DEFENSE NUCLEAR FACILITIES SAFETY BOARD 

June 28, 2013 

MEMORANDUM FOR: Steven Stokes, Acting Technical Director 

FROM: Jonathan Plaue, DNFSB Site Representative 

SUBJECT: LLNL Activity Report for Week Ending June 28, 2013 

Plutonium Facility: On Tuesday, three workers detected significant levels of radioactive 

contamination while completing an operation to bag-out bottles of waste solution from a 

glovebox used to process plutonium-238. The workers detected the contamination on a table 

used to receive the bagged bottles. The continuous air monitors did not alarm and the 

contamination was localized to this table; however, the level of contamination was beyond the 

range of the instrument. One worker also detected moderate contamination levels on his 

coveralls. The Facility Manager appropriately requested a critique of the event, which concluded 

there were no issues with the planning, performance of the operation, or the immediate response 

to the abnormal event. The level of contamination was categorized as a Large Event per the 

Facility Safety Plan, which required the development of a formal recovery plan. Workers 

successfully completed the recovery on Thursday. 

The working theory is that the bag-out bag breached, and management is investigating potential 

causes, including sharps inside and outside of the glovebox. Notably, a Health & Safety 

Technician was present for the bag-out as required by the Operational Safety Plan (OSP). The 

presence of the technician for this event was clearly beneficial. The Facility Manager added this 

requirement to the OSP after reviewing the recommendations from the plutonium-238 best 

practices benchmarking effort (see weekly report dated May 10, 2013). The Site Representative 

notes that program and facility management have not yet incorporated many of the other 

recommendations from the benchmarking effort, though future efforts are planned. 

On June 28, 2013, the Livermore Field Office (LFO) approved the Justification for Continued 

Operations (JCO) related to the questionable components in the loft (see weekly report dated 

June 14, 2013). LFO approved the JCO without conditions, but limited the approval period to 

one year. 

On June 21, 2013, the laboratory contractor submitted to LFO a safety basis amendment to allow 

operations of the oxidation furnace in the Metal Conversion Glovebox with 100 % oxygen. The 

oxidation process is the final step used to convert plutonium metal to oxide through hydride and 

nitride intermediates. LFO previously clarified that 4 % oxygen was required to perform this 

operation because of the potential to create a violent reaction if workers inadvertently introduced 

plutonium hydride into the pulsed-bed reactor (see weekly report dated April 27, 2012). After 

operating with 4 % oxygen, program personnel determined that the processing rate was too slow 

to continue their demonstration work on Zero Power Physics Reactor fuel plates. To mitigate the 

risk of using 100 % oxygen, the contractor proposed creating a new Specific Administrative 

Control to ensure that the dehydride process step is accomplished twice at sufficient temperature 

prior to introducing material into the oxidation furnace. LFO is reviewing the amendment.