[DO NOT PUBLISH]

In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Eleventh Circuit

____________________

No. 23-10554

Non-Argument Calendar

____________________

RICHARD R. FINCH, 

Plaintiff-Appellant,

versus

EMI CONSORTIUM SONGS, INC.,

a New York corporation,

d.b.a. EMI Longitude Music,

Defendant,

HARRY WAYNE CASEY, 

an individual,

HARRICK MUSIC, INC., 

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2 Opinion of the Court 23-10554

a Florida corporation,

Defendants-Appellees,

MATTHEW NELLES, et al.,

Respondents.

____________________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of Florida

D.C. Docket No. 1:22-cv-20144-DPG

____________________

Before NEWSOM, LAGOA, and BRASHER, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:

There’s a lot of history in this case, but only a small part of 

it matters. In 1983, Richard Finch transferred his copyright and 

royalty rights to bandmate Harry Casey. Some legal back-andforth occurred in the interim, but we’ll jump ahead. In 2015, Casey 

sent Finch a letter asserting that Finch was never an “author” under 

the terms of the Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. § 203, and thus didn’t 

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23-10554 Opinion of the Court 3

retain any termination rights.1 Four years later, in 2019, Finch sent 

Casey a notice of termination under § 203. 

This litigation began in 2022, when Finch filed suit against 

Casey and others requesting declaratory judgment that his § 203 

termination rights were valid. Casey asserted multiple defenses in 

response, including that Finch’s claim was barred by the copyright 

law’s three-year statute of limitations. See id. § 507(b) (copyright 

claims must be “commenced within three years after the claim accrued.”). 

The district court granted summary judgment for Casey on 

the ground that Finch’s claims were time-barred.2 Copyrightbased claims that turn on ownership or authorship accrue on the 

date that the “plaintiff learns, or should as a reasonable person have 

learned, that the defendant was violating his ownership rights.” 

See, e.g., Webster v. Dean Guitars, 955 F.3d 1270, 1276 (11th Cir. 

2020). An express assertion of sole authorship or ownership—like 

Casey’s letter—triggers the accrual of an ownership claim. Id. at 

1276–77. Accordingly, the district court held, the clock began to 

1 Finch allegedly also sent a termination letter to Casey in 2012. The parties 

dispute whether Casey ever received the letter, but that doesn’t matter for 

purposes of this appeal. The relevant events begin with the 2015 letter. 

2 “We review a district court’s grant of summary judgment de novo, viewing 

the evidence and drawing all reasonable inferences in the light most favorable 

to the nonmoving party.” Salinero v. Johnson & Johnson, 995 F.3d 959, 964 (11th 

Cir. 2021) (citation omitted).

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run on Finch’s § 203 claim when Casey expressly repudiated 

Finch’s authorship in May 2015. 

Notwithstanding the district court’s straightforward ruling, 

Finch raises one narrow issue on appeal: whether Casey could raise 

the statute of limitations as a defense at all. To be clear, Finch 

doesn’t challenge the statute of limitations’ application; rather, he 

challenges the availability of the defense. Finch attempts to paint 

Casey’s statute-of-limitations defense as a time-barred authorship 

counterclaim—limited by the same three-year statute of limitations that hinders Finch here. 

Despite his efforts, the two defenses are distinct. Statutes of 

limitations are affirmative defenses. Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(c); see also Day 

v. Liberty Nat’l Life Ins. Co., 122 F.3d 1012, 1015 (11th Cir. 1997) (per 

curiam) (“A statute of limitations defense is an affirmative defense.”

(citation omitted)). The Sixth Circuit case on which Finch so heavily relies to argue otherwise, Garza v. Everly, concerned “a defendant . . . seeking affirmative relief packaged within a defense and . . . 

attempting to dodge a statute of limitations.” 59 F.4th 876, 884 (6th 

Cir. 2023). The Sixth Circuit concluded that such a defendant 

couldn’t leverage an affirmative defense into affirmative relief. Id. 

This case is different. Casey does not seek any affirmative 

relief, nor does he attempt to dodge a statute of limitations. If anything—ironically—Finch is the one “packag[ing]” claims and defenses to get around a statute of limitations. Casey raised an affirmative defense distinct from any authorship claim. Because the statute of limitations argument is dispositive, we need not consider the 

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sole-authorship debate. The district court was correct to grant 

summary judgment. 

As a final bit of housekeeping, we address Casey’s “Motion 

for Damages and Costs Pursuant to Rule 38.” Rule 38 sanctions are 

appropriately imposed against appellants who raise “clearly frivolous claims in the face of established law and clear facts.” Farese v. 

Scherer, 342 F.3d 1223, 1232 (11th Cir. 2003) (per curiam) (internal 

quotation marks omitted). For purposes of Rule 38, a claim is 

clearly frivolous if it is “utterly devoid of merit.” Bonfiglio v. Nugent, 

986 F.2d 1391, 1393 (11th Cir. 1993). Although Finch’s appeal 

pushes the boundary, we will exercise our discretion to DENY Casey’s motion here.

AFFIRMED.

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