COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
Present: Judges Alston, Cha fin and Senior Judge Haley

DOMINIQUE TIARA NASH MEMORANDUM OPINION * BY v. Record No . 0455-17-4 JUDGE TERESA M. CHAFIN NOVEMBER 28, 2017 ARLINGTON COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN SERVICES

FROM THE CIRCUIT COUR T OF ARLINGTON COUNTY Daniel S. Fiore, II, Judge (Dusty Sparrow Reed, on briefs), for appellant. Appellant submitting on briefs. (Karen M. Grane, Assistant C ounty Attorney; Shirley Norman Taylor, Guardian ad litem for the minor child; Ellen M. Dague, Guardian ad litem for appellant, on brief), f or appellee. Appellee and guardians ad litem submitting on brief.
Dominique Tiara Nash appeal s the February 23, 2017 decision of the Circuit Court of Arlington County (the circuit court) terminating her residual p arental rights as to her son, J.N. Nash presents three assignment s of error on appeal. First, she contends that the circuit court erred by terminating her parent al rights pursuant to Code § 16. 1-283(B)(2) because the record established a finding that J.N . was “at-risk of neglect” rather than abused or neglected. Second, she argues that the circuit cour t erred in finding sufficient e vidence to terminate her parental rights pursuant to Code § 16.1-283(C) because the evidence did not establish that she was unwilling or unable to remedy the conditions that led to J.N.’s placement in foster care, or that the Arlington County Department of Human Services (DHS) made re asonable and appropriate efforts to assist her in doi ng so. Finally, Nash also argues t hat the circuit c ourt erred in denying

* Pursuant to Code § 17.1-413, this op inion is not designated fo r publication.UNPUBLISHED- 2 - her motion for visitation when her residual parental rights wer e erroneously terminated. For the reasons that follow, we affirm t he circuit court’s decision.
I. BACKGROUND “When reviewing a [circuit] c ourt’s decision on appeal, we vie w the evidence in the light most favorable to the prevai ling party, granting it the benefit of any reasonable inferences.” Boatright v. Wise Cty. Dep ’t of Soc. Servs., 64 Va. App. 71, 76 , 764 S.E.2d 724, 727 (2014) (quoting Congdon v. Congdon, 40 Va. App. 255, 258, 578 S.E.2d 8 33, 835 (2003)). Following a report in August 2015 that Nash was using and selling drugs fro m her home, Child Protective Services (CPS) initiated a saf ety plan with Nash wherein she ag reed that neither she nor anyone else would use or possess drugs or alcohol in the presence of J .N., Nash’s infant son. Nash also agreed to ongoing services from CPS. The following month, CPS received a new report regarding drugs in the home and an episode of domestic violence. Aft er a home visit on September 10, 2015, CPS Investigator Jacque Tuck informed Nash that because of her failure to comply with the safety plan, and because of concerns regarding Nas h’s CPS history and prior deci sion-making, CPS would be removing J.N. from the home. Ei ght-month-old J.N. was temporar ily placed in foster care, and DHS identified the reason as e xposure to domestic violence and substance abuse in the home. On October 6, 2015, the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Distric t Court for Arlington County (juvenile court) determine d that J.N. was at risk of bei ng neglected by Nash. At a dispositional hearing on Nove mber 6, 2015, the juvenile court o rdered that custody of J.N. be transferred to DHS and it approved the submitted foster care se rvices plan establishing concurrent goals of relative pl acement or returning J.N. home. The plan identified several things Nash needed to accomplish to return J.N. to her care, including: 1) undergo a substan ce abuse program and follow any recommendations,- 3 - 2) participate in the Victim In tervention Program in order to u nderstand “the dynamics of domestic violence and its imp act on children,” 3) demonstrate h er commitment to keeping J.N. safe by developing healthy relationships and positive communica tion skills, 4) complete a parenting class, 5) attend weekl y supervised visits with J.N. t o offer the structure and consistency necessary for his emotional deve lopment, 6) obtain employment i n order to support herself and J.N. financially, 7) maintain a ppropriate housing, and 8) atten d all court hearings and participate in meetings pertaining to her services. Nash completed the parenting class, participated in team meetin gs regarding her services, and completed a substance abuse assessment, which referred her for a separate mental health assessment. She also attended s upervised visits with J.N. when transportation was available, but she did not progress to unsuperv ised visits. After losing her housing voucher in January 2016, Nash entered homeless shelters for brief periods of time, but r emained homeless throughout the duration of the termination proceedings. As such, her individu al therapy sessions focused on case management more than her therapy needs, and her attendance began to decline over time. Nash also failed to present evid ence of consistent employment o r a reliable source of income. Following a hearing on July 7, 2016, a permanency planning orde r was entered approving a permanent goal of adoption. The juvenile court determined th at termination of parental rights was in J.N.’s best interests a nd directed DHS to file a petitio n in support of doing so. On November 10, 2016, the juvenile court terminated Nash’s residua l parental rights pursuant to Code § 16.1-283(B) and 16.1-283(C). On appeal to the circuit court , the court concluded that Nash f ailed to remedy the conditions that led to J.N.’s pl acement in foster care despite the substantial services offered by DHS. The circuit court further c oncluded that J.N. “was neglec ted, and it [was] not reasonably- 4 - likely that the conditions whic h resulted in such neglect can b e substantially corrected or eliminated so as to allow [his] safe return to [Nash] within a reasonable period of time.” As the circuit court concluded that Nash had been unable to su bstantially remedy the conditions that led to J.N.’s placement in foster care within a reasonable time notwithstanding the reasonable and appropriate services offered by DHS, it term inated her residual parental rights pertaining to J.N. pursuant to Code § 16.1-283(B) and 16.1-283( C). This appeal followed.
II. ANALYSIS First, Nash argues that, absen t a finding of abuse or neglect from the J&DR court, the circuit court erred in ordering t he termination of Nash’s resid ual parental right s where it “did not have the authority to make a finding of ‘neglect’ because the . . . finding that J.N. was ‘at-risk of neglect’ was not appealed.” Next , Nash argues that the circuit court erred by conc luding that she was unwilling or unable to remedy the conditions that led to J. N. being placed in foster care, or that the Department made reason able and appropriate efforts to help her do so. Finally, she argues that because her residual pa rental rights were erroneous ly terminated, her motion for visitation was therefore impr operly denied. We disagree. “When reviewing a termination of a parent’s residual parental rights, it would be unfitting to not acknowledge that ‘[t]he t ermination of parental rights i s a grave, drastic and irreversible action.’” Farrell v. Warren Ct y. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 59 Va. App. 375, 400, 719 S.E.2d 329, 341 (2012) (quoting Helen W. v. Fairfa x Cty. Dep’t of Human Dev., 1 2 Va. App. 877, 883, 407 S.E.2d 25, 28-29 (1991)). “In matters of a child’s welfare, [c ircuit] courts are vested with broad discretion in making the decisi ons necessary to guard and to fo ster a child’s best interests.” Thach v. Arlington Cty. Dep’t of Human Servs., 63 Va. App. 157, 168, 754 S.E.2d 922, 927 (2014) (quoting Logan v. Fairfax C ty. Dep’t of Human Dev., 13 V a. App. 123, 128, 409 S.E.2d 460, 463 (1991)). “When reviewing a decision to terminate pare ntal rights, we presume the- 5 - circuit court ‘thoroughly weighed a ll the evidence, considered the statutory requirements, and made its determination based on the child’s best interests.’” Toms v. Hanover Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 46 Va. App. 257, 265-66, 616 S.E.2d 765, 769 (2005) (qu oting Fields v. Dinwiddie Cty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 46 Va. App. 1, 7, 614 S.E.2d 656, 659 (20 05)). “Where the circuit court’s judgment is based on evidence heard ore tenus , its decision to terminat e a parent’s rights is entitled to great weight and [th e decision] ‘will not be distur bed on appeal unless [it is] plainly wrong or without evidence to s upport it.’” Thach, 63 Va. App. at 168-69, 754 S.E.2d at 927-28 (quoting Logan, 13 Va. App. at 128, 409 S.E.2d at 463).
A. THE CIRCUIT COURT WAS PERMITTED UPON DE NOVO REVIEW TO FIND THAT J.N. WAS ABUSED OR NEGLECTED Nash contends that the circuit court could not order terminatio n of her parental rights pursuant to Code § 16.1-283(B) abs ent a finding of neglect in t he juvenile court. 1 She concedes that she failed to present this a rgument to the circuit court. Nevertheless, she a sks this Court to reach the issue by applying the ends of justice exception to Ru le 5A:18. We decline to do so. “The Court of Appeals will not c onsider an argument on appeal w hich was not presented to the trial court.” Ohr ee v. Commonwealth, 26 Va. App. 299, 3 08, 494 S.E.2d 484, 488 (1998). See Rule 5A:18. When a party fails to object to a court’s ruli ng, this Court is permitted upon request to consider the ruli ng “as a basis for reversal . . . t o attain the ends of justice.” Rule 5A:18. “The ends of justice excep tion is narrow[,] is to be us ed sparingly,” and is to be invoked when an error is “clear, substa ntial and material.” Redman v. Commonwealth, 25 Va. App. 215, 220-21, 487 S.E.2d 269, 272 (1997) (quoti ng Brown v. Commonweal th, 8 Va. App. 126, 132, 380 S.E.2d 8, 10-11 (1989)). “In ord er to avail oneself of the exception, a defendant must

1 To the extent Nash challenges th e juvenile court’s termination decision on the basis of finding J.N. was “at-risk of ne glect” as opposed to abused and neglected, such a challenge is beyond the jurisdiction of this C ourt and we will not consider it. See Code § 17.1-405.- 6 - affirmatively show that a misca rriage of justice has occurred, not that a miscarriage might have occurred.” Le v. Commonw ealth, 65 Va. App. 66, 73, 774 S.E.2d 475, 479 (2015) (quoting Redman, 25 Va. App. at 221, 487 S.E.2d at 272). “We have repeatedly held that an appeal to the circuit court fr om a court not of record . . . annuls the judgment of the infer ior tribunal as completely as i f there had been no previous trial . . . .” Walker v. Dep’t of Pub. Welfare, 223 Va. 557, 563, 29 0 S.E.2d 887, 890 (1982). Thus, “an appeal from the juvenile court must be heard de novo by the circuit court. ” Fairfax Cty. Dep’t of Family Servs . v. D.N., 29 Va. App. 400, 406, 512 S.E.2 d 830, 832 (1999); see also Code § 16.1-296 (“From any final orde r or judgment of the juven ile court affecting the rights or interests of any person coming w ithin its jurisdiction, an appe al may be taken to the circuit court

. . . and shall be heard de novo .”).
“A de novo hearing means a trial anew , with the burden of proof remaining upon the party with whom it rested in the juvenile court.” Parish v. Sp aulding, 20 Va. App. 130, 132, 455 S.E.2d 728, 729 (1995) (quoting Box v. Talley, 1 Va. App. 289, 292, 338 S.E.2d 349, 351 (1986)). “A court which hears a case de novo , which disregards the judg ment of the court below, which hears evidence anew and new evidence, and which makes fin al disposition of the case, acts not as a court of appeals bu t as one exercising original j urisdiction.” Addison v. Salyer, 185 Va. 644, 650, 40 S.E.2d 260, 263 (1946) (quoting Gemmell, Inc. v. Svea Fire and Life Ins., 166 Va. 95, 98, 184 S.E. 457, 458 (1936)). Because the burden of proof reste d with DHS in the juvenile cou rt, the burden of proof remained on DHS in the de novo appeal to the circuit court. As such, DHS was required to put forth evidence as if proceeding i n a trial anew, which required DHS to establish by clear and convincing evidence that termina tion of Nash’s residual parenta l rights was the only reasonable and appropriate recourse. In hear ing the evidence anew and in making a final disposition of the- 7 - case, the circuit court was in no way hindered by any actions o r findings of the juvenile court, and the court was therefore pe rmitted to independently find tha t J.N. had been abused or neglected. Accordingly, the circuit cour t did not err when it found that J .N. had been neglected while in Nash’s care. Where the re is no error, there is no mis carriage of justice. Finding no miscarriage of justice, this Cour t declines to invoke the ends of justice exception to Rule 5A:18.
B. NASH’S SUFFICIENCY CHALLENGE IS WAIVED FOR FAILURE TO CHALLENGE AN ALTERNATIVE HOLDING Nash argues that the evidence wa s insufficient to terminate he r parental rights under Code § 16.1-283(C) where it did not s how that she was unwilling or unable to remedy the conditions that led to J.N.’s placement in foster care, or that DHS made reasonable and appropriate efforts to assist her in doing so. DHS contends th at Nash’s argument was not preserved in the circuit court because she failed to renew her motion to strike following her case in chief and because she did not file a motion for reconsiderat ion. In closing argument, however, Nas h argued as to the progress sh e had made with the services she utilized until DHS ceased providing those services . Additionally, counsel for Nash endorsed the circuit court’s fi nal order as seen and objected t o “as to finding that [DHS] made reasonable and appropriate effort s to substantially remedy the conditions which led to or required continuation of the child’s foster care placement,” tracking th e language of Code § 16.1-283(C). However, despite preserving her su fficiency argument with respe ct to Code § 16.1-283(C), Nash failed to preserv e or present a sufficiency argument with respect to Code § 16.1-283(B). The February 23, 2017 f inal order expressly ref lects that the c ircuit court found clear and convincing evidence to support termination under both Code § 16.1-283(B) and 16.1-283(C). Nash presented no argum ent or objection to any po rtion of the circuit court’s ruling pertaining to Code § 16.1-283 (B). Furthermore, despite requesting that the Court apply- 8 - the ends of justice exception to h er first assignment of error, Nash did not challenge the overall sufficiency of the evidence supporting termination under Code § 16.1-283(B). Instead, she challenged only the circuit court’s ability to make a finding o f neglect where the juvenile court had only found J.N. was at risk of neglect. “[I]n ‘situations in which the re is one or more alternative ho ldings on an issue,’ the appellant’s ‘failure to address one of the holdings results in a waiver of any cla im of error with respect to the court’s deci sion on that issue.’” Johnson v. Co mmonwealth, 45 Va. App. 113, 116, 609 S.E.2d 58, 60 (2005) (quoting United States v. Hatchet t, 245 F.3d 625, 644-45 (7th Cir. 2001)). This Court has recogni zed that Code § 16.1-283(B) and 16.1-283(C) are “individual bases upon which a petitioner may s eek to terminate residual pa rental rights,” City of Newport News Dep’t of Soc. Servs. v. Winslow, 40 Va. App. 556, 563, 580 S.E.2d 463, 466 (2003), and that this Court is not requir ed to consider termination under o ne particular subsection when termination is upheld under anot her subsection of Code § 16.1-2 83. See Fields v. Dinwiddie Cty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 46 Va. App. 1, 8, 614 S.E.2d 656, 65 9 (2005). Because Nash failed to challenge t he sufficiency of the eviden ce supporting the circuit court’s termination under C ode § 16.1-283(B), and because eithe r subsection independently supports a termination decision, Nas h has waived her sufficienc y challenge to the termination under Code § 16.1-283(C). As such, we affirm the circuit court ’s decision terminating Nash’s residual parental rights. C. NASH FAILED TO PROVIDE PERTINENT AUTHORITY AS REQUIRED BY RULE 5A:20 AND HAS WAIVED HER ARGUMENT AS TO HER MOTION TO REINSTATE VISITATION Finally, Nash argues that because the circuit court made no sep arate findings in denying her motion to reinstate visitati on, it “must be presumed” that the termination decision was the- 9 - basis for the denial. She thus c ontends that beca use the termi nation decision was in error, so too was the circuit court’s denial of her motion. Nash presents her argument wit hout any supporting case law or s tatutory authority. Rule 5A:20(e) states that an opening brief shall contain, among othe r things, “principles of law and authorities” pertaini ng to each assignment of error. “Statemen ts unsupported by argument, authority, or citations to the re cord do not merit appellate co nsideration.” Buchanan v. Buchanan, 14 Va. App. 53, 56, 415 S.E.2d 237, 239 (1992). Havi ng presented no citations or authority in support of her argument, Nash has waived any claim of error with regard to the denial of her motion to reinsta te visitation. See Rule 5A:20(e ). Finding this omission to be significant, this Court will not consider the argument on appea l. See Jay v. Commonwealth, 275 Va. 510, 520, 659 S.E.2d 311, 317 (2008).
III. CONCLUSION Because the circuit court did not err in its de novo proceeding by finding that J.N. was neglected, the ends of justice ex ception is inapplicable to Nas h’s claim and we do not consider it on appeal. Additionally, because Nash challenged the sufficien cy of the evidence supporting termination of her parental rights under Code § 16.1-283(C) onl y, and not the sufficiency as pertaining to Code § 16.1-283(B), Nas h failed to challenge an a lternative holding that supported termination and therefore waived the argument on appeal. Final ly, because Nash failed to provide supporting case law or a uthority as to why her motion t o reinstate visitation was improperly denied, we decline t o consider her argument. Accord ingly, we affirm the circuit court’s decision to terminate Nas h’s residual parental rights a s pertaining to J.N. and the denial of her motion to reins tate visitation. Affirmed.