In the 

United States Court of Appeals 

For the Seventh Circuit ____________________

No. 16‐1774

ELOUISE BRADLEY,

Plaintiff‐Appellant,

v.

JENNIFER SABREE, ET AL.,

Defendants‐Appellees.

____________________

Appeal from the United States District Court for the

Eastern District of Wisconsin.

No. 15‐CV‐1384‐PP — Pamela Pepper, Judge.

____________________

SUBMITTED AUGUST 26, 2016 — DECIDED SEPTEMBER 6, 2016

____________________

Before MANION, ROVNER and HAMILTON, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM. Elouise Bradley appeals the dismissal of her

civil‐rights lawsuit alleging that employees of the Wisconsin

Department of Children and Families and Lutheran Social

Services played a role in the improper revocation of her li‐

cense to operate a childcare center. We affirm.
2 No. 16‐1774

This is Bradley’s third appeal from lawsuits alleging im‐

proprieties with her license revocation. See Bradley v. Wis.

Dep’t of Children & Families, 528 F. App’x 680 (7th Cir. 2013)

(affirming dismissal of suit against department, a state

agency, which is not subject to § 1983 liability); Bradley v. Sa‐

bree, 594 F. App’x 881 (7th Cir. 2015) (affirming dismissal of

§ 1983 suit against department officials and social‐service

workers for failure to state a claim). In the complaint here,

Bradley again alleged that her license was improperly re‐

voked because of actions by six people—five of whom she

had sued in her second suit. As she asserted, two department

employees, without permission, photographed the space in

her home where she operated the daycare program and was

in the process of reorganizing; they then falsely accused her

of child abuse and neglect and forced her to surrender her li‐

cense. Bradley further alleged that an employee interviewed

her adopted son without her consent and did not fix an incor‐

rect report accusing her of child abuse. Besides the five de‐

fendants she had sued earlier, Bradley named one other state

employee, Kari Kerber, who she alleged had investigated her

for child neglect—thereby contributing to the daycare’s clo‐

sure. All of the defendants, Bradley asserts, violated the “Fed‐

eral Right to Privacy Act” (most likely referring to the Privacy

Act of 1974, 5 U.S.C. § 552a), the Child Abuse Prevention and

Treatment Act, 42 U.S.C. § 5106(a), the Fourth and Fourteenth

Amendments, the Due Process Clause, and 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983,

1985(3). The state defendants moved to dismiss the complaint

as being barred by claim preclusion and for failure to state a

claim.
No. 16‐1774 3

The district court dismissed the claims against all of the

defendants.1 The court first concluded that claim preclusion

barred the claims against the five who had been defendants

in the second lawsuit because the claims there were based on

the same events as the current suit. As for the sixth defendant,

Kerber, the court concluded that the complaint failed to state

a claim under any constitutional provision or federal statute

identified by Bradley.

On appeal Bradley does not meaningfully challenge the

district court’s application of claim preclusion and instead

maintains that her complaint stated a claim. But the court

properly concluded that claim preclusion bars her claims here

because they involved the same parties (five of the defend‐

ants, not including Kerber) as well as the same core of opera‐

tive facts, and the litigation in the prior suit had resulted in a

                                                  1 The court dismissed Bradley’s claims against the two unserved non‐

DCF defendants based on the belief that 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2), a provision

within the statute governing in forma pauperis proceedings, required it to

screen complaints filed by self‐represented plaintiffs, and dismiss any

complaint that failed to state a claim. Although we have stated that

28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) applies to fee paying plaintiffs like Bradley, see Rowe

v. Shake, 196 F.3d 778, 783 (7th Cir. 1999), other circuits have disagreed, see

Grayson v. Mayview State Hosp., 293 F.3d 103, 109 n.10 (3d Cir. 2002); Staf‐

ford v. United States, 208 F.3d 1177, 1179 n.4 (10th Cir. 2000); Benson v.

O’Brian, 179 F.3d 1014, 1016–17 (6th Cir. 1999); Bazrowx v. Scott, 136 F.3d

1053, 1054 (5th Cir. 1998). We need not reconcile any possible conflict be‐

cause it makes no difference in this case. The district court has authority

to dismiss defective claims, and the procedural protections that we have

outlined—notice and opportunity to respond, see Dawson v. Newman, 419

F.3d 656, 660 (7th Cir. 2005); Hoskins v. Poelstra, 320 F.3d 761, 763 (7th Cir.

2003); Stewart Title Guar. Co. v. Cadle Co., 74 F.3d 835, 836 (7th Cir. 1996)—

were satisfied by the state defendants’ motion to dismiss, and Bradley her‐

self was able to file a response.
4 No. 16‐1774

final judgment on the merits. See Bernstein v. Bankert, 733 F.3d

190, 226 (7th Cir. 2013); Ross ex rel. Ross v. Bd. of Educ. of Twp.

High Sch. Dist. 211, 486 F.3d 279, 283–84 (7th Cir. 2007). Brad‐

ley does not try to clarify her claims against Kerber, the de‐

fendant who was not involved in the prior suit, and we see no

basis to disturb the court’s decision that Bradley failed to state

a claim against Kerber or any of the other defendants.

We have reviewed all of Bradley’s remaining contentions,

and none has merit. We warn Bradley that submitting further

frivolous appeals to this court may result in sanctions. See

Support Sys. Int’l, Inc. v. Mack, 45 F.3d 185, 186 (7th Cir. 1995).

AFFIRMED.