### IN THE COURT OF APP EALS OF TENNESS EE AT KNOXVI LLE A ssi gne d on Br ie fs A pr il 9, 200 7 C.S.C., ET AL 

### . v. KNO X COUNTY BOARD OF EDUCATI ON, ET AL 

### .

Appeal f rom the Chancer y Court for K nox Coun ty No. 157833-2 Dar yl F ansler, Chancellor

No. E2006–01155-COA-R 3-CV - F ILED MAY 25, 2007

I n th is c la ss a c tio n la

ws uit fi le d a g a ins t the Kn ox County B oa rd of Ed uc a tio n an d it s su

pe ri nte nd e nt, the trial cour

t awar ded the Plaintiffs a por tion of t heir attorney ’s fees pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988. The De fenda

nts arg ue on appe al t hat t he trial court erre d in finding the P laintiffs to be “pr evailing parties” in the litigation and that the tr ial court’s a war d of attorne y ’s fe es was unwarr anted a nd
err oneous. We hold that althoug h the P l ai n t i ff s we re not succ essful on all of their claims, they achie ved enoug h succe ss i n t h eir lawsuit to be “preva iling par ties.” We find no abuse of the trial
c ourt ’s dis c re tio n in

awa rd ingPla int if

fs $4 5, 00 0 in

a tto rn e y ’s fe e s, and

c on se qu e ntl y

a ff ir m.

Tenn. R. App . P . 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgme nt of th e Chancer y Court Affi rm ed

S HAR ON G. L EE , J ., delivere d the opinion of the cour t, in which H ER SCH EL P. F R A N KS , P.J ., and C H A RLES D. S US ANO , J R ., J ., joined.

Martha H are n M cCampbell, Knoxvil le, Tenne ssee, f or the Appe llants, Knox County Boa rd of Ed uc a tio n a nd Dr . Ch arl e s L ind se y , Su

pe ri nte nd e nt.

Dea n Hill Ri vkin and Br enda McGe e, Knoxvi lle, Tenne ssee, for the A ppellees, C.S.C., a minor, by his nex t friend a

nd mother, L .C., on behalf of C.S.C . and all other s simil arly situated, and M.A.M., a minor, by his ne x t f

riend and mother, B .M., on behalf of M.A.M. and all other s simil arly situated.Init i als are used i n thi s l i t i ga t i o n to p rese rve t he an o nym i t y of t he P l ainti f f s. 1

-2- OP IN ION

I. Backg ro und

This is the second time this case ha s been a ppeale d. Our opinion on the first appe al, C.S .C. v. Knox County Bd. of Educ., No. E2006-00087-COA-R3-CV, 2006 WL 3731304 (Tenn. Ct. App. E.S., Dec. 19, 2006) (“ C.S.C. I ” ) pr ov ide s th e fo llo wi ngpr oc e dura l and fa c tua l ba c kg ro un d. I n Apr il of 20 03 , th e name d P laintif fs fi le d th is a c tio n f

or the mse lve s and

on be ha lf of a ll K no x Coun ty 1 Sc ho ol s tud e nts wh o h a d b e e n, or in t he futur e wo uld

be , r e mov e d f

ro m the ir re g ula

r p ub lic sc ho ols for pe riods of time in excess of ten consec utive day s beca use of disciplinary

rea sons. C.S.C. I , 2006 WL37 31 30 4, a t *1 . The c omp la int a lle g e d tha t the De fe nd ants ' fa ilure to pr ov ide the Pla int if fs wi th
cer tain specifie d alternative educa tional service s during the students' periods of suspe nsion violated
se c ti on s o f t he T enn ess ee C od e, s tat e regul ati on s, andth e Ten nes see a ndUni ted S tate s Co ns tit uti on s. Id. Mo re sp e c if

ic a lly , th e Pla int if

fs a lle g e d, a mon g oth e r t hin g s, tha t K no x Coun ty , in failin g to pr ov ide its stu de nts wi th a lte rn a tiv e e du c a tio na l ser vic e s, ha d n ot c omp lie d w iththe re qu ir e me nts of Tenn. Code Ann. § 49-6-3402, w hich in 1986 mandated that “ [a] t least one (1) alternative school shall be established and available for students in g rade s seven throug h twelve (7-12) who have been suspended o r ex pelled as pr ovided in this part... .” The complaint soug ht damag es, a judg ment decla ring the alleg ed violations, and injunctive re lief. The tr ial court gra nted the Plaintiffs' motion for c lass cer

tification. The c lass consisted of a ll students enrolle d in Knox County Schools who were , or will be, suspende d or expelled from school f or more tha

n ten conse cutive day s. Id. Shortly afte r the filing of the c om p l ai n t , the trial cour t entere d an orde r g ranting Plaintiff M. A. M. ’s mot ion

fo r a te mpo ra ry inj un c tio n r e qu ir ingKn ox C o u nt y t o i mm e d i a

t e l y pr ov ide M. A. M. wi th a lte rn a tiv e e du c a tio na l se rv ic e s, and fu rt he r f ind inga s f

oll ow s:
The Cou rt finds that the plaintiff ha s demonstrated a substantial likelihood of succe ss on the merits of his claim as follows: F ollowing his ex pulsion from Halls Middle School on Marc h 10, 2003, M.A.M was de nied alter

native educ ational s er v i ces pur suant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 4 9- 6- 34 02 (a ) by bei ng pla c e d b y de fe nd ant o n a

wa iti nglis t fo r su c h se rv ic e s fo r an e xce ssi ve pe ri od of tim e

. To date, M. A. M. has not rec eived a lternative e ducational s er v i ce s of any kind. The Court a lso fi nd s th a t M. A. M. wi ll s uf fe r i mmediat e and

ir re pa ra ble harm in the absenc e of the issuance of a te mporary injunction; that the
a c tua l in jur y to t he pla int if

f o utw e ig hs the burd e n o n th e de fe nd ants of p r o v id in g e d

u c a ti o n a l s e r

v ic e s to th e p la in ti f

f ; an d th a t the issuance of

this temporary

injunction is i n the public intere st.

I n J uly of 2003, the Knox County Boa rd of Educ ation adopted poli ci es t o cr eate an entitlement to alternative education for all students cer tified in the class. F or the 2003-2004 school-3-

y ear , the Defenda

nts implemented an evening alternative education prog ram for students suspended fo r m or e tha

n te n da y s. Th e Pla int if

fs c ha lle ng e d se ve ra l a sp e c ts o f t he 20 03 -2 00 4 n ig ht p ro g ra m, seeking temporar

y injunctive relief and other relief from the trial court. The 2003-2004 pr og ram proved to be ineffe ctive and unworka ble; in the Boa

rd’s wor ds, “it was appa

rent to the school sy stem that the prog ram did not operate as designe d... .” Among other thing s, the 2003-2004 nig ht prog ram lacke d subject matter instruc tion and there was a n administrative problem re g ardingth e tr a n s mi s sion of a student’s assig nments betwee n the reg ular teache r and the night pr og ram fa cilitator. C.S.C. I, 2006 WL 3731304 at *1. Following a hearing on Aug ust 12, 2003, the trial court he ld, among other thing s, that (1) the De fe nd ants we re e njo ine d f ro m im ple me nti ngan e ve nin g a lte rn a tiv e e du c a tio n pro g ra m for mid dle school students beca

use, as f ound by the trial cour

t, the leg islature had not a uthorized such a prog ram; and ( 2) contra

ry to the Plaintiffs' a ssertions, the Def endants wer e not r equire d to provide
s tudents with transportation to and fr om the sites of the eve ning a lternative sc hools. Id. The trial court re serve d ruling on the issue rai s ed b y t h e P laintiffs as to whethe r the e vening prog ram, a s desig ned by

the Def endants, c onflicted with minimum st ate r equire ments. Id.

As found and stated by

the trial cour

t, “[c]ouns el for the parties wor ked tog ether

during the 20 03 -2 00 4 s c ho ol y e ar t o a dd re ss o bje c tio ns to a

nd pr ob le ms w iththi s n e wl y

imp le me nte d p ro g ra

m. As a result of the collaborative eff ort, a new prog ram was instit uted for the 2004-2005 school y ear ...” Be cause the 2003-2004 nig ht prog ram ha d been a bandoned in f

avor of the ne w prog ram, the pa rties
rea ched a partial settlement ag ree ment reg arding the ea rlier pr og ram. C.S.C. I , 2006 WL3731304, at *1. The a g ree ment set forth var ious remedies a vailable to any

class member

adver sely

aff ecte d by the 2003-2004 night pr og ram. Id. The trial court found the foll owing as re g ards the se ttlement
a g re e me nt: On April 4, 2005, counse l announce d that a settlement ha d been

r e a c h e d r e g ar d in g th e 2 0 0 3

- 2 0 0 4 N A P [N ig h t A lt e r n a ti v e Pr o g r a m]

. An order a

p p r o v in g th is s e tt le me n t w a s e n te r e d o nA p r il 1 1 , 2 0 0 5. I n the ag ree d settlement enter ed April 4, 2005, it was ac knowledg ed that th e NA P f

or 20 03 -2 00 4 d id n ot m eet Kn ox County Sc ho ols ’ expectations for a lternative e ducation. I t was further ac knowledg ed that some students w ho attended the NAP did not rec eive pr escr ibed
course s and other students did not r ece ive cre dits. Bec ause the 2003- 2004 school y ear

progra m was no longer in place it wa s a c kn ow le dg e d th a t it

wa s n ot i n th e be st i nt erest of e ith e r p art

y to litiga te to deter

mine if the 2003-2004 pr og ram would withstand judicial inquiry

. Whil e not admitting the 2003- 2004 NAP prog ram wa s inadequate, the def endants, ne verthe less, ag ree d to provide appropr iate ser vices to a ny student who attende d the NAP who did not rec eive pr escr ibed
c o u r s e s an d

o t h e r s tu d e n t s w h o d i d

n o tr e c e i v e c r e d i t s

. A d d i t i o n a l l y,-4- c e rt a in r e me die s w e re ide nti fi e d a s bei ng a pp ro pr ia te to t

ho se stu de nts and

we re se t f

or th i n th e a g re e me nt. De ta ils wi th r e g ard to the implementation of this “par tial ag ree d settlemen t ” were to be neg otiated by

the par ties and memorialized in side ag ree ments, which
wer e also filed. I

n one such ag ree ment dated Ma rch 1, 2005, de fe nd ants a g re e d th a t pl a int if fs were th e pr e va ili ngpa

rt ie s “ in t his settlement” a

nd att ac h ed a letter

from [Pl aintiffs’] attorney Br enda McGe e to [ Def

endants’] attorney Martha Mc Campbell dated Mar ch 2, 2 0 0 5 , in

w h ic h M r

. Ri v k in

an d M s

. M c G e e a g r e e d

to w aive attorney s’ fe es (but not the cost of litig ation) to date. This a g ree d settlement was a

pproved by

the C ourt by

order dated Apr il 11, 2005.

I n Aug us t 2 0 0 4 , t he Plaintiffs filed a motion for a temporar y injunction, alleg ing that the Def endants' 2004-2005 nig ht alternative education prog ram violated state and fe dera l law (1) by offe ring less than 12 hours of instruction pe r we ek; (2) by failing to provide instruction in all of the
core course s; (3) by

failing to provide support ser vices, such a s counseling , ang er ma nag ement, and other psy cholog ical ser

vices; and ( 4) by

failing to offer

a cur riculum fo cu sed on re forming the students' be havior. C.S.C. I , 2006 WL 3731304, at *2. On Apr il 7-8, 2005, the trial cour t held a hear ing to a ddress the Plaintiffs' challeng es to the 2004-2005 nig ht prog ram. The trial court f ound in favor of

the Def endants a s reg ards the c halleng es to the 2004-20 0 5 n i gh t alternative education prog ram, a

nd this court aff

irmed the trial c ourt’s dec ision in C.S.C. I

. Id.

On Janu ary 27 , 2 00 6, the Pla int if

fs fi le d a pe tit ion fo r atto rn e y ’s fe e s and

c os ts p ur su a nt t o the Civil Rights Attorney ’s Fe es Awar ds Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1988, and Tenn. R. Ci v

. P

. 5 4

. 04. Plaintiffs’ attorney

Dea n Hill Rivkin submitt ed an af fidavit documenting his total fees in the amount of $9 3, 63 0 ( 31 2. 1 h ours a t $3 00 pe r h our) . Pl a int if fs ’ atto rn e y

B re nd a Mc Ge e su

bmi tte d a n a ff ida vit documenting her to t al fe es in the amount of $53,370 (237.2 hour s at $225 per hour ). The f ees a ff ida vit s w e re su

pp or te d b y a ff ida vit s o f Kno x vil le a tto rn e y s atte sti ngto t he ir re a so na ble ne ss. Neither the re ason ab l en es s of the Plaintiffs’ attorney s’ hourly rate s, nor the number

of hours expended, was c halleng ed by the Def endants a s inappropriate or e x cessive.

On Ap ri l 25 , 2 00 6, the tr ia l c ourt e nte re d a jud g me nt i n f

a vo r of the pa

re nt of on e of

the c la ss members, K.M., f

or dama g es re sulting fr om “the fa ilure of the D efe ndants to offe r K.M.’s son any prog ram of a lternative e ducation and the fac t that K.M.’s son, who turne d 18 in October , 2004, would have be e n p e r

mi tt e d b y h is h ig h s c h o o l to g r a d u a te in M ay , 2 0 0 5 , if h e h a d n o t be en expelled.”
On May 2, 2006, the trial cour

t entere d a judg ment awa rding the Plaintiffs $45,000 o f the reque sted $147,000 in attorney ’s fe es; $2,971 in out of pocket e x penses; and c ourt costs.-5- II. Issu e Prese nted

The Defend an ts a

p p e a l, r a is in g th e is s u e o f w h e th e r th e tr ia l c o u rt e r

r e d in aw a r d ing
a tto rn e y ’s fe e s and

c ourt c os ts t o th e Pla int if

fs

. III. St andard of Review

The attorney

fee provision in 42 U.S.C. § 1988 states that a court “ in its di scre tion, may allow the pre vailing pa

rty ... a re asonable attorney ' s fee as p art of the costs.” Se e Con so lid ate d W as te Sy ste ms , LLC v . Me tro

po litan Go v ’t of Nas hv ill e & Da v ids on Cou nty , No. M2002-02582-COA- R3- CV, 2005 WL 1541860, at *45 (Te nn. Ct. App. M .S., J une 30, 2005). “As the la ng uag e of the statute makes c lear , the deter mination of whether

to make an a

war d of fe es, as we ll as the amount of such f ees, lies within the discre tion of the trial cour t. A trial court' s decision to g rant or de ny fee s is reviewe d for a

buse of discr etion. Fogerty v . MGM G roup Holdings Corp. , 3 79 F .3 d 3 48 , 3 57 (6 th Cir. 2004)

. That discretion is limited, howeve r, by the re quirement that only a pre vailing pa

rty may qu a lif y fo r a fe e award. Add ition a lly , if it i s d e te rm ine d th a t a

pa rt y me e ts the pr e va ili ngpa

rt y require ment, fee s should be awa rded “ unless specia l circ umstances would r ender such an a

war d unjust.” He ns le

yv . Ec k e rh ar t , 461 U.S. 424, 429, 103 S.C t. 1933, 1937 (1983).” Id.

I n Eldridge v. Eldridge , 42 S.W .3d 82, 85 (Ten n . 2001), the Te nnessee Supreme Court provided the f

ollowing guidance reg ardingthe abuse of discretion standa rd:

Under the abuse of discretion standa rd, a tria l court' s ruling “ will be up he ld s o lo nga s r e a so na ble min ds c an d isa g re e as to the pr op ri e ty of the de cision made.” Sta te v . S c ott , 33 S.W .3d 7 4 6 , 7 5 2 (Tenn. 20 00 ); State v. G i l l iland , 22 S.W .3d 266, 273 (Tenn. 2000) . A trial court abuses its discretion only when it “applie[s] an incor rec t leg al standard, or

rea che[s] a decision which is ag ainst logic or re asoning that cause [s] an injustice to the par ty complaining .” State v. Shirley , 6 S.W .3 d 2 4 3 , 247 (Tenn. 1999) . The abuse of discretion standa rd does not permit the appe llate cour t to substitute its judgment for that of the trial c ourt. Myint v. Allstate Ins. Co. , 970 S

. W

. 2 d 9 2 0 , 927 (Tenn. 1998)

. An abuse of discretion occurs when the l ower court' s decision is without a basis in law or fa ct and is, theref ore, a rbitrar y , ill o g ical, or unc onscionable. State v. Brown & W illiamson T

obacco Corp. , 18 S .W. 3d

18 6, 19 1 ( Te nn . 2 00 0) ; D e n v e r A r e a M e a t Cu tt e r

s a n d E m p lo y e r s P e n s io n Plan v. Clayton, 209 S.W .3d 584, 590 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2006).

IV . Ana ly sis

The De fenda

nts argue that the trial cour t erre d in finding that the Plaintiffs were “pre vailing parties” in the litigation bec ause their succe ss in pursuing some of their cla ims was limit ed, p arti c u la r ly a f te r th e p arti a l s e tt le me n t a g r e e me n t w a s e xe c u te d an d a p p r o v e d b y th e tr ia l c o u rt. We-6-

ho ld t he tr ia l c ourt

did no t a bu se its dis c re tio n b y

ho ldi ngthat th e P lai ntif

fs ob ta ine d s uf

fi c ie ntl y succe ssful results in the o v er al l liti g ation to achieve “pre vailing pa rty ” status under

42 U.S.C. § 1988. Rece ntly , this court, addre ssing the sa me issue as pre sented he re, dis cussed at leng th the “pre vailing pa

rty ” conc ept as interpr eted and develope d by the Unit ed S tates Supreme Court in the
case of Con so lid

ate d W as te Sy ste ms , LLC

v . M e tro po lit an Go v ’t of N as hv ill e & Da v ids on Cou nty , No. M2002-02582-COA- R3-CV, 2005 WL 1541860 (Tenn. Ct. App. M.S., J une 30, 2005). The Con so lid ate d W as te Sy ste ms court noted that a plaintiff is a “pre vailing party” whe n actua l relief on the merits of his or her claim materia lly alters the le g al re lationship between the parties by modify ing the de fe nd ant' s b e havio r in a way that dir e c tly be ne fi ts the pla int if f, and fu rt he r s ta te d a s f

oll ow s in
re le va nt p art :
The meaning of the term “pre vailing party” has been the subject of a
n u mb e r o f o p i n i o n s b y t h e U n i t e d

S t a t e s S u

p r e m e C o u rt

. R e c e n t l y, t h e C o u rth a s i n d i c a t e d

t h a tt h e m e an i n g i s r e l a t i v e l y c l e ar

. In Bu c k ha nn on Bo ar

d a nd Car e Ho me

s, In c . v . W

est V irg ini a De pa rtment of He alt

h a nd Hu ma n R eso ur c es, 532 U.S. 598, 121 S.Ct . 1835 (2001), the Court r uled that a “ preva iling party ” does not include one who fails to se cure a judg ment or cour t-order ed conse nt decr ee, even though the desired result of the lawsuit i s achie ved beca use of a voluntary

chang e in the def

endant 's co n duct, thus declining to adopt the “c ataly st” theory

. I n t hat opinion, the Court
ma de it c le ar t

hat to be a

pr e va il in g pa

rt y , o ne mus t r e c e ive a t le a st
so me ju dic ia lly -s anc tio ne d r e lie f o n th e me ri ts o f h is o r h e r c la im. 532 U.S. at 600-604, 121 S.Ct. at 1838-40.

De sc ri bin g “ pr evai li ng pa rt y ” a s a te rm of art , th e Court

re fe rr e d to the B lack' s L aw Di ct i onary definition: “[a] party

in whose favor a judgme nt is render ed, re g ardle ss of the amount of damag es aw arde d ... Also termed suc cessf

ul party .” A preva iling par ty is one who has been a war ded some re lief by the court. 532 U.S. at 603, 121 S.Ct . at 1839.

* * * This threshold require ment has l ong exis ted. “Only wher e a party has preva iled on the merits of at least some of his claims ... has ther e bee n a dete rmination of the ‘substantial rig hts of t he par ties,’ which Congr ess deter

mined was a

nece ssary foundation for depar ting f rom the us ual rule in thi s country that eac h party

is to bear the e x pense of his own attorney .” Hanrahan v. Ham pton, 446 U.S. 754, 7 5 8 , 100 S.Ct

. 1987 (1980). In Hensley
, the C ourt soug ht to clarify the standar d wher e the plaintiff ac hieves only limit ed succ ess. Hensley
, 46 1 U .S. at 431, 103 S.Ct. at 1938. The Court defined a preva iling par

ty as one who succ eede d “on any

signific ant issue in litigation which a chieve s-7- some of the be nefit the pa rties soug ht in bringingsuit.” Id.

I n Texas St ate T

eache rs Ass'n. v. Garland Independent Sc hool Dist., 489 U.S. 782, 792, 109 S.Ct . 1486, 1493 (1989), the Court r esolved
a split among the circ uit c ourts and reje cted the stand ar d re quiring that a party succe ed on the “ce ntral issue” in the ca se and a chieve the “primar y relief soug ht.” 489 U.S. at 791, 109 S.Ct. at 1493. I nstead, the C ourt rea ffirme d the Hensley standard. T he Court also re iterate d that wher e the c laims arise from a core set of fa cts and involve re lated theories of law, the deg ree of success t he plainti ff attains is relevant to the siz e of the fee awa

rd, i.e., whether

the awa rd is rea sonable, not to the elig ibilit y

for a n awa rd, i.e., whether

the plaintiff is a pre vailing pa rt y

. 48 9 U. S. a t 79 0, 10 9 S. Ct. a t 14 92 ; see also Farrar v. Hobby
, 506 U.S. 103, 113, 113 S.C t. 566, 574 (1 992). The Te x as Te ac he rs A s s 'n case established an exception w here the plaintiff' s succe ss can be chara cter ized as “purely technica l or de mi nim is; ” in that situation, the plaintiff is not a pre vailing pa rty

. Texas St ate T

eache rs Ass'

n, 489 U.S. at 792, 109 S.Ct . at 1494. Howe ver, Farrar c lari fi e d th a t a pa rt y wh o is awa

rd e d o nly no min a l da

ma g e s is a pr e va ili ngpa

rt y be c a us e preva iling party status doe s not tur n on the mag nitude of t h e relief obtained. Fa rra r, 506 U.S. at 114, 113 S.Ct . at 574.

* * * I ndeed, the Supreme Court has state d, “the touchst one of the preva iling par

ty inquiry must be th e m aterial alteration of the leg al
re la tio ns hip of

the pa rt ie s in a mann e r w hic h Co ngres s so ug ht t o promote in the fee statute.” Texas St ate T eache rs Ass'

n, 489 U.S. at 79 2- 93 ; 10 9 S. Ct. a t 1494 . I t has a lso he ld that the re lie f g ra nte d mu st “af fec t the behavior

of the de fenda

nt toward the pla intiff.” Rhodes v. Ste war t, 488 U.S. 1, 4, 109 S.C t. 202, 203 (1988).

“ [T]o q ua lif y a s a pr e va ili ngpa

rt y , a civ il rig hts pla int if

f m us t ob ta in
a t le a st s ome re lie f o n th e me ri ts o f h is cl a im. Th e pla int if f m us t obtain an enf

orce able ju dg ment ag ainst the defe ndant from whom fe e s ar e s o u g h t, o r c o mp ar a b le r e li e f thr o u g h a c o n s e n t decr ee or se ttl e me nt. Whate ve r re lie f the pla int if f se c ur e s mu st d ir e c tly

be ne fi t him at the time of the judg ment or settlement.... In short, a plaintiff

“ pr e va ils ” wh e n a c tua l r e lie f on th e me ri ts o f h is c la im m a te ri a lly alters the le g al re lationship between the p ar ties by modify ing the defe ndant' s behavior in a way that di re ctly

benef its the plaintiff.” Fa rra r, 506 U.S. at 111-12, 113 S.Ct. at 573. (citations omitt ed).

Whil e a pla intiff

who obtains only

a dec laratory

judgme nt in his or-8- her f avor ma y qualify as a pr evailing party , entry of such a judgme nt does not automatica lly

compel that re sult. Rh od

es, 488 U.S. at 3, 109 S.Ct

. at 203. Rather, the que stion is whether the judg ment produce s so me a c tio n or ce ssatio n o f a c tio n b y the de fe nd ant o r o the rw ise aff ects the be havior of the defe ndant towar d the plaintiff. “A d ec laratory

judgme nt, in this respe ct, is no differ ent from a ny other judgme nt.” 488 U.S. at 4, 109 S.Ct. at 203.

Con so lid ate d W as te Sy ste ms , LLC , 2005 WL 1541860, at *46-47.

I n the prese nt c ase, the Plaintiffs a chieve d signific ant judicially -sanc tioned relie f o n t he merits of some, but not all, of their c laim s. I nitially , the Plaintiffs obtained tempora ry injunctive relief , and fur ther obtained class certification. L ater , the P laintiffs obtained much of what they wer e s e e k i n g – ana l t e r n a t i v e e d u c a t i o n p r o g r a m f

o r s tu d e n t s e x p e l l e d

o r s u s p e n d e d

f o r m o r e t h ant e n d a ys that rea sonably

met the students’ ed u ca t ional needs – throug h their ef forts in neg otiating a

nd executing the partial settlement a g ree ment. This ag ree ment re ceive d a judicial imprimatur by the tr ia l c ourt ’s or de r a

pp ro vin g it, and the “ sid e a g re e me nt” to the se ttl e me nt, e xec ute d b y the pa rt ie s, sp e c if ic a lly pr ov ide d th a t “ the de fe nd ants a g re e that the pla int if fs are the pr e va ili ngpa

rt ie s in thi s settlement.” F inally , some of the Plaintiffs w ere succe ssful in recove ring damag es for their expenses in obtaining substitute education such as private schooling for their children.

The Def endants argue that their decisions to implement and later improve the al ternative
e du c a tio n p ro g ra

ms f or Kn ox County

stu de nts we re pure ly

vo lun tary

and no t c a us e d b y Pla int if fs ’ laws uit . T he De fe nd ants state in t he ir br ie f that “ [i]n Jan

ua ry 20 03 , thre e mon ths be fo re thi s la ws uit
wa s f ile d, the Kn ox County B oa rd of Ed uc a tio n dir e c te d the a dmi nis tr a tio n to for mul a te a pla

n to provide a lternative sc hool service s suspended or expelled from their regular school pr og ram...The school sy stem voluntarily implemented an al t er n ative school prog ram for the 2003-2004 school y e ar. ” Th is a

rgume nt h a s n o evi den ti ary supp or t in the re c or d. Th e so le c itatio n to the re c or d in
su pp or t of the De fe nd ants ’ a sse rt ion that th e c ha

ng e s w e re vo lun tari ly

ma de is t o a

fi le d resp onse in which the De fenda

nts refe r to a portion of a deposition that is not included in the re cord. In any event, this fac tually -driven a rg ument was considere d and reje cted by the trial cour

t, and we f

ind no
err or in its doing so. Even thoug h the Plaintiffs qualify as “prevailing parties” under the statute, they may not be entitled to a

n awa rd of attorney ’s fee s if such an awa rd would not be rea sonable. C o n s o l i d a t ed W aste Systems , 2005 WL 1541860, at *49. “The nature of re lief obtained is re levant to the amount of fe e s awa rd e d a nd to t he e xer c ise of

dis c re tio n b y

the tr ia l c ourt

in det erm ini ngthat amou nt. Fa rra r, 50 6 U .S. a t 114, 11 3 S.Ct. a t 574. Th a t is be c a us e the c ourt mus t con sid e r the re la tio ns hip betwee n the extent of succe ss a nd the amount of the fe e aw ard. Hensley
, 46 1 U .S. a t 43 8, 10 3 S. Ct.
a t 19 42 . T he degree of ove ra ll s uc c e ss i s an im po rt ant, or

e ve n th e mos t c ri tic a l, f a c tor in deter mining the r easona

bleness of a

fee awa rd. Id .; Te x as Te ac he rs Ass'n. , 4 89 U. S. at 79 3, 10 9 S. Ct.
a t 14 93 -9 4; Hensley

, 461 U.S. at 436, 103 S.Ct . at 1941.” Id.-9-

The De fenda

nts arg ue that, conside ring the ag ree ment of the Plaintiffs’ attorney s to waive the ir fe e s “ to d a te ,” ma de on

Marc h 2 , 2 00 5, and the su bs e qu e nt la c k of

su c c e ss o f P la int if

fs in t he ir challeng e to the 2004-2005 nig ht alternative prog ram, the only rea sonable fee in this case is no fee at all. The Plaintiffs c ounter that the trial cour t properly considere d these mitigating f actor s and that the dec ision to award only 30% of the attorney ’s fe es incurr ed by the Plaintiffs was withi n the trial court’s r easona

ble discre tion.

I n the pre sent ca se, the trial court enter ed a thoroug h, thoughtf ul me morandum and or der on its fe e awa

rd de c isi on . T he tr ia l c ourt e xpla ine d it s d e c isi on

a s f oll ow s:

I n this case, the pla intiff class pre vailed on numer ous individual cases
se e kin g inj un c tiv e re lie f a s w e ll a s o n in div idu a l c la ims fo r d a ma g e s. Additionally , class counse l was ac tively involved reg ardingthe 2003- 2004 NAP. Fu rt her, the parties themse lves desig nated plaintiffs a s the preva iling party

when the or der a

pproving the ag ree d settlement for the 2003-2004 NAP prog ram was enter ed. The Court would not hesitate to aw ard f

ees taking into ac count the lac k of succ ess of the pla int if f c la ss i n r e g ard

to t he 20 04 -2 00 5 N AP.

Howeve r, per

the so-ca lled s i d e ag ree ment attache d to the partial settlement of cla ims to t he 2003 -2 0 0 4 school y ear , class counse l expressly waived f ees up to Marc h 2, 2005. Fr om that point forwar d,
eve n t h o u g h the plaintiff cla ss had bee n desig nated a s a pre vailing party , the Court never

theless has to consider the rea sonablene ss of the fee s ex p ended a fter Ma

rch 2, 2005, g iving c onsideration for the deg ree of succ ess of the c lass on the claims asse rted.

No ca se has be en cited a nd the Court has f

o u n d none base d on compar able f

acts whe re the class h as b een deemed the preva iling pa rt y and c ouns e l ha s w a ive d f

e e s to a date c e rt a in. I n th a t se ns e , th is
case is most uni que. ...

I n revie wing the fee petition, it is c lear to the Court that not all of the
se rv ic e s o f p la int if

fs ’ c ouns e l pr ior

to M arc h 2 00 5 r e la te d s ole ly to the 2003-2004 school y ear

. Much of the time prior to Marc h 2, 2005, involved prepa

ration for the hea ring in April 2005 conce rning the 2004-2005 NAP progr am. Additionally , it is also clear that some of the time entries subsequent to Ma rch 2, 2005, relate to obtaining c ourt
a p p r o v a l o f th e s e tt le me n t r e g ar d in g th e 2 0 0 3

- 2 0 0 4 N A P pr og ram and the implementation of r emedies related to it. These fa ctors further add to the complexity

of the re solution of the fee issue.

* * *-10- [I ]n som e instance s it is readily discernible a s to what particula r

“ c la im” the tim e is e xpe nd e d. I n oth e rs it i s n ot s o c le ar a nd in s ome circ umstances time could have bee n expended on both the 2003-2004 and the 2004- 2005 school y ear claims.

* * * Th e Court ’s a

bil ity to exe rc ise its dis c re tio n in thi s matte r i s compounded by

the factors set for

th above. The Court must consider
c o u n s e l s ’ w a i v e r

o f a p arto f t h e i r f e e , t h e o v e r l a

p o f s o m e a c t i v i t y, and the fa c t th a t pla int if

fs a c hie ve d only

lim ite d s uc c e ss a

nd argua bly
no su c c e ss r e g ard ingthe 20 04 -2 00 5 N AP p ro g ra m.
The Court must al

so be cognizant of the fact that , as pointed out by plaintiffs’ counse l o n more than one occa sion, the alternative education program was enacte d by the legislature in 1984 and Knox County had done little to implem ent the requireme nts of that program prior to the institut ion of these cases

. The Court also obser ved during the c ours e of

th is l iti g a tio n th a t w hil e the B oa rd of Ed uc a tio n d id strive g reatly

to implement the curre nt prog rams ther e wa s also an element of

resistanc e indig enous to any litigation. I n summation, the Court cannot say that plaintiffs’ counse ls’ eff orts did nothing to bring about a judicially

sanctioned chang e in the leg al re lationship of the parties. Indeed, e ven duringthe trial in April 2005 school boar d witnesses testified a s to the ong oing e ffor ts to upgra de and improve the NAP prog ram. Taking all of the afore mentioned factors i nto consideration, the Court is of the op ini on that c la ss c ouns e l sh ou ld b e e nti tle d to a n a g g re g a te fee of $45,000.00 plus $2,971.00 for out of pocket expenses. Court
c os ts a re ta xed to d e fe nd ants

. (Emphasis adde d). As the italicized portion of the trial cour t’s order indicates, it is clear

that the ef

forts of the Pla int if f c la ss m e mbe rs and

the ir c ouns e l have c on tr ibute d to the pu bli c int e re st thr ou g h th is litigation. As we stated in W halen v. Hutc hison, No. E2001-01404- COA-R3-CV, 2002 WL489558, at *2 (Te nn. Ct. App. E.S., April 1, 2002), “ The leg islative purpose be hind the Attorney ' s Fe e Awa rd Ac t of 19 76 , 4 2 U .S. C. § 19 88 , a s ame nd e d, is t o en cou rag e pr ivate e nf or c e me nt o f t

he pu bli c interest. I t is to be ‘libera lly construed to a chieve the public purposes involved in the c ong ressional
enac tment.’” As the tr ial court found, the leg islature ena cted the a lternativ e ed ucation prog ramT he p ert i nent s t atu te , n o w lo cat ed at T enn. C o d e A nn. § 4 9

- 6

- 3 4 0 2 (a), was ori gi nal l y enact ed i n 19 8 4

. I n 2
19 86 , t he G ene r al Ass emb l y amended i t t o re qui r e t hat “ [ a] l t er nat i ve s chool s s hal l be av ai l abl e f or s t udent s i n g r ades

s eve n ( 7) t hr ough t wel ve ( 12 ) wh o hav e been s us pended or e xpel l ed as provi ded f or h er ei n. ”
-11- re qu i r e m e n t s i nt h e m i d

- 1 9 8 0 s an d K n o x C o u n t y

h a d d o n e “ l i t t l e t o i mp l e m e n tt h e r e qu ir e me nts 2 of that pr og ra

m” pr ior to the ins tit

uti on of thi s a c tio n. F ur

the r, a s a lr e a dy

no te d, the tr ia l c ourt

on ly
awa rd e d 3 0% of

the tot a l r e qu e ste d f

e e s, ind ic a tin g tha

t it di d con si der the mit ig a tin g fa c tor s to Plaintiffs’ succe ss, as discussed above

.
I n Consolidat ed W

aste Systems , this court noted t he trial court’s broad dis cre tion in awar ding
a tto rn e y ’s fe e s, and

the re a so ns fo r a ff

or din g that br oa d d isc re tio n, a s f oll ow s:
A trial cour

t has broad discretion in dec iding whe ther to aw ard f ees to a pr e va ili ngpa

rt y and the a mou nt of fe e s th a t are re a so na

ble . “ I t is
c e ntr a l to the awa

rd ing of fe e s und e r § 19 88 that th e dis tr ic t ju dg e , in his o r her go od

jud g me nt, make the a sse ssm e nt o f w hat is a re asonable fee under the circ umstances of the ca se.” B la n c h a rd v. Bergeron, 489 U.S. 87, 96, 109 S.Ct

. 939, 946 (1989). The trial court is u su a lly in t he be st p os iti on

to make fe e awa

rd de c isi on s b e c a

us e it has m ore closely observe d and g ained a g reater unde rstanding of the litigation, the lawy ering , and the r esults. Hensley
, 461 U. S

. at 437, 103 S.Ct

. at 1491. “The [t rial] court is in the best position t o ascr ibe
a re a sona ble va lue to t

he lawy e ri ngit h a s w itn e sse d a nd the re su lts that lawy eringhas ac hieved.” W ilcox, 42 F.3d at 555.

20 05 WL15 41 86 0, a t *5 0. Simi lar dis c re tio n is af fo rd e d to the tr ia l cou

rt in aw ard ingc ourt

c os ts:

[ O]n a pp e a l Pla int if

f m us t sh owe xtra or din ary

c ir c ums tanc e s to
o v erc ome the pre sumption i n favor of the discr etionary

purview of the Trial Court in taxing the costs of the T ri al Court. “Tenn.Code Ann. § 20-12-119 a

nd Tenn.R.C iv.P. 54.04 give tria l courts the
a uth or ity to t a x the c os ts i nc ur re d in th e tr ial co ur

t. T he se deter minations are within the trial court' s discretion, and they will be revie wed on a

ppeal only u n d er very

extraordinary

circ umstances.” Ro ge rs v . R us se ll, 733 S.W .2d 79, 88 (Tenn.Ct.App.1986).

LeBrun v. Elmore, No. E1999-01523-COA-R3-CV, 2000 WL 224628, at *6 (Tenn. Ct. App. E.S., F e b. 28 , 2 00 0) . We ho ld t hat th e awa

rd of a tto rn e y ’s fe e s and ta xing of c ourt c os ts w a s a

re a so na ble
e xer c ise of

the tr ia l c ourt ’s dis c re tio n, c on sid e ri ngthe tot a lity of the lit ig a tio n a

nd a pp lic a ble
a uth or iti e s.-12- V . Conclu sion

For the af oreme ntioned rea sons, the judgme nt of the trial court is af firmed. The Plaintiffs
re qu e st a n aw ard of a tto rn e y ’s fe e s inc ur re d in this ap pe a l. Exe rc isi ng our dis c re tio n, we de c lin e thi s re qu e st a nd ho ld t hat e a c h sid e sh ou ld b e re sp on sib le fo r p ay ingthe ir ow n atto rn e y ’s fe e s o n a

pp e a l. Costs of appeal a

re a ssessed to the Appe llants, Knox County Boa rd o f Educa

tion and Dr. Char les L indsey , Superintendent.

_________________________________________ SHARON G. L EE, J UDGE