J-S67030-14 

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37 

IN RE: ADOPTION OF: T.J.S. IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA 

 

APPEAL OF: T.B., MOTHER No. 1064 WDA 2014 

Appeal from the Order May 20, 2014, 

in the Court of Common Pleas of Westmoreland County, Orphans’ 

Court, at No(s): 23 of 2013 

IN RE: ADOPTION OF: T.B.S. IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA 

 

APPEAL OF: T.B., MOTHER No. 1065 WDA 2014 

Appeal from the Order May 20, 2014, 

in the Court of Common Pleas of Westmoreland County, Orphans’ 

Court, at No(s): 24 of 2013 

BEFORE: DONOHUE, MUNDY, and FITZGERALD*, JJ. 

MEMORANDUM BY MUNDY, J.: FILED FEBRUARY 2, 2015 

 Appellant, T.B. (Mother), appeals from the May 20, 2014 orders 

involuntarily terminating her parental rights to her sons, T.J.S., born in 

August 2007, and T.B.S., born in November 2011.1 After careful review, we 

affirm. 

 This action arises from the filing of two petitions for the involuntary 

termination of Mother’s parental rights pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A. 

§§ 2511(a)(2), (5), (8), and (b) by the Westmoreland County Children’s 

 

* Former Justice specially assigned to Superior Court. 

1

 By orders dated July 10, 2013, the parental rights of T.J.S. and T.B.S.’s 

natural father, H.C.S., Jr. (Father), were voluntarily terminated. Father did 

not file a notice of appeal, and he is not a party to this appeal. 
J-S67030-14 

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Bureau (WCCB) on February 15, 2013. Subsequently, Mother expressed the 

desire to relinquish her parental rights to T.J.S. and T.B.S., and, following a 

hearing, on July 10, 2013, the orphans’ court voluntarily terminated 

Mother’s parental rights. Thereafter, on August 7, 2013, Mother filed timely 

notices of appeal. This Court concluded that Mother’s waiver of her right to 

counsel was invalid, and, therefore, her consent to voluntarily terminate her 

parental rights was void. As such, on February 7, 2014, we reversed the 

orders and remanded the case to the orphans’ court. See In re Adoption 

of T.J.S. & T.B.S., 97 A.3d 797 (Pa. Super. 2014) (unpublished 

memorandum). 

Upon remand, on May 15, 2014, the orphans’ court held an evidentiary 

hearing for the involuntary termination of Mother’s parental rights. WCCB 

presented the testimony of the following witnesses: Lisa Wood, social worker 

at Wesley Spectrum Services; Carol Hughes, M.A., a licensed psychologist 

who performed a forensic bonding assessment; and Susan Storer, the WCCB 

caseworker. Mother testified on her own behalf, and she presented the 

testimony of her husband, R.B., and the Court-Appointed Special Advocate, 

Rhonda Dean. At the conclusion of said hearing, the orphans’ court set forth 

findings of fact pertaining to each child, that the competent record evidence 

supports. Regarding T.J.S., the orphans’ court made the following findings 

of fact pursuant to Section 2511(a)(2). 

1) Mother’s repeated incapacity has caused 

[T.J.S.] to be without essential parental care, control 
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or subsistence necessary for his physical or mental

well-being and the conditions and causes of the 

incapacity cannot or will not be remedied by 

[Mother]. 

2) Specifically, th[e orphans’ c]ourt finds that 

WCCB has provided services since 2010 in an effort 

to remedy Mother’s incapacity. 

3) Prior to the WCCB assuming custody, the WCCB 

began providing General Protective Services to 

Mother and the family on May 26, 2010 due to 

Mother’s mental health issues, parenting deficits, 

and domestic violence reports. 

4) Mother has received the following contracted 

services since September of 2010: intensive family 

reunification services, including hands-on parenting 

and budgeting, supervised visitation with [T.J.S.],

anger management treatment, mental health 

treatment and medication. 

5) Ongoing reported concerns regarding [T.J.S.]’s 

safety within Mother’s home include, pill bottles, 

medication, lighters, poisonous cleaners, and sharp

objects on the floor and/or within [T.J.S.]’s reach. 

On another occasion, Mother dressed [T.J.S.]’s infant 

brother [T.B.S.] in clothing not appropriate for the 

weather conditions. Mother failed to realize that 

[T.B.S.] was overheating due to being dressed for 

very cold temperatures during the unseasonably 

warm December day and, on another occasion, 

Mother allowed [T.J.S.] to walk around in snow while 

only wearing footed pajamas. Mother also failed to

change [T.B.S.]’s diaper for approximately twelve 

(12) hours, not realizing that he had clearly soiled 

the diaper on multiple occasions. 

6) [T.J.S.] was taken into agency custody on 

March 15, 2011 and was returned to Mother’s 

custody on May 15, 2011, with continued services. 
J-S67030-14 

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7) On December 5, 2011, [T.J.S.] and [T.B.S.] 

were taken into custody when Mother violated the 

established safety plan. 

8) While [T.J.S.] has been in custody, Mother has 

continued to receive intensive parenting instruction 

in an effort to alleviate the circumstances which 

necessitated placement. 

9) Although Mother has complied moderately with 

the Child Permanency Plan, th[e orphans’ c]ourt 

finds that Mother has made no progress towards 

alleviating the circumstances which necessitated 

placement, in that, while Mother has received 

intensive parenting services for over two (2) years, 

Mother has been unable to demonstrate that she is 

capable of implementing the parenting that has been

modeled for her and which is necessary to ensure 

the safety and welfare of [T.J.S.] 

10) During supervised visitation, Mother had 

demonstrated concrete thinking and has been unable 

to develop flexible thinking. Mother has consistently 

demonstrated unsafe parenting with [T.J.S.], and 

although Mother has been instructed extensively in 

proper and safe parenting, Mother has been unable 

or unwilling to implement the techniques modeled for 

her. Mother does not react appropriately to matters 

that would normally be concerning, such as a child 

falling. Mother has a difficult time making 

conversation with [T.J.S.] and requires prompting 

during the visits to do so. Mother has difficulty with 

multi-tasking and does not react well when 

something occurs during the visit that is not planned. 

Mother is still not able to care for and engage both of 

her children at the same time. Mother has a lack of 

understanding of appropriate developmental 

expectations and in such regard, Mother 

inappropriately disciplines [T.J.S.] for ageappropriate behaviors. 

11) Psychologist, Carol A. Hughes, completed a 

Forensic Bonding Assessment in June of 2013 and 

updated that Assessment in April/May of 2014. At 
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the termination hearing, the parties stipulated to Ms. 

Hughes being qualified as an expert in the area of 

bonding and attachment. Th[e orphans’ c]ourt 

accepts and relies upon Ms. Hughes’ analysis of the

bond between Mother and [T.J.S.] 

12) Based upon Ms. Hughes’ observation of [T.J.S.] 

and Mother’s interaction during supervised visitation, 

th[e orphans’ c]ourt finds as follows: [T.J.S.] does 

not perceive Mother as being available to reliably and 

consistently meet his needs. Therefore, he does not 

turn to her to do so. Specifically, during visits,

[T.J.S.] did not approach Mother to greet her with a 

physical display of affection. When Mother 

approached [T.J.S.] and picked him up, [T.J.S.] 

“went limp” and did not reciprocate Mother’s 

embrace. [T.J.S.] mostly engaged in solitary play 

during Mother’s visitation and placed himself out of 

social distance from Mother. [T.J.S.] demonstrates

an “insecure avoidant relational pattern” with 

Mother. Mother continues to present with significant 

parenting deficits. 

Findings of Fact, 5/20/14, at 1-3 (1064 WDA 2014).2 The findings of fact 

regarding T.B.S. are substantially similar to the above quoted findings in the 

matter of T.J.S. See Findings of Fact, 5/20/14, at ¶¶ 1-11 (1065 WDA 

2014). Pertinent to this appeal we note the orphans’ court’s 12th finding of 

fact differs regarding T.B.S., as follows. 

12) Based upon Ms. Hughes’ observation of 

[T.B.S.] and Mother’s interaction during supervised

visitation, th[e orphans’ c]ourt finds that, because 

[T.B.S.] was one (1) month of age when he came 

into the custody of the WCCB, Mother has no longterm history of providing caregiver responsibilities 

for [T.B.S.] As such, there is no development of an 

 

2

 We note the orphans’ court’s findings of fact do not contain pagination. 

Therefore, for ease of review, we have assigned each page a corresponding 

page number. 
J-S67030-14 

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attachment bond for [T.B.S.] and Mother. Mother 

lacks the skill and ability to form that attachment

and bond. For example, she is not able to initiate

playful interaction with [T.B.S.] [T.B.S.] on occasion 

moved away from Mother when Mother attempted to 

create physical contact. [T.B.S.] demonstrated no 

preference for proximity to Mother. [T.B.S.] did not 

look to Mother for shared positive affect[ion], did not 

engage in activity to seek Mother’s attention or to

bring Mother into proximity. Mother continues to 

present with significant parenting deficits.

Id. at ¶ 12. 

By orders dated May 20, 2014, the orphans’ court terminated Mother’s 

parental rights pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A.§§ 2511(a)(2), (5), (8), and (b). On 

June 18, 2014, Mother timely filed notices of appeal and concise statements 

of errors complained of on appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a)(2)(i), which 

this Court consolidated sua sponte.

3

 See generally Pa.R.A.P. 513. 

 On appeal, Mother presents the following issues for our review. 

I. Whether the [orphans’] court erred in finding by

clear and convincing evidence that the moving party

met its burden as to terminating the parental rights 

of [M]other under 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(2)? 

II. Whether the [orphans’] court erred in finding by 

clear and convincing evidence that the moving party

met its burden as to terminating the parental rights 

of [M]other under 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(5)? 

III. Whether the [orphans’] court erred in finding by 

clear and convincing evidence that the moving party

 

3

 In lieu of filing Rule 1925(a) opinions, the orphans’ court adopted its May 

20, 2014 findings of fact for T.J.S. and T.B.S. We further note that the 

orphans’ court states it adopts its May 15, 2014 findings of fact, but said 

orders were not filed until May 20, 2014. 
J-S67030-14 

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met its burden as to terminating the parental rights 

of [M]other under 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(8)? 

Mother’s Brief at 4. 

We review a termination order according to the following standard. 

[A]ppellate courts must apply an abuse of discretion 

standard when considering a trial court’s 

determination of a petition for termination of 

parental rights. As in dependency cases, our 

standard of review requires an appellate court to 

accept the findings of fact and credibility 

determinations of the trial court if they are supported 

by the record. In re R.J.T., 9 A.3d 1179, 1190 

([Pa.] 2010). If the factual findings are supported, 

appellate courts review to determine if the trial court 

made an error of law or abused its discretion. Id.; 

[In re] R.I.S., 36 A.3d [567,] 572 [(Pa. 2011) 

(plurality)]. As has been often stated, an abuse of 

discretion does not result merely because the 

reviewing court might have reached a different 

conclusion. Id.; see also Samuel-Bassett v. Kia 

Motors America, Inc., 34 A.3d 1, 51 ([Pa.] 2011); 

Christianson v. Ely, 838 A.2d 630, 634 ([Pa.] 

2003). Instead, a decision may be reversed for an 

abuse of discretion only upon demonstration of 

manifest unreasonableness, partiality, prejudice, 

bias, or ill-will. Id.

As we discussed in R.J.T., there are clear 

reasons for applying an abuse of discretion standard 

of review in these cases. We observed that, unlike

trial courts, appellate courts are not equipped to 

make the fact-specific determinations on a cold 

record, where the trial judges are observing the 

parties during the relevant hearing and often 

presiding over numerous other hearings regarding 

the child and parents. R.J.T., [supra]. Therefore, 

even where the facts could support an opposite 

result, as is often the case in dependency and 

termination cases, an appellate court must resist the 

urge to second guess the trial court and impose its

own credibility determinations and judgment; 
J-S67030-14 

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instead we must defer to the trial judges so long as 

the factual findings are supported by the record and 

the court’s legal conclusions are not the result of an 

error of law or an abuse of discretion. In re 

Adoption of Atencio, 650 A.2d 1064, 1066 ([Pa.] 

1994). 

In re Adoption of S.P., 47 A.3d 817, 826–827 (Pa. 2012) (parallel citations 

omitted). 

 Termination of parental rights is governed by Section 2511 of the 

Adoption Act, which requires a bifurcated analysis.

Our case law has made clear that under Section 

2511, the court must engage in a bifurcated process

prior to terminating parental rights. Initially, the 

focus is on the conduct of the parent. The party 

seeking termination must prove by clear and 

convincing evidence that the parent’s conduct 

satisfies the statutory grounds for termination 

delineated in Section 2511(a). Only if the court 

determines that the parent’s conduct warrants 

termination of his or her parental rights does the 

court engage in the second part of the analysis 

pursuant to Section 2511(b): determination of the 

needs and welfare of the child under the standard of 

best interests of the child. One major aspect of the 

needs and welfare analysis concerns the nature and 

status of the emotional bond between parent and 

child, with close attention paid to the effect on the 

child of permanently severing any such bond. 

In re L.M., 923 A.2d 505, 511 (Pa. Super. 2007), citing 23 Pa.C.S.A. 

§ 2511. The burden is on the petitioner to prove by clear and convincing 

evidence that the asserted statutory grounds for seeking the termination of 

parental rights are valid. In re R.N.J., 985 A.2d 273, 276 (Pa. Super. 

2009). 
J-S67030-14 

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 Instantly, we conclude the orphans’ court properly terminated Mother’s 

parental rights pursuant to Section 2511(a)(2) and (b), which provides as 

follows. 

§ 2511. Grounds for involuntary termination 

(a) General Rule.--The rights of a parent in regard 

to a child may be terminated after a petition filed on 

any of the following grounds: 

... 

(2) The repeated and continued incapacity, 

abuse, neglect or refusal of the parent has 

caused the child to be without essential 

parental care, control or subsistence necessary 

for his physical or mental well-being and the 

conditions and causes of the incapacity, abuse, 

neglect or refusal cannot or will not be 

remedied by the parent. 

... 

(b) Other considerations.--The court in 

terminating the rights of a parent shall give primary 

consideration to the developmental, physical and 

emotional needs and welfare of the child. The rights 

of a parent shall not be terminated solely on the 

basis of environmental factors such as inadequate 

housing, furnishings, income, clothing and medical 

care if found to be beyond the control of the parent. 

With respect to any petition filed pursuant to 

subsection (a)(1), (6) or (8), the court shall not 

consider any efforts by the parent to remedy the 

conditions described therein which are first initiated 

subsequent to the giving of notice of the filing of the 

petition. 

23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(2), (b); see also In re B.L.W., 843 A.2d 380, 384 

(Pa. Super. 2004) (en banc) (stating that this Court need only agree with 
J-S67030-14 

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any one subsection of Section 2511(a), in addition to Section 2511(b), in 

order to affirm the termination of parental rights). 

To satisfy the requirements of Section 2511(a)(2), the moving party 

must produce clear and convincing evidence regarding the following 

elements: “(1) repeated and continued incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal; 

(2) such incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal caused the child to be without 

essential parental care, control or subsistence necessary for his physical or 

mental well-being; and (3) the causes of the incapacity, abuse, neglect or 

refusal cannot or will not be remedied.” In re Adoption of M.E.P., 825 

A.2d 1266, 1272 (Pa. Super. 2003). “The grounds for termination of 

parental rights [under Section 2511(a)(2),] due to parental incapacity that 

cannot be remedied, are not limited to affirmative misconduct ... [t]o the 

contrary, those grounds may include acts of refusal as well as incapacity to 

perform parental duties.” In re A.L.D., 797 A.2d 326, 337 (Pa. Super. 

2002). 

 With respect to Section 2511(b), this Court has explained the requisite 

analysis as follows. 

Subsection 2511(b) focuses on whether termination 

of parental rights would best serve the 

developmental, physical, and emotional needs and 

welfare of the child. In In re C.M.S., 884 A.2d 

1284, 1287 (Pa. Super. 2005), this Court stated, 

“Intangibles such as love, comfort, security, and 

stability are involved in the inquiry into the needs 

and welfare of the child.” In addition, we instructed 

that the trial court must also discern the nature and 

status of the parent-child bond, with utmost 
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attention to the effect on the child of permanently

severing that bond. Id. However, in cases where 

there is no evidence of a bond between a parent and

child, it is reasonable to infer that no bond exists. 

In re K.Z.S., 946 A.2d 753, 762-63 (Pa. Super. 

2008). Accordingly, the extent of the bond-effect 

analysis necessarily depends on the circumstances of 

the particular case. Id. at 63. 

In re Adoption of J.M., 991 A.2d 321, 324 (Pa. Super. 2010). 

 On appeal, Mother argues that the evidence does not support 

termination under Section 2511(a)(2) because there is a “reasonable 

possibility that the causes and conditions which have led to separation, 

namely parenting issues, can be remedied and the family restored.” 

Mother’s Brief at 10. Specifically, Mother asserts that she has had stable 

housing for the last year, and with the assistance of her husband,4 she 

“would be able to remedy the parenting issues in this case.” Id. Further, 

Mother relies on the testimony of the Court Appointed Special Advocate, 

Rhonda Dean, who stated that she observed one supervised visit of Mother 

with T.J.S. and T.B.S. during which Mother “multi-tasked well” in caring and 

interacting with each child. N.T., 5/15/14, at 142. Upon careful review, we 

reject Mother’s arguments. 

 The testimonial evidence reveals that WCCB first became involved with 

this family in 2010, when Mother self-referred due to her frustration in 

parenting T.J.S., who was then approximately three years old. N.T., 

 

4

 Mother testified that she married R.B. on May 31, 2013. N.T., 5/15/14, at 

146. R.B. is not the biological father of T.J.S. or T.B.S. 
J-S67030-14 

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5/15/14, at 7. Lisa Wood, a clinical social worker at Wesley Spectrum 

Services, testified that she began working with Mother in September 2010 

with respect to her parenting skills, budgeting issues, and housing concerns. 

Id. Wood testified regarding Mother’s parenting deficits as follows. 

Q. What were the deficits in parenting that you were 

working on with [M]other? 

A. [ ] There were issues in terms of what [T.J.S.] 

was eating, how much he was eating, when he was 

eating, how much he was sleeping, the diaper 

changes. And with mom there were a lot of 

incidents where, when we would talk about things, 

she would blame dad or she would say dad needs to 

do that.... 

Id. at 14. In addition, Wood testified, “there was concern during that time 

in general in regards to [Mother’s and Father’s] decision making and 

judgment.” Id. at 14-15. 

 On March 15, 2011, T.J.S. was placed in custody due, in part, to 

housing instability, domestic violence between Mother and Father, and an 

allegation that the child had a physical injury caused by Father that was 

subsequently deemed unfounded. Id. at 15-17, 127. T.J.S. was returned 

home to Mother on May 16, 2011, with services ordered. Id. at 18, 127-

128. In addition, a safety plan was developed precluding Mother from being 

alone with T.J.S. for more than two hours at a time. Id. at 18. 

 Wood continued to work with the family through the time of T.B.S.’s 

birth in November 2011, during which concerns remained involving housing 

instability and parenting deficits that risked the safety and welfare of T.J.S. 
J-S67030-14 

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Id. at 18-26. On December 5, 2011, less than one month after T.B.S.’s 

birth, T.J.S. and T.B.S. were placed in custody after Mother called WCCB to 

report that Father had left the home. Id. at 26. Wood visited the home on 

the day of placement and found T.B.S. bright red, lethargic, and with his 

eyes rolling backwards. Id. at 26-27. Further, Wood found that T.B.S. was 

dressed too warmly, and that Mother “had not noticed how hot [T.B.S.] was 

or what his needs were during that time.” Id. at 27. 

 After the placement, Wood supervised Mother’s visits, which increased 

from twice to three times per week.5 Id. at 31-32. Wood testified that 

Mother consistently failed to display age-appropriate parenting skills during 

the visits, including, but not limited to, showing a minimal reaction to T.B.S. 

falling and hitting his head, and T.J.S. having a plastic bag over his head. 

Id. at 32-35, 40-44. Further, Wood testified that Mother was unable to 

focus on T.J.S. and T.B.S. at the same time during visits. Id. at 38. In 

January 2013, Mother’s husband, R.B., began attending supervised visits 

with her. Id. at 44. Wood testified that Mother “wanted him to be like the 

main caretaker for T.B.S[.]”6 Id. 

 

5

 Wood testified that, following the voluntary termination orders in July of 

2013, supervised visits decreased, with the last one occurring on September 

12, 2013. N.T., 5/15/14, at 49, 51. However, upon the reversal of the 

voluntary termination orders and the remand of the case by this Court, 

Mother participated in an additional five visits with T.J.S. and T.B.S. Id. at 

51. 

6

 Wood testified that R.B. appeared uncomfortable and somewhat afraid 

around T.J.S and T.B.S. during visits. N.T., 5/15/14, at 54-55. 
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Wood testified that Mother does not understand age-appropriate 

behaviors and the proper development of T.J.S. and T.B.S. Id. at 46-49. 

Indeed, Carol Hughes, M.A., a licensed psychologist, observed three visits 

between Mother and T.J.S. and T.B.S. and testified that Mother “struggle[d] 

to utilize the direction and the instruction provided by the supervisor in 

these visits. [T]here was lack of monitoring for safety. You see instances of 

the inappropriate developmental expectations. There’s lack of empathetic 

responding [by Mother to T.J.S. and T.B.S.]” Id. at 89. 

Wood stated that Mother has made no progress in her parenting skills. 

Id. at 49-51, 57. Wood testified on cross-examination by the Guardian Ad 

Litem (GAL) as follows. 

Q. So, if you’re looking at the big picture and 

[Mother’s] capacity to take care of these kids? 

A. Yes. It’s been the ongoing theme of not being 

able to retain information ... and an ongoing theme 

of repeatedly talking about the same things over and 

over and over. And then just happening, like you 

said, one time it’s the diaper, one time it’s a 

medication bottle, one time it’s a fishing hook, one 

time it’s a glass; just repeated things of the same

theme or nature of safety or of caretaking or 

feeding. You know, there are themes in all of those 

areas that speak back to not being able to meet the

basic needs of the [C]hildren. 

Id. at 63-64. Likewise, the WCCB caseworker, Susan Storer, testified that 

Mother has not made any progress in her parenting skills. Id. at 132-133. 

 Significantly, Mother testified that, in addition to services from Wood, 

she currently receives services from Life Way Support Center, which teaches 
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hands-on parenting. Id. at 148, 151. However, Mother testified with 

respect to the difficulty she encounters during supervised visits as follows. 

Q. What do you do during visits? 

A. I ... interact with the [C]hildren. I play with them 

and try to keep [T.B.S.] occupied, but it’s kind of

hard to keep a two year old occupied because ... he’s

like the Energizer Bunny, he doesn’t want to sit still. 

It’s hard to play with the six year old while watching 

after my two year old. 

Id. at 150-151. 

The foregoing testimonial evidence demonstrates that Mother’s 

repeated and continued incapacity has caused T.J.S. and T.B.S. to be 

without essential parental care, control or subsistence necessary for their 

physical or mental well-being, and that the causes of her incapacity will not 

be remedied. As such, we discern no abuse of discretion by the orphans’ 

court in terminating Mother’s parental rights pursuant to Section 

2511(a)(2).7 

Further, contrary to Mother’s assertion, we will not disturb the 

termination orders based on the testimony of the Court Appointed Special 

Advocate, Rhonda Dean. Dean wrote two reports in the underlying matter, 

dated January 28, 2013, and March 27, 2014, which the orphans’ court 

admitted into evidence during the termination hearing. Dean testified that 

she observed three visits between Mother and T.J.S. and T.B.S. N.T., 

 

7

 Based on this disposition, we need not address Mother’s issues with 

respect to Sections 2511(a)(5) and (8). 
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5/15/14, at 141. In the January 28, 2013 report, Dean stated that, during 

the supervised visit on December 27, 2012, Mother “multi-tasked well with 

caring for and interacting with both of her children.” Id. at 141-142, Exhibit 

A at 4. Nevertheless, Dean testified that T.J.S. and T.B.S. share a bond with 

the foster parents, and she did not recommend removing them from the 

foster home. Id. at 143-145. In fact, upon inquiry by the orphans’ court, 

Dean testified that she has the same recommendation as the agency, that is, 

to terminate Mother’s parental rights. Id. at 145. Therefore, we conclude 

the orphans’ court did not err in concluding there was clear and convincing 

evidence to support the termination of Mother’s parental rights pursuant to 

Section 2511(a)(2). 

Although Mother does not invoke Section 2511(b) in her issues on 

appeal, in light of the requisite bifurcated analysis, we review the 

developmental, physical, and emotional needs and welfare of the child. With 

respect to the bond analysis pursuant to Section 2511(b), our Supreme 

Court confirmed that, “the mere existence of a bond or attachment of a child 

to a parent will not necessarily result in the denial of a termination petition.” 

In re T.S.M., 71 A.3d 251, 267 (Pa. 2013). The Court further stated that, 

“[c]ommon sense dictates that courts considering termination must also 

consider whether the children are in a pre-adoptive home and whether they 

have a bond with their foster parents.” Id. at 268 (citation omitted). 

Moreover, the Court directed that, in weighing the bond considerations 
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pursuant to section 2511(b), “courts must keep the ticking clock of 

childhood ever in mind.” The Court observed that, “[c]hildren are young for 

a scant number of years, and we have an obligation to see to their healthy 

development quickly. When courts fail ... the result, all too often, is 

catastrophically maladjusted children.” Id. at 269. 

 In this case, Hughes observed three visits between Mother and T.J.S. 

and T.B.S. and performed two bonding evaluations. N.T., 5/15/14, at 102-

103. Hughes testified she observed T.J.S. engage in solitary play during the 

visits, and she opined that T.J.S. displayed a relational pattern of avoidance 

toward Mother. Id. at 71, 72, 79, 104. Hughes testified neither child

showed significant joy in seeing Mother during the visits. Id. at 114. With 

respect to T.B.S., Hughes testified that, because Mother was his primary 

caregiver for less than one month, he does not have an attachment to her. 

Id. at 104. 

In contrast, Hughes testified that T.J.S. and T.B.S. have a bond with 

their foster parents, a pre-adoptive resource, with whom they have lived for 

17 months. Id. at 89, 110, 134. Significantly, Hughes testified T.J.S. and 

T.B.S. would suffer a “great negative impact” if they are removed from their 

foster family. Id. at 100. With respect to terminating Mother’s parental 

rights, Hughes agreed on direct examination that no harm would come to 

either child and testified, “I don’t believe the children would have 

adjustment problems if Mother’s rights were terminated.” Id. at 101. 
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 Based on the foregoing testimonial and documentary evidence, we 

discern no abuse of discretion by the court in concluding that T.J.S. and 

T.B.S.’s “primary emotional attachment is with the foster parents,” and 

returning T.J.S. and T.B.S. to Mother would have a “significant negative 

effect on the[ir] development[.]” Findings of Fact, 5/20/14, at 4. 

Accordingly, we affirm the orders involuntarily terminating Mother’s parental 

rights pursuant to Section 2511(a)(2) and (b). 

 Orders affirmed. 

Judgment Entered. 

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq. 

Prothonotary 

Date: 2/2/2015