# 1_EN_ACT_part1_v5.docx

european flagEUROPEAN COMMISSION Brussels, 15.12.2017 COM(2017) 720 final REPORT FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND THE COUNCIL Mid-term review report of the External Financing Instruments {SWD(2017) 463 final}{SWD(2017) 600 final}{SWD(2017) 601 final}{SWD(2017) 602 final}{SWD(2017) 604 final}{SWD(2017) 605 final}{SWD(2017) 606 final}{SWD(2017) 607 final}{SWD(2017) 608 final}{SWD(2017) 609 final}
Contents Executive summary 1. Introduction Purpose Scope 2. Background 3. Financial breakdown 4. Achievement of objectives Relevance of the objectives Effectiveness Efficiency Internal coherence, external coherence, complementarity and synergies between external financing instruments Added-value Leverage effect Scope for simplification Contribution to a consistent EU external action Contribution to EU priorities for smart, sustainable and inclusive growth Long-term impact 5. Conclusions
Annexes List of acronyms Executive summary This report responds to the Regulation (EU) 236/2014 of 11 March 2014 laying down common rules and procedures for the implementation of the European Union's (EU) instruments for financing external action 1 ('the Common Implementing Regulation') which requires a mid-term review report on several EU external financing instruments ('the instruments'). This report assesses whether these instruments are still fit for purpose, so as to ensure the effective implementation of the EU's assistance. It will inform decisions on the renewal, amendment or suspension of the types of actions implemented under the set of instruments. The report analyses whether the objectives have been met, focusing on the results, their efficiency, added-value, the scope for simplification, internal and external coherence including complementarity and synergies, the continued relevance of all objectives, their contribution to a consistent EU external action and where relevant to the EU priorities for smart, sustainable and inclusive growth, and the leverage effect achieved. The report is based on the findings from a set of 10 evaluation staff working documents (one per external financing instrument) which are annexed to this report. These staff working documents are themselves based on 10 external evaluations of the instruments that took place in 2016-2017 and an overarching report (the 'coherence report') that drew lessons and key messages from across the set of these instruments. The evaluation staff working documents show that the instruments are at this time, generally fit for purpose and positive trends are emerging in relation to the instruments' objectives. In conclusion, there is no need to amend the instruments through legislative amendments or delegated acts. Since the adoption of the instruments, the international and EU policy framework has changed with the adoption of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, the Global Strategy for the European Union's Foreign and Security Policy and the new European Consensus on Development. Nevertheless, the broad nature of the instruments' objectives covers partner country needs and global and EU priorities without any major gaps. Furthermore, in their first years of implementation, they have in part enabled the EU to respond to new crises and evolving needs. However, limited resources and financial flexibility, combined with a multiplication of crises, have stretched the instruments to their limits. The main findings of the evaluation point to a need to adapt the way the instruments are implemented, notably through a more strategic and overarching programming and ensuring coherent interactions at operational level in the renewed international context. Looking towards the future, the next generation of instruments will need to take into account the level of financial and other forms of flexibility needed for external action in order to respond to the challenges faced by the EU on the world stage. 1. Introduction
Purpose This report responds to Article 17 of the Common Implementing Regulation which requires a mid-term review report of the EU's external financing instruments ("the instruments") by the end of 2017. This report assesses whether these instruments remain fit for purpose, with a view to ensuring the effective implementation of the EU's assistance. It will inform decisions on the renewal, amendment or suspension of the types of actions implemented under the instruments. Scope The Common Implementing Regulation applies to the following: · Development Cooperation Instrument 2 ; · European Instrument for Human Rights and Democracy 3 ; · European Neighbourhood Instrument 4 ; · Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace 5 ; · Instrument for Pre-Accession Assistance; 6 and · Partnership Instrument for Cooperation with third countries 7 . Other instruments that follow the requirements set out in the Common Implementing Regulation and have therefore been included in this report are: · Instrument for Nuclear Safety Cooperation 8 ; and · Greenland Decision 9 . Since this report provides an overview of the instruments, it also includes the 11 th European Development Fund (EDF). The 11 th EDF refers to a performance review 10 that needs to be carried out by the end of 2018. The performance review is similar to the mid-term review provided in the Common Implementing Regulation. The Decision on the association of the overseas countries and territories was included in the performance review of the 11 th EDF. This mid-term review report therefore covers nine instruments as well as the Common Implementation Review itself. In line with the requirements of the Common Implementation Regulation, this report covers the period from 1 January 2014 to 30 June 2017. It analyses the achievement of the objectives of each of the instruments mentioned above, focusing on their results, efficiency, added-value, the scope for simplification, internal and external coherence including complementarity and synergies between the instruments, the continued relevance of all objectives, the contribution of the instruments to a consistent EU external action and where relevant to the EU's priorities for smart, sustainable and inclusive growth, and the leverage effect achieved by the funds.
A series of external evaluations took place in 2016-2017 on all the instruments 11 to inform this report. The evaluation staff working documents linked to this report are also largely based on these external evaluations. 2. Background The EU remains the world's biggest provider of external assistance. Through this assistance it aims to reduce poverty, promote global and EU interests and fundamental values (such as democracy, human rights, peace, stability, solidarity, and prosperity) 12 and support the safeguarding of global public goods. The instruments make up a major part of the 2014-2020 Multi-annual Financial Framework's (MFF) 13 Heading IV "Global Europe" 14 . The initial total amount of Heading IV was EUR 66.2 billion (i.e. 6 % of the MFF). The EU budget instruments falling under this report 15 represent a total of EUR 51.8 billion. In addition, the 11 th EDF which is outside the EU budget has an allocation of EUR 30.5 billion. Table 1: Main Heading IV instruments and EDF 16 Instruments
Amounts, € millions 1. Instrument for Pre-accession assistance (IPA II)
12.138,63 2. European Neighbourhood Instrument (ENI)
16.496,26 3. Development Cooperation Instrument (DCI)
19.947,59 4. Partnership Instrument (PI)
958,53 5. European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR)
1.306,56 6. Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace (IcSP)
2.365,85 7. Instrument for Nuclear Safety Cooperation (INSC)
325,321 8. Greenland Decision (GD)
217,8 Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP)
2.121,24 Macro-financial Assistance (MFA)
294,843 Guarantee Fund for External Actions
1.627,67 Humanitarian aid
8.2909,02 EU Civil Protection Mechanism
122,827 EU Aid Volunteers initiative (EUAV)
126,02 European Fund for Sustainable Development (EFSD)
350 Margin 4
-672,572 9. 11th European Development Fund, including the Overseas Countries and Territories Decision
30.506,00 10. Common Implementing Regulation (not a financing instrument but a Regulation for the implementation of some of the above instruments)
N/A Most instruments have been under financial pressure since their creation because of: · an increase in the number of crises; · instability in the Neighbourhood and beyond; · terrorist threats; · unprecedented refugee flows; and · a sharp increase in irregular migration 17 and trafficking of human beings. Innovative and ad hoc mechanisms had to be set up to help enhance the EU's responsiveness in the face of new pressures, such as trust funds and the Facility for Refugees in Turkey 18 . The recently adopted European Fund for Sustainable Development (September 2017) has also been established to provide further leverage capacity 19 . Adopted in early 2014, the instruments were designed to be broad enough to adapt to an evolving policy framework. Their enabling nature has been tested as the lines between foreign and development policies and the importance of the link between internal and external policies have evolved in the past few years 20 . That said, no amendments were considered as needed since the instruments were established, except to cover new actions in capacity-building for security and development under the Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace 21 . 3. Financial breakdown
As required by the Common Implementing Regulation, the tables in the annexes display consolidated information on all funding included in the scope of this report: spending by country and region, and per instrument together with contributions to trust funds and external assigned revenues. 4. Achievement of objectives The instruments pursue different, overall objectives: EFI
Main objective DCI
Reduce and in the long-term eradicate poverty in developing countries that do not benefit from funding under EDF, ENI or IPA.
Provide thematic support for development-related global public goods and challenges (GPGC), and to civil society organisations and local authorities in partner countries (CSO/LAs).
Support the strategic partnership between Africa and the EU. ENI
Further advance towards an area of shared prosperity and good neighbourliness involving the EU and 16 countries and territories 22 . IPA II
Support eight beneficiaries 23 in adopting and implementing the reforms required for EU membership. 11 th EDF
Reduce and in the long-term eradicate poverty in African, Caribbean and Pacific States.
Attain sustainable development of overseas countries and territories. PI
Advance and promote EU and mutual interests and support partnership and alliance-building on global challenges and external aspects of EU internal policies. EIDHR
Support democracy and enhance respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, and democracy in third countries. IcSP
Provide crisis response and conflict prevention, support peace-building and address global, trans-regional and emerging threats. INSC
Promote a high-level of nuclear safety, radiation protection, and the application of efficient and effective safeguards of nuclear material in third countries. Greenland
Preserve the close and lasting links between Greenland, the EU and Denmark, while supporting the sustainable development of Greenland. The evaluation staff working documents show that positive trends are emerging in relation to these objectives 24 . For example, most countries where the 11 th EDF and DCI geographic programmes operate have experienced progress in poverty reduction and human and economic development over the last 10 years 25 . In the western Balkans, IPA II assistance contributed to the implementation of reforms in key areas, such as the judiciary, anti-corruption, public administration and social inclusion, and supported the progressive alignment with EU legislation and standards. In the Neighbourhood, ENI assistance produced visible results in various sectors, such as regional development, agriculture, the labour market, border management and migration. At the same time, the instruments (ENI complemented by IcSP 26 ) demonstrated a capacity to respond to evolving needs and crisis situations. The INSC raised levels of nuclear safety, for example by supporting follow-up to the joint comprehensive plan of action cooperation with Iran, and stress testing nuclear power plants in various countries. The PI effectively influenced policy developments in partner countries in line with EU interests and contributed to development of mutual relationship with third countries, 27 complementing the larger thematic activities financed under the DCI, in particular the Global Public Goods and Challenges programme. However, difficulties in measuring the achievement of objectives should be noted. As this is a mid-term review report and several of the instruments only recently started being implemented (following the drafting of strategy documents), it is too early to measure the achievement of high-level (and long-term) objectives at this stage. To help mitigate this situation, the external evaluations also collected data from previous instruments. That said, other limitations in measuring the achievement of objectives must be taken into consideration. Often EU support can only be seen as a contributing factor towards any results achieved. For example, the fight to eradicate poverty is a highly ambitious endeavour. Many factors, both internal and external, affect the development of the EU's partner countries and other objectives. Other major external relations actors play an active role, together with an increasing number of private donors including foundations. In addition, it is for the partner countries to adopt and implement the necessary reforms and policies that the instruments support. Relevance of the objectives The evaluation staff working documents have confirmed that the instruments' objectives were largely relevant to the policy priorities at the time of their design 28 .
Compared to the 2007-2013 MFF, the strategic relevance has improved substantially, as lessons from the past were integrated in the new regulations: · confirmation of global reach (IcSP, PI); · promotion of EU interests worldwide (PI); · increased focus on conflict prevention (IcSP); · new common programming principles (DCI, EDF); · greater differentiation (DCI, ENI, IPA); · sharper focus on sector approaches (IPA); · clear delineation of specific objectives (EIDHR); · enhanced consistency and complementarity between the IcSP and the geographical cooperation instruments 29 and with CFSP operations; · broader ambitions for the Greenland partnership (GD); and · harmonisation of implementing procedures (CIR) Furthermore, the external evaluations underline the strategic relevance of the thematic instruments 30 , in particular their ability to act without the explicit consent of the partner country if required, such as engaging in crisis response, human rights and democratisation in a deteriorating context and promoting EU interests and global actions on public goods, including climate change. The set of broad, enabling instruments have been able to cover EU priorities without any major gaps 31 , except for capacity-building in support of security and development (CBSD) 32 . However, on programming (where programming applies) and implementation of the instruments, this potential was not always fully exploited. In some countries actions under the instruments were strategically combined 33 , whereas in others, the potential for strategically combining actions was not always used 34 .
A major benefit of the instruments' relevance is the flexibility that they have built into them. Flexibility to respond to unforeseen events is required at different levels: (i) short-term crisis response 35 ; (ii) flexibility in choice of programming and implementation methods 36 ; (iii) financial flexibility 37 with reserve funds and reallocations within and between instruments; (iv) flexibility in the multi-annual programming with the possibility to adapt the duration of the programming to the situation on the ground and to swiftly redirect the funding in case of major changes; and (v) the use of special measures provided for by the Common Implementing Regulation 38 . The evaluation staff working documents found that the instruments, due to their enabling character and sufficiently broad objectives, facilitated the EU to respond to new crises and its evolving needs and policy objectives as well as those of partner countries. However, the ability to reallocate financial resources was fully exhausted with the emergence of new crises in countries surrounding the EU. Internal resources and funds that were not earmarked were insufficient to deal with the crises. Consequently, Heading IV had to be increased during the mid-term review of the MFF, and the EU had to set up different crisis-related trust funds and coordination mechanisms such as a Facility for Refugees in Turkey (FRiT) 39 . Through the trust funds and the FRiT, the EU was able to respond fairly rapidly to the crises and mobilise additional funds from EU Member States and other donors, even if the contributions from Member States were less than expected . The response also had to be facilitated by the use of special measures outside the regular programming decisions. It is too early to conclude whether all the instruments are adequately designed to fully implement the Global Strategy for the EU's Foreign and Security Policy and the new European Consensus on Development, which focuses on the implementation of the internationally agreed Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). Although there is a clear alignment between the new SDGs and the objectives of several instruments. Overall, it appears that the priorities and sectors of intervention defined in the regulations for the 11 th EDF, EIDHR, ENI, DCI, IPA II, IcSP and the PI are still relevant and encompass current needs and priorities. This implies that no amendments to the regulations are needed at this stage 40 . Nevertheless, the lessons-learned from the mid-term review of the MFF in terms of limited financial flexibility and complexity of the current architecture, thwarting enhanced complementarity on the ground, as well as to cover gaps in the area of security would need to be considered in the future architecture of the instruments 41 . Effectiveness Many of the partner countries and themes addressed by the instruments have experienced positive progress over the last years. Recent annual reports on the implementation of the EU instruments for financing external actions 42 present numerous positive examples for all the objectives concerned, despite the sometimes difficult contexts (e.g. in the case of the Neighbourhood and sub-Saharan Africa). For example: · the public administration reform in Georgia;
· the 90% reduction in poverty in Vietnam over the last decade; · the stabilisation of Colombia after the peace agreement (by short and longer-term actions 43 ); and · supporting the training of nuclear power plant staff in Ukraine to improve safety. However, the overall effectiveness of the instruments in meeting their objectives is difficult to measure, partly because of the difficulty in defining appropriate monitoring and evaluation systems at the instrument-level. Also a number of results can only be measured at country and/or sector level and cannot be aggregated at instrument-level, partly because of the variety of countries and themes concerned. In a few cases (e.g. EDF and DCI) high-level indicators linked to the Millennium Development Goals (until 2015) and the Sustainable Development Goals (since 2015) were included in the legal base and are used to measure global progress 44 but these are: (i) not directly attributable to the actions of the instruments; (ii) influenced by many external factors (e.g. government policies, interventions from other donors and the international context) and (iii) unable to assess the instruments' characteristics such as flexibility. Since the establishment of the instruments, the Commission has invested efforts and improved reporting on the results of projects and programmes. For example with the launch of the EU-International cooperation and development results framework 45 in 2015 which produced its first report on selected results in July 2016 46 . Other, similar performance frameworks with strategic and operational indicators have also been created specifically for IPA II and the PI 47 . Despite these improvements further efforts are needed at instrument level to ensure a clear monitoring and evaluation system is in place to explain how the EU will measure change. The range of implementation arrangements available plays a major role in the instruments’ effectiveness 48 . The simplifications introduced in the Common Implementation Regulation such as the possibility of sub-granting or awarding grants to entities without legal personality, have reinforced the EIDHR’s effectiveness 49 . Benefiting from exceptions, crisis response under the IcSP can be as rapid as humanitarian aid 50 . The introduction of the budget support modality and the related policy dialogue under the IPA II have played an important role in improving policy dialogue in support of furthering real reforms and stabilisation programmes in beneficiary countries. This was particularly the case in the western Balkans where this was introduced for the first time 51 . Similarly in Greenland budget support arrangements resulted in stronger public financial management systems and improvements in the national administration's ability to plan and implement policies 52 . However, EU procedures (originating from the Financial Regulation) are still perceived by interested parties as lengthy and burdensome 53 . In terms of mainstreaming EU priorities, significant progress has been noted in some programmes in the areas of climate change and environment. 54 However, more remains to be done to integrate these areas across all sectors in view of the scale of the challenges 55 . Mainstreaming human rights issues including gender equality and women's empowerment is still a work-in-progress although some positive messages have emerged from the study 56 on the implementation of the EU gender action plan II 57 , in particular for the IcSP. Overall, the external evaluations have shown partner governments' lack of interest or resistance to working in support of human rights often presents a major challenge in implementation. Efficiency The level of administrative expenditure points to an efficient management of the instruments’ respective budgets 58 .
While overall organisational performance may be efficient, some interested parties consider the implementation of the instruments in some cases as administratively burdensome. The Commission is perceived by some stakeholders as being more focused on process rather than on policy objectives and results. Requirements such as mainstreaming different policies and fulfilling international commitments such as ownership and partnership imply heavy processes. Other regulations (such as the Comitology Regulation 59 ) add to the complexity and length of time needed to implement the instruments. Modest efficiency gains were made in comparison to the instruments from the 2007-2013 MFF. For example by reducing the number of DCI thematic programmes from five to two, although rigidities remains within the Global Public Goods and Challenges programme since five different budget lines were created 60 . Some efficiency gains resulting from the simplification processes (such as the use of national strategies rather than EU country strategies and that joint programming documents can replace multi-annual indicative programmes if quality criteria are met) were introduced for DCI, EDF, ENI and IPA II programming processes. On geographic instruments, a lengthy programming process is in place to safeguard principles of ownership and partnership. In the case of the EDF, the procedures also include involvement of the National/Regional Authorising Officers whose function is often seen as hampering effectiveness and efficiency, in particular at regional level. An explanation often given relates to capacity issues despite regular support in capacity-building 61 . The establishment of the Common Implementation Regulation was a new, simplifying feature of the 2014-2020 MFF for the EU-budget instruments covered by this report, which was largely replicated in the 11 th EDF implementation regulation. By harmonising rules and limiting differences of interpretation across the external financing instruments, the external evaluations point to efficiency gains thanks to the Common Implementation Regulation, albeit on a modest scale. Under, for example, the EIDHR (in specific cases) and especially the IcSP, direct award of funding speeds up implementation in situations of crisis or urgent need. Internal coherence, external coherence, complementarity and synergies between external financing instruments Each external financing instrument has its own specific scope either based on the issues of substance it addresses (the EIDHR, INSC, IcSP, and PI have a potential worldwide application) or in terms of geographical focus (the DCI, EDF, ENI, GD, and IPA II accompanied by specific themes). Three instruments are clearly designed to complement others through their distinct implementation modalities: 1) EIDHR (independent and flexible actions); 2) IcSP (for quick response with short and long-term actions); and 3) PI (actions in the EU and/or mutual interest that are not possible to fund under the DCI, ENI or IPA II) 62 . The internal coherence within the instruments is largely satisfactory because of revised geographic programming instructions, sector concentration, appropriate decision-making processes and improved quality review systems. However significant variations can be observed at the level of EU delegations.
The evaluation staff working documents provide some examples of complementarities between the instruments. For example, the EIDHR and the PI support certain actions that other geographic instruments are not able to finance, such as direct cooperation with civil society organisations on human rights issues or cooperation with industrialised countries 63 . Effective synergies between the IcSP (with its ability to provide short-term reactions without programming) and the geographic instruments were also found. Although effective follow-up is hampered by the lack of flexibility in procedures of most other instruments which are bound by long programming periods 64 . Nevertheless, overall coherence between instruments could be further improved, in particular by streamlining the instruments to reduce the boundaries between geographic (the 11 th EDF, ENI, DCI, and IPA II) and thematic instruments/programmes (thematic programmes within the DCI, IcSP and PI) which can both intervene in the same areas 65 . The specific scope of the geographic instruments has made it difficult to engage strategically and coherently with some partner countries. Three geographical instruments are used to engage with Africa (the EDF, DCI and ENI) and cooperation at continental level is funded both from the DCI (the Pan-African programme) and with a slightly reduced scope from the 11 th EDF (intra-ACP programme) 66 . Similarly, it has proven difficult to build bridges between regions as, for example, EU relations with the Caribbean and Latin America are covered both by the DCI and the EDF. Policy Coherence for Development 67 has gained momentum. T he analysis of trade policy support to development in regional cooperation shows an increasing attention to the trade/development nexus 68 . The nexuses between security/development/humanitarian aid also gained political momentum. On geographic instruments (the DCI, ENI and 11 th EDF), in terms of coherence between partner country and EU priorities, some external evaluations mention tendencies towards predominantly EU driven agendas during the programming. This was despite the extensive consultation of interested parties during programming and project implementation, and, in particular in the EDF, the co-signature of the multi-annual programming documents and annual actions. This apparent trade-off between EU interests/international values and partnership principles should be seen within the new policy context of the universally agreed 2030 Agenda/SDGs 69 . Added-value A combination of several factors explains the added-value of the EU's instruments 70 : (i) the EU's competence or expertise 71 ; (ii) the EU's nature as a supranational entity, and the relative neutrality, political influence and leverage this potentially entails 72 ; (iii) geographical spread of some instruments 73 including the presence in fragile contexts where there are fewer development partners and the significant volume of funds available 74 , (iv) the scope of the instruments and modalities (such as budget support, grants, indirect management, blending facilities and rapid decision-making for crisis response); and (v) the ability of the EU to lead on joint actions (i.e. joint programming and joint implementation), especially with Member States. Additional factors are that the instruments can be used to intervene at various levels (i.e. national regional, continental), the predictability of funds (especially the EDF which is not subject to the annuality rule of the EU budget 75 ), the emphasis placed on regional cooperation 76 and the unique position of the EU to prepare accession countries for EU membership through the IPA.
More specialised instruments have specific added-value linked to their scope. For example, the IcSP’s speed, flexibility and capacity to adapt to evolving contexts, and presence in zones where other actors are absent 77 , and the EIDHR actions in sensitive human rights situations without needing partner governments' consent. Leverage effect Conditions are in place for the instruments to enable a strengthened policy dialogue at country level, in particular when programmes are implemented through budget support 78 . The PI substantiates policy dialogues/partnerships with third countries through support of specific cooperation activities (based on mutual interest) which help to promote EU interests and create a unique political leverage 79 . Another important leverage effect stems from the donor coordination role the EU Delegations play: fostering complementarity and coherence between different EU actors and increasing the visibility of the EU. This is particularly true where joint programming processes have been launched 80 . The specialised instruments also engage in targeted policy dialogue, for example through the INSC or the EIDHR on election observation. The IcSP contributed to leverage the EU's policy dialogue in increasing donor funds spent in a conflict-sensitive manner 81 . The evaluations also point to some drawbacks for the political leverage exerted in terms of enhanced policy dialogue on human rights and fundamental values. The drawbacks were linked in particular to a decreasing acceptance of the liberal democratic model of development, the diminishing importance of official development assistance and the emergence of new actors 82 . The instruments' financial leverage is reasonably high, thanks mainly to blending facilities (i.e. for DCI, EDF, ENI and IPA). 83 The creation of trust funds has also resulted in financial leverage 84 , even if not always at the expected level. Scope for simplification Cost-efficient and effective delivery mechanisms are essential to improve the instruments' performance. The Commission has embarked on a simplification process through the revision of the multi-annual programming guidelines and annual decision procedures. Nevertheless, the overall number of instruments as well as some instruments in particular was still viewed by interested parties as complex, administratively burdensome and lacking financial flexibility. The detailed budget distribution included in the DCI both for geographic and thematic programmes adds to the complexity and rigidity of the instrument, making the possibilities to transfer funds between objectives and for changing priorities within the instrument difficult, in particular when there is a need to face emergencies and crises. Before the 2014-2020 MFF, each instrument had its own implementing rules which led to divergences in their implementation covering the 2007-2013 MFF. The Common Implementing Regulation, to which the EDF implementing regulation 85 is largely aligned, contributed to the simplification agenda in that it prevented divergences and problems in interpretation 86 . Since 2014, the continued simplification efforts in external relations have been focused on eliminating unnecessary burdens, increasing flexibility and reducing complexity for external partners at implementation level. Other simplifications are also in sight, but first require amendments to the Financial Regulation by the Council and the European Parliament, for which a revision 87 was proposed by the Commission. Contribution to a consistent EU external action The EU ensures the security and prosperity for Europeans by actively engaging on the world stage, to promote its interests and uphold the values of democracy, the rule of law and protection of human rights. EU external action policies 88 include international commitments such as the 2030 Agenda and the Paris Agreement on climate change, together with the Global Strategy for the EU's Foreign and Security Policy, the new European Consensus on Development, the renewed EU-Africa partnership, the reviewed European Neighbourhood policy, the Enlargement policy and the Consensus on Humanitarian Aid, among others, which taken together provides the necessary framework for the EU to achieve its objectives.
To meet these objectives, the EU toolbox for external policies encompasses development cooperation, diplomacy, peace, security and defence actions, economic cooperation, enlargement, humanitarian aid and civil protection, enhanced neighbourhood relations, macro-financial assistance, partnership on global challenges and trade. The instruments' part of this toolbox accounts for more than three quarters of the available funding under the present MFF, and have contributed to the EU's external action since 2014, as mentioned in the evaluation staff working documents. Furthermore, to improve the EU's effectiveness in supporting stability, security and sustainable development in partner countries the Commission adopted a proposal to amend the IcSP Regulation 89 . The amendment closes the gap identified in the EU's ability to provide support when building EU partners' capacities in the security sector and would enable the EU to support military actors, under exceptional and clearly defined circumstances. Through the use of joint programming with Member States and other donors, a more coherent and visible EU response to partner countries' development has been created. A specific evaluation 90 published in March 2017 found progress on joint programming with Member States showing that, despite still being in its early stages, it is valuable for the EU and its Member States. Challenges linked to ensuring ownership of the process and results by partner countries would need to be further addressed. On civil society in partner countries, although the geographical instruments work mainly with their authorities, cooperation with civil society organisations remains a constant feature across the instruments with a view to contributing to reinforcing the organisations’ capacity and to a civil society that is able to promote reforms and hold governments to account. Some instruments and programmes, such as the EIDHR and the DCI CSO/LA are primarily intended to support civil society. The close interconnection between internal and external policies is self-evident, for instance, with the migration crisis where the coordination and complementarity between instruments was necessary. EU internal policy priorities have been integrated, to the extent possible, in external actions in a coherent and consistent way, in order to safeguard EU interests and promote mutual interest solutions and also benefited from the specialist focus of PI on the internal/external policy nexus. To properly address external interest and achieve global objectives stronger collaboration between EU internal and external services have been pursued 91 to ensure coherent approaches and to avoid duplication and overlaps. To help reinforce coherence, to ensure that EU actions are mutually reinforcing and to avoid contradictory approaches, external services need to have a more complete picture of the activities that take place outside the EU, in particular on global challenges such as climate change, biodiversity or the fight against terrorism. The current multiple programming documents covering a given country/region/continent make it difficult to have a clear overview of external actions 92 . Contribution to EU priorities for smart, sustainable and inclusive growth Smart, sustainable and inclusive growth is at the heart of the EU’s external assistance. The instruments contribute to smart growth through support to trade-related projects and the development of collective approaches on climate change and environment. In line with the Agenda for Change 93 that aims to significantly increase the impact and effectiveness of the EU’s external assistance, EU assistance at country level has to focus on three or fewer sectors of concentration in most partner countries. EU support has since been more focused on the two priority areas of the Agenda for Change, one of those being inclusive and sustainable growth for human development 94 . IPA II has a clear objective of enhancing its beneficiary countries' economic and social development with a view to attaining the targets set in the Europe 2020 strategy for smart, sustainable and inclusive growth. The development instruments have a strong focus on smart, sustainable and inclusive growth as reflected in the actions adopted in the various Annual Action Programmes 95 . The PI also contributes to these EU priorities as does the Greenland Decision. On the PI, one of its specific objectives is the promotion of the international dimension of the Europe 2020 strategy in all its aspects (e.g. jobs, growth, and investments, SMEs).
Since 2008 the Commission has been setting up blending facilities in different regions of the world, resulting in the leveraging of investments, to promote sustainable economic development. These blending operations have covered different areas of intervention (infrastructure projects, Micro, Small and Medium Enterprise financing, etc.) and the value added they generate varies according to the specific additionality objective they are meant to address, as well as to the economic conditions in the given country of operations (e.g. macroeconomic framework, conducive business environment, investment climate). Long-term impact The external evaluations have highlighted that there are obvious difficulties in measuring the long-term impact of the instruments at the mid-point of their implementation, as some of them have only recently started implementing a significant number of projects and programmes and baselines have, in many cases, not yet been established. Nevertheless, some evaluations were able to look at achievements under previous instruments to show positive trends in key indicators. For example, the DCI supported the drafting of 50 national and regional climate strategies over the last years; in Neighbourhood countries, and despite difficult circumstances (e.g. the global economic crisis, regional crises, civil wars, terrorism, and the migration crisis), some countries showed significant progress in certain governance areas (e.g. Georgia in the area of public administration). For the PI the mid-term evaluation concludes that the support deployed is on track to deliver the expected impacts 96 . Performance against the current set of objectives contained in the instruments is dependent on various external factors outside the control of the instruments, such as national ownership, political will and a country's administrative capacity. The cost of non-action or late action in external relations would be catastrophic if instability, conflict and war were to increase, in particular in the EU’s Neighbourhood, with potential spill-over effects for the EU itself. 5. Conclusions In conclusion, the current set of instruments is still relevant and has proved to be sufficiently enabling. At this stage there is therefore no need to amend them through legislative proposals or delegated acts. However, the staff working documents linked to this report point to some aspects deserving attention in the future, with a view to improving the implementation of the EU's external action and drawing lessons for the next generation of instruments. Issues addressed in the different external evaluations will be taken into account within the remaining period of implementation of the instruments and during the preparation of the next generation of the instruments. In particular: · The 2030 Agenda is key as it sets out ambitious universal Sustainable Development Goals and is based on multi-stakeholder partnerships, highlighting the importance of "non-aid" agenda and interlinkages between goals, including the security-development nexus. The Sustainable Development Goals must be consistently and coherently taken into account in the EU's external action. In line with the 2030 Agenda, the Global Strategy and the new European Consensus on Development provide a new vision for the EU's external action 97 . · The importance of promoting fundamental values and human rights is at the core of the instruments, but external evaluations point to an increased difficulty to promote and take this agenda forward in many countries, and to the shrinking space for civil society organisation in many countries as well. This makes it difficult for the EU to work on these important dimensions and highlights another possible tension between some fundamental elements of EU external action and the partnership and ownership principles. · In the current context of multiple crises and conflicts, the EU’s multi-annual financial framework needs to be able to adjust swiftly to changing priorities and unforeseen events, and to deliver rapidly on the ground. 98 The instruments similarly need sufficient financial and other kinds of flexibility for external action to respond to the many challenges for the EU on the world stage. This flexibility needs to be built up at different levels. This means starting from the budget, which should include more substantial reserves, through to multi-annual programming, and greater simplification at implementation level to increase efficiency and effectiveness.
· The balance between long-term commitments to support reforms in partner countries and short-term actions should be reassessed. This points to a tension between predictability, linked to aid effectiveness commitments and the flexibility of the EU’s external assistance. · Overall, consideration needs to be given to the future level of ambition for peace and security in external actions 99 . Also, based on recent experience, a rapid and flexible capacity for crisis response will continue to be needed. · While there is evidence of coherence among instruments, this could be enhanced by streamlining their number. This would help to ensure better interactions at the operational level, in particular between geographic and thematic instruments and programmes that can intervene in the same areas. · Mainstreaming of EU priorities, while overall a success e.g. for climate change and environmental protection, has proved challenging in some contexts, in particular due to resistance from partner countries, and a possible tension between furthering the EU agenda, e.g. regarding the promotion of action to address global challenges and public goods or regarding migration and security, and the ownership and partnership principles. · The nexus between internal and external policy objectives needs to be better articulated. Alternative approaches to this cooperation would need to be developed building on the experience of the DCI Global Public Goods and Challenges programme and the PI, which has a global scope. · The principle of graduation in the DCI intentionally limited the EU's ability to cooperate with Upper Middle Income Countries through bilateral cooperation. The EU must pursue cooperation with all countries including more advanced developing countries and strategic partners, in line with the 2030 Agenda and the European Consensus on Development. · The potential for cooperation with EU Member States, notably through joint programming, would need to be further strengthened. This however would require more commitment from both partner country governments and Member States in certain countries. Annexes Table 1 Spending by beneficiary country and region and per instrument / in EUR

Table 2 Contributions to Facility for Refugees in Turkey in '000 EUR Table 3 Contributions to Trust Funds (disbursements from contributors / in EUR millions) 100
List of acronyms ACP
Africa, Caribbean, Pacific DAC
OECD Development Assistance Committee DCI
Development Cooperation Instrument DG DEVCO
Commission service for international cooperation and development DG NEAR
Commission service for Neighbourhood and Enlargement Negotiations EDF
European Development Fund EIDHR
European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights EFI
External Financing Instrument ENI
European Neighbourhood Instrument EU
European Union FPI
Commission service for Foreign Policy Instruments GD
Greenland Decision IPA
Instrument for Pre-Accession Assistance INSC
Instrument for Nuclear Safety and Cooperation IcSP
Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace MTR
Mid-Term Review OCTs
Overseas Countries and Territories OECD
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development PI
Partnership Instrument
(1) See the Common Implementing Regulation:
https://publications.europa.eu/en/publication-detail/-/publication/43f92a44-af94-11e3-86f9-01aa75ed71a1/language-en
(2) Regulation (EU) 233/2014 of 11 March 2014, OJ L77 of 15 March 2014, p. 44
https://eeas.europa.eu/sites/eeas/files/regulation_eu_no_2332014_of_the_ep_and_the_council_establishing_a_financing_instrument_for_development_cooperation_2014-2020_0.pdf
(3) Regulation 235/2014 of 11 March 2014, OJ L77 of 15 March 2014, p. 85
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2014:077:0085:0094:EN:PDF
(4) Regulation 232/2014 of 11 March 2014, OJ L77 of 15 March 2014, p. 27
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32014R0232&from=EN
(5) Regulation 230/2014 of 11 March 2014, OJ L77 of 15 March 2014, p. 01
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32014R0230&from=EN
(6) Regulation 231/2014 of 11 March 2014, OJ L77 of 15 March 2014, p. 11
https://ec.europa.eu/neighbourhood-enlargement/sites/near/files/pdf/financial_assistance/ipa/2014/231-2014_ipa-2-reg.pdf
(7) Regulation 234/2014 of 11 March 2014, OJ L77 of 15 March 2014, p. 77
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32014R0234&from=EN
(8) Regulation 237/2014 of 11 March 2014, OJ L77 of 15 March 2014, p. 109
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32014R0237&from=EN
(9) Council Decision 2014/137/EU of 14 March 2014 on relations between the European Union on one hand, and Greenland and the Kingdom of Denmark on the other, OJ L 76 of 15 March 2014
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32014D0137&from=HU
(10) Article 18 of Regulation 2015/322 of 02 March 2015 on the implementation of the 11 th EDF, OJ L 58 of 03 March 2015
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32015R0322&from=EN
(11) The external reports are annexed to the staff working documents that are linked to this report. The external evaluations are also available at:
https://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/public-consultation-external-financing-instruments-european-union_en
(12) See Article 3 (5), 21 of the Treaty on the European Union. The EU's interests, principles and fundamental values are further defined in international agreements and EU external relation policies such as: the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development (
https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/post2015/transformingourworld
); the Addis Ababa Action Agenda of the Third International Conference on Financing for Development (
https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/index.php?page=view&type=400&nr=2051&menu=35
); the Paris Agreement under the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (
http://unfccc.int/paris_agreement/items/9485.php
); the European Consensus on Development (
https://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/policies/european-development-policy/european-consensus-development_en
); the Partnership Framework with Third Countries under the European Agenda on Migration (
https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/sites/homeaffairs/files/what-we-do/policies/european-agenda-migration/proposal-implementation-package/docs/20160607/communication_external_aspects_eam_towards_new_migration_ompact_en.pdf
); and the Global Strategy for the European Union on Foreign and Security Policy (
https://europa.eu/globalstrategy
)
(13) Council Regulation (EU, EURATOM) No 1311/2013 of 2 December 2013 laying down the Multi-annual Financial Framework for the years 2014-2020, OJ L 347/884, p. 884.
(14) The Multi-annual Financial Framework is divided into six broad groups of expenditure called "Headings".
(15) See instruments mentioned in the section on "Scope" and also listed under 1-10 in Table 1.
(16) Figures include all transfers between instruments up to July 2017 and the mid-term review of the MFF:
http://ec.europa.eu/budget/mff/figures/index_en.cfm
(17)
Irregular immigrants are third-country nationals who do not fulfil, or no longer fulfil, the conditions of entry as set out in Article 5 of the Schengen Borders Code or other conditions for entry, stay or residence in that Member State. In 2014 there was an almost three-fold increase compared with 2013 (source: European Parliament briefing):
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2015/554202/EPRS_BRI(2015)554202_EN.pdf)
. On the whole, this trend has subsequently been confirmed.
(18) The four EU trust funds created during January 2014-June 2017 are: 1) the European Trust Fund for the Central African Republic (i.e. the Bêkou Trust Fund, July 2014), 2) the EU regional Trust Fund in response to the Syrian crisis (i.e. the Madad Trust Fund, December 2014), 3) the European Emergency Trust Fund for stability and addressing root causes of irregular migration and displaced people in Africa (November 2015), and 4) the EU Trust Fund for Colombia (December 2016). Furthermore, the Facility for Refugees in Turkey was set up in February 2016 (.Commission Decision C/2016/855 of 10 February 2016 on the Facility for Refugees in Turkey amending Commission Decision C(2015) 9500 of 24 November 2015.
(19) Regulation (EU) 2017/1601 of 27 September 2017, OJ L249 p. 1
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=OJ:L:2017:249:TOC
The External Fund for Sustainable Development will combine blending activities with a guarantee, to unblock bottlenecks to private investment by reducing the risks involved.
(20) See the external "Coherence Report: i nsights from the external evaluations of the external financing instruments" (July 2017),
https://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/coherence-report-insights-external-evaluation-external-financing-instruments_en
, paragraph 8.
(21) See also Section 4 "Contribution to a consistent Union external action". See proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council COM(2016)447:
https://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/proposal-amending-regulation-eu-no-2302014-establishing-icsp-com2016-447_en
(22) These 16 countries and territories are: Algeria, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Egypt, Georgia, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Libya, Moldova, Morocco, Occupied Palestinian Territory, Syria, Tunisia, and Ukraine.
(23) These 8 beneficiaries are: Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Iceland, Kosovo*, Montenegro, Serbia, Turkey, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. (* This designation is without prejudice to positions on status and is in line with the United Nations Security Council Resolution 1244/1999 and International Court of Justice opinion on the Kosovo declaration of independence). Iceland has decided not to continue the discussions related to the accession process.
(24) See Section 4 on "Effectiveness" for further examples of how the instruments are achieving their objectives.
(25) See indicators on poverty evolution in the last Millennium Development Goal Report (2015)
http://www.un.org/millenniumgoals/2015_MDG_Report/pdf/MDG%202015%20rev%20(July%201).pdf
(26) Source Commission staff working document on the evaluation of the IcSP, Section 5.
(27) Source: Commission staff working document on the evaluation of PI, Section 5.
(28) Examples: Communication COM(2011)637 final of 13 October 2011 'Increasing the impact of EU Development Policy: an Agenda for Change'
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX%3A52011DC0637&qid=1412922281378&from=EN
Council Conclusions on " Increasing the Impact of EU Development Policy: an Agenda for Change” (3166th Foreign Affairs Council Meeting, Brussels), 14 May 2012),
the European Consensus on Development (while
the ' Joint statement by the Council, the European Parliament and the Commission on European Union Development Policy: the European Consensus' was adopted in 2005, it was published in the Official Journal C46 of 24 February 2006, p1):
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ%3AC%3A2006%3A046%3A0001%3A0019%3AEN%3APDF

Neighbourhood Policy: Communication COM (2011)303 final, 24 May 2011 'A new response to a changing Neighbourhood'; the EU Strategic Partnerships: Strategic Partnership Agreements have been signed with 10 countries: Brazil, Canada, China, India, Japan, Mexico, the Republic of Korea, Republic of South Africa, the Russian Federation, and the United States of America ; Strategy for Smart and sustainable Growth (Europe 2020): Communication COM (2010) of 3 March 2010 'Europe 2020: A strategy for smart, sustainable and inclusive growth" ,
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A52010DC2020

Policy on Trade, Growth and World Affairs: Communication COM(2010) 612 final of 9 November 2010 "Trade, Growth and World Affairs. Trade Policy as a core component of the EU's 2020 strategy'; and the European Security Strategy: "A secure Europe in a better world. European Security Strategy", adopted by the European Council, 12 December 2003.
(29) Source: Coherence Report, paragraph 10.
(30) Source: Coherence Report paragraph 13.
(31) Source: Coherence Report, paragraph 14.
(32) See Section 2 "Background" about the amendment to the IcSP.
(33) Source Commission staff working document on the evaluation of the IcSP, Section 5
(34) Source: Coherence Report, paragraph 16.
(35) Source: Coherence Report, Table 2, page 7.
(36) Source: Commission staff working document on the evaluation of PI, Section 5.
(37) The financial flexibility of the 11 th EDF was particularly noted, with some 20 % of its funds being unallocated from the onset.
(38) Source: Commission staff working document on the evaluation of IPA II, Section 5.
(39) See annexes on the financial breakdown for further details on the EU trust funds and the Facility for Refugees in Turkey.
(40) With the exception of the CBSD proposal, see Section 2 "Background"
(41) See "Conclusions" in Section 5 and Coherence Report paragraph 65.
(42) For example see the '2016 Annual Report on the implementation of the European Union's instruments for financing external actions in 2015', SWD (2016) 456 final of 19 December 2016.
(43) Source: Commission staff working document on the evaluation of the IcSP, Section 5
(44) See Annex 4 of part 2/2 of the 19 December 2016 Commission staff working document accompanying the document '2016 Annual Report on the implementation of the European Union's instruments for financing external actions in 2015', SWD(2016) 456 final of 19 December 2016.
https://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/sites/devco/files/annual-report-swd-part-2-2016-456-20161221_en.pdf
(45) See further information on the EU international cooperation and development results framework:
https://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/devcos-results-framework_en
(46) This report presents selected results achieved from EU funded development cooperation projects and programmes completed in mid-2013 - mid-2014 in EU partner countries. See:
https://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/eu-international-cooperation-and-development-first-report-selected-results-july-2013-june-2014_en
(47) Source: Commission staff working document on the evaluation of PI, Section 3 and the Commission staff working document on the evaluation of IPA II, Section 5
(48) Source: Commission staff working document on the evaluation of PI, Section 5. Annual programmes for Electoral Observation Missions allow for fast updating in line with evolving election calendars in partner countries.
(49) Source: Commission staff working document on the evaluation of the EIDHR, Section 5.
(50) Source: Commission staff working document on the evaluation of the IcSP Section 5.
(51) Source: Commission staff working document on the evaluation of IPA II, Section 5.
(52)
Source: Commission staff working document on the evaluation of the Council Decision on relations between the European Union, on the one hand, and Greenland and the Kingdom of Denmark on the other (Greenland Decision), section 6.
(53) Source: for example see Commission staff working document on the evaluation of the EIDHR, Section on Conclusions.
(54) 11th EDF climate contributions increased from 3.3% in 2014 to 23.3% in 2016 and DCI climate change contributions increased from 17.7% in 2014 to 24.9% in 2016. Source: Indicator 12b, EU international cooperation and development results framework with input from the OECD DAC Creditor Reporting System.
(55) Source: for example see Commission staff working document on the evaluation of the DCI, Section 5; Commission staff working document on the evaluation of the EDF, Section 5.
(56) Source: EU gender action plan 2016-2020 at year one: European implementation assessment by the European Parliament:
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/thinktank/en/document.html?reference=EPRS_STU%282017%29603256
(57) The gender action plan 2016-2020 is the EU's framework for promoting gender equality and women and girls' empowerment in external relations in external relations. The above-mentioned European implementation assessment by the European Parliament states that the EU has mainstreamed the notion of gender equality and women's empowerment in partner countries and has taken on board a number of lessons identified from the previous Gender Action Plan (2010-2015). The IcSP was particularly commended on results to date in terms of engagement with women’s NGOs/CSOs on the “whole of society” approach.
(58) See Commission staff working document accompanying the document '2016 Annual Report on the implementation of the European Union's instruments for financing external actions in 2015', SWD(2016)456 final of 19 December 2016.
(59) Comitology refers to a process by which committees made of representatives from Member States assist in the making, adoption and implementation of EU laws. See Comitology Regulation:
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/ALL/?uri=celex%3A32011R0182
(60) Source: Commission staff working document on the evaluation of the DCI, Section 5.
(61) Source: Commission staff working document on the evaluation of the 11 th EDF Section 5.
(62) Source: Commission staff working document on the evaluation of the PI for cooperation with third countries, Section 2.
(63) Including with some strategic partner countries such as: Brazil, China, India and Mexico.
(64) Source: Commission staff working document on the evaluation of IcSP, Section 5.
(65) Source: Coherence Report, paragraph 33
(66) In addition, the IcSP crisis response component devoted 33% of its funds to Africa during the period under review.
(67) Through Policy Coherence for Development the EU seeks to take account of development objectives in all of its policies that are likely to affect developing countries. It aims at minimising contradictions and building synergies between different EU policies to benefit developing countries and increase the effectiveness of development cooperation. Policy coherence in support of development objectives was first integrated in EU fundamental law in 1992 and further reinforced in the Treaty of Lisbon (Art. 208 Treaty on the Functioning of the EU) making the EU a forerunner on the international stage in this area.
(68) See 5th EU Policy Coherence for Development report, 2015:
https://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/policies/policy-coherence-development_en
(69) Source: Coherence Report, paragraph 51-53.
(70) Source: Coherence Report, paragraph 37 and Section 5 of the staff working documents annexed to this report.
(71) See for example the Centres of Thematic Expertise created by the Commission. Source: Commission Staff working document on the evaluation of IPA II, Section 5. Or under the PI, for example the EU's expertise in technical standards, Source: Commission staff working document on the evaluation of PI, Annex 3.
(72) The EU is largely perceived by dialogue partners as an actor not defending or advancing the interest of a particular country, which is important for the EU as a peace and security actor under IcSP crisis response and for Election Observation Missions under EIDHR.
(73) EIDHR's worldwide scope, including Election Observation Missions and the PI (albeit focused on strategic partners).
(74) Especially the EDF and the thematic component of the DCI.
(75) Annuality is the budgetary principle according to which expenditure and revenue are programmed and authorised for one year, starting on 1 January and ending on 31 December. Source: Article 9 of Regulation 966/2012 on the financial rules applicable to the general budget of the Union:
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32012R0966&from=EN
(76) Source: Commission staff working document on the evaluation of IPA II, Section 5.
(77) Source Commission staff working document on the evaluation of the IcSP, Section 2.
(78) Sources: Commission staff working document on ENI, Section 5, and Commission staff working document for IPA II, Section 5.
(79) Source: Commission staff working document on the evaluation of PI, Section 5.
(80) See external evaluation on Joint Programming:
https://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/evaluation-eu-joint-programming-process-development-cooperation-2011-2015_en
(81) Source: Commission staff working documenton the IcSP, Section 5.
(82) Source: Coherence Report, box 1, page 5.
(83) Sources: for example, Commission staff working document on the evaluation of the DCI, Section 5 and the staff working document on the evaluation of the EDF, Section 5.
(84) See Table 3 in annex for financial breakdown.
(85) Council Regulation (EU) 2015/323 on the financial regulation applicable to the 11th European Development Fund of 2 March 2015, OJ L58, p 17
(86) Source: Commission staff working document on the evaluation of the Common Implementing Regulation, page 8.
(87) Commission's proposal COM(2016) 605 final of 14 September 2016,
(88) See Article 3 (5), 21 of the Treaty on the European Union
(89) See Section 2 "Background" for more information.
(90) See external evaluation of EU Joint Programming Process of Development Cooperation (March 2017)

http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/evaluation-eu-joint-programming-process-development-cooperation-2011-2015_en
(91) Source: Commission staff working document on the evaluation of PI, Section 5.
(92) See for example the description of the instruments active in Africa under Section 4 on 'Internal coherence, external coherence, complementarity and synergies between external financing instruments'.
(93) COM (2011) 637, 13 October 2011.
(94) Source: Commission staff working document accompanying the document '2016 Annual Report on the implementation of the European Union's instruments for financing external actions in 2015', SWD(2016)456 final of 19 December 2016..
(95) Source: Commission 2016 Annual Report on the implementation of the European Union's instruments for financing external actions in 2015, SWD (2016) 456 final of 19 December 2016
(96) Source: Commission Staff working document on the evaluation of PI, Section 5.
(97) See also the Rome Declaration of 25 March 2017.
(98) Source: Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council ‘Mid-term review/revision of the multiannual financial framework 2014-2020, and EU budget focused on results’, COM (2016) 603 final of 14 September 2016.
(99) Commission COM (2017)2025 of 1 March 2017 - White Paper on the Future of Europe; COM(2017) 315 of 7 June 2017 - Reflection Paper on the Future of European Defence; COM(2017) 358 of 28 June 2017 - Reflection Paper on the future of EU Finances.
(100) Source: European Commission Service for International Cooperation and Development, July 2017. Figures as of 30 September 2017 based on the reporting package: Overview of all EU Trust Funds published by DG Budget