IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE

AT NASHVILLE

Assigned on Briefs May 19, 2010

STEVEN DOUSAY v. DWIGHT A. BARBEE, WARDEN

Direct Appeal from the Circuit Court for Williamson County

No. 09451 Timothy L. Easter, Judge

No. M2009-01841-CCA-R3-HC - Filed July 27, 2010

The Petitioner, Steven Dousay, pled guilty in Williamson County to theft over $10,000, and

the trial court sentenced him to six years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. He

filed a petition in the Williamson County Circuit Court for a writ of habeas corpus, which

the habeas corpus court dismissed. The Petitioner appeals , and,after a review of the record

in this case, we conclude the habeas court properly dismissed the petition for habeas corpus

relief. Accordingly, we affirm its judgment.

Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Circuit Court Affirmed

ROBERT W. WEDEMEYER,J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which DAVID H. WELLES

and JERRY L. SMITH, JJ., joined.

Steven Dousay, Pro se, Nashville, Tennessee.

Robert E. Cooper, Jr., Attorney General and Reporter; Michael E. Moore, Solicitor General;

and Lacy Wilber, Assistant Attorney General, Kim R. Helper, District Attorney General, and

Mary Katherine White, Assistant District Attorney General, for the Appellee, State of

Tennessee.

OPINION

I. Facts & Procedural History

When the Petitioner pled guilty to the crime underlying this appeal, he was already

serving a sentence from a 2003 Davidson County conviction. In his petition for a writ of

habeas corpus, which the Petitioner filed in Williamson County, he claimed that he pled

guilty in this case with the understanding that he would serve his six-year sentence in the

CCA Metropolitan Detention Center (“CCA”) rather than the Tennessee Department of
Correction, because, in CCA, he could earn sentence reduction credits. The trial court

ordered him to serve his sentence in the Tennessee Department of Correction. The Petitioner

claimed that, because he pled guilty with the understanding that he would be sent to CCA,

his plea was not knowing and voluntary and that, therefore, his sentence is void.

The Petitioner’s petition was filed in Williamson County. The State, however, moved

to dismiss his petition for failure to file with “the court or judge most convenient in point of

distance to the applicant” as required by Tennessee Code Annotated section 29-21-105

because the Petitioner is currently serving his sentence in Davidson County, not Williamson

County. The Petitioner filed a response to the State’s motion, explaining that he filed in

Williamson County rather than Davidson County where he is currently incarcerated, because

“the records are available and easier to access in the trial court and [it] is more cost effective

to the tax payers to hear the case [in Williamson County] rather than filing in another county

and having the burden of transferring them to another county court.” The habeas court

dismissed the petition, agreeing with the State that Williamson County was not the proper

venue for the Petitioner’s petition.

II. Analysis

On appeal, the Petitioner contends that the habeas court improperly dismissed his

petition, because, given “the extensive amount of records that were involved,” he properly

filed his petition in the Williamson County Circuit Court. He also argues that the habeas

court erred when it failed to transfer his petition to the Davidson County Criminal Court. As

to the substance of his petition, the Petitioner argues his sentence is void because it is the

result of a plea that was not knowing and voluntary. He also argues that the entry of his

unknowing and involuntary plea violated his right to due process.

Article I, section 15 of the Tennessee Constitution guarantees the right to seek habeas

corpus relief. See Faulkner v. State, 226 S.W.3d 358, 361 (Tenn. 2007). Although the right

is guaranteed in the Tennessee Constitution, the right is governed by statute. T.C.A. §

29-21-101 (2006) et seq. The determination of whether habeas corpus relief should be

granted is a question of law and is accordingly given de novo review. Smith v. Lewis, 202

S.W.3d 124, 127 (Tenn. 2006); Hart v. State, 21 S.W.3d 901, 903 (Tenn. 2000). Although

there is no statutory limit preventing a habeas corpus petition, the grounds upon which relief

can be granted are very narrow. Taylor v. State, 995 S.W.2d 78, 83 (Tenn. 1999). It is the

burden of the petitioner to demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence that “the sentence

is void or that the confinement is illegal.” Wyatt v. State, 24 S.W.3d 319, 322 (Tenn. 2000).

In other words, the very narrow grounds upon which a habeas corpus petition can be based

are as follows: (1) a claim there was a void judgment which was facially invalid because the

convicting court was without jurisdiction or authority to sentence the defendant; or (2) a

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claim the defendant's sentence has expired. Stephenson v. Carlton, 28 S.W.3d 910, 911

(Tenn. 2000); Archer v. State, 851 S.W.2d 157, 164 (Tenn. 1993). “An illegal sentence, one

whose imposition directly contravenes a statute, is considered void and may be set aside at

any time.” May v. Carlton, 245 S.W.3d 340, 344 (Tenn. 2008) (citing State v. Burkhart, 566

S.W.2d 871, 873 (Tenn. 1978)). In contrast, a voidable judgment is “one that is facially valid

and requires the introduction of proof beyond the face of the record or judgment to establish

its invalidity.” Taylor, 995 S.W.2d at 83; see State v. Ritchie, 20 S.W.3d 624, 633 (Tenn.

2000).

Further, a petition for the writ of habeas corpus must comply with several strict

procedural requirements. One such procedural requirement is that “[t]he application should

be made to the court or judge most convenient in point of distance to the applicant, unless

a sufficient reason be given in the petition for not applying to such court or judge.” T.C.A.

§ 29-21-105 (2006). Filing with the nearest court or judge generally means the county where

the petitioner is being held, unless a sufficient reason is given for not doing so. Carter v.

Bell, 279 S.W.3d 560, 562-63 (Tenn. 2009) (citing State ex rel. Leach v. Avery, 215 Tenn.

425, 387 S.W.2d 346, 347 (1964)); also see Paul Barnett v. State, No.

E1999-01583-CCA-R3-CD, 2000 WL 782048, at *4 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Knoxville, June

20, 2000) (“[W]hether the location of the witnesses and relevant documents in a different

county justifies filing a habeas corpus petition in that county should be a case-by-case

determination.”), no Tenn. R.App. P. 11 application filed. A habeas court may dismiss a

petition for habeas corpus relief that fails to comply with this procedural requirement.

Hickman v. State, 153 S.W.3d 16, 21 (Tenn. 2004); James M. Grant v. State, No.

M2006-01368-CCA-R3-HC, 2006 WL 2805208, at *3 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Nashville, Oct.

2 2006), no Tenn. R. App. P. 11 application filed.

In the case under submission, the Petitioner, who is incarcerated in Davidson County,

filed his petition in Williamson County, which is not the court “most convenient in point of

distance to the [Petitioner].” T.C.A. § 29-21-105. The Williamson County Circuit Court’s

entry of the Petitioner’s judgment and sentence does not alone enable the Petitioner to file

his petition in Williamson County rather than Davidson County. See T.C.A. § 29-21-105;

Carter v. Bell, 279 S.W.3d at 563. To allow a petitioner in each case to file his or her

petition for habeas corpus relief in the county of conviction would undermine the

jurisdictional and procedural requirements of Tennessee Code Annotated section 29-21-105.

The Petitioner’s claims are based solely upon interpretation of the law and do not require

documents, other than the Petitioner’s judgment, more accessible to the sentencing court.

We conclude that the Williamson County Circuit Court is not the proper venue for the

Petitioner’s petition and that it, therefore, properly dismissed his petition. As such, he is not

entitled to relief.

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Even assuming the Petitioner filed in an appropriate venue, the habeas corpus court

properly dismissed his petition on its merits. The Petitioner’s claim for habeas corpus relief

is based upon his claim that his guilty plea was not knowing and voluntary. The dismissal

of the petition by the habeas corpus court was proper because allegations relating to the

voluntariness of a guilty plea would not render the judgment of conviction void, but merely

voidable, and voidable convictions are not cognizable in a habeas corpus proceeding. See

Passarella v. State, 891 S.W.2d 619, 627 (Tenn. Crim. App.1994); Luttrell v. State, 644

S.W.2d 408, 409 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1982). Furthermore, if the petition were treated as one

for post-conviction relief, relief would be barred because the petition was filed well beyond

the one-year statute of limitations period afforded a post-conviction petitioner. T.C.A. §

40-30-102(a) (2009). Thus, we conclude that the habeas court properly dismissed the

Petitioner’s petition for a writ of habeas corpus.

III. Conclusion

In accordance with the aforementioned reasoning and authorities, we conclude that

the Petitioner filed his petition for habeas corpus relief in an improper venue and further that

his petition lacks merit. As such, we affirm the judgment of the habeas court.

___________________________________

ROBERT W. WEDEMEYER, JUDGE

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