United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

Chicago, Illinois 60604

Argued December 13, 2006

Decided January 8, 2007

Before

Hon. WILLIAM J. BAUER, Circuit Judge

Hon. RICHARD A. POSNER, Circuit Judge

Hon. TERENCE T. EVANS, Circuit Judge

 

No. 06-1951

KARRIS BILAL, Appeal from the United States District 

Plaintiff-Appellant, Court for the Northern District of Illinois, 

Eastern Division.

v. No. 03 C 9253

BP AMERICA, INC. and JAMES DIETZ, John W. Darrah,

Defendants-Appellees. Judge.

ORDER

BP American, Inc. (BP), dismissed Karris Bilal, an African-American

employee, and Bilal turned around and sued the company and his former

supervisor, James Dietz, under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §

2000(e) et seq., and 42 U.S.C. § 1981, alleging race discrimination and retaliation. 

The district court granted summary judgment for the defendants, determining that

Bilal failed to make a prima facie case on either claim and also failed to show that

BP’s stated reason for his dismissal was pretextual. Bilal appeals, but as far as we

can tell from his brief, the original retaliation claim is not presented.

In 1998 Bilal began working as a tax attorney at Amoco, which later merged

with BP. In 2000 and 2001 several colleagues expressed concerns about Bilal’s

NONPRECEDENTIAL

DISPOSITION

To be cited only in accordance with

 Fed. R. App. P. 32.1
No. 06-1951 2

competence to his supervisor, Dietz. Dietz eventually put Bilal on probation in May

2001. More than a year later, eight managers collectively decided, after reviewing

Bilal’s performance and long-term career prospects, that his employment would end

on December 31, 2002.

Bilal filed a complaint in federal court alleging that in May 2001 Dietz made

racially disparaging remarks. According to Bilal, Dietz told him: “If it was left up to

me, I wouldn’t hire any of your kind;” “You don’t know who you’re messing with,

boy;” and “If you cause trouble, I will destroy your black ass.” 

After the parties engaged in discovery, the defendants filed a motion for

summary judgment, accompanied by a N.D. Ill. Local Rule 56.1 statement of

material facts. Bilal (who was represented by counsel in the district court

proceedings) opposed the motion and filed a response, but it did not comply with the

requirements of Rule 56.1. He neither admitted nor denied the defendants’ facts

but instead refuted them by presenting additional facts of his own. He

subsequently filed an amended response, but it also did not comply with Rule 56.1. 

In denying the defendants’ facts, he once again improperly proposed his own

additional facts rather than presenting them in a separate section.

The district court ignored Bilal’s proposed statements and deemed admitted

the facts in the defendants’ statement. The court determined (along with other

findings not challenged on appeal) that Bilal failed to make out a case of race

discrimination under the indirect method established in McDonnell Douglas Corp.

v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802-04 (1973), because he could not satisfy the “meeting

performance expectations” or “similarly situated” prongs, and he could not show

that the proffered reason for his discharge—poor performance—was pretextual. 

The district court granted summary judgment to the defendants and, as authorized

by F.R.C.P. 54(d), awarded $5040.59 in costs. No attorneys’ fees were included in

this award, which the district court resolved in a four-page order.

It is well settled that a district court may ignore alleged “facts” that fail to

comply with the court’s summary judgment procedures. And a court may then

deem the opposing party’s facts admitted. See Local Rule 56.1(b)(3)(C); Ammons v.

Aramark Uniform Services, Inc., 368 F.3d 809, 817 (7th Cir. 2004); Smith v. Lamz,

321 F.3d 680, 683 (7th Cir. 2003). Bilal’s brief refers in passing to the district

court’s “misapplication” of rule 56.1, but he does not argue that his proposed

statements of fact complied with Rule 56.1, nor does he argue that—his failure to

comply with the rule notwithstanding—the district court abused its discretion by

ignoring his submissions. Therefore, we review the grant of summary judgment on

the record as defined by the defendants’ statement of facts.
No. 06-1951 3

First, Bilal argues generally that he presented sufficient evidence to make

out a case of race discrimination under the indirect method of proof. But in making

this argument, he ignores the defendants’ proposed facts, which he constructively

admitted, and which establish (1) that Bilal’s supervisor and several of his

colleagues harbored concerns about his knowledge of tax law, (2) that Bilal received

at least two unfavorable performance reviews, and (3) that he was on probation for

more than a year before he was terminated. Bilal cannot argue in the face of these

admissions that he was meeting BP’s expectations, nor can he show that their

stated reason for firing him—poor performance—was a “deliberate falsehood.” See

Forrester v. Rauland-Borg Corp., 453 F3d 416, 419 (7th Cir. 2006). Also, Bilal’s only

support for his argument that he could satisfy the “similarly situated” requirement

for discrimination claims consists of facts that are outside the record. As such, we

cannot take them into account. See Cichon v. Exelon Generation Co., L.L.C., 401

F.3d 803, 810 (7th Cir. 2005).

Bilal also contests, in a one-sentence argument, the district court’s order

requiring him to pay statutory costs pursuant to F.R.C.P. 54(d). He argues that

awarding costs to BP is unfair because BP “gross[es] more than 16 billion dollars a

year,” but it would have been an abuse of discretion for the district court to deny

costs to the defendants based solely on the relative wealth of the parties. See

Mother and Father v. Cassidy, 338 F.3d 704, 710 (7th Cir. 2003) (holding that under

Rule 54(d), costs must be awarded to a prevailing party unless that party engaged

in misconduct or the losing party is indigent). Bilal also argues that requiring

employees to pay employers’ costs will deter Title VII litigation, but our

longstanding rule is that “Title VII carved out no blanket exception from Rule

54(d).” Delta Air Lines, Inc. v. Colbert, 692 F.2d 489, 490 (7th Cir. 1982).

Although we construe their filings liberally, pro se litigants still must comply

with Fed. R. App. P. 28(a)(9) which requires that an appellant’s brief contain

“appellant’s contentions and the reasons for them, with citations to the authorities

and parts of the record on which the appellant relies.” See Anderson v. Hardman,

241 F.3d 544, 545 (7th Cir. 2001). The remainder of Bilal’s arguments—that

granting summary judgment to the defendants violated the constitution and

conflicted with some sort of “clear congressional right” created by Title VII, and that

he presented sufficient evidence to make out a race discrimination case under the

direct method—are forfeited because they are undeveloped, unsupported by legal

authority, and are not responsive to the district court’s analysis.

We therefore affirm the district court’s decision.