Adrian Paul MILLS, Appellant v. The STATE of Texas, Appellee

NO. 14-16-00597-CR NO. 14-16-00598-CR

Court of Appeals of Texas, Houston (14th Dist.).

Opinions filed December 21, 2017

Rebecca Klaren, Jack Roady, Joseph Frank, Galveston, TX, for Appellee.

James Ducote, League City, TX, for Appellant.

Panel consists of Justices Christopher, Busby, and Jewell

**MAJORITY OPINION**

J. Brett Busby, Justice

Appellant Adrian Paul Mills challenges the trial court's entry of findings, in connection with his convictions of intoxication manslaughter and assault, that he used a motor vehicle as a deadly weapon. Appellant contends the entry of these findings in the judgment violated his due process rights because (1) the deadly weapon allegation was not encompassed within his guilty pleas, and (2) the trial court was not the fact-finder at the punishment phase. We hold the trial court did not err by entering the deadly weapon findings because *383appellant pled guilty to the charges alleged in the indictments, and each indictment included a deadly weapon allegation. Further, appellant stipulated in his guilty pleas that the facts contained in the indictments were true and correct and constituted evidence in the case. Moreover, even if appellant could show he did not plead guilty to the deadly weapon allegations, the trial court could still appropriately conclude that a deadly weapon was used because a motor vehicle is capable of causing death or serious bodily injury, and appellant stipulated to and was found guilty of causing both death and serious bodily injury with a motor vehicle due to his intoxication. We therefore affirm the judgments containing deadly weapon findings.

**BACKGROUND**

Appellant was driving down Seawall Boulevard in Galveston and reached 80 to 90 miles per hour before driving into oncoming traffic, where he struck the vehicle of complainants Ashley Boyd and his wife, Alice Boyd. Testing revealed appellant's alcohol level was well above the legal limit. Ashley Boyd was pronounced dead at the scene. Alice Boyd survived but sustained multiple injuries.

Appellant was indicted by a grand jury on one count of intoxication manslaughter with a vehicle for causing Ashley Boyd's death, and one count of intoxication assault with a vehicle for causing serious bodily injury to Alice Boyd. Each indictment includes two paragraphs between the traditional opening and closing language, and these paragraphs are separated by a caption reading "Notice of Intent to Seek a Deadly Weapon Finding." Below the heading is the following sentence: "And it is further presented that the defendant used or exhibited a deadly weapon, to-wit: a motor vehicle, during the commission of or [the] immediate flight from said offense."

The trial court admonished appellant that intoxication manslaughter was a second-degree felony that carried a term of imprisonment between two and twenty years and a possible fine not to exceed $10,000. Appellant was also admonished that intoxication assault was a third-degree felony that carried a term of imprisonment not less than two years or more than ten and a possible fine not to exceed $10,000. After the admonishments, appellant signed a written plea and waiver stipulation for each charge and requested that a jury assess his punishment. Appellant was then arraigned outside of the presence of the jury and pled guilty to both charges after a reading of both indictments, including the deadly weapon language beneath the "Notice" heading. Following jury selection, the State read each indictment again in front of the jury, including the deadly weapon language beneath the "Notice" heading, and appellant again pled guilty to both charges. The State and appellant then presented their cases to the jury as to punishment.

After the State and appellant rested their cases, appellant moved for a directed verdict on the deadly weapon finding. Appellant argued his motion should be granted and no special issue submitted to the jury because the State did not present any evidence of a deadly weapon during the punishment phase of the trial. The State asserted that appellant pled guilty to the use of a deadly weapon when he pled guilty to the indictments. The trial judge agreed with the State, saying "my understanding is that she read the indictment including the notice of a deadly weapon, and your client pled guilty on both cases. Motion for directed verdict is denied."

Outside the presence of the jury, the trial judge asked if there were objections to the proposed jury charges, which each included (based on the deadly weapon *384plea) an instruction that appellant would not be eligible for parole until his time served equaled one-half of the sentence imposed. Both the State and appellant responded that they had no objections. The jury, having been instructed that appellant was guilty of both charges as alleged in the indictments, sentenced him to twelve years in prison for the offense of intoxication manslaughter, and ten years in prison with a recommendation of probation for the offense of intoxication assault.

After the jury was dismissed, appellant raised an objection to the proposed judgments, which included deadly weapon findings. Appellant argued that the fact finder on that special issue would have been the jury, and because no affirmative finding was made by the jury, it would be inappropriate for the trial court to make the findings. The State responded that appellant had pled guilty to the indictments, which included deadly weapon allegations, and thus the trial court could properly enter deadly weapon findings into the judgments. The trial court considered the issue and relevant case law presented by both parties and stated, "the court is granting or making the deadly weapon finding in the judgment." Shortly thereafter, while reading the judgment into the record, the trial court stated, "I have entered a deadly weapon finding on this based on the indictment and the plea."

**ANALYSIS**

In a single issue on appeal, appellant contends he did not plead guilty to using a deadly weapon, and therefore the issue should have gone to the jury for a factual finding because he elected to have a jury determine his punishment. In appellant's view, the trial court's deadly weapon findings violate his right to due process.

**I. Standard of review and applicable law**

The trial court entered deadly weapon findings based on appellant's guilty pleas. A guilty plea is valid when it "represents a voluntary and intelligent choice among the alternative courses of action open to the defendant." *State v. Guerrero* , 400 S.W.3d 576, 588 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013). To enter a voluntary plea, a defendant must possess "an understanding of the law in relation to the facts." *McCarthy v. United States* , 394 U.S. 459, 466, 89 S.Ct. 1166, 22 L.Ed.2d 418 (1969). To enter an intelligent plea, a defendant must have "sufficient awareness of the consequences." *Ex Parte Palmberg* , 491 S.W.3d 804, 807 (Tex. Crim. App. 2016). A guilty plea does not violate due process even when a defendant enters it while "operating under various misapprehensions about the nature or strength of the State's case against him-for example, misestimating the likely penalty...." *Id.* Moreover, when a "defendant waives his state court remedies and admits his guilt, he does so under the law then existing; further, he assumes the risk of ordinary error in either his or his attorney's assessment of the law and facts." *Id.* at 808 (quoting *McMann v. Richardson* , 397 U.S. 759, 774, 90 S.Ct. 1441, 25 L.Ed.2d 763 (1970) ).

In Texas criminal proceedings, a defendant must be found guilty by a jury unless the defendant has entered a guilty plea and effectively waived his right to a jury trial. Tex. Code Crim. Pro. Ann. art. 1.15 (West 2005). For the trial court to accept the guilty plea, the State must introduce evidence into the record showing the guilt of the defendant, and that evidence must be accepted by the trial court as the basis for its judgment. *Id.* The State's burden to present evidence may be waived by the defendant, pursuant to a stipulation and *385waiver that is approved by the trial court. *Id.*

A deadly weapon is defined as a firearm or anything manifestly designed, made, or adapted for the purpose of inflicting death or serious bodily injury; or "anything that in the manner of its use or intended use is capable of causing death or serious bodily injury." Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 1.07(a)(17) (West Supp. 2016). If "a deadly weapon ... was used or exhibited during the commission of a felony offense or during immediate flight therefrom," then "[o]n an *affirmative finding* under this subdivision, the trial court shall enter the finding in the judgment of the court."1

As the Court of Criminal Appeals explained in *Polk v. State* , an affirmative finding can be made in several circumstances. 693 S.W.2d 391, 394 (Tex. Crim. App. 1985). First, the fact-finder's verdict on the indictment may constitute an affirmative finding if the indictment by allegation specifically places the deadly weapon issue before the trier of fact and the defendant is found guilty as charged in the indictment. *Id.* Second, an affirmative finding can occur as a matter of law if the trier of fact finds that a deadly weapon *per se* (such as a firearm) has been used in the commission of the offense. *Id.* Third, a finding may be made if the trier of fact responds affirmatively to a special issue submitted during the punishment stage of trial. *Id.* More recently, the Court of Criminal Appeals has added a fourth circumstance, holding that an affirmative deadly weapon finding can be made when the jury finds the defendant guilty as charged in the indictment and the indictment alleges the defendant caused death or serious bodily injury with a weapon. *Crumpton v. State* , 301 S.W.3d 663, 664 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009) (holding jury necessarily found defendant used a deadly weapon because a deadly weapon is something that, in the manner of its use, is capable of causing death, and jury found defendant did, in fact, cause death).

The Court of Criminal Appeals has held that an applicant is "entitled to notice that the State would pursue an affirmative finding...." *Ex parte Patterson* , 740 S.W.2d 766, 775 (Tex. Crim. App. 1987), *overruled on other grounds by**Ex parte Beck* , 769 S.W.2d 525 (Tex. Crim. App. 1989). The notice need not appear in the indictment; however, "it may, and probably should appear there, preferably in a separate paragraph...." *Id.* at 776.

**II. The trial court properly entered deadly weapon findings based on appellant's guilty pleas and stipulations to use of a deadly weapon.**

Appellant and the State disagree about the scope of appellant's guilty pleas. Appellant argues that he pled guilty to the offenses of intoxication manslaughter and intoxication assault, but not to the deadly weapon allegations, which he argues merely gave him notice that the issue was in contest. In response, the State argues appellant pled guilty to the deadly weapon allegations three separate times: (1) when he signed a written plea admonishment and swore that he pled guilty to having committed each and every element of the offenses as alleged in the indictments; (2) when he was arraigned outside the presence of the jury and pled guilty to both charges read from the indictments, which *386included the allegations of the deadly weapon; and (3) when the State read each indictment, including the allegation of the deadly weapon, in the presence of the jury and he pled guilty to each charge for a third time.

An indictment must begin with the phrase "In the name and by the authority of the State of Texas," and end with "against the peace and dignity of the State." Tex. Code Crim. Pro. Ann. art. 21.16 (West 2009). The deadly weapon allegations at issue are located between "In the name and by the authority of the State of Texas" and "against the peace and dignity of the State." Although we do not recommend the practice of inserting the heading "Notice of Intent to Seek a Deadly Weapon Finding" before alleging use of a deadly weapon in an indictment, we hold that the deadly weapon allegations constituted part of the indictments to which appellant pled guilty.

Even if appellant were operating under a misapprehension about the specific consequence of pleading guilty to a deadly weapon allegation captioned as a "notice," such a plea does not violate due process. *Ex Parte Palmberg* , 491 S.W.3d at 807. A defendant "need not have comprehensive awareness of the specific impact that relinquishing his constitutional rights may have." *Id.* Rather, the defendant need only have "sufficient awareness" to meet due process requirements. *Id.* Because the indictments included notice of a deadly weapon allegation, appellant was "sufficiently aware" of the allegation and has not argued on appeal that he did not understand the possible consequences associated with a deadly weapon finding.

According to the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure, the trial court must enter a deadly weapon finding in the final judgment upon an affirmative finding that a deadly weapon was used or exhibited.2 As explained above, under the first scenario discussed in *Polk v. State* , an affirmative finding arises when the defendant is found guilty as charged in the indictment and the indictment specifically alleges the use of a deadly weapon. 693 S.W.2d at 394. We have held that appellant's indictments included deadly weapon allegations. For each offense, appellant pled guilty to having committed each and every element of the offense alleged in the indictment and, as part of an evidentiary waiver, stipulated that "the facts contained in the indictment ... are true and correct and constitute the evidence in this case." Appellant's guilty pleas, waivers, and stipulations were accepted by the trial court and appellant was found guilty as charged in the indictments. Based on the guilty pleas and stipulations, we hold the trial court properly entered deadly weapon findings in the judgments under the first *Polk* scenario. *Id.*

**III. The trial court properly entered deadly weapon findings based on appellant's guilty pleas to causing death and serious bodily injury with his vehicle due to intoxication.**

The State also argues that a trial court may appropriately enter a deadly weapon finding when the offense itself, as alleged in the indictment, requires the use or exhibition of a deadly weapon. Thus, even if appellant were correct that he did not plead guilty to the "notice" portion of each indictment expressly alleging use of a deadly weapon, a deadly weapon finding would still be proper if it could be deduced from the charged offenses to which appellant did plead guilty.

*387*Duran v. State* , 492 S.W.3d 741, 747 (Tex. Crim. App. 2016) (analyzing *Crumpton* and noting its effect was to extend the degree to which courts can rely upon deductive reasoning to determine whether jury made an affirmative deadly weapon finding).

In *Crumpton* , the Court of Criminal Appeals held that the trial court properly entered a deadly weapon finding because the jury, in finding the defendant guilty of criminally negligent homicide, necessarily found that he used a vehicle as a deadly weapon. 301 S.W.3d at 664. The court reasoned: "If a deadly weapon is anything that is capable of causing death or serious bodily injury, and the indictment alleges that the defendant caused death or serious bodily injury [by striking the complainant's vehicle with her vehicle], and the jury finds the defendant guilty as charged in the indictment, the verdict is necessarily a finding that a deadly weapon was used." *Id.* at 665 ; *see also**Blount v. State* , 257 S.W.3d 712, 714 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008) (holding that allegation of aggravated assault by causing serious bodily injury with weapon or instrument "necessarily implies the use of a deadly weapon," which is anything that in the manner of its use or intended use is capable of causing serious bodily injury).

On appeal, appellant contends only that he did not plead guilty to the deadly weapon allegations found beneath the "Notice of Intent" heading. Thus, it is uncontested that he pled guilty to the first paragraphs of the indictments, stipulating that the facts alleged were true and constituted evidence in the case. The first paragraphs read as follows:

> Adrian Paul Mills, on or about the 26th day of July, 2014 ... did then and there operate a motor vehicle in a public place while intoxicated ... and did by reason of such intoxication [cause the death of another, namely, ASHLEY BOYD / cause serious bodily injury to another, namely, ALICE BOYD], by accident or mistake, to-wit: by driving said motor vehicle into a motor vehicle driven by ASHLEY BOYD.

In accepting appellant's pleas of guilty, the trial court determined that his stipulations provided sufficient evidence of each essential element of the charged offenses. Tex. Code Crim. Pro. Ann. art. 1.15 ; *Staggs v. State* , 314 S.W.3d 155, 159 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2010, no pet.). After hearing evidence at the punishment hearing, the jury also found appellant guilty of the offenses as alleged in the indictments, which the trial court instructed it to do given appellant's plea.

The question raised by the State is whether appellant's stipulations and the jury's findings of guilt necessarily reflect that a deadly weapon was used. As noted above, a deadly weapon is anything that (1) in the manner of its use or intended use is (2) capable of causing death or serious bodily injury. *Sierra v. State* , 280 S.W.3d 250, 255 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009). "A motor vehicle, in the manner of its use or intended use, is clearly capable of causing death or serious bodily injury and therefore can be a deadly weapon." *Ex parte McKithan* , 838 S.W.2d 560, 561 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992) (per curiam).

The indictment in this case alleged that the manner in which appellant used his vehicle caused it to become a deadly weapon. In particular, the State alleged and appellant stipulated that by reason of his intoxication he drove his vehicle into another vehicle, causing death and serious bodily injury to others. No proof of intent to use the vehicle as a deadly weapon is necessary. *Walker v. State* , 897 S.W.2d 812, 813-14 (Tex. Crim. App. 1995). Because appellant stipulated that he caused death and serious bodily injury with a motor vehicle due to his *388intoxication and was found guilty on that basis, we hold the trial court could appropriately enter a finding under *Crumpton* that a deadly weapon was used in each offense. *See*301 S.W.3d at 664-65 ; *Martinez v. State* , 883 S.W.2d 771, 773 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1994, pet. ref'd) (holding "the use of a motor vehicle as a deadly weapon [is] an essential element of the offense" of intoxication manslaughter); *see also**Hood v. State* , No. 06-09-00227-CR, 2010 WL 3189975, at *3 (Tex. App.-Texarkana Aug. 13, 2010, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (holding allegation that instrument caused death "necessarily include[d]" allegation that it was " 'in the manner of its use ... capable of causing' (since it did cause) death," and therefore indictment for intoxication manslaughter similar to appellant's provided sufficient notice to support finding that vehicle was deadly weapon); *McKee v. State* , No. 02-06-00203-CR, 2007 WL 289496, at *4 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth Feb. 1, 2007, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (same).

* * *

For these reasons, we hold that the deadly weapon allegations were part of the indictments, and thus appellant pled guilty and stipulated to the truth of the allegations. In addition, appellant stipulated to and was found guilty of causing death and serious bodily injury with a motor vehicle due to intoxication, which necessarily establishes that he used a deadly weapon. Therefore, we hold appellant's due process rights were not infringed by the trial court's entry of deadly weapon findings in the judgments. We overrule appellant's sole issue.

**CONCLUSION**

Having overruled appellant's issue on appeal, we affirm the trial court's judgments.

( Christopher, J., concurring).

1

Act of June 10, 1977, 65th Leg., R.S., ch. 347, § 1, sec. 3f, 1977 Tex. Gen. Laws 925, 926, *repealed by* Act of June 17, 2015, 84th Leg., R.S., ch. 770, § 3.01, 2015 Tex. Gen. Laws 2320, 2394, eff. Jan. 1, 2017 (current version at Tex. Code Crim. Pro. Ann. art. 42A.054(c) (West Supp. 2016)). This statute, former article 42.12 § 3g(a)(2), applied at the time the trial court issued its judgment.

2

Act of June 10, 1977, 65th Leg., R.S., ch. 347, § 1, sec. 3f, 1977 Tex. Gen. Laws 925, 926 (repealed 2015) (current version at Tex. Code Crim. Pro. Ann. art. 42A.054(c) ).

Tracy Christopher, Justice, concurring.

**CONCURRING OPINION**

I concur in the judgment but I respectfully disagree with the majority's reasoning. In my opinion, appellant pleaded guilty to the deadly weapon factual allegation. There is no need to go further in the opinion than that. Instead, the majority essentially concludes that a deadly weapon finding is always presumed in an intoxication manslaughter case.

The case law in this area is confusing and contradictory. Let's start with the notice requirement. As noted in the majority opinion, the Court of Criminal Appeals has held that a defendant is "entitled to notice that the State would pursue an affirmative finding." *Ex parte Patterson* , 740 S.W.2d 766, 775 (Tex. Crim. App. 1987). The notice need not appear in the indictment; however, "it may, and probably should appear there, preferably in a separate paragraph." *Id.* at 776.

*Patterson* 's holding was clarified by *Ex parte Beck* , 769 S.W.2d 525 (Tex. Crim. App. 1989). In that case, the indictment alleged that the defendant caused the death of the complainant by shooting him with a gun. The court held that this was sufficient notice of an intent to seek a deadly weapon finding.

*Beck* 's holding was expanded in *Blount v. State* , 257 S.W.3d 712 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008). In that case, an allegation that the defendant committed or attempted to commit aggravated assault in connection with a burglary gave adequate notice for a deadly weapon finding. The court held:

> Aggravated assault may be committed in only two ways: (1) by "caus[ing] serious bodily injury" or (2) by "us[ing] or exhibit[ing] a deadly weapon during the *389commission of the assault." Each of these involves the use of a deadly weapon. The first way necessarily implies the use of a deadly weapon, which is "anything that in the manner of its use or intended use is capable of causing death or serious bodily injury." The second way specifies the use of a deadly weapon. Therefore an allegation that a defendant committed aggravated assault gives him notice that the deadly nature of the weapon alleged in the indictment would be an issue at trial and that the State may seek an affirmative finding on the use of the weapon.

*Id.* at 714 (citations omitted).

One lower court opinion has discussed *Blount* in connection with intoxication manslaughter. *See**Hood v. State* , No. 06-09-00227-CR, 2010 WL 3189975 (Tex. App.-Texarkana Aug. 13, 2010, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication). That court explained:

> Looking first at the indictment, we find that Hood was given notice of the charge that his operation of a motor vehicle while intoxicated caused the death of Fisher "by driving said motor vehicle into the person of the said injured party." Our highest court has held that any allegation which avers that a death was caused by a named instrument necessarily includes an allegation that the named instrument was "in the manner of its use ... capable of causing" (since it did cause) death.

*Id.* , 2010 WL 3189975, at *3.

The court concluded that the indictment itself gave notice that the State would seek a deadly weapon finding. (The court also noted that the State sent another notice eight days before trial.) The defendant pleaded guilty and the court made a deadly weapon finding.

Here, in Trial Cause No. 14-CR-2296, the indictment alleged intoxication manslaughter1 and included a separate notice requirement as follows:

> IN THE NAME AND BY THE AUTHORITY OF THE STATE OF TEXAS

> THE GRAND JURORS for the County of Galveston ... present that ADRIAN PAUL MILLS ... did then and there operate [a] motor vehicle in a public place while intoxicated ... and did by reason of such intoxication cause the death of another, namely ASHLEY BOYD, by accident or mistake, to-wit: by driving said motor vehicle into a motor vehicle driven by ASHLEY BOYD.

> ***NOTICE OF INTENT TO SEEK A DEADLY WEAPON FINDING***

> And it is further presented that the defendant used or exhibited a deadly weapon, to-wit: a motor vehicle, during the commission of or immediate flight from said offense.

> AGAINST THE PEACE AND DIGNITY OF THE STATE.

Appellant alleged in his brief that he did not plead guilty to the deadly weapon finding and wanted a jury to make the deadly weapon finding. I agree with the majority opinion that he pleaded guilty to the deadly weapon finding and section II of the opinion.

Appellant signed this form:

> ***GUILTY PLEA:*** Understanding and agreeing to all of the above, I freely and voluntarily plead **GUILTY** and confess my **GUILT** to having committed each and every element of the offense alleged in the indictment or information by *390which I have been charged in this cause and I agree and stipulate that the facts contained in the indictment or information are true and correct and constitute the evidence in this case.

Twice the entire indictment was read to the appellant (including the notice of intent and the supplemental factual allegation) and he pleaded guilty. At no time did appellant indicate that he was not pleading guilty to the deadly weapon factual assertion. That should be the end to this point of error.

Instead the majority goes further in section III and unnecessarily concludes that an indictment for intoxication manslaughter will always include a deadly weapon allegation-and that such a finding does not have to separately be made by a fact finder. In other words, the majority opinion stands for the proposition that if there was no "notice of intent" and no factual assertion of a deadly weapon in the indictment, the trial judge could still have entered a deadly weapon finding. While this may ultimately be a proper extension of *Blount* , it is unnecessary at this time. And as such it is dicta.

This holding will also mean that a jury will never have to be asked for a separate finding of deadly weapon in an intoxication manslaughter case-because the judge can imply it later under *Crumpton v. State* , 301 S.W.3d 663 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009). This holding will also mean that we will not have to do a separate sufficiency review for evidence of a deadly weapon if the jury finds the defendant guilty of intoxication manslaughter.2 It will also mean that State will not have to put on any evidence of the manner of use of the vehicle-other than to show it caused the death of or serious bodily injury to someone. Normally, the State follows the dictates of *Sierra v. State* , 280 S.W.3d 250 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009), and establishes that the driving was dangerous or reckless or violated traffic laws. In fact, the cases described in footnote two detail the evidence of reckless or dangerous driving.

But under the majority opinion, that will no longer be necessary. Even without reckless or dangerous driving, a deadly weapon finding is appropriate. So, for example, a deadly weapon finding is always appropriate for an intoxicated person, who by accident, slowly backs out of a parking space and hits a pedestrian (because he was too intoxicated to notice the pedestrian) causing death or serious bodily injury to the pedestrian. Nor could a defendant plead guilty to intoxication manslaughter but not guilty to the deadly weapon allegation-because those two pleas would conflict.

To me, this turns the entire concept of a "separate deadly weapon finding" on its head. It has the effect of automatically reducing a defendant's eligibility for parole *391for any crime where an element of the offense is death or serious bodily injury. Perhaps this is where the Court of Criminal Appeals will ultimately go, but it is unnecessary to this case and therefore I respectfully concur in the judgment only.

1

A separate indictment in Trial Cause No. 14-CR-2297 alleged intoxication assault by causing serious bodily injury to Alice Boyd.

2

Recent court of appeals decisions go both ways on this issue. Several courts have performed a separate sufficiency review. *See**Hilburn v. State* , 312 S.W.3d 169, 176-78 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 2010, no pet.) ; *Cook v. State* , 328 S.W.3d 95, 101 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 2010, pet. ref'd) ; *Balderas v. State* , No. 13-11-00522-CR, 2012 WL 2469642, at *2-3 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi June 28, 2012, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication); *Pina v. State* , No. 11-10-00135-CR, 2012 WL 1579561, at *7 (Tex. App.-Eastland May 3, 2012, pet. ref'd) (mem. op., not designated for publication); *Brown v. State* , No. 10-09-00110-CR, 2010 WL 376953, at *1-2 (Tex. App.-Waco Feb. 3, 2010, pet. ref'd) (mem. op., not designated for publication); *Jackson v. State* , No. 08-07-00061-CR, 2009 WL 1552890, at *9 (Tex. App.-El Paso June 3, 2009, no pet.) (not designated for publication). The Texarkana Court of Appeals concluded that actually causing the death of another is all the proof needed to support a deadly weapon finding, but went ahead and looked at the manner of driving the vehicle too. *See**Hood* , 2010 WL 3189975, at *4-5.