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Sanchez v. Hartford

JOSE SANCHEZ v. CITY OF HARTFORD ET AL.

(AC 46228)

Elgo, Clark and Westbrook, Js.

Syllabus

The plaintiff sought to recover damages from the defendants, the city of

Hartford and D, a police officer employed by the city, in connection

with injuries he sustained when a motorcycle he was driving collided

with D’s police vehicle. At the time of the accident, the plaintiff was

driving through an intersection with a green light, and D, who was

responding to an emergency call, accelerated his vehicle through the

same intersection with a red light. D activated the lights and sirens

on his vehicle pursuant to statute (§ 14-283) only as he entered the

intersection, not before. The plaintiff alleged that D’s negligence had

caused his injuries and that the city was required to indemnify D pursuant

to the municipal indemnification statute (§ 7-465). After a trial, the jury

returned a verdict for the plaintiff against both defendants, and the

trial court rendered judgment in accordance with the verdict. On the

defendants’ appeal to this court, held:

1. The defendants could not prevail on their claim that it was plain error

for the trial court to instruct the jury on common-law principles of

negligence regarding the operation of a motor vehicle and to fail to

instruct the jury that D, as an operator of an emergency vehicle, was

permitted to disregard driving statutes, ordinances and regulations:

recent decisions by our Supreme Court, including Adesokan v. Bloomfield (347 Conn. 416) and Daley v. Kashmanian (344 Conn. 464), supported a claim that the law is unsettled with respect to whether commonlaw negligence principles apply in the context of § 14-283; moreover,

the instructions to the jury regarding negligence in this case did not

amount to an error so obvious on its face that it was undebatable, as

the court’s instructions adequately apprised the jury on the applicable

exception to the ordinary rules of driving triggered on satisfaction of

the requirements of § 14-283.

2. The defendants could not prevail on their claim that the trial court committed plain error by failing to instruct the jury that § 14-283 (e) imposed

a legal duty on the plaintiff to slow down, pull over and/or stop prior

to entering an intersection when an emergency vehicle with its lights

and sirens on approached the same intersection; the court’s instruction

to the jury on contributory negligence substantially complied with the

language of § 14-283 (e) and adequately apprised the jury of the plaintiff’s

duty under § 14-283 (e), and the omission of a specific instruction was

not so obvious an error as to constitute plain error.

Argued May 16—officially released September 3, 2024
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Sanchez v. Hartford

Procedural History

Action to recover damages for, inter alia, personal

injuries sustained as a result of the alleged negligence

of the defendant James Davis, brought to the Superior

Court in the judicial district of Hartford and tried to

the jury before Baio, J.; verdict and judgment for the

plaintiff, from which the defendants appealed to this

court. Affirmed.

Thomas R. Gerarde, with whom were Demar G.

Osbourne and Lidia M. Michols, for the appellants

(defendants).

Michael J. Reilly, for the appellee (plaintiff).

Opinion

WESTBROOK, J. The defendants, the city of Hartford

(city) and James Davis, a police officer employed by

the city, appeal from the judgment of the trial court

rendered after a jury trial finding Davis negligent in

violation of General Statutes § 14-283,1 the city liable

for indemnification pursuant to General Statutes § 7-

465,2 and finding the plaintiff, Jose Sanchez, contributorily negligent. On appeal, the defendants claim that

1 General Statutes § 14-283 provides in relevant part: ‘‘(b) (1) The operator

of an emergency vehicle may . . . (B) except as provided in subdivision

(2) of this subsection, proceed past any red light, stop signal or stop sign,

but only after slowing down or stopping to the extent necessary for the

safe operation of such vehicle . . . .’’ 2 General Statutes § 7-465 (a) provides in relevant part that ‘‘[a]ny town,

city or borough, notwithstanding any inconsistent provision of law, general,

special or local, shall pay on behalf of any employee of such municipality

. . . all sums which such employee becomes obligated to pay by reason of

the liability imposed upon such employee by law for damages awarded for

infringement of any person’s civil rights or for physical damages to person

or property, except as set forth in this section, if the employee, at the time

of the occurrence, accident, physical injury or damages complained of,

was acting in the performance of his duties and within the scope of his

employment, and if such occurrence, accident, physical injury or damage

was not the result of any wilful or wanton act of such employee in the

discharge of such duty. . . .’’
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Sanchez v. Hartford

the court committed plain error3 by (1) (a) instructing

the jury on common law principles of negligence regarding the operation of a motor vehicle, including the duty

to drive with due care, and (b) failing to instruct the

jury that Davis, as an operator of an emergency vehicle,

was permitted to disregard driving statutes, ordinances

and regulations, and (2) failing to instruct the jury that,

pursuant to § 14-283 (e), other operators of motor vehicles have a mandatory duty to drive to a position parallel

to the curb of the roadway and remain there until the

emergency vehicle has passed, ‘‘[u]pon the immediate

approach of an emergency vehicle making use of . . .

an audible warning signal device and such visible flashing or revolving lights . . . .’’4 General Statutes § 14-

283 (e). We conclude that the record does not support

3 The defendants failed to take exception to, and acquiesced in, the jury

instructions following an opportunity to review them. ‘‘Relevant to the issue

of waiver in the context of jury instruction claims, our Supreme Court stated

that when the trial court provides counsel with a copy of the proposed

jury instructions, allows a meaningful opportunity for their review, solicits

comments from counsel regarding changes or modifications and counsel

affirmatively accepts the instructions proposed or given, the defendant may

be deemed to have knowledge of any potential flaws therein and to have

waived implicitly the constitutional right to challenge the instructions on

direct appeal.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Leach, 165 Conn.

App. 28, 32, 138 A.3d 445, cert. denied, 323 Conn. 948, 169 A.3d 792 (2016).

A court may, however, review an unpreserved claim under the plain error

doctrine. See State v. Bellamy, 323 Conn. 400, 437, 147 A.3d 655 (2016). The

plain error doctrine, ‘‘codified at Practice Book § 60-5, is an extraordinary

remedy used by appellate courts [only] to rectify errors committed at trial

that, although unpreserved, are of such monumental proportion that they

threaten to erode our system of justice and work a serious and manifest

injustice on the aggrieved party.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id.

The defendants’ attorney conceded at oral argument before this court

that all of the defendants’ claims were unpreserved and are made under

the plain error doctrine. 4 The defendants additionally argue that the trial court improperly failed

to charge the jury that driving with due regard for safety under § 14-283

‘‘involved a discretionary determination by the operator of the emergency

vehicle.’’ We need not address this claim, however, because it is apparent

that this claim is an attempt to apply discretionary act immunity under

General Statutes § 52-557n to this case. Our Supreme Court’s recent decisions in Adesokan v. Bloomfield, 347 Conn. 416, 297 A.3d 983 (2023), and
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Sanchez v. Hartford

the defendants’ claims that the challenged portions of

the jury instructions constituted plain error. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The following facts, which the jury reasonably could

have found, and procedural history are relevant to the

defendants’ claims on appeal. On June 13, 2018, the

plaintiff was injured in an automobile accident. At the

time of the accident, the plaintiff was driving a motorcycle through a green light in a southbound direction on

Wethersfield Avenue in Hartford. Davis was responding

to an emergency call5 and accelerated his vehicle

through a red light on Brown Street heading in an eastbound direction. Davis, in accordance with the city’s

policy and § 14-283, had the lights and sirens of his

police cruiser on as he travelled through the red light,

but he had turned the lights and sirens on only as he

entered the intersection, not before.6 The plaintiff’s

motorcycle collided into the side of the police cruiser

shortly after the cruiser entered the intersection.

In October, 2018, the plaintiff brought a claim of

negligence against Davis alleging a violation of § 14-

283, and a claim of indemnification against the city

Daley v. Kashmanian, 344 Conn. 464, 280 A.3d 68 (2022), however, clearly

hold that discretionary act immunity under § 52-557n does not apply to

driving a motor vehicle in either emergency or nonemergency circumstances. The defendants’ citations to Borelli v. Renaldi, 336 Conn. 1, 243

A.3d 1064 (2020), in support of their claim are not persuasive, because

Borelli held that the decision to initiate a police chase, as distinguished

from the manner of driving an emergency vehicle, was protected as a

discretionary act under § 52-557n. See id., 3–4. We therefore conclude that

it was not plain error for the court to fail to charge the jury regarding the

‘‘discretionary determination by the operator of the emergency vehicle.’’ 5 Davis was responding to a report of an individual with a mental illness

experiencing hallucinations in the intersection of Wethersfield Avenue, Airport Road and Brown Street. 6 Davis turned off the police cruiser’s lights and sirens as he approached

the intersection so as not to disturb the individual reportedly in the intersection. He turned both the lights and sirens back on only as he began to enter

the intersection of Wethersfield Avenue and Brown Street.
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Sanchez v. Hartford

pursuant to § 7-465. The defendants filed an answer (1)

denying liability and (2) asserting a number of special

defenses, including contributory negligence.

The matter was tried before a jury over the course

of several days in November, 2022. During trial, the

trial court, Baio, J., requested that the parties submit

proposed jury charges and interrogatories. The defendants did not submit any jury charges prior to the court’s

deadline for doing so.7 After the close of evidence, the

court conducted a charging conference and summarized the results of the conference on the record, which

reflected that the defendants did not object to the jury

charges now challenged on appeal.8

The parties subsequently submitted proposed jury

interrogatories. The plaintiff’s proposed interrogatories

tracked the language of § 14-283. The defendants’ proposed interrogatories focused instead on discretionary

act immunity. The trial court, in light of our Supreme

Court’s recent decision in Daley v. Kashmanian, 344

Conn. 464, 280 A.3d 68 (2022), reserved for itself the

question of whether governmental immunity would

apply to the facts presented, and opted to use the plaintiff’s jury interrogatories rather than the defendants’.

In its charge to the jury, the trial court explained that

the plaintiff was asserting a claim of negligence. The

court instructed the jury that ‘‘[n]egligence is the doing

of something which a reasonably prudent person would

not do under the circumstances,’’ and that ‘‘[t]he use

of proper care in a given situation is the care which an

7 The defendants submitted two proposed jury charges after the deadline,

one charge regarding foreseeability and another regarding sudden emergency. The court declined to add these untimely charges because the first

was already subsumed in a different proposed charge and the second was

irrelevant to the case. 8 The defendants expressed concern only over the lack of inclusion of

the factors of foreseeability and emergency circumstances in the negligence charge.
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Sanchez v. Hartford

ordinarily prudent person would use in view of the

surrounding circumstances.’’ The court explained that

the plaintiff alleged that Davis ‘‘was negligent in that

he violated § 14-283,’’ and that, ‘‘[i]n order to find [Davis]

negligent, [the jury] must find that he proceeded

through the red light without due regard as set forth

in the statute.’’ The court additionally explained several

common-law principles of negligence related to the

operation of a motor vehicle, including failure to yield

the right of way, failure to keep and maintain a reasonable and proper lookout for other vehicles on the roadway, failure to keep the vehicle under proper and reasonable control, failure to turn the vehicle to avoid the

collision, failure to apply brakes in a timely fashion,

and operating the vehicle in a careless manner and

failing, under the circumstances, to take reasonable and

proper precautions to avoid the probability of harm.

The court instructed the jury that the defendants had

asserted a special defense of comparative negligence

and that they claimed that the plaintiff was negligent

because he ‘‘failed to stop, yield, or keep a reasonable

and proper lookout for emergency vehicles in violation

of . . . § 14-283 and [General Statutes §] 14-283b.’’

After deliberation, the jury returned a verdict in favor

of the plaintiff against both defendants in the amount

of $1,069,649.04. The jury found Davis negligent and the

plaintiff contributorily negligent, assigning 35 percent

comparative negligence to the plaintiff. In its special

interrogatories, the jury specifically found that Davis

failed (1) to slow down or stop to the extent necessary

for the safe operation of his vehicle when he proceeded

past the red light and (2) to operate his vehicle at the

time of the incident with due regard for the safety of

all persons and property given all the circumstances

and conditions then present. The court accepted the

jury’s verdict and rendered judgment in accordance

with the verdict on November 18, 2022.
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Sanchez v. Hartford

The defendants filed posttrial motions, including a

motion to set aside the verdict on the grounds that the

defendants were immune from liability for negligence

under the doctrine of governmental immunity and that

the jury instructions and special interrogatories were

prejudicial, irrelevant, and resulted in jury confusion.

The court heard oral argument on the defendants’ posttrial motions on January 13, 2023. After oral argument,

the court denied the motions. This appeal followed.

The following legal principles guide our analysis of

the defendants’ claims. ‘‘It is well established that the

plain error doctrine, codified at Practice Book § 60-5,9

is an extraordinary remedy used by appellate courts to

rectify errors committed at trial that, although unpreserved [and nonconstitutional in nature], are of such

monumental proportion that they threaten to erode our

system of justice and work a serious and manifest injustice on the aggrieved party. [T]he plain error doctrine

. . . is not . . . a rule of reviewability. It is a rule of

reversibility. That is, it is a doctrine that this court

invokes in order to rectify a trial court ruling that,

although either not properly preserved or never raised

at all in the trial court, nonetheless requires reversal

of the trial court’s judgment . . . for reasons of policy.’’

(Footnote added; internal quotation marks omitted.)

State v. Ruocco, 322 Conn. 796, 803, 144 A.3d 354 (2016).

‘‘An appellate court addressing a claim of plain error

first must determine if the error is indeed plain in the

sense that it is patent [or] readily [discernible] on the

face of a factually adequate record, [and] also . . .

obvious in the sense of not debatable. . . . This determination clearly requires a review of the plain error

9 Practice Book § 60-5 provides in relevant part that ‘‘[t]he court may

reverse or modify the decision of the trial court if it determines that the

factual findings are clearly erroneous in view of the evidence and pleadings

in the whole record, or that the decision is otherwise erroneous in law. . . .’’
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Sanchez v. Hartford

claim presented in light of the record. Although a complete record and an obvious error are prerequisites for

plain error review, they are not, of themselves, sufficient for its application. . . . [T]he plain error doctrine

is reserved for truly extraordinary situations [in which]

the existence of the error is so obvious that it affects

the fairness and integrity of and public confidence in

the judicial proceedings. . . . [I]n addition to examining the patent nature of the error, the reviewing court

must examine that error for the grievousness of its

consequences in order to determine whether reversal

under the plain error doctrine is appropriate. A party

cannot prevail under plain error unless it has demonstrated that the failure to grant relief will result in manifest injustice. . . . [Previously], [our Supreme Court]

described the two-pronged nature of the plain error

doctrine: [An appellant] cannot prevail under [the plain

error doctrine] . . . unless he demonstrates that the

claimed error is both so clear and so harmful that a

failure to reverse the judgment would result in manifest

injustice.’’ (Citations omitted; emphasis in original;

internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. McClain,

324 Conn. 802, 812, 155 A.3d 209 (2017).

I

The defendants first claim that it was plain error

for the trial court to instruct the jury on common-law

principles of negligence regarding the operation of a

motor vehicle and for the court to fail to instruct the

jury that Davis, as an operator of an emergency vehicle,

was permitted to disregard driving statutes, ordinances

and regulations. We disagree.

We turn to the first prong of the plain error doctrine,

namely, whether the trial court’s decision to instruct

the jury on common-law principles of negligence

regarding the operation of a motor vehicle, and its failure to instruct the jury that Davis, as an operator of an
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Sanchez v. Hartford

emergency vehicle, was permitted to disregard driving

statutes, ordinances and regulations, was so patent or

readily discernible an error as to constitute plain error.

To determine whether the trial court committed plain

error in instructing the jury on common-law principles

of negligence regarding the operation of a motor vehicle, we must examine the trial court’s jury instructions,

mindful that, ‘‘[j]ury instructions are to be read as a

whole, and instructions claimed to be improper are read

in the context of the entire charge. . . . A jury charge

is to be considered from the standpoint of its effect on

the jury in guiding it to a correct verdict. . . . The test

to determine if a jury charge is proper is whether it

fairly presents the case to the jury in such a way that

injustice is not done to either party under the established rules of law. . . . [I]nstructions to the jury need

not be in the precise language of a request. . . . Moreover, [j]ury instructions need not be exhaustive, perfect

or technically accurate, so long as they are correct in

law, adapted to the issues and sufficient for the guidance of the jury.’’ (Citations omitted; internal quotation

marks omitted.) McDermott v. Calvary Baptist Church,

263 Conn. 378, 383–84, 819 A.2d 795 (2003).

The trial court in this case instructed the jury that

‘‘the plaintiff specifically allege[d] that [Davis] was negligent in that he violated § 14-283 of the General Statutes

and [the city’s] general order concerning the operation

of police vehicles.

‘‘Where it would normally be a mandated finding of

lack of due care for a civilian to proceed against a red

light, [§] 14-283 permits a police officer to do so in

certain circumstances. The statute permits the officer,

if the operator of any emergency vehicle, to do so only

after slowing down or stopping to the extent necessary

for the safe operation of such vehicle and only if driving
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Sanchez v. Hartford

with due regard for the safety of all persons and property. Emergency vehicle is defined in relevant part as

any vehicle operated by a police officer ‘answering an

emergency call or in pursuit of fleeing law violators.’

You may consider as evidence of what is required to

determine due regard such things as the [police] manual

and the circumstances then and there existing, including for example, sight lines, the ability to stop and the

like. In order to find [Davis] negligent, you must find

that he proceeded through the red light without due

regard as set forth in the statute.’’

The court also instructed the jury on several commonlaw principles of negligence, including the failure to

‘‘yield the right of way to the plaintiff’s vehicle,’’ ‘‘keep

and maintain a reasonable and proper lookout for other

vehicles on the roadway,’’ ‘‘keep his vehicle under

proper and reasonable control,’’ ‘‘turn his vehicle to the

left or to the right to avoid the collision,’’ ‘‘apply his

brakes in a timely fashion to avoid the collision when,

in the exercise of reasonable care, he could and should

have done so,’’ ‘‘sound his horn or otherwise signal or

warn the plaintiff of the impending collision,’’ and ‘‘take

reasonable and proper precautions to avoid the probability of harm to the plaintiff’’ under the circumstances

then and there existing.

The defendants in this case contend that the jury

instructions were flawed because the jury should have

been instructed only in accordance with § 14-283 once

the requirements of the statute were satisfied, and not

with common-law principles of negligence. The defendants argue that, under a plain reading of § 14-283, the

only way a police officer responding to an emergency

in accordance with the statute can be found negligent

is if he or she was found to have not been ‘‘[driving]

with due regard for the safety of all persons and property’’ and not ‘‘if they do not abide by traffic laws such

as failing to yield the right of way to the [plaintiff’s]
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Sanchez v. Hartford

vehicle.’’ They argue that it was therefore plain error

for the court to instruct the jury in this case on other

principles of negligence and to fail to instruct the jury

that, under § 14-283, ‘‘emergency operators are authorized to disregard statutes, ordinances or regulations

governing direction of movement or turning in a specific

direction’’ because the requirements of § 14-283 were

met.

Recent cases from our Supreme Court, however,

undermine the defendants’ claim. In Adesokan v.

Bloomfield, 347 Conn. 416, 441, 297 A.3d 983 (2023),

our Supreme Court stated, ‘‘by its own terms, § 14-

283 (d) imposes . . . a negligence standard of care on

emergency vehicle operators . . . .’’ ‘‘Section 14-283

provides the operators of emergency vehicles relief in

certain discrete circumstances—such as the response

to an emergency or the police pursuit of a fleeing law

violator—from what ordinarily would be negligence per

se, namely, the operation of a motor vehicle in violation

of rules of the road such as speed limits and traffic

control devices. . . . The effect of the statute is merely

to displace the conclusive presumption of negligence

that ordinarily arises from the violation of traffic rules.

The statute does not relieve operators of emergency

vehicles from their general duty to exercise due care

for the safety of others.’’ (Citation omitted; emphasis

added; footnote omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Daley v. Kashmanian, supra, 344 Conn. 492.

We conclude that the question of whether § 14-283

precludes the application of other common-law principles of negligence is unsettled and that, as a result, it

was not plain error for the court to instruct the jury on

both § 14-283 and common-law forms of negligence.

‘‘[W]e emphasize that it has been especially rare for a

jury instruction to be so clearly improper that our courts

have deemed plain error review necessary to correct

it. . . . This court has done so when the trial court has
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Sanchez v. Hartford

affirmatively misstated the law . . . and when it has

failed to comply with a statute that mandates a particular instruction. . . . We do not suggest that there are

no other circumstances in which an instruction could

constitute plain error, but the reluctance with which

we have chosen that course underscores that plain error

is reserved for only the most egregious defects.’’ (Citations omitted.) State v. Kyle A., 348 Conn. 437, 448, 307

A.3d 249 (2024). On the basis of our review of our

Supreme Court’s decisions in Daley and Adesokan, we

are not persuaded that the court’s jury instruction

addressing both § 14-283 and common-law principles

of negligence amounted to an error so obvious on its

face that is beyond debate. Existing case law, at best,

supports a claim the law is unsettled with respect to

whether common-law negligence principles apply in the

context of § 14-283.

We additionally are not persuaded that, when read

as a whole, the court’s instructions inadequately

apprised the jury that, under § 14-283, ‘‘emergency operators are authorized to disregard statutes, ordinances

or regulations governing direction of movement or turning in a specific direction.’’ The court noted in its

instruction to the jury that § 14-283 provides an exception to the drivers of emergency vehicles, stating that,

‘‘[w]here it would normally be a mandated finding of

lack of due care for a civilian to proceed against a red

light, [§] 14-283 permits a police officer to do so in

certain circumstances.’’ Although not stated in the specific language of § 14-283, the court’s instructions adequately apprised the jury on the applicable exception

to the ordinary rules of driving triggered on the satisfaction of the requirements of the statute. We accordingly

conclude that it was not plain error for the court to

not specifically instruct the jury that, under § 14-283,

‘‘emergency operators are authorized to disregard statutes, ordinances or regulations governing direction of

movement or turning in a specific direction.’’
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Sanchez v. Hartford

We are therefore unpersuaded that the court’s negligence instructions amounted to an error so obvious on

its face that is undebatable. We accordingly conclude

that the negligence jury instructions in this case were

not so clearly and obviously wrong that, when read as

a whole, they constitute plain error.10

II

The defendants next claim that the court committed

plain error by failing to instruct the jury that § 14-283

imposed a legal duty on operators of motor vehicles,

such as the plaintiff, to slow down, pull over and/or stop

prior to entering an intersection when an emergency

vehicle with its lights and sirens on approaches the

same intersection. We disagree.

We turn to the first prong of the plain error doctrine,

as previously set forth in part I of this opinion, namely,

whether the trial court’s failure to instruct the jury that

the plaintiff ‘‘had a mandatory obligation to immediately

drive to a position parallel to, and as close as possible

to, the right-hand curb of the roadway, keep clear of

an intersection, and stop and remain in such position

until the emergency vehicle passed pursuant to . . .

§ 14-283’’ is so clear an error that a failure to reverse

the judgment would result in manifest injustice.

In the present case, the court instructed the jury

that ‘‘the defendant[s] must prove that the plaintiff was

negligent in one or more of the ways specified in the

special defense and that such negligence was a legal

cause of any of the plaintiff’s injuries.

10 ‘‘Having determined that the [defendants’] claim fails under the first

prong of the plain error doctrine, we need not reach the second prong,

which examines whether failure to correct the alleged error would result

in manifest injustice. See State v. Blaine, 334 Conn. 298, 313 n.5, 221 A.3d

798 (2019) (declining to reach second prong of plain error doctrine because

defendant’s claim failed under first prong).’’ Cookish v. Commissioner of

Correction, 337 Conn. 348, 359, 253 A.3d 467 (2020).
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Sanchez v. Hartford

‘‘The special defense filed by the defendant[s] alleges

a number of specific ways in which the plaintiff was

negligent. . . . To establish that the plaintiff was negligent, it is not necessary for the defendant[s] to prove

all of these specific allegations. The proof by a preponderance of the evidence of any one of these specific

allegations is sufficient to prove negligence on the part

of the plaintiff. The [defendants claim] that the plaintiff’s injury was the result of his own negligence in that

... he failed to stop, yield, or keep a reasonable and

proper lookout for . . . emergency vehicles in violation of . . . §§ 14-283 and 14-283b.’’ (Emphasis

added.)

The defendants argue that ‘‘[t]he court should have

instructed the jury that, if they found that the [plaintiff]

failed to drive to a position parallel to the right-hand

edge or curb of the roadway and remain stopped in

that position until the emergency vehicle passed, then

the jury could find that the [plaintiff] was contributorily

negligent pursuant to . . . § 14-283.’’

Although the court did not read verbatim the duty in

§ 14-283 (e) that, ‘‘[u]pon the immediate approach of

[a] . . . local police vehicle properly and lawfully making use of an audible warning signal device . . . the

operator of every other vehicle in the immediate vicinity

shall immediately drive to a position parallel to, and as

close as possible to, the right-hand edge or curb of the

roadway clear of any intersection and shall stop and

remain in such position until the emergency vehicle has

passed,’’ this omission did not constitute plain error.

The court’s instruction to the jury on contributory negligence, including that it consider whether the plaintiff

had failed to ‘‘stop, yield, or keep a reasonable and

proper lookout for emergency vehicles in violation of

. . . §§ 14-283 and 14-283b,’’ substantially complied

with the statutory language of § 14-283. A plain reading

of the instruction as given is that it is a violation of
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Sanchez v. Hartford

§ 14-283 to fail to stop and yield upon the approach of

an emergency vehicle. As previously stated in part I of

this opinion, ‘‘[t]he test to determine if a jury charge is

proper is whether it fairly presents the case to the jury

in such a way that injustice is not done to either party

under the established rules of law,’’ and ‘‘[j]ury instructions need not be exhaustive, perfect or technically

accurate, so long as they are correct in law, adapted

to the issues and sufficient for the guidance of the jury.’’

(Emphasis added; internal quotation marks omitted.)

McDermott v. Calvary Baptist Church, supra, 263 Conn.

383–84. We are not persuaded that the court’s omission

of a specific instruction that an operator’s duty is triggered by an approaching police vehicle with its sirens

on, or that an operator is negligent when they fail to

drive to a position parallel to the right-hand edge or

curb of the roadway upon the immediate approach of

a police vehicle with its sirens on was so obvious an

error so as to constitute plain error. Taken as a whole,

we conclude that the instruction fairly and adequately

apprised the jury of the plaintiff’s duty under § 14-

283 (e).

The instruction as given generally tracks § 14-283 (e)

and gave the jury a clear understanding of the issue

presented under the cause of action, defenses, and evidence presented. We therefore conclude that the court’s

instruction on the defendants’ special defense under

§ 14-283 in this case was not so clearly and patently

wrong that it rose to the level of plain error.11

The judgment is affirmed.

In this opinion the other judges concurred.

11 See footnote 10 of this opinion.