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SJC-12450

CITY OF PITTSFIELD vs. LOCAL 447 INTERNATIONAL BROTHERHOOD OF 

POLICE OFFICERS.

Berkshire. May 7, 2018. - October 3, 2018.

Present: Gants, C.J., Gaziano, Lowy, Budd, & Cypher, JJ.

Municipal Corporations, Police. Police, Discharge. Public 

Employment, Police, Termination. Arbitration, Police, 

Confirmation of award. Public Policy.

Civil action commenced in the Superior Court Department on 

May 11, 2017.

The case was heard by Daniel A. Ford, J.

The Supreme Judicial Court granted an application for 

direct appellate review.

Richard M. Dohoney for the plaintiff.

Timothy M. Burke (Jared S. Burke also present) for the 

defendant.

Eric R. Atstupenas, for Massachusetts Chiefs of Police 

Association, Inc., amicus curiae, submitted a brief.

CYPHER, J. Dale Eason was terminated from his position as 

a police officer in the Pittsfield police department on grounds 

of conduct unbecoming a police officer, untruthfulness, and 
2

falsifying records. His union, Local 447 International 

Brotherhood of Police Officers (union), filed a grievance, 

pursuant to a collective bargaining agreement between the union 

and the city of Pittsfield (city). The union and city submitted 

Eason's termination to arbitration with two agreed-upon issues:

(1) "Was there just cause to terminate the employment of Dale 

Eason?"; and (2) "If not, what shall the remedy be?" The 

arbitrator found that there was not just cause for termination 

and reinstated Eason with a three-day suspension.

The city commenced an action pursuant to G. L. c. 150C,

§ 11, in the Superior Court to vacate the arbitrator's award, 

arguing that it is contrary to public policy. A Superior Court

judge confirmed the arbitration award, and the city appealed. 

We thereafter granted the city's application for direct 

appellate review. We conclude that the arbitrator's award of 

reinstatement does not violate public policy in the 

circumstances of this case, where the arbitrator found that the 

officer's statements were "intentionally misleading" but not 

"intentionally false" and where the statements did not lead to a

wrongful arrest or prosecution, or result in any deprivation of 

liberty or denial of civil rights.

Background. We recite the facts as found by the 

arbitrator. The case arose from a February, 2016, incident in 

which Eason responded to a reported larceny at a supermarket. 
3

Eason arrested a woman, identified by supermarket security, and 

placed her in the back of his police cruiser. In his arrest

report, Eason said the suspect "began thrashing her body around 

in the back seat . . . . For her safety, I attempted to remove 

the [suspect] from my vehicle and place her onto the ground to 

control her body." He additionally noted, "Also, [supermarket] 

[s]ecurity wanted to get a photo as part of their process."

The arbitrator explained that "[w]hen questioned during the 

investigation, [Eason] acknowledged that he removed the

[suspect] from the back seat of his police cruiser to enable the 

supermarket security to photograph her, pursuant to a practice 

of photographing larceny suspects, which officers know about and 

facilitate." The city terminated Eason for "conduct unbecoming 

a police officer, untruthfulness, and falsifying records, based 

on the reason [he] reported for removal of the [suspect], 

expressed [as]: 'for her safety.'" The city also asserted that 

there was no evidence that the suspect was thrashing in the 

cruiser. Eason "acknowledge[d] that he removed the [suspect] to 

enable the store to photograph her, according to practice" and 

"also assert[ed] that the [suspect] had been out of control in 

the back of the car before she was removed, but not immediately 

prior to her removal. [He] denie[d] that he lied, implicitly, 

because she was thrashing and they needed to photograph her, 

fairly simultaneously."
4

The arbitrator held that Eason's misconduct did not amount 

to just cause for termination, "a capital offense in the 

employment context." The arbitrator found that "the three words 

at issue were untrue, intentionally misleading, and cause for 

discipline, but less than intentionally false" (emphasis in 

original).1 He also found that there was "persuasive evidence 

that the [suspect] acted up in the back before she was removed." 

The arbitrator held that the city failed to "persuade [him] that 

[Eason's] misconduct was so serious that it justified 

termination without prior, corrective discipline."

Discussion. A brief reminder of the history of labor 

arbitration is useful to put the discussion that follows in 

context. In 1935, Congress recognized that "the refusal by some 

employers to accept the procedure of collective bargaining

lead[s] to strikes and other forms of industrial strife or 

unrest" and enacted the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), 29 

U.S.C. §§ 151-169. 29 U.S.C. § 151. In pursuit of labor peace 

and "the free flow of . . . commerce," Congress declared it to 

be the policy of the United States to encourage collective 

bargaining. Id. See National Labor Relations Bd. v. AllisChalmers Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 175, 180 (1967) ("National labor 

policy has been built on the premise that by pooling their 

 

1 The arbitrator also found that the statements were 

"knowingly inaccurate."
5

economic strength and acting through a labor organization freely 

chosen by the majority, the employees of an appropriate unit 

have the most effective means of bargaining for improvements in 

wages, hours, and working conditions"). To effectuate that

policy, Congress established a framework for representation of 

private sector workers by a labor organization elected by the 

majority of employees. Once that organization, often a union, 

was elected and certified as the employees' exclusive bargaining 

representative, it was a violation of law for an employer to 

refuse to bargain in good faith to reach a collective bargaining 

agreement. 29 U.S.C. § 158.

The NLRA, however, does not reach the bargaining 

relationship between workers and their public employers at the 

State and local level. In 1973, the Legislature established an 

analog to the NLRA, G. L. c. 150E, governing bargaining between 

public employers and employees. Similar to the NLRA,2 G. L. c.

150E prohibits employers from refusing to bargain in good faith 

with elected employee representatives.

The Legislature further evinces its preference for the 

results of collective bargaining, including the outcome of 

arbitration, in G. L. c. 150E, § 7 (d), mandating that the terms 

 

2 We have long recognized the relationship between 

Congress's endorsed policy of collective bargaining and that of 

the Legislature's as embodied in G. L. c. 150E. Trustees of 

Forbes Library v. Labor Relations Comm'n, 384 Mass. 559, 562 n.2 

(1981).
6

of collective bargaining agreements shall prevail over certain 

statutes governing myriad working conditions of public 

employees, including regulations promulgated by a police 

commissioner. See id.; Boston v. Boston Police Patrolmen's 

Ass'n, 477 Mass. 434, 441 (2017) (Williams) (noting "courts' 

reluctance to allow [police commissioner's] broad discretionary 

powers to subsume bargained-for provisions").

1. Standard of review. The collective bargaining 

agreement between the city and the union, like many of its kind,

contains a grievance procedure. A delicate balance of both 

parties' concessions and demands yielded the city's promise to 

consider the union's grievances3 through a process that, if 

necessary, culminates with arbitration. In any collective 

bargaining context, it is the arbitrator's expertise that the 

parties bargained for. United Steelworkers of Am. v. American 

Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564, 568 (1960). The Legislature has 

indorsed, and we must respect, a strong public policy favoring 

arbitration. School Comm. of Pittsfield v. United Educators of 

Pittsfield, 438 Mass. 753, 728 (2003) ("Public policy in the 

Commonwealth strongly encourages arbitration"). "Arbitration 

would have little value if it were merely an intermediate step 

 

3 The grievance process allows the union or, pursuant to 

G. L. c. 150E, individual employees to object to an action taken 

by the city that is governed by the collective bargaining 

agreement. Such actions include, but are not limited to, the 

termination of employment, at issue here.
7

between a grievance and litigation in the courts." Id. The 

Legislature has codified this priority, permitting courts to 

vacate arbitration awards only in rare, statutorily enumerated 

circumstances. See G. L. c. 150C, § 11.

The system of collective bargaining created and indorsed by 

the Legislature necessitates deference to the bargained-for 

result of an arbitrator's award. We review the trial judge's 

decision to uphold the arbitration award de novo, but our 

examination of the underlying award is informed by the "strong 

public policy favoring arbitration" (citation omitted). See 

Bureau of Special Investigations v. Coalition of Pub. Safety, 

430 Mass. 601, 603 (2000). However, the relationship between a 

reviewing court and the result of an arbitration is unlike the 

relationship between an appellate court and the outcome of a 

lower court's proceedings. Lynn v. Thompson, 435 Mass. 54, 61

(2001), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 1131 (2002). Our review of the 

underlying arbitration decision is considerably more deferential 

than even the abuse of discretion or clear error standards 

applied to lower court decisions. Id. See Williams, 477 Mass. 

at 439-440. Indeed, an arbitration award carries a presumption 

of propriety because it is the arbitrator's judgment, not

necessarily an objectively correct answer, for which the parties 

have bargained. United Steelworkers of Am., 363 U.S. at 568.
8

We therefore "uphold an arbitrator's decision even where it 

is wrong on the facts or the law, and whether it is wise or 

foolish, clear or ambiguous." Boston v. Boston Police 

Patrolmen's Ass'n, 443 Mass. 813, 818 (2005) (DiSciullo). 

"Because the parties have contracted to have disputes settled by 

an arbitrator chosen by them rather than by a judge, it is the 

arbitrator's view of the facts and of the meaning of the 

contract that they have agreed to accept." United Paperworks 

Int'l Union, AFL-CIO v. Misco, Inc., 484 U.S. 29, 37–38 (1987)

(Misco). Where the arbitrator allegedly engaged in 

"improvident, even silly, factfinding," we are nonetheless bound 

by those facts. Major League Baseball Players Ass'n v. Garvey, 

532 U.S. 504, 509 (2001), quoting Misco, supra at 39. See Lynn, 

435 Mass. at 62, quoting Delta Air Lines, Inc. v. Air Line 

Pilots Ass'n, Int'l, 861 F.2d 665, 670 (11th Cir. 1988), cert. 

denied, 493 U.S. 871 (1989) ("An arbitrator's result may be 

wrong; it may appear unsupported; it may appear poorly reasoned; 

it may appear foolish. Yet, it may not be subject to court 

interference"). An award cannot be disturbed even if an 

arbitrator's findings are so confusing or unclear that, in order 

to evaluate the merits of an award, we would have to confront 

conflicting inferences. See Misco, supra at 44 ("A refusal to 

enforce an award must rest on more than speculation or 

assumption," and it was "inappropriate" for lower court to infer 
9

connection between arbitrator's facts and public policy at 

issue); Sheriff of Suffolk County v. Jail Officers & Employees 

of Suffolk County, 451 Mass. 698, 701-703 (2008) (arbitrator's 

factual findings were "far from a model of clarity" but "it 

would not be appropriate to vacate the arbitrator's award based 

on possibly incorrect factual inferences we might draw from his 

ambiguous findings").4

2. Public policy exception. Bound by the facts as 

explicitly found by the arbitrator, we evaluate the city's 

argument that public policy prohibits the enforcement of the 

arbitration award. The city cites a public policy that requires 

police officers "to be truthful in all of their official 

dealings," which is necessary for "the police to gain and 

preserve the public trust [and] maintain public confidence"

(citation omitted). The city finds the root of this public 

 

4 Although we attempted to remand for clarification of facts 

in Sheriff of Suffolk County v. Jail Officers & Employees of 

Suffolk County, 451 Mass. 698, 702 n.5 (2008), remand was not 

possible due to the arbitrator's death, so we were left to 

wrestle with the facts as found. See United Steelworkers of Am. 

v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593, 598 (1960)

("Arbitrators have no obligation to the court to give their 

reasons for an award. To require opinions free of ambiguity may 

lead arbitrators to play it safe by writing no supporting 

opinions. This would be undesirable for a well-reasoned opinion 

tends to engender confidence in the integrity of the process and 

aids in clarifying the underlying agreement" [footnote 

omitted]).
10

policy in G. L. c. 268, § 6A,5 prohibiting "false written reports 

by public officers or employees."6

"[T]he judiciary must be cautious about overruling an 

arbitration award on the ground that it conflicts with public 

policy" (citation omitted). Bureau of Special Investigations, 

430 Mass. at 604. "[W]e apply a stringent, three-part analysis" 

to determine whether the public policy exception applies to the 

otherwise mandated enforcement of an arbitration award

(quotation and citation omitted). Williams, 477 Mass. at 442. 

"First, the policy at issue must be well defined and dominant,

and is to be ascertained by reference to the laws and legal 

precedents and not from general considerations of supposed 

 

5 "Whoever, being an officer or employee of the commonwealth 

or of any political subdivision thereof or of any authority 

created by the general court, in the course of his official 

duties executes, files or publishes any false written report, 

minutes or statement, knowing the same to be false in a material 

matter, shall be punished by a fine of not more than one 

thousand dollars or by imprisonment for not more than one year, 

or by both such fine and imprisonment." G. L. c. 268, § 6A.

6 The city also notes that in May, 2017, after Eason had 

been terminated, the district attorney for the Berkshire 

district sent the Pittsfield police chief a letter stating that 

he would not call Eason "to testify on behalf of the 

Commonwealth in any criminal matter, whether presently pending 

or in the future." Although very troubling, this was not part 

of the evidence considered by the city when firing Eason or by 

the arbitrator when making his decision. It therefore has no 

bearing on our consideration of the propriety of the 

arbitrator's decision. However, although it is required to 

abide by the results of this arbitration, the city is, of 

course, not prohibited from pursuing any additional appropriate 

discipline based on the district attorney's letter or any other 

newly acquired information.
11

public interests" (quotations and citation omitted). Id. 

Second, the exception must not merely address "disfavored 

conduct, in the abstract" but must target "disfavored conduct 

which is integral to the performance of employment duties"

(emphasis in original). Id., quoting Massachusetts Highway 

Dep't v. American Fed'n of State, County, & Mun. Employees, 

Council 93, 420 Mass. 13, 16 (1995). Third, we inquire whether 

an award reinstating the employee violates public policy.

Williams, supra at 442-443. The burden is on the party seeking 

vacation of the award, the city, to demonstrate that the award 

satisfies each of these prongs.7 DiSciullo, 443 Mass. at 819.

We have already held that public policy supports 

terminating police officers for lying and that such a public 

policy satisfies the first two prongs. Id.8 We turn our 

attention to the third prong of this test, whether the award

violates public policy. It is crucial to note that "[t]he 

 

7 The city erroneously argues that "the burden ought to be 

on the party arguing against the mandatory termination of an 

officer who lies about a material matter in a police report to 

proffer some authority for that position" (emphasis in 

original). We decline to shift the burden from the party 

seeking judicial intervention in the arbitration process.

8 Unlike in Boston v. Boston Police Patrolmen's Ass'n, 443 

Mass. 813, 819 (2005), the union here does not concede any 

element of this test. The city and the union dispute whether 

Eason's alleged misconduct constituted knowingly false 

statements about a "material" matter in violation of G. L. 

c. 268, § 6A. Neither party cites any authority for its 

contention that the disputed aspect of the report was or was not 

"material."
12

question in the third prong is not whether the employee's 

behavior violates public policy," but whether the award itself 

does. Williams, 477 Mass. at 442-443.

In the rare circumstances where Massachusetts reviewing 

courts have exercised the power to vacate an arbitration award 

on public policy grounds, there was no ambiguity in the material 

underlying factual findings. See Massachusetts Bay Transp. 

Auth. v. Boston Carmen's Union, Local 589, Amalgamated Transit 

Union, 454 Mass. 19, 24-26, 29-30 (2009) (arbitrator's award 

removing seniority from employee who won settlement as result of 

discrimination violated public policy); School Dist. of Beverly

v. Geller, 435 Mass. 223, 224 (2001) (vacating arbitration award 

where arbitrator reinstated teacher who had used physical force 

against students); Boston v. Boston Police Patrolmen's Ass'n, 74 

Mass. App. Ct. 379, 380-382 (2009) (reinstatement of officer who 

admitted to sufficient facts for assault by means of dangerous 

weapon when off duty and whose case was continued without

finding violated public policy).

In DiSciullo, 443 Mass. at 814, which the city argues is 

controlling, we vacated an arbitrator's award reinstating an 

officer who was found to have behaved with "egregious dishonesty 

and abuse of [an] official position." In that case, DiSciullo 

filed an incident report and a statement of criminal charges 

falsely alleging disorderly conduct, assault and battery on a 
13

police officer, and resisting arrest. Id. at 815. Thus, the 

factual findings established a clear nexus between the officer's 

dishonesty and the arrest and charges. Our decision to vacate 

the arbitrator's award in DiSciullo was based on our conclusion 

that the specific factual findings of the arbitrator concerning 

the officer's egregious dishonesty and abuse of official 

position mandated dismissal of the officer. Id. at 819-820.

Here, the arbitrator's findings about Eason's misconduct do not 

describe conduct that rises to the level of misconduct that 

necessitated termination of the officer in DiSciullo. We

cannot, in these circumstances, substitute our judgment for that 

of the arbitrator's in determining the appropriate discipline. 

See W.R. Grace & Co. v. Local Union 759, Int'l Union of the 

United Rubber, Cork, Linoleum & Plastic Workers of Am., 461 U.S. 

757, 765 (1983) ("Regardless of what our view might be of the 

correctness of [the arbitrator's] contractual interpretation, 

the Company and the Union bargained for that interpretation. A 

. . . court may not second-guess it").

In Sheriff of Suffolk County, 451 Mass. at 701, we 

considered an arbitrator's decision where "the factual findings 

. . . [were] far from a model of clarity." There, "the 

arbitrator concluded that [the jail officer] filed reports with 

the sheriff's internal investigation officers that were 

incomplete or false or misleading, but does not attempt to 
14

distinguish among these three possibilities" (emphasis added). 

Id. at 701-702. We stated that "[i]n a situation where a jail 

officer actually witnesses fellow officers assault an individual 

who is held in the sheriff's custody, and then lies about this 

fact and files false reports that memorialize the falsity, we 

have little doubt that established public policy would condemn 

such conduct and would require the discharge of such an 

officer." Id. at 702. In that case, therefore, there was a 

nexus between the misconduct of the jail officer and the harm to 

the prisoner. We concluded, however, that "the arbitrator's 

findings [were] not sufficiently clear on what [the officer] 

witnessed, or on the character of his reports and participation 

in the sheriff's investigation -- that is, did he supply false 

information, or was he simply less than complete?" Id. In 

light of the "strong public policy . . . that favors 

arbitration," we determined that "it would not be appropriate to 

vacate the arbitrator's award based on possibly incorrect 

factual inferences we might draw from his ambiguous findings." 

Id. at 702-703.

In Williams, 477 Mass. at 436-437, 445, we were constrained 

to approve the reinstatement of an officer who used a choke hold 

on someone who "testified that he could not breathe and began to 

lose consciousness," because the arbitrator found that the 

officer did not use excessive force and was "not untruthful" in 
15

reporting the incident. We held that it was not a violation of 

public policy to reinstate an officer who, as found by the 

arbitrator, did not use excessive force and did not lie. Id. at 

445.

The distinction between a statement that is "intentionally 

misleading" but not "intentionally false" is, at best, elusive.9

We need not dwell on the meaning of the arbitrator's factual 

findings, however, because the arbitrator found that the officer 

made a statement that was both "knowingly inaccurate" and 

"intentionally misleading" -- and this finding alone is 

sufficient to raise a question whether the arbitrator's award 

reinstating him is contrary to public policy. Undoubtedly, were 

we to conduct a de novo analysis we would not draw the same 

distinction between an "intentionally misleading" and an 

"intentionally false" statement, as did the arbitrator. See 

Williams, 477 Mass. at 444. See Misco, 484 U.S. at 38 ("an 

arbitrator must find facts and a court may not reject those 

findings simply because it disagrees with them"). "The question

. . . is not whether [Eason's] conduct justified termination, 

but whether it required termination, such that any lesser 

sanction would violate public policy" (emphasis in original). 

Williams, supra at 445. We have drawn the public policy 

 

9 Logically, if a statement is not only "untrue" but also 

"knowingly inaccurate" and "intentionally misleading," it must 

also be "intentionally false."
16

exception quite narrowly because "[w]e cannot purport to 

encourage arbitration and yet devise ways to undermine an 

arbitrator's authority." School Dist. of Beverly, 435 Mass. at 

248 (Cowin, J., dissenting). Obligated to credit the 

arbitrator's conclusion that a phrase in Eason's report was no 

more than misleading and that termination was not permissible 

under the collective bargaining agreement, we must uphold the 

award. See Concerned Minority Educators of Worcester v. School 

Comm. of Worcester, 392 Mass. 184, 187 (1984) ("we have no 

business overruling an arbitrator because we give a contract a 

different interpretation").

Our decision does nothing to limit the ability of police 

chiefs to terminate officers for lying where the arbitrator 

agrees that such conduct occurred. Nor does this decision 

change the public policy exception that bars the reinstatement 

of officers, as was the case in DiSciullo, whose lies have 

restricted other's liberty. Even a statement which is

"intentionally misleading . . . but less than intentionally 

false" that resulted in arrest, prosecution, loss of liberty, or 

a violation of civil rights would justify, on public policy 

grounds, the decision of a police chief to terminate an officer.

General Laws c. 268, § 6A, which makes it a crime for a 

police officer in the course of his or her official duties to 

file or publish "any false written report, minutes[,] or 
17

statement, knowing the same to be false in a material matter,"

and G. L. c. 268, § 13B, which makes it a crime for anyone to 

wilfully mislead another person who is a judge, prosecutor, or 

police officer "with the intent to impede, obstruct, delay, 

harm, punish or otherwise interfere thereby" with a criminal 

investigation or any criminal, juvenile, or civil proceeding "or 

do so with reckless disregard," reflect the Legislature's 

embrace of the important public policy interest that our police 

officers speak and act with integrity.10 Had Eason's wilfully 

misleading statement constituted a crime under § 13B, meaning 

that it was made with the intent to impede, obstruct, or 

otherwise interfere with a criminal investigation or any 

criminal, juvenile, or civil proceeding, then the third prong 

would have been met and public policy would have required that 

we set aside an award reinstating him. But the suspect here was 

not charged with any conduct related to her removal from the 

police cruiser -- she was charged only with larceny, not with 

assault and battery on a police officer or disorderly conduct. 

Therefore, the officer's "knowingly inaccurate" and 

"intentionally misleading" statement in his police report was 

not made with the intent to impede, obstruct, or otherwise 

 

10 In contrast with § 6A, a violation of § 13B does not 

require a knowing false statement; it suffices that the 

statement "directly or indirectly, willfully . . . misleads 

. . . another person."
18

interfere with any criminal investigation or proceeding; the 

arbitrator's factual findings indicate instead that the officer 

made this statement solely in an attempt to avoid discipline for 

removing the suspect from his police cruiser for the purpose of 

allowing supermarket personnel to photograph her.11

In making these employment decisions, police chiefs who are 

responsible for maintaining the integrity of their departments

and for preserving public trust in their officers need clear 

lines. It requires commitment and courage for a police chief to 

terminate the employment of a police officer; it is generally 

easier to avoid doing so. Termination of an officer's 

employment means that the police department almost invariably 

will need to incur the expense of arbitration, including the 

substantial attorney's fees from litigating such an arbitration. 

And if the arbitrator disagrees with the decision to terminate, 

the officer will be reinstated and the police department will be 

required to make the officer whole with respect to lost benefits 

under the collective bargaining agreement, including back pay, 

compensation for lost income from overtime and details, and the 

return of seniority rights. If there are no clear public policy 

lines supporting termination, it is extremely difficult for a 

 

11 The arbitrator wrote, "I believe the [officer] wanted to 

conceal the real reason for removing the [suspect] by falsely 

reporting that it was safety-related . . . [and that] the 

[officer] referred to safety to deflect the readers of his 

report away from his bad judgment."
19

police chief to risk such a decision where it might be undone by 

an arbitrator whose decision cannot be reversed by a court even 

when it is plainly wrong as a matter of fact or as a matter of 

law.

Where a police chief decides to terminate an officer in 

circumstances in which the officer's false statements violated 

G. L. c. 268, § 6A or 13B, or which otherwise resulted in an 

unjustified arrest or prosecution, or in a deprivation of 

liberty or denial of civil rights, an arbitration award finding 

no just cause for such a dismissal and reinstating the officer 

would violate public policy. We affirm the arbitrator's award 

here only because it did not cross this public policy line.

Judgment affirmed.