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PETER SZYNKOWICZ v. LINDA BONAUITO-O’HARA

(AC 38198)

DiPentima, C. J., and Lavine and Pellegrino, Js.

Submitted on briefs October 19, 2016—officially released January 10, 2017
(Appeal from Superior Court, judicial district of

Waterbury, Zemetis, J. [motion to strike]; BrazzelMassaro, J. [summary judgment].)

Steven P. Kulas filed a brief for the appellant

(plaintiff).

Elizabeth S. Bennett filed a brief for the appellee

(defendant).
Opinion

DiPENTIMA, C. J. The plaintiff, Peter Szynkowicz,

appeals from the judgment rendered in favor of the

defendant, Linda Bonauito-O’Hara, doing business as

Linda’s Team, William Raveis. The underlying dispute

arose when the plaintiff and the seller, Edward Development Company, LLC, entered into a dual agency

agreement1 naming Brenda Hanley, a realtor who

worked for the same real estate company as the defendant, to act as their dual agent in connection with locating, purchasing and developing the property known as

Lot 7 Meadow Brook Drive in East Haddam. After entering into the dual agency agreement, the plaintiff entered

into a real estate contract with the seller to develop a

single-family home on the property, which was subsequently cancelled when the seller was unable to complete construction. The plaintiff commenced this action

against the defendant, whom the plaintiff alleges was

also a party to the dual agency agreement, forthe return

of his deposited moneys advanced to the seller upon

the advice of the defendant. On appeal, the plaintiff

claims that the court erred in granting (1) the motion to

strike count five of his complaint because he adequately

had alleged an action for breach of an oral contract

against the defendant, and (2) the motion for summary

judgment because genuine issues of material fact exist

as to the defendant’s liability under counts one, two,

three and four of his complaint. We affirm the judgment

of the trial court.

The following facts and procedural history are relevant to our determination of this appeal. On October

5, 2012, the plaintiff commenced this action against the

defendant with a five count complaint. In ruling on the

motion to strike, the court, Zemetis, J., succinctly set

forth the factual allegations of the complaint: The plaintiff alleged that he ‘‘and the defendant entered into a

dual agency agreement on May 2, 2008, in connection

with the defendant aiding the plaintiff in locating, purchasing and developing a piece of real property known

as Lot 7 Meadow Brook Drive, East Haddam, Connecticut . . . . The defendant and its employees knew or

should have known that the seller of the property was

having financial difficulties when the dual agency

agreement was entered into because the defendant was

the seller’s exclusive broker. The defendant failed to

disclose the seller’s financial difficulties to the plaintiff,

despite the duty to do so. After entering the dual agency

agreement, the plaintiff entered into a [purchase

agreement] with the seller to develop a single family

home on the property. After signing the purchase

agreement, the defendant repeatedly represented to the

plaintiff that the defendant would be able to obtain

financing for the plaintiff and failed to disclose the

seller’s shaky financial condition. The defendant

encouraged the plaintiff [to] remain in the deal after he
had offered to withdraw. Based on his reliance on the

defendant’s representations that the seller was in good

financial condition, the plaintiff advanced money to the

seller in connection with the construction project. On

November 25, 2008, the [dual agency] agreement was

cancelled because the seller was unable to complete

construction. The defendant, although having a duty to

disclose the seller’s financial difficulties, never did so.’’

The plaintiff’s complaint contained five counts. Count

one alleged that the defendant’s failure to disclose information about the seller’s financial difficulty constituted

a breach of the defendant’s contract with the plaintiff.

Count two alleged that the defendant’s actions in entering a dual agency agreement, i.e., a contract, with the

plaintiff and failing to disclose the seller’s financial difficulty constituted a breach of the implied covenant of

good faith and fair dealing. Count three alleged that

the defendant’s actions in representing that she could

obtain financing for the plaintiff, encouraging the plaintiff to stay in the deal when he offered to withdraw,

and failing to disclose the seller’s financial difficulty

were fraudulent in connection with her duty to represent the plaintiff. Count four alleged that the defendant’s actions in stating that she could obtain financing

for the plaintiff, encouraging the plaintiff to stay in the

deal when he offered to withdraw and failing to disclose

the seller’s financial difficulty violated General Statutes

§ 42-110b, a provision of the Connecticut Unfair Trade

Practices Act (CUTPA), General Statutes § 42-110a et

seq. Count five alleged that the defendant’s actions in

failing to secure the purchase and the development of

the real property violated an oral agreement between

the defendant and the plaintiff.

On April 8, 2013, the defendant filed a motion to

strike counts one, two and five on the grounds that

the plaintiff had failed to allege facts to support the

existence of a contract between himself and the defendant. On July 26, 2013, the court denied the defendant’s

motion to strike counts one and two, but granted the

defendant’s motion as to count five. In granting the

defendant’s motion to strike count five, the court noted

that it could not ‘‘find that the plaintiff . . . sufficiently

pleaded that the defendant breached an oral contract

in count five. First, [the] plaintiff has insufficiently

alleged the existence of an oral contract because the

plaintiff failed to allege facts pertaining to scope or

terms of an oral agreement. Additionally, in count five

the plaintiff has alleged no specific contractual obligation that has not been met.’’ Accordingly, the court

concluded that because ‘‘the plaintiff has failed to sufficiently allege facts implying the existence of a privity

of contract between the parties and has merely alleged

misrepresentations and omissions by the defendant

. . . count five has failed to sufficiently allege a breach

of a term of that alleged oral contract . . . [and] [t]he

defendant’s motion to strike count five is granted.’’
Judgment was subsequently rendered in favor of the

defendant on this count.2 Thereafter, the defendant filed

an answer specifically denying the allegation that she

had entered into a contract with the plaintiff.

On February 13, 2014, the defendant filed a motion

for summary judgment as to counts three and four of

the complaint. The plaintiff filed an objection to the

defendant’s motion for summary judgment. On May 5,

2014, the court denied the motion ‘‘without prejudice.’’

One year later, on February 13, 2015, the defendant

filed another motion for summary judgment as to all

the remaining counts of the complaint. In its July 16,

2015 memorandum of decision granting the motion for

summary judgment, the court, Brazzel-Massaro, J.,

stated: ‘‘[T]he defendant filed a motion for summary

judgment as to counts one and two of the plaintiff’s

complaint on the ground that there [was] no privity of

contract between the plaintiff and the defendant. The

defendant further [sought] summary judgment as to

count three on the ground that it [was] barred by General Statutes § 52-577, and count four on the ground

that it [was] barred by General Statutes § 42-110g (f).

The defendant filed a memorandum [of law] in support

of the motion and the [dual agency agreement], the

‘Exclusive Right to Represent Buyer or Tenant Authorization’ form, and the partial deposition transcript of

the plaintiff. On March 18, 2015, the plaintiff filed an

objection and a memorandum [of law] in support of

the objection, as well as an affidavit of the plaintiff.’’

The court further stated: ‘‘In the memorandum of law

in support of the motion, the defendant argues that

summary judgment as to count one and two is proper

because there is no privity of contract between the

plaintiff and the defendant. In particular, the dual

agency agreement on which the plaintiff is basing his

claims is actually a form consenting to Brenda Hanley

acting as a dual agent, to which the defendant is not a

party. The plaintiff counters that the actions of the

parties raise factual issues as to whether the defendant

was acting on behalf of the plaintiff and that the plaintiff

believed at the time that the defendant was acting on

his behalf. The defendant further argues that summary

judgment should be granted as to countthree [and count

four] because the plaintiff filed his lawsuit outside the

three year statutes of limitations as outlined in [§§ 52-

577 and 42-110g (f)] and that the statutes of limitations

[are] not tolled. The plaintiff again counters that the

statutes of limitations [were] tolled by a continuing

course of conduct. The defendant contends in response

that the continuing course of conduct doctrine requires

the existence of a special relationship between the parties giving rise to a continuing duty and no special

relationship exists because there is no privity of contract between the plaintiff and the defendant.’’

In granting the defendant’s motion for summary judg-
ment on counts one and two, the court stated: ‘‘The

defendant has met her burden of showing that there is

no genuine issue of material fact that there [was] no

privity of contract between the plaintiff and the defendant [and] [t]he plaintiff has provided no evidence [to

rebut this].’’ In granting the motion for summary judgment on counts three and four, the court also stated

that: ‘‘The defendant has met her burden of showing

that there [was] no genuine issue of material fact that

count three and count four are barred by the statutes

of limitations under § 52-577 and § 42-110g (f) . . .

[and] [t]he plaintiff has provided no evidence to rebut

this finding.’’ This appeal followed.

I

We decline to review the plaintiff’s claim that the

court erred in granting the defendant’s motion to strike

count five because this claim is inadequately briefed.3

We first note that the plaintiff has devoted less than

one page to his argument on this claim. The plaintiff’s

analysis of this claim consists of a statement that ‘‘[a]

review of count [five] of the Plaintiff’s complaint, which

incorporated by reference the allegation of count [one]

of the Plaintiff’s complaint, indicates that the Plaintiff

adequately alleged an action for a breach of an oral

contract against the Defendant.’’ Where a claim is simply asserted but thereafter receives only cursory attention in the brief without substantive discussion or

citation of authorities, it is deemed to be abandoned.

See Bicio v. Brewer, 92 Conn. App. 158, 172, 884 A.2d

12 (2005); see also Braham v. Newbould, 160 Conn. App.

294, 312 n.15, 124 A.3d 977 (2015) (claim abandoned

that was not properly briefed). We conclude that the

plaintiff’s claim is inadequately briefed and, therefore,

we decline to review it.

II

The plaintiff next claims that the court erred in granting the motion for summary judgment because genuine

issues of material fact exist regarding counts one, two,

three and four of the complaint. Specifically, the plaintiff argues that the court improperly granted summary

judgment because (1) there were genuine issues of

material fact as to whether the parties were in privity

of contract, which is required to establish count one

of the plaintiff’s complaint, alleging breach of contract,

and count two, alleging breach of the covenant of good

faith and fair dealing, and (2) he presented sufficient

evidence to show the existence of a genuine issue of

material fact as to whether the statutes of limitations

were tolled by the continuing course of conduct doctrine applicable to count three, alleging fraud, and count

four, alleging a CUTPA violation. We disagree.

We begin our analysis by setting forth the well established standard of review. ‘‘Practice Book § 17-49 provides that summary judgment shall be rendered
forthwith if the pleadings, affidavits and any other proof

submitted show that there is no genuine issue as to any

material fact and that the moving party is entitled to

judgment as a matter of law. A party moving for summary judgment is held to a strict standard. . . . To

satisfy his burden the movant must make a showing

that it is quite clear what the truth is, and that excludes

any real doubt as to the existence of any genuine issue

of material fact. . . . As the burden of proof is on the

movant, the evidence must be viewed in the light most

favorable to the opponent. . . . Once the moving party

has met its burden, however, the opposing party must

present evidence that demonstrates the existence of

some disputed factual issue. . . . It is not enough, however, for the opposing party merely to assert the existence of such a disputed issue. Mere assertions of fact

. . . are insufficient to establish the existence of a

material fact and, therefore, cannot refute evidence

properly presented to the court under Practice Book

§ [17-45]. . . . Our review of the trial court’s decision

to grant [a] motion for summary judgment is plenary.’’

(Internal quotation marks omitted.) Capasso v.

Christmann, 163 Conn. App. 248, 257, 135 A.3d 733

(2016). ‘‘We therefore must decide whether the court’s

conclusions were legally and logically correct and find

support in the record.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Brown v. Otake, 164 Conn. App. 686, 701, 138 A.3d

951 (2016).

A

We first consider the plaintiff’s claim that the court

erred in rendering summary judgment on count one,

alleging breach of contract, and count two, alleging

breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing.

The plaintiff argues that genuine issues of material fact

exist as to whether the parties were in privity of contract. We disagree.

We begin by setting forth the legal principles relevant

to the issue before us. ’’[T]he obligation of contracts

is limited to the parties making them, and, ordinarily,

only those who are parties to contracts are liable for

their breach. . . . In other words, [a] person who is

not a party to a contract (i.e., is not named in the

contract and has not executed it) is not bound by its

terms.’’ (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks

omitted.) FCM Group, Inc. v. Miller, 300 Conn. 774,

797, 17 A.3d 40 (2011).

‘‘It is axiomatic that the . . . duty of good faith and

fair dealing is a covenant implied into a contract or a

contractual relationship. . . . The covenant of good

faith and fair dealing presupposes that the terms and

purpose of the contract are agreed upon by the parties

and that what is in dispute is a party’s discretionary

application or interpretation of a contract term. . . .

In accordance with these authorities, the existence of

a contract between the parties is a necessary anteced-
ent to any claim of breach of the [covenant] of good

faith and fair dealing.’’ (Citations omitted; emphasis

in the original; internal quotation marks omitted.)

Macomber v. Travelers Property & Casualty Corp., 261

Conn. 620, 638, 804 A.2d 180 (2002).

In its memorandum of decision, the court concluded

that summary judgment was warranted on the breach

of contract and breach of the covenant of good faith

and fair dealing counts because ‘‘[t]he defendant has

met her burden of showing that there is no genuine

issue of material fact that’’ the parties were not in privity

of contract, i.e., there is no contractual relationship.

The court expressly noted that because ‘‘[t]he plaintiff

has provided no evidence to show that there is a genuine

issue of material fact’’ regarding whether there was

privity of contract between the parties, he could not

assert a claim for breach of contract against the defendant on the basis of the contract. The court further

observed that ‘‘[s]ince a duty to act in good faith is

dependent on the existence of a contract and there is

not contractual privity between the plaintiff and the

defendant, the plaintiff also cannot bring a claim for

breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing

against the defendant.’’ In addition, the court emphasized: ‘‘[T]he fact that the defendant worked closely

with . . . Hanley or aided in the performance of the

alleged [dual agency] agreement does not bring the

defendant, individually, into contractual privity with the

plaintiff . . . [and] [w]here the language of the contract is clear and unambiguous, the contract is to be

given effect according to its terms. . . . Therefore, the

plaintiff’s subjective belief that the defendant was a

party to the alleged [dual agency] agreement does not

alter the clear terms naming . . . Hanley, alone, as the

single agent to represent both [the] seller and [the plaintiff].’’ (Citations omitted.)

On appeal, the plaintiff claims that the court improperly concluded that he had failed to provide sufficient

evidence to show the existence of a genuine issue of

material fact as to whether the parties were in privity of

contract because at the time he signed the dual agency

agreement, he was under the belief that the defendant

was representing him in the real estate transaction.

In turn, the defendant argues that the court properly

granted her motion for summary judgment because she

submitted sufficient evidence to show that there was

no genuine issue of material fact that the parties were

not in privity of contract, and the plaintiff failed to meet

his burden of providing evidentiary support to refute

this. We agree with the defendant.

The plaintiff’s breach of contract and breach of the

covenant of good faith and fair dealing counts indisputably rest on the allegation that the defendant was a

party to the dual agency agreement to create the

required privity of contract. ‘‘Contract obligations are
. . . owed only to the specific individuals named in the

contract.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Vaccaro

v. Shell Beach Condominium, Inc., 169 Conn. App. 21,

36, A.3d (2016); see also FCM Group, Inc. v.

Miller, supra, 300 Conn. 798 (it is axiomatic that an

action ‘‘for breach of contract may not be maintained

against a person who is not a party to the contract’’

[internal quotation marks omitted]); see Bruno v. Whipple, 138 Conn. App. 496, 510, 54 A.3d 184 (2012) (‘‘a

person cannot be held liable for breach of the implied

covenant of good faith and fair dealing without being

a party to a contract’’).

The defendant’s documentation attached to her memorandum of law in support of the motion included a

copy ofthe dual agency agreement, the ‘‘Exclusive Right

to Represent Buyer or Tenant Authorization’’ form, and

the partial deposition transcript of the plaintiff. The

dual agency agreement provides in relevant part that:

‘‘[The plaintiff] and [the] Seller having previously consented to William Raveis Real Estate, Inc., acting as

dual agents, hereby consent to: Brenda Hanley [sales

associate] [a]cting as a single agent represent[ing] both

[the plaintiff] and [the] Seller with negotiation of sale

of Lot 7 Meadowbrook Estates.’’ According to the terms

of the dual agency agreement, the plaintiff consented

to Hanley, his real estate agent, and not the defendant,

to act as a dual agent on behalf of himself and the seller.

The only parties named in the dual agency agreement

were the plaintiff, the plaintiff’s tenant, the seller and

Hanley, all of whom are the only parties to have signed

the dual agency agreement.

The dual agency agreement did not purport to bind

the defendant nor did it refer to the defendant, who

was neither a signatory to the dual agency agreement

nor a title holder to the property. The defendant also

submitted the ‘‘Exclusive Right to Represent Buyer or

Tenant Authorization’’ form, which appoints William

Raveis Real Estate as the plaintiff’s exclusive real estate

Broker. This form was signed by the plaintiff and Hanley

acting on behalf of William Raveis Real Estate. The

defendant was neither named in nor a signatory to this

form. In addition, the defendant offered the partial

deposition transcript of the plaintiff, wherein the plaintiff acknowledged that he never had entered into a

contract with the defendant, nor was the defendant his

real estate agent.4

As the court properly concluded, the documentary

evidence attached to the defendant’s motion for summary judgment demonstrated that there was no genuine

issue of material fact that the parties were not in privity

of contract, and, therefore, the burden was shifted to

the plaintiff to demonstrate that his allegations were

supported by at least some proof. See Marinos v. Poirot,

308 Conn. 706, 715, 66 A.3d 860 (2013). To meet his

burden by showing a genuine issue of material fact
existed as to whether the parties were in privity of

contract, the plaintiff filed an objection to the motion

and an affidavit that purportedly supported the allegations in his complaint.

In his affidavit, the plaintiff averred that at the time

he signed the dual agency agreement, he believed that

the defendant was in control of the real estate office

and would supervise his real estate agent, Hanley; at

one meeting, the defendant conducted all negotiations,

which concerned the contract dispute between the

plaintiff and the seller; the plaintiff’s agent had to run

everything by the defendant; and the defendant made

affirmative representations concerning the seller’s

financial status to him.5

In his objection to the motion

for summary judgment, the plaintiff argued that, as

alleged in his complaint and supported by his affidavit,

the circumstances surrounding the signing of the dual

agency agreement and the actions of the defendant

subsequent to the plaintiff’s signing the dual agency

agreement raised the same factual issue as to whether

the defendant was acting on behalf of the plaintiff in

the real estate transaction.6

The plaintiff’s submissions, however, fail to demonstrate the existence of a genuine issue of material fact

as to whether the parties were in privity of contract.

‘‘After the [defendant’s] submission, the plaintiff’s

[m]ere assertion of fact became insufficient to establish

the existence of a material fact, and, therefore, [could]

notrefute [the] evidence properly presented to the court

by the [defendant].’’(Internal quotation marks omitted.)

Id. Therefore, the court properly granted summary judgment on these two counts.

B

We next consider whether the court erred in granting

the defendant’s motion for summary judgment on count

three, alleging fraud, and count four, alleging a CUTPA

violation. The plaintiff claims that the court improperly

granted summary judgment on counts three and four

because he presented sufficient evidence to show the

existence of a genuine issue of material fact as to

whether the statutes of limitations were tolled by the

continuing course of conduct doctrine.7 We disagree.

We begin by setting forth the legal principles relevant

to the issue before us. ‘‘Summary judgment may be

granted where the claim is barred by the statute of

limitations.’’ Doty v. Mucci, 238 Conn. 800, 806, 679

A.2d 945 (1996). With respect to count three, alleging

fraud, and count four, alleging a CUTPA violation, the

applicable statutes of limitations are three years pursuant to §§ 52-5778 and 42- 110g (f),9

respectively. See

Krondes v. Norwalk Savings Society, 53 Conn. App.

102, 113, 728 A.2d 1103 (1999). As a general rule, the

statute of limitations begins to run on the date of the

act or omission complained of or when the conduct of
the defendant occurs. Certain Underwriters at Lloyd’s,

London v. Cooperman, 289 Conn. 383, 408, 957 A.2d

836 (2008).

‘‘Nonetheless, [w]hen the wrong sued upon consists

of a continuing course of conduct, the statute does not

begin to run until that course of conduct is completed.

. . . [I]n order [t]o support a finding of a continuing

course of conduct that may toll the statute of limitations

there must be evidence of the breach of a duty that

remained in existence after commission of the original

wrong related thereto. That duty must not have terminated prior to commencement of the period allowed

for bringing an action for such a wrong. . . . Where

[our Supreme Court has] upheld a finding that a duty

continued to exist after the cessation of the act or

omission relied upon, there has been evidence of either

a special relationship between the parties giving rise

to such a continuing duty or some later wrongful conduct of a defendant related to the prior act.’’ (Internal

quotation marks omitted.) Haas v. Haas, 137 Conn.

App. 424, 433, 48 A.3d 713 (2012).

The plaintiff claims that the court erred in failing to

consider the evidence presented in his affidavit that

supports his contention that the wrong committed by

the defendant consisted of a continuing course of conduct, which tolled the statutes of limitations until he

discovered the true facts of the seller’s financial situation. The wrong alleged by the plaintiff in counts three

and four arises from statements of the defendant that

she could obtain financing for the plaintiff, encouraging

the plaintiff to stay in the deal when he expressed a

desire to withdraw and failing to disclose the seller’s

financial difficulty. We are not persuaded by the plaintiff’s claim.

In concluding that counts three and four were barred

by the applicable three year statutes of limitations, the

court expressly noted: ‘‘In his deposition transcript,

the plaintiff admits that the last time he spoke to the

defendant was in a meeting in July of 2008. The plaintiff

failed to provide any evidence showing that he had

contact with the defendant after the meeting in July,

2008.’’ Also there was ‘‘no allegation in the complaint

nor [was] there any evidence provided by the plaintiff

that the defendant committed some wrongful act after

July, 2008.’’ ‘‘Based on these undisputed facts, the tortious conduct must have occurred in or before July,

2008. The latest the plaintiff could have brought a fraud

claim and a CUTPA claim against the defendant, therefore, was in July, 2011. The plaintiff did not file this

action until October 5, 2012, more than a year outside

the three year statutes of limitations.’’

In considering whether the statutes of limitations

were tolled by the continuing course of conduct doctrine, we agree with the court that the defendant made

the required showing that the parties were not in privity
of contract.10 We also agree with the court’s conclusion

that there was ‘‘no evidence of a special relationship

between the plaintiff and the defendant that would toll

the statutes of limitations under the continuing course

of conduct doctrine.’’11 In the absence of a special relationship between the parties, the statutes of limitations

were not tolled by the continuing course of conduct

doctrine. Accordingly, counts three and four were

barred by the three year statutes of limitations. We,

therefore, conclude that the court properly granted

summary judgment on these two counts.

The judgment is affirmed.

In this opinion the other judges concurred.

1 Pursuant to the website for the Department of Consumer Protection: ‘‘If

a real estate agent working on the sale of a particular home also represents

a client who might be interested in buying that home, by law, the agent

must provide both the seller and the potential buyer with a ‘Dual Agency

Consent Agreement’ form to sign.’’ Department of Consumer Protection,

‘‘Dual Agency,’’ (last modified April 12, 2012), available at http://www.ct.gov/

dcp/cwp/view.asp?q=502404 (last visited December 29, 2016); see also Regs.,

Conn. State Agencies § 20–325d–2 (b)(i)(‘‘[a]real estate broker orreal estate

salesperson, when acting as a dual agent, shall make a written disclosure of

dual agency to all parties by using the dual agency consent agreement’’).

2 After the plaintiff did not file a new pleading, the defendant filed a motion

for judgment requesting that judgment be rendered in her favor upon the

stricken fifth count of the complaint pursuant to Practice Book § 10-44. On

September 8, 2015, the court, Brazzel-Massaro, J., granted the defendant’s

motion for judgment.

3 We note with approval the trial court’s determination that count five

failed to set forth sufficiently a breach of contract action because it ‘‘merely

alleged that ‘[t]he actions of the [d]efendant’ constituted a breach of the

oral contract. Count five, therefore, included no allegation specifying what

provision of the oral contract was violated.’’ As established by our case law,

‘‘[m]ere conclusions of law, without factual support, are not enough to

survive a motion to strike.’’ Keller v. Beckenstein, 117 Conn. App. 550, 565,

979 A.2d 1055, cert. denied, 294 Conn. 913, 983 A.2d 274 (2009).

4 The following exchange occurred between the plaintiff and the defendant’s counsel at the plaintiff’s deposition:

‘‘Q. . . . Did you ever enter into a contract with [the defendant]?

‘‘A. In light of you right now today going over this with me, her name is

not on here, so I don’t have a contract with [the defendant], based on these

two documents.

* * *

‘‘Q. But we agreed before that you don’t actually have a contract with

[the defendant]?

‘‘A. Right. We agreed after you brought to my attention [that the defendant’s] name is not on there, therefore, I wouldn’t have a contract with

[the defendant].’’

5 Specifically, the plaintiff asserts that the defendant contacted the plaintiff

to persuade him to finance the property through a construction loan. After

declining to take out a construction loan, the plaintiff asked the defendant if

the seller had sufficient resources to complete the project and the defendant

replied that the seller had no financial issues. In reliance on the defendant’s

statement, the plaintiff advanced moneys and materials to the seller. Shortly

thereafter, the seller failed to complete the contract and caused the plaintiff

to lose all the moneys and materials he had advanced to the seller. The

plaintiff contends, therefore, that the defendant’s affirmative actions

imposed an obligation to keep the plaintiff informed of the seller’s financial situation.

6 As discussed previously, the plaintiff identified two actions of the defendant to support his contention that the parties were in privity of contract.

First, the court found that, at the time the plaintiff signed the contract, he

believed that ‘‘the defendant was in control of the real estate office, in

control of the agent that represented the plaintiff, and that the defendant

was also acting on behalf of the plaintiff.’’ Next, the plaintiff argues that

the actions of the defendant, in conducting negotiations at one meeting that
concerned the contract dispute between the plaintiff and the seller and the

fact that the plaintiff’s agent had to run everything by the defendant, raised

factual issues as to whether the defendant was acting on behalf of the

plaintiff.

7 The plaintiff does not claim that the continuing course of conduct doctrine applies due to some later wrongful conduct related to the initial wrongful act or omission. Therefore, we limit our review to whether the court

properly granted summary judgment in concluding that the statutes of limitations were not tolled by the continuing course of conduct doctrine because

there was no special relationship between the parties. Brusby v. Metropolitan District, 160 Conn. App. 638, 662, 127 A.3d 257 (2015).

8 General Statutes § 52-577 provides: ‘‘No action founded upon a tort shall

be brought but within three years from the date of the act or omission

complained of.’’

9 General Statutes § 42-110g (f) provides: ‘‘An action under this section

may not be brought more than three years after the occurrence of a violation

of this chapter.’’

10 As best as we can discern, all of the plaintiff’s claims as to the tolling

of the statutes of limitations rest on a theory that a continuing duty arose

from the special relationship between the parties, thus creating a privity of

contract between the parties. We have concluded in part II A of this opinion

that the court properly determined that there was no genuine issue of

material fact as to whether privity of contract existed between the plaintiff

and the defendant.

11 To the extent that the plaintiff referenced other claims that he and the

defendant were in a special relationship, his brief does not support this

contention. ‘‘It is well settled that [w]e are not required to review claims

that are inadequately briefed. . . . We consistently have held that [a]nalysis,

rather than mere abstract assertion, is required in order to avoid abandoning

an issue by failure to brief the issue properly. . . . [F]or this court judiciously and efficiently to consider claims of error raised on appeal . . . the

parties must clearly and fully set forth their arguments in their briefs. We

do not reverse the judgment of a trial court on the basis of challenges to

its rulings that have not been adequately briefed. . . . The parties may not

merely cite a legal principle without analyzing the relationship between the

facts of the case and the law cited. Assignments of error which are merely

mentioned but not briefed beyond a mere statement of the claim will be

deemed abandoned and will not be reviewed by this court.’’ (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Lucarelli v. Freedom of Information

Commission, 136 Conn. App. 405, 407 n.1, 46 A.3d 937, cert. denied, 307

Conn. 907, 53 A.3d 222 (2012). Accordingly, to the extent that the plaintiff

has inadequately attempted to challenge the court’s determination that no

special relationship existed between the plaintiff and the defendant that

would toll the statutes of limitations under the continuing course of conduct

doctrine, we deem such claims abandoned and decline to review them

on appeal.