Filed 6/16/16 P. v. Webb CA2/6

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for 

publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication 

or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. 

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION SIX

THE PEOPLE,

 Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

CREAGH WEBB,

 Defendant and Appellant.

2d Crim. No. B266587

(Super. Ct. No. 2020032632)

(Ventura County)

Creagh Webb appeals from judgment after an order revoking his 

postrelease community supervision (PRCS). (Pen. Code, § 3450 et seq.)1 He contends 

the revocation procedures employed by Ventura County violated his right to due process 

because he did not have a Morrissey-compliant2 probable cause hearing before the court 

within 15 days of arrest. He seeks an order reversing the trial court’s denial of his motion 

to dismiss. We affirm.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

In 2011, Webb was convicted after plea of guilty to driving under the 

influence causing injury (Veh. Code, § 23153, subd. (a)). In a separate case, he was 

convicted of identity theft (§ 530.5, subd. (a)). The trial court sentenced Webb to 

consecutive prison terms. 

 

1 All statutory references are to the Penal Code unless otherwise stated.

2 Morrissey v. Brewer (1972) 408 U.S. 471 (Morrissey).
2

Webb was released in 2012 on PRCS following realignment. The Ventura 

County Probation Agency is his supervising agency. As a condition of release, he agreed 

to report to probation as directed, to not use drugs or controlled substances, to not 

associate with persons using or trafficking in drugs or controlled substances, to submit to 

drug testing, and to participate in drug treatment as directed. He also agreed the 

probation agency could, without a court hearing, order “flash incarceration” in a county 

jail for up to 10 days if he violated the conditions of his release. (§ 3453, subd. (q).)

In June 2015,3 Webb failed to report to a scheduled appointment with 

probation. The same month, he tested positive for codeine and morphine, admitted using 

heroin, and was contacted while asking another known user for “dope.” Webb also did 

not report for drug testing and did not re-enroll in drug treatment as directed. These acts 

collectively resulted in revocation proceedings for his sixth violation of PRCS. 

Webb was taken into custody on June 14. The next day, Senior Deputy 

Probation Officer Venessa Meza met with Webb. Meza conducted an administrative 

probable cause hearing, and concluded there was probable cause to believe that Webb 

violated the terms of PRCS. She advised Webb of his right to be represented by an 

attorney. 

On June 19, the probation agency filed a revocation petition. The hearing 

was set for July 2. 

On the day of the hearing, Webb moved (through counsel) to dismiss the 

petition for revocation and for release based upon an alleged violation of due process. He 

argued he was entitled to arraignment before a court within 10 days of arrest and a 

probable cause hearing before a court within 15 days of arrest.

The trial court denied Webb’s motion to dismiss and heard the revocation 

petition. Webb submitted on the probation officer’s report. The trial court found him in 

violation of PRCS and ordered him to serve a jail sentence. 

 

3 All future dates are in the year 2015.
3

DISCUSSION 

Due Process Requirements

Revocation of supervised release deprives a person of a conditional liberty 

interest, and may only be had with due process protections. (Morrissey, supra, 408 U.S. 

at p. 482 [parole revocation]; People v. Vickers (1972) 8 Cal.3d 451, 458 (Vickers)

[probation revocation].) 

To conform to due process, revocation of conditional release requires a 

two-step process: (1) an initial determination of probable cause to justify temporary 

detention; and (2) a formal revocation hearing to determine whether the facts warrant 

revocation. (Morrissey, supra, 408 U.S. at p. 485; Vickers, supra, 8 Cal.3d at p. 456.) It 

is undisputed that the formal revocation hearing complied with Morrissey and Vickers in 

this case.

The Probable Cause Hearing

The probable cause determination is a “minimal inquiry,” made near the 

place of arrest “as promptly as convenient after arrest.” (Morrissey, supra, 408 U.S. at 

p. 485.) It need not be made by a judicial officer; it may be made by any qualified person 

“not directly involved in the case.” (Id. at pp. 485-486 [probable cause determination for 

parole revocation may be made by a parole officer other than the officer who reports the 

violation or recommends revocation]; Vickers, supra, 8 Cal.3d at pp. 456-457.) To 

conform to due process, the probable cause determination must be preceded by notice of 

the hearing and the alleged violations, and must provide an opportunity for the supervised 

person to speak on his own behalf, present evidence, and question adverse witnesses. 

(Morrissey, at pp. 485-486; Vickers, at pp. 456-457.) The officer who determines 

probable cause must summarize what occurs at the hearing, but need not make formal 

findings of fact and law. (Morrissey, at p. 487; Vickers, at p. 457.) 

Webb complains that the probable cause hearing conducted by Meza was 

“nothing more than a pro forma, ex-parte interview” and that “there is nothing in the 

record to suggest that a fact-finding determination was held.” But these arguments 

advanced on appeal were not made to the trial court. Arguments not raised below are
4

forfeited. (People v. Hartshorn (2012) 202 Cal.App.4th 1145, 1151.) And, in any event, 

we decline to exercise our discretion to review forfeited issues because, as explained 

below, Webb has failed to demonstrate prejudice in view of the court’s findings at the 

formal revocation hearing. For the same reasons, we do not address Webb’s arguments 

regarding the effect of Proposition 9, the Victims’ Bill of Rights Act of 2008: Marsy’s 

Law.

Webb Has Failed to Demonstrate Prejudice

Webb argues that his due process rights were violated at the probable cause 

phase, prior to the formal revocation hearing. But the underlying problem with his appeal 

is this: No matter what due process violation is claimed, he makes no showing of 

prejudice at the formal revocation hearing. He submitted at the revocation hearing and 

has now served his sentence.

The denial of a Morrissey-compliant probable cause hearing does not 

warrant reversal unless the violation results in prejudice at the revocation hearing. (In re 

La Croix (1974) 12 Cal.3d 146, 154-155.) But Webb makes no showing that any due 

process defect prejudiced him or affected the outcome of the PRCS revocation hearing. 

(In re Winn (1975) 13 Cal.3d 694, 698 [defendant has burden of showing prejudice]; 

In re Moore (1975) 45 Cal.App.3d 285, 294.) Because he was found in violation and has 

served the custodial sanction “there is nothing for us to remedy, even if we were disposed 

to do so.” (Spencer v. Kemna (1998) 523 U.S. 1, 18.) 

DISPOSITION

The judgment is affirmed. 

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.

TANGEMAN, J.

We concur:

GILBERT, P. J. PERREN, J.
Donald D. Coleman, Judge

Superior Court County of Ventura

______________________________

Wayne C. Tobin, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant 

and Appellant.

Kamala D. Harris, Attorney General, Gerald A. Engler, Chief Assistant 

Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Paul M. 

Roadarmel, Jr., Supervising Deputy Attorney General, and Stephanie A. Miyoshi, Deputy 

Attorney General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.