### IN THE COURT OF APP EALS OF TENNESS EE AT JAC KSON Se pte m be r 17, 200 8 S es sio n
KI M BROW N v. WI LLI AM SHAPPLEY, M.D.
Direc t Appeal from the Chancer y Court for Shelby Cou nty No. CH-07-1162- 3 Ke nny W. Arm strong, Chancellor

No. W2008-00201-C OA-R3-C V - F iled October 9, 2008

________________________

Tenn. R. App . P . 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgme nt of th e Chancer y Court Affi rm ed in p art; reve rsed in part; and Rem anded
D A VI D R. F ARMER , J ., delivere d the opinion of the cour t, in which H OL L Y M. K I RBY , J. an d J. S TEVE N S T A FF O RD , J ., joined.
Kim Brown, Pro Se.
Michae l G. McL are n and Robert B . Shappley , Memphis, Tennesse e, for the appe llee, Willi am Shappley , M.D.
OP IN ION This is the second appe ara nce of the dispute betwee n these pa rties in this Court. The curre nt a pp e a l ari se s f

ro m th e tr ia l c ourt ’s imp os iti on of Rul e 11 sa

nc tio ns a g a ins t Pla int if

f/Ap pe lla nt K im Br own (Mr. B rown). U

pon motion by

Def endant/Appe llee Willi am Shappley , M.D. (Dr . Shappley ), the trial cour

t dismi ssed Mr. B rown’s br eac h of contra ct ac tion and awa rded D r. Shappley

attorney ’s f e e s in th e a mo u n t o f

$ 5 0 0 p u r s u an t t o Ru le 1 1 o f th e T e n n e s s e e Ru le s o f

Ci v il Pr o c e dure. We aff irm dismiss al of Mr. Br own’s ac tion under the doc trine of re s ju dic ata , but reve rse the imposition of Rul e 11 sanc tio ns and

the awa rd of a tto rn e y ’s fe e s. This dispute beg an in Marc h 2005 when Dr . Shappley per fo rm ed cir cumcision surg ery on Mr. B rown. I n Marc h 2006, Mr. B rown c ommenced a n action for

medical malpr actice ag ainst Dr. Shappley in the Circuit Court for Shelby County . The trial c ourt enter ed summary judgme nt in favor of Dr. Shapple y in May 2006, when Mr. Br own failed to file an expert aff idavit in response to Dr. Shappley ’s motion for summary judgme nt. Mr. Br own then filed an action in the Ge nera l Sessions Court for Shelby

County , which the c ourt dismissed upon determining the matter ha d been litig ated in t he c ir c uit c ourt . In Jun e 20 06 , Mr. B ro wn fi le d a motio n in the c ir c uit

c ourt mov ingthe c ourt

to-2-

set aside summary judgme nt a nd to a mend his c omplaint to include a claim for medical battery

. The circ uit court denied the motion and Mr. Br own filed a timely notice of appea l to this Court. On appea l, w e aff

irmed the awa

rd of summary judgme nt to Dr. Shappley and observe d that Mr. B rown’s alleg ations did not constitut e a c laim for medica l battery . We deni ed M r. Brown’s motion for rehe aring ; the Tenne ssee Supreme Court de nied Mr. Br own’s application for per mission t o appea l

. Brown v. Shappley , No. W2006-01632-COA-R3-CV, 2007 WL596672 (Tenn. Ct. App. F eb. 27, 2007)( rehearing denie d Mar. 28, 2007) perm. app. de nied (Tenn. Aug . 20, 2007).
I n J une 2007, Mr. B rown filed a bre ach of contra ct ac tion ag ainst Dr. Shappley in the Chance ry Court for Shelby

County . I t is from this breac h of contra ct action that the pre sent appe al arises. In his J une 2007 complaint, Mr. Br own asser ted Dr. Shappley brea ched an oral a g ree ment to perfor m a fre nectomy

. He sought damag es i n the amount of $55 million. Dr. Shappley answe red on J uly 24, denying Mr . Br own’s allegations and assertingseven a ffirmative defe nses, including the failure to state a cl ai m an d the doctrine of re s ju dic ata . Dr. Shappley also counter -cla imed and asser ted claims of intentional infliction of emotional distress, outrag eous conduc t, and malicious prosec ution. Dr. Shappley soug ht compensatory

damag es in the amount of $1 million and punitive dama g e s. On the same day , Dr. Shappley also filed a motion for sa ncti o n s u n d er Rule 11 of the Tenne ssee Rules of Civil Procedure . I n his moti on, Dr. S happley asser ted that Mr. B rown’s a ction was ba rr ed b y the doctrine of res judicata and that its purpose wa s to harass Dr . Shappley . The cer tificate of service attache d to Dr. S happley ’s Rule 11 motion indicates that it was serve d on Mr. Br own on J uly

24, 2007. The trial c ourt g rante d Dr. Shappley ’s Rule 11 motion in September 2007, dismiss ed Mr. B rown’s c omplaint, and awa rded Dr. Shappley attorney ’s fee s in the amount of $500. Dr. Shappley

voluntarily

dismiss ed his counter -cla im and the trial cour t entere d final judg ment on Janu ary 3, 20 08 . M r. B ro wn

fi le d a tim e ly no tic e of a pp e a l to thi s Co ur

t.
Issues Presented
Mr . B ro wn

pr e se nts tw o is su e s f

or our r e vie w, a s w e sli g htl y re wo rd the m: (1) Whether the trial c ourt err ed by dismiss ing Mr . Br own’s cla im based on the doctrine of

res judicata. (2) Whether the trial c ourt err ed by imposing Rule 11 s an ct i o n s ag ainst Mr. Br own.
Stan dard of Revie w A trial cour

t’s deter mination that a cla im is barred by the doctrine of res judicata pr e se nts a question of law

that we r eview de novo , with no presumption of corr ectne ss. In re Es tate of B oo te , 198 S.W .3d 699, 719 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2005). We revie w a tria l court’s rulingon a Rule 11 motion under a n abuse of

discretion standa

rd. Ho ok e r v . S un dq uis t , 107 S.W .3d 532, 535 (Tenn. Ct. App.-3-

2002). An a

buse of discr etion occur s when the de cision of the lower court has no basis in law or fa ct and is there fore arbitra

ry , illogica l, or u n consciona ble. Id. (citing State v. Brown & W illiamson Tobacco Corp. , 18 S.W .3d 186, 191 (Tenn. 2000) ). Our revie w of Rule 11 dec isions is g overne d under this def

ere ntial standard since the question o f wh ether a Rule 11 violation has occ urre d require s the trial court to make hig hly fac t-intensive deter

minations reg ardingthe re asonable ness of the attorne y ’s conduc t. Id. We reviewthe trial cour t’s fin d i n g s of fa ct with a pre sumption of corr ectne ss. Id. ; Tenn. R. App. P. 13(d).
Re s J udic ata
We first turn to whether

the trial cour

t erre d by dismiss ing this law suit ba sed on the doctrine of re s ju dic ata

. Under

the doctrine of res judicata, a final judgme nt on the m erits t hat is rende red by a c ourt of c omp e te nt jur isd ic tio n co nc lud e s the ri g hts of the pa rt ie s and the ir

pr ivi e s, and , w ith respe ct to them, bars a

subsequent ac tion involvi ng the same c laim or ca use of a ction. Richardson
v . Te nn . B d. of D e nti

str y , 913 S.W .2d 446, 459 (Tenn. 1995)

. I t is a claim prec lusion doctrine that prohibits mult iple lawsuits betwee n the litigants a nd their privies with re spect to the issues which wer e or c ould have be en litigated in the prior suit. Ma sse ng ill v . S c ott , 738 S.W .2d 629, 631 (Tenn. 1 9 8 7 )

. A c c o r d i n g l y, r es ju dic a ta ap p l i es not only to issues actually

raised a nd adjudicate d in the prior lawsuit, but to “all cla ims and issues which wer e re l ev an t and which c ould rea sonably have been litig ated in a pr ior ac tion.” Am

. Nat 'l Ba nk an d Tr us t Co . o f Ch att an ooga v . Clar

k , 586 S.W .2d 825, 826 (Tenn. 19 79). I t is a “rule of rest” that promotes finality in liti g ation. Mo ulton v . F or d Motor Co. , 5 33 S.W. 2d

29 5, 29 6 (T e nn
. 19 76 )( qu oti ng 2 F re e man on Judg me nts , § 62 6, 13 20 (5 th ed.1925)) . I n order

for the doc trine of res judicata to apply , the prior judg ment must have bee n final and conc luded the rig hts of the par ties on the merits. Richardson , 9 1 3 S

. W

. 2 d a t4 5 9

. A d d i t i o n a l l y, the lawsuits must invol ve the same par ties and the same cause of ac tion or identical issues. Id. Ho we ve r, a

pa rt y ’s fa ilure to ra ise an is su e or the or y do e s n ot p re se rv e that is su e or the or y a s a g round for

a subseque nt lawsuit. Ba rn e tt v. Mi lan Se ati ng Sy s. , 215 S.W .3d 828, 835 (Tenn. 2007)

. I n order that a judg ment or dec ree should be on the merits, it is not ne cessa ry that the litigation sh o u ld be deter mined “on the mer its,” in the moral or a bstract se nse of these wor ds. I t is sufficient that the status of the a ction was such that the parties might have had their suit t hus disposed of, if they had prope rly

prese nted and
mana g e d th e ir

re sp e c tiv e c a se s.
Ma dy un v . B all

ar d , 7 8 3 S

. W

. 2 d

9 4 6 , 9 4 8 (T en n
. Ap p
. 1 9 8 9 )( qu o t i n g Pa rk es v . Cl ift , 77 Tenn. 524 (1882))

. We must agr ee w ith the trial court that Mr. B rown’s br eac h of contra ct cl ai m could and should have be en litigated in the 2006 ac tion in circuit court. The re is no dispute that Mr. B rown’s brea ch of c ontrac t claim arises out of t h e s am e acts, transaction and oc curr ence s as his medical
ma lpr a c tic e c la im. F ur

the r, the re is n o d isp ute that th e e arl ie r l iti g a tio n re su lte d in a fi na l ju dg me nt. We affir m dismi ssal of Mr. Br own’s brea ch of contra ct claim based on the doctrine of re s ju dic ata

.-4- Rul e 11
We next turn to whether the t rial court err ed by g ranting Dr. S happley ’s m otion for sanc tions un de r R ule 11 of the Te nn e sse e Rul e s o f C ivi l Pr oc e dure . Ru le 11 .0 2 p ro vid e s: By prese nting to the c ourt (whe ther by signing , filing, subm i tting, or later advocating) a plea ding, w ritten motion, or other pape r, an attorney or unre prese nted party is c ertify

ing that to the best of the pe rson' s knowledg e, information, and belief, formed a fter a

n inquiry rea sonable unde r the c ircumstance s,-- (1 ) it is no t bei ng pr e se nte d for any imp ro pe r pur po se , suc h as to h ara ss o r t o cause unnece ssary

delay or nee dless incre ase in the c ost of litigation; (2) the c laims, defense s, and other le g al contentions t here in are war rante d by exis ting law

or by a nonfr ivolous arg ument for the e x tension, modification, or reve rsal of e x isting law or the establishment of ne w law; (3) the alleg ations and other fac tual contentions have evidentiary support or, if sp e c if ic a lly so ide nti fi e d, are lik e ly

to h a ve e vid e nti ary su

pp or t a ft e r a re a so na ble opportunity

for f urther inve stigation or discovery ; and (4 ) t h e d e n i a l o f f

a c tu a l c o n t e n t i o n s ar e w ar r an t e d o n t h e e v i d e n c e o r , if specific ally

so identified, ar e re asonably based on a

lack of information or be lief.
Rul e 11 .0 3 c on ta ins pr oc e dura l r e qu ir e me nts and pr ov ide s, in r e le va

nt p art :
I f, af ter notice and a r easona

ble opportunity

to respond, the c ourt deter mines that subdivision 11.02 has be en violated, the court may , subject to the conditions stated below, impose an appropr iate sanction upon the attorney s, law firms, or pa rties that have violate d subdivision 11.02 or are r esponsible for the violation. (1) How I nit iat e d. (a) By Motion. A motion for sanc tions under this rule sh al l be made separ ately from other

mot i ons or re quests and shall desc ribe the spe cific c onduct alleg ed to v i o l at e subdivision 11.02. I t shall be serve d as provided in Rule 5, but shall not be fil ed with or presented to t he court unless, withi n 21 days after servic e of the motion (

or such other period as t h e co urt may presc ribe) , the challenge d paper, claim, de

fense, c ontention, allegation, or denial i s not wit hdrawn or appropriately correc ted. I f warra nted, t he court may awa

rd t o the par

ty preva iling on the mo ti o nth e r e a s o n a

b le e xp e n s e s an d

a tt o r n e y ’ s f e e s in c u r r e d in p r e s e n ti n g or op po sin g the mot ion . Abs e nt e xce ptiona l c ir c ums tanc e s, a law f ir m sh a ll b e he ld j ointly responsible for

violations commit ted by its partners, a ssociates, a nd e mpl oy e e s.-5-

Tenne ssee Rules of Civil Procedure 11.03(empha sis added).
The e mphasized portion of Rule 11.0 3 (1)( a) is the Rule’s 21- day “saf e har bor” pr ovision. Mitrano v. Houser , 240 S.W .3d 854, 862 (Tenn. Ct

. Ap p
. 2007). This provision serve s dual purposes. Id. First, it provides an attorne y or par ty actingpro se with “notice and fair war ning that an adve rsar

y is proposing se eking sanctions.” Id. Second, it d et er s fr ivolous, unsupported, or otherwise imprope r plea dings f rom beingfiled with the cour t. Id.
This Court has noted that the proce dures established in Rule 11.03 are clea r, unambig uous and mandatory

. Id. Acc ording ly , we will re verse an orde r of sanc tions where the moving pa rty has not complied with the Rule’s safe harbor provisions. Id. This Court rec ently reve rsed a

n order of sanctions for f

ailure to c omply

with Rule 11.03(1)(a ) in TPI Corporati on v. W ilson , wher e the r ecor d indicated that the de fenda nt had filed his motion with t he cour t and sent it to plaintiff’s counsel the s a m e d ay. TPI Corp. v. W ilson , No. E2007-02315- COA-R3-CV, 2008 WL3821077, at *5 (Te nn. Ct. App. Aug . 18, 2008). Upon re view of the rec ord i n this case , we observe, as noted above, that Dr. Shappley filed his Rule 11 moti on on J uly 24, 2007, and serve d it on Mr. Br own the same da y . As we a lso noted above , D r
. Sh a

p p le y f il e d h is Ru le 1 1 mo ti o nth e s a me d ay h e f il e d h is an s w e r

an d c o u n te rcomplaint. We f

ind nothing in the rec ord to indicate that Dr. Shapple y complied with the Rule’s saf e harbor provision.
F ur the r, we no te that Ru le 11 .0 3( 3) pr ov ide s: When im po sing sanc tio ns , th e c ourt sh a ll d e sc ri be the c on du c t de te rm ine d to constitute a violation of this rule and e x plain the basis for the sanction imposed.
I n th is c a se , th e tr ia l c ourt ’s or de r o ff e rs no de sc ri pti on of

the c on du c t th a t th e c ourt de te rm ine d to be sanc tionable. Dr. Shappley ’s arg ument to this Court, as we pe rce ive it, is that Mr. Brow n has had nume ro us “ bit e s at th e a

pp le ” thr ou g ho ut t

he lit ig a tio n p ro c e ss a

nd that hi s so le purp os e is to h ara ss Dr. Shappley

. The Te nnessee Supreme Court has n o t ed t h at the main objective of Rule 11 is to deter attorney s from violating Rule 11.02. I ts ma in pur pose is to deter “abuse in the litigation proc ess.” An dr e ws v. B ibl e , 8 12 S.W. 2d 28 4, 29 2 ( Te nn . 1 99 1) . T he su pr e me c ourt

ha s c ha ra c te ri zed Rul e 11 as a “potent weapon that can a nd should be used to cur

b litigation abuse s.” Id. At the same time, ho we ve r, the su

pr e me c ourt

ha s a dv ise d th e tr ia l c ourt s t o im po se Rul e 11 sanc tio ns on ly wi th “utmost care .” Id.
Th e c ourt s are to a

pp ly a sta nd ard of “ ob je c tiv e re a so na

ble ne ss u nd e r t he c ir c ums tanc e s” when determining whether conduct is sanctionable under Rule 11. Ho ok e r v . S un dq uis t , 107 S.W .3d at 5 3 6 (c i t i n g An dr e ws , 8 12 S.W. 2d a t 28 8) . “ Sanc tio ns are a pp ro pr iate wh e n an a tto rn e y su bmi ts a motion or other pa

p er o n grounds which he knows or should know ar e without merit, and a-6-

showing of subjective ba d faith is not require d.” Id. (quoting Boyd v . Prime Foc us, Inc. , 83 S.W .3d 76 1, 76 5 ( Te nn . Ct . App .2 00 1) ). Ho we ve r, wh e n d e c idi ngwh e the r t o im po se sanc tio ns un de r R

ule 11, the trial cour

t should consider all the c ircumstance s. Id. “[T] he trial judg e should consider not on ly the c ir c ums tanc e s o f t

he pa rt ic ula r v iol a tio n, bu t als o the fa c tor s b e ari ngon the re a so na

ble ne ss of the c onduct, such a s experience and past pe rfor mance o f t h e at t o rn ey , as we ll as the g ener al standards of

conduct of

the bar of the c ourt.” An dr e ws , 812 S.W .2d at 292 n.4.
We c ann ot a g re e wi th D r. Shap ple y that th e e xer c ise of

a lit ig ant’ s r ig hts to t

he a pp e llate pr oc e ss c on sti tut e s mu lti ple “ bit e s at t he a pp le .” Cle arl y , a s o ne ro us a s D r. Sha pp le y may fi nd it, a litiga nt has the rig ht to avail himself of the a ppellate pr ocess. F urther, a lthough Mr. B rown’s attempt to liti g ate his medica l malprac tice cla im in the g ener al s essions court after the circ uit court had aw arde d s u m m ar y j u d gment to Dr. Shappley may be per ceive d as an a

ttempt at an end- run aro un d th e sy ste m, we ob se rv e that his med ic a l malp ra c tic e a c tio n sta te d n o b re a c h o f c on tr a c t c la im. See B rown v. Shappley , No. W2006-01632-COA-R3-CV, 2007 WL 596672 (Tenn. Ct. App. F eb. 27, 2007). Althoug h, as not ed, Mr. Br own’s breac h of contract claim is barre d by the doctrine of res jud ic ata , w e c ann ot a g re e that th e me re fi lin g of the c la im c on sti tut e d s anc tio na ble c on du c t in violation of Rule 11.02.
Hol din g
I n light of the fore g oing, w e af firm dismiss al of Mr. B rown’s a ction based on the doctrine of re s ju dic ata

. We r ever se the trial court’s imposit ion of Rule 11 sanctions ag ains t M r. Br o wn, ho we ve r, and

the a tte nd ant a

wa rd of a tto rn e y ’s fe e s to Dr . Sh a pp le y
. I n s o d oin g , w e ob se rv e that, e xce pt f or his ri g ht t o a

pp ly for pe rm iss ion

to a pp e a l ou r d e c isi on he re to t he Te nn e sse e Sup re me Court, Mr. Br own has e x hausted a ll avenue s o f l i gati on ag ainst Dr. Shappley with respec t to the e ve nts of Marc h 2 00 5. Exe rc isi ngour dis c re tio n, c os ts of thi s a pp e a l are ta xed

to t he Ap pe lla

nt, Ki m Br own.

___________________________________ DAVI D R. FARMER, J UDGE