J. S20030/17

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION – SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA :

:

IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

v. :

:

SHAMIR SIMPKINS, : No. 742 EDA 2016

:

 Appellant :

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence, February 5, 2016,

in the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County

Criminal Division at No. CP-51-CR-0013143-2014

BEFORE: BOWES, J., OTT, J., AND FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E. 

MEMORANDUM BY FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E.: FILED MAY 26, 2017

Shamir Simpkins appeals from the judgment of sentence of 

February 5, 2016, following his conviction of robbery and related charges. 

Appellant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support the robbery 

charge. After careful review, we affirm.

The trial court has summarized the facts of this case as follows:

Omar Robbins-Morris testified that he was in 

the vicinity of North 16th and York Streets in 

Philadelphia, at about 9:50 AM on November 3, 

2014, on his way to work. As Robbins-Morris 

attempted to pass [appellant], who was standing on 

the sidewalk, [appellant] cut him off and would not 

let him by. [Appellant] then swung at RobbinsMorris, striking him in the left rear of his head. 

Robbins-Morris put down his bag, and the 

confrontation escalated into an altercation, during 

which, [appellant] threw a trash can at RobbinsMorris, breaking his glasses.
J. S20030/17

- 2 -

As Robbins-Morris attempted to retrieve his 

bag, [appellant] grabbed the bag and threw it across 

the street. Robbins-Morris retrieved his bag and 

started walking down the street, as [appellant] 

followed him. Robbins-Morris went into a corner 

store, but [appellant] waited for him. At some point, 

[appellant] entered the store and told Robbins-Morris 

that if he just gave him the bag, [appellant] would 

leave him alone.

At some point [appellant] went into RobbinsMorris[’] bag and took a calculator and headphones.

When police arrived on the scene, [appellant] 

was walking extremely close to an unidentified third 

person. When the officer stopped [appellant], he 

had to ask that person to step away.

Trial court opinion, 5/26/16 at 1-2 (citations to the transcript omitted).

Following a bench trial held on December 4, 2015, appellant was found 

guilty of robbery as a felony of the second degree, simple assault, and 

criminal mischief.1 Appellant was found not guilty of terroristic threats and 

recklessly endangering another person. (Notes of testimony, 12/4/15 at 

41.) On February 5, 2016, the trial court imposed a sentence of 3 years’ 

probation for robbery, with no further penalty on the remaining counts. No 

post-sentence motions were filed; however, on March 4, 2016, appellant 

filed a timely notice of appeal. On April 4, 2016, appellant was ordered to 

file a concise statement of errors complained of on appeal within 21 days 

pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b), and appellant timely complied on April 25, 

2016. The trial court filed a Rule 1925(a) opinion on May 26, 2016. 

 

1 18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 3701(a)(1)(iv), 2701(a), & 3304(a)(2), respectively. 
J. S20030/17

- 3 -

Appellant has raised the following issue for this court’s review: “Was 

not the evidence insufficient as a matter of law to sustain appellant’s 

conviction for robbery where there was insufficient evidence that appellant’s 

actions were taken in the course of committing a theft?” (Appellant’s brief 

at 3.)2

When reviewing a claim challenging the sufficiency of 

the evidence, we apply the following standard:

[W]hether viewing all the evidence 

admitted at trial in the light most 

favorable to the verdict winner, there is 

sufficient evidence to enable the 

fact-finder to find every element of the 

crime beyond a reasonable doubt. In 

applying [the above] test, we may not 

weigh the evidence and substitute our 

judgment for the fact-finder. In addition, 

we note that the facts and circumstances 

established by the Commonwealth need 

not preclude every possibility of 

innocence. Any doubts regarding a 

defendant’s guilt may be resolved by the 

fact-finder unless the evidence is so 

weak and inconclusive that as a matter 

of law no probability of fact may be 

drawn from the combined circumstances. 

The Commonwealth may sustain its 

burden of proving every element of the 

crime beyond a reasonable doubt by 

means of wholly circumstantial evidence. 

Moreover, in applying the above test, the 

entire record must be evaluated and all 

evidence actually received must be 

considered. Finally, the trier of fact while 

 

2 An additional issue raised in appellant’s Rule 1925(b) statement and 

addressed by the trial court in its Rule 1925(a) opinion, whether the trial 

court abused its discretion in overruling defense counsel’s objections to 

allegedly leading questions, has been abandoned on appeal.
J. S20030/17

- 4 -

passing upon the credibility of witnesses 

and the weight of the evidence produced, 

is free to believe all, part or none of the 

evidence.

Commonwealth v. Bullick, 830 A.2d 998, 1000 

(Pa.Super. 2003) (quoting Commonwealth v. 

Gooding, 818 A.2d 546, 549 (Pa.Super. 2003), 

appeal denied, 575 Pa. 691, 835 A.2d 709 (2003)).

Commonwealth v. Jannett, 58 A.3d 818, 819-820 (Pa.Super. 2012).

Robbery is defined, in relevant part, as follows:

(a) Offense defined.--

(1) A person is guilty of robbery if, in the 

course of committing a theft, he: 

(iv) inflicts bodily injury upon 

another or threatens another 

with or intentionally puts him 

in fear of immediate bodily 

injury[.] 

18 Pa.C.S.A. § 3701(a)(1)(iv). “An act shall be deemed ‘in the course of 

committing a theft’ if it occurs in an attempt to commit theft or in flight after 

the attempt or commission.” 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 3701(a)(2). 

To sustain a conviction of robbery, the 

Commonwealth must establish beyond a reasonable 

doubt that appellant, in the course of committing a 

theft, inflicted [] bodily injury upon Mr. [RobbinsMorris], or threatened him with or intentionally put 

him in fear of immediate [] bodily injury. 

18 Pa.C.S.A. § 3701(a). The element “in the course 

of committing a theft” is proven if the 

Commonwealth proves that the offense occurred 

during an attempt to commit theft or in flight after 

the attempt or commission. 18 Pa.C.S.A. 

§ 3701(a)(2). An attempted theft is committed when 

a person, with intent to commit a theft, does any act 
J. S20030/17

- 5 -

which constitutes a substantial step toward 

commission of the theft. 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 9[01](a). A 

person commits a theft if he or she “unlawfully takes 

. . . movable property of another with intent to 

deprive him thereof.” 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 3921(a). In 

light of these statutory definitions, the 

Commonwealth must prove beyond a reasonable 

doubt that appellant, with the intent to take property 

from [Robbins-Morris] and deprive [Robbins-Morris] 

of the property, took a substantial step toward those 

ends, and during the course of the act, inflicted [] 

bodily injury upon [Robbins-Morris].

Commonwealth v. Ennis, 574 A.2d 1116, 1119 (Pa.Super. 1990).

“Often, intent cannot be proven directly but must be 

inferred from examination of the facts and 

circumstances of the case.” Commonwealth v. 

Pond, 846 A.2d 699, 707 (Pa.Super. 2004) (citation 

omitted). Therefore, the Commonwealth is not 

required to provide direct proof of [the defendant]’s 

frame of mind. Commonwealth v. Matthews, 870 

A.2d 924, 928-29 (Pa.Super. 2005) (en banc), 

affirmed, 589 Pa. 487, 909 A.2d 1254 (2006). 

Instead, the Commonwealth can demonstrate its 

case through circumstantial evidence. Id. We can 

look at the totality of the circumstances to determine 

if [the defendant]'s actions gave rise to a reasonable 

inference of the requisite mens rea. Pond, supra.

Commonwealth v. Winger, 957 A.2d 325, 329 (Pa.Super. 2008).

Appellant argues that the Commonwealth failed to prove he had the 

requisite intent to deprive Robbins-Morris of his belongings. Appellant 

concedes that the evidence was sufficient to prove simple assault and 

criminal mischief, but argues that he never attempted to take anything from 

Robbins-Morris. Rather, appellant suggests that the testimony indicated 

that he simply wanted to fight with Robbins-Morris. (Appellant’s brief at 13.)
J. S20030/17

- 6 -

Robbins-Morris testified that he was walking down the street when 

appellant jumped him and struck him in the side of the head. (Notes of 

testimony, 12/4/15 at 9-10.) Robbins-Morris had never met appellant 

before that day. (Id. at 9.) Robbins-Morris testified that he “thought 

[appellant] was crazy or something.” (Id. at 10.) After Robbins-Morris set 

his book bag down on the ground, appellant threw a trash can at him, 

breaking his glasses. (Id. at 10-11.) 

During the altercation, Robbins-Morris went to retrieve his bag, at 

which point appellant grabbed it and threw it across the street. (Id.) 

Robbins-Morris testified that, “I’m just wondering why he attacked me. In 

the middle of the fight, I tried to grab my bag and go on my way to work. 

When I went to grab my bag, we started fighting again.” (Id.) Eventually 

Robbins-Morris was able to break free from appellant and go get his bag, 

using passing vehicles as a buffer. (Id. at 11, 20.)

Appellant followed Robbins-Morris to a corner store. (Id. at 11-12.) 

Robbins-Morris went inside, but appellant was waiting outside for him. (Id.

at 12.) Robbins-Morris testified that he “couldn’t go anywhere.” (Id.) His 

nose was bleeding and his glasses were broken. (Id. at 12-13, 24.) 

Robbins-Morris told people inside the store what happened and they called 

the police. (Id.) Appellant came into the store and told Robbins-Morris that 

if he gave him the book bag, appellant would leave him alone. (Id. at 12, 
J. S20030/17

- 7 -

23-24, 27.) Robbins-Morris testified that, “I wasn’t giving him my bag.” 

(Id. at 12.) 

Robbins-Morris testified that later, he discovered that his headphones 

and a scientific calculator were missing. (Id. at 15-16.) These items were 

never recovered. (Id.) Officer Roger McFadden, who arrested appellant, 

testified that appellant did not have anything on his person that belonged to 

Robbins-Morris. (Id. at 31.) The unidentified male walking with appellant 

was excluded as a suspect. (Id. at 31-32.) 

The trial court found, sitting as fact-finder in this non-jury case, that 

appellant removed the headphones and calculator from Robbins-Morris’ book 

bag. (Trial court opinion, 5/26/16 at 4.) However, Robbins-Morris conceded 

that the bag was already open when appellant threw it across the street and 

that the items could have flown out at that time:

Q. But when he grabbed the bag, he threw it in 

the middle of the street?

A. Yes.

Q. As far as you know, that’s how your items got 

broken?

A. He did pull some stuff out [sic] the bag too.

Q. He pulled it out when he was throwing it across 

the street?

A. When he picked up the bag it was kind of open 

so, yes, he did throw my stuff.

Q. When he picked up your bag, it was already a 

little bit – he didn’t open it, right?
J. S20030/17

- 8 -

A. Right.

Q. So anything that came out of that happened 

while he was throwing the bag in the street?

A. It could possibly be.

Q. And after he threw the bag in the street, he 

started fighting you again?

A. Yes.

Q. He didn’t go to the bag again, correct?

A. No.

Notes of testimony, 12/4/15 at 19.

While the trial court’s conclusion that appellant purposefully removed 

the headphones and calculator from Robbins-Morris’ book bag does not 

appear to be supported by the evidence, appellant clearly deprived RobbinsMorris of his property. Appellant threw the book bag into the street out of 

Robbins-Morris’ reach.

Robbins-Morris retrieved his bag from the street and walked down to 

the corner store, where he solicited help. (Id. at 11-12, 20-21.) Appellant 

followed Robbins-Morris to the corner store. (Id. at 11-12.) While 

Robbins-Morris waited inside the store for police to arrive, appellant lingered 

around outside, waiting for Robbins-Morris to come out. (Id. at 23.) 

Occasionally, appellant would enter the store and make comments such as, 

“[T]his is my corner store, you going to stay in there all day[?]” (Id.) 

According to Robbins-Morris’ statement to police, “[Appellant] kept walking 
J. S20030/17

- 9 -

by the door, looking inside, and waiting for me to come out.” (Id.; Defense 

Exhibit D-1.)

Robbins-Morris testified that, “He told me if I just gave him my bag, 

he would leave me alone. I wasn’t giving him my bag.” (Id. at 12; see 

also trial court opinion, 5/26/16 at 4 (“As Robbins-Morris attempted to get 

to safety, he recovered his bag and fled, pursued by [appellant] who 

barricaded him inside a corner store, demanding his bag as a condition to 

leave. These were not isolated events, but part of a continuum of force by 

[appellant], designed to separate the complainant from his belongings.”).) 

In his statement to police, in response to the detective’s question, “Did the 

male verbally threaten you?”; Robbins-Morris answered, “Yeah. When he 

said if I put my bookbag down and came out [of] the store, we could finish 

this.” (Notes of testimony, 12/4/15 at 27; defense Exhibit D-1.) 

We determine that the evidence adduced by the Commonwealth at 

trial was sufficient, as a matter of law, to prove that appellant had the intent 

to deprive Robbins-Morris of his property, whether or not he took the 

headphones and calculator. Issues of credibility are left to the trier of fact, 

and it is not this court’s function to re-weigh the evidence on appeal.

Judgment of sentence affirmed.
J. S20030/17

- 10 -

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 5/26/2017