[Cite as In re D.C., 2016-Ohio-769.]

STATE OF OHIO, BELMONT COUNTY 

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS 

SEVENTH DISTRICT 

IN THE MATTER OF D.C. 

 MINOR/APPELLANT 

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CASE NO. 14 BE 27 

OPINION 

CHARACTER OF PROCEEDINGS: Criminal Appeal from Court of Common 

Pleas, Juvenile Division of Belmont 

County, Ohio 

Case No. 13 JA 558 

JUDGMENT: Dismissed as Moot 

APPEARANCES: 

For Plaintiff-Appellant Attorney Charlyn Bohland 

Assistant Public Defender 

250 East Broad Street, Suite 1400 

Columbus, Ohio 43215 

For Defendant-Appellee Attorney Daniel P. Fry 

Belmont County Prosecutor 

Attorney Scott Lloyd 

Assistant Prosecutor 

147-A West Main Street 

St. Clairsville, Ohio 43950 

JUDGES: 

Hon. Mary DeGenaro 

Hon. Cheryl L. Waite 

Hon. Carol Ann Robb 

 

 
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 Dated: February 29, 2016 
[Cite as In re D.C., 2016-Ohio-769.]

DeGENARO, J. 

{¶1} This appeal filed by the Office of the Public Defender on behalf of D.C., 

Minor-Appellant herein, challenges the Belmont County Juvenile Court's decision 

which allegedly failed to credit D.C. for the total amount of time he was confined at 

the juvenile detention center and a juvenile residential center. As D.C. completed his 

DYS commitment and is no longer on any form of supervision, this appeal is moot. 

{¶2} At 15 years of age D.C. was adjudicated a delinquent child for 

committing arson, a first-degree felony if committed by an adult. On September 10, 

2013, the juvenile court committed D.C. to the Ohio Department of Youth Services for 

a minimum period of one year, maximum to his 21st birthday; but, suspended the 

commitment on the condition that he successfully complete the program at Oakview 

Juvenile Rehabilitation Center. 

{¶3} After D.C. failed to comply with the program at Oakview, the juvenile 

court reimposed D.C.'s commitment to DYS and granted only 23 days of detention 

credit. D.C. entered DYS on February 21, 2014. 

{¶4} Counsel for D.C. filed a motion to modify his sentence. On May 2, 2014, 

The Ohio Office of the Public Defender also began representing D.C. and on May 2, 

2014, filed a "Notice of Limited Appearance and Motion for Recalculation of 

Detention Credit" arguing that he did not receive credit for a period of time served at 

the Sargus Juvenile Center and at Oakview. 

{¶5} On May 6, 2014, the juvenile court granted D.C.'s motion and again 

suspended the sentence to DYS and ordered D.C. back to Oakview, but denied the 

Ohio Public Defender’s motion to recalculate D.C.'s detention credit. 

{¶6} Although D.C. was released from DYS on May 6, 2014, the Ohio Public 

Defender appealed the juvenile court’s order denying detention credit recalculation. 

{¶7} On July 31, 2015, the State filed a notice with this court that D.C. was 

no longer in "any detention facility, DYS or otherwise. He is off parole and no longer 

on any form of probation or supervision." D.C. conceded that he was "no longer 

under juvenile court supervision" and "this Court’s ruling would not impact his case." 

{¶8} In his sole assignment of error, D.C. asserts: 
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 The juvenile court erred when it failed to grant D.C. credit for the 

total amount of time he was confined at the Sargus Juvenile Center and 

Oakview Juvenile Residential Center relative to his offense, in violation 

of R.C. 2152.18(B); Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S. 

Constitution; and Article I, Section 16, Ohio Constitution. 

{¶9} This Court stated in State ex rel Cordray v. Basinger, 7th Dist. 09 MA 

119, 2010-Ohio-4870, ¶80: 

A case may be moot when there is no longer a "live" issue to be 

determined, or when "the parties lack a legally cognizable interest in the 

outcome." Allen v. totes/Isotoner Corp., 123 Ohio St.3d 216, 2009-

Ohio-4231, 915 N.E.2d 622, at ¶17, quoting Los Angeles Cty. v. Davis

(1979), 440 U.S. 625, 631, 99 S.Ct. 1379, 59 L.Ed.2d 642. An action is 

only moot when it would be impossible to provide meaningful relief even 

in a ruling in favor of the party seeking relief. Id. at ¶18. However, an 

action will not be moot if an actual controversy still exists between 

adverse litigants. State ex rel. The Plain Dealer v. Ohio Dept. of Ins., 80 

Ohio St.3d 513, 517-518, 1997-Ohio-75, 687 N.E.2d 661. 

{¶10} D.C. acknowledges that the case is moot, but nonetheless invokes an 

exception to the mootness doctrine. D.C. contends that due to the short average 

commitment for children at DYS, coupled with the lengthy period of appellate review, 

the issue will escape review, necessitating the exception here and resolution on the 

merits. Although D.C. relies on State v. Neville, 7th Dist. No. 03 BE 06, 2004-Ohio6840, to support applying the exception here, that case is not on point and involved 

jail time credit while the adult defendant was awaiting extradition. 

{¶11} This case is moot. D.C. was released from DYS nearly a month before 

this appeal was filed. Detention credit is irrelevant because D.C. was discharged and 

is not in a juvenile detention facility, nor is D.C. under any form of supervision. 
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{¶12} Contrary to the Ohio Public Defender's argument, the present issue is 

not one that is capable of repetition and yet will evade review. This exception applies 

only in rare circumstances when two factors are both present: "(1) the challenged 

action is too short in duration to be fully litigated before its cessation or expiration, 

and (2) there is a reasonable expectation that the same complaining party will be 

subject to the same action again.” State ex rel. Calvary v. Upper Arlington, 89 Ohio 

St.3d 229, 231, 2001-Ohio-142, 729 N.E.2d 1182. As D.C. is no longer a juvenile, 

there is no expectation that he will be subject to the same scenario. 

{¶13} Accordingly, D.C.’s assignment of error is moot and this appeal is 

dismissed. 

Waite, J., concurs 

Robb, J., concurs 

 

APPROVED: 

 

Mary DeGenaro, Judge