Illinois Official Reports 

Appellate Court

U.S. Bank, N.A. v. Quadrangle House Condominium Ass’n,

2018 IL App (1st) 171711

Appellate Court 

Caption

U.S. BANK, N.A., as Legal Title Trustee for Truman 2012 SC2 Title 

Trust, Plaintiff and Counterdefendant-Appellee, v. QUADRANGLE 

HOUSE CONDOMINIUM ASSOCIATION, Defendant and 

Counterplaintiff-Appellant.

District & No. First District, Second Division

Docket No. 1-17-1711

Filed June 26, 2018

Decision Under 

Review

Appeal from the Circuit Court of Cook County, No. 16-CH-04811; the 

Hon. Celia Gamrath, Judge, presiding.

Judgment Affirmed.

Counsel on

Appeal

Jeffrey S. Youngerman, Terry A. Fox, and Timothy P. Mahoney, of 

Flaherty & Youngerman, P.C., of Chicago, for appellant.

Plunkett Cooney, P.C., of Chicago (Timothy P. Collins, of counsel), 

for appellee.

Panel JUSTICE PUCINSKI delivered the judgment of the court, with 

opinion

Presiding Justice Mason and Justice Hyman concurred in the 

judgment and opinion. 
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 OPINION 

¶ 1 Defendant Quadrangle House Condominium Association (Association) appeals from an 

order of the circuit court of Cook County granting plaintiff U.S. Bank’s motion for summary 

judgment on its complaint for a declaratory judgment and denying the Association’s

cross-motion for summary judgment on its counterclaim for unpaid assessments. The sole 

question of law presented for consideration is whether U.S. Bank’s payment of postforeclosure 

sale assessments, several months after purchasing a condominium unit at a judicial foreclosure 

sale, extinguished the Association’s lien for preforeclosure sale assessments, pursuant to 

section 9(g)(3) of the Condominium Property Act (Act) (765 ILCS 605/9(g)(3) (West 2016)), 

and as interpreted by 1010 Lake Shore Ass’n v. Deutsche Bank National Trust Co., 2015 IL 

118372. We affirm the judgment of the circuit court for the reasons that follow. 

¶ 2 BACKGROUND 

¶ 3 The subject property, unit 5B, is located at 6700 South Shore Drive, in Chicago, Illinois, 

and was previously owned by Betty Colvin. In 2011, U.S. Bank’s predecessor in interest, 

Wells Fargo Bank, commenced an action to foreclose a mortgage lien interest encumbering 

unit 5B. The matter was filed in the Chancery Division and captioned Wells Fargo Bank v. 

Colvin, No. 11 CH 19139 (Cir. Ct. Cook County). 

¶ 4 On July 29, 2015, the circuit court entered an order confirming the sale and granting 

possession of unit 5B to U.S. Bank as the successful bidder at a judicial sale held on June 24, 

2015. The circuit court’s order was captioned U.S. Bank N.A. v. Colvin, No. 11 CH 19139 (Cir. 

Ct. Cook County, July 29, 2015). A judicial deed granting U.S. Bank title to unit 5B was issued 

pursuant to the order approving the sale and was recorded by the Cook County Recorder of 

Deeds on August 28, 2015. Shortly thereafter, U.S. Bank retained Parkvue Realty (Parkvue) to 

recover possession of and market unit 5B. U.S. Bank asked Parkvue to contact the Association 

for information about the payment of postforeclosure sale assessments. Early in September 

2015, Parkvue provided the Association with a copy of the judicial deed and informed the 

Association that any correspondence and assessment invoices were to be sent to U.S. Bank at 

P.O. Box 830, Armonk, New York 10504. 

¶ 5 On September 24, after receiving no response from the Association, U.S. Bank asked the 

Association for an invoice reflecting the postforeclosure sale assessments due for unit 5B. 

However, the Association sent U.S. Bank a resident ledger for Gloria Carter, who possessed no 

interest in unit 5B. 

¶ 6 In October, U.S. Bank received the invoice it had requested along with a resident ledger for 

unit 5B, both showing the amount due from U.S. Bank was $3079.62 for its proportionate 

share of common expenses beginning July 1, 2015. U.S. Bank also received a resident ledger 

addressed to Mrs. Colvin, which showed a $62,579.35 amount due for preforeclosure sale 

assessments. 

¶ 7 According to U.S. Bank, it immediately sent the Association a $3919.34 check, dated 

October 6, 2015, comprising the $3079.62 amount due and $839.72 in assessments for the 

upcoming month of November. The Association initially claimed that it was never received 

but then acknowledged having received the check in November, when U.S. Bank placed a stop 

payment order on the check. On November 6, U.S. Bank issued another $3919.34 check, 
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which the Association received and credited to U.S. Bank. From December 2015 to February 

2017, the Association sent invoices that U.S. Bank paid in full. 

¶ 8 In 2016, U.S. Bank requested a paid assessment letter from the Association, and the 

Association issued a letter on January 25 stating that a $63,464.07 lien in favor of the 

Association existed under section 9(g)(1) of the Act (765 ILCS 605/9(g)(1) (West 2016)) for 

the period from May 1, 2009, to January 25, 2016. The letter stated that U.S. Bank had not 

extinguished the lien by payment of assessments under section 9(g)(3) of the Act (id.

§ 9(g)(3)). The letter stated that the amount due from U.S. Bank under section 9(g)(4) of the 

Act (id. § 9(g)(4)) was the $63,464.07, “due to failure of purchaser at judicial sale to confirm 

extinguishment of lien, the extinguishment of lien by lender will render the amount owed by 

the subsequent purchaser to be $0.”

¶ 9 In March, the Association sent U.S. Bank a notice and demand for possession of unit 5B as 

a condition precedent to an action for forcible entry and detainer. In April, U.S. Bank filed the 

underlying complaint for declaratory judgment in case number 16 CH 04811, asking for a 

determination that the Association’s lien had been extinguished. In June, the Association filed 

a counterclaim for unpaid assessments totaling $63,464.07, “inclusive of the Colvin Balance.” 

In July, U.S. Bank filed an amended complaint for declaratory judgment. 

¶ 10 In 2017, the parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment, and the circuit court 

entered an order granting summary judgment in favor of U.S. Bank on June 28. The 

Association filed a timely notice of appeal from the June 28 order, which declared that U.S. 

Bank had paid all postforeclosure sale assessments required under section 9(g)(3) of the Act 

and extinguished the Association’s lien on the Colvin balance for the period before July 1, 

2015. 

¶ 11 We take judicial notice that, after the Association filed its notice of appeal, U.S. Bank sold 

unit 5B to a nonparty on July 31 and the special warranty deed conveying unit 5B was recorded 

on August 3 as document number 1721557092. See generally City of Chicago v. Soludczyk, 

2017 IL App (1st) 162449, ¶ 3 n.1. On November 13, this court denied U.S. Bank’s motion to 

dismiss the appeal as moot by application of Illinois Supreme Court Rule 305(k) (eff. July 1, 

2017). 

¶ 12 ANALYSIS 

¶ 13 We initially reject U.S. Bank’s contention that this appeal is moot because the Association 

failed to file an appeal bond. See, e.g., Jack Spring, Inc. v. Little, 50 Ill. 2d 351, 355-56 (1972) 

(the right to appeal may not be conditioned upon posting an appeal bond); Downstate National 

Bank v. Elmore, 224 Ill. App. 3d 1075, 1083 (1992) (finding that controversy existed as to 

plaintiff’s lien rights against property and question not mooted by foreclosure action that 

excluded nonparty); O’Brien v. Cacciatore, 227 Ill. App. 3d 836, 842 (1992) (failure to obtain 

a stay does not, alone, render an issue moot). Moreover, an order granting summary judgment 

in a declaratory judgment action is final, and a notice of appeal must be filed within 30 days of 

the entry of the order, as occurred in this case. Universal Underwriters Insurance Co. v. Judge 

& James, Ltd., 372 Ill. App. 3d 372, 379-80 (2007). 

¶ 14 On the merits, the Association solely contends that U.S. Bank’s payment of 

postforeclosure sale assessments several months after purchasing unit 5B at a judicial 

foreclosure sale did not extinguish the Association’s lien for preforeclosure sale assessments, 
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pursuant to section 9(g)(3) of the Act and as construed by our supreme court in 1010 Lake 

Shore Ass’n, 2015 IL 118372. 

¶ 15 Because this case was disposed of by the circuit court pursuant to cross-motions for 

summary judgment, our review is de novo. Quadrangle House Condominium Ass’n v. U.S. 

Bank, N.A., 2018 IL App (1st) 171713, ¶ 8. On cross-motions for summary judgment, the 

parties concede that only a question of law is presented and invite the court to decide the issue 

on the record. Id. “Summary judgment is appropriate when there is no genuine issue of 

material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Virginia Surety 

Co. v. Northern Insurance Co. of New York, 224 Ill. 2d 550, 556 (2007); 735 ILCS 5/2-1005(c) 

(West 2016). 

¶ 16 The Association argues that it is difficult to read our supreme court’s construction of 

section 9(g)(3) in 1010 Lake Shore Ass’n as anything other than requiring U.S. Bank to begin 

paying postforeclosure sale assessments the month after the foreclosure sale in order to 

confirm the extinguishment of the Association’s lien for preforeclosure sale assessments. 

Because U.S. Bank failed to begin paying postforeclosure sale assessments for unit 5B the 

month after the foreclosure sale, the Association argues that U.S. Bank’s tardy payments did 

not confirm the extinguishment of the Association’s lien.

¶ 17 Section 9(g)(3) states: 

“(3) The purchaser of a condominium unit at a judicial foreclosure sale, or a 

mortgagee who receives title to a unit by deed in lieu of foreclosure or judgment by 

common law strict foreclosure or otherwise takes possession pursuant to court order 

under the Illinois Mortgage Foreclosure Law, shall have the duty to pay the unit’s 

proportionate share of the common expenses for the unit assessed from and after the 

first day of the month after the date of the judicial foreclosure sale, delivery of the deed 

in lieu of foreclosure, entry of a judgment in common law strict foreclosure, or taking 

of possession pursuant to such court order. Such payment confirms the extinguishment 

of any lien created pursuant to paragraph (1) or (2) of this subsection (g) by virtue of 

the failure or refusal of a prior unit owner to make payment of common expenses, 

where the judicial foreclosure sale has been confirmed by order of the court, a deed in 

lieu thereof has been accepted by the lender, or a consent judgment has been entered by 

the court.” 765 ILCS 605/9(g)(3) (West 2016).

¶ 18 In 1010 Lake Shore Ass’n, 2015 IL 118372, ¶ 24, our supreme court stated that the first 

sentence of section 9(g)(3) “plainly requires a foreclosure sale purchaser to pay common 

expense assessments beginning in the month following the foreclosure sale.” The supreme 

court stated that the second sentence of section 9(g)(3) “provides an incentive for prompt 

payment of those postforeclosure sale assessments.” Id. The supreme court concluded that 

pursuant to the plain language of section 9(g)(3), “the payment of postforeclosure sale 

assessments formally approves and makes certain the cancellation of the condominium 

association’s lien.” Id.

¶ 19 In Country Club Estates Condominium Ass’n v. Bayview Loan Servicing, LLC, 2017 IL 

App (1st) 162459, ¶ 12, pet. for leave to appeal denied, No. 122687 (Ill. Nov. 22, 2017), we 

considered the argument that there is no promptness requirement under the plain language of 

section 9(g)(3). We noted that, although the plain language of this section clearly provides that 

a foreclosure buyer’s duty to pay monthly assessments begins on “the first day of the month 

after the date of the judicial foreclosure sale,” this section does not expressly include a deadline 
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for confirming the extinguishment of an association’s lien. Id. ¶ 14. We found no legislative 

debate about the “extinguishment clause” but noted occasions where our legislature expressed 

concern about the difficulties met by condominium associations when a unit owner fails to pay 

common expenses and the unit goes into foreclosure. Id. ¶ 15. Although that concern was 

expressed during discussions about the 2006 amendment to the Act, we stated it was still 

pertinent to the interpretation of section 9(g)(3). Id. ¶ 16. We then stated that our supreme 

court’s construction of section 9(g)(3) in 1010 Lake Shore Ass’n “acknowledges that a time 

requirement is implicit in section 9(g)(3), insofar as that section gives foreclosure buyers an 

‘incentive for prompt payment.’ If as Bayview argues, a foreclosure sale buyer could withhold 

payment of postforeclosure sale assessments indefinitely and still obtain the benefit of section 

9(g)(3), the statute would not provide any such incentive.” Id. ¶ 18. Based on the statements of 

our supreme court in 1010 Lake Shore Ass’n and our legislature regarding the policies 

“animating” this section, we held “that in order to extinguish an association’s lien for 

preforeclosure sale assessments, a foreclosure buyer must make ‘prompt’ payment of current 

assessments.” Id. ¶ 21. We stated that “1010 Lake Shore [Ass’n] did not create a requirement 

of promptness; it merely articulated the requirement that was already implicit in the purpose 

underlying section 9(g)(3).” (Emphasis in original.) Id. ¶ 30. 

¶ 20 Eight months after we filed our opinion in Country Club Estates Condominium Ass’n, the 

Sixth Division of this court filed its opinion in Quadrangle House Condominium Ass’n, 2018 

IL App (1st) 171713, ¶ 11 (filed April 20, 2018), rejecting the condominium association’s 

argument that U.S. Bank was required to begin paying postforeclosure sale assessments in the 

month following the sale in order to extinguish the association’s lien for unpaid preforeclosure 

sale assessments. The Sixth Division stated, “[c]ontrary to our colleagues in [Country Club 

Estates Condominium Ass’n], we do not believe that the cited sentence in 1010 Lake Shore 

[Ass’n] means that payment of post-purchase assessments must be prompt in order to 

constitute a confirmation of the extinguishment of any lien created under subsection 9(g)(1) for 

any unpaid pre-sale assessments.” Id. ¶ 13. However, about one month later, the Sixth Division 

filed V&T Investment Corp. v. West Columbia Place Condominium Ass’n, 2018 IL App (1st) 

170436, ¶ 30 (filed May 18, 2018), citing our opinion in Country Club Estates Condominium 

Ass’n, as guidance on determining when a foreclosure buyer’s payment of assessments is 

prompt. We see no reason to depart from our holding in Country Club Estates Condominium 

Ass’n and proceed with our analysis to determine whether U.S. Bank made prompt payment of 

postforeclosure sale assessments. 

¶ 21 The circuit court in this case entered an order on July 20, 2015, confirming the sale and 

granting U.S. Bank possession of unit 5B. U.S. Bank provided the Association with a copy of 

the judicial deed and an address where assessment invoices were to be sent in early September 

2015. U.S. Bank then commenced paying postforeclosure sale assessments on October 6, 

2015, about two months after its liability for postforeclosure sale assessments began, but the 

Association claimed that it was never received and then acknowledged having received the 

check in November. Under these circumstances, we conclude that U.S. Bank made prompt 

payment of postforeclosure sale assessments and extinguished the Association’s lien for 

preforeclosure sale assessments. Cf. Country Club Estates Condominium Ass’n, 2017 IL App 

(1st) 162459, ¶ 31 (“We cannot discern from the record what reasons, if any, existed for 

Bayview’s delay in payment. And the Association did not file a cross-motion for summary 

judgment, so we are not in a position to say that Bayview’s tender was not prompt as a matter 
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of law.”); see generally V&T Investment Corp., 2018 IL App (1st) 170436, ¶ 30.

¶ 22 CONCLUSION 

¶ 23 For the reasons stated, we affirm the judgment of the circuit court of Cook County granting 

U.S. Bank’s motion for summary judgment on its complaint for a declaratory judgment and 

denying the Association’s cross-motion for summary judgment on its counterclaim for unpaid 

assessments. 

¶ 24 Affirmed.