### IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE AT NASHVILLE STATE OF TENNESSEE v. MAC K SAMUEL STOKES Direct Appeal from the Criminal Court for Giles County

No. 7951 Jim T. Hamilton, Judge

No. M1999-02252-CCA-R3-CD - Decided June 9, 2000

The defendant,

Mack Samuel Stokes, was convicted by a Giles County jury of theft of property over $500 and possession of a motor vehicle with

out a vehicle

i dentification number. He received concurrent

sentences of two years and thirty days, respectively. In this direct appeal, the defendant makes the following alle

gations: (1) the evidence was insufficient to sustain his convictions; and (2) the trial court

erred by sustaining the District Attorney's objection to defense counsel's closing argu ment and by admonishing defense counsel in the presence of the jury. Upon a rev iew of th e record, we aff

irm the judgment of t

he trial court. Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Criminal Court Affirmed

. R ILEY , J. delivered the opinion of the court, in which W ADE , P.J. and O GLE , J. joined. Hershell D. Koge

r, Pulaski, Tennes see, for the app ellant, Mack Samue

l Stokes. Paul G. Summers, Attorney General and Reporter; Todd R. Kelley, Assistant Attorney General; T. Michael Bottoms, District Attorney General; and Richard H. Dunavant, Assistant District Attorney General, for the appellee, State of Tennessee. OPINION FACTS

The victim was the owner of an orange 1976 Triumph Spitfire convertible. He made a deal withthe owner of

Cars Plus to place the car on the used car lot at a price of $900. On July 17, 1996, the victim noticed the car was not on the lot. When he inquired as to whether the car had been sold, the lot manager realized the car had been stolen and informed local authorities. A dispatcher notified officers to be on the lookout for the stolen vehicle. Giles County Sheriff's De puty Sands observe

d a white Triumph Spi

tfire without a lic

ense plate andattempted to stop the

vehicle by activa

ting her blue lights.

The vehicle did no

t immediately stop. It turned onto

another road, and finally stopped in a pasture. The defendant was a passenger-2-

in the car, and his broth

er was the drive

r. When asked wh

y the vehicle did

not have a license tag, the defendant

responded, "we just bought the car." He then produced a piece of notebook paper he purportedto b e a handwr itten bill of sale. The alleged bill of sale was undated and referred to a 1974 MG. Sands testified the handwriting was the same for the buyer and seller. In addition Sands testified that

the VIN plate had been removed from the vehicle; the steering column was loose; wires were pulled out; and the automobile appeared to have been recently painted. She noted the original color of dark orange was visible. The car was subsequent ly iden tified by the owner as the stolen 1976 Triumph Spitfire. The defendant and his brother were arrested and transported to the local jail. Defendant wa s Mirandized , and he gave the f ollowing statement: I think that on Monday, me and my brother was at a salvage yard

in Salem, Alabama, when I seen a

little foreign whit

e car... I start

ed talking to

this Mexican or His

panic guy who was driving the car. He said that he wanted

to sell the car for about $500, andI talked him down to $250 cash. So I paid him cash for the car, and he pulled out the bill of sale. My b rother, Jason, watched me fill out the bill of sa

le and David Johnston signed it. After I bought the car, I drove it to my house

and started working on it... The defendant’s brother also gave a statement with conflicting details about the pu rchase of the vehicle and testified at trial. Defendant did not testify at trial.
A Giles County jury found defendant guilty of theft over $500 and possession of a motor vehicle withouta vehicle identification number (VIN). In this appeal as of right, defendant makes the following allegations: (1) the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions; and (2) the trial court erred by sustaining the state's objection during defendant's closing argument and by admonishing trial counsel in the presence of the jury. These allegations are without merit. ANALYSIS A. Sufficiency of the Evidence Defendant

contends the evidence was insufficient to prove guilt beyon

d a reasonable d

oubt. In Tennessee, great weight is given to the result reached

by the jury

in a criminal trial. A jury verdict accredits the state’s witnesses and resolves all conflicts in favor of the state. State v. Bigbee , 885 S.W.2d 797, 803 (Tenn. 1994). On appeal, the sta

te is entitled to the

strongest legitimate view of the evidence and

all reasonable inferences which may be draw n therefrom. Id. ; State v. Cabbage , 571 S.W.2d 832, 835 (Tenn . 1 978). Moreover, a guilty verdict removes the presumption of innocence which the appella nt enjoyed a

t trial and raises

a presumption of g

uilt on appeal. State v. Grace , 493 S.W.2d 474, 476 (Tenn . 1973). The appe llant has the burde

n of overcoming

this presumption of guilt. Id. Although the evidence of the defen da nt’s guilt is circumstantial in nature, circumstantial-3-

evidence alone may be sufficient to support a conviction. State v. Tharpe , 726 S.W.2d 896, 899-900 (Tenn. 1987); State v. Buttrey , 756 S.W.2d 718, 721 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1 988). However, f or this to occur, the circumstantial evidence must be consistent w

ith guilt of the ac

cused, inconsiste

nt with innocence, and must exclude eve ry other re

asonable theory

or hypoth

esi s except that of gu

ilt. Tharpe , 726 S.W.2d at 900.
I n the inst ant case, the State presented proof that on July 17, 1996, an orange Triumph Spitfire convert

iblewas discovered stolen from Cars Plus in Lawrence County. Law enforcement officers were advised of

the theft. In Giles County, approximately thirty minutes later, Deputy Sands observed a white Triumph Spitfire conver tible without registration in the possession of the defendant andhis brother. The defendant produced a “piece of paper,” which he purpor ted to be a bill of sale, andasserted ownership of the vehicle. However, the “bill of sale” was for a 1974 MG, not a 1976 Triumph Spitfire. It was also obvious to Deputy Sands that the vehicle had rece ntly been p ainte d white, and the origin al color was deep orange. Furthermore, wires had been cut; the c ar could no longer be started with a key; the VIN had been removed; and the o wner of the stolen

vehicle subsequently identified the “white” Triumph as the car which was taken fr om the lot. Upon their arrest, the defendant and his brother provided conflicting statements as to their acquisition of the vehicle. Furthermore, the defendant’s brother’s trial t

estimony con

flicted with

his earlier statement to police.
When a defendant

has possession of

recently s

tolen goods and c

annot provide an a

dequate explanation as to how he obtained the goods, an inference can be made by the jury that the defendant unlawfully

acquired the pr operty. Bush v. State , 541 S.W.2d 391, 394 (Tenn. 1976). This was a classic jury question. In light of the evidence presented by the state, we conclude a r ational ju ror could find beyond a

reasonable doubt that

the defendant knowingly exercised control over the stolen vehicle over $500 in value

and knowingly posse

ssed it without a veh

icle identificat

ion number. This issue is without meri

t. B. Closing Arguments
Defendant

argues thetrial court improperly sustained the State’s objection to his statement during closing argument

that it was “possibl

e” somebody else

could have stolen the car. He further claims the trial court er

red by admonishing

counsel that he kn

ew not to get into that “possible stuff.” Defense counsel asserts the trial court’s comments in the presence of the jury were prejudicia l. Defense counsel’s statement

was proper in its context

and did not impermissibly mislead the jury as to reasonable

doubt. Neverthel

ess, we find any e

rror committ

ed by the t rial court in sustaining the objection was harmless. In addition, we do not find the trial court unduly admonished counsel, nor do we find the defendant was prejudiced by the court’s comments. The court merely stated that counsel was a

ware of the def

inition of reasona

ble doubt and instru

cted him to

contain his arguments to said d

efinition. This issue

is without merit.-4- CONCLUSION
The evidence was suf

ficient to support t

he defendant’s

convictions. While we find defense counsel’s closing argument was proper, we hold that the trial court’s error in sustaining the state’s objection was harmless. Furthermore, we find the defendant was not prejudiced by the trial court’s remarks. Thus, the judgment of the trial court is AFFIRMED.