After an examination of the briefs and the record, we have concluded that oral *

argument is unnecessary. Thus the appeal is submitted on the briefs and the record. FED.

R. APP. P. 34(a)(2).

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

Chicago, Illinois 60604

Submitted March 31, 2009*

Decided April 1, 2009

Before

 

FRANK H. EASTERBROOK, Chief Judge

 DIANE P. WOOD, Circuit Judge

 DIANE S. SYKES, Circuit Judge

No. 08-2845

STACY ALEXANDER, et al., Appeal from the United States District 

Plaintiffs-Appellants, Court for the Southern District of Illinois.

v. No. 07-CV-634-WDS

CASINO QUEEN INC., William D. Stiehl,

Defendant-Appellee. Judge.

O R D E R

Stacy Alexander, Kathie Miller, and Kim Rogers sued their former employer, Casino

Queen Inc., for employment discrimination. After the plaintiffs repeatedly failed to comply

with procedural rules and court directives, the district court dismissed their case for failure

to prosecute. They appeal, and we affirm.

In July 2006 the three employees filed separate complaints with the Equal

Employment Opportunity Commission, alleging that Casino Queen had discriminated

NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION

To be cited only in accordance with

Fed. R. App. P. 32.1
No. 08-2845 Page 2

against them on the basis of their race (African American) in violation of Title VII of the

Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq., and 42 U.S.C. § 1981. The EEOC sent them

right-to-sue letters; on the last day of the permitted 90-day period, they brought this

lawsuit. Their attorney, however, did not file the complaint electronically as required by

the local rules, and so the following month the district court ordered them to show cause

why their case should not be dismissed for failure to prosecute. Counsel responded that he

had misunderstood the local rules and that a medical condition had prevented him from

correcting the mistake sooner. 

This early scare did not improve counsel’s performance. Additional instances of

noncompliance with federal and local rules, as well as court-ordered deadlines, led to

further warnings of dismissal for failure to prosecute. In early 2008 the plaintiffs’ failure to

serve Casino Queen properly prompted the court to advise them that dismissal for want of

prosecution was (again) imminent. The lawyer fixed the service problem, but another

incident soon arose: in May, he disregarded a magistrate judge’s directive to initiate a

pretrial conference call between the court and the parties. The court again ordered the

plaintiffs to show cause why their case should not be dismissed for failure to prosecute.

When counsel did not comply with this order, the district judge adopted the magistrate

judge’s recommendation (made on his own initiative) that the case be dismissed with

prejudice for failure to prosecute. The plaintiffs responded by filing a “letter of objection,”

in which they asked the court to overturn the dismissal because their attorney had

“dropped the ball” and “grossly misrepresented” them; they also asked for 30 days to seek

new counsel. The district judge construed this letter as a motion for reconsideration and

extension of time and denied the motion. 

The plaintiffs, now proceeding pro se, appeal the dismissal of their case for failure to

prosecute. They argue that dismissal relieves Casino Queen of liability for discriminating

against them and that it is unfair to punish them for the unprofessional conduct of their

attorney. 

At the outset we note that the plaintiffs’ appellate brief bears the signature of only

Stacy Alexander. But Alexander, a non-lawyer, may not represent the interests of Miller or

Rogers. See Malone v. Nielson, 474 F.3d 934, 937 (7th Cir. 2007); United States ex rel. Lu v. Ou,

368 F.3d 773, 775 (7th Cir. 2004). Because Miller and Rogers neither signed the brief nor

filed one of their own, they are dismissed as parties to this appeal. See Muzikowski v.

Paramount Pictures Corp., 322 F.3d 918, 924 (7th Cir. 2003). 

As for the merits, our review of a dismissal for failure to prosecute is deferential, see

Gabriel v. Hamlin, 514 F.3d 734, 736 (7th Cir. 2008), and we conclude that the court did not
No. 08-2845 Page 3

abuse its discretion here. District courts have the power to control their dockets, and there

comes a point when disregard of court rules and orders becomes so serious that sanctions,

including dismissing a case sua sponte, are in order. See Link v. Wabash R.R. Co., 370 U.S. 626,

630-31 (1962); Aura Lamp & Lighting, Inc. v. International Trading Corp., 325 F.3d 903, 909-10

(7th Cir. 2003). In three separate show-cause orders, the court formally warned the

plaintiffs (through counsel) about the prospect of dismissal; the last of the orders elicited no

response at all. The plaintiffs urge that they are blameless and that responsibility for the

malfeasance lies only with their attorney, but the “sins of the agent can be visited upon the

principal.” Ball v. City of Chi., 2 F.3d 752, 756 (7th Cir. 1993). If their attorney committed

malpractice, the plaintiffs can bring a malpractice action against him; they should not,

however, be permitted to shift the burden of his neglect to the district court and the

defendant. Tango Music, LLC v. Deadquick Music, Inc., 348 F.3d 244, 247 (7th Cir. 2003). 

Miller and Rogers are dismissed as parties to this appeal, and the judgment of the

district court is otherwise AFFIRMED.