J-S64037-18

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

v.

DALLAS RAY VAVRA, 

Appellant.

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 3918 EDA 2017

Appeal from the Order, November 3, 2017,

in the Court of Common Pleas of Northampton County,

Criminal Division at No(s): CP-48-CR-0000809-2011.

BEFORE: BOWES, J., OLSON, J., and KUNSELMAN, J.

MEMORANDUM BY KUNSELMAN, J.: FILED DECEMBER 20, 2018

Dallas Ray Vavra appeals from the order denying his serial petition 

under the Post Conviction Relief Act, 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-9546. We affirm.

In 2010, following a bench trial, Vavra was convicted of theft by failure 

to make required disposition of funds and receiving stolen property. The trial 

court sentenced him to nine to twenty-three months of incarceration. Vavra 

filed a timely appeal to this Court. On August 2, 2012, we affirmed his 

judgment of sentence. Commonwealth v. Vavra, 60 A.3d 555 (Pa. Super. 

2012) (unpublished memorandum). Vavra did not seek further review.

On December 26, 2012, Vavra filed a pro se PCRA petition. The PCRA 

court appointed counsel, who subsequently filed an amended PCRA petition. 

The PCRA court held a hearing on April 1, 2013, and the court denied the 

petition on May 3, 2013. Vavra filed an appeal to this Court (No. 1668 EDA 
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2013). During the pendency of that appeal, on January 13, 2014, Vavra filed 

a subpoena for appellate counsel, who he claimed was ineffective. The court 

quashed the subpoena on February 4, 2014. On February 18, 2014, Vavra 

filed a pro se motion for reconsideration, which the trial court denied on 

February 19, 2014. On February 21, 2014, Vavra filed a notice of appeal from 

the order quashing his subpoena (No. 717 EDA 2014). On March 18, 2014, 

Vavra another notice of appeal from the order denying his motion for 

reconsideration (No. 924 EDA 2014).

This Court found that Vavra’s appeal at No. 924 EDA 2014 was 

duplicative of his appeal at No. 717 EDA 2014, which involved the underlying 

order quashing the subpoena. On July 18, 2014 this Court had dismissed the 

appeal at No. 717 EDA 2014 without prejudice, because it, in turn, was 

duplicative of Vavra’s pending appeal from the denial of his PCRA petition at 

No. 1668 EDA 2013. Thu, this Court dismissed the appeal at No. 924 EDA 

2014. We further stated:

[S]ince 2011, [Vavra] has filed 57 notices of appeal in 

five criminal cases from Monroe and Northampton counties. 

[Vavra] has also filed more than 126 motions resulting in 

this Court’s Prothonotary having to file, process, and docket 

more than 277 [additional] documents. Thus, we hereby 

prohibit [Vavra] from submitting any additional 

filings for relief in this case without prior permission 

from this Court. We further direct the Prothonotary to 

assess appropriate costs against [Vavra] in connection with 

the instant appeal. See Pa.R.A.P. 2744 (stating appellate 

court may assess costs if it determines appeal is frivolous).
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Commonwealth v. Vavra, 2015 WL 6957472 (Pa. Super. 2015), 

unpublished judgment order at 3 (footnote omitted).

On July 22, 2016, this Court affirmed the order denying Vavra’s PCRA 

petition at No. 1668 EDA 2013. Commonwealth v. Vavra, 2016 WL4743874 

(Pa. Super. 2016). We affirmed because “Vavra has completed his sentence 

and is therefore no longer eligible for PCRA relief.” See id., unpublished 

judgment order at 2-3. In addition, we noted that “Vavra has been prohibited 

from submitting ‘any additional filing for relief’ in this appeal . . . without 

permission from this Court. Id., unpublished judgment order at 3, n.2. The 

Pennsylvania Supreme Court denied Vavra’s petition for allowance of appeal 

on March 14, 2017. Commonwealth v. Vavra, 169 A.3d 7 (Pa. 2017).

Vavra did not heed our directives. On August 22, 2017, Vavra filed a 

“Motion for Habeas Corpus—Praecipe for Entry of an Adverse Order of the 

Court.” The court denied this petition on August 31, 2017. Thereafter, Vavra 

filed two notices of appeal from this order (No. 3229 EDA 2017 and No. 3232 

EDA 2017). 

On October 30, 2017, Vavra filed “Defendant’s Pro-Se Habeas Corpus—

Motion to Have All of the Court’ Orders and Proceedings Vacated, From the 

Date of July 29th, 2011 Up to and Including the Present Date; for Lack of 

Jurisdiction Pursuant to the Still [Pending] Appeal on Defendant’s Speedy Trial 
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Rights.”

1

 The PCRA court denied this petition on November 3, 2017. This 

appeal followed (No. 3918 EDA 2017). On December 15, 2017, the court 

entered an order directing Vavra to file a Concise Statement of Errors 

Complained of on Appeal within twenty-one days. See Pa.R.A.P. 1925. Vavra 

failed to timely comply with this order. Instead, Vavra filed “Appellant’s 

Statement Nunc Pro Tunc” on June 7, 2018.2 

Before addressing the issues Vavra raises in this appeal, we must first 

determine if this appeal is properly before us.

Initially, we note that Vavra’s latest filing should have been treated as 

a petition for post-conviction relief. See Commonwealth v. Descardes, 136 

A.3d 493, 503 (Pa. 2016) (explaining that, when a petitioner’s claim is 

cognizable under the PCRA, the PCRA is the only method of obtaining collateral 

review). This Court’s standard of review regarding an order dismissing a 

petition under the PCRA is to ascertain whether “the determination of the PCRA 

court is supported by the evidence of record and is free of legal error. The 

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1 Vavra filed a similar motion on September 22, 2017. There is no indication 

in the record that the court ruled on it.

2 Additionally, Vavra has subsequently filed three applications for relief with

this Court. In an Order dated August 16, 2018 we denied each application 

and further stated: “This Court prohibits [Vavra] from submitting any 

additional filings for relief or notice of appeal in the Northampton Court of 

Common Pleas and the Prothonotary of this Court, involving trial court docket 

number CP-48888-CR0000809-2011, without prior permission from this 

Court.”

 
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PCRA court’s findings will not be disturbed unless there is no support for the 

findings in the certified record.” Commonwealth v. Barndt, 74 A.3d 185, 

191-92 (Pa. Super. 2013) (citations omitted). 

Generally, a petition for relief under the PCRA, including a second or 

subsequent petition, must be filed within one year of the date the judgment 

is final unless the petition alleges, and the petitioner proves, that he meets an 

exception to the time for filing the petition, set forth at 42 Pa.C.S.A. sections 

9545(b)(1)(i), (ii), and (iii).3 A PCRA petition invoking one of these statutory 

exceptions must “be filed within 60 days of the date the claims could have 

been presented.” See Commonwealth v. Hernandez, 79 A.3d 649, 651-

52 (Pa. Super. 2013) (citations omitted); see also 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(2). 

Asserted exceptions to the time restrictions for a PCRA petition must be 

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3 The exceptions to the timeliness requirement are:

(i) the failure to raise the claim previously was the result of 

interference of government officials with the presentation of the 

claim in violation of the Constitution or laws of this Commonwealth 

or the Constitution or laws of the United States.

(ii) the facts upon which the claim is predicated were unknown to 

the petitioner and could not have been ascertained by the exercise 

of due diligence; or

(iii) the right asserted is a constitutional right that was recognized 

by the Supreme Court of the United States or the Supreme Court 

of Pennsylvania after the time period provided in this section and 

has been held by that court to apply retroactively.

42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9545(b)(1)(i), (ii), and (iii).
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included in the petition, and may not be raised for the first time on appeal. 

Commonwealth v. Furgess, 149 A.3d 90 (Pa. Super. 2016).

Here, because Vavra did not seek further review following our decision 

affirming his judgment of sentence, for PCRA purposes, his judgment of 

sentence became final thirty days thereafter, or on September 4, 2012.4 See 

42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9543(b)(3). Thus, for purposes of the PCRA’s time bar, Vavra 

had to file his PCRA petition by September 4, 2013. Vavra filed his latest 

petition on November 3, 2017. Thus, the petition is untimely, unless Vavra 

satisfied his burden of pleading and proving that one of the enumerated 

exceptions applies. See Hernandez, supra.

Vavra has not acknowledged the PCRA’s time bar, let alone pled or 

proven any exception thereto. Thus, the PCRA court lacked jurisdiction to 

consider the merits of Vavra’s serial petition. We could affirm on this basis 

alone. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9543(b)(3). See Commonwealth v. Doty, 48 

A.3d 451, 456 (Pa. Super. 2012) (explain this Court is not bound by the PCRA 

court’s rationale, but may affirm on any basis).

Nevertheless, we echo the holding of our previous judgment order that 

Vavra is ineligible for post-conviction relief because he had completed serving 

his sentence at the above docket number. Although Vavra may still be on 

probation for convictions in another county, see Vavra’s Reply Brief at 6, the 

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4 This date takes into account that the thirtieth day fell on a Saturday, as 

well as the Labor Day holiday. See 1 Pa.C.S.A. § 1908.
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PCRA specifically provides that to be eligible for relief the petitioner must be 

still serving a sentence for the crime for which he seeks relief. See 42 

Pa.C.S.A. § 9543(a)(1)(i) (providing that, to be eligible for relief under the 

PCRA, a petitioner must plead and prove by a preponderance of the evidence 

that he “has been convicted of a crime under the laws of this Commonwealth 

and is at the time relief is granted . . . currently serving a sentence of 

imprisonment, probation or parole for the crime”) (emphasis added).

Contrary to Vavra’s claim that he is still under supervision for payment 

of fees, Vavra’s Reply Brief at 6, a PCRA petitioner is ineligible for postconviction relief when the only component of his sentence outstanding is the 

payment of restitution, Commonwealth v. James, 771 A.2d 33 (Pa. Super. 

2001), or when the only component outstanding is the payment of a fine. 

Commonwealth v. Fisher, 703 A.2d 714 (Pa. Super. 1997).

Moreover, we note that the Commonwealth claims that all of his 

appellate issues are waived on appeal because he failed to timely comply with 

the PCRA court’s request for a Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) statement. See 

Commonwealth’s Brief at 6. We agree. See Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b)(3)(i); 

Commonwealth v. Lord, 719 A.2d 306, 309 (Pa. 1998), reaffirmed in 

Commonwealth v. Castillo, 888 A.2d 775, 780 (Pa. 2005) (establishing 

bright line rule that in order to preserve claims for appellate review, the 

appellant must comply whenever the trial court orders them to file a Pa.R.A.P. 

1925(b) statement; any issues not raised in the statement are deemed 

waived).
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In response, Vavra avers that the PCRA court lacked jurisdiction to enter 

the order requiring a Rule 1925(b) statement, as well as all previous orders, 

due to an “UNADJUDICATED PRO SE appeal” which he had filed as part of 

his direct appeal on July 29, 2011. Vavra’s Brief at 19 (emphasis in original). 

This jurisdictional challenge is the essential element of most of the claims he 

raises on appeal. Vavra is mistaken, as no notice of appeal remains pending.

Following his conviction and sentence, Vavra filed a pro se notice of 

appeal, even though he was still represented by counsel. In Vavra’s direct 

appeal we explained:

Neither [Vavra] nor his counsel filed a post-sentence 

motion, but on July 29, 2011, [Vavra] filed a pro se timely 

notice of appeal. Although there was no certificate of 

service, the trial court docket entry for the notice of appeal 

indicates that copies were provided to [Vavra’s] counsel and 

the Commonwealth. Criminal Docket at 6. On August 5, 

2011, the court ordered a statement pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 

1925(b). Neither the order nor the docket state[s] on whom 

service was made, but [Vavra’s] counsel complied on August 

26, 2011. Although the record does not include any 

petitions for extension of time, the trial court stated that 

[Vavra] filed such pro se requests. The court entered two 

orders . . . granting [Vavra] an additional fifteen days. 

[Vavra] subsequently filed a pro se twenty-three page 

1925(b) statement on October 7, 2011. Trial Ct. Op., 

11/15/12, at 1.

Vavra, unpublished memorandum at 3-4.

This Court then noted Pennsylvania’s long-standing policy which 

precludes “hybrid representation,” that is, instances where a pro se appellant 

continues to file documents regarding his appeal, even though his counsel is 

filing similar items on his behalf. See generally, Commonwealth v. Jette, 
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23 A.3d 1032 (Pa. 2011). We then discussed other cases that explained that 

the purpose behind this prohibition was “driven primarily by the problems of 

competing filings from an appellant and his counsel.” Vavra, unpublished 

memorandum at 5-6 (citing Commonwealth v. Glacken, 32 A.3d 750, 753 

(Pa. Super. 2011). In Glacken, a represented defendant filed a pro se notice 

of appeal, Rule 1925(b) statement and appellate brief with this Court, while 

his counsel did not file “anything.” Glacken, 32 A.3d at 752. Under the 

circumstances, we distinguished Jette, and did not quash the appeal on this 

basis because there were no “competing filings.” Id., at 753.

In Vavra’s direct appeal, this Court also recognized that there were no 

“competing filings” between Vavra and his counsel:

Instantly, no post-sentence motion was left outstanding 

by [Vavra’s] pro se notice of appeal, counsel complied with 

the court’s 1925(b) order, and counsel filed an appellate 

brief. Because there are no competing filings, by [Vavra] 

and his counsel, we decline to quash this appeal. See 

[Glacken, 32 A.3d at 752-53]. We do note that the trial 

court erred in accepting and ruling on [Vavra’s] pro se 

petitions for extension of time to file a Rule 1925(b) 

statement. See Commonwealth v. Ali, 10 A.3d 282, 293 

(Pa. 2010) (holding that because defendant was 

represented by counsel on appeal, his pro se Pa.R.A.P. 

1925(b) statement was a legal nullity). Nevertheless, 

because the counseled brief does not address any issue 

raised in [Vavra’s] pro se 1925(b) statement, we need not 

consider the propriety of any issues presented by [Vavra] 

therein.

Vavra, unpublished memorandum at 6. We then addressed and rejected 

Vavra’s two issues argued in his counseled brief.
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As this Court noted above, Vavra’s filing of a pro se notice of appeal, 

and counsel’s later filing of a Rule 1925(b) statement and brief, complemented 

each other rather than competed against other. In other words, there was no 

need for counsel to file a counseled notice of appeal.5 In addition, we note 

that, although Vavra claims he only filed the notice of appeal to challenge the 

denial of his Rule 600 motion, his pro se filing actually preserved his appeal 

of any preserved issues regarding his conviction and sentencing. This Court 

disposed of all issues raised on his direct appeal in the unpublished 

memorandum dated August 2, 2012. See Vavra, supra. 

Finally, Vavra asserts that the PCRA court also lacked jurisdiction 

because of his two other pending appeals at this docket number. We find no 

merit to this claim, and note that each of these appeals have been disposed 

of administratively. See Commonwealth v. Vavra, No. 3232 EDA 2017 

(dismissing appeal as duplicative); Commonwealth v. Vavra, No. 3229 EDA 

2017 (dismissing appeal for failure to file a brief). 

In sum, for all of the above reasons, we conclude that the PCRA court 

properly denied Vavra’s latest PCRA petition. The petition was untimely. The 

PCRA court had jurisdiction to order the Rule 1925(b) statement, and Vavra 

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5 Had counsel done so, the notice of appeal would have been likely quashed 

by this Court as duplicative. See generally, Commonwealth v. Cooper, 27 

A.3d 994 (Pa. 2011).
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did not comply. We therefore affirm the PCRA court’s order denying postconviction relief.6

Order affirmed.

Judge Bowes joins the Memorandum.

Judge Olson files a Concurring Statement.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 12/20/18

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6 We remind Vavra of this Court’s previous orders prohibiting him from filing 

additional applications for relief or notices of appeal relating to his convictions 

at CP-48-000809-2011. Should Vavra continue to disobey this prohibition we 

will not hesitate to impose additional costs on him. See Pa.R.A.P. 2744.