alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
STATE of North Carolina v. Traneta Shanaia Ke CAMPBELL

No. COA18-883

Court of Appeals of North Carolina.

Filed: July 2, 2019

AFFIRMED.
No. 09-1173.

#### Richard John Florance, Jr., Petitioner v. Texas.

560 U.S. 906, 130 S. Ct. 3294,

176 L. Ed. 2d 1187,

2010 U.S. LEXIS 4005.

May 17, 2010.

Petition for writ of cer-tiorari to the Court of Appeals of Texas, Fifth District, denied.
Filed 2/11/15 P. v. Gray CA2/5 

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS 

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for 

publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication 

or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. 

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA 

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT 

DIVISION FIVE 

THE PEOPLE, 

 Plaintiff and Respondent, 

 v. 

STANLEY GRAY, 

 Defendant and Appellant. 

 B259582 

 (Los Angeles County 

 Super. Ct. No. NA094864) 

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, Mark C. 

Kim, Judge. Dismissed. 

 Murray A. Rosenberg, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant 

and Appellant. 

 No appearance for Plaintiff and Respondent. 
2

Defendant, Stanley Gray, purports to appeal from a drug conviction. On May 9, 

2014, defendant pled guilty to a drug charge. Defendant’s probable cause certificate 

issuance request was denied. We have a duty to raise issues concerning our jurisdiction 

on our own motion. (Jennings v. Marralle (1994) 8 Cal.4th 121, 126; Olson v. Cory

(1983) 35 Cal.3d 390, 398.) Thus, we issued an order to show cause concerning possible 

dismissal of the appeal and placed the matter on calendar. Defendant has failed to fully 

and timely comply with both Penal Code section 1237.5 and California Rules of Court, 

rule 8.304(b). (In re Chavez (2003) 30 Cal.4th 643, 651; People v. Mendez (1999) 19 

Cal.4th 1084, 1099; People v. Way (2003) 113 Cal.App.4th 733, 736.) Without a 

probable cause certificate, defendant cannot appeal. (People v. Kaanehe (1977) 19 

Cal.3d 1, 8; People v. Ribero (1971) 4 Cal.3d 55, 61; People v. West (1970) 3 Cal.3d 595, 

600-601; People v. Ward (1967) 66 Cal.2d 571, 574-576.) 

 The appeal is dismissed. 

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS 

 TURNER, P. J. 

We concur: 

 KRIEGLER, J. 

GOODMAN, J.*

 

* Judge of the Los Angeles Superior Court, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to 

article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.
EXHIBIT 32
                            CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
                             18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,
                             AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
                  SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002


Pursuant  to  Section  906  of  the  Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, the undersigned
officer  of  the  registrant  certifies,  to the best of his knowledge, that the
registrant's Quarterly Report on Form 10-QSB for the period ended March 31, 2004
(the  "Form  10-QSB")  fully  complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or
15(d)  of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and that the information contained
in  the  Form  10-QSB,  fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial
condition  and  results  of  operations  of  the  registrant.

Date: May 17, 2004


/s/ Masafumi Hata
Amanasu  Technologies  Corporation
Masafumi  Hata
Chairman,  President,  Director  and  Principle  Accounting  Officer
No. 09-9801.

#### Yuri Garcia, Petitioner v. United States.

559 U.S. 1099, 130 S. Ct. 2390,

176 L. Ed. 2d 780,

2010 U.S. LEXIS 3669.

April 26, 2010.

Petition for writ of cer-tiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit denied.
#### Clinton Bolick, as Mayor of the City of Fort Myers, Florida, a Municipal Corporation, *Plaintiff in Error,*v. The State of Florida, ex rel, L. A. Wingate, Frank Kellow, A. B. Cutter and Elmer Hough, Commissioners of the City of Fort Myers, Florida, a Municipal Corporation, *Defendants in Error.*

Division B.

Opinion Filed May 30, 1928.

*Clements, Clements & Craven,*Attorneys for Plaintiff in Error;

*Campbell & Campbell,*Attorneys for Defendants" in Error.

Terrell, J.

This petition in mandamus was filed on the part of the Commissioners of the City of Fort Myers against its Mayor, Clinton Boliek, seeking to require him (Clinton Bolick) as mayor of said city to sign certain refunding bonds of the said city, issued pursuant to Chapter 11855, Acts of 1927, Laws of Florida, and validated as authorized by Section 3296, *et seq.,*Revised General Statutes of Florida. To the alternative writ of mandamus answer was entered resisting the execution of the said bonds on the ground that they were issued illegally and that the *983City of Port Myers was without power to issue them. Peremptory writ of mandamus was awarded and writ of error taken to this Court.

The sole error assigned here is that the court erred in granting both the alternative and the peremptory writ of mandamus.

Examination of the record discloses that the bonds brought in question were issued for the purpose of paying for a municipal park and golf course acquired by virtue of Chapter 10100, Acts of 1925, and Chapter 12719, Acts of 1925, Laws of Florida. The last enumerated being the Charter Act of the City of Fort Myers. Inspection of these acts reveals ample authority on the part of the City of Fort Myers for acquiring lands for a municipal park and golf course. The absence of statutory authority for acquiring lands for that purpose is therefore not shown. The record further discloses that all matters of resistance set forth in the return to the alternative writ were such as could be and were in effect put in repose by the decree validating the bonds. No appeal was taken from the validation decree so the decree granting the peremptory writ is affirmed. City of Fort Myers v. State of Florida, *et al.,*decided April 14, 1928.

Affirmed.

Whitfield, P. J., and Buford, J., concur.

Ellis, C. J., and Strum and Brown, J. J., concur in the opinion and judgment.
ACCARDI v. HARTFORD UNDERWRITERS INSURANCE COMPANY

42A19-1

Supreme Court of North Carolina.

May 2, 2019

Daniel K. Bryson, Attorney at Law, J. Hunter Bryson, Attorney at Law, for Accardi, Thomas.

Stephen D. Feldman, Attorney at Law, Raleigh, Kim E. Rinehart, Attorney at Law, Pro Hac Vice, David R. Roth, Attorney at Law, Pro Hac Vice, for Hartford Underwriters Insurance Company.

Mark R. Sigmon, Attorney at Law, Raleigh, for United Policyholders.

Roger A. Peters, II, Attorney at Law, for American Property Casualty Insurance Association.

The following order has been entered on the motion filed on the 1st of May 2019 by American Property Casualty Insurance Association for leave to file Amicus Curiae Brief:

"Motion Allowed by order of the Court in conference, this the 2nd of May 2019."

Unless already submitted, the Amicus Brief shall be submitted to the court within the times allowed and in the manner provided by Appellate Rule 28(i).
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5
<LEGEND>
The schedule contains summary financial information extracted from the
consolidated financial statements for the year ended May 31, 1999 and is
qualified in its entirety by reference to such statements.
</LEGEND>

<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   YEAR
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          MAY-31-1999
<PERIOD-END>                               MAY-31-1999
<CASH>                                       1,678,175
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                1,585,432
<ALLOWANCES>                                         0
<INVENTORY>                                    594,093
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                             4,035,413
<PP&E>                                       1,074,196
<DEPRECIATION>                               (502,828)
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                               5,198,172
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                        1,860,639
<BONDS>                                              0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                      1,750
<COMMON>                                        50,403
<OTHER-SE>                                   3,101,380
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                 5,198,172
<SALES>                                      6,024,263
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                             6,024,263
<CGS>                                        1,833,238
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                1,833,238
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                             7,002,134
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                              11,880
<INCOME-PRETAX>                            (2,822,989)
<INCOME-TAX>                                         0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                        (2,822,989)
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                               (2,822,989)
<EPS-BASIC>                                      (.08)
<EPS-DILUTED>                                    (.08)


</TABLE>
Exhibit
15.3






Report
of Independent Registered Public Accounting Firm




To the
Board of Directors and Shareholders of Tomkins plc




We have
audited the accompanying consolidated balance sheets of Tomkins plc and
subsidiaries (the “Company”) as at 3 January
2009 and 29 December 2007, and the related consolidated income statements,
consolidated statements of recognised income and expense, reconciliations of
changes in consolidated shareholders’ equityand
consolidated cash flow statements for each of the three years in the period
ended 3 January 2009.  These financial statements are the
responsibility of the Company’s management.  Our responsibility is to
express an opinion on these financial statements based on our
audits.




We
conducted our audits in accordance with standards of the Public Company
Accounting Oversight Board (United States).  Those standards require that
we plan and perform the audit to obtain reasonable assurance about whether the
financial statements are free of material misstatement. An audit includes
examining, on a test basis, evidence supporting the amounts and disclosures in
the financial statements.  An audit also includes assessing the accounting
principles used and significant estimates made by management, as well as
evaluating the overall financial statement presentation.  We believe that
our audits provide a reasonable basis for our opinion.




In our
opinion, such consolidated financial statements present fairly, in all material
respects, the financial position of Tomkins plc and subsidiaries as at 3 January
2009 and 29 December 2007, and the results of their operations and their cash
flows for each of the three years in the period ended 3 January 2009, in
conformity with International Financial Reporting Standards as issued by the
International Accounting Standards Board.




We have
also audited, in accordance with the standards of the Public Company Accounting
Oversight Board (United States), the Company’s internal control over financial
reporting as at 3 January 2009, based on the criteria established in Internal Control—Integrated
Frameworkissued by the Committee of Sponsoring Organizations of the
Treadway Commission and our report
dated       24 February 2009 expressed an
unqualified opinion on the effectiveness of the Company’s internal control over
financial reporting.









Deloitte
LLP




London,
United Kingdom


24
February 2009
31 October 2019 *********************

NSN: 8940-01-523-0786 (NMM) * MONOGRAPH M8K

 *********************

Item: Nuts and raisins with pan coated chocolate disks (Type II)

Document: PCR-N-003, Nut and Fruit Mix, Packaged in a Flexible Pouch, Shelf Stable

Approximate Caloric Value Per Serving: 370 Component Classification: Primary

Estimated Shelf Life: 36 months at 80°F

Item Characteristics

Appearance:

Free flowing mixture of peanuts, walnuts, almonds, filberts, raisins, and pan coated 

chocolate disks. Free of clumped ingredients that cannot be broken with light pressure. 

Pan coated chocolate disks have a glossy candy shell in at least five different vibrant 

colors and a double-convex lens shape.

Odor: Unsalted, shelled, roasted peanuts, walnuts, almonds, filberts, raisins and sweet milk 

chocolate.

Flavor: Unsalted, shelled, roasted peanuts, walnuts, almonds, filberts, raisins and sweet milk 

chocolate.

Texture: Firm to crunchy nuts; moist, chewy raisins; pan coated chocolate disks cannot be easily 

crushed or cracked.

Possible Deteriorative Changes 

Appearance: All components darkened or clumped together. Nuts and pan coated disks crushed or 

broken.

Odor: Stale, rancid nuts or pan coated disks.

Flavor: Stale, rancid nuts or pan coated disks.

Texture: Soft nuts; dry, hard raisins; hard, cracked/broken pan coated disks.

Unique Examination/Test Procedures

Product is considered serviceable if clumps of nuts, raisins, and pan coated chocolate disks can be 

broken with light pressure.
Special Notes

This pouched product shall be nitrogen flushed or contain an oxygen scavenger. If defect such as 

oxidized or rancid odors or flavors exist, they are likely due to package failure or the absence of an 

oxygen scavenger. There may be some loose and/or detached skins and peanut splits.
STATE v. Norfolk Junior BEST

300A93-3

Supreme Court of North Carolina.

June 27, 2019

Jonathan P. Babb, Special Counsel to Attorney General, Jon David, District Attorney, for State of North Carolina.

Michael Unti, Raleigh, Jay H. Ferguson, Durham, Erica W. Washington, Attorney at Law, for Best, Norfolk Junior.

From Bladen (93CRS2621 93CRS2622 93CRS2622 93CRS2621)

The following order has been entered on the Motion for Extension of Time to File Brief filed on the 26th of June 2019 by Defendant:

"Motion Allowed for sixty days by order of the Court in conference, this the 27th of June 2019."

*208Defendant shall have up to and including the 26th day of August, 2019 to file and serve his/her brief with this Court.
* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this

opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited

circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

FILED

May 16, 2005

Charles R. Fulbruge III

Clerk

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

 

No. 04-20504

Summary Calendar

 

TUNDE HARRY WILLIAMS,

Petitioner-Appellant,

versus

ROBERT MASON, Officer in Charge, HIPOLITO ACOSTA,

District Director, Immigration Naturalization Service;

ALBERTO R. GONZALES, U.S. ATTORNEY GENERAL;

ANY OTHER PERSON HAVING PLAINTIFF IN CUSTODY,

Respondents-Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of Texas

USDC No. 4:04-CV-1877

Before JONES, BARKSDALE, and PRADO, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

Tunde Harry Williams appeals the district court’s

dismissal of his petition for writ of habeas corpus filed pursuant

to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. In his petition, Williams argued that the INS

deprived him of his right to Fifth Amendment due process by not

reopening his removal proceeding so that he could pursue adjustment

of status under the Legal Immigration and Family Equity (LIFE) Act,
2

8 U.S.C. § 1255(i). He challenged the decisions of the Board of

Immigration Appeals (BIA) denying his motion to reopen his removal

proceeding and also denying his motion to reconsider the BIA’s

denial of his motion to reopen. Finding no error, we AFFIRM.

The district court correctly concluded that it lacked

jurisdiction for three reasons. First, Williams seeks review of

the Attorney General’s decision to execute a removal order, review

of which is precluded under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(g). See Cardoso v.

Reno, 216 F.3d 512, 516-17 (5th Cir. 1999). Second, because

Williams’s motion to reopen his case was filed untimely, he failed

to exhaust his administrative remedies, which precluded the

district court from exercising jurisdiction over his claims. See

Enriquez-Alvarado v. Ashcroft, 371 F.3d 246, 248 (5th Cir. 2004).

Finally, because no legal standard exists against which to judge

the BIA’s decision not to exercise its sua sponte authority to

reopen Williams’s removal proceeding and not to reconsider that

decision, the district court lacked jurisdiction to review the

BIA’s discretionary decisions. See id. at 250; see also Bravo v.

Ashcroft, 341 F.3d 590, 592 (5th Cir. 2003) (“Although federal

courts retain habeas jurisdiction to review statutory and

constitutional claims, there is no jurisdiction to review denials

of discretionary relief.”).

The district court also denied Williams’s alternative

request for a transfer of his case to this court for direct review

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1631. For the reasons set forth above,
3

transfer of this action by the district court would not have been

proper because this case could not have been brought in this court

at the time that it was filed. See 28 U.S.C. § 1631.

Accordingly, the judgment of the district court is

AFFIRMED.
<PAGE>

                                                         Exhibit 23

                     Consent Of Independent Auditors


     We consent to the incorporation by reference in the Registration 
Statement (Form S-8 No. 33-91056) pertaining to the Employee Stock
Purchase Plans of Granite Broadcasting Corporation of our report dated
January 24, 1997, with respect to the consolidated financial statements
and the financial statement schedule of Granite Broadcasting Corporation
included in its Form 10-K/A for the year ended December 31, 1996, filed
with the Securities and Exchange Commission.


                                    /s/ Ernst & Young LLP
                                        ------------------


New York, New York
June 26, 1997
George Reynold EVANS v. Ernie LEE, Onslow County District Attorney and State of North Carolina

No. 60P19

Supreme Court of North Carolina.

March 27, 2019

George Reynold Evans, for Evans, George Reynold.

Daniel P. O'Brien, Special Deputy Attorney General, for State of N.C., et al.

***ORDER***

Upon consideration of the petition filed by Petitioner on the 15th of February 2019 in *249this matter for a writ of mandamus, the following order was entered and is hereby certified to the Superior Court, Onslow County:

"Denied by order of the Court in conference, this the 27th of March 2019."

The following order has been entered on the motion filed on the 15th of February 2019 by Petitioner to Proceed In Forma Pauperis:

"Motion Allowed by order of the Court in conference, this the 27th of March 2019."
<PAGE>

                                                                    Exhibit 32.2

                    CERTIFICATION OF CHIEF OPERATING OFFICER
                       PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350

      In connection with the accompanying Quarter Report on Form 10-Q of the
      Company for the three months ended June 30, 2005, I, Douglas N. Biddle,
      Chief Operating Officer of the Company, hereby certify pursuant to 18
      U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the
      Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 that:

            1)    such Quarter Report on Form 10-Q of the Company for the three
                  months ended June 30, 2005, fully complies with the
                  requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities
                  Exchange Act of 1934; and

            2)    the information contained in such Quarter Report on Form 10-Q
                  of the Company for the three months ended June 30, 2005,
                  fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial
                  condition and results of operations of Plumas Bancorp.

Date: August 11, 2005                   /s/ D. N. Biddle
                                     -----------------------------------
                                     Douglas N. Biddle, Chief Operating Officer
## United States Court of Appeals FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________ No. 08-3492

___________ Roberta R. Cano, * * Appellant, * * Appeal from the United States v. * District Court for the * Eastern District of Missouri. Timothy F. Geithner, Secretary of the * United States Department of the * [UNPUBLISHED] Treasury, * * Appellee. *

___________ Submitted: November 24, 2009 Filed: November 30, 2009

___________ Before WOLLMAN, RILEY, and SMITH, Circuit Judges.

___________ PER CURIAM. Roberta Cano (Cano) appeals the district court’s 1 adverse grant of summary judgment in this pro se Title VII complaint in which she claimed that she was denied a promotion based on reverse discrimination, and that she suffered retaliation, harassment, a hostile work environment, and constructive discharge when she

1 The Honorable Frederick R. Buckles, Un ited States Magistrate Judge for the Eastern District of Missouri, to whom the case was referred for final disposition by consent of he parties pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c).complained about the promotion. For th e following reasons, we affirm the grant of summary judgment. See Johnson v. Blaukat , 453 F.3d 1108, 1112 (8th Cir. 2006) (standard of review). First, we find Cano failed to estab lish a prima facie case of reverse discrimination, see Duffy v. Wolle , 123 F.3d 1026, 1036 (8th Cir. 1997) (burden), and, regardless, Cano failed to create a trialworthy issue of whether her employer’s legitimate nondiscriminatory reasons for prom oting another employee were pretextual, see McCullough v. Univ. of Ark. for Med. Scis. , 559 F.3d 855, 864 (8th Cir. 2009) (burden-shifting). Second, we find Cano’s retaliation claim is without merit, because she was not subjected to the type of materially adverse employment actions that would deter a reasonable employee from enga ging in protected activity. See Turner v. Gonzales , 421 F.3d 688, 695-96 (8th Cir. 2005) (pri ma facie case of retaliation); see also Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White , 548 U.S. 53, 68 (2006) (explaining that a plaintiff must show a reasonabl e employee would have found the challenged actions materially adverse, rather than trivial harms). Similarly, Cano’s allegations do not support a constructive-discharge claim, see MacGregor v. Mallinckrodt, Inc. , 373 F.3d 923, 928 (8th Cir. 2004) (constructive discharge), or a hostile-workenvironment claim, see Anda v. Wickes Furniture Co. , 517 F.3d 526, 531-32 (8th Cir. 2008) (prima facie case of hostile work environment).
We affirm.

______________________________

-2-
David HOLLAND, Employee, Plaintiff v. PARRISH TIRE COMPANY, Employer, Accident Fund Insurance Co., Carrier, Defendants.

No. COA18-809

Court of Appeals of North Carolina.

Filed: July 16, 2019

REVERSED.