### D ISTRICT 

### C OURT 

### O F 

### A PPEAL 

### O F 

### T HE 

### S TATE 

### O F 

### F LORIDA

F OURTH D ISTRICT

TROY W. KLEIN
, Appellant,

v.

ALAN D. ROMAN and DEBORAH W. ROMAN
, Appellee s

.

No s

. 4D 15

- 4783 and 16

- 1880

[September 6, 2017 ]

Consolidated a ppeal s from the Circuit Court for the Fifteenth Judicial Circuit, Palm Beach County ; Scott Suskauer , Judge; L.T. Case No.

2008DR001975XXXXMB

.

Troy W. Klein of Law Office of Troy W. Klein, P.A., West Palm Beach,

pro se

.

Jeffrey S. D'Amore and Rosemarie W. Guerini of D'Amore Law Firm, P.A., Palm Beach Gardens, for appellee Alan D. Roman

.

Jill G. Weiss of Jill G. Weiss, P.A., Palm Beach Gardens, for appellee

Deborah W. Roman.

F ORST

, J.

Appellant Troy Klein makes several arguments on appe al related to the

trial court’s order granting A p pellee Alan Roman’s motion to release Appellant’s charging lien and award sanctions. We write only to addres s two of Appellant’s arguments on appeal: (1) whether the trial court erred by awarding attorney’ s fees to Appellee without eliciting the testimony of

an independent expert , and (2) whether the court erred by failing to expressly apply the “ lodestar ” method to calculate those fees. We find the first argument meritless, but reverse the second. We affirm all other issues on appeal without discussion

.

Bac kground

App ellant was the attorney for A ppellee’s former wife in a dissolution of marriage proceeding. Because of unpaid attorney’s fees owed under a2 contract with Appellee’ s former wife, Appellant filed a notice of charging

lien asserting an interest in the former wife’s two homes. However , a s part

of the marital settlement agreement, Appellee recei ved one of the properties.

When A ppellee sought to sell that property

, he learned of the lien and

sent a letter to Appellant demanding a release, to no avail. A ppellee subsequently filed a motion to release the lien and award sanctions

. T he

trial co urt held a hearing at which Appellee ’s counsel testified regarding the amount of attorney’s fees he incurred in th e effort to have the lien

remov ed . C ounsel submitted an affidavit detailing his hourly rate, the

number of hours worked , and the type of work he had done

.

T he trial court granted Appellee’s motion, and ordered Appellant to release the charging lien and to pay Appellee $5,146.50 in attorne y’ s fees.

Afterwards , Appellant submitted a motion for rehearing, making almost all the same arguments he now makes on appeal. T he trial court denied the

motion.

Analysis

“The standard of review of an award of attorneys’ fees is abuse of

discretion.” Diwakar v. Montecito Palm Beach Condo. Ass’n. , 143 So. 3d 958, 960 (Fla. 4th DCA 2014)

. The awar d must be supported by competent, substantial evidence. Id.

Appellant first argues that the trial court’s award of attorney’s fees was

erroneous given that Appellee “failed to present any independent expert testimony regarding the reasonableness of the attorney’s fees bein g sought despite the well

- established legal requirement to do so.” We need not

consider the merits of Appellant’s argument, as it was unpreserved. Appellant failed to make a timely, contemporaneous objection at the fee hearing regarding Appellee’s failure to provide independent expert

testi mony. See San Pedro v. Law Office of Paul Burkhart , 168 So. 3d 299, 300 (Fla. 4th DCA 2015) (“To the extent that Appellants now contest the admission of the exhibits and the lack of testimony, those arguments were waived when Appellants failed to object at the hearing.”); Diwakar , 143 So. 3d at 960 (“To t he extent Diwakar argues on appeal that the attorneys’ fee award was erroneous in the absence of testimony from a fees expert plus the attorney who performed the work, the argument was waived when Diwakar failed to object at trial.”); DM Records, Inc. v. T urnpike Commercial Plaza, Phase II, Condo. Ass’n , 894 So. 2d 1030, 1031 (Fla. 4th DCA 2005) (“If we were to allow these issues to be raised for the first time on appeal,3 where there was no objection in trial court, it would be unfair to the party seeking f ees and the trial judge and result in unnecessary appeals.”).

Even if the issue had been preserved, Section 61.16(1), Florida Statutes (2016)

, appears to control, given the nature of the underlying case from which this award of attorney’s fees stems. 1 Under that statute, “ [a] n application for attorney’s fees, suit money, or costs, whether temporary or otherwise, shall not require corroborating expert testimony in order to support an award under this chapter .” § 61.16 (1) , Fla. Stat. (2015) (emphasis add ed).

Alt hough we a ffirm the first issue, we reverse the second. As both parties correctly recognize

, the trial court erred by failing to expressly apply the lodestar method when calculating the amount of attorney’s fees

in its order. “It is well

- sett led that an award of attorney’s fees must . . . contain express findings regarding the number of hours reasonably expended and a reasonable hourly rate for the type of litigation in volved.”

Simhoni v. Chambliss

, 843 So. 2d 1036, 1037 (Fla. 4th DCA 2003)

. There,

because the trial court failed to include an express lodestar calculation,

we reversed and remanded for the trial court to enter a new written order containing the necessary calculation. Id. We do the same here. We also note, as we did in Simhon i , that “[t] he court need not hold a new evidentiary hearing if it is able to enter a written order from its notes or a transcript of the original fees hearing. ” Id. Appellee’s counsel’ s affidavit detailing why he charged $5,146.50 in fees should enable the court to enter a new written order without holding a new hearing.

Conclusion

Because the trial court failed to expressly calculate its attorney’s fees award by way of the lodestar method, we reverse and remand for the trial

court to enter a new written order. The trial court’s order is otherwise

affirmed.

Affirmed in Part, Reversed and R emanded in Part

.

G ERBER
, C.J., and W ARNER
, J., concur.

* * *

Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.

1 Chapter 61 governs the award of attorney’s fees in dissolution of marriage, support, and time

- sharing cases.