IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON

DARREN L. ARENDS,

Appellant,

v.

STATE OF WASHINGTON,

Respondent.

No. 85870-0-I 

DIVISION ONE

UNPUBLISHED OPINION

SMITH, C.J. — Under former RCW 9.41.040, individuals could petition to 

restore their firearm rights in their county of residence or in the court that entered 

the relevant prohibition on firearm possession. In early 2023, the legislature 

restricted the appropriate venue for firearm restoration petitions to the county that 

entered the prohibition on firearm possession. 

A month after the new statute took effect, Darren Arends petitioned to 

restore his firearm rights in Snohomish County Superior Court, his county of 

residence. The superior court denied his petition, citing improper venue. On 

appeal, Arends claims that the former firearm restoration statute applies to him 

because his right to petition for restoration “vested” before the new statute took 

effect. Therefore, he maintains, he can file his petition in his current county of 

residence rather than in Davison County, South Dakota, the county that entered 

the prohibition. Because the legislature did not intend to create a vested right to 

petition for firearm restoration, we disagree and affirm.
No. 85870-0-I/2

2

FACTS

Legislative Background

Before July 2023, former RCW 9.41.040 governed the process of restoring 

an individual’s right to possess a firearm. Under that statute, there were two 

appropriate venues in which to file a restoration petition: (1) the court of record 

that ordered the petitioner’s prohibition on possessing a firearm; or (2) the 

superior court in the county in which the petitioner currently resided. Former 

RCW 9.41.040(4) (2005).

In early 2023, the legislature amended RCW 9.41.040 and added a new 

section to chapter 9.41 RCW. LAWS OF 2023, ch. 295. Under the new section, 

RCW 9.41.041, firearm restoration petitions can only be filed in the superior court 

of the county that entered a prohibition on possession. LAWS OF 2023, ch. 295, 

§ 4(3)(a). In its findings related to the amendments, the legislature noted that its 

updates to the laws governing the unlawful possession of firearms and the 

restoration of firearm rights aimed to “reduc[e] the risks of lethality and other 

harm associated with gun violence, gender-based violence, and other types of 

violence.” LAWS OF 2023, ch. 295. The legislature also found that easy access to 

firearms is a risk factor that increases the likelihood of individuals engaging in 

future violence and presenting further risk to public safety. LAWS OF 2023, 

ch. 295, §1(4). 

On July 23, 2023, Substitute House Bill 1562 took effect, repealing 

former RCW 9.41.040(4) and enacting RCW 9.41.041. LAWS OF 2023, ch. 295. 
No. 85870-0-I/3

3

Present Case

In August 2023, Darren Arends petitioned the Snohomish County Superior 

Court to restore his firearm rights. His right had been restricted due to his 

conviction for grand theft in Davison County, South Dakota. Although Arends 

petitioned the court after RCW 9.41.041 took effect, Arends claimed that former 

RCW 9.41.040(4) applied to him because he had completed the former statute’s 

requirements before the new statute took effect. Arends contended that once he 

completed the former statute’s requirements, his right to petition for restoration 

“vested,” thereby allowing him to proceed under the former statute.

The State opposed Arends’s petition, arguing that Snohomish County 

Superior Court was not the proper venue because the prohibition had not been 

entered there. The State also contended that Arends had not yet completed his 

sentencing conditions. The court denied Arends’s petition and adopted the 

State’s position in full.1 

Arends appeals.

ANALYSIS

Vested Right to Petition Under Former RCW 9.41.040

Both parties contend that whether RCW 9.41.041 operates prospectively 

or retroactively is determinative of whether a right vested under former 

RCW 9.41.040. Arends maintains that because the precipitating event that 

triggers application of former RCW 9.41.040 is completion of the statutory 

 

1

 In support of its order, the court attached the State’s response to 

Arends’s petition rather than explain its reasoning.
No. 85870-0-I/4

4

requirements, and because he completed the requirements before 

RCW 9.41.041 took effect, his right to petition for restoration “vested” and his 

claim under the former statute is preserved. The State counters that completion 

of the statutory requirements does not result in a “vested” right because filing the 

restoration petition is the precipitating event, not completion of the statutory 

requirements.2 The State therefore maintains that Arends is subject to the new 

statute because he filed his petition after it took effect. 

We disagree with both parties. The relevant inquiry here is not whether 

the new statute operates prospectively or retroactively or what constitutes a 

precipitating event, but whether the subject matter and language of former 

RCW 9.41.040 indicate that Arends possessed a “vested right” to petition for 

restoration once he met the statutory requirements for restoration of his 

purported right to possess a firearm under the former statute. Because the 

legislature intended firearm restoration procedures to further public safety, we

conclude that Arends’s right to petition for restoration did not “vest” when he 

completed the statutory requirements of former RCW 9.41.040.

The term “vested right” is not easily defined, but “has been commonly held 

to connote ‘an immediate, fixed right of present or future enjoyment.’ ” Adams v. 

Ernst, 1 Wn.2d 254, 264-65, 95 P.2d 799 (1939) (quoting Pearsall v. Great N.

Ry. Co., 161 U.S. 646, 16 S. Ct. 705, 40 L. Ed. 838 (1896)). A “vested right, 

 

2 Our Supreme Court previously determined that the precipitating event 

for eligibility of restoration is when the statutory requirements are met, not when 

the petition is filed. State v. Dennis, 191 Wn.2d 169, 177, 421 P.3d 944 (2018).
No. 85870-0-I/5

5

entitled to protection from legislation, must be something more than a mere 

expectation based upon an anticipated continuance of the existing law; it must 

have become a title, legal or equitable, to the present or future enjoyment of 

property, a demand, or a legal exemption from a demand by another.” Godfrey 

v. State, 84 Wn.2d 959, 963, 530 P.2d 630 (1975) (emphasis omitted). “[A] 

vested right must be definite, as opposed to an assumed expectation that one 

will be able to exercise a certain privilege in the future.” Wash. State Ass’n of 

Counties v. State, 199 Wn.2d 1, 19, 502 P.3d 825 (2022). “ ‘[A] mere 

expectation based upon an anticipated continuance of the existing law’ is 

insufficient to vest a legal right.” State v. Shultz, 138 Wn.2d 638, 646, 980 P.2d 

1265 (1999) (emphasis omitted) (quoting State v. Hennings, 129 Wn.2d 512, 919 

P.2d 580 (1996)).

A right may vest in a number of ways, such as by final judgment or

contract. Wash. State Ass’n of Counties, 199 Wn.2d at 19; see, e.g., Bailey v. 

Sch. Dist. No. 49, 108 Wash. 612, 614, 185 P. 810 (1919) (final judgment); Scott 

Paper Co. v. City of Anacortes, 90 Wn.2d 19, 32, 578 P.2d 1292 (1978)

(contracts). Rights may also vest upon completion of statutory conditions in 

certain limited circumstances. State v. T.K., 139 Wn.2d 320, 334, 987 P.2d 63 

(1999) (T.K. II).

3

 

3 Because we cite to both the Court of Appeals’ and Washington State 

Supreme Court’s decision in State v. T.K., we refer to the Supreme Court’s 

decision as T.K. II and the Court of Appeals’ decision as T.K. I.
No. 85870-0-I/6

6

The subject matter of the statute and the statutory language guide our 

analysis of whether completion of the statutory conditions results in a vested 

right. See T.K. II, 139 Wn.2d at 331-32, 335. This inquiry implicates statutory 

interpretation, a question of law that we review de novo. Dep’t of Ecology v. 

Campbell & Gwinn, LLC, 146 Wn.2d 1, 9, 43 P.3d 4 (2002). When interpreting a 

statute, our purpose is to determine and give effect to the legislature’s intent, and 

we begin with the plain language of the statute. Campbell & Gwinn, 146 Wn.2d 

at 9-10. “We derive the legislative intent of a statute solely from the plain 

language by considering the text of the provision in question, the context of the 

statute in which the provision is found, related provisions, and the statutory 

scheme as a whole.” State v. Dennis, 191 Wn.2d 169, 172-73, 421 P.3d 944 

(2018). When interpreting a criminal statute, “we give it a literal and strict 

interpretation.” State v. Delgado, 148 Wn.2d 723, 727, 63 P.3d 792 (2003). 

1. Statutory Interpretation

The statute at issue, former RCW 9.41.040, designates the requirements 

that an individual must meet before petitioning the court:

An individual may petition a court of record to have his or her right 

to possess a firearm restored . . . 

[i]f the conviction or finding of not guilty by reason of insanity was 

for a felony offense, after five or more consecutive years in the 

community without being convicted or found not guilty by reason of 

insanity or currently charged with any felony, gross misdemeanor, 

or misdemeanor crimes, if the individual has no prior felony 

convictions that prohibit the possession of a firearm counted as part 

of the offender score under RCW 9.94A.525.

Former RCW 9.41.040(4)(b), (a)(ii)(A).
No. 85870-0-I/7

7

After these requirements are met, an individual “may” petition the court for 

relief. Former RCW 9.41.040(4)(b). Once the superior court determines that the 

statute’s enumerated requirements are met, the court’s role is purely ministerial; 

it must grant the petition. State v. Swanson, 116 Wn. App. 67, 78, 65 P.3d 343 

(2003). However, the process of restoration is one of legislative grace; there is 

no Second Amendment right to firearm restoration. See, e.g., ch. 9.41 RCW

(restoration of firearm rights exclusively governed by statute); see also District of 

Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 626, 128 S. Ct. 2783, 171 L. Ed. 2d 637 (2008) 

(“Like most rights, the right secured by the Second Amendment is not 

unlimited.”).

Here, the subject matter of the statute and the legislature’s intent are

determinative of whether a vested right exists upon completion of the statutory 

requirements. The statute creates a court-supervised procedure for firearm right 

restoration to further public safety by reducing gun violence. At the heart of the 

statute is public safety, clearly evidenced by the legislature’s repeated amending 

of the statute to add more stringent requirements for restoration. See, e.g., H.B.

REP. ON H.B. 3095, 60th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2008) (additional notice 

required when person who was prohibited from possessing firearm due to 

involuntary commitment has right to possess restored); FINAL B. REP. ON 

H.B. 1498, 61st Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2009) (imposing burden of proof for 

persons who have been involuntarily committed); FINAL B. REP. ON H.B. 1455, 

62nd Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2011) (restricting venue where petition to restore 
No. 85870-0-I/8

8

rights may be filed); FINAL B. REP. ON S.B. 5205, 66th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wash.

2019) (persons found incompetent to stand trial and who have history of violent 

acts must prove each restoration requirement by preponderance of evidence);

FINAL B. REP. ON S.H.B. 1562, 68th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2023) (restricting 

venue where petition to restore rights may be filed). 

The legislature’s actions also evidence an intent to protect the public. For 

example, in the wake of our Supreme Court’s Dennis decision, which interpreted 

the statutory requirement that a petitioner be crime-free for five years before 

petitioning for firearm restoration to mean any crime-free period following felony 

conviction, the legislature amended the firearm restoration statute to clarify that 

the five-year period must immediately precede filing of a restoration petition. 

S.H.B. 1562, 68th Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2023) (“The legislature also finds it would 

be helpful to refine statutory language that was at issue in the Washington state 

supreme court’s decision in State v. Dennis, 191 Wn.2d 169 (2018).”); 

RCW 9.41.041(2)(a)(i).

Moreover, when the legislature most recently updated the restoration 

procedures, it noted that the stricter venue provisions were aimed at “reducing 

the risks of lethality and other harm associated with gun violence, gender-based 

violence, and other types of violence.” LAWS OF 2023, ch. 295. The legislature 

also found that easy access to firearms presents a risk to public safety. LAWS OF 

2023, ch. 295, §1(4). To conclude that satisfaction of the statutory requirements 

results in an absolute right to petition for restoration of one’s firearm rights runs 
No. 85870-0-I/9

9

contrary to the legislature’s intent. The legislature has repeatedly evidenced that 

gun violence is an important issue of public safety and has taken steps to make 

restoration of firearm rights increasingly difficult. 

We conclude that Arends had an expectation that he could petition the 

court to restore his firearm rights once he complied with the statute, but not an 

absolute, vested right regarding restoration of those rights. At any point before 

he petitioned to restore his firearm rights, the legislature could have amended the 

law to prevent him from doing so. Settled law dictates that the expectation of 

being able to exercise a certain privilege in the future is insufficient to vest a legal 

right. 

2. State v. T.K

Still, Arends contends that T.K. II is dispositive of whether completion of 

statutory requirements results in a vested right. We disagree.

In T.K. II, the defendant pleaded guilty to first degree child molestation. 

139 Wn.2d at 323. After T.K. completed the requirements of the disposition 

order, he petitioned the juvenile court to vacate his duty to register under the sex 

offender registration statute. State v. T.K., 94 Wn. App. 286, 288-89, 971 P.2d 

121 (1999) (T.K. I).

4

 The court found that T.K. had been “fully rehabilitated” and 

entered an order ending his registration requirement. T.K. I, 94 Wn. App. at 289. 

At the time the court entered its order, T.K. was not eligible to request vacation or 

sealing of his conviction records under RCW 13.50.050 because two years had 

 

4

 The facts of T.K. II are drawn from the Court of Appeals decision 

because it includes more detail.
No. 85870-0-I/10

10

not yet passed from the date he was discharged from supervision. T.K. I, 94 Wn. 

App. at 289. Before T.K. could petition to have his juvenile records sealed, the 

legislature changed the statutory requirements for sealing, increasing the 

requisite waiting period. T.K. II, 139 Wn.2d at 323-24. After the statute was 

amended, T.K. moved to expunge his juvenile record. T.K. I, 94 Wn. App. at 

290. The juvenile court denied the motion, concluding that the updated statute 

applied. T.K. I, 94 Wn. App. at 290. 

On appeal, this court reversed, determining that T.K.’s right to have his 

record expunged under the former statute “matured”

5 when he satisfied the 

conditions of expungement. T.K. I, 94 Wn. App. at 291. Our Supreme Court 

later affirmed, explaining that T.K.’s “right to sealing became absolute [i.e., 

vested] upon completion of the statutory conditions” after the two-year waiting 

period had expired. T.K. II, 139 Wn.2d at 334. The court compared the waiting 

period to a statute of limitations, noting that “ ‘[u]ntil the statute has run it is a 

mere regulation of the remedy . . . subject to legislative control,’ ” but afterwards 

it is “ ‘a defense, not of grace, but of right . . . absolute and vested, . . . not to be 

taken away by legislative enactment.’ ” T.K. II, 139 Wn.2d at 332 (some 

alterations in original (quoting State v. Hodgson, 108 Wn.2d 662, 668, 740 P.2d 

848 (1987)). The court also considered the subject matter addressed by the 

statute and the mandatory language of the statute. Because T.K.’s right vested 

 

5 We briefly note that “matured” and “vested” are used interchangeably in 

vested rights analysis and possess substantially similar meanings. Compare

T.K. I, 94 Wn. App. at 290 (referring to a right as “matured”) with T.K. II, 139 

Wn.2d at 332 (referring to a right as “vested”). 
No. 85870-0-I/11

11

before the change in the law, our Supreme Court reasoned that the new law 

could not retroactively require T.K. to meet stricter conditions for sealing his 

juvenile records. T.K. II, 139 Wn.2d at 334-35. 

But T.K. does not stand for the proposition that completion of statutory 

requirements always resulted in a vested right. The Supreme Court in T.K. II

considered the subject matter of the statute and the language of the statute when 

it concluded that T.K. possessed a vested right to have their convictions sealed. 

139 Wn.2d at 331-32. Furthermore, since T.K. II, courts have not extended 

vested rights analysis outside the arena of sealing or vacation. Compare State v. 

D.S., 128 Wn. App. 569, 115 P.3d 1047 (2005) (vested right to have juvenile 

records sealed) and In re Pers. Restraint of Carrier, 173 Wn.2d 791, 272 P.3d 

209 (2012) (vested right in vacated status of former conviction) with State v. 

Webb, 112 Wn. App. 618, 50 P.3d 654 (2002) (no vested right under former 

offender scoring statute); State v. Sell, 110 Wn. App. 741, 43 P.3d 1246 (2002) 

(no vested right to deferred DUI prosecution); State v. Varga, 151 Wn.2d 179, 86 

P.3d 139 (2004) (no vested right in “washed out” status of prior convictions); In re 

Pers. Restraint of Martin, 129 Wn. App. 135, 118 P.3d 387 (2005) (no vested 

right to delay paying LFOs until after release); In re Pers. Restraint of Flint, 174 

Wn.2d 539, 277 P.3d 657 (2012) (no vested right to remain in community 

custody).

Arends’s assertion that there is “no conceptual difference between the 

juvenile sealing scheme and the firearm restoration scheme” is unpersuasive. 
No. 85870-0-I/12

12

The statutes at issue in T.K. II and the present case are markedly different. The 

juvenile sealing scheme aims to “limit public access to juvenile court records in 

recognition of the unique purpose of juvenile courts to rehabilitate and reintegrate 

youth into society.” State v. S.J.C., 183 Wn.2d 408, 419, 352 P.3d 749 (2015). 

The legislature has repeatedly recognized that “ ‘[c]hildren are different’ ” from 

adults and that “ ‘our criminal justice system [must] address this difference when 

punishing children.’ ” State v. Anderson, 200 Wn.2d 266, 285, 516 P.3d 1213

(2022) (second alteration in original) (quoting In re Pers. Restraint of Ali, 196 

Wn.2d 220, 225, 474 P.3d 507 (2020). Rather than restoring a right, the act of 

sealing gives juveniles new rights to protect their futures. 

In contrast, the firearm restoration scheme is carefully structured to further 

public safety and prevent gun violence. Firearm restoration returns a right that 

was purposefully taken away to protect the public. Although the two statutes 

share some similarities, their vast difference in subject matter and legislative 

intent sets them apart. T.K. II is readily distinguishable from the case at hand.

Because we conclude that Arends did not possess a vested right to 

proceed under former RCW 9.41.040, we conclude that the court did not err in 

denying Arends’s restoration petition.

3. Relief Available

Finally, we briefly note that at oral argument, Arends revealed that he 

successfully petitioned a South Dakota court to restore his right to possess a 
No. 85870-0-I/13

13

firearm.

6

 Arends claimed that a Washington court would not recognize the South 

Dakota order and that there was no procedure available to seek recognition of 

the South Dakota order.7 But under the full faith and credit clause of the United 

States Constitution, a judgment rendered by another state is entitled to 

recognition in Washington. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1 (“Full faith and credit shall be 

given in each state to the public acts, records, and judicial proceedings of every 

other state.”). And Arends provides no evidence that no procedure exists for him 

to petition the court for relief.

We affirm. 

WE CONCUR:

 

6 Wash. Ct. of Appeals oral argument, State v. Arends, No. 85870-0-I

(Jan. 19, 2024), at 21 min., 38 sec. through 22 min., 5 sec., audio recording by

TVW, Washington State’s Public Affairs Network, http://www.tvw.org.

7 Wash. Ct. of Appeals oral argument, supra.