Filed 5/1/24; certified for publication 5/21/24 (order attached) 

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION EIGHT

JOHN SANDY CAMPBELL,

Plaintiff and Appellant,

v.

LOS ANGELES UNIFIED 

SCHOOL DISTRICT,

Defendant and Respondent.

 B320442

 Los Angeles County

Super. Ct. No. 21STCV33808

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los 

Angeles County, Michael L. Stern, Judge. Affirmed.

 John Sandy Campbell, in pro. per., for Plaintiff and 

Appellant.

Anthony Julian Bejarano, Marcos Fredrick Hernandez and 

Nazli Alimi for Defendant and Respondent.

____________________
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In September 2021, John Sandy Campbell sued her former 

employer, the Los Angeles Unified School District, over events 

leading up to her dismissal in August 2017. 

The trial court sustained the District’s demurrer and gave 

Campbell leave to amend. 

Campbell’s amended complaint claims the District racially 

discriminated against her and retaliated against her for 

whistleblowing, in violation of Labor Code sections 1102.5 and 

1106 and Government Code section 12940 (the Fair Employment 

and Housing Act (the Act)). The District again demurred, 

arguing Campbell had not complied with the Government Code’s 

claim presentation requirement and the statute of limitations 

barred her cause of action under the Act. 

The trial court again sided with the District and sustained 

this demurrer without leave to amend on the basis of Le Mere v. 

Los Angeles Unified School District (2019) 35 Cal.App.5th 237 (Le 

Mere) and Government Code section 12965, subdivision (c)(1)(C). 

Campbell did not provide a reporter’s transcript or a settled 

statement of the hearing. 

We independently review the trial court’s ruling and apply 

the familiar standard for demurrers. (See Blank v. Kirwan

(1985) 39 Cal.3d 311, 318.) 

The trial court was right. 

A plaintiff suing a public entity for damages must timely 

present a written claim to the entity before filing suit. (Le Mere, 

supra, 35 Cal.App.5th at p. 246.) Generally, this claim 

presentation requirement is an element of a valid cause of action 

against a public entity. (Willis v. City of Carlsbad (2020) 48 

Cal.App.5th 1104, 1119 (Willis).) Government Code section 

911.2, subdivision (a), requires a plaintiff to submit a government 
3

claim within six months or one year of the accrual of a cause of 

action, depending on the type of claim. Failing to present a 

timely claim, or to seek leave to file a late claim, bars the suit. 

(See Le Mere, supra, 35 Cal.App.5th at p. 246.) 

Campbell’s operative pleading seeks actual and punitive 

damages. Campbell concedes the claim presentation requirement 

applies here. Citing Government Code sections 910.8 and 911, 

which concern insufficient government claims, Campbell appears 

to argue substantial compliance is enough and she substantially 

complied with this requirement. 

Assuming for purposes of analysis her interpretation of 

these provisions is correct, Campbell did not demonstrate she 

substantially complied with the claim presentation requirement. 

Simply noting that she previously submitted various racial 

discrimination and whistleblower complaints is not enough. 

(E.g., Willis, supra, 48 Cal.App.5th at p. 1123, fn. 11, citations 

omitted [“Willis maintains the Labor Commissioner complaint 

put City ‘on notice’ of his retaliation claim. But he does not cite 

authority for the proposition, and service of a complaint with 

the state Labor Commissioner does not comply with Government 

Claims Act presentation requirements for purposes of a claim 

against City. Nor is it the equivalent of ‘substantial compliance’ 

with the Act.”].) And it is not enough to say the District already 

knew of the circumstances surrounding Campbell’s claims. (See 

Le Mere, supra, 35 Cal.App.5th at p. 246.) 

The record appears to contain only Campbell’s precomplaint inquiry to the California Department of Fair 

Employment and Housing, dated August 21, 2017, and related 

correspondence. 
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Campbell has not shown that any of her complaints went to 

the right people or contained the information required by statute. 

(See Gov. Code, § 910 [setting out the required contents of a 

government claim]; id. § 915, subd. (a) [requiring service of a 

claim against a local public entity to be made on the “clerk, 

secretary or auditor thereof” or to the “governing body”]; see also 

Jameson v. Desta (2018) 5 Cal.5th 594, 608–609 [we presume the 

judgment is correct; appellant bears the burden of demonstrating 

error].) Further, Campbell’s amended complaint did not plead

compliance with the claim presentation requirement. (See Willis, 

supra, 48 Cal.App.5th at p. 1119 [“a complaint failing to allege 

facts demonstrating timely presentation of a claim or that such 

presentation was excused is subject to a general demurrer for not 

stating facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action”].) 

Campbell alternatively appears to contend she is exempt 

from presenting any government claim. But she cites no 

authority for this point and fails to explain why Le Mere is not 

controlling regarding her whistleblower claim. 

Regarding Campbell’s other claim for violation of the Act, 

Campbell’s amended complaint shows this claim is time-barred. 

The attachments to this pleading show Campbell, in 2017, 

initiated a complaint with the Department of Fair Employment 

and Housing, which investigated and closed Campbell’s case after 

finding insufficient evidence. The Department provided 

Campbell a Right to Sue notice dated October 9, 2018. The notice 

told Campbell she had one year to file a civil action. Campbell 

did not sue until September 2021. Her suit was untimely. (See 

Gov. Code, § 12965, subd. (c)(1)(C).)

Campbell argues the trial court abused its discretion in not 

considering Jolly v. Eli Lilly & Co. (1988) 44 Cal.3d 1103 (Jolly), 
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and the discovery rule saves her lawsuit because she could not 

have known earlier who perpetrated certain wrongful acts 

against her or the animus behind these acts. Campbell largely 

omits record citations. Her 2017 pre-complaint inquiry to the 

Department named the administrators who committed 

transgressions against her and described the supposed racial 

animus and hostile workplace. 

“A plaintiff need not be aware of the specific ‘facts’ 

necessary to establish the claim; that is a process contemplated 

by pretrial discovery. Once the plaintiff has a suspicion of 

wrongdoing, and therefore an incentive to sue, she must decide 

whether to file suit or sit on her rights. So long as a suspicion 

exists, it is clear that the plaintiff must go find the facts; she 

cannot wait for the facts to find her.” (Jolly, supra, 44 Cal.3d at 

p. 1111.) Campbell had enough information here. In any event, 

she sued the District for employment-related acts resulting in her 

termination, not any individual she recently discovered. 

(Campbell also sued the “Los Angeles Board of Education,” but 

the trial court apparently changed this name to “Los Angeles 

Unified School District of Education.”) 

The trial court properly sustained the District’s demurrer 

without leave to amend. Campbell’s appellate brief does not 

argue any amendment could cure the defects. 

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DISPOSITION

We affirm the judgment and order sustaining the demurrer 

without leave to amend and award costs to the respondent.

WILEY, J.

We concur: 

STRATTON, P. J. 

GRIMES, J. 
Filed 5/21/24

CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION EIGHT

JOHN SANDY CAMPBELL, 

 Plaintiff and Appellant,

v.

LOS ANGELES UNIFIED 

SCHOOL DISTRICT,

 Defendant and Respondent.

 B320442

 (Los Angeles County

 Super. Ct. No. 21STCV33808)

ORDER CERTIFYING

OPINION

FOR PUBLICATION

[No change in judgment]

THE COURT:

The opinion in the above-entitled matter filed on May 1, 

2024, was not certified for publication in the Official Reports. For 

good cause, it now appears that the opinion should be published 

in the Official Reports and it is so ordered.

There is no change in the judgment. 

____________________________________________________________

STRATTON, P. J. GRIMES, J. WILEY, J.