FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL

STATE OF FLORIDA

_____________________________

No. 1D2022-0191

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MATTHEW PATRICK HASLAUER,

Appellant,

v.

ASHLEY MARIE HASLAUER,

Appellee.

_____________________________

On appeal from the Circuit Court for Okaloosa County.

John T. Brown, Judge.

March 6, 2024

WINOKUR, J.

Matthew Patrick Haslauer (“Former Husband”) appeals a 

Final Judgment dissolving his marriage to Ashley Marie Haslauer

(“Former Wife”) and seeks review of an order granting attorney’s 

fees pursuant to Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.600(c)(3). 

We affirm the dissolution judgment. However, because we find 

that Former Wife did not establish her entitlement to attorney’s 

fees pursuant to section 61.16, Florida Statutes, we vacate the fee 

order.
2

I

When the parties married in 2015, Former Husband had a 

money market account with a balance of approximately $21,000. 

At some point after the marriage, the account became a joint 

account between Former Husband and Former Wife. Sometime 

later, Former Wife told Former Husband that she wanted a 

divorce. Before either party filed a petition for dissolution of 

marriage, Former Husband transferred approximately $17,500 

from the joint account into a separate account that he alone 

controlled. When confronted by Former Wife about the transfer, 

Former Husband stated: “I need those funds in an accessible 

account to pay for my lawyer.” True to his word, Former Husband 

then used those funds to retain the services of an attorney. Not 

long thereafter, Former Husband filed a petition for dissolution of 

marriage.

Former Wife filed a counter petition, which included a

boilerplate request for attorney’s fees:

The Wife has become obligated to pay the 

undersigned attorney a reasonable fee and costs to 

represent her in this action, on both a temporary and 

permanent basis. The Husband has the financial 

resources to pay same and should be required to do so.

In that request, however, Former Wife did not allege that she 

needed financial assistance so that she could obtain the services of 

an attorney. Nor did Former Wife file a request for an interim fee 

order so that she could continue to maintain or defend the action.

As part of the equitable distribution of marital assets and 

liabilities in the final judgment of dissolution of marriage, the trial 

court ordered Former Husband to make a $41,000 equalization 

payment to Former Wife.1 After considering salaries and child 

support, the parties monthly net incomes were roughly equivalent: 

$6,845 for Former Husband and $6,854 for Former Wife. At the 

1 The trial court granted a motion for rehearing in part by 

reducing the equalization payment from $49,000 to $41,000.
3

time of dissolution, Former Wife had an annual salary of $98,000 

and Former Husband had an annual salary of $128,000. Former 

Wife did not request spousal support; however, the trial court 

ordered Former Husband to pay her $850 per month in child 

support. 

Regarding attorney’s fees, the Final Judgment of Dissolution 

of Marriage ordered Former Husband to pay Former Wife’s 

attorney’s fees without making any specific findings of fact to 

support and explain the decision, saying only “[Former] Wife is 

found to have the need and the [Former] Husband is found to have 

the ability to pay [Former] Wife’s attorney’s fees and costs.” The 

court reserved jurisdiction to determine the amount. In the order 

on rehearing, the trial court characterized the fee order as an 

equitable reimbursement for Former Husband’s unilateral 

transfer of marital funds:

The Court cannot as a matter of equity allow one party to 

spend marital funds on that one party’s attorney’s fees 

without taking that into consideration in the award of 

attorney’s fees to the other party. The payment of 

attorney’s fees is not a race that benefits the faster in this 

matter.

After Former Husband filed a notice of appeal, the trial court 

conducted a hearing to determine the fee amount, ruling that

Former Wife was entitled to $58,738.59 from Former Husband for 

her attorney’s fees. Former Husband then filed another notice of 

appeal, which this Court treated as a motion for review under 

Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.600(c)(3).

II

Section 61.16, Florida Statutes, authorizes a trial court to 

order one party to pay another party’s reasonable attorney’s fees 

in a proceeding held under Chapter 61, Florida Statutes. See

§ 61.16(1), Fla. Stat. (“The court may from time to time, after 

considering the financial resources of both parties, order a party to 

pay a reasonable amount for attorney’s fees, suit money, and the 

cost to the other party of maintaining or defending any proceeding 
4

under this chapter, including enforcement and modification 

proceedings and appeals.”).

We note first that section 61.16 “is not a prevailing party fee 

statute.” Schneider v. Schneider, 32 So. 3d 151, 156 (Fla. 4th DCA

2010) (citing Widder v. Widder, 673 So. 2d 954 (Fla. 4th DCA 

1996)); see also Humerickhouse v. Humerickhouse, 932 So. 2d 1142, 

1145 (Fla. 2d DCA 2006) (“An award of attorney’s fees in domestic 

support cases is not dependent on one party’s success in the 

litigation but rather upon the parties’ relative financial 

resources.”) (citing Bullock v. Jones, 666 So. 2d 224, 225 (Fla. 2d 

DCA 1995)). Instead, as the supreme court explained in Rosen v. 

Rosen, the purpose of section 61.16 is “to ensure that both parties 

have similar access to competent legal counsel, the trial court must 

look to each spouse’s need for suit money versus each spouse’s 

respective ability to pay.” 696 So. 2d 697, 699 (Fla. 1997); see also 

Mishoe v. Mishoe, 591 So. 2d 1100, 1101 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992) 

(“Attorney’s fees may be awarded in domestic cases to insure that 

each party has a similar ability to secure competent legal 

counsel.”). Section 61.16 helps mitigate the future harm that would 

otherwise result from an economic disparity between the parties. 

See Nichols v. Nichols, 519 So. 2d 620, 621–22 (Fla. 1988) (“[T]he 

equitable considerations underlying our dissolution law compel 

the trial court to mitigate the harm an impecunious spouse would 

suffer where the other spouse’s financial advantage accords him or 

her an unfair ability to obtain legal assistance.” (citation omitted)); 

see also Standard Guar. Ins. Co. v. Quanstrom, 555 So. 2d 828, 835 

(Fla. 1990) (“A significant purpose of [section 61.16 as a] feeauthorizing statute is to assure that one party is not limited in the 

type of representation he or she would receive because that party’s 

financial position is so inferior to that of the other party.”).

Because it provides “access” to legal representation, section 

61.16 contemplates a prospective, rather than a retrospective, fee 

order. This court explained this principle in Jessup v. Werner, 354 

So. 3d 605, 608–09 (Fla. 1st DCA 2022):

[A] trial court must consider whether the requesting 

party has a lack of access to money or other assets that 

precludes him or her from hiring counsel to assist in ably 

seeing the proceeding through to its conclusion. The 
5

statute uses the phrase “from time to time,” which 

indicates the interlocutory and ongoing nature of the 

consideration in a dissolution or paternity action. This 

approach stands in marked contrast with that taken in a 

case involving a typical prevailing-party fee provision, 

where a trial court would not consider a fee request until 

after a final judgment is rendered.

In this case, the trial court did not make an interim 

order regarding attorney’s fees. Instead, it tucks into its 

final paternity judgment just a preliminary 

determination of whether there should be a fee payment 

at all. In doing so, it treats the fee determination as a 

matter of reimbursement for fees that the mother 

ostensibly already paid, and perhaps for fees she still has 

to pay. Section 742.045, though, is not a reimbursement 

provision, like a prevailing-party provision might be. 

Instead, the terms of section 742.045, as characterized by 

the supreme court, required the trial court to consider 

whether the mother needed money from the father to hire 

and retain competent counsel to represent her in the 

proceeding.

But see Nichols, 519 So. 2d at 621 (concluding that denying a 

spouse’s motion for temporary attorney’s fees solely because the 

spouse was represented by counsel at the hearing was 

unacceptable because it “would mean that the requesting spouse 

as a matter of sheer formality must appear pro se in order to be 

entitled to temporary attorney’s fees”).

“A trial court’s order granting or denying a request for 

attorney’s fees [under section 61.16] is reviewed for abuse of 

discretion.” Dennis v. Dennis, 230 So. 3d 1277, 1278 (Fla. 1st DCA 

2017) (citing Broemer v. Broemer, 109 So. 3d 284, 290 (Fla. 1st DCA 

2013)).
6

III

The fee order is erroneous in several respects, which we 

address in turn.

A

In her counter-petition, Former Wife only included a generic 

request for attorney’s fees. Although Former Wife alleged that 

“Husband has the financial resources” to pay the attorneys’ fees 

for both parties, the counter-petition failed to allege that Former 

Wife could not obtain the services of a competent attorney without 

an order under section 61.16. Instead of demonstrating how, for 

example, Former Husband’s unilateral transfer of funds created a 

need for an order under section 61.16, Former Wife alleged that 

she used a “high interest credit card” to retain the services of her

attorney. Then at trial, Former Wife testified that she wanted 

Former Husband to pay her attorney’s fees because she “already 

paid his attorney’s fees.”

But as stated above, equitable reimbursement is not the 

purpose of section 61.16. Because the counter-petition failed to 

plead an immediate need for financial assistance, it did not 

establish a basis for an award of attorney’s fees under section 

61.16. See Longmeier v. Longmeier, 921 So. 2d 808, 809 (Fla. 1st 

DCA 2006) (finding that “a request for fees must be specifically 

pled under section 61.16, which is a discretionary-fee provision,” 

and that “it is error for a trial court to award attorney’s fees 

pursuant to section 61.16(1) where attorney’s fees are not 

specifically pled.” (citation and footnote omitted)); see also

Szymanski v. Szymanski, 603 So. 2d 73, 74 (Fla. 4th DCA 1992) 

(holding that an award of attorney’s fees and costs in a dissolution 

proceeding is error “in the absence of a properly pled request”).

B

Given the sizeable equalization payment ($41,000) and the 

balanced economic positions of the parties (net monthly income of 

approximately $6,850.00 for both), Former Husband “is in no 

better position [than Former Wife] to pay attorney’s fees.” Galligar 

v. Galligar, 77 So. 3d 808, 810 (Fla. 1st DCA 2011). Because both 
7

parties have a similar ability to pay their own legal fees, the trial 

court erred when it ordered Former Husband to pay Former Wife’s

attorney’s fees under section 61.16. See Haywald v. Fougere, 164 

So. 3d 786, 787 (Fla. 1st DCA 2015) (“It is an abuse of discretion to 

grant fees where both parties are equally able to pay their own.”).

See also Williams v. Jones, 290 So. 3d 609, 611 (Fla. 1st DCA 2020)

(finding that after “an equitable distribution of the marital 

property has been achieved and the trial court has equalized 

incomes through its alimony award, the trial court abuses its 

discretion in awarding attorney’s fees.”); Nolan v. Nolan, 188 So. 

3d 977, 980 (Fla. 1st DCA 2016) (holding that an award of 

attorney’s fees is error “if the equal distribution of the marital 

property has been achieved and the trial court equalized incomes 

through its alimony awards.” (citation omitted)).

C

The trial court waited until the end of the proceedings to order 

Former Husband to pay Former Wife’s attorney’s fees under

section 61.16. With regard to Former Husband’s ability to pay, the 

court found that “his gross annual pay is $128,213.00.” As to 

Former Wife’s need for financial assistance, however, no specific 

findings of fact support or explain the trial court’s determination.

To the contrary, the court found that Former Wife works “as a 

Civilian Contracting Officer with the Department of Veteran 

Affairs [and] her gross annual pay is $98,286.00.”

Given these facts as well as the lack of any specific finding as 

to Former Wife’s need for financial assistance, we see no basis in 

the record to support the trial court’s decision to order Former 

Husband to pay Former Wife’s attorney’s fees. The failure to make

specific findings of fact to support its decision also constitutes 

reversible error. See Dorsey v. Dorsey, 266 So. 3d 1282, 1289 (Fla. 

1st DCA 2019) (holding that an “award of fees and costs under 

section 61.16 must include specific findings of fact to support and 

explain the ruling” and that the “absence of any such findings 

requires reversal of this part of the final judgment and a remand 

for specific findings of fact to support any directive for 

contribution”); see also Fleming v. Fleming, 279 So. 3d 763, 765

(Fla. 1st DCA 2019) (same); Allen v. Allen, 114 So. 3d 1102, 1104 

(Fla. 1st DCA 2013) (same).
8

D

We specifically reject the trial court’s reliance on a footnote in 

Bellows v. Bellows, 245 So. 3d 999 (Fla. 4th DCA 2018), which 

stated as follows:

However, if a spouse depletes a marital asset to pay for 

attorney’s fees in the dissolution case, it follows that a 

trial court may take this factor into account in 

determining whether the spouse has a need for an award 

attorney’s fees and, if so, the amount of the spouse’s need 

for attorney’s fees.

Id. at 1001 n.1. Unlike this case, however, Bellows did not involve 

an order requiring one party to pay the other party’s attorney’s 

fees. Rather, Bellows involved a challenge to the trial court’s 

decision to distribute a valueless account to the former wife. Id. at 

1000–01. The parties in that case had a joint account that “had a 

marital value of $7,145 as of the date of the petition for 

dissolution.” Id. at 1001. The wife “used this asset on attorney’s 

fees and living expenses during the pendency of the [dissolution 

proceedings].” Id. Although “[t]here was no evidence or finding of 

misconduct,” the lower court apparently included the un-depleted 

value of the asset in the equitable distribution grid. Id. at 1000–

01. Expressed in terms of valuation dates, the trial court valued 

the asset as of the date of the petition ($7,415) – not as of the date 

of dissolution ($0).

The Fourth District reversed in Bellows, stating: “As the case 

law makes clear, depleting an asset to pay attorney’s fees in the 

divorce case is insufficient, without a finding of misconduct, to 

warrant assigning the depleted asset as part of the equitable 

distribution plan.” Id. at 1000. At the end of that sentence, the 

court included the footnote cited by the lower court in this case–

that depletion of a marital asset can be taken “into account in 

determining whether the spouse has a need for an award 

attorney’s fees.” Id. at 1001 n.1. However, nothing in Bellows

suggests that a trial court can order the payment of attorney’s fees 

under section 61.16 without making specific findings of fact to 

support and explain the award. In short, Bellows simply recognizes 

the possibility of a 61.16 award.
9

E

As stated above, nothing in section 61.16 permits payment of 

fees merely because a party unilaterally transferred funds for that 

party’s use in the dissolution. But regardless of section 61.16, 

without any trial court finding of misconduct by Former Husband, 

the trial court could not reimburse Former Wife for Former’s 

Husband’s unilateral transfer of funds. See Ballard v. Ballard, 158 

So. 3d 641, 642–43 (Fla. 1st DCA 2014) (holding that “[s]ums that 

have been diminished during dissolution proceedings for purposes 

reasonably related to the marriage, such as attorney’s fees for the 

dissolution, should not be included in an equitable distribution 

scheme unless there is evidence that one spouse intentionally 

dissipated the asset for his or her own benefit and for a purpose 

unrelated to the marriage” and that “[i]n that event, the trial court 

must make a specific finding of intentional misconduct.”).

The court specifically found that Former Husband committed 

no misconduct. In the order on rehearing, the trial court 

characterized the fee order as an equitable reimbursement for 

Former’s Husband’s unilateral transfer of marital funds (to pay his 

own attorney’s fees). However, the trial court expressly found that 

Former Husband did not engage in intentional misconduct when 

he made the unilateral transfer: “The Court does not find the 

[Former Husband]’s dissipation resulted from intentional 

misconduct . . . .”

Absent misconduct, Former Husband was free to use marital 

funds to pay his legal fees for the dissolution proceeding. See Lopez 

v. Lopez, 135 So. 3d 326, 329 (Fla. 5th DCA 2013) (“Attorney’s fees 

spent on the dissolution of the marriage are considered reasonable 

living expenses.”); see also Bellows, 245 So. 3d at 1000 (“Where a 

spouse depletes an asset for attorney’s fees or reasonable living 

expenses and there is no finding of misconduct, the asset should 

not be assigned to that spouse as part of the equitable distribution 

plan.”).2

2 The trial court’s erroneous finding regarding Former Wife’s 

entitlement to attorney’s fees was made in the dissolution order 

rather than the later order awarding fees to Former Wife. Because 
10

IV

For the reasons outlined above, we grant the Former 

Husband’s motion for review of the order awarding attorney’s fees 

to Former Wife. We affirm the dissolution order.

AFFIRMED in part, VACATED in part, and REMANDED.

ROBERTS, J., concurs; TANENBAUM, J., concurs with opinion.

_____________________________

Not final until disposition of any timely and 

authorized motion under Fla. R. App. P. 9.330 or 

9.331.

_____________________________

TANENBAUM, J., concurring.

Key to the error that we are correcting here on a motion for 

review is the fact that the post-decretal fee order is retrospective 

and remedial. That is not what section 61.16, Florida Statutes, 

authorizes. The terminology used in section 61.16 points to the 

relief allowed being temporary and prospective, awardable during

the award of fees was intertwined with the equitable distribution 

of marital assets and liabilities, we initially viewed the entitlement 

to the award as appealable under Rule 9.110(h) with the amount 

of the award separately reviewable by motion under Rule 

9.600(c)(3). See generally Nolan v. Nolan, 188 So. 3d 977, 980 (Fla. 

1st DCA 2016) (“A trial court abuses its discretion in awarding 

attorney’s fees if the equal distribution of the marital property has 

been achieved and the trial court equalized incomes through its 

alimony awards.”). However, the more traditional view is that the 

issue was nonfinal until the court awarded fees. See, e.g., McGee v. 

McGee, 264 So. 3d 1087, 1089 (Fla. 1st DCA 2019) (noting that a 

portion of the final judgment determining entitlement to fees but 

not awarding fees is nonfinal). Accordingly, we have addressed this 

matter pursuant to motion for review of the fee order under Rule 

9.600(c)(3).
11

the pendency of one of the phases of the dissolution proceeding and 

not “after the fact.” See § 61.16(1), Fla. Stat. (allowing a trial court, 

“from time to time,” to “order a party pay a reasonable amount for 

attorney’s fees, suit money, and the cost to the other party of 

maintaining or defending any [dissolution proceeding], including 

enforcement and modification proceedings and appeals” (emphasis 

supplied)); cf. § 61.052(3), Fla. Stat. (listing the interim orders that 

a trial court may make while the dissolution proceeding is ongoing: 

“for the support and alimony of the parties; the parenting plan, 

support, maintenance, and education of the minor child of the 

marriage; attorney’s fees; and the preservation of the property of 

the parties”); § 61.071, Fla. Stat. (authorizing an allowance for 

“alimony and suit money” pendente lite, or while the suit is 

pending).

As the majority opinion observes, the purpose of the statute is 

to ensure that both spouses have equivalent access to capable legal 

counsel. To fulfill that purpose, a trial court necessarily will be 

looking prospectively: How much does the requesting spouse need

(but does not have) so that he or she can pay a lawyer to keep 

prosecuting or defending the dissolution, enforcement, 

modification, or appellate proceeding? Once the trial court makes 

that assessment, the trial court will consider whether the other 

spouse has the financial resources to cover that need in the 

interim. Cf. § 61.16(1), Fla. Stat. (requiring the trial court to 

consider “the financial resources of both parties”).

Because it is prospective, the trial court’s order under section 

61.16 does not operate like a judgment: It does not permanently 

establish a legal right of one spouse against the other or alter the 

legal relationship between the spouses that extends beyond the 

trial court’s jurisdiction over the parties. Cf. § 61.052(4), Fla. Stat. 

(providing for a “judgment of dissolution of marriage” that 

“result[s] in each spouse having the status of being single and 

unmarried”); § 61.075(2), Fla. Stat. (stating that any award of a 

cash payment as part of equitable distribution “vest[s] when the 

judgment is awarded and the award shall not terminate upon 

remarriage or death of either party . . . but shall be treated as a 

debt”); § 61.075(4), Fla. Stat. (stating that the “judgment 

[equitably] distributing assets shall have the effect of a duly 

executed instrument of conveyance, transfer, release, or 
12

acquisition which is recorded in the county where the property is 

located”); § 61.075(9), Fla. Stat. (requiring trial court to “consider 

whether a judgment of alimony shall be made” after it determines 

the “equitable distribution of the marital assets and liabilities”); 

§ 61.13(3), Fla. Stat. (“For purposes of establishing or modifying 

parental responsibility and creating, developing, approving, or 

modifying a parenting plan, including a time-sharing schedule, 

which governs each parent’s relationship with his or her minor 

child and the relationship between each parent with regard to his 

or her minor child, the best interests of the child must be the 

primary consideration.” (emphasis supplied)).

The order instead establishes an obligation on the part of the 

payor spouse, at the hands of the trial court—the order then being 

enforceable through contempt proceedings rather than through 

execution. See § 61.16(2), Fla. Stat.; but cf. § 61.11, Fla. Stat. 

(authorizing a writ of bodily attachment to enforce support 

obligation); § 61.14, Fla. Stat. (providing for modification and 

enforcement of alimony and child-support orders, including 

contempt proceedings for non-payment of alimony or child support, 

and for a judgment of delinquency for non-payment of child 

support); § 61.17, Fla. Stat. (providing for enforcement of an “order 

or judgment for the payment of alimony or child support,” 

including through a “judgment for arrearages”).

An order under section 61.16, then, is not supposed to be 

remedial. Contrast this type of an order with a judgment awarding 

fees to a prevailing party, which adjudicates that party’s legal 

entitlement to fees based on the application of law to a judicially

determined set of facts about events that already have occurred. 

This judgment comes after rendition of an earlier judgment that 

has made one party or the other the prevailing one—a postdecretal, supplemental and recordable judgment that is separately 

appealable as such. Cf. Clearwater Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. 

Sampson, 336 So. 2d 78, 79 (Fla. 1976) (characterizing a true 

“interlocutory order” as one leading up to a final judgment and 

distinguishing that type of order from a “final post decretal order,” 

which is one coming after a final judgment that nevertheless “is 

dispositive of any question” and “completes the judicial labor on 

that portion of the” post-judgment cause).
13

An order under section 61.16 does not have this effect. It is 

interlocutory and procedural and allows the trial court to manage 

the spouses’ relative ability to hire and keep counsel during a 

phase in the dissolution proceeding. For this reason, Florida Rule 

of Appellate Procedure 9.600(c) allows for our review of such orders 

by motion for review to be filed in the appeal of the underlying 

judgment. But cf. Fla. R. App. P. 9.130(a)(3)(C)(iii)a. (providing for 

an appeal of a non-final order in a family law matter that 

determines a right to immediate monetary relief).

It is important to highlight here, then, that the final order on 

appeal is the final judgment of dissolution, which was dated 

October 26, 2021, as modified on the former husband’s motion for 

rehearing. Among other things, it dissolved the marriage, 

established parenting responsibility and timesharing, and 

distributed marital assets. To be sure, the judgment effected a 

significant, conclusive change in the legal relationship and the 

relative rights between the divorcing parties and their children. As 

to the marital assets, the judgment is conclusive regarding what 

the trial court determines to be a fair and just division. There is no 

statutory provision that authorizes alteration of that distribution. 

Any “true-up” to correct for any interim imbalances must occur at 

the time of the judgment making the distribution. Cf. § 61.075(1), 

(3), Fla. Stat. (requiring presumption of equal distribution but 

allowing for “an unequal distribution” based on a variety of factors, 

including “factors necessary to do equity and justice between the 

parties,” but at all events requiring that the trial court make 

“factual findings in the judgment” that support the court’s 

“rationale” for the distribution); § 61.075(5), Fla. Stat. (allowing for 

“interim partial distribution during the pendency of a dissolution 

action” but requiring that the court take the interim distribution 

into account “and give appropriate credit . . . in its final allocation 

of marital assets and liabilities”). 

In awarding the fee order on review in this case, rather than 

focus on whether the former wife had a continuing need to hire or 

retain counsel in the dissolution proceeding (say, for enforcement 

or modification of the court’s orders)—as section 61.16 requires—

the court made its determination looking backwards at the 

equitable distribution reflected in the judgment that had just 

become final. The trial court made the fee award based on the 
14

rationale that it “cannot, as a matter of equity, allow one party to 

spend marital funds on that one party’s attorney’s fees without 

taking that into consideration in the award of attorney’s fees to the 

other party.” This is not a permissible basis for a fee award under 

section 61.16.

The order in essence second-guesses the equitable 

distribution—which already included an equalization payment of 

$49,128.51 from the former husband to the former wife—by 

requiring an even larger, additional cash payment to make 

everything fairer. Section 61.16 cannot be used as an end-run 

around the well-established principle of a judgment’s finality. See 

Shelby Mut. Ins. Co. of Shelby, Ohio v. Pearson, 236 So. 2d 1, 3 

(Fla. 1970) (“Unless a proper motion or petition is filed within the 

allotted time, the judgment or order of the trial court becomes 

absolute. Except as provided by Rules 1.530 and 1.540, Florida 

Rules of Civil Procedure, the trial court has no authority to alter, 

modify or vacate an order or judgment.”); Kippy Corp. v. Colburn, 

177 So. 2d 193, 196–97 (Fla. 1965) (same); see also Pruitt v. Brock, 

437 So. 2d 768, 773 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983) (describing two 

mechanisms by which a trial court can reconsider and correct its 

own final judgment—timely motion for rehearing and timely 

motion for relief from judgment—and observing that the trial court 

otherwise loses jurisdiction over its judgment). By the time of the 

award, in fact, the dissolution proceeding in the trial court had 

come to an end, and an appeal had commenced in this court. The 

trial court had no authority to reconsider how it distributed the 

marital property between the former spouses and try to “make it 

right” via a fee order.

Meanwhile, it is quite telling that the trial court made a 

general finding in the dissolution judgment that the former wife 

had a need for suit money and the former husband had an ability 

to pay, without making any determination as to an amount. The 

trial court’s approach here is redolent of that used in civil 

litigation: Make an initial determination of entitlement, based on 

who the prevailing party is, and determine an amount at a later 

hearing. This is not the correct approach, because section 61.16 

does not authorize prevailing party fees. The only question for the 

trial court was whether, at the time it was considering an award 

of fees, the former wife still needed money for a lawyer.
15

After the judgment was entered, though, how could there still 

be a need? The former wife had had the benefit of counsel all along, 

and at no point during the dissolution proceeding did she claim 

that she needed money from the former husband to pay for her 

lawyer. She made the decision instead to finance her lawyer’s fees 

by credit card. Her decision to incur her own debt to pay for her 

lawyer, rather than to seek assistance from the court, was hers 

alone to make. She (and her lawyer) now must live with that 

decision because the law does not allow for any alternative once 

the equitable dissolution judgment was rendered. This is not to say 

the former wife now could not still seek some award of fees 

prospectively to cover her continued need for counsel to prosecute 

this appeal or to modify or enforce the timesharing or support 

components of the dissolution judgment. The former wife, however, 

was not seeking prospective litigation support when she obtained 

the current fee order, so that is not a basis before us for review.

For the reasons set out in more detail in the majority opinion, 

I concur in affirming the dissolution judgment and in vacating the 

fee order rendered under section 61.16. 

_____________________________

Michael T. Webster of Michael T. Webster, P.A., Shalimar, for 

Appellant.

Tonya C. Petermann of Tonya C. Petermann, P.A., Fort Walton 

Beach; Richard D. Zasada of Zasada Law, LLC, Miramar Beach,

for Appellee.