DEFENSE NUCLEAR FACILITIES SAFETY BOARD

February 23, 2024

TO: Katherine R. Herrera, Acting Technical Director

FROM: L. Lin, Z.C. McCabe, and E.P. Richardson, Resident Inspectors

SUBJECT: Savannah River Site Activity Report for Week Ending February 23, 2024

Tank Farms: A resident inspector (RI) discussed cold weather protection procedures and 

practices with Tank Farms personnel. Some of the daily checklists and procedures are 

appropriately detailed, but the monthly facility walkdown for cold weather preparation is written 

more broadly. While this can allow an operator to determine what locations may require 

additional protection, but without more detailed guidance, it may be difficult for an operator to 

know where to look. For example, the operator is to ensure the portable heaters are inspected, 

tested, and staged as necessary. During a walkdown earlier in the year, the RI had noted an area 

with portable heat lamps, some of which were not on. Tank Farms personnel determined that the 

heat lamps that were noted to be off were not needed. After discussions with Tank Farms 

management, it was clear that key areas have been identified for deployment of portable heaters 

as extra protection from cold weather and the expectation is that operators would bring up any 

issues with portable heaters while performing their daily rounds. However, a specific list of 

portable heaters locations does not exist. 

Savannah River National Laboratory (SRNL): SRNL initiated their Implementation 

Verification Review (IVR) for revision 3 of the yet to be implemented Documented Safety 

Analysis (DSA) and Technical Safety Requirements (TSR) this week. The team consists of 

personnel across the DOE complex, such as Los Alamos National Laboratory and Idaho National 

Laboratory, as well as SRS personnel. Interviews are scheduled to begin next week, which will 

be conducted remotely. IVR team members will travel to conduct the onsite portion of the 

review the week of March 11.

BSRA transmitted the Safety Basis Strategy (SBS) to DOE-SR for their review and comment. 

The SBS outlines upcoming safety basis efforts planned by BSRA regarding revision 4 and 

revision 5 of the DSA and TSR. The SBS includes potential resolution to Board safety issues 

described in the Board’s April 5, 2023, letter to the Office of Environmental Management (DOEEM). DOE-EM replied on August 23, 2023, stating that they were fundamentally aligned with 

the Board’s concerns. The SBS addresses the Safety Integrity Level determination of 

instrumentation and the completion of Specific Administrative Control determinations on 

remaining administrative controls that were not addressed in revision 3 of the DSA and TSR. 

However, it does not outline the plan for inclusion of the results of the backfit analysis of the fire 

water supply system into the safety basis. BSRA personnel are currently developing the backfit 

analysis and expect it to be completed in May 2024. 

H-Canyon: H-Canyon personnel entered the Potential Inadequacy in the Safety Analysis 

(PISA) process twice regarding the 70-ton cask car. For the first instance, H-Canyon personnel 

determined that the material-at-risk was appropriately conservative, and a PISA did not exist. 

However, during that determination, H-Canyon personnel found that the cask car, a safety 

significant initial condition design feature, was inappropriately credited as protecting the public 

from a release of radiological material during a fire.