DEFENSE NUCLEAR FACILITIES SAFETY BOARD

February 16, 2024

TO: Katherine R. Herrera, Acting Technical Director

FROM: A. Holloway and C. Stott, Resident Inspectors

SUBJECT: Pantex Plant Activity Report for Week Ending February 16, 2024

Staff Activity: J. Anderson, F. Bamdad, C. Berg, and Z. Demeke were onsite to review a hazard 

analysis report as part of assessing the effectiveness of Board Recommendation 2019-1.

Safety Basis: This week, CNS safety analysis engineering (SAE) declared a potential 

inadequacy of the safety analysis (PISA) related to the identification of a nuclear explosive with 

deformation and cracking on a weapon component (see 2/9/24 report). In response to the PISA, 

CNS implemented an operational restriction prohibiting further operations on the unit.

In addition, last week, CNS SAE declared another PISA when identifying the combination 

weight of two items (i.e., desiccant and electrostatic dissipative bag) exceeded the parameters for 

a specific impact hazard for one weapon program. CNS further determined that the PISA 

represented an unreviewed safety question due to the increase in probability of a previously 

evaluated accident and its consequences. In this instance, CNS did not implement any 

operational restrictions due to existing controls within the hazard analysis report.

Furthermore, last week, a CNS operations center manager discovered that the Pantex Plant 

Operations Center Manual had been updated and published without proper authorization. The 

manual update incorporated less restrictive severe weather controls. CNS personnel had 

previously questioned the new controls and their inconsistency with the current Technical Safety 

Requirements (TSR). CNS mission engineering personnel stated that the change was 

appropriate, as the less restrictive severe weather controls were approved by NPO and would be 

included in the next TSR revision. However, the next TSR revision did not include these revised 

controls since the necessary implementation process had not been completed. Since the 

Operations Center Manual still conflicted with the revised TSR, the CNS operations center 

manager determined that there had been three separate occurrences when actions were not taken

in accordance with the TSR for high wind events. CNS declared that a violation of the TSR 

occurred due to this oversight. During the investigation, CNS personnel compiled actions to 

republish the previous Pantex Plant Operations Center Manual with the more restrictive severe 

weather controls, brief all plant shift superintendents on this change, and complete the necessary 

implementation process for the new controls.

NPO Correspondence: Earlier this week, NPO transmitted a memo to CNS identifying an 

emerging item of interest (EII) specific to the recent increase in weapon quality issues (see

9/15/23, 11/17/23, 12/8/23, and 1/19/24 reports). In the memo, NPO identifies seven weapon 

quality issues that “are directly chargeable to CNS in Fiscal Year 2024.” NPO has previously 

directed CNS to take corrective actions for each of the seven weapon quality issues listed. The

purpose of this EII is to document NPO concerns and provide criteria for consideration during an 

overarching evaluation of the recent increase. NPO states that the evaluation “should consider 

underlying issues such as training, culture, overtime, error rate on graves versus day shift, etc., 

and relation to other known performance issues such as Conduct of Operations.”