United States Court of Appeals 

For the Seventh Circuit 

Chicago, Illinois 60604 

Submitted November 10, 2020*

Decided November 19, 2020 

Before 

DIANE S. SYKES, Chief Judge 

JOEL M. FLAUM, Circuit Judge 

MICHAEL B. BRENNAN, Circuit Judge

No. 19-2805 

JOHN D. HAYWOOD , 

Plaintiff-Appellant, 

v. 

LUCAS MAUE, 

 Defendant-Appellee.

 Appeal from the United States District 

Court for the Southern District of Illinois. 

No. 18-cv-524-SMY-RJD 

Staci M. Yandle, 

Judge. 

O R D E R 

John Haywood, an Illinois inmate, appeals the entry of summary judgment 

against him in his suit for alleged constitutional violations stemming from an 

altercation with another inmate. Because Haywood did not exhaust his administrative 

remedies, we affirm. 

*

 We have agreed to decide the case without oral argument because the briefs and 

record adequately present the facts and legal arguments, and oral argument would not 

significantly aid the court. FED. R. APP. P. 34(a)(2)(C). 

NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION 

To be cited only in accordance with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 
No. 19-2805 Page 2 

In 2018 Haywood sued corrections officer Lucas Maue under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for 

an incident that occurred four years earlier while he was incarcerated at Menard 

Correctional Facility in Chester, Illinois. According to Haywood’s complaint, Maue 

incited him to fight his cellmate for possession of the bottom bunk and then put him in 

a chokehold, causing injuries. Haywood filed an emergency grievance with the warden, 

who forwarded it to a grievance officer. The grievance officer denied the grievance on 

September 2, 2014, and the chief administrative officer concurred with that ruling six 

days later. The grievance officer’s report notified Haywood that he had 30 days from 

the date of the chief administrative officer’s decision to appeal to the Administrative 

Review Board. Although Haywood signed and dated his appeal September 11, 2014, the 

Board received the appeal on October 23—45 days after the date of the chief 

administrative officer’s decision. The Board returned the appeal as untimely. 

The district judge referred Haywood’s complaint to a magistrate judge for a 

hearing under Pavey v. Conley, 663 F.3d 899, 904 (7th Cir. 2011), to determine whether 

Haywood exhausted his administrative remedies before filing suit as required by 

42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). After a hearing the magistrate judge determined that Haywood’s 

appeal to the Board was untimely, that his testimony about not receiving the chief 

administrative officer’s decision until mid-October was disingenuous and not credible, 

that he failed to exhaust his administrative remedies before filing this suit, and that his 

complaint otherwise was barred by Illinois’s two-year statute of limitations for 

personal-injury actions. See 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/13-202. 

Haywood argues that his late appeal to the Board should be excused because 

copies of the grievance officer’s denial were withheld from him while he was being 

transferred between cells. We cannot meaningfully review Haywood’s argument, 

however, because he failed to supplement the record with a transcript of the Pavey 

hearing. See FED. R. APP. P. 10(b)(2); Morisch v. United States, 653 F.3d 522, 529 (7th Cir. 

2011). Regardless, Haywood failed to develop any argument over why the magistrate 

judge needed to credit his version of events. Given the clear-error standard with which 

we review the district court’s factual findings, Haywood has given us no reason to think 

that a mistake has been committed. See Wilborn v. Ealey, 881 F.3d 998, 1006 (7th Cir. 

2018); Pavey, 663 F.3d at 904. 

As for the court’s additional ruling that Haywood’s complaint was barred by 

Illinois’s two-year statute of limitations, Haywood argues that the accrual date for his 

excessive-force claim should be tolled because prison medical staff concealed his 

injuries. But as Maue asserts, Haywood did not object to—and thereby waived his right 
No. 19-2805 Page 3 

to object to—the magistrate judge’s recommendation that his claim accrued on 

November 5, 2014. See FED. R. CIV. P. 72(a); Banco Del Atlantico, S.A. v. Woods Indus. Inc., 

519 F.3d 350, 354 (7th Cir. 2008). In any event, the date of discovery of an injury is 

irrelevant to accrual because excessive-force claims are “immediately” actionable from 

the date of the incident. Evans v. Poskon, 603 F.3d 362, 363 (7th Cir. 2010); Gonzalez v. 

Entress, 133 F.3d 551, 555 (7th Cir. 1998). 

We have considered Haywood’s remaining arguments, and none has merit. 

AFFIRMED