NO T R EC OM M EN DE D F OR F UL L- TEX T P UB LIC AT ION File Na me: 10a0479n.06 No. 08-5709 UN ITED STA TES C OU RT OF AP P EA LS F OR THE SI XT H C IR CU IT UNI TED STATES OF AMERI CA, Plaintiff-Appellee , v. WAYNE A. GOO DL OE, De fe nd ant- Ap pe lla

nt.

______________________________ ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ON APPEAL FROM THE UN I TE D ST AT ES D I STR I CT C O U R T F O R

T H E M ID D LE DI STRI CT OF TEN

NESSEE
OP IN ION

Be for e : C OLE, G ILM AN , a nd WH ITE, Ci r c uitJudg e s. HELE NE N. WHITE, Circuit Jud ge. Def endant Way

ne Goodloe a

ppeals the district c ourt order denying his motion for re duction of sentenc e, broug ht pursuant t o 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2) , based on the retroa ctive ame ndments to the cra ck-c ocaine sentenc ing guideline. We AF F IRM
. I. A. On August 8, 2002, pursuant to a plea ag ree ment, Goodloe plea d ed g uilty to one count of conspirac y

to distribute 50 gr ams or more o f cr ack c ocaine , in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1). The a g ree ment provided in per tinent part that the g overnme nt would move to dismiss the re maining counts of the indictment, the pa rties would jointly

rec ommend that Goodloe’s base offe nse level be
score d at 32 (which corr elated to 50- 150 g rams of cra ck under the g uideline in place at the time), the g overnme nt would rec ommend a three-leve l reduc tion for ac cepta nce of responsibility , the par

ties would reta in the rig ht to arg ue for and ag ainst application of the “ safe ty valve” exception to theNo. 08-5709

United States v. Goodloe

Whil e ar g u i n g t h e re quest at the sente ncing hear ing, G oodloe’s attorne y argued for

a 1 reduc tion to “one cr iminal hist ory point.” 2 mandatory

minimum sentenc e, and, by enter ing his plea, Goodloe would waive his r ight to appea l any sentenc e within the maxim um pr ovided by the g uidelines rang e associate d with the offe nse leve l de te rm ine d b y

the c ourt
. Th e pr e se nte nc e re po rt

(P SR) c a lc ulate d that Goo dlo e ha d fou r cr imi na l histo ry

po int s, a ll based upon va

rious juvenile offe nses, the last of whic h was drivingwithout a license a fter c urfe w. Th e fo ur c ri min a l hi sto ry

po int s p la c e d G oo dlo e in cr imi na l histo ry c a te g or y I I I . G oo dlo e ’s of

fe ns e level of 29 and criminal hi story cate g ory of I I I resulted in a guidelines sente ncing rang e of 108- 135 months. However , Goodloe wa s subject t o a 1 20-month statutory mandatory

minimum under 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)( A). Ac cording ly , the P SR calc ulated his “applica ble” guidelines rang e as 120 to 1 35 mon ths
. Go o d l o e o b

j ec t edt o re ce i v i n g a c ri m i n al h i s t o ry p o i n t for the driving- without-a-lice nse-a ftercur fe w o ff

ense, a rg uing that he was not sente nced to the minimum of 30 day s that U.S.S.G. § 4A1. 2 (c ) re q u ires in orde r to g ener ate a criminal history

point. Goodloe also reque sted a downwar d depar

ture fr om criminal history I I Ito ca t ego ry I , based upon, inte r a lia , h is j uv e nil e
c o n v i c t i o n s o v e r s t a t i n g t h e s e r i o u s n e s s o f h i s c r i m i n a l h i s t o r

y. 1 The district cour

t conducte d a sente ncing hear ing on O ctober 28, 2002. The c ourt reje cted Goodloe’s argument conce rning the point f or the drivers- license offe nse, observing that the g uid e lin e s c a lle d f

or a dd ingGo od loe ’s or ig ina l te rm of imp ri so nme nt to the a dd iti on a l pr iso n ti me he re cei v e d f

o r v io lati n g h is p r o b a ti o n , to ta li n g o v e r 3 0 d ay s . B u t th e d is tr ic t c o u rt a g r e e d thatNo. 08-5709

United States v. Goodloe

A d e fe nd ant m

us t have n o mo re tha

n o ne c ri min a l hi sto ry

po int to q ua lif y fo r t he sa fe ty 2 va lve . T he re le va

nt p ro vis ion

of the sa fe ty -v a lve statut e fo r p ur po se s o f t his a pp e a l is (f) L imit at i o n on applicability of statutory

minimum s in certa in case s.– Notwithstanding any other provision of law, in the ca se of a n offe nse under

section 401, 404, or 406 of the Controlled Substanc es Act (21 U .S.C. 841, 844, 846) . . . , the cour t s h all impose a sentenc e pursua nt to guidelines pr omulgated by the United States Sentencing Commi ssion under sec tion 994 of tit l e 2 8 wi t hout reg ard to a ny statutory minimum sentenc e, if the court finds at s entenc ing, after the Gover nment has bee n aff

orded the opportunity

to make a r ecommendation, that– (1) the de fenda

nt does not have more than 1 criminal history point, as deter mined under the sentenc ing guidelines[.] 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f)(1) (bold remove d). 3 Goodloe’s c riminal history points over-re prese nted the likelihood that he would commit future
cr i m es , an d

“d ep ar t [ ed ] d o wn t o a c ri m i n al h i s t o ry ca t ego ry o f o n e, [ co rr el at i n g t o a] gu i d el i n e r an ge [of] 87 to 108 [ months] .” Howeve r, t he court found t hat not withstanding this departure, it wa s not perm itte d to r e c a lc u late G o o d lo e ’ s c r im in a l h is to r y p o in ts , an d th e r e f

o r e G o o d lo e s ti ll had four points and was not elig ible for a safe ty -valve reduc tion. The court conclude d that the mandator y 2 minimum 120-month sentence applied, noted that “ under the g uidelines the statutory mandatory minimum sentenc e become s the g uideline rang e,” and sentenc ed Goodloe to 120 months in prison. Ne ith e r p art

y ra ise d a dd iti on a l ob

je c tio ns . B. On Fe bruar

y 22, 2008, Goodloe filed a pro se mot ion fo r r e se nte nc ingpurs ua

nt t o 1 8 U .S. C. § 3582(c) (2). The district c ourt appointed counsel. Throug h counsel, Goodloe argued that the cr ackcoca i n e am endments lower ed his sentenc ing r ang e, trig g eringthe cour t’s authority

to resente nce
un de r § 35 82 ; th a t Un ite d S tates v . Cl

ar k , 110 F.3d 15 (6th Cir. 1997), dictates that he rec eive theNo. 08-5709

United States v. Goodloe

Be caus e a conclusion that Goodloe is not entitled to resente ncing would prec lude a r e- 3 evaluation of his criminal history score and/or e ligibility

for the sa fety -valve reduc tion, it appears that th is p or

tio n o f t he dis tr ic t c ourt ’s op ini on is, fu nc tio na lly a t le a st, an a lte rn a tiv e ana ly sis
. 4 benef it of any g uideline amendments pa ssed subsequent to his orig inal sentenc e, including the nonretroac t i v e chang e in the guidelines conc erningcounting prior off enses not sepa

rate d by an interveningarr es t, which he maintaine d would now score three of his previous off enses a s
wa rr an t i n g a

s i n g l e c r i m i n a l h i s t o r

y p o i n t ; an d

th a th i s r e m a i n i n g p r i o r o f f e n s e ( t h e n o -l ic e ns e offe nse) should not rec eive a criminal hi story point for the same reasons he had arg ued at his origina l
se nte nc inghe ari ng . A c c or din g ly , G oo dlo e argue d, he ha d only on e c ri min a l hi sto ry po int and wo uld be e lig ibl e fo r t

he sa fe ty va lve up on

re se nte nc ingun de r t

he a me nd e d c ra c k guid e lin e s. The district cour

t denied Goodloe’ s motion, finding that it was not authorized to reduc e Goodlo e’ s o rginal sentenc e pursua nt to § 3582(c)( 2) bec ause G oodloe’s 120-month mandatory minimum sentenc e wa s not affe cted by the amendment to the cra ck sente ncing g uidelines. The c ourt went on to ana ly

ze G oodloe’s qualification f or the safe ty valve. I t r ejec ted Goodloe’s a rg ument that 3 he should not rec eive a

point for the no-lice nse offe nse, reiter ating its e arlier conclusion that the 40 additional day s in prison that Goodloe rec eived f or violating probation counte d. Be cause counting this criminal history

point meant that Goodloe had at l east two a nd thus would not qualify for the saf e ty v a lv e , th e c o u rt d id n o t e v a lu a te th e p arti e s ’ ar g u me n ts c o n c e r n in g th e thr e e o f

f e n ses (a nd three points) potentially

aff ecte d by the interve ning- arr est g uideline cha ng e. C. Goodloe timely

appea led. The g overnme nt filed a motion to dismiss , arguing that Goodloe’s challeng e of the d istrict court’s orig inal conclusion at sente ncing that he had too many criminalNo. 08-5709

United States v. Goodloe

5 history points to be eligible f

or the s af et y v al v e v iolated the ter ms of his plea ag ree ment. The g overnme nt argued tha t b y not challeng ing G oodloe’s § 3582 motion in the district court, it had alre ady g iven him a “bite at the a pple” that it was not oblig ated to provide under the terms of the ple a ag ree ment, but it wished t o avoid devoting t ime and re source s to the “appe al of a deter mination that [Go od loe ] wa s n ot e nti tle d to in the fi rs t pla c e .” Go od loe re sp on de d th a t th e wa ive r c ov e re d a pp e a ls, bu t no t § 3 58 2 mo tio ns . O n M a rc h 6 , 200 9, a

pa ne l of thi s c ourt re fe rr e d th e mot ion

to t he me ri ts panel, noting that “[i] t is unclear w hether the appe llate-wa iver p ro v i s ion in the defe ndant’s plea ag ree ment encompa ssed a § 3582(c) (2) motion and, thus, w hether the defe ndant knowing ly waived his right to file suc h a mot ion, g iven t he lack of a specific ref ere nce to such a moti on in the appellate

waiver provision. I t does not appea r t hat t he court has eve r direc tly addre ssed this issue.” United S ta te s v . G o odloe , No
. 0 8 -5709 (6th Cir. Mar. 3, 2009) (orde r re fer ring motion to di smiss t o the merits panel)
. II. T h e go v ern m en t ’s m o t i o n t o d i s m i s s t h e ap p ea l i s b as edu p o nt h e f o l l o wi n g wa i v er

l an gu age in t he ple a a g re e me nt: 16
. . . . [T]he de fe nd ant k no wi ng ly wa ive s th e ri g ht t o a

pp e a l any sente nc e wi thi n the maxim um provided in the offe nse level as deter mined by the court or the manner in which that sentenc e wa s deter mined on the grounds set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3742 or on any gro u n d wh ateve r, in exchang e for the conc essions made by the United States in this plea ag ree ment. Such waiver does not a pply , howeve r, t o cl ai m s of pr os e c uto ri a l mi sc on du c t, i ne ff e c tiv e a ssi sta

nc e of c ouns e l, o r i f t

he Court de pa rt s upwar d. 18. The de fenda

nt also knowing ly

waives the rig ht to challeng e the se n tence imposed and the manne r in which it was det er m i n ed in any collater al attac k,No. 08-5709

United States v. Goodloe

6 including, but not limited to, a mot ion broug ht pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255, except fo r c la ims of

ine ff e c tiv e a ssi sta

nc e of c ouns e l or

pr os e c uto ri a l mi sc on du c t. The wa iver doe s not mention § 3582 mot ions. Any ambig uity in plea- ag ree ment lang uag e is construed a g ainst the g overnme nt. See U nited Sta te s v . H arris , 473 F.3d 222, 225 (6th Cir. 2006). Althoug h Goodloe did waive the rig ht to appeal or collate rally

attack the sentenc e imposed, a § 3582 motion is not an attack on the orig inal sentenc e. See U nited States v. Cooley , 590 F.3d 293, 297 ( 5th Cir. 2009) (per curiam) (“§ 3582( c)( 2) motions do not contest but rather

bring to the court’s attenti o n chang es in the g uidelines that allow for a
se nte nc e re du c tio n. ” ); id
. (“ I n d ee d , the def endant c ould not contest the district court’s or igina l sente n c e o f im

p r is o n me n t thr o u g h § 3 5 8 2 ( c ) ( 2 ) p r o c e e d in g s b e c a u s e § 3 5 8 2 ( c ) ( 2 ) p r o v ide s no
avenue throug h which to attac k the orig inal sentenc e.”) (some quotation marks omitted). Se e als o United States v. W

oods , 5 81 F .3 d 5 31 , 5 36 (7 th C ir . 2 00 9) ; United States v. Leniear , 574 F.3d 668, 67 2 & n. 3 ( 9th

Cir . 2 00 9) ; Un ite d S

tates v . Ch av e

z- Sa lai s , 337 F.3d 1170, 1174 ( 10th Cir. 2003); United States v. Strachan , 319 F. App’x
. 774, 776 (11th Cir. 2009) (unpublished); United States v. Isaacs , 301 F. App’ x 183, 185 (3d Cir. 2008) (unpublished) (noting that appellant who was ba rre d by appellate waiver

was fr ee to f

ile a § 3582 motion). Thus, beca use the wa iver is at best ambiguous
a s to the § 3 58 2 mo tio n, we de ny the g ov e rnme nt’ s mo tio n to dis mis s.

III
. Although G oodloe fra

mes his appea l as an attack on the district court’s c riminal history score de ter min a tio n, tw o p re lim ina ry de te rm inatio ns on

wh ic h h is a

rgume nt r e sts ob viate the ne e d to addre ss Goodloe’s stated claim. First, bec ause G oodloe is subject to a ten- y ear statutory minimumNo. 08-5709

United States v. Goodloe

7 se nte nc e , a

nd the re fo re the re tr oa c tiv e c ra c k ame ndme nts do no t ha ve the e ff e c t of re du c inghis
s en t en ci ng g uidelines rang e, he is not elig ible for r esente ncing under § 3582. Sec ond, assuming arguendo that Goodloe is e ntitled to resentenc ing, the district court could not have proper ly applied Am e ndme nt 7 09 to r e c a lc ulate his c ri min a l hi sto ry po int s b e c a

us e it i s n ot a

mon g tho se a me ndme nts C o n g r e s s d i r e c t s s h o u l d

b e a p p l i e d r e t r o a c t i v e l y.

A. A district court’s de cision to gra n t or deny a § 3582 motion is reviewe d for a buse of discretion. See U

nited States v. Pev eler , 359 F.3d 369, 373 (6th Cir. 2004) . Howeve r, “[w]here, a s here , the district court doe s not simpl y decline to use its authority under § 3 5 82(c) (2) but instead rules that it ha s no authority to r educe the defe ndant’s sentenc e under the statute, the district cour t’s
c on c lus ion

that th e de fe nd ant i s in e lig ibl e fo r a se nte nc e re du c tio n i s a qu e sti on of law that is revie wed de novo.” United States v. J ohnson , 569 F.3d 619, 623 ( 6th Cir. 2009). A district court may

modify a def endant’ s sentence only

“as p ro vided by

statute.” United States v. W

ashington , 5 84 F .3 d 6 93 , 6 96 (6 th C ir . 200 9) . T he re le va nt s tatut e he re , 1 8 U .S. C. § 3582(c) (2), pr ovides that a sentencing court “may not modify a term of imprisonment once it has been imposed” except (2) in th e c a s e o f

a d e f e n d an t wh o h a s b e e ns e n te n c e d to a te r m o f im p r isonment based on a sentenc ing range that has subsequently been low ered by the Sente ncing Commission pursuant

to 28 U.S.C. 994(

o) , upon mot i o n o f t h e defenda nt or the Direc tor of the B urea

u of P ri s o n s , or on its own motion, the court may reduc e the term of imprisonment, a fter considering the fac tors set forth in se ction 3553(a) to the extent that they

are applicable , if suc h a reduction is consistent with appl icable policy statements issued by the Se ntencing Commission
. (empha sis added).No. 08-5709

United States v. Goodloe

The curr ent version of § 1B1.10( a) be came eff ective Ma rch 3, 2008, be fore the district court 4 ruled on Goodloe ’s § 3582 motion. See J ohnson , 564 F.3d at 422. 8 I n U.S.S.G. § 1B1.10, the S entenc ing Comm ission identified the amendments that may be applied re troac tively

throug h § 3582(c) (2), a

nd explained the “limited nature” of § 3582 relief
. See United States v. J

ohnson , 5 64 F .3 d 4 19 , 4 22 (6 th C ir . 2 00 9) . U .S. S.G . § 1B 1. 10 pr ov ide s: (1) I n G e ne ra l.–

I n a c a se in whic h a

de fe nd ant i s se rv inga

te rm of imp ri so nme nt, and the guideline ra

ng e applica

ble to that defe ndant has subsequently been lowe red as a r esult of an amendment to the Guidelines Manual listed in subsection (c) be low, the c ourt may re du c e the de fe nd ant’ s te rm of imp ri so nme nt as pr ov ide d by 18 U. S.C. § 3582(c) (2). As r equire d b y 1 8 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2) , any such re duction in the de fe nd ant’ s te rm

of imp ri so nme nt s ha ll b e c on sis te nt w iththi s p oli c y state me nt. (2) Exclusions.– A reduction in the def endant’ s t er m o f i mprisonment is not c on sis te nt wi th thi s po lic y state me nt and the re fo re is no t a uth or ize d un de r 1 8 U .S. C. § 3582(c) (2) if– (A ) N on e of

the a me ndme nts lis te d in su bs e c tio n (c ) i s a

pp lic a ble to the def endant; or (B ) An amendme nt listed in subse ction ( c) does not have the effec t of lowering the defendant’s applicable guideline range
. U. S.S. G. § 1 B 1. 10 (a ) ( e mphasis a dd e d)
. Th e Ap pli c a tio n N ote to t his se c tio n e xpla ins that a 4 retroa ctive ame ndment does n o t have the eff ect of loweringthe def

endant’ s applicable g uidelines rang e wher e the defe ndant’s orig inal sentenc e was dictated by a statutory

minimum . Section 1B1.10
c mt. n. 1Astate s: 1. Application of Subsection (a ). (A) E ligibility .– Eligibility for c onsideration under 18 U .S.C. 3582(c)(2) is trigg ere d only by an ame ndment listed in subsection ( c) t h at l ower s the applica ble g uideline rang e. Ac cording ly , a re duction in the defe ndant’s t erm of imprisonment is not authorized under 1 8 U.S .C. 3582(c)( 2) and is not consistent with this poli cy statement if: (i) None of the amendments listed in subsection (c) is applicable to the defe ndant; or (ii) an amendment listed in subsection (c) is applica ble to the def

endantNo. 08-5709

United States v. Goodloe

9 bu t th e a me ndme nt d oe s n ot have the e ff e c t of low e ri ngthe de fe nd ant’ s a pp lic a ble g uideline ra

ng e bec ause of

the operation of

another g uideline or statutory

provision (e.g ., a statutory

mandatory

minimum term of imprisonment). (bold remove d). Amendment 706, the “ cra ck ame ndment,” is the re troac tive amendment on which Goodloe’ s
c la im f o r a § 3 5 8 2 r e d

u c t i o n i s b a s e d
. T h e a m e n dm e n t i s i n c l u d e d i n t h e l i s t o f a m e n dm e nts in U. S.S. G. § 1 B 1. 10 (c ), and “ ha s th e e ff

e c t of re du c ingby

tw o le ve ls the ba se of

fe ns e le ve l f

or mos t
coca ine-ba se [crac k] offenses.” Johnson , 569 F.3d at 624. The key inquiry here is whether the cra ck amendment ha s the eff

ect of loweringGoodloe’s “sente ncing rang e” a s require d by § 3582(c) (2). I t do e s n ot. T h e d i s t r i c tc o u rti n i t i a l l y c a l c u l a t e d

G o o d l o e ’ s s e n t e n c i n g r an g e a s 1 0 8

- 1 3 5 m o n t h s . If Goodloe’s offense level is lowere d by two pursuant to t he ame ndment, his rang e bec omes 87-108 months. However , the “a pplicable r ang e” that m u s t b e l o wered by the amendme nt is the actual
se nte nc ing ra

ng e that re su lts fr om a

pp lic a tio n of a ll the re le va nt g uid e lin e s and

statut or y min imums. Se e ge ne ra lly Johnson , 5 64 F .3 d at 423. Th e ten -ye ar s tatut or y min imum of

21 U. S.C. § 8 4 1 (b )( 1 )( A) wa s i np l ac e a tt h e t i m e o f G o o d l o e’ s i n i t i al s en t en ci n g, m ak i n g h i s re l ev an tra n ge 120-135 months. Be cause this same mandatory minimum would have c ontrolled his resente ncing
as well, his releva

nt “ra ng e” on r esente ncing would have be en 120 months. See id. ( holding that wher e the mandatory

m i n i m u m s en tence exceeds the guidelines rang e, it repla ces the g uidelines rang e). G ood l o e ar gu es that the movement fr om 120-135 months to 120 mont hs is a qualifying
re du c tio n in ra

ng e . Ho we ve r, wh e re the de fe nd ant wa s initi a lly se nte nc e d to the statut or y min imum, courts have not embra ced this i nterpre tation. See id. at 421-23 (de fenda nt “was not in fa ct sentenc edNo. 08-5709

United States v. Goodloe

I n light of G oodloe’s ar g ument that technica lly , he fac ed a lower rang e in any

chang e fr om 5 12 0- 13 5 mo nth s to 1 20 -12 0 mo nths, it i s w or th p oin tin g ou t th a t, d e sp ite his ini tia l “ a pp lic a ble rang e,” G oodloe neve r ac tually fac ed a r isk of a sente nce hig her tha n 120 months. The district court de pa rt e d d ow nw ard

a t se nte nc ing , c a lc ulatin g Go od loe ’s g uid e lin e ra ng e a s 8 7- 10 8 mo nth s. Goodloe re ceive d a sente nce a s high a s 120 months only beca use it was re quired by

statute. 10 based on a Guidelines rang e that was subseque ntly reduc ed” where the statutory minimum was 240 months, his i nitial g uidelines rang e wa s 240-293 months, and his amended r ang e would have been 188-235 months b u t fo r t h e statutory minimum , making the minimum of defenda nt’s rang e 240
mon ths ); see also United States v . Robinson , 353 F. App’x 941, 942 (5th Cir. 2009) (unpublished per c uriam) ( aff

irming district c ourt’s denia l without not i n g d ef en d ant’s initial rang e, base d upon fa c t that de fe nd ant ha d re c e ive d the statut or y min imum and

wa s st ill su

bje c t to it) ; United States v. Parker , 358 F. App’ x 632, 634 (6th Cir. 2009) (unpublished per c uriam) ( defe ndant not sentenc ed based upon a

g uidelines rang e that has been subsequently lowere d wher e “his sentenc e wa s instead based on the mandatory

minimum imposed by 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)( A), whic h rema ins unchang ed by Amendment 706.”) ; U.S.S.G. § 1B1.10(a) cmt. n . 1 A (r eduction not authorized if a r etroa ctive amendment “ is applicable to the defe ndant but the amendment does not ha ve the eff ect of lowering the def endant’ s applicable g uideline ra ng e bec ause of

the oper ation o f
. . . a statutory mandatory minimum term of imprisonment[] .”) 5 B. Goodloe see ks to avoid application of the statut o ry m an datory minimum on rese ntencing throug h the safe ty

valve, whic h is available to a defe ndant with only one criminal history point. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f)(1) , su

pra note 2. At Goodloe’ s orig inal sentencing , the cour t assessed f

our cr iminal history points, three o f whi ch re sulted from re lated drugtransac tions. Goodloe asserts thatNo. 08-5709

United States v. Goodloe

11 application of the 2007 amendments to U.S.S.G. § 4A1.2(a) would result in these thre e points being
re du c e d to on e , a

nd argue s th a t Un ite d Sta te

s v . Clar k , 110 F.3d 15 ( 6th Cir. 1997), mandates that he be re se nte nc e d u

nd e r t he g uid e lin e s a s th e y

e xiste d at the tim e of

re se nte nc ing . H ow e ve r, be c a us e the g uidelines expressly

prec lude application of the subsequent amendments to U .S.S.G. § 4A1.2(a), Goodloe’s a

rg ument fails. The g uidelines make clea r that a rese ntencing under § 3582 is not a full resente ncing . The
re le va nt p or tio ns of U. S.S. G. § 1 B 1. 10 state : (a) Authority .– (3) L imitation.– C onsistent w it h s u b s e c ti o n ( b ), procee dings under 18 U. S. C. 3 58 2(

c ) ( 2) an d th is p oli c

ysta te me nt d

o not c on sti tute a fu ll re se nte nc ing

of t hede fe nd an t. (b) De termination of Reduc tion in Term of I mprisonment.– (1) In Gene ral.– In deter mining wh ether , and to what e x tent, a re du c tio n in

the de fe nd ant’ s ter m of

imp ri so nme nt u

nd e r 1 8 U .S. C. 35 82 (c)(2 ) and

thi s p oli c y

state me nt i s w arr ante d, the c ourt sh a ll deter mine the amende d g uideline ra n ge that would have be en applicable to the defe ndant if the amendment(s) to the guidelines listed in subsection (c) ha d been in e ffe ct at the time the defendant was s en t ence d. I n making such dete rmination, thec ou rt s ha ll substitut e only the am endme nts list ed in subsection ( c) for the corresponding guideline provisions that were applied when the defendant w as sentence d and shall leave all other guideline application decisions unaffected. U.S.S.G. §§ 1B1.10(a )(3) & ( b)(1) (empha sis added). This sec tion was ena cted a fter Clark, supra, upon which Goodloe’ s argument is premised. Th e langua g e of

§ 1 B 1. 10 (b )( 1) is c le ar: if an ame ndme nt i s n ot l ist e d in § 1 B 1. 10 (c ), it cannot be ap p lied in a § 3582(c )(2) rese ntencingproce eding . Amendment 709, which G oodloeNo. 08-5709

United States v. Goodloe

B e c a us e Go od loe ’s thr e e dr

ug of fe ns e s c on tin

ue to wa rr ant the thr e e po int s ori g ina lly 6 assessed, the re is no need to address his ar g uments challeng ing the criminal history point he rec eived for the no- license of

fense
. We note that our decision is consistent with the di sposition of similar ca ses. In United States 7 v. Flores , 311 F. App’ x 287, 289 (11th Cir. 2009) (unpublished), the district court found that F lores was e ntitled to a reduc tion in her sentence based on the crack amendment, but not below the ten- y ear statutory minimum of 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)( 1)(A)
. Flore s argued that the district court e rre d by failing to re-de termine he r elig ibilit y for the sa fety v alve ba sed on a r eca lculation of her criminal history points accor ding to (non-re troac tive) Amendme nt 709. Id . at 288. The c ourt of appe als aff irmed, concludingthat, “[t] he re cord he re shows that the district court followed the proper proce d ure f

or r e - s e n t e n c i n g u n d e r

§ 3 5 8 2 ( c ) ( 2 )
. . . . [T ]h e d i s t r i c tc o u rtd i d n o tp l a i n l y

e r r i nf a i l i n g t o a

pp ly Amendment 709 to re -dete rmine F lores’s sa fety -valve elig ibilit y .” Id
. at 289. See also United States v . P e te rs , 524 F.3d 905, 907 (8th Cir.) cert. de nied , 129 S. Ct . 290 (2008) ( holding that de fenda nt not entitled to reconsider ation of cr iminal hist ory score under Amendment 709 in § 3582 motion: “Mr. Peters was and is not entitl ed to safe ty valve r elief, but he is subject to the statutory mandatory min imum se ntenc e th at he re c e ive d. ” ); United States v. Adrow , 280 F. App’ x 569, 570 (8th Cir. 2008) (unpublished pe r cu r ia m) ( u p holding § 3582 de nial wher e district cour t was bound by

statutory minimum and “r efuse d to rec onsider Adrow’ s criminal history score or g rant saf ety valve r elief” ). 12 contends a

pplies to make his three prior off enses pr operly

score d as one, is not listed in subsection § 1B1.10( c) and thus cannot properly be applied on r esente ncing
. Se e Un ite d S tates v . G ill is , 592 F.3d 696, 699 ( 6th Cir. 2009) (finding no enti t l em en t t o rese ntencingwher e sente nce is ba sed on
no n- re tr oa c tiv e a me ndme nt) . T hu s, Go od loe ’s c ri min a l hi sto ry po int s c onti nu e to m a ke him ineligible f

or the saf ety valve, and the district cour t corr ectly deter

mined that notwithstanding the 6

su bs e qu e nt a

me ndme nt t o th e c ra c k guid e lin e s, Go od loe ’s min imum se nte nc e r e m a i n e d 1 2 0 m o nths
. A c c o r d in g ly , G o o d lo e is n o t e ntitled t o a s e n te n c e r e d

u c ti o nu n d e r

1 8 U
. S. C § 3 5 8 2 ( c ) ( 2 )
. We AF F IRM. 7