NO. 4-00-0958 

IN THE APPELLATE COURT

OF ILLINOIS

FOURTH DISTRICT

PEKIN INSURANCE COMPANY,

	Plaintiff-Appellant,

	v.

ESTATE OF CLINTON RITTER, Deceased,

	Defendant-Appellee.	)

)

)

)

)

)

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)	Appeal from

Circuit Court of

Ford County

No. 00MR7

Honorable

Stephen R. Pacey,

Judge Presiding.

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	JUSTICE McCULLOUGH delivered the opinion of the court:

	In this declaratory judgment action, plaintiff, Pekin

Insurance Company (Pekin), appeals from the order of the circuit

court of Ford County granting summary judgment in favor of

defendant, the estate of Clinton Ritter, deceased, and denying

Pekin's cross-motion for summary judgment.  The trial court's

ruling allowed defendant to "stack" available underinsured motorist

(UIM) coverage for multiple vehicles under the same Pekin policy. 

The only issue is whether the UIM coverage limitation provision of

the policy, read in conjunction with the remaining provisions of

the policy, is ambiguous.  We reverse and remand with directions to

enter summary judgment in favor of Pekin.

	The construction of an insurance policy is a question of

law (Outboard Marine Corp. v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Co., 154 Ill. 2d 90, 108, 607 N.E.2d 1204, 1212 (1992)), and we construe it de novo (Mank v. West American Insurance Co., 249 Ill. App. 3d 827, 830, 620 N.E.2d 6, 8 (1993)).

	The Pekin policy involved in this case lists three vehicles in the declaration sheet and limits the liabilities for

UIM coverage to $50,000 per person and $100,000 per accident.  The

UIM coverage limitation provision provides in relevant part as

follows:

		"D. LIMIT OF INSURANCE

		1. Regardless of the number of covered

'autos,' 'insureds,' premiums paid, claims

made or vehicles involved in the 'accident,'

the most we will pay for all damages resulting

from any one 'accident' is the Limit of Insur

ance for UNDERINSURED MOTORISTS COVERAGE shown

in this endorsement."

	With the exception of the policy limits and the number of

vehicles insured, the policy in this case is identical to the

policy found ambiguous in Pekin Insurance Co. v. Estate of Goben, 303 Ill. App. 3d 639, 646-49, 707 N.E.2d 1259, 1264-66 (1999). 

Here, too, the declaration sheet contained two columns per vehicle.

It showed UIM coverage to be limited to "50/100" in the first

column for each vehicle, with the second column showing UIM

premiums of $7 for vehicle 1, $7 for vehicle 2, and $11 for vehicle

3.  As does the disposition in Goben, the defense relies on the obiter dictum in Bruder v. Country Mutual Insurance Co., 156 Ill. 2d 179, 192-93, 620 N.E.2d 355, 362 (1993), even though the Bruder decision found unambiguous the limitation of UIM coverage clause

using virtually identical language to that employed in this case

and in Goben (Bruder, 156 Ill. 2d at 189-94, 620 N.E.2d at 360-63).  The Goben court relied on the fact that the UIM limitation-of-  coverage clause referred to the UIM coverage in the endorsements and concluded that it could be read to implyinfer that the parties

intended multiple coverage amounts, one for each vehicle, were

afforded by payment of the separate premiums.  We disagree.

    	Although referred to as an "anti-stacking clause," the parties agree that the relevant clause in this case defines the

limits of UIM coverage.  This case does not involve stacking of

coverage under multiple insurance policies.  The entries in the

columns on the declaration page in this policy do nothing more than

indicate the amount of coverage provided for each vehicle and the

amount of the total premium allotted to that coverage.  To the

extent that there could be some confusion arising out of whether

the coverages could be "stacked," the UIIUM coverage limitation

provision clarifies that question.  That provision is not ambigu

ous.  The amount that would be paid for all damage is limited by

the UIM coverage, i.e., "50/100," for any covered vehicle.  The policy does not allow for UIM coverage for each vehicle to be

aggregated.

	When the language limiting UIM coverage is unambiguous,

the fact that separate premiums are paid does not render the UIM-

coverage- limitation clause ambiguous; it simply means that the

insured can recover under one of the coverages.  See Menke v. Country Mutual Insurance Co., 78 Ill. 2d 420, 425-26, 401 N.E.2d 539, 542 (1980).  A similar limitation on uninsured motorist

coverage was upheld in Cincinnati Insurance Co. v. Miller, 190 Ill. App. 3d 240, 248-49, 546 N.E.2d 700, 706 (1989).

	Although it involves interpretation of a different

insurance policy, we are equally unpersuaded by the analysis in

Yates v. Farmers Automobile Insurance Associatio'n, 311 Ill. App. 3d 797, 799-800, 724 N.E.2d 1042, 1044-45 (2000).  The Yates decision seems to contradict Frigo v. Motors Insurance Corp., 271 Ill. App. 3d 50, 53-54, 60-65, 648 N.E.2d 180, 182-83, 186-90 (1995), wherein the

court found unambiguous a UIM- limitation clause very similar to the

clause interpreted in Yates.

	The summary judgment entered in the circuit court of Ford

County in favor of defendant is reversed, and the cause is remanded

with directions to enter summary judgment in favor of Pekin.

	Reversed and remanded with directions.

	McCULLOUGH, J., with MYERSCOUGH and KNECHT, JJ., concurringr .  .