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STATE OF CONNECTICUT v. DWIGHT DICKERSON

(AC 35725)

Beach, Sheldon and Norcott, Js.

Argued May 21—officially released July 22, 2014

(Appeal from Superior Court, judicial district of New

Haven, geographical area number twenty-three, Lager,

J. [judgment]; Holden, J. [motion for exemption].)

S. Max Simmons, with whom was Diane Polan, for

the appellant (defendant).

James M. Ralls, assistant state’s attorney, with

whom, on the brief, were Michael Dearington, state’s

attorney, and Mary A. SanAngelo, senior assistant

state’s attorney, for the appellee (state).
Opinion

SHELDON, J. The defendant, Dwight Dickerson,

appeals from the judgment of the trial court denying

his motion for exemption from lifetime registration on

the Connecticut sex offenderregistry on the ground that

the statutory scheme imposing the lifetime registration

requirement upon him violates his rights underthe equal

protection clauses of the United States and Connecticut

constitutions. The defendant claims initially that the

challenged statutes violate the fourteenth amendment

to the United States constitution by differentiating,

without a rational basis, between himself and others

like him who have been convicted of sexual assault in

the second degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a71 (a)(2),1 which is statutorily categorized as a ‘‘sexually

violent offense’’ for which lifetime sex offenderregistration is required, and persons who have been convicted

of other forms of sexual assault in the second degree

which have not been so characterized, and thus for

which sex offender registration is limited to a period

of ten years. As his fallback position, the defendant

argues that even if the statutorily mandated difference

in registration requirements survives his federal equal

protection challenge because it is found to be supported

by a rational basis, it must nonetheless be struck down

under what he claims to be the heightened standard of

review applicable to equal protection challenges under

article first, § 20, of the Connecticut constitution, as

amended by articles five and twenty-one of the

amendments.

The state disagrees, arguing first that there is indeed

a rational basis for requiring lifetime sex offender registration for persons convicted of violent second degree

sexual assaults, while imposing a shorter registration

period upon persons convicted of otherforms of second

degree sexual assault. Therefore, it argues, because the

defendant cannot establish that his state equal protection challenge to the sex offender registration statutes

is subject to review under a higher standard of scrutiny

than his federal equal protection challenge to those

statutes, both challenges must be rejected because the

differential treatment authorized by those statutes is

supported by a factual basis. We agree with the state,

and thus affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The following procedural history, as set forth by the

court, is relevant to our resolution of this claim: ‘‘The

[defendant] pleaded guilty to one count of sexual

assault in the second degree under the Alford doctrine2

and two counts of fourth degree sexual assault. The

trial court imposed sentence on December 14, 1994.

The court sentenced the [defendant] to eight years

incarceration suspended after serving four years, to be

followed by five years of probation. The court sentenced the [defendant] to a one year period of incarceration on each count of fourth degree sexual assault for
a total effective sentence of eight years suspended after

four years incarceration and five years probation. . . .

‘‘While incarcerated [the defendant] was a model

inmate. He had no disciplinary actions taken against

him. While in prison he took advantage of virtually every

opportunity available to him, including sex offender

classes, a course in life planning skills, basic and

advanced courses in nonviolent conflict resolution, a

course in anger and aggression, two religious courses

given by the Prison Fellowship, and the Emmaus Bible

Correspondence Course. He took two classes offered

by Asnuntuck [Community] College (with a 3.5 GPA).

He worked as an assistant teacher in the GED course

in Cheshire Correctional Institution and as a math

instructor in Osborn Correctional Institution, and his

supervisors have recommended him very highly.

‘‘In 1996, after serving two years of his original four

year sentence, [the defendant] was paroled directly to

his family, pursuant to the trial court’s order, after having been approved by his treatment provider to live

with his young children.

[The defendant] successfully completed five years of

probation. Since [his] release in 1996 . . . he has not

been arrested or otherwise involved with the criminal

justice system. He also continued to seek treatment for

his behavioral issues. He successfully completed five

years of sex offender treatment with the Center for the

Treatment of Problem Sexual Behavior in Middletown.

While in the program he took and passed three polygraph tests and also had his home computer searched

multiple times for inappropriate material, and none was

ever found.

‘‘From 2002 to 2007, [the defendant] paid for and

received private counseling. His clinical therapist

attested that [the defendant] ‘has accomplished successful control of his prior adjustment issues.’ He has

also sought out educational opportunities at his church;

in 1999, he completed a course in parenting adolescents

at the Church on the Rock.

‘‘[The defendant] has also had a successful working

career since his release from incarceration. From 1997

to 2003 he worked as a machinist for Moroso, GKN

Westland Aerospace, and AMTEC, learning to work on

computerized numerical control machines. In 2003 he

joined Sikorsky Aircraft as a multimachine specialist;

in 2009 he became final assembly mechanical inspector,

inspecting helicopters before they are delivered to military or civilian customers. He has had no disciplinary

issues at work, has been continuously employed at

Sikorsky since 2003, and has been highly recommended

by his supervisor.

‘‘[The defendant] has made extraordinary efforts to

obtain higher education since [his] release. In January,

2004, he began taking classes at Albertus Magnus Col-
lege in New Haven, where he had a 3.7 GPA. In 2005,

he became a nondegree student at Yale University; after

one year, he was admitted to the degree program. He

attended Yale while working full-time at Sikorsky and

while supporting his two children through college. [The

defendant] graduated from Yale in 2010 with a B.A. in

sociology and a focus on urban studies; his GPA was

3.23. In the fall of 2011, he began a master’s program

in sociology at Southern Connecticut State University

while continuing to work full-time.

‘‘[The defendant] actively participates in and contributes to his community. Since his release, he has been

an active member of first the Kingdom Life Christian

Church in Milford and then the Church on the Rock in

New Haven. He has been highly recommended by the

pastors of both churches. He plays keyboards and trumpet in his church’s band and is an active musician in

the community, giving volunteer performances at Emergency Shelter Management Services in New Haven and

at the Seacrest Retirement Center in West Haven. In

2008, he helped establish a summer scholarship program at the Neighborhood Music School in New Haven.

‘‘Further, the facts reveal that [the defendant] is also

the founder and CEO of Tri-Cord, an organization dedicated to providing tools to formerly incarcerated people

to help them become successful. He does motivational

speaking based on his own challenges and successes.

[The defendant] is an active member of the New Haven

Reentry Roundtable and a respected spokesperson for

formerly incarcerated people. On May 7, 2012, the Connecticut Department of Correction granted [the defendant] direct access to DOC facilities as a ‘VIP

Professional Partner.’ On May 11, 2012, the Judicial

Branch notified him that Tri-Cord had been selected to

provide training services related to family matters and

the criminal system.

‘‘Prominent members of the community offered letters of support for the [defendant]. Bishop Jay Ramirez,

senior pastor of Kingdom Life Christian Church in Milford, Connecticut, stated in a letter of support, ‘In this

line of work I hear so much garbage and so many promises to change. Too often it simply never comes to pass.

From time [to time] I have the privilege of participating

in someone’s genuine conversion or restoration. [The

defendant] is one of these people.’ . . .

‘‘The lifetime sex offender registration requirement

has imposed numerous significant hardships on [the

defendant]. He has been unable to find employment

commensurate with his skills and education. He has

been denied interviews for supervisory and management positions at Sikorsky, and for the company’s leadership training program despite having a completely

clean personnel file, several years of experience, and

an outstanding education. He has been unable to find

temporary jobs as a machinist despite his experience
and skills. He has also suffered harassment from

coworkers. In 2008, [the defendant] applied for a pardon

but was denied by the Board of Pardons and Paroles,

despite his successfulrehabilitation and many contributions to the community. The board cited his status as

a registered sex offender as the reason for denying his

application.’’ (Citation omitted; footnote omitted.) On

February 3, 2012, the defendant filed a motion for

exemption from lifetime registration on theConnecticut

sex offender registry. The court heard argument on

the defendant’s motion on September 11, 2012, and

subsequently denied the defendant’s motion, issuing an

accompanying memorandum of decision dated May 10,

2013, from which this appeal followed.

We begin our analysis of the defendant’s claim, as

did the trial court, with a review of the relevant statutory

authority governing motions for exemption from the

sex offender registry, as set forth in General Statutes

§ 54-251 (b) and (c), and of the history of the sex

offender registration requirements, as codified in General Statutes § 54-250 through 54-261, also known as

Megan’s Law. ‘‘The legislature enacted [Megan’s Law]

to protect the public from sex offenders . . . . The

requirement to register as [a] sex offender is regulatory,

rather than punitive, in nature . . . .

‘‘[As our] Supreme Court has observed, the goal of

Megan’s Law . . . is to alert the public by identifying

potential sexual offender recidivists when necessary

for public safety. . . . This goal is accomplished by

requiring persons convicted of certain offenses to register with the [Commissioner of Emergency Services and

Public Protection] and by mandating disclosure of that

registry to the public.

‘‘The law designates four classes of offenses: (1) the

victim is a minor or the sexual offense is nonviolent;

General Statutes § 54-251; (2) the sexual offense is violent; General Statutes § 54-252; (3) the sexual offense

was committed in anotherjurisdiction; General Statutes

§ 54-253; or (4) the felony was committed for a sexual

purpose. General Statutes § 54-254. Our Supreme Court

[has held] . . . that [o]nly under the last classification

is the trial court given discretion whether to impose

the registration requirement . . . we did not explain

the basis for that conclusion. The text of the statutory

scheme, however, makes that distinction clear. The first

three provisions provide that a defendant shall register . . . .

‘‘[Before the trial court, the defendant did] not challenge the factual underpinnings that form the basis for

mandatory registration under § 54-250 et seq.; neither

[was] there any dispute that the applicable language of

this statute is cast in mandatory terms. The obligation

to register as a sex offender is triggered by the entry

of the judgment of conviction(s) of predicate sexual

offenses. . . . The [defendant did] not claim exemp-
tion pursuant to any exception under § 54-250. Absent

that, our registration scheme does not authorize or provide for individualized assessment nor offer the registrant the opportunity to demonstrate rehabilitation or

shorten [his or her] registration requirement.’’ (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.)

I

FEDERAL EQUAL PROTECTION CHALLENGE

The defendant was convicted of second degree sexual

assault under § 53a-71 (a) (2) for engaging in sexual

intercourse with a victim who was ‘‘mentally defective

to the extent that [she] was unable to consent to such

sexual intercourse.’’ The challenged statutes, particularly § 54-250 (11),3 categorize that offense as a ‘‘sexually violent offense,’’ and thereby require, pursuant to

§ 54-252 (a),4that persons convicted of that offense

register as sex offenders for life. The defendant first

claims that the court erred in finding that the lifetime

registration requirement does not violate his right to

equal protection of the laws under the fourteenth

amendment to the United States constitution. Specifically, he argues that the court was unable to articulate

any rational basis for establishing different sex offender

registration requirements for those who commit different forms of second degree sexual assaults. The state

claims, to the contrary, that there is indeed a rational

basis for imposing different sex offender registration

requirements upon those who commit different types of

second degree sexual assault, and thus that the lifetime

registration requirement imposed upon the defendant

for his conviction of a violent sexual assault does not

violate his right to equal protection of the law under

the federal constitution. We agree with the state.

The question of whether the application of the statutory scheme imposing sex offender registration upon

the defendant violates his equal protection rights is a

question of law over which we have plenary review.

See State v. Long, 268 Conn. 508, 530, 847 A.2d 862 (en

banc), cert. denied, 543 U.S. 969, 125 S. Ct. 424, 160 L.

Ed. 2d 340 (2004). The equal protection clause of the

fourteenth amendment to the United States constitution

provides that no state shall ‘‘deny to any person within

its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.’’ U.S.

Const., amend. XIV, § 1. ‘‘[T]he concept of equal protection . . . has been traditionally viewed as requiring the

uniform treatment of persons standing in the same relation to the governmental action questioned or challenged. . . . Conversely, the equal protection clause

places no restrictions on the state’s authority to treat

dissimilar persons in a dissimilar manner. . . . Thus,

[t]o implicate the equal protection [clause] . . . it is

necessary that the state statute . . . in question, either

on its face or in practice, treat persons standing in the

same relation to it differently. . . . [Accordingly], the

analytical predicate [of an equal protection claim] is a
determination of who are the persons [purporting to

be] similarly situated. . . . The similarly situated

inquiry focuses on whether the [defendant is] similarly

situated to another group for purposes of the challenged

government action. . . . Thus, [t]his initial inquiry is

not whether persons are similarly situated for all purposes, but whether they are similarly situated for purposes of the law challenged.’’ (Citations omitted;

internal quotation marks omitted.) Kerrigan v. Commissioner of Public Health, 289 Conn. 135, 157–58, 957

A.2d 407 (2008).

‘‘To determine whether a particular classification violates the guarantees of equal protection, the court must

consider the character of the classification; the individual interests affected by the classification; and the governmental interests asserted in support of the

classification. . . . Where, as here, the classification

at issue neither impinges upon a fundamental right nor

affects a suspect group it will withstand constitutional

attack if the distinction is founded on a rational basis.

. . . Rational basis review is satisfied so long as there

is a plausible policy reason for the classification . . . .

[I]t is irrelevant whether the conceivable basis for the

challenged distinction actually motivated the legislature.’’(Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Morales, 240 Conn. 727, 739, 694 A.2d 758

(1997). ‘‘Rational basis review demands only that the

challenged classification be rationally related to a legitimate government interest. . . . A party challenging a

law under rational basis review bears the burden of

proving that the law’s class-based distinctions are

wholly irrational.’’ (Citation omitted.) State v. Dyous,

307 Conn. 299, 317, 53 A.3d 153 (2012).

The defendant here claims that the statutory scheme

at issue treats differently individuals who have been

convicted of second degree sexual assault for committing violent offenses and those who similarly have been

convicted of second degree sexual assault, but whose

offenses are categorized as offenses against minors or

nonviolent offenses. Specifically, he claims that

because the statutory scheme requires lifetime registration for violent offenders, but only a ten year registration requirement for offenses against minors and

nonviolent offenders, it violates his right to equal protection of the law under the United States constitution.

The state argues, to the contrary, that the defendant’s

claim is flawed because there are no sexual assaults—

and thus no registration requirements—that are designated as having been committed solely against adult

victims. Rather, it claims that the statutory scheme at

issue in this case applies to offenses committed against

both adult and minor victims alike.5 We agree.

It is undisputed that the statutory scheme imposing

sex offender registration requirements neither affects

a suspect group nor implicates a fundamental right for
the purposes of the federal equal protection clause, and

therefore must be analyzed under rational basis review.

Furthermore, we conclude that the defendant is similarly situated, for the purpose of the statutory scheme

at issue in his equal protection challenge, to those who

have been convicted of nonviolent second degree sexual assaults. Thus, we turn to whether there is a plausible policy reason for this classification.

In the present case, we have no difficulty in ascertaining a rational basis for the disparate treatment in the

statutory lifetime sex offender registration requirement

for those who have been convicted of violent second

degree sexual assaults as compared to the ten year

registration requirement for those who have been convicted of nonviolent second degree sexual assaults. We

agree with the court’s assessment and finding that a

rational basis exists for the differentiation in registration requirements between violent and nonviolent second degree sexual assault offenders.

The court explained, ‘‘[i]t is well established that [t]he

legislature enacted [Megan’s Law] to protect the public

from sex offenders. . . . [T]he lifetime registration

requirement for those convicted of sexually violent

offenses reflects an effort to target those sex offenders

who engage in particularly predatory conduct. While

the defendant contends that the application of the registration requirements could lead to inequitable results

in certain situations, it is not the role of the judiciary

to second-guess the legislature. Although there may

be other, perhaps even better, options available to the

legislature to accomplish its legitimate objectives,

rational basis review affords great deference to legislative choices and does not authorize this court to substitute its judgment, or that of the [defendant], for that

of this state’s elected representatives, as long as the

classifications drawn by the legislature are reasonable.

. . . [E]qual protection is not a license for courts to

judge the wisdom, fairness, or logic of legislative

choices. . . . Rational basis review is satisfied [as]

long as there is a plausible policy reason for the classification . . . . [I]t is irrelevant whether the conceivable

basis for the challenged distinction actually motivated

the legislature. . . . To succeed, the party challenging

the legislation must negative every conceivable basis

which might support it.’’ (Citations omitted; internal

quotation marks omitted.)

We conclude that the defendant has failed to demonstrate that there is no rational basis for the difference

between the registration requirements for those convicted of violent second degree sexual assaults and

those convicted of nonviolent second degree sexual

assaults.6 Requiring lifetime sex offender registration

for those who have been convicted of violent second

degree sexual assaults is rationally related to the government’s legitimate interest in protecting the public
from sex offenders whose actions demonstrate a willingness to use force or the threat of force to overcome

the will of victims who have not expressed consent to

engage in sexual intercourse—and in this case, a victim

who was not even capable of expressing such consent

by reason of mental defect.Accordingly, the defendant’s

federal equal protection challenge must be rejected.

II

STATE EQUAL PROTECTION CHALLENGE

The defendant’s fallback argument is that even if his

federal equal protection challenge does not survive

rational basis review, the equal protection clause of the

Connecticut constitution provides an independent and

greater basis to support his claim because it requires

heightened review. The state argues that although the

defendant raises a claim under the state constitution,

he does not demonstrate that the state equal protection

clause provides any additional protection or that his

claim is subject to heightened review thereunder. We

agree with the state that the defendant’s equal protection challenge under the Connecticut constitution also

must be rejected because he has not established that

his claim is subject to heightened review, or is different

in any other material respect from his federal equal

protection challenge.

The equal protection clause of the Connecticut constitution, article first, § 20, as amended by articles five

and twenty-one of the amendments, provides in relevant

part that ‘‘[n]o person shall be denied the equal protection of the law . . . .’’7

‘‘It is well established that federal constitutional and statutory law establishes a

minimum national standard for the exercise of individual rights and does not inhibit state governments from

affording higher levels of protection for such rights.

. . . [Hence], although we often rely on the United

States Supreme Court’s interpretation of the amendments to the constitution of the United States to delineate the boundaries of the protections provided by the

constitution of Connecticut, we have also recognized

that, in some instances, our state constitution provides

protections beyond those provided by the federal constitution, as that document has been interpreted by

the United States Supreme Court. . . . The analytical

framework by which we determine whether, in any

given instance, our state constitution affords broader

protection to our citizens than the federal constitutional

minimum is well settled.’’ (Internal quotation marks

omitted.) State v. Wade, 297 Conn. 262, 286–87, 998 A.2d

1114 (2010).

‘‘[I]n State v. Geisler, 222 Conn. 672, 685, 610 A.2d

1225 (1992), we set forth six factors that, to the extent

applicable, are to be considered in construing the contours of our state constitution so that we may reach

reasoned and principled results as to its meaning. These
factors are: (1) the text of the operative constitutional

provision; (2) holdings and dicta of this court and the

Appellate Court; (3) persuasive and relevant federal

precedent; (4) persuasive sister state decisions; (5) the

history of the operative constitutional provision, including the historical constitutional setting and the debates

of the framers; and (6) contemporary economic and

sociological considerations, including relevant public

policies.’’ Kerrigan v. Commissioner of Public Health,

supra, 289 Conn. 157. The defendant claims that the

fourth, fifth and sixth Geisler factors weigh in favor of

a more expansive reading of the state equal protection

guarantee, and thus support his argument that the court

erred in finding that his right to equal protection of the

law underthe Connecticut constitution was not violated

by imposing the lifetime sex offender registration

requirement upon him. We will consider each Geisler

factorin turn to determine whetherthe equal protection

clause of the Connecticut constitution affords greater

protection to claimants than its federal counterpart.

With regard to the first Geisler factor—the text of

the operative state and federal constitutional provisions—the court noted that ‘‘the defendant acknowledge[d] that the text of the equal protection clause of

the Connecticut constitution is very similar to [that of]

the federal equal protection clause and is therefore not

particularly instructive in the present case.’’ Indeed, on

appeal, the defendant stated in his brief that ‘‘[t]he text

of article first, § 20, is substantively identical to that of

the Fourteenth Amendment, so the first Geisler factor

does not come into play.’’ Although the defendant

argues that the first factor is thus inapplicable to this

court’s analysis, we conclude that it is not only relevant

to that analysis, but supportive of the court’s conclusion

that the equal protection guarantee set forth in the

Connecticut constitution is the same as that set forth

in the United States constitution.

The defendant claims as well that the second and

third Geisler factors—the holdings and dicta of our

Supreme Court and this court, as well as persuasive

and relevant federal precedent—‘‘do not apply because

no Connecticut or federal court appears to have

addressed th[is] specific question . . . .’’ Here, once

again, although the defendant argues that the second

and third factors are inapplicable to the court’s analysis,

we find that the lack of Connecticut and federal precedent on this issue actually demonstrates that Connecticut’s equal protection provision affords no greater

protection to persons bringing state equal protection

claims of the sort here presented than federal equal

protection claims. The trial court concluded, and we

agree, that ‘‘the defendant has not shown that the

Geisler factors concerning relevant Connecticut and

federal precedent support his argument.’’

The defendant next claims that the fourth Geisler
factor—persuasive sister state decisions—supports his

state equal protection challenge because relevant sister

state decisions ‘‘reject unequal treatment for people

convicted of offenses that are almost identical in nature

and severity [to that of the defendant].’’ In this regard,

the defendant cites to several California cases for the

proposition that other jurisdictions have invalidated

aspects of sex offender registration laws that create

arbitrary distinctions between different classes of

offenders. In particular, the defendant claims that in

People v. Hofsheier, 37 Cal. 4th 1185, 1207, 129 P.3d 29,

39 Cal. Rptr. 3d 821 (2006), the California Supreme

Court held that unequal treatment of defendants who

have been convicted of oral copulation with a minor—

an offense that required mandatory registration—and

defendants who have been convicted of sexual intercourse with a minor—an offense that afforded the court

discretion whether or not to require registration—violated equal protection because there was no plausible

rationale for distinguishing between these two offenses

and their respective registration requirements. He

attempts to draw a parallel between Hofsheier and the

facts of this case to lend support to his argument that

the distinctions between the registration requirements

for different forms of Connecticut’s second degree sexual assaults lack any rational basis. We are not persuaded.

In Hofsheier, the twenty-two year old defendant, who

had pleaded guilty to felony oral copulation with a sixteen year old minor, an offense which required mandatory sex offender registration, claimed a federal equal

protection violation because the similar offense of

unlawful sexual intercourse with a minor was not subject to mandatory registration, but only to registration

only at the court’s discretion. Id., 1192. The court found

that individuals who were convicted of oral copulation

and those who were convicted of sexual intercourse

with minors were similarly situated, and thus concluded

that there was no rational basis for treating the two

groups differently. Id., 1200–1207. The ‘‘contrasting

treatment of persons convicted of oral copulation with

minors and those convicted of unlawful sexual intercourse with minors raise[d] the equal protection issue’’

in that case; id., 1198; because ‘‘[t]he only difference

between the two offenses [was] the nature of the sexual

act.’’ Id., 1200. Although the California sex offender

registration statute at issue in Hofsheier distinguished

between oral copulation and sexual intercourse with

minors for registration purposes, the challenged Connecticut statutes in this case makes no such similar

distinction between oral copulation and sexual intercourse for purposes of incarceration, fine or registration, nor do they impose different requirements for one

form of second degree sexual assault over the other.

Moreover, the California Court of Appeal expressly

declined to extend the holding of Hofsheier in People
v. Jeha, 187 Cal. App. 4th 1063, 114 Cal. Rptr. 3d 711

(2010), a case factually similar to the present case. In

Jeha, the defendant, who was convicted of sexual penetration of an unconscious victim, an offense which

required mandatory sex offender registration, claimed

an equal protection violation because the allegedly similar offenses of sexual or oral penetration of a minor

required registration only at the court’s discretion. Id.,

1068. Although the defendant in Jeha urged the court

‘‘to find him similarly situated with other defendants

whose sex offenses involved consensual participants

but whose status as minors rendered them unable to

give legal consent’’; id., 1076; the court rejected this

argument, reasoning that ‘‘[a] sex offense against an

intoxicated or unconscious person is not one that

involves a voluntary participant. . . . The forcible

nature of [the] defendant’s sex offense sets him apart

from the [defendant] in Hofsheier and following cases

in which an equal protection challenge . . . was sustained.’’ (Citation omitted.) Id., 1076–77. The California

Court of Appeal thus held that there was no equal protection violation in Jeha because the victim in that case

had been unconscious at the time of the sexual assault

and therefore was unable to consent to penetration. Id.

The court in the present case aptly noted that ‘‘the

distinction drawn by the Connecticut legislature in

requiring those convicted of sexually violent offenses

to registerforlife is not arbitrary,’’ as was the distinction

ruled unconstitutional in Hofsheier. It thus concluded

that ‘‘the defendant’s argument pursuant to Hofsheier

and its progeny is not persuasive.’’ We agree, and conclude that the fourth Geisler factor does not support

the defendant’s state equal protection challenge.

With regard to the fifth Geisler factor—the history of

the operative constitutional provision—the defendant

claims that our Supreme Court, in Kerrigan v. Commissioner of Public Health, supra, 289 Conn. 141, held that

the equal protection clause of the Connecticut constitution provides broader protection to claimants thereunder than to claimants under the federal equal protection

clause, lending support to his state equal protection

challenge. Although the court in Kerrigan found that

Connecticut’s equal protection provision guarantees

greater protection than its federal counterpart with

regard to same sex marriage, that conclusion was

reached as a result of the court’s determination that

sexual orientation is a quasi-suspect class and that laws

that treat people differently on that basis are subject

to intermediate or heightened scrutiny, rather than

rational basis review, to which the defendant’s challenge is subject under the federal equal protection

clause. Nowhere in his brief does the defendant suggest

that Connecticut’s equal protection analysis under

rational basis review differs in any way from the federal

analysis, or that historical factors support a heightened

review of his present claim. Thus, we conclude that
the fifth Geisler factor does not lend support to the

defendant’s claim for a heightened standard of review

on his state equal protection challenge.

As to the sixth and final Geisler factor—contemporary economic and sociological considerations, including relevant public policy—the defendant claims that

because there is an increasing awareness that registration can be unduly harsh to those offenders who pose

little risk of reoffending, this factor weighs in his favor.

Specifically, he claims that exempting him from lifetime

registration would enable him to ‘‘become a contributing member of society . . . be free of the legal restrictions and ongoing harassment that he currently suffers

as a result of registration . . . [and] help him gain

employment more commensurate with his education

and qualifications . . . .’’ The court held, and we agree,

that ‘‘[t]he defendant fails to take into account the legitimate public safety reasons for requiring registration

among those convicted of sexually violent offenses,’’

and thus we conclude that the sixth Geisler factor does

not lend support to the defendant’s state equal protection challenge.

In sum, we conclude that the court properly found

that none of the Geisler factors supports the defendant’s

claim that heightened scrutiny must be applied to his

state equal protection challenge to the requirement that

he submit to lifetime registration as a sex offender as

a result of his conviction of second degree sexual

assault in violation of § 53a-71 (a) (2). For that reason,

because the defendant’s state equal protection challenge, like his federal equal protection challenge, is

subject to rational basis review, that challenge must

also be rejected for the reasons set forth in part I of

this opinion.

The judgment is affirmed.

In this opinion the other judges concurred.

1 General Statutes § 53a-71 (a) provides in relevant part: ‘‘A person is

guilty of sexual assault in the second degree when such person engages in

sexual intercourse with another person and . . . (2) such other person is

mentally defective to the extent that such other person is unable to consent

to such sexual intercourse . . . .’’

We note that although § 53a-71 (a) (2) was amended in 2000; see Public

Acts 2000, No. 00-161, § 2; since the time of the defendant’s crime in 1992,

that amendment has no bearing on the merits of this appeal. In the interest

of simplicity, we refer to the current revision of the statute.

2 See North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 37, 91 S. Ct. 160, 27 L. Ed. 2d

162 (1970).

3 General Statutes § 54-250 (11) provides: ‘‘ ‘Sexually violent offense’

means (A) a violation of section 53a-70, except subdivision (2) of subsection

(a) of said section, 53a-70a, 53a-70b, 53a-71, except subdivision (1), (4), (8)

or (10) or subparagraph (B) of subdivision (9) of subsection (a) of said

section or subparagraph (A) of subdivision (9) of subsection (a) of said

section if the court makes a finding that, at the time of the offense, the

victim was under eighteen years of age, 53a-72a, except subdivision (2) of

subsection (a) of said section, or 53a-72b, or of section 53a-92 or 53a-92a,

provided the court makes a finding that the offense was committed with

intent to sexually violate or abuse the victim, (B) a violation of any of the

offenses specified in subparagraph (A) of this subdivision for which a person

is criminally liable under section 53a-8, 53a-48 or 53a-49, or (C) a violation

of any predecessor statute to any of the offenses specified in subparagraph
(A) or(B) ofthis subdivision the essential elements of which are substantially

the same as said offense.’’

4 General Statutes § 54-252 (a) provides in relevant part: ‘‘Any person who

has been convicted or found not guilty by reason of mental disease or defect

of a sexually violent offense, and (1) is released into the community on or

after October 1, 1988, and prior to October 1, 1998, and resides in this state,

shall, on October 1, 1998, or within three days of residing in this state,

whichever is later . . . register such person’s name, identifying factors and

criminal history record, documentation of any treatment received by such

person for mental abnormality or personality disorder, and such person’s

residence address and electronic mail address, instant message address or

other similar Internet communication identifier, if any, with the Commissioner of Emergency Services and Public Protection on such forms and in

such locations as said commissioner shall direct, and shall maintain such

registration for life. . . .’’

The defendant was sentenced, on his conviction of second degree sexual

assault, to a total effective term of eight years imprisonment, suspended

after four years, followed by five years probation. In 1996, after serving two

years of his original four year sentence, the defendant was paroled directly

to his family. In addition to his second degree sexual assault conviction,

the defendant pleaded guilty to two counts of fourth degree sexual assault

under General Statutes § 53a-73a arising from two separate incidents in 1993

and 1994. An offense resulting in a conviction of fourth degree sexual assault

is categorized as a nonviolent sexual offense and requires only a ten year

registration period. See General Statutes §§ 53a-73a, 54-250 (5) and 54-251

(a). Such registration, however, is required only for defendants who were

released from custody after October 1, 1998. General Statutes § 54-251 (a).

Because the defendant was released prior to October 1, 1998, his conviction

of two counts of fourth degree sexual assault do not require registration.

Thus, his only conviction requiring registration, and thus the only one before

this court on appeal, is that of second degree sexual assault.

5 The defendant attempts to argue that the statutory scheme at issue in

this case imposes a harsher registration period for offenses against adults

than those against minors, and that no rational basis could possibly exist

for treating people who offend against minors less harshly than those who

commit the same crimes against adults. The defendant’s argument, as the

state notes, is flawed for several reasons.

All convictions for engaging in intercourse that is compelled by threat or

force, against an adult or a minor, require lifetime registration. General

Statutes §§ 53a-70 (a) (1) and 54-250 (11). Convictions for engaging in intercourse with minors under age thirteen when the actor is more than two

years older also require lifetime registration. General Statutes §§ 53a-70 (a)

(2) and 54-250 (11). Further, convictions for engaging in intercourse with

any victim, whether an adult or a minor, who is incapable of consenting

because of mental disease or defect, or because of a physical incapacity,

also require lifetime registration. See General Statutes §§ 53a-70 (a) (4)

(mentally incapacitated), 53a-71 (a) (2) (mentally defective), 53a-71 (a) (3)

(physically helpless) and 54-250 (11). Additionally, convictions for engaging

in intercourse with other vulnerable persons, regardless of their age, when

the actor is in a position of authority or control, require lifetime registration.

See General Statutes §§ 53a-71 (a) (5) (persons in custody), 53a-71 (a) (6)

(psychiatric patients), 53a-71 (a) (7) (medical patients), 53a-71 (a) (11)

(persons receiving developmental services) and 54-250 (11).

Sexual assaults committed upon older minors, such as engaging in intercourse with minors between thirteen years of age or older but under sixteen

years of age, who may actually consent but who cannot legally consent, or

intercourse with minors under the age of eighteen when the actor is a

guardian, teacher, coach, or in another position of authority, all are subject

to a ten year registration period. See General Statutes §§ 53a-71 (a) (1), 53a71 (a) (4), 53a-71 (a) (8), 53a-71 (a) (9), 53a-71 (a) (10), 54-250 (2) and 54-

251 (a). The reason for a limited registration period in these scenarios is

in part because of the presumed existence of a relationship between the

actor and the minor. Although sexual assaults against an older minor with

whom the actor has a relationship, such as guardian, teacher or coach, still

may be predatory, persons who commit sexual assaults through the use of

force or the threatened use of force pose a greater danger to the public

than those who partake in sexual acts with older minors who may actually

consent, but cannot legally consent.

To summarize, intercourse that is compelled, or engaged in with minors

under age thirteen or with certain other vulnerable persons, regardless of
the victim’s age, require lifetime registration. To the contrary, noncompelled

intercourse with older minors requires registration for ten years. We therefore conclude that the defendant’s argument that he is similarly situated to

those who commit second degree sexual assault against minors is flawed,

and thus that the differentiation between second degree sexual assaults and

their respective registration requirements at issue here actually is between

violent and nonviolent sexual assaults.

6 The defendant additionally cites to the relevant legislative history in

support of his federal equal protection challenge, claiming that the registration requirements for second degree sexual assault are the ‘‘arbitrary result

of historical accident,’’ and that what legislators thought they were voting

for differed from the actual text of the statute. As the court properly noted,

‘‘[i]n order for a statute to withstand rational basis review, we consider

whether the classification and disparate treatment inherent in a statute bear

a rational relationship to a legitimate state end and are based on reasons

related to the accomplishment of that goal . . . . [U]nder this analysis, the

legislature is not required to articulate the purpose or rationale for its

classification. The test . . . is whether [the] court can conceive of a rational

basis for sustaining the legislation; we need not have evidence that the

legislature actually acted upon that basis.’’ (Internal quotation marks

omitted.)

Moreover, where the text of the statute is ‘‘plain and unambiguous and

does not yield absurd or unworkable results, extratextual evidence of the

meaning of the [statute] shall not be considered.’’ (Internal quotation marks

omitted.) State v. Maguire, 310 Conn. 535, 572, 78 A.3d 828 (2013). The

defendant acknowledges that the plain meaning of § 54-252 (a) requires

lifetime registration. The legislative history of the lifetime sex offender

registration requirement, therefore, is not relevant to our review of the

defendant’s claim on appeal.

7 Article first, § 1, of the Connecticut constitution additionally provides:

‘‘All men when they form a social compact, are equal in rights; and no man

or set of men are entitled to exclusive public emoluments or privileges

from the community.’’ The present claim has not been made under the

foregoing provision.