In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

____________

No. 07-2552

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

PRINCE S. KNOX,

Defendant-Appellant.

____________

Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.

No. 06 CR 917—Suzanne B. Conlon, Judge.

____________

ARGUED MAY 9, 2008—DECIDED SEPTEMBER 2, 2008

____________

Before FLAUM, KANNE, and TINDER, Circuit Judges.

TINDER, Circuit Judge. Appellant Prince Solomon Knox

entered the United States as part of a refugee resettlement

program. He was later indicted and convicted essentially

for lying to the United States government by denying

involvement with armed rebel groups in connection

with his admittance into the country. We address three

main issues in this appeal—a venue question; Knox’s

request, which the district court denied, to go to Africa
2 No. 07-2552

for investigation/depositions; and two challenges to the

sufficiency of the evidence. 

I. Background

During the 1990s Liberia was in the midst of several

civil conflicts. The Department of State, the Office of

United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, and the

Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”) began a

United States resettlement program for Liberians in

Côte d’Ivoire (a.k.a. the Ivory Coast) who could not

return to Liberia or remain in Côte d’Ivoire because of the

civil unrest. Eligible individuals could apply to enter

the United States as refugees. Defendant Prince Solomon

Knox was from Sierra Leone, but his wife, Elizabeth

Knox, from Liberia, could apply for her entire family.

Knox, Elizabeth Knox, and their daughter applied under

this program. Of course, to be admitted, applicants had to

meet the qualifications, one of which, relevant here,

deemed persons who had belonged to or assisted

disfavored armed groups ineligible.

There are three such rebel groups we concern ourselves

with in this case: the National Patriotic Front of Liberia

(“NPFL”), the Independent National Patriotic Front of

Liberia (“INPFL”), and the Revolutionary United Front

(“RUF”). The RUF was known for grievous human rights

violations, the disturbing details of which are unnecessary

to recount for our present purposes. See Revolutionary

United Front, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ Revolutionary_

United_Front (last visited Aug. 4, 2008); see also Kamara

v. Attorney General of the United States, 420 F.3d 202, 207
No. 07-2552 3

(3d Cir. 2005) (describing some of the RUF’s “grievous

human rights violations”). The State Department has

designated the RUF as a terrorist organization on the

terrorist exclusion list since December 2001.

On December 9, 2003, a State Department employee

interviewed the Knox family in Abidjan, Côte d’Ivoire.

At that time, in response to questions from DHS immigration officer David Radel, Knox denied that he had ever

been a member of disfavored armed groups, denied that

he had assisted them, and denied having served or participated in military service or armed conflict. Similarly,

on Form I-590, Registration for Classification as Refugee,

Knox answered that he had no membership in and provided no aid to armed groups. He also answered “none”

when directed on the form to list “political, professional

or social organizations of which I am now or have been

a member or with which I am now or have been

affiliated with since my 16th birthday.” Radel also completed Form G-646, Sworn Statement of Refugee Applying

for Admission, into the United States on Knox’s behalf.

Knox answered “no” to the following questions: “Have

you ever provided support, including housing, transportation, communications, funds, documents, weapons or

training for any person or organization that has ever

engaged in or conspired to engage in sabotage, kidnaping,

assassination, hijacking, or any other form of terrorist

activity?” and “Have you ever been a representative

or member of a terrorist organization or a member of a

group which endorses terrorist activity?” These and other

similar statements are also confirmed in Radel’s written

notes of the interview.
4 No. 07-2552

Radel recommended that Knox be resettled in the United

States on or about December 9, 2003. Knox entered the

United States on April 14, 2004, through the Chicago

O’Hare international airport. He presented the I-590 Form

stamped by Radel to the DHS officer at O’Hare. Knox

then moved to St. Louis, Missouri. It was in Missouri that

Knox was arrested on December 21, 2006. The government

had come to believe that Knox had belonged to or supported the RUF, NPFL, and/or INPFL, and therefore,

lied on the forms and to Radel.

Knox was charged in a four-count indictment—two

counts for making materially false statements to federal agents and two counts for visa fraud, in violation of

18 U.S.C. §§ 1001 and 1546. The first count addressed

lying under oath on Form I-590, which was submitted

at O’Hare to gain entry. The second was for false statements on Form G-646. Count Three was for making similar

false statements to Radel in Côte d’Ivoire. Count Four

was for lying to an Immigration and Customs Enforcement agent on or about March 29, 2006, “in the Eastern

District of Missouri and Northern District of Illinois.” (It

appears that this “lie” was Knox claiming he had never

held a gun, a statement made in a recorded telephone

call between Knox and a government agent.) The district

court found Knox indigent and appointed counsel.

The factual crux of the case is whether Knox lied about

his involvement in these rebel groups. The majority of the

events related to the charges occurred in Sierra Leone,

Liberia, and Côte d’Ivoire. Accordingly, the defense

sought to investigate and possibly depose potential wit-
No. 07-2552 5

nesses in West Africa. Knox filed a written application for

authorization of extraordinary and substantial travel

and expert witness expenses with the intent to ultimately

take foreign depositions under Federal Rule of Criminal

Procedure 15. The district judge denied the application

without prejudice due to “vagueness” and a “failure to

address the legal basis for taking foreign depositions

in three unidentified West African countries.”

Knox filed another motion for leave to take foreign

depositions and identified four prospective witnesses by

name and address who were believed to have personal

first-hand knowledge concerning whether the defendant

was a member of any of the relevant groups. Knox also

pointed out that the government would be bringing

over witnesses from Africa. The court gave Knox an

opportunity to supply additional information (costs, etc.),

including in camera disclosures of the basis for

believing the witnesses would appear voluntarily, how

they would be contacted, etc. The government also filed

its opposition to Knox’s request(s). The court concluded

that the defense did not provide enough detailed information, Knox having only explained that travel to West

Africa was necessary to investigate, locate, and interview

these individuals and that then more information would

be available. The court found this “problematic and

unworkable.” The defense could not provide the requisite

notice of when and where the depositions would occur.

The district court also faulted Knox for failing to address

the legality of the proposed investigations under the

sovereign laws of the relevant foreign nations or the

diplomatic implications to the United States. The court
6 No. 07-2552

found it “speculative” that Knox’s proposed depositions

would ever even occur or that they would preserve material evidence under these unreliable circumstances. The

court, in a separate ruling, also denied expenses for

travel and expert services in Africa. Knox persisted nonetheless, filing an emergency motion and an amended

emergency motion for the district court to reconsider. The

district court was not persuaded, and the court denied

the motions for reconsideration.

At trial the government’s witnesses testified to the

following: they saw Knox serving as a bodyguard for an

RUF leader, saw him carrying an AK-47 rifle, saw him

at RUF meetings, observed him with RUF members, heard

him go by the name of a leader of the INPFL, saw him

in RUF apparel, heard him brag about being a rebel

fighter, overheard him tell about killing a family, and

knew that he was having an affair with an RUF leader’s

wife. Knox’s only trial witness was his estranged wife,

who hadn’t met him until 1996 or 1997 (a government

witness testified regarding events dating as far back as

1992). She denied ever seeing him in rebel garb or associating with the rebel groups. She admitted to a 7-8 month

separation and admitted that Knox never took her to his

home and that he told her it was none of her business

who his people were when she asked. The government

also elicited testimony that Knox hit her and threatened

to take their daughter shortly before their interviews

with the State Department.

At the close of the government’s case the defendant

made a Rule 29 motion for acquittal, but cited no specific
No. 07-2552 7

grounds. He renewed the motion after closing arguments.

The jury convicted on all four counts. Knox was sentenced to 12 months’ imprisonment and three years of

supervised release. His sentence was completed on or

about December 14, 2007. Knox is currently in custody

with the Bureau of Immigration and Customs Enforcement, which has initiated removal proceedings.

Knox now appeals. There are three major aspects to his

appeal that we will take up in turn: a question about

proper venue; a review of the district court’s decision to

deny Knox’s request to go to West Africa to investigate

and depose potential witnesses; and two sufficiency-of-theevidence challenges.

II. Venue

Knox argues that venue in the Northern District of

Illinois was improper with respect to Counts Three and

Four. The general rule is that we review de novo a

district court’s denial of a motion for judgment of acquittal

due to improper venue. See United States v. Ringer, 300 F.3d

788, 790 (7th Cir. 2002). However, this itself presents us

with a hurdle—whether Knox preserved this issue with

his generic Rule 29 motion for acquittal, as to either or

both counts, and if not preserved, whether that failure

was waiver or forfeiture.

Conventionally, a waiver is a knowing and intentional

relinquishment of a right, while forfeiture is the result of

unintentional relinquishment. E.g., United States v. Charles,

476 F.3d 492, 495 (7th Cir. 2007). Waiver precludes review,
8 No. 07-2552

whereas forfeiture permits review for plain error. Id. In

Ringer we found that “[a] claim of improper venue is

waived if the issue is apparent on the face of the indictment and an objection is not made before the close of the

government’s case.” Ringer, 300 F.3d at 790. We continued,

“[I]f the indictment does not provide notice of a possible

defect in venue and the government rests without

proving that the crimes occurred in the district charged,

the defendant may then file a venue objection in a

motion for acquittal.” Id.

A. Count Three

We begin with Count Three. The alleged violation of

18 U.S.C. § 1001 occurred “in Abidjan, Ivory Coast”

according to the indictment. The indictment did not in

any way plead that the alleged false statements with

which Knox was charged had any impact in the Northern

District of Illinois. Therefore, we conclude, without

much difficulty, that notice of a possible defect in venue

was “apparent on the face of the indictment.” Accordingly,

Knox waived the argument by not making an objection

before the close of the government’s case. Id.; United

States v. Brandon, 50 F.3d 464, 469 (7th Cir. 1995); United

States v. John, 518 F.2d 705, 709 (7th Cir. 1975); United States

v. Bohle, 445 F.2d 54, 58-59 (7th Cir. 1971) (explaining that

“where the fact of improper venue is apparent on the

face of the indictment, it has been uniformly held that the

objection is waived if not presented before the close of the

Government’s case” (citing Wright’s Federal Practice &

Procedure: Criminal § 306)), overruled on other grounds by
No. 07-2552 9

Even if we were to reject Ringer as Knox requests and some- 1

how conclude that he had until the end of the government’s

case to raise a venue objection, we would nevertheless find

that he waived the argument, because his “objection” at the

close of the government’s case, discussed infra in Part B, was

inadequate and did not preserve the venue issue for appeal.

United States v. Lawson, 653 F.2d 299, 303 n.12 (7th Cir.

1981); see also United States v. McDonough, 603 F.2d 19, 22

n.1 (7th Cir. 1979).

Knox urges us to discard Ringer’s application of the

waiver standard and apply the distinction we now draw

between waiver and forfeiture—which Knox believes

would result in our finding that he only forfeited, rather

than waived, the argument. We disagree, however, with

Knox’s premise that our court’s more recent applications

of the waiver/forfeiture distinction are inconsistent with

Ringer. Where venue was not adequately pleaded from

the outset and the potential defect is apparent on the

face of the indictment (such as this case where the only

location mentioned is in Africa), failing to raise such an

obvious issue is logically considered a knowing and

intentional relinquishment. Therefore, consistent with

both our traditional waiver/forfeiture distinction and

our governing case law, Knox waived any venue argument with respect to Count Three by not raising a venue

objection before the close of the government’s case.1
10 No. 07-2552

The relevant exchanges were brief indeed. At the end of the 2

government’s case, counsel for Knox addressed the court:

“I would make a rule 29 motion for judgment of acquittal on all

four counts of the indictment, but I will waive any argument at

this time.” The judge responded at once, first noting his construction of the evidence in a light most favorable to the

government, then finding “[T]he government has established a

prima facie case as to all four counts.” Later, after closing

arguments, Knox’s counsel again requested “[C]ould the

record reflect a renewal of my Rule 29 motion of acquittal, and

I will waive argument?” The court responded: “All right. Your

motion is noted and denied.”

B. Count Four

The venue issue regarding Count Four is more difficult.

Count Four of the indictment alleged that the 18 U.S.C.

§ 1001 violation occurred “in the eastern District of Missouri and the Northern District of Illinois.” Therefore,

unlike Count Three that only mentioned Côte d’Ivoire,

we cannot say that any potential venue defect presented

itself on the face of the indictment. As we said in Ringer,

“if the indictment does not provide notice of a possible

defect in venue . . . the defendant may then file a venue

objection in a motion for acquittal” at the end of the government’s case. Ringer, 300 F.3d at 790. Thus we are presented

with the question of whether the bare Rule 29 motion,

which did not mention venue (or anything else) specifically, was sufficient to preserve the venue issue.2

The government has the burden of proving venue by

a preponderance of the evidence. E.g., United States v.

Muhammad, 502 F.3d 646, 652 (7th Cir. 2007). In United
No. 07-2552 11

States v. Jones, we found that “the motion for acquittal

made at the conclusion of all the evidence properly raised

the question of venue in the court below.” 174 F.2d 746,

748 (7th Cir. 1949). We explained that it was a challenge

that the government failed in its proof and that the rules

do not require specifics in the motion. The government has

a duty to prove its case, including venue, and if it “is

challenged as to sufficiency by a general motion for

acquittal, it is the Government’s duty to require the

defendant to be specific in his objection, and a failure to

do so will not enable the Government on appeal to say

that the question was not specifically raised below.” Id.

However, thirty years later we expressed doubt about

Jones and have continued to move away from that holding.

McDonough, 603 F.2d at 22 (“[W]e have some question

about the continued viability of the Jones rule . . . .”). In

McDonough, distinguishing without overruling Jones, we

focused on the district judge’s question asking if there

was anything specific that would justify a directed acquittal, and found that “the failure to urge the matter

[of venue] when asked to be specific forecloses, in our

opinion, raising the question on this appeal.” Id. We

criticized the defendant’s interpretation of Jones which

would give “the defendant the right to conceal possible

reversible error, even . . . when the grounds for objection

would have been . . . easily discovered.” Id. We also

went on to discuss the unique nature of venue, explaining

that while part of the government’s case, it can be

waived, is not part of the charged offense, and need only

be proved by a preponderance of the evidence. Id. 
12 No. 07-2552

Similarly in United States v. Todosijevic, 161 F.3d 479, 482

(7th Cir. 1998), we found a Rule 29 motion insufficient to

preserve an issue “because [the defendant] rests her

current challenge on grounds different from those she

relied on in her motion to the trial court.” Id. We highlighted, as in McDonough, the defendant’s failure to raise

additional issues in response to the judge’s query as to

whether there were other possible grounds. See also id. at

482 n.3 (mentioning another case in which we had explained in dicta that “the defendant waived the sufficiency of evidence argument on all grounds except that

which he relied upon at the trial court level”). And in

United States v. Rodriguez, we concluded, in dicta, that the

defendant’s “contention with respect to venue [wa]s

untimely” because his “motion for acquittal did not raise

the venue issue.” 67 F.3d 1312, 1317-18 (7th Cir. 1995).

Other circuits seem to follow approaches more akin to

our recent cases rather than the approach in Jones. Many

cases conclude, similar to our approach in Todosijevic, that

if specific issues are argued with the motion for acquittal,

the ones that are not asserted are waived. See, e.g., United

States v. Phillips, 477 F.3d 215, 219 (5th Cir. 2007) (finding

when a defendant asserts, in a Rule 29 motion, specific

grounds for a specific element of a specific count, he

waives all others for that count); United States v. Chance, 306

F.3d 356, 369 (6th Cir. 2002) (“Although specificity in a

Rule 29 motion is not required, where the defendant

makes a Rule 29 motion on specific grounds, all grounds

not specified in the motion are waived.”). Others conclude

more directly that an objection to venue is waived when

not specifically raised in the Rule 29 motion. See, e.g.,
No. 07-2552 13

United States v. Rommy, 506 F.3d 108, 119 (2d Cir. 2007)

(“[T]he law treats objections to venue as waived ‘unless

specifically articulated in defense counsel’s motion for

acquittal.’ ”); United States v. Carbajal, 290 F.3d 277, 289 n.19

(5th Cir. 2002) (“[The defendant] failed to preserve this

issue for appeal by specifically raising the issue in his

motion for acquittal or by requesting a jury instruction

on venue.”); United States v. Potamitis, 739 F.2d 784, 791

(2d Cir. 1984) (“A general motion for a judgment of

acquittal . . . is not sufficient to raise and preserve for

appeal the question of venue.”). But see United States v.

Zidell, 323 F.3d 412, 421 (6th Cir. 2003) (concluding that

a general Rule 29 motion preserved the venue challenge).

In reaching these conclusions, these courts focused, as

we have in this circuit, on the unusual status of venue.

While very important—as the defendant notes, it’s in

the Constitution twice, U.S. Const. art. III, § 2, cl. 3; amend.

VI—venue is universally recognized as waivable. It is

not an element of the charged crimes. And, as such,

while the burden does rest with the prosecution, that

burden of proof is only a preponderance of the evidence

(unlike the “beyond a reasonable doubt” standard for

the elements of the crime itself). Furthermore, a

defendant should not be permitted to hide in the weeds

with an objection (especially on a waivable issue with a

lower proof burden) only to pounce on appeal just in

case things do not go as desired in the court below. The

take-away message is that venue can be waived and a

defendant needs to be specific in a motion for acquittal

in order to preserve a venue argument for appeal.
14 No. 07-2552

This opinion has been circulated among all judges of this court 3

in regular active service under Circuit Rule 40(e). No judge

favored a rehearing en banc on the question of overruling

United States v. Jones.

This conclusion is analogous to our discussion supra explain- 4

ing that where a venue issue is obvious on the face of the

indictment, the failure to raise the issue is a knowing relinquishment (especially since venue is waivable anyway). See Ringer,

300 F.3d at 790. Once the government reaches the end of its

case without proving venue, then it’s just as if the deficiency

is obvious on the face of the indictment, and a defendant’s

failure to raise a venue objection by that time is logically

considered knowing and intentional.

Unlike McDonough and Todosijevic, the record here does

not reflect any inquiry on the part of the judge inviting

the defendant to argue specific grounds of the Rule 29

motion. Therefore, we cannot simply distinguish Jones.

Given the move in our own circuit away from Jones and

the similar treatment in cases from our sister circuits,

we take this opportunity to clarify our position and in

doing so overrule Jones. We now make explicit that a 3

bare Rule 29 motion for acquittal that does not even

mention venue waives the venue argument and fails to

preserve the issue for appeal. Applying this to the facts 4

of the instant case we find that Knox did not preserve

the venue challenge. Thus, the issue is waived, and

nothing more need be said.
No. 07-2552 15

III. Foreign Funding

Knox applied for funds to travel to West Africa to

investigate and depose witnesses under 18 U.S.C.

§ 3006A(e)(1) and Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 15;

the district judge denied his requests. 18 U.S.C.

§ 3006A(e)(1) authorizes investigative and expert expenditures on behalf of indigent defendants when necessary for adequate representation. We review a district

court’s decision to grant or deny such funds under

18 U.S.C. § 3006A(e)(1) for abuse of discretion. See United

States v. Smith, 502 F.3d 680, 686 (7th Cir. 2007). Rule 15

of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure also permits

a defendant to make a motion to depose witnesses—an

unusual occurrence in a criminal case—when “exceptional circumstances” warrant it. This is also reviewed for

abuse of discretion. See, e.g., United States v. Thomas, 62 F.3d

1332, 1340 (11th Cir. 1995); United States v. Kelley, 36 F.3d

1118, 1125 (D.C. Cir. 1994).

In Smith, the defendant sought funds for a fingerprint

expert. We explained that under 18 U.S.C. § 3006A(e)(1)

“[t]he government will give an indigent defendant access

to expert services adequate to facilitate the defendant’s

representation if the court finds that the services are

necessary” and that they should be provided “where ‘a

reasonable attorney would engage such services for a

client having the independent financial means to pay for

them.’ ” Smith, 502 F.3d at 686 (citing United States v.

Cravens, 275 F.3d 637, 639 (7th Cir. 2001)). Furthermore,

before granting the expenditures, the court may consider

whether the defendant has a “plausible defense” as the
16 No. 07-2552

government does not have to “finance a fishing expedition.” United States v. King, 356 F.3d 774, 778 (7th Cir. 2004)

(internal quotation omitted).

We addressed the Rule 15 “exceptional circumstances”

requirement briefly in United States v. Morrison, 946

F.2d 484, 490 (7th Cir. 1991), where we affirmed a district

court’s denial of a request for money to travel to Puerto

Rico to interview witnesses, take depositions, and investigate the scene of a drug ring’s alleged operations. We

explained that “a showing of exceptional circumstances

must be considerably more concrete and particularized

than mere speculation about the possible need for depositions in the future.” Id. Beyond this brief treatment in

Morrison, we have not had the occasion to outline any

“test” for when the “exceptional circumstances” threshold

would be met justifying authorization of foreign depositions; therefore we take note of some factors considered

relevant by other circuits. The Ninth Circuit considered

whether the deponent would be available at the proposed

location of the deposition, whether the deponent would

be willing to testify, and the safety of United States officials in going to the foreign location. See United States v.

Olafson, 203 F.3d 560, 567 (9th Cir. 2000). The Eleventh

Circuit focused on the materiality of the proposed testimony, the availability of the witness, whether injustice

will otherwise result without the material testimony

that the deposition could provide, and whether countervailing factors would make the deposition unjust to the

nonmoving party. See Thomas, 62 F.3d at 1340-41. The D.C.

Circuit listed as critical factors the materiality of the

testimony and the unavailability of the witness to testify
No. 07-2552 17

at trial and also noted that there is “typically some showing, beyond ‘unsubstantiated speculation,’ that the evidence exculpates the defendant.” Kelley, 36 F.3d at 1125

(citing cases from the Third, Fifth, and Ninth Circuits).

As we described, Knox made many attempts to obtain

authorization for expenses to investigate and depose

witnesses in the West African countries of Sierra Leone,

Liberia, and Côte d’Ivoire. We are not unsympathetic to

his desire to investigate and depose witnesses there—he

is correct that many of the events relevant to his case

occurred there. However, we do not find that the

district court abused its discretion in denying funds for

a proposal accurately characterized by the district court

as “problematic and unworkable.”

Specifically, addressing Rule 15’s requirements, we

conclude Knox’s request was not sufficiently “concrete

and particularized” to justify authorizing the expenditures.

Morrison, 946 F.2d at 490. Moreover, Knox’s request would

fail under nearly all of the factors we cited from other

circuits. Knox could not provide when or where

the potential witnesses would be found. He had their

addresses but offered nothing to establish the individuals would be present at any given date or time—or

how he would get over the hurdle of no phone or

email availability. For example, one witness’s address

was in Sierra Leone, but Knox indicated that the witness

was also believed to spend time in Côte d’Ivoire and

that he might be found there; plans for tracking this

witness down were not offered. Considering this search

would involve crossing international borders, it is not
18 No. 07-2552

In essence, Knox was seeking funds to first find these individ- 5

uals, then to interview them, and only after that to announce

whether he would seek to depose them. If nothing else was

flawed about this request, the holding pattern that would be

imposed on the attorney for the government raises serious

concerns. Government counsel would need to be in a position

to be in an unspecified location in West Africa, perhaps on

short notice, for an indefinite period.

an insignificant question. Such an absence of attention to

detail pervaded Knox’s entire request. Similarly, the 5

materiality of the potential testimony seemed based

entirely on conjecture and speculation. No details were

given regarding the expected substance of their testimony or how it would exculpate Knox. Knox also did not

disclose any basis, other than a familial relation to the

defendant, for why these individuals would be willing

to testify voluntarily. There was also a rather cavalier

attitude toward international law and diplomatic concerns raised by the district judge. Knox argued that such

matters were not his concern; nevertheless, surely he

cannot expect a United States court to authorize such

expenses to engage in investigating terrorist group membership without detail on the legality of investigating and

taking depositions in these countries. In the end Knox

simply did not demonstrate the requisite “exceptional

circumstances” for Rule 15 depositions.

Knox argues that he may have been able to furnish

these answers if he had been given investigative funding

under § 3006A(e)(1). He asserts that his request was a twostep process and that he could have been given funds to
No. 07-2552 19

go investigate, after which he could satisfy the Rule 15

requirements. But we conclude his § 3006A(e)(1) requests

failed for many of the same reasons. He could not provide sufficient details for the trip regarding when,

where, and how he would make contact with the witnesses. We understand that there were difficulties

given the undeveloped communications infrastructure

in some areas; however, Knox did not suggest how he

intended to overcome this challenge. He provided only a

vague trip itinerary, and the estimated expenses were

equally broad and without detail, as well as possibly in

excess of the statutory amount. See 18 U.S.C. § 3006A(e)(3)

(“Compensation to be paid to a person for services rendered by him to a person under this subsection, or to be

paid to an organization for services rendered by an employee thereof, shall not exceed $1,600, exclusive of reimbursement for expenses reasonably incurred, unless

payment in excess of that limit is certified by the

court . . . .”). His “spreadsheet” for the 12-day trip had

only six itemized entries and totaled $34,565.30. (Although in a later motion he did indicate the costs would

be less.) Knox did not make a convincing showing that

these expenses were “necessary” for adequate representation and that “a reasonable attorney would engage such

services for a client having the independent financial

means to pay for them.”

To recap, while Knox was persistent in his requests,

those requests simply did not provide enough information to justify granting them. He had not contacted potential witnesses; he could not provide a proposed itinerary;

he did not sufficiently address the practical or diplomatic
20 No. 07-2552

issues inherently related to going to foreign countries

for these purposes. He could not provide the government

with notice of when or where such depositions might

occur or even a proposal of how this might be arranged.

While some difficulties making arrangements to interview and depose these witnesses may be understandable

given the remote areas being dealt with, it is those very

circumstances and the nature of this case (involving

terrorist activities and rebel groups) which heightened

the concerns and made the need for planning more acute.

Too many unknowns remained unresolved and unresearched for the government to foot the bill for what

appeared a bit like a “fishing expedition” into seemingly

unknown and potentially shark-infested waters. Knox has

not shown on appeal that the district court abused its

discretion in denying the requests.

We also note that Knox presented a constitutional

argument on this issue, specifically raising his Sixth

Amendment right to present a defense. However, as Knox

admitted in his brief, this right “is not unlimited and may

‘bow to accommodate other legitimate interests in the

criminal trial process.’ ” Horton v. Litscher, 427 F.3d 498, 504

(7th Cir. 2005) (quoting Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S.

284, 295 (1973)). Requiring more from Knox in this

instance to support his requests was quite reasonable and

clearly in furtherance of other legitimate interests. Certainly, there are occasionally situations where procedural

rules must bend to the demands of the Constitution. See,

e.g., Chambers, 410 U.S. at 302-03. Knox, however, has

presented no compelling reason that the rules applied here,

Rule 15 and § 3006A, should bend to accommodate his
No. 07-2552 21

“fishing expedition,” and he has presented no persuasive

argument that the rules were “arbitrary” or “disproportionate to the purposes they are designed to serve.” Horton,

427 F.3d at 503 (“[R]ules ‘designed to assure both fairness and reliability in the ascertainment of guilt and

innocence’ . . . do not abridge an accused’s right to

present a defense so long as they are not ‘arbitrary or

disproportionate to the purposes they are designed to

serve.’ ” (quoting Chambers, 410 U.S. at 302 and Rock v.

Arkansas, 483 U.S. 44, 56 (1987)). We do not find that his

constitutional rights were violated, especially since he

fell short in establishing the materiality of the potential

testimony and the availability of any of the potential

witnesses and did not establish the “necessity” of the

funding, as we discussed supra. Cf. United States v. Loggins,

486 F.3d 977, 982 (7th Cir. 2007) (finding the evidence

at issue “lack[ed] th[e] exculpatory significance and the

reliability necessary to support a Sixth Amendment

violation”). 

IV. Sufficiency of the Evidence

Lastly, Knox challenges the sufficiency of the evidence

with respect to Counts One and Two. We review de novo

and will reverse a conviction only when no rational trier

of fact, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable

to the prosecution, could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. E.g., United

States v. Mendoza, 510 F.3d 749, 752 (7th Cir. 2007). This

standard is “highly deferential” and “nearly insurmountable.” Id. (internal quotations omitted).
22 No. 07-2552

Count One charged Knox in connection with responding “none” when asked to list political, professional,

or social organizations of which he was now or has been

a member or with which he was or had been affiliated

since his 16th birthday on Form I-590. He argues that the

government never proved that the RUF or any other

armed rebel group at issue was a “political, professional, or

social organization.” He makes an analogy to the United

States Army, expressing doubt that a United States

soldier would say he belonged to a “political, professional,

or social organization.” The RUF and related groups were

described as terrorist organizations, not groups with

political or social agendas. Knox agrees the evidence

supported a finding that he belonged to an armed group,

but he points out that was not what the government had

to show.

Knox’s argument with respect to Count Two is similar.

Count Two alleges two knowing false statements of

material fact: First, that Knox lied on Form G-646 denying

he ever provided support, including housing, transportation, communications, funds, weapons, documents, etc.

for any person or organization that has engaged in or

conspired to engage in sabotage, kidnaping, assassination,

hijacking, or any other form of terrorist activity; Second,

that he lied on Form G-646 when he denied ever being

a representative or member of a terrorist organization or

a member of a group which endorses terrorist activity.

Knox argues that while he stipulated at trial that the

RUF is on the terrorist exclusion list, the government did

not establish that Knox knew any of this when he was

responding to Radel’s questions. He asserts that the
No. 07-2552 23

testimony from the government’s witnesses establishing

Knox’s connection with these groups (serving as an

armed guard at a speech, wearing rebel garb, etc.) falls

short of acts (kidnaping, assassination, hijacking, etc.)

referred to in the form and does not establish that Knox

knew that the RUF was a terrorist organization engaged

in such acts.

The government, in response to the Count One argument, notes that testimony from multiple witnesses

established that the RUF was a political or social organization. Specifically an expert testified that there were social,

political, and military aspects to the organization. Testimony from other witnesses included references to “battling

the government” and other similar comments. The government’s response with respect to Count Two is that

Knox’s claim that he did not know RUF engaged in terrorist activities, etc. is incredible. Witnesses testified that

Liberia and Côte d’Ivoire were war-torn countries experiencing severe civil conflict with armed groups burning

whole villages and massacring civilians. In fact, these

circumstances are what prompted the creation of the

refugee program to which the Knox family applied.

Given a defendant’s “uphill battle” in mounting a

sufficiency-of-the-evidence challenge, we conclude the

evidence was sufficient for any trier of fact to find Knox

guilty of visa fraud as charged in Counts One and Two.

The testimony collectively was sufficient to enable a jury

to reasonably conclude that the rebel groups at issue

would accurately be described as “political, professional,

or social” organizations. Witnesses also testified that Knox
24 No. 07-2552

served as a bodyguard for a RUF leader, was seen at RUF

meetings, was seen carrying a gun, had said he killed a

family, and went by the name of an INPFL leader, among

other things. Given this involvement and the state of civil

unrest generally, a jury could reasonably infer, with little

effort, that Knox could not help but be aware of the group’s

terrorist bent. Thus, Knox does not prevail on these

sufficiency-of-the-evidence challenges.

V. Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of conviction

is AFFIRMED.

9-2-08