UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

MAHA VISCONTI,

Plaintiff,

v.

JOSEPH BURGHARDT, et al.,

Defendant.

 Civil Action No. 23-3145 (RDM)

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Plaintiff Maha Visconti, proceeding pro se, brought this action against State Court 

Judge Joseph Burghardt, Federal District Court Judge Jesus Bernal, the Superior Courts of Los 

Angeles, the United States District Court for the Central District of California, the Clerks of the 

Central District Court of California, the United States of America, and the Federal Bureau of 

Investigations (“FBI”). Dkt. 1 at 4–5. Plaintiff claims that she was “unlawfully and illegally 

incarcerated on 8/22/2023 without due process nor any single evidence of any crime, nor

violation by Defendant State Court Judge Burghardt.” Id. at 6. She also claims that Judge 

Bernal “was not randomly selected” to preside over her two federal court cases, id. at 11; see 

also id. at 10, that Judge Bernal previously criminally conspired with her ex-husband, id. at 12, 

and that Judge Bernal is retaliating against her in her cases, id. at 13. She seeks damages, in 

the amount of $50 million, under 28 U.S.C. § 1983. Id. at 22. Her civil cover sheet also 

indicates that she seeks habeas relief, id., and her complaint elsewhere alleges constitutional 

due process violations, id. at 6, 8. Plaintiff further seeks injunctive relief against “[a]ll bench 

officers in Los Angeles Superior[] and Federal Court at Central District Court.” Id. at 7. 

After purporting to serve Defendant Judge Burghardt, Dkt. 18, Plaintiff filed a motion 
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for default judgment as to Judge Burghardt, Dkt. 19. Judge Burghardt opposed that motion, 

explaining that he had not been properly served because he “never received a properly issued 

summons.” Dkt. 25 at 1–2. As Judge Burghardt points out, the “summons filed with the 

affidavit [for proof of service represents] that service occurred on February 9, 2024, but the 

attached summons is not directed to Judge Burghardt, is not signed by the Clerk, and does not 

bear the court’s seal.” Id. at 2 (citing Dkt. 18). After filing her motion for default but before

Judge Burghardt filed his response, Plaintiff filed a second affidavit of service, Dkt. 23, this 

time claiming service on the Superior Court of Los Angeles, id. at 2. The attached summons

was blank and was not signed by the Clerk. Id. at 1.

On April 4, 2024, Plaintiff filed a request for summons to issue to five defendants. Dkt. 

29. These were directed to: Joseph Burghardt, id. at 1, the Superior Courts of Los Angeles, 

Dkt. 29-1 at 1, the Clerks of Central District Court of California, Los Angeles Division, Dkt. 

29-2 at 1, the FBI, Dkt. 29-3 at 1, and Jesus Bernal, Dkt. 29-4 at 1. The five summons were 

signed and sealed by the Clerk on April 8, 2024. Dkt. 31. Plaintiff purported to file a 

Certificate of Service on April 13, 2024, Dkt. 38, but, rather than attesting to the proper service 

of process pursuant to Rule 4, her filing merely indicated that she had served Dkts. 27, 30, 32, 

33, 34, and 35 on Defendants using the CM/ECF system. Dkt. 38 at 1–2. It said nothing of 

service of the summons or complaint. See id. 

On April 26, 2024, Judge Burghardt and the Superior Court of California, County of 

Los Angeles moved to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction, lack of subject matter 

jurisdiction, and failure to state a claim on which relief can be granted. Dkt. 46. That same 

day, the Court issued a Fox/Neal Order directing Plaintiff to file her opposition to the motion to 

dismiss on or before May 20, 2024. Dkt. 48. Plaintiff moved for an extension of time, Dkt. 
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49, and the Court granted her an extension until June 12, 2024, to file her opposition, Min. 

Order (May 13, 2024). Rather than file her opposition, however, Plaintiff submitted a series of 

other documents: she filed an Ex Parte Application for an Order to Obtain Video Camera 

Footage, Dkt. 50, dated May 28, 2024; she filed a Brief in Support of Complaint and Request 

for Equitable and Injunctive Relief, Dkt. 55, dated June 1, 2024; and she filed a Motion for 

Expedited Discovery and to Compel the Production of Documents, Dkt. 57, dated June 3, 

2024. Judge Burghardt opposed the Ex Parte Application. Dkt. 54.

On June 6, 2024, Plaintiff then filed an “urgent notice” for a further extension of time

until June 20, 2024, to oppose the pending motion to dismiss. Dkt. 53. According to Plaintiff,

she was unable to get paper and pencils with which to finish writing her opposition. Id. The 

Court granted the extension. Min. Order (Jun. 9, 2024). 

Plaintiff filed a Declaration in Support of Motion for Discovery, which is dated June 

12, 2024. Dkt. 58. Then, Plaintiff filed a Declaration in Support of Plaintiff’s Motion to 

Change Time for Expedited Discovery and to Compel Production of Documents and Records, 

which is dated June 14, 2024. Dkt. 61. Plaintiff filed a Motion to Change Time for Hearing or 

Consideration on Plaintiff’s Motion for Expedited Discovery and to Compel Production of 

Documents, which is dated on June 15, 2024. Dkt. 60. In a document dated that same day, 

entitled “Extremely Further Urgent Notification,” Plaintiff claimed that she had been barred as 

of June 12, 2024, from going to the law library at the facility in which she is incarcerated and 

thus could not finalize her opposition to the motion to dismiss. Dkt. 62 at 3–4. Plaintiff 

requests permission to submit her opposition brief eight days after the date on which she 

regains access to the law library. Id. at 5; see also Dkt. 64. She also moves for a court order 

granting her immediate access to Los Angeles County Jail Facility (“CRDF”) Jail’s Law 
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Library. Dkt. 63. 

Notwithstanding Plaintiff’s contention that she not been allowed to conduct any legal 

work or to go the law library since June 12, 2024, she filed a lengthy motion for sanctions 

pursuant to Rule 11, Dkt. 65, which is dated June 18 and 19, 2024. She also filed a Notice of 

Adding CRDF as a party to this action, which is dated June 20, 2024. Dkt. 67. Plaintiff 

additionally filed a partial opposition to Defendants’ motion to dismiss, Dkt. 68, dated June 20, 

2024, along with two notices of exhibits in support of that opposition brief, Dkt. 69; Dkt. 70. 

The partial opposition responds to Defendants’ claim of judicial immunity but does not address 

the Court’s jurisdiction. See generally Dkt. 68.

Plaintiff’s myriad motions are premature. Plaintiff bears the burden of establishing that 

the court has subject-matter jurisdiction, see Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 561 

(1992), and “establishing a factual basis for the exercise of personal jurisdiction” over each 

defendant, Crane v. N.Y. Zoological Soc., 894 F.2d 454, 456 (D.C. Cir. 1990). Plaintiff has 

met neither burden. Where, as here, the plaintiff is proceeding pro se, the court will hold her 

pleadings “to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers,” Erickson v. 

Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted), but “as with 

any other plaintiff, a pro se plaintiff must meet h[er] burden of establishing subject-matter 

jurisdiction.” Patel v. Ambit Grp., No. 18-cv-2985, 2019 WL 4472124, at *2 (D.D.C. Sept. 17, 

2019). “Until the court has established personal jurisdiction [over a party],” moreover, “any 

assertion of judicial power over the party violates due process.” Ins. Corp. of Ireland v. 

Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 456 U.S. 694, 706 (1982). The Court will, accordingly, 

deny her myriad motions without prejudice as premature and order her to show cause why the 

case should not be dismissed for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, lack of personal 
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jurisdiction, and failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.

The Court doubts that it has jurisdiction for at least three reasons. First, Plaintiff seeks

to challenge various prior state or federal court proceedings that this Court lacks jurisdiction to 

review. For the claims related to state court proceedings in Los Angeles Superior Court, this 

Court “cannot review the decisions of state courts or direct state court judicial off[ic]ers in the 

performance of their duties.” Zernik v. U.S. Dep’t of Just., 630 F. Supp. 2d 24, 27 (D.D.C. 

2009); see also Richardson v. D.C. Ct. of Appeals, 83 F.3d 1513, 1514 (D.C. Cir. 1996)

(“[W]ithin the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, . . . federal district courts lack jurisdiction to review

judicial decisions by state and District of Columbia courts.”). For the claims related to federal 

court proceedings in the Central District of California, “one district court does not have 

jurisdiction to review the decisions of another district court or federal appellate court or to take 

disciplinary action against other federal judges.” Klayman v. Kollar-Kotelly, No. 12-5340, 

2013 WL 2395909, at *1 (D.C. Cir. May 20, 2013) (citations omitted). 

Second, the Court lacks jurisdiction over damages claims against state officials that are 

barred by sovereign immunity or Eleventh Amendment immunity. See Dougherty v. United 

States, 156 F. Supp. 3d 222, 228 (D.D.C. 2016), aff’d sub nom. Dougherty v. McKee, No. 16-

5052, 2017 WL 2332591 (D.C. Cir. Feb. 2, 2017) (explaining that sovereign immunity 

defenses are evaluated under Rule 12(b)(1)). The Eleventh Amendment bars suits against the 

state or state officials sued in their official capacities for damages unless the state has waived 

its immunity or Congress has abrogated that immunity pursuant to Section 5 of the Fourteenth 

Amendment. See Will v. Michigan Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 66 (1989). Plaintiff 

brings her claims pursuant to Section 1983, and Congress did not abrogate state sovereign 

immunity in suits against states or state officials named in their official capacities when it 
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passed Section 1983. Id. at 71. Similarly, Plaintiff fails to identify any waiver of federal 

sovereign immunity that would permit her to recover damages from the federal defendants. 

F.D.I.C. v. Meyer, 510 U.S. 471, 475 (1994) (“Absent a waiver, sovereign immunity shields 

the Federal Government and its agencies from suit.”); see also Smith v. Scalia, 44 F. Supp. 3d 

28, 38 (D.D.C. 2014), aff’d, No. 14-5180, 2015 WL 13710107 (D.C. Cir. Jan. 14, 2015) (“[T]o 

the extent that [Plaintiff] has sued the judges in their official capacity, these defendants are part 

of the United States government for the purposes of sovereign immunity[.]”).

Third, Plaintiff has offered no basis to conclude that the Court has personal jurisdiction 

over Judge Burghardt or the Superior Court of Los Angeles—the only defendants she has 

purportedly served. Dkt. 18; Dkt. 23. Neither are “essentially at home” in the District of 

Columbia and thus subject to general personal jurisdiction. Ford Motor Co. v. Mont. Eighth 

Jud Ct., 592 U.S. 351, 358 (2021). Nor does Plaintiff allege contacts with the District of 

Columbia that would satisfy the D.C. long-arm statute, D.C. Code § 13-423, or the 

constitutional requirements of due process. GTE New Media Servs. Inc. v. BellSouth Corp., 

199 F.3d 1343, 1347 (D.C. Cir. 2000).

Finally, even if the Court has subject matter and personal jurisdiction, and even if (i.e., 

assuming without deciding) that the judicial officers and courts she seeks to sue are not 

protected by absolute judicial immunity, compare Dkt. 47 at 16–17, with Dkt. 68 at 17–36, 

Plaintiff’s claims do not appear to be claims on which this Court could grant relief. To the 

extent that Plaintiff seeks release from incarceration, “a prisoner may not challenge ‘the fact or 

duration of his confinement’ in a civil action brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 . . . [r]ather, the 

sole remedy for assertedly unlawful incarceration is through habeas corpus.” Dufur v. United 

States Parole Comm’n, 34 F.4th 1090, 1095 (D.C. Cir. 2022) (quoting Preiser v. Rodriguez, 
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411 U.S. 475, 489 (1973)). Although Plaintiff refers to habeas in her civil cover sheet, she has 

not filed a habeas petition and, more importantly, has not sued her immediate custodian in the 

district in which she is confined. Id. at 1097; see also 28 U.S.C. § 2241. And, to the extent 

that Plaintiff seeks damages for wrongful conviction, “a § 1983 plaintiff must prove that the 

conviction or sentence has been reversed on direct appeal, expunged by executive order, 

declared invalid by a state tribunal authorized to make such determination, or called into 

question by a federal court’s issuance of a writ of habeas corpus, 28 U.S.C. § 2254.” Heck v. 

Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 486–87 (1994). Plaintiff nowhere alleges that her conviction or 

sentence have been reversed, invalidated, or expunged, and, indeed, she suggests just the 

contrary. 

For all of these reasons, the Court DENIES as premature Plaintiff’s motion for 

subpoenas to issue, Dkt. 37, motion for discovery, Dkt. 57, motion for expedited discovery, 

Dkt. 60, and motion for sanctions, Dkt. 65. The Court further ORDERS Plaintiff to SHOW 

CAUSE within 21 days—that is, on or before July 15, 2024—(1) why the Court has personal 

and subject-matter jurisdiction in this case; (2) why the Court has personal jurisdiction over 

each named defendant; (3) why the named judicial officers and agents are not immune from 

suit; and (4) why the case should not be dismissed pursuant to Dufur, 34 F.4th at 1095, and 

Humphrey, 512 U.S. at 486–87. Plaintiff is cautioned that if Plaintiff fails to respond to this 

order in a timely manner, the Court will grant the pending motion to dismiss, Dkt. 46, will

deny Plaintiff’s motion for default judgment, Dkt. 19, and will dismiss the action for one or 

more of the reasons identified above and/or for failure to prosecute. Given Plaintiff’s claims 

about access to the law library, the Court GRANTS in part Plaintiff’s motion for extension of 

time, Dkt. 64. Plaintiff shall file her full opposition to Defendants’ motion to dismiss on or 
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before July 15, 2024, along with her answer to the Show Cause Order. 

The Court further ORDERS that pending further order of the Court, Plaintiff shall not 

file any motions or notices in this matter that do not relate specifically to the questions posed 

above and the pending motion to dismiss. Plaintiff is cautioned that if she disregards this 

Order and continues to file extraneous material on the docket, the Court may rescind her 

CM/ECF filing privileges and/or dismiss her suit for failure to comply with the Court’s 

directions. Cf. Peterson v. Archstone Communities LLC, 637 F.3d 416, 418 (D.C. Cir. 2011); 

Link v. Wabash R. Co., 370 U.S. 626, 631 (1962). Plaintiff’s repeated requests for extensions 

of time to respond to the pending motion to dismiss based on a lack of access to necessary 

supplies or a law library are difficult to reconcile with her copious filings (including multiple 

filings dated the same day) that fail to address the Court’s jurisdiction to proceed. For now, 

Plaintiff’s sole focus should be on responding to this Order and the pending motion to dismiss.

SO ORDERED.

 /s/ Randolph D. Moss 

 RANDOLPH D. MOSS 

 United States District Judge 

Date: June 22, 2024