COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
Present: Judges Benton, Humphreys and Senior Judge Overton

NEWPORT NEWS DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL SERVICES MEMORANDUM OPINION * v. Record No. 1230-04-1 PER CURIAM OCTOBER 26, 2004 THOMAS COOPER

FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF NEWPORT NEWS David F. Pugh, Judge (Pamela P. Bates, Assistant City Attorney, on brief), for appellant. No brief for appellee. No brief for Guardian ad litem for the minor children.
This matter arises out of pe titions filed by the Newport News De partment of Social Services to terminate Thomas Cooper’s pa rental rights in his four minor daughters. The Department contends the trial court erred when it granted father’s motion to strike the evidence and dismissed the petitions to terminate his pare ntal rights. Upon reviewing th e record and DSS’s brief, we conclude that this appeal is without merit. Accordingly, we summarily affirm the decision of the trial court. See Rule 5A:27. Background We view the evidence in the light most favor able to the prevailing party below and grant to it all reasonable inferences fairly deducible therefrom. See Logan v. Fairfax County Dep’t of
Human Dev. , 13 Va. App. 123, 128, 409 S.E.2d 460, 463 (1991). On January 2, 2001, the Department removed the father’s four daughters from his home upon a complaint of neglect and

* Pursuant to Code § 17.1-413, this opin ion is not designated for publication.- 2 - abuse. The mother of the children is deceased. The conditions which led to the removal of the children included housekeeping problems, the poor hygiene of the daughters, and the failure to obtain adequate dental and medical care for the children. Prior to the removal of the children, the Department had provided the family with numerous services, includi ng assistance with house cleaning, medical and dental care, and food stamps. The Department filed foster care service plan s for the children with the goal of returning the girls to father’s home. The plans required fa ther to complete psychological, psychiatric and psychosexual examinations, and to secure and ma intain housing and maintain employment. The Department also recommended that father enter into individual, anger management, and family counseling. Kimberly Chaney, a former foster care so cial worker, testified father completed “[e]verything except the i ndividual therapy.” Chaney testif ied father rented a three-bedroom apartment, took psychological, psychiatric and psychosexual evaluations, and completed anger management and parenting classes. She also te stified that father had successful supervised visitation with three of the children for about four months. He then had unsupervised visitation for a period of time until the Department became concerned about the behavior of the children after the visits and terminated all visitation. Selena Marrow-Smith, a foster care worker w ho later monitored the family, testified that, in February 2003, she visited father in his thre e-bedroom apartment, which she stated was an “appropriate” place for the children to reside. Fath er was employed with a security firm, and he continued to work with that firm at of the tim e of the hearing. During Marrow-Smith’s visit, father told her that he intended to re-marry a nd would then have increased income. He also expressed a desire for the child ren to return to his care.- 3 - Marrow-Smith testified that in April 2003, the Department filed new foster care service plans for the children, changing the goals to adopti on based in part on an e xpressed desire of the children not to return to their father’s care. Sh e also testified that the Department was concerned that father had not participated in individua l or family therapy. She acknowledged, however, that father had improved his housing situa tion, housekeeping issues, and his income. Julia Canestrari, a licensed clinical therapis t, met with some of the daughters and met with father in February 2002. Sh e testified that father could not articulate why the children were removed from his custody, except that he knew the family’s residence was not clean. Father also told her he was overwhelmed by the loss of the children’s mother and he was having difficulty meeting the day-to-day needs of the children. Richard Tumblin, a licensed clinical social worker, testified as an expert on parenting evaluations. In November and December 2002, he conducted a parenting evaluation on father, he had two individual sessions with father, and he also had two parent-child sessions with the family. Tumblin noted that father informed him he had taken parenting classes and had found them helpful. Tumblin also testified that fath er was cooperative and ve rbal during the sessions and that father acknowledged he had made mistak es. Tumblin, whose last contact with father was in December 2002, recommended that father obtain ongoing individu al counseling for six months to one year and that he have only supervised visitation with the children. Tumblin did not recommend that father’s pa rental rights be terminated. On December 17, 2002 and January 15, 2003, Dr. Julia Hislop, a psychologist, conducted a parenting-capacity evaluation on fa ther. She testified that father ’s “prognosis is guarded due to lack of consistent participation in treatment.” She recommended individu al therapy to address “social concerns, his history of aggression a nd abuse and his coping re sources.” Dr. Hislop testified that father has “quite [a] significant” need for individual therapy in order to address his- 4 - coping resources, reduce aggression, and improve hi s ability to form close relationships. She also suggested that father not have unsupervised visitation with the child ren and that visitation decisions be made in collaborati on with the children’s therapists. The trial court granted father’s motion to strike the evidence. The trial court ruled that the Department did not show that father did not substantially comply with the requirements of Code § 16.1-283(C)(2), and it denied the petitions to terminate father’s pa rental rights in the children. Analysis Recognizing that “[t]he termination of resi dual parental rights is a grave, drastic and irreversible action,” Helen W. v. Fa irfax County Dep’t of Human Devel. , 12 Va. App. 877, 883, 407 S.E.2d 25, 28-29 (1991), we, nevertheless, presum e the “‘trial court . . . thoroughly weighed all the evidence [and] considered th e statutory requirements.’” Logan , 13 Va. App. at 128, 409 S.E.2d at 463 (quoting Farley v. Farley , 9 Va. App. 326, 329, 387 S.E.2d 794, 796 (1990)). Code § 16.1-283(C)(2) provides, in pertinent part, that a cour t may terminate the residual parental rights of a parent of a child in foster care upon clear and convincing evidence that it is in the best interest of the child and that the following exists: The parent or parents, without good cause, have been unwilling or unable within a reasonable period of time not to exceed twelve months from the date the child wa s placed in foster care to remedy substantially the conditio ns which led to or required continuation of the child’s foster care placement, notwithstanding the reasonable and appropriate efforts of social, medical, mental health or other rehabilitative agencies to such end. Proof that the parent or parents, without good cause, have failed or been unable to make substantial progress towards elim ination of the conditions which led to or required continuation of the child’s foster care placement in accordance with their obliga tions under and within the time limits or goals set forth in a foster care plan filed with the court or any other plan jointly designed and agreed to by the parent or parents and a public or private so cial, medical, mental health or other rehabilitative agency shall c onstitute prima facie evidence of this condition. The court shall take into consideration the prior- 5 - efforts of such agencies to rehabil itate the parent or parents prior to the placement of the child in foster care. The trial court found that the Department did not show that father had not substantially remedied “the situation.” Specifically, the cour t found that the Departme nt failed to show “at what point” father was required to go to individual counseling a nd that the Department did not prove father’s attendance at counseling “was a cond ition that required [the children] to remain in foster care.” The evidence also showed that father remedi ed many of the conditions which resulted in the removal of the children such as finding a ppropriate housing, maintaining employment, and increasing his income. In addition, Tumblin a nd Dr. Hislop recommended that father have continued supervised visi tation with the children. In view of the trial court’s findings and the evidence supporting those findings, we hold that the trial court’s decision not to terminat e father’s parental ri ghts is supported by the evidence. See Norfolk Div. of Soc. Servs. v. Hardy , 42 Va. App. 546, 554-55, 593 S.E.2d 528, 532-33 (2004) (although parent did not follow th rough with continued re commended counseling and did not substantially remedy conditions leadi ng to foster care placement, evidence supported trial court’s decision not to termin ate parental rights). For thes e reasons, we affirm the decision of the trial court. Affirmed.