Received by the Board 03.27.24

Dear Chair Connery: 

This letter is provided on behalf of the Secretary of Energy in response to Defense Nuclear 

Facilities Safety Board's (DNFSB or Board) October 4, 2023, letter regarding ongoing safety • 

improvements at the Savannah River Tritium Enterprise (SRTE). Your letter requested that the 

Department of Energy (DOE) provide a report and briefing within six months of receipt of the 

letter on DOE's progress on safety improvements at SRTE and stated that the report and briefing 

should include a prioritized list of safety risk reduction efforts, allocated resources, and a 

schedule for completion. The letter also requested that DOE provide a report and briefing 

annually ·after the first report on progress of the facility and system upgrades, decisions made for 

proposed upgrades and analytical initiatives, and the impacts of safety risk reduction efforts and 

that the annual reports and briefings include any changes and justification for those changes 

regarding prioritization, resource allocation, and schedule for safety risk reduction efforts since 

the previous report and briefing. 

As noted in your letter, DOE's National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) is pm·suing a 

multi-pronged approach to improving the SRTE safety posture by updating the safety basis, reducing potential doses to co-located workers, enhancing the SRTE Emergency Preparedness 

Program, and constructing the Tritium Finishing Facility while maintaining safe operations at HArea Old Manufacturing. Collectively, the modifications, upgrades, and programmatic 

improvements in these areas provide a systematic approach to improving safety at SRTE. 

During your site visit in May 2023, the Board was provided a briefing on the following topics: 

(1) SRTE safety basis; (2) Tritium inventory; (3) Co-located Worker Dose Reduction strategy; 

(4) mass casualty event drill and exercises; and (5) planned calendar year 2025 outage. NNSA 

and Savannah River Nuclear Solutions are committed to continued improvements following a 

comprehensive approach that focuses both on enhancing existing programs and infrastructure 

and identifying and implementing new controls. The enclosed repmt summarizes the ongoing 

initiatives to address the progress and status ofNNSA's approach to improving safety at SRTE. 
Received by the Board 03.27.24

Jill Hruby 

Enclosure 
Received by the Board 03.27.24

Department of Energy

s National Nuclear Security Administration {DOE/NNSA) and Savannah 

River Nuclear Solutions (SRNS) briefed the Board on the following topics: (1) Savannah River 

Tritium Enterprise (SRTE) safety basis; (2) Tritium inventory; (3) Co-located Worker Dose 

Reduction (CLWDR) strategy; (4) mass casualty event drill and exercises; and (5) planned 

calendar year 2025 outage. 

On October 4, 2023, the Secretary of Energy received a letter from the Board requesting a 

report and briefing within six months of receipt of the letter on the DOE/NNSA's progress on 

safety improvements at SRTE and an annual report and briefing to follow thereafter on progress 

of the facility and system upgrades, decisions made for proposed upgrades and analytical 

initiatives, and the impacts of safety risk reduction efforts. The Board's letter stated that the 

"annual report and briefing should include any changes and justification for those changes 

regarding prioritization, resource allocation, and schedule for safety risk reduction efforts since 

the previous report and briefing." 

NNSA and SRNS are committed to continued improvements to the safety posture of the SRTE 

Tritium Facilities. As noted in the Board's letter, NNSA is pursuing a multi-pronged approach to 

improving the SRTE safety posture. The modifications, upgrades, and programmatic 

improvements discussed in this report provide a systematic approach to improving safety at 

SRTE. This report provides a status on NNSA's multi-pronged approach, which will be updated in 

subsequent reports. Due to funding cycles, the resource allocations and scheduling of projects 

and activities is an ongoing effort; activities in the analysis and evaluation stage are funded 

under the existing contract, and specific project resources will be included in future reports as 

they are identified. Prioritization is discussed below in terms of which efforts NNSA continues 

to pursue. As funding allocations are authorized, NNSA will re-evaluate the approach to 

prioritize activities with the highest safety impact. 

1. SRTE Safety Basis 

SRTE currently implements two Documented Safety Analyses {DSAs) and Technical Safety 

Requirements (TSRs), one for the Tritium Extraction Facility (TEF) and one for the Tritium 

Facilities (TF). SRNS has made significant progress to combine the safety basis documents into a 

single DSA and TSR, the Combined Tritium Facilities (CTF) safety basis. The CTF DSA was 

partially developed to incorporate MELCOR Accident Computer Code System 2 atmospheric 

Annual Report on Ongoing Initiatives to Address the Progress and Status of the SRTE I Page 1 of 7 
Received by the Board 03.27.24

the DSA and TSR are Safety Class 217-H Vault Fire Damper, 217-H Vault Transient Combustible 

Material Control SAC, Vehicle Barrier Movement SAC, Critical Lift SAC, and Passive Fire Barriers. 

These controls improve the safety posture for certain events analyzed in the consolidated 

hazard analysis involving fires, critical lifts, and/or vehicle impacts. Implementation efforts are 

underway, with full facility implementation expected in fiscal year (FY) 2024. These efforts are 

being conducted with existing contract funds. 

Two planned improvements identified in the safety basis, and cited in the Board's letter, provide 

an enhanced SRTE safety posture: the 233-lH Fire Barrier and investigation of 296-H stack 

collapse mitigation/prevention. 

233-lH Fire Barrier 

The CTF safety basis implementation is scheduled for FY 2024; however, the 233-lH Fire Barrier 

will not be credited in the CTF DSA and TSR until the project is complete and is released to 

operations. Once complete, the 233-lH Fire Barrier will be credited to prevent the propagation 

of fires in or out of H-Area Old Manufacturing (HAOM). To accomplish this, a backfit analysis of 

the 233-lH Fire Barrier identified several structures, systems, and components (SSCs) that 

require modification to enable crediting the fire barrier in the DSA to further reduce the 

postulated consequences. These upgrades have been documented as design input for a project 

to upgrade all SSCs necessary to credit the 233-lH Fire Barrier. The initial design of the 233-lH 

Fire Barrier modifications is nearing completion and is scheduled to be issued in FY 2024. 

Following acceptance of the design, the project will transition when it is authorized for 

execution to focus on procurements and construction with project completion currently 

forecasted in FY 2026. 

296-H Stack Collapse Mitigation 

An engineering control does not readily exist to address the reported material at risk (MAR) 

release postulated in the post seismic event followed by a full facility fire due to the assumed 

296-H Stack collapse and subsequent impact to the 217-H Vault. Efforts continue to identify 

possible solutions focused on potential modifications to the 296-H Stack or 217-H Vault and to 

protect the MAR within 217-H from fire propagation in the event the 296-H Stack collapses on 

the 217-H Vault during/after a design basis earthquake. Initially, NNSA and SRNS collaborated to identify 12 possible solutions to protect the MAR in 217-H in the postulated post-seismic fire 

Annual Report on Ongoing Initiatives to Address the Progress and Status of the SRTE I Page 2 of 7 
Received by the Board 03.27.24

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multiple SSCs and analytical assumptions that could reduce the postulated high residual doses 

to CWs documented in the SRTE Consolidated Hazards Analysis. CLWDR is working to minimize the dose consequence to the CW through initiatives which provide credited SSCs that are not 

currently credited in the DSA. The CLWDR strategy started with 19 deliverables in pursuit of 

nine initiatives with the aim to improve the safety posture and reduce postulated high 

consequences to CWs. The nine initiatives are discussed below, which is documented in the 

CLWDR Roadmap. The relative order of magnitude (RM) costs below was provided by SRTE and 

has not been formally reviewed or accepted by NNSA. 

1. H-Area New Manufacturing {HANM) Exhaust Stack: This is anticipated to be a line-item 

project with a RM cost between $150 million (M) and $250M and a notional Critical 

Decision 4 (CD-4) date of 2038. This system will involve Natural Phenomena Hazard 

Design Category 3 (NDC-3)-qualified ductwork within HANM, ventilation fans, exterior 

ducting to the stack, diesel generator, and an approximately 200-foot stack. 

2. HANM Fire Suppression: This is anticipated to be a line-item project with a RM cost 

between $SOM to $100M (or $105M to $16SM when combining the cost for HANM and 

TEF) and a notional CD-4 date of 2037. This system will involve NDC-3 qualified fire 

water supply and fire sprinkler system. 

3. TEF Fire Suppression: This is anticipated to be a line-item project with a RM cost 

between $SOM to $100M (or $105M to $165M when combining the cost for HANM and 

TEF) and a notional CD-4 date of 2037. This system will involve NDC-3 qualified fire 

water supply and fire sprinkler system. 

4. HANM Seismic Tritium Confinements System {STCS) Upgrade: This is anticipated to be a 

General Plant Project (GPP) with a RM cost between $10M to $15M and will notionally 

become operational in 2035. This system will involve seismically qualified glovebox 

structural supports, process vessels, valves, seismic triggers, and relay cabinet. 

5. HANM Hydrogen-Tritium Thermal Cycling Absorption Process {HT-TCAP) STCS: This is 

anticipated to be a GPP with a RM cost between $12M to $17M and will notionally 

become operational in 2033. This system will involve seismically qualified glovebox 

structural supports, process vessels, valves, seismic triggers, and relay cabinet. 

Annual Report on Ongoing Initiatives to Address the Progress and Status of the SRTE I Page 3 of 7 
Received by the Board 03.27.24

its results have been incorporated into the CTF DSA. 

9. Tritium Oxidation Study: .These analyses will notionally be complete in 2030 and involve 

analyzing the release of tritium during fire events and the percent conversion of 

elemental tritium to tritium oxide in fires. It is important to note that it may be difficult 

for the vested parties to reach a consensus on the utilization of a percent conversion less 

than 100 percent. 

Since the Board's May 2023 briefing, the modifications that have been de-scoped are the HANM 

NDC-3 Stack and related infrastructure and the TEF STCS. The physical modifications that 

continue to be pursued are the HANM and TEF seismically qualified fire suppression systems, 

the HANM STCS upgrade, and the HANM HT-TCAP STCS. 

Fire suppression system evaluations continue to progress and the initial evaluations for both 

HANM and TEF are complete. Both system evaluations identified open items that are being 

pursued so that the system's seismic performance can be documented. The TEF open items are 

expected to be resolved in FY 2025, and the HANM open items are expected to be resolved in 

FY 2026. Funding for these modifications will be pursued following the completion of backfit 

analyses, conceptual design, and cost estimation efforts. 

The HANM STCS upgrade completed all seismic analyses and obtained concurrence through 

NNSA subject matter expert review. This initiative is currently pursuing a conceptual design 

revision to incorporate the changes identified by the preliminary backfit analysis of the existing 

confinement system, with a new cost estimate expected in FY 2025. HANM STCS and the HANM 

HT-TCAP STCS will both be pursued to achieve the desired consequence reduction. However, 

due to the required sequencing, the HANM STCS will be upgraded prior to HT-TCAP STCS. 

Following funding for the design and execution of the HANM STCS upgrade, the CLWDR strategy 

will evaluate the pursuit of a credited seismic tritium confinement system for the HT-TCAP 

system. 

The Savannah River Field Office (SRFO) provides DNFSB monthly updates on the schedule of 

ongoing and forecasted work in the CLWDR strategy. 

Annuc;1I Report on Ongoing Initiatives to Address the Progress and Status of the SRTE I Page 4 of 7 
Received by the Board 03.27.24

incorporate lessons learned from SRPPF, LAP4, and UPF to modify, upgrade, and improve future 

safety conditions at TFF. 

Site preparation activities that can be completed using existing/available project funding for TFF 

include the demolition of the existing warehouse, the construction of one new warehouse, and 

the installation of a new 13.8 kilovolt power supply to the HANM facility. These site preparation 

activities are planned for completion by March 2025. Limited design scope will also continue 

during the site preparation phase of the project, including a draft Preliminary Documented 

Safety Analysis for the Preliminary Safety and Design Results and design of selected process 

systems. The HAOM facility will remain operational until the completion of the TFF project. 

HAOM Bridging Strategy 

The HAOM Bridging Strategy was developed to help maintain continued operations in the 

HAOM facility until TFF is constructed and is periodically assessed and revised as necessary to 

ensure continued operations in HAOM based on facility/equipment conditions, production 

requirements, and programmatic changes. The second revision of the Bridging Strategy was issued in June 2023 and was incorporated into the approved SRTE integrated priority list (IPL) in 

October 2023. 

During the revision, personnel performed a series of walkdowns by utilizing existing operational 

risk reports. The assessment included various electrical, communications, fire protection, HVAC, 

steam, breathing/instrument air, chilled water plant, non-process gas supplies, building 

structure, and reservoir processes. The bridging strategy only addresses the recapitalization 

and major maintenance necessary to maintain HAOM in an operational state while minimizing 

risks to the mission. The bridging strategy does not address the activities that would be 

necessary to address the building limitations related to natural phenomena hazard events and 

the compliance with current national codes and standards. 

There are several scopes within the Bridging Strategy that will improve the operational safety of 

the HAOM facility. Funding requests will be added to the budget cycle accordingly; however, as 

work progresses, a more balanced approach may be applied. As TFF project work continues, 

SRNS will curtail, revise, or stop selected scopes and adjust time frames for work to be 

performed based on facility needs to continue operations. The following activities are identified 

in the Bridging Strategy as contributing to the overall radiological safety of the facility: 

Annual Report on Ongoing Initiatives to Address the Progress and Status of the SRTE I Page S of 7 
Received by the Board 03.27.24

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HAOM hoods. This effort Is tentatively scheduled for beginning design in FY 2029. 

• Fire System Sprinkler Head Replacement - The life cycle replacement for all sprinkler 

heads in HAOM will require replacement in 2030. Parts will be procured and installed as 

a part of regular fire system maintenance. Sprinkler head replacement is expected to 

begin in FY 2024 and will continue through FY 2030. 

The status for each of the bridging strategy scopes are tracked on the IPL. There have been 

several recent Bridging Strategy accomplishments to ensure HAOM's enduring mission, 

including completion ofthe Main Side (HAOM original structure) Motor Control Center 

replacements, the cooling tower and chiller refurbishments, and the Hoffman Blowers 

replacement for the air monitoring system. Significant progress continues with laser marker 

replacement, calorimeter refurbishments, mass spectrometer and scanning electron 

microscope procurements, and several other projects identified in the Bridging Strategy scope. 

4. SRTE Emergency Preparedness (EP} 

SRTE initiated an EP Improvement Plan (originally titled the "SRTE Emergency Preparedness Drill 

Improvement Plan") in August 2022 to further align the SRTE program within the framework of 

DOE Order 151.1D, Comprehensive Emergency Management System. This improvement plan 

applies changes as new opportunities arise and currently encompasses improvements to many 

aspects of EP, including the following: 

• drill conduct; • training; • drill scenarios; 

• programmatic improvements; and 

• administrative improvements. 

In August 2023, SRFO sent a letter of concern to SRNS about the SRTE EP Program. In the letter, 

SRFO communicated four areas of concern related to drill improvement, personnel turnover, 

training, and expertise and noted that the SRTE Emergency Management Program is a critical 

element of Tritium Enterprise DSA. SRFO requested a comprehensive Emergency Management 

plan with corrective actions, measurable milestones, and effectiveness reviews from SRTE and 

Annual Report on Ongoing Initiatives to Address the Progress and Status of the SRTE I Page 6 of 7 
Received by the Board 03.27.24

Levels and Site Area Emergencies identified (expected to be completed in FY 2025); 

• Addition of Senior Management drill observers to help identify areas of growth 

(completed in FY 2024); 

• Communications improvements (expected to be completed in FY 2024); 

• Comprehensive hot washes immediately following the drill play (implemented); 

• Improved and standardized drill and exercise reporting (completed in FY 2024); 

• Standardization and strengthening of matrixing to sitewide EP organizations (completed 

in FY 2024); and 

• Preparation for a postulated mass casualty drill. 

- SRTE plans to execute a postulated mass casualty drill in FY 2024 that assumes 

the onsite medical response capacity will be exceeded. This drill will contain 

various postulated risk/release elements to challenge first responders with the 

need to prioritize their response as the drill evolves. 

Additional actions to strengthen SRTE's EP program include the incorporation of the SRTE EP 

organization into the Operations organization while remaining connected to matrixed support 

from both Site EP and the Site Drill Team. SRNS also revitalized their conduct of operations drill 

program and ran postulated abnormal event scenarios on both day shifts and backshifts, 

lessening administrative burdens in favor of increased drill/practice time. 

Annual Report on Ongoing Initiatives to Address the Progress and Status of the SRTE I Page 7 of 7