TO BE PUBLISHED

V. IN SUPREME COURT

RODGER WILLIAM MOORE RESPONDENT

OPINION AND ORDER

The Supreme Court of Ohio permanently disbarred Rodger William

Moore1 from the practice of law.2 The Kentucky Bar Association (KBA) filed a

petition with this Court asking that we impose reciprocal discipline under

Kentucky Rules of the Supreme Court (SCR) 3.435(4). This Court ordered

Moore to show cause why we should not impose such discipline, and he has

failed to respond to that order. Because Moore failed to show cause why this

Court should not impose reciprocal discipline, we hereby disbar him from the

practice of law in this Commonwealth, as consistent with the order of the

Supreme Court of Ohio.

1 Moore was admitted to the practice of law in the Commonwealth of Kentucky on

August 1, 2007. His bar roster address is listed as 1101 St. Gregory Place, Suite 300,

Cincinnati, Ohio 41001, and his KBA number is 91860.

2 Cincinnati Bar Assn. v. Moore, Slip Opinion No. 2019-0hio-2063.
I. BACKGROUND.

In 2014, Shannon Marshall was a party to a divorce proceeding. Marshall

was initially represented by an attorney from legal aid, but, acting upon advice

from a friend, Marshall contacted Moore to inquire as to whether he would be

willing to take her case. Moore sent Marshall an email stating that he would file

a notice of substitution of counsel in her divorce proceeding, and he instructed

Marshall to notify her legal-aid attorney that another attorney “volunteered to

take [her] case at no charge.” Moore also sent an email directly to Marshall’s

legal-aid attorney stating that he had agreed to represent Marshall at no

charge. Moore did not provide Marshall with a fee agreement or any other

documents indicating that he intended to charge her for his services. In

reliance on Moore’s assurance that he would represent her at no charge,

Marshall terminated the legal-aid representation. Less than four weeks after

Moore commenced the representation, he sent Marshall an invoice for $9,500.

Marshall testified that Moore explained that he did not expect Marshall to pay

the invoice but instead intended to seek an award of attorney’s fees from her

husband in the divorce proceeding. But Moore never sought an award of

attorney’s fees from the court.

In April 2015, Moore began to complain to Marshall that her case “was a

lot of work.” On April 20, 2015, Moore emailed Marshall an $11,000

promissory note and requested that she sign it. Because Marshall was in dire

financial straits and thus had no way to hire another attorney to represent her

in the ongoing divorce proceeding, Marshall orally agreed to pay Moore over

time in accordance with the promissory note.

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On June 25, 2015, Moore was suspended from the practice of law in

Ohio for two years, with the second year stayed on conditions—which was later

revoked upon a finding of contempt for continuing to practice law during the

term of suspension—“based on findings that [Moore] engaged in illegal

activities that adversely reflected on his honesty and trustworthiness, and

knowingly made false statements of material facts during the ensuing

disciplinary investigation.”

Just one day after his suspension, Moore attempted to represent

Marshall during a hearing in her divorce case. Moore did inform Marshall that

he was not sure the court would allow him to represent her at this hearing. The

presiding magistrate ultimately continued the hearing to allow Marshall to find

other representation after he noted Moore’s suspension and instructed Moore

to leave the courtroom. Moore’s associate, Andrew Green, took over

representation through the trial of Marshall’s divorce in September 2015.

In September 2016, Green filed a breach of contract action against

Marshall on behalf of Moore. The complaint falsely alleged that Marshall had

agreed to Moore’s billing rate of $225 an hour and that Moore made multiple

requests for payment of his fee, to which Marshall refused to respond. Marshall

was forced to hire an attorney to defend against this complaint. The trial court

eventually dismissed the action.

The Supreme Court of Ohio adopted the Ohio Board of Professional

Conduct’s finding that Moore’s conduct in agreeing to represent Marshall for

free and then demanding she sign a promissory note, using a “bait and switch”

tactic, and knowingly making false allegations in the breach of contract

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complaint violated the equivalent of Kentucky’s SCR 3.130-1.5(a) for charging

an unreasonable (“excessive”) fee; and SCR 3.130-8.4(c) for engaging in

conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation. The Supreme

Court of Ohio also adopted the Board’s finding that Moore violated Ohio’s

Prof.Cond.R. 8.4(d), which prohibits a lawyer from engaging in conduct that is

prejudicial to the administration ofjustice.3 Based on these findings, the

Supreme Court of Ohio agreed with the Board’s assessment that Moore was no

longer fit to practice law and permanently disbarred Moore.

II. ANALYSIS.

If an attorney licensed to practice law in the Commonwealth receives

discipline in another jurisdiction, SCR 3.435(4) generally requires this Court to

impose identical discipline unless the respondent proves “by substantial

evidence: (a) a lack ofjurisdiction or fraud in the out-of-state disciplinary

proceeding, or (b) that misconduct established warrants substantially different

discipline in this State.” Furthermore, SCR 3.435(4)(c) requires this Court to

recognize that “[i]n all other respects, a final adjudication in another

jurisdiction that an attorney has been guilty of misconduct shall establish

conclusively the misconduct for purposes of a disciplinary proceeding in

[Kentucky].” Under SCR 3.435(4), we impose reciprocal discipline because

Moore failed to offer any evidence that the Ohio Supreme Court lacked

3 Kentucky does not have a counterpart to Ohio’s Prof.Cond.R. 8.4, but the rules need

not be identical to impose reciprocal discipline. Kentucky Bar Ass’n v. Trainor, 277

S.W.3d 604, 605 (Ky. 2009).

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jurisdiction, the Ohio proceeding was fraudulent, or that Moore’s misconduct

warranted substantially different discipline in Kentucky.

III. ORDER

For the reasons stated above, the Court ORDERS that:

1. Rodger William Moore is permanently disbarred from the practice of law

in Kentucky; and

2. In accordance with SCR 3.450, Moore shall pay all costs associated with

these proceedings; and

3. Under SCR 3.390, Moore must, within ten days from the entry of this

Opinion and Order, notify all clients, in writing, of his inability to

represent them; notify, in writing, all courts in which he has matters

pending of his disbarment from the practice of law; and furnish copies of

all letters of notice to the Office of Bar Counsel. Furthermore, to the

extent possible, Moore must immediately cancel and cease any

advertising activities in which he is engaged.

All sitting. All concur.

ENTERED: September 26, 2019

CHI

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