2022 WI App 38

COURT OF APPEALS OF WISCONSIN

PUBLISHED OPINION

Case No.: 2021AP809-CR

Complete Title of Case: 

STATE OF WISCONSIN,

 PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT,

 V.

JUNIOR L. WILLIAMS-HOLMES,

 DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.

Opinion Filed: June 15, 2022

Submitted on Briefs: March 16, 2022

Oral Argument: 

JUDGES: Gundrum, P.J., Neubauer and Grogan, JJ.

Concurred:

Dissented:

Appellant

ATTORNEYS: On behalf of the defendant-appellant, the cause was submitted on the 

briefs of Dustin C. Haskell, assistant state public defender of 

Milwaukee. 

Respondent

ATTORNEYS: On behalf of the plaintiff-respondent, the cause was submitted on the 

brief of John W. Kellis, assistant attorney general, and Joshua L. Kaul, 

attorney general. 
2022 WI App 38

COURT OF APPEALS

DECISION

DATED AND FILED

June 15, 2022

Sheila T. Reiff

Clerk of Court of Appeals

NOTICE

This opinion is subject to further editing. If 

published, the official version will appear in 

the bound volume of the Official Reports. 

A party may file with the Supreme Court a 

petition to review an adverse decision by the 

Court of Appeals. See WIS. STAT. § 808.10 and 

RULE 809.62. 

Appeal No. 2021AP809-CR Cir. Ct. No. 2019CF687

STATE OF WISCONSIN IN COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF WISCONSIN,

 PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT,

 V.

JUNIOR L. WILLIAMS-HOLMES,

 DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.

APPEAL from a judgment and an order of the circuit court for 

Kenosha County: BRUCE E. SCHROEDER, Judge. Affirmed.

Before Gundrum, P.J., Neubauer and Grogan, JJ. 

¶1 GUNDRUM, P.J. Junior L. Williams-Holmes appeals from a 

judgment and order of the circuit court. He contends the court erred in denying his 

postconviction motion challenging conditions of his probation and extended 
No. 2021AP809-CR

2

supervision (hereinafter collectively referred to as “supervision”) that he “not ... 

reside with any member of the opposite sex without the permission of the Court, 

nor reside with any child who is not related to [him] by blood without the permission 

of the Court.” (Emphasis added.) Specifically, Williams-Holmes contends these

conditions (improperly) grant to the court the role of “administering” his supervision 

with regard to these conditions while the statutes specifically grant that role to the 

Department of Corrections (the department). He insists we must “amend” the 

conditions so that they read that he may not reside with any woman or with a child 

not related to him by blood without the permission of the department. 

¶2 Because Williams-Holmes’ request would be in conflict with the 

circuit court’s “probationary program” and because the court’s supervision 

conditions as written can be read and implemented in a manner consistent with the 

law, we uphold them, but we do so with the clarification contained herein. We 

affirm.

Background

¶3 Williams-Holmes pled guilty to two counts of battery, one count of 

false imprisonment, and one count of bail jumping, all as a repeater, in connection 

with domestic abuse he committed against his girlfriend. His sentence included 

confinement in prison followed by a period of extended supervision, and he was 

also ordered to serve several years of consecutive probation. The circuit court stated 

that in light of Williams-Holmes’ history of domestic violence, it was ordering as 

conditions of supervision that he “not ... reside with any member of the opposite 

sex without the permission of the Court, nor reside with any child who is not related 

to [him] by blood without the permission of the Court.” (Emphasis added.)
No. 2021AP809-CR

3

¶4 In considering whether to separately order that Williams-Holmes have 

no contact with the victim, the court stated: “I’ve already put in, in effect, a no 

contact. He’ll have to come in and get approval.” (Emphasis added.) The court 

also explained to Williams-Holmes that “even though I’ve restricted your living 

with children, you can come back to court and get permission if you show that 

you’re going to be a responsible individual.” (Emphasis added.)

¶5 Postconviction, Williams-Holmes moved to amend the judgment of 

conviction “to require permission from [the department], not the court, before 

Mr. Williams-Holmes may live with women or children not related to him by 

blood.” In denying Williams-Holmes’ motion, the circuit court articulated in a 

written memorandum that Williams-Holmes “has moved ... to transfer from the 

court to [the department] the authority to regulate his residence with women and 

children unrelated by blood.” (Emphasis added.) The court expressed its belief that 

it had the constitutional authority “to impose conditions and regulate the behavior

of a probationer.” (Emphasis added.) The court also explained that “[i]t was the 

practices of [the department] which led me initially to impose the requirement for

my approval of the department’s practice of residential placements of offenders 

with unrelated children.” (Emphasis added.) The court provided a specific 

“example of how the department even now approaches this issue.”

¶6 The example is a 2019 e-mail request from a department probation 

and parole agent seeking the permission of the circuit court for an offender, who 

presumably had been recently sentenced by this particular judge, to live at a 

residence “with his girlfriend of two years ... and her 8-year-old son along with [the 

girlfriend’s] adult sister and 20-year-old niece.” In its e-mail response denying the 

agent’s request, the court stated in part, “I definitely would not approve the 

placement which [the department] is proposing without more information,” noting 
No. 2021AP809-CR

4

that, in a case out of Milwaukee, the offender was sentenced somewhat recently 

without a presentence report “so there is a substantial information gap about him.” 

The court added, “I must admit I am concerned that [the department] would suggest 

this ‘solution’” and “I have felt for many years that [the department] gives too little 

attention to the vulnerability of children who are involved in these placements, and 

does not seem to appreciate the enhanced risk these children are exposed to when 

placements like this are allowed.”

1

 Following this example, the court referred to its 

belief that “supervision” of its “program of probation” is the role of the court.

¶7 On appeal, Williams-Holmes challenges the conditions of supervision 

the court ordered in this case and the denial of his postconviction motion related to 

the same. 

Relevant Statutes

¶8 WISCONSIN STAT. § 301.03 (2019-20),2 General corrections 

authority, provides that the department shall:

 ....

(3) Administer parole, extended supervision, and probation 

matters, except that the decision to grant or deny parole to 

inmates shall be made by the parole commission and the 

decision to revoke probation, extended supervision, or 

parole, ... shall be made by the division of hearings and 

appeals in the department of administration.

(Emphasis added.)

 

1

 There is no indication that the offender himself was copied on or aware of these 

communications.

2

 All references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 2019-20 version unless otherwise 

noted.
No. 2021AP809-CR

5

¶9 WISCONSIN STAT. § 973.10, Control and supervision of 

probationers, provides:

(1) Imposition of probation shall have the effect of placing 

the defendant in the custody of the department and shall 

subject the defendant to the control of the department under 

conditions set by the court and rules and regulations 

established by the department for the supervision of 

probationers, parolees and persons on extended supervision.

(Emphasis added.) And WIS. STAT. §§ 973.01(5), EXTENDED SUPERVISION 

CONDITIONS, and 973.09(1), Probation, respectively provide that when a court 

imposes a bifurcated sentence, it may “impose conditions upon the term of extended 

supervision” and when it places a person on probation it may “impose any 

conditions which appear to be reasonable and appropriate.”

¶10 WISCONSIN STAT. § 973.09(3)(a) provides: “Prior to the expiration of 

any probation period, the court, for cause and by order, may extend probation for a 

stated period or modify the terms and conditions thereof.” (Emphasis added.) And 

WIS. STAT. § 302.113(7m)(a) provides: “[A] person subject to this section [i.e., the 

defendant] or the department may petition the sentencing court to modify any 

conditions of extended supervision set by the court.” (Emphasis added.)

Discussion

¶11 As conditions of supervision, the circuit court ordered that WilliamsHolmes “not ... reside with any member of the opposite sex without the permission 

of the Court, nor reside with any child who is not related to [him] by blood without 

the permission of the Court.” As indicated, Williams-Holmes insists that these

supervision conditions “must be amended to require permission from [the 

department], not the court.” He points out that following the court’s sentencing of 

him, he was placed into the custody and under the control of the department, per 
No. 2021AP809-CR

6

WIS. STAT. § 973.10, and asserts that without adopting his proposed “amend[ment]”

to the supervision conditions, the circuit court is left in the position of administering 

probation and extended supervision matters, contrary to WIS. STAT. § 301.03(3).3 

The State counters that the challenged supervision conditions are authorized by WIS.

STAT. §§ 973.09(3)(a) and 302.113(7m)(a) because they amount to little more than 

the court expressing that in the future the court may be willing to modify the 

prohibition against Williams-Holmes residing with women and/or with children 

unrelated by blood if the situation warrants.

¶12 This appeal calls upon us to interpret and apply various statutes. 

Statutory interpretation and application are matters of law we review de novo. See

Century Fence Co. v. American Sewer Servs., 2021 WI App 75, ¶8, 399 Wis. 2d 

742, 967 N.W.2d 32. Furthermore, in interpreting statutes that are alleged to be in 

conflict, we must “seek[] to harmonize them through a reasonable construction that 

gives effect to all provisions.” State v. Reyes Fuerte, 2017 WI 104, ¶29, 378 Wis.

2d 504, 904 N.W.2d 773. Thus, we will do so.

¶13 In its sentencing comments expounding on the challenged supervision 

conditions, the circuit court appeared to indicate that its conditions that Williams-

 

3

 Williams-Holmes clarifies in his brief-in-chief that he is “not challenging the [circuit] 

court’s authority to impose a condition limiting his ability to live with women and unrelated 

children” and, again, that he is “not seeking to overturn” these conditions. In his reply brief, he 

further adds that the court “was authorized to set a term of supervision limiting Mr. WilliamsHolmes’ living options” and again notes he “has not challenged the court’s discretionary authority 

to limit his ability to live with women or nonbiological children.” Williams-Holmes’ concessions

work out well as we have already determined that challenged supervision conditions very similar 

to the ones before us—and ordered by the same judge—were “reasonable and appropriate.” See 

State v. Luckett, No. 2009AP2679-CR, unpublished slip op. ¶¶3, 11, 18 (WI App Apr. 21, 2010). 

While we are not bound by this prior unpublished decision, we do find it persuasive because in 

Luckett we noted that “[t]he circuit court’s focus was clearly on the protection of community 

interests, which is a valid factor in crafting conditions” of supervision, id., ¶11, and similarly in the

case now before us, the court imposed the challenged supervision conditions because of WilliamsHolmes’ “history of domestic violence.”
No. 2021AP809-CR

7

Holmes not reside with any woman and/or with any child not related to him by blood 

“without the permission of the Court” meant that William-Holmes could not reside 

with any woman and/or such child unless the court modified the conditions, thereby 

giving its “permission.” Related to this understanding of the supervision conditions, 

the court stated: “I’ve already put in, in effect, a no contact. He’ll have to come in

and get approval.” (Emphasis added.) The court further explained to WilliamHolmes that “even though I’ve restricted your living with children, you can come 

back to court and get permission if you show that you’re going to be a responsible

individual.” (Emphasis added.)

¶14 In its postconviction memorandum, however, the circuit court seemed 

to indicate that its “without the permission of the court” language was referring to a 

more informal process of approval and oversight of department decisions related to 

these supervision conditions as opposed to actual modification of the conditions 

pursuant to WIS. STAT. §§ 973.09(3)(a) and 302.113(7m)(a). Related to this

understanding of the supervision conditions, the court referred to its role as one of 

“regulat[ing]” the “behavior” of a “probationer,” including regulating who that 

probationer resides with during supervision. The court explained that it was the 

“practices” of the department that led the court to impose its “without the permission 

of the court” requirement. Referring to a prior case before it, the court provided an

example of informal, e-mail oversight the court exercised over a department-agent’s 

“placement” decision as to who the offender in that case could or could not reside 

with. The court further expressed its belief that “supervision” of its “program of 

probation” is the role of the court.

¶15 The imposition of conditions of probation and extended supervision 

are discretionary matters for the circuit court, State v. Miller, 2005 WI App 114, 

¶11, 283 Wis. 2d 465, 701 N.W.2d 47—who is far more familiar with the particular 
No. 2021AP809-CR

8

offender than we are—and we are to “look for reasons to sustain a circuit court’s 

discretionary decision,” see State v. Muth, 2020 WI 65, ¶14, 392 Wis. 2d 578, 945 

N.W.2d 645. Furthermore, WIS. STAT. §§ 973.09(1) and 973.01(5) “specifically 

authorize[] the [circuit] court to impose” supervision conditions. See State v. Linse, 

161 Wis. 2d 719, 725, 469 N.W.2d 201 (Ct. App. 1991). Thus, as we harmonize 

WIS. STAT. § 301.03(3)’s grant of authority to the department to “administer” 

supervision matters with § 973.09(3)(a) and WIS. STAT. § 302.113(7m)(a)’s grant 

of authority to circuit courts to “modify” conditions of supervision, it is important 

that our application of the court’s conditions of supervision be consistent with the 

general “probationary program” “envisioned” and “ordered” by the court. See 

Linse, 161 Wis. 2d at 724-25 (expressing that in the situation where the department 

imposes additional conditions on a probationer, “the court is best able to determine 

whether these additional conditions are consistent with the probationary program 

envisioned by the court” and holding that where such additional conditions conflict 

with a court-ordered condition of supervision, the court-ordered condition “will 

prevail”). 

¶16 It appears to us that the problem underlying this appeal is that this 

particular circuit court judge and the department may have previously treated similar 

“without the permission of the court” language related to similar domestic-abusedriven conditions imposed by this judge as allowing for a type of informal, situationby-situation oversight by the court of who an offender may or may not reside with, 

as opposed to the court requiring its no-residing-with-women-or-childrenunrelated-by-blood condition to be modified through the mechanisms of WIS. STAT.

§§ 973.09(3)(a) and 302.113(7m)(a).

¶17 If the circuit court’s “permission” for William-Holmes to reside with 

women and/or with children unrelated by blood or with a particular woman and/or 
No. 2021AP809-CR

9

with a particular child unrelated by blood is effectuated through the informal, 

oversight/“regulation”/“supervision” procedure the court appears to have utilized in 

at least the prior example it referenced in its postconviction memorandum, this 

would be unlawful as it would amount to the court usurping the department’s 

statutorily granted authority to “administer” extended supervision and probation 

“matters.” See WIS. STAT. § 301.03(3). The court’s method for granting its 

“permission” for an offender to reside with particular individuals as indicated in this 

memorandum amounts to the court effectively managing, directing, and 

superintending this supervision condition on a situation-by-situation basis. See 

Manitowoc County v. Local 986A, AFSCME, AFL-CIO, 170 Wis. 2d 692, 698, 

489 N.W.2d 722 (Ct. App. 1992) (defining “administer” as “to manage the affairs 

of ... to direct or superintend the execution, use or conduct of” (citing administer, 

WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INT’L DICTIONARY (1976))). This is the department’s role.4

¶18 If, however, the court’s “permission” to reside with women and/or 

with children unrelated by blood or with a particular woman and/or with a particular 

child unrelated by blood is effectuated pursuant to WIS. STAT. §§ 973.09(3) and 

 

4

 Our supreme court has previously noted that “the legislature has constitutional authority 

to offer probation as an alternative to sentencing, the judiciary has authority to impose probation, 

and the executive branch has the authority to administer probation.” State v. Horn, 226 Wis. 2d 

637, 648, 594 N.W.2d 772 (1999). 

Whether a convicted defendant is sentenced to prison or the circuit 

court imposes probation, “[t]he adversary system has terminated 

and the administrative process, vested in the executive branch of 

the government, directed to the correctional and rehabilitative 

processes of the parole and probation system has been substituted 

in its place.” The judiciary phase of the criminal process—

imposing a penalty—is complete. 

Id. at 650 (alteration in original; citation omitted). Consistent with WIS. STAT. § 301.03(3), the 

Horn court expressed that administration of probation is “vest[ed]” in the executive branch, Horn, 

226 Wis. 2d at 650; however, it also recognized that modification of terms and conditions of 

probation may be accomplished pursuant to WIS. STAT. § 973.09(3)(a). Horn, 226 Wis. 2d at 651.
No. 2021AP809-CR

10

302.113(7m) and the requirements and procedures of those statutes, then such a 

grant of permission is lawful as it would merely amount to a statutorily authorized 

modification of the conditions of supervision. For modification of the probation

conditions, for example, such modification would have to be effectuated pursuant 

to § 973.09(3), and thus, the modification would need to be “for cause” and made 

“by order.” Modification of the extended supervision conditions would have to be 

effectuated pursuant to § 302.113(7m), which allows for either the offender or the 

department to “petition” the court “to modify any conditions of extended 

supervision set by the court” and which contains other procedures and requirements. 

Absent the court granting “permission” through a modification of the conditions in 

a manner consistent with these statutory provisions, the conditions prohibiting 

William-Holmes from residing with any woman and/or with any child unrelated by 

blood remain in effect. 

¶19 We cannot accommodate William-Holmes’ request that we simply 

“amend” the language of the circuit court’s supervision conditions from “without 

the permission of the court” to “without the permission of the department” because 

such a change would clearly be inconsistent with the probationary program 

envisioned and ordered by the court. Indeed, the court’s chosen language for the 

conditions themselves as well as other above-identified aspects of the record make 

it quite clear that in sentencing William-Holmes, the court lacked confidence in the 
No. 2021AP809-CR

11

department’s ability and/or willingness to properly administer the no-residing-withwomen-or-unrelated-children conditions imposed in this case.5

¶20 To harmonize the statutes and do so in a manner consistent with the 

circuit court’s probationary program in this case, which includes restricting who 

Williams-Holmes may live with for the purpose of protecting the community and 

rehabilitating Williams-Holmes, see State v. Sepulveda, 119 Wis. 2d 546, 554-55, 

350 N.W.2d 96 (1984) (identifying that “the dual purposes of probation [are] 

rehabilitating the defendant and protecting society”), we hold that the “permission” 

of the court for Williams-Holmes to reside with a woman or with a child not related 

by blood, if given, is to be granted by the court through the means of an actual 

modification of the supervision conditions via WIS. STAT. §§ 302.113(7m) and 

973.09(3) and the procedures and requirements related to those statutes. Our 

holding today is consistent with case law.

 

5

 We note that in a summary order issued a year ago, we granted a defendant’s request to 

amend the circuit court’s nearly identical supervision-condition language from “without court’s 

permission” to “without permission of the supervising agent.” State v. Exson, No. 2020AP411-

CR, unpublished op. and order at *5 n.3 (WI App June 9, 2021). A significant difference between 

that case and this one is that in Exson the State agreed with the defendant’s request for this change, 

stating in its briefing:

[I]f the circuit court insists on requiring [the defendant] to seek 

permission to live with women or minor children (as opposed to 

ordering a condition that would simply bar [the defendant] from 

living with women or children for the duration of his extended 

supervision), the condition should be amended only to reflect that 

[the defendant] must seek the permission of the Department of 

Corrections, rather than the circuit court.

The State has taken a very different, adversarial position in the case now before us and in doing so

also developed legal arguments in support of its position.
No. 2021AP809-CR

12

¶21 In Sepulveda, our supreme court reflected on “the probation statute, 

particularly [WIS. STAT. §] 973.09(3)(a) addressing the court’s power to extend 

probation or modify its terms” and then expressed that “inherent within the 

probation statute is the court’s continued power to effectuate the dual purposes of 

probation, namely, rehabilitating the defendant and protecting society, through the 

court’s authority to modify or extend probationary terms.”6 Sepulveda, 119 Wis. 2d 

at 554 (emphasis added). Thus, our supreme court recognized that the circuit courts 

do have continuing power, even after sentencing, to effectuate the purposes of 

probation, but indicated that this power is to be exercised “through” the statutory 

authority to modify the terms and conditions of probation, namely § 973.09(3)(a).

¶22 Similar to Sepulveda, in State v. Hays we stated

[t]he theory of probation envisions that an individual 

convicted of a crime who is responsive to supervision and 

guidance may be rehabilitated without placing him or her in 

prison. To achieve this theory a [circuit] court is permitted 

to impose conditions of probation that are designed to 

rehabilitate the probationer and protect society. Inherent in 

the probation statute is a continuing power in the [circuit] 

court to accomplish the theory of probation through the 

court’s authority to modify the terms of probation.

State v. Hays, 173 Wis. 2d 439, 445, 496 N.W.2d 645 (Ct. App. 1992) (second and 

third emphasis added; citations omitted). This statement came immediately after 

our quotation of the WIS. STAT. § 973.09(3)(a) language: “Prior to the expiration of 

any probation period, the court, for cause and by order, may extend probation for a 

stated period or modify the terms and conditions thereof.” Id. Our statement related 

to the “continuing power” of the circuit court to accomplish the stated “theory of 

 

6

 We have previously clarified that “[e]xtended supervision is akin to probation” and 

“[t]herefore, ‘case law relating to the propriety of conditions of probation is applicable to conditions 

of supervision.’” State v. Harris, 2008 WI App 189, ¶12, 315 Wis. 2d 537, 763 N.W.2d 206

(citations omitted).
No. 2021AP809-CR

13

probation” did not suggest that a circuit court has the authority to engage in some 

sort of informal, situation-by-situation oversight of a defendant on supervision but 

instead indicated, like the Sepulveda court did, that this continuing power is 

exercised “through” the statutory mechanism of § 973.09(3)(a) for modifying a 

condition of probation. See Hays, 173 Wis. 2d at 445 (emphasis omitted).

¶23 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the circuit court, but clarify that 

“permission” for William-Holmes to reside with women and/or with children 

unrelated by blood or with any particular woman and/or with any particular child 

unrelated by blood must be effectuated “through” WIS. STAT. §§ 973.09 and 

302.113.

By the Court.—Judgment and order affirmed.