Defen dant Cathy Lanier h as also m ov ed to dism iss. D ef. Lanie r’s Mot. to D ism iss. B ecause the 1 pl ai nt if

f ha s st at ed

th at h e do es n ot

o pp os e D ef

en dant L an ie r’ s m ot io n to d is m is s, th e co urt g rants it. See Pl.’s Resp
. Acco rding ly , fo r the purpo ses o f this Mem orand um O pinion , “ the defend ant” s hall refer to the D istrict of Colum bia. UN ITED STA TES D ISTRIC T C OU RT F OR THE D ISTRIC T OF CO LU M BIA PRATEEK DAVE, : : Plaintiff, : Ci vil Action No.: 08-0856 (RMU)

: v. : Document Nos.: 2, 5

: CA TH Y LAN I ER e t al

. , : : Def endants. : M EM OR

AN DU M OP IN ION G RANT I NG D EF END A N T L A N I ER ’ S M OT I ON T O D IS M IS S ; O RDE RI NG F URT HE R B R I EF I N G O N THE ADAAND RE HAB I L I T AT I ON A C T C L A I MS ; D E NYI NG D EF END A N T D IS TR ICT O F C O L U M B IA ’ S M OT I ON T O D I SM I SS THE T I TLE VI I C L A I M I. IN TR OD UC TIO N This matter come s befor e the c ourt on the def endant’ s motion t o dismiss
. The plaintiff, a 1 former cade t at the District of Columbia Metropolitan Police Depa rtment Institut e of Police Science (“I PS”), alleg es discrimination and re taliation under the A merica ns with Disabiliti es Ac t (“A DA”) , 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101 et seq. ; the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 791 et seq. ; and Ti tle VI Iof the Civil Ri g hts Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e et seq. The de fenda nt, the District of Col umb ia , mo ve s to dis mis s th e AD A a nd Re ha bil itatio n A c t c la ims un de r F e de ra l Ru le of Civ il Procedur e 12(b) (6) f

or fa ilure to sufficie ntly

state a c laim of disability discrimination. The defe ndant furthe r moves to dismiss t he Title VI Ireta liation claim under Rule 12(b) (6) f or fa ilure to state a c laim. In light of r ece nt chang es to the ADA , the cour t orders f urther br iefingon the plaintiff’s ADAand Reha bilitation Act claims. And beca use, at this stag e in the proc eeding s, the2

plaintiff has suff

iciently pled his Title VI Ireta liation claim, the court de nies the def endant’ s motion to di smiss as to thi s claim.

II. F ACTUAL & P ROCEDURAL BACK GR OUND Th e pla int if

f, an Ind ian A me ri c an ma le , w a s a c a de t at I PS f

ro m Se pte mbe r 2 00 4 unti l Se pte mbe r 2 00 6. Com

pl. ¶¶ 5, 6. Th e pla int if

f a lle g e s th at du

ri nga tr a ini nge xer c ise in No ve mbe r 2 00 4, a

tr a ine r o f H isp anic de sc e nt p us he d h im d own a hil l, c a us inginj ur

y to h is shoulder. Id. ¶ 6 . B e lie vin gthat th e tr a ine r’ s c on du c t w a s mo tiv ate d b y dis c ri min ator

y anim us , the plaintiff complaine d about the incident to the de fenda nt. Id. Followingthe incident, the pla int if f w a s p la c e d o n li mit e d d uty or sic k le ave fo r f

ive months to r e c e ive tr e atme nt f or his shoulder, which inc luded Cortisone shots but no surge ry . Id. Th e pla int if

f a lle g e s th at a ft e r h e re tur ne d to wo rk , th e de fe nd ant r e ta liate d a g a ins t hi m for r eportingthe incident. Id. ¶ 7 . T he a lle g e d r e ta liatio n in c lud e d g ivi nghim on ly a c a de mic
wo rk su pp le me nte d b y

phy sic a l tr a ini ng , tr a ini nghim wi th a low e r- le ve l c la ss, makin gsa rc a sti c
rema rks about his abilities and withholding spe cialized trainingnece ssary for graduation from I PS. Id. As a re sult of the repe titious phy sical training , the plaintiff deve loped asthma, re sulting in an additional one to two months of sick leave. Id. Whil e ca dets normally g raduate from the
aca demy in six months, the plaintiff spent two y ear s at the ac ademy and did not g raduate. Id. ¶ 8. In September 2006, the defe ndant issued the plaintiff a letter of te rmination from I PS. Id. ¶ 9. Af te r h is t e rm inatio n, the pla int if f f ile d a c omp la int

wi th t he Eq ua l E mpl oy

me nt O pp or

tun ity Commi ssion (“EEOC”) , which subseque ntly issued him a rig ht to sue letter. Id. ¶ 10. The plaintiff filed the instant complaint on May 19, 2008. See ge nerally Compl. The defe ndant has3

moved to dismiss , arguing that the plaintiff fa ils to sufficiently plead a ny of his claims. See ge ne ra lly Def .’s Mot. The plaintiff oppose s the motion. Se e ge ne ra lly Pl.’s Opp’n. The c ourt
no w t ur ns to t he pa rt ie s’ argume nts .

III . A NA LY SIS A. Le ga l St anda r d forRul e 12 (b )( 6) M ot ion to Di sm iss A Rule 12(b)( 6) motion to dism iss tests the lega l sufficienc y of a c omplaint. Browning v. Clint on , 2 92 F .3 d 2 35 , 2 42 (D .C. Cir . 2 00 2) . T he c omp la int ne e d o nly

se t f or th a sh or t and pla in statement of the c laim, givingthe def endant f air notice of the c laim and the g rounds upon which it rests. Kingman Park Civic Ass’n v. W illiams , 348 F.3d 1033, 1040 ( D.C. Cir. 2003) (citing F ED . R. C IV . P. 8(a)( 2) and Conley v. G ibson , 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957)). “ Such simpli fied notice pleadingis made possible by the libera l opportunity

for discove ry

and the other

pre- trial proce dures e stablished by the Rules to disclose more pre cisely the basis of both cla im and defe nse to define more na rrowly the disputed fac ts and issues.” Conley , 355 U.S. at 47-48 (i nte rn a l qu otatio n ma

rk s o mitte d) . It is no t ne c e ssa ry fo r t he pla int if

f t o p le a d a ll e le me nts of

his prima fa cie c ase in the c omplaint, Swierkiewicz v. Sonoma N.A. , 534 U.S. 506, 511-14 (2002), or “plea d law or match fa cts to ever y element of

a leg al theory ,” Kri e

ge r v . F ad e ly , 211 F.3d 134, 136 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (inter nal quotation marks and c itation omit ted). Yet, the plaintiff must alleg e “a ny set of fa cts consistent with the alleg ations.” Be ll A tl. Cor p. v . Two mb ly , 127 S. Ct . 1955, 1969 (2007) ( abrog atingthe oft-quoted la nguag e fr om Conley , 3 55 U. S. at 45 -5 6, ins tr uc tin gc ourt s n ot t o d ism iss fo r f a ilure to s tate a

c la im unle ss i t appea rs beyond doubt that “no set of f acts in support of his cla im [ ] would entit le him to relief” );4

Aktieselsk

abet AF 21. Nov. 2001 v . Fame J eans, Inc
. , 525 F.3d 8, 16 n.4 ( D.C. Cir. 2008) (af firmingthat “a c omplaint needs some information about the circ umstances g iving r ise to the
c la ims ” ). Whil e the se fa c ts m us t “ po sse ss e no ugh h e ft

to ‘ sh o[w ] that th e ple a de r i s e nti tle d to relief ,’” a complaint “does not ne ed deta iled fac tual alleg ations.” Twom bly , 127 S. Ct . at 1964, 1966. In resolvinga Rule 12(b) (6) motion, the cour t must t reat the complaint’s fa ctual
a lle g atio ns – in c lud ingmixe d q ue sti on s o f l aw a

nd fa c t – a s tr

ue and dr aw a ll r e a so na

ble infere nces the ref

rom in the plaintiff’s fa

vor. Macharia v. U

nited States , 334 F.3d 61, 64, 67 (D .C. Cir . 2 00 3) ; Ho ly

Lan d F ou nd . fo r R e lie f &De v . v . A sh c ro

ft , 333 F.3d 156, 165 ( D.C. Cir. 20 03 ); Browning , 292 F.3d at 242. Whi le many well-plea ded complaints ar e conc lusory , the court ne ed not ac cept a s true infe renc es unsupported by fac ts set out in the complaint or leg al conclusions ca st as fac tual alleg ations. W arre n v . D ist

ric t of Colum bia , 3 53 F .3 d 3 6, 40 (D .C. Cir. 2004); Browning , 292 F.3d at 242. B . T h e C o u rt O rd er s Fu rt h er B ri ef i n g o n th e A DA a n d Re h a b i l i ta ti o n Ac t C l a i ms In September 2008, Cong ress pa ssed the ADAAmendments Ac t of 2008 (“the Act”) , which esta

blishes that past Supreme Court dec isions have too narr owly define d “the br oad scope of protec tion intended to be af forde d by the ADA.” Pub. L . No. 110-25, 122 Stat. 3553 (ef fec tive J an. 1, 2009). Mor e spec ifically , the Act e x pressly disavows the Supreme Court’s interpre tation of the ADAin two leadingcase s, Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc. , 527 U.S. 471 (1999) a nd Toyota Motor Manufacturing, Kentucky , Inc. v . W

illiams , 534 U.S. 184 (2002). Id. (d e te rm ini ngthat Toyota Motor Manufacturing established a mor e limited interpretation of

“ su bs tanti a lly

lim its ” and

“ ma jor lif e a c tiv ity” tha

n Co ngre ss i nte nd e d a

nd that Sutton too
narr owly limit ed the inter

pretation of “re g arde d as” disable d and improper ly weig hed the impac t5

of mit ig atin gme a sure s o n th e de te rm inatio n o f whe the r a n in div idu a l is dis a

ble d) . T he Ac t, there fore , alters the le g al landsca pe applica

ble in the instant action. In light of the se cha ng es, the court orde rs furthe r brief

ing by the par ties on the plaintiff’s AD A and Reha bilitation Act claims. C. The Co ur t D e nie s t he De fend ant ’s M ot ion to Di sm iss th e Tit le VI I R e ta lia ti on C lai m

1. Le ga l St anda r d fora R e ta lia ti on C lai m To preva il on a claim of re taliation, a plaintiff must follow the McD onnell Douglas framework. Morgan v. Fe d. Home Loan Mortgage Corp. , 328 F.3d 647, 651 ( D.C. Cir. 2003) (applying the Mc

Do nn e ll D ou

gla s fr ame wo rk

to a Ti tle VI Ire ta liatio n c la im) ; Duncan v . W ash. Metro. Area Transit Auth. , 214 F.R.D. 43, 49-50 & n.8 (D.D.C. 2003) ( applying the Mc Do nn e ll Do ug las framework to a

Rehabilitation Act reta liation claim). The Supre me Court explained the fr ame wo rk

a s f oll ow s: First, the plaintiff ha s the burden of proving by the preponde ranc e of the e vidence a prima fa cie c ase of

[retal i at ion] . Second, if the pla intiff succe eds in provingthe prima fa cie c ase, the burden shifts to the def endant “ to art i cu late some leg itimate, [non-retal i at o ry ] re ason for the employ ee’ s rejec tion” . . . . Third, should the defe ndant ca

rry this burden, the plaintiff must then have an opportunity to prove by a pre pondera

nce of the evidence that the le g itimate rea sons offer ed by the def endant we re no t it s tr

ue re a so ns , b ut w e re a

pr e te xt fo r [r e tal iat io n]
. . . . Th e ult imate burden of persua ding the trier of

fac t that the defe ndant int enti onally [retaliated] ag ainst the plaintiff re mains at all times with the plaintiff. Tex. De p’t of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine , 450 U.S. 248, 252-53 (1981) ( internal c itations omi tted) (qu o t i n g McD onnell Douglas v. Gree n , 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973)). To e sta bli sha pr ima fa c ie c a se of

re ta liatio n, a

pla int if f m us t sh owthat ( 1) he e ng a g e d in a statutorily

protec ted ac tivity , (2) a

rea sonable e mploy ee w ould have f ound the cha lleng ed
a c tio n mate ri a lly

a dv e rs e , a

nd (3 ) t he re e xiste d a

c a us a l c onne c tio n b e tw e e n th e pr ote c te d a c tiv ity and the mate rially

adver se ac tion. Bu rli ng ton N. &Sa nta FeRy . Co . v . W hite , 548 U.S. 53, 67-6

69 (2006); see also Scott v. Ke mpthorne , 2006 WL1980219, at *3 (10th Cir. J uly 17, 2006). The plaintiff’s burde n is not gre at: he “me rely needs to e stablish facts ade quate to per mit an infere nce of re taliatory

motive.” Fo rm an v . S

ma ll , 271 F.3d 285, 299 ( D.C. Cir. 2001). I f t he e mpl oye r s uc c e ssf

ull y pr e se nts a

le g iti mate , n on -r e ta liator y re a so n f or its a c tio ns , “the pr esumption raised by the prima fa cie is re butted and drops f rom the ca se.” St. Mary’s Honor Ctr. v. Hicks , 5 09 U. S. 5 02 , 5 07 (1 99 3) (i nte rn a l c itatio n o mitte d) ; Brady v. O ffice of the Sergeant at Arms, U.S. Houseof Represe ntatives , 520 F.3d 490, 494 ( D.C. Cir. 2008) (noting that “the pr ima fac ie ca se is a lar g ely unnece ssary

sideshow”) . Upon such a showingby

the defe ndant, the district cour t need r esolve only

one question: “Ha s the employ ee pr oduced
s u f f i c i e n te v i d e n c e f

o r a r e a s o n a b l e j ur y t o f i n d th atth e e mp l o ye r ’ s a s s e rt e d n o n - [ r e t a l i at o r

y]
rea son was not the ac tual rea son and that the e mploy er intentionally [retaliated] ag ainst the employ ee on the basis of ra ce, c olor, relig ion, sex , or national orig in? ” Brady , 520 F.3d at 494. In other wor ds, did the plaintiff “show bo th that the re ason wa s false, and that . . . [retaliation] was the r eal r eason.” W

eber , 494 F.3d at 186 (alterations in original and inter nal quotations
o m i t t ed ) ( qu o t i n g St. Ma ry ’s Ho no r Ct r. , 509 U.S. at 515). The c ourt must consider whe ther the jury could “infe r [retaliation] from the plaintiff’s prima f acie case and any

other e vidence the plaintiff offe rs to show that the ac tions were [reta liatory ] or that the non-[retaliatory] j ustification was pre text ual.” Sm ith v . D ist ric t of Colum bia , 4 3 0 F. 3 d

4 5 0 , 4 5 5 (2 0 0 5 ) ( qu o t i n g Murray v
. Gi lm or e , 4 0 6 F. 3 d

7 0 8 , 7 1 3 (D
. C
. C i r. 2 0 0 5 ))
. T h e c o urts h o u l d as s es s th e p l ai n t i ff

’s ch al l en ge to the employ er’ s expl anation in light of the totality

of the c ircumstance s of the ca se. Aka v

. W as h. Ho sp . Ct

r. , 156 F.3d 1284, 1291 ( D.C. Cir. 1998). The stre ng th of the plaintiff’s pr ima fac ie ca se, espe cially the exist ence of a c ausal7

connec tion, can be a

signific ant fa ctor in his attempt to rebut the de fenda nt’s leg itimate nonreta liatory

rea son for the a dverse action. See A ka, 156 F.3d at 1289 n.4 (stating that “a prima facie case that strong ly

sug g ests intentional discrimination may be enough by

itself to survive
summa ry jud g me nt” ); Laurent v. Bureau of Rehab., I nc. , 5 44 F . Su

pp . 2 d 1 7, 23 n. 5 ( D. D. C. 2008) (holdingthat the plaintiff ca nnot establish pretext because “she is unable to show any
c a us a l c onne c tio n” ); Meadows v. M ukasey , 2008 WL2211434, at *5-6 (D .D.C. May 29, 2008) (holdingthat the plaintiff demonstrated pre textin part by establishing a

causa l connec tion). The plaintiff may

establish a ca

usal conne ction “by

showingthat the employ er ha d knowledg e of the employ ee’ s protecte d activity , and that the [retaliator y ] personnel ac tion took place shortly afte r that activity .” Con es v . S ha lal a , 1 9 9 F. 3 d

5 1 2 , 5 2 1 (D
. C
. C i r. 2 0 0 0 ) ( qu o t i n g Mitchell v. Baldrige , 7 59 F .2 d 8 0, 86 (D .C. Cir . 1 98 5) ); accord Clark County Sch. D ist. v. Breede n , 532 U.S. 268, 273 (2001) (notingthat the tempora l connec tion mustbe “ve ry close” : a three - or f

ourmonth period betwe en an a dverse action and pr otected a ctivity is insufficient to show a c ausal
connec tion, and a 20-month per iod sugg ests “no ca usality at all”)
. 2. The Plaintiff

Has Ple d a Legally Cogn izable Claim of Retaliation The plaintiff a lleg es that his trainer “tre ated him in a discriminatory manner ” by

pushing him down a hill during a

trainingexercise in Nove mber 2004. Compl. ¶¶ 6, 18. The plaintiff further asser ts that when he c omplained about the tra iner’s discr iminatory conduct, the de fenda

nt reta liated ag ainst him by

char acte rizing him as poor c adet, r efusingto advanc e him at the
aca demy , subjectinghim to dis parate conditions and ultimately terminatinghim from the police
aca demy
. Id. ¶ 22. The de fenda nt moves to dismi ss the Title VI Iclaims on the g rounds that the action wa s not adverse and, in any case , that there is no temporal conne ction betwee n the8

plaintiff’s complaint and the defe ndant’s alleg edly reta liatory

conduct. See ge nerally Def .’s Mot. The c ourt addre sses ea ch of the se ar guments in turn. The de fenda

nt first aver s that the plaintiff fa ils to st ate that a ny of the a lleg edly

reta liatory conduct c onstitut ed an a dverse personne l action. Def .’s Mot. at 9. The plaintiff, on the other hand, maintains that he ha s met his burden at this stag e of the proce eding s by alleg ing that the de fe nd ant e ng a g e d in

a dv e rs e e mpl oy

me nt a c tio ns a g a ins t hi m. P l.’ s O pp ’n at 5- 7. An

“ ‘a dv e rs e employ ment action’ is ‘a

signific ant cha

ng e in employ

ment status, such as hiring , firing , failing to promote, rea ssignment with sig nificantly differ ent re sponsibili ties, or a de cision causing signific ant cha

ng e in bene fits.’” Douglas v. Donov an , 2009 WL673569, at *1 (D.C. Cir. Mar. 1 7 , 2 0 0 9 ) ( qu o t i n g Bu rli ng ton In du s. , I nc . v . E lle rth , 5 24 U. S. 7 42 , 7 61 (1 99 8) ; Tay lor v . S ma ll , 350 F.3d 1286, 1293 ( D.C. Cir. 2003)). Ac tions short of firing , including “ [d] ischarg e, demotion, or undesira

ble re assig nment,” ca

n constitute adver se employ ment actions. Amiri v. Stoladi Prop. Group , 4 0 7 F. S u p p . 2 d 1 1 9 , 1 2 5 (D
. D. C
. 2 0 0 5 ) ( ci t i n g Burlington In du s. , 524 U.S. at 765). As a pr e lim ina

ry matte r, the c ourt

no te s th at in

the re ta liatio n c onte xt, th e te rm “ a dv e rs e action” “ encompa ss[ es] a broade r swee p of ac tions than those in a pure discr imination claim.” Baloch v. Kem

pthorne , 550 F.3d 1191, 1198 n.4 ( D.C. Cir. 2008). Thus, “[r]etaliation claims are ‘not limit ed to discriminatory actions that af

fec t the terms and c onditions of employ ment’ and may extend to harms that are not workplac e-r elated or employ ment-re lated so longas ‘a
rea sonable e mploy ee w ould have f ound the cha lleng ed ac tion materially adver se.’” Id. (quoting Bu rli ng ton N. , 5 4 8 U. S
. at6 4 , 6 8 ). T h e p l ai n t i ff h er e a l l ege s th atth e d ef

en d an tcr ea t eda c h an ge in his employ

ment status by

placinghim in a lower-le vel trainingclass, deny ing him tra iningThis Circu it recen tly no ted th at at the sum

m ary judg m ent sta g e, em

ploym ent ac tions of this ty pe 2 w ou ld

b e “c on cl us iv el y

p re sum ed

to b e adv er se e m

pl oy m en t a ct io ns , e v en

if any a ll eg ed h arm is specu lativ e.” Dou

glas v. Don ovan , 2 009 WL 6 7356 9, at *2 (D .C . C ir. Mar. 17 , 2 009).

9 op po rt un iti e s n e c e ssa

ry fo r gra du atio n a

nd ult ima te ly fi ri nghim . Co mpl . ¶

¶ 7 -9 , 1 8. Th e se a c ts
m ay f a l l un d e r th e c at e g o r i e s e s t a

b l i s h e d b y Burlington Industri es , including f ailure to promote,
rea ssignment with sig nificantly differ ent re sponsibili ties and firing
. Se e Bu rli ng ton In du s. , 524 U.S. at 761. 2 The c ases that the de fenda nt cites reg ardingwhether denial of tra ining may

be conside red an adve rse e mploy

ment action ar e inapposite for two rea sons: first, they

occur red at the summary j u d gm en ts t age o r b ey o n d , af t er th e p l ai n t i ff

s h adb ee nal l o we d

t o d ev el o p th ei r c l ai m s th ro u gh the discover

y proce ss. See Def

.’s Mot. at 11-12. And se cond, bec ause the plaintiff in the instant action wa s employ ed as a cade t, trainingopportunities were more c entra l to his professional advanc ement than they

are in a ty

pical employ

ment scena

rio. Cole ma n v . D ist

ric t of Colum bia , 2 0 0 6 W L 2 4 3 4 9 2 6 , at* 6 (D
. D. C
. Au g. 2 2 , 2 0 0 6 ) ( ci t i n g Burlington N. , 548 U.S. at 68) (de nying in part the de fenda

nt’s motion for summary

judgme nt beca

use the plaintiff, a

fire de partment cade t, alleg ed that the de fenda nt retaliate d ag ainst her by denying he r trainingclasses a nd subjectingher to unwa

rra nted discipline). Thus, the c ourt deter mines that the ac ts alleg ed by the plaintiff may

be conside red “ adver se” a nd there fore reje cts the def endant’ s contention to the contra ry . In addition, the defe ndant ar gues that there is no temporal proxim ity betwee n the plaintiff’s re port of the incide nt with the trainer a nd his termination near ly

two y ear s later. De f.’s Mot. at 7-9. The pla intiff counter s that he has pled f acts fr om which ca

usation can be inferr ed. Pl.’s Opp’n at 5-7. To e stablish a causa l connec tion, an employ er must have had knowledg e of10

the employ ee’ s protecte d act a nd must have take n an adve rse pe rsonnel ac tion as a re sult of the protec ted ac t. Cones , 199 F.3d at 521. The def endant c ites sever al ca ses in which cour ts have deter mined that a time lapse of even a fewmonths between the protec ted ac tivity and the a lleg ed
re ta liator y a c t f a ile d to g ive ri se to a

n in fe re nc e of

c a us atio n. De f. ’s Mo t. at 7- 9. B ut h e re , whil e the pla int if

f d oe s n ot s pe c if

y the e xac t inte rv a l be tw e e n th e pr ote c te d a c tiv ity and the a lle g e dly
re ta liator y a c ts, dr awi nga ll r e a so na ble inf e re nc e s in the pla int if

f’ s f avo r, the c omp la int

su g g e sts that th e se a dv e rs e a c ts b e g an s oo n a ft e r h e re tur ne d f ro m si c k le ave and

oc c ur re d r e gula rl y un til he wa s ultim ately

terminated. Compl. ¶¶ 6- 9; Pl.’s Opp’n at 5 (cla iming that af ter the inc ident th e d ef en d an tgav e t h e p l ai n t i ff

o n l y ac ad em i c w o rk , s u

b j ec t edh i mt o ri go ro u s p h y s i ca l tra i n i n g, require d him to train with a lower c lass, made sa rca stic remar

ks about his abilities, prevented him fr om o bta ini ngsp e c ia lize d tr a ini ngne c e ssa ry fo r gra du atio n a

nd ult imate ly

te rm inate d h im from the a cade my). Fur thermore , temporal proximit y , though of ten an indicator of ca

usation, is not a require d element of

a re taliation claim, particula rly at this stage of the proc eeding s. Swierkiewicz , 534 U.S. at 511-14 (holdingthat the plaintiff nee d not plead all ele ments of his prima fa cie c ase in the
c omp la int ); Bec kham v . Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp. , 590 F. Supp. 2d 82, 89 (D.D .C. 2008) (deny ing the defe ndant’s motion to dism iss based on lac k of tempora l prox imity beca use the pla int if f h a d s atis fi e d h e r b ur de n at th at e arl y sta g e of the pr oc e e din g s) ; se e als o Beard v. Preston , 5 76 F . Su

pp . 2 d 9 3, 10 5- 06 (D .D .C. 20 07 ) ( statin gthat a la c k o f t e mpo ra l pr oximi ty alone doe s not mandate a g rant of summar

y judgme nt). Ac c or din g ly , e ve n if the c ourt we re to
c on c lud e that th e pla int if

f h a d f a ile d to su ff

ic ie ntl y ple a d te mpo ra l pr oximi ty , th e pla int if f w ou ld still meet the bur den nec essar y to overc ome a motion to dismi ss. Rochon v . Gonzalez , 438 F.3d11

1 2 1 1 , 1 2 2 0 (D
. C
. C i r. 2 0 0 0 ) ( qu o t i n g Sparrow v. United Air Lines, Inc. , 216 F.3d 1111, 1114 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (obse rvingthat “in orde r to survive a motion to di smiss, all [ the] complaint has to say . . . is ‘the [defenda

nt] reta liated ag ainst me bec ause I eng ag ed in protec ted ac tivity ’”) ); Vancev. Chao , 496 F. Supp. 2d 182, 187 (D.D .C. 2007) (holdingthat “[a]t t his early stag e of the proce eding s, plaintiff ca

n meet her

prima fa cie bur den of c ausation simply by alleg ing that the adver se ac tions were c aused by her pr otected a ctivity ”). A s a re sult, the court holds that the plaintiff has made out a leg ally cog nizable claim of re taliation by contendingthat he eng ag ed in a pr ote c te d a c tiv ity

by re po rt ingthe tr a ine r’ s a lle g e dly dis c ri min ator

y c on du c t and

that in re sp on se to h is c omp la int , th e de fe nd ant r e ta liate d a g a ins t hi m by su bje c tin ghim

to m ate ri a lly

a dv e rs e
a c tio ns . See B urlington N. , 548 U.S. at 67-69. Ac cording ly , the cour t denies the de fenda

nt’s motion to di smiss t he plaintiff’ s Title VI Ireta liation claim.

IV . C ON CL USI ON For the fore g oing r easons, the c ourt g rants def endant L anier ’s motion to dis miss and denies de fenda

nt District of Columbia’s motion t o dismiss the plaintiff’s Title VI Iclaim. Fur ther, in lig ht of the ADAAmendments Ac t of 2008, the cour t orders f urther br iefingon the plaintiff’s ADAand Reha bilitation Act claims ag ainst defe ndant District of Columbia. An Orde r
c on sis te nt w iththi s Me mor and um O pin ion

is s e pa ra te ly and c onte mpo ra

ne ou sly iss ue d th is 2 7th day of Mar ch, 2009.

RI CARDO M. URBI NA Un i t edS t at es Di s tri ctJ u d ge