NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.

UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL

AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE

ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS

DIVISION ONE

SAMANTHA D., Appellant, 

v. 

DEPARTMENT OF CHILD SAFETY, T.D., A.D., C.W., Appellees. 

No. 1 CA-JV 17-0534 

Appeal from the Superior Court in Mohave County

No. S8015JD201600088 

The Honorable Douglas Camacho, Commissioner

AFFIRMED

COUNSEL

The Stavris Law Firm PLLC, Scottsdale

By Alison Stavris

Counsel for Appellant

Arizona Attorney General’s Office, Mesa

By Amanda Adams

Counsel for Appellee Department of Child Safety

Mohave County Legal Advocate, Kingman

By Kathy Tuthill

Counsel for Appellees T.D., A.D., and C.W.

FILED 5-31-2018
SAMANTHA D. v. DCS, et al. 

Decision of the Court

2 

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Judge David D. Weinzweig delivered the decision of the Court, in which 

Presiding Judge Diane M. Johnsen and Judge Paul J. McMurdie joined.

W E I N Z W E I G, Judge:

¶1 Samantha D. appeals from the juvenile court’s order 

terminating her parental rights to three biological children. We affirm.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

¶2 Samantha D. (“Mother”) had three children born between 

2013 and 2015, C.W., A.D. and T.D., with three different fathers, including 

Matthew W., C.W.’s biological father (“Father”). Mother, Father and the 

children lived together in November 2016 inside a recreational vehicle 

(“RV”) parked near the Kingman home of Father’s brother. 

¶3 On a Sunday evening, the family gathered to eat and watch 

football at the brother’s adjacent home. Father drank heavily, became ill 

and returned to the RV to rest. Mother soon followed with A.D., who was 

fussing and crying. Mother fed A.D. as Father vomited in the bathroom. 

She then returned to the house, leaving A.D. with Father in the RV. 

¶4 Not more than 30 minutes later, Father yelled for Mother. He 

said A.D. needed to go to the hospital because he pulled A.D.’s leg and 

heard it pop. Mother took A.D. to the emergency room at Kingman 

Regional Medical Center. She left C.W. and T.D. with Father. 

¶5 A.D. had fractured his left femur. His right temple was 

bruised and lacerated. He had bruising around the neck, petechia on both 

eyelids and facial abrasions. Hospital staff asked Mother what happened. 

Mother lied. She said A.D. was standing on a chair when he fell and caught 

his leg in the chair. She attributed the bruising and facial abrasions to other 

recent events, including that A.D. had fallen down the stairs and been 

involved in an off-road-vehicle accident. 

¶6 Child abuse was suspected. Nurses contacted the sheriff’s 

office and Department of Child Safety (“DCS”). A.D. was transferred that 

night by ambulance to a second hospital and emergency room, Sunrise 

Children’s Hospital. Mother accompanied him. She repeated her story to 
SAMANTHA D. v. DCS, et al. 

Decision of the Court

3 

hospital staff, saying A.D. injured his leg when he fell from a chair and other 

recent adventures caused his bruises and facial abrasions. 

¶7 A.D.’s treating physician doubted Mother’s account. He 

noted that “[t]he patient’s mechanism for injury is not consistent with his 

fracture” and referred A.D. to the hospital’s child protection team for 

suspected non-accidental trauma. A second physician later repositioned 

A.D.’s bone and placed him in “a long splint from the pelvis down to the 

ankle.” 

¶8 The next day, DCS took temporary custody of C.W. and T.D. 

and filed a petition alleging they were dependent as to Mother. DCS 

claimed Mother had neglected them “due to [an] unfit home” and failed to 

protect their brother, A.D., from physical abuse. 

¶9 Mother and Father provided different stories to law 

enforcement and DCS. Father initially denied causing A.D.’s injuries, but 

later admitted he had “become frustrated and annoyed” because A.D. 

“would not stay on the bed.” He shook A.D., grabbed his left arm and leg, 

“forcefully threw him onto the bed” and “heard [a] leg pop.” He conceded 

that Mother had “chang[ed] the story to make it sound like [A.D.] fell [off

a] chair,” but confessed that he injured A.D. “out of frustration.” And he 

admitted to “drinking heavily.” Police arrested Father and charged him 

with aggravated assault and child abuse. Father later pled guilty to child 

abuse. 

¶10 A pair of DCS investigators inspected the RV. The first 

characterized the living conditions as “cause for removal” alone. The 

second cataloged the dangerous and unsanitary conditions, both inside and 

outside the RV. She encountered a foul odor, piles of rotten trash and debris 

outside the RV, along with chemical containers and dangerous tools. She 

described how flies swarmed from the RV when she opened the door to 

enter and how an “overwhelming smell of fecal matter” pervaded the cabin. 

The “toilet was full of feces and urine.” She found used diapers next to food

items, “soiled blankets” in the playpen, piles of dirty dishes and “wires 

everywhere.” She observed clothes, trash, rotting food and debris strewn 

about the trailer. The children all slept on a piece of foam on the floor. 

Mother later conceded the RV was “not really” safe for the children. 

¶11 DCS seized temporary custody of A.D. upon his release from 

the hospital and placed him in foster care with his siblings, T.D. and C.W.

DCS filed a supplemental petition alleging A.D. was similarly dependent 

as to Mother based on abuse and neglect. The juvenile court adjudicated 
SAMANTHA D. v. DCS, et al. 

Decision of the Court

4 

the children dependent and approved concurrent case plans of family 

reunification and severance and adoption. 

¶12 DCS formulated a case plan for Mother and referred her for 

substance-abuse treatment, random drug testing, behavioral health 

services, a psychological evaluation and parenting classes. Mother 

accepted treatment and services for a few months, but her participation was 

sporadic. In addition, DCS arranged supervised visits between Mother and 

children, which went well and the children were happy to see Mother. 

¶13 Mother frequently stumbled in the months after removal. She 

tested positive for marijuana and alcohol. She could not maintain stable 

employment and housing. DCS learned Mother was dating a felon who’d 

been convicted of aggravated assault, although Mother said they were just 

friends. Mother was arrested for possession of methamphetamine and 

drug paraphernalia. She pled guilty. The court entered a deferred entry of 

guilt and placed her on probation for one year. 

¶14 Meanwhile, the children thrived in foster care. Their foster 

placement met their basic needs and ensured that A.D. received the care he 

needed to recover from his injuries. 

¶15 Against that backdrop, DCS determined it had sufficient 

grounds to move for severance based on abuse and neglect under A.R.S. 

§ 8-533(B)(2) and filed a motion to terminate Mother’s parental rights to the 

children in January 2017. Mother denied the allegations and requested a 

severance trial. 

¶16 The court heard two days of evidence and argument. Mother 

was present, represented by counsel and testified on her own behalf. The 

court ultimately terminated Mother’s parental rights to A.D., C.W. and T.D. 

based on neglect, but did not find clear and convincing evidence of willful 

abuse.1 Mother timely appealed. We have jurisdiction pursuant to Ariz. 

Const. art. VI, § 9 and A.R.S. § 8-235(A). 

 

1 The written order was inconsistent with the findings the court 

made at the conclusion of the trial; it inadvertently listed abuse as a second 

ground for terminating Mother’s parental rights. We need not consider the 

issue of willful abuse, however, because reasonable evidence supports the 

severance based on neglect. Jesus M. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 203 Ariz. 

278, 280, ¶ 3 (App. 2002). 
SAMANTHA D. v. DCS, et al. 

Decision of the Court

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DISCUSSION

A. General Principles.

¶17 Mother has a fundamental but not absolute right to custody 

of her children. Michael J. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 196 Ariz. 246, 248, 

¶¶ 11-12 (2000). To sever the parent-child relationship, the juvenile court 

must find clear and convincing evidence of at least one statutory ground in

A.R.S. § 8-533(B) and find that termination is in the child’s best interests by 

a preponderance of the evidence. Id. at 249, ¶ 12; Kent K. v. Bobby M., 210 

Ariz. 279, 288, ¶ 41 (2005). We will affirm a severance order unless it is 

clearly erroneous. Jesus M., 203 Ariz. at 280, ¶ 4. We accept the court’s 

findings of fact unless no reasonable evidence supports them, id., and view 

the evidence in the light most favorable to upholding the order. Denise R. 

v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 221 Ariz. 92, 97, ¶ 20 (App. 2009). 

B. Neglect.

¶18 Mother argues the juvenile court had insufficient evidence to 

terminate her parental rights based on neglect. Parental rights may be 

terminated when there is clear and convincing evidence that “the parent 

has neglected or willfully abused a child.” A.R.S. § 8-533(B)(2). Neglect 

includes “the inability or unwillingness of a parent . . . to provide [the] child 

with supervision, food, clothing, shelter or medical care if that inability or 

unwillingness causes unreasonable risk of harm to the child’s health or 

welfare.” A.R.S. § 8-201(25)(a). 

¶19 The juvenile court was presented with substantial evidence to 

find neglect. The court heard considerable evidence and testimony that the 

children lived in foul and hazardous conditions at the time of removal, both 

inside the RV and outside. The court found “[t]he home was completely 

unsanitary, with trash and debris blocking the entrance and exit. There was 

trash and hazardous items throughout the inside and outside of the home, 

[including] rotting food, sharp objects and tools within reach of the 

children. The home poses a significant risk to the well-being of the 

children.” 

¶20 The court found more support from the uncontested events 

leading to A.D.’s injury. Mother left A.D. alone with Father despite 

knowing Father had consumed a significant amount of alcohol, was 

“already upset from an earlier argument” and was “frustrated due to the 

children being too loud.” Father broke A.D.’s femur and bruised his neck. 

And yet, later that same night, Mother left T.D. and C.W. alone with Father. 
SAMANTHA D. v. DCS, et al. 

Decision of the Court

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¶21 Mother also misled the hospital staff and law enforcement 

about the genesis of A.D.’s injuries in order to protect Father. In doing so, 

she firmly placed Father’s interests above A.D.’s well-being. Even after 

months of services, she never accepted responsibility for A.D.’s injuries or 

the severity of her decision to leave the children with an inappropriate 

caregiver. 

¶22 We are not persuaded by Mother’s arguments. She argues 

“the inside of her residence was cleanly [sic],” but substantial evidence was 

presented to the contrary. Jennifer S. v. Dep’t of Child Safety, 240 Ariz. 282, 

287, ¶ 16 (App. 2016) (“[T]he resolution of conflicts in the evidence is 

uniquely the province of the juvenile court, and we will not reweigh the 

evidence in our review.”). She also claims to have secured a new residence 

with a man named “Michael” and his roommate. She says Michael is 

financially supporting her and will support her three children if returned 

to her care. But the evidence demonstrates that Mother has lived a 

transitory existence. She moved at least five times in less than 18 months. 

Michael never testified. And she provided the court with no reason for his 

altruism; indeed, she denied even dating him. Even assuming Mother’s 

current situation is different, Michael has no legal obligation to financially

support her and her children. And she offered no evidence that, if the 

relationship dissolves, she would have means to care for her children by 

herself. The court did not err by terminating Mother’s parental rights based 

on neglect.

C. Best Interests.

¶23 Mother likewise disputes that termination was in the 

children’s best interests under a preponderance of the evidence. Severance 

of the parent-child relationship is in a child’s best interest if the child would 

benefit from termination of the parental relationship or would be harmed 

by continuing the relationship. James S. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 193 Ariz. 

351, 356, ¶ 18 (App. 1998). The court may consider whether the child is 

adoptable, an adoptive placement is immediately available and the existing 

placement is meeting the child’s needs. Raymond F. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. 

Sec., 224 Ariz. 373, 379, ¶ 30 (App. 2010). 

¶24 The record contains substantial evidence to support the 

juvenile court’s best-interests finding. The court heard testimony from 

three DCS officials that termination of Mother’s parental rights was in the 

children’s best interest because it provided an opportunity for them to be 

adopted by someone willing and able to protect them. One official testified 

that the children were adoptable, the current placement was meeting their 
SAMANTHA D. v. DCS, et al. 

Decision of the Court

7 

needs and DCS had identified a possible adoption placement for all three 

children. 

¶25 The record also indicates that maintaining the parent-child 

relationship would be detrimental to the children while termination of 

parental rights would benefit the children by freeing them from a neglectful 

parent. Mother’s post-removal circumstances and conduct are instructive. 

She tested positive for marijuana and alcohol, failed to maintain stable 

employment and housing, cohabitated with a convicted felon and pled 

guilty to possessing methamphetamines and drug paraphernalia. She often 

misled DCS about her current living conditions. And at the severance trial, 

Mother said she was unemployed.

¶26 We reject Mother’s arguments that termination is not in the 

best interests of her children because “she loves her children” and “the 

children are happy to see their Mother.” The court expressed skepticism 

that a three-year-old and four-year-old would understand “everything that 

[was] going on.” And the juvenile court was in the best position, as the trier 

of fact, to weigh the evidence, assess the credibility of witnesses and resolve 

any conflicts in the evidence. Because reasonable evidence supports the 

court’s findings and conclusions, we do not disturb them. Jennifer S., 240 

Ariz. at 287, ¶ 16. The juvenile court did not err in its best-interests finding.

CONCLUSION

¶27 The juvenile court properly terminated Mother’s parental 

rights to her three children based on neglect. We affirm.