[DO NOT PUBLISH]

In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Eleventh Circuit

____________________

No. 21-10387

____________________

STACEY IAN HUMPHREYS, 

Petitioner-Appellant,

versus

WARDEN, GEORGIA DIAGNOSTIC PRISON,

Respondent-Appellee.

____________________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of Georgia

D.C. Docket No. 1:18-cv-02534-LMM

____________________

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Before WILLIAM PRYOR, Chief Judge, and ROSENBAUM and 

NEWSOM, Circuit Judges. 

PER CURIAM:

Petitioner Stacey Humphreys, a death-row inmate in Georgia, filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 

§ 2254. Between the district court and this Court, Humphreys received a certificate of appealability (“COA”) on four issues. First, 

Humphreys asserts that juror misconduct and bias plagued the proceedings and deprived him of his due-process rights. Second, 

Humphreys contends the trial court gave an improper Allen charge, 

which compounded the juror misconduct. And third and fourth, 

Humphreys asks us to find that his trial counsel was ineffective during the investigation and presentation of mitigating evidence and 

that his appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to raise the juror-misconduct claim sooner. 

After careful consideration of the claims and with the benefit of oral argument, we affirm the district court’s denial of the habeas petition.

I. BACKGROUND

A. Facts

Humphreys was arrested for the murders of Cynthia Williams and Lori Brown in November 2003. Jimmy Berry was appointed as trial counsel. After the state issued its notice of intent 

to seek the death penalty in February 2004, the Georgia Capital Defender’s Office (“GCD”) signed onto the case with its director, 

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Chris Adams, joining Berry. The responsibility for Humphreys’s 

case shifted over the course of four years, but Berry remained on 

the case the entire time. Teri Thompson from GCD replaced Adams and worked on the case from January 2006 until June 2007. At 

that time, Deborah Czuba (who had also been working on the case 

during the same period as Thompson) became the second-chair attorney. Berry was first chair, presenting both the guilt and sentencing phases. 

At trial, the evidence showed the following tragic facts relating to the murders of Williams and Brown: 

At approximately 12:40 p.m. on November 3, 

2003, Humphreys, a convicted felon who was still on 

parole, entered a home construction company’s sales 

office located in a model home for a new subdivision 

in Cobb County [Georgia]. Cindy Williams and Lori 

Brown were employed there as real estate agents. 

Finding Ms. Williams alone in the office, Humphreys 

used a stolen handgun to force her to undress and to 

reveal the personal identification number (PIN) for 

her automated teller machine (ATM) card. After calling Ms. Williams’s bank to learn the amount of her 

current balance, Humphreys tied her underwear so 

tightly around her neck that, when her body was discovered, her neck bore a prominent ligature mark and 

her tongue was protruding from her mouth, which 

had turned purple. While choking Ms. Williams, 

Humphreys forced her to get down on her hands and 

knees and to move into Ms. Brown’s office and behind 

Ms. Brown’s desk. Humphreys placed his handgun at 

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Ms. Williams[’s] back and positioned a bag of balloons between the gun and her body to muffle the 

sound of gunshots. He then fired a shot into her back 

that went through her lung and heart, fired a second 

shot through her head, and left her face-down on her 

hands and knees under the desk.

Ms. Brown entered the office during or shortly 

after Humphreys’s attack on Ms. Williams, and he attacked her too. Ms. Brown suffered a hemorrhage in 

her throat that was consistent with her having been 

choked in a headlock-type grip or having been struck 

in the throat. Humphreys also forced Ms. Brown to 

undress and to reveal her PIN, called her bank to obtain her balance, and made her kneel with her head 

facing the floor. Then, while standing over Ms. 

Brown, Humphreys fired one gunshot through her 

head, this time using both a bag of balloons and Ms. 

Brown’s folded blouse to muffle the sound. He 

dragged her body to her desk, took both victims’ 

driver’s licenses and ATM and credit cards, and left the 

scene at approximately 1:30 p.m. Neither victim sustained any defensive wounds.

When the builder, whose office was located in 

the model home’s basement, heard the door chime of 

the security system indicating that someone had exited the sales office, he went to the sales office to meet 

with the [real-estate] agents. There he discovered Ms. 

Brown’s body and called 911. The responding police 

officer discovered Ms. Williams’s body.

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After interviewing the builder and canvassing 

the neighborhood, the police released to the media 

descriptions of the suspect and a Dodge Durango 

truck seen at the sales office near the time of the 

crimes. In response, someone at the job site where 

Humphreys worked called to advise that Humphreys 

and his vehicle matched those descriptions and that 

Humphreys did not report to work on the day of the 

crimes. The police began to investigate Humphreys 

and made arrangements through his parole officer to 

meet with him on the morning of November 7, 2003. 

Humphreys skipped the meeting, however, and 

eluded police officers who had him under surveillance.

Humphreys was apprehended in Wisconsin 

the following day. Police there recovered from the 

console of his rental vehicle a Ruger 9-millimeter pistol, which was determined to be the murder weapon. 

Swabbings from that gun revealed blood containing 

Ms. Williams’s DNA. A stain on the driver-side floormat of Humphreys’s Durango was determined to be 

blood containing Ms. Brown’s DNA.

After the murders, the victims’ ATM cards 

were used to withdraw over $3,000 from their accounts. Two days after the murders, Humphreys deposited $1,000 into his account, and he had approximately $800 in cash in his possession when he was arrested. Humphreys claimed in a statement to the police that he did not remember his actions at the time 

of the crimes. However, when asked why he fled, he 

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said: “I know I did it. I know it just as well as I know 

my own name.” He also told the police that he had 

recently taken out some high-interest “payday” loans 

and that he “got [in] over [his] head with that stinking 

truck.”

Humphreys v. State, 694 S.E.2d 316, 322–23 (Ga. 2010). 

Humphreys was convicted on September 25, 2007, in the Superior Court of Cobb County, Georgia, of two counts each of malice murder, felony murder, aggravated assault, kidnapping, and 

armed robbery in connection with the murders of the two women 

at their workplace. Defense counsel then presented evidence of 

mitigation during the sentencing phase. Trial counsel’s mitigation 

strategy was to show that Humphreys suffered severe and frequent 

physical abuse as a child and suffered from Asperger’s Syndrome. 

On September 30, 2007, after a sentencing hearing, the same jury 

found the existence of several statutory aggravating circumstances 

and recommended a sentence of death. The trial court imposed 

death sentences for each murder. 

B. Jury Selection and Deliberations

Much of Humphreys’s petition centers on the selection of a 

particular individual as a juror, Linda Chancey, and her interaction 

with other jurors during the sentencing phase. To explain Humphreys’s claim, we must first discuss the jury-selection process and 

the jury’s deliberations. We note from the outset, though, that 

most of this information comes from post-sentencing interviews 

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of jurors that the trial court later found to be inadmissible and the 

Supreme Court of Georgia agreed. 

During jury selection, prospective juror Linda Chancey 

stated on a questionnaire that she had been the victim of an armed 

robbery and attempted rape. Both the questionnaire and her voir 

dire testimony revealed that her assailant was a convicted murderer 

who had escaped from a mental hospital. When the prosecution 

asked her about the incident during voir dire, Chancey said that her 

assailant “actually didn’t do [her] any physical bodily harm. [She] 

was able to escape before he ever actually physically entered the 

dwelling, so it was preempted.” Chancey further attested that her 

prior experience would not prevent her from sitting as a fair juror 

and that she felt she could listen to the evidence and follow the law. 

Defense counsel did not ask any follow-up questions. Nor did he 

challenge Chancey for cause or bias, even though the defense had 

a preemptory strike remaining. Chancey was seated on the jury. 

In contrast to her answers during the voir dire process, 

Chancey apparently told the other jurors during deliberations that 

her assailant actually breached her home and attacked her. In an 

unsworn statement, another juror stated that Chancey told the jurors she “had been attacked in her bed in her apartment. [She] was 

naked in her bed and a man broke in and attacked her. [She] ran 

into the halls of her apartment and finally someone opened the 

door.” When jurors asked Chancey if she told the attorneys this, 

she said she hadn’t thought about it. After trial, investigators for 

Humphreys went to Chancey’s home to conduct an interview. 

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Chancey told them that “a strange man came in through the window of her apartment, robbed her, and tried to rape her.” Based 

on these circumstances, Humphreys contends Chancey lied during 

voir dire. 

Humphreys also asserts that Chancey bullied other jurors 

into voting for a death sentence. Deliberations were contentious 

and lengthy. According to Susan Barber, the jury foreperson, from 

“day one, [Chancey] had her mind made up: early in the trial – before the end of the first phase – she said something along the lines 

of he’s guilty and he deserves to die.” Chancey later stated that she 

“would only vote for death.” Following the presentation of evidence during sentencing, initially, three jurors—Susan Barber, 

Alma Pogue, and Tara Newsome—believed that Humphreys 

should receive life without parole and indicated they wouldn’t vote 

for death (resulting in a vote of 9-3 in favor of death). It became 

apparent that two of the jurors (Barber and Pogue) were set on a 

life sentence (resulting in a vote of 10-2), so two male jurors began 

trying to convince the other eight jurors to change their votes from 

death to life without parole. Later, the jurors agreed that they 

would unanimously vote for life without parole, but when the jurors tallied their votes, Chancey voted for death. At that point, the 

vote was 11-1 in favor of life without parole. The deliberations 

continued and became quite heated, eventually resulting in a verdict for death. 

A post-trial investigation revealed some jurors claimed that 

Chancey yelled and cursed at others during deliberations. Chancey 

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herself agreed that the deliberations in the penalty phase were “volatile” with screaming and raised voices, and at one point, another 

juror “took a swing” at Chancey and punched a hole in the wall. 

Chancey went through the crime-scene photos, threw them on the 

table and showed them to the other jurors and asked them, “[D]o 

you want this to happen to someone you know? And Chancey 

yelled at the other jurors that she intended to “stay here till forever 

if it takes it for [Humphreys] to get death.” Chancey also “put her 

feet up on the table and said that she was digging in and she would 

not change her vote.” She told the others that “they had to reach a 

unanimous decision or [Humphreys] would be paroled.” 

After deliberating for approximately eight hours over a period of two days, Jury Foreperson Barber, wrote a note to the court 

which stated as follows:

We, the jury, have agreed on statutory aggravating 

circumstances on both counts, but not on the penalty. 

While we agreed that life imprisonment with parole 

is not an option, we are unable to come to a unanimous decision on either death or life imprisonment 

without parole as a sentence. Please advise. 

(emphasis added). Before Barber provided the note to the court, 

however, Chancey, added the word “currently.” Barber re-wrote 

the note and the version sent to the court stated as follows:

We, the jury, have agreed on statutory aggravating 

circumstances on both counts, but not on the penalty. 

Currently we agreed life imprisonment with parole is 

not an acceptable option. We are currently unable to 

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form a unanimous decision on death or on life imprisonment without parole. Please advise. 

(emphasis added). 

Chancey said she revised the note because she did not want 

to give the court the impression that the jury was at an impasse. 

She believed the manner in which Barber originally wrote the note 

could have resulted in a mistrial, which she said she “wasn’t going 

to let [] happen.”1

 The court placed the note in the record but did 

not read it aloud, instead summarizing its contents for the parties 

and letting them know that the court intended to instruct the jury 

to keep deliberating.2 At that time, the trial court told the jury, 

“[Y]ou need to continue with your deliberations, and address the 

remaining issues.” 

Humphreys points out that under controlling law at the 

time, if the jury failed to reach a unanimous decision on the death 

penalty, the court would have imposed a sentence of life without 

1 Chancey said that if a mistrial were declared, the jury would either have to 

“do it over again” or Humphreys “would get parole and hunt the jurors 

down.” 

2 The court summarized the contents of the note as follows: 

[The jurors have] indicated that they have reached a verdict in 

regard to some of the issues that have been submitted to them, 

but have not yet reached a decision on other issues that were 

submitted to them.

Humphreys, 694 S.E.2d at 331. 

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the possibility of parole. See O.C.G.A. § 17-10-31.1(c) (repealed by 

Ga. L. 2009 p.223, § 6, effective April 29, 2009).3 

Rather than informing the jury about this statute, the trial 

court told the jury to continue deliberating after receiving its note. 

When the jury did so, the deliberations became quite heated with 

Chancey “yell[ing]” at and making personal attacks on the other 

jurors. Chancey also apparently used her prior experience as a victim of a crime to pressure the other jurors to impose the death 

penalty. As we’ve described, Chancey shared a version of her 

3 The then-relevant statutory section provided as follows:

Where a jury has been impaneled to determine sentence and 

the jury has unanimously found the existence of at least one 

statutory aggravating circumstance but is unable to reach a unanimous verdict as to sentence, the judge shall dismiss the jury and 

shall impose a sentence of either life imprisonment or imprisonment 

for life without parole. In imposing sentence, the judge may sentence the defendant to imprisonment for life without parole 

only if the court finds beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant committed at least one statutory aggravating circumstance and the trial court has been informed by the jury foreman that upon their last vote, a majority of the jurors cast their 

vote for a sentence of death or for a sentence of life imprisonment without parole; provided, however, that the trial judge 

may impose a sentence of life imprisonment as provided by 

law.

§ 17-10-31.1(c) (emphases added). 

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assault that included a much closer encounter with her attacker 

than she had shared during voir dire. 

Following three more hours of deliberations, Foreperson 

Barber sent a second note to the court asking that the jurors be 

allowed to rehear a taped statement that Humphreys had given to 

law enforcement. See Humphreys, 694 S.E.2d at 32. After listening 

to the recording, the jury resumed deliberations for approximately 

two more hours, at which point, defense counsel moved for a mistrial. Id. The trial court denied the motion, finding that the jury 

had not indicated it was deadlocked. Id. 

Another two hours of deliberations passed, and Barber sent 

yet another note to the court. This one read, “Due to the hostile 

nature of one of the jurors, I am asking to be removed from the 

jury.” The trial court read the note to the parties and informed 

them that it intended to give the jury a modified Allen4 charge. Defense counsel renewed its motion for a mistrial, but the trial court 

again denied the motion. The judge brought the jury into the 

courtroom and issued the following charge:

The Court deems it advisable at this time to 

give you some instruction in regard to the manner in 

which you should be conducting your deliberations in 

the case. You’ve been deliberating upon this case for 

a period of time. The Court deems it proper to advise 

4 See Allen v. United States, 164 U.S. 492 (1896).

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you further in regard to the desirability of agreement, 

if possible. 

The case has been exhaustively and carefully 

tried by both sides and has been submitted to you for 

decision and verdict, if possible, and not for disagreement. It is the law that a unanimous verdict is required.

While this verdict must be the conclusion of 

each juror independently, and not a mere acquiescence of the jurors in order to reach an agreement, it 

is nevertheless necessary for all the jurors to examine 

the issues and the questions submitted to them with 

candor and with fairness and with a proper regard for 

in [sic] deference to the opinion of each other.

A proper regard for the judgment of others 

will greatly aid us in forming our own judgment. 

Each juror should listen with courtesy to the arguments of the other jurors with the disposition to be 

convinced by them. 

If the members of the jury differ in their view 

of the evidence, the difference of opinion should 

cause them all to scrutinize the evidence more carefully and closely and to reexamine the grounds of 

their own opinion. 

Your duty is to decide the issues that have been 

submitted to you if you can consci[enti]ously do so. 

In conferring, you should lay aside all mere pride of 

opinion and should bear in mind that the jury room 

is no place for hostility or taking up and maintaining 

in a spirit of controversy either side of the cause.

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You should bear in mind at all times that, as jurors, you should not be advocates for either side of 

the case. You should keep in mind the truth as it appears from the evidence, examined in the light of the 

instructions that the Court has given to you.

You may, again, retire to the jury room for a 

reasonable time, examine your differences in a spirit 

of fairness and candor and courtesy, and try to arrive 

at a verdict if you can conscientiously do so. At this 

time, you may return to the jury room. 

(emphases added). 

Later interviews with the jurors revealed that Foreperson 

Barber and other jurors took from this instruction that the jury’s 

decision on sentencing must be unanimous. And they believed if 

they were deadlocked, Humphreys would get life imprisonment 

with the possibility of parole or that he could “walk.” After receiving the third note, the court did not ask why Barber wished to be 

removed from the jury. And Barber later explained that she did not 

believe it was an option to send another note to the court stating 

that the jury was deadlocked since “[t]he judge had made it clear 

that it didn’t matter: [the jury] didn’t have a choice other than to 

be unanimous.” That day, the jury deliberated for an additional 

two hours before retiring for the evening at 10:20 p.m. 

The next day, when the jury resumed deliberations, Foreperson Barber decided to “fight for [a sentence of ] life without parole.” At that point in the deliberations, Foreperson Barber and 

Juror Pogue were the only two not voting for death. Despite 

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Barber’s intent to fight, Chancey would “not engage in debate at 

all.” The parties could hear “screaming” coming from the jury 

room. Barber became “extremely distressed and locked [herself ] 

in the bathroom and cried.” She later expressed that she felt they 

had run out of options because she “thought that unanimity was 

our only choice.” Pogue deferred to Barber as to whether to “stick 

it out” but the two finally relented, and after two hours of deliberations, the jury returned two death sentences because they “didn’t 

want Mr. Humphreys to go free.” 

Barber expressed that she believed she “had absolutely no 

other option . . . [She] cried the entire time. [She said] [i]t was one 

of the hardest things [she had] ever done because [she] was not 

true to [her] own belief about what the proper sentence should 

be.” Barber also said if she had known that “not being unanimous 

meant a sentence of life without parole in this case, it would have 

been easy to stand [her] ground as long as [she] needed to.” 

On September 30, 2007, the jury found the existence of several statutory aggravating factors and recommended that Humphreys be executed.5

 The trial court ultimately imposed two death 

sentences for the murders of Williams and Brown. 

5 One of the five aggravating factors found by the jury is set forth in O.C.G.A. 

§ 17-10-30(b)(10), which provides that a jury may impose a death sentence 

when the “murder was committed for the purpose of avoiding, interfering 

with, or preventing a lawful arrest or custody in a place of lawful confinement, 

of himself or another.” The Supreme Court of Georgia later found that the 

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C. Post-trial Proceedings

1. Motion for New Trial

After interviewing some jurors, who revealed the circumstances we’ve noted, Humphreys’s trial counsel filed a motion for 

new trial. Although defense counsel raised various grounds in the 

motion, they did not raise a claim of juror misconduct. Instead, 

counsel challenged the trial court’s Allen charge, claiming it led jurors to erroneously believe that they were required to reach a unanimous decision. In support of the claim, Humphreys submitted the 

affidavits of Juror Darrell Parker and two investigators. See Humphreys, 694 S.E.2d at 333. 

The trial court denied the motion for new trial. Among 

other conclusions, the trial court determined that both the juror 

and investigator affidavits were inadmissible under O.C.G.A. § 17-

9-41 and did not fall under any exception. That statutory section 

provided that the “[a]ffidavits of jurors may be taken to sustain but 

not to impeach their verdict.” The trial court explained that exceptions to the rule are allowed “where extrajudicial and prejudicial 

information has been brought to the jury’s attention improperly, or 

where non-jurors have interfered with the jury’s deliberations.” 

The trial court determined that the affidavits did not offer any evidence of extrajudicial prejudicial information improperly brought 

jury’s reliance on O.C.G.A. § 17-10-30(b)(10) as an aggravating factor was improper but still affirmed the death sentence. 

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to the jury’s attention or allege any non-juror interference had occurred. Accordingly, the court concluded that the affidavits did not 

fall into any exception to § 17-9-41 and could not be considered. 

Regarding the Allen charge, the trial court looked to the decision in Walker v. State, 635 S.E.2d 740, 748 (Ga. 2006). There, the 

defendant made a similar claim of error because, during the sentencing phase, the jury was told, “[Y]our verdict as to penalty must 

be unanimous” and it was directed to continue deliberating after 

the jury told the trial court that it could not reach a unanimous 

verdict. Id. The trial court pointed out that in Walker, the Supreme 

Court of Georgia rejected the claim of error since Georgia law expects a jury to consider all the evidence and attempt to reach unanimity on the issue of sentence, and, if possible, unanimously recommend a sentence. Based on Walker, the trial court rejected 

Humphreys’s Allen-charge claim and ultimately denied the motion 

for new trial. 

2. Direct Appeal

In Humphreys’s direct appeal, he again raised the issue of 

the Allen charge and again omitted any claim of juror misconduct. 

He argued that the portion of the instruction that stated that “[i]t 

is the law that a unanimous verdict is required” was an incorrect 

statement of the law in the sentencing phase of a death-penalty 

case and misled the jurors. Humphreys, 694 S.E.2d at 332–33. The 

Supreme Court of Georgia disagreed, affirming Humphreys’s convictions and sentences. Id. at 334−36. 

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The Supreme Court of Georgia also agreed with the trial 

court’s ruling that the juror and investigator affidavits were inadmissible under O.C.G.A. § 17-9-41. Id. at 333. Thus, it upheld the 

trial court’s decision to exclude the juror and investigator affidavits 

when analyzing the alleged coerciveness of the Allen charge. Id. 

(citing Gardiner v. State, 444 S.E.2d 300 (Ga. 1994) and noting that 

exceptions to § 17-9-41 exist but do not include juror’s misapprehension regarding the law). 

The Supreme Court of Georgia then turned to the issue of 

whether the Allen charge was “so coercive as to cause a juror to 

‘abandon an honest conviction for reasons other than those based 

upon the trial or the arguments of other jurors.’” Id. at 333−34

(quoting Mayfield v. State, 578 S.E.2d 438, 443 (2003)). The Court 

concluded it was not. Id. at 334. 

Still, the Court recognized that the charge could lead to 

claims of jury confusion that require an analysis of the circumstances of the jury instructions given. Id. It then analyzed the 

charge in Humphreys’s case and found that the challenged “unanimity” language was just a “small portion of the extensive Allen 

charge given.” Id. The court determined that the overall charge 

passed muster. It explained, 

[The overall Allen charge] [c]autioned the jurors that 

the verdict was not to be the . . . mere acquiescence 

[of the jurors] in order to reach an agreement, that 

any difference of opinion should cause the jurors to 

scrutinize the evidence more [carefully and] closely 

and that the aim was to keep the truth in view as it 

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appeared from the evidence, considered in light of the 

court’s instructions.

Id. (cleaned up). 

The Court also noted that after the publication of the verdicts, the jury was polled. Id. At that time, each juror affirmed that 

the verdicts announced were the verdicts that they had reached and 

that each juror had reached the verdicts without pressure from anyone during deliberations. Id. Ultimately, the Court concluded the 

Allen charge did not unduly coerce the jury into rendering a death 

sentence because the “unanimous verdict” language was required 

and was “one small portion of an otherwise balanced and fair Allen 

charge.” Id. But because potential problems existed with the Allen 

charge that could result in claims of jury confusion, the Court instructed future trial courts “to omit this language from Allen 

charges given during the sentencing phase of death penalty trials.” 

Id. 

The Supreme Court of the United States denied Humphreys’s petition for writ of certiorari on November 15, 2010. See 

Humphreys v. Georgia, 562 U.S. 1046 (2010). 

D. Habeas Proceedings

1. State Habeas Petition

Humphreys filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the 

Superior Court of Butts County on February 14, 2011. He later 

amended that petition to include twenty-one claims for relief. As 

relevant here, Humphreys contended that (1) trial counsel were 

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ineffective in their mitigation investigation and presentation; (2) his 

constitutional rights were violated as a result of juror misconduct; 

(3) the manner in which the trial court handled the jury deadlock 

and Allen charge was erroneous; and (4) appellate counsel’s failure 

to adequately litigate these claims during the motion for new trial 

and direct appeal also deprived him of due process. 

The state habeas court held an evidentiary hearing in February 2013. At that hearing, Humphreys’s new counsel presented 

both affidavits and live testimony of jurors, the substance of which 

we have already set forth. Humphreys also submitted evidence 

during the habeas proceedings that painted a somewhat different 

picture of his childhood than the one presented to the sentencing 

jury—including the fact that he had been sexually abused by his 

great grandmother. 

When addressing the juror-misconduct claim, the state habeas court recognized the claim included assertions that Chancey 

(1) was not forthcoming during voir dire about her experience as a 

victim of violent crime and her willingness to consider a sentence 

other than death; (2) pressured and bullied other jurors into voting 

for a death sentence, refused to deliberate, and used the Allen 

charge to convince other jurors that they had to reach a verdict; and 

(3) altered a note to the trial court to mislead it about the status of 

deliberations. In support of these claims, Humphreys offered the 

affidavits of three jurors—one of which was filed in support of the 

motion for new trial. Humphreys also offered the live testimony 

of Foreperson Barber. 

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In denying relief, the state habeas court first found the jurormisconduct claims to be procedurally defaulted under O.C.G.A. 

§ 9-14-48(d) because Humphreys failed to raise them in the motion 

for new trial or on direct appeal. It also determined that Humphreys had not overcome the procedural default because he 

showed neither cause for failing to raise the issue nor actual prejudice as a result of appellate counsel’s failure to raise these claims. 

In conducting this analysis, the state habeas court acknowledged 

that Humphreys sought to rely on juror affidavits and Foreperson 

Barber’s testimony but found them to be inadmissible under 

O.C.G.A. § 17-9-41, O.C.G.A. § 9-10-9, and Georgia law.6 Humphreys presented no other evidence of Chancey’s alleged bias or 

misconduct, so in the absence of the jurors’ affidavits and Barber’s 

live testimony, nothing was left to support a valid challenge for 

cause by defense counsel. The state habeas court further determined that even if it considered the juror testimony, Humphreys 

still failed to show any resulting prejudice. 

As for the ineffective-assistance-of-trial-counsel claim, the 

court began by thoroughly detailing trial counsel’s qualifications, 

the mitigation investigation counsel conducted, and counsel’s 

presentation of evidence and experts during the sentencing phase. 

The court concluded that trial counsel were not ineffective in their 

presentation of mitigation evidence, and it determined that, in 

6 The state habeas court acknowledged both the juror affidavits and Barber’s 

live testimony and grouped them together, referring to them as “testimony.”

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particular, counsel were not ineffective for not presenting allegations that Humphreys’s great grandmother had sexually abused 

him. In support of this conclusion, the court noted that the defense 

team had questioned Humphreys about sexual abuse, and Humphreys had failed to disclose any such abuse. 

The state habeas court also determined that trial counsel’s 

investigation and presentation of mental-health and other mitigating evidence were reasonable. The only “new” evidence Humphreys presented at the habeas hearing was of sexual abuse, but 

Humphreys did not disclose it to trial counsel or anyone else when 

asked, so, the court concluded, trial counsel could not be faulted 

for failing to discover it. 

Not only that, but the court determined that Humphreys 

failed to show the requisite Strickland prejudice. As the court reasoned, the additional evidence presented to it during the habeas evidentiary hearing would not have created a reasonable probability 

of a different outcome had it been presented originally. That was 

so, the court reasoned, because the majority of the evidence presented in habeas proceedings (mostly having to do with physical 

abuse, poor living conditions, and mental-health assessments) reiterated the testimony presented during sentencing. Indeed, the 

court concluded that much of the testimony from both lay witnesses and expert witnesses during the habeas proceedings was cumulative. In the end, the court weighed the totality of the aggravating evidence against the totality of the mitigating evidence and 

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announced that “any additional mitigating testimony would not 

have created a reasonable probability of a different outcome.” 

Rounding out its decision, the state habeas court addressed 

Humphreys’s claim that the trial court improperly instructed the 

jury on the principle of unanimity in capital sentencing—the Allen 

charge claim. Humphreys candidly acknowledged that the Supreme Court of Georgia had already reviewed and rejected the 

claim, but he asserted that the Court had erred in its legal conclusions. The state habeas court noted that it did not review in a habeas proceeding issues raised and litigated on direct appeal. And 

because Humphreys had failed to advise the state habeas court 

about any changes in the law, the court determined the claim was 

precluded from review under the doctrine of res judicata. 

In sum, the state habeas court denied Humphreys’s petition 

in its entirety. 

2. Supreme Court of Georgia’s Denial of Certificate of Probable Cause to Appeal

Humphreys filed an application for certificate of probable 

cause to appeal with the Supreme Court of Georgia. That court 

denied the entirety of the application, finding that it lacked any arguable merit. 

Humphreys filed a petition for writ of certiorari, which the 

Supreme Court of the United States denied on April 16, 2018. 

3. Federal Habeas Petition (§ 2254 Petition)

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Humphreys filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 in the United States District Court for the 

Northern District of Georgia. He later amended the petition. 

On September 16, 2020, the district court issued a final order 

denying relief on all claims and dismissed the petition with prejudice, except as to a challenge not applicable here. The district court 

granted Humphreys a COA on the issue of whether his trial counsel was ineffective in investigating and presenting his case in mitigation during the penalty phase of his trial. 

4. Notice of Appeal and Motion to Expand COA

Humphreys timely filed his notice of appeal with this Court 

and later sought an expansion of the COA to include six additional 

claims of constitutional error. We granted the motion in part and 

permitted Humphreys to appeal four claims as follows: (1) whether

Humphreys is entitled to relief from the denial of his habeas

petition on his claim that juror bias and misconduct deprived him 

of his constitutional rights; (2) whether Humphreys is entitled to

relief from the denial of his habeas petition on his claim that the

trial judge gave inaccurate, misleading, or coercive instructions

and inadequately responded to juror misconduct; (3) whether 

Humphreys is entitled to relief from the denial of his habeas petition on his claim that he was denied his Sixth Amendment right

to effective assistance of counsel by appellate counsel; and (4) 

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whether his trial counsel was ineffective in investigating and presenting his case in mitigation during the penalty phase of his trial. 

The parties fully briefed these issues, and we heard oral argument. 

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

This Court reviews “de novo the denial of a petition for a 

writ of habeas corpus.” Morrow v. Warden, 886 F.3d 1138, 1146 (11th 

Cir. 2018) (quotation omitted). But the Antiterrorism and Effective 

Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”) governs our review of federal 

habeas petitions and prescribes a highly deferential framework for 

evaluating issues previously decided in state court. Pye v. Warden, 

Ga. Diagnostic Prison, 50 F.4th 1025, 1034 (11th Cir. 2022) (en banc); 

Sealey v. Warden, Ga. Diagnostic Prison, 954 F.3d 1338, 1354 (11th Cir. 

2020). Under AEDPA, we may not grant habeas relief on claims 

that were “adjudicated on the merits in [s]tate court” unless the 

state court’s decision (1) “was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined 

by the Supreme Court of the United States,” or (2) “was based on 

an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence 

presented in the [s]tate court proceeding.” Sealey, 954 F.3d at 1354 

(quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)). These standards mean that we must 

give state-court decisions “the benefit of the doubt.” Evans v. Sec’y,

Dep’t of Corr., 703 F.3d 1316, 1325 (11th Cir. 2013) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). 

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A state-court decision is not “contrary to” federal law under 

2254(d)(1) “unless it contradicts the United States Supreme Court 

on a settled question of law or holds differently than did that Court 

on a set of materially indistinguishable facts.” Id. (citation and internal quotation marks omitted); see also Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 

362, 405 (2000). 

And a state-court decision is not an “unreasonable application” of federal law under 2254(d)(1) “unless the state court identifies the correct governing legal principle as articulated by the 

United States Supreme Court, but unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of the petitioner’s case, unreasonably extends the 

principle to a new context where it should not apply, or unreasonably refuses to extend it to a new context where it should apply.” 

Evans, 703 F.3d at 1325 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted); see also Williams, 529 U.S. at 407 (a state court decision is an 

“unreasonable application” of clearly established law if the state 

court identifies the correct governing legal rule from the Supreme 

Court’s holdings but unreasonably applies it to the facts of the particular defendant’s case). 

Regarding AEDPA’s unreasonable-application-of-federal-law 

provision under 2254(d)(1), “[t]he key word is ‘unreasonable,’ 

which is more than simply incorrect.” Sealey, 954 F.3d at 1354. To 

meet this standard, “a prisoner must show far more than that the 

state court’s decision was merely wrong or even clear error.” Pye, 

50 F.4th at 1034 (quoting Shinn v. Kayer, 141 S. Ct. 517, 523 (2020) 

(per curiam) (quotation marks omitted)). “[A] state court’s 

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application of federal law is unreasonable only if no fairminded jurist could agree with the state court’s determination or conclusion.” Raulerson v. Warden, 928 F.3d 987, 995–96 (11th Cir. 2019) 

(citations and internal quotation marks omitted). This is “a difficult 

to meet and highly deferential standard . . . , which demands that 

state-court decisions be given the benefit of the doubt.” Id. at 996 

(citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Still, AEDPA does 

not “prohibit a federal court from finding an application of a principle unreasonable when it involves a set of facts different from 

those of the case in which the principle was announced. The statute recognizes, to the contrary, that even a general standard may 

be applied in an unreasonable manner.” Panetti v. Quarterman, 551 

U.S. 930, 953 (2007) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).

For each claim presented, we review “the last state-court adjudication on the merits.” Greene v. Fisher, 565 U.S. 34, 40 (2011). If 

the state court did not reach the merits of the claim, though, “federal habeas review is not subject to the deferential standard that 

applies under AEDPA[.]” Cone v. Bell, 556 U.S. 449, 472 (2009). Rather, in that case, we review the claim de novo. Id. The Supreme 

Court has instructed us to presume “the state court adjudicated the 

claim on the merits in the absence of any indication or state-law 

procedural principles to the contrary.” Harrington v. Richter, 562 

U.S. 86, 99 (2011) (citation omitted). An indication to the contrary 

exists when, for example, the state court has denied the petitioner’s 

claim on only one prong of the Strickland test. In that case, we 

review de novo the prong that the state court never reached. See, 

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e.g., Rompilla v. Beard, 545 U.S. 374, 380, 390, (2005); Wiins v. Smith, 

539 U.S. 510, 534 (2003).

We also defer to a state court’s determination of the facts 

under 2264(d)(2) unless the state-court decision “was based on an 

unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence 

presented in the State court proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). Section 2254(d)(2) is similar to § 2254(d)(1) in that it requires us to

give state courts “substantial deference.” Brumfield v. Cain, 576 

U.S. 305, 314 (2015). “We may not characterize . . . state-court

factual determinations as unreasonable ‘merely because we would

have reached a different conclusion in the first instance.’” Id. at 

313–14 (quoting Wood v. Allen, 558 U.S. 290, 301 (2010)) (alteration

adopted). We also presume that the state court’s factual determinations are correct, absent clear and convincing evidence to the

contrary. Pye, 50 F.4th at 1035; 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1).

If the petition satisfies § 2254(d)’s requirements, we then 

consider whether the state court’s error was harmless. Brecht v. 

Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 637 (1993). In collateral-review cases, a 

federal constitutional error is harmless unless it caused “actual 

prejudice.” Id. at 637 (citation omitted). Put another way, we examine “whether the error ‘had substantial and injurious effect or 

influence in determining the jury’s verdict.’” Id. at 623, 637 (quoting Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 776 (1946)); See also

Brown v. Davenport, 596 U.S. 118, 122 (2022) (“When a state

court has ruled on the merits of a state prisoner’s claim, a federal

court cannot grant relief without first applying both the test this

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Court outlined in Brecht and the one Congress prescribed in 

AEDPA.”).

III. DISCUSSION

A. Juror Misconduct

Humphreys contends that juror misconduct infected the 

trial from voir dire all the way through jury deliberations, resulting 

in a violation of his due-process rights. He points to the following 

as evidence of Chancey’s misconduct: (1) lying during voir dire 

about her experience as a victim of a crime and her unwillingness 

to consider a sentence other than death; (2) intimidating other jurors and refusing to deliberate; and (3) altering a note to the trial 

court to mislead it about the status of deliberations.

According to Humphreys, Chancey vacillated between refusing to deliberate and berating other jurors, and she admitted 

that she would vote for only a death sentence. Humphreys also 

emphasizes that during deliberations, Chancey revealed that she 

had been dishonest during voir dire about the home invasion and 

attempted rape. Had Chancey revealed that information during 

jury selection, Humphreys asserts, the defense would have stricken 

her. Humphreys further takes issue with what he deems to be 

Chancey’s “bullying” and coercion of the other jurors. He contends that, paired with the trial court’s Allen charge, Chancey’s conduct caused at least one juror—Barber—to surrender her honestly 

held beliefs about the appropriate sentence. Finally, Humphreys 

characterizes Chancey’s alteration of the jury note by inserting the 

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word “currently” as an attempt to mislead the trial court that the 

jury was not deadlocked. 

The state habeas court concluded Humphreys procedurally 

defaulted these claims because he failed to raise them in his motion 

for new trial or on direct appeal. The Supreme Court of Georgia 

and the district court agreed. 

The issue of whether a claim is subject to the doctrine of 

procedural default “is a mixed question of fact and law, which we

review de novo.” Ward v. Hall, 592 F.3d 1144, 1175 (11th Cir. 2010) 

(citation and internal quotation marks omitted). 

The doctrine of procedural default bars a court from reviewing a petitioner’s claim when that claim has been or would be 

rejected in state court on a state procedural ground. See Judd v. Haley, 250 F.3d 1308, 1313 (11th Cir. 2001). We have explained, 

Federal habeas review reduces the finality of litigation and frustrates states’ sovereign power to punish

offenders and states’ good-faith attempts to honor

constitutional rights. So, when a state prisoner fails

to follow state procedural rules, thereby procedurally

defaulting on the claim, our authority to review the

prisoner’s state court criminal conviction is severely

restricted. Federal review of a petitioner’s claim is

barred by the procedural-default doctrine if the last

state court to review the claim states clearly and expressly that its judgment rests on a procedural bar,

and that bar provides an adequate and independent

state ground for denying relief.

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Atkins v. Singletary, 965 F.2d 952, 956 (11th Cir. 1992) (citations and 

internal quotation marks omitted). Because the state habeas court 

concluded that Humphreys procedurally defaulted his claims 

about Chancey, those claims are also likely barred from review in 

this proceeding. 

Still, we have recognized that a petitioner may obtain federal 

review of a procedurally defaulted claim if he can show both 

“cause” for the default and actual “prejudice” resulting from the 

default. Henderson v. Campbell, 353 F.3d 880, 892 (11th Cir. 2003) 

(citing Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 485 (1986), and Wainwright v. 

Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 87 (1977)). To establish “cause,” a petitioner 

“must demonstrate that some objective factor external to the defense impeded the effort to raise the claim properly in the state 

court.” Id. (quoting Wright v. Hopper, 169 F.3d 695, 703 (11th 

Cir.1999)); Mizev. Hall, 532 F.3d 1184, 1190 (11th Cir. 2008) (“Cause 

exists if there was ‘some objective factor external to the defense

[that] impeded counsel’s efforts to comply with the State’s procedural rule.’” (quoting Murray, 477 U.S. at 488)). To establish prejudice, a petitioner must show that “there is at least a reasonable 

probability that the result of the proceeding would have been different.” Henderson, 353 F.3d at 892 (citing Wright, 169 F.3d at 703, 

and Crawford v. Head, 311 F.3d 1288, 1327−28 (11th Cir. 2002)). 

We have further explained that a federal court may also 

grant a habeas petition on a procedurally defaulted claim, without 

a showing of cause or prejudice, to “correct a fundamental miscarriage of justice.” Id. (citing Murray, 477 U.S. at 495−96). A 

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fundamental miscarriage of justice occurs only in an extraordinary 

case, where a constitutional violation has resulted in the conviction 

of someone who is actually innocent. Id. (citing Murray, 477 U.S. 

at 49596). 

Here, Humphreys does not claim actual innocence, so he 

must establish cause and prejudice to overcome the procedural bar 

to his juror-misconduct claim. He says he can demonstrate cause 

for the default because his appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to raise the claims about Chancey’s conduct earlier. So embedded in Humphreys’s juror-misconduct claim is his separate claim 

that his appellate counsel was ineffective. 

For the reasons we explain below, we disagree with Humphreys that his appellate counsel was ineffective. We therefore 

deny that separate claim. And because Humphreys cannot show 

that his counsel was ineffective, he also cannot show cause for the 

procedural default of the juror-misconduct claim, so we deny that 

claim, too.

1. Strickland Standard

When a federal habeas petitioner alleges ineffective assistance of counsel, as here, the relevant law “as determined by the 

Supreme Court” is Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). To 

prevail on an ineffective-assistance claim under Strickland, a petitioner must show that (1) his “counsel’s representation fell below 

an objective standard of reasonableness” and (2) a reasonable probability “that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of 

the proceeding would have been different.” Id. at 687–88, 694. We 

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can resolve an ineffectiveness claim on either ground if a petitioner 

cannot prove both. Atkins, 965 F.2d at 959; see also Strickland, 466 

U.S. at 697. A reasonable probability of a different outcome is a 

probability “sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.” 

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694. It is not enough for the defendant to 

show that the errors had “some conceivable effect on the outcome 

of the proceeding.” Id. at 693. Rather, defense counsel’s errors 

must be “so serious” that they deprived the defendant of a “fair 

trial, a trial whose result is reliable.” Id. at 687.

When we assess counsel’s performance, we must avoid 

viewing their decisions through the “distorting effects of hindsight.” Id. at 689. We must also “indulge a strong presumption that 

counsel’s conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance.” Id. The defendant bears the burden to show that 

counsel made errors “so serious that counsel was not functioning 

as the ‘counsel’ guaranteed . . . by the Sixth Amendment.” Id. at 

687. He must show that the attorney’s representation amounted 

to incompetence under prevailing professional norms. Id. at 690. 

As we have explained, “The test has nothing to do with what the 

best lawyers would have done. Nor is the test even what most good 

lawyers would have done.” Waters v. Thomas, 46 F.3d 1506, 1512 

(11th Cir. 1995) (en banc) (citation and internal quotation marks 

omitted). Instead, the inquiry is whether counsel’s actions were “so 

patently unreasonable that no competent attorney would have chosen [them].” Kelly v. United States, 820 F.2d 1173, 1176 (11th Cir. 

1987) (per curiam) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). 

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And when we apply AEDPA deference on top of Strickland 

deference, we may reject a state-court finding that trial counsel was 

adequate only upon the dual-determination that counsel acted in a 

professionally unreasonable manner (under Strickland) and that the 

state court’s contrary determination was “objectively unreasonable” (under § 2254). It is a “rare” circumstance when a federal court 

finds in favor of a habeas petitioner on both accounts. Johnson v. 

Sec’y, Dep’t of Corr., 643 F.3d 907, 910–11 (11th Cir. 2011). 

2. Admissibility of Juror Testimony 

Because Humphreys’s ineffective-assistance claim is premised on the evidence contained in the affidavits and testimony counsel obtained about juror deliberations, Humphreys can establish 

the necessary “cause” to avoid procedural default of his juror-misconduct claims only if that evidence is admissible. The state habeas 

court refused to consider that evidence, finding it to be inadmissible. Previously, both the trial court and Supreme Court of Georgia 

had reached the same conclusion with respect to Humphreys’s 

claim that the Allen charge was coercive. 

Humphreys acknowledges that the lower courts, relying on 

Georgia law, refused to consider the juror statements. In Georgia, 

in general, jurors may not impeach their own verdict. O’Donnell v. 

Smith, 751 S.E.2d 324, 327 (Ga. 2013); see also Henley v. State, 678 

S.E.2d 884, 887 (Ga. 2009) (“[A] jury verdict may not be challenged 

based on an affidavit from one or more jurors.”). Indeed, former 

O.C.G.A. § 17-9-41 (repealed by Ga. L. 2011, Act 52, § 33, effective 

January 1, 2013), referred to as the “no-impeachment rule,” 

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provided that “[t]he affidavits of jurors may be taken to sustain but 

not impeach their verdict.”7 This rule applies equally to juror affidavits and live testimony by jurors, even in death-penalty cases. See 

Roebuck v. State, 586 S.E.2d 651, 658 (Ga. 2003); Oliver v. State, 461 

S.E.2d 222 (Ga. 1995); Spencer v. State, 398 S.E.2d 179 (Ga. 1990). 

That said, this general rule cannot override a defendant’s right to a 

fair trial. O’Donnell, 751 S.E.2d at 327 (citing Henley, 678 S.E.2d at 

888, and Turpin v. Todd, 493 S.E.2d 900 (Ga. 1997)). 

Multiple exceptions to the general rule also exist: “when (1) 

prejudicial, extrajudicial information has been brought to the jury’s 

attention; (2) nonjurors have interfered with deliberations; or (3) 

there has been irregular jury conduct so prejudicial that the verdict 

lacks due process.” Tate v. State, 628 S.E.2d 730, 73233 (Ga. Ct. 

App. 2006); see also Crowe v. Hall, 490 F.3d 840, 846 (11th Cir. 2007). 

Analogously, Federal Rule of Evidence 606(b) also generally precludes courts from relying on post-trial juror testimony during an inquiry into the validity of a verdict. That rule provides, 

“During an inquiry into the validity of a verdict . . . , a juror may not

testify about any statement made or incident that occurred during

the jury’s deliberations; the effect of anything on that juror’s or another juror’s vote; or any juror’s mental processes concerning the

verdict or indictment.” Fed. R. Evid. 606(b)(1) (emphasis added). 

Because of this rule, a court may not consider a juror’s affidavit or

7 This statute was in place at the time of Humphreys’s motion for new trial 

and direct appeal in 2008 and 2010, respectively. 

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testimony on these matters. Id. As with the Georgia rule, the federal rule contains exceptions. Under Federal Rule of Evidence 

606(b)(2), a jury may testify about its verdict when “(A) extraneous

prejudicial information was improperly brought to the jury’s attention; (B) an outside influence was improperly brought to bear on 

any juror; or (C) a mistake was made in entering the verdict on the 

verdict form.” Rule 606(b) reveals Congress’s endorsement of a 

“broad no-impeachment rule, with only limited exceptions.” PenaRodriguez v. Colorado, 580 U.S. 206, 217 (2017). 

Rule 606(b) arose from the common-law rule against admitting jury testimony to impeach a verdict. In Tanner v. United States, 

the Supreme Court explained that “full and frank discussion in the 

jury room, jurors’ willingness to return an unpopular verdict, and 

the community’s trust in a system that relies on the decisions of 

laypeople would all be undermined by a barrage of postverdict 

scrutiny of juror conduct.” 483 U.S. 107, 120–21 (1987). The Supreme Court has reasoned that Rule 606(b) “promotes full and vigorous discussion by providing jurors with considerable assurance

that after being discharged they will not be summoned to recount 

their deliberations, and they will not otherwise be harassed or annoyed by litigants seeking to challenge the verdict. The rule gives

stability and finality to verdicts.” Pena-Rodriguez, 580 U.S. at 218.

Here, Humphreys does not claim that the verdict came as a 

result of external influences or a mistake in the verdict form. And 

“juror misconduct” is not an exception to the no-impeachment 

rule, so post-trial testimony from jurors regarding alleged 

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misconduct is not admissible under Federal Rule 606(b). See Warger 

v. Shauers, 574 U.S. 40 (2014); Tanner, 483 U.S. 107 (1987). 

But Humphreys argues the state habeas court unreasonably 

refused to consider the juror testimony establishing Chancey’s misconduct based on constitutional standards of fairness that require 

criminally accused defendants to enjoy a panel of fair and impartial 

jurors. 

In Humphreys’s view, the no-impeachment rule presupposes the existence of specific trial safeguards the Supreme Court 

recognized in Tanner that bring misconduct to light during the trial 

proceedings, eliminating the need for post-trial inquiries into deliberations. Those safeguards include (1) “[t]he suitability of an individual for the responsibility of jury service . . . is examined during 

voir dire[,]” (2) “[t]he jury is observable by the court, by counsel, 

and by court personnel[,]” (3) “jurors are observable by each other, 

and may report inappropriate juror behavior to the court before

they render a verdict[,]” and] (4) “nonjuror evidence of misconduct.” Tanner, 483 U.S. at 127; See also Warger, 574 U.S. at 51. But 

Humphreys contends the Tanner safeguards are not infallible and 

they sometimes fail to capture serious juror misconduct. 

As Humphreys sees things, this is a “rare” case in which all 

four of the Tanner safeguards failed. And because the Tanner safeguards failed, the no-impeachment rule should yield and the state 

habeas court should have considered the juror testimony. He emphasizes the Supreme Court’s acknowledgment that “[t]here may 

be cases of juror bias so extreme that, almost by definition, the jury 

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trial right has been abridged. If and when such a case arises, the 

Court can consider whether the usual safeguards are or are not sufficient to protect the integrity of the process.” Warger, 574 U.S. at 

51 n.3. Humphreys argues this is such a case. 

In short, Humphreys asserts Chancey’s bias and misconduct implicate his Eighth Amendment right to a fair and reasonable 

sentencing determination and his due-process right to an impartial, 

unbiased jury. He says the no-impeachment rule should be 

“stripped away” to preserve his rights and we should find the state 

habeas court unreasonably refused to take that action. Still, Humphreys acknowledges that the Supreme Court has considered the 

application of the no-impeachment rule in only a small number of 

cases. See Blue Brief at 69, n. 27 (citing United States v. Reid, 53 U.S. 

361 (1851), Mattox v. United States, 146 U.S. 140 (1892), McDonald v. 

Pless, 238 U.S. 264 (1915), Tanner v. United States, 483 U.S. 107 (1987), 

Warger v. Shauers, 574 U.S. 40 (2014), and Pena-Rodriguez v. Colorado, 

580 U.S. 206 (2017)). But he asserts that Pless, Tanner, Warger, and

Pena-Rodriguez establish the lower courts’ authority to review and 

consider the juror testimony.

Humphreys’s argument is somewhat novel. Indeed, the Supreme Court issued three of the cases he relies on—Reid (1851), 

Mattox (1892), and Pless (1915)—before Congress adopted Rule 

606(b) in 1975, which endorsed a broad no-impeachment rule, with

“limited exceptions.” See Pena-Rodriguez, 580 U.S. at 215218. And 

although both Reid and Pless noted the possibility of an exception 

to the no-impeachment rule in the “gravest and most important 

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cases[,]” Pless, 238 U.S. at 269, the Supreme Court has addressed this 

circumstance in only three cases—Tanner, Warger, and Pena-Rodriguez. See Reid, 53 U.S. at 366. Yet in only one of those cases—PenaRodriguez—did the Court actually allow an exception to the no-impeachment rule. 

In Tanner, the Court rejected a Sixth Amendment exception

for evidence that some jurors were under the influence of drugs

and alcohol during the trial. Tanner, 483 U.S. at 125. In reaching

this conclusion, the Court noted the “long-recognized and very

substantial concerns” supporting “the protection of jury deliberations from intrusive inquiry.” Id. at 127. In particular, the Court

did not want attorneys to use juror testimony to attack verdicts because, the Court ruled, that would result in jurors being “harassed

and beset by the defeated party,” thus destroying “all frankness and 

freedom of discussion and conference.” Id. at 120 (quoting Pless, 

238 U.S. at 267–68). The Court also expressed concerns about attempts to impeach a verdict that would “disrupt the finality of the

process” and undermine both “jurors’ willingness to return an unpopular verdict” and “the community’s trust in a system that relies

on the decisions of laypeople.” Id. at 120–21. 

Besides identifying the problems with cracking open jury deliberations post-verdict, the Court emphasized the existing safeguards that protect the defendant’s right to an impartial and competent jury beyond post-trial juror testimony, which we noted earlier. Id. at 127. Balancing the concerns and safeguards against the

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defendant’s Sixth Amendment interest, the Court affirmed the exclusion of affidavits about the jury’s inebriated state.

Warger was a civil case. There, the Supreme Court again declined to recognize an exception to the no-impeachment rule. After the trial court entered the verdict, the losing party sought to

proffer evidence that the jury forewoman failed to disclose pro-defendant bias during voir dire. Warger, 574 U.S. at 43. Like in Tanner,

the Court relied substantially on existing safeguards for a fair trial. 

The Court stated, “Even if jurors lie in voir dire in a way that conceals bias, juror impartiality is adequately assured by the parties’

ability to bring to the court’s attention any evidence of bias before

the verdict is rendered, and to employ nonjuror evidence even after

the verdict is rendered.” Id. at 51. 

Still, the Warger Court reiterated that the no-impeachment

rule may have exceptions. As in Reid and Pless, the Court warned

of “juror bias so extreme that, almost by definition, the jury trial

right has been abridged.” Id. at 51 n.3. The Court announced, “If

and when such a case arises,” it would “consider whether the usual 

safeguards are or are not sufficient to protect the integrity of the

process.” Id. 

As it turned out, in Pena-Rodriguez, the Supreme Court encountered such a grave case. There, the Court held, 

where a juror makes a clear statement that indicates 

he or she relied on racial stereotypes or animus to 

convict a criminal defendant, the Sixth Amendment 

requires that the no-impeachment rule give way in 

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order to permit the trial court to consider the evidence of the juror’s statement and any resulting denial of the jury trial guarantee. 

Pena-Rodriguez, 580 U.S. at 225. Despite finding an exception, the 

Supreme Court once again emphasized that its recognition in 

Warger—that there may be extreme cases where the jury trial right 

requires an exception to the no-impeachment rule—“must be interpreted in context as a guarded, cautious statement.” Id. at 221. 

As the Court explained, such a begrudging exception was necessary “to avoid formulating an exception that might undermine the

jury dynamics and finality interests the no-impeachment rule seeks

to protect.” Id. But given that “racial animus was a significant motivating factor in [the juror’s] finding of guilt,” the Court held that

the Constitution required an exception to the no-impeachment 

rule. Id. at 221, 225. That was so, the Court explained, because

such statements cast “serious doubt” on the fairness of the trial and 

resulting verdict. Id. at 225. 

Against this legal landscape, we cannot say that Humphreys’s appellate counsel acted unreasonably in refraining from

raising the juror-misconduct claims in the motion for new trial or

in the direct appeal. For starters, only Pena-Rodriguez has ever applied an exception to the no-impeachment rule. But that case involved prejudice based on a protected status. And that type of bias

is in a category of its own. Plus, Pena-Rodriguez was not decided

until well afterthe motion for new trial and direct appeal were filed. 

When counsel filed those documents, the Court had never recognized an exception to the no-impeachment rule. In fact, counsel

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didn’t have the benefit of Warger, either, when moving for a new

trial and filing the direct appeal.

That leaves Reid, Pless, and Tanner. To be sure, in Reid and 

Pless, the Supreme Court left the door open for a case in which juror bias was so severe that the right to a fair trial was abridged. But 

those cases did not give any concrete examples to guide counsel. 

Here, Chancey allegedly revealed that she had lied during 

voir dire about the particulars of being a victim of a crime, bullied 

other jurors, was loud and unwilling to deliberate, and altered a 

note. The other jurors knew all these things during deliberations 

and could have brought them to the trial court’s attention. They 

did not—even though Chancey was the only juror involved in the 

troubling conduct and even though Chancey’s conduct did not involve racial bias. As the Supreme Court explained in Pena-Rodriguez, “[t]he stigma that attends racial bias may make it difficult for

a juror to report inappropriate statements during the course of juror deliberations.” 580 U.S. at 225. The same is not true here. So

while we certainly understand and are concerned by Chancey’s

conduct, we cannot say that counsel unreasonably decided that it

did not fall into a then-theoretical exception to the no-impeachment rule.

In short, appellate counsel’srepresentation did not fall below

an objective standard of reasonableness when counsel did not pursue the juror-misconduct claims in the motion for new trial or on

direct appeal. Perhaps, some other lawyer may have pursued the

claim. But the test is not what the best lawyer or even a good

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lawyer would have done. Not raising these claims was not “so patently unreasonable that no competent attorney would have chosen” counsel’s actions.8 Kelly, 820 F.2d at 1176. 

Ultimately, because Humphreys has not shown that appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to pursue the juror-misconduct claims sooner, he cannot demonstrate the cause required to 

defeat the procedural default of those claims. For this reason, we 

are barred from examining the merits of the juror-misconduct 

claims. The claims are therefore denied.

8 We recognize that appellate counsel submitted other affidavits in support of 

the Allen charge claim. But that claim is markedly different because the affidavits made up only a small portion of the evidence supporting the claim. The 

Allen charge claim was based on an amalgamation of the trial judge’s own 

words, the jury notes to the court, the amount of time it took the jurors to 

deliberate, the yelling coming from the jury room, and other evidence. In 

contrast, the juror-misconduct claims are based exclusively on the post-trial 

juror interviews, juror affidavits, and juror testimony. In short, the entirety of 

the juror-misconduct claim is premised upon juror testimony—evidence that 

is inadmissible under the no-impeachment rule. See Fed. R. Evid. 606(b) (“a 

juror may not testify about any statement made or incident that occurred during the jury’s deliberations”); see also Gavin v. Comm’r, Ala. Dep’t of Corr., 40 

F.4th 1247 (11th Cir. 2022); Roebuck, 586 S.E.2d at 658; Oliver, 461 S.E.2d at 223–

24. It was not unreasonable for counsel to refrain from pursuing those claims 

under Humphreys’s novel theory where it was nearly a foregone conclusion

that the only piece of evidence—the juror testimony—would not be considered and the court would be left with nothing to support the juror-misconduct 

claims. 

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B. Ineffective Assistance of Appellate Counsel

Humphreys’s ineffective-assistance-of-appellate-counsel 

claim necessarily fails for the same reason that Humphreys cannot 

show cause for his procedural default: as we’ve explained, counsel 

did not act unreasonably when they did not pursue the juror-misconduct claims sooner. Consequently, we reject Humphreys’s 

claim that his appellate counsel was ineffective under Strickland.

C. Allen Charge

Humphreys also argues that the trial court coerced a sentencing verdict by instructing the jurors that “[i]t is the law that a 

unanimous verdict is required,” by repeatedly returning them to 

the jury deliberation room despite their declaration of a deadlock, 

and by ignoring Foreperson Barber’s plea to be excused “due to the 

hostile nature” of one of her fellow jurors. On direct appeal, the 

Supreme Court of Georgia found the trial court’s instructions did 

not constitute coercion and the trial court’s unanimity instruction 

was correct. Humphreys, 694 S.E.2d at 332−34. 

Because the Supreme Court of Georgia adjudicated the coercion claim on the merits, it is entitled to AEDPA deference.9 We 

9 Although the state habeas court briefly addressed the Allen-charge claim, it 

determined that it was barred from adjudicating it because the claim had already been litigated on direct appeal and could not be reviewed absent a 

change in the law. We therefore look to the decision of the Supreme Court 

of Georgia on direct appeal since it is the “last state-court adjudication on the 

merits” with respect to the Allen-charge claim. Greene, 565 U.S. at 40. 

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may grant relief on this claim only if the Supreme Court of Georgia’s determination was (1) “contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law, as determined by 

the Supreme Court of the United States,” or (2) “based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the [s]tate court proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). 

Trial courts may not coerce juries into rendering verdicts. 

See United States v. Davis, 779 F.3d 1305, 1312 (11th Cir. 2015). And 

a defendant “being tried by a jury is entitled to the uncoerced verdict of that body.” Lowenfield v. Phelps, 484 U.S. 231, 241 (1988). 

That said, the Supreme Court has held that a trial court may instruct a deadlocked jury to keep deliberating. Id. at 237 (citing Allen 

v. United States, 164 U.S. 492 (1896)). Therefore, “[i]n an Allen 

charge, the judge instructs a deadlocked jury to undertake further 

efforts to reach a verdict.” United States v. Chigbo, 38 F.3d 543, 544 

n.1 (11th Cir. 1994) (per curiam). Although we’ve acknowledged 

the potential for coercion in an Allen charge, we’ve also approved 

the use of the charge. Rubinstein v. Yehuda, 38 F.4th 982, 996−97 

(11th Cir. 2022). Accordingly, district courts have broad discretion 

in issuing Allen charges but must take care to not “coerce any juror 

to give up an honest belief.” United States v. Anderson, 1 F.4th 1244, 

1269 (11th Cir. 2021) (quoting Davis, 779 F.3d at 1312).

We recently reiterated that “[c]oercion does not mean ‘simple pressure to agree.’” Sears v. Warden, 73 F.4th 1269, 1301 (11th 

Cir. 2023) (per curiam) (quoting Brewster v. Hetzel, 913 F.3d 1042, 

1053 (11th Cir. 2019)). “Pressure becomes coercive when the 

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actions of the court result in ‘a minority of the jurors sacrificing 

their conscientious scruples for the sake of reaching agreement.’” 

Id. (quoting Brewster, 913 F.3d at 1053)). 

In our Circuit, whether a verdict was coerced presents a 

mixed question of law and fact. Id. We look at the language the 

trial court employed and “examine the totality of the circumstances to see if the court’s actions created a substantial risk that 

one or more jurors would be coerced into abandoning their honest 

convictions.” Brewster, 913 F.3d at 1053 (citing United States v. 

Woodard, 531 F.3d 1352, 1364 (11th Cir. 2008)). The relevant, but 

not exhaustive, circumstances we consider include the following: 

(1) the total length of deliberations; (2) the number of 

times the jury reported being deadlocked and was instructed to resume deliberations; (3) whether the 

judge knew of the jury's numerical split when he instructed the jury to continue deliberating; (4) whether 

any of the instructions implied that the jurors were 

violating their oaths or acting improperly by failing to 

reach a verdict; and (5) the time between the final supplemental instruction and the jury's verdict. 

Id. (citations omitted).

Here, the Supreme Court of Georgia concluded that the Allen charge, considered as a whole, was not coercive. Humphreys, 

694 S.E.2d at 334. The court noted that it had previously considered the same “a unanimous verdict is required” instruction given 

as part of an Allen charge in the sentencing phase of a death-penalty 

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trial and found that it was technically a correct statement of the 

law. Id. (citing Legare v. State, 302 S.E.2d 351 (Ga. 1983)). Relying 

on Legare, the Supreme Court of Georgia explained that “it is true 

that any ‘verdict’ rendered [in the sentencing phase] must be unanimous and thus also true, stated in isolation, that it is ‘the law that 

a unanimous verdict is required.’” Id. (quoting Legare, 302 S.E.2d at 

353). 

The Supreme Court of Georgia further expounded, noting 

that Georgia requires a unanimous verdict even in the sentencing

phase of a capital case because under its death-penalty law,

“[w]here a jury is unable to agree on a verdict, that disagreement is

not itself a verdict.” Id. (quoting Rominev. State, 350 S.E.2d 446, 451 

(Ga. 1986)). As the court explained Georgia law, “[t]he jury’s deadlock may lead to a sentence of life with or without parole imposed

by the trial court, but it does not result either in a mistrial subject

to retrial (as in other contexts where a jury deadlocks) or an automatic verdict (as occurs under the death penalty law of other

states).” Id. (citing Romine, 350 S.E.2d at 451). Thus, the court emphasized, it had “repeatedly held that a trial court is not required to

instruct the jury in the sentencing phase of a death penalty trial

about the consequences of a deadlock.” Id. (citing Jenkins v. State,

498 S.E.2d 502 (Ga. 1998)). 

Still, the Supreme Court of Georgia recognized that the 

charge could lead to claims of jury confusion, requiring an analysis 

of the “circumstances of the jury instructions given[.]” Id. The 

court then considered the circumstances here and determined that 

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the unanimity language amounted to merely a small portion of the 

extensive Allen charge the trial court gave. In the court’s view, several other aspects of the Allen charge minimized the unanimity language in these ways: 

[It] cautioned the jurors that the verdict was not to be 

the . . . mere acquiescence [of the jurors] in order to 

reach an agreement, that any difference of opinion 

should cause the jurors to scrutinize the evidence 

more [carefully and] closely and that the aim was to 

keep the truth in view as it appeared from the evidence, considered in light of the court’s instructions.

Id. (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Plus, the court 

observed, the trial court polled the jury, and each juror affirmed 

that the verdicts announced were the verdicts that they had 

reached. Id. Each juror also confirmed that they had rendered their 

verdicts without any pressure from anyone during their deliberations. Id. 

In the end, the Supreme Court of Georgia concluded that 

the Allen charge did not unduly coerce the jury into rendering a 

death sentence because the unanimous-verdict language was required at the time and was “but one small portion of an otherwise 

balanced and fair Allen charge.” Id. Still, the court recognized that 

the unanimity language may result in claims of “jury confusion.” 

For this reason, the court instructed future trial courts to exclude 

this language from Allen charges given during the sentencing phase 

of death-penalty trials. Id. 

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Humphreys argues it was unreasonable for the Supreme 

Court of Georgia to find that the jury charge, which results in jury 

confusion, was constitutional. And he claims that when a trial 

court insists that the jury must reach a decision, even in the face of 

a deadlock, that instruction is unconstitutionally coercive. We reject both claims. First, the Supreme Court of Georgia did not find 

that the “unanimous verdict language” in the jury charge results in

jury confusion; rather, it found that it could result in jury confusion. 

Second, the court made an individualized determination of the circumstances in Humphreys’s case to ascertain whether juror confusion occurred in Humphreys’s trial and determined it did not.10 

We must defer to the Supreme Court of Georgia’s decision 

so long as it did not unreasonably determine the facts in light of 

the evidence presented and its decision was not contrary to, or an 

unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law as determined by the Supreme Court. Humphreys cannot meet the 

AEDPA standard on either ground.

With respect to its factual determinations, the Supreme 

Court of Georgia accurately recounted the circumstances leading 

to the jury’s verdict. It correctly noted that, during the sentencing 

phase, the jury deliberated for approximately eight hours over a 

10 Importantly, the Supreme Court of Georgia found that the inclusion of the

unanimity language in an Allen charge would require a detailed analysis of the

full circumstances of the jury instructions given. Here, the court engaged in 

that analysis. 

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period of two days before Foreperson Barber sent the trial court a 

note that stated, 

We, the jury, have agreed on statutory aggravating 

circumstances on both counts, but not on the penalty. 

Currently we agreed life imprisonment with parole is 

not an acceptable option. We are currently unable to 

form a unanimous decision on death or on life imprisonment without parole. Please advise. 

Humphreys, 694 S.E.2d at 331 (emphasis added). 

The Supreme Court of Georgia recounted that the trial 

judge informed counsel of the note and summed up its details, advising counsel that the jury “indicated that they have reached a verdict in regard to some of the issues that have been submitted to 

them, but have not yet reached a decision on other issues that were 

submitted to them.” Id. So the trial court declared its intention to 

call the jury in and instruct it to continue deliberating. Id. When 

the jurors were brought into the courtroom, the judge instructed 

them as follows:

I guess you’ve been deliberating now about eight 

hours in the case. And the case was a lengthy trial, 

and there are a lot of issues. And you need to continue with your deliberations, and address the remaining issues. 

 The Supreme Court of Georgia next correctly noted that 

the jury returned to the jury room and continued deliberations 

for about three more hours before sending a second note to the 

court. Id. at 332. In that note, the jury asked to listen to Humphreys’s taped statement to detectives. Id. The court allowed the 

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jury to listen to the statement, and the jury returned to the jury 

room to continue deliberations. Id. After about two hours or so, 

defense moved for a mistrial. Id. The trial court denied the motion, emphasizing that the jury had not indicated that it was deadlocked. Id.

Following that motion, the jury deliberated for another 

roughly two hours, when Foreperson Barber sent a note to the 

court. She asked to be removed from the jury “[d]ue to the hostile 

nature of one of the jurors.” Id. In response to this note, the trial 

court announced that it intended to give the jury a modified Allen 

charge. Id. The Supreme Court of Georgia correctly set forth the 

verbatim Allen charge in its decision, acknowledging that Foreperson Barber’s note and the trial court’s intent to give an Allen charge 

prompted an objection from the defense and a renewal of the defense’s motion for mistrial, which the trial court again denied. Id.

at 332 & n.7 

After reading the juror’s note and without identifying from 

whom it came, the trial court gave the modified Allen charge. Id.

at 332. The jury retired to the jury room at 8:40 p.m., where it 

deliberated until 10:20 p.m., and then went home for the evening. 

Id. at 333. The following morning, the jurors reconvened and deliberated for two more hours, and the jury returned a death sentence for the two murders. Id. 

After reviewing the complete record, we cannot say that 

clear and convincing evidence exists that the Supreme Court of 

Georgia clearly erred in its factual determinations based on the 

evidence presented. The sequence of events and other facts set 

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forth by the court were correct. Humphreys does not appear to 

dispute this. Rather, he argues that the court’s legal conclusion of 

no coercion was unreasonable. 

But on this record, we cannot say that the Supreme Court 

of Georgia’s decision was contrary to or an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States. With respect to the trial court’s 

first decision to send the jurors back for further deliberations, the 

court correctly observed that whether a jury is “hopelessly deadlocked” is a determination to be made by the trial court and will 

be reversed on appeal only for an abuse of discretion. Humphreys, 

694 S.E.2d at 332. And here, the court emphasized, the trial was 

lengthy, the jury “had been deliberating for less than nine hours, 

and the language twice used in the note that the jurors ‘currently’ 

were not able to agree indicated that deliberations were ongoing.” 

Id. 

As for the two later notes, the Supreme Court of Georgia 

again pointed to the length of the trial in relation to the time the 

jury had been deliberating, and the court also noted that the jurors 

had recently requested to rehear evidence. Id. at 333. These facts, 

the court said, showed that the jurors were continuing to actively 

deliberate. Id. We can’t say that the Supreme Court of Georgia’s 

determinations in these regards were unreasonable. 

With respect to the Allen charge, the Supreme Court of 

Georgia recognized the correct law in its analysis, considering

whether, as a whole, the charge was “so coercive as to cause a juror

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to abandon an honest conviction forreasons otherthan those based

upon the trial or the arguments of other jurors.” Id. (citation and 

internal quotation marks omitted). It concluded that it was not. 

Then, the court emphasized that the trial court polled the jurors,

and each juror disavowed any coercion. Id. at 334. Again, these

determinations are neither unreasonable nor contrary to law. 

The Supreme Court’s case law on what constitutes a coerced 

verdict is quite limited. When the Supreme Court of Georgia issued its decision here, the leading case on this topic was Lowenfield. 

There, the Supreme Court determined that a jury’s penalty-phase 

verdict was not coerced after the trial court polled the jurors on 

whether further deliberations would be helpful and then instructed 

the jury to continue deliberating. 484 U.S. at 240–41.

In Lowenfield, the Supreme Court acknowledged that juror 

coercion can support a constitutional claim and that the relevant 

inquiry is the totality of the circumstances. Id. at 237–38. That 

said, the Supreme Court hasn’t shed further light on what constitutes juror coercion that violates a defendant’s constitutional 

rights. Given this fact and the Supreme Court of Georgia’s analysis 

here, we cannot conclude that the Supreme Court of Georgia unreasonably applied existing federal law. 

To the extent that Humphreys relies on Jenkins to support 

his argument that his conviction should be reversed, we disagree. 

In Jenkins, the Supreme Court reversed a conviction based on jury 

instructions given in a federal prosecution. But the Court has since 

explained that it based its decision there on the Court’s 

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“supervisory power over the federal courts, and not on constitutional grounds.” Lowenfield, 484 U.S. at 239 n.2 (citation omitted); 

Early v. Packer, 537 U.S. 3, 10 (2002) (per curiam). The same is true 

of the Court’s decision in United States v. Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422 

(1978), another case upon which Humphreys relies. Consequently, 

both Jenkins and Gypsum Co. “are off the table as far as § 2254(d) is 

concerned.” Sears, 73 F.4th at 1304 (quoting Packer, 537 U.S at 10).

In sum, the Supreme Court of Georgia accurately portrayed 

the facts and examined the Allen charge in its entirety, determining 

that the trial court did not coerce the jury to return a death sentence. Under AEDPA, we must defer to the Supreme Court of 

Georgia’s decision because it did not unreasonably determine the 

facts in light of the evidence presented, and its finding of no coercion was not contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly 

established federal law as determined by the Supreme Court. 

D. Ineffective Assistance of Trial Counsel 

In his final claim, Humphreys challenges the state habeas 

court’s finding that his trial counsel was not ineffective in investigating and presenting mitigation evidence. In Humphreys’s view,

trial counsel’s failure to conduct a thorough and accurate mitigation case caused them not to learn about years of childhood sexual 

abuse that Humphreys endured from his great-grandmother, the 

full extent of his mother’s neglect and abuse, or his lengthy family 

history of mental illness, abuse, and drug dependency. Humphreys 

also complains that the defense did not accept the diagnoses of 

their own mental-health clinician because someone on the defense 

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team had already “chosen” another diagnosis for Humphreys—Asperger’s Syndrome. Based on these claims, Humphreys contends 

trial counsel’s representation of him fell below the prevailing professional norms. Had a jury had heard the undiscovered, unpresented evidence, Humphreys contends, “there is clearly a reasonable probability that the . . . jury . . . ‘would have struck a different balance.’” 

As we’ve noted, the state habeas court denied Humphreys’s 

claims after holding an evidentiary hearing during which new 

counsel presented evidence in support of Humphreys’s claims. 

The Supreme Court of Georgia denied a certificate of probable 

cause to appeal, and the district court denied relief on the claim. 

We apply AEDPA deference to the state habeas court’s opinion. 

That requires us to deny Humphreys’s petition on this ground. 

First, the state habeas court discussed at length the qualifications of the defense team and, based on these details, it determined 

that Humphreys’s trial counsel were death-penalty qualified and 

their experience supported a finding of effective assistance of counsel. 

Next, the state habeas court described the investigation the 

defense team conducted and found it to be reasonable. The court 

noted that counsel interviewed Humphreys’s family members, 

friends, co-workers, and teacher, where available. The defense 

team also spoke with Humphreys, his father, stepmother, brotherin-law, paternal grandmother, aunt, uncle, and stepfather about 

Humphreys’s mental-health history and questioned them about 

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any physical, mental, or sexual abuse Humphreys suffered. During 

this investigation, neither Humphreys nor any of his family members indicated that he had been sexually abused. 

Besides these steps, defense counsel reviewed Humphreys’s 

prison records, criminal records, employment records, family records, financial records, legal records, medical records, social-services records, psychological records, and school records. And to 

prepare for the sentencing phase, defense counsel hired a licensed 

clinical social worker (Marti Loring, who met with Humphreys and 

diagnosed him with post-traumatic stress disorder (“PTSD”) and 

Asperger’s Syndrome), a prison adaptability expert (James Aiken), 

a neuropsychologist (Robert Schaffer, who diagnosed Humphreys 

with PTSD, Dissociative Disorder, and Asperger’s Syndrome), a 

psychiatrist (Bhushan Agharkar, to render an opinion as to trauma 

and abuse),11 a victim outreach specialist, and a trauma expert. 

As for the investigation of childhood sexual abuse, at the evidentiary hearing, mitigation specialist Laura Switzer testified that 

she suspected Humphreys had been sexually abused. But during 

the defense team’s interviews of witnesses (including Humphreys), 

no one reported that he had been sexually abused. In fact, the defense team asked Humphreys directly about sexual abuse, but 

Humphreys denied any recollection of such abuse. 

11 Dr. Agharkar disagreed with the diagnosis of Asperger’s Syndrome, and defense counsel decided he would not testify since his evaluation did not support 

their sentencing-phase theory. 

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The state habeas court summarized defense counsel’s 

presentation during the guilt-innocence phase as follows: (1) Humphreys’s childhood was characterized by violence,trauma, and instability and that he was raised by a dysfunctional, abusive family; (2) 

Humphreys’s parents divorced when he was two years old, and he 

lived with his mother for a while, during which he received a head

injury that resulted in a concussion; (3) when Humphreys’s father

gained custody of him, violence and disruption occurred in the

home; and (4) Humphreys was placed in special education because 

ofbehavioral problems. The state habeas court also noted that trial

counsel advised the jury about Humphreys’s mental-health issues, 

including about dissociative episodes that started when he was a

teenager, and about his obsessive-compulsive behavior (“OCD”). 

Finally, the state habeas court acknowledged that trial counsel presented evidence that Humphreys was non­violent and non-confrontational. 

As for the state habeas court’s findings about counsel’s performance during the penalty phase of the trial, it determined that 

trial counsel “made a reasonable presentation during the sentencing phase based on their strategy and the information discovered 

during their investigation.” It recognized the strategy was to present evidence of Asperger’s Syndrome as well as Humphreys’s 

traumatic childhood to allow the jurors to have some empathy for 

him. The state habeas court pointed out that defense counsel used 

the testimony of six lay witnesses and three experts to present the 

information to the jury. 

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The state habeas court summarized the testimony of each 

witness. As relevant here, the court pointed out that trial counsel 

presented the testimony of Humphreys’s stepmother, Janie Swick, 

who conveyed the dynamics in the home, including that Humphreys’s father was verbally and physically abusive to him. Swick 

explained that Humphreys’s father “bullied” him and caused him 

to run away in fear. She recalled an incident in which Humphreys’s 

father struck him in the arm with a broom, requiring Humphreys 

to go to the hospital. Swick also informed the jury that Humphreys 

did not have many friends growing up and had mental problems, 

and she said she regretted not getting psychological help for Humphreys. 

Next, Humphreys’s half-sister Julia testified to the abuse 

their father inflicted on them. Although the father disciplined all 

the children, Julia characterized the abuse he inflicted upon Humphreys as “very bad.” Julia explained that her father used switches 

and belts to discipline the children. And she recalled an incident 

where their father challenged Humphreys to a fight. During that 

fight, their father repeatedly punched Humphreys in the head before he finally escaped. 

Later, the state habeas court turned to the testimony of 

Humphreys’s sister Dayna, who gave examples of their “rather difficult” early childhood. According to Dayna, their father was an 

unhappy man who was hard on them and showed very little affection. He did not handle stress well and often became angry and 

violent. Dayna testified that their father physically abused her and 

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Humphreys throughout their childhood, imposing whippings with 

a large belt or stick. Their father beat Humphreys with his fist. 

The state habeas court further recounted the testimony of 

the two expert witnesses trial counsel presented to the jury during 

the mitigation phase. Dr. Loring, who was qualified as an expert

in social work and trauma, testified that she met with Humphreys 

on four occasions for approximately three hours each time. Dr.

Loring also interviewed sixteen individuals to get their perceptions, experiences, and observations of Humphreys. To complete 

her analysis of Humphreys, Dr. Loring reviewed extensive records 

including police records, school records, jail records, divorce records, work records, and hospital records. 

Dr. Loring testified to the jury that Humphreys’s childhood 

was marked by abuse; he spent his early childhood living in a home 

where drugs were bought and sold. As evidence of the “extensive 

physical abuse,” Dr. Loring testified that the Department of Family 

and Children Services discovered cigarette burns on Humphreys 

when he was a child. At age two, Humphreys’s entire body was 

bruised following a beating by his father, who admitted that he had 

“lost it” and beaten him. At age three, he was taken to the hospital 

for a fractured skull. At age four, his shoulder was dislocated as the 

result of a violent shaking by his father. Dr. Loring also spoke of 

the incident where Humphreys’s father hit Humphreys with a 

broom handle. After the incident, his father threatened to kill his 

stepmother if she tried to take Humphreys to the hospital for treatment. Besides these incidents, Dr. Loring recounted that 

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Humphreys’s father had severely beaten by him because he got 

into a car accident and, on another occasion, his father sat on his 

private parts, holding Humphreys’s hands above his head and continually beating him in the head and the chest. 

And the state habeas court noted that Dr. Loring explained 

to the jury that Humphreys’s father flew “into a rage as a matter of 

pattern, not just one time or two, and he would whip or beat 

[Humphreys].” Dr. Loring described the abuse as “not only explosive physically, where [Humphreys] would get slapped and 

punched, thrown across the room, indeed, but there was a very 

remarkable emotional component to the abuse that [his father] 

committed upon [Humphreys and his sister].” In Dr. Loring’s 

view, this was “ritualistic emotional abuse,” meaning a series of 

steps led up to the physical abuse. 

The state habeas court also considered Dr. Loring’s testimony that, growing up, Humphreys was in special education and 

exhibited “odd classroom behavior, inappropriate behavior, that 

was marked by a lack of focus, being hyper, [and] a lack of concentration.” She said these symptoms were often seen in children who 

are traumatized and abused. Dr. Loring also told the jury that as a 

result of his abusive upbringing, Humphreys tended to wander off, 

even to different states, evidencing Humphreys’s dissociation. 

Dr. Loring advised the jury that she had diagnosed Humphreys with PTSD and Asperger’s Syndrome. In Dr. Loring’s view, 

Humphreys suffered from PTSD because of the trauma he 

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experienced during his childhood and teenage years. Regarding 

her diagnosis of Asperger’s Syndrome, Dr. Loring educated the 

jury that individuals with Asperger’s Syndrome were “very impaired in their ability to be close or intimate with another person” 

and severely suffered from a “sustained impairment in social interaction.” Dr. Loring provided several indicia to support her diagnosis of Humphreys. She opined that he had “a real impaired ability 

to relate to people and to empathize with them,” and his life experiences caused him to be “much more involved with objects or 

cleaning or a kind of ritual of what you do at what moment in 

time.” 

When the state habeas court finished reviewing Dr. Loring’s 

testimony to the jury, it then went through Dr. Robert Shaffer’s 

testimony. Dr. Schaffer, a clinical psychologist, interviewed six individuals about their observations of Humphreys. Dr. Shaffer also 

spoke with Dr. Loring about the social history she prepared on 

Humphreys and reviewed police reports, hospital records, school 

records, and prison records. Based upon his evaluation, Dr. Shaffer 

opined that Humphreys suffered from PTSD, Dissociative Disorder, and Asperger’s Syndrome. 

In support of his diagnosis of Asperger’s Syndrome, Dr. Shaffer testified that Humphreys had very unusual cleaning routines, 

and he explained that Humphreys became uncomfortable and agitated if his routine was disturbed. Dr. Shaffer also testified that 

Humphreys met the criteria for Asperger’s in that he had an “extreme interest” in reading science fiction and constantly talked 

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about these books for hours with different people as if they really 

could be true. Additionally, Dr. Shaffer recounted Humphrey’s 

lack of the normal emotional give and take. 

As for Dissociative Disorder, Dr. Shaffer said that involved 

an individual who “split[s] off from their normal state of awareness” and experiences “periods of productive and active behaviors, 

and then later, ha[s] no recollection of that.” Dr. Shaffer opined to 

the jury that Humphreys suffered from Dissociative Disorder as a 

result of the violence in his home, so Humphreys was unaware of 

the “normal judgment and thoughts and memories that he has to 

bring to bear on a situation.” 

Besides this testimony, Dr. Shaffer told the jury that Humphreys met all the diagnostic criteria for PTSD. In Dr. Shaffer’s 

view, there was “pretty strong evidence that there was significant 

abuse before [Humphreys’s] age of earliest memory.” And he also 

said that the second category of diagnostics for PTSD—avoidance 

of the memories—also applied to Humphreys, as there was “clear 

evidence of a great deal of denial” by Humphreys. Finally, Dr. 

Shaffer testified that Humphreys’s denial was his attempt to “avoid 

re-experiencing the problems and horrors” that occurred in his life. 

The state habeas court then recounted the evidence presented during the habeas proceedings: (1) the testimony of Humphreys’s step-siblings, who testified that Humphreys’s mother verbally and physically abused them, (2) Humphreys’s ROTC teacher, 

who testified that he was in special education classes for a 

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behavioral disorder, (3) Humphreys’s childhood neighbor, who 

testified that Humphreys’s father yelled at him often and spanked 

him in the yard after he soiled his underwear, and (4) two expert 

witnesses. 

The most relevant testimony here was that of the two expert 

witnesses, Dr. Julie Rand Dorney and Dr. Victoria Reynolds. The 

state habeas court recounted that testimony.

It noted that Dr. Dorney, an expert in forensic psychiatry, testified she performed an examination of Humphreys over the 

course of two days, and diagnosed him with obsessive-compulsive 

disorder and depressive disorder, NOS. She also found that he had 

many symptoms of both PTSD and bipolar disorder, but she concluded he did not meet all the criteria for either diagnosis. Dr. Dorney testified that, in her second meeting with Humphreys, he told 

her that he had been sexually abused by his great-grandmother. 

As for Dr. Reynolds, an expert in trauma and its impact on 

victims, she testified about much of the evidence presented in the 

sentencing proceedings. She acknowledged that when she spoke 

to Humphreys about his great-grandmother, he did not reveal the 

sexual abuse. Still, Dr. Reynolds suspected Humphreys had been 

sexually abused based on his level of dissociativeness, his level of 

compartmentalization, and his sexual activity. Dr. Reynolds also 

spoke about the trauma Humphreys endured growing up, including a skull fracture, the instability in the home, and physical abuse. 

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After these detailed inventories of defense counsel’s presentation of evidence at the mitigation stage and habeas counsel’s 

presentation of evidence at the habeas hearing, the state habeas 

court concluded that trial counsel performed adequately. And 

“particularly in light of trial counsel’s thorough investigation and 

strategic decisions[,]” the state habeas court determined that Humphreys was not prejudiced by counsel’s failure to discover and present the additional mitigation evidence Humphreys said should 

have been presented. As the state habeas court emphasized, trial 

counsel was not required to present all mitigation evidence and 

“[c]onsidering the realities of the courtroom, more is not always 

better. . . . [G]ood advocacy requires ‘winnowing out’ some arguments, witnesses, evidence, and so on, to stress others.” 

Plus, the state habeas court observed that the evidence submitted during the habeas proceedings was largely cumulative of 

the evidence presented at trial. Indeed, the court concluded, the 

only truly “new evidence” concerned Humphreys’s past sexual 

abuse, although neither Humphreys nor anyone else had disclosed 

the abuse prior to the habeas proceedings. Still, the state habeas 

court noted, Humphreys’s defense team remained suspicious and 

investigated further. The court explained that it “weigh[ed] heavily the information provided by the defendant” in evaluating the 

reasonableness of counsel’s investigation. 

Here, Humphreys did not provide the court with any evidence of sexual abuse that would have been available to trial counsel. The only evidence was his self-report to Dr. Dorney, after the 

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sentencing proceedings. Given these circumstances, the state habeas court explained that trial counsel “does not render ineffective 

assistance by failing to discover and develop evidence of childhood 

abuse that his client does not mention to him.” Accordingly, the 

state habeas court concluded trial counsel’s performance was not 

deficient “for not presenting evidence that [Humphreys] withheld 

from them.” 

And in any case, the state habeas court determined that 

Humphreys failed to show any prejudice since the additional evidence presented in the habeas proceedings would not have created 

a reasonable probability of a different outcome. As the court explained, a comparison of the trial record with the habeas record 

“shows the majority of the evidence presented in habeas reiterated 

the testimony presented at trial.” 

As for the expert testimony, the state habeas court recognized that the habeas experts diagnosed Humphreys with OCD, 

but the trial experts diagnosed him with PTSD, dissociative disorder, and Asperger’s Syndrome. But the court reasoned that the diagnoses were based on the same behaviors and symptoms. And 

while OCD could be one possible diagnosis, it was not the only reasonable diagnosis that could be made from the information. 

With respect to the new evidence of past sexual abuse, even 

assuming the investigation was deficient (as we’ve noted, the court 

found it wasn’t because the defense team expressly asked about sexual abuse and Humphreys and his relatives and friends did not disclose it), Humphreys still did not demonstrate a reasonable 

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probability that the outcome would have been different if the evidence had been presented at trial, given the weight of the mitigation evidence that counsel did present.

In sum, the state habeas court found that Humphreys failed 

to show deficient performance or the required resulting prejudice. 

Consequently, the state habeas court denied the ineffective-assistance-of-trial-counsel claims. 

As we have already noted, to succeed on an ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim, the petitioner must show both that (1) his 

attorney’s performance was deficient, and (2) the deficiency prejudiced his defense. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687. And because Strickland’s standard itself requires deference to counsel’s performance, 

and AEDPA, by its terms, requires deference to state-court decisions, our review of state courts’ resolution of the deficient-performance prong of Strickland’s ineffective-assistance standard requires 

double deference. See Cullen v. Pinholster, 563 U.S. 170, 202 (2011).

After careful consideration, and applying AEDPA deference, 

we conclude that the state habeas court reasonably determined 

that Humphreys failed to show unconstitutionally deficient performance on the part of his trial counsel. In answering this question, 

we reweigh the aggravating evidence against the totality of the 

available mitigating evidence. See Ferrell v. Hall, 640 F.3d 1199, 1234 

(11th Cir. 2011). In doing so, we find nothing unreasonable about 

the state court’s determination that counsel were not deficient in 

not uncovering Humphreys’s sexual abuse. Here, members of the 

defense team interviewed Humphreys and others, asking 

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specifically whether Humphreys had been sexually abused. No 

one responded that he had. Counsel also reviewed medical, 

school, and other records, but they, too, failed to reveal Humphreys’s sexual abuse. A defense attorney preparing for sentencing 

in a capital trial is not required “to scour the globe on the off chance 

something will turn up.” Everett v. Sec’y, Fla. Dep’t of Corr., 779 F.3d 

1212, 1250 (11th Cir. 2015) (quoting Rompilla, 545 U.S. at 382−383).

As for the additional evidence of Humphreys’s non-sexual 

abuse and his mental conditions, counsel presented substantial mitigation evidence, and the new habeas evidence was mostly cumulative of what was presented during the trial and sentencing proceedings. The jury learned of the severe and frequent physical and 

mental abuse, as well as neglect, that Humphreys suffered as a 

child. It also learned of Humphreys’s mental-health issues—his dissociative episodes, his OCD behaviors, and his other odd behavior.

The state habeas court reasonably concluded that any additional evidence about these issues would be cumulative. The 

“mere fact that other witnesses might have been available or that 

other testimony might have been elicited from those who testified 

is not a sufficient ground to prove ineffectiveness of counsel.” 

Chandler v. United States, 218 F.3d 1305, 1316 n.20 (11th Cir. 2000) 

(citation omitted).

Finally, as for Humphreys’s suggestion that his trial counsel 

conducted a last-minute mental-health investigation and reached 

an unreasonable conclusion that he suffered from Asperger’s Syndrome, we cannot conclude that the state habeas court 

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unreasonably rejected that claim, either. Dr. Shaffer conducted his 

first evaluation of Humphreys in May 2005, but at that time, he was 

instructed not to prepare a written report. Dr. Shaffer later conducted a second evaluation of Humphreys in August of 2007 after 

reviewing additional records, reviewing case information, and interviewing witnesses. After the second evaluation, Dr. Shaffer diagnosed Humphreys with PTSD, Dissociative Disorder, and Asperger’s Syndrome. This timeline refutes the idea that defense counsel 

waited until just prior to trial to develop a mitigation strategy and 

hire defense experts. 

Humphreys focuses on the opinion of another doctor who 

agreed with Dr. Shaffer’s findings that Humphreys exhibited symptoms of PTSD but disagreed with the Asperger’s Syndrome diagnosis. The defense was not required to present the testimony of 

the second doctor; it made a strategic decision not to present it. 

And the state habeas court was not unreasonable in concluding that 

decision was within competent counsel’s discretion. See Nance v. 

Warden, Ga. Diagnostic Prison, 922 F.3d 1298, 1302 (11th Cir. 2019) 

(“It is especially difficult to succeed with an ineffective assistance 

claim questioning the strategic decisions of trial counsel who were 

informed of the available evidence.”). After all, other evidence supports defense counsel’s strategy. Along with Dr. Shaffer, Dr. Loring opined that Humphreys suffered from PTSD and Asperger’s 

Syndrome. Consequently, two doctors’ findings supported the defense team’s decision. And both Dr. Loring and Dr. Shaffer testified 

as to how they came up with their diagnoses. 

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For these reasons, the state habeas court’s determination 

that defense counsel was not ineffective is entitled to deference. 

We will not disturb that finding on the grounds advanced by Humphreys.

Though this conclusion requires us to deny Humphreys’s 

petition even without considering the state habeas court’s prejudice determination, we nonetheless find that the court’s prejudice 

determination was likewise not unreasonable. As the state habeas 

court explained, with the exception of the sexual-assault evidence, 

the remainder of the evidence was largely cumulative of the hefty 

mitigation evidence trial counsel presented to the jury. And we 

cannot say the habeas court unreasonably concluded that the addition of the sexual-assault evidence would have made an overall difference in the impact of the mitigation case, given the strong evidence of abuse and mental-health issues counsel presented. So for 

this reason, too, we reject Humphreys’s claim of ineffective assistance.

IV. CONCLUSION

Our review of the record compels the conclusion that Humphreys is not entitled to relief on any of the claims he presented in 

his petition for writ of habeas corpus. We therefore affirm the district court’s denial of Humphreys’s habeas petition. 

AFFIRMED.

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21-10387 ROSENBAUM, J., Concurring 1

ROSENBAUM, Circuit Judge, Concurring:

I concur in the panel opinion because I think that a combination of the no-impeachment rule and the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”) require it. But I am 

deeply concerned about what transpired during jury deliberations 

here.

Linda Chancey swore under oath during voir dire that her 

attacker “actually didn’t do [her] any physical bodily harm” because 

she “escape[d] before he actually physically entered the dwelling.” 

That was false. Chancey told jurors that she “was naked in her bed 

and a man broke in and attacked her” in her bed. And after trial, 

Chancey told Humphreys’s investigators that “a strange man came 

through the window of her apartment, robbed her, and tried to 

rape her.” These were important facts, and had Humphreys’s lawyers known of them, they could have exercised the remaining peremptory strike to remove Chancey from the jury. But they didn’t 

know about them. And they didn’t know because Chancey lied 

during voir dire.

Even worse, Susan Barber testified that on “day one, 

[Chancey] had her mind made up: early in the trial—before the 

end of the first phase—she said something along the lines of he’s 

guilty and he deserves to die.” Indeed, according to Barber, 

Chancey told the other jurors that she “would only vote for death.”

So even when the other eleven jurors, after deliberating 

many hours, voted for life without parole, Chancey would not even 

consider it. Of course, it was Chancey’s right to vote for death if 

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2 ROSENBAUM, J., Concurring 21-10387

she thought the facts warranted it. But Humphreys had the right

to expect that (a) Chancey had told the truth during voir dire, and 

(b) she would at least honestly consider imposing a sentence of life 

without parole. 

Worse still, Chancey incorrectly told the other jurors that 

“they had to reach a unanimous decision or [Humphreys] would 

be paroled.” That, of course, was wrong. In fact, had the jurors 

failed to reach a unanimous decision, Humphreys would have been 

sentenced to life without parole under Georgia law. But Chancey’s 

incorrect statement, combined with the court’s repeated instructions to the jury to continue deliberating, caused Barber to believe 

incorrectly that if the jury didn’t return a death verdict, Humphreys would be sentenced to life imprisonment with the possibility of parole or that he could “walk.”

Based on Barber’s testimony about what occurred during 

jury deliberations, two things seem clear: (1) Chancey was dishonest during voir dire, and her undisclosed bias likely made her unable 

to consider any verdict other than death, and (2) had the jury not 

incorrectly believed, as a result of the trial court’s instructions and 

Chancey’s statements, that Humphreys would have been released 

or been sentenced to life with the possibility of parole if the jury 

couldn’t return a verdict, the jury wouldn’t have returned a verdict, 

and Humphreys would have been sentenced to life imprisonment 

without the possibility of parole. Put simply, I do not doubt that 

the errors here “actually prejudice[d]” Humphreys. See Brecht v 

Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 637 (1993). When an error “actually 

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21-10387 ROSENBAUM, J., Concurring 3

prejudices” a defendant and that error is the difference between life 

and death, in my view, we should be able to correct that error.

But we can’t here. The problem is that proving prejudice 

requires us to consider the jurors’ testimony about what occurred 

during deliberations. Yet Georgia law and the no-impeachment 

rule prohibit us from doing just that.

True, the Supreme Court has identified an exception to the 

no-impeachment rule. But the Court has never recognized an exception under the specific circumstances here (and when the state 

courts considered Humphreys’s case, the Supreme Court had yet 

to apply the limited exception in any case). 

And while the Court has limited any exception to the “gravest and most important of cases”—a category into which deathpenalty cases would seem to fall—AEDPA’s standard of review cuts 

off that avenue for granting the petition. As I’ve noted, the Supreme Court has applied the exception in only a single case ever—

and the reason there was the juror’s racial bias, which was not the 

case here. And though a Supreme Court case need not be directly 

on point to make it applicable, here, the Supreme Court has otherwise consistently refused to apply the exception and has cautioned 

time and again against construing the exception in any way but extremely narrowly. 

Given this precedent, if we faithfully apply AEDPA’s standard of review, we cannot find that the state court’s decision was 

“contrary to” federal law. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). That’s so because 

the state court’s decision does not “contradict[] the United States 

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4 ROSENBAUM, J., Concurring 21-10387

Supreme Court on a settled question of law or hold[] differently 

than did that Court on a set of materially indistinguishable facts.” 

Evans v. Sec’y, Dep’t of Corr., 703 F.3d 1316, 1325 (11th Cir. 2013) (citation omitted).

So I must reluctantly concur in today’s opinion. But I don’t 

think that makes it right.

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