J-S52039-17

2017 PA Super 279

IN RE: PRIVATE CRIMINAL 

COMPLAINT DONALD MILES

APPEAL OF: DONALD MILES

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

No. 434 MDA 2017

Appeal from the Order Entered February 22, 2017

In the Court of Common Pleas of Lackawanna County 

Civil Division at No(s): 2016 -CV-6308

BEFORE: GANTMAN, P.J., LAZARUS, J., and MUSMANNO, J.

OPINION BY GANTMAN, P.J.: FILED AUGUST 28, 2017

Appellant, Donald Miles, appeals pro se from the order entered in the 

Lackawanna County Court of Common Pleas, which denied and dismissed his 

petition for approval of his private criminal complaint. We affirm. 

The trial court opinion sets forth the relevant facts and procedural 

history of this case as follows: 

BACKGROUND

1. [Appellant] has attempted to file a private criminal 

complaint against Vincent Butkiewicz, John Munley, 

Thomas Davis, Harold Zech, all alleged to be Detectives 

with the Lackawanna County District Attorney’s Office. He 

has also in the same pleading attempted to file a criminal 

complaint against Attorneys James R. Elliot and Corey 

Kolcharno and “...others to be charged from the DA’s Office 

magistrates & judge. Unlimited John Doe, unlimited Jane 

Doe.” 

2. [Appellant] has also attempted to file a criminal 

complaint against Assistant District Attorney Cathy Ann 

Tully, District Attorney James Henry Scanlon IV, Andrew 

Jarbola (Judge, Lackawanna County Court of Common 

Pleas), John Pesota (Magisterial District Judge) and Alyce 
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Farrell (Magisterial District Judge), Vito P. Geroulo (Judge, 

Lackawanna County Court of Common Pleas). ... For the 

reasons that follow, the relief sought by [Appellant] is 

denied and dismissed. 

3. All of the above are alleged to have criminally 

wronged [Appellant] relative to a criminal matter filed to 

OTN number L924393 at Magisterial District Judge Alyce 

Farrell’s Office 45-1-02. The location of the alleged crime 

is at 521 Arthur Avenue, Scranton, PA 18510. The date of 

the offense is in dispute but approximately February 17, 

2016. 

4. [Appellant] attempted to file a private criminal 

complaint with the issuing authority against the District 

Attorney and members of his staff on or about September 

9, 2016. The matter had to be referred by the issuing 

authority to the District Attorney for approval to proceed 

with the case per Pa.R.Crim.P. 506(A). 

5. On or about October 13, 2016, a letter from the first 

Assistant District Attorney Gene P. Riccardo directed to 

[Appellant] acknowledged the private [criminal] complaint 

attempted to be filed by [Appellant] against Attorney 

Cathy Tully. At that time, recognizing the conflict of 

interest, the Lackawanna County District Attorney’s Office 

referred the putative criminal complaints to the Office of 

the Attorney General of the Commonwealth of 

Pennsylvania. ... 

6. This referral was acknowledged as received by the 

Office of the Attorney General of the Commonwealth of 

Pennsylvania on December 28, 2016. ... 

7. [Appellant] erroneously filed a Petition for Review of 

the District [Attorney’s] “...disapproval of his Private 

Criminal Complaint.” The Petition for Review...is in error 

because at that point on November 8, 2016, the District 

Attorney’s Office had not disapproved his private criminal 

complaint but had referred it, due to conflicts, to the Office

of the Attorney General. ... 

8. On February 6, 2017 at 3:09 p.m., this [c]ourt 

received an email from an attorney with the Office of the 
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Attorney General with two attachments. ... The 

attachments indicate the Office of Attorney General for the 

Commonwealth of Pennsylvania refuses to approve 

[Appellant’s] private criminal complaint...per Pa.R.Crim.P. 

506(2). The reason for the disapproval as articulated 

in...Request to Close the Case dated January 26, 2017 is[:] 

“In his lengthy PCC [Appellant] completely failed, however, 

to articulate or produce any evidence of criminal conduct 

by anybody. ... It is clear he is merely trying to confuse 

and delay his criminal trial with this PCC.” 

9. Due to the response by the Office of the Attorney 

General, closing the case of [Appellant’s] [private criminal 

complaint], [Appellant’s] untimely and inaccurate 

[p]etition for review had now become ripe for decision. 

This is so because now the erroneous alleged rejection of 

the [p]rivate [c]riminal [c]omplaint by the Office of the 

District Attorney has in fact occurred by the Office of the 

Attorney General. Accordingly, the November 8, 2016 

Petition for Review filed by [Appellant] will now be 

entertained on its merits by this [c]ourt. 

10. [T]he January 26, 2017 letter from the Office of the 

Attorney General to [Appellant] and...the request to Close 

Case also dated January 26, 2017 were submitted to this 

[c]ourt by email dated February 6, 2017. 

11. The context of both [documents] indicate[s] the 

conclusion of the Office of the Attorney General that the 

proposed private [criminal] complaints of [Appellant] are 

lacking substantive merit. The letter...states, “[Y]our 

private criminal complaint fails to articulate or produce any 

evidence of criminal conduct by any person. Moreover, the 

events you describe therein are the same incidents for 

which you are currently awaiting trial.” (Docket No. CP 

35-482-2015).

12. The Request to Close Case...states, “To conclude, 

[Appellant] neither alleged nor substantiated at all any 

facts to support any criminal charge against any person. I 

do not find this PCC to be in good faith.” 

(Trial Court Opinion, filed February 22, 2017, at 1-4). 
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Procedurally, by order and opinion filed February 22, 2017, the trial 

court denied and dismissed Appellant’s petition for approval of his private 

criminal complaint. Appellant timely filed a pro se notice of appeal on March 

7, 2017. The trial court did not order Appellant to file a concise statement of 

errors complained of on appeal per Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b), and Appellant did not 

voluntarily file a Rule 1925(b) statement. 

Appellant raises one issue for our review:

WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED AN ABUSE OF 

DISCRETION OR AN ERROR OF LAW WHERE THE TRIAL 

COURT DEPRIVED APPELLANT HIS DUE PROCESS OF LAW 

UNDER OUR UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION WHEN THE 

TRIAL COURT DID NOT ALLOW APPELLANT A FAIR 

OPPORTUNITY TO FILE A PROPER AND TIMELY PETITION 

FOR REVIEW PURSUANT TO PENNSYLVANIA RULE[] OF 

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE...506(B)(2) IN THE COURT OF 

COMMON PLEAS OF LACKAWANNA COUNTY FOR SENIOR 

DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL BERNARD A. ANDERSON’S 

DISAPPROVAL OF APPELLANT’S PRIVATE CRIMINAL 

COMPLAINT?

(Appellant’s Brief at 4). 

Appellant argues he was deprived of his due process rights. 

Particularly, Appellant questions the referral of his private criminal complaint 

to the Attorney General’s Office. Appellant does not understand why the 

District Attorney’s Office of Lackawanna County refused to rule on the 

private criminal complaint. Appellant maintains he did not receive timely 

notification of approval or disapproval of his private criminal complaint as 

well. Appellant asserts his concern about “deadlines” prompted him to file a 

premature petition for review on November 8, 2016. Appellant contends the 
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Attorney General unreasonably delayed his decision to disapprove 

Appellant’s private criminal complaint.

Appellant further asserts the trial court deprived Appellant of his due 

process rights by directly reviewing the disapproval of the Attorney General’s 

Office. Appellant contends he was denied the opportunity to file a proper 

petition for review per Pa.R.Crim.P. 506(B)(2) to defend or challenge the 

Attorney General’s disapproval. Appellant concludes he is the victim of a 

conspiracy to divest him of his constitutional due process rights, and this 

Court should reverse the trial court’s order denying approval of Appellant’s 

private criminal complaint. We disagree.

Appellate examination of a trial court’s review of the District Attorney’s 

decision to disapprove a private criminal complaint implicates the following:

[W]hen the district attorney disapproves a private criminal 

complaint solely on the basis of legal conclusions, the trial 

court undertakes de novo review of the matter. 

Thereafter, the appellate court will review the trial court’s 

decision for an error of law. As with all questions of law, 

the appellate standard of review is de novo and the 

appellate scope of review is plenary. 

* * *

[W]hen the district attorney disapproves a private criminal 

complaint on wholly policy considerations, or on a hybrid of 

legal and policy considerations, the trial court’s standard of 

review of the district attorney's decision is abuse of 

discretion. This deferential standard recognizes the 

limitations on judicial power to interfere with the district 

attorney’s discretion in these kinds of decisions. 

In re Ullman, 995 A.2d 1207, 1213 (Pa.Super. 2010), appeal denied, 610 
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Pa. 600, 20 A.3d 489 (2011) (quoting In re Private Criminal Complaint 

of Wilson, 879 A.2d 199, 214–15 (Pa.Super. 2005) (en banc) (internal 

citations omitted)). 

A private criminal complaint must at the outset set forth a prima facie

case of criminal conduct. In re Ullman, supra at 1213. Nevertheless, 

even “a well-crafted private criminal complaint cannot be the end of the 

inquiry for the prosecutor.” Id. (quoting In re Private Complaint of 

Adams, 764 A.2d 577, 580 (Pa.Super. 2000). The district attorney must 

investigate the allegations of the complaint to permit a proper decision on 

whether to approve or disapprove the complaint. In re Ullman, supra at 

1213. “[S]uch investigation is not necessary where the allegations of 

criminal conduct in the complaint are unsupported by factual averments.” 

Id. (quoting Commonwealth v. Muroski, 506 A.2d 1312, 1317 (Pa.Super. 

1986) (en banc). Both the district attorney and the trial court have a 

responsibility to prevent the misuse of judicial and prosecutorial resources in 

the pursuit of pointless prosecutions. In re Ullman, supra at 1213. 

Moreover,

[E]ven if the facts recited in the complaint make out a 

prima facie case, the district attorney cannot blindly bring 

charges, particularly where an investigation may cause 

him to question their validity. Forcing the prosecutor to 

bring charges in every instance where a complaint sets out 

a prima facie case would compel the district attorney to 

bring cases he suspects, or has concluded via

investigation, are meritless. The public prosecutor is duty

bound to bring only those cases that are appropriate for 

prosecution. This duty continues throughout a criminal 
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proceeding and obligates the district attorney to withdraw 

charges when he concludes, after investigation, that the 

prosecution lacks a legal basis. 

Id. at 1214 (quoting In re Private Criminal Complaint of Wilson, supra

at 212).

The district attorney is permitted to exercise sound 

discretion to refrain from proceeding in a criminal case 

whenever he, in good faith, thinks that the prosecution

would not serve the best interests of the state. This 

decision not to prosecute may be implemented by the 

district attorney’s refusal to approve the private criminal 

complaint at the outset.

In re Ullman, supra at 1214 (quoting Commonwealth v. Malloy, 450 

A.2d 689, 692 (Pa.Super. 1982). “When the district attorney disapproves a 

private criminal complaint, based on the sufficiency of the facts necessary to 

establish the elements of the crime charged, that decision is a legal 

conclusion subject to de novo review.” In re Ullman, supra at 1214 (citing 

Commonwealth ex rel. Guarrasi v. Carroll, 979 A.2d 383, 385 

(Pa.Super. 2009) (stating district attorney’s disapproval of private criminal 

complaint, due to lack of evidence to prove elements of crimes charged,

constitutes legal conclusion subject to de novo review). 

Rule 506 of the Pennsylvania Rules of Criminal Procedure applies to 

review of private criminal complaints and provides:

Rule 506. Approval of Private Complaints

(A) When the affiant is not a law enforcement officer, the 

complaint shall be submitted to an attorney for the 

Commonwealth, who shall approve or disapprove it 

without unreasonable delay.
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(B) If the attorney for the Commonwealth:

(1) approves the complaint, the attorney shall indicate 

this decision on the complaint form and transmit it to the 

issuing authority;

(2) disapproves the complaint, the attorney shall state 

the reasons on the complaint form and return it to the 

affiant. Thereafter, the affiant may petition the court of 

common pleas for review of the decision.

* * *

Pa.R.Crim.P. 506. “If the district attorney disapproves a private criminal 

complaint, the complainant can petition the Court of Common Pleas for Rule 

506 review.” In re Ullman, supra at 1214.

The trial court must first correctly identify the nature of the 

district attorney’s reason(s) for denying a private criminal 

complaint. 

* * *

Under Rule 506 and settled case law, the private criminal 

complainant has no right to an evidentiary hearing in 

connection with the trial court’s review of the district 

attorney’s decision to disapprove the private criminal 

complaint. Rule 506 merely allows the private criminal 

complainant the opportunity to have his complaint 

reviewed in the Court of Common Pleas, following the 

district attorney’s adverse decision. 

Id. (quoting In re Private Criminal Complaint of Wilson, supra at 212–

13) (internal citations omitted)). 

The Pennsylvania Crimes Code defines the offense of unsworn 

falsification to authorities as follows:

§ 4904. Unsworn falsification to authorities
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(a) In general.─A person commits a misdemeanor of 

the second degree if, with intent to mislead a public 

servant in performing his official function, he:

(1) makes any written false statement which he

does not believe to be true;

(2) submits or invites reliance on any writing 

which he knows to be forged, altered or otherwise 

lacking in authenticity; or

(3) submits or invites reliance on any sample, 

specimen, map, boundary mark, or other object 

which he knows to be false.

(b) Statements “under penalty”.─A person commits a 

misdemeanor of the third degree if he makes a written 

false statement which he does not believe to be true, on or 

pursuant to a form bearing notice, authorized by law, to 

the effect that false statements made therein are 

punishable. 

(c) Perjury provisions applicable.─Section 4902(c) 

through (f) of this title (relating to perjury) applies to this 

section.

(d) Penalty.─In addition to any other penalty that may 

be imposed, a person convicted under this section shall be 

sentenced to pay a fine of at least $1,000.

18 Pa.C.S.A. § 4904. The Crimes Code defines the offense of false reports 

to law enforcement authorities as follows: 

§ 4906. False reports to law enforcement 

authorities

(a) Falsely incriminating another.─Except as 

provided in subsection (c), a person who knowingly gives 

false information to any law enforcement officer with intent 

to implicate another commits a misdemeanor of the 

second degree. 
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(b) Fictitious reports.─Except as provided in 

subsection (c), a person commits a misdemeanor of the 

third degree if he:

(1) reports to law enforcement authorities an 

offense or other incident within their concern 

knowing that it did not occur; or

(2) pretends to furnish such authorities with 

information relating to an offense or incident when 

he knows he has no information relating to such 

offense or incident.

(c) Grading.—

(1) If the violation of subsection (a) or (b) occurs 

during a declared state of emergency and the false 

report causes the resources of the law enforcement 

authority to be diverted from dealing with the 

declared state of emergency, the offense shall be 

graded one step greater than that set forth in the 

applicable subsection.

(2) If the violation of subsection (a) or (b) relates 

to a false report of the theft or loss of a firearm, as 

defined in section 5515 (relating to prohibiting of 

paramilitary training), the offense shall be graded 

one step greater than that set forth in the applicable 

subsection. 

18 Pa.C.S.A. § 4906. The Crimes Code defines the offense of false swearing 

as follows:

§ 4903. False swearing

(a) False swearing in official matters.―A person who 

makes a false statement under oath or equivalent 

affirmation, or swears or affirms the truth of such a 

statement previously made, when he does not believe the 

statement to be true is guilty of a misdemeanor of the 

second degree if:

(1) the falsification occurs in an official 
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proceeding; or

(2) the falsification is intended to mislead a public 

servant in performing his official function.

(b) Other false swearing.―A person who makes a 

false statement under oath or equivalent affirmation, or 

swears or affirms the truth of such a statement previously 

made, when he does not believe the statement to be true, 

is guilty of a misdemeanor of the third degree, if the 

statement is one which is required by law to be sworn or 

affirmed before a notary or other person authorized to 

administer oaths.

(c) Perjury provisions applicable.―Section 4902(c) 

through (f) of this title (relating to perjury) applies to this 

section.

18 Pa.C.S.A. § 4903. 

The Crimes Code describes the offense of perjury as follows:

§ 4902. Perjury

(a) Offense defined.—A person is guilty of perjury, a 

felony of the third degree, if in any official proceeding he 

makes a false statement under oath or equivalent 

affirmation, or swears or affirms the truth of a statement 

previously made, when the statement is material and he 

does not believe it to be true.

(b) Materiality.—Falsification is material, regardless of 

the admissibility of the statement under rules of evidence, 

if it could have affected the course or outcome of the 

proceeding. It is no defense that the declarant mistakenly 

believed the falsification to be immaterial. Whether a 

falsification is material in a given factual situation is a 

question of law.

(c) Irregularities no defense.—It is not a defense to 

prosecution under this section that the oath or affirmation 

was administered or taken in an irregular manner or that 

the declarant was not competent to make the statement. 

A document purporting to be made upon oath or 
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affirmation at any time when the actor presents it as being 

so verified shall be deemed to have been duly sworn or 

affirmed.

(d) Retraction.—No person shall be guilty of an offense 

under this section if he retracted the falsification in the 

course of the proceeding in which it was made before it 

became manifest that the falsification was or would be 

exposed and before the falsification substantially affected 

the proceeding.

(e) Inconsistent statements.—Where the defendant 

made inconsistent statements under oath or equivalent 

affirmation, both having been made within the period of 

the statute of limitations, the prosecution may proceed by 

setting forth the inconsistent statements in a single count 

alleging in the alternative that one or the other was false 

and not believed by the defendant. In such case it shall 

not be necessary for the prosecution to prove which 

statement was false but only that one or the other was 

false and not believed by the defendant to be true.

(f) Corroboration.—In any prosecution under this 

section, except under subsection (e) of this section, falsity 

of a statement may not be established by the 

uncorroborated testimony of a single witness. 

18 Pa.C.S.A. § 4902. “The general purpose of this section is to define the 

various situations in which lying constitutes a felony. The essential elements 

of the offense are (1) oath or affirmation; (2) materiality of the lie; and (3) 

requirement that the lie be told in an official proceeding involving a hearing. 

If there is no oath or affirmation, the falsification can only be a 

misdemeanor....” 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 4902 Comment. Subsection (f) of the 

perjury statute has produced explanatory and applicable case law which 

states corroboration of perjury still requires two witnesses or one witness 

and circumstantial evidence to support the witness. Commonwealth v. 
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Johnson, 534 Pa. 51, 626 A.2d 514 (1993). The circumstantial evidence 

“must fit together so tightly as to preclude any reasonable doubt of guilt... 

and [serves] the principal purposes of the common law two-witness rule, 

namely, protecting the defendant against good-faith mistakes and against 

the grudge witness.” Id. at 54, 626 A.2d at 515. 

Prosecution under subsection (e) for perjury involving 

inconsistent statements made under oath or equivalent 

affirmation, however, does not require corroboration: 

[W]here...there is proof that the defendant made two 

contradictory statements under oath. When such 

conflicting statements are made there is no doubt 

that the person making them has committed perjury 

for he establishes it, but the difficulty is as to which 

of the two statements is the false one. In such case, 

the problem is reduced to one of determining 

whether there is some competent evidence from 

which the jury might find that the perjury was 

committed on the occasion charged in the 

indictment. The evidence necessary to identify the 

perjured statement may be direct or circumstantial 

but it must be competent. 

In re Ullman, supra at 1215-16. 

The Crimes Code defines official oppression as follows:

§ 5301. Official oppression

A person acting or purporting to act in an official capacity 

or taking advantage of such actual or purported capacity 

commits a misdemeanor of the second degree if, knowing 

that his conduct is illegal, he:

(1) subjects another to arrest, detention, search, 

seizure, mistreatment, dispossession, assessment, 

lien or other infringement of personal or property 

rights; or
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(2) denies or impedes another in the exercise or 

enjoyment of any right, privilege, power or 

immunity.

18 Pa.C.S.A. § 5301. The Pennsylvania Crimes Code defines conspiracy in 

relevant part as follows:

§ 903. Criminal conspiracy

(a) Definition of conspiracy.―A person is guilty of 

conspiracy with another person or persons to commit a 

crime if with the intent of promoting or facilitating its 

commission he:

(1) agrees with such other person or persons that 

they or one or more of them will engage in conduct 

which constitutes such crime or an attempt or 

solicitation to commit such crime; or

(2) agrees to aid such other person or persons in 

the planning or commission of such crime or of an 

attempt or solicitation to commit such crime.

(b) Scope of conspiratorial relationship.―If a person 

guilty of conspiracy, as defined by subsection (a) of this 

section, knows that a person with whom he conspires to 

commit a crime has conspired with another person or 

persons to commit the same crime, he is guilty of 

conspiring with such other person or persons, to commit 

such crime whether or not he knows their identity.

(c) Conspiracy with multiple criminal 

objectives.―If a person conspires to commit a number of 

crimes, he is guilty of only one conspiracy so long as such 

multiple crimes are the object of the same agreement or 

continuous conspiratorial relationship.

* * *

(e) Overt act.―No person may be convicted of 

conspiracy to commit a crime unless an overt act in 

pursuance of such conspiracy is alleged and proved to 

have been done by him or by a person with whom he 
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conspired.

(f) Renunciation.―It is a defense that the actor, after 

conspiring to commit a crime, thwarted the success of the 

conspiracy, under circumstances manifesting a complete 

and voluntary renunciation of his criminal intent.

(g) Duration of conspiracy.―For purposes of 42 

Pa.C.S. § 5552(d) (relating to commission of offense):

(1) conspiracy is a continuing course of conduct 

which terminates when the crime or crimes which 

are its object are committed or the agreement that 

they be committed is abandoned by the defendant 

and by those with whom he conspired;

(2) such abandonment is presumed if neither the 

defendant nor anyone with whom he conspired does 

any overt act in pursuance of the conspiracy during 

the applicable period of limitation; and

(3) if an individual abandons the agreement, the 

conspiracy is terminated as to him only if and when 

he advises those with whom he conspired of his 

abandonment or he informs the law enforcement 

authorities of the existence of the conspiracy and of 

his participation therein.

18 Pa.C.S.A. § 903. 

Instantly, the trial court reasoned:

15. A review of the proposed [private criminal 

complaints] offered by [Appellant] shows incongruity 

between the factual allegations and the elements of the 

criminal statutes that he is attempting to employ. 

Essentially, the pleading of [Appellant] is an attempt to fit 

the proverbial square peg into the round hole. An example 

of this has been referenced in the Attorney General’s 

Request to Close Case.... In it, the Commonwealth 

observes, “...[Appellant] claimed it was perjury for the 

Commonwealth to amend at the preliminary hearing a date 

alleged in the complaint.” This amendment was approved 

by the Magisterial District Judge at the preliminary hearing 
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and subsequently approved by the trial judge. The facts 

as alleged by [Appellant] simply do not add up to the 

elements necessary to establish the criminal violations as 

alleged.

16. [Appellant] also misquotes Detective Butkiewicz in a 

transcript in order to try to contort the facts to try to equal 

the facts needed for his alleged criminal charges elements.

17. We have reviewed the proposed pleadings of 

[Appellant] including his rights to add “Unlimited John and 

Unlimited Jane Doe” and we are compelled to conclude 

that the Commonwealth was correct in [its] decision by the 

Office of the Attorney General to reject approval of 

[Appellant’s] rambling and incongruent pleading. 

18. We reach this conclusion by applying the de novo

standard of review and the plenary scope of review as per 

[In re Private Criminal Complaint of] Wilson, 

supra...since the rejection of this proposed complaint was 

on substantive legal grounds, and not on policy grounds. 

* * *

20. A lack of factual averment concerning criminal 

activity can render a private criminal complaint and 

supporting affidavit defective and thus not a properly 

drafted complaint as is the case herein. It is incumbent 

upon the private complaint to provide the district attorney 

to make an informed decision regarding whether to permit 

criminal proceedings. ... We conclude [Appellant’s] 

incongruent factual averments and pleading are fatally 

defective. ... 

21. As Wilson tells us, a district attorney may have an 

obligation to investigate a properly drafted private criminal 

complaint which sets forth a prima facie case of criminal 

conduct. However, a prosecutor is not obligated to 

conduct an investigation when allegations made are not 

supported by factual averments. Both the district attorney 

and the courts have a responsibility to prevent misuse of 

both judicial and prosecutorial resources. ... 

22. We decline to employ a policy analysis of the 
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decision by the Pennsylvania Attorney General to deny 

approval since the disapproval herein was for substantive 

legal deficiencies and not policy reasons.

23. A private criminal complaint is not entitled to an 

evidentiary hearing regarding a trial court’s review of the 

Commonwealth’s decision to disapprove a private criminal 

complaint. Braman v. Corbett, 19 A.3d 1151 (Pa.Super. 

2011).

24. For all of the above reasons as stated the Petition of 

[Appellant] seeking approval of his putative criminal 

complaints, as now rejected by the Office of the Attorney 

General of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, is denied 

and dismissed as being totally devoid of merit. An 

appropriate Order follows. 

(Trial Court Opinion at 5-7) (some internal citations omitted). The certified 

record confirms the court correctly used a de novo standard of review of the 

Attorney General’s decision, because the Attorney General disapproved 

Appellant’s complaint for lack of factual support. See Carrol, supra. Upon 

its review, the court confirmed Appellant had failed to articulate sufficient 

facts to establish a prima facie case on each of the crimes alleged. See

Pa.C.S.A. §§ 4904, 4906, 4903, 4902, 5301, 903. The court validated the 

Attorney General’s disapproval of Appellant’s private criminal complaint, 

based on the independent finding of no evidence of criminal wrongdoing to 

support Appellant’s private criminal complaint. 

Here, Appellant submitted a hand-written, multi-paged complaint 

consisting of allegations expressed largely as conclusions of law, without 

factual specificity to support the offenses alleged, including unsworn 

falsification to authorities, false reports to law enforcement authorities, false 
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swearing, perjury, official oppression, and criminal conspiracy. Appellant, 

however, does show in his complaint that he filed it in retaliation for the 

criminal charges filed against him. Further, the general topics Appellant 

highlights in his private criminal complaint are matters more properly 

brought to the court’s attention in the course of Appellant’s criminal case, 

through pretrial motions to suppress and at trial, through cross-examination 

and impeachment of witnesses. Limited statements, taken out of context 

from a hearing transcript that is not part of this certified record, will not 

serve to corroborate Appellant’s allegations against the investigating 

detectives, members of the district attorney’s office, and the judiciary. 

After an independent review of the certified record, we endorse the 

trial court’s evaluation of Appellant’s private criminal complaint and see no 

error in the court’s decision. Therefore, applying the proper appellate 

standard of review, we hold Appellant failed to show the trial court 

committed an error of law when it denied and dismissed Appellant’s petition 

for approval of his private criminal complaint. See In re Ullman, supra. 

Accordingly, we affirm. 
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Order affirmed. 

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 8/28/2017