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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

GEORGIOS V. VLOUTIS, :

:

Plaintiff, :

:

v. : Civil Action No. 23-1926 (UNA)

:

DEUTSCHE LUFTHANSA :

AKHENGESELL SCHAFT, :

:

Defendant. :

MEMORANDUM OPINION

This matter is before the Court on plaintiff’s application to proceed in forma pauperis

(ECF No. 2), his pro se complaint (ECF No. 1), and motions for CM/ECF User Name and 

Password (ECF No. 3), Motion to the Court Not to Publish My Address (ECF No. 4), and 

Motion Regarding Plaintiff’s Notifications as Noted as Voice Prints (ECF No. 5). The Court 

will grant the application, dismiss the complaint without prejudice, and deny the motions.

The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure require that a complaint contain “‘a short and plain 

statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,’ in order to ‘give the 

defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests[.]’” Bell Atl. 

Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957)). 

Further, a complaint must “contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to 

relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting 

Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). A claim is facially plausible “when the plaintiff pleads factual 

content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the 

misconduct alleged.” Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). Although a pro se complaint is 

“held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers,” Erickson v. Pardus, 
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551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (per curiam) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted), it “must 

plead ‘factual matter’ that permits the court to infer ‘more than the mere possibility of 

misconduct,’” Atherton v. District of Columbia Office of the Mayor, 567 F.3d 672, 681-82 (D.C. 

Cir. 2009) (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678-79). As drafted, the complaint fails to meet these 

goals. 

On February 21, 2022, plaintiff arrived at the airport in Houston, Texas; his luggage did 

not. See Compl. at 4. According to plaintiff, his missing luggage was returned to him six days 

later, after it had “been opened and handled by terrorist.” Id. Plaintiff faulted defendant for 

failing to perform “spectrographic voice prints of terrorist and/or terrorist sympathizers working 

for Lufthansa at locations in USA, Europe, Asia, Africa and South America.” Id. He deemed 

Lufthansa “a terrorism supporting corporation,” the negligence of which caused plaintiff to 

receive death threats and experience “severe health issues [and] emotional distress[.]” Id. He 

has demanded damages of $40 million “because Lufthansa . . . allows terrorist[s] to work at 

Lufthansa locations worldwide.” Id. 

In wholly conclusory fashion, plaintiff attributes death threats, physical ailments and 

emotional distress to terrorists in defendant’s employ. The complaint alleges no facts from 

which the Court could infer more than the mere possibility of defendant’s misconduct. 

Accordingly, the Court will dismiss the complaint and this civil action without prejudice. An 

Order is issued separately.

DATE: July 6, 2023 TREVOR N. McFADDEN

United States District Judge