UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

LARRY POWELL,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v. No. 95-3212

FLUOR DANIEL, INCORPORATED,

Defendant-Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of South Carolina, at Greenville.

G. Ross Anderson, Jr., District Judge.

(CA-94-2119-6-3AK)

Argued: December 5, 1996

Decided: January 21, 1997

Before HALL and NIEMEYER, Circuit Judges, and DAVIS,

United States District Judge for the District of Maryland,

sitting by designation.

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Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

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COUNSEL

ARGUED: Judy Pinkston McCarthy, Knoxville, Tennessee, for

Appellant. Ingrid Blackwelder Erwin, OGLETREE, DEAKINS,

NASH, SMOAK & STEWART, L.L.P., Greenville, South Carolina,

for Appellee. ON BRIEF: Benjamin P. Glass, OGLETREE,

DEAKINS, NASH, SMOAK & STEWART, L.L.P., Greenville,

South Carolina, for Appellee.

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Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See

Local Rule 36(c).

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OPINION

PER CURIAM:

Larry Powell sued Fluor Daniel, Inc., his former employer, alleging

that Fluor Daniel discriminated against him on the basis of his disability, a severe gastrointestinal disorder, by failing to provide a reasonable accommodation and by firing him because of his disability. He

brought his action under the Americans With Disabilities Act, 42

U.S.C. § 12101 et seq., and analogous Tennessee law. In his complaint, Powell alleged that, while working for Fluor Daniel in the

Ukraine, he developed the disorder, which eventually required him to

return to the United States for treatment, and that Fluor Daniel did not

make sufficient accommodation. He alleged further that because of

his condition, Fluor Daniel terminated his employment. Following a

four-day trial, the jury rendered a verdict on all claims in favor of

Fluor Daniel.

On appeal, Powell argues that the district court abused its discretion (1) in refusing to compel further testimony during pretrial depositions of Fluor Daniel, noticed under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure

30(b)(6); (2) in refusing, at trial, to admit a greater portion of Fluor

Daniel's memorandum in support of its pretrial motion for summary

judgment as an admission by a party-opponent under Federal Rule of

Evidence 801(d)(2); and (3) in preventing Powell from introducing

evidence about loss of disability benefits.

After having considered fully the arguments of counsel and reviewing the record, we cannot find that the district court abused its discretion on either the pretrial discovery issue or the challenged evidentiary matters.

While Powell has demonstrated that Fluor Daniel frustrated his

effort to use Rule 30(b)(6) effectively, the district court observed that

Powell obtained all of the discovery that he sought. And beyond his

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frustration during discovery, Powell has been unable to demonstrate

such prejudice as would require us to order a new trial.

On Powell's first evidentiary challenge -- relating to the manner

in which the district court redacted Fluor Daniel's summary judgment

memorandum -- we can find no abuse of discretion. The manner in

which to redact a document for presentation to the jury falls well

within the broad discretion allowed to trial courts in regulating evidence.

Finally, on the second evidentiary ruling relating to the admission

of evidence about Powell's disability benefits, the district court simply ruled that if Powell wished to present evidence on disability benefits of which he was allegedly deprived, the court would permit Fluor

Daniel to defend by presenting evidence on related workers compensation benefits. The court never refused Powell's introduction of the

evidence, but stated instead:

No, you can ask it, but you do so at your own peril because

you're the one that asked me to rule out certain matters and

I ruled with you. And now you're getting ready to go back

in them yourself.

(Emphasis added). In leaving such a strategic decision to Powell, the

court certainly did not abuse its discretion.

Finding no merit to Powell's assignments of error, we affirm the

judgment of the district court.

AFFIRMED

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