Pursuant to Ind.Appellate Rule 65(D), 

this Memorandum Decision shall not be 

regarded as precedent or cited before 

any court except for the purpose of 

establishing the defense of res judicata, 

collateral estoppel, or the law of the case.

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANTS: ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEES:

MICHAEL L. CARMIN ROBERT C. PRICE

GREGORY A. BULLMAN Price & Runnells

Andrews Harrell Mann Carmin & Parker, P.C. Bloomington, Indiana

Bloomington, Indiana

THOMAS A. BERRY

Berry & Domer

Bloomington, Indiana

IN THE

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

SHERRI HILLENBURG and )

DENNIS HILLENBURG, )

)

Appellants-Plaintiffs, )

)

vs. ) No. 53A04-1111-PL-615

)

PAUL D. REEVES AND NORMA J. REEVES )

REVOCABLE TRUST; PAUL REEVES, )

NORMA J. REEVES and JOHN REEVES, )

)

Appellees-Defendants. )

APPEAL FROM THE MONROE CIRCUIT COURT

The Honorable Elizabeth A. Cure, Judge

Cause No. 53C04-0907-PL-1934

August 13, 2012

MEMORANDUM DECISION - NOT FOR PUBLICATION

MAY, Judge
2

Sherri and Dennis Hillenburg appeal the denial of their Motion to Correct Error filed 

in response to a judgment in favor of the Paul D. Reeves and Norma J. Reeves Revocable 

Trust, Paul Reeves, Norma J. Reeves, and John Reeves (collectively, “Reeves”) regarding the 

ownership of a parcel of land situated between land owned by Hillenburgs and land owned 

by Reeves (the “Disputed Parcel”). Hillenburgs present multiple issues for our review, but 

we find one dispositive – whether the trial court erred when it determined Reeves established 

ownership of the Disputed Parcel through title by acquiescence. We affirm.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

The Disputed Parcel measures approximately twelve feet across at its widest point. 

Sometime prior to 1939, when Norma Reeves’ parents, John and Janlee Holland, bought the 

Reeves parcel, a barbed wire fence was erected between the two parcels to separate the 

Reeves parcel from an orchard owned by the Adams Brothers. In 2008, Dennis Hillenburg 

surveyed his property and discovered the fence was on the Hillenburg parcel.

On July 31, 2009, Sherri Hillenburg filed a complaint against Reeves, alleging a 

dispute over who may use a passageway on the Disputed Parcel, whether there was trespass 

on the Disputed Parcel, and damages therefrom. Reeves answered and counterclaimed to 

quiet the title of the Disputed Parcel through adverse possession or title by acquiescence. In 

the counterclaim, Reeves named Dennis Hillenburg as a co-defendant. 

After a bench trial, the court declared Reeves the owner of the Disputed Parcel by 

adverse possession and title by acquiescence. The Hillenburgs filed a Motion to Correct 

Error, which the trial court denied.
3

DISCUSSION AND DECISION

A trial court has broad discretion in ruling on a motion to correct error. Volunteers of 

Am. v. Premier Auto Acceptance Corp., 755 N.E.2d 656, 658 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001). We will 

reverse only for an abuse of that discretion. Id. An abuse of discretion occurs if the decision 

was against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances before the court or if the court 

misapplied the law. Id.

Where, as here, a party has requested findings and conclusions under Indiana Trial 

Rule 52(A), our standard of review is well-settled. We must first determine whether the 

evidence supports the findings and second, whether the findings support the judgment.

Maxwell v. Maxwell, 850 N.E.2d 969, 972 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006), reh’g denied, trans. denied. 

We will disturb the judgment only where there is no evidence supporting the findings or the 

findings do not support the judgment. Id. We do not reweigh the evidence and consider only 

the evidence favorable to the judgment. Id. Appellants must establish the findings are 

clearly erroneous, which occurs only when a review of the record leaves us firmly convinced 

a mistake has been made. Id. We defer substantially to findings of fact, but we do not defer 

to conclusions of law. Id. A judgment is clearly erroneous if it relies on an incorrect legal 

standard. Id. When a party requests findings and conclusions, a trial court is required to 

make complete special findings sufficient to disclose a valid basis under the issues for the 

legal result reached in the judgment. Id. The purpose of Rule 52(A) findings and 

conclusions is to provide the parties and reviewing courts with the theory on which the case 

was decided. Id.
4

In its order denying the Hillenburgs’ motion to correct error, the trial court found, 

“Reeves proved by clear and convincing evidence all the requirements to establish title by 

acquiescence.” (App. at 21.) The Hillenburgs argue this conclusion of law is in error, as 

“there was no Finding of any agreement – explicit or implicit – that the fence was the 

property line.” (Br. of Appellant at 19-20.) We disagree.

Over a century ago, our Indiana Supreme Court explained the doctrine of title by 

acquiescence:

As a general rule, it is affirmed by the authorities that where owners of 

adjoining premises establish by agreement a boundary or dividing line between 

their lands, take and hold possession of their respective tracts, and improve the 

same in accordance with such division, each party, in the absence of fraud, will 

thereafter be estopped from asserting that the line so agreed upon and 

established is not the true boundary line, although the period of time which has 

elapsed since such line was established and possession taken is less than the 

statutory period of limitation. The general rule recognized by the authorities is 

that a boundary line located under such circumstances, in the absence of fraud, 

becomes binding on the owners establishing it, not on the principle that the 

title to the lands can be passed by parol, but for the reason that such owners 

have agreed permanently upon the limits of their respective premises and have 

acted in respect to such line, and have been controlled thereby, and therefore 

will not thereafter be permitted to repudiate their acts.

Adams v. Betz, 167 Ind. 161, 169, 78 N.E. 649, 652 (1906). More recently, this court 

delineated specific circumstances under which a landowner may obtain a parcel of land via 

title by acquiescence:

Two adjoining property owners (1) share a good-faith belief concerning the 

location of the common boundary line that separates their properties and, (2) 

although the agreed-upon location is not in fact the actual boundary, (3) use 

their properties as if that boundary was the actual boundary (4) for a period of 

at least twenty years. 
5

Huntington v. Riggs, 862 N.E.2d 1263, 1274 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007), Friedlander, J. 

concurring,

1

trans. denied. The agreement between the two adjoining landowners “need not 

be express and may be inferred from the parties’ actions, but there must be evidence of some 

agreement as to the boundary line.” Freiburger v. Fry, 439 N.E.2d 169, 172 (Ind. Ct. App. 

1982). An agreement regarding a boundary between adjoining properties other than the 

actual property line “is not only binding on those parties who agree but also their successors 

in interest as long as there was no fraud present in the making of the agreement.” Id.

Reeves presented evidence that for over twenty years the adjacent property owners 

agreed the fence was the property boundary. The fence was in its current location when 

Reeves purchased the parcel in 1963, and since that time it has served as the boundary 

between the Reeves parcel and the adjoining property. During this time, Reeves maintained

and used the Disputed Parcel as a recreation area, cut firewood, allowed the City of 

Bloomington to run a water line from Lake Monroe, and dug a trench to connect the Disputed

Parcel to the water line.

Reeves testified he and Mr. Eads, who owned the adjoining parcel in the late 1970’s

both believed and agreed the fence was the boundary between their two properties. Reeves 

testified the two subsequent owners of the Hillenburg property, Spires and Andler, did not 

protest Reeves’ use of the Disputed Parcel nor did they question whether the fence, then in 

disrepair, was the property boundary.

In 1986, the Hillenburgs bought the property adjoining the Reeves parcel. In 1999, 

 

1

 The other panelists joined the concurring opinion. 
6

Reeves removed trees from the Disputed Parcel and sold the timber. There is no evidence the 

Hillenburgs took issue with the removal of the timber at the time of its removal, nor does it 

appear the Hillenburgs contested the fence’s status as the boundary between the properties 

until Dennis Hillenburg conducted a survey in 2008. By that time, Reeves and all the people 

who owned the adjacent parcel since 1963, including the Hillenburgs, had agreed the fence 

had been the boundary between the properties for over forty years. Therefore, we agree 

Reeves obtained title by acquiescence, and affirm the trial court’s denial of the Hillenburgs’ 

Motion to Correct Error.2

Affirmed.

FRIEDLANDER, J., and BARNES, J., concur.

 

2 The Hillenburgs also appeal the denial of Sherri’s claim for trespass, and they claim the trial court should 

have ruled on Dennis’ motion for attorney fees. As the trial court properly found Reeves owns the Disputed 

Parcel, Sherri’s trespass claim is moot. In its order denying the Hillenburgs’ Motion to Correct Errors, the trial 

court stated, “Each party shall pay their [sic] own attorney fees and costs.” (App. at 22.) Thus, the trial court 

did rule on Dennis’ motion. As the Hillenburgs have not presented an argument why that ruling was in error, 

we are unable to address the issue.