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*********************************************** 
CRISTIANE M. ALMEIDA v. RENATO ALMEIDA

(AC 41312)

Keller, Elgo and Bishop, Js.

Syllabus

The defendant, whose marriage to the plaintiff previously had been dissolved, appealed to this court from the judgment of the trial court

granting the plaintiff’s motion for clarification of the dissolution judgment. As part of its judgment of dissolution, the court had ordered, inter

alia, that the defendant quitclaim to the plaintiff all interest in certain

real property, and the defendant signed a quitclaim deed, assigning his

rights and interest in the property to the plaintiff. After the plaintiff

subsequently learned that the defendant’s business partner was on the

deed of the property, she filed a postjudgment motion for clarification,

in which she asked the court to determine whether it intended for the

defendant to make whatever arrangements were necessary with his

business partner to transfer all interest in the property to the plaintiff

or if the court, instead, intended to award the plaintiff with a 50 percent

interest in the property. The court granted the plaintiff’s motion, finding

that it had previously determined in its dissolution judgment that the

defendant’s testimony regarding a business partner was not credible,

that it had previously ordered the defendant to quitclaim all interest in

the property to the plaintiff, and that it intended for the plaintiff to

acquire 100 percent interest in the property. The court, thus, ordered

the defendant to take the necessary measures to effectuate the terms

of the dissolution judgment. Held that the trial court improperly modified

the dissolution judgment when it issued its clarification order; that

court’s order did not simply effectuate its existing judgment but, instead,

introduced a new element into the details of the judgment because, when

it became obvious that the defendant could not transfer 100 percent

ownership interest to the plaintiff solely by his execution of a quitclaim

deed, the court ordered the defendant to take additional steps beyond

quitclaiming his interest in the property to the plaintiff, and although

the plaintiff claimed that the court’s original intent that the plaintiff

receive a 100 percent interest in the property is evinced by the language

in the dissolution judgment memorandum of decision, the court’s subsequent order is premised on facts that it originally did not believe, as

the court, in its dissolution judgment, did not credit the defendant’s

testimony that he was only a 50 percent owner of the property, and by

subsequently ordering the defendant to take the necessary measures so

that the plaintiff could acquire a 100 percent interest in the property,

the court substantively modified the dissolution judgment.

Argued March 5—officially released June 25, 2019

Procedural History

Action for the dissolution of a marriage, and for other

relief, brought to the Superior Court in the judicial district of Hartford and tried to the court, Ficeto, J.; judgment dissolving the marriage and granting certain other

relief; thereafter, the court granted the plaintiff’s motion

for clarification and issued a clarification of the dissolution judgment, and the defendant appealed to this court.

Reversed; judgment directed.

David R. Peck, with whom, on the brief, was Brittany

Wallace, for the appellant (defendant).

Giovanna Shay, with whom, on the brief, were

Ramona Mercado-Espinoza and Enelsa Diaz, for the

appellee (plaintiff).
Opinion

ELGO, J. In this postdissolution matter, the defendant, Renato Almeida, appeals from the judgment of

the trial court granting the motion for clarification filed

by the plaintiff, Cristiane M. Almeida. On appeal, the

defendant claims that the court improperly modified the

dissolution judgment when it rendered its clarification.1

We agree and, therefore, reverse the judgment of the

trial court.

The following facts and procedural history are relevant to this appeal. The parties’ marriage was dissolved

on October 16, 2015. In its memorandum of decision, the

court, Ficeto, J., found, inter alia, that ‘‘[t]he defendant

acquired four properties during the course of the marriage. The property at 409 Sigourney Street, Hartford

[property], is where the parties made their home and

the defendant currently resides. It is a three family

home; the defendant resides in one unit and rents two.

[The defendant] listed the value of [the property] at

$144,000 on his financial affidavit. He alleges [that] he

is only a 50 percent owner of [the property] and that

his business partner owns 50 percent through a business

entity known as Talyah Home Improvement, LLC. . . .

All properties were purchased with cash. Counsel for

the plaintiff inquired how the defendant was able to

acquire the . . . properties with no loans or mortgages.

[The defendant] testified that a sister brought him

$100,000 from Brazil and that he used it as seed money

for ‘flipping’ houses. He alleges [that] the money was

his and that he had saved it in Brazil. He was unable

to provide documentation relative to the $100,000. The

defendant testified relative to his business entity,

Talyah Home Improvement, LLC. There was no evidence introduced relative to either the limited liability

[company] or its members. [The defendant] vaguely

testified about his partner, who has been in Brazil for

the past year. [The defendant] alleges that he deals with

his partner’s ‘people.’ A review of the defendant’s tax

returns for the years 2010, 2011, 2012, and 2014 show[s]

no schedules related to income from a business entity

known as Talyah Home Improvement, LLC.2

. . . The

court does not find credible [the defendant’s] recitation

relative to his financial affairs.’’ (Footnote in original.)

As part of its judgment of dissolution, the court

ordered, inter alia, that ‘‘[t]he defendant shall forthwith

vacate and quitclaim to the plaintiff all interest in [the

property]. [The] [p]laintiff shall thereafter be responsible for all expenses relating to said [property], including, but not limited to, real estate taxes, insurance, and

utilities, and shall indemnify and hold the defendant

harmless in regard to the same.’’

Subsequently, on December 4, 2015, the defendant

signed a quitclaim deed, assigning his rights and interest

in the property to the plaintiff.3 On February 2, 2016,
the parties entered into an agreement, which provided,

in relevant part, that the ‘‘[p]laintiff will execute a substitution of agent and interim change of member for

Talyah Home Improvement, LLC, and [the] defendant

will file said documents and pay the associated filing

fees to the Connecticut Secretary of State. This will

allow [the] plaintiff to lawfully collect rents at [the

property] going forward.’’

On September 21, 2017, the plaintiff filed a motion

for contempt in which she claimed: ‘‘1. On October 16,

2015, the court ordered the defendant to vacate and

quitclaim to the plaintiff all interest in [the property].

2. On December 4, 2015, the defendant quitclaimed to

the plaintiff [the property]; however, it has come to the

plaintiff’s attention that there was another person on

the deed of the property. 3. The plaintiff is now being

sued by Domingos, Joelson, in care of Salatiel De Matos

through a power of attorney. . . . 4. During the divorce

proceedings, the defendant never stated that he was

only [one-half] owner of the aforementioned property.

5. As a result, the plaintiff may have to sell the aforementioned property and [lose one half] of the equity in the

home. 6. The defendant is in violation and in contempt

of the court orders.’’

On December 4, 2017, the plaintiff filed a postjudgment motion for clarification, in which she argued that

‘‘[c]larification of the [dissolution] judgment [was] necessary to determine if the court intended for the defendant to make whatever arrangements were necessary

with his business partner in Brazil to transfer ‘all interest’ in the [property] to the plaintiff, or if it was the

court’s intention to award the plaintiff with a 50 percent

interest in the property and/or [the limited liability

company].’’

On December 5, 2017, the court, Nastri, J., entered

an order, which provided that: ‘‘1. Upon agreement of

the parties, [the] plaintiff will withdraw the motion for

contempt . . . and pursue the more appropriate

motion for clarification filed [on] December 4, 2017. 2.

The plaintiff’s new motion will be calendared at a later

date. It will be appropriate for Judge Ficeto to hear the

plaintiff’s new motion, as she was [the] judge who

issued the judgment memorandum on October 16,

2015.’’

On January 5, 2018, without the motion ever being

calendared, as ordered by Judge Nastri, the court

entered an order granting the plaintiff’s motion for clarification. That order stated in relevant part: ‘‘The court

noted in its factual findings of October 16, 2015, that

it did not find the defendant . . . credible relative to

the ownership of the [property]. The defendant produced no evidence relative to the ownership of the

property. He testified vaguely about a limited liability

[company] and a partner in Brazil. He alleged that the

partner resided in Brazil, so he dealt with the alleged
partner’s representative. The court did not find the testimony credible. The court ordered that the defendant

quitclaim ‘all interest’ to the plaintiff. The court

intended that the plaintiff . . . acquire 100 percent

interest in [the property] and be the sole owner of

said property. The defendant is ordered to take the

necessary measures to effectuate the terms of the judgment.’’ From that decision, the defendant appeals.

On appeal, the defendant claims that the court

improperly modified the dissolution judgment when it

rendered its clarification order. In response, the plaintiff

contends that the court’s order was a proper clarification of its original judgment. We agree with the

defendant.

We begin by setting forth our standard of review and

relevant legal principles. ‘‘It is well established that

[t]he court’s judgment in an action for dissolution of a

marriage is final and binding [on] the parties, where no

appeal is taken therefrom, unless and to the extent that

statutes, the common law or rules of [practice] permit

the setting aside or modification of that judgment.

Under Practice Book [§ 17-4], a civil judgment may be

opened or set aside . . . [when] a motion seeking to

do so is filed within four months from the date of its

rendition. . . . Absent waiver, consent or other submission to jurisdiction, however, a court is without

jurisdiction to modify or correct a judgment, in other

than clerical respects, after the expiration of [that four

month period] . . . .

‘‘Even beyond the four month time frame set forth in

Practice Book § 17-4,4 however, courts have continuing

jurisdiction to fashion a remedy appropriate to the vindication of a prior . . . judgment . . . pursuant to

[their] inherent powers . . . . When an ambiguity in

the language of a prior judgment has arisen as a result

of postjudgment events, therefore, a trial court may, at

any time, exercise its continuing jurisdiction to effectuate its prior [judgment] . . . by interpreting [the]

ambiguous judgment and entering orders to effectuate

the judgment as interpreted . . . . In cases in which

execution of the original judgment occurs over a period

of years, a motion for clarification is an appropriate

procedural vehicle to ensure that the original judgment

is properly effectuated. . . .

‘‘Although a trial court may interpret an ambiguous

judgment . . . a motion for clarification may not . . .

be used to modify or to alter the substantive terms of

a prior judgment . . . and we look to the substance of

the relief sought by the motion rather than the form to

determine whether a motion is properly characterized

as one seeking a clarification or a modification. . . .

‘‘In order to determine whether the trial court properly clarified ambiguity in the judgment or impermissibly modified or altered the substantive terms of the
judgment, we must first construe the trial court’s judgment. It is well established that the construction of a

judgment presents a question of law over which we

exercise plenary review. . . . In construing a trial

court’s judgment, [t]he determinative factor is the intention of the court as gathered from all parts of the judgment. . . . The interpretation of a judgment may

involve the circumstances surrounding the making of

the judgment. . . . Effect must be given to that which

is clearly implied as well as to that which is expressed.

. . . The judgment should admit of a consistent construction as a whole. . . . In addition . . . because

the trial judge who issues the order that is the subject

of subsequent clarification is familiar with the entire

record and, of course, with the order itself, that judge

is in the best position to clarify any ambiguity in the

order. For that reason, substantial deference is

accorded to a court’s interpretation of its own order.

. . . Accordingly, we will not disturb a trial court’s

clarification of an ambiguity in its own order unless

the court’s interpretation of that order is manifestly

unreasonable.’’ (Citations omitted; footnote in original;

internal quotation marks omitted.) Bauer v. Bauer, 308

Conn. 124, 129–32, 60 A.3d 950 (2013).

‘‘[T]he purpose of a clarification is to take a prior

statement, decision or order and make it easier to

understand. Motions for clarification, therefore, may be

appropriate where there is an ambiguous term in a

judgment or decision . . . but, not where the movant’s

request would cause a substantive change in the

existing decision. Moreover, motions for clarification

may be made at any time and are grounded in the trial

court’s equitable authority to protect the integrity of its

judgments.’’ (Citation omitted.) In re Haley B., 262

Conn. 406, 413, 815 A.2d 113 (2003).

In the present case, the court, in its dissolution judgment memorandum of decision, ordered the defendant

to quitclaim all interest in the property to the plaintiff,

and the defendant subsequently signed a quitclaim

deed, thereby assigning his interest to the plaintiff.

Although the plaintiff essentially asked the court in her

motion for clarification to clarify what it meant in its

dissolution judgment order by ‘‘all interest’’ when it

ordered the defendant to ‘‘quitclaim to the plaintiff all

interest’’ in the property, she asserted that ‘‘[c]larification of the [dissolution] judgment [was] necessary to

determine if the court intended for the defendant to

make whatever arrangements were necessary with his

business partner in Brazil to transfer ‘all interest’ in the

[property] to the plaintiff . . . .’’ (Emphasis added.)

The court’s dissolution judgment order, however, identified that the specific action the defendant was required

to take was to quitclaim all interest in the property.

The plaintiff’s motion sought to change the substance

of the judgment by asking the trial court to revisit its

original judgment and effectuate its original intent by
introducing a new element into its judgment—that the

defendant not just quitclaim whatever interest in the

property he was able to, but that he ‘‘make whatever

arrangements were necessary’’ so as to be able to transfer his partner’s interest as well. Accordingly, the plaintiff’s motion more properly is characterized as a motion

to modify because it ‘‘represent[s] an attempt to alter

the substantive terms of the original judgment.’’ Mickey

v. Mickey, 292 Conn. 597, 606, 974 A.2d 641 (2009); see

also In re Haley B., supra, 262 Conn. 414 (motion for

clarification properly characterized as motion to alter

or to modify original judgment when trial court

changed, on basis of mistake made at trial, visitation

order by reducing frequency of visitation from weekly

to monthly visitation in order to effectuate intent of

original judgment); Miller v. Miller, 16 Conn. App. 412,

416–17, 547 A.2d 922 (motion for clarification improperly modified original judgment, which allowed defendant to satisfy $500,000 lump sum alimony award by

transferring securities to plaintiff, by subsequently

ordering that any securities transferred to plaintiff in

satisfaction of lump sum alimony award pay dividends

of at least $50,000 per year), cert. denied, 209 Conn.

823, 552 A.2d 430 (1988).

Moreover, by ordering in its clarification order that

the defendant ‘‘take the necessary measures’’ so that

the plaintiff could acquire a 100 percent interest in the

property, the court did more than simply effectuate its

existing judgment. In Lawrence v. Cords, 165 Conn.

App. 473, 484, 139 A.3d 778, cert. denied, 322 Conn. 907,

140 A.3d 221 (2016), this court ‘‘explained the difference

between postjudgment orders that modify a judgment

rather than effectuate it. A modification is [a] change;

an alteration or amendment which introduces new elements into the details, or cancels some of them, but

leaves the general purpose and effect of the subjectmatter intact. . . . In contrast, an order effectuating

an existing judgment allows the court to protect the

integrity of its original ruling by ensuring the parties’

timely compliance therewith.’’ (Internal quotation

marks omitted.) The court’s clarification order in the

present case introduced a new element into the details

of the judgment because, when it became obvious that

the defendant could not transfer 100 percent ownership

interest to the plaintiff solely by his execution of a

quitclaim deed, the court ordered the defendant to take

additional steps beyond quitclaiming his interest in the

property to the plaintiff. Accordingly, the court’s order

amounted to a modification of the dissolution judgment.

As the plaintiff correctly notes, in construing a marital

dissolution judgment, the court’s judgment must be

interpreted as a whole. See Bauer v. Bauer, supra, 308

Conn. 131 (‘‘The interpretation of a judgment may

involve the circumstances surrounding the making of

the judgment. . . . Effect must be given to that which

is clearly implied as well as to that which is expressed.
. . . The judgment should admit of a consistent construction as a whole.’’ [Internal quotation marks omitted.]). The plaintiff asserts that the court’s original

intent that the plaintiff receive a 100 percent interest

in the property is evinced by the language in the dissolution judgment memorandum of decision. Specifically,

she points our attention to the language within the

court’s factual findings wherein the court states that it

did not find credible the defendant’s ‘‘recitation relative

to his financial affairs.’’ She also refers to the language

within the dissolution judgment orders, which provide

that the plaintiff will be responsible for all expenses

associated with the property, including real estate

taxes, insurance, and utilities. Despite these statements,

however, the court recognized that the defendant had

testified that he owned a 50 percent interest in the

property, as was indicated on his financial affidavit.

While the court did not credit the defendant’s testimony,

it also did not find that the defendant owned a 100

percent interest in the property, and there was no testimony or evidence submitted that would have supported

such a finding.5 Therefore, the court’s subsequent order

is premised on facts that it originally did not believe.

‘‘It is well established that disbelief of a witness is not

the equivalent of proof.’’ State v. Simmons, 188 Conn.

App. 813, 843, 205 A.3d 569 (2019). Having not credited

the defendant’s testimony that he was only a 50 percent

owner of the property, and having ordered the defendant to ‘‘take the necessary measures’’ so that the plaintiff could acquire a 100 percent interest in the property,

the court substantively modified the dissolution

judgment.

We also are not persuaded by the plaintiff’s argument

that the present case is ‘‘analogous’’ to Bauer v. Bauer,

supra, 308 Conn. 124.6

InBauer, the judgment of dissolution rendered by the trial court provided that its memorandum of decision was incorporated by reference. Id.,

126. Within its memorandum of decision, the court

stated that the parties agreed to split equally the defendant’s pension accounts. Id. When the court issued

twelve orders at the end of its memorandum of decision,

however, the court did not refer to the pension

accounts. Id., 127. Neither party appealed from the

court’s judgment. Id. Years later, the plaintiff filed a

motion for clarification asking the court to ‘‘reconfirm

its previous order requiring [that] the defendant equally

split his [pension accounts] with the plaintiff . . . .’’

(Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id. The court

granted the motion for clarification; id.; and explained

that ‘‘[b]ecause there is an alleged ambiguity or incompleteness in the decision of the trial court . . . [the]

court will clarify that, pursuant to the parties’ stipulation: The defendant is ordered to split equally his . . .

pension [accounts] . . . .’’ (Internal quotation marks

omitted.) Id., 128. On appeal, our Supreme Court concluded that, given the discrepancy between the trial
court’s factual findings indicating that the parties would

equally divide the defendant’s pension accounts and

the lack of a formal order to that effect, the judgment

was ambiguous. Id., 132. The court further concluded

that ‘‘a motion for clarification was the proper method

for resolving the ambiguity because the motion did not

seek to change the terms or substance of the judgment,

but merely sought to resolve the ambiguity in the judgment by reconciling the discrepancy between the

court’s factual findings and its orders. . . . The plaintiff sought to clarify that the pension accounts would

be split equally by the parties rather than awarded in

their entirety to the defendant—she did not seek to

change the percentage of the amount that would be

awarded to her.’’ (Citation omitted.) Id., 132–33. Our

Supreme Court, thus, determined that ‘‘[n]ot only was

[the trial court’s] interpretation reasonable, but any

other interpretation would have rendered the trial

court’s factual finding superfluous and inconsistent

with its orders. Moreover, the clarification merely reiterated the factual finding as originally stated and, thus,

did not change or modify the judgment.’’ Id., 135.

The plaintiff correctly points out that the defendant

in the present case, like the defendant in Bauer, did

not raise on appeal any challenge to the trial court’s

factual findings. The plaintiff also contends that the

present case is similar to Bauer because the court’s

clarification in the present case, like that in Bauer,

‘‘merely reiterated the factual finding[s] as originally

stated and, thus, did not change or modify the judgment.’’ Id. In making that analogy, however, the plaintiff

misconstrues Bauer. In Bauer, the factual finding that

was reiterated in the court’s clarification was the court’s

statement that the parties agreed to split the pension

accounts. Id., 132. In its clarification, the court took

its prior factual finding regarding that agreement and

clarified that it was part of its orders. The facts of the

present case are markedly different.

Unlike Bauer, where the trial court stated that an

agreement was reached by the parties as to the division

of certain property in its factual findings and then reiterated that factual finding in its clarification; id., 135;

in the present case, after the defendant had already

quitclaimed his interest in the property to the plaintiff

pursuant to the court’s dissolution judgment, the court’s

clarification adds that the defendant ‘‘is ordered to take

the necessary measures to effectuate the terms of the

judgment’’ so that the plaintiff may acquire a 100 percent

interest in the property. Accordingly, the court’s clarification is not a reiteration of its previous order, as the

plaintiff suggests, but, rather, constituted a substantive

change to the dissolution judgment that introduces an

additional element.7

For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that the trial

court improperly modified the dissolution judgment
when it issued its clarification order.

The judgment is reversed and the case is remanded

with direction to deny the plaintiff’s motion for clarification.

In this opinion the other judges concurred.

1 The defendant also claims that the trial court’s order dated January 5,

2018, is unenforceable because the court had no authority to order the

defendant to acquire an interest in property he did not have at the time of

the dissolution. Because we agree with the defendant’s first claim that the

court improperly modified the dissolution judgment, we need not address

this issue.

2

‘‘The 2013 tax returns were not submitted into evidence. The 2010, 2011,

2012 and 2014 tax returns contain a Schedule C Profit or Loss from Business

for [another business entity].’’

3 Pursuant to General Statutes § 47-36f, ‘‘[a] deed entitled ‘Quitclaim Deed,’

when duly executed, has the force and effect of a conveyance to the releasee

of all the releasor’s right, title and interest in and to the property described

therein except as otherwise limited therein, but without any covenants of

title. A ‘Quitclaim Deed’ may be used as a release of a mortgage, attachment,

judgment lien or any other interest in real property.’’

4

‘‘Practice Book § 17-4 provides in relevant part: ‘(a) Unless otherwise

provided by law and except in such cases in which the court has continuing

jurisdiction, any civil judgment or decree rendered in the [S]uperior [C]ourt

may not be opened or set aside unless a motion to open or set aside is filed

within four months succeeding the date on which notice was sent. The

parties may waive the provisions of this subsection or otherwise submit to

the jurisdiction of the court. . . .’ ’’ Bauer v. Bauer, 308 Conn. 124, 130, 60

A.3d 950 (2013).

5 Throughout the trial, the defendant testified that the property was owned

by Talyah Home Improvement, LLC, and that he was a co-owner of that

company. The defendant, however, did not provide any evidence to support

his testimony. In his financial affidavit dated September 11, 2015, his most

recent financial affidavit before the trial began, the defendant listed the

property as an asset owned ‘‘joint with other,’’ and he indicated that the

value of his interest was one half of the equity in the property. The defendant’s financial affidavit also included Talyah Home Improvement, LLC, as

a business interest, of which he indicated he owned 50 percent. Although

the plaintiff’s counsel questioned the defendant about the company and his

business partner, the plaintiff did not provide any evidence to suggest that

the defendant was not a 50 percent owner of the property through the

company, as he had claimed.

6

In her appellate brief, the plaintiff also explicates the facts in Ranfone

v. Ranfone, 119 Conn. App. 341, 987 A.2d 1088 (2010), and Stewart v. Stewart,

157 Conn. App. 601, 117 A.3d 958 (2015), but she does not offer any analysis

as to how they apply to the present case beyond the conclusory statements:

‘‘This case is similar to Bauer and Ranfone and Stewart. The trial court’s

clarification resolved a latent ambiguity in the language of the judgment,

was based on its original factual findings, and sought to effectuate the trial

court’s intent in the original order.’’

7 We note that, inexplicably, the plaintiff asserts that the court’s clarification order ‘‘did not require [the defendant] to acquire a new interest in the

property; rather, it reconfirmed that the trial court had rejected his claim

that he could not transfer the assets of the [limited liability company],

specifically, [the property], to the plaintiff.’’ The fact that the defendant has

executed a quitclaim deed to the plaintiff and has assigned his rights in

Talyah Home Improvement, LLC, to the plaintiff, and yet a second owner

to the property has brought an action to protect that interest, undermines

that argument.