Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 85A02-1506-JT-794|March 28, 2016 Page 1 of 17

MEMORANDUM DECISION 

Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), 

this Memorandum Decision shall not be 

regarded as precedent or cited before any 

court except for the purpose of establishing 

the defense of res judicata, collateral 

estoppel, or the law of the case. 

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANTS

Daniel J. Vanderpool 

Vanderpool Law Firm 

Warsaw, Indiana 

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE

Gregory F. Zoeller 

Attorney General 

Robert J. Henke 

David E. Corey 

Deputy Attorney General 

Indianapolis, Indiana 

IN THE 

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

In the Matter of the Involuntary 

Termination of the Parent-Child 

Relationship of A.B. (Minor 

Child): 

G.B. (Mother) and C.B. (Father) 

Appellants-Respondents, 

v. 

Indiana Department of Child 

Services, 

Appellee-Petitioner 

March 28, 2016

Court of Appeals Case No. 

85A02-1506-JT-794 

Appeal from the Wabash Circuit 

Court 

The Honorable Robert R. 

McCallen, III, Judge 

Trial Court Cause No. 

85C01-1410-JT-13 

Vaidik, Chief Judge. 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 85A02-1506-JT-794|March 28, 2016 Page 2 of 17

Case Summary 

[1] G.B. (“Mother”) and C.B. (“Father”) appeal the termination of their parentchild relationship with A.B. In addition to arguing that the evidence is 

insufficient to prove there is a reasonable probability that the circumstances 

leading to A.B.’s removal will not be remedied and that termination is in A.B.’s 

best interests, Mother and Father also contend that the trial court’s findings are 

not supported by clear and convincing evidence because the court relied upon 

judicially noticed records of other cases, and those records were not entered 

into evidence. Indiana Rule of Evidence 201 permits courts to take judicial 

notice of records of a court of this state. There is no requirement in Rule 201 

that such records be entered into the record of the present case. However, we 

have previously addressed the need to include judicially noticed records from 

other cases in the record submitted for appeal where those records are necessary 

for appellate review. In this case, the Indiana Department of Child Services 

(“DCS”) included relevant portions of the “other” records in its appendix. That 

is sufficient to permit appellate review. Concluding that DCS has proven the 

statutory requirements by clear and convincing evidence and that the trial 

court’s judgment terminating parental rights to A.B. is not clearly erroneous, we 

affirm. 

Facts and Procedural History 

[2] A.B. was born November 1, 2012, to Mother and Father. In January 2013, 

Father overdosed on heroin and Mother drove him to the hospital. At that 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 85A02-1506-JT-794|March 28, 2016 Page 3 of 17

time, both Father and Mother admitted using illegal drugs, and DCS removed 

A.B., then two months old, from them. A.B. was placed in foster care for 

nineteen days before ultimately being placed with Father’s aunt and uncle. 

[3] DCS filed a petition alleging A.B. was a child in need of services (“CHINS”). 

Mother agreed and the court adjudicated A.B. a CHINS on February 12, 2013. 

The court entered default judgment against Father the next day because he 

failed to appear for any of the hearings. According to the terms of the 

dispositional order entered in March 2013, Mother and Father were required to, 

among other things, participate in substance-abuse treatment, submit to drug 

screening, and participate in home-based services. Father was also ordered to 

participate in the Father Engagement Program. 

[4] From March 2013 until March 2015, neither Mother nor Father complied with 

the dispositional order, with one exception: Mother attended the majority of her 

supervised visitations. Otherwise, Mother estimated that her longest period of 

sobriety lasted just three weeks. In October 2013, Mother requested 

participation in Family Drug Treatment Court, and a modified dispositional 

order was entered to transfer her case. The Family Drug Treatment Court 

terminated Mother’s participation after only eight months because she violated 

the terms of her placement by testing positive for controlled substances at least 

fifteen times, including multiple positive tests for methamphetamine and at least 

one positive test for heroin, and failed to appear in court on multiple occasions. 

Mother also estimated that she failed to report for approximately twenty drug 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 85A02-1506-JT-794|March 28, 2016 Page 4 of 17

screens. Mother’s addictions therapist testified that Mother began treatment in 

late July 2014, continued for approximately two weeks, and then quit. 

[5] Father was similarly noncompliant with the dispositional order. He did not 

make his first appearance in the underlying CHINS case until the July 19, 2013 

periodic-review hearing—seven months after the initial hearing. The court 

noted in its order from the July 2013 hearing that Father had not visited A.B. 

Father was on probation for a felony conviction until August 2013, when his 

probation was revoked for failing drug screening and failing to report to his 

probation officer. Father met with his social worker twice for the Father 

Engagement Program in March 2014. He missed the third appointment, and 

the social worker was unable to reach him after that. Father’s file was closed in 

April 2014 for lack of participation. He continued failing drug screens, and his 

probation was revoked again in June 2014. He has been incarcerated since. 

[6] Finally, neither parent participated in home-based services to any meaningful 

extent in the two years after A.B. was adjudicated a CHINS. The familyservices provider began working with Mother starting in January 2013 and 

Father starting in October 2013. Services were stopped in April 2014 because 

of inconsistent attendance. 

[7] DCS filed a petition to terminate Mother’s and Father’s parental rights in 

October 2014. The fact-finding hearing was originally scheduled for December, 

but it was continued multiple times. While the fact-finding hearing was 

pending, Mother discovered that she was pregnant. She stopped using illegal 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 85A02-1506-JT-794|March 28, 2016 Page 5 of 17

drugs—her last positive screen for illegal drugs was January 22, 2015—and 

began participating in the ordered services in March 2015. Father was 

convicted of one Class D felony in April and another Class D felony in May 

2015, resulting in his continued incarceration. Although unable to participate 

in services, Father has remained drug-free while incarcerated. 

[8] The fact-finding hearing occurred in May 2015. At the outset of the hearing, 

the court announced that it was taking judicial notice of several related “cases,” 

including the original CHINS case, the Family Drug Treatment Court case, and 

criminal cases against Father. Tr. p. 5-6. No objections were raised, and there 

was no request for a hearing on the matter. 

[9] The Court Appointed Special Advocate (CASA) recommended termination of 

parental rights. She based her recommendation on a full review of the file, six 

meetings with A.B. in her current placement, the CASA’s educational 

background and experience, and the reports of other service providers. She did 

not meet with either Mother or Father after being assigned this case—the 

original CASA died before the petition to terminate parental rights was filed. 

She testified that she did not meet with Father because he was in jail from the 

time she was appointed until the hearing, and she attempted to contact Mother 

four times, but was unable to reach her. The Family Case Manager (FCM) also 

testified that it was in A.B.’s best interests to terminate the parent-child 

relationship. 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 85A02-1506-JT-794|March 28, 2016 Page 6 of 17

[10] In June 2015 the trial court entered an order with findings terminating Mother’s 

and Father’s parental rights. Among the findings: 

[Father] never really engaged for any length of time in services. 

[He] was in and out of jail and has been for the better part of 

[A.B.]’s life. When he was not incarcerated, he participated 

minimally in services. [Mother’s] participation in services when 

she did so was limited, at least until very recently. 

* * * * * 

From the time of [A.B.’s] removal until early January, 2015, 

neither [Mother] or [Father] had participated in services in any 

meaningful way. In January 2015, some four months after the 

petition to terminate parental rights was filed, [Mother] began 

engaging in random drug screens. By then, [Mother] was aware 

she was pregnant. . . . On or about March 9, 2015, [Mother] 

began substance abuse counseling, individual counseling, moral 

recognition therapy and was passing all of her drug screens. 

However, though her participation has been more consistent 

since March 9, 2015, this is not [Mother]’s first time at engaging 

in services and all prior efforts fell far short. 

* * * * * 

[Father’s aunt] testified and the Court believes that she fully 

hoped to be a temporary caregiver for [A.B.] while [Mother] and 

[Father] got their act together. However, she is aware of 

[Mother’s] actions over the last two years or so and recognizes 

the significant likelihood that [Mother’s] current engagement is 

temporary and she will not ever be able to parent [A.B.]. 

[Father’s aunt] wants what is best for [A.B.] despite the awkward 

position that puts her in. 

* * * * * 

The DCS made significant efforts to facilitate reunification. 

Services were offered, time and again. Despite those efforts 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 85A02-1506-JT-794|March 28, 2016 Page 7 of 17

neither parent benefitted to any appreciable degree, [Mother’s] 

recent engagement in services notwithstanding. Her efforts were 

too little, too late. Reunification was the goal, and it was 

pursued, to no avail. 

Appellants’ App. 14-19. 

[11] Mother and Father appeal the termination of their parental rights. 

Discussion and Decision 

[12] The Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution protects the right 

of parents to establish a home and raise their children. In re K.T.K., 989 N.E.2d 

1225, 1230 (Ind. 2013). However, a parent’s rights may be terminated if the 

parent is unable or unwilling to meet his or her parental responsibilities by 

failing to provide for the child’s immediate and long-term needs. Id. The 

purpose of terminating parental rights is not to punish parents, but to protect 

their children. In re L.S., 717 N.E.2d 204, 208 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999), trans. 

denied. 

[13] When reviewing the termination of parental rights, we do not reweigh the 

evidence or judge witness credibility. Bester v. Lake Cnty. Office of Family & 

Children, 839 N.E.2d 143, 147 (Ind. 2005). Rather, we consider only the 

evidence and the reasonable inferences that are most favorable to the judgment 

of the trial court. Id. When the trial court has entered findings and 

conclusions, we apply a two-tiered standard of review. K.E. v. Ind. Dep’t of Child 

Servs., 39 N.E.3d 641, 646 (Ind. 2015). First, we determine whether the 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 85A02-1506-JT-794|March 28, 2016 Page 8 of 17

evidence supports the findings, and second, whether the findings support the 

judgment. Id. The judgment will be set aside only if it is clearly erroneous. Id. 

A judgment is clearly erroneous if the findings do not support the trial court’s 

conclusions or the conclusions do not support the judgment. In re R.J., 829 

N.E.2d 1032, 1035 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005). 

[14] A petition to terminate parental rights must allege, among other things: 

(B) that one (1) of the following is true: 

(i) There is a reasonable probability that the conditions 

that resulted in the child’s removal or the reasons for 

placement outside the home of the parents will not be 

remedied. 

(ii) There is a reasonable probability that the continuation 

of the parent-child relationship poses a threat to the 

well-being of the child. 

(iii) The child has, on two (2) separate occasions, been 

adjudicated a child in need of services; 

(C) that termination is in the best interests of the child[.] 

Ind. Code § 31-35-2-4(b)(2). DCS must prove the alleged circumstances by 

clear and convincing evidence. K.T.K., 989 N.E.2d at 1231. 

[15] Mother and Father raise five arguments, which we consolidate and restate as: 

(1) the record does not support the trial court’s findings because judicially 

noticed records from other cases that support the findings were not entered into 

evidence; (2) there is insufficient evidence to support the trial court’s 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 85A02-1506-JT-794|March 28, 2016 Page 9 of 17

conclusions that the conditions that resulted in A.B.’s removal would not be 

remedied and that continuation of the parent-child relationship poses a threat to 

A.B.’s well-being; and (3) it is not in the best interests of A.B. to terminate the 

parent-child relationship. 

I. Judicial Notice 

[16] At the outset of the termination hearing, the trial court announced it was taking 

judicial notice of several “cases” and then listed cause numbers that included 

the related Family Drug Treatment Court cause number, the underlying 

CHINS proceeding, and five of Father’s criminal cases. Tr. p. 5. DCS also 

requested judicial notice of another criminal case related to Father in a different 

county, submitting “paperwork from that case[,]” and the court took judicial 

notice of it as well. Id. at 5-6. However, no records from the judicially noticed 

cases were entered into the record of this case. Therefore, Mother and Father 

argue that the record here does not support the trial court’s findings to the 

extent that those findings are based on judicial notice of records from the other 

cases.1

 

1

 Mother and Father question “whether [Indiana Rule of Evidence 201] allows the Court to note only that 

the records exist; or, to note the contents of those records...” Appellants’ Br. p. 14. Because Mother and 

Father do not state an objection to a specific document or fact that the trial court noticed, we are unable to 

fully address this question. However, we have previously held that a trial court may take judicial notice of 

certain contents within the records of related proceedings. See In re D.K., 968 N.E.2d 792, 796 (Ind. Ct. App. 

2012) (stating that judicial notice of documents filed in a CHINS action was proper in the subsequent 

termination of parental rights case); see also In re Paternity of P.R., 940 N.E.2d 346, 350 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010) 

(stating that it was not error for a trial court to take judicial notice of the substance of a protective order even 

though the protective order file was not entered into evidence). 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 85A02-1506-JT-794|March 28, 2016 Page 10 of 17

[17] Mother and Father waived this argument. Issues not raised at the trial court are 

waived on appeal. In re Involuntary Termination of Parent-Child Relationship of 

B.R., 875 N.E.2d 369, 373 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007), trans. denied. Where a party 

objects to a court taking judicial notice, Indiana Rule of Evidence 201 

specifically provides an opportunity for a hearing—even after the notice has 

been taken. Ind. Evidence Rule 201(e) (“On timely request, a party is entitled 

to be heard on the propriety of taking judicial notice and the nature of the fact 

to be noticed. If the court takes judicial notice before notifying a party, the 

party, on request, is still entitled to be heard.”); see also In re Paternity of P.R., 940 

N.E.2d 346, 350 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010). However, the timely request must be 

made to the trial court; “appealing the trial court’s action does not constitute a 

timely request for an opportunity to be heard pursuant to Rule 201(e).” In re 

Paternity of P.R., 940 N.E.2d at 350. 

[18] Neither Mother nor Father objected to the trial court taking judicial notice of 

the “cases” or requested that the trial court incorporate the material in the 

record. In fact, later in the proceeding, Mother’s attorney expressly 

acknowledged that the trial court had taken judicial notice of one of Father’s 

criminal cases and stipulated that “the information contained therein is 

accurate.” Tr. p. 47. While it is not clear what the trial court meant when it 

said it was taking judicial notice of “cases,” and it is possible that Mother and 

Father did not realize the scope of the judicial notice being taken at the time, 

that scope was certainly clear when the final order was issued. Rule 201 

permitted them to request a hearing at that time to dispute what the trial court 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 85A02-1506-JT-794|March 28, 2016 Page 11 of 17

noticed or to request that the trial court include certain documents in the record 

of this case. No such request was made to the trial court. By failing to raise the 

question with the trial court, Mother and Father have waived their argument. 

[19] Waiver notwithstanding, Mother’s and Father’s argument that the trial court’s 

findings are unsupported because the record is incomplete still fails. They 

contend that In re D.K. “essentially requires” that “where a court takes judicial 

notice, some effort must be made to include those records in the record of the 

current proceeding.” Appellants’ Br. p. 15. The issue in D.K. was that neither 

party nor the trial court included records from the judicially noticed underlying 

CHINS case and the Appellee’s brief relied on facts that were, therefore, 

missing from the record on appeal. This Court concluded that “if a party on 

appeal wishes to rely on parts of the ‘other’ record or records in making an 

argument before this court, it should include those parts in an appendix 

submitted to this court under Indiana Appellate Rule 50.” In re D.K., 968 

N.E.2d at 797. That is precisely what DCS did in this case; DCS filed an 

Appellee’s Appendix that contained the relevant portions from the judicially 

noticed cases. That is sufficient to allow appellate review and meets the 

standard expressed in D.K. 

II. Reasonable Probability That the Conditions Resulting 

in Removal Will Not Be Remedied 

[20] Mother and Father contend that there was insufficient evidence to support the 

trial court’s conclusions that they were unlikely to remedy the conditions that 

resulted in the removal of A.B., and that continuation of the parent-child 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 85A02-1506-JT-794|March 28, 2016 Page 12 of 17

relationship poses a threat to A.B.’s well-being. Indiana Code section 31-35-2-

4(b)(2)(B) is written in the disjunctive. Therefore, DCS is required to establish 

by clear and convincing evidence only one of the three requirements of 

subsection (B). In this case, we conclude that there is sufficient evidence to 

support the trial court’s finding that there is a reasonable probability that the 

conditions that resulted in A.B.’s removal will not be remedied. Therefore, we 

need not address the finding that continuation of the parent-child relationship 

poses a threat to A.B.’s well-being. 

[21] In determining whether the conditions that resulted in a child’s removal or 

placement outside the home will not be remedied, we engage in a two-step 

analysis. In re E.M., 4 N.E.3d 636, 642-643 (Ind. 2014). We first identify the 

conditions that led to removal or placement outside the home and then 

determine whether there is a reasonable probability that those conditions will 

not be remedied. Id. The second step requires trial courts to judge a parent’s 

fitness at the time of the termination proceeding, taking into consideration 

evidence of changed conditions, and balancing any recent improvements 

against habitual patterns of conduct to determine whether there is a substantial 

probability of future neglect or deprivation. Id. In so doing, trial courts have 

discretion to weigh a parent’s prior history more heavily than efforts made only 

shortly before termination, and courts may find that a parent’s past behavior is 

the best predictor of his or her future behavior. Id. Finally, a parent’s testimony 

about future plans is not evidence upon which a trial court can base its 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 85A02-1506-JT-794|March 28, 2016 Page 13 of 17

termination decision. In re B.D.J., 728 N.E.2d 195, 202 n.1 (Ind. Ct. App. 

2000). 

[22] Here, A.B. was removed from Mother and Father because of their drug use. 

The dispositional order required both parents to submit to drug screening, 

participate in substance-abuse treatment, and participate in home-based 

services. But from March 2013 until March 2015, neither Mother nor Father 

complied with that order. Mother testified that her longest period of sobriety 

was three weeks during the two years from A.B.’s removal in January 2013 

until she discovered that she was two-months pregnant in January 2015. 

According to the order terminating Mother’s participation in Family Drug 

Treatment Court, she tested positive for illegal substances, including 

methamphetamine and heroin, fifteen times and failed to report for an 

additional twenty drug screens. Father’s probation was revoked twice for illegal 

drug use and he has spent the majority of the last two years incarcerated. He 

has not participated in either substance-abuse treatment or the Father 

Engagement Program to any meaningful extent. 

[23] Both parents point to their recent sobriety and intention to engage in services 

going forward as evidence that the condition leading to A.B.’s removal will be 

remedied. In addition, Mother raises the fact that she substantially complied 

with supervised visitation at all times, and with her other services during her 

brief periods of sobriety before January 2015 as well as after March 2015. 

Father argues that he has been sober during the last year, while incarcerated, 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 85A02-1506-JT-794|March 28, 2016 Page 14 of 17

and that services were unavailable to him during his incarceration, but he 

intends to engage with them when he is released.2

[24] These arguments invite us to reweigh the evidence—to put more emphasis on 

the recent improvement than the prior two years of non-compliance and 

substance abuse. We will not reweigh evidence on appeal. Bester, 839 N.E.2d 

at 147. Mother’s and Father’s two-year history of non-compliance with the 

dispositional order and continued substance abuse is supported by the record. 

And the findings of non-compliance and continued substance abuse support the 

trial court’s conclusion that there is a reasonable probability that the conditions 

that resulted in A.B.’s removal will not be remedied. 

III. Best Interests of the Child 

[25] In determining what is in a child’s best interests, the trial court must look to the 

totality of the evidence. In re A.D.S., 987 N.E.2d 1150, 1158 (Ind. Ct. App. 

2013), trans. denied. In so doing, the trial court must subordinate the interests of 

 

2

 Father asserts that he is in the same position as the father in K.E. v. Indiana Department of Child Services, 39 

N.E.3d 641 (Ind. 2015). We find the facts of this case distinguishable from the facts in K.E. The father in 

K.E. saw his children every two weeks and called them daily to talk and to tell them goodnight. Id. at 649. 

Father in this case did not even see A.B. for the first seven months after her removal—and then his probation 

was revoked due to his continued drug use. In K.E., the father voluntarily completed twelve programs to 

improve his life and parenting skills while he was incarcerated. Id. Here, the trial court saw no evidence of 

meaningful engagement in any programs or services, including during the periods when Father was not 

incarcerated. Moreover, during periods between incarceration, Father testified that his paycheck typically 

lasted one day due to the amount he spent on illegal drugs. Tr. p. 64. The dispositional order in this case 

clearly required Father to stop using illegal drugs in order to regain custody of A.B., and he agrees that he 

spent his money on “pills, heroin, amphetamines, whatever [he] could get[.]” Id. Incarceration is only one 

factor in determining whether the condition that led to the removal of a child will be remedied. Id. at 648. It 

is the other factors, like the relationship with the child and the effort made to participate in programs that 

develop parenting skills, which distinguish K.E. from this case. 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 85A02-1506-JT-794|March 28, 2016 Page 15 of 17

the parent to those of the child. Id. The court need not wait until a child is 

irreversibly harmed before terminating the parent-child relationship. Id. We 

have previously held that the recommendation by both the FCM and CASA to 

terminate parental rights, in addition to evidence that the conditions resulting in 

removal will not be remedied, is sufficient to show by clear and convincing 

evidence that termination is in the child’s best interests. Id. at 1158-59. 

[26] Here, both the CASA and the FCM recommended termination of parental 

rights, and there is evidence that the conditions resulting in removal will not be 

remedied. However, Mother and Father contend that Indiana Code section 31-

35-2-4.5(d)(1) “provides a mechanism that allows parents to request that a 

termination proceeding be dismissed if certain circumstances apply.” 

Appellants’ Br. p. 20. The statute provides in pertinent part: 

A person described in section 4(a) of this chapter may file a 

motion to dismiss the petition to terminate the parent-child 

relationship if any of the following circumstances apply: 

(1) That the current case plan prepared by or under the 

supervision of the department or the probation department 

under IC 31-34-15, IC 31-37-19-1.5, or IC 31-37-22-4.5 has 

documented a compelling reason, based on facts and 

circumstances stated in the petition or motion, for 

concluding that filing, or proceeding to a final 

determination of, a petition to terminate the parent-child 

relationship is not in the best interests of the child. A 

compelling reason may include the fact that the child is 

being cared for by a custodian who is a relative (as defined 

in IC 31-9-2-107(c)). 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 85A02-1506-JT-794|March 28, 2016 Page 16 of 17

I.C. § 31-35-2-4.5(d)(1). Mother and Father further argue that the language of 

the statute indicates that A.B.’s placement with Father’s aunt and uncle is a 

“compelling reason” to conclude that termination of their parental rights is not 

in A.B.’s best interests and that the “effect on A.B. of giving the parents more 

time will be minimal.” Appellants’ Br. p. 21. 

[27] First, to clarify, Section 31-35-2-4.5(d)(1) provides a mechanism for a “person 

described in section 4(a) of this chapter” to file a motion to dismiss the petition 

to terminate the parent-child relationship. Indiana Code section 31-35-2-4(a) 

describes three people: “(1) The attorney for the department. (2) The child’s 

court appointed special advocate. (3) The child’s guardian ad litem.” It does 

not include parents. Section 31-35-2-4.5(d)(1) does not provide a special 

statutory mechanism for parents to request dismissal of a termination 

proceeding. 

[28] Additionally, Section 31-35-2-4.5(d)(1) permits, but does not require, the 

dismissal of a petition to terminate parental rights when the child is in the care 

of a relative. See, e.g., In re G.H., 906 N.E.2d 248, 252 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009); 

James v. Pike Cnty., 759 N.E.2d 1140, 1144 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001); M.H.C. v. Hill, 

750 N.E.2d 872, 878 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001). Placement with a relative may 

provide a “compelling reason” for DCS to request dismissal of its petition for 

termination of parental rights under the terms of the statute. But such 

placement does not compel the trial court to find that it is in the best interests of 

the child to retain the parent-child relationship. 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 85A02-1506-JT-794|March 28, 2016 Page 17 of 17

[29] The balance of Mother and Father’s argument is, again, a request that we 

reweigh the evidence, which we will not do. Bester, 839 N.E.2d at 147. The 

trial court’s determination that termination of the parent-child relationship is in 

A.B.’s best interests is supported by the testimony of the CASA and the FCM as 

well as the two-year history of noncompliance with the dispositional order. 

[30] Affirmed. 

Bailey, J., and Crone, J., concur.