Opinion filed January 11, 2024

In The

Eleventh Court of Appeals __________

No. 11-22-00010-CR 

__________

FABIAN CHAVEZ POLVON, Appellant

V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

On Appeal from the 161st District Court

Ector County, Texas

Trial Court Cause No. B-20-0175-CR

O P I N I O N

The jury convicted Appellant, Fabian Chavez Polvon, of capital murder. 

Because the State did not seek the death penalty, the trial court assessed his 

punishment at confinement for life, without the possibility of parole, in the 

Correctional Institutions Division of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice. See 

TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 12.31(a)(2) (West 2019), § 19.03(a)(7)(A) (West Supp. 

2023). In his sole issue on appeal, Appellant contends that the trial court erred when 
2

it “fail[ed] to limit the timing, method, and scope” of the mental health examination 

that it ordered the State’s expert to complete. We affirm. 

Background Facts

On November 26, 2019, Appellant’s estranged wife, Tiffany Polvon, had 

parked her vehicle in the parking lot of a car wash. She and a male passenger, Joseph 

Granado, were sitting inside the vehicle when Appellant drove his pickup into the 

parking lot and rammed it into the back of Tiffany’s vehicle. Appellant exited his 

pickup armed with a gun. Granado, a manager at the car wash, was occupying the 

front passenger seat of Tiffany’s vehicle at the time. Granado exited the vehicle as 

Appellant approached. As Appellant approached, he shot Granado twice, hitting

him once in the face and once in the chest, mortally wounding him. Appellant then 

circled around the front of Tiffany’s vehicle and moved to the driver’s side where 

he shot Tiffany at least eight times in the face, head, neck, and torso, before dragging 

her body from the vehicle and leaving it laying on the ground. Both Tiffany and 

Granado died at the scene. 

Tiffany had previously filed for divorce in February 2019. A close family 

member of Tiffany testified that Appellant threatened Tiffany that “if he ever caught 

her in [her] vehicle with another man, that she wasn’t going to like what would 

happen” and to “be careful what you do and where you go, because I have eyes 

everywhere.” In October 2019, the same family member was with Tiffany at a bar 

when Appellant entered the bar with three male family members and started a scuffle 

with two men that had been playing “Jenga” with the women.

Procedural History

Appellant timely filed a notice of his intent to present the affirmative defense 

of insanity. See PENAL § 8.01 (West 2021); TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN.

art. 46C.051 (West 2016). Appellant’s attorneys informed the State that they had 

retained Dr. James Schutte, a forensic psychologist, to interview Appellant. The 
3

State subsequently filed a motion requesting that Appellant submit to an interview 

by the State’s psychiatric expert in order to prepare for possible rebuttal testimony. 

At the pretrial hearing on the State’s motion, defense counsel objected to the 

State’s motion to appoint a psychiatric expert. Defense counsel argued that, under 

Soria v. State and Lagrone v. State, “the notice of insanity is a very limited waiver 

of the Defendant’s 5th Amendment right. Because that [sic] 5th Amendment waiver, 

the State is . . . very circumscribed as to what they can do, and is only limited only 

[sic] to rebuttal and only to what we have done.” See Soria v. State, 933 S.W.2d 46, 

57–58 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996); Lagrone v. State, 942 S.W.2d 602, 611 (Tex. Crim. 

App. 1997) (holding that trial courts are allowed to “order criminal defendants to 

submit to a state-sponsored psychiatric exam on future dangerousness when the 

defense introduces, or plans to introduce, its own future dangerousness expert 

testimony.”) (emphasis in original). 

Defense counsel first asserted that this “limited waiver” of Appellant’s Fifth 

Amendment rights required the trial court to appoint a psychologist, rather than a 

psychiatrist, because defense counsel had retained a psychologist. The trial court 

disagreed that the language of Soria and Lagrone requires trial courts to appoint the 

same type of expert used by the defense. Defense counsel also asserted that the 

State’s expert was required to use the same examination methodsin the same manner 

as the defense expert had conducted his examination. Following a discussion 

between the trial court and counsel, the trial court determined that it would be 

“fundamentally unfair” to require the State’s expert to evaluate Appellant with “their 

hands tied.” 

The trial court ruled that (1) the State’s expert could “use medically 

recognized manners of investigation” to determine Appellant’s sanity at the time of 

the offense; (2) defense counsel and the State should exchange expert reports prior 

to trial; and (3) defense counsel should object to the State expert’s report before the 
4

State expert testifies if defense counsel determined the report went “way too far” or 

“violate[d] Lagrone.” 

At the conclusion of the pretrial hearing, the trial court revisited its ruling on 

the State’s motion. The following exchange occurred between the trial court and the 

attorneys:

THE COURT: [T]he order is that the State’s psychiatrist can be 

[sic] examine using all medical -- medically reasonable techniques. 

However, the Defense, obviously, upon review of the State’s Expert’s 

report. If they see something that they think has gone, in their opinion 

too far, they will bring it to the court’s attention and I recall on it. But 

as far as getting there, the State’s expert can use all reasonable medical 

techniques to do the examination for sanity at the time of the alleged 

offense?

[THE STATE]: Yes, sir.

THE COURT: Is that clear enough for everybody?

[THE STATE]: Yes, sir.

[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Yes. Thank you very much. 

THE COURT: All right. And, then again, if you have a problem 

with what he brings back and you notify me, we will take it up before 

it goes to the jury, even if we just need a 5 minute hearing.

The trial court also signed a written order granting the State’s motion. It 

provided that Appellant would be interviewed by the State’s mental health expert,

Dr. Roddy Strobel, M.D. 

The State subsequently filed a motion to exclude defense expert testimony on 

the issue of insanity after Appellant “refused to cooperate” with Dr. Strobel during 

her examination. In Appellant’s response to the State’s motion, defense counsel 

explained that they had spoken with Appellant after the State informed them of 
5

Appellant’s refusal to cooperate and that “there was a misunderstanding and that 

[Appellant] intended to cooperate with the State’s expert.” 

The trial court held another pretrial hearing after being informed that 

Dr. Strobel had concerns about Appellant’s competency to stand trial. At the 

hearing, Dr. Strobel recounted that she had started her evaluation by asking 

Appellant what “not guilty by reason of insanity” meant, and Appellant told her that 

“he wasn’t sure.” Dr. Strobel felt that she “needed to decide for [her]self if the 

Defendant was competent to stand trial” before she continued with the sanity 

evaluation.1

 Dr. Strobel continued to ask Appellant competency questions. 

Appellant answered some questions, but not others, and Dr. Strobel decided to stop 

the examination. The trial court asked defense counsel whether he was concerned 

with Appellant’s competency to stand trial, and defense counsel confirmed that he 

had no concerns. The trial court proceeded to conduct its own inquiry of Appellant’s 

competency. Satisfied with Appellant’s answers, the trial court ordered that 

Dr. Strobel re-examine Appellant as soon as possible and that Appellant cooperate 

with the examination. Dr. Strobel was able to complete her evaluation about a week 

later. 

At trial, defense counsel called their expert, Dr. Schutte, to testify during 

Appellant’s case-in-chief. Dr. Schutte testified that he interviewed Appellant four 

times for a total of ten hours and that, in his professional opinion, Appellant was 

legally insane at the time of the offense. Dr. Schutte diagnosed Appellant with 

“major depressive disorder, severe, with psychotic features.” Dr. Schutte testified 

that Appellant’s disorder had caused him to suffer from hallucinations and delusions 

at the time of the offense that made him unable to understand that his conduct was 

wrong or illegal.

1

Dr. Strobel explained that it is best practice to begin a sanity evaluation with competency questions 

because “someone has to be competent in order to be evaluated for sanity.” 
6

Dr. Schutte testified that Appellant gave a history of “episodes of hearing the 

voice of his step-father mumbling at him, swearing at him. And he also reports 

having seen or experienced what is a visual hallucination of his step-father.” 

Appellant informed Dr. Schutte that he had taken an acne medication listing 

hallucinations and delusions as potential side effects. Appellant’s family told 

Dr. Schutte that Appellant had “a history of concussions” and had experienced at 

least three traumatic brain injuries in his lifetime. 

Appellant told Dr. Schutte that, on the day of the offense, he “was surprised 

to see his step-father” at the car wash. Appellant told Dr. Schutte that his stepfather 

approached his vehicle and swore at him. Appellant believed that his wife had 

become “involved” with his stepfather and that he had to shoot his stepfather to save 

his wife from a “dangerous relationship.” 

Dr. Schutte opined that Appellant was exhibiting signs of a severe mental 

illness at the time of the shooting. Dr. Schutte explained that, when a person 

experiences delusions and hallucinations like Appellant said he experienced at the 

car wash, it “can lead them to not appreciate that what they are doing is wrong or 

illegal, because they are operating on something going on internally, rather than what 

is going on objectively or externally.” Dr. Schutte stated that he was “always 

sensitive to the possibility that the person may not be forthcoming with [him]” when 

examining a patient for a court setting, but that he did not believe Appellant was 

malingering during the interviews. 

The State then called Dr. Strobel to testify as a rebuttal witness. We note that, 

irrespective of the trial court’s statement that it would permit the defense to challenge 

Dr. Strobel’s assessment if it felt that Dr. Strobel went too far in her examination of 

Appellant, Appellant did not present a complaint about Dr. Strobel’s examination 

prior to her testimony at trial. Further, the defense did not lodge an objection to 

Dr. Strobel’s testimony. Dr. Strobel interviewed Appellant twice for a total of four 
7

hours. Dr. Strobel disagreed with Dr. Schutte’s diagnosis of Appellant as having 

major depressive order, severe, with psychosis. 

Dr. Strobel testified that she was unable to complete a sanity evaluation during 

her first visit with Appellant because “[he] did not answer, or at the time, chose not 

to or could not answer . . . questions regarding competency to stand trial,” causing

concerns about Appellant’s competency. Appellant gave Dr. Strobel some 

“background history” during her first visit, such as “see[ing] a man with a baseball 

cap hovering over his bed when he was six,” seeing a marriage counselor, previously 

being on an antidepressant, and seeking mental health services while he was 

incarcerated. Dr. Strobel perceived Appellant exhibiting signs of “mild paranoia” 

and noted that he did not always make eye contact with her. Dr. Strobel said that a 

lack of eye contact can indicate “avoiding” when Appellant was “talking about 

things that may not have been true.”

Dr. Strobel recalled Appellant being “more forthcoming” during her second 

visit. Strobel said that Appellant gave her more information about the day of the 

incident, maintained better eye contact, and was “able to answer the competency 

restoration questions that he couldn’t answer . . . eight days before.” Dr. Strobel 

testified that Appellant’s different behavior during her second visit would “indicate 

that at least at one point he was not telling the truth[.]” 

 Dr. Strobel testified about the inconsistencies between what Dr. Schutte 

reported that Appellant told him during his interviews and what Appellant told 

Dr. Strobel during her interviews. Dr. Strobel testified that Appellant was 

inconsistent in what type of alcohol he had consumed on the day of the shooting, his 

motivations in disposing of the firearm he used, and, notably, what he perceived at 

the time of the shooting. Appellant told Dr. Schutte that he saw his stepfather on the 

day of the shooting, but he told Dr. Strobel that the passenger in his wife’s vehicle 

“looked a lot like his step-father. Even his voice sounded like his step-father’s.” 
8

Dr. Strobel noted that Appellant’s act of shooting his wife more times than the male 

passenger was significant because, if Appellant had hallucinated that the passenger

was his stepfather, the passenger “would be the person, logically, that would receive 

the rage end, more bullets.” Dr. Strobel also noted that she believed Appellant was 

being dishonest with her when Appellant told her that he did not remember shooting

the male passenger, yet also said he remembered feeling “shaky” after he shot him.

Dr. Strobel further testified that delusions are not “one time affairs” and that 

it would be “highly unlikely that in a split minute you would have a delusion.” Thus, 

Dr. Strobel’s opinion was that Appellant was sane at the time of the offense and that 

he was able to understand the difference between right and wrong. Dr. Strobel 

believed Appellant was malingering during his interviews.2

 

The trial court’s charge contained an instruction that “no act done in a state of 

insanity can be punished as an offense” and that the defendant must prove that, “at 

the time of the conduct charged against a person, as a result of severe mental disease 

or defect, he did not know that his conduct was wrong” by a preponderance of the 

evidence. The jury rejected Appellant’s claim of insanity by finding him guilty of 

capital murder.

Analysis

In his sole issue, Appellant contends that the trial court’s failure to place limits 

on Dr. Strobel’s examination resulted in a violation of Appellant’s Fifth Amendment 

privilege against self-incrimination. Appellant asserts that the trial court allowed the 

State, through Dr. Strobel, to have “an unfettered opportunity” to custodially 

interrogate Appellant “for the purpose of finding inconsistencies in his statements.” 

2

Dr. Strobel defined malingering as “an intentional production of false or exaggerated symptoms 

of either physical or psychological matter. And it is produced to get some kind of external reward to get 

out of something or to gain something.” 
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The State contends that Appellant failed to preserve his complaints for our review

because he did not object to Dr. Strobel’s report or testimony. 

We begin with the threshold issue of whether Appellant preserved his 

complaints for appellate review. “As a prerequisite to presenting a complaint for 

appellate review,” a party must have made a timely request, objection, or motion to 

the trial court “with sufficient specificity to make the trial court aware of the 

complaint, unless the specific grounds were apparent from the context.” TEX. R.

APP. P. 33.1(a)(1)(A). The trial court must then either “(A) rule[ ] on the request, 

objection, or motion, either expressly or implicitly; or (B) refuse[ ] to rule on the 

request, objection, or motion, and the complaining party objected to the refusal.” 

TEX. R. APP. P. 33.1(a)(2).

Appellant states his issue as follows: “Whether the trial court erred in failing 

to limit the timing, method, and scope of the State’s mental health evaluation of 

Appellant.” He contends that the State’s expert psychiatrist was able to interrogate 

him without the protection of the assistance of counsel or a recording device that

would have accurately recorded Appellant’s statements. Appellant asserts that the 

trial court gave Dr. Strobel “an unfettered opportunity to interrogate [Appellant]

without his attorney, for the purpose of finding inconsistencies in his statements.” 

Appellant further contends that the trial court “made no effort to limit the State’s 

expert’s interrogation, nor the introduction of statements obtained during that 

interrogation.” 

“Generally, a party must complain in the trial court in order to preserve that 

complaint for appellate review.” London v. State, 490 S.W.3d 503, 506–07 (Tex. 

Crim. App. 2016) (citing TEX. R. APP. P. 33.1(a)(1)). “Whether a party’s particular 

complaint is preserved depends on whether the complaint on appeal comports with 

the complaint made at trial.” Pena v. State, 285 S.W.3d 459, 464 (Tex. Crim. App. 

2009). As explained by the court in Pena:
10

To avoid forfeiting a complaint on appeal, the party must “let the trial 

judge know what he wants, why he thinks he is entitled to it, and to do 

so clearly enough for the judge to understand him at a time when the 

judge is in the proper position to do something about it.” This gives the 

trial judge and the opposing party an opportunity to correct the error.

Id. (quoting Lankston v. State, 827 S.W.2d 907, 909 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992)).

Some of Appellant’s contentions on appeal do not comport with the matters 

that he raised in the trial court. Appellant did not make a request to the trial court 

for his trial counsel to be present for Dr. Strobel’s examination or that it be recorded. 

By failing to make these specific requests with respect to the procedures for 

Dr. Strobel’s examination, Appellant did not preserve these complaints for appellate 

review. See Davis v. State, 313 S.W.3d 317, 351 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010) (addressing 

objections to the procedure for a mental health examination). Appellant also waived 

any objection to the matters to which Dr. Strobel testified by not objecting at trial. 

“It is now axiomatic that in order to preserve an error in the admission of evidence 

for appellate review, a defendant must make a timely objection.” Johnson v. State, 

878 S.W.2d 164, 167 (Tex. Crim. App. 1994). 

At the pretrial hearing, Appellant objected to the State’s motion to appoint a 

psychiatric expert and asserted that the language in the motion was “overbroad.” 

Appellant asked the trial court to impose limits on Dr. Strobel’s examination in order 

to protect his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination. Appellant 

asserted to the trial court that the State should only be able to use a psychologist to 

examine him using “the exact same testing and exact same methods that we did.” 

Appellant also asserted that the State’s examination should be rebuttal in the sense 

that Dr. Strobel should not be able to examine Appellant until Dr. Schutte submitted 

his report. Thus, Appellant objected in the trial court to the type of expert that the 

State could use, the nature of the examination that the State’s expert could do, and 

the timing of the examination by the State’s expert. The trial court overruled each 
11

of these objections. Accordingly, Appellant preserved these complaints for appellate 

review. See TEX. R. APP. P. 33.1(a)(1)(A). 

Because Appellant’s preserved complaints implicate a constitutional privilege 

against self-incrimination, we review the trial court’s rulings de novo. Woodall v. 

State, 336 S.W.3d 634, 642 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011). In many respects, Appellant’s 

preserved complaints concern the rule announced in Lagrone and Soria and the 

scope of the examination that they require. As explained in Chamberlain v. State:

The holdings of Soria and Lagrone are governed by the principle that 

if a defendant breaks his silence to speak to his own psychiatric expert 

and introduces that testimony which is based on such interview, he has 

constructively taken the stand and waived his fifth amendment right to 

refuse to submit to the State’s psychiatric experts. The focus is the 

defendant’s choice to break his silence. The issue is not whether 

appellant introduced psychiatric evidence or merely rebutted such 

evidence. The issue is whether the psychiatric testimony he intended 

to introduce was based on his own participation in the psychiatric 

testing and examination. Appellant intended to introduce psychiatric 

testimony based upon his participation in a psychiatric examination. 

This “constitute[s] a waiver of the defendant’s fifth amendment 

privilege in the same manner as would the defendant’s election to 

testify at trial.” Soria, 933 S.W.2d at 54. Appellant cannot claim a fifth 

amendment privilege in refusing to submit to the State’s psychiatric 

examinations and then introduce evidence gained through his 

participation in his own psychiatric examination. The essential 

principles at work in Lagrone and Soria are waiver and parity; if a 

defendant testifies, even in mere rebuttal, the State may be allowed to 

cross-examine him. Lagrone, 942 S.W.2d at 611; Soria, 933 S.W.2d at 

54.

998 S.W.2d 230, 234 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999); see Davis, 313 S.W.3d at 352 

(explaining the underlying rationale for the Lagrone rule.) 

Appellant initially suggests that the Soria-Lagrone rule may not apply to nondeath penalty cases. In a mandamus proceeding, the El Paso Court of Appeals noted 

that the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals has not extended the Soria-Lagrone rule 
12

to non-death penalty cases. In re State, 588 S.W.3d 307, 310 (Tex. App.—El Paso 

2019) (orig. proceeding). In another mandamus proceeding, the Texas Court of 

Criminal Appeals noted that the applicability of the Soria-Lagrone rule to non-death 

penalty cases was unsettled. Simon v. Levario, 306 S.W.3d 318, 322 (Tex. Crim. 

App. 2009) (orig. proceeding).

The Fort Worth Court of Appeals addressed the Soria-Lagrone rule in a nondeath penalty case in Lott v. State, No. 02-18-00487-CR, 2019 WL 5792660, at *11

(Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2019, pet. ref’d) (mem. op., not designated for publication). 

Like Appellant here, the defendant in Lott filed a notice stating his intent to present 

an insanity defense. Id. at *9. The court concluded that a defendant’s future 

dangerousness in a death penalty case, as was the issue in Soria and Lagrone, is 

analogous to a claim of insanity in any context. Id. at *11. The court held:

We fail to see why the court of criminal appeals’ holdings in Soria and 

Lagrone would not apply here. And the federal courts have uniformly 

held that where a defendant raises a mental-status defense such as 

insanity during the guilt-innocence phase of trial, the constitution does 

not prohibit a trial court from ordering the defendant to undergo a 

psychiatric examination for the limited purpose of rebutting the 

asserted defense. See United States v. Byers, 740 F.2d 1104, 1111 (D.C. 

Cir. 1984) (plurality opinion) (collecting cases); U.S. v. Cohen, 530 

F.2d 43, 47 (5th Cir. 1976) (holding “compelled psychiatric 

examination [may be ordered] when a defendant has raised the insanity 

defense”); see also Kansas v. Cheever, 571 U.S. 87, 94 (2013) 

(“[W]here a defense expert who has examined the defendant testifies 

that the defendant lacked the requisite mental state to commit an 

offense, the prosecution may present psychiatric evidence in rebuttal.”).

Here, the trial court ordered Lott to submit to a psychiatric examination 

with Price only after Lott filed notice that he intended to raise insanity. 

Given that fact, and based on the above authorities, we conclude that 

the trial court did not violate Lott’s Fifth Amendment privilege against 

self-incrimination by ordering him to submit to that examination to 

rebut Lott’s insanity defense.
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Id. at *11-12. For the same reasons expressed in Lott, we also conclude that the 

Soria-Lagrone rule applies whenever a defendant intends to present an insanity 

defense in a non-death penalty case. The rationale is the same—“if a defendant 

breaks his silence to speak to his own psychiatric expert and introduces that 

testimony which is based on such interview, he has constructively taken the stand 

and waived his fifth amendment right to refuse to submit to the State’s psychiatric 

experts.” Davis, 313 S.W.3d at 352.

The holdings of Soria and Lagrone provide that a trial court should limit a 

compelled psychiatric examination to rebuttal issues. See Soria, 933 S.W.2d at 57–

58; Lagrone, 942 S.W.2d at 611–12. Neither case prescribes the specific methods 

the State’s expert should use in conducting an examination of a defendant to ensure 

that the expert’s examination is limited to rebuttal. Soria and Lagrone also do not 

specify that the State must use the same type of mental health expert used by the 

defense. Furthermore, the requirement for a defendant to submit to a mental health 

examination by the State’s expert is triggered when the defense “introduces, or plans 

to introduce” its own expert testimony. Lagrone, 942 S.W.2d at 611 (emphasis in 

original). Accordingly, Appellant is incorrect in his assertion that Dr. Strobel had to 

have Dr. Schutte’s report in hand before examining Appellant. 

Appellant contends that the trial court should have imposed limits on 

Dr. Strobel’s examination to protect Appellant’s Fifth Amendment privilege against 

self-incrimination. But as noted by the court in Lott, when the State’s expert is 

tasked with determining the defendant’s sanity at the time of the offense, “[s]uch a 

determination necessarily would require [the State’s expert] to question [the 

defendant] about the surrounding circumstances of the offense.” 2019 WL 5792660,

at *10 (citing U.S. v. Leonard, 609 F.2d 1163, 1165 (5th Cir. 1980) (“[P]sychiatrists 

would not be able to obtain reliable testimony [on the issue of sanity] unless they 
14

were free to inquire into the prior conduct of the defendant, including his 

participation in the criminal activity with which he is charged.”). 

Appellant also contends that Dr. Strobel was acting as an “agent for the State” 

because she was testifying as “an interrogator who successfully tricked her subject 

into apparently contradicting himself.”3

 The record does not support this contention. 

Dr. Strobel testified that she arrived at a malingering diagnosis because Appellant 

provided inconsistent details between his interview with Dr. Schutte and his 

interview with Dr. Strobel. Dr. Strobel testified that being dishonest can be a sign 

of malingering, and that Appellant giving different information to her than he gave 

to Dr. Schutte led to her malingering diagnosis. Therefore, Dr. Strobel was not 

testifying about Appellant’s inconsistent statements during her examination to 

impeach Appellant’s credibility, but rather to support her opinion regarding 

Appellant’s sanity and malingering diagnosis. Furthermore, as noted in Leonard, 

the defendant’s privilege against self-incrimination is protected whenever he 

submits to an examination by the State’s mental health expert on the issue of sanity 

because the matters that the defendant discloses to the State’s expert cannot be used 

to address any other issues. 609 F.2d at 1166. 

In summary, Appellant gave notice of presenting an insanity defense and he 

spoke to his own mental health expert to support his claim. By doing so, Appellant 

waived his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination under Soria and 

Lagrone for the purpose of rebutting the asserted insanity defense. An examination 

by the State’s mental health expert under Soria and Lagrone is not limited by the 

type of expert that the State may use, the type of examination that the State’s expert 

may employ, or the sequence of the examination performed by the State’s expert. 

Because Appellant sought to present an insanity defense, the waiver of his privilege 

3

Once again, we note that Appellant did not lodge any objections to Dr. Strobel’s testimony at trial.
15

against self-incrimination necessarily extended to an inquiry by the State’s mental 

health expert into details about the charged conduct. Thus, the trial court did not err 

or violate Appellant’s Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination by 

ordering him to submit to Dr. Strobel’s examination to rebut Appellant’s insanity 

defense. We overrule Appellant’s sole issue on appeal. 

This Court’s Ruling

We affirm the judgment of the trial court. 

JOHN M. BAILEY

CHIEF JUSTICE

January 11, 2024

Publish. See TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(b). 

Panel consists of: Bailey, C.J., 

Trotter, J., and Williams, J.