PUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 16 - 4615

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA , Plaintiff

– Appellee ,
v. CHARLES D. DOUGLAS, a/k/a Chris Davis , Defendant

- Appellant

.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Virginia , at Charlottesville

. Norman K. Moon , Senior District Judge. ( 3:16

- cr - 00017

- NKM

- 1 )

A rgued : January 24, 2017 Decided: March 9, 2017

Before NIEMEYER, TRAXLER, and DI AZ , Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by published opinion

. Judge Traxler wrote the opinion , in which Judge Niemeyer and Judge Diaz joined.

ARGUED : Lisa M. Lorish, OFFICE OF THE FEDERAL PUBLIC DEFENDER, Charlottesville, Virginia, for Appellant. Nancy Spodick Healey, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Charlottesville, Virginia, for Appellee. ON BRIEF : Larry W. Shelton, Federal Public Defender, O FFICE OF THE FEDERAL PUBLIC DEFENDER, Roanoke, Virginia, for Appellant. John P. Fishwick, Jr., United States Attorney, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Roanoke, Virginia, for Appellee.2 TRAXLER, Circuit Judge: Defendant

- Appellant Charles Douglas pled guilty to failure to register as a sex offender u nder the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act (“SORNA”) , in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2250(a)

. He was sentenced to 15 months in prison, followed by five years of supervised release. On appeal , Douglas challenges the district court’s imposition as a special condition of supervised release that he undergo a sex

- offender evaluation

. For the reasons that follow, we affirm. I. Douglas was convicted in Virginia state court of aggravated sexual abuse in August 1994 , arising out of the sexual abuse of his stepdaughter from January 1990 through February 1992 , when h is victim was between 10 and 12 years old. Douglas was in his early thirties at the time. He was sentenced to ten years in prison, su spended to one year, plus two years o f supervised probation. Douglas partic i pated in a sex

- offender treatment program in 1995, while he was on state probation

. A s a result of t his state conviction, D ouglas was also requi r ed to register as a sex offender for life

. Douglas was arrested for failure to register as a sex offender in Virginia in December 1999 , but the charges were dropped in April 2000. He la st registered as a sex offender in October 2001 , also in Virginia

. In 2002 a nd again in 2010, the Virginia State Police obtained arrest warrant s for Douglas based on his failure to register as a sex offender. However, Do uglas successfully evaded detection and arrest by assuming a false name and moving across state lines

. H e r esid ed at various times i n Washington, D.C., Kentucky, and Texas. I n3 October 2015, the United States Marshal s S ervice attempted to arrest Douglas in Kentucky when they became aware that he was residing there with an adult woman and using the alias “Chris Davis

. ” Accord i ng to the ir interview of the woman, D ouglas had no identification, no driver’s license, and no birth certificate during his time in Kentucky , and he avoided working for employers that required identification or paperwork. W hen Douglas learned that the M arshals had come to his home t o arrest him , he fled to Texas , where he was finally located and ar res t ed in February 2016 . He was indicted in the Western District of Kentucky for fail ure to register as a sex offender in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2250 (a) , but consen ted to a tran s fer of his case to the Western District of Virginia , where he pled guilty without a plea agreement

. A p resentence r eport (“PSR”) was prepared setting forth a guideline imprisonment range of 15

- 21 months for the SORNA conviction , plus a statu torily required term of supervised release of not less than five years. In addition to the standard conditions of supervised release not challenged here, t he PSR recommended that the court impose 16 special “Sex Offender Conditions” for supervised release provided for in Standing Order 2013

- 04 of the Western District of Virginia

. Douglas objected to the imposi t ion of 13 of the 16 conditions , arguing that his SORNA violation was not a sex offense and that his prior conviction for aggravated sexual assault in 1994 was too remote in time to justify the conditions

. The government agreed that Douglas’s prior sex offense conviction was remote in time, but it argued that most of the sex - offender conditions were justified because “th e remoteness of the defendant’s sex offense is directly related to his efforts to avoid4 apprehension ” and “ there is no way to know whether the defe n dant pose s a recidivism risk .” J.A. 18. A t a minimum, the government requested that the district court r eq uire Douglas to submit to a sex

- offender evaluation for the purpose of evaluating his risk to the public and determining what, if any, other treatment or conditions were warranted to serve the goals of sentencing

. The district court agreed. D ouglas was sentenced to 15 months ’ imprisonment, plus five years of supervised release , with the special condition that he “ submit to an evaluation by a qualified mental health professional, approved by the probation officer, who is experienced in the treatment o f sexual offenders ” and “ take all medications reasonably related to his condition, complete all treatment recommendations, and abide by all rules, requirements , and conditions imposed by the treatment provider until discharged from treatment by the provide r. ” J .A. 39. However, t he district court declined to impose the remaining 12 s ex - offender conditions recommended by the PSR and objected to by Douglas , opting instead to add the proviso that the probation officer could “r equest modifications to the condi tions of supervision as determined by the assessment of [the] qualified mental health professional. ” J.A. 39. 1 II.

1 The district court also imposed the three sex - offense conditions recommended by the PSR that Douglas did not challenge. Specifically, Douglas is required to comply with all federal, state, and local registration requirements ; he is prohibited from possessing , viewing, or using any child pornography materials, or knowingly entering or remaining in any location where such materials are present ; and he is required to obtain his probation officer’s approval of his residence and employment situation

.5 D istrict courts are afforded “ broad latitude to impose c onditions on supervised release , ” which we review for abuse of discretion only

. United States v. Armel , 585 F.3d 182, 186 (4th Cir. 2009). T he court may impose any sp e cial condition that is “ reasonably related ” to the statutory sentencing factors referenced in 18 U.S.C. § 3583(d)(1) , which include : (1) “ the nature and circumstances of the offense and the history and characteristics of the defendant ,” 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1) ; and (2) “the need for the sentence imposed . . . to afford adequate deterrence to criminal conduct,” 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(B), “to protect the public from furthe r crimes of the defendant,” 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(C), and “to provide the defendant with needed educational or vocational training, medical care, or other correctional treatment in the most effective manner , ” 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(D) ; s ee United States v. Dotson , 324 F.3d 256, 260 (4th Cir. 2003). W hen imposing such conditions, the sentencing court must also ensure that the condition “i nvolve s no greater deprivation of liberty than is reasonably necessary” to serve these sentencing goals , 18 U.S.C. § 35 83(d)(2) , and that it “ is consistent with any pertinent policy statements issued by the Sentencing Commission , ” 18 U.S.C. § 3583(d)(3) ; see Dotson , 324 F.3d at 260

- 61. “Sex offender conditions of supervised release may be imposed, even at sentencing for c rimes which are not sex crimes, if supported by § 3583(d)

. ” United States v. Bear , 769 F.3d 1221, 1226 (10th Cir. 2014). The “ particular restriction does not require an offense

- specific nexus, but the sentencing court must adequately explain its decision and its reasons for imposing it.” United States v. Worley , 6 85 F.3d 404, 407 (4th Cir. 2012) (internal citation and quotation marks omitted). The “ court must demonstrate6 that it considered the parties’ arguments and had a reasoned basis for exercising its own legal decisionmaking authority.” United States v. Lynn , 592 F.3d 572, 576 (4th Cir. 2010) (internal quotation marks omitted) . The “statement of reasons is importan t because it helps the sentencing process evolve, allows for meaningful appellate review, and promotes the perception of fair sentencing.” Id. (internal citation, quotation marks and alterations omitted)). A

. Douglas first contends that the district co urt committed procedural error by failing
to adequately explain the basis for the condition requiring him to submit to a sex - offender evaluation

. We disagree. T he district court record contains the information necessary for us to conduct a meaningful app ellate review of the substantive reasonableness of the special condition

. See id.; Armel , 585 F.3d at 186. At the sentencing hearing, t he district court explicitly considered the remoteness of Douglas’s prior sex offense , mindful that it should not “dwell” solely on the prior sex offense when evaluating whether the sex - offense condition s of supervised release were warranted. J.A. 49

. However, the district court also shared the government’s concern about the 1 4

- plus years of evasive actions that Dou glas took to avoid apprehension by law enforcement after he failed to register as a sex offender. The district court then stated that it had “ c onsidered the factors noted in 18 U.S.C. [§] 3553(a): the defendant’s history, characteris t i c s, and the nature a n d cir c u m stances of the offense, as well as the defendant’s prior sex conviction,” and proceeded to address the sex offender

- conditions recommended in the PSR . J.A. 6 0 . In7 doing so, t he district court explain ed that “the remoteness of [Douglas’s ] conviction [ ] is such that the Court should not assume that all of the se [recommended] conditions , after an assessment, be complied with , ” and further noted that “ otherwise, I think we would be going into punishing the defendant for the original offense rat her than what he is here for today

. ” J.A. 62 (emphasis added)

. Having reviewed all of the relevant considerations, the district court decided to only impose the limited c ondition that Douglas submit to a

sex - offender evaluation, explaining that “ [t]he pr obation officer will [then] know what the provider determined, ” J.A. 61

- 62, and “ can look [for] guidance from the sex offender conditions” for further appropriate conditions. J.A. 62 (emphasis added)

. According ly ,
we are satisfied that the district court adequately considered the parties ’ arguments and that the district court’s explanation, while brief, was s ufficient t o allow meaningful appellate review of the substantive reasonabl e ness of the challenged condition

. B. Douglas next contends that the district court abused its discretion in imposing the limited condition that he submit to a sex

- offender evaluation , arguing that it is not reasonably related to the sentencing factors set forth in § § 3553(a)(1), (a)(2)(B), (a)(2)(C), and (a)(2)(D), and th at it i nvolve s a greater deprivation of liberty than reasonably necessary in vi o lation of § 3583(d)(2). Specifically, Douglas argues that his 1994 sex - offense conviction is too remote , standing alone, to justify the need for a sex offender evaluation . As further support, Douglas points out that he completed a sex abuse treatment program in 1995 ( during his two years of supervised probation for his prior sex offense ) , and that his criminal record ha s been clean since then ( with the8 exception of the 19 99 arrest for failure to register and a 2002 arrest for driving while suspended )

. As the district court recognized, “ [p] rior sex offenses can be too temporally remote for sex

- offender conditions of supervised release to be reasonably related to the
natu re and circumstances of the offense, the defendant ’ s history and characteristics, the deterrence of criminal conduct, the protection of the public from further crimes of the defendant, or the defendant’s educational, vocational, medical or other correction al needs .” Bear , 769 F.3d at 1227

. F or example, we have held that a 12

- year - old sex offense conviction , committed when the defendant was 21 years old, could not, “standing alone,” justify special sex

- offender conditions

. Worley , 685 F.3d at 409. However, “[t]here is no bright

- line rule for the outer limit of temporal remoteness, in part because district courts must consider more than just the age of a defendant’s prior conviction.” Bear , 769 F.3d at 1227. That is precisely what the district court properly did in this case. W hile Douglas is correct that his SORNA violation is not a "sex offense" for purposes of imposing a term of supervised release under the Guidelines , see U.S.S.G. § 5D1.2, cmt. n.1 , a SORNA violat ion is not wholly unrelated to the prior sex offense. Indeed, th e very purpose of SORNA is to “protect the community from the risks posed by convicted sex offenders by requiring registration and then by providing notification” to the public. United States v. Morales

- Cruz , 712 F.3d 71, 7 5 (1st Cir. 2013); United States v. Under Seal , 709 F.3d 257, 260 (4th Cir. 2013) (SORNA “was enacted ‘to protect the public from sex offenders and offenders against children, and in response to the vicious attacks by violent predators,’ ” [ by ] “ ‘establish[ing] a comprehensive national system for9 the registration of those offenders

. ’”) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 16901) ; see also Smith v. Doe , 538 U.S. 84, 99 (2003) (noting with respect to analogous requirements under Alaska law, that “[t]he purpose and the princip al effect of notification are to inform the public for its own safety , not to humiliate the offender ”)

. SORNA “‘ma [ d ] e more uniform what had remained a patchwork of federal and 50 individual state registration systems, with loopholes and defici encies that had resulted in an estimated 100,000 sex offenders becoming missing or lost.” Nichols v. United States , 136 S. Ct. 1113, 1119 (2016) (internal quotation marks omitted)

. The “[r] egistration requirements [that] SORNA imposes are justified by th e high recidivism rate for offenders. ” Morales

- Cruz , 712 F.3d at 7 5 ; Smith , 538 U.S. at 105 (“[R]ecidivism is the statutory concern”)

. Here, the district court plainly did not ground the challenged condition that Douglas submit to a sex

- offender evaluati on solely upon Douglas’s 1994 conviction. Rather, there are a number of other circumstances that weighed into and justified the district court’s decision to impose the limited condition that Douglas submit to the evaluation as a first step to determining what, if any, additional treatment and conditions

were warranted. Douglas ’s prior sex offense involved the sexual assault of a prepubescent minor on multiple occasions over a two

- year period

-- when Douglas was in his thirties and the child was between 10 and 12 years ol d. Although he completed a sex

- offender treatment
program in 1995, while he was on state probation, Douglas ceased complying with his registration requirements in 2001 , within f ive years of completing his state probation10 term . H e then too k affirmative steps , including changing his name and moving regularly , to elude detection and arrest for over 14 years . Consequently, Douglas did not merely fail to register under SORNA years after he had completed his sentence and treatment for his prior sex offense , and Douglas was not arrested within a short time after he violated his registration requirements

. Instead, h e “made a conscious choice to defeat th[e] purposes” of the sex

- offender registration laws i n several different jurisdictions for well over a decade. Morales

- Cruz , 712 F.3d at 75. “These continuing failures certainly permit a rational inference that [Douglas] presented a reci di vism risk and warranted deterrent punishment

. His conduct undermined the efforts made by Congress in SORNA, and by the states in their statutes, to combat the risks of recidivism.” Id. ; see also Bear , 769 F.3d at 1228 (noting that defendant’s “intervening sex offender registration conviction and current SORNA conviction, while fundamentally different tha n the underlying sex offenses, are not entirely unrelated and raise concerns that [defendant] may not comply with his ongoing SORNA obligations,” justifying “special conditions related to rehabilitation and monitoring”) ; cf. United States v. Springston , 65 0 F.3d 1153 , 1157 (8th Cir. 2011) (noting that special conditions requiring

sex - offender treatment might “ be justified in a case involving failure to register as a sex offender ” for a remote prior conviction, “ such as when there is reason to believe that t he failure to register evidences recalcitrance and an ongoing proclivity to commit sexual crimes”), vacated on other grounds , 132 S. Ct. 1905 (2012)

. W e are also not persuaded by Douglas’s argument that the condition was not justified because his criminal record has been clean since his prior offense (with the11 exception of the 1999 arrest for failure to register and a 2002 arrest for driving while suspended) , and that he only took steps to evade arrest during the ensuing 14 years to avoid paying $70,000 in child support, and not to victimize children in secret. Although there is no thing in the record to indicate that Douglas engaged in sexual offenses or inappropriate sexual behavior during the time that he was on the run , his arguments cannot be divorced from the fact that he was, in fact, on the run. He was taking affirmative steps to conceal his activities from law enforcement and simultaneously (and knowingly) violating state and federal registration laws , the very purpose of which are to aler t the public to the presence of a convicted sex offender so as to deter sexually deviant and recidivist behavior and to prevent, particularly in the case of child sex offenders, offenses that often take place in secret. Cf. Morales

- Cruz , 712 F.3d at 75 (h olding that in light of defendant’s “manifest lack of respect for the SORNA registration requirements, and the reasonable inference that his refusal to comply with these requirements poses a risk of recidivism, the district court’s imposition of sex

- offend er treatment was reasonably related to [defendant’s] present offense as well as to his criminal history”). Accordingly , we hold that the district court acted well within its broad discretion
to impose the condition that Douglas submit to a sex

- offender e valuation. The condition is reasonably related to the nature and circumstances of the offense and the history and characteristics of the defendant, including his prior sex offense and the extraordinary steps he took to avoid registration and apprehension by law enforcement for many years

. The condition is also reasonably related to the need to protect the public from further crimes of the defendant , to provide the defendant with needed treatment in the most12 effective manner, and to afford adequate deterre nce to criminal conduct in the future

. Moreover, the district court’s approach of imposing the single condition that Douglas submit to a sex

- offender evaluation , and declining to impose additional conditions unless the evaluation were to indicate that the y are warranted , reflects the district court’s measured judgment to impose condition s causing no greater a deprivation of liberty than

wa s reasonably necessary to satisfy th ose factors

. 2 III. For the foregoing reasons, we hold that the sentence imposed by the district court is procedurally and substantive ly reasonable, and we affirm the judgment of the district
court. A FFIRMED

2 On appeal, D ouglas complains about the invasiveness of a sex

- offender evaluation, specifically its use of polygraphs and penile plethysmography testing. Although Douglas did not specifically raise this claim during the sentencing hearing, he did object collectively t o the sex

- offender evaluation condition and the separate condition that he submit to polygraph and plethysmograph examinations in his sentencing memorandum

. T he district court only imposed the former condition (the sex

- offender evaluation) , and it declined to impose the latter condition ( pertaining to polygraphs and plethysmographs ) pending the results of th e evaluation. In any event, w e ha ve held that polygraphs and the plethysmograph test are “useful for treatment of sex offenders , ” and we have upheld the use of the se tools as a condition of release. See United States v. Dotson , 324 F.3d 256, 260 (4th Cir. 2003) (internal quotation marks omitted). Accordingly, even assuming that the qualified mental health provider would i nclude these examinati ons as a part of the initial sex - offen der evaluation, it would not change our analysis of the reasonableness of the district court’s exercise of its discretion to impose the condition in light of all of the circumstances and the goals of sentencing

.