NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

RYAN DREXLER, 

Plaintiff-Appellant, 

 v. 

BRADFORD BILLET, 

Defendant-Appellee.

No. 18-55947 

D.C. No. 

2:17-cv-08552-DMG-JC 

MEMORANDUM*

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Central District of California

Dolly M. Gee, District Judge, Presiding

Submitted November 8, 2019**

Pasadena, California

Before: FARRIS and McKEOWN, Circuit Judges, and KENDALL,*** District 

Judge.

Ryan Drexler appeals the district court’s dismissal, pursuant to California’s 

anti-SLAPP statute, of his breach of contract and fraudulent inducement action. 

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent 

except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision 

without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

*** The Honorable Virginia M. Kendall, United States District Judge for 

the Northern District of Illinois, sitting by designation.

FILED

NOV 13 2019

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
2 

He argues the district court failed to apply Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) when 

evaluating his complaint, instead mistakenly applying Rule 56 by considering 

extrinsic evidence. Drexler also contends the district court erred in finding he was 

not an intended beneficiary of a contract—the breach of which led in part to this 

suit—and by determining that Bradford Billet did not contract away his right to 

anti-SLAPP protections. The parties are familiar with the facts, so we do not 

repeat them here. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We affirm the 

district court.

We review de novo a district court's ruling on a motion to strike under 

California's anti-SLAPP statute. Makaeff v. Trump Univ., LLC, 715 F.3d 254, 261 

(9th Cir. 2013).

Drexler relies on our recent holding that a court evaluating a California antiSLAPP motion challenging the legal sufficiency of a claim should apply the Rule 

12(b)(6) standard, whereas a motion to strike challenging the factual sufficiency of 

a claim is subject to the Rule 56 standard with accompanying discovery. Planned 

Parenthood Fed'n of Am., Inc. v. Ctr. for Med. Progress, 890 F.3d 828, 834 (9th 

Cir. 2018). This reliance is misplaced, as the district court based its ruling on the 

general nature of Drexler’s allegations, only glancingly referenced Billet’s 

declaration, and therefore “correctly applied a Rule 12(b)(6) standard to 
3 

Defendant[’s] Motion to Strike challenging the legal sufficiency of Plaintiff[’s] 

complaint.” Planned Parenthood, 890 F.3d at 835.

Drexler’s arguments that the district court mistakenly concluded he was not 

an intended beneficiary to the 2014 confidentiality agreement and that Billet 

waived anti-SLAPP protection are similarly unavailing. The district court 

correctly applied New York law requiring that contracting parties’ intention to 

benefit a third party be plain “on the face of the contract.” Synovus Bank of Tampa 

Bay v. Valley Nat'l Bank, 487 F. Supp. 2d 360, 368 (S.D.N.Y. 2007). The 

confidentiality agreement’s reference to “certain information and documents 

concerning [Drexler-Billet’s] former business and personal interests” is insufficient 

to conclude that Drexler was an intended beneficiary of the 2014 agreement. 

Drexler’s waiver argument is derivative of the beneficiary claim, and therefore also 

fails.

AFFIRMED.