DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA

FOURTH DISTRICT

AVANT CAPITAL, LLC, d/b/a

AVANT RECOVERY FUND, 

Appellant,

v.

ELSA GOMEZ,

Appellee.

No. 4D17-1014

[September 20, 2018]

Appeal from the Circuit Court for the Nineteenth Judicial Circuit, St. 

Lucie County; Robert E. Belanger, Judge; L.T. Case No. 56-2016-CA000145.

Mark A. Levy of Brinkley Morgan, Fort Lauderdale, for appellant.

No brief filed for appellee.

LEVINE, J.

The issue presented for our review is whether the omission of the word 

“Corporation” from the lender’s name on the promissory note rendered the 

note invalid. We find that the trial court erred in granting summary 

judgment because of this omission and incorrectly found the note invalid

as a matter of law. We reverse the summary judgment. 

Avant Capital filed a complaint against appellee for breach of a 

promissory note. The complaint alleged that appellee and Providian 

Mortgage of South Florida entered into a loan which was ultimately 

transferred and assigned to Avant Capital. Avant Capital claimed that it 

was the owner and holder of the note and in possession of the original 

note. 

The copy of the note attached to the complaint listed Providian 

Mortgage of South Florida as the lender. An allonge to the note contained 

an endorsement by Providian Mortgage of South Florida to American 

Brokers Conduit who, in turn, endorsed the note to Trinity Financial 

Services. A second allonge contained an endorsement by Trinity Financial 
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to Avant Capital. 

Appellee moved for summary judgment, arguing that Avant Capital 

lacked standing because “Providian Mortgage of South Florida” was a 

nonexistent entity. Appellee submitted certificates from the Florida 

Department of State and Florida Office of Financial Regulation in support. 

Appellee argued that the note and mortgage were void and that 

endorsements from a nonexistent entity are a nullity. 

In opposition to the motion, Avant Capital submitted a certificate from 

the Florida Office of Financial Regulation showing that a mortgage broker 

license existed for “Providian Mortgage Corporation of South Florida.” 

(emphasis added). 

The trial court entered summary judgment and dismissed the 

complaint, stating: 

A party’s rights that flow from another, are limited to those 

rights the original party possesses. The original party pled 

throughout this case by the plaintiff, “Providian Mortgage of 

South Florida,” does not exist. Assignment of rights 

originating from a nonexistent entity is no assignment at all. 

Because the party pled concededly did not exist, plaintiff has 

no standing to enforce the claimed rights of what was 

conceded to be a nonexistent entity.

An order granting summary judgment is reviewed de novo. Volusia Cty. 

v. Aberdeen at Ormond Beach, L.P., 760 So. 2d 126, 130 (Fla. 2000). 

“Summary judgment is proper if there is no genuine issue of material fact 

and if the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” Id. 

“All doubts and inferences must be resolved against the moving party, and 

if there is the slightest doubt or conflict in the evidence, then summary 

judgment is not available.” E. Qualcom Corp. v. Glob. Commerce Ctr. Ass’n, 

59 So. 3d 347, 350 (Fla. 4th DCA 2011) (citation omitted).

We find that the trial court erred in entering summary judgment based

entirely on the omission of the word “Corporation” from the original 

lender’s name. We note that section 694.12, Florida Statutes (2017), 

provides: 

All deeds of conveyance, bills of sale, mortgages, or other 

transfers of real or personal property within the limits of this 

state, heretofore made and received bona fide and upon good 

consideration by any corporation, or to any corporation, in 
3

which the name of said corporation shall be incorrectly set out 

in such deed, bill of sale, mortgage or other instrument by 

omitting a word from the corporate name, or by adding a word 

thereto, or by misspelling any part of the name of said 

corporation, and the identity of said corporation shall plainly 

appear from the contents of said instrument, or otherwise, 

such deed, bill of sale, mortgage or other instrument, shall be 

taken and deemed valid and effectual as though the name of 

said corporation were correctly set out in said deed, bill of 

sale, mortgage or other instrument, and the same shall, 

notwithstanding such irregularity or defect, be deemed and 

taken as properly executed.

“[S]light departures from the name used by the corporation, such as 

the omission of a part of its name or the inclusion of additional words, 

generally will not affect the validity of contracts or other business 

transactions as long as the identity of the corporation can be reasonably 

established from the evidence.” Presley v. Ponce Plaza Assocs., 723 So. 2d 

328, 330 (Fla. 3d DCA 1998) (Cope, J., specially concurring) (emphasis 

omitted) (citing 6 William Meade Fletcher et al., Fletcher Cyclopedia of the 

Law of Private Corporations § 2444, at 156-58 (perm. ed. rev. vol. 1996)). 

See also Sweet v. Ranger Realty Co., 146 So. 199, 200 (Fla. 1933) (affirming 

denial of motion to dismiss suit brought to foreclose a tax certificate issued 

to “Covington Bank & Trust Company” instead of “Covington Trust and 

Banking Company”); accord Laws v. Ranger Realty Co., 148 So. 583, 583 

(Fla. 1933). 

In the instant case, omission of the word “Corporation” from Providian’s 

name on the note did not affect the validity of the loan or Providian’s 

endorsement because, taking the evidence in the light most favorable to 

the non-moving party, one could identify Providian Mortgage of South 

Florida as being the same entity as Providian Mortgage Corporation of 

South Florida. Because this issue of material fact remained, the trial court 

erred in finding as a matter of law that the two entities could not be the 

same. As such, we reverse and remand for further proceedings. 

Reversed and remanded for further proceedings.

GERBER, C.J., and CIKLIN, J., concur.

* * *

Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.