J-S71018-19

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

JACQUELINE SIMON

v.

EDWARD MCCUSKER 

Appellant

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 2125 EDA 2019

Appeal from the Order Entered June 18, 2019

In the Court of Common Pleas of Bucks County Domestic Relations at 

No(s): 2013DR01247, 

Pacses 234114054

BEFORE: BOWES, J., MURRAY, J., and McLAUGHLIN, J.

MEMORANDUM BY MURRAY, J.: FILED FEBRUARY 14, 2020

Edward McCusker (Father) appeals pro se from the child support order

addressing arrearages owed by Father to Jacqueline Simon (Mother). Upon 

review, we affirm.

The trial court summarized the factual and procedural background as 

follows:

Mother filed a complaint for support on June 21, 2013.

On August 15, 2013, Father was ordered to pay Mother $1500.00 

for the support of their two minor children.

Thereafter, due to a criminal conviction, Father was incarcerated 

for approximately four and a half years, during which time the 

Support Order was suspended effective December 30, 2014. He 

was incarcerated from May of 2014 until his release in September 

of 2018. (N.T., 6/18/19, p. 9).

The parties entered into a Property Settlement Agreement dated 

September 12, 2016, in regards to their divorce, which was 
J-S71018-19

- 2 -

officially docketed on September 30, 2016. This was incorporated 

as part of the final Decree in Divorce on March 20, 2017.

On February 6, 2019, by Order of this Court, the Honorable James 

M. McMaster, determined the non-financial obligation order, 

effective December 30, 2014, is to be reinstated as a charging 

support obligation through PACSES. Additionally, the order shall 

terminate and be arrears only, effective November 14, 2016 due 

to older child J.’s emancipation.

On March 8, 2019, this non-support matter was continued 

generally giving Father sixty days (60) to file a Petition for 

Modification.

On April 5, 2019, Father filed a “Petition for 

Modification/Termination of an Existing Support Order.” Within 

his Pro Se petition, Father alleged that Mother owed him money 

[and] claimed that “she has lived in our jointly owned home 

without making a single payment for over 9 years.” By the date 

of the hearing, Father no longer raised this argument.

On June 18, 2019, a hearing was held before the Honorable Leslie 

Gorbey, to address Father’s repayment of arrearage, the amount 

of arrearage and his obligation to pay said arrearage. The current 

arrears balance is $39,075.69. There have been no payments 

since the order was reinstated.

Following said hearing, the Court so ordered on the same date the 

following: “NFOB [nonfinancial obligation] order to reinstate and 

all arrears/fees previously removed from PACSES are to be 

reinstated. After the Hearing this date, the order that had been 

charging $1500.00 per month for two children is to be modified 

retroactively and arrears balance adjusted as follows: Due to the

emancipation of child J[T.], effective 8/1/15, child support reduces 

to $979.00 per month for the remaining child. Order then 

terminates, effective 11/14/16 due to the emancipation of child, 

J[A.]. Arrears/fees to be payable at $1500.00 per month until the 

balance has been paid in full. Case then to close.” (Trial Court 

Order, 6/18/19).

On July 16, 2019, Father filed, Pro Se, a timely Notice of Appeal 

from the Support Order entered on June 18, 2019.
J-S71018-19

- 3 -

On July 19, 2019 Father filed, Pro Se, his Concise Statement of 

Matters Complained of on Appeal.

Trial Court Opinion, 8/30/19, at 1-3.

At the outset, we recognize our standard of review:

When evaluating a support order, this Court may only reverse the 

trial court’s determination where the order cannot be sustained on 

any valid ground. We will not interfere with the broad discretion 

afforded the trial court absent an abuse of the discretion or 

insufficient evidence to sustain the support order. An abuse of 

discretion is not merely an error of judgment; if, in reaching a 

conclusion, the court overrides or misapplies the law, or the 

judgment exercised is shown by the record to be either manifestly 

unreasonable or the product of partiality, prejudice, bias or ill will, 

discretion has been abused. In addition, we note that the duty to 

support one’s child is absolute, and the purpose of child 

support is to promote the child’s best interests.

Samii v. Samii, 847 A.2d 691, 694 (Pa. Super. 2004) (citations omitted)

(emphasis added).

On appeal, Father states his issues, verbatim, as follows:

A. Did the trial court abuse its discretion and/or err as a matter of 

law and fact in entering the order reinstating the arrearages when 

[Mother] released all and any debts owed to her as stated in the 

Marital Settlement Agreement.

B. Did the Court err when they did not allow a “stay” in order for 

me to produce my business P&L statements?

C. Did the Court abuse their discretion when they did not consider 

the intent of the Settlement Agreement?

D. Did the Court err when they ruled that I owed ANY arrearages 

when it was precisely written into the settlement agreement that 

[Mother] released me of ANY and ALL debts owed to her?

E. Did the Court abuse their discretion by interfering with a 

settlement agreement which mutually released both parties of 
J-S71018-19

- 4 -

ANY and ALL debt when it ordered I pay [Mother] monies she 

released me from?

F. Did the Court err on its interpretation of Pa. law regarding 

Settlement Agreements and their effect on support orders?

Father’s Brief at 3-5 (suggested answers omitted).

Five of Father’s six issues (A, C, D, E and F) are repetitive, and at their 

essence “center around the parties’ property settlement agreement of 

September 12, 2016, and Father’s assertion that it releases him from any child 

support obligation, including specifically the repayment of arrearage.” Trial 

Court Opinion, 8/30/19, at 4. This argument is completely unavailing.

First, Father has conceded that the settlement agreement did not 

address child support. See N.T., 6/18/19, at 7. Further, it is well settled that 

the duty to support one’s children is absolute. See Depp v. Holland, 636 

A.2d 204, 206 (Pa. Super. 1994). Even if Mother had agreed in the marital 

settlement agreement to release Father from his child support obligation —

including arrears — our Supreme Court has expressly stated that parents 

“have no power to bargain away the rights of their children.” Knorr v. Knorr, 

588 A.2d 503, 505 (Pa. 1991).

The trial court correctly explained:

Father’s reference to [the] property settlement agreement 

in divorce, obfuscates the issues by mixing concepts of child 

support obligations with marital debt. For purposes of his 

argument he treats these as identical.

Pennsylvania law, however, draws a distinction between the 

legal obligation to provide support for one’s children, and the 

separate rights and responsibilities for addressing valid marital 
J-S71018-19

- 5 -

debt. The property settlement agreement deals only specifically 

with those issues necessary to finalize the parties’ divorce.

***

In this instance, as the record clearly demonstrates, and as 

uncontested by Father, a valid order of [child] support was 

originally entered in 2013. The order rendered Father an obligor. 

Irrespective of his failure to adhere, the order obligated Father as 

liable for child support payments.

Trial Court Opinion at 5.

For the above reasons, we find no merit to Father’s argument that the 

trial court erred in finding that Father and Mother did not and could not 

“bargain away amounts accumulated for child support.” See, e.g., N.T., 

6/18/19, at 7.

In his remaining issue, “B”, Father states that the court erred by failing 

to “allow a ‘stay’ in order for [Father] to produce [his] business P&L 

statements,” because the statements “would prove” Father does “not have 

the ability to pay $1500 per month.” Father’s Brief at 3. Again, Father’s issue 

lacks merit. Both the trial court and Mother counter that Father never 

requested a stay, and the record supports their contentions. See Trial Court 

Opinion, 6/18/19, at 10; Mother’s Brief at 17.

Furthermore, the trial court emphasized that the parties were given “due 

notice of the hearing of June 18, 2019.” N.T., 6/18/19, at 9. The trial court 

explained:

The support conference in this matter was scheduled and held on 

May 7, 2019. For both the conference and the hearing, the parties 

received the standard written Order as set forth in Rule 1910.27. 

As such, they were directed to provide, among other items, a true 

copy of their most recent tax return and the “Income Statement 
J-S71018-19

- 6 -

and the appropriate Expense Statement” (enclosed with order) as 

required by Rule 1910.11(c). Father failed to provide the required 

information at either conference or hearing. Thus, Father, who 

filed the petition and sought no advance continuance, presumably 

had opportunity to gather whatever documents he believed to be 

necessary in support of his petition. Yet, when asked at the 

hearing whether he had brought stock certificates for his 

company, under cross by Mother’s counsel, Father testified as 

follows:

Q. But, sir, on this brochure, as you’ve said, this is a 

previous company. Whose name is on this brochure, 

front page?

A. Well, it's me, because I took over in 2018.

Q. Okay.

A. That’s me. I was president in 2018. It’s a new 

company.

Q. But I believe you said the numbers belong to the 

old company, but yet –

A. The ones you’re referencing in 2015, 2016, and 

‘17, I’ve told you, that’s previous to me.

Q. But it is safe to assume that since your name is 

on this company, on the front page, as the CEO and 

president, that this is your company?

A. No, sir.

Q. It’s not safe to assume?

A. I’m an officer. There’s plenty of presidents that 

don’t own a company. I own 19 percent of the 

company. I swear. I’ll supply the certificate to you.

Q. You haven’t brought any of the certificates?

A. I didn't know what to bring[.]

(N.T., 06/18/19, pp. 22-23).
J-S71018-19

- 7 -

The record, including this sequence of testimony, is bereft 

of any stay request from Father. Father was represented by 

counsel at said hearing. However, during his testimony it became 

apparent Father failed to bring paperwork with him which he says 

would have supported his own petition. His assertion that he did 

not know what to bring is insufficient reason to excuse his burden. 

No specific assertion was offered to suggest Father was unable to 

access or produce documents for his own company at the hearing. 

In fact, testimony was presented by Mother casting doubt on 

Father’s self-serving assertions. Emails from Father were 

introduced wherein he claimed to be actually a majority 

shareholder and CEO of this company. (N.T., 06/18/19, pp. 50-

51). At the very least, Father is a business owner and shareholder 

in a company which has a contract with Dick’s Sporting Goods 

Company. (N.T., 06/18/19, pp. 44-45).

Trial Court Opinion, 6/18/19, at 9-10.

Upon review, the record compel our finding that the trial court did not 

abuse its discretion court in concluding that Father failed to present 

“compelling evidence” of an inability to pay, and ordering Father to pay child 

support arrearages. See id. at 11.

Order affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 2/14/20