UNITED STATES CO URT OF APPEALS FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT

DAVID SILVER, Plaintiff-Appellant,

v. BRUNO VASSEL, III; GORDON PETERSON; CLINTON H. BULLOCK, Defendants-Appellees. No. 13-2091 (D.C. No. 1:12-CV-00948-JAP-RHS) (D. N.M.)

ORDER AND JUDGMENT *

Before KELLY , TYMKOVICH , and PHILLIPS , Circuit Judges.
David Silver appeals the di strict court’s dismissal of his fraud, racketeering, disparagement, and negligent infliction of emotional distress (“NIED”) claims. Exercising jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, we affirm. Silver is the founder and CEO of an i nvestment group, Santa Fe Capital Group (“SFCG”), located in Santa Fe, New Mexi co. In 2002, SFCG entered into an

* After examining the briefs and appella te record, this pa nel has determined unanimously that oral argument would not mate rially assist the de termination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the doctr ines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be cite d, however, for its persuasi ve value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1. FILED United States Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit 

### October 16, 2013
Elisabeth A. Shumaker Clerk of Court- 2 - agreement with iboats , inc. (“iboats”), a Utah corporation, under which Silver would locate investors to provide st artup capital to the company in exchange for preferred stock. Under the agreement, SFCG would then receive a percentage of the securities purchased by the investors that S ilver introduced to iboats. Silver found six investors to purchase pr eferred stock in iboa ts. According to him, although iboats grew e xponentially, the company paid no dividends or interest on the preferred stock to t hose six investors, and viol ated numerous covenants to their investment agreements. In 2012, iboats’ counsel, Clinton Bullock, contacted the preferred shareholders a nd made offers to buy or c onvert to common stock their preferred shares. After the investors informed Silver of the offers, he contacted iboats’ CFO, Gordon Peterson, and dema nded that iboats pay each of the six investors a specified return on their original investment. But iboats apparently did not do so. Proceeding pro se, Silver then brought a diversity action in the District of New Mexico for fraud and racketeering based on alleged violations of the contract between SFCG and iboats. He also assert ed claims of disp aragement and NIED based on the fact that Bullock, Peters on, and CEO Bruno Vassel (hereinafter “Defendants”) communicated with the i nvestors without including him, thus allegedly damaging his reputation. The Defendants moved to dismiss the co mplaint and the district court granted the motion. The court first dismissed Silv er’s fraud and racketeering charges for lack- 3 - of standing. The court reasoned that because those claims were based on the contract between SFCG and iboats, only SFCG had sta nding to sue to enforce the contract’s terms. Nor could Silver bring a clai m on SFCG’s behalf because he was not a lawyer. See Rowland v. Cal. Men’s Colony , 506 U.S. 194, 201-202 (1993) (a business entity can only appear in court th rough an attorney and not a corporate officer appearing pro so). The court also held that even if Silver could bring his claim, dismissal was appropriate because th e lawsuit did not name the real party in interest, iboats, as it wa s the company—and not the Defendants individually—with which SFCG contracted. As to the disparagement and NIED clai ms, the district court concluded that it lacked personal jurisdiction over the Defendants because none of them had established minimum contacts with the Distri ct of New Mexico such that they should reasonably anticipate being ha led into court there. See World-Wide Volkswagon Corp. v. Woodson , 444 U.S. 286, 297 (1980). The court alternatively found that dismissal was appropriate for improper venue. On appeal, Silver does not challenge th e district court’s conclusion about the dismissal of his disparagemen t and NIED claims, thus re view of those claims is waived. See Adler v. Wal- Mart Stores, Inc ., 144 F.3d 664, 679 ( 10th Cir. 1998). Rather, Silver challenges the court’s dismis sal of his fraud and racketeering claims on two grounds. First, Silver alleges that despite his pro se stat us, the district court denied him any leniency and instead held him to the same sta ndards as a practicing- 4 - attorney. 1 See Hall v. Bellmon , 935 F.2d 1106, 1110 (10th Cir. 1991) (“A pro se litigant’s pleadings are to be construed libera lly and held to a less stringent standard than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.”). It is true that while discussing his pro se status, the court noted Silv er’s numerous federal cases and experience with federal litigation. But it only did so in finding that he had sufficient experience in federal court to recognize the obvious jurisdicti onal and procedural defects with his complaint—the same defects, it should be noted, for whic h all pro se litigants are held accountable. See Hall v. Witteman , 584 F.3d 859, 863-64 (10th Cir. 2009). Second, Silver contends that by acti ng adversely to iboa ts’ interests, the Defendants are liable in their individua l capacity and are therefore the properly named parties in interest. See Mosier v. Callister , Nebeker & McCullough , 546 F.3d 1271, 1276 (10th Cir. 2008) (noting that under th e “adverse interest exception,” conduct by corporate officers acting in their own interest and adverse to the company will not be imputed to the company). Ho wever, Silver’s only support for this contention is a conclusory statement that the Defenda nts caused the preferred stockholders to be “angry,” a nd “[t]o anger one’s earliest stockholders clearly hurts the corporation’s intere sts.” Aplt. Br. at 14. Moreover , Silver ignores entirely that the court also dismissed his claims because he lacked standing to bring them on his company’s behalf. The distri ct court did not err in dism issing Silver’s claims.

1 It is worth noting that S ilver suggests in his brief that he is, in fact, a disbarred attorney. Aplt. Br. at 12.- 5 - Accordingly, the judgment of th e district court is affirmed.

Entered for the Court
Paul J. Kelly, Jr. Circuit Judge