IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA

No. 22-1396

Filed June 21, 2023

IN THE INTEREST OF K.D.,

Minor Child,

R.D., Mother,

Petitioner-Appellee,

R.P., Father,

Respondent-Appellant.

________________________________________________________________

Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Clinton County, Kimberly K. 

Shepherd, District Associate Judge.

A father appeals the termination of his parental rights under Iowa Code 

chapter 600A (2022). AFFIRMED. 

Joseph C. Glazebrook of Glazebrook Law, PLLC, Des Moines, for 

appellant.

Jennifer Margaret Triner Olsen of Olsen Law Firm, Davenport, for appellee.

Dana L. Copell of the Law Office of Dana L. Copell, Davenport, attorney 

and guardian ad litem for minor child.

Considered by Badding, P.J., Buller, J., and Danilson, S.J.* Tabor, J., takes 

no part.

*Senior judge assigned by order pursuant to Iowa Code section 602.9206 

(2023). 
2

DANILSON, Senior Judge.

A father appeals the termination of his parental rights under Iowa Code 

section 600A.8(3)(b) (2022). He contends the juvenile court erroneously found he 

abandoned his child and failed to consider whether his “disability” “validly excuses 

the lack of physical visitation” he had with the child. Upon our review, we affirm.

I. Background Facts and Proceedings

The father and mother had a brief relationship in late 2008 to early 2009. 

The mother learned she was pregnant in February 2009. Shortly thereafter, the 

father moved to Illinois. They exchanged text messages “a couple times a month” 

during the pregnancy. Their child, K.D., was born in August. The father saw the 

child at the hospital after her birth. After that, the father had visits with the child 

approximately once per month at the mother’s home in Camanche.

In early 2010, the father filed a petition to establish custody, physical care, 

visitation, and child support. He continued to see the child approximately once per 

month until June 2010, and then he did not have a visit again until August 2011. 

Following a hearing, the district court entered an order granting the mother sole 

legal custody and physical care of the child. The court observed the father had not 

provided financial support for the child or “exercised regular visitation or significant 

contact with the child since her birth” and the mother had been “the sole support 

of the parties’ daughter.” The court also noted K.D., who was “not quite two years 

of age,” was “not familiar” with the father.1 The court established a graduated 

1 The court also observed the father “has sent angry text messages to [the mother] 

demonstrating animosity on his part toward [her] and a general disrespect for her

as a person, and this affects her present ability to totally trust him with their 

daughter.”
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supervised visitation schedule for the father. Approximately four visits took place 

in the first few months after the decree was entered, none of which were overnight 

or unsupervised, and then the father stopped attending visits. 

The mother filed an application for modification of the paternity decree, 

alleging that because the father had not “accomplished” the graduated schedule, 

it was “now necessary [for him] to have supervised visitation.” In January 2012, 

the parties met with the court and agreed upon another graduated schedule. The 

father next saw K.D. in April 2012, when the mother brought the child to Illinois for 

a visit, and he has not seen her since. The mother and K.D. continue to live in 

Camanche. The father lives in Illinois. The mother married D.S. in 2014, and they 

had a child together, six-year-old M.S. 

In 2022, the mother filed a petition to terminate the father’s parental rights,

alleging he abandoned the child. See Iowa Code § 600A.8(3) (2022). The mother 

further alleged termination of the father’s parental rights was in the child’s best 

interests “so that her step-father [D.S.] may legally adopt her.” Following a hearing, 

the district court granted the petition. The father appeals.

II. Standard of Review

We review private terminations under chapter 600A de novo. In re C.A.V., 

787 N.W.2d 96, 99 (Iowa Ct. App. 2010). We give weight to the district court's 

factual findings, particularly on credibility issues, but are not bound by them. Id.

Our primary concern is K.D.’s best interests. See id.

III. Abandonment

“To abandon a minor child” means to “reject[ ] the duties imposed by the 

parent-child relationship, . . . which may be evinced by the person, while being able 
4

to do so, making no provision or making only a marginal effort to provide for the 

support of the child or to communicate with the child.” Id. § 600A.2(20). A parent 

of a child who is six months or older

is deemed to have abandoned the child unless the parent maintains 

substantial and continuous or repeated contact with the child as 

demonstrated by contribution toward support of the child of a 

reasonable amount, according to the parent’s means, and as 

demonstrated by any of the following:

(1) Visiting the child at least monthly when physically and 

financially able to do so and when not prevented from doing so by 

the person having lawful custody of the child.

(2) Regular communication with the child or with the person 

having the care or custody of the child, when physically and 

financially unable to visit the child or when prevented from visiting 

the child by the person having lawful custody of the child.

(3) Openly living with the child for a period of six months within 

the one-year period immediately preceding the termination of 

parental rights hearing and during that period openly holding himself 

or herself out to be the parent of the child.

Id. § 600A.8(3)(b).

The father claims “[a]s an out-of-state non-custodial parent, [he] was in a 

difficult position.”2 He acknowledges “being behind overall in his child support 

2 He further alleges the court failed to consider whether his “disability” “validly 

excuses the lack of physical visitation” he had with the child. Specifically, he claims 

the court “effectively impos[ed] an unconstitutional exclusion of disabled parents 

from maintaining parental rights.” This issue was not preserved for review. With 

regard to the father’s health, the juvenile court observed the father “offered multiple 

reasons for why he did not exercise visitation over the years, including travel,

health reasons, and financial reasons.” (Internal citations to the record omitted.) 

The court also noted the father “claim[ed] this child is entitled to a portion of his 

disability [payments], but no evidence was offered to the Court concerning 

whether, when, and how the child would receive money, and no evidence was 

offered concerning any specific amount of money the child may receive from the 

government, in conjunction with the father’s disability.” 

Because the father’s argument on appeal regarding his disability was 

neither raised nor decided by the court, it is not properly before us. See State v. 

Derby, 800 N.W.2d 52, 60 (Iowa 2011) (“Issues not raised before the district court, 

including constitutional issues, cannot be raised for the first time on appeal.”). 

Moreover, upon our de novo review of the record, we echo the court’s observation 
5

obligations” but argues he “did make efforts toward substantial compliance.” We 

note at the time of the termination hearing, the father owed more than $19,000 in 

child support,3 and he had never provided any medical support. The father further 

argues the mother “blocked” his “efforts to see his child, to thereafter have contact 

with his child, and to support his child.” The record belies his claim. In the first 

year of K.D.’s life, the father saw the child only a handful of times. And during the 

midst of the custody case, which the father initiated in 2010, he did not see the 

child for over a year. The mother admitted she denied the father’s request for a 

visit in November 2011, but she testified she did so because he skipped his visits 

in October. As the mother explained, “He wanted to take her . . . on the overnight 

visit, and I didn’t feel comfortable with that because he hadn’t fulfilled prior 

commitments to the visitation schedule” as ordered by the court. 

The father last saw K.D. in 2012, when she was two years old. At the time 

of the termination hearing, K.D. was twelve years old. During that time, the father 

sent “infrequent” messages to the mother, “every couple of months”; “usually like 

rants” to “criticize [her] and [her] parenting” and threats about taking “court action” 

or “coming to [Iowa].” The father did not send cards or presents to the child, or 

otherwise communicate with her. The record shows the father knew where the 

mother and K.D. lived, because his early visits had taken place there and he had 

called the police to their home. He had not asked to see K.D. until recently, 

that the issue raised below of the father’s health was just one of many “countless 

excuses” why he has not actively participated in K.D.’s life. We agree we cannot 

disregard his disability, but that does not excuse his numerous other failures, such 

as his failure to communicate in writing or by cards, phone, or computer and his 

failure to provide support. 

3 At the time of the hearing, the father’s child support obligation was $83 per month.
6

requests the mother did not honor because “it had been [ten] years since she saw 

him, and they had no relationship together at that point.” The mother further 

explained she believed that any contact had to follow the graduated visitation 

schedule as agreed to by the parties and entered by the district court. 

The juvenile court found the father’s claims regarding his efforts to 

participate in the child’s life were not credible and his statements in general to be 

“inconsistent and unreliable.” We defer to the court’s determination. See In re 

G.A., 826 N.W.2d 125, 127 (Iowa Ct. App. 2012). As the court stated:

[The father] made countless excuses regarding why he has 

not been an active participant in his daughter’s life. All the excuses 

offered by [the father] are simply words. The Court finds it telling that 

[the father] has never, by his own admission, sent a letter, or birthday 

card, or birthday present, or Christmas present, to his daughter. [The 

father] clearly knows how to contact his daughter, as demonstrated 

in the [mother]’s exhibits. He knows where his daughter lives, he 

knows contact information for his daughter, and he knows how to 

reach many people in relation to his daughter. Yet, [the father] has 

not seen his daughter in over ten years. In her statement to the 

Court, the guardian ad litem reported she asked the child if there was 

anything the child wanted to say to [the father]. The child’s response 

was, “Where have you been?” [The father], by his actions and lack 

of action over the past ten years, has demonstrated that he has

nothing to offer this child financially or emotionally. [The father] offers 

nothing but empty words. [The father] has not assumed the duties 

of a parent, has not fulfilled his financial obligations, has not shown 

any real interest in the child, has not made any effort to initiate or 

maintain communication with the child, and has not established a 

place of importance in this child’s life.

On our de novo review, we agree with the court that the father failed to maintain 

substantial and continuous or repeated contact with the child as described in any 

of the paragraphs set forth in section 600A.8(3)(b)(1)–(3).

“Once that threshold showing has been made,” the mother “next must show 

by clear and convincing evidence termination of parental rights is in the best 
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interest of the child.” In re Q.G., 911 N.W.2d 761, 770 (Iowa 2018); see also Iowa 

Code §§ 600A.1, 600A.8. When considering a child’s best interests, we consider 

the statutory best interest framework from Iowa Code section 232.116(2). In re 

A.H.B., 791 N.W.2d 687, 690–91 (Iowa 2010).

We determine termination of the father’s parental rights is in the child’s best 

interests. The father has no relationship with K.D. and last saw the child over ten 

years ago, when she was two years old. As the guardian ad litem observed, K.D. 

“doesn’t know” the father; “[s]he couldn’t pick him out of a lineup.” See id. at 691 

(“[I]t is significant that [the child] likely has no recollection of his father.”). The 

mother testified the child has a “special bond” with D.S. and calls him “Dad,” and 

D.S. wishes to adopt the child. See In re J.G., No. 21-1836, 2022 WL 2347775, at 

*5 (Iowa Ct. App. June 29, 2022) (noting it was in the child’s best interests to 

solidify a step-parent’s role as caregiver when they had been performing that role 

for much of the child’s life). Termination of the father’s parental rights is in K.D.’s 

best interests.

AFFIRMED.