* Effective March 31, 1995, the functions of the Secr etary of Health and

Human Services in social security cases were transf erred to the Commissioner of Social Security. P.L. No. 103-296. In the text we refer to the Secretary because she was the appropriate party at the time of the un derlying administrative decision.

** This order and judgment is not binding precedent, e xcept under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and col lateral estoppel. The court generally disfavors the citation of orders and judg ments; nevertheless, an order and judgment may be cited under the terms and condi tions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS Filed 11/21/96 FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT
CLARK E. CHAMBERS (now deceased), JAMES CHAMBERS, RONALD CHAMBERS, PHILLIP CHAMBERS, BETH BURGAN, GENEVA LANCE, and BARBARA PORTER, Plaintiffs-Appellants,

v. SHIRLEY S. CHATER, Commissioner of Social Security, *

Defendant-Appellee. No. 96-5062 (D.C. No. CV-94-1013-W) (N.D. Okla.)

ORDER AND JUDGMENT ***** Honorable John W. Lungstrum, District Judge, UnitedStates District Court

for the District of Kansas, sitting by designation. -2- Before BALDOCK and BRISCOE, Circuit Judges, and LUN GSTRUM, *** District Judge.

After examining the briefs and appellate record, th is panel has determined unanimously to grant the parties’ request for a dec ision on the briefs without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(f) and 10th Cir. R. 34.1.9. Th e case is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument. Claimant Clark E. Chambers filed an application forsocial security disability benefits claiming disability due to a se izure disorder, pain in his back and neck, reduced grip strength, impaired concentration and balance, and occasional blurred vision. Claimant died after the administrative proceedings were concluded. On appeal of the Secretary’s denia l of benefits to the district court, claimant’s siblings were substituted for cla imant, pursuant to 20 C.F.R. § 404.503(b). The district court upheld the Secret ary’s denial of benefits, and appellants have appealed that decision to this court. After claimant’s application was denied initially, a hearing was held before an administrative law judge (ALJ). The ALJ denied benefits at step five of the five-step sequential evaluation process. See Williams v. Bowen , 844 F.2d 748,-3-

750-51 (10th Cir. 1988)(discussing five steps). Th e ALJ concluded that although claimant could not return to his past relevant work , he was able to perform medium work not requiring exposure to heights or mo ving machinery, or operating an automobile, and that such work existed in significant numbers in the national economy. We review the Secretary’s decision to determine whe ther the findings of fact are supported by substantial evidence based onthe entire record, and to ascertain whether she applied the correct legal sta ndards. Castellano v. Secretary of Health & Human Servs. , 26 F.3d 1027, 1028 (10th Cir. 1994). Substantial evidence is “‘such relevant evidence as a reasonabl e mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.’” Soliz v. Chate r , 82 F.3d 373, 375 (10th Cir. 1996)(quoting Richardson v. Perales , 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971)(further quotation omitted)). We do not reweigh the evidence. Hamilt on v. Secretary of Health & Human Servs. , 961 F.2d 1495, 1498 (10th Cir. 1992). The issues presented on appeal are (1) whether the ALJ was required to obtain a recent RFC evaluation to demonstrate that claimant could perform medium work, and (2) whether the ALJ improperly dis regarded the evidence that claimant suffered from blurred vision and impaired concentration. Appellants maintain that the ALJ was required to ob tain a recent RFC evaluation to establish that claimant could meet th e physical requirements of-4-

medium work. They assert that the ALJ’s reliance o n Dr. Scott’s October 1989 report, written four years before the administrativ e hearing in December 1993, was not probative of claimant’s abilities at the ti me of the hearing. Although the ALJ apparently did not rely on it, the record conta ins a physical RFC evaluation dated December 4, 1992, and affirmed on May 27, 199 3, indicating that claimant had abilities and restrictions consistent with the ALJ’s conclusion. Even if the ALJ did not consider the recent RFC evaluation, how ever, he did not err in relying on the medical reports from Dr. Scott dated October 1989, and Dr. Martin dated January 1990, both of which released claimantto work, although Dr. Martin recommended against construction labor. There was no evidence, medical or otherwise, that claimant’s condition worsened afterthose medical reports were prepared. See, e.g. , II R. at 54 (claimant’s testimony that his pain h ad stayed the same since the time of his back injury). The ALJ w as not required to obtain another RFC evaluation because the evidence was ade quate to evaluate claimant’s condition. Cf. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1512(e)(where medical evidence is inadequate to determine whether claimant is disabled, additional information will be sought). We next address the claim that the ALJ improperly d isregarded the evidence that claimant’s ability to work was limite d by the side effects of his medication. Claimant stated that his medication impaired his concentration, and caused occasional blurred vision, but his treating physician did not indicate that it-5-

was a chronic problem. To the contrary, the record reflects that claimant complained of side effects on one occasion, and his medication was adjusted to alleviate the problem. No further similar complain ts appear in the medical records. Therefore, substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s determination that claimant’s ability to work was not limited by the s ide effects of his medication. Appellants’ remaining arguments that the ALJ substi tuted his own medical opinion for those of the physicians, and the ALJ ba sed his decision solely on a lack of evidence, are without merit. Appellants’ r equest to file a supplemental record is GRANTED. We have reviewed those material s, as well as the other volumes of the record and the parties’ briefs, and we have considered appellants’ arguments in light of those materials. We conclude that substantial evidence supports the determination that claimant could perf orm medium work not requiring exposure to heights or moving machinery, or operating an automobile, and therefore, he was not disabled within the meani ng of the Social Security Act. The judgment of the United States District Court fo r the Northern District of Oklahoma is AFFIRMED.

Entered for the Court

Bobby R. Baldock Circuit Judge