## I L L I N O I S 

## O F F I C I A L 

## R E P O R T S Appellate Court

Claim sone v. Profe

ssional Property Management

, LLC , 2011 IL App (2d) 101115

Appellate Court Caption CL AI MSONE, I ndividually and a s Su b r o g e e o f T r i- Co u

n ty O p p o rtunities and L y nn Br ome, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. PROFESSI ONAL PROP ERTY MANAGEMEN T, L L C, UNKNO WN OWNERS OF BLACKHAWK APARTMENTS, and J ANI S PUMFREY, Defe ndants-Appe llees.

District & N o. Second District Docke t No. 2-10-1115

Filed September 12, 2011

Held ( Note: This syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the
court but has been
p r e p a r e d b y t h e Reporter of

Dec isions for the conve nience of the reade r. ) I n a subrog ation action by the worke rs’ compensa tion insurer of the employ er of a home-c are provider who fell on the snow- and ice- cover ed stairway t o h er client’s apar tment, the trial court proper ly enter ed
summary jud gm en t for the apar tment manag ement company on the
g round that the m an agement company did not voluntarily undertake a duty to remove the natura l accumulation of snow and ice wher e the snowfa l l wa s the first of the season, the injured home-c are provider noticed the snow on the stairs, plaintiff did not show the requisite relianc e

on the manag ement company ’s prior perf ormanc e in clea

ning the stairs, and the manag ement company ’s contra ct did not ex p re ssly require the
company to remove the snow and ice

.

Dec ision Under Review Appea l from the Circuit Court o f Ogl e County
, No. 07-L -54; the Hon. Michae l T. Mallon, J udg e, pre siding.J udg ment Affir med.

Counsel on Appea l P au l A. Tsukuno, of I nman & Fitzgibbons, L td., of Chicag o, for appellant.

Daniel L . Polsby , of Dowd & Dowd, L td., of Chicag o, for a ppellees.

Panel P RESI DI NG J USTI CE J ORGENSEN delivere d the judgme nt of th e court, with opinion.
J ustices Hudson and B irkett conc urre d in the judgme nt and opinion.

OP INION

¶ 1 P l ai n t i ff

, C l ai m s o ne, provided worke rs’ compensat i o n co v er age t o T ri -C o u n t y Opportunities and its emplo y ee , L y nn Br ome. After Br ome slipped and fell on a rea r apar tment stairca se that was cover ed with snow and ice, plaintiff, as subrog ee, sued defe ndants, Professional Property Manag ement, L L C (an apar tment manag ement company ), Bla ckhaw k Apar

tments, and J anis Pumfrey (the apar tment resident who had hired Br ome), alleg ing that they brea ched their duty of rea sonable car e in maintaining the subject proper ty and, as a result, direc tly and proxi mately cause d Br ome’s injurie s. Def endants moved for
summary judgme nt, arguing that they had no duty to remove natura l acc umulations of snow and ice from the premises. The trial court g rante d defe ndants’ motion. Plaintiff appea ls. We aff irm.

¶ 2 I . BA CKGROUND ¶ 3 On Dec ember 15, 2005, L y nn Br ome, who worke d for Tri-Co u n t y Opportuni ties, was perf orming gener al housekee ping and cooking duties for J anice Pumfrey
, who resided at Bla ckhaw k Apar

tments. Br ome s lipped and fell while descending a re ar stair case that was

cover ed with snow and ice. Br ome s ubsequently filed a worke rs’ compensation cl ai m and

rec eived be nefits. ¶ 4 On Dec ember 14, 2007, plaintiff filed a subrog ation complaint ag ainst defe ndants (820 I L CS 305/5 (West 2006)), alleg ing that it provided worke rs’ compensation cover ag e to TriCounty Opportunities and Br ome (Tri-County ’s employ ee) and had the rig ht to bring a cause of action ag ainst the defe ndants, wh o h ad l ega l liability for damag es to Br ome, beca use Br ome failed to institute her own cause of action. Plaintiff further al l ege d t hat defe ndants

wer e neg lige nt in failing to remove snow and ice from the premises and that, as a direc t and

-2-proxi mate re sult, Brome w as injured. 1

¶ 5 On Aug ust 5, 2010, defe ndants jointly moved for summary judgme nt, arguing that they had no duty to remove snow and ice that had natura lly acc umulated on the subject proper ty ’s

rea r stairca se. On September 20, 2010, plaintiff filed a response , arguing that defe ndants had

a d u t y t o remove the snow and ice beca use: (1) defe ndants voluntarily assumed a duty to maintain the premises fre e of sno w and ice (in rec og nition that it was not the tenants’ responsibility to clea

r their own stairca ses); or (2) a maintenan ce / caretake r ag ree ment betwee n Professional Property Manag ement and Michae l Gilroy
, the car etake r/site manag er, provided for

remova l. ¶ 6 The pertinent fac ts in the parties’ filings specific ally provide as follows. Pumfrey was a resident at Bla ckhaw k Apar tments in Ore g on. Eac h unit had two floors, and Pumfrey ’s unit, No. 3, had a wooden porch off of the building’s second- floor rea r entra nce that was share d by the residents. An uncover ed wooden stairca se, which, as depicted in a p h o t o graph contained in the rec ord, consisted of 13 steps, led from the porch to the g round level of the complex. Pumfrey was unable to shovel or salt her unit’s back stairca se becau s e s h e had difficulty walking

. ¶ 7 On Dec ember 1 5
, 2002, Br ome, who had been employ ed by Tri-County for about one
y ear , was perf

orming household duties for Pumfrey

. Br ome had worke d at Pumfrey ’s residenc e for four or five months, visiti ng once per wee k; she g ener ally worke d from 8 a.m. to 10 a.m. Br ome arr ived at Pumfrey ’s apar tment at 8 a.m. and acc essed the unit via the rea r stairca se (Pumfrey had left the rea r door open). Acc ording to Br o m e, d u ri n g the previous night a “big bl i z z ar d ” had occur red, which was the season’ s first snowfall. When Br ome

arr ived, none of the complex’s walkwa y s or stairs had been clea

red of snow, but the parking lot had been plowed. After perf orming her work duties for two hours, Br ome exit ed the
apar tment f rom the rea

r exit
, intending to take out the g arba g e. Ty pically
, when Br ome did the laundry

or took out the g arba g e, she would walk out of the unit’s re ar door and use the

rea r stairca se to rea ch g round level. She noticed that snow rema ined on the stairs and she threw the g arba g e over the landing so that she could use her hand to g rasp the handra il; she

was afr aid of falling

. As Br ome desce nded the first or second step, she slipped on the snow. Her rig ht leg came out in front of her and her body buckled and cra shed i n t o t he railing spindles. B rome landed on he r buttocks and wr enche d her r ight a rm from holding onto the railing

. She g ot up and went down the stairs. After she threw out the g arba g e, she went home. Br ome subsequently repor ted her injuries to T ri-County

. She underw ent medical treatment for he r injuries and f

iled a wor kers’ compensa

tion claim. ¶ 8 Michae l G ilroy worke d for Professional Property Manag ement as a site mana g er at the Bla ckhaw k Apar

tments. He testified at his deposition that his duties included snow remova l. Sy lvia Gilroy
, his wife, was also employ ed as a site manage r at the complex (and was employ ed by Bla ckhaw k Apar tments) and assisted Michae l in removing snow. He explained that they both clea

red snow at the complex from walkwa y s, sidewalks, and back stairs. I t was

On M ar ch 2 , 200 9, t he t ri al cou rt di smisse d Pumfre y from the sui t. 7 35 I LCS 5/ 2- 1009 1 (W est 200 6) (a ddr ess ing volunt ar y dismissa ls ).

-3-not the tenants’ r esponsibility to remove snow f

rom the re ar stair case s. ¶ 9 T h e ma

n a g e me nt a gr e e me nt b etwee n Bla ckhaw k and Professional Property Manag e me nt provided:
“I

. Maintenanc e and Repair. The ag ent will maintain and repa ir Project in acc ordanc e with the manag ement Plan a nd local codes, and keep it in g ood condition acc eptable to the Owne r and Rura l Development at all times. This wil l include, but is not li mited to, clea ning, pa inting, dec orating , plumbing, car pentry , g rounds car e, ene rg y conser vation

measure s and prac tices; and such o t her maintenanc e and repa ir work as may be

nece ssary , subject to any limit ations imposed by the Owner in addition to those contained here in.” ¶ 10 The lease ag ree ment betwee n Professional Property Manag ement and Pumfrey provided in a sec tion addressing the tenant’ s obliga tions:
“6. To keep the premises in a clean and sanitary condition, to maintain the y ard, walks, porche s, halls and other common are as used by the tenant(s) in a neat and order ly

manner as presc ribed by the owner /owner’ s ag ent, not to make any repa irs or alterations without written consent of the owner /owner’ s ag ent *** and to notify the owner /owner’ s ag ent promptly

of the ne ed for

any repa irs to the premises.” ¶ 11 I n a section addre ssing manag ement’s obligations, the lease provided that manag ement’s obligations included:
“1. To maintain the buildings and any unassig ned community are as in a dece nt, safe and sanitary condition in acc ordanc e with Rural Deve lopment re g ulations and any applicable local housing codes or ordinanc es. Fa ilure of the owner /owner’ s ag ent to do so should be broug ht to the attention of the owne r and/or Rura l Development.” ¶ 12 A maintenanc e/ca retaker ag ree ment betwee n Professional Property M an age m en t an d Michae l Gilroy

provided that the c are taker /site manag er w ould:
“d. Kee p sidewalks fre e of ice and/or snow and take bids on snow remova l of drivewa y s/parking are as as instructed by PPM

. Over night snowfall on all walks must be clea ned by 7:15 a.m. wee kday s and/or we ekend/holiday s.”
I n a sec tion specifica lly

addre ssing snow r emoval, the a g ree ment provided:
“a. Bids are reque sted in September on snow plowing of parking lots and drivewa y s (whe re a pplicable) . Bids should be for war ded to y our Are a Mana g er. b. The Maintenanc e/Care taker will keep sidewalks fre e of ice and s n ow. Contact y our Are a Manag er for specific instructions for purcha sing deice r. Apply deice r pellets to icy sidewalk are as. (I f nece ssary , sidewalks may be contra cted to outside vendors as the need arises.) ” ¶ 13 I n his deposition, Michae l stated that the term “sidewa lks” in the maintenanc e/ca retaker
ag ree ment included the front and rea r stairca ses. Sy lvia testified at her deposi t ion that her duties included snow remova l, including from Pumfrey ’s rea r stairca se. She also salted and

remove d snow from the landing at the top of the stairs. She went to Bla ckhaw k Apar tments daily in the winter to chec k for snow or ice. When she beg an her snow remova l, she started
at the stairs at Pumfrey ’s apar tment

. Fu rther, Kar en L arke
, Professional Property

-4-Manag ement’s manag er, who oversa w various sites for her employ er, including the subject
proper ty , testified at her deposition that the Gilroy s’ duties included snow remova l. L arke also stated that she left his methods and prac tices of snow remova l to Michae l’s discretion. ¶ 14 On October 12, 2010, following hear ing, the trial court g rante d defe ndants’ s u m m ar y judgme nt motion. P laintiff appe als.

¶ 15 I I . ANALYSI S ¶ 16 Plaintiff argu es t h at the trial court err ed in g ranting summary judgme nt to defe ndants, beca use, in its view, there was a materia l fac tual q u estion conce rning whether defe ndants owed Br ome a duty

. Plaintiff raises two alternative bases upon which a duty may be found. First, it contends that, by removing snow from the stairca se over a period of y ear s prior to Br o me’s fall, defe ndants voluntarily assumed a duty to keep the premises fre e of ice an d

snow on the day of the acc ident. Second, plaintiff argues that, by virtue of the snow-re moval provisions in the lease and maintenanc e/ca re taker ag ree ments, defe ndants contra ctually

as sumed a duty to keep the stairca se fre e of ice and snow. For the following rea sons, we reje ct plaintiff’s a

rg uments. ¶ 17 Summary judgme nt is properly g rante d wher e “the pleading s, depositions, a dmissions
, and aff idavits on file, when taken toge ther in the light most favor able to the nonmovant, show that t h er e i s n o g enuine issue of materia l fac t and that the movant is entitled to judgme nt as a matter of law.” Fremont Casualty Insurance Co. v. Ace -Chicago Great Dane Corp.
, 317 I ll. App. 3d 67, 73 (2000). To establish neg lige nce, the plaintiff must prove a duty owed to it by the defe ndant, a brea ch of that duty
, and an injury proxi mately cause d by that brea ch. Rhodes v. Illinois Central Gulf R.R.
, 172 I ll. 2d 213, 227 (1996). Although the question whether a duty has been brea ched is a fac tual one, the exis tence of a duty g ener ally
prese nts a question of law. Frederic k v. Professional Truck Driver Traini ng School, Inc.
, 328 I ll. App. 3d 472, 476 (2002). Howeve r, “if there is a dispute o f m at er i al fa ct aff ecting the exis tence of an undertak i n g of a duty
, summary judgme nt is improper.” Bourgonje v. Mache v , 362 I ll. App. 3d 984, 995 (2005). I n assessing whether a duty exis ts, “a court must deter mine whether there is a relationship betwee n the parties requiring that a leg al obligation be imposed upon one for the benef it of the other.” Rhodes v. Illinois Central Gulf R.R.
, 172 I ll. 2d at 227. ¶ 18 There is no common-law duty to remove natura l acc umul at i o n s o f snow or ice. See Galivan v. Lincolnshire Inn
, 147 I ll. App. 3d 228, 229 (1986); see also Graham v. City of Chicago , 346 I ll. 638, 641 (1931) (there is no duty to remove natural ac cumulations of ice or snow, and one is g ener ally not liable for injuries c aused by natura l acc umulations of ice

or snow). Plaintiff argues that, under two exceptions to the g ener al rule, defe ndants had: (1) previously voluntarily remove d snow and ice from the premises and, as such, they had a duty
to remove it (by 7:15 a.m.) on the date of the acc ident; and (2) a contra ctual duty to remove snow and ice from the pr emises.

¶ 19 A. Voluntary Assumption or Undertakingof Duty ¶ 20 First, plaintiff arg ues that defe nd an t s o we d Br o m e a d u t y of car e based upon their

-5-voluntary assumption of a dut y t o m aintain the premises fre e and clea r of snow and ice. Def endants, plaintiff notes, voluntarily undertook snow and ice remova l from the premises on a daily basis during the winter se ason. ¶ 21 The rea soning behind the g ener al ru l e t h at a proper ty owner has no duty to remove natura l a ccumulations of ice and snow is “that it is unrea listi c to expect proper ty owner s to keep all are as wher e people may walk clea r from ice and snow at all times during the winter months

. ” Or d

man v. Dacon Managem ent Corp.
, 261 I ll. App. 3d 275, 281 (1994). One exception to this rule is a voluntary undertaking. Bourgonje
, 362 I ll. App. 3d at 995. Under the volunt ar y -under

taking theory
, wher e a person voluntarily ag ree s to perf orm a service

nece ssary for the pr otection of a

nother pe rson or their pr operty , a duty may be imposed on the party undertaking the service ; that party must perf orm the service in such a manner as not to incre ase the risk of harm to the other person who relies on the undertaking. Id. at 995-96. One who is neg lige nt in the undertaking will be held liable for the fore seea ble conseque nces of the act if another suffe rs harm beca use they relied on the underta king. Id. The voluntary

undertaking theory is derive d from sections 323 (cla ims wher e there is liability to an injured
p arty for whom the vol untary undertaking was m ade) and 324A (addr essing liability t o an injured third party for neg lige nt perf ormanc e of an undertaking) of the Restatement (Second) of Torts (Restateme nt) (Restateme nt (Second) of Torts §§ 323, 324A (1965))

. Bourgonje
, 362 I ll. App. 3d at 996. Both sections have been adopted by our supreme court. See Frye v. Medic are-Glase r Corp.
, 153 I ll. 2d 26, 32 (1992); Rowe v. State Bank of Lombard
, 125 I ll. 2d 203, 217 (1988); Pippin v. Chicago Housing Authority
, 78 I ll. 2d 204, 211 (1979). Section 324A applies to this case and provide s: “One who undertakes, g ratuitously or for considera tion, to rende r service s to another which he should rec og nize as nece ssary for the protec tion of a third person or his things, is subject to liability to the third person for phy sical harm resulting fro m his failure to exercise r easona

ble ca re to prote ct his undertaking , if (a) his failure to e x erc ise rea sonable c are incre ases the r isk of such har m, or (b) he has under

taken to per form a duty

owed by the other to the third pe rson, or (c) the harm is suffe red beca use of relianc e of the other or the third person upon the undertaking.” Restatement (Sec ond) Torts § 324A ( 1965). ¶ 22 The voluntary -under taking exception a

pplies to c ases involving both nonfea sance ( i.e.
, wher e there is the failure by omission to perf orm the voluntary undertaking) and misfeasa nce ( i.e.
, the neg lige nt perf

ormanc e of the undertaking)

. Bo u r gonje
, 362 I ll. App. 3d at 996 (citing case s); see also Ordman
, 261 I ll. App. 3d at 279 (in a misfeasa nce case , noting that, wher e “a duty would not otherwise arise, a duty to act reasona bly may be im posed whe n a defe ndant neg lige ntly perf orms a voluntary undertaking” ). I n a case involving nonfea sance , such as this, “a plaintiff’s rel i ance on the defendant’s promise is an independent, essential element” of the case

. Bourgonje
, 362 I ll. App. 3d at 997. A plainti ff m ay recover for nonfea sance for a g ratuitous undertaking wher e “the plaintiff rea sonably relie[d] on the defe ndant’s promise.” Id. at 998. The voluntar y -under taking theory is narr owly construed. Fichtel v. Board of

Directors of the River Shore of Naperville Condominium Ass’n, Hillcrest Managem ent Co.
, 389 I ll. App. 3d 951, 961 (2009); see also Frye v. Medic are-Glase r Corp.
,

-6-153 I ll. 2d 26, 33 (1992).

¶ 23 Plaintiff argues that the fac ts here show a voluntary undertaking of a duty by defe ndants. I t notes that it was the manag ers’
, not the tenants’, duty to remove snow and ice from the rea r stairca ses and that the Gilroy s’ duties included snow remova l, which they perf ormed in previous seasons and which included the rea r stairca se of Pumfrey ’s apar tment. Plaintiff further arg ues that whether

sufficie nt relianc e wa s shown is a fac tual question for a jury to deter mine unless the mater ial fac ts are undisputed. ¶ 24 Plaintiff relies on Eichler v. Plitt Theatres, Inc.
, 167 I ll. App. 3d 685 (1988). In Eichler
, the plaintiff sued four defe ndants afte r she slipped and fell on a natura l acc umulation of ice in a shopping cente r parking lot. Severa l trusts owned various contig uous parc els of land that

wer e used for parking at the shopping cente r, which included a theater

. The defe ndant trust that owned the parc el on which the plaintiff fell (U rb an ) and another defe ndant trust (Hutensky

) had enter ed into an ease ment ag ree ment that outlined their various rig hts; Urba n ag ree d to keep its parc el clea r of snow and i ce

. Ur b an also contra cted with a defe ndant landsca ping company (Welhausen) to perf orm snowplowing and re m o val. The trial court enter ed summary

judgme nt in favor of

the def endants. ¶ 25 On appe al, the cour t assessed the plaintiff’s argument that the defe ndants had a duty to

remove snow and ice beca use they had ente red into a c ontrac t in which they undertook the obligation to do so. First, the court deter mined that Restatement section 324A applied to the

case

. Id. at 692. Next, the court assessed whether summary judgme nt w as proper ly g rante d

as to eac h defe ndant. As to Welhausen, the court held that summary judgme nt wa s appropr iately g rante d in its favor beca use the company contra cted to remove only snow and
not ice and beca

use the parties ag ree d that the ice that cause d the plaintiff’s fall was a natura l

acc umulation. Id. As to Urban, the court he ld that its promis e to Hutensky in the ease ment ag ree ment to remove snow and ice from its parc el was sufficie nt f or Hutensky to rely upon and that this relianc e was sufficie nt to establish a duty on Urban ’s part. Acc ording ly
, the court held that summary judgme nt in favor of Urba n was inappr opriate. Id. The c ourt held that summary

judgme nt f

or Hutensky was prope rly g rante d beca

use Hutensky

did not own the parc el on which the plaintiff fell and under the ease ment ag ree ment eac h party had ag ree d
to remove snow and ice only from its own parc el. Id. The court next held t h at summary judgme nt was inappropriately g rante d in the theater ’s (Plitt ’s) favor

. Id. After the ease ment ag ree ment was enter ed into, Urba n and Plit t enter ed into a lease ag ree ment under which Plit t

acc epted Urba

n’s rig hts and obligations under the ease ment ag ree ment. The court held that, under the lease ag ree ment, Plit t assumed an obligation to remove snow and ice (by virtue of assuming all of Urba

n’s obligations) and that Plit t’s promise to remove snow and ice cre ated the requisite relianc e, on Urba n’s part, to find that Plit t h ad a d uty

. Id. Howeve r, t he court noted that “whe ther Urba

n actua lly relied on the lease ag ree ment is a question which may be further develope d.” Id. at 693. Acc ording to the court, ther e wa s an implication that Urba n did not rely on Plit t’s promise beca use Urba n, not Plit t, contra cted with Welhausen for snow

-7-remova l. Id. 2

¶ 26 We find that plaintiff’s relianc e on Eichler is misplaced. E i ch l er i s d i s t i n guishable beca use it involved sever al contra cts betwee n the defe ndants. I n this first argument, plaintiff does not asser

t a contra ctual assumption of a duty but, rathe r, one that arose out of defe ndants’ g ratuitous prac tice of clea ring t h e snow from the rea r stairca se of Pumfrey ’s
apar tment. Although it did initially deter mine that Restatement section 3 2 4 A ap p lied, the Eichler court’s primary analy sis foc u s ed on the defe ndants’ various contractual relationships, and the contractua l terms wer e outcome-de terminative. Specifica lly
, as to eac h of the defe ndants, the court found it critica l that: Welhausen contracted to remove snow and
not ice; in the easem ent agreem ent , Urba n promised Hutensky to remove snow and ice from Urba n’s par cel; Hutensky ag ree d in the easem ent agr eem ent to remove snow a

nd ice f rom only its own parc el; and Plit t and Urba n enter ed into a lease agreemen t under which Plit t

acc epted Ur

ban’s r ights a

nd responsibilities. Id. at 692-93. ¶ 27 Def

endants respond that the Gilroy s’ g ratuitous remova l of snow from the stairs over a period of y ear s prior to Br ome’s fall did not cre ate a continuing duty to clea r the stairs ever

y time that snow natura lly acc umulated there on. They urg e that there is a signific ant distinction betwee n voluntarily assuming a duty and perf orming i t n egl i g ently (misfea sance ) and not perf orming a task that has been voluntarily undertaken in the past (nonfe asanc e). Def endants

conce de that a pa

rty eng ag ing in voluntarily removing snow owes a duty to a third party to clea r the snow in a nonneg lige nt manner

. Howeve r, they contend that imposing a duty on defe ndants to clea

r snow and ice from the rea r stairca se ever

y time they acc umulate imposes

an unre asonable obligation. ¶ 28 Def

endants re l y o n Chisolm v. Stephens
, 47 I ll. App. 3d 999 (1977). I n Chisolm , the plaintiff, a tenant, sued her landlords afte r she slipped and fell on a natura l acc umulation of i ce an d snow on the landlords’ sidewalk. The ice and snow had not been clea red o n t h e

acc ident date. The plaintiff claimed that the landlords’ 15-y ear prac tice of cl eaning the sidewalk eac h mo rn i n g and her relianc e there on established that the landlords had a leg al duty to examine and clea

n the s idewalk on the m orningof the a ccide nt. After disposing of the plaint i ff ’s contra ct-ba sed arguments, the court turned to the voluntary -under taking
argument and upheld summary judgme nt for the defe ndants. Id. at 1007. The court noted that “liability for nonf easa nce in c onnection with a g ratuitous undertaking may arise where the benef iciarie s had relied on its perf ormanc e.” Id. (citing
, among others, Restatement section 323). The c ourt elabor ated:
“R eliance may rea sonably be place d wher e there is a dece ptive appea ranc e that
p er formanc e had been made, or wher e a repr esentation of perf ormanc e has been communicated to plaintiff by defe ndant, or wher e plaintiff is otherwise preve nted from obtaining knowledg e or substitut e perf ormanc e of the undertaking. But, to justify relianc e, plaintiff must be unawa re of the actua l c ircumstance s and not e qually capa ble

T he c our t f

urt her hel d t hat th er e was a f act ual que st ion as to whet her Urb an o r Pl it t wa s 2 negli gent i n r emov ing ic e, b eca use th e c om pla int (a nd t he p la int if

f’ s de pos it ion ) a ll eged t hat th e par king area at is sue was cover ed wi th ic e. Id.

-8-of dete rmining suc h fac ts.” Id.

¶ 29 The Chisolm court held t hat t he requisite relianc e was not prese nt in the case and that, there fore
, the defe ndants had no leg al duty to clea r the snow and ice. Id. at 1008. The court noted that the snow and ice had not been clea red on the acci d en t date; the exis ting icy conditions wer e not hidden; and it was still sleeting and snowing when the plaintiff slipped and fell on the sidewalk. Id. Thus, the plaintif f co u l d n o t h ave justifiably relied on the landlords’ prior

perf ormanc e. Id. ¶ 30 We ag ree with defe ndants that Chisolm controls. As in that case , defe ndants here had not clea red the snow and ice from the rea r stairca se of Pumfrey ’s apar tment on the morning of Br ome’s acc ident. Howeve r, as in Chisolm
, the exis ting conditions wer e not hidden. Br ome

saw that the stairca se had not been clea red; its condition was obvious. I ndeed, Br ome testified at her deposition that she noticed the snow on the stairs when she arr ived and ag ain when she exit ed the apar

tment. On t hat (second) occasion, she threw t h e garb age over the landing so that she could use her hand to g rasp the handra il beca use she was afr aid of falling

. Thus, on the morning she arr ived at th e ap ar t m en t and observe d (at least twice) that the stairca se had not been clea red, she could not h ave justifiably relied on the Gilroy s’ prior perf ormanc e. Fur

thermore
, Br ome testified that she had worke d at Pumfrey ’s residenc e for only five months and that the previous evening ’s snowfall was the first of the season; there fore
, she could not h av e b een awa re of the Gilroy s’ pattern of shoveling Pumfrey ’s stairs. Acc ording ly
, beca

use pl aintiff did not show the requisite relianc e, we conclude that the trial cour

t did not err in g ranting summary judgme nt to defenda

nts.

¶ 31 B. Contra ctual Assumption of Duty ¶ 32 S ec o n d
, p l ai n t i ff argue s t h at , b y v i rt u e o f t h e l ea s e agr ee m en t an d t h e maintenanc e/ca

retaker ag ree ment, defe ndants assumed a duty not i m p o sed upon them by

common law to keep Pumfrey ’s stairca se fre e of ice and snow. For the following rea sons, we reje ct plaintiff’s c laim. ¶ 33 Whet h er a co n t ra ct i m p o s es a leg al duty prese nts a question of law. Frederic k v. Professional Tr uck D river Training School, Inc. , 328 I ll. App. 3d 472, 481 (2002). Unle ss the contra ct spec ifies a spe cial mea ning, w e interpr et its terms acc ording to the ir common, g ener ally acc epted definitions. Id. at 481 (re jecting the plaintiff’s argument that the term “super vision” encompa sses snow and ice remova l). ¶ 34 As previously noted, a l an d o wn er o r p o s sessor has no common-law duty to remove

n at u ra l acc umulations of ice or snow. Galivan
, 147 I ll. App. 3d at 229. However
, a landowner that contra ctually obligates itself to a tenant to remove snow and ice may be held liable t o a thi rd party for it s failure to remove the accumulation. W ells v. Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co.
, 171 I ll. App. 3d 1012, 1018 (1988); Schoondyk e v. Heil, He i l

, Smart & Golee, I nc. , 89 I ll. App. 3d 640, 643-45 (1980). ¶ 35 I n Schoondyk

e , the plaintiff fell on unplowed snow on a common sidewalk at her pa rents’ condominium, wher e she resided. The plaintiff’s pare nts paid a monthly assessment that included a char g e for snow r emoval. The court reve rsed the g rant of summary judgme nt to the defe ndants and held that the defe ndant condominium association and t wo defe ndant

-9-corpor ations, by virtue of their ag ree ment with t h e u n i t owner s in the “De clar ation of

Condomini um” a

n d “ Co n d o mi n iu

m B y -L aws” (which provided for snow remova l), assumed

a duty that was not imposed on them by common law to remove snow from the premises. Id.
at 645. Fur

ther, their duty extende d t o the plaintiff, who was a nonowner occupie r of a condominium unit, beca

use it was fore seea

ble that their failure to perf orm their contra ctual obligation to clear snow c ould harm a nonow ner r esident. Id. ¶ 36 Rely ing o n S

ch o o n d yk e , p l ai ntiff points to the lease ag ree ment’s provision that the
manag ement’s obliga

tions included the responsibility to maintain the common are as in a safe condition. I t further points to the maintenanc e/ca retaker ag ree ment provision that stated that the car etake r will keep “sidewa lks” fre e of ice and/or snow and that overnig ht snowfalls must be clea n ed fr o m “a l l walks” by 7:15 a.m. Plaintiff also notes that Michae l stated that his duties included snow remova l from the complex’s rea r stairca ses. Thus, plaintiff rea sons that the rec ord supports the imposit ion of a duty upon defe ndants to r emove snow and ice from the rea r stairca se of Pumfrey ’s apar tment. At a minimum
, it alternatively urg es, the contra cts

are fac ially ambig uous and cannot be interpre ted without the use o f p ar o l evidence ( i.e.
, L arke ’s and the G ilroy s’ testimony ). ¶ 37 Def

endants respond that none of the contra cts require d remova l of snow and ice from the

s t aircase wher e Br ome fell. They note that only the maintenanc e/ca retaker ag reem en t specific ally addre ssed snow and ice remova l and that it require d only that the car etake r keep the sidewalks fre e of ice and snow. Def endants urg e that we not add provisions to the
ag ree ment–namely the Gilroy s’ testimony that their duties included snow remova l from the stairca ses–bec ause, in their v ie w , th e c o ntra c t is unambig uous. See, e.g. , Suburban Insurance Servic es, Inc. v. Virginia Surety Co.
, 322 I ll. App. 3d 688, 691 (2001) (if a contra ct is c lear and unambig uous, the parties’ intent must be deter mined solely from the contra ct’s plain lan gu age , and extrinsi c evidenc e outside the “four corne rs” of the document may not be considere d). Def

endants asser

t that, to the extent that the Gilroy s eng ag ed in additional snow

remova l, that conduct is more proper ly analy zed (and, here
, reje cted) under the voluntary undertaking a

naly sis addresse d in plaintiff’s first ar g ument. ¶ 38 Addre ssing Schoondyke
, d ef en d an t s corr ectly note that the case did not discuss the specific lang uag e in the contra cts at issue. There fore
, other than for the purpose of stating the
g ener al rule that a landowne r that contra ctually obligates itself to a t enant to remove snow and ice may be held liable to a third party for its failure to remove the acc umulation, the case is not particu l ar l y h elpful to our analy sis. Def endants urg e instead that W ells controls. I n W ells
, the plaintiff slipped and fell on ice in a g roce ry store parking lot and sued the store and the contra ctor whom the store hired to remove snow from the lot. On the day of the acc ident, around the perimete r of the lot, there wer e piles of snow that h ad b een prese nt for sever al

wee ks as a r esult of snowplowing operations. The issues on appea l w ere , first, whether the ice was a natura l acc umulation cause d by the slope of the lot, combined with the manner in which the snow was plowed, and, second, whether the defe ndants wer e n egl i gen t in removing it. The court aff irmed summary judgme nt for the defe ndants. W ells
, 171 I ll. App. 3d at 1021. The court first reje cted the plaintiff’s claim that the ice was an unnatura l

acc umulation. Id. at 1018. I t next acknow ledg ed that an ow ner tha t contra ctually obligates itself to a tenant to remove snow and ice may be liable to a third party for its failure to do so.

-10-Id. Howeve r, afte r stating (without further exp l an at i on) that Schoondyk e was fac tually distinguishable, the court held that the g roce ry store was under no contractual obligation to

remove snow from its parking lot. Id. at 1018-19. Rather, it voluntarily assumed the duty and
contra cted with the contra ctor to perf orm the snow remova l. Id. at 1019. The scope of the store’s duty as to snowplowing was to ref rain from perf

orming it neg lige ntly

. Id. The court 3 conclude d that there was no evidenc e of neg lige nt plowing opera tions. Id. ; see a lso JudgeZeit v. Gene ral Parking Corp.
, 376 I ll. App. 3d 573, 582-83 (2007) (for a duty to arise on the part of a parking g ara g e manag ement company , its contra ct with the plaintiff’s employ er to operate and manag e the lot must contain ex press langua g e im posing an obligat i o n o n i t to plow the parking fac ility ; snow remova l was mentioned only in the schedule of reimbursa ble
operating ex penses; the manag ement compa ny subcontrac ted wit h another entity for snow

remova l, but that contra ct did not im p o s e a duty on the manag ement company to remove snow; finally
, the manag ement company did not enter into any contra ct with any

invitee to

remove snow). ¶ 39 I f we view the Gilroy s’ employ ment rela tionshi p w it

h Pr o f e s s io n a l Pr o p e r

ty M anag ement

as akin to a snowplowing contra ctor hired by a manag ement company , we co n cl u de that defe ndants undertook no duty to clea r the rea r stairca se of snow and ice. W ells and other

case s hold t h at “prope rty manag ement companies do not undertake a duty to plow their
proper ty by mere ly contra cting with a snow remova l company .” Judge- Zeit
, 376 I ll. App. 3d
at 580 -8 2 (c i t ing W

ells in a case wher e the manag ement company ’s contra ct with the snowplowing company provided that the rooftop parking are a was to be salted and plowed by 8 a.m.); W

ells
, 171 I ll. App. 3d at 1018-19 (hiring a snow rem o v al company is not undertaking a contra ctual duty to remove snow; rathe r, it is a voluntary as s umption of the duty and both the entity that hired the snow remova l company and the snow remova l
company owed only a duty to ref rain from neg lige ntly perf orming the snow remova l; “abse nt evidenc e of an unnatura l acc umulation or neg lige nt plowing operations, there is no showing of an exis ting duty on the part of the defe ndants”); see also McBride v. Taxman Corp.
, 327 I ll. App. 3d 992, 996-97 (2002) (noting that case s that assess snow remova l companies’ duty
to third parties hold that the duty is only to ref rain from neg lige ntly removing s n o w by

cre ating or ag g rava

ting an unnatura l acc umulation of ice or snow; further noting that the case law does not hold that a snow remova l company may be liable to a third party for the failure
to perf orm snow remova l, as distinct from perf orming an aff

irmative act that cre ates or ag g ravates an unnatura l acc umulation of ice or snow). Acc ording ly
, under this line of case s, if the Gi l ro y s ’ function or role is viewed as a snow remova l service
, neither they nor Professional Property Manag ement could be found to have contra ctually undertaken a duty
to remove snow and ice from the stairca se of Pumfrey ’s apar tment on the d ay of Br ome’s

acc ident. ¶ 40 Alternatively
, if t h e Gi l ro y s ar e v i ew ed as em p l o y ee s (and not contra ctors) of Professional Property Manag ement, standing in the manag ement company ’s shoes, we ag ain

As t o t he c ont ra ct or, th e c our t h el d t hat hi s ob li gatio n t o pe rf orm unde r t he c ont ra ct was 3
to the groce ry st ore and not to th e pl ai nti ff

. W el ls , 171 I ll . App. 3d a t 1 019. His dut y to t he s tor e

was to abs ta in fr om

negli gence i n pe rf

orming his j ob d uti es. Id.

-11-conclude, as we explain below, that, on the day of Br ome’s acc ident, defe ndants owed

plai n t i ff n o d uty to clea

r snow and ice from the rea r stairca se of Pumfrey ’s apar tment. As previously noted, in case s of nonfea sance , a proper ty owner may contra ctually assume a duty
to a third party

to r emove snow and ice. Schoondyk e , 89 I ll. App. 3d at 645. In Eichler
, the
court held that, wher e Urba n contra cted in an ease ment ag ree ment with Hutensky to maintain Urba n’s parc el and for the “ ‘prompt remova l of all *** snow an d ice,’ ” the contra ct established a duty on Urba n’s part to remove the ice and summary judgme nt in Urba n’s favor

was inappropriate. Eichler
, 167 I ll. App. 3d at 688, 692. I n contra st, the lang uag e contained in the contra cts here imposed no such duty on defe ndants. ¶ 41 He re , t h e m ai n t enanc e/ca retaker ag ree ment specific ally addre ssed snow remova l. I n section 3.2, which addre ssed the car eta k er’ s specific duties, it provided that the car etake r shall “[k] eep sidewalks fre e of ice an d/ or snow and take bids on snow remova l of drivewa y s/parking are as as instructed by PPM

. Over night sno wfall on all walks must be clea ned by 7:15 a.m. wee kday s and/or wee kend/holiday s.” (Emphase s added.) I n section 4.3, which addre ssed snow remova l, the contra ct provided that “The Maintenanc e/Care taker will keep sidewalks fre e of ice and snow. Contact y our Are a Manag er for specific instructions for purcha sing deice r. Apply deice r pellets to ic y sidewalk areas

. (I f nece ssary , sidewalks may be contr acte d to outside vendors as the ne ed ar ises.)” ( Emphases a dded.) ¶ 42 We c onclude that the terms “sidewa lks” and “all walks” clea rly and unambig uously do not encompass c ommon staircase s. A “sidewa lk” is defined a s “a walk for f oot passeng ers

usu. at the side of a street or roadw ay : a foot paveme nt.” Webster’s Third New I nternational Di ctionary 2113 (1993). A “wa lk” is define d as “a path specia lly arr ang ed or p av ed fo r walking ” or “a route reg ularly trave rsed by a person in the performanc e of a particula r activity (as patrolling
, beg g ing, or [ve n ding]).” Webster’s Third New I nternational Dictionary 2571 (1993). The fore g oing definitions do not expli citly mention stairca ses, nor

can we rea sonably rea d them as including stairca ses. There fore
, we must reje ct plaintiff’s
argumen t that there is a materia l fac tual question prec luding summary judgme nt as to whether a sidewalk encompa sses a common stairca se, or, alternatively
, that we can conclude

as a matter of law that defe ndants undertook in the contra ct the duty to c lear the complex’s stairca ses. ¶ 43 Finally
, we also reje ct plaintif f’ s ar gu m en t t h at either the manag ement ag ree ment’s lang uag e obliga

ting Professional P roper

ty Manag ement to “maintain” the “g rounds” and perf orm “maintena

nce and repa ir work,” or the lease ag ree men t ’s provision that
manag ement’s obliga

tions include the responsibility to “maintain” the common ar ea s in a safe condition, is ambig uous beca use it is susceptible to multipl e meaning s and could include

snow remova l from t he re ar stair case s. To find a duty to clear ice a nd snow, courts re quire
express lang uag e imposing such a duty

. See, e.g. , Judge- Zeit
, 376 I ll. App. 3d at 582 (“F or

a duty to arise, one of these contra cts [t o manage and operate parking fac iliti es] must contain
expre ss lang uag e imposing an obligation on [t he manag ement company ] to plow the parking fac ility .” (Empha ses adde d.)). ¶ 44 We conclude that the trial court did not err in g ranting summary judgme nt to defe ndants.

-12-¶ 45 I I I . CONCL USI ON

¶ 46 For the fore g oing rea sons, the judgme nt of the circ uit court of Og le County is a ffirme d.

¶ 47 Affir

med.

-13-