alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### STATE v. JOHN GOSS.

(Filed 14 October, 1942.)

Appeal by defendant from *Clement, J.,*at March Term, 1942, of Wilkes.

Criminal prosecution upon bill of indictment charging defendant with the murder of one Paul Wall.

•The defendant entered a plea of not guilty.

The solicitor announced in open court that the State would not ask for the capital felony of murder in the first degree, but would ask for a verdict of murder in the second degree or manslaughter, as the evidence may appear to justify.

Verdict: Guilty of manslaughter.

Judgment: Confinement in the State’s Prison not less than two nor more than five years.

Defendant appeals to Supreme Court and assigns error.

*752
      *Attorney-General McMullan and Assistant Attorneys-General Patton and Rhodes for the State.*

*Trivette & Holshouser for defendant, appellant.*

Per Curiam.

Careful consideration of the several assignments of error shown in the record on this appeal fails to reveal prejudicial error, if any error there be. They present no tenable reason for disturbing the trial below.

Hence, in the judgment from which appeal is taken, we find

No error.
Exhibit 32.1
------------


                    Certification Pursuant to 18 USC ss.1350, as Adopted
      Pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002


In connection with the Quarterly  Report of Strategika,  Inc.  (Company) on Form
10-QSB  (Report) for the quarter  ended  September  30, 2003,  as filed with the
Securities and Exchange  Commission on the date hereof. I, LI Jinyuan,  Chairman
and President,  certify to the best of our knowledge,  pursuant to 18 U.S.C. ss.
1350, as adopted pursuant to ss. 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:

         (1)      The Report fully  complies  with the  requirements  of Section
                  13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

         (2)      The information  contained in the Report fairly  presents,  in
                  all material respects,  the financial condition and results of
                  operations of the Company.

/s/ LI Jinyuan
----------------
LI Jinyuan
Chairman and President



Dated: September 30, 2003
       ------------------
<PAGE>
                                                                  Exhibit 32.2

                            CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
                             18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,
                             AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
                  SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

In connection with the Quarterly Report of Inveresk Research Group, Inc. (the
"Company") on Form 10-Q for the period ended June 30, 2003 as filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the "Report"), I, D.J.
Paul E. Cowan, Chief Financial Officer and Treasurer of the Company, certify,
pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:


      (1) The Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or
      15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

      (2) The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all
      material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of
      the Company.

                                      /s/ D.J. Paul E. Cowan
                                      ----------------------
                                      D.J. Paul E. Cowan
                                      Chief Financial Officer and Treasurer
                                      August 6, 2003
STATE of North Carolina v. Justin Matthew SCRUGGS

No. COA18-1217

Court of Appeals of North Carolina.

Filed: August 6, 2019

NO ERROR.
Fourth Court of Appeals

San Antonio, Texas

October 17, 2018

No. 04-18-00466-CV

Pedro RAMIREZ,

Appellant

v.

Frances RAMIREZ,

Appellee

From the 131st Judicial District Court, Bexar County, Texas

Trial Court No. 2017-CI-21553

Honorable Angelica Jimenez, Judge Presiding

ORDER

After this court granted Appellant’s first motion for extension of time to file the brief, 

Appellant’s brief was due on October 10, 2018. On the due date, Appellant filed a second 

motion for extension of time to file the brief until November 9, 2018, for a total extension of 

sixty days. 

Appellant’s motion is GRANTED. Appellant’s brief is due on November 9, 2018. See

TEX. R. APP. P. 38.6(d). Further motions for extension of time to file the brief are discouraged.

_________________________________

Patricia O. Alvarez, Justice

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of the said 

court on this 17th day of October, 2018.

___________________________________

KEITH E. HOTTLE,

Clerk of Court
#### STATE v. ELLIS JARMAN.

(Filed 14 March, 1928.)

Appeal by defendant from *Qranmer, J.,*at December Term, 1927, of IeNOIe.

No error.

*Attorney-General Brummitt and Assistant Attorney-General Nash for the State.*

*P. D. Groom for defendant.*

Pee Oueiam.

The defendant was found guilty of aiding and abetting in the manufacture of intoxicating liquors. The defendant made a motion for judgment of nonsuit at the close of the State’s evidence and at the conclusion of all the evidence. C. S., 4643. These motions were refused by the court below, and in this we think there was no error.

Without reciting the evidence on the part of the State, we think it was sufficient to be submitted to the jury.

No error.
#### Henry Hager *v.*State Compensation Commissioner *et al.*

(No. 7348)

Submitted September 7, 1932.

Decided September 13, 1932.

*W. L. Taylor,*for appellant.

*Howard B. Lee,*Attorney General, and *R. Dennis Steed,*Assistant Attorney General, for respondents.

Hatcher, President .-

The claimant was employed in a mine of a subscriber to the Workmen’s Compensation Fund. The mine was on a hill and a hoist was operated by the employer to take the employees up and down the hill. On the occasion of claimant’s injury, his work was over for the day; he signalled for the hoist several times but the operator failed to respond; in such case it “was .up to the men to walk olí” or wait indefinitely on the hoist (according to the mine superintendent), so the claimant started down the hill on a path used regularly (“almost daily”) by the employees when the hoist was not available; and when a few hundred feet from the hoist landing (on the hill) and while still on the employer’s property, he fell and broke his leg. Compensation was denied on the ground that claimant’s injury was not received in the course of his employment, and was not the result thereof.

*493Upon an examination of the authorities we find it to be tbe general rule that when an employee is accidentally injured upon premises owned or controlled by the employer at a point reasonably proximate to the place of work, while the employee is going to or. from his work on a permissible route in general use by the employees, such injury will be deemed to have arisen from and in the course of the employment within the Workmen’s Compensation Acts. See the following authorities on Workmen’s Compensation Laws: 1 Schneider, p. 779; Harper, sec. 36; Boyd, sec. 486; Annotation, 49 A. L. R., pp. 426 and 443. This rule accords with the opinion of this court expressed in *De Constantin*v. *Commission,*75 W. Va. 32, on pages 34-5, 83 S. E. 88.

We therefore hold that the facts in this case bring the plaintiff within this rule and reverse the holding of the commissioner.

*Reversed and remanded.*
EXHIBIT [32.1]

                CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,
                    AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO SECTION 906 OF THE
                           SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002


In connection with the Annual Report of Boston Financial Qualified Housing Tax
Credits L.P. III (the "Partnership") on Form 10-KSB for the year ended March 31,
2005 as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof
(the "Report"), the undersigned, the Principal Executive Officer and Principal
Financial Officer, hereby certifies pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as
adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:

1.   the Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d)
     of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

2.   the information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material
     respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the
     Partnership.



                                             /s/Jenny Netzer
                                             ----------------------------------
                                             Jenny Netzer
                                             Principal Executive Officer and
                                             Principal Financial Officer
                                             Arch Street III, Inc., as
                                             Managing General Partner of
                                             Boston Financial Qualified
                                             Housing Tax Credits L.P. III

                                             Date:  July 13, 2005


A signed original of this written statement required by section 906 has been
provided to the Partnership and will be retained by the Partnership and
furnished to the Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff upon request.



<page>
exv10w53






Exhibit 10.53




AMENDMENT NO. 1




TO THE



CON-WAY SUPPLEMENTAL RETIREMENT SAVINGS PLAN



AMENDED AND RESTATED DECEMBER 2008


The Con-way Supplemental Retirement Savings Plan, Amended and Restated December 2008 (the “Plan”)
is hereby amended as follows, pursuant to Section 9.1 of the Plan. This amendment shall be
effective as of April 1, 2009.



1. Section 3.2 Deferrals, is amended to replace subsection (a) thereunder in its entirety
with the following:





     (a) if the Participant makes the maximum elective deferrals under Code Section 402(g),
or the maximum elective contributions permitted under the terms of the Retirement Savings
Plan for the Plan Year if less, an amount equal to the Matching Contributions that would
have been made on behalf of the Participant if Excess Compensation had been recognized under
the Retirement Savings Plan, less actual Matching Contributions made on behalf of the
Participant under the Retirement Savings Plan; provided that amounts credited under this
subsection shall not exceed the Participant’s Excess Compensation for the Plan Year
multiplied by three percent (3%);


2. Section 3.2 Deferrals is amended to replace the phrase “applicable to” with the phrase
“actually made to the Retirement Savings Plan with respect to” in both subsection (b) and
subsection (c) thereunder.




	 	 	 	 	 	 	 
	 	 	CON-WAY INC.	 	 
	 
	 	 	 	 	 	 
	 

	 	By:	 	 	 	 
	 

	 	 	 	 

Leslie P. Lundberg
	 	 
	 

	 	 	 	Vice President, Human Resources	 	 
	 
	 	 	 	 	 	 
	 	 	Dated:                                         , 2009
<PAGE>
                                                                    EXHIBIT 99.2

                            CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
               18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350, AS ADOPTED AND PURSUANT TO
                  SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

In connection with the quarterly report of American Achievement Corporation on
Form 10-Q for the period ending March 1, 2003 as filed with the Securities and
Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the "Report"), I, Sherice P. Bench,
Chief Financial Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section
1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002,
that:

(1) The Report fully complies with requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the
Securities and Exchange Act 1934; and

(2) The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material
respects, the financial condition and results of operations of American
Achievement Corporation as of the dates and for the periods expressed in this
Report.



             Dated: April 10, 2003                /s/ SHERICE P. BENCH
                                                 ------------------------------
                                                     Sherice P. Bench
                                                  CHIEF FINANCIAL OFFICER
## F IFTH 

## D ISTRICT 

## C OURT OF 

## A PPEAL 

## S TATE OF 

## F LORIDA

_____________________________ Case No. 5D2 2- 2408 LT Case No. 2019

- CA

- 001779 -A

_____________________________ R ACHELLE V ANDORN F/K/A R ACHELLE M ARTIN , Appellant,

v. D EUTSCHE B ANK T RUST C OMPANY A MERICAS , J OSEPH B. M AR TIN , H ERITAGE P ARK O F S T . A UGUSTINE H OMEOWNERS A SSOSICATION , I NC ., DCS M ORTAGE I NC ., A ND L IONSTONE , LLC, Appellee s .

______________ _______________ On appeal from the Circuit Court for St. Johns County. Kenneth J. Janesk, Judge. Rachelle Vandorn, Valley Center, pro se. No Appearance for Appellee s . October 3, 2 0 23
P ER C URIAM
. A FFIRMED . E DWARDS , C.J., J AY , and B OATWRIGHT , JJ., concur.2 _____________________________ Not fin al until disposition of any timely and authorized motion under Fla. R. App. P. 9.330 or 9.331 .

_____________________________
```

Exhibit 32

                CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,
                       AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO SECTION 906
                        OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

In  connection  with the Quarterly  Report of Vibrant  Health  International,  a
Nevada  corporation (the  "Company"),  on Form 10-QSB for the period ending June
30, 2004 as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission (the "Report"), I,
Thomas H. McAdam,  Chief Executive  Officer and Chief  Financial  Officer of the
Company,  certify,  pursuant to 18 U.S.C.  Section 1350, as adopted  pursuant to
Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:

     (1)  The Report fully  complies with the  requirements  of section 13(a) or
          15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

     (2)  The  information  contained  in the  Report  fairly  presents,  in all
          material respects, the financial condition and result of operations of
          the Company.

                                                                       /s/Thomas McAdam
                                                                       --------------------------
                                                                       Thomas H. McAdam
                                                                       Chief Executive Officer and
                                                                       Chief Financial Officer
July 22, 2004
```
NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

ERENDIRA RANGEL-PALACIOS, 

Plaintiff-Appellant, 

 v. 

SWEETWATER UNION HIGH SCHOOL 

DISTRICT, a public entity, 

Defendant-Appellee.

No. 17-56258 

D.C. No. 3:16-cv-00872-AJB-BLM 

MEMORANDUM*

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of California

Anthony J. Battaglia, District Judge, Presiding

Submitted March 13, 2018**

Before: LEAVY, M. SMITH, and CHRISTEN, Circuit Judges.

Erendira Rangel-Palacios appeals pro se from the district court’s judgment 

dismissing her action alleging Title VII claims. We have jurisdiction under 28 

U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo. Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 341 (9th Cir. 

2010) (dismissal based on Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6)); Jones v. Blanas, 393 F.3d 918, 

 

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent 

except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision 

without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

FILED

MAR 23 2018

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
 2 17-56258 

926 (9th Cir. 2004) (dismissal based on the applicable statute of limitations). We 

may affirm on any basis supported by the record. Thompson v. Paul, 547 F.3d 

1055, 1058-59 (9th Cir. 2008). We affirm.

The district court properly dismissed Rangel-Palacios’s Title VII claim 

concerning allegations in her 2015 Equal Employment Opportunity Commission 

(“EEOC”) charge as barred by the applicable statute of limitations, and RangelPalacios failed to allege facts sufficient to show that equitable tolling applies. See

42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(1) (Title VII complainant must file EEOC charge no later 

than 180 days, or authorized state or local agency charge no later than 300 days, 

after alleged unlawful practice occurred); Stoll v. Runyon, 165 F.3d 1238, 1242 

(9th Cir. 1999) (explaining that equitable tolling is warranted “when extraordinary

circumstances beyond the plaintiff’s control made it impossible to file a claim on 

time”).

Dismissal of Rangel-Palacios’s Title VII claim concerning allegations in her 

2013 EEOC charge was proper because Rangel-Palacios failed to file this action 

within ninety days of receiving a right-to-sue letter. See Payan v. Aramark Mgmt. 

Servs. Ltd. P’ship, 495 F.3d 1119, 1121-22 (9th Cir. 2007) (Title VII action must 

be commenced within ninety days of issuance of the right to sue letter). 
 3 17-56258 

We do not consider documents not presented to the district court. See

United States v. Elias, 921 F.2d 870, 874 (9th Cir. 1990) (“Documents or facts not 

presented to the district court are not part of the record on appeal.”).

AFFIRMED.
Exhibit 32.2

                              CNB BANCORP, INC.

                          CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
                           18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,
                            AS ENACTED PURSUANT TO
                SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

In connection with the Annual Report of CNB Bancorp, Inc. (the "Company") on
Form 10-K for the period ending December 31, 2004 as filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the "Report"), I,
George A. Morgan, Chief Financial Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant
to 18 U.S.C. section 1350, as enacted pursuant to Section 906 of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:

(1)  The Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or
     15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

(2)  The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material
     respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the
     Company.


By /s/ George A. Morgan
-----------------------------------------
George A. Morgan, Chief Financial Officer
March 28, 2005
CHARLESTON.

#### W. S. Wray, *Assignee of L. G. Toney v.*Guyan Lumber Company

(No. 5634.)

Submitted April 27, 1926.

Decided May 11, 1926.

*Assignments*— Assignee *of Claim Arising Out of Tort to Real or Personal Property Cannot, Under Statute or at Common Law, Maintain Action Thereon in His Own Name (Code, c. 99,*§ *lh).*

The assignee of a claim arising out of a tort to real or personal property cannot, under Section 14, Chapter 99, Code, or at common' law, maintain an action thereon in his own name.

Hatcher, Judge, absent.

(Assignments, 5 C. J. §§ 189, 193.)

(Noth : Parenthetical references *by*Editors, C. J. — Cyc. Not part of syllabi.)

Error to Circuit Court, Wyoming County.

Action by W. S. Wray, assignee of L. G. Toney, against the Guyan Lumber Company. Judgment for defendant, and plaintiff brings error.

*Affirmed,*

*Bussell S. Bits,*for plaintiff in error.

*J. Albert Toler,*for defendant in error.

*620LlTZ, PrÍESIDENT :

Lester G. Toney instituted this action in trespass on the case against the defendant, Guyan Lumber Company, a corporation, for the wrongful cutting and removing of timber. The present plaintiff, W. S. Wray, claiming the benefit of the cause of action as assignee of Toney, thereafter, over the objection of the defendant, was substituted as plaintiff in lieu of Toney. To the judgment of the trial court upon a directed verdict in favor of the defendant, the plaintiff obtained this writ.

Wray cannot maintain the action in his own name as as-signee of the original plaintiff, Toney, and the trial court improperly permitted him to be substituted as plaintiff in lieu of Toney. “While a claim arising out of a tort to real or personal property is assignable, the assignee cannot, under Section 14, Chapter 99, Code, or at common law, maintain an action thereon in his own name. Such action may be maintained in the name of the assignor for the use of the assignee.” *Barkers Creek Coal Co.*v. *Alpha Pocahontas Coal Co., 96*W. Va. 700, 123 S. E. 803; *Keyser Canning Co.*v. *Klots Throwing Co.,*98 W. Va. 487, 128 S. E. 280.

In view of the fact that the substituted plaintiff, W. S. Wray, cannot maintain the action in his own name, it is unnecessary to consider the questions raised on the merits of the case.

The judgment of the circuit court is affirmed, without prejudice to the rights of the parties.

*Affirmed.*
DENT 

Table IV, Insignificant defect. End seam dent. Does not 

materially affect appearance or usability. Not scored.
CHARLESTON.

#### State *v.*Wyoming County Bank *et al.*State *v.*First Nat. Bank of Mullens *et al.*State *v.*Bank of Mullens *et al.*

(Nos. 6607-6609)

Submitted May 6, 1930.

Decided May 13, 1930.

*Bailey <6 Shannon,*for plaintiffs in error Wyoming County Bank, E. Price Rose, R. D. and Lee P. Bailey, F. H. and F. E. Shannon, John D. Farmer, W. R. Shumate, W. M. Lewis, R. F. Wildey, W. H. Ruby, Grover C. Worrell, and Rezzonico.

*Grover C. 'Worrell*and *D. D. Moran,*for the State.

Woods, Judge:

These three actions were brought on separate surety bonds given under section 51, chapter 39, Code, by the Wyoming County Bank, the First National Bank of Mullens, and the Bank of Mullens, respectively, all designated county depositories and now in the hands of receivers, to recover, by reason of said banks’ failure to safely keep and pay over on proper order all public moneys of the county deposited therein. The writs of error are prosecuted by the several sureties, against whom judgments were taken.

*169Tbe sureties take tbe position that tbe declarations and motion for judgment were insufficient in law in that they failed to allege an entry of an order by tbe county court directing the prosecuting attorney to institute tbe several actions. In support of such position several cases are cited involving actions in debt on a sheriff's bond, all of which held that the declaration must allege in effect that the county court did make an order and duly entered the same of record, in which order it directed the said sheriff to pay the said several sums of money due and owing from him as sheriff over to his successor in office, etc. In those cases such an allegation was required in order to show that the sheriff had defaulted, since he was not authorized to pay out any moneys except on such an order of the court. *State*v. *Hays,*30 W. Va. 107, 3 S. E. 177.

While section 51, chapter 39, Code, provides that an action “shall lie on such [surety] bond at the instance of the county court, or the sheriff,” it nowhere requires an order of the county court directing the institution of such suit. The motion for judgment in the first-named case, and the declarations in the other two, all allege a breach of duty on the part of the several banks, in that they so conducted their business that their doors were closed by governmental authority. The liability of the several bondsmen rests upon this breach of trust and consequent inability of the banks to pay over on proper order . all public moneys, and is not dependent upon an order directing the bringing of suit. Whether or not a declaration or a notice of motion failed to set out such an authorization would in no wise add to or subtract from the breach. We are therefore of opinion that the allegation was immaterial, and that the judgments entered in the three cases should be upheld.

*Affirmed.*