J-S36013-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

v.

CLEO RUFFIN 

Appellant

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 3044 EDA 2022

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered October 19, 2022

In the Court of Common Pleas of Delaware County Criminal Division at 

No(s): CP-23-CR-0002640-2021

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

v.

CLEO RUFFIN JR. 

Appellant

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 3045 EDA 2022

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered October 19, 2022

In the Court of Common Pleas of Delaware County Criminal Division at 

No(s): CP-23-CR-0000027-2022

BEFORE: BOWES, J., NICHOLS, J., and KING, J.

MEMORANDUM BY BOWES, J.: FILED MAY 8, 2024

In this direct appeal by Cleo Ruffin, Jr. from his judgment of sentence, 

we previously denied the motion to withdraw filed by his counsel, as our 

independent review of the record pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 

748 (1967), and Commonwealth v. Santiago, 978 A.2d 349 (Pa. 2009), 

identified an issue of arguable merit. Both parties filed substituted briefs and 

the Commonwealth concedes that Appellant pled guilty to an inoperative 
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criminal offense. We agree with the parties that the judgment of sentence for 

violating 18 Pa.C.S. § 4915 must be vacated. Since this invalidates the 

parties’ plea bargain, we vacate the judgment of sentence and the plea 

agreement, and remand for further proceedings consistent with this 

memorandum. 

Our prior memorandum set forth the full factual and procedural 

background underlying these appeals. See Commonwealth v. Ruffin, 309

A.3d 1086, 2023 WL 8277600, at *1 (Pa.Super. 2023) (non-precedential

decision). For present purposes, we need only observe that Appellant, 

pursuant to a plea agreement, entered a guilty plea at docket 27-2022 to one 

count of failing to comply with his sexual offender registration obligations in 

violation of § 4915. As part of the bargain, the Commonwealth withdrew one 

count of violating 18 Pa.C.S. § 4915.1(a)(1). Separately, Appellant entered 

a guilty plea at docket 2640-2021 to one count of summary disorderly

conduct, with the Commonwealth withdrawing a charge of simple assault.1 

Appellant filed a notice of appeal at each docket, and we sua sponte

consolidated the appeals. Appointed counsel concluded that the appeal was 

frivolous, exclusively addressing in the Anders brief Appellant’s complaint 

that plea counsel was ineffective. We agreed that those complaints could not 

be raised in this direct appeal. However, we noted that § 4915(a)(1) was one 

component of sweeping legislative enactments that our Supreme Court held 

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1 The second case arose from different facts and was consolidated for purposes 

of a global plea negotiation. 
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to be unconstitutional pursuant to the “single subject” rule of the Pennsylvania 

Constitution, and thus void ab initio. See Commonwealth v. McIntyre, 232 

A.3d 609, 619 (Pa. 2020); Commonwealth v. Neiman, 84 A.3d 603, 605 

(Pa. 2013). Therefore, we directed Appellant’s counsel to file a merits brief 

addressing this issue of arguable merit.

Appellant’s substituted brief raises the following issue: “Whether the . . . 

conviction . . . under 18 Pa.C.S. § 4915(a)(1), a statute declared 

unconstitutional and void ab initio, should be vacated.” Appellant’s 

substituted brief at 5. Appellant cites the foregoing law, asserting that the 

§ 4915 offense cannot be enforced. We agree. Pursuant to McIntyre,

Appellant’s sentence is illegal and must be vacated. See McIntyre, 232 A.3d 

at 619 (“[McIntyre]’s conviction and sentence cannot stand . . . because his 

conviction was likewise based on [§] 4915, which . . . must be regarded as 

void from the time of its enactment.”). This issue implicates the legality of 

Appellant’s sentence and is not subject to issue preservation requirements. 

Id. at 616. 

Concluding that Appellant’s sentence for a violation of § 4915 is illegal 

leads to the question of remedy. The parties presume that we should vacate 

only the judgment of sentence as to that count and leave the remainder of 

the plea bargain undisturbed. See Commonwealth’s substituted brief at 11 

(contending that “[Appellant]’s conviction for failing to comply . . . should be 

vacated,” but “his disorderly conduct conviction be affirmed”); Appellant’s 
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brief at 10 (“Appellant asserts that his conviction for failing to comply with sex 

offender registration . . . should be vacated.”).

However, we are not bound by the parties’ view of the proper disposition 

of the appeal. See generally Commonwealth v. Brown, 196 A.3d 130, 

146 (Pa. 2018) (explaining that the judicial branch is not required to adopt 

the parties’ agreement on legal conclusions; “a district attorney’s concession 

of error is not a substitute for independent judicial review”). Unpersuaded by 

the parties’ advocacy, we conclude that the appropriate remedy is to vacate 

the guilty plea and return the parties to the pre-plea negotiation stage.

It is well-settled “that a criminal defendant cannot agree to an illegal 

sentence, so the fact that the illegality was a term of his plea bargain is of no 

legal significance.” Commonwealth v. Gentry, 101 A.3d 813, 819 

(Pa.Super. 2014). In Commonwealth v. Ford, 217 A.3d 824 (Pa. 2019),

our Supreme Court addressed a sentence entered following a guilty plea 

encompassing three dockets, in which the court imposed fines and costs 

without determining Ford’s ability to pay. During collateral proceedings, Ford 

alleged that his sentence was illegal without said hearing. The Commonwealth 

conceded that point but claimed that by accepting fines as part of a bargain 

Ford implicitly agreed that he was able to pay. The Ford Court disagreed and 

held that Ford’s sentence was illegal. As it pertains to this matter, the Superior 

Court panel had vacated the non-mandatory fines and remanded for 

resentencing. The Supreme Court determined that this remedy was 

inadequate.
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As for the Superior Court’s chosen remedy, however, the panel 

should have vacated Ford’s entire judgment of sentence rather 

than simply vacating the illegal fines and remanding for 

resentencing. Indeed, the Commonwealth persuasively argues 

that it will be deprived of the benefit of its bargain if criminal 

defendants can, for instance, agree to pay a larger fine in 

exchange for a shorter term of incarceration, but then later 

attempt to eliminate or reduce the fine in a post-conviction 

proceeding. . . . Because selectively vacating specific conditions 

of a plea agreement threatens to upset the parties’ underlying 

bargain, the better remedy is to put both sides right back where 

they started, at which point they can begin plea negotiations anew 

or proceed to trial.

Id. at 831.

Similarly, we cannot simply vacate the judgment of sentence imposed 

at the § 4915 count, as that “threatens to upset the parties’ underlying 

bargain[.]” Id. Additionally, in the closely related context of ineffective 

assistance of counsel claims premised on erroneous legal advice relative to a 

negotiated guilty plea, the accepted remedy is to vacate the entire plea. 

Commonwealth v. Melendez-Negron, 123 A.3d 1087, 1094 (Pa.Super. 

2015) (vacating guilty plea and remanding for further proceedings; agreeing 

with PCRA petitioner that a “shared misapprehension that the mandatory 

minimum sentence . . . applied” tainted the parties’ negotiations); 

Commonwealth v. DiMatteo, 177 A.3d 182, 196 (Pa. 2018) (explaining that 

Melendez-Negron stands for “the proposition that both parties to a 

negotiated guilty plea are entitled to the benefit of their bargains, but such 

bargains may not be premised on some shared misapprehension that 

wrongfully induces the plea”) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 

We therefore direct that the parties be returned to the pre-plea stage.
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Judgment of sentence vacated. Plea agreement vacated. Cases 

remanded for further proceedings. Jurisdiction relinquished. 

Date: 5/08/2024