alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
* This order and judgment is not binding precedent, e xcept under the

doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and col lateral estoppel. The court generally disfavors the citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order and judgment may be cited under the terms and condi tions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3. 

## F I L E D United States Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit 

### SEP 3 1999 

### PATRICK FISHER Clerk UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT

TOMI EDWARD JENNINGS, JR.,

Petitioner-Appellant,

v. STATE OF WYOMING; WYOMING ATTORNEY GENERAL,

Respondents-Appellees. No. 99-8024 (D.C. No. 97-CV-210) (D. Wyo.)

ORDER AND JUDGMENT *

Before BRORBY , EBEL , and HENRY , Circuit Judges.

After examining the briefs and appellate record, th is panel has determined unanimously that oral argument would not materiallyassist the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument.-2-

This appeal arises from the district court’s dismis sal of petitioner’s petition for writ of habeas corpus as time-barred. The Anti terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA) amended the habeas corpus statute and established a one-year limitation period to file habeas petitions. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). Because the judgment on petitioner’s conviction was final before the effective date of AEDPA, he had until April 24, 1997 to file a petition for habeas relief. See Hoggro v. Boone , 150 F.3d 1223, 1225-26 (10th Cir. 1998). Petitio ner’s first habeas petition was filed before that date, but the district court dismissed it on February 27, 1997, because petitioner had not exhau sted his state remedies and he failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. The district court was obligated to dismiss the fir st petition because exhaustion of state remedies is a prerequisite to federal habeas relief. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1)(A). Had petitioner requested p ost-conviction relief in state court pursuant to Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 7-14-101 throu gh 108 (1999), the one-year limitation period would have been tolled while he h ad a properly filed application for state post-conviction relief pending in the state court. See Barnett v. Lemaster , 167 F.3d 1321, 1322-23 (10th Cir. 1999). He did not, however, avail himself of those remedies. Consequently, when peti tioner filed his second request for habeas relief on August 25, 1997, the one-year limitation period had long since expired. We agree with the district court th at the habeas petition is time--3-

barred, and we must DISMISS the appeal. The applic ation for a certificate of appealability is DENIED. The mandate shall issue f orthwith.

Entered for the Court

Robert H. Henry Circuit Judge
COURT OF APPEALS

SECOND DISTRICT OF TEXAS

FORT WORTH

NO. 02-13-00161-CV

Rolling Plains Management 

Corporation of Baylor, Cottle, Foard, 

Hardeman, and Wilbarger Counties 

d/b/a Sharp Lines Rural Public 

Transportation

v.

Patricia Hobbs, Administratrix of the 

Estate of Patty Blackburn, Deceased

§

§

§

§

From the 78th District Court

of Wichita County (177,908-B)

March 20, 2013

Opinion by Justice Walker

JUDGMENT

This court has considered the record on appeal in this case and holds that 

there was no error in the trial court’s judgment. It is ordered that the judgment of 

the trial court is affirmed.

It is further ordered that appellant Rolling Plains Management Corporation 

of Baylor, Cottle, Foard, Hardeman, and Wilbarger Counties d/b/a Sharp Lines 

Rural Public Transportation shall pay all of the costs of this appeal, for which let 

execution issue.

SECOND DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS 

By _________________________________

 Justice Sue Walker
##### 



Exhibit 32.1 CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002 In connection with the quarterly report on Form 10-Q of Crum & Forster Holdings
Corp. (the Company) for the period ended September 30, 2004 (the Report) as
filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof, I,
Nikolas Antonopoulos, Chief Executive Officer and President of the Company,
certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as enacted pursuant to Section 906
of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:  1.
    
    this Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or
15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and2.
    
    the information contained in this Report fairly presents, in all
material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of
the Company. Date: November 5, 2004
    
    By:
    
    /s/  Nikolas Antonopoulos
Nikolas Antonopoulos
Chief Executive Officer and President
 A signed original of this written statement required by Section 906 has been
provided to the Company and will be retained by the Company and furnished to
the Securities and Exchange Commission, or its staff, upon request.
#### Sarah R. W. Palmer, a Widow, *Appellant,*v. Katherine L. Fitzpatrick, Trustee, *Appellee.*

Division B.

Decision Filed June 11, 1928.

*Bart A. Riley,*for Appellant;

*Winifred B. Judge,*for Appellee.

Per Curiam.

This cause having heretofore been submitted to the Court upon the transcript of the record of the decree herein and briefs and argument of counsel for the respective parties, and the record having been seen and inspected, and the Court being now advised of its judgment to be given in the premises, it seems to the Court that there is no error in the said decree; it is, therefore, considered, ordered and decreed by the Court that the said decree of the Circuit Court be, and the same is hereby affirmed.

Whitfield, P. J., and Terrell and Buford, J. J, concur.
# C_2016201EN.01000101.xml

| 7.6.2016 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 201/1 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

7.6.2016

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 201/1

---

Guidelines on State aid to airports and airlines: acceptance of the proposed appropriate measures pursuant to Article 108(1) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union by all Member States

(pursuant to Article 23(1) of Council Regulation (EU) 2015/1589 of 13 July 2015 laying down detailed rules for the application of Article 108 of the Treaty of the Functioning of the European Union (1))

1

(2016/C 201/01)

In paragraph 169 of the Guidelines on State aid to airports and airlines (2), the Commission proposed that Member States, where necessary, amend their existing schemes in order to bring them into line with those guidelines by 12 months at the latest after 4 April 2014. In paragraph 170 of the same guidelines, Member States were invited to give their explicit unconditional agreement to those guidelines within two months following 4 April 2014.

2

Pursuant to Article 23(1) of Council Regulation (EU) 2015/1589 of 13 July 2015 laying down detailed rules for the application of Article 108 of the Treaty of the Functioning of the European Union, the Commission recorded the unconditional and explicit agreement to the appropriate measures by all Member States.

---

(1)  OJ L 248, 24.9.2015, p. 9.

1

(2)  OJ C 99, 4.4.2014, p. 3.

2

---
NO. SCWC-10-0000062
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF HAWAI # I

STATE OF HAWAI # I, Respondent/Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs. MIKI POUSIMA, Petitioner/Defendant-Appellant.

CERTIORARI TO THE INTERMEDIATE COURT OF APPEALS (ICA NO. CAAP-10-0000062; CR. NO. 09-1-0288K)
ORDER REJECTING APPLICATION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI (By: Recktenwald, C.J., Nakayama, Acoba, and McKenna, JJ., and Circuit Judge Sakamoto,

in place of Duffy, J., recused) The Application for Writ of Certiorari filed on February 7, 2012 by Petitioner/Defendant-Appellant, Miki Pousima is hereby rejected.

DATED: Honolulu, Hawai # i, March 20, 2012.
Jack M. Tonaki, /s/ Mark E. Recktenwald Public Defender, and Taryn R. Tomasa, /s/ Paula A. Nakayama Deputy Public Defender, for petitioner/ /s/ Simeon R. Acoba, Jr. defendant-appellant on the application. /s/ Sabrina S. McKenna Charlene Iboshi, /s/ Karl K. Sakamoto Prosecuting Attorney, and Linda L. Walton, Deputy Prosecuting Attorney, for respondent/ plaintiff-appellee on the response. Electronically Filed Supreme Court SCWC-10-0000062 20-MAR-2012 01:40 PM
FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL

STATE OF FLORIDA

_____________________________

No. 1D20-2902

_____________________________

ANDREA R. HART BUSEY,

Appellant,

v.

HILLERY B. MAHER,

Appellee.

_____________________________

On appeal from the Circuit Court for Duval County.

John I. Guy, Judge.

September 30, 2021

PER CURIAM.

AFFIRMED.

RAY, MAKAR, and M.K. THOMAS, JJ., concur.

_____________________________

Not final until disposition of any timely and 

authorized motion under Fla. R. App. P. 9.330 or 

9.331.

_____________________________

Nicholas Martino, Jacksonville, for Appellant.
2

Beth M. Terry, Law Office of Beth M. Terry, P.A., Jacksonville, for 

Appellee.
EXHIBIT 23-3



                              Miller and Lents, Ltd. [Leterhead]


                              February 27, 1996

MCN Corporation
500 Griswold
Detroit, Mi  48226


                              Re: MCN Corporation
                                  1995 Annual Report on Form 10-K

Ladies and Gentlemen:

The firm of Miller and Lents, Ltd. consents to the use of its name and the
information contained in its report dated January 12, 1996, regarding MCN
corporation oil and gas reserve information as of December 31, 1995, in its
1995 Annual Report on Form 10-K.

In addition, Miller and Lents, Ltd. consents to the incorporation by
reference of said material in Registration Statement Nos.33-43075, 33-
52825, and 33-52827 on Form S-8, 33-55665 and 33-57115 on Form S-3, and
Post Effective Amendment no. 1 to Registration Statement no. 33-21930-99 on
Form S-8 of MCN Corporation.

Miller and Lents, Ltd.has no interest in MCN Corporation or in any
affiliated companies or subsidiaries and is not to receive such interest as
payment for such reports and has no director, officer, or employee
otherwise connected with MCN Corporation.  We are not employed by MCN
Corporation on a contingent basis.

                              Yours very truly,

                              MILLER AND LENTS, LTD.



                              By /s/ P.G. Von Tungeln
                                 --------------------
                                 P.G. Von Tungeln
                                 President

PGVT/mk
Exhibit 32.1







Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, the undersigned  officer of The Bank of New York Mellon Trust Company, N.A., as Trustee on behalf of Government  rust 1-D (the "Trust"), hereby certifies, to his knowledge, that the Trust's Annual Report on Form 10-K for the year ended December 31, 2010 (the  "Report") fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d), as applicable, of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and that the information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results


of operations of the Trust.




/s/ Lawrence M. Kusch


-----------------------------




Name:   Lawrence M. Kusch


Title:  Vice President




March 29, 2011
No. 09-8309.

#### Jose A. Vega-Figueroa, Petitioner v. United States.

559 U.S. 1089, 130 S. Ct. 2145,

176 L. Ed. 2d 762,

2010 U.S. LEXIS 3239.

April 19, 2010.

Petition for rehearing denied.

*763Former decision, 559 U.S. 953, 130 S. Ct. 1542, 176 L. Ed. 2d 136, 2010 U.S. LEXIS 1415.
<PAGE>
                                                                    EXHIBIT 32.1

                      CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO SECTION 906
                        OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

      CERTIFICATION OF CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER AND CHIEF FINANCIAL OFFICER
                                   PURSUANT TO
                        18 UNITED STATESC. SECTION 1350,
                             AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
                  SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

I, Elizabeth H. Davila, certify, pursuant to 18 UNITED STATESC. Section 1350, as
adopted pursuant to Section 906 of Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that the Annual
Report of VISX, Incorporated on Form 10-K for the period ended December 31, 2003
fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 and that information contained in such Annual Report on
Form 10-K fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and
results of operations of VISX, Incorporated.

                                        /s/Elizabeth H. Davila
                                        ----------------------------------------
                                        Elizabeth H. Davila
                                        Chief Executive Officer
                                        March 12, 2004

I, Derek A. Bertocci, certify, pursuant to 18 UNITED STATESC. Section 1350, as
adopted pursuant to Section 906 of Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that the Annual
Report of VISX, Incorporated on Form 10-K for the period ended December 31, 2003
fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 and that information contained in such Annual Report on
Form 10-K fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and
results of operations of VISX, Incorporated.

                                        /s/Derek A. Bertocci
                                        ----------------------------------------
                                        Derek A. Bertocci
                                        Chief Financial Officer
                                        March 12, 2004
Brandon ATKINS, Plaintiff, v. TOWN OF WAKE FOREST, Defendant.

No. COA18-1167

Court of Appeals of North Carolina.

Filed: July 2, 2019

AFFIRMED.
#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Araind Johnson, Appellant.

[719 NYS2d 232]

Judgment, Supreme Court, New York County (Joan Sudolnik, J.), rendered September 14, 1998, convicting defendant, after a jury trial, of criminal sale of a controlled substance in the third degree, and sentencing him, as a second felony offender, to a term of 6 to 12 years, unanimously affirmed.

The verdict was not against the weight of the evidence *(see, People v Bleakley,*69 NY2d 490). Issues of credibility were properly presented to the jury and there is no reason to disturb its determinations.

*295In this observation sale case, the court properly admitted photographs of the crime scene taken from the officer’s observation post with the use of a lens replicating the degree of magnification provided by the officer’s binoculars. These photographs were properly authenticated through the testimony of the observing officer and testimony from the photographer was not required *(see, People v Byrnes,*33 NY2d 343). The court also properly denied defendant’s request for a missing witness charge with respect to the photographer who took the photos since defendant made no prima facie showing that the photographer would have provided material, non-cumulative testimony. Aside from the officer’s authentication testimony, the People also introduced expert testimony from the photographer’s supervisor. This testimony established that the photographs were taken in accordance with standardized procedure, and testimony from the actual photographer would have added nothing *(cf., People v Atkins,*273 AD2d 11).

The court properly denied defendant’s untimely request for an adverse inference charge, made at the close of trial, based on the People’s failure to introduce the officer’s binoculars into evidence. The People were under no obligation to place the binoculars in evidence, and defendant never sought to examine the binoculars or to have them produced in order to introduce them as a defense exhibit. Concur — Sullivan, P. J., Nardelli, Williams, Mazzarelli and Saxe, JJ.
### IN THE TENTH COURT OF APPEALS
No. 10
- 11
- 00377
- CR
EX PARTE MARTIN LEE TREDWAY

From the 220th District Court Bosque County, Texas Trial Court No. 05
- 02
- 13863
- BCCR

MEMORANDUM OPINION
Martin Lee Tredway has filed what he calls a “Motion for Harm Analysis,” in which he argues that the trial court improperly excluded evidence which purportedly supported his innocence with respect to his conviction for sexual assault of a child. 1 In
his m otion, Tredway “prays his motion may be ‘granted’ in the interest of justice and without prejudice set aside and vacate the appellant’s judgment of sentence under

1 Appellant’s “Motion for Harm Analysis” does not contain proof of service. A copy of all documents presented to the Court must be served on all parties to the appeal and must contain proof of service. T EX

. R. A PP

. P. 9.5. Proof of service may be in the form of either an acknowledgment of service by the person served or a certif icate of service. Id. at R. 9.5 (d). On October 21, 2011, we received a letter informing us that appellant has not served his “Motion for H arm Analysis” on the State. To expedite this matter, we implement Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 2 and suspend the p roof of service requirement of r ule 9.5 for this document only

. Id. at R. 2. All f uture filings must comply with r ule 9.5.Ex Parte Tredway Page 2

Clewis v. State , 922 S.W.2d 126, 129 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996).” 2 We construe Tredway’s
“Motion for Harm Analysis” as a post

- conviction writ of habeas corpus. See T EX
. C ODE
C RIM
. P ROC

. A NN
. art. 11.01 (West 2005) (“The writ of habeas corpus is the remedy to be used when any person is restrained in his liberty.”). This Court, as an intermediate appe llate court, has no jurisdiction over post

conviction writs of habeas corpus in felony cases. See Ex parte Martinez , 175 S.W.3d 510,
512

- 13 (Tex. App.

— Texarkana 2005, orig. proceeding) (“Our law requires post

conviction applications for writs of habeas co rpus, for felony cases in which the death penalty was not assessed, to be filed in the court of original conviction, made returnable to the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals.”) (citing T EX
. C ODE C RIM
. P ROC

. A NN
. art. 11.07, §3(a), (b) (West Supp. 2010)); In re McAfee , 53 S.W.3d 715, 717 (Tex. App.

— Houston [1st Dist.] 2001, orig. proceeding) (noting that “only the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals has jurisdiction in final post

- conviction felony proceedings”); see also Ex parte Maxey , No. 10

- 10

- 00345

- CR, 2010 Te x. App. LEXIS 8141 (Tex. App.

— Waco Oct. 6, 2010, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication). Because we have no jurisdiction over this post

- conviction habeas corpus proceeding, we dismiss it.

AL SCOGGINS Justice

2 We also note that the proposition of law for which Tredway cites the Clewis opinion has been overruled by the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals. See Brooks v. State , 323 S.W.3d 893, 895 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010).Ex Parte Tredway Page 3

Before Chief Justice Gray, Justice Davis, and Justice Scoggins Dismissed Opinion delivered and filed November 2, 2011 Do n ot p ublish [CR25]
No. 09-9410.

#### Yayah Talib, Petitioner v. United States.

559 U.S. 1055, 130 S. Ct. 2363,

2010 U.S. LEXIS 2996.

176 L. Ed. 2d 572,

April 5, 2010.

Petition for writ of certio-rari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit denied.

*573Same case below, 347 Fed. Appx. 934.
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent *

except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

The Honorable Frederic Block, Senior United States District Judge for **

the Eastern District of New York, sitting by designation.

NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

 FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

ANTENOR HERMAN REYNOSOORTEGA,

 Petitioner,

 v.

ERIC H. HOLDER, Jr., Attorney General,

 Respondent.

No. 05-77264

Agency No. A29-191-929

MEMORANDUM *

On Petition for Review of an Order of the

Board of Immigration Appeals

Submitted May 6, 2010

Pasadena, California

Before: O’SCANNLAIN and TALLMAN, Circuit Judges, and BLOCK, ** 

District Judge.

Antenor Reynoso-Ortega (“Petitioner”), a citizen of Peru, petitions for

review of an order of the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) dismissing his

appeal of an Immigration Judge’s (“IJ”) denial of his application for asylum,

FILED

JUN 02 2010

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
2

withholding of removal, protection under the United Nations Convention Against

Torture (“the CAT”), suspension of deportation, and voluntary departure. We have

jurisdiction, 8 U.S.C. § 1252, and review for substantial evidence. INS v. EliasZacarias, 502 U.S. 478, 481 n.1 (1992).

Petitioner claimed that he had been persecuted by Sendero Luminoso, a/k/a

“Shining Path.” The BIA’s conclusion that Petitioner was not credible is supported

by substantial evidence. Petitioner’s 2004 testimony to the IJ was directly contrary

to his 1994 testimony to the asylum officer, and the discrepancy went to the heart

of his claim. Regardless of his credibility, Petitioner’s asylum claim also fails

because he did not demonstrate that he was targeted by Shining Path on account of

a protected ground; his service in the Peruvian Army does not qualify. CruzNavarro v. INS, 232 F.3d 1024, 1029 (9th Cir. 2000). In light of this disposition,

we have no need to address whether Petitioner was properly classified as a

persecutor, barring him from asylum relief. 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(2)(A)(i).

Since he cannot establish eligibility for asylum, it necessarily follows that

Petitioner cannot meet the higher standard for withholding of removal. CruzNavarro, 232 F.3d at 1031.

As to Petitioner’s claim under the CAT, the record contains no evidence that

Shining Path operates with the acquiescence of the Peruvian government. Zheng v.
3

Ashcroft, 332 F.3d 1186, 1196 (9th Cir. 2003) (noting that acquiescence may be

established by showing a government’s “willful blindness to the torture of [its]

citizens by third parties”). Accordingly, Petitioner failed to demonstrate eligibility

for relief under the CAT.

Because Petitioner raises no colorable constitutional claim or question of

law, we lack jurisdiction to review the BIA’s discretionary decision to deny

suspension of deportation and voluntary departure. Mendez-Castro v. Mukasey,

552 F.3d 975, 978 (9th Cir. 2009). 

PETITION FOR REVIEW DENIED in part; DISMISSED in part.
EXHIBIT 32.2



Certification of Principal Executive Officer

Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. 1350

(Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002)



I, Gandolfo Verra, Chief Financial Officer of Cordia Corporation (the "Registrant") do hereby certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350 as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that, to the best of my knowledge, based upon a review of the Annual Report on Form 10-KSB/A for the year ended December 31, 2006 of the Registrant, as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the "Report"):



(1) The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended; and

(2) The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Registrant.







By: /s/ Gandolfo Verra



-----------------------------------



Gandolfo Verra



Chief Financial Officer



April 3, 2007



* A signed original of this written statement required by Section 906 has been provided to Cordia Corporation and will be retained by Cordia Corporation and furnished to the Securities Exchange Commission or its staff upon request.