DEFENSE NUCLEAR FACILITIES SAFETY BOARD 

August 9, 2013 

MEMORANDUM FOR: Steven Stokes, Acting Technical Director 

FROM: Jonathan Plaue, DNFSB Site Representative 

SUBJECT: LLNL Activity Report for Week Ending August 9, 2013 

Emergency Management: In a letter to the laboratory contractor dated August 7, 2013, the 

Livermore Field Office (LFO) noted a decline in the conduct and degree of rigor associated with 

drills and exercises at the laboratory. LFO noted that this decline did not support the intended 

validation of the effectiveness of facility-level and institutional emergency response 

organizations as required. Specifically, LFO noted expectations with regard to: (1) scenario 

development and execution to ensure realism and suitable degree of difficulty, (2) sufficient 

personnel with appropriate skills, knowledge, and abilities to control and evaluate exercises, and 

(3) scenarios that are systematically developed and tested using postulated events from facilityspecific hazard assessments. LFO requested a response within 30 days. 

Training: Alameda County Fire Department (ACFD) personnel are expected to be proficient in 

the response to an emergency involving the release of radioactive materials at the laboratory. As 

a result of recent observations that call into question this proficiency, the Site Representative 

reviewed the applicable supplemental training provided by the laboratory contractor. The 

following observations are notable: 

 A systematic training needs analysis is not documented to identify any additional 

qualifications required to respond to the unique hazards present at the laboratory 

 In addition to state-certified Hazardous Materials Technician training, the contractor requires 

ACFD personnel to take a 3 hour web-based training on radiation safety for emergencies on a 

2 year periodicity—there is no hands-on component provided by the contractor 

 The contractor conducts familiarity tours of the nuclear facilities for ACFD on an annual 

basis; however, the tours do not include any practical component (e.g., meter use, 

contaminated patient handling, decontamination, etc.) 

 ACFD personnel receive some training from the Department of Energy’s Radiological 

Assistance Program, but this training is not formally mandated or tracked by the contractor 

 Applicable LFO subject matter experts have not formally observed or otherwise assessed any 

of this training or the emergency response actions performed by ACFD during drills and 

exercises 

Startup and Restart: On July 31, 2013, the contractor submitted to LFO a startup notification 

report. The report notes the addition of a restart for the Shaker with a readiness assessment 

planned for November 2013 and continued evaluation of the need for readiness associated with 

new processing activities involving plutonium-238. The contractor continues to experience 

difficulty estimating schedules—the projected schedules for all listed readiness activities were 

delayed again. For example, since it was first projected, the schedule for the West Wing of the 

Tritium Science Station has slipped at least 30 months and the General Purpose Tritium 

Glovebox at least 13 months. In general, since the new contractor began, the average delay 

between the first projection and the actual completion of readiness activities is about 6 months 

(excluding activities that have not started or were removed after numerous delays). In the Site 

Representative’s opinion, these delays suggest underlying weaknesses in the conduct of 

engineering and project management, and indicate the need to strengthen program direction and 

priority.