2014 Decisions

Opinions of the United

States Court of Appeals

for the Third Circuit

4-30-2014

Christine Mays v. General Binding Corporation

Precedential or Non-Precedential: Non-Precedential

Docket No. 13-2642

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NOT PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

__________

No. 13-2642

___________

CHRISTINE MAYS;

MARK MAYS, (h/w),

 Appellants

v.

GENERAL BINDING CORPORATION; 

JOHN DOES 1-5, (fictitious persons);

ABC COMPANIES 1-5, (fictitious entities); 

JOHN DOES 6-10, (fictitious persons); 

ABC COMPANIES 6-10, (fictitious entities)

______________

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

(D.C. Civ. Action No. 1-11-cv-05836)

District Judge: Honorable Jerome B. Simandle

______________

Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)

March 18, 2014

______________

Before: CHAGARES, GREENAWAY, JR., VANASKIE, Circuit Judges.

(Opinion Filed: April 30, 2014)

______________

OPINION

______________
GREENAWAY, JR., Circuit Judge.

After suffering an injury from a laminating machine, an elementary school teacher 

brought a product liability lawsuit against the manufacturer General Binding Corporation 

(“GBC”). The District Court granted GBC’s summary judgment motion. For the 

foregoing reasons, we shall affirm the District Court’s order. 

I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

Because we write primarily for the parties who are familiar with the facts and 

procedural history, we recount only the essential facts. 

On April 20, 2010, Christine Mays ( “Mays”), a teacher at Johnson Elementary 

School, was utilizing the school’s laminating machine that was manufactured and sold by 

GBC. When Mays finished using the machine she turned the machine off with her right 

index finger and felt an electrical flow sensation from her finger through her arm to her 

shoulder. As a result of this incident, Mays sustained a burn to her right index finger and 

reported a permanent loss of feeling in her right finger. 

On August 17, 2011, Mays, joined by her husband Mark Mays (together 

“Appellants”),

1 filed a complaint in the Superior Court of New Jersey, naming GBC and 

 1 Mark Mays joined Christine Mays as a plaintiff alleging that he “has been 

deprived of his wife’s support, society, services, advice, counsel, guidance and/or 

consortium” as a “direct and proximate result of the negligence of the Defendants . . . .” 

(App. 88.)
several unnamed persons and companies as Defendants.2

 Defendants removed the matter 

to the United States District Court for the District of New Jersey based on diversity of 

citizenship. 

After discovery and the exchange of expert reports, GBC moved for summary 

judgment on all claims. Appellants did not oppose the grant of summary judgment on 

their negligence and manufacturing defect claims. The District Court granted GBC’s 

motion for summary judgment on Appellants’ design defect, failure to warn, and loss of 

consortium claims. This timely appeal followed.3

II. JURISDICTION 

The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332. This Court has 

jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.

III. ANALYSIS 

This Court’s review of the District Court’s order granting summary judgment is 

plenary. See Merkle v. Upper Dublin Sch. Dist., 211 F.3d 782, 788 (3d Cir. 2000). 

Summary judgment is granted when, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to 

the nonmoving party, there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is 

entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); Beers–Capitol v. Whetzel,

 2 After factual discovery Appellants had not moved to name these fictitious parties 

and therefore, the District Court dismissed the claims against these unnamed parties. 

(App. 4.) 
256 F.3d 120, 130 n.6 (3d Cir. 2001). 

A. Design Defect Claim 

Federal courts sitting in diversity apply the substantive law of the state whose law 

governs the action. Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938). Under New 

Jersey law, to succeed under a strict-liability design-defect theory, a plaintiff must 

generally prove that “(1) the product was defective; (2) the defect existed when the 

product left the hands of the defendant; and (3) the defect caused the injury to a 

reasonably foreseeable user.” Jurado v. W. Gear Works, 619 A.2d 1312, 1317 (N.J. 

1993). In a design defect case, a plaintiff who asserts that the product could have been 

designed more safely must “prove under a risk-utility analysis the existence of an 

alternative design that is both practical and feasible.” Lewis v. Am. Cyanamid Co., 715 

A.2d 967, 980 (N.J. 1998).

Appellants argue that the District Court erred in granting summary judgment on 

the design defect claim. Specifically, Appellants claim that a reasonable jury could 

reasonably infer that an alternative design of the laminating machine existed which could 

have prevented or reduced the risk of suffering an electrostatic shock as a result of using 

the machine. Appellants base this argument on the report of George Widas (“Widas 

 3 Appellants do not appeal the District Court’s dismissal of their loss of 

consortium claim. 
Report”), which stated that alternative designs “were and are readily available.” 

(Appellants’ Br. 6 (internal quotation marks omitted).)

Appellants’ argument fails for several reasons. First, as the District Court 

correctly assessed, the Widas Report was critically deficient. While the report identified 

“designed-in features” – including well-grounded induction bars, ionization neutralizers,

and web cleaners – as alternatives to the grounding technology already utilized by GBC,

it offered no specifications on whether the suggested designed-in features were 

economically or practically feasible. The report’s analysis was further undermined by the 

report provided by James Crabtree, GBC’s expert, documenting that none of the nine 

competing laminators examined incorporated the alternative design recommended by 

Widas. (See App. 229 (“None of the reviewed laminators were found to contain 

induction bars, inductive neutralizers or active static neutralizers in their laminate/web 

handling paths.”).) An alternative design lacking in specificity or a factual basis cannot 

support a cause of action for damages because tort law is not designed to accommodate 

claims that would absolutely minimize accidents. See Zaza v. Marquess & Nell, Inc., 675 

A.2d 620, 627 (N.J. 1996) (“An inference of defectiveness may not be drawn from the 

mere fact that someone was injured.”). 

On appeal, Appellants contend that the District Court should have conducted an in 

limine hearing, giving them an opportunity to address those concerns prior to granting 

summary judgment. This argument is also unavailing. While it is true that this Court has 

favored holding in limine hearings in making a reliability determination, Padillas v. 

Stork-Gamco, Inc., 186 F.3d 412, 417 (3d Cir. 1999), reliability was not at issue here. 
Rather, the Widas Report was critically deficient to meet the burden imposed by New 

Jersey law for a plaintiff to survive summary judgment. See Lewis, 715 A.2d at 980 (“A 

plaintiff must prove either that the product’s risks outweighed its utility or that the 

product could have been designed in an alternative manner so as to minimize or eliminate 

the risk of harm.”). The District Court was not obligated to hold the record open when it 

was undisputed that the report was a “very detailed” one that was “full of details.” (App. 

57, 58.); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(d) (stating that a party opposing summary judgment 

on the basis that additional discovery is warranted must “show[ ] by affidavit or 

declaration that, for specified reasons, it cannot present facts essential to justify its 

opposition”). 

Therefore, the District Court did not err in granting GBC’s motion for summary 

judgment on the design defect claim. 

B. Failure to Warn Claim

Under New Jersey law, “[a] manufacturer or seller of a product shall be liable in a 

product liability action only if the claimant proves by a preponderance of the evidence 

that the product causing the harm was not reasonably fit, suitable or safe for its intended 

purpose because it . . . failed to contain adequate warnings or instructions . . . .” N.J. Stat. 

Ann. § 2A:58C-2 (West 1987). 

In order to bring a failure to warn claim, a plaintiff must initially establish that the 

defendant had a duty to warn. James v. Bessemer Processing Co., Inc., 714 A.2d 898, 
908 (N.J. 1998). To establish such a duty, she must satisfy “a very low threshold of proof 

in order to impute to a manufacturer sufficient knowledge to trigger the duty to provide a 

warning of the harmful effects of its product.” Coffman v. Keene Corp., 628 A.2d 710, 

719 (N.J. 1993). In cases proceeding under a theory of strict liability, as here, knowledge 

of the harmful effects of a product will be imputed to a manufacturer on a showing that 

“knowledge of the defect existed within the relevant industry.” Id.

Appellants argue that the District Court erred in finding that there was insufficient 

evidence triggering a duty to warn, since the Court had observed that there could be a 

genuine dispute as to a material fact with regard to whether the discharge of static 

electricity could cause personal injury. 

Appellants are conflating two distinct concepts. The mere fact that static 

electricity could cause personal injury does not necessarily indicate that the industry was 

aware of the potential harm. Indeed, the record was entirely devoid of a documented 

instance of a similar injury, forcing the District Court to conclude that the instant case 

was “an unprecedented sample-of-one incident.” (App. 27.) Under these factual 

circumstances, this Court cannot presuppose knowledge of the alleged hazard of the 

product. See James, 714 A.2d at 908 (holding that duty to warn is triggered when 

“knowledge in the industry has been established”). 

Therefore, the District Court did not err in granting summary judgment on 

Appellants’ failure to warn claim. 

IV. CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the order of the District Court.