SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY

APPELLATE DIVISION

DOCKET NO. A-0137-19T4

STATE OF NEW JERSEY,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

DONOVAN M. MANGUM,

Defendant-Respondent.

______________________________

Submitted February 25, 2020 – Decided April 7, 2020

Before Judges Hoffman and Firko.

On appeal from an interlocutory order of the Superior 

Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Camden County, 

Indictment No. 18-08-2090.

Jill S. Mayer, Acting Camden County Prosecutor, 

attorney for appellant (Jason Magid, Special Deputy 

Attorney General/Acting Assistant Prosecutor, of 

counsel and on the brief).

Stephen Rogers Piper, attorney for respondent.

PER CURIAM

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the 

internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
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By leave granted, the State appeals from the July 30, 2019 Law Division 

order granting defendant's motion to suppress a handgun. We affirm.

 I.

We derive the following facts from the June 12, 2019 hearing on 

defendant's motion to suppress. At the hearing, the State presented the 

testimony of two witnesses, Detective Baruch Zepeda, a member of the 

Fugitive Task Force of the United States Marshall Service, and Detective 

Prince Reed, a member of the Shooting Response Team (SRT) of the Camden 

County Metro Police Department.

On the evening of July 2, 2018, members of the Fugitive Task Force 

were canvassing streets in Camden looking for five fugitives with outstanding 

warrants. At the same time, SRT members, including Detective Prince Reed, 

were also working in the area and received a "Wanted" flier, which included 

photos of the five fugitives.

According to Detective Reed, at about 8:30 p.m., he was in the area of 

Third Avenue and Stevens Street, when he came upon defendant, one of the 

fugitives whose photo appeared in the flier. He described defendant as a "bald 

male, dark skin, and clean shaven." 
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Detective Reed recounted that defendant was "carrying a book bag and 

had an open container of an alcoholic beverage." Defendant was holding this 

container in a paper bag; however, Detective Reed said the bag was partially 

rolled down, allowing him to see enough of it that "it was very apparent that it 

was an alcoholic beverage . . . " He believed it was a twenty-four ounce beer

can, which he called "a tall boy." He added that the open container "was one 

of the reasons for stopping" defendant.

Upon making these observations, Detective Reed exited his unmarked 

vehicle, wearing a visible badge on his hip and a vest with police identifiers on 

the front, intending to make a pedestrian stop. At this point, defendant 

dropped the beer can and fled. Detective Reed and another detective chased 

after him. They announced their pursuit on their police radios, and Detective 

Zepeda responded. 

Defendant ran down an alley, where the detectives observed him throw 

his backpack over a fence and into a residential yard. The other detective 

remained with the backpack while Detective Reed continued to give chase. 

Detective Reed eventually caught up with defendant and apprehended him; in 

a search incident to arrest, he found a "jar of marijuana[.]"
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 The homeowners adjacent to the alley consented to police retrieving the 

backpack from their rear yard and confirmed the backpack did not belong to 

them. A search of the backpack revealed a silver Ruger Mark IV .22 LR 

handgun. The gun contained nine ball rounds in the magazine. Upon further 

investigation, the handgun was reported stolen. 

Detective Zepeda subsequently prepared a report of defendant's arrest; 

however, the report did not include any reference to Detective Reed's 

identification of defendant as one of the five individuals from the wanted 

fliers. Detective Reed did not prepare a report of the encounter or arrest. 

Additionally, the police never recovered the beer can defendant allegedly

dropped. On cross-examination, Detective Reed agreed that if he "had not 

seen a match with the fugitive sheet," he would not "have jumped out of [his] 

vehicle for somebody who just had a beer in their hand."

On July 2, 2018, a grand jury charged defendant with second-degree 

unlawful possession of a weapon, pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5(b)(1) (count 

one), and third-degree receiving stolen property, pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:20-7 

(count two). 

On July 26, 2019, the motion judge delivered an oral opinion granting

defendant's motion to suppress the handgun. The judge ruled the State failed 
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to establish that Detective Reed had an "objectively reasonable basis to believe 

that defendant was wanted as a fugitive or was engaged in criminal behavior" 

to make an investigatory stop. The judge found both Detective Reed and 

Detective Zepeda credible but relied on State v. Elders, 192 N.J. 224, 247 

(2007), and concluded the State failed to present evidence to support Detective 

Reed's objective belief that the stop was justified based on him identifying 

defendant as one of the targeted fugitives. The judge noted the State did not 

introduce the wanted flier into evidence, and Detective Zepeda's report did not 

document Detective Reed's observations. Without any supporting testimony or 

evidence, the judge concluded that Detective Reed's identification of defendant 

as "bald male, dark skin, and clean shaven" was an insufficient basis to initiate

an investigatory stop.

Accordingly, the motion judge concluded the State "presented no 

evidence that the defendant was otherwise reasonably suspected of being 

engaged in criminal behavior[,]" pointing to Detective Reed's acknowledgment 

that he would not "have jumped out of [his] vehicle for somebody who just had 

a beer in their hand." 

The judge then considered whether the State established a significant 

attenuation between the stop and the seizure of the gun and addressed the three 
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factors set forth in State v. Williams, 410 N.J. Super. 549 (App. Div. 2009). 

The judge focused on the second factor and concluded "the State has not 

established that the intervening circumstances of the defendant's discarding of 

the evidence amounts to significant attenuation." The judge found defendant's 

abandonment of his backpack immaterial because Williams did not address 

abandonment when discussing attenuation. 

On August 16, 2019, we granted the State's motion for leave to appeal

the order granting defendant's suppression motion.

II.

We review the trial court's findings of fact on a motion to suppress 

deferentially, affirming whenever they are supported by sufficient credible 

evidence in the record. Elders, 192 N.J. at 243. We particularly defer to those 

findings that flow from the trial court's opportunity to see and hear the 

witnesses, an opportunity not enjoyed by a reviewing court. State v. Johnson, 

42 N.J. 146, 161 (1964); see also State v. Diaz-Bridges, 208 N.J. 544, 565

(2012). Appellate courts should reverse only when the trial court's 

determination "is clearly a mistaken one and so plainly unwarranted that the 

interests of justice demand intervention and correction." Johnson, 42 N.J. at 

162. "A trial court's interpretation of the law, however, and the consequences 
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that flow from established facts are not entitled to any special deference," and 

its "legal conclusions are reviewed de novo." Ibid.

It is the State's burden to establish by a preponderance of the evidence 

that the challenged stop and seizure falls within an exception to the Fourth 

Amendment's warrant requirement. Elders, 192 N.J. at 246. One such 

exception is the investigatory or Terry1-type stop, in which specific and 

articulable facts, along with rational inferences, give rise to a reasonable and 

articulable suspicion of criminal activity. State v. Pineiro, 181 N.J. 13, 20

(2004). The test is objective, the question being whether at the moment of 

seizure, the officer had at his command sufficient facts supporting a person of 

reasonable caution in the belief that a seizure was appropriate. Id. at 21-22.

The analysis must be fact-sensitive, each case must be carefully reviewed, and 

an individual determination made. Id. at 22. The totality of the circumstances

must satisfy the reasonable and articulable standard. Elders, 192 N.J. at 247.

On appeal, the State argues the judge erred when he concluded the State 

failed to establish that Detective Reed had reasonable suspicion to conduct an 

investigatory stop based upon his belief that defendant was violating a local 

ordinance proscribing public consumption of alcoholic beverages. The State 

 

1

 Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
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further argues the judge erroneously focused on Detective Reed's testimony 

that he stopped defendant based on his determination that defendant was one 

of the five individuals depicted in the photos contained on the wanted flier. 

"A police officer may conduct an investigatory stop of a person if that 

officer has 'particularized suspicion based upon an objective observation that 

the person stopped has been or is about to engage in criminal wrongdoing.'" 

State v. Coles, 218 N.J. 322, 343 (2014) (quoting State v. Davis, 104 N.J. 490, 

504 (1986)). "The stop must be reasonable and justified by articulable facts; it 

may not be based on arbitrary police practices, the officer's subjective good 

faith, or a mere hunch." Ibid. Law enforcement officers are justified in 

conducting an investigatory stop when they have a reasonable and articulable 

suspicion of criminal activity. Pineiro, 181 N.J. at 20. As the Court has

explained,

An investigatory stop is valid only if the officer has a 

'particularized suspicion' based upon an objective 

observation that the person stopped has been or is 

about to engage in criminal wrongdoing. The 

"articulable reasons" or "particularized suspicion" of 

criminal activity must be based upon the law 

enforcement officer's assessment of the totality of the 

circumstances with which he is faced. Such 

observations are those that, in view of officer's 

experience and knowledge, taken together with 

rational inferences drawn from those facts, reasonably 
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warrant the limited intrusion upon the individual's 

freedom.

[Davis, 104 N.J. at 504 (citations omitted).]

The reasonable suspicion standard requires "some minimal level of 

objective justification for making the stop." State v. Nishina, 175 N.J. 502, 

511 (2003). "Its application is highly fact sensitive and, therefore, not readily, 

or even usefully, reduced to a neat set of legal rules." Ibid. (citations omitted). 

Facts that seem innocent in isolation "can sustain a finding of reasonable 

suspicion when considered in the aggregate, so long as the officer maintains an 

objectively reasonable belief that the collective circumstances are consistent 

with criminal conduct." Ibid. (citation omitted). "An officer's experience and 

knowledge are factors courts should consider in applying the totality of the 

circumstances test." Pineiro, 181 N.J. at 22. "Neither inarticulate hunches nor 

an arresting officer's subjective good faith can justify an infringement of a 

citizen's constitutionally guaranteed rights." Id. at 21 (citation omitted). An 

officer must clearly explain exactly what behavior led him to believe a 

defendant was engaged in criminal conduct. State v. Thomas, 110 N.J. 673, 

678 (1988) (requiring that officers be able to point to "specific and articulable 

facts.").
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In Nishina, an experienced police officer stopped the defendant and his 

three companions on the grounds of an elementary school at approximately 

10:00 p.m. 175 N.J. at 506. The officer testified that it was very unusual to 

see individuals at the school at that time because school was not in session and 

a local ordinance proscribed their presence after dark. Ibid. Also, although 

the school had a parking lot, defendant's car was parked across the street, some 

distance from the school. Ibid.

The officer requested the defendant's driver's license, registration and 

insurance card. Id. at 507. While receiving these documents, he smelled a 

strong odor of marijuana emanating from the defendant's clothes. Id. at 508. 

Thus, he patted down the defendant, discovering a pen and a pack of rolling 

papers that he believed were drug paraphernalia. Ibid. The officer then 

searched the defendant's car and found marijuana. Id. at 508-09. The officer 

admitted the school was not located in a high crime area, but the police were 

watching the school because of bomb threats made to other schools. Id. at 

508. The defendant was convicted of possession of a controlled dangerous 

substance. Id. at 509. On appeal, defendant argued there was no constitutional 

basis for the stop. Id. at 509-10.
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Our Supreme Court found the officer reasonably suspected that the 

defendant had been engaged or was about to engage in criminal activity, 

stating,

First, the encounter took place at about ten o'clock on 

a Sunday night when the school clearly was closed.

That fact created a duty for [the officer] to investigate 

the presence of defendant and his three companions, 

especially in view of the Colts Neck ordinance 

mandating that "[n]o person may, in any manner, enter 

upon, remain on or use the school grounds at times 

other than those designated[.]"

Second, defendant explained to the officer that he and 

his friends had driven to the school because they had 

heard of its playground. Given the time of evening, 

defendant's mature age, and the officer's testimony 

that the playground consisted of a swing set "for the 

kids to play on," defendant's explanation was highly 

questionable, if not inherently unreliable. . . . The 

time of day and physical location at which a policecitizen encounter takes place are relevant to the 

analysis.

[Id. at 512 (citations omitted).]

The Court noted that "[a]lthough when viewed in isolation some of the facts 

might support an innocent interpretation of events, collectively they formed a 

minimal level of objective justification for the officer's conduct." Id. at 513 

(citation omitted). 
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While Nishina held that an observed violation of an ordinance is 

sufficient criminal activity to create a reasonable suspicion to initiate an 

investigatory stop, the Court also required other objective facts beyond an 

ordinance violation to support the officer's reasonable suspicion. Id. at 512. 

Here, the State failed to present any corroborating evidence that defendant 

violated the public drinking ordinance. Detective Reed did not testify he 

observed defendant drinking alcohol in public nor did he provide an 

explanation for his belief that defendant was holding an "open container." In 

addition, the State did not introduce the can defendant discarded. Lacking this 

evidence, the stop was not supported by any corroborating evidence or 

testimony. The State failed to establish the necessary reasonable and 

articulable suspicion to justify the stop under review. Davis, 104 N.J. at 504. 

We discern no basis to disturb the order under review.

Affirmed.