FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL

STATE OF FLORIDA

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No. 1D16-5680

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DANTRELL J. JENKINS,

Appellant,

v.

STATE OF FLORIDA,

Appellee.

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On appeal from the Circuit Court for Bradford County.

William E. Davis, Judge.

April 5, 2018

PER CURIAM.

Dantrell Jenkins was charged and convicted of sexual 

battery upon a person less than twelve years of age and 

sentenced to life in prison. On appeal, he argues that the trial 

court failed to conduct an adequate hearing before deciding to 

admit a child hearsay statement. We disagree and affirm. 

Jenkins is a close relative of the victim’s father, had a close 

relationship with the victim and her mother, and often came to 

their house. Jenkins admitted that in the early morning hours 

one day, when the victim was eight years old, he came to the 

house high on various drugs and lay down next to her. Sometime 

later, the victim’s father walked into the living room and saw the 

victim with Jenkins’ penis in her mouth. Jenkins contends that 

he woke up when the victim, on her own, took Jenkins’ pants off 

and began performing oral sex on him. Just as he woke up, and 

before he could stop her, he claims, her father walked in and saw 
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them. The victim gave a different account of the events, which 

included Jenkins waking her up, grabbing her by the back of the 

head, and forcing her to put his penis in her mouth. 

The victim told her mother that her father had walked in 

that morning and saw Jenkins’ penis in her mouth; she 

mentioned no other details, such as who initiated the act. The 

State filed a notice to rely on this statement at trial as the 

statement of a child victim pursuant to section 90.803(23), 

Florida Statutes.

At the child-hearsay hearing, the victim’s mother told the 

trial court what the victim told her. The defense conceded that 

Jenkins had already admitted that the incident occurred, and 

only argued as to who initiated it. But the defense argued that 

the victim’s mother was not a credible source, and believed some 

of her hearing testimony was incompatible with her previous

interview with child services personnel, in which she purportedly 

minimized her knowledge of the incident. If the trial court 

continued the hearing, the defense asserted, it could produce the 

mother’s interviewer and demonstrate the mother’s inconsistency 

and lack of credibility. If she was found to not be a credible 

witness, the statement must be excluded. 

The trial court stated that any concerns it might have as to 

the mother’s credibility were alleviated by Jenkins’ own 

admission. The only statement the victim made to her mother—

that her father walked in and saw her and Jenkins—was 

undisputed by Jenkins. The court declined to continue the 

hearing and held that, so long as the victim testified at trial, her 

statement to her mother would be admitted. 

Evidence at trial included the testimony of the victim, her 

mother and father, the defense witness intended to impeach the 

mother, and the individuals who conducted the interviews of both 

the victim and Jenkins, as well as the recorded interviews 

themselves. The jury returned a guilty verdict within twelve 

minutes. 

Jenkins does not argue that the trial court’s findings were 

inadequate under section 90.803(23), Florida Statutes, but only 
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that it should have continued the hearing to allow the defense to 

present an impeachment witness. Jenkins presents no authority 

indicating that a trial court must continue a properly scheduled 

hearing so the defense may produce impeachment witnesses, and 

we decline to impose such a rule. Because there was competent, 

substantial evidence supporting the reliability of the statement 

at issue, the trial court did not abuse its discretion. See Perez v. 

State, 536 So. 2d 206, 211 (Fla. 1988). This is especially the case 

when the defendant stipulates to the truth of the statement. See 

id. at 212 (Shaw, J., concurring specially) (“Even more 

significantly, the hearsay statements were consistent with the 

confession of petitioner . . . . Under these circumstances, the 

hearsay corroborated the confession and served only to prove 

corpus delicti by showing that a crime had been committed.”). 

Had there been any error, it would have been harmless, as 

Jenkins admitted that the act occurred in a post-Miranda∗

recorded interview played before the jury. 

AFFIRMED.

B.L. THOMAS, C.J., and MAKAR and WINOKUR, JJ., concur.

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Not final until disposition of any timely and 

authorized motion under Fla. R. App. P. 9.330 or 

9.331.

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Andy Thomas, Public Defender, and Kevin Steiger, Assistant 

Public Defender, Tallahassee, for Appellant.

Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, and Jason Rodriguez, 

Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.

 ∗ Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).