IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Pennsylvania Transportation :

Service, Inc., :

Petitioner :

:

v. : No. 1709 C.D. 2016

: Argued: May 1, 2017

Pennsylvania Public Utility :

Commission, :

Respondent :

BEFORE: HONORABLE P. KEVIN BROBSON, Judge

HONORABLE JULIA K. HEARTHWAY, Judge

HONORABLE JAMES GARDNER COLINS, Senior Judge

OPINION

BY JUDGE BROBSON FILED: July 3, 2017 

Pennsylvania Transportation Service, Inc. (PTS) petitions for review 

of an order of the Pennsylvania Public Utility Commission (PUC), which granted, 

in part, PTS’s petition for reconsideration of staff action (Petition). PTS filed the

Petition in response to a PUC decision, which modified the description of 

operating rights in PTS’s certificate of public convenience. For the reasons that 

follow, we affirm. 

PTS is a Pennsylvania corporation engaged in the for-hire 

transportation (taxicab) business. On April 3, 2015, PTS purchased certain call or 

demand (taxi) rights issued by the PUC to Concord Limousine, Inc. t/a Concord 

Coach Taxi (Concord). The rights PTS purchased on April 3, 2015, were 

originally transferred to Concord from Boston Coach-Pennsylvania Corp. t/d/b/a 

Boston Coach (Boston). With regard to the taxi rights transferred from Boston to 
2

Concord, an administrative law judge (ALJ) issued an opinion and order dated 

January 14, 2000, describing the transferred rights as follows:

To transport as a common carrier by motor vehicle, 

persons upon call or demand: (1) in the Bala-Cynwyd 

Section of Lower Merion Township, Montgomery 

County, between the Schuylkill River on the east and 

Wynnewood Avenue on the west and extending to Rock 

Hill Road, Bryn Mawr Avenue and Montgomery Avenue 

on the north and from points in that area to other points 

in Pennsylvania, and vice versa; all transportation to be 

on call by telephone to the carrier’s office; and (2) in that 

part of the City of Philadelphia, Philadelphia County, 

beginning at the intersection of City Line Avenue 

and 52nd Street, thence continuing south along 52nd 

Street to Wynnefield Avenue, thence continuing south

along Wynnefield Avenue to Belmont Avenue, thence 

continuing south along Belmont Avenue to its 

intersection with Montgomery Avenue, thence 

continuing in an easterly direction along Montgomery 

Avenue until the same intersects with the Schuylkill 

River, thence continuing [in] a northerly direction to City 

Line Avenue and the place of beginning; all 

transportation to be upon call by telephone to the 

carrier’s office. 

(Reproduced Record (R.R.) at P60-P61.)1

On April 3, 2015, PTS filed with the PUC an application for approval 

of the transfer of rights from Concord to PTS. On March 1, 2016,2the Secretary of 

 

1 Citations to the reproduced record are consistent with the pagination in the reproduced 

record filed by PTS, which does not conform to the requirements of Pa. R.A.P. 2173.

2

The Secretary of the PUC originally issued a letter on February 5, 2016; however, that 

letter contained typographical errors. The Secretary of the PUC issued a corrected letter dated

March 1, 2016. The typographical errors and the dates of the letters are not relevant to the 

instant appeal. 
3

the PUC issued a letter notifying PTS that its application was approved, but that 

the PUC had modified the description of the transferred operating rights. 

Specifically, the March 1, 2016 letter omitted the portion of the description of 

operating rights in the City of Philadelphia (the City) and included the following 

note:

The transferor’s authority originally also included an area 

in the city and county of Philadelphia. That area now 

falls under the jurisdiction of the Philadelphia Parking 

Authority [(PPA)], and this Commission has no power to 

grant the transfer of that portion of the original authority. 

Additionally, the words vice versa were included by error 

in the description. These words were only in the 

transferor’s tariff, and not in the original order granting 

authority; therefore, vice versa has not been included. 

(R.R. at P67.)3

On March 21, 2016, PTS filed a “petition for reconsideration of staff 

action” with the PUC, arguing that the PUC did not have authority to make 

material changes to the transferred operating rights. On September 15, 2016, the 

 

3

Specifically, the following language was omitted from the description of operating 

rights: 

and (2) in that part of the City of Philadelphia, Philadelphia County, beginning at 

the intersection of City Line Avenue and 52nd Street, thence continuing south 

along 52nd Street to Wynnefield Avenue, thence continuing south along 

Wynnefield Avenue to Belmont Avenue, thence continuing south along Belmont 

Avenue to its intersection with Montgomery Avenue, thence continuing in an 

easterly direction along Montgomery Avenue until the same intersects with the 

Schuylkill River, thence continuing [in] a northerly direction to City Line Avenue 

and the place of beginning; all transportation to be upon call by telephone to the 

carrier’s office. 

(R.R. at P61.) Throughout this opinion, we refer to the omitted portion of the transferred 

operational rights as the “Philadelphia rights.” 
4

PUC granted PTS’s request, in part, by restoring the vice versa rights excluded 

pursuant to the March 1, 2016 letter. The PUC, however, explained that the PPA, 

not the PUC, had authority to alter or approve a transfer of operational rights 

within the City.

4

 PTS subsequently filed in this Court a petition for review of the 

PUC’s September 15, 2016 order. 

In its petition for review,

5

PTS argues that the PUC violated its right 

to due process by partially revoking PTS’s operational rights without holding a 

hearing on the issue of whether the Philadelphia rights should be excluded from the 

certificate. The PUC contends that it had no jurisdiction to include the 

Philadelphia rights because the authority to grant operational rights within the City 

is vested solely in the PPA.

Prior to 2004, the PUC was the sole agency responsible for the 

regulation of taxicab operations throughout Pennsylvania, including the City. With 

respect to taxicabs operating on a City-wide basis, the PUC’s duties and 

 

4 On December 16, 2016, the PUC issued a notice dismissing PTS’s application to begin 

service for failure to comply with certain PUC requirements within 60 days of the “Commission 

Order/Secretarial Letter” approving PTS’s application, presumably referring to the 

September 15, 2016 order of the PUC. (R.R. at P147.) On January 3, 2017, PTS filed a petition 

for reconsideration of the December 16, 2016 notice, asserting that because it had petitioned this 

Court for review of the September 15, 2016 opinion and order, that order was not yet final, and, 

thus, PTS was not obligated to satisfy the PUC requirements until the final disposition of the 

instant matter. The disposition of PTS’s petition for reconsideration has not been made part of 

the record and has no bearing on our decision in the instant matter. 

5 Appellate review of a PUC order is limited to determining whether a constitutional 

violation, an error of law, or a violation of PUC procedure has occurred and whether necessary 

findings of fact are supported by substantial evidence. 2 Pa. C.S. § 704; Popowsky v. Pa. Pub. 

Util. Comm’n, 910 A.2d 38, 48 (Pa. 2006). 
5

responsibilities were set forth in what was commonly known as the Medallion

Act, 66 Pa. C.S. §§ 2401-2416.

6

 Concord and PTS, however, are considered 

“partial rights” taxicab companies, meaning they have been granted authority to 

operate in part, but not in all, of the City. As partial rights taxicab companies, both 

Concord and PTS were not subject to the provisions of the Medallion Act, but 

were, instead, regulated by the Public Utility Code, 66 Pa. C.S. §§ 101-3316. 

In 2004, the Legislature enacted an amendment to the Parking 

Authorities Law (Law),7 which, inter alia, repealed the Medallion Act and 

transferred jurisdiction and regulation of taxicab service within the City from the 

PUC to the PPA. The amendment is commonly referred to as Act 94.8 The PUC 

retained jurisdiction over the regulation of taxicab service throughout the 

remaining portions of the Commonwealth. 

We have previously held that the PUC continues to regulate taxicab 

companies with pre-Act 94 rights to the extent that they operate outside of the City. 

Germantown Cab Co. v. Pub. Util. Comm’n, 97 A.3d 410, 417

(Pa. Cmwlth. 2014). We have also held that the PPA regulates taxicab companies 

with pre-Act 94 rights to the extent that they operate within the City. Bucks Cnty. 

Servs., Inc. v. Phila. Parking Auth., 104 A.3d 604, 611 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2014). Thus, 

the Legislature, by enacting Act 94, created a regulatory system in which the PUC 

 

6 Repealed by the Act of December 30, 2002, P.L. 2001. 

7

53 Pa. C.S. §§ 5501-5517, 5701-5745. The Law is part of the General Local 

Government Code. See 53 Pa. C.S. § 101.

8 Act of July 16, 2004, P.L. 758. 
6

and the PPA share jurisdiction over the operation of taxicab companies to the 

extent that such companies operate both within and without the City. 

Because taxicab service is considered a public utility, taxicab 

operators must acquire a certificate of public convenience prior to beginning 

operations. 66 Pa. C.S. § 1101; Ronald Cab, Inc. v. Pa. Pub. Util. 

Comm’n, 76 A.3d 74, 75 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2013). After approving a transfer of 

operational rights between taxicab companies, the PUC must set forth and describe 

the limits of the territory in which the acquiring taxicab company may provide 

service—i.e., a description of the taxicab company’s operational rights. 

Susquehanna Area Reg’l Airport Auth. v. Pa. Pub. Util. Comm’n, 911 A.2d 612, 

619 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2006), appeal denied, 923 A.2d 412 (Pa. 2007). 

With respect to the transfer of “partial rights” within the City, 

Section 5711(c)(5) of the Law, 53 Pa. C.S. § 5711(c)(5), provides:

The transfer of a certificate of public convenience, 

by any means or device, shall be subject to the prior

approval of the [PPA] which may, in its sole or peculiar 

discretion as it deems appropriate, attach such conditions, 

including the appropriate allocation of proceeds, as it 

may find to be necessary or proper.

(Emphasis added.) Similarly, Section 1103(a) of the Public Utility Code, 

66 Pa. C.S. § 1103(a), authorizes the PUC to grant certificates of public 

convenience to taxicab companies operating outside of the City.9 The PUC has 

 

9

Section 1103(a) of the Public Utility Code provides:

Every application for a certificate of public convenience shall be made to 

the commission in writing, be verified by oath or affirmation, and be in such 

form, and contain such information, as the commission may require by its 

regulations. A certificate of public convenience shall be granted by order of the 

commission, only if the commission shall find or determine that the granting of 

(Footnote continued on next page...)
7

authority to revoke or amend certificates of public convenience upon due cause 

being shown. P.D.J. Cab Co. v. Pa. Pub. Util. Comm’n, 501 A.2d 342, 344-45

(Pa. Cmwlth. 1985). 

PTS argues that the PUC violated its right to due process by partially 

revoking its operating rights without holding a hearing on the issue of whether the 

Philadelphia rights should be excluded from the description of operating rights. 

PTS’s argument is founded on the presumption that it properly filed an application 

to approve the transfer of operating rights and was wrongfully denied part of the 

acquired operating rights without notice and an opportunity to be heard. PTS’s 

argument, however, fails because it is based on the faulty assumption that the PUC 

had authority to grant those rights even if it held a hearing on PTS’s application. 

As we have previously held, this is not the case. 

In Bucks County, we reaffirmed “this Court’s prior rulings confirming 

the [PPA’s] regulatory reach with respect to [taxicab companies] when providing 

taxicab service within the City.” Bucks Cnty., 104 A.3d at 609. We did not 

 

(continued...)

such certificate is necessary or proper for the service, accommodation, 

convenience, or safety of the public. The commission, in granting such 

certificate, may impose such conditions as it may deem to be just and reasonable. 

In every case, the commission shall make a finding or determination in writing, 

stating whether or not its approval is granted. Any holder of a certificate of public 

convenience, exercising the authority conferred by such certificate, shall be 

deemed to have waived any and all objections to the terms and conditions of such 

certificate.

See also Lehigh Valley Transp. Servs., Inc. v. Pa. Pub. Util. Comm’n, 56 A.3d 49, 55 (Pa. 

Cmwlth. 2012) (describing procedure and requirements for application to PUC for certificate of 

public convenience.). 
8

conclude that the PPA’s authority was limited to enforcing violations of PPA 

regulations within the City or that the PPA had authority only to issue new 

certificates of public convenience with operating rights within the City. We also 

opined that Section 5711(c)(2.1) of the Law, 53 Pa. C.S. § 5711(c)(2.1),

does not demand that the [PPA] issue a certificate of 

public convenience to those companies that had existing 

service rights within the City prior to Act 94’s passage. 

Instead, this section appears to allow the [PPA] to issue 

certificates of public convenience to provide 

non-citywide call or demand service. Because, however, 

[taxicab companies] had that authority prior to the 

passage of Act 94, they were not required to obtain, and 

the [PPA] was not required to issue, a new certificate of 

public convenience.

Id. Thus, the portion of those taxicab companies’ operating rights within the City

has been within the jurisdiction of the PPA since the effective date of Act 94, but 

the PPA was not required to issue separate certificates of public convenience to 

taxicab companies with existing rights. Only the PPA, however, has the authority 

to issue a new certificate of public convenience that includes rights within the City. 

Moreover, it does not appear that the PUC expressly deprived PTS of 

its operational rights by omitting the Philadelphia rights.10 “Key to the 

determination of whether a party has been denied procedural due process is 

 

10 To the extent PTS argues that Concord was somehow deprived of its due process rights

by the PUC’s omission of the Philadelphia rights from PTS’s certificate of public convenience, 

such an argument is irrelevant to the instant matter as Concord is not a party to this action and 

PTS may not seek to enforce the rights of a third party on appeal. See Pa. Dental Ass’n v. Dep’t

of Health, 461 A.2d 329, 331 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1983) (“One may not claim standing, ordinarily, to 

vindicate the constitutional rights of some third party [unless] the relationship of the litigant and 

the third party is inextricably bound up with the activity the litigant seeks to pursue and there is 

some obstacle to the assertion by the third party of his own right.” (internal citation omitted)). 
9

whether that party has suffered demonstrable prejudice.” Sobat v. Borough of 

Midland, 141 A.3d 618, 627 n.9 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2016). The March 1, 2016 letter 

from the PUC noted only that the PUC was without authority to grant a transfer of 

the Philadelphia rights. The PUC did not express that it was revoking or 

modifying PTS’s rights to exclude the Philadelphia rights. Rather, the 

March 1, 2016 letter seemed to indicate that PTS would simply need to seek 

additional approval from the PPA for the transfer of the Philadelphia rights. Thus, 

PTS fails to demonstrate that the PUC’s March 1, 2016 letter caused it 

“demonstrable prejudice” simply by noting that PTS cannot obtain all of the relief 

that it seeks from the PUC.

The PPA has held complete authority over taxicab companies 

providing service within the City since Act 94 went into effect. We now clarify 

that where a taxicab company possessing operational rights both within and 

without the City seeks to transfer those rights to another entity, the PPA has 

exclusive authority to grant, deny, or impose conditions on the transfer of the 

portion of the operational rights within the City.11 The PUC retains authority over 

the transfer of operational rights outside of the City.

 

11 During these proceedings, the PUC questioned whether Concord’s Philadelphia rights 

had been cancelled by the PPA pursuant to a July 14, 2016 decision and order in the matter of 

Philadelphia Parking Authority v. Concord Limousine, Inc., Docket No. C-16-01-035. On 

May 24, 2017, PTS filed an application with this Court, seeking a remand to the PUC for further 

consideration and the opportunity to be heard regarding the impact of the PPA’s July 14, 2016 

decision and order on PTS’s application for the transfer of rights from Concord to PTS. By order 

dated June 8, 2017, this Court denied PTS’s application. We note, however, that to the extent 

that PTS seeks to challenge the PPA’s July 14, 2016 decision and order and/or seek approval of 

the transfer of the Philadelphia rights from Concord to PTS, the PUC does not appear to be the 

proper forum. 
10

Accordingly, we affirm the PUC’s September 15, 2016 order. 

 

 P. KEVIN BROBSON, Judge
IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Pennsylvania Transportation :

Service, Inc., :

Petitioner :

:

v. : No. 1709 C.D. 2016

:

Pennsylvania Public Utility :

Commission, :

Respondent :

O R D E R

AND NOW, this 3

rd day of July, 2017, the order of the Pennsylvania 

Public Utility Commission, dated September 15, 2016, is hereby AFFIRMED. 

 

 P. KEVIN BROBSON, Judge