Filed 4/13/23 In re Nicholas G. CA2/7

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions 

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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION SEVEN

In re NICHOLAS G. et al., Persons

Coming Under the Juvenile Court 

Law.

 B319782

 (Los Angeles County

 Super. Ct. No. 

 18CCJP04900A-C)

LOS ANGELES COUNTY 

DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN 

AND FAMILY SERVICES,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

TIFFANY G. et al.,

Defendants and Appellants.

APPEAL from orders of the Superior Court of Los Angeles 

County, Lisa A. Brackelmanns, Juvenile Court Referee. Affirmed 

in part. Conditionally affirmed in part and remanded with 

directions.

Lori Siegel, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for 

Defendant and Appellant Tiffany G.
2

Caitlin Christian, under appointment by the Court of 

Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant Robert H.

Tarkian & Associates and Arezoo Pichvai for Plaintiff and 

Respondent.

_____________________

Tiffany G., the mother of four-year-old Nicholas G.,

1

threeyear-old Elizabeth H. and two-year-old Hope H., appeals the

juvenile court’s April 6, 2022 orders denying her petition to 

reinstate family reunification services and terminating parental 

rights. Tiffany contends the court erred in denying her petition 

based on its findings that she had failed to present evidence of 

changed circumstances and reinstatement of reunification 

services was not in the children’s best interests. She contends 

the court erred in terminating parental rights because Nicholas 

was not likely to be adopted and the sibling-relationship 

exception to termination of parental rights applied. Tiffany also 

contends remand is required because the Los Angeles County 

Department of Children and Family Services and the juvenile 

court failed to comply with their duties of inquiry under the 

Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978 (ICWA) (25 U.S.C. 

§ 1901 et seq.) and related California law. The Department does 

not oppose a limited remand for ICWA compliance. 

Robert H., the presumed father of all three children,

appeals the order terminating his parental rights, joining in 

Tiffany’s arguments to the extent they benefit him. 

1

The record sometimes refers to Nicholas as Nicholas G. and 

other times as Nicholas H. Because the parties identify him as 

Nicholas G. in their appellate briefs, we do so as well. 
3

We affirm the order denying Tiffany’s petition to reinstate 

reunification services. We conditionally affirm the order 

terminating parental rights and remand for the Department and 

the juvenile court to comply with ICWA and California law. 

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

1. The Dependency Petition for Newborn Nicholas and the 

Court’s ICWA Finding

In October 2018 Tiffany and Robert pleaded no contest to 

an amended petition under Welfare and Institutions Code 

section 300, subdivision (b),2alleging they each had a long history 

of using methamphetamine; both currently used 

methamphetamine and other illicit drugs; and Tiffany had used 

illicit substances during her recent pregnancy with Nicholas, 

resulting in his testing positive for amphetamines at birth, all of 

which placed Nicholas at substantial risk of serious physical 

harm. The juvenile court declared Nicholas a dependent child of 

the court, removed him from parental custody and ordered family 

reunification services for Tiffany and Robert, including drug and 

alcohol programs for both parents with random weekly drug 

testing. Visitation was to be monitored. 

Tiffany and Robert completed ICWA-020 Parental 

Notification of Indian Status forms in advance of the initial 

detention hearing in August 2019, checking the boxes indicating 

they had no Indian ancestry as far as they knew. Based on 

Tiffany’s and Robert’s denials of any Indian ancestry, the court 

stated it had no reason to believe Nicholas was an Indian child 

and found ICWA did not apply. In its September 6, 2018 

2

Statutory references are to this code unless otherwise 

stated. 
4

jurisdiction/disposition report, the Department stated Tiffany 

and Robert had told the social worker during a post-detention 

interview that Nicholas had no Indian ancestry; he was a 

“Caucasian” child. Neither the Department nor the court made 

any further ICWA inquiries as to Nicholas.

2. Nicholas’s Six-month Review Hearing

At the six-month review hearing on June 2019 (§ 366.21, 

subd. (e)), the court found a substantial risk to Nicholas’s 

physical safety if he were returned to his parents’ custody. The 

court found Robert’s progress in his case plan minimal at best 

and terminated his family reunification services. The court found 

Tiffany in partial compliance and continued her services. 

3. Newborn Elizabeth’s Detention, a New Dependency 

Petition and the Court’s ICWA Finding

In August 2019 Tiffany gave birth to Elizabeth. Both 

Tiffany and Elizabeth had positive toxicology screenings for 

amphetamines at Elizabeth’s birth. Elizabeth was immediately 

detained, and the Department filed a section 300 petition for her. 

In September 2019 the court sustained an amended 

section 300, subdivision (b), petition, finding Tiffany had a long 

history of substance abuse; Tiffany used illicit substances while 

pregnant with Elizabeth; Robert was a daily user of 

methamphetamine and cocaine; and both parents’ substance 

abuse and failure to protect placed Elizabeth at substantial risk 

of serious physical harm. The court declared Elizabeth a 

dependent child of the court and removed her from parental 

custody. The court granted Tiffany family reunification services, 

again requiring her to complete a drug program and participate 

in random weekly drug testing, and denied Robert family 

reunification services pursuant to section 361.5, 
5

subdivision (b)(10). The court ordered monitored visitation for 

both parents. 

As to ICWA, Tiffany and Robert supplied ICWA-020 forms 

at Elizabeth’s August 2019 detention hearing again indicating 

they had no Indian ancestry as far as they knew. Based on those 

forms, the court found ICWA did not apply. Although maternal 

great-aunt Ronalda S. and maternal great-uncle Jesse S. were 

present at Elizabeth’s detention hearing, they were not asked 

about her Indian ancestry. 

4. The 12-month Review Hearing for Nicholas; the 

Six-month Review Hearing for Elizabeth

At the March 2020 12-month review hearing for Nicholas 

(§ 366.21, subd. (f)) and the six-month review hearing for 

Elizabeth, the court found Tiffany’s progress with her case plan 

insubstantial. Still, the court continued Tiffany’s family 

reunification services for both children. 

5. Hope’s Detention at Birth, the Filing of a New 

Dependency Petition and ICWA Findings

In August 2020 Tiffany gave birth to Hope and both tested 

positive for amphetamines. Hope was immediately detained. 

The court found, based on Robert’s and Tiffany’s new ICWA-020 

forms again denying knowledge of Indian ancestry, that ICWA 

did not apply. 

The Department filed a new section 300 petition in August 

2020 as to Hope, alleging Tiffany’s use of illicit drugs during her 

pregnancy with Hope, her and Robert’s continued substance 

abuse and failure to protect their children placed Hope at 

substantial risk of serious physical harm (§ 300, subds. (b), (j).). 
6

6. The Court’s Orders Terminating Tiffany’s Family 

Reunification Services and Setting the Selection and 

Implementation Hearing for Nicholas and Elizabeth

In October 2020 the court held the 12-month review 

hearing for Elizabeth and the 18-month review hearing for 

Nicholas (§ 366.22). Citing Tiffany’s failure to participate 

consistently in a drug treatment program and her continuing 

substance abuse, the court terminated Tiffany’s family 

reunification services with Nicholas and Elizabeth and set a

selection and implementation hearing pursuant to section 366.26

for both children for February 21, 2021. 

7. The Court’s Jurisdiction Findings and Disposition Order 

Concerning Hope and the Order Setting the Selection 

and Implementation Hearing for Hope

The court sustained the new petition as to Hope at the 

December 2020 jurisdiction hearing (§ 300, subds. (b), (j)). At a 

March 2021 disposition hearing the court declared Hope a 

dependent child of the court and removed her from parental 

custody. The court denied Tiffany and Robert family 

reunification services pursuant to section 361.5, 

subdivision (b)(10), (11), (13), and set a selection and 

implementation hearing for Hope for June 24, 2021. That 

hearing, along with the selection and implementation hearings 

for Nicholas and Elizabeth, was continued several times. 

8. Tiffany’s Section 388 Petition To Reinstate Her Family 

Reunification Services After Giving Birth to Jacob

In November 2021 Tiffany filed a section 388 petition 

seeking reinstatement of her reunification services. Tiffany’s 

petition alleged she had enrolled in a residential drug treatment 

center in August 2021 and shortly thereafter gave birth to 
7

Jacob H. The Department allowed Jacob to reside with her at the 

drug treatment facility due to her significant progress in the 

treatment program.

3

 Tiffany submitted evidence of 16 clean drug 

tests and consistent participation in a 12-step program and 

counseling. 

Tiffany’s petition acknowledged Nicholas had been residing 

in Arizona with Ronalda since his placement with her in 

December 2019; the court had ordered an evaluation under the 

Interstate Compact on the Placement of Children (ICPC) for the 

potential placement of Elizabeth and Hope with Ronalda’s 

granddaughter Kristie L. and the ICPC had recently been 

approved. However, Tiffany urged the court not to place 

Elizabeth and Hope in Arizona but to allow them to remain in 

California, if not in her custody, then at least with an order 

reinstating her family reunification services. 

9. The April 2022 Hearing on Tiffany’s Section 388 Petition 

and the Selection and Implementation Hearing for All 

Three Children

The hearing on Tiffany’s section 388 petition and the 

selection and implementation hearing for all three children was 

held on April 6, 2022. By that time Elizabeth and Hope had been 

placed with Kristie; Nicholas remained placed with Ronalda. All 

three children were thriving in their placements. Kristie wished 

to adopt Elizabeth and Hope. Ronalda wished to adopt Nicholas.

In support of her petition Tiffany testified that by August 

2021 she had finally realized she needed to break her addictive 

patterns and address her drug addiction for good. She enrolled in 

the Didi Hirsch residential drug treatment program where she 

3

Jacob is not a subject of this appeal. 
8

gave birth to Jacob. She recently completed the program with 

clean drug tests throughout her stay. Tiffany supported this 

claim with a letter from her drug treatment counselor, who also 

related to the court that Tiffany had exhibited a desire to stay 

sober, set boundaries, hold herself accountable and care for 

Jacob. 

Tiffany explained she was living with Jacob in a soberliving home and hoped to find a new place where she could reside 

with all her children. She stated she was no longer in a 

relationship with Robert, although she saw him regularly so that 

he could visit with Jacob and they could have joint virtual visits 

with Nicholas, Elizabeth and Hope. Tiffany acknowledged she 

had left her first sober-living home suddenly, and without notice 

to anyone, to live with a relative after finding mold in her room. 

After speaking with a social worker and realizing her mistake, 

she found a new sober-living facility in February 2022 where she 

and Jacob were currently residing. Tiffany testified she was 

eight-months sober and continued to have clean weekly drug 

tests in her sober-living facility. Tiffany sought custody of her 

children or, at the very least, reinstatement of family 

reunification services with Nicholas, Elizabeth and Hope so that 

they could be a family.

Tiffany also supplied a letter from Laurence Blanchard, a 

senior pastor and counselor affiliated with her sober-living home. 

Pastor Blanchard attributed Tiffany’s drug abuse to her

significant childhood traumas and her misguided effort to numb 

her pain. However, Pastor Blanchard continued, with the loss of 

custody of Elizabeth and Hope and the birth of Jacob (Pastor 

Blanchard did not mention Nicholas), Tiffany realized she needed 

to change her life. Assisted by her drug program, her sober-living 
9

facility and local church, Tiffany had forged a new drug-free path. 

Pastor Blanchard was convinced that Tiffany “has put herself on 

the road to permanent sobriety and that she has demonstrated 

the commitment and willpower to remain on that road.” 

Tiffany submitted similar letters from her sponsor at her 

sober-living facility and from Elizabeth and Hope’s former foster 

parent (a relative) emphasizing Tiffany’s recent sobriety, good 

care of Jacob and commitment to remaining sober and reuniting 

with all her children. 

The children’s counsel and the Department urged the court 

to deny Tiffany’s section 388 petition, asserting Tiffany presented 

“changing circumstances,” not “changed circumstances.” They 

reminded the court Tiffany had used methamphetamine since she 

was a teenager and during all four of her pregnancies; she had 

begun treatment several times in the past while her three older 

children were under court supervision, only to return to using 

methamphetamine; and she recently abruptly left one soberliving facility without notifying the Department. Although 

Tiffany acknowledged suffering from depression, she had taken 

herself off her medication without medical supervision and was 

not in counseling other than services she received in her soberliving home. Most importantly, they argued, her recent eightmonth sobriety in a structured sober-living environment was too 

recent and too tenuous to risk upsetting the stability the children 

had gained in relative placements with their prospective adoptive 

parents. None of the children had ever lived with Tiffany; all 

three had developed a parental bond with their prospective 

adoptive parents; and Ronalda and Kristie had stated they 

planned to ensure all three children would remain in each other’s 

lives. 
10

The court denied Tiffany’s section 388 petition, finding her 

recent sobriety signified “changing, but not changed” 

circumstances. The court also found reinstatement of family 

reunification services was not in the best interests of Nicholas, 

Elizabeth or Hope. In addition, observing Robert had not 

addressed his drug issues at all, the court expressed its concern 

that Tiffany’s unwillingness to eliminate Robert from her life

until he addressed his own drug addiction placed Tiffany’s own 

fragile sobriety at risk. 

Proceeding directly to the selection and implementation 

hearing, the court terminated Tiffany’s and Robert’s parental 

rights over all three children, finding no exception to termination 

applied. As to the sibling-bond exception that Tiffany raised, the 

court responded that the children’s prospective adoptive parents, 

who were also relatives, articulated a desire to maintain a family 

bond among Elizabeth, Hope and Nicholas. In any event, the 

court found, “[A]ny risk of loss of ongoing contact with the 

children and their siblings [wa]s outweighed by the long-term 

benefit to the children from the permanency and stability of 

adoption.” 

DISCUSSION

1. Section 388 and Standard of Review 

Section 388 provides for modification of juvenile court

orders when the moving party presents new evidence or a change 

of circumstance and demonstrates modification of the previous 

order is in the child’s best interest. (In re Jasmon O. (1994) 

8 Cal.4th 398, 415; In re Stephanie M. (1994) 7 Cal.4th 295, 317; 

In re Alayah J. (2017) 9 Cal.App.5th 469, 478; see In re 

Zacharia D. (1993) 6 Cal.4th 435, 447 [“‘[s]ection 388 provides the 

“escape mechanism” that . . . must be built into the process to 
11

allow the court to consider new information’”]; Cal. Rules of 

Court, rule 5.570(e).) “‘“The petitioner has the burden of showing 

by a preponderance of the evidence (1) that there is new evidence 

or a change of circumstances and (2) that the proposed 

modification would be in the best interests of the child.”

[Citation.] “[T]he change in circumstances must be substantial.”’” 

(In re Malick T. (2022) 73 Cal.App.5th 1109, 1122-1123; accord, 

In re J.M. (2020) 50 Cal.App.5th 833, 845.)

When, as here, a section 388 petition is filed after family 

reunification services have been terminated, the juvenile court’s 

overriding concern is the child’s best interests. (In re 

Stephanie M., supra, 7 Cal.4th at p. 317.) The parent’s interests 

in the care, custody and companionship of the child are no longer 

paramount; and the focus shifts to the needs of the child for 

permanency and stability. (Ibid.; In re Malick T., supra,

73 Cal.App.5th at p. 1123; In re Jacob P. (2007) 157 Cal.App.4th 

819, 828.) Nonetheless, a parent may rebut the presumption that 

continued care is in the best interest of the child after 

termination of reunification services by showing that 

circumstances have changed and would warrant further 

reunification services. (In re Marilyn H. (1993) 5 Cal.4th 

295, 310.) 

“[B]est interests is a complex idea” that requires 

consideration of a variety of factors. (In re Kimberly F. (1997) 

56 Cal.App.4th 519, 530; see In re Jacob P., supra,

157 Cal.App.4th at pp. 832-833.) In determining whether a 

section 388 petitioner has made the requisite showing, the 

juvenile court may consider the entire factual and procedural 

history of the case, including factors such as the seriousness of 

the reason leading to the child’s removal, the reason the problem 
12

was not resolved, the passage of time since the child’s removal, 

the relative strength of the bonds with the child, the nature of the 

change of circumstance, and the reason the change was not made 

sooner. (In re Mickel O. (2011) 197 Cal.App.4th 586, 616; In re 

Aaliyah R. (2006) 136 Cal.App.4th 437, 446-447; In re Justice P. 

(2004) 123 Cal.App.4th 181, 188-189.)

If the juvenile court has ruled the parent failed to carry his 

or her initial burden to demonstrate new evidence or changed 

circumstances, the first step of the analysis, the question for the 

reviewing court is whether that finding is erroneous as a matter 

of law. (See In re Matthew M. (2023) 88 Cal.App.5th 1186, 1194

[“where the issue on appeal turns on a failure of proof at trial, 

‘the question for the reviewing court [becomes] “‘whether the 

evidence compels a finding in favor of the appellant as a matter of 

law’”’”]; In re Aurora P. (2015) 241 Cal.App.4th 1142, 1156 

[same].) We review the court’s best-interest finding for abuse of 

discretion and may disturb the exercise of that discretion only in 

the rare case when the court has made an arbitrary or irrational 

determination. (In re Stephanie M., supra, 7 Cal.4th at pp. 318-

319; In re I.B. (2020) 53 Cal.App.5th 133, 153.) We do not inquire 

whether substantial evidence would have supported a different 

order, nor do we reweigh the evidence and substitute our 

judgment for that of the juvenile court. (In re Stephanie M., at 

pp. 318-319.)

2. The Court Did Not Err in Denying Tiffany’s Section 388 

Petition Seeking Reinstatement of Reunification Services

Tiffany contends, and we agree, the court misapprehended 

Tiffany’s initial burden when it found Tiffany had presented 

“changing” but not “changed” circumstances. Section 388, 

subdivision (a)(1), authorizes a parent to seek a modification of a 

court order “upon grounds of change of circumstance or new 
13

evidence[.]” Tiffany presented new and substantial evidence of a 

change of circumstance—her eight-month sobriety following 

completion of a residential drug treatment program and her 

relocation to a sober-living residence with Jacob. The court’s 

emphasis on the recent, and still-tenuous, nature of Tiffany’s 

sobriety was properly directed to the second prong of the 

section 388 analysis—whether a new order reinstating 

reunification services with Nicholas, Elizabeth and Hope was in 

the children’s best interests. (See generally In re Ernesto R. 

(2014) 230 Cal.App.4th 219, 221; In re J.C. (2014) 

226 Cal.App.4th 503, 527.) 

As to that second prong, the court did not abuse its 

discretion in determining reinstatement of reunification services 

would not be in any of the children’s best interests. Although 

Tiffany presented glowing reports of her recent sobriety, which 

the court credited, the court also emphasized Tiffany’s longstanding drug addiction and the very recent nature of her 

rehabilitation and expressed concern over her ability to maintain 

it outside the structured environment of her sober-living facility, 

especially when Robert, who had not addressed his drug 

addiction, remained a constant presence in her life. The court 

also observed that Nicholas, Elizabeth and Hope were each

detained at birth, had never lived with Tiffany and had no 

meaningful relationship with her. In contrast, all three were 

thriving in the care of their prospective adoptive parents with 

whom they shared a parental bond. Considering all the 

circumstances, the court found that jeopardizing the children’s 

stability by reinstating family reunification in the hope that 

Tiffany’s recent sobriety would continue was not in any of the 
14

children’s best interests. That finding, amply supported by the 

record, was well within the court’s discretion. 

3. The Court Did Not Err in Terminating Parental Rights

The express purpose of a section 366.26 hearing is “to 

provide stable, permanent homes” for dependent children.

(§ 366.26, subd. (b); see In re Christopher L. (2022) 12 Cal.5th 

1063, 1076 [the selection and implementation hearing “‘is 

designed to protect children’s ‘compelling rights . . . to have a 

placement that is stable, permanent, and that allows the 

caretaker to make a full emotional commitment to the child’””].) 

The question at the hearing is not “‘whether the child should be 

returned to the parent, an issue already decided in the negative 

with the permanent plan of return to the parent having been 

rejected,’” but “‘whether the child is adoptable and what the 

alternative permanency plan should be.’” (In re Christopher L.,

at p. 1076; accord, In re Caden C. (2021) 11 Cal.5th 614, 630-631.) 

The legislative preference at this critical stage is for 

adoption. (§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1); In re Caden C., supra, 

11 Cal.5th at p. 630; In re Celine R. (2003) 31 Cal.4th 45, 53.) If 

the court finds by clear and convincing evidence that it is likely 

the child will be adopted within a reasonable time and none of 

the six statutory exceptions to termination and placement for 

adoption contained in section 366.26 applies, the court must 

terminate parental rights and order the child placed for adoption. 

(§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1); In re Caden C., at p. 630.) 

a. The court properly found Nicholas was likely to be 

adopted within a reasonable time

Tiffany contends there was no substantial evidence 

Nicholas was likely to be adopted (see In re J.W. (2018) 

26 Cal.App.5th 263, 267 [we review the court’s adoptability 
15

findings by clear and convincing evidence for substantial 

evidence]), emphasizing that, at the time of the selection and 

implementation hearing, Nicholas had begun exhibiting certain 

behavioral symptoms and was scheduled to be evaluated for 

autism spectrum disorder.

Contrary to Tiffany’s suggestion, that Nicholas may be 

diagnosed with autism spectrum disorder does not make him 

unlikely to be adopted. (See In re J.W., supra, 26 Cal.App.5th at 

pp. 268-269 [“Very few children in the dependency system are 

without problems. To deny [a child] the chance to permanently 

become a member of a family that loves him and that he loves, 

simply because he has special needs, would derail the entire 

concept of permanent planning”].) Moreover, Ronalda, well 

aware of Nicholas’s behavioral challenges, has never identified 

them as an obstacle to adoption or wavered from her desire and 

commitment to adopt him. That alone is substantial evidence to 

support adoptability. (See In re Mary C. (2020) 48 Cal.App.5th 

793, 803-804 [that a prospective adoptive parent has expressed 

interest in adopting the child is, alone, substantial evidence that 

a child is likely to be adopted within a reasonable time]; In re

Sarah M. (1994) 22 Cal.App.4th 1642, 1649-1650 [“[u]sually, the 

fact that a prospective adoptive parent has expressed interest in 

adopting the minor is evidence that the minor’s age, physical 

condition, mental state, and other matters relating to the child 

are not likely to dissuade individuals from adopting the minor”].) 

Tiffany’s related claim that Ronalda was disqualified from 

obtaining ICPC foster care approval for adoption, leaving 

Nicholas unlikely to be adopted by her, is also without merit. 

Even if we credited Tiffany’s questionable argument that 

Ronalda’s ability to adopt had some relevance to the question of 
16

Nicholas’s adoptability (see In re Sarah M., supra, 22 Cal.App.4th 

at p. 1650 [the issue of adoptability focuses on the child, not the 

prospective adoptive parent; “a prospective adoptive parent’s 

willingness to adopt generally indicates the minor is likely to be 

adopted within a reasonable time either by the prospective 

adoptive parent or by some other family”]), a careful reading of 

the record shows no such legal impediment to Ronalda’s adoption 

of Nicholas. Although the Department expressed some early 

concern whether Ronalda was required to obtain ICPC foster care 

approval in Arizona to adopt Nicholas and recommended (and 

Ronalda agreed to) legal guardianship as a back-up alternative, 

the Department clarified on March 21, 2022, in advance of the 

selection and implementation hearing, that Ronalda needed only 

to obtain ICPC approval for adoption by a relative caregiver, for 

which she indisputably qualified. Ronalda could begin the ICPC 

approval process once parental rights had been terminated. 

Tiffany has not demonstrated any error in the court’s 

adoptability findings.

b. The court did not err in finding Tiffany had not 

established the sibling-relationship exception 

As discussed, at the section 366.26 hearing, the focus shifts 

from family reunification to selection and implementation of a 

permanent plan for the child. If adoption is likely, the court must 

terminate parental rights and free the child for adoption barring 

applicability one of six statutory exceptions to termination 

enumerated in section 366.26. (In re Christopher L., supra,

12 Cal.5th at p. 1076; see In re Celine R., supra, 31 Cal.4th at 

p. 53 [“court must order adoption and its necessary consequence, 

termination of parental rights, unless one of the specified 

circumstances provides a compelling reason for finding that 
17

termination of parental rights would be detrimental to the 

child”]; see also In re Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at pp. 630-631 

[“if the parent shows that termination would be detrimental to 

the child for at least one specifically enumerated reason, the 

court should decline to terminate parental rights and select 

another permanent plan”].) The statutory exceptions are 

applicable only in “exceptional circumstances”; adoption remains 

the norm. (Id. at p. 631 [“‘[t]he statutory exceptions merely 

permit the court, in exceptional circumstances [citation], to 

choose an option other than the norm, which remains adoption’”]; 

In re Celine R., at p. 53 [same]; see In re Matthew C. (1993) 

6 Cal.4th 386, 392 [when a child is adoptable and the court finds 

that declining to apply one of the statutory exceptions would not 

cause detriment to the child, the decision to terminate parental 

rights is relatively automatic].)

The sibling-relationship exception to termination of 

parental rights and placement for adoption applies when the 

juvenile court concludes there would be “substantial interference 

with a child’s sibling relationship, taking into consideration the 

nature and extent of the relationship, including, but not limited 

to, whether the child was raised with a sibling in the same home, 

whether the child shared significant common experiences or has 

existing close and strong bonds with a sibling, and whether 

ongoing contact is in the child’s best interest, including the child’s 

long-term emotional interest, as compared to the benefit of legal 

permanence through adoption.” (§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(B)(v).)

“The purpose of the sibling exception is to preserve longstanding sibling relationships that serve as ‘anchors for 

dependent children whose lives are in turmoil.’” (In re 

Elizabeth M. (2018) 19 Cal.App.5th 768, 781; accord, In re 
18

Isaiah S. (2016) 5 Cal.App.5th 428, 437.) “‘To show a substantial 

interference with a sibling relationship the parent [or sibling 

granted standing] must show the existence of a significant sibling 

relationship, the severance of which would be detrimental to the 

child. Many siblings have a relationship with each other, but 

would not suffer detriment if that relationship ended. If the 

relationship is not sufficiently significant to cause detriment on 

termination, there is no substantial interference with that 

relationship.’” (In re Elizabeth M., at p. 781; accord, In re L.Y.L. 

(2002) 101 Cal.App.4th 942, 952.)

If the court finds a significant sibling relationship exists 

and would be upended by terminating parental rights and 

adoption, then the court must “balance the beneficial interest of 

the child in maintaining the sibling relationship, which might 

leave the child in a tenuous guardianship or foster home 

placement, against the sense of security and belonging adoption 

and a new home would confer.” (In re L.Y.L., supra, 

101 Cal.App.4th at p. 951; accord, In re Elizabeth M., supra, 

19 Cal.App.5th at p. 781; In re D.M. (2012) 205 Cal.App.4th 

283, 293.)

The parent has the burden of proving the statutory 

exception applies. (In re Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th p. 625; In re 

Elizabeth M., supra, 19 Cal.App.5th at p. 781.) The court’s 

decision a parent has not carried this burden may be based on 

either or both of two component determinations—whether a 

beneficial sibling relationship exists and whether the existence of 

that relationship constitutes “a compelling reason for 

determining that termination would be detrimental to the child.” 

(§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(B); see In Elizabeth M., at pp. 781-782.)
19

We review the juvenile court’s finding the parent has not 

established the existence of the requisite beneficial relationship 

under the substantial evidence standard. (See In re Caden C.,

supra, 11 Cal.5th at pp. 639-640.) When the juvenile court 

concludes the benefit to the child derived from preserving the 

sibling relationship is not sufficiently compelling to outweigh the 

benefit achieved by the permanency of adoption, we review that 

determination for abuse of discretion. (See Id. at p. 640; In re 

Elizabeth M., supra, 19 Cal.App.5th at p. 782.)

Implicitly acknowledging none of the children shared a 

sibling bond with Jacob, Tiffany contends there was a beneficial 

sibling relationship between Nicholas, on the one hand, and his 

sisters, on the other hand, that would be disrupted to their 

detriment by the termination of parental rights. Although 

Nicholas had never lived with his sisters, Tiffany maintains they 

saw each other and Nicholas had even referred to Hope as “his 

baby.” Tiffany contends the court ignored this evidence when it 

found no sibling bond existed and failed to reach the question 

whether adoption would be detrimental to the sibling 

relationship. 

Although Nicholas and his sisters apparently enjoyed each 

other’s company, there was little, if any, evidence of an actual

sibling bond between Nicholas, one the one hand, and either of 

his sisters, on the other, let alone evidence that it would be 

detrimental to any of them to sever that relationship. Even if 

there were a sibling bond, the court found Ronalda’s and Kristie’s

own familial relationship, together with their express 

commitment to ensuring the children remained in each other 

lives, made it unlikely that termination of parental rights would 

interfere with the siblings’ relationship. (See In re D.O. (2016)
20

247 Cal.App.4th 166, 176 [juvenile court properly considered 

caregiver’s assurance of future sibling visits when determining 

sibling-relationship exception did not apply]; see also In re 

Celine R., supra, 31 Cal.4th at p. 55 [“[w]hen appropriate, court 

can encourage the adoptive parents to agree to visits among the 

siblings”].) 

And, even if Tiffany could establish a beneficial sibling 

relationship between Nicholas and his sisters that would be 

disrupted by termination of parental rights, the court found any 

benefit from preserving that relationship was substantially 

outweighed by the benefits of the permanency and stability each 

of the children would gain from adoption, the very finding Tiffany 

asserts the court did not make. That finding was well within the 

court’s discretion. Simply stated, Tiffany has not demonstrated 

hers was the “exceptional case” where the stability and 

permanency of adoption is outweighed by the benefits of

preserving the sibling relationship. (In re Caden C., supra, 

11 Cal.5th at p. 631; see generally In re Daisy D. (2006)

144 Cal.App.4th 287, 293 [“[t]he author of the legislation adding

the sibling relationship exception anticipated that ‘use of the new

exception “will likely be rare,’’ meaning ‘that the child’s

relationship with his or her siblings would rarely be sufficiently

strong to outweigh the benefits of adoption’”].)

4. Remand Is Necessary for Compliance with ICWA Inquiry 

Requirements 

ICWA and governing federal regulations (25 C.F.R. 

§ 23.101 et seq. (2023)) set minimal procedural protections for 

state courts to follow before removing Indian children and placing 

them in foster care or adoptive homes. (In re Y.W. (2021) 

70 Cal.App.5th 542, 551.) The statute authorizes states to 
21

provide “‘a higher standard of protection’” to Indian children, 

their families and their tribes than the rights provided under 

ICWA. (In re T.G. (2020) 58 Cal.App.5th 275, 287-288; 

see 25 U.S.C. § 1921.) In addition to significantly limiting state 

court actions concerning out-of-family placements for Indian 

children (see In re T.G., at pp. 287-288), ICWA permits an Indian 

child’s tribe to intervene in or, where appropriate, exercise 

jurisdiction over a child custody proceeding (see 25 U.S.C. 

§ 1911(c); In re Isaiah W. (2016) 1 Cal.5th 1, 8).

To ensure Indian tribes may exercise their rights in 

dependency proceedings as guaranteed by ICWA and related 

state law (see In re Isaiah W., supra, 1 Cal.5th at p. 5), an 

investigation of a child’s possible Indian ancestry must be 

undertaken and, where appropriate, notice provided to interested 

tribes. (See § 224.2, subd. (a) [imposing on the court and child 

protective services agencies “an affirmative and continuing duty 

to inquire whether a child . . . is or may be an Indian child”].) 

The duty to inquire “begins with the initial contact” (§ 224.2, 

subd. (a)) and obligates the juvenile court and child protective 

services agencies to ask all relevant involved individuals whether 

the child may be an Indian child. (In re Rylei S. (2022) 

81 Cal.App.5th 309, 316; § 224.2, subds. (a)-(c).) 

Section 224.2, subdivision (b), requires the child protective 

agency to ask “the child, parents, legal guardian, Indian 

custodian, extended family members, others who have an interest 

in the child, and the party reporting child abuse or neglect, 

whether the child is, or may be, an Indian child and where the 

child, the parents, or Indian custodian is domiciled.” (See In re 

T.G., supra, 58 Cal.App.5th at p. 290; Cal. Rules of Court, 

rule 5.481(a)(1).) If the court or child protective agency “has 
22

reason to believe that an Indian child is involved in a proceeding, 

but does not have sufficient information to determine that there 

is reason to know that the child is an Indian child,” the court and 

the Department “shall make further inquiry regarding the 

possible Indian status of the child, and shall make that inquiry as 

soon as practicable.” (§ 224.2, subd. (e); Cal. Rules of Court, 

rule 5.481(a)(4).) If the further inquiry “results in a reason to 

know the child is an Indian child, then the formal notice 

requirements of section 224.3 apply.” (In re D.S. (2020)

46 Cal.App.5th 1041, 1052; see 25 U.S.C. § 1912(a); § 224.3 

[notice under ICWA “shall be provided” if the court, social 

worker, or probation officer “has reason to know . . . that an 

Indian child is involved”].) 

“‘The duty to develop information concerning whether a 

child is an Indian child rests with the court and the Department, 

not the parents or members of the parents’ families.’” (In re 

Rylei S., supra, 81 Cal.App.5th at p. 317; accord, In re Antonio R.

(2022) 76 Cal.App.5th 421, 430; In re Benjamin M. (2021) 

70 Cal.App.5th 735, 742 [“the agency has a duty to gather 

information by conducting an initial inquiry, where the other 

party—here the parent . . . has no similar obligation”].) 

Here, after Tiffany and Robert both stated they had no 

Indian ancestry, the Department made no further inquiries to 

any known extended family member despite having the contact

information for several of them.

4 Moreover, in finding ICWA did 

4 Welfare and Institutions Code section 224.1, 

subdivision (c), provides “extended family member” is defined as 

provided in ICWA. ICWA defines “extended family member,” if 

not separately defined by the law or custom of the Indian child’s 
23

not apply to the children, the court relied entirely on the parents’ 

responses and made no further ICWA inquiries—not to maternal 

great-aunt and great-uncle Ronalda or Jesse, who were present 

at Elizabeth’s detention hearing (the initial contact), or to the 

Department to ensure it complied with its ICWA obligations. As 

the Department implicitly concedes, much more was required.

5

tribe, as “a person who has reached the age of eighteen and who 

is the Indian child’s grandparent, aunt or uncle, brother or sister, 

brother-in-law or sister-in-law, niece or nephew, first or second 

cousin, or stepparent.” (25 U.S.C. § 1903(2).) 

The Department’s reports indicate the Department had 

contact information for maternal grandmother Dianna, maternal 

grandfather Bryant G., maternal uncle Donald G., paternal 

grandmother Lillian R., paternal cousins Bill B. and Joe P., 

paternal aunt Cheyenne E. and paternal cousin June L.

5

In not opposing a remand for ICWA compliance, the

Department implicitly recognizes not only that error occurred,

but also this division’s treatment of ICWA inquiry error. (See, 

e.g., In re Antonio R. supra, 76 Cal.App.5th at p. 436 [“[I]n

determining whether the failure to make an adequate initial 

inquiry is prejudicial, we ask whether the information in the 

hands of the extended family members is likely to be meaningful 

in determining whether the child is an Indian child, not whether 

the information is likely to show the child is in fact an Indian 

child. In most circumstances, the information in the possession 

of extended relatives is likely to be meaningful in determining 

whether the child is an Indian child—regardless of whether the 

information ultimately shows the child is or is not an Indian 

child”].) The question concerning the standard of prejudice under 

which to evaluate ICWA inquiry error is currently pending in the 

Supreme Court. (See In re Dezi C. (2022) 79 Cal.App.5th 769, 

review granted Sept. 21, 2022, S275578.) 
24

DISPOSITION

The juvenile court’s April 6, 2022 order denying Tiffany’s 

section 388 petition is affirmed. The juvenile court’s April 6, 

2022 order terminating Tiffany and Robert’s parental rights is 

conditionally affirmed. The matter is remanded to the juvenile 

court for full compliance with the inquiry and notice provisions of 

ICWA and related California law, including for the Department 

to make all reasonable efforts to identify and thereafter interview 

all extended family members, not just those who have previously 

been identified, as well as others who have an interest in any of 

the children, regarding the children’s possible Indian ancestry 

and to submit a report of its interviews or efforts to conduct the 

interviews to the juvenile court, and for further proceedings not 

inconsistent with this opinion. 

PERLUSS, P. J. 

We concur:

SEGAL, J.

FEUER, J.