J-A26031-20

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

v.

ABRAHAM MICHELE MAMAN 

Appellant

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 3443 EDA 2019

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered October 30, 2019

In the Court of Common Pleas of Montgomery County Criminal Division 

at No(s): CP-46-CR-0002330-2019

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

v.

ABRAHAM MICHELE MAMAN 

Appellant

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 3444 EDA 2019

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered October 2, 2019

In the Court of Common Pleas of Montgomery County Criminal Division 

at No(s): CP-46-CR-0000524-2019

BEFORE: BENDER, P.J.E., LAZARUS, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E.*

MEMORANDUM BY STEVENS, P.J.E.: FILED OCTOBER 19, 2020

Appellant Abraham Michele Maman appeals the judgment of sentence 

entered by the Court of Common Pleas of Montgomery County after Appellant 

pled guilty on two separate dockets to unlawful contact or communication with 

a minor (photographing, videotaping, depicting on computer or filming sexual 

____________________________________________

* Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.
J-A26031-20

- 2 -

acts), indecent assault, corruption of minors, and sexual abuse of children. 

For the reasons that follow, we affirm the judgment of sentence with the 

exception that we eliminate the condition that the trial court placed on 

Appellant’s release from imprisonment.

The trial court summarized the factual background of this case as 

follows:

[Appellant] was previously the manager of a Roots 

Restaurant in East Norriton, PA. Between May 1, 2018 and 

December 8, 2018, on multiple occasions, [Appellant] met with an 

employee of the restaurant named A.G. inside his office at the 

restaurant. A.G. is a male who was under the age of sixteen (16). 

On one occasion, [Appellant] brought the victim into his office and 

put his hands over and underneath the victim’s pants and 

performed masturbation on him. During this incident, a 

surveillance camera inside the office was able to transmit video of 

the encounter to [Appellant’s] computer. On another occasion, 

[Appellant] drove A.G. home from work and offered him $100.00 

to allow [Appellant to] perform oral sex on him. 

Trial Court Opinion (T.C.O.), 2/13/20, at 1-2.

On June 11, 2019, Appellant entered an open guilty plea to the 

aforementioned charges. On October 2, 2019, the trial court imposed the 

following individual sentences: 54-108 months of imprisonment for the 

unlawful contact or communication with a minor charge, 6-12 months of

imprisonment for the indecent assault charge, 6-12 months of imprisonment

for the corruption of minors charge, and 22-42 months of imprisonment for 

the sexual abuse of minors charge. The trial court indicated that all the 

sentences would run consecutively with the exception of the sexual abuse of 
J-A26031-20

- 3 -

children charge. As a result, Appellant received an aggregate sentence of 66 

to 132 months (51⁄2-11 years) of imprisonment.

On October 11, 2019, Appellant filed timely-post sentence motions, 

arguing that his aggregate term of imprisonment was unduly harsh and 

requesting a lesser aggregate sentence of three to six years of imprisonment. 

On October 30, 2019, the trial court modified Appellant’s sentence on the 

sexual abuse of children charge to 21-42 months of imprisonment1 and denied 

Appellant’s post-sentence motions.

On November 22, 2019, Appellant filed a motion to submit supplemental 

post-sentence motions nunc pro tunc, which the trial court subsequently 

denied. On November 27, 2019, Appellant filed this timely appeal. 

Appellant also complied with the trial court’s direction to file a concise 

statement of errors complained of on appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b).

Appellant raises the following issues for our review on appeal:

I. Whether the Sentencing Court had lawful authority to impose 

conditions of Appellant’s parole from a state sentence?

II. Whether the imposition of consecutive guideline sentences 

resulted in a manifestly unreasonable aggregate sentence, when, 

in formulating such a sentence, the Sentencing Court improperly 

relied upon conclusions based on personal beliefs which were 

contrary to the evidence presented at sentencing, and wholly 

failed to consider the rehabilitative needs of [Appellant] in 

contravention of Section 9721(b) of the Sentencing Code?

Appellant’s Brief, at 4.

____________________________________________

1 As this sentence ran concurrently to the other individual sentences, it did 

not affect Appellant’s aggregate sentence.
J-A26031-20

- 4 -

First, Appellant argues that the trial court had no authority to impose 

conditions on his parole to prohibit Appellant from contacting the victim, 

having any unsupervised contact with minors, and from being within 1,000 

feet of any school or playground. While Appellant raises this argument for the 

first time on appeal, this claim is a challenge to the legality of his sentence, 

and thus, unwaivable. See Commonwealth v. Alexander, 16 A.3d 1152, 

1154-55 (Pa.Super. 2011) (citing Commonwealth v. Wilson, 11 A.3d 519 

(Pa.Super. 2010) (en banc) (finding that a challenge to the trial court’s 

authority to impose conditions on a defendant’s probation or parole constitutes 

a challenge to the legality of sentence which is unwaivable).

We agree that the trial court did not have the authority to impose this 

restriction. This Court has held that “the Pennsylvania Board of Probation and 

Parole [(PBPP)] has exclusive authority to determine parole when the offender 

is sentenced to a maximum term of imprisonment of two or more years.” 

Commonwealth v. Coulverson, 34 A.3d 135, 141 (Pa.Super. 2011)

(quoting Commonwealth v. Mears, 972 A.2d 1210 (Pa.Super. 2009)). In

Coulverson, this Court found that the trial court exceeded its authority in 

imposing a condition that Appellant have no contact with his victims or their 

families upon his release on parole. Coulverson, 34 A.3d at 141-42. See 

also 61 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 6132(a) and (b)(1), (2) (codifying the principle 

established in Mears). 
J-A26031-20

- 5 -

In this case, as Appellant was sentenced to a maximum term of 

imprisonment of more than two years, the PBPP has exclusive authority to 

determine his parole. 

To the extent that the trial court’s sentencing order imposes conditions 

of parole, we vacate those conditions. We note that “[t]his Court has the 

authority to correct an illegal sentence directly rather than to remand the case 

for re-sentencing as long as we do not disrupt the trial court’s sentencing 

scheme in doing so.” Commonwealth v. Melvin, 103 A.3d 1, 56 (Pa.Super. 

2014) (citation omitted). As our elimination of the trial court’s condition upon 

Appellant’s release from prison does not disrupt the trial court’s sentencing 

scheme, we need not remand for resentencing.

Second, Appellant argues that the trial court abused its discretion in (1) 

imposing consecutive guideline sentences that resulted in a manifestly 

unreasonable aggregate sentence, (2) improperly relying upon conclusions 

based on personal beliefs which were contrary to the evidence presented at 

sentencing, and (3) failing to consider Appellant’s rehabilitative needs.

However, it is well-established that “[a] challenge to the discretionary 

aspects of sentencing does not entitle an appellant to review as of right.” 

Commonwealth v. Bynum-Hamilton, 135 A.3d 179, 184 (Pa.Super. 2016). 

In order to invoke this Court’s jurisdiction to address such a challenge, the 

appellant must satisfy the following four-part test: the appellant must (1) file 

a timely notice of appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 902, 903; (2) preserve the 

issues at sentencing or in a timely post-sentence motion pursuant to 
J-A26031-20

- 6 -

Pa.R.Crim.P. 720; (3) ensure that the appellant’s brief does not have a fatal 

defect as set forth in Pa.R.A.P. 2119(f); and (4) set forth a substantial 

question that the sentence appealed from is not appropriate under the 

Sentencing Code under 42 Pa.C.S. § 9781(b). Id. 

Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal and a timely post-sentence 

motion. However, the sole issue Appellant raised in his post-sentence motion 

was his claim that his aggregate sentence was manifestly excessive due to the 

consecutive nature of his individual sentences. It is well-established that 

“issues challenging the discretionary aspects of sentence must be raised in a 

post-sentence motion or by presenting the claim during the sentencing 

proceedings. Absent such efforts, an objection to a discretionary aspect of a 

sentence is waived.” Commonwealth v. Heaster, 171 A.3d 268 (Pa.Super. 

2017) (quoting Commonwealth v. Lamonda, 52 A.3d 365, 371 (Pa.Super. 

2012) (en banc)). As such, while Appellant properly preserved his challenge 

to the trial court’s decision to run his sentences consecutively, we deem all 

other challenges raised in Appellant’s appellate brief to be waived. 

We must also determine whether Appellant has raised a substantial 

question for our review. 

The determination of what constitutes a substantial question must 

be evaluated on a case-by-case basis. A substantial question 

exists only when the appellant advances a colorable argument 

that the sentencing judge's actions were either: (1) inconsistent 

with a specific provision of the Sentencing Code; or (2) contrary 

to the fundamental norms which underlie the sentencing process.
J-A26031-20

- 7 -

Commonwealth v. Caldwell, 117 A.3d 763, 768 (Pa.Super. 2015). (internal 

citations omitted). 

With respect to a lower court’s discretion to impose consecutive 

sentences, our Court has provided the following:

Although Pennsylvania's system stands for individualized 

sentencing, the court is not required to impose the “minimum 

possible” confinement. Under 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9721, the court has 

discretion to impose sentences consecutively or concurrently and, 

ordinarily, a challenge to this exercise of discretion does not raise 

a substantial question. The imposition of consecutive, rather 

than concurrent, sentences may raise a substantial 

question in only the most extreme circumstances, such as 

where the aggregate sentence is unduly harsh, considering the 

nature of the crimes and the length of imprisonment. 

Commonwealth v. Moury, 992 A.2d 162, 171–72 (Pa.Super. 2010) 

(citations omitted) (emphasis added). This Court has emphasized that the 

key to resolving the preliminary substantial question inquiry is whether the 

decision to sentence consecutively raises the aggregate sentence to, what 

appears upon its face to be, an excessive level in light of the criminal conduct 

at issue in the case.” Commonwealth v. Mastromarino, 2 A.3d 581, 588 

(Pa.Super. 2010) (quoting Commonwealth v. Gonzalez-Dejusus, 994 A.2d 

595, 598–99 (Pa.Super. 2010)).

Specifically, Appellant claims the trial court’s decision to run his 

individual sentences (which all fell in the standard range of the sentencing 

guidelines) consecutively resulted in an unreasonable aggregate sentence as 

Appellant accepted responsibility for his crimes and expressed remorse.
J-A26031-20

- 8 -

Appellant makes no attempt to articulate any reasons why the 

imposition of consecutive sentences in this case is unduly harsh considering 

the nature of the crimes and the length of his aggregate term of imprisonment. 

In this case, Appellant took advantage of his position as the victim’s employer 

to manipulate the victim into allowing Appellant to molest him. The trial court 

emphasized that Appellant befriended and groomed the victim in his position 

of trust and exploited the victim’s vulnerability. Notes of Testimony (N.T.), 

Sentencing, 10/2/19, at 55-58. As such, the trial court found that Appellant 

preyed upon the minor victim for his own sexual gratification. Id.

In addition, Appellant recorded the sexual assault through the 

restaurant’s surveillance system and arranged for the video to be sent to his 

computer. Furthermore, Appellant sought to assault the minor victim on a 

subsequent occasion by offering the victim $100 to allow Appellant to give the 

victim oral sex, which the victim resisted.

Based on the record before this Court, we find that Appellant’s 

aggregate sentence of 51⁄2 -11 years of imprisonment is neither unduly harsh 

nor excessive in light of Appellant’s criminal conduct. As such, Appellant has 

not raised a substantial question for our review and his challenge to the 

discretionary aspects of his sentence is meritless.

Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of sentence after modification of 

the sentence as described hereinabove to eliminate the condition that the trial 

court placed on Appellant’s release from imprisonment.
J-A26031-20

- 9 -

Judgment of sentence affirmed with appropriate correction. Jurisdiction 

relinquished.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 10/19/20