J-S09038-21

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

v.

OMAR GLASGOW 

Appellant

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 1021 EDA 2020

Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered July 11, 2019

In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Criminal Division at 

No(s): CP-51-CR-1200461-2001

BEFORE: OLSON, J., McCAFFERY, J., and MUSMANNO, J.

MEMORANDUM BY MUSMANNO, J.: FILED APRIL 13, 2021

Omar Glasgow (“Glasgow”) appeals from the Order dismissing his 

second Petition for relief filed pursuant to the Post Conviction Relief Act 

(“PCRA”). See 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-9546. We affirm.

The PCRA court set forth the relevant factual and procedural history as 

follows:

The evidence adduced at trial showed that on January 26, 2001, 

[Glasgow] knocked on victim Anthony Randall’s [(“Randall”)] 

door, entered his apartment in a rage, and demanded money. 

When Randall did not immediately comply, [Glasgow] hit Randall 

on the head with a fire extinguisher. [Glasgow’s] two companions 

then entered the apartment[,] and the three men beat Randall 

until he lost consciousness. [Randall] woke up in the hospital, 

where he remained for three days. Later that same day, 

[Glasgow] and his two accomplices pulled up in a car next to 

victim Reginald Smith [(“Smith”)] and his girlfriend[,] Yvette 

Mitchell. [Glasgow] chased Smith down the street and began 

punching Smith repeatedly[,] while his companion broke a bottle 

over Smith’s head. After Smith fell to the ground [Glasgow] and 

his cohort continued to kick and stomp Smith’s body and head 
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with their boots. [Glasgow] and his companion left[,] but returned 

a few moments later with their third companion. By this time, a 

small crowd of approximately 10-20 people had gathered around 

Smith’s unconscious body. [Glasgow] inexplicably began firing his 

weapon up and down the street. Mark Thor[n]ton, who had 

spoken to Smith on the street just before [Glasgow’s] attack, was 

grazed by a bullet. [Glasgow] and his companions fled the scene 

in a car. Police arrived on the scene shortly thereafter[,] and an 

ambulance took Smith to the hospital. Smith never regained 

consciousness[,] and remained intubated until he died seven 

months later as a result of head injuries sustained during the 

beating.

On May 31, 2005, a jury found [Glasgow] guilty of third[-

]degree murder, conspiracy, and two counts of aggravated 

assault. On July 19, 2005, [the trial court] sentenced him to an 

aggregate term of 35 to 75 years [of] state incarceration. Th[is] 

Court affirmed this judgment of sentence on October 12, 2006. 

[See Commonwealth v. Glasgow, 913 A.2d 941 (Pa. Super. 

2006) (unpublished memorandum). Glasgow] did not seek review 

before the Pennsylvania Supreme Court.

On March 24, 2006, while his direct appeal was still pending 

before th[is] Court, [Glasgow] filed a premature PCRA [P]etition. 

This [P]etition was reinstated after review of [Glasgow’s] direct 

appeal was completed. On January 3, 2007, PCRA counsel filed 

an [A]mended [P]etition alleging trial counsel’s ineffectiveness. 

This [P]etition was dismissed on January 8, 2008. Th[is] Court 

affirmed this dismissal ... [, and] the Pennsylvania Supreme Court 

denied allocator. [See Commonwealth v. Glasgow, 970 A.2d 

467 (Pa. Super. 2009) (unpublished memorandum), appeal 

denied, 8 A.3d 342 (Pa. 2010).]

On June 19, 2014, [Glasgow] filed a pro se Petition for Writ 

of Habeas Corpus. On April 26, 2018, [Glasgow’s] counsel[,] 

Lauren Wimmer, Esquire [(“Attorney Wimmer”),] filed a second 

PCRA [P]etition[, raising the newly-discovered fact exception to 

the PCRA’s time bar]. ... On September 18, 2018, [Glasgow] filed 

a supplemental [A]mended [P]etition. On April 24, 2019, the 

Commonwealth filed its Motion to Dismiss. On June 11, 2019, 

[the PCRA c]ourt sent [Glasgow] a Notice of Intent to Dismiss 

Pursuant to [Pa.R.Crim.P.] 907. On June 18, [Glasgow] replied to 

the [Rule] 907 [N]otice. On July 11, 2019, [the PCRA c]ourt
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dismissed [Glasgow’s P]etition based upon lack of merit. On July 

30, 2019, PCRA counsel filed a [M]otion to withdraw.[FN1] 

On August 26, 2019, [Glasgow’s] appellate rights were 

reinstated[,] nunc pro tunc.

[FN2] On that same day, [the PCRA 

c]ourt granted [Attorney] Wimmer’s [M]otion to withdraw and 

issued an [O]rder that new counsel be appointed. On December 

5, 2019, Matthew Sullivan, Esquire [(“Attorney Sullivan”),] was 

appointed as counsel. On January 7, 2020, [Attorney] Sullivan 

was relieved and [Attorney] Wimmer was appointed as PCRA 

counsel. [Attorney] Wimmer then filed a PCRA [P]etition, asking 

that [Glasgow’s] appellate rights be reinstated once again. On 

March 12, 2020, [the PCRA court] granted relief and reinstated 

[Glasgow’s] appellate rights. On March 16, 2020, [Glasgow] ... 

filed a Notice of Appeal....

[FN1] [Attorney] Wimmer ... had been retained as counsel; however, 

[Glasgow] could no longer afford to pay her after his [P]etition 

was dismissed. [Attorney] Wimmer asked that she be permitted 

to withdraw so that she could be appointed by the court as 

counsel.

[FN2] No timely direct appeal was filed as a result of this 

reinstatement.

PCRA Court Opinion, 8/31/20, at 1-3. Glasgow also filed a Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) 

Concise Statement of errors complained of on appeal.

Glasgow now raises the following issues for our consideration:

I. Did the PCRA court err in holding that [Glasgow] is unable to 

establish jurisdiction under the newly-discovered fact exception 

pursuant to 42 Pa.C.S.[A.] § 9545(b)(1)(ii)?

II. Did the PCRA court err in denying [Glasgow’s] after-discovered 

evidence claim without an evidentiary hearing[,] where he 

successfully pleaded and proved all four prongs of the afterdiscovered evidence test under 42 Pa.C.S.[A.] § 9543(a)(2)(vi)?

Brief for Appellant at 3.
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We will address Glasgow’s claims together. Glasgow first argues that in 

March 2018, he was approached by another inmate, DeWayne White 

(“White”), who told Glasgow that he was present at the time of the fight. Id.

at 15. White told an investigator that Glasgow had been knocked unconscious 

before Smith was knocked to the ground and kicked by two other individuals. 

Id. According to Glasgow,

[o]n the day of the shooting, White was outside with his two 

children when he noticed a crowd gathering approximately 1⁄2 

block away. As White approached the crowd, he noticed a bunch 

of guys fighting and observed [Glasgow] being knocked to the 

ground. White said that [Glasgow] was the first person knocked 

to the ground. [Glasgow] appeared to be unconscious; he was 

not moving. White was 10 to 15 feet away from [Glasgow]. 

[Randall] was fighting with two other guys and was eventually 

knocked to the ground. This fight continued on for two to three 

minutes after [Glasgow] was knocked unconscious. White saw 

[Glasgow’s] friends kicking [Smith] as [Smith] attempted to block 

their kicks. White heard sirens and left the scene prior to the 

arrival of the police. [White] moved out of that neighborhood 

between July and August 2001.

Id. at 15-16. Glasgow claims that he filed the instant PCRA Petition within 

approximately one month of learning of this evidence, and filed his Amended 

PCRA Petition after receiving an Affidavit from White. Id. at 16 n.2. Glasgow 

asserts that the PCRA court improperly stated that the alleged “new fact” was 

that Glasgow had been knocked unconscious by Smith; however, Glasgow 

maintains the “new fact” is “that a disinterested witness possesses first-hand 

knowledge that [Glasgow] was not involved in the fight that resulted in the 

injuries that led to [Smith’s] death.” Id. at 18. Glasgow also contends that 

he could not have discovered this information sooner, because White had 
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moved out of the neighborhood “almost contemporaneously with [Smith’s] 

passing.” Id. at 19.

In his second claim,1 Glasgow again argues that White’s testimony could 

not have been obtained earlier through the exercise of reasonable diligence, 

because White moved out of the neighborhood a few months after the fight. 

Id. at 22. Glasgow claims that there was no evidence presented at trial that 

he was unconscious at the time of the fight that led to Smith’s death. Id. at 

23. Glasgow also asserts that this new information would not be used solely 

for impeachment purposes, as it also provides “a different factual scenario 

than that presented at [Glasgow’s] trial.” Id. at 23-24. According to Glasgow, 

this evidence would compel a different result, because a jury could conclude 

that Glasgow did not commit an overt act necessary to sustain his conviction. 

Id. at 25.

Our standard of review regarding a PCRA court’s order is 

whether the determination of the PCRA court is supported by the 

evidence of record and is free of legal error. The PCRA court’s 

findings will not be disturbed unless there is no support for the 

findings in the certified record.

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1

In his second claim, Glasgow cites to 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9543(a)(2)(vi), 

concerning after-discovered evidence claims under the PCRA. Because 

Glasgow’s PCRA Petition is facially untimely, as we will discuss infra, his claim 

must be considered an attempt to invoke the newly-discovered fact exception 

to the PCRA’s timeliness requirement. See Commonwealth v. Burton, 158 

A.3d 618, 628 (Pa. 2017) (explaining that an after-discovered evidence claim, 

raised in a timely PCRA petition, is distinct from the newly-discovered fact 

exception to the PCRA’s time limitations).
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Commonwealth v. Garcia, 23 A.3d 1059, 1061 (Pa. Super. 2011) (citations 

omitted).

Initially, under the PCRA, any PCRA petition, “including a second or 

subsequent petition, shall be filed within one year of the date the judgment 

becomes final[.]” 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1) (emphasis added). A judgment 

of sentence becomes final “at the conclusion of direct review, including 

discretionary review in the Supreme Court of the United States and the 

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, or at the expiration of time for seeking the 

review.” Id. § 9545(b)(3). The PCRA’s timeliness requirements are 

jurisdictional in nature, and a court may not address the merits of an untimely 

petition. Commonwealth v. Rienzi, 827 A.2d 369, 371 (Pa. 2003). Here, 

Glasgow’s judgment of sentence became final in November 2006, when his 

time for seeking allowance of appeal with our Supreme Court expired. See

Pa.R.A.P. 1113. Because Glasgow filed the instant PCRA Petition on April 26,

2018, his Petition is facially untimely.

Pennsylvania courts may consider an untimely petition if the appellant 

can explicitly plead and prove one of the three exceptions set forth at 42 

Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1)(i)-(iii). Any petition invoking one of these exceptions 

“shall be filed within one year of the date the claim could have been 

presented.” 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(2). Glasgow invokes the newlydiscovered fact exception, which

requires that the facts upon which such a claim is predicated must 

not have been known to appellant, nor could they have been 
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ascertained by due diligence. To fall within this exception, the 

factual predicate of the claim must not be of public record and 

must not be facts that were previously known but are now 

presented through a newly-discovered source.

Commonwealth v. Shannon, 184 A.3d 1010, 1015-16 (Pa. Super. 2018) 

(citations, quotation marks, and some brackets omitted). Further, “[d]ue 

diligence demands that the petitioner take reasonable steps to protect his own 

interests. A petitioner must explain why he could not have obtained the new 

fact(s) earlier with the exercise of due diligence. This rule is strictly enforced.” 

Commonwealth v. Monaco, 996 A.2d 1076, 1080 (Pa. Super. 2010) 

(citations omitted).

The PCRA court addressed Glasgow’s arguments as follows:

[Glasgow] relies upon the [A]ffidavit of [] White, a fellow inmate 

he met in 2017[,] while they were both incarcerated at SCI –

Forest. In his [A]ffidavit, White stated that while he was living at 

2807 S. 82nd Street, he was outside with his children when he saw 

several men fighting. [White] stated that he saw [Glasgow] get 

knocked down by two other men while [Glasgow] was still 

unconscious. [White] stated that he immediately left the scene 

as soon as he heard police sirens. White stated that he never told 

anyone that he witnessed the crime until he ran into [Glasgow] in 

prison. Indeed, at no time prior to his current PCRA [P]etition did 

[Glasgow] ever claim that he was unconscious, not prior to trial, 

not at trial, not post-trial, not on direct appeal, and not in his prior 

PCRA [P]etition.

Moreover, [Glasgow’s] attempt to invoke the afterdiscovered evidence exception fails[,] as he did not explain how 

he could not have ascertained White’s statement earlier. 

[Glasgow] simply states that he could not have known about 

White’s presence at the crime scene any earlier because he was, 

as White asserts, unconscious at the time. However, the evidence 

adduced at trial showed that a crowd of up to 20 people had 

gathered during the incident. [Glasgow] does not explain why he 

did not attempt to identify and contact any of those onlookers to 
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see if anyone had observed him being knocked unconscious prior 

to Smith’s beating. [Glasgow] does not identify who hit him or 

who[m] he was fighting with[,] nor does he explain what 

happened to him after he regained consciousness. [Glasgow] fails 

to provide any explanation as to why he waited nearly 20 years, 

and only after meeting White in jail, to put forth the argument 

that he was unconscious during the attack on Smith. ... [D]ue 

diligence requires some “reasonable efforts” on the part of the 

petitioner to show that he attempted to uncover facts to support 

his claim. Here, [Glasgow] made no effort to find witnesses to 

support his claim that he was unconscious during Smith’s attack[,] 

and did not even put forth this claim until White approached him 

in prison. Accordingly, no relief is due.

PCRA Court Opinion, 8/31/20, at 6-7.

We agree with the PCRA court’s analysis. If Glasgow was unconscious 

during the fight, he presumably would have known of that fact before his 

fortuitous encounter with White. As the PCRA court noted, Glasgow failed to 

explain why he made no attempt to locate additional witnesses. Glasgow 

acknowledged in his brief that a defense investigator located three witnesses, 

see Brief for Appellant at 22, though he does not explain whether any of those 

witnesses were ever asked if they had seen Glasgow unconscious. Further, 

Glasgow repeatedly points to the fact that White moved out of the 

neighborhood as evidence that he could not have obtained this information 

sooner. However, as Glasgow himself indicates in his brief, White moved out 

of the neighborhood a few months after the fight. See id. at 19, 22. 

Accordingly, Glasgow failed to establish the existence of a newly-discovered 

fact that he could not have ascertained sooner through the exercise of due 

diligence. See Shannon, supra; Monaco, supra; see also
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Commonwealth v. Marshall, 947 A.2d 714, 720 (Pa. 2008) (stating that 

“[t]he focus of the exception is on the newly discovered facts, not on a newly 

discovered or newly willing source for previously known facts.” (citation 

omitted; emphasis in original)).

Because Glasgow has failed to successfully invoke any of the exceptions 

necessary to circumvent the PCRA’s timeliness requirement, the PCRA court 

did not err when it dismissed Glasgow’s Petition.

Order affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 4/13/2021