EXECUTIVE SESSION 

PERMANENT SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE, 

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, 

WASHINGTON, D.C. 

INTERVIEW OF: JOHN CARLIN 

Thursday, July, 2017 

Washington, D.C. 

The interview in the above matter was held in Room HVC-304, the Capitol, 

commencing at 10:13 a.m. 

Present: Representatives Gowdy, Stewart, Speier, Schiff, Swalwell, and 

Conaway. 
Appearances: 

For the PERMANENT SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE: 

For JOHN CARLIN: 

KENNETH L. WAINSTEIN, ESQ. 

Davis Polk & Wardwell, LLP 

901 15th Street, NW 

Washington, D.C. 20005 

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3 

Good morning, everyone. This is a transcribed interview of 

John Carlin, former Assistant Attorney General for the National Security Division at 

Department of Justice. 

Sir, thank you for speaking with us today. 

MR. CARLIN: Thank you. 

For the record, I'm , staff member for the House 

Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence. At this point, in time I'd like for us to 

briefly go around the room and introduce ourselves, starting with Mr. Gowdy. 

MR. GOWDY: Trey Gowdy, South Carolina. 

MR. STEWART OF UTAH: Congressman Stewart, from Utah. 

, HPSCI staff. 

with the majority staff. 

, with the minority. 

with the minority. 

MS. SPEIER: Jackie Speier, California. 

MR. SCHIFF: Adam Schiff, California. 

MR. WAINSTEIN: Ken Wainstein. 

MR. CARLIN: And John Carlin. 

the record. 

Thank you. Before we begin, I want to state a few things for 

MR. STEWART OF UTAH: I'm sorry, can I just-- Ken, what's your role? 

MR. WAINSTEIN: I am his counsel. 

MR. STEWART OF UTAH: Okay. I wanted to make sure. 

The questioning will be conducted by members and staff. 

During the course of this interview members and staff may ask questions during 
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their allotted time period. Some questions may seem basic, but that is because we 

need to clearly establish fact and understand the situation. Please do not assume 

we know any facts you may previously have disclosed as part of any other 

investigations or review. 

During the course of this interview, we will take any breaks that you desire. 

There is a reporter making a record of these proceedings so we can easily consult 

written compilation of your answers. The reporter may ask you to spell certain 

terms or unusual phrases you might use and ask may you to slow down or repeat 

your answers. 

We ask that you give complete and fulsome replies to questions based on 

your best recollections. Right now clear top secret /SCI level, but please let us 

know if your answer requires you to speak to classified at a compartmented level 

and we will make the necessary arrangements. 

If a question unclear or you're uncertain in your response, please let us know. 

And if you do not know the answer to a question or cannot remember, simply say so. 

You are entitled to have a lawyer present for this interview, though you are 

not required to. I understand that Ken Wainstein of Davis Polk is here with you 

today. For the record, I will ask him to state his details again. 

MR. WAINSTEIN: Ken Wainstein, W-a-i-n-s-t-e-i-n, Davis Polk & Wardwell, 

representing John Carlin. 

Thank you sir. The interview will be transcribed. Because 

the reporter cannot record gestures, we ask that you answer verbally. If you forget 

to do this, you might be reminded to do so. 

Consistent with the committee's rules of procedure you or you and your 

counsel if you wish, will have a reasonable opportunity to inspect the transcript of 
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this interview in order to determine whether your answers were correctly 

transcribed. The transcript will remain in the committee's custody. The committee 

also reserves the right to request your return for additional questions should the 

need arise. 

The process for the interview is as follows, the majority will be given 45 

minutes to ask questions, then the minority will be given 45 minutes to ask their 

questions. Immediately thereafter, we will take a 5 minute break. After which, the 

majority will be given 15 minutes to ask questions and the minority will be given 15 

minutes to ask questions. These time limits will be strictly adhered to by all sides 

with no extensions being granted. Time will be kept for each portion of the 

interview with warnings given at the 5 minute and 1 minute mark respectively. 

To ensure confidentiality, we ask that you not disclose the interview with 

anyone, other than your attorney. Our record today will reflect that you have not 

been compelled to appear. You are reminded that it is unlawful to deliberately 

provide false information to Member of Congress or staff. Lastly, the record will 

reflect that you are voluntarily participating in this interview which is under oath. 

Do you understand these circumstances, sir? 

MR. CARLIN: Yes. 

And if you will raise your right- hand, I will administer the oath. 

Do you solemnly swear to tell the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the 

truth, so help you god? 

Thank you, sir. 

Mr. Gowdy, over to you. 

MR. GOWDY: It's 10:15, does everybody agree on the time? 

Yes sir. 
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EXAMINATION: 

MR. GOWDY: Mr. Carlin, thank you for being here. You're a subject 

matter expert. I can't speak for my colleagues on the other side, but neither Mr. 

Stewart nor I would qualify as a subject matter expert. So before we ask you what 

appears to be a rudimentary question, just bear with us, okay? 

MR. CARLIN: Yes. 

MR. GOWDY: Are you familiar with what is sometimes referred to as the 

Steele dossier? 

MR. CARLIN: Yes. 

MR. GOWDY: Have you read it? 

MR. CARLIN: Public parts -- yeah, I can't recall reading it in its entirety, I 

think I've read parts of it. 

MR. GOWDY: Let's go back to the Carter Page FISA application. 

MR. STEWART OF UTAH: Can I ask you a clarifying question? 

MR. GOWDY: Sure. 

MR. STEWART OF UTAH: When you say you read parts of it, did you read 

that as parts of it in your role in a classified setting or was it only in media reports? 

MR. CARLIN: Thanks for asking. That's the part that's getting fuzzed up in 

my memory which was directed to my attention when I was in the role versus all the 

chatter that's been there about it in the public reporting and then after the fact. 

MR. GOWDY: We'll make him get to it --

MR. SCHIFF: Mr. Gowdy, if I could. I just want to make sure we are 

permitted to discuss what you just asked about this in this setting with the people 

present who are present. I think we should make sure before we proceed on that. 

MR. GOWDY: You would know the answer to that better than I would, you 
are the ranking member and a member of the Gang of Eight. I don't know. 

: That's not our understanding, no. 

MR. SCHIFF: I don't believe we can go ahead with that with all the people 

present here. And --

MR. GOWDY: We can't go into the FISA application process? 

MR. SCHIFF: You mentioned a specific application and are we -- is this a 

classified session today? Is the first question. 

Yes, it is a classified session. 

MR. SCHIFF: Okay. The second is whether all the folks who are here, 

including staff and members are permitted to go into this. So I don't know the 

answer to that. 

MR. GOWDY: I don't either and it will be a very short 2-hour interview if we 

cannot go into the FISA application. So I'm going to have to let someone else 

resolve that. I don't know the answer to that question. 

MR. SCHIFF: We've had a rather uncoordinated, to put it diplomatically, 

process with that where initially it was only the Gang of Eight, then the Judiciary 

Committee was permitted to see it, but not the members of our committee, apart 

from the Gang of Eight. But then some of our members went to the Judiciary 

Committee to view it. And that made the least sense of all. 

But also I think apart from Gang of Eight staff, I don't know how many staff 

are permitted to discuss or learn about it. So that's as much as I can tell you about 

it. I can also say that -- well. I guess I shouldn't say any more than that. 

MR. GOWDY: Well, I appreciate you bringing that. As ranking member 

you are infinitely more familiar with what can and not be gone into then just regular 

old line back ventures like Stewart and myself. But to the extent the jurisdiction is 


an answer on this? 

MR. GOWDY: But what I'm struggling with is who do we go to for the 

answer. 

Well, we can figure that out. It will take a few minutes. 

MR. GOWDY: Off the record. 

[Recess.] 

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MR. GOWDY: Is there any resolution? Is it okay to proceed with our line of 

questions? 

MR. SCHIFF: I think we're going to start out by asking whether he 

participated in the preparation of any FISA application and see where we go from 

there. 

MR. GOWDY: Thank you for your patience, Mr. Carlin and to your attorney. 

Did you participate in preparation of any FISA applications related to Russian active 

measures or counterintelligence matters related to Russia in 2016? 

MR. CARLIN: Yes. 

MR. GOWDY: Did you participate in any FISA applications related to Carter 

Page? 

MR. CARLIN: I believe-- I believe I did. There's been so much public 

reporting since I left, but I remember being involved in the preparation of the FISA 

application for an individual that was related to the Trump campaign and being 

briefed on it. 

MR. GOWDY: Do you remember being involved in FISA applications for 

more than one person connected with the Trump campaign? 

MR. CARLIN: I just remember that -- I just remember one and -- I'm not 

sure how far to go while we're doing this --
MR. GOWDY: Well, I will be the one who gets in trouble, not you. 

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MR. CARLIN: Okay. I remember there was one application. I don't 

remember whether or not I actually signed it. My memory is that I did not sign it. 

But I remember getting briefed at one point that there's an application that involved 

someone who was linked to the campaign that our folks saw because of that it was a 

highly sensitive application, we're giving it extra scrutiny and that it relied upon -- the 

part of the affidavit relied upon -- a portion of the affidavit relied upon someone who 

was affiliated in some way with, or had been with, a group that was associated with 

the other campaign. And because of that, they wanted to give it extra scrutiny and 

to ensure that the leadership or the FBI knew -- knew of that background. So 

that -- that's the part that is sticking in my memory. 

MR. GOWDY: Now you lost me a little bit, which is my fault, not yours. 

When you said, the other campaign, what campaign are you referring to? 

MR. CARLIN: Sorry. So there was the Clinton campaign and the Trump 

campaign. There was an individual who was associated with the Trump campaign 

as I recall with this application. I'm not sure if they knew exactly what the nature of 

the association was and then there was part of the information, that was going into 

the affidavit for probable cause, came from someone who had had some 

association with a group that was associated with the Clinton campaign. 

MR. GOWDY: Do you recall the name of the group? 

MR. CARLIN: I don't, but-- I think at the time that association was 

supposed to be over, but it still caused reason to give it extra scrutiny. And our 

folks wanted to make sure that the leadership of the FBI knew the history of whoever 

that individual was and could take extra steps to either corroborate that he had given 

truthful information before or that there were other -- other factors inside the affidavit 
that would corroborate it. And --

MR. GOWDY: Do you remember the name of the individual? 

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MR. CARLIN: I -- I don't actually -- there's been so much public reporting 

since that it's influencing, but I don't think I cleanly remember, you know, them -- the 

name based on what I remember from that actual time. If that makes sense. 

MR. GOWDY: Sort of. Is your -- any chance the public reporting may have 

refreshed your recollection on the name you previously remembered? 

MR. CARLIN: I'm so skeptical often of what the public reporting is getting 

right, what actually happened. I'm trying to distinguish what I read in the papers 

versus what I actually remember happening at the time. I don't think I was that 

focused on the name of the person at the time. 

What I remember is being briefed on that surrounding set of circumstances. 

And then because of that, making sure that there was a briefing so that the 

leadership of the Department was aware of it and that the FBI leadership was aware 

of it. And I remember talking to -- raising it with the then deputy director Andrew 

McCabe. 

MR. GOWDY: All right. That's on the Bureau side. On the DOJ side, who 

can sign off on or approve FISA applications related to counterintelligence? 

MR. CARLIN: The Attorney General, Deputy Attorney General, and me. 

And on this one, without looking at the document, I don't actually remember signing 

this particular FISA -- I don't know if there's a way to refresh my recollection? 

MR. GOWDY: And the Attorney General at the time would have been Ms. 

Sally Yates? 

MR. CARLIN: No, the Attorney General then was -- she was the deputy 

Attorney General at the time and the Attorney General was Loretta Lynch. 
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MR. GOWDY: So Ms. Lynch, Ms. Yates and you, would have been one of 

the three to sign off on FISA applications related to counterintelligence during this 

time period? 

MR. CARLIN: Yes. 

MR. GOWDY: All right. And you don't recall whether you were the one 

who did it or not? 

MR. CARLIN: Correct. 

MR. GOWDY: All right. Do you recall reading what's been known as the 

Steele dossier during this same time period? 

MR. CARLIN: See that's the part -- I don't remember reading the whole, 

what's now called the Steele dossier or something called a dossier at the time. 

MR. GOWDY: So that was an inartfully asked question on my behalf. I've 

got to ask it more artfully. Do you recall any portions of the Steele dossier being in 

any application you reviewed prior to submitting it? 

MR. CARLIN: The part I remember, I think it was the same individual that 

later gets associated with the dossier was a -- one of the sources for some of the 

information in the application, because that was the issue that got flagged. I don't 

remember at the time if it was called a dossier. I know that there was some written 

documents versus them relying on a source. 

MR. GOWDY: This would have been a Bureau source? 

MR. CARLIN: Yes. 

MR. GOWDY: Is this the same person you're referring to go that may have 

been connected with what you called another campaign or the other campaign. 

MR. CARLIN: The other -- the Clinton campaign, yes. 

MR. GOWDY: The Clinton campaign. 


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questions about the sourcing, that's the part that's sticking in my head? 

MR. GOWDY: The evidentiary standard for seeking a FISA warrant would 

be what. 

MR. CARLIN: Probable cause. 

MR. GOWDY: So how would you investigate or seek to substantiate the 

information you received from sources and subsources? 

MR. CARLIN: And that's fairly common this issue of -- you're a former 

prosecutor -- getting back to when I was in street crime. I remember going a jury 

and explaining if all crime happened in front of a church, that would be great, and 

then you would be hearing from priests as witnesses, but it doesn't. And usually 

you end up hearing from people who have something in their backgrounds, but you 

need to look at all the circumstances, all the facts and -- to corroborate and see 

whether it's true or not. 

A lot of the sources that we would use would have one issue or another. 

And it is important in those cases to make sure that that information is included in 

your application to the court and then anything that would corroborate them is also 

included in the application to the court. 

My memories on this, even before I left based on the oral conversation that 

our folks had already been told that he had done prior work for the FBI that had 

proven to be corroborated. 

MR. GOWDY: Him being who? 

MR. CARLIN: I'm conflating it with public reporting. I wouldn't otherwise 

independently remember the guy's name from this conversation, but I assume it is 

Steele based the public reporting. 

MR. GOWDY: You believe it was Steele. 
MR. CARLIN: Based on the public -- the way it is has been publicly 

reported. I don't think, without looking at the --

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MR. GOWDY: You don't recall whether or not he was an official source of 

the Bureau signed up as an informant? 

MR. CARLIN: No, I just don't remember. 

MR. GOWDY: What would refresh your recollection on whether or not there 

were any applications submitted that were either withdrawn or rejected? 

MR. CARLIN: The applications if there's any back and forth with the court. 

MR. GOWDY: Where would that be? 

MR. CARLIN: Where would the application -­

MR. GOWDY: Where would that --

MR. CARLIN: I guess it would reside in -- the way it was structured, I had a 

deputy assistant attorney general, who oversaw the office of intelligence, Stewart 

Evans, there would be records that were held in that shop. 

In that shop there's a subsection called counterintelligence investigations, 

other than that I guess the court. But I'm not as familiar with ho

,

w the court keeps its 

own records. 

MR. GOWDY: Who took your place? 

MR. CARLIN: When I immediately left, the acting assistant attorney general 

was Mary McCord. And then subsequently she's left, and now the acting assistant 

attorney general is Dana Boente, and there hasn't been a nominee yet. 

MR. GOWDY: So you would not -- typically how long are applications valid 

for -- not applications, warrants. If it is signed, how long is it good for? 

MR. CARLIN: I don't recall. 

MR. GOWDY: Does it differ depending on the case? 
MR. CARLIN: I think in some cases we did put in different reviewed 

provisions with the court. 

MR. GOWDY: So you wouldn't know whether or not DOJ or the Bureau 

asked for a re- up? 

MR. CARLIN: No. 

MR. GOWDY: You wouldn't know, you were gone at the time? 

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MR. CARLIN: Certainly. If it was signed after I left, I certainly would be 

gone when it was re- upped and I think I would be gone anyway because my 

recollection is it was happening towards the end of my tenure. I knew I was leaving 

at that time. 

MR. GOWDY: All right. Well let's go to something that was squarely within 

your tenure. June of 2016, I believe -- my friends on the other side will correct me if 

I'm wrong, I believe Director Corney testified that the Bureau's investigation began 

in June of 2016. Do you remember when you were first briefed on Russian efforts 

to interfere/influence our 2016 election? 

MR. CARLIN: Sorry. Director Corney testified that what began in June of 

2016? 

MR. GOWDY: The Bureau's investigation. And I could be wrong about 

that. I have that -- well, let me just ask you, do you recall when the Bureau -- does 

the Bureau have to come to you for permission to begin an investigation into matters 

like that? 

MR. CARLIN: So the way the counterintelligence investigations work, as a 

best practice, if you will, we would really be encouraged if they were doing the 

counterintelligence investigation that they would hook up in the beginning with our 

CS, our counterintelligence and expert control section. Both when I was at the 

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can't remember the precise dates, but June sounds about right on some of the cyber 

enabled activity. 

MR. GOWDY: This estimate speaks for itself, I could be off. You 

mentioned cyber activities with respect to campaigns. When did you learn that 

DNC had been hacked? 

MR. CARLIN: That's the part -- I can't fully remember, but June sounds 

right. I'm just not -- I would have to look, and it may have even been a bit earlier 

that I heard wind of it. I might be conflating it with some of these other Russian 

activities that we were hearing at the same time in terms of nonprofits and others. 

MR. GOWDY: Were you part of the investigation into the hack of the DNC 

servers? 

MR. CARLIN: Yes. 

MR. GOWDY: Do you recall whether or not the DNC turned the server over 

to the Bureau? 

MR. CARLIN: I don't. I remember discussion about them working 

with -- they hired an outside -- they hired an outside contractor to assist them I think 

it was Crowd Strike and there were discussions back and forth about getting the data 

or information they needed from CrowdStrike. I recall asking about it a couple of 

times and not -- our folks weren't getting updates. There was a period of time it 

went kind of slow. 

MR. GOWDY: Why would the DNC go to, did you say CrowdStrike? 

MR. CARLIN: I may be misremembering. There were a couple of key ones 

that helped us on different cases. I think it was -- I think this one was Crowd Strike. 

MR. GOWDY: Why would the -- do you know why the DNC would go to 

CrowdStrike and not go to the Bureau? 
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MR. CARLIN: Actually that was fairly common in cyber investigations, I'm 

seeing that now on the private sector side. A lot of -- outside of any political 

organization, companies, most corporations, they often would use these third party 

contractors, who they hired through their own counsel, and maximize the control 

from the point of view of the victim. They are always worried about exactly what's 

going to happen if they share information. ·sometimes they are worried about their 

businesses being disrupted. 

And so there's a lot of expertise in some of these groups. They often have a 

lot of ex government employees in them. Actually, there was a hiring problem. It 

is something to worry about in the FBI because it is such a hot job right now. 

Sometimes you lose a lot of your best experts to outside vendors. So that part 

wouldn't have struck me as odd. 

MR. GOWDY: CrowdStrike, would have been good about producing 

witnesses for your subsequent trial? 

MR. CARLIN: I'm trying to remember the different groups, but in general, 

we've had success in criminal cases when we've used these third party 

intermediaries. Nation-state cases are rare to bring. It was part of a new process. 

We brought that first case in 2014 against five members of the People's Liberation 

Army. There I think it would be Mandiant, now FireEye, but they were cooperative 

and helped with the case in the -- North Korea has so many cases, I think it was 

Mandiant FireEye again, and they were helpful. 

I can't remember who some of the financial institutions used with the Iranian 

D-DOS attacks case. But in general we often did use, we'd either use them as 

witnesses or they would provide information in a way that we could subsequently 

authenticate and that would allow us to bring criminal cases. 
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MR. GOWDY: I'm trying to reconcile your being okay with an outside 

nongovernmental entity being used with Director Corney's frustration that it was not 

produced to the Bureau. I think he used to worked for the Bureau, didn't he? 

MR. CARLIN: Oh, yeah. No, I mean -- look, we always, if you could get it 

kind of the dru.thers wou ld be get everything we can directly from the victim 

compan ies, servers, et cetera. It's just in cyber cases for a while that rarely was 

happening when it came to private company victims instead we're working through 

third party intermediaries. 

There may be frustrations sometimes depending on the third party 

intermediary and the victim as to what they give you. The idea that we d idn't get 

u nfettered access is pretty common in a cyber investigation these days. It doesn't 

mean you love it, but actually a lot of the cyber agencies are trying to use that too. 

MR. GOWDY: I guess I'm just trying to understand why a victim would feel 

comfortable providing something to a private entity, but not being comfortable 

providing it to the world's premier law enforcement agency? 

MR. CARLIN: Well, obviously my bias towards the world's premier law 

enforcement agency, having worked there, but I'm seeing it now. When I advise 

private clients too, and I can tell you a little bit about the thought process -- I know a 

little bit more of their thought process, not that they didn'ttry to explain it to me when 

I was on the other side too, but -- and I'm not saying this specifically for DNC, this is 

more general for private companies when they are going through this thought 

process. 

But they want to maximize the control over the information , they retain the 

private group so it works for them, usually through counsel, so it is privileged and 

they are often worried about ancillary consequences . So they might support the 
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law enforcement investigation. Sometimes they are worried at what might happen 

if there's a prosecution, how disruptive it is going to be to their business, but then 

they also worry about potential ancillary consequences like civil suit from people 

whose information might be compromised or regulatory actions. 

And so it is just a lot of uncertainty for them. They are trying to increase the 

certainty and one way they can do that is by having the private company report 

directly to them, take their direction through counsel. 

MR. GOWDY: I get that, but we're in the summer of 2016, when the throes 

of the presidential election a foreign country is attempting to either interrupt, 

influence or otherwise impact the election. There's always a potential for other. 

victims, which I would think you would want to stop the potentiality for others being 

victimized. Which just has me wondering why you wouldn't turn it over to the 

world's premier law agency, if for no other reason than just to prevent other people 

from being victimized? 

MR. CARLIN: Is that a specific case, I can't -- I would just be speculate to 

what was going on in their internal conversations. It was vital to us --

MR. GOWDY: So you didn't have any conversations with anyone at the 

DNC about it? That would have been the Bureau? 

MR. CARLIN: I did not. And I remember the Bureau handling it and I 

actually remember us saying is there some way we can help or get our folks directly 

involved with the conversation? I don't know whether that happened in this case. 

Sometimes we would end up being the intermediary usually with counsel, not 

directly with the company itself. So again, they usually hire them through an 

outside law firm. Our trial attorneys would sometimes have the conversation over 

the terms with the outside law firm. In this case, I think -- I do have a memory for a 
24 

period of time that it was just the FBI because I remember our folks, and I asked at 

some point is there some way can help we bring our trial attorneys in. I don't 

remember if they ever got brought in to that conversation. 

MR. GOWDY: Would you have probable cause to issue a subpoena or 

search warrant for the server? 

MR. CARLIN: I don't remember being presented with an affidavit. 

MR. GOWDY: It is a separate question. 

MR. CARLIN: Right. So it's hard to --

MR. GOWDY: Is that evidence of a crime? 

MR. CARLIN: -- speculate. You think at some point we'd probably cross 

that threshold, I don't know if we crossed that threshold because of what they 

provided. 

MR. GOWDY: Would it have been evidence of a crime? 

MR. CARLIN: Our theory would be yeah, every time we have a potential 

hack that the server could contain evidence of that crime. 

MR. GOWDY: Would it potentially have helped you identify who the 

perpetrator was? 

MR. CARLIN: That being -- the information that would reside on the 

servers? 

MR. GOWDY: Yeah. 

MR. CARLIN: Sure, yeah. You want to do the forensic analysis of the 

servers. 

MR. GOWDY: So you would have had probable cause to issue a subpoena 

and or search warrant, a grand jury subpoena or a search warrant? 

MR. CARLIN: So there's -- a subpoena is a lower threshold so I think at 


27 

regularly. It was unusual for them to come outside of the context of the briefing and 

get a normal FISA to have a special briefing, saying we have a concern, this one's 

highly sensitive. So that's unusual. 

And then secondly, having a foreign power potentially directly try to co- op 

someone in a presidential campaign, my experience I don't recall that happening 

before. 

MR. STEWART OF UTAH: Yeah. And I appreciate that and that helps me 

understand it. And we're reviewing what you were telling us before, this was highly 

sensitive. So you -- your organization was giving it extra scrutiny. But at the same 

time you don't recall. As you sit here today, you can't tell us yes or no that this 

was -- that Carter Page was a target of this application? 

MR. CARLIN: I want to look at the -- I want to look at the application, that's 

my memory is that it is Carter Page. It's just there has been so much reporting 

between whatever this late October and September and now I'm afraid that's 

influencing my ability to go back. 

MR. STEWART OF UTAH: Okay. Believe me, I have a horrible memory. 

I would hate to have to go back and recall these things. But that does help, 

because you think it was Carter Page, but you would want to verify that. Is that a 

fair synopsis? 

MR. CARLIN: Yes. 

MR. STEWART OF UTAH: Okay. You mentioned that the reviewed 

information was provided from a group associated with other campaigns. Did they 

question the credibility of the source then, of some of the sourcing material for this 

application? That would have justified this application? As you are having this 

conversation or this briefing did someone raise their hand and say, we don't know if 

MR. STEWART OF UTAH: Suspicious characters in general. 

29 

Was there any advocate or any individual or individuals who seemed to be 

more active saying, I don't think we can trust this source, I think we need to delve 

into this more deeply? 

MR. CARLIN: In this case? 

MR. STEWART OF UTAH: Yeah. 

MR. CARLIN: So I remember them -- Stu Evans, the deputy assistant 

attorney general is the one I -- I don't remember if there's someone else at the 

briefing, but I remember Stu Evans was there and he's the one you said both that 

this was sensitive and that there was this issue with the source. And it was that 

combination of the sensitivity of who the FISA would be on, plus the issue with the 

source that correctly, and I agreed with him, meant it should get a higher level of 

scrutiny and that it the leadership and the FBI and the Department should be aware 

before it was signed off on. 

And we should take the extra steps in terms of -- if I remember, learning more 

about his -- at some point it came back from the FBI and it had additional history with 

him which is why I think he was considered a trusted source in the past. 

MR. STEWART OF UTAH: So he was considered a trusted source by the 

FBI? 

MR. CARLIN: That's my -- yeah, that's my memory that there were some 

folks that worked with the source in the past, other cases and it had been 

corroborated. 

Five minutes, sir. 

MR. STEWART OF UTAH: I will go more quickly then. 

So it is your recollection that if someone is in the FBI or the FBl's agency who 
30 

says no we believe this is a trusted source and we can rely upon this information? 

MR. CARLIN: Yeah. The way our process usually worked you ask 

questions of the investigative agency, they provided additional information. 

MR. STEWART: I have a couple more questions. Trey, do you have more 

that you want to come back to? 

MR. GOWDY: I just have two quick ones. 

Did you brief the AG on this matter? 

MR. CARLIN: That's where I have this -- I know that we arranged for them 

to be briefed, and I remember talking to the deputy director of the FBI about 

this - - about this matter. I don't have a specific memory of briefing the Attorney 

General on it. 

MR. GOWDY: The DAG. 

MR. CARLIN: Yeah, the deputy attorney general. I -- I don't -- I'm pretty 

sure she was at one of these meetings, but I don't actually 1 00 percent recall that I 

briefed or was present when the deputy attorney general was briefed, but I know 

that's the arrangement that our folks remember. I just can't remember whether I 

was actually there or not. 

MR. GOWDY: Last two questions, Congressman. 

MR. STEWART OF UTAH: Yes. 

MR. GOWDY: Did you discuss this matter with the media at any point 

before you left DOJ? 

MR. CARLIN: No. 

MR. GOWDY: Have you discussed this matter with the media since you left 

DOJ? 

MR. CARLIN: When you say this matter, they definitely ask, but I take very 


33 

what you're referring to there is an organization that was hired by one Republican 

candidate in the primary and later contracted with the Clinton campaign in terms of 

operational research. Is that the type of relationship you're talking about? 

MR. CARLIN: Yeah, that's helping to refresh my memory. It was 

something like that, yes. 

MR. SCHIFF: And this was someone that was doing work for that 

organization, but not directly for either of those prior campaigns, either of those 

other campaigns? 

MR. CARLIN: I just don't remember, but I remember -- after some back and 

forth between the attorneys and the FBI that my memory is that at the time this was 

coming up that he wasn't -- he was doing this on his own rather than working for 

someone affiliated with one of the campaigns. That's my memory of it. 

MR. SCHIFF: Your recollection is he a started out working for this entity, 

that start out working for one or more campaigns, at the time he was providing this 

information he was doing it for a different reason, but the history was a concern? 

MR. CARLIN: Yes. 

been considered a big deal, something to be very careful about. 

MR. CARLIN: Yes. 

MR. SCHIFF: And then you have the second layer being that this former 

British intelligence person had at one point worked for an entity affiliated with 

opposition campaigns? 

MR. CARLIN: Yes. 

MR. SCHIFF: So both those factors would have told you that we need to 

make sure we dot our "i's," cross our ''t's," and this source is credible? 

MR. CARLIN: Exactly, yes. 

35 

MR. SCHIFF: So when this was brought to your attention, your recollection 

is there was a discussion about needing to make sure that the information we're 

getting from this person is credible if we're going to put it in a FISA application. 

MR. CARLIN: Yes. 

MR. SCHIFF: And at some point, after those concerns were raised, it was 

brought back that, yes, in fact, he had a good relationship with the U.S. 

Government, and that he had been found to be credible in the past. 

MR. CARLIN: Yes. 

MR. SCHIFF: Do you know -- and you may have left by then -- whether, in 

fact, the FISA application was approved and what the result of the collection was on 

the FISA? 

MR. CARLIN: Yeah. I don't -- I don't remember hearing that it was 

approved, and I just don't remember that. 

If it had been declined while I was there, that's a significantly unusual event 

and rare enough that I would -- I think I would have remembered the clerk declining 

to sign an affidavit. 

37 

And I don't recall them -- I don't recall this reaching a stage where they 

elevated it and said -- and brought us in and said: We want to do a search warrant 

or we need this elevated to your level. 

MR. SCHIFF: At this point, also, you are not in a position to say whether the 

DNC had actually been asked for and turned down a request to provide their server? 

MR. CARLIN: No, I don't know. 

MR. SCHIFF: You mentioned in the private sector it's not uncommon for a 

victim of a cyber crime to want to hire a private firm rather than give over their server 

to the government and suffer whatever disruption that might occur? 

MR. CARLIN: In the majority of the cases that I oversaw, working as a 

prosecutor and now in the private sector, the company chooses to use a private 

vendor as an intermediary, usually through an offer. 

MR. SCHIFF: And this allows them to avoid disruption, but also maintain 

their proprietary interest in their information. 

MR. CARLIN: Yeah. It's a question of proprietary interest and then 

privilege. So it would be -- they want it to be attorney- client privilege. 

There are cases where they ask for a friendly -- what's called a friendly grand 

jury subpoena, the idea being they want to share the information, but if they share it 

pursuant to the authority of a grand jury subpoena, then that increases the likelihood 

that the information would be kept private. 

MR. SCHIFF: And you tried to work with them, because after all, they are 

the victims of the crimes, they are not the perpetrators that you would have brought 

before the grand jury? 

MR. CARLIN: One of the key changes that we have been trying to make, 

back since I was first a computer hacking, intellectual property prosecutor as an 
38 

AUSA, through one time at the FBI National Security Division, was encouraging 

companies to go forward. The FBI had a whole campaign, we did as well at the 

Department of Justice, to tell companies, if you come forward and say that you are a 

victim, we are going to treat you as a victim. We are not going to revictimize you as 

part of the crime. 

And it used to be 10, 12 years ago that companies would say that they didn't 

want to report these crimes because their offices would be turned into a crime 

scene. I think we've made good progress at changing that mentality, so they are 

hearing that we don't do that, that we work cooperatively, that we treat them as a 

victim, that we're concerned about their interests. 

That was of great importance both at the FBI and Justice to continue that 

campaign, because it's still a problem, that the majority of folks that are hacked in 

the private sector don't come forward and share that information with the Bureau. 

MR. SCHIFF: And you mentioned one of the reasons the private companies 

were reluctant to turn over the server is it might be disruptive to their business. In 

what way would that be disruptive? 

MR. CARLIN: So there's a couple of different reasons. I mean, one, 

literally, back when I was early doing this, you'd seize the server. And so, you 

know, that's where the information is housed that is running the computer system for 

the company, and depending on what the company is, their business may depend 

on that information, or maybe how they produce whatever widget it is that they're 

producing. So that can be enormously disruptive. 

And then they also are concerned, again, if they lose control of what's often 

private or proprietary information, either through the criminal justice process or 

because they have now -- they get shared with other regulatory agencies, plaintiffs 
39 

lawyers now routinely serve companies with requests when they do discovery to get 

at any information that you may have shared with the government. And I'm finding 

sort of it's a top- of- mind concern for general counsels. 

MR. SCHIFF: So in the midst of a Presidential campaign, it would be natural 

for a political party to be concerned about any disruption with having to give up their 

server? 

MR. CARLIN: I would imagine at least as much for a private company doing 

business, if you are in the middle of a campaign and you rely on your server for your 

data, it would be disruptive, sure. 

MR. SCHIFF: Let me turn, if I could, to a question of tradecraft. You've 

probably seen the public reports recently of a meeting that the President's son, 

Mr. Manafort, and Mr. Kushner had with several Russian -- Russians and Russian 

Americans. 

According to the email chain that produced that meeting, the meeting was 

brought about after communication between the Russian crown prosecutor, who I 

understand is the equivalent of the Russian attorney general, and Aras Agalarov, 

one of the oligarchs, in an effort to convey damaging information about Secretary 

Clinton to the Trump campaign. 

It is reported it went through a chain of crown prosecutor, to oligarch, to 

oligarch's son, to business associate, to President's son, to campaign. 

Does anything about that strike you as consistent with Russian tradecraft? 

If the Russians wanted to get information to the campaign, would they do it directly? 

Would they do it through cutouts? Would they do it through parties like were 

present at this meeting, a Russian lawyer, a Russian American lobbyist, a Russian 

oligarch, an oligarch's lawyer? Does any of that strike you as consistent with 


Russia oligarch sanctioned, my understanding is you cannot travel to the United 

States. Is that correct? 

42 

MR. CARLIN: I'd want to be careful on the details of the answer, but if you 

were specifically named in a sanction, it might be difficult for you to travel without 

getting -- I can't recall whether it was because of the sanction or because of the 

sanction we had a policy with Russia that they probably wouldn't, in the ordinary 

course, grant visas to those who were sanctioned. But the state would refuse to 

grant the visa unless there's some special circumstance as to which --

MS. SPEIER: So a special circumstance? 

MR. CARLIN: Yeah. 

MS. SPEIER: Because VEB was a sanctioned bank, and yet, Mr. Gorkov 

was here in the United States in early January. So I just found that kind of curious, 

like maybe there was some ironclad prohibition, but maybe there was not. 

MR. CARLIN: And I don't want -- there may be others who are more expert 

on that question. 

MS. SPEIER: So let's go back. We know now that Russia started hacking 

into the DNC server back in July of 2015. When did you become aware of it? 

MR. CARLIN: I don't recall the exact time I became aware of it. 

MS. SPEIER: But it was certainly before the FBI notified the DNC that they 

were being hacked, correct? Or did you find out about it --

MR. CARLIN: Actually, I'm not sure. I think that this -- this may not have 

been optimal, but I think they actually -- this may have proceeded for a period of 

time before I, at least, was notified, and that it may have happened -- I'm not sure 

anyone at NSD knew originally. 

MS. SPEIER: So in August or September, the DNC is notified by an FBI 



46 

who conspired with the PLA to hack into Boeing. 

And so the idea that it looked like the Russians were increasing their active 

measures campaign, we had seen them interfere with elections before, meant that 

from our perspective and the changes we were trying to make, that we were 

p ushing - or we wanted to try to be -- see if there was some way we could 

d isrupt - disrupt the Russians. 

MS. SPEIER: So, you know, hindsight is always 20/20. Do you think the 

U.S. Government moved too slowly? 

MR. CARLIN: So when -- if you think -- the intention behind going public on 

October 7th was to keep the Russians from trying to undermine confidence. in the 

integrity of our campaign and to view their efforts as a failure. 

And so with hindsight, we didn't do enough fast enough, because they view 

this as a success, which is why I think you see in the assessment, which I share, is 

that they are going to try to do this again in 2020, maybe as early as 201 8. 

So I'm glad this committee is taking the effort taken to learn what happened 

here. Hopefully, we can focus on what do we do to protect our system from an 

active threat is going to come at us -- come at us again. 

MS. SPEIER: Okay. With that admonition to all of us, what would you do 

d ifferently? 

MR. CARLIN: I had a couple of thoughts, and some are structural. 

So I think timing matters. Ideally, you could be able to go -- so there's a 

three-pronged approach that we have been pushing generally with the national 

security actors. One is figure out who did it. So there you just need to keep 

resourcing. I hope there's parts of the Community that are working to do 

attribution. And some private sector groups. 
47 

Second, when you figure out who did it, make it public, because if we keep it 

in the shadows, the type of harm that you can do through cyber- enabled means is 

different than the spy- versus- spy intelligence that we also handled in our division. 

And I don't think the kind of Cold War, keep everything in the shadows, just watch 

what they're doing works when you have an Intel threat on this scale. 

And the third is, once you figure out who did it and once you make it public, 

impose consequences and keep raising the costs until the behavior changes. I 

think we did that well in terms of changing Chinese approach to targeting our private 

companies for the private gain of their competitors. We have not done it yet in 

terms of changing Russia's calculus on meddling with our elections. 

I don't know if the December 29th actions were taken earlier, whether that 

would have had a more -- a greater impact on Russia's thinking and calculus; in 

other words, if those were done pre- campaign. 

But going forward, a couple of ideas. One would be that the administration, 

I think, struggled with the idea that anything they did would seem political, because 

there's always one party in charge, and there's going to be an opposition party the 

way our system works. So we all know that now. We know that Russian wants to 

exploit that. 

So if Congress were to mandate that the career professionals provide 

assessments like we do with things like the worldwide threat assessment, perhaps 

yearly, with a version of which that could be made public, at least as to the 

conclusions, you take out of the sphere of politics, I hope, and wouldn't make it 

partisan, and there would just be a declaration: So- and- so foreign power is trying 

to interfere with our elections. 

We are very focused on the Russians, rightly so, but now that Russia, looks 
48 

like they succeeded, I'm also worried about other nation-states thinking: Hey, this 

works, so let's try it. 

So that's one. 

Secondly, I wonder if Congress can help in terms of we need a deterrence 

element of our strategy, and to deter, it means your adversary needs to know in 

advance that you're actually going to take action . And there are i mportant 

separation of powers issues with Congress and the executive branch , b ut I know in 

other areas this committee and others have asked us to provide campaign. 

So once you get a report that a foreign power is trying to i nfluence our 

elections, certainly, if they are trying to actually hit the ballot boxes or people's ability 

to vote on the registration, that you have them briefed as to what the retaliatory 

actions are going to be and have a plan in place. And, ideally, we would announce 

ahead of time at a minimum that if we use this mechanism and conclude that you 

are trying to interfere with the election, there wi ll be consequences, both public and 

private, to a nation-state. 

MS. SPEIER: So when would you say you were certain it was Russia and 

no one else? 

MR. CARLIN: I don't have an exact date. 

MS. SPEIER: I u nderstand. 

MR. CARLIN: But by July. 

MS. SPEIER: 201 6? 

MR. CARLIN: By July 2016 and maybe earlier. 

MS. SPEIER: So in your schematic, that's when you wou ld take steps 

to -- you would announce it then, or would you have announced it before then? 

MR. CARLIN: As soon as you have the 

1

assessment that the foreign power 







56 

Act. You'd use the Espionage Act, 793. Depending on the circumstances in these 

cases, obstruction statutes, 18 U.S.C. 951. It's usually what we use for people who 

are spies and didn't declare it, which spies rarely do. 

MR. SWALWELL: Like FARA? 

MR. CARLIN: FARA, often versus like a 951. Or if you are a traditional 

spy, we're usually looking at our core statutes. But FARA's within the scope of 

jurisdiction. And then sometimes you look for money related. 

MR. SWALWELL: So that would be like RICO and wire fraud? 

MR. CARLIN: Wire fraud, money laundering type statutes, tax evasion. 

MR. SWALWELL: Great. Thank you. 

MR. GOWDY: We are going to go 15 and 15 now. 

I've been gone a long time, Mr. Carlin. I don't remember the word collude 

being part of the U.S. Code. No statutes that I was familiar with. 

Is the word collude part of any of the statutes you just made reference to, to 

Mr. Swalwell? 

MR. CARLIN: No, it's not a term I remember really using. 

MR. GOWDY: I do remember the word conspiracy. 

MR. CARLIN: Exactly, sir. 

MR. GOWDY: And I'm assuming the two words are 

interchangeably -- collude, conspiracy, confederate, tacit agreement -- I guess. 

don't know. The word collude, I'm not familiar with that being an element of any 

criminal statute. Have I missed one? 

MR. CARLIN: No, I think the two -- probably the two closest concepts, one 

would be a conspiracy, an agreement to commit a criminal act, where you take an 

overt step, and aiding and abetting, which if you aid and abet someone in the 
commission of another --

MR. GOWDY: Well, you can have this pretty good little felony that's after 

the fact. You may -- that's a stretch. 

MR. CARLIN: Like obstruction or false statement in order to protect 

someone else. 

57 

MR. GOWDY: Hold that false statement thought for just a second. We're 

going to come back to that. 

So the crimes that we know were committed, I guess, absent a jury verdict, 

hacking of the DNC and Podesta's Gmail account? 

MR. CARLIN: And they both, like, they'd be an unauthorized access to 

someone's system, at a minimum, you have computer fraud and abuse, and then, 

depending on the intent, might turn into -- actually, I know we're in a closed session, 

but it's just been ingrained in me as a prosecutor, it's not a crime unless someone 

brings a charge, but it does sound like criminal -- criminal conduct. 

MR. GOWDY: You don't recall any evidence in that FISA application 

suggesting that Carter Page colluded, conspired, confederated with either the 

hacking of the DNC or Podesta's email, do you? 

MR. CARLIN: My recollection of what's actually in the affidavit versus the 

brief that I got, I don't even really remember looking at the affidavit. But -- so I have 

trouble answering the question for that reason alone. If you are asking me at the 

time that I was there --

MR. GOWDY: Let me ask it differently, more broadly. Probable cause is 

the evidentiary standard for presenting something to the FISA court? 

MR. CARLIN: For a Title I FISA. 

MR. GOWDY: Okay. Probable cause of what? 
MR. CARLIN: Agent of a foreign power. Some people get confused on 

that, but this group knows. Could be a terrorist. 

MR. GOWDY: Weapons of mass destruction. 

MR. CARLIN: Okay. 

MR. GOWDY: But it doesn't have to be evidence of a crime? 

MR. CARLIN: No, it's a different standard. 

58 

MR. GOWDY: Okay. Now, you mentioned false statement. I want to ask 

you if you remember -- do you remember being interviewed by PBS? 

MR. CARLIN: Yes. 

MR. GOWDY: I'm going to read this to you. I don't have any idea whether 

you said it or not. It's in quotes, that's why I'm going to read it. If you take 

exception to it, I'll let you and your lawyer decide whether or not they got it right. 

"For the National Security Advisor to secretly be having conversations with 

Russia officials, not telling the Vice President of the United States, I can't imagine a 

situation which would cause more alarm for the career counterintelligence officials," 

close quote. 

Does that sound like what you may have said to PBS? 

MR. CARLIN: Oh, yeah. 

MR. GOWDY: All right. What do you mean by secretly? 

MR. CARLIN: Again, I'm not assuming that it's true. I can't remember what 

the exact question, but the -- which would be different. But if the National Security 

Advisor had meetings with the -- secretly, in other words, didn't tell the -- or lied 

about it to the Vice President of the United States --

MR. GOWDY: Hang on to the word lie. We're getting to it in a second. 

But this would have been the putative National Security Advisor, right? Would this 
59 

have been before the inauguration. 

MR. CARLIN: I was out. So in terms of what I was thinking in my head 

answering this question, was the actual national -- if the actual National Security 

Advisor of the United States, to my mind, that is the -- if not the, definitely one of the 

most important positions in our entire national security apparatus. They have 

access to every secret that I know of, they are usually read into the most sensitive 

compartments. If they are secretly meaning with a -- secretly meeting without the 

knowledge of their own -- not secretly -- I think I get what your -- if it was a secret, if, 

like, the President, the Vice President, and the Intel agency knew but it was secret 

from everybody else, that's not what I was referring to. But if it's secret like --

MR. GOWDY: That's what I'm getting at. Lots of conversations are secret, 

and then you don't have them, like, on Facebook Live, you don't have them on 

national television. 

And you were gone, you were gone, so you may not have the chronology 

perfectly, I may not have it perfectly, you may have been referencing public 

reporting about a December conversation between the putative National Security 

Advisor and what you called a Russian official. That would have been 

pre-inauguration, so he would not be the National Security Advisor. Is that fair? 

MR. CARLIN: If it's in December, he wouldn't be the National Security 

Advisor, yeah. 

MR. GOWDY: Right. Now, you said not telling the Vice President of the 

United States. Are you sure you didn't tell the Vice President of the United States 

they talked, or did he not mention the topic of sanctions? 

MR. CARLIN: I want to be 100 percent clear. This is why I should be even 

more careful about not answering hypotheticals. 
60 

I don't know -- I was gone. So what I was getting at is if a National Security 

Advisor talks to the Russians without authorization, hiding it from his own 

intelligence officials, lying to it about the Vice President, that I would be -- because 

Russia is so active in its attempt to corrupt our officials, that I can't think of anything 

that would cause us more alarms and concern inside the division. 

MR. GOWDY: I'm with you. I'm just looking for the word "if' in your quote. 

I'm with you. I'm just looking for the word "if." 

MR. CARLIN: The --

MR. GOWDY: All right. We'll move on. I'm not going to harp on that. 

But what is the statute that is implicated when someone is interviewed by the 

Bureau and gives a false statement? 

MR. CARLIN: If you give a false statement to law enforcement -­

MR. GOWDY: Is that 1001? 

MR. CARLIN: Yeah. There's a couple other statutes that have to -- that 

are specific that have to do false statements with different law enforcement, but -­

MR. GOWDY: Somewhere under oath, but 1001? 

MR. CARLIN: Is one. 

MR. GOWDY: All right. Is that a strict liability crime, or are there elements, 

including an intent to deceive? 

MR. CARLIN: Oh. No, it requires -- so, in other words, if you're -- if you 

had no intent to make a false -- it requires intent to make a false statement. 

MR. GOWDY: So if, hypothetically, the Bureau agents did interview 

someone, concluded that there was no intent to deceive, that wouldn't be a crime, 

would it? Or you would certainly rather have the defense side of that case rather 

than the prosecutor side? 
MR. CARLIN: Oh. It wouldn't be up to the Bureau agents to make 

the -- that - - the --

61 

MR. GOWDY: Oh, but if a Bureau agent were called to the stand and had to 

say, "I do not think they intended to deceive," would you rather be the prosecutor or 

the defense attorney in that case? 

MR. CARLIN: That would be a tough case for the prosecutor. 

MR. GOWDY: That would be a tough one. 

All right. Carter Page. I know we are asking you to remember stuff --

MR. CARLIN: But just going back to what you said, it might be a tough case, 

but sometimes, assuming you mean after all, sometimes you find out something the 

FBI agent fully believes the person they are talking to, and then you get additional 

proof after the fact that the FBI agent doesn't know --

MR. GOWDY: Sometimes. Sometimes all you got -­

MR. CARLIN: Well, then it would be tough. 

MR. GOWDY: -- is a defendant, who doesn't have a testify, and two agents 

who say, "I don't think he was trying to deceive us." That's a tough fact pattern. 

MR. CARLIN: That would be tough. 

MR. GOWDY: All right. Back to Carter Page. I know it's hard to go back, 

but let me go back to 2016. We've got one Presidential candidate who there is· an 

open investigation -- let me correct that -- matter. We'll use the word matter, an 

open matter with relation to one Presidential candidate. And here something 

comes across your desk related to the other Presidential candidate. You don't 

think you would have discussed that with Attorney General Lynch or Deputy AG 

Yates? 

MR. CARLIN: Two things. One, I'm not sure when it came in or that the 
investigation was closed. I know that it gets reopened --

MR. GOWDY: Are you talking about the other candidate? 

MR. CARLIN: Yeah. 

62 

MR. GOWDY: I think it was closed in July and reopened by the time you left. 

MR. CARLIN: That wasn't the gist of your question. 

MR. GOWDY: Matter. Not investigation, matter. 

MR. CARLIN: Well, we -- the -- I think the Attorney General would 

get -- would get briefed. But I'm having trouble because of the timing and when it 

occurred. And the reason I was getting briefed -- and when I say the highest levels 

of the Department, it's for exactly that point. This is something the Attorney 

General, the Deputy Attorney General needs to be briefed and the leadership of 

the --

MR. GOWDY: I mean, it's a big deal. 

MR. CARLIN: It is. And the leadership of the FBI. 

And just in terms of my memory, I remember talking to the then Deputy 

Director of the FBI about it. I don't remember whether I personally talked to the 

Attorney General. I may have, I just don't -- I don't independently remember that 

conversation. Closer to remember than I did with the Deputy Attorney General, but 

I can't -- you know, kind of picture the room and when the conversation took -- took 

place. 

And it's right around the time when I'm leaving, so it may be that I was, like, 

out of time, they get briefed, and I'm gone. I just don't -- I don't remember unless I 

look at something to refresh it. 

MR. GOWDY: All right. Do you recall discussing Carter Page with anyone 

else in the Intelligence Community? Is that a name you had ever heard before? 

64 

briefings when we knew someone was an agent of a foreign power and they might 

not know they are an agent of a foreign power, I recall getting -- we use the term in 

our defensive briefings. 

MR. GOWDY: Do you know whether any defensive briefings were given to 

anyone in the Trump campaign about Carter Page? 

MR. CARLIN: I don't know one way or the other. 

MR. GOWDY: Who would have done that? 

MR. CARLIN: Usually, that would be done through the FBI. I guess it -- the 

circumstance I remember'is usually FBI. Maybe it could be done through Secret 

Service or another agency. 

MR. GOWDY: It wouldn't be DOJ proper? It would be a law enforcement 

agency probably? 

MR. CARLIN: Yes. Sometimes we'd be in the room, depending on who it 

was in the defensive -- defensive briefing. But usually FBI. 

MR. GOWDY: How much time I've got? 

Two minutes. 

MR. GOWDY: Let me ask you this in my concluding 2 minutes. 

I'm fascinated by motive. We never had to prove it, Swalwell is as an old, 

washed up prosecutor, you never had to prove motive, but the jury always wants to 

know. 

There's public reporting that there was really negative information about 

Secretary of State Clinton that was never publicly disseminated. Are you familiar 

with that? 

MR. CARLIN: That there's negative information about her that --

MR. GOWDY: That was captured through these Russian active measures 



[1 2:42 p.m.] 

MS. SPEIER: So I understand wanting to inform, but the rationale for 

informing was that he would become co-opted by the Russians. That's a huge 

jump from --

MR. CARLIN: So I think there would be a concern that -- I mean -­

MS. SPEIER: Was there any evidence, I guess? 

68 

MR. CARLIN: I wasn't there so I really don't know. But in general your 

concern often is if there's a secret meeting that -- and especially if you were to lie 

about it to someone, that that could be used to coerce you and that -- in our 

experience with the Russians in general, they were constantly looking for ways to 

gain leverage, much low ranking -- sometimes people you didn't really know why 

they were trying to gain the leverage. 

It was just so much part of their trade craft that they were always looking for a 

way in that they would later use to exploit you to get to you act on their behalf. I 

wasn't there, I'm not saying specifically what happened with Flynn. But just -- I 

don't know. But if someone lied about a meeting with the Russians you could see 

that being used to exploit them. 

MS. SPEIER: So let me shift gears for a moment. During this time you 

became aware that Russians were intruding into the State and local election boards. 

You were still in your position at that time. Correct? 

MR. CARLIN: Yeah, I think it was relatively late. So close to when I'm 

leaving, but we got indicia that they were doing an exploratory cyber activities with 

State election boards. 

MS. SPEIER: So the word now is that we got word of this in the summer of 

201 6. So your recollection is you got word about it much later? 
MR. CARLIN: No, I left in October, so I think it was -­

MS. SPEIER: So what action, if any, did NSD take? 

69 

MR. CARLIN: So there were a cou ple of different efforts going on, the NSD 

took actions to, you know, one has to support the investigations of the needed 

process, the Department of Homeland Security had the lead in terms of the integrity 

of the electoral system and how to inform State boards. I think we worked -- I'm a 

little fuzzy on who did what. I remember an FBI report. I can't remember, it may 

have not have gone out through FBI. It may have gone out through Homeland to 

alert them to the activity --

MS. SPEIER: So Homeland Security Department doesn't really inform local 

elected boards and State Secretaries of States until October and then provides 

resources. Is that late? 

MR. CARLIN: I can't recall the exact timing, but in terms of just putting in a 

general like things to look for where we could try to improve going into 201 8, and 

2020, there was not a good mechanism, a good communication between Federal 

authorities and State electoral authorities at the time. And at the time, it wasn't -- it 

hadn't been -- it was probably an oversight, but it hadn't been designated as critical 

infrastructure. Critical infrastructure was focused more on things like water and 

electricity, and n uclear, and that was a mistake as well. It is clearly critical to the 

functioning of our democracy. So I think that is something. 

The other thing I always worry about -- the executive order and with some of 

our measures because we were focused on critical infrastructu re, when you look at 

what North Korea did with Sony and similarly in some respects to what Russia did in 

our elections, they are attacking a fundamental value of what makes us American in 

our system rather than -- and that's the crux of what makes it such a vital national 
70 

security issue rather than the technical system that they are attacking and some of 

our legal tools and our response programs gear off whether or not it's a specific 

system. 

And so I wonder if we should change our approach on that, because it just 

seems like each time a foreign adversary gets created we spend all the time doing 

the executive order that allows to sanction people for a cyber activity, it had to be 

amended for the Russians because it only covered critical infrastructure and 

economic espionage, which were the two things that were fundamentally drafted. 

So I wonder if there is language we could use that is more linked to our 

values that would broaden the toolkit for the law enforcement Intel and military 

authorities. 

MS. SPEIER: So there is a Russian who became an American citizen, who 

has been lobbying against the Magnitsky Act - - is that and it appears at this meeting 

with Donald Trump, Jr., does that alarm you, just knowing that fact that you have 

someone who -- or is that commonplace where Russians come here, become U.S. 

citizens and then lobby on behalf of the homeland, the first homeland? 

MR. CARLIN: On behalf. Loads in, because I know you're talking about a 

specific -- I think in general we have a concern about agents of a foreign power 

here, if they do any -- if they are working directly on behalf of the foreign power there 

is a criminal statute so it looks like espionage, that's 18 U.S.C. 951. 

And the point of the foreign agents registration act is even if they are not 

really a spy, but they are doing activity that's on behalf of the foreign Nation that we 

have transparency about those activities, that's become a harder to administer since 

a lobbying act reform the LOA. And it also doesn't have simple investigative 

demand authority. 

72 

[Whereupon, at 1 2:53 p.m., the interview was concluded.]