NO. 4-05-0418 Filed: 8/23/06 

IN THE APPELLATE COURT 

OF ILLINOIS 

FOURTH DISTRICT THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, ) Appeal from 

Plaintiff-Appellee, ) Circuit Court of 

v. ) Adams County 

ANTONIO D. PIERCE, ) No. 05CF2 

Defendant-Appellant. ) 

 ) Honorable 

 ) Scott H. Walden, 

 ) Judge Presiding. _________________________________________________________________

 JUSTICE KNECHT delivered the opinion of the court: 

Following a jury trial, defendant, Antonio D. Pierce, 

was convicted of theft from the person (720 ILCS 5/16-1 (West 

2004)) and sentenced to six years' imprisonment. On appeal from 

his conviction, defendant argues the court erred by modifying the 

Illinois pattern jury instruction (IPI) for theft from the person 

to include theft of property "from the person or presence of 

another." We affirm. 

I. BACKGROUND 

On September 13, 2004, Robert Gallaher went to the 

Silver Moon Tavern in Quincy, Illinois. Gallaher sat at the bar 

and purchased beer from the bartender, Linda Sheehan. To pay 

Sheehan for his beer, Gallaher placed $50 on the bar directly in 

front of him. Gallaher testified he had his hand on the money 

while the money was on the bar. After he paid for his drinks, 

several twenties were in front of him. 

Defendant entered the bar and approached Gallaher. 

Defendant offered to sell Gallaher cigarettes. Gallaher de-
- 2 -

clined. Gallaher then removed his hand from the money to light a 

cigarette. A surveillance tape from the bar shows the victim 

intermittently placing his left hand on his money while holding a 

cigarette in his right hand. Defendant grabbed the money and ran 

from the bar. The surveillance tape confirmed the victim's and 

the bartender's testimony. 

At the jury conference, the State offered modified 

versions of Illinois Pattern Jury Instructions, Criminal, Nos. 

13.09 and 13.10 (4th ed. 2000) (hereinafter IPI Criminal 4th). 

The State's proposed instruction added the phrase "or presence" 

to the IPI. For example, the modified version of IPI Criminal 

4th No. 13.09 read as follows: 

"A person commits the offense of theft 

from the person when he knowingly obtains 

unauthorized control over the property by 

taking said property from the person or presence of another and intends to deprive the 

owner permanently of the use or benefit of 

the property." (Emphasis added.) 

Defendant objected to the proposed modifications. 

Defendant argued the committee had not added "or presence" to the 

IPI and no decision from this court supported the modification. 

The court, citing People v. Jackson, 158 Ill. App. 3d 394, 511 

N.E.2d 923 (1987), and People v. Harrell, 342 Ill. App. 3d 904, 

795 N.E.2d 1022 (2003), agreed with the State and ordered the 

modified instructions given. 

The jury found defendant guilty of theft from the 
- 3 -

person. The court sentenced defendant as stated. This appeal 

followed. 

II. ANALYSIS 

Defendant argues the trial court erred by not using the 

pattern instructions to describe the theft-from-the-person 

statute. Defendant contends the trial court's addition of "or 

presence" was erroneous because it was an inaccurate statement of 

the law. Defendant contends the language in the theft-from-theperson statute is plain and unambiguous: theft "from the person" 

simply means theft of property attached to the person. By adding 

the words "or presence," defendant contends the court improperly 

expanded the theft-from-the-person offense to include conduct not 

contemplated by the legislature. 

The State argues the instruction was proper because 

theft from the person is properly interpreted as including theft 

from the person's presence. 

Generally, trial courts must use pattern instructions 

when "an appropriate IPI instruction exists on a subject upon 

which the trial court has determined the jury should be instructed." People v. Pollock, 202 Ill. 2d 189, 212, 780 N.E.2d 

669, 682 (2002). The instructions 

"were 'painstakingly drafted with the use of 

simple, brief[,] and unslanted language so as 

to clearly and concisely state the law,' and, 

for that reason, 'the use of additional instructions on a subject already covered by 

IPI would defeat the goal that all instruc-
- 4 -

tions be simple, brief, impartial[,] and free 

from argument.'" Pollock, 202 Ill. 2d at 

212, 780 N.E.2d at 682, quoting People v. 

Haywood, 82 Ill. 2d 540, 545, 413 N.E.2d 410, 

413 (1980). 

Trial courts have discretion to give a nonpattern jury instruction. See Pollock, 202 Ill. 2d at 211, 780 N.E.2d at 682. When 

courts do so, the nonpattern instruction should be "an accurate, 

simple, brief, impartial, and nonargumentative statement of the 

law." Pollock, 202 Ill. 2d at 211, 780 N.E.2d at 682. If it is 

not, we may find the trial court abused its discretion in giving 

the nonpattern instruction. See Pollock, 202 Ill. 2d at 211, 780 

N.E.2d at 682. 

In this case, the question of whether the jury instruction was proper hinges on whether the addition of "or presence" 

is an accurate statement of the law. This is a matter of statutory construction, a matter we review de novo. See People v. 

Whitney, 188 Ill. 2d 91, 98, 720 N.E.2d 225, 229 (1999). 

Our goal in construing statutes "is to ascertain and 

give effect to the legislature's intent." People v. Dixon, 359 

Ill. App. 3d 938, 941, 835 N.E.2d 925, 928 (2005), citing Whitney, 188 Ill. 2d at 97, 720 N.E.2d at 228. The best means for 

satisfying this goal is to examine the language of the statute. 

When the language of the statute is clear and unambiguous, we 

will give effect to its plain meaning. See Dixon, 359 Ill. App. 

3d at 941, 835 N.E.2d at 928. When, however, the language is 

ambiguous, we "may consider other extrinsic aids for construc-
- 5 -

tion, including legislative history, to resolve the ambiguity and 

determine legislative intent." Whitney, 188 Ill. 2d at 97-98, 

720 N.E.2d at 228. We are also mindful of the general rule to 

strictly construe penal statutes in the defendant's favor. See 

Whitney, 188 Ill. 2d at 98, 720 N.E.2d at 228. 

Section 16-1 of the Criminal Code of 1961 (720 ILCS 

5/16-1 (West 2004)) defines theft. One of the definitions, 

applicable here, is that one commits theft when he or she knowingly "[o]btains or exerts unauthorized control over property of 

the owner" and "[i]ntends to deprive the owner permanently of the 

use or benefit of the property." 720 ILCS 5/16-1(a)(1)(A) (West 

2004). "Theft of property from the person" is a sentencing 

enhancement. See 720 ILCS 5/16-1(b)(4) (West 2004) ("Theft of 

property from the person not exceeding $300 in value *** is a 

Class 3 felony"). While "[t]heft of property not from the 

person" when the value of the property does not exceed $300 is a 

Class A misdemeanor, "[t]heft of property from the person" in the 

same amount is a Class 3 felony. See 720 ILCS 5/16-1(b)(1), 

(b)(4) (West 2004). 

We find the plain language of the theft-from-the-person 

statute does not support defendant's view. A reasonable reading 

of the statute applies to the situation here. The money was 

directly in front of the victim, and the money was snatched just 

after the victim removed his hands from it. 

Defendant emphasizes the difference between the theftfrom-the-person statute and the robbery statute. The robbery 

statute states one "commits robbery when he or she takes property 
- 6 -

*** from the person or presence of another by the use of force or 

by threatening the imminent use of force." (Emphasis added.) 

720 ILCS 5/18-1(a) (West 2004). Defendant contends the inclusion 

of the "presence" language in the robbery statute, but the 

omission of the same language in the theft-from-the-person 

statute, shows legislative intent to impose a harsher penalty for 

theft from the person's body. Defendant contends this interpretation of the language in the two statutes complies with the 

principle that courts construe statutes so no phrase or word is 

rendered meaningless. See People v. Parvin, 125 Ill. 2d 519, 

525, 533 N.E.2d 813, 815 (1988). 

Before the current version of the robbery statute, the 

language was limited to "from the person of another." See People 

v. Braverman, 340 Ill. 525, 530, 173 N.E. 55, 57 (1930) ("'Robbery,' as defined by the statute, is the felonious and violent 

taking of money, goods[,] or other valuable thing, from the 

person of another by force or intimidation"). The Supreme Court 

of Illinois in Braverman examined common law and concluded "from 

the person" included the taking of property in the possession or 

control of the person robbed. Braverman, 340 Ill. at 531, 173 

N.E. at 57. Because of the Braverman interpretation of the 

robbery statute, the statute was changed to incorporate "presence." See 720 ILCS Ann. 5/18-1, Committee Comments 1961, at 6 

(Smith-Hurd 2003). 

We do not believe defendant is correct that to construe 

the theft-from-the-person statute as the State would have us do 

renders the phrase "or presence" in the robbery statute meaning-
- 7 -

less. The Committee Comments indicate the addition of "or 

presence" to the robbery statute did not change the law: 

"This paragraph codifies the law in 

Illinois on robbery. No change is intended. 

*** '. . . or presence' is added to incorporate the court's holding in People v. 

Braverman ***." (Emphasis added.) 720 ILCS 

Ann. 5/18-1, Committee Comments 1961, at 6 

(Smith-Hurd 2003). 

The "or presence" language thus clarified the law after a defendant's attempt to avoid a robbery conviction when the property 

taken was not on the victim, but in the victim's presence and 

control (see Braverman, 340 Ill. at 531, 173 N.E. at 57). 

Defendant further urges this court to follow People v. 

Williams, 42 Ill. App. 3d 134, 355 N.E.2d 597 (1976), which 

concluded the theft-from-the-person statute necessitated the 

property be taken from the victim's body or clothes. In Williams, the First District considered the appeal of a defendant 

convicted of attempt (robbery). The defendant argued, in part, 

his conviction "was improper because there was no evidence that 

[he] used force or threatened the imminent use of force." 

Williams, 42 Ill. App. 3d at 135, 355 N.E.2d at 598. After the 

court found the conviction unsupported because no evidence showed 

force, the court considered whether the defendant was guilty of 

theft. The court rejected the State's suggestion the defendant 

could be guilty of theft from the person: 

"The difficulty with this is that the evi-
- 8 -

dence does not support this charge. Williams 

did not attempt to take money from Bell's 

person but did attempt to take it from the 

cash register which was in her presence." 

Williams, 42 Ill. App. 3d at 138, 355 N.E.2d 

at 601. 

Three cases since Williams have rejected the proposition the theft-from-the-person statute does not extend beyond 

thefts of property from on the person. See Harrell, 342 Ill. 

App. 3d at 909, 795 N.E.2d at 1025; People v. Sims, 245 Ill. App. 

3d 221, 224, 614 N.E.2d 893, 896 (1993); Jackson, 158 Ill. App. 

3d at 399, 511 N.E.2d at 926. In Jackson, the Fifth District 

considered the appeal of a defendant charged with theft from the 

person. Jackson, 158 Ill. App. 3d at 394, 511 N.E.2d at 923. 

The evidence at trial established the victim, when returning to 

his car at a rest stop, was approached by the defendant. The 

defendant pushed the victim against the victim's car and asked 

for the victim's billfold. After the victim stated he did not 

have one, the defendant reached behind the victim to look for a 

wallet. The defendant then opened the door and removed the 

victim's wallet from under the driver's seat. The defendant 

stole cash and credit cards from the wallet. The defendant also 

stole other items from the car. See Jackson, 158 Ill. App. 3d at 

395-96, 511 N.E.2d at 924. 

The Jackson court upheld the defendant's conviction. 

The Jackson court concluded the words "from the person" included 

"the taking of property not only from the actual person of the 
- 9 -

victim but also from the presence of the victim." Jackson, 158 

Ill. App. 3d at 399, 511 N.E.2d at 926. The court reasoned, in 

part, the danger of confrontation was as great in taking it from 

under his car seat as it would have been had the defendant taken 

the wallet from defendant's pocket. The court further concluded 

the victim's person was violated. See Jackson, 158 Ill. App. 3d 

at 397, 511 N.E.2d at 925. The Jackson court further found 

persuasive a comparison of the theft-from-the-person statute to 

the robbery statute. First, the court noted the law permits when 

an article is stolen without a threat of violence to the person, 

the crime will be held to be theft from the person. See Jackson, 

158 Ill. App. 3d at 397, 511 N.E.2d at 925, citing People v. 

Patton, 76 Ill. 2d 45, 389 N.E.2d 1174 (1979). Second, the 

Jackson court reasoned the "from the person" language in the 

robbery statute, before the words "or presence" were added, 

included property taken from the person. See Jackson, 158 Ill. 

App. 3d at 397-98, 511 N.E.2d at 925, quoting Braverman, 340 Ill. 

at 530-31, 173 N.E. at 57. 

In Sims, the Third District reversed a theft-from-theperson conviction but did not hold the theft-from-the-person 

statute was limited to takings from on the person. The victim 

was in a store; her two-year-old son and her purse were in the 

child's seat of a shopping cart. While shopping, the victim 

turned from her cart to look at merchandise. At that point, she 

was approximately 2 1/2 feet from the cart. The victim heard her 

son fuss. When she turned around, she saw the defendant leave 

the aisle and she noticed her purse was missing. Sims, 245 Ill. 
- 10 -

App. 3d at 222-23, 614 N.E.2d at 895. 

The Sims court expressly agreed with the holding in 

Jackson, and thus agreed the theft did not have to come from the 

person's body, but refused to apply Jackson's holding to the 

facts before it. The court determined "more evidence is required 

to support a conviction of theft of property from the person than 

the mere taking of property from the presence of a victim who is 

unaware of the theft which occurred several feet away from her 

person." Sims, 245 Ill. App. 3d at 224, 614 N.E.2d at 896. 

In Harrell, the Second District affirmed the defendant's conviction for theft from the person when he took the 

victim's purse from a shopping cart. Specifically, the victim 

and her husband had finished shopping and were returning to their 

car. The purse was in the baby seat. As the husband opened the 

truck, the defendant approached the victim from behind, reached 

around her, and snatched the purse from the cart. Harrell, 342 

Ill. App. 3d at 906, 795 N.E.2d at 1023. 

The Harrell court agreed with Sims's conclusion that 

"from the person" includes "'when the victim has been detained or 

searched as in Jackson or when the victim's privacy has been 

directly invaded at the time the property is taken.'" Harrell, 

342 Ill. App. 3d at 909, 795 N.E.2d at 1025, quoting Sims, 245 

Ill. App. 3d at 224, 614 N.E.2d at 896. The Harrell court 

concluded its facts were more similar to those in Jackson: 

"The victim stated that defendant reached 

around her to take the purse from the cart. 

She must have been standing immediately next 
- 11 -

to the cart and was obviously aware of the 

theft as it occurred. These facts distinguish the case from Sims. Clearly, the victim's privacy was directly invaded." 

Harrell, 342 Ill. App. 3d at 909, 795 N.E.2d 

at 1025. 

The split among the appellate districts in this state 

exemplifies the split among state courts across the country. 

Compare Terral v. State, 84 Nev. 412, 414, 442 P.2d 465, 466 

(1968), and State v. Lucero, 28 Utah 2d 61, 62, 498 P.2d 350, 351 

(1972), with In re Welfare of D.D.S., 396 N.W.2d 831, 832-33 

(Minn. 1986), and State v. Shepard, 726 A.2d 1138, 1141-42 (R.I. 

1999). The Terral court, which held theft from the person 

requires a taking from property on the person, reasoned that the 

Statute of 8 Elizabeth in the 16th century created the offense of 

larceny from the person and was intended to apply to 

pickpocketing, requiring proof of an actual taking from the 

person. See Terral, 84 Nev. at 413-14, 442 P.2d at 465-66. 

On the other hand, some courts that reached a conclusion contrary to the one in Terral also relied on the common law. 

 For example, in D.D.S., the court reasoned under common law, 

property taken from the person included property taken from the 

presence of the person. See D.D.S., 396 N.W.2d at 832. The 

D.D.S. court quoted Coke from the 1600s: "'for that which is 

taken in his presence, is in law taken from his person.'" 

D.D.S., 396 N.W.2d at 832. 

We conclude defendant's conduct in taking the money 
- 12 -

from the bar in front of the victim falls within the language of 

"theft of property from the person." We find compelling the fact 

the legislature, in drafting the theft-from-the-person statute, 

used the same words that were used in describing robbery offenses. See People v. Campbell, 234 Ill. 391, 393, 84 N.E. 1035, 

1036 (1908) ("The difference between stealing from the person of 

another, and robbery, lies in the force or intimidation used"). 

These same words, "from the person," as indicated by Braverman, 

included property taken from one's presence and control. See 

also D.D.S., 396 N.W.2d at 832. That the legislature has not yet 

decided to clarify the meaning of the "from the person" language 

in the theft-from-the-person statute carries little weight. See 

Harrell, 342 Ill. App. 3d at 909, 795 N.E.2d at 1026. In addition, we find the risk of confrontation that intensifies when a 

theft occurs in a victim's presence is the same as when the theft 

is from the victim's body. See Jackson, 158 Ill. App. 3d at 397, 

511 N.E.2d at 925; D.D.S., 396 N.W.2d at 833 ("Taking property 

that is in the immediate presence or control of the victim 

carries with it the same special potential for physical violence 

or alarm as that associated with a taking of property that is in 

the hand of the victim"). 

We hold the addition of "or presence" was an accurate 

statement of the law. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in defining "from the person" for the jury, which was not 

done by IPI Criminal 4th No. 13.09 or 13.10. See generally 177 

Ill. 2d R. 451(a) ("Whenever IPI Criminal 2d does not contain an 

instruction on a subject on which the court determines that the 
- 13 -

jury should be instructed, the instruction given on that subject 

should be simple, brief, impartial, and free from argument"). 

We note we need not ascertain whether Sims's awareness 

standard or whether an "'under the protection'" standard (see 

generally D.D.S., 396 N.W.2d at 832, quoting R. Perkins, Perkins 

on Criminal Law, 278-79 (2d ed. 1969)) is appropriate for defining when an item is in a victim's presence. Here, the facts 

satisfy either standard. 

III. CONCLUSION 

For the reasons stated, we affirm the trial court's 

judgment. 

Affirmed. 

McCULLOUGH and COOK, JJ., concur.