IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Yuzza Henderson, :

Petitioner :

:

v. : No. 1239 C.D. 2021

:

Unemployment Compensation :

Board of Review, :

Respondent : Submitted: October 28, 2022

BEFORE: HONORABLE ANNE E. COVEY, Judge

HONORABLE ELLEN CEISLER, Judge

HONORABLE MARY HANNAH LEAVITT, Senior Judge

OPINION NOT REPORTED

MEMORANDUM OPINION BY

JUDGE CEISLER FILED: March 9, 2023

Yuzza Henderson (Claimant) petitions for review, pro se, of the September 2, 

2021 Order of the Unemployment Compensation Board of Review (Board)

affirming the decision of a Referee to deny Claimant unemployment compensation 

(UC) benefits. The Board concluded that Claimant was ineligible for UC benefits 

because she was discharged from work for willful misconduct under Section 402(e) 

of the Unemployment Compensation Law (Law)1 and denied Claimant’s request for 

a remand hearing. We affirm the Board’s Order.

Background

Claimant worked as a full-time case manager for the Philadelphia Housing 

Authority (Employer) from March 24, 2017, through September 25, 2020. Bd.’s 

1 Act of December 5, 1936, Second Ex. Sess., P.L. (1937) 2897, as amended, 43 P.S. § 

802(e). Section 402(e) of the Law provides that an employee is ineligible for UC benefits for any 

week in which her unemployment is due to her discharge from work for willful misconduct. 43 

P.S. § 802(e).
2

Finding of Fact (F.F.) No. 1. In the spring of 2020, Claimant’s work hours were 

9:00 a.m. to 5:00 p.m. Id. No. 2. She worked in Employer’s office on Wednesdays

and Fridays and worked remotely on Mondays, Tuesdays, and Thursdays. Id.

Claimant complied with her assigned work schedule until August 26, 2020. 

Id. Nos. 3-4. Beginning on August 26, 2020, Claimant did not report to work, submit 

time records, or contact her supervisor to report her absences. Id. No. 4. Claimant’s 

supervisor tried several times to contact Claimant by phone and email and asked 

Claimant to return her calls, but Claimant did not respond. Id. Nos. 5-6. On 

September 25, 2020, Employer discharged Claimant for insubordination, neglect of 

duty, and unsatisfactory job performance. Id. No. 7.

Claimant filed a claim for UC benefits, which the local Service Center denied. 

The Service Center found, based on its review of the claim record, that Employer 

met its burden of proving that Claimant was insubordinate, thereby justifying her 

discharge for willful misconduct. Notice of Determination, 1/21/21, at 1. 

Therefore, the Service Center determined that Claimant was ineligible for UC 

benefits under Section 402(e) of the Law.

Claimant appealed to the Referee, who held a telephone hearing on March 9, 

2021. Claimant, appearing pro se, testified on her own behalf. Employer presented 

the testimony of Tiffany Pinkney, Employer’s Title Compensation and Benefit 

Specialist, and Lauren Bishop, Employer’s Director of Site-Based and Senior 

Programs.

2

Ms. Bishop was Claimant’s immediate supervisor at the time of her discharge. 

Notes of Testimony (N.T.), 3/9/21, at 18. Ms. Bishop testified that on August 20, 

2 Two other Employer witnesses were also present at the hearing but did not testify: Stacey 

Collins, Employer’s Labor and Employee Relations Manager, and Zachary McNeil, Employer’s 

Director of Resident Relations and Youth Program. See Notes of Testimony (N.T.), 3/9/21, at 2.
3

2020, she emailed Claimant about her failure to communicate to her what days she 

intended to be absent from work, but Claimant did not respond. Id. at 14; see id., 

Ex. E-1. In her August 20, 2020 email, Ms. Bishop also directed Claimant to follow 

up with Employer’s human resources consultant for “additional coaching . . . so as 

a team [they] could grow, move forward, and work on [their] communication.” N.T., 

3/9/21, at 14.

On August 26, 2020, Claimant sent a text message to Ms. Bishop, stating that 

“she wouldn’t be reading [her] e[]mail because she wouldn’t be present at [the] team 

meeting, and that her lawyer would be in touch with [human resources].” Id. at 12-

13. After that date, Claimant stopped reporting to the office. Id. at 13. Ms. Bishop

sent Claimant several emails about her work and upcoming deadlines, but she did 

not respond. Id. On September 16, 2020, Ms. Bishop called Claimant “to see if 

everything was okay,” but Claimant did not answer the phone or respond. Id. Ms. 

Bishop testified that she received no further communication from Claimant between 

August 26, 2020, and September 25, 2020, the date of her discharge. Id.

Claimant testified that she had “medical documentation” for her absences on 

August 12-14, 2020, and August 27-29, 2020. Id. at 21-22. She testified, however,

that she did not give Employer medical documentation for those days because

Employer did not ask for it and because she did not want to disclose her health issues. 

Id. at 23-25, 28. Claimant testified that she notified Employer that she would be 

absent on those days. Id. at 23. Claimant admitted, however, that Ms. Bishop did 

not approve her absences. Id. at 24. Claimant also admitted that she did not respond 

to Ms. Bishop’s email regarding her absences on August 13-14, 2020, stating: “I was 

mindful of that . . . [b]ecause they wrote me up for email etiquette.” Id. at 27.
4

Claimant testified that, at that time, she was “closing on [her] home in 

[Employer’s] home ownership program,” “managing [her] house and working 

remotely,” and “also doing fieldwork” and “visiting [her] clients.” Id. at 24. She 

stopped submitting time records after September 3, 2020, because Employer “shut 

down [her]system.” Id. at 25. Claimant testified that she did not contact Ms. Bishop

about the system shutdown because she and Ms. Bishop were “not getting along.” 

Id. Claimant tried to contact human resources to inquire about the shutdown but was 

unsuccessful. Id. Claimant testified that she continued to work, but she did so

without pay and asked Employer for an advance so she could close on her home. Id. 

Claimant testified that she was “supposed to close on [September 4, 2020], but 

[Employer] didn’t [give her] a paycheck.” Id. at 26. Claimant initially thought the 

system shutdown “was just a glitch,” but she later realized that she had been fired. 

Id. at 25-27.

Following the hearing, the Referee affirmed the Service Center’s decision. 

The Referee concluded:

Based on the testimony of [E]mployer, and the competent evidence 

contained in the record, the Referee finds that [C]laimant was absent 

without authorization. The conduct of [C]laimant falls below the 

standards of behavior which an employer can reasonably expect from 

its employees. It is reasonable for [E]mployer to expect employees to 

report to work on time, and contact their supervisor regarding any 

issues with attendance. Therefore, [E]mployer has met its burden under 

Section 402(e) of the . . . Law.

Ref.’s Order, 3/17/21, at 3 (emphasis added). The Referee further concluded:

[C]laimant testified that she was dealing with medical issues which 

required her to be absent from work. [C]laimant testified that she was 

closing on a house and dealing with settlement issues in programs that 

were through [Employer]. 
5

[C]laimant acknowledged that she did not have authorization from her 

supervisor to be absent on the dates in question. [C]laimant testified 

that she had conflicts with her supervisor, and chose to permit her legal 

representative to speak on her behalf, or [C]laimant would speak 

directly to Human Resources or other managers.

The Referee finds that the testimony of [C]laimant has not established 

good cause or justification for her absences without authorization. 

Therefore, as [E]mployer has met its burden under Section 402(e) of 

the Law, [UC] benefits are denied.

Id. (emphasis added).

Claimant appealed to the Board, which adopted the Referee’s findings of fact 

and conclusions of law on the issue of willful misconduct. The Board expressly 

credited the testimony of Employer’s witness regarding Claimant’s absences from 

work and rejected Claimant’s argument that she did not intentionally neglect her 

duties. Board’s Order, 9/2/21, at 1-2. 

The Board also denied Claimant’s request for a remand hearing to present 

additional evidence, concluding as follows:

[C]laimant requested a remand hearing to present additional testimony 

and evidence. [C]laimant argues that she was unable to submit her 

documents [five] days before the hearing because she did not receive 

the notice of hearing [five] days before the hearing. [C]laimant testified 

that she received the notice of hearing, but [also that] she “knew about 

the hearing because she called.” It is not clear from this testimony that 

[C]laimant did not receive the notice of hearing in time to submit her 

documents before the deadline. Moreover, [C]laimant testified that she 

did not submit her documents [five] days before the hearing because 

“my computer, my laptop malfunctioned,” not because she received the 

notice of hearing too late.

[C]laimant also argues that the Referee “did not assist her in presenting 

her case[,]” but a referee has no obligation to assist a party to present 

her case. A referee is only obligated to advise a party of her legal 

rights. [C]laimant also argues that the Referee cut off her testimony 
6

and did not give her a chance to present her case. The Board 

conduct[ed] an independent review of the record and finds the 

Referee’s decision to be proper. Therefore, [C]laimant’s request for a 

remand hearing is denied.

Id. at 2 (emphasis added).3 Claimant now petitions for review of the Board’s 

decision.

Analysis

Preliminarily, we note that Claimant’s pro se Petition for Review and 

appellate briefs are difficult to comprehend. Claimant’s briefs also fail to conform 

to the requirements of our Rules of Appellate Procedure in numerous respects. See

Pa.R.A.P. 2101; see also Lal v. Dep’t of Transp., 755 A.2d 48, 49 (Pa. Cmwlth. 

2000) (“This Court has repeatedly held that substantial omissions, defects, and/or 

failures to conform to the minimal requirements for writing an appellate brief set 

forth in Chapter 21 of the Pennsylvania Rules of Appellate Procedure will result in 

the quashing or dismissal of the appeal.”). Despite these shortcomings, however,

we will address the issues we are able to glean from Claimant’s pro se filings. See 

Richardson v. Pa. Ins. Dep’t, 54 A.3d 420, 426 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2012) (recognizing 

that this Court may limit its review to the cognizable arguments it can glean from a 

pro se appellant’s brief, despite noncompliance with the Rules of Appellate 

Procedure).

Claimant first asserts that the Board abused its discretion in denying her 

request for a remand. She contends that the Referee improperly precluded some of 

her documentary evidence at the hearing and seeks a remand to present additional 

evidence in support of her claims. Claimant’s Br. at 15-17, 30-33. 

3

In its decision, the Board noted that “[C]laimant attached documents to her appeal, and 

refers to facts, which cannot be considered because they are not part of the record.” Bd.’s Order, 

9/2/21, at 1.
7

The Referee’s hearing notice, which was mailed to Claimant on February 17, 

2021, informed her that she was required to submit her documents to the Referee’s 

office “at least five (5) days” before the hearing. Record (R.) Item No. 8; see 34 Pa. 

Code § 101.130(e) (stating that, for a telephone hearing, the referee “may require 

that the documents be delivered up to [five] days in advance of the hearing”). At the 

hearing, Claimant initially testified that she did not receive the hearing notice and 

only “knew about the hearing because [she] called” the Department of Labor and 

Industry (Department). N.T., 3/9/21, at 3. However, Claimant later testified that 

she did receive the hearing notice. Id. When asked a second time if she received 

the notice stating that “the hearing was going to happen today at this time,” Claimant 

replied, “Yes. . . . I did receive that.” Id. at 4. The Referee was therefore “satisfied 

that [Claimant] received the documents.” Id.

The Referee then stated that he received many of Claimant’s documents that 

day, and Employer’s tax representative stated that he received Claimant’s documents 

15 minutes before the hearing began. Id. at 5-6; see R. Item No. 10. When the 

Referee asked Claimant why she did not submit the documents until that day, she

replied: “My computer, my laptop malfunctioned” and that it was “just the struggle 

back and forth with trying to . . . get everything together.” N.T., 3/9/21, at 6. She 

testified that she sent the documents after a “place that [she] go[es] to[] . . . [was] 

nice enough to allow [her] to use [its] facility . . . so [she could] properly submit the 

documents” to the Referee. Id.

Employer objected to the admission of Claimant’s documents on the ground 

that she was required to submit them no later than five days before the hearing. Id. 

The Referee sustained the objection and precluded the documents because “they 

were not sent in advance” as required by the hearing notice. Id.; see 34 Pa. Code § 
8

101.131(h) (stating that documents not submitted in accordance with the hearing 

notice “may not be admitted nor testimony given or taken from it unless consent has 

been requested from and given by all parties”) (emphasis added). Thus, although 

the Board’s regulations permit the Referee to admit documents not submitted in 

compliance with the hearing notice, because Employer objected to the admission of 

Claimant’s documents, the Referee properly excluded them. See Beverly Hall Corp. 

v. Unemployment Comp. Bd. of Rev., 106 A.3d 829, 834 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2014) 

(concluding that the Board properly affirmed the referee’s exclusion of evidence not 

submitted in advance of the hearing, where the Department objected to such 

evidence).

Moreover, it is within the Board’s discretion whether to grant a request for 

remand. See Section 504 of the Law, 43 P.S. § 824 (“The [B]oard shall have power, 

on its own motion, or on appeal, to . . . affirm, modify, or reverse the determination 

. . . of the . . . referee on the basis of the evidence previously submitted in the case, 

or direct the taking of additional evidence.”) (emphasis added); Hussar v. 

Unemployment Comp. Bd. of Rev., 432 A.2d 643, 645 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1981) (stating 

that the Board has the discretionary power to remand for the taking of additional 

evidence, if the Board determines that the record before it is inadequate for proper 

resolution of the issues). This Court will not reverse the Board’s decision to deny a 

request for remand absent an abuse of discretion. Fisher v. Unemployment Comp.

Bd. of Rev., 696 A.2d 895, 897 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1997).

Here, after initially testifying that she did not receive the hearing notice, 

Claimant testified, twice, that she did receive it. N.T., 3/9/21, at 3-4. While 

Claimant may have had additional evidence to support her version of the events

leading to her discharge, she did not submit her evidence to the Referee before the 
9

hearing as required by the hearing notice. The Board specifically discredited 

Claimant’s testimony that she could not submit her documents on time due to a 

computer malfunction. Bd.’s Order, 9/2/21, at 2.4 Because the documents were 

available to Claimant before the hearing, we conclude that the Board did not abuse 

its discretion in denying Claimant’s request for a remand. Cf. Fisher, 696 A.2d at 

897 (recognizing that “a remand hearing is generally granted to allow a party the 

opportunity to present evidence not offered at the original hearing because it was 

not then available”) (emphasis added).

Next, Claimant asserts that the Referee failed to adequately assist her in

presenting her case during the hearing. Claimant’s Br. at 34. We disagree.

The Board’s regulations provide: “[W]here a party is not represented by 

counsel, the tribunal before whom the hearing is being held should advise [her] as 

to [her] rights, aid [her] in examining and cross-examining witnesses, and give 

[her] every assistance compatible with the impartial discharge of its official duties.” 

34 Pa. Code § 101.21(a) (emphasis added). In interpreting this regulation, this Court 

has held that, in addition to advising a pro se litigant of her rights and aiding her in 

questioning witnesses, the referee “must act reasonably in assisting in the 

development of the necessary facts.” Hackler v. Unemployment Comp. Bd. of Rev., 

24 A.3d 1112, 1115 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2011). However, “the referee is not required to 

become and should not assume the role of a claimant’s advocate.” McFadden v. 

Unemployment Comp. Bd. of Rev., 806 A.2d 955, 958 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2002). 

Furthermore, “[t]he referee need not advise an uncounseled claimant on specific 

4

In her Petition for Appeal filed with the Board, Claimant proffered an additional reason 

why she did not submit her documentary evidence in advance of the hearing, stating that her “lack 

of finances brought about many restrictions[] [w]hich is one of the main reasons [she] could not 

meet the five-day deadline in submitting evidence.” R. Item No. 13.
10

evidentiary questions or points of law, nor need the referee show any greater 

deference to an uncounseled claimant than that afforded a claimant with an 

attorney.” Brennan v. Unemployment Comp. Bd. of Rev., 487 A.2d 73, 77 (Pa. 

Cmwlth. 1985) (citation omitted). 

Based on our review of the hearing transcript, this Court is satisfied that the 

Referee complied with the requirements of 34 Pa. Code § 101.21(a). The Referee 

gave Claimant ample opportunity to testify and to cross-examine Employer’s 

witnesses, and the Referee asked Claimantseveral questions to clarify her testimony. 

See N.T., 3/9/21, at 9-11, 22-28. The Referee also asked several questions of 

Employer’s witness, Ms. Bishop. See id. at 17-19. At one point, the Referee 

interrupted Claimant’s cross-examination of Ms. Bishop only to ask Claimant to 

repeat her question because there was background noise on the telephone line. See 

id. at 20. We conclude that Claimant was afforded a fair hearing and that the Referee

properly discharged his duties under 34 Pa. Code § 101.21(a). See Procito v. 

Unemployment Comp. Bd. of Rev., 945 A.2d 261, 264 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2008) (en 

banc).5

Lastly, Claimant challenges the Board’s credibility findings throughout her 

appellate briefs. It is well settled, however, that questions of credibility and the 

resolution of evidentiary conflicts are exclusively within the Board’s discretion and 

may not be re-evaluated on appellate review. Waverly Heights, Ltd. v. 

Unemployment Comp. Bd. of Rev., 173 A.3d 1224, 1227 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2017). “[T]he 

5

In its decision, the Board erroneously stated that “a referee has no obligation to assist a 

[pro se] party to present her case” and “is only obligated to advise a [pro se] party of her legal 

rights.” Bd.’s Order, 9/2/21, at 2. This statement contradicts both the plain language of 34 Pa. 

Code § 101.21(a) and our case law, as discussed above. However, while the Board applied an

incorrect standard in evaluating the Referee’s conduct at the hearing, we conclude, based on our 

independent review of the record, that the Referee complied with the Board’s regulation and 

adequately assisted Claimant in presenting her case.
11

Board . . . may reject even uncontradicted testimony if it is deemed not credible or 

worthy of belief.” Id. (citation omitted). Where the Board’s findings are supported 

by substantial, credible evidence, those findings are conclusive on appeal. Brandt 

v. Unemployment Comp. Bd. of Rev., 643 A.2d 78, 79 (Pa. 1994).

The testimony of Claimant’s supervisor, which the Board expressly credited,

established that Claimant stopped reporting to work, submitting time records, and

reporting her absences as of August 26, 2020. Bd.’s F.F. No. 4; Bd.’s Order, 9/2/21, 

at 1. Claimant also failed to respond to her supervisor’s multiple attempts to contact 

her after that date. Bd.’s F.F. No. 5. Based on this evidence, the Board determined 

that: (1) Claimant’s failure to report to work, submit time records, report her 

absences, or communicate with Employer was a disregard of Employer’s interests 

and the behavioral standards Employer rightfully expects of its employees; and (2) 

Claimant lacked good cause for her conduct. Bd.’s Order, 9/2/21, at 1-2; Ref.’s 

Order, 3/17/21, at 3. We conclude that the Board’s findings are supported by the 

substantial, credible evidence of record.

Conclusion

Accordingly, we affirm the Board’s Order.6

____________________________

ELLEN CEISLER, Judge

6

In support of her assertions on appeal, Claimant refers to, and attaches to her pro se filings, 

several documents that are not part of the certified record in this case. It is well settled, however,

that this Court may not consider extra-record evidence that is not part of the certified record on 

appeal. See Umedman v. Unemployment Comp. Bd. of Rev., 52 A.3d 558, 564 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2012); 

see also B.K. v. Dep’t of Pub. Welfare, 36 A.3d 649, 657 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2012) (“For purposes of 

appellate review, that which is not part of the certified record does not exist.”). Therefore, in 

reaching our decision, we do not consider Claimant’s extra-record evidence or her arguments 

based on that evidence.
IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Yuzza Henderson, :

Petitioner :

:

v. : No. 1239 C.D. 2021

:

Unemployment Compensation :

Board of Review, :

Respondent :

O R D E R

AND NOW, this 9

th day of March, 2023, the Order of the Unemployment 

Compensation Board of Review, dated September 2, 2021, is hereby AFFIRMED, 

and Yuzza Henderson’s “Motion to Set Aside/De Novo to Admit Relevant 

Evidence,” filed on February 8, 2023, is hereby DENIED.

____________________________

ELLEN CEISLER, Judge