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STATE OF MICHIGAN 

COURT OF APPEALS 

GIMMY G. TRESS, ANN M. TRESS, RONALD 

G. THALHAMMER, Trustee for the RONALD G. 

THALHAMMER TRUST, CHRISTOPHER J. 

MICHELS, VERONICA MICHELS, MELITA A. 

REUBER, Trustee for the MARY A. MEDICO, 

Sole Benefit Trust, GREGORY D. 

FLEWELLING, WILLIAM DEVAULT, KATHY 

DEVAULT, JEANE GILSON, LEONA GILSON, 

PATRICIA DENNIS, FREDERICK B. COWPER, 

SUSAN M. COWPER, JAMES R. THOMAS, JIM 

LUCIUS, Power of Attorney, JAMES GORMAN, 

THOMAS E. HOFFMEYER, and ETHELYN M. 

HOFFMEYER, 

 Plaintiffs-Appellees, 

UNPUBLISHED 

May 9, 2017 

v No. 331230 

Roscommon Circuit Court 

ROSCOMMON COUNTY ROAD 

COMMISSION, CHARTER 

COMMUNICATIONS, TOWNSHIP OF LYON, 

ROSCOMMON COUNTY DRAIN 

COMMISSIONER, DIRECTOR OF THE 

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, 

DIRECTOR OF THE DEPARTMENT OF 

ENERGY LABOR & ECONOMIC 

GROWTH/DIRECTOR, FRONTIER 

COMMUNICATIONS, CONSUMERS ENERGY, 

DIANE MILLER, ELSBETH CURRY, RICK 

RUDER and PAULINE C. RUDDER, Trustees for 

the RICK RUDER and PAULINE C. RUDER 

TRUST, TRUSTEES OF GAIL A WOLGAST 

TRUST, ROBERT L. HANSEN, KARRIE R. 

HANSEN, FRANKLIN J. HUNT, GLORIA A. 

HUNT, TRUSTEES OF CARMELA 

CIAVAGLIA TRUST, TRUSTEES OF JOAN L. 

ENGLISH TRUST, TIMOTHY J. HARRIS, 

DEBORAH M. HARRIS, STEPHEN J. BALSAM, 

KATHRYN A. GOFORTH, MICHAEL R. 

GOFORTH, WILLIAM RAY GOFORTH, 

LC No. 14-722037-CH 
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JAMES P. VONDALE, CAROL L. VONDALE, 

CHARLES E. MIRES and LINDA S. MIRES, 

Trustees of the CHARLES E. MIRES and LINDA 

S. MIRES TRUST, TRUSTEES OF FRED W. 

TIEMAN TRUST, TRUSTEES OF JOLENE K. 

PEACOCK TRUST, MICHAEL C. DELAERE, 

KEVIN I. DAWLEY, SUSAN DAWLEY, 

JOSEPH F. MULANEY, LAURA M. 

MULANEY, DAVID T. DIONESE, JOHN 

DAVIS, Trustee of the JOHN DAVIS TRUST, 

DALE D. SCHACHT, KATHLEEN S. 

SCHACHT, TIMOTHY L. MONET, TRUSTEES 

OF CLARENCE L. TYLKOWSKI TRUST, 

JAMES E. FRENCH, CAROL J. MCWETHY, 

Trustee of the CAROL J. MCWETHY TRUST, 

DANIEL G. DIONESE, ELLEN A. DIONESE, 

TRUSTEES OF KATHLEEN M. TROCK 

TRUST, NORBERT C. ROOBAERT, MARY 

BETH ROOBAERT, BILL W. BELLAMY, 

ELIZABETH L. BELLAMY, ARTHUR A. 

LOEFFLER, CHERYL A. LOEFFLER, JAMES J. 

KAUFMAN, RENEE L. KAUFMAN, RONALD 

T. SNOW, SR., FELICIA SNOW, CAMERON 

ROHDY, HOI ROHDY, MICHAEL THOMAS, 

SHERRI THOMAS, PATRICIA BLACKBURN, 

MICHAEL OLKOWSKI, DIANE OLKOWSKI, 

VALERIE MAE JEWELL, ROBERT M. HRIC, 

DOLORES L. HRIC, BRIAN RASHOTTE, 

KRISTINE RASHOTTE, KEITH M. ADDIS, 

JOHN D. MOORE, RONALD J. BYLICH, 

DAVID MISPELON, LAURA MISPELON, 

PAUL MISPELON, JENNIE MISPELON, JOHN 

L. TAYLOR, SCOT K. WOOD, TAMARA M. 

WOOD, LINDA K. RAMSEY, STEPHEN KIDD, 

LYNN KIDD, RICHARD E. RUSSELL and 

CAROLYN M. RUSSELL TRUST, RICHARD C. 

OLKOWSKI, COSIMO CUSUMANO, 

JOSEPHINE CUSUMANO, DOUGLAS W. 

THORNLEY, AGNES THORNLEY, DONATO 

SIMONE, CONNIE SIMONE, THERESA 

PIETRANGELO, JOHN W. THOMAS, NANCY 

B. ZUZIAK, JAMES A. ZUZIAK, JAMES A. 

KURISH, APRIL L. KURISH, JOHN L. HARRIS, 

VICTORIA J. HARRIS, TARAS HELEN 

RESIDENT AGENT, J & I LASH FAMILY, LLC 

and ROBERT and DOLORES HRIC TRUST 
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 Defendants, 

and 

JAMES M. BUTT, and MARY W. BUTT, 

 Defendants-Appellants. 

Before: SAWYER, P.J., and MURRAY and GLEICHER, JJ. 

PER CURIAM. 

 The question in this case is: what happens when a county or township abandons roads 

previously dedicated to the public? Employing only Michigan’s Land Division Act, the trial 

court determined that the abandoned roadway is divided in half and awarded in fee to the 

landowners abutting the street. However, our Supreme Court has declared that the Land 

Division Act may not be used to create substantive property rights in this fashion. Moreover, the 

lower court’s judgment granted exclusive use of half of each abandoned roadway to its new 

owner, in contravention of long-established rules regarding the rights of lot owners to use private 

subdivision roads. We therefore vacate the trial court’s judgment and remand to allow plaintiffs 

to amend their complaint to seek relief under an alternate legal theory. 

I. BACKGROUND 

 In 1927, a developer platted and subdivided a large swath of wooded land in Roscommon 

County and styled it the Hillcrest Subdivision. The area is near Higgins Lake, but is separated 

from the water by a road and a compact row of lakeside houses. By 2014, it became apparent 

that Hillcrest would never meet the expectations of its designer. The land remains wooded with 

only a handful of homes scattered throughout. As a result of this sylvan state, many of the 

roadways marked on the plat map and dedicated to the public have never been cleared. Others 

are “two-tracks” or paths. 

 In 1972 and 2013, Roscommon County abandoned portions of various platted roads 

within Hillcrest, declaring its disinterest in maintaining these passages as public roads. These 

abandonments included portions of Summit and Peach Roads. Ownership of the roads then fell 

to Lyon Township. The township followed the county’s lead and abandoned the roads as well. 

 Plaintiffs all own property along Peach Road or at the apex of Summit Road 

development. On July 18, 2014, plaintiffs filed suit against the county, township, utility 

companies, certain state agencies, and every owner of land within 300 feet of the subject 

roadways.1

 Plaintiffs sought to amend the plat to vacate “those parts of the following roads, 

Summit Road between Lots 22 and 34, and Peach Road between 133 and 136 within the Plat of 

 

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 These parties are required defendants pursuant to MCL 560.224a. 
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Hillcrest” and to vest “fee simple title absolute to the adjacent abutting lot owners, pursuant to” 

MCL 560.227a of the Land Division Act, MCL 560.101 et seq. 

 MCL 560.221 provides that a circuit court may “vacate, correct, or revise all or part of a 

recorded plat.” To initiate this remedy, a lot owner within a subdivision must file a complaint 

seeking specific relief. MCL 560.222. MCL 560.226(1)(b) and (c) provide that before a court 

may consider vacation, correction, or revision of a platted roadway dedicated to a county or 

township, the governmental unit must first relinquish its rights. MCL 560.227a provides for the 

transfer of title to a vacated roadway, in relevant part, as follows: 

(1) Title to any part of the plat vacated by the court’s judgment, other than a street 

or alley, shall vest in the rightful proprietor of that part. Title to a street or alley 

the full width of which is vacated by the court’s judgment shall vest in the rightful 

proprietors of the lots, within the subdivision covered by the plat, abutting the 

street or alley. . . . 

(2) If the lots abutting the vacated street or alley on both sides belong to the same 

proprietor, title to the vacated street or alley shall vest in that proprietor. If the 

lots on opposite sides of the vacated street or alley belong to different proprietors, 

title up to the center line of the vacated street or alley shall vest in the respective 

proprietors of the abutting lots on each side. . . . 

 The Butt family owns four lots—103, 104, 131, and 132—fronting on Summit Road, 

bordered by Maple Road to the east and Peach Road on the West. Summit Road dead ends at the 

western border of the Butts’ property. For convenience, we include this inset from the plat map: 
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 The Butt family objected to the vacation of Peach and Summit Roads. James Butt 

attested that he lives on a portion of Summit Road that would be affected by the court’s order. 

He claimed that he uses both Peach and Summit Roads and that “having the use of these roads 

was a substantial consideration for [his] decision to purchase four lots and to invest in” his 

property. Mr. Butt further contended that he would “not be able to move the Fifth Wheel out of 

[his] pole barn without being able to use the full width of Summit Road.” Consistent with these 

objections, the Butt family sought summary dismissal of plaintiffs’ complaint pursuant to MCR 

2.116(C)(8) and (10). The Butts noted that plaintiffs sought only to vacate those portions of the 

roadways that service the Butt property and that the vacation of Summit Road “would land lock 

their pole barn, which faces Summit and houses their 36’ foot Fifth Wheel and 32 foot motor 

home.” 

 Plaintiffs opposed the Butts’ summary disposition motion, arguing that the county and 

township had already abandoned the roads. Plaintiffs further noted that Peach Road was a 

“paper road” that “has never been cut in at all” and that Summit had not been “built to 

specifications.” Essentially, the case boiled down to a factual dispute regarding whether the 

Butts had reasonable objections to the vacation of the roadways on the plat. This required a trial, 

plaintiffs urged. 

 The circuit court denied summary relief and ordered the matter to proceed to trial. At 

trial, James and Mary Butt testified, as well as their neighbors on Peach and Summit Roads, 

Gimmy Tress and Ron Thalhammer. The Butts contended that plaintiffs’ entire action was 

aimed at preventing their use of their 60-foot pole barn and the “toys” stored within. However, 

Mr. Butt admitted that he received no complaints from neighbors until two years earlier when he 

began clearing and filling in Peach Road adjacent to his property, an area which at that time was 

completely wooded. Mr. Butt accused Tress of building a fence down the center line of Summit 

Road, which the township ordered him to remove. Tress denied that he erected a fence. Rather, 

he claimed that he installed posts as part of a survey. 

 Tress indicated that when he purchased his property, the Butts had only a seasonal 

cottage and Summit Road was narrow and wooded. The Butts had since cleared the road 

between the Tress and Butt properties to look like a parking lot and cleared the Butt property so 

it was no longer wooded. Tress wanted to maintain the dead end as it was then, but subsequently 

described that he desired the property to be maintained “[a]s it was when [he] bought it.” Tress 

intended “to maintain the peace and quiet.” He was evasive when asked if he would allow the 

Butts to continue to use the entire 50-foot width of Summit Road abutting their property to 

maneuver vehicles into their pole barn. 

 Thalhammer testified that his property has been in his family since the 1960s. His 

parents cleared Peach Road only up to their house, not all the way to Summit as platted. The 

stretch of platted road between Thalhammer’s property and Summit Road (where the Butt 

property is situated) remained completely wooded. Moreover, Thalhammer testified that a steep 

“severe drop off” in the area prevented the construction of a passable road. Recently, the Butts 

had “put a pathway to access up in front of [Thalhammer’s] house and then continued down 

Peach Road.” This would serve almost like a back road to the Butts’ property and cause at least 

new foot traffic in front of Thalhammer’s home. 
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 The circuit court found that since the creation of Hillcrest Subdivision, individual 

landowners had carved out the roads described on the plat map only as necessary and only for 

personal ingress and egress. The Butts wanted to expand the use of the roadways beyond this 

tradition. And the Butts’ objections to plaintiffs’ request to vacate certain roadways was not 

reasonable, the court concluded. The trial judge noted that he had personally used large 

equipment like that kept in the Butts’ pole barn. He found Mr. Butt’s claimed need of the full 

50-foot roadway to pull his vehicles into the pole barn “spurious.” Accordingly, the court 

vacated those portions of Summit and Peach Roads adjacent to the Butts’ property. The court 

awarded fee title interest in the roadway up to the halfway mark to the adjoining landowners. 

The court ruled that only easements of record would survive. 

 The Butts now appeal. 

II. ANALYSIS 

 We “review[] a trial court’s findings of fact in a bench trial for clear error and its 

conclusions of law de novo.” Alan Custom Homes, Inc v Krol, 256 Mich App 505, 512; 667 

NW2d 379 (2003), citing MCR 2.613(C). “A finding is clearly erroneous where, after reviewing 

the entire record, this Court is left with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been 

made.” Alan Custom Homes, 256 Mich App at 512. 

 As noted, MCL 560.227a of the LDA permits “title up to the center line” of a vacated 

street to vest in the abutting landowners. The purpose of this statute is “to prevent the creation of 

odd strips of land when alleys [or roadways] are vacated.” Valoppi v Detroit Engineering & 

Machine Co, 339 Mich 674, 678; 64 NW2d 884 (1954) (discussing a substantively similar 

predecessor statute). 

 When a street is platted, dedicated to the public, and the dedication accepted, “ ‘a 

threefold relation to the street’ ” is sustained by the abutting landowners. 2000 Baum Family 

Trust v Babel, 488 Mich 136, 152; 793 NW2d 633 (2010), quoting Detroit City R Co v Mills, 85 

Mich 634, 653; 48 NW 1007 (1891) (GRANT, J.). The sustained relations are: 

“1. As one of the general public. 

2. As owner of the reversionary interest to the center of the street. 

3. As owner of a lot, possessed of the right of ingress and egress to and from the 

street.” [Id.] 

 The reversionary interest held by abutting landowners helps “prevent the creation of odd 

strips of land. . . .” Valoppi, 339 Mich at 678. Under both the common law and the statutory

scheme, it has long been the rule that title to a road abandoned by the public reverts to the 

abutting landowners. See 2000 Baum Family Trust, 488 Mich at 155-156. 

 The right of ingress and egress “is considered a natural easement and one of the incidents 

of ownership or occupancy of land.” Id. at 157. Exclusive of the public right to use a road, 

owners of lots within a platted subdivision have a private right, “an incorporeal hereditament,” to 

use the roads as accessways. Id. (quotation marks and citation omitted). “[T]his right of access 
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constitutes a property right that adds value to the land.” Id. As described by this Court in 

Minerva Partners, Ltd v First Passage, LLC, 274 Mich App 207, 219; 731 NW2d 472 (2007): 

The purchaser of property recorded in a plat receives both the interest described in 

the deed and the rights indicated in the plat. Kirchen v Remenga, 291 Mich 94, 

102-110; 288 NW 344 (1939); Fry v Kaiser, 60 Mich App 574, 577; 232 NW2d 

673 (1975). Further, “[a] grantee of property in a platted subdivision acquires a 

private right entitling him ‘ “to the use of the streets and ways laid down on the 

plat . . . .’ ” Nelson v Roscommon Co Rd Comm, 117 Mich App 125, 132; 323 

NW2d 621 (1982), quoting Rindone v Corey Community Church, 335 Mich 311, 

317; 55 NW2d 844 (1952). When a county road commission abandons a public 

right-of-way, it only relinquishes the public’s right to use that road, street, or 

easement. See MCL 224.18(3). By bestowing the right to use streets in a 

subdivision on the owners of lots in that subdivision, the plat gives these owners a 

right to use these streets that is independent of the public’s right to use these 

streets once they are dedicated for public use. Accordingly, if the platted streets 

in a subdivision are abandoned for public use, the lot owners still retain a 

separate, private right to use the streets in that subdivision. Essentially, the lot 

owners retain an independent easement over the streets formerly dedicated for 

public use, which is unaffected by the road commission’s abandonment of these 

streets. 

See also Rindone, 117 Mich App at 316-317 (quotation marks and citation omitted) (“These 

decisions adopt the view that where lands are platted and sales are made with reference to the 

plat, the acts of the owner in themselves merely create private rights in the grantees entitling the 

grantees to the use of the streets and ways laid down on the plat or referred to in the 

conveyance.”). 

 The interplay of the second and third “relations” created confusion in this case. But as 

held in Nelson, 117 Mich App at 133, “Although title to a street which is vacated by court 

judgment vests in the abutting property owners, MCL 560.227a . . ., the back-lot property 

owners’ right to use the platted street, a right in the nature of an easement, may remain 

unimpaired.” Thus, even if a platted street is vacated by court order, the adjoining landowners, 

such as Butt, continue to enjoy a right to fully use the vacated road. Moreover, “[t]he rights 

granted under the dedicatory clauses in the plat to the owners of lots in the subdivision may not 

be infringed by one lot owner for his own convenience to the detriment of his fellow lot owners.” 

Minnis v Jyleen, 333 Mich 447, 454; 53 NW2d 328 (1952). 

 A lot owner seeking to protect his or her right of use must raise “reasonable objections to 

vacation.” Vander Meer v Ottawa Co, 12 Mich App 494, 497; 163 NW2d 227 (1968). This test 

was culled from the language of an earlier statute that was not included in the LDA. Even so, the 

test has endured. In re Gondek, 69 Mich App 73, 77; 244 NW2d 361 (1976). See also 

Brookshire-Big Tree Ass’n v Onieda Twp, 225 Mich App 196, 201; 570 NW2d 294 (1997). 

 As described by this Court, “The test of whether an objection to vacation of a portion of a 

recorded plat is reasonable is not capable of precise answer.” Vander Meer, 12 Mich App at 497. 

In Westveer v Ainsworth, 279 Mich 580, 584-585; 273 NW 275 (1937), a plat dedicated to
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cottage life among undisturbed sand dunes could not be vacated to accommodate a resort. “It is 

a reasonable objection to vacation of the plat that it is proposed to take from the lot owners the 

conditions they prize as advantages and for which they have paid . . . .” Id. at 585. In this vein, 

“access to one’s property as it existed under a recorded plat at the time of purchase forms the 

basis of a reasonable objection to impairment of that access by vacation.” Vander Meer, 12 

Mich App at 497. In In re Upjohn, 256 Mich 181, 182-183; 239 NW 359 (1931), the Supreme 

Court found that a lot owner did not raise a reasonable objection to vacating a “driveway,” 

actually a road, where it had never “been opened, is difficult to locate,” and was only used as 

part of a golf course fairway. The mere speculation that roadways that the objector actually used 

might be closed in the future was insufficient to block the vacation of other unused roadways, the 

Court determined. 

 These examples guide our conclusion that the circuit court clearly erred in determining 

that the Butts failed to raise a reasonable objection to the vacation of Summit Road. The Butts 

used Summit Road along the entire length of their property. At the east end where Summit 

intersects with Maple, the Butts erected a garage for their daily-use vehicles. At the far west end 

of their property, the Butts constructed a large pole barn and depended upon the use of Summit 

Road to park recreational vehicles inside. The Butts relied upon the plat description of Summit 

Road and denial of the use of this road will deeply impact their use and enjoyment of their 

property. 

 The circuit court did not clearly err, however, in determining that the Butts presented no 

reasonable objection to the vacation of Peach Road. Mr. Butt claims he depended on his right to 

build up Peach Road as a second access point to his property for emergency vehicles. Mr. Butt 

did not deny that the topography of the area included a steep drop off. Yet, he claimed that he 

intended to fill in the area to make it passable. The circuit court found this plan unlikely and 

credited competing evidence that the fire marshal rejected Peach Street as a possible route to the 

Butts’ house. 

 However, the Butts assert that the circuit court could not vacate the roads and grant fee 

title interest to the abutting landowners in the manner it did. Specifically, they contend that the 

LDA “lays out a procedure to amend a plat to conform with the facts that exist, but an action 

brought under this law will not lie unless the Plaintiffs are first able to show a superior claim to 

the property at issue under some legal theory, such as adverse possession . . . .” 

 The LDA “provides a process for surveying and marking subdivided property.” Tomecek 

v Bavas, 482 Mich 484, 495; 759 NW2d 178 (2008) (opinion by KELLY, J.). “The LDA was 

never intended to enable a court to establish an otherwise nonexistent property right. Rather, the 

act allows a court to alter a plat to reflect property rights already in existence.” Id. at 496. 

Concerning the interplay between an action brought under the LDA and an action to quiet title, 

our Supreme Court has said 

an action that seeks to establish a substantive property right arises independently 

of an LDA action to vacate, correct, or revise a recorded plat. It is only after such 

a property right has been recognized that the need arises under the LDA to revise 

a plat that does not reflect the newly recognized property right. Until that 

property right is legally recognized, the LDA is inapplicable. The language of the 
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LDA and our cases analyzing the LDA demonstrate that an LDA action is 

appropriate when a party’s interest arises from or is traceable to the plat or the 

platting process. [Beach v Township of Lima, 489 Mich 99, 102; 802 NW2d 1 

(2011).] 

 In Tomacek, 482 Mich at 496, the Court held that the plaintiffs did not seek, and the trial 

court did not effectuate, the creation of substantive property rights through the LDA. Rather, the 

plaintiffs sought to clarify their right to install a sewer connection along an easement marked on 

the plat map for ingress and egress to a landlocked parcel. “The trial court merely used the LDA 

as the tool to validate property rights that already existed.” Id. 

 In Beach, 489 Mich at 103-104, the plaintiffs sought to declare title to platted streets 

under the theory of adverse possession. The streets had never been developed and the plaintiffs 

had farmed the land for approximately 100 years. Id. at 104. The Supreme Court held that an 

equitable quiet title action was the proper method by which to establish the plaintiffs’ property 

rights. Id. at 110. Only when those rights were settled could a court correct the plat map. Id. 

 Our conclusion finds support in the plain language of the LDA. The LDA 

defines a plat as a “map or chart of a subdivision of land.” [MCL 560.102(a).] 

This Court has also described plats as “a description of the physical property 

interests on a particular area of land.” [Tomacek, 482 Mich 496 (opinion by 

KELLY, J.).] When a party files an LDA action to vacate, correct, or revise a 

recorded plat, MCL 560.223(b) requires the plaintiff to set forth the “reasons for 

seeking the vacation, correction, or revision of the plat.” However, without a 

judicial decree showing that plaintiffs validly obtained record title to the property, 

there is no legal or record basis for plaintiffs to seek a vacation, correction, or 

revision of the plat. Thus, the plat accurately reflected the underlying substantive 

property rights until the change in ownership rights was established by plaintiffs’ 

adverse possession action. [Id. at 111.] 

 The portion of Summit Road vacated by the trial court had already been graded and filled 

in by the Butts. Before the county abandoned the road, it also graded and cleared snow from the 

area. When the county and township abandoned their interests, this portion of Summit became a 

private road, one still in use by both the Butts and the Tresses. Public abandonment did not 

create an odd strip of land between the property of two owners over which rights needed to be 

established as contemplated in Valoppi, 339 Mich at 678. And both the Tresses and the Butts 

retained the right to use this portion of Summit Road for ingress and egress. 2000 Baum Family 

Trust, 488 Mich at 152, quoting Detroit City R Co, 85 Mich at 653. The trial court could not use 

the LDA to eliminate the private road, divide the subject land in half, and award each side 

exclusive use of its portion. This was the creation of substantive property rights, not permitted 

under the statutes. Because the newly created property rights conflicted with the Butts’ right to 

use the road despite its abandonment, the trial court erred by failing to preserve the easement 

enjoyed by the Butts, which was created when the roads were platted. 

 Although use of Peach Road has not been as heavy, plaintiffs still employed an incorrect 

legal mechanism to establish their rights. Accordingly, we must vacate the trial court’s order 
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awarding fee title interests to the roads in question based only on the LDA. On remand, the court 

must modify the order consistent with this opinion. 

 We vacate the lower court’s judgment and remand for further proceedings consistent with 

this opinion. We do not retain jurisdiction. 

/s/ David H. Sawyer 

/s/ Christopher M. Murray 

/s/ Elizabeth L. Gleicher