2013 IL 114994



### IN TH E
SUPREME COURT
OF
THE STATE OF IL LI NOI S

(Doc ket No. 114994)
In re SHEL BY R., a Minor (The People of the State of I llinois
,

Appellant, v. Shelby

R., Appellee)

.

Opinion filed September 19, 2013.

J USTI CE THEI S deliver ed the judgme nt of the court, with opinion.
Chief J ustice Kilbride and J ustices Fr eem an , Thomas, Gar man, Kar meier, a nd Bur ke conc urre d in the judgme nt and opinion.

OP INION

¶ 1 T h e principal issue in this appea l is whether the J uvenile C o u rt

Act of 1987 (Ac t) (705 I L CS 405/1-1 et seq. (West 2010)) authorizes

a trial court to commit a minor to the Depa rtment of J uvenile J ustice (D ep artment) when the minor, who was adjudicate d delinquent for unlawful consumption of alcohol, violates the conditions o f h er probation. The appellate court held that the Act does not permit commitment to the Depa

rtment and reve rsed the judgme nt of the trial court. 2012 I LApp (4th) 110191. ¶ 2 For the rea son s t h at fo l l o w, we af fi rm t h e judgme nt of the appellate court.

¶ 3 BA CKGROUND ¶ 4 On December 30, 2009, in the C hampaign County circ uit court,

the State filed a petition for adjudication of war dship with respe ct to responde nt, Shelby R., then 14 year s old. The petition alleg ed that onDec ember 29, 2009, responde nt committed the offe nses of domestic b attery (720 I L CS 5/12-3.2(a) (1), (2) (West 2010)), in that s h e punched a family mem b er, and tore another family member’ s shirt;
ag g ravated assault (720 I L CS 5/12-2(a )(1) (West 2010)), in that she

wa v ed a knife at her mother; and unlawful consumption of alcohol (235 I L CS 5/6-20(e) (West 2010)). Respondent was ap p ointed counsel and enter ed a gen er al denial to the charg es. The trial court g rante d the S t ate’s motion to detain responde nt pending further
p roceeding s and order ed that responde nt be detained at t h e Champaign County

Youth Detention Center

. ¶ 5 Trial on the State’s petition was schedule d for Fe bruar y 1, 2010. On that date, the trial court was advised that re s p o n dent had been

acc epte d i n t o a residential substance abuse treatment program at Gatew ay Foundation in Carbondale

. The trial court co n ti n u e d th e c ase for st atus, putting the trial “on hold” until responde nt completed
treatment. ¶ 6 In April 2010, responde nt left Gatew ay without co mp l etingthe

program. As a conseque nce, the following mon th responde nt was ag ain confine d to the Champaign Coun ty Youth Detention Center, wher e she rema ined until J une 7, 2010. On that date, responde nt pled
guilty to unlaw fu l consumption of alcohol, a Class A misdemeanor (2 3 5 I L CS 5/6-20(f) (West 2010)), in exchang e for dismiss al of t h e domestic battery and ag g ravated assault charg es. The State provided

a fac tual basis for the charg e, advising the court that on Dec ember 29, 2009, responde nt admitted to a police office r that she had consumed al cohol, and that a breath test reve aled a blood-alcohol content of 0.142. The trial court acc epted the plea, adjudicate d respond ent a delinquent minor, and made her a war d of the court. On responde nt’s motion, the trial court rele ased responde nt fro m detention to the custody of her mother, pendingsentenc ing. ¶ 7 On J u l y 7
, 2010, the trial court sentenc ed re s p o n d en t t o 1 8

months’ probation. Amongthe conditions of her probation was that responde nt ref

rain from consuming any alcoholic bever ag es or using illicit drug s. Respondent was also require d to submit to random drug testing. ¶ 8 On S ep t em b er 8, 2010, the State filed a p et i t i o n t o re v o k e

responde nt’s probation. The State alleg ed that on August 18, 2010, responde nt submitt ed a urine sample that tested positive for the
prese nce of marijuana and coca in e metabolites. Respondent subsequentl y admitted the probation violation. The trial court advised

-2-responde nt of the possible conseque nces of that admission, including commitment to the Depa rtment fo r up to one year

. The trial court revoke d responde nt’ s p ro bation and, at a new sentenc ing hearing, committed re s pondent to the Depa rtment for an indeterminate term

o f 3 6 4 day s, with a cre dit of 55 day s for time spent in pretrial detention. Respondent was the rea fter c onveyed to the Depa rtment’s fac ility in Warrenville. ¶ 9 Re s p o n dent filed a motion to rec onsider her sentenc e, arguing t h a t the Act prohibits commitment t o t h e Depa rtment for unlawful consumption of alcohol. The trial court disagree d, an d denied responde nt’s motion. Respondent challeng ed her sentenc e on appea l, and the a ppellate c ourt reve rsed. 2012 I LApp (4th) 110191. ¶ 10 The appellate court first rec og nized that beca use responde nt ha d completed her sentence, th e i s s u e o f i ts validity was moot

. Id. ¶ 16. The appellate court, howeve r, agree d with responde nt that r e v ie w was appropriate under the public interest exception to the moo t ness doctrine. Id. ¶ 17. On the merits, the appellate court held that the Act does not permit a minor to be sentenc ed to i n ca rc eration in the Depa rtment for unla

wful consumption of alc ohol. Id. ¶ 57. ¶ 11 We allowed the State’ s petition for leave to appea l. I ll. S. C t. R.

315(a) (ef f. F eb. 26, 2010).

¶ 12 ANALYSI S ¶ 13 The State ar gu es t h at we n ee d n o t consi der the propriety of responde nt’s sentenc e because the case i s mo o t an d
, contra ry to the appellate court’s judgme nt, the public interest exception t o t h e mootness doctrine is inapplicable. Alternatively
, the State argues that

even if t h e public interest exception applies, the appellate court misconstrued t he Act. Acc ordi ng to the S tate, the trial court’s order committing responde nt to the Depa rtment wa s proper , pursuant to section 1-4.1 of the Act (705 I L CS 405/1-4.1 (West 2010)), beca use

re s p o ndent vi olated a valid court order when she vi olated the terms of her probation. On these issues of law our revie w proce eds de novo

. W right Development Group, LLC v. W alsh
, 238 I ll. 2d 620, 632-33 (2010); In re C.C. , 2011 I L111795, ¶ 29.

¶ 14 Mootness ¶ 15 An app ea l i s m o o t i f n o co n t roversy exis ts or if events have

occur red which fore close the revie wing court from granting eff ectua l

-3-relief to the complaining party

. In re Marriage of Peters-F arrell
, 216 I ll. 2d 287, 291 (2005). Wher e, as h ere , the appea l involves the validity of a sentenc e, s u ch appea l is rende red moot if the sentenc e has been serve d. People v. Roberson
, 21 2 I l l

. 2d 430, 435 (2004); Peo p l e v. Lynn
, 102 I ll. 2d 267, 272 (1984). Respondent acknowl edg ed, in the appellate court, that she serve d her sentenc e. Thus, her appellate court appea l was moot. Although the g ener al rule is that I llinois courts will not decide moot questions ( W r i gh t Dev elopment Group
, 238 I ll. 2d at 632), this co u rt has rec og nized exceptions to that rule. See In re Alfred H.H.
, 233 I ll. 2d 3 4 5
, 3 5 5, 358, 361 (2009) (discussing the publi c interest exception, the “ca pable of repe tition yet avoid i n g review” exception, and the collater al conse quence s exception to the mootness doctrine). ¶ 16 In the instant case , the appellate co u rt h el d that the validity of responde nt’s sentenc e, althoug h moot, was revie wable under the public interest exception to the mootness doctrine. 2012 I L App (4th) 110191, ¶ 17. This exception p er m i t s revie w of an otherwise moot question wher e the “magnitude o r i mmediacy of the interests involved war

rant[s] act i o n b y the court.” (I nterna l quotation marks omitted.) Felzak v. Hruby
, 226 I ll. 2d 382, 392 (2007) (quoting Dixon

v. Chicago & North W

estern Transportation Co.
, 151 I ll. 2d 108, 117 (1992))

. Application of this exception, which is narr owly construed, require s a clea

r showing o f eac h of the following criteria: (1) the question prese nted is of a public nature ; (2) an authoritative deter mination of t he question is desirable for the f uture guidance of public office rs; and (3) the question is likely to rec ur. WisnaskyBettorf v. Pierce , 2012 I L111253, ¶ 12; Felzak, 226 I ll. 2d at 393. ¶ 17 The State does not dispute that the appellate court corr ectly found

that the first and third criteria are satisfied here

. The State argues only that the second criterion—the desirability of an authoritative determination—is not satisfied. The State contends that the second criterion require s a disarra y in the law or conflicting prec edent on the
qu es t i on befor e the court, or some other circ umstance, that woul d make an authoritative deter mination not m er ely useful to public office rs, but “espe cially useful” to them. The State continues that the appellate court here was fac ed with a complete absenc e of prec edent

as to whether a juvenile may be committed to the Depa rtment for undera g e d ri n k i n g an d the l aw was thus not in disarra y , and that no other circ umstance exis ts which would require an authoritative deter mination on that question. The State argues that under these

-4-circ umstances the appellate court err ed in applying the public interest exception and its opinion, t here fore , must be vacated. We disagree

. ¶ 18 S ince our formal adoption of the public intere s t ex ce p t i o n i n

People ex rel. W

allace v. Labrenz
, 411 I ll. 618, 622 (1952), this court has revie wed a varie ty of otherwise moot issues under this exception. See, e.g. , In re E.G.
, 1 3 3 I ll. 2d 98 (1989) (whether a mi nor has the right to ref

use medical treatment); Bonagur o v. County Officers Electoral Board
, 158 I ll. 2d 391 (1994) (whe ther a political party may fill a vaca ncy in nomination for judicial office by party resol u t ion); Roberson
, 212 I ll. 2d 430 (whe ther a defe ndant is entitled to a cre dit

on a violation-of-ba il-bond sentenc e for time spent in custo dy

awa iting trial on the underlying charg e that was d i smissed); In re Christ opher K., 217 I ll. 2d 348 (2005) ( whether the law- of-the- case doctrine bars consideration of an extended juvenile jurisdic t i on motion afte r the denial of a discretionar y transfe r motion is aff

irmed

on appea l); W

irt z v. Qui nn , 2011 I L 111903 (whe ther an appropriations bill impermissibly contained substantive la

w). ¶ 19 When considering whether the second criterion for application of

the public interest exception has b ee n satisfied, this court has emphasized the importance o f ex amining the state of the law as it relates to the moot question. In re Commitment of Hernande z , 239 I ll. 2d 195, 202 (2010); Christ opher K.
, 217 I ll. 2d at 360. Gene rally
, we have “dec lined to a

pply the public interest exception when there are

no conflicting prec edents requiring an aut h oritative resolution.” Peters-F arrell , 216 I ll. 2d at 292. Acc ord In re J.T. , 221 I ll. 2d 338, 351 (2006) (findin g n o need for an authoritative deter mination of
moot issue wher e appe llate cour t case s on that issue were uniform). Conversely
, we have fre quently cited the confus ed state of the law when deciding that an author itative resolution of an otherwise moot question is desirable

. See, e.g. , In re Andrew B.
, 237 I ll. 2d 340, 347 (2010) (“se cond element [of public interest exception] is satisfied beca use our appellate court is divided on the issue”); Commonwealth Edison Co. v. W

ill County Collector
, 196 I ll. 2d 27, 33 (2001) (“our

case law *** is in conflict” and the g ov erning principles are “in the
state of some muddle” (interna l quotation marks omitted)); In re D.L.
, 191 I ll. 2d 1, 8 (2000) (“the rele vant appellate court prec edents are in conflict” ). ¶ 20 Notwithstanding the signific anc e o f a co n fl ict in the case law

when deter

mining whether a moot question should be decide d under the public interest exception, the absenc e of a conflict does not

-5-nece ssarily bar our revie w. Case law demonstrates that even issues of first impression may be appropriate for revie w under this exception. In Labrenz
, for ex ample, we considere d an is sue of first impression involving the trial court’s authority to appoint a guardia n on behalf of an infant whose par ents, for r elig ious reasons, would not consent to

cer tain medical treatment. Apply ing the public interest exception, we noted that in situations wher e a child’s life is endang ere d, “public authorities must act promptly i f t h eir action is to be eff ective, and althoug h the pre cise limits of authorized conduct ca nnot be fix ed in advanc e, n o g reater uncer tainty should exis t than the nature of the problems makes ine vitable.” Labrenz , 411 I ll. at 623. ¶ 21 We have also considere d various issues of first impression arising

under our elec tion law, including issues reg ardin g e lig ibilit y to run for public office

. See, e.g. , W

isnasky-Be ttorf

, 2012 I L 111253; Goodman

v. W ard
, 241 I ll. 2d 398 (2011); Cin ku s v. Village of Stickney Municipal Officers Electoral Board
, 228 I ll. 2d 200 (2008). We

rea soned that considera

t i on of such issues, though moot, would unquestionably aid elec tion off i cials and lower courts in deciding elec tion disputes promptly
, avoiding uncer tainty in the elec toral
proce ss. Goodman
, 241 I ll. 2d at 405. We applied the same rationale in Sandholm v. Kue ck

er , 2012 I L 111443, to an issue of first im p ression reg arding attorney fee s under the Citi zen Par ti c ip a ti o n A c t (735 I L CS 110/25 (West 2008)). Although the attorney fee issue was rende red moot by our decision on the main issue, we deter mined that consideration under the p ub l i c interest exception was war rante d beca use, inter alia
, a “def

initive deci s i o n b y this court will provide
guidance to the lower courts in deciding which attorney fee s are appropriate under the Act.” Sandholm
, 2012 I L 111443, ¶ 63 (citing Goodman , 241 I ll. 2d at 404-05). ¶ 22 Her e, the appellate court was also confr onted with an issue of first

impression—whether a juvenile may be commit te d to the Depa

rtment for undera g e drinking

. The need for an authoritative deter mination of this issue, which involves the liberty interests of minors, is at least as g reat as the need relative to the attorne y fee issue in Sandholm
, the candidate elig ibilit y issue in Goodman
, and the medical car e issue in Labrenz . Providing a definitive dec ision as to the statutory limit s of

a judge ’s sentenc ing authority for undera g e drinking, a comm on

occur renc e, wi l l provide guidance not only to juvenile court judge s and prosec utors, but also defe nse attorney s who must advi s e their
young clients in a competent and acc urate manner

. No g reater

-6-uncer tainty should exis t in a delinquent minor p ro ce ed ing than the circ umstances of

an individual case may

dictate. ¶ 23 We conclude that the appellate cour t did not err when it applied the public intere st ex ception to the m ootness doctrine and revie wed the sentenc ing issue on the merits. For the same r easons that r eview by the appellate court was appropriate, revie w by this court i s als o appropriate. Thus, we turn to the substantive issue befor e us.

¶ 24 Unlawf

ul Consumpt ion of Alcohol and Commitment to the Depa rtment of Juvenile J ustice ¶ 25 T h e L i qu o r C o n t ro l Act of 1934 forbids the consumption of

alcohol by any person under the ag e of 21. 235 I L CS 5/6-20(e) (West 2010). A violation constitutes a Class A misdemeanor. 235 I L CS 5/6- 20(f) (West 2010). Respondent admitted to a violation of this act and

was a djudicated a

delinquent minor. ¶ 26 In criminal proce eding s, s en t en cing is g overne d by the Unified

Code of Correc tions, under which a Class A misde m eanor is punishable b y imprisonment for a term of less than one year

. 730 I L CS 5/5-4.5-55(a ) (West 2010). In delinquent minor proce eding s, howeve r, sentencing is g overne d by the provisi ons of section 5-710 of the Juvenile Court Act (705 I L CS 405/ 5-710 (West 2010)). ¶ 27 The trial court orig inally sentenc ed responde nt to probation, one

of the sentenc ing order s expressly au t h o ri zed under section 5-710. 705 I L CS 405/5-710(1)( a)( i) (West 201 0 ). Shortly there afte r, the State filed a petition to revoke responde nt’s probation. Pursuan t to section 5-720 of

the Act:
“I f the court fi n d s that the minor has violated a condition at any time prior to the expiration or termination of the period of probation ***, it may continue him or her on t h e ex isting
sentenc e, with or without modifyi n g or enlar g ing the conditions, or may revoke probation * * * and impose any other sentenc e that was available under Section 5-710 at the tim e o f the initial sentenc e. ” (Emphasis added.) 705 I L CS 405/5-720(4) ( West 2010). The trial c ourt revoke d responde nt’s probation and sentenc ed her to

an indeterminate term of 364 day s in the Depa rtment of J uvenil e J ustice with cre dit for time spent in pretria l detention.

-7-¶ 28 Al t houg h commitment to th e De p ar t m en t i s an au th o ri z ed
sentenc e under section 5-710, its availability is limit ed. Section 5- 710(1)(b) states:
“A m i n o r found to be guilty may be committed to the Depa rtment of J uvenile J ustice ***, provi d ed that the commitment *** shall be made only if a term of incar cer ation is permitted by

law for adults found guilty

of the off ense for which the minor was adju d i cate d delinquent.” 705 I L CS 405/5-710(1)(b) (West 2010). Additionally , section 5-710( 7) states:
“In no event shall a guilty minor be committed to the Depa rtment of J uvenile J ustice for a period of time in excess of that period for which a n adult could be c ommitt ed for the

same a ct.” 705 I L CS 405/ 5-710(7) (West 2010).
The Act define s the term “adult” as “a person 21 year s of age or older.” 705 I L CS 405/1-3(2) (West 2010). See also 705 I L CS 405/1- 3(10), 5-105(10) (West 2010) (“ ‘Mino r’ means a person under the
ag e of 21 year s subject to this Act.”). ¶ 29 The a

ppellate c ourt rea soned that beca use an “adult,” a s defined in the Act, could not be found gu i l t y o f the “off ense” for which responde nt was adjudicate d delinquent, and could not be incar cer ated for the “same act” that responde nt c ommitt ed, incar cer ation was not available under se ction 5-710 at the time of the initial sente nce a nd, thus, was not an option when the trial court revoke d responde nt’s probation. 2012 I LApp (4th) 110191, ¶¶ 51-52. The appellate court reje cted the State’s argument that t h e “inca rce ration of minors” provision set forth in section 1-4.1 of the Act (705 I L C S 4 0 5 / 1 -4.1 (West 2010)) authorized the inc a r c e r a ti o n of responde nt. 2012 I L App (4th) 110191, ¶¶

40-47. ¶ 30 Section 1-4.1 states:

“Exc ept for minors accuse d of violation of an o r der of the
court , any minor acc used of any act under fe d era l or State law, or a municipal ordinanc e that would not b e i l l egal if committed by an adult, cannot be place d in a jail, municipal lockup, detention cente r or secur e corr ection al fac ility

. Confinement in a county jail of a minor acc used of a violation of an order of the court, or of a minor for whom ther e is

rea sonable cause to believe t h at the minor is a person described in section (3) of Section 5-105 [a delinquent

-8-minor], shall be in acc ord ance with the restric tions set forth in Section 5-410 and 5-501 of this Act.” (Emphasis added.) 705 I L CS 405/ 1-4.1 (West 2010). ¶ 31 The State arg ues that the appell at e co u rt misconstrued the Act. Foc using on the exception set forth in the first sentenc e of section 1- 4.1, the State argues th at the trial court was authorized to sentenc e responde nt to incar cer ation beca use she violated an order of the court by violating the terms of her probation. Respondent counter s that any authority under the Act to incar cer ate minors acc used of violating a
court order applies only prior to an adjudicator y proceed ing and, there fore , is inapplicable he re. ¶ 32 As in all case s of statutory construction, our primary objective is

to g ive eff

ect to the intent of the leg islature. The most re l i ab l e indicator of such intent is the languag e of the Act, which must be
g iven its plain and ordinary meaning

. In re D.F.
, 208 I ll. 2d 223, 229 (2 0 0 3 ). When the statutory languag e is clea r and unambiguous, we will g ive it eff

ect without resor

t to extrinsi c aids for construction. In

re C.C.
, 2011 I L 111795, ¶ 30. Our analy sis of the Act is also guided by the fundame ntal principle that statutes must be rea d as a whole and
not as isolated provisions. Michigan Ave nue National Bank v. County of Cook
, 191 I l l

. 2 d 493, 504 (2000). Fur ther, we will presume that the leg islature did not intend an absurdit y , in c o nv e n ie nce, or injusti ce. Sandholm
, 2012 I L 111443, ¶ 41. Fina l l y , we must heed the leg islature’s direc tive that the Act b e “l i bera lly construed” to car ry out the purpose and policy expressly s et fo rt h there in. 705 I L CS 405/1-2(4) ( West 2010). ¶ 33 T h e S t at e ar gu es t h at section 1-4.1 is a broa d s en t en ci n g

provision, permitting incarc eration when a minor is in “violation of an orde r of the c ourt” (705 IL CS 405/ 1-4.1 (West 2010)). The State posits that respondent, havingviolated a condition of her probation,

was in violation of an order of the court and, th u s , was proper ly
sentenc ed to a term in the Depa rtment of J uvenile J ustice. The State’s

ar gument, howeve r, overlooks that the trial court did not sentence responde nt to incar cer ation beca use she was in violation of an order of the court. The trial court revoke d responde nt’s probation, and then
sentenc ed her to incar cer ation on the sole offe nse for which she was adjudicate d delinquent: unlawful c onsumption of alcohol. ¶ 34 S ec t i o n 5 -7 2 0 o f t he Act g overns the proce ss for revoki n g a

delinquent minor’s sentenc e of probation. 705 I L CS 405/5-720 (West 2 0 10). This section sets forth the notice require ments (705 I L C S

-9-405/5-720(1) (West 2010)), the manner i n which a probation

revoc ation hearing must be con ducted (705 I L CS 405/5-720(2), (3) (West 2010)), and h o w t h e court must proce ed “[i] f the court finds that the minor has violated a condition” of p ro b ati on (705 I L CS 405/5-720(4), (5) (West 201 0 )). Respondent here admitted the violation alleg ed in the State’s revoc ation petition, and the trial court

re v o k ed responde nt’s probation as it was permitted to do under

s e c tion 5-720. See 705 I L CS 405/5-720(4) (West 2010). At that point,
t h e court’s only option was to “impose any other sentenc e that was available u n d er Section 5-710 at the time of the initial sentenc e .” (Emphasis added.) Id. At the time of the initial sentenc e, t h e o n l y offe nse for wh i ch responde nt could be sentenc ed was undera g e drinking

. Thus, assuming, as the State argues, that section 1 -4.1 permits a minor to be sentenced t o i ncar cer ation for violation of an order of the court, this provision is inapplicable wher e, as here
, the minor is sentence d for a

n entirely differ ent offe nse. ¶ 35 The State, in eff ect, would have us rea d section 1-4.1 as cre ating

a new sentenc ing s ch em e that overrides the probation revoc ation provisions set forth in section 5-720 and the sentenc ing provisions of section 5-710. The plain languag e of section 1-4.1, howeve r, does not support this view of leg islative intent. ¶ 36 We o b s er v e first that section 1-4.1 does not ref er to probation

revoc ation proce eding s specific ally
, or to posttrial delinquent minor
proce eding s g ener ally

. Nor does section 1-4.1 conta in any ref ere nce to the ki nds of s en t encing order s a court may enter when a minor is found guilty in a delinquent minor proce eding or guilty of vi olat ing

a condition of probation. The comp l et e absenc e of languag e even hinting that the leg islature intended to modify the sentenc ing scheme for delinquent minors strong ly milit ates ag ainst construing section 1- 4.1 in that fashion. ¶ 37 We also observe that th e i n ca rc er at ion exception, by its plain

terms, applies only to minors “ac cused” of violating a court o rd er. This word choice indicates that the leg islature intended section 1-4.1
to a pply to minors who have not yet been found guilty of violating a court order

. Thus, section 1-4.1 is not a s en t en cing provision, as it applies to those “a ccuse d,” not those “f ound guilty .” ¶ 38 The State disagree s that the term “ac cused” limit s the application

of section 1-4.1 in t his fashion. The State explains that I llinois statutes, s u ch as the Uniform Criminal Ex tradition Act (725 I L CS 225/3 (West 2010)), the Rights of Crime Victims and Wit nesses Act

-10-(725 I L CS 120/4 (West 2010)), and the Milit ary Code of I llinois (20 I L CS 1805/71 (West 2010)), are reple te with instances wher e t h e word “ac cused” includes both persons charg ed with a crime and those
persons convicted of a crime. Ba sed on these other statutes, the State maintains that the word “ac cused,” as used in the first sentenc e of sectio n 1 -4.1, identifies the person to whom the incar cer ation exception applies, and not the proce dural stag e at which the exception applies. Thus, ac co rd ing to the State, the incar cer ation exception applies to minors found guilty of violatinga cour

t order. ¶ 39 Al t h o u gh t h i s co u rt may , when discerning leg islativ e i n t en t ,

consider simil ar and relat ed enac tments ( People ex rel. Illinois Depa r tme n t of Corrections v. Hawkins
, 2011 I L 110792, ¶ 24), we find no simil arity and no rea l relationship betwee n the J uvenile Court Act, on the one hand, and the Uniform Criminal Ex tradition Act, the Rights of Crime Victims and Wit nesses Act, or the Milit ary Code on the other hand. T h us, the term “ac cused,” as used in these statutes, does not inform our interpre tation of that term as used in the J uvenile Court Act. Rather, our interpre tation is informed by the manner in which “ac cused” is used in differ ent sections of the J uvenile Court Act

. Under our rules of statutory construction, “[w]here a word is used in differ ent sections of the same statute, the presumption is that the word is used with the same meaning throughout the statute, unless

a contra ry leg islative intent is clea rly expressed.” People v. Maggette
, 195 I ll. 2d 336, 349 (2001). ¶ 40 The term “ac cuse d ” ap p ea rs n o t o n l y in the first sentenc e of

section 1-4.1, on which the State relies, it also appea rs in the second (final) sentenc e of se ction 1-4.1: “Confinement in a county jail of a minor accuse d of a vi o l a t i o n of an order of the court , or of a minor for whom there is rea sonable cause to believe that the minor is a person described in section (3) of Se ction 5-105 [a delinquent minor], shall be in acc ordanc e wi th the restric tions set forth in Sec tions 5-410 and 5-501 of this Ac t.” (Emphasis added.) 705 I L CS 405/ 1-4.1 (West 2010).
Sections 5-410 and 5-501 contain restric tions on the time and manner i n wh i ch a minor may be held following arr est and pending an adjudicator

y hearing. 705 I L CS 405/5-410, 5-501 (West 2010); In re Randall M.
, 231 I ll

. 2d 122, 129-33 (2008). The incorporation of these prea djudication provisions demonstrates that the term “ac cused,” as used in the second sentenc e of section 1-4.1, identifies

-11-a minor who ha s not y et bee n adjudicate d guilty of violatinga cour

t order

. Indeed, the State agree s that the second sentenc e of section 1- 4.1 applies prior t o an adjudication of guilt. The State, howeve r, offe rs no cog ent rea son for construing the s ame languag e in the
p re ceding sentenc e to mean something differ ent. Fur thermore
, th e only other sections of the Act in which the term “ac cused” appea rs do

n o t s u gg est a differ ent meaning

. See 705 I L CS 405/5-401(3), 5

- 401.5(e) (West 2010). We, there fore
, reje ct the State’s argument that the incar cer ation exception c onstitut es a broad sentenc ing provision applicable to minors found guilty of violatinga cour

t order. ¶ 41 Our construction of sectio n 1 -4

. 1 d o es not rende r the identical

languag e in section 5-401(3) of the Act superf luous. Section 5-401(3)
states: “E x cept for minors acc used of violation of an order of th e court, an y m i n o r acc used of any act under fede ral or State law, or a municipal or co un t y ordinanc e that would not be illega l if committed by an adult, cannot be p l ac ed i n a jail, municipal locku p , detention cente r, or secur e corr ectional fac ility

. J uveniles acc used with undera g e consumption and undera g e possessio n of alcohol cannot be place d in a jail, municipal lockup, detention cente r, or corre ctional facility .” 705 I L CS 405/ 5-401(3) (West 2010). ¶ 42 Section 5-401(3) is located within part 4 of the delinquent minors

article of the Act (ar

ticle V), which addre sses the arr es t an d t aking into custody of minors. See 705 I L CS 405/5-401 through 5-415 (West 2010). ¶ 43 Its applicability is neces s ar i ly limit ed by its location within the

d e li n q uent minors article

. The applicability of section 1-4.1, h o w e v e r , is not simil arly limit ed. Section 1-4.1, located within the g ener al provisions of article I
, potentially applies not only to prea djudication delinquent minors, but to other minors that come within the auspice s of the Act, who have been acc used of violating a court order

. See 705 I L CS 5/3-1 to 3-40 (West 2010) (ar ticle I I I ) (addr essing minors in need of authoritative intervention); 705 I L CS 5/4-1 to 4-29 (West 2 0 1 0 ) (ar

ticle IV) (addr essing addicted minors). We view the leg islature’s decision to repe at, in section 5-401(3)
, the same languag e appea

ring in the first sentenc e of section 1-4.1 as simply the leg islature’s attempt to clarify the i ncar cer ation except ion’s g ener al applicability
, notwithstanding the specific exclusion for “[j] uveniles

acc used with undera g e consumption and undera g e poss es s i o n of

-12-alcohol.” 705 I L CS 405/5-401(3) (West 2 0 1 0 ). We note that at the

same time the leg islature adopted the first sentenc e of section 1-4.1, and added the same languag e to section 5-401, it also amende d article IV of the Act, which addre sses addicted mino rs, to clar ify that “[m] inors taken into temporar y custody under this Section are subject
to the provisions of Section 1-4.1.” Pub. Act 86-1154 (ef f. J an. 1, 1993) (c odified at 705 I L CS 405/ 4-4(4) (West 2010)). ¶ 44 In short, construing section 1-4.1 as applying only to minors who

have not yet been found gu i l t y o f violating a court order does not rende r this provision superf luous when considere d in light of section 5-401(3) . Moreove r, the limit ed overla p betwee n these two sections of the Act does not ma

nifest an intent by

the Gene ral Asse mbly that section 1-4.1 override the sentenc ing provisions in section 5-710 or the probation revocation provisions i n section 5-720. ¶ 45 We further reje ct the State’s ar gument that the first sentenc e of

section 1-4.1 effectively takes its meaning from section 56 33(a) (11)( A)(ii) of the fede ral J uvenile J ustice and Delinquenc y Prevention Act (42 U.S.C. § 5633(a) (11)( A)(ii) (2006))

. This section of the fede ral act sets forth one of four core require ments with which

a state must comply in order to qualify for fede ral g rant monies to support that s t at e’ s juvenile justice and delinquency preve ntion eff orts. See 42 U.S.C. § 563 3 (c ) (2006) (identify ing the four require ments). Section 5633(a)(11) provides in re levant par t: “[J ]uveniles who are ch arge d with or who have committed an offe nse that would not be criminal i f committed by

an adult[ ] ***
shall not be place d in secur e detention fac iliti es or secur e

corr ectional fac iliti es[.] ” 42 U.S.C. § 5633(a) (11)( A) (2 0 06). 1
The fede ral act also contains an exc ep t i on to this require ment for “juveniles who are charg ed with or who have committed a violation of a va lid court order .” 42 U.S.C. § 5633(a) (11)( A)(ii) ( 2006). ¶ 46 The State maintains that Congr ess adopted the “valid court orde r

exception” in 1980 in respon s e to criticism that the fede ral act,

enac ted six year s earlier, limit ed a court’s ability to deal with chronic
status offe nders, such as chronic truants, runaw ay s, and curf ew

T his re qui re m ent has bec om e known as the “de ins ti tut ion al izat ion of 1
st atus off end er s.” Robe rt W. Sweet
, J r., Dei nst it uti onal iz ati on of Sta tus Off end ers : I n Pe rsp ect iv e , 18 Pepp . L. Re v. 389, 40 5 ( 1991 ).

-13-violators. See D’lora h L

. Hughes, An Ove rview ofthe Juve nile Justice

a nd Delinquenc

y Preve ntion Act and the Valid Court Order Exc eption
, 2011 Ark. L

. Notes 29, 32. Noting a simil arity betwee n the langu age of section 5633 of the fede ral act and section 1-4.1 of the I llinois statute, the State argues that the trial court’s c ommitm ent of responde nt was consistent with this valid court order ex ception. Acc ording to the State, responde nt committed a flagrant brea ch of the
terms of her probation, which was exactly the situation the valid court order exception was intended to a ddress. ¶ 47 T h e issue befor e us is not whether the trial court’s s en t en ce o f

incar cer ation is consistent with the purpose purportedly underly ing Congr ess’ adoption of the valid court order exception. The issue is whether the trial cour

t’s sentenc e of incar cer ation is consistent with the languag e of the I llinois statute. To the extent the fede ral statute is rele vant to that issue, we note that althoug h the l anguag e in section 1-4.1 is simil ar to section 5633 of the fede ral statute, i t i s not identical. The fede ral statute car ves out an ex ce p t i on to the rule prohi biting the institutionaliz ation of status offe nders for juveniles “cha rg ed with” a violation of a valid court order
, as well as juveniles “who have committed” a viol ation of a valid court order. 42 U.S.C. § 5633(a) (11)( A)(ii) (2006). Section 1-4.1, howeve r, only refers to minors “ac cused” of being in violation o f a valid court order

. 705 I L CS 405/1-4.1 (West 2010). “Ac cused” is akin to “cha rg ed with.” It is not akin to one “who ha s committed” a violation of a c ourt order

. T h u s , section 1-4.1 car

ves out a more narr ow exception to the rul e prohibiting the institutionaliz ation of status of fende rs. Although the State would ignor e this distinction betwee n the fede ral statute and the I llinois statute, we must apply section 1-4.1 a s written. See Hines v. Departme nt of

Public Aid
, 221 I ll. 2d 222, 230 (2006) (cour t may not

annex new p rovisions or substitut e differ ent ones in the guise of statutory construction). ¶ 48 The State contends that rea ding the I llinois statute so that a minor

could be incar cer ated up o n t h e mere acc usation of vi olating a court order bu t co uld not be incar cer ated upon being found guilty of violating a court order produce s an absurdity
, a result to be avoided. S ee People v. Hanna
, 207 I ll. 2d 486, 499 (2003). W e dis agree that

rea ding the statute acc ording to the its plain t er m s produce s an absurdity

. The conce rns that animate the Act’s provisions relating to the potential detention of minors upon be ing taken into custody and prior to an adjud icatory proce eding are not nece ssarily the same

-14-concer n s th a t a n im a te the Act’s sentenc ing provisions. The leg islature could have rea sonably concluded that enlar g ing the circ umstances under which a minor could be sentenc ed to i n ca rceration is antithetical to the statutory policy of promoting the development and implementation of community -base d programs to preve nt delinquent behavior . 705 I L CS 405/ 5-101(2) (a) (West 2010).

¶ 49 CONCLUSI ON ¶ 50 We conclude that the trial court was without authority to commit

responde nt to the Depa rtment of J uvenil e J u stice for unlawful consumption of alcohol. W e, there fore
, aff irm the judgme nt of the appellate court re versingthe judg ment of the trial c ourt.

¶ 51 Affir

med.

-15-