PUBLISH UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
TENTH CIRCUIT

In the Matter of: C.W. MINING COMPANY, a/k/a Co-op Mining Company, Debtor.

------------------------------ C.W. MINING COMPANY, Appellant/Cross- Appellee,

v. AQUILA, INC.; OWELL PRECAST, LLC, Appellees, KENNETH A. RUSHTON, Trustee, Intervenor – Appellee/Cross- Appellant. Nos. 10-4023 & 10-4033

Appeals from the Opinion of the United States Bankruptcy Appellate Pane l of the Tenth Circuit (BAP No. UT-08-102) FILED United States Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit 

### February 14, 2011
Elisabeth A. Shumaker Clerk of Court- 2 - Russell S. Walker, Woodbury & Kesler, P.C., Salt Lake City, Utah (David R. Williams and Anthony M. Grover with him on the briefs) for Appellant/Cross-Appellee Brent D. Wride, Ray Quinney & Nebeker P.C. , Salt Lake City, Utah (Steven W. Call and Eleaine A. Monson with him on the briefs) for Appellees/Cross-Appellants Aquila, Inc. and Owell Precast, LLC (Tyler S. Foutz, Olse n Skoubye & Nielson, LLC, with them on the briefs) Michael N. Zundel, Prince, Yeates & Geldzah ler, Salt Lake City, Utah (Aaron B. Millar with him on the briefs) for Intervenor-App ellee/Cross-Appellant Kenneth A. Rushton, Trustee

Before LUCERO , HARTZ , and HOLMES , Circuit Judges.

LUCERO , Circuit Judge.

C.W. Mining Corporation (“C.W.”) is the debtor in this involuntary Chapter 7 bankruptcy proceeding. On summary judgment, the bankruptcy court determined that the creditors who filed the involuntary petition we re “qualifying creditors” as required to trigger involuntary bankruptcy. C.W.’s former managers (“the Managers”), 1 purporting to act on C.W.’s behalf, appealed the grant of summary judgment to the Tenth Circuit Bankruptcy Appellate Panel (“BAP”), which affirmed. A threshold question before the BAP wa s whether the Managers could bring C.W.’s appeal over the Chapter 7 trustee’s objec tion. Reasoning that “[a] putative debtor

1 A major question presented in this case is whether the Managers were authorized to bring C.W.’s appeal. We therefore refer to the appellees as “the Managers” rather than “C.W.” throughout this opinion.- 3 - must have standing to bring a bankruptcy co urt’s involuntary order for relief before an appellate court,” the BAP heard the appeal. But this case is about the Managers’ authority, not about C.W.’s standing. C.W. had standing to appeal. However, the Chapter 7 trustee was the only person authorized to bring the appeal. The Managers were divested of their authority to appeal by the appointment of the Chapter 7 trustee, which they did not challenge. Exercising jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 158(d)(1), we therefore reverse and remand with the instruction to dismiss.
I C.W. operated a coal mine in Emery Coun ty, Utah. On January 8, 2008, Aquila, Inc. (“Aquila”), Owell Precast, LLC (“Owell”) and House of Pumps, Inc. 2 (collectively, “the Creditors”) filed an involuntary Chapter 11 bankruptcy petition against C.W. 3 Aquila filed a motion for partial summary judgment on July 15, 2008, seeking a ruling that Aquila and Owell were qua lifying petitioning creditors. 4 C.W. opposed the motion. On September 17, 2008, the bankruptcy co urt granted Aquila’s motion and shortly thereafter ordered involuntary Chapter 11 relief against C.W. On September 29, 2008,

2 House of Pumps is not a party on appeal.

3 At the time this petition was filed, th e Bankruptcy Code allowed involuntary petitions under Chapter 7 or Chapter 11, provide d: (1) there are at least three creditors; (2) all of whose claims are not “contingent as to liability or subject to a bona fide dispute”; and (3) whose claims in total me et a statutory minimum amount, which in 2008 was $13,475. See 11 U.S.C. § 303(b)(1) (2008) (sup erseded); 11 U.S.C. § 104 (amount under § 303 regularly adjusted by the Judi cial Conference of the United States).

4 House of Pumps’ qualifying creditor status was unchallenged.- 4 - C.W. filed a motion to reconsider the su mmary judgment ruling. But before the bankruptcy court ruled on that motion, Aquila moved to appoint a Ch apter 11 trustee or convert the case to Chapter 7. At the hearin g on the motion, C.W.’s attorney stated that the only Chapter 11 plan that it could propose would be a liquidati ng plan, and C.W.’s president testified that he wi shed to convert to Chapter 7 and that “C.W. Mining has no assets. It has no other operating cash, or a ny way to operate anything at all.” The bankruptcy court granted Aquila’s moti on on November 13, 2008, and appointed Kenneth Rushton (“the Trustee”) Chapter 7 in terim trustee on November 19, 2008. On November 26, 2008, the bankruptcy court de nied the pending motion to reconsider, and

on December 8, 2008, Russell Walker, C.W.’s former counsel, purporting to act on behalf of the corporation, appealed to the BAP. On appeal to the BAP the Trustee filed a motion to dismiss on two grounds: (1) C.W., as a hopelessly insolvent corporation, l acked standing to appeal after the Trustee was appointed; and (2) Walker was not auth orized to file C.W.’s appeal. The BAP denied the Trustee’s motion to dismiss but affirmed the grant of summary judgment on the merits, holding that the Cred itors were bona fide creditors as a matter of law. In this appeal, the Managers argue (on C.W.’s beha lf) that Owell was not a qualifying creditor. The Trustee cross-appeals, re peating the standing argument s presented in his motion to dismiss before the BAP.
II We review the BAP’s grant of summary judgment de novo, applying the same- 5 - legal standard used by the BAP. In re Holytex Carpet Mills, Inc. , 73 F.3d 1516, 1518 (10th Cir. 1996). Summary judgment is proper only “if the movant shows there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). “We examine the factual record and reasonable inferences therefrom in the light most favorable to [t he Managers], who opposed summary judgment.” Thom as v. Int’l Bus. Machs. , 48 F.3d 478, 484 (10th Cir. 1995). This case turns on a simple question— following appointment of a Chapter 7 trustee in a corporate debtor’s bankruptcy, may former management appeal an adverse bankruptcy court ruling on the debtor’s behalf? Supreme Court precedent and bankruptcy law compel us to conclude that such an appeal is forbidden. A The 1978 Bankruptcy Code is silent regarding the standard for standing to appeal. Holmes v. Silver Wings Aviation, Inc. , 881 F.2d 939, 940 (10th Cir. 1989). But this circuit has adopted the rule, derived from the Bankruptcy Ac t of 1898, that appellate review of a bankruptcy court order is limited to “persons aggrieved” by that order. Id. To qualify as a “person aggrieved,” a person’ s rights or interests must be “directly and adversely affected pecuniarily by the decree or order of th e bankruptcy court.” Id. (quotation omitted). Accordin gly, “[u]nless the estate is solvent and excess will eventually go to the debtor, or unless the matt er involves rights unique to the debtor, the debtor is not a party aggrieve d by orders affecting the ad ministration of the bankruptcy
estate.” In re Weston , 18 F.3d 860, 863-64 (10th Cir. 1994) (footnote omitted). “[A]- 6 - hopelessly insolvent debtor does not have sta nding to appeal orders affecting the size of the estate, since such an orde r would not diminish the debt or’s property, increase his burdens, or detrimentally affect his rights.” In re El San Juan Hotel , 809 F.2d 151, 154- 55 (1st Cir. 1987). C.W. may well have standing as a “person aggrieved.” 5 The Trustee argues that C.W. is hopelessly insolvent. That appears to be true—C.W.’s liab ilities exceed its assets by almost $50 million and it ha s ceased mining operations. But even if C.W. seems “hopelessly insolvent,” the company could still be a “per son aggrieved.” The rule articulated in El San Juan Hotel precludes a hopelessly insolvent debtor from appealing orders affecting the size of the estate . 809 F.2d at 154-55. This rule makes sense because

5 We may not assume that C.W. has Artic le III standing in order to reach the merits of the Managers’ case. See Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t , 523 U.S. 83, 101-02 (1998) (federal courts must address jurisdictional questions, such as Article III standing, prior to reaching the merits). Bu t we are satisfied that the “irreducible constitutional minimum” of Article III st anding exists in this case. See id. at 102. C.W. being forced into bankruptcy cer tainly injured the company, th at injury can be traced to the challenged conduct, and a favorable decision (vaca ting the involuntary petition) would redress that injury. See Ne. Fla. Chapter of the Asso ciated Gen. Contractors of Am. v. City of Jacksonville , 508 U.S. 656, 663-64 (1993) (outlining the three conjunctive factors required to show Article III standing). But standing “is more stringent in bankrupt cy appeals than the case or controversy standing requirement of Article III.” In re Alpex Computer Corp. , 71 F.3d 353, 357 n.6 (10th Cir. 1995) (quotations omitted). The “person aggrieved” st anding rule is a prudential limitation, not an Article III lim itation. In re Combustion Eng’g, Inc. , 391 F.3d 190, 214 n.20 (3d Cir. 20 04). Accordingly, we may assume, without deciding, that C.W. is a “person aggrieved.” See Kennedy v. Allera , 612 F.3d 261, 270 n.3 (4th Cir. 2010) (“While a court may not, of course, si mply assume the exis tence of Article III standing, prudential standing qu estions may be avoided in order to decide a case on the merits.”) (citation omitted)).- 7 - such a debtor would r eceive nothing, in the end, regardle ss of the estate’s size. See id. ; see also Matter of Andreuccetti , 975 F.2d 413, 417 (7th Cir. 1992). However, the Managers are not appealing an order regarding the size of the bankruptcy estate; they seek to challenge the legitimacy of its creation. Although C. W. is insolvent, the order putting it into involuntary bank ruptcy certainly appears to have affected its pecuniary interests directly and adve rsely as required by Holmes , 881 F.2d at 940.
B Consequently, the determina tive question in this case is not whether C.W. has standing as a “person aggrieved” to appeal, but whether the Managers have authority to appeal on C.W.’s behalf. 6 C.W., a corporation, cannot commit any act on its own. It can act only through its authorized agents. Ke ys Youth Servs., Inc. v. City of Olathe , 248 F.3d 1267, 1271 n.3 (10th Cir. 2001). The Ma nagers claim they have the authority to bring C.W.’s appeal. However, the Trustee co unters that only he may bring the appeal, because the Managers were “co mpletely ousted” when C.W .’s bankruptcy was converted

6 Some courts have framed somewhat sim ilar issues as questions of standing, under the rule that a person suing “must be able to allege an injury that affects his own legal rights” rather than those of a third party. See, e.g. , J.F. Shea Co., Inc. v. City of Chicago , 992 F.2d 745, 749-50 (7th Cir. 1993) (e mployees may not sue on behalf of a corporation); Am. Towers, In c. v. Town of Falmouth , 217 F. Supp. 154, 157 (D. Me. 2002) (injury to subsidiary corporation did no t give parent corporation power to sue on subsidiary’s behalf). However, because the Managers’ authority is defined by bankruptcy law, in this case, the question of who has the le gal capacity to bring C.W.’s appeal is best treated as a s ubstantive question of law. Cf. Log Furniture, Inc. v. Call , 180 F. App’x 785, 788 (10th Cir. 2006) (unpub lished) (addressing the “legal capacity” of former management as a substantive issue).- 8 - to Chapter 7 and a trustee was appointed.
1 Not all bankruptcies have trustees. In general, Chapter 11 bankruptcies do not.
See 7 Collier on Bankruptcy ¶ 1 104.02[1] (Alan N. Resnic k & Henry J. Sommer eds., 16th ed. 2010) (normally a Chapter 11 debtor remains in possession of its assets and continues to operate its busin ess, although the court may appoint a trustee in limited cases, such as where fraud or mismanagement are alleged). By comparison, Chapter 7 bankruptcies always have a trustee. An in terim trustee is appoin ted “promptly” after a Chapter 7 order for relief is granted, 11 U.S. C. § 701, and eventually, a permanent trustee (who may be the same as the interim trus tee), is installed for the duration of the bankruptcy, § 702. Chapter 7 trustees have extensive powe rs and responsibilities relating to the liquidation of the bankruptcy es tate. Trustees must: coll ect and liquidate all of the estate’s property; close the es tate as efficiently as possibl e; account for all property received; investigate the debtor’s financial a ffairs; examine claims against the estate and reject those that are not meritorious; and ma y (and sometimes must) bring legal action on behalf of the estate. See §§ 323(b), 704(a); see also 6 Collier on Bankruptcy, at ¶ 704.03. The Supreme Court confirmed the breadth of this authority in Commodity Futures Trading Commission v. Weintraub , 471 U.S. 343 (1985). In Weintraub , a Chapter 7 corporate debtor was being investigated fo r violating commodities trading laws. Id. at 345-46. Government officers subpoenaed the debtor’s former general counsel, who- 9 - refused to answer the government’s questi ons based on an asse rted attorney-client privilege. Id. at 346. Consequently, the government asked the Chapter 7 trustee to waive the privilege, and he did. Id. The Court held that waiver was proper. It explained that, in solvent corporations, the power to waive the corpora tion’s attorney-client privilege is normally exercised by its managers, who must do so consistent with th eir fiduciary duty toward the corporation. Id. at 348-49. However, only active manage rs may exercise the privilege; former managers no longer ha ve any role. See id. at 349. And the Court held that general principle controlled for a bankrup t corporation: “[b]ecause the attorney-client privilege is controlled, outside of bankrupt cy, by a corporation’s management, the actor [within the bankruptcy context] whose duties most clos ely resemble those of management should control the privilege in bankruptcy.” Id. at 351-52. Weintraub held that the trustee’s role is clos est to that of management. Once a corporation is in bankruptcy, “[t]he powe rs and duties of a bankruptcy trustee are extensive,” with the Bankruptcy Code gi ving the trustee “wide-ranging management authority over the debtor.” Id. at 352. In contrast, the powers of the debtor’s directors are severely limited. Their role is to turn over th e corporation’s property to the trustee and to provide certain information to the trust ee and to the creditors. Congress contemplated that when a trustee is appointed, he assumes control of the business, and the debtor’s directors are “completely ousted.” Id. at 352-53 (citations omitted). Accordingly, the debtor’s director s could not “exercise the traditional management function of cont rolling the corporation’s attorney-client- 10 - privilege,” and the trustee could waive the pr ivilege over the directors’ objections. Id. at 353, 358. The Managers provide no basis for distinguishing between a bankrupt corporation’s attorney-client privilege, which Weintraub held is controlled by the trustee, and the corporation’s right to appeal adve rse bankruptcy court decisions. To the contrary, the Bankruptcy Code vests the right to litigate on be half of the estate in the
trustee, see 11 U.S.C. § 323, an d includes an estate’s legal clai ms as part of the estate’s property, see § 541. The rule that the Managers urge—that former management controls C.W.’s appeal right in this case—necessarily would result in the trustee controlling some, but not all, of the debtor’s assets. Such a result cannot be squared with Weintraub ’s rule that corporate officers are “com pletely ousted” once a trustee has been appointed. See 771 U.S. at 353. The rule that “only the bankruptcy trus tee may appeal an order from a bankruptcy court” was created “as a means to control, in an orderly manner, proceedings that often involve numerous creditors w ho are dissatisfied with any co mpromise that jeopardizes the full payment of their outstanding claims against the bankrupt.” In re Westwood Cmty. Two Ass’n, Inc. , 293 F.3d 1332, 1334 (11th Cir. 2002); cf. El San Juan Hotel , 809 F.2d at 154 (explaining the general rationale for bankruptcy appellate standing rules). As this court has persuasively explained: [T]he [Bankruptcy] Code makes no pr ovision within the structure of Chapter 7 for “former management” to appear in the proceeding and attempt to control the prope rty of the estate or assert a separate interest on- 11 - behalf of the Debtor. The whole not ion that the contrary is true is antithetical to the basic concept of a corporate li quidating bankru ptcy under Chapter 7 of the Code. . . . The only pe rson with standing or legal capacity to represent [the Debtor] in any litig ation, including these appeals, is its Trustee

. Log Furniture, Inc. , 180 F. App’x at 787-88 (emphasi s added). Other individuals might have standing to appeal under the “person ag grieved rule,” but thos e individuals may not usurp the corporation ’s right to appeal, which may be exercised by the trustee alone.
2 The BAP’s contrary conclusion is grou nded on the threshold error (which the Managers repeat in this appeal) of confusing C.W.’s right to appeal with C.W.’s former management’s right to bring C.W.’s appeal. In its opinion, the BAP did not recognize that this case is about the Managers’ authority, not C.W.’s standing. In deciding to exercise jurisdiction, the BAP’s primar y concern was fairness. It correctly noted that the Bankruptcy Code give s a putative involuntary debtor the right to challenge the involuntary petition. See 11 U.S.C. § 303(d). Accordingly, the BAP accepted the Managers’ argument that “if invol untary debtors like C.W. [] are denied standing to appeal, their right to answer [under § 303(d)] is rendered a nullity.” Yet the question is not whether C.W. can appeal the § 30 3(b) determination, but who can bring C.W.’s appeal. It would certai nly be unfair and against the spirit of the Bankruptcy Code to prevent a debtor from a ppealing a § 303(b) determination. In the present action, the Trustee’s mo tion to dismiss never contested C.W.’s right to appeal. Rather, it argued that the Trus tee alone could decide to pu rsue such an appeal.- 12 - After C.W. entered into Chapter 7 bankru ptcy and a trustee was appointed, C.W.’s former management’s only role was “to turn ove r the corporation’s property to the trustee and to provide certain inform ation to the trustee and to the creditors.” Weintraub , 471 U.S. at 352. C.W.’s directors were otherwise “completely ousted.” Id. at 353. The Bankruptcy Code makes no provision for former management to appear in a Chapter 7 proceeding to assert a separate in terest on behalf of the Debtor. 7 See Log Furniture, Inc. , 180 F. App’x at 787. Authority to make le gal decisions, like all other business decisions, passed to the Trustee alone. In Weintraub , the appointment of a trustee di d not destroy the attorney-client privilege, but only changed who could assert it. Similarly in this cas e, the appointment of the Trustee did not, as the BAP held, destro y C.W.’s right to appeal. Such a right remained intact. All that changed was who could bring that appeal. Although the BAP discussed how “CW[] asserts” that its right to appeal was on the line, C.W., in fact, asserted no such thing—that argument was made by C.W.’s former management, purporting to act on C.W.’s behalf. C.W., through its only legally authorized representative, the Trustee, correctly argued th e contrary: the decision to appeal must be made by the Trustee after identifying the best interests of the estate. 3 The Managers’ equity argument is slightly different from that advanced in the

7 At oral argument, the Managers’ coun sel stated: “We do not represent the [bankruptcy] estate. We repres ent a separate interest . . . .”- 13 - BAP’s order, but rests on the same misguided conflation of C.W. with C.W.’s former management. In contrast to the BAP’s right-without- a-remedy concern, the Managers advance an equitable argument, making a distinc tion between involuntary and voluntary bankruptcy proceedings. They explain that, as an involuntary debtor, C.W. was “forced into the bankruptcy.” Conseq uently, they contend “[e]quity demands that an involuntary debtor have standing to appeal both the involuntary petition [a nd] bankruptcy court orders for relief where the debtor has been placed into bankruptcy against its will.” At oral argument, the Managers went furt her, calling the involunt ary petition a “harsh remedy that will force a compan y into this nightmare,” and requested an equitable right to appeal on that basis. 8 Perhaps the Managers’ equity argument seems compelling, at least facially. C.W. was forced into bank ruptcy involuntarily. It contested that involuntary petition and lost. And now the Trustee is seeking to prevent C.W. from appealing. But their argument is flawed because it is unresponsive to the Trustee’s contention. No one took away C.W.’s right to appeal. As discussed above, C.W.—the

8 The Managers’ point us to a Tenth Ci rcuit case, Bartmann v. Maverick Tube Corp. , 853 F.2d 1540 (10th Ci r. 1988). It is not on point. In Bartmann , the bankruptcy court dismissed an involuntary petition, holdi ng one of the creditors did not qualify under § 303(b), and the creditors appealed to the district court. Id. at 1541-42. The district court reversed and ordere d the bankruptcy court to grant the petition. Id. at 1542. We heard the debtor’s appeal. Id. Bartmann is readily distinguishable because the debtor in that case appealed before a bankruptc y trustee had been appointed. See id. at 1541-42.- 14 - corporate entity—may in fact have standing to appeal as a “per son aggrieved.” But C.W.’s standing does not authorize the Mana gers to act on C.W.’s behalf. There is therefore nothing unfair, because we are not denying C.W. the right to appeal. In accordance with bankruptcy law and with Supreme Court precedent, see Weintraub , 471 U.S. at 352-53, we merely reaffirm that onl y the Trustee has the right to bring C.W.’s appeal. Furthermore, and contrary to the Managers’ argument, there is no “separate interest” for the Managers to represent. Co rporations have only the interests the law grants them. As the Supreme Court explained long ago, “[a] corpora tion is an artificial being, invisible, intangible, and existing only in contemplation of law. Being a mere creature of law, it possesses only those propertie s which the charter of its creation confers upon it, either expressly, or as incidental to its very existence.” Trs. of Dartmouth Coll. v. Woodward , 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518, 636 (1 819). And “a corporation remains unchanged and unaffected in its identity by changes in its members.” Old Dominion Copper Mining & Smelting Co. v. Lewisohn , 210 U.S. 206, 216 (1908). When a corporation enters Chapter 7 bank ruptcy and a trustee is appointed, the corporation itself, as an inta ngible legal creation, remains unchanged. But it gets new management, in the form of a trustee, Weintraub , 471 U.S. at 353, and its legal purpose becomes vastly different. The Supreme Cour t “has long recognized that a chief purpose of the bankruptcy laws is to secure a prom pt and effectual administration and settlement of the estate of all bankrupts within a limited period.” Katchen v. Landy , 382 U.S. 323,- 15 - 328 (1966) (quotation omitted). The entire purpose of invo luntary bankruptcy is to “protect the interests and desi res of the creditors as a whol e.” Basin Elec. Power Co-op. v. Midwest Processing Co. , 47 B.R. 903, 908 (D.N.D. 19 84). Accordingly, bankruptcy law drastically redefines and narrows the co rporation’s “interest”—the major purpose for its continued existence is maximizing the valu e of the estate for its creditors, not its shareholders. Bankruptcy law abrogates other “i nterests” C.W. may have formerly had. To the extent the Managers argue they ar e vindicating C.W.’s interests, they are wrong. Just the opposite is true: the Ma nagers’ attempts to c onfound the Trustee’s administration of the estate hinder the only interest C.W. now legally has, which is liquidating the business in such a manner as to maximize the estate’s value. Seeking to distinguish Weintraub , the Managers contend that its “complete ouster” rule should not apply in involuntary bankruptci es. But such a distinction finds no support in bankruptcy law. Under th e rule the Managers urge us to adopt, an involuntary corporate debtor’s former managers would linger on the scene long after the Code and Weintraub require them to exit. Instead of an orderly liquidation of the estate, every move by the Trustee, and every adverse court decision, could be contested and appealed. As this case demonstrates, such actions de lay the Chapter 7 liquidation and seriously erode the value of the estate. We decline to create a rule that runs entirely counter to the very purpose of Chapter 7 bankruptcy.
4 Accordingly, we confirm that following th e appointment of a trustee in a corporate- 16 - Chapter 7 bankruptcy, the corporation’s former managers are not authorized to bring the corporation’s appeal—even if that appeal c ontests the very initiatio n of the bankruptcy itself. There is no equitable exception to th is rule, nor is there a distinction between voluntary and involuntary debtors. However, we do note three limit s of our holding. First, we do not hold that a bankrupt corporation’s managers never have the authority to bring the corporation’s appeal. Before a trustee is appointed, control of the corporation remains vested in its managers. Moreove r, the Chapter 11 bankruptcy trustee, if there is one, has a much different ro le than in Chapter 7. Chapter 11 focuses on the debtor: its essence “is to provide a mech anism for the reorganization of a financially distressed business or individual in the hope that a profitable and productive member of its economic community can once again emerge.” 1 Collier on Bankruptcy, at ¶ 1.07[3]. Therefore, in Chapter 11, a trustee takes up the fiduciary duties of the former managers and has an interest in reorganizing the bankru ptcy estate for the sh areholders as well as the creditors. Weintraub , 471 U.S. at 345. When a co rporate bankruptcy is converted from Chapter 11 to Chapter 7, a sea change takes place. Ch apter 7 shifts the focus to creditors, 1 Collier on Bankruptcy, at ¶ 1.07[ 1][a], and protects the creditors by appointing a trustee to control the estate. And even after conversion to Chapter 7, a corporation’s management is not without recourse. While they still control the corporatio n, managers can contest a conversion to Chapter 7. See 11 U.S.C. § 1112(b)(1). Acco rdingly, they can appeal a conversion order (at least until a trustee is appointed). See In re Rosson , 545 F.3d 764,- 17 - 770 (9th Cir. 2008). But when corporate managers fail to appeal the conversion to Chapter 7, they cannot atone for their mistake by appealing other determinations over a trustee’s objection. Given the Managers’ failu re to appeal the conversion in this case, their arguments regarding equity ring especially hollow. Second, our rule does not ap ply to individuals in Chapter 7 bankruptcy. We do not hold that C.W. has no right to appeal the bankruptcy cour t’s § 303(b) determination. Instead, our holding is premised on the fact th at: (1) a corporation can only act through its agents; and (2) after a Chap ter 7 trustee is appointed, the trustee is the only agent authorized to act for the corporation. C.W. still may have an appeal right, but the only natural person who can control th e right is the trustee. This rule does not follow for natural persons in Chapter 7 bankruptcy. An individual debtor can appeal over a trus tee’s objection if the debtor is a “person aggrieved.” This is so because individual de btors have interests, outside the bankruptcy estate, which can be implicated by adverse ba nkruptcy court determinations. But whether a debtor is a “person aggrieved” is a separate inquiry (and one we could have reached had the Trustee, not the Managers, appealed to the BAP). Because no party authorized to make the argument claims that C.W. is a pers on aggrieved, we decline to consider that issue here. Third, we do not hold th at former managers cannot appeal a bankruptcy court order in their own right. If C.W.’s managers themselves have been injured pecuniarily, they can appeal as “persons aggrieved.” Cf. In re LTV Steel Co. , 560 F.3d 449, 450,- 18 - 455-56 (6th Cir. 2009). Such an appeal mu st be brought on their own behalf, not on behalf of C.W.
III Accordingly, we REVERSE and REMAND with the instruction to DISMISS

.