In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit ____________________ 

No. 20-2445 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

v.

GREGORY SANFORD, 

Defendant-Appellant. 

____________________ 

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Central District of Illinois. 

No. 12-cr-10069-JES — James E. Shadid, Judge. 

____________________ 

SUBMITTED JANUARY 5, 2021∗— DECIDED JANUARY 25, 2021 

____________________ 

Before SYKES, Chief Judge, and ROVNER and BRENNAN,

Circuit Judges. 

∗ We have agreed to decide the case without oral argument because the 

briefs and record adequately present the facts and legal arguments, and 

oral argument would not significantly aid the court. FED. R. APP.

P. 34(a)(2)(C).
2 No. 20-2445 

SYKES, Chief Judge. Gregory Sanford is serving a 15-year 

sentence in federal prison for a 2014 cocaine-trafficking 

conviction. He moved for compassionate release under 

18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A), citing the COVID-19 pandemic. He 

did not, however, exhaust administrative remedies within 

the Bureau of Prisons before filing his motion. The government raised the exhaustion problem in the district court and 

also opposed Sanford’s release request on the merits. The 

judge skipped over the exhaustion question and proceeded 

directly to the merits, declining to reduce Sanford’s sentence.

Sanford appealed.

The government defends the judge’s decision on the 

merits but again raises the exhaustion problem, arguing that 

the exhaustion requirement in § 3582(c)(1)(A) is a mandatory

claim-processing rule and therefore must be enforced when 

properly invoked. Three circuits agree and none have held 

otherwise; we now join the emerging consensus. Sanford 

failed to comply with the exhaustion requirement before 

moving for compassionate release. The government properly 

raised the exhaustion issue in the district court and here. We

therefore enforce the requirement and affirm the judgment, 

though on different grounds.

I. Background

In 2014 Sanford was convicted in the Central District of 

Illinois of possession of cocaine with intent to distribute. The 

judge imposed a sentence of 180 months in prison— 

82 months below the bottom of the range recommended by 

the Sentencing Guidelines. Sanford is currently housed in the

federal correctional facility in Victorville, California, and has 

served roughly half of his sentence. 
No. 20-2445 3 

On April 28, 2020, the warden at the Victorville prison

received two written requests from Sanford seeking compassionate release under § 3582(c)(1)(A) due to the COVID-19 

pandemic. Without waiting for a response from the warden

or letting 30 days lapse without a response (as the statute 

requires), Sanford filed a pro se compassionate-release 

motion in the sentencing court just three days later, on 

May 1. The court appointed the Federal Defender’s Office to 

represent him, and counsel filed an amended motion. The 

amendment focused mostly on the risks of COVID-19 for 

prison populations generally. At the very end of the motion, 

however, counsel stated that Sanford “suffers from several 

health conditions, including stomach pain, shortness of 

breath, and anxiety,” though no details were provided.

On May 14 the warden denied Sanford’s request, explaining that § 3582(c)(1)(A) permits the Bureau of Prisons

(“BOP”) to ask the court to reduce a prisoner’s sentence for

“extraordinary and compelling” reasons, but as a medically 

stable 38-year-old and considering the risks of the virus, 

Sanford’s circumstances did not satisfy this standard. The 

warden also explained that “[t]he BOP is taking extraordinary measures” to prevent the spread of COVID-19. Finally, 

the warden advised Sanford of his right to pursue an administrative appeal and explained the process for doing so. 

Meanwhile, the government responded to Sanford’s 

amended motion, making two basic points. First, the government noted that Sanford failed to comply with the statute’s requirement of administrative exhaustion before filing 

his motion for compassionate release. The statute provides in 

relevant part: 
4 No. 20-2445 

(c) Modification of an imposed term of 

imprisonment. The court may not modify a term of 

imprisonment once it has been imposed except 

that— 

(1) in any case— 

(A) the court, upon motion of the 

Director of the Bureau of Prisons, or upon 

motion of the defendant after the defendant 

has fully exhausted all administrative rights 

to appeal a failure of the Bureau of Prisons to 

bring a motion on the defendant’s behalf or 

the lapse of 30 days from the receipt of such a

request by the warden of the defendant’s facility, whichever is earlier, may reduce the 

term of imprisonment ... after considering the factors set forth in section 

3553(a) to the extent that they are applicable, if it finds that— 

(i) extraordinary and compelling 

reasons warrant such a reduction ... . 

18 U.S.C. § 3582(c) (emphases added). The government 

argued that the statutory exhaustion requirement, though 

not jurisdictional, is a mandatory claim-processing rule and 

must be enforced if invoked. Because Sanford had not 

complied with the requirement, the government urged the

court to deny the motion for this reason alone.

Second, the government argued against release on the 

merits, noting that the Victorville prison did not have any 

positive COVID-19 cases at that time and that Sanford, as a 
No. 20-2445 5 

38-year-old with no serious medical conditions, had not 

established that he was at particular risk. A generalized claim 

of “stomach pain, shortness of breath, and anxiety,” the 

government argued, was insufficient to satisfy the statute’s 

requirement of “extraordinary and compelling reasons” for a

sentence reduction.

In reply Sanford’s counsel noted that the warden had denied Sanford’s administrative request on May 14 and urged

the court to proceed directly to the merits. The balance of 

counsel’s reply amplified her earlier arguments about the 

dangers of COVID-19 to all prisoners.

The judge declined to rule on the exhaustion issue and

instead addressed Sanford’s motion on the merits, concluding that the “mere presence” of COVID-19 in prison is not an 

extraordinary and compelling reason for compassionate 

release. Rather, release might be appropriate when a facility

is facing a serious, uncontained COVID-19 outbreak and the 

prisoner’s medical conditions place him at significant risk of 

complications from the virus. Because Sanford had not 

shown that he had an elevated risk for a severe case of

COVID-19, the judge declined to reduce his sentence and 

denied the motion. 

II. Analysis

Section 3582(c)(1) establishes a default rule that the district court “may not modify a term of imprisonment once it 

has been imposed,” with a few limited exceptions. At issue 

here is the so-called “compassionate release” provision, 

which authorizes a sentence reduction if the court finds that 

“extraordinary and compelling reasons warrant such a 

reduction.” § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i). 
6 No. 20-2445 

Before 2018 compassionate release required a motion 

from the BOP. United States v. Gunn, 980 F.3d 1178, 1179 (7th

Cir. 2020). The First Step Act of 2018 amended the statute to 

permit the court to adjudicate a motion directly from the 

defendant—provided, however, that the defendant must first 

present his request for compassionate release to the warden 

and exhaust administrative appeals (if the request is denied) 

or wait ”30 days from the receipt of such a request by the 

warden of the defendant’s facility, whichever is earlier.”

We have recently held that the exhaustion requirement in 

§ 3582(c)(1)(A) is an affirmative defense, not a jurisdictional

prerequisite, so the government will lose the benefit of the 

defense if it fails to properly invoke it. Id. at 1181. We have 

not yet directly addressed—that is, not in a published opinion—whether the exhaustion requirement is a mandatory 

claim-processing rule and therefore must be enforced when 

properly invoked.1 Several of our sister circuits have held 

that it is. See United States v. Franco, 973 F.3d 465, 468 (5th Cir. 

2020); United States v. Alam, 960 F.3d 831, 833–34 (6th Cir. 

2020); see also United States v. Raia, 954 F.3d 594, 597 (3d Cir. 

2020) (characterizing the statute’s exhaustion requirement as 

a “glaring roadblock foreclosing compassionate release”).

We agree. The statute plainly uses mandatory language: 

the court “may not modify a term of imprisonment” on the

defendant’s own motion (as opposed to one from the BOP) 

until “after the defendant has fully exhausted all administra1 In a recent unpublished order, we enforced the exhaustion requirement as a mandatory claim-processing rule. United States v. Williams, 

829 F. App’x 138, 140 (7th Cir. 2020). 
No. 20-2445 7 

tive rights to appeal” from the warden’s denial of his request 

or “the lapse of 30 days from the receipt of such a request by 

the warden, whichever is earlier.” § 3582(c)(1)(A). This is the 

language of “a paradigmatic mandatory claim-processing 

rule.” Franco, 973 F.3d at 468.

“If properly invoked, mandatory claim-processing rules 

must be enforced ... .” Hamer v. Neighborhood Hous. Servs. of 

Chi., 138 S. Ct. 13, 17 (2017); see Fort Bend Cnty. v. Davis,

139 S. Ct. 1843, 1849 (2019). The government properly invoked Sanford’s failure to comply with § 3582(c)(1)(A)’s 

exhaustion requirement, thoroughly briefing the issue in the 

district court and on appeal. Though the judge passed over 

the exhaustion question in favor of a ruling on the merits, a 

remand for exhaustion factfinding is unnecessary because 

the facts are not in dispute. Sanford filed his § 3582(c)(1)(A) 

motion just three days after the warden received his request

for compassionate release, without waiting for a response 

(and pursuing an administrative appeal) or the lapse of 

30 days.

That resolves this appeal. Although the parties addressed 

the judge’s ruling on the merits, we do not need to reach 

those arguments. Because Sanford failed to comply with the 

statute’s exhaustion requirement, we affirm the denial of his

motion for compassionate release. 

AFFIRMED