# United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit Chicago, Illinois 60604

Submitted November 10, 2020 *

Decided November 19, 2020

Before

DIANE S. SYKES, Chief Judge

J OEL M. FLAUM, Circuit Judge

MICHAEL B. BRENNAN, Circuit Judge

No. 19-2805

J OHN D. HAYWOOD , Plaintiff-Appellant ,

v

.
LUCAS MAUE, Defendant-Appellee

. Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Illinois.

No. 18-cv-524-SMY-RJD

Staci M. Yandle, J udge

.

O R D E R
John Haywood, an Illinois inmate, appe als the entry of summary judgment against him in his suit for alleged consti tutional violations stemming from an altercation with another inmate. Because Haywood did not exhaust his administrative remedies, we affirm.

* We have agreed to decide the case wi thout oral argument because the briefs and record adequately present the facts and le gal arguments, and oral argument would not significantly aid the court. F ED

. R. A PP

. P. 34(a)(2)(C). NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION To be cited onl y in accordance with Fed. R. A pp . P. 32.1No. 19-2805 Page 2

In 2018 Haywood sued corrections officer Lucas Maue under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for an incident that occurred four years earlier while he was incarcerated at Menard Correctional Facility in Chester, Illinois. According to Haywood’s complaint, Maue incited him to fight his cellmate for possession of the bottom bunk and then put him in a chokehold, causing injuries. Haywood file d an emergency grievance with the warden, who forwarded it to a grievance officer. The grievance officer denied the grievance on September 2, 2014, and the chief administrative officer concurred with that ruling six days later. The grievance officer’s report no tified Haywood that he had 30 days from the date of the chief administrative officer’ s decision to appeal to the Administrative Review Board. Although Haywood signed an d dated his appeal September 11, 2014, the Board received the appeal on October 23—45 days after the date of the chief administrative officer’s decision. The Bo ard returned the appeal as untimely.

The district judge referred Haywood’s complaint to a magistrate judge for a hearing under Pavey v. Conley, 663 F.3d 899, 904 (7th Cir. 2011), to determine whether Haywood exhausted his administrative remedi es before filing suit as required by 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). After a hearing the ma gistrate judge determined that Haywood’s appeal to the Board was untimely, that hi s testimony about not receiving the chief administrative officer’s decision until mid- October was disingenuous and not credible, that he failed to exhaust his administrative re medies before filing th is suit, and that his complaint otherwise was barred by Illinoi s’s two-year statute of limitations for personal-injury actions. See 735 I LL

. C OMP

. S TAT . 5/13-202.

Haywood argues that his late appeal to the Board should be excused because copies of the grievance officer’s denial were withheld from him while he was being transferred between cells. We cannot meaningfully review Haywood’s argument, however, because he failed to supplement the record with a transcript of the Pavey hearing. See F ED

. R. A PP

. P. 10(b)(2); Morisch v. United States , 653 F.3d 522, 529 (7th Cir. 2011). Regardless, Haywood failed to develop any argument over why the magistrate judge needed to credit his version of events . Given the clear-error standard with which we review the district court’s fa ctual findings, Haywood has given us no reason to think that a mistake has been committed. See Wilborn v. Ealey , 881 F.3d 998, 1006 (7th Cir. 2018); Pavey , 663 F.3d at 904.

As for the court’s additional ruling that Haywood’s complaint was barred by Illinois’s two-year statute of limitations, Hayw ood argues that the accrual date for his excessive-force claim should be tolled beca use prison medical staff concealed his injuries. But as Maue asserts, Haywood did not object to—and thereby waived his rightNo. 19-2805 Page 3

to object to—the magistrate judge’s reco mmendation that his claim accrued on November 5, 2014. See F ED

. R. C IV . P. 72(a); Banco Del Atlantico, S.A. v. Woods Indus

. Inc. , 519 F.3d 350, 354 (7th Cir. 2008). In any event, th e date of discovery of an injury is irrelevant to accrual because excessive-force claims are “immediately” actionable from the date of the incident. Evans v. Poskon , 603 F.3d 362, 363 (7th Cir. 2010); Gonzalez v. Entress , 133 F.3d 551, 555 (7th Cir. 1998).

We have considered Haywood’s remaining arguments, and none has merit.

AFFIRMED