RECORD IMPOUNDED

SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY

APPELLATE DIVISION

DOCKET NO. A-3318-17T4

NEW JERSEY DIVISION OF

CHILD PROTECTION AND 

PERMANENCY,

Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

B.C.R.,

Defendant-Appellant,

and 

J.L.N.,

Defendant.

———————————————

IN THE MATTER OF THE 

GUARDIANSHIP OF J.C.J.N., 

a Minor.

———————————————

Submitted December 12, 2018 – Decided

Before Judges Alvarez and Mawla.

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the 

internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.

December 27, 2018
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A-3318-17T4

On appeal from Superior Court of New Jersey, 

Chancery Division, Family Part, Mercer County, 

Docket No. FG-11-0048-17.

Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney for 

appellant (Phuong V. Dao, Designated Counsel, on the 

briefs).

Gurbir S. Grewal, Attorney General, attorney for 

respondent (Melissa D. Schaffer, Assistant Attorney 

General, of counsel; Melvina D. Fennell, Deputy 

Attorney General, on the brief). 

Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, Law Guardian, 

attorney for minor (Meredith A. Pollock, of counsel; 

Phyllis G. Warren, Designated Counsel, on the brief).

PER CURIAM

B.C.R. (Betty1) appeals from a March 9, 2018 judgment terminating her 

parental rights to her son J.C.J.N. (John). We affirm. 

We take the following facts from the record. Betty has had a history of 

involvement with the Division of Child Protection and Permanency (Division), 

beginning in 2002, with the birth of her first child. At the time, a psychological 

evaluation conducted on behalf of the Division concluded Betty could not 

adequately parent her child because she was emotionally disturbed, had 

developmental and emotional delays, and was communication-impaired. 

 

1

 We utilize fictitious names to protect the parties' privacy. 
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Another psychological evaluation performed in July 2007, showed little change 

in Betty's condition and concluded she had a poor prognosis because she was 

incapable of controlling her emotions and her anger. Betty was evaluated by 

five other professionals, all of whom drew similar conclusions. 

John was born to Betty and J.L.N. (Jim) in February 2016. The Division 

received a referral the day after John's birth because he was born premature at 

twenty-nine weeks gestation, weighed three pounds and ten ounces, and both he 

and Betty had tested positive for cannabis. At the hospital, Betty was aggressive 

and irritable and declined to take the medicine prescribed for her. John was 

placed in the neonatal intensive care unit for treatment and monitoring. 

Betty revealed she had smoked cannabis and cigarettes throughout her 

pregnancy, and did not receive prenatal care. She also indicated she had been 

diagnosed with schizo-affective disorder. Betty claimed she self-medicated with 

cannabis because she did not like the effects of the medicine prescribed for her. 

She continued to smoke cannabis after her discharge. 

In March 2016, a caseworker reported Betty admitted to using cannabis 

and appeared to be in need of mental health treatment. The Division also became 

concerned about Betty's potential housing instability because the caseworker 

noted she had not purchased a bed or any supplies for John. Betty claimed Jim 
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did not care for John and only saw him as a means to receive government 

benefits. Betty offered several excuses as to why Jim's family could not care 

for John, including her claim their house was infested with bedbugs. 

On March 15, 2016, the Division filed a verified complaint for custody, 

which the court granted. John was placed in a resource home and the Division 

provided weekly visitation for Betty. The Division referred Betty for substance 

abuse and psychological evaluations, which were scheduled for March and 

April, but she did not attend either appointment. Betty did attend a substance 

abuse evaluation, scheduled in March 2016, with a counselor from Child 

Protection Substance Abuse Initiative. There, she tested positive for cannabis. 

As a result of the evaluation, Betty was recommended to an outpatient substance 

abuse treatment program at Catholic Charities Family Growth Program in May 

2016, but was discharged two months later for lack of compliance. 

Betty's statements and conduct in the presence of Division caseworkers 

demonstrated she labored with mental illness. Betty claimed the Division had 

changed her name and birth date because it did not want to obtain the true 

information from a military base. She claimed her father was smothered by a 

pillow while at a hospital and implicated her previous Division caseworker in 

the death of her family members. Betty claimed cancer could be treated with a 
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plant purchased at Home Depot. A caseworker reported Betty ambulated in an 

unusual way while being transported to a visit with John, although she had no 

prior problems with walking. When they arrived for the visit Betty stood silently 

and stared at John. In June 2016, a caseworker reported Betty acted erratically 

during transport, holding her keys in a threatening stabbing manner while she 

sat in the passenger seat of the vehicle. 

Betty continued not to comply with evaluations arranged by the Division. 

The Division provided bus passes for transportation to psychological 

evaluations in June and August 2016, but she failed to attend. Betty claimed she 

missed some of her appointments because she did not feel like attending.

In July 2016, Betty tested positive for cannabis when she arrived for 

visitation. She ignored a court order which required she maintain sobriety in 

order to have visitation. Betty also refused to attend court ordered anger 

management and parenting classes. She claimed she would attend only after the 

Division refunded money she believed she was owed. 

During a visit in September 2016, Betty became verbally abusive with 

Division staff and threatened to shoot a security guard. The court ordered that 

visitation would not resume "until [Betty] complete[d] [a] psychological and a 

psychiatric evaluation for medication due to her mental health issues." 
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In 2017, Betty was referred for a psychological evaluation, which found 

she suffered from: psychotic disorder not otherwise specified; history of major 

depressive disorder, severe with psychotic disorder; intermittent explosive 

disorder; rule/out delusional disorder; cannabis use disorder; borderline 

intellectual functioning; unspecified personality disorder, paranoid, antisocial 

and borderline features. The report also concluded Betty was not capable of 

parenting John, nor could she safely resume visitation. The evaluator 

concluded:

[Betty's] visits were discontinued due to her volatile 

behavior and refusal to take redirection. Nothing has 

taken place since her visits were suspended that would 

lead her behavior to change. She continues to endorse 

physical discipline, she has an extremely high score on 

the Child Abuse Potential Inventory, she has very low 

scores on the parenting inventory and refuses to take 

any feedback about her parenting, she does not 

understand what structure is or what the importance of 

it is in raising children, she did not acknowledge that 

[John] has any special needs when asked about 

parenting him and also made very unusual statements 

such as it would be acceptable for her children to rob a 

local store with a gun.

The report further indicated "[a] prior psychological evaluation [performed] . . . 

on July 29, 2009[,] stated that 'her prognosis is at best guarded and most likely 

poor.' In 2017 this remains the case. It is not likely that she will ever be able 

to independently or safely care for a child." 
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The Division referred Betty for a substance abuse evaluation. She failed 

to attend three scheduled appointments and the evaluator closed the case. 

The Division arranged for Betty to attend a psychological evaluation with 

Barry Katz, Ph.D. After the initial session, Dr. Katz opined that Betty displayed 

delusional and psychotic thinking, it was unsafe to resume visitation, and 

recommended partial hospitalization. At the conclusion of a different session in 

November 2017, Dr. Katz informed the Division Betty had stated she possessed 

machine guns she obtained while she was in the military, a claim she had also 

made to another evaluator. However, there was no evidence Betty had ever 

served in the military. 

Dr. Katz's report concluded Betty "presented as highly agitated, irrational 

and volatile." She "intermixed racial slurs with irrational, paranoid and 

nonsensical statements. [She] expressed recurring themes that she did not have 

the patience or time to meet, that she was being exploited, [and] that [the 

Division's involvement] was a conspiracy[.]" Dr. Katz's opined as follows:

Across interviews, [Betty] presented as in the 

throes of an active psychotic episode. [Betty] displayed 

impaired reasoning, impaired judgment, delusional 

ideation and thought disorder. [Betty] was impaired in 

her ability to control her impulses and continually 

appeared on the verge of becoming overwhelmed. 

[She] showed evidence of a thought disorder and was 

frequently on the verge of losing control of her anger
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. . . . [Her] anger toward the paternal family equaled 

her anger toward the Division and those she believed 

aligned with [the Division]. [Betty] made delusional 

accusations in general of pedophilia and various other 

criminal behavior and exploitive behavior. [She] would 

repeatedly show loss in functioning, self-control and 

reality when questioned about parenting, her past, her 

paramour, her situation and her children. [Betty] 

presented with this same impaired state across 

interviews. The [Division] worker and [the Division] 

staff reported observing similar behaviors by [Betty] 

over many instances. These problems in function were 

also noted throughout the record with origins in early 

adolescence.

[Betty] was steadfast in her commitment not to 

comply with medication, treatment and any other 

services. This pledge on the part of [Betty] was 

reflected in her ongoing behavior as was reported in the 

record. [She] not only expressed her desire not to 

comply with any services during the interview, but the 

record indicates that [she] has been chronically 

noncompliant with services, including therapy and 

medication.

. . . .

[Betty] displayed loss of control of her emotions 

and cognition during the current assessment. [She] 

displayed poor frustration tolerance that was repeatedly 

on the brink of explosive outbursts that would be fueled 

by internal psychotic processes and cognitive 

distortion. This behavior during the interview is 

consistent with the reports in the record of [Betty] 

having loss of functioning along with psychotic and/or 

explosive behaviors. This has led to [Betty] having her 

visits suspended. Such behaviors would put others at 

risk, especially a vulnerable child.
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The report also stated Betty's chronically impaired condition would likely cause 

her to act out in violent impulses, and concluded she would likely act violently 

toward a child in her care. Dr. Katz found a child in Betty's care would be at 

imminent risk of harm and she would be unable to care for a child in the 

foreseeable future. He recommended visitation be suspended.

In August 2017, Betty and John attended a bonding evaluation with Dr. 

Katz. John did not make eye contact with Betty during the observation, and 

instead looked around the room and out the window with a concerned 

expression. John rested his head against Betty, but peered through the window 

or looked directly at Dr. Katz. John had a "flat affect" and looked somber and 

withdrawn. Dr. Katz observed that when Betty put John down he did not cry, 

and when she picked him up he continued to display a concerned expression. 

He also noted John did not reciprocate the affection displayed by Betty. 

Dr. Katz also conducted a bonding evaluation with the resource parent. 

The resource parent provided a complete history of John's placement, and 

provided a detailed description of his medical and developmental history. John

smiled and laughed with the resource parent during the observation, and seemed 

excited and joyful. He also noted John crawled around the room and generally 

exhibited a full range of emotion. 
10 A-3318-17T4

Dr. Katz concluded John did not have an attachment to either of his 

biological parents and did not recognize them. He concluded the resource parent 

was John's primary parent and he would not suffer a significant harm if Betty's 

parental rights were terminated. Rather, Dr. Katz found John would suffer a 

substantial harm if his relationship with the resource parent was severed, and 

concluded Betty was incapable of remediating such harm. 

The record demonstrates John's brain had not fully developed in utero and 

he will likely remain mentally challenged throughout his life. He presently has 

numerous developmental challenges and issues hearing, seeing, walking, and 

feeding. He has required treatment from specialists including a neurologist, a 

nutritionist, an occupational therapist, a physical therapist, and an ear, nose, and 

throat specialist.

The guardianship trial took place in February and March 2018. The 

Division presented testimony from Dr. Katz and the caseworker, Monique Ford. 

Betty testified on her own behalf and presented no other testimony.

Ford's testimony explained the Division's involvement since the removal, 

its assessment of relative placements, the services provided to the family, and 

John's progress in his resource home, as we have summarized it. Dr. Katz was 
11 A-3318-17T4

qualified without objection as an expert in the field of psychology, and testified 

consistent with the conclusions in his psychological and bonding evaluations.

Dr. Katz's conclusions explained Betty's prognosis. He testified she likely 

suffered from mental impairment since adolescence, and the disorder was 

progressing and worsening over time. He opined the combination of Betty's

psychotic disorder, propensity for violence, and poor understanding of parenting 

responsibilities would put John at a high risk of danger because she was 

incapable of parenting him. Dr. Katz concluded there was an "imminent risk of 

severe harm leading to potential catastrophic consequences for the child." 

Dr. Katz linked Betty's conduct with the harms John had suffered. He 

testified because John will potentially struggle with his developmental delays 

throughout his lifetime, he required a parent with knowledge of the delays who 

was capable of addressing them. Dr. Katz explained his findings by referencing

Betty's poor track record. He noted John had lost hearing in one ear because of

Betty's failure to consent to ear surgery. Betty's delusional thinking placed John

at significant risk of harm if he were left to her care. Additionally, Dr. Katz

opined John would potentially experience bouts of anger, depression, 

maladjustment, or regression if his relationship with the resource parent were 

severed, which Betty could not remediate because of the lack of a bond. 
12 A-3318-17T4

Betty's testimony blamed the Division for failing to provide services. 

Despite the lack of evidence, she claimed both she and John had autism, which 

the Division failed to treat. She further asserted the Division abused her and 

generally abuses autistic and deaf children. Betty claimed the Division did not 

compensate her for a radiation test and owed her millions of dollars. She 

testified her plan to parent John was to have him returned to her care, and to "let 

him know that he got the problem." 

The trial judge delivered an oral decision on March 9, 2018. The judge

reviewed Betty's extensive history with the Division and the services it offered 

her following the birth of her first two children. The judge credited Ford's 

testimony regarding the services offered to Betty after John's birth. The judge 

accepted the extensive findings made by Dr. Katz, which she noted were

unrebutted. The judge concluded the Division had proven all four prongs of the 

best interest of the child test, codified in N.J.S.A. 30:4C-15.1(a), by clear and 

convincing evidence. 

With respect to prongs one and two, the judge found Betty had harmed 

John by failing to provide a caring family for him. The judge noted Betty did 

not maintain stable housing and failed to obtain parenting necessities when John

was born. She also found Betty's severe mental health problems prevented her 
13 A-3318-17T4

from understanding or meeting John's special needs. The judge also noted Betty 

had harmed John by failing to seek prenatal care or treatment for her own mental 

health issues, and instead resorting to drug use. 

The trial judge recounted Betty's erratic and abusive behavior during 

visits, which caused them to be canceled. She also concluded Betty had not

demonstrated she could provide a safe and stable home for John or remedy the 

issues which caused the removal. The judge credited Dr. Katz's testimony, 

which highlighted the high risk of severe and enduring harm John would suffer 

if he were removed from this resource parent. 

As to prong three, the judge found the Division made reasonable efforts 

to provide services to Betty to remedy the circumstances which led to John's

removal. The judge found Betty only minimally complied with services. She 

found the Division met its burden to consider alternatives to termination, citing

the Division's initial plan of reunification with Betty and the Division's

continued provision of services to her despite her unwillingness to comply. The 

judge also found the Division had conducted a sufficient investigation of relative

resources, but determined none were suitable. 

The trial judge found the Division had proven prong four. She concluded 

a termination of parental rights would not do more harm than good because Betty 
14 A-3318-17T4

had no plan to care for John and address his developmental needs. The judge 

found Betty incapable of parenting because of her untreated mental health 

issues. She concluded Betty's conduct and testimony reinforced Dr. Katz's 

determinations regarding Betty's inability to parent. Noting the respective 

bonding evaluations performed by Dr. Katz, the trial judge concluded the 

resource parent understood and met all of John's developmental needs and was 

willing to adopt him. 

The judge signed a judgment terminating the parental rights of both Betty 

and Jim to John. Jim did not file an appeal. This appeal by Betty followed.

I.

"Appellate review of a trial court's decision to terminate parental rights is 

limited[.]" In re Guardianship of J.N.H., 172 N.J. 440, 472 (2002). "Because 

of the Family Part's special jurisdiction and expertise in family matters, we 

accord particular deference to a Family Part judge's fact-finding." N.J. Div. of 

Youth & Family Servs. v. T.M., 399 N.J. Super. 453, 463 (App. Div. 2008)

(citing Cesare v. Cesare, 154 N.J. 394, 413 (1998)). Deference is appropriate 

because the trial judge has a "'feel of the case' that can never be realized by a 

review of the cold record." N.J. Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v. R.G., 217

N.J. 527, 552 (2014) (quoting N.J. Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v. E.P., 196 
15 A-3318-17T4

N.J. 58, 104 (2008)). A reviewing court will not disturb a family court's 

termination of parental rights so long as they are "supported by 'substantial and 

credible evidence' on the record." N.J. Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v. F.M., 

211 N.J. 420, 448 (2012) (quoting N.J. Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v. M.M., 

189 N.J. 261, 279 (2007)). 

"When the credibility of witnesses is an important factor, the trial court's 

conclusions must be given great weight and must be accepted by the appellate 

court unless clearly lacking in reasonable support." N.J. Div. of Youth & Family 

Servs. v. F.M., 375 N.J. Super. 235, 259 (2005) (citing In re Guardianship of 

DMH, 161 N.J. 365, 382 (1999)). In other words, a family court decision is 

overturned only when the fact-findings are "so 'wide of the mark' that [the 

Appellate Division's] intervention is necessary to correct an injustice." F.M., 

211 N.J. at 448 (quoting E.P. 196 N.J. at 104). The factual findings of the trial 

court should not be disturbed on appeal unless "they are so wholly unsupportable 

as to result in a denial of justice." In re Guardianship of J.T., 269 N.J. Super.

172, 188 (App. Div. 1993) (quoting Rova Farms Resort, Inc. v. Inv'rs Ins. Co. 

of Am., 65 N.J. 474, 483-84 (1974)). When the trial court’s findings are 

"supported by adequate, substantial and credible evidence[,]" those findings 
16 A-3318-17T4

should be upheld on appeal. Ibid. (quoting Rova Farms Resort, Inc., 65 N.J. at 

484).

On appeal, Betty challenges the trial court's findings under prong one, 

three, and four. As to prong one, she argues there was no evidence presented 

showing her mental health and drug use harmed John. As to prong three, she 

contends the Division failed to meet its reasonable efforts mandate because she 

did not receive sufficient visitation and the Division failed to help her enroll in 

a recommended partial hospitalization program. As to prong four, she claims 

she did not harm John when she interacted with him, and therefore, the Division 

did not establish it would be more harmful than not to terminate parental rights.

II.

"A parent's right to enjoy a relationship with his or her child is 

constitutionally protected." In re Guardianship of K.H.O., 161 N.J. 337, 346 

(1999) (citations omitted). However, this protection "is tempered by the State's 

parens patriae responsibility to protect the welfare of children." Id. at 347

(citing In re Guardianship of J.C., 129 N.J. 1, 10 (1992)); see N.J.S.A. 30:4C1(a). 

Under N.J.S.A. 30:4C-15.1(a), the Division must prove by clear and 

convincing evidence termination is in the best interest of the child. F.M., 211 
17 A-3318-17T4

N.J. at 447 (citing N.J. Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v. R.D., 207 N.J. 88, 113

(2011)). Our Supreme Court has determined the clear and convincing evidence 

standard is satisfied when, in the mind of the factfinder, there is a "firm belief 

or conviction as to the truth of the allegations sought to be established, evidence 

so clear, direct and weighty and convincing as to enable the factfinder to come 

to a clear conviction, without hesitancy, of the precise facts in issue." N.J. Div. 

of Youth & Family Servs. v. I.S., 202 N.J. 145, 168 (2010) (quoting In re 

Seaman, 133 N.J. 67, 74 (1993) (citation, internal quotation and editing marks 

omitted)). "Because of the elemental nature of the parent-child relationship, and 

recognizing that the severing of that relationship is among the most 'severe and 

. . . irreversible' forms of state action," E.P., 196 N.J. at 102 (quoting Santosky 

v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 759 (1982)), courts "consistently impose[] strict 

standards for the termination of parental rights" and "all doubts must be resolved 

against termination of parental rights." K.H.O., 161 N.J. at 347 (citations 

omitted). The issue under the statute is "the 'best interests of any child,' not 

simply the presence or absence of culpable fault" on the part of the parent. In 

re Guardianship of R., 155 N.J. Super. 186, 195 (App. Div. 1977) (quoting 

N.J.S.A. 30:4C-15(c)). 
18 A-3318-17T4

Under the "best interest of the child" standard, the Division must prove by 

clear and convincing evidence:

(1) The child's safety, health, or development has 

been or will continue to be endangered by the 

parental relationship;

(2) The parent is unwilling or unable to eliminate the 

harm facing the child or is unable or unwilling to 

provide a safe and stable home for the child and 

the delay of permanent placement will add to the 

harm. Such harm may include evidence that 

separating the child from his resource family 

parents would cause serious and enduring 

emotional or psychological harm to the child;

(3) The Division has made reasonable efforts to 

provide services to help the parent correct the 

circumstances which led to the child's placement 

outside the home and the court has considered 

alternatives to termination of parental rights; and

(4) Termination of parental rights will not do more 

harm than good.

[N.J.S.A. 30:4C-15.1(a).]

"Importantly, those four prongs are not 'discrete and separate,' but 'relate to and 

overlap with one another to provide a comprehensive standard that identifies 

[the] child's best interests.'" N.J. Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v. G.L., 191 

N.J. 596, 606-07 (2007) (quoting K.H.O., 161 N.J. at 348). 
19 A-3318-17T4

A.

We reject Betty's argument that she did not harm John through her 

conduct. Under prong one, the Division must prove a harm to the child exists, 

and that the harm is "one that threatens the child's health and will likely have 

continuing deleterious effects on the child." M.M., 189 N.J. at 281 (quoting 

K.H.O., 161 N.J. at 352). The harm need not be physical, as "[s]erious and 

lasting emotional or psychological harm to children as the result of the action or 

inaction of their biological parent[] can constitute injury sufficient to authorize 

a termination of parental rights." In re Guardianship of K.L.F., 129 N.J. 32, 44 

(1992) (citing J.C., 129 N.J. at 18). The focus of the harm is not on any isolated 

incident, but rather "the focus is on the effect of harms arising from the parentchild relationship over time on the child's health and development." K.H.O., 

161 N.J. at 348. "Moreover, '[c]ourts need not wait to act until a child is actually 

irreparably impaired by parental inattention or neglect'" before acting. Dep't of 

Children & Families v. E.D.-O., 223 N.J. 166, 178 (2015) (quoting DMH, 161 

N.J. at 383). Prong one may be satisfied where a parent exposes the child to the 

risk of future harm. N.J. Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v. A.G., 344 N.J. Super. 

418, 440 (App. Div. 2001).
20 A-3318-17T4

Betty's arguments are not supported by the record. The trial judge found 

her inability to provide a safe and stable home for John, her severe and untreated 

mental health issues, and continued use of drugs put John at a substantial risk of 

harm. Betty's erratic conduct during the Division's involvement in this case 

proved Dr. Katz's findings she had not improved, could not address her mental 

health problems, and would continue to harm John. As Dr. Katz noted, Betty 

was likely to act out in violent impulses due to her psychotic disorder and 

inability to control her emotions. This was problematic because John's 

developmental delays made him more vulnerable to harm. 

Moreover, Betty's reliance on N.J. Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v. V.T., 

423 N.J. Super. 320, 330-31 (App. Div. 2011), a case in which we held illicit 

drug use does not automatically support a finding of abuse and neglect, is 

misplaced. V.T. is inapposite because here the Division's case and the judge's 

findings under prong one did not find harm to John relying solely on Betty's 

drug use. Rather, the judge considered the fact Betty smoked cannabis during 

her pregnancy, continued to abuse it afterwards, refused to comply with 

substance abuse treatment services, exhibited aggressive and erratic behavior 

indicative of the lack of treatment, and failed to maintain a stable home. 
21 A-3318-17T4

The trial judge's prong one findings were supported by substantial credible 

evidence in the record. For these reasons, we decline to disturb them.

B.

We also reject Betty's challenges to the judge's prong three findings. 

Under prong three, the court must consider whether the Division "made 

reasonable efforts to provide services to help the parent correct the 

circumstances which led to the child's placement outside the home." N.J.S.A.

30:4C-15.1(a)(3). The Division's efforts must be analyzed "with reference to 

the circumstances of the individual case," including the parent's degree of 

participation. DMH, 161 N.J. at 390.

N.J.S.A. 30:4C-15.1(c) defines "reasonable efforts" as "attempts by an 

agency authorized by the [D]ivision to assist the parents in remedying the 

circumstances and conditions that led to the placement of the child and in 

reinforcing the family structure." The statute sets forth examples of "reasonable 

attempts" at reunification, including, but not limited to:

(1) consultation and cooperation with the parent in 

developing a plan for appropriate services;

(2) providing services that have been agreed upon, to 

the family, in order to further the goal of family 

reunification;
22 A-3318-17T4

(3) informing the parent at appropriate intervals of 

the child's progress, development, and health; 

and

(4) facilitating appropriate visitation.

[Ibid.]

Further, "the Division's efforts in providing classes and parenting 

programs must by their very nature take into consideration the abilities and 

mental conditions of the parents[,]" but the determination of reasonableness does 

not turn on the success of those efforts. A.G., 344 N.J. Super. at 442. Such a 

determination is fact specific and depends on the circumstances of each case. 

DMH, 161 N.J. at 390. "'Even if the Division ha[s] been deficient in the services 

offered to' a parent, reversal of the termination order is not necessarily 

'warranted, because the best interests of the child controls' the ultimate 

determination regarding termination of parental rights." N.J. Div. of Youth & 

Family Servs. v. L.J.D., 428 N.J. Super. 451, 488 (App. Div. 2012) (quoting N.J. 

Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v. F.H., 389 N.J. Super. 576, 621 (App. Div. 

2007)).

Citing I.S., 202 N.J. at 178-80, Betty argues one-hour weekly visitation 

supervised in the Division's office was unreasonable. In I.S., the Court found 

the Division failed to satisfy the third prong of the best interest test. Ibid. The 
23 A-3318-17T4

Court noted the importance of providing appropriate visitation to assist in 

reunification of the parent and child. Id. at 178-79. Although the Court found 

the Division offered services in the form of visitation, paternity testing for the 

defendant, and considered relatives as resource placements, it concluded the 

Division failed to offer services sufficiently tailored to facilitate reunification in 

order to satisfy its burden under prong three of the best interests test. Id. at 177-

78. 

The circumstances here were different, and Betty's argument that the 

inadequate visitation was the reason for the adverse outcome misreads the 

record. Indeed, the Division made extensive efforts on other fronts to engage 

Betty in mental health and substance abuse services designed to remedy the 

circumstances which led to John's removal. From the time John was removed 

until the trial, it was Betty's mental impairments and behavioral instability which

prevented her from taking advantage of the visitation, not the reverse. 

Moreover, Betty's drug use prior to visitation, and her conduct during it,

demonstrated increased visitation would continue to place John at risk of harm

and would not facilitate the Division's obligations under the third prong.

We also reject Betty's arguments that prong three was not met because the 

mental health services provided were unreasonable because she was "not the 
24 A-3318-17T4

typical client based on her history and mental impairments[,]" and thus could 

not be entrusted to enroll in the services on her own. The record demonstrates 

the Division made substantial efforts to engage Betty in mental health services, 

including requiring she have psychological evaluations, substance abuse 

evaluations and treatment, referrals to mental health services, transportation 

assistance, and family team meetings. However, Betty refused to comply with 

services and claimed she did not need them. The record does not support the 

notion the Division merely referred Betty for services without follow-up. The 

trial judge's prong three determination is supported by substantial credible 

evidence in the record.

C.

Finally, Betty argues there is no evidence to support the trial judge's 

finding that John's continued contact with her would do more harm than good. 

Betty argues the fourth prong was not established because she never harmed 

John, but instead fed him, changed his diapers, and displayed affection during 

visitation, and claims Dr. Katz's observations corroborated this. We disagree.

Prong four "serves as a fail-safe against termination even where the 

remaining standards have been met." G.L., 191 N.J. at 609. "The question to 

be addressed under [prong four] is whether, after considering and balancing the 
25 A-3318-17T4

two relationships, the child will suffer a greater harm from the termination of 

ties with [his] natural parents than from permanent disruption of [his] 

relationship with [his] foster parents." I.S., 202 N.J. at 181 (citations and 

quotation marks omitted). "[T]o satisfy the fourth prong, the [Division] should 

offer testimony of a well[-]qualified expert who has had full opportunity to make 

a comprehensive, objective, and informed evaluation of the child's relationship 

with both the natural parents and the foster parents." F.M., 211 N.J. at 453 

(citations and internal quotations omitted).

The court's prong four determination is supported by ample credible 

evidence in the record, including the unrebutted expert testimony of Dr. Katz

regarding Betty's parenting deficits and lack of a bond with John. As Dr. Katz 

opined, John's developmental delays required a caregiver who would address 

them. Betty had no plan to meet the child's needs, and her failure to address her 

own mental health deficits, which manifested themselves during the case 

through paranoid delusions and threats of violence, only underscored that she 

would place John at substantial risk of harm. 

Dr. Katz's unrebutted testimony proved John had significant attachment 

to the resource parent and would suffer harm if the relationship were severed. 

John was happy and joyful with the resource parent, unlike his demeanor when 
26 A-3318-17T4

with Betty. Dr. Katz opined Betty would be incapable of remediating the severe 

and enduring harm John would suffer if his relationship with the resource parent 

were severed. The judge's determination as to prong four of the best interest test 

was supported by substantial credible evidence in the record and we will not 

disturb it.

Affirmed.