Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 18A-CT-1330| June 19, 2019 Page 1 of 11

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT

Stephen C. Wheeler

Smith Fisher Maas Howard & Lloyd, 

P.C.

Indianapolis, Indiana

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE

P. Gregory Cross

The Cross Law Firm, P.C.

Muncie, Indiana

I N T H E

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

Auto-Owners Insurance 

Company,

Appellant,

v.

Travis Shroyer,

Appellee.

June 19, 2019

Court of Appeals Case No.

18A-CT-1330

Appeal from the Henry Circuit 

Court

The Honorable Bob A. Witham, 

Judge

Trial Court Cause No.

33C01-1407-CT-22

Pyle, Judge.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 18A-CT-1330| June 19, 2019 Page 2 of 11

Statement of the Case

[1] Brena Berardicelli (“Berardicelli”), on behalf of her three-year-old son (“J.B.”),

filed a complaint for damages, alleging that Travis Shroyer (“Shroyer”) caused 

injuries to J.B. by negligently operating a skid loader on his premises. Shroyer’s

homeowner’s insurance company, Auto-Owners Insurance Company (“AutoOwners”), denied coverage for the accident as well as any duty to indemnify or 

defend Shroyer. 

[2] Shroyer brought an insurance coverage declaratory judgment action requesting 

Auto-Owners indemnify and defend him pursuant to the Personal Liability 

Protection Coverage under his homeowner’s insurance policy (the “Policy”). 

In response, Auto-Owners filed a motion for summary judgment alleging that it 

had no duty to indemnify or defend Shroyer’s liability claims because the 

undisputed evidence demonstrates that J.B. was an “insured” under the Policy 

and that, as a matter of law, the coverage for bodily injury to J.B. was excluded. 

The trial court denied Auto-Owners’ motion for summary judgment.

[3] On appeal, Auto-Owners argues that the trial court erred in denying the motion 

and that it was entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law because J.B.

qualifies as an “insured” under the Policy. Concluding that J.B. was an 

“insured” as defined in the Policy at the time of the accident, we reverse the 

denial of summary judgment and remand to the trial court to enter judgment in 

favor of Auto-Owners.

[4] We reverse and remand.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 18A-CT-1330| June 19, 2019 Page 3 of 11

Issue

Whether the trial court erred in denying summary judgment to 

Auto-Owners.

Facts

[5] Beginning in the summer of 2013 until April 2014, Berardicelli and her two 

sons resided with Shroyer at his residence. Berardicelli and Shroyer were 

“together” and shared a bedroom at the residence. (App. Vol. 2 at 194). On 

April 26, 2014, Shroyer moved a Caterpillar skid loader out of his barn. 

Shroyer planned to use the skid loader to move stone, put in a garden, and do 

some other landscaping. At some point, Shroyer “thought he had backed over 

the pile of dirt he had just left behind him, but got off the machine to check and 

noticed [J.B.’s] battery operated four-wheeler under the machine and [J.B.] 

laying on the ground injured.” (App. Vol. 2 at 183). As a result, J.B. suffered 

serious injuries.

[6] Property-Owners Insurance Company, which is an affiliate of Auto-Owners, 

insured Shroyer. The Policy identifies the insured premises as Shroyer’s 

residence, which was the location of the accident. The Policy provides personal 

liability coverage with limits of $500,000 for each occurrence. The Policy

provides liability coverage as follows:

Coverage E – Personal Liability. We will pay all sums any 

insured becomes legally obligated to pay as damages because of 

or arising out of bodily injury or property damage caused by an 

occurrence to which this coverage applies. 
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* * *

We will settle or defend, as we consider appropriate, any claim 

or suit for damages covered by this policy. We will do this at our 

expense, using attorneys of our choice. This agreement to settle 

or defend claims or suits ends when we have paid the limit of 

our liability. 

(App. Vol. 2 at 145, 146) (emphasis in original). Furthermore, the Policy 

contains certain exclusions from liability coverage:

Coverage E – Personal Liability does not apply:

* * *

(6) to bodily injury or personal injury to any insured.

(App. Vol. 2 at 148) (emphasis in original). The Policy defines “bodily injury” 

as “physical injury, sickness or disease sustained by a person including resulting 

death of that person.” (App. Vol. 2 at 128). The Policy defines “occurrence” as 

“an accident that results in bodily injury or property damage and includes, as 

one occurrence, all continuous or repeated exposure to substantially the same 

generally harmful conditions.” (App. Vol. 2 at 129) (emphasis in original). 

[7] The Policy defines an “insured” as “any other person under the age of 21 

residing with [the named insured] who is in [the named insured’s] care . . . .” 

(App. Vol. 2 at 128) (emphasis omitted). The term “care” is not defined in the 

Policy. Additionally, separate and specific to the Personal Liability Protection 

section, an insured also means, with respect to any vehicle covered by the

Policy, “any other person you permit to use the vehicle while on an insured 

premises.” (App. Vol. 2 at 129) (emphasis in original).
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[8] A few days after the accident, on April 29, 2014, Shroyer submitted a claim to 

Auto-Owners regarding the accident. Auto-Owners informed Shroyer that no 

coverage existed for the accident because J.B. “resided at the insured premises 

with his mother and Shroyer (and was an ‘insured’ under the Policy, thereby 

triggering certain Policy Exclusions).” (App. Vol. 2 at 109). 

[9] In July 2014, Berardicelli, on behalf of J.B., filed the instant lawsuit (“the 

Lawsuit”) against Shroyer, alleging that J.B. was injured on Shroyer’s property 

by Shroyer’s operation of a machine. Berardicelli later filed a “First Amended 

Complaint for Damages with Jury Demand” against Shroyer in August 2015. 

(App. Vol. 2 at 21). On October 9, 2015, Shroyer filed his answer. AutoOwners continued to deny coverage for the accident. 

[10] On March 14, 2016, Shroyer filed a “Third-Party Complaint on Insurance 

Contract” against Auto-Owners requesting that the trial court enter a 

declaratory judgment stating that Auto-Owners must defend and indemnify him 

in the Lawsuit. (App. Vol. 2 at 30). Auto-Owners answered on May 10, 2016. 

[11] On October 9, 2017, Auto-Owners filed a “Motion for Summary Judgment and 

Designation of Evidence in Support Thereof.” (App. Vol. 2 at 206). On the 

same date, Auto-Owners also filed a “Brief in Support of Motion for Summary 

Judgment.” (App. Vol. 2 at 89). Auto-Owners argued that it has no duty to 

indemnify or defend Shroyer’s liability claims because the undisputed evidence 

demonstrated that J.B. was an insured under the Policy and that as a matter of 

law, any coverage for bodily injury to J.B. was excluded. 
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[12] Auto-Owners designated several affidavits, exhibits, and depositions in support 

of its position. This evidence included testimony that Berardicelli was not 

employed, did not pay rent, and did not contribute to any household expenses 

or utilities. Shroyer “[t]old [her she] didn’t have to” pay anything, and he took 

care of the expenses himself. (App. Vol. 2 at 194). In addition to providing 

money to Berardicelli, Shroyer purchased diapers and “necessities” for her two 

sons. (App. Vol. 2 at 202). Shroyer typically told Berardicelli if the sons 

needed to be disciplined; however, he “might have told them to sit in the 

timeout chair or something like that.” (App. Vol. 2 at 204).

[13] In response, Shroyer filed his “Brief in Opposition to Motion for Summary 

Judgment” and designated evidence in support of his position that J.B. was not 

an insured under the Policy. Included in this evidence was Shroyer’s own

testimony that he was never involved in any of the decision-making regarding 

the various needs of the children. He also testified that he never watched them. 

Likewise, Berardicelli testified that when she had an errand to run, she “always 

had [the boys] with [her].” (App. Vol. 3 at 48). She also testified that she took 

care of the discipline and if an issue did arise, she would “take care of it.” 

(App. Vol. 3 at 48). Furthermore, she stated that she provided food for her 

children through “food stamps[.]” (App. Vol. 3 at 57). 

[14] The trial court held a hearing on Auto-Owners’ motion for summary judgment 

and denied the motion. The trial court did not make any specific findings or 

conclusions regarding its denial of the motion. At the request of Auto-Owners, 
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the trial court certified its denial of summary judgment for interlocutory appeal, 

and our Court accepted jurisdiction. 

Decision

[15] Auto-Owners appeals the trial court’s denial of summary judgment. AutoOwners contends that J.B. was an “insured” under the Policy, resulting in the 

exclusion of any coverage for bodily injury to J.B. Auto-Owners presents two 

theories on appeal. First, Auto-Owners asserts that J.B. was in Shroyer’s care, 

thus making him an insured under one definition in the Policy. Second, AutoOwners argues that the accident and injuries arose out of J.B.’s use of a covered 

vehicle with Shroyer’s permission on the insured premises, thus making him an 

insured under another separate definition in the Policy. Because the designated 

evidence shows that J.B. was in Shroyer’s care and qualifies as an insured under 

the first theory, we need not address the merits of Auto-Owners’ second theory.

[16] When reviewing the grant or denial of summary judgment, we apply the same 

test as the trial court: summary judgment is appropriate only where the 

designated evidence shows there is no genuine issue of material fact and the 

moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Hughley v. State, 15 

N.E.3d 1000, 1003 (Ind. 2014); Ind. Trial Rule 56(C). “Insurance policies are 

governed by the same rules of construction as other contracts. As with other 

contracts, the interpretation of an insurance policy is a question of law.” Briles 

v. Wasusau Ins. Companies, 858 N.E.2d 208, 213 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006) (citations 

omitted). Further, the “[c]onstruction of a written contract is a question of law 

for which summary judgment is particularly appropriate.” Weidman v. Erie Ins.
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Group, 745 N.E.2d 292, 297 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001). And where the challenge to 

summary judgment raises questions of law, we review them de novo. Rogers v. 

Martin, 63 N.E.3d 316, 320 (Ind. 2016). 

[17] In ruling on a motion for summary judgment, not only all facts but also all 

“‘reasonable inferences drawn from those facts are construed in favor of the 

nonmoving party.’” Auto-Owners Ins. Co. v. Harvey, 842 N.E.2d 1279, 1289 (Ind. 

2006) (quoting Colonial Penn Ins. Co. v. Guzorek, 690 N.E.2d 664, 667 (Ind. 

1997)). A party seeking appellate reversal of the denial of summary judgment 

must demonstrate that the designated evidentiary matter negates the existence 

of any genuine issue of material fact and that the moving party is entitled to 

judgment as a matter of law. T.R. 56(C); Cinergy Corp. v. Assoc. Elec. & Gas Ins. 

Servs., Ltd., 865 N.E.2d 571, 574 (Ind. 2007). 

[18] The parties do not dispute that Auto-Owners would not have to provide 

coverage for bodily injury if J.B. was an “insured.” Instead, they dispute the 

existence of a genuine issue of material fact as to whether J.B. was an insured 

under the Policy by virtue of being in Shroyer’s “care.” Although the term 

“care” is undefined in the Policy, the Indiana Supreme Court has previously 

reviewed the definition of “care” as used in an insurance policy. In Holiday 

Hospitality Franchising, Inc. v. AMCO Ins. Co., 983 N.E.2d 574 (Ind. 2013), a 

minor was molested at a hotel by a hotel employee. The minor’s parents were 

not at the hotel, and the minor was staying in a room rented to his friend’s 

mother. The hotel’s insurance policy excluded coverage for molestation “by 
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anyone of any person while in the care, custody or control of the insured.” Id. 

at 576. The phrase “care, custody, or control” was not defined in the policy. 

[19] In discerning the meaning of “care” as used in an insurance policy, the court 

noted that the dictionary definition of “care” was defined as “[t]he function of 

watching, guarding, or overseeing.” Id. at 579 (citing Webster’s II New College 

Dictionary 168 (1995)). Using this definition, the supreme court focused on the 

child’s status and held that the child was in the hotel’s “care” for purposes of 

the insurance policy, as it was undisputed that the minor was molested by a 

hotel employee while he was a guest at the hotel, was staying in a room rented

to the mother of his friend, and was in the room behind a locked door when the 

employee entered and molested him.

[20] Turning to this case, when we focus on the child’s status, as did our supreme 

court in Holiday Hospitality, we conclude that J.B. was an insured under the 

Policy at the time of the accident. As defined in the Policy, an insured means 

“any other person under the age of 21 residing with [the named insured] who is 

in [the named insured’s] care . . . .” (App. Vol. 2 at 128) (emphasis omitted). It 

is undisputed that J.B., three years old at the time, was under the age of 21 and 

was residing with Shroyer. Both Shroyer and Berardicelli testified about J.B.’s 

age and that J.B., his brother, and Berardicelli lived with Shroyer at the insured 

premises from the summer of 2013 until April 2014. 

[21] It is also undisputed that Berardicelli did not work while living with Shroyer

and was not responsible for paying rent, sharing in any of the utilities, or 
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household expenses because Shroyer “[t]old [her she] didn’t have to.” (App. 

Vol. 2 at 194). Rather, Shroyer took care of the expenses himself and provided 

Berardicelli with money because they “were together.” (App. Vol. 2 at 194). 

Further, Shroyer purchased a vehicle for Berardicelli and paid for its 

maintenance and gas. Shroyer testified that he provided diapers and other 

“necessities” for J.B. and his brother. (App. Vol. 2 at 202). Although Shroyer 

would typically tell Berardicelli if the brothers needed to be disciplined, he 

“might have told them to sit in the timeout chair or something like that.” (App. 

Vol. 2 at 204). Thus, by providing a place to live, transportation, financial 

support, and other necessities, Shroyer engaged in “the function of watching, 

guarding, or overseeing[]” the various needs and overall well-being of J.B. See

Holiday Hospitality, 983 N.E.2d at 579.

[22] Shroyer’s argument that Berardicelli possessed the “sole responsibility” 

concerning the watching, guarding or overseeing of J.B. is unconvincing. 

(Shroyer’s Br. 18). The concept of “care” is not a mutually exclusive concept.

See, e.g., Holiday Hospitality, 983 N.E.2d at 580-581 (holding that hotel guest 

molested by hotel employee was under the “care, custody or control” of the 

hotel, within the meaning of a similar insurance coverage exclusion, despite 

also being in the care of his friend's mother). Although J.B. was in the care of 

his mother Berardicelli, he was still, as a matter of law, in Shroyer’s care. 

[23] Auto-Owners has demonstrated that the designated evidence negates the 

existence of any genuine issue of material fact and is entitled to judgment as a 

matter of law. Thus, under the Policy, J.B. was an insured at the time of the 
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accident and any coverage for bodily injury to J.B. is excluded. Accordingly, 

we reverse the trial court’s denial of summary judgment and remand with 

instructions to grant summary judgment in favor of Auto-Owners. 

[24] Reversed and remanded.

Najam, J., and Altice, J., concur.