### IN THE COURT OF APP EALS OF TENNESS EE AT JAC KSON FE BR U A RY 21, 200 8 S es sio n
SHE RRIE E NGLE R, ET AL 

### . v. KA RN ES LE GAL SER VIC ES

Direc t Appeal from the Circ uit Court forMadison Cou nty

No. C-04- 475 Roy Mor gan, Jud ge

No. W2006-02443-C OA-R3-C V - Filed May 29, 2008

Th is a pp e a l invo lve s th e Te nn e sse e savin g statut e , T e nn . Co de Ann. § 2 8- 1- 105. The pla int if fs ’ lawsuit was dismissed without pr ejudice for failure to pr osecute when their attorney failed to appea r at a he aring . Three months after the dismiss al, the plaintiffs’ attorney filed a motion seekingrelief from the or der of dismiss al, citing the saving statute, along with a n amende d complaint. The trial court c onsidered the motion under Rule 60 but did not address the a pplicability

of the savingstatute. The c ourt ref

used t o set aside the order of dismiss al upon finding that the attorne y ’s fa ilure to attend the hear ing did not constitute excusable neg lect. The plaintiffs appe al. We reve rse a nd rema nd for fu rt he r p ro c e e din g s.

Te nn. R . A pp. P . 3 ; A ppe al a s o f R igh t; Judg me nt of th e Ci r c uit

Co ur t R e ve r se d and Rem aned

A LA N E. H I G H ERS , P.J., W.S., delivered the opinion of the court, in which D AVI D R. F ARMER , J., and H OL LY M. K I RBY , J., joined.

Gr e go ry W . M int on , M e din a , T N, fo r A pp e lla nts

Lanis L. Ka

rnes, Ma rlene Simps on, Jackson, TN , for Appe llee

OP IN ION-2- I. F A C TS & P R OC EDU R A L H I S T ORY

On Novembe r 18, 2004, Sherr ie and Er ic Eng ler filed a complaint ag ainst Karne s L eg al Service s in Madison County Circuit Court. The Eng lers alleg ed that an unle ashed G erma n Shepherd do g ra n o nto the En g le rs ’ p ro pe rt y tow ard Mr s. En g le r and he r le a sh e d do g , re su lti ng in inj ur ie s to Mrs. Eng ler whe n her dog “jer ked her arm” and caused her t o fall. The E ng lers alleg ed that Ka rnes L eg al Service s was the leg al owner of the mobile home located next t o the Eng lers’ mobile home,

an d t h at s o m eo n e wo rk i n g o n t h e de fe n d an t ’s p ro p erty o wn ed th e un l ea s h edGe rm an S h ep h er d d o g. The Eng lers cla imed that Kar nes L egal Services wa s liable for the neg lige nce of its employ ee pursua nt to the doctrine of r espondeat superior. The y soug ht damag es for

persona l injuries in the

amou nt o f $ 15 0, 00 0, and

$1 00 ,0 00 in d ama g e s f

or los s o f c on so rt ium

.
On J anuar

y 19, 2005, attorney

L anis Kar

nes filed a motion to dism iss by specia l appea

ranc e on behalf of Ka rnes L eg al Service s, assertinglack of sub j ec t m at t er jurisdiction, lack of pe rsonal jurisdiction, and failure to state a claim upon which relief can be g rante d. The motion stated that the plaintiffs’ cla im was “leg ally basele ss be cause it is filed ag ainst the wrong party ,” as Ka rnes L eg al Service s owned no prope rty and had no e mploy ee w ith a Ger man Shepher d dog

.
O nF e b r u ar y 1 7 , 2 0 0 6 , t h e d e f

e n d an t s e t th e m o t i o n t o d i s m i s s t o b e h e ar d o n d o c k e tc a l l d ay, Fe bruar y 24, 2006, and fax ed notice of the hea ri n g t o t h e Engler s’ attorne y

. On Fe bruar y 24, the En g le rs ’ atto rn e y

a pp e are d a nd or a lly mov e d f or a c on tin ua nc e . T he tr ia l ju dg e re se t th e he ari ngdate for Marc h 13, 2006, and the judge reminded the Eng lers’ attorney that he had not r esponded to the motion to di smiss t hat was f iled thirteen months ear lier.

At the Marc h 1 3, 20 06 he ari ng , Ms. Ka rn e s wa s pr e se nt on be ha lf of Ka rn e s L e g a l Se rv ic e s, but no one appe are d on behalf of the Eng lers. Ms. Kar nes informe d t h e t ri al j u d g e that she ha d pe rs on a lly

re min de d th e En g le rs ’ atto rn e y of the he ari ng by te le ph on e on the pr e vio us F ri da y . Ms. Kar nes then moved to dismiss for lac k of prose cution, and the tria l judge dismiss ed the c ase without prejudice for f

ailure to prose cute.

On Ju n e 2 2 , 2 0 0 6 , c o u n s e l f o r th e E n g le r s f

il e d a “ M o ti o n f

o r Re li e f f

r o m Ju dg ment of Dismiss al an d for L eave of Court to Amend Complaint.” Th e mot ion state d th a t th e En g le rs ’ attorney failed to a

ppear at th e h ear ing be cause of a pr oblem with his computerized calenda r, and it sought re l i ef pur suant to Rule 60.02 of the Tenne ssee Rules of Civil Procedure for mistake or excusable neg lect. In addition, the motion sought relief under the “savin g statute,” statingthe fo llo wi ng :

Al so , s inc e thi s H on or a ble Court

dis mis se d th is l aws uit “without prejudice ”, Plaintiffs are entitled to rene w the li t i gati on purs ua nt t o T .C. A. § 2 8- 1- 10 5 w hic h p ro vid e s:

Ne w a c tio n a ft e r a dv e rs e de c isi on . – I f t he act ion is

commence d within the time l i m i t ed by a rule orR u l e 1 5 .03 o f t h e T en n esse e R u l es o f C i v i l P ro ce d u re, e n t i t l ed “ R elati o n B ac k o f A m en d m en t s, ” p ro v i d es: 1

W henever t h e cl ai m or de f ens e as s er t ed i n a m ende d pl ea di ngs a r os e out of t he conduc t , t r ans ac t i on, or oc cur r enc e s et f or t h or a t t em pt ed t o be s et fo rt h i n t he

or i gi nal pl ea di ng, t he am endm ent r el at es bac k t o t he dat e of t he or i gi nal pl ea di ng. A n a m endm ent c hangi ng t he par t y or t he nam i ng of t he par t y by or a gai ns t w hom

a c la im is a sse rte d re la te s b a c k if th e fo re g o in g p ro v isio n is sa tisfie d a n d if, w ith in
t he peri od provi ded b y l aw f or c om m enci ng an ac t i on or w i t hi n 12 0 day s af t er
com m encem ent of t he act i on , t he part y t o be b ro u g h t i n by am endm ent ( 1) has

r e c e i v e d s u c h n o t i c e o f t h e i n s t i t u t i o n o f t h e a c t i o n t h a t t h e p a r t y w i l l not be pr ej udi ce d i n m ai nt ai ni ng a de f ens e on t he m er i t s , a nd ( 2) kne w or s houl d ha ve know n t hat
, but f or a m i s t ake c once r ni ng t he i dent i t y of t he pr oper pa r t y, t he ac t i on

w o u ld h a v e b e e n b ro u g h t ag a in st th e p a rty

.

T he E ng l er s al l eged t hat L ani s K ar nes w as t he o nl y kn ow n pri nci pal of t he ent i t i es nam ed as def endan t s , and t hey
at t ac hed var i ous doc um ent s a nd a f f i davi t s t o t hei r m ot i on i n an at t em pt t o prove t hat t he e nt i t i es w er e s i m pl y a l t er e gos of Lani s K ar nes

. For exam pl e, t hey fi l ed t he aff i davi t of an em pl oy ee at t he t r ai l er park w here t he K ar nes and E ng l er

m obi l e hom es w er e l oca t ed, w hi ch s t at ed t hat Lani s K ar nes l ea s ed t he l ot , but c hec ks f r om K ar nes Lega l Se r vi ce s a nd/ or K ar nes Ren t al w er e u s ed t o pay t he r ent

. O t her do cum ent s s t at ed t hat t he ent i t i es s hare d t he s am e t el epho ne nu m ber

an d ad d ress.

-3-

statut e of lim itatio n, but th e jud g me nt o r d e c re e is rende red a g ain st the plaintiff upon any g round not concludinghis right of

action, or where the judg ment

or de c re e is r e nd e red in

fa vo r o f t he pla int if

f, and is

arr e ste d, or

re ve rs e d on app e a l, t

he pla int if

f, or his

r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s an d p r i v i e s , a s th e c a s e m ay b e , m ay, from time to time, commence a new action within one (1) y ear afte r the re versa l or arr est.

Un de r t he c ir c ums tanc e s, thi s H on or a ble Cou rt sh ou ld se t a sid e its judgme nt of dismissal and allow Plaintiffs to resume the litigation.

Th e En g le rs ’ m oti on

so ug ht p e rm iss ion

to f ile an ame nd e d c omp la int , a nd th ey atta c he d th e ir pr op os e d ame nd e d c omp la int to t he mot ion . T he ame nd e d c omp la int name d a dd iti on a l de fe nd ants , inc lud ingL anis Ka

rn e s, Ka rn e s K us tom Ka bin e ts, and Ka

rn e s Re nta l. Th e En g le rs argue d in t he ir motion that adding the a dditional de fenda nts w as proper

pursuant to Rule 15 of the Te nnessee Rules of Civil P roce dure beca

use the named entities wer e all alter eg os of L anis Kar

nes, and the y

claimed that L anis Kar

nes had known of the incident since the orig inal lawsuit was filed. On September 22, 1 2006, the Eng lers filed another motion for leave of cour t to amend the complaint, see king to a dd two

a dd iti on a l de fe nd ants

. Ms. Karne s filed a r es p o n s e t o the Eng lers’ motion, ag ain by specia l appea ranc e.
Followinga hea

ring , the t ri al co u rt enter ed an or der on D ece mber 6, 2006, de nying the Eng lers’ moti on for relief from the j udg ment, and ruling t hat their motion to amend the complaint

was re ndere d moot. The order stated t hat t he Engler s’ attorney ’s fa ilure to attend the he aringwas-4-

not justi fied a

nd did not constitut e excusable ne g lect pursuant to Rule 60. The Engler s timely filed

a no tic e of a pp e a l to thi s Co ur

t.

II. I SSU ES P R ESENTED The Eng lers pre sent the followingissues, as we pe rce ive them, for r eview:

1. Whether the trial court improperly dismiss ed the c ase f or fa ilure to prosec ute when the re w as
no su c h mo tio n p e nd ingbe fo re the tr ia l c ourt ; 2. Whe the r t

he tr ia l c ourt

e rr e d in de nyingthe mot ion

fo r r e lie f f

ro m ju dg me nt.

For the following rea sons, we re v er se the de cision of the cir cuit court a nd rema nd for f urther pr oc e e din g s.

III

. S TA N D A R D O F REVIEW

We r eview a trial court’s conclusions of law under a de novo sta nd ard up on the re c or d w ith no presumption of cor

rec t n es s

. Union C

arbide Corp. v. Huddleston , 854 S.W .2d 87, 91 (Tenn. 1 9 9 3 ) ( ci t i n g Estate of Adkins v. W hite Consol. Indus., Inc. , 788 S.W .2d 815, 817 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1989)).

IV. D I S CUS S I ON

A. T he Di smissa l f or Fai lure to P ro se c ute

On appea l, the Eng lers contend that the tr ial court e rre d in dismi ssing their complaint when the re was no mo ti on

to d ism iss fo r f

a ilure to p ro se c ute be fo re the c ourt . We fi nd no me ri t in

thi s argument beca

use, ac cordingto the order of dismissal, “Def

end an t moved to dismiss for lac k of prosec ution” afte r the plaintiff did not appe ar. In addition, “[ i ] t i s clea rly within the power of

the Court sua sponte to dismiss for f ailure to prose cute.” Townsend S cientific Trust v. Fo od T e c hn o lo g y I nv es tors, L.P. , N o. W20 05 -0 08 35 -C OA -R 3- CV , 2 00 6 WL 47 43 3, a t *2 (T e nn . Ct

. App. J an. 11, 2006) ( ci t i n g Ge n

. T r ansp. Servs. v . W

ilson , 1985 Tenn. App. L EXI S 3395, at *16 (Tenn. Ct. App. Mar . 22, 1985)).

B. T he Mo tio n f or Re lie f f ro m Judg ment a nd f

or Le av eto A mend C

ompla int
The Eng lers filed the ir motion for relief from judg ment alo n g with an amende d complaint approximately

three months after the ir ca se wa s dismis sed without prejudice for f ailure to prose cute. The mot ion soug ht relief pursuant to Rule 60 and also under Tennessee Code Annotated section 28-T h e sa v in g sta tu te p ro v id e s, in re le v a n t p a rt: 2

( a) I f

t he ac t i on i s c om m enc ed w i t hi n t he t i m e l i m i t ed b y a r ul e or s t at ut e of l i m i t at i on, but t he j udgm ent or de cr ee i s rend ered a gai ns t t he pl ai nt i f f upon a ny gr ound not c oncl udi ng t he pl ai nt i f f ' s r i ght of a ct i on , or w her e t he j udgm ent or d e c re e is re n d e re d in fa v o r o f th e p la in tiff, a n d is ar re ste d , o r re v e rs e d o n a p p e a l,
t he pl ai nt i f f
, or t he pl ai nt i f f ' s r epr es ent at i ves and pri vi es , as t he c as e m ay be
, m ay, f r om t i m e t o t i m e, com m enc e a new a ct i on w i t hi n one ( 1) ye ar a ft er t he r eve r s al or
a rr e st.

T en n

. C o d e A n n

. § 2 8 -1-1 0 5 (20 0 0 ).

-5- 1- 10 5. No w g e ne ra lly kn ow n as the “ savin g statut e ,” se c tio n 2 8- 1- 10 5 w a s p re vio us ly re fe rr e d to 2 as t h e “i n co n clus ive dismissal statute.” McGe e v. Jac obs , 236 S.W .3d 162, 165 (Tenn. Ct. App. 20 07 ). “ Th e purp os e of

the Te nn e sse e savin g s st a tut e is t o pr ov ide a dil ig e nt pla int if f a n o pp or tun ity to r enew a suit that is dismissed by any judgme nt or decr ee that does not c onclude t h e p laintiff’s rig ht of ac tion.” Cro nin v . Ho we , 9 0 6 S

. W

. 2 d

9 1 0 , 9 1 2 (T en n

. 1 9 9 5 ) ( ci t i n g Du k es v . M on tgo me ry County Nursing Home , 639 S.W .2d 910, 913 (Tenn. 1982) ). Althoug h many of the c ases de aling with the saving statute involve voluntary nonsuits, “it is clea

r fr om the wordingof the statute that its scope is broade r than that.” Watts v. Kroger Co. , 102 S.W .3d 645, 647 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2002) (q u o t i n g Creed v. V

alentine , 967 S.W .2d 325 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1997)) . “[I ]t mak es no differ ence whether the initial inconc lusive dismiss al or dismiss al not on the merits was a voluntary nonsuit or

a dismiss al without pr ejudice for want of pr osecution.” Id. A new a ction may be broug ht within one y e ar a ft e r t

he inc on c lus ive dis mis sa l of an a c tio n bro ug ht wit hin the pe ri od of

the a pp lic a ble statut e of limitations. Id.

I n this case , then, t he Engler s could have simply ref iled their complaint ag ainst Karne s L eg al Service s within one y ear

of t he dis missal without prejudice . Instead, they filed a “ Motion for Relief from Judgment of Dismissal a nd for L eave of Court to Amend Complaint,” but seeking relief under the savingstatute. Althoug h this wa s not the usual method of proce eding under the savingstatute, we be lieve the trial court should ha ve allowed the plaintiffs to r enew their lawsuit. As stated a bove, the savin g statut e is m e ant “ to p ro vid e a dil ig e nt p la int if

f a n o pp or tunity to r e ne w a

su it that is dismiss ed by

any judgme nt or dec ree that does not c onclude the plaintiff’s rig ht of ac tion.” Cro nin

v . Ho we , 9 0 6 S. W. 2 d 9 1 0 , 9 1 2 ( T e n n

. 1 9 9 5 )

. A d il ig e n t p la inti f f is o n e w h o s e ti me ly

filed complaint puts the defe ndant on notice that the plaintiff intends to a ssert his or her leg al rig hts. Id. (c i t i n g Lee v. Crenshaw , 622 F.2d 202 ( 6th Cir. 1980)). The S u p re m e C ourt has stated that the lang uag e of the saving statute “must be applied a ccor ding to the spirit of the statute.” Id. at 912-13.

The statute ha s not merely letter but a spirit. That spirit is manifested in the history

of the statute . . . . It is th at a p l ai n t iff shall not be finally cast out by

the forc e of a

ny j u d gm ent or decre e whatsoever,

no t c on c lud ing his ri g ht of a c tio n, wi tho ut a n o pp or tun ity to s ue a g a in within the brief pe riod limit ed.-6-

Cro nin , 9 0 6 S

. W

. 2 d

at 9 1 3 (c i t i n g Nashville, C & St. L. Ry. v. Bolton , 134 Tenn. 447, 184 S.W. 9, 11 (1 91 6) ). Te nn e sse e c ourt s h ave “ lon g be e n c omm itt e d to th e vie w t ha t th e ‘s avin g s st a tut e ’ i s
reme dial and should be libera lly construed in further ance of i ts purpose a nd in order to br ing c ases within its spirit and fair intention.” Id. (c i t i n g Ke e v . S he lte r I ns

. , 852 S.W .2d 226, 228 (Tenn. 1993)). In another

case , the Supreme Court a g ain emphasized the purpose of the savingstatute and i n s t r u c t e d c o u rt s t o i n t e r

p r e tt h e s t a tu t e l i b e r a l l y:

I t is well s et t l ed that Te nnessee law strong ly favor s the

re so lut i o no f

a l l d i s p u t e s o nt h e i r

m e r i t s , an d

t h a tt h e s av i n g s t a tu te is t o b e g ive n a br oa d a

nd lib e ra l c on str

uc tio n in or de r t o a c hie ve thi s g o al. W oods v. Palmer , 4 96 S.W. 2d 47 4 ( Te nn . 1 97 4) ; Balsinger v. Ga ss , 214 Te nn . 3 43 , 3 79 S.W. 2d 80 0 ( 19 64 ); Brooksbank v . Roane Cou nty , 2 07 Te nn . 5 24 , 3 41 S.W. 2d 57 0 (1 96 0) . T his ru le and its supporting rationale wer e ably enunciated in Ge ne ra l A c c ide nt F ire & Life As sur. Corp. v. Kirkland , 210 Tenn. 39, 356 S.W.2d 283 (1 96 2) , w he re we state d th a t:

Wit hin r ece nt year s our Court, a s well as the Courts of la st r e so rt in o the r S tate s, has paid

mor e a tte nti on

to the basic a

nd intrinsic rig hts of t he par ties than it has to f or m, doi ng jus tic e be tw e e n th e pa rt ie s in

a dmi nis te ri ngthe sp ir it of the law i ns te a d o f t

he c old letter of the law. The letter of Sec tion 28-106 T.C.A. [the fo re ru

nn e r t o § 28 -1 -1 05 ], as wel l a s th e sp ir it wh ic h p ro mpt e d it s e na c tme nt , sh ow s th a t th e ba sic purpose wa s to aid the courts in administering the law fairly betwee n litigants without binding them to minor

and te c hn ic a l mi sta

ke s m ade by

the ir c ouns e l in interpre t i n g t h e c o mp l ex i t i es o f o ur l aw s o f p ro ce d ure.

Kirkland , 210 Tenn. at 43, 356 S.W .2d at 285. Henley v. Cobb , 916 S.W .2d 915, 916-17 (Tenn. 1996). The br oad and liber al purpose of the saving statute “is not to be fritter ed aw ay by any narr ow construc tion.” Id. at 918.

K e e p i n g t h e s e p r i n c i p l e s i n m i n d , w e n o w tur nt o th e l an g u a g e o f

th e s av i n g s t a tu t e

. It provides that plaintiffs may “commenc e a ne w action” w ithin one y ear of the inconc lusive dismis sal of a timely

filed suit. “An ac tion is commenced by fili n g a compl aint.” Old Hickory Eng’g & Ma c h. Co ., Inc

. v . Henry , 937 S.W .2d 782, 784 (Tenn. 1996 ) (c i t i n g Tenn. R. Civ. P. 3). I n Ol dT h e c o m p la in t w a s file d o n b e h a lf o f a c o rp o ra tio n a n d sig n e d b y th e c o rp o ra tio n ’s n o n -la w y e r p re sid e n t. 3
O ld H i ck o ry , 937 S. W

. 2d a t 784. The Cour t e xpl ai ned t hat t he s i gni ng of a pl ea di ng by a n a t t or ney o f r ec or d or t he par t y i s a n e s s ent i al c ondi t i on t o t he val i di t y of a pl ea di ng, and a cor por at i on c annot a ct pr o s e i n a c our t pr oce edi ng nor
c a n it b e re p re se n te d b y a n o ff ic e r o r o th e r n o n -la w y e r a g e n t. I d. a t 7 8 5 -8 6 . B e c a u se o f th e d e fic ie n c y in th e c o m p la in t, i t w as s ub j ect t o bei ng s t r i cken f r om t he r ecor d a nd di d not “com m ence” t he act i on as r equi r ed by t he s avi ng s t at ut e. I d. a t 786.

-7- Hicko ry , the plaintiff did not “commenc e a ne w ac tion” within the meaning of t he saving statute by f i l i n g a d e f i c i e n tc o mp l a i n tt h a td i d

n o tc o n t a i nth e s i g n a tur e o f ana t t o r n e y o r th e p arty. 3

Ho we ve r, purs ua

nt t o T e nn e sse e Cod e Anno tate d s e cti on 28 -1 -1 01 , a n “ a c tio n” a lso “includes motions, g arnishments, petitions, a nd other leg al proce eding s in judicial tribunals for the redr ess of c ivil inj uries.” I n Frazier v. East Tenn . Baptist H o s p., Inc. , 55 S.W .3d 925, 928-29 (Tenn. 2001) , the Supreme Court looked t o this definition of “ac tion” and conc luded that “the f iling of a motion to amend a long w ith a proposed amended c o mpla int constitut es commenc ement of a new action within the purviewof the savingstatute.” In that cas e, t h e p l ai n t iff had nonsuited one of

sever al def

endants, a nd within a y ea r, filed a motion to amend a nd proposed amended c omplaint seekingto re-join the or igina l defe ndant. Id. at 928. The Court stated that the plaintiff’s filingof

a mot ion to a me nd and pr op os e d ame nd e d c omp la int su ff ic e d “ to satis fy the ‘r e su sc itativ e ’ p ur po se of the savingstatute.” Id. at 929. In Woods v. Pal m er , 496 S.W .2d 474, 476 (Tenn. 1973) , the Court held that filing a

claim ag ainst an estate was “ equivalent to the commenceme nt of an a ction” within the meaningof the savingstatute. In Fow le r v . D av e npo rt , No. E2000-02509- COA-R3-CV, 20 01 WL61 71 94 , at *1 (T e nn

. Ct. Ap p. June 6, 20 01 ), the c ourt no te d th a t th e pla int if f i n th a t c a se had timely

filed a “m o t i o n to reinstate” his case a fter it wa s dismis sed without prejudice . The Sup re me Court a lso imp lie d that a “ mot ion to re ins tate ” c ou ld b e a c c e pta ble un de r t

he savin g statut e in He nry v . G oin s , 104 S.W .3d 475, 482 (Tenn. 2003) , statin g, “Ha d the trial cour t dismi ssed the

c a se wi tho ut pr e

jud ic e , the pa

rt ie s c ou ld have mov e d to re ins tate the c a se or c ou ld h ave re -f

ile d th e ir claims within the time permitted by the saving s statute.”

I n this case , we c onclude that the E ng lers’ motion for r elief f rom the dismissal and to amend the complaint was suf

ficient to “ commence a new action” within the meaningof the savingstatute. The Eng lers could ha

ve simply re- filed their c omplaint without s eekingto have the first dismissal set aside. As the Supreme Court noted in Henley , 916 S.W .2d at 916-17, the purpose of the saving statute is “to aid the cour

ts in administ eringthe law f airly b etwee n litigants without binding them to minor and technic al m istakes m ade by their counsel in interpre ting the c omplex ities of our laws of proc edure .”

We e xp r e s s n o o p in io n , h o w e v e r , a s to w h e th e r th e E n g le r s ’ s h o u ld

b e p e r mi tt e d to assert the ir c la ims a g a ins t th e a dd iti on a l de fe nd ants in t he ir pr op os e d ame nd e d c omp la int purs ua nt to Ru le 15 .0 1 a nd 15 .0 3 of the Te nn e sse e Rul e s of Civi l Proc e dure

. “ Th e savin g s statut e is n ot a pp lic a ble to the claims in a rene wed complaint ag ainst a party not na med as a defe nd an t i n t h e o ri ginal complaint.” Turner v

. Aldor C o. of Nashville, Inc. , 827 S.W .2d 318, 321 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1991). I f they wer e not named in the f

irst ac t i on, there is nothing to save. H oweve r, in a timely second action filed unde r the savingstatute, the same pr ocedur al and substantive benef its are confe rre d upon-8-

the plaintiff that we re a

vailable to the plaintiff in the f irst action. Cro nin v

. Ho we , 906 S.W .2d 910, 913 (Tenn. 1995)

. See, e .g. , Energy Saving Produ cts, Inc. v. Carney , 737 S.W .2d 783, 785 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1987) (holding that a plaintiff c ould amend his second complaint to add a c laim pursuant to R ule 15 .0 1 o f t

he Te nn e sse e Rul e s o f C ivi l Pr oc edu re becau se he wo uld have be e n e nti tle d to

ame nd the c omp la int

in t he or ig ina l a c tio n) ; Turner , 827 S.W .2d at 322 (c onsideringwhether a plaintiff met the “r elation bac k” re quirements of Rule 15.03 to allow hi m to add a pa rty in his second complaint who was not named in the first). The Supreme Court has stated that Rule 15.03 applies separ ately and indepe ndently

of the Tennessee saving statute. Frazier v. East Tenn . Baptist Hosp., Inc. , 55 S.W .3d 925, 930 (Tenn. 2001). In order for a party to take advantag e of Te nnessee Rule of Civil Procedur e 15.03, he or she must show:
(1) that the c laim ar i s es o ut of the same c onduct, transa ction, or

oc c ur re nc e se t f

or th i n it s o ri g ina l c omp la int ; (2 ) t hat th e ne w d e fe nd ant h a d n oti c e that th e pla int if f h a d f ile d s uit befor e the r

unning of the applica

ble statute of limitations; and (3) that the de fenda

nt knew or should have known t h at the plaintiff would have nam ed i t as a de fenda nt had it not been for

a misnomer or other similar mistake.

Turner , 827 S.W .2d at 321-22. There is insuff icient evidenc e as to these f actor s in the rec ord, and the trial cour

t should address this issue on remand.

V. C ONCL US I ON

For the af oreme ntioned rea sons, we re verse the dec ision of the circ uit court and re mand for further proce eding s. Costs of thi s appea l are taxed to the appellee, K arne s L eg al Service s, for whic h

e x e c u t i o nm ay i s s u e i f

n e c e s s ar y.

___________________________________

AL ANE. HI GH ERS , P. J. , W .S.