Pursuant to Ind.Appellate Rule 65(D),

this Memorandum Decision shall not be regarded as precedent or cited before any court except for the purpose of establishing the defense of res judicata, collateral estoppel, or the law of the case.

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANTS : ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEES : MICHAEL L. CARMIN ROBERT C. PRICE GREGORY A. BULLMAN Price & Runnells Andrews Harrell Mann Carmin & Parker, P.C. Bloomington, Indiana Bloomington, Indiana THOMAS A. BERRY Berry & Domer B loomington, Indiana


## IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
SHERRI HILLENBURG and ) DENNIS HILLENBURG, ) ) Appellants

- Plaintiffs, ) ) vs. ) No. 53 A04

- 1111

- PL

- 615 ) PAUL D. REEVES AND NORMA J. REEVES ) REVOCABLE TRUST; PAUL REEVES, ) NORMA J. REEVES and JO HN REEVES, ) ) Appellees

- Defendants. )

APPEAL FROM THE MONROE CIRCUIT COURT The Honorable Elizabeth A. Cure, Judge Cause No. 53C04

- 0907

- PL

- 1934 August 13, 2012 MEMORANDUM DECISION
- NOT FOR PUBLICATION MAY, Judge2

Sherri and Dennis Hillenburg appea l the denial of their Motion to Correct E rror filed in response to a judgment in favor of the Paul D. Reeves and Norma J. Reeves Revocable Trust, Paul Reeves, Norma J. Reeves, and John Reeves ( collectively, “ Reeves ” ) regarding the ownership of a parcel of land situated between land owned by Hillenburg s and land owned by Reeves ( the “Disputed Parcel”). Hillenburg s present multiple issues for our review, but
we find one dispositive

– whether the trial court erred when it determined Reeves established
ownersh ip of the Disputed Parcel through title by acquiescence. We affirm.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
The Disputed Parcel measur es approximately twelve feet across at its widest point. Sometime prior to 1939, when Norma Reeves’ parents, John and Janlee Holla nd, bought the Reeves parcel, a barbed wire fence was erected between the two parcels to separate the Reeves parcel from an orchard owned by the Adams Brothers. In 2008, Dennis Hillenburg surveyed his property and discovered the fence was on the Hillenbur g parcel

. On July 31, 2009, Sherri Hillenburg filed a complaint against Reeves, alleging a dispute over who may use a passageway on the Disputed Parcel, whether there was trespass on the Disputed Parcel, and damages therefrom. Reeves answer ed and counter claimed to quiet the title of the Disputed Parcel through adverse possession or title by acquiescence. In the counterclaim, Reeves named Dennis Hillenburg as a co - defendant.
After a bench trial , the court declared Reeves the owner of the Disputed Parce l by adverse possession and title by acquiescence. The Hillenburg s filed a Motion to Correct
Error , which t he trial court deni ed

.3 DISCUSSION AND DECISION A trial court has broad discretion in ruling on a motion to correct error. Volunteers of
Am. v. Pre mier Auto Acceptance Corp ., 755 N.E.2d 656, 658 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001). We will reverse only for an abuse of that discretion. Id

. An abuse of discretion occurs if the decision was against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances before the cour t or if the court misapplied the law. Id

. Where, as here, a party has requested findings and conclusions under Indiana Trial Rule 52(A), our standard of review is well

- settled. We must first determine whether the evidence supports the findings and secon d, whether the findings support the judgment.
Maxwell v. Maxwell , 850 N.E.2d 969, 972 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006), reh’g denied , trans. denied

. We will disturb the judgment only where there is no evidence supporting the findings or the findings do not support t he judgment. Id

. We do not reweigh the evidence and consider only the evidence favorable to the judgment. Id

. Appellants must establish the findings are clearly erroneous, which occurs only when a review of the record leaves us firmly convinced
a mista ke has been made. Id

. We defer substantially to findings of fact, but we do not defer
to conclusions of law. Id

. A judgment is clearly erroneous if it relies on an incorrect legal
standard. Id

. When a party requests findings and conclusions, a trial court is required to make complete special findings sufficient to disclose a valid basis under the issues for the legal result reached in the judgment. Id

. The purpose of Rule 52(A) findings and conclusions is to provide the parties and reviewing courts with the theory on which the case
was decided. Id

.4

In its order denying the Hill enburg s ’ motion to correct error, the trial court found, “Reeves proved by clear and convincing evidence all the requirements to establish title by acquiescence.” (App. at 21 .) The Hillenburg s argue this conclusion of law is in error, as “there was no Finding of any agreement

– explicit or implicit

– that the fence was the property line.” (Br. of Appellant at 19

- 20.) We disagree.
O ver a century ago, o ur Indiana Supreme Cour t explained the doctrine of title by acquiescence: As a general rule, it is affirmed by the authorities that where owners of adjoining premises establish by agreement a boundary or dividing line between their lands, take and hold possession of their respec tive tracts, and improve the same in accordance with such division, each party, in the absence of fraud, will thereafter be estopped from asserting that the line so agreed upon and established is not the true boundary line, although the period of time whic h has elapsed since such line was established and possession taken is less than the statutory period of limitation. The general rule recognized by the authorities is that a boundary line located under such circumstances, in the absence of fraud, becomes b inding on the owners establishing it, not on the principle that the title to the lands can be passed by parol, but for the reason that such owners have agreed permanently upon the limits of their respective premises and have acted in respect to such line, and have been controlled thereby, and therefore will not thereafter be permitted to repudiate their acts. Adams v. Betz , 167 Ind. 161, 169, 78 N.E. 649, 652 (1906). More recently, this court delineated specific circumstances under which a landowner may o btain a parcel of land via title by acquiescence: Two adjoining property owners (1) share a good

- faith belief concerning the location of the common boundary line that separates their properties and, (2) although the agreed

- upon location is not in fact the actual boundary, (3) use their properties as if that boundary was the actual boundary (4) for a period of at least twenty years.5

Huntington v. Riggs , 862 N.E.2d 1263 , 1274 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007), Friedlander , J. concurring , 1 trans. denied

. The agreement between the two adjoining landowners “need not be express and may be inferred from the parties’ actions, but there must be evidence of some agreement as to the boundary line.” Freiburger v. Fry , 439 N.E.2d 169, 172 (Ind. Ct. App. 1982). An agreement rega rding a boundary between adjoining properties other than the
actual property line “is not only binding on those parties who agree but also their successors in interest as long as there was no fraud present in the making of the agreement.” Id

. Reeves pres ented evidence that for over twenty years the adjacent property owners agreed the fence was the property boundary. The fence was in its current location when Reeves purchased the parcel in 1963, and since that time it has served as the boundary
between th e Reeves parcel and the adjoining property. During this time, Reeves maintained
and used the Disputed P arcel as a recreation area, cut firewood, allowed the City of Bloomington to run a water line from Lake Monroe, and dug a trench to connect the Disputed
Parcel to the water line.
Reeves testified he and Mr. Eads , who owned the adjoining parcel in the late 1970’s both believed and agreed the fence was the boundary between their two properties. Reeves testified the two subsequent owners of the Hillenburg property , Spires and Andler, did not protest Reeves’ use of the Disputed Parcel nor did they question whether the fence, then in disrepair, was the property boundary. In 1986, the Hillenburg s bought the property adjoining the Reeves parcel. In 1999,

1 The other panelists joined the concurring opi nion.6

Reev es removed trees from the Disputed Parcel and sold the timber. There is no evidence the Hillenburg s took issue with the removal of the timber at the time of its removal , nor does it
appear the Hillenburg s contest ed the fence’s status as the boundary betwe en the properties
until Dennis Hillenburg conducted a survey in 2008. By that time, Reeves and all the people
who owne d the adjacent parcel since 1963, including the Hillenburgs, had agreed the fence
had been the boundary between the properties for over f orty years. Therefore, we agree Reeves obtained title by acquiescence, and affirm the trial court’s denial of the Hillenburg s ’
Motion to Correct E rror. 2
Affirmed. FRIEDLANDER, J., and BARNES, J., concur.

2 The Hillenburgs also appeal the denial of Sherri’s claim for trespass, and they claim the trial court should have ruled on Dennis’ motion for attorney fees. As the trial court properly found Reeves owns the Disputed Parcel, Sherri’s trespass cla im is moot. In its order denying the Hillenburgs’ Motion to Correct Errors, the trial court stated, “Each party shall pay their [sic] own attorney fees and costs.” (App. at 22.) Thus, the trial court did rule on Dennis’ motion. As the Hillenburgs have not presented an argument why that ruling was in error, we are unable to address the issue.