J-S15029-22

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

v.

AILEAF ASHFORD 

Appellant

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 1017 EDA 2021

Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered April 30, 2021

In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County

Criminal Division at CP-51-CR-0502211-1999

BEFORE: NICHOLS, J., MURRAY, J., and SULLIVAN, J.

MEMORANDUM BY MURRAY, J.: FILED JUNE 7, 2022

Aileaf Ashford (Appellant) appeals pro se from the order dismissing as 

untimely his fourth petition filed pursuant to the Post Conviction Relief Act 

(PCRA), 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-9546. We affirm.

On August 23, 2000, a jury convicted Appellant of first-degree murder,

and the trial court sentenced him to life in prison. This Court affirmed 

Appellant’s judgment of sentence on December 29, 2001, and on May 2, 2002, 

the Pennsylvania Supreme Court denied allowance of appeal. See

Commonwealth v. Ashford, 792 A.2d 1278 (Pa. Super. 2001) (unpublished

memorandum), appeal denied 798 A.2d 1286 (Pa. 2002).

Appellant filed three unsuccessful petitions seeking post-conviction 

relief. See Commonwealth Brief at 5-6 (detailing procedural history). On 

August 31, 2020, Appellant pro se filed the instant petition, his fourth, seeking

relief based on newly discovered facts from a trial witness, Rykeith Sullivan 
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(Sullivan). On March 29, 2021, the PCRA court issued notice of intent to 

dismiss the petition pursuant to Pa.R.Crim.P. 907. The PCRA court dismissed

the petition without a hearing on April 30, 2021. Appellant timely appealed.

Appellant presents the following issues for review:

1. DID THE COURT ERR OR ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN HOLDING 

THAT [APPELLANT] DID NOT MEET THE THRESHOLD 

REQUIREMENTS TO INVOKE THE PCRA COURT’S 

JURISDICTION?

2. DID THE COURT ERR IN DISMISSING APPELLANT’S PETITION 

FOR RELIEF PURSUANT TO THE POST CONVICTION RELIEF ACT 

AS UNTIMELY AND WITHOUT A HEARING?

3. DOES EVIDENCE OF ACTUAL INNOCENCE PROVE A 

MISCARRIAGE OF JUSTICE OR DUE PROCESS VIOLATION HAS 

OCCURRED?

Appellant’s Brief at 8 (unnumbered).

Our review the PCRA court’s order “is limited to examining whether the 

PCRA court’s determination is supported by the evidence of record and 

whether it is free of legal error.” Commonwealth v. Sandusky, 203 A.3d 

1033, 1043 (Pa. Super. 2019) (citation omitted).

Like the PCRA court, we must consider the timeliness of Appellant’s

petition. The timeliness of a PCRA petition implicates jurisdiction, and no court 

has jurisdiction to hear an untimely petition. Commonwealth v. Williams, 

35 A.3d 44, 52 (Pa. Super. 2011). Any PCRA petition, including a second or 

subsequent petition, must be filed within one year of the date the judgment 

of sentence becomes final. 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1). Judgment is final “at 
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the conclusion of direct review, including discretionary review in the Supreme 

Court of the United States and the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, or at the 

expiration of time for seeking review.” 42 Pa.C.S.A § 

9545(b)(3); Commonwealth v. Pollard, 911 A.2d 1005, 1007 (Pa. Super. 

2006). To meet an exception to the time requirement, a petitioner must plead

and prove:

(i) the failure to raise the claim previously was the result of 

interference by government officials with the 

presentation of the claim in violation of the Constitution 

or laws of this Commonwealth or the Constitution or 

laws of the United States;

(ii) the facts upon which the claim is predicated were 

unknown to the petitioner and could not have been 

ascertained by the exercise of due diligence; or

(iii) the right asserted is a constitutional right that was 

recognized by the Supreme Court of the United States or 

the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania after the time period 

provided in this section and has been held by that court 

to apply retroactively.

42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1)(i)-(iii). A petition attempting to invoke an

exception must “be filed within one year of the date the claim could have been 

presented.” 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(2).

Appellant agrees his petition is untimely, but claims he met the 

exception of proving newly discovered facts. See Appellant’s Brief at 12 

(stating PCRA court “misapplied the newly discovered fact exception . . . 

leading to an erroneous dismissal of PCRA petition as untimely.”).
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To obtain relief based on newly discovered facts, Appellant must 

establish his proffered evidence “(1) could not have been obtained prior to the 

conclusion of the trial by the exercise of reasonable diligence; (2) is not merely 

corroborative or cumulative; (3) will not be used solely to impeach the 

credibility of a witness; and (4) would likely result in a different verdict if a 

new trial were granted.” Commonwealth v. Pagan, 950 A.2d 270, 292 (Pa. 

2008) (citation omitted). 

Appellant contends he received exculpatory evidence from Sullivan, who

was approximately 12 years old when he testified at Appellant’s trial as a 

rebuttal witness for the Commonwealth. Appellant explains that he learned 

about the evidence when he was

transferred to SCI-Smithfield on September 4, 2019, and within 

days of his being there, on September 8, 2019, an inmate [] told 

[A]ppellant that he spoke to Sullivan on the phone, and that 

Sullivan told [him] he had wrote [A]ppellant a letter, and to tell 

[A]ppellant to call him (Sullivan).

Appellant’s Brief at 14. Appellant claims he contacted Sullivan, who wrote him 

“a letter and subsequent affidavit, stating that he was coerced to give that 

fabricated testimony by the victim’s sister.” Id. at 10. Appellant asserts he 

did not learn of the new facts until after he 

arrived at SCI-Smithfield on September 4, 2019. So despite any 

date on the affidavit/statement, it is timely filed if done by or 

before September 4, 2020. That burden was met when appellant 

submitted his petition on August 31, 2020.

Id. at 17. Appellant maintains Sullivan’s letter and affidavit constitute 

“admissions of fabrications.” Id. at 16.
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Conversely, the Commonwealth argues Appellant “failed to explain why 

he was unable to ascertain the supposed new information over the last twenty 

years with the exercise of due diligence.” Commonwealth Brief at 8. In 

addition, the Commonwealth emphasizes “Sullivan did not state in either the 

letter or affidavit that his testimony at trial was false in any way[.]” Id. at 10

(footnote omitted). Finally, the Commonwealth argues Appellant “failed to 

explain how any theoretical contradiction in Sullivan’s trial testimony would 

have entitled him to relief,” given the “ample evidence proving Appellant’s 

guilt.” Id. at 12. We agree.

Sullivan’s letter to Appellant is not dated. Pertinently, Sullivan 

apologizes for testifying at trial and states:

I didn’t want to testify at your trial, I was forced to by my family 

(babysitter). I was told what to say, the D.A. had to know I didn’t 

know what happened and had to know or help prep me because I 

was super young and never really saw anything that had anything 

to your case [sic], plus I was nervous & was informed to ball up 

my fist to hide the nervousness.

***

I was told investigators w[ere] looking for me about your case, I 

just never got back with them. Basically I was told a bad guy 

would walk free if I didn’t go to court. At the time I had no idea 

what was going on.

PCRA Petition, 8/31/20, Letter at 1 (undated).

In the affidavit, Sullivan swears:
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I am not claiming that anyone is innocent because I do not 

know Ali,

1 nor was I there or know of any murder of [the victim]. 

I am simply trying to correct a wrong that may have been done.

I remember being groomed in a side room, being told what 

to say if I was nervous and what to do to hide my nervousness. I 

was told to ball my fist as tight as I could.

What I don’t remember is ever being present to any murders 

to this day, let alone the guy in the neighborhood that would pay 

me to pick up his food on store runs as a kid.2

I truly am sorry if I have caused or was part [of] causing 

any wrong, but I am willing and available to testify to these facts 

if, and or when I am called.

PCRA Petition, 8/31/20, Affidavit at 1 (undated) (footnotes added).

The PCRA court determined Appellant failed to establish he raised the 

newly discovered fact exception within one year as required by 42 Pa.C.S.A. 

§ 9545(b)(2). The PCRA court explained:

[Appellant] indicated in his PCRA petition that Sullivan wrote him 

a letter in September 2019 stating the reasons for his alleged false 

testimony. However, Petitioner did not give a precise date of 

when he discovered said information. Rather, in his [Rule] 907 

response, he implored this [c]ourt to use the postmarked date on 

the envelope Sullivan’s letter was mailed in. The envelope 

[Appellant] referenced was postmarked May 11, 2020 and 

addressed to an inmate by the name of Cleo McKinney - NF 7199. 

Furthermore, [Appellant] again did not state the precise date that 

he received the affidavit, and the date of when he discovered the 

alleged new facts, but rather again requested this [c]ourt use the 

postmarked envelope presumably the affidavit was mailed in to 

determine when he discovered this allegedly new information. 

The postmark on the envelope referenced was dated for December 

____________________________________________

1 As indicated by his salutation to “Ali” at the top of the letter, Sullivan is

referring to Appellant, whose given name is Aileaf.

2 Sullivan appears to be referencing the victim.
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21, 2019, again this did not give this [c]ourt any indication as to 

when [Appellant] initially learned of the new information. 

[Appellant], therefore, did not demonstrate that he raised [it] 

within the one year of the date that he could have presented it.

PCRA Court Opinion, 6/10/21, at 4 (citations omitted).

The record supports the above reasoning. In addition, the record 

supports the PCRA court’s findings, in the alternative, with respect to

Appellant’s claims of newly discovered facts. The PCRA court stated:

Even if [Appellant] had satisfied his burden of proving that 

he raised his claim within one year of discovering the new 

information, he still would have failed to invoke the newly 

discovered fact exception. During [] trial, Sullivan testified

[Appellant] came to his home and confessed to shooting the 

[victim]. At no point during his trial testimony did Sullivan allege 

to be a witness to the homicide. In his affidavit, Sullivan again 

stated that he was not present at the scene. He confirmed “I am 

not claiming that anyone was innocent because I do not know Ali, 

nor was I there or knew of any murder of Shelton [sic] ... I

remember being groomed in a sick3room, being told what to 

say if I was nervous and what to do to hide my 

nervousness.” Sullivan did not elaborate as to what he was 

told to say to help dissipate his nervousness during testimony. 

Similarly, in his letter Sullivan neither recanted nor contradicted

his trial testimony. Rather, he affirmed that he was not at the 

scene of the crime. He continued to say “I was told what to say, 

the D.A. had to know I didn’t know what happened and had to 

know or help prep me because I was super young and really never 

saw anything that had anything to [do with] your case, plus I was 

nervous...” Sullivan did not elaborate in either his letter or his 

affidavit on the communication that took place between him and 

the [C]ommonwealth. More importantly, in neither document did 

he state that he fabricated his testimony during trial. Rather, 

Sullivan appeared to be describing what steps were taken to make 

____________________________________________

3 As indicated above, we read Sullivan’s handwriting as stating he was 

“groomed in a ‘side’ room.” PCRA Petition, 8/31/20, Affidavit at 1 (undated). 

The distinction between “sick” and “side” does not impact our analysis or 

disposition.
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him comfortable to testify in court as a presumably nervous child 

witness.

Id. at 4-5 (bold emphasis in original, citations omitted).

Furthermore, the record reveals ample evidence of Appellant’s guilt, 

including testimony from an eyewitness who stated he saw Appellant argue 

with the victim about whether Appellant could sell drugs from the victim’s 

“corner,” and later saw Appellant fire multiple shots at the victim before 

fleeing. Appellant is not entitled to relief because it is unlikely a new trial 

would result in a different verdict. See Pagan, supra.

For the above reasons, we discern no error by the PCRA court. 

Commonwealth v. Jones, A.2d 903, 906 (Pa. Super. 2008) (citation 

omitted) (“There is no absolute right to an evidentiary hearing on a 

PCRA petition, and if the PCRA court can determine from the record that no 

genuine issues of material fact exist, then a hearing is not necessary.”); see 

also Pa.R.Crim.P. 907(2).

Order affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 6/7/2022