This decision was not selected for publication inthe New Mexico Reports. Please see Rule 12- 1 405 NMRA for restrictions on the citation of unpublished decisions. Please also note that this 2 electronic decision may contain computer-generated errors or other deviations from the official 3 paper version filed by the Supreme Court and does not include the filing date. 4 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW MEXICO 5 Opinion Number: 6 7 Filing Date: 8 9 NO. 30,607 10 STATE OF NEW MEXICO, 11 Plaintiff-Appellee, 12

v. 13 PEDRO ZARAZUA, 14 Defendant-Appellant. 15

APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF EDDY COUNTY 16 Thomas A. Rutledge, District Judge 17
Liane E. Kerr, L.L.C 18 Liane E. Kerr 19 Albuquerque, NM 20 for Appellant 21 Gary K. King, Attorney General 22 Andrea Sassa, Assistant Attorney General 23 Santa Fe, NM 24for Appellee 12 DECISION 1 MAES, Justice. 2 {1} Defendant, Pedro Zarazua, was convictedof first-degree murder, contrary to 3 NMSA 1978, Section 30-2-1 (1963, as amended through 1994), for the death of 4 James Thomas “Birdman” Sparrow (Victim). Pursuant to Rule 12-102(A)(1) 5 NMRA, Defendant appeals his conviction directly to this Court, arguing that (1) 6 the evidence was insufficient to support a c onviction of first-degree murder; (2) the 7 district court improperly admitted into evidence a graphic, forensic picture of 8 Victim at the crime scene; and (3) the district court improperly qualified Lieutenant 9 Jeff Zuniga to testify as an expert w itness concerning blood spatter evidence. We 10 conclude that the evidence was sufficient to support Defendant’s conviction, the 11 district court properly admitted the graphic photograph and properly qualified the 12 State’s witness as an expert. We affirm the conviction. 13 I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 14 {2} The jury could have found the following facts. On December 24, 2005, 15 Defendant and his associates “pulled over” the vehicle in which Victim was 16 traveling to confront Victim about a $50. 00 debt, because he believed that Victim 17 had sold him fake drugs. A passenger fro m Victim’s vehicle, George Luevano, 18 intervened, and though some words wereexchanged, no physical altercation 19 ensued from the confrontation. 203 {3} Four days later, Victim was at the apartment of Lydia Lujan. Several 1 witnesses testified that Defendant was there as well and that he appeared to be 2 “pumped up.” Defendant was observed carrying a handgun with a brown handle in 3 his right pocket. Around this time, Lindsey Sparrow, Victim’s sister, received a 4 call from Victim asking her to lend him $50.00 to pay a debt involving drugs and 5 informing her that it was a “life or death s ituation.” Victim told her that he feared 6 Defendant would stab him if he did not pay up. Sparrow was unable to provide her 7 brother with the funds he requested. 8 {4} Lujan testified that Defendant persuaded Victim to leave the apartment with 9 him and that Defendant later returned inthe company of two unidentified females, 10 but without Victim. Other witnesses testif ied that they saw Victim in the parking 11 lot of Lujan’s apartment complex with another male and that the two left together 12 in a gray car. One of these witnesses also testified that the same unknown male 13 later returned without Victim, accompanie d by two women. Lujan testified that 14 Defendant admitted to killing Victim and went into her house to wash blood off of 15 his hands. 16 {5} On the night of the murder, two residents of the North Park Trailer Park 17 testified that they heard four gunshots shortly after midnight. One stated that she 18 was inside her home, but after hearing the shots she went outside to see what had 19 happened and observed a gray car speeding away. She called the police, and the 204 first officer arrived on the scene withina few minutes. The reporting witness 1 pointed the officer to the direction from which she believed the shots had 2 originated, and upon inspection, the officer found Victim on the ground with what 3 appeared to be gunshot wounds to the head. 4 {6} Lead crime scene investigator, Lt. Jeff Zuniga, arrived on the scene at 5 approximately 2:45 a.m. Lt. Zuniga took several photographs as he processed the 6 scene, including one close-up of Victim’s wounds to the head. He also observed 7 blood spatter patterns surrounding Victim and blood pooling around Victim’s head. 8 A subsequent autopsy revealed that Vic tim had been shot four times, resulting in 9 three wounds “to the right side of the head and one to the right side of the back.” 10 The Office of the Medical Investigator’s fo rensic pathologist testified that any one 11 of the four wounds could have caused Victim’s death. 12 {7} Before dawn on the day after the murder, Defendant met with Robert 13 Hernandez in order to obtain ammunition for a .357 handgun. Hernandez testified 14 that Defendant needed bullets for his .357 handgun because he had run into trouble 15 with the police and that Luevano might be after him as well. Being without such 16 caliber ammunition, Hernandez offered to lend Defendant his .45 handgun for the 17 night in exchange for the .357 handgun. Hernandez kept the .357 handgun until he 18 was arrested on non-related charges on December 30, 2005. Once in custody, 19 Hernandez informed the authorities that he was in possession of a .357 handgun 205 that he believed was used to murder Vic tim and that he could arrange to have it 1 delivered to an officer. Hernandez telephoned his girlfriend and had her retrieve 2 the gun and give it to an officer. Bullet comparison and ballistic analysis later 3 established that the .357 handgun was the weapon used to kill Victim. 4 {8} A jury found Defendant guilty of murder in the first degree and was given a 5 life sentence. This direct appeal followed. SeeN.M. Const. art. VI, § 2 (“Appeals 6 from a judgment of the district court imposing a sentence of death or life 7 imprisonment shall be taken directly to the supreme court.”); accord Rule 12- 8 102(A)(1) NMRA. 9 II. DISCUSSION 10 A. Whether the evidence was sufficient to support Defendant’s conviction 11 of murder in the first degree. 12
{9} Defendant claims that the evidence relied upon by the jury was insufficient 13 to support a conviction of murder in the first degree. Although the substance of 14 Defendant’s challenge is somewhat unc lear, Defendant seems to argue that 15 circumstantial evidence alone is insufficient to support a jury’s finding of guilt on 16 the element of deliberate intent. Defendantasserts that “the State must present 17 both direct evidence of a specific intent to kill and evidence of an overt act from 18 which the jury may infer such an intent .” Defendant concludes the argument on 19 this point, stating, “Defendant admits that if the jury were to buy the tenuous 20 theory set forth by the State, the jury c ould circumstantially find that he planned to 216 kill [Victim]; however, inasmuch as there was no forensic evidence linking the 1 Defendant to the murder, deference to the jury’s finding cannot stand.” 2 Defendant’s claim is without merit. 3 {10} In reviewing a conviction for sufficient evidence, we “examine the record to 4 determine whether substantial evidence of either a direct or circumstantial nature 5 exists to support a verdict of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt with respect to every 6 element essential to a conviction.” State v. Day , 2008-NMSC-007, ¶ 15, 143 N.M. 7 359, 176 P.3d 1091 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). “We view the 8 evidence in the light most favorable to th e verdict, resolving all conflicts therein 9 and indulging all permissible inferences therefrom in favor of the verdict.” Id. 10 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Viewing the evidence in the light 11 most favorable to the verdict, if the Court determines that the jury could not 12 reasonably infer guilt with respect to anelement of the crime, then such an 13 inference is speculative and there is insu fficient evidence to support the conviction. 14 See State v. Apodaca, 118 N.M. 762, 765-66, 887 P.2d 756, 759-60 (1994); State v. 15 McGee , 2002-NMCA-090, ¶ 20, 132 N.M. 537, 51 P.3d 1191; State v. Hernandez , 16 1998-NMCA-082, ¶ 6, 125 N.M. 661, 964 P.2d 825. However, “[c]ontrary 17 evidence supporting acquittal does not provide a basis for reversal because the jury 18 is free to reject Defendant’s version of the facts.” State v. Duran , 19 2006-NMSC-035, ¶ 5, 140 N.M. 94, 140 P. 3d 515 (internal quotation marks and 207 citation omitted). 1 {11} This Court has consistently held that when “reviewing the sufficiency of the 2 evidence to establish that the defendant acted with deliberate intent, we inquire 3 whether substantial evidence, either direct or circumstantial in nature, exists to 4 support a verdict of guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.” State v. Motes , 118 N.M. 5 727, 729, 885 P.2d 648, 650 (1994) (emphasi s added) (internal quotation marks 6 and citation omitted). “Intent is subjec tive and is almost always inferred from 7 other facts in the case.” Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). In 8 Duran , this Court held that the defendant’s deliberate intent to kill could be 9 reasonably inferred from the physical evidence of a struggle and multiple stab 10 wounds suffered by the victim. 2006-NMSC-035 , ¶ 8. 11 {12} In the present case, Victim was shot four times, including twice in the head. 12 As in Duran , the jury could infer deliberate intent to kill from the physical 13 evidence surrounding the killing alone. Multiple gunshot wounds, any one of 14 which could have caused death, provide a reasonable inference that “the slayer . . . 15 weigh[ed] and consider[ed] the question of killing and his reasons for and against 16 such a choice.” UJI 14-201 NMRA. In addition to the physical circumstances of 17 the killing, however, the evidence estab lishing that Defendant committed first 18 degree murder is overwhelming. After l eaving with Victim, Defendant returned to 19 Lujan’s house, washed blood off of his hands, and admitted to killing Victim. 208 Additionally, the evidence established th at Defendant had a motive for killing 1 Victim, namely, a dispute over a $50.00 debt, and that Defendant was seen 2 carrying a weapon, which the jury reasonably could have found was used to kill 3 Victim. Accordingly, we reject Defendant’s sufficiency of the evidence claim. 4 B. Whether the district court abus ed its discretion by admitting a 5 photograph displaying Victim’s gunshot wounds to the head. 6 {13} Defendant asserts that the districtcourt improperly admitted a graphic 7 photograph of Victim taken at the crime scene because the photo’s probative value 8 was substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. The photograph in 9 question is a close-up of Victim’s head from the neck up. It shows the gunshot 10 wound to Victim’s right eye and the resulting gore from that wound. Also visible 11 is a second gunshot wound to the upper-left side of Victim’s head and a large pool 12 of blood surrounding Victim’s head. 13 {14} In reviewing a trial court’s admission of photographic evidence, we utilize 14 an abuse of discretion standard. State v. Saiz , 2008-NMSC-048, ¶ 53, 144 N.M. 15 663, 191 P.3d 521, abrogated by State v. Belanger, 2009-NMSC-025, __ N.M. __, 16 __ P.3d __, cert. granted, 2007-NMCERT-010, __ N.M. __, __ P.3d __ (No. 17 30,654, May 12, 2009). We have establishe d that “[a]n abuse of discretion occurs 18 when the ruling is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and 19 circumstances of the case.” State v. Woodward, 121 N.M. 1, 4, 908 P.2d 231, 234 20 (1995). Further, “[a] trial court has great discretion in balancing the prejudicial 219 impact of a photograph against its probative value.” State v. Mora , 1997-NMSC1 060, ¶ 55, 124 N.M. 346, 950 P.2d 789. 2 {15} “Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is 3 substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice . . . .” Rule 11-403 4 NMRA. “The trial court ought to exclude photographs which are calculated to 5 arouse the prejudices and passions of the jury and which are not reasonably 6 relevant to the issues of the case.” State v. Boeglin , 105 N.M. 247, 253, 731 P.2d 7 943, 949 (1987). 8 {16} However, graphic photographs are not per se unduly prejudicial, and district 9 courts are afforded broad discretion c oncerning admission of relevant photographic 10 evidence. “Photographs are relevant and admissible for the purpose of clarifying 11 and illustrating testimony.” Mora , 1997-NMSC-060, ¶ 54. For example, in 12 Boeglin , this Court upheld the admission of a close-up photograph depicting 13 gruesome neck wounds suffered by the victim , proffered to “illustrate, clarify, and 14 corroborate the testimony of witnesses.” 105 N.M. at 253, 731 P.2d at 949. 15 Similarly, in Saiz , we held that the district court did not abuse its discretion by 16 admitting five photographs of the victim’s decomposed body, where those 17 photographs aided the pathologist’s testimony explaining the nature of the victim’s 18 injuries to the jury. 2008-NMSC-048, ¶ 54; see also Mora , 1997-NMSC-060, ¶ 55 19 (holding that admission of autopsy photographs was not an abuse of discretion). 2010 Photographs showing a victim’s injuries, therefore, are probative “to show the 1 nature of the injury, to explain the basis of the forensic pathologist’s opinion, and 2 to illustrate the forensic pathologist’s testimony,” and may be admitted for such 3 purposes. State v. Garcia , 2005-NMCA-042, ¶ 50, 137 N.M. 315, 110 P.3d 531. 4 {17} In the present case, the contested photograph was relevant to the State’s case 5 at trial and was not unduly prejudicial. For the reasons previously explained, the 6 location and severity of the wounds depicted in the photograph supported the 7 State’s claim that the killing was committed with deliberate intent. Additionally, 8 the pool of blood shown in the photograph corroborated Lt. Zuniga’s testimony, 9 that Victim was shot and killed where his body was found, thus buttressing the 10 State’s theory that Defendant had lured Victim away from witnesses to kill him. 11 The district court acknowledged the potential prejudicial effect of the photograph 12 on the jury and appropriately limited the admission of photographic evidence. See 13 Boeglin , 105 N.M. at 253, 731 P.2d at 949 (holding that the district court properly 14 “exercised its discretion carefully by comp elling the State to choose one of the two 15 proffered relevant photographswhich served to illustrate, clarify, and corroborate 16 the testimony of witnesses for the prosecution and the defense”). Given the 17 relevance of the photograph and the distri ct court’s due consideration of the 18 potential prejudice to the jury, we conclude that the court did not abuse its 19 discretion by admitting the photograph. 2011 C. Whether the district court abusedits discretion by qualifying Lt. 1 Zuniga as an expert witness in blood spatter analysis. 2
{18} Defendant’s final contention on appeal is that the district court improperly 3 qualified the State’s witness, Lt. Zuniga, as an expert in blood spatter evidence, 4 because he lacked sufficient knowledge, training and experience. We review 5 Defendant’s claim for an abuse of discretion. State v. Alberico , 116 N.M. 156, 6 169, 861 P.2d 192, 205 (1993). Generally “any doubt regarding the admissibility 7 of scientific evidence should be resolv ed in favor of admission, rather than 8 exclusion.” State v. Fry , 2006-NMSC-001, ¶ 55, 138 N.M. 700, 126 P.3d 516 9 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 10 {19} Rule 11-702 NMRA governs the admission of expert testimony: “If 11 scientific, technical or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to 12 understand the evidence or to determine a f act in issue, a witness qualified as an 13 expert by knowledge, skill, experience, trai ning or education may testify thereto in 14 the form of an opinion or otherwise.” Therefore, Rule 11-702 predicates the 15 admissibility of expert testimony on three requirements, that (1) the expert be 16 qualified; (2) the testimony be of assistance to the trier of fact; and (3) the expert’s 17 testimony be about scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge with a 18 reliable basis. Alberico , 116 N.M. at 166, 861 P.2d at 202. Defendant challenges 19 the admission of Lt. Zuniga’s testimony solely on the basis of the first requirement. 20 {20} In general, the district court judge ha s wide discretion to determine whether 2112 a witness is qualified to gi ve expert testimony. In State v. Downey , we recently 1 explained that 2 [u]nder Rule 11-702, a witness must qualify as an expert 3 in the field for which his or her testimony is offered 4 before such testimony is admissible. In most cases, this 5 means that the calling party must qualify the witness to 6 testify as an expert first, before any substantive testimony 7 is given. In order to testify, it must appear that an expert 8 witness has acquired suffici ent knowledge, skill, training, 9 or experience that such testimony will aid the fact finder, 10 but no set criteria can be laid down to test such 11 qualifications. The use of the disjunctive “or” in Rule 12 11-702 permits a witness to be qualified under a wide 13 variety of bases, “knowledge , skill, experience, training, 14 or education,” and underscores that broad discretion 15 intentionally is given to the trial court to determine 16 whether expert testimony will assist the trier of fact. 17 2008-NMSC-061, ¶ 26, 145 N.M. 232, 195 P.3d 1244 (internal quotation marks 18 and citations omitted). Once the district c ourt determines that an expert witness is 19 qualified under any one of the wide variety of bases enumerated in Rule 11-702, 20 any perceived deficiencies in the expert’s qualifications pertain to the weight of the 21 evidence, rather than its admissibility. See State v. McDonald, 1998-NMSC-034, 22 ¶ 21, 126 N.M. 44, 966 P.2d 752 (“[T]he jury [is] free to weigh every aspect of the 23 expert’s qualifications and [is] free to disregard it entirely.”). 24 {21} The State sought to introduce blood spatter evidence through the testimony 25 of Lt. Zuniga in order to establish that blood spatter patterns and blood pooling at 2613 the crime scene indicated that Victim was shot and killed where his body was 1 found. Defense counsel objected to Lt. Zuni ga’s qualification as an expert in blood 2 spatter analysis, and in response, the court permitted counsel to voir dire the 3 witness. Voir dire revealed that Lt . Zuniga had received a composite 40 hours of 4 blood spatter training over the course of three separate training sessions from 2001 5 through 2004. Lt. Zuniga explained that th e first and last training sessions were 6 conducted by the Department of Public Safety and taught by officer Art Ortiz, the 7 head of the crime scene processing unit for the New Mexico State Police. The 8 second training session was conducted by anindependent company and taught by 9 pathologist Sandra Maes. At the conclusion of voir dire, the court found Lt. Zuniga 10 to be an expert in blood spatter evidence. 11 {22} Defendant provides no meaningful argument as to why the jury should not 12 have been allowed to hear Lt. Zuniga ’s testimony and weigh his qualifications. 13 Given Lt. Zuniga’s specialized training in blood spatter recognition and his 14 experience as an investigator, we cannot say that his qualifications were deficient 15 to such a level that the district court committed an abuse of discretion by allowing 16 him to testify. 17 III. CONCLUSION 18 {23} For the foregoing reasons, we affirm Defendant’s conviction of murder in 19 the first degree. 2014 {24} IT IS SO ORDERED. 1

_____________________________ 2 PETRA JIMENEZ MAES, Justice 315 WE CONCUR: 1

_________________________________ 2 EDWARD L. CHÁVEZ, Chief Justice 3

_________________________________ 4 PATRICIO M. SERNA, Justice 5

_________________________________ 6 RICHARD C. BOSSON, Justice 7

_________________________________ 8 CHARLES W. DANIELS, Justice 9