UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT

________________ _________________ STEVEN M. HUNTER, Petitioner - Appellant,

v. MOORHEAD, Warden, Respondent - Appellee. No. 18-1077 (D.C. No. 1:16- CV-02680-MJW) (D. Colo.)

________________ _________________ ORDER DENYING CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY 

________________ _________________ Before HOLMES , O’BRIEN , and CARSON , Circuit Judges.

________________ _________________ Pro se petitioner Steven Hunter, a pris oner in the custody of the Fed eral Bureau of Prisons, seeks a certificate o f appealability (COA) to appeal t he dismissal of his 28 U.S.C. § 2241 habeas petition . Hunter’s confinement arises from a conviction entered by the District of Columbia Superi or Court; therefore, he is co nsidered a state prisoner and must be granted a COA before he can appeal the denial of hi s § 2241 petition. See Eldridge v. Berkebile , 791 F.3d 1239, 1243 (10th Ci r. 2015) (stating a state prisone r must obtain a COA to appeal the denial of a § 2241 petition, while a federal prisoner does

 This order is not binding prec edent except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral esto ppel. It may be cited, howeve r, for its persuasive value consistent with Fed. R. App. P . 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1. FILED United States Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit 

### November 15, 2018
Elisabeth A. Shumaker Clerk of Court2 not). 1 We deny Hunter’s request for a C OA, deny his request to proce ed in forma pauperis (IFP) on appeal, and dismiss this matter.
I. BACKGROUND In 1996 the District of Columbi a Superior Court convicted Hunt er of assault, first degree burglary, assault with a d angerous weapon, aggravated as sault while armed, and possession of a firearm during a crime of violence, and sentenc ed him to 31 years in prison. On February 3 , 2014, the United States Parole Commissi on (Commission) released Hunter on parole. Seven months later, he was charged with stalking, cyber stalking, and making a harassing phone call while he was on par ole. At his parole revocation hearing, Hunter, repr esented by counsel, admitted to violating the conditions of his parole. The Commission in itially determined the offense category to be four, with an incarceration guideline range of 20 to 26 months, but on rem and from the National Appeals Board, the Commission lo wered the offense category to o ne, with an incarceration guideline range of 0 to 8 months. N evertheless, on remand the Commission again imposed a sentence of 60 m onths because Hunter presented a more serious risk than indicated by the guidelin es, there was a reasonable likeli hood he would violate the law if released, and his incarcerat ion was necessary to protect the public.

1 At the time he filed his § 2241 petition, Hunter was housed at the United States Penitentiary in Florence, Colorad o. He was subsequently transf erred to the Federal Correctional Institution in Memphi s, Tennessee. This circuit h as jurisdiction based on his placement at the time he filed is petition. Santillanes v. U.S. Parole Comm’n , 754 F.2d 887, 888 (10th Cir. 1985).3 In his habeas petition, Hunter a sserted twelve claims for reli ef. The parties consented to proceed before a magistrate judge. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(c). The magistrate judge denied habeas relief, denied a COA, denied leave to proce ed IFP on appeal, and dismissed the case. Hunter now s eeks a COA on two claims: (1) the Commission erroneously applied the 2000 ver sion of the re-parole guideline s instead of the 1987 version, which resulted in a lon ger re-parole sentence in viola tion of the Ex Post Facto Clause; and (2) the Commission’s imposition of the same sentenc e after remand demonstrated vindictiveness in v iolation of his due process rig hts. He further asserts the magistrate judge was biased agai nst him. He has abandoned all other claims.
II. DISCUSSION A COA is a jurisdictional prer equisite to our review of a petit ion for a writ of habeas corpus. Miller–El v. Cockrell , 537 U.S. 322, 336 (2003). We will issue a COA “only if the applicant has made a substantial showing of the de nial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). Where, as here, “a district c ourt has rejected the constitutional claims on the mer its, the showing required to sa tisfy § 2253(c) is straightforward: The petitioner must demonstrate that reasonab le jurists would find the district court’s assessment of t he constitutional claims debata ble or wrong.” Slack v.
McDaniel , 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000). We have thoroughly review ed the record, Hunter’s pro se appellate briefs, and the magistrate judge’s thorough and cogent order; he has failed to make the applicable showing. In particular, he has not demonstrated how or why the magistrate judge erred; he merely speculates, saying if the Commission had applied the 1987 version of the4 re-parole guidelines, the result of his re-parole proceedings w ould have been more favorable. Making a case for a COA is difficult. It requires specific reasons, supported by specific authority, detailing how the judge erred. Simply r estating the arguments raised in the district court a nd spouting platitudes and genera lities falls far short. Because no jurist of reason could reasonabl y debate the correctness of the result reached by the magistrate judge, we deny a CO A and dismiss this matter. Hunter asserts the magistrate j udge was prejudiced against him because he issued rulings adverse to him. “Advers e rulings alone do not demonstr ate judicial bias.” Bixler
v. Foster , 596 F.3d 751, 762 (10th Cir. 20 10). His argument is not even debatably

correct.
III. CONCLUSION We DENY the request for a COA and DISMISS this matter. The magistrate judge denied Hunt er’s request to proceed on appe al without prepayment of fees, a privilege e xtended only to those who qual ify for in forma pauperis (IFP) status, to wit , impecunious circumstances and the presentation of non-frivolo us issues. Hunter has here renewed his desire to proceed without prepayment of fees, again claiming IFP status, but he fa ils to qualify. We deny his IFP request. The case is closed and the relevant statute, 28 U.S. C. § 1915(a), does not waive p ayment of fees, only5 prepayment of fees. All filing a nd docketing fees ($505.00) ar e due and payable to the Clerk of the District Court.

Entered for the Court

Terrence L. O’Brien Circuit Judge