MA'TT'ER OF M— 

In DEPORTATION Proceedings 

A-10582561 

Decided by Board June 28, 1962 

Crime involving moral turpitude—Section 835(a), Title 14, Virgin Islands Code. 

Conviction for drawing and delivering worthless checks in violation of section 835(a), Title 14, Virgin Islands Code, is conviction of a crime involving 

moral turpitude. • 

CHARGE: 

Order: Act of 1952—Section 241(a) (4) [8 U.S.C. 1251(a) (4) j—Crime within 

five years—Drawing and delivering worthless checks. 

BEFORE THE BOARD 

DISCUSSION: The special inquiry officer terminated the deportaportation proceeding and certified the case to this Board for final 

decision. 

The respondent is a 32-year-old married male, native of the Canal 

Zone and British subject, who last entered the United States on 

November 1, 1957, at which time he was admitted for permanent 

residence. On December 22, 1961, he was convicted in the District 

Court of the Virgin Islands on five counts of a criminal information 

which charged the drawing and delivering of worthless checks and 

he was sentenced to imprisonment for 2 1/2years. Six months of the 

sentence was to be served in jail and the remainder of the sentence 

was suspended, the respondent being placed on probation during 

the latter 2 years. The offenses were committed between June 9, and 

August 12, 1961. The sole issue is whether the crimes involve moral 

turpitude. 

We have carefully considered the entire record. The Virgin Islands Code (Title 14, section 835(a)) provides, in part, as follows: 

"Whoever makes, draws, utters, or delivers any check, draft or order 

for the payment of money—(1) to the value of $100 or more upon 

any bank or other depository Iniowing at the time of such making, 

drawing, uttering or delivering that the maker or drawer has not 

sufficient funds in, or credit with, such bank or other depository for 

the payment of such check, draft or order, in full, upon its presenta743 
tion, shall be fined not more than $1,000 or imprisoned not more than 

5 years, or both * * *." The second subdivision of section 835 (a) 

provides for a fine of not more than $200 or imprisonment of not 

more than one year, or both, where the value of the check was less 

than $100. Section 835 (b) provides that the making of a check, the 

payment of which is refused by the drawee, shall be 'prima facie 

evidence of the maker's knowledge of insufficient funds in such bank 

if the maker has not paid the drawee the amount due together with 

costs within ten days after receiving notice that such check has not 

been paid by the drawee. 

In Matter of B—, 4-297 (1951), we concluded that issuing worthless checks under the statutory provisions of Ohio and Indiana involved moral turpitude. In both of these statutes, however, an es-

.' tial element was the intent to defraud; whereas, the statutory provision under discussion here does not specifically refer to this as being 

an element of the crime. For that reason, and due to certain language 

in another reported case, the special inquiry officer was of the opinion 

that the Government failed to establish that the crimes involve moral 

turpitude. 

The reported case last mentioned is Matter of B—, 3-278 (1948), 

which was a decision by the Service that did not reach this Board for 

review. It involved a conviction under a- French statutory provision 

for issuing checks without having the necessary funds on deposit. 

That statute did not require intent to defraud but did require the 

element of bad faith. The discussion there related primarily to the 

element of bad faith, and the Service concluded that it was not established that the crime involved moral turpitude. We do not consider 

that case relevant since the statutory provision in this respondent's 

case does not involve the term "bad faith." In that case, at pages 279– 

80, there is a statement reading as follows : "Under the standards 

prevailing in the United.States the crime of which this alien was convicted would involve moral turpitude only if the offense was committed with intent to defraud." We do not believe that a statement 

so broad was necessary there. It seems to imply that issuing a worthless check in the United States would never involve moral turpitude 

unless the statute of the particular State expressly made the intent 

to defraud an element of the crime. For the reasons indicated below, 

we disapprove any such implication from the quoted statement 

In Matter of B—, 4-297, supra, the Ohio and Indiana statutory 

provisions, by their specific language, made the intent to defraud an 

essential element of the crime. Hence, that fact alone made the offense 

one involving moral turpitude. On the other hand, it does not follow 

that the absence of this element from the statutory language makes a 

worthless check offense one that does not involve moral turpitude. 

744 
The statutory provision under which this respondent was cinivieted 

specifically requires knowledge on the part of the maker of the dieck 

that he does not have sufficient funds in the hank for the payment of 

the check, and we believe that issuing a check under such circumstances 

is tantamount to an intention to defraud. This is particularly so 

since any possibility that the check might have been issued inadvertently or negligently is ruled out by the provision of section 835(h) 

which affords the maker of the check ten days within which to arrange 

pi yment. 

In Jordan v. DeGeorge, 341 U.S. 223 (1951), the Court was considering convictions for conspiracy to defraud the United States of 

taxes and held that the offenses involved moral turpitude. However, 

the Court went beyond that and said (p. 232) : "* * * the decided 

cases make it plain that crimes in which fraud was an ingredient 

have always been regarded as involving moral turpitude" and that 

the phrase "crime involving moral turpitude" has without exception 

been construed to embrace fraudulen, conduct. One of the cases 

cited by the Court as involving an intent to defraud was United 

States ex rel. Popoff v. Reimer, 79 F.2d 513 (C.C.A. 2, 1935). Popoff 

had been convicted under 8 U.S.C. 414, 1934 ed., for knowingly aiding an alien not entitled thereto to apply for or to secure naturalization, etc. Although the statute did not contain any element of 

intent to defraud the Government, the Circuit Court of Appeals 

stated that the appellant's crime necessarily was aiding the applicant 

to commit a fraud upon the Government and that the offense involved moral turpitude. 

In Matter 1?—, 5-29 (approved by Atty. Gen., 1952), we readied 

the conclusion that moral turpitude was involved in the conviction 

of an alien for being a party to the making of a false statement concerning the alien's nonliability for military service in violation of 50 

U.S.11. App. 311. Although the statutory provision contained no 

language which could be considered as making the intent to defraud 

an element of the crime, we held (p. 38) that fraud was inherent in the 

offense. In Matter of G—R—, 2 733 (approved by Atty. Gen., 

1947), we held that assault with a deadly weapon involved moral 

turpitude although the conviction was under a statute which had been 

amended so that. "with intent to do bodily harm" had been deleted. 

In Seaboard 011 Co. v. Cunningham, 51 F.2d 321 (C.C.A. 5, 

1931), cert. den. 284 U.S. 657, the court considered two sections of 

the laws of Florida relating to the issuance of checks without having 

Ull lielmbit fur the pitymen:, thereof. The court 

stated (p. 324) that neither of the sections by express words made 

the intent to defraud an element of the crime, but that the general 

rule is that criminal intent is an implied and nee(, ..,, ary ingredient. 

745 
In view of the foregoing, it is our considered opinion that the 

crime set forth in section 835(a), Title 14, Virgin Islands Code, 

involves moral turpitude, and we conclude that the respondent is 

deportable on the charge stated in the order to show cause. During 

the hearing, the respondent stated that he desired to apply for voluntary departure, but he is not eligible for that relief. Section 

244(e) of the Immigration and Nationality Act prohibits the granting of voluntary departure to an alien who is deportable under section 241(a) (4) unless he is eligible for suspension of deportation 

under paragraphs (4) or , (5) of section 244(a). In addition, the 

respondent is unable to prove the required good moral character 

because of the provisions of section 101 ( f) (3) of the Act. 

It appears that the respondent's wife is an alien lawfully admitted 

r permanent residence. The special inquiry officer indicated to 

the respondent that he could request, in the deportation proceeding, 

that the crime be waived ; that the matter of submitting such an 

application would be deferred temporarily ; and that the respondent 

would be given an c-wortunity to submit the application if the 

special inquiry officer concluded that he was deportable. The respondent is not eligible to apply, during the deportation proceeding, 

for a waiver under section 212 (g) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, as amended September 26, 1961, but such application is to be 

filed with the American consular officer at the time the alien may 

apply for a new immigrant visa.' Matter of DeF—, 8-68 (Atty. 

_Gen., 1959) ; Matter of DeG , 8 325 (Atty. Gen., 1959) ; 8 CFR 

212.7(a). The respondent designated Panama as the country to which 

he is to be deported, and the special inquiry officer informed him that 

if Panama refused to accept him deportation would be directed to 

England. 

ORDER: It is ordered that the special inquiry officer's order terminating the deportation proceeding be withdrawn. 

It is further ordered that the respondent be deported from the 

United States to Panama, or in the alternative to England, on the 

-charge stated in the order to show cause. 

'We are not here concerned with applications made under sections 245 and 

249 of the Immigration and Nationality Act, and filed in accordance with the 

provisions of 8 OFR 242.17. 

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