1 NO T R EC OM M EN DE D F OR F UL L- TEX T P UB LIC AT ION F ile Nam e: 08a0443n.06 F iled: July 28, 2008 Nos. 05-6360 / 6362 UN ITED STA TES C OU RT OF AP P EA LS F OR THE SI XT H C IR CU IT
UNITED STAT ES O F AMERICA, P laintif f-App ellee,
v. EV ER ETT K I RK OG BU RN and KENN ETH CRUTCHER, De fend ant -A ppe lla nt s. ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ON AP P EA L F RO M THE U NI TED STA TES DI STR IC T CO UR T F OR THE M ID DL E D ISTRIC T OF TEN NE SSEE

Before: M AR TIN , G IBBO NS, and G RI F F IN , C ir c uitJudg e s. JULIA SMITH GIBBONS , Circuit Judge. Co-defe ndants Ever ett Ki rk Ogb u rn and K e n n e t h C r

u t c h e r a p p e a l t h e i r

c o n v i c t i o n s an d s e n t e n c e s ar i s i n g f r o m t h e s a m e dr

u g c o n s p i r a c y. Ogburn ar g ues that the district cour t: (1) er red by d en y i n g h is requeste d jury instruction; and (2) imposed an unre asonable sentenc e. Crutc h er arg ues that the district cour t erre d by : (1) admitting another co-de fenda

nt’s g uilty

plea; (2) denying him counse l at a cr itical stag e; (3) not suppre ssing wi r e t a p e v i d e n c e ; ( 4 ) e n h an c i n g h i s s e n t e n c e p u r s u an t t o 2 1 U
. S
. C
. § 8 4 1 ; an d ( 5 ) e n h an c ing his sentenc e for

prior convic tions in vi olation of his Six th Amendment rig ht to j u ry t ri al

. Fo r the following rea sons, we af

firm Ogburn’s a

nd Crutcher ’s convictions and se ntence s.Although the judgme nt form provides that a ll three c ounts involved 500 gr ams or more of 1 co ca i n e, t h e indictment, jury form, and PSR all provide that two of these offe nses involved more than 500 g rams of c ocaine and that one involved mor e than 5 kilog rams of c ocaine

. 2 I. This case involves a major c ocaine distribution conspiracy led by Andre z Mi randa

and inv olv ingOg

burn , Cr utc he r and fi ft e e n oth e r name d de fe nd ants
. Al tho ug h mos t of the de fe nd a nts ple d g u il ty , O g b u r

n an d Cr u tc h e r b o th p le d n o t g u il ty an d p r o c e e d e d to a ju r y tr ia l. Og burn wa s fo un d guil ty

of : ( 1) c on sp ir a c y

to d istri bu te 50 0 gra

ms o r m or e of c oc a ine in vio la tio n of 21 U. S.C. § 846; and (2) posse ssion of 500 g rams or more of coca ine wit h intent to dist ribute in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) . Crutcher was found g uilty

of: (1) c onspiracy

to distribute marijuana a

nd five g rams or more of coc aine in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846; (2) three counts of possession with intent to distribute cocaine in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841; (4) possession of f irea rms i n fu rthera

nce of 1 dr ugtr a ff ic kin g in vio la tio n of

18 U. S.C. § 9 24 (c ); and

(5 ) b e inga

fe lon in p os se ssi on

of fi re a rm s in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g). A. The fa cts relating to Ogburn ar e as fo l l o ws. At trial, the g overnme nt provided testimony from Dr ug Enforc ement Ag ency (DEA) ag ents and wire t ap re co rding s detailing Ogburn’s
conver sations with Miranda and evidence of Ogburn’ s multi ple purc hases of coca ine from Mira

nda. Ogburn’s Prese ntence I nvestig ation Report (PSR) recommende d a base offe nse l evel of 26 based on the amount of coc aine attributable to him. Bu t beca use Ogburn qualified a s a ca ree r offe nder due to his two prior felony convictions for violent or dr ug offe nses, the PSR recommended a base offe nse leve l of 37, pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1(b) (A). A s a ca ree r off ender , his criminal history cate g ory was deeme d to be VI , resulting in a rec ommended sentenc e of 360 months to l ife.The district cour t refe rre d to the “851” e nhance ment. Pursuant to 21 U
. S
. C. § 851, the 2 g overnme nt w a s r e qu ir e d to p r o v id e Cr

u tc h e r n o ti c e th a t i t w o u ld

s e e k a s e n te n c e e n h an c e me nt based on Crutc her’ s three pr evious felony d rug convic tions in Tennessee state cour t. The g ov e rnme nt c le arl y

pr ov ide d th is n oti c e . We pr e su me that th e dis tr ic t c ourt was re fe rr ingto U. S.S. G. § 4 B 1. 1( b) (A ), wh ic h p ro vid es for a ba se of fe ns e le ve l of

37 if the of fe ns e c arr ie s a statutory maxi mum of life imprisonment. 3 Ogburn objec ted to the PSRon a number of g rounds, including th e § 4B1.1 ca ree r off ender enhanc ement. At the sentenc ing he aring , t h e d istrict court re jected O g burn’s a

rg uments and adopte d a Guidelines ra

ng e of 360 months to life. I t e x plained, howeve r, that the ca ree r off ender enhanc ement 2 is not primarily

intended “to punish for the particula r cr ime [of conviction] but to reflec t the seriousness [of the def

end an t ’s risk of] recidivism.” Concer ned about the inc rea se of 11 of fense

levels (f rom 26 to 37) and the pote ntial resulting dispa rity betwee n Og burn’s sente nce a nd that of other c o-conspirators, the cour t found that “the e nhance ment . . . has an e x traordina ry and
unrea sonable im p ac t o n [ Ogburn’s] guide line rang e.” B eca use this impact “take s this case out of

. . . the heartland of case s[,] ” the district court determined that it “justifie[d] a downwa rd depa rture of tw o o ff e ns e le ve ls. ” As a

re su lt, the dis tr ic t c ourt

de te rm ine d th a t O g burn ’s of fe ns e le ve l sh ou ld be 35, resulting in a Guidelines rang e of 292-365 m onths. The dist rict court then imposed a sente nce of 30 0 mont hs . I tw e n to nt o e xp l a i nt h a ti ni mp o s i n g t h i s s e n t e n c e ( a s w e l l a s C r u t c h e r ’ s ) , it considere d “the nature a

nd circ umstances o f t h i s offe nse, [the defe ndant’s] involvement in the conspirac y , a s w e ll a s th e h is to r y an d c h ar a c te r is ti c s o f

th e d e f e n d an t. ” I t f

u rth e r n o te d th a t t he
se nte nc e wo uld

“ re fl e c t ser iou sn e ss fo r thi s off e nc e , . . . pr omo te re sp e c t f or the law, . . . p ro vid e jus t punishment, . . . affor d ad eq u at e d et er rence, . . . prote ct the public fr om further crimes, . . . [and]4

provide opportunities [for the def endants] to ge t drug treatment[ ,] m edica l car e[, a]nd educational opportunities.” I t also specific ally noted that “the se ntencingg uidelines are not mandatory .”

B. The fa cts relating to Crutche r ar e as f ollows. Accor ding to testimony at trial, Crutche r wa s first introduced to Mira

nda by Migue l H erna

ndez. Orig inally , Her

nandez acte d as a mi ddle-man, purcha sing c ocaine from Miranda and then se lling it to Crutcher. B ut Crutcher e ventually beg an purcha sing c ocaine direc tly from Miranda

and distributing it f

rom a supply

house. DEA w iretaps

and surv e ill anc e e ve ntu a lly a le rt e d a g e nts to C rutc he r’ s v e hic le (a tan Su burb an) , w hic h a g e nts observe d at the supply

house. Crutcher was a rre sted on Octobe r 27, 2003 while drivingthe tan Suburban. I n his vehicle,

arr esting office rs discovere d a bag containing $164,705 in c ash which Crutcher said he wa s taking to “[Hernande z’s] people.” After a search warr ant for Crutcher ’s hous e was executed, off icer s found two loaded ha

ndg uns, a loade d shotgun, a nd an additional $23,300 in ca sh. Following his arre st, Crutcher c ame to the DE A offic e in Nashville whe re he was interv ie wed by DE A A g e nt M art i Ro be rt s. At tr ia l, R ob e rt s te sti fi e d th a t a ft e r C rutc he r w a s g ive n h is Miranda
wa rn ing s, he a dmi tte d th a t he int e nd e d to us e the $1 64 ,7 05 to pa y He rn and e z fo r s e ve ra l ki log ra ms of cocaine that Herna

ndez had provided Crutc her a fewday s ear lier. Roberts fur ther testified that Crutch e r d e s c r ib e d p u r c h a s in g c o c a in e f r o m b o th H e r

n an d e z an d M ir an d a an d d is tr ib u ti n g the
coca ine out of a supply

house. Prior to trial, Crutcher

filed a pr o s e motion to s uppress wire tap evidenc e and joined ( along with Og burn) a

nother motion filed by

other c o-def

endants to suppress the same evide nce. Crutc her5

also filed a motion to suppress st atements made to police following hi s arr est. After an evide ntiary hear ing on Septe mber 23, 2004, the district c ourt denied e ach of these motions. Th e g ov e rnme nt fi le d a

n in fo rm a tio n p ur su ant t o 2 1 U .S. C. § 85 1 n oti fy ingCr utc he r t hat it
wo uld se e k a se nte nc e e nh anc e me nt b a se d o n Cr utc he r’ s th re e pr e vio us fe lony dr ugc on vic tio ns in Tenne ssee state court. At trial, co-defe n d an t s Adolpho Arrizon, Mickey Flinn, Wantay a F ord, Jaime Guzm an, Ronald Petway , J ohn Pill ow, B rian Woodward, a nd Her nandez all testified as to their involveme nt with Miranda in the conspirac y . Seven of these co-de fenda nts also testified as to their g uilty pleas
re la te d to thi s con sp ir a c y . Wir e ta p re c or din g s and te sti mony fr om He rn and e z, A rr izon , A g e nt M a tt Br adfor d, and Roberts chronic led Crutcher ’s interac tions with Miranda and his coc aine pur chase s from Her nandez and Miranda . Although Mira nda did not testify , Roberts testified as to Miranda ’s g uilty plea without objection. F ollowing tria l, a jury found Crutche r g uilty

on all counts. Crutcher ’s PSRcalc ulated his rec ommended Guidelines rang e in three steps. First, pursua nt to U.S.S.G. § 3D1.2, the PS R gr ouped the c onspiracy (21 U.S.C. § 846) and possession with intent to distribute cocaine (21 U.S.C. § 841) offe nses. B ased on the PSR ’s assumption that at least 50 but le ss t ha n 1 50 kil og ra

ms o f c oc a ine we re a ttr ibuta ble to C rutc he r f

or the se of fe ns e s, Cr utc he r’ s b a se offe nse leve l would ha

ve been 36 for the conspirac y and possession of fense s under § 2D1.1( c)( 2). B ut b ecaus e Cr

utc he r’ s o ff

e ns e inv olv e d d ist

ri bu tio n o f c oc a ine and

po sse ssi on

of fi re arm s in further ance of a traffic king offense , Crutcher qualified as a “car eer offe nder” pursuant to § 4B1.1. A c c o r d in g ly , th e PS R r e c o mm e n d e d a b a s e o f f e n s e le v e l o f 3 7 f

o r Cr u tc h e r ’ s c o n s p ir acy

and possession with intent to di stribute convictions.6

Se c on d, purs ua

nt t o U .S. S.G . § 3D 1.2(c ), the fe lon in p os se ssi on

of fi re arm s o ff

e ns e (1 8 U. S.C. § 92 2( g )) wa s g ro up e d wi th t he fi rs t se t of

of fe ns e s, us ingon ly

the hig he r b a se of

fe ns e le ve l. Cr

utc he r’ s o ff

e ns e le ve l f

or the fe lon in p os se ssi on of fi re arm s off e ns e wa s 3 3, purs ua

nt t o § 4B1.4 ( b)(3) (B ), bec ause he qualified as an “a rmed c are er c riminal” under U.S.S.G. § 4B1.4 and 18 U.S.C. § 924(e) . Be cause the base offe nse leve l for the c onspiracy /possession offense s (37) wa s g reater than f

or his felon in possession cha rg e (33) , the P SR assigned Crutc her a base of fense level
o f 3 7
. C o mb i n i n g t h i s wi t h C ru t ch er ’s cr i m i n al h i s t o ry ca t ego ry VI re s u l t ed i n a G u i d el i n es ra n ge of 360 months to life. Third, Crutcher ’s possession of firearms in further ance of t raf ficking offe nse (18 U.S.C. § 924(c) ) wa s considere d separ ately b ec ause it re quires a c onsecutive te rm of imprisonment under U.S.S.G. § 2K2.4, note 1. Pursuant to § 4B1.1( c)( 2)(A) , adding the mandator y 60 month mini mum penalty for the 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) off ense to the 360 months to life Guidelines r ang e re sulted in a Guidelines ra

ng e of 420 months to life plus 60 months im prisonment. Cr utc he r o bje c te d to the Gu ide lin e s r ang e re c omm e nd e d b y the PSR on a numbe r of

g ro un ds

. At the s e n te n c in g h e ar in g , th e d is tr ic t c o u rt f ir s t a d dr e s s e d

th e 1 8 U
. S. C. § 8 4 1 ( b ) s tatutory enhanc ement. Section 841 includes va rious mandatory

statutory enhanc ements if an of

fense occur s

“ a f t e r t w o o r m o r e p r i o r c o n v i c t i o n s f o r a f e l o n y d r u g o f f e n s e h a v e b e c o m e f

i n a l

. . . . ” S p e c i f

i c a l l y, it requires a

mandatory

life sentenc e for

a def endant c onvicted of possessing 5 kilog rams or more of coc aine. See 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)( A)(ii). The g overnme nt relied upon Crutche r’ s prior
c on vic tio ns in T e nn e sse e state c ourt fo r the fo llo wi ng fe lony of fe ns e s: (1 ) p os se ssi on

of 30 0 g ra ms or more of

coca ine with intent to dist ribute, ar ising out of Crutche r’s sale of coc aine to underc over
a g e nts on May 30 , 1 99 2; ( 2) c on sp ir a c y to se ll 30 0 or mor e g ra

ms o f c oc a ine , a

ri sin g fr om e ve ntsI n addition, pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 4 B1
. 4 , the district court c oncluded that Crutche r 3 qualified a s an ar

med ca ree r cr iminal under 18 U.S.C. § 924(e) w hich, in turn, applies to a de fenda nt that violates § 922(g ) and ha s three pr evious violent felony convictions. The life se ntence was ba sed on C ru t ch er’ s conspirac y and possession of g reater than 5 4 kilogr ams of coc aine of

fense s. See § 841(b)( 1)(A) (ii). The district court imposed conc urre nt 360 month sentence s for the two posse ssion of 500 g rams or more offe nses and the § 922( g ) off ense. 7 occur ring betwee n May

14-30, 1992; and (3) posses sion of marijuana on May 31, 1992, which
c on sti tut e d a

fe lony du e to C rutc he r’ s p ri or

po sse ssi on

c on vic tio ns . Crutcher argued that these convictions should be treated a s one off ense suc h that the § 841(b) enhanc ement would not apply

. The district c ourt reje cted this a rg ument, concludingthat Crutcher ’s prior state c onvictions were separ ate f elony drug offe nses such that the ma ndatory enhanc ement applied. 3 After hear ing testimony reg arding the amount of drugs attributable to Crutcher and a numbe r of Crutche r’s a

rg uments , the district court a dopted the Guidelines r ang e of 420 months to life as
rec ommended in the PSR. But based upon the § 841( b) mandatory statutory enhanc ement, the district court sentenc ed Crutche r to a life- sentenc e with a 60- month consecutive se ntence
. 4 II. A. Ogburn conte nds the district court: (1) e rre d by ref using to g ive his r e q

u e s te d jury

instruction; and (2) imposed a proc edura lly unrea sonable sente nce. We a ddress e ach a rg ument in turn.8 1. A district co u rt ’s ref

usal to g ive a spe cific instruc tion is t y pically revie wed f

or abuse of discretion. Fisher v. Ford Motor Co, 224 F.3d 570, 576 (6th Cir. 2000). B eca use Ogburn did not
o bject to the propose d instructions, however , our re view is for pla in error

. S e e U n it e d States v. Cleaves , 299 F.3d 564, 567 ( 6th Cir. 2002). To establish plain err or, Ogburn must “show (1) e rror , (2) that wa s obvious or clea r, (3) that aff

ect ed [ h is] substantial rig hts and (4) that affe cted the fairne ss, integr ity , or public re putation of the judicial proc eeding s.” United States v. Vonner , 516 F.3d 382, 386 ( 6th Cir. 2008) ( en banc ) (c itation and quotation marks omitted). Ogburn ar g ues that the district cour t should have g iven the jury his first proposed instruction: “Single acts, without more, a re insuff icient to link a defe ndant to a conspira cy .” Ogburn conte nds that the district court should have g iven t h i s i n s t ru ction beca use a buy er- seller r elationship alone does not establish the ag ree ment nece ssary to prove membe rship in a conspira cy . Ogburn is corr ect that a def endant’ s involvement in a conspirac y require s awa rene ss of t he object of t he conspira cy and voluntarily association with the conspirac y . See, e .g.,United States v. Gibbs, 182 F.3d 408, 421- 22 (6th Cir. 1999). But a

district court i s n o t required to expli citly clar ify the diffe renc e betwe en a buy e r- se lle r r e la tio ns hip and a c on sp ir a c y so lon g a s it “ ha s g ive n a c omp le te ins tr

uc tio n r e c iti nga ll the eleme nts of conspirac y and re quirements fo r m em b er s hip in a conspirac y .” Riggs v. United States , 209 F.3d 828, 833 ( 6th Cir. 2000). T o es t ab l i s h Ogb u rn ’s p ar t i ci p at i o ni nt h e c o n s p i ra cy , i nad d i t i o n t o t h e a m o u n to f d ru gs involved (500 g rams or more of coc aine) , the g overnme nt was required to prove “( 1) an a g ree ment9

to viola t e d ru g l aw s, (2) knowle dg e and intent to join the conspira cy , and (3) participation in the conspirac y .” See U

nited States v. Colon , 268 F.3d 367, 375 ( 6th Cir. 2001). Th e dis tr ic t c ourt

ins tr uc te d th e jur

y , in re le va nt p art , th a t it

wo uld ne e d to fi nd

that: First, two or more persons rea ched a n ag ree ment or ca

me to an under standing to k no wi ng ly and int e nti on a lly

dis tr ibute or p os ses s w ithint e nt t o d ist ri bu te c on tr oll e d s ub sta

nc e s; Second, from on or about November 1, 2002, to on or about Oc tober 27, 2003, the def

endants voluntarily

and intenti onally

joined in the ag ree ment or understanding ; and Third, y ou find that the ag ree ment or under standing involved a quantity of a mix ture or substance containing a detec table amount of marijuana and 500 g rams or more of a mix ture or substanc e conta ining c ocaine

. This jury instruction acc urate ly stated the require d elements for membership in the conspirac y . See Riggs , 2 09 F .3 d a t 83 3. Th e re fo re , the dis tr ic t c ourt did no t e rr , le t a lon e pla inl y

e rr , b y re fu sin g to g ive Ogburn’s a dditional inst ruction. 2. Ogburn also argues that in imposing his se ntence , the district c ourt commi t t ed p rocedural
err ors by treating the G uidelines as mandatory and fa iling to fully

consider the oth er § 3553(a) fac tors. We conclude that the district court committed no such er rors. Fo l l o wi n g Booke r v. United States , we r eview se ntence s for re asonable ness. 543 U.S. 220, 260-62 (2005). This re view has both proc edura l and substantive components. Gall v. United States 128 S.Ct . 586, 597 (2007). A s t h e Supreme Court re cently explained, treating the Guidelines a s mandatory

or fa iling to consider

the § 3553(a ) fa ctors would constitute “si g nificant proc edura l
err or.” Id. Og burn fi rs t c on te nd s that the dis tr ic t c ourt tr e a te d th e Gu ide lin e s a s ma nd a tor y be c a us e it

“ e xplic itl y

de te rm ine d a

g uid e lin e ra

ng e and se nte nc e d w iththat r ang e a s a fir m sta rt ingpo int .” Th isOg burn dev ot e s a

sig nif ic ant p or tio n h is b ri e f t o a

rguin g that a

pp e llate pr op or

tio na lity 5 revie w is incompatible with Booke r . I ndeed, our appellate revie w may

not require extraordinary jus tif ic a tio ns fo r l arg e va

ri anc e s o r e mpl oy a “ ri g id ma the ma tic a l fo rm ula ” c omp ari ngthe str e ng th of such a justification wi t h t h e ex t en t o f a va rianc e. Ga ll , 1 28 S.Ct . at 59 5. B ut O g burn fa ils to explain how our appellate standard of revie w influenc ed the dis tri c t c ou rt’ s imposit ion of Ogburn’s below-G uidelines sentenc e. 10 argume nt i s n ot w e ll t a ke n. Th e di st ri c t c ourt was required to proper ly calc ulate the Guide lines rang e, id ., which as “[t] he Supreme Court expl ained in Ga ll [is] the ‘ starting poi nt and the initial be nc hm ar k ’ for fede ral sente ncing .” See United States v. T hompson , 515 F.3d 556, 561 ( 6th Cir. 2 0 0 8 ) ( em p h as i s ad d ed ) ( qu o t i n g Gall, 12 8 S. Ct. a t 59 6) . In th is c a se , th e dis tr ic t c ourt e xplic itl y
no te d th at “ the se nte nc ing g uid e lin e s ar e no t man dator y .” Mo re ov e r, the dis tr ic t court e xer c ise d it s d i s cr et i o nb y

s en t en ci n g Ogb u rn t o 3 0 0 m o n t h s

— b el o w t h e p ro p er l y

ca l cu l at edGu i d el i n es ra n ge of 360 months to life. Ogburn also s u g g e s ts th a

t t h e d istric t court impermissibly “applied a

rebuttable presumption” that the Guidelines ra

ng e provided an appropr iate sentenc e. Ogburn is c orre ct that a district cour t may not presume that the G uidelines range provides a “re asonable ” or a ppropriate sentenc e. See United States v. W

ilms , 495 F.3d 277, 281 ( 6th C i r. 2 0 0 7 ). Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), the dis tr ic t c ourt ’s ob lig a tio n is to i mpo se a se nte nc e “ su ff

ic ie nt, bu t not greate r t

ha n n e c e ssa ry , to comply with the purposes set f orth in [§ 3553(a)(2)].” “ Reasonable ness is the appellat e standa rd of revie w in judgingwhether a district cour t has ac complished its task.” United States v. Fore man , 436 F.3d 638, 644 n.1 ( 6th Cir. 2006). And this court’s pre sumption t hat within-Guidelines sente nces
are substantively

rea sonable, see U

nited States v. W

illiams , 436 F.3d 706, 708 (6th Cir. 2006), is an ap pe lla te presumption. See R ita v. United States , 127 S.Ct . 2456, 2465 (2007). 511

But the r ecor d does not indicate that the district court applied a rebuttable presumption that the Guidelines provide d an appr opriate se ntence
. Co m p a r e W ilms , 4 9 5 F.3d at 281 (conc luding sentenc e wa s unrea sonable be cause district court explicit l y re q u i red defenda nt to “overc ome the presumption of rea sonablene ss w ith r espec t to the sentenc ing g uidelines”). The fac t that the district court ultimately

imposed a below-G uidelines sentenc e strong ly sug g ests that it did not presume that the Guidelines provide d an appr opriate se ntence
. S t i l l , Og burn sug g ests that “it is conce ivable, based on the district court’s comments, that it would have sentence d [Ogburn] eve n lower, but for the g uidelines.” This may be true. But the Guidelines ar e one of the fa ctors to be c onsidered; the district court’s c onsideration of the m does not mean that the district c ourt presu m ed t h at the Guidelines provided a

n appropr iate sente nce or treated the Guidelines a s mandatory

. We also conclude that the di strict court adequate ly considere d the § 3553(a) fac tors—which ultimately

cause d it to im pose a be low-Guidelines se ntence . Over all, t h e district cour t noted that both Og burn’s a

nd Crutcher ’s sentenc es we re ba sed upon a numbe r of § 3553( a) f actor s—the seriousness of the offe nse, promoti ng respe ct for the law, providing just punishm ent, af fording de te rr e nc e , a

nd the ne e d to pr ote c t th e pu bli c fr om f

utu re c ri me s. Withre sp e c t to Ogburn in pa rt ic ula r, the dis tr ic t c ourt no te d the imp or tanc e of pr ov idi ng him the op po rt un it y to obta in treatment and educ ation while incar cer ated a nd its concer

n that the U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1 e nhance ment “extraordinar ily

and unduly

exagg erated” his Guidelines r ang e. I t al s o co nsidered the potential disparity betwee n Ogburn’s sente nce a nd other membe rs of the c onspiracy

. The district cour

t did not treat the Guidelines as mandatory or fa il to consider the § 3553(a ) fa c tor s. Ac c or din g ly , O g burn ’s pr oc e dura l r e a so na ble ne ss a rgume nt f a ils

.12 B. Cr utc he r a rgue s th a t th e dis tr ic t c ourt e rr e d b y : ( 1) a dmi tti ngano the r c o- de fe nd ant’ s g uil ty plea; (2) denying him counse l at a cr itical stag e; (3) not suppr essing wireta p evidenc e; (4) e nhancing his se nt ence pu rsua

nt t o 2 1 U .S. C. § 84 1; a

nd (5 ) e nh anc inghis se nte nc e fo r p ri or c on vic tio ns in violation of his Si x th Amendment rig ht to jury trial. We addre ss eac h argument in turn. 1. Crutcher first argues that the ad mission of a non-testifying a lleg ed co- conspirator ’s (Mirand a ’s ) guil ty

ple a vio la te d h is Si xth A me ndme nt r ig ht t o c on fr on t a wi tne ss a g a ins t hi m. Roberts testified that Miranda , the foc us of the DEA ’s investig ation, had pled guilty to the drug conspirac y

at issue. Gene rally , “Confrontation Cl ause violations are subject to ha rmless err or re view.” Jordan v. Hurley , 397 F.3d 360, 363 ( 6th Cir. 2005) . But be cause Crutcher did not object to the introduction of Miranda ’s plea at trial, we re view this claim for pla in error

. See U nited States v. Bake r , 458 F.3d 513, 517 (6th Cir. 20 0 6 ). Ag ain, to show plain err or, Crutche r must “show (1) err or, (2) that was
o b v i o u s o r c l e ar , ( 3 ) t h a t a f f e c t e d [ h i s ] s u

b s t an t i a l r i g h t s an d

( 4 ) t h a ta f

f e c t e d t h e f a i r n e s s , i n t e g r i t y,
or public reputation of the judicial proce eding s.” Vonner , 516 F.3d at 386 (citation and quotation marks omitted). Th e Con fr on ta tio n Cl a

us e re qu ir e s th a t “ te sti mon ia l” ou t- of -c ourt state me nts of

fe re d a g a ins t the ac cused to prove the truth of the matter a sserted on ly be a dmi tte d if

the de c lara

nt i s unava ila

ble and the de fenda

nt has had an opportunity to c ross-examine the def endant. United States v. Cromer , 3 8 9 F. 3 d 6 6 2 , 6 7 1 (6 t h C i r. 2 0 0 4 ) ( ci t i n g Crawf ord v. W ashington , 541 U.S. 36, 61, 68 (2004)) . The13

g overnme nt does not contend that Mira nda wa s unavailable or that C ru t cher had a previous op po rt un ity to c ro ss- e xami ne him

. Th e re fo re , it wa s c on sti tut ion a l e rr or to a dmi t Mi ra

nd a ’s ple a

if the plea w as (a ) testimonial, and (b) of fer ed for the truth of the matter

asser ted. We need not dec ide whether Mi randa ’s pl ea was t estimonial or offere d for the truth of the

m att er a sserted. A ssuming both arguendo , Crutcher cannot show that his subst antial rig hts were violated by

the admission of Miranda ’s g uilty plea. Give n the over

whelming amount of testimony by oth e r d e fe nd ants in t

his c a se re g ard ing the e xiste nc e of a c on sp ir a c y and Mir and a ’s le a din g ro le in it, C rutcher ca

nnot seriously

argue that jurors doubte d either f act. And H erna

ndez, Arrizon, Br adfor d, and Roberts a ll tied Crutcher t o M i ra n d a and describe d Crutcher ’s own role in the conspirac y . Be cause Crutcher cannot show that the jury would have r eac hed a dif fer ent conc lusion ha d e vid e nc e of

Mir and a ’s ple a no t be e n a dmi tte d, he ha s n ot e sta bli sh e d th a t hi s su

bs tanti a l r ig hts
wer e violated by

any potential err or. 2. Crutcher next contends that he was “ denied c ounsel at a c ri t i ca l s t age” —during the September 24, 2004 suppr ession hear ing. B ut Crutcher doe s not alleg e that his counsel wa s absent from the suppre ssion hearing

. Compare Bell v. Cone , 535 U.S. 685, 695 (2002) ( “A tria l would be presumptively

unfair . . . w here the ac cused i s d en i ed the presenc e of counse l at a cr itical stag e . . . .”) (empha sis added) (c i tations and quotation marks omitted). I nstead, Crutche r ar g ues that th e dis tr ic t c ourt

sh ou ld h a ve ho no re d h is r e qu e st ( on the e ve of

the su pp ressi on hear in g) to
su bs tit ute Da vid Coo pe r fo r Ed

wa rd Ki nd a ll as his a tto rn e y . T he dis tr ic t c ourt de nie d th is r e qu e st along with Kindall’s motion to withdraw, but allowed Cooper to participate in the suppression14

he ari ng . A lth ou g h Cr

uc he r h a d tw o atto rn e y s p re se nt at th e he ari ng , h e c on te nd s th a t be c a us e of his “bre akdow n in

c omm un ic a tio n” wi th K ind a ll, the c ourt sh ou ld h a ve a llo we d h im t o s ub sti tut e
c ouns e l. We reviewthe denial of

a motion to substi tute counsel for abuse of discretion. United States

v . Tr uji llo , 376 F.3d 593, 606 ( 6th Cir. 2004). I n re vie wi ng de nia l of a mot ion to s ub sti tut e c ouns e l,
we c onsider: (1) the timeliness of the motion, (2) the ade quacy of the c ourt’s i n q u i ry

into the ma tte r, (3 ) t

he e xtent of

the c on fl ic t be tw e e n the a tto rn e y and c lie nt a nd wh e the r i t wa s so g re a t that it r e su lte d in a tot a l la c k o f c omm

un ic a tio n p re ve nti ngan a de qu a te defe nse, and ( 4) the ba lancingof these f actor s with the public’s interest in the prompt and ef ficient a dminist ration of justice.
Id. (c i t i n g United States v. Mac k, 258 F.3d 548, 556 (6th Cir. 2001)). Weig hing the se fa ctors, we
c on c lud e that the dis tr ic t c ourt did no t a bu se its dis c re tio n. F ir st, Cr utc he r su bmi tte d his re qu e st t o substitut e counsel on the e ve of a suppression hea

ring involving eig hteen de fenda nts. See Trujillo, 376 F.3d at 606-07 (noting untimeliness of m otion to substitut e subm itted three day s befor e trial). S ec o n d , af

t er d en y i n g Ke n d al l ’s m o t i o nan d al l o wi n g C o o p er

t o re m ai nat t h e s u

p p re s s i o nh ea ri n g, the dis tr ic t c ourt aske d Cr utc he r h is tho ug hts a

bo ut t his arr ang e me nt. Cr

utc he r a ns we re d “ [i]t is fine.” This exchang e indi cate s that the di strict court adequate ly inquired i nto the matter. See U nited States v. Sullivan , 431 F.3d 976, 980- 81 (6th Cir. 2005) (c ourt’s inqui ry was a dequate wher e a defe ndant informed the court that counsel could proce ed). Third, any conflict be tween Crutc her a nd Ki nd a ll d oe s n ot a

pp e ar t o h a ve c a

us e d a “ tot a l la c k o f c omm

un ic a tio n p re ve nti ngan a de qu a te defe nse . . . .” Se e Tru

jil lo , 376 F.3d at 606. I nstead, Crutcher mere ly had two attorne y s prese nt at the suppression hea

ring

.15 3. Crutcher next arg ues that the district cour t erre d by

not suppressing evidenc e fr om the wireta ps beca use the g overnme nt did not show that such wireta ps wer e nece ssary . “When re viewing the denial of

a motion to suppress, we r eview the district c ourt’s finding s of fac t f or clea r er ror a nd its c o n cl u s i o ns of law de novo. ” Un ite d S tat es v . F

os te r 376 F.3d 577, 583 ( 6th Cir. 2004). Reg arding the issuanc e of w arr ants for e lectronic surveillance under 18 U .S.C. § 2518, “gr eat defe rence is normally

paid to the deter

mination of an issuing judg e.” United States v. Giac alone, 853 F.2d 470, 479 ( 6th Cir. 1988) (citation and quotation marks omitt ed). “ The burde n of production and persua sion r ests on the person seeking to suppr ess evidenc e.” Un ite d Stat es v . S mi th , 783 F.2d 648, 650 ( 6th Cir. 1986). A judg e may

issue a wa

rra nt for ele ctronic s u rv ei l lance if (1) “ normal investig ative proce dures ha

ve been t ried and have failed or rea sonably appea r t o be unli kely

to succe ed if tried or to b e too da

ng e ro us ,” and

(2 ) a n a pp lic a tio n inc lud e s a “a

fu ll a nd c omp le te state me nt” to t

his e ff e c t. 18 U.S.C. § 2518(3)(c) , (1)( c). “ Howeve r, the g overnme nt is not require d to prove that ever y other
conce ivable method has be en tried a nd fail ed or that all ave nues of investig ation have be en exhausted.” Giacalone, 8 5 3 F. 2 d at 4 8 0 (q u o t i n g United States v. Alfano , 8 38 F .2 d 1 58 , 1 63 (6 th Cir. 1988)). I nstead, “[a]ll that is r equire d is that the investigators g ive serious c onsideration to the non-wire tap technique s prior to applying for wir etap a uthority and that the c ourt be infor med of the
rea sons for the investig ators’ be lief th at s u ch n o n-wire tap technique s have be en or w ill li kely be inadequate.” Alfano , 838 F.2d at 163-64.16

The district cour

t found that the gov er nment provided “ multipl e alter native mea

ns of investigation and explained why eac h failed to a chieve all the objectives of the investig ation, why
eac h was unlikely

to succe ed if tried, or why such efforts t hreatened to aler t the conspirators to the inv es t i gat i v e efforts.” It also noted that the g overnme nt had submitted affidavits attesting to the ina de qu a c y of us ing many oth e r me tho ds inc lud ing ph y sic a l surv e ill anc e , un de rc ov er ag e nts , c on fi de nti a l in fo rm ants , a nd tr a dit ion a l se arc h w arr ants
. Th e go ve rnme nt a sse rt e d th a t th e se
me tho ds thr e a te ne d to a le rt the c on sp ir a tor s to the inv e sti g a tiv e e ff or ts or wo uld fa il to me e t th e fu ll ob j ectives of the investig ation, which soug ht to identify other c onspirators, date s, times, and l o ca t i o n s o f c o n s p i ra cy ac t i v i t i es . C ru t ch er d o es n o t ar gu e t h at an y o f t h e d i s t ri ct co u rt ’s fi n d i n gs
wer e cle arly

err oneous. I nstead, Cruc her a

rg ues that once the hub of the c onspiracy (Miranda ) was identified, “the re
was no proof that

. . . traditional methods could not have be en utiliz ed.” B ut the g overnme nt was not require d to prove that tr a dit ion a l me tho ds could not have be en utilized

. I nstead, it only neede d to provide re asons for its be lief that traditional methods wer e likely to be inadequate. Alfano , 838 F.2d at 163-64. Crutcher fails to e x plain how traditional methods that the g overnme nt be lieved we re inadequate for a chievingthe objectives of the investig ation beca me ade quate onc e the g overnme nt lear ned (in pa rt throug h elec tronic surveillance) that Miranda was t he hub of the c onspiracy . After Miranda w as identified, the g overnme nt still soug ht to identify additional members a

nd activities of the conspira cy , and the a ffidavits still support the co n clusion that traditional methods would be ina de qu a te to a c hie ve thi s o bje c tiv e . Th e dis tr ic t c ourt did no t e rr in de nying the mot ion to s up pr e ss.Although Crutc her r efe rs to 21 U.S.C. § 851, which provide s the notice pro v is io n associate d 6 with § 841, we unde rstand Crutche r to be c halleng ing the imposit ion of the life se ntence rathe r than the notice he rec eived that this enha nceme nt would be soug ht.

17 4. Crutcher next contends that the district court er red in sentenc ing him to life imprisonment pursuant to 21 U.S.C. § 841. Section 841 require s, in releva nt part, that a de fenda

nt convicted of 6 possessing 5 kilog rams or more of coc aine be se nte nc e d to lif e imp ri so nme nt i f h e c omm its thi s offe nse “a fter two or more prior convictions for a

felony drug offe nse have become final . . . .” See 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)( A)(ii). Crutc her a rg ues that the district cour t erre d in apply ing this statutory provision beca

use his prior drugoffe nses should have be en tre at ed toge ther a s one convic tion. Be cause “dete rminin g wh et h er the conduct wa s a sing le occ asion or multiple occa sions p re s en t s a l ega l qu es t i o nco n ce rn i n g t h e i n t er p re t at i o no f a s t at u t e, we re v i ew t h e d i s t ri ct co u rt 's decision de novo.” United States v. Thomas , 211 F.3d 316, 319 ( 6th Cir. 2000). “L ife sente nces unde r § 841(b) are trig g ere d by predic ate cri minal episodes that occ ur at distinct ti mes.’” United States v. Ande rson , 76 F.3d 685, 690 (6th Cir. 1996) (citation and quotation marks omitted) (a lso finding it sig nifi ca nt that defe ndant’s prior f elonies occ urre d at “at differ ent place s, and with diffe rent pe ople,” id . at 69 1) . E ve n w he re the tim ing of tw o co nv ic tio ns ov e rl a ps , “[a]n episode is an incident that is part of a s er i es , but forms a sepa rate unit within t he whole. Although r elated to the e ntire cour se of e vents, an episode is a punctuated occur renc e with a

limit ed duration.” Un ite d S

tat es v . H ug he s, 924 F.2d 1354, 1361 ( 6th Cir.1991). I n this case, the district c ourt proper ly applied § 841(b) . The g overnme nt relied upon thre e prior Te nnessee state cour t convictions for felony offe nses: (1) possession of 300 g rams or more of18

coca ine with intent to dist ribute, arising out of C rutche r’s sale of cocaine to underc over a g ents on May 30, 1992; (2) conspira cy to se ll 300 or more g rams of c ocaine , arising from eve nts occurr ing betwee n May

14-30, 1992; and (3) possession of marijuana on May 31, 1992, which constituted a felony due to Crutcher ’s prior possession convic tions. Al tho ug h th e re wa s so me ov e rl a p b e tw e e n th e c oc a ine po sse ssi on wi th i nte nt to d istri bu te and conspiracy convictions, the former seems to qualify as “an incident t hat i s part of a series, but forms a separ ate unit within t he whole [conspira cy ].” Se e Hu gh es, 92 4 F. 2d a t 1361 . Reg ard le ss, the marijuana

possession conviction clea rly arose from conduc t occur ring at a time (Ma

y 31) distinct from t h e conduc t involved in the conspirac y (May 14-30) a

nd coca ine possession (May 30)
con v i cti ons and occ urre d in a distinct place ( Crutcher ’s home). A ccor dingly , the marijuana possession conviction constituted a sepa rate episode fr om the coca ine possession and co n s p i racy convictions. See Anderson , 76 F.3d at 690. Be cause the gover nment established at lea st two—if not three —felony

convictions, the district court did not er r in applying § 841( b). 5. Crutcher argues that enha

ncing his Guidelines ra

ng e base d on the fa ct of prior convictions not proven to a jury

bey ond a reasonable doubt violated t he S ix th Amendment. The Supreme Court has held that the f

act of a prior c onviction nee d n o t be submitted to a jury

. Almendarez- Torres v. United States , 5 23 U. S. 2 24 (1 99 8) ; see also Appre ndi v

. New Jersey , 530 U.S. 466, 489-90 (2000) ( n o ti n g th a t “ [ar gu a

b [l y ] Almendarez- Torres wa s wr on g ly de c ide d, ” bu t st ill ho ldi ngtha t “ [o] ther than the fact of a prior conviction , any fac t t h at i n cr ease s the pena lty for a crime be y ond the presc ribed statutory

maxi mum must be subm itted to a jury , and prove d bey ond a re asonable doubt”)19

(empha sis added). Still, Crutcher ar g ues that the prior conviction ex ception is no longe r good law based on Justi ce T homas’s conc urre nce in Shepard v. United St a tes, 544 U.S. 13, 27-28 (2005) ( T h o m a s , J. , c o n c u r

r i n g ) ( n o t i n g t h a t “ a m a

j o r i t y o f t h e C o u rt n o w r e c o g n i zes tha t Alme nd ar ezTorres was wr ong ly

decide d[,] ” and that “in an appr opriate c ase, this Court should consider Almendarez- Torres ’ continuing viability ”). Bu tfo l l o wi n g Shephard, thi s cou rt ha s hel d th a t Almendarez- Torres rema ins g ood law. See United States v. J

ones , 45 3 F .3 d 7 77 , 7 79 (6 th C ir . 2 00 6) ; Un ite d S tat es v . H ill , 440 F.3d 292, 298- 99 & n. 3 ( 6th

Cir . 2 00 6) (r e

je c tin g argume nt t

ha t Ju s t i c e Th oma s’ s c on c ur

re nc e re nd e rs Al

me nd ar ezTorres ov e rr

ule d b e c a us e “ the Court

of Ap pe a ls s ho uld

fo llo w the c a se wh ic h d ir e c tly c on tr ols , l ea v i n g t o [ t h e S u

p re m e C o u rt ] t h e p re ro gat i v e o f o v erru l i n g i t s o wn d ec i s i o n s ”) (q u o t i n g Tenet v. Doe , 544 U.S. 1, 10-11 (2005) ) (inter nal quotation marks omitted). Ac cording ly , the fa ct of Cructher ’s prior c onvictions did not need to be submitted to a jury

. 6. Cr utc he r ha s su

bmi tte d a su pp le me nta l pr o s e brief a lleg ing a number of a dditional gr ounds upon which the district cour t erre d. Be cause Crutcher was re prese nted by co unsel on appe al, we decline to addre ss these c laims. See United States v. Howton, 260 F. App’ x 813, 819 (6th Cir. 2008) (“ We d e c lin e to a dd

re ss t he se argume nts be c a

us e [the de fe nd ant] w a s r e pr e se nte d b y c ouns e l in

thi s
ma tte r. ” ); Un ite d S

tat es v . J e nk ins , 22 9 F . App ’x 36 2, 37 0 ( 6th Cir

. 20 05 ) ( “ [W]e d o n ot o rd ina ri ly consider pro se claims broug ht by a def endant r epre sented by

counsel on a

ppeal. . . .” ). III . For the fore g oing r easons, we aff irm.