FILED

April 21, 1997

Cecil Crowson, Jr.

Appellate C ourt Clerk

IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE

AT KNOXVILLE 

 JANUARY 1997 SESSION

BILLY GROOMS, )

)

Appellant, ) No. 03C01-9603-CC-00136

 )

) Cocke County

v. ) 

) Honorable William R. Holt, Jr., Judge

)

STATE OF TENNESSEE, ) (Post-Conviction)

) 

Appellee. )

For the Appellant: For the Appellee:

Billy Grooms, Pro Se John Knox Walkup

# 101022 Attorney General of Tennessee

S.T.S.R.C.F. and

Route 4, Box 600 Eugene Honea

Pikeville, TN 37367-9243 Assistant Attorney General of Tennessee 

450 James Robertson Parkway

Nashville, TN 37243-0493

Alfred C. Schmutzer, Jr.

District Attorney General

301 Sevier County Courthouse

Sevierville, TN 37862

and

James B. Dunn

Assistant District Attorney General

339A East Main Street

Newport, TN 37821

OPINION FILED:____________________

AFFIRMED

Joseph M. Tipton

Judge
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O P I N I O N

The petitioner, Billy Grooms, appeals as of right from the Cocke County

Circuit Court’s denial of his third petition for post-conviction relief which he filed in

September 1994. He is presently in the custody of the Department of Correction

serving concurrent life sentences resulting from his 1986 convictions on two counts of

first degree murder. The convictions and sentences were affirmed on appeal. State v.

Billy Grooms, No. 107, Cocke County (Tenn. Crim. App. Mar. 26, 1986), app. denied

(June 30, 1986). The petitioner contends (1) that his petition is not barred by the threeyear statute of limitations then existing for post-conviction claims and (2) that he may

still raise constitutional violations that were previously unknown to him at the time of his

earlier post-conviction litigation. We disagree. 

In substance, the present petition contends (1) that his right to

confrontation was violated when hearsay statements of a nontestifying codefendant

were admitted at trial, (2) that due process was violated by the admission of his

statements by the codefendant after they unsuccessfully sought a severance because

of incompatible defenses, (3) that his trial, appellate and post-conviction counsel were

ineffective by failing to preserve and present various issues, and (4) that his removal

from safety valve early parole eligibility violated due process and constituted ex post

facto enhancement of punishment. His asserted reason for not raising the trial issues

before is his ignorance and reliance upon attorneys who were ineffective. The trial

court ruled that the petition seeking relief from his 1986 convictions was time barred

and that it had no jurisdiction over the petitioner’s parole complaints. 

At the times in issue, there was a three-year statute of limitations for the

filing of post-conviction actions. See T.C.A. § 40-30-102 (repealed 1995). The
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exceptions were quite limited, essentially dealing with there being no reasonable

opportunity existing during the limitations period to file a claim on the ground raised. 

See, e.g., Burford v. State, 845 S.W.2d 204 (Tenn. 1994); Watkins v. State, 903

S.W.2d 302 (Tenn. 1995) (petitioner insane during limitations period); Wooden v. State,

898 S.W.2d 752 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1994) (delayed disclosure of exculpatory evidence

withheld by state). However, a petitioner’s mere claim of ignorance of the facts or

issues does not toll the statute of limitations even if that ignorance stems from reliance

upon counsel’s advice relative to post-conviction claims. See State v. Phillips, 904

S.W.2d 123 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1995). In any event, a claim of ineffective assistance of

prior post-conviction counsel presents no excuse for not raising existing constitutional

claims. See House v. State, 911 S.W.2d 705, 712 (Tenn. 1995). Thus, when viewed in

the context of having three previous reviews of his convictions, two being by means of

post-conviction actions, the petitioner’s claims of ignorance and reliance upon

ineffective counsel are for naught relative to tolling the statute of limitations. The

statute of limitations applies so as to bar the post-conviction petition in this case relative

to the murder convictions.

As for the petitioner’s claim that he was wrongfully stripped of his early

parole eligibility under the safety valve statute, the trial court was correct in concluding

that it was without jurisdiction to determine the claim. Issues involving Department of

Correction prisoner release computations are not cognizable in a post-conviction case

and must be pursued under the Administrative Procedure Act. See Slagle v. Reynolds,

845 S.W.2d 167 (Tenn. 1992). Moreover, we note that the early release eligibility issue

raised by the petitioner has been rejected relative to another prisoner. See Kaylor v.

Bradley, 912 S.W.2d 728 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1995). In any event, it is not a justiciable

issue in this case.
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In consideration of the foregoing and the record as a whole, the judgment

of the trial court is affirmed.

____________________________

Joseph M. Tipton, Judge

CONCUR:

__________________________

Gary R. Wade, Judge

__________________________

William M. Barker, Judge