IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF MISSISSIPPI NO. 2015-CA-00252-COA LINDA FAY BARNETT-PHILLIPS A/K/A LINDA BARNETT-PHILLIPS A/K/A LINDA BARNETT APPELLANT

v. STATE OF MISSISSIPPI APPELLEE DATE OF JUDGMENT: 01/16/2015 TRIAL JUDGE: HON. W ILLIAM E. CHAPMAN III COURT FROM W HICH APPEALED: RANKIN COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT: CODY W ILLIAM GIBSON PERCY STANFIELD JR. W I LLIAM SCOTT MULLENNIX ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE: OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL BY: SCOTT STUART NATURE OF THE CASE: CIVIL - POST-CONVICTION RELIEF TRIAL COURT DISPOSITION: MOTION FOR POST-CONVICTION RELIEF DISMISSED DISPOSITION: AFFIRMED - 06/14/2016 MOTION FOR REHEARING FILED: MANDATE ISSUED: BEFORE IRVING, P.J., BARNES AND GREENLEE, JJ. GREENLEE, J., FOR THE COURT: ¶1. Linda Fay Barnett-Phillips appeals the dism is s a l o f h er m otion f or post-conviction relief

. Because we f

ind her m otion is without m erit, w e af f irm the circuit court’s dism issal. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND ¶2. On June 11, 2012, Barnett-Phillips pleaded guilty to two counts of sale of ten dosage units (DU) of a lprazolam , m ore comm only known as X anax or Niravam

. On count one, the circuit court sentenced Barnett-Phillips to twenty y ears’ incarceration, with f if teen y ears toserve and f ive y ears of post- r e l e a s e supervision. On count two, the circuit court sentenced Barnett-Phi l l i p s t o twenty y e ars, with one day to s erve an d f ive y ears of post-release supervision. Th e c i r c u i t court entered the judgm ent on June 20, 2012. Barnett-Phillips did not appeal. ¶3. In the 2 0 1 4 r e g u l a r s e s s i on, approxim ately one and o ne-half y ears af t er BarnettPhi llips was sentenced, the M ississippi Legislature am ended M ississippi Code Annotated

s e c t i o n s 4 1 -29-139 and 47-7-3, changing the m axim um s e ntence f

or sale of alprazolam in the am ount f

or which Barnett-Phillips pleaded guilty f r om twenty

y ears to eight y ears, and changing the criteria f

o r parole eligibility

. 2014 Miss. Laws ch. 457, §§ 37, 40 (H.B. 585). The Legislature did n o t provide that the changed m axim um sentence s hould apply retroactively

. See 2014 Miss. Laws ch. 457 (H.B. 585). ¶4. On Decem

ber 11, 2014, Barnett-Phillips f i led in the circuit court a “Petition f or PostConviction Relief [ (PCR)] and Motion f or Recomm e ndation to the Mississippi Parole Board [ (Parole Board)] f

or E arly Release.” On January 1 6, 2015, the circuit court dism issed the PCR petition and declined to r ecomm end t o the Parole Board that Barnett-P h i l l i p s be paroled. The c ircuit court f ound f rom the f ace o f Barnett-Phillips’s petition and m o tion that she w as not entitled to any relief and entered an order of

dism issal under Mississippi Code Annotated section 99-39-11(2) (Rev. 2015). The c ircuit court also declined to recomm end
to the P arole B oard that Barnett-Phillips be p a r o l e d under Mississippi Code Annotated section 47-7-3. Barnett-Phillips a ppeals the dism issal and f

ailure to recomm end parole to this

2Court. DISCUSSION

¶5. W e review the d ism i s s a l o f a P C R m otion under an abuse-of -discretion standard.
W illiams v. State , 110 So. 3d 840, 842 (¶11) (Miss. C t. App. 2013). W e will only reverse if the circuit court’s decision was clearly e rroneous. Id

. W e review questions o f law de novo. Id

. ¶6. On appeal, Barnett-Phillips argues th e c i r c u i t c o u r t e rred in d ism issing her PCR

m otion because it f

ailed to retroactively apply am endm ents to the s t a t u t e u nder which she

was sentenced. 1 S he also argues that the c i r c u i t c o u r t e rred in not granting a positive

recomm endation of

parole. 2 W e f

ind Barnett-Phillips’s argum e n ts are without m erit.
I. Unlaw ful and Unconstitutional Sentence ¶7. Under Mississippi Code Annotated section 9 9-19-1 (Rev. 2015), a statutory change

1 B arn ett-P h i llip s cites M i ssissip p i C o d e A n n o t at e d s e c t i on 41- 29- 139( b ) ( 4)(A ). T h at sectio n ap p lies t o th e sale o f less th a n ten D U o f alp razo lam . S h e w as co n v icted o f sale o f ten D U o f alp razo lam

. S o sectio n 4 1

- 2 9 -1 3 9 (b )(4 )(B ) w o u ld b e th e c o rrect su b sectio n if th e cu rren t v ersio n o f th e statu te ap p lied

. B u t as d iscu ssed in th i s o p in io n , th e statu te d o es n o t ap p ly retro activ ely

. 2 B arn ett-P h i llip s o n ly c h allen g es th e d en i al o f h er req u est f o r ju d icia l a u th o riza tio n o f p aro le elig i b ility , n o t w h eth er sh e is elig ib le f o r p aro l e. T h u s w e d o n o t a d d ress th e issu e o f h er p ar o le elig ib ility

. H o w e v er, in S in ko v. S ta te , 2 0 1 5

- C A -0 0 1 0 7 -C O A , 2 0 1 6 WL 1 4 2 3 4 3 0 (M iss. C t. A p p . A p r . 1 2 , 2 0 1 6 ), w e h eld th at, b ased o n o th er p arts o f th e 2 0 1 4 leg islatio n cited a

b o v e, a d ef

en d an t w h o w as co n v icted u n d e r s e ctio n 4 1 -2 9 -1 3 9 (a), n o t in ex cess o f th e am o u n ts sp ecif i ed in sectio n 4 1 -2 9 -1 3 9 (b ), p rio r to Ju ly 1 , 2 0 1 4 , w as n o lo n g er in elig ib le f

o r p aro le b y reaso n o f th at co n v i ctio n . In ad d itio n , th e G o v ern o r recen tly sig n ed in to law a m easu re clarif

yin g ex p an sio n o f p aro le elig ib ility f o r p erso n s co n v i cted o f sellin g o r m an u f actu r in g co n tro lled su b stan ces. S ee 2 0 1 6 M iss. L aw s H .B . 1 0 7

. 3a ff

e cting conviction or sentencing has no a pplication t o crim es c omm itted prior to enactm ent of the change, unless specif ically stated in the am ending s tatute. Miss. Code Ann. § 99-19-1.
W h ile the Legislature can perm it the trial court to resentence a def e n dant f or a m ilder
sentence where s uch a

uthorization is specif

ically s tated i n the am ended l aw, section 99-19-1 expressly states that the previous law will “rem ain in ef f ect f or the purpose o f p r o v i d i ng punishm ent, unless otherwise specially provided in the new statute.” 3 McBride v. State , 914 So. 2 d 260, 264 (¶11) ( Miss. Ct. App. 2005) (quoting Lampley v. State , 308 So. 2d 87, 90 (Miss. 1975)). ¶8. T he right to be f

ree f rom an unlawf

ul sentence is a f

undam ental right. Alexander v. State , 879 So. 2d 512, 514 (¶9) (Miss. Ct. App. 2004). “W hen a statute i s am ended to provide f or a lesser penalty , and the am endm ent takes ef f ect bef ore sentencing, the trial court m ust sentence according to the statute as am e nded.” Culbert v. State , 800 So. 2d 546, 552 (¶19) (Miss. Ct. App. 2001) (citing Daniels v. State , 742 So. 2d 1140, 1145 (¶17) (Miss. 1999)). However, when a person is sentenced prior to a statute’s am endm ent, the p e n a lty of the
statute as it existed at the tim e of sente n cing a p plies. I d

. ( citing Davis v. State , 738 So. 2d 299, 300 (¶3) (Miss. Ct. App. 1999)).

3 U n d er M ississip p i C o d e A n n o tated sectio n 9 9 -1 9 -3 3 (R ev . 2 0 1 5 ), “w h e n a statu te is am e n d ed to p ro v id e f o r a lesser p e n a lty , an d th e am en d m e n t tak es ef f ect b ef o re sen ten cin g , th e trial co u rt m u st sen ten ce acco rd i n g to th e statu te as am en d ed .” D a n iels v. S ta te , 7 4 2 S o . 2 d 1 1 4 0 , 1 1 4 5 (¶1 7 ) (M iss. 1 9 9 9 ). H o w ev e r, w e f in d th at sectio n 9 9 -1 9 -3 3 d o es n o t ap p ly t o B arn e t t

- P h i l l ip s as sh e w as co n v icted a n d sen ten ced y ears b ef o re M ississip p i C o d e A n n o tated sect i on 4 1 -2 9

- 1 3 9 , th e sen ten c in g statu te ap p l icab le to B arn ettP h illip s , w as am en d ed

. 4¶9. Barnett-Phillips argues the circuit court should resentence her in accord a n c e w i t h

section 41-29-139 as am ended in 2014; that we should ignore section 9 9-19-1 beca use its application is archaic; and that section 99-19-33 allows her to avail herself of the am ended version based on tim i ng alone. W e disagree. ¶10. The law is clear on this m atter, and w e have specif ically stated that a s entence is not

m ade unlawf

ul u pon the p assage of an am endm ent to the sentencing statute af ter the sentence has becom e f

inal. McBride , 914 So. 2d at 264 (¶11) (citing Lampley , 308 So. 2d at 90). The revision to section 41-29-139 was ma d e ef f e ctive July 1, 2014, nearly two y ears af ter Barnett-Phillips’s sentencing o n J une 11, 2012. The Legislature could have required resentencing under the am ended statute, but it d id not. Further, the Legislature, through the plain text of section 99-19-1, has s t a ted that if it m eans f o r a sentencing statute to be retroactive, then it will say so in the text o f the statute i tself

. W e f ind B arnett-Phillips’s claim that she should be resentenced under the am e n ded version of the statute is without m erit. ¶11. Barnett-Phillips argues that Mississippi Code Annotated section 99-19-33 allows her
to benef it f rom the new law b ased on the tim ing of the sentencing rather than the c o mm ission of the crim e. M i s s . C o d e A nn. § 99-19-33. “This section gives the trial judge the right to
sentence one c onvicted of [ a] crim e af ter the law has been changed so as to perm it a m ilder
sentence bef

ore the con v i ction has becom e f i nal.” Lampley , 308 So. 2 d at 90. The statute gives the c ircuit court judge the a bility to sentence according to the m ilder punishm ent when the sentencing law changes between the date of c o n v i ction and the conviction becom ing

5f

inal. Here, Barnett-Phillips’s conviction becam e f inal when s he did not appeal. T h e s t at utory changes to s ection 41-29-139 were m ade a f ter Barnett-Phillips’s c o n v i ction b ecam e f inal. Section 99-19-33 has no bearing on B arnett-Phillips, and we, theref o re, f ind her argum ent without m erit. ¶12. Barnett-Phillips f

urther argues that this Court can ignore section 99-19-1 because it is archaic. Barnett-Phillips does not provide any authority to reinf o rce her claim that we m ay ignore a statute sim

ply because it has been in ef f e c t longer than others. F ailure to cite any authority m ay b e t r e a t e d as a procedural bar, and the Court is under no duty to consider assignm ents of error in such instances. W illiams v
. State , 708 So. 2d 1 358, 1 361 (¶12) (Miss. 1998). This Court f

inds this issue is without m erit.
II. Denial of Parole Recom m endation ¶13. Any of

f ender, not having comm itted a violent crim e under section 97-3-2, and having served twenty -f

ive percent or m ore of

her sentence, m ay be paroled by the Parole Board if the sentencing judge authorizes the of f ender to be e l igible f

or parole consider a t i o n . M iss. Code Ann. § 47-7-3(1)(g)(iii). ¶14. Barnett-Phillips argues that the circuit c o urt erred when i t declined to recomm end to the Parole Board that she be deem ed parole e ligible. 4 She again p oints t o the a m ended parts of Mississippi Code Annotated section 47-7-3 and a “Task Force F i n a l Report” f or House

4 B arn e tt-P h illip s cites M ississip p i C o d e A n n o tated sectio n “4 7 -7

- 7 (3 )(1 )(f )” f o r statu to ry au th o rity

. S ectio n 4 7 -7 -7 w a s rep ealed ef f e c tiv e Ju ly 1 , 1 9 7 6

. We a s su m e th at sh e m ean t sectio n 4 7 -7 -3 (1 )(f ). 6Bill 585—the b ill that m ade the am endm ents to section 47-7-3 law. Though this report does

provide som e insight into the l egislative intent behind the am endm ents, it is n ot controlling in this situation. The plain language of the statute i s unam biguous and clear. Davis , 750 So. 2d at 1233. There is no need to resort to rules of statutory interpretation when the language used by the Legislature is unam biguous and clear. Davis v. Pub. Emps’ Ret. Sys. , 750 So. 2d 1225, 1233 (¶25) (Miss. 1999). ¶15. The p lain language of section 47-7-3 unam biguously p r o v i d e s that the circuit court judge h ad discretion to issue a positive or negative recomm endation f or parole eligibility

. It

uses the w ord “m ay ” regarding recomm ending parole e ligibility , n ot “shall.” “A basic tenet of s tatutory construction is that ‘ shall’ is m andatory and ‘m ay ’ is discretionary .” Khurana v. Miss. Dep’t of Revenue , 85 So. 3 d 851, 854 (¶9) (Miss. 2012). Barnett-Phillips’s claim that the c ircuit court erred b y issuing a negative r ecomm e ndation f or parole e ligibility is without

m erit. ¶16. F u r t h e r mo r e , t he Mississippi Suprem e Court has ordered t h a t t h e d e n i a l o f a

recomm endation to the Parole Board f or an early release and/or parole, pursuant to section 47-7-3, “f ail[ s] to im

plicate an appealable judgm ent.” Gamage v. State , No. 2015-CP-00593- SCT (Miss. Oct. 8, 2015) (en banc order). CONCLUSION ¶17. Because we f

i n d B a rnett-Phillips’s c laim s are without m erit, we af f irm the circuit court’s dis mi s s al of her PCR m otion. The negative recomm endation f or p arole e ligibility ,

7pursuant to t he suprem e court’s en banc order i n G amage v. State , is not an a ppealable judgm ent. ¶18. THE JUD G MENT OF THE C IRCUIT COURT O F R ANKIN COUNTY DISMISSING THE MOTION FOR POST-CONVICTION RELIEF IS AFFIRMED. ALL COSTS OF THIS APPEAL ARE ASSESSED TO THE APPELLANT. LEE, C.J., IRVING A ND GRIFFIS, P.JJ., ISHEE, CARLT O N , F A IR AND WILSON, JJ., CONCUR. J A MES, J., C ONCURS IN PART WITHOUT SEPARATE WRITTEN OPINION. BARNES, J., CONCURS IN P ART AND IN THE RESUL T WITHOUT SEPARATE WRITTEN OPINION.

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