In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

No. 00-1032

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

ROBERT P. CROTTEAU,

Defendant-Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Western District of Wisconsin.

No. 99 CR 70--John C. Shabaz, Chief Judge.

Argued May 17, 2000--Decided July 10, 2000

 Before BAUER, COFFEY and KANNE, Circuit Judges.

 COFFEY, Circuit Judge. On July 14, 1999, a grand

jury returned a one-count indictment charging the

defendant-appellant, Robert Crotteau, with

"knowingly and unlawfully [taking], by force and

violence, and by intimidation, from the person

and presence of others, money totaling

approximately $1,430," in violation of 18 U.S.C.

sec.sec. 2113(a) and (d), and after a jury trial,

he was found guilty as charged. Following the

sentencing hearing, the trial court sentenced him

to 87 months’ imprisonment, restitution in the

amount of $1430, a $100 special assessment, and

5 years’ supervised release. On appeal, Crotteau

challenges: 1) an evidentiary ruling granting the

government’s motion to exclude the defendant’s

psychologist from offering expert testimony; 2)

the court’s ruling striking the testimony of

defendant’s proffered expert regarding the height

of the bank robber; 3) the sufficiency of the

evidence supporting his conviction; and 4) the

content of a note sent to the jury by the trial

judge. We affirm.

I. BACKGROUND

 In late 1996 and early 1997, the defendant,

Robert Crotteau, was living at 2202 26th Avenue,

Rice Lake, Wisconsin,/1 approximately 3 miles

by car, and 1 miles by snowmobile, from the town
of Brill, Wisconsin. A major state snowmobile

trail ran from the back of the property into

Brill.

 During late 1996 and early 1997, Crotteau

talked with David Demars about the possibility of

robbing a bank, specifically the Brill State

Bank, because both of them were in need of money.

Demars and Crotteau concluded that it would be

best to rob the bank in the early morning when

the tills were still full of money. They also

concluded that it would be best to rob the bank

when the weather was snowy because it would be

harder for law enforcement to track them, or to

even respond to a robbery. Also during the

conversation, Demars and Crotteau discussed using

a snowmobile as a getaway vehicle. Finally, they

discussed the best weapon to use and Demars

suggested using Crotteau’s black BB gun, which

looked like a semi-automatic pistol, because

Demars thought that a prison sentence would be

shorter if a BB gun was used instead of a real

gun. During this time period, Crotteau also had

a conversation with his friend, Daniel Swanson,

in which the defendant discussed robbing a bank

in bad weather.

 1. The Brill State Bank Robbery

 January 10, 1997, was a windy, snowy day in the

Rice Lake, Wisconsin area, and at approximately

9:20 a.m., a man wearing dark knit gloves, a

hooded army-type jacket, and a ski mask, exposing

only his eyes, entered the Brill State Bank,

carrying a black gun that resembled a semiautomatic pistol in his left hand and a cream

colored canvas bag with some red on its side in

his right hand. While displaying the weapon to

the bank teller, Janice Saffert, the man demanded

"I want your 20s in the bag." Saffert complied

and placed $1430 into the bag, and upon receiving

the bag of money, the robber fled the bank on

foot and made his escape, apparently unobserved

by any witnesses.

 Immediately following the robbery, Saffert

reported to the police that the bank robber was

approximately 5’2" in height, but after viewing

the bank surveillance video and seeing that the

robber was leaning over on the teller’s counter,

she stated that the robber’s height was 5’8" or

5’9". She also described for the authorities the

gun used by the robber, his clothes, gloves,

mask, body shape, voice, and eyes, as well as his

race and approximate age.

 2. The Victim’s Report of the Robber’s Return to

the Bank
 On October 17, 1997, the defendant, Crotteau,

went to the Brill State Bank to exchange coins

for currency and the teller that assisted

Crotteau on this occasion happened to be Janice

Saffert, the victim teller from the January 10,

1997, robbery. On this October day, Crotteau had

a bag in his right hand, apparently similar to

the one used in the robbery, which he placed on

the teller’s counter. Upon seeing Crotteau at her

counter, Saffert thought to herself, "Oh my God,

I think he’s the one." According to Saffert, her

heart was beating fast, her hands became sweaty,

and her knees were wobbly. As she was counting

the coins for Crotteau, Saffert tried to get a

closer look at him. When she returned to her

teller station after counting the coins, she

asked Crotteau a few questions, including his

name, in order that she could hear his voice and

compare it with the robber’s. After Crotteau left

the bank building, Saffert informed her coworkers that he was the robber. One of her coworkers followed Crotteau out of the bank and

wrote down his vehicle license plate number, in

hopes of assisting law enforcement in

apprehending him.

 3. The FBI Investigation

 As a result of the encounter on October 17,

1997, Janice Saffert was certain that Crotteau

was the man who robbed her on January 10, 1997.

The authorities were then notified, and the FBI

commenced an investigation of Robert Crotteau as

a possible suspect. Crotteau and many of his

family members and friends were interviewed by

the FBI and local law enforcement officials.

David Demars told investigators that, after the

January 1997 Brill bank robbery, Crotteau gave

him cash in amounts ranging from $20 to $80 for

items he wanted to buy on five or six occasions.

Prior to the robbery, Demars and Crotteau

occasionally hunted for cigarette butts to smoke,

but after the robbery, there were times when

Crotteau bought packs of cigarettes for Demars

and his wife. Additionally, whereas in late 1996

and early 1997 the two men would often talk about

robbing banks to get some extra money, after the

bank robbery, Crotteau would either change the

subject or ignore Demars whenever he brought up

the possibility of committing a bank robbery.

Finally, Demars viewed the bank surveillance

video of the robbery and concluded that, based on

the robber’s build, his walk, and the way he

carried himself, the robber looked very much like

Robert Crotteau.

 David Demars’ wife, Crystal Demars, was also

interviewed by law enforcement authorities
regarding the robbery. She had known Crotteau for

six years at the time of the interview and had

lived with him for some time at the house in Rice

Lake. She viewed the surveillance video and also

concluded that, based on the way the robber

walked and carried himself, he was Robert

Crotteau.

 Jennifer Burt, Crotteau’s former girlfriend who

lived with him on the Demars’ property at the

time of the Brill State Bank robbery, was

interviewed by local law enforcement officers in

the Rusk County, Wisconsin jail where she was

incarcerated at the time. The officers showed

Burt both the October 17, 1997 bank video and the

video of the robbery on January 10, 1997. Without

hesitation, Burt identified the individual in the

October 17 surveillance video as Robert Crotteau.

When shown the video of the robbery, her demeanor

changed, she became very quiet, and she looked

down at the floor, stating that she did not see

anything that she recognized in the video. Burt

viewed the video a second, and then a third,

time, but both times she told the officers that

she did not recognize anything in the video. As

Burt was led back to her cell, she began to cry

and was brought back to the video room, where she

told the officer that it appeared to her that the

person concealing his identity in the bank

robbery video was Robert Crotteau. Burt advised

the officer that she was due to be released from

jail soon and that she did not want to be called

to testify.

 David Apfel, also a close friend of Crotteau,

stated during an interview with the FBI that

Crotteau told him that he (Crotteau) had to be

careful because the FBI was watching him for the

Brill State Bank robbery. When Apfel asked

Crotteau why he was not spending the money he had

obtained in the heist, the defendant said

"something like maybe some day or something like

that."

 David and Crystal Demars and Jennifer Burt all

told the FBI that Crotteau had access to, and

occasionally was observed wearing, green Army

jackets, snowmobile boots, black stretch gloves,

and a snowmobile mask. They also stated that he

had a BB gun that looked exactly like the one

seen in the Brill bank robbery surveillance

video. Burt, Crotteau’s girlfriend, had a creamcolored bag with "Marlboro" in red letters on the

side when she lived with him and she left it with

the defendant after she moved out. 

 When the FBI interviewed Crotteau in July of

1999, he told them that in January of 1997, he

was 18 years old, 5’9" to 5’10" tall, and weighed

approximately 150 pounds. He also denied that he
had ever jokingly, much less seriously, discussed

robbing a bank with his friends. Crotteau also

told the FBI that he was not involved in the

Brill State Bank robbery, had never worn an Armytype jacket or Parka, and that he never owned nor

wore snowmobile-type boots with the fur lining

sticking out at the top. Furthermore, he insisted

that he never had a canvas bag with red lettering

on it, and that he had never seen such a bag nor

had he ever seen his girlfriend in possession of

such a bag. Crotteau did admit to the FBI that he

owned BB pistols that looked like semi-automatic

weapons (like the one used in the Brill bank

robbery).

 4. Crotteau’s Trial By Jury

 On October 12 and 13, 1999, Crotteau was

brought to trial before a jury in the Western

District of Wisconsin. At the final pre-trial

hearing on October 8, 1999, the government filed

a motion to exclude the defendant’s psychologist

from testifying as an expert on the reliability

of eyewitness identification. The district court

reserved ruling on the motion until such time as

it could be considered in light of the evidence

offered at trial. The matter was again brought up

on the second day of trial, October 13, 1999,

after the close of the government’s case. After

defense counsel made an offer of proof, the trial

court granted the motion to exclude the

psychologist’s testimony on the ground that it

would not be helpful to the jury.

 During the course of the trial, the defense

called Ray Miller, a friend of Crotteau, to offer

expert testimony on the height of the bank robber

and the defendant by comparing the two bank video

surveillance tapes offered at trial (one of the

robbery and the other of Crotteau’s October 17,

1997 trip to the bank to cash in his spare

change). After the jury had heard Miller’s

testimony on direct and the government had crossexamined him, the government moved to strike

Miller’s testimony on the grounds that he was not

a qualified expert under Fed. R. Evid. 702/2 and

that his opinion was not admissible under Fed. R.

Evid. 703./3 The trial judge granted the

government’s motion to strike the testimony and

instructed the jury accordingly.

 At the close of the government’s case in chief,

Crotteau moved for a judgment of acquittal under

Rule 29./4 The judge denied Crotteau’s motion,

and the case went to the jury.

 The jury started its deliberation at

approximately 1:00 p.m. on October 13, 1999. At

3:57 p.m., the jury sent a written note
requesting a definition of reasonable doubt. The

trial judge met with the parties and, after a

brief argument, sent a note back to the jury at

4:45 p.m., stating as follows: 

Members of the jury. No definition of reasonable

doubt is available. The phrase is self

explanatory and is its own best definition. Will

you also join us in court at 6 p.m. for

adjournment until 9 a.m. tomorrow.

Although he objected to the reasonable doubt

statement and urged the court to craft a

definition for the jury, counsel for Crotteau did

not object to the last sentence of the note

(regarding adjournment) when the court read the

proposed note to the parties prior to sending it

to the jury. At 5:30 p.m., the jury found

Crotteau guilty of the robbery of the Brill State

Bank on January 10, 1997.

 Crotteau appeals from that conviction on

numerous grounds. Specifically, he asks us to

determine: 1) whether the district court abused

its discretion by excluding expert testimony on

the reliability of the eyewitness identification

of the defendant made by the victim bank teller

(Saffert); 2) whether the trial court abused its

discretion by striking the testimony of a defense

witness (Ray Miller), offering expert testimony

as to the height of the bank robber; 3) whether

the evidence is sufficient to sustain Crotteau’s

armed bank robbery conviction; and 4) whether the

trial judge committed plain error by informing

the jury, approximately four hours into its

deliberations, that the court planned to adjourn

for the day at 6:00 p.m.

II. DISCUSSION

 A. Exclusion of Expert Testimony Regarding

Reliability of Eyewitness Identification

 Initially, Crotteau contends that the district

court erred when it excluded, as unhelpful to the

jury, a psychologist’s expert testimony on the

reliability of eyewitness identification. The

expert testimony was specifically designed to

discredit the identification of Crotteau as the

robber made by the victim bank teller, Janice

Saffert, by demonstrating that Saffert may have

suffered from a form of post-traumatic stress

disorder as a result of the bank robbery. Thus,

when Crotteau walked into the bank on October 17,

1997, carrying a bag similar to the one used in

the robbery, Saffert experienced a flashback of

sorts and would thereby not have been able to

accurately identify Crotteau as the robber.

 Given that there is no allegation that the
trial judge improperly applied the framework set

forth in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals,

Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993), we review the trial

judge’s decision to exclude expert testimony for

an abuse of discretion. See United States v.

Hall, 165 F.3d 1095, 1101 (7th Cir.), cert.

denied, 119 S. Ct. 2381 (1999). Thus, our review

focuses on the issue of whether the trial judge

abused his discretion in not allowing this

defense expert to testify. 

 As this court has explained, we afford great

deference to a judge’s evidentiary rulings:

We review a trial judge’s determination of the

admissibility of evidence under the abuse of

discretion standard. We afford great deference to

the trial court’s determination of the

admissibility of evidence because of the trial

judge’s first-hand exposure to the witnesses and

the evidence as a whole, and because of the

judge’s familiarity with the case and ability to

gauge the impact of the evidence in the context

of the entire proceeding. Indeed, [a]ppellants

who challenge evidentiary rulings of the district

court are like rich men who wish to enter the

Kingdom: their prospects compare with those of

camels who wish to pass through the eye of the

needle. Because we give special deference to the

rulings of the trial judge[,] [a defendant]

obviously "carries a heavy burden. In this

context, we will not reverse unless the record

contains no evidence on which [the district

court] rationally could have based [its]

decision, or where the supposed facts found are

clearly erroneous. Moreover, if an error in the

admission or exclusion of evidence was committed

during the trial, the court will grant a new

trial only if the error had a substantial

influence over the jury, and the result reached

was inconsistent with substantial justice.

United States v. Walton, 2000 WL 767891, *4 (7th

Cir. June 14, 2000) (internal citations and

quotations omitted) (brackets in original).

 In Hall, this court identified three

considerations which supported the trial court’s

exclusion of the proffered expert testimony

regarding the reliability of eyewitness

identifications in that case: 1) the opportunity

for cross-examination; 2) the use of a cautionary

instruction; and 3) the presence of corroborating

evidence. See Hall, 165 F.3d at 1107-08. Each of

these three factors is present in the instant

case and each supports the decision of the trial

judge to exclude the testimony of the expert

psychologist.

 As we stated before, "any weaknesses in
eyewitness identification testimony ordinarily

can be exposed through careful cross-examination

of the eyewitnesses." Hall, 165 F.3d at 1107

(citations omitted). Furthermore, Crotteau’s

counsel cross-examined Saffert extensively on the

potential problems of her eyewitness testimony

and was given ample latitude to argue this to the

jury. As the district judge noted, the victim

bank teller was on the stand, on direct and

cross, for a total of approximately one and onehalf hours. Defense counsel led her step-by-step

through the day that Crotteau came into the bank

on October 17th, with the teller admitting that

her heart was racing, her knees were wobbly, her

hands were sweating, and that she immediately

thought Crotteau was the bank robber before she

even heard his voice. Crotteau’s counsel argued

these facts to the jury, along with the fact that

Crotteau came into the bank some 9 months after

Saffert had been the robbery victim, and

encouraged the jury to discredit the teller’s

eyewitness identification based on these facts.

It was within the jury’s province to choose to

credit or discredit Saffert’s testimony based on

all of the facts before it. See id. ("[W]e

believe that the credibility of eyewitness

testimony is generally not an appropriate subject

matter for expert testimony because it influences

a critical function of the jury--determining the

credibility of witnesses.") (citation omitted).

Unfortunately for Crotteau, the jury elected to

believe Saffert’s testimony.

 Additionally, the two instructions given to the

jury by the trial judge regarding the credibility

of the witnesses were certainly sufficient. The

first was an instruction regarding the testimony

of witnesses, taken directly from Seventh Circuit

Pattern Instruction Section 1.03, and the second

was a cautionary instruction drawn from Hall. The

second instruction reads as follows:

You have heard testimony of an identification of

a person. Identification testimony is an

expression of belief or impression by the

witness. You should consider whether, or to what

extent, the witness had the ability and

opportunity to observe the person at the time of

the offense and to make a reliable identification

later. You should consider the circumstances

under which the witness later made the

identification.

The government has the burden of proving beyond

a reasonable doubt that the defendant was the

person who committed the crime charged.

These two instructions properly cautioned the

jury to carefully weigh all of the circumstances

surrounding Saffert’s identification of Crotteau
as the robber before reaching any conclusion.

 Finally, there was substantial corroborating

evidence to implicate Crotteau as the robber of

the Brill State Bank. Again in Hall, we stated

that when there is corroborating evidence, expert

testimony regarding the reliability of eyewitness

identification is not necessary. See id.; see

also United States v. Kime, 99 F.3d 870, 885 (8th

Cir. 1996) (court reluctant to find abuse of

discretion in district court’s decision to

exclude expert testimony on eyewitness

identifications "unless the government’s case

against the defendant rested exclusively on

uncorroborated eyewitness testimony"). The

testimony of David Demars, David Apfel, and

Daniel Swanson all served to corroborate

Saffert’s identification of Crotteau as the

robber by relating incriminating statements and

actions made by Crotteau both before and after

the robbery. David Demars, Crystal Demars, and

Jennifer Burt also each identified Crotteau as

the bank robber in the surveillance video based

on the way the robber walked and carried himself.

Finally, Crotteau’s own statements to the FBI

denying ever having owned or worn clothing worn

by the robber corroborated the teller’s

identification because several other witnesses

reported having seen Crotteau wearing such items

on previous occasions.

 Thus, we hold that the trial court did not

abuse its discretion in excluding the expert

testimony of the psychologist. Such testimony was

not necessary because the defense extensively

cross-examined the eyewitness regarding the

reliability of her identification, the

experienced trial judge provided the jury with

clear, concise, and unambiguous cautionary

instructions on the reliability of eyewitness

identifications, and the teller’s identification

of Crotteau as the robber was substantially

corroborated by other testimony offered at trial.

 B. The Striking of Proffered Expert Testimony

Regarding the Height of the Bank Robber

 Crotteau next contends that the district court

abused its discretion by striking the testimony

of a would-be expert witness, Ray Miller,

regarding the height of the bank robber in the

video, on the grounds that the witness was not

qualified as an expert under Fed. R. Evid. 702

because he lacked the education, knowledge,

training, experience, and methodology necessary

to qualify him as an expert. We review the

district judge’s decision to exclude expert

testimony for an abuse of discretion. See Hall,

165 F.3d at 1101.
 Ray Miller testified before the jury that he

had examined the video surveillance tapes from

the January 10, 1997 bank robbery, and from

Crotteau’s visit to the bank on October 17, 1997.

Miller testified that based on his viewing of the

tapes and some measurements that he took, he

determined that the robber on the January tape

was only 5’2", while Crotteau appeared to be

approximately 5’8" on the October tape.

 Miller testified that he left high school after

his freshman year, was home-taught, and

subsequently obtained his GED, that he had

trained himself on the computer software that he

used to reach his findings regarding the height

of Crotteau and the robber, that he had but two

years of experience with the personal computer,

and that he would not call himself an "expert" in

the field in which he was testifying.

Furthermore, Miller admitted that he relied on

information, such as a poor quality copy of the

tapes rather than the originals, that an expert

in the field would not have relied upon. Miller

also offered his opinion that an expert in the

field would likely have taken more measurements

than the scant number taken by Miller in reaching

his conclusions. In fact, Miller admitted that

although he visited the bank to take some

measurements, he did not measure the teller’s

counter, nor did he measure the victim teller

herself. Thus, the government moved to strike

Miller’s testimony and the judge granted the

government’s motion, finding that Miller was not

qualified as an expert under Fed. R. Evid. 702.

 We hold that the trial court did not abuse its

discretion in striking Miller’s testimony. Based

on the record before us and the facts elicited at

trial regarding Miller’s lack of qualifications

and methodology as described above, we agree with

the trial judge’s ruling that Miller was not

qualified to offer expert testimony on the height

of the bank robber and Crotteau.

 C. Sufficiency of the Evidence

 Crotteau asks this court to reverse his

conviction, claiming that the district judge

erroneously denied his motion for acquittal

pursuant to Rule 29 of the Federal Rules of

Criminal Procedure. We review the judge’s denial

of a motion for acquittal de novo. See United

States v. Griffin, 194 F.3d 808, 816 (7th Cir.

1999), cert. denied, 120 S. Ct. 1546 (2000).

"Viewing the entire record and accompanying

inferences in the light most favorable to the

Government, we affirm the district court’s ruling

as long as any rational trier of fact could have

found the essential elements of the crime beyond
a reasonable doubt." Id. (citing United States v.

Hach, 162 F.3d 937, 942 (7th Cir. 1998), cert.

denied, 119 S. Ct. 1586 (1999)). Where, as here,

a defendant asks us to conclude that the evidence

was insufficient to support his conviction, he

faces a very high hurdle

because [w]hen reviewing a conviction for

sufficiency of the evidence, we neither reweigh

the evidence nor do we substitute our judgment of

the facts for that of the factfinder. We consider

the evidence in the light most favorable to the

prosecution, making all reasonable inferences in

its favor, and affirm the conviction so long as

any rational trier of fact could have found the

defendant to have committed the essential

elements of the crime. Reversal is warranted only

when the record is devoid of any evidence,

regardless of how it is weighed, from which a

jury could find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.

United States v. Hall and Walker, 2000 WL 626721,

at *7 (7th Cir. May 16, 2000) (internal citations

and quotations omitted) (brackets in original).

 Much of Crotteau’s argument regarding the

sufficiency of the evidence centers around his

apparent belief that many of the witnesses were

not credible and their identifications of

Crotteau were unreliable. He claims that Janice

Saffert’s eyewitness identification of Crotteau

is unreliable because she could not remember the

shape of the robber’s eyes, she admitted that by

listening to the voice of the robber he could

have been one of her sons, and she described that

the robber held his gun in his right hand when it

was actually his left. Crotteau also argues that

Crystal Demars’ and Jennifer Burt’s

identifications of Crotteau as the robber in the

bank surveillance tape were unreliable because

both women testified that they were not

absolutely certain that it was Crotteau in the

video. Finally, he asserts that David Demars,

Daniel Swanson, and David Apfel provided no

evidence that Crotteau was the robber because

they offered no testimony concerning any steps

that were taken in preparation to rob the bank,

but merely testified as to portions of

discussions in which the men discussed the

possibility of robbing the Brill State Bank.

 We reject Crotteau’s argument that the evidence

was insufficient to support his conviction. All

of his attacks on the evidence essentially are

challenges to the credibility of the witnesses;

attacks which are properly made before the jury,

and not this court. See United States v.

Woolfolk, 197 F.3d 900, 904 (7th Cir. 1999)

("Questions of witness credibility are reserved

for the jury, and its assessments will not be
second guessed by an appellate panel.").

Unfortunately for Crotteau, the jury resolved the

credibility questions against him. 

 Based upon our review of the record, we reject

Crotteau’s claim on the sufficiency of the

evidence because there was more than ample

evidence from which a rational factfinder could

have concluded beyond a reasonable doubt that

Crotteau robbed the Brill State Bank in January

of 1997.

 D. The Trial Court’s Alleged Jury Coercion

 After the jury had been deliberating for nearly

three hours, it sent a written note to the court

requesting a definition of reasonable doubt. The

trial judge met with the parties to discuss how

to proceed and, after a brief argument, sent a

note in response to the jury at 4:45 p.m.,

stating as follows:

Members of the jury. No definition of reasonable

doubt is available. The phrase is self

explanatory and is its own best definition. Will

you also join us in court at 6 p.m. for

adjournment until 9 a.m. tomorrow.

Counsel for Crotteau did not object to the last

sentence of the note (regarding adjournment) when

the court read the proposed note to the parties

before sending it to the jury. At 5:30 p.m., the

jury sent a note stating that it had reached a

verdict.

 Crotteau contends that the trial judge coerced

a guilty verdict when it informed the jury at

approximately 4:45 p.m. that deliberations would

end for the day at 6:00 p.m. and resume the

following morning. Because Crotteau did not

object to the note before the district court, we

review Crotteau’s claim for plain error. See

United States v. Staples, 202 F.3d 992, 994 (7th

Cir. 2000).

 In determining whether the court coerced the

jury into returning a guilty verdict, "[t]he

relevant inquiry . . . is whether the court’s

communications pressured the jury to surrender

their honest opinions for the mere purpose of

returning a verdict." United States v. Kramer,

955 F.2d 479, 489 (7th Cir. 1992) (citations

omitted). Instructions which are neutral and

simply instruct the jury to continue in its

deliberations do not warrant reversal. Id. 

 We hold that the language that the district

court used in its note regarding the times for

adjournment for the day and re-adjournment for
the next day did not, in any manner, coerce the

jury into hastily reaching a guilty verdict. The

note was neutral and favored neither the

prosecution nor the defense; instead, the note

merely responded to the jury’s earlier question

requesting a definition of reasonable doubt and

advised the jury of the court’s schedule.

 This court has previously stated our approval

of a schedule in which a judge adjourns "the

jury’s deliberations at a reasonable hour and

require[s] them to come back the next day."

United States v. Feekes, 879 F.2d 1562, 1567 (7th

Cir. 1989). Although the jury came back with a

guilty verdict forty-five minutes after receiving

the note from the trial court, there is no

evidence that it did so because it was coerced by

the trial judge into reaching a guilty verdict.

Thus, we are of the opinion that the court did

not commit plain error in submitting the note to

the jury. 

 The decision of the district court is

AFFIRMED.

/1 Crotteau lived with his sister, Danylle Demars,

Danylle’s brother-in-law, David Demars, David’s

wife, Crystal, and Jennifer Burt, Crotteau’s

then-girlfriend.

/2 Fed. R. Evid. 702 states as follows:

If scientific, technical, or other specialized

knowledge will assist the trier of fact to

understand the evidence or to determine a fact in

issue, a witness qualified as an expert by

knowledge, skill, experience, training, or

education, may testify thereto in the form of an

opinion or otherwise.

/3 Fed. R. Evid. 703 states:

The facts or data in the particular case upon

which an expert bases an opinion or inference may

be those perceived by or made known to the expert

at or before the hearing. If of a type reasonably

relied upon by experts in the particular field in

forming opinions or inferences upon the subject,

the facts or data need not be admissible in

evidence.

/4 Rule 29 of the Federal Rules of Criminal

Procedure provides, in relevant part:

The court on motion of a defendant or of its own

motion shall order the entry of judgment of

acquittal of one or more offenses charged in the
indictment or information after the evidence on

either side is closed if the evidence is

insufficient to sustain a conviction of such

offense or offenses. If a defendant’s motion for

judgment of acquittal at the close of the

evidence offered by the government is not

granted, the defendant may offer evidence without

having reserved the right.