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Michigan Supreme Court 

Lansing, Michigan 48909 

C hief Justice Justices 

Maura D. Corrigan	 Michael F. Cavanagh 

Elizabeth A. Weaver 

Marilyn Kelly 

Clifford W. Taylor Opinion Robert P. Young, Jr. 

Stephen J. Markman 

FILED JANUARY 30, 2001
 

CHERYL DENISE SEWELL, 


Plaintiff-Appellee,
 

v	 No. 116528
 

CLEAN CUT MANAGEMENT, INC. and


JOHN DOE,
 

Defendants,
 

and
 

JEFFREY CRUSE, Individually and d/b/a


CLEAN CUT MANAGEMENT, INC.,
 

Defendants-Appellants.
 

PER CURIAM
 

The plaintiff tenant sued the defendant landlord,
 

alleging negligence and unlawful eviction. During trial, the
 

defendant moved for a directed verdict on the ground that a
 

prior judgment in the district court had resolved the issue
 

whether the eviction was lawful. The circuit court denied the
 

motion and later entered judgment in favor of the plaintiff.
 

The Court of Appeals affirmed. We reverse the judgments of
 
the circuit court and the Court of Appeals, and remand this
 

case to the circuit court for further proceedings. 


I
 

Defendant Jeffrey Cruse owned a house at 17184 Warrington
 

Drive in Detroit. He rented a flat in the house to plaintiff
 

C. Denise Sewell for $450 per month.
 

Ms. Sewell soon fell behind in her rent. She says that
 

she was withholding rent because of numerous unrepaired
 

problems in the flat.
 

In May 1995, Mr. Cruse filed a complaint in the district
 

court, seeking termination of Ms. Sewell’s tenancy.1 This led
 

to a consent judgment that entered twelve days later.2 The
 

judgment required Ms. Sewell to pay $450 by June 2. However,
 

the judgment further provided:
 

[Mr. Cruse] agrees to make repairs to side


door, lock on front door, tile in bathroom, repair


bathroom leak, bath ceiling, repair hot water &


electrical; all to be made before money is due on


6/2/95.[3]
 

Mr. Cruse says he made the required repairs. Ms. Sewell
 

says he did not. However, Mr. Cruse has testified that Ms.
 

Sewell did sign a form indicating that the repairs had been
 

made. 


1 Summary proceedings for the recovery of possession of


premises are governed by MCL 600.5701 et seq.; MSA 27A.5701 et
 

seq. and by MCR 4.201.
 

2 MCR 4.201(K).
 

3 This language is handwritten on the judgment form and


is not entirely legible. We have added punctuation.
 

2
 
Using this documentation, Mr. Cruse returned to the
 

district court, where he signed a June 5 application for a
 

writ of restitution.4 The form indicated that Mr. Cruse had
 

complied with the terms of the judgment and that Ms. Sewell
 

had not met her payment obligation. The court signed the writ
 

on June 7. The form directed the court officer to “remove
 

[Ms. Sewell] from the premises described and to restore
 

peaceful possession to [Mr. Cruse].”
 

Ms. Sewell did not appeal the consent judgment or the
 

writ of restitution. Neither did she ask the district court
 

to set aside the judgment or the writ.
 

Several weeks later, a district court bailiff effected
 

the eviction. There is conflicting testimony about whether he
 

removed all of Ms. Sewell’s possessions from the flat. At a
 

minimum, he put most of her possessions on the front lawn.
 

Ms. Sewell, who had been in the hospital, learned of the
 

eviction a few days later. With family members, she went to
 

the flat. Apparently while removing additional property from
 

the premises, she slipped and fell. Ms. Sewell had received
 

a kidney transplant in 1991 and another in 1995, and her fall
 

evidently caused serious complications in that regard.
 

In March 1996, Ms. Sewell sued Mr. Cruse in circuit
 

court.5 In count I of the complaint, she alleged that he had
 

4 MCR 4.201(L).
 

5
 The defendants named in the complaint were Clean Cut


Management, Inc.; Mr. Cruse, individually and doing business
 

3
 
negligently maintained the premises and that she had suffered
 

serious injury as the result. In count II, she alleged that
 

she had been unlawfully evicted.6
 

This case was tried before a jury in circuit court.
 

During trial, Mr. Cruse moved for a directed verdict. He
 

argued that the district court eviction order was a binding
 

resolution of the question whether the eviction had been
 

legal. The court denied the motion.
 

In its verdict, the jury found that Mr. Cruse had been
 

negligent,7 and that his negligence had been the proximate
 

cause of $4,700 in lost wages for Ms. Sewell, as well as
 

$50,000 in noneconomic damages. The jury also found that she
 

had been unlawfully ejected from her premises and that her
 

property loss was in the amount of $5,000. Thus the total
 

verdict was $59,700.
 

as Clean Cut Management; and John Doe. The complaint was


answered by Mr. Cruse, doing business as Clean Cut Management,


and he has been the only defendant to participate in this


litigation. Thus we will continue to refer to him as the sole
 

defendant.
 

6 Ms. Sewell also asked for treble damages under MCL


600.2918(1); MSA 27A.2918(1), which provides:
 

Any person who is ejected or put out of any


lands or tenements in a forcible and unlawful
 

manner, or being out is afterwards held or kept


out, by force, if he prevails, is entitled to
 

recover 3 times the amount of his actual damages or


$200.00, whichever is greater, in addition to


recovering possession.
 

7 The jury found no negligence on the part of Ms. Sewell.
 

4
 
Mr. Cruse moved for judgment notwithstanding the verdict
 

or, alternatively, for new trial. He argued that the district
 

court proceedings that granted him possession of the
 

Warrington premises were res judicata and collateral estoppel.
 

He also argued that, in light of the district court judgment
 

and writ, Ms. Sewell had been a trespasser at the time she
 

slipped and fell. The circuit court denied the motion.
 

The Court of Appeals affirmed,8 citing our decision in
 

JAM Corp v AARO Disposal, Inc, 461 Mich 161; 600 NW2d 617
 

(1999).
 

Mr. Cruse has now applied to this Court for leave to
 

appeal.
 

II
 

The procedural history in JAM Corp was complicated by
 

uncertainty regarding the proper names and identities of the
 

parties. However, there came a point when JAM9 began summary
 

proceedings in district court to regain control of premises
 

that had been leased to AARO Disposal, Inc. Because of
 

problems relating to the corporate status (or lack thereof) of
 

JAM, the district court action was dismissed with prejudice
 

(though the premises were returned to the control of JAM).
 

461 Mich 162-165.
 

8
 Unpublished opinion per curiam, issued December 3,


1999, reh den February 25, 2000 (Docket No. 208148).
 

9 There were several variants of the “JAM” corporate name


but, for present purposes, they are not important.
 

5
 
Following the dismissal in district court, JAM filed suit
 

against AARO in circuit court.10 The complaint stated six
 

causes of action, including implied contract and unjust
 

enrichment. The circuit court dismissed the complaint with
 

prejudice, finding the district court dismissal to be res
 

judicata. The Court of Appeals affirmed.11 461 Mich 165-166.
 

In JAM Corp, this Court examined several sections of the
 

chapter dealing with summary proceedings. Our conclusion was
 

that “[p]lainly the Legislature took these cases outside the
 

realm of the normal rules concerning merger and bar in order
 

that attorneys would not be obliged to fasten all other
 

pending claims to the swiftly moving summary proceedings.”
 

461 Mich 168-169. We also said that “it is evident that
 

judgment in these summary proceedings, no matter who prevails,
 

does not bar other claims for relief.” 461 Mich 170.
 

Accordingly, we reversed the judgments of the Court of
 

Appeals and circuit court in JAM Corp, and remanded the case
 

for further proceedings on JAM’s circuit court suit. 461 Mich
 

171.
 

III
 

In the present case, the Court of Appeals fastened on our
 

statement that judgment in summary proceedings does not bar
 

10 JAM also appealed the district court dismissal, though


the result of that appeal was unknown to us as we wrote our


opinion in JAM Corp. 461 Mich 165.
 

11 Unpublished opinion per curiam, issued January 16,


1998, reh den April 21, 1998 (Docket No. 193594).
 

6
 
other claims for relief. Quoting that holding, it affirmed a
 

circuit court judgment based on a jury’s verdict that the
 

eviction had been illegal, notwithstanding that the eviction
 

occurred pursuant to an unappealed district court consent
 

judgment and writ of restitution.
 

This is not consistent with the statute or with our
 

analysis in JAM Corp. We said in JAM Corp that “judgment in
 

these summary proceedings, no matter who prevails, does not
 

bar other claims for relief.” 461 Mich 170. Nothing in the
 

statute or in JAM Corp stands for the proposition that, having
 

litigated in the district court the issue who has the right to
 

the premises, that question can be relitigated de novo in a
 

subsequent suit. Such an approach would empty MCL 600.5701 et
 

seq.; MSA 27A.5701 et seq. of all significance. After
 

repossessing premises in accord with the statute and an order
 

of the district court, a landlord would remain in jeopardy of
 

further litigation on that same question.
 

Neither do principles of res judicata support judgment of
 

the Court of Appeals. In Dart v Dart, 460 Mich 573, 586; 597
 

NW2d 82 (1999), we explained:
 

Res judicata bars a subsequent action between


the same parties when the evidence or essential


facts are identical. Eaton Co Bd of Co Rd Comm'rs
 

v Schultz, 205 Mich App 371, 375; 521 NW2d 847
 

(1994). A second action is barred when (1) the


first action was decided on the merits, (2) the


matter contested in the second action was or could
 

have been resolved in the first, and (3) both


actions involve the same parties or their privies.


Id. at 375-376.
 

7
 
Michigan courts have broadly applied the
 

doctrine of res judicata. They have barred, not


only claims already litigated, but every claim


arising from the same transaction that the parties,


exercising reasonable diligence, could have raised


but did not. Gose v Monroe Auto Equipment Co, 409


Mich 147, 160-163; 294 NW2d 165 (1980); Sprague v
 

Buhagiar, 213 Mich App 310, 313; 539 NW2d 587
 

(1995).
 

This case obviously presents issues concerning the
 

relationship between summary possession proceedings and the
 

doctrine of res judicata. As explained in Dart, Michigan’s
 

broad res judicata rule bars claims arising out of the same
 

transaction that could have been litigated in a prior
 

proceeding, but were not. JAM Corp, 461 Mich 167.
 

Our decision in JAM Corp recognized a statutory exception
 

to this rule with respect to claims that “could have been”
 

litigated in a prior proceeding. See id. at 168, citing MCL
 

600.5750; MSA 27A.5750. There, we recognized that the
 

legislative intent for this exception was to remove the
 

incentive for attorneys to “fasten all other pending claims to
 

swiftly moving summary proceedings.” Id. at 169. Our
 

decision in JAM Corp said nothing about the preclusive effect
 

of claims actually litigated in the summary proceedings.
 

Thus, the “other claims of relief,” described in JAM Corp at
 

170, were those claims that “could have been” brought during
 

the summary proceedings, but were not. This Court was not
 

describing subsequent claims involving the issues actually
 

litigated in the summary proceedings.
 

8
 
In the present case, Ms. Sewell sought damages for
 

personal injuries suffered on Mr. Cruse’s premises and for
 

damage to personal property. Mr. Cruse says she was a
 

trespasser and that the circuit court should have granted a
 

directed verdict in his favor. We need not decide in this
 

opinion the full effect of the district court’s judgment and
 

writ, with respect to the status of Ms. Sewell as she entered
 

the premises or the extent, if any, of Mr. Cruse’s duty toward
 

her. However, we do hold that, where the district court
 

judgment and writ have not been reversed or vacated, they are
 

conclusive on the narrow issue whether the eviction was
 

proper. 


Unlike JAM Corp, this case presents a question regarding
 

the preclusive effect of a claim that was actually litigated
 

in the summary proceeding. Therefore, the limited statutory
 

exception to Michigan’s res judicata rule does not apply. The
 

circuit court thus erred in failing to grant, at least in
 

part, the motion for a directed verdict.
 

For these reasons we reverse the judgments of the circuit
 

court and the Court of Appeals. We remand this case to the
 

circuit court. On remand, the circuit court shall enter
 

judgment in favor of the defendant on the plaintiff’s wrongful
 

eviction claim. Because the verdict in favor of the plaintiff
 

on her negligence claim may have been influenced by the error
 

9
 
with regard to her wrongful eviction claim, we remand for
 

further proceedings consistent with this opinion with regard
 

to the negligence claim. MCR 7.302(F)(1).
 

CORRIGAN, C.J., and WEAVER, TAYLOR, YOUNG, and MARKMAN, JJ.,
 

concurred.
 

10
 
 

________________________________ 

v 

S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N
 

SUPREME COURT
 

CHERYL DENISE SEWELL, 


Plaintiff-Appellee,
 

No. 116528
 

CLEAN CUT MANAGEMENT, INC. and


JOHN DOE,
 

Defendants,
 

and
 

JEFFREY CRUSE, Individually and d/b/a


CLEAN CUT MANAGEMENT, INC.,
 

Defendants-Appellants.
 

CAVANAGH, J.
 

I would not decide this case by a per curiam opinion.
 

Because this case offers the opportunity to address a
 

jurisprudentially significant issue, I would grant leave so we
 

might avail ourselves of full briefing and argument by the
 

parties.
 

KELLY, J., concurred with CAVANAGH, J.