J. S 0 6 0 32 /20

NON

- PRECEDENTIAL DECISION

– SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

PRINGLE ELECTRIC, INC., :

: IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA Appellant :

:

v. :

: SNEAKER VILLA, INC. DOING BUSINESS AS VILLA AND DTLR, INC.

DOING BUSINESS AS VILLA :

:

: No. 2736 EDA 2019

Appeal from the Order Entered August 6, 2019,

in the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County

Civil Division at No. 1904M0014

BEFORE: LAZARUS , J.

, McLAUGHLIN , J., AND FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E.

MEMORANDUM BY FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E.: FILED JULY 08, 2020

Pringle Electric, Inc.

, appeals from the August 6, 2019 order, entered in

the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County , sustaining the preliminary

objections of Sneaker Villa, Inc., d/b/a Villa, and DT LR, Inc., d/b/a Villa

(collectively “ Villa ” ), and dismissing appellant ’ s mechanic s ’ lien claim. 1 We

r everse

.

The record reveals the following : On April 17, 2019, a ppellant filed a

mechanics ’ l ien claim alleging that it subcontracted with Arizona Designs

Project Management, LLC ( “ ADMP ” )

, to provide electrical work for a new

Sneaker Villa/DTLR store located at 1231 North Broad Street in Philadelphia.

1 See 49 P.S. § 1101 et seq.J . S06 0 32 /20

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( Appellant’s mechanics ’ lien claim at ¶¶ 2, 3

, 7

- 10; Exhibit A. ) The claim

identifies the “ [o]wners ” as “ Sneaker Villa, Inc., d/b/a Villa, and DTLR, Inc.,

d/b/a Villa. ” ( Id. at ¶¶ 6, 8

. ) Appellant completed its work on November 15,

2018. ( Id. at ¶ 7.) On March 6, 2019, appellant sent formal notice of its

intention to file a mechanics ’ lien claim. ( Id. at ¶ 15; Exhibit B.)

Appellant further alleged that it performed electrical w ork and supplied

the labor, materials, and equipment to perform the work. ( Id. at ¶¶ 10, 11,

1 2; Exhibit A at 1, 4

- 8. 2 ) The total contract price for the electrical work was

$61, 470. ( Id. , E xhibit A at 8. ) Appellant claims it did not receiv e full

payment

, and a balance of $ 29,481 3 remains due and owing

. ( Id. at ¶¶ 13,

14. ) The property subject to the lien is described as the real property located

at 1231 North Broad Street, being utilized as a Sneaker Villa retail store. ( Id.

at ¶ 18 .)

O n May 13, 2019

, Villa responded by filing preliminary objections to the

claim

. A ppell ant filed a timely answer

. On August 6, 2019 , the trial court

issu ed an order sustaining Villa ’ s preliminary objections

. Appellant ti mely

appeal ed. On September 4, 2019, the trial court ordered appellant to file a

2 Exhibit A to appellant ’ s mechanics ’ lien claim does not contain pagination

. Therefore, for the ease of discussion

, we have assigned each page a corresponding number.

3 We note that based on the figures set forth in appellant ’ s formal notice of

intention to file a mechanics li en claim, the amount owed appellant is $24, 481

, as initially set forth in the notice. ( See a ppellant ’ s formal notice

, 4/6/ 19 at ¶ 3. )J . S06 0 32 /20

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statement of errors complained of on appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b).

Appellant timely complied. The trial court then filed its Rule 1925(a) opinion

.

Appellant raises the following issues for our review:

[1.] Did the trial c ourt err in sustaining the

p reliminary o bjections and finding that [appellant] should seek collection of the sums sought in the mechanics ’ lien c laim via a breach

of contract action, rather than the l ien?

[2.] Should the tr ial c ourt have o verruled the f irst preliminary o bjection, arguing [either Sneaker Villa or DTLR] was not an “ o wner ” and also arguing the fee owner was a necessary

defendant?

[3.] Should the t rial co urt have o verruled the s econd preliminary o bjection, arguing lack of specificity?

[4.] Should the trial c ourt have overruled the t hird preliminary o bjection, arguing lack of service?

[5.] Should the trial c ourt have o verruled the fourth preliminary o bjection, arguing excess curtilage?

Appellant ’ s brief at 5

- 6 (extraneous capitalization omitted)

.

Our scope of review i n determining whether the trial court properly

s ustained preliminary objections is as follows:

[This] court must examine the averments in the complaint, together with the documents and exhibits

a ttached there to in order to evaluate the su fficiency

of the facts averred.

Our inquiry goes only to determi ning the legal sufficiency of appellant ’ s complaint and we may only decide whether sufficient facts have been pleaded which would permit recovery if ultimately proven. We

must be abl e to state with certainty that upon theJ . S06 0 32 /20

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- facts averred, the law will not pe rmit recovery by the plaintiff.

This Court will reverse the trial court ’ s decision only

where there has been an error of law or abuse of

discretion. Further, when the sustaining of preliminary objections results in the denial of a claim

or the dismissa l of a suit in a mechanics ’ lien proceeding, preliminary objections should be sustained only where the case is clear and doubtless

.

Denlinger, Inc. v. Agresta , 714 A.2d 1048, 1050 (Pa.Super. 1998)

(citati ons and quotation marks omitted )

.

Mechanics ’ liens were unknown at common law and are entirely a creature of statute. Such liens are designed to protect persons who, before being paid (or fully paid), provide labor or material to improve a piece of property. The [m]echanics ’ [l]ien [l] aw

. . . was intended to protect the prepayment labor and

materials that a contractor invests in another ’ s property

. Mechanics ’ liens accomplish this goal by giving lienholders security for their payment independent of contractual remedies.

Bricklayers of Western Pen nsylvania Combined Funds, Inc. v. Scott ’ s

Development Co. , 90 A.3d 682, 690 (Pa. 2014) (citations omitted)

.

[E]very improvement and the estate or title of the owner in the property shall be subject to a lien, to be perfected as herein provided, for the payment of all debts due by the owner to the contractor or by the contractor to any of his subcontractors for l abor

or materials furnished in the erection or construction,

or the alteration or repair of the improvement[.]

49 P.S

. § 1301(a) (emphasis added)

. An “ [owner] means an owner in fee, a

tenant for life or years or one having any other estate in or title to property. ”

49 P.S. § 1201(3). “ [A] subcontractor is generally understood to be a personJ . S06 0 32 /20

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or business who performs for and takes from the prime contractor a specific

part of the labor or material requirements of the original contract. ”

Pennsylvania Combined Funds , 90 A.3d at 691 (citat ion and quotation

marks omitted )

. See also 49 P.S. § 1201(5).

Mechanics ’ liens and assumpsit actions are cumulative remedies. See

49 P.S. § 1702. As this court noted : “ there may not only be a mechanics ’

lien filed against the owner and contractor, and that prosecuted to judgment,

but a personal action may be brought on his personal liability on the contract. ”

Matternas v. Stehman , 642 A.2d 1120, 1124 (Pa.Super. 1994) (citation

omitted ). “ It sometimes happens that out of the same transaction there

arise[s] rights both in personam and in rem

. In such case, a judgment

in rem does not merge the action in personam on the original claim, and

does not constitute a bar to an action thereon. ” Id. at 1125

, quoting

47 AmJur2d, Judgments § 1074 at 136 (footnotes omitted, italics added).

Here, the trial court sustained the preliminary objections because:

[a]ppellant and [ Villa ] were parties in a contract to perform work at the [p]roperty. Pursuant t o 49 P.S. §1101

, . . . lien proceedings are not intended to settle contractual obligations. Therefore, this court

sustained [ Villa ’ s ] preliminary objections on the basis that the [c]laim was not the proper avenue by which these contractual obligations sho uld be settled.

Trial court opinion, 10/7/19 at 2

- 3. T he trial court relied on this court ’ s opinion

in Matternas v. Stehman , 642 A.2d 1120 (Pa.Super. 1994). (Trial court ’ sJ . S06 0 32 /20

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-

order, 8/6/19 at n.1; trial court opinion, 10/7/19 at 2

- 3.) The trial court ’ s

reliance on Matternas is misplaced. 4

Accepting the averments in appellant ’ s mechanics ’ lien claim as fact

, 5

the only contract appellant asserts is with ADPM

, 6 the general contractor.

Further, a mechanics ’ lien claim is the proper remedy for appellant

, a s

subcontractor , to lien the owner s ’ 7 property to secure recover y for the labor,

material, equipment, services and work it provided to ADPM. See 49 P.S.

§§ 1201(3), 1201(5), 1301(a). Additionally, appellant ’ s claim comports with

the requirements of 49 P .S. § 1503.

As mechanics ’ liens claims and contract actions are cumulative

remedies, r egardless of whether or not appellant had a contractual

relationship with Villa, appellant was entitled to file a mechanics ’ lien claim.

4 In Matternas , this court held that a consent order concluding a mechanic ’ s lien proceeding, brought by a building contractor against the property owners, did not collaterally estop the property owners from bringing a subsequent assumpsit action seeking damages for breach of the contract because there was no basis to regard any issue as having been settled by the consent order.

5 See Philadelphia Const. Services, LLC v. Domb , 903 A.2d 1262, 1266 (Pa.Super. 2006) ( n oting that in ruling on preliminary objections to a

mechanics ’ lien claim, the trial court i s required to accept the averments in appellant ’ s claim as fact)

.

6 See a ppellant ’ s mechanics ’ lien claim , 4/17/19 at ¶¶ 2, 3, 8, 9, 15; E xhibit A.

7 There is no dispute that Villa, as lessee of 1231 North Broad Street in Philadelphia, was the owner of the property for purposes of the mechanics ’

lien law.J . S06 0 32 /20

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Thus, the trial court erred in concluding, as a matter of law

, that

appellant ’ s only remedy w as a breach of contract action.

Order reversed. Case remanded. Jurisdiction relinquished.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq. Prothonotary

Date: 7/8/2020