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******************************************************FRANK VANDEVER v

. COMMISSIONER OF CORRECTION (SC 19036)
Rogers, C. J., and Palmer, Zarella, Eveleigh, McDonald,

Espinosa and Robinson, Js. Argued May 1—officially released December 30, 2014 Frank Vandever, self-represented, the appellant(petitioner).
Madeline A. Melchionne, assistant attorney general, with whom, on the brief, were George Jepsen, attorney general, and TerrenceM. O’Neill, assistantattorneygeneral, for the appellee (respondent). Emily Gerrick, law student intern, with whom were HopeMetcalf

,DavidMcGuire, and, onthebrief,Sandra Staub, for the Allard K. Lowenstein International Human Rights Clinic et al. as amici curiae.Opinion PALMER, J. Under Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 483–84, 115 S. Ct. 2293, 132 L. Ed. 2d 418 (1995), and Wilkinson v. Austin, 545 U.S. 209, 222–23, 125 S. Ct. 2384, 162 L. Ed. 2d 174 (2005), prison inmates have a protected liberty interest in avoiding certain conditions of confinement if, pursuant to state statute or regulation, they can be subjected to such conditions only if certain procedural requirements are met, and those conditions impose an atypical and significant hardship in relation to the ordinary incidents ofprison life. This certifiedappealraisesthequestionofwhetherConnecticut prisoners have a liberty interest in avoiding administrative segregation1 at Northern Correctional Institution (Northern), the state’s maximum security prison and, if so, whether the self-represented petitioner, Frank Vandever, was afforded due process before his transfer to Northern. The petitioner appeals from the judgment of the Appellate Court, which dismissed his appeal from the habeas court’s denial of his petition for certification to appeal from that court’s judgment denying his petition for a writ of habeas corpus.2 The petitioner claims that the Appellate Court incorrectly concluded, contraryto the holdings inSandin and Wilkinson, that prisoners in Connecticut do not have a liberty interest in avoiding administrative segregation because the respondent, the Commissioner of Correction, has unfettered discretion to classify them at any security level. See Vandever v. Commissioner of Correction, 135 Conn. App. 735, 741–42, 42 A.3d 494 (2012). He further claims that his due process rights were violated because the evidence presented at the hearing that he was affordedto contest his placement in administrative segregation at Northern does not support the respondent’s placement decision. We agree with the petitionerthattheAppellate Courtwasincorrectinsofar
as it indicated that under no circumstances can Connecticutprisonersestablishalibertyinterestinavoiding administrative segregation. We also conclude that the Appellate Court incorrectly determined that the habeas court acted within its discretion in denying the petition for certification to appeal from the judgment of the habeas court because, as we explain more fully hereinafter, thehabeas court’sreasonfordenyingthatpetition
was itself unsupportable. We nevertheless conclude that it is apparent from the record that, even if the petitioner had a liberty interest in avoiding his transfer to Northern, he received all of the process he was due priortothattransfer. Wethereforereversethejudgment of the Appellate Court and direct that court to affirm the habeas court’s judgment.
The following undisputed facts and procedural history are relevant to our resolution of this appeal. The petitioner is serving sentences for numerous convictions, including murder and escape from a correctionalinstitution. In October, 1997, shortly after Department of Correction (department) officials transferred the petitionerto the generalpopulation at MacDougall Correctional Institution following his December 31, 1991 escape from what is nowthe Osborn Correctional Institution (Osborn), certain department personnel found the petitioner in possession of a National Institute of Justice (NIJ) publication entitled ‘‘Stopping Escapes: Perimeter Security,’’ which discusses perimeter security at prisons in the United States. The petitioner was chargedwithadisciplinaryviolationin connectionwith this incident and, following a hearing, was found guilty ofpossessionofcontraband. Asaresult, the department sanctioned the petitioner by revoking ninety days of previously earned statutory good time credits, as authorized by General Statutes (Rev. to 1987) § 18-7a (c). Thereafter, the department’s Offender Classification and Population Management Unit notified the petitioner that it would conduct a hearing to determine whetherhe shouldbe placed on administrative segregation status.3 Following the hearing, at which the petitionerwaspermittedto presentwitnesses andto testify
on his own behalf, the hearing officer recommended thatthe petitioner’s security classification be increased in level, ‘‘with high security monitoring available,’’ but that he not be placed on administrative segregation status. Thereafter, the Inmate Classification Administrator overruled the hearing officer’s recommendation andorderedthatthepetitionerbeplacedonadministrative segregation status. The petitioner was in administrative segregation between November, 1997, andJune, 1999, or approximately 570 days. Pursuant to departmentpolicy, prisonersin administrative segregationare ineligible to earn statutory good time credits and seven day job credits.4
In apriorhabeas proceeding, the petitioner had challengedthe disciplinaryreportthatwasissuedinconnection with his possession ofthe NIJ publication. On July 28, 2003, the respondent agreedto withdrawthat report and to restore the ninety days of statutory good time that had been revoked as a result of his possession of the NIJpublication.5 Inlight ofthis agreement, the prior habeas petition was dismissed as moot. At that time, the petitioner argued that the department also should credit his sentence to include the good time credits and
seven day job credits that he was ineligible to earn while he was in administrative segregation, but the habeas court noted that he would have to raise that claim in a separate habeas petition.
In November, 2003, the petitioner filed the present habeas petition, alleging, inter alia, that the respondent improperly had placed him in administrative segregation on the basis of a disciplinary report that later was expunged. Inhisprayerforrelief, thepetitionerclaimed that he was entitled to receive the good time and seven dayjob credits that, underthe department’s administra-tive directives, he was ineligible to earn while in administrative segregation.
Atthetrialonthepetitioner’shabeaspetition, Frederick Levesque, the department’s Director of Offender Classification, testified on behalfofthe respondent. He explained that, although a disciplinary violation often is the precipitating event that leads to the review of an inmate’s eligibility for administrative segregation status, an administrative segregation hearing is not a disciplinary hearing, and placement in administrative segregation is not a form of punishment; rather, it is a management tool that is used to control inmates who are perceived to present the greatest safety and security threats. According to Levesque, the petitioner was placed in administrative segregation after a routine searchofhiscellturneduptheNIJpublicationonprison perimetersecurity. Levesque statedthatthepetitioner’s possession of such a publication so soon after being released from administrative segregation following his escape from Osborn was deemed ‘‘highly suspicious’’ and caused department officials to conclude that the petitioner posed a danger ‘‘to the safety and security of

. . . [the] facility.’’ With respect to the decision to place the petitioner in administrative segregation, Levesque explained that the petitioner ‘‘ha[d] already proven

. . . that he [was] very good at escaping. [The]

. . . number one mission

. . . is to protect the public. Unfortunately, back in 1991, we didn’t do a very good job of that. [The petitioner] actually escaped and went and committed

. . . additional crime[s]

. . . .’’ Levesque also observed that, in addition to his successful escape in 1991, the petitioner also had attempted to escape from prison two other times.
In its memorandum of decision, the habeas court, in denying the habeas petition, made no findings as to whether the petitioner’s placement in administrative segregation was improper on the ground that the evidence presented atthe administrative segregationhearing was insufficient to support the respondent’s placement decision. Instead, the court denied the habeas petition on the basis of its determination that the petitionerwas not entitled to the reliefthat he was seeking. Specifically, the court stated that ‘‘[t]he petitioner

. . . never had orpresently has a right to the statutory good time andseven dayjob credits he is seeking. The awarding of such credits always has been and remains solely within the respondent’s discretion.

. . . Such decisions are discretionary and wholly within the [respondent’s] purview in accordance with General Statutes § 18-7a.’’6 The habeas court also denied the petitioner’s petition for certification to appeal from its judgment.
ThepetitionerappealedtotheAppellate Court, claiming that the habeas court had abused its discretion in denying his petition for certification to appeal because, inter alia, the habeas court had not addressed his con-tention that, under Sandin and Wilkinson, his placement in administrative segregation violated his right to due process. See Vandeverv. CommissionerofCorrection, Conn. Appellate Court Records & Briefs, March Term, 2012, Petitioner’s Briefpp. 12–22. The petitioner maintained that he had a right to due process prior to his placement in administrative segregation, and that he was deprived of that right because that placement
was based on an expunged disciplinary report and a prior escape for which he already had completed his period ofadministrative segregation. See id., pp. 23–27. The petitioner further explained that, contrary to the determination of the habeas court, he had not claimed
a constitutional or statutory right to the good time and work credits that he was ineligible to earn while in administrative segregation; rather, he had claimed only that he should be awarded those credits to remedy the due process violation stemming from his unjustifiable placement in administrative segregation. See id., p. 17.
The Appellate Court rejected the petitioner’s claims. See Vandever v. Commissioner of Correction, 135 Conn. App. 741–43. In contrast to the habeas court, the Appellate Court did not base its conclusion on the discretionary nature of the award of good time and work credits. See id., 741–42. But cf. id., 743 (noting that ‘‘the respondent ha[s] the discretion to award [or not to award statutory] good time credits

. . . and ha[s] the authority to promulgate rules that make an inmate ineligible to earn statutory good time’’ in concluding that ‘‘[t]he petitioner had no protected liberty interest in ‘good time’ not yet credited’’ [citation omitted]). Like the habeas court, however, the Appellate Court did not address the petitioner’s contention that, under Sandin, he had a protected liberty interest in avoiding administrative segregation, orthatthe process that he received prior to his transfer to Northern was constitutionally deficient. The Appellate Court concluded, instead, that ‘‘[i]nmates do not have a constitutionally protected right to a particular classification.

. . . Discipline by prison officials in response to a wide range of misconduct falls within the expected perimeters of a sentence imposed by a court of law.

. . . In order to state a claim of a violation of due process, an inmate must show a protected liberty interest and a deprivation ofthat interest without being afforded due process of law. A prisoner’s liberty interest to be free from disciplinary segregation is not inherent in the due process clause of the federal constitution.

. . . Under Connecticut law, the Commissioner of Correction retains discretionary authority to classify prisoners at any security level.

. . . A prisoner has no constitutionally protected interest in or to a particular classification.’’ (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 741–42. The Appellate Court ultimately determined that the habeas court had not abused its discretion in denying the petition for certification toappeal and dismissed the petitioner’s appeal. Id., 743.
On appeal to this court following our grant ofcertification, the petitioner reasserts his claim that he had
a protected liberty interest in avoiding administrative segregation and that his transfer to Northern violated his right to due process because it was based on a disciplinary report that laterwas expunged, and aprior escape for which he already had completed his period of administrative segregation. At oral argument before this court, the respondent conceded, as he must, that the Appellate Court incorrectly concluded, contrary to the rule in Sandin and Wilkinson, that, as a matter of law, Connecticut inmates cannot establish a liberty interest in avoiding administrative segregation. The respondent argues, however, that Wilkinson and Sandin make clear that, when a prisoner has a liberty interest in avoiding administrative segregation, the require-ments of due process are met as long as the prisoner receives notice and an opportunity to be heard prior to being placed in administrative segregation, and there is at least some evidence to supportthat placement decision. The respondent further contends that, even if the petitioner had a liberty interest in avoiding placement in administrative segregation at Northern, he received all of the process that he was due prior to his transfer there.7 We agree with the respondent.8
The following principles guide our analysis of the petitioner’s claim. ‘‘In order to prevail on his due process claim, the [petitioner] must prove that: (1) he has beendeprivedofaproperty [orliberty] interestcognizable under the due process clause; and (2) the deprivation of the property [or liberty] interest has occurred without due process oflaw.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Matos, 240 Conn. 743, 749, 694 A.2d 775 (1997). Although ‘‘the [c]onstitution itself does not give rise to a liberty interest in avoiding transfer to
more adverse conditions of confinement

. . . a liberty interest in avoiding particular conditions of confinement may arise from state policies or regulations

. . . .’’ (Citations omitted.) Wilkinson v. Austin, supra, 545 U.S. 221–22. ‘‘States may under certain circumstances create liberty interests [that] are protected by the [d]ue [p]rocess [c]lause.

. . . But these interests will be generally limited to freedom from restraint which, while not exceeding the sentence in such an unexpected manner as to give rise to protection by the [d]ue [p]rocess [c]lause of its own force

. . . nonetheless imposes atypical and significant hardship on the inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life.’’ (Citations omitted.) Sandin v. Conner, supra, 515 U.S. 483–84; see also Sealey v. Giltner, 116 F.3d 47, 52 (2d Cir. 1997) (‘‘a prisoner has a liberty interest only if the deprivation of which he complains is atypical and significant and the state has created the interest by statute orregulation’’). Thus, to establish alibertyinter-est in avoiding administrative segregation, the petitioner was required to prove that state regulations requiredahearingbeforehe couldbeplacedinadministrative segregation and that the conditions of his confinement at Northern imposed an atypical and significant hardship in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life.
The respondent does not dispute that, pursuant to
one of the department’s administrative directives, the petitioner was entitled to notice and a hearing prior to being transferred to Northern, and that the respondent
was requiredto profferareason orreasons forconcluding thatthe petitionerposes athreatto safety and security. The first requirement ofSandin is therefore met.9 The respondent maintains, however, that the record is inadequate to review whether the second prong of Sandin has been met because the petitioner failed to present evidence concerning the conditions ofhis confinement at Northern, and, consequently, it is impossibleforthis courtto determinewhetherthose conditions resulted in an atypical and significant hardship in relation to the conditions ordinarily incident to prison life. In response, the petitioner and amici curiae10 argue that this court can decide whetherthe secondprong ofSandin has been met as a matter of law, first, because it is clear from the department’s administrative directive that the conditions of confinement at Northern are every bit as harsh as those experienced by the inmates in Wilkinson, which the United States Supreme Court concluded ‘‘impose[d] an atypical and significant hardshipunderanyplausiblebaseline’’; Wilkinsonv.Austin, supra, 545 U.S. 223; and, second, because the Second Circuit Court ofAppeals has determined that 305 days in administrative segregation in a New York maximum security prison, a far shorter period of time than the petitioner spent at Northern, is sufficiently atypical of ordinaryprisonlifetoestablishconclusivelyaninmate’s libertyinterestinavoidingsuchconfinement. See Colon

v. Howard, 215 F.3d 227, 229, 231–32 (2d Cir. 2000). As
we previously indicated, however, we need not resolve thisissuebecause, evenifwe assumethatthepetitioner hadalibertyinterestinavoidingadministrative segregation at Northern, he received all ofthe process to which he was constitutionally entitled.
In Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460, 103 S. Ct. 864, 74 L. Ed. 2d 675 (1983), the United States Supreme Court considered the process that is due to a prisoner prior to his placement in administrative segregation. ‘‘The requirements imposed by the [due process] [c]lause are, of course, flexible and variable [depending on] the particular situation being examined.

. . . In determining what is due process in the prison context, we are reminded that one cannot automatically apply procedural rules designed for free citizens in an open society

. . . to the very different situation presented by a disciplinary proceeding in a state prison.

. . . Prison admin-istrators

. . . should be accorded wide-ranging deference inthe adoption and execution ofpolicies and practices that in theirjudgment are needed to preserve internal order and discipline and to maintain institutional security.

. . . These considerations convince [the court] that [prison officials are] obligatedto engage onlyinaninformal, nonadversaryreviewoftheinformation supporting [an inmate’s] administrative confinement, including whatever statement [the inmate] wishe[s] to submit, within a reasonable time after [placement in] administrative segregation.’’ (Citations omitted; internal quotationmarks omitted.) Id., 472; see also Taylor v. Rodriguez, 238 F.3d 188, 192 (2d Cir. 2001) (‘‘[t]he [United States] Supreme Court requires that, assuming the existence ofa liberty interest, aprisoner placed in administrative segregation be provided
some notice ofthe charges against him and an opportunity to present his views to the prison official charged with deciding whetherto transferhim to administrative segregation’’ [internal quotation marks omitted]).
‘‘In a variety of contexts, [including the prison context] the [United States Supreme] Court has [also] recognized that a governmental decision resulting in the loss ofanimportantlibertyinterestviolates dueprocess ifthe decisionisnotsupportedbyanyevidence.’’Superintendent v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445, 455, 105 S. Ct. 2768, 86 L. Ed. 2d 356 (1985); see also Taylor v. Rodriguez, supra, 238 F.3d 194 (when inmate has liberty interest in avoiding transfer to more restrictive conditions of confinement, decision to transfer must be supported by ‘‘ ‘some evidence’ ’’). This standard is a lenient one, requiring only ‘‘a modicum of evidence’’ to support the challenged decision. Superintendentv. Hill, supra, 455. ‘‘Ascertaining whether this standard is satisfied does not require examination of the entire record, independent assessment of the credibility of witnesses, or weighing ofthe evidence. Instead, the relevant question iswhetherthere is anyevidence inthe recordthatcould support the conclusion reached by the disciplinary board.’’ Id., 455–56; see also Castro v. Terhune, 712 F.3d 1304, 1314 (9th Cir. 2013) (characterizing test as

‘‘ ‘minimally stringent’ ’’).
In the present case, the petitioner does not dispute that the procedures that he was afforded prior to being placed in administrative segregation exceeded those to which he was constitutionally entitled under Hewitt

. As we discussed previously, prior to being transferred to Northern, the petitioner was provided with written notice of the reasons for the transfer followed by a hearing at which he was allowed to present evidence and argument as to why the transfer was unwarranted. Thepetitionerwasalsogiventhe optionofhavingastaff advocate represent him at the hearing. The petitioner’s contention, rather, is that the respondent’s reasons for placing him in administrative segregation were invalid because the disciplinary report relating to his posses-sion ofthe NIJpublicationwas subsequently expunged, and because he already had completed his period of administrative segregation following his escape. The petitioner provides no authority for the proposition that department officials were not permitted to consider his interest in learning about perimeter security, and the fact that he previously had escaped from Osborn and attempted to escape on two other occasions, in evaluating whether he should be placed in administrative segregation, and our independent research has uncovered no such authority. This is not surprising, because we cannot perceive of any reason why it was improper for department officials to consider this information. To the contrary, it is well established that prison officials, in determining the appropriate security classification for inmates, often and for good reason must rely on an inmate’s past conduct
as a predictor of his or her future behavior. See, e.g., Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215, 225, 96 S. Ct. 2532, 49 L. Ed. 2d 451 (1976) (‘‘[t]ransfers between institutions, forexample, are made foravarietyofreasons and often involve no more than informed predictions as to what wouldbest serve institutional security orthe safety and welfare ofthe inmate’’); Crawford v. Lappin, 446 Fed. Appx. 413, 415 (3d Cir. 2011) (rejecting inmate’s claim that his placement in administrative segregation violated due process because decision was predicated, in part, on conduct for which he already had been disciplined, and explaining that ‘‘due process is not violated by placing an inmate in administrative custody based
on past conduct when that conduct provides a basis for predicting [future misconduct]’’); Shoats v. Horn, 213 F.3d 140, 146 (3d Cir. 2000) (‘‘[e]ven [if the court] conclude[d] that [the prisoner’s] continued confinementinadministrative custody [was] basedsolelyonhis past crimes, the process he receivedwouldnonetheless pass constitutional muster, because predictions of likelyfuturebehaviorbasedonagenerallyvolatile criminal character have been upheld by the [United States] Supreme Court’’). Moreover, as Levesque explained at the habeas trial, the prior hearing relating to the petitioner’s possession of the NIJ publication was a disciplinary proceeding held for the purpose of determining whether the petitioner had violated any prison rules. The fact that it
was later determined thatthat publication was not contraband—apparently because it had been approved by prison mail room personnel—was immaterial to the issue ofwhetherthepetitioner couldbe safelymanaged in the general population in light of his undiminished interest in perimeter security and all that that interest implied for an inmate with his escape history. Levesque testified that, as far as he was concerned, there was absolutely no legitimate reason for any inmate to concern himselfwith a prison’s perimeter security system, much less so an inmate with the petitioner’s prior his-tory of escapes, and that it was for this reason—to
ensure the safety and security of the prison as well as the public—that department officials ultimately concluded that the petitioner should be returned to administrative segregation. Although the petitioner obviously disagrees with this decision, we cannot conclude that it was unjustified, or that the evidence otherwise did not support it.11
Inthis regard, itbears emphasisthat ‘‘aprison’s internal security is peculiarly a matter normally left to the discretion of prison administrators. In assessing the seriousness of a threat to institutional security, prison administrators necessarily draw on more than the specific facts surrounding a particular incident; instead, they must consider the character of the inmates confined in the institution, recent and longstanding relations between prisoners and guards, prisoners inter se, and the like. In the volatile atmosphere of a prison, an inmate easily may constitute an unacceptable threat to the safety of other prisoners and guards even if he himself has committed no misconduct; rumor, reputation, and even more imponderable factors may suffice to spark potentially disastrous incidents. Thejudgment of prison officials in this context, like that of those makingparole decisions, turns largelyonpurelysubjective evaluations and on predictions of future behavior

. . . .’’ (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Hewittv. Helms, supra, 459 U.S. 474. It therefore is not the role of this court to second-guess that decision, especially when, as in the present case, there is ample reason, based on the undisputed evidence, to support it. See, e.g., Superintendent v. Hill, supra, 472 U.S. 455 (‘‘that due process requires some evidentiary basis for a decision

. . . does [not] imply that a disciplinary board’s

. . . decisions

. . . are subject to second-guessing upon review’’); Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 547, 99 S. Ct. 1861, 60L. Ed. 2d447 (1979) (‘‘[p]rison administrators

. . . should be accorded wide-ranging deference inthe adoption and execution ofpolicies and practices that in theirjudgment are needed to preserve internal order and discipline and to maintain institutional security’’).
As we have explained, however, the habeas court apparently misunderstood the petitioner’s claim, and,
asaresult, itsreasonforrejectingtheclaimisunsustainable. See footnotes 6 and 7 of this opinion. Consequently, the Appellate Court incorrectly determined that the habeas court acted within its discretion in dismissing the petitioner’s petition for certification to appeal from the habeas court’s judgment. Because, however, the petitioner cannotprevail on his claim that he was denied due process prior to being placed in administrative segregation, we conclude that the habeas courtproperlyhad determinedthatthe petitioner’s habeas petition must be denied.The form of the judgment of the Appellate Court is improper, the judgment of the Appellate Court is reversed, and the case is remanded to that court with direction to affirm the judgment of the habeas court denying the petition for a writ of habeas corpus. In this opinion the other justices concurred.

1 Department of Correction Administrative Directive 9.4 (3) (B) defines ‘‘administrative segregation’’ as ‘‘[p]lacement of an inmate on a restrictive housing status that results in segregation of the inmate whose behavior or management factors pose a threat to the security ofthe facility or a risk to the safety of staff or other inmates and that the inmate can no longer be safely managed in general population.’’

2 We granted the petitioner’s petition for certification to appeal, limited to the following question: ‘‘Did the Appellate Court improperly conclude, contrarytotherule ofSandinv. Conner, [supra, 515U.S. 472], and Wilkinson

v. Austin, [supra, 545 U.S. 209], that the petitioner had no liberty interest in avoiding administrative segregation?’’ Vandeverv. CommissionerofCorrection, 307 Conn. 909, 53 A.3d 999 (2012).

3 The hearing notice provided in relevant part: ‘‘Reason for Hearing: On [October 21, 1997]

. . . you received a [c]ontraband [c]lass A disciplinary report substituted for [c]onspiracy to [c]ommit [e]scape. The contraband youpossessedwas documentation detailing electronicperimetertechnology found in correctional facilities. The documentation you recently held, combined with your escape record, may pose a threat to the safety and security of the institutional community. Therefore, a special classification hearing will be held

. . . to consider you for placement on [a]dministrative [s]egregation status. You will have the opportunity, at this hearing, to offer any statements on your behalf

. . . . ‘‘[You may request] a staff advocate to act [on] your behalf

. . . . A reasonable number ofrelevant and nonredundant witnesses may appear on your behalf.

. . .’’

4 General Statutes § 18-98a provides: ‘‘Each person committed to the custody ofthe Commissioner of Correction who is employed within the institution to which he was sentenced, or outside as provided by section 18-100, for a period of seven consecutive days, except for temporary interruption ofsuch period as excused by the commissioner forvalid reasons, may have

one day deducted from his sentence for such period, in addition to any other earned time, at the discretion of the Commissioner of Correction.’’ Department of Correction Administrative Directive 9.4 (5) provides: ‘‘An inmate shall not earn or receive statutory good time, seven-day work credit, restorationoflostgoodtime oroutstandingmeritoriousperformanceawards while on Administrative Segregation, Close Custody, Chronic Discipline Status or Special Needs Management.’’

5 The record indicates that the disciplinary report ultimately was withdrawn dueto concerns overwhetherthe NIJpublicationactuallyconstituted contraband in light of the fact that it inadvertently had been stamped ‘‘approved’’ by officials in the mail room at Osborn.

6 In reaching this determination, the habeas court relied onAbed v. Commissioner ofCorrection, 43 Conn. App. 176, 682 A.2d 558, cert. denied, 239 Conn. 937, 684A.2d 707 (1996), andBeasleyv. CommissionerofCorrection, 50 Conn. App. 421, 718 A.2d 487 (1998), aff’d, 249 Conn. 499, 733 A.2d 833 (1999). As we explain more fully hereinafter; see footnote 7 ofthis opinion; the habeas court misunderstood the petitioner to be claiming a statutory

orconstitutionalrighttothegoodtimeandworkcreditsthathewasineligible to earn while in administrative segregation. It is clear from the record, however, that the petitioner recognized that the foregoing authority precluded such a claim, and that he sought the credits only as a remedy for the due process violation that he allegedly had suffered.

7 We note that the respondent also asserted at oral argument that the petitioner never claimed in the habeas court that he had a liberty interest in avoiding administrative segregation, only that he had a right to the statutorygoodtimecreditthathewasineligibletoearnwhilehewasinadministrativesegregation. Areviewoftherecord, however, revealsthatthepetitioner’s claim was squarelybefore the habeas court, andthatthat court simplyfailed to address it. In his habeas petition, which he initiated on a form provided to him, the petitioner selected box ‘‘6c,’’ indicating that his ‘‘hearing on

. . . classification

. . . [was] improper

. . . .’’ In an attachment to his petition, he clarified that he was referring to his administrative segregation hearing.The petitioner also argued in his posttrial brief to the habeas court that ‘‘placement of an [inmate in administrative segregation] mandates a proper due process

. . . and is not any discretional or classification process.

. . . The placement ofan [inmate in administrative segregation] creates a liberty interestbecause [statutorygoodtime] is denied, anditrepresents anatypical and significant hardship from ordinaryprison life.’’ (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) In support of this claim, the petitioner expressly relied onSandin, which establishes the framework for evaluating whether a prisoner has a liberty interest in avoiding administrative segregation. Accordingly, the habeas court’s reason for denying the habeas petition, namely, that the award of good time and work credits is entirely within the discretion of the respondent, cannot be sustained because it is based on a claim that the petitioner never made.

8 Appellatereviewofthehabeascourt’s denialofapetitionforcertification to appeal is governed by General Statutes § 52-470 (g), which provides: ‘‘No appeal from the judgment rendered in a habeas corpus proceeding brought by or on behalf of a person who has been convicted of a crime in order to obtain such person’s release may be taken unless the appellant, within ten days after the case is decided, petitions the judge before whom the case
was tried or, if such judge is unavailable, a judge of the Superior Court designated by the Chief Court Administrator, to certify that a question is involved in the decision which ought to be reviewed by the court having jurisdiction and the judge so certifies.’’ Wepreviouslyhave explainedthat, inenactingthis statute, ‘‘thelegislature intended to discourage frivolous habeas appeals.

. . . A habeas appeal

. . . is not

. . . frivolous and warrants appellate review if the appellant can show: that the issues are debatable among jurists of reason; that a court could resolve the issues [in a different manner]; or that the questions are adequate to deserve encouragement to proceed further.

. . . [I]f an appeal is not frivolous, the habeas court’s failure to grant certification to appeal is an abuse of discretion.

. . . ‘‘In determiningwhetherthe habeas court abused its discretion in denying the petitioner’s request for certification, we necessarily must consider the merits ofthepetitioner’s underlying claims to determine whetherthe habeas court reasonably determined that the petitioner’s appeal was frivolous. In other words, we review the petitioner’s substantive claims for the purpose ofascertainingwhetherthose claims satisfy one ormore ofthe three criteria [that we have] identified

. . . for determining the propriety of the habeas court’s denial of the petition for certification.’’ (Citations omitted; internal quotationmarks omitted.) Taylorv. CommissionerofCorrection, 284 Conn. 433, 448–49, 936 A.2d 611 (2007).

9 Department of Correction Administrative Directive 9.4 (12) provides that, before an inmate canbeplaced onadministrative segregation status, he mustreceive ‘‘notice andahearing’’thatcomplywiththe specificprocedures outlined in subparagraphs (A) and (B) of 9.4 (12) ofthe directive. Pursuant to 9.4 (12) (C), the hearing officer is also required to issue a written recommendationthatincludestheinformationhe orshereliedonandthereasoning behind the recommendation. This directive satisfies the first prong of Sandin because it requires, ‘‘in language ofan unmistakablymandatory character, that aprisonernot suffer

aparticular deprivation’’—in this case, placement in administrative segregation at Northern—‘‘absent specified predicates.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Vega v. Lantz, 596 F.3d 77, 83 (2d Cir. 2010).

10 We granted the application of the American Civil Liberties Union of ConnecticutandtheAllard K. Lowenstein InternationalHuman Rights Clinic (Human Rights Clinic) to file a brief as amici curiae in support of the petitioner’s claim ofadue process violation, andwe also grantedpermission to the Human Rights Clinic to present oral argument in this court not to exceed ten minutes.

11 To the extent that the petitioner contends that his double jeopardy rights were violated by his placement in administrative segregation on the basis ofconduct that previously had resulted in prison discipline, that claim also is without merit because the double jeopardy clause is not implicated by such a placement. See, e.g., Crawford v. Lappin, supra, 446 Fed. Appx. 415 (‘‘Nor is there any basis for [the petitioner’s] claim that placement [in administrative segregation] based on previously disciplined conduct constitutes a doublejeopardyviolation. See UnitedStates v. Newby, 11 F.3d 1143, 1144 (3d Cir. 1993) ([A] prison disciplinary hearing is not a prosecution for [d]ouble [j]eopardy [c]lause purposes.).’’ [Internal quotation marks omitted.]).