/ T i me. ” -13- 21 A.L .R.2d 1216; 29 Am. J ur. 2d Evid. § 830; 32 C.J .S. Evid. § 588(2)). Specimens “should be handled with the g reatest of car e and all persons who handle the specimen should be rea dy to identify it and test i fy t o i t s custody and uncha

ng ed condition.” Shell, 935 S.W.2d at 409. W hether the requisite cha in of custody

has been established to justify admission, howeve r, is “a matter committed to the discretion of the trial judg e and [ t] his deter mination will not be overturned in the abse nce of a cle arly mistaken exercis e t h ere of.” I d.; see Woods v. Metro. Gov’t of N ashville & Davidson County , No. M2001-03143

- CO A

- R3

- CV , 2 0 0 3 WL 2 2 9 38947, at *3 (Te nn. Ct. App. Dec. 10, 2003)

. “Th e ide nti ty

of [the ] . . . sampl e [] ne e d n ot b e pr ov e d b e yon d a ll p os sib ili ty of do ub t or that a ll po ssi bilit y of ta

mpe ri ngwi th [i t] be e xclu de d. Th e c ir c ums tanc e s n e e d o nly e sta bli shre a so na

ble assura nce of the i dentity of t he sample.” Shell, 935 S.W .2d at 409 (quotingPatterson v. State, 160 S.E.2d 815 (Ga. 1968) ).
In this case , we find that the facts rea sonably establish that Mr. Davis supplied the positive urine spec imen. Although the collector of the specimen did not testify , this is notenough to rende r the evidenc e incompete nt. See Shell, 935 S.W .2d at 409-10 (noting t h at “t he fa ilure to have the phlebotomist available to testify did not render

the evidenc e incompete nt” and that “ the circ umstances unde r which the s amples were taken and the t ests conducte d[] are matters af fec ting the cr edibility

of the e vidence rather t h an the admissibi lity ”). Mr . Houston provided testimony reg ardingthe chain of custody number, the ba

r code , and the c hain of c ustody form sig ned by

Mr. Davis. The chain of custody form contained the signatures of the three individuals who handled the specimen onc e it arr ived at t h e t o x icolog y lab; one of those individuals beingMr. Houston. 22 Moreove r, notwithstanding his late r attempt to disavow his a ctions, Mr. Davis sig ned the c hain of c us tod y fo rm ve ri fy ingthe pr oc e dure s u se d d ur ingthe dr

ugte st a nd a c kn ow le dg ingthat the c ha in of custody number on the s ample and the form wer e identical. Ba sed on these f acts, the B oard ha d a re asonable assura

nce that the positive urine sampled be longe d to Mr. Davis, and a s such, the Boa rd, in its discretion, determined t hat t he posi tive urine sample was admissi ble. W e find no err or in this determination. Havingdeter

mined that the positive ur ine spec imen test resultwas a dmissibl e evide nce in the Boa rd’s he aring , the B oard’ s decision to terminate Mr . Davis’ e mploy ment was supporte d by su bs tanti a l and

mate ri a l e vid e nc e and

wa s n e i t h e r a rb itr ary no r c a pr ic iou s. Ac c or din g ly , w e re ins tate the trial cour

t’s decision to deny

Mr. Davis’ Petition for Writ of Certiora ri.-14- CO NC LU SION
For the re a s o n s s tate d a

b o v e , th e ju d g me n t o f th e Co urt o f Ap p e a ls is r e v e r s e d , an d the jud g me nt o f t

he tr ia l c ourt

is r e ins tate d in

a ll r e sp e c ts. Cos ts of thi s app e a l ar e taxed to De re k D avis f o r w h i c he x e c ut i o nm ay i s s u e i f n e c e s s ar y.

______________________________

CO RN EL IA A . CLARK, JUSTI CE