### FI LED U.S. COURT O F APP EALS ELEVENTH CIRCUIT N ovembe r 30 , 2 005 THO MAS K. KAH N CL ERK [PUBLIS H] IN THE UN ITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FO R T HE EL EV EN TH CIRC UI T

____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ N o. 05- 1131 8

____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ D. C . Do ck et No . 0 4 -0 0 1 9 4 -C R- WS UNITED STAT ES OF AMERIC A, Plaintiff-Appellee, ve rs us CARLO S D EO N W IL LI AMS , a. k. a. Bo da ci ous, D ef en dant- Appe llant.

____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ Appeal f rom the United State s District Court f o r th e S o u t h e rn D i s t r i c to f

A l ab a ma

____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ _ (N ove m be r 30, 200 5) Be fo re A N D E RS O N , BL A CK

and C A RN E S, Ci rc uit

Jud ge s. PE R CU RIA M: In this Guidelines int erpretation case, w e exam ine the m eaning of the word

“ an y ” as it

is use d inU nit ed

S ta te s S en te nc ing G uid el ine § 2K2. 1( c) (1 ), andThe c ross ref ere nce pr ovision in § 2K2.1 inst ructs the c ourt to apply § 2X1.1 if the 1 de fe nd ant u se d o r p os se sse d a ny fi re arm in c onne c tio n w iththe c omm iss ion of ano the r o ff

e ns e and the r esulting ba se leve l is higher than it would otherwise be . U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(c)( 1). Section 2X1.1, in turn, instructs the cour t to use the offe nse leve l that is the same as the unde rlying offe nse. The unde rlying of fense , in this case, would be a g g ravated assault, § 2A2.2.

2 co nc lud e that i t c ove rs any f ir earm that i s us ed

in co nne ct ionw iththe c om m iss ion of another offense which is within th e re levant condu ct of the char ged offense.

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND O n January

29, 200 4, Carl os W ill iam s w as arr es te d f or sho oti ng E ri c Mc Cants f

our day s e ar lie r. A t the ti m e of the arr es t, the of

fi ce rs f ound tw o guns i n W illiam s’ s car. W illiam s was c harged in state court for the assault, and the federa l gr an d j ur y ind ic te d hi m

f or be ing af el on i n po sse ssi on o f a fi re ar m , in vio la tio n of 18 U . S. C. § 92 2( g) . W ill iam s pl ed gui lty to poss es sin g on e of

the f ir earm s w ith out a plea agr eem ent. T he Governm ent did no t prove that the firear m in the federa l ch ar ge w as the sam e one use d inthe Mc Cants a ssa ult . Inhis w ri tte n ob

j ec tio ns t o th e Pr es en te nc e Re port and at se nte nc ing , W ill iam s ob

j ec te d to the c al cu la tio n of his ba se of

fe nse le ve l. A ft er

he ar ing te sti m ony and d et er m ini ng b y

apr ep onde ranc e of

the e vid en ce that the a ssa ult on McCants w as relevant conduct to the federal possession charge, the district court ca lc ulate d th e ba se le ve l by c ro ss- re fe re nc ing f

ro m the f ir earm s gu ide lin e, § 2K2. 1, to the gui deline for aggravated assault, § 2A2.2. T he district court added ten 13

poi nts to the ba se of

fe nse le ve l of

f ourte enbe ca

use af ir earm w as dis ch ar ge d and the vic tim

sus ta ine d se ri ous bodi ly

inj ur y . T he c ourt su

btr ac te d th re e poi nts f

or ac ce ptanc e of

r es pons ibi lity . W ithaba se of fe nse le ve l of

tw en ty -o ne , and a cr im ina l hi sto ry

le ve l of V I, the sug ge ste d G uid el ine s r an ge w as se ve nty -s ev ento nin ety -s ix m onths; the dis tr ic t c ourt se nte nc ed W ill iam s to nin ety -s ix m onths’ im pr iso nm en t. II. STANDARD OF REVIEW W ill iam s w as se nte nc ed

a ft er the S upr em e Co urt hande d do w n it s de ci sio n in U nit ed S ta te s v. Bo oke r, 543 U . S. __, 125 S . Ct . 738 ( 2005 ). W e re vie wque sti ons of lawari sin g un de r the G uid el ine s de nov o. U nit ed S ta te s v. Cr aw fo rd , 407 F . 3d 1174 , 1178 (11 Cir. 2005 ). O nce the district court has calculated the G uidelin es th co rr ec tly , w e re vie wthe se nte nc e fo r re as ona ble ne ss. I d. a t 11 79. III. DISC USSION A. The m eaning of “ any ” in U. S. S. G. § 2K2.1(c )(1). W ill iam s c ont en ds tha t the w or d “ any ” in § 2K2. 1( c) (1 ) is c onf ine d to any

of the firearm s that he was c harged with possessin g. T hus, he argued that the district co urt e rr one ousl y

c ro ss- re fe re nc ed

to the a ggr av at ed

a ssa ult gui de lin e, w hic h di d n o ti n v o l v e th e f

i r e a rm i n th e f

e d e r a l c h a r g e . Th e Go v e rn men tc o u n t e r s th a t“ a n y” m ust m ean any

f ir earm the de fe ndant p oss es se d, be it the one s c harg ed

or not . T heSection 2K2.1(b)( 5) re ads: “I f the de fenda nt used or possessed a

ny firea rm or 2 ammunition in connection with another f elony offe nse; or possessed or

transfe rre d any

firea rm or ammunit ion

wi th k no wl e dg e , inte nt, or

re a so n to be lie ve that it

wo uld be us e d o r p os se sse d in c onne c tio n w ithano the r f e lony of fe ns e , in c re a se by

4 le ve ls. I f t

he re su lti ngof

fe ns e le ve l is le ss than level 18, incr ease to level 18.”

4 se ct ionin que sti on r ea ds: (c) Cross Refe rence (1 ) If the de fe ndant u se d or

pos se sse d an

y fi re ar m or

a m m uni tio n in co nne ct ionw iththe c om

m iss ionor

a tte m pte d c om m iss ionof an oth er of fe nse , or pos se sse d or

tr an sf er re d af ir earm or am m uni tio n w ithkno w le dge or int en t tha t i t w oul d be use d or poss essed in connection with another offe nse, apply -- (A ) § 2X 1. 1 ( A tte m

pt, S oli ci ta tio n, or

Co nspi ra cy ) in r es pe ct

to that other offense, if the re sultin g offense level is greate r than th atde te rm in edab ov e . . . . U . S. S. G . § 2K2. 1( c) (1 ). ( em pha sis a dde d) A lth oughthi s c ourt ha s no t r ea ch ed thi s is sue pr ec ise ly , it

ha s di sc uss ed

the m ean in g o f th e sa m e k ey word s u se d i n a no th er p ro vi si on of t he Gui de li ne s, i .e. § 2K2.1(b)( 5). In U nited States v. S utton , 302 F. 3d 12 26 (11 Cir. 2002 ), this court

2 th ex am in edth e m ean in g o f “ th e fi rear m or a m m un it io n” in th e U.S.S.G. § 4B1.4(b)(3)( A) sentencing enhancem ent for § 922(g) violatio ns. It dete rm ined that

“ the ” m eant tha t the f

ir earm ha d to be the one w hic h w as c harg ed in the vio la tio n of §92 2( g) . I n r ea ch ing thi s c onc lus ion , the c ourt f ir st n ote d th at

the pla in langua ge of

the gui de lin e m

ust be f oll ow ed . I d. at

122 7. T he n it

c ont inu ed :5

Whil e the w or d " an y " i s ge ne ra l and n onsp ec if ic , the w or d " the " i s particular and specific. The Sentencing Guidelines them selves evince anund er standi ng o f thi s di sti nc tio n. Whe n any f ir earm or a m m uni tio n w ill do, the G uid el ine s us e the non spe ci fi c phr as es "any f ir earm or am m uni tio n, " s ee , e . g. , U SS G § 2K2. 1( b) (5 ), or "a f ir earm or am m uni tio n, " s ee , e . g. , § 2K 1. 1( c) (1 ), r athe r than th e spe ci fi c phr as e "the f ir earm or a m m uni tio n. " T he use of

"the f ir earm or a m m uni tio n" in § 4B 1. 4( b) (3 )( A ), the n, ind ic at es that this G uid el ine appl ie s on ly to ap a rt i c u l a r

f i r e a rm. Id . at 1 22 7- 28 . T w o othe r ci rc uit s have f ound thi s r ea soni ng p er sua siv e w he n in te rp re tin g part s of § 2K2. 1. I n th e fi rs t of

the m , the E igh th C ir cu it ci te d S utt on a ppr ovi ngl y w he n it he ld tha t § 2K2. 1( b) (5 ) did not r equir e the “ an y

f ir earm ” to b e the one charged in the indictm ent. United States v. Mann, 315 F.3d 1054 , 1056 (8 Cir. th 2003 ). T he court chara cterize d § 2K2.1(b)( 5)’ s “ refe rence to ‘ any firearm ’ ” as unam big uous . I d. T he c ourt a lso not ed that the de fe ndant’ s c onstru ct ionof the

“ an y ” to m ean th e ch ar ge d f ir earm w oul d le ad

to anabsur d r es ult , i. e. it w oul d re w ar d th ose c ri m ina ls who h ad the f or es igh t t o ge t r id o f the w ea pon. I d. a t 10 57. Although Mann did no t invo lve the precise provision at iss ue here, it did inv olve a provisi on of the sam e guideline that us ed the sam e key words, “ any

firearm .” Th u s , M a n n i s p e r s u a s i v e au t h o r i t y. InU nit ed S ta te s v. Jard ine , 364 F . 3d 1 200 (1 0 Ci r. 200 4) , the T en th C ir cu it th ad dr es se d § 2 K2. 1( c) (1 ), the ve ry pr ovi sio n a t i ssu e he re , and d et er m ine d th at

itThe Supreme Court vacated this decision and on re mand, the Te nth Circuit reinstated 3 its opini on but remande d for r esente ncingconsistent with Booke r. United States v. Jardine, 406 F.3d 1261 ( 10 Cir. 2005).

th Th e c onte xt of

§ 2 K2 .1 (b )( 4) , e nh anc ingthe of fe ns e le ve l of

the po sse ssi on

by tw o if 4 the fire arm wa s stolen, may sug g est that it refe rs to the cha rg ed fire arm a s havingbeen stolen. 6 re fe rr ed to an y f ir earm pos se sse d by

the de fe ndant. T he c ourt st ar te d w iththe 3 pl ai n l an gu ag e, no ti ng th atth e Gui de li ne s d idno t p ro vi de a de fin it io n o f th e te rm . Id . a t 12 07. I t c ite d M an n and S utt on f or the ir dis cu ssi on o f the G uid el ine s’ use of

“ th e” an d “ an y .” Id . at 1 20 8. It he ldth atth e te rm “ an y fir earm ” was un am

bi gu ou s. Id . F ina lly , the c ourt po int ed to tw o f urthe r co nsi de ratio ns: the f ac t tha t the G uid el ine s r equir e the c ourt t o c onsi de r al l r el ev an t c ondu ct w he n se nte nc ing and the f ac t tha t the de fe ndant’ s in te rp re ta tio n w oul d le ad to anabsur d r es ult

f or the sa m e rea so n c it edin Man n. Id . By c ontra st, in U nit ed

S ta te s v. G onz al es , 996 F . 2d 8 8 ( 5 Ci r. 199 3) , the th Fi fth C ir cu it in d ic tar ej ec te d th e pla in m eanin g of “ an y f ir earm , ” re as oni ng tha t i t did not f it w iththe “ ove ra ll co nte xt o f se ct ion2K2. 1. ” 996 F . 2d at 92 n. 6. T he co urt r ea sone d th at

the “ an y f ir earm ” m

ust be a t l ea st r el at ed

to the one c harg ed

in the ind ic tm en t. I d. L ike Jud ge A rn old in his dis se nt i n Mann, the c ourt po int ed to the language in § 2 K2. 1(b)(4), which enhanced the sentence if “ any firearm ” w as sto le n, and r ea sone d th at

thi s c anonl y

log ic al ly be the c harg ed

f ir earm s or

it w oul d not m ak e se nse . I d. 4Howeve r, there is no simi lar c ontextin the instant § 2K2.1(c) (1) to over ride the pla in meaningof the word " any ." It i s n o ta b s o l u t e l y c l e ar w h e r e th e S i x thC i r c u i tf i t s w i thr e s p e c tt o th e s e i s s u e s . In 5 United States v. Settle, 414 F.3d 629 (6th Cir. 2005), r einstatingin part 394 F .3d 422 (6 Cir. th 20 05 ), the Sixth C ir c uit

se e me d to a g re e wi th t

he Ei g hth Cir c uit in M ann and the Te nth

Cir c uit in J ardine that "a

ny firea rm" meant any

firea rm used by

the def endant in conne ction with another o f f e n s e w it h in th e r e le v an t c o n d

u c t o f th e c h ar g e d

o f f e n s e , s e e id . at 6 3 3 . H o w e v e r , o nth e n e xt pa g e , th e c ourt

se e me d to a lso re qu ir e that th e fi re arm its e lf , whic h w a s u se d in

c onne c tio n w ith the other of

fense , must have some " clea r conne ction" w ith the firea rm possessed in the c harg ed of fe ns e . I d. at 63 4. I t is no t a bs olute ly c le ar t ha t th e c onne c tio n b e tw e e n th e tw o f ir e arm s w ou ld be de e me d s uf

fi c ie ntl y c le ar i f t he on ly c onne c tio n is tha

t th e dif fe re nt f ir e arm is u se d in c o n n e c t i o nw i than o th e r

o f f e n s e w h i c hi s w i th i nth e r e l e v an tc o n d u c to f th e c h ar g e d

o f f e n s e . If the ans we r t o th at qu e sti on is i n th e a ff

ir mativ e , th e n th e Sixth C ir c uit is a ligne d w iththe Ei g hth Circuit and the Te nth Circuit, and with our holding in this case . 7 W e j ointhe E igh th and T en th C ir cu its to hol d th at “ an y f ir earm ” tr uly m eans any firearm . A s we earlier

held in Sutton , the S entencing Comm issio n uses “ the” 5 an d “ an y ” pur

pose ly and m ak es dis tin ct ion s de pe ndi ng o n w hic h w or d it use s. 302 F. 2d at 12 27. T he re is nothin g inthe langua ge or c ont ex t of

sub se ct ion( c) (1 ) that m odifies the words “ any firearm ,” nor is there any thing in the application notes that su gge sts adif

fe re nt i nte rp re ta tio n. T he re fo re , “ an y , ” as use d insub se ct ion (c )( 1) , c anappl y

to fi re ar m s no t nam ed

in the ind ic tm en t. B. D oe s th e co nduc t us ed in the § 2K2. 1( c) c ro ss r ef er en ce have to fa ll w ith in the r el ev an t c ondu ct de fi nit ion ? The r elevant conduct prov ision of the G uidelin es expressly provides th at

“ [u ] nle ss o the rw ise spe ci fi ed . . . c ro ss r ef

er en ce s inCh ap te r T w o . . . sha ll beSe c tio n 1 B 1. 3( a ) r e a ds : 6 Chapters Two ( Offe nse Conduct) a nd Three (Adjustments). Unless other wise spec ified, (i ) t he ba se of

fe ns e le ve l w he re the guid e lin e sp e c if ie s mo re tha

n o ne ba se of

fe ns e le ve l, (ii) spec ific off

ense c hara cter istics and (iii) cross re fer ence s in Chapter Two, a nd (iv) ad j u s tm en t s i nC h ap t er

T h re e, s h al l b e d et erm i n edo nth e b as i s o f t h e f o l l o wi n g: (1)( A) a ll acts and omissions committ ed, aide d, abetted, c ounseled, c ommanded, ind uc e d, pr oc ur e d, or

wi llf ull y c a us e d b y the de fe nd ant;

. . . that occur red dur ing the commission of the offe nse of c onviction, in prepar ation fo r t hat of fe ns e , o r i n th e c ours e of

atte mpt ingto a

vo id d e te c tio n o r r e sp on sib ili ty for that of fense . (2 ) s ole ly wi th r e sp e c t to of

fe ns e s o f a

c ha ra c te r f or wh ic h § 3D 1. 2( d) wo uld re qu ir e g ro up ingof

mul tip le c ounts , a ll a c ts a nd omi ssi on s d e sc ri be d in subdivisions (1)( A) a

nd (1)( B) above that were part of the same c ourse of conduct or common sche me or plan a s the offe nse of c onviction; (3) a ll harm that resulted f rom the ac ts and omissions s pecif ied in subsections (a) (1) a nd (a) (2) a

bove, and a ll harm that was the obje ct of such a cts and omissions ; and (4) a ny other infor

mation specified in the a

pplicable guideline. 8 de te rm ine d onthe ba sis of the f oll ow ing . . . [ de sc ri bin g f our c at eg or ie s of

r el ev an t co nduc t] . ” S ec tio n 1B 1. 3( a) . T hus, the sho rt answ er to the que sti on i s y es , the 6 oth er of fe nse c ro ss- re fe re nc ed

in Se ct ion2K2. 1( c) m

ust be w ith in the r el ev an t conduct of the charged offense “ unless o therwise spec ified.” Like the question abou t the m eaning of “ any firearm ,” a split has develop ed am ong the c ir cu its r eg ar din g th e que sti on o f whe the r the c ro ss- re fe re nc ed of fe nse in § 2K2. 1( c) m

ust be w ith in the r el ev an t c ondu ct of the c harg ed

of fe nse . T he9

Se ve nthCi rc uit

ha s c onsi ste ntl y

he ld tha t § 1B 1. 3' s r el ev an t c ondu ct de fi nit ion m ust be appliedto the condu ct contained in the § 2K2.1(c) cross ref erence . See, e. g. , U nit ed

S ta te s v. Jon es , 313 F . 3d 1 019, 102 2 ( 7 Ci r. 200 2) . T o su ppor t this th re ad ing , the S ev en th C ir cu it ci te d th e langua ge of § 1B 1. 3, w hic h st at es that c ro ss re fe re nc es und er

Ch ap te r T w o have to fi t un de r the r el ev an t c ondu ct te st: “ ‘ U nle ss oth er w ise spe ci fi ed , . . . ( iii ) cr oss r ef er en ce s inCh ap te r T w o . . . sha ll be determ ined on th e basis of the following [definitions of rele vant condu ct] .’ ” Uni te d S ta te s v . Rit se m a, 31 F.3d55 9, 5 64 (7 Cir . 19 94 ) (quo ti ng U.S.S.G. § th 1B1.3(a) ). T his langu age m akes § 1B1.3 “ a general application p rinciple that governs bo th cross refe rences in Chapter Tw o offenses and offense level ad j ustm en ts i n C ha

pte r T hr ee , pr ovi de d th ose se ct ion s do not spe ci fy to the co ntr ar y . ” I d. T he c om

m en tary to § 1B 1. 3, the c ourt no te d, pr ovi de s th at onl y w he re the re are “ m or e expli ci t i nstru ct ion s” sho uld the r el ev an t c ondu ct

not be use d. I d. a t 56 5. T he c ourt i n R its em a he ld tha t the langua ge in § 2K2. 1( c) , “ in connection with,” fa iled to provi de the necessary “ m ore explicit instructio n[] .” Id . The refo re, i t h el d t ha t t he rel ev an t co nd uc t re qu ire m en ts fou ndin § 1 B1 .3 go ve rn edth e u se of t he § 2 K2.1 cro ss refer en ce. Id .In justifying its broa d interpre tation of " any firea rm" to mean truly

any firea rm, the 7 Ei g hth Cir c uit , in

Mann , r e lie d u

po n th e Gu ide lin e s' ins tr

uc tio n th at ot

he r o ff e ns e s r e fe rr e d to in sp e c if ic of fe ns e c ha ra c te ri sti c s ( and

c ro ss r e fe re nc e s) are lim ite d to su c h o the r o ff e ns e s a s f a ll within the releva

nt conduct of the char g ed off ense. 315 F .3d at 1056. Mann de alt with the § 2K2.1(b)( 5) enha

nceme nt for possessingany firea rm in connec tion with another fe lony . Section 1B1.3 state s that specific offe nse cha rac teristics, of which § (b)(5) is one, are to be g overne d by th e s am e r el ev an tco n d

u ctp ro v i s i o nas ar e c ro s s re fe re n ce s . Ad d i t i o n al l y , b ec au s e t h e l an gu age of (b )( 5) is e sse nti a lly

the same a s ( c )( 1) , th e Ei g hth Cir c uit wo uld lik e ly re g ard the langua g e in (c) (1) a s not beingexpli cit enoug h to warr ant disreg ardingthe stricture s of § 1B 1.3. 10 Se ve ra l othe r ci rc uit s have j oin ed thi s in te rp re ta tio n. T he T en th C ir cu it in 7 Jard ine m ar

ri ed it s br oa d in te rp re ta tio n of “ an y f ir earm ” to the G uid el ine s’ re qui re m en t tha t the c ro ss- re fe re nc ed c ondu ct be w ith in the r el ev an t c ondu ct . 364 F. 3d at 12 09. T he S ixth C ir cu it al so r equir es that the oth er of fe nse c ro ssrefe renced by

§ 2K2.1(c )(1) be within the relevant conduct of the charged fire arm of fen se . Sett le , 41 4 F .3dat 6 33 -3 4. By c ontra st, the F if

th C ir cu it ha s he ld t

ha t § 1B 1. 3' s stri ct

ur es on r el ev an t conduct do not applyto § 2K2.1(c) (1)’ s cross-ref erence d condu ct. Gonzales , 996 F. 2d at 91-92 . The c ourt stated: “ the broad language of section 2K2.1(c)( 1), part ic ularl y

it s un lim ite d r ef

er en ce s to ' an oth er

of fe nse , ' ind ic at es that i t i s no t restricted to offe nses which would be relevant conduct but em braces a ll illegal co nduc t pe rf

orm ed or int en de d by

de fe ndant c onc er

nin g af ir earm inv olv ed in the ch arg edoff

en se .” Id . a t 92 . W e j oin with the circuits that have held that th e cr oss-refer enced conduct11

m us t fa ll un de r th e d efi ni ti on s o f rel ev an t co nd uc t fo un d i n § 1B 1.3 . Sect io n 1 B1 .3 specifically

provides th at offenses cr oss-refer enced in Chapter T wo m ean offe nses within the relevant conduct, unless oth erw ise specified. The language of § 2K2. 1( c) – “ [i ] f the de fe ndant u se d . . . any f ir earm . . . in co nne ct ionw iththe com m issio n . . . of another offense” – does no t specify , one w ay or the other, w he the r the oth er

of fe nse sho uld

be w ith in the r el ev an t c ondu ct . I n othe r w or ds, the m ere refe rence to “ another offense” does not resolve the questio n of whether the oth er of fe nse m ust be w ith in the r el ev an t c ondu ct of the c harg ed

of fe nse . T hus, w e re ad ily

c onc lud e that § 2K2. 1( c) doe s no t “ oth er w ise spe ci fy , ” an d th er ef or e the ge ne ra l pr inc ipl e of

§1B 1. 3 a ppl ie s to r equir e that su choth er of fe nse s m ust be wit hi n t he rel ev an t co nd uc t o f th e ch arg edoff en se . C. Is the aggravated assault on McCants w ithin the relevant conduct of the charged firearm offense? Inthe c as e be fo re us, the G ove rn m en t arg ue s th at the a ssa ult on M cC an ts fa lls und er

the r el ev an t c ondu ct

pr ovi sio n f

ound a t § 1B 1. 3( a) (2 ). T his is the pr ovi sio n th at

a ppl ie s to “ of

fe nse s of ac hara ct er

f or w hic h § 3 D 1. 2( d) w oul d req ui re g ro up in g o f m

ul ti pl e co un ts .” U.S.S.G. § 1 B1 .3(a )(2 ). Howev er, §Section 3D1.2(d) spe cifica lly excludes from its operation “all offe nses in Chapter Tw o, 8 Part A, ” wh ic h e nc omp a sse s a ssa ult of fe ns e s. The Gove rnment also make s an ar gument that it is notthe assault that would be 9 g ro up e d b ut r athe r t

he fi re arm

us e d in the a ssa ult . T his in n ot c or

re c t: § 2K2. 1( c )( 1) re fe rs to another offe nse in which a

firea rm was use d. There fore , it is t he other offe nse which must be su bje c t to the ru le s r e g ard ingg ro up ingbe c a us e it i s th e a ssa

ult guid e lin e tha

t is us e d to c a lc ulate the of fe ns e le ve l. 12 3D 1. 2( d) spe ci fi ca lly

e xc lud es a ssa

ult f ro m be ing gr oupe d. T he re fo re , the 8 de fi nit ionof

r el ev an t c ondu ct

f ound in § 1B 1. 3( a) (2 ) is n ot ava ila ble to the Governm ent. See Jones, 313 F.3d at 1023 n.3 (rej ecting an argum ent that an

9 ar m ed r obbe ry /f el ony m ur de r w as r el ev an t c ondu ct und er § 1B 1. 3( a) (2 ) be ca

use that pr ovi sio n r equir es that the oth er of fe nse be one f

or w hic h § 3 D 1. 2( d) w oul d re qui re gr oupi ng, and b ec au se the arm ed r obbe ry /f el ony m ur de r w as spe ci fi ca lly excluded from

the groupin g operation of § 3D1.2(d)); a ccord Se ttle, 414 F. 3d at 632 n .2; see a lso Ritsem a, 31 F.3d at 566 (rej ecting use of § 1B1.3(a)( 2) because § 2K2. 1 and § 2J1 . 2 ( obstru ct ionof j ust ic e) w er e not

li ste d a s of

fe nse s th at

w er e to be gro up edto ge th er). Be ca use thi s w as the the or

y upo n w hic h th e G ove rn m en t r el ie d be lowto showr el ev an t c ondu ct , and a ppare ntl y w as the onl y

r at ion al e re lie d up on b y

the dis tr ic t c ourt, w e va cate W ill iam s’ s se nte nc e an d r em an d f or r es en te nc ing . T he dis tr ic t c ourt sh al l e xa m ine the oth er pr ovi sio ns o f § 1B 1. 3 to de te rm ine if the assault is relevant conduct to the possess ion, and craf t a re asonable sentence under13

the a dvi sor

y G uid el ine s. A cc or din gly , W ill iam s’ s se nte nc e is V A CA T E D and RE MA N D E D f or re se nte nc ing .14

CA RN E S, Ci rc uit

Jud ge , c onc ur

ri ng: Co nc ur ri ng i n th e j udgm en t and j oin ing the opi nio n of the Co urt, I w ri te separately

to com m ent on where we are after the decision in Boo ker v. United States, 543 U.S . ___, 125 S. Ct. 738 (200 5), and to o ffer a suggestio n to the dis trict co ur ts whi ch m ay

he lp av oi d u nn eces sa ry

res en te nc e p ro ceed in gs . T he Bo oke r de ci sio n di d no t f re e us f ro m the ta sk o f ap ply ing the S en te nc ing G uid el ine s, som e pr ovi sio ns o f w hic h are m ind -num bin gly c om ple x and o the rs of w hic h are j ust

m ind -num

bin g. B ec au se the pos t- Bo oke r re gim e re qui re s “ ac curate advice” fr om

the guidelin es, w e have held that the guidelin es m ust be applied correc tly . United States v. Ellis, 419 F.3d 1189 , 1192 (11th Cir. 2005); United St at es v. Jor di, 418 F . 3d 1 212, 121 5 ( 11th C ir . 200 5) ; U nit ed S ta te s v. Cr aw fo rd , 407 F. 3d 1 174, 117 8 ( 11th C ir . 200 5) . T he sw or d danc e m ust sti ll be don e. I ts st ep s ca n b e in tri cat e an d t he m us ic un rel en ti ng , as t hi s ca se sh ows . T he de fe ndant, ac onvi ct ed f el on, w as c au ght

r ed -h an de d inpos se ssi on o f tw o f ir earm s. F ewc ri m es are e as ie r to p ro ve , and the de fe ndant p le ad ed gui lty to violatin g 18 U.S .C. § 922(g)(1). T he m ost im portant facts for sentencing purposes ar e that the de fe ndant h ad tw o pr ior f el ony c onvi ct ion s and an a dul t l if et im e fu ll of co nvi ct ion s f

or le sse r of fe nse s; h e w as on s upe rv ise d r el ea se a t the ti m e of thi s crim e; he possessed no t one but two weapons when ar rested; and he had shot a m an15

four day s before he w as caught poss essing th ese fir earm s. T he district court se nte nc ed the de fe ndant t o 96 m onths i m pr iso nm en t, a

r ea sona ble se nte nc e that, if an ythi ng, is on the li ght

sid e in v ie wof

the f ac ts. I n asim

ple r— an d so m e w oul d say m or e ratio na l— sy ste m

of se nte nc ing and r ev ie w , that w oul d have be enthe e nd of it . B ut h er e w e ar e va catin g an un que sti ona bly r ea sona ble se nte nc e an d se ndi ng the case back to the district court for anoth er sentence proceeding in which, af ter the defendant is hauled from prison in to court again, and m ore scar ce r esources are spe nt, the dis tr ic t c ourt w ill be f re e to p ro noun ce the sam e 96- m onth se nte nc e it im pose d th e fi rs t t im e ar ound . A nd, of c our se , the de fe ndant w ill have nothin g to lo se fro m ap pe al in g t ha t s en te nc e ag ai n. W e do all of this because the sentencing sy stem in place forc es us to review for any perce ived m istake each step the district court took in dancing its way thr oughthe intri cate gui de lin es , a dvi sor y tho ugh the y

be . I f co nvi nc ed

that the district court m ade it through the guidelin es without a m isstep, which is to say that it int er pr et ed tho se pr ovi sio ns e xa ct ly the w ay w e do, w e al so a sse ss the reasonableness of the actual sentence im posed. T he Booker decision has added that issu e to those that we re view. T he rea lity is, howe ver, that our reversals stem fr om int er pr et at ionof

the gui de lin es , not

f ro m the unr ea sona

ble ne ss o f the se nte nc es that di str ic t c ourts are im posi ng. W ith out

m uc h e xc ep tio n, in the pos t-16

Bo oke r w or ld w e se nd c as es ba ck f or r es en te nc ing be ca

use of som e dif fe re nc e of opi nio n a bout the a dvi ce that the gui de lin es pr ovi de d th e dis tr ic t c ourt, not be ca use we th in k t he sen te nc e im

po se d i s u nr eas on ab le . This case is a good exam ple of how w e ar e spending our sentence review tim e. I n th e co ur se of

r ev ie w ing the se nte nc e in this sim ple -c ri m e ca se , w e ha ve de ci de d th re e gui de lin es iss ue s, a t l ea st tw o of w hic h are dif

fi cu lt en oughto ha ve pr oduc ed c ir cu it spl its . T he f

ir st i ssu e ha s to do w iththe m eanin g of one w or d in on e cl au se of o ne su bd iv is io n o f on e su bs ect io n o f on e g ui de li ne . See U.S.S.G. § 2K2. 1( c) (1 )( “ [i ] f the de fe ndant u se d or pos se sse d any

f ir earm or a m m uni tio n in connection with anoth er f elony offense . . .” ) (e m

phasis add ed). A s the Court expla ins , tw o othe r ci rc uit s a ppe ar to be on o ne sid e of

thi s in te rp re tiv e iss ue , one ci rc uit is on the oth er

sid e of it , and the opi nio n of

y et anothe r ci rc uit

is co nf usi ng en oughthat w e cannot

te ll w he re it

stands on the iss ue . T he se co nd i ssu e is a dif fe re nt o ne inv olv ing the sam e cr oss -r ef er en ce pr ovi sio n, § 2K2. 1( c) , and i ts re la tio n to anothe r pr ovi sio n, § 1B 1. 3, and tha t i ssu e ha s a lso pr oduc ed ac ir cu it sp li t. The district court’ s m isstep, if any , involves not those two guidelin es issues but in stead the relevant conduct provis ion of § 1B1.3(a)(2) and § 3D1.2(d), which § 1B 1. 3( a) (2 ) inc or

por at es by

r ef er en ce , and the e ff

ec t of tho se pr ovi sio ns o n th e17

ca lc ulatio n of

the a dvi sor

y gui de lin es se nte nc ing r an ge in thi s c as e. B ec au se of our re ad ing of

the gui de lin es pr ovi sio ns, w e ar e se tti ng a sid e a pe rf ec tly r ea sona ble se nte nc e an d se ndi ng the c as e ba ck f or m or e pr oc ee din gs whic h pr oba bly w ill re sul t i n th e sam e se nte nc e be ing im pose d a ga in. W e do n ot e ve n ho ld tha t the re le vant c ondu ct

pr ovi sio n is ina

ppl ic ab le but

ins te ad dir ec t the dis tr ic t c ourt t o exam ine other theories under which it m ight b e applied. H owever that court resolves the relevant conduct issu e on rem and, whatever it decides the advisory gui de lin es r an ge is in l igh t of w ha t w e ha ve sa id, it

sti ll m ust c onsi de r the sam e 18 U . S. C. § 35 53( a) f

ac tor s th at

it did ini tia lly in de ci din g th e ap pr opr ia te se nte nc e in th is cas e. Th er ei n ru n s a t h re ad o f mad n es s th ro u g h th e met h o dn o w i n p l ac e. We reviewand decide close, hair -splittin g interpretive issues arising from guidelin es that are onl y

a dvi sor y , and w e se t a sid e se nte nc es e ve n th oughthe dis tr ic t c ourt, onc e its “ m isunde rs tandi ng” of the gui de lin es is co rr ec te d, is fr ee to im pose the sam e se nte nc e, and u sua lly w ill do s o. T he gui de lin es are ba se d up on d ec isi ons that the S en te nc ing Co m

m iss ionm ad e af

te r co nsi de ri ng the f

ac tor s se t ou t i n § 35 53( a) , w hic h are the sam e fa ct or s th e dis tr ic t c ourt m ust c onsi de r in r ea ch ing its de ci sio n a

bout the pr ope r se nte nc e in a

c as e af te r it ha s c al cu la te d th e Com m issio n’ s advice in the form of a guidelines range. I f a district court18

m isinterprets how the Sentencing Com m issio n has resolved the appli cation of the § 3553 (a ) fa ct or s inagiv enf ac tua l se tti ng— if

it m isa ppl ie s th e gui de lin es —the n th e co urt ha s m isr ea d th e advic e it is t o c onsi de r, but it sti ll ha s th e re spon sib ili ty to decide for itself howthe § 3553 (a) factors a pplyto the case before it. I f the fe deral co urt sy ste m

ha d e ndl es s r es our ce s or li ght doc ke ts, the pos t- Bo oke r sy ste m of se nte nc e re vie ww oul d m ak e m or e se nse , but the j udi ci al w or ld w e inh ab it is o ne of sc ar ce r es our ce s burd en ed by he av y de m an ds. O f co ur se , ne ith er thi s C ourt no r the dis tr ic t c ourts c anc hange the Bo oke r gui de lin es se nte nc ing r eg im e an d th e ap pe ll at e rev ie w system

th atap pl ie s t o i t. Ther e is, how ever, som ething th at the district courts can do to m inim ize poin tless reversals and unnecessary do-overs of sentence proceedings. I f a se nte nc ing c ourt i s f

ac ed w ithagui de lin es que sti on tha t m ay be co m e aniss ue on ap pe al , the c ourt c anind ic at e w he the r the a dvi ce that r es ult s f ro m it s r es olu tio n of that qu es tio n m ak es adif fe re nc e in the se nte nc e. F or e xa m ple , in thi s c as e if

the dis tr ic t c ourt ha d st at ed

that r eg ar dle ss o f howthe gui de lin es r el ev an t c ondu ct iss ue w as r es olv ed , it

w oul d c onsi de r the pr ior a ssa ult und er § 35 53( a) (1 ) & ( 2) (C ) an d on tha t ba sis w oul d st ill im pose the sam e 96- m onth se nte nc e, w e w oul d no t have to se nd this c as e ba ck

f or m or e se nte nc e pr oc ee din gs. T he se nte nc ing c ourt m igh t have stated that its rulin g on th e re levant condu ct issue resulted in a guid elines19

range of 77 to 96 m onth s, but that if it we re wrong abou t that and the range wa s only27 to 33 m onth s, the sentence still w ouldhave been 96 m onth s based on th e § 35 53 (a) fa ct or s. On th atba si s we c ou ldan d wo ul d h av e aff irmed. T his sug ge sti on i s no t so m e ra dic al ne wide a bor n of f ru str at ionc hur

ne d up by the Booker decision. T he Suprem e Court and this Court have lon g recognized that it is no t necessary

to decide guidelin es issues or rem and cases for newsentence pr oc eed in gs wher e th e g ui de li ne s erro r, if a ny, didno t af fect th e se nt en ce. Se e W ill iam s v. U nit ed

S ta te s, 503 U . S. 193 , 202 , 112 S . Ct . 111 2, 112 0–21 ( 1992 ) (“ [O ] nc e the c ourt of

appe al s ha s de ci de d th at the dis tr ic t c ourt m isa

ppl ie d th e G uid el ine s, ar em an d is appr opr ia te unl es s th e re vie w ing c ourt c onc lud es , on the re co rd a s aw hol e, that the e rr or w as harm le ss, i. e. , that the e rr or did not a ff ec t the dis tr ic t c ourt’ s se le ct ionof the se nte nc e im

pose d. ”) ; U nit ed

S ta te s v. Bl as , 360 F . 3d 1268 , 1272–73 (11th Cir. 2004) (declining to decide whether the district court mi s ap p l i e dth e g u i d e l i n e s w h e r e th e d i s t r i c tc o u rtw o u l dh a v e r e a c h e dth e s a me se nte nc e re gard le ss o f an y e rr or ); U nit ed

S ta te s v. H er sh, 297 F . 3d 1 233, 125 0–54 (1 1thCi r. 200 2) ( hol din g th at the se nte nc e w as “ w ith out e rr or and n ee d no t be re m an de d f

or r es en te nc ing ” ev entho ugh the dis tr ic t c ourt e rr ed in ap ply ing the groupin g guid elines because the district court had stated that it would have reached the sam e re sul t thr oughan up w ar d de part ur e if ne ce ssary ); U nit ed

S ta te s v.20

Ke ndrick, 22 F. 3d 10 66, 1068 (11t h Cir. 1994 ) (r ecognizing th at if a guid elines er ro r “ did not a ff ec t the dis tr ic t c ourt’ s se le ct ionof the se nte nc e im

pose d” the se nt en ce i s due to be affi rm ed ) (i nt ern al cit at io ns an d m ark s o m it te d) . Of course, if a sentencing court believes that how it resolves a particular guid elines issue do es m atter—that the sentence it im poses would h ave been differe nt if the guidelin es range had been—the court can note that for the r ecord as w el l. T ha t ki nd o f inf

orm at ionw oul d he lp u s f oc us o ur appe llate a tte nti on o n th e iss ue s th at

m atte r. A nd n oth ing I have sa id i s m eant t o im ply that a dis tr ic t c ourt i s not free to decide a

dispu ted guid elines issue without m entioni ng, or even co nsi de ri ng, w he the r the r es ult of that de ci sio n a ct

ua lly a ff ec ts the se nte nc e it im pose s f oll ow ing c onsi de ratio n of the § 35 53( a) f

ac tor s. I t i s th e pr er oga tiv e of se nte nc ing c ourts t o sp eak or r em ai n si le nt a

bout suc h m atte rs . T he c hoi ce is th ei rs .