DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA

FOURTH DISTRICT

TROY W. KLEIN,

Appellant,

v.

ALAN D. ROMAN and DEBORAH W. ROMAN,

Appellees.

Nos. 4D15-4783 and 16-1880

[September 6, 2017]

Consolidated appeals from the Circuit Court for the Fifteenth Judicial 

Circuit, Palm Beach County; Scott Suskauer, Judge; L.T. Case No. 

2008DR001975XXXXMB.

Troy W. Klein of Law Office of Troy W. Klein, P.A., West Palm Beach, 

pro se.

Jeffrey S. D'Amore and Rosemarie W. Guerini of D'Amore Law Firm, 

P.A., Palm Beach Gardens, for appellee Alan D. Roman.

Jill G. Weiss of Jill G. Weiss, P.A., Palm Beach Gardens, for appellee 

Deborah W. Roman.

FORST, J.

Appellant Troy Klein makes several arguments on appeal related to the 

trial court’s order granting Appellee Alan Roman’s motion to release 

Appellant’s charging lien and award sanctions. We write only to address 

two of Appellant’s arguments on appeal: (1) whether the trial court erred 

by awarding attorney’s fees to Appellee without eliciting the testimony of 

an independent expert, and (2) whether the court erred by failing to

expressly apply the “lodestar” method to calculate those fees. We find the 

first argument meritless, but reverse the second. We affirm all other issues 

on appeal without discussion. 

Background

Appellant was the attorney for Appellee’s former wife in a dissolution of 

marriage proceeding. Because of unpaid attorney’s fees owed under a 
2

contract with Appellee’s former wife, Appellant filed a notice of charging 

lien asserting an interest in the former wife’s two homes. However, as part 

of the marital settlement agreement, Appellee received one of the 

properties.

When Appellee sought to sell that property, he learned of the lien and

sent a letter to Appellant demanding a release, to no avail. Appellee 

subsequently filed a motion to release the lien and award sanctions. The 

trial court held a hearing at which Appellee’s counsel testified regarding 

the amount of attorney’s fees he incurred in the effort to have the lien 

removed. Counsel submitted an affidavit detailing his hourly rate, the 

number of hours worked, and the type of work he had done. 

The trial court granted Appellee’s motion, and ordered Appellant to 

release the charging lien and to pay Appellee $5,146.50 in attorney’s fees. 

Afterwards, Appellant submitted a motion for rehearing, making almost all

the same arguments he now makes on appeal. The trial court denied the 

motion. 

Analysis

“The standard of review of an award of attorneys’ fees is abuse of 

discretion.” Diwakar v. Montecito Palm Beach Condo. Ass’n., 143 So. 3d 

958, 960 (Fla. 4th DCA 2014). The award must be supported by 

competent, substantial evidence. Id.

Appellant first argues that the trial court’s award of attorney’s fees was 

erroneous given that Appellee “failed to present any independent expert 

testimony regarding the reasonableness of the attorney’s fees being sought 

despite the well-established legal requirement to do so.” We need not 

consider the merits of Appellant’s argument, as it was unpreserved. 

Appellant failed to make a timely, contemporaneous objection at the fee 

hearing regarding Appellee’s failure to provide independent expert 

testimony. See San Pedro v. Law Office of Paul Burkhart, 168 So. 3d 299, 

300 (Fla. 4th DCA 2015) (“To the extent that Appellants now contest the 

admission of the exhibits and the lack of testimony, those arguments were 

waived when Appellants failed to object at the hearing.”); Diwakar, 143 So. 

3d at 960 (“To the extent Diwakar argues on appeal that the attorneys’ fee 

award was erroneous in the absence of testimony from a fees expert plus 

the attorney who performed the work, the argument was waived when 

Diwakar failed to object at trial.”); DM Records, Inc. v. Turnpike Commercial 

Plaza, Phase II, Condo. Ass’n, 894 So. 2d 1030, 1031 (Fla. 4th DCA 2005) 

(“If we were to allow these issues to be raised for the first time on appeal, 
3

where there was no objection in trial court, it would be unfair to the party 

seeking fees and the trial judge and result in unnecessary appeals.”). 

Even if the issue had been preserved, Section 61.16(1), Florida Statutes

(2016), appears to control, given the nature of the underlying case from 

which this award of attorney’s fees stems.1 Under that statute, “[a]n 

application for attorney’s fees, suit money, or costs, whether temporary or 

otherwise, shall not require corroborating expert testimony in order to 

support an award under this chapter.” § 61.16(1), Fla. Stat. (2015)

(emphasis added). 

Although we affirm the first issue, we reverse the second. As both 

parties correctly recognize, the trial court erred by failing to expressly 

apply the lodestar method when calculating the amount of attorney’s fees 

in its order. “It is well-settled that an award of attorney’s fees must . . . 

contain express findings regarding the number of hours reasonably 

expended and a reasonable hourly rate for the type of litigation involved.” 

Simhoni v. Chambliss, 843 So. 2d 1036, 1037 (Fla. 4th DCA 2003). There,

because the trial court failed to include an express lodestar calculation, 

we reversed and remanded for the trial court to enter a new written order 

containing the necessary calculation. Id. We do the same here. We also 

note, as we did in Simhoni, that “[t]he court need not hold a new evidentiary 

hearing if it is able to enter a written order from its notes or a transcript 

of the original fees hearing.” Id. Appellee’s counsel’s affidavit detailing

why he charged $5,146.50 in fees should enable the court to enter a new 

written order without holding a new hearing.

Conclusion

Because the trial court failed to expressly calculate its attorney’s fees 

award by way of the lodestar method, we reverse and remand for the trial 

court to enter a new written order. The trial court’s order is otherwise 

affirmed.

Affirmed in Part, Reversed and Remanded in Part.

GERBER, C.J., and WARNER, J., concur.

* * *

Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.

1 Chapter 61 governs the award of attorney’s fees in dissolution of marriage, 

support, and time-sharing cases.