Filed 4/30/14 Old Town Redlands v. Panoussis CA2/1 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

OLD TOWN REDLANDS, LLC,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

GEORGE PANOUSSIS,

Defendant and Appellant. B245124

(Los Angeles County Super. Ct. No. BC456353)

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County. Mary H. Strobel, Judge. Affirmed.

______ George Panoussis, in pro. per.; the Mellor Law Firm and Mark A. Mellor for Defendant and Appellant. The Dressler Law Group a nd Thomas W. Dressler for Plaintiff and Respondent.

______2 On March 2, 2011, Old Town Redlands, LLC filed a complaint to quiet title against George Panoussis and German Rodri guez. According to the complaint, Old Town Redlands became the fee simple owner of property at 5125 Melrose Avenue in Los Angeles when it purchased the property in July 2002. Old Town Redlands acquired the property subject to a February 1, 1988 30-year lease in favor of Panoussis, and Rodriguez was Panoussis’s subten ant. In addition to occupa ncy under the 30-year lease, which would terminate on February 1, 2018 , Panoussis claimed the existence of a second lease entered into on February 1, 1988 between him and Ol d Town Redlands’s predecessor, which “automatically goes into effe ct upon the February 1, 2018 expiration of [the first lease], . . . te rminates on February 1, 2038 ” and provides Panoussis “an option to purchase the . . . [p]roperty for a fixed price ($365,000) at any time prior to February 1, 2038.” On May 21, 2009, Panoussis r ecorded a copy of th e purported second

lease. Old Town Redlands a lleged that the purported second lease “is a fraud and forgery having absolutely no force and ef fect . . .” and prayed for a decree quieting title to the property, finding that Panoussis’s rights as a tenant, as well as Rodriguez’s rights as a subtenant, terminate on February 1, 2018 up on expiration of the first lease without right to extend or purchase. After a bench trial, the trial court ruled for Old Town Redlands on two independent grounds: (1) the purported s econd lease, extending the lease period to February 1, 2038 and giving Panoussis th e option to purchase, was not “a genuine document actually entered into between the parties whose signa tures it bears at or about February 1988,” but rather “sometime afte r 2002, long after [Old Town Redlands’s predecessor] had lost any intere st in the [p]roperty,” and t hus did not constitute a valid

cloud on Old Town Redlands’s title to the property; and (2) ev en if the purported second lease were a genuine document, Panoussis a nd Rodriguez were equitably estopped from asserting its validity. Based on these finding s, the court entered a judgment quieting title and cancelling instrument, stating that “[t]he [p]urported [second] [l]ease shall be and hereby is cancelled and shall be stricken from the records of th e Los Angeles County Recorder” and “[t]itle to the . . . [p]roperty is quieted in favor of . . . Old Town3 Redlands . . . and against . . . Panoussis and . . . Rodriguez . . . . The court finds that the purported [second] lease with option to purchase . . . is absolutely void ab initio and of no force and effect whatsoever. [O ld Town Redlands’s] title to the . . . [p]roperty is free and clear of any and all rights, leaseholds, or ot her interests, legal or equitable, including without limitation the purported option to purchase, arising from or under the [p]urported [second] [l]ease.” Panoussis appealed from the judgment. Because substantial evidence supports the trial court’s finding that the purported second lease was not a genuine document, and its attendant determination quieting title to the property in favor of Ol d Town Redlands free and clear of the purported second lease, we affirm the judgment. 1

DISCUSSION In evaluating the sufficiency of the evidence, “‘the power of an appellate court begins and ends with the determination as to whet her there is any substantial evidence contradicted or uncontradicted [that] will support the finding of fact.’ [Citations.] [¶] It is well established that a reviewing court starts with the presumption that the

record contains evidence to sustain every finding of fact.’ [Citations.]” ( Foreman & Clark Corp. v. Fallon (1971) 3 Cal.3d 875, 881.) During the bench trial, Keith Hagaman, the managing member of Old Town Redlands, testified that, when he inquired about the property in March 2002, he received

information from an at torney representing Western States Corporation, Panoussis’s company, regarding the first lease expiring in 2018, and Old Town Redlands agreed to purchase the property subject to that lease. Hagaman, however, received no information regarding the purported second lease. Ha gaman also spoke to Panoussis several times about the property, and in non e of the conversations did Panoussis mention the purported second lease. When Hagaman asked Panoussi s to send him the lease on the property, Panoussis faxed him only the first lease a nd wrote on the cover sheet identifying the

faxed document as the “Lease of 5125 Melros e Av.” Hagaman also did an independent

1 Only Panoussis appealed from the judgment. Rodriguez thus is not a party to the appeal.4 review of documents relating to the propert y, which he obtained from bank files and pleadings from bankruptcy and unlawful detainer actions involving the property, and nothing in his investigation revealed the ex istence of the purported second lease. Hagaman testified that it was not until 20 09 during a depos ition of Panoussis in an unlawful detainer proceeding brought by Old Town Redlan ds against Panoussis on the basis of unauthorized alterations to the prop erty that Hagaman learned of the purported second lease. And, indeed, Panoussis did not record the purport ed second lease until 2009, well after Old Town Redlands’s purchase of the property. According to Hagaman,

Old Town Redlands would no t have purchased the property had it been aware of a second lease, which purportedl y extended the term of the already 30-year lease another 20 years and gave Panoussis the option to purchase the property at any time between February 2018 and February 2038 at the fixe d price of $365,000. In addition, Terrilyn Baron, a representative from a bank involved in prior wrongful foreclosure and unlawful detainer actions regarding the property, te stified that Panoussi s did not mention the purported second lease during those proceedings . This evidence suffi ciently supports the court’s determination that the purported se cond lease was not a genuine document and

thus did not constitute a valid cloud on Ol d Town Redlands’s title to the property.

Panoussis asserts that other evidence demonstrates the validity of the purported second lease. For example, he cites his ow n testimony that he told Hagaman about the purported second lease before Hagaman purchas ed the property. The trial court rejected Panoussis’s testimony as not credible. It c oncluded, “In his test imony, Panoussis had a tendency to hyperbole. Further, Panoussis cl aimed not to understand many of [Old Town Redlands’s] counsel’s questions, was argumentative in cr oss-examination, and at times gave sarcastic responses. Considering [Panou ssis’s] attitude toward the case and about giving testimony, his personal stake in the out come, his lack of memory as to certain events, and comparing his testimony to the other evidence received in the case, the [c]ourt does not find Panoussis’[s] testimony regarding the creation of [the purported second] [l]ease . . . to be credible.” Pano ussis also cites the te stimony of Cymbidium Graham, who did secretarial work for him, th at she obtained blank lease forms in 19885 for the first lease ending in 2018 and the purported second leas e, did the typing on both leases in February 1988 and sent a copy of both leases to Hagaman in or around October 2000. The court rejected Graham ’s testimony as well, giving it “no weight” because, although Graham testif ied she worked for Panoussi s in 1988, she previously had signed a declaration in 2002 in which she stated “‘I am an acquaintance of George Panoussis and I took messages, handled his accounting and bo okkeeping from 1996 forward.’” According to the court, “[t]his date is significant as Graham earlier testified to assisting with the creation of [the purporte d second] [l]ease . . . in 1988. Graham admitted to signing the declaration under penalty of perjury.” The court also determined

that it was “not credible that a seller would commit to a fixed price 30 years in the future and agree that the option at that price would remain open for 20 years.” Given the court’s credibility findings are reasonable inferenc es drawn from the evidence, we may not

substitute a different view of the ev idence for that of the court’s. ( Valiyee v. Department of Motor Vehicles (1999) 74 Cal.App.4th 1026, 1031.) 2

2 Panoussis spends the vast majority of his appellate briefs arguing the trial court erred in deciding the case on the ground of equitable estoppel. Because the judgment rests on two independent grounds, we need no t address Panoussis’s equitable estoppel argument because, as noted, the evidence sufficiently suppor ts the court’s independent finding that the purported second lease was not a genuine document.6 DISPOSITION The judgment is affirmed. Old Town Re dlands is entitled to recover its costs on appeal.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.

ROTHSCHILD, Acting P. J. We concur:

JOHNSON, J.

MILLER, J. *

* Judge of the Los Angeles Superior Court, Assigned by the Ch ief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.