J-S26044-16

* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION – SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA,

 

v.

JERRY RANSOME,

 Appellant

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IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 725 EDA 2015

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence June 21, 2013,

in the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County, 

Criminal Division at No(s): CP-51-CR-0006515-2007

BEFORE: OLSON, STABILE, and STRASSBURGER,* JJ.

MEMORANDUM BY STRASSBURGER, J.: FILED MAY 16, 2016

Jerry Ransome (Appellant) appeals from the judgment of sentence 

entered following his convictions for second-degree murder, robbery, 

aggravated assault, conspiracy to commit robbery, possession of 

instruments of a crime, and multiple violations of the Uniform Firearms Act. 

We affirm.

The trial court summarized the relevant factual and procedural history 

of this case as follows.

On October 3, 2006, at approximately 9:20 pm, Gary 

Roemhild, Kevin Roemhild, Keith Pena and the decedent, Michael 

Thierry, were standing on the front steps of 1500 Rosalie Street, 

where Gary rented an apartment. As the complainants were 

conversing with each other, [Appellant] and his cohorts, all of 

whom were armed, approached them.

Sensing that a robbery was about to occur, Gary 

attempted to run inside. He could not open the door before 

[Appellant’s] brother, Isaiah Ransome, who was holding a 

handgun, grabbed Gary and demanded that he empty his 
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pockets. Keith Pena was standing on the steps next to Gary. 

Appellant, who brandished a .32 caliber revolver, robbed Pena. 

Kevin Roemhild and Michael Thierry were at the bottom of the 

steps, near the pavement. Eric Gales pointed a .22 caliber rifle 

at Kevin Roemhild’s head during the robbery. Sean Gordine 

confronted Michael Thierry.

Gary, Keith and Kevin each gave up their money, wallets 

and cell phones. Michael Thierry dropped his keys and cell 

phone and ran. At that point, all four defendants turned toward 

Thierry and started shooting. Thierry was shot in the head and 

groin and collapsed near the intersection of Rosalie and Horrocks 

Streets. As they fled, the defendants turned their weapons on 

the surviving victims and fired multiple gunshots at them.

Police arrived on scene within a few minutes. They found 

Thierry lying in the street. Thierry was taken to the hospital, 

where he died three days later.

Over the next several months, homicide detectives 

interviewed the victims and spoke with several witnesses. One 

of those witnesses was [Appellant’s] brother, Jamil Ransome. 

Jamil gave information to the police that implicated both of his 

brothers and Gordine. 

Following his arrest, [Appellant] voluntarily gave a

statement to police admitting his involvement in the robbery and 

shooting. Appellant told police that his gun went off 

accidentally. 

At trial, the surviving victims and multiple bystanders who 

observed the robbery and subsequent shooting positively 

identified [Appellant] as one of the shooters. The 

Commonwealth also presented testimony from several police 

officers and the medical examiner, ballistics evidence linking the 

defendants to the crime, inculpatory statements and letters 

[Appellant] made after the shooting, and a cell phone video 

depicting all four defendants playing Russian roulette with a .32 

caliber handgun. Appellant did not have a license to carry a 

firearm.

***
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The defendants were jointly tried by jury before the 

Honorable Carolyn Engle Temin. [Appellant was 17 years old at 

the time of the incident. He was tried as an adult along with his 

co-defendants.] On June 13, 2008, the jury returned a partial 

verdict finding all four defendants not guilty of first degree 

murder, but deadlocking on the remaining charges.

A second jury trial was set to commence in May of 2009. 

Prior to the start of trial, the Commonwealth asked Judge Temin 

to reconsider several evidentiary rulings she had made prior to 

[Appellant’s] first trial. Specifically, the Commonwealth sought 

the introduction of cell phone records and writings made by one 

or more of the defendants that had been ruled inadmissible at 

the previous trial. Judge Temin denied the Commonwealth’s 

Motion to Reconsider. The Commonwealth appealed Judge 

Temin’s ruling to the Pennsylvania Superior Court, which vacated 

her order. On March 31, 2011, defense counsel filed a Petition 

for Allowance of Appeal in the Pennsylvania Supreme Court. 

This Petition was denied on June 2, 2011. Appellant’s case was 

then scheduled for retrial. 

On December 14, 2012, at the conclusion of a second jury 

trial, the jury found [Appellant] guilty of second degree murder, 

three counts of robbery (F-1), three counts of aggravated 

assault (F-1), criminal conspiracy, possession of an instrument 

of crime (PIC) and violating §§ 6106 and 6108 of the Uniform 

Firearms Act.

[Judge Temin retired prior to sentencing Appellant. 

Appellant’s case was then assigned to the Honorable Benjamin 

Lerner.] On June 21, 2013, following a lengthy hearing, [Judge 

Lerner] sentenced [Appellant] to thirty-five (35) years to life 

imprisonment on the second degree murder bill and concurrent 

prison terms of five (5) to ten (10) years on the robbery and 

conspiracy bills [] and two-and-a-half (21⁄2) to five (5) years on 

the § 6106 bill. The court also imposed a prison term of five (5) 

to ten (10) years for each aggravated assault bill (these 

sentences were ordered to run concurrently to each other but 

consecutively to the murder). No further penalty was imposed 

on the remaining bills. Appellant’s total aggregate sentence was 

forty (40) years to life.

Appellant filed post-sentence motions, which were denied 

by [the] court on July 5, 2013. Appellant thereafter filed a 
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timely appeal. The appeal was dismissed because [Appellant] 

failed to file a docketing statement pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 3517.

On February 18, 2015, [the] court granted [Appellant’s] 

request to have his direct appeal rights reinstated nunc pro tunc. 

This timely appeal followed. [Both Appellant and the trial court 

complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925.]

Trial Court Opinion, 8/7/2015, at 1-4 (citations to notes of testimony and 

footnotes omitted).

Before we address the issues Appellant raises in his brief, we consider 

the impact of Appellant’s non-compliance with the appellate briefing 

requirements. Rule 2101 of our Rules of Appellate Procedure provides that 

an appellant’s brief “shall conform in all material respects with the 

requirements of these rules as nearly as the circumstances of the particular 

case will admit, otherwise they may be suppressed, and, if the defects are in 

the brief or reproduced record of the appellant and are substantial, the 

appeal or other matter may be quashed or dismissed.” Pa.R.A.P. 2101. In 

particular, the argument section of an appellate brief shall include 

“discussion and citation of authorities as are deemed pertinent.” Pa.R.A.P. 

2119(a). Further, “[i]f reference is made to the pleadings, evidence, charge, 

opinion or order, or any other matter appearing in the record, the argument 

must set forth, in immediate connection therewith, or in a footnote thereto, 

a reference to the place in the record where the matter referred to appears.” 

Pa.R.A.P. 2119(c). Additionally, “[w]hen the finding of, or the refusal to 

find, a fact is argued, the argument must contain a synopsis of all the 
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evidence on the point, with a reference to the place in the record where the 

evidence may be found” and “[w]here under the applicable law an issue is 

not reviewable on appeal unless raised or preserved below, the argument 

must set forth, in immediate connection therewith or in a footnote thereto, 

either a specific cross-reference to the page or pages of the statement of the 

case which set forth the information relating thereto[.]” Pa.R.A.P. 2119(d), 

(e). Appellant’s brief fails to comport with these rules. However, we decline 

to dismiss the appeal “outright” or “in its entirety” and instead will consider 

whether each issue is sufficiently developed to avoid waiver.

In his first issue, Appellant argues that the trial court erred “by 

allowing the Commonwealth to repeatedly engage in prosecutorial 

misconduct in the presence of the jury despite several warnings.” Appellant’s 

Brief at 7. In support of his argument, Appellant lists eight examples of 

alleged misconduct and/or the trial court’s response thereto (some with 

pinpoint citations to the record, some without), the cumulative effect of 

which, he alleges, should result in a new trial. Id. at 7-8. Appellant then 

cites to case law outlining the duties of a prosecutor. Id. at 8. Appellant’s 

argument on this point fails to comply with the requirements of Pa.R.A.P. 

2119(a) and (d). Notably absent from his argument on this point is any 

actual argument, including, but not limited to, the relevant standard under 

which this Court is to review and resolve claims of prosecutorial misconduct. 

See e.g. Commonwealth v. Holley, 945 A.2d 241 (Pa. Super. 2008); 
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Commonwealth v. Judy, 978 A.2d 1015, 1019–1020 (Pa. Super. 2009). 

This Court has emphasized that it is the obligation of the appellant to 

present arguments that are sufficiently developed for our review. In re 

R.D., 44 A.3d 657, 674 (Pa. Super. 2012). “We will not act as counsel and 

will not develop arguments on behalf of an appellant.” Id. (quotation 

omitted). Accordingly, we find this claim waived.

Appellant next contends that the trial court erred in denying his motion 

to suppress his statement to police. Appellant’s Brief at 10-11. This 

argument suffers from the same deficiencies as the first: although Appellant 

claims that his constitutional rights were violated, he fails to develop this 

claim in any meaningful way, either by citation to authorities outlining this 

Court’s standard for reviewing denials of suppression motions or to the 

record itself. Moreover, as the Commonwealth points out, Appellant has 

failed to ensure that a transcript of the suppression hearing at issue was 

included in the certified record in violation of Pa.R.A.P. 1911, 1921-1923.1

Commonwealth’s Brief at 18. Accordingly, we are constrained to find this 

claim waived.

Similarly, Appellant’s third claim, in which he contends that the trial 

court erred in denying his motion in limine regarding physical evidence 

seized from his jail cell, and his fourth, in which he argues that the trial 

court erred in allowing the admission of a cell phone video at trial, are 

 

1 The record reflects that Appellant requested his trial transcript, but did not 

request transcription of the May 2008 suppression hearing.
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waived due to his failure to present any meaningful argument on either 

point, his failure to provide any citations to the record or to relevant case 

law, and, to the extent that either of these claims was raised at the 

suppression hearing (a fact that is unclear because of Appellant’s total 

failure to provide citations to the record to support his boilerplate 

arguments), his failure to provide this Court with the relevant notes of 

testimony. 

Appellant’s fifth issue is a single-sentence challenge to the legality of 

his sentence: “Act 204 of 2012 is unconstitutional in that the original 

purpose of the proposed legislation (i.e., Senate Bill 850) was substantively 

altered/amended during the legislative process in direct and clear violation 

of Article III, Section 1 of the Pennsylvania Constitution.” Appellant’s Brief at 

14. Once more, because he has failed to provide meaningful argument on 

this point, we determine Appellant has waived this claim. However, as the 

trial court aptly noted: 

In Commonwealth v. Booker, 103 A.2d 325 (Pa. Super. 

2014), the defendant unsuccessfully raised the same issue. 

Booker was convicted of first degree murder and related 

offenses. On appeal, he argued that the statute governing 

murder sentences for offenders under age 18 violated the 

original purpose clause of the state constitution. The Superior 

Court rejected Booker’s claim after considering the bill in 

question, its purposes and the circumstances underlying the 

legislature’s decision to amend the original bill. The Court stated:

The original bill, S.B. 850 was to create new 

offenses regarding cyber bullying and sexting by 

minors, modify expungement for, exclude the public 

from, and create referrals to alternative adjudication 
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programs following hearings regarding summary 

offenses by minors, and create a presumption of 

indigency in juvenile division proceedings. Whereas 

the final version of the bill modified expungement 

requirements for underage drinking and summary 

offenses by minors, created the new Section 1102.1 

and enacted a new chapter in the Crimes Code to 

create an “Office of the Victim Advocate” to advocate 

for juvenile crime victims. The final bill also excluded 

the public from juvenile summary offense hearings, 

created referrals to alternative adjudication 

programs for juvenile summary offenses, eliminated 

juvenile summary offenses as a basis for 

dependency, and established five-year intervals for 

parole applications for juvenile sentences under 

Section 1102.1.

Id. at 335. (citations omitted).

The Court noted that both the original and final version of 

the bill dealt with amending existing juvenile law. With regard to 

the purpose of the amendment in issue, Section 1102.1, it was 

added in response to the United States Supreme Court’s decision 

in Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. ---, 132 S.Ct. 2455, 183 L.Ed.2d 

407 (2012) (holding that a statute requiring a mandatory life 

sentence without the possibility of parole for a juvenile convicted 

of first or second degree murder violates the Eighth 

Amendment’s prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment). Id.

Although [Appellant] was convicted of second degree 

murder, he was sentenced under the same statute as Booker. 

That statute and the manner in which it was passed present no 

constitutional violations. Accordingly, this claim has no merit.

Trial Court Opinion, 8/7/2015, at 18-19. Accordingly, even if Appellant’s 

claim had been preserved properly, he would not be entitled to relief.

In his sixth issue, Appellant challenges the timing of an interlocutory 

appeal filed by the Commonwealth. His argument on this point is as follows.

In response to the trial court’s aforesaid June 4, 2008 order 

partially granting [Appellant’s] motion in limine, the 
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Commonwealth filed an interlocutory appeal on May 26, 2009. 

Accordingly, because that filing was well beyond the thirty day 

mandate pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 903(a) and because no 

extraordinary circumstances existed for that delay, such filing 

was untimely despite the February 1, 2011 Superior Court order 

granting the Commonwealth’s appeal.

Appellant’s Brief at 15. 

A panel of this Court has previously determined that “the 

Commonwealth had a right to seek reconsideration of the original motion-inlimine order, and also to file the instant appeal from that order,” and 

addressed on the merits the substantive issues raised by the 

Commonwealth. Commonwealth v. Ransome, 24 A.3d 441, at *15 (Pa. 

Super. 2011) (unpublished memorandum). It is well-settled that “[a]mong 

the related but distinct rules which make up the law of the case doctrine are 

that: (1) upon remand for further proceedings, a trial court may not alter 

the resolution of a legal question previously decided by the appellate court in 

the matter[.]” Commonwealth v. Starr, 664 A.2d 1326, 1331 (Pa. 1995). 

Accordingly, as the prior decision of this Court is the law of the case, and 

therefore binding on the trial court, Appellant is not entitled to relief on this 

issue.

In his final claim, Appellant asserts a boilerplate, undeveloped 

challenge to the weight and sufficiency of the evidence. Appellant’s Brief at 

unnumbered page after 15. Appellant makes no attempt to differentiate 

between these two concepts. See Commonwealth v. Widmer, 744 A.2d 

745, 751-52 (Pa. 2000) (delineating the distinctions between a challenge to 
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the sufficiency of the evidence and a claim that a verdict is against the 

weight of the evidence).

With respect to sufficiency-of-the-evidence claims, it is well-settled 

that the 1925(b) statement must specify the element or elements upon 

which the evidence was insufficient, or the claim may be waived. 

Commonwealth v. Williams, 959 A.2d 1252, 1257-58 (Pa. Super. 2008). 

In his 1925(b) statement, and on appeal, Appellant merely asserts general 

sufficiency challenges for each of his twelve convictions, and fails to specify 

which element or elements of each crime he is challenging. Appellant’s Brief 

at unnumbered page after page 15; Appellant’s Concise Statement, 

4/13/2015. We reiterate that this Court will not act as counsel and will not 

develop arguments on behalf of an appellant. In re R.D., 44 A.3d at 674. 

Accordingly, we are constrained to find Appellant’s sufficiency-of-theevidence claims waived. 

We turn next to Appellant’s weight-of-the-evidence challenge.

The law pertaining to weight of the evidence claims is wellsettled. The weight of the evidence is a matter exclusively for 

the finder of fact, who is free to believe all, part, or none of the 

evidence and to determine the credibility of the witnesses. A new 

trial is not warranted because of a mere conflict in the testimony 

and must have a stronger foundation than a reassessment of the 

credibility of witnesses. Rather, the role of the trial judge is to 

determine that notwithstanding all the facts, certain facts are so 

clearly of greater weight that to ignore them or to give them 

equal weight with all the facts is to deny justice. 

On appeal, our purview is extremely limited and is 

confined to whether the trial court abused its discretion in 

finding that the jury verdict did not shock its conscience. Thus, 
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appellate review of a weight claim consists of a review of the 

trial court’s exercise of discretion, not a review of the underlying 

question of whether the verdict is against the weight of the 

evidence. 

Commonwealth v. Gonzalez, 109 A.3d 711, 723 (Pa. Super. 2015) 

(quotation marks and citations omitted).

Appellant’s argument is woefully undeveloped as to this point, and is 

therefore waived. Moreover, the trial court determined that, due to the 

overwhelming evidence of Appellant’s guilt, the verdict was not against the 

weight of the evidence. Trial Court Opinion, 8/7/2015, at 5-10. We have 

reviewed the record and discern no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s 

finding. Commonwealth v. Rivera, 983 A.2d 1211, 1225 (2009) (holding 

that a “trial court’s denial of a motion for a new trial based on a weight of 

the evidence claim is the least assailable of its rulings.”) Accordingly, even if 

Appellant had preserved properly his weight claim, it would merit him no 

relief. 

For all of the foregoing reasons, we affirm Appellant’s judgment of 

sentence.

Judgment of sentence affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 5/16/2016