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Filed 10/20/21 Brown v. Safeway CA1/5

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on 

opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 

8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for 

purposes of rule 8.1115. 

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION FIVE

ALICE BROWN,

Plaintiff and Appellant,

v.

SAFEWAY, INC.,

Defendant and Respondent.

A161804

(Del Norte County

Super. Ct. No. CVPI-2019-1127)

MEMORANDUM OPINION1

Alice Brown, acting in propria persona, sued Safeway, Inc. 

(Safeway) after its employee allegedly denied her a refund 

totaling $4.11, told other employees and customers that Brown 

lied, and called the police to falsely report her refusal to leave the 

store. Brown appeals from an order granting Safeway’s special 

motion to strike her intentional misrepresentation, defamation, 

and discrimination causes of action, pursuant to the anti-SLAPP 

statute (Code Civ. Proc., § 425.16).2 

1 We resolve this appeal by a memorandum opinion 

pursuant to California Standards of Judicial Administration, 

standard 8.1.

2 Undesignated statutory references are to the Code of 

Civil Procedure. 
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Brown argues that the trial court erred by granting 

Safeway’s motion “while acknowledging this case as a mixed 

cause of action.” She cites Baral v. Schnitt (2016) 1 Cal.5th 376 

and Flatley v. Mauro (2006) 39 Cal.4th 299 as support for her 

argument. She does not explain how these authorities support 

her position, set forth the allegations of her operative complaint, 

attempt to identify any specific allegations and explain why they 

are not subject to being struck under the anti-SLAPP statute, or 

support her argument with citation to the record. 

As an appellate court, we must presume the trial court’s 

order is correct, and the appellant bears the burden of 

affirmatively demonstrating error. (Howard v. Thrifty Drug & 

Discount Stores (1995) 10 Cal.4th 424, 443.) Here, Brown has not 

addressed the merits of her appeal in a meaningful way. (People 

v. Stanley (1995) 10 Cal.4th 764, 793 [reviewing courts may 

disregard points missing cogent legal argument]; Golden Drugs 

Co., Inc. v. Maxwell-Jolly (2009) 179 Cal.App.4th 1455, 1468.) 

She also has not identified the material facts or supported them 

with proper citation to the record. (See Cal. Rules of Court, rule 

8.204(a)(1)(C) [any reference to matters in record must be 

supported with citation to volume and page number]; Nwosu v. 

Uba (2004) 122 Cal.App.4th 1229, 1246.) 

We acknowledge Brown filed her opening brief in propria 

persona. But self-represented litigants “are held to the same 

standards as attorneys.” (Kobayashi v. Superior Court (2009) 175 

Cal.App.4th 536, 543; accord, Rappleyea v. Campbell (1994) 8 

Cal.4th 975, 984-985.) 

In any event, to the extent Brown implicitly argues, as she 

did below, that Safeway’s statements to police were unprotected 

under the anti-SLAPP statute because they were unlawful, we 

disagree. Safeway does not admit that its police report was false. 

Nor is there any uncontroverted evidence that it was false. 

Safeway’s report to police is protected petitioning activity under 
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section 425.16, subdivision (e)(1)-(2). (Flatley v. Mauro, supra, 39 

Cal.4th at pp. 317, 320; Kenne v. Stennis (2014) 230 Cal.App.4th 

953, 967 [“false” police report is protected activity under antiSLAPP statute if falsity is contested].) By failing to submit any 

admissible evidence in support of her opposition to the motion to 

strike, Brown did not meet her burden, at the second step, to 

establish a probability of success on claims arising from this 

protected activity. (See § 425.16, subd. (b); Monster Energy Co. v. 

Schechter (2019) 7 Cal.5th 781, 788 [“a plaintiff seeking to 

demonstrate the merit of the claim ‘may not rely solely on its 

complaint, even if verified; instead, its proof must be made upon 

competent admissible evidence’ ”].) 

Finally, even if we could construe Brown’s conclusory 

reference to “a mixed cause of action” in her opening brief as an 

argument that Safeway failed to meet its burden below as the 

party moving to strike the entire defamation cause of action (see 

Bonni v. St. Joseph Health System (2021) 11 Cal.5th 995, 1009, 

1011; Baral v. Schnitt, supra, 1 Cal.5th at pp. 384, 396), she is 

barred from challenging the trial court’s order striking that cause 

of action because she abandoned her prior appeal (A158754) from 

the now final order striking an identical cause of action. (See § 

906 [reviewing court not authorized “to review any decision or 

order from which an appeal might have been taken”]; In re Baycol 

Cases I & II (2011) 51 Cal.4th 751, 761, fn. 8; In re Cicely L. 

(1994) 28 Cal.App.4th 1697, 1705 [“ ‘If an order is 

appealable . . . and no timely appeal is taken therefrom, the 

issues determined by the order are res judicata’ ”].) We conclude 

Brown has failed to demonstrate error.

DISPOSITION

The order is affirmed. The parties shall bear their own 

costs on appeal. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.278(a)(5).)
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_______________________

BURNS, J. 

We concur:

____________________________

JACKSON, P.J.

____________________________

SIMONS, J.

A161804