COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
Present: Judges Beales, Huff and Senior Judge Clements

THOMASINA LI GHT, A/K/A EVA LIGHT MEMORANDUM OPINION * v. Record No. 1996- 18-4 PER CURIAM JUNE 4, 2019 ALEXANDRIA DEPARTMEN T OF COMMUNITY AND HUMAN SERVICES

FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF ALEXANDRIA Lisa B. Kemler, Judge (Sameena Sabir, on brief), for appellant. Appellant submitti ng on brief. (Jonathan D. Westreich, Special Counsel; Joanna C. Anderson; Jill A. Schaub; Chr istopher G. Findlater, Guardian ad litemfor the minor child; Office of the City Attorney, on brief), for appell ee. Appellee and Guardian ad litem submitting on brief.
Thomasina Light, a/k/a Eva Light (mother) appeals the orders t erminating her p arental rights and approving the foster care pla n’s goal of returning the chil d to the father’s hom e. Mother argues that the circuit court erred by finding that (1) the Alexandria Department of Com munity and Human Services (the Department) provided reasonable services to mothe r and (2) the termination of mother’s parental rights was the “least restrictive option” eve n though the child was placed with his biological father. Upon reviewing the record and briefs of the parties, we conclude that the circuit court did not e rr. Accordingly, we affirm the decisionof the circuit court.

* Pursuant to Code § 17.1-413, this op inion is not designated fo r publication.UNPUBLISHED- 2 - BACKGROUND 1 “On appeal from the termination of parental rights, this Court is required t o review the evidence in the light most favor able to the party prevailing inthe circuit court.” Yafi v. Stafford Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 69 Va . App. 539, 550-51 (2018) (quoting T hach v. Arlington Cty. Dep’t of Human Servs., 63 Va. App. 157, 168 (2014)). Mother had been diagnosed wit h paranoid schizophrenia and bipo lar disorder and had been hospitalized “multiple times” for mental health issues. I n January 2017, mother was pregnant and had been homeless until she began residing with he r mother, Thomasina Lynette Light (the maternal grandmothe r). Mother denied being pregnantand told the maternal grandmother that she “had atumor on her stomach.” Throughout her pregnancy, mother did not participate in mental health treatment and did not take any med ication for her mental illness. When mother went into labor in April 2017, she was “combative and aggressive” with the paramedics, who responded to the maternal grandmother’s hom e. Mother denied being pregnant or in labor. Eventuall y, mother was transported to th e hospital where she gave birth to the child who is the subject of this appeal. While in the hospital, mother spoke with stuffed animals, laug hed to herself, and spoke about herself in the third pers on. Mother was very possessive of the child and refused to listen to the nurses about how to care for the child. The nurses and doc tors expressed concern to the Department about mother’s mental health and her ability to care for the child.

1 The record in this case was seal ed. Nevertheless, the appeal necessitates unsealing relevant portions of the record to resolve the issues appellant has raised. Evidence and factual findings below that are necessar y to address the assignments of error are included in this opinion. Consequently, “[t]o the extent that this opinion mentions facts found in the seale d record, we unseal only those specific facts , finding them relevant to the decision in this case. The remainder of the previously sealed recor d remains sealed.” Levick v. Mac Dougall, 294 Va. 283, 288 n.1 (2017).- 3 - A social worker met with mother, but found her to be “difficul t to engage . . . in conversation.” Mother informed the social worker that she did not want to return to the maternal grandmother’s home because the maternal grandmother was “not ni ce” and the home was “unsafe and dangerous.” Mother d id not have an alternative pla ce to stay with the child, and she did not want the child to be releas ed to the maternal grandmoth er. The Department removed the child from mother’s care, and mothe r was involuntarily committed to a hospital for psychiatric care. On April 28, 201 7, the City of Alexandria Juvenile and Domestic Relations District Court (the JDR court) entered t he emergency removal order. The Department spoke with Kevin Peck (father) on April 28, 201 7. Father informed the Department that he and mother had been engaged to be married, b ut he called off the wedding. The child was the result of a pl anned pregnancy, and he wanted custody of the child. A paternity test confirmed that father was t he biological father of the chi ld. On May 4, 2017, the JDR court entered a preliminary child prot ective order and ordered the parents to complete a ment al health assessment and comply w ith all recommendations. On June 1, 2017, the JDR court entered an adjudicatory order and f ound that the child was abused or neglected. On June 29, 2017, the JDR court entered a dispositi onal order, which was appealed to the circuit court. The circuitcourt adjudicated the child to be abused or neglected and entered a dispositional order. The circuit court also entered a child pr otective order and ordered mother to cooperate with family engagement services and preschool prevent ion services, cooperate with mental health evaluations and tre atment, comply with all treatm ent recommendations and medication, and cooperate with a par ental fitness assessment. The circuit court referred the case back to the JDR court. In August 2017, mother was hospita lized again for mental healt h treatment. After her discharge, mother lived in a s helter and subsequently moved to the maternal grandmother’s- 4 - house; however, she expressed a d esire to obtain her own housin g. The Department referred mother to counseling, psychiatri c services, and medication mana gement. Mother consistently attended individual counseling and complied with medication man agement. The Department also referred mother to presc hool prevention services to develo p skills to care for the child. In November 2017, the Department offered mother weekly supervised visitation with the child. The Department also required mother to show financial stability . Although mother was employed, she could not maintain the same job for more than a m onth. The Department further required mother “to demonstrate a n acceptable level of self-reg ulation, organization and problem solving skills.” In July 2018, mother participated in a parental capacity asses sment. The psychologist noticed that mother had a “mis understanding” about her mental h ealth and never acknowledged her diagnosis. The psychologist d iagnosed mother with bipolar disorder I, moderate. The psychologist found that mother had “poor control of her emotion s” and “poor coping skills,” which led her “to be compulsive a nd feel helpless when attempti ng to control her world and manage her problems.” The psychologist also found that mother had “poor interpersonal relationships” and “low self-e steem.” Although mother had a “h ealthy interest in parenting” the child and demonstrated an “ability to understand child developm ent,” the psychologist was concerned that mother lacked asupport system due to her “tumul tuous relationship with her mother.” Mother’s mental hea lth also proved to be a concern be cause she still had “difficulty being honest with herself and managing her emotions in a health y manner.” The psychologist questioned mother’s capacity to meet the child’s developmental and emotional needs. Considering mother’s limitations and weaknesses, the psychologi st opined that there was a possibility of a “moderate level of risk for future child negle ct.”- 5 - The Department recommended a goal of returning the child home t o father. Father had complied with the Department’s re quirements and developed a str ong bond with the child. In June 2018, the Department placed the child, on a trial basis, w ith father. On the other hand, mother was not consistent with he r visitations and had a “weak” attachment to the child. Since mother did not consistently visit with the child, the Departmen t was unable to assess her mental health stability. In August 2018, the Department filed a petition for a permanen cy planning hearing with the goal of return home to father and a petition to terminate m other’s parental rights. On September 4, 2018, the JDR court terminated mother’s parental r ights and approved the goal of returning the child home to fathe r. Mother appealed to the cir cuit court. On November 9, 2018, the parties app eared before the circuit c ourt. Mother’s therapist testified that mother regular ly attended counseling sessions, w ith the goal of managing her emotions better. When mother was hospitalized in August 2017, she still did not acknowledge her mental illness, and instea d, stated that her hospitalizatio n occurred because of a “misunderstanding.” The therapistlast saw mother in September 2018 and explained that mother had made progress toward gaining insight into her mental illnes s, but still had not fully accepted it. The therapist did not believe that mother could care for h erself independently and needed her family’s financial support. Mother also did not accept any res ponsibility in the child’s removal and repeatedly described it as “a miscommunication, a misunders tanding.” The Department presented additional evidence that in August 20 18, mother still had not accepted responsibility for the child’s removal. Mother told t he social worker that the child’s removal “was a big conspiracy on the hospital and agency’s part s and that it was done to make money.” The Department also prese nted evidence that mother did not understand the situation- 6 - because after the JDR court terminated her parental rights, mot her thought that her visitations would increase. The Department remained concerned about mother’s housing and e mployment situation. Mother was living with the mater nal grandmother, with whom she had a “conflictual relationship.” Mother also w as unable to stay at one job for m ore than a month. The Department explained that it was seeking t he termination of mother’s paren tal rights, eve n though the child was being placed with his father and not being adopted, because mother had failed to address her mental health issues and show tha t she was capable of parenting the child. Mother testified and denied muc h of the Departm ent’s evidence about her pregnancy and the birth of the child. She said that she knew she was pregnan t and she knew she was in labor; however, she did not want father t o come to the hospital becaus e he had abused her “mentally and emotionally.” When asked if she understood why the child w as removed, mother explained that the Department was “in f ear of [her] like throwing fits or something.” Mother testified that she take s her medication and sees a psyc hiatrist and counselor. In October 2018, mother moved, so s he had a new psychiatrist and c ounselor, both of whom she had seen once before the circuit court hearing. Mother acknowl edged that she had been diagnosed as bipolar and that th e medication helped her feel “m ore stabilized.” Mother also admitted that father had “made a lot of progress” and that the child was doing well in his care. She told t he circuit court that she wa nted father, herself , or her mother to have custody of the child and tha t she did not want her parenta l rights to be terminated. At the conclusion of the eviden ce and argument, the circuit co urt terminated mother’s parental rights under Code § 16.1- 283(B) and (C)(2). The circu it court also approved the foster care plan’s goal of returning the child home to father and refe rred the matter to the JDR court for further proceedings. This appeal followed.- 7 - ANALYSIS In our review of a trial court’s termination of parental rights , the “trial court is presumed to have thoroughly weighed all the evidence, considered the sta tutory requirements, and made its determination based on the child’s best interests.” Castillo v . Loudoun Cty. Dep’t of Family Servs., 68 Va. App. 547, 558 (2018) (quoting Logan v. Fairfax C ty. Dep’t of Human Dev., 13 Va. App. 123, 128 (1991)). “Where, as here, the court hears th e evidence ore tenus , its finding is entitled to great weight and will not be disturbed on appeal un less plainly wrong or without evidence to support it.” Fauquier Cty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. v. Ridgeway, 59 Va. App. 185, 190 (2011) (quoting Martin v. Pittsylvania Cty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs ., 3 Va. App. 15, 20 (1986)).
Reasonable services Mother argues that the circui t court erred in finding that the Department had provided reasonable services to her. Mothe r asserts that if the service s had been reasonable, then she “should have progressed, in increas ed contact, increased visita tion, less supervision and ultimately a co-parenting relationship with Father.” The circuit court terminated m other’s parental r ights under Cod e § 16.1-283(B), which states a parent’s parental r ights may be terminated if: 1. The neglect or abuse suffered by s uch child presented a ser ious and substantial threat to his life, health or development; and 2. It is not reasonably likely t hat the conditions which resul ted in such neglect or abuse can be subs tantially corrected or elimina ted so as to allow the child’s safe return to his parent or parents within a reasonable period of time. In making this determination, the court shall take into considera tion the efforts made to rehabil itate the parent or parents by any public or private social, medical, mental health or other rehabilitative agencies prior to the chi ld’s initial placement in foster care.- 8 - The circuit court adjudicated that the child was abused or neg lected. 2 Once the court found that the child was abused or neglected, the Department wa s not required to provide services to mother. “Nothi ng in Code § 16.1-283 or the larger statutory scheme requires that . . . [rehabilitative] services be provi ded in all cases as a prerequ isite to termination under subsection B.” Toms v. Hanover Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 46 Va. App. 257, 268 (2005); see also Farrell v. Warren Cty. Dep’t of Soc . Servs., 59 Va. App. 375, 408-09 (2012 ). Nevertheless, the Department referred mother to individual counseling, psychiatri c services, medication management, preschool prevention s ervices, and a parental capac ity assessment. Therefore, the circuit court did not err because despite the Department not be ing required to provide services to mother, it had provided her w ith reasonable services. Termination of parental rights Mother argues that the circuit court erred when it terminated her parental rights because it was not necessary when the chil d had been placed with father. She asserts that the termination of her parental rights should ha ve been the last resort. “The termination of parental ri ghts is a grave , drastic, and i rreversible action.” Haugen v. Shenandoah Valley Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 274 Va. 27, 34-35 (2007 ) (quoting Lowe v. Dep’t of Pub. Welfare of the City of Richmond, 231 Va. 277, 280 (1986)). “The Supreme Court has repeatedly emphasized that ‘[ w]hile it may be occasionally nece ssary to sever the legal relationship between parent and c hild, those circumstances are rare.’” Thach, 63 Va. App. at 172 (quoting Tackett v. Arlington Cty. Dep’t of Human Servs., 62 Va . App. 296, 320 (2013)). “If there is ‘reason to believe that positive, nurturing parent-chi ld relationships exist, the [state’s] parens patriae interest favors preservation, no t severance, of natural famili al bonds.’” Id. at 173 (quoting Richmond Dep’t of Soc . Servs. v. Crawley, 47 Va. App. 572, 581 (2006)).

2 Mother did not appeal the circu it court’s finding that the chi ld was abused or neglected.- 9 - The circuit court recognized that it is “never easy . . . to de cide whether or not to terminate a parent’s rights.” As noted above, the circuit cour t terminated mother’s parental rights under Code § 16.1-283(B), whic h “‘speaks prospectively’ and requires the circuit court to make a judgment call on the parent ’s ability, following a findi ng of neglect or abuse, to substantially remedy the underlyi ng problems.” Toms, 46 Va. Ap p. at 270-71 (quoting City of Newport News Dep’t of Soc. S ervs. v. Winslow, 40 Va. App. 556, 562-63 (2003)). Although mother had completed many of the required services, there was n o evidence that she had remedied the conditions that led t o the child’s f oster care pla cement. Mother refused to acknowledge her role in the chil d’s removal from her care. She testified that the child was removed because the Department was “in fear of [her] like throw ing fits or something.” The psychologist who evaluated mother also expressed concerns about mother’s mental health and her inability to manage her emo tions and develop healthy relati onships. In addition, the psychologist found that mother had a “tendency to minimize the reality of her life” and did not take responsibility f or her actions. The psychologist forewarn ed that the child would be at risk of neglect if placed with mother. M other’s therapist testified that mother had not fully accepted her mental illness, although she had made progress toward gaini ng insight about it. The therapist did not believe that mother was capable of caring for herself i ndependently and relied on her family for support. The circuit court based its d ecision to terminate mother’s par ental rights on a number of factors, including mother’s men tal illness, her history of unst able housing and employment, her inability to care for herself independently, and her relationsh ip issues. The circuit court acknowledged that mother had “made a lot of progress since her last hospitalization,” but explained that her focus for the future should be on her own we ll-being. The evidence proved that the child had not bonded with m other, but was very attache d to father. The circuit court- 10 - found that mother did not have the “tools and resources and edu cation to be a good[,] caring and loving parent to” the child, and it was uncertain whether she w ould be capable of developing those skills. “It is clearly not in t he best interests of a child to spend a lengthy period of time waiting to find out when, or even if, a parent will be capable of resum ing his [or her] responsibilities.” Tackett, 62 Va. App. at 322 (quotin g Kaywood v. Halifax Cty. De p’t of Soc. Servs., 10 Va. App. 535, 540 (1990)). Considering the circumstances, the circuit c ourt did not err in terminating mother’s parental rights under Code § 16.1-283(B) and finding t hat the termination was in the child’s best interests. “When a trial court’s judgment is made on alternative grounds, we need only consider whether any one of the alternativ es is sufficient to sustain th e judgment of the t rial court, and if so, we need not address the ot her grounds.” Kilby v. Culpeper Cty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 55 Va. App. 106, 108 n.1 (2009); see also F ields v. Dinwiddie Cty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 46 Va. App. 1, 8 (2005) (the Court affi rmed termination of parenta l rights under one subsection of Code § 16.1-283 and did not need to a ddress termination of pare ntal rights pursuant to another subsection). Therefore, we will not consider whether the circu it court erred in terminating mother’s parental rights pur suant to Code § 16.1-283(C)(2).
CONCLUSION For the foregoing reasons, the circuit court’s ruling is affirm ed. Affirmed.