* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not

be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR.

R. 47.5.4.

REVISED AUGUST 11, 2010

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 09-60675

Summary Calendar

GEORGE CASAS, also known as Jorge

Plaintiff - Appellant

v.

U S JOINER

Defendant - Appellee

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of Mississippi

USDC No. 1:08-CV-127

Before JONES, Chief Judge, and GARZA and BENAVIDES, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

George Casas appeals from a summary judgment dismissing his maritime

and state law tort claims against U.S. Joiner, LLC. Finding no reversible error,

we AFFIRM. 

Casas, an employee of Land Coast Insulation, Inc., tripped, fell, and was

injured while installing insulation in a compartment of an amphibious transport

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

F I L E D

May 10, 2010

Lyle W. Cayce

Clerk
No. 09-60675

1 An initial lawsuit brought by Casas in state court and removed to federal district court

was ultimately dismissed for want of jurisdiction, but that procedural history is not relevant

to this appeal. Additionally, Casas and Northrup Grumman have settled and those claims are

not at issue. 

2

dock (LPD-19) under construction in Northrup Grumman’s Pascagoula,

Mississippi shipyard. Northrup Grumman had subcontracted with U.S. Joiner

to complete the LPD-19’s interior, and, in turn, U.S. Joiner subcontracted with

Land Coastto install insulation. Casas fell while walking on the compartment’s

unfinished floor, which consisted of metal beams placed two feet apart and

raised twelve to eighteen inches off of the ground. Casas allegedly asked a U.S.

Joiner employee to supply plywood to temporarily form a flat surface over the

beams, but U.S. Joiner negligently provided only two to three plywood sheets

and consequently left floor beams exposed.

Casas brought maritime tort claims as well as Mississippi state law tort

claims against Northrup Grumman and U.S. Joiner.1 The district court granted

U.S. Joiner’s motion for summary judgment on both claims, finding that the

alleged negligence was not significantly related to a traditional maritime

activity, as required to sustain a maritime tort claim, and U.S. Joiner owed no

duty to Casas. Casas appeals.

This court reviews a district court’s grant of summary judgment de novo,

applying the same standards as the district court. DePree v. Saunders, 588 F.3d

282, 286 (5th Cir. 2009) (citation omitted). Summary judgment is proper “if the

pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file,

together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any

material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of

law.” FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c). 
No. 09-60675

3

A. Maritime Tort Claim 

28 U.S.C. § 1333(1) gives district courts original jurisdiction over “any civil

case of admiralty or maritime jurisdiction.” A party seeking to invoke admiralty

jurisdiction over a tort claim must show that the tort has (1) a “maritime situs”

and (2) a “maritime nexus” (i.e., that the alleged wrong bears a “significant

relationship to a traditional maritime activity”). Taylor v. Kennedy Engine, Inc.,

861 F.2d 127, 128 (5th Cir. 1988). Maritime situs is conceded. Citing this court’s

decision in Hollister v. Luke Constr. Co., 517 F.2d 920 (5th Cir. 1975) (per

curiam), the district court found that Casas’s tort claim had no maritime nexus

because U.S. Joiner’s alleged negligence arose in the context of shipbuilding,

which is not a maritime activity. Casas argues that the activity that caused his

injury bore a significant relationship to maritime activity because his work on

the LPD-19 was necessary for the vessel to accomplish its purpose and

essentially asks us to ignore the “flawed logic” of Hollister. Hollister has been

repeatedly relied upon by this court. See Cain v. Transocean Offshore USA, Inc.,

518 F.3d 295, 301 (5th Cir. 2008) (noting the “historical tradition that vessels

under construction give rise to neither a maritime contract nor a maritime tort”);

Lowe v. Ingalls Shipbuilding, 723 F.2d 1173, 1187 (5th Cir. 1984) (rejecting

admiralty jurisdiction and citing Hollister for the proposition “that an injury to

a ship construction worker on board a ship under construction and lying in

navigable waters is not a maritime tort”); see also Owens-Illinois, Inc. v. U.S.

Dist. Court for the W. Dist. of Wash., 698 F.2d 967, 970 (9th Cir. 1983) (tort

claims arising from asbestos exposure during new ship construction do not bear

a significant relationship to traditional maritime activity); Keene Corp. v. U.S.,

700 F.2d 836, 844 (2d Cir. 1983) (“a tort arising out of work on an uncompleted
No. 09-60675

4

vessel has been held to fall outside admiralty jurisdiction.”). This panel lacks

authority to overrule circuit precedent. Teague v. City of Flower Mound,

179 F.3d 377, 383 (5th Cir. 1999).

B. Mississippi Tort Claim

To succeed in a negligence action under Mississippi law, a plaintiff must

show duty, breach of duty, proximate causation, and injury. Palmer v. Biloxi

Reg’l Med. Ctr., Inc., 564 So. 2d 1346, 1355 (Miss. 1990). The district court held

that U.S. Joiner owed no duty to Casas because Land Coast, not U.S. Joiner,

exercised control over Casas’s work and because Casas’s injuries arose out ofthe

work Land Coast contracted to perform. Moreover, the district court determined

that any duty of care that U.S. Joiner may have “assumed” by agreeing to supply

plywood did not remain intact because Land Coast and Casas had knowledge of

the dangerous condition of the LPD-19 compartment’s floor. 

Mississippi law imposes a duty on a premises owner to its business

invitees to keep the premises in reasonably safe condition. Jones v. James

Reeves Contractors, Inc., 701 So. 2d 774, 782 (Miss. 1997). However, when the

business invitee is an independent contractor, a premises owner owes no duty

to protect the contractor or its employees from risks “arising from or intimately

connected with defects ofthe premises . . . which the independent contractor has

undertaken to repair.” Id. Nor does a premises owner owe a duty to an

independent contractor who has the “right and fact of control over the premises

and the nature and details of the work.” Id. (quoting Magee v. Transcon. Gas

Pipeline Corp., 551 So. 2d 182, 185 (Miss. 1989)). The district court correctly

held that Casas presented no evidence that U.S. Joiner owed a duty to the

independent contractor, Land Coast, or its employees based on a the “right of
No. 09-60675

5

control”, and Casas’s injuries were “intimately connected” with Land Coast’s

work. 

Nonetheless, Casas maintains that, by providing plywood sheets at Casas’s

request, U.S. Joiner undertook to repair the compartment floor’s dangerous

condition and thereby assumed a duty to Land Coast’s employees. A party can

assume a duty by conduct where none otherwise exists. See Magnolia Constr.

Co., Inc. v. Miss. Gulf South Eng’rs, Inc., 518 So. 2d 1194, 1201 (Miss. 1988).

However, as the district court correctly recognized, Mississippi law also holds

that even if a duty to make premises safe arises, that duty does not “remain

intact” if an independent contractor has knowledge of the dangerous condition.

Hill v. Int’l Paper Co., 121 F.3d 168, 175–76 (5th Cir. 1997) (quoting Jones,

701 So. 2d at 782). Land Coast and Casas knew of the condition of the

compartment’s unfinished floor, as Casas personally complained about the

beams and requested plywood from a Land Coast supervisor before he sought

help from U.S. Joiner. Casas argues—without legal support—that an

independent contractor’s actual knowledge of a dangerous condition only

alleviates a duty to warn, butthe Mississippi Supreme Court described the duty

that is eliminated by an independent contractor’s knowledge as the duty “to

make the premises safe.” Jones, 701 So. 2d at 783. Thus, even if U.S. Joiner

assumed a duty to make the premises reasonably safe by undertaking to correct

the dangerous condition of the compartment floor, Land Coast’s and Casas’s

knowledge of that condition removed the duty.

For the foregoing reasons, the judgment is AFFIRMED.