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Filed 8/29/13 Ehrlich v. Ruiz CA1/3 

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS 

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for 

publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication 

or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. 

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA 

FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT 

DIVISION THREE 

JAKE W. EHRLICH, III., 

 Plaintiff and Respondent,. 

v. 

HUMBERTO RUIZ, JR., 

 Defendant and Appellant. 

 A136460 

 (San Francisco County 

 Super. Ct. No. CCH-12-573254) 

 This is an appeal from a civil harassment restraining order entered against 

defendant Humberto Ruiz on July 13, 2012 for the protection of plaintiff Jake W. Ehrlich. 

Entry of this order followed an uncontested hearing at which plaintiff testified as to the 

veracity of his statements describing defendant’s harassment as set forth in his request for 

restraining order under penalty of perjury, and defendant failed to appear or to otherwise 

offer opposition. We affirm.1

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 

 On March 27, 2007, plaintiff filed in San Francisco Superior Court a Request for 

Civil Harassment Restraining Order seeking protection from defendant for himself and 

his live-in girlfriend, Erica Scott-Kurjanowicz. According to plaintiff’s request form, he 

and defendant were close friends from 1983 to 2003.2

 However, shortly thereafter, for 

 

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 Plaintiff declined to file a respondent’s brief. 

2

 The request filed by plaintiff was completed on Mandatory Judicial Form CH-100. 
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unidentified reasons, their relationship soured, with defendant beginning in 2003 a 

continuous course of conduct directed at plaintiff that including stalking, threatening and 

otherwise harming plaintiff and his girlfriend. In particular, plaintiff averred that 

defendant had more than once threatened to kill him, telling him, “You deserve a bullet in 

your head,” and leaving him a voicemail on March 26, 2012 “saying something about 

‘bullet to my face.’ ” In addition to these death threats, plaintiff averred that defendant 

had, among other things, sent him threatening text and voicemail messages at all hours of 

the day and night, stolen his identity to apply for credit cards and to gain access to 

pornographic websites, broken a window of his home, attempted to break into his home, 

and spread false rumors about him. All of plaintiff’s averments were made under penalty 

of perjury. 

 The day after plaintiff’s request was filed in court, a temporary restraining order 

was issued against defendant and a notice of hearing was filed setting a court date of 

April 18, 2012. This temporary restraining order was subsequently reissued and the 

hearing date continued several times until, finally, on July 13, 2012, the court ordered 

that the matter would be heard despite defendant’s absence.3

 

 On July 13, 2012, the trial court issued a permanent Civil Harassment Restraining 

Order After Hearing against defendant for plaintiff’s protection with an expiration date of 

July 13, 2015. Pursuant to this order, defendant was required to stay at least 50 yards 

away from plaintiff, his girlfriend (Ms. Scott-Kurjanowicz), his vehicle, his residence and 

his workplace. In addition, defendant was prohibited from harassing, attacking, striking, 

threatening, assaulting, hitting, following, stalking, destroying personal property, keeping 

under surveillance, blocking movement, contacting, telephoning, emailing, mailing, or 

taking any action, directly or indirectly, to obtain the address or location of plaintiff or 

Ms. Scott-Kurjanowicz. 

 

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 Defendant telephoned the court on July 13, 2012 to say he would not appear due to 

illness. In addition, at the previously scheduled hearing on June 29, 2012, defendant 

appeared and requested a continuance to obtain counsel. Although defendant’s request 

was granted, no counsel appeared on his behalf at the July 13, 2012 continued hearing. 
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 On September 4, 2012, defendant filed a notice of appeal of this order. 

DISCUSSION 

 Defendant challenges the civil harassment restraining order entered against him on 

July 13, 2012 pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 527.6 on the ground that the 

order was not supported by competent, clear and convincing evidence.4 For reasons 

discussed below, we disagree. 

 To obtain a civil harassment restraining order pursuant to section 527.6, a plaintiff 

must show by clear and convincing evidence that he or she has been “harassed,” meaning 

subjected to “a knowing and willful course of conduct directed at a specific person which 

seriously alarms, annoys, or harasses the person, and which serves no legitimate 

purpose.” Further, the identified course of conduct must be such that a reasonable person 

would, as a result, suffer substantial emotional distress, and must actually cause the 

plaintiff to suffer substantial emotional distress. (§ 527.6, subds. (a), (b), (d).)5 

 “ ‘Section 527.6 was passed to supplement the existing common law torts of 

invasion of privacy and intentional infliction of emotional distress by providing quick 

relief to harassment victims threatened with great or irreparable injury. [Citation.] It was 

 

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 Unless otherwise stated, all statutory citations herein are to the Code of Civil 

Procedure. 

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 For purposes of section 527.6, the following definitions apply: “Course of 

conduct” is a “pattern of conduct composed of a series of acts over a period of time, 

however short, evidencing a continuity of purpose, including following or stalking an 

individual, making harassing telephone calls to an individual, or sending harassing 

correspondence to an individual by any means, including, but not limited to, the use of 

public or private mails, interoffice mail, facsimile, or computer email . . . .”; “Credible 

threat of violence” is “a knowing and willful statement or course of conduct that would 

place a reasonable person in fear for his or her safety, or the safety of his or her 

immediate family, and that serves no legitimate purpose;” “Harassment” is “unlawful 

violence, a credible threat of violence, or a knowing and willful course of conduct 

directed at a specific person that seriously alarms, annoys, or harasses the person, and 

that serves no legitimate purpose . . . ;” and “Unlawful violence” is “any assault or 

battery, or stalking as prohibited in Section 646.9 of the Penal Code, but shall not include 

lawful acts of self-defense or defense of others.” (§ 527.6, subd. (b).) Constitutionallyprotected activity is not included within the meaning of “course of conduct.” (Ibid.) 
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enacted to protect the individual’s right to pursue safety, happiness and privacy as 

guaranteed by the California Constitution. [Citation.]” (Nebel v. Sulak (1999) 73 

Cal.App.4th 1363, 1369.) “ ‘Section 527.6 has been used where the victim has been 

stalked, threatened or otherwise seriously harassed. [Citations.]’ [Citation.]” (Ibid.) 

 A trial court’s decision to grant a restraining order or other permanent injunction is 

a matter left to its sound discretion and will not be disturbed on appeal absent a showing 

of clear abuse of discretion. (Shapiro v. San Diego City of Council (2002) 96 

Cal.App.4th 904, 912.) On appeal, “[w]e resolve all factual conflicts and questions of 

credibility in favor of the prevailing party and indulge in all legitimate and reasonable 

inferences to uphold the finding of the trial court if it is supported by substantial evidence 

which is reasonable, credible and of solid value.” (Schild v. Rubin (1991) 232 

Cal.App.3d 755, 762.) 

 Here, the trial court granted the injunction prohibiting defendant from engaging in 

a wide-range of harassing activities and from being within 50 yards of plaintiff, his 

girlfriend, vehicle, residence and workplace, for a period of three years. In doing so, the 

trial court accepted plaintiff’s description of defendant’s past and ongoing harassment, as 

set forth in the request for restraining order, after plaintiff, a sworn witness, confirmed in 

open court that all of the information in his request form “is true and correct.” No 

further showing was required. Given this substantial evidence of a course of harassing 

conduct that would cause a reasonable person to suffer substantial emotional distress, and 

did cause plaintiff to suffer such distress, the trial court’s decision to grant plaintiff’s 

request for a restraining order was proper. (§ 527.6, subds. (a), (b), (d)); see also 

Greenwich S.F., LLC v. Wong (2010) 190 Cal.App.4th 739, 767-768 [a single witness’s 

statements may constitute substantial evidence].) 

 In reaching this conclusion, we note that, at no time before the trial court did 

defendant, who was absent from and unrepresented by counsel at the hearing, object to 
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any statement or information in plaintiff’s request for restraining order.6

 As such, 

plaintiff has forfeited any right on appeal to challenge the trial court’s admission of this 

evidence. “To obtain reversal based on the erroneous admission of evidence, the record 

must show a timely objection making clear that specific ground. ([Evid. Code] § 353; In 

re C.B. (2010) 190 Cal.App.4th 102, 132 . . . [hearsay objections ‘waived by the failure to 

object below’].) Lack of such objection deprives the proponent of the evidence an 

opportunity to establish a better record or some alternative basis for admission. (See 

People v. Waidla (2000) 22 Cal.4th 690, 717 . . . .)” (Duronslet v. Kamps (2012) 203 

Cal.App.4th 717, 726.) Indeed, the statutory procedures under section 527.6 are quite 

straightforward: “ ‘[I]f it is offered, relevant oral testimony must be taken from available 

witnesses, and the trial court cannot issue an injunction unless it finds, by clear and 

convincing evidence, that unlawful harassment already exists in fact.’ [Citation.] . . . [A]t 

a hearing to obtain an injunction pursuant to section 527.6, ‘[b]oth sides may offer 

evidence by deposition, affidavit, or oral testimony, and the court shall receive such 

evidence, subject only to such reasonable limitations as are necessary to conserve the 

expeditious nature of the harassment procedure set forth by . . . section 527.6.’ ” 

[Citation.]; see Kaiser Foundation Hospitals v. Wilson (2011) 201 Cal.App.4th 550, 556 

. . . . [trial court properly considered hearsay evidence when deciding whether to issue a 

restraining order pursuant to Code Civ. Proc., § 527.8, former subd. (f), which permitted 

the court to ‘receive any testimony that is relevant’ when issuing an injunction preventing 

workplace violence].)” (Duronslet v. Kamps (2012) 203 Cal.App.4th 717, 729, quoting 

Schraer v. Berkeley Property Owners’ Assn. (1989) 207 Cal.App.3d 719, 733 [italics 

added]; see also § 527.6, subd. (h) [“respondent may file a response that explains, 

excuses, justifies, or denies the alleged harassment or may file a cross-petition under this 

section”].) As such, where, as here, the defendant fails to offer any evidence of his own 

or to object to the evidence offered by his opponent, in writing or in person, and then 

offers no justification for his failure to act, the defendant has no grounds upon which to 

 

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 As mentioned above, defendant requested and was granted a continuance to secure 

representation at the previous hearing, yet no counsel appeared on his behalf. 
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complain on appeal. To the contrary, under these circumstances, we stand by the trial 

court’s decision to accept as credible the unchallenged and sworn testimony and 

statements of the person seeking protection that substantial harassment has occurred and 

continues to occur. (Schild v. Rubin, supra, 232 Cal.App.3d at p. 762.) 

DISPOSITION 

 The July 13, 2012 civil harassment restraining order is affirmed. 

 _________________________ 

 Jenkins, J. 

We concur: 

_________________________ 

McGuiness, P. J. 

_________________________ 

Pollak, J.