Blockburge r v. United States , 284 U.S. 299 (1932). 1 T EX . P EN . C ODE §19.02(b)( 3)(e mphasis added)

. 2 

## IN THE COU RT O F CR IM IN AL AP PE ALS

OF TE XAS

N O . P D - 1555 - 07

JAR ED D A N I EL LITT R EL L , A ppe l l ant

v . THE S TA TE OF TE X AS
ON APP ELLANT ’ S PET I TI ON FOR DI S CRETI ON ARY REVI EW

FROM THE S EVENTH CO URT O F AP PEALS

POTTER CO UNTY
K ELL ER , P J. , f

i l ed a di s s ent i ng opi ni on . Fe lony murder a

nd ag g ravated r o b b er y are not the “same offe nse” unde r Blockburge r 1 beca use ea ch off

ense r equire s proof of a

fac t that the other doe s not. A person c o m m its felony

m u rd er if he “c ommits or att e mp ts t o c om mi t a f e lo n y , ” a n d in th e c o u r s e o f th a t c o mm ission or

a tte mpt e d c omm iss ion , h e c a us e s the de a th of a n ind ivi du a l. F e lony mur de r t hu s r e qu ir e s th e de a th 2 of an individual, while ag g ravated robber y does not. And ag g ravated robbe ry require s a complete dLITT RELL DIS SENT — 2

433 U.S. 682 (1977). 3 Id. at 682 (e mphasis added)

. 4 Id. at 682 n.*. 5 445 U.S. 684 (1980). 6 ag g ravated robber

y , while felony murder does not. The indictment in the prese nt case trac ked the lang uag e of the felony

murder sta tute. Supreme Court prec edent in this are a, and a flood of c ases follo wing from var ious jurisdictions, have for the most par t failed to addr ess the “attempt” aspec t of t heir felony murder statutes. I n a ter se per curiam opinion in Harris v. Oklahoma , th e Sup re me Court re a c he d th e un e xce pti on a l c on c lus ion that fe lony mur de r an d rob be ry we re the same of fe ns e when the r obbery

was p ar t o f the proof r equire d to establish the felony murder. Specifica lly , the

3 Supreme Court stated: “When, as he re, c onviction of a g reater c rime, murder , cannot be had without conviction of the le sser c rime, robbery with firea

rms, the Double Jeopardy Clause bar s prosec ution fo r t he le sse r c ri me a ft e r c on vic tio n o f t he g re a te r one .” I n a foo tno te to that sen te nc e , th e Sup re me 4 Court expl icitly

set forth the assumption it was making : “ The State conce ded in its response to the petition f o r c e rti o r a r i th a t ‘ in th e M u r d e r c a s e , it w a s n e c e s s a r y f o r a ll th e in g r e d ie n ts of

the underlying f

elony of Rob b ery

with Fire arms to be pr oved.’” But in the pre sent ca se, it was not 5

nece ssary to prove the co m mission of an ag g ravated robbe ry to obtain a conviction for felony murder; pr oving a

n attempt would have suf fice d. Then in W

halen v. United States , the Supreme Court he ld that rape was a lesser- included of fe ns e of fe lony mur de r, wh e n the the or

y of fe lony mur de r w a s k ill ingthe sa me vic timin t he c ou rs e of ra pe. The Supreme Court observed tha t the District of Columbia’s definition of fe lony murder 6 require d proof of

a killing a

nd of “the commission or attempted commission of rape or of one of fiveLITT RELL DIS SENT — 3

Id. at 686. 7 Id. at 685. 8 Id. at 694. 9 4 7 6 So

. 2 d

1 6 5 , 1 6 9 ( F la

. 1 9 8 5 ) (Shaw, J ., c o n c u r r in g ) ( c a s e c it a ti o n o mi tt e d , te xt 10 substitut ed for

statutory citation). 472 A.2d 1200 (R.I . 1984). 11 other spec ified fe lonies.” But the Court made no further re fer ence to the attempt aspec t of the 7 statute, and it did not say

whether “attempt” la

ng uag e wa s included in the indictment. The Court’s discussion seems to indicate that it was not, since it char acte rized the t wo offe nses bef ore it as “ rape ”

a nd “ kil lin g the sa

me vic tim in the pe rp e tr a tio n of ra pe .” Th e Court

sa id t ha t “ pr oo f o f a

ra pe is a 8

ne c e ssa ry e le me nt o f p ro of

of the fe lon y

mur de r. ” Th e Sup re me Court ne ve r d isc us se d w ha t it 9 would have h e ld if th e D

. C. f e lo n y mu r d e r p r o s e c u ti o n h a d r e qu ir e d o n ly p r o o f th a t a r a p e wa s attempted. I n a concurring opinion in State v. Enmund , Ju s ti c e Sh a w s u c c in c tl y e xp la in e d

th e e f fec t

“ a tt e mp t” la ng uag e had in disting uishing a felony murder f rom its so-called unde rly ing of fense under Blockburge r : This proposition can be se en most clea rly by rec og nizi ng that an attempted felony can a lso be a pr e dic a te fo r f

e lo ny mur de r: the on ly

pr e dic a te pr oo f r e qu ir e d is that a felony was intended; there is no require ment to pr ove the non-intent elements of the fe lon y . A n a tte mpt e d f

e lony se rv e s ju st a s we ll as a c omp le te d f e lon y a s a pr e dic a te felony for felony murder. With this understanding of the unde rpinning of the fe lony murder r ule in mind, application of the rule of Bl oc k bu rg e r [citation om itted] to the statutory elements [of felony

murder] and the predic ate f elonies listed there in show that eac h contains at lea st one eleme nt unique to itself. 10 The Rhode I sland ca se of J e ffe rso n v . S

tat e provides a c oncre te illustration of how felony 11 murder ba sed on an att e mp t to commit the underly ing f elony is a differe nt offense than the complete dLITT RELL DIS SENT — 4

Id. at 1202. 12 Id. 13 Id. at 1202-03. 14 Id. at 1203. Se e als o People v . Ream , 481 Mich. 223, 241-242, 750 N.W.2d 536, 546- 15 47 (2008) ( First-de g ree felony murder a nd the under ly ing f

elony are differ ent offe nses under Blockburge r .). I t could be that the languag e “c ommits or attempts to commit” contained in the f elony 16 murder sta tute signifie s that a per son is guilty of fe lony murder if he at l e as t

a tte mpt s to c omm it the un de rl y ingfe lony ; e sse nti a lly , th e “ c omm it” po rt ion of the ph ra se inc or

po ra te s th e ru le codified f or attempt off

enses that “ [i ]t is no defense to prosecution for criminal attempt that the offe nse attempted w as ac tually committed.” See T EX . P EN . C ODE §15.01(c)

. un de rl y ingfe lony . In th a t c a se , th e de fe nd a nt w a s in dic te d f or bo th ro bb e ry

a nd mur de r. At

tr ia l, 12 the judg e g rante d a judg ment of ac quittal on the robbery count but instructed the jury on felony murder in the c ourse of

an attempted r obbery , and the de fenda nt was convicted of fe lony murder. 13 I n res p o n se to the def

endant’ s claim that the ac quittal on the robbery count pre cluded a

conviction for f elony murder, the Supreme Court of Rhode I sland pointed out that the applica ble fe lony murder statute permitted a conviction if the killing occur red during the perpe tration or attempted pe rpetration of c e rt a in f

e lon ie s, a nd

thu s, “ the a tte mpt

to c omm it a

ny of the e nu me ra

te d f e lon ie s ma

y se rv e a s a distinct underly ing f

elony for invoking the felony -murder rule.” The fa ilure to prove a completed 14 robber y did not necessa

rily preve nt the State from showing an attempted robbery , and thus establishing f

elony murder. 15 Of c ours e , ap pe lla

nt’ s f e lony mur de r c ha

rg e a lle g e d b oth the commission and attempted commission of ag g ravated robbe ry . But e ven if c ommissi on and attem p t wi th respec t to the

un de rl y ingof

fe ns e a re a lte rn a te me tho ds of c omm itt ing fe lony mur de r, the n a pp e lla nt p ro c e du ra lly 16 defa ulted his Double J eopar dy claim bec ause ( it appea

rs) he failed to object on those g rounds to theLITT RELL DIS SENT — 5

Lan gs v . S

tat e , 183 S.W .3d 680, 686-87, 689 (Te x . Crim. App. 2006). 17 s u b m i s s i o n o f

b o t h t h e o r i e s o f

f e l o n y m u r d e r

t o t h e j u r y. 17 Ire sp e c tf ull y dis se nt.

Filed: Oc tober 15, 2008 Pub lis h