alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
* Pursuant to 5 TH C IR . R. 47.5, the court has determined

that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5 TH C IR . R. 47.5.4. IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 98-50479 Summary Calendar

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff-Appellee,

versus JUAN ESTRADA, JR., Defendant-Appellant.

- - - - - - - - - - Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Texas USDC No. SA-97-CR-62-1

- - - - - - - - - - January 25, 1999 Before JOLLY, SMITH, and WIENER, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: * Juan Estrada, Jr., appeals his guilty-plea conviction for possession with intent to distribute cocaine in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) and possession of a firearm by a convicted felon in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g). Estrada argues that the district court erred in denying his motion for suppression of evidence seized after his automobile was stopped by an officer of the San Antonio Police Department. He contends that he did not violate a Texas traffic statute. The district court did not errNo. 98-50479 -2- in finding that the traffic stop was reasonable because the police officer had probable cause to believe that Estrada committed a traffic violation of changing lanes without using a turn signal. See Tex. Transp. Code Ann. §§ 545.104 & 545.106 (Vernon 1999); United States v. Miller , 146 F.3d 274, 277 (5th Cir. 1998). Estrada argues that the district court erred in basing its decision primarily on information obtained from first-time informants whose reliability and credibility were not properly established. Estrada is apparently referring to a prior police report that a man named Juan Estrada, who drove a car matching the description of the car Estrada was driving when stopped for the instant traffic violation, had committed an aggravated kidnapping. As noted above, the district court did not err in holding that the initial traffic stop was reasonable. The subsequent arrest and search of Estrada was based on his failure to obey the police officers’ lawful command to stop the engine of the automobile and for his subsequent assaultive behavior. The district court did not base its decision primarily on information of first-time informants whose reliability had not been established. Estrada argues that the inventory search of his automobile was unconstitutional because it was not conducted pursuant to a standardized policy of the San Antonio Police Department. The district court did not err in holding that the evidence presented at the hearing concerning the motion to suppress, including the testimony of two police officers and the supervisor of theNo. 98-50479 -3- property room, indicated that the San Antonio Police Department has an unwritten policy of opening closed or locked containers during inventory searches to determine the contents and protect property and officers’ safety. See United States v. Hope , 102 F.3d 114, 116 (5th Cir. 1996).

AFFIRMED.
Exhibit 11

                        STATEMENT RE COMPUTATION OF PER-SHARE EARNINGS

<TABLE>
<CAPTION>
                                                                YEAR ENDED MARCH 31
                                                       1998            1997           1996
                                                    -----------    -----------    -----------
<S>                                                   <C>            <C>            <C>      
Basic and Diluted
Average common shares outstanding                     1,754,342      1,401,112      1,281,460

Net effect of dilutive  stock  options - based on
the  treasury  method  using average market price            --             --             --
                                                    -----------    -----------    -----------
Total                                                 1,754,342      1,401,112      1,281,460
                                                    -----------    -----------    -----------
(Loss) income from continuing operations            $  (206,108)   $   126,731    $  (778,332)
Preferred stock dividends                               162,000        162,000        203,836
                                                    -----------    -----------    -----------

(Loss) income applicable to common stockholders        (368,108)       (35,269)      (982,168)
                                                    ===========    ===========    ===========
</TABLE>
exv10w14






Exhibit 10.14




ADDENDUM





	1.	 	Stock Option Agreement: Stock options in the amount of 30,000 shares
of Calgon Carbon Corporation’s common shares vesting in increments of 10,000 shares. On
or after January 2, 2001, you may purchase the stock granted as follows:





	 	 	 	 	 
	Purchase Date	 	Number of Shares
	On or after January 2, 2001

	 	 	10,000	 
	On or after January 2, 2002

	 	 	10,000	 
	On or after January 2, 2003

	 	 	10,000	 







The option may be exercised in accordance with the above schedule in whole or in part at
any time to and including January 1, 2010. The details of the option grant will be
included in the Stock Option Agreement between the Company and you.




The stock options that you will be granted when employment begins will continue to be
exercisable, per the vesting schedule in the stock option agreement, if you are
terminated without cause.




	2.	 	Your relocation will be provided for per the Company’s Employee
Relocation Policy. The policy includes:






	 	•	 	Transport of your household goods
	 
	 	•	 	Transportation, meals, and lodging for you and your family
including packing and unpacking of goods
	 
	 	•	 	Reimbursement for your spouse’s trips for locating a new
residence, limited to six days
	 
	 	•	 	Reimbursement for standard and usual costs associated with
selling your current residence, not including sale price
	 
	 	•	 	Reimbursement for standard and usual costs of purchasing a
new residence, not including purchase price
	 
	 	•	 	Reimbursement for temporary housing for up to 180 days from
your date of employment






	3.	 	You will be provided with a company car per the conditions of the Company’s Car
Policy.
	 
	4.	 	The Company shall support you in obtaining a non-residence status in Belgium.
	 
	5.	 	The Company will discuss methods to enhance the pension and disability plan
provisions available to you provided that such enhancements comply with appropriate labor
laws and do not require amendment of Plans to include all participants.
	 
	6.	 	Termination of the employment contract: The parties acknowledge that the
annual pay at the time of entering into employment is at least equal to BEF 1,912,000
gross and therefore agree to fix the notice period to be observed by the Company in the
event of termination of the employment contract without serious reason according to the
following formula (current Claeys formula):





               N= 0.89 x (Sen) + 0.08 x (A) + 0.0013 x (S) — 2



          Whereby:




               N = notice period in months



               Sen = seniority in years and in parts of years



 









 





               A = age in years and part years



               S =salary expressed in plurals of BEF
1,000 reduced by the index at the time of the calculation
of the Claeys formula



          However, the parties expressly agree that the notice period to be observed by the
Company is fixed at minimum 18 months.
STATE v. Tyler Deion GREENFIELD

11A19-1

Supreme Court of North Carolina.

August 8, 2019

Jess D. Mekeel, Assistant Attorney General, for State of North Carolina.

Kathryn L. VandenBerg, Assistant Appellant Defender, for Greenfield, Tyler Deion.

Teresa M. Postell, Assistant Attorney General, for State of North Carolina.

Ben R. David, District Attorney, for State of North Carolina.

*645The following order has been entered on the Motion for Extension of Time to File Brief filed on the 8th of August 2019 by State of NC:

"Motion Allowed by order of the Court in conference, this the 8th of August 2019."
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

MIDDLE DISTRICT

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA,

Respondent

v.

JULIETTE ANN MARTIN,

Petitioner

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

No. 288 MAL 2020

Petition for Allowance of Appeal 

from the Order of the Superior Court

ORDER

PER CURIAM

AND NOW, this 23rd day of November, 2020, the Petition for Allowance of Appeal

is DENIED.
Order filed August 4, 2017 

In The

Fourteenth Court of Appeals

____________

NO. 14-17-00506-CV

____________

IN THE INTEREST OF M.R.D.W., CHILD

On Appeal from the 314th District Court

Harris County, Texas

Trial Court Cause No. 2016-03574J

ORDER

This is an accelerated appeal from a judgment in a suit in which the 

termination of the parent-child relationship is at issue. Appellant R.W.’s brief was 

due August 2, 2017. No brief or motion for extension has been filed. 

Appeals in parental termination cases and child protection cases are to be 

brought to final disposition within 180 days of the date the notice of appeal is filed. 

See Tex. R. Jud. Admin. 6.2(a) (effective May 1, 2012). This accelerated schedule 

requires greater compliance with briefing deadlines. 

Therefore, we order R.W.’s appointed counsel, William Thursland, to file 

R.W.’s brief no later than August 14, 2017. If the brief is not filed by that date,
2

counsel may be required to show cause why he should not be held in contempt of 

court. In addition, the court may require appointment of new counsel due to the 

failure to timely file appellant’s brief. 

PER CURIAM
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<PAGE>
<ARTICLE> 5
<LEGEND>
THIS SCHEDULE CONTAINS SUMMARY FINANCIAL INFORMATION EXTRACTED FROM FORM 10-KSB
AND IS QUALIFIED IN ITS ENTIRETY BY REFERENCE TO SUCH FINANCIAL STATEMENTS.
</LEGEND>
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   YEAR
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-1997
<PERIOD-START>                             JAN-01-1997
<PERIOD-END>                               DEC-31-1997
<CASH>                                       1,498,540
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                    7,863
<ALLOWANCES>                                         0
<INVENTORY>                                          0
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                             1,506,403
<PP&E>                                               0
<DEPRECIATION>                                       0
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                               1,506,403
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                          857,652
<BONDS>                                              0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                        33,755
<OTHER-SE>                                     614,996
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                 1,506,403
<SALES>                                         42,436
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                                42,436
<CGS>                                           23,039
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                   23,039
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                             1,888,743
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                           (121,932)
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                      0
<INCOME-TAX>                                         0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                                  0
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                               (1,747,414)
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                   (0.05)
<EPS-DILUTED>                                   (0.05)
        

</TABLE>
#### C. E. McRae, F. E. Platt, Albert Carlton, H. J. Downing and M. H. Harrison, as and Constituting the Board of County Commissioners of DeSoto County, Florida, *Appellants,*v. D. L. McSwain, L. L. Morgan and F. Marqus, *Appellees.*

Division B.

Opinion Filed May 10, 1928.

*B. J2. Brown,*for Appellant;

*Leitner <& Leitner*for Appellee.

Per Curiam.

Chapter 10514, Acts of 1925, authorizes the County Commissioners of DeSoto County “to issue and sell the bonds of said county in an amount not to exceed $300,000.00, the proceeds thereof to be used to purchase a site and to erect and equip a general hospital in said county.” The chancellor enjoined the County Commissioners from purchasing a hospital site and from erecting a hospital. A demurrer to the bill of complaint was' overruled and the County Commissioners appealed.

*894The statute is indefinite and incomplete in that it does not provide that the “general hospital,” for the construction of which county bonds are to be sold and county taxes to be levied, is for or shall be used for a county purpose; and the Act does not authorize the County Commissioners to purchase a site or to erect a hospital. Unless the hospital is used for a permissible county purpose, a county tax cannot be levied for its construction or maintenance without violating Section 5, of Article IS, of the State Constitution. The statute does not give the County Commissioners authority to purchase a site or to build a hospital, therefore, the orders appealed from áre affirmed.

Whitfield, P. J., and Terrell and Buford, J. J., concur.

Ellis, C. J., and Strum and Brown, J. J., concur in the opinion and judgment.
**EXHIBIT 31.2****CERTIFICATION**I, Robert K. Moskovitz, certify that:1. I have reviewed this quarterly report on Form 10-Q for the quarter ended September 30, 2007of Lease Equity Appreciation Fund I, L.P.; 2. Based on my knowledge, this report does not contain any untrue statement of a material factor omit to state a material fact necessary to make the statements made, in light of thecircumstances under which such statements were made, not misleading with respect to the periodcovered by this report; 3. Based on my knowledge, the financial statements, and other financial information included inthis report, fairly present in all material respects the financial condition, results ofoperations and cash flows of the registrant as of, and for, the periods presented in thisreport; 4. The registrant’s other certifying officer(s) and I are responsible for establishing andmaintaining disclosure controls and procedures (as defined in Exchange Act Rules 13a-15(e) and15d-15(e)) [omission in accordance with SEC Release No. 33-8760 (December 15, 2006)] for theregistrant and have: (a) Designed such disclosure controls and procedures, or caused such disclosure controlsand procedures to be designed under our supervision, to ensure that material informationrelating to the registrant, including its consolidated subsidiaries, is made known to us byothers within those entities, particularly during the period in which this report is beingprepared;  (b) [omission in accordance with SEC Release No. 33-8760 (December 15, 2006)];  (c) Evaluated the effectiveness of the registrant’s disclosure controls and procedures andpresented in this report our conclusions about the effectiveness of the disclosure controlsand procedures, as of the end of the period covered by this report based on suchevaluation; and  (d) Disclosed in this report any change in the registrant’s internal control over financialreporting that occurred during the registrant’s most recent fiscal quarter (theregistrant’s fourth fiscal quarter in the case of an annual report) that has materiallyaffected, or is reasonably likely to materially affect, the registrant’s internal controlover financial reporting; and5. The registrant’s other certifying officer(s) and I have disclosed, based on our most recentevaluation of internal control over financial reporting, to the registrant’s auditors and theaudit committee of the registrant’s board of directors (or persons performing the equivalentfunctions): (a) All significant deficiencies and material weaknesses in the design or operation ofinternal control over financial reporting which are reasonably likely to adversely affectthe registrant’s ability to record, process, summarize and report financial information;and  (b) Any fraud, whether or not material, that involves management or other employees whohave a significant role in the registrant’s internal control over financial reporting.     Date: November 14, 2007 /s/ Robert K. Moskovitz         Name: Robert K. Moskovitz    Title: Chief Financial Officer of the General Partner
EXHIBIT 32.1





CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO


18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,


AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO


SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002





In connection with the Quarterly Report of Lease Equity Appreciation Fund I, L.P. (the “Company”) on Form 10-Q for the quarter ended March 31, 2011 as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the “Report”), I, Crit S. DeMent, Chief Executive Officer of the General Partner of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:





(1)
The Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, and





(2)
The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.


Date: May 16, 2011
/s/ Crit S. DeMentName: Crit S. DeMentTitle: Chief Executive Officer of the General Partner
COURT OF APPEALS

	SECOND DISTRICT OF TEXAS

	FORT WORTH 

					NO. 2-05-127-CV

IN THE INTEREST OF D.W.R., III AND A.C.R.

	----------

	FROM THE 233RD DISTRICT COURT OF TARRANT COUNTY

	----------

		MEMORANDUM OPINION1 AND JUDGMENT

	------------

	On April 6, 2005 and April 21, 2005, we notified appellant, in accordance with rule of appellate procedure 42.3(c), that we would dismiss this appeal unless the $125 filing fee was paid. Tex. R. App. P. 42.3(c).  Appellant has not paid the $125 filing fee.  See Tex. R. App. P. 5, 12.1(b).

	Because appellant has failed to comply with a requirement of the rules of appellate procedure and the Texas Supreme Court's order of July 21, 1998,2 we dismiss the appeal.  See Tex. R. App. P. 42.3(c), 43.2(f).

	Appellant shall pay all costs of this appeal, for which let execution issue.  See Tex. R. App. P. 5.

								PER CURIAM

PANEL D: WALKER, J.; CAYCE, C.J.; and MCCOY, J.	

DELIVERED: May 12, 2005
##### 



Exhibit 31.1

CERTIFICATION

I, Ronald Mustari, President and Chief Executive Officer (principal executive
officer) of Whitehall Limited, Inc. certify that:

1.     I have reviewed this
annual report on Form 10-KSB of Whitehall Limited,
Inc.;

2.     Based on my knowledge, this report does not contain any untrue
statement of a material fact or omit to state a material fact necessary to make
the statements made, in light of the circumstances under which such statements
were made, not misleading with respect to the period covered by this report;

3.     Based on my knowledge,
 the financial statements, and other financial
information included in this report, fairly present in all material
respects the financial condition, results of operations and cash flows of the
registrant as of, and for, the periods presented in this report;

4.     The registrants other certifying officers and I are responsible for
establishing and maintaining disclosure controls and procedures (as defined in
Exchange Act Rules 13a-15(e) and 15d-15(e)) for the registrant and we have:

a) designed such disclosure controls
and procedures, or caused such disclosure controls and procedures to
be designed under our supervision, to ensure that material
information relating to the registrant, including its consolidated
subsidiaries, is made known to us by others within those entities, particularly
during the period in which this report is being prepared;

b) evaluated the effectiveness of the registrants disclosure controls and
procedures and  presented in this report our conclusions about the effectiveness
of the disclosure controls and procedures as of the end of the period
covered by this report based on such evaluation; and

c) disclosed in this report any change
in the registrant's internal control over financial reporting that
occurred during the registrant's most recent fiscal quarter that has
materially affected, or is reasonably likely to
materially affect, the
registrant's control over financial reporting; and

5.     The registrants other certifying officers and I have disclosed, based on
our most recent evaluation of internal control over financial
reporting, to the registrants auditors and the audit
committee of registrants board of directors (or persons performing the
equivalent function):

a) all significant deficiencies and
material weaknesses in the design or operation of internal control
over financial reporting which are reasonably likely to adversely affect the registrants ability to record, process,
summarize and report financial information; and

b) any fraud, whether or not material, that involves management or other
employees who have a significant role in the registrants
internal control over financial reporting.

Date: June  18, 2004

| |  |                                                      
| |  | -----------------------------------------------------
| |  | /s/ Ronald Mustari                                   
| |  |                                                      
| |  | Ronald Mustari, President and
Chief Executive Officer