Present: Hassell, C.J., Keenan, Koontz, Kinser, Lemons, and 

Agee, JJ., and Russell, S.J. 

KYNA CHANELLE McGOWAN 

 OPINION BY 

v. Record No. 062482 JUSTICE LAWRENCE L. KOONTZ, JR. 

 November 2, 2007 

COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 

FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 

In this appeal, the sole issue we consider is whether the 

trial court erred in admitting evidence of a subsequent crime 

committed by the criminal defendant for the purpose of 

impeaching the credibility of the defendant’s testimony during 

cross-examination. 

BACKGROUND 

Kyna Chanelle McGowan (McGowan) was indicted, as a 

principal in the second degree, for unlawfully and feloniously 

distributing cocaine on March 4, 2004 in the City of Hampton. 

Thereafter, she was tried and found guilty of that offense in 

a jury trial conducted in the Circuit Court of the City of 

Hampton, and sentenced to five years imprisonment with a 

$5,000 fine. 

We state the evidence taken at trial in the light most 

favorable to the Commonwealth, the prevailing party below. 

Teleguz v. Commonwealth, 273 Va. 458, 467, 643 S.E.2d 708, 714 

(2007). On March 4, 2004, James McCoy (McCoy), a confidential 

informant working for the Hampton Police Department’s Special 
2

Investigations Unit, conducted a controlled buy of crack 

cocaine as part of a local drug interdiction program. After 

driving to a particular shopping center known to be in a 

“high-drug area,” McCoy was approached by Saroyal Booker 

(Booker), who asked McCoy whether “he was looking.” McCoy 

responded that he wanted a “20 rock.” Booker then instructed 

McCoy to follow her because her “girl [was] across the street 

at McDonald’s.” 

Upon arriving at the McDonald’s parking lot, McCoy 

watched as Booker approached and spoke with McGowan. McCoy 

continued his observation as McGowan reached under her shirt 

and handed something to Booker. Booker then returned to McCoy 

and handed him two rocks of crack cocaine in exchange for 

twenty dollars. Booker then walked over to McGowan, and 

again, a transaction occurred. 

On July 13, 2004, McGowan was arrested pursuant to the 

indictment charging her for distribution of cocaine on March 

4, 2004. At that time, Hampton Police Detective Christine 

Saunders conducted a search incident to arrest, during which 

McGowan “turned her back, reached down into her bra and handed 

[the Detective] two items . . . wrapped in small pieces of 

plastic.” Detective Saunders believed these items to be crack 

cocaine. 
3

Prior to trial, the Commonwealth moved the trial court in 

limine to allow it to introduce evidence of the suspected 

crack cocaine found in McGowan’s possession on the day of her 

arrest. The court denied the motion with respect to the 

introduction of the evidence in the Commonwealth’s case-inchief. However, the court expressly reserved ruling as to 

whether the Commonwealth could introduce that evidence in 

rebuttal. 

McGowan chose to take the stand during the ensuing jury 

trial, denying any knowledge of, and participation in, the 

March 4, 2004 drug sale. McGowan maintained that she had 

removed money from her bra and given it to Booker, her friend, 

to buy a meal at the McDonald’s restaurant. During crossexamination, McGowan testified that she “wouldn’t know crack 

cocaine if [she] saw it.” In an attempt to impeach McGowan’s 

statement, the Commonwealth then asked “[s]o when you were 

arrested on July 13, 2004, did you have any crack cocaine on 

your person?” Over defense counsel’s objection, the trial 

court allowed similar questioning to proceed, to which McGowan 

denied possessing crack cocaine on July 13, 2004. The court 

reasoned that, because McGowan had not objected to initial 

questions concerning her lack of knowledge of crack cocaine, 

she had thus “opened the door” to the evidence of her later 

possession of the drug on July 13, 2004. The Commonwealth 
4

then elicited the testimony of Detective Saunders regarding 

the arrest and search of McGowan on July 13, 2004, for the 

purpose of rebutting McGowan’s testimony. 

At the conclusion of the introduction of the evidence, 

the trial court gave a limiting instruction directing the jury 

to consider the July 13, 2004 incident “only as evidence of 

the defendant’s intent, opportunity or as evidence of the 

absence of mistake or accident on the part of the defendant in 

connection with the offense for which she is on trial.” When 

the proceedings in the trial court were concluded, McGowan 

pursued an appeal of her conviction in the Court of Appeals. 

The Court of Appeals affirmed McGowan’s conviction in a 

divided en banc decision, holding that “[t]he trial court 

properly admitted the evidence of McGowan’s subsequent 

possession of cocaine in order to prove her knowledge of 

cocaine, as well as to impeach her credibility.” McGowan v. 

Commonwealth, 48 Va. App. 333, 344, 630 S.E.2d 758, 764 

(2006). This appeal followed. 

DISCUSSION 

The thrust of the Commonwealth’s position is that McGowan 

“opened the door” to evidence of other crimes when she 

testified during cross-examination that she had no knowledge 

of cocaine. See Satcher v. Commonwealth, 244 Va. 220, 251-52, 

421 S.E.2d 821, 840 (1992) (denial of complicity in crime by 
5

witness opens the door for questions on cross-examination 

relevant to issue of guilt or innocence). The Commonwealth 

does not contend that the evidence of McGowan’s possession of 

crack cocaine when she was arrested on July 13, 2004 was 

admissible in its case-in-chief to prove that McGowan had the 

requisite knowledge of cocaine on March 4, 2004 as charged in 

the indictment. 

Indeed, in accord with this Court’s well-established 

precedent addressing the inadmissibility of evidence of other 

crimes to prove the crime presently charged, there is no 

challenge to the trial court’s denial of the Commonwealth’s 

motion in limine with regard to that issue. See generally, 

Kirkpatrick v. Commonwealth, 211 Va. 269, 176 S.E.2d 802 

(1970). Likewise, there is no dispute that in order to 

convict McGowan of the charged offense, the Commonwealth had 

the burden of proving that McGowan had knowledge of the nature 

and character of the substance involved in the alleged 

distribution on March 4, 2004. See Burton v. Commonwealth, 

215 Va. 711, 713, 213 S.E.2d 757, 759 (1975) (Commonwealth 

must prove that defendant possessed drug with knowledge of its 

nature and character). Thus, the sole focus of our analysis 

here is whether, under the particular circumstances of this 

case, the Commonwealth was properly permitted to introduce 

evidence of another crime during its cross-examination of 
6

McGowan and during rebuttal testimony in order to establish an 

essential element of the crime charged. 

In Guill v. Commonwealth, 255 Va. 134, 495 S.E.2d 489 

(1998), we held that: 

Evidence that shows or tends to show a defendant has 

committed a prior crime generally is inadmissible to 

prove the crime charged. Such evidence implicating 

an accused in other crimes unrelated to the charged 

offense is inadmissible because it may confuse the 

issues being tried and cause undue prejudice to the 

defendant. 

Id. at 138, 495 S.E.2d at 491 (internal citations omitted). 

There are several exceptions to this rule. “Evidence of 

‘other crimes’ is relevant and admissible if it tends to prove 

any element of the offense charged. Thus, evidence of other 

crimes is allowed when it tends to prove motive, intent, or 

knowledge of the defendant.” Id. (citing Kirkpatrick, 211 Va. 

at 272, 176 S.E.2d at 805) (emphasis omitted). 

However, in order for evidence of the defendant’s other 

crimes to be admissible under the “knowledge of the defendant” 

exception, its tendency to produce prejudice must not outweigh 

its probative value. See Coe v. Commonwealth, 231 Va. 83, 87, 

340 S.E.2d 820, 823 (1986). We have held in this regard that 

“[e]vidence of collateral facts or those incapable of 

affording any reasonable presumption or inference on matters 

in issue, because [they are] too remote or irrelevant, cannot 

be accepted in evidence.” Bunting v. Commonwealth, 208 Va. 
7

309, 314, 157 S.E.2d 204, 208 (1967). Accordingly, “ ‘[t]he 

test as to whether a matter is material or collateral, in the 

matter of impeachment of a witness, is whether . . . the 

cross-examining party would be entitled to prove it in support 

of his case.’ ” Stottlemyer v. Ghramm, 268 Va. 7, 12, 597 

S.E.2d 191, 193 (2004) (quoting Allen v. Commonwealth, 122 Va. 

834, 842, 94 S.E. 783, 786 (1918)). Therefore, when “ ‘the 

circumstances [of the other event] have no intimate connection 

with the main fact; if they constitute no link in the chain of 

evidence . . . they ought to be excluded.’ ” Guill, 255 Va. 

at 139, 495 S.E.2d at 492 (quoting Walker v. Commonwealth, 28 

Va. (1 Leigh) 574, 577 (1829)). Evidence that relates to a 

separate offense for which the defendant is not currently 

standing trial, and which cannot be used for any purpose other 

than for impeachment of the defendant, is certainly collateral 

to the main issue. Cf. Seilheimer v. Melville, 224 Va. 323, 

327, 295 S.E.2d 896, 898 (1982). 

Notwithstanding these principles, it is well settled 

that, “[e]very criminal defendant is privileged to testify 

in his own defense, or to refuse to do so. But that 

privilege cannot be construed to include the right to commit 

perjury.” Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222, 225 (1971). 

Clearly, a criminal defendant such as McGowan cannot expect 

to make a misleading statement to the jury without also 
8

“open[ing] the door to cross-examination for the purpose of 

attacking [her] credibility.” Santmier v. Commonwealth, 217 

Va. 318, 319-20, 228 S.E.2d 681, 682 (1976). Under our 

jurisprudence however, the cross-examiner is bound by the 

answer given, and cannot introduce any extrinsic evidence to 

otherwise contradict the witness. Allen, 122 Va. at 841, 94 

S.E. at 785. Thus, “the answer of the witness will be 

conclusive; [she] cannot be asked as to any collateral 

independent fact merely with a view to contradict [her] 

afterwards by calling another witness.” Id. at 842, 94 S.E. 

at 786. 

Applying these principles to the facts in this case, we 

are of opinion that the trial court erred in permitting the 

Commonwealth to introduce evidence of McGowan’s alleged 

possession of crack cocaine on July 13, 2004, during the 

trial for the March 4, 2004 distribution of cocaine. 

Assuming, as we must from the record, that the substance 

recovered during the search of McGowan on July 13, 2004 was 

in fact crack cocaine, evidence of McGowan’s possession of 

that substance was evidence of another crime. The July 13, 

2004 crime was committed subsequent to the crime charged, 

and had little, if any, tendency to prove that McGowan had 

knowledge of cocaine on March 4, 2004. This evidence was 
9

therefore unduly prejudicial and inadmissible in the 

Commonwealth’s case-in-chief. 

Moreover, while the Commonwealth had the right to 

cross-examine McGowan with regard to her knowledge of crack 

cocaine after she chose to testify on her own behalf, the 

Commonwealth was not permitted through the testimony of 

Detective Saunders to offer clearly prejudicial evidence of 

another crime to rebut McGowan’s testimony. The 

Commonwealth cannot be allowed to essentially smuggle into 

evidence during its cross-examination of a defendant proof 

of another crime not admissible in its case-in-chief, which 

is not only highly inflammatory and misleading to a jury, 

but lacking in serious probative value as well. To hold 

otherwise would, as the dissent in the Court of Appeals 

aptly noted, allow the exception to swallow the rule 

prohibiting evidence of other crimes in drug-related cases. 

McGowan, 48 Va. App. at 347, 630 S.E.2d at 765 (Frank, J., 

dissenting). 

CONCLUSION 

For these reasons, we conclude that the Court of Appeals 

erred in holding that the trial court properly admitted the 

evidence of McGowan’s subsequent possession of cocaine in 

order to prove her knowledge of cocaine on March 4, 2004, as 

well as to impeach her credibility. Accordingly, we will 
10

reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals and remand this 

case to that Court with instructions that the case be remanded 

to the trial court for a new trial, if the Commonwealth be so 

advised.

Reversed and remanded.