alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
<page> EXHIBIT 32.01

CERTIFICATION OF PRESIDENT PURSUANT TO
18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,
AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002




In connection with the Quarterly Report of Morgan Stanley Charter
Campbell L.P. (the ?Partnership?) on Form 10-Q for the quarter
ended September 30, 2007, as filed with the Securities and
Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the ?Report?), I, Walter
Davis, President of Demeter Management Corporation, the general
partner of the Partnership, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section
1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act
of 2002, that, to the best of my knowledge:
(1)	The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section
13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and
(2)	The information contained in the Report fairly presents,
in all material respects, the financial condition and
results of operations of the Partnership.









By:   /s/ Walter Davis

Name:		Walter Davis
Title:	President of Demeter Management Corporation,
			the general partner of the Partnership

Date:		November 13, 2007


? 6 ?


? 6 ?


MORGAN STANLEY CHARTER CAMPBELL L.P.
NOTES TO FINANCIAL STATEMENTS (CONTINUED)





? 84 ?

- 37 -

- 85 -
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 16-41085

Conference Calendar

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee

v.

JORGE MAURICIO VASQUEZ,

Defendant-Appellant

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of Texas

USDC No. 7:16-CR-323-1

Before KING, HAYNES, and GRAVES, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

The Federal Public Defender appointed to represent Jorge Mauricio 

Vasquez has moved for leave to withdraw and has filed a brief in accordance 

with Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), and United States v. Flores, 632 

F.3d 229 (5th Cir. 2011). Vasquez has filed a response. We have reviewed 

counsel’s brief and the relevant portions of the record reflected therein, as well 

as Vasquez’s response. We concur with counsel’s assessment that the appeal 

 

* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not 

be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH 

CIR. R. 47.5.4.

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

FILED

April 18, 2017

Lyle W. Cayce

Clerk

 Case: 16-41085 Document: 00513956138 Page: 1 Date Filed: 04/18/2017
No. 16-41085

2

presents no nonfrivolous issue for appellate review.1 Accordingly, counsel’s 

motion for leave to withdraw is GRANTED, counsel is excused from further 

responsibilities herein, and the APPEAL IS DISMISSED. See 5TH CIR. R. 42.2.

 

1 The district court did not err by declining to apply a sentencing guidelines range 

provided by a guidelines amendment that would go into effect more than three months after 

Vasquez’s sentencing. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(4)(A) (requiring district courts to consider, 

except in remanded cases, the sentencing range provided by the guidelines “in effect on the 

date the defendant is sentenced”); see also United States v. Caro-Alarcon, 420 F. App’x 397, 

397-98 (5th Cir. 2011).

 Case: 16-41085 Document: 00513956138 Page: 2 Date Filed: 04/18/2017
#### UNITED STATES of America, Appellee, v. Elvin Lee BYNUM, James Thomas Wescott, John C. Smith, Willie Mae Taylor, and William Gray, Appellants.

No. 9365.

United States Court of Appeals Fourth Circuit.

Argued Jan. 4, 1965.

Decided May 13, 1965.

*123Peter K. Babalas, Norfolk, Va. (Amato, Babalas, Breit, Cohen, Rutter & Friedman, Norfolk, Va., on brief), for appellant James Thomas Wescott.

Frederick T. Stant, Jr., Norfolk, Va. (Parsons, Stant & Parsons, Norfolk, Va., on brief), for appellants Elvin Lee Bynum and John C. Smith.

C. V. Spratley, Jr., U. S. Atty. (Plato Cacheris, First Asst. U. S. Atty., on brief), for appellee.

Before SOBELOFF, BOREMAN and BRYAN, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:

The five appellants were indicted for conspiracy to violate the federal narcotics laws. 26 U.S.C.A. § 7237. Our examination of the record discloses no basis for a jury finding of a single conspiracy as charged. There possibly were several distinct conspiracies, but these were not alleged. Nor did the indictment include counts for substantive offenses, which the evidence would clearly support.

The use of the conspiracy charge here, to the neglect of substantive charges, was in our opinion inappropriate. Difficult questions arise from the overuse of conspiracy indictments. Much of the evidence consisted of statements made by various defendants at different times and under different circumstances, which would not have been admissible against other defendants, except under the special rules prevailing in prosecutions for conspiracy. When statements made by some of the defendants out of the presence of their co-defendants are admitted serious problems are created for the co-defendants, the prosecutor and the judge. .Such declarations are often admitted before the existence of the conspiracy has been duly proved by the testimony, but on the assumption that the conspiracy will later be proved independently. The practical effect is that the declarations tend to be used to prove the conspiracy which is required to be shown independently in order to make the declarations admissible. The independent proof is often absent, yet the jury cannot readily distinguish between the defendants who made and are bound by the statements and other defendants who are not bound thereby because not proven to be co-conspirators of the declarants. While district judges endeavor to avoid this result by instructing the jury, as the District Judge conscientiously endeavored to do in this case, it is rarely possible to be sure that the jury has been able to make proper discrimination in obedience to such instructions.

The difficulties in this case would have been avoided if each defendant had been indicted and tried for the violation or violations to which he was a party.

We reverse the judgment without prejudice to the Government’s seeking indictments-for substantive offenses.

Reversed.
#### J. L. Moore and C. L. Sawyer, Appellants, v. H. H. Holder, Jr., *Appellee.*

Opinion Filed March 17, 1928.

*J. E. Bedgood,*for Appellants;

*H. II. Holder, Jr.,*for Appellee.

Whitehurst, Circuit Judge:

*505The appellants were sureties on a bond given by the principal against whom suit was ccmmenced in the Circuit Court of Lake County to foreclose a chattel mortgage.

The complainant sued out a writ of attachment in aid of foreclosure. The bond was given for the release of the property levied on and was conditioned that the property would be forthcoming upon the final decree and further conditioned to pay the amount of the final decree in said cause.

The appellants now contend that the property levied upon by virtue of the attachment writ and for the release of which the bond was given was not the same property described in the mortgage being foreclosed and, therefore, the bond is unenforceable against them.

The chancellor found that the property could not be forthcoming and, thereupon, entered judgment against the principal and sureties on the bond for the amount found to be due.

There is no error in this decree. The bond is for the payment of the final order, judgment and decree made in said cause and is authorized by Sections 3417, 3418 of the Eevised General Statutes.

The obligors on a bend of this character are estopped from questioning the validity of the writ, or of the levy, or the fact of levy, or from setting up that the property was not subject to levy. 6 C. J. 351, 352; Town of Weston v. Raulston, 41 Southeastern 338; 17 R. C. L. 248. The decree is affirmed.

Per Curiam. — The record in this cause having been considered by this Court, and the foregoing opinion prepared under Chapter 7837, Acts of 1919, adopted by the Court as its opinion, it is considered, ordered and decreed by the *506Court that the decree of the Circuit Court in this cause be, and the same is hereby, affirmed.

Ellis, C. J., and Whitfield, Terrell, Strum, Brown and Buford, J. J., concur.
Order entered January 15, 2014

In The



## Court of Appeals

**Fifth District of Texas at Dallas**

No. 05

- 13

- 0123 7

- CR

JOHN CLOUD, Appellant

V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

On Appeal from the 195th Judicial District Court

Dallas County, Texas

Trial Court Cau se No. F93

- 61603

- N



### O RDER

The Court GRANTS the State’s motion for extension of time to file the State’s brief. We

ORDER the Clerk of the Court to file the brief tendered as of the date of this order.

/s/ LANA MYERS

JUSTICE
**EXHIBIT    32.1**

**CERTIFICATIONPURSUANT TO****18U.S.C. SECTION 1350,AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO****SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002**

In connection with the Quarterly Report of Lease Equity Appreciation Fund I, L.P. (the “Company”) on Form 10-Q for the fiscal quarter ended June 30, 2005 as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the “Report”), I, Crit S. DeMent, Chief Executive Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that: 

(1)   The    Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) ofthe Securities Exchange Act of 1934, and

(2)   The    information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects,the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.

|                  | /s/ Crit S. DeMent      |
|-----------------------|-------------------------|
|                  |                         |
|                  | Crit S. DeMent          |
| August 15,       2005 | Chief Executive Officer |

----
FAA-2010-0278

Contacts. With whom outside the FAA has this proposal been discussed?

Organization

National Business Aircl'llft AssocilltiOU

Regional Airline Association

Aircrafl Owners & Pilots Association

ATA

Person Contacted

IW CoW

Da\'e Loiterer

Robert Hackman

Date

/IJz.~b1

II/Z'l

Response

-
U.S. Department of Transportation, Docket Operations

West Building Ground Floor, Room w12

- 1 40 1200 New Jersey Avenue, S.E. Washington, DC 20590



## Application to Amend

Section 333 Exemption No. 11351 Regulatory Docket No. FAA

- 2014

- 10 81

December 18 , 2015

Pe titioner: bizUAS c orp Bernd Lutz, PhD CEO 4845 Pearl East Circle, Suite 101 Boulder, CO 80301 Te l: 303.931.4126 Email: bernd@bizUAS.com Website: www.bizUAS.com

Greetings
,
By l etter from the FAA dated April 17 , 2015, an exemption was granted to bizUAS c orp for relief under S ection 333. That letter was marked Section 333 Exemption N o. 11351 Reg ulatory Docket No. FAA

- 2014

- 1081

. bizUAS c orp hereby requests that the exemption so granted be amended to include DJI Inspire and DJI Matrice models

. Re levant facts and reasoning are:

 The DJI Inspire and DJI Matrice are advanced evolution s of the DJI Phantom 3 model which was approved in bizUAS’ Exemption No. 11351 B

.

 Size, weight and performance specification of the DJI Inspire (“I ”) and DJI Mat rix (“M”) are substantially similar to those of the approved DJI Phantom 3 (“P3 ”) in all relevant respects:

o Gross weight (MTOW): P3=1280g; I=2935 g; M=3400g

o Diagonal Size (includin g propellers): P3=590mm; I =581 mm; M=650mm

o Maximu m Ascent Speed: P3=5m/sec; I =5m/sec M=5m/sec

o Maxi mum Desce nt Speed: P3=3m/sec; I =4 m/sec; M=4m/s

o Vertical Hover Accuracy: P3=+/

- 10cm; I = +/

- 50cm; M=+/

- 50cm

o Horizontal Hover Accuracy : P3=+/

- 1m; I =+/

- 2.5m; M=+/

- 2.5m

o Maximum Speed: P3=16m/sec; I=22m/sec; M=22m/sec

 The findings, rationale and conclusions contained in FAA’s Exempt ion No. 11351 and 11351B apply without modification to this application to include the DJI Inspire and DJI Matrice in Exemption No. 11351

. T hank you for your consideration of this important request. Please advise us of any a d ditional information that may be required.

Sincerely,

Bernd Lutz, PhD CEO, bizUAS c orp
TEXAS COURT OF APPEALS, THIRD DISTRICT, AT AUSTIN

JUDGMENT RENDERED JULY 3, 2019

NO. 03-18-00760-CV

Huong Le Nguyen; 1960 Family Practice, P.A.; Cypress Creek ER, PLLC; Cypress Creek 

ER of Harmony PLLC; Providence Hospital of North Houston LLC; Vein Away, LLC; 

and TMMS Holdings LLC, Appellants

v.

0800989127 WB, LLC, Appellee

APPEAL FROM THE 419TH DISTRICT COURT OF TRAVIS COUNTY

BEFORE CHIEF JUSTICE ROSE, JUSTICES TRIANA AND SMITH

REVERSED AND REMANDED -- OPINION BY CHIEF JUSTICE ROSE

This is an appeal from the final judgment signed by the trial court on September 11, 2018. The 

parties have filed a joint motion to reverse and remand and to expedite the issuance of the 

mandate. Having considered the motion, the Court agrees that the motion should be granted. 

Therefore, the Court grants the motion, reverses the trial court’s judgment, and remands the case 

to the trial court for entry of an agreed, take-nothing judgment, in accordance with the parties’ 

agreement. Appellants shall pay all costs relating to this appeal, both in this Court and in the 

court below.
as guidelines and the "[fl allure to adhere to the standards does not, in and

of itself, constitute ineffective assistance of counsel"). We disagree with Armora's contention.

"A district court may, in its discretion, grant a defendant's [presentence] motion to withdraw a guilty plea for any substantial reason if it is fair and just." Woods v. State, 114 Nev. 468, 475, 958 P.2d 91, 95 (1998) (internal quotations omitted). At the hearing on his motion, Armora's former counsel testified that although he was unable to accept collect telephone calls from inmates, he did in fact meet several times with Armora and thoroughly discussed the plea negotiations and agreement with him prior to the entry of his plea. Based on the totality of the circumstances, the district court determined that Armora "fail[ed] to establish any substantial, fair, and just reason to withdraw [his] plea" or prejudice, and that his plea was entered voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently. See Crawford v. State, 117 Nev. 718, 722, 30 P.3d 1123, 1125-26 (2001). We conclude that Armora failed to satisfy his burden and prove that his plea was invalid, see Molina v. State, 120 Nev. 185, 190, 87 P.3d 533, 537 (2004), and the district court did not abuse its discretion by denying his motion, Johnson v. State, 123 Nev. 139, 144, 159 P.3d 1096, 1098 (2007) ("This court will not reverse a district court's determination

SUPREME COURT

OF NEVADA
(0) 1947A 2Gibbons

J. J.

HIMMEMMITZEIMBEIVI 1112§114E011 WE

concerning the validity of a plea absent a clear abuse of discretion."). Accordingly, we

ORDER the judgment of conviction AFFIRMED. 2

Douglas

cc: Hon. Jennifer P. Togliatti, District Judge Hon. Linda Marie Bell, District Judge Law Office of Betsy Allen Attorney General/Carson City Clark County District Attorney Eighth District Court Clerk

2 The fast track statement does not comply with NRAP 3C(h)(1) and NRAP 32(a)(4) because it does not contain 1-inch margins on all four sides. The fast track statement and response do not comply with NRAP 3C(h)(1) and NRAP 32(a)(4) because it appears that the text is not double-spaced. Counsel for the parties are cautioned that the failure to comply with the briefing requirements in the future may result in the imposition of sanctions. 

### See NRAP 3C(n).

SUPREME COURT

OF NEVADA
(0) I947A 3
```

[Federal Register Volume 78, Number 169 (Friday, August 30, 2013)]
[Notices]
[Page 53734]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Printing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2013-21355]

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

 COMMITTEE FOR PURCHASE FROM PEOPLE WHO ARE BLIND OR SEVERELY DISABLED

Procurement List; Proposed Additions

AGENCY: Committee for Purchase From People Who Are Blind or Severely 
Disabled.

ACTION: Proposed Additions to the Procurement List.

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

SUMMARY: The Committee is proposing to add products to the Procurement 
List that will be furnished by the nonprofit agency employing persons 
who are blind or have other severe disabilities.

DATES: Comments must be received on or before: September 30, 2013.

ADDRESSES: Committee for Purchase From People Who Are Blind or Severely 
Disabled, 1401 S Clark Street, Suite 10800, Arlington, Virginia, 22202-
4149.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION OR TO SUBMIT COMMENTS CONTACT: Barry S. 
Lineback, Telephone: (703) 603-7740, Fax: (703) 603-0655, or email 
CMTEFedReg@AbilityOne.gov.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: This notice is published pursuant to 41 
U.S.C. 8503 (a)(2) and 41 CFR 51-2.3. Its purpose is to provide 
interested persons an opportunity to submit comments on the proposed 
actions.

Additions

    If the Committee approves the proposed additions, the entities of 
the Federal Government identified in this notice will be required to 
procure the products listed below from the nonprofit agency employing 
persons who are blind or have other severe disabilities.
    The following products are proposed for addition to Procurement 
List for production by the nonprofit agency listed:

Products:

NSN: 6645-00-NIB-0141--Clock, Wall, Quartz Movement, 14.5''
NSN: 6645-00-NIB-0143--Clock, Wall, Self-Set Movement, 14.5''
NSN: 6645-00-NIB-0145--Clock, Wall, Quartz Movement, 16.5''
NSN: 6645-00-NIB-0147--Clock, Wall, Self-Set Movement, 16.5''
Coverage: A-List for the Total Government Requirement as aggregated 
by the General Services Administration.
NSN: 6645-00-NIB-0142--Clock, Wall, Quartz Movement, Customizable 
Logo, 14.5''
NSN: 6645-00-NIB-0144--Clock, Wall, Self-Set Movement, Customizable 
Logo, 14.5''
NSN: 6645-00-NIB-0146--Clock, Wall, Quartz Movement, Customizable 
Logo, 16.5''
NSN: 6645-00-NIB-0148--Clock, Wall, Self-Set Movement, Customizable 
Logo, 16.5''
NSN: 6645-00-NIB-0149--Clock, Wall, Quartz Movement, 15.5''
NSN: 6645-00-NIB-0150--Clock, Wall, Quartz Movement, Customizable 
Logo, 15.5''
NSN: 6645-00-NIB-0151--Clock, Wall, Self-Set Movement, 15.5''
NSN: 6645-00-NIB-0152--Clock, Wall, Self-Set Movement, Customizable 
Logo, 15.5''
Coverage: B-List for the Broad Government Requirement as aggregated 
by the General Services Administration
NPA: The Chicago Lighthouse for People Who are Blind or Visually 
Impaired, Chicago, IL
Contracting Activity: General Services Administration, New York, NY

Barry S. Lineback,
Director, Business Operations.
[FR Doc. 2013-21355 Filed 8-29-13; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 6353-01-P
```
#### Peter Descovich, Respondent, v John Blieka, Appellant.

[718 NYS2d 870]

In an action to recover damages for personal injuries, the defendant appeals from an order of the Supreme Court, Nassau County (Franco, J.), entered February 2, 2000, which granted the plaintiffs motion for summary judgment on the issue of liability, and denied his cross motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint on the ground that the plaintiff did not sustain a serious injury within the meaning of Insurance Law § 5102 (d).

Ordered that the order is reversed, on the law, with costs, the cross motion is granted, the motion is denied as academic, and the complaint is dismissed.

The Supreme Court erred in denying the defendant’s cross motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint on the ground that the plaintiff did not sustain a serious injury within the meaning of Insurance Law § 5102 (d). The affirmed medical reports of the physicians who examined the plaintiff on behalf of the defendant were sufficient to establish a prima facie case that the plaintiff did not sustain a serious injury as a result of the accident at issue. The burden therefore shifted to the plaintiff to raise a triable issue of fact that he sustained a serious injury *(see, Gaddy v Eyler,*79 NY2d 955, 956-957).

Contrary to the conclusion of the Supreme Court, the plaintiffs opposition to the cross motion was insufficient to raise a triable issue of fact. Although the plaintiffs treating physician submitted an affidavit indicating that the plaintiff suffered from a herniated disc and bulging discs, such injuries *500do not alone constitute a serious injury. Rather, the plaintiff is still required to provide objective evidence of the extent or degree of physical limitations resulting from such injuries and their duration *(see, Guzman v Michael Mgt.,*266 AD2d 508; *Noble v Ackerman,*252 AD2d 392, 394-395). In this respect, the plaintiffs evidence was lacking, and thus, the defendant was entitled to summary judgment dismissing the complaint *(see, Guzman v Michael Mgt., supra).*Bracken, Acting P. J., Santucci, Altman and Florio, JJ., concur.
David L. GREER, Appellant, v. STATE of Missouri, Respondent.

WD 80740

Missouri Court of Appeals, Western District.

ORDER FILED: MAY 15, 2018

Jeannie Marie Willibey, Kansas City, MO, Counsel for Appellant.

Robert J Bartholomew Jr., Jefferson City, MO, Counsel for Respondent.

Before Division Four: Mark D. Pfeiffer, Chief Judge, Presiding, Alok Ahuja, Judge, Anthony Rex Gabbert, Judge

**ORDER**

Per Curiam:

David L. Greer appeals from a judgment denying his Rule 24.035 motion for post-conviction relief, without an evidentiary hearing, after he pleaded guilty to the class C felony of possession of a controlled substance, methamphetamine, as a prior and persistent drug offender. We affirm. Rule 84.16(b).
* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined

that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent

except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR.

R. 47.5.4.

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

FILED

November 9, 2005

Charles R. Fulbruge III

Clerk

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

 

No. 05-50982

Summary Calendar

 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

versus

MOISES DELGADO-LOPEZ,

Defendant-Appellant.

--------------------

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Western District of Texas

USDC No. 3:04-CR-870-ALL

--------------------

Before REAVLEY, GARZA, and BENAVIDES, Circuit Judges. 

PER CURIAM:*

Appealing the Judgment in a Criminal Case, Moises DelgadoLopez raises arguments that are foreclosed by Almendarez-Torres

v. United States, 523 U.S. 224, 235 (1998), which held that a

prior conviction is a sentencing factor under 8 U.S.C. 

§ 1326(b)(2) and not a separate criminal offense. The

Government’s motion for summary affirmance is GRANTED, and the

judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.