UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT 

_________________________________ 

STEVEN M. HUNTER, 

 Petitioner - Appellant, 

v. 

MOORHEAD, Warden, 

 Respondent - Appellee. 

No. 18-1077 

(D.C. No. 1:16-CV-02680-MJW) 

(D. Colo.) 

_________________________________ 

ORDER DENYING CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY

_________________________________ 

Before HOLMES, O’BRIEN, and CARSON, Circuit Judges. 

_________________________________ 

Pro se petitioner Steven Hunter, a prisoner in the custody of the Federal Bureau of 

Prisons, seeks a certificate of appealability (COA) to appeal the dismissal of his 

28 U.S.C. § 2241 habeas petition. Hunter’s confinement arises from a conviction entered 

by the District of Columbia Superior Court; therefore, he is considered a state prisoner 

and must be granted a COA before he can appeal the denial of his § 2241 petition. See 

Eldridge v. Berkebile, 791 F.3d 1239, 1243 (10th Cir. 2015) (stating a state prisoner must 

obtain a COA to appeal the denial of a § 2241 petition, while a federal prisoner does 

 

 This order is not binding precedent except under the doctrines of law of the case, 

res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value 

consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1. 

FILED 

United States Court of Appeals 

Tenth Circuit 

November 15, 2018

Elisabeth A. Shumaker 

Clerk of Court
2 

not).1

 We deny Hunter’s request for a COA, deny his request to proceed in forma 

pauperis (IFP) on appeal, and dismiss this matter. 

I. BACKGROUND

 In 1996 the District of Columbia Superior Court convicted Hunter of assault, first 

degree burglary, assault with a dangerous weapon, aggravated assault while armed, and 

possession of a firearm during a crime of violence, and sentenced him to 31 years in 

prison. On February 3, 2014, the United States Parole Commission (Commission) 

released Hunter on parole. Seven months later, he was charged with stalking, cyber 

stalking, and making a harassing phone call while he was on parole. At his parole 

revocation hearing, Hunter, represented by counsel, admitted to violating the conditions 

of his parole. The Commission initially determined the offense category to be four, with 

an incarceration guideline range of 20 to 26 months, but on remand from the National 

Appeals Board, the Commission lowered the offense category to one, with an 

incarceration guideline range of 0 to 8 months. Nevertheless, on remand the Commission 

again imposed a sentence of 60 months because Hunter presented a more serious risk 

than indicated by the guidelines, there was a reasonable likelihood he would violate the 

law if released, and his incarceration was necessary to protect the public. 

 1

 At the time he filed his § 2241 petition, Hunter was housed at the United States 

Penitentiary in Florence, Colorado. He was subsequently transferred to the Federal 

Correctional Institution in Memphis, Tennessee. This circuit has jurisdiction based on his 

placement at the time he filed is petition. Santillanes v. U.S. Parole Comm’n, 754 F.2d 

887, 888 (10th Cir. 1985). 
3 

 In his habeas petition, Hunter asserted twelve claims for relief. The parties 

consented to proceed before a magistrate judge. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(c). The magistrate 

judge denied habeas relief, denied a COA, denied leave to proceed IFP on appeal, and 

dismissed the case. Hunter now seeks a COA on two claims: (1) the Commission 

erroneously applied the 2000 version of the re-parole guidelines instead of the 1987 

version, which resulted in a longer re-parole sentence in violation of the Ex Post Facto 

Clause; and (2) the Commission’s imposition of the same sentence after remand 

demonstrated vindictiveness in violation of his due process rights. He further asserts the 

magistrate judge was biased against him. He has abandoned all other claims. 

II. DISCUSSION 

A COA is a jurisdictional prerequisite to our review of a petition for a writ of 

habeas corpus. Miller–El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 336 (2003). We will issue a COA 

“only if the applicant has made a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional 

right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). Where, as here, “a district court has rejected the 

constitutional claims on the merits, the showing required to satisfy § 2253(c) is 

straightforward: The petitioner must demonstrate that reasonable jurists would find the 

district court’s assessment of the constitutional claims debatable or wrong.” Slack v. 

McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000). 

We have thoroughly reviewed the record, Hunter’s pro se appellate briefs, and the 

magistrate judge’s thorough and cogent order; he has failed to make the applicable 

showing. In particular, he has not demonstrated how or why the magistrate judge erred; 

he merely speculates, saying if the Commission had applied the 1987 version of the 
4 

re-parole guidelines, the result of his re-parole proceedings would have been more 

favorable. Making a case for a COA is difficult. It requires specific reasons, supported 

by specific authority, detailing how the judge erred. Simply restating the arguments 

raised in the district court and spouting platitudes and generalities falls far short. Because 

no jurist of reason could reasonably debate the correctness of the result reached by the 

magistrate judge, we deny a COA and dismiss this matter. 

Hunter asserts the magistrate judge was prejudiced against him because he issued 

rulings adverse to him. “Adverse rulings alone do not demonstrate judicial bias.” Bixler 

v. Foster, 596 F.3d 751, 762 (10th Cir. 2010). His argument is not even debatably 

correct. 

III. CONCLUSION 

We DENY the request for a COA and DISMISS this matter. 

The magistrate judge denied Hunter’s request to proceed on appeal without 

prepayment of fees, a privilege extended only to those who qualify for in forma pauperis 

(IFP) status, to wit, impecunious circumstances and the presentation of non-frivolous 

issues. Hunter has here renewed his desire to proceed without prepayment of fees, again 

claiming IFP status, but he fails to qualify. We deny his IFP request. The case is closed 

and the relevant statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a), does not waive payment of fees, only 
5 

prepayment of fees. All filing and docketing fees ($505.00) are due and payable to the 

Clerk of the District Court. 

 

Entered for the Court 

Terrence L. O’Brien 

Circuit Judge