In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

Nos. 08-1138 & 08-1161

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

ROOSEVELT POWELL and WILLIE HARRIS,

Defendants-Appellants.

Appeals from the United States District Court 

for the Northern District of Indiana, Hammond Division.

No. 06 CR 197—Philip P. Simon, Judge.

ARGUED APRIL 9, 2009—DECIDED AUGUST 7, 2009

Before MANION, ROVNER, and WOOD, Circuit Judges.

MANION, Circuit Judge. A grand jury indicted Willie

Harris, a Gary, Indiana, lawyer, and Roosevelt Powell,

who collected property taxes on behalf of Lake County,

Indiana, for their role in the sale of two properties to the

Gary Urban Enterprise Association. A jury found Harris

and Powell guilty of wire fraud, conspiring to defraud

the United States, and filing a false tax return. They

appeal. We affirm their convictions and Harris’s sen-
2 Nos. 08-1138 & 08-1161

tence, but vacate Powell’s sentence and remand to the

district court for further proceedings.

I.

Indiana’s enterprise zone program was devised in 1983

in an attempt to provide incentives for businesses to

locate or expand in distressed and blighted areas.

Jim Landers & Dagney Faulk, In the Zone: A Look at Indiana’s Enterprise Zones, Ind. Bus. Rev., Summer 2005, at 7.

Businesses inside the enterprise zone receive tax incentives in exchange for donating a percentage of the tax

savings to the local urban enterprise association. Id. at 9.

The Gary Urban Enterprise Association (“GUEA”) was

such an association; businesses located within the Gary

enterprise zone contributed heavily to it in lieu of paying

inventory taxes. However, due to a combination of a

large pot of money at the GUEA’s disposal—as much as

five million dollars a year—and minimal oversight over

how the money was to be spent, the GUEA attracted a

corrupt abuse of the funds. The GUEA was ultimately

dissolved after an investigation revealed that the

GUEA’s executive director, JoJuana Meeks, was treating

the GUEA as her personal bank account. Prior to its

demise, however, the GUEA had embarked on a propertypurchasing spree, acquiring many properties in Gary

for the purpose of redeveloping them. The convictions of

defendants Roosevelt Powell and Willie Harris in this

case resulted from their roles in the sale of two properties

in Gary to the GUEA: a former grocery store located at

6300 Miller, and a vacant building located at 768 Broadway.
Nos. 08-1138 & 08-1161 3

We base our account of the facts on the evidence presented 1

at trial, taken in the light most favorable to the government.

United States v. Hach, 162 F.3d 937, 942 (7th Cir. 1998).

A. 6300 Miller1

Towards the end of 1999, the owners of 6300 Miller, who

had long ceased operating the building on the property

as a grocery store, let the members of the Lake County

Council know that they intended to donate the property

to a public charity. William Smith, one of the councilmen

and—later—a co-defendant of Powell and Harris, got

wind of the intended donation and indicated that he

knew of an organization that might have some interest

in the property. Harris, an attorney who owned the law

firm Willie Harris & Associates in Gary, then contacted

Gerald Bishop, one of the lawyers for the owners of

6300 Miller, about the property. He told Bishop that the

Gary Historical and Cultural Society (“Historical Society”),

a local nonprofit organization, would accept 6300 Miller

as a donation. Dharathula Millender, Harris’s 84-year-old

aunt by marriage, was the Historical Society’s president,

and Harris was its attorney. The papers for the transfer

were drawn up and signed at Harris’s law office on

December 27, 2000. At the time of the donation, 6300 Miller

was appraised for $397,500 and had $37,000 in accrued

property taxes, which the Historical Society assumed.

Harris, Smith, and Powell then attempted to sell the

property. In the spring of 2001, Powell called Meeks at the

GUEA and told her about it. Powell knew her from his

work at SRI, a company hired to run the delinquent
4 Nos. 08-1138 & 08-1161

property tax sale auctions in Lake County. Powell had

seen Meeks attend several auctions on behalf of the

GUEA and, after finding out what she was doing, offered

to help her. He eventually assisted Meeks in buying “a lot”

of property for the GUEA—including a house he owned

in his daughter’s name.

Powell and Smith showed Meeks the property at

6300 Miller. Powell told her that the property was in

the process of being transferred from the county to the

Historical Society (which was not true) and that she

could buy it once the transfer was completed. They then

discussed a purchase price. Powell stated that they

wanted $450,000. After Meeks told him that the GUEA

“couldn’t do that,” the parties quickly agreed on a price

of $200,000. Property taxes were not discussed—even

though, by this point, the unpaid property taxes had

ballooned to $73,000. Powell directed Meeks to prepare

a purchase agreement in the name of the Historical

Society and to make out the check to that organization.

A purchase agreement was prepared and addressed to

Millender but signed by Harris on behalf of the

Historical Society. While the agreement called for the

GUEA to pay the outstanding property taxes, no

amount was listed. Meeks assumed that taxes would not

be an issue because the county was transferring the

property to the Historical Society.

Property taxes did indeed turn out to be a non-issue, but

not for the reason Meeks assumed. In addition to his

work for SRI, Powell also owned and operated a

company named US Research Consultants, Inc. (“US
Nos. 08-1138 & 08-1161 5

Research”), which had a contract with Lake County to

collect delinquent property taxes on its behalf. On

October 2, Lee Christakis, an attorney working for US

Research who acted on Powell’s instructions, filed a

lawsuit against the Historical Society regarding the delinquent taxes owed on 6300 Miller. Despite the fact that

the building was in decent shape and the GUEA was

paying $200,000 to buy it in order to use it as a training

center, the complaint stated that the property was in a

state of disrepair necessitating its demolition in order to

be restored to a tax-paying basis. Harris personally accepted service of the complaint on behalf of the

Historical Society three minutes after the complaint was

filed. An agreed order was entered later that day

reducing all property taxes due on the property to

$15,000, which Harris paid. The Lake County Treasurer—

whose permission US Research was required to seek

before reaching a settlement with a taxpayer—was not

aware of either the lawsuit or settlement.

On the same day as the lawsuit to reduce the property

taxes, Powell picked up the $200,000 check from the

GUEA. The check was deposited into Harris’s law firm

trust account on October 3. At the same time, Harris wrote

a check from the trust account to himself (postdated

October 4) for $50,000 and deposited it into his law firm’s

business account. He also wrote a check to Smith for

$75,000, one to Powell for $25,000, and another to the

Historical Society for $50,000. Bank records showed that

Smith deposited his check shortly thereafter, while

Powell deposited his check about a week later.
6 Nos. 08-1138 & 08-1161

Section 501(c)(3) of title 26 exempts from federal income 2

taxation “[c]orporations, and any community chest, fund, or

foundation, organized and operated exclusively for religious,

charitable, scientific, testing for public safety, literary, or

educational purposes.”

Millender deposited the $50,000 check in the Historical

Society’s bank account a week after Powell. According to

her testimony at trial, Millender’s entire understanding of

how the Historical Society obtained the $50,000 rested on

a conversation she had with Smith, during which he had

asked her if “they” could “borrow” the Historical Society’s

501(c)(3) status for $50,000 “to get a building for a training 2

program for young people.” Although Millender was

present at the short meeting in Harris’s law office during

which the documents donating the property to the Historical Society were completed, and even signed the

document transferring the property from the former

grocery store owners to the Historical Society, she testified

that she did not know that the Historical Society ever

owned 6300 Miller. Rather, she stated that she had complete trust in her attorney Harris: “if he said sign it,

I would sign it. I wouldn’t read it. I would sign it, if he

said it’s something you’re supposed to do.”

Millender was not told that the Historical Society would

have to own any property in order to receive the $50,000.

She testified that she would never have taken title to 6300

Miller because the cash-strapped Historical Society had

difficulty meeting expenses for the old school building

it currently possessed. She was surprised when FBI

agents showed her the $200,000 check from the GUEA to
Nos. 08-1138 & 08-1161 7

the Historical Society; she did not know about that check

either, or that Smith, Powell, and Harris had pocketed

$150,000 of the proceeds. Millender also was never informed about the property taxes owed on the property

or the lawsuit filed against the Historical Society. Her

signatures both on the $200,000 check and the deed transferring 6300 Miller to the GUEA were forged. She did

acknowledge receiving and depositing the $50,000 check

on behalf of the Historical Society.

B. 768 Broadway

The second property sale involved in this case was the

sale of the vacant building located at 768 Broadway to

the GUEA. Harris paid $2,600 for the property in September 1999. Because he was having marital problems at

the time, Harris hid his ownership of the property from

his wife by titling the property in the name of Dorothy

Ard, a close family friend. Harris told Ard he would pay

for the property, its maintenance, and any taxes.

In August 2001, Powell contacted Meeks and told her

that 768 Broadway was available, claiming that his client

was Dorothy Ard, “an elderly woman who was trying to

divest herself and move back south.” After viewing the

property, Meeks again spoke with Powell, who stated

Ard was looking for at least $60,000. Meeks offered $40,000,

and Powell said he would contact Ard. Powell called

back and claimed that he had spoken to Ard and that she

would settle for $51,500. Meeks agreed and gave Powell a

GUEA check for $51,500 made out to Dorothy Ard. The

check was deposited into Harris’s law firm business
8 Nos. 08-1138 & 08-1161

account. Powell received $14,000 from Harris for the sale

of the building.

At trial, Ard testified that Harris told her in 2001 that

he had reconciled with his wife and asked Ard to sign a

deed transferring the property back to him. Based on

Harris’s representation, Ard signed the deed. Harris did

not tell Ard he was selling the property; the deed that Ard

signed was in fact the deed transferring the property to

the GUEA. Ard also did not know that the GUEA had

purchased the property for $51,500. Her signature on

both the check from the GUEA and the deeds filed in the

state auditor’s office were forged.

A jury convicted Harris and Powell under 18 U.S.C. §§ 2

and 1343 of wire fraud in relation to the sale of 6300 Miller

and under 18 U.S.C. § 371 for conspiring to commit theft

of government funds by reducing the property taxes on

6300 Miller. It also found Powell guilty under 26 U.S.C.

§ 7206(1) for willfully filing a false tax return due to his

failure to report the income he received from the sales

of 6300 Miller and 768 Broadway. Lastly, the jury convicted Harris under § 7206(1) for failing to report his

income from the sale of 768 Broadway as a capital gain.

For their sentences, Powell received 37 months’ imprisonment, while Harris received 55 months’ imprisonment.

Both Powell and Harris appeal.

II.

On appeal, both Powell and Harris present several

challenges to their convictions and sentences. We turn
Nos. 08-1138 & 08-1161 9

Harris states in his brief that he “adopts and incorporates by 3

reference, without repeating, the standard of review and the

argument on the wire fraud issue . . . as presented in the Appellant’s Brief of co-appellant Powell.” Because Harris

does not provide any further argument besides his incorporation of Powell’s arguments, we will discuss only Powell’s

contentions.

first to Powell’s challenge to the sufficiency of the government’s evidence supporting his wire fraud conviction.3

Our review of a challenge to the sufficiency of the

evidence is quite deferential. We examine the evidence

in the light most favorable to the government, United

States v. Useni, 516 F.3d 634, 646 (7th Cir. 2008), looking

only at whether evidence exists from which “any

rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” Hach,

162 F.3d at 942. That standard, by itself, presents “a

nearly insurmountable hurdle to the defendant.” Id.

(quoting United States v. Teague, 956 F.2d 1427, 1433 (7th

Cir. 1992)).

The wire fraud statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1343, prohibits the

use of the interstate wires in “any scheme or artifice to

defraud, or for obtaining money or property by means

of false or fraudulent pretenses, representations, or promises.” To convict a defendant of wire fraud, the government

must prove three elements: (1) the defendant participated

in a scheme to defraud; (2) the defendant intended to

defraud; and (3) a use of an interstate wire in furtherance

of the fraudulent scheme. United States v. Turner, 551

F.3d 657, 664 (7th Cir. 2008). Powell argues that the evi-
10 Nos. 08-1138 & 08-1161

dence was insufficient to support a jury finding that

he knowingly participated in a scheme to defraud involving the use of the interstate wires in furtherance of the

scheme.

We examine first Powell’s claim that there was no

scheme to defraud. “A scheme to defraud requires ‘the

making of a false statement or material misrepresentation,

or the concealment of [a] material fact.’ ” United States v.

Sloan, 492 F.3d 884, 890 (7th Cir. 2007) (quoting United

States v. Stephens, 421 F.3d 503, 507 (7th Cir. 2005)). Powell

asserts that there was no false statement or material

misrepresentation because Millender and the Historical

Society got the benefit of the bargain: Smith promised

Millender and the Historical Society $50,000 if “they” could

“borrow” the Historical Society’s 501(c)(3) status, and

Millender and the Historical Society received $50,000.

Thus, Powell contends, there was no fraud perpetrated

on the Historical Society.

Powell’s argument ignores the defendants’ failure to give

Millender the whole story on how the Historical Society

was to receive the $50,000. Neither Smith nor Harris nor

Powell disclosed to Millender that the Historical Society

needed to take title to 6300 Miller, and therefore assume

all the burdens of owning that property—including a

hefty property tax bill. Nor did they tell her that they

were able to sell the property for $200,000, or that they

were going to keep nearly three-quarters of the proceeds for themselves. These were significant omissions:

Millender testified that she would never have taken title

to 6300 Miller because the cash-strapped Historical
Nos. 08-1138 & 08-1161 11

Society could not even meet the expenses for the other

building it possessed.

Powell claims that Millender should have known that

the Historical Society owned 6300 Miller because she was

present at Harris’s office when the documents were

executed transferring 6300 Miller to the Historical Society.

But the jury reasonably could have concluded otherwise.

Millender testified that she completely trusted Harris,

who was her nephew-in-law and the Historical Society’s

attorney, and that she would sign whatever he put in

front of her without reading it. She also repeatedly denied

ever knowing that the Historical Society owned 6300

Miller. A jury was entitled to take Millender at her word.

“[I]t is not our role, when reviewing the sufficiency of the

evidence, to second-guess a jury’s credibility determinations.” United States v. Buchmeier, 255 F.3d 415, 420 (7th

Cir. 2001).

Moreover, even if Powell could show beyond dispute

that Millender knew the Historical Society owned 6300

Miller, he does not contest that neither he nor Smith

nor Powell disclosed to Millender the sale of the property

to the GUEA for $200,000. Nor does he contest that they

failed to tell Millender that they would pocket threequarters of the proceeds from that sale. Those omissions

are material; absent them, the impoverished Historical

Society stood to gain an additional $150,000 in badly

needed funds. Significantly, Smith, Powell, and Harris

did not merely fail to tell Millender about the sale and

their profiting from it. They actively concealed the sale

from her, going so far as to forge her signature on both
12 Nos. 08-1138 & 08-1161

the $200,000 check from the GUEA and the deed transferring 6300 Miller to the GUEA so that she would never

know about the transaction. As we have said before, a

failure to disclose information may constitute fraud if

the “omission [is] accompanied by acts of concealment.”

United States v. Stephens, 421 F.3d 503, 507 (7th Cir. 2005).

A reasonable jury certainly could have concluded that is

what occurred here. The government thus presented

sufficient evidence of a scheme to defraud the Historical

Society.

But, Powell asserts, even granting that there was a

scheme to defraud, he did not knowingly participate in it.

That argument was not raised in either of Powell’s Rule 29

motions in the district court, which challenged only the

sufficiency of the evidence supporting the scheme to

defraud. Powell has therefore forfeited it, and we review

only for plain error. United States v. Groves, 470 F.3d 311,

324 (7th Cir. 2006). Under the plain error standard,

Powell must show “that a ‘manifest miscarriage of justice

will occur if his conviction is not reversed.’ ” United

States v. Hensley, ___ F.3d ___, 2009 WL 2178650, at *5 (7th

Cir. July 23, 2009) (quoting United States v. Irby, 558 F.3d

651, 653 (7th Cir. 2009)). “Put another way, reversal is

warranted only if the record is devoid of evidence

pointing to guilt, or if the evidence on a key element was

so tenuous that a conviction would be shocking.” Id.

There is no such lack of evidence in this case. Powell

characterizes his role in the sale of 6300 Miller as merely

that of a real estate agent receiving a commission for

bringing “together a willing seller with a willing buyer.”
Nos. 08-1138 & 08-1161 13

Recall that the property recently had been appraised for 4

$397,000 and that Powell had initially told Meeks that his

“client” was looking for $450,000.

Both in his reply brief and at oral argument, Powell’s attor- 5

ney expressly admitted that, if the jury chose to believe Lake

County Treaurer Peggy Katona’s testimony that Powell

had not gotten her required authorization for the property tax

reduction, the evidence was sufficient for a jury to find

against him on count two of the indictment, the § 371 count,

which charged a conspiracy based on the fraudulent reduction of the property taxes owed on 6300 Miller. 

Such a characterization, however, does not square with

the evidence of Powell’s willingness to drop more than

50% off the asking price (and appraised value) of

6300 Miller on the day of the sale, since it is highly un- 4

likely that a legitimate real estate agent would settle so

quickly on such a reduction. Nor does it mesh with

Powell’s role in the fraudulent lawsuit filed on behalf of

Lake County to reduce the property taxes owed on 6300

Miller, which he does not challenge in this court. That 5

lawsuit was a fraud on the court. Powell obtained the

property tax reduction by falsely representing to the

judge through his attorney that 6300 Miller needed to be

demolished and by failing to tell the judge that the property was being sold the same day for $200,000—an amount

easily sufficient to satisfy the back property taxes. A real

estate agent receiving a legitimate commission does not, on

the same day as the sale, orchestrate a dishonest lawsuit

that results in an unauthorized reduction of property taxes

to the tune of $58,000. A jury was therefore entitled to

reject Powell’s real-estate-agent gloss to his involvement
14 Nos. 08-1138 & 08-1161

in the sale of 6300 Miller. See United States v. Humphreys,

468 F.3d 1051, 1054 (7th Cir. 2006) (“[A]lternative explanations alone, even if plausible, do not ordinarily

overcome the defendant’s burden in challenging the

sufficiency of the evidence.” (quoting United States v.

Romero, 57 F.3d 565, 570 (7th Cir. 1995))).

Powell disputes that the property tax reduction had

any relationship to the scheme to defraud, but that argument is a non-starter. A reasonable jury could have concluded that any tax savings advanced the scheme by

going straight to the defendants’ bottom line. While the

purchase agreement called for the GUEA to pay the

outstanding property taxes, no amount was listed. Meeks

testified that the defendants had given her the impression

that property taxes would not be an issue because they

had told her the Historical Society was in the process of

obtaining the property from the county. Meeks’s testimony

is backed by the fact that Harris, and not the GUEA, paid

the remaining $15,000 due after the fraudulent lawsuit

reduced the property taxes. Because the property tax

reduction allowed the schemers to keep more of their illgotten gains, it was part and parcel of the overall

scheme to defraud.

Powell, however, compares his lot to that of the defendant in United States v. Rahseparian, 231 F.3d 1257 (10th Cir.

2000). Like Powell, the defendant in Rahseparian was

also convicted on circumstantial evidence. But that is

where the similarity ends. In Rahseparian, the defendant’s

participation in the illegal scheme was limited to acts that,

by themselves, were innocent: doing the banking for his

sons, who ran the fraudulent telemarketing scheme at
Nos. 08-1138 & 08-1161 15

issue there, and purchasing “lead sheets” for them, a

common and perfectly legal way for telemarketing businesses to identify potential customers. The Tenth Circuit

held that those activities, in and of themselves, did not

support an inference that the defendant knew that his

sons’ business was defrauding its customers. 231 F.3d

at 1263.

In contrast, the lawsuit filed by Powell’s company, US

Research, which caused a substantial reduction of the

property taxes owed, was inherently fraudulent. It represented that 6300 Miller needed to be demolished when

in fact it was being sold that day for a substantially discounted $200,000. As we have discussed above, the

lawsuit furthered the overall scheme by leaving more

money for the defendants to divide amongst themselves.

Considering that the evidence showed that Powell

himself received $25,000 from the sale of 6300 Miller, the

jury could reasonably infer that Powell had knowledge

of, and intended to further, the scheme to defraud the

Historical Society.

Powell also challenges the use-of-the-wires element of

his wire fraud conviction. He claims that there was insufficient proof that the wires were used in furtherance of

the fraudulent scheme. Again, Powell’s failure to raise

this argument in his Rule 29 motions means that we

review only for plain error. Groves, 470 F.3d at 324.

Our recent decision in United States v. Turner, 551 F.3d

657 (7th Cir. 2008), spells out the current state of the law

on the use-of-the-wires element:

The mail- and wire-fraud statutes are not intended to

reach all frauds but only those in which a mailing or
16 Nos. 08-1138 & 08-1161

use of an interstate wire is part of the scheme. Schmuck

v. United States, 489 U.S. 705, 710, 109 S. Ct. 1443, 103 L.

Ed. 2d 734 (1989). The use of the mail or wire need not

be an indispensable part of the fraud to satisfy the “in

furtherance of” element of the offense; it need only “be

incident to an essential part of the scheme . . . or a step

in [the] plot.” Id. at 710-11 (alteration in original)

(internal quotation marks & citation omitted). “In

other words, the success of the scheme must in some

measure depend on the mailing [or wire transmission].” United States v. Seward, 272 F.3d 831, 836 (7th

Cir. 2001). The defendant himself need not

personally cause the mailing or use of the wire; it is

enough that the use of mail or wire “will follow in the

ordinary course of business, or where such use can

reasonably be foreseen, even though not actually

intended.” Pereira v. United States, 347 U.S. 1, 8-9, 74 S.

Ct. 358, 98 L. Ed. 435 (1954) (“Where one does an act

with knowledge that the use of the mails will follow in

the ordinary course of business, or where such use can

reasonably be foreseen, even though not actually

intended, then he ‘causes’ the mails to be used.”);

United States v. Hickok, 77 F.3d 992, 1004 (7th Cir. 1996).

The mailing or use of the wires need not itself contain

false or fraudulent material; a “routine or innocent”

mailing or use of the wire can supply this element of

the offense, as long as the use of the mail or wire is part

of the execution of the scheme. Schmuck, 489 U.S. at

714-15, 109 S. Ct. 1443; United States v. Brocksmith, 991

F.2d 1363, 1368 (7th Cir. 1993).

Turner, 551 F.3d at 666 (internal footnote omitted).
Nos. 08-1138 & 08-1161 17

To satisfy the use-of-the-wires element in this case, the

government relied on the transfer of the $200,000 sale

proceeds of 6300 Miller from the GUEA’s bank through

an interstate wire to Harris’s trust account. As the object

of the scheme to defraud the Historical Society was the

money, the actual receipt of the funds into Harris’s trust

account was an essential part of the scheme. See Turner,

551 F.3d at 668. Powell argues, however, that the $200,000

wire transfer is insufficient to support his conviction

because the fraud was already completed when the

money was received by the bank. Harris’s law firm trust

account was credited with $200,000 on October 3, 2001,

while the interstate wire transfer did not occur until

October 5. To support that argument, Powell relies primarily on United States v. Kann, 323 U.S. 88 (1944). Kann held

that the use of interstate means to collect a check does not

violate § 1341 because the scheme was complete as soon

as the depository bank paid the check:

The banks which cashed or credited the checks, being

holders in due course, were entitled to collect from the

drawee bank in each case and the drawer had no

defense to payment. The scheme in each case had

reached fruition. The persons intended to receive the

money had received it irrevocably. It was immaterial to

them, or to any consummation of the scheme, how the

bank which paid or credited the check would collect

from the drawee bank. It cannot be said that the

mailings in question were for the purpose of

executing the scheme, as the statute requires.

323 U.S. at 94; see also United States v. Maze, 414 U.S.

395 (1974).
18 Nos. 08-1138 & 08-1161

We previously considered Kann in United States v. Franks,

309 F.3d 977 (7th Cir. 2002), a case involving a medical

clinic worker who stole checks from her clinic and deposited them in her personal bank account. There we held

that the bank’s use of interstate couriers to forward

the checks for collection was sufficient for purposes of

§ 1341. We distinguished Kann thusly:

Kann predates the Uniform Commercial Code, which

makes it easy for a customer’s bank to reverse the

credit if the instrument cannot be collected. Franks

deposited the checks into her personal account. Even

if she drew off the embezzled funds promptly, her

own funds remained and could have been debited to

cover the loss, had the checks not been sent out of

state and paid in due course. This made interstate

transportation essential to the scheme’s success.

Franks, 309 F.3d at 978. That same distinction also

applies here. While Harris’s trust account may have been

credited with the $200,000 immediately, the bank easily

could have withdrawn such provisional credit until

it received the $200,000 wire transfer. See Ind. Code §§ 26-1-

4-201(a), 26-1-4-214(a). Had the bank done so, the defendants would have failed to fully execute their scheme

to enrich themselves at the Historical Society’s expense.

(Powell certainly would not have benefitted because he

did not cash his check until well after the transfer.) Thus,

while the defendants in Kann may have received the

funds “irrevocably,” 323 U.S. at 94, Harris and his coschemers did not until after the wire transfer of the funds.

A jury could therefore have reasonably concluded that
Nos. 08-1138 & 08-1161 19

a use of the wires was in furtherance of the scheme and

find the use-of-the-wires element satisfied on that basis.

We next turn to the defendants’ challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence supporting their tax convictions.

Powell contests his conviction for failing to accurately

report his total income on his 2001 tax return in violation of 26 U.S.C. § 7206(1). He claims that there was not

enough evidence of willfulness to convict him. Because

Powell did not raise any challenge to that conviction in

either of his Rule 29 motions, our review of this issue is for

plain error only. Groves, 470 F.3d at 324. Recall that,

under that standard, the record need only contain some

evidence pointing to guilt; as long as the record is not

completely devoid of such evidence, we will affirm.

Irby, 558 F.3d at 653.

We conclude that the record contains sufficient evidence

of Powell’s guilt on the § 7206(1) count to clear that low

hurdle. For conviction, § 7206(1) requires that a defendant

“[w]illfully make[ ] and subscribe[ ] any return, statement,

or other document, which contains or is verified by a

written declaration that it is made under the penalties

of perjury, and which he does not believe to be true and

correct as to every material matter.” See also United States

v. Pree, 408 F.3d 855, 865-66 (7th Cir. 2005). In other words,

a conviction “under section 7206(1) requires proof that:

(1) a person made or subscribed to a federal tax return

which he verified as true; (2) the return was false as to a

material matter; (3) the defendant signed the return

willfully and knowing it was false; and (4) the return

contained a written declaration that it was made under
20 Nos. 08-1138 & 08-1161

the penalty of perjury.” United States v. Presbitero, 569 F.3d

691, 700 (7th Cir. 2009).

Here, it is undisputed that Powell’s 2001 return, which

he signed under penalty of perjury, did not report either

the $25,000 Powell received from the sale of 6300 Miller or

the $14,000 he received from the sale of 768 Broadway.

While the return was prepared by his accountant, the

accountant testified that she relied upon her clients for the

information she placed in the returns. Failure to supply

an accountant with accurate information is evidence of

willfulness. See Useni, 516 F.3d at 650. Moreover, the jury,

when considering Powell’s income omission, had before

it the evidence of the defendants’ fraudulent scheme to

profit off of the sale of 6300 Miller. Because the $25,000

was obtained through fraud, Powell had a strong

incentive to refrain from reporting the income. See United

States v. Ytem, 255 F.3d 394, 397 (7th Cir. 2001) (“[T]he fact

that illegal income is taxable is widely known, even

among lay people.”).

In arguing against the government’s evidence of willfulness, Powell highlights the fact that he filed an amended

return in 2004, after a civil audit, that included the

$39,000, the aggregate amount he received from the

fraud. However, for what it was worth, Powell was able to

put that evidence in front of the jury. And the probative

value of it was minimal because it only raised the

question of why the information was not included in the

first place. United States v. Ross, 626 F.2d 77, 81 (9th Cir.

1980). The critical time-frame for determining willfulness

is when Powell signed the return, not two years after-
Nos. 08-1138 & 08-1161 21

wards. See United States v. McClain, 934 F.2d 822, 835 (7th

Cir. 1991); see also United States v. Radtke, 415 F.3d 826, 840-

41 (8th Cir. 2005).

Powell also makes much of the fact that his accountant

lost the information that he had provided her about his

2001 income, and that as a result she could not verify for

certain that he had failed to provide her the information

about the $39,000 he received from Harris for the sale of

6300 Miller and 768 Broadway. Yet that fact was also

presented to the jury, and the jury still convicted Powell.

In light of the evidence of willfulness we have discussed,

the jury’s guilty verdict on the § 7206(1) count cannot

be seriously challenged; it certainly was not “shocking.”

Irby, 558 F.3d at 653. We therefore will not disturb

Powell’s conviction for failing to accurately report his

total income on his 2001 tax return.

Harris also challenges his conviction under § 7206(1).

Like Powell, Harris failed to raise this issue in his Rule 29

motion in the district court, so our review again is for

plain error only. Groves, 470 F.3d at 324. Harris was convicted for willfully failing to report on his 2001 return,

as a capital gain, the $34,900 in profit he made from the

sale of 768 Broadway. Harris claims that his conviction

should be reversed because he reported that income—just

not as a capital gain. At trial, Harris introduced through

his wife—who did the accounting work for his law

firm—accounting schedules. Those schedules, supposedly

used to prepare Harris’s 2001 taxes, contained entries for

each deposit into the law firm’s bank account. One of

the entries was the $51,500 check from the GUEA for the
22 Nos. 08-1138 & 08-1161

sale of 768 Broadway. Because the total income from the

deposits listed on the schedules matched the amount

Harris reported for total income on Schedule C, Harris

claims that he reported the income from the sale of 768

Broadway on Schedule C.

The government, however, presented evidence casting

doubt on that claim. The accounting schedules upon

which Harris relied were time-stamped March 31, 2007,

one week after the superseding indictment that added the

tax count against Harris was handed down. Harris did not

provide them to the government until shortly before

trial—which was almost a year after the grand jury had

subpoenaed them. Moreover, at the time they were subpoenaed, Harris, citing an unspecified “computer crash,”

told the grand jury that he did not have any papers supporting his 2001 tax return. Such timing of the schedules’

disclosure, coupled with the fact that they were under the

control of Harris’s wife—who had a strong motive to

doctor the records—cast doubt on their reliability. See

United States v. Spano, 421 F.3d 599, 604 (7th Cir. 2005).

Moreover, the schedules were inaccurate. Despite the

testimony of Harris’s wife that the entries on the schedules

would match the actual deposits made into the law firm

bank account, they did not. In fact, they were off by more

than $200,000. That substantial discrepancy between the

record of actual deposits and the accounting schedules

reinforces the inference that they were altered. Since

those schedules were the only evidence Harris offered to

show that he reported the income from the sale, the jury

reasonably could have chosen to disbelieve Harris’s
Nos. 08-1138 & 08-1161 23

Harris’s brief states that it “adopts and incorporates by 6

reference, without repeating, the standard of review and the

argument on the coerced jury issue” as well as “on the conspiracy to commit theft form [sic] the Historical Society and from

Lake County issue, as presented in the Appellant’s Brief of coappellant Powell.” Powell, however, did not appeal those

issues. Harris has therefore incorporated two non-existent

arguments. Because Harris does not present any argument or

cite any legal authority in his own brief on those issues, he

has waived appellate review of them. Useni, 516 F.3d at 658 (“It

is not the obligation of this court to research and construct

the legal arguments open to parties, especially when they are

represented by counsel.”).

claim that he reported the income from the sale. At the

very least, Harris has failed to establish plain error.

We turn now to the sentencing issues raised by the

defendants. Both Harris and Powell question the amount 6

of loss used to compute their sentences. After grouping

their convictions on count one (the wire fraud offense) and

count two (conspiring to commit theft of Lake County’s

funds by reducing the property taxes on 6300 Miller), the

court enhanced both Harris’s and Powell’s sentences

twelve levels based on a loss of $208,000. See U.S.S.G.

§ 2B1.1(b)(1)(G). The district court reached that loss

amount by adding $150,000 (the loss to the Historical

Society, or alternatively the gain to the defendants, from

the diverted proceeds of the sale of 6300 Miller) to $58,000,

the money the defendants stole from Lake County by

illegally reducing the property taxes owed on 6300 Miller

from $73,000 to $15,000.
24 Nos. 08-1138 & 08-1161

“We review a district court’s loss calculations, which

need only be ‘a reasonable estimate of the loss,’ U.S.S.G.

§ 2B1.1 cmt. 3(C), for clear error.” United States v. Watts,

535 F.3d 650, 658 (7th Cir. 2008). We see no clear error

here. The GUEA paid $200,000 for 6300 Miller, so the “fair

market value of the property unlawfully taken” was at

least that amount. U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1 application note 3(C)(i)

(2007); see also United States v. Radziszewski, 474 F.3d 480,

487 (7th Cir. 2007); United States v. Hardy, 289 F.3d 608, 613

(9th Cir. 2002). That amount is offset by the $50,000 the

Historical Society received, see U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1 application

note 3(E)(i) (2007), leaving $150,000 as the loss to the

Historical Society from the sale or, alternatively, the

amount the defendants unlawfully gained. Similarly,

Lake County received $15,000 in property taxes when,

absent the defendants’ duplicitous lawsuit, it was entitled

to $73,000, a difference of $58,000. Adding those two

amounts, as the district court did, yields $208,000, thereby

justifying the application of U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1(b)(1)(G).

We reject the defendants’ arguments for a lesser loss.

Powell and Harris argue that, by including both the loss

to the Historical Society and the loss to Lake County, the

district court impermissibly double-counted. But that

argument ignores the fact that two separate entities

suffered distinct losses, as embodied by the two counts

of conviction. In count one, the Historical Society lost

(or the defendants improperly gained) $150,000 because,

as the owner of the property (at least on paper), it was

entitled to the full proceeds from the sale. And in count

two, the county lost $58,000 in property tax revenue

that could have been paid from the proceeds of the sale.
Nos. 08-1138 & 08-1161 25

Those are different losses, and the district court was

right to include both of them.

In a variation on their first argument, the defendants

also argue that the district court should have reduced

the amount of property taxes payable from its calculation of the loss to the Historical Society, or the gain to the

defendants, from the sale of 6300 Miller. According to

Powell and Harris, had the Historical Society received the

full $200,000, it would have had to pay the $73,000 in

property taxes; thus, they claim that the $73,000 in property taxes ought to have been deducted from the loss.

Alternatively, because Harris paid $15,000 in property

taxes, they claim that amount should have been deducted

from the $150,000 the district court calculated as the

defendants’ gain.

Neither Harris nor Powell cite any authority to support reducing either the loss or gain that way, and the

commentary to the Guidelines do not provide for that type

of reduction. See U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1 application note 3(D)-(E)

(2007). Moreover, Harris’s $15,000 payment of the

property taxes was to further the fraudulent scheme.

We have held that such expenses in furtherance of the

unlawful activity need not be excluded from the gain. See

United States v. Marvin, 28 F.3d 663, 664-65 (7th Cir. 1994).

Furthermore, the loss to the Historical Society is undiminished by the property taxes because the purchase agreement between the GUEA and the Historical Society

expressly obligated the GUEA, not the Historical Society,

to pay any outstanding property taxes. The defendants’

arguments concerning the reduction of the loss amount

therefore have no merit.
26 Nos. 08-1138 & 08-1161

Harris raises two other objections to his sentence.

First, he challenges his two-level enhancement under

U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1 for obstruction of justice. We review a

district court’s factual findings supporting a § 3C1.1

enhancement for clear error. United States v. Strode, 552

F.3d 630, 635 (7th Cir. 2009). The district court’s factual

findings will stand as long as they are “plausible in light

of the record in its entirety.” United States v. White, 368

F.3d 911, 916 (7th Cir. 2004).

Harris’s obstruction enhancement was based on his

failure to comply with a grand jury subpoena requesting

copies of tax returns and accounting schedules used to

prepare the returns. In September 2006, FBI agents served

Harris’s law firm with the subpoena. In a signed statement, Harris responded to the subpoena by claiming

that the law firm did not have the accounting schedules

due to a “computer crash.” However, on March 31, 2007,

one week after the grand jury returned a superceding

indictment adding a tax count against Harris, Harris’s

wife, who was the law firm’s accountant, printed out the

accounting schedules. At trial, she testified that Harris

never gave her the subpoena and that she did not

know that the grand jury had subpoenaed the law firm’s

accounting schedules until after the indictment.

According to the commentary to the obstruction enhancement, “concealing . . . evidence that is material to an

official investigation” is obstruction. U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1

application note 4(d) (2007). The district court concluded

that Harris’s behavior was just that. We agree. At the very

least, it was obstructive for Harris to fail to tell the one
Nos. 08-1138 & 08-1161 27

person in his law firm who had control over the subpoenaed documents—his wife—about what documents the

subpoena requested, since those documents were

material to the investigation. Moreover, the computers’

fortuitous recovery in time for Harris to use the accounting schedules in his own defense strongly suggests

that Harris’s “computer crash” excuse was unworthy of

belief. The district court did not commit clear error in

applying the obstruction enhancement.

Harris’s second objection to his sentence is what he

views as an unwarranted disparity between his sentence

(55 months) and Powell’s (37 months). Harris claims their

conduct was similar and therefore warranted similar

sentences. We reject that argument, first, because it is

wrong on the law, United States v. Omole, 523 F.3d 691,

700 (7th Cir. 2008) (“This court refuses to view the discrepancy between sentences of codefendants as a basis

for challenging a sentence.”), and, second, because it is

wrong on the facts. In many ways, Harris’s conduct was

more culpable than Powell’s. The most important difference between the two is that Harris was the one who

abused his position as the Historical Society’s lawyer to

pull off the sale of 6300 Miller. Indeed, it was Harris’s

own law firm and its trust account that was the locus of

the fraud. Moreover, as we have discussed above, Harris

obstructed justice by failing to turn over documents the

grand jury had ordered him to produce. Given those

significant differences, we see no error in the district

court’s decision to mete out a stiffer sentence to Harris

than to Powell.
28 Nos. 08-1138 & 08-1161

We turn now to Powell’s final challenge to his sentence.

He claims that the district court improperly disregarded

his arguments at sentencing for leniency based on his

advanced age and health problems. Regarding those

arguments, the district court stated the following when

it pronounced sentence:

I specifically have taken into consideration everything that Mr. Milner has brought to my attention.

The defendant’s age, his lack of criminal history, his

health problems. Those are certainly factors that

weigh greatly on me and bear on the history and

characteristics of the Defendant, but they are, of course,

also taken into account by the guidelines themselves.

It is not clear what the district court meant by that last

phrase that we have emphasized; it appears to be a misstatement of the law. Although the Guidelines do

account for a defendant’s criminal history, see U.S.S.G.

§§ 4A1.1, 4A1.2, they do not factor in a defendant’s age

and health. Instead, the Guidelines list advanced age

and serious health conditions as grounds for departure,

though in limited circumstances: the commentary to the

Guidelines states that, although age and health are “not

ordinarily relevant in determining whether a departure

may be warranted,” they may be a “reason to depart

downward” when a defendant is either “elderly” or

“seriously infirm.” U.S.S.G. §§ 5H1.1, 5H1.4. Of course,

post-Booker, those departures are “obsolete.” United States

v. Johnson, 427 F.3d 423, 426 (7th Cir. 2005). While the

district court can still use them for guidance, United States

v. Filipiak, 466 F.3d 582, 584 (7th Cir. 2006), it has the
Nos. 08-1138 & 08-1161 29

The district court did state later on during its pronounce- 7

ment of the sentence that, “[o]n the other issues of the defendant’s age, and his lack of criminal history, I just don’t think

that those are enough to persuade me that a nonguideline

sentence is appropriate in this case.” However, that ambiguous

statement, while coming closer to a correct understanding of

the court’s § 3553(a) authority, does not mitigate the court’s

previous statements, which appeared to rely on an invalid

ground to reject Powell’s arguments. A remand is therefore

necessary. Cf. United States v. Smith, 562 F.3d 866, 874-76 (7th Cir.

2009) (finding no remand necessary where it was clear

from context that the district judge did not rely on his

previous misstatement of the law when pronouncing sentence).

authority to consider Powell’s physical impairments and

advanced age when determining the sentence it believes

appropriate under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). United States v.

Millet, 510 F.3d 668, 680 (7th Cir. 2007).

Because the district court appeared to misapprehend its

authority under § 3553(a), a remand is appropriate to give

the district court an opportunity to clarify its ruling. On 7

remand, the district court should consider Powell’s arguments about his advanced age and infirm health in light

of the factors outlined in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).

III.

The government presented sufficient evidence that

Powell and Harris knowingly participated in a scheme

to defraud the Historical Society that involved the use

of the interstate wires, and both Powell’s and Harris’s
30 Nos. 08-1138 & 08-1161

convictions under 26 U.S.C. § 7206(1) survive review for

plain error. Furthermore, the district court properly

calculated the loss amount used to determine both

Harris’s and Powell’s sentences by adding the $150,000

proceeds the defendants purloined from the sale of 6300

Miller to the $58,000 Lake County lost in property taxes

as a result of the fraudulent lawsuit. The district court

also correctly enhanced Harris’s sentence based on his

failure to comply with the grand jury subpoena requiring

him to hand over accounting schedules material to the

government’s investigation of his 2001 tax returns. And

the disparity between Harris’s sentence and Powell’s

was warranted. We therefore AFFIRM the defendants’

convictions and Harris’s sentence. However, because the

district court appeared to improperly reject Powell’s

arguments for leniency based on his advanced age and

poor health, we VACATE and REMAND Powell’s sentence

for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

8-7-09