UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

DOMINION COAL CORPORATION,

Petitioner,

v.

EZEKIAL H. VANCE; DIRECTOR, OFFICE

No. 96-1160

OF WORKERS' COMPENSATION

PROGRAMS, UNITED STATES

DEPARTMENT OF LABOR,

Respondents.

On Petition for Review of an Order

of the Benefits Review Board.

(No. 95-897-BLA)

Argued: January 27, 1997

Decided: March 20, 1997

Before MURNAGHAN, NIEMEYER, and MOTZ, Circuit Judges.

_________________________________________________________________

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion. Judge Niemeyer wrote

a dissenting opinion.

_________________________________________________________________

COUNSEL

ARGUED: Ronald Eugene Gilbertson, KILCULLEN, WILSON &

KILCULLEN, Washington, D.C., for Petitioner. Frederick Klein

Muth, HENSLEY, MUTH, GARTON & HAYES, Bluefield, West

Virginia, for Respondent Vance; Richard Anthony Seid, UNITED

STATES DEPARTMENT OF LABOR, Washington, D.C., for
Respondent Director. ON BRIEF: J. Davitt McAteer, Acting Solicitor of Labor, Donald S. Shire, Associate Solicitor, Christian P.

Barber, Counsel for Appellate Litigation, Helen H. Cox, UNITED

STATES DEPARTMENT OF LABOR, Washington, D.C., for

Respondent Director.

_________________________________________________________________

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See

Local Rule 36(c).

_________________________________________________________________

OPINION

PER CURIAM:

Dominion Coal appeals from the Black Lung Benefits Review

Board's order upholding an Administrative Law Judge's award of

benefits to Ezekial Vance. The ALJ's finding of pneumoconiosis

under 20 C.F.R. § 718.202(a)(4) (1996) and the ALJ's decision that

Vance's disability was "due to" coal worker's pneumoconiosis were

legally correct and supported by substantial evidence. Accordingly,

we affirm.

I.

Ezekial H. Vance worked for thirty-three years as a coal miner, and

smoked a half-a-pack of cigarettes a day for over thirty years.

Vance

quit smoking in 1990. Vance worked for Dominion Coal Corporation

("Dominion") for eighteen years, and retired in October 1989. On

May 6, 1993 he filed an application for federal black lung benefits

under 30 U.S.C. §§ 901-945 (1994). The Department of Labor determined that Vance was eligible for benefits, and that Dominion was

the responsible operator. Dominion filed a controversion to this

finding, and Vance's case was forwarded to an ALJ.

On July 8, 1994 Vance and Dominion appeared before the ALJ,

who considered the various and conflicting medical testimony and

held that Vance was entitled to benefits. Dominion appealed this

rul2
ing to the Benefits Review Board. The Board affirmed the decision

of the ALJ and Dominion appealed to this court.

II.

The standard of our review of the Board's decision is set forth in

the Longshoremen's and Harbor Worker's Compensation Act, 33

U.S.C. § 921 (1994), and incorporated into the Black Lung Act by 30

U.S.C. § 932(a) (1994). See Grizzle v. Pickands Mather & Co., 994

F.2d 1093, 1096 (4th Cir. 1993). The Board reviews the ALJ's findings of fact to determine if they are "supported by substantial

evidence in the record considered as a whole." Doss v. Director,

Office

of Workers Compensation Programs, 53 F.3d 654, 658 (4th Cir.

1995). We review the Board for "errors of law," and to determine

whether the Board correctly followed its "statutory standard of

review

of factual determinations," i.e. whether the Board was correct that

the

ALJ's findings of fact were supported by "substantial evidence."

Doss, 53 F.3d at 658-59.

Substantial evidence is "more than a mere scintilla" and evidence

that "a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a

conclusion." Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971). Under the

substantial evidence requirement "[t]he ALJ has sole power to make

credibility determinations and resolve inconsistencies in the evidence." Grizzle, 994 F.2d at 1096.

With these standards in mind we turn to the Board's affirmance of

the ALJ in this case. Dominion appeals two aspects of the Board's

decision. The first is the Board's affirmance of the ALJ's finding

of

"legal" pneumoconiosis under 20 C.F.R. § 718.202(a)(4) (1996). The

second is the Board's affirmance of the ALJ's decision that Vance's

total disability was "due to" his pneumoconiosis under 20 C.F.R.

§ 718.204 (1996). We discuss these issues in order.

A.

Under 20 C.F.R. § 718.202(a) (1996) there are four ways to establish the existence of pneumoconiosis. The ALJ found pneumoconiosis

under both § 718.202(a)(1) and § 718.202(a)(4). Section

3
718.202(a)(1) allows a finding of pneumoconiosis on the basis of a

positive x-ray. Section 718.202(a)(4) allows a finding of

pneumoconiosis when "a physician, exercising sound medical judgment, notwithstanding a negative X-ray, finds that the miner suffers or suffered

from pneumoconiosis as defined in § 718.201." 20 C.F.R.

§ 718.202(a)(4) (1996). Section 718.201 defines pneumoconiosis as

"a chronic dust disease of the lung and its sequelae, including

respiratory and pulmonary impairments, arising out of coal mine employment." 20 C.F.R. § 718.201 (1996). The Board affirmed the ALJ

solely on the basis of his § 718.202(a)(4) finding, and so only

that

basis is before us. See Grigg v. Director, Office of Workers

Compensation Programs, 28 F.3d 416, 418 (4th Cir. 1994); Securities and

Exch. Comm'n v. Chenery Corp., 318 U.S. 80 (1943).1

1.

Dominion first argues that the Board committed legal error because

it affirmed the ALJ's finding of pneumoconiosis under

§ 718.202(a)(4) without considering whether the ALJ's x-ray

findings

under § 718.202(a)(1) were correct. Dominion asserts that because

§ 718.202(a)(4) applies "notwithstanding" a negative x-ray, it

presupposes and requires a finding of negative x-ray evidence under

§ 718.202(a)(1). Vance and the Director maintain that §

718.202(a)(4)

is a separate ground for a finding of legal pneumoconiosis, and as

long as both the Board and the ALJ stated sufficient facts to

support

a finding under § 718.202(a)(4) separate x-ray findings under

§ 718.202(a)(1) are not necessary.

We agree with Vance and the Director's reading of the regulations.

The four methods of finding pneumoconiosis are not to be read and

applied in seriatim. Instead, each can stand on its own. The

"notwithstanding" language clarifies that under § 718.202(a)(4) a doctor

may

find pneumoconiosis regardless of a negative x-ray; it requires no

specific x-ray findings. In fact its plain language suggests the exact

oppo-

_________________________________________________________________

1 The dissent suggests that we have focused upon the Board's

holding

under § 718.202(a)(4) "perhaps" because we "recogniz[e] the flaws

in the

ALJ's evaluation of the x-ray evidence." Under Chenery, we may only

review those aspects of the ALJ's decision relied upon by the
Board. 318

U.S. at 87-88.

4
site conclusion, that § 718.202(a)(4) applies"notwithstanding" any

xray findings.2

2.

Dominion also argues that there is insufficient evidence to support

the ALJ's § 718.202(a)(4) finding. Section 718.202(a)(4) allows a

finding of legal pneumoconiosis "notwithstanding a negative X-ray"

if a Doctor's finding is "supported by a reasoned medical opinion"

and is "based on objective medical evidence such as blood-gas

studies, electrocardiograms, pulmonary function studies, physical

performance tests, physical examination, and medical and work histories." 20 C.F.R. § 718.202(a)(4) (1996).

In making his finding under § 718.202(a)(4) the ALJ first summarized the findings of Drs. Evans, Forehand, Sargent, Wiot, Renn,

Fino

and Rasmussen. The ALJ chose to rely particularly on the reports of

the three doctors who actually examined Vance: Drs. Forehand, Rasmussen and Sargent. We have repeatedly stated that"the opinions of

treating and examining physicians deserve especial consideration"

and that "great reliance on the conclusions of a claimant's

examining

physician" may be appropriate. Grizzle v. Pickands Mather & Co.,

994 F.2d 1093, 1097 (4th Cir. 1993) (quoting Hubbard v. Califano, 582 F.2d 319, 323 (4th Cir. 1978), and King v. Califano, 615 F.2d

1018, 1020 (4th Cir. 1980)). Furthermore, "[w]e defer to the ALJ's

evaluation of the proper weight to accord conflicting medical opinions." Stiltner v. Island Creek Coal Co., 86 F.3d 337, 342 (4th

Cir.

1996); see also Grizzle, 994 F.2d at 1096.

Therefore we focus our review of the evidence, as the ALJ did,

upon the three examining physicians. Dr. J. Randolph Forehand

_________________________________________________________________

2 Dominion also argues that because both the Administrative

Procedure

Act and the Black Lung Benefits Act require an ALJ and the Board to

consider all relevant evidence, an ALJ must consider x-rays under

§ 718.202(a)(4). But, all that must be considered is relevant

evidence,

and if a doctor does not rely upon an x-ray to reach her §

718.202(a)(4)

conclusion, there is no need to separately consider x-rays. What is

necessary is to consider the basis on which the doctor herself relied

for sufficiency.

5
examined Vance on June 10, 1993 at the request of the Department

of Labor. Dr. Forehand was authorized by the Department of Labor

to perform a general medical history, a full physical evaluation,

a pulmonary function test, an arterial blood-gas study, an

electrocardiogram, and a chest x-ray. Based upon these various tests Dr.

Forehand

concluded that Vance suffered from coal worker's pneumoconiosis,

that Vance was totally disabled, and that working in the coal mine

was a "contributing factor" in Vance's disability. In describing

the

basis of this finding at deposition Dr. Forehand stated:

I thought [Vance's] findings, with a history of thirty-two

years of underground coal mining, a lot of that at the face

of a dusty area, abnormalities of his pulmonary function

study, abnormalities of the arterial blood gas, plus a fairly

impressive exercise intolerance based on his study, I thought

that his findings were consistent with coal worker's pneumoconiosis.

Dr. Forehand's diagnosis was also based upon an x-ray that both he

and a Dr. Shahan read as showing pneumoconiosis. However, contrary to the suggestion of the dissent, Dr. Forehand specifically

stated

at deposition that he did not depend on the x-ray in making his

diagnosis and that even if the x-ray readings had been negative he

would

have reached the same conclusion.3 _________________________________________________________________

3 Consider the following exchange during Dr. Forehand's deposition:

Q: If you had seen what you felt was a negative film on this

individual, how might that have changed your opinion, if at

all?

A: In this particular individual I was taking into

consideration

his years under ground and the location in the mine at the

face.

This is an extremely important component to the overall

evaluation. And the variation in the reading probably would not have

altered my conclusions.

Q: Therefore, if you had assumed a negative finding on x-ray,

your opinion would still be the same, i.e., that there was

some

contribution to this man's impairment caused by the mine dust

exposure?
A: Yes.

6
Dr. Forehand reached the conclusion that Vance suffered from coal

worker's pneumoconiosis based upon a blood-gas study, an electrocardiogram, a pulmonary function study, a physical performance

test,

a physical examination, and medical and work histories. These are

the

precise tests specifically listed as the "objective medical

evidence"

required to establish a "reasoned medical" diagnosis of

pneumoconiosis under § 718.202(a)(4). Furthermore, Dr. Forehand specifically

stated that his diagnosis would be the same regardless of the x-ray

evidence. As such, Dr. Forehand's diagnosis is certainly sufficient

under § 718.202(a)(4).

Dr. Donald Rasmussen examined Vance on April 6, 1994. Dr. Rasmussen performed a medical history and a physical evaluation, as

well as a chest x-ray, an electrocardiogram, a spirometry exam,

diffusing capacity studies, and blood-gas studies at rest and during

exercise. Dr. Rasmussen found that Vance suffered from pneumoconiosis

as a result of his thirty years of coal mine employment, and that

Vance was totally disabled. In his deposition Dr. Rasmussen listed

a

number of factors that contributed to his diagnosis:

[Vance's] history indicated significant respiratory symptoms. He had abnormal physical findings consistent with

chronic lung disease. He had an abnormal x-ray consistent

with simple pneumoconiosis. He showed moderate partially

reversible obstructive ventilatory impairment, a minimal

decrease in his diffusing capacity, and poor exercise tolerance, limited principally by ventilatory impairment, also

showing some minimal impairment in gas exchange.

[In the physical examination] there was moderate to marked

reduction in the quality of breath sounds or the transmission

of breath sounds and there was also prolongation of the

expiratory phase with forced respirations.

Dr. Rasmussen also found "moderate airway obstruction" in the

ventilator studies, "abnormal" gas exchange at rest, an "inability

to

perform significant physical work," and "impairment" after

exercise.

Dr. Rasmussen did note that Vance's impairment was partially

reversible, but not so completely reversible as to discount a

finding

of pneumoconiosis. Dr. Rasmussen recognized at deposition that

7
pneumoconiosis is an "irreversible condition," and reiterated a

diagnosis of pneumoconiosis. Furthermore, contrary to the dissent's

suggestion that Dr. Rasmussen's opinion should be discounted because

of his reliance upon a positive x-ray, Dr. Rasmussen specifically

stated at deposition that although he read Vance's x-rays as

positive,

a negative x-ray would not have changed his diagnosis.

Dr. Rasmussen, like Dr. Forehand, performed all of the tests listed

in § 718.202(a)(4) and reached a diagnosis of pneumoconiosis that

would have been the same regardless of the x-ray evidence. As such,

Dr. Rasmussen also well supported a finding of pneumoconiosis

under § 718.202(a)(4).

Dr. Dale Sargent examined Vance on October 29, 1993. Dr. Sargent performed a medical and work history, as well as an

electrocardiogram, a pulmonary function test at rest,4 and a chest x-ray. Dr.

Sargent reached the conclusion that Vance suffered from a "moderate

ventilatory impairment." Dr. Sargent's October, 1993 report stated

that although "[i]t is my overall impression that Mr. Vance may be

suffering from coal worker's pneumoconiosis" and that that he

"could

not entirely exclude coal worker's pneumoconiosis," the x-ray and

physical exam findings were more consistent with"cigarette smoking

and not coal dust exposure." At his July, 1994 deposition Dr.

Sargent

reiterated that he thought the x-rays excluded any finding of

pneumoconiosis "with the qualifying statement that[he] couldn't

completely

exclude low profusion simple pneumoconiosis on the basis of the

chest X-ray finding." Taken together, these three statements well

support the ALJ's statement that Dr. Sargent could not"rule out" pneumoconiosis.

Dominion argues that the evidence listed above is insufficient to

establish pneumoconiosis under § 718.202(a)(4) and that in

affirming

the ALJ under § 718.202(a)(4) the Board has attempted an "end run"

around the ALJ's x-ray findings under § 718.202(a)(1). Dominion is

correct that an ALJ may not find -- and therefore the Board may not

affirm a finding of -- pneumoconiosis under § 718.202(a)(4) relying

upon a doctor whose opinion was wholly or largely based upon an

_________________________________________________________________

4 Dr. Sargent did not perform a pulmonary function test during

exercise.

8

erroneous x-ray reading. Obviously, a diagnosis based largely upon

a positive x-ray finding would not be a finding of pneumoconiosis

"notwithstanding" the x-ray evidence. But, an ALJ may find legal

pneumoconiosis under § 718.202(a)(4) based upon a doctor's "reasoned medical" diagnosis of pneumoconiosis supported by other "objective medical evidence," such as the tests listed in 20 C.F.R.

§ 718.202(a)(4) (1996).

In this case both Dr. Rasmussen and Dr. Forehand supported their

"reasoned medical opinion" with "objective medical evidence" aside

from the x-ray evidence. The ALJ explicitly relied upon these two

doctors, and fairly stated that although Dr. Sargent attributed

Vance's

lung impairment to smoking he could not rule pneumoconiosis out

either in his medical report or at deposition.5 As such, there was

substantial evidence to support the ALJ's decision, and the Board correctly affirmed the ALJ's § 718.202(a)(4) finding.

B.

Dominion, joined in part by the Director, next challenges the

Board's affirmance of the ALJ's finding that Vance was "totally

dis-

_________________________________________________________________

5 Although Dominion raises no other objection to the ALJ's factual

findings under § 718.202(a)(4) the Director sua sponte argues that

the

ALJ mischaracterized the medical testimony of Dr. Sargent. As

stated

above Dr. Sargent made two separate findings: 1) that "Mr. Vance

may

be suffering from coal worker's pneumoconiosis," but this finding

was

limited to "low profusion simple pneumoconiosis," which Dr. Sargent

thought was not responsible for Vance's impairment; 2) Vance was

impaired, but as a result of cigarette smoking. From this the

Director

argues that the ALJ misunderstood Sargent as positively stating

that

Vance suffered from pneumoconiosis.

The ALJ did not state that Dr. Sargent found pneumoconiosis. The

ALJ stated that "[a]ll the doctors that actually examined the

claimant

[Drs. Forehand, Rasmussen and Sargent] found that he suffered from

coal workers' pneumoconiosis, or at least, could not rule it out."

(Emphasis added). As the above description of Dr. Sargent's

testimony

makes clear the ALJ was correct that Sargent "could not rule out

coal

workers' pneumoconiosis." Therefore, it is the Director who misconstrues the ALJ's opinion.
9
abled due to pneumoconiosis." 20 C.F.R.§ 718.204(a) (1996)

(emphasis added). All of the doctors agreed that Vance is totally

disabled, so the only remaining question is causation. The §

718.204(a)

causation standard requires a claimant to show "that his

pneumoconiosis was at least a contributing cause of his totally disabling

respiratory impairment." Dehue Coal Co. v. Ballard , 65 F.3d 1189, 1195-96

(4th Cir. 1995) (quoting Robinson v. Pickands Mather & Co., 914

F.2d 35, 38 (4th Cir. 1990)). Accordingly we ask whether "the

claimant's coal mining [was] a necessary condition of his disability. If

the

claimant would have been disabled to the same degree and by the

same time in his life if he had never been a miner, then benefits

should not be awarded." Dehue, 65 F.3d at 1196 (emphasis in original).

1.

Dominion argues first that there was insufficient evidence to support the ALJ's finding of causation. Dominion asserts that both Dr.

Forehand and Dr. Rasmussen were equivocal in their discussions of

causation. Both Dr. Rasmussen and Dr. Forehand did state that smoking played a part in Vance's disability and that it was difficult

to discern exactly the effect of smoking vis a vis coal dust. However,

both

doctors were unequivocal in their findings that coal dust

"contributed"

to Vance's disability. Dr. Rasmussen specifically stated that "coal

mine dust exposure is at least a major contributing factor to

[Vance's]

totally disabling respiratory insufficiency." Dr. Rasmussen also

stated

that Vance's smoking history alone was most likely insufficient to

produce his level of impairment. Dr. Forehand also stated that coal

worker's pneumoconiosis was "contributing to[Vance's] impairment." Thus, both Dr. Rasmussen and Dr. Forehand offered sufficient

evidence of causation for the Board to uphold the ALJ's decision.

2.

Dominion, joined by the Director, next argues that the Board erred

in upholding the ALJ's decision because the ALJ did not properly

state how it resolved the conflicting evidence on causation. In

particular Dominion argues that the ALJ did not sufficiently rebut the

opinions of Drs. Fino, Sargent and Renn, who stated that Vance's

disability was not "due to" pneumoconiosis. Dominion is correct
that

10
"[a] bald conclusion, unsupported by reasoning or evidence, is

generally of no use to a reviewing court." Maxey v. Califano, 598 F.2d

874,

876 (4th Cir. 1979). The Board held that the ALJ"implicitly

credited

Dr. Forehand's testimony."

However, a fair reading of the ALJ's opinion indicates that the ALJ

did more than implicitly credit Dr. Forehand, and that the ALJ

stated

more than a bald conclusion. The ALJ summarized the opinions on

causation of Drs. Fino, Sargent, Renn, Forehand and Rasmussen. As

noted earlier, the ALJ chose to rely more heavily on the reports of

the

doctors who had personally seen Vance: Drs. Rasmussen, Forehand

and Sargent. For this reason, it was reasonable for the ALJ not to

specifically rebut the findings of Drs. Renn and Fino.

Therefore, the only remaining question is whether the ALJ properly

considered and rejected Dr. Sargent's finding of no causation, and

whether the ALJ explicitly credited the findings of Drs. Rasmussen

and Forehand. The ALJ rebutted the findings of Dr. Sargent in its

conclusion to the causation section. First, the ALJ reiterated that

Dr.

Sargent "could not rule out coal workers' pneumoconiosis." Second,

the ALJ concluded the causation section with a lengthy quote of Dr.

Forehand that directly contradicts Dr. Sargent's description of

pneumoconiosis: "the preponderance of the medical literature [ ]

suggests

it is a spectrum disease and no one pattern. Pneumoconiosis is not

limited to one ventilatory pattern. And I think most of the

literature

suggest[s] that it is a mixed or obstructive and not a pure

restrictive

pattern." This quote is not included as window dressing. It is the

only

lengthy quote in the causation section, and presents clear evidence

that the ALJ agreed with Drs. Forehand and Rasmussen's assessment

of causation -- that Vance's symptoms are consistent with legal

pneumoconiosis, and have disabled him -- and disagreed with Dr.

Sargent's conclusion to the contrary.

In short, the ALJ's causation finding was more than a "bare conclusion;" the ALJ specifically considered and rejected Dr. Sargent's

views, credited Drs. Rasmussen and Forehand, and provided both the

Board and this court a sufficient basis for review. Therefore, we

affirm the Board's decision to uphold the ALJ's findings on causation.

11

III.

The Board did not err in affirming the ALJ's findings, and so the

Board's order is hereby

AFFIRMED.

NIEMEYER, Circuit Judge, dissenting:

Because I believe that the ALJ's analysis of the medical evidence

in this case fell far short of meeting established standards for

evaluating such evidence, I would remand this case to the Board with

instructions to remand it to the ALJ for further analysis.

The questions of whether Vance had pneumoconiosis and whether

pneumoconiosis was the cause of his disability are extremely close.

Even Vance's own doctors described symptoms that are more consistent with cigarette smoking than with pneumoconiosis. Accordingly,

whether the ALJ properly analyzed the medical evidence is critical

to

the proper resolution of Vance's claim.

It would appear first that the ALJ simply failed to follow the

requirements of applicable regulations in evaluating the x-ray evidence. He placed most reliance on readings by physicians whose

qualifications are not in the record, acting directly contrary to

20

C.F.R. §§ 718.202(a)(1) & 718.102. It was for good reason that the

Board did not rely on the ALJ's finding with respect to the x-ray

evidence in affirming the ALJ. It is also for this reason that we must

be

particularly vigilant to disqualify any medical report to the

extent that

it relies on a positive x-ray finding.

The majority, reviewing the basis of the Benefits Review Board

decision but perhaps also recognizing the flaws in the ALJ's

evaluation of the x-ray evidence, addresses only whether Vance

established

the existence of pneumoconiosis by medical evidence under 20 C.F.R.

§ 718.202(a)(4). But the ALJ's analysis under (a)(4) is just as

flawed.

The ALJ characterized the physicians on whom he relied as having

found that the claimant "suffered from coal workers'

pneumoconiosis,

or at least, could not rule it out." He relied on the reports of

Drs. Forehand, Sargent, and Rasmussen.

12

At the outset, in evaluating the evidence of Dr. Sargent, the ALJ

clearly erred. The ALJ concluded that Dr. Sargent could not "rule

out"

pneumoconiosis, but that is directly contrary to his opinion. While

Dr.

Sargent initially stated that he could not rule out pneumoconiosis

on

the basis of an initial reading of an x-ray, his later test

results, as well

as a review of other physicians' readings and test results,

ultimately

convinced him that Vance did not suffer from pneumoconiosis and

that Vance's overall impairment was due to cigarette smoking.

With respect to Dr. Forehand, the record does not provide enough

information to determine to what extent he relied on x-rays. If he

relied on a positive x-ray, then that is not an independent opinion

that

would support a finding of pneumoconiosis under§ 718.204(a)(4).

Moreover, Dr. Forehand could only conclude that his findings "were

consistent with coal worker's pneumoconiosis." (Emphasis added).

Finally, Dr. Rasmussen's findings were the most ambiguous. He

relied expressly on positive x-ray testimony, which would

disqualify

his opinion under § 718.204(a)(4), at least to the extent of his

reliance

on a positive x-ray. Moreover, Dr. Rasmussen concluded that there

was a "moderate partially reversible obstructive ventilatory

impairment" (emphasis added), an indication that the disease was caused

by

cigarette smoking and not by pneumoconiosis. Pneumoconiosis is

irreversible. See Mullins Coal Co. v. Director, Officer of Workers'

Compensation Programs, 484 U.S. 135, 151 (1988).

Against this most thin and perhaps even disqualified evidence, the

ALJ failed to give reasoned opinions as to why he was discrediting

the opinions of the doctors offered by the coal mine operator that

Vance did not have pneumoconiosis and that the vast number of xrays did not support a finding of pneumoconiosis.

On the issue of whether pneumoconiosis caused Vance's disability,

the ALJ likewise provided inadequate analysis, concluding simply,

on

the basis of opinions from Drs. Forehand and Rasmussen, that the

claimant had established that his total disability was due to

pneumoconiosis. The ALJ offered no rationale for crediting these doctors

over Drs. Fino, Sargent, and Renn, all of whom had stated that

pattern

of partial reversible obstruction which Vance demonstrated was not

consistent with pneumoconiosis.
13
Finally, I should not omit noting that the Director has urged us to

remand this case for similar reasons.

For the foregoing reasons, I respectfully dissent.

14