812 August 7, 2014 No. 52

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE

STATE OF OREGON

STATE OF OREGON,

Petitioner on Review,

v.

JOHN LEONARD HOLDORF, JR.,

Respondent on Review.

(CC 09061153; CA A144719; SC S060766)

En Banc

On review of a decision of the Court of Appeals.*

Argued and submitted June 13, 2013.

Leigh A. Salmon, Assistant Attorney General, Salem, 

argued the cause and filed the brief for petitioner on review. 

With her on the brief were Ellen F. Rosenblum, Attorney 

General, and Anna M. Joyce, Solicitor General.

Alice Newlin-Cushing, Deputy Public Defender, Salem, 

argued the cause and filed the brief for respondent on review. 

With her on the brief was Peter Gartlan, Chief Defender, 

Office of Public Defense Services.

BALDWIN, J.

The decision of the Court of Appeals is reversed. The 

judgment of the circuit court is affirmed.

______________

* Appeal from Linn County Circuit Court, Glen D. Baisinger, Judge. 250 Or 

App 509, 280 P3d 404 (2012).
Cite as 355 Or 812 (2014) 813

Defendant was convicted of possession of marijuana, ORS 475.864(3), and 

possession of methamphetamine, ORS 475.894, after an officer stopped a vehicle in which defendant was a passenger and conducted a warrantless search of 

defendant. Prior to trial, defendant sought to suppress evidence obtained during 

the search. The trial court denied the motion, concluding that the officer had 

reasonable suspicion to stop defendant for suspected drug crimes. The Court of 

Appeals reversed that decision, concluding that the officer lacked reasonable suspicion because the officer’s observations relating to defendant were limited to 

defendant’s nervous and fidgety behavior. The court reasoned that such behavior, although consistent with methamphetamine use, could be caused by other 

non-incriminating factors. The court further reasoned that the officer could not 

infer that defendant was engaged in drug activity based on the suspected drug 

activities of the vehicle’s driver, because that information was too speculative 

and indirect. Held: (1) The officer who stopped defendant could reasonably consider, under the totality of the circumstances, information that other officers had 

shared regarding the suspected drug activities of the driver of the vehicle; and 

(2) the officer’s observation that defendant appeared to be under the influence of 

methamphetamine, based on the officer’s training and experience, together with 

the other information on which the officer properly relied, was sufficient to establish reasonable suspicion that defendant had committed the crime of possession 

of methamphetamine.

The decision of the Court of Appeals is reversed. The judgment of the circuit 

court is affirmed.
814 State v. Holdorf

BALDWIN, J.

Defendant was convicted of possession of marijuana, 

ORS 475.864(3), and possession of methamphetamine, ORS 

475.894, after police officers stopped him and discovered 

those controlled substances on him. The trial court concluded that the officer who stopped defendant had a reasonable suspicion that defendant was involved in criminal drug 

activity and denied defendant’s motion to suppress evidence 

of the drugs. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that 

the officer did not have a reasonable suspicion of drug activity. State v. Holdorf, 250 Or App 509, 280 P3d 404 (2012).

We allowed review to determine whether, at the 

time of the stop, the officer had a reasonable suspicion that 

defendant was involved in criminal drug activity and, in 

particular, (1) whether the officer who stopped defendant 

could rely on factual information provided to him by other 

officers to establish “reasonable suspicion,” and (2) whether 

the officer’s observation that defendant appeared to be under 

the influence of methamphetamine, based on the officer’s 

training and experience, was sufficient to establish “reasonable suspicion” that defendant had committed the crime of 

possession of methamphetamine when considered under the 

totality of the circumstances. We answer those questions in 

the affirmative, reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals, 

and affirm the judgment of the trial court.

In reviewing a denial of a motion to suppress, we 

are bound by the trial court’s findings of historical fact that 

are supported by evidence in the record. State v. Stevens, 311 

Or 119, 126, 806 P2d 92 (1991). If the trial court “[does] not 

make findings on all pertinent historical facts and there is 

evidence from which those facts could be decided more than 

one way, we will presume that the trial court found facts 

in a manner consistent with its ultimate conclusion.” Id. at 

127 (citing Ball v. Gladden, 250 Or 485, 487, 443 P2d 621 

(1968)). On review, our role is to decide whether the trial 

court correctly applied the law to those historical facts. State 

v. Peller, 287 Or 255, 260, 598 P2d 684 (1979); see also State 

v. Ehly, 317 Or 66, 80, 854 P2d 421 (1993) (stating standard 

of review for “reasonable suspicion”).
Cite as 355 Or 812 (2014) 815

I. BACKGROUND

Albany Police Detective Davis was on duty when 

he observed a blue SUV occupied by Watts, who was driving, and defendant, a passenger. Davis recognized Watts, 

but he did not recognize defendant. Davis was familiar with 

Watts as a suspect through Davis’s ongoing investigation of 

a local methamphetamine distribution ring. Davis also had 

received reports about Watts from Officer Fandrem, who 

had observed an occupant of the same SUV engage in an 

apparent drug deal two weeks earlier. On a separate occasion after that observation, Fandrem had attempted to stop 

Watts in the SUV, but Watts eluded capture after a highspeed chase. Davis also knew that Watts had been convicted 

of a felony and had an outstanding warrant for violating 

parole.

Davis put out a call to alert other officers in the 

area about Watts. Albany Police Officer Salang responded 

to that call. Davis gave Salang a description of the vehicle 

and told Salang that Watts was a criminal suspect in an 

ongoing drug investigation. Salang knew Watts from prior 

encounters and knew that Watts was a convicted felon with 

an outstanding warrant.

Shortly thereafter, Salang spotted Watts driving 

the SUV. Salang followed the SUV until he observed Watts 

commit a traffic infraction. He then activated his overhead 

lights and stopped the SUV. Salang called for backup before 

he approached the vehicle.

While Salang was talking to Watts, he observed 

that defendant “appear[ed] very nervous” and “very fidgety,” and was “making minimal eye contact” with him. To 

Salang, defendant appeared to be “tweaking,” meaning that 

he appeared to be under the influence of methamphetamine. 

Salang requested defendant’s name and date of birth, which 

defendant provided.

Salang then ran warrant checks on Watts and 

defendant. Dispatch confirmed that Watts had a warrant for 

his arrest. Defendant, however, was “clear” of any warrant. 

Defendant asked if he could leave, and Salang told him that 

he could not leave at that time. At that point, Salang was still 
816 State v. Holdorf

waiting for backup officers to arrive. After backup arrived, 

the officers removed Watts from the SUV and secured him 

in a patrol car.

Salang then returned to the SUV, where defendant 

was still seated in the passenger seat. At that time, Salang 

was preparing to perform an inventory of the vehicle for a 

nuisance tow. He asked defendant if there were any weapons 

or contraband in the vehicle. Defendant responded that there 

was a knife between the seat and the door. Defendant opened 

the passenger door and Salang saw the knife slide down 

between the seat and door jam. Defendant stepped out of the 

vehicle and Salang conducted a “pat down” search of defendant. He found a second knife and three small metal containers in defendant’s pockets. Quantities of marijuana and methamphetamine were subsequently found inside the containers.

Defendant was arrested and charged with one 

count each of unlawful possession of marijuana, ORS 

475.864(3), and unlawful possession of methamphetamine, 

ORS 475.894. Prior to trial, defendant moved to suppress 

the evidence obtained during the warrantless search and 

seizure of his person.1

 At the hearing on defendant’s motion, 

Detective Davis and Officer Salang testified. Davis testified 

to his training and experience investigating narcotic crimes, 

and explained the information that he gave to Salang about 

Watts. Salang testified that, during his law enforcement 

career, he had regular contact with people who possess or 

are under the influence of methamphetamine, and that he 

was familiar with common practices relating to the use of 

methamphetamine.

After considering the evidence, the trial court 

denied defendant’s motion. The trial court concluded that 

Salang had a reasonable suspicion to stop defendant for suspected drug crimes and that Salang’s safety concerns justified keeping defendant at the scene when he requested to 

1 Although defendant raised a number of issues in his motion to suppress 

relating to inculpatory statements that he made and drug evidence that was 

seized, his assignments of error in the Court of Appeals were limited to the validity of the stop (i.e., the seizure of his person) by Salang. The parties agree that the 

stop occurred when defendant asked if he could leave and Salang told defendant 

that he could not. Defendant contends that his statements and the drug evidence 

should have been suppressed because the stop was illegal.
Cite as 355 Or 812 (2014) 817

leave. Defendant then entered a conditional guilty plea pursuant to ORS 135.335(3) and reserved his right to challenge 

on appeal the trial court’s denial of his pretrial motion to 

suppress.

On appeal, the Court of Appeals concluded that the 

specific and articulable facts in this case did not support a 

reasonable suspicion that defendant was involved in criminal activity when he was stopped. It noted that the only 

fact cited by Salang that directly related to defendant, as 

opposed to the SUV or Watts, was defendant’s nervous, fidgety demeanor. It reasoned that, even if those characteristics could, in some circumstances, be an indicator of present methamphetamine possession, defendant’s demeanor, 

although consistent with methamphetamine use, could be 

caused by other non-incriminating factors. Holdorf, 250 Or 

App at 514. The court further concluded that defendant’s 

seizure was not justified by officer safety concerns because 

all danger had dissipated by the time backup officers had 

arrived and Watts was arrested.2 Id. at 515.

II. ANALYSIS

A. “Reasonable Suspicion” Standard

Defendant based his motion to suppress on ORS 

131.615(1) and Article I, section 9, of the Oregon Constitution.3

We therefore first examine the statute establishing the standard that police officers are required to follow when making 

an investigatory stop of a person. ORS 131.615(1) provides:

“A peace officer who reasonably suspects that a person 

has committed or is about to commit a crime may stop the 

person and, after informing the person that the peace officer is a peace officer, make a reasonably inquiry.”

2 The state did not seek review of the Court of Appeals’ determination that 

the stop was not justified based on officer safety concerns. Holdorf, 250 Or App at 

515. Therefore, the only issue for our determination is whether Officer Salang’s 

seizure of defendant was based on a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity.

3 Article I, section 9, provides:

“No law shall violate the right of the people to be secure in their persons, 

houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable search, or seizure; and no 

warrant shall issue but upon probable cause, supported by oath, or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the person or 

thing to be seized.”
818 State v. Holdorf

An officer “reasonably suspects” criminal conduct when the 

officer

“holds a belief that is reasonable under the totality of the 

circumstances existing at the time and place the peace officer acts * **.”

ORS 131.605(6).

As previously mentioned, this dispute is limited to 

whether Officer Salang reasonably suspected that defendant had committed or was about to commit a crime when 

he stopped defendant to investigate. Other provisions of the 

statutory framework relating to the permissible scope of the 

stop and frisk of persons, ORS 131.605 to 131.625, are not at 

issue in this case.

As this court has observed, ORS 131.615 was a legislative effort to codify state and federal case law permitting 

the temporary and limited restraint on liberty interests by 

police officers incident to investigatory stops. State v. Valdez, 

277 Or 621, 625, 561 P2d 1006 (1977). Specifically, the legislation was intended as

“‘a codification of the peace officer’s ability to stop a person 

as close to the Terry [v. Ohio, 392 US 1, 88 S Ct 1868, 20 

L Ed 2d 889 (1968)] and [State v. Cloman, 254 Or 1, 456 

P2d 67 (1969)] rationale as possible while giving the courts 

leeway to interpret the protean situations that arise and 

giving the officer limited “stopping” powers.’”

Valdez, 277 Or at 625 (quoting the commentary to the final 

draft of the Proposed Oregon Criminal Procedure Code) 

(footnotes omitted). The codification contemplated

“‘* * * an objective test in the forefront of the stop determination. In other words, the test should be what a reasonable officer would think in this situation and not what this 

particular arresting officer thought.’”

Id. at 625-26 (quoting from the commentary to the final 

draft of the Proposed Oregon Criminal Procedure Code) 

(emphasis omitted).

This court has held that an analysis of a defendant’s rights under ORS 131.605 to 131.625 is substantially 

the same as an analysis of a defendant’s rights under the 
Cite as 355 Or 812 (2014) 819

search and seizure provisions of the Oregon and federal 

constitutions. State v. Kennedy, 290 Or 493, 497, 624 P2d 

99 (1981); see also State v. Toevs, 327 Or 525, 534, 964 P2d 

1007 (1998) (so stating). In 1997, the legislature limited the 

authority of courts to exclude relevant evidence in a criminal action “on the grounds that it was obtained in violation of any statutory provision” unless exclusion is required 

by the Oregon or federal constitution, the rules of evidence 

governing privileges and hearsay, or the rights of the press. 

ORS 136.432. Accordingly, our review in this case is limited 

to whether Article I, section 9, of the Oregon Constitution 

requires exclusion of the evidence identified in defendant’s 

motion to suppress.

In Valdez, this court considered an Article I, section 

9, challenge after police officers stopped the defendant when 

the defendant and two other men placed a paper bag into 

the trunk of an automobile in a part of town that the officers 

considered “to be one with a high incidence of vice activity.” 

277 Or at 623. The officers “had never seen any of the three 

men before and knew nothing of them,” but considered the 

suspects’ dress “like a typical pusher” and “not typical of 

persons found in the area.” Id. at 623-24. The court held 

that the instinct and experience of the officers did not provide a sufficient basis for “reasonable suspicion” under ORS 

131.615(1), without articulable facts pointing to criminal 

activity that could be objectively evaluated. Id. at 628. The 

court contrasted those circumstances with the facts in Terry

and Cloman, where the stops were based on a reasonable 

suspicion of criminal activity:

“It is apparent that in both Terry and Cloman the officers who stopped the defendants for questioning concerning criminal activity had a much greater fund of suspicious 

activity to justify objectively their suspicion of criminal 

activity than had the officers in the present case. Here there 

is insufficient evidence suggesting criminal activity which 

can be objectively evaluated. We do not have persons who 

‘didn’t look right’ repetitively taking turns conferring and 

looking surreptitiously into a store, nor do we have known 

copper wire thieves unloading copper wire into a private 

garage in the middle of the night. In this case we have persons who ‘didn’t look right’ putting a paper bag into the 

trunk of an automobile—a not too remarkable action.
820 State v. Holdorf

“We recognize that the statutory standard for the stopping and questioning of a person concerning his possible 

criminal activity was intended to be less than the standard for probable cause to arrest. We also recognize that 

experienced police develop what amounts to an intuitive 

sixth sense about matters of this kind. As the officer testified, ‘he * ** looked real sharp * * * like a typical pusher, 

to me.’ Such instinct and experience cannot, however, form 

the entire basis for ‘reasonable suspicion,’ because no practical control can be exercised over police by courts if, in 

the absence of any very remarkable activity, the officer’s 

instinct and experience may be used as the sole reason to 

justify infringement upon the personal liberty sought to be 

protected by the statute.”

Valdez, 277 Or at 627-28. Thus, in Valdez, an objective 

review of the totality of the circumstances confronting the 

officers did not provide a basis for a reasonable suspicion 

that criminal activity was afoot.

We also reviewed the constitutionality of a stop in 

State v. Lichty, 313 Or 579, 835 P2d 904 (1992). In Lichty, 

a clerk in a convenience store found the defendant’s wallet 

containing a plastic baggy of cocaine. The store owner told 

a police officer that “‘I just found this wallet in the store, 

** * a bag of coke fell out of it,’” and that the defendant had 

claimed the wallet. Id. at 584. The court rejected the defendant’s argument that, “because Storie [the store owner] was 

not an expert in drug identification and the officer knew 

that she was not such an expert, the officer could not reasonably rely on Storie’s statement that she saw cocaine, at least 

without further inquiry.” Id. at 585. In concluding that the 

police officer had reasonable suspicion to stop the defendant, 

the court explained:

“People often speak in the shorthand of opinions or conclusions, not in the form of a recitation of pure fact. There 

was evidence presented in this case that members of society have a general knowledge regarding the appearance of 

cocaine. Storie testified that she believed that the powdery 

substance in the bag that she saw was cocaine because 

of her knowledge as to the appearance of cocaine from

‘[w]atching the news, [and] watching t.v. programs. You see 

it every day on the news.’ When Storie, a named informant, 

told [Officer] Derby that she saw ‘a bag of coke,’ she was 
Cite as 355 Or 812 (2014) 821

saying that she saw a transparent bag, small enough to be 

put in a wallet, that contained a white powdery substance. 

Having heard that statement, it was reasonable for Derby 

to add his own expertise concerning the way illegal drugs 

are carried and to infer that the white powdery substance 

could be cocaine. Defendant and his companion then drove 

up and claimed the right to possess the wallet. These facts 

gave Derby a reasonable suspicion that defendant’s wallet 

contained cocaine and that defendant therefore was committing a crime.”

Id. (emphasis in original).

Finally, in State v. Ehly, 317 Or 66, 854 P2d 421 

(1993), police officers who were called to a motel recognized 

the defendant, an unruly guest, as a convicted felon and 

ordered him to back away from a gym bag that he was reaching into. The state conceded, and the court agreed, that the 

defendant “was stopped and thus was ‘seized’ when Corporal 

Cleaves put her hand on her gun and ordered defendant to 

‘back up,’ and he submitted to that show of police authority.” 

Id. at 79. The court explained its conclusion that the officers 

had reasonable suspicion to justify the stop:

“Applying the reasonable suspicion standard to the 

facts in this case, the specific and articulable facts that 

support the officers’ reasonable inference that defendant 

had committed a crime are the following: Immediately 

before Corporal Cleaves put her hand on her gun and 

ordered defendant to ‘back up,’ the officers were confronted 

by a person whom they knew had prior felony convictions, 

whom they knew to be a methamphetamine user, and who 

appeared at that time to be under the influence of methamphetamine. Corporal Cleaves knew that many people who 

use illegal narcotics possess guns. When she saw defendant reaching into the gym bag with both his hands concealed, she thought that he had a gun. The officer knew 

that defendant was a friend of Gene Gammond and that 

defendant and Gammond were ‘running together.’ They 

also had reason to believe that Gammond was armed with 

an automatic handgun, and they had seen him drive out 

of the motel parking lot only minutes earlier. The officers 

reasonably could have believed that the gym bag belonged 

to Gammond and that it contained Gammond’s automatic 

handgun. The gym bag was large enough to have contained 

a weapon. When Officer Emerson asked defendant why he 
822 State v. Holdorf

did not just dump the gym bag’s contents on the bed and 

look for the key, defendant did not respond. Moreover, after 

telling the officers that the gym bag was not his, defendant 

continued to rummage through the gym bag with both his 

hands concealed. Considering the totality of those circumstances, we conclude that Corporal Cleaves had an objectively reasonable suspicion that defendant had committed 

the crime of felon in possession of a firearm.”

Id. at 80-81 (footnote omitted).

In concluding that the officers reasonably suspected 

criminal activity, the court observed that “[w]hether the 

suspicion is reasonable often will depend on the inferences 

drawn from the particular circumstances confronting the 

officer, viewed in the light of the officer’s experience.” Id. at 

80 (citing Terry, 392 US at 21-22, 27-30). The court made 

its determination based on the “specific and articulable 

facts that support[ed] the officer’s reasonable inference that 

defendant had committed a crime.” Id. The court concluded 

that the officers “held a belief that was objectively reasonable under the totality of the circumstances existing at that 

time and place, that defendant had committed a crime.”4 Id.

at 79 (emphasis added).

To summarize: The people have a liberty interest 

to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures that is 

4 That standard mirrors the rationale of Terry:

“[I]n justifying the particular intrusion the police officer must be able to 

point to specific and articulable facts which, taken together with rational 

inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant that intrusion. The scheme 

of the Fourth Amendment becomes meaningful only when it is assured that 

at some point the conduct of those charged with enforcing the laws can be 

subjected to the more detached, neutral scrutiny of a judge who must evaluate the reasonableness of a particular search or seizure in light of the particular circumstances. And in making that assessment it is imperative that 

the facts be judged against an objective standard: would the facts available to 

the officer at the moment of the seizure or the search warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief that the action taken was appropriate? Anything 

less would invite intrusions upon constitutionally guaranteed rights based 

on nothing more substantial than inarticulate hunches, a result this Court 

has consistently refused to sanction. And simple good faith on the part of 

the arresting officer is not enough. *** If subjective good faith alone were 

the test, the protections of the Fourth Amendment would evaporate, and the 

people would be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, only in 

the discretion of the police.”

392 US 21-22 (footnotes, internal citations, and internal quotation marks omitted; omission in original).
Cite as 355 Or 812 (2014) 823

protected by provisions of the Oregon and federal constitutions. The standard of “reasonable suspicion” justifying a 

police intrusion on that liberty interest when a person is 

stopped was intended to be less than the standard of probable cause to arrest. A stop is unlawful unless it meets an 

objective test of reasonableness based on observable facts. 

Officer intuition and experience alone are not sufficient to 

meet that objective test. However, if an officer is able to point 

to specific and articulable facts that a person has committed 

a crime or is about to commit a crime, the officer has a “reasonable suspicion” and may stop the person to investigate.

B. Officer Salang’s Reliance on Information from Other 

Officers

With the above understanding in mind, we turn to 

the specific questions before us on review. We begin with our 

first question: Could Officer Salang, in stopping defendant, 

rely on the factual information provided to him by other 

police officers to establish reasonable suspicion?

As previously mentioned, Officer Salang relied on 

information provided to him by Detective Davis, who had 

observed defendant as a passenger in a blue SUV driven by 

Wattsr. Davis was familiar with Watts as a current suspect 

in an ongoing investigation of a local methamphetamine 

distribution ring. Davis also knew that Watts was wanted 

on an outstanding warrant for violating parole following a 

felony conviction. Davis put out a call to alert officers that 

Watts should be pulled over, and he provided the above 

background information to Salang, who responded to the 

call and pulled Watts over after he observed Watts commit a 

traffic infraction.

The trial court concluded that Salang had reasonable suspicion to stop defendant for a suspected drug crime.5

Thus, the trial court implicitly credited the information 

from Davis that Salang relied upon as part of the totality of 

the circumstances justifying the stop. The Court of Appeals, 

5 The trial court did not make detailed findings of fact on the issue of 

Salang’s reasonable suspicion. However, as we explain, the findings made by the 

trial court were sufficient to support its conclusion that the stop was justified by 

reasonable suspicion.
824 State v. Holdorf

however, rejected that information from Davis and the other 

officers:

“[W]e conclude that Salang did not have reasonable suspicion that defendant was involved in criminal activity 

at the time he was stopped. The only fact cited by Salang 

that relates to defendant himself, as opposed to the SUV 

or Watts, is his nervous, fidgety demeanor. * ** And as for 

Watts and the extent to which being in his proximity might 

indicate ongoing criminal activity by defendant, it is significant that the only criminal activity that Salang knew

Watts was engaged in was being in violation of his parole. 

He apparently had heard second-hand information that 

Watts was suspected of methamphetamine distribution. 

The information about the parking-lot drug transaction 

was something that Salang heard from Davis who heard 

it from a third officer who was not even certain about what 

he had seen. The information about the SUV was similarly 

indirect and speculative.”

Holdorf, 250 Or App at 514-15 (emphasis in original).

Read strictly, the above analysis appears to reject 

any information pointing to criminal activity that did 

not “relate[] to defendant himself” or was not personally 

observed by Officer Salang. Id. at 514. However, our case 

law does not require such a truncated approach to judicial review for “reasonable suspicion.” Rather, our case law 

requires an objective review of observable facts to determine 

whether a police stop is justified by “reasonable suspicion.” 

That judicial review looks to the totality of the circumstances 

confronting a police officer and not just those circumstances 

that directly relate to a suspect or are personally observed 

by the police officer stopping a suspect.

In considering the totality of the circumstances 

confronting them, police officers often reasonably rely on 

information provided to them by other officers to determine 

whether to stop a suspect. We have recognized that there are 

circumstances where a police officer may act based on the 

shared knowledge of the police when effectuating an arrest:

“The collective knowledge doctrine focuses on the shared 

knowledge of the police as a unit rather than merely on the 

knowledge of the officer who acts. The doctrine therefore 
Cite as 355 Or 812 (2014) 825

permits a police officer to act if the officer reasonably relies 

on instructions from an officer who has probable cause.”

State v. Soldahl, 331 Or 420, 427, 15 P3d 564 (2000). That 

recognition “in no way undermines the probable cause 

requirement. The doctrine merely views law enforcement 

agencies as a unit.” Id. at 428. We hold that the collective 

knowledge doctrine also applies when a police officer reasonably relies on information from other officers in making 

a determination that a stop is justified based on articulable facts that criminal activity is afoot. See generally Lichty, 

313 Or at 585 (totality of circumstances considered by police 

officers included reasonable reliance on information from 

informant).

To be sure, a court must ultimately determine 

whether a police officer has “point[ed] to specific and articulable facts that give rise to a reasonable inference that 

a person has committed [or is about to commit] a crime” 

to justify a stop. Ehly, 317 Or at 80. However, courts must 

consider the “totality of the circumstances” confronting an 

officer in making that determination. Id. at 79. Thus, the 

Court of Appeals erred to the extent that it did not consider 

the information that Salang had received from other officers 

as circumstances to weigh in its ultimate determination of 

whether there was reasonable suspicion for Salang to stop 

defendant. That information included the shared knowledge 

of Davis and other officers about Watts and the SUV. See 

Soldahl, 331 Or at 427.

C. Officer Salang’s Opinion That Defendant was Under the 

Influence of Methamphetamine

We now turn to our second question on review: Was 

Officer Salang’s observation that defendant appeared to 

be under the influence of methamphetamine, based on his 

training and experience, together with other information 

on which the officer properly relied, sufficient to establish 

a reasonable suspicion that defendant had or was about to 

commit a crime?

As mentioned, Officer Salang testified that, in his 

opinion, defendant was under the influence of methamphetamine at the time of the stop. Salang stated that defendant 
826 State v. Holdorf

was nervous and fidgety, avoided eye contact with him, and 

looked like he was “tweaking”:

“Q. And do you make any—you identify that he’s male, 

any other things that you recognize or that you notice 

about the passenger?

“A. He was appearing very nervous when I first contacted 

him, making minimal eye contact with myself when 

I was talking to Mr. Watts at first, and then when I’d 

talk to him. He was very fidgety.

“Q. Fidgety?

“A. Yeah.

“Q. When *** making eye contact, not making eye contact, describe that for us, what you mean by he’s not 

making eye contact. Is it—is it out of the ordinary?

“A. It’s out of the ordinary when you speak to a person for 

them not to look at you. He kept kind of looking down 

or straight when I was asking him for his name. 

Kind of would just look at me for a second and then 

look away. I also noticed that his hands were—he 

was kind of doing this (indicating) a little bit, which 

appeared—for me it appeared that he was nervous 

about something.

“Q. Did he appear to be under the influence of 

methamphetamine?

“A. Yes.

“Q. You used previously the term ‘tweaking’?

“A. Mmm-hmm.

“Q. Did it appear he was tweaking?

“A. Yes.”

Officer Salang also testified about his training and 

experience as a police officer and, in particular, about his 

experience with users of methamphetamine:

“Q. Can you give us a thumbnail sketch of your background, training and experience in law enforcement?

“A. I’ve been with the Albany Police Department for 

almost five years. I am now a school resource officer. 

Prior to that I was a patrol officer for about four and 
Cite as 355 Or 812 (2014) 827

a half years. Prior to being a patrol officer, I was a 

corrections deputy for Lincoln County for almost two 

years serving in the jail. Prior to that about ten years 

experience in juvenile corrections in different capacities as a juvenile probation officer, detention worker, 

and various types of work.

“Q. And in each of those jobs have you come in contact 

on a fairly regular basis with people who possess 

methamphetamine, may be under the influence of 

methamphetamine, and are you familiar with the 

patterns and practices of methamphetamine dealing 

and possession and use?

“A. Yes, both in my patrol duties and corrections when 

they come in in the booking.

“Q. And what kinds of behaviors do you see when 

you see someone who is under the influence of 

methamphetamine?

“A. Someone that might be fidgety, we have a term, 

tweaking, someone that might not have been sleeping for days because of the [sic] under the influence 

of the methamphetamines.

“Q. Is it a pretty distinct look?

“A. Yes.”

By concluding that Officer Salang’s stop of defendant was supported by reasonable suspicion, the trial court 

implicitly credited Salang’s observations of defendant’s distinct behavior and Salang’s training and experience related 

to methamphetamine use by criminal suspects.6

 Those were 

articulable facts that the court considered along with other 

specific and articulable facts relating to Watts, a current 

suspect in an ongoing investigation of a local methamphetamine distribution ring.

6 In addition to testifying that defendant’s behavior, particularly defendant’s 

“tweaking,” was consistent, based on Salang’s training and experience, with the 

behavior of methamphetamine users that he had previously observed, Salang 

gave his opinion that defendant was under the influence of methamphetamine at 

the time of the stop. That opinion was received by the trial court without objection. Therefore, Salang’s competency as a witness to give that opinion was not 

raised as a contested issue in this case.
828 State v. Holdorf

From its inception, the “reasonable suspicion” standard has included a proper regard for the experience that 

police officers bring with them when they encounter criminal suspects. The “reasonable suspicion” standard applies 

to a police officer acting in his or her official capacity when 

stopping a person that the officer reasonably suspects “has 

committed or is about to commit a crime.” ORS 131.615(1); 

see also ORS 131.605 (peace officer defined as the meaning 

given in ORS 133.005). This court has quoted the following from the commentary to the final draft of the Proposed 

Oregon Criminal Procedure Code:

“‘***[W]hen an officer observes unusual conduct which 

leads him reasonably to conclude in light of his experience 

that criminal activity is afoot and when he is able to point 

to specific and articulable facts which give rise to the inference that criminal activity is afoot, the officer has ‘reasonable suspicion’ and hence can stop the individual for 

investigation.’”

Valdez, 277 Or at 626 (emphasis added).

Indeed, this court has expressly stated that “[w]hether

[a police officer’s] suspicion is reasonable often will depend 

on the inferences drawn from the particular circumstances 

confronting the officer, viewed in the light of the officer’s 

experience.” Ehly, 317 Or at 80 (citing Terry, 392 US at 

21-22); see also id. at 79 (totality of circumstances for officers included observation that suspect appeared to be under 

the influence of methamphetamine); Lichty, 313 Or at 585 

(“Having heard that statement [from an informant], it was 

reasonable for [Officer] Derby to add his own expertise concerning the way illegal drugs are carried and to infer that 

the white powdery substance could be cocaine.” (Emphasis 

in original.)).

Further, this court has given weight, as appropriate in criminal cases, to officer’s training and experience 

when we have reviewed probable cause determinations. 

See State v. Heckathorne, 347 Or 474, 485, 223 P3d 1034 

(2009) (“[The] individual expertise and training [of a police 

officer] may provide the knowledge that turns various sensory clues into probable cause.”); State v. Goodman, 328 Or 

318, 328, 975 P2d 458 (1999) (police officer’s training and 
Cite as 355 Or 812 (2014) 829

experience in drug investigations contributed to necessary 

factual nexus between a residence, the defendant, and a 

remote marijuana grow location in establishing probable 

cause for search); State v. Herbert, 302 Or 237, 243, 729 P2d 

547 (1986) (police officer, based upon his experience, had 

probable cause to believe that a paperfold contained contraband); State v. Westlund, 302 Or 225, 231-32, 729 P2d 541 

(1986) (same with respect to police officer’s belief that a vial 

contained a controlled substance). We conclude that a police 

officer’s training and experience may, depending on the factual circumstances, also be given appropriate weight when 

a stop is reviewed under the less exacting standard of “reasonable suspicion.”

How much weight a reviewing court will give to a 

police officer’s training and experience in assessing the officer’s testimony in such a review will, of course, depend on 

the circumstances of each case. We emphasize that a police 

officer’s training and experience, as relevant to proving particular circumstances, is not presumed based solely upon 

a police officer’s employment status. Rather, that training 

and experience must be established, as it was here, through 

admissible evidence of specific articulable facts that permit 

an officer to make a reasonable inference based on the officer’s pertinent training and experience.

III. CONCLUSION

Here, Officer Salang testified that defendant was 

nervous and fidgety and avoided eye contact. Salang also 

testified that, in his substantial experience as a police officer, he had observed a distinctive behavior associated with 

methamphetamine use that is popularly referred to as 

“tweaking” and that, in his opinion, defendant was tweaking. Salang also testified that another police officer had told 

him that the driver of the blue SUV in which defendant was 

riding was a known felon with an outstanding warrant who 

was under investigation as a suspect in a local methamphetamine distribution ring.7

 We conclude that the above 

facts, considered in their totality, gave rise to a reasonable 

7 We agree with the Court of Appeals that Officer Fandrem’s explanation 

that he had observed an occupant of the same SUV engage in an apparent drug 

deal two weeks earlier is too speculative to be considered in this analysis.
830 State v. Holdorf

inference that defendant committed the crime of possession 

of methamphetamine, ORS 475.894. Thus, Salang’s stop of 

defendant was justified by “reasonable suspicion.” See Ehly, 

317 Or at 80.

The decision of the Court of Appeals is reversed. 

The judgment of the circuit court is affirmed.