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Federal Bureau of Investigation

Department of Homeland Security

Strategic Intelligence Assessment and Data on 

Domestic Terrorism 

Submitted to the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, the Committee on 

Homeland Security, and the Committee of the Judiciary of the United States House 

of Representatives, and the Select Committee on Intelligence, the Committee on 

Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, and the Committee of the Judiciary 

of the United States Senate

October 2022
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Table of Contents

I. Overview of Reporting Requirement............................................................................................2

II. Executive Summary ........................................................................................................................2

III. Domestic Terrorism: Definitions, Terminology and Methodology ............................................3

IV. Strategic Intelligence Assessment..................................................................................................6

V. Discussion and Comparison of Investigative Activities...............................................................7

VI. Data on Domestic Terrorism........................................................................................................18

VII. Recommendations.........................................................................................................................25

Appendix A................................................................................................................................................28

Appendix B................................................................................................................................................34

Appendix C................................................................................................................................................37

I. Overview of Reporting Requirement

Pursuant to Section 5602(a) and (b) of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 

(FY) 20201(hereafter “the Act”), the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and the Department 

of Homeland Security (DHS), in consultation with the Office of the Director of National 

Intelligence (ODNI), including the National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC), and the 

Department of Justice (DOJ), jointly produced two reports on domestic terrorism (DT), which 

provided data as of the end of FY 2019.

2 Section 5602(d) of the Act requires the Director of the 

FBI and the Secretary of Homeland Security, in consultation with the Director of National 

Intelligence (DNI) in a manner consistent with the authorities and responsibilities of such 

Director, to jointly submit to the appropriate Congressional committees annual updates to those 

reports. This report constitutes the annual updates for FY 2020 and FY 2021.

II. Executive Summary

Preventing terrorist attacks remains a top priority for both the FBI and the DHS, and the FBI 

serves as the lead investigative agency on terrorism matters. The threat posed by international 

and domestic threat actors has evolved significantly since 9/11. One of the most significant 

terrorism threats to the Homeland we face today is posed by lone offenders3and small groups of 

individuals who commit acts of violence motivated by a range of ideological beliefs and/or 

personal grievances. Of these actors, domestic violent extremists represent one of the most 

persistent threats to the United States today. These individuals are often radicalized online and 

look to conduct attacks with easily accessible weapons. Many of these violent extremists are 

motivated and inspired by a mix of ideological, socio-political and personal grievances against

 

1 Public Law 116-92, enacted 20 December 2019.

2 The report Domestic Terrorism: Definitions, Terminology, and Methodology was published in November 2020; 

and the report Strategic Intelligence Assessment and Data on Domestic Terrorism was published in May 2021.

3 The FBI and DHS define a lone offender as an individual motivated by one or more violent extremist ideologies 

who, operating alone, supports or engages in acts of unlawful violence in furtherance of that ideology or ideologies 

that may involve influence from a larger terrorist organization or a foreign actor. The mere advocacy of political or 

social positions, political activism, use of strong rhetoric, or generalized philosophic embrace of violent tactics does 

not constitute violent extremism, and may be constitutionally protected.
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their targets. With this report, we are providing our strategic intelligence assessments on DT, a 

detailed discussion of our procedures and methods to address DT threats, as well as data on DT 

incidents and FBI investigations.

III. Domestic Terrorism: Definitions, Terminology and Methodology

Section 5602(a) of the Act requires the Director of the FBI and the Secretary of Homeland 

Security, in consultation with the DNI, to jointly develop, to the fullest extent feasible and for 

purposes of internal recordkeeping and tracking, uniform and standardized definitions of the 

terms “domestic terrorism,” “act of domestic terrorism,” “domestic terrorism groups,” and any 

other commonly used terms with respect to DT; methodologies for tracking incidents of DT; and 

descriptions of categories and subcategories of DT and ideologies relating to DT; and to jointly 

submit the information in a report to the appropriate Congressional committees. 

Definitions

For the FBI’s purposes, “domestic terrorism” is defined by 18 U.S.C. § 2331(5), as 

activities:

 Involving acts dangerous to human life that are a violation of the criminal laws of the United 

States or of any State;

 Appearing to be intended to:

oIntimidate or coerce a civilian population;

oInfluence the policy of government by intimidation or coercion; or

o Affect the conduct of a government by mass destruction, assassination or kidnapping; and

 Occurring primarily within the territorial jurisdiction of the United States.

DHS derives its definition of DT from the Homeland Security Act definition of terrorism, 

6 U.S.C. § 101(18), which is similar, but not identical to, the 18 U.S.C. § 2331(5) definition.

Under the Homeland Security Act of 2002, terrorism is defined as any activity that:

 Involves an act that:

oIs dangerous to human life or potentially destructive of critical infrastructure or key 

resources; and

oIs a violation of the criminal laws of the United States or of any State or other subdivision 

of the United States; and

 Appears to be intended to:

oIntimidate or coerce a civilian population;

oInfluence the policy of a government by intimidation or coercion; or

o Affect the conduct of a government by mass destruction, assassination, or kidnapping.

Both references in U.S. Code are definitions and not federal criminal charging statutes for DT.
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Terminology

The FBI and DHS use the term “domestic violent extremism” to refer to DT threats. The word 

“violent” is important because mere advocacy of political or social positions, political activism, 

use of strong rhetoric, or generalized philosophic embrace of violent tactics does not constitute 

violent extremism and may be constitutionally protected. Under FBI policy and federal law, no 

investigative activity may be based solely on activity protected by the First Amendment, or the 

apparent or actual race, ethnicity, national origin, religion, gender, sexual orientation, or gender 

identity of the individual or group. Similarly, DHS’s Office of Intelligence and Analysis (I&A) is 

prohibited from engaging in any intelligence activities for the purpose of affecting the political 

process in the United States or for the sole purpose of monitoring activities protected by the First 

Amendment or the lawful exercise of other rights secured by the Constitution or laws of the 

United States, and DHS policy prohibits any intelligence activities based solely on an 

individual’s or group’s race, ethnicity, gender, religion, sexual orientation, gender identity, 

country of birth, or nationality. 

A “domestic violent extremist” (DVE) is defined as an individual based and operating primarily 

within the United States or its territories without direction or inspiration from a foreign terrorist 

group or other foreign power who seeks to further political or social goals, wholly or in part, 

through unlawful acts of force or violence dangerous to human life.

The U.S. government, including the FBI and DHS, continually reviews and evaluates 

intelligence and information from multiple sources to ensure it appropriately identifies and 

categorizes national security threats, including those that are criminal in nature, to the Homeland. 

As part of this continual internal review, the FBI and DHS prioritize threat categories, which are 

further described below, as needed, and as threats evolve. While categories help the FBI and 

DHS better understand the threat associated with broad categories of DT-related criminal actors, 

the FBI and DHS recognize motivations vary, are nuanced, and sometimes are derived from a 

blend of ideologies. The categories also inform our intelligence and prevention efforts.

Since 2019, the U.S. government has used the following five threat categories to 

understand the DT threat: 

(1) Racially or Ethnically Motivated Violent Extremism: This threat category 

encompasses threats involving the potentially unlawful use or threat of force or 

violence, in violation of federal law, in furtherance of political or social agendas 

which are deemed to derive from bias, often related to race, held by the actor against 

others, including a given population group. Racially or ethnically motivated violent 

extremists (RMVEs) use both political and religious justifications to support their 

racially- or ethnically-based ideological objectives and criminal activities. One set of 

RMVE threat actors use their belief in the superiority of the white race to justify their 

use of violence to further their political, cultural, and religious goals. A separate and 

distinct set of RMVE threat actors use real or perceived racism or injustice in 

American society, a separate Black Homeland, and/or violent interpretations of 

religious teachings to justify their use of violence to further their social or political 

goals.
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(2) Anti-Government or Anti-Authority Violent Extremism: This threat category 

encompasses the potentially unlawful use or threat of force or violence, in violation 

of federal law, in furtherance of political and/or social agendas, which are deemed to 

derive from anti-government or anti-authority sentiment, including opposition to 

perceived economic, social, or racial hierarchies, or perceived government overreach, 

negligence, or illegitimacy. This threat category typically includes threats from 

anarchist violent extremists (AVEs), militia violent extremists (MVEs), and sovereign 

citizen violent extremists (SCVEs).

(3) Animal Rights/Environmental Violent Extremism: This threat category 

encompasses the potentially unlawful use or threat of force or violence, in violation 

of federal law, in furtherance of political and/or social agendas by those seeking to 

end or mitigate perceived cruelty, harm, or exploitation of animals and/or the 

perceived exploitation or destruction of natural resources and the environment. 

(4) Abortion-Related Violent Extremism: This threat category encompasses the 

potentially unlawful use or threat of force or violence, in violation of federal law, in 

furtherance of political and/or social agendas relating to abortion, including 

individuals who advocate for violence in support of either pro-life or pro-choice 

beliefs.

(5) All Other Domestic Terrorism Threats: This threat category encompasses threats 

involving the potentially unlawful use or threat of force or violence, in violation of 

federal law, in furtherance of political and/or social agendas which are not otherwise 

exclusively defined under one of the other threat categories. Such agendas may derive 

from, but are not limited to, a mixture of personal grievances and beliefs, political 

concerns, and aspects of conspiracy theories, including those described in the other 

DT threat categories. Some actors in this category may also carry bias related to 

religion, gender, or sexual orientation. Several DVEs have combined components of 

different ideologies to develop a personalized belief system that they use to justify 

violent, criminal action.

Methodology

The FBI recognizes a DT incident as an ideologically-driven criminal act, including threats 

made to or acts of violence against specific victims, in furtherance of a domestic political 

and/or social goal. For DHS, these ideologically driven criminal acts must be dangerous to 

human life or potentially destructive to critical infrastructure or key resources to meet the 

definition of DT. A single incident may be part of a scheme or a serial criminal or violent 

activity conducted by the same perpetrator(s) using the same tactic(s). The FBI and DHS 

recognize a DT plot as a combination of criminal activity and planning that collectively 

reflect steps toward criminal action in furtherance of a domestic political and/or social goal. 

Disrupted DT plots are plots which, absent law enforcement intervention, could have 

resulted in a DT incident.
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The FBI makes every effort to document lethal and non-lethal DT incidents, but it is important to 

note there is no mandatory incident reporting requirement for state, local, tribal, and territorial 

(SLTT) law enforcement agencies to report criminal activity that appears to be ideologically 

motivated and is mitigated at the SLTT level. DHS complements the FBI’s effort to document 

DT incidents through a parallel effort to identify and analyze DT attacks and plots via 

engagement with SLTT law enforcement through DHS intelligence officers deployed to fusion 

centers, review of DHS components’ information, and open source research. The results of these 

efforts are also shared with the FBI.

IV. Strategic Intelligence Assessment

The FBI, in coordination with prosecutors in the U.S. Attorneys’ Offices (USAOs) and DOJ’s 

National Security Division (NSD), continues to successfully investigate and disrupt DVE 

activities, plots, and threats. The FBI and DHS continue to provide strategic warnings and 

analysis of the heightened DT threat. DVE lone offenders acting independently and without 

direction from specific groups are the primary actors in lethal DT incidents. The FBI and DHS 

assessed lone offenders and small groups of individuals would continue to be the primary actor 

in these attacks and would continue to pose significant mitigation challenges due to their 

capacity for independent radicalization and mobilization and preference for easily accessible 

weapons. The FBI and DHS assessed multiple factors, including perceptions of – or responses 

to – political and social conditions and law enforcement and government overreach, would also 

almost certainly continue to contribute to DVE radicalization, target selection, and mobilization 

in violation of federal, state, and local law and hate crime4statutes.

In 2020, the FBI and DHS assessed RMVEs, primarily those advocating the superiority of the 

white race, likely would continue to be the most lethal category of the DT threat to the 

Homeland. In 2020, four DT-related attacks resulted in four deaths. Three of the attacks were 

committed by DVEs with anti-government or anti-authority violent extremist ideologies, 

specifically militia violent extremism and anarchist violent extremism. One lethal attack was 

committed by an RMVE who allegedly used his interpretations of religious teachings to justify a 

murder. In 2020, for the first time since 2011, no lethal attacks were committed by RMVEs who 

espouse a belief in the superiority of the white race.

In 2021, the FBI and DHS assessed RMVEs advocating the superiority of the white race and 

anti-authority or anti-government violent extremists, specifically militia violent extremists, 

presented the most lethal threat categories. The FBI and DHS assessed RMVEs were most likely 

to conduct mass-casualty attacks against civilians, and militia violent extremists would typically 

target law enforcement and government personnel and facilities. In 2021, at least four DT-related 

attacks resulted in 13 deaths. DVEs with mixed or personalized ideologies committed two of the 

four attacks. The other two lethal attacks were committed by RMVEs – one who advocated the 

 

4 The FBI defines a hate crime as a criminal offense that was motivated, in whole or in part, by the offender’s bias 

against a person’s actual or perceived race/ethnicity, national origin, gender, gender identity, religion, disability, 

and/or sexual orientation, and was committed against persons, property, or society.
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superiority of the white race and one who allegedly used his interpretations of religious teachings 

to justify the murder of a police officer.

In 2021 and 2022, the FBI, DHS, and NCTC produced annual joint strategic intelligence 

assessments on domestic violent extremism. In March 2021, the agencies published an 

assessment titled, Domestic Violent Extremism Poses Heightened Threat in 2021. An 

unclassified summary of the assessment is available in Appendix B.5In June 2022, the agencies 

published a second joint assessment titled, Wide-Ranging Domestic Violent Extremist Threat to

Persist. That assessment is unclassified and is available in Appendix C.

V. Discussion and Comparison of Investigative Activities

The Act calls for a discussion and comparison of the following activities:

 The criteria for opening, managing, and closing DT and international terrorism (IT) 

investigations.

 Standards and procedures for the FBI with respect to the review, prioritization, and 

mitigation of DT and IT threats in the United States.

 The planning, development, production, analysis, and evaluation of intelligence and 

intelligence products relating to terrorism, noting any differences with respect to DT and IT.

 The sharing of information relating to DT and IT by and between the federal government; 

SLTT and foreign governments; the appropriate Congressional committees; 

nongovernmental organizations; and the private sector.

 The criteria and methodology used by the FBI to identify or assign terrorism classifications

to DT investigations.

 Compliance with privacy, civil rights, and civil liberties policies and protections, including 

protections against the public release of names or other personally identifiable information 

of individuals involved in incidents, investigations, indictments, prosecutions, or convictions 

for which data is reported under the Act.

 Information regarding any training or resources provided to assist federal and SLTT law 

enforcement agencies in understanding, detecting, deterring, and investigating acts of DT, 

including the date, type, subject, and recipient agencies of such training or resources.

 

5 The agencies provided the full, classified version of the report to the appropriate Congressional committees in 

March 2021. The unclassified summary is also available on the ODNI’s public website.
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Criteria for Opening, Managing, and Closing DT and IT Investigations

Opening: The FBI opens a full investigation6predicated on an “articulable factual basis” that 

reasonably indicates the existence of federal criminal activity or a threat to national security, or 

to protect against such activity or threat. The opening of a full investigation must be approved by 

a Supervisory Special Agent and notice to the responsible Headquarters unit must be provided 

within 15 days of opening. The FBI may open a preliminary investigation7on the basis of any 

“allegation or information” indicative of possible criminal activity or threats to the national 

security.8 The opening of a preliminary investigation by a Field Office requires the approval of a 

Supervisory Special Agent, but does not require notice to the DOJ, unless it involves a sensitive 

investigative matter (SIM).

9

The opening of an investigation involving a SIM must be reviewed by the Field Office’s Chief 

Division Counsel (CDC), approved by the Special Agent in Charge, and provided to the 

responsible Headquarters Unit Chief within 15 days of opening as notice. The Field Office must 

notify the USAO within 30 days unless inappropriate, and in that case, Headquarters must notify 

and provide an explanation to DOJ within 30 days. 

No investigation may be opened based solely on activities protected by the First Amendment or 

the lawful exercise of rights secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States.

The opening of a preliminary or full investigation classified as a DT matter must be approved by

the Field Office’s CDC; however, the opening of a full investigation classified as an IT matter 

does not have the same requirement. 

Managing: The Attorney General’s Guidelines for Domestic FBI Operations (AGG-Dom) 

authorize all lawful investigative methods in the conduct of a full investigation. The FBI requires 

 

6 A full investigation may be opened if there is an “articulable factual basis” for the investigation that reasonably 

indicates one of the following circumstances exists: an activity constituting a federal crime or a threat to the national 

security has or may have occurred, is or may be occurring, or will or may occur, and the investigation may obtain 

information relating to the activity or the involvement or role of an individual, group, or organization in such 

activity. An enterprise investigation is a type of full investigation that examines the structure, scope, and nature of 

the group or organization.

7 A preliminary investigation is a type of predicated investigation that may be opened (predicated) on the basis of 

any “allegation or information” indicative of possible criminal activity or threats to the national security. 

Preliminary investigations may be opened to detect, obtain information about, or prevent or protect against federal 

crimes or threats to the national security. Enterprise investigations cannot be conducted as preliminary investigations 

or assessments, nor may they be conducted for the sole purpose of collecting foreign intelligence.

8 The significance of the distinction between the full and preliminary investigation is in the availability of 

investigative tools. A preliminary investigation, which is based on the lesser factual predicate, limits the 

investigative tools and methods available, while the full investigation, which is based on the more robust factual 

predicate, permits the full range of legally available investigative tools and methods. In some instances, cases 

opened as preliminary investigations may be converted to full investigations based on the development of additional 

facts during the course of the investigation.

9 A sensitive investigative matter (SIM) involves the activities of a domestic public official or political candidate 

(involving corruption or a threat to the national security), religious or political organization or individual prominent 

in such an organization, or news media, or any other matter which, in the judgment of the official authorizing an 

investigation, should be brought to the attention of FBI Headquarters and other DOJ officials.
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file reviews of full investigations every 90 days. Some investigative methods the FBI is 

authorized to use differ between DT and IT investigations, based on the differences in statutory 

investigative authorities available in criminal matters, such as DT investigations, and in foreign 

intelligence matters, such as IT investigations. For example, a full investigation of a DT matter 

may conduct electronic surveillance, if authorized, pursuant to Title III of the Omnibus Crime 

Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968. A full investigation of an IT matter may also conduct 

electronic surveillance, as authorized, pursuant to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 

1978, as amended. Additionally, investigations of DT and IT matters may make use of federal 

grand jury subpoenas to compel the disclosure of records and other relevant information, but 

investigations of IT matters may also use a National Security Letter10 to compel defined 

categories of records from certain businesses. Finally, investigations of DT matters must be 

periodically reviewed by the Field Office’s CDC, and investigations of IT matters do not have 

the same requirement. 

Closing: A Supervisory Special Agent must approve the closure of both full and preliminary 

investigations. A preliminary investigation must be closed within six months of its opening but 

may be extended for an additional six months. At the conclusion of either type of investigation, 

each of the following items must be documented: 

 A summary of the results of the investigation.

 Whether logical and reasonable investigation was completed.

 Whether all investigative methods/techniques initiated have been completed and/or 

discontinued.

 Whether all set leads have been completed and/or discontinued.

 Whether all evidence has been returned, destroyed, or retained in accordance with evidence 

policy.

 A summary statement of the reason the full investigation will be closed.

At the conclusion of a full investigation, the Field Office must also document whether sufficient 

personnel and financial resources were expended on the investigation, or an 

explanation/justification for not expending sufficient resources.

There are no substantive differences in how the FBI closes full investigations of DT or IT 

matters.

 

10 A National Security Letter is an administrative demand for documents or records that are relevant to a predicated 

investigation to protect against international terrorism or clandestine intelligence activities.
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The following chart presents a comparison of FBI policies for both DT and IT preliminary and 

full investigations.

PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION FULL INVESTIGATION

PREDICATION

Information or an allegation indicating the 

existence of federal criminal activity or a 

threat to national security (or to protect 

against such activity or threat)

Articulable factual basis that reasonably 

indicates the existence of federal criminal 

activity or a threat to national security (or to 

protect against such activity or threat) 

APPROVAL TO 

OPEN

 Supervisory Special Agent (SSA)

 If a Domestic Terrorism (DT) matter, Field 

Office (FO) Chief Division Counsel (CDC)

 SSA

 Notice to the responsible Headquarters 

(HQ) unit must be provided within 15 days 

of opening

 If a DT matter, FO CDC

APPROVAL TO 

OPEN: SENSITIVE 

INVESTIGATIVE 

MATTER (SIM)

 FO CDC

 FO Special Agent in Charge (SAC)

 Notice to responsible HQ Unit Chief within 

15 days of opening.

 Notice to the US Attorney’s Office (USAO) 

within 30 days unless inappropriate, HQ 

must notify the Department of Justice 

(DOJ) within 30 days

 FO CDC

 FO SAC

 Notice to responsible HQ Unit Chief within 

15 days of opening

 Notice to the USAO within 30 days unless 

inappropriate, HQ must notify DOJ within 

30 days

FILE REVIEW Every 90 calendar days Every 90 calendar days

EXAMPLES OF 

AUTHORIZED 

INVESTIGATIVE 

METHODS

In a DT Matter:

 Obtain public information

 Physical surveillance 

 Federal grand jury subpoenas

In an International Terrorism (IT) Matter: 

 Obtain public information

 Physical Surveillance 

 Federal grand jury subpoenas and National 

Security Letters (NSLs)

In a DT Matter:

 Obtain public information

 Physical surveillance 

 Federal grand jury subpoenas

 Electronic surveillance pursuant to Title III 

of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe 

Streets Act of 1968

In an IT Matter: 

 Obtain public information

 Physical Surveillance 

 Federal grand jury subpoenas and NSLs

 Electronic surveillance pursuant to Foreign 

Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, as 

amended

CLOSURE Must be closed within six months but may 

be extended for an additional six months

No duration limit

APPROVAL TO 

CLOSE

SSA

 Notice to the responsible HQ unit must be 

provided prior to closing

SSA

 Notice to the responsible HQ unit must be 

provided prior to closing

APPROVAL TO 

CLOSE: SIM

SSA, with SAC approval SSA, with SAC approval
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Standards and Procedures for Reviewing, Prioritizing, and Mitigating DT and IT Threats

The FBI uses the Threat Review and Prioritization (TRP) process as a standardized method for 

reviewing and prioritizing threats within operational programs to inform threat strategies, 

mitigation plans, and resource allocation. Headquarters operational divisions use the TRP 

process to uniformly define threat issues for the organization, determine their prioritization at the 

national level, establish FBI National Threat Priorities (NTPs), and develop national threat 

strategies for those threats to the FBI enterprise. Field Offices then cascade the results of the 

national-level TRP process to prioritize threat issues and create threat strategies to mitigate 

threats based on the threat landscape of their specific areas of responsibility (AORs). The FBI 

conducts the TRP process on a biennial basis, but it may be conducted annually at the discretion 

of the Field Office or Headquarters operational division head. For DT and IT threats, DOJ 

NSD’s Counterterrorism Section (CTS) attorneys offer prosecutorial views during the nationallevel TRP process. 

The TRP process seeks to build consensus, and includes applicable USAO(s) and stakeholders, 

such as NSD/CTS, to determine prioritization (banding) and to develop threat strategies for 

mitigation of threat issues. Headquarters operational divisions develop national threat strategies 

for each threat issue to guide enterprise-wide mitigation efforts. Field Offices develop threat 

strategies annually for all threat issues they band, and they detail the particular steps the Field 

Office plans to take to mitigate each banded threat issue in their AOR. These threat strategies 

must be used to guide mitigation of each threat issue for the upcoming fiscal year, unless a 

change in threat banding or threat strategies occurs during midyear negotiations. The TRP of the 

FBI is classified as it incorporates sources and methods as a basis of strategic alignment of 

national security resources. 

There are no differences in how the FBI reviews and prioritizes DT and IT threats, and each 

threat issue is reviewed independently; however, the threat band dictates priorities within these 

programs. Investigative methods the FBI is authorized to use differ between DT and IT 

investigations, and DT investigations may be subject to additional legal review. 

Planning, Development, Production, Analysis, and Evaluation of Intelligence and Intelligence 

Products Relating to DT and IT

The FBI intelligence cycle for both DT and IT matters consists of planning intelligence efforts 

around priorities based on national or Field Office threat strategies, collecting raw intelligence 

information, processing and synthesizing data, analyzing and crafting assessments into analytic 

intelligence products, disseminating those products, briefing analysis to decision makers, and 

evaluating disseminated products and the production process to inform future efforts.

Similarly, DHS began Intelligence Threat Banding in 2019, a process in which DHS intelligence 

leadership, as part of the Homeland Security Intelligence Council (HSIC), prioritizes threat 

topics. The process is informed by DHS’s execution of the intelligence cycle – the development 

of requirements, collection through field operations or open source collectors, and analysis to 

produce finished intelligence in the DT space.
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DHS implements Intelligence Threat Banding across its mission areas. The results are used to 

inform and drive the Department’s collection and analysis efforts for maximum impact against 

the “high banded” topic areas; develop cross component programs, projects, and activities; and 

inform intelligence resource allocation decisions.

During the planning phase of the intelligence cycle, both the FBI and DHS consider the National 

Intelligence Priorities Framework, which documents the U.S. Intelligence Community’s 

priorities; the FBI also considers its own standing intelligence and investigative responsibilities, 

which are addressed and prioritized in the TRP process. During the TRP process, the FBI 

identifies the intelligence needs related to the threat priorities, and those intelligence needs drive 

the subsequent stages of the intelligence cycle. Meanwhile, DHS also addresses any additional 

priorities and/or requirements identified by the Secretary of Homeland Security or the Under 

Secretary of Homeland Security for Intelligence and Analysis, the latter of whom serves as the 

DHS Chief Intelligence Officer. 

During the collection and processing phases of the intelligence cycle, both the FBI and DHS 

obtain raw intelligence from lawful collection methods consistent with their respective 

authorities and then synthesize this data into a form intelligence personnel can use. In the 

analysis and evaluation phases, analysts examine and evaluate all source intelligence, including 

collected information; add context, as needed; and integrate the information into complete 

assessments. The analysts make assessments about the implications of the information for the 

United States and document the assessments in analytic intelligence products.

Legal review is required for any FBI intelligence product, such as an Intelligence Information 

Report (IIR),11 related to a potential SIM or other sensitive information, in accordance with the 

guidelines in the FBI’s Domestic Investigations and Operations Guide (DIOG) and identified 

“legal review triggers.” One such legal review trigger is information related to DT. Similarly, all 

of DHS’s finished intelligence products undergo a rigorous legal, privacy, civil rights and civil 

liberties review process, as well as intelligence oversight review prior to dissemination outside 

DHS to help ensure the rights of U.S. persons are protected.

Finally, intelligence analysis is disseminated in either a written intelligence product or a verbal 

briefing during the production phase. Intelligence analysis customers for both FBI and DHS 

include leadership, policymakers, military leaders, other federal and SLTT government officials, 

private sector partners, and operational counterparts who then make decisions informed by that 

information. For DHS, the Homeland Security Information Network-Intelligence is the primary 

means for disseminating unclassified DHS raw intelligence reporting and finished intelligence 

products to authorized federal, SLTT, and private sector partners.

 

11 An Intelligence Information Report (IIR) is the FBI’s primary document used to share raw, non-compartmented 

FBI intelligence information.
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Sharing of Information Relating to DT and IT

The FBI’s National Strategy for Information Sharing and Safeguarding provides the common 

vision, goals, and framework needed to guide information sharing initiatives with our federal and 

SLTT partners, foreign government counterparts, and private sector stake holders. The FBI 

shares information consistent with the Privacy Act, FBI policy, and any other applicable laws 

and memoranda of understanding or agreement with other agencies.

The FBI works closely with our federal and SLTT law enforcement partners to investigate and 

disrupt both DT and IT. The FBI also has a strong working relationship with DOJ’s CTS which, 

as of June 2022, includes a Domestic Terrorism Unit. 

Drawing on expertise across NSD and the DOJ more broadly, the Domestic Terrorism Unit has 

several functions: prosecuting and coordinating DT cases, developing training and policies on 

DT matters, and supporting the work of the Department in implementing a whole-of-government 

strategy on countering DT. This structure preserves flexibility, while allowing CTS to better 

support the FBI, which has dedicated teams for handling DT and IT matters. We recognize that 

countering DT must be a whole-of-Department effort. To that end, the unit will include liaisons 

from components outside of NSD, including the Civil Rights Division and the Tax Division, 

among others, to marshal Department-wide expertise and resources and offer a mechanism for 

DOJ components to assess collaboratively and bring to bear all available tools to hold violent 

extremists accountable. We also leverage the strong work by our SLTT law enforcement 

partners. The unit will engage in outreach to these partners to share lessons learned, increase 

information sharing, and ensure that we are bringing all available tools – state and federal – to 

bear against violent extremism.

The front line of the counterterrorism mission in the United States is the FBI-led Joint Terrorism 

Task Forces (JTTFs). The FBI maintains about 56 JTTFs nationwide spanning over 100 

locations, with representation in all 56 FBI Field Offices and satellite Resident Agencies. The 

JTTFs have participation of over 50 federal and over 500 SLTT agencies. These relationships are 

critical to effective information sharing and the leveraging of local expertise and experience in 

FBI investigations. The FBI also shares intelligence products with federal and SLTT partners as 

appropriate to inform them of the current threat environment and these products are posted on 

portals like the Law Enforcement Enterprise Portal. 

The FBI and DHS, in coordination with NCTC, produce Joint Intelligence Bulletins (JIBs) and 

other products that communicate updated threat information and assessments to our federal and

SLTT partners at the Unclassified//For Official Use Only (FOUO) or Law Enforcement Sensitive 

(LES) levels. JIBs alert our partners to significant arrests – including those accomplished through 

collaboration among different law enforcement entities – and trends we have observed in both 

the DT and IT arenas. Additionally, beginning in early 2022, the FBI, DHS, and NCTC began 

producing tri-seal domestic violent extremism-focused intelligence products under the auspices 

of a Joint Analytic Cell (JAC). The JAC ensures close collaboration among the three agencies to 

provide more data-informed strategic analysis of the DT threat environment and better inform 

policymakers and state and local law enforcement agencies of changes in the threat landscapes.
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DHS products within the DT and IT spaces are shared with authorized federal, SLTT, and 

private sector partners, including the National Network of Fusion Centers, private sector security 

officials, and other customers. For those operating at primarily the unclassified level, products at 

the FOUO and LES levels are shared via the Homeland Security Information Network.

Criteria and Methodology to Identify or Assign Terrorism Classifications to FBI DT

Investigations 

While classifications, or categories, help the FBI better understand the criminal actors we pursue, 

we recognize actors’ motivations vary, are nuanced, and sometimes are derived from a blend of 

socio-political goals or personal grievances. Regardless of the classification, the FBI follows the 

facts and evidence of the case to carry out our investigations. Currently, the U.S. government 

broadly refers to the DT threat by using the following threat categories, which are further defined 

in the “Definitions, Terminology and Methodology” section of this report: (1) Racially or 

Ethnically Motivated Violent Extremism; (2) Anti-Government or Anti-Authority Violent 

Extremism; (3) Animal Rights/Environmental Violent Extremism; (4) Abortion-Related Violent 

Extremism; and (5) All Other Domestic Terrorism Threats.

In addition to conducting investigative activity in response to the DT threats described 

above, the FBI also conducts civil unrest and anti-riot investigations under its DT Program. 

The FBI conducts civil unrest investigations to address violations of federal criminal law 

involving a civil disturbance. The FBI conducts anti-riot investigations to address 

violations of federal criminal law in which an individual uses force or violence during a 

public gathering. For both civil unrest and anti-riot investigations, the FBI provides 

information or assistance to other federal, state, or local authorities.

Compliance with Privacy, Civil Rights, and Civil Liberties Policies and Protections

The FBI is responsible for protecting the security of our Nation and its people from crime and 

terrorism while maintaining rigorous obedience to the Constitution and compliance with all 

applicable statutes, regulations, and policies. The AGG-Dom establishes a set of basic principles 

that serve as the foundation for all FBI mission-related activities. These principles demonstrate 

respect for civil liberties and privacy as well as adherence to the Constitution and laws of the 

United States.

One of the most important principles in the AGG-Dom is the threshold requirement that all 

investigative activities be conducted for an authorized purpose, which under the AGG-Dom

means an authorized national security, criminal, or foreign intelligence collection purpose. The 

authorized purpose must be well-founded and well-documented; and the information sought and 

investigative method used to obtain it must be focused in scope, time, and manner to achieve the 

underlying purpose.

The AGG-Dom authorizes all lawful investigative methods in the conduct of a full investigation. 

These methods, which range in intrusiveness, consider the effect on the privacy and civil liberties 
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of individuals and the potential to cause harm to, or otherwise damage the reputation of 

individuals. According to policy, the least intrusive method should be used, based upon the 

circumstances of the investigation, but the FBI may use any lawful method consistent with the 

AGG-Dom. A more intrusive method may be warranted in light of the seriousness of a criminal 

or national security threat or the importance of a foreign intelligence requirement, and the 

options available to obtain the intelligence, information, or evidence

By emphasizing the use of the least intrusive means to obtain intelligence, information, or 

evidence, FBI employees can effectively execute their duties while mitigating the potential 

negative impact on the privacy and civil liberties of all people encompassed within the 

investigation, including targets, witnesses, and victims. 

As a matter of FBI policy, law enforcement activities within the scope of DT investigations are 

particularly subject to close internal legal review and supervisory approvals to ensure 

constitutional rights, privacy, and civil liberties are protected at each juncture. DT investigations 

undergo numerous legal reviews due to the likelihood these investigations may touch upon First 

Amendment-protected activities, and/or other Constitutional rights, civil liberties and privacyrelated considerations. 

DHS is steadfastly committed to the highest standards of conduct across the Department, 

especially when it comes to the equitable and transparent enforcement of our laws. DHS’s

intelligence activities within the terrorism space are governed by DHS’s Intelligence Oversight 

Guidelines, which were approved by the Attorney General in 2017. These guidelines reflect 

DHS’s legal authorities as well as legal and policy protections for privacy, civil rights, and civil 

liberties. Countering domestic violent extremism is a vital part of the Department’s broader

obligation to help ensure the security of our Nation, and DHS recognizes that mission can 

succeed only if the Department respects and protects the values of the Nation. DHS prioritizes 

rigorous safeguarding civil rights, civil liberties, and individual privacy protections across all its 

domestic counterterrorism efforts, including those related to countering DT. 

In confronting the threat of domestic violent extremism, DHS focuses on potential criminal 

activity. It does not engage in any intelligence activity for the sole purpose of monitoring 

activities protected by the First Amendment or the lawful exercise of other rights secured by the 

Constitution or laws of the United States, or for the purpose of retaliating against a whistleblower 

or suppressing or burdening criticism or dissent. Further, DHS policy also prohibits the 

consideration of race or ethnicity in its intelligence, investigative, screening, or law enforcement 

activities in all but the most exceptional instances. Additionally, how DHS identifies and detects 

DT requires faithful adherence to fair information practice principles and privacy-focused 

departmental policies. DHS always incorporates privacy protections in information technology 

systems, technologies, rulemakings, programs, pilot projects, and other activities that involve the 

planned use of personally identifiable information. DHS’s Office for Civil Rights and Civil 

Liberties, Privacy Office, and Office of the General Counsel are involved in all of its 

counterterrorism and prevention missions, and DHS-I&A’s intelligence activities are further 

reviewed by its internal Privacy and Intelligence Oversight Branch. These offices continue to 

help oversee and train DHS intelligence personnel on how to respect the privacy, civil rights, and 

civil liberties of all people and communities. 
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The NCTC ensures its analytic work addressing the domestic violent extremism threat in support 

of the FBI and DHS is fully consistent with the NCTC’s authorities and undertaken in 

accordance with the ODNI Intelligence Activities Procedures Approved by the Attorney General 

Pursuant to Executive Order 12333 (ODNI Guidelines) for the protection of U.S. person12

information. The NCTC has issued procedures to implement the ODNI Guidelines requirements 

and established additional prudential safeguards to inform the Center’s domestic 

counterterrorism intelligence activities. These safeguards include prior supervisory approval and 

completion of training on domestic counterterrorism authorities prior to undertaking queries 

designed to retrieve domestic counterterrorism intelligence. The NCTC’s domestic 

counterterrorism support to the FBI and DHS focuses on trends and transnational threats, and 

when assessing individual actors, NCTC relies on FBI and DHS determinations of whether 

specific individuals are DVEs. Legal and privacy, civil rights, and civil liberties officers advise 

on all aspects of the analytic production process and NCTC has integrated their review of 

domestic violent extremism products into its publication processes. The NCTC is not authorized 

to and does not collect, access, obtain, or maintain information concerning U.S. persons solely 

for the purpose of monitoring activities protected by the First Amendment or the lawful exercise 

of other rights secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States.

Training or Resources Provided to Federal, State, Local, and Tribal Law Enforcement 

Agencies

The FBI takes a leadership role in identifying and addressing emerging threats, and as such, 

actively engages with its federal and SLTT law enforcement partners through the JTTFs. The 

FBI shares and encourages the sharing of intelligence and participates in multi-agency command 

posts to ensure maximum coordination. In order to proactively address threats, especially during 

ongoing incidents, the FBI has developed and shared best practices that are implemented across 

the nation.

The FBI’s Behavioral Threat Assessment Center (BTAC), housed within the FBI’s Critical 

Incident Response Group, supports JTTFs as well as state and local law enforcement partners by 

providing operational support in the form of tailored threat management strategies. In addition to 

operational support for pending threat investigations, the BTAC also trains on lessons learned 

from operational experience and research to better aid in prevention efforts. The BTAC is 

leading an unfunded national Threat Assessment and Threat Management (TATM) initiative to 

organize, coordinate, and synchronize an enterprise-wide strategy, which endeavors to build and 

develop stronger partnerships between law enforcement and across all levels of government with 

local mental health practitioners and other relevant stakeholders, in an effort to prevent acts of 

terrorism and targeted violence.

 

12 Executive Order 12333 defines a U.S. person as a U.S. citizen, an alien known by the intelligence element 

concerned to be a permanent resident alien, an unincorporated association substantially composed of U.S. citizens or 

permanent resident aliens, or a corporation incorporated in the United States, except for a corporation directed and 

controlled by a foreign government or governments.
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The FBI’s BTAC has established designated Threat Management Coordinators (TMC) in each 

Field Office, provided advanced training to 115 TMCs, and commenced training of FBI Task 

Force Officers to work as liaison counterparts within state and local governments. The BTAC 

and local Field Office TMCs have identified 12 active local or regional TATM teams with FBI 

participation, and an additional five FBI-led TATM teams. The 12 local/regional teams are 

in/around and have participation from FBI Field Offices in Baltimore, Buffalo, Las Vegas, Los 

Angeles, Miami, Minneapolis, New Haven, New York, Phoenix, Pittsburgh, San Antonio, and 

Washington, DC; the five FBI-led teams are run by the FBI Boston, Denver, Honolulu, 

Oklahoma City, and Philadelphia Field Offices.

In 2021, the FBI, DHS, and NCTC jointly updated the booklet, U.S. Violent Extremist 

Mobilization Indicators, which contains observable indicators to help bystanders or observers 

recognize behaviors that may indicate mobilization to violence. Unlike prior editions – which 

focused entirely on foreign terrorist-inspired homegrown violent extremists – the 2021 edition 

was expanded to include indicators that apply across U.S.-based ideologically motivated violent 

extremists, including indicators validated as relevant for DVEs.13 The booklet was published to 

help law enforcement and first responder partners and the public at large recognize potentially 

dangerous behaviors to help identify terrorists before they conduct deadly attacks. It is important 

to note some behavioral indicators may relate to Constitutionally-protected or otherwise lawful 

activities. Law enforcement action should never be taken solely on the basis of Constitutionallyprotected activities; therefore, the FBI considers the totality of the circumstances in determining 

whether there is a lawful basis for investigative activity.

The FBI also maintains the eGuardian system as a resource to facilitate sharing of suspicious 

activity reports for terrorism or other threat related information by federal and SLTT law 

enforcement agencies, to include over 70 state and local fusion centers, and the Department of 

Defense. Currently, eGuardian is used in all 50 states, four US Territories, and the District of 

Columbia.

Specific to formalized training, the FBI offers the Counterterrorism Baseline Operational 

Learning Tool (CT BOLT) course to all new counterterrorism employees, including Task Force 

Officers supporting the JTTFs. In addition to operational training and instruction, the course 

provides training on applicable privacy and civil liberties law and policy and the fundamentals of 

protecting First Amendment rights during the course of FBI investigations. The FBI conducts the

CT BOLT course on a monthly basis, and during 2020 and 2021, more than 500 students 

completed the course.

DHS’s National Threat Evaluation and Reporting Program (NTER), established in 2019, serves 

as a joint collaborative effort by the DHS and federal and SLTT partners that builds on the 

success of the Nationwide Suspicious Activity Reporting (SAR) Program. It provides law 

enforcement and homeland security partners with additional resources and training to help 

identify and prevent targeted violence and mass casualty incidents implicating homeland 

security, including those associated with terrorism, as well as facilitating a national capacity for 

 

13 The 2021 edition served as an update to a prior version published in 2019, and it was published on the ODNI’s 

public website.
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identifying, evaluating, and reporting, and sharing tips and leads related to those threats. NTER 

is the program and training lead for the Nationwide SAR Initiative (NSI) to assist partners in 

reporting and sharing suspicious activity and is arranging a review of the NSI SAR preoperational behavioral categories through the lens of domestic violent extremism and targeted 

violence. The NTER’s Master Trainer Program trains homeland security partners to assist their 

local communities in adapting to an evolving threat landscape. Master Trainers teach behavioral 

threat assessment techniques and best practices to local partners, and are equipped to empower 

SLTT partners to identify and assess risk and warning signs, and manage potential threats of 

future, targeted violence regardless of motive.

The DHS Office for State and Local Law Enforcement (OSLLE) is a headquarters-level 

organization that was created on the recommendation of the 9/11 Commission. OSLLE’s mission 

is to lead DHS coordination, liaison, and advocacy for SLTT and campus law enforcement by 

building and cultivating strong partnerships. The office executes its mission by sharing timely 

and pertinent information and resources with SLTT and campus partners; advising the Secretary 

and DHS components on the issues, concerns, and recommendations of SLTT and campus law 

enforcement during policy, program, and initiative development; and ensuring that DHS law 

enforcement and terrorism focused grants are appropriately focused on terrorism prevention 

activities. To efficiently and effectively share many of the resources readily available to SLTT 

and campus law enforcement, including training and grant opportunities, OSLLE maintains the 

DHS Law Enforcement Resource Guide,

14 and works to share these resources with SLTT 

campus law enforcement and other related stakeholders through various forums. When a SLTT 

and campus law enforcement request for resources cannot be fulfilled by existing DHS 

resources, OSLLE works with intra- and interagency partners to develop customized solutions.

The U.S. Secret Service National Threat Assessment Center (NTAC) is authorized by the 

Presidential Threat Protection Act of 2000 (Pub. L. 106-544) to conduct research, training, and 

consultation on threat assessment and the prevention of targeted violence. NTAC is comprised of 

a multidisciplinary team of social science researchers and regional program managers who 

support and empower our partners in law enforcement, schools, government, and other public 

and private sector organizations to combat the ever-evolving threat of targeted violence 

impacting communities across the United States. NTAC publishes operationally relevant 

research examining all forms of targeted violence and produces guides for establishing proactive, 

targeted violence prevention programs. NTAC staff provide training on threat assessment and the 

prevention of targeted violence, by request, to public safety audiences, which often include 

SLTT law enforcement, schools, universities, and other agencies and organizations with public 

safety responsibilities. NTAC is authorized to provide consultation on the development of threat 

assessment policies and protocols, as well as on complex threat assessment cases.

VI. Data on Domestic Terrorism 

The Act calls for annual updates to the following data and information, and this report provides 

two years of annual updates, to include data and information for 2020 and 2021:

15

 

14 Available via: https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/2022-04/22_0407_OSLLE_LE-resource-guidesigned_508.pdf.

15 For data related to investigations, DHS defers to the FBI.
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 For each completed or attempted DT incident that has occurred in the United States: a 

description of such incident; the date and location of such incident; the number and type of 

completed and attempted federal nonviolent crimes committed during such incident; the 

number and type of federal and state property crimes committed during such incident, 

including an estimate of economic damages resulting from such crimes; and the number and 

type of complete and attempted federal violent crimes committed during such incident, 

including the number of people killed or injured as a result of such crimes.

 An identification of each assessment,16 preliminary investigation, full investigation, and 

enterprise investigation with a nexus to DT opened, pending, or closed by the FBI; and the 

number of assessments, preliminary investigations, full investigations, and enterprise 

investigations associated with each DT investigative classification.

 The number of assessments, preliminary investigations, full investigations, and enterprise 

investigations with a nexus to DT initiated as a result of a referral or investigation by a 

federal, SLTT, or foreign government of a hate crime.

 The number of federal criminal charges with a nexus to DT, including the number of 

indictments and complaints associated with each DT investigative classification; a summary 

of the allegations in each such indictment; the disposition of the prosecution; and, if 

applicable, the sentence imposed as a result of a conviction on such charges.

 Referrals of DT incidents by or to SLTT or foreign governments, to or by departments or 

agencies of the federal government, for investigation or prosecution, including the number 

of such referrals associated with each DT investigative classification, and a summary of 

each such referral that includes the rationale for such referral and the disposition of the 

applicable federal investigation or prosecution. 

 The number of intelligence products associated with each DT investigative classification.

 With respect to the FBI, the number of staff working on DT matters and a summary of time 

utilization by and recordkeeping data for personnel working on such matters, including the 

number or percentage of such personnel associated with each DT investigative classification 

in the FBI’s Headquarters Operational Divisions and Field Divisions.

 With respect to the DHS I&A, the number of staff working on DT matters.

 With respect to the NCTC, the number of staff working on DT matters and the applicable 

legal authorities relating to the activities of such staff.

 

16 An assessment is an investigative activity, which requires an authorized purpose and articulated objective(s). 

Assessments may be carried out to detect, obtain information about, or prevent or protect against federal crimes or 

threats to the national security or to collect foreign intelligence.
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Completed or Attempted DT Incidents in the United States 

Appendix A provides information that represents significant DT incidents and disrupted plots 

that have occurred in the United States during 2020 and 2021. Many DT incidents are rooted in 

state and local level criminal activity, and there is currently no mandatory incident reporting 

requirement for these incidents to be reported to the federal government. 

Identification and Number of Each FBI DT Investigation

As of the end of FY 2020, the FBI was conducting approximately 1,400 pending DT 

investigations; and as of the end of FY 2021, the FBI was conducting approximately 2,700 DT 

investigations. A significant portion of the FY 2021 investigations were directly related to the

unlawful activities during the January 2021 siege on the U.S. Capitol. The following table 

presents the percentage breakout of DT investigations by investigative classification as of the 

end of FY 2020 and FY 2021.

Percentage Breakout of FBI Domestic Terrorism Investigations by Investigative Classification

Investigative Classification End of FY 2020 End of FY 2021

Racially or Ethnically Motivated Violent Extremism 40% 19%

Anti-Government or Anti-Authority Violent Extremism 37% 38%

Animal Rights/Environmental Violent Extremism 1% 1%

Abortion-Related Violent Extremism 1% 0%

All Other DT Threats 4% 11%

Anti-Riot Laws/Civil Unrest 17% 31%

Identification of FBI DT Assessments and Investigations as a Result of a Hate Crime 

Hate crimes violations and DT are not mutually exclusive. A hate crime is targeted violence 

motivated by the offender’s bias against a person’s actual or perceived characteristics, while a 

DT incident involves acts dangerous to human life that are in violation of criminal laws and in 

furtherance of a social or political goal. The FBI’s Domestic Terrorism-Hate Crimes Fusion Cell 

help to address the intersection of the FBI counterterrorism and criminal investigative missions 

to combat DT and provide justice to those who are victims of hate crimes.

The Hate Crime Statistics Program of the FBI’s Uniform Crime Reporting (UCR) Program 

collects data regarding criminal offenses that were motivated, in whole or in part, by the 

offender’s bias against a person’s actual or perceived race/ethnicity, gender, gender identity, 

religion, disability, or sexual orientation, and were committed against persons, property, or 
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society. The FBI publishes an annual report of hate crime statistics, and in 2020, law 

enforcement agencies participating in the UCR Program reported 8,263 hate crime incidents.17

While the FBI collects and reports hate crime statistics, there is no mandatory reporting 

requirement to identify hate crime incidents that would also be considered criminal activity that 

appears to be motivated by a socio-political goal consistent with the DT threat categories. In 

instances of a potential hate crime, the FBI will open a civil rights investigation. If throughout 

the investigation a DT ideology is identified, the Criminal Investigative Division and 

Counterterrorism Division will work together through the Domestic Terrorism-Hate Crimes 

Fusion Cell to determine the best path forward. This may include, but is not limited to, 

converting the investigation to a DT case, assigning a DT agent to the case, or developing regular 

communication between the two programs. In cases involving DVEs, where a potential hate 

crime is identified, the Counterterrorism Division’s DT Program will coordinate with the 

Criminal Investigative Division’s Civil Rights Program and the local USAO to assess the 

potential for a hate crimes charge. In certain instances, based on the specific context of the 

investigation, parallel DT and hate crimes cases will be opened. 

Number of Federal Charges with a DT Nexus

A litany of federal and state charges are used to charge DT subjects for applicable criminal 

violations. Federal charges include those related to weapons, explosives, threats, attacks on 

federal officials or facilities, hate crimes, arson, violence against animal enterprises, and material 

support to terrorists. Under 18 U.S.C. § 2339A, it is a crime to provide material support or 

resources to another knowing or intending they will be used in preparation for or carrying out 

certain terrorism-related offenses. Unlike a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2339B, the recipient of the 

material support need not be a designated foreign terrorist organization. 

In FY 2020, the FBI, often in coordination with partner agencies, arrested approximately 180 DT 

subjects. In FY 2021, the FBI, often in coordination with partner agencies, arrested 

approximately 800 DT subjects.18

Individuals whose conduct involves DT or a threat thereof may be prosecuted by any USAO 

under a wide range of criminal statutes, some of which on their face relate to DT, and others of 

which do not.19 While the criminal code includes a definition of DT, see 18 U.S.C. § 2331(5), 

there is no standalone federal DT statute. For example, the DOJ has prosecuted cases against 

 

17 The FBI’s Hate Crime Statistics, 2020, released fall 2021. As of the date of this report, the FBI has not yet 

published the annual report for 2021.

18 A significant portion of arrests of DT subjects in FY 2021 were related to the unlawful activities during the 

January 2021 siege on the U.S. Capitol. 

19 Several statutes reach conduct that may be associated with terrorism, without regard to whether the offense itself 

involves domestic or international terrorism. These include statutes relating to aircraft sabotage, id. § 32; weapons of 

mass destruction, e.g., id. §§ 175, 175b, 175c, 229, 831, 832, 2332a, 2332h, 2332i; arson and bombing of federal 

property, e.g., id. §§ 844, 2332a, 2332f; and causing injury or death to a federal official, e.g. id. §§ 111, 115, 351, 

1114, 1751; among others. It is also a crime to provide material support or resources to another knowing or 

intending that they be used in preparation for or carrying out certain terrorism-related offenses. Id. § 2339A.
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such individuals using weapons charges, e.g., 18 U.S.C. §§ 922, 924; charges relating to use or 

possession of explosives, e.g., 26 U.S.C. §§ 5845, 5861; threat, hoax, or riot charges, e.g., 18 

U.S.C. §§ 871, 875, 876, 1038, 2101; and charges proscribing attacks on federal officials or 

facilities, e.g., id. § 111, 115, 351, 844, 930, 1114, 1361, 1751. DOJ has also prosecuted cases 

involving DT using the material support to terrorist activity statute at 18 U.S.C. § 2339A. Hate 

crimes charges, e.g., id. § 249, may be appropriate where individuals engage in DT that is 

motivated by biases against a race, religion, ethnicity, or other specified factors. However, not all 

hate crimes cases involve DT. Arson, id. § 844, or specific charges relating to violence against 

animal enterprises, id. § 43, may apply to animal rights/environmental violent extremists. In 

some cases, drug trafficking, tax, or state and local charges could also provide a lawful basis to 

disrupt an individual believed to be planning or pursuing acts of DT. Finally, in some DT cases, 

DOJ seeks the use of the terrorism sentencing enhancement.20

DOJ recognizes the need for coordination and consistency in DOJ/FBI efforts to hold 

accountable DVEs who engage in criminal conduct. An important part of achieving those goals 

is to have the ability to identify and internally track investigations and prosecutions involving 

conduct related to domestic violent extremism, and the Department is implementing changes that 

will allow us to better identify and track such cases. In March 2021, the Acting Deputy Attorney 

General issued guidance to all USAOs to provide information to NSD on DT investigations and 

prosecutions. This directive not only highlighted the need for effective coordination, but also 

implemented a plan for better tracking of the important DVE-related work being done by federal 

investigators and prosecutors around the country. 

Referrals of DT Incidents to the FBI

The eGuardian system is the FBI’s case management system for handling suspicious activity 

reports from federal and SLTT law enforcement agencies and the Department of Defense related 

to counterterrorism, counterintelligence, cyber incidents, criminal complaints, and weapons of 

mass destruction. These reports are then migrated to the FBI’s internal Guardian system where it 

is further evaluated by the appropriate squad or JTTF for any action deemed necessary. 

In FY 2020, the FBI received approximately 5,669 referrals of possible DT incidents; and in 

FY 2021, the FBI received approximately 8,375 referrals of possible DT incidents.

In FY 2020, the FBI referred approximately 1,287 possible DT incidents to federal and/or SLTT

partners. In FY 2021, the FBI referred approximately 1,399 possible DT incidents to federal 

and/or SLTT partners. The FBI refers incidents to partner agencies for multiple reasons. For 

example, the incident may not have a federal criminal nexus or the incident may be the statutory 

 

20 The Sentencing Guidelines provide a significant sentencing enhancement for offenses that involve, or are intended 

to promote, a “federal crime of terrorism”—often increasing the guideline range to the statutory maximum.” See 

USSG § 3A1.4. “The Sentencing Guidelines also provide for a similar upward departure for other offenses that were 

calculated to influence or affect the conduct of government by intimidation or coercion, to retaliate against 

government conduct, or to intimidate or coerce a civilian population.” See id. cmt. n.4.
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responsibility of another law enforcement organization. In addition, the FBI may refer an 

incident to a partner agency, but continue to investigate the incident jointly. 

In FY 2020, the FBI converted approximately 747 Guardian incidents to preliminary or full 

DT investigations. In FY 2021, the FBI converted approximately 1,525 Guardian incidents to 

preliminary or full DT investigations.

DT Intelligence Products

From FY 2020 through FY 2021, the FBI produced approximately 6,000 DT-related intelligence 

products. A single intelligence product often contains threat reporting or case information from 

subjects associated with multiple investigative classifications, and as such, the FBI does not have 

the data to determine the number of intelligence products associated with each DT investigative 

classification. FBI intelligence products incorporate collection, domain, targeting, or threat 

analysis and are written at the tactical, operational, and strategic levels. FBI intelligence products 

are prepared for both internal and external audiences.

From FY 2020 through FY 2021, I&A has produced over 500 DT-related raw intelligence 

reports (IIRs, Open Source Intelligence Reports, and Field Intelligence Reports) and produced,

jointly produced, or contributed to approximately 100 finished intelligence products related to 

DT, with the majority of these products released at the Unclassified//FOUO level to better 

inform SLTT partners. The finished intelligence products are available to appropriate 

Congressional partners via CapNet.

Number of Staff Working DT Matters 

One of the FBI’s most vital assets in the counterterrorism fight is our ability to remain agile in 

combatting the threats we face. Staffing for the FBI’s counterterrorism mission is aligned based 

on threat priorities and, as is true across the FBI, can and does realign in response to the 

evolution of the threats and any critical incidents.

The front line of the counterterrorism mission in the United States is represented by the FBI-led 

JTTFs, which investigate both DT and IT matters. The FBI leads approximately 56 JTTFs 

spanning over 100 locations nationwide and across all 56 Field Offices, including our satellite 

Resident Agencies, with participation of over 50 federal and over 500 SLTT agencies. The 

JTTFs are comprised of approximately 4,400 investigators, including FBI Special Agents and 

Task Force Officers, and additional analysts and professional staff who support these JTTF 

members and the investigations they lead. The JTTF partnerships at the federal and SLTT levels 

are force multipliers as they leverage local expertise, experience, and resources in FBI 

counterterrorism investigations.

In FBI Field Offices, squads are dedicated to the counterterrorism mission and not necessarily 

assigned specifically to investigate DT or IT matters. This is significant because the motivation 

behind an alleged threat or act of terrorism may not be immediately apparent. Additionally, when 
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an incident occurs, Field Office personnel from all operational programs – for example, criminal 

or counterintelligence – may respond. 

Similar to our posture against the IT threat, the FBI’s Counterterrorism Division at Headquarters 

has a dedicated Domestic Terrorism Operations Section (DTOS), comprised of Special Agents,

Intelligence Analysts, and Professional Staff. The FBI’s DTOS oversees and provides 

operational support to all 56 Field Offices and their Resident Agencies in investigating the use of 

violence by individuals to further social or political goals in violation of federal criminal statutes.

The DTOS oversees the Domestic Terrorism-Hate Crimes Fusion Cell, which creates more 

opportunities for investigative creativity, provides multi-program coordination, helps ensure 

seamless information sharing, and enhances investigative resources to combat the DT threat. 

The FBI’s Counterterrorism Division also has specialized intelligence and targeting units that 

work to combat DT specifically, as well as additional units that provide support across the FBI’s

counterterrorism mission, not exclusive to DT or IT matters. The FBI conducts national-level 

strategic analysis of the DT threat through the Counterterrorism Analysis Section. This dedicated 

body of Intelligence Analysts focuses on providing strategic assessments of the IT and DT threat 

and actively works with DHS and NCTC to provide accurate intelligence on the threat picture.

Further, all FBI counterterrorism investigations are led by the same Counterterrorism Division

Deputy Assistant Director for Operations, who has a unique vantage point from which to assess 

the terrorism threat around the globe and prioritize investigations and operations across the 

country. Additionally, the FBI’s Office of the General Counsel employs in-house attorneys 

within the National Security and Cyber Law Branch that are dedicated to providing legal 

assistance on DT operations at FBI Headquarters. This aligns with the legal counsel represented 

in all 56 FBI field offices. 

As indicated above, DOJ/NSD also recently established a Domestic Terrorism Unit within the 

CTS that has several functions: prosecuting and coordinating DT cases, developing training and 

policies on DT matters, and supporting the work of the Department in implementing a whole-ofgovernment strategy on countering DT. The Department believes that this change best enables us 

to respond to the evolving and persistent DT threat.

DHS I&A’s Counterterrorism Mission Center (CTMC) leads I&A’s analysis of DT issues. 

CTMC provides intelligence support and analysis that focuses on domestic threat actors, 

including DVEs, consistent with the Department’s statutory charges to identify priorities for 

protective and support measures regarding terrorist and other threats to homeland security. In 

2021, I&A created a Domestic Terrorism Branch, housed within CTMC, consisting of 

intelligence personnel solely dedicated to focusing on the DT landscape. These analysts have 

enabled I&A to increase its production and sharing of information on DT threats, engagement 

with FBI and NCTC counterparts to jointly author strategic DT intelligence products, and 

interactions with subject matter experts outside government. This branch currently consists of 

nine full time employees and one manager. Additionally, I&A maintains a presence at state and 

local fusion centers through its Office of Regional Intelligence,21 and I&A analysts at DHS 

 

21 The Office of Regional Intelligence was formerly the Field Operations Division.
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Headquarters work with those individuals to author joint products on issues relevant to their

regions, including domestic violent extremism and physical threats to critical infrastructure. 

In addition, I&A’s Current and Emerging Threat Center maintains a small team of open source 

intelligence collectors to monitor and report on publicly available information sources online 

within the DT space, consistent with I&A’s Intelligence Oversight Guidelines.

I&A’s Office of Regional Intelligence has approximately 120 personnel deployed to field 

locations across the United States, primarily in state and local fusion centers. These officers work 

across a range of threat issues and actors, including the DVE mission space. I&A’s fielddeployed officers collect and report intelligence information in serialized raw intelligence reports 

and provide regionally-focused analysis, which may include DVE topics.

All of the DHS staff mentioned are specific to I&A, in accordance with the reporting 

requirements. Similar to FBI, DHS has added personnel and resources to counter DT in response 

to the evolution of the threat and to support the implementation of the June 2021 National 

Strategy for Countering Domestic Terrorism. These personnel span the breadth and depth of the 

DHS mission set, including but not limited to DHS representatives to JTTFs. DHS is the largest 

and longest standing federal contributor to the JTTFs nationwide and those personnel are closely 

involved with countering DT through the JTTFs. 

While NCTC’s primary missions are focused on the threat posed by IT, the Center provides 

domestic counterterrorism support, where appropriate, to the FBI and DHS, which are the lead 

domestic counterterrorism agencies. The NCTC identifies and monitors international and 

transnational trends across a range of violent extremist actors, and its primary role in providing 

domestic counterterrorism support to the FBI and DHS is to look for and analyze transnational 

linkages. Domestically, the NCTC provides domestic counterterrorism support to the FBI and 

DHS consistent with its legal authorities and ODNI Guidelines, which include protection for 

privacy, civil rights, and civil liberties of U.S. persons. NCTC’s analytic coverage of domestic 

violent extremism topics, specifically, amounts to a small fraction of its broader counterterrorism 

portfolio. NCTC does not have analysts focused exclusively on domestic violent extremism 

threats.

VII. Recommendations

The Act requires the Director of the FBI and the Secretary of Homeland Security, in consultation 

with the DNI, to jointly submit to the appropriate Congressional committees a report on DT 

containing recommendations with respect to the need to change authorities, roles, resources, or 

responsibilities within the federal government to more effectively prevent and counter DT 

activities, and measures necessary to ensure the protection of privacy and civil liberties.

Implementation of the National Strategy for Countering Domestic Terrorism

In June 2021, the White House released the first-ever National Strategy for Countering Domestic 

Terrorism, which provides a government-wide strategy to counter domestic violent extremism. 
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The national strategy references the March 2021 U.S. Intelligence Community intelligence 

assessment titled, Domestic Violent Extremism Poses Heightened Threat in 2021, and lays out a 

comprehensive strategy to address the DT threat, building on a foundation of U.S. government 

collaboration on programmatic aspects of countering DT – such as information sharing, training, 

prevention, and intervention efforts – while fostering a broader community that extends beyond 

the U.S. government to critical partners. The national strategy also reinforces the U.S. 

government’s commitment to approaching this important work while avoiding unlawful 

discrimination, bias, and stereotyping and the protection of American civil rights and civil 

liberties, including preserving and safeguarding constitutionally protected freedom of speech and 

association, while focusing on addressing unlawful violence. The strategy also includes 

prevention efforts to enhance community resilience against domestic terrorism and the provision 

of available resources.

The FBI, DHS, and NCTC remain dedicated to working with our partners on the effective 

implementation of the national strategy and continue to evolve our response to this threat. 

As part of the national strategy, the FBI has increased intelligence production regarding the DT 

threat; continued to develop and implement TATM teams throughout the country; enhanced 

engagement with private sector partners; and developed and provided unclassified resources –

such as the U.S. Violent Extremist Mobilization Indicators booklet, which was jointly developed 

with DHS and NCTC – to multiple audiences, including law enforcement partners, first 

responders, and the American public.

Importantly, DHS plays a key role in this whole-of-government effort, and I&A has undertaken a 

number of actions and initiatives to support the national strategy, in line with broader 

Departmental efforts. As noted above, in 2021, I&A established a Domestic Terrorism Branch 

solely focused on analyzing threats from domestic violent extremism. I&A has also delivered 

numerous briefings to a variety of partners regarding the DVE movements and various trends 

impacting homeland security, and I&A has contributed to the development of a number of 

National Terrorism Advisory System bulletins, which provide the public awareness of the 

current threat environment for the Homeland.

Further, DHS continues to enhance the role of its Counterterrorism Coordinator, who is 

responsible for coordinating the Department’s counterterrorism-related activities – including 

intelligence, planning, operational, and policy matters – as well as the Counter Threats Advisory 

Board, which coordinates ongoing threat mitigation efforts across the Department.

DHS’s Center for Prevention Programs and Partnerships (CP3) also continues to expand its 

efforts to prevent terrorism and targeted violence by providing partners at the state and local 

level with the tools to prevent violence. Through technical, financial, and educational assistance, 

CP3 is leveraging community-based partnerships to enhance local capabilities and ensure 

individuals receive help before they radicalize to violence. CP3 also partners with DHS’s Federal 

Emergency Management Agency to administer the Targeted Violence and Terrorism Prevention 

(TVTP) Grants Program, which provides funding to enhance and expand prevention capabilities. 

The TVTP grant program complements existing programs that enhance the preparedness of our 

nation, including the Nonprofit Security Grant Program which provides support for target 
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hardening and other physical security enhancements at nonprofit organizations, as well as the 

State Homeland Security Program and Urban Area Security Initiative grant programs, which 

have prioritized combating domestic violent extremism as a “National Priority Area” in both FY

2021 and FY 2022.

Legislative Initiatives 

The DOJ continually assesses whether additional legislative authorities would improve our

efforts to combat DT and other national security threats. The FBI is actively working with DOJ 

on some broader legislative initiatives that can benefit both federal investigations and 

prosecutions, including those relating to DT. For example, there are ongoing discussions about 

adjusting legislation in response to the challenges in disrupting juvenile threat actors via federal 

law enforcement actions. We will inform and work with the Congress in the event we identify 

any critical gaps in our authorities that may have negative effects on our ability to accomplish 

our mission.

Resource Enhancements

To close the gaps in the FBI’s ability to disrupt and deter DT threats, the DOJ and FBI have 

continuously engaged with Congress and the Office of Management and Budget to appropriately 

allocate resources towards combatting the DT threat.

Meanwhile, DHS is committed to expanding its ability to collect, analyze, and share domestic 

violent extremism information overtly or from publicly available sources, consistent with its 

authorities, while simultaneously safeguarding privacy, civil rights, and civil liberties of all 

persons, to enhance the Department’s ability to rapidly analyze and communicate DT threats and 

inform policy makers’ and its homeland security partners’ decisions and actions, and to enhance 

and expand the ability of our partners across all levels of government and the private sector to 

prevent acts of terrorism and targeted violence.
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Appendix A

Significant Domestic Terrorism Incidents in the United States from 2020 and 202122

This appendix solely includes incidents the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) has 

investigated as significant domestic terrorism (DT) incidents. Additional incidents that meet the 

Department of Homeland Security’s (DHS’s) statutory definition of terrorism and that DHS 

analysts assess to be incidents of DT may not be included. These incidents typically have been 

investigated by the FBI as hate crimes and/or by state and local law enforcement for criminal 

violations of laws in their respective jurisdictions.

DATE AND LOCATION DESCRIPTION 

January 2020:

Georgia

Three racially or ethnically motivated violent extremists (RMVEs) who 

advocated for the superiority of the white race were arrested and charged with 

violations, including conspiracy to commit murder and participation in a 

criminal gang. The individuals, all members of “The Base,” a self-identified 

RMVE organization, conspired in a plot to murder individuals they perceived to 

be “anti-fascists.” In November 2021, all three subjects pleaded guilty. One 

subject was sentenced to 40 years, with 20 years to serve in prison; another 

subject was sentenced to 30 years, with 8-15 years to serve in prison; and the 

third subject was sentenced to 25 years, with 6 years to serve in prison. 

January 2020:

Delaware; Maryland

Three RMVEs who advocated for the superiority of the white race, one of 

whom is a Canadian national, were arrested in Delaware and Maryland and 

charged with violations related to harboring an illegal alien and firearms. In 

December 2020, one subject pleaded guilty and was sentenced to five years in 

prison. In June 2021, the other two subjects pleaded guilty, and in October 

2021, they were each sentenced to nine years in prison.

January 2020:

Wisconsin

A RMVE who advocated for the superiority of the white race was arrested and 

charged with violations for his alleged role in vandalizing a synagogue in 

Racine, Wisconsin. The individual’s arrest was part of a broader law 

enforcement campaign to disrupt DT acts planned by subjects associated with 

the “The Base,” a self-identified RMVE organization. In July 2020, the subject 

pleaded guilty.

 

22 Unless otherwise noted, some of these matters are active/pending.
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DATE AND LOCATION DESCRIPTION 

February 2020:

Arizona; Florida; 

Texas; Washington

Four RMVEs who advocated for the superiority of the white race, and who 

were associated with the “Atomwaffen Division,” a self-identified RMVE 

organization, were arrested and charged with violations related to their roles in 

a coordinated operation to intimidate and threaten journalists and activists 

through the targeted distribution of threatening posters to their victims inperson or through the mail. In September 2020, one subject pleaded guilty, and 

in December 2020, the subject was sentenced to 16 months in prison. In 

September 2020, a second subject pleaded guilty, and in March 2021, the 

subject was sentenced to time served. In April 2021, a third subject pleaded

guilty, and in August 2021, the subject was sentenced to three years in prison. 

In September 2021, the fourth subject was tried and convicted, and in January 

2022, the subject was sentenced to seven years in prison. 

February 2020:

Texas

An RMVE who advocated for the superiority of the white race was arrested and 

charged for violations related to his participation in a conspiracy involving 

“swatting,” a harassment tactic in which emergency services are dispatched to 

an unwitting person’s location. The individual’s targets included at least one 

news office and journalist. In July 2020, the subject pleaded guilty, and in May 

2021, the subject was sentenced to 41 months in prison.

March 2020:

Missouri

The FBI attempted to arrest an RMVE who advocated for the superiority of the 

white race on one charge related to providing material support to terrorists 

based on the subject’s plot to carry out a mass-casualty attack targeting a 

Missouri hospital. The individual succumbed to injuries after a shooting 

incident during the attempted arrest. The subject’s attack plot included using a 

vehicle-based improvised explosive device and came after approximately seven 

months of planning and preparation, which included the acquisition of bombmaking materials.

May 2020:

New York

Following a local law enforcement vehicle pursuit, local deputies and a militia 

violent extremist (MVE) exchanged gun fire, and the MVE died as a result of the 

interaction. The investigation recovered pipe bombs, explosives manuals, a 

large amount of cash, and several firearms.

May 2020:

Nevada

Three Las Vegas-based DVEs with personalized ideologies were arrested and 

charged for violations related to conspiring to cause destruction during 

protests and possession of an unregistered destructive device. The subjects 

plotted to damage and destroy buildings and property owned by the U.S.

government, as well as a public utility installation. The subjects self-identified 

as part of the “Boogaloo” movement.

June 2020:

Texas

An MVE was arrested and charged with violations related to conspiracy to 

distribute controlled substances. The court ordered the subject to be detained 

pending trial due to the threat the subject posed to the community. The 

subject used his social media accounts to advocate vigilante “guerrilla warfare” 

against National Guardsmen patrolling protests, to claim the subject was 

“hunting Antifa,” and to threaten to kill looters. In April 2021, the subject 

pleaded guilty, and in November 2021, the subject was sentenced to 37 

months in prison.
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DATE AND LOCATION DESCRIPTION 

June 2020:

California

An MVE was arrested by local law enforcement and charged with violations 

related to the killing a Santa Cruz County, California, Sheriff’s Office Sergeant 

and wounding a Deputy. The subject was later federally indicted and charged 

with violations related to the murder and attempted murder of a person 

assisting an officer or employee of the U.S. government. Investigation 

identified the MVE and an accomplice as the alleged perpetrators of the 29 

May 2020 shootings of two Federal Protective Security Officers in Oakland, 

California, which resulted in the death of one of the officers. In June 2022, the 

subject pleaded guilty and was sentenced to 41 years in prison.

August 2020:

California

An MVE was arrested by local law enforcement and charged with violations 

related to stalking and harassing a public official. The MVE allegedly sent 24 

threatening letters to a county Public Health Officer after a shelter-in-place

order in response to COVID-19.

August 2020:

Oregon

A now-deceased anarchist violent extremist (AVE) who self-identified as 

“Antifa” shot and killed an individual in Portland, Oregon, during an event 

attended by individuals of opposing ideologies. The subject died during law 

enforcement’s attempted arrest of the subject.

September 2020:

Minnesota

Two Minnesota-based DVEs with personalized ideologies were arrested and 

charged with conspiring to provide material support and resources to Hamas, a 

designated foreign terrorist organization, for use against Israeli and U.S. 

military personnel overseas. The subjects proposed assisting the individuals 

they believed were members of Hamas, including discussing potentially 

destroying a courthouse in Minnesota and attacking a police station and other 

targets, as a means to advance the “Boogaloo” cause. In May 2022, one subject 

pleaded guilty and was sentenced to three years in prison. In June 2022, the 

second subject pleaded guilty and was sentenced to four years in prison.

September 2020:

Ohio

An MVE was arrested and charged with violations related to the possession of a 

machine gun. Investigation revealed the subject expressed the desire to 

commit violence against perceived ideological opponents and sought to

manufacture ricin from castor bean plants to place in the tips of hollow point 

rounds to do as much harm as possible to potential victims. In August 2021, the 

subject pleaded guilty, and in December 2021, the subject was sentenced to 

time served.

September 2020:

California

An MVE was arrested and charged with firearms-related violations. Local police 

had also previously arrested the subject in May 2020 for allegedly driving his 

truck into a crowd of protesters. In May 2021, the subject pleaded guilty, and 

in October 2021, the subject was sentenced to one year and one day in prison.

October 2020:

Michigan

During the attempted arrest of an MVE on firearms-related charges, the MVE 

fired upon law enforcement and died as a result of the interaction. The subject 

previously expressed his willingness to die for his cause and engage violently 

with law enforcement, such as during a traffic stop or a law enforcement visit 

to his property. 
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DATE AND LOCATION DESCRIPTION 

October 2020:

Delaware; Michigan; 

South Carolina

Thirteen MVEs, some of whom, self-identified as the “Wolverine Watchmen,” 

were arrested and charged with violations related to an alleged conspiracy to 

kidnap the Governor of Michigan before the November 2020 general election

because of perceived abuses of power pertaining to her response to the 

COVID-19 pandemic. Of the 13 subjects, six were arrested and charged 

federally, and the remaining seven were arrested and charged by state/local 

authorities. Of the six subjects charged federally:

 In January 2021, one subject pleaded guilty, and in August 2021, the 

subject was sentenced to 75 months in prison.

 In February 2022, a second subject pleaded guilty, and in October 2022, 

the subject was sentenced to 48 months in prison.

 In April 2022, a jury acquitted two of the individuals.

 In August 2022, a jury convicted the remaining two individuals.

November 2020:

New York

An MVE was arrested and charged with violations related to threatening to kill 

politicians, members of law enforcement, and protesters in retaliation for the 

2020 U.S. Presidential Election. In April 2021, the subject pleaded guilty. In May 

2022, the MVE was sentenced to 36 months in prison for being a convicted 

felon in possession of a firearm.

November 2020:

Ohio

The FBI attempted to arrest an RMVE motivated by racial injustice in American 

society, the desire for a separate Black homeland, and/or violent 

interpretations of religious teachings, on charges related to kidnapping a 

woman, murdering another, and transporting the woman across state lines. 

During the attempted arrest, the subject fired upon law enforcement and was 

fatally wounded during the interaction. Investigation identified the subject’s 

social media postings, which revealed his violent interpretation of religious 

teachings, including content questioning the identity of the true followers of 

Judaism and claiming that white Christians had historically forced their religion 

upon enslaved Africans.

Summer and Early Fall 

2020

Nationwide

Multiple threat actors – including DVEs adhering to various DT ideologies and 

criminal actors – primarily targeted businesses and law enforcement as part of 

violence and criminal activity surrounding lawful protests held nationwide 

during the summer and early fall of 2020. The FBI and its law enforcement 

partners arrested hundreds of individuals on a variety of charges, primarily 

related to property crimes against businesses, violence against law 

enforcement and law enforcement property, and criminal activity targeting 

government buildings and property.

January 2021:

Washington, DC

On 5 January 2022, an unidentified subject(s) with an unidentified motivation

placed two pipe bombs in Washington, DC. The subject(s) placed one device in 

an alley behind the Republican National Committee Headquarters and another

device next to a park bench near the Democratic National Committee 

Headquarters. Law enforcement officers identified the devices and secured the 

area without any detonation. 
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DATE AND LOCATION DESCRIPTION 

January 2021:

Washington, DC

Multiple threat actors – including DVEs adhering to various DT ideologies and 

criminal actors – participated in the 6 January 2021 siege on the U.S. Capitol, 

disrupting a joint session of the U.S. Congress in the process of affirming the 

presidential election results. During the attack, approximately 140 police 

officers were assaulted; and according to a May 2021 estimate by the Architect 

of the Capitol, the attack caused approximately $1.5 million worth of damage 

to the U.S. Capitol building. During 2021, more than 725 individuals were 

arrested in nearly all 50 states and Washington, DC, for their criminal actions 

related to the siege on the U.S. Capitol. 

As of the end of 2021, of the more than 725 subjects arrested:

 More than 225 subjects were charged with assaulting, resisting, or 

impeding officers or employees. 

 Approximately 640 subjects were charged with entering or remaining in a 

restricted federal building or grounds. 

 Dozens of subjects were charged with conspiracy, either to: obstruct a 

Congressional proceeding; obstruct law enforcement during a civil 

disorder; injure an officer; or some combination of the three.

 Approximately 165 subjects pleaded guilty to a variety of federal charges, 

from misdemeanors to felony obstruction.

 Approximately 70 subjects received a variety of sentences for their 

criminal activity, from probation to periods of incarceration in prison.

January 2021:

Florida

An AVE was arrested and charged with violations related to interstate threats 

after the subject issued a “Call to Arms” for like-minded individuals to violently 

confront protestors that may gather at the Florida Capitol in the wake of the 6 

January 2021 siege on the U.S. Capitol. In May 2021, a jury found the subject 

guilty, and in October 2021, the subject was sentence to 44 months in prison.

February 2021:

Illinois

An MVE was arrested and charged with firearms-related violations. The subject 

sought to recruit like-minded individuals to execute militant and random 

attacks and expressed a desire to violently take over a television station to 

broadcast the subject’s own message.

March 2021:

Georgia

A DVE with a personalized ideology related to his claimed sex addiction was 

arrested and charged with violations relating to the subject’s execution of fatal 

shootings at spas near Atlanta, Georgia, killing eight individuals and injuring

others. He targeted the spas in an attempt to eliminate “temptation” and 

allegedly plotted a subsequent attack against a pornography-related target in 

Florida. In July 2021, the subject pleaded guilty to state/local charges of 

murder and was sentenced to life in prison.

April 2021:

Texas

An MVE was arrested and charged with violations related to the subject’s plot 

to blow up an Amazon data center, which the subject hoped would provoke a 

reaction that would convince the American people to take action against what 

he perceived to be a “dictatorship.” In June 2021, the subject pleaded guilty, 

and in October 2021, the subject was sentenced to 10 years in prison.
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DATE AND LOCATION DESCRIPTION 

May 2021:

Georgia

Three MVEs were arrested and charged with violations related to their plot to

target mobile COVID-19 vaccination sites. In January 2022, one subject pleaded

guilty, and in June 2022, the subject was sentenced to 18 months in prison. In 

February 2022, a second subject pleaded guilty, and in May 2022, the subject 

was sentenced to 21 months in prison. In February 2022, the third subject 

pleaded guilty, and in May 2022, the subject was sentenced to three years in 

prison.

June 2021:

Colorado

A now-deceased DVE with a personalized ideology shot and killed an Arvada 

Police Department officer who was responding to a suspicious activity call. A 

nearby civilian responded to the area of the shooting and engaged the subject; 

both the civilian and the subject were killed during the interaction. During the 

shootings, two police vehicles were also struck by gunfire. Investigation 

indicates the subject had a personalized ideology and was targeting law 

enforcement. 

June 2021:

Florida

An RMVE motivated by racial injustice in American society, the desire for a 

separate Black homeland, and/or violent interpretations of religious teachings,

allegedly shot and killed a Daytona Beach Police Department officer after the 

officer approached the subject’s vehicle with the subject inside. The subject

fled the scene and was later arrested in Georgia on 26 June 2021 and charged 

by state/local authorities with first degree murder of a law enforcement officer 

with a firearm.

June 2021:

Massachusetts

A now-deceased RMVE who advocated for the superiority of the white race 

stole a box truck and drove it into a vehicle with two occupants and then 

crashed the truck into a residence. The subject exited the truck and shot and 

killed two African American individuals. The subject fired at responding law 

enforcement, who returned fire, and the subject died as a result of the 

interaction. Investigation revealed the subject left behind writings indicating he 

conducted the attack based on RMVE ideologies.

July 2021:

Ohio

An involuntary celibate violent extremist was arrested and charged with hate 

crime and firearms-related violations related to the subject’s alleged plot to

attack a sorority. 

July 2021:

California

Two MVEs were arrested and charged with violations related to their alleged 

plot to bomb the Democratic Party headquarters in Sacramento, California. 

Investigation revealed evidence that the subjects had multiple pipe bombs and 

dozens of firearms. In November 2021, one of the two subjects pleaded guilty.

September 2021:

Alaska

A DVE with a personalized ideology was arrested and charged with violations

related to threatening interstate communications, cyberstalking, and making a 

bomb threat. The arrest and charges were based on the subject allegedly 

making threats of violence against multiple law enforcement departments. 

September 2021:

Texas

A DVE with a personalized ideology was arrested and charged with arsonrelated violations for throwing a Molotov cocktail through the window of a 

political party office in Austin, Texas, causing a fire. In January 2022, the subject 

pleaded guilty, and in May 2022, the subject was sentenced to six years in 

prison.
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Appendix B
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Appendix C
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