CHAPTER 17. REGULATORY IMPACT ANALYSIS

TABLE O F CONTENTS

**17.1 I**  **NTRODUCTION**

**.................................. .......................................................................**  **17­1**

**17.2 M**  **ETHODOLOGY**

**................................... .....................................................................**  **17­1**

**17.2.1 M**  **odeling M**  **ethod............................................................................................... 17­1** 

**17.2.1.1 G**  **eneral S**  **ervice Fluorescent**  **Lamps................................................... 17­2** 

**17.2.1.1.1 S**  **cenarios A**  **nalyzed**

**.......................................................... 17­2** 

**17.2.1.1.2 M**  **arket S**  **hare Matrices** 

**..................................................... 17­3** 

**17.2.1.2 I**  **ncandescent R**  **eflector Lamps** 

**........................................................... 17­3** 

**17.2.1.2.1 S**  **cenario............................................................................ 17­3**

**1 7.2.1.2.2**  **M arket**  **S hare**  **Matrices**

**..................................................... 17­3** 

**17.2.2 P**  **olicy A**  **ssumptions**

**........................................................................................... 17­4** 

**17.2.3 I**  **nteraction o**  **f Non­Regulatory**  **Alternatives**

**...................................................... 17­4** 

**17.3 NO**  **N­REGULATORY A**  **LTERNATIVES**

**................................................................... 17­5** 

**17.3.1 No**  **New Regulatory**  **A ction** 

**............................................................................... 17­5** 

**17.3.2 C**  **onsumer R**  **ebates**

**............................................................................................. 17­5** 

**17.3.3 C**  **onsumer Ta**  **x Credits** 

**....................................................................................... 17­8** 

**17.3.4 M**  **anufacturer T**  **ax Credits.................................................................................. 17­9** 

**17.3.5 V**  **oluntary En**  **ergy­Efficiency Programs** 

**............................................................ 17­9** 

**17.3.6 Ea**  **rly Replacement........................... ................................................................ 17­10** 

**17.3.7 B**  **ulk G**  **overnment Purchases............................................................................**  **17­10**

**17.4 R**  **ESULTS S**  **UMMARY FOR**  **NON­REGULATORY ALTERNATIVES.................**  **17­11**

**17.4.1 No**  **New Regulatory**  **A ction** 

**............................................................................. 17­12** 

**17.4.2 C**  **onsumer R**  **ebates**

**........................................................................................... 17­12** 

**17.4.3 C**  **onsumer Ta**  **x Credits** 

**..................................................................................... 17­12** 

**17.4.4 M**  **anufacturer T**  **ax Credits................................................................................ 17­12** 

**17.4.5 V**  **oluntary En**  **ergy­Efficiency Programs** 

**.......................................................... 17­13** 

**17.4.6 B**  **ulk G**  **overnment Purchases............................................................................**  **17­13**

**17.4.7 En**  **ergy Conservation Standards....................................................................... 17­13** 

**REFERENCES**

**........................................................................................................................ 17­14** 

LIST O F TABLES

**Table 1**  **7.2.1 Market**  **Share Matrix**  **for PAR38**  **90W in**  **the Commercial**  **Sector for**  **Roll­Up, No** 

**Product S**  **ubstitution Scenario**  **for Proposed**  **Standards**

**..................................................... 17­4** 

**Table 17.3.1 Market Penetration Due to Consumer Rebates for GSFL Product Classes......... 17­7** 

**Table 17.3.2**  **Market Penetration**  **Due to**  **Consumer Rebates**  **for IRL**  **Product Classes** 

**............ 17­8** 

**Table 17.4.1**  **GSFL: NES**  **and NPV**  **of Non­Regulatory**  **Alternatives Compared**  **to the**  **Proposed**

**17­i Standards.......................................................................................................................... 17­11** 

**Table 17.4.2**  **IRL: NES**  **and NPV**  **of Non­Regulatory**  **Alternatives Compared**  **to the**  **Proposed**

**Standards.......................................................................................................................... 17­11**

LIST O F FIGURES

**Figure 1**  **7.3.1 Commercial**  **Market Penetration**  **Curve as**  **a Function**  **of Simple**  **PBP................ 17­6** 

**Figure 17.3.2**  **Residential Market**  **Penetration Curve**  **as a**  **Function of**  **Simple PBP** 

**................ 17­7** 

**17­ii**CHAPTER 17. REGULATORY IMPACT ANALYSIS

17.1 I NTRODUCTION

**Th e**  **D epartment**  **of Energy**  **(DOE) has**  **determined that**  **energy conservation**  **standards for** 

**GSFL and**  **IRL constitute**  **a “significant**  **regulatory action”**  **under Executive**  **Order (E.O.)**  **12866**

**“Regulatory Planning**  **and Review.”**  **58 FR**  **51735 (October**  **4, 1993).**  **Therefore, DOE**  **has**

**prepared this**  **regulatory impact**  **analysis (RIA),**  **which is**  **subject to**  **review under**  **the Executive** 

**Order by**  **the Office**  **of Information**  **and Regulatory**  **Affairs (OIRA).**  **58 FR**  **51735 This**  **chapter**

**evaluates several**  **non­regulatory alternatives**  **and compares**  **the costs**  **and benefits**  **of each** 

**alternative to**  **the proposed**  **standards.**

**DOE i**  **dentified six**  **major, non­regulatory**  **alternatives to**  **standards as**  **representing**

**feasible policy**  **options to**  **achieve potentially**  **similar improvements**  **in GSFL**  **and IRL**  **energy**

**efficiency:**

• **Consumer R**  **ebates**

• **Consumer Ta**  **x Credits** 

• **Manufacturer T**  **ax Credits** 

• **Voluntary En**  **ergy Efficiency**  **Programs**

• **Bulk g**  **overnment purchases** 

• **Early r**  **eplacement**

**DOE e**  **valuated each**  **of the**  **alternatives that**  **apply to**  **the lamp**  **products covered**  **by this** 

**final rule**  **in terms**  **of its**  **ability to**  **achieve significant**  **energy savings**  **at a**  **reasonable cost,**  **and**

**compared the**  **effectiveness of**  **each one**  **to that**  **of the**  **adopted standards.**  **The following**  **sections**

**discuss the**  **analysis method**  **used, the**  **non­regulatory alternatives**  **considered, and**  **the energy** 

**savings calculated.** 

17.2 M ETHODOLOGY

1 7.2.1 M odeling M ethod

**Each n**  **on­regulatory alternative**  **to the**  **proposed standards**  **improves the**  **average**

**efficiency of**  **new lamp**  **products relative**  **to the**  **base case**  **(no new**  **regulatory action).**  **The**

**analysis assumed**  **that each**  **non­regulatory alternative**  **would entice**  **consumers to**  **purchase lamps** 

**at targeted**  **efficacy levels,**  **the same**  **efficacy levels**  **as required**  **by the**  **proposed standards.** 

**Contrary to**  **the proposed**  **standards, however,**  **the market**  **penetration of**  **non­regulatory**

**alternatives would**  **only impact**  **the portion**  **of the**  **market below**  **the targeted**  **efficacy level.**  **DOE**

**made specific**  **assumptions about**  **the percentage**  **of this**  **market impacted**  **under each**  **non**

**regulatory alternative.**  **Details of**  **these assumptions**  **can be**  **found in**  **section 17.3.** 

**17­1 In**  **comparing a**  **non­regulatory alternative**  **to the**  **proposed standards,**  **the key**  **measures of** 

**comparison were:** 

• **National e**  **nergy savings**  **(NES) in**  **kilowatt hours**  **(kWh): Cumulative**  **national primary** 

**energy savings**  **for equipment**  **bought in**  **the period**  **from the**  **effective date**  **of the**  **policy**

**case, 2012,**  **to end**  **of the**  **analysis period,**  **2042.**

• **Net p**  **resent value**  **(NPV): The**  **value of**  **net monetary**  **savings from**  **equipment bought**  **in**

**the period**  **from the**  **effective date**  **of the**  **policy case,**  **2012, to**  **the end**  **of the**  **analysis**

**period, 2042.**  **DOE calculated**  **the NPV**  **as the**  **difference between**  **the present**  **value of** 

**equipment and**  **operating expenditures**  **(including energy)**  **in the**  **base case,**  **and the** 

**present value**  **of expenditures**  **in each**  **alternative case.**  **1**

**DOE quantified**  **the market**  **penetration of**  **each alternative;**  **that is,**  **what percent**  **of**

**consumers below**  **the target**  **efficacy level**  **would migrate**  **to the**  **higher efficacy**  **products. DOE** 

**then revised**  **inputs to**  **the national**  **impact analysis**  **(NIA) spreadsheet**  **models. (See**  **chapter 11**  **of**

**the technical**  **support document**  **(TSD) for**  **a description**  **of the**  **NIA spreadsheet**  **models.) With** 

**these modifications,**  **DOE calculated**  **the NES**  **and NPV**  **of each**  **non­regulatory alternative,**  **and**

**compared it**  **to that**  **of the**  **proposed standards.**  **The sections**  **below provide**  **more detail**  **on how** 

**the NIA**  **Spreadsheet Models**  **for general**  **service fluorescent**  **lamps (GSFL)**  **and incandescent** 

**reflector lamps**  **(IRL) were**  **modified for**  **these calculations.** 

17.2.1.1 G eneral S ervice Fluorescent Lamps

17.2.1.1.1 S cenarios A nalyzed

**Although D**  **OE considered**  **eight different**  **combinations of**  **base and**  **standards case** 

**scenarios for**  **the GSFL**  **NIA (see**  **TSD Chapter**  **10, Shipment**  **Analysis, for**  **a description**  **of each),** 

**DOE only**  **considered two**  **scenario combinations**  **when calculating**  **energy savings**  **and net** 

**present value**  **for the**  **RIA. Specifically,**  **DOE used**  **the Roll­up**  **scenario to**  **model consumer** 

**responses to**  **each of**  **the non­regulatory**  **alternatives considered.**  **The Roll­up**  **scenario represents** 

**a scenario**  **in which**  **only consumers**  **purchasing product**  **below the**  **target efficacy**  **level would**  **be**

**affected by**  **the regulatory**  **or non­regulatory**  **initiative. This**  **contrasts with**  **the Shift**  **scenario**

**(analyzed in**  **the NIA),**  **which assumes**  **that all**  **consumers, even**  **those who**  **in base­case**  **purchase**

**products with**  **efficacies higher**  **than the**  **baseline efficacy,**  **will shift**  **to even**  **higher efficacy** 

**product in**  **response to**  **amended energy**  **conservation standards.**  **Because the**  **non­regulatory**

**alternatives analyzed**  **in the**  **RIA are**  **directed towards**  **those consumers**  **that do**  **not already**  **use**

**energy efficient**  **products, DOE**  **determined that**  **the Roll­up**  **scenario would**  **best reflect**  **market**

**behavior. DOE**  **analyzed the**  **Roll­up scenario**  **in combination**  **with the**  **Existing Technologies** 

**base case**  **and the**  **High Lighting**  **Expertise standards**  **case scenario,**  **which represents**  **the upper** 

**DOE used**  **the same**  **time period**  **for NPV**  **in the**  **RIA as**  **it did**  **for the**  **NIA in**  **the notice**  **of proposed**  **rulemaking.**

**The longer**  **period for**  **operating cost**  **savings allows**  **the policy**  **impact analysis**  **to account**  **for the**  **operating cost** 

**savings benefits**  **for products**  **purchased through**  **the year**  **2042.**

**17­2 1** **bound energy**  **savings and**  **NPV, and**  **the Emerging**  **Technologies base**  **case and**  **the Market** 

**Segment­Based Lighting**  **Expertise standards­case**  **scenario, which**  **reflects the**  **lower bound.** 

17.2.1.1.2 M arket S hare Matrices

**Having s**  **elected a**  **scenario to**  **use for**  **modeling purposes,**  **DOE then**  **calculated the**  **market**

**penetration for**  **each lamp**  **type (e.g.,**  **4­foot T8**  **medium bipin)**  **and in**  **each market**  **segment (e.g.,** 

**lamp failure,**  **new construction,**  **retrofit) of**  **each non­regulatory**  **alternative as**  **a percentage**  **of the** 

**penetration forecast.**  **For example,**  **for the**  **consumer rebate**  **non­regulatory alternative,**  **DOE in** 

**the 2012**  **4­foot T8**  **medium bipin**  **High Expertise**  **market share**  **matrix for**  **new ballasts,**  **DOE**

**calculated that**  **25.5% of**  **standards case**  **penetration (i.e.,**  **100%) would**  **occur with**  **consumer**

**rebates. DOE**  **ran this**  **analysis for**  **each non­regulatory**  **alternative both**  **the aforementioned** 

**scenarios it**  **analyzed for**  **the RIA.** 

17.2.1.2 I ncandescent R eflector Lamps

17.2.1.2.1 S cenario

**A lthough**  **D OE**  **considered eight**  **different combinations**  **of base­case**  **and standards­case** 

**scenarios for**  **the IRL**  **NIA, DOE**  **only considered**  **two of**  **these scenario**  **combinations when** 

**calculating energy**  **savings for**  **the RIA.**  **DOE believed**  **that the**  **Roll­up, No**  **Product Substitution** 

**scenario best**  **reflected the**  **market under**  **each of**  **the non­regulatory**  **alternatives considered.**  **As**

**discussed earlier**  **with regard**  **to GSFL,**  **because these**  **non­regulatory alternatives**  **are directed** 

**towards those**  **consumers that**  **do not**  **already use**  **energy efficient**  **products, for**  **IRL, DOE** 

**determined that**  **the Roll­up**  **scenario would**  **best reflect**  **market behavior.** 

**Furthermore, D**  **OE believed**  **that a**  **scenario modeling**  **“No Product**  **Substitution” would** 

**best model**  **the market**  **for non­regulatory**  **alternatives. The**  **No Product**  **Substitution scenario** 

**does not**  **model any**  **additional shift**  **to non­regulated**  **reflector technologies,**  **such as**  **exempted**

**IRL or**  **reflector compact**  **fluorescent lamps.**  **The Product**  **Substitution scenario**  **(with models**  **a**

**movement to**  **these alternative**  **lamp types)**  **was developed**  **to model**  **consumers’ response**  **to the** 

**high first­cost**  **of standards­compliant**  **products that**  **would enter**  **the market**  **following an**  **imposed**

**standard. Because**  **mandatory standards**  **will not**  **be imposed**  **in a**  **non­regulatory alternative,** 

**consumers will**  **not encounter**  **this situation**  **and are**  **therefore unlikely**  **to shift**  **from IRL**  **to other** 

**lamp types**  **due to**  **voluntary initiatives.**  **Therefore, DOE**  **concluded that**  **the No**  **Product**

**Substitution scenario**  **was the**  **most appropriate**  **to model**  **a voluntary**  **energy program.** 

**Based o**  **n these**  **two points,**  **DOE determined**  **that the**  **Roll­up, No**  **Product Substitution** 

**scenario paired**  **with both**  **the Existing**  **Technologies and**  **Emerging Technologies**  **base­case**

**shipment scenarios**  **would best**  **reflect market**  **behavior and**  **used only**  **these scenarios**  **to calculate** 

**NES and**  **NPV for**  **the RIA**  **analysis.**

17.2.1.2.2 M arket S hare Matrices

**17­3 Having**  **selected a**  **scenario to**  **use for**  **modeling purposes,**  **DOE then**  **calculated the**  **market**

**penetration of**  **each non­regulatory**  **alternative. DOE**  **used these**  **market penetration**  **percentages**

**to modify**  **the market**  **share matrices.**  **DOE assumed**  **that the**  **market penetration**  **represented the** 

**percent of**  **consumers that**  **would migrate**  **from the**  **lamp they**  **would have**  **bought in**  **the base**  **case**

**to the**  **lamp at**  **a higher**  **efficacy level.**  **Table 17.2.1**  **demonstrates this**  **modification in**  **more**

**detail. Table**  **17.2.1 shows**  **the market**  **share matrix**  **for IRL**  **in the**  **roll­up no**  **product substitution** 

**scenario. It**  **also shows**  **the same**  **market share**  **matrix, adjusted**  **to reflect**  **the government** 

**purchase alternative.** 

Table 1 7.2.1 Market Share Matrix for PAR38 90W in the Commercial Sector for Roll­Up,

No Product Substitution Scenario for Proposed Standards

**EL Lamp**  **T ype**  **Base C**  **ase TSL**  **4 Bulk**  **G overnment** 

**Purchase**

**2011 2**  **042 2**  **013 2**  **042 2**  **013 2**  **042**

**0 Halogen**  **7 7%**  **4 5%**  **0 %**  **0 %**  **58% 35%** 

**1 Improved**  **H alogen**  **(Xenon) 0%**  **0 %**  **0 %**  **0 %**  **0% 0%** 

**2 Long**  **L ife**  **HIR 5%**  **1 3%**  **0 %**  **0 %**  **4% 10%** 

**2 Improved**  **H alogen**  **(Silver) 3%**  **5 %**  **0 %**  **0 %**  **2% 4%** 

**3 HIR**  **1 0%**  **2 5%**  **0 %**  **0 %**  **8% 19%** 

**4 Improved**  **H IR**  **5% 1**  **3% 1**  **00% 1**  **00% 58%**  **35%**

**5 Improved**  **H IR**  **Plus 0%**  **0 %**  **0 %**  **0 %**  **0% 0%** 

**As seen**  **in the**  **tables, consumers**  **that do**  **not migrate**  **to higher**  **efficiencies remain**  **at their** 

**existing efficiency**  **level. Similar**  **modifications were**  **made to**  **the market**  **share matrices**  **for other** 

**baselines for**  **each of**  **the non­regulatory**  **alternatives.**

17.2.2 P olicy A ssumptions

**DOE c**  **alculated the**  **impact of**  **non­regulatory alternatives**  **from the**  **effective date**  **for**

**proposed efficiency**  **standards, 2012,**  **through the**  **end of**  **the analysis**  **period, 2042.**  **In some** 

**scenarios, increases**  **on product**  **prices are**  **partially mitigated**  **by government**  **rebates or**  **tax**

**credits. DOE**  **assumed that**  **credits and**  **rebates would**  **be paid**  **for by**  **consumers in**  **another form** 

**(such as**  **additional taxes),**  **and therefore**  **did not**  **include them**  **as a**  **benefit for**  **the purposes**  **of**

**calculating the**  **national NPV.**  **DOE did**  **not consider**  **administrative costs**  **for any**  **of the**  **non**

**regulatory policies**  **in its**  **analysis. Inclusion**  **of such**  **costs would**  **decrease the**  **NPV by**  **a small** 

**amount.**

17.2.3 I nteraction o f Non­Regulatory Alternatives

**DOE c**  **alculated the**  **impacts of**  **each regulatory**  **policy separately**  **from those**  **of the**  **other**

**policies. In**  **practice, certain**  **alternatives are**  **often most**  **effective when**  **implemented**

**simultaneously with**  **other incentives.**  **DOE attempted**  **to make**  **conservative assumptions**  **to**

**avoid double­counting**  **policy impacts.**  **Therefore, the**  **impacts of**  **non­regulatory alternatives** 

**reported below**  **are not**  **additive. Furthermore,**  **the combined**  **impact of**  **several or**  **all of**  **the**

**policies may**  **not be**  **inferred by**  **adding the**  **results together.** 

**17­4**17.3 NON­REGULATORY A LTERNATIVES

**The i**  **mpact of**  **a non­regulatory**  **alternative is**  **strongly influenced**  **by the**  **rate of**  **consumer**

**participation and**  **is therefore**  **less certain**  **than the**  **impact of**  **the proposed**  **standards, which** 

**require mandatory**  **compliance. To**  **determine market**  **penetration rates,**  **DOE conducted**  **a**

**literature review**  **of each**  **non­regulatory alternative**  **and consulted**  **with key**  **experts to**  **gather**

**information on**  **similar incentive**  **programs that**  **have been**  **implemented in**  **the U.S.**  **By studying** 

**actual results**  **of these**  **programs, DOE**  **sought to**  **make credible**  **assumptions of**  **their potential** 

**market impacts.**  **This section**  **summarizes DOE’s**  **conclusions from**  **this research**  **as they**  **apply to** 

**each non­regulatory**  **alternative.**

17.3.1 N o N ew Regulatory Action

**The c**  **ase in**  **which no**  **new regulatory**  **action is**  **taken with**  **regard to**  **lighting efficiency** 

**constitutes the**  **base case**  **scenario described**  **in chapter**  **11 of**  **the TSD.**  **This case**  **defines the**  **basis**

**of comparison**  **for all**  **other scenarios.**  **By definition,**  **no new**  **regulatory action**  **yields zero**  **energy**

**savings and**  **a net**  **present value**  **of zero**  **dollars.**

17.3.2 C onsumer R ebates

**Consumer r**  **ebates cover**  **a portion**  **of the**  **difference in**  **incremental product**  **price between** 

**products meeting**  **baseline efficiency**  **levels and**  **those meeting**  **higher efficiency**  **levels, resulting** 

**in a**  **higher percentage**  **of consumers**  **purchasing more­efficient**  **models. For**  **GSFL, DOE** 

**estimated the**  **impact of**  **improving the**  **simple payback**  **through a**  **rebate that**  **paid 70**  **percent of** 

**the incremental**  **product price.**  **DOE based**  **the 70­percent**  **rebate on**  **existing utility**  **rebate**

**programs for**  **replacing a**  **T12 lamp**  **with a**  **T8 lamp**  **or upgrading**  **an existing**  **T8 lamp**  **to a**  **more**

**efficacious T8**  **lamp. DOE**  **studied each**  **program and**  **found that**  **the average**  **rebate amounted**  **to**

**about 70**  **percent of**  **the incremental**  **product price.**  **DOE assumed**  **that the**  **consumer rebate** 

**policy would**  **cover the**  **incremental equipment**  **costs for**  **IRL by**  **the same**  **percentage. DOE**  **then**

**used a**  **market penetration**  **curve, which**  **estimates percent**  **market adoption**  **of a**  **technology as**  **a**

**function of**  **technology simple**  **payback. DOE**  **calculated the**  **payback for**  **each product**  **with and** 

**without the**  **rebate to**  **project the**  **increased market**  **penetration of**  **the product**  **due to**  **a rebate** 

**program.**

**DOE f**  **irst calculated**  **the simple**  **payback for**  **each design**  **option with**  **an efficiency** 

**meeting the**  **target efficiency**  **level relative**  **to the**  **base case**  **design with**  **no rebate**  **(see chapter**  **8**

**of the**  **TSD for**  **details on**  **lamp product**  **classes). It**  **then calculated**  **another simple**  **payback for** 

**each product**  **class meeting**  **the target**  **efficiency level,**  **with a**  **rebate reducing**  **its incremental** 

**product price,**  **relative to**  **the base**  **case. Because**  **of the**  **incremental cost**  **reduction due**  **to the** 

**rebate, the**  **payback (in**  **years) for**  **the rebate**  **product is**  **shorter.**

**17­5 DOE**  **then used**  **market penetration**  **curves i**  **to estimate**  **the increased**  **percentage of** 

**consumers who**  **would purchase**  **units that**  **meet the**  **target efficiency**  **levels if**  **given a**  **rebate**

**incentive. Figure**  **17.3.1 and**  **Figure 17.3.2**  **show the**  **market penetration**  **curves used**  **in this** 

**analysis.**

Figure 1 7.3.1 Commercial Market Penetration Curve as a Function of Simple PBP

0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%MarketPenetration

0 2 4 6 8 10

PBP

**17­6**Figure 17.3.2 Residential Market Penetration Curve as a Function of Simple PBP

0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%MarketPenetration

0 2 4 6 8 10

PBP

**For GSFL,**  **DOE considered**  **how three**  **different lamp**  **purchase events**  **might be**  **affected**

**by consumer**  **rebates: lamp**  **failure, standards**  **induced retrofit,**  **and ballast**  **failure (or**  **new**

**construction). Using**  **the curves**  **above, DOE**  **calculated the**  **market penetration**  **for all**  **\ analyzed** 

**lamp types.**  **Table 17.3.1**  **shows the**  **calculated market**  **penetration for**  **each GSFL**  **lamp type**  **and**

**lamp purchase**  **event.**

Table 1 7.3.1 Market Penetration Due to Consumer Rebates for GSFL Product Classes

Lamp System Sector P urchase E vent Market

P enetration

**4­foot T**  **12 MBP**  **Residential L**  **amp F**  **ailure 0%** 

**4 ­foot**  **T 12**  **MBP Residential**  **B allast**  **F ailure**  **91%**

**4 ­foot**  **T 12**  **MBP Residential**  **R etrofit**  **3 0%** 

**4 ­foot**  **T 8**  **MBP Residential**  **B allast**  **F ailure**  **33%**

**4 ­foot**  **T 12**  **MBP Commercial**  **L amp**  **F ailure**  **12%**

**4 ­foot**  **T 12**  **MBP Commercial**  **B allast**  **F ailure**  **16%**

**4 ­foot**  **T 12**  **MBP Commercial**  **S tandards­Induced**  **R etrofit**  **5%**

**4 ­foot**  **T 8**  **MBP Commercial**  **L amp**  **F ailure**  **0%**

**4 ­foot**  **T 8**  **MBP Commercial**  **B allast**  **F ailure**  **26%**

**8 ­foot**  **T 12**  **SP slimline**  **Commercial L**  **amp F**  **ailure 6%** 

**8 ­foot**  **T 12**  **SP slimline**  **Commercial B**  **allast F**  **ailure/ Standards­Induced**  **Retrofit 0%** 

**8 ­foot**  **T 8**  **SP slimline**  **Commercial L**  **amp F**  **ailure/Ballast Failure**  **0%**

**4 ­foot**  **T 5**  **MiniBP SO**  **Commercial L**  **amp F**  **ailure 0%** 

**4 ­foot**  **T 5**  **MiniBP SO**  **Commercial B**  **allast F**  **ailure 33%** 

**1 7­7** **8­foot T12**  **RDC HO**  **Industrial L**  **amp F**  **ailure/Ballast Failure**  **33%**

**8 ­foot**  **T 8**  **RDC HO**  **Industrial B**  **allast F**  **ailure 0%** 

**4 ­foot**  **T 5**  **MiniBP HO**  **Industrial L**  **amp F**  **ailure/Ballast Failure**  **0%**

**Similar to**  **GSFL, DOE**  **assumed that**  **the rebate**  **for IRL**  **products would**  **cover 70**  **percent**

**of the**  **incremental product**  **price. Table**  **17.3.2 shows**  **the market**  **penetration for**  **each product** 

**class and**  **baseline for**  **IRL.**

Table 1 7.3.2 Market Penetration Due to Consumer Rebates for IRL Product Classes

Baseline Lamp Sector M arket

P enetration

**90W P**  **AR38 Commercial**  **1 3%** 

**R esi**  **dential 4**  **1%**

**7 5W**  **P AR38**  **Commercial 1**  **3%**

**R esi**  **dential 4**  **3%**

**5 0W**  **P AR30**  **Commercial 3**  **2%**

**R esi**  **dential 6**  **0%**

**To estimate**  **the impacts**  **of this**  **rebate policy,**  **DOE applied**  **these market**  **share increases** 

**to the**  **market share**  **matrices of**  **the NIA**  **spreadsheet model.**  **DOE assumed**  **that the**  **impact of**  **this**

**policy would**  **be to**  **permanently transform**  **the market**  **so that**  **the increased**  **market penetration** 

**seen in**  **the first**  **year of**  **the program**  **would be**  **maintained throughout**  **the forecast**  **period. The** 

**resulting energy**  **savings are**  **shown in**  **section 17.4.2.** 

17.3.3 C onsumer T ax Credits

**Consumer t**  **ax credits**  **cover a**  **percentage of**  **the difference**  **in incremental**  **product price** 

**between products**  **meeting baseline**  **efficiency levels**  **and those**  **with higher**  **efficiencies.**

**Consumer tax**  **credits are**  **considered a**  **viable non­regulatory**  **market transformation**  **program, as** 

**shown by**  **the inclusion**  **of Federal**  **consumer tax**  **credits in**  **EPACT 2005**  **for various**  **residential**

**appliances.**

**DOE e**  **stimated that**  **for both**  **GSFL and**  **IRL, the**  **consumer participation**  **rate would**  **be**

**lower than**  **the rate**  **of participation**  **in consumer**  **rebates. Research**  **on tax**  **credits has**  **shown that** 

**the time**  **delay to**  **the consumer**  **in receiving**  **a reimbursement**  **through a**  **tax credit,**  **plus the**  **added**

**transaction costs**  **in tax­return**  **preparation, make**  **the tax**  **credit incentive**  **less effective**  **than a** 

**rebate received**  **at the**  **time of**  **purchase. Based**  **on previous**  **analysis ii** 

**, DOE**  **assumed that**  **only 60** 

**percent as**  **many consumers**  **would take**  **advantage of**  **the tax**  **credit as**  **would take**  **advantage of**  **a**

**rebate.**

**Using a**  **similar approach**  **as for**  **the rebate**  **policy, DOE**  **estimated that**  **the market**  **share of** 

**target efficiency**  **level lamp**  **products would**  **increase due**  **to consumer**  **tax credits**  **over the**  **base**

**case. For**  **both lamp**  **products, these**  **percentage market**  **penetrations are**  **60 percent**  **of the**  **market**

**penetrations estimated**  **for the**  **consumer rebate**  **policy (which**  **are shown**  **in Table**  **17.3.1 and** 

**Table 17.3.2).** 

**17­8 DOE**  **assumed that**  **the impact**  **of this**  **policy would**  **be to**  **permanently transform**  **the**

**market so**  **that the**  **increased market**  **penetration seen**  **in the**  **first year**  **of the**  **program would**  **be**

**maintained throughout**  **the forecast**  **period. Section**  **17.4.3 presents**  **the results**  **of the**  **analysis for** 

**the consumer**  **tax credit**  **policy.**

17.3.4 M anufacturer T ax Credits

**Manufacturer t**  **ax credits**  **are considered**  **a viable**  **non­regulatory market**  **transformation**

**program, as**  **shown by**  **the inclusion**  **of Federal**  **tax credits**  **in EPACT**  **2005 for**  **manufacturers of** 

**residential appliances.**  **Similar to**  **consumer tax**  **credits, manufacturer**  **tax credits**  **would**

**effectively result**  **in lower**  **product prices**  **for consumers**  **by an**  **amount that**  **covered part**  **of the** 

**incremental price**  **difference between**  **products meeting**  **baseline efficiency**  **levels and**  **those**

**meeting targeted**  **efficiency levels.** 

**DOE a**  **ssumed that**  **this incentive**  **policy would**  **help reimburse**  **manufacturers for** 

**retooling costs.**  **Because these**  **tax credits**  **would go**  **to manufacturers**  **instead of**  **consumers, DOE** 

**assumed that**  **manufacturers would**  **pass on**  **the reduced**  **costs. However,**  **because the**  **program**

**would not**  **be visible**  **to the**  **end­consumers, DOE**  **assumed that**  **half of**  **the consumers**  **assumed to** 

**take advantage**  **of consumer**  **tax credits**  **would purchase**  **more­efficient products**  **under a** 

**manufacturer tax**  **credit program.**  **iii Using**  **this information,**  **DOE calculated**  **the percentage**  **by**

**which market**  **penetration of**  **target efficient**  **level lamp**  **products would**  **increase due**  **to**

**manufacturer tax**  **credits over**  **the base**  **case.**

**DOE a**  **ssumed that**  **the impact**  **of this**  **policy would**  **be to**  **permanently transform**  **the**

**market so**  **that the**  **increased market**  **penetration seen**  **in the**  **first year**  **of the**  **program would**  **be**

**maintained throughout**  **the forecast**  **period. Section**  **17.4.4 below**  **presents the**  **results of**  **the**

**analysis for**  **the manufacturer**  **tax credit**  **policy.**

17.3.5 V oluntary E nergy­Efficiency Programs

**DOE e**  **stimated the**  **impact of**  **a voluntary**  **energy efficiency**  **program by**  **reviewing the** 

**historical and**  **projected market**  **transformation performance**  **of past**  **and current**  **ENERGY STAR** 

**programs. The**  **Environmental Protection**  **Agency (EPA)**  **introduced the**  **Green Lights**  **program in** 

**January of**  **1991. Green**  **Lights was**  **a voluntary**  **(non­regulatory) program**  **tasked with**  **a goal**  **of**

**reducing air**  **pollution by**  **promoting energy**  **efficient lighting.**  **Companies that**  **elected to** 

**participate installed**  **energy efficient**  **lighting where**  **it proved**  **to be**  **cost­effective (as**  **long as** 

**lighting quality**  **was not**  **diminished). In**  **return, the**  **EPA provided**  **technical assistance**  **and public** 

**recognition. In**  **a similar**  **effort, the**  **EPA launched**  **the ENERGY**  **STAR program**  **in 1992**  **as a** 

**voluntary labeling**  **program to**  **help consumers**  **identify the**  **most energy**  **efficient products**  **on the** 

**market. In**  **1996, Green**  **Lights became**  **a part**  **of the**  **ENERGY STAR**  **program iv** 

**.**

**In o**  **rder to**  **determine how**  **a lighting**  **market would**  **respond to**  **a voluntary**  **energy**

**program, DOE**  **analyzed the**  **success of**  **the Green**  **Lights program**  **in the**  **1990s. One**  **of the** 

**significant results**  **of the**  **Green Lights**  **program was**  **observed in**  **the fluorescent**  **ballast market.** 

**Electronic ballasts**  **are, on**  **average, more**  **efficient than**  **magnetic ballasts.**  **As such,**  **as a**  **result of** 

**17­9 the**  **Green Lights**  **initiative, electronic**  **ballasts began**  **to enter**  **the market**  **in increasing**  **numbers.**

**A study**  **that analyzed**  **the impact**  **of public**  **programs on**  **fluorescent ballast**  **shipments concluded** 

**that of**  **all the**  **electronic ballasts**  **shipped between**  **1986 and**  **2000, 61**  **percent were**  **due to**  **a public** 

**program v** 

**. DOE**  **used data**  **from the**  **US Census**  **to calculate**  **the percent**  **of the**  **market that**  **opted**

**to use**  **more efficient**  **ballasts as**  **a result**  **of a**  **voluntary program.**  **To do**  **this, DOE**  **calculated 61** 

**percent of**  **the electronic**  **ballast shipments**  **and divided**  **it by**  **the sum**  **of those**  **shipments plus**  **the**

**total magnetic**  **ballast shipments.**  **The 39**  **percent of**  **electronic ballasts**  **that did**  **not occur**  **as a** 

**result of**  **a public**  **program were**  **not included**  **in the**  **denominator, since**  **consumers who**  **bought**

**these ballasts**  **were considered**  **to already**  **be using**  **energy efficient**  **technologies. DOE**  **concluded**

**that 20%**  **of the**  **market would**  **shift to**  **more efficient**  **products as**  **a result**  **of a**  **voluntary energy** 

**efficiency program.**  **This percentage**  **was applied**  **across all**  **baselines and**  **efficiency levels.** 

**DOE a**  **ssumed that**  **the impact**  **of this**  **policy would**  **be to**  **permanently transform**  **the**

**market so**  **that the**  **increased market**  **penetration seen**  **in the**  **first year**  **of the**  **program would**  **be**

**maintained throughout**  **the forecast**  **period. Section**  **17.4.5 below**  **presents the**  **results of**  **the**

**analysis for**  **the voluntary**  **energy efficiency**  **program alternative.** 

17.3.6 E arly R eplacement

**The e**  **arly replacement**  **policy alternative**  **envisions a**  **program to**  **replace old,**  **inefficient**

**units with**  **models meeting**  **efficiency levels**  **higher than**  **baseline equipment.**  **DOE did**  **not model** 

**this scenario**  **because the**  **lifetime of**  **GSFL and**  **IRL is**  **very short**  **(the lifetime**  **of even**  **the highest** 

**efficacy IRL**  **lamp is**  **only 1.2**  **years), so**  **the savings**  **would not**  **be very**  **great. Early**  **replacement**

**policies are**  **generally beneficial**  **for products**  **with long**  **lifetimes (**  **e.g.**

**, washers**  **a nd**  **dryers,**

**furnaces) and**  **represent a**  **significant upfront**  **investment, neither**  **of which**  **apply to**  **GSFL and** 

**IRL.**

17.3.7 B ulk G overnment Purchases

**Under t**  **his policy**  **alternative, the**  **government sector**  **would be**  **encouraged to**  **shift its** 

**purchases to**  **lamps that**  **met the**  **target efficiency**  **levels. Aggregating**  **public sector**  **demand could** 

**provide a**  **market signal**  **to manufacturers**  **and vendors**  **that some**  **of their**  **largest customers**  **seek**

**suppliers with**  **products that**  **meet an**  **efficiency target**  **at competitive**  **prices. This**  **program could** 

**also induce**  **“market pull”**  **impacts through**  **the effects**  **of manufacturers**  **and vendors**  **achieving**

**economies of**  **scale for**  **high­efficiency products.**  **DOE assumed**  **that government**  **agencies, such** 

**as the**  **U.S. General**  **Services Administration**  **(GSA), would**  **administer such**  **a program.** 

**Similar t**  **o previous**  **analysis, DOE**  **used floor**  **space data**  **from CBECS**  **2003 vi**  **to derive**  **the**

**proportion of**  **government­owned floor**  **space to**  **total commercial**  **floor space**  **(including malls),** 

**which is**  **21.4 percent.**  **DOE assumed**  **that floor**  **space owned**  **equated to**  **lamp sales.**  **DOE then** 

**added a**  **1.4 percent**  **market­pull impact**  **to arrive**  **at a**  **conservative 22.8**  **percent market** 

**penetration rate.**  **vii This**  **percentage was**  **used for**  **both GSFL**  **and IRL,**  **and across**  **all TSLs.**  **Bulk**

**government purchases**  **will not**  **affect the**  **residential market.** 

**17­10 DOE**  **assumed that**  **the impact**  **of this**  **policy would**  **be to**  **permanently transform**  **the**

**market so**  **that the**  **increased market**  **penetration seen**  **in the**  **first year**  **of the**  **program would**  **be**

**maintained throughout**  **the forecast**  **period. Section**  **17.4.6 below**  **presents the**  **results of**  **the**

**analysis for**  **the bulk**  **government purchases**  **policy.**

17.4 R ESULTS S UMMARY FOR NON­REGULATORY ALTERNATIVES

**The NO**  **PR proposed**  **TSL 3**  **for GSFL**  **and TSL**  **4 for**  **IRL. Table**  **17.4.1 and**  **Table 17.4.2** 

**show the**  **NES and**  **NPV of**  **each of**  **the applicable**  **non­regulatory alternatives**  **at these**  **proposed**

**efficiency levels.**  **The case**  **in which**  **no regulatory**  **action is**  **taken constitutes**  **the base**  **case (or** 

**“No Action”)**  **scenario. Since**  **this is**  **the base**  **case, energy**  **savings and**  **NPV are**  **zero by** 

**definition. For**  **comparison, the**  **table includes**  **the impacts**  **of the**  **proposed energy**  **conservation**

**standards. The**  **tables display**  **the NPV**  **results based**  **on two**  **discount rates**  **(seven percent**  **and**

**three percent**  **real). Note**  **that the**  **tables do**  **not include**  **early replacement**  **as an**  **alternative. As** 

**discussed in**  **section 17.3.6,**  **DOE found**  **that this**  **alternative was**  **not applicable**  **to GSFL**  **or IRL.** 

Table 1 7.4.1 GSFL: NES and NPV of Non­Regulatory Alternatives Compared to the

Proposed Standards

Policy Alternatives 1 National Energy

Savings (quads) Net P resent Value (billion $2007)

7% D iscount Rate 3% D iscount Rate

**No N**  **ew Regulatory**  **Action 0**  **0 0** 

**Consumer R**  **ebates 1.33­1.74**  **1 .89­2.67**  **4 .57­6.58** 

**C onsumer**  **T ax**  **Credits 0.63­0.83**  **1 .09­1.33**  **2 .32­3.17** 

**M anufacturer**  **T ax**  **Credits 0.35­0.44**  **0 .68­0.70**  **1 .35­1.64** 

**V ol**  **untary E**  **nergy**

**Efficiency Programs**  **1.09­1.44 1**  **.50­2.10 3**  **.68­5.19**

**B ul**  **k G**  **overnment**

**Purchases 1.21­1.61**  **1 .66­2.36**  **4 .08­5.82** 

**P roposed**  **S tandards**  **2 3.15­7.12**  **3.11­7.39 8**  **.57­24.87**

**N ot**  **es:**

**1 NPV**  **discounted to**  **2007; Non­regulatory**  **alternatives encourage**  **purchases of**  **GSFL at**  **TSL 3.** 

Table 17.4.2 IRL: NES and NPV of Non­Regulatory Alternatives Compared to the

Proposed Standards

Policy Alternatives 1 National Energy

Savings (quads) Net P resent Value (billion $2007)

7% D iscount Rate 3% D iscount Rate

**No N**  **ew Regulatory**  **Action 0**  **0 0** 

**Consumer R**  **ebates 0.52­0.69**  **1 .52­1.89**  **3 .19­3.97** 

**C onsumer**  **T ax**  **Credits 0.32­0.42**  **0 .96­1.17**  **1 .97­2.44** 

**M anufacturer**  **T ax**  **Credits 0.16­0.21**  **0 .53­0.64**  **1 .05­1.28** 

**V ol**  **untary E**  **nergy**

**Efficiency Programs**  **0.26­0.45 0**  **.83­1.28 1**  **.65­2.59**

**B ul**  **k G**  **overnment**

**Purchases 0.04­0.24**  **0 .23­0.72**  **0 .32­1.33** 

**P roposed**  **S tandards**  **1.25­2.21 3**  **.72­6.00 7**  **.68­12.45**

**N ot**  **es:**

**1 NPV**  **discounted to**  **2007, Non­regulatory**  **alternatives encourage**  **purchases of**  **IRL at**  **TSL 4.** 

**17­11 The**  **results for**  **each scenario**  **are reported**  **at the**  **TSLs proposed**  **by DOE**  **in this** 

**rulemaking: TSL**  **3 for**  **GSFL, TSL**  **4 for**  **IRL. For**  **GSFL, the**  **range results**  **from the**  **effects of** 

**applying the**  **lighting expertise**  **scenario discussed**  **in section**  **V.E.4.b of**  **the NOPR.**  **The lower** 

**end of**  **the range**  **represents the**  **emerging technologies,**  **market segment**  **based lighting**  **expertise**

**scenario, whereas**  **the upper**  **end of**  **the range**  **represents the**  **existing technologies,**  **high lighting** 

**expertise scenario.**  **For IRL,**  **the range**  **of impacts**  **results from**  **the two**  **base­case shipment** 

**scenarios analyzed**  **in the**  **NIA. The**  **lower end**  **of the**  **range represents**  **the emerging**  **technologies**

**scenario, whereas**  **the upper**  **range represents**  **the existing**  **technologies scenario.** 

**None o**  **f the**  **non­regulatory alternatives**  **examined by**  **DOE would**  **save as**  **much energy**  **or**

**have an**  **NPV as**  **high as**  **the proposed**  **standards. Additionally,**  **several of**  **the alternatives**  **would**

**require new**  **legislation, such**  **as consumer**  **or manufacturer**  **tax credits,**  **since authority**  **to carry** 

**out these**  **alternatives does**  **not presently**  **exist. The**  **following section**  **reviews the**  **NES and**  **NPV**

**for each**  **non­regulatory alternative.** 

17.4.1 N o N ew Regulatory Action

**The c**  **ase in**  **which no**  **regulatory action**  **is taken**  **constitutes the**  **base case**  **(or “No**  **Action”)**

**scenario. Since**  **this is**  **the base**  **case, energy**  **savings and**  **NPV are**  **zero by**  **definition.**

17.4.2 C onsumer R ebates

**At t**  **he estimated**  **participation rates**  **for GSFL,**  **DOE calculated**  **that consumer**  **rebates**

**would provide**  **between 1.33**  **and 1.74**  **quads of**  **national energy**  **savings and**  **an NPV**  **between**

**$1.89 and**  **$2.67 billion**  **(at a**  **7­percent discount**  **rate). For**  **IRL, DOE**  **calculated that**  **consumer**

**rebates at**  **the estimated**  **participation rates**  **would provide**  **between 0.52**  **and 0.69**  **quads of** 

**national energy**  **savings and**  **an NPV**  **between $1.52**  **and $1.89**  **billion (at**  **a 7­percent**  **discount**

**rate). Although**  **DOE estimated**  **that consumer**  **rebates would**  **provide national**  **benefits for**  **GSFL**

**and IRL**  **products, these**  **benefits would**  **be smaller**  **than the**  **benefits resulting**  **from the**  **proposed**

**energy conservation**  **standards. Thus,**  **DOE rejected**  **consumer rebates**  **as a**  **policy alternative**  **to**

**energy conservation**  **standards.**

17.4.3 C onsumer T ax Credits

**For G**  **SFL, at**  **the estimated**  **participation rate,**  **consumer tax**  **credits would**  **provide**

**national energy**  **savings between**  **0.63 and**  **0.83 quads**  **and an**  **NPV between**  **$1.09 and**  **$1.33**

**billion (at**  **a 7­percent**  **discount rate).**  **At the**  **estimated participation**  **rates for**  **IRL, consumer**  **tax**

**credits would**  **provide between**  **0.32 and**  **0.42 quads**  **of national**  **energy savings**  **and an**  **NPV**

**between $0.96**  **and $1.17**  **billion (at**  **a 7­percent**  **discount rate).**  **DOE estimated**  **that while** 

**consumer tax**  **credits would**  **yield national**  **benefits for**  **GSFL and**  **IRL, these**  **benefits would**  **be**

**much smaller**  **than the**  **benefits from**  **the proposed**  **energy conservation**  **standards. Thus,**  **DOE**

**rejected consumer**  **tax credits**  **as a**  **policy alternative**  **to energy**  **conservation standards.** 

17.4.4 M anufacturer T ax Credits

**17­12 At**  **the estimated**  **participation rates**  **for GSFL,**  **DOE calculated**  **that manufacturer**  **tax**

**credits would**  **provide between**  **0.35 and**  **0.44 quads**  **of national**  **energy savings**  **and an**  **NPV**

**between $0.68**  **and $0.70**  **billion (at**  **a 7­percent**  **discount rate).**  **For IRL,**  **DOE estimated**  **national**

**energy savings**  **between 0.16**  **and 0.21**  **quads and**  **an NPV**  **between $0.53**  **and $0.64**  **billion (at**  **a**

**7­percent discount**  **rate) for**  **IRL. DOE**  **estimated that**  **while manufacturer**  **tax credits**  **would yield** 

**national benefits**  **for GSFL**  **and IRL,**  **these benefits**  **would be**  **much smaller**  **than the**  **benefits from** 

**the proposed**  **energy conservation**  **standards. Thus,**  **DOE rejected**  **manufacturer tax**  **credits as**  **a**

**policy alternative**  **to energy**  **conservation standards.** 

17.4.5 V oluntary E nergy­Efficiency Programs

**For G**  **SFL, DOE**  **estimated that**  **voluntary energy**  **efficiency targets**  **would provide** 

**between 1.09**  **and 1.44**  **quads of**  **national energy**  **savings and**  **an NPV**  **between $1.50**  **and $2.10** 

**billion (at**  **a 7­percent**  **discount rate).**  **For IRL,**  **DOE estimated**  **national energy**  **savings between** 

**0.26 a**  **nd 0**  **.45 quads**  **and an**  **NPV between**  **$0.83 and**  **$1.28 billion**  **(at a**  **7­percent discount**  **rate)**

**for IRL.**  **DOE estimated**  **that while**  **voluntary energy**  **efficiency targets**  **would yield**  **national**

**benefits for**  **GSFL and**  **IRL, these**  **benefits would**  **be much**  **smaller than**  **the benefits**  **from the** 

**proposed energy**  **conservation standards.**  **Thus, DOE**  **rejected voluntary**  **energy efficiency**  **targets**

**as a**  **policy alternative**  **to energy**  **conservation standards.** 

17.4.6 B ulk G overnment Purchases

**At t**  **he above**  **estimated participation**  **rates, the**  **bulk government**  **purchases scenario**  **would**

**provide between**  **1.21 and**  **1.61 quads**  **of national**  **energy savings**  **and an**  **NPV between**  **$1.66 and** 

**$2.36 billion**  **(at a**  **7­percent discount**  **rate) for**  **GSFL, and**  **between 0.04**  **and 0.24**  **quads of** 

**national energy**  **savings and**  **an NPV**  **between $0.23**  **and $0.72**  **billion (at**  **a 7­percent**  **discount**

**rate) for**  **IRL. DOE**  **estimated that**  **while bulk**  **government purchases**  **would yield**  **national**

**benefits for**  **GSFL and**  **IRL, these**  **benefits would**  **be much**  **smaller than**  **the benefits**  **from the** 

**proposed energy**  **conservation standards.**  **Thus, DOE**  **rejected voluntary**  **energy efficiency**  **targets**

**as a**  **policy alternative**  **to energy**  **conservation standards.** 

17.4.7 E nergy C onservation Standards

**DOE proposes**  **to adopt**  **the efficiency**  **levels listed**  **in section**  **VI.C of**  **the NOPR.**  **As**

**indicated in**  **the paragraphs**  **above, none**  **of the**  **alternatives DOE**  **examined would**  **save as**  **much**

**energy as**  **the proposed**  **energy conservation**  **standards. In**  **addition, several**  **of the**  **alternatives**

**would require**  **new enabling**  **legislation, such**  **as customer**  **tax credits,**  **since authority**  **to carry**  **out**

**those alternatives**  **does not**  **presently exist.** 

**17­13**REFERENCES

**i** Energy Savings Potential of Solid State Lighting in General Illumination Applications

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**Report. Prepared**  **by Navigant**  **Consulting Inc.**  **for Lighting**  **Research and**  **Development, Building** 

**Technologies Program,**  **Office of**  **Energy Efficiency**  **and Renewable**  **Energy. U.S.**  **Department of** 

**Energy. December**  **2006.**

**ii U.S.**  **Department o**  **f Energy.**  **Regulatory I**  **mpact Analysis**  **for Today’s**  **Energy Conservation** 

**Standards f**  **or Residential**  **Furnaces and**  **Boilers. September**  **2007. Available**  **at:**

**http://www1.e ere.energy.gov/buildings/appliance_standards/residential/pdfs/fb_fr_tsd/ria.pdf** 

**.**

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**Standards f**  **or Residential**  **Furnaces and**  **Boilers. September**  **2007. Available**  **at:**

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**iv Energy**  **Star. “Major**  **Milestones.” Last**  **viewed on**  **December 23,**  **2008. Available**  **at**

**http://www.energystar.gov/index.cfm?c=about.ab_milestones**

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**v Horowitz,**  **Marvin J.**  **“Economic Indicators**  **of Market**  **Transformation: Energy**  **Efficient**

**Lighting and**  **EPA's Green**  **Lights”,** Energy Journal

**, Vol.**  **22, No.**  **4, pp.**  **95­122**

**vi U.S.**  **Department o**  **f Energy.**  **Energy Information**  **Agency, Commercial**  **Building Energy** 

**Consumption Survey**  **(2003). Available**  **at:**

**http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/cbecs/cbecs2003/detailed_tables_2003/detailed_tables_2003.html**

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**vii U.S.**  **Department o**  **f Energy.**  **Regulatory I**  **mpact Analysis:**  **Energy Conservation**  **Standards for** 

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**17­14**