DEFENSE NUCLEAR FACILITIES SAFETY BOARD

January 19, 2024

TO: Katherine R. Herrera, Acting Technical Director

FROM: L. Lin, Z.C. McCabe, and E.P. Richardson, Resident Inspectors

SUBJECT: Savannah River Site Activity Report for Week Ending January 19, 2024

Defense Waste Processing Facility (DWPF): Following multiple unsuccessful attempts to 

perform the diesel generator largest load surveillance (see 12/8/23 and 12/29/23 reports), DWPF

personnel successfully completed all required actions. A resident inspector (RI) observed the 

performance of the surveillance from the control room. The DWPF team worked very well 

together and exhibited good communications, procedural compliance, and leadership by the 

control room manager, especially during resolution of unexpected conditions.

Savannah River Tritium Enterprise (SRTE): SRTE personnel conducted the same drill 

performed last week (see 1/12/24 report) with the exception of the technical support room being 

staffed and participating in the evolution this week. The SRTE drill team continues to make 

incremental improvements to their conduct of drills. For instance, during last week’s 

performance, SRTE personnel noted that data for a tritium air monitor was not included in the 

scenario and had to deem it out of service to allow the scenario to develop as intended. The most 

recent iteration of the drill included the necessary data as well as streamlined the drill props in 

the control room. Communications continues to be an acknowledged weakness during drill play, 

especially between the different venues. Additionally, SRTE personnel have also identified a 

weakness with regard to understanding specific vocabulary while classifying an emergency

during drill play. SRTE has emergency action levels (EALs) for an unmonitored release of 

tritium along with a fire or along with an explosion. The confusion is centered around if a 

hydrogen deflagration (i.e., subsonic explosion) should be considered a fire, an explosion, or if 

SRTE should identify an additional EAL. The EALs differ in their source term calculations. 

There may also be a knowledge gap within some of the SRTE workforce with regard to 

understanding what a deflagration is.

SRMC Oral Board: An RI observed an oral board for a shift technical engineer candidate. The 

RI noted no issues with the conduct of the board and noted improvements made based on 

previous feedback.

SRMC Readiness Activities: Saltstone completed a facility self-assessment for operational 

readiness of Saltstone Disposal Unit (SDU) 9. The team identified three findings and one 

opportunity for improvement. Because the need date for SDU 9 is in 2028, many of the actions 

are several years out. A couple of the findings identified that the Management Control Plan 

should address these future items.

SRMC initiated an Independent Verification Review (IVR) for direct transfers of 

decontaminated salt solution from the Salt Waste Processing Facility (SWPF) to Saltstone. 

Previously, the only transfer path for decontaminated salt solution was from SWPF to Tank 

Farms to Saltstone. The IVR team is reviewing the changes made to the transfer control program

and all the interfaces between the facilities.