### IN THE CO URT OF CR IMINAL APPEALS OF T ENN ESSEE AT NASHVILL E Feb ru ary 10 , 20 09 Ses si on

STATE OF TENNESS EE v . RICHARD ANTHO NY ARRIOLA

Appeal f rom the Cr im inal Cou rt for Davidson Coun ty No. 95-D- 2835 Monte Wat kin s, Jud ge

No. M2007- 00428-CCA -R3-C D - F iled Augu st 26, 2009

After conducting a bench trial, the trial court found the Def endant, Richard Anthony Arriola, g uilty of one count of first deg ree murder, one count of attempted first deg ree murder, a nd two counts of attempted second deg ree murder. The trial court sentenc ed the Def endant to a

n eff ective sentenc e of life imprisonment plus fiftee n y ear s. This Court rema nded the case to the trial court for an order clar ify ing its finding s on the insanity defe nse. On a

ppeal, the Def

endant claims: (1) the trial court

err ed when it used an improper leg al standard for the insanity defe nse; and (2) the evidenc e prese nted
at trial proved by clea

r and convincing evidenc e that the Def en d an t was not g uilty by rea son of insanity

. After a thoro u gh revie w of the rec ord and the applicable law, we conclude that the trial
court ap p l i ed an improper leg al standard for the insanity defe nse. There fore
, we reve rse the convictions and re mand for a new tria l.

Tenn. R. App . 3 Appeal; Jud gm ent of the Crim inal Cou rt R ever sed and Rem anded

R O B E R T W. W E D E M E Y E R , J
., delivere d the opinion of the co u rt , in which D A V I D H. W E L L E S and T H O M A S T. W O O D A L L , J J ., joined.

J eff rey DeVa sher and Aimee Solway
, Nashville, Tenne s s ee (o n appea l); Ross Alderma n and J

. Michae l Eng le, Nashville, Te nnessee (at trial) , for the A ppellant, Richard A nthony Arriola.

Robert E. Cooper, J r., Attorney Gene ral and Reporter ; Michae l E. Moore, Solicitor Gene ral; J ames E. Gaylord, Assistant Attorney Gene ral; Vict o r S

. J ohnson, I I I
, District Attorney Gene ral; Roge r Moore, Assistant District Attorney Gene ral, for

the Appellee , State of Tenne ssee.

OP INION

I. F acts

1A. Trial

I n our rema

nd to the trial co u rt for clar ification of its finding s on the insanity defe nse, we summarized the rele vant fa cts:

This case arises from a standoff betwee n the Def endant and the Davidson County Sheriff’ s Depa

rtment on September 22, 1995, which resulted in the death of Offic er J err

y Newsome

. The Def

endant was indicted on char g es of one count of first deg ree murder, one count of attempted first deg ree murder, and two counts of attempted second deg ree murder. The Def endant waived his rig ht to a jury trial. At his trial, the rele vant evidenc e included: the Def endant was a well-a djusted a n d a c ti v e y oung man as he completed high school. After enrolling in colleg e at the University of Tenne ssee- Martin, he beg an exhibi ting sy mptoms of mental illness. Acc ording
to his mo ther, Viola Couser, and his brother, J ohn Arriola, the Def endant beca

me

rec lusive and para

noid. After completing only o n e t ri m ester, the Def endant left colleg e and moved back home to Nashville. He then trave led around the world, later claiming to ha

ve visited Jerusalem a

nd to have joined a

relig ious g roup in F lorida. When the Def

endant would “trav el
, ” h e wo uld leave home for months at a time, taking only a “pac k on his bac k ” and not tell his family his plans. The Def endant also enlisted in the Navy (and was discharg ed af ter three to four months for an unknown rea son) and g ot marrie d for less than a month. When he was in Nashville, he worke d at his step-fa ther’s restaur ant peeling potatoes. Whil e he was at home, he
eng ag ed in peculiar activities like prea ching on street corne rs and on his front porch when no one was near him to listen. He alwa y s car ried a Bible with him, and he
repe atedly tried to baptize his family

. The Def endant was even arr ested once for
prea ching outside in the rain.

Acc ording to Couser, the Def endant was first hospitaliz ed for mental health
trea tment in 1987. He re m ai n ed at Middle Tenne ssee Mental Hea lth I nstitut e (MTMHI ) for thirty day s, wher e the doctors diagnosed him with para noid schizophrenia. The Def

endant was rele ased with order s to stay on his medicine and continue trea tment, but he did neither. The Def endant was hospitaliz ed at MTMHI for another thirty day s in 1988, wher e he was trea ted ag ain for para

noid schizophrenia. Simi lar to bef o re , u p o n rele ase, he ref

used t o take his medication. Around 1989 or 1990, the Def endant moved from the upstairs of his pare nts’ house into their baseme nt, which he kept “clutter ed u p , ” according to his mother. The Def endant was hospita l i z ed a t h ird time in 1991 at Ba ptist Hospital as a result of judicial order

. The Def

endant had g otten into a fist fig ht with his older brother, J ohn,

over the issue of the Def endant not bathing reg ularly

. J ohn ag ree d to drop t h e char g es if the Def

endant enter ed an inpatient t re at ment fac ility

. He was kept for thirty day s, trea ted for para noid sc hizophrenia, and rele ased. Acc ording to Couser
, afte r the Def

endant was rele ased, h e s t o p p ed his trea tment; when descr ibing one manifestation of her son’s illness when he stopped his medication, she sai d
, he

2“w as n ’t keeping himself clea n. He g rew the bear d and he wasn’t g etting his h ai r cut.”

I n September 1995, the Def endant be g an posting signs f or hi s “businesses” in his neig hborhood. The Def endant tho u gh t he ran a scuba diving business, an elec trician business, and an adver tising business. When the police serve d his pare nts with a war

rant, order ing that the signs be remove d or they pay a fine, the Def endant threa tened the police with his neig hbor’s dog s. The Def endant’ s pare nts took down his signs to avoid pay ing a fine, but the Def endant repla ced the signs and ref used to

remove them. The Def

endant’ s pare nts both thought if they serve d the Def endant with an eviction war

rant, the judge could commit the Def endant for trea tment or, at least, have the Def

endant a g ree to treatment, similar to what ha ppened in 1991.

On September 22, 1995, Offic er J ohnnie Spears and Offic er J err y Newsome

arr ived at t he Def

endant’ s house to serve him with the eviction war rant. Offic er Spears wore his badg e in a visible location, and Offic er Newsome wore a g ree n and
tan Sheriff’ s Depa

rtment uniform. They knocked on the door with their night sticks,
to avoid another threa t involving the neig hbor’ s d o g s. The Def endant “ca

me out sideway s with his hand behind his back. .

. . He was cussing .” Offi cer Spears said he dropped the war

rant on the g round, and as he started to turn, “that’s when [t he Def end an t ] s h o t me in the mid-section, and it knocked me down.” Offic er Spears also saw Offic er Newsome “g rab his chest and fall.” Offic er Spears said the Def endant was orig inally firing a handg un, but as he made his way back to his police cruiser to call for he lp, the Def

endant beg an using a camouf lag ed shotgun. Offic er Sp ea rs t houg ht Offic er Newsome was dead beca use he never saw him move afte r falling

. Of

fi cer Spears made a radio call signa ling that a “police office r [was] in serious dang er.”

Offic er Mike Hag ar arr ived at the scene afte r hear ing the radio call. He saw Offic er Newsome ly ing in the g rass and not moving. After additional police arr ived, they rea liz ed the Def

endant was still in the baseme nt, and they called for the SW AT
team. Offic er Hag ar stated that the Defenda nt’s brother, J ohn Arriola, c ame to the

s ce n e and war

ned them that the Def

endant was schizophrenic. Offic er Hag ar sai d that, while he was at the scene , no shots wer e fired befor e the SW AT team went into the house.

When the S WAT team ar rived, they divided up into two teams: one for the upstairs portion of the house and one for the baseme nt portion of the house. They initially tried neg otiating with the De fenda nt, but there was no response

. After the
neg otiation failed, the SW AT team beg an to move into the house. Be fore the baseme nt team made it into the house, they beg an “dra wing fire” from the Def

endant afte r throwing two “distrac tion device s” into the house. Distraction device s are stun g rena des t hat “cause[] a c o n cu s s ion.

. . . And i f [ a person is] looking at it the flash

3will temporar ily blind them.” After throwing in the second device
, the SW AT team

hear d g un s h o t s

. According to Offic er Randy Hickman, one of the SW AT team members on the “upstairs” team, “once we dropped the device s , [ t he Def endant] fire[d] two, approx imately two shots, at us , up the s tairca se t here

. Then we g [a] ve commands to come out, and at which time he fired about, approximately
, two more shots at us, up the steps. I could see the rounds ric ochet.”

As the S WAT team was “thinking of what [ it was ] go i n g t o do next, that’s when the suspect came out” of the house. Offic er Hy de said the baseme nt was “filled with smoke,” and, as the Def en dant came out cursing
, one SW AT team member kicked the Def

endant’s lower body to knock him on the ground. At that point, the Def endant tried g rabbing the office r’s wea pon, but only manag ed to g rab the strap. Eventually
, the Def

endant was arr ested and put into a van for transport to the hospital to chec k on his injuries.

Offic er Pat Posti g lione, an office r on the murder squad, helped transport the Def endant to the hospital. He descr ibed the De fenda nt as “ve ry

subdued” a

nd said the Def endant ref used to g ive a statement beca use “he didn’t trust the g overnme nt.” Offic er L arr

y Flair
, another office r of the murder squad, char acte rized the Def endant

as “c o here nt, conscious.” I n fac t, the Def endant chose not to waive his Mira n d a rig hts when they wer e g iven to him, and he ref used to g ive consent to sear ch his
proper ty

. Once t h e De fenda

nt was out of the baseme nt, various office rs of the murder squad sear ched the baseme nt for wea pons. Offic er Bill Pridemore descr ibed the baseme nt as “ver

y disarra y ed. Thing s [were] scatter ed throug hout the floor.” The off icer s found a ha

ndg un in a hole in the dry wall.

Doctor Br

uce L evy , the curr ent medical ex aminer for Nashville and a specia list i n fore nsic patholog y , testified that Off icer J err y Newsome was shot five times: three times with a handg un and two times with a shotgun. Three of the shots

wer e quickly

fata l.

Since the arr est, the Def

endant has been housed at MTMHI and underg oing thera py and trea tment for para noid schizoph re n i a. Some of the Def endant’ s delusions included that his mother did not g ive birth to him; rathe r, he believed she found him at an airport. The Def endant also had a fasc ination with relig ion, and he believed he neede d to bapt i z e his family members in his bathtub. Dr. Rokey a Fa rooque, one of the Def

endant’ s doctors at MTMHI
, testified that the Def enda nt “[believed] that he would be the next Pope. He owned the g overnme nt world bank. He owned the g overnme nt of the United States.” Additionally
, he believed h e invented the bar code

. Dr. Fa rooque discussed the Def endant’ s “g radua l d et er i orating function” at g rea t leng th. She said he was diag nosed ag ain wi t h
para noid schizophrenia in 1996, which t o o k i nto acc ount his bizarre behavior s, relig i o u s ideas, loose speec h, hallucinations, delusional thinking, g randiose

4delusional th in k in g , a n d p e r s e c u to r ia l delusional thinking. Dr. Fa rooque testified that

on September 22, 1995, the Def endant was psy chotic and was not able to appre ciate the wrongf

ulness of hi s actions. I n fac t, she said he f elt justified to defend himself beca use he thoug ht he owned e very thing.

The Def endant was also trea ted by Dr. Samuel Craddock, who echoe d Dr. Fa rooque’ s opinion that the Def endant could not appre ciate the wrong fulness of his actions. Dr. Craddock descr ibed the Def endant as “suspicious of just about

ever y body that he encounte red.” He also stated that the Def endant believed he owned Palm Be ach, Florida

. Speaking of the September 1995 shooting incident, Dr. Craddock said, “I think even if [t he Def endant] wer e a specta tor, though, acr oss the
street watching what was occur ring
, I am not so sure that he could compre hend even what was g oing o n h e was so mentally ill, much less being able to participa te and having the emotional involvement.” Whenever the Def endant was asked about the shooting incident, he complained of “burning sen s at ions.” He also suffe red from those sensations when the doctors sug g ested that he take some psy cholog ical tests. Moreove r, Dr. Cradd o ck convey ed that the Def endant told him that he would not have done any

thing illega l, imply ing that he did not know his shooting the police was illega l.

Dr. Patricia Corry explained that the Def endant had two “plans” as part of his mental illness. “Plan A” include d all of his purely delusional thoug hts, such as, he
was g oing to be come King Richard. “Plan B” included his thoug hts a nd memories

conce rning the September 22, 1995, shooting. When talking about the shooting, the Def endant only rec alls “intruding thoughts that - rea lly voices, or fee lings, or things that - he thought he could float around outside his body
, things t h at he could fee l inside his body as well.” The Def endant told Dr. Corry that he hear d “v o ices that told hi m to shoot and kill any body that messed with him.” Dr. Corry said the Def endant thought the ship the Quee n Mary I I was on its way to Florida to take him and Vane ssa Corona, one of the char acte rs the Def endant cre ated in his mind, to the Vatica n. He believed that Corona was the Dis trict Attorney in Miami, Florida and that she would leave the United States with him when he beca me King Richard, the President of the United States, or the first American J ew i s h Pope. Whil e in
trea tment, the Def

en d an t planned which eig hty -five countries he was g oing to conquer and rule when he beca me king. The Def

endant consistently believed himself
to be either a saint or a prea cher

. Dr. Corry also elab o ra t ed t h at the Def endant believed one of the deputies had a virus that “wa s just kind of fre e-f low” and it could move from c omputers to humans in the Def endant’ s thoughts. The De fenda nt was afr aid of c ontrac ting this virus when the police came to his door. Additionally , the Def endant believed the CI A met in a churc h on W es t E n d Avenue in Nashville, Tenne ssee two months prior to the shooting

.

The De fenda

nt was in custody

from 1995 until 2006 before he was deeme d

5competent to stand trial. Dr. Ronnie S t o u t, another of the Def endant’ s doctors at MTMHI
, said that the Def endant’ s treatment pr og ress wa s very slow, partially due to the difficulty

of asc erta ining the pr oper me dication for him.

After hear ing this testimony
, the trial court found the Def endant g uilty of first deg ree murder, attempted first deg ree murder, a nd two counts of attempted second deg ree murder. I t sentenc ed the Def endant to an eff

ec t i v e sentenc e of life imprisonment plus fifteen y ear s.

State v. Richard Anthony Arriola
, No. M2007-00428-CCA-R3-CD, 2 0 0 8 WL 1991098, at *1-4 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Nashville, May 8, 2008) (here i n Arriola I ) (footnotes omitted), no Tenn. R. App. P. 11 application filed

.

The Def endant appea led his c onvictions to this Court claiming that: ( 1) the trial court used

an improper leg al standard for the insanity defe nse beca use the court require d the Def endant to prove that he was unable to appre ciate both the wrong fulness of his a ctions and the nature of his a ctions; and (2) the trial court wrong ly sentenc ed him to consec utive sentenc es. On appeal
, t h i s C o u rt

rema nded the case to the trial court wi t h i n s t ru cti ons to issue an order clar ify ing its previous finding s. Id. at *8. This Court also aff irmed the Def

endant’ s sentenc es. Id

. The trial court has since issued a supplemental order setting out its finding s with respe ct to the Def endant’ s insanity defe nse. I t is from this order that the De fenda nt now appea ls.

II. Analysi s

On appe al, the De fenda

nt contends that: (1) the trial court e rre d when it used a n improper leg al standard fo r t he insanity defe nse; and (2) the evidenc e prese nted at trial clea rly and convincing ly

supported an insa

nity defe nse.

A. Insan ity Defense Legal Standard

The Def endant claims that the trial court applied the wrong leg al standard for the insanity defe nse beca

use the trial court understood the Def enda n t ’s ab ility to appre ciate the nature of his actions to encompa ss his ability to appre ciate the wrong fulness of his actions, and, acc ording ly
, require d the Def

endant to prove he appr e c ia te d n e it h e r the nature nor the wrong fulness of his actions. The State arg ues that the trial court did not err beca use, althoug h it stated that “wr ong fulness is part and parc el of the word nature ,” the trial court later “look[ed] furthe r at the specific fac ts to discern whether the [D] efe ndant could appr ecia te the wr ong fulness of his ac tions.”

We discussed the statutorily -base d insanity standard in Arriola I
, and we conclude d that for

a defe ndant to succe ssfully prove an insanity defe nse, he need only prove that, as a result of a sever e

m en t al disease or defe ct, either he did not appre ciate the nature of his actions or he did no t appre ciate tha t his actions were wrong ful:

6The statutory require ments for an insanity defe nse are descr ibed in Tenne ssee

Code Annotated se ction 39-11-501:

I t is an aff

irmative defe nse to prosec ution that, at the time of the commission of the acts constituting the offe nse, the def en d an t, as a result of a sever e mental disea se or de fec t, was unable to appre ciate the nature or wrong fulness of the defe ndant’s acts. Mental disease or defe ct does not otherwise constitute a defe nse. The defe ndant has the burden of proving the defe nse of insanity by clea r and convincing evidenc e.

(empha sis added) (1995). When interpre ting a statute, courts should use the “natur al and ordinary meaning [s o f the statutory lang uag e], unless the leg islature used [t he words] in a specia liz ed, technica l sense.” BellSouth Telecomm

., Inc. v. Gree n , 972 S.W .2d 663, 673 (Tenn. App. 1997). The word at i s s u e h er e i s “or.” There is no indication t h at t h e l eg islature used it in a specia liz ed, technica l way , there fore
, we will assi g n it its natura l and ordinary meaning

. Acc ording to Black’ s Law Dictionary
, “or” is “a disjunctive particle used to express an alterna tive or to g ive a choice of one among two or more things.” Black’ s Law Dictionary 1095 (6th ed. 1990). We contr as t that with the definition of “and,” which is “a conjunction

connec t i ng words or phrase s expressing the idea that the latter is to be added to or taken along with the first.” Black’ s Law Dictionary 86 (6th ed. 1990). Apply ing the

corr ect definition of “or” to this statute, the plain meaning shows two distinct wa y s that the defe ndant may

prese nt a succ essful insanity defe nse: proving either tha t he could n o t appre ciate the nature of his acts or, in the alterna tive, that he could not appre ciate the wrong fulness of his acts. Moreove r, to preva il, the Def endant need not prove both that h e could not appre ciate the nature of his act and that he could not appre ciate the wrong fulness of his ac ts.

Arriola I
, 2008 WL 1991098, at *5. I n Arriola I
, we rema

nded the ca s e t o t h e trial court and instructed it to clar ify its fac tual finding s with respe ct to the Def endant’ s insanity defe nse. Id. at *8.

Comply ing w ith our reque st, the trial court issued a written orde r cla

rify ing its finding s on the issue of insanity

. I t conclude d that the con ce p t of “wr ong fulness” is a narr ower part of the

conce pt of “na ture:”

As the [c] ourt stated in its orig inal ruling
, the experts testified t h at the defe ndant could not appre ciate the wrong fulness of his actions. Howeve r, they could not say that the def

endant c ould not apprec iate the na ture of his a ctions.

The [c] ourt believes that because the defendant could not prove that he was unable t o appreciate the nature of his acti o n s he therefore could not prove that he

was un a b le to appreciate the wrongfulness of his actions

. Although the words

7“natur e” and “wr ong fulness” are distinctly differ ent wor ds, “wrongf ulness” is

encom passed in the word “nature.” The plain meaning of the word “natur e” is that “it is the essential cha

rac ter of some thing.” Since terms such as “rig htfulness” and “wr ong fulness” speak to the essenc e of char acte r, it follows that wrongfulness is part and parcel of the word nature, and is simply more narrow ly defined than the word
nature. The [c]ourt thus had to look further at the specific fac ts to discern whether the def endant c ould appre ciate the wrong fulness of his ac tions.

(empha sis added)

. The trial court then listed fac ts from the case that, in its view, demonstrated the Def endant kne w his actions wer e wr ong :

I nitially
, when the defe ndant was contac ted by the dep u t i es, he hid his

wea pon behind his back, thus indicating not only his intent but his knowledg e of the
wrong fulness of his action. After the def endant shot and wounded one deputy and killed another deputy
, he demonstrated that he knew that it was wrong by barr icading himself in his apar

tment and ref

using to come out even afte r being surrounde d by the police. He had to be forc ed out throug h the use of distraction device s. The defe ndant further demonstrated the wrong fulness of his actions by hiding his pistol. I f he truly believed that he owned the world and could do no wrong , he would not h av e attempted to hi de him self or one of his we apons. More over, the defe ndant re fused to disc uss w ith the police or his tre atment providers the acts that he committed tha t day
, ag ain imply ing that he knew that his act i o n s we re wrong. I t was not until sometime later that he beg an to discuss the events of that d ay with his trea tment providers.

After that discussion
, the trial court conclude d that “the defe ndant did not car ry his burden of proving by cle ar an d co nvincing evidenc e that he was unable to appre ciate the nature or wrong fulness of his ac ts.”

Whether the trial c ourt used the pr oper leg al standard for the insanity defe nse is a question of law, which we revie w de novo with no presumption of corr ectne ss. We conclude that t h e trial
court applied the wrong leg al standard. First, the t ri al co u rt cl early stated that the conce pt of “wr ong fulness” is encompa ssed in the conce pt of “natur e.” We respe ctfully disag ree

. “Wrong fulness” g oes to whether a defe ndant understands whether the actions we re wr ong , or, in other w o r d s , it a d d

resse s a moral capa city
, wher eas “natur e” g oes to whether a defe ndant understands what the actions wer e, or, in other words, it addre sses a cognitive capac ity

. See Clark v. Arizona
, 548 U.S. 735, 747-48, 753-54 (2006) (interpr eting Arizona’s insanity defense statute, which has 1 simil ar lang uag e to Tenne ssee’ s statute)); see also State v. Holder
, 15 S.W .3d 905 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1999) (holding that the defe ndant knew the nature of his actions beca use he knew he stabbed a man

T h e r e l e v a n t p o r t i o n o f t h e A r i z o n a i n s a n i t y d e f e n s e s t a t u t e r e a d s t h a t a “ p e r s o n w a s s u f f e r i n g f r o m s u c h a 1

m e n t a l d i s e a s e o r d e f

e c t a s n o t t o k n o w t h e n a t u r e a n d q u a l i t y o f t h e a c t o r , i f s u c h p e r s o n d i d k n o w , t h a t s u c h p e r s o n d i d n o t k n o w t h a t w h a t h e w a s d o i n g w a s w r o n g

. ” A r i z

. R e v

. S t a t

. A n n

. § 1 3

- 5 0 2 ( W e s t 1 9 7 8 )

.
8and that he knew the wrong fulness of those actions beca use he knew stabbing a person was wrong ). Addi tionally
, as we stated in Arriola I
, the L eg islature listed “wr ong fulness” and “natur e” as independe nt g rounds of supporting a defe nse of insanity

. See T.C.A. § 39-11-501 (1995). Thus, the two words must be mutually exclusive and not “par

t and par cel,” as the trial c ourt found.

Second, a defe nd an t need only succe ssfully prove that he, “as a result of a sever e mental disease or defe ct, was unable to appre ciate the nature or wrong fulness of [hi s] acts.” T.C.A. § 39-11- 501. The trial court wrote that “ because the defe ndant could not prove that h e wa s u n ab l e to appre ciate the nature of his actions he therefore could not prove that he was unable to appre ciate the wrongfulness of his actions.” (empha sis added.) Ag ain, we respe ctfully disag ree

. A defe ndant need only prove that, as a result of a severe mental dis ea s e or defect, either he could not appre ciate the
nature of his actions or he could not appre ciate the wrong fulness of those actions. T.C.A. § 39-11- 501. I n addition to the discussion we have alre ady prese nted from Arriola I
, we add that the nature

or wrong fulness lang uag e of the Tenne ssee insanity defe nse statute corr esponds to a portion of the M’Naghten standard, a well-known insanity defe nse rule. Arriola I

, 2008 WL 1991098, at * 5; 8 2 Eng . Rep. 718. M’Naughten rea ds, in rele vant part, that the defe ndant “wa s labouring under suc h

a defe ct of rea son, from disease of the mind, as not to know the nature and quality of the act he was doing; or, if he did know it, that he did not know he was doing what was wrong .” 8 Eng

. Rep. 718. I n Graham v. State
, the Tenne ssee Supreme Court analy zed that particula

r languag e of the M’Naghten insanity

standard, a

nd it parsed out the r equire ments of the two-pr ong test:

There are two M'Naghten tests: (1) knowledg e of the nature and quality of the act and (2) knowledg e of its wrong fulness. These criter ia are expressed in the conjunctive in that it must be shown that the defe ndant knew rig ht from wrong and knew the nature and quality of the act, in order to convict of a crime while laboring under a defe ct of

rea son or disease of the mind. I f a defe ndant does not know the nature and quality of the act he is insane; i f h e k n o ws t his but does not know rig ht from wrong , he is insane.

The failure to rec og nize and apply both prong s of this two-prong test opera tes to

narr ow the rule s.

Graham v. State
, 547 S.W .2d 531, 539 (Tenn. 1977). I n other words, if a defe ndant proves by clea r and convincing evidenc e either prong (that he can n o t ap p re ci at e the nature of his acts or that he
cannot appre ciate the wrong fulness of his acts), he has met the burden of the insanity defe nse. Given the marke d simil arities betwee n the M ’ Na u g h te n s ta n d a r d a n d th e curr ent Tenne ssee insanity defe nse statute, we see no rea son not to impute the Tenne ssee Supreme Court’s previous conclusion to the

T h e T e n n e s s e e i n s a n i t y d e f e n s e s t a t u t e w a s f

o r m a l l y a d o p t e d f

r o m t h e F e d e r a l I n s a n i t y D e f e n s e A c t o f 2

1 9 8 4
, a n d t h e s a m e n a t u r e a n d w r o n g f u l n e s s l a n g u a g e i s i n b o t h t h e F e d e r a l i n s a n i t y s t a t u t e a n d t h e T e n n e s s e e i n s a n i t y s t a t u t e

. S e e S t a t e v

. F l a k e , 8 8 S

. W

. 3 d 5 4 0
, 5 5 0

- 5 1 ( T e n n

. 2 0 0 2 ) ; s e e a l s o 1 8 U

. S

. C

. § 1 7

. T h a t s a m e n a t u r e

a n d w r o n g f

u l n e s s l a n g u a g e i s a l s o f o u n d i n M ’ N

a u g h t e n , a n d w h i l e t h e r e a r e o b v i o u s d i f f e r e n c e s b e t w e e n t h e T e n n e s s e e s t a t u t e a n d t h e M ’ N a u g h t e n s t a n d a r d
, s u c h a s w h o b e a r s t h e b u r d e n o f p r o o f
, w e l o o k o n l y t o t h e s i m i l a r

c l a u s e s b e t w e e n t h e m w h i c h d i s c u s s t h e n a t u r e a n d w r o n g f u l n e s s o f a d e f

e n d a n t ’ s a c t i o n s

. S e e 8 E n g

. R e p

. 7 1 8

.
9curr ent statute. As such, there are two separ ate prong s of the Tenne ssee insanity defe nse: whether

the defe ndant understood the nature of his actions or whether he understood the wrong fulness of his actions. And, a defe ndant need only prove one prong to be succe ssful in his defe nse. Thus, the trial
court err ed in the leg al standard it applied, and we must turn to addre ss whether
, apply ing the corr ect leg al standar d, the evidenc e wa s sufficient to prove the insanity defe nse.

B. Rem edy

The Def endant a rg ues that he has proven by clea r and convincing evidenc e that, as a result of a sever e mental disease, he was unable to appre ciate the wrong fulness of his conduct. The Def endant asks this Court to rely on the trial cour

t’s fac tual finding s but to apply the correc t leg al

s t an d ard to those finding s. The State arg ues that this Court must rely on the trial court’s fa ct u al finding s and that these finding s, taken in the light most favor able to the State, do n o t s u ff i ci en t ly support the Def

endant’ s insanity

defe nse.

After a care ful considera

tion, we conclude that we cannot gra n t t h e re lief sought by either side, rathe r, we must rema nd this case for a new trial. Although this case was a b en ch t ri al
, we

conc l u d e that the appropr iate reme dy to be the same as for a jury trial. Gene rally
, a jury would resolve all fac tual issues and apply the appropr iate leg al principles, as instructed by the trial court. Simi larly
, if in a bench trial, the trial court mere ly issued a finding of g uilt, all fac tual finding s would be based on that deter

mination. This case is not that simple. I n this case , the trial court, acting as the finder of fac t, twice explained his fac tual finding s and conclusions o f l aw wi t h respe ct to the Def endant’ s insanity defe nse. Be cause he enuncia ted th e s e f in d in g s , th is Court may not ignor e them. See ge nerally State v. H

ood , 868 S.W .2d 744 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1993)

.

I n our vi ew, the trial court’s application, in this bench trial, of an err oneous l eg al s tandar d for insanity should be analy zed just as we would analy ze a jury trial in which the jury was g iven this

err oneous leg al standard for deter mining the applicability of the insanity defe nse. We conclude that this err or aff

ecte d the verdic t, was not harmless, and preve nted the Def endant from rec eiving a fair trial. See State v. Hodges
, 944 S.W .2d 346, 352 (Tenn. 1997). Gene ra l l y , “a defe ndant has a constitutional rig ht to a corr ect and complete char g e of the law.” State v. Teel
, 793 S.W .2d 236, 249 (Tenn. 1990), superce ded by statute on other grounds as stated in S t a t e v. Reid
, 91 S.W .3d 247 (Tenn. 2002). Be cause the De fe n d ant’s conviction is based on the trial court’s application of an

err oneous leg al standard, the Def endant did not rec eive a fair trial. See Hodges
, 944 S.W .2d at 352 (“A jury instruction is considere d “pre judicially err oneous,” only “if it fails to fairly submit the leg al issues or if it misleads the jury as to the applicable l aw

. ”). Considering the Def endant’ s constitutional right to a f

air trial, we rema

nd this case f

or a ne w trial.

The Def endant arg ues that he proved by clea r and convincing evidenc e that he is entitled to

a verdic t of “not g uilty by rea son of insanity ” and that t h i s Court should modify the trial court’s judgme nt to that eff

ect. We respe ctfully decline to do so. To a larg e extent, whether the Def endant met his burden of pr oof as to the i nsanity defe nse depends upon the cr edibility of the De fenda

nt’s expert witnesses. Be cause we are a revie wing co u rt , without, in most situations, the means of

10assessing the cre dibilit y of witnesses, we have conclude d that a new trial is the appropr iate reme dy

in this case. B eca

use a ne w t rial di ctates the utiliz ation of a new finder of fa cts, we a lso conclude that the intere sts of justice require that a diffe rent trial judg e be a ssigne d this case upon r emand.

I n sum, we conclude the Def endant did not rec eive a fair tr ial, and the pr oper r emedy is to order a new trial.

III. Conclusi on

This Court is of the opinion that the trial court applied an incorre ct leg al standard of insanity to this case

. After a ca

ref ul reviewof the rec ord and the applicable law, we reve rse the judgme nts of the trial court and rema nd this case for a new trial. We further order that this case be transfe rre d from Division V of the D a vidson County Criminal Court to another Division of the Davidson County Criminal Court for further proce eding s.

_______ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _______________ ROBERT W. WEDEMEYER, J UDGE

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