In the

Court of Appeals

Second Appellate District of Texas

at Fort Worth

___________________________

No. 02-23-00242-CV

___________________________

On Appeal from the 153rd District Court

Tarrant County, Texas

Trial Court No. 153-337301-22

Before Birdwell, Womack, and Wallach, JJ.

Memorandum Opinion by Justice Womack

RAJESH MANDALAPU AND SRAVEK TECHNOLOGIES, LLC, Appellants

V.

VASU TECHNOLOGIES, LLC AND BRIAN BOEHMER, Appellees
2

MEMORANDUM OPINION

I. INTRODUCTION

In this interlocutory appeal, Appellants Rajesh Mandalapu and Sravik1

Technologies, LLC (Sravik) raise two issues challenging the denial of their special 

appearance in which they contend that a Texas court did not have specific jurisdiction 

to adjudicate claims brought against them by Appellees Vasu Technologies, LLC

(Vasu) and Brian Boehmer. See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 51.014(a)(7) 

(interlocutory appeal); Tex. R. Civ. P. 120a (special appearance). Because we conclude 

that the trial court erred by denying the special appearance, we will reverse and render.

II. BACKGROUND

This case involves multiple parties and non-parties who provided IT services

for “an end-client user,” which in this case was the Defense Logistics Agency (DLA).

DLA is an agency within the Department of Defense that does logistical handling of 

everything from military hardware to food for American troops stationed around the 

world. Pertinent here, DLA contracted with Alamo City Engineering Services 

(ACES) to “put a new system in to manage [DLA’s] warehousing and also to manage 

the transportation logistics.” Resolute Solutions, LLC (Resolute)—an IT staffing 

1While Appellants’ notice of appeal spelled the name “Sravek,” other record 

references, including Appellants’ answer, indicate that the name is spelled “Sravik.” 

Indeed, Appellants’ counsel spelled the name “Sravik” at the hearing on the special 

appearance, and Appellees’ counsel also spelled the name “Sravik” at a deposition. 

On appeal, all briefs spell it “Sravik.” Therefore, we will use the spelling “Sravik.” 
3

company whose business involved recruiting and contracting with various IT 

consultants—provided services to DLA, the “end-client user.”

2 Resolute had 

contracts with Sravik and an entity named either Red Commerce, Inc. (Red 

Commerce) or RED Global, who in turn contracted with Vasu or Boehmer.

3

 

Mandalapu—who owns Sravik—was a supervisor of Boehmer. 

In September 2022, Appellees Vasu and Boehmer sued Appellants Mandalapu 

and Sravik alleging a single cause of action for “tortious interference with existing 

contract.” As alleged in the pleadings, before the expiration of the contract with Red 

Commerce, Boehmer was informed that the contract had been terminated. 

According to Appellees, 

[Appellants] willfully and intentionally interfered with the contract by 

communicating to third-parties unsupported reasons for termination 

including baseless allegations regarding [Appellee’s] performance. No 

performance issues (or any other issues) had ever been communicated to

[Appellees] regarding performance issues under the contract. 

[Appellants’] tortious interference proximately caused the contract to be 

terminated, with [Appellee] Boehmer ultimately losing his employment. 

2Other portions of the record state that ACES was Resolute’s “customer” and 

that DLA was Resolute’s “end customer.”

3Boehmer was employed by Vasu and did computer software consulting and 

programming for it. Appellees’ pleadings state that Vasu had a contract with Red 

Commerce whereby Boehmer would provide IT services to Red Commerce. A copy 

of that contract was attached to Appellees’ pleadings. At the special appearance 

hearing, however, Boehmer testified and his attorney stated that the contract was with 

RED Global. The record is not clear about how Red Commerce and RED Global are 

related, if at all.
4

Appellants answered the suit and filed a special appearance challenging 

personal jurisdiction, contending that neither Appellant “does business in Texas, 

maintains offices in Texas[,] nor has sufficient minimum contacts with Texas to 

confer jurisdiction on Texas [c]ourts.” The special appearance included Mandalapu’s 

affidavit, wherein he stated the following:

• He was a resident of St. Louis, Missouri.

• Sravik was a Missouri limited liability company with its principal place of 

business in St. Louis, Missouri.

• Neither he nor Sravik did business in Texas or maintained offices in 

Texas.

• Sravik contracted with Resolute, a Wyoming limited liability company 

headquartered in Sheridan, Wyoming, for the provision of IT services.

• Neither he nor Sravik had any contractual relationships with any persons 

or business entities in Texas, and specifically, neither had a contractual 

relationship with Appellees.

• As part of his employment with Sravik, as a contractor for Resolute, he 

supervised eighteen people and/or businesses across the country and, at

the time of the loss Appellees complain of in their petition, he was 

supervising twelve such people and/or businesses.

• His supervisory activities took place from his business location in St. 

Louis, Missouri.

• Sravik did not “conduct business” in Texas.

• Sravik was contractually required by Resolute to oversee the work of

myriad IT businesses and personnel throughout the United States.
5

• Sravik provided services to Resolute but not to Appellees or any other 

entity. 

The trial court set a hearing on the special appearance. At the conclusion of 

the first hearing, the trial court continued it to allow Appellees to amend their 

pleadings. 

Prior to the continued hearing, Appellees amended their pleadings and filed a 

response to Appellants’ special appearance. The amended pleadings again alleged a 

single cause of action for tortious interference of a contract and did not change the 

wording of the paragraph addressing that cause of action. 

The response to the special appearance stated that the “jurisdictional analysis

involves specific jurisdiction, as the cause of action for tortious interference arises out 

of the IT consulting work performed by Boehmer and Mandalapu for the DLA 

project in Corpus Christi, Texas.” It added the following “jurisdictional facts”:

• Mandalapu executed a contract for the provision of IT consulting 

services with Resolute. Paragraph 4.7 of the contract contains an 

arbitration provision, mandating arbitration in Houston, Texas; 

paragraph 12.1 contains a Texas choice of law provision. The statement 

of work in the exhibit to the contract indicates ACES (located in San 

Antonio, Texas) as the end-user client. Resolute maintains a branch 

office in Houston, Texas.

• Mandalapu traveled to Corpus Christi, Texas, four times in connection

with IT consulting services performed for the DLA project.

• The visits occurred in January 2021, January 2022, April 2022, and May

2022.
6

• Two of these visits involved actual physical on-site visits to the DLA 

facility in Corpus Christi, Texas, where Mandalapu interacted with 

various consultants on the project, many of whom were Texas residents.

• The remaining two visits involved work from the hotel conference room 

in Corpus Christi, Texas.

• In addition to Boehmer, Mandalapu supervised twelve to eighteen other 

IT consultants, three of whom were Texas residents, including Boehmer,

on the DLA project.

• The prime contract for the DLA project was awarded to ACES in San 

Antonio, Texas. ACES formed a team of consultants designated as 

“Team ACES.”

4

 Mandalapu was a member of Team ACES and 

maintained a Team ACES email address that he utilized for various work 

on the DLA project.

• In supervising Boehmer, Mandalapu assigned tasks, tracked status, 

provided technical help, and managed vacation requests. Mandalapu 

conducted regular one-on-one meetings via phone or Microsoft Teams 

with Boehmer throughout the work on the DLA project.

• Mandalapu also conducted weekly and monthly team meetings with all 

IT consultants that he supervised, which included Boehmer and the 

three other Texas residents.

• In addition to his supervisory role, Mandalapu also interviewed 

approximately twenty consultants, six of whom were hired to work on 

the DLA project. 

In addition, Appellees attached Mandalapu’s January 5, 2023 deposition to the 

response. 

4

In his deposition, Mandalapu testified that “Team ACES doesn’t exist 

physically,” but it is a way of referring to the group of consultants as a whole. 
7

Prior to the continued hearing, Appellants filed a supplement to their special

appearance, in which they argued that the three “particularly pertinent” jurisdictional 

facts cited in the amended pleadings—that Appellants had a contract with a third 

party that has a branch office in Texas and that contains a Texas choice of law 

provision; that Appellants traveled to Corpus Christi, Texas, four times; and that 

Appellants sent “at least two” e-mails to Boehmer during one of Appellants’ work

trips to Corpus Christi—were insufficient to assert specific jurisdiction over 

Appellants. 

At the continued hearing, Appellees called Boehmer as a witness, and he

explained that he worked on a contract with DLA involving installing a new system to 

manage DLA’s warehousing and transportation logistics. Boehmer testified that the 

“prime” contract with DLA was awarded to ACES in San Antonio, Texas, which 

created a “ghost entity” consisting of anyone who worked on the project. According 

to Boehmer, Mandalapu was a member of this entity, a “team lead,” and Boehmer’s 

supervisor. A total of four people on the team were Texas residents. To staff the job

with IT consultants, ACES used Resolute. Boehmer’s employment contract was with 

RED Global. Boehmer stated that Corpus Christi, Texas, was the “pilot location 

where they were rolling out all of their - - the software so that DLA could convert to 

this warehousing management software and transportation software.” To Boehmer’s 

knowledge, Mandalapu made four trips to Corpus Christi, Texas, to work on the DLA 
8

project. Boehmer averred that he had some type of interaction with Mandalapu on a 

weekly basis. 

At the conclusion of Boehmer’s testimony, the trial court asked, “[W]hat facts 

do you have about where the tortious interference occurred?” Appellees’ counsel 

responded, “The answer to your first question, ‘Where did it occur?’ We don’t know 

yet. . . . This cause of action relates to and arises out of this Corpus Christi job. 

That’s all I have to show for jurisdictional analysis.” Appellees’ counsel also stated 

that provisions in the Resolute contract regarding arbitration and choice of law did

not relate to Appellees’ assertion of specific jurisdiction.

5

 

At the hearing’s conclusion, the trial court denied the special appearance and 

later entered an order to that effect. Appellants requested findings of fact and 

conclusions of law, which were entered. Although Appellants requested amended and 

additional findings and conclusions, none were entered. Appellants appeal from the 

order denying their special appearance.

III. DISCUSSION

In their first issue, Appellants complain that the trial court erred in denying

their special appearance “(a) when [Appellees] failed to carry their initial burden to 

plead sufficient allegations to bring [Appellants] within the reach of Texas’ long[-]arm 

statute—i.e.[,] for their tortious interference claim, that [Appellees] committed the 

5The trial court’s findings of fact and conclusions of law do not refer to any 

such contractual provisions.
9

tortious acts in Texas; and (b) [Appellants] each proved that they are not Texas 

residents.” In their second issue, Appellants ask if “the trial court ha[d] specific 

personal jurisdiction over [them] when (a) the evidence is legally insufficient to 

establish that [they] had sufficient minimum contacts with Texas; (b) as a matter of 

law[,] [Appellants’] contacts with Texas fall short of purposeful availment; and (c) as a 

matter of law, there is no substantial connection between any of [Appellants’] contacts 

with Texas and the operative facts of this litigation (the claim for tortious interference 

with an existing contract).”

A. Standard of Review and Applicable Law

A party may challenge a Texas court’s exercise of personal jurisdiction over it 

by filing a special appearance under Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 120a. See Tex. R. 

Civ. P. 120a. As the Texas Supreme Court recently explained:

Texas courts may assert personal jurisdiction over a nonresident 

defendant if (1) the Texas long-arm statute so provides and (2) the 

exercise of jurisdiction “is consistent with federal and state due process 

guarantees.” “Our long-arm statute reaches as far as the federal 

constitutional requirements for due process will allow,” so Texas courts 

may exercise personal jurisdiction over foreign defendants “having such 

‘contacts’ with the forum [s]tate that ‘the maintenance of the suit’ is 

‘reasonable[ ] in the context of our federal system of government’ and 

‘does not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.’”

This “minimum contacts” inquiry is a “forum-by-forum” or “sovereignby-sovereign” analysis that examines “the nature and extent of ‘the 

defendant’s relationship to the forum’” to determine whether the 

defendant is amenable to general or specific jurisdiction.

State v. Volkswagen Aktiengesellschaft, 669 S.W.3d 399, 412 (Tex. 2023) (footnotes 

omitted).
10

A defendant’s contacts with the forum can give rise to either general or specific 

jurisdiction. Luciano v. SprayFoamPolymers.com, LLC, 625 S.W.3d 1, 8 (Tex. 2021)

(citing Spir Star AG v. Kimich, 310 S.W.3d 868, 872 (Tex. 2010)). A court has general

jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant whose “affiliations with the State are so 

‘continuous and systematic’ as to render [it] essentially at home in the forum State.” 

Id. (quoting TV Azteca v. Ruiz, 490 S.W.3d 29, 37 (Tex. 2016) (alteration in original) 

(quoting Daimler AG v. Bauman, 571 U.S. 117, 127, 134 S. Ct. 746, 754 (2014))). 

Specific jurisdiction “covers defendants less intimately connected with a State, but 

only as to a narrower class of claims.” Id. (quoting Ford Motor Co. v. Mont. Eighth Jud. 

Dist. Ct., -- U.S. --, 141 S. Ct. 1017, 1024 (2021)).

Both parties agree that only specific jurisdiction—not general jurisdiction—is at 

issue here. With specific jurisdiction, a minimum-contacts showing requires two

things: (1) that “the defendant purposefully avails itself of the privilege of conducting 

activities in the forum state[;]” and (2) “the suit ‘arise[s] out of or relate[s] to the 

defendant’s contacts with the forum[.]’” Id. at 8–9. When assessing whether 

minimum contacts are satisfied, we look only to the defendant’s contacts and not the

“unilateral activity” of some third party. Id. at 9 (citing Michiana Easy Livin’ Country, 

Inc. v. Holten, 168 S.W.3d 777, 785 (Tex. 2005) and Burger King v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 

462, 474, 105 S. Ct. 2174, 2183 (1985) (quoting Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253, 

78 S. Ct. 1228, 1239–40 (1958))).
11

In a challenge to either type of personal jurisdiction, the parties bear shifting 

burdens of proof. See Kelly v. Gen. Interior Constr., Inc., 301 S.W.3d 653, 658 (Tex. 

2010). As we explained in Southwire Co., LLC v. Sparks, No. 02-21-00126-CV, 2021 

WL 5368692, at *3–4 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Nov. 18, 2021, no pet.) (mem. op.), 

resolution of a special appearance involves a “complicated procedural sequence”:

• “[T]he plaintiff bears the initial burden to plead sufficient allegations to 

bring the nonresident defendant within the reach of Texas’s long-arm 

statute.” Kelly, 301 S.W.3d at 658.

• “Once the plaintiff has pleaded sufficient jurisdictional allegations, the 

defendant filing a special appearance bears the burden to negate all bases

of personal jurisdiction alleged by the plaintiff.” Id. The defendant’s 

burden is “tied to the allegation in the plaintiff’s pleading.” Id.

• “If the plaintiff fails to plead facts bringing the defendant within reach of 

the long-arm statute . . ., the defendant need only prove that it does not 

live in Texas to negate jurisdiction.” Id. at 658–59. To correct the 

failure to allege jurisdictional facts, the plaintiff should amend to include 

“necessary factual allegations.” Id. at 659.

• “The defendant can negate jurisdiction on either a factual or legal basis.” 

Id. 

• “Factually, the defendant can present evidence that it has no 

contacts with Texas, effectively disproving the plaintiff’s 

allegations.” Id. 

• To negate jurisdiction on a legal basis,

the defendant can show that even if the plaintiff’s alleged 

facts are true, the evidence is legally insufficient to 

establish jurisdiction; the defendant’s contacts with Texas 

fall short of purposeful availment; for specific 

jurisdiction, that the claims do not arise from the

contacts; or that traditional notions of fair play and 
12

substantial justice are offended by the exercise of 

jurisdiction.

Id.

• Should the defendant make a factual challenge to the plaintiff’s 

jurisdictional allegations, “[t]he plaintiff can then respond with its own 

evidence that affirms its allegations, and it risks dismissal of its lawsuit if 

it cannot present the trial court with evidence establishing personal 

jurisdiction.” Id. (footnote omitted).

Southwire, 2021 WL 5368692, at *3–4.

Rule 120a of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure requires that a special 

appearance be determined on the pleadings, any stipulations by the parties, affidavits 

and attachments filed by the parties, results of discovery, and any oral testimony. See

Tex. R. Civ. P. 120a(3); see also Kelly, 301 S.W.3d at 658 n.4 (stating that while 

pleadings are essential to frame the jurisdictional dispute, they are not dispositive, and

additional evidence under Rule 120a “merely supports or undermines the allegations 

in the pleadings”).

A court’s authority to exercise jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant is a 

question of law that we review de novo. Volkswagen, 669 S.W.3d at 413. If a trial 

court enters an order denying a special appearance and the trial court issues findings 

of fact and conclusions of law, the appellant may challenge the fact findings on legal 

and factual sufficiency grounds. BMC Software Belgium, NV v. Marchand, 83 S.W.3d 

789, 794 (Tex. 2002). We may review the fact findings for both legal and factual 

sufficiency. Id. Appellate courts review a trial court’s conclusions of law as a legal 
13

question. Id. The appellant may not challenge a trial court’s conclusions of law for 

factual insufficiency; however, the reviewing court may review the trial court’s legal 

conclusions drawn from the facts to determine their correctness. Id.

B. Analysis

While set out in two issues, the controlling issue in this appeal is whether the 

relevant facts give rise to specific jurisdiction over Appellants. The only relevant

prong of the Texas long-arm statute is Section 17.042(2), which provides jurisdiction

over a nonresident who “commits a tort in whole or in part in this state.”

6

 Tex. Civ. 

Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 17.042(2).

Appellants argue that the trial court’s order should be reversed because 

“minimum contacts requires not only purposeful availment but also proof that the 

alleged liability—here the claim of tortious interference—arises from or relates to the 

forum contacts.” And because Appellees “have admitted they do not know where the

alleged tortious interference occurred, and the trial court’s Findings of Fact and 

Conclusions of Law do not include a finding that the alleged tortious interference 

occurred in Texas,” Appellants urge that Appellees have not satisfied their burden for 

specific jurisdiction. 

6Appellees’ response to the special appearance states not only that Appellants 

“are subject to the personal jurisdiction of the Texas courts under the theory of 

specific jurisdiction” but also that the long-arm statute allows the exercise of personal 

jurisdiction under Section 17.042(2). 
14

In their claim of specific jurisdiction, Appellees argue that their jurisdictional 

pleading allegations satisfy their initial burden and that the assertion of specific 

jurisdiction over Appellants comports with constitutional guarantees of due process:

Appellants’ minimum contacts with Texas such as travel to Texas, 

working on a Texas-based project, and supervising Texas residents all 

establish sufficient minimum contacts. Appellants[’] contacts were

purposeful, as they were directly related to the rollout of the DLA 

project in Corpus Christi, Texas. Finally, Appellants’ contacts were 

“related to” the operative facts of this litigation. Boehmer’s claim for 

tortious interference with existing contract arose directly out of the 

supervisory role between Boehmer and Mandalapu. Mandalapu 

supervised, evaluated, and provided feedback on Boehmer’s job 

performance relating to the DLA project. The tortious interference 

claim arises out of Boehmer’s employment contract during the DLA 

project and therefore, Mandalapu’s alleged liability “relates to” his 

contacts with Texas.

Appellants respond that Appellees have “grossly mischaracterized” their 

consulting and supervisory IT services, which they provide under their contract with

Resolute. Also, Appellants contend that Appellees have failed to show that their 

claim for tortious interference arises out of or relates to their contacts in Texas, 

stating that Appellees “provide no evidence or argument that the alleged 

communications about Boehmer’s poor performance took place in Texas.” 

Moreover, Appellants note that the trial court afforded an opportunity to conduct 

discovery for jurisdictional purposes, including depositions, wherein they could have 

“questioned [Appellants] about the alleged communications with Red Commerce or 

others regarding [Appellees’] poor performance, including, where those alleged 

communications occurred,” but “they did not.” 
15

Based on the shifting burdens of proof, we look first at the plaintiff’s pleadings

for jurisdictional facts. See Kelly, 301 S.W.3d at 658. “If the plaintiff fails to plead 

facts bringing the defendant within reach of the long-arm statute (i.e., for a tort claim, 

that the defendant committed tortious acts in Texas), the defendant need only prove 

that it does not live in Texas to negate jurisdiction.” Id. at 658–59.

In their live pleading—the second amended petition—Appellees alleged that 

Mandalapu is a resident of St. Louis, Missouri, and Sravik is a Missouri limited liability

company with its principal place of business in Missouri. Appellants confirm these 

facts in the affidavit attached to their special appearance. 

Appellees’ pleadings set out facts that they state are “particularly pertinent to 

the allegations of specific jurisdiction,” including:

Mandalapu traveled to Corpus Christi four times in connection with the 

IT consulting services performed for the DLA project. The visits 

occurred in January 2021, January 2022, April 2022, and May 2022. Two 

of these visits involved actual physical on-site visits to the DLA facility 

in Corpus Christi, Texas, where Mandalapu interacted with various 

consultants on the project, many of whom were Texas residents. 

The remaining two visits involved work from the hotel 

conference room in Corpus Christi, Texas. 

However, the live pleadings contain no allegations that any tortious conduct occurred 

in Texas. And there is no explanation of what was said or done at the Corpus Christi 

visits that relate to the claims against Appellants. See Julian v. Cadence McShane Constr. 

Co., LLC, No. 01-15-00465-CV, 2015 WL 6755616, at *6 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st 

Dist.] Nov. 5, 2015, no pet.) (mem. op.) (“For actions occurring in Texas, Bedrich 
16

asserts that Julian ‘[a]ttend[ed] multiple meetings in person with Cadence McShane in 

Texas.’ But Bedrich offers no explanation of what was said or done at those meetings 

or how anything said or done at those meetings relate to any of their claims against 

Julian.”).

Our sister court considered a similar pleading in Vinmar Overseas Singapore PTE

Ltd. v. PTT International Trading PTE Ltd., 538 S.W.3d 126, 132–33 (Tex. App.—

Houston [14th Dist.] 2017, pet. denied). There, Vinmar asserted numerous 

jurisdictional facts, including that “[t]he logistical operations underlying certain of the

transactions that Defendants interfered [sic] took place in Houston, Texas,” and that

“[a] tort was committed in Texas.” Id. at 132. Despite these and other alleged

jurisdictional facts, the court concluded:

Vinmar does not allege in any of its live pleadings or its response to the 

Amended Special Appearance the location for any of the alleged acts by 

PTT or Krishnan. Vinmar alleged that Krishnan and PTT 

misappropriated its trade secrets and confidential information, but it 

does not allege that the misappropriation occurred in whole or in part in 

Texas. Likewise, Vinmar does not allege facts showing where the alleged 

tortious interference with the employment agreement occurred, where 

the alleged business disparagement occurred, or where the alleged 

conspiracy occurred.

Id. at 134; see Moncrief Oil Int’l, Inc. v. OAO Gazprom, 414 S.W.3d 142, 153, 157 (Tex. 

2013) (holding nonresident defendant subject to jurisdiction for misappropriation of 

trade secrets claim where defendant obtained trade secrets in Texas but not for 

tortious interference claim where alleged acts of interference occurred outside of 

Texas and stating that “a nonresident directing a tort at Texas from afar is insufficient 
17

to confer specific jurisdiction”); see also M & F Worldwide Corp. v. Pepsi-Cola Metro.

Bottling Co., Inc., 512 S.W.3d 878, 890 (Tex. 2017) (stating that “to the extent the 

Mafco defendants purposefully directed activities toward Texas, Pepsi’s causes of 

action do not arise from those contacts” and holding that the trial court lacked 

specific jurisdiction over the Mafco defendants). Therefore, the Vinmar court

affirmed the trial court’s order granting the special appearance. Vinmar, 538 S.W.3d at 

139.

Appellants rely heavily on the Texas Supreme Court’s decision in Kelly. See

Kelly, 301 S.W.3d at 653. In Kelly, as here, there were allegations that the defendant 

officers had a connection with Texas. Id. In explaining that connection, the supreme 

court cited to the majority opinion in the court of appeals: “The record reveals that 

performance under the construction contract was to be performed exclusively in 

Texas. The Officers sent and directed payments to [Appellee/Plaintiff] in Texas. 

Kelly made site visits to the Texas work site. The Officers received numerous 

invoices from Texas regarding the [hotel] project.” Id. at 656–57 (citing Kelly v. Gen. 

Interior Const., Inc., 262 S.W.3d 79, 86 n.5 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2008),

rev’d, 301 S.W.3d 653). However, the supreme court determined that the plaintiff had 

failed to plead facts within the reach of the Texas long-arm statute because it did not 

allege that the officers at issue committed any of the wrongdoing in Texas. Id. As the 

court explained,
18

GIC [General Interior Construction, Inc.] failed to plead facts within the 

reach of the long-arm statute because it did not allege that the Officers 

[Daniel Kelly and Laura Hofstatter] committed any tortious acts in 

Texas. As noted, GIC’s live pleading contains no allegations that the 

Officers’ wrongdoing occurred in Texas. Regarding the fraud claim, 

GIC did allege several fraudulent acts (e.g., providing false affidavits to 

Meristar and misrepresenting to GIC that it would be paid in full), but it 

did not allege that any fraudulent acts occurred in Texas. Regarding the 

trust-fund claims, GIC did not allege that the Officers used or retained 

the trust funds in Texas, nor that they submitted false affidavits to 

Meristar in Texas. Thus, although GIC has alleged two claims of

wrongdoing, it has not alleged that any acts giving rise to these two 

claims occurred in Texas.

Id. at 659–60. Moreover, in Kelly, the court noted that “[t]he most relevant piece of 

[special appearance] evidence” was an affidavit of GIC’s president stating that 

Hofstatter promised him payment. Id. at 660. But the affidavit “d[id] not state where

this conversation occurred or make any connection with Texas” and was silent as to 

the “[o]fficers’ Texas contacts related to its claims.” Id.; see Ascend Nat’l, LLC v. 

Ludders, No. 14-20-00396-CV, 2022 WL 553123, at *6 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th

Dist.] Feb. 24, 2022, no pet.) (mem. op.) (affirming order granting special appearance 

and stating that a visit to Texas “cannot be a jurisdictional contact for purposes of the 

fraud claim because there is no allegation or evidence establishing that Ludders made 

the alleged misrepresentation during that meeting”).

Similar to Kelly, Appellees failed to plead that the alleged wrongful conduct 

occurred in Texas. See Steward Health Care Sys., LLC v. Saidara, 633 S.W.3d 120, 131 

(Tex. App.—Dallas 2021, no pet.) (en banc) (affirming trial court’s order granting

Saidara’s special appearance and stating that, although Saidara visited Texas in 
19

connection with a sale, “[t]here is no allegation in the petition that Saidara made any

misrepresentation during his visits to Texas”). Although Appellees contend generally 

on appeal that “Mandalapu’s alleged liability ‘relates to’ his contacts with Texas,” they 

are silent on how Mandalapu’s Texas contacts related to their tortious interference 

with contract claims. See Fisher v. Eagle Rock Custom Homes Inc., No. 14-18-00483-CV, 

2020 WL 205975, at *7 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] Jan. 14, 2020, no pet.) 

(mem. op.) (“Appellees asserted Fisher had certain activities in and contacts with the 

state but did not allege that those were tortious behaviors.”). This silence was 

confirmed at the special appearance hearing, when Appellees’ counsel conceded to the 

trial court that “[w]e don’t know yet” where the tortious interference occurred. 

In support of their argument that their pleadings are sufficient to satisfy the 

Texas long-arm statute, Appellees cite two Texas cases, both which were decided 

before Kelly. See Ji-Haw Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Broquet, No. 04-07-00622-CV, 2008 WL 

441822 (Tex. App.—San Antonio Feb. 20, 2008, no pet.); Thunderbird Supply Co., Inc. v. 

Williams, 161 S.W.3d 731 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 2005, no pet.). In addition, both 

cases are distinguishable. As noted by our sister court, Ji-Haw involved a products

liability claim surrounding the design, manufacture, and marketing of an XBOX 

gaming system. Careington Int’l Corp. v. First Call Telemedicine, LLC, No. 05-20-00841-

CV, 2021 WL 1731753, at *3 (Tex. App.—Dallas May 3, 2021, no pet.) (mem. op.)

(stating that Ji-Haw “is distinguishable from this case, which involves alleged tortious 

interference with a contract”).
20

Similarly, Thunderbird involved allegations against thirteen corporations for 

designing, manufacturing, and marketing certain “toxic products.” Thunderbird, 161 

S.W.3d at 733. Again, there were no allegations of tortious interference with a 

contract. As noted by Appellees, the plaintiff there “pleaded that he was exposed to 

various toxic products designed, manufactured, and marketed by the defendants and 

that all or substantial parts of the events or omissions giving rise to the claims 

occurred in Texas.”

7

 While the Beaumont court held that the plaintiff had met his 

initial pleading allegations, it ultimately held that Thunderbird did not purposefully 

establish sufficient minimum contacts with Texas to support exercising jurisdiction

over it. Id. at 736. Therefore, the court reversed the trial court’s order denying 

Thunderbird’s special appearance and dismissed the claims against it. Id.

Here, the trial court’s findings of fact and conclusions of law do not include a 

finding that the alleged tortious interference with a contract occurred in Texas. With 

7Careington rejected the argument that venue pleadings may be considered in 

determining the sufficiency of the pleadings for personal jurisdictional purposes:

Careington also relies on its venue allegation that “a substantial part of 

the events giving rise to Careington’s claims herein occurred in Collin 

County[, Texas].” But this doesn’t expressly allege that First Call 

committed any conduct in Texas, nor does it carry such an implication. 

Careington’s venue allegation could be true even if First Call had no 

contact with Texas, since its co-defendant—which allegedly breached 

the contract that First Call allegedly interfered with—allegedly has its 

principal place of business in McKinney, Texas.

Careington, 2021 WL 1731753, at *3.
21

regard to Mandalapu’s visits to Texas and emails during the work trip, the trial court 

entered the following findings of fact:

• “[Mandalapu’s] supervision began in November 2021. As the DLA 

project progressed, Mandalapu traveled to Texas and visited the DLA

facility in Corpus Christi, Texas[,] on four occasions.”

• “These occasions were July 2021, January 2022, April 2022, and May 

2022. On two of these visits, Mandalapu personally visited the DLA 

facility and met with DLA personnel, including other consultants 

working on the project. With respect to the two visits to Texas, 

Mandalapu worked from his hotel conference room.”

• “On at least two occasions while in Texas, Mandalapu emailed members 

of the consulting team (including Boehmer), assigning various tasks and 

advising as to the details of his visit to the DLA facility.”

• “The purpose of Mandalapu’s visits to Texas was to physically inspect 

the DLA facility, learn the operational process, and gather technical data 

on the DLA processes, in order to design, test and implement the new 

IT system. Mandalapu gathered this information and then assigned 

various tasks to the consultants under his supervision, including 

Boehmer.”

8

8While these contacts arguably demonstrate that Appellants purposefully 

availed themselves of the privilege of conducting activities in Texas, they do not 

establish specific jurisdiction because they do not demonstrate that Appellants’

liability arises from or relates to the forum contacts. “A claim arises from or relates to 

a defendant’s forum contacts if there is a ‘substantial connection between those 

contacts and the operative facts of the litigation.’” TV Azteca, 490 S.W.3d at 52

(quoting Moki Mac River Expeditions v. Drugg, 221 S.W.3d 569, 585 (Tex. 2007)). “The 

operative facts are those on which the trial will focus to prove the liability of the 

defendant who is challenging jurisdiction.” Stauffer v. Nicholson, 438 S.W.3d 205, 212 

(Tex. App.—Dallas 2014, no pet.) (citing Moncrief Oil, 414 S.W.3d at 156). Here, the 

contacts relied upon by Appellees relate to Appellants’ non-tortious conduct; as to 

Appellants’ alleged tortious conduct, Appellees have not established that such conduct 

occurred in Texas, and, thus, Appellees have not established a substantial connection 

between Appellants’ contacts with Texas and the operative facts of the litigation. See 

Brenham Oil & Gas, Inc. v. TGS-NOPEC Geophysical Co., 472 S.W.3d 744, 765 (Tex. 
22

While a conclusion of law stated that “the cause of action asserted by Plaintiff 

[Appellee] arises from and is related to Defendants’ [Appellants’] purposeful activities 

within Texas,” nowhere in its findings or conclusions does the trial court find that 

Appellants committed tortious interference with a contract in Texas. 

The question under Kelly is whether Appellees have alleged that Appellants 

committed any tortious act in Texas. See Careington, 2021 WL 1731753, at *3. They

have not. Because Appellees failed to plead jurisdictional facts, Appellants could and 

did meet their burden to negate all bases of jurisdiction by proving that they do not

live in Texas. See Kelly, 301 S.W.3d at 660. Appellees do not challenge that fact, and 

indeed, they admit it in their live pleadings.

Therefore, considering the pleadings and the jurisdictional evidence, we hold 

that the trial court did not have personal jurisdiction over Appellants. We sustain 

Appellants’ issues on appeal.

App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2015, no pet.) (stating that the “operative facts” of the 

tortious interference claim “would be acts or communications assisting or 

encouraging TGS to malign Brenham Oil or otherwise interfere with its prospective 

business relations with Togo” and holding that the “Texas-linked evidence relied 

upon by Brenham Oil pertains only to ENT[’]s non[-]tortious conduct in the purchase 

of seismic data from TCS” and that said “forum contacts are not the operative facts

of the litigation and therefore are not contacts that will support an exercise of specific 

jurisdiction”).
23

IV. CONCLUSION

Having sustained Appellants’ issues, we reverse the trial court’s order denying 

the special appearance and render judgment dismissing the case for want of personal 

jurisdiction.

/s/ Dana Womack

Dana Womack

Justice

Delivered: December 21, 2023