Federal Register / Vol. 74, No. 44 / Monday, March 9, 2009 / Notices 10077 

1The Order also noted that on March 10, 2003, 

Respondent had surrendered his DEA registration, 

that in February 2004, the Missouri State Board for 

the Healing Arts had entered into a settlement 

agreement with Respondent under which his 

medical license was placed on probation for seven 

years, and that in April 2006, Respondent’s state 

controlled substances registration had been 

restored. Id. at 1–2. 

Drug Schedule 

Amphetamine (1100) ................................................................................................................................................................................... II 

Methamphetamine (1105) ........................................................................................................................................................................... II 

Methylphenidate (1724) ............................................................................................................................................................................... II 

Amobarbital (2125) ...................................................................................................................................................................................... II 

Pentobarbital (2270) .................................................................................................................................................................................... II 

Secobarbital (2315) ..................................................................................................................................................................................... II 

Phencyclidine (7471) ................................................................................................................................................................................... II 

Phenylacetone (8501) ................................................................................................................................................................................. II 

Cocaine (9041) ............................................................................................................................................................................................ II 

Codeine (9050) ............................................................................................................................................................................................ II 

Dihydrocodeine (9120) ................................................................................................................................................................................ II 

Oxycodone (9143) ....................................................................................................................................................................................... II 

Hydromorphone (9150) ............................................................................................................................................................................... II 

Benzoylecgonine (9180) .............................................................................................................................................................................. II 

Ethylmorphine (9190) .................................................................................................................................................................................. II 

Meperidine (9230) ....................................................................................................................................................................................... II 

Methadone (9250) ....................................................................................................................................................................................... II 

Dextropropoxyphene, bulk (non-dosage forms) (9273) .............................................................................................................................. II 

Morphine (9300) .......................................................................................................................................................................................... II 

Oripavine (9330) .......................................................................................................................................................................................... II 

Thebaine (9333) .......................................................................................................................................................................................... II 

Levo-alphacetylmethadol (9648) ................................................................................................................................................................. II 

Oxymorphone (9652) ................................................................................................................................................................................... II 

Fentanyl (9801) ........................................................................................................................................................................................... II 

The company plans to import small 

quantities of the listed controlled 

substances for the manufacture of 

analytical reference standards. 

No comments or objections have been 

received. DEA has considered the 

factors in 21 U.S.C. 823(a) and 952(a) 

and determined that the registration of 

Cerilliant Corporation to import the 

basic classes of controlled substances is 

consistent with the public interest, and 

with United States obligations under 

international treaties, conventions, or 

protocols in effect on May 1, 1971, at 

this time. DEA has investigated 

Cerilliant Corporation to ensure that the 

company’s registration is consistent 

with the public interest. The 

investigation has included inspection 

and testing of the company’s physical 

security systems, verification of the 

company’s compliance with state and 

local laws, and a review of the 

company’s background and history. 

Therefore, pursuant to 21 U.S.C. 952(a) 

and 958(a), and in accordance with 21 

CFR 1301.34, the above named company 

is granted registration as an importer of 

the basic classes of controlled 

substances listed. 

Dated: March 4, 2009. 

Joseph T. Rannazzisi, 

Deputy Assistant Administrator, Office of 

Diversion Control, Drug Enforcement 

Administration. 

[FR Doc. E9–4945 Filed 3–6–09; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 4410–09–P 

DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE 

Drug Enforcement Administration 

[Docket No. 06–78] 

Steven M. Abbadessa, D.O.; Grant of 

Restricted Registration 

On August 7, 2006, the Deputy 

Assistant Administrator, Office of 

Diversion Control, Drug Enforcement 

Administration, issued an Order to 

Show Cause to Steven M. Abbadessa, 

D.O. (Respondent), of St. Louis, 

Missouri. The Show Cause Order 

proposed the denial of Respondent’s 

pending application for a DEA 

Certificate of Registration as a 

practitioner, on the ground that his 

‘‘registration would be inconsistent with 

the public interest.’’ Id. at 1 (citing 21 

U.S.C. 823(f)). 

The Show Cause Order specifically 

alleged that ‘‘[o]n or about January 1981, 

[Respondent] illegally possessed and 

distributed * * * cocaine in violation of 

21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1),’’ that Respondent 

was subsequently charged and arrested, 

and that he had admitted to agents that 

he had been involved ‘‘in the illegal 

distribution of cocaine, a schedule II 

controlled substance,’’ but that ‘‘no 

further prosecution was undertaken’’ 

because he cooperated with authorities. 

Id. 

The Show Cause Order next alleged 

that on December 4, 2001, Respondent 

was arrested by local police at a hotel 

in Clayton, Missouri, where he was 

found to have in his possession cocaine, 

as well as two prescription controlled 

substances—a combination drug 

containing hydrocodone, a schedule III 

controlled substance, and alprazolam, a 

schedule IV controlled substance. Id. 

The Order further alleged that the 

hydrocodone and the alprazolam ‘‘had 

been dispensed in the name of an 

acquaintance’’ of Respondent. Id. 

Relatedly, the Show Cause Order 

alleged that Respondent was 

subsequently indicted in state court on 

one felony count of possession of 

cocaine, and two felony counts of 

obtaining controlled substances by 

fraud. Id. The Order further alleged that 

on January 31, 2003, Respondent pled 

guilty to all three counts, but that he 

was allowed to withdraw his pleas after 

he completed a ‘‘one-year drug 

program.’’ 1 Id. at 1–2. 

Respondent, through his counsel, 

requested a hearing on the allegations. 

ALJ Ex. 2. The matter was assigned to 

Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) Gail 

Randall, who conducted a hearing in St. 

Louis, Missouri, on May 15 and 16, 

2007. At the hearing, both the 

Government and Respondent put on 

testimony and introduced documentary 

evidence into the record. Following the 

hearing, both parties submitted briefs 

containing their proposed findings of 

fact, conclusions of law, and argument. 

On February 13, 2008, the ALJ issued 

her recommended decision (ALJ). In her 

decision, the ALJ concluded that the 


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2The incident which prompted the denial (and 

this proceeding) is discussed below. 

Government had established grounds for 

the denial of Respondent’s application. 

ALJ at 55. The ALJ held, however, that 

Respondent had accepted responsibility 

for his misconduct and had ‘‘provided 

ample mitigating evidence and adequate 

assurances that he is able to responsibly 

handle [controlled substances] and is 

willing to abide by restrictions and/or 

requirements placed upon him.’’ Id. at 

57. The ALJ thus recommended that 

Respondent’s application be granted 

subject to three restrictions. Id. 

Thereafter, the Government filed 

exceptions to the ALJ’s decision. 

Having considered the entire record 

in this matter, I adopt the ALJ’s 

recommended decision except for her 

conclusions regarding the hardship 

imposed by Respondent’s lack of a 

registration, which is not a relevant 

consideration under the Controlled 

Substances Act. I hold that while the 

Government made out a prima facie 

case to deny the application, 

Respondent has convincingly 

demonstrated that he can be entrusted 

with a new registration subject to 

conditions. However, I impose 

additional conditions beyond those 

recommended by the ALJ. I therefore 

reject the Government’s exceptions and 

will grant Respondent a new registration 

subject to the conditions as set forth 

below. I make the following findings. 

Findings 

Respondent is a Doctor of Osteopathy 

(D.O.) and a board-certified proctologist. 

Respondent holds a license as an 

Osteopathic Physician and Surgeon 

from the Missouri State Board of 

Registration for the Healing Arts. RX 16, 

at 25. Effective February 9, 2004, 

Respondent’s state license was placed 

on probation for a period of seven years. 

Id. Respondent also held a DEA 

Certificate of Registration from 1987 

until he surrendered it on March 7, 

2003. GX 4. 

Respondent is, however, currently 

authorized to practice medicine subject 

to numerous conditions. These include, 

inter alia: (1) That he ‘‘abstain 

completely from the personal use or 

possession of controlled substances 

* * * unless that use of the drug has 

been prescribed by a person licensed to 

prescribe such drug and with whom [he] 

has a bona fide physician/patient 

relationship,’’ RX 16, at 26; (2) that he 

participate in the Missouri State 

Medical Association’s Physician Health 

Program (MPHP), id. at 25–26; (3) that 

he completely abstain from the use of 

alcohol, id. at 27; (4) that he ‘‘submit to 

biological fluid testing’’ at his own 

expense and that the presence of any 

drug not supported by a valid 

prescription which had been submitted 

to the Board is a violation of his 

discipline, id.; (5) that he ‘‘cause a letter 

of evaluation from [a] chemical 

dependency professional or from the 

rehabilitation or aftercare program to be 

submitted to the Board’’ each quarter, 

id.; and (6) that he agree to 

‘‘unannounced visits from the Board’s 

representatives to monitor his 

compliance with’’ the agreement. Id. at 

28. 

On November 10, 2003, Respondent 

applied for a new Missouri Controlled 

Substance Registration, his previous 

state registration having lapsed on 

March 31, 2003. GX 10, at 6. On August 

24, 2004, the Missouri Bureau of 

Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs (BNDD) 

denied Respondent’s application and 

issued an administrative complaint.2 Id. 

On April 6, 2005, Respondent and the 

State entered into a stipulation and 

consent order under which Respondent 

acknowledged that the State had 

‘‘sufficient evidence’’ to support the 

allegations of the denial letter and that 

cause existed to deny Respondent’s 

application. Id. The parties agreed, 

however, that Respondent would accept 

the State’s denial of his application, but 

that the State would consider a new 

application on or after January 1, 2006, 

and would grant the application 

provided that he did not commit new 

violations of controlled-substance laws 

and regulations and complied with his 

agreements with the state medical board 

and the Missouri Physicians Health 

Program. Id. at 8. 

On or about January 5, 2006, 

Respondent submitted a new 

application for a state controlled 

substances registration. GX 11, at 3. On 

April 3, 2006, Respondent and the State 

entered into a settlement agreement 

under which Respondent again agreed 

that cause existed under Missouri law to 

deny his application. Id. at 3–4. The 

parties agreed, however, that the State 

would grant him a new registration 

subject to extensive probationary terms. 

Id. at 4. 

The terms included, inter alia: (1) 

That Respondent maintain duplicate 

copies of ‘‘serially numbered’’ 

prescriptions and that copies be 

‘‘maintained separately from each 

patient’s charts,’’ (2) that Respondent 

‘‘not prescribe or administer controlled 

substances for himself, his immediate 

family or his employees except in a lifethreatening emergency,’’ (3) that 

Respondent ‘‘not order, purchase, or 

accept controlled substances,’’ (4) that 

Respondent ‘‘not obtain’’ any controlled 

substance unless it is prescribed to him 

by a practitioner with whom he ‘‘has a 

legitimate practitioner-patient 

relationship,’’ and that he inform any 

treating practitioner ‘‘of his prior 

chemical dependence before he is given 

a prescription,’’ (5) that Respondent 

ensure that any prescribing practitioner 

notify the BNDD of any prescription that 

was issued to him including the medical 

purpose of the prescription, (6) that 

Respondent shall remain a member of 

MPHP and ensure that quarterly reports 

were released to the BNDD, (7) that the 

BNDD ‘‘shall have authority to obtain 

biological * * * and hair samples’’ at 

Respondent’s expense, and (8) that both 

state and DEA investigators ‘‘shall have 

access to all required controlled drug 

records at any time during regular office 

hours.’’ Id. at 4–6. Respondent was thus 

granted a new state controlled substance 

registration; the probationary terms 

remain in effect until April 3, 2011. Id. 

at 1. 

Respondent’s Drug-Related Incidents 

The 1981 Incident 

In 1981, DEA Agents in Kirksville, 

Missouri, were notified by an informant 

that Respondent was a ‘‘large cocaine 

dealer.’’ Tr. 51. Through the informant, 

a meeting was arranged at which an 

Agent posed as someone interested in 

buying cocaine from Respondent. Id. at 

52–53. Respondent told the Agent that 

he could supply him with ‘‘two to three 

ounces of cocaine’’ and gave him a 

sample to test. Id. at 52. Respondent 

wanted money upfront, but the Agent 

refused to provide it. Id. Respondent 

and the Agent ended the meeting by 

agreeing to meet at a later date. Id. at 53. 

The following day, Respondent and 

the Agent had a telephone conversation 

during which the former told the latter 

that he could get him ‘‘all the cocaine 

he wanted,’’ which he thought was 

‘‘three or four ounces.’’ GX 3, at 2. 

Respondent did not, however, 

consummate a deal with the Agent. Id. 

Respondent did not hear again from the 

Agent for several weeks, when the latter 

called and told Respondent that he had 

some marijuana and cocaine for sale and 

asked if Respondent would ‘‘take it on 

consignment.’’ Id. 

Respondent agreed to meet the Agent. 

Id. Upon his arrival at the meeting, 

Respondent was arrested and charged 

with cocaine distribution. Id. 

Respondent cooperated with the 

authorities; as a result of his 

cooperation, two other persons were 

arrested. Tr. 99. Because of his 

cooperation, Respondent’s case was 

sealed and he was not convicted of an 

offense. Id. at 98–99. 


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The 1992 Incident 

In 1992, Respondent was treated for 

headaches by a neurologist, who 

prescribed Vicodin to him. Tr. 255–56. 

When Respondent continued to seek 

refills of the Vicodin over a sustained 

period of time, the neurologist raised 

with him the subject of whether he was 

addicted. Id. at 256. Respondent agreed 

to contact the MPHP and underwent an 

in-patient evaluation which lasted seven 

to eight days. Id. Upon being 

discharged, Respondent participated in 

the MPHP program for approximately 

six years, during which he attend 

weekly Caduceus meetings and 

submitted to drug testing. Id. at 259. 

Respondent left the program in 1998, 

thinking that he ‘‘was okay.’’ Id. at 260. 

While Respondent was fine for a little 

while, he eventually started drinking 

again and then abusing drugs again. Id. 

The 2001 Incident 

On December 4, 2001, an employee of 

a Ritz-Carlton hotel located in Clayton, 

Missouri contacted local police and 

reported that he had observed cocaine 

in the room in which Respondent was 

staying. Id. at 14–15. Upon their arrival, 

the police went to Respondent’s room, 

knocked on the door, and were let in by 

a cab driver named Rodney. Id. at 16. 

Respondent walked out of the bedroom 

area, observed the officers who were in 

uniform, and ran back into the bedroom. 

Id. at 16–17. The officers pursued 

Respondent and subdued him. Id. at 17. 

On a table, the officers found a bag 

containing 14.38 grams of cocaine, a 

black plastic container which held 

seven-tenths of a gram of cocaine, and 

assorted paraphernalia used to prepare 

and snort the drug such as plates, 

straws, a calling card and a credit card. 

Id. at 18. 

The officers also seized two 

prescription drug vials; one contained 

thirty-seven tablets of hydrocodone, the 

other contained forty-one tablets of 

alprazolam. Id. at 18–19. The labels on 

the vials listed Rodney as the patient 

and Respondent as the prescriber (and 

included his DEA number); the 

quantities dispensed were forty tablets 

of hydrocodone and forty-two tablets of 

alprazolam. Id. Respondent was 

subsequently arrested and taken to the 

police station for booking. Id. at 22. 

Rodney told the police that he had 

first met Respondent two days earlier 

when he drove him from a restaurant to 

his home; on that occasion, Respondent 

had asked Rodney for his business card 

because he was having car problems. Id. 

at 20–21. Upon meeting Respondent on 

December 4th, Respondent told Rodney 

that he was going to call in some 

prescriptions in Rodney’s name and 

asked Rodney if he could pick them up 

at the pharmacy. Id. at 21. Respondent 

gave him money, and Rodney picked up 

the prescriptions that were found in the 

hotel room. Id. 

At the police station, Respondent 

admitted that he had written the two 

prescriptions. Id. at 23. He was also 

observed as being in ‘‘an agitated state, 

pacing back and forth in his cell’’ and 

hitting his head against the wall. Id. 

According to the arresting officer, who 

had extensive experience in narcotics 

investigations, Respondent showed 

signs of impairment. Id. at 24. 

Respondent was subsequently 

charged with three felony offenses 

under state law: One count of 

possession of a controlled substance, 

and two counts of fraudulently 

attempting to obtain a controlled 

substance. GX 5. On January 31, 2003, 

Respondent pled guilty to the charges 

and was allowed to enter into the St. 

Louis County Drug Court Program. GXs 

5 & 7. Under the program, Respondent 

was required to, inter alia, undergo 

treatment, submit to urine and breath 

tests, not possess or use either 

controlled substances (unless prescribed 

by his doctor) or alcoholic beverages, 

and attend weekly court sessions for a 

minimum period of one year. GX 7. 

Respondent successfully completed the 

program and was allowed to withdraw 

his guilty pleas. GX 8. 

Respondent’s Evidence Regarding His 

Rehabilitation 

Following his December 2001 arrest, 

and before even entering the Drug Court 

Program, Respondent sought treatment 

from the MPHP program. Tr. 140–42. On 

December 17, 2001, Respondent entered 

the Talbott Recovery Campus to be 

treated for chemical dependency. RX 6, 

at 1. Respondent was treated at Talbott 

for approximately four months and was 

discharged on April 6, 2002. Id. 

According to the discharge summary, 

Respondent had ‘‘progressed well 

though his treatment process and * * * 

was able to develop healthier and more 

positive ways of coping with life 

without engaging in self destructive 

behaviors.’’ Id. at 5. 

On February 7, 2003, Respondent’s 

attending physician at Talbott wrote a 

letter to Respondent’s counsel. RX 5. 

The attending physician noted that 

Respondent ‘‘has complied with all the 

recommendations of our treatment team 

in aftercare. He has been active in 

recovery groups and attends our Return 

Visits. His urine drug screens have 

remained negative.’’ Id. 

The physician further wrote that 

Respondent ‘‘is doing well in recovery. 

He impresses us as willing to comply 

with all recommendations and 

continued participation in recovery 

activities.’’ Id. Finally, the physician 

stated his belief that Respondent ‘‘is 

competent to practice medicine. He 

appears committed to his patients and 

his profession. We would support any 

administrative decision to allow him to 

continue to practice medicine.’’ Id. 

As further evidence of his 

rehabilitation, Respondent introduced 

an affidavit (dated March 15, 2007) of 

Ms. Tina Steinman, Executive Director 

of the Missouri State Board of 

Registration for the Healing Arts. RX 4, 

at 1–2. According to Ms. Steinman, ‘‘[a]s 

of the date of [the] affidavit,’’ 

Respondent ‘‘is in compliance with the 

Settlement Agreement that he signed 

with the [state board] that was effective 

February 9, 2004.’’ Id. at 1. 

Respondent also called several 

witnesses to testify regarding his 

rehabilitation, including Robert 

Bondurant, the coordinator of the 

MPHP. Tr. 111. In his testimony, Mr. 

Bondurant explained that if a physician 

failed a drug test or had ‘‘some other 

adverse activity,’’ he would not support 

the physician before the licensing 

authority. Id. at 118. Mr. Bondurant 

further explained that MPHP used 

several monitoring mechanisms 

including random testing for both street 

drugs and prescription drugs; contacting 

the physician’s family members, 

employers and colleagues; and 

monitoring the physician’s attendance 

and participation in support groups and 

Caduceus meetings. Id. at 122 & 138. 

With respect to Respondent, Mr. 

Bondurant explained that he joined the 

MPHP shortly after being treated at 

Talbott and had signed a new agreement 

in 2004 after the State Board placed him 

on probation. Id. at 143. Mr. Bondurant 

further testified that Respondent had 

done everything that Talbott had 

recommended for his aftercare, and that 

he had joined MPHP two years before he 

was ordered to do so by the State Board. 

Id. at 144–45. Moreover, at the time of 

the hearing, Respondent, who was then 

five years into the process of his 

rehabilitation, was continuing to go to 

AA and Caduceus meetings. Id. at 146. 

Mr. Bondurant also testified that 

Respondent had been subjected to 

numerous drug tests as part of both the 

Drug Court Program and MPHP, and 

that every test was negative. Id. at 152– 

53. Mr. Bondurant testified that MPHP 

will randomly call Respondent for a 

drug test and that he had never refused 

to undergo a test. Id. at 153–54. 

Respondent is also required to call the 

State Board every morning to determine 

whether he has been selected for testing. 


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3The record establishes that the testing screens 

for prescriptions opiates including hydrocodone 

and oxycodone. 

4On cross-examination, Respondent was asked if 

he ‘‘attribute[d] this whole [1981] incident to like 

youthful indiscretion or how do you characterize 

this?’’ Tr. 391. Respondent answered: ‘‘Yes.’’ Id. 

5 In applying for a new registration, Respondent 

submitted extensive documentation regarding the 

2001 incident, the criminal charges and their 

disposition, the voluntary surrender of his DEA 

registration, and the actions taken by both the 

Missouri Board and BNDD. See RX 16. He also 

included various letters of support. These included 

the letter from his attending physician at Talbott; 

a letter from the MPHP supporting his application 

to the state BNDD which indicated that he was ‘‘in 

complete compliance’’ with the program, and that 

both the program’s Medical Director and 

Coordinator (Mr. Bondurant) supported his request 

for a state registration; and finally, a letter from Dr. 

Orlovick which discussed Respondent’s 

participation in the Caduceus Group and concluded 

that ‘‘[h]e is now fully ready, and deserving, of 

receiving his BNDD and DEA number.’’ RX 16, at 

8, 47, & 49. 

At the hearing, a Diversion Group Supervisor 

(GS) who oversaw the pre-registration investigation 

acknowledged that these materials had been 

submitted as part of the application. Tr. 84. The GS 

testified, however, that while he reviewed the 

application, he had not reviewed all of the 

attachments and had not talked about Respondent’s 

application with any person other than the DI who 

was assigned the investigation. Id. at 105. 

The GS also testified that the DI who performed 

the investigation obtained no evidence that any of 

the information provided by Respondent was 

inaccurate or that Respondent was again abusing 

controlled substances. Id. at 86. Finally, the DI 

testified that in light of all of the information 

contained in Respondent’s application, he could 

not explain why it would now be inconsistent with 

the public interest to grant his application. Id. at 

101. When asked ‘‘what more’’ Respondent had to 

do to establish that his registration would be 

consistent with the public interest?, the GS 

answered: ‘‘My personal opinion, I believe he’s had 

two or three chances to abide by the regulations 

* * * to handle controlled substances and I believe 

he failed at that.’’ Id. at 108–09. 

Id. at 154. The State Board has never 

reported to Mr. Bondurant that 

Respondent has tested positive for a 

controlled substance.3 Id. Nor has Mr. 

Bondurant received any other adverse 

information from the Board regarding 

Respondent. Id. at 156. 

Mr. Bondurant further testified that he 

had no information that would indicate 

that Respondent was currently using or 

abusing controlled substances that had 

not been prescribed to him. Id. at 161. 

He also opined that Respondent is ‘‘in 

a very solid recovery,’’ but that his 

addiction is ‘‘going to be a lifetime issue 

for him.’’ Id. at 162. Finally, Mr. 

Bondurant testified that he believed that 

Respondent could safely handle and 

prescribe controlled substances, and 

that he had ‘‘no reason to believe that 

he’’ poses a threat to public safety. Id. 

at 166. 

Respondent also elicited the 

testimony of R.S., a dentist who, at the 

time of hearing, had know him for six 

years from his participation in the St. 

Louis Caduceus group Id. at 201–02, 

210. R.S. testified that Respondent’s 

‘‘level of commitment to his recovery is 

outstanding,’’ that Respondent had 

operated on him, and that he would not 

have let Respondent do so if he did not 

‘‘have his head in the right place.’’ Id. 

at 212. R.S. also stated that he had 

referred his wife and several friends to 

Respondent and that he could not think 

of any reason as to why he would not 

safely prescribe controlled substances. 

Id. at 212 & 214. 

Respondent further called Ralph 

Orlovick, Ph.D., a clinical psychologist, 

who specializes in the treatment of 

chemical dependency and who has run 

the MPHP’s aftercare program 

(Caduceus Group) since 1995. Id. at 270; 

RX 15. Dr. Orlovick explained that 

Respondent ‘‘accept[s] responsibility for 

his own behavior,’’ Tr. 295–96, and ‘‘has 

an extremely deep acceptance of the fact 

that he is an addict in recovery and has 

established a lifestyle that maintains 

and protects that * * * recovery.’’ Id. at 

287. He also testified that Respondent 

was ‘‘a different person * * * than he 

was’’ when he first entered the program, 

id. at 289–90; that he had ‘‘no fears or 

concerns about’’ Respondent’s regaining 

a registration, id. at 294; and that ‘‘the 

length of [his] recovery and the ways he 

has been managing his life [were] 

excellent indices reflecting his readiness 

to get a [registration] in a responsible 

way.’’ Id. at 295. Dr. Orlovick further 

testified that he did not know of any 

reason why the Agency should not grant 

Respondent’s application, and that he 

had the tools necessary to continue his 

recovery. Id. 

Respondent testified that while he 

was allowed to withdraw his guilty 

pleas to the three charges which arose 

out of his December 2001 arrest, the acts 

‘‘absolutely happened and I take full 

responsibility.’’ 4 Id. at 352. Respondent 

further testified that he was never 

sanctioned for non-compliance during 

his participation in the drug-court 

program, and that he did all of the 

things he was required to do as part of 

the program. Id. at 354–56. 

Respondent also testified regarding 

the settlement agreement he had entered 

into with the Missouri Board. In this 

testimony, Respondent acknowledged 

that he was chemically dependent. Id. at 

358–60. He also testified regarding the 

various terms of the agreement, 

including that he must call every 

morning to determine whether he has 

been selected to provide either a urine 

or hair sample. Id. at 360. 

Respondent also testified regarding 

his obtaining a new state controlled 

substances registration and indicated 

that while he had not yet had to 

institute the terms and conditions 

imposed by the Missouri BNDD because 

he is still unable to legally prescribe a 

controlled substance, he was 

‘‘absolutely’’ willing to do so, and that 

it would be ‘‘no’’ problem for him to do 

so. Id. at 369–70. Respondent testified 

that his probation with the BNDD would 

last for ‘‘five years.’’ Id. at 372. He also 

testified that he considered holding a 

DEA registration to be ‘‘an absolute 

privilege,’’ id. at 373; that he had 

attended a three-day continuing medical 

education course on the prescribing of 

controlled substances, id. at 375; and 

that he ‘‘would do anything required’’ to 

regain his registration, including 

agreeing to warrantless searches, 

submitting to drug testing, and 

maintaining a prescription log. Id. at 

385. 

Finally, Respondent testified that he 

had not harmed any patient during the 

period in which he was abusing drugs 

and there is no evidence to the contrary. 

Id. at 388. Nor is there any evidence that 

Respondent has ever used his 

prescribing authority to deal drugs to 

others. 

The Government put on no rebuttal 

case.5

Discussion 

Section 303(f) of the Controlled 

Substances Act (CSA) provides that 

‘‘[t]he Attorney General may deny an 

application for [a practitioner’s] 

registration if he determines that the 

issuance of such registration would be 

inconsistent with the public interest.’’ 

21 U.S.C. 823(f). In making the public 

interest determination, the Act requires 

the consideration of the following 

factors: 

(1) The recommendation of the appropriate 

State licensing board or professional 

disciplinary authority. 

(2) The applicant’s experience in 

dispensing * * * controlled substances. 

(3) The applicant’s conviction record under 

Federal or State laws relating to the 

manufacture, distribution, or dispensing of 

controlled substances. 

(4) Compliance with applicable State, 

Federal, or local laws relating to controlled 

substances. 

(5) Such other conduct which may threaten 

the public health and safety. 

Id. 

‘‘[T]hese factors are considered in the 

disjunctive.’’ Robert A. Leslie, M.D., 68 

FR 15227, 15230 (2003). I may rely on 

any one or a combination of factors, and 

may give each factor the weight I deem 

appropriate in determining whether an 

application for a registration should be 

denied. Id. Moreover, I am ‘‘not required 


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Federal Register / Vol. 74, No. 44 / Monday, March 9, 2009 / Notices 10081 

6The Government’s own exhibit establishes that 

Respondent was not convicted of any offense 

related to the 2001 incident, which was nolprossed. See GX 8. 

to make findings as to all of the factors.’’ 

Hoxie v. DEA, 419 F.3d 477, 482 (6th 

Cir. 2005); see also Morall v. DEA, 412 

F.3d 165, 173–74 (D.C. Cir. 2005). 

In this case, it is not disputed that 

Respondent violated Federal law both in 

1981, when he was charged with 

cocaine distribution, and most 

significantly, in December 2001, when 

he possessed cocaine and obtained for 

his own use, two prescription controlled 

substances, hydrocodone and 

alprazolam, by writing fraudulent 

prescriptions which were issued in the 

name of a cab driver. The Government 

has therefore made out a prima facie 

case to deny his application. 

This Agency has repeatedly held, 

however, that a proceeding under 

section 303 ‘‘ ‘is a remedial measure, 

based upon the public interest and the 

necessity to protect the public from 

those individuals who have misused 

* * * their DEA Certificate of 

Registration, and who have not 

presented sufficient mitigating evidence 

to assure the Administrator that they 

can be entrusted with the responsibility 

carried by such a registration.’ ’’ Samuel 

S. Jackson, 72 FR 23848, 23853 (2007) 

(quoting Leo R. Miller, 53 FR 21931, 

21932 (1988)). Therefore, where, as 

here, ‘‘the Government has proved that 

a registrant has committed acts 

inconsistent with the public interest, a 

registrant must ‘present sufficient 

mitigating evidence to assure the 

Administrator that [he] can be entrusted 

with the responsibility carried by such 

a registration.’ ’’ Medicine ShoppeJonesborough, 73 FR 364, 387 (2008) 

(quoting Jackson, 72 FR at 23853 (2007) 

(quoting Leo R. Miller, 53 FR 21931, 

21932 (1988))), aff’d, Medicine ShoppeJonesborough v. DEA, slip. op. at 9–10 

(6th Cir. Nov. 13, 2008). ‘‘Moreover, 

because ‘past performance is the best 

predictor of future performance,’ ALRA 

Labs, Inc. v. DEA, 54 F.3d 450, 452 (7th 

Cir. 1995), [DEA] has repeatedly held 

that where a registrant has committed 

acts inconsistent with the public 

interest, the registrant must accept 

responsibility for [his] actions and 

demonstrate that [he] will not engage in 

future misconduct.’’ Medicine Shoppe, 

73 FR at 387; accord Jackson, 72 FR at 

23853; John H. Kennedy, 71 FR 35705, 

35709 (2006); Prince George Daniels, 60 

FR 62884, 62887 (1995). See also Hoxie 

v. DEA, 419 F.3d at 483 (‘‘admitting 

fault’’ is ‘‘properly consider[ed]’’ by 

DEA to be an ‘‘important factor[]’’ in the 

public interest determination). 

The Government raises two arguments 

in support of its contention that 

Respondent’s application should be 

denied. In its proposed findings, the 

Government contends that ‘‘[a]lthough 

Respondent presented substantial expert 

and peer testimony in support of his 

rehabilitation, he does not appear to 

have taken full responsibility for his 

past forays into addiction and drug 

abuse.’’ Gov. Proposed Findings at 6. In 

its Exceptions, however, the 

Government argues that ‘‘[t]he evidence 

that the applicant presented at the 

hearing as to his rehabilitation was 

sparse and less than convincing.’’ Gov. 

Exceptions at 2. 

As for the contention that Respondent 

has not taken ‘‘full responsibility for’’ 

what it describes as his ‘‘past forays,’’ 

apparently the Government relies on 

Respondent’s testimony regarding the 

1981 episode, as well as the reasons he 

gave for the problems he had in 1991 

and 2001. The Government’s contention 

is wholly unpersuasive. 

As for the 1981 arrest for cocaine 

distribution, twenty-seven years have 

elapsed since this event and there is no 

evidence that Respondent ever 

subsequently engaged in the unlawful 

distribution of either illicit (street) or 

prescription controlled substances to 

others. Furthermore, Respondent did 

not deny that he had committed the 

acts. 

The Government apparently also finds 

fault with Respondent’s testimony 

regarding what led to his becoming 

addicted in 1991. See Prop. Findings at 

4 (‘‘He attributed his 1991–1992 drug 

use to chronic headaches.’’). The 

Government, however, offered no 

evidence to refute Respondent’s 

testimony that he was prescribed 

controlled substances as treatment for a 

legitimate medical condition, and that 

he became addicted over the course of 

that treatment. Nor is Respondent the 

first person to become addicted to a 

drug prescribed in the course of 

legitimate medical treatment. Related to 

this incident, the Government also 

ignores that Respondent voluntarily 

entered treatment and underwent 

treatment and aftercare for 

approximately six years. Moreover, in 

discussing this period of his life, 

Respondent did not deny that he was 

chemically dependent. 

Finally, the Government contends 

that Respondent ‘‘attributed his 2001 

conviction to personal stress’’ 6 and that 

he ‘‘failed recovery after several years of 

rehabilitation.’’ Id. The Government, 

however, offered no evidence showing 

that Respondent’s testimony was false, 

and in any event, it is not clear why his 

explanation—‘‘a number of things, 

personal things, stress,’’ Tr. 393— 

regarding the cause of his relapse, 

establishes that he has failed to accept 

responsibility. 

In any event, the great weight of the 

evidence refutes the contention. 

Notably, Respondent fully 

acknowledged his misconduct in 

writing the prescriptions to the cab 

driver. Moreover, with respect to his 

addiction, Respondent produced ample 

evidence demonstrating that he 

acknowledges that he is chemically 

dependent. This includes both 

Respondent’s testimony and written 

admission regarding his addiction. See 

GX 9, at 3 (settlement agreement with 

state board; ‘‘Respondent has admitted 

he is chemically dependent’’); Tr. 261 

(‘‘I went [to treatment] because 

something had to change * * * I 

couldn’t keep doing what I was doing’’); 

id. at 358–59 (acknowledging his 

admission in the state board settlement 

agreement); see also GX 1, at 4 (answer 

to DEA application’s liability questions; 

‘‘I am committed to a lifelong recovery 

program and will follow all continuing 

recommendations of MPHP and the 

[state] Board.’’). 

Moreover, both Dr. Orlovick, the 

psychologist who runs MPHP’s aftercare 

program, and Mr. Bondurant, the MPHP 

Program Coordinator, testified that 

Respondent acknowledges his 

addiction. See id. at 287 (testimony of 

Dr. Orlovick; Respondent ‘‘has an 

extremely deep acceptance of the fact 

that he is an addict in recovery and has 

established a lifestyle that maintains 

and protects that * * * recovery’’); id. 

at 295 (testimony of Dr. Orlovick; 

Respondent ‘‘accept[s] responsibility for 

his own behavior’’). Id. at 164 

(testimony of Mr. Bondurant; ‘‘over the 

intervening years [Respondent] has 

learned that he does have limitations 

and that the addiction issue is a lifelong process and he is not stronger than 

the addiction’’). It is thus clear that 

Respondent has accepted responsibility 

for both his misconduct and addiction. 

As for the contention that Respondent 

has not sufficiently established his 

rehabilitation, in its proposed findings, 

the Government acknowledged that 

‘‘Respondent presented substantial 

expert and peer testimony in support of 

his rehabilitation,’’ Id. at 6. In its 

Exceptions, however, the Government 

does an about-face and now argues that 

‘‘[t]he evidence that the applicant 

presented at the hearing as to his 

rehabilitation was sparse and less than 

convincing.’’ Gov. Exc. at 2. Even 

ignoring the inconsistency between its 

initial and subsequent positions, I 

conclude that Respondent put forward 

compelling evidence of his 


dwashington3 on PROD1PC60 with NOTICES
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7Notwithstanding the suggestion in the 

Government’s proposed findings, there is no 

evidence that Respondent has relapsed following 

the treatment he received in 2002. 

8The record establishes that another doctor, who 

was alternatively characterized as Respondent’s 

associate or partner, administers controlled 

substances at his clinic. Tr. 244. According to 

Respondent, while his associate/partner holds a 

DEA and state registration, the latter is not 

authorized under agreements with the state 

authorities to stock controlled substances and no 

controlled substances are currently being stocked at 

the clinic. The record does not establish how 

Respondent’s partner/associate obtains and 

maintains the controlled substances which are used 

at his clinic. 

rehabilitation.7 Specifically, in addition 

to his own testimony, Respondent 

introduced the affidavit of the Missouri 

Board’s Executive Director that he was 

‘‘in compliance with the Settlement 

Agreement,’’ RX 4, at 1; a letter from the 

physician who treated him at Talbott, 

RX 5; and again, the testimony (and 

letters) of Mr. Bondurant, Dr. Orlovick, 

and R.S., a dentist who was also a 

member of Respondent’s aftercare 

group. 

More specifically, Respondent’s 

treating physician at Talbott wrote that 

his drug screens were negative, that he 

was ‘‘doing well in recovery,’’ that he 

was ‘‘willing to comply with all 

recommendations and continued 

participation in recovery activities,’’ and 

that he ‘‘is competent to practice 

medicine.’’ RX 5. Mr. Bondurant 

testified as to Respondent’s compliance 

with the conditions of the MPHP; that 

he had never failed or refused to 

undergo a drug test (whether the test 

was ordered by the Drug Court, MPHP, 

or the Board); that he had not received 

any adverse information regarding 

Respondent, who is ‘‘in a very solid 

recovery’’; and that he had ‘‘no reason 

to believe that [Respondent] would’’ 

pose a threat to public safety. Tr. 153– 

54, 156, 161–62, 166. 

To similar effect, Dr. Orlovick 

testified that Respondent ‘‘has 

established a lifestyle that maintains 

and protects [his] recovery,’’ and that he 

had ‘‘no fears or concerns about’’ 

Respondent’s regaining a registration. 

Id. at 287 & 294. Dr. Orlovick also 

testified that ‘‘the length of 

[Respondent’s] recovery and the ways 

he has been managing his life [are] 

excellent indices reflecting his readiness 

to’’ responsibly hold a registration. Id. at 

295. Dr. Orlovick further stated that he 

did know of any reason why 

Respondent’s application should not be 

granted and that he had the tools 

necessary to maintain his recovery. Id. 

Finally, R.S., who has known 

Respondent for six years from their 

participation in Caduceus meetings, 

testified that Respondent’s 

‘‘commitment to his recovery is 

outstanding.’’ Id. at 212. He also stated 

that he could not think of any reason 

why Respondent would not responsibly 

prescribe controlled substances. Id. at 

214. 

In response to this evidence, much of 

which was available at the time 

Respondent applied for a new 

registration, the Government offered 

nothing. I hold, however, that 

Respondent’s evidence as to his 

rehabilitation is convincing and reject 

the Government’s contention to the 

contrary. Indeed, as the Supervisory DI 

testified, he could not explain why it 

would be inconsistent with the public 

interest for Respondent to hold a 

registration. I therefore conclude that 

Respondent has established that 

granting his application would be 

consistent with the public interest. 21 

U.S.C. 823(f). 

Sanction 

As Respondent himself recognizes, 

the record nonetheless supports 

imposing conditions on his registration. 

Resp. Proposed Findings at 21–22. 

Under the Settlement Agreement with 

the State Board, Respondent is required 

to maintain duplicate serially numbered 

prescriptions separately from patient 

charts for each controlled substance 

prescription he writes. GX 11, at 4. 

Respondent has agreed to provide or 

make available these records to this 

Agency and has also agreed to consent 

to inspections of these records without 

the Government having to obtain an 

administrative warrant. Resp. Prop. 

Findings at 22. These requirements are 

therefore imposed as conditions of 

Respondent’s registration. 

Relatedly, the record also supports the 

ALJ’s recommendation that Respondent 

must maintain and submit on a 

quarterly basis, a log listing in 

chronological order, all controlled 

substance prescriptions he issues. The 

log shall include the prescription 

number, patient name and address, 

name, amount and strength of the drug 

prescribed, and number of refills 

authorized. The log shall also include 

any prescriptions and refills authorized 

by Respondent by telephone. 

According to the terms of his 

agreement with the State BNDD, 

Respondent is not authorized to ‘‘order, 

purchase or accept’’ any controlled 

substances. GX 11, at 5. The BNDD 

Order further provides that Respondent 

‘‘shall not dispense any controlled 

substances other than by administering 

or prescribing.’’ Id. 

It is unclear whether Respondent 

seeks authority to administer controlled 

substances at his clinic (as opposed to 

in a hospital setting), whether the BNDD 

agreement authorizes him to do so, and 

if he is permitted to do so, how he can 

legally obtain them.8 Moreover, the 

extent to which Respondent performs 

procedures in his clinic which require 

the administration of a controlled 

substance is also not fully established 

on this record. 

In the event Respondent seeks 

authority to administer controlled 

substances at the clinic, he must first 

provide evidence from the Missouri 

BNDD clearly stating that he is 

authorized to do so. Respondent must 

also explain how any controlled 

substances will be lawfully obtained 

(notwithstanding his agreement with the 

BNDD prohibiting his ordering and 

purchasing them), how they will be 

stored, and how they will be accounted 

for. Respondent shall not administer 

controlled substances at his clinic until 

he complies with this condition and 

receives written approval from this 

Agency. Respondent can, however, 

administer a controlled substance in a 

hospital setting. 

Respondent shall not prescribe any 

controlled substance to himself or any 

family member. Respondent shall not 

obtain a controlled substance for his 

own use unless it has been prescribed 

by another practitioner in accordance 

with the prescription requirement of 

federal law. See 21 CFR 1306.04 (‘‘A 

prescription for a controlled substance 

to be effective must be issued for a 

legitimate medical purpose by an 

individual practitioner acting in the 

usual course of his professional 

practice.’’). 

Respondent shall also ensure that the 

MPHP quarterly status reports are 

submitted to the Agency. All reports 

and logs are to be submitted to the 

Special Agent in Charge (or his 

designee), St. Louis Field Division, no 

later than fifteen days following the end 

of the quarter. Respondent shall also 

promptly notify the Special Agent in 

Charge (or his designee) of any action 

taken by either the State Board or BNDD 

against his license or state registration. 

Failure to comply with any of the 

conditions specified above shall be 

grounds for the suspension or 

revocation of Respondent’s registration. 

Order 

Pursuant to the authority vested in me 

by 21 U.S.C. 823(f), as well as 28 CFR 

0.100(b) & 0.104, I hereby order that the 

application of Steven M. Abbadessa, 

D.O., for a DEA Certificate of 

Registration as a practitioner be, and it 


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Federal Register / Vol. 74, No. 44 / Monday, March 9, 2009 / Notices 10083 

hereby is, granted, subject to the 

conditions set forth above. This Order is 

effective immediately. 

Dated: February 26, 2009. 

Michele M. Leonhart, 

Deputy Administrator. 

[FR Doc. E9–4906 Filed 3–6–09; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 4410–09–P 

DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE 

Drug Enforcement Administration 

[Docket No. 06–28] 

Joseph Gaudio, M.D.; Suspension of 

Registration 

On September 16, 2005, the Deputy 

Assistant Administrator, Office of 

Diversion Control, Drug Enforcement 

Administration, issued an Order to 

Show Cause to Joseph Gaudio, M.D. 

(Respondent) of Alpine, New Jersey. 

The Show Cause Order sought the 

revocation of Respondent’s DEA 

Certificate of Registration, which 

authorizes him to handle controlled 

substances as a practitioner, and the 

denial of any pending applications to 

renew or modify his registration, on the 

ground that he had committed acts 

which rendered his continued 

registration ‘‘inconsistent with the 

public interest.’’ Show Cause Order at 1 

(citing 21 U.S.C. 823(f) & 824(a)(4)). 

The Show Cause Order alleged that 

Respondent had issued prescriptions for 

controlled substances which lacked a 

legitimate medical purpose, and that in 

doing so, he had acted outside of the 

usual course of professional practice. Id. 

at 1 & 6. The Show Cause Order 

specifically alleged that Respondent had 

‘‘prescrib[ed] controlled substances to 

Internet customers despite never 

establishing a genuine doctor-patient 

relationship with the Internet 

customer.’’ Id. at 5. Relatedly, the Show 

Cause Order alleged that Respondent 

‘‘did not see customers, had no prior 

doctor-patient relationships with the 

Internet customers, did not conduct 

physical exams, * * * did [not] create 

or maintain patient records,’’ and that 

‘‘[t]he only information usually 

reviewed prior to issuing drug orders 

was the customer’s online 

questionnaire.’’ Id. at 6. 

The Show Cause Order also alleged 

that ‘‘[a] review of prescriptions filled 

by [Carrington Healthcare System/ 

Infiniti Services Group] revealed that 

[Respondent] ha[d] issued drug orders 

for controlled substances to Internet 

customers throughout the United States, 

including Georgia, Texas, Pennsylvania, 

Alabama, Louisiana, and Kentucky.’’ Id. 

The Show Cause Order further alleged 

that ‘‘[a] review of prescriptions filled 

by [Carrington/Infiniti] for the period 

October 13, 2004 to January 21, 2005, 

revealed that [Respondent] ha[d] issued 

16 drug orders to Internet customers in 

at least nine different states.’’ Id. 

On October 21, 2005, Respondent, 

through his counsel, requested a hearing 

on the allegations. The matter was 

assigned to Administrative Law Judge 

(ALJ) Gail Randall, who conducted a 

hearing on May 2–5, 2006, in New York, 

NY. At the hearing, both parties put on 

testimony and introduced documentary 

evidence. Thereafter, both parties 

submitted briefs containing their 

proposed findings of fact, conclusions of 

law, and arguments. 

On November 2, 2007, the ALJ issued 

her recommended decision. In her 

decision, the ALJ concluded that ‘‘[t]he 

Government has clearly demonstrated 

that the Respondent’s Internet practice 

and his resulting issuance of controlled 

substance prescriptions * * * violated 

the Controlled Substances Act.’’ ALJ at 

43. Applying the totality of the 

circumstances test, the ALJ concluded, 

however, that the revocation of 

Respondent’s registration was not 

warranted. Id. at 43–44. 

The ALJ specifically noted that 

‘‘Respondent’s conduct encompassed a 

one year period,’’ that Respondent had 

‘‘voluntarily cease[d]’’ his conduct, but 

that he had not done so until three 

months after he was served with the 

Show Cause Order. Id. at 43. While the 

ALJ deemed Respondent’s cessation of 

his conduct as ‘‘commendable because 

of its voluntary nature,’’ she further 

explained that he ‘‘demonstrated a lack 

of sound judgment’’ in ‘‘continuing to’’ 

prescribe after being served with the 

Show Cause Order. Id. at 44. The ALJ 

also found of concern ‘‘Respondent’s 

failure to be totally truthful during his 

testimony.’’ Id. 

The ALJ reasoned, however, that 

Respondent was ‘‘a very educated, 

dedicated and talented physician 

practicing in a sometimes difficult 

specialty, pain management,’’ and that 

the revocation of his registration would 

render him ‘‘being unable to handle 

controlled substances’’ in his specialty. 

Id. Because the record demonstrated 

that Respondent had practiced medicine 

for eleven years, and that ‘‘the only 

instances of [his] improper handling of 

controlled substances were related to 

his’’ Internet prescribing, the ALJ 

recommended that Respondent’s 

registration be continued subject to the 

condition that he ‘‘not engage in any 

activity involving prescribing controlled 

substances and the Internet.’’ Id. 

Having considered the entire record 

in this matter, I hereby issued this 

Decision and Final Order. I adopt the 

ALJ’s conclusions that Respondent 

violated both the Controlled Substances 

Act (CSA) and various state standards of 

medical practice in issuing 

prescriptions to persons who ordered 

drugs through an Internet site. For 

reasons explained below, I reject the 

ALJ’s recommended sanction as 

inconsistent with agency precedent and 

will order the suspension of 

Respondent’s registration for a period of 

one year. I make the following findings. 

Findings 

Respondent is a medical doctor who 

is board certified in both anesthesiology 

and pain management and is licensed to 

practice medicine in the States of New 

York and New Jersey. Tr. 488. 

Respondent is also the holder of a DEA 

Certificate of Registration, which 

authorizes him to dispense controlled 

substances in schedules II through V as 

a practitioner. GX 1, at 2. While the 

expiration date of Respondent’s 

registration was September 30, 2006, 

Respondent submitted a renewal 

application on August 4, 2006. See 

Reply to Respondent’s Status Report, at 

1. I therefore find that Respondent’s 

prior registration has remained in effect 

pending the issuance of this Final Order 

and that Respondent also has an 

application pending before the Agency. 

See 5 U.S.C. 558(c). 

Respondent attended medical school 

at The Autonomous University of 

Guadalajara, and the New York Medical 

College. RX 1, at 2. Subsequently, 

Respondent did his residency in 

anesthesiology at St. Luke’s/Roosevelt 

Hospital, an institution which is 

affiliated with the Columbia University 

College of Physicians and Surgeons, 

where he received an award given to the 

Outstanding Graduate Resident in 

Anesthesiology. Id. Respondent also did 

a fellowship in Pain Management at the 

Memorial Sloan Kettering Cancer 

Center, where he was elected Chief 

Fellow. Id. at 1. 

Upon completion of his fellowship, 

Respondent joined New Jersey 

Anesthesia Associates (NJAA), a group 

of physicians which provides anesthesia 

services at St. Barnabas Medical Center. 

Tr. 345–47. Respondent is a partner in 

NJAA. Id. at 347. In addition to 

providing anesthesia, Respondent also 

treats both acute and chronic pain 

patients. Id. at 555–56. Respondent is 

also an attending physician and clinical 

professor at St. Barnabas, where he 

trains residents in anesthesia. Id. at 360. 

Respondent came to the attention of 

the Agency during its investigation of a 


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