DEFENSE NUCLEAR FACILITIES SAFETY BOARD

February 9, 2024

TO: Katherine R. Herrera, Acting Technical Director

FROM: L. Lin, Z.C. McCabe, and E.P. Richardson, Resident Inspectors

SUBJECT: Savannah River Site Activity Report for Week Ending February 9, 2024

F-Tank Farm: Upon exiting a radiological buffer area (RBA), a construction worker alarmed 

the personnel contamination monitor (PCM) due to contamination on their boot. Further surveys 

revealed 1,000,000 dpm/100cm2 β/γ and no detectable alpha contamination on the boot. After 

removing their boot (which could not be decontaminated enough for release), the construction 

worker cleared the PCM three times before being released. Three other workers in the same 

location were verified clear of contamination. F-Tank Farm personnel have conducted a 

thorough investigation and radiological protection inspectors (RPI) have conducted extensive 

surveys. To date, they have found one small spot that probed 2,000,000 dpm/100cm2 β/γ and no 

detectable alpha in the contamination monitor trailer. They have not been able to identify the 

source of the contamination, which analysis identified as Cs-137. Facility management directed 

further investigation and surveys following the issue investigation meeting. 

Defense Waste Processing Facility (DWPF): Over the last two weeks, operations personnel 

plugged a glass waste canister prior to it reaching the required fill height and three personnel at

DWPF were injured while not wearing the required personnel protective equipment (PPE). Two 

construction workers received head injuries while not wearing hard hats, and an operator 

received a hand laceration after removing their gloves to improve dexterity while removing a 

locking device. These events occurred while the facility continues its sustained period of 

deliberate operations.

Savannah River National Laboratory (SRNL): SRNL personnel completed their Facility 

Self-Assessment (FSA) to determine SRNL’s readiness to implement Revision 3 of the 

Documented Safety Analysis (DSA) and Technical Safety Requirements (TSR). The FSA 

identified six findings and five opportunities for improvement. Following the briefing of the 

FSA results, SRNL personnel determined that they are ready to initiate the Implementation 

Verification Review on February 20. This version of the DSA and TSR represents significant 

changes to the SRNL safety basis, including identifying new and upgrading existing controls.

HB-Line: HB-Line management was notified by the Central Counting Facility of elevated air 

sample filter paper readings from January 19-24. During the investigation, personnel discussed

that the RPIs performing continuous air monitor (CAM) operability checks on January 23 and 24

did not follow procedures to notify their first line manager (FLM) of readings above 4 DAC-hr

or control access. The CAM alarm setpoint is at 10 DAC-hrs and had alarmed between January 

23 and 24. The RPI performing operability checks the morning of January 24 acknowledged the 

alarm, saw that the air sample readings had decreased (but was still above 4 DAC-hrs), and 

entered the room with the alarmed CAM to perform habitability surveys and change out the filter 

paper. During the issue investigation, personnel indicated that there was a history of elevated air 

sample readings. The facility has had weak supply ventilation since one of three booster fans

failed back in 2020, which was further exacerbated after outage work in 2022, and the facility 

had not prioritized repairs to the booster fan.