UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 11-4669

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff – Appellee, 

v. 

GUY W. ESCUE, III, 

Defendant - Appellant. 

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern 

District of West Virginia, at Charleston. John T. Copenhaver, 

Jr., District Judge. (2:10-cr-00159-1) 

Submitted: December 7, 2011 Decided: December 9, 2011

Before SHEDD, DUNCAN, and WYNN, Circuit Judges. 

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion. 

Mary Lou Newberger, Federal Public Defender, Jonathan D. Byrne, 

Appellate Counsel, Edward H. Weis, Assistant Federal Public 

Defender, Charleston, West Virginia, for Appellant. R. Booth 

Goodwin II, United States Attorney, Steven I. Loew, Assistant 

United States Attorney, Charleston, West Virginia, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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PER CURIAM: 

Guy W. Escue, III, pled guilty, pursuant to a written 

plea agreement, to one count of possession of a firearm by a 

convicted felon, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1), 

924(a)(2) (2006), and was sentenced to eighty-four months’ 

imprisonment. In the plea agreement, Escue reserved the right 

to challenge the district court’s denial of his motion to 

suppress evidence seized from his bedroom. Escue contends on 

appeal that the district court erred in denying the motion to 

suppress because his consent to search the bedroom was not 

voluntarily given. We affirm. 

In reviewing the district court’s denial of Escue’s 

suppression motion, we review the court’s factual findings for 

clear error and its legal conclusions de novo. United States v. 

Foster, 634 F.3d 243, 246 (4th Cir. 2011). Because the district 

court denied Escue’s motion, we review the evidence in the light 

most favorable to the Government. Id. We also defer to the 

district court’s credibility determinations. United States v. 

Abu Ali, 528 F.3d 210, 232 (4th Cir. 2008). 

The Fourth Amendment guarantees “[t]he right of the 

people to be secure . . . against unreasonable searches and 

seizures.” U.S. Const. amend. IV. This guarantee requires that 

“searches be conducted pursuant to a warrant issued by an 

independent judicial officer.” California v. Carney, 471 U.S. 
3

386, 390 (1985). There are, however, “a few specifically 

established and well-delineated exceptions” to this general 

rule. California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 580 (1991) (internal 

quotation marks omitted). 

With these standards in mind, and having reviewed the 

transcript of the suppression hearing and the parties’ briefs, 

we conclude that the district court did not err in denying 

Escue’s motion to suppress. The record amply supports the 

district court’s finding that Escue consented to the search of 

his bedroom. Further, we conclude after review of the record 

that Escue voluntarily consented to the search. 

See Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 219, 227 (1973) 

(recognizing that consent is an exception to the warrant 

requirement and that voluntariness of consent depends on the 

totality of the circumstances); United States v. Lattimore, 

87 F.3d 647, 650 (4th Cir. 1996) (en banc) (listing factors 

appropriate for consideration in reviewing whether consent was 

voluntarily given). 

Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s judgment. 

We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal 

contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the 

court and argument would not aid the decisional process. 

AFFIRMED