[Cite as In re I.R., 2023-Ohio-3044.]

STATE OF OHIO ) IN THE COURT OF APPEALS

)ss: NINTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT

COUNTY OF SUMMIT )

IN RE: I.R.

S.R.

V.R.

C.A. Nos. 30500

30501

30502

30529

30530

30531

APPEAL FROM JUDGMENT

ENTERED IN THE

COURT OF COMMON PLEAS

COUNTY OF SUMMIT, OHIO

CASE Nos. DN 21 07 0526

DN 21 07 0527

DN 21 07 0528

DECISION AND JOURNAL ENTRY

Dated: August 30, 2023

HENSAL, Judge.

{¶1} Appellants, A.R. (“Mother”) and W.R. (“Father”), appeal from a judgment of the 

Summit County Court of Common Pleas, Juvenile Division, that terminated their parental rights 

and placed three of their minor children in the permanent custody of Summit County Children 

Services Board (“CSB”). This Court affirms. 

I.

{¶2} Mother and Father are married and are the parents of I.R., born September 1, 2019; 

S.R., born September 28, 2015; and V.R., born October 30, 2014. They have two younger children 

who were also removed from their custody but are not parties to this appeal. 
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{¶3} CSB filed its original dependency complaints concerning these children on July 9, 

2021. The agency had received a referral that the children were living in an unsafe and unsanitary 

home, had poor hygiene, and were not being regularly fed. Upon investigation, a CSB intake 

worker was able to speak to the older two children and Mother but was not allowed inside the 

family home. V.R. disclosed to the caseworker that Father “had touched her private part,” but 

Father would not allow the caseworker or anyone else to question the child further. 

{¶4} The juvenile court granted CSB an order of access to the family home and ordered 

that the children be removed from the parents’ custody and placed in the emergency temporary 

custody of CSB. CSB twice amended its complaints to allege more details about the unsafe and 

unsanitary condition of the home, and to add further disclosures by both V.R. and S.R. that Father 

had sexually abused them. Through amended complaints filed in August 2021, CSB alleged that 

all three children were abused under Revised Code Section 2151.031(B), neglected under Section 

2151.03(A)(2) and (3), and dependent under Section 2151.04(C). 

{¶5} The August amended complaints also alleged that V.R. and S.R. were abused under 

Revised Code Section 2151.031(A) and (D). Section 2151.031(A), which is quoted in the 

amended complaint, explicitly requires that a child be “the victim of ‘sexual activity’ as defined 

under Chapter 2907. of the Revised Code, where such activity would constitute an offense under 

that chapter, except that the court need not find that any person has been convicted of the offense 

in order to find that the child is an abused child[.]” Pertaining to the allegations of sexual abuse 

of V.R. and S.R., the August complaints included the following factual allegations:

On August 9, 2021[, CSB] received new intake reports with concerns of sexual 

abuse. It was alleged that Father has sexually abused [V.R.] and [S.R.], with 

allegations of [F]ather touching the children’s private parts and description of 

ejaculation. Mother also has allegedly participated in the sexual abuse. The 

children were evaluated at the Akron Children’s Hospital CARE Center on August 

25, 2021. [V.R.’s] disclosures were found to be consistent with a diagnosis of child 
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sexual abuse. There is a criminal investigation underway with the Akron Police 

Department. The Juvenile Court has suspended the parents’ visitation.

{¶6} The matter came before a magistrate for an adjudicatory hearing. Mother and 

Father appeared and were represented by trial counsel. At the hearing, each parent executed a 

written waiver of trial rights and “admit[ted] to” the allegations in the second amended complaint. 

The magistrate questioned each of them to ascertain that their waivers had been executed 

knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently. Consequently, the trial court adjudicated the children 

abused, neglected, and dependent as alleged in the August amended complaints. 

{¶7} The parents also appeared with their respective trial counsel on the date set for the 

dispositional hearing and waived their rights to a contested hearing. With the parents’ agreement, 

the trial court placed the children in the temporary custody of CSB and adopted the case plan as 

an order of the court. Among other things, the case plan required the parents to obtain mental 

health assessments, engage in recommended counseling, and resolve the problems with the 

condition of their home. 

{¶8} After the adjudication and initial disposition of the children, V.R. and S.R. obtained 

more detailed trauma assessments at Lighthouse Family Center. The assessor opined that V.R.’s 

disclosures were consistent with sexual abuse but that S.R.’s disclosures, likely because of her 

younger age and developmental delays, had been less consistent. Without objection from either 

parent, the trial court adopted an amended case plan, which added trauma counseling for both 

children and required Father to obtain a sexual offender evaluation and follow all treatment 

recommendations. 

{¶9} Throughout this case, Mother and Father refused to communicate with CSB, except 

through their court-appointed counsel. Apparently, their trial counsel made an informal agreement 

with the first caseworker to speak to the parents only with their counsel present, but no such 
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agreement is reflected in the record. Moreover, the first caseworker explained that she had 

difficulty coordinating communications through counsel and the second caseworker was not aware 

of any agreement. Nevertheless, aside from some last-minute counseling by Mother, neither parent 

engaged in case plan services. Because their visitation was suspended shortly after this case began, 

Father did not visit the children during this case and Mother was permitted to have only minimal 

contact with the children via Zoom. 

{¶10} The parents did provide CSB with the names and contact information of relatives 

who were interested in placement of some of the children: a maternal aunt (“Aunt”) and the 

maternal grandparents (“Grandparents”). Because Aunt and Grandparents lived in Pennsylvania, 

CSB was required to reach out to the children services agency there through the Interstate Compact 

for the Placement of Children (“ICPC”) to investigate those relatives for potential placement. 

Ultimately, ICPC home studies approved Aunt for placement, but not Grandparents. Aunt, 

however, was willing to take custody of only S.R. and one of the parents’ younger children, W.R., 

and visited the children only twice during this case. 

{¶11} On June 13, 2022, CSB moved for permanent custody of I.R., S.R., V.R., and W.R. 

The parents alternatively moved for S.R. and W.R. to be placed in the legal custody of Aunt and 

for I.R. and V.R. to be placed in the legal custody of Grandparents or, alternatively, for temporary 

custody to be extended for six months to allow Grandparents time to appeal the denial of their 

ICPC assessment or for Mother to have more time to work toward reunification. 

{¶12} Following an evidentiary hearing on the competing dispositional motions, the trial 

court terminated parental rights and placed I.R., S.R., and V.R. in the permanent custody of CSB. 

The trial court continued W.R. in the temporary custody of CSB, to allow more time for CSB to 

pursue placement of him with Aunt in Pennsylvania. 
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{¶13} The parents timely appeal and raise a total of six assignments of error. This Court 

will consolidate and rearrange some of their assigned errors to facilitate review.

II.

MOTHER’S ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR II

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ALLOWING THE TESTIMONY OF CARRIE 

SCHNIRRING REGARDING THE HEARSAY STATEMENTS OF S.R. AND 

V.R. WHEN THOSE STATEMENTS DID NOT FIT WITHIN ANY 

RECOGNIZED HEARSAY EXCEPTION.

FATHER’S ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR IV

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ADMITTING THE STATEMENTS OF TWO 

MINOR CHILDREN IN [VIOLATION] OF EVIDENCE RULES 803 AND 807.

{¶14} Mother’s second assignment of error and Father’s fourth assignment of error 

challenge the trial court’s admission of statements that V.R. and S.R. made to Carrie Schnirring 

during their psychological assessments at Lighthouse Family Center. The parents maintain that 

the children’s statements were inadmissible hearsay. This Court recognizes that the trial court’s 

decision to admit this evidence was within its sound discretion and will not reverse that decision 

unless the trial court abused its discretion. In re S.S., 9th Dist. Wayne No. 21AP0022, 2023-Ohio245, ¶ 36. An abuse of discretion means more than an error of judgment; it implies that the trial 

court’s attitude was unreasonable, arbitrary, or unconscionable. Blakemore v. Blakemore, 5 Ohio 

St.3d 217, 219 (1983).

{¶15} Mother and Father primarily argue that the children’s statements were not 

admissible under Evidence Rule 807(A), which pertains to statements made by a child under the 

age of 12 that describe sexual activity perpetrated against the child. This Court has repeatedly 

held, however, that a party seeking to admit a young child’s statements about sexual abuse “‘need 

not satisfy the rigors of [Evidence Rule] 807(A) if [a] child’s statement can be admitted through a 
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different hearsay exception.’” In re E.L., 9th Dist. Medina No. 18CA0060-M, 2019-Ohio-1490, ¶ 

8, quoting State v. Lortz, 9th Dist. Summit No. 23762, 2008-Ohio-3108, ¶ 20.

{¶16} The trial court did not admit these statements under Rule 807, however. Instead, it 

concluded that the statements were admissible under Evidence Rule 803(4) as statements made for 

purposes of their mental health diagnoses or treatment. See State v. Brown, 9th Dist. Summit No. 

25287, 2011-Ohio-1041, ¶ 32; Browning v. Burt, 66 Ohio St.3d 544, 557 (1993), citing Black’s 

Law Dictionary (6 Ed.1990), 453-454 and 1502 (interpreting the terms “medical diagnosis” and 

“treatment” in a different context as “terms of art * * * relating to the identification and alleviation 

of a physical or mental illness, disease, or defect.”) 

{¶17} Evidence Rule 803(4) provides that “[s]tatements made for purposes of medical 

diagnosis or treatment” including medical history, past or present symptoms, pain, or sensations 

“are not excluded by the hearsay rule, even though the declarant is available as a witness[.]” The 

parents assert that the statements made by V.R. and S.R. to Ms. Schnirring were not made for 

purposes of diagnosis or treatment, but they fail to develop arguments based on Ohio law. 

{¶18} In In re J.B., 9th Dist. Lorain No. 18CA011424, 2019-Ohio-1929, ¶ 10, this Court 

summarized Ohio case law interpreting the admissibility of evidence under Rule 803(4):

[T]he only issue relevant to the admission of a child’s statements pursuant to [Rule] 

803(4) is whether the statements were made for purposes of medical diagnosis or 

treatment. State v. Muttart, 116 Ohio St.3d 5, 2007-Ohio-5267, ¶ 46. The high 

court set out a nonexhaustive list of considerations to determine the purpose of the 

child’s statements, including (1) whether the child’s statements were elicited in a 

leading or suggestive manner; (2) whether a motive to lie exists, e.g., in relation to 

a “bitter custody battle[;]” and (3) whether the child understood the need to be 

truthful to the medical provider. Id. at ¶ 49, quoting State v. Dever, 64 Ohio St.3d 

401, 410 (1992). Other contextual considerations include the child’s age, the 

consistency of the child’s assertions, and whether the interview of the child was 

conducted pursuant to proper protocol. Id.
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Neither parent has argued that the statements of V.R. and S.R. during their psychological 

assessments failed to satisfy the above standard for admissibility. 

{¶19} The evidence at issue is the testimony of Ms. Schnirring, the professional who 

evaluated each child at Lighthouse, as well as the lengthy written reports about her assessment of 

each child. Ms. Schnirring testified about her years of experience and training and that she has 

performed “[w]ell over 2,500” psychological assessments of children alleged to have been the 

victims of sexual abuse. Without objection from any of the parties, the trial court qualified her to 

testify as an expert in the field of child sexual abuse and trauma. Ms. Schnirring’s written reports 

include a detailed description of her separate assessment of each child, which occurred over a 

series of four meetings. 

{¶20} The written reports and Ms. Schnirring’s testimony include mental health diagnoses 

for each child and explain how the assessments were performed in anticipation of the children 

engaging in ongoing counseling. In addition to first assessing the ability of each young child to 

tell the truth, Ms. Schnirring explained her interview protocol, which included allowing the 

children to first make unprompted disclosures of sexual touching and later refer to anatomical 

drawings. Ms. Schnirring concluded that S.R.’s disclosures were not reliable because they were 

inconsistent and were likely hampered by her younger age and developmental delays. 

{¶21} Ms. Schnirring’s written report about V.R.’s evaluation, on the other hand, included 

the child’s descriptive and consistent disclosures about multiple incidents of sexual abuse by 

Father at the family home and at a relative’s home in Pennsylvania. The report includes V.R.’s 

description of Father’s male genitalia, sexual acts that he required her to perform on him, and his 

repeated acts of ejaculating (which she described as “pee[ing]”) on her body and in her mouth. 
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V.R. told Ms. Schnirring that Father would give her Kool Aid after he “pee[d]” in her mouth 

because he knew that the “pee” tasted bad. 

{¶22} Ms. Schnirring concluded that V.R.’s disclosures were consistent with sexual abuse 

because her descriptions of the incidents were “detailed, specific, and compelling” and 

demonstrated “advanced sexual knowledge despite her young age.” Although Ms. Schnirring 

accepted V.R.’s detailed disclosures but was reluctant to believe S.R.’s inconsistent disclosures, 

she recommended that both girls engage in ongoing trauma therapy. The record reflects that the 

case plan was amended shortly afterward to add trauma counseling for both children. 

{¶23} Mother and Father have failed to demonstrate that the trial court abused its 

discretion by admitting the children’s statements to Ms. Schnirring as statements made for the 

purpose of medical diagnosis or treatment under Rule 803(4). Mother’s second and Father’s fourth 

assignments of error are overruled.

FATHER’S ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR II

THE TRIAL COURT DENIED THE PARENTS THEIR DUE-PROCESS 

RIGHTS GUARANTEED TO THEM BY THE UNITED STATES AND OHIO 

CONSTITUTIONS.

{¶24} Father’s second assignment of error, as stated, is that both parents were deprived of 

their constitutional rights to due process. Assuming, without deciding, that Father has standing to 

raise a constitutional argument on behalf of Mother and himself, he raised no constitutional 

argument in the trial court and has not argued plain error on appeal. Moreover, Father has failed 

to articulate how either parent was deprived of due process in this case. Father implicitly argues 

that he was deprived of an opportunity to defend himself against the allegations that he sexually 

abused V.R. and S.R., but that argument is not supported by the record in this case. 
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{¶25} To begin with, Father and Mother had the opportunity to contest the sexual abuse 

allegations in the amended complaints but chose to waive those rights, in consultation with their 

trial counsel. Had the parents exercised their rights to a contested adjudicatory hearing, CSB 

would have been required to prove, by clear and convincing evidence, that both children were “the 

victim[s] of ‘sexual activity’ as defined under Chapter 2907. of the Revised Code[.]” R.C. 

2151.031(A); In re C.G., 9th Dist. Summit No. 29171, 2019-Ohio-2102, ¶ 21 (emphasizing that 

the agency must prove the allegations of dependency, neglect, or abuse by clear and convincing 

evidence).

{¶26} On the date set for the adjudicatory hearing, both parents executed written and oral 

waivers of their rights to a hearing and agreed to S.R. and V.R. being adjudicated abused under 

Section 2151.031(A). Among other things, the written waiver forms explicitly state that the 

parents admitted to the allegations in the complaint and waived their rights to require that CSB 

prove its allegations by clear and convincing evidence. The magistrate questioned the parents to 

ascertain that their waivers of trial rights had been executed in a knowing, voluntary, and intelligent 

manner. The trial court adopted the magistrate’s adjudicatory decision and neither parent filed any 

objections. 

{¶27} Later, CSB filed an amended case plan to require that Father obtain a sexual 

offender assessment and follow all treatment recommendations. Father asserts that he was again 

denied due process at this point because, had he complied with this case plan requirement, he 

would have been forced to admit that he abused the girls. Father had the statutory right to file an 

objection to the amended case plan, however, but he did not. See R.C. 2151.412(F)(2) (providing 

each party with the opportunity to propose amendments to the case plan and/or object to and 
10

 

request a hearing on any case plan amendment proposed by another party). The trial court did not 

adopt the amended case plan as a court order until after the time for objections had expired.

{¶28} Mother and Father later had the opportunity to defend against CSB’s motion for 

permanent custody through the final evidentiary hearing, and then to raise any alleged errors in the 

trial court proceedings through this appeal. Both parents were provided with numerous procedural 

safeguards to protect their fundamental parental rights. The record fails to support Father’s claim 

that he or Mother were denied due process in this case. Father’s second assignment of error is 

overruled.

FATHER’S ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR I

THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN ITS GRANT OF 

PERMANENT CUSTODY TO [CSB] AS SUCH DECISION WAS NOT 

SUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE AND WAS AGAINST THE MANIFEST 

WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE.

MOTHER’S ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR I

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN AWARDING PERMANENT CUSTODY TO 

[CSB][AS THE JUDGMENT] WAS AGAINST THE MANIFEST WEIGHT OF 

THE EVIDENCE.

FATHER’S ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR III

[CSB] DID NOT MAKE REASONABLE EFFORTS TO FINALIZE A 

PERMANENCY PLAN FOR THE CHILDREN AND THE TRIAL COURT 

ERRED AND ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN DENYING A SIX-MONTH 

EXTENSION [OF TEMPORARY CUSTODY] AS [CSB] DID NOT 

SERIOUSLY CONSIDER PLACEMENT WITH FAMILY MEMBERS.

{¶29} Finally, having overruled the parents’ assignments of error alleging procedural and 

evidentiary errors, this Court turns to their arguments that the trial court’s decision on the merits 

was not supported by the evidence presented at the permanent custody hearing. Although Father’s 

third assignment of error is stated as a “reasonable efforts” argument, he essentially argues that the 

trial court erred in granting CSB’s motion for permanent custody because the agency failed to fully 
11

 

investigate Aunt and/or Grandparents as potential legal custodians for the children. The record 

reveals, however, that CSB and the trial court did fully consider these relatives as potential legal 

custodians, which will be addressed in more detail below. 

{¶30} Before a juvenile court may terminate parental rights and award permanent custody 

of a child to a proper moving agency, it must find clear and convincing evidence of both prongs 

of the permanent custody test: (1) that the child is abandoned; orphaned; has been in the temporary 

custody of the agency for at least 12 months of a consecutive 22-month period; the child or another 

child of the same parent has been adjudicated abused, neglected, or dependent three times; or that 

the child cannot be placed with either parent, based on an analysis under R.C. 2151.414(E); and 

(2) that the grant of permanent custody to the agency is in the best interest of the child, based on 

an analysis under R.C. 2151.414(D)(1). R.C. 2151.414(B)(1) and 2151.414(B)(2); see also In re 

William S., 75 Ohio St.3d 95, 98-99 (1996). Clear and convincing evidence is that which will 

“produce in the mind of the trier of facts a firm belief or conviction as to the facts sought to be 

established.” (Internal quotations omitted.) In re Adoption of Holcomb, 18 Ohio St.3d 361, 368 

(1985), quoting Cross v. Ledford, 161 Ohio St. 469 (1954), paragraph three of the syllabus. 

{¶31} In considering whether the juvenile court’s judgment is against the manifest weight 

of the evidence, this Court “weighs the evidence and all reasonable inferences, considers the 

credibility of witnesses and determines whether in resolving conflicts in the evidence, the [finder 

of fact] clearly lost its way and created such a manifest miscarriage of justice that the [judgment] 

must be reversed and a new [hearing] ordered.” (Internal quotations and citations omitted.) 

Eastley v. Volkman, 132 Ohio St.3d 328, 2012-Ohio-2179, ¶ 20. When weighing the evidence, 

this Court “must always be mindful of the presumption in favor of the finder of fact.” Id. at ¶ 21.
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{¶32} The trial court found that the first prong of the permanent custody test was satisfied 

in this case for alternative reasons, including the grounds set forth in R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(a) and 

R.C. 2151.414(E)(1). Those provisions together provide that the child “cannot be placed with 

either of the child’s parents within a reasonable time or should not be placed with the child’s 

parents[]” if the trial court finds, by clear and convincing evidence, that “[f]ollowing the placement 

of the child outside the child’s home * * *, the parent has failed continuously and repeatedly to 

substantially remedy the conditions causing the child to be placed outside the child’s home.” The 

parents do not dispute this finding, which is fully supported by the record. 

{¶33} The parents challenge the trial court’s finding that permanent custody was in the 

best interest of the children. They do not dispute the trial court’s conclusion that the children 

should not have been returned to their custody at the time of the hearing or in the foreseeable 

future. Instead, they argue that the trial court should have placed the children in the legal custody 

of Aunt and/or Grandparents. The evidence at the hearing demonstrated, however, that only Aunt 

was approved after an ICPC investigation. Because Grandparents had not been approved for 

placement at the time of the hearing, the trial court could not place the children in their legal 

custody. See R.C. 5103.23, Article III(D). Moreover, as to the request that the trial court extend 

temporary custody to allow time for Grandparents to appeal the denial of the ICPC assessment, 

there was no evidence presented at the hearing about why Grandparents were not approved, 

whether they had actually appealed the denial, and/or the likelihood that they could prevail on an 

appeal of the denial. 

{¶34} Although Aunt had been approved as a relative placement through the ICPC 

investigation, she was willing to take custody of S.R., but not I.R. or V.R. The guardian ad litem 

opined that S.R. and I.R. were closely bonded and it was not in their best interest to separate them. 
13

 

Aunt also had not developed a close bond with any of the children, as she had visited them only 

two times during this case. 

{¶35} Moreover, this Court has held “that if permanent custody is in the best interest of 

the child, legal custody to a relative necessarily is not.” In re M.S., 9th Dist. Summit Nos. 30506 

and 30515, 2023-Ohio-1558, ¶ 26. Consequently, this Court will review the trial court’s decision 

that permanent custody was in the best interest of the children. This Court’s best interest review 

focuses on the best interest factors set forth in R.C. 2151.414(D). In making its best interest 

determination, the trial court was required to consider the statutory best interest factors, which 

include: the interaction and interrelationships of the child, the wishes of the child, the custodial 

history of the child, the child’s need for permanence and whether that can be achieved without a 

grant of permanent custody, and whether any of the factors outlined in R.C. 2151.414(E)(7)-(11) 

apply.1 R.C. 2151.414(D)(1)(a)-(e); see In re R.G., 9th Dist. Summit Nos. 24834 and 24850, 2009-

Ohio-6284, ¶ 11.

{¶36} The parents have not developed an argument under the best interest factors. 

Instead, they assert that the trial court should have placed the children with relatives because they 

are blood relatives. Aside from evidence that only Aunt had been approved for placements, and 

she was willing to take S.R., but not the other two children, the determination about the children’s 

best interest required the trial court to consider whether it was in the best interest of the children 

for their parents to maintain residual parental rights. In re M.S., 9th Dist. Summit No. 30506, 

2023-Ohio-1558, ¶ 28. 

{¶37} The parents in this case do not argue that their residual parental rights or this family 

relationship should be preserved, nor do they dispute “that they failed to work on the case plan to 

1 The trial court did not find that any of those provisions applied to the facts of this case. 
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demonstrate that they wanted to preserve their family.” Id. Mother and Father had almost no 

contact with their young children throughout this case and did not even begin to address the 

significant problem of Father’s admitted past sexual abuse of V.R. and S.R. “If the parents have 

made minimal effort to improve their parenting abilities and/or [maintain] a relationship with their 

[children], the trial court should consider that evidence in determining whether there is a family 

relationship that should be preserved. Id. at ¶ 27, citing In re C.M., 2003-Ohio-5040, at ¶ 11. 

{¶38} Any preservation of residual parental rights in this case would necessarily require 

assurances that the children would be protected from their parents, who had made no effort to 

address the potential threat that they pose to their children. No evidence was presented to the trial 

court that the proposed custodians would be able to protect the children from their parents or that 

they understood the trauma that V.R. and S.R. had endured.

{¶39} The children’s interaction with their biological relatives during this case had been 

minimal. The remaining best interest factors (the children’s wishes, their custodial history, and 

their need for legal permanence) also weighed in favor of permanent custody. S.R. and V.R. have 

expressed fear of Father, who still resided with Mother, and that they do not want to go home to 

their parents. The children’s custodial history during this case included moving between 

temporary placements. S.R. and V.R. will need ongoing trauma counseling and assurances from 

their caregivers that they reside in a safe and stable home. The foster parents of S.R. and I.R. are 

interested in adopting them, but not V.R. Nevertheless, CSB will attempt to place the three 

children together in the same adoptive home. At a minimum, the foster parents who want to adopt 

S.R. and I.R. expressed a willingness to maintain ongoing contact between the siblings. 
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{¶40} Given the evidence before the trial court, this Court cannot conclude that it lost its 

way in determining that permanent custody to CSB was in the children’s best interest. Mother’s 

first and Father’s first and third assignments of error are overruled.

III.

{¶35} Mother’s and Father’s assignments of error are overruled. The judgment of the 

Summit County Court of Common Pleas, Juvenile Division, is affirmed. 

Judgment affirmed.

There were reasonable grounds for this appeal.

We order that a special mandate issue out of this Court, directing the Court of Common 

Pleas, County of Summit, State of Ohio, to carry this judgment into execution. A certified copy 

of this journal entry shall constitute the mandate, pursuant to App.R. 27.

Immediately upon the filing hereof, this document shall constitute the journal entry of 

judgment, and it shall be file stamped by the Clerk of the Court of Appeals at which time the period 

for review shall begin to run. App.R. 22(C). The Clerk of the Court of Appeals is instructed to 

mail a notice of entry of this judgment to the parties and to make a notation of the mailing in the 

docket, pursuant to App.R. 30.

Costs taxed to Appellant.

JENNIFER HENSAL

FOR THE COURT
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SUTTON, P. J.

STEVENSON, J.

CONCUR.

APPEARANCES:

THOMAS C. LOEPP, Attorney at Law, for Appellant.

ALAN M. MEDVICK, Attorney at Law, for Appellant.

SHERRI BEVAN WALSH, Prosecuting Attorney, and C. RICHLEY RALEY, JR., Assistant 

Prosecuting Attorney, for Appellee.