AFFIRMED and Opinion Filed July 17, 2023 

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In The 

### Court of Appeals Fifth District of Texas at Dallas No. 05-22-00175-CV PATRICIA A. ERVING, Appellant V. UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF HOUSING AND URBAN DEVELOPMENT, AND GARLAND HOUSING AGENCY, Appellees On Appeal from the 192nd Judicial District Court Dallas County, Texas Trial Court Cause No. DC-21-15968 MEMORANDUM OPINION Before Justices Molberg, Pedersen, III, and Miskel Opinion by Justice Miskel Patricia Erving appeals the trial court’ s final judgment granting the pleas to the jurisdiction of Garland Housing Agency (GHA) and the United States Department of Housing a nd Urban Development (HUD) and dismissing her claims against them. Because Ervi ng failed to demonstrate any waiver of governmental or sovereign immunity, we affirm the trial court’s order.
I. P ROCEDURAL B ACKGROUND Erving, acting pro se, filed a lawsuit against GHA and HUD alleging that her participation in a government program for mortgage assistance was wrongfully–2– terminated. Erving’s petition also genera lly claims that GHA and HUD ignored applicable health and disability rules, housing safety standa rds, and government restrictions on landlord terminations during the pandemic. In addition, she asserts a retaliation claim. In response, GHA filed a plea to the jurisdiction, answer, and affirmative defenses denying all claims and asserting governmental immunity from the suit. GHA, which is a department of the City of Garland, also argued that it is a non-jural entity that cannot separately be sued. Er ving did not file a response to GHA’s plea to the jurisdiction, and the trial court considered the motion on submission. On January 31, 2022, the trial court granted GHA’s plea to the jurisdiction and dismissed all claims against GHA. HUD also filed a plea to the jurisdiction on January 25, 2022, asserting sovereign immunity from the suit. On Fe bruary 17, 2022, the trial court held a hearing on this motion, at which both HUD a nd Erving were present. The trial court granted HUD’s plea to the jurisdiction a nd dismissed all claims against HUD by written order on that date. The trial cour t did not state the bases for its orders granting the pleas to the ju risdiction of GHA and HUD. In her briefing on appeal, Erving merely expands on the allegations in her original petition. Her appellate briefs do not address the grounds for the pleas to the jurisdiction or describe how she alleges immunity was waived.–3– In response, GHA argues that the tria l court properly dismissed Erving’s claims against GHA because GHA (through th e City of Garland) has governmental immunity and because it is a non-jural entity , and that Erving’s appeal should be dismissed because she inadequately briefed her issues and waived appellate review of all claims. HUD ha s not filed a brief.
II. A PPELLATE J URISDICTION GHA argues that this court does not have jurisdiction over this appeal because it was untimely. We first address our jurisdiction to hear this appeal.
A. Procedural Background on Appeal On March 3, 2022, Erving f iled her notice of appeal in this court, appealing only the January 31 order that granted GHA’ s plea to the jurisdiction and listing GHA as the only respondent. The notice of appeal, subsequent court filings, and correspondence were sent to HUD’s counsel (who was e rroneously listed as GHA’s counsel), rather than to GHA, until HUD’s c ounsel clarified the error in a letter filed on April 21, 2022. With the possible exception of Erving’s amended notice of appeal, all subsequent filings and corre spondence have been served only on GHA and its counsel. This court requested that Erving supplem ent the record with signed copies of both the January and February orders gran ting the pleas to the jurisdiction of GHA and HUD, and two supplemental records were filed.–4– After obtaining two extensions from this court, Erving file d her appellant’s brief on July 15, 2022. This court inform ed Erving of numerous briefing defects and cautioned her that failure to file an amende d brief complying with specified appellate procedural rules could result in the dismissal of her appeal. Erving filed an amended notice of appeal eight days later in which she added HUD as a defendant in the case style an d also added the February order granting HUD’s plea to the jurisdiction as the judgment being appealed. 1 After obtaining two additional extensions from this court, Er ving filed an amende d brief on September 26, 2022.
B. Applicable Law Under Texas law, “[a] judgment is final for purposes of appeal if it disposes of all pending parties and claims in the reco rd, except as necessary to carry out the decree.” Lehmann v. Har-Con Corp. , 39 S.W.3d 191, 195 (Tex. 2001). Appellate procedural rules require that the notice of appeal must be filed within 30 days after the final judgment is signed, subj ect to certain exceptions. T EX
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. P. 26.1. One exception is for accelerated appeals from cer tain interlocutory orders permitted by statute, which must be filed within 20 days after the order is signed. T EX
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1 We note that the February date in Erving’s am ended notice is erroneously written as February 15, 2022, and the actual date of the trial court’s order gr anting HUD’s plea to the jurisdiction was February 17, 2022. We construe this amended notice of app eal as referring to the February 17 order. See City of San Antonio v. Rodriguez , 828 S.W.2d 417, 418 (Tex. 1992) (per curiam ) (holding that appellant’s notation of the incorrect cause number on its notice of appeal was a procedural defect that did not defeat the court’s jurisdiction).–5– 26.1(b), 28.1(a), (b). Rule 25.1(g) permits an appellant to file an amended notice of appeal “correcting a defect or omission in an earlier filed notice” before the appellant’s brief is filed. T EX
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. P. 25.1(g). The Texas Supreme Court has long held th at the rules of appellate procedure and the record before the court “will be libe rally construed in favor of the right of appeal.” Hunt v. Wichita Cnty. Water Imp. Dist. No. 2 , 211 S.W.2d 743, 744 (Tex. 1948); see Warwick Towers Council of Co-Owners ex. rel. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Park Warwick, L.P. , 244 S.W.3d 838, 839 (Tex. 2008) (per curiam). It recently reiterated that “we have repeatedly instructed that appeals should be decided on the merits rather than dismissed for a pr ocedural defect, and a failure to comply with procedural formalities need not cause inevitable dismissal.” State ex. rel. Durden v. Shahan , 658 S.W.3d 300, 304 (Tex. 2022) (per curiam). Rather, a timely filed instrument will invoke the appellate court’s jurisdiction if it demonstrates a bona fide attempt to do so. Durden , 658 S.W.3d at 304; In re J.M. , 396 S.W.3d 528, 530 (Tex. 2013). The Texas S upreme Court has further instructed that “[w]hen a party has timely made a bona fi de attempt to invoke appella te jurisdiction, the court of appeals must accept the deficient notice or give the party an opportunity to amend and refile it to perfect the appeal.” Durden , 658 S.W.3d at 305.
C. Erving’s appeal was timely filed after the final judgment. GHA argues that this court lacks juri sdiction because Erving failed to timely appeal the interlocutory order within 20 da ys after the trial court signed the January–6– 31 order. See T EX
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. P. 26.1(b); 28.1 (a), (b). The trial court’s order granting GHA’s plea to the jurisdiction on January 31, 2022, was an inte rlocutory order and not a final judgment because Erving’s clai ms against HUD, the other defendant in the case, had not yet been resolved. See Lehmann , 39 S.W.3d at 205. Although a person “may appeal” from an interlocutory order on a plea to the jurisdiction by a governmental unit, such an interlocutory a ppeal is permissive, and “a party does not forfeit its right to challenge a ruling on appeal from a final judgment simply by opting not to pursue an interlocutory appeal of that ruling.” See T EX
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. C ODE § 51.014(a)(8); Bonsmara Nat. Beef Co., LLC v. Hart of Tex. Cattle Feeders, LLC , 603 S.W.3d 385, 387 (Tex. 2020). On February 17, 2022, the trial court granted HUD’s plea to the jurisdiction and dismissed Erving’s claims against HUD, the only remaining party in the case. At that point, the February order became the final judgment, and the interlocutory order granting GHA’s plea to the jurisdiction and dismissing Erving’s claims against GHA merged into it. See Bonsmara , 603 S.W.3d at 390 (“When a trial court renders a final judgment, the court’s interlocutor y orders merge into the judgment and may be challenged by appealing that judgment.”). Erving challenged the ruling after the tr ial court rendered the final judgment in the case. Although Erving’s timely notice of appeal only referenced the January interlocutory order, she file d an amended notice of appeal to add the February final judgment. Erving’s amended notice of a ppeal was not timely under Rule 25.1(g).–7– However, as stated by our sister court, Ru le 25.1(g) “vests the appellate court with the discretion to consider an amended notice of appeal in a case in which any notice of appeal has already been filed.” St. Mina Auto Sales, Inc. v. Al–Muasher , 481 S.W.3d 661, 666 (Tex. App.—Houston [1 st Dist.] 2015, pet. denied). We view Erving’s addition of this February judgmen t in her amended notice as a correction of the type of defect contemplated by Rule 25.1(g). See also Noorian v. McCandless , 37 S.W.3d 170, 173 (Tex.App.-H ouston [1st Dist.] 2001, pet. denied) (concluding that it is not a jurisdictional error when a no tice of appeal refers to an interlocutory order instead of the final judgment and Rule 25.1 allows an ame nded notice of appeal to correct the defect). For these reasons, we accept the amende d notice of appeal and conclude that we have jurisdiction to hear Ervi ng’s appeal of the final judgment.
III. E RVING F AILED TO D EMONSTRATE A W AIVER OF I MMUNITY A. Erving’s Claims were Inadequately Briefed Given that Erving’s amended brief still c ontains no citations to authority or the record, in addition to other defects, th is court could dismiss this appeal solely based on Erving’s failure to file a brief th at complies with Texa s Rules of Appellate Procedure. See T EX
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. P. 38.1, 42.3(b), (c); In re J.P. , 365 S.W.3d 833, 837 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2012, no pet. ) (“Failure to cite appli cable authority or provide substantive analysis waives an issue on app eal.”) However, we elect to review her appeal of the trial court’s grant of GH A and HUD’s pleas to the jurisdiction.–8– B. Standard of Review Governmental immunity from suit im plicates a court’s subject-matter jurisdiction and is properly raised in a plea to the jurisdiction. See Dohlen v. City of
San Antonio , 643 S.W.3d 387, 392 (Tex. 2022). We review a court’s ruling on a plea to the jurisdiction de novo. City of Austin v. Quinlan , No. 22-0202, 2023 WL 3767092 at *2 (Tex. 2023). With respect to federal claims, we gene rally apply federal substantive law and Texas procedural law when reviewing a fede ral law claim filed in Texas state court. United Independent School District v. Mayers, 665 S.W.3d 775, 782 (Tex. App.— San Antonio 2023) (citing BNSF Ry. Co. v. Phillips , 485 S.W.3d 908, 910 (Tex. 2015) (per curiam)). The tria l court's subject matter juri sdiction over federal claims presents a question of la w we review de novo. Id. at 783.
C. Applicable Law Governmental immunity protects political subdivisions of the State, including housing authorities, from suit. Hous. Auth. of the City of Dall. v. Killingsworth , 331 S.W.3d 806, 810 (Tex. App.—Da llas 2011, pet. denied); see also T EX
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. G OV ’ T C ODE A NN . § 392.006 (stating that a housing authority is a unit of government whose functions are essential governmental functions). Similarly, the “basic rule of federal sovereign immunity is that the United States cannot be sued at all without the consent of Congress.” Block v. North Dakota ex rel. Bd. of Univ. and Sch. Lands , 461 U.S. 273, 287 (1983). A party sui ng a governmental unit bears the burden of affirmatively–9– demonstrating waiver of immunity. City of San Antonio v. Maspero , 640 S.W.3d 523, 528 (Tex. 2022); Univ. of Tex. M.D. Anderso n Cancer Ctr. v. McKenzie , 578 S.W.3d 506, 512 (Tex. 2019). A statutory waiv er of immunity must be clear and unambiguous. Dohlen , 643 S.W.3d at 392. A plea to the jurisdiction “may challenge the pleadings, the existence of jurisdictional facts, or both.” Tex. Dep’t of Crim. Justice v. Rangel , 595 S.W.3d 198, 205 (Tex. 2020) (quoting Alamo Heights Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Clark , 544 S.W.3d 755, 770 (Tex. 2018)). “When a plea to the jurisdiction challenges the pleadings, we determine if the pleader has alleged facts that affirmativ ely demonstrate the court's jurisdiction to h ear the cause.” Dohlen , 643 S.W.3d at 393 (quoting Tex. Dep’t of Parks & Wildlife v. Miranda , 133 S.W.3d 217, 226 (Tex. 2004)). The court must “construe the plaintiff’s pleadings liberally, taking all factual assertions as true, and look to the plaintiff’s intent.” McKenzie , 578 S.W.3d at 512 (quoting Heckman v. Williamson Cnty. , 369 S.W.3d 137, 150 (Tex. 2012)). If the pleadings do not contain sufficient facts to demonstrate the court’s jurisdiction, the plaintiffs are given an opportunity to amend their pleadings unless the pleadings affirmatively demonstrate incurable defects. Dohlen , 643 S.W.3d at 393. If the pl eadings affirmatively negate the existence of jurisdiction, then a pl ea may be granted without allowing the plaintiffs an opportunity to amend. Id. If the evidence is undisputed or fails to raise a fact question, the plea must be granted. McKenzie , 578 S.W.3d at 512 (quoting Univ. of Tex. at Austin v. Hayes , 327 S.W.3d 113, 116 (Tex. 2010) (per curiam)).–10– D. The pleadings do not affirmat ively demonstrate a waiver of immunity with respect to GHA or HUD, and the pleading defects are incurable. This court’s jurisdiction is limited to a review of the judgment that is the subject of the appeal, which consists of the trial court’s orders granting GHA’s and HUD’s pleas to the jurisdiction due to gove rnmental and sovereign immunity. In her briefing, Erving never addr esses the issue of immunity and simply reasserts and expands on various allegations pertaining to the merits of her purported claims, which are somewhat difficult to discern. We liberally construe pro se pleadings and briefs. See Lipscomb v. City of Dallas , No. 05-17-00484-CV, 2018 WL 525685 at *1. However, we hold pr o se litigants to the same st andards as licensed attorneys and require them to comply with applicab le laws and rules of procedure to avoid giving a pro se litigant an unfair advantage over a party represented by counsel. Id. Nonetheless, even construing Erving’s tria l court pleadings liberally in favor of jurisdiction and taking all fact ual assertions as true, we find that they do not allege facts affirmatively establishing that govern mental or sovereign immunity has been waived in this case. GHA is an agency of the City of Ga rland, a governmental unit protected by governmental immunity absent a waiver. See Quinlan , 2023 WL 3767092 at *2; Killingsworth , 331 S.W.3d at 810; T EX
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. G OV ’ T C ODE A NN . § 392.006. Likewise, HUD is an agency of the United States pr otected by federal sovereign–11– immunity and cannot be sued wit hout the consent of Congress. See Block , 461 U.S.
at 287. In her pleadings, Erving generally alle ges that her home mortgage assistance was terminated in violation of rules relating to disabilitie s and pandemic restrictions on termination. She also references violat ions of unspecified housing standards and health and safety regulations. Finally, Erving asks that “the retaliation, in Justice be addressed.” 2 The trial court held a hearing on GHA’s plea to the jurisdiction which Erving did not attend. She attended the s ubsequent hearing on HUD’s plea to the jurisdiction and further explai ned some of her ge neral allegations bu t failed to offer any arguments or evidence relating to a waiver of immunity. Erving generally alleges that GHA a nd HUD failed to comply with “HUD regulations Section 504 in regards to disabled clients” but offers no specific cites to authority or facts in the record in support of this claim. To the extent that Erving is referring to prohibitions against discrimi nation on the basis of disability under section 504 of the Rehabilita tion Act of 1973 (29 U.S.C. § 794) as it may pertain to HUD programs, she fails to cite a st atutory provision waiving immunity for violations of the statute. Moreover, to demonstrate waiver of immunity pursuant to a statute, a plaintiff must “actually allege” a violation of the statute. Dohlen , 643

2 Erving attempts to provide furthe r factual allegations relating to he r claims in her briefing in this court. However, we may not consider factual assertions that appear solely in briefs and are not supported by the record. See Marshall v. Hous. Auth. of City of San Antonio , 198 S.W.3d 782, 789 (Tex. 2006).–12– S.W.3d at 392. A plaintiff “actually allege s” a violation of a statute “by pleading facts that state a claim ther eunder;” mere refere nce to the statute’s elements in the pleading is not enough. Id. Erving has not pleaded facts that state a claim under this
statute. As for Erving’s claim that GHA employ ees retaliated agains t her, the Texas Tort Claims Act precludes her from asse rting a retaliation claim against GHA because this statute waives governmental immunity only in certain specific circumstances that Erving does not allege are applicable here, and its waivers of immunity do not apply to claims relati ng to “any other intentional tort.” See T EX
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. C ODE A NN . § 101.021–.022, 101.057(2); Thomas v. Dall. Hous. Auth. , No. 05-21-00273-CV, 2022 WL 1955751, at *3 (Tex. App.—Dallas June 3, 2022) (mem. op.) (concluding that the Texas To rt Claims Act’s waiver of immunity did not apply to claims of retaliatory conduct directed by the housing agency). Erving’s amended brief alleges that the government restricted terminations by landlords during the pandemic but does not cite authority or allege facts demonstrating a violation of applicable law or waiver of governmental immunity. She does not mention any other statutes or authority or otherwise cite facts for any cause of action for which she affirmativel y demonstrates a waiver of governmental immunity, and we can discern none from the record. To the extent we can construe the clai ms in Erving’s pleadings, her pleadings affirmatively negate jurisdiction. Dohlen , 643 S.W.3d at 393. Additionally, her–13– pleadings do not allege facts sufficient to demonstrate a basis for a waiver of governmental immunity that could be viable even with additiona l time to cure her pleading defects. As a result, we find that the pleading defects are incurable and that additional time to amend the pleadings is not required.
IV. C ONCLUSION Because Erving failed to demonstr ate a waiver of GHA’s governmental immunity or HUD’s sovereign immunity, we need not reach GHA’s other arguments in this appeal. We affirm th e judgment of the trial court.

220175F.P05 / s/ Emily Miskel EMILY MISKEL JUSTICE–14– 

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Court of Appeals Fifth District of Texas at Dallas JUDGMENT PATRICIA A. ERVING, Appellant
No. 05-22-00175-CV V.
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF HOUSING AND URBAN DEVELOPMENT, AND GARLAND HOUS ING AGENCY, Appellees On Appeal from the 192nd Judicial District Court, Dallas County, Texas Trial Court Cause No. DC-21-15968. Opinion delivered by Justice Miskel. Justices Molberg and Pedersen, III participating.

In accordance with this Court’s opinion of this date, the judgment of the trial court is AFFIRMED

. It is ORDERED that each party bear its own costs of this appeal.
Judgment entered this 17th day of July, 2023.