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*********************************************** 
ROBERT GOODY, ADMINISTRATOR (ESTATE OF

RICHARD GOODY) v. MICHAEL

J. BEDARD ET AL.

(AC 42259)

Alvord, Elgo and Devlin, Js.

Syllabus

The plaintiff administrator of the estate of the decedent sought to recover

damages from the defendant S for negligence in connection with the

drug overdose and subsequent death of the decedent at her residence.

He alleged that, on the day that the decedent overdosed, B, who lived

with S at her residence, invited the decedent to consume drugs at the

residence where the decedent became unresponsive and unconscious,

that the decedent thereafter died and that the decedent’s injuries and

death were caused by S’s negligence in that she knew or should have

known that drugs were being used on the premises and she failed, inter

alia, to take any action to remove the drugs from the premises. S filed

a motion for summary judgment and an affidavit in support thereof in

which she averred that she did not invite the decedent to her residence

and B did not ask her permission to have him there, that she was not

present at her residence when the decedent was there and that she did

not learn that he had been there until the day after he had overdosed.

Thereafter, the trial court granted, over S’s objection, two motions filed

by the plaintiff for an extension of time to respond to S’s motion for

summary judgment. Nearly two weeks after the second deadline date

and four days before the rescheduled date for oral argument on S’s

motion for summary judgment, the plaintiff filed a third motion for an

extension of time, which the court did not act on. Thereafter, following

a hearing, the trial court granted S’s motion for summary judgment and

rendered judgment thereon, from which the plaintiff appealed to this

court. Held:

1. The plaintiff’s claim that the trial court abused its discretion in effectively

denying his third motion for an extension of time to respond to S’s

motion for summary judgment because additional time for discovery

was needed to obtain B’s medical records and to perform depositions

of other witnesses was unavailing; the plaintiff already had been granted

two prior motions for an extension of time and there were no affidavits

before the trial court articulating with specificity what additional discovery might justify a further continuance of the hearing and, potentially,

the trial, the third motion for an extension of time was filed just four days

before the rescheduled hearing and there was an absence of information

verified by affidavit detailing precisely what facts were within the exclusive knowledge of the person to be deposed.

2. The plaintiff could not prevail on his claim that the trial court improperly

granted S’s motion for summary judgment, which was based on his

assertion that that court erred in determining that there was no disputed

issue of material fact that S did not owe a duty of care to the decedent:

no genuine issue of material fact existed as to whether S was at her

residence when the decedent was there, as the only evidence before

the court on that issue was S’s affidavit in which she averred that she

was not present when he was there; moreover, contrary to the plaintiff’s

contention that S had a duty to aid and to protect the decedent because

she knew or should have known that B possessed drugs and alcohol in

her residence and that they would cause the decedent harm, on the

basis of the evidence presented, this court could not conclude that an

ordinary person in S’s position would anticipate that the decedent would

ingest drugs in her residence and suffer serious physical injuries that

would result in his death, and the plaintiff did not allege any recognized

special relationship of custody or control between the decedent and S

that would warrant the imposition of a duty; furthermore, the plaintiff’s

assertion that S owed the decedent a duty of care under the theory of

premises liability was without merit, as he failed to provide any case

law to support his contention that B’s possession of drugs and alcohol

constituted a defect on S’s premises.
Argued February 18—officially released October 6, 2020

Procedural History

Action to recover damages for, inter alia, the defendants’ alleged negligence, and for other relief, brought

to the Superior Court in the judicial district of New

London, where the named defendant was defaulted for

failure to appear; thereafter, the plaintiff filed a motion

for an extension of time; subsequently, the court,

Swienton, J., granted the motion for summary judgment

filed by the defendant Flori Schmoegner and rendered

judgment thereon, from which the plaintiff appealed to

this court. Affirmed.

Peter G. Billings, for the appellant (plaintiff).

Joseph M. Busher, Jr., for the appellee (defendant

Flori Schmoegner).
Opinion

ELGO, J. The plaintiff, Robert Goody, administrator

of the estate of Richard Goody (decedent), appeals from

the summary judgment rendered by the trial court in

favor of the defendant Flori Schmoegner.1 On appeal,

the plaintiff claims that the court erred by (1) effectively

denying his motion for an extension of time to conduct

additional discovery when it rendered summary judgment, and (2) determining that the defendant did not

owe a duty of care to the decedent in rendering summary judgment. We disagree and, accordingly, affirm

the judgment of the trial court.

The following facts, viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, and procedural history are relevant

to our resolution of this appeal. ‘‘The defendant . . .

owned the residence located at 8 Illinois Court, Oakdale

. . . where she lived with . . . Bedard, her ‘husband,

boyfriend and/or friend.’ . . . On February 9, 2016, the

[decedent] . . . was invited to the premises in order

to consume drugs. . . . Around 7 p.m. on that day, the

[decedent] became unresponsive and could not breathe.

Bedard waited until 8:32 p.m. to seek medical assistance, and, when the emergency medical personnel

arrived at the Illinois Court premises, the [decedent]

was unconscious and unresponsive. He was transported

to the emergency room at Backus Hospital, where he

received Narcan, was placed on life support and

received additional medical treatment. The [decedent]

was then transferred to Yale New Haven Hospital where

he received critical care until his death on February 11,

2016. . . .

‘‘In count four [of his complaint] against the defendant . . . the plaintiff alleges that the injuries and

death of [the decedent] were caused by the negligence

of [the defendant] in that she allowed Bedard to live

on the premises, she knew or should have known that

drugs were being used on the premises and failed to

take any action to remove the drugs from the premises.

In addition, she failed to take any action to save the

[decedent], failed to warn or protect his safety, failed to

provide emergency medical personnel with information

regarding the decedent’s activities, and failed to exercise control over the premises.

‘‘The defendant . . . has provided an affidavit in support of her motion for summary judgment which states

that she did not invite [the decedent] to her residence,

that Bedard did not ask permission to have [the decedent] to her home, that she was not at home at any

time [the decedent] was at the premises, and [that] she

did not learn of his presence at her home until February

10, 2016. She was at work while [the decedent] was at

her premises.

‘‘On February 21, 2018, the defendant . . . filed her

motion for summary judgment. On June 18, 2018, the
plaintiff filed an ‘initial’ memorandum in opposition to

the defendant’s motion for summary judgment. He has

indicated that he filed for an extension of time in order

to respond to the motion for summary judgment, which

motion was pending before the court. The court docket

indicates that he filed a motion for [an] extension of

time on March 20, 2018, seeking until June 1, 2018, to

respond to the motion for summary judgment, which

motion for [an] extension of time was granted over

objection. . . . On June 14, 2018, the plaintiff filed a

second motion for [an] extension of time, seeking until

September 1, 2018, to respond, which motion was

granted on June 18, 2018. . . .

‘‘The plaintiff filed his ‘initial’ response on June 18,

2018. On September 13, 2018, a third motion for [an]

extension of time to respond was filed by the plaintiff,

the defendant filed an objection to the motion, and the

court heard oral argument on the motion for summary

judgment on September 17, 2018.’’ (Citations omitted.)

On October 3, 2018, the trial court granted the defendant’s motion for summary judgment and rendered summary judgment in her favor. The plaintiff subsequently

filed this appeal.

I

The plaintiff first claims that the court improperly

denied his motion for an extension of time to respond

to the motion for summary judgment. Specifically, he

argues that the court abused its discretion because he

had ‘‘demonstrated a compelling reason why the additional time was needed to conduct discovery and the

steps [his] counsel had already taken for that purpose.’’

We disagree.

The following additional facts are relevant to our

resolution of this claim. The plaintiff submitted, and

the court accepted, a scheduling order in which all

dispositive motions were to be filed by March 15, 2018.

Trial was scheduled for November 6, 2018. The defendant filed her motion for summary judgment on February 21, 2018. On March 20, 2018, the plaintiff filed a

motion for an extension of time—to June 1, 2018—to

respond to the defendant’s motion for summary judgment. Over objection by the defendant, the court

granted the plaintiff’s motion. On June 14, 2018, two

weeks after his requested deadline date, the plaintiff

filed a second motion for an extension of time

requesting that the deadline to respond again be

extended, to September 1, 2018. That motion also was

granted by the court. On June 18, 2018, the plaintiff

filed an initial response to the defendant’s motion for

summary judgment. On September 13, 2018, nearly two

weeks after his second deadline date and four days

before the rescheduled date for oral argument on the

motion for summary judgment, the plaintiff filed his

third motion for an extension of time. The defendant

filed an objection. Oral argument on the motion for
summary judgment went forward as scheduled on September 17, 2018, at which time the plaintiff stated that

he needed more time to conduct discovery. The trial

court issued its memorandum of decision on October

3, 2018, granting the defendant’s motion for summary

judgment and did not act on the plaintiff’s third motion

for an extension of time.

We begin by setting forth the applicable standard of

review. Practice Book § 17-45 provides in relevant part:

‘‘(a) A motion for summary judgment shall be supported

by appropriate documents, including but not limited to

affidavits, certified transcripts of testimony under oath,

disclosures, written admissions and other supporting

documents. (b) Unless otherwise ordered by the judicial

authority, any adverse party shall file and serve a

response to the motion for summary judgment within

forty-five days of the filing of the motion, including

opposing affidavits and other available documentary

evidence. . . .’’ Practice Book § 17-47 provides:

‘‘Should it appear from the affidavits of a party opposing

the motion that such party cannot, for reasons stated,

present facts essential to justify opposition, the judicial

authority may deny the motion for judgment or may

order a continuance to permit affidavits to be obtained

or discovery to be had or may make such other order

as is just.’’ ‘‘A trial court’s adjudication of a motion

for a continuance pursuant to Practice Book § 17-47

is reviewed for an abuse of discretion.’’ Chase Home

Finance, LLC v. Scroggin, 194 Conn. App. 843, 860,

222 A.3d 1025 (2019). ‘‘Under the abuse of discretion

standard for review, [an appellate court] will make

every reasonable presumption in favor of upholding the

trial court’s ruling and only upset it for a manifest abuse

of discretion.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.)

Perez v. D & L Tractor Trailer School, 117 Conn. App.

680, 701–702, 981 A.2d 497 (2009), cert. denied, 294

Conn. 923, 985 A.2d 1062 (2010).

On appeal, the plaintiff argues that the court abused

its discretion in denying his third motion for an extension of time because additional time was needed to

obtain documents and to perform depositions to contradict the defendant’s affidavit and to respond to her

motion for summary judgment. The plaintiff claims that

those documents, specifically Bedard’s medical records

and depositions of other witnesses, would demonstrate

that the defendant was aware of Bedard’s ‘‘numerous

stints in drug and alcohol rehabilitation’’ and that the

defendant ‘‘could have [been] present’’ at the time of

the decedent’s death.

As we discuss in part II of this opinion, however, the

plaintiff has not demonstrated how mere knowledge of

Bedard’s drug addiction would have created an issue

of material fact with respect to the defendant’s duty to

the decedent. In addition, the plaintiff made reference

in his motion to unnamed witnesses with nothing more
specific than the claim that they were ‘‘further witnesses

to the events at issue . . . .’’ In his brief before this

court, the plaintiff insinuates that the deposition testimony of those further witnesses would support his contention that the defendant could have been present at

the time of the decedent’s death. Although the plaintiff

did not provide to the court the affidavits required pursuant to Practice Book § 17-47, the court specifically

asked how this additional discovery sought by the plaintiff would have any bearing on the issues presented in

the defendant’s motion for summary judgment.2 The

plaintiff responded, in reference to Bedard’s medical

records, that they would show the defendant to be

‘‘uncredible’’ with respect to her denial that Bedard

consistently abused substances in her home.

As the court emphasized in its memorandum of decision, the plaintiff had already been granted two prior

motions for extensions of time. The plaintiff’s third

motion for an extension of time, which was filed just

four days before the rescheduled hearing on the summary judgment motion, requested that the deadline to

respond be moved to October 21, 2018, just over two

weeks before the jury trial was scheduled to begin on

November 6, 2018. After hearing from the parties, the

court indicated that it would review the motions and

issue its decision. It is in this context that we emphasize

that proper affidavits with the required showing of ‘‘precisely what facts are within the exclusive knowledge

of the [party to be deposed]’’ are not merely procedural

rules. (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Weissman v.

Koskoff, Koskoff & Bieder, P.C., 136 Conn. App. 557,

559, 46 A.3d 943 (2012). They form the basis on which

a court can rely and make an informed determination as

to whether the information potentially to be discovered

justifies the requested continuance. Moreover, in considering whether the court abused its discretion, we

observe that ‘‘[m]atters involving judicial economy,

docket management [and control of] courtroom proceedings . . . are particularly within the province of a

trial court.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Sowell

v. DiCara, 161 Conn. App. 102, 132, 127 A.3d 356, cert.

denied, 320 Conn. 909, 128 A.3d 953 (2015). Here, the

court had before it the representations of counsel and

no affidavits articulating with any specificity what additional discovery might justify a continuance of the hearing on the motion for summary judgment and, potentially, the trial. Given the timing of the third motion for

an extension of time and, in the absence of information

verified by affidavit detailing ‘‘precisely what facts are

within the exclusive knowledge of the [party to be

deposed]’’; (internal quotation marks omitted) Weissman v. Koskoff, Koskoff & Bieder, P.C., supra, 559; we

cannot conclude that the court abused its discretion

in failing to grant the plaintiff’s third motion for an

extension of time.

II
The plaintiff next claims that the court improperly

granted the defendant’s motion for summary judgment.

Specifically, he argues that the defendant failed to demonstrate, and the court improperly determined, that

there ‘‘were no material facts in dispute that would

give rise to the existence of a legal duty owed by the

defendant . . . .’’ We disagree.

The following legal principles govern our review of

this claim. ‘‘The standard governing our review of a

trial court’s decision to grant a motion for summary

judgment is well established. Practice Book § 17-49 provides that summary judgment shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, affidavits and any other proof

submitted show that there is no genuine issue as to any

material fact and that the moving party is entitled to

judgment as a matter of law. A party moving for summary judgment is held to a strict standard. . . . To

satisfy his burden the movant must make a showing

that it is quite clear what the truth is, and that excludes

any real doubt as to the existence of any genuine issue

of material fact. . . . As the burden of proof is on the

movant, the evidence must be viewed in the light most

favorable to the opponent. . . . When documents submitted in support of a motion for summary judgment

fail to establish that there is no genuine issue of material

fact, the nonmoving party has no obligation to submit

documents establishing the existence of such an issue.

. . . Once the moving party has met its burden, however, the opposing party must present evidence that

demonstrates the existence of some disputed factual

issue. . . . It is not enough, however, for the opposing

party merely to assert the existence of such a disputed

issue. Mere assertions of fact . . . are insufficient to

establish the existence of a material fact and, therefore,

cannot refute evidence properly presented to the court

under Practice Book § [17-45]. . . . Our review of the

trial court’s decision to grant [a] motion for summary

judgment is plenary.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Cyr v. VKB, LLC, 194 Conn. App. 871, 877, 222

A.3d 965 (2019).

‘‘The essential elements of a cause of action in negligence are well established: duty; breach of that duty;

causation; and actual injury. . . . Contained within the

first element, duty, there are two distinct considerations. . . . First, it is necessary to determine the existence of a duty, and [second], if one is found, it is

necessary to evaluate the scope of that duty. . . . The

issue of whether a duty exists is a question of law . . .

which is subject to plenary review.’’ (Internal quotation

marks omitted.) Vermont Mutual Ins. Co. v. Fern, 165

Conn. App. 665, 671, 140 A.3d 278 (2016).

‘‘Issues of negligence are ordinarily not susceptible

of summary adjudication but should be resolved by trial

in the ordinary manner. . . . Nevertheless, [t]he issue

of whether a defendant owes a duty of care is an appro-
priate matter for summary judgment because the question is one of law.’’ (Citation omitted; internal quotation

marks omitted.) Streifel v. Bulkley, 195 Conn. App. 294,

304, 224 A.3d 539, cert. denied, 335 Conn. 911, 228 A.3d

375 (2020).

‘‘Duty is a legal conclusion about relationships

between individuals, made after the fact, and [is] imperative to a negligence cause of action. . . . Thus, [t]here

can be no actionable negligence . . . unless there

exists a cognizable duty of care. . . . [T]he test for the

existence of a legal duty of care entails (1) a determination of whether an ordinary person in the defendant’s

position, knowing what the defendant knew or should

have known, would anticipate that harm of the general

nature of that suffered was likely to result, and (2) a

determination, on the basis of a public policy analysis,

of whether the defendant’s responsibility for its negligent conduct should extend to the particular consequences or particular plaintiff in the case.’’ (Citations

omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Ryan

Transportation, Inc. v. M & G Associates, 266 Conn.

520, 525–26, 832 A.2d 1180 (2003).

On appeal, the plaintiff claims that the court improperly rendered summary judgment when it determined

that there was no dispute as to any material fact. The

plaintiff, however, does not specify or discuss which

material facts were still in dispute. The first part of the

plaintiff’s brief, addressing the motion for an extension

of time, claims that he needed more time to complete

discovery so as to demonstrate that the defendant was

aware of Bedard’s issues with drugs and alcohol and

that she was present at her home when the decedent

was there. The plaintiff claims that ‘‘[t]he trial court

relied on a self-serving affidavit from the defendant

. . . which was inconsistent with the deposition testimony of . . . Bedard and neglected to consider the

complaint in its entirety.’’ He does not, however, expand

on this claim. We note that the defendant submitted an

affidavit to the trial court, attached to her memorandum

of law in support of her motion for summary judgment,

in which she averred that she was not present at her

home on February 9, 2016, when the decedent was there

and that she did not learn that the decedent had been

at her home until the next day. As the nonmoving party,

the burden shifted to the plaintiff to dispute this fact.

See Cyr v. VKB, LLC, supra, 194 Conn. App. 877; Streifel

v. Bulkley, supra, 195 Conn. App. 300 (‘‘The movant has

the burden of showing the nonexistence of such issues

but the evidence thus presented, if otherwise sufficient,

is not rebutted by the bald statement that an issue of

fact does exist. . . . To oppose a motion for summary

judgment successfully, the nonmovant must recite specific facts . . . which contradict those stated in the

movant’s affidavits and documents.’’ (Internal quotation

marks omitted.)). The plaintiff did not present any evidence to the court that the defendant was home when
the decedent was present. As such, the only evidence

before the court to consider regarding whether the

defendant was home was the defendant’s affidavit. The

court, therefore, properly determined that no dispute

of material fact existed on that issue.

The plaintiff further argues that the court improperly

rendered summary judgment because the defendant

knew or should have known that Bedard possessed

drugs and alcohol in her home and that she failed to

take any action to remove them or to protect the decedent when she knew or should have known that they

would cause harm to persons, namely, the decedent.

The plaintiff asserts that the court failed to consider a

number of allegations in his complaint, namely, ‘‘that

the defendant . . . ‘failed to take any action to save

the . . . decedent, failed to warn or protect his safety,

failed to provide emergency medical personnel with

information regarding the decedent’s activities, and

failed to exercise control over the premises.’ ’’3

(Emphasis omitted.) We disagree.

The court first analyzed the plaintiff’s claims under

the general negligence standard. The court explained

that ‘‘[t]he consequences surrounding [the decedent’s]

death are too remote to be reasonably foreseeable to

the defendant . . . .’’ Next, the court discussed the

public policy considerations relevant to determining

whether a duty existed. The court explained that ‘‘[there

is a] general prohibition against imposing upon an individual a duty to control the conduct of a third party.

. . . [Under the policy analysis] there generally is no

duty that obligates one party to aid or to protect

another. One exception to this general rule arises when

a definite relationship between the parties is of such a

character that public policy justifies the imposition of

a duty to aid or protect another.’’ (Citation omitted;

internal quotation marks omitted.) The court thereafter

explained that, even ‘‘[i]f the court accepts as fact, [the

allegation] that Bedard was the ‘husband, boyfriend

and/or friend’ of the defendant,’’ there is no basis for

finding that this relationship gives rise to a duty to aid

or to protect a third party.

The court subsequently analyzed the plaintiff’s claims

using a premises liability standard. The court stated

that ‘‘in order for the plaintiff to succeed on such a

theory, he must show that [the defendant] owed [the

decedent] a duty to warn [the decedent] of the presence

of dangerous and intoxicating drugs on the premises.’’

The court then explained that the revised complaint

alleged that the decedent was invited by Bedard to

the premises in order to consume drugs and that the

decedent’s voluntary consumption of drugs, ‘‘if it can

be proven that [the decedent’s] death was the result of

drugs consumed on the [defendant’s] premises, was the

cause of his own death.’’

The plaintiff alleged that the defendant knew or
should have known that Bedard possessed drugs and

alcohol in her home and that she therefore had a duty

to aid or to protect the decedent. He did not produce any

evidence, in the form of exhibits or counteraffidavits,

to support the allegation that the defendant was aware

that drugs were in her home. Also, the plaintiff did

not present any evidence, beyond mere speculation, to

support the contention that the defendant should have

known that Bedard possessed drugs and alcohol in her

home. Instead, the court was presented with undisputed

evidence that the defendant did not invite the decedent

to her home, that she did not give permission for Bedard

to invite the decedent into her home, and that she was

not aware the decedent was in her home until the following day. On the basis of what was presented to the

court regarding what the defendant knew or should

have known, we cannot conclude that an ordinary person in her position would anticipate that the decedent

would ingest drugs in her home and suffer serious physical injuries that would result in his death. See Sic v.

Nunan, 307 Conn. 399, 409, 54 A.3d 553 (2012) (‘‘[W]hat

is relevant . . . is the . . . attenuation between [the

defendant’s] conduct, on the one hand, and the consequences to and the identity of the plaintiff, on the other

hand. . . . [D]ue care does not require that one guard

against eventualities which at best are too remote to

be reasonably foreseeable.’’ (Citation omitted; internal

quotation marks omitted.)).

As the trial court explained, there is generally no duty

to aid or to protect another person in the absence of

a special relationship of custody or control between

the parties that would warrant the imposition of such

a duty. See Demond v. Project Service, LLC, 331 Conn.

816, 836, 208 A.3d 626 (2019). The plaintiff has not

specifically alleged any recognized special relationship

between the parties that would warrant the imposition

of a duty.

The plaintiff did allege in his complaint that the defendant was the owner of the home where Bedard lived

and that she, therefore, owed the decedent a duty of

care under the theory of premises liability, in that, as

the owner of the house, she had a duty to warn the

decedent of the presence of intoxicating substances.

‘‘To hold the defendant liable for her personal injuries

. . . the plaintiff must prove (1) the existence of a

defect, (2) that the defendant knew or in the exercise

of reasonable care should have known about the defect

and (3) that such defect had existed for such a length

of time that the [defendant] should, in the exercise of

reasonable care, have discovered it in time to remedy

it.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Bisson v. WalMart Stores, Inc., 184 Conn. App. 619, 628, 195 A.3d

707 (2018). Here, the plaintiff’s claim cannot succeed

because the alleged ‘‘defect’’ in the premises was

another party’s conduct, in that Bedard possessed drugs

and alcohol and provided them to the decedent. The
plaintiff has not provided any case law to support the

contention that a codefendant’s possession of drugs

and alcohol constitutes a defect on her premises.

On the basis of the foregoing, we conclude that the

trial court properly rendered summary judgment in

favor of the defendant.

The judgment is affirmed.

In this opinion the other judges concurred.

1 The plaintiff also brought this action against Michael J. Bedard. The

plaintiff alleged that Bedard was living with Schmoegner at her home when

Bedard invited the decedent to Schmoegner’s home for the purpose of

consuming drugs, which is where the decedent overdosed. Bedard was

served with notice of the action on May 2, 2017. After failing to file an

appearance, Bedard was defaulted for failure to appear pursuant to Practice

Book § 17-20. Because the plaintiff has not filed a motion for judgment, no

judgment has been entered as to Bedard, and, as such, the counts against

him remain pending in the trial court. For clarity, in this opinion, we refer

to Schmoegner as the defendant and to Bedard by name.

Although the action is still pending as to Bedard, this court has the

jurisdiction to decide the plaintiff’s appeal. Our jurisdiction is limited to

appeals taken from final judgments, unless otherwise provided by law. See

Practice Book § 61-1. ‘‘Our rules of practice . . . set forth certain circumstances under which a party may appeal from a judgment disposing of less

than all of the counts of a complaint. Thus, a party may appeal if the partial

judgment disposes of all causes of action against a particular party or parties;

see Practice Book § 61-3 . . . .’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Krausman v. Liberty Mutual Ins. Co., 195 Conn. App. 682, 687–88, 227 A.3d 91

(2020). Because all counts of the complaint pertaining to the defendant have

been disposed of, we have jurisdiction to hear the plaintiff’s appeal.

2 As additional grounds for affirming the trial court, the defendant notes

that the plaintiff’s third motion for an extension of time failed to comply

with Practice Book § 17-47, which requires affidavits that show ‘‘precisely

what facts are within the exclusive knowledge of the [party to be deposed]

and what steps [the plaintiff] has taken to attempt to acquire these facts.’’

(Internal quotation marks omitted.) Weissman v. Koskoff, Koskoff & Bieder,

P.C., 136 Conn. App. 557, 559, 46 A.3d 943 (2012). In response, the plaintiff

is dismissive of that claim and suggests this failure is merely procedural.

To the contrary, this court recently reaffirmed the principle that a party’s

failure to comply with the requirements of § 17-47 is ‘‘fatal to [the] claim

that [a] trial court abused its discretion’’ in refusing to grant a motion for

continuance to accommodate discovery in response to summary judgment

motions. (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Chase Home Finance, LLC v.

Scroggin, supra, 194 Conn. App. 861.

3 The plaintiff alleged in his complaint and now argues on appeal that the

defendant failed to aid or to provide emergency medical care to the decedent.

First, we reiterate that the defendant submitted an affidavit to the court in

which she averred that she was not home when the decedent was present, she

did not invite the decedent to her home, she did not give Bedard permission

to invite the decedent to her home, she did not know that Bedard had invited

the decedent to her home, and she was not aware that the decedent had

been at her home on February 9, 2016, until the following day. The plaintiff

did not produce any evidence to rebut the assertions in the defendant’s

affidavit. The plaintiff, therefore, could not succeed on his claims that the

defendant failed to provide emergency medical care to the decedent or to

take any action to save the decedent’s life because the only evidence presented to the court established that she was not present at her home while

the decedent was there and, thus, could not have taken any action to aid

the decedent.