If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to 

revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports.

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S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N

C O U R T O F A P P E A L S

ANESTHESIA SERVICES AFFILIATES, 

MICHIGAN AMBULATORY SURGICAL 

CENTER, and SPINE SPECIALISTS OF 

MICHIGAN, PC,

Plaintiffs-Appellants,

UNPUBLISHED

November 21, 2019

v No. 344317

Wayne Circuit Court

CITY OF DETROIT, LC No. 17-005448-NF

Defendant-Appellee.

Before: CAMERON, P.J., and CAVANAGH and SHAPIRO, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

Plaintiffs appeal as of right an order granting defendant summary disposition in this nofault action. We reverse and remand.

This case arises from a bus accident that occurred in Detroit, Michigan in which Amber 

Chaplain sustained injuries. Chaplain’s domicile is at issue. Chaplain signed an affidavit of no

motor vehicle insurance stating that she lived at “19698 Spencer” and testified as to the same. 

The house located at 19698 Spencer Street, Detroit Michigan 48234 is owned by Chaplain’s 

aunt, Carol Chatters. Chatters testified that Chaplain did not live with her on the date of the 

accident. Chatters also testified that she had automobile insurance on the date of the accident.

Defendant filed a motion for summary disposition arguing that Chatters’s insurer, rather 

than defendant, was the insurer of highest priority because Chaplain was domiciled with Chatters 

when the accident occurred. Plaintiffs contended that there was a question of fact on the issue 

and that, regardless, defendant could not assert priority as a defense against an injured party. 

The trial court agreed with defendant and granted its motion for summary disposition. This 

appeal followed.

Plaintiffs argue that there was a genuine issue of material fact on the issue of whether 

Chaplain was domiciled with Chatters, and that, even if defendant was not the insurer of highest 
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priority under the no-fault act, defendant could not assert priority as a defense. We agree that 

there is a genuine issue of material fact on the issue of Chaplain’s domicile.

We review de novo a lower court’s decision on a motion for summary disposition under 

MCR 2.116(C)(10). Johnson v Recca, 492 Mich 169, 173; 821 NW2d 520 (2012). A motion 

brought under MCR 2.116(C)(10) “tests the factual support of a plaintiff’s claim.” Spiek v Dept 

of Transp, 456 Mich 331, 337; 572 NW2d 201 (1998). The moving party must identify the 

matters that have no disputed factual issues, and has the initial burden of supporting its position 

with documentary evidence. Quinto v Cross & Peters Co, 451 Mich 358, 362; 547 NW2d 314 

(1996). The party opposing the motion must then establish by evidentiary materials that a 

genuine issue of disputed fact exists. Id. at 362-363. After considering the documentary 

evidence submitted in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, the court determines 

whether a genuine issue of material fact exists to warrant a trial. Walsh v Taylor, 263 Mich App 

618, 621; 689 NW2d 506 (2004). “Courts are liberal in finding a factual dispute sufficient to 

withstand summary disposition.” Patrick v Turkelson, 322 Mich App 595, 605; 913 NW2d 369 

(2018) (quotation marks and citation omitted).

I. DOMICILE

“[T]he no-fault act does not define the term ‘domiciled.’ ” Grange Ins Co of Mich v 

Lawrence, 494 Mich 475, 492; 835 NW2d 363 (2013). “The unambiguous language of MCL 

500.3114(1) simply states that ‘a personal protection insurance policy . . . applies to accidental 

bodily injury to the person named in the policy, the person’s spouse, and a relative of either

domiciled in the same house-hold . . . .’ ” Id. at 492-493. Chatters unequivocally testified that 

she had an automobile insurance policy through Nationwide at the time of the accident. While 

plaintiffs argue this is not sufficient to establish that Chatters actually had insurance, plaintiffs 

fail to point to anything in the record to support this argument. Thus, the fact that Chatters had 

automobile insurance at the time of the accident was established.

“A domicile determination is generally a question of fact; however, where the underlying 

material facts are not in dispute, the determination of domicile is a question of law for the circuit 

court.” Id. at 490. “Michigan courts have defined ‘domicile’ to mean the place where a person 

has his true, fixed, permanent home, and principal establishment, and to which, whenever he is 

absent, he has the intention of returning.” Id. at 493 (quotation marks and citation omitted). 

“[A] person may have only one domicile, but more than one residence.” Id. at 494.

Michigan courts apply a “multi-factor test . . . in which no one factor is determinative” to 

determine domicile. Id. at 497. As noted in Lawrence, 494 Mich at 497, Michigan courts apply 

the factors set forth in Workman v Detroit Auto Inter-Ins Exch, 404 Mich 477; 274 NW2d 373 

(1979), and Dairyland Ins Co v Auto Owners Inc Co, 123 Mich App 675; 333 NW2d 322 (1983). 

In Workman, our Supreme Court articulated four factors to be considered when determining a 

person’s domicile:

(1) the subjective or declared intent of the person of remaining, either 

permanently or for an indefinite or unlimited length of time, in the place he 

contends is his “domicile” or “household”; (2) the formality or informality of the 

relationship between the person and the members of the household; (3) whether 
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the place where the person lives is in the same house, within the same curtilage or 

upon the same premises; (4) the existence of another place of lodging by the 

person alleging “residence” or “domicile” in the household. [Workman, 404 Mich 

at 496-497 (internal citations omitted).]

This Court has also set forth the following factors, on the basis of Dairyland, to determine a 

person’s domicile:

(1) the person’s mailing address; (2) whether the person maintains possessions at 

the insured’s home; (3) whether the insured’s address appears on the person’s 

driver’s license and other documents; (4) whether a bedroom is maintained for the 

person at the insured’s home; and (5) whether the person is dependent upon the 

insured for financial support or assistance. [Williams v State Farm Mut Auto Ins 

Co, 202 Mich App 491, 494-495; 509 NW2d 821 (1993), citing Dobson v Maki, 

184 Mich App 244, 252; 457 NW2d 132 (1990), and Dairyland, 123 Mich App at 

682.]

In regard to the first Workman factor, the subjective or declared intent of the person to 

remain at the home she contends to be her domicile or household, Chaplain testified that at the 

time of the accident she lived with Chatters. However, Chaplain also testified that she stayed 

overnight at her boyfriend’s house during this time period. Thus, it is not clear whether 

Chaplain’s intent was to remain at Chatters’s home.

The second Workman factor, which considers the formality of the relationship between 

the person and other members of the household, is inconclusive. Chatters is Chaplain’s aunt and 

the two had a personal relationship. However, neither Chatters’s nor Chaplain’s testimony 

suggest that there was any sort of formal arrangement in regards to Chaplain living at the 

Spencer Street house. For example, there was no evidence that Chaplain paid Chatters rent.

The third Workman factor, whether the place where the person lives is in the same house, 

within the same curtilage or upon the same premises, did not weigh for or against a finding that 

Chaplain was domiciled with Chatters because there was conflicting evidence regarding 

Chaplain’s residence. Chaplain testified that she lived with Chatters at 19698 Spencer. Chaplain 

also provided the Spencer Street address on her affidavit of no motor vehicle insurance and 

identification card. However, Chatters testified that Chaplain did not live with her at the Spencer 

Street address at the time of the accident. Chatters further testified that Chaplain moved out of 

the Spencer Street house after the death of Chaplain’s grandmother in 2015. Chatters believed 

that Chaplain lived with her friend, Crystal Jones, at the time of the accident. Thus, there is 

conflicting evidence regarding Chaplain’s residence at the time of the accident.

The fourth Workman factor, the existence of another place of lodging by the person 

alleging residence or domicile in the household, also did not weigh for or against a finding that 

Chaplain was domiciled with Chatters because there was evidence presented that Chaplain had 

other places of lodging. Chaplain testified that she “went back and forth” between her 

boyfriend’s house and the Spencer Street house around the time of the accident. Chatters 

testified that Chaplain lived with Jones at the time of the accident. Thus, there is evidence that 

Chaplain had one or two other places of lodging in addition to Chatters’s home.
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The first Dairyland factor, a person’s mailing address, supports the conclusion that 

Chaplain was domiciled with Chatters. Chatters testified that Chaplain received mail at the 

Spencer Street house. The second Dairyland factor, whether the person maintains possessions at 

the insured’s home, also supports the conclusion that Chaplain was domiciled with Chatters. 

Chatters testified that Chaplain kept some personal items in a bedroom at the Spencer Street 

home. The third Dairyland factor, whether the insured’s address is listed on the individual’s

driver’s license and other documents, further supports the conclusion that Chaplain was 

domiciled with Chatters. Chaplain’s state identification card listed the Spencer Street address.

The fourth Dairyland factor, whether a bedroom is maintained for the person at the 

insured’s home, is inconclusive. Chatters testified that the Spencer Street house had two guest

rooms and that most guests stayed in a different room than the bedroom Chaplain used. 

However, Chaplain’s sister also stayed in the guest bedroom Chaplain used when she visited 

Chatters. Thus, it is not clear whether a bedroom was maintained for Chaplain at the Spencer 

Street home or whether Chaplain simply stayed in the same guest room whenever she stayed at 

the home. The fifth Dairyland factor, whether the person is dependent upon the insured for 

financial support or assistance, weighs against finding that Chaplain was domiciled with 

Chatters. There is no evidence that Chaplain was dependent on Chatters for financial support or 

assistance.

Accordingly, some of the factors support the trial court’s determination that Chaplain was 

domiciled with Chatters at the time of the accident while others do not. Therefore, there is a 

genuine issue of material fact as to whether Chaplain was domiciled with Chatters at the time of 

the accident; this is particularly true because domicile is a question of fact for the jury when the 

underlying facts are in dispute. See Lawrence, 494 Mich at 490.

II. PRIORITY DEFENSE

As there is a question of fact regarding Chaplain’s domicile, this Court need not address 

plaintiffs’ argument regarding defendant’s ability to assert a priority defense. However, we note 

and reject plaintiffs’ argument that, even if defendant is not the highest priority insurer under the 

act, it cannot raise priority as a defense against plaintiffs because Chaplain could not now file a 

claim for no-fault benefits with Chatters’s insurance company. Plaintiffs are correct that, under 

MCL 500.3145(1), claims for no-fault benefits must be filed within one year of the date of the 

accident. But plaintiffs’ interpretation of the no-fault act would defeat the purpose of the priority 

provision. According to plaintiffs’ interpretation, a plaintiff could file a claim for no-fault 

benefits against any insurer no matter where they fall in order of priority and, if one year has 

passed, require that insurer to provide no-fault benefits to the plaintiff even though the insurer 

was never first in order of priority. This is untenable.

And plaintiffs have provided no persuasive authority to convince us otherwise. Instead, 

plaintiffs rely on Borgess Med Ctr v Resto, 273 Mich App 558; 730 NW2d 738 (2007), opinion 

vacated and judgment aff’d 482 Mich 946 (2008). But our Supreme Court vacated that opinion 

and stated that it was affirming “the judgment of the Court of Appeals for the reasons stated in 

the concurring opinion.” Borgess Med Ctr, 482 Mich at 946. The concurring opinion stated:

I write separately simply to state that I do not rely on a statutory distinction 

between “a person suffering accidental bodily injury” and a claimant under MCL 
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500.3114(4). Defendant indisputably insured the owner of the occupied vehicle, 

and no insurer in a higher priority was identified. [Borgess Med Ctr, 273 Mich 

App at 585 (WHITE, J., concurring).]

It is not clear whether our Supreme Court affirmed the judgment on the basis of the first or 

second line of the concurring opinion, or both. What is clear, however, is that the court vacated 

the majority opinion, meaning plaintiffs cannot rely on it as precedential. See Straman v Lewis, 

220 Mich App 448, 451-452; 559 NW2d 405 (1996).

Reversed and remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. We do not 

retain jurisdiction.

/s/ Thomas C. Cameron

/s/ Mark J. Cavanagh

/s/ Douglas B. Shapiro