NOT RECOMMENDED FOR PUBLICATION

File Name: 21a0032n.06

No. 19-2260

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT

SHANE GROUP INC, et al.,

Plaintiffs-Appellees,

v.

BLUE CROSS BLUE SHIELD OF MICHIGAN,

Defendant-Appellee,

CHRISTOPHER ANDREWS,

Objector-Appellant.

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

ON APPEAL FROM THE 

UNITED STATES DISTRICT 

COURT FOR THE EASTERN 

DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN

Before: SILER, COOK, and KETHLEDGE, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM. Christopher Andrews objects to a class-action settlement agreement and 

appeals the district court’s finding that the agreement was “fair, reasonable, and adequate.” Fed. 

R. Civ. P. 23(e)(2). We reject his arguments and affirm.

This is a class action in which the plaintiffs alleged that Blue Cross Blue Shield of Michigan 

(Blue Cross) had engaged in an extensive price-fixing scheme. A proposed settlement first came 

to us in 2016, when we held that the district court had abused its discretion when it sealed various 

filings and records. We therefore vacated the district court’s approval of the original settlement 

and instructed it to “begin the Rule 23(e) process anew.” See Shane Grp., Inc. v. Blue Cross Blue 

Shield of Mich., 825 F.3d 299, 311 (6th Cir. 2016).

On remand, the district court eventually approved a new settlement agreement in 2019. 

R. 364 at Page ID 18897. The agreement provides for a total settlement fund of $29.99 million. 
No. 19-2260, Shane Grp., et al. v. Blue Cross Blue Shield of Mich.

2

That amount, after deductions for fees and expenses, would leave about $16 million for payments 

to class members, whose damages were allegedly about $50 million (after deducting $58 million 

in alleged damages for a single class member that opted out).

Andrews himself (proceeding pro se) is a serial objector who in this case unsuccessfully 

sought a $150,000 payoff to drop his objections. He is now the sole remaining objector. 

We review the approval of a settlement agreement for an abuse of discretion. In re Dry 

Max Pampers Litig., 724 F.3d 713, 717 (6th Cir. 2013).

Andrews raises a raft of objections, many of them undeveloped, all of them meritless. His

argument that the district court judge should have recused herself is waived (in addition to being 

undeveloped), since Andrews did not make that argument in the district court. See McDaniel v. 

Upsher-Smith Labs., Inc., 893 F.3d 941, 948 (6th Cir. 2018). He argues that the named plaintiffs 

lacked standing to assert their claims, but does not explain why. He also argues that the distribution 

of any leftover funds to Free Clinics of Michigan would be a kickback for Blue Cross. But the 

two entities are not legally related, and Andrews’s argument is otherwise conclusory. Andrews 

argues that payment of so-called “service awards” to certain named plaintiffs amounted to a 

bounty. On this record, however, those payments correlate to the substantial amount of time that 

the named plaintiffs actually spent producing documents and otherwise advancing the litigation of 

the case. Andrews further argues that the named plaintiffs and class counsel were “inadequate” 

representatives of the class. But that argument too is conclusory, and is undermined by the 

substantial recovery (32% of alleged damages, after deductions for fees and expenses) for 

unnamed class members. Andrews’s remaining objections are likewise undeveloped and are 

therefore forfeited. See Courser v. Allard, 969 F.3d 604, 616 (6th Cir. 2020).

The district court’s judgment is affirmed.