NOT PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

___________ No. 13

- 2409

___________ NORMAN SHELTON ,

Appellant

v. S. E. THOMAS; U

. S

. ATTORNEY GENERAL

____________________________________ On Appeal from the United Stat es District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania (D.C. Civil Action No. 13

- cv
- 00404 ) District Judge: Honorable William J. Nealon Jr.

____________________________________ Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)

September 23, 2013 Before: JORDAN, GREENAWAY, JR. and SCIRICA , Circuit Judges

(Opinion filed : September 24, 2013 )

___________ OPINION

___________ PER CURIAM Appellant Norman Shelton is a federal prisoner incarcerated in USP Lewisburg; he has been held in the Special Management Unit (SMU), he alleges, since August 27, 2009. Proceeding pro se, he filed a 28 U.S.C. § 2241 habeas corpus petition attacking his

continued confinement in the SMU

. Shelton requested release from the SMU , money2

da mages , and that a criminal indictment be filed against a prison official

. The District

Court dismissed Shelton ’ s petition, holding that hi s claims were not properly brought in a § 2241 petition , and Shelton appealed. W e have jurisdicti on to review the Di strict

Court ’ s judgment under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1291 and 2253(a)

. The District Court correctly determined that Shelton ’ s § 2241 petition does not challenge the basic fact or duration of his imprisonment, which is the “essence of
habeas.” Preiser v. Rodriguez , 411 U.S. 475, 484 (1973). While it is true that we have
held that § 2241 “confers habeas jurisdiction to hear the petition of a federal prisoner who is challenging not the validity bu t the execution of his sentence, ” Woodall v. Fed. Bureau

of Prisons , 43 2 F.3d 235, 241 (3d Cir. 2005) ( internal quotation marks omitted), “t o challenge the execution of his sentence under § 2241, [ a petitioner] would need to allege

that BOP ’ s conduct was somehow inconsistent with a command or recommenda tion in the sentencing judgment, ” Cardona v. Bledsoe , 681 F.3d 533, 537 (3d Cir. 2012).

Shelton has made no such allegation; instead, he argues that he has been held in the SMU for longer than federal law permits and in violation of his due process rights. T hus, as in

Cardona , “the District Court correctly dismissed his petition for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.” Id. at 537. 1

1 Principles of preclusion also bar Shelton ’ s action. He previously filed a materially indistinguishable action in the District Court, which the District Court dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. He then appealed to this Court, and we affirmed. See C.A. No. 13

- 1586

. Although res judicata does not inevitably bar a second action when the fi rst action was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction, see Compagnie Des Bauxites de Guinee v. L ’ Union Atlantique S.A. d ’ Assurances , 723 F.2d 357, 360 (3d Cir. 1983), a party is precluded3

We will therefore affirm the District Court ’ s judgment.

from relitigating “matters actually adjud g ed” in the first case, Bromwel l v. Mich

. Mut

. Ins. Co. , 1 15 F.3d 208, 212 (3d Cir. 1997) (internal quotation marks omitted) . Therefore, the ruling in Shelton ’ s first case that his challenge to his placement in the SMU is not cognizable under § 2241 bars his attempt in this case to bri ng the same claim under the same statute.