### IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 19

- 30734

SHARON KIM BEAZLEY, individually & on behalf of minor child, LMB; LILLIAN MARIE BEAZLEY, JORDON KALE BEAZLEY ; JAKE LYNFIELD
BEAZLEY

,

Plaintiff s

- Appellants

v.

METROPOLITAN LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY; SCHLUMBERGER TECHNOLOGY CORPORATION,

Defendants

- Appellee s

Appeal from the United States District Court
for the We stern District of Louisiana
USDC No. 6 :1 6

- CV

- 1 188

Before STEWART

, DENNIS , and HAYNES , Circuit Judges

.
PER CURIAM: *

Plaintiffs, survivors of decedent Greg Lynfield Beazley (Mr. Beazley)

, brought suit against Defendants, Metropolitan Life Insurance Company

(“Met L ife”) and Schlumberger Technology Corporation (“STC”) , alleging that

Defendants unlawfully denied a claim for life insurance benefits due under

* Pursuant to 5 TH C IR . R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5 TH C IR . R. 47.5.4. United States Court of Appeals
Fifth Circuit 

### FILED
May 27, 2020

Lyle W. Cayce
Clerk Case: 19-30734 Document: 00515430511 Page: 1 Date Filed: 05/27/2020No. 19

- 30734

2 policies Mr. Beazley had purchased while an employee of STC. The policies

were issued by MetLife as part of an employee welfare plan (“Plan”) STC had

established , and t he Plan is governed by the Employee Retirement Income

Security Act ( “ ERISA ” ) , 29 U.S.C. § 1001 et seq

. In a thorough opinion, the

district court determined that MetLife, the insurer and claims administrator

for the Plan, did not abuse its discretion in de nying Plaintiffs’ claim. Beazley v.

Metro. Life Ins. Co. , 413 F. Supp. 3d 535, 538 (W.D. La. 2019). We affirm. 1

I.

We review the district court’s decision de novo, “applying the same

standards as the district court” in this ERISA case. Schexnayder v. Hartford

Life & Acc. Ins. Co. , 600 F.3d 465, 468 (5th Cir. 2010) ; see Swenson v. United

of Omaha Life Ins. Co. , 876 F.3d 809, 810 (5th Cir. 2017)

. “ Because the Plan

gave [MetLife] discretionary authority to determine eligibility for benefit s as

well as to construe the Plan ’ s terms, we review [MetLife]’s denial of benefits

for an abuse of discretion. ” Schexnayder , 600 F.3d at 468

.
II.

On appeal, Plaintiffs first contend that MetLife ha d an inherent con f lict

of intere s t as both the Plan’s insurer and claims administrator

. It is true that

t he Supreme Court has stated that a conflict of interest exists where, as here,

the plan administrator both evaluates and pays claims

. Metro. Life Ins. Co. v.

Glenn , 554 U.S . 105, 1 14 (2008). H owever, the Court has also explained that

this conflict does not per se change the standard of review from “ deferential to

de novo

. ” Id. Rather, the “conflict should be weighed as a factor in determining

1 In the district court, defendants named Jared Beazley, a biological child of Mr.

Be azley, as a defendant in interpleader. Because of the district court’s conclusion that MetLife did not abuse its discretion in denying plaintiffs’ benefits claim, the district court did not determine whether Jared Beazley would have been a proper benefici ary under the benefits policies at issue, and Jared Beazley did not participate in this appeal. Case: 19-30734 Document: 00515430511 Page: 2 Date Filed: 05/27/2020No. 19

- 30734

3 whether there is an abuse of discretion.” Id. at 115 (internal quotation marks

and citation omitted). “A reviewing court may give more weight to a conflict of

interest, where the circumstances surrounding the plan administrator ’ s

decision suggest ‘ procedural unreasonableness. ’” Schexnayder , 600 F.3d 46 5,

469 (5th Cir. 2010) (quoting Glenn, 554 U.S. at 118)

.
In Schexnayder v. Hartford Life & Acc. Ins. Co

. , t he district court found

such procedural unreasonableness, and, ultimately, an abuse of discretion by

the plan administrator; we affirmed. Id. at 467, 471. There, t he p laintiff had

been covered by a n employer

- sponsored disability insurance plan that was

administered and insured by Hartford Life Group Insurance Co. (“Hartford”).

Id

. at 467. Based on r ecurrent pain in the plaintiff’s back and extremities

, t he

Social Security Administration (“SSA”) determined that he was “totally

disabled,” thereb y authorizing him to receive SSA disability payments. Id. at

46 7

- 6 8. Despite this determination

, Hartford, which had been making

disability payments to the plaintiff, re

- evaluate d him and concluded he did not

“ remain disabled from any occupation” and th us terminated its benefits

payments. Id. Plaintiff sued, and we affirmed the district court’s

determination t hat Hartford abused its discretion in terminating his disability

benefits. Id. Our ruling was based on the fact that “ Hartford did not address

the SSA award” in its decision to deny benefits. Id. at 471. Its failure to even

“ acknowledge an agency determination that was in direct conflict with its own

determination” showed that “ the method by which it made the decision [ to

terminate benefits] was unreasonable.” Id.

Here, by contrast, Plaintiffs merely make the conclusory argument that

“MetLife’s method in making its benefits decision

. . . was unreasonable.” They

entirely fail to identify how or why MetLife’s decision

- making was

unreasonable, other than the fact that MetLife has a conflict of interest. But Case: 19-30734 Document: 00515430511 Page: 3 Date Filed: 05/27/2020No. 19

- 30734

4 without showing how “t hat conflict is

. . . a significant factor in this case,” we

cannot conclude that MetLife abused its discretion. Holland v. Int’l Paper Co.

Ret. Plan

, 576 F.3d 250 (5th Cir. 2009); s ee Glenn

, 554 U.S. at 114.

Plaintiffs next argue that the district cour t erred because MetLife

supposedly delayed mailing a notice to Mr. Beazley of his option to convert or

port his policies following his termination from STC and thus the termination

of his policies. Plaintiffs contend that it “seems unfair” for MetLife to “avoid

responsibility” for sending this notice to Mr. Beazley twenty

- three days after

STC terminated him

. However, they identify neither caselaw nor any

statutory, regulatory, or Plan provision imposing a duty on MetLife to provide

notice to Mr . Beazley of his option to convert or port his policies beyond that

already contained in the Plan. Because Plaintiffs fail to identify such a duty,

they do not demonstrate that MetLife abused its discretion by mailing notice

of the right to convert or por t in a dilatory manner

.
Plaintiffs further contend tha t the Plan does not address th e

consequences of an insured dying within t he time period in which coverage can

be ported

. 2 However, the Plan ’ s terms are clear . U nder the Plan, since MetLife

sent written notice to Mr. Beazley of his option to port “more than 15 days after

but within 91 days” of the end of his insurance, Mr. Beazley had 45 days from

the termination of his employment to request

, in writing

, to p ort. And it is

undispute d that Mr. Beazley did not request to port his coverage during the 37

days from when his life insurance ended on May 6, 2014 until his death on

June 12, 2014.

2 Mr. Beazley had both basic and supplemental life insurance. Per the Plan, o nly the supplemental life insurance policy was eligible for porting. Case: 19-30734 Document: 00515430511 Page: 4 Date Filed: 05/27/2020No. 19

- 30734

5 The Plan also expressly provides that if (1) an insured dies “within 31

days” of when his life insurance ends and (2) MetLife has “not received” an

application to port

, the insured’s beneficiaries may still receive payment under

the policy

, provided MetLife receives a benefits claim accompanied by a p roof

of death. However, Mr. Beazley died af ter the laps e of this 31

- day period, and

thus Plaintiffs cannot avail themselves of this provi s ion.

Plaintiffs final argument is that MetLife acted unreasonabl y by not

immediately providing Donna La tiolais , a Beazley family friend, with

i nformation on porting coverage when , at the request of Mr. Beazley’s widow,

Latiolais contacted the company to inquire about Mr. Beazley’s coverage

. But

Plaintiffs do not cite any legal duty MetLife had to provide Latiolai s with

information on porting coverage. Plaintiffs also provide no support for their

contention that MetLife abused its discretion by not allowing Mr. Beazley’s

beneficiaries to port his insurance coverage. Accordingly, Plaintiffs have not

shown that Met Life abused its discretion in denying their claims

.

* * *

For these reasons, the judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED. Case: 19-30734 Document: 00515430511 Page: 5 Date Filed: 05/27/2020