IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA

No. 23-0297

Filed April 10, 2024

STATE OF IOWA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.

DAVID EDWARD MYERS,

Defendant-Appellant.

________________________________________________________________

Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Des Moines County, 

Jennifer S. Bailey, Judge.

A defendant appeals his criminal conviction. AFFIRMED.

R.E. Breckenridge of Breckenridge Law P.C., Ottumwa, for appellant.

Brenna Bird, Attorney General, and Joshua A. Duden, Assistant Attorney 

General, for appellee.

Considered by Greer, P.J., and Ahlers and Buller, JJ.
2

AHLERS, Judge.

While seeking medical treatment at a hospital for an unrelated injury, a 

woman reported an incident of violence that occurred a few days earlier. The 

woman had a bruised chest and hemorrhaged eye. She reported that her thenparamour, David Myers, inflicted the injuries. Hospital staff contacted law 

enforcement. Following an investigation, Myers was charged with domestic abuse 

assault causing bodily injury in violation of Iowa Code sections 708.1 and 

708.2A(2)(b) (2022). A jury found Myers guilty. Myers appeals, challenging the 

sufficiency of the evidence.

Before discussing the merits of the issue raised by Myers, we first address 

the scope of this appeal. Myers frames his appeal as a sufficiency-of-the-evidence 

challenge, yet he sprinkles his brief with references to evidentiary challenges. If 

Myers intended to raise evidentiary issues—which is not clear—we decline to 

address them for three reasons. First, any evidentiary challenges are not 

developed, and we will not develop arguments for him. See, e.g., State v. Wilson,

No. 21-1287, 2022 WL 17481348, at *1 (Iowa Ct. App. Dec. 7, 2022) (declining to 

address evidentiary issues sprinkled within a sufficiency-of-the-evidence 

challenge). Second, the way Myers presents the evidentiary issues leads us to 

conclude the issues are included only as part of his sufficiency challenge. See id. 

Third, even if his evidentiary challenges were clearly presented and developed, we 

could not address them because error was not preserved for our review. Myers 

raised no objections to the evidence he now seemingly challenges when it was

offered at trial, so he cannot challenge the evidence on appeal. See State v. Trane, 

984 N.W.2d 429, 434–35 (Iowa 2023) (“We will not consider an evidentiary 
3

complaint unless the complaining party made their ‘specific objection’ to the 

evidence ‘known’ in the district court, and the court had the ‘opportunity to pass 

upon the objection and correct any error.’” (quoting State v. Brown, 656 N.W.2d 

355, 361 (Iowa 2003))). So, if Myers is attempting to lodge evidentiary challenges, 

we decline to address them, and we limit our discussion to his sufficiency-of-theevidence challenge.

We review sufficiency-of-the-evidence challenges for correction of errors at 

law. State v. Crawford, 974 N.W.2d 510, 516 (Iowa 2022). This means we view 

the record “in the light most favorable to the State” and “draw all legitimate 

inferences in support of the verdict.” Id. (citation omitted). We will uphold a verdict 

if it is supported by substantial evidence. Id. Evidence is substantial if it could 

persuade a rational jury that Myers is guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. See id. 

The district court instructed the jury that, in order to find Myers guilty of 

domestic abuse assault causing bodily injury, the State had to prove four elements: 

(1) Myers acted with the intent to cause pain or injury to the woman, result in 

physical contact which was insulting or offensive to her, or place her in fear of 

immediate physical contact that would have been painful, injurious, insulting, or 

offensive to her; (2) Myers had the apparent ability to do the act; (3) the act caused 

a bodily injury to the woman; and (4) the act occurred between family or household 

members who resided together at the time of the incident or within the past year. 

Myers made no objection to the instructions, so they became the law of the case 

for purposes of appellate review of his sufficiency-of-the-evidence challenge. See 

State v. Schiebout, 944 N.W.2d 666, 671 (Iowa 2020). 
4

While Myers does not expressly state which element or elements of the 

marshaling instruction he contends the State failed to prove, we discern from the 

substance of his argument that he challenges only the intent component of the first 

element. Myers argues the State presented insufficient evidence to prove his 

specific intent. See State v. Fountain, 786 N.W.2d 260, 265 (Iowa 2010) 

(confirming that assault under what is now Iowa Code section 708.1(2)(a) or (b) is 

a specific-intent crime). Myers points to the conflicting testimony given by him and 

the woman. Myers testified that he and the woman got in a “playful” struggle over 

her cell phone because he desired to look at a photo on her phone, so he intended 

no harm. The woman’s testimony painted a different picture—Myers came at her

aggressively, tried to get her phone from her, and “held [her] down against [her] 

will and hurt [her].” She testified that she sustained injuries in the encounter and 

that Myers’s pattern of violence made her “scared for [her] life.” See State v. 

Taylor, 689 N.W.2d 116, 125 (Iowa 2004) (noting that prior acts of violence are 

relevant on the issue of intent in a domestic-abuse-assault case).

Because “[s]pecific intent is seldom capable of direct proof,” a factfinder can 

infer a defendant’s intent to commit an assault based on the circumstances. State 

v. Walker, 574 N.W.2d 280, 289 (Iowa 1998); see also Taylor, 689 N.W.2d at 132. 

Here, the jury’s guilty verdict in the face of the competing evidence shows it

believed the woman’s testimony and concluded Myers possessed the requisite 

intent. The authority to make that credibility determination rests with the jury, not 

the appellate court. State v. Musser, 721 N.W.2d 758, 761 (Iowa 2006). As 

substantial evidence supports the guilty verdict, we affirm.

AFFIRMED.