09-08 97 -ag

Pranata v. Holder BIA A 096 266 278 

### UNITED STATES COURT OF AP PEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCU IT 

# SUM MARY ORDER

RU L I N G S BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO SUMMARY ORDERS FILED AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY THIS COURT’S LOCAL RULE 32.1 AND FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1. IN A B R I E F O R O T H ER PAPER IN WHICH A LITIGANT CITES A SUMMARY ORDER, IN EACH PARAGRAPH IN WHICH A CITATION APPEARS, AT LEAST ONE CITATION MUST EITHER BE TO THE FEDERAL APPEN DIX OR BE ACCOMPANIED BY THE NOTATION: “(SUMMARY ORDER).” A PARTY CITING A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF THAT SUMMARY ORDER TOGETHER WITH THE PAPER IN WHICH THE SUMMARY ORDER IS CITED ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL UNLESS THE SUMMARY ORDER IS AVAILABL E I N AN E L E CTRONIC DATABASE WHICH IS PUBLICLY ACCES SIBLE WITHOUT PAYMENT OF FEE (SUCH AS THE DATABASE AVAILABLE AT HTTP://WWW.CA2.USCOURTS.GOV/). IF NO COPY IS SERVED BY REASON OF THE AVAILABILITY OF THE ORDER ON SUCH A DATABASE, T HE CITATION MUST INCLUDE REFERENCE TO THAT DATABASE AND THE DOCKET NUMBER OF THE CASE IN WHICH THE ORDER WAS ENTERED. 1 At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals 2 for the Second Circuit, held at the Daniel Patrick Moynihan 3 United States Courthouse, 500 Pearl Street, in the City of 4 New York, on the 1 day of December, two thousand nine. st 5 6 PRESENT: 7 PIERRE N. LEVAL, 8 BARRINGTON D. PARKER, 9 RICHARD C. WESLEY, 10 Circuit Judges . 11

_______________________________________ 12 13 KINTORO PRANATA, 14 Petitioner , 15 16 v. 09-0897-ag 17 NAC 18 ERIC H. HOLDER, JR., UNITED STATES 19 ATTORNEY GENERAL, 20 Respondent . 21

_______________________________________ 22 23 FOR PETITIONER: H. Raymond Fasano, New York, New 24 York.2 1 FOR RESPONDENT: Tony West, Assistant Attorney 2 General; John S. Hogan, Senior 3 Litigation Counsel; Achiezer 4 Guggenheim, Trial Attorney, Office 5 of Immigration Litigation, United 6 States Department of Justice, 7 Washington, D.C. 8 9 UPON DUE CONSIDERATION of this petition for review of a 1 0 Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) decision, it is hereby 1 1 ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED, that the petition for review 1 2 is DENIED. 1 3 Petitioner Kintoro Pranata, a native and citizen of 1 4 Indonesia, seeks review of the February 5, 2009 order of the 1 5 BIA denying his motion to reopen. In re Kintoro Pranata , 1 6 No. A 096 266 278 (B.I.A. Feb. 5, 2009). We assume the 1 7 parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts and 1 8 procedural history of the case. 1 9 We review the BIA’s denial of a motion to reopen for 2 0 abuse of discretion, mindful of the Supreme Court’s 2 1 admonition that such motions are “disfavored.” Ali v. 22 Gonzales , 448 F.3d 515, 517 (2d Cir. 2006) (citing INS v. 23 Doherty , 502 U.S. 314, 322-23 (1992)). We find that the BIA 2 4 did not abuse its discretion in denying Pranata’s motion to 2 5 reopen as untimely. As the BIA noted, it had issued a final 2 6 order of removal in May 2005, but Pranata did not file his3 1 motion until September 2008, well beyond the 90-day 2 deadline. See8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). There is no time 3 limit for filing a motion to reopen “based on changed 4 circumstances arising in the country of nationality or in 5 the country to which deportation has been ordered, if such 6 evidence is material and was not available and could not 7 have been discovered or presented at the previous hearing.” 8 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii). Here, however, the BIA 9 properly found that Pranata’s motion did not qualify for 1 0 such an exception, and that he did not otherwise demonstrate 1 1 his prima facie eligibility for relief. See INS v. Abudu , 1 2 485 U.S. 94, 104-05 (1988).

Pranata argues 1 3 that our decision in Mufied v. Mukasey , 1 4 508 F.3d 88 (2d Cir. 2007), requires the BIA to articulate 1 5 precise legal standards for analyzing whether a petitioner 1 6 has established a pattern or practice of persecution in his 1 7 or her home country. As a preliminary matter, Pranata’s 1 8 reliance on Mufied does not excuse his late filing, as the 1 9 regulations do not provide that an untimely motion to reopen 2 0 may be excused on these grounds. 8 C.F.R. 2 1 § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii), Furthermore, in Mufied , we remanded 2 2 because neither the Immigration Judge (“IJ”) nor the BIA4 1 considered Mufied’s pattern or practice claim. Mufied , 508 2 F.3d at 91. Here, on the other hand, the BIA directly 3 addressed the claim, finding that Pranata failed to establish materially changed country conditions 4 “with 5 respect to this issue of a pattern or practice of 6 persecution of Christians of Chinese ethnicity or any other 7 ethnicity in Indonesia.” Accordingly, remand under Mufiedis 8 not required here. 9 Pranata also argues that the BIA did not adequately 1 0 consider his evidence of materially changed country 1 1 conditions in Indonesia. Contrary to Pranata’s argument, 1 2 the BIA considered the evidence, including 53 documents, 1 3 8 exhibits, an affidavit, and a State Department Report, 1 4 before rejecting Pranata’s claim. The BIA noted that “the 1 5 government of Indonesia generally respects freedom of 1 6 religion,” citing the 2007 State Department International 1 7 Religious Freedom Report for Indonesia. The BIA also found 1 8 that the remaining evidence Pranata submitted did not reflect a meaningful change in country conditions. 1 9 Pranata 2 0 is essentially requesting that the BIA analyze and discuss 2 1 in its decision each piece of evidence he submitted. However, 2 2 the BIA is not required to “expressly parse or5 1 refute on the record each individual argument or piece of 2 evidence offered by the petitioner,” see Jian Hui Shao , 546 F.3d 138, 169 (2d Cir. 2008), 3 as long as it “has given 4 reasoned consideration to the petition, and made adequate 5 findings.” Wei Guang Wang v. BIA , 437 F.3d 270, 275 (2d Cir. 2006). 6 Because we cannot find that the BIA’s decision 7 “provide[d] no rational explanation, inexplicably depart[ed] 8 from established policies, is devoid of any reasoning, or contains only summary or conclusory statements 9 ,” the BIA did 1 0 not abuse its discretion in denying Pranata’s motion to reopen. 11 See Ke Zhen Zhao v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice , 265 F.3d 83, 93 (2d Cir. 2001). 12 For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is 13 1 4 DENIED. As we have completed our review, any stay of 1 5 removal that the Court previously granted in this petition 1 6 is VACATED, and any pending motion for a stay of removal in 1 7 this petition is DISMISSED as moot. Any pending request for 1 8 oral argument in this petition is DENIED in accordance with 1 9 Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 34(a)(2), and Second 2 0 Circuit Local Rule 34(b). 2 1 FOR THE COURT: 2 2 Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk 23 24 By:___________________________ 25