Interim Decision #2031 

MATTER OF QUINTANILLA-MONTES 

In Exclusion Proceedings 

A-18464888 

Decided by Board March 20, 1970 

"Sunday marching" and drill for about an hour in Mexico under the direction of a soldier from the regular Mexican Army, uver a period of approximately a year, during which no rank was held, no firearms were 

issued nor instructions given in the use of weapons, no uniforms, pay nor 

allowances of any nature were received, and no food, transportation nor 

medical services were furnished, did not constitute service in the armed 

forces of a foreign state so as to expatriate under section 349(a) (3) of 

the Immigration and Nationality Act. 

EXCLUDABLE; Act of 1952—Section 212 (a) (20) [8 U.S.0 1182 (a) (20)] —Im 

migrant—no immigrant visa. 

The special inquiry officer, at the request of the Immigration 

and Naturalization service, has certified to us for final decision 

his order in these exclusion proceedings that the applicant be admitted to the United States as a citizen thereof. The question de-. 

cided by him was whether the applicant was a United States citizen or whether he was an immigrant not in possession of an 

immigrant visa and thus excludable under section 212(a) (20) of 

the Immigration and Nationality Act. 

The applicant is a 33-year-old married male who was born in 

Laredo, Texas to a Mexican citizen father and a United States 

citizen mother. Under these circumstances he acquired at birth 

dual citizenship of the United States and Mexico. 1At the age of 

three he was taken to Mexico by his parents and resided there 

ever since with the exception of several one day visits when he 

was seven or eight years old and again when he came to the 

United States in 1968 for two months, entering as a visitor for 

pleasure. 

On November 21, 1968 the applicant applied for admission to 

1Section 301(a), I. & N. Act (8 U.S.C. 1401 (a) ); Article 30 (as amended 

in 1934) of the Mexican Constitution of 1917 (Ex. 3). 

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Interim Decision #2031 

the United States as a United States citizen. He was detained for 

a hearing. The question arose as to whether the applicant who 

had acquired United States citizenship at birth had not subsequently expatriated under section 349 (a) (3) of the Immigration 

and Nationality Act by reason of having served in the armed 

forces of a foreign state. Section 349(a) (3) of the Act provides: 

From and after the effective date of this Act a person who is a national of 

the United States whether by birth or naturalization loses his nationality by 

entering, or serving in, the armed forces of a foreign state unless, prior to 

such entry or service, such entry or service is specifically authorized in writing by the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense. 

Applicant's alleged military service in Mexico lasted for approximately a year, from December 1955 to December 1956, during which time he engaged in "Sunday marching." This consisted 

of his meeting once a week with a small group of eighteen and 

nineteen year old boys who would then, under the direction of a 

soldier from the regular Mexican Army, march and drill for about 

an hour, after which they engaged in sports. 

Those engaged in Sunday marching held no rank. They were 

not issued firearms or instructed in the use of weapons. They received no uniforms, but those who could afford it purchased khaki 

pants and shirts. They received no pay or allowances of any nature. No food, transportation or medical services were furnished. 

The marchers did, however, salute the Mexican flag and on certain occasions would recite a verse which amounted to a pledge of 

allegiance to the flag. From the testimony of the applicant it appears the entire activity was conducted in a most informal manner. The marchers were subject to being drafted into the regular 

armed forces of Mexico, but all male citizens over the age of 18 

were subject to this whether they engaged in Sunday marching 

or not. 

There have been several cases before this Board in which Sunday marching was involved. In Matter of Vargas-Calderon, 

1611-10445 (BIA, 1954) (unreported), the question arose 

whether the applicant had made an affirmation of loyalty to Mexico while serving as a Sunday marcher so as to expatriate himself 

under section 401 (b) of the Nationality Act of 1940. Our decision 

was concerned with expatriation by oath taking rather than by 

service in the army of a foreign state. 

In Matter of M—G—, 6 I. & N. Dec. 641 (BIA, 1955), we decided the case on two grounds. The first was that there was no 

proof that the marcher had taken an oath of allegiance to a foreign state so as to expatriate under section 401 (b) of the Nation509 
Interim. Decision #2031 

ality Act of 1940. The second was that there was in force at that 

time Executive Agreement No. 323 between the United States 

and Mexico 2which provided exemption from loss of nationality 

under section 401 (c) of said Act to United States nationals who 

were required to serve in the armed forces of Mexico.' A similar 

result was reached in Matter of Lopez-Vasquez, A-8943473 

(RT A, 1956) in which we said: "Since the evidence before us affirmatively establishes that the applicant was conscripted into the 

armed forces of Mexico while Executive Agreement No. 323 was 

in force and effect, we find that he did not expatriate himself 

under section 401 (c) ." 

In all of the above cases it was assumed that Sunday marching 

constituted military service. Each case was then decided upon a 

different ground, e.g., oath taking and/or the effect of Executive 

Agreement No. 323. The case before us now aPpears to be the 

first in which the specific question of whether Sunday marching 

is tantamount to military service, has been raised and argued. 

We conclude that Sunday marching as described above does not 

constitute service in the armed forces of a foreign state so as to 

expatriate one under section 349 (a) (3) of the Immigration and 

Nationality Act. To deprive one of his United States citizenship 

we feel that the statute contemplates much more than simply 

marching an hour or so each week. We hold that applicant's 

"Sunday marching" was not an act in derogation of his allegiance 

to the United States or inconsistent with his obligations, responsibilities and loyalty as a United States citizen. 

The record contains substantial evidence that the Sunday 

marching by the applicant was compulsory under Mexican law. 

Since we hold that the marching itself was not within the ambit 

of section 349(a) (3), we need not confront the conclusive presumption of voluntariness that would otherwise apply under section 349 (b) of the Act. Compulsory military service, of course, 

does not expatriate' Further, the pledge of allegiance to the Mexican flag that applicant was compelled to take, even if such pledge 

is considered as an oath of allegiance, is not expatriating under 

2 In force from January 22, 1943 to October 28, 1952. 

3A Circular of the Minister of National Defense of Mexico, dated Decemer 14, 1948 states that the Mexican Government considers men engaged in 

Sunday military service to be a part of the active, regular army of Mexico 

during their year's service. The State Department regarded the circular as a 

statement of the status of persons engaged in Sunday marching. 

4 Lehmann v. Acheson, 206 F.2d 592,594 (3 Cir., 1953) ; Dos Reis exrel. 

Camara v. Nicholls, 161 F.2d 860 (1 Cir., 1947) ; Podea v. Acheson, 179 F.2d 

306 (2 Cir., 1950); Pondolfa v. Acheson, 202 F.2d 38 (2 Cir., 1953). 

510 
Interim Decision #2031 

section 349 (a) (2) of the Act as it was a concomittant of his nonexpatriating marching and not a separate and distinct act.' 

ORDER: It is ordered that no change be made in the order of 

the special inquiry officer and that the applicant be admitted to 

the United States as a United States ciizen, 

Matter cf V—L—, 5 I. & N. Dec. 497 (BIA, 1953) ; Moldoveanu v. 

Dulles, 168 F. Supp. 1 (E.D. Mich., 1958). 

511