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******************************************************STATE OF CONNECTICUT v. DWIGHT DICKERSON (AC 35725)
Beach, Sheldon and Norcott, Js. Argued May 21—officially released July 22, 2014 (Appeal from Superior Court, judicial district of New Haven, geographical area number twenty-three, Lager, J. [judgment]; Holden, J. [motion for exemption].)
S. Max Simmons, with whom was Diane Polan, for the appellant (defendant).
James M. Ralls, assistant state’s attorney, with whom, on the brief, were Michael Dearington, state’s attorney, and Mary A. SanAngelo, senior assistant state’s attorney, for the appellee (state).Opinion SHELDON, J. The defendant, Dwight Dickerson, appeals from the judgment of the trial court denying his motion for exemption from lifetime registration on the Connecticutsexoffenderregistryonthegroundthat the statutory scheme imposing the lifetime registration requirementuponhimviolateshisrightsundertheequal protectionclauses oftheUnited Statesand Connecticut constitutions. The defendant claims initially that the challenged statutes violate the fourteenth amendment to the United States constitution by differentiating, without a rational basis, between himself and others like him who have been convicted of sexual assault in theseconddegreeinviolationofGeneralStatutes § 53a71 (a) (2),1whichisstatutorilycategorizedasa‘‘sexually violentoffense’’forwhichlifetimesexoffenderregistration is required, and persons who have been convicted of other forms of sexual assault in the second degree which have not been so characterized, and thus for which sex offender registration is limited to a period of ten years. As his fallback position, the defendant argues that even ifthe statutorily mandated difference in registration requirements survives his federal equal protectionchallengebecauseitisfoundtobesupported by a rational basis, it must nonetheless be struck down under what he claims to be the heightened standard of review applicable to equal protection challenges under article first, § 20, of the Connecticut constitution, as amended by articles five and twenty-one of the amendments.
The state disagrees, arguing first that there is indeed

arationalbasisforrequiringlifetime sex offenderregistration for persons convicted ofviolent second degree sexual assaults, while imposing a shorter registration perioduponpersonsconvictedofotherformsofsecond degree sexual assault. Therefore, it argues, because the defendant cannot establish that his state equal protection challenge to the sex offender registration statutes is subject to review under ahigher standard ofscrutiny than his federal equal protection challenge to those statutes, both challenges must be rejected because the differential treatment authorized by those statutes is supported by a factual basis. We agree with the state, and thus affirm the judgment of the trial court.
The following procedural history, as set forth by the court, is relevant to our resolution of this claim: ‘‘The [defendant] pleaded guilty to one count of sexual assault in the second degree undertheAlford doctrine2 and two counts of fourth degree sexual assault. The trial court imposed sentence on December 14, 1994. The court sentenced the [defendant] to eight years incarceration suspended after serving four years, to be followed by five years of probation. The court sentencedthe [defendant] toaoneyearperiodofincarceration on each count of fourth degree sexual assault foratotal effective sentence ofeightyears suspended after four years incarceration and five years probation.

. . . ‘‘While incarcerated [the defendant] was a model inmate. He had no disciplinary actions taken against him. Whileinprisonhetookadvantage ofvirtuallyevery opportunity available to him, including sex offender classes, a course in life planning skills, basic and advanced courses in nonviolent conflict resolution, a
course in anger and aggression, two religious courses given by the Prison Fellowship, and the Emmaus Bible Correspondence Course. He took two classes offered by Asnuntuck [Community] College (with a 3.5 GPA). He worked as an assistant teacher in the GED course in Cheshire Correctional Institution and as a math instructor in Osborn Correctional Institution, and his supervisors have recommended him very highly.
‘‘In 1996, after serving two years of his original four year sentence, [the defendant] was paroled directly to his family, pursuant to the trial court’s order, after having been approved by his treatment provider to live with his young children. [The defendant] successfully completed five years of probation. Since [his] release in 1996

. . . he has not been arrested or otherwise involved with the criminal justice system. He also continued to seek treatment for his behavioral issues. He successfully completed five years ofsex offender treatment with the Center for the Treatment ofProblem Sexual Behavior in Middletown. While in the program he took and passed three polygraph tests and also had his home computer searched multipletimesforinappropriate material, andnonewas
ever found.
‘‘From 2002 to 2007, [the defendant] paid for and received private counseling. His clinical therapist attested that [the defendant] ‘has accomplished successful control of his prior adjustment issues.’ He has also soughtouteducational opportunities athis church; in 1999, he completedacourse inparentingadolescents at the Church on the Rock. ‘‘[The defendant] has also had a successful working

career since his release from incarceration. From 1997 to 2003 he worked as a machinist for Moroso, GKN Westland Aerospace, and AMTEC, learning to work on computerized numerical control machines. In 2003 he joined Sikorsky Aircraft as a multimachine specialist; in2009hebecamefinalassemblymechanicalinspector, inspecting helicopters before they are deliveredto military or civilian customers. He has had no disciplinary issues at work, has been continuously employed at Sikorskysince 2003, andhasbeenhighlyrecommended by his supervisor. ‘‘[The defendant] has made extraordinary efforts to obtain higher education since [his] release. In January, 2004, he began taking classes at Albertus Magnus Col-lege in New Haven, where he had a 3.7 GPA. In 2005, hebecame anondegree studentatYale University; after

one year, he was admitted to the degree program. He attended Yale while working full-time at Sikorsky and while supportinghistwo childrenthrough college. [The defendant] graduated from Yale in 2010 with a B.A. in sociology and a focus on urban studies; his GPA was 3.23. In the fall of 2011, he began a master’s program in sociology at Southern Connecticut State University while continuing to work full-time. ‘‘[The defendant] actively participates in and contributes to his community. Since his release, he has been

an active member of first the Kingdom Life Christian Church in Milford and then the Church on the Rock in New Haven. He has been highly recommended by the pastors ofbothchurches. Heplays keyboardsandtrumpet in his church’s band and is an active musician in the community, givingvolunteerperformancesatEmergency Shelter Management Services in New Haven and at the Seacrest Retirement Center in West Haven. In 2008, he helped establish a summer scholarship program atthe Neighborhood Music School in New Haven. ‘‘Further, the facts reveal that [the defendant] is also the founder and CEO ofTri-Cord, an organization dedicatedtoprovidingtoolstoformerlyincarceratedpeople to help them become successful. He does motivational speaking based on his own challenges and successes. [The defendant] is an active member ofthe New Haven Reentry Roundtable and a respected spokesperson for formerly incarcerated people. On May 7, 2012, the Connecticut Department of Correction granted [the defendant] direct access to DOC facilities as a ‘VIP Professional Partner.’ On May 11, 2012, the Judicial Branch notified him that Tri-Cord had been selected to provide training services related to family matters and the criminal system. ‘‘Prominent members of the community offered letters ofsupportforthe [defendant]. BishopJayRamirez, senior pastor of Kingdom Life Christian Church in Milford, Connecticut, stated in a letter of support, ‘In this line ofworkI hearso much garbage and so manypromisesto change. Too oftenit simplynevercomes topass. From time [to time] I have the privilege ofparticipating in someone’s genuine conversion or restoration. [The defendant] is one of these people.’

. . . ‘‘The lifetime sex offender registration requirement has imposed numerous significant hardships on [the defendant]. He has been unable to find employment commensurate with his skills and education. He has been denied interviews for supervisory and managementpositions at Sikorsky, andforthe company’s leadership training program despite having a completely clean personnel file, several years of experience, and

an outstanding education. He has been unable to find temporary jobs as a machinist despite his experienceand skills. He has also suffered harassment from coworkers. In2008, [thedefendant] appliedforapardon but was denied by the Board of Pardons and Paroles, despitehissuccessfulrehabilitationandmanycontributions to the community. The board cited his status as
a registered sex offender as the reason for denying his application.’’ (Citation omitted; footnote omitted.) On February 3, 2012, the defendant filed a motion for exemptionfromlifetimeregistrationontheConnecticut

sex offender registry. The court heard argument on the defendant’s motion on September 11, 2012, and subsequently denied the defendant’s motion, issuing an accompanying memorandum ofdecision dated May 10, 2013, from which this appeal followed.
We begin our analysis of the defendant’s claim, as didthetrialcourt,withareviewoftherelevantstatutory authority governing motions for exemption from the

sex offender registry, as set forth in General Statutes § 54-251 (b) and (c), and of the history of the sex offender registration requirements, as codified in General Statutes § 54-250 through 54-261, also known as Megan’s Law. ‘‘The legislature enacted [Megan’s Law] to protect the public from sex offenders

. . . . The requirementtoregisteras [a] sexoffenderisregulatory, rather than punitive, in nature

. . . . ‘‘[As our] Supreme Court has observed, the goal of Megan’s Law

. . . is to alert the public by identifying potential sexual offender recidivists when necessary for public safety.

. . . This goal is accomplished by requiringpersons convictedofcertainoffensestoregisterwith the [Commissioner ofEmergency Services and Public Protection] and by mandating disclosure ofthat registry to the public.
‘‘The law designates four classes of offenses: (1) the victim is a minor or the sexual offense is nonviolent; General Statutes § 54-251; (2) the sexual offense is violent; General Statutes § 54-252; (3) the sexual offense

wascommittedinanotherjurisdiction; GeneralStatutes § 54-253; or (4) the felony was committed for a sexual purpose. General Statutes § 54-254. Our Supreme Court [has held]

. . . that [o]nly under the last classification is the trial court given discretion whether to impose the registration requirement

. . . we did not explain the basis for that conclusion. The text of the statutory scheme, however, makesthatdistinctionclear. Thefirst three provisions provide that a defendant shall register

. . . . ‘‘[Before the trial court, the defendant did] not challenge the factual underpinnings that form the basis for mandatory registration under § 54-250 et seq.; neither [was] there any dispute that the applicable language of this statute is cast in mandatory terms. The obligation to register as a sex offender is triggered by the entry of the judgment of conviction(s) of predicate sexual offenses.

. . . The [defendant did] not claim exemp-tion pursuant to any exception under § 54-250. Absent that, ourregistration scheme does not authorize orprovide for individualized assessment nor offer the registrant the opportunity to demonstrate rehabilitation or shorten [his or her] registration requirement.’’ (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.)
I
FEDERAL EQUAL PROTECTION CHALLENGE
Thedefendantwasconvictedofseconddegreesexual assault under § 53a-71 (a) (2) for engaging in sexual intercourse with a victim who was ‘‘mentally defective to the extent that [she] was unable to consent to such sexual intercourse.’’ The challenged statutes, particularly § 54-250 (11),3 categorize that offense as a ‘‘sexually violent offense,’’ and thereby require, pursuant to § 54-252 (a),4 that persons convicted of that offense register as sex offenders for life. The defendant first claims that the court erred in finding that the lifetime registration requirement does not violate his right to equal protection of the laws under the fourteenth amendment to the United States constitution. Specifically, he argues that the court was unable to articulate anyrationalbasisforestablishingdifferentsexoffender registration requirements for those who commit different forms of second degree sexual assaults. The state claims, to the contrary, that there is indeed a rational basis for imposing different sex offender registration requirementsuponthosewho commitdifferenttypes of second degree sexual assault, and thus thatthe lifetime registration requirement imposed upon the defendant for his conviction of a violent sexual assault does not violate his right to equal protection of the law under the federal constitution. We agree with the state.
The question ofwhether the application ofthe statutory scheme imposing sex offender registration upon the defendant violates his equal protection rights is a question of law over which we have plenary review. See State v. Long, 268 Conn. 508, 530, 847 A.2d 862 (en banc), cert. denied, 543 U.S. 969, 125 S. Ct. 424, 160 L. Ed. 2d 340 (2004). The equal protection clause of the fourteenthamendmenttotheUnitedStatesconstitution provides that no state shall ‘‘deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.’’ U.S. Const., amend. XIV, § 1. ‘‘[T]he concept ofequalprotection

. . . has been traditionally viewed as requiring the uniformtreatment ofpersons standinginthe same relation to the governmental action questioned or challenged.

. . . Conversely, the equal protection clause places no restrictions on the state’s authority to treat dissimilar persons in a dissimilar manner.

. . . Thus, [t]o implicate the equal protection [clause]

. . . it is necessary that the state statute

. . . in question, either

on its face or in practice, treat persons standing in the

same relation to it differently.

. . . [Accordingly], the analytical predicate [of an equal protection claim] is adetermination of who are the persons [purporting to be] similarly situated.

. . . The similarly situated inquiry focuses on whether the [defendant is] similarly situatedtoanothergroupforpurposesofthechallenged government action.

. . . Thus, [t]his initial inquiry is not whether persons are similarly situated for all purposes, but whether they are similarly situated for purposes of the law challenged.’’ (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Kerrigan v. CommissionerofPublicHealth, 289 Conn. 135, 157–58, 957 A.2d 407 (2008).
‘‘To determinewhetheraparticularclassificationviolates the guarantees ofequalprotection, the court must considerthe character ofthe classification; the individual interests affected bythe classification; and the governmental interests asserted in support of the classification.

. . . Where, as here, the classification at issue neither impinges upon a fundamental right nor affects a suspect group it will withstand constitutional attack if the distinction is founded on a rational basis.

. . . Rational basis review is satisfied so long as there is a plausible policy reason for the classification

. . . . [I]t is irrelevant whether the conceivable basis for the challenged distinction actually motivated the legislature.’’ (Citationsomitted; internalquotationmarksomitted.) State v. Morales, 240 Conn. 727, 739, 694 A.2d 758 (1997). ‘‘Rational basis review demands only that the challengedclassificationberationallyrelatedto alegitimate government interest.

. . . A party challenging a law under rational basis review bears the burden of proving that the law’s class-based distinctions are wholly irrational.’’ (Citation omitted.) State v. Dyous, 307 Conn. 299, 317, 53 A.3d 153 (2012).
The defendant here claims that the statutory scheme at issue treats differently individuals who have been convicted of second degree sexual assault for committingviolent offenses andthose who similarlyhave been convicted of second degree sexual assault, but whose offenses are categorized as offenses against minors or nonviolent offenses. Specifically, he claims that becausethe statutoryscheme requires lifetime registration for violent offenders, but only a ten year registration requirement for offenses against minors and nonviolent offenders, it violates his right to equal protection ofthe law under the United States constitution. The state argues, to the contrary, that the defendant’s claim is flawed because there are no sexual assaults— and thus no registration requirements—that are designated as having been committed solely against adult victims. Rather, it claims that the statutory scheme at issue in this case applies to offenses committed against both adult and minor victims alike.5 We agree. It is undisputed that the statutory scheme imposing

sex offender registration requirements neither affects

a suspect group nor implicates a fundamental right forthepurposes ofthe federal equalprotection clause, and therefore mustbe analyzedunderrationalbasis review. Furthermore, we conclude that the defendant is similarly situated, for the purpose of the statutory scheme at issue in his equal protection challenge, to those who have been convicted of nonviolent second degree sexual assaults. Thus, we turn to whetherthere is aplausible policy reason for this classification.
Inthepresentcase, wehaveno difficultyinascertaining a rational basis for the disparate treatment in the statutorylifetime sex offenderregistrationrequirement for those who have been convicted of violent second degree sexual assaults as compared to the ten year registration requirement for those who have been convicted ofnonviolent second degree sexual assaults. We agree with the court’s assessment and finding that a rational basis exists for the differentiation in registration requirements between violent and nonviolent second degree sexual assault offenders.
The courtexplained, ‘‘[i]tiswellestablishedthat [t]he legislature enacted [Megan’s Law] to protect the public from sex offenders.

. . . [T]he lifetime registration requirement for those convicted of sexually violent offenses reflects an effort to target those sex offenders who engage in particularly predatory conduct. While the defendantcontendsthatthe applicationoftheregistration requirements could lead to inequitable results in certain situations, it is not the role of the judiciary to second-guess the legislature. Although there may be other, perhaps even better, options available to the legislature to accomplish its legitimate objectives, rational basis review affords great deference to legislative choices and does not authorize this courtto substitute its judgment, or that of the [defendant], for that of this state’s elected representatives, as long as the classifications drawn by the legislature are reasonable.

. . . [E]qual protection is not a license for courts to judge the wisdom, fairness, or logic of legislative choices.

. . . Rational basis review is satisfied [as] long asthere is aplausiblepolicyreasonforthe classification

. . . . [I]t is irrelevant whether the conceivable basis for the challenged distinction actually motivated the legislature.

. . . To succeed, the party challenging the legislation must negative every conceivable basis which might support it.’’ (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.)
We conclude that the defendant has failed to demonstrate that there is no rational basis for the difference between the registration requirements for those convicted of violent second degree sexual assaults and those convicted of nonviolent second degree sexual assaults.6 Requiring lifetime sex offender registration for those who have been convicted of violent second degree sexual assaults is rationally related to the government’s legitimate interest in protecting the publicfrom sex offenders whose actions demonstrate a willingness to use force or the threat offorce to overcome the will ofvictims who have not expressed consent to engage in sexual intercourse—and inthis case, avictim who was not even capable of expressing such consent byreasonofmentaldefect.Accordingly,thedefendant’s federal equal protection challenge must be rejected.
II
STATE EQUAL PROTECTION CHALLENGE
The defendant’s fallback argument is that even ifhis federal equal protection challenge does not survive rational basis review, the equalprotection clause ofthe Connecticut constitution provides an independent and greater basis to support his claim because it requires heightened review. The state argues that although the defendant raises a claim under the state constitution, he does not demonstrate thatthe state equalprotection clause provides any additional protection or that his claim is subject to heightened review thereunder. We agree with the state that the defendant’s equal protection challenge under the Connecticut constitution also must be rejected because he has not established that his claim is subjectto heightened review, oris different in any other material respect from his federal equal protection challenge.
The equal protection clause of the Connecticut constitution, article first, § 20, as amended by articles five andtwenty-oneoftheamendments,providesinrelevant part that ‘‘[n]o person shall be denied the equal protection of the law

. . . .’’7 ‘‘It is well established that federal constitutional and statutory law establishes a minimum national standard for the exercise ofindividual rights and does not inhibit state governments from affording higher levels of protection for such rights.

. . . [Hence], although we often rely on the United States Supreme Court’s interpretation of the amendments to the constitution ofthe United States to delineate the boundaries ofthe protections provided by the constitution of Connecticut, we have also recognized that, in some instances, our state constitution provides protections beyond those provided by the federal constitution, as that document has been interpreted by the United States Supreme Court.

. . . The analytical framework by which we determine whether, in any given instance, our state constitution affords broader protectionto ourcitizensthanthefederalconstitutional minimum is well settled.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.)Statev. Wade, 297 Conn. 262, 286–87, 998A.2d 1114 (2010). ‘‘[I]n State v. Geisler, 222 Conn. 672, 685, 610 A.2d 1225 (1992), we set forth six factors that, to the extent applicable, are to be considered in construing the contours of our state constitution so that we may reach reasonedandprincipledresultsastoitsmeaning. Thesefactors are: (1) the text of the operative constitutional provision; (2) holdings and dicta of this court and the Appellate Court; (3) persuasive and relevant federal precedent; (4) persuasive sister state decisions; (5) the historyofthe operative constitutionalprovision, including the historical constitutional setting and the debates of the framers; and (6) contemporary economic and sociological considerations, including relevant public policies.’’ Kerrigan v. Commissioner ofPublicHealth, supra, 289 Conn. 157. The defendant claims that the fourth, fifth and sixth Geisler factors weigh in favor of

a more expansive reading ofthe state equal protection guarantee, andthus supporthis argumentthatthe court erred in finding that his right to equal protection ofthe lawunderthe Connecticutconstitutionwasnotviolated by imposing the lifetime sex offender registration requirement upon him. We will consider each Geisler factorinturnto determinewhetherthe equalprotection clause of the Connecticut constitution affords greater protection to claimants than its federal counterpart.
With regard to the first Geisler factor—the text of the operative state and federal constitutional provisions—the court noted that ‘‘the defendant acknowledge[d] that the text of the equal protection clause of the Connecticut constitution is very similar to [that of] the federal equal protection clause and is therefore not particularly instructive in the present case.’’ Indeed, on appeal, the defendant stated in his briefthat ‘‘[t]he text of article first, § 20, is substantively identical to that of the Fourteenth Amendment, so the first Geisler factor does not come into play.’’ Although the defendant argues that the first factor is thus inapplicable to this court’s analysis, we conclude that it is not onlyrelevant tothatanalysis, butsupportive ofthe court’sconclusion that the equal protection guarantee set forth in the Connecticut constitution is the same as that set forth in the United States constitution.
The defendant claims as well that the second and third Geisler factors—the holdings and dicta of our Supreme Court and this court, as well as persuasive and relevant federalprecedent—‘‘do not applybecause

no Connecticut or federal court appears to have addressed th[is] specific question

. . . .’’ Here, once again, although the defendant argues that the second andthirdfactorsareinapplicabletothe court’sanalysis,

we find that the lack of Connecticut and federal precedent on this issue actually demonstrates that Connecticut’s equal protection provision affords no greater protection to persons bringing state equal protection claims of the sort here presented than federal equal protection claims. The trial court concluded, and we agree, that ‘‘the defendant has not shown that the Geisler factors concerning relevant Connecticut and federal precedent support his argument.’’
The defendant next claims that the fourth Geislerfactor—persuasive sister state decisions—supports his state equalprotection challenge because relevant sister state decisions ‘‘reject unequal treatment for people convicted ofoffensesthatare almostidenticalinnature and severity [to that ofthe defendant].’’ In this regard, the defendant cites to several California cases for the proposition that other jurisdictions have invalidated aspects of sex offender registration laws that create arbitrary distinctions between different classes of offenders. In particular, the defendant claims that in People v. Hofsheier, 37 Cal. 4th 1185, 1207, 129 P.3d 29, 39 Cal. Rptr. 3d 821 (2006), the California Supreme Court held that unequal treatment of defendants who have been convicted of oral copulation with a minor—

an offense that required mandatory registration—and defendants who have been convicted of sexual intercoursewithaminor—anoffensethataffordedthe court discretion whether or not to require registration—violated equal protection because there was no plausible rationale for distinguishingbetweenthese two offenses and their respective registration requirements. He attempts to draw a parallel between Hofsheier and the facts of this case to lend support to his argument that the distinctions between the registration requirements for different forms ofConnecticut’s second degree sexual assaults lack any rational basis. We are not persuaded.
InHofsheier, thetwenty-twoyearolddefendant, who had pleaded guilty to felony oral copulation with a sixteen year old minor, an offense which required mandatory sex offender registration, claimed a federal equal protection violation because the similar offense of unlawful sexual intercourse with a minor was not subject to mandatory registration, but only to registration only atthe court’s discretion. Id., 1192. The courtfound that individuals who were convicted oforal copulation and those who were convicted of sexual intercourse withminorsweresimilarlysituated, andthusconcluded that there was no rational basis for treating the two groups differently. Id., 1200–1207. The ‘‘contrasting treatment ofpersons convicted of oral copulation with minors and those convicted of unlawful sexual intercourse with minors raise[d] the equal protection issue’’ in that case; id., 1198; because ‘‘[t]he only difference betweenthetwo offenses [was] thenature ofthe sexual act.’’ Id., 1200. Although the California sex offender registration statute at issue in Hofsheier distinguished between oral copulation and sexual intercourse with minors for registration purposes, the challenged Connecticut statutes in this case makes no such similar distinction between oral copulation and sexual intercourse for purposes of incarceration, fine or registration, nor do they impose different requirements for one form of second degree sexual assault over the other. Moreover, the California Court of Appeal expressly declined to extend the holding of Hofsheier in Peoplev. Jeha, 187 Cal. App. 4th 1063, 114 Cal. Rptr. 3d 711 (2010), a case factually similar to the present case. In Jeha, the defendant, who was convicted ofsexualpenetration of an unconscious victim, an offense which required mandatory sex offender registration, claimed

anequalprotectionviolationbecausetheallegedlysimilar offenses of sexual or oral penetration of a minor required registration only at the court’s discretion. Id., 1068. Although the defendant in Jeha urged the court ‘‘to find him similarly situated with other defendants whose sex offenses involved consensual participants but whose status as minors rendered them unable to give legal consent’’; id., 1076; the court rejected this argument, reasoning that ‘‘[a] sex offense against an intoxicated or unconscious person is not one that involves a voluntary participant.

. . . The forcible nature of [the] defendant’s sex offense sets him apart from the [defendant] in Hofsheier and following cases in which an equal protection challenge

. . . was sustained.’’ (Citation omitted.) Id., 1076–77. The California Court ofAppeal thus held that there was no equal protectionviolation inJehabecause thevictim inthat case had been unconscious at the time ofthe sexual assault and therefore was unable to consent to penetration. Id. The court in the present case aptly noted that ‘‘the distinction drawn by the Connecticut legislature in requiring those convicted of sexually violent offenses toregisterforlifeisnotarbitrary,’’aswasthedistinction ruled unconstitutional in Hofsheier

. It thus concluded that ‘‘the defendant’s argument pursuant to Hofsheier and its progeny is not persuasive.’’ We agree, and conclude that the fourth Geisler factor does not support the defendant’s state equal protection challenge.
With regard to the fifth Geislerfactor—the history of the operative constitutional provision—the defendant claimsthatourSupreme Court, inKerriganv. CommissionerofPublicHealth, supra, 289 Conn. 141, held that the equalprotection clause ofthe Connecticut constitution provides broader protection to claimants thereunderthanto claimantsunderthefederal equalprotection clause, lending support to his state equal protection challenge. Although the court in Kerrigan found that Connecticut’s equal protection provision guarantees greater protection than its federal counterpart with regard to same sex marriage, that conclusion was reached as a result of the court’s determination that sexual orientationis aquasi-suspect class andthatlaws that treat people differently on that basis are subject to intermediate or heightened scrutiny, rather than rational basis review, to which the defendant’s challenge is subject under the federal equal protection clause. Nowhere inhisbriefdoesthe defendantsuggest that Connecticut’s equal protection analysis under rationalbasis review differs inanywayfromthe federal analysis, orthat historical factors support aheightened review of his present claim. Thus, we conclude thatthe fifth Geisler factor does not lend support to the defendant’s claim for a heightened standard of review

on his state equal protection challenge.
As to the sixth and final Geisler factor—contemporary economic and sociological considerations, including relevant public policy—the defendant claims that because there is an increasing awareness that registration can be unduly harsh to those offenders who pose little risk ofreoffending, this factor weighs in his favor. Specifically, he claimsthatexemptinghimfromlifetime registration would enable him to ‘‘become a contributing member of society

. . . be free ofthe legal restrictions and ongoing harassment that he currently suffers

as a result of registration

. . . [and] help him gain employment more commensurate with his education and qualifications

. . . .’’ The court held, and we agree, that‘‘[t]he defendantfailstotakeinto accountthelegitimate public safety reasons for requiring registration among those convicted of sexually violent offenses,’’ and thus we conclude thatthe sixth Geislerfactor does not lend support to the defendant’s state equal protection challenge.
In sum, we conclude that the court properly found thatnoneoftheGeislerfactorssupportsthedefendant’s claim that heightened scrutiny must be applied to his state equalprotection challenge tothe requirementthat he submit to lifetime registration as a sex offender as
a result of his conviction of second degree sexual assault in violation of § 53a-71 (a) (2). For that reason, because the defendant’s state equal protection challenge, like his federal equal protection challenge, is subject to rational basis review, that challenge must also be rejected for the reasons set forth in part I of this opinion.
The judgment is affirmed.
In this opinion the otherjudges concurred.

1 General Statutes § 53a-71 (a) provides in relevant part: ‘‘A person is guilty of sexual assault in the second degree when such person engages in sexual intercourse with another person and

. . . (2) such other person is mentally defective to the extent that such other person is unable to consent to such sexual intercourse

. . . .’’ We note that although § 53a-71 (a) (2) was amended in 2000; see Public Acts 2000, No. 00-161, § 2; since the time of the defendant’s crime in 1992, that amendment has no bearing on the merits ofthis appeal. In the interest of simplicity, we refer to the current revision of the statute.

2 See North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 37, 91 S. Ct. 160, 27 L. Ed. 2d 162 (1970).

3 General Statutes § 54-250 (11) provides: ‘‘ ‘Sexually violent offense’

means (A) aviolation ofsection 53a-70, except subdivision (2) ofsubsection (a) of said section, 53a-70a, 53a-70b, 53a-71, except subdivision (1), (4), (8)

or (10) or subparagraph (B) of subdivision (9) of subsection (a) of said section or subparagraph (A) of subdivision (9) of subsection (a) of said section if the court makes a finding that, at the time of the offense, the victim was under eighteen years of age, 53a-72a, except subdivision (2) of subsection (a) of said section, or 53a-72b, or of section 53a-92 or 53a-92a, provided the court makes a finding that the offense was committed with intent to sexually violate or abuse the victim, (B) a violation of any of the offenses specifiedinsubparagraph (A) ofthissubdivisionforwhichaperson is criminally liable under section 53a-8, 53a-48 or 53a-49, or (C) a violation ofany predecessor statute to any ofthe offenses specified in subparagraph(A) or(B) ofthissubdivisiontheessentialelementsofwhicharesubstantially the same as said offense.’’

4 General Statutes § 54-252 (a) provides in relevantpart: ‘‘Anyperson who has been convicted orfoundnot guiltybyreason ofmental disease or defect of a sexually violent offense, and (1) is released into the community on or after October 1, 1988, and prior to October 1, 1998, and resides in this state, shall, on October 1, 1998, or within three days of residing in this state, whichever is later

. . . register such person’s name, identifying factors and criminal history record, documentation of any treatment received by such person for mental abnormality or personality disorder, and such person’s residence address and electronic mail address, instant message address or other similar Internet communication identifier, if any, with the Commissioner of Emergency Services and Public Protection on such forms and in such locations as said commissioner shall direct, and shall maintain such registration for life.

. . .’’ The defendant was sentenced, on his conviction ofsecond degree sexual assault, to a total effective term of eight years imprisonment, suspended after four years, followed by five years probation. In 1996, after serving two years ofhis original four year sentence, the defendant was paroled directly to his family. In addition to his second degree sexual assault conviction, the defendant pleaded guilty to two counts of fourth degree sexual assault underGeneral Statutes § 53a-73aarising fromtwo separate incidents in 1993 and 1994. Anoffense resultingin aconvictionoffourthdegree sexualassault is categorized as a nonviolent sexual offense and requires only a ten year registration period. See General Statutes §§ 53a-73a, 54-250 (5) and 54-251 (a). Such registration, however, is required only for defendants who were released from custody after October 1, 1998. General Statutes § 54-251 (a). Because the defendant was released priorto October 1, 1998, his conviction of two counts of fourth degree sexual assault do not require registration. Thus, his onlyconvictionrequiringregistration, andthusthe onlyone before this court on appeal, is that of second degree sexual assault.

5 The defendant attempts to argue that the statutory scheme at issue in this case imposes a harsher registration period for offenses against adults than those against minors, and that no rational basis could possibly exist for treating people who offend against minors less harshly than those who commit the same crimes against adults. The defendant’s argument, as the state notes, is flawed for several reasons. All convictions for engaging in intercourse that is compelled by threat or force, against an adult or a minor, require lifetime registration. General Statutes §§ 53a-70 (a) (1) and 54-250 (11). Convictions for engaging in intercourse with minors under age thirteen when the actor is more than two years older also require lifetime registration. General Statutes §§ 53a-70 (a) (2) and 54-250 (11). Further, convictions for engaging in intercourse with any victim, whether an adult or a minor, who is incapable of consenting because of mental disease or defect, or because of a physical incapacity, also require lifetime registration. See General Statutes §§ 53a-70 (a) (4) (mentally incapacitated), 53a-71 (a) (2) (mentally defective), 53a-71 (a) (3) (physically helpless) and 54-250 (11). Additionally, convictions for engaging in intercourse with other vulnerable persons, regardless oftheir age, when the actoris in aposition ofauthority or control, require lifetime registration. See General Statutes §§ 53a-71 (a) (5) (persons in custody), 53a-71 (a) (6) (psychiatric patients), 53a-71 (a) (7) (medical patients), 53a-71 (a) (11) (persons receiving developmental services) and 54-250 (11). Sexual assaults committed upon older minors, such as engaging in intercourse with minors between thirteenyears ofage or olderbutunder sixteen years of age, who may actually consent but who cannot legally consent, or intercourse with minors under the age of eighteen when the actor is a guardian, teacher, coach, or in another position ofauthority, all are subject to aten year registration period. See General Statutes §§ 53a-71 (a) (1), 53a71 (a) (4), 53a-71 (a) (8), 53a-71 (a) (9), 53a-71 (a) (10), 54-250 (2) and 54- 251 (a). The reason for a limited registration period in these scenarios is in part because of the presumed existence of a relationship between the actor and the minor. Although sexual assaults against an older minor with whom the actor has a relationship, such as guardian, teacher or coach, still may be predatory, persons who commit sexual assaults through the use of force or the threatened use of force pose a greater danger to the public than those who partake in sexual acts with older minors who may actually consent, but cannot legally consent. To summarize, intercourse that is compelled, or engaged in with minors under age thirteen or with certain other vulnerable persons, regardless ofthevictim’s age, require lifetime registration. To the contrary, noncompelled intercourse with older minors requires registration for ten years. We therefore conclude that the defendant’s argument that he is similarly situated to those who commit second degree sexual assault against minors is flawed, and thus thatthe differentiation between second degree sexual assaults and their respective registration requirements at issue here actually is between violent and nonviolent sexual assaults.

6 The defendant additionally cites to the relevant legislative history in support ofhis federal equal protection challenge, claiming that the registration requirements for second degree sexual assault are the ‘‘arbitrary result of historical accident,’’ and that what legislators thought they were voting for differed from the actual text ofthe statute. As the court properly noted, ‘‘[i]n order for a statute to withstand rational basis review, we consider whetherthe classification and disparate treatment inherentin astatute bear

a rational relationship to a legitimate state end and are based on reasons related to the accomplishment ofthat goal

. . . . [U]nder this analysis, the legislature is not required to articulate the purpose or rationale for its classification. The test

. . . is whether [the] court can conceive ofa rational basis for sustaining the legislation; we need not have evidence that the legislature actually acted upon that basis.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Moreover, where the text of the statute is ‘‘plain and unambiguous and does not yield absurd or unworkable results, extratextual evidence of the meaning ofthe [statute] shall not be considered.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Maguire, 310 Conn. 535, 572, 78 A.3d 828 (2013). The defendant acknowledges that the plain meaning of § 54-252 (a) requires lifetime registration. The legislative history of the lifetime sex offender registration requirement, therefore, is not relevant to our review of the defendant’s claim on appeal.

7Article first, § 1, of the Connecticut constitution additionally provides: ‘‘All men when they form a social compact, are equal in rights; and no man
or set of men are entitled to exclusive public emoluments or privileges from the community.’’ The present claim has not been made under the foregoing provision.