STATEMENT 

OF

THE HONORABLE BRUCE HAMILTON, CHAIRMAN

DEFENSE NUCLEAR FACILITIES SAFETY BOARD

before the

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES, SUBCOMMITTEE ON 

STRATEGIC FORCES

UNITED STATES HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

APRIL 9, 2019 

Chairman Cooper, Ranking Member Turner, and distinguished members of this 

Subcommittee, it is an honor to be before you today as chairman of the Defense Nuclear 

Facilities Safety Board to share my observations on the challenges and Board’s actions

associated with providing oversight of the Department of Energy’s defense nuclear facilities

complex.

For those members of the Subcommittee who may not be familiar with the work of the 

Board, we are responsible, by statute, to conduct independent oversight of defense nuclear

facilities and to inform the Secretary of Energy when we find issues that challenge the adequate 

protection of public health and safety. The Board is also statutorily mandated to review the 

content and implementation of DOE standards, facility and system designs, and events and 

practices at DOE defense nuclear facilities that the Board determines have adversely affected, or

may adversely affect, public health and safety.

The President’s request for the Board is $29,450,000 and 100 full-time equivalents

(FTEs) to carry out the Board’s mission in Fiscal Year 2020. This is a five percent decrease 

from the agency’s Fiscal Year 2019 appropriation level of $31,000,000. The Board’s foundation 

is built on the expertise of its Board members and its staff in support of the Board’s mission, and 

approximately two-thirds of the Board’s annual budget is dedicated to salaries and benefits.

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I would like to discuss a few of the Board’s priorities as they relate to providing oversight 

of the Department of Energy’s defense nuclear facilities complex. The Board currently has four 

open Recommendations that the Department is working to address and are in various stages of 

completion. First, Recommendation 2011-1, Safety Culture at the Waste Treatment and

Immobilization Plant: the Department has completed its implementation plan, and the Board is

evaluating the Department’s actions against the original Recommendation to ascertain if progress

was made to resolve the original concerns of the Recommendation. Second, Recommendation 

2012-1, Savannah River Site Building 235-F Safety: the Department is working towards the

mitigation of Pu–238 hazard and is currently focused on Cell 1. Next, Recommendation 2012-2, 

Hanford Tank Farms Flammable Gas Safety Strategy: the Department is working to implement 

tank ventilation that meets requirements for safety-related systems. Finally, Recommendation 

2019-1, Pantex Uncontrolled Hazard Scenarios and 10 CFR 830 Implementation: the Board is 

awaiting the Department’s response regarding this most recent recommendation. 

At Los Alamos National Laboratory, the Board plans to focus on the Plutonium Facility’s

(PF-4) seismic vulnerabilities of the structure, deficiencies in facility safety basis and safety

systems, and deficiencies in nuclear criticality safety program. In addition, the Board is focused 

on Transuranic Waste Management including the safety basis for Area G transuranic waste 

operations and safety controls for mobile loading of transuranic waste for shipment to Waste 

Isolation Pilot Plant. 

At the Idaho National Laboratory, the Board is analyzing implications of the April 2018 

solid waste drum over-pressurization event in the Accelerated Retrieval Project (ARP) V. The 

Board sent two pieces of correspondence to share its concerns and outline open questions for the

Department. The Board is also planning a public hearing for May 2019 to discuss the 

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implications of the hazards of solid waste and the controls the Department uses to protect the 

public. 

At the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant, the Board has been and will continue to monitor steady

state operations. The Board plans to continue reviewing revised safety basis and safety

management programs related to maintenance, radiological protection, and ground control. 

At Hanford the Department’s clean-up work poses worker hazards and potential for 

radioactive releases. The Board plans to continue monitoring DOE efforts to demolish 

deactivated, high-hazard plutonium production and processing facilities, and to retrieve and 

disposition nuclear waste that was created during the production of plutonium. 

At the Savannah River Site, the Board plans to focus on the Tritium Facilities and design

basis accidents with severe onsite consequences. In addition, the Board plans to review 

processing and storage of nuclear materials, plutonium storage and down-blend, spent nuclear

fuel storage and processing, high-level waste storage and processing, and the startup of the Salt 

Waste Processing Facility. 

At the Y-12 National Security Complex, the Board will focus on the nuclear criticality 

safety program, uranium accumulation in process equipment, and construction of the Uranium 

Processing Facility. 

The Board is also focused on aging infrastructure. Aging facilities are prone to degraded

systems and structures, increased radiological hold-up, obsolescent equipment and unavailable 

replacement parts, and retrofits to meet evolving missions. The increased use of Administrative

Controls coupled with inexperienced staff presents challenges. The Board is monitoring the 

Department’s efforts to mitigate risks and develop replacement capabilities such as the Y-12 

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Extended Life Program, Los Alamos National Laboratory Plutonium Strategy, and Pantex ramps

structural retrofits and safety system upgrades. 

The Board also plans to perform design and construction oversight. Prior to construction

of new facilities, the Board reviews safety basis and safety-related structures, systems, and 

components. During construction the Board is there to review quality assurance and operability

testing of safety systems. More than a dozen new facilities are under the Board’s purview 

including the Hanford Waste Treatment and Immobilization Plant and related facilities, Y-12 

Uranium Processing Facility (UPF), Savannah River Salt Waste Processing Facility, and Pantex

Material Staging Facility. 

Now I would like to discuss the Board’s most recent accomplishments that we will 

continue to build upon in the coming year. The Board reviewed the safety basis and control

strategy for nuclear explosive operations at the Pantex Plant. In April 2018, the Board approved 

the conduct of a preliminary safety inquiry, which is a type of safety investigation under 42 

U.S.C. § 2286a(b)(2) and 10 Code of Federal Regulations Part 1708, regarding implementation 

of 10 Code of Federal Regulations Part 830 at Pantex. Based on the preliminary safety inquiry, 

the Board determined that portions of the safety basis for Pantex nuclear explosive operations do 

not meet 10 Code of Federal Regulations Part 830; that multiple components of the process for 

maintaining and verifying implementation of the Pantex safety basis are deficient, including

completion of annual updates as required by 10 Code of Federal Regulations Part 830; and that, 

to date, the NNSA Production Office and the Pantex management and operating contractor have 

been unable to resolve known safety basis deficiencies. The Board posted documents describing 

these conclusions on its public website on September 10, 2018. After sending the Secretary of

Energy a Draft Recommendation and receiving the Secretary’s response, on February 20, 2019, 

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the Board approved and sent the Secretary Board Recommendation 2019-1, Uncontrolled 

Hazard Scenarios and 10 CFR 830 Implementation at the Pantex Plant. The Board is awaiting 

the Secretary’s response due in early May. Given the importance of the Pantex Plant to the

National Nuclear Security Administration’s mission, its aging infrastructure, and increase in

operational tempo, we are concerned with the safety posture at the Pantex Plant. The Board 

determined these were issues of adequate protection and conveyed those concerns in the form of 

a Recommendation.

On April 11, 2018, four waste drums at the Idaho National Laboratory underwent overpressurization, ejecting their lids and spreading radiological waste within the ARP-V. The 

Department of Energy determined that waste in the drums generated methane gas, which 

contributed to the event. The Board determined that current drums with repackaged waste may 

contain flammable gases in high enough concentrations to allow deflagrations, and the 

Department of Energy currently does not have effective controls at the Idaho National 

Laboratory to prevent or mitigate such deflagrations. The Board continues to seek information 

related to these drums to determine if these are issues of adequate protection and recently sent 

the Secretary of Energy correspondence formally requesting information. As part of this effort, 

the Board intends to conduct a public hearing on the subject of safety management of solid waste 

storage and processing in the Department of Energy complex by the end of May 2019. The 

Waste Isolation Pilot Plant accident in February 2014 coupled with what we are seeing at the 

Idaho National Laboratory, confirms that legacy waste handling, processing, and packaging 

continues to be a challenge that warrants the Department’s diligence. The Department needs to 

better understand how to package and store this waste safely at the generator sites even before 

transport to the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant. 

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The Board has also focused its resources on reviewing the combined Tritium Facilities

Safety Basis at the Savannah River Site. In a June 4, 2018, letter to the Secretary of Energy, the 

Board stated it was concerned that there is a need to evaluate and implement additional safety

controls for the Savannah River Site Tritium Facilities to address accident scenarios that may

result in high radiological dose consequences to co-located workers or off-site public. The 

Board also noted concerns with how the facility worker is relied on to self-protect during events, 

the Department of Energy’s application of administrative controls, and various analytical 

assumptions used in the safety basis for the facilities. 

The Department of Energy is revising Title 10, Code of Federal Regulations, Part 830 (10 

CFR Part 830), Nuclear Safety Management, which is the cornerstone of the Department of 

Energy’s regulatory framework to ensure adequate protection of public health and safety. The 

Board has identified several concerns with the Department of Energy’s notice of proposed 

rulemaking and communicated its comments in its letter of October 5, 2018, to the Secretary of

Energy. The Board is concerned that the proposed revision will make it more difficult for the 

Department of Energy to exercise consistent oversight across the complex and loosens 

requirements upon which the Department of Energy and the public rely to ensure adequate 

protection of public health and safety. The Department has maintained a solid safety record at

defense nuclear facilities and is working on simultaneous changes to its regulatory framework. 

The Board remains concerned that adjustments to the regulatory framework at a time when the

complex is facing growth in mission, complicated decommissioning work, an always aging 

infrastructure, and human capital turnover could contribute to a less robust safety posture. 

The Board utilized its staff to conduct nuclear criticality safety reviews in 2018 to

ascertain the health of selected Department of Energy defense nuclear facilities complex

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programs. In particular, the Board reviewed the management and operating contractor’s nuclear

criticality safety programs for compliance with ANSI/ANS criticality safety standards, as well as

the Department of Energy’s field office oversight. The Board’s most recent review included the 

Y-12 National Security Complex. The Board’s oversight of the Y-12 criticality safety program

is ongoing. Criticality safety issues remain a concern across the complex.

Finally, in May 2018, the Department of Energy issued Order 140.1, Interface with the

Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board, to replace its prior directive on interface with the

Board, Manual 140.1-1B. Order 140.1 incorporated major changes including new restrictions 

and protocols regarding the Board’s access to information, facilities, and personnel that could 

diminish the Board’s ability to effectively perform its statutory mandate under the Atomic

Energy Act of 1954, as amended. As written, Order 140.1 could limit Board oversight of many 

of the Department of Energy’s defense nuclear facilities. The Board has communicated its

concerns regarding Order 140.1 to the Secretary of Energy in its letters of September 17 and 

December 21, 2018, and has held three public hearings to gather information on the 

implementation of the order by the Department of Energy and its contractors. It is the

unanimous view of the Board that DOE Order 140.1 is in direct conflict with a plain reading of 

the Atomic Energy Act (as Amended) in several ways. For instance, the Order defines the public 

as existing only outside the geographical site boundary. Such an interpretation could preclude 

Board oversight for workers, collocated workers, and general members of the public who were 

present inside a site boundary. Notably, it could also prevent Board oversight for important 

programs such as criticality safety. Not only is this inconsistent with the Atomic Energy Act, but

this would be a clear departure from well-established past practices. In its December 21, 2018, 

letter, the Board reiterated its commitment to collaborate with the Department of Energy to 

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resolve these concerns, however, to date we have seen no evidence that the Secretary is inclined

to do so. 

I would also like to discuss several items of Board internal management. On August 14, 

2018, the Board approved (three in favor, one opposed) the following motion made by thenActing Chairman Hamilton:

“In order to improve effectiveness in conducting the Mission of the Defense Nuclear 

Facilities Safety Board through more robust field oversight and a leaner and nimbler 

headquarters staff, the Board approves and directs the following: 

“1. The Acting Chairman shall establish an Executive Director of Operations (EDO) who 

has line authority over all Agency staff except the Office of the General Counsel. The EDO is

the senior employee responsible for budgetary and general administration matters and the senior

employee responsible for technical matters as specified in 42 U.S.C. § 2286. (c) (7)(C )(i) and 

(iii). The EDO position shall be filled through posting both internally and externally; 

“2. The Acting Chairman shall re-structure the agency’s organization, administrative 

units, and functions in accordance with enclosure (1) while retaining the organizational 

flexibility to optimize performance;

“3. The Acting Chairman shall establish a limit of 100 FTE (86, plus 5 Board Members

and 9 SES) for FY2019. The Acting Chairman shall reduce further the size of the Agency

through selected attrition to 79 FTE (69, plus 5 Board Members and 5 SES), at which time that 

will become the new limit.

“4. The Acting Chairman shall implement this re-structuring as the approved FY 2019 

staffing plan. 

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“These changes shall be executed in accordance with all applicable Federal statutes and

regulations.” 

Congressional appropriators did not support the plan, and they included language in the 

Energy and Water Development and Related Agencies Appropriations Act, 2019 which 

preempted its implementation. Consequently, I have made no structural changes to our 

organization. I have directed hiring employees to backfill specific positions, and although we 

remain below our FY2019 funded 117 FTE, we will need to hire in order to achieve the 

100 employees proposed in the 2020 budget.” 

The Board contracted with the National Academy of Public Administration (NAPA) to 

perform a comprehensive assessment of the Board’s operations. In November 2018, NAPA 

issued its report, which provided numerous recommendations for improving the Board’s 

operations and mission effectiveness. The Board has begun to discuss the NAPA 

recommendations, identify corrective actions, and will continue this effort in 2019. The Board is

currently exploring another contract with NAPA to review and revise the Board’s strategic plan 

for the next five years.

The Board’s Office of Inspector General (OIG) completed five assessments on Board

programs during Fiscal Year 2018, including its Assessment of the Most Serious Management 

and Performance Challenges Facing DNFSB in Fiscal Year 2018. The Independent Evaluation 

of DNFSB’s Implementation of the Federal Information Security Modernization Act (FISMA) of 

2014 for Fiscal Year 2017, (DNFSB-18-A-02) resulted in two recommendations to strengthen 

the information security program. The Board will continue to support the Inspector General’s 

audits of the Board’s operations. Chairman Cooper, Ranking Member Turner, thank you again 

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for the opportunity to be here today. We at the Board look forward to working with this 

Subcommittee and I stand ready to respond to any questions you may have.