* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that

this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except

under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

__________________

No. 97-20008

Summary Calendar

__________________

Beatrice M. Thomas,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

versus

Exxon Company U.S.A.,

Defendant-Appellee.

______________________________________________

Appeal from the United States District Court for the

Southern District of Texas

(H-95-CV-939)

______________________________________________

August 1, 1997

Before JOLLY, BENAVIDES, and PARKER, Circuit Judges.

BENAVIDES, Circuit Judge:*

Beatrice M. Thomas brought suit against her employer, Exxon

Company U.S.A. (“Exxon”), for race discrimination, national origin

discrimination, and retaliation, in violation of Title VII of the

Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq.,
1 The district court granted Exxon’s motion for summary judgment

on Thomas’s § 1981 retaliation claim. Thomas does not challenge

that decision on appeal.

2

and the Civil Rights Act of 1866, 42 U.S.C. § 1981. The district

court granted Exxon’s motion for summary judgment on Thomas’s Title

VII claims because she did not file her action within the ninetyday period prescribed by statute. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1).

A jury subsequently returned a verdict in favor of Exxon on

Thomas’s § 1981 discrimination claim.1 Thomas appeals the district

court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of Exxon on her Title

VII claims. In addition, Thomas argues that the district court

committed reversible error when it admitted certain evidence at

trial.

It is undisputed that the EEOC issued Thomas a notice of her

right to sue on December 20, 1994. The Commission sent the notice

by certified mail to the address that Thomas had previously

provided. On December 23, 1994, the receipt was signed by Thomas’s

eighteen-year-old daughter. Thomas actually received the notice on

December 28, 1994. Thomas filed suit on March 28, 1995, ninetyfive days after her daughter acknowledged receipt of the notice.

The language of Title VII provides that the ninety-day period

to bring a civil action begins to run from “the giving of such

notice,” rather than on the day that such notice is actually

received. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1); Espinoza v. Missouri Pac.

R.R. Co., 754 F.2d 1247, 1249 (5th Cir. 1985). This court has
3

recognized that “ordinarily the purposes of the Act will be served

by commencement of the ninety-day period on the date that notice is

received at the address supplied to the EEOC by the claimant.”

Espinoza, 754 F.2d at 1249. Thus, the limitations period began to

run in this case when Thomas’s daughter acknowledged receipt of the

notice at the address Thomas provided to the EEOC. Thomas actually

received the notice eighty-five days before the ninety-day

limitations period expired. Although commencement of the ninetyday period may be delayed pursuant to the doctrine of equitable

tolling, that doctrine is inapplicable in the instant case. See

id. at 1250-51; see also Scholar v. Pacific Bell, 963 F.2d 264,

267-68 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 868, 113 S. Ct. 196, 121

L.Ed.2d 139 (1992). Accordingly, Thomas’s failure to file her

Title VII claims within the ninety-day limitations period bars her

claims.

Thomas also argues that the district court erred by admitting

evidence at trial of allegations that she had damaged her computer

at work after learning that she had been terminated. We conclude,

however, that Thomas’s failure to timely and specifically object to

the introduction of this evidence precludes our review of the

propriety of its admission. See FED. R. EVID. 103(a)(1); United

States v. Martinez, 962 F.2d 1161, 1166 & n.8 (5th Cir. 1992).

For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the district court

is AFFIRMED.
4