2012 Decisions

Opinions of the United

States Court of Appeals

for the Third Circuit

2-9-2012

Stephen Brazelton v. Ronnie Holt

Precedential or Non-Precedential: Non-Precedential

Docket No. 11-4144

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GLD-098 NOT PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

___________

No. 11-4144

___________

STEPHEN BRAZELTON,

Appellant

v.

RONNIE R. HOLT, Warden; C.O. ORNER

____________________________________

On Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Middle District of Pennsylvania

(D.C. Civil No. 4-10-cv-01223)

District Judge: Honorable William W. Caldwell

____________________________________

Submitted for Possible Dismissal Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)

or Summary Action Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6

January 26, 2012

Before: FUENTES, GREENAWAY, JR., and STAPLETON, Circuit Judges

(Opinion filed: February 9, 2012)

_________

OPINION

_________

PER CURIAM

Stephen Brazelton, a federal inmate proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, 

appeals a District Court order that partly dismissed his complaint and partly granted 

summary judgment in favor of the defendants. For the following reasons, we will 
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summarily affirm.

The parties all agree that on June 17, 2009, Brazelton’s hand was injured when it 

was caught in the hinges of his cell door. They differ, however, on the particulars on the 

incident. Defendant Corrections Officer Matthew Orner claims he was following 

standard procedures for the 4:00 P.M. “count” on the day in question, flicking the dayroom lights to encourage inmates to return to their cells. See Orner Decl. ¶¶ 6–7, ECF 

No. 84-1. Upon beginning to close Brazelton’s door, Orner heard him yell, and Brazelton 

told him that his hand was caught in the door’s hinges. Orner Decl. ¶ 10; Orner 

Interrogatories Resp. 1, ECF No. 30-15. To Orner, the wound (a blood blister) did not 

look serious, and Brazelton informed him that he “did not need medical attention” and 

that it was his (Brazelton’s) fault, Orner Decl. ¶¶ 10–12, 15; nevertheless, Orner called 

medical services and sent Brazelton to the infirmary after the 4:00 P.M. count was over. 

Orner Decl. ¶¶ 13–14; Orner Interrogatories Resp. 5. Medical staff observed mild 

swelling, and the hand was splinted; follow-up treatment revealed no lasting injuries. See

Sullivan Decl. ¶ 4–11, ECF No. 84-1.

But as recounted by Brazelton, Orner, who arrived late to the shift, was “rushing” 

to lock inmates in their assigned cells. See, e.g., Compl. § D(3), ECF No. 1; Brazelton 

Dep. Tr. 39:3–9, ECF No. 84-2. In his haste, Orner made several errors, such as closing 

cell doors before checking to see whether inmates were present. Brazelton Dep. Tr. 

41:4–9, 12–15. The eventual injury, far from being minor, “gashed” Brazelton’s hand 

open; afterwards, Orner stood at Brazelton’s cell door, apologizing and promising to 
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secure medical treatment.1 Brazelton Dep. Tr. 48:22–49:4. Brazelton was finally seen by 

medical around 7:00 P.M, and suffered injuries that were significant in scope. See, e.g., 

Brazelton Dep. Tr. 53:16–17. 

Shortly after the incident, Brazelton commenced pursuit of his administrative 

remedies, citing (inter alia) Orner’s “reckless disregard for [his] safety” and requesting 

treatment and compensation. Brazelton’s final administrative appeal was denied on 

March 11, 2010. Brazelton separately filed an Administrative Tort Claim that was denied 

on January 29, 2010. 

Having exhausted the administrative process, Brazelton filed a civil-rights suit 

pursuant to Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 

U.S. 388 (1971), naming as defendants Orner and Warden Ronnie Holt. Brazelton 

claimed that “Orner, acting under the authority of . . . Holt, . . . did inflict harm, cruel and 

unusual punishment . . . by slamming cell-door #220[] on [Brazelton’s] fingers,” causing 

lasting injury. Compl. § D(3). The District Court read the complaint as also raising a 

claim under the Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b), and proceeded 

accordingly. See Order n.2, ECF No. 6. 

 

1 Brazelton included numerous inmate affidavits to corroborate his version of the 

encounter. See ECF No. 30-6. He also maintained that his injuries were far greater than 

reported in the provided medical records, and accused the Bureau of Prisons of 

engineering a cover-up by refusing to properly document the damage to his hand. See, 

e.g., Abraham Statement, ECF No. 30-6; Mot. for Summary Judgment 5, ECF No. 29 

(“Two of my fingers, my hand and wrist were damaged. My fingers, wrist and hand were 

bleeding.”); Pl.’s Resp. 2, ECF No. 92 (charging the Bureau of Prisons with refusing “to 

take photos of my hand on the day of injury. My fingers were smashed flat. I was 

bleeding from three sites.”). 
4

We need not recount in detail much of what followed; suffice to say, the case 

quickly metamorphosed into a dispute over discovery in general and missing video 

recordings of the day in question in particular. Brazelton sought sanctions, arguing that 

the defendants were “stonewalling” him, committing fraud upon the court, purposefully 

destroying evidence, and exhibiting “100% disregard for the court[’s] time, costs, and . . . 

limited resources.” See generally Motion, ECF No. 29. Eventually, the defendants 

moved to dismiss and for summary judgment. The presiding Magistrate Judge 

recommended granting2the motion and denying Brazelton’s request for sanctions, and 

the District Court (in large part) concurred. See Brazelton v. Holt, No. 4:10–CV–1223, 

2011 WL 4553121, at *1, *2 n.3 (M.D. Pa. Sept. 29, 2011). This timely appeal followed.

We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and conduct plenary review of 

summary judgment and dismissal decisions, including those implicating sovereign 

immunity. See United States v. Virgin Islands, 363 F.3d 276, 284 (3d Cir. 2004); Air 

Courier Conference/Int’l Comm. v. U.S. Postal Serv., 959 F.2d 1213, 1217 (3d Cir. 

1992). With regard to dismissal, we must accept all well-pleaded allegations in the 

complaint as true and draw all reasonable inferences in Brazelton’s favor. Capogrosso v. 

Sup. Ct. of N.J., 588 F.3d 180, 184 (3d Cir. 2009) (per curiam). Leave to amend a 

defective complaint should generally be granted to pro se plaintiffs when amendment 

would “neither be inequitable nor futile.” Grayson v. Mayview State Hosp., 293 F.3d 

 

2

The Magistrate Judge observed that Brazelton had explicitly abandoned any Federal 

Tort Claims Act claim. See Pl.’s Reply Br. 8, ECF No. 88. He therefore recommended 

“dismissing” the defendants’ summary judgment motion on that ground. Brazelton v. 

Holt, No. 4:10–1223, 2011 WL 4565776, at *12 (M.D. Pa. Aug. 4, 2011). 
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103, 114 (3d Cir. 2002). With regard to summary judgment, we employ the same 

standard used by the District Court, and will affirm its decision if there is no genuine 

issue of material fact and the defendants are entitled to judgment as a matter of law, again 

viewing the facts in the light most favorable to Brazelton.3 Farrell v. Planters Lifesavers 

Co., 206 F.3d 271, 278 (3d Cir. 2000).

We may dispense quickly with the starker defects in this appeal. First, the District 

Court correctly dismissed the claims against the defendants in their official capacities as 

being barred by sovereign immunity. “[T]he federal government is generally immune 

from suit, except where Congress has expressly articulated an exception to the 

immunity.” Scheafnocker v. Comm’r, 642 F.3d 428, 434 (3d Cir. 2011).

4

 A Bivens suit 

“against a defendant in his or her official capacity would merely be another way of 

pleading an action against the United States, which would be barred by the doctrine of 

sovereign immunity.” Consejo de Desarrollo Economico de Mexicali, A.C. v. United 

States, 482 F.3d 1157, 1173 (9th Cir. 2007). Second, it is clear from the record that 

Brazelton’s claims against defendant Holt arose from the warden’s conduct in the 

evidence-gathering phase and in the administrative-remedy process. See, e.g., Aff., ECF 

 

3 We do not address the propriety of the District Court’s decision to deem the defendants’ 

recitation of facts “admitted” due to Brazelton’s noncompliance with its local rules. As 

we discuss below, the outcome is the same under either factual reading; as such, we will 

give Brazelton’s retelling due weight for the purposes of this appeal.

4 Of course, the Federal Tort Claims Act includes precisely such a (limited) waiver. See

White-Squire v. U.S. Postal Serv., 592 F.3d 453, 456 (3d Cir. 2010). On this front, 

Brazelton’s complaint was defective, as he did not name the United States as a defendant. 
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No. 30-6. Since “respondeat superior is not a viable theory of Bivens liability,” Rivera v. 

Riley, 209 F.3d 24, 28 (1st Cir. 2000), Brazelton did not state a claim against Holt by 

merely suggesting that he was Orner’s supervisor or that he participated in the subsequent 

investigation. We agree, further, that amendment would be futile with regard to these 

deficiencies.

Turning, then, to the meat of the suit, we agree with the District Court that 

summary judgment was warranted. “To be cruel and unusual punishment [under the 

Eighth Amendment], conduct that does not purport to be punishment at all must involve 

more than ordinary lack of due care for the prisoner’s interests or safety[;] . . . [i]t is 

obduracy and wantonness, not inadvertence or error in good faith, that characterize the 

conduct prohibited by the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause.” Whitley v. Albers, 

475 U.S. 312, 319 (1986); see also Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994) (“[A]

prison official cannot be found liable under the Eighth Amendment for denying an inmate 

humane conditions of confinement unless the official knows of and disregards an 

excessive risk to inmate health or safety.”). “[A]n accident or inadvertence or mere 

negligence does not [in itself] trigger the Eighth Amendment.” Grabowski v. Jackson 

Cnty. Pub. Defenders Office, 47 F.3d 1386, 1395 n.12 (5th Cir. 1995) (citing Estelle v. 

Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 105–06 (1976)). Simply put, nowhere does Brazelton show that 

Orner was aware of and disregarded an excessive or substantial risk of harm to inmates 

due to his alleged haste. In Orner’s retelling, Brazelton’s injury was an unfortunate 

 

See Galvin v. Occupational Safety & Health Admin., 860 F.2d 181, 183 (5th Cir. 1988). 

As we agree that the tort claims were abandoned, this defect is of no moment. 
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accident; in Brazelton’s, it was an accident compounded by negligence and carelessness. 

But in neither scenario was Orner’s conduct reflective of the heightened standard 

required to sustain an Eighth Amendment claim. 

In light of the above, we conclude that the District Court did not abuse its 

discretion in declining to sanction the defendants. See Simmerman v. Corino, 27 F.3d 

58, 61 (3d Cir. 1994). Even if videotaped evidence existed that could have supported 

Brazelton’s version of the events, it would not suffice to elevate his claims above an 

Eighth Amendment threshold. See Schmid v. Milwaukee Elec. Tool Corp., 13 F.3d 76, 

79 (3d Cir. 1994) (holding that a “key consideration[]” in evaluating sanctions connected 

with the discovery process is whether a party was prejudiced by the missing evidence).

While we sympathize with Brazelton’s situation, the Eighth Amendment simply 

does not provide relief for the conduct about which he complains. For the foregoing 

reasons, and as we find that this appeal presents no substantial issue, we will summarily 

affirm the judgment of the District Court. Murray v. Bledsoe, 650 F.3d 246, 248 (3d Cir. 

2011) (per curiam); see also 3d Cir. L.A.R. 27.4; I.O.P. 10.6.