alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### Mitchell Blomquist and Anna M. Prouty, *Plaintiffs in Error,*v. State of Florida, *Defendant in Error.*

Division A.

Decision Filed April 21, 1928.

*C. E. Kensinger,*for Plaintiffs in Error;

*Erect PL. Davis,*Attorney General, and *PL. E. Carter,*Assistant, for the State.

Per Curiam.

This cause having heretofore been submitted to the Court upon the transcript of the record of the judgment herein and briefs and argument of counsel for the respective parties, and the record having been seen and inspected, and the Court being now advised of its judgment to be given in the premises, it seems to the Court that there is no error in the said judgment. It is, therefore, considered, ordered and adjudged by the Court that the said judgment of the Circuit Court be, and the same is hereby affirmed.

Ellis, C. J., and Strum and Brown, J. J., concur.
a6632884ex10-1.htm


EXHIBIT 10.1







SUMMARY OF 2011 LONG TERM INCENTIVE PROGRAM


 


On February 28, 2011, Metropolitan Health Networks, Inc.’s (the “Company”) Board of Directors, based upon the recommendation of the Company’s Compensation Committee, approved the terms and conditions of the Company’s 2011 Long Term Incentive Award Program (the “2011 LTI Program”). The 2011 LTI Program grants, pursuant to the general terms and conditions of the Company’s Omnibus Equity Compensation Plan, varying amounts of stock options and restricted shares of Common Stock (the “Equity Award”) to various executives and employees (the “Plan Participants”).


 


Each year, the Compensation Committee assigns each of the Plan Participants an equity incentive award amount expressed as a percentage of the participant’s annual base salary for the subject year (the “Equity Percentage”). In setting this Equity Percentage for executives, in addition to competitive market information, the Compensation Committee considers the Company’s operating results and performance, the individual executive’s performance against the individual’s objectives, the percentage of overall share usage attributed to executives and the total number of shares subject to grants relative to the Company’s equity capital structure. The Compensation Committee does not place particular emphasis on any one factor but rather analyzes the appropriateness of awarding long term equity compensation in light of all of these considerations. The table below sets forth the 2011 Equity Percentage for certain of the Plan Participants, namely the Company’s Chief Executive Officer, Chief Financial Officer, Chief Operating Officer and General Counsel.


 








	
Name and Title

	  	
Equity Percentage 


for 2011


	
Michael Earley


 Chief Executive Officer

	  	
 


100%


	
Roberto J. Sabo


 Chief Financial Officer

	  	
 


80%


	
Jose A. Guethon, M.D.


 Chief Operating Officer

	  	
 


80%


	
Roberto L. Palenzuela


 General Counsel

	  	
 


50%












 


Pursuant to the 2011 LTI Program, the Equity Award will be paid to the executive officers referenced above in March 2011 and will be paid approximately 40% in stock options and approximately 60% in restricted shares of Common Stock.  The stock price used to calculate the Equity Award of each executive officer is the average closing price of our Common Stock for the 30 trading days immediately preceding February 1 (the “Market Price”).


 


Restricted shares are valued at 100% of the Market Price and stock options are valued at 33% of the Market Price. Both forms of award generally vest ratably on an annual basis over a four year service period and expire after a ten year term. The exercise price for option grants is based on the closing price of our Common Stock on the NYSE Amex on the grant date.
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON

DIVISION II

In the Matter of the Personal Restraint

Petition of

MICHAEL WILLIAM RICHIE,

Petitioner.

No. 53589-1-II

UNPUBLISHED OPINION

AFTER REMAND

WORSWICK, J. — Michael Richie seeks relief from personal restraint imposed

following his 2014 conviction for second degree assault. On remand from this court, the 

trial court sentenced him in 2016 to life without possibility of parole under the Persistent 

Offender Accountability Act because he had strike offenses in the form of prior convictions 

for second degree robbery. After the legislature removed second degree robbery from the 

list of strike offenses, Laws of 2019, ch. 187, Richie petitioned for resentencing, seeking 

retroactive application of that act. The act was held not to apply retroactively in State v. 

Jenks, 197 Wn.2d 708, 719, 487 P.3d 482 (2021). But the State now concedes that under 

Laws of 2021, ch. 141, § 1:

In any criminal case wherein an offender has been sentenced as a persistent 

offender, the offender must have a resentencing hearing if a current or past 

conviction for robbery in the second degree was used as a basis for the 

finding that the offender was a persistent offender.

Filed

Washington State

Court of Appeals

Division Two

August 17, 2021
No. 53589-1-II

2

We accept the State’s concession and remand Richie’s judgment and sentence to 

the trial court for resentencing. The certificate of finality will be issued as soon as possible.

A majority of the panel having determined that this opinion will not be printed in the 

Washington Appellate Reports, but will be filed for public record in accordance with RCW

2.06.040, it is so ordered.

Worswick, J.

We concur:

Maxa, J.

Veljacic, J.
Document Headings

                    Document headings vary by document type but may contain                    the following:                  
                -                       the agency or agencies that issued and signed a document                    
                -                       the number of the CFR title and the number of each part                      the document amends, proposes to amend, or is directly                      related to                    
                -                       the agency docket number / agency internal file number                    
                -                       the RIN which identifies each regulatory action listed in                      the Unified Agenda of Federal Regulatory and Deregulatory                      Actions                    

                    See the                                          Document Drafting Handbook                                        for more details.                  

###### Nuclear Regulatory Commission

The ACRS Subcommittee on Plant License Renewal will hold a meeting on April 1, 2009, Room T-2B3, 11545 Rockville Pike, Rockville, Maryland. 

The entire meeting will be open to public attendance. 

The agenda for the subject meeting shall be as follows: 

*Wednesday, April 1, 2009-8:30 a.m.-12:30 p.m.*

The Subcommittee will discuss the license renewal application for the Susquehanna Steam Electric Station, Units 1 and 2 and the associated Safety Evaluation Report (SER) with Open Items prepared by the staff. The Subcommittee will hear presentations by and hold discussions with representatives of the NRC staff, PPL Susquehanna, and other interested persons regarding this matter. The Subcommittee will gather information, analyze relevant issues and facts, and formulate proposed positions and actions, as appropriate, for deliberation by the full Committee. 

                    Members of the public desiring to provide oral statements and/or written comments should notify the Designated Federal Official, Mr. Peter Wen (telephone (301) 415-2832 five days prior to the meeting, if possible, so that appropriate arrangements can be made. Electronic recordings will be permitted. Detailed procedures for the conduct of and participation in ACRS meetings were published in the                     **Federal Register**                     on October 6, 2008 (73 FR 58268-58269).                 

Further information regarding this meeting can be obtained by contacting the Designated Federal Official between 6:45 a.m. and 3:30 p.m. (ET). Persons planning to attend this meeting are urged to contact the above named individual at least two working days prior to the meeting to be advised of any potential changes to the agenda. 

Dated: March 10, 2009. 

Cayetano Santos, 

Chief,  Reactor Safety Branch A, Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards.

 [FR Doc. E9-5600 Filed 3-13-09; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 7590-01-P
Hon. W. A. Davis

State Registrar Texas State Board of Health

.. - Opinion No. O-3.525 Re: Whether or not gitimate child born

.. .. . an illeto a
,. Austin, Texas aivorcea motner takes tne surname of her divorced husDear Mr. Davis: band or her maiden name?

Webeg to acknowledge receipt of your letter of June 4, 1941, as follows, to-wit:

“Will you please advise meas to the legal nameof an illegitimate child born to a divorced mother, whoretained the nameof her former husband? Should such a child take the surname of her divorced husband, or her maiden. namebefore she married?” As a relic of the Common Lawof marriage, the wife, upon her marriage, takes the nameof her husband. This is the legitimate fruit of the Common Lawconception, that upon marriage the identity of the wife as a juristic person was merged in that of her husband.

There is no statute of Texas touching the question but it has been decided by the SupremeCourt that the rule oh the Common

Law, in the absence of a statute, governs the matter.

“Upon marriage the law confers upon the wife the nameof her husband, and this continues to be her lawful nametill changed by a subsequent marriage, or by the decree of a competent court as on final disposition of the divorce proceeding where such change of nameis specially prayed for,

-- a relic of the Common Lawfiction of unity. While there is nothing in our statute compe~lling the wife to take or assume the nameof her husband, yet by operation of law her husband’s surnamebecomes her’s upon marriage. It has been held that she is not bound by a judgment in a suit against her in her name, as where she is cited therein by publicat ionD In such case she is not a party to the suit 0u-- Speer’s Lawof Marital Rights (3d Ed.) p. 28, X26.Hon. W. A. Davis, page 2 (O-3525)

The text quoted cites Murphyv. Coffey, 33 Tex. 

### 508,and Freeman v. Hawkins, 

### 77Tex. 

### 1498.

The case of Barkley v. Dunke, 

### 87 S.W. 

### 1147,by our SupremeCourt illustrates the effect of marriage upon the status of the wife in this, that there had been a void marriage because the husband had a living wife, nevertheless the court held that the marriage had the statutory ef-~ feet to emancipate the womanfrom the disability of infancy, which status began with and abided beyond the marriage status. There had been a dissolution of the attempted marriage in that case. page 

### 27, X

### 25.See Speer's Lawof Marital Rights (3d Ed.)

Fromthese authorities it follows that your question should be answered to the effect that in the case you put the illegitimate child takes the nameof its mother, which, of course, in the case you state is the sameas that of her divorced husband. Very truly yours ATTORNEY

GENERAL

OFTEXAS By /s/ Ocie Speer Ocie Speer, Assistant APPROVED

JUN11, 

### 1941 FIRST ASSISTANT

ATTORNEY

GENERAL APPROVED:

OPINION

COMMITTEE BY: BMB,CHAIRMAN OS:m:vb
#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Steven McKenzie, Appellant.

[772 NYS2d 587]

Appeal by the defendant from a judgment of the County Court, Orange County (DeRosa, J.), rendered August 23, 2002.

Ordered that the judgment is affirmed *(see People v Seaberg,*74 NY2d 1 [1989]; *People v Pellegrino,*60 NY2d 636 [1983]).

Santucci, J.P., Smith, Luciano and Adams, JJ., concur.
NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff

- Appellee,

v.

PAUL RICHARD BUTTS,

Defendant

- Appellant. No. 21

- 10331

D.C. No. 2:05

- cr

- 01127

- DGC

- 1

MEMORANDUM *

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Arizona

David G. Campbell, District Judge, Presiding

Submitted July 12, 2022 * *

Before: SCHROEDER, R. NELSON, and VANDYKE, Circuit Judges.

Paul Richard Butts appeals from the district cour t ’ s judgment and challenges

the revocation of supervised release, as well as the t hree

- month sentence and

lifetime term of supervised release imposed upon revocation. Pursuant to Anders

v. Calif ornia , 386 U.S. 738 (1967), Butts ’s counsel has filed a brief stating that

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent

except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36

- 3.

** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision

without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). 

# FILED

JUL 18 2022

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS2 21

- 10331

there are no grounds for relief, along with a motion to withdraw as counsel of

record. We have provided Butts the opportunity to file a pro se supplemental brief.

No pro se supple mental brief or answering brief has been filed.

Our independent review of the record pursuant to Penson v. Ohio , 488 U.S.

75, 80 (1988), discloses no arguable grounds for relief on direct appeal.

Counsel’s motion to withdraw is GRANTED.

AFFIRMED.
Sean DOUGHERTY, Appellant/Claimant, v. CUSTOM CELLULAR, INC., and Division of Employment Security, Respondents.

No. ED 105873

Missouri Court of Appeals, Eastern District, DIVISION FOUR.

FILED: March 13, 2018

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT-Claimant: Sean Dougherty, Pro Se, 2578 Coppergate Square Dr., Apartment K, St. Louis, MO 63129-6197.

ATTORNEY FOR RESPONDENT: Bart Anton Matanic-attorney for Division of Employment Security, 421 East Dunklin Street, Box 59, Jefferson City, MO 65104, Custom Cellular, Inc., Pro Se, 7501 W. Memorial Road, MS 220, Oklahoma City, OK 73142.

Before Colleen Dolan, P.J., Mary K. Hoff, J., and Lisa S. Van Amburg, J.

*ORDER*

PER CURIAM

Sean Dougherty ("Claimant") appeals from the order of the Labor and Industrial Relations Commission disqualifying him *77from unemployment benefits after his termination from his employment with Custom Cellular, Inc. because of misconduct connected with work. We affirm.

We have reviewed the briefs of the parties, the legal file, and the record on appeal and find the claims of error to be without merit. No error of law appears. An extended opinion reciting the detailed facts and restating the principles of law applicable to this case would serve no jurisprudential or precedential purpose. We have, however, provided a memorandum opinion for the use of the parties setting forth the reasons for our decision. We affirm the Judgment pursuant to Rule 84.16(b).
**Exhibit 32.1**

 

CERTIFICATION OF CHIEFEXECUTIVE OFFICER PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350, AS ADOPTED PURSUANTTO SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

 

I, James W. Bernau,certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that the Annual Report of Willamette ValleyVineyards Inc. on Form 10-KSB for the annual period ended December 31,2007 fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) ofthe Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and that information contained in such 10-Kfairly presents in all material respects the financial condition and results ofoperations of Willamette Valley Vineyards Inc.

 
| Date:  May 16, 2008 |
|-------------------------------|
| By:                           | /s/  James W. Bernau |   |
| Name:  James W. Bernau   |
| Title:                        | Chief  Executive Officer |
|                               |  |  |  |
ACCARDI v. HARTFORD UNDERWRITERS INSURANCE COMPANY

42A19-1

Supreme Court of North Carolina.

May 15, 2019

Daniel K. Bryson, Attorney at Law, J. Hunter Bryson, Attorney at Law, Raleigh, for Accardi, Thomas.

Stephen D. Feldman, Attorney at Law, Raleigh, Kim E. Rinehart, Attorney at Law, Pro Hac Vice, David R. Roth, Attorney at Law, Pro Hac Vice, for Hartford Underwriters Insurance Company.

Mark R. Sigmon, Attorney at Law, Raleigh, for United Policyholders.

Roger A. Peters, II, Attorney at Law, for American Property Casualty Insurance Association.

*106The following order has been entered on the motion filed on the 13th of May 2019 by Daniel R. Johnson for Admission Pro Hac Vice:

"Motion Allowed by order of the Court in conference, this the 15th of May 2019."
#### Jules Polonetsky et al., Respondents-Appellants, v Better Homes Depot, Inc., Appellant-Respondent, et al., Defendant.

[720 NYS2d 59]

Order, Supreme Court, New York County (Marcy Friedman, J.), entered July 21, 2000, which granted defendants’ motion to dismiss the complaint pursuant to CPLR 3211 only to the extent of dismissing the complaint as against individual defendant Eric Fessler, unanimously modified, on the law, to grant the motion to the further extent of dismissing the complaint as against defendant Better Homes Depot, Inc., and otherwise affirmed, without costs. The Clerk is directed to enter judgment in favor of defendant Better Homes Depot, Inc., dismissing the complaint a.s against it.

In this action to enjoin defendants, pursuant to the Consumer Protection Law, from committing allegedly deceptive trade practices in the marketing and sale of residential homes, the motion court erred in denying defendants’ motion insofar as it sought dismissal of the complaint as against defendant Better Homes Depot, Inc., because real estate sales do not fall within the plain and unambiguous definition of consumer goods or ser*419vices contained in the Consumer Protection Law *(see,*Administrative Code of City of NY §§ 20-700, 20-701). In construing the statute, the motion court improperly deferred to plaintiffs exceedingly broad interpretation of the Consumer Protection Law’s enabling legislation, rather than the plain meaning of the applicable statutory language *(see, Seittelman v Sabol,*91 NY2d 618, 625; *Matter of Beekman Hill Assn. v Chin,*274 AD2d 161, 166-167, *lv denied 95*NY2d 767). Additionally, given the clarity of the statutory language, resort to the statute’s legislative history as an interpretive aid was not warranted *(see, Sega v State of New York,*60 NY2d 183, 191; *Bender v Jamaica Hosp.,*40 NY2d 560, 561-562).

With respect to plaintiffs cross appeal, the complaint was properly dismissed as against the individual defendant, Eric Fessler, in light of the absence of allegations that Fessler had engaged in tortious conduct for personal pecuniary gain wholly independent from the conduct of the corporate defendant *(see, Murtha v Yonkers Child Care Assn.,*45 NY2d 913, 915; *Bank of N. Y. v Berisford Intl.,*190 AD2d 622). Concur — Rosenberger, J. P., Tom, Ellerin, Rubin and Buckley, JJ.
```

[Federal Register Volume 77, Number 48 (Monday, March 12, 2012)]
[Notices]
[Page 14570]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Printing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2012-5836]

=======================================================================
-----------------------------------------------------------------------

NATIONAL FOUNDATION ON THE ARTS AND THE HUMANITIES

Public Availability of the National Endowment for the Humanities 
FY 2011 Service Contract Inventory

AGENCY: National Endowment for the Humanities.

ACTION: Notice of public availability of FY 2011 service contract 
inventory.

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

SUMMARY: In accordance with Section 743 of Division C of the 
Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2010 (Pub. L. 111-117), the National 
Endowment for the Humanities (NEH) is publishing this notice to advise 
the public of the availability of the FY 2011 Service Contract 
Inventory. This inventory provides information on service contract 
actions over $25,000 that were made in FY 2011. The information is 
organized by function to show how contracted resources are distributed 
throughout the agency. The inventory has been developed in accordance 
with guidance issued on November 5, 2010 and December 19, 2011 by the 
Office of Management and Budget's Office of Federal Procurement Policy 
(OFPP). OFPP's guidance is available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/procurement-service-contract-inventories. NEH has posted its inventory 
and a summary of the inventory on the NEH homepage at the following 
link: http://www.neh.gov/whoweare/administrative.html.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Barry Maynes, Director, Administrative 
Services Office at 202-606-8233 or bmaynes@neh.gov.

    Dated: March 6, 2012.
Michael P. McDonald,
General Counsel and Federal Register Liaison Officer.
[FR Doc. 2012-5836 Filed 3-9-12; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 7537-01-P
```
##### 



EXHIBIT 32.2

CERTIFICATION ACCOMPANYING PERIODIC REPORT
PURSUANT TO SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002
(18 U.S.C. SEC.1350)

I, Sherice P. Bench, Chief Financial Officer of American Achievement
Corporation (the Company), hereby certify that:

(1)  The Annual Report of the Company on Form 10-Q for the quarter ended
November 29, 2003 (the Report) fully complies with the requirements of
Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

(2)  The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material
respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company as
of the dates and for the periods expressed in the Report.

Date: January 9, 2004

| |  |                               
| |  | ------------------------------
| |  | /s/ SHERICE P. BENCH          
| |  |                               
| |  | Name: Sherice P. Bench        
| |  | Title: Chief Financial Officer