FILED U.S. COURT OF APPEALS ELEVENTH CIRCUIT JULY 26 2000 THOMAS K. KAHN CLERK [PUBLISH] IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

________________________ No. 99-13903

________________________ D. C. Docket No. 99-00992-CV-RLV-1 FREDERICK T. STEED, Petitioner-Appellant,
versus FREDERICK HEAD, Warden, Respondent-Appellee.

________________________ Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia

_________________________ (July 26, 2000) Before EDMONDSON and BIRCH, Circuit Judge s, and SHAPIRO *, District Judge.

_____________________________ * Honorable Norma L. Shapiro, U.S. District Judge for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, sitting by designation. BIRCH, Circuit Judge:2 Frederick T. Steed appeals the districtcourt’s denial of his habeas corpus petition as untimely. Steed contends that his petition wa s not time-barred because the statute of limitations is tolled to include the ninety day period during which he could have petitioned the United States Supreme for certiorari review of the denial of his state habeas corpus petition. Alternatively, he argues that equitable tolling applies. We affirm for the reasons that follow. I. BACKGROUND On December 9, 1994, Steed was convict ed for armed robbery and sentenced to twenty years’ imprisonment. On Fe bruary 19, 1996, a Georgia court of appeals affirmed his conviction on direct appeal . On May 10, 1996, the Georgia Supreme Court denied Steed’s petition for writ of certiorari. Steed did not petition the United States Supreme Court for certio rari review of his direct appeal. On November 6, 1996, Steed filed a petition for habeas corpus in state court which was denied on March 19, 1997. On May 4, 1998, the Geor gia Supreme Court denied Steed’s petition for a certificate of probable cause to appeal the denial of his petition. Steed did not petition the United States Supreme Court for certio rari review of the denial of his state habeas corpus petition. On April 20, 1999, Steed filed his petition for habeas corpus in federal court. The district court adopted a magistrate judge’s report and3 recommendation and denied the petition because it was time-barred. The district court reasoned that under the plain language of Section 2244(d)(2), “[a] petition for a writ of certiorari to the United Stat es Supreme Court is not partof the state post-conviction process” and does not toll the statute of limitations under Section 2244(d)(2). The court also concluded that equitable tolling was not appropriate. This appeal followed. II. DISCUSSION Standard of Review We review de novo the district court’s determina tion that the petition for federal habeas corpus relief was time-barred under section 2244(d) . See Wilcox v. Florida Dept. of Corrections , 158 F.3d 1209, 1211 n.4 (11th Cir. 1998). We affirm on the issue of whether the statute of limitations tolling provision in 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2) includes the time for seeking certiorari review by the United States Supreme Court based on Coates v. Byrd , 211 F.3d 1225 (11th Cir. 2000) (holding that "the time during which a pe tition for writ of certiorari is pending, or could have been filed, followi ng the denial of collateral relie f in the state courts, is not to be subtracted from the running of time for 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)"). Steed contends that the lim itations period is subject to equitable tolling because his calculation of the statute of limitati ons depended on an interpretation of a novel legal issue and he was require d to interpret Section 2244(d)(2 ) in the absence of “clear4 law.” We review the district court’s determination that equitable tolling is inapplicable de novo. See Sandvik v. United States , 177 F.3d 1269, 1270-71 (11th Cir. 1999); see also Justice v. United States , 6 F.3d 1474, 1478 (11th Cir. 1993). Section 2244 is a statute of limitations, nota jurisdictional bar. Therefore, it permits equitable tolling “whe n a movant untimely files because of extraordinary circumstances that are both beyond his control and unavoidable even with diligence.” Sandvik, 177 F.3d at 1271. Equitable tolling is an extraordinary remedy which is typically applied sparingly. See Irwin v. Dept. of Veterans Affairs , 498 U.S. 89, 96 (1990). Mere attorney negligence doe s not justify equitable tolling. See Sandvik , 177 F.3d at 1270; see also Justice , 6 F.3d at 1480 (quoting Irwin, 498 U.S. at 96 (“‘principles of equitable tolling . . . do not ex tend to what is at best a garden variety claim of excusable neglect’”)). An attorney’s miscalculation of the limitations period or mistake is not a basis for equitable tolling. See Harris v. Hutchinson , 209 F.3d 325, 330-31 (4th Cir. 2000) (prisoner seeking fede ral habeas corpus relief claimed that he relied on his attorney’s misinterpretati on of section 2244(d)(1) limitations period); Taliani v. Chrans , 189 F.3d 597, 597-98 (7th Cir. 1999) (prisoner seeking federal habeas corpus relief claimed that his attorney miscalculated section 2244(d)(1) limitations period due to inadequate research). Any miscalculation or misinterpretation by Steed’s attorney in in terpreting the plain language of the statute5 does not constitute an extraordinary circ umstance sufficient to warrant equitable tolling. III. CONCLUSION We conclude that Section 2244(d)(2) doe s not permit the tolling of the statute of limitations for the period of time a de fendant could have petitioned the United States Supreme Court for certiorari review of the denial of state habeas corpus relief. Moreover, the record does not support the application of the doctrine of equitable tolling. Steed’s petition for federal ha beas corpus relief was time-barred. AFFIRMED.