### IN THE COURT OF APP EALS OF TENNESS EE AT JAC KSON Se pte m be r 20, 200 6 S es sio n
IN R E: ESTA TE OF AN NE F. THR EEF OOT, AN NE W. M ILLERv. TH E UN ITED STA TES

A Dire ct A ppeal f

romthe P robate C ourt for Shelb y County No. C-6880 The Honorable DonnS outhern, Jud ge

No. W2005-02942-C OA-R3-C V - F iled Novem ber 3, 2006

Appellant, Executrix of Dece dent’s Estate, f iled a re quest with the Probate Court of Shelby Countyto authorize the post-mortem t ransf er of rea l property to a limited family partne rship, which
was a lleg edly

established by oral contra ct enter ed by and betwee n the Appellant and De cede nt prior to Dece dent’s de ath

. T he United States, Appe llee, disputed the Appe llant’s contention that there was an oral contra ct to f

orm a partne rship. The trial court found that the rec ord d i d n o t s u p p o rt an enfor cea ble ora l contrac t b y cl ear and c onvincing evidenc e. Appe llant appea ls. W e af firm and
rema nd.

Te nn. R . A pp. P . 3 ; A ppe al a s o f Rig ht ; J udgm e nt of the P r oba teCo ur t A ffirm e d and Rem anded

W. F RAN K C RAW FORD , P.J ., W.S ., delivere d the opinion of the court, in which D AVI D R. F ARMER , J . and H OL L Y M. K I RBY , J ., joined.

Rob e rt F . M ill e r, Rob e rt

A. Mc L e a n, Ni c ho l G ibs on Da vis on , a ndP aul C. P eel of Me mph is, Tenne ssee f

or Appe llant, Anne W. Mill er
J ohn A. Nolet and L

indsey Cooper of Washing ton, D.C., for Appe llee, The United States

OP IN ION

Anne F . Three foot (“D ece dent”) died testate on September 23, 2002. The Dec edent na med he r o nly c hil d, An neW. Mi lle r ( “ Ap pe lla nt” ), e xec utrix of he r E state . O n O c tob e r 1 8, 20 02 , M s. Mil le r f ile d a “ Pe tit ion fo r P ro bate of

Will andAp po int me nt o f P e rs on a l Re pr e se ntativ e ” fo r the L a st W i l l & T e s t a m e n t o f t h e D e c e d e n t

. T h e D e c e d e n t ’ s W i l l w a s a d m i t t e d t o p r o b a t e o n t h e s a m e d a y, and Ms. Miller was a

ppointed executrix there of. I n h er Wil l, the Dec edent made a number of sp e c if ic c a sh be qu e sts , b ut b e qu e a the d a ll o f h e r p e rs on a l e ff e c ts a nd re ma ind e r of

he r E state to M s. Mil le r. Ac c or din g to an a c c ou nti ng fi le d b y the Es ta te on Oc tob e r 1 4, 20 05 , th e g ro ss p ro bate e state at Dec edent’ s death e x cee ded $3 million.T hi s d o cum ent was at t ached as E xhi b i t A t o t he P et i t i o n. 1

-2- O n A u g u s t 2 7 , 2 0 0 3 , M s
. M il le r f il e d , o n b e h a lf o f th e E s tate , a “ Pe ti ti o n to A u th o r iz e Ex ecution of Partnership Ag ree ment and Subscripti on Ag ree ment and Sale of Real Estate” (the

“ Pe tit ion ” ). Th e Pe tit ion re a ds , in re le va nt p art , a s f oll ow s:
2. That prior to Ms. Thre efoot’s de ath, the law f irm of Waller L andsen D ortch & Davis...wa s retaine d by [Ms . Miller] , acting as a tto rn e y -i n- fa c t f

or the de c e a se d, to pr ov ide e state plann ing se rv ic e s. These se rvice s i n cl u ded forming a family limit ed partnership under the la ws of the Sta te of Te nn e sse e a ndkn ow n a s th e Th re e fo ot F a mil y Partners, L .P. (The “Partnership”) in w hich the dece ased would own
a nin e ty -n ine pe rc e nt ( 99 %) lim ite d p art ne rs hip int e re st a nd[Ms. Mil le r] a on e pe rc e nt ( 1% ) g e ne ra l pa rt ne rs hip int e re st. 3. That pursua nt to the Partnershi p Ag ree ment and a subsc ription ag ree ment related t here to, the decease d ag ree d to contribute all of he r i n t e r e s ti n c e r t a i n tr a c t s o f r e a l e s t a t e l yi n g i n P e rr y C o u n t y, Tenne ssee, ex cept for a r esidenc e and thr ee sur rounding acr es located t h er eo n , an d ce rt ai n s ec u ri t i es , b o n d s an d ca s h i n h erb ro k er age acc ounts....
4. That the Certificate of Formation for the Partn er s h i p was sig ned by [Ms . Miller] and filed with the Secre tary of State on September 16, 2002, and with the Shelby CountyReg ister on September 23, 2002.... 1

5. That the Partne rship Ag ree ment and Subscription Materials for the Partnership we re c ompleted on September 20, 2002, in acc o rdance with the ag ree ment enter ed into betwee n [Ms . Miller] and the dece dent, but wer e not executed prior to the death of dec edent.... 6. That pursua nt to T.C.A. Sections 61-1- 101(7) and 61-2-502( a), the dece dent and [Ms. Mill er] made a binding or al ag ree ment to enter into the P ar t n ership Agr eeme nt and contribute the assets to the Partnership....

* * *

8. That [Ms

. Miller], as Ex ecutrix , is r equire d pursuant to T.C.A. § 61

- 2

- 5 0 2 ( a ) to tr a n s f

e r ti tl e to th e p r o p e r ty

d e s c r ib e d in the Subscription Agr eeme nt to the Partnership....-3- 9. That while title to the rea l property described i n the Subscription A g r e e m e n tv e s t e d i n t h e b e n e f i c i ar i e s u n d e r

t h e d e c e d e n t ’ s wi ll pursuant to T.C.A. § 3 1 -2-103, the Court is nonethe less authorized
un de r T .C. A. § 3 0- 2- 40 2( c ) t o d ive st tho se be ne fi c iari e s of the ir tit le
a ndint e re st t o the re a l pr op e rt y a nd a uth orize [Ms. Mil le r] to v e st t itl e to t he re a l pr op e rt y

in the Part ne rs hip to s a tis fy its statut ory

ri g ht t o t h e r e a l p r o p e r t y.
* * * 11. That pursua nt to 28 U.S.C .S. § 2410, the United States of Americ a be joined as a party to this action for the pur pose of quieting title t o th e p r o p e r ty th a t th e d e c e d e n t a g r e e d to tr a n s f e r to the Part ne rs hip and de te rm ini ng that th e lie n a ri sin g un de r 2 6 U .S. C.S. § 6324 (a) (1) (lien for feder al estate tax es) a pplies to the 99% limited partne rshi p interest in the Partne rship which wa s part of the dece dent’s probate estate rathe r than to the property which is subject to the c on tr a c tua l ri g hts of the Part ne rs hip a nd is to be c on tr ibu te d to the Partner ship pursuant to the terms of the Subscription Ag ree ment beca use of the prior claim of the Partnership u n d er T.C.A. § 61-2- 502(a)

. The Partnership Ag ree ment and Subscription Materials wer e attache d t o t h e P et i t i o n as Exhi bit s B and C r e sp e c tiv e ly . T he Part ne rs hip Ag re e me nt w a s e xec ute d o n Jun e 4, 20 03 (s ome se ve n mo nth s a ft e r De c e de nt’ s de a th) by a nd be tw e e n Ms. Mil le r a s g e ne ra l pa rt ne r andTh e Es ta te of An ne F . T hr e e fo ot a s a lim ite d pa rt ne r. Th e Sub sc ri pti on Ma te ri a ls p ro vid e , in re le va nt p art , th a t: (1) the E state subscribe s to a 99% l imited partne rship interest and, in c onsideration ther eof, a g ree s to transfe r t o the P artne rship sever al t rac ts of real property located in Per ry County , Tenne ssee ( no cash va lue is g iven for the rea l property ), and spe cific a mounts of cash a nd marke table secu rities (with a va lue of ne arly

$1.5 milli on); and (2) Ms. Mill er indi v idually subscribes to a 1% g ener al partne rship interest and, in consideration there of, agr ees to a cash contribution equal to 1.010100101 pe rc e nt o f the fair

mark e t va lue of the pr op e rt y c on tr ibu te d b y

the Es ta te . N e ith e r the Part ne rs hip Ag ree ment nor the Subscription Materials we re sig ned by the Dec edent prior to her de ath (a s they
we re bo th exe c ute d some se ve n mo nth s a ft e r that e ve nt) . Rathe r, a ll d oc ume nts we re sig ne d b y Ms. Miller, i ndividually

as to her inter est and c ontribution as a g ener al partner a nd in her c apac ity as executrix of the De cede nt’s Estate as to the Estate’s intere st and contribution as a limited partne r.
On Oc tob e r 2 , 2 00 3, the Un ite d St a te s (“ Ap pe lle e ” ) fi le d a “N oti c e of Re mov a l” of

the c a se to the Un ite d St a te s D ist ri c t Co urt f

or the Wes te rn Di stric t of

Te nn e sse e pu rs uan t to 2 8 U .S. C. §§1444 and 2410. On Oc tober 14, 2003, the United States filed its Answer in whic h it denies that the Dec edent wa s a partner in the Partne rship, and denies that the Decede nt eff ectuated any

transfe r of prope rty

into the Partnership, or that the Dec edent authorized such transf er. O n October

31, 2003, the Estate moved to remand the matter to State court. As g rounds for its motion, the Estate asse rted-4-

that fede ral jurisdict i o n wo u l d require a fe dera l question and, bec ause the case involved only the q u e s t i o n o f

w h e t h e r D e c e d e n th a d e n t e r e d i n t o a n e n f o r c e ab l e o r a l c o n tr a c tr e s p e c t i n g h e r p r o p e r t y, no such fede ral question exis ted so as to c onfer jurisdiction on the f eder al court. I n the alternative, the Estate a

rg ued that the c ase involved only state probate matters a nd, conseque ntly , was subjec t to the “probate exception” to f eder al jurisdiction. Although the United States opposed the r emand, by its Order of

Marc h 15, 2004, the Dis trict Court held t hat i t lacked r emoval jurisdiction, g rante d the Es ta te ’s mot ion a ndre ma nd e d th e ma tte r t o th e Te nn e sse e pr ob a te c ou rt

. On J uly 9, 2004, the United S t ates filed a motion to dis miss the Petit ion for lac k of jurisdiction or, in the alternative, for summary judgme nt. This moti on was de nied by the court and the matter proce eded to he aring on October 17, 2005. On November 17, 2005, the tr i al co u rt
e nte re d it s O rd e r, wh ic h r e a ds , in pe rt ine nt p art , a s f oll ow s: [O] n the issue bef

ore th e C ourt–whethe r there is an executory
c on tr a c t w hic h s ho uldbe e nf or c e d– the Cou rt

fi nd s:
1. There was no writing evide ncing a contr act t o co ntribute any assets to the partnership.

2

. W h en an ora l contrac t is sought to be enf orce d the trier of

fac t must scrutiniz e and w eig h the evidenc e and de termine the e x istence of an or al contra ct by

clea r and c onvincing proof.

3. Af te r a bo ut a fi ft e e n mi nu te me e tin g wi th h e r C PA and[Ms. Miller], t he dec edent instructe d [Ms . Mill er] and her acc ountant to ge t the fa milylimit ed partnership done.

4. A fa mily limit ed partne rship was formed but the de cede nt passed
away befor e any

assets we re transfer

red i nto the partne rship, which
a t th e tim e of

de c e de nt’ s d e a th w a s a n e mpt y ve sse l.

5. Th e pr oo f i s n ot s uf

fi c ie nt a s to e xac tly wh a t the de c e de nt w ou ld have put into the partnership.

6. Th e de c e de nt d id n ot m ake a g if t of the Pe rry Cou nty re a l e state in that she did not transfe r it during her life time and the g ift was not completed. Whereupon, this Court further finds that there was no c ontrac t to c on tr ibu te a ny a sse ts to the famil y lim ite d pa rt ne rs hip wh ic h is bin din g up on the Es ta te of An ne Th re e fo ot.-5- Wherefor e, it is he re b yorder ed, adjudg ed and de cre ed that the re wa s n o c on tr a c t bi nd ing up on the Es ta te of An ne Th re e fo ot t o fund the familylimit ed partnership....

Ms. Mill er a

ppeals fr om this Order a nd raises two issues f or re view as state d in her brie f:

I . Whether the Prob at e C o u rt err ed in holding that there w as no c on tr a c t to c on tr ibu te a ny a sse ts t o th e fam il ylim ite d p art ne rs hip wh ic h is bin din g up on the e state of An ne F . T hr e e fo ot.

I I . Whether the Probate Court erre d in apply ing a clea r and convincing standard to the f unding of the partnership.

Concernin g t h e s t an d ard of revie w used by

the trial court, Ms. Mil ler a rg ues that the trial court e rre d in requiring the Estate to prove the exist ence of an e nforc eable partne rship contra ct by clea r a n d c o n v in c in g e v id e n c e , a n d a s s e r ts th a t th e le s s s trin g e n t p r e p o n d e r a n c e o f th e evidenc e standard is a

pplicable to the que stion of whether an ora l contrac t to fund the Partner ship ex ists.

I n 1988, Tenne ssee a dopted the Te nnessee Revised Uniform Li m i t ed Partnership Ac t (“ TRU L PA” ), co difi e d at T .C. A. §§ 61 -2 -1 01 to 6 1- 2- 12 08 (2 00 2 a ndSup p. 20 05 ). TRU L PA define s a li mited partne rship as “a partne rship formed by two (2) or more persons under the laws of the state of T ennesse e, and ha ving one (1) or more g ener al partners a n d o n e (1) or more limited partne rs.” T.C.A.. § 61-2-101( 8). T.C.A. § 61-2-20 perta ins to the execution of a Certific ate a nd the fo rm a tio n o f a

lim ite d p art ne rs hip a ndre a ds , in re le va nt p art , a s f oll ow s: A limited partnership is forme d at the time of the filing of the initial
certificate of limit ed partne rship with the secr etary of state or at any later date or time spec ified i n the certificate of l imited partnership if, in either c ase, the re ha s been substantial c ompliance wi t h the require ments of this section.
T.C.A. § 61-2-201( c).

Al l of the g e ne ra l partne rs , o f w hic h th e re mus t be a t le a st o ne , mu st e xec ute the c e rt if ic a te of lim ite d p art ne rs hip . T .C. A. § 6 1- 2- 20 1( a ). Ho we ve r, TRU L PA does no t req uir e a pa rt ne rs hip ag ree ment to be filed. T.C.A. § 61-2-201( b). A partnership ag ree ment is “...any ag ree ment, written
or oral, of the partne rs as to the aff airs of a limit ed partne rship and the conduct of it s b u s iness.” T.C.A. § 61-2-101( 11). Although TRUL PA doe s not require a written partner ship ag ree ment, see T.C.A. 61-2-201( b), “TRUL PA does i mplicitly presume that a limited partnership will operate from some kind of ag ree ment or under standing betwee n the partners.” In Re Taylor & Ass oc., L.P. , 249 B.R. 431, 443 (E.D . Tenn. 1997). In rea ching the conc lusion that TRUL PA presumes some sort of ag ree ment betwee n the parties to the partner ship, the Taylor Cou rt re a so ne d a s f

oll ow s:-6- I t is a xiomatic that bu sin e ss a sso c ia te s, whe the r j oin t ve ntu re rs , partne rs, or limited partner s, to a minimum deg ree jointly ag ree to and understand the purpose, intent, and g oal of th e ir business relationship. I ndeed, the partne rs of a

limit ed part n er ship must agr ee “ as to the aff airs of a limited partner ship and the conduc t of its business.” See [T.C .A.] § 61-2-101( 11) (defining a partnership agr eeme nt). Section 61-2-301, in re levant part, is inst ructive:
(a) I n connec tion with the formati o n o f a lim ited pa rt ne rs hip , a pe rs on a c qu ir ing a pa rt ne rs hip int e re st
as a limit ed partner is admit ted as a limit ed partner of the limited partnership upon the latter to occur of : (1) The formation of the limi t ed partnership[, see Section 61-2-201( c) ]; or
(2) T h e t i m e p ro v i de d

i n a n d u p o n c o m p l i a n c e w ith the pa rtn e rsh ip a gre e me nt or, if t he pa rtn e rsh ip
a g r e e m e n t

do e s n o t s o p ro v i de , w h e n th e p e r s o n 's admission is refl ec t ed in the records of the limited partnership.
(b) Af ter the formation of a limited partnership, a person a cquiring a partnership intere st as a limited partne r is admitted as a lim ited partne r of the limited partne rship:
(1 ) In th e c a se of

a pe rs on a c qu ir ing a

pa rtners hip in te r e s t d ir e c tl y

f r o m th e li mi te d p ar tn e r s h ip, a t the time provided in and upon c ompliance w i t h the pa rtn e rsh ip a greeme nt o r, if t he pa rtn e rsh ip agr ee ment does not so provide, upon the consent of all pa rtn e rs a nd

whe n th e pe rso n's a dm iss ion is
re fle c te d in the re c or

ds of t he lim ite d p ar tne rsh ip
AAAA
Id . § 61-2-301( a)( 1), (2) , and (b) (1) ( emphasis adde d).

An a na ly sis of

TRU L PA r e ve a ls p e op le wa nti ng to for m a limit ed par

tnersh i p cannot just stumble into one. The statutory require ments for be coming a limited partner are signific ant; the benef it of limi ted liabi l i t yexacts a price . “Ge nera lly , limit ed partne rships are cre ature s of statute, and statutory com p l i ance establishes their e x istence.” Hayes v. FPI Nursery Partners 1984-I ,-7- No . 9 0- 15 22 4, 93 6 F. 2d 57 7 (T able ), 19 91 WL 10 34 47 , at p. * 3 ( 9th Cir. June 11 , 1 99 1) (c itatio n o mit te d) ; see also In re Drim m el , 108 B.R. 284, 287 (Bkrtc y .D.Kan.1989) (noting limit ed partnerships, as “cr eatur es of statute[, ...] m ust be define d”). L imited partnerships ar e cre atur e s o f

s tatu te

. . . . U n li k e a

g e n e r a l p ar tn e r s h ip , a

li mi te d partne rship cannot be cre ated by informal agr ee m ent; its ex istence depends on c ompliance with the Uniform L imited Partnership Act.... [F ]ilin g de fe c ts a ff

e c t the lia bil ity of the os te ns ibl e lim ite d p art ne rs
. Cont ine nta l Wa ste Sy ste m, Inc . v . Z os o P ar tne rs , 727 F.Supp. 1143, 1146 (N.D.I ll.1989) (apply ing Illinois law). In Re Taylor & Ass oc., L.P. , 249 B.R. at 443- 44.

I n addition to the statutory filing r equire ments, in order to form a limited partnership, ther e mus t a lso be pr oo f that th e pa rt ie s to the pa

rt ne rs hip “ int e n[de d] to do the thi ng s w hic h c on sti tut e a partnership.” Bas s v. B as s , 814 S.W .2d 38, 41 (Tenn. 1991) . This requisite intent arises f rom the p ar t n er s h i p agr ee m en t , wh i ch , as d i s cu s s ed ab o v e, m ay b e o ra l i n fo rm
. I n t h e i n s t an tca s e, al t h o u gh there is a written Partne rship Ag ree ment, that written ag ree ment was ex ecute d afte r the De cede nt’s de a th. Con se qu e ntl y , it pr ov ide s no con c lus ive e vid e nc e a s to wh e the r M s. Th re e fo ot i nte nd e d to enter into a partne rshi p p ri o r t o h er de ath and, if so, what she intended to contribute to that partne rship.

The burde n of proof

of the e x istence of

a partnership is upon the o n e who alleg es the partne rship. Mull

ins v . Ev ans , 308 S.W .2d 494, 498 (Tenn. Ct. App.1957). In Johns on v. Grave s , 15 Te nn . A pp . 4 66 , 1 93 2 WL 13 42 (1 93 2) , th e Cou rt

de te rm ine d that or a l pa

rt ne rs hip a g re e me nts of the ty pe at issue in the c ase at bar should be a naly zed under a clea r and c onvincing s t andard of pr oo f. Th e Cou rt ’s re a so ne d a s f oll ow s:
T h e C o u r t s r e c o g n i z e t h e d a n g e r w h i c h l u rk s i n c o n tr a c ts o f t his nature [i .e. contr acts of pa rtnership] , which summarily dispose of
on e ' s es tat e. Th e y

are e a sy

to f abric a te , a ndmus t be c le arl y es t ab l i s h e d

. W h i l e i ti s n o tes s en t i al t h at t h eyb e i n wr i t i n g, nevertheless when an oral c ontrac t is soug ht to be enfor ced, the try ers [s ic ] o f th e f

a c ts ar e r e q u ir e d to c ar e f u ll y s c ru ti n iz e a n d w eig h the evidenc e, and should be satisfied of its exist enc e b y cl ear and
c o n v i n c i n g p r o o f

. E v i d e n c e o f a d m i s s i o n s o f a d e a d m a n h a s a l w a ys be e n c on sid e re d w e ak a ndun re lia ble , a ndsh ou ld b e a c te d u po n w ith caution and be scrutinized wit h care be fore it is m ade the basis of
e sta bli sh ing the e xiste nc e of

a c on tr a c t by

the de c e de nt.
Id. at * 1 2 (q u o t i n g Mc Cal lum v. Pi c ke ns , 213 N.Y.S. 119, 121 (N.Y. Sup. 1925))

.-8-

Although the se contra cts may be express or implied, written or or al, in order to be enfor cea ble the contract must, “among other e lements, result fr om a meeting of the minds in mutual assent to terms, must be base d upon sufficie nt consideration, and must be sufficiently definite.” Wheeler v. Haley , No. 91-267-I , 1993 WL 398489 , * 5 (T en n . Ct. App. Oct. 1, 1993) (c iting Johns on v. Central Nat. I ns. Co. , 210 Te nn . 24, 34 -3 5, 35 6 S.W.2 d 2 77 , 2 81 (1 96 2) ; Ja mest owne on Sig nal , I nc . v . Fi rst Fe de ra l Sa v . & L oa n Ass 'n ., 807 S.W .2d 559, 564 (Tenn. Ct. App.1990); Price v . Mercury Supply Co. , 6 8 2 S. W. 2 d 9 2 4 , 9 3 3 ( T e n n
. Ct

. A p p
. 1 9 8 4 ) ) . I n Ba ss v. B ass , 814 S.W .2d 38 (Tenn. 1991), our Supreme Court explained the standar d for de termining the exist ence of a pa rt ne rs hip c on tr a c t ba se d u po n th e int e nti on of the pa rt ie s th e re to, to w it:
[T] he existence of a

partne rship d ep en d s upon the intention of the parties, a nd the contr o l l i n g intention in thi s reg ard is that
asce rtainable from the a cts of the pa rties. Wy att

v . Br own , 39 Tenn.App. 28, 281 S. W

. 2 d 64, 67 (1955). Althoug h a contr act of partne rship, either e x press or implied, is essential to the c reation of pa rt ne rs hip status , it is no t e sse nti a l that the pa rt ie s a c tually

int e ndto beco m e p ar tners. Wy att , 281 S.W .2d at 67. The e x istence of a partne rship is not a question of the parties' undis cl o sed intention or
e ve n th e te rm ino log y

the y us e to de sc ri be the ir re la tio ns hip , no r is i t
nece ssary that the parties have an understanding of the leg al ef fec t of their ac ts. Rob e rts , 779 S.W .2d at 795-96. It i s t h e i n t ent to do the things whic h constitute a partnership that determines whether individuals are pa

rtners, rega rd l ess if it is their purpose to cr eate or avoid the re lationship. Wy att , 2 8 1 S

. W

. 2 d a t6 7

. S t a t e d a n o t h e r w a y, the exist ence of a pa

rtnership may

be implied from the c ircumstance s wher e it appea

rs that the in d i v i d u als involved have e ntere d into a bu sin e ss r e la tio ns hip fo r p ro fi t, c omb ini ng the ir pr op e rt y , la

bo r, sk ill , e x p e r i e n c e , o r

m o n e y.
Id . at 41 (footnotes omitted).

Be cause the written Partne rship Ag ree ment in this case is n o t dispositi ve on the issue of whether Ms. Three foot intended to form a limited partnership with her daug hter, i f a c ontrac t of partne rship exis ts, then the rec ord her e must establish, “by clea r and c onvincing proof, the e x istence of a n oral con tr act of

pa rt ne rs hip e vid e nc e d b y

mutua l a sse nt t o s uf

fi c ie ntl y de fi nit e te rm s th a t is supported byvalid consideration.” In re Taylor & Assoc., L.P. , 249 B.R. at 469. Althoug h it does not require as much c erta inty as the “ bey ond a rea sonable doubt” standard, the “cle ar and convinc ing evidenc e” sta ndard is more exacting tha n the “pr eponder ance of the evidenc e” sta ndard. O'Daniel v. Messier , 905 S.W. 2d 18 2, 18 8 (T e nn .Ct .A pp .1 99 5) (r e v' d o n o the r g ro un ds ); Bra ndo n v . W right , 83 8 S. W.2d 532, 53 6 ( Te nn . Ct . A pp .1 99 2) . In o rd e r t o b e c le ar andc on vin c ing , e vid e nc e mus t eliminate any

serious or substantial doubt about t he correc tness of t he conclusions to be drawn fr om the evidenc e. Hodges v. S.C. Toof & Co. , 83 3 S.W. 2d 89 6, 90 1 n. 3 (Ten n. 1992 ); O'Daniel , 905 S.W .2d at 188. Such evidenc e should pr oduce in the fac t-finder ' s mind a firm belief or convic tion-9-

as to the truth of the alleg ations sought to be e stablished. O'Daniel , 905 S.W .2d at 188; Wiltcher v. Bradley , 708 S.W .2d 407, 411 (T en n .Ct.App.1985). I n contra st to the preponder ance of the
e vid e nc e stan dard , clear andc on vin c ing e vid e nc e sh ou ld d e mon str a te that th e truthof the fa c ts
asserted is “hig hly

probable ” as oppose d to merely “more probable ” than not. Lettner v. Plum m er , 55 9 S. W.2 d 7 85 , 7 87 (T e nn .1 97 7) ; Go lds mith v . Ro be rts , 622 S.W .2d 4 3 8, 441 (T e nn .Ct .A pp .1 98 1) ; Bra ndo n v . W right , 838 S. W

. 2 d at 536. Nonethe less, even if there is not sufficie nt proof in the re cord of an oral contra ct, “the exis tence of a partne rship may be implied from the c ir c ums ta nc e s w he re it a pp e ars that th e ind ivi du a ls i nv olv e d h a ve e nte red into a bu sin e ss relationship for profit, combining their prope rty , labor, skill, experience , or mon ey .” Bas s , 814 S.W .2d at 41.

At the c los e of

pr oo f in this c a se , the tr ia l c ou rt c on c lud e d th a t th e e vid e nc e faile d to e sta bli sh the e xiste nc e of

a n o ra l c on tr a c t th a t is su ff ic ie ntl y de fi nit e to e nf

or c e , to wi t:
Th e pr ob le m is , it ’s mor e in t e rm s o f w he the r the re wa s a c on tr a c t, e xec uto ry

c on tr a c t. I

thi nk I ’v e g ot t o lo ok

a t, u nd e r the se circ umstances, a s to whether I can f ind that there w as a c ontrac t. I t’s cle ar that th e y

–th e re wa s n o w ri tte n a g re e me nt, writt e n c on tr a c t,
e vid e nc ing a

c on tr a c t.
The law is c lear in T ennesse e, when an ora l contrac t is sought to be enf orce d, the trier o f fact must scrutiniz e and w eig h the
e v id e n c e , s a ti s f

y it s e xis te n c e b y c le ar a n d c o n v in c in g p r o o f

. . . . [T ]o be an enfor cea

ble contra ct, it must result in the meeting of the minds and mutual consent, must be based upon sufficie nt c onsideration and must be sufficiently

definite.

I t appears to me that we ’ve g ot some problems in sever al
are as, whe re one of which is the–it’s suff iciently definite, the evidenc e is that afte r about a 15-minute meeting wit h the CPA and he r d a ug hte r, sh e [Ms. Th re e fo ot] s a id g o ahe a d o r g o to it or g e t it done, towa rd s t o that eff ect. Sadly

and unfortunately , she passe d
away befor e the–much one was done , other than establishing the–filing the ce rtificate in Nashville, which is rea lly not much more than an e mpty

vessel with nothing tr ansfe rre d to it. Not h i ng was tr a nsferre d to it d uring he r l if e tim e . A ndI

do thi nk that th e re jus t isn’t en o u gh sufficie ncy

of proof as to exactly

or eve n as to what
wa s– wh a t sh e wo uldha ve pu t in that do c ume nt.

Tu rn ing to the re c or d in thi s c a se , th e e vid e nc e ind ic a te s th a t Mr . F os te r, Ms. Mil le r, a ndMs. Three foot met for a

pproxi mately 4 5 -minutes, 15-minutes of which w as spent discussing the proposed f

amily limit ed partnership. Acc ording to Mr. Foster, M s. Three foot expressed her desire to maintain control over

the fa milyfarm and Mr. F oster advise d her that she would still own the-10-

property throug h her pa

rtnership intere st. Mr. Foster testif ie d that Ms. Three foot “c lear ly understood that the fa

rm property

and...sig nificant portion of he r marke table sec u ri t i es” w ould go into the Part ne rs hip . H ow e ve r, ne ith e r M r. F os te r no r M s. Mil le r t e sti fi e d th a t Ms . T hr e e fo ot a c tua lly tol d either of them to put the farm or

any portion of her se curities into the Partner ship. The Dec edent’ s direc tive to “g et it done” is not sufficie ntly definite to provide clear and convincing proof that he r intent was to form the Partnership, much less that she intende d to transfe r the f am i l y farm and sp e c if ic se c uriti e s into that e nti ty . A s th e tr ia l c ou rt c or re c tly de te rm ine d, thee vid e nc e he re c a n o nly
su pp ort a fi nd ing that, at mo st, the De c e de nt m a nif e ste d a n in te nt f

or Ms. Mil le r a ndMr . F os te r t o beg in the proce ss of forming a partnership. There is, how ever , no evidenc e in the re cord on w hich to base a determination of whether the Dec edent ex presse d an acce ptance of any of the terms of the partne rship ag ree ment that was written afte r her death, nor is there any evidenc e to clea rly support a finding that the Dec edent intende d to transfe r the fa rm, or any

securities, to the Partnership.

For the fore g oing r easons, we aff irm the Orde r of the trial court and rema nd this case f or such fu rthe r pro ceedi ng s a s may be ne c e ssa

ry . Co sts of

thi s a pp e a l are a sse sse d a g a ins t th e Ap pe lla nt, Anne W. Miller, and her

surety

.

__________________________________________

W. F RANK CR A WF O R D , PR E S I D I N G JU DG E, W.S.