Filed 5/25/21 P. v. Baird CA2/6

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not 

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certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. 

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION SIX

THE PEOPLE,

 Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

JACOB J. BAIRD,

 Defendant and Appellant.

2d Crim. No. B306344

(Super. Ct. No. 2018018858)

(Ventura County)

Jacob J. Baird appeals from the judgment after the 

jury convicted him of six counts of owning, possessing or 

controlling a firearm in violation of a term of probation (Pen. 

Code,1 § 29815, subd. (a)), one count of owning, possessing or 

controlling ammunition in violation of a term of probation 

(§ 30305, subd. (a)(1)), and a misdemeanor violation of carrying a 

loaded firearm in public (§ 25850, subd. (a)). The trial court 

placed him on formal probation for 36 months with various terms 

1 Unless otherwise noted, all subsequent statutory 

references are to the Penal Code.
2

and conditions including that he serve 180 days in the county jail.

Baird contends: (1) there is no substantial evidence 

he was subject to a probation firearm prohibition, and (2) the 

probation term must be reduced to two years. We modify the 

judgment to reduce the probation term to two years and 

otherwise affirm.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

In 2017, Baird pled guilty to felony grand theft after 

he stole property from his employer, including a video camera 

case he planned to use to store handguns. The court agreed to 

“seriously consider” reducing the charge to a misdemeanor at the 

time of sentencing. (§ 17, subd. (b).)

At the request of the court, the probation department 

prepared recommended terms and conditions for both felony and 

misdemeanor probation. The recommended felony terms

included, “The defendant shall not own, possess, or have 

immediate access to any dangerous weapons, firearms, 

ammunition, or oleocapsicum [sic] pepper spray.” The 

recommended misdemeanor terms included, “No dangerous 

weapons, firearms, ammunition.”

At sentencing, the trial court declared the case to be 

a misdemeanor. The court reduced the jail term, restitution fine, 

and fees from those recommended in the probation report. A

transcript of an audio recording of the hearing quotes the judge 

as stating, “Remaining terms and conditions set forth in 

Probation’s report are appropriate. [¶] Based on the criminal 

history, no alcohol terms are appropriate from what I’ve seen. 

Drug terms are imposed.” Baird then “accept[ed] probation on 

those terms.”

The court reporter who prepared the transcript also 
3

prepared a second version that states, “no other terms are 

appropriate” rather than “no alcohol terms are appropriate.” 

(Italics added.) When the audio recording was played for the jury

in the current case, the reporter testified that she heard the word 

“alcohol,” not “other.”

The minute order states that Baird was released on 

36 months conditional revocable release (summary probation) on 

terms that include: “You shall not own, possess, or have 

immediate access to any dangerous weapons, firearms, 

ammunition or oleocapsicum [sic] pepper spray.” The minute 

order included an alcohol prohibition.

The minute order was based on information a judicial 

assistant entered into the computer system. She had worked 

with the sentencing judge for about six years. She interpreted 

his statement, “Remaining terms and conditions set forth in 

Probation’s report are appropriate,” to mean that the probation 

terms in the probation report were to be imposed. Baird signed 

the minute order, acknowledging, “I have received a copy of these 

conditions. I understand and agree to each of the conditions 

listed above.”

On June 1, 2018, while Baird was on probation in the 

2017 case, he went to a bar in Camarillo with a loaded handgun 

under his shirt in his waistband. After arresting Baird, deputies 

conducted a probation search of a bedroom and a garage safe at 

his home and found seven handguns, three rifles, a shotgun, and 

3,000 rounds of ammunition.

DISCUSSION

Sufficiency of the evidence

Baird contends his constitutional due process right 

was violated because the evidence was insufficient to establish he 
4

was prohibited from owning or possessing a firearm as “an 

express condition of probation.” We disagree.

Section 29815, subdivision (a), provides: “Any person 

who, as an express condition of probation, is prohibited or 

restricted from owning, possessing, controlling, receiving, or 

purchasing a firearm and who owns, purchases, receives, or has 

in possession or under custody or control, any firearm . . . is 

guilty of a public offense.” Section 30305, subdivision (a), makes 

it a crime for any “person prohibited from owning or possessing a 

firearm” pursuant to provisions including section 29815 to “own, 

possess, or have under custody or control, any ammunition.”

Due process requires that every element of an offense 

be proven by evidence that could reasonably convince a trier of 

fact beyond a reasonable doubt. (Jackson v. Virginia (1979) 443 

U.S. 307, 316-318.) We review the judgment to determine if it is 

supported by substantial evidence. (People v. Mincey (1992) 2 

Cal.4th 408, 432.) We review the entire record in the light most 

favorable to the judgment, presume in support of the judgment 

every fact that can reasonably be deduced from the evidence in 

the record and determine whether any reasonable finder of fact 

could have found that the prosecution sustained its burden of 

proof beyond a reasonable doubt. (Ibid.) We do not reweigh 

conflicting evidence or reevaluate the credibility of witnesses. 

(People v. Whisenhunt (2008) 44 Cal.4th 174, 200.)

Baird contends the record does not establish the 

existence of a probation term prohibiting him from possessing a 

firearm. A trial court’s oral pronouncements “will be harmonized

if possible” with the court minutes. (People v. Smith (1983) 33 

Cal.3d 596, 599.) “[P]robation conditions ‘need not be spelled out 

in great detail in court as long as the defendant knows what they 
5

are; to require recital in court is unnecessary in view of the fact 

the probation conditions are spelled out in detail on the probation 

order.”’ (People v. Pirali (2013) 217 Cal.App.4th 1341, 1346; see 

People v. Thrash (1978) 80 Cal.App.3d 898 [defendant bound by 

travel restriction added to written probation terms after 

sentencing, signed by judge, and provided to defendant].) Here, 

the comments of the sentencing judge, combined with the 

probation recommendations and the minute order signed by 

Baird, constitute substantial evidence that a firearm prohibition 

was imposed as a condition of probation.

Baird relies on one version of the sentencing

transcript to support his contention that the court did not impose 

the firearm prohibition. But the jury heard the audio recording 

of the hearing and ultimately resolved any conflicts in the 

evidence. (People v. Houston (2012) 54 Cal.4th 1186, 1214; 

CALCRIM No. 302.

Baird contends “it would have been illogical for the 

court to impose a firearm prohibition, because it would have been 

unreasonable” pursuant to People v. Lent (1975) 15 Cal.3d 481.2 

He also contends that the court should have stated the 

relationship between the firearm prohibition and the statutory 

purposes of probation. (§ 1203.1; People v. Clark (1982) 130 

Cal.App.3d 371, 386.) Baird apparently relies on Lent and Clark

to support his argument that the court did not prohibit firearm 

2 “A condition of probation will not be held invalid unless it 

‘(1) has no relationship to the crime of which the offender was 

convicted, (2) relates to conduct which is not in itself criminal, 

and (3) requires or forbids conduct which is not reasonably 

related to future criminality. . . .’” (People v. Lent, supra, 15 

Cal.3d at p. 486.)
6

possession, and not as an attempt to collaterally attack the

legality of the probation condition. If the former, the record 

contains substantial evidence that the court did impose the 

prohibition; if the latter, Baird forfeited any challenge to the 

legality of the probation condition by failing to object when it was 

imposed. (People v. Welch (1993) 5 Cal.4th 228, 237; see People v. 

Bowen (2004) 125 Cal.App.4th 101, 106.)

Baird contends that his right to own firearms was 

“restored” when the probation case was reduced to a 

misdemeanor. (§ 17, subd. (b).) He relies on People v. Gilbreth

(2007) 156 Cal.App.4th 53, 57, and People v. Culbert (2013) 218 

Cal.App.4th 184, 194, which hold that the law prohibiting felons 

from possessing firearms does not apply when the felony has 

been reduced to a misdemeanor. But Baird was not convicted of 

being a felon in possession of a firearm or ammunition. (§ 29800, 

former §§ 12021, 12316, subd. (b).) Instead, he was convicted of 

possessing firearms and ammunition in violation of a term of 

probation. (§§ 29815, 30305, subd. (a)(1).) The law regarding 

felons in possession of firearms does not limit the court’s 

authority to impose a firearm prohibition as a condition of 

probation. (§ 1203.1, subd. (j).) And while section 29805, which 

imposes a 10-year firearm prohibition for certain misdemeanor 

convictions, does not apply to Baird’s grand theft conviction, it 

also does not prohibit a probation condition prohibiting firearms.

Probation duration

Baird contends that his probation term must be 

reduced to two years pursuant to a recent amendment to section 

1203.1. We agree.

On April 27, 2020, the trial court placed Baird on 36 

months’ formal probation. On September 30, 2020, the Governor 
7

signed Assembly Bill No. 1950 (2019-2020 Reg. Sess.) (A.B. 1950), 

effective January 1, 2021. (Stats. 2020, ch. 328, § 2.) A.B. 1950 

amended section 1203.1, subdivision (a), to limit probation in 

felony cases to two years, with certain exceptions not applicable 

here. 

The Attorney General “does not contest” that the 

amendment applies. The two-year limitation on felony probation 

enacted by A.B. 1950 is an ameliorative change retroactive to 

cases not yet final on appeal. (People v. Sims (2021) 59 

Cal.App.5th 943, 955-964; People v. Quinn (2021) 59 Cal.App.5th 

874.)

The Attorney General requests that we remand to the 

trial court to consider whether any probation terms should be 

modified in light of the modified duration of probation. (See 

People v. Sims, supra, 59 Cal.App.5th at p. 964.) Remand is 

unnecessary because, should the trial court deem it appropriate

to modify or terminate probation, it retains the jurisdiction to do 

so. (§ 1203.3, subd. (a); People v. Quinn, supra, 59 Cal.App.5th at 

p. 885 & fn. 6.) We therefore order that the probation period be 

reduced to two years. 

DISPOSITION

We modify the judgment to reduce the probation term 

to two years. In all other respects the judgment is affirmed.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.

TANGEMAN, J.

We concur:

YEGAN, Acting P. J PERREN, J.
Ferdinand Inumerable, Judge

Superior Court County of Ventura

______________________________

Nancy Wechsler, under appointment by the Court of 

Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.

Xavier Becerra, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, 

Chief Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, 

Assistant Attorney General, Noah P. Hill and Thomas C. Hsieh, 

Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.