FI L ED U.S. COURT OF A P P E A LS E LE V E N T H C IR C U IT SEPTEMBER 17, 2007 THOMAS K. KAH

N CL ERK [ DO NOT PUBLISH ] IN THE UN ITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FO R T HE EL EV EN TH CIRC UI T

____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ N o. 07- 1077 8 Non-A rgum ent Calendar

____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ D. C. Dock etNo. 02 -0 28 74 -CV-2 -WMA DAVID KING, an in di vi du al , MIC HAEL FOSTER, an in di vi du al , SUNCOAST FRINGE BENEFITS, INC., a co rp or at io n, CONSOLIDATED MARKETING GROUP, INC., a co rp or at ion , Pl ai nt iff s- App el la nt s , v e r s u s NATIONAL UNION FIRE INSURANCE COMP ANY OF PITTSBURGH, PENNSYLVANIA, a co rp or at io n, at al. , D ef en da nts , NATIONW IDE MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY, a co rp or at ion , D efendant-Appellee
.

____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ Appeal f rom the United State s District Court for the NorthernDistrict of Alabam a

____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ _ (S ep te m be r 17, 200 7)2

Be fo re D U BI N A , CA RN E S a nd MA RC U S , Ci rc uit Jud ge s. PE R CU RIA M: T his is the se co nd app ea l fil ed by D av id K ing , Mi ch ae l F ost er , S unc oa st F ri nge Be ne fi ts, I nc . , a nd C onso lid at ed Marke tin g G ro up, I nc . ( co lle ct ive ly , “ K ing Pl ai nti ff s” or “ A ppe llants ”) in thi s ind em nif ic at ion ac tio n ag ai nst N at ion w ide U nio n In sur an ce Co m

pa ny ( “N at ion w ide ”) , in w hic h Appe llants a lle ge d vi ola tio ns o f A la ba m a an d F lor ida

law , inc lud ing tha t N at ion w ide br ea ch ed it s in sur an ce c ontra ct s with the Appellants and engaged in fraud, tortious interfere nce, bad faith, negligence,
an d w an ton ne ss, in co nne ct ion w ith its fa ilure to inde m nif y or de fe nd the Appe llants in the und erly ing tort ac tion, McFar lin v. Conseco, I nc., Case N o. CV -99-AR -2282-S (N .D . A la., filed Apr. 14, 2000). Be cause our prior decision in the m atter c onsti tutes t h e “l a w o f

t h e c a s e ” a n df

o r e c l o s e s t h e i n s t a n tap p e a l , w e a f f i rm. The district court pre viou sly hel d tha t the K i ng P l a intiffs’ bad-faith claim failed unde r A la

ba m a law , ba se d bo th o n th e m eri ts a nd f or la ck of standi ng, a nd tha t the negligence and wantonness claim s wer e on l y a t t em pts, that the court term ed

“ tr an spare nt, ” by

the K ing P la int if

fs to re as se rt

the unsu cc es sf

ul b ad -f ai th c la im
. T he district court expressly

dism issed a l l cl ai m s for dam ages, w ith the exception of a br ea ch -o f- co ntr ac t c la im

f or e co nom ic da m ages . In its pa rt ia l su m m ar y j udgm en t
or de r, the dis tr ic t c ourt ob se rv ed tha t “ the onl y

e co nom ic los s arg uably

sus ta ine d byWe are wholly unpersua ded by

the Appellants’ sug g estio n t h at t heir mer e mention of 1 conseque ntial damag es, in a footnote of their brief in K ing I , was suff icient to raise a

claim, either on the merits or on due proce ss gr ounds. Cf. Un i t ed States v. J ernig an, 341 F .3d 1273, 1284 n. 8 (11th Cir. 2003) (holdingissue abandone d wher e, althoug h the def endant made passing ref

ere nces to iss ue i nb r i e f

, th e r e f e r e n c e s w e r e un d e rt ak e na s b a c k g r o un d t o c l a i m s th a th e e xp r e s s ly advanc ed); Ta llahassee Mem ’l Reg ’l Med. Ctr. v. B owen, 815 F .2d 1435, 1446 n. 16 (11th Cir. 1987) (stating that single footnote in initial brief did not sufficiently prese rve issue that was ar g ued in reply brief)
. 3 the K ing pla int if

fs , a nd tha t m igh t be r ec ove re d inthi s c as e, is w ha t the y ow e to the ir law y er s to the e xte nt n ot a lr ea dy r ei m bur se d by N at ion w ide
. ” T he c ourt c ont inu ed :

“ In other wor ds, th e o nly rem aining claim based on contract is the claim for r ecovery of th e unpa id- by -N at ion w ide r ea sona ble c ost of the de fe nse of

the K ing pla int if

fs , that is, unless there is a viable claim for m ental anguish in f avor of the King plaintiffs arising from the alleged breach of contract.” T he district court then no ted that there
was no su ch cla im

form en ta l an gu is h. O n in te rl oc uto ry

appe al , w e af

fi rm ed tha t de ci sio n. Se e K ing v. N at ’ l U nio n Fire I ns. Co. of Pittsburgh, Pa. , 201 Fed. Appx. 749, 2006 W L 3 1472 90 (11th Cir. N ov. 2, 200 6) ( “ K ing I ”)
. N ota bly , the K ing P la int if

fs ra ise d no c la im , a nd, ind ee d,
as se rt ed no s ugge st io n of e rr or , c onc er nin g th e dis tr ic t c ourt’ s c onc lus iontha t the onl y r em ai nin g c la im

c onc er ne d th e reco ve ry of

a tto rn ey s’ f

ee s. C f. Mare k v. 1 Si ngl et ar y , 62 F
. 3d 1 295, 129 8 n. 2 ( 11th C ir
. 199 5) ( “ Is sue s no t c le ar ly r ai se d inthe br ie fs a re c onsi de re d a

ba ndon ed
. ”) ; se e al so A cc es s Now , In c. v. S outhw es t A ir lin es , Co., 385 F.3d 1324 , 133 0 (11th Cir. 2004) (“ If an argum ent is not full y briefed ( let4

al one not pr es en te d a t a ll) to th e Ci rc uit Co urt, e va lua tin g it s m er its w oul d be im pr ope r both be ca

use the appe llants m ay co ntr ol the iss ue s they ra ise on a ppe al a nd be cau se th e ap pe ll ee wo ul d h av e n o o pp or tu ni ty to re sp o n d to it .”). In Kin g I, we sta te d th at

w e af fi rm ed the dis tr ic t c ourt’ s part ia l sum m ar y j udgm en t in al l r es pe ct s, thus exp licitly

rej ecting all claim s asserted by the King Plaintiffs in that interlocutory ap pe al , a nd i m

pli ci tly a ff irm ing a ll iss ue s, e ve n th ose not r ai se d ( an d thus, ab an do ne d) , res ol ve d b y

th e d is tri ctco ur t’s p art ia l s umm ary jud gm en t. A ft er our de ci sio n inK ing I , the pa rt ie s re tur ne d to the dis tr ic t c ourt t o r es olv e the onl y r em ai nin g c la im : the unp ai d- fo r attor ne y s’ f ee s ari sin g ou t of

the de fe nse of the King Plaintiffs in McFarlin. Much to the district court’ s surprise thou gh, w hen the parties returned for

a status conference on that claim , Appellants con tended that the y w er e en tit le d to re co ve r fr om N at ion w ide not

onl y the unp ai d- fo r at tor

ne y s’ f ee s, but a lso c onse que nti al da m ag es in an am ount Appe llants es tim at ed to be $1, 200, 000. The district court f

ound the dam ages we re precluded, b y virtue of its previous order, whi ch was a ffi rm edin Kin g I. Under the la

w- of-th e- ca s e d o ct ri n e, co u rt s ar e p re cl u d ed fr om “ revisiting issues tha t w er e de ci de d e xpl ic itl y or by ne ce ssary

im pli ca tio n in a pr ior ap pe al
. ” Sc hiavo
v. S ch ia vo, 403 F
. 3d 1289 , 1291 (1 1thCi r. 200 5) ; K al y v. A ll D ef

en da nts , 389 F
. 3d 1191 , 119 8 (1 1th Ci r. 2004 ) (“ Re al iz ing tha t a pr ior de ci sio n is l awof the c as e as to5

m at te rs de ci de d e xpl ic itl y a nd b y ne ce ssary

im plica tio n, w e fi nd tha t our pr ior af fi rm at ionof

the dis tr ic t c ourt c onst itu te s law of th e case h er e . . . . ”) , c er t de nie d, 125 S. Ct
. 2523 (2 005)
. In shor t, our de ci sio n in K ing I , pr ec lud es us f ro m r ev isi tin g issues ot her than the claim for attorney s’ fee s, beca

use it was the only

claim left af ter the district court’ s partial sum m ary j udgm ent and our affirm ance of it. T he district
co urt l ike w ise c or

re ct ly de cl ine d to r ev isi t the iss ue of conse que nti al da m ag es on
re m an d f ro m our K ing I de ci sio n. AFFIRMED.