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________________________________ Michigan Supreme Court Lansing, Michigan 48909

C hief Justice Justices Maura D. Corrigan Michael F. Cavanagh Elizabeth A. Weaver Marilyn Kelly Clifford W. Taylor Robert P. Young, Jr. 

# Opinion
Stephen J. Markman
FILED JANUARY 30, 2001

CHERYL DENISE SEWELL, Plaintiff-Appellee,
v No. 116528 CLEAN CUT MANAGEMENT, INC. and JOHN DOE, Defendants, and JEFFREY CRUSE, Individually and d/b/a CLEAN CUT MANAGEMENT, INC., Defendants-Appellants.
PER CURIAM The plaintiff tenant sued the defendant landlord, alleging negligence and unlawful eviction. During trial, the defendant moved for a directed verdict on the ground that a prior judgment in the distri ct cou rt had resolved the issue whether the eviction was lawful. The circuit court denied the motion and later entered judgment in favor of the plaintiff. The Court of Appeals affirmed. We reverse the judgments ofthe circuit court and the Court of Appeals, and remand this case to the circuit court for further proceedings. I Defendant Jeffrey Cruse owned a house at 17184 Warrington Drive in Detroit. He rented a flat in the house to plaintiff C. Denise Sewell for $450 per month. Ms. Sewell soon fell behind in her rent. She says that she w as withholding rent because of numerous unrepair ed problems in the flat. InMay 1995, Mr. Cruse filed a complaint in the district court, seeking termination of Ms. Sewell’s tenancy. 1 This led to a consent judgment that entered twelv e da ys later. 2 The judgment required Ms. Sewell to pay $450 by June 2. However, the judgment further provided: [Mr. Cruse] agrees to make repairs to side door, lock on front door, tile in bathroom, repair bathroom leak, bath ceiling, repair hot water & ele ctrica l; all to be made before money is due on 6/2/95. [3] Mr. Cruse says he made the required repairs. Ms. Sewell says he d id not. However, Mr. Cruse has testified that Ms. Sewell did sign a form indicating that the repairs had been made.

1 Summary proceedings for the recovery of possession of premises are governed by MCL 600.5701 et seq .; MSA 27A.5701 et seq . and by MCR 4.201.
2 MCR 4.201(K).
3 This language is handwritten on the j udgmen t form and is not entirely legible. We have added punctuation. 2Using this documentation, Mr. Cruse returned to the district court, where he signed a June 5 application for a writ of restitution. 4 The f orm indicated that Mr. Cruse had complied with the terms of the judgment and that Ms. Sewell had not met her payment obligation. The court signed the writ
onJune 7. The form directed the court officer to “remove [Ms. Sew ell] from the premises described and to restore peaceful possession to [Mr. Cruse].” Ms. Se wel l did not appeal the consent judgment or the writ of restitution. Neither did she ask the district court to set aside the judgment or the writ. Several weeks later, a district court bailiff effe cted the eviction. There is conflicting testimony about whether he removed all of Ms. Sewell’s possessions from the flat. At a minimum, he put most of her possessions on the front lawn. Ms. Sewell, who had been in the hospital, learned of the eviction a few days later. With family members, she went to the flat. Apparently while removing additional property from the premises, she slipped and fell. Ms. Sewell had received
a kidney transplant in1991 and another in 1995, and her fall evidently caused serious complications in that regard. InMarch 19 96, Ms . Sewell sued Mr. Cruse in circuit court. 5 In count I of the complaint, she alleged that he had

4 MCR 4.201(L).
5Th e defendants named in the complaint were Clean Cut Management, Inc.; Mr. Cruse, individually and doing business 3negligentlymaintained the premises and that she had suffered serious injury as the result. In count II, she alleged that she had been unlawfully evicted. 6 This case was tried before a jury i n circuit court. During trial, Mr. Cruse moved for a directed verdict. He
ar gued that the district court eviction order was a bi ndin g resolutionof the question whether the eviction had been legal. The court denied the motion. Inits verdict, the jury found that Mr. Cruse had been negligent, 7 and that his negligence had been the proximate
cause of $4,700 in lost wages for Ms. Sewell, as well as $50,000 in noneconomic damages. The jury also found that she had been unlawfully ejected fr om her premises and that her propertylos s was in t he amount of $5,000. Thus the total verdict was $59,700.

as Clean Cut Management; and John Doe. The complaint was answered by Mr. Cruse, doing business as Clean Cut Management, and he has been the only defendant to participate in this litigation. Thus we will continue to refer to him as the sole defendant.
6 Ms. Sewell also asked for tr eble damages under MCL 600.2918(1); MSA 27A.2918(1), which provides: Anyperson who is ejected or put out of any lands or tenements in a forcible and unlawfu l mann er, or being out is afterwards held or kept out, by force, if he prevails, is ent itled to recover 3 times the amount of his actual damages or $200.00, whichever is greater, in addition to recovering possession.
7 The jury found no negligence on the part of Ms. Sewell. 4Mr. Cruse moved for judgment notwithstanding the verdict or, alternatively, for new trial. He argued that the district court proceedings that granted h im p ossession of the Warringtonpremises were res judicata and collateral estoppel. He also argued that, in light of the district court judgment and writ, Ms. Sewell had been a trespass er at the time she slipped and fell. The circuit court denied the motion. The Court of Appeals affirmed, 8 citing our decision in JAM Corp v AARO Disposal, Inc , 461 Mich 161; 6 00 N W2d 617 (1999). Mr. Cruse has now applied to this Court for leave to appeal. II The procedural history in JAM Corp was complicated by uncertainty regarding the proper names and identities of the parties. However, there came a point when JAM 9 began summary p roce edings in district court to regain control of premises that had been leased to AARO Disposal, Inc. Because of problems relating to the corporate status (or lack thereof) of JAM, the district court action was dismissed with pre judi ce (thoughthe pr emi ses were returned to the control of JAM). 461 Mich 162-165.

8Unpublished opinion per curiam, issued December 3, 1999, reh den February 25, 2000 (Docket No. 208148).
9 There were several variants of the “JAM” corporate name but, for present purposes, they are not important. 5Following the dismissal in district court, JAM filed suit aga inst AARO in circuit court. 10 The complaint stated si x causes of action, including implie d contract and unjust enrichment. The circuit court dismisse d th e complaint with prejudice, finding the district court dism issa l to be res judicata. The Court of Appeals affirmed. 11 461 Mich 165-166. In JAM Corp , this Court examined several sections of the chapter dealing with summary proceedings. Our conclusion was that “[p]lainly the Legislature took these cases outside the realm of the normal rules concerning merger and bar in order that attorneys would not be obliged to fa ste n all other pending claims to the swiftly moving summary proceedings.” 461 Mich 1 68-169. We also said that “it is evident that judgment in these summary proceedings, no matter who prevails, does not bar other claims for relief.” 461 Mich 170. Accordingly, we reversed the judgments of th e Co urt of Appeals and circuit court in JAM Corp , and remanded the case for further proceedings on JAM’s circuit court suit. 461 Mich 171. III Inthe present case, the Court of Appeals fastened on our statement tha t judgment in summary proceedings does not bar

10 JAM also appealed the district court dismissal, though the result of that appeal was unknown to us as we wrote our opinion in JAM Corp . 461 Mich 165.
11 Unpublished opinion per curiam, issued January 16, 1998, reh den April 21, 1998 (Docket No. 193594). 6other claims for relief. Quoting that holding, it affirmed a circuit court judgment based on a jury’s verdict that the eviction had been illegal, notwithstanding that the eviction
occu rred pursuant to an unappealed district court consent judgment and writ of restitution. This is not consistent with the statute or with our analysis in JAM Corp . We said in JAM Corp that “judgment in these summary pr ocee dings, no matter who prevails, does not bar otherclaims for relief.” 461 Mich 170. Nothing in the statute or in JAM Corp stands for the proposition that, having litigated in the district court the issue who has the right to the premises, that question can be relitigated de novo in a subsequent suit. Such an approach would empty MCL 600.5701 et seq .; MSA 27A.5701 et seq . of all significance. After repossessing premises in accord withthe statute and an order of the district court, a landlord would remain in jeopardy of further litigation on that same question. Neither do principles of res judicata support judgment of the Court of Appeals. In Dart v Dart , 460 Mich 573, 586; 597 NW2d 82 (1999), we explained: Res judicata bars a subsequent action between the s ame p arties when the evidence or essential facts are identical. Eaton Co Bd of Co Rd Comm'rs vSchultz , 205 Mich App 371, 375; 521 NW2d 847 (1994). A second action is barred when (1) the first action was dec ided on the merits, (2) the matter contested in the second action was or could have been resolved inthe first, and (3) both actions involve the same parties or their privies. Id . at 375-376.
7Michigancourts have broadly applied the doctrine of res judicata. They have barred, not onlyclaims already litigated, but every claim arising from the same transaction that the parties, exercising reasonable diligence, could have raised but did not. Gose v Monroe Auto Equipment Co , 409 Mich147, 160-163; 294 NW2d 1 65 ( 1980); Sprague v Buhagiar , 213 Mich App 310, 313; 539 NW2d 587 (1995). This case obviously presents issues concerning the relationship between summary possession proceedings and the doctrine of res judica ta. A s explained in Dart , Michigan’s broad res judicata rule bars claims arising out of the same transactionthat could have been litigated in a prior proceeding, but were not. JAM Corp , 461 Mich 167. Our decision in JAM Corp recognized a statutory exception to this rule with respect to claims that “could have been” litigated in a prior proceeding. See id. at 168, citing MCL 600.5750; MSA 27A.5750. There, we recognized that the legislative intent for this exception was to remove the incentive for attorneys to “fasten all other pending claims to swiftlymoving summary proceedings.” Id . at 169. Our decisionin JAM Corp said nothing about the preclusive effect of claims actually litigated in the s ummary proceedings. Thus, the “other claims of relief,” described in JAM Corp at 170, were those claims that “could have been” brought during the summary proceedings, but were not. This Court was not describing subsequent claims involving the issues actually litigated in the summary proceedings.

8Inthe present case, Ms. Sewel l so ught damages for personal injuries suffered on Mr. Cruse’s premises and for damage to personal property. Mr. Cruse says she was a trespasser and that the circuit court s hould have granted a directed v erdict in his favor. We need not decide in this opinion the full effect of the district court’s judgment and writ, with respect to the status of Ms. Sewell as she entered the premises or the extent, if any, of Mr. Cruse’s duty toward her. However, we do hold that, where the district court judgment and writ have not been reversed or vacated, they are conclusive on the narrow issue whet her the eviction was proper. Unlike JAM Corp , this case presents a questionregarding the preclusive effect of a claim that was actually litigated in the summary proceeding. Therefore, the limited statutory exceptionto Michigan’s res judicata rule does not apply. The circuit court thus erred in failing to grant, at least in part, the motion for a directed verdict. For these reasons we reverse the judgments of the circuit court and the Court of Appeals. We remand this case to the circuit court. On remand, the circuit cou rt sha ll enter judgment in favor of the defendant on the plaintiff’s wrongful evictionclaim. Because the verdict in favor of the plaintiff
onher negligence claim may have been influenced by the error

9withregard to her wrongful eviction claim, we remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion with regard to the negligence claim. MCR 7.302(F)(1). C ORRIGAN , C.J., and WEAVER , T AYLOR , Y OUNG , and M ARKMAN , JJ., concurred.

10________________________________ v S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N SUPREME COURT

CHERYL DENISE SEWELL, Plaintiff-Appellee, No. 116528 CLEAN CUT MANAGEMENT, INC. and JOHN DOE, Defendants, and JEFFREY CRUSE, Individually and d/b/a CLEAN CUT MANAGEMENT, INC., Defendants-Appellants.
CAVANAGH, J. I would not decide this case by a per curiam opinion. Because this case offers the opportunity to a ddre ss a jurisprudentiallysignificant issue, I would grant leave so we might avail ourselves of full briefing an d a rgument by the parties. K ELLY , J., concurred with C AVANAGH , J.