J. S06032/20

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION – SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

PRINGLE ELECTRIC, INC., :

:

IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

 Appellant :

:

v. :

:

SNEAKER VILLA, INC. DOING 

BUSINESS AS VILLA AND DTLR, INC.

DOING BUSINESS AS VILLA

:

:

:

No. 2736 EDA 2019

Appeal from the Order Entered August 6, 2019,

in the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County

Civil Division at No. 1904M0014

BEFORE: LAZARUS, J., McLAUGHLIN, J., AND FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E.

MEMORANDUM BY FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E.: FILED JULY 08, 2020

Pringle Electric, Inc., appeals from the August 6, 2019 order, entered in

the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County, sustaining the preliminary 

objections of Sneaker Villa, Inc., d/b/a Villa, and DTLR, Inc., d/b/a Villa 

(collectively “Villa”), and dismissing appellant’s mechanics’ lien claim.1 We 

reverse.

The record reveals the following: On April 17, 2019, appellant filed a 

mechanics’ lien claim alleging that it subcontracted with Arizona Designs 

Project Management, LLC (“ADMP”), to provide electrical work for a new 

Sneaker Villa/DTLR store located at 1231 North Broad Street in Philadelphia. 

 

1 See 49 P.S. § 1101 et seq.
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(Appellant’s mechanics’ lien claim at ¶¶ 2, 3, 7-10; Exhibit A.) The claim 

identifies the “[o]wners” as “Sneaker Villa, Inc., d/b/a Villa, and DTLR, Inc., 

d/b/a Villa.” (Id. at ¶¶ 6, 8.) Appellant completed its work on November 15, 

2018. (Id. at ¶ 7.) On March 6, 2019, appellant sent formal notice of its 

intention to file a mechanics’ lien claim. (Id. at ¶ 15; Exhibit B.)

Appellant further alleged that it performed electrical work and supplied 

the labor, materials, and equipment to perform the work. (Id. at ¶¶ 10, 11, 

12; Exhibit A at 1, 4-8.2) The total contract price for the electrical work was 

$61,470. (Id., Exhibit A at 8.) Appellant claims it did not receive full 

payment, and a balance of $29,4813remains due and owing. (Id. at ¶¶ 13, 

14.) The property subject to the lien is described as the real property located 

at 1231 North Broad Street, being utilized as a Sneaker Villa retail store. (Id.

at ¶ 18.)

On May 13, 2019, Villa responded by filing preliminary objections to the 

claim. Appellant filed a timely answer. On August 6, 2019, the trial court 

issued an order sustaining Villa’s preliminary objections. Appellant timely 

appealed. On September 4, 2019, the trial court ordered appellant to file a 

 

2 Exhibit A to appellant’s mechanics’ lien claim does not contain pagination. 

Therefore, for the ease of discussion, we have assigned each page a 

corresponding number.

3 We note that based on the figures set forth in appellant’s formal notice of 

intention to file a mechanics lien claim, the amount owed appellant is $24,481, 

as initially set forth in the notice. (See appellant’s formal notice, 4/6/19 at 

¶ 3.)
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statement of errors complained of on appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b). 

Appellant timely complied. The trial court then filed its Rule 1925(a) opinion.

Appellant raises the following issues for our review:

[1.] Did the trial court err in sustaining the 

preliminary objections and finding that 

[appellant] should seek collection of the sums 

sought in the mechanics’ lien claim via a breach 

of contract action, rather than the lien?

[2.] Should the trial court have overruled the first

preliminary objection, arguing [either Sneaker 

Villa or DTLR] was not an “owner” and also 

arguing the fee owner was a necessary

defendant?

[3.] Should the trial court have overruled the second

preliminary objection, arguing lack of 

specificity?

[4.] Should the trial court have overruled the third

preliminary objection, arguing lack of service?

[5.] Should the trial court have overruled the fourth

preliminary objection, arguing excess curtilage?

Appellant’s brief at 5-6 (extraneous capitalization omitted).

Our scope of review in determining whether the trial court properly 

sustained preliminary objections is as follows:

[This] court must examine the averments in the 

complaint, together with the documents and exhibits 

attached thereto in order to evaluate the sufficiency 

of the facts averred.

Our inquiry goes only to determining the legal 

sufficiency of appellant’s complaint and we may only 

decide whether sufficient facts have been pleaded 

which would permit recovery if ultimately proven. We 

must be able to state with certainty that upon the 
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facts averred, the law will not permit recovery by the 

plaintiff.

This Court will reverse the trial court’s decision only 

where there has been an error of law or abuse of 

discretion. Further, when the sustaining of 

preliminary objections results in the denial of a claim 

or the dismissal of a suit in a mechanics’ lien 

proceeding, preliminary objections should be 

sustained only where the case is clear and doubtless.

Denlinger, Inc. v. Agresta, 714 A.2d 1048, 1050 (Pa.Super. 1998)

(citations and quotation marks omitted).

Mechanics’ liens were unknown at common law and 

are entirely a creature of statute. Such liens are 

designed to protect persons who, before being paid 

(or fully paid), provide labor or material to improve a 

piece of property. The [m]echanics’ [l]ien [l]aw . . .

was intended to protect the prepayment labor and 

materials that a contractor invests in another’s 

property. Mechanics’ liens accomplish this goal by 

giving lienholders security for their payment 

independent of contractual remedies.

Bricklayers of Western Pennsylvania Combined Funds, Inc. v. Scott’s 

Development Co., 90 A.3d 682, 690 (Pa. 2014) (citations omitted).

[E]very improvement and the estate or title of the 

owner in the property shall be subject to a lien, to be 

perfected as herein provided, for the payment of all 

debts due by the owner to the contractor or by the 

contractor to any of his subcontractors for labor 

or materials furnished in the erection or construction, 

or the alteration or repair of the improvement[.]

49 P.S. § 1301(a) (emphasis added). An “[owner] means an owner in fee, a

tenant for life or years or one having any other estate in or title to property.”

49 P.S. § 1201(3). “[A] subcontractor is generally understood to be a person 
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or business who performs for and takes from the prime contractor a specific 

part of the labor or material requirements of the original contract.”

Pennsylvania Combined Funds, 90 A.3d at 691 (citation and quotation

marks omitted). See also 49 P.S. § 1201(5).

Mechanics’ liens and assumpsit actions are cumulative remedies. See

49 P.S. § 1702. As this court noted: “there may not only be a mechanics’

lien filed against the owner and contractor, and that prosecuted to judgment, 

but a personal action may be brought on his personal liability on the contract.”

Matternas v. Stehman, 642 A.2d 1120, 1124 (Pa.Super. 1994) (citation

omitted). “It sometimes happens that out of the same transaction there 

arise[s] rights both in personam and in rem. In such case, a judgment 

in rem does not merge the action in personam on the original claim, and 

does not constitute a bar to an action thereon.” Id. at 1125, quoting 

47 AmJur2d, Judgments § 1074 at 136 (footnotes omitted, italics added).

Here, the trial court sustained the preliminary objections because:

[a]ppellant and [Villa] were parties in a contract to 

perform work at the [p]roperty. Pursuant to 49 P.S. 

§1101, . . . lien proceedings are not intended to settle 

contractual obligations. Therefore, this court 

sustained [Villa’s] preliminary objections on the basis 

that the [c]laim was not the proper avenue by which 

these contractual obligations should be settled.

Trial court opinion, 10/7/19 at 2-3. The trial court relied on this court’s opinion

in Matternas v. Stehman, 642 A.2d 1120 (Pa.Super. 1994). (Trial court’s 
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order, 8/6/19 at n.1; trial court opinion, 10/7/19 at 2-3.) The trial court’s 

reliance on Matternas is misplaced.4

Accepting the averments in appellant’s mechanics’ lien claim as fact,

5

the only contract appellant asserts is with ADPM,

6

the general contractor. 

Further, a mechanics’ lien claim is the proper remedy for appellant, as

subcontractor, to lien the owners’

7 property to secure recovery for the labor, 

material, equipment, services and work it provided to ADPM. See 49 P.S. 

§§ 1201(3), 1201(5), 1301(a). Additionally, appellant’s claim comports with 

the requirements of 49 P.S. § 1503.

As mechanics’ liens claims and contract actions are cumulative 

remedies, regardless of whether or not appellant had a contractual 

relationship with Villa, appellant was entitled to file a mechanics’ lien claim.

 

4

In Matternas, this court held that a consent order concluding a mechanic’s 

lien proceeding, brought by a building contractor against the property owners, 

did not collaterally estop the property owners from bringing a subsequent 

assumpsit action seeking damages for breach of the contract because there 

was no basis to regard any issue as having been settled by the consent order.

5 See Philadelphia Const. Services, LLC v. Domb, 903 A.2d 1262, 1266 

(Pa.Super. 2006) (noting that in ruling on preliminary objections to a 

mechanics’ lien claim, the trial court is required to accept the averments in 

appellant’s claim as fact).

6 See appellant’s mechanics’ lien claim, 4/17/19 at ¶¶ 2, 3, 8, 9, 15; Exhibit A.

7 There is no dispute that Villa, as lessee of 1231 North Broad Street in 

Philadelphia, was the owner of the property for purposes of the mechanics’

lien law.
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Thus, the trial court erred in concluding, as a matter of law, that 

appellant’s only remedy was a breach of contract action.

Order reversed. Case remanded. Jurisdiction relinquished.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 7/8/2020