SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY

APPELLATE DIVISION

DOCKET NO. A-0990-19

CRYSTAL SAYLOR,

Petitioner-Appellant,

v.

BOARD OF EDUCATION 

OF THE TOWN OF WEST

NEW YORK, HUDSON 

COUNTY,

Respondent-Respondent.

____________________________

Argued March 9, 2021 – Decided May 12, 2021

Before Judges Fisher, Moynihan, and Gummer.

On appeal from the New Jersey Commissioner of 

Education, Docket No. 219-8/18.

William P. Hannan argued the cause for appellant

(Oxfeld Cohen, PC, attorneys; Sanford R. Oxfeld, of 

counsel; William P. Hannan, of counsel and on the 

briefs).

Afshan T. Ajmiri Giner argued the cause for respondent

West New York Board of Education (Florio Perrucci 

Steinhardt Cappelli Tipton & Taylor, LLC, attorneys; 

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the 

internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
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Lester E. Taylor III, of counsel; Afshan T. Ajmiri 

Giner, of counsel and on the brief).

Gurbir S. Grewal, Attorney General, attorney for 

respondent Commissioner of Education (Sadia 

Ahsanuddin, Deputy Attorney General, on the 

statement in lieu of brief). 

PER CURIAM

Petitioner Crystal Saylor served as the administrative assistant to the 

superintendent of schools before she was terminated from employment with 

respondent Board of Education of the Town of West New York (the Board) for 

conduct unbecoming an employee. She appeals from the final decision of the 

Commissioner of Education who adopted the initial decision of the 

administrative law judge (ALJ)—which affirmed her termination of 

employment without a tenure hearing, see N.J.S.A. 18A:6-10—and dismissed

her petition. She argues the Commissioner erred in concluding she was not 

under tenure as a secretary, pursuant to N.J.S.A. 18A:17-2, when she was 

terminated. We conclude Saylor has met her burden of proving that the 

Commissioner's action was arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable, DiNapoli v. 

Bd. of Educ. of Twp. of Verona, 434 N.J. Super. 233, 236 (App. Div. 2014), and

reverse. 
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Saylor was hired by the Board as the secretary to the Business Department 

commencing January 16, 2010, and entered an employment contract for the 

remainder of the 2009-2010 school year, with an annual salary of $33,000. She 

was reappointed to the same secretarial position for the 2010-2011 and 2011-

2012 school years, but in November 2011 the Board contracted to employ Saylor 

for the 2011-2012 school year as the Administrative Assistant to the Assistant 

Superintendent of Educational and Personnel Services, with an annual salary of 

$40,000. She was reappointed to that position for the 2012-2013, 2013-2014 

and 2014-2015 school years with modest raises. On July 1, 2015, the assistant 

superintendent with whom Saylor had been working since November 2011 was 

promoted to superintendent. Two weeks later, the Board approved the new 

superintendent's recommendation to appoint Saylor as Secretary to the 

Superintendent of Schools at a pro-rated salary of $72,500. She remained in 

that position until her termination in June 2018.

Saylor filed an appeal to the Commissioner of Education claiming she was 

a tenured employee under N.J.S.A. 18A:17-2, and the Board erred by failing to 

file tenure charges and affording her a hearing pursuant to N.J.S.A. 18A:6-10. 

The matter was transferred to the Office of Administrative Law and, after an 

evidentiary hearing at which Saylor and the superintendent were the only 
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witnesses, the ALJ issued an initial decision affirming Saylor's termination and 

dismissing her petition, finding she did not have tenure because she had 

insufficient time in the Business Department secretarial position to qualify, and

her "duties [as] Administrative Assistant to the Superintendent [were] 

significantly different" from her "job description for Secretary to the Business 

Department [which] was consistent with the common understanding of the 

duties of a secretary," and those duties were "not interchangeable." The ALJ 

found Saylor was a "confidential" employee who was "without union or 

statutory rights."

The Commissioner focused on Saylor's job responsibilities in "agree[ing] 

with the ALJ that [Saylor] was not employed as a secretary when she held the 

position of Administrative Assistant to the Superintendent, and therefore did not 

have tenure rights when she was terminated." 

In our "limited role" in reviewing an agency decision, In re Stallworth, 

208 N.J. 182, 194 (2011) (quoting Henry v. Rahway State Prison, 81 N.J. 571, 

579 (1980)), we reverse an agency's decision "only in those rare circumstances 

in which an agency action is clearly inconsistent with its statutory mission or 

other state policy," In re Musick, 143 N.J. 206, 216 (1996). We "should not 

disturb an administrative agency's determinations or findings unless there is a 
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clear showing that (1) the agency did not follow the law; (2) the decision was 

arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable; or (3) the decision was not supported by 

substantial evidence." In re Virtua-West Jersey Hosp. Voorhees, 194 N.J. 413, 

422 (2008).

While we "defer to the specialized or technical expertise of the agency 

charged with administration of a regulatory system," ibid., we are not bound by 

an "agency's interpretation of a statute or its determination of a strictly legal 

issue," Mayflower Sec. Co. v. Bureau of Sec., 64 N.J. 85, 93 (1973). "We review 

[an] agency's legal conclusions de novo." DiNapoli, 434 N.J. Super. at 236. The 

Commissioner mistakenly construed N.J.S.A. 18A:17-2 in concluding, under the 

facts presented, Saylor was not a secretary during her service to the assistant 

superintendent and, later, to the superintendent. 

"Any person holding any secretarial or clerical position or employment 

under a board of education of any school district or under any office thereof" 

gains tenure under N.J.S.A. 18A:17-2(b), after

1. The expiration of a period of employment of three 

consecutive calendar years in the district or such shorter 

period as may be fixed by the board or office employing 

him, or

2. Employment for three consecutive academic years, 

together with employment at the beginning of the next 

succeeding academic year, an academic year being the 

period between the time when school opens in the 
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district after the general summer vacation and the 

beginning of the next succeeding summer vacation[.]

The statute further provides anyone who acquires tenure "shall hold his office, 

position or employment under tenure during good behavior and efficiency and 

shall not be dismissed or suspended or reduced in compensation, except for 

neglect, misbehavior or other offense and only in the manner prescribed by" 

N.J.S.A. 18A:6-9 to -29.

"[T]he language of N.J.S.A. 18A:17-2 limits the retention of tenure to the 

time during which the employee holds her secretarial office, position or 

employment." DiNapoli, 434 N.J. Super. at 239. "To acquire the security of 

tenure, the precise conditions enunciated in the applicable statute must be met."

Id. at 237-38. Thus, the determination of this case turns on whether Saylor held 

a secretarial position, or in the words of the Legislature, "any secretarial 

position," for the required statutory period.

The Commissioner differentiated Saylor's position with the Business 

Department from her subsequent positions with the assistant superintendent and 

superintendent because "her responsibilities, as well as salary, increased 

dramatically. She went from answering phones and typing documents to 

preparing for Board meetings, coordinating district-wide professional 

development activities, renewing contracts for the early childhood program, and 
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coordinating the Read Across America program." The Commissioner agreed 

with the ALJ's reliance on our unpublished decision in Burger v. Board of 

Education of the Borough of Maywood, No. A-5223-10 (App. Div. June 5, 

2012),

where the ALJ, Commissioner, and Appellate Division 

all found that a tenured secretary was not entitled to the 

position of Administrative Assistant to the 

Superintendent over a non-tenured employee, after the 

hours of her secretary position were reduced as part of 

a reduction in force. Just as the Administrative 

Assistant to the Superintendent in Burger was not 

considered to be a secretary because of her increased 

responsibilities – including supervising other 

secretaries in the Superintendent's office, coordinating 

district-wide administrative activities, overseeing the 

hiring of substitute teachers, and preparing for Board 

meetings – the petitioner's job responsibilities also 

extended far beyond her former duties as a secretary, so 

the positions are not substantially similar.

We do not agree that our unpublished decision in Burger is controlling1 or

apposite. Significantly, as counsel for the Board informed during oral argument, 

no job descriptions were adopted by the Board for any of the positions Saylor 

1

 Indeed, Burger cannot be controlling because, by rule, it has no precedential 

value. R. 1:36-3.
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held.2 Largely, the evidence of Saylor's duties was presented by Saylor and the 

superintendent and supplemented by some documents. 

Saylor testified to and outlined in her merits brief her core duties as the 

Administrative Assistant to the Assistant Superintendent included:

answering phones; making appointments for [the 

assistant superintendent]; sending faxes and emails for

[the assistant superintendent]; preparing [the assistant 

superintendent] for upcoming meetings; preparing 

requisitions for supplies; preparing reassignments for 

in and out of district meetings and workshops; keeping 

a calendar for [the assistant superintendent] and 

updating her on all district events and meetings; 

preparing for field trips and fundraisers for Board 

meetings; filing papers; typing memos; and interacting 

with parents who complained and wished to meet with 

[the assistant superintendent].

As Administrative Assistant to the Superintendent, she essentially 

completed the same tasks with the addition of: "[p]reparing agenda for Board 

meetings; [p]reparing professional development days; [p]reparing for the Read 

[A]cross America event by making memos, mailing out invitations, keeping 

track of attendees, and ordering breakfast; [c]ollecting and keeping contracts for 

early childhood, as well as renewing them; and [m]aking accommodations for 

2

 The ALJ asked the superintendent: "You have not eyeballed a document that 

says job description for an administrative assistant to any of the cabinet, you 

know, positions, correct?" The superintendent replied: "Correct. I don't do 

those ordinary things. That's what you have secretaries for." 
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out-of-district seminars." During her testimony before the ALJ, Saylor

acknowledged her duties in these two administrative assistant positions "were 

greater and beyond the scope of clerical or secretarial duties than . . . when [she 

was] the secretary in the Business Department." But petitioner maintained her 

job was still secretarial in nature; although her responsibilities expanded, she 

said they were still in line with "the goal of handling correspondence and

managing a routine and detail work for her superior." 

The superintendent testified that Saylor interfaced with the public, other 

district employees and the Board on her behalf and served as a confidential 

assistant, unlike the other secretaries in the District. The superintendent further 

emphasized that Saylor had "duties district-wide that a normal secretary would 

not" have, such as "prepar[ing] things and coordinat[ing] things district-wide" 

and the confidentiality of her position that required "prepar[ing] many 

confidential documents for [the superintendent]" and reviewing resumes for 

position qualifications for the superintendent to recommend to Human 

Resources. 

In her merits brief, Saylor acknowledges her position took on a districtwide element but notes that "[t]he [s]uperintendent is responsible for the districtwide duties; Saylor simply executed tasks for the [s]uperintendent through the 
10 A-0990-19

means afforded a typical secretary." The record is clear that she took on 

additional duties when she left the Business Department, commensurate with the 

increased responsibilities of the assistant superintendent and superintendent. 

But she continued to perform secretarial duties. 

In fact, when questioned by the ALJ about the difference between a 

secretary and administrative assistant, the superintendent focused on, what she 

termed, the "confidential title" of the position:

[THE COURT]: The person who's the assistant to the 

superintendent, does it matter, in terms of what they're 

doing, that the title is "secretary" versus "administrative 

assistant"? That's one question.

[SUPERINTENDENT]: Okay.

[THE COURT]: Yes or no?

[SUPERINTENDENT]: I'm going to say, for the 

purposes of confidentiality, they are two different 

things. Administrative - -

[THE COURT]: What do you mean by "purpose of 

confidentiality"?

[SUPERINTENDENT]: Well, secretary - - secretary to 

the superintendent is now dealing with the Board of 

Education as well and things that are being prepared for 

the Board of Education.

[THE COURT]: But an administrative assistant is also 

doing that, no?
11 A-0990-19

[SUPERINTENDENT]: It's a - - it's a confidential title.

[THE COURT]: Which?

[SUPERINTENDENT]: Both. I'm going to say both, 

in this capacity to the superintendent because it's 

attached to the superintendent. 

[THE COURT]: So what's the - - is the secretary to the 

superintendent, that confidential position, worth a 

salary of 72,500, is that synonymous with the 

administrative assistant to the superintendent, at a 

salary of 72,500? Are they synonymous?

[SUPERINTENDENT]: I don't think I understand.

[THE COURT]: Are they synonymous?

[SUPERINTENDENT]: No, they're not.

[THE COURT]: Do you have a different secretary? 

You have a secretary and an administrative assistant?

[SUPERINTENDENT]: There is an administrative 

assistant that is part-time that also works with me as a 

part-time basis. 

[THE COURT]: Did the titles change between when 

Ms. Saylor was appointed and when she was fired? Did 

the labels change in those three years when you were 

the superintendent?

[SUPERINTENDENT]: Oh, the superintendent? No.

[THE COURT]: So when she was hired, she was hired 

as a secretary.

[SUPERINTENDENT]: Yes.
12 A-0990-19

[THE COURT]: But when she was fired - - I'm not sure 

it specifies. But when she got that salary change, she 

was - - it was administrative assistant to the 

superintendent.

[SUPERINTENDENT]: But that's in a template. 

You're reading that in a template that they did in an 

office downstairs where there are many clerical 

mistakes. The resolution read "secretary." It's a 

different position.

[THE COURT]: Okay. So officially and formally,

Crystal Saylor was secretary to the superintendent - -

happened to be you - - and that's a confidential position 

to a cabinet member. Is that accurate?

[SUPERINTENDENT]: To the superintendent.

[THE COURT]: To the - - but the superintendent is a 

cabinet position?

[SUPERINTENDENT]: Leads the cabinet.

[THE COURT]: What?

[SUPERINTENDENT]: I'm outside of - - I lead - - I 

oversee the cabinet. 

[THE COURT]: Okay.

[SUPERINTENDENT]: I'm outside the cabinet.

[THE COURT]: You're the president.

[SUPERINTENDENT]: Yes.

[THE COURT]: They're your - - they're your cabinet.
13 A-0990-19

[SUPERINTENDENT]: Yes.

[THE COURT]: Okay, okay.

[SUPERINTENDENT]: So the cabinet members have 

the administrative assistants; the superintendent has the 

confidential secretary assigned to the superintendent.

The superintendent later explained:

[a] confidential employee is one that maintains all 

records totally confidential, can manage and work with 

documents that no one else will see other than myself, 

and when I'm writing, to show them to someone else. 

They should never leave the purview of her sight or his 

sight, for that matter - - I'm not being sexist - - and can 

represent me and my signature in the entire district.

She clarified there were other titles in the district that were "confidential": 

administrative assistants. When asked on cross-examination if the 

administrative assistants had "the same responsibilities as [her] secretary[,]" the 

superintendent replied affirmatively. The Board attorney followed, asking "isn't 

it true, . . . as testified by . . . Saylor, the secretary to the superintendent does 

basically a lot of the same responsibilities as the admin assistants do, but also, a

number of more responsibilities, correct?" The superintendent answered: 

"Yes." 

The testimonial evidence was not the only proof that showed the Board 

did not differentiate between "secretary" and "administrative assistant." At least 
14 A-0990-19

one employment contract in the record uses the term "Administrative Assistant 

to the Assistant Superintendent." A "Salary Change Form" for "Human 

Resource Dept. Only" also designates the job title as "Administrative Assistant." 

But the resolution set forth in the details for the Board Work Session/Business 

Meeting Agenda for July 15, 2015 reads:

WHEREAS, the Superintendent of Schools has a need 

for a Secretary to the Superintendent of Schools; and 

WHEREAS, Crystal Saylor currently holds the position 

of secretary assigned to the Board Office; and

WHEREAS, the Superintendent of Schools in 

recommending the promotion of Crystal Saylor to the 

position of Secretary to the Superintendent of Schools.

NOW THEREFORE, BE IT RESOLVED, that upon the 

recommendation of the Superintendent of Schools, 

Crystal Saylor is hereby appointed as Secretary to the 

Superintendent of Schools effective immediately at the 

pro-rated salary of $72,500.00. 

Even the Board attorney, when questioning the superintendent, used the 

terms interchangeably:

[BOARD COUNSEL]: With respect to the position of 

secretary to the superintendent and/or administrative 

assistant to the superintendent, it's accurate that Ms. 

Saylor did not serve three years and a day in that 

capacity, correct?

[SUPERINTENDENT]: In which capacity?

[BOARD COUNSEL]: As - - when she worked for you 

as superintendent, she served just under three years 

right?
15 A-0990-19

[SUPERINTENDENT]: Yes. 

The evidence presented does not support the Commissioner's conclusion 

that the positions held by Saylor after she left the Business Department were not 

secretarial positions. The Board did not adopt job descriptions differentiating 

the positions. Saylor's continued function as a secretary, in addition to the 

additional duties required by her positions with the superintendent and assistant 

superintendent evokes our nearly-sixty-year-old holding: 

We . . . take the view that where an employee holding 

a position covered by tenure is promoted to a position 

which encompasses his former duties and additionally 

requires the performance of services which are not

covered by tenure, and he thereafter continues to render 

services in both capacities, his right in his tenure 

position continues until terminated in accordance with 

the statute.

[Quinlan v. Bd. of Educ. of Twp. of N. Bergen, 73 N.J. 

Super. 40, 51-52 (1962).]

We think that holding has application here, especially where the lines between 

secretary and administrative assistant are so blurred. If a secretary moves to a 

position that still requires secretarial duties, but adds additional duties in a 

position that is not specifically culled from the tenure statute's "secretarial 

position," we see no reason why the employee should not retain tenure-track 

status. 
16 A-0990-19

Indeed, the statute allows a person holding "any secretarial position" to 

gain tenure. N.J.S.A. 18A:17-2(b) (emphasis added). Saylor moved from one 

secretarial position to others in which she continued her secretarial role with 

extra duties required by her superior's status. The evidence supports that Saylor 

was still referred to as a secretary, buttressing the conclusion her positions were 

still secretarial.

Our interpretation is consistent with the liberal construction accorded the 

Tenure Act in order "to achieve its beneficent ends." Spiewak v. Bd. of Educ.

of Rutherford, 90 N.J. 63, 74-75 (1982). "[S]ince tenure statutes are intended 

to secure efficient public service by protecting public employees in their 

employment, 'the widest range should be given to the applicability of the law.'" 

Barnes v. Bd. of Educ. of the City of Jersey City, 85 N.J. Super. 42, 45 (App. 

Div. 1964) (quoting Sullivan v. McOsker, 84 N.J.L. 380, 385 (E. & A. 1913)).

"[I]f the statute is silent or ambiguous with respect to the specific issue, the 

question for the court is whether the agency's answer is based on a permissible 

construction of the statute." Kasper v. Bd. of Trs. of the Tchrs' Pension & 

Annuity Fund, 164 N.J. 564, 581 (2000) (citation omitted); see also Matturri v. 

Bd. of Trs. of the Jud. Ret. Sys., 173 N.J. 368, 381-82 (2002). We conclude the 

Commissioner did not properly construe N.J.S.A. 18A:17-2 in concluding 
17 A-0990-19

Saylor did not hold a secretarial position in service to the assistant 

superintendent and superintendent.

We note, although the Commissioner adopted the ALJ's initial decision as 

the final decision, the final decision did not discuss the ALJ's conclusion that 

Saylor was a "confidential employee." To the extent it was adopted, we disagree 

that that designation excluded Saylor from tenure.

Other than the superintendent's testimony that Saylor was considered a 

"confidential employee," we see no other evidence in the record to support that 

conclusion. Again, there was no job description or other documentary proof, 

including the Board resolution appointing Saylor to the position, that established 

the position was "confidential." Furthermore, there is no evidence that Saylor 

was designated a confidential employee under N.J.S.A. 11A:3-4(h), the statute 

cited by the ALJ in support of her finding that Saylor was one, or that a 

corresponding "certification and appointment . . . [was] recorded in the minutes 

of the Civil Service Commission" as required by that statute.3

3

 N.J.S.A. 11A:3-4(h) provides:

The State unclassified service shall not be subject to the 

provisions of this title unless otherwise specified and 

shall include the following:

. . . .
18 A-0990-19

Moreover, N.J.S.A. 18A:17-2 does not carve out "confidential" secretarial 

positions from its purview. Again, the Legislature conferred tenure status on 

any secretarial position. See Perez v. Zagami, LLC, 218 N.J. 202, 209-10 (2014) 

("There is no more persuasive evidence of legislative intent than the words by 

which the Legislature undertook to express its purpose[.]"). "[T]he words of the 

enactment are to be accorded a rational meaning in harmony with the obvious 

intent and purpose of the law." State v. Brown, 22 N.J. 405, 415 (1956); see 

also State v. Tischio, 107 N.J. 504, 511 (1987). "Where the Legislature's intent 

is remedial, a court should construe a statute liberally." Young v. Schering 

Corp., 141 N.J. 16, 25 (1995). 

If the Legislature intended to exclude "confidential employees" from 

N.J.S.A. 18A:17-2, it could have done so directly. We therefore reject any

interpretation of the statute that would exclude "any secretarial position"

because "it is not [our] function . . . to 'rewrite a plainly-written enactment of 

the Legislature []or presume that the Legislature intended something other than 

that expressed by way of the plain language.'" DiProspero v. Penn, 183 N.J. 

h. One secretary and one confidential assistant to each 

department head, board, principal executive officer and 

commission. Each certification and appointment 

hereunder shall be recorded in the minutes of the Civil 

Service Commission[.]
19 A-0990-19

477, 492 (2005) (third alteration in original) (quoting O'Connell v. State, 171 

N.J. 484, 488 (2002)). We will not "'write in an additional qualification which 

the Legislature pointedly omitted in drafting its own enactment,' or 'engage in 

conjecture or surmise which will circumvent the plain meaning of the act.'" Ibid.

(first quoting Craster v. Bd. of Comm'rs of Newark, 9 N.J. 225, 230 (1952); then 

quoting In re Closing of Jamesburg High Sch., 83 N.J. 540, 548 (1980)).

We conclude Saylor achieved tenure in the secretarial position she held 

since beginning employment with the Board in 2010 and continuing until her 

termination in 2018. She was thus entitled to face tenure charges at a tenure 

hearing. N.J.S.A. 18A:6-10.

Reversed and remanded for proceedings consistent with this opinion. We 

do not retain jurisdiction.