1

IN THE SUPREME COURT, STATE OF WYOMING

2014 WY 134

OCTOBER TERM, A.D. 2014

October 29, 2014

BOARD OF PROFESSIONAL 

RESPONSIBILITY, WYOMING STATE 

BAR,

Petitioner,

v.

LAURENCE W. STINSON, WSB No. 

6-2918,

Respondent.

D-14-0002

ORDER OF PUBLIC CENSURE

[¶1] This matter comes before the Court upon a Report and Recommendation by the 

Board of Professional Responsibility of the Wyoming State Bar (the Board) for a public 

reprimand of Laurence W. Stinson. Having reviewed the Report and Recommendation 

and Mr. Stinson’s objection to it, considered the oral arguments of counsel, and 

performed an independent and thorough review of the Board record, the Court concludes

Mr. Stinson violated Rule 3.1(c) of the Wyoming Rules of Professional Conduct and 

accepts the recommendation of the Board that Mr. Stinson be publicly reprimanded and 

that he pay costs in the amount recommended by the Board. We further rule that the 

Board properly denied Mr. Stinson’s motion for sanctions.

FACTS

[¶2] During the events which led to this disciplinary matter, Mr. Stinson was a 

shareholder in Bonner Stinson, P.C., in Cody, Wyoming. The disciplinary matter arose 

out of Mr. Stinson’s conduct during the firm’s representation of Dr. John H. Schneider, a 

Cody neurosurgeon, who became embroiled in a dispute with Dr. Jimmie Biles, an 

orthopedic surgeon in Cody. Dr. Biles accused Dr. Schneider of having a third party 

disseminate defamatory statements about him, and then, in the ensuing federal litigation, 

Dr. Biles accused Dr. Schneider of obstructing justice, suborning perjury, and bribing a 

witness. Because the charges against Mr. Stinson relate in large part to his knowledge of 
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his client’s actions and when he obtained that knowledge, we must first outline in some 

detail the facts related to the federal proceedings. We will then outline the disciplinary 

proceedings that resulted from Mr. Stinson’s conduct during his representation of Dr. 

Schneider in the federal proceedings.

A. Federal Proceedings

[¶3] On August 29, 2011, Dr. Biles filed a complaint in Federal District Court, for the 

District of Wyoming, against an Indiana woman by the name of Lisa Fallon. The 

complaint alleged that Ms. Fallon arranged to print and direct mail a defamatory flyer 

about Dr. Biles to over 14,000 Wyoming residents. The flyer stated:

Alert – my name is Rita and I was in Cody and broke my 

ankle this summer and this doctor ‘fixed it”. (sic) He did a 

terrible job and I needed two more surgeries at home and I am 

suing him. I looked up this doctor and found this recent 

arrest. If this is your doctor beware and let the hospital in 

Cody and your state medical board know about him. He has 

already been investigated for drunkenness when on call at the 

hospital and has a dozen lawsuits that he lost! The Wyoming 

board of medicine told me he has several complaints from 

other doctors and Physician Assistants that he was drunk at 

work and in the operating room. Beware! How can they let 

someone like this practice? You can find this on line at Park 

County Sheriff’s department website.

[¶4] The flyer followed this statement with what was alleged to be a booking photo of 

Dr. Biles, arrest information related to a 2010 driving under the influence charge, and 

accusations connecting Dr. Biles to: “Lewd act with resisting arrest;” “Illegal possession 

controlled substance;” and “Felony Investigation.” Aside from the photo and a DWUI 

arrest, all information in the flyer was false.

[¶5] Before filing the action against Ms. Fallon, who lives in Indiana, counsel for Dr. 

Biles investigated Ms. Fallon’s connections with Cody, Wyoming. They found that her 

only connection to Wyoming was her relationship with Dr. Schneider and his wife, 

Michelle Schneider. Through further investigation, Dr. Biles’ counsel found evidence 

that connected Dr. Schneider to the company that printed the flyers. Despite having 

found this connection, Dr. Biles’ counsel made the decision to first sue Ms. Fallon and 

seek discovery from her before proceeding against Dr. Schneider and any other potential 

defendants.

[¶6] In September 2011, Dr. Schneider met with Mr. Stinson and Brad Bonner to 

discuss the lawsuit that Dr. Biles had filed against Ms. Fallon. Dr. Schneider told Mr. 
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Stinson and Mr. Bonner that Ms. Fallon was a close family friend who could not afford 

an attorney to defend against the action filed by Dr. Biles. Dr. Schneider asked Mr. 

Stinson and Mr. Bonner to help find an attorney to represent Ms. Fallon, and he informed 

them that he wished to pay the fees of that attorney. Mr. Stinson and Mr. Bonner referred 

Ms. Fallon to an attorney who agreed to represent her, on the condition that Dr. Schneider 

understood that Ms. Fallon’s communications with her counsel would be privileged and 

that paying for Ms. Fallon’s defense did not allow him to control that defense. Ms. 

Fallon’s attorney and Dr. Schneider executed a fee agreement to that effect.

[¶7] On October 7, 2011, Ms. Fallon, through her attorney, filed an answer to Dr. 

Biles’ complaint. In that answer, Ms. Fallon admitted that she created and mailed the 

flyer to the over 14,000 Wyoming residents. Ms. Fallon also admitted that she did not 

use her own money to print and mail the flyers, but she denied that she acted at the 

request of a third party. Mr. Stinson received a copy of the answer.

[¶8] On October 16, 2011, Mr. Stinson received self-executing discovery submitted by 

Dr. Biles’ counsel in the action against Ms. Fallon, and according to his billing invoice to 

Dr. Schneider, Mr. Stinson spent over one hour reviewing that discovery. The selfexecuting discovery included documents that showed that Dr. Schneider ordered and paid 

for the mailing labels used to distribute the flyer.

[¶9] On October 20, 2011, Ms. Fallon’s attorney sent her an e-mail questioning her 

position that she and she alone was responsible for mailing the defamatory flyer. He 

stated:

Plaintiffs know this was not your idea. The world 

knows this was not your idea. Four doctors up there had a 

business Schneider, Biles, Emery, and one other. They split 

up. The split was horrible and because of the split they do not 

like each other. They proceed to do mean things to each 

other. No nurse in Indiana, especially a nice nurse, 

(remember everybody likes nurses) decides one day to spend 

her own money and send out a flyer because she does not like 

the way a doctor is behaving in Wyoming. A state she has 

never lived. (sic) A doctor who has never treated her. She 

has never done this before, and now all of sudden she takes a 

moral crusade against Dr. Biles. Unless you are completely 

crazy that dog don’t hunt, the boat don’t float, and that story 

is not believable.

[¶10] Ms. Fallon’s attorney did not copy Mr. Stinson with this e-mail or use these terms 

to describe to Mr. Stinson his reaction to Ms. Fallon’s version of events. Ms. Fallon’s 

attorney did, however, sometime in October 2011, tell Mr. Stinson that he felt Ms. 
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Fallon’s version was “fanciful and doesn’t make any sense.” On October 21, 2011, Mr. 

Stinson and Ms. Fallon’s attorney exchanged e-mails regarding concerns that Ms. Fallon 

was not being truthful in responding to interrogatories. Specifically, Ms. Fallon’s 

attorney e-mailed Mr. Stinson:

We talk then she has to have a time period to think—where I 

know she communicates with Schneider. I keep telling her 

this is not a game just tell the truth, but I think we will never 

get there on the truth level.

Mr. Stinson responded:

I think you[r] read of circumstances is likely correct. I just 

told Schneider yesterday to quit talking to her at all. My 

advice will be ignored.

[¶11] On October 31, 2011, Mr. Stinson received and reviewed Ms. Fallon’s draft 

interrogatory responses, which had been forwarded to him by Ms. Fallon’s attorney. In 

those responses, Ms. Fallon again stated that she alone created the flyer, but she also 

provided names of individuals who provided her information that she used in the flyer. 

Included among those individuals was Dr. Schneider. Ms. Fallon also stated in her 

interrogatory responses that Dr. Schneider responded to her plans to send the flyer by 

stating, “Dr. Biles deserves it as he is a menace to the community of doctors and he was 

probably going to kill someone when he was drunk.” Additionally, Ms. Fallon elaborated 

on the details of Dr. Schneider’s providing her with the mailing list for the flyer:

Schneider said that they were public files that anyone can use 

and they did not specifically come from his patient database 

and were not “his patients” so he had no problem just giving 

me a labels database from Park County and its surrounding

counties. I did not pay for them and Dr. Schneider did not 

ask for any payment, he just mailed them to me on a stick 

drive.

[¶12] On November 17, 2011, Dr. Biles’ counsel took Ms. Fallon’s deposition. The 

deposition was sealed by agreement of the parties, so Mr. Stinson was not able to review 

the deposition. Ms. Fallon’s attorney understood this agreement precluded him from 

allowing anyone to read the deposition transcript, but he also understood he was 

permitted to discuss the deposition with Mr. Stinson because Dr. Biles’ attorney asked 

him to convey to Mr. Stinson that Dr. Biles would like to resolve the matter through a 

financial settlement with Dr. Schneider. On November 21, 2011, Mr. Stinson met with 

Ms. Fallon’s attorney and discussed the deposition. Ms. Fallon’s attorney informed Mr. 

Stinson that Ms. Fallon testified that she alone was responsible for distributing the flyer 
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but that she received the mailing list and the money to cover the cost of the mailing from 

the Schneiders.

[¶13] On November 22, 2011, counsel for both Ms. Fallon and Dr. Biles received a letter 

with enclosures from the Park County Attorney. The letter enclosed copies of documents 

that had been printed from a stick drive that a worker in the laundry room of the West 

Park County Hospital in Cody found in the pocket of a man’s surgical scrubs. Hospital 

administration sent the stick drive to the county attorney, who provided the 

aforementioned copies of the documents to both counsel and to law enforcement. The 

documents found on the stick drive became known as “the laundry room documents,” or 

the “LRDs.”

[¶14] The LRDs consisted of three documents. The first document was addressed to 

Ms. Fallon and was an eight-page document that instructed her on how to testify in her 

deposition. It included the following passages:

[Dr. Biles’ counsel] will do everything they can to intimidate 

as well as befriend you with one common goal – to show this 

flier creation and distribution was a conspiracy directed by 

Dr. Schneider and Michelle to slander Biles. As we have 

discussed, if you are able to withstand the heat of the 

deposition and ‘take a bullet’, regardless of final economic 

damages in favor of Biles in any type of judgment, you will 

be taken care of far in excess of any paycheck. The amount 

he will get will be negligible and have no impact on your life.

* * * 

* * * They will obviously say many times, through various 

ways that “it is better for you to tell the truth about your coconspirator”. Don’t believe any of it – they will not befriend 

you or help you in any way and as soon as they “turn you”, 

you will be treated like a prison Bitch. Please stay focused on 

the truths in the interrogatories and this primer. All other 

questions beyond what is covered here are vague 

recollections, influenced by your current medical condition of 

significant thyroid imbalance, frequent antibiotics for kidney 

and bladder infections and your overwhelming worry that you 

have cancer that they will discover when they do your surgery 

next month. * * * Please read, read and re-read these facts, as 

well as the interrogatory answers and use these to answer the 

questions they ask briefly and to the point. * * *

* * * 

Reading through the last email from [Dr. Biles’ counsel], they 

plan to demonstrate through your answers that you had no 
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knowledge of Biles and therefore could not have generated 

the idea to develop the flier or had the motivation to do so and 

you must have been coerced, even by friendship with 

Michelle and Dr. Schneider, to take these actions. This is 

where you can expound and be creative in your testimony 

attacking him as a drunk, posing danger to the community 

and patients, citing your uncle being killed by a drunk driver, 

etc. * * *

* * * 

The details of Dr. Schneider’s involvement are in the 

interrogatory answers. Just as you had spoke with the other 

people listed in the interrogatories, you called me and asked 

my knowledge about the Biles incident. Recall the 

interrogatory answers and it is OK to have them in front of 

you and simply respond to their questions by reading your 

answers that way you do not have to develop anything more 

than is listed in the answers. YOU SHOULD FALL BACK 

ON THE FACT THAT YOU DO NOT FEEL WELL 

BECAUSE OF YOUR MEDICAL CONDITIONS THAT 

INCLUDE THYROID IMBALANCE AND YOU NEED 

YOUR ANSWERS IN FRONT OF YOU AS YOUR NOTES 

OF THE DETAILS OF THE PEOPLE YOU HAVE 

SPOKEN WITH AND THE TIMELINE SINCE YOU ARE 

HAVING A DIFFICULT TIME INDEPENDENTLY 

RECALLING THESE FACTS. [Emphasis in original.]

[¶15] The second document in the LRDs was a one-page document purporting to 

summarize the contacts and discussions between Ms. Fallon and Dr. Schneider regarding 

the flyer and the lawsuit. In regard to the lawsuit, the document closes with a statement 

that “Nothing specific to the claim is discussed.” The third document in the LRDs was a 

four-page document setting forth draft answers to the interrogatories that had been served 

on Ms. Fallon.

[¶16] On November 22, 2011, Ms. Fallon’s attorney forwarded the Park County 

Attorney’s letter and the LRDs to Mr. Stinson. That same day, Mr. Stinson and Mr. 

Bonner met with Dr. Schneider to discuss the LRDs. Mr. Stinson described this as a 

“very heated” meeting during which they asked Dr. Schneider to explain the documents 

and in particular whether he was paying for Ms. Fallon’s testimony. Mr. Stinson testified 

that Dr. Schneider admitted that he had typed the documents but denied that he had paid 

or attempted to pay for Ms. Fallon’s testimony. Dr. Schneider’s explanation was that he 

was on the telephone with Ms. Fallon as he was typing the document and was merely 

helping to prepare her and typing the answers as she was providing them. Mr. Stinson 

testified that he did not have sufficient evidence at that time that Dr. Schneider was lying 
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to him and he resolved the doubt in favor of his client. Mr. Stinson and Mr. Bonner 

instructed Dr. Schneider that he was to have no further contact whatsoever with Ms. 

Fallon.

[¶17] On November 23, 2011, counsel for Dr. Biles served third party subpoenas on Dr. 

and Mrs. Schneider, seeking communications with Ms. Fallon, forensic expert access to 

the Schneiders’ computers and smart phones, and records of monies paid by the 

Schneiders to Ms. Fallon. On December 7, 2011, Mr. Stinson, on behalf of the 

Schneiders, filed a motion to quash the subpoenas. Mr. Stinson stated as the basis for the 

motion to quash that the subpoenas were overbroad and unduly burdensome, that Ms. 

Fallon testified under oath that she acted alone in creating and disseminating the 

defamatory flyer, and that counsel for Dr. Biles had not shown any connection between 

the Schneiders and Dr. Biles’ claims against Ms. Fallon. On January 6, 2012, the district 

court denied the motion to quash and ordered that the Schneiders produce the subpoenaed 

documents and items. In so ruling, the court explained:

The Court is satisfied that the evidence sought pursuant to 

this subpoena will be relevant and significant in discovering 

the contours of any conspiracy giving rise to plaintiff’s 

defamation claims. Defendant Fallon did not have any close 

connections in the Park County area other than the Schneider 

family. Following the deposition of Defendant Fallon, it 

appears that she claims she was solely responsible for the 

flyer and did not receive approval of it from Dr. Schneider 

prior to its dissemination. In contrast, among other things, 

plaintiff has asserted a belief that Defendant Fallon was 

acting as a conduit of information that was funneled to her 

from someone in Park County and was not the initial source 

of the defamatory materials.

The information sought by this subpoena would be 

relevant and necessary to the parties in attempting to ascertain 

the truth in this regard.

[¶18] On January 19, 2012, a hearing was held on another discovery dispute, and during 

that hearing, the district court ordered the Schneiders to provide all subpoenaed items by 

February 3, 2012. On February 29, 2012, the court issued an order finding that the 

Schneiders had failed to make a good faith effort to comply with the subpoena, fining the 

Schneiders $1000.00, and directing that they provide all subpoenaed items by March 9, 

2012. On March 8, 2012, the Schneiders filed their verified supplemental response to the 

subpoena.

[¶19] On January 28, 2012, Dr. Biles served on the Schneiders a complaint alleging 

RICO and defamation claims against the Schneiders and a related business entity. On 
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February 21, 2012, Mr. Stinson signed and filed, on behalf the Schneiders and their 

related entity, an Answer and Counterclaim. In that Answer and Counterclaim, Mr. 

Stinson included the following statements:

[¶ 38a] Plaintiff has taken the deposition of Lisa Shaurette 

Fallon in the related case of Biles v. Fallon. Ms. Fallon has 

testified that she, and she alone, created the flier of which 

Plaintiff complains is defamatory. Thus, Plaintiff has 

obtained testimony under oath that contradicts and dispels the 

allegations contained in Plaintiff’s complaint. As a result, the 

allegations contained within the complaint are known to be 

untrue by Plaintiff and are not made in good faith. Rather, 

such allegations are made as part of long-standing animosity 

Plaintiff has for John Schneider.

[¶ 43b] Plaintiff is himself responsible for negative public 

perceptions regarding him and his personality because 

Plaintiff is known to and/or has: often consumed alcohol 

while driving; consumed alcohol while driving with 

employees while engaged in the course and scope of business; 

allows or has allowed his wife – a non-medically trained 

individual – to provide point of contact care for his patients 

(and may bill Medicare, Medicaid and/or insurance 

companies for these services); engaged in medical decisionmaking while under the influence of alcohol; bad-mouths 

other physicians and medical personnel; engages in 

subversive conduct toward other physicians; creates conflict 

with his employees and the employees of other physicians; 

waived a gun around his office and pointed that gun at an 

employee and commanded that the employee “dance”; fails to 

pay people who provide goods and services at the ranch 

owned by Plaintiff (or a company he controls); has failed to 

uphold or fulfill contractual obligations and commitments to 

parties connected to ranch activities and/or business ventures 

and other acts which create and foster the bad reputation he 

created for himself.

[¶ 54] Biles knew that his complaint was false and, despite 

such knowledge, recklessly published the complaint by filing 

the same in a public docket.

[¶20] On April 23, 2012, Dr. Biles’ counsel disclosed to Mr. Stinson copies of e-mail 

correspondence between Dr. Schneider and Ms. Fallon that had been obtained through a 
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third-party subpoena served on Ms. Fallon’s Indiana employer. The e-mails contained 

communications wherein Dr. Schneider urged Ms. Fallon to avoid being deposed, 

provided a medical excuse to be signed by her physician to help her avoid being deposed, 

instructed her on how to answer deposition and interrogatory questions, advised her to be 

vague in answering questions (“the best answers to use are ‘I do not have recollection of 

that’”), offered to destroy her computer hard drives by giving them the “microwave 

treatment,” and told her she should have “a 250k plus payoff for your future.”

[¶21] After receiving the disclosures from Dr. Biles’ counsel, Mr. Stinson and Mr. 

Bonner conferred with Mark Gifford, Bar Counsel, concerning their disclosure 

obligations under the Rules of Professional Conduct, and on April 25, 2012, Mr. Stinson 

and Mr. Bonner requested a hearing with the district court for the purpose of disclosing 

the e-mail correspondence between Dr. Schneider and Ms. Fallon. The following day, 

the court held the requested hearing, and Mr. Bonner summarized the e-mail 

correspondence as follows:

In general, the emails concern Ms. Fallon’s answers to 

interrogatories and the testimony that she would be giving in 

an upcoming scheduled deposition. There is considerable 

communication from Dr. Schneider where – and it’s to Ms. 

Fallon – where Dr. Schneider quite apparently is instructing 

Ms. Fallon on what to say, what not to say, and how to say it, 

both in her deposition and in her interrogatories. There is 

also a document that quite apparently appears to be – and it’s 

provided from him to her – that appears to be his proposed 

text of her interrogatory answers.

While all of that is a really, really, really bad idea, I 

don’t know if that conduct in and of itself would necessarily 

motivate this disclosure. However, the emails also contain 

communication in which Dr. Schneider provides Ms. Fallon 

with a doctor’s note for signature by her personal physician. 

And the purpose of the note, it is stated in their 

communication, is to prevent Ms. Fallon from having to give 

her deposition in the litigation.

Then, Your Honor, when Ms. Fallon relates in an 

email to Dr. Schneider that she has secured her doctor’s 

commitment to sign the doctor’s note, thus hopefully in their 

mind precluding the deposition, Dr. Schneider writes in a 

responding email, “That should be a 250k-plus payoff for 

your future. Thank you.”

[¶22] Shortly after this disclosure, Dr. Biles’ claims against Ms. Fallon and the 

Schneiders were settled in a confidential settlement.
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B. Disciplinary Proceedings

[¶23] Following the disclosures to the district court, Bar Counsel appointed Special Bar 

Counsel to determine whether formal charges should be filed based on the conduct of 

counsel during the federal proceedings. In accordance with Rule 11(d) of the 

Disciplinary Code, Special Bar Counsel presented the matter to the Peer Review Panel 

for a determination of probable cause to justify filing a formal charge against Mr. 

Stinson. On April 5, 2013, the Peer Review Panel issued a Finding of Probable Cause, 

which stated:

This matter came before the Peer Review Panel on 

April 4, 2013 upon motion of Special Bar Counsel. A 

quorum of the Panel reviewed the Complaint, file materials 

and proposed Formal Charge and, being fully advised in this 

matter, finds, pursuant to Disciplinary Code Section 7(c)(iii), 

that probable cause exists justifying the filing of a Formal 

Charge.

[¶24] On April 10, 2013, the Wyoming State Bar (the Bar), through Special Bar 

Counsel, filed with the Board of Professional Responsibility (the Board) a Formal Charge 

against Mr. Stinson. The Bar asserted two violations of the Wyoming Rules of 

Professional Conduct. The first charge alleged that Mr. Stinson violated Rule 3.3 by 

delaying disclosure to the court of his client’s scheme to obstruct justice for five months 

after Mr. Stinson obtained actual knowledge of the scheme. The second charge alleged 

that Mr. Stinson violated Rule 3.1(c) by: 1) signing and filing affirmative defenses and 

counterclaims that alleged facts Respondent knew to be false; 2) representing Fallon’s 

deposition testimony to the Court as a basis for relief without first conducting a 

reasonable inquiry into his client’s apparent bribery of Fallon to give false testimony; and 

3) asserting embarrassing detailed allegations about Biles for improper purposes.

[¶25] On October 3, 2013, Mr. Stinson designated three expert witnesses: Richard 

Honaker, Judge Nancy Freudenthal, and Judge Alan Johnson. The Bar filed a motion in 

limine to exclude the expert testimony on ground that the testimony calls for inadmissible 

legal conclusions and would invade the province of the Board. The Board granted the 

motion in limine in part and denied it in part. The Board ruled that the three experts 

could testify, but it limited that testimony, ordering that none of the experts could testify 

as to the ultimate question of whether Mr. Stinson’s actions were in compliance with any 

Rule of Professional Conduct. We will set forth any necessary additional facts as they 

relate to the expert testimony in our discussion of Mr. Stinson’s challenge to the 

limitations placed on that testimony.
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[¶26] Beginning on November 6, 2013, a three-day hearing was held on the charges 

against Mr. Stinson. At the conclusion of the hearing, the BPR deliberated on the charges 

and announced its findings:

And the Board has determined by a majority of the 

quorum that the Bar has proved by clear and convincing 

evidence that the Respondent has violated Rule 3.1[c], and 

the Board has determined by a majority of the quorum that a 

violation has not been proved by clear and convincing 

evidence concerning the Respondent violating 3.3(b). 

Therefore, that portion of the formal charge is dismissed.

[¶27] The Board then proceeded to hear evidence and argument on sanctions. At the 

conclusion of that presentation, the Board again recessed for deliberations. Following 

those deliberations, the Board announced that its recommended sanction was a public

reprimand. The Board also recommended that Mr. Stinson be required to pay hearing 

costs and the $500.00 administrative fee required by the Disciplinary Code.

[¶28] On January 3, 2014, the Board filed with the Supreme Court its Report and 

Recommendation for Public Reprimand. On January 21, 2014, Mr. Stinson filed a 

motion for W.R.C.P. 11 sanctions against the Bar, the Peer Review Panel, and against 

Special Bar Counsel based on the Bar’s refusal to dismiss the Formal Charge. On 

January 23, 2014, Mr. Stinson filed Respondent’s Objections to Costs, Request for 

Allocation, and Request for Amended Report and Recommendation, along with a request 

for a hearing on the objections. On March 13, 2014, the Board issued orders denying 

both the motion for Rule 11 sanctions and the objection to costs.

ATTORNEY DISCIPLINARY PROCEDURE

[¶29] This Court considers a recommended disciplinary action according to the 

following principles:

The purposes of the state bar disciplinary procedure 

are to maintain “the integrity of the bar,” “to prevent the 

transgressions of an individual lawyer from bringing its 

image into disrepute” and to “protect the public and the 

administration of justice.” Bd. of Prof’l Responsibility v. 

Casper, 2014 WY 22, ¶ 7, 318 P.3d 790, 793 (Wyo. 2014); 

Bd. of Prof’l Responsibility v. Davidson, 2009 WY 48, ¶ 17, 

205 P.3d 1008, 1015 (Wyo. 2009); In re Clark, 613 P.2d 

1218, 1221 (Wyo. 1980). Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 5–2–114 

(LexisNexis 2013) charges this Court with adopting rules of 

“practice and procedure in all courts of this state, for the 
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purpose of promoting the speedy and efficient determination 

of litigation upon its merits.” Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 5–2–

118(a)(iii) (LexisNexis 2013) further charges this Court with 

adopting rules establishing “practice and procedure for 

disciplining, suspending, and disbarring attorneys.”

Pursuant to Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 33–5–104 (LexisNexis 

2013), membership to the bar is by petition to the Wyoming 

Supreme Court. Pursuant to § 1(a) of the Disciplinary Code 

for the Wyoming State Bar, attorneys are “subject to the 

exclusive disciplinary jurisdiction of this Court and the 

Board....” Disciplinary proceedings are “necessarily incident 

to the inherent power of courts to control properly their own 

affairs.” State Bd. of Law Examiners v. Brown, 53 Wyo. 42, 

49, 77 P.2d 626, 628 (Wyo. 1938). The Board acts as an arm 

of this Court in taking evidence and making findings and 

recommendations to this Court. Mendicino v. Whitchurch, 

565 P.2d 460, 475 (Wyo. 1977). Although we give due 

consideration to the Board’s findings and recommendations, 

the “ultimate judgment in these cases is vested in the Court.” 

Casper, ¶ 8, 318 P.3d at 793–94, citing Mendicino, 565 P.2d 

at 466. See also Davidson, ¶ 1, 205 P.3d at 1012.

In determining whether discipline is appropriate in 

these special proceedings, this Court must be satisfied that 

“substantial, clear, convincing, and satisfactory evidence” 

exists to sustain the findings of the Board. Mendicino, 565 

P.2d at 475. Clear and convincing evidence is “that kind of 

proof that would persuade a trier of fact that the truth of the 

contention is highly probable.” SMH v. State, 2012 WY 165, 

¶ 19, 290 P.3d 1104, 1109 (Wyo. 2012); Meyer v. Norman, 

780 P.2d 283, 291 (Wyo. 1989). The clear and convincing 

standard must be applied consistently to each and every 

charge against the attorney. Id.

Bd. of Prof’l Responsibility v. Richard, 2014 WY 98, ¶¶ 51-53, ___ P.3d ___ (Wyo. 

2014).

DISCUSSION

[¶30] Mr. Stinson objects to the Board’s recommended finding that he violated Rule 

3.1(c), the Board’s limitation on the testimony of his expert witnesses, and the Board’s 

recommended sanction and award of costs. We will address each of these questions 

separately, and as a final matter, we will address Mr. Stinson’s Rule 11 motion.
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A. Rule 3.1(c) Violation

[¶31] Rule 3.1(c) of the Wyoming Rules of Professional Conduct provides:

The signature of an attorney constitutes a certificate by him 

that he has read the pleading, motion, or other court 

document; that to the best of his knowledge, information, and 

belief, formed after reasonable inquiry, it is well grounded in 

fact and is warranted by existing law or a good faith argument 

for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing law; 

and that it is not interposed for any improper purpose such as 

to harass or to cause unnecessary delay or needless increase 

in the cost of litigation.

[¶32] Comments 1 and 2 to Rule 3.1 are relevant to our consideration of Mr. Stinson’s 

conduct. Comment 1 provides:

The advocate has a duty to use legal procedure for the fullest 

benefit of the client’s cause, but also a duty not to abuse legal 

procedure. The law, both procedural and substantive, 

establishes the limits within which an advocate may proceed. 

However, the law is not always clear and never is static. 

Accordingly, in determining the proper scope of advocacy, 

account must be taken of the law’s ambiguities and potential 

for change.

[¶33] Comment 2 to Rule 3.1 states:

The filing of an action or defense or similar action taken for a 

client is not frivolous merely because the facts have not first 

been fully substantiated or because the lawyer expects to 

develop vital evidence only by discovery. What is required of 

lawyers, however, is that they inform themselves about the 

facts of their clients’ cases and the applicable law and 

determine that they can make good faith arguments in support 

of their clients’ positions. Such action is not frivolous even 

though the lawyer believes that the client’s position 

ultimately will not prevail. The action is frivolous, however, 

if the lawyer is unable either to make a good faith argument 

on the merits of the action taken or to support the action taken 

by a good faith argument for an extension, modification or 

reversal of existing law.
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[¶34] The Board found clear and convincing evidence that Mr. Stinson violated Rule 

3.1(c). Mr. Stinson objects to the recommended Rule 3.1(c) findings on the grounds that 

they are unsupported by expert testimony or other clear and convincing evidence. We 

will address first Mr. Stinson’s argument that the Bar was required to present expert 

testimony on the charged violations, and then we will address whether the record contains 

clear and convincing evidence that Mr. Stinson violated Rule 3.1(c).

1. Bar’s Lack of Expert Testimony to Support Rule 3.1(c) Violation

[¶35] Mr. Stinson contends that because the Bar presented no expert testimony on the 

question of whether he violated Rule 3.1(c), no violation of the rule can be found. In so 

arguing, Mr. Stinson relies on Painter v. Abels, 998 P.2d 931, 939 (Wyo. 2000), wherein 

this Court held that a finding of unprofessional conduct by a medical doctor was 

unsupported by substantial evidence because the finding was not supported by expert 

testimony. Mr. Stinson’s reliance on Painter is misplaced.

[¶36] In Painter, this Court rejected the finding of unprofessional conduct unsupported 

by expert testimony because the record left us with essentially no evidence against which 

to evaluate the Board of Medicine's findings. We explained:

The Board found Dr. Painter’s participation in a 

patient case study using an EDS machine was unprofessional 

conduct “contrary to recognized standards of ethics of the 

medical profession” under the American Medical 

Association’s Code of Medical Ethics, supra, and thus a 

violation of § 33–26–402(a)(xxvii). The Code of Medical 

Ethics, supra, requires that participation in any such clinical 

study be part of a systematic program competently designed 

under accepted standards of scientific research to produce 

scientifically valid and significant data. The Board provided 

no expert testimony on this count. We addressed virtually the 

same issue in Devous v. Wyoming State Board of Medical 

Examiners, 845 P.2d 408, 418 (Wyo. 1993), in regard to § 

33–26–402(a)(xv), (xviii), and (xxvi):

The crux of the issue is whether the record must 

include expert testimony with respect to [the pertinent] 

statutory grounds, or whether we must acknowledge 

and accept the expertise of the Board members in 

establishing standards that demonstrate infringement 

of the statute.... If judicial review has any purpose, it 

must be exercised by objectively evaluating evidence 
15

in the record. There is no way that a judicial review 

could reach the subjective determination of standards 

by individual members of the Board.

Painter, 998 P.2d 939.

[¶37] Our subsequent decisions have emphasized that this holding does not mean that 

expert testimony is required to support all findings of a professional code of conduct 

violation. For example, in Billings v. Wyo. Bd. of Outfitters and Prof’l Guides, 2004 WY 

42, ¶¶ 51–52, 88 P.3d 455, 474–75 (Wyo. 2004) (Billings II), we concluded that expert 

testimony was not required to prove the professional standard and a breach thereof where 

an outfitter willfully abandoned a client on a wilderness trail. We explained:

Neither the nature of the violation, nor the facts underlying it, 

involves subject matter “not within our knowledge” or 

requiring additional expert testimony. The state of the record 

is such that in reviewing the issue, we are not required merely 

to accept the Board’s subjective expertise for a standard that 

demonstrates infringement of the statute. Contrary to 

Billings’ argument, it does not appear that the Board’s use of 

the term “abandonment” was for purposes of establishing a 

formal standard of care, but was the Board’s factual 

characterization of Billings’ actions.

Billings II, ¶ 52, 88 P.3d 475.

[¶38] Similarly, in Penny v. State ex rel. Wyo. Mental Health Professions Licensing Bd., 

2005 WY 117, 120 P.3d 152 (Wyo. 2005), this Court held that expert testimony was not 

required to support findings that the license applicant violated the code of conduct 

applicable to social workers by practicing without a license and losing a client file. We 

reasoned:

We are satisfied that expert testimony was not required under 

the particular circumstances now before this Court because, 

as in Billings II, the nature of the alleged violations is “within 

our knowledge.” For instance, accepting the Board’s 

credibility determinations, the evidence is such that we are 

left with little if any doubt that the appellant knowingly 

practiced without a license and knowingly represented 

himself as licensed when he was not. Further, the evidence 

fully supports the conclusion that the appellant engaged in 

practices clearly identified in Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 33–38–

102(a)(v) as “clinical social work,” including diagnosis and 
16

counseling. And in the matter underlying the second 

complaint, he either lost a client’s file, evidencing gross

incompetence, or he refused to produce it at the Board’s 

request, either of which was a licensing violation. Expert 

testimony was not required to establish these violations.

Penny, ¶ 32, 120 P.3d at 170-71.

[¶39] In so holding in Penny, we distinguished findings that require expert testimony, 

explaining:

Clearly, this case is wholly unlike Billings I and 

Devous. Here, rather than relying upon its members’ 

individual standards, the Board meticulously detailed in its 

order the applicable statutory and administrative standards, 

including the ethical codes adopted therein. The problem 

identified in Billings I and Devous is the impossibility of 

judicial review where the record does not reveal the identified 

standard of professional care against which a licensee’s 

conduct is to be measured. That problem does not exist here. 

Once the legislature and the administrative agency have fully 

identified the standard of care, it does not require expert 

testimony, at least in the present circumstances, to establish 

that standard.

Penny, ¶ 31, 120 P.3d at 170.

[¶40] Rule 3.1(c) likewise presents a clearly identified standard. The question before us, 

under Rule 3.1(c), is whether, to the best of Mr. Stinson’s knowledge, information, and 

belief, his filings in the federal proceedings were supported by fact and not interposed for 

an improper purpose such as to harass or publicly embarrass. This question requires that 

we review the filings signed by Mr. Stinson and compare his statements in those filings 

with what he knew when he signed the filings. The record contains the evidence that will 

allow us to complete this comparison, and we are therefore not presented with questions 

that require us to use subjective or undefined standards to formulate an answer. The Bar 

was therefore not required to present expert testimony on the Rule 3.1(c) question.1

 

1

In relying on this Court’s analysis in Billings II and Penny, we recognize that this Court is situated 

differently when ruling on an attorney disciplinary matter. The Board is not an administrative agency, 

and it is not governed by the Wyoming Administrative Procedure Act. Instead, the Board is an arm of 

this Court, and when ruling on an attorney disciplinary matter, we are not acting in an appellate capacity 

but are instead acting on a recommended ruling, with the ultimate judgment being vested in this Court. 

Richard, ¶ 52, ___ P.3d ___. Nonetheless, we find the analysis in Billings II and Penny helpful, because, 

although this Court is the ultimate decision-maker in these matters, we have made it clear that our 
17

[¶41] Having determined that expert testimony was not required to prove the Rule 3.1(c) 

violation, we turn next to the question of whether the record otherwise contains clear and 

convincing evidence that Mr. Stinson’s filings in the federal proceedings violated Rule 

3.1(c).

2. Evidence in Support of Rule 3.1(c) Violation

[¶42] The Board found clear and convincing evidence that Mr. Stinson violated Rule 

3.1(c) and recommended the following conclusions of law:

4. An officer of the Court owes a duty of candor 

that precludes a “head in the sand” response to the evidence 

disclosed. While in many circumstances a lawyer may 

reasonably rely on what a client tells the lawyer, doing only 

that was insufficient in this matter after the LRD evidence 

surfaced showing the client likely conspired with a witness to 

obstruct justice. Instead of further informing himself about 

the facts of his client’s case, Respondent assisted Schneider in 

delaying production of evidence of relevant facts by filing a 

motion to quash the subpoenas. Respondent then stood by as 

Schneider not only failed to timely produce the financial 

records and emails requested in the subpoenas, but also 

disobeyed the Court’s order to produce all items requested in 

the Subpoena by February 3, 2012. As a result, when 

Respondent filed the Answer and Counterclaims in the 

Second Federal Case, he not only failed to take independent 

action to obtain and review Schneider’s records pursuant to 

his duty to conduct a reasonable inquiry, he knew that 

Schneider had failed to comply with legitimate discovery 

requests for that information and had disobeyed the Court’s 

order to produce that information by a date certain.

5. Respondent’s purpose in asserting the 

affirmative defenses and counterclaims in the Second Federal 

Case was not proper. Respondent asserted the defenses and 

counterclaims not in an effort to advocate Schneider’s 

legitimate rights, but in furtherance of Schneider’s objective 

 

“determination must be made upon the evidence that was presented to the Board at the hearing.” Bd. of 

Prof’l Responsibility v. Davidson, 2009 WY 48, ¶ 8, 205 P.3d 1008, 1012 (Wyo. 2009). Using the 

Billings II and Penny analysis to determine the need for expert evidence helps to ensure that this Court’s 

ruling on a disciplinary matter is based on the evidentiary record and not on a subjective evaluation of a 

duty or standard of care.
18

to publicly embarrass and humiliate Biles beyond the harm 

caused by the original defamatory mailing. Respondent did 

so not by pleading facts bearing on Biles’ public reputation as 

to his professional ability or supposed criminal act—subjects 

addressed in the fliers mailed—but instead by seeking to 

publish and publicize previously confidential and private 

information about Biles.

[¶43] Mr. Stinson’s first two arguments concerning the sufficiency of the evidence focus 

on the Board’s conclusions regarding the motion to quash that he filed on behalf of the 

Schneiders. Specifically, Mr. Stinson argues that there is no evidence that he violated 

Rule 3.1(c) by assisting his client in delaying production of evidence by filing the motion 

to quash or by standing by as his client failed to timely comply with the court’s order 

regarding the subpoena. We do not read the Board’s recommended conclusions as 

holding that Mr. Stinson’s filing of the motion to quash was in itself a violation of Rule 

3.1(c). The Board’s comments regarding the subpoena appear instead to be directed to 

the Board’s conclusion that Mr. Stinson failed to investigate his client’s connection to the 

dissemination of the defamatory flyer—suggesting that under the circumstances, Mr. 

Stinson would have been better served by educating himself with the subpoenaed 

information rather than seeking to prevent its disclosure.

[¶44] Regardless of the intention behind the Board’s conclusions of law concerning the 

motion to quash, however, this Court agrees with Mr. Stinson that the record does not 

contain clear and convincing evidence that the motion to quash was filed for an improper 

purpose. Judge Johnson, who heard the motion to quash and ultimately denied the 

motion, testified in the Board hearing that while he did not find the motion well taken, he 

also did not find it frivolous. From our review of the record, we likewise find that the 

record does not contain clear and convincing evidence that Mr. Stinson assisted his client 

in delaying production of information, or that he stood by while his client failed to timely 

comply with the subpoena.

[¶45] We do, however, find that the record contains clear and convincing evidence that 

Mr. Stinson made allegations in the Answer and Counterclaim that he filed and signed on 

behalf the Schneiders for which he did not have a good faith basis. We further find that 

the record contains clear and convincing evidence that Mr. Stinson made allegations in 

the Answer and Counterclaim that were made for the improper purpose of publicly 

embarrassing the other party to the action, Dr. Biles. Both of these actions violated Rule 

3.1(c).

[¶46] By the time Mr. Stinson filed the Answer and Counterclaim, he had the following 

information:
19

--the self-executing discovery of Dr. Biles, which included documentation that Dr. 

Schneider ordered and paid for the mailing labels that Ms. Fallon used in disseminating 

the defamatory flyer;

--Ms. Fallon’s interrogatory responses in which she confirmed that Dr. Schneider had 

provided the mailing labels and also stated that Dr. Schneider had provided her with 

information concerning Dr. Biles and had encouraged her to send the flyer;

--reports of Ms. Fallon’s deposition testimony, which reports included not only her 

testimony that she acted alone in disseminating the flyer, but also her testimony that the 

Schneiders paid the costs associated with creating and mailing the flyer;

--the expressed concerns of Ms. Fallon’s attorney that Ms. Fallon was not being truthful 

in her testimony and discovery responses in which she took full responsibility for the 

flyer and that she was being coached by Dr. Schneider in responding to questions 

concerning her involvement; 

--Judge Johnson’s order denying the motion to quash in which he acknowledged Ms. 

Fallon’s deposition testimony taking full responsibility for the flyer but still found that 

there was enough of a question concerning Dr. Schneider’s involvement to warrant the 

breadth of the subpoena; and 

--the LRDs and Dr. Schneider’s admission that he had created the LRDs.

[¶47] We are particularly troubled by the LRDs. Neither the content nor the tone of the 

LRDs fits with Dr. Schneider’s explanation to Mr. Stinson that in preparing the 

documents, he was merely acting as Ms. Fallon’s scribe and providing her general 

instruction on what to expect when she is deposed. The LRDs instructed Ms. Fallon on 

how to answer deposition questions and contained assurances that she would not be hurt 

if she adhered to the scripted answers as well as warnings regarding the jeopardy that she 

would face if she deviated from the script and allowed Dr. Biles’ counsel to “turn her.” 

Despite having the LRDs and the other above-described information that implicated Dr. 

Schneider in flyer scheme, Mr. Stinson signed and filed the Answer and Counterclaim 

with inclusion of the following statements:

[¶ 38(a)] Plaintiff has taken the deposition of Lisa Shaurette 

Fallon in the related case of Biles v. Fallon. Ms. Fallon has 

testified that she, and she alone, created the flier of which 

Plaintiff complains is defamatory. Thus, Plaintiff has 

obtained testimony under oath that contradicts and dispels the 

allegations contained in Plaintiff’s complaint. As a result, the 

allegations contained within the complaint are known to be 

untrue by Plaintiff and are not made in good faith. Rather, 

such allegations are made as part of long-standing animosity 

Plaintiff has for John Schneider.

[¶ 54] Biles knew that his complaint was false and, despite 

such knowledge, recklessly published the complaint by filing

the same in a public docket.
20

[¶48] Given the LRDs and the other information available to Mr. Stinson when he 

prepared the Answer and Counterclaim, he had to know, at the very least, that questions 

remained concerning his client’s connection to the dissemination of the defamatory flyer. 

We therefore find the evidence clear and convincing that Mr. Stinson did not have a good 

faith basis for including Paragraphs 38(a) and 54 in the Answer and Counterclaim.

[¶49] We turn then to statements contained in the Answer and Counterclaim that we find 

were made for the improper purpose of embarrassing Dr. Biles. In this regard, we are 

most concerned with Paragraph 43(b), which was included as an affirmative defense and 

states:

Plaintiff is himself responsible for negative public 

perceptions regarding him and his personality because 

Plaintiff is known to and/or has: often consumed alcohol 

while driving; consumed alcohol while driving with 

employees while engaged in the course and scope of business; 

allows or has allowed his wife – a non-medically trained 

individual – to provide point of contact care for his patients 

(and may bill Medicare, Medicaid and/or insurance 

companies for these services); engaged in medical decisionmaking while under the influence of alcohol; bad-mouths 

other physicians and medical personnel; engages in 

subversive conduct toward other physicians; creates conflict 

with his employees and the employees of other physicians; 

waived a gun around his office and pointed that gun at an 

employee and commanded that the employee “dance”; fails to 

pay people who provide goods and services at the ranch 

owned by Plaintiff (or a company he controls); has failed to 

uphold or fulfill contractual obligations and commitments to 

parties connected to ranch activities and/or business ventures 

and other acts which create and foster the bad reputation he 

created for himself.

[¶50] Mr. Stinson contends that this paragraph was included in the Answer and 

Counterclaim not to cause embarrassment but rather to ensure that the pleading complied 

with the specificity required in federal pleadings by the Iqbal-Twombly standard. The 

Iqbal-Twombly standard requires as follows:

To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must 

contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to “state a 

claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Id., at 570, 127 

S.Ct. 1955. A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff 
21

pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the 

reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the 

misconduct alleged. Id., at 556, 127 S.Ct. 1955. The 

plausibility standard is not akin to a “probability 

requirement,” but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that 

a defendant has acted unlawfully. Ibid. Where a complaint 

pleads facts that are “merely consistent with” a defendant’s 

liability, it “stops short of the line between possibility and 

plausibility of ‘entitlement to relief.’” Id., at 557, 127 S.Ct. 

1955 (brackets omitted).

Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1949, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009) 

(citing Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 557, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 

929 (2007)).

[¶51] We will assume for purposes of our analysis here that the Iqbal-Twombly standard 

extends to the pleading of an affirmative defense, although that is less than certain. See, 

5 Charles Alan Wright and Arthur R.. Miller, Fed. Prac. & Proc. Civ. § 1274 (3d ed.) 

(Supp. 2014) (courts are divided on whether Iqbal-Twombly standard extends to pleading 

of affirmative defenses); Malibu Media, LLC v. Ryder, 2013 WL 4757266 * 2 (Tenth 

Circuit has not addressed whether Iqbal-Twombly standard extends to pleading of 

affirmative defenses). Even assuming the requirement of enhanced detail and specificity 

required by the Iqbal-Twombly standard applied to the pleading of Dr. Schneider’s 

affirmative defenses, this Court is not persuaded that compliance with that standard was 

the motivation behind Paragraph 43(b) of the Answer and Counterclaim. The record 

instead persuades us that the paragraph was included for the purpose of embarrassing Dr. 

Biles.

[¶52] We reach this conclusion and our agreement with the Board’s recommended 

finding for a number of reasons. First, while Paragraph 43(b) contains significant detail 

concerning alleged bad behavior by Dr. Biles, it contains no detail as to how the 

referenced acts are alleged to be a matter of public knowledge. This is in contrast to the 

allegations in Paragraph 43(a), relating to Dr. Biles’ DWUI arrest, wherein the 

affirmative defense specified how the DWUI arrest was allegedly a matter of public 

record: “Park County, Wyoming uses a public booking system that displays photographs 

and charges of people arrested.” If insulating the affirmative defense from a motion to 

strike were truly what motivated the detail in Paragraph 43(b), we would expect the 

defense to identify how the acts are publicly known, rather than just listing alleged bad 

acts, most of which were wholly unrelated to the acts alleged in the defamatory flyer.

[¶53] We are further persuaded that the improper purpose of embarrassing Dr. Biles 

motivated the pleading because of the press release that accompanied the filing of the 

Answer and Counterclaim. The Answer and Counterclaim was filed on February 21, 
22

2012. Mr. Stinson’s billing records on the Schneider matter show that also on February 

21, 2012, he spoke with Kim Sapone, an employee of Acclaim, LLP Public Relations, 

regarding the Answer and Counterclaim. On February 22, 2012, Ms. Sapone sent a press 

release to the Cody Enterprise and the Billings Gazette, which stated:

Local Surgeon’s Response to Libel Allegations

Cody, WY – Dr. John H. Schneider, Neurosurgeon, filed in 

federal court on Tuesday in response to recent allegations of 

defamation of character by orthopedic surgeon, Dr. Jimmie 

Biles. Dr. Schneider’s response not only addresses the suit 

brought on by Dr. Biles but will carry with it a countersuit on 

behalf of Dr. John H. Schneider as well as a suit on behalf of 

the People of Wyoming.

Court filings hold sworn testimony that proves Dr. Schneider 

had no involvement in the negative flyer distributed last 

December about Dr. Biles. The individual named in 

disseminating the flyer testified that she, and she alone, 

created the flyer. Court records also indicate that Dr. Biles 

has a long history of erratic, alcohol and substance abuse 

related behavior that has left many, including patients, the 

general public and Dr. Schneider, feeling victimized.

“It’s a shame it had to come to this,” said Dr. Schneider. “Dr. 

Biles has some personal demons to overcome, and I feel sorry 

for him. It’s sad to see a man lash out at others in a desperate 

attempt to salvage a career that is crumbling around him. I 

hope he is able to get healthy and in control again someday.”

Attorney for Dr. Schneider, Laurence Stinson of Bonner 

Stinson Law Firm, feels the suit brought on by Dr. Biles is 

another attempt to cause harm to Dr. Schneider “as a result of 

long-standing animosity and jealousy toward Dr. Schneider, 

his former friend, who refused to finance a ranch operation 

owned by Dr. Biles.”

Dr. Schneider continued “We look forward to getting this 

over with so we can get back to our purpose – helping our 

patients and our community.” Dr. Schneider stated that he 

has tried to take the higher ground in his dealings with Dr. 

Biles over the last several years, but “my personal integrity 

and my professional career demand that I not stand idly by 

any longer.”

[¶54] In the hearing before the Board, Mr. Stinson denied that he approved this press 

release or that he provided a quote to Ms. Sapone. Mr. Stinson confirmed that he had 

talked to Ms. Sapone and testified that he believed he had talked to her more than once, 
23

stating, “Partly I was trying to get them to quit doing this.” This testimony does not 

change our view of the manner in which the affirmative defenses were pled. Mr. Stinson 

testified that he knew of his client’s animosity toward Dr. Biles. Indeed, Dr. Schneider 

made his intentions clear early in the federal proceedings when Ms. Fallon’s attorney

informed both Mr. Stinson and Dr. Schneider, by e-mail, that Dr. Biles’ counsel was 

going to argue that Dr. Schneider was Ms. Fallon’s co-conspirator in disseminating the 

defamatory flyer. Dr. Schneider responded, with a copy to Mr. Stinson, “I am well aware 

of the tact and Laurence is mounting a devastating counter suit against Biles.” Mr. 

Stinson knew of his client’s animosity, knew his client wanted to deal a devastating blow 

to Dr. Biles, and knew his client was working on a press release. Under these 

circumstances, the utmost care should have been taken in preparing the Answer and 

Counterclaim to ensure its compliance with Rule 3.1(c). The pleading was not so 

prepared and was instead crafted to serve the improper purposes of Dr. Schneider. The 

record contains clear and convincing evidence that the pleading violated Rule 3.1(c).

B. Limitation on Expert Testimony

[¶55] We addressed earlier in this opinion the reasons that the Bar was not required to 

present expert testimony to prove the rule violations at issue in this matter. We now turn 

to the related question of whether the Board erred in limiting the expert testimony that 

Mr. Stinson sought to introduce.

[¶56] Our first task in ruling on this question is to determine the standard to be used in

reviewing the Board’s evidentiary rulings. Typically, we review a trial court’s ruling on 

the admissibility of expert evidence for an abuse of discretion. Craft v. State, 2013 WY 

41, ¶ 28, 298 P.3d 825, 833 (Wyo. 2013). As noted earlier, however, this Court sits in a 

unique posture in ruling on attorney disciplinary matters. We have described the division 

of functions between this Court and the Board as follows:

In Meyer v. Norman, 780 P.2d 283, 286–288 (Wyo.

1989), we described the structural relationship between the 

Wyoming Supreme Court and the Wyoming State Bar, but we 

did not detail the procedure that this Court follows in 

reviewing and acting upon a disciplinary recommendation of 

the Board. Although the case arose under earlier versions of 

the Rules of Professional Conduct and the Disciplinary Code, 

the procedural holdings of Mendicino v. Whitchurch, 565 

P.2d 460, 465–66, 475 (Wyo. 1977) remain valid; that is, the 

Board is an arm of this Court whose purpose is to investigate 

allegations of professional misconduct and to report its 

findings and recommendations to the Court, which is the 

ultimate decision-maker in attorney disciplinary matters. 

Sections 21(c)(iii) and (iv) of the current Disciplinary Code 
24

make it clear that the Court’s determination of appropriate 

discipline is its own, but that the determination must be made 

upon the evidence that was presented to the Board at the 

hearing. That process has been described as: “All attorney 

discipline cases require a two step analysis. First, the Court 

must determine whether the record supports the findings and 

recommendations, then it must independently determine the 

sanctions warranted by the facts of the case.” Idaho State Bar 

v. Souza, 142 Idaho 502, 129 P.3d 1251, 1254 (2006).

Davidson, ¶ 8, 205 P.3d at 1012.

[¶57] In other words, the Disciplinary Code has structured disciplinary proceedings so it 

is the Board that hears evidence in the first instance and compiles the record. As part of 

that division of duties, the Disciplinary Code authorizes the Board, through either a 

disciplinary judge or the Board chair, to rule on evidentiary matters in accordance with 

the Wyoming Rules of Evidence. See Disciplinary Code §§ 8(g)(vi), 9(b)(iii), 19(b). In 

performing this function, the Board is called upon to exercise the same discretion that a 

trial court exercises in ruling on the admissibility of evidence. Given the structure of our 

attorney disciplinary proceedings, the division of functions between this Court and the 

Board, and the discretion the Board must necessarily use in ruling on the admissibility of 

evidence, we see no reason to deviate from our abuse of discretion standard of review. 

We will thus review the Board’s limitation on Mr. Stinson’s proffered expert testimony 

using our abuse of discretion standard of review and will find an abuse of discretion only 

if the Board could not have reasonably concluded as it did in limiting the testimony of 

Mr. Stinson’s designated experts. See Stalcup v. State, 2013 WY 114, ¶ 18, 311 P.3d 

104, 110 (Wyo. 2013) (“A trial court abuses its discretion when it could not have 

reasonably concluded as it did.”).2

[¶58] W.R.E. 702 governs the admissibility of expert testimony and provides that such 

evidence is admissible if it “will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to 

determine a fact in issue.” W.R.E. 702 (LexisNexis 2014). The Board permitted Mr. 

Stinson’s experts to testify subject to the following limitation:

 

2 We will not address the limitations the Board placed on expert testimony concerning the charged Rule 

3.3 violations because the Board found no violation of Rule 3.3 and therefore those charges and the 

evidentiary rulings related thereto are not before the Court. We likewise will not discuss the limitations 

placed on Judge Johnson’s testimony. Judge Johnson’s proposed opinion regarding Rule 3.1(c) addressed 

only the filing of the subpoena, and we have already concluded that the filing of the subpoena did not 

violate Rule 3.1(c). Our discussion of the limitations on expert testimony will therefore be confined to 

the limitations on the opinions of Judge Freudenthal and Richard Honaker concerning the Rule 3.1(c) 

violations.
25

Neither Mr. Honaker, Judge Freudenthal, nor Judge Johnson 

may testify as to whether or not any actions or inactions by 

the Respondent were or were not ethical; were or were not in 

compliance with any Rule of Professional Conduct; or 

whether or not any specific state of mind of the Respondent 

or any other attorney would or would not constitute a 

violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct.

[¶59] Mr. Stinson designated Judge Freudenthal as an expert witness who would testify 

in keeping with the opinions stated in her expert affidavit. Concerning the charged 

violations of Rule 3.1(c), Judge Freudenthal offered the following opinions:

8. I also do not believe that Mr. Stinson violated 

Rule 3.1(c) of the Wyoming Rules of Professional Conduct 

by using the Fallon deposition testimony as he understood it 

to be to vigorously defend Dr. Schneider.

9. In regard to the aspect of the charge against Mr. 

Stinson that he should not have included the detailed 

allegations directed at Dr. Biles in his Answer and 

Counterclaim, current federal law requires more than 

conclusory facts to be included in a Counterclaim to avoid 

dismissal under the Iqbal/Twombly line of cases.

[¶60] Judge Freudenthal was permitted to provide testimony consistent with the opinion 

offered in Paragraph 9 of her affidavit, so that portion of her proffered testimony is not at 

issue. With respect to the opinion offered in Paragraph 8 of the affidavit, the Board 

adhered to its exclusion of any opinion as to whether the Answer and Counterclaim 

violated a rule of conduct, but Judge Freudenthal was permitted to testify:

Q. Okay. Did you ever believe that Mr. Stinson’s 

use of the admissions in the Lisa Fallon deposition in his 

defense of the Schneiders was improper in any way? And I 

don’t mean to ask that in regard to any ethical obligations.

A. I wasn’t surprised by his use of those. I didn’t 

consider it improper –

Q. Okay.

A. -- in terms of what to expect in the course of 

that case. I expected that fight.

[¶61] The record shows that the Board took a similar approach in limiting Richard 

Honaker’s testimony. Mr. Stinson designated Mr. Honaker to provide the following 

opinions concerning the charged Rule 3.1(c) violations:
26

b. Mr. Stinson did not violate Rule 3.1(c) of the 

Wyoming Rules of Professional Conduct by relying upon the 

Fallon deposition testimony to defend Dr. Schneider and to 

assert a counterclaim on Dr. Schneider’s behalf in Biles v. 

Schneider, United States District Court, District of Wyoming, 

Civil No. 11-CV-366-F.

* * * 

(10) Nothing changed in the case for Mr. Bonner and 

Mr. Stinson between late November 2011 and the afternoon 

of April 23, 2012, when Mr. Bonner and Mr. Stinson received 

documents (not the “laundry room documents”) from 

Plaintiff’s counsel that proved to them, for the first time, that 

their client had lied to them and in fact had attempted to 

manipulate the legal process through a fraudulent delay of the 

Fallon deposition. At that point they made the decision to 

withdraw from any further representation of Dr. Schneider.

(11) Because the Rules did not require Mr. Bonner 

and Mr. Stinson to withdraw earlier than April 23, 2012, they 

owed their client, Dr. Schneider, prior to that date, an ethical 

duty to represent him competently and effectively, abiding by 

his decisions concerning the objectives of representation. It 

would have violated that ethical duty, and, in addition, likely 

would have constituted legal malpractice, for Mr. Bonner and 

Mr. Stinson to ignore the single piece of sworn testimony that 

existed – the deposition of Lisa Fallon – and to fail to use that 

sworn testimony to their client’s advantage.

(12) Mr. Bonner and Mr. Stinson were acting as 

advocates for a client within the adversary system. “As an 

advocate, a lawyer zealously asserts the client’s position 

under the rules of the adversary system.” (Wyoming Rules of 

Professional Conduct, Preamble: a Lawyer’s Responsibilities, 

[2]). The adversary system only works when each party has 

independent counsel and is well represented, and an 

independent, fair, and impartial tribunal decides the issues of 

fact and law. As advocates for their client, it was not Mr. 

Bonner’s or Mr. Stinson’s role to weigh the evidence and to 

adjudicate whether or not Ms. Fallon had committed perjury 

in her deposition or whether Dr. Schneider, despite his 

protestations to the contrary, had suborned such perjury. The 

final result of these cases – settlement of both cases well 

before trial settings – bears out that the adversary system 

worked well, with each participant representing his or her 
27

client effectively, and that justice was done. Mr. Bonner and 

Mr. Stinson played their roles appropriately, with careful and 

prudent deliberation, and nothing they did resulted in any 

fraud upon the judicial system or miscarriage of justice. 

Rather than being prejudiced, it appears likely that the 

Plaintiff benefitted from the way the process played itself out. 

As more facts gradually came to light, the Plaintiff’s cases 

became stronger, and voluntary settlements occurred. 

(13) With regard to the aspect of the charge against 

Mr. Stinson that he should not have included such detailed 

allegations in his Answer and Counterclaim, the Bar admits 

that Mr. Stinson had a factual basis for those allegations. The 

Bar alleges that such detail was not necessary and was done 

only for “purposes of harassment and embarrassment” 

(Formal Charge, ¶ 77). Current federal law, however, 

requires detailed pleadings to avoid dismissal. See Bell 

Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007) and Ashcroft 

v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 129 S.Ct. 1937 (2009). Wyoming’s 

state courts are moving in the same direction. See, for 

example, Rule 3 of the Wyoming Rules of Civil Procedure for 

Circuit Courts. The Answer and Counterclaim complied with 

current federal standards of pleading, demonstrating Mr. 

Stinson’s competence under Rule 1.1, Wyoming Rules of 

Professional Conduct, to represent a client in the United 

States District Court.

[¶62] The hearing transcript shows that Mr. Honaker was permitted to and did testify to 

all of the above-designated opinions, subject only to the limitation that he not testify as to 

whether Mr. Stinson violated Rule 3.1(c). In particular, Mr. Honaker was permitted to 

testify: that an attorney “must presume the client’s being honest until proven otherwise;” 

that there was nothing inappropriate in the manner that Mr. Stinson pled the Answer and 

Counterclaim; that “the pleading was, with specificity, required by the legal precedent;” 

and that the detail in the pleading was “a positive thing” because it put the plaintiff on 

notice as to where the defendant would be coming from. Mr. Honaker was also permitted 

to testify:

Q. Was Laurence Stinson in any way obligated to 

determine the reliabilities of the Fallon testimony before 

using it in his client’s defense?

A. Well, he had a responsibility as a lawyer, if he 

knew it was false – you know, a lawyer cannot present false 

evidence to a court. That would be a terrible thing to do. So 

unless he knew it was false, it was something that he owed a 
28

responsibility to his client to present. It was evidence that –

apparently it was favorable to his client. I think that if he 

reasonably believed that it was false, it still would have been 

proper to present it.

Q. Do you believe that he would have been 

obligated to use it only if he knew it was true?

A. No, to the contrary. I think a lawyer is 

obligated to use evidence that’s favorable to their client 

unless they know it’s false.

[¶63] Essentially, Mr. Stinson was permitted to present the designated opinion testimony 

of Judge Freudenthal and Mr. Honaker almost in its entirety, with the only limitation 

being that neither witness was permitted provide an opinion on the ultimate question of 

whether Mr. Stinson violated Rule 3.1(c). We find no abuse of discretion in the Board’s 

ruling.

[¶64] This Court has held that a trier of fact does not abuse its discretion when it 

excludes expert testimony on a question of law. Ruby Drilling Co., Inc. v. Duncan Oil 

Co., Inc., 2002 WY 85, ¶ 22, 47 P.3d 964, 971 (Wyo. 2002) (“Contract construction is a 

question of law and solely within the court’s province.”). In Ruby Drilling, we explained 

the distinction between expert testimony that may be excluded as encroaching on a 

question of law and that which should not be excluded:

Ruby relies on Samson Resources Company v. Quarles 

Drilling Company, 783 P.2d 974, 977 (Okla.Ct.App.1989). 

The Samson Resources case involved a drilling contract with 

an explicit modification clause governing conditions which 

would trigger a change from a footage to a day work contract. 

The Samson Resources trial court excluded expert testimony 

on the industry custom and usage regarding notice of such a 

change intended to apprise the contracting parties of a 

modification of the contract from footage to day work. The 

Samson Resources appellate court found the industry 

evidence was relevant to proper construction of the contract. 

We agree with this result and point out the trial court in the 

appeal before us permitted testimony regarding industry 

custom and usage. However, the Samson Resources case does 

not support Ruby’s position that its expert should have been 

permitted to testify as to the proper contract construction or 

which party he believed was obligated to ensure inclusion of 

specific clauses in the contract. Here, the trial court was 

absolutely correct and fully within its broad discretion when it 

precluded the attempt to have Ruby’s expert witness construe 
29

the contract. Contract construction is a question of law and 

solely within the court’s province.

Ruby Drilling, ¶ 22, 47 P.3d at 971.

[¶65] The Board’s ruling on Mr. Stinson’s proffered expert testimony tracked this 

approach. The Board allowed expert testimony on considerations that Mr. Stinson argued 

justified the manner in which he pled the allegations in the Answer and Counterclaim, 

including the legal requirements governing federal pleadings and a lawyer’s obligations 

to a client. This testimony, by addressing the context of the pleadings, was directed at 

assisting the trier of fact in understanding the evidence or determining a fact in issue—the 

reasons Mr. Stinson pled the Answer and Counterclaim as he did. The expert opinions on 

whether Mr. Stinson violated Rule 3.1(c), on the other hand, are not opinions that assist 

the trier of fact in understanding the evidence or determining a fact in issue. They instead 

offer a legal conclusion, which is the province of the Board and this Court.

[¶66] Answering the question of whether Mr. Stinson’s conduct violated Rule 3.1(c) is 

properly left to the Board and ultimately this Court. As we discussed earlier, Rule 3.1(c) 

is not a rule of professional conduct that requires definition or clarification by expert 

testimony because the rule sets forth an objective standard that the Board and this Court 

are able to apply to the facts in evidence. Importantly, our decision whether there has 

been a violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct must be based on the entire 

evidentiary record. See Richard, ¶ 2, ___ P.3d ___, n.1 (emphasizing that this Court’s 

decision is based on “an independent review of the entire record”); Davidson, ¶ 8, 205 

P.3d at 1012 (this Court’s “determination must be made upon the evidence that was 

presented to the Board at the hearing”). This highlights the deficiency in an expert 

opinion on the ultimate conclusion of law. In most cases, and certainly in this case, the 

expert opinions are based not on the entire evidentiary record before the Board but rather 

on a narrow subset of the evidence.3 While opinions concerning factors that must be 

considered in preparing competent pleadings may assist the trier of fact, in this case, a 

 

3

 That the expert opinions offered in this matter were based on less than the entire record on which this 

Court must base its ultimate conclusions was clear from the expert testimony. For example, Judge 

Freudenthal testified that she ruled only on the particular motions that were brought before her and that 

she was not asked to do any further examination of other matters. Mr. Honaker testified to reviewing a 

broader base of documents, many described in only general terms, such as “e-mails produced by [Ms. 

Fallon’s attorney],” and “e-mails produced by Mr. Stinson.” It was nonetheless clear from his testimony 

that the documents reviewed did not include the entire record that was before the Board or this Court. For 

example, the press release issued by Dr. Schneider’s public relations firm was neither identified as a 

document that Mr. Honaker reviewed nor discussed in his analysis of Mr. Stinson’s pleadings. Finally, 

the experts were not present for the hearing testimony of any of the witnesses, including Mr. Stinson’s 

testimony, and that testimony therefore was not factored into their opinions regarding whether Mr. 

Stinson violated a rule of professional conduct.
30

legal conclusion based on less than the entire evidentiary record is not helpful. The 

Board thus did not abuse its discretion in limiting the expert testimony.

C. Determination of Appropriate Sanction

[¶67] In determining the appropriate sanction for an attorney’s rule violation, this Court 

is guided by the American Bar Association’s Standards for Imposing Lawyer Discipline 

(ABA Standards). See Richard, ¶ 70 ___ P.3d ___; Casper, ¶ 25, 318 P.3d at 797-801. 

The Board identified the following applicable standards in its Report and 

Recommendation for Public Reprimand:

3. ABA Standard 3.0 lists four factors to be 

considered in imposing a sanction after a finding of lawyer 

misconduct:

(a) the duty violated;

(b) the lawyer’s mental state;

(c) the potential or actual injury caused by the lawyer’s 

misconduct; and

(d) the existence of aggravating or mitigating factors.

The First Factor: The Duty Violated

4. Violations of Rule 3.1(c) fall within the 

Standard 6.2, “Abuse of the Legal Process.”

Absent aggravating or mitigating circumstances, upon 

application of the factors set out in Standard 3.0, the 

following sanctions are generally appropriate in cases 

involving failure to expedite litigation or bring a meritorious 

claim, or failure to obey any obligation under the rules of the 

tribunal except for an open refusal based on an assertion that 

no valid obligation exists:

6.21 Disbarment is generally appropriate when a lawyer 

knowingly violates a court order or a rule with the intent to 

obtain a benefit for the lawyer or another, and causes serious 

or potentially serious injury to a party or causes serious or 

potentially serious interference with a legal proceeding.

6.22 Suspension is generally appropriate when a lawyer 

knows that he or she is violating a court order or rule, and 
31

causes injury or potential injury to a client or a party, or 

causes interference or potential interference with a legal 

proceeding.

6.23 Reprimand [i.e., “public censure” under Section 4(a)(iii) 

of Wyoming’s Disciplinary Code] is generally appropriate 

when a lawyer negligently fails to comply with a court order 

or rule, and causes injury or potential injury to a client or 

other party, or causes interference or potential interference 

with a legal proceeding.

6.24 Admonition [i.e., “private reprimand” under Section 4(b) 

of Wyoming’s Disciplinary Code] is generally appropriate 

when a lawyer engages in an isolated instance of negligence 

in complying with a court order or rule, and causes little or no 

actual or potential injury to a party, or causes little or no 

actual or potential interference with a legal proceeding.

The Second Factor: The Lawyer’s Mental State

5. The preamble to the ABA Standards includes 

the following discussion regarding mental state:

The mental states used in this model are defined as follows. 

The most culpable mental state is that of intent, when the 

lawyer acts with the conscious objective or purpose to 

accomplish a particular result. The next most culpable mental 

state is that of knowledge, when the lawyer acts with 

conscious awareness of the nature or attendant circumstances 

of his or her conduct both without the conscious objective or 

purpose to accomplish a particular result. The least culpable 

mental state is negligence, when a lawyer fails to be aware of 

a substantial risk that circumstances exist or that a result will 

follow, which failure is a deviation of a care that a reasonable 

lawyer would exercise in the situation.

* * * 

The Third Factor: The Potential Or Actual Injury Caused 

By The Lawyer’s Misconduct

7. Under the ABA Standards, “injury” is defined 

as “harm to a client, the public, the legal system, or the 

profession which results from a lawyer’s misconduct. The 

level of injury can range from ‘serious’ injury to ‘little or no’ 

injury; a reference to ‘injury’ alone indicates any level of 
32

injury greater than ‘little or no’ injury.” “Potential injury” is 

defined as “harm to a client, the public, the legal system or 

the profession that is reasonably foreseeable at the time of the 

lawyer’s misconduct, and which, but for some intervening 

factor or event, would probably have resulted from the 

lawyer’s misconduct.”

* * * 

The Fourth Factor: The Existence Of Aggravating Or 

Mitigating Factors

ABA Standard 9.0, entitled “Aggravation and Mitigation,” 

provides as follows:

9.1 Generally

After misconduct has been established, aggravating and 

mitigating circumstances may be considered in deciding what 

sanction to impose.

9.2 Aggravation

9.21 Definition. Aggravation or aggravating circumstances 

are any considerations or factors that may justify an increase 

in the degree of discipline to be imposed.

9.22 Factors which may be considered in aggravation.

Aggravating factors include:

(a) prior disciplinary offenses;

(b) dishonest or selfish motive;

(c) a pattern of misconduct;

(d) multiple offenses;

(e) bad faith obstruction of the disciplinary proceeding by 

intentionally failing to comply with rules or orders of the 

disciplinary agency;

(f) submission of false evidence, false statements, or other 

deceptive practices during the disciplinary process;

(g) refusal to acknowledge wrongful nature of conduct;

(h) vulnerability of the victim;

(i) substantial experience in the practice of law;
33

(j) indifference in making restitution; and

(k) illegal conduct, including that involving the use of 

controlled substances.

9.3 Mitigation

9.31 Definition. Mitigation or mitigating circumstances are 

any considerations or factors that may justify a reduction in 

the degree of discipline to be imposed.

9.32 Factors which may be considered in mitigation.

Mitigating factors include:

(a) absence of a prior disciplinary record;

(b) absence of a dishonest or selfish motive;

(c) personal or emotional problems;

(d) timely good faith effort to make restitution or to rectify 

consequences of misconduct;

(e) full and free disclosure of disciplinary board or 

cooperative attitude toward proceedings;

(f) inexperience in the practice of law;

(g) character or reputation;

(h) physical disability;

(i) mental disability or chemical dependency including 

alcoholism or drug abuse when:

(1) there is medical evidence that the respondent is affected 

by a chemical dependency or mental disability;

(2) the chemical dependency or mental disability caused the 

misconduct;

(3) the respondent’s recovery from the chemical dependency 

or mental disability is demonstrated by a meaningful and 

sustained period of successful rehabilitation; and

(4) the recovery arrested the misconduct and recurrence of 

that misconduct is unlikely.
34

(j) delay in disciplinary proceedings;

(k) imposition of other penalties or sanctions;

(l) remorse; and

(m) remoteness of prior offenses.

9.4 Factors Which Are Neither Aggravating nor Mitigating.

The following factors should not be considered as either 

aggravating or mitigating:

(a) forced or compelled restitution;

(b) agreeing to the client’s demand for certain improper 

behavior or result;

(c) withdrawal of complaint against the lawyer;

(d) resignation prior to completion of disciplinary 

proceedings;

(e) complainant’s recommendation as to sanction; and

(f) failure of injured client to complain.

[¶68] The Board recommended that this Court issue a public censure as the appropriate 

discipline in response to Mr. Stinson’s rule violations. Mr. Stinson contends that if the 

Court does find a rule violation, then a private reprimand is the proper level discipline. 

The Bar counters that the Court should consider imposing a disciplinary suspension 

instead of the recommended public censure. Based on our consideration of the four 

factors set forth above, we agree with the Board’s recommended sanction and conclude 

that a public censure is the appropriate level of discipline.

[¶69] In considering the first two factors, the duty violated and the lawyer’s mental state, 

our goal is to determine whether Mr. Stinson’s rule violation was committed negligently 

or knowingly. If the violation was committed knowingly, that weighs in favor of a 

suspension, whereas a negligent violation would weigh in favor of a public censure or 

private reprimand. Mr. Stinson testified as to his mental state regarding the Answer and 

Counterclaim and the press release that immediately followed the filing:

Q. Weren’t you concerned, when you filed your 

answer and counterclaim and your client used this press 

release, that the purpose of the answer and counterclaims 
35

were just to smear Dr. Biles in every way possible, and to do 

that in the media?

A. I was concerned that Dr. Schneider had thought 

some things were going on with Dr. Biles we weren’t able to 

verify, so we didn’t file counterclaims on those. With regard 

to the other information, I thought we had good investigative 

sources for that. And as Becky mentioned in her openings, 

we did all those investigations. Did I think my client was 

angry at Dr. Biles, yes. And I thought Dr. Biles was angry at 

my client.

Q. Did you think he was using you and your law 

enforcement license to put things in the court files so he could 

issue press releases to defame Dr. Biles further?

A. Now or then?

Q. When these articles came out.

A. No, I didn’t think that then. I was too busy 

doing other things. Now I think it, and I wish he wouldn't 

have issued press releases. I don’t like it when clients do 

things like that.

[¶70] During the sanctions portion of the hearing before the Board, Mr. Stinson further 

explained:

Q. (BY BOARD MEMBER ARNEY) * * * Do 

you feel that the kind of personality Dr. Schneider was, if not 

overwhelmed, that you were pushed, maybe, beyond your 

good senses? Did you feel – and that happens to all of us, I 

realize. But did you feel pressure from him, maybe, to do 

things that, upon reflection, you wouldn’t do again?

A. Oh, yeah. And you know the funny thing is, 

Mr. Arney, is [Dr. Biles’ attorney] Dan Fleck was kind of 

trying to tell everybody this, but we were – we had such our –

you know, our adversary hats on. And litigation with The 

Spence Firm is tough. You’ve done that, and it seemed like a 

game. We thought we were being tricked. He kept saying 

like, man, you guys got to look at this, and we on our side 

were like what’s this guy talking about? And I did feel that 

way.

* * * 

I felt conned by Dr. Schneider, but I also felt like I let 

myself be conned.
36

[¶71] While Mr. Stinson arguably should have known that the allegations in the Answer

and Counterclaim were not grounded in a good faith factual basis and that they were 

being made for an improper purpose, we accept his explanation that he did not knowingly 

violate Rule 3.1(c) and was instead improperly influenced by his client. For this reason, 

we reject the Bar’s suggestion that a suspension is the appropriate level of discipline, and 

we turn to the final two factors to determine whether they weigh in favor of a public 

censure or private reprimand.

[¶72] The third factor is the potential or actual injury caused by the misconduct. Mr. 

Stinson acknowledged in his testimony that the filing of the Answer and Counterclaim 

received widespread coverage in newsprint:

Q. This press release went out on February 22nd, 

the next day after your filing of the answer and counterclaim?

A. Yes.

* * * 

Q. It goes to the Cody Enterprise, which some 

people don’t read. It goes to –

A. I’m going to go with most of Cody, but . . . 

Q. -- the Billings Gazette.

The Powell Tribune got their hands on it. You 

know that because they wrote an article, right?

A. Well, I think Cody wrote – I think everybody 

wrote an article. I mean, at some point Casper Star-Tribune 

wrote an article, everything said in court was being reprinted.

Q. Yeah.

A. The Cody Enterprise, they’re always a day 

behind everybody else, and the Gazette. There were articles 

flying. I mean, it was number one news story for a while in 

Cody.

[¶73] Counsel for Dr. Biles testified concerning the impact that the Answer and 

Counterclaim and its publication had on Dr. Biles:

Q. What impact did this strategic approach of the 

counterclaims have on your client?

A. Well, it devastated him. He was – he was 

horribly embarrassed that he had a DUI to begin with. It was 

a low point for him, obviously. Then to have it brought to 

light was something he expected, because it was in the public. 

But everything that came as a result of what they did to him 

was certainly a horrific thing that he had happen in his life. 

But then to have, when he trying to vindicate himself by 
37

filing the defamation lawsuit and by exercising his rights to 

access the courts, then to be castigated again for simply filing 

that lawsuit, being called a drunk in press, saying that he has 

problems, saying that he needs help, those are all things that 

were, you know, a further insult to him, at the very time when 

he was trying to – rectify things.

[¶74] The Answer and Counterclaim was intended, at least by Mr. Stinson’s client, to be 

used as a source for a press release and further dissemination of the allegations against 

Dr. Biles. This improper use, which Mr. Stinson made possible, caused harm to Dr. 

Biles, and this harm weighs in favor of a public censure.

[¶75] The final factor we must consider is the existence of mitigating or aggravating 

circumstances. The Board found two mitigating factors, and from our review of the 

record we agree with the finding:

10. The Board finds the following mitigating 

factors: (1) absence of a prior disciplinary record and (2) 

good reputation as a competent attorney. Respondent called 

as witnesses at the hearing before the Board Judge Alan 

Johnson and Judge Nancy Freudenthal, the two federal judges 

who presided over the Federal Case [Biles v. Fallon] and the 

Second Federal Case [Biles v. Schneider]. It was evident to 

the Board from their willingness to appear and from their 

testimony that both judges considered Respondent to be a 

competent attorney of good reputation.

[¶76] The Board also found two aggravating factors: 1) Mr. Stinson’s substantial 

experience, eighteen years, in the practice of law; and 2) his refusal to acknowledge the 

wrongful nature of his conduct. Mr. Stinson contests the second aggravating factor 

identified by the Board, contending that the only evidence the Board could be relying on 

for this finding is Mr. Stinson’s insistence on a hearing on the Formal Charge. We 

disagree.

[¶77] During the sanctions portion of the hearing before the Board, Mr. Stinson 

appeared to acknowledge the wrongful nature of his conduct, but then moments later, he 

retracted that acknowledgement and maintained that his manner of pleading the Answer 

and Counterclaim was proper. When asked by his counsel to discuss with the Board what 

he believed to be mitigating factors, Mr. Stinson testified, in part:

A. * * * I did not think you were going to find –

find me culpable on the 3.3(b), but I did think so on the 

3.1(c). And I thought so because as this proceeding has 
38

progressed – and I regret that. I didn’t like it. And if I had to 

go back and do it again, that wouldn’t be the pleading that I 

drafted. And I have learned a lot from it. So I acknowledge 

that, and that’s kind of what I thought was going to come 

back.

There’s obviously a lot of things in this particular 

circumstance I wouldn’t have – would do differently, but one 

of them is better written communication with my own client. 

So I acknowledge that’s a problem. And I didn’t like that 

pleading. And that’s not going to be the way it happens in the 

future. * * * 

* * * 

Q. (BY VICE CHAIRMAN BLUEMEL): * * * 

So you’ve said here that, yeah, there’s some things in the 

pleading that I’m not pleased with and I wouldn’t do it again.

A. Yes.

Q. What does that – what are you not pleased 

with?

A. So I don’t – I think you could have found either 

way on it, okay? I mean, I think I – you know, I met legal 

pleading standards to do it. But when I look back on this case 

with hindsight, I don’t like how that pleading was – it played 

like [Special Bar Counsel] was saying it played. I mean, that 

wasn’t the intent of it. But when you look at it, it was like, 

wow, these allegations look like these two high school kids 

fighting over it. And I think I could have found some other 

way to do that. I’m not sure how, but I think I could have 

found some other way.

Q. When did you realize it?

A. Kind of had that whole prophecy as it was 

going on here and we were talking about it and Dan Fleck 

was talking about it. I’m not trying to be duplicitous with 

you. I think you could have found I did just fine. I think I 

met legal proceeding standards. I think I had factual grounds 

to do it, but just realize I’d do it differently.

[¶78] Having considered all four factors—the duty violated, Mr. Stinson’s mental state, 

the harm caused by the violation, and the aggravating and mitigating circumstances—we 

agree with the Board that the appropriate sanction for the violation is a public reprimand.

D. Recommended Order Assessing Costs
39

[¶79] As part of its recommendation, the Board recommended that the Court enter an 

order reimbursing the Bar for costs incurred in this matter in the amount of $15,613.76, 

as supported by the Bar’s Affidavit of Costs and Expenses. Mr. Stinson objects to the 

assessment of costs on the grounds that 1) the recommendation did not allow him an 

opportunity to respond to the Bar’s affidavit of costs; 2) the recommendation failed to 

separate costs between the Rule 3.3 and Rule 3.1 charges; and 3) the recommendation 

failed to consider whether the Bar’s costs were reasonable. We reject Mr. Stinson’s 

objection and accept the Board’s recommendation.

1. Opportunity to Respond to Affidavit of Costs

[¶80] This Court has ruled that before costs may be assessed against an attorney in a 

disciplinary proceeding, that attorney must be given notice of the Bar’s intention to seek 

those costs.

Fundamental fairness demands that sufficient notice of 

charges and their consequences must be provided to enable 

the Respondent to make meaningful choices with the respect 

to the need for, and the manner of, his defense without being 

subjected to any element of surprise. Morgan v. United 

States, 304 U.S. 1, 58 S.Ct. 773, 82 L.Ed. 1129 (1938); White, 

648 P.2d 528.

Meyer v. Norman, 780 P.2d 283, 290 (Wyo. 1989).

[¶81] The Formal Charge the Bar filed against Mr. Stinson provided him with the notice 

required by Meyer. The Formal Charge included a request in the prayer for relief that 

Mr. Stinson be required to reimburse the Bar for all costs and expenses of prosecuting the 

matter and for the disciplinary proceeding. The prayer for relief was then followed by 

this notice regarding the costs:

NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that the Wyoming State 

Bar intends to seek recovery from Respondent of all current 

and future costs of the disciplinary proceeding and 

investigation hereof. Such costs include all costs of 

discovery, copying and postage, fees for subpoenas, process, 

witnesses, and mileage, and all costs of hearing, including 

court reporting fees, preparing a full transcript of the hearing, 

and travel, lodging, meals for Bar Counsel, Board members 

and witnesses.

[¶82] Furthermore, the final decision on all disciplinary matters, including the 

recommended sanction and cost assessments, rests with this Court. Disciplinary Code 
40

§ 26(c) (“The BPR may recommend to the Court the assessment of those costs and fees 

and, if the Court imposes discipline, the Court may assess all or any part of the certified 

costs and fees against respondent.”). The Board recommended the assessment of costs, 

and Mr. Stinson has had the opportunity to object to the costs in his submissions to this 

Court. We thus reject Mr. Stinson’s contention that he has not been provided an adequate 

opportunity to be heard on the assessment of costs.

2. Apportionment of Costs

[¶83] Mr. Stinson next argues that the recommended cost assessment should be rejected 

because the Board did not apportion the costs between the Rule 3.1(c) charge proven and 

the Rule 3.3 charge that the Board found had not been proved by clear and convincing 

evidence. We disagree.

[¶84] The Bar charged two rule violations. Both violations arose out of the same course 

of events, and resolution of both charges required an understanding of what Mr. Stinson 

knew concerning his client’s actions and when he knew it. That being the case, there is 

no practical way to apportion the costs. We therefore find no basis to require an 

apportionment as a condition to assessing costs and we reject Mr. Stinson’s request to 

impose such a requirement.

3. Reasonableness of Costs

[¶85] Mr. Stinson contends that the recommended costs should be rejected as 

unreasonable because the itemized costs are not costs permitted under Rule 501(a) of the 

Uniform Rules for District Courts. He further argues that the costs of room and board for 

the Board members should not be awarded in any case because such an award of costs “is 

a punitive measure that most assuredly has a chilling effect on respondents who wish to 

challenge the charges brought against them.” We again reject both of these objections.

[¶86] First, the Uniform Rules for District Courts do not apply to disciplinary 

proceedings before the Board. Section 11(n) of the Disciplinary Code lists the provisions 

of the Wyoming Rules of Civil Procedure that apply in a disciplinary proceeding. That 

list does not include U.R.D.C. 501(a), and that rule is not otherwise referenced or 

incorporated in any section of the Disciplinary Code. Mr. Stinson’s reliance on Rule 

501(a) is therefore misplaced. 

[¶87] We are likewise not persuaded by Mr. Stinson’s argument concerning the chilling 

effect of an award of costs for the Board members’ lodging and meal expenses incurred 

for the hearing. We acknowledge that the potential for an award of costs may have a 

chilling effect on a charged attorney’s decision whether to contest the charges. We do 

not know, however, that the lodging and meal expenses necessarily have a greater 

chilling effect than any of the other costs, and the Disciplinary Code plainly allows for 
41

the assessment of costs. On the other hand, no costs may be assessed unless the Board 

and this Court find by clear and convincing evidence that a rule violation occurred. This 

should offset at least to some degree the chilling effect associated with the cost 

assessment. An attorney is not penalized for defending against the charges but is 

responsible for the costs associated with the rule violation. We thus believe the code has 

appropriately balanced the risk of a cost assessment, and we will not make the requested 

adjustment.

E. Rule 11 Motion for Sanctions

[¶88] On January 21, 2014, Mr. Stinson filed a motion pursuant to W.R.C.P. 11(b)(3), 

alleging there was no factual basis for the Formal Charge and seeking sanctions against 

the Bar, the Peer Review Panel, and Special Bar Counsel. On March 13, 2014, the Board 

entered an order denying Mr. Stinson's Rule 11 motion. The parties disagree whether the 

denial of the Rule 11 motion is before this Court, but in the interests of judicial economy 

and to ensure that all issues related to this matter are resolved, we will address it. Both 

the Board and this Court have found clear and convincing evidence that Mr. Stinson 

violated Rule 3.1(c). We therefore find no basis for the Rule 11 motion and affirm the 

denial of the motion.

IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED THAT:

1. Laurence W. Stinson is hereby publicly censured for his violation of Rule 3.1(c); 

and

2. By March 1, 2015, Laurence W. Stinson shall pay costs of $15,631.76 associated 

with the disciplinary proceedings and an administrative fee of $500.00.4

[¶89] DATED this 29th day of October, 2014.

BY THE COURT*

/s/

E. JAMES BURKE

Chief Justice

*Justice Davis took no part in the consideration of this matter. Judge Donnell participated by 

assignment.

 

4 Mr. Stinson objected to references in the Board’s Report and Recommendation to information that Mr. 

Stinson contends was admitted into evidence subject to a stipulation that it would remain confidential. 

Because this Court has not adopted and incorporated the Board’s Report and Recommendation and has 

not otherwise referenced the confidential information, we do not address this objection further.