[Cite as Ma v. Cincinnati Children's Hosp. Med. Ctr., 2023-Ohio-1727.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS

FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT OF OHIO

HAMILTON COUNTY, OHIO

JUN MA, PH.D.,

 Plaintiff-Appellant,

 VS.

CINCINNATI CHILDREN’S 

HOSPITAL MEDICAL CENTER,

 Defendant-Appellee.

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APPEAL NO. C-220420 

TRIAL NO. A-1606910

 

 O P I N I O N.

Civil Appeal From: Hamilton County Court of Common Pleas

 

Judgment Appealed From Is: Reversed and Cause Remanded

Date of Judgment Entry on Appeal: May 24, 2023

Mezibov Butler, Marc D. Mezibov, Susan L. Butler and Brian J. Butler, for PlaintiffAppellant, 

Taft Stettinius & Hollister LLP, Beth A. Bryan, W. Stuart Dornette and Evan T. 

Priestle, for Defendant-Appellee.
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BERGERON, Presiding Judge.

{¶1} This matter comes before this court a second time as plaintiff-appellant 

Jun Ma, Ph.D., appeals a grant of summary judgment in favor of defendant-appellee 

Cincinnati Children’s Hospital Medical Center (“Children’s”). A biomedical researcher

and tenured professor jointly employed by Children’s and the University of Cincinnati 

College of Medicine (“UC COM”), Dr. Ma challenges his termination as inconsistent 

with the “tenure” requirement contained in his written contract. The trial court 

granted summary judgment in Children’s favor after finding that, as a matter of law, 

Children’s had “just cause” to terminate his employment. But we see things 

differently—because the concept of “just cause” is ambiguous in the context of this 

case, various factual issues exist for resolution at trial and preclude summary 

judgment. Accordingly, we sustain Dr. Ma’s assignment of error challenging the trial 

court’s grant of summary judgment, and we reverse the trial court’s judgment and 

remand this cause for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

I.

{¶2} In June 1992, an initial offer of employment as a researcher at 

Children’s and affiliated faculty member at UC COM was extended to Dr. Ma. This 

offer letter anticipated a potential future tenure promotion and included a specific 

amount of money that Children’s would provide as start-up funds to support Dr. Ma’s 

salary and research in the first three to five years of employment, affording Dr. Ma a 

few years of cushion before needing to obtain external funding. It also outlined Dr. 

Ma’s responsibilities as a researcher at Children’s, including the requirement that he 

“sustain [his] individual research program[] with external funds from federal granting 

agencies.” Notably, the letter did not define the term “sustain” or otherwise specify a 
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percentage of costs (or any specific amount of funds) that Dr. Ma must cover each year. 

Nor did the letter detail any potential consequences for failing to sustain sufficient 

funding levels. The letter did, however, assure: “Your salary and support are the 

responsibility of Children’s Hospital. These are guaranteed by us and you can proceed 

with the assurance that the salary and support as listed are firm.” Dr. Ma accepted the

offer set forth in the 1992 letter and commenced work in September of that year.

{¶3} In October 1997, Dr. Ma applied for tenure. Following a lengthy 

administrative review process, he was awarded tenure and promoted to an associate 

professorship in June 1998. At the time he achieved tenure, Children’s had no written 

tenure policy, nor was Dr. Ma otherwise apprised of the rights associated with his 

tenured position. See Ma v. Cincinnati Children’s Hosp. Med. Ctr., 2020-Ohio-1471, 

153 N.E.3d 866 (1st Dist.).

{¶4} Nearly a decade later, in 2007, the University of Houston courted Dr. 

Ma and offered him a job. To convince him to stay, Children’s offered to increase his 

salary to $160,000, to move him to the Children’s Division of Biomedical Informatics 

where he could help develop a new Center for Gene Variant Studies, and to 

recommend his promotion to full professor. As start-up funding for this new position, 

Children’s offered a specific amount of money over the following three years to 

supplement his external funding and support his salary and research. The promotion 

package persuaded Dr. Ma to remain at Children’s. 

{¶5} Beginning in 2010, however, Dr. Ma’s performance reviews began 

cataloging a consistent failure to meet funding expectations. Each of his reviews 

between 2010 and 2015 emphasized that he failed to secure adequate funding, and no 

signs of improvement emerged on the horizon. And it is undisputed that, between 
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June 2012 and September 2015, Dr. Ma did not apply for any grants. In the 14 months 

following September 2015, he submitted six applications for federal funding, all of 

which were denied. 

{¶6} Frustrated by this trend, in mid-2016, Children’s notified Dr. Ma that it 

could no longer support his position, allowing him eight months to secure other 

employment. Dr. Ma inquired into materials regarding what tenure meant so that he 

could understand his rights. But shortly thereafter, he received a policy outlining his 

rights as an at-will employee. When Dr. Ma attempted to explain that he was a tenured 

professor and therefore not at-will, Children’s refused to consider his viewpoint. 

{¶7} As a result, in December 2016, Dr. Ma filed a complaint against 

Children’s and UC COM, asserting claims for promissory estoppel, fraudulent 

inducement, and declaratory and injunctive relief. In March 2017, the trial court 

granted UC COM’s motion to dismiss it from the case, and given that Dr. Ma never 

appealed that dismissal, the case has proceeded ever since against Children’s as the 

sole defendant.

{¶8} In August 2017, after the trial court denied him the injunctive relief he 

sought, Children’s terminated Dr. Ma’s employment due to his failure to maintain 

adequate funding. In October 2018, however, the trial court granted summary 

judgment in favor of Dr. Ma on his declaratory relief claim. The trial court held that 

he enjoyed certain contractual tenure rights, including just cause termination 

protection and a pretermination hearing before an independent panel. The court 

declined to rule on whether the grounds for Dr. Ma’s employment termination were 

justified, however, leaving that issue to the independent panel. The court also ordered 

Dr. Ma’s reinstatement to his faculty position and lab as well as restoration of back-
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pay and employee benefits to which he would have been entitled in the absence of his

termination.

{¶9} Children’s appealed the judgment to this court, and in April 2020, we 

affirmed only the portion of the judgment holding that tenure entitled Dr. Ma to 

continued employment at Children’s absent just cause for termination. Ma, 2020-

Ohio-1471, 153 N.E.3d 866, at ¶ 27. We reversed the finding that Dr. Ma was entitled 

to procedural “due process” protections such as a pretermination hearing and vacated 

reinstatement and other remedies, holding that Dr. Ma had not yet established an 

absence of just cause. Id. at ¶ 38. In this respect, we emphasized that the issue of 

whether Dr. Ma proved that Children’s lacked just cause to terminate his employment

was “not * * * resolved on the record before us.” Id. at ¶ 34.

{¶10} On remand, in December 2020, Dr. Ma filed an amended complaint 

against Children’s, asserting claims for declaratory judgment, injunctive relief, and 

breach of contract. The trial court struck the claim for injunctive relief, see Cedar Fair, 

L.P. v. Falfas, 140 Ohio St.3d 447, 2014-Ohio-3943, 19 N.E.3d 893, ¶ 4 (“specific 

performance is not an available remedy for breach of an employment contract unless 

it is explicitly provided for in the contract or by an applicable statute”), which Dr. Ma 

does not appeal. 

{¶11} In August 2021, Children’s filed a summary judgment motion on Dr. 

Ma’s two remaining claims, requesting that the trial court find as a matter of law that 

it possessed just cause to terminate his employment. Alongside his response in 

opposition to the motion, Dr. Ma moved to file various documents under seal so that 

he could submit comparative evidence that other Children’s professors, equally or 

more under-funded than him, did not suffer termination. With respect to the breach 
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of contract claim, the trial court found that Dr. Ma’s failure to develop and maintain 

external funding for his research program constituted just cause for termination of 

employment as a matter of law. As such, the court granted Children’s motion for 

summary judgment in August 2022. The trial court never ruled on the motion to file 

documents under seal.

{¶12} Dr. Ma now appeals the trial court’s judgment with respect to the breach 

of contract claim, raising two assignments of error. 

II.

{¶13} In his first assignment of error, Dr. Ma claims that the trial court erred 

in finding that no genuine issue of material fact exists with respect to whether 

Children’s had just cause to terminate his employment. According to Dr. Ma, the trial 

court should not have resolved this issue on summary judgment.

{¶14} We review this question de novo, conducting an independent review of 

the record to determine the propriety of summary judgment. See Al Neyer, LLC v. 

Westfield Ins. Co., 1st Dist. Hamilton No. C-200007, 2020-Ohio-5417, ¶ 13. 

Under Civ.R. 56(C), summary judgment is proper where the moving 

party establishes that “(1) no genuine issue of any material fact remains, 

(2) the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, and (3) 

it appears from the evidence that reasonable minds can come to but one 

conclusion, and construing the evidence most strongly in favor of the 

nonmoving party, that conclusion is adverse to the party against whom 

the motion for summary judgment is made.”

Id. at ¶ 14, quoting State ex rel. Duncan v. Mentor City Council, 105 Ohio St.3d 372, 

2005-Ohio-2163, 826 N.E.2d 832, ¶ 9. 
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{¶15} The elements of a breach of contract claim include: “(1) the existence of 

a contract, (2) performance by the plaintiff, (3) breach by the defendant, and (4) 

damages resulting from the breach.” Brendamour v. City of the Village of Indian Hill, 

1st Dist. Hamilton Nos. C-210504, C-210516 and C-210517, 2022-Ohio-4724, ¶ 18, 

citing White v. Pitman, 2020-Ohio-3957, 156 N.E.3d 1026, ¶ 37 (1st Dist.). 

{¶16} As we recognized in the prior appeal, Dr. Ma’s breach of contract claim 

arises under the “valid and binding contract” that this court determined “governs Dr. 

Ma’s employment.” Ma, 2020-Ohio-1471, 153 N.E.3d 866, at ¶ 32. The contract 

consisted of “a series of communications over a number of years that [gave] rise to the 

contractual relationship[.]” Id. at ¶ 17. At the heart of the contract are four documents: 

the 1992 offer letter, Dr. Ma’s acceptance, a 1997 document awarding tenure, and a 

2007 offer letter. Notably, none of these documents define “just cause,” nor did 

Children’s put forth any tenure policy or document defining or otherwise explaining 

the term during the relevant period of 1992-1998: Dr. Ma was awarded tenure in 1998, 

and “[c]ourts are required to interpret [a] contract in such a way as to give effect to the 

intention of the parties at the time the agreement was entered into * * *.” (Emphasis 

added.) Watkins v. Brown, 97 Ohio App.3d 160, 163, 646 N.E.2d 485 (2d Dist.1994). 

The 2007 letter could also assume relevance, since the parties renegotiated certain 

aspects of their relationship, but it too stands silent on the meaning of “tenure” or “just 

cause.”

{¶17} With the first aspect of a contractual claim satisfied, the parties shift 

their focus to the second and third elements. With respect to the second element 

(performance by the plaintiff), Children’s argues that Dr. Ma could not prevail on his 

breach of contract claim because, having failed to secure adequate funding as required 
OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

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by his employment contract, he failed to establish that he performed his obligations 

under the contract upon which he is suing. See Patel v. Krushna SS LLC, 2018-Ohio263, 106 N.E.3d 169 (8th Dist.). And as to the third element (breach by the defendant), 

absent Dr. Ma’s performance, Children’s insists that it could not have breached. On 

both points, Dr. Ma counters that a genuine issue of material fact remains with respect 

to whether Children’s had just cause to terminate him. 

{¶18} As we consider the meaning of “just cause” in the context of Dr. Ma’s 

tenure agreement, as in any contractual dispute, our “primary objective is to ascertain 

and give effect to the parties’ intent * * *.” Wal-Mart Realty Co. v. Tri-Cty. Commons 

Assocs., LLC, 1st Dist. Hamilton No. C-160747, 2017-Ohio-9280, ¶ 10. “Just cause” 

protection arises by virtue of the definition of “tenure” that we recognized based on 

the state of the undisputed record existing in the prior appeal. Ma at ¶ 21, 29. If, in 

considering the language employed by the parties, the contractual provision at issue is 

clear and unambiguous, we defer to the plain language of the agreement and apply it. 

See id. at ¶ 17, citing Shifrin v. Forest City Ents., Inc., 64 Ohio St.3d 635, 638, 597 

N.E.2d 499 (1992). But, if the provision proves ambiguous, the court may consider 

extrinsic evidence to discern the parties’ intent. See Kahler v. Cincinnati Inc., 1st Dist. 

Hamilton No. C-140407, 2015-Ohio-979, ¶ 17. Such ambiguity can arise when “a 

material phrase in the provision is undefined.” Ma at ¶ 17, quoting Career & Technical 

Assn. v. Auburn Vocational School Dist. Bd. of Edn., 11th Dist. Lake No. 2013-L-010, 

2014-Ohio-1572, ¶ 18. 

{¶19} As a threshold matter, although both parties present competing caselaw 

to persuade us of their conceptualization of “just cause,” we must acknowledge that 

Ohio caselaw fails to define the term “just cause” with any real precision. Caselaw 
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supplies various definitions, including requiring “some degree of ‘fault’ on the part of 

the employee,” Scarnati v. Ohio Dept. of Mental Health, 10th Dist. Franklin No. 

94API01-102, 1994 Ohio App. LEXIS 3534, 13 (Aug. 11, 1994), “a fairly serious matter,” 

Ellsworth v. Streetsboro City School Dist. Bd. of Edn., 2019-Ohio-4731, 136 N.E.3d 

549, ¶ 47 (8th Dist.), and “neglect of duty * * * dishonesty * * * unfaithfulness to the 

employer’s interest,” Hosking v. Hollaender Mfg. Co., 114 Ohio App. 70, 71, 175 N.E.2d 

201 (1st Dist.1961). While no consistent definition of “just cause” exists in Ohio law, 

various Ohio cases have emphasized the fact-dependent nature of the inquiry: “[t]he 

determination of whether just cause [for termination of employment] exists 

necessarily depends on the unique factual considerations of the particular case.” 

Irvine v. Unemp. Comp. Bd. of Rev., 19 Ohio St.3d 15, 17, 482 N.E.2d 587 (1985); see 

DS Express Carriers Inc. v. Dixie, 6th Dist. Erie No. E-12-034, 2013-Ohio-4829, ¶ 4 

(“Whether just cause for termination of employment exists depends on the unique 

facts of the case.”); Bellevue City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Edn. v. Martin, 6th Dist. Huron No. 

H-12-009, 2013-Ohio-2801, ¶ 11; Gen. Die Casters, Inc. v. Dir., Ohio Dept. of Job and 

Family Servs., 9th Dist. Summit No. 27701, 2015-Ohio-4033, ¶ 9. We see no 

indication in the existing record that the parties intended to borrow any specific legal 

definition of “just cause” to govern their relationship, and so the inquiry in this case 

remains necessarily a fact-dependent one. 

{¶20} Without any contractual definition of “tenure” or the related concept of 

“just cause,” or any Children’s policy or document shedding light on its meaning

during the relevant time period,

1 we must consider extrinsic evidence. “Although 

1 Many employment contracts, of course, contain detailed definitions of “just cause.” This one, 

unfortunately, does not. 
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ordinarily courts should not grant summary judgment on a contract dispute when an 

ambiguity exists, * * * if the extrinsic evidence stands undisputed, then the court may 

take this step.” (Citation omitted.) Ma, 2020-Ohio-1471, 153 N.E.3d 866, at ¶ 18, 

citing Lewis v. Mathes, 161 Ohio App.3d 1, 2005-Ohio-1975, 829 N.E.2d 318, ¶ 25 (4th 

Dist.). 

{¶21} Both Children’s and Dr. Ma present evidence to advance their respective 

interpretations of “just cause.” Dr. Ma testified that, at the time of his award of tenure, 

he believed “just cause” contemplated employment protection in the absence of 

intentional misconduct. He understood that he could not be fired unless he engaged 

in intentional misconduct, akin to sexual harassment or fraud. He also explained that 

funding deficiencies, in his view, would not rise to the level of just cause. To bolster 

this interpretation, Dr. Ma relies on testimony from Dr. Sandra Degen, a retired 

Children’s employee who served on the committee that recommended him for tenure. 

Dr. Degen testified that, based on her understanding of tenure and just cause gathered 

through her service at Children’s, a lack of funding is not and has never been a 

sufficient reason to terminate a tenured professor’s employment, so long as the 

professor documents that he or she is making a concerted effort to apply for grants. 

According to Dr. Degen, the following would justify termination of a tenured 

employee: unprofessional behavior, academic misconduct, plagiarism, falsification of 

data, or mistreatment of colleagues. And, as this court noted in 2020, Dr. Degen’s 

testimony is probative as she has personal knowledge of tenure and its conditions at 

Children’s during the relevant time period and she served on the committee that 

evaluated Dr. Ma’s suitability for tenure. See Ma at ¶ 20.
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{¶22} On the other hand, Children’s maintains that, in its view, “just cause” 

encompasses Dr. Ma’s failure to secure sufficient funding where his funding 

deficiencies injured Children’s by costing it hundreds of thousands of dollars. In 

support of its view, Children’s cites to Hosking, 114 Ohio App. at 72, 175 N.E.2d 201, 

which held that “it is sufficient for the employer to show that the employee was guilty 

of a default in duty whose natural tendency was to injure his business.” Children’s 

documents a persistent failure of Dr. Ma to attain appropriate levels of funding to 

support his salary, which left Children’s footing an increasingly growing bill between 

2012 and 2016. According to Children’s, it emphasized this funding obligation to Dr. 

Ma in the 1992 letter: “In exchange for our support, we expect you to develop an 

independent research program and to maintain external funding of your research,” 

and “all our faculty must sustain their individual research programs with external 

funds from federal granting agencies.” Children’s explains that it expected Dr. Ma to 

sustain 70 percent of his research and salary through external funding. As far as the 

record reveals, this 70 percent target began appearing on Dr. Ma’s performance 

reviews in 2010 and was included as a provision in the employment contracts of more 

recently hired Children’s employees. Therefore, according to Children’s, because 

certain contractual language required Dr. Ma to obtain funding, and he failed to do so, 

which injured Children’s, “just cause” for termination of employment existed as a 

matter of law. 

{¶23} Although we appreciate Children’s argument here, several factors 

convince us that it did not establish entitlement to judgment as a matter of law. First, 

while some contractual language suggests an obligation to attain funding, other 

contractual language creates ambiguities on this score. For example, the 1992 letter 
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contains a provision stating: “Your salary and support are the responsibility of the 

Children’s Hospital. These are guaranteed by us and you can proceed with the 

assurance that the salary and support as listed are firm.” Second, and related, the 70

percent figure highlighted by Children’s appears nowhere in any of the relevant 

contractual documents pertaining to Dr. Ma. And this gets back to the problem that 

we highlighted in the prior appeal—Children’s simply failed to engage in any drafting 

precision in its agreement with Dr. Ma. Had it provided some clear 70 percent metric 

and indicated that failure to attain that level would constitute just cause, then we 

probably would not be here. And third, without any contractual provision explaining 

some mandatory percentage and the repercussions of failure to attain it, we cannot say 

that the level of funding that Dr. Ma attained constitutes just cause as a matter of law. 

Reinforcing that point, some evidence presented by Dr. Ma indicates that he was not 

meeting the 70 percent “requirement” at the time that Children’s convinced him to 

stay in 2007 and promoted him. Moreover, while the 2007 letter warned, “We cannot 

guarantee funds to maintain the operation of your laboratory, should you have a 

‘funding gap,’ ” it never elaborated on this point or indicated that this “gap” might 

constitute grounds for termination. In fact, evidence in the record reveals that funding 

gaps are common and even expected, and Dr. Degen testified that she understood that 

funding deficiencies would not result in termination, but instead would simply impact

the size and scope of the professor’s research opportunities.

{¶24} Dr. Ma seems to acknowledge that, at some level, an abject failure to 

perform his job functions would represent just cause for termination. But the problem 

is where to draw the line, in light of the evidentiary record at hand. Given the material 

disputes of fact and the inherent ambiguity in the contractual documents, a jury will 
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ultimately have to do that. Taking all inferences in favor of Dr. Ma as the nonmoving 

party, because the definition of “just cause” is highly fact-dependent and bears on the 

propriety of his termination—underpinning his breach of contract claim—this issue is 

genuine and material. And “[i]t is generally the role of the fact finder to resolve 

ambiguity.” Kaiser v. Goff, 2022-Ohio-4725, 204 N.E.3d 1203, ¶ 38 (1st Dist.), 

quoting Westfield Ins. Co. v. Galatis, 100 Ohio St.3d 216, 2003-Ohio-5849, 797 

N.E.2d 1256, ¶ 13.

{¶25} To be clear, this is not to say that Dr. Ma’s ongoing failure to obtain 

sufficient funding is not just cause to terminate his employment. At trial, when 

presented with the contract and the extrinsic evidence bearing on the definition of 

“just cause” in this case from the relevant period, a jury may well find that Children’s 

had just cause to terminate Dr. Ma’s employment. However, on this record and at this 

stage of the proceedings, we simply cannot decide this question as a matter of law.

{¶26} Accordingly, we sustain Dr. Ma’s first assignment of error. 

III.

{¶27} In his second assignment of error, Dr. Ma maintains that the trial court’s 

failure to rule on his motion to file documents under seal unduly prejudiced him on

summary judgment. Dr. Ma sought to submit comparative evidence of other faculty 

members’ funding levels. But because we are sustaining Dr. Ma’s first assignment of 

error and remanding this cause for trial, this issue is moot, and we decline to address 

the second assignment of error. The trial court should consider Dr. Ma’s motion on 

remand.

* * *
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{¶28} In light of the foregoing analysis, we sustain Dr. Ma’s first assignment 

of error, reverse the trial court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of Children’s,

and remand this cause for further proceedings consistent with this opinion and the 

law.

Judgment reversed and cause remanded.

 

BOCK and KINSLEY, JJ., concur.

Please note:

The court has recorded its entry on the date of the release of this opinion.