United States Court of Appeals

for the Fifth Circuit

No. 20-60178

Manuel F. Nkoumou Ondo, 

Petitioner,

versus

William P. Barr, U.S. Attorney General, 

Respondent.

Petition for Review of an Order of the 

Board of Immigration Appeals

Agency No. A201 426 809

Before Willett, Ho, and Duncan, Circuit Judges.

Per Curiam:*

Manuel F. Nkoumou Ondo, a native and citizen of the Republic of 

Cameroon, petitions for review of the decision of the Board of Immigration 

Appeals (“BIA”), which adopted and affirmed the decision of the 

Immigration Judge (“IJ”) to deny his application for asylum and withholding 

of removal. Because Ondo failed to exhaust his administrative remedies with 

* Pursuant to 5th Circuit Rule 47.5, the court has determined that this 

opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited 

circumstances set forth in 5th Circuit Rule 47.5.4.

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

FILED

September 4, 2020

Lyle W. Cayce

Clerk

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respect to one of his claims, we lack jurisdiction to consider it. With respect 

to his remaining claim, we deny his petition for review as meritless.

I.

Ondo was a “gendarme”1 in the Cameroonian military and asserts 

that others in his unit committed human rights abuses. He testified that on 

one occasion, a military general asked him how many soldiers were stationed 

with him. Answering honestly, he provided a number much lower than that 

reported by his lieutenant, who had apparently inflated the number to receive 

increased food rations. According to Ondo, the lieutenant retaliated against 

him by assigning him longer guard duty shifts. He also testified that the same 

lieutenant gave orders for Ondo’s cousin to be killed after an unrelated 

altercation. After that, Ondo stated, the lieutenant approached him and said, 

“One is gone and the other will follow soon.” Ondo interpreted this as a 

threat that he would meet the same fate as his cousin. 

An IJ denied Ondo’s application for asylum, withholding of removal, 

and protection under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). Ondo 

appealed to the BIA, raising only his claim for asylum and withholding of 

removal. He contended the IJ had erred in denying his application because 

“[b]y practically any definition offered, Respondent has established 

persecution on account of hi[s] being a gendarme officer who was threatened 

for disclosing the corruption of Lieutenant Wonso.” Ondo’s argument 

before the BIA was essentially that the IJ’s opinion was “internally 

inconsistent” because it had found Ondo’s testimony credible but, despite a 

“mountain of evidence,” had disagreed that he was entitled to relief. 

1 In Cameroon, a gendarme is a member of the military police force. Ondo testified 

that the gendarmes were sent to maintain order in areas of unrest. 

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The BIA adopted and affirmed the IJ’s decision. First, it noted that on 

appeal, Ondo did not challenge the denial of his claim under the CAT. It then 

explained that he had failed to show either past persecution or a well-founded 

fear of future persecution. See 8 C.F.R. § 208.13(b); Gjetani v. Barr, 968 F.3d 

393, 396 (5th Cir. 2020) (“To establish eligibility for asylum, Gjetani was 

required to demonstrate either past persecution or a well-founded fear of 

future persecution.”). His experiences did not rise to the “extreme” level 

required to be considered persecution. Moreover, Ondo had not 

demonstrated that a protected ground had been or will be “one central 

reason” for any mistreatment, past or future.2

Mr. Ondo now petitions for our review of the BIA’s decision. He 

contends that the BIA erred by combining its analyses of past persecution and 

fear of future persecution. He also maintains that he belongs to a particular 

social group of “whistleblowers within the Gendarme force that have 

exposed corruption and protested human rights abuses,” and who thus face 

“persecution.” In addition, he raises for the first time the argument that he 

fears persecution based on imputed political opinion. He asserts that after 

calling attention to the lieutenant’s corrupt behavior, he was labeled as 

having an “anti-government or separatist political opinion.” He also cites his 

testimony that the military sent him a message accusing him of training rebels 

and threatening to execute him on return. Further, Ondo explains that he 

testified to humanitarian organizations about human rights abuses by 

gendarmes, arguing that this “shows that [he] engaged in activities that could 

be perceived as expressions of anti-corruption beliefs.” 

2 The Immigration and Nationality Act places the burden of proof on the applicant 

to show that she is a refugee, that is, to “establish that race, religion, nationality, 

membership in a particular social group, or political opinion was or will be at least one 

central reason for persecuting the applicant.” 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(i).

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In response, the Government moves to dismiss the petition for lack of 

jurisdiction on the grounds that Ondo failed to exhaust administrative 

remedies. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(d)(1) (requiring exhaustion of available 

administrative remedies). In its view, Ondo’s arguments on appeal are 

different from those argued before the BIA, and are therefore unexhausted. 

In the alternative, the Government moves for summary denial. Summary 

disposition “is appropriate if ‘the position of one of the parties is clearly right 

as a matter of law so that there can be no substantial question as to the 

outcome of the case.’” United States v. Arambula, 950 F.3d 909, 909 (5th Cir. 

2020) (quoting Groendyke Transp., Inc. v. Davis, 406 F.2d 1158, 1162) (5th 

Cir. 1969)). 

II.

As a threshold matter, we must determine whether we have 

jurisdiction to review Ondo’s petition. A court “may review a final order of 

removal only if . . . the alien has exhausted all administrative remedies 

available to the alien as of right.” § 1252(d). Because our jurisdiction is 

limited by statute, the failure to exhaust administrative remedies “serves as 

a jurisdictional bar to our consideration of the issue.” Wang v. Ashcroft, 260 

F.3d 448, 452 (5th Cir. 2001). The exhaustion requirement applies when a 

petitioner could have raised the issue before the BIA, and the issue was one 

the BIA “has adequate mechanisms to address and remedy.” Omari v. 

Holder, 562 F.3d 314, 318–19 (5th Cir. 2009). While a petitioner must take 

“some affirmative action” to present an issue to the BIA, the arguments 

before the BIA and on appeal need not be identical. Vazquez v. Sessions, 885 

F.3d 862, 868 (5th Cir. 2018). The exhaustion requirement does not bar 

“subsequent variations in analysis or changes in the scope of an argument” 

but rather ensures that the petitioner has “presented an issue in some 

concrete way in order to put the BIA on notice of his claim.” Id.

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Ondo’s failure to exhaust administrative remedies precludes our 

review of his claim that he fears future persecution based on imputed political 

opinion. Before the BIA, he maintained that he belonged to a particular social 

group of whistleblowers in the gendarmes who exposed corruption. He did 

not contend that he would be in danger due to a perception that he held an 

anti-government or separatist political opinion. Because Ondo neglected to 

properly raise this argument before the BIA, we cannot consider it on appeal. 

See § 1252(d). Therefore, we dismiss for lack of jurisdiction Ondo’s claim 

based on imputed political opinion.

III.

Ondo also contends the BIA erred by considering and rejecting his 

claim of past persecution and well-founded fear of future persecution as a 

package, rather than evaluating each separately. The Government answers 

that 8 U.S.C. § 1252(d) bars review of this claim as well because Ondo did 

not raise the claim in a motion to reconsider. “A motion for reconsideration 

is ‘not generally required’ to challenge an error in the BIA’s opinion.” Dale 

v. Holder, 610 F.3d 294, 298 (5th Cir. 2010) (quoting Omari, 562 F.3d at 320). 

“But where the BIA’s decision itself results in a new issue and the BIA has 

an available and adequate means for addressing that issue, a party must first 

bring it to the BIA’s attention through a motion for reconsideration.” Omari, 

562 F.3d at 320. For instance, when a petitioner alleged on appeal that the 

BIA impermissibly engaged in factfinding, we determined that this was a new 

issue that “must first be brought to the BIA in a motion for reconsideration.” 

Id. By contrast, a petitioner need not file a motion for consideration when he 

asserts that the BIA erred “in regard to the same ground for relief already 

presented to the BIA.” Dale, 610 F.3d at 299.

We agree with Ondo that § 1252(d) does not preclude our 

consideration of this claim, which is part and parcel of his claim based on 

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purported membership in a particular social group. This claim is not a “new 

issue” that was never presented before the BIA, as in Omari. It is closer to 

Dale, where the petitioner on appeal “dispute[d] only the BIA’s answer to 

the issue he previously raised before it.” Id. at 300. Like the petitioner in 

Dale, Ondo’s “ground for relief . . . ha[s] remained logically consistent 

throughout.” Id. He sufficiently presented this claim to the BIA, exhausting 

his administrative remedies. 

Nonetheless, we agree with the Government that summary 

disposition is appropriate. Ondo has waived a crucial component of his claim 

by failing to challenge the BIA’s conclusion that he had not established 

membership in a particular social group. A petitioner who declines to 

challenge the BIA’s conclusion regarding his claim abandons that claim on 

appeal. Sharma v. Holder, 729 F.3d 407, 411 n.1 (5th Cir. 2013) (explaining 

that a petitioner “abandoned his claim for humanitarian asylum by failing to 

raise any challenge to the BIA’s conclusion that he is not entitled to 

humanitarian asylum”). Because he does not contest the BIA’s contrary 

conclusion, Ondo has abandoned his argument that he belongs to a particular 

social group.

The IJ stated that the group Ondo described might meet the definition 

of a particular social group but determined that Ondo had not shown he was 

a part of such a group. The IJ noted that a whistleblower is someone “who 

seeks to uncover or bring light to corruptive activity,” but Ondo was not 

aware of the corruption when he acted. Instead, “the general . . . asked him a 

question and he gave an honest answer.” The BIA explained it was thus “not 

clear on this record that [Ondo] is a whistle blower who ‘exposed corruption’ 

based on a single conversation with a general, or ‘protested’ human rights 

abuses by refusing to participate in military missions.” Rather than 

challenging those adverse determinations, Ondo mischaracterizes the 

opinions, contending that “[t]he IJ recognized that this was a cognizable 

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particular social group, and the BIA adopted and affirmed the IJ’s decision.” 

By refusing to acknowledge the BIA’s holding, Ondo has abandoned any 

argument that it was erroneous. 

Because Ondo cannot demonstrate that a protected ground was “one 

central reason” for past or future persecution, he cannot show that he is 

entitled to relief. See Gonzales-Veliz v. Barr, 938 F.3d 219, 224 (5th Cir. 2019) 

(“For both asylum and withholding-of-removal claims . . . an alien must show 

that a protected ground (e.g., membership in a particular social group) was 

‘at least one central reason for persecuting the applicant.’”) (quoting 8 

U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(i)). Accordingly, we will summarily deny his petition 

on that claim.

IV.

In sum, we DISMISS for lack of jurisdiction Ondo’s claim that he is 

entitled to relief because he faces persecution on the basis of imputed political 

opinion. We otherwise DENY the petition for review. All other pending 

motions are DENIED AS MOOT. 

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