Filed 8/7/24 Marriage of Pollard CA2/2

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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION TWO

In re the Marriage of ERIC 

and JOLYNN POLLARD.

_____________________________

ERIC POLLARD,

 Appellant,

v.

JOLYNN SCHARRER,

 Respondent.

 B336037

 (Los Angeles County

 Super. Ct. No. GD046260)

APPEAL from a postjudgment order of the Superior Court 

of Los Angeles County, Sarah J. Heidel, Judge. Modified and 

affirmed.

Gary W. Kearney for Appellant.

Schweitzer Law Partners and Mane Hakobyan for 

Respondent.

________________________
2

This is the second appeal brought by Eric M. Pollard (Eric) 

against his former wife Jolynn Pollard (Jolynn) following the 

dissolution of their marriage 13 years ago.1 In this appeal, Eric 

is challenging the family court’s order delaying the accrual of 

postjudgment interest on his share of net equity in the family 

home until after the home is appraised.2 The order is modified to 

award postjudgment interest to Eric accruing from January 1, 

2018, and otherwise affirmed.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND3

Eric and Jolynn ended their marriage on July 19, 2011. 

They had joint legal custody of their two daughters. Jolynn had 

primary physical custody of the girls.

The parties’ judgment of dissolution incorporated a 

Dissolution Settlement Agreement (settlement agreement) that 

stipulated: “JoLynn will remain in the family home . . . until at 

least such time as the youngest child of the parties is twenty 

years old or leaves the family home to attend post-high school 

education, whichever occurs latest. [Jolynn] agrees to pay all 

expenses associated with living in the home, including but not 

1 Jolynn’s surname is now Scharrer, but we will continue to 

refer to both parties by their first names for clarity and 

simplicity.

2 Eric attempted to bring another appeal (B324657) from 

an order concerning unpaid child support and accrued interest, 

which we dismissed on August 8, 2023, for lack of jurisdiction 

because the notice of appeal was not timely filed.

3 To the extent they are relevant, the facts in this opinion 

are taken from our unpublished opinion in In re Marriage of 

Pollard (Dec. 17, 2021, B310862) [nonpub. opn.].)
3

limited to the mortgage payments, taxes, insurance, utility bills, 

and maintenance costs.

“[T]he estimated [market] value of the [family home] as of 

October 22, 2010 is $827,000.00. At such time as the youngest 

child turns twenty or leaves the family home to attend post-high 

school education, whichever occurs latest, the home will be sold 

and the net equity will be equitably divided between the parties 

as follows: seventy percent (70%) to JoLynn; thirty percent (30%) 

to Eric. Eric transferred title to reflect that Jolynn legally owns 

70% of the [family home] immediately upon the execution of this 

agreement. Should Jolynn desire to purchase Eric’s 30% interest 

at the date the home is to be sold, JoLynn will obtain a home 

equity loan and will pay the [sic] Eric his share of the above 

stated equity.” Both parties signed the settlement agreement.

In 2016, the parties took out a loan on the family home to 

fund the daughters’ college education. Eric agreed to lessen his 

share in the net equity from 30 to 25 percent because Jolynn 

“ ‘took on the responsibility’ ” for the loan. (In re Marriage of 

Pollard, supra, B310862).)

A. Eric’s First Appeal B310862

The condition precedent to the sale of the family home 

occurred on January 1, 2018; the parties’ younger daughter 

turned 20 years old the day before. According to Eric, Jolynn did 

not list the home for sale or obtain a home equity loan to buy out 

Eric’s share. According to Jolynn, she opted to buy out Eric’s 25 

percent share of the home’s net equity, but they could not agree 

on an amount.

On September 11, 2020, Eric filed a request for order 

seeking “one of two reliefs:” (1) “Order the [family home] sold and 

pay my share of the sale net equity as per the terms of the 
4

judgment or,” (2) “Pay my share of the equity of the [family home] 

as of January 1, 2018 plus legal interest thereon.”

A hearing was held on Eric’s request on January 15, 2021. 

When the hearing concluded, the family court ordered in 

pertinent part: (1) “The parties are to attempt to select, by 

January 21, 2021, a mutually acceptable real party appraiser to 

determine the fair market value of the [family home] as of 

January 1, 2018, the date the youngest child attained the age of 

20 years,” (2) “Once the [family home] appraisal is received, the 

Parties shall calculate the net equity of the [home] which is the 

fair market value determined by the appraiser less the 

outstanding [mortgage] loan balance secured by the [home] as of 

January 1, 2018,” and (3) Jolynn “is ordered to then forthwith 

pay to [Eric] twenty-five percent (25%) of the net equity” in the 

home. There is no mention of prejudgment interest in the 

written order after hearing drafted by Eric’s counsel and signed 

by Jolynn’s counsel and the court.

Eric filed an ex parte request for clarification of the order, 

asking whether, upon the effective transfer of the family home, 

he was entitled to receive: (1) postjudgment interest accruing 

from January 1, 2018, to the date he was paid his net equity 

share, or (2) reasonable rental value of Jolynn’s use of the home 

pursuant to In re Marriage of Watts (1985) 171 Cal.App.3d 366.

The family court denied Eric’s request for ex parte relief, 

finding the written “order after hearing submitted by [Jolynn’s] 

counsel as Exhibit A to the responsive declaration to this ex parte 

is accurate to the order of the court.”

Eric appealed from the January 15, 2021 order, contending 

the family court erroneously interpreted the judgment as 

designating January 1, 2018, as the date of the appraised 
5

valuation of the family home in calculating its net equity and 

improperly denied him postjudgment interest.4 We affirmed. 

During the hearing, Eric had neither contested the January 1, 

2018 valuation date nor asked the family court to consider or rule 

on the question of postjudgment interest. (In re Marriage of 

Pollard, supra, B310862).)

B. Eric’s Present Appeal B336037

As of October 2023, an appraiser had not been chosen, the 

family home had not been appraised, and the net equity in the 

home had not been determined.

On October 11, 2023, Jolynn filed a request for order asking 

the family court to determine: (1) the net equity in the family 

home as of January 1, 2018, (2) the amount Jolynn would have to 

pay to buy out Eric’s share of the net equity, (3) the amount of 

Eric’s unpaid child support, and (4) the offset of the child support 

arrears against the buy-out amount. In her supporting 

declaration, Jolynn calculated Eric’s buy-out amount (25 percent 

net equity) without postjudgment interest. Jolynn did not 

compute an offset for Eric’s unpaid child support payments.

In his responsive declaration, Eric estimated the amount of 

his 25 percent net equity and included the postjudgment interest 

that had accrued from January 1, 2018. Eric calculated the sum 

due him from Jolynn, offset by his unpaid child support.

A hearing on Jolynn’s request was held on December 13, 

2023. At its conclusion, the family court appointed an appraiser 

“to conduct an appraisal of the [family home], and that 

4 Although the order after hearing was filed on January 29, 

2021, the notice of appeal is from the “January 15, 2021” order. 

For clarity and consistency, we refer to this order as the 

January 15, 2021 order, as we did in our prior opinion.
6

determination of the buyout amount [shall] then proceed 

pursuant to the Court’s 1/29/21 order.” The court also ordered 

“[p]ursuant to the 1/29/21 order interest shall accrue after the 

appraisal of the” family home.5 The order made no mention of an 

offset for unpaid child support.

Eric filed a timely notice of appeal from the December 13, 

2023 order.

DISCUSSION

Eric contends the family court violated Code of Civil 

Procedure section 685.020 by denying him postjudgment interest 

on his share of the family home’s net equity accruing from 

January 1, 2018, until the home was appraised.6 Eric’s issue 

presents two subsidiary questions: (1) Is Eric entitled to receive 

postjudgment interest? (2) If so, when did that interest begin to 

accrue?

As our answers involve statutory interpretation, 

independent review is required. (Bacilio v. City of Los Angeles

(2018) 28 Cal.App.5th 717, 723; In re Marriage of Dalgleish &

Selvaggio (2017) 17 Cal.App.5th 1172, 1177–1178 (Dalgleish & 

Selvaggio) [“[T]he issue of when interest begins to accrue on an 

amount included in a monetary judgment is a question of law 

that we review de novo.”].)

5 The record does not contain a reporter’s transcript of the 

December 13, 2023 hearing.

6 In his opening brief Eric also argues he is entitled to 

postjudgment interest accruing from July 19, 2011, the date of 

the judgment of dissolution. However, Eric’s reply brief appears 

to clarify he is seeking interest accruing from January 1, 2018, 

not from July 19, 2011.
7

A. Eric Is Entitled To Receive Postjudgment 

Interest on the Money Judgment 

“ ‘Money judgment’ means that part of a judgment that 

requires the payment of money.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 680.270.) 

“[I]nterest accrues at the rate of 10 percent per annum on the 

principal amount of a money judgment remaining unsatisfied.” 

(Code Civ. Proc., § 685.010, subd. (a)(1).)

The judgment of dissolution, as amended, awarded Jolynn 

a sum equal to 75 percent and Eric 25 percent of the net equity in 

the family home as determined by an appraisal based on the 

January 1, 2018 valuation. When the family court, as here, 

orders an equalizing payment rather than making an in-kind 

division of nonmonetary community property, that award “is a 

money judgment on which interest accrues from the date of its 

entry.” (In re Marriage of Pollard (1988) 204 Cal.App.3d 1380, 

1382 (Pollard); accord, Dalgleish & Selvaggio (2017), supra, 17 

Cal.App.5th at p. 1178.) Not to award postjudgment interest in a 

case like the one at bar, as the court explained in Dalgleish & 

Selvaggio at page 1178, “would have permitted the wife to enjoy 

the use of the home and benefit from the appreciation on its value 

while depriving the husband of the use of his money award.” The 

same principle applies here: Eric was entitled to interest on the 

past-due equalizing sum at the statutory rate of 10 percent per 

annum.

In response, Jolynn argues this case is akin to In re 

Marriage of Teichmann (1984) 157 Cal.App.3d 302 (Teichmann) 

in which a couple’s interlocutory dissolution judgment awarded 

the husband a business partnership and ordered the sale of the 

family home. The wife was to receive $89,000 from the sale 

proceeds and the husband $3,100 to balance the property 
8

division, with the remaining proceeds to be divided equally. (Id.

at pp. 304–305.) The wife was to remain in the home until its 

sale, which did not occur until 19 months later. Following the 

sale, the wife filed a cost bill seeking $10,282.98 as accrued 

interest on the $89,000 award. The family court ordered the cost 

bill stricken, and the wife appealed. (Id. at p. 305.)

On appeal, the Teichmann court held the wife’s exclusive 

use and enjoyment of the family home for 19 months until its sale 

with an equal share of any appreciation in value at the time of 

the sale was sufficient compensation in lieu of interest. 

(Teichmann, supra, 157 Cal.App.3d at p. 307.) The court further 

held the $ 89,000 award was not a money judgment. (Ibid.) It 

was neither due nor payable by the husband but was to be 

distributed to the wife from the net proceeds of the eventual sale. 

(Ibid.) “[S]ince there exists neither a money judgment nor 

judgment debtor, no recoverable interest could or did accrue.”

(Teichmann, at p. 308.)

Jolynn urges the judgment in this case, like the judgment 

in Teichmann, was not a money judgment because it did not 

require her to make any payment to Eric. Instead, she argues, 

the judgment provided for the sale of the family home when the 

condition precedent was met, the 75 percent–25 percent 

distribution of net equity between the parties following the sale, 

and the option for Jolynn to buy out Eric’s 25 percent share.

We are not persuaded, first because we agree with Pollard 

and Dalgleish & Selvaggio that the 75 percent–25 percent 

equalizing payment was a money judgment. Second, Jolynn 

maintained throughout the proceedings that she intended to buy 

out Eric’s share, for which she was required to pay him

25 percent of the family home’s net equity based on the 
9

January 1, 2018 valuation. Further, the Teichmann court 

concluded the wife’s sole use and enjoyment of the family home 

for 19 months and receipt of an equal share of the home’s 

appreciation when sold were sufficient compensation without 

postjudgment interest. Here, Jolynn has benefitted from sole use 

and enjoyment of the family home for years and is to receive all 

its appreciation in value when sold. In arguing Eric should be 

deprived of postjudgment interest, Jolynn simply wants to have 

her cake and eat it too.

B. Interest Begin To Accrue From the January 1,

2018 Valuation

In general, “interest commences to accrue on a money 

judgment on the date of entry of the judgment.” (Code Civ. Proc.,

§ 685.020, subd. (a).) This is a unique case. An argument that 

interest began to accrue when the judgment of dissolution was 

entered in 2011 would be hard to make, given the condition 

precedent had not yet occurred and no equalizing payment was 

then due. While the judgment contains no fixed date for the sale 

of the family home or for payment of the 25 percent buy out, the 

parties agree the amount of net equity in the family home was 

fixed as of January 1, 2018. In our view, it is from that date, not 

“after the appraisal of” the family home, that postjudgment 

interest shall accrue.

Jolynn resists this conclusion by relying on collateral 

estoppel or issue preclusion, which prohibits relitigation of an 

issue that was previously litigated because the issue has been 

conclusively resolved. There are four essential elements of 

collateral estoppel. It applies: “(1) after final adjudication (2) of 

an identical issue (3) actually litigated and necessarily decided in 

the first suit and (4) asserted against one who was a party in the 
10

first suit or one in privity with that party.” (DKN Holdings LLC 

v. Faerber (2015) 61 Cal.4th 813, 825.) Jolynn, as the party who 

asserts the bar of collateral estoppel, bears the burden of 

demonstrating each of its elements. (Lucido v. Superior Court

(1990) 51 Cal.3d 335, 341; Jenkins v. County of Riverside (2006) 

138 Cal.App.4th 593, 617.)

Not all the prerequisite elements for application of 

collateral estoppel have been met in this case. To be sure, the 

parties have been the same throughout the proceedings. The 

same issue—whether Eric’s share should be subject to 

postjudgment interest from January 1, 2018—was raised in Eric’s 

initial request for order, in his ex parte request for clarification of 

the January 15, 2021 order, and lastly in his responsive 

declaration to Jolynn’s request for order, which led to the 

December 13, 2023 order and instant appeal.

However, the lynchpin precluding the application of 

collateral estoppel here is the element “actually litigated.” An 

issue is “actually litigated” for purposes of collateral estoppel only 

if it was properly raised, submitted for determination, and 

decided in the prior proceeding. (Hernandez v. City of Pomona

(2009) 46 Cal.4th 501, 511–512.) Whether Eric should have been 

awarded postjudgment interest was not actually litigated in the 

first two proceedings. In our earlier opinion we noted his 

entitlement to postjudgment interest was one of two “reliefs” Eric 

sought in his initial request for an order. But, the issue was not 

raised at the January 15, 2021 hearing, and was not part of the 

family court’s oral order after counsels’ argument or the written 

order drafted by Eric’s counsel. In denying Eric’s ex parte 

request for clarification that followed, the family court indicated 

what had been determined at the January 15 hearing was 
11

accurately reflected in the written order. The order did not 

dispose of the issue of Eric’s postjudgment interest. Because the 

issue was not “actually litigated,” it was not necessarily decided 

or resolved by a final decision on the merits. There was no

preclusive effect in the subsequent litigation of December 13, 

2023.

DISPOSITION

The December 13, 2023 postjudgment order is modified to 

require the assessment of postjudgment interest of 10 percent per 

annum commencing January 1, 2018. In all other respects the 

order is affirmed. The parties are to bear their own costs on 

appeal.

LUI, P. J.

We concur:

ASHMANN-GERST, J.

HOFFSTADT, J.