DEFENSE NUCLEAR FACILITIES SAFETY BOARD

March 1, 2024

TO: Timothy J. Dwyer, Technical Director

FROM: A. Holloway and C. Stott, Resident Inspectors

SUBJECT: Pantex Plant Activity Report for Week Ending March 1, 2024

Staff Activity: Resident inspectors assessed cell assembly activities for an operational safety 

review, as well as a nuclear explosive safety change evaluation for staging an anomalous unit in 

an enhanced transportation cart until a path forward can be determined (see 02/09/2024 report).

Grassland Fire: This week, due to high winds and dry conditions, the Texas Panhandle 

experienced historic wildfire activity. On Tuesday, Pantex declared an operational emergency 

due to a wildfire approaching the site. This fire, titled the “Windy Deuce Fire,” eventually came 

within four miles of the Pantex site boundary. In response, nonessential personnel were 

evacuated from the site with a small contingent eventually sheltering in place. The Plant Shift 

Superintendent activated the Emergency Response Organization, which reported to the 

emergency operations center (EOC) within the Pantex site or to the alternate EOC in Amarillo. 

The resident inspectors monitored emergency activities from the alternate EOC, noting a 

particularly swift response and collaboration between site and local personnel. Following

termination of the operational emergency, NPO and CNS personnel discussed opportunities for 

improvement in future emergency responses, including communication enhancements between 

EOC locations to improve overall situational awareness. 

Operating Procedures: As allowed by site requirements, CNS process engineering develops 

electronic line-throughs (ELT) of operating procedures as an operator aid under certain 

circumstances. ELTs do not undergo the same level of review and approval as typical operating 

procedures and therefore their use is limited to a few specific cases. As an example, if a nuclear 

explosive operating procedure (NEOP) could be used on a weapon program with multiple 

modifications, CNS process engineering would utilize an ELT to line-through certain steps and 

option trees that are not applicable to the specific weapon modification being worked. 

CNS process engineering recently developed a nuclear explosive engineering procedure (NEEP)

that directed the bypassing of certain steps within the NEOP. However, the CNS process 

engineer—attempting to provide an operator aid to support the production technician execution 

of the NEEP—inappropriately developed an ELT of the NEOP with the select operational steps 

removed. The ELT, though, had one additional step, related to application of Lubri-Bond® to a 

component, inadvertently removed beyond the NEEP direction. Consequently, production 

technicians when conducting operations per the ELT on two nuclear explosives did not apply 

Lubri-Bond® to the component. For the second unit, CNS quality assurance inspection 

technicians went beyond expectations and compared the ELT to the NEEP direction and 

identified the discrepancy. In response, CNS non-conformed the units and obtained a special 

exception release from the design agencies permitting continued assembly. Additionally, CNS 

process engineering performed an extent of condition review regarding the use of ELTs and 

discontinued all ELTs not in accordance with site requirements. Finally, in response to a recent 

nuclear explosive safety change evaluation (see 01/26/2024 report), CNS process engineering 

also discontinued the limited practice of using NEEPs to direct line-throughs of NEOP steps.