2010 Decisions

Opinions of the United

States Court of Appeals

for the Third Circuit

9-21-2010

Joey Jackson v. Div Dev Disabilities

Precedential or Non-Precedential: Non-Precedential

Docket No. 10-2825

Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2010

This decision is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit at Villanova

University School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in 2010 Decisions by an authorized administrator of Villanova

University School of Law Digital Repository. For more information, please contact Benjamin.Carlson@law.villanova.edu.

Recommended Citation

"Joey Jackson v. Div Dev Disabilities" (2010). 2010 Decisions. Paper 567.

http://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2010/567
1

NOT PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

___________

No. 10-2825

___________

JOEY W. JACKSON,

 Appellant

v.

DIVISION OF DEVELOPMENTAL DISABILITIES

____________________________________

On Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of New Jersey

(D.C. Civ. No. 09-cv-05366)

District Judge: Honorable Mary L. Cooper

____________________________________

Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)

September 17, 2010

Before: SMITH, FISHER and GARTH, Circuit Judges

(Opinion filed: September 21, 2010 )

_________

 OPINION

_________

PER CURIAM

Joey W. Jackson appeals pro se from the District Court’s order dismissing his

complaint. We will affirm.
 Jackson apparently refers to the Developmentally Disabled Assistance and Bill of 1

Rights Act of 1975. The Supreme Court has held that this statute does not create

substantive individual rights. See Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S.

1, 28 n.21 (1981)

 Jackson later sent some 106 letters to the District Court over the course of the 2

litigation complaining about virtually every aspect of his care. He also repeatedly called

the District Court Clerk and the various judges assigned to this case and repeatedly

appeared in person at the Clerk’s office. This conduct led the District Court to issue an

injunction on December 22, 2009, prohibiting Jackson from calling or appearing in

person at the court until further order and directing him to communicate with the court

(continued...)

2

Jackson suffers from a mental disability and is under the care of the New Jersey

Division of Developmental Disabilities (“DDD”). He filed pro se a one-page complaint

against the DDD, to which he attached several documents and a cover sheet citing the

Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (“ADA”) and the “Civil Rights Act of 1975.”1

The complaint and its attachments can be liberally construed to assert two claims. 

First, the complaint states that the DDD “denied an emergency placement[] because of my

dual diagnosis” and that Jackson wants placement “in better care housing.” From a letter

attached to the complaint, it appears that Jackson sought an emergency transfer from his

housing with Allies, Inc., to an agency called NHS on the basis of unspecified “abuse and

neglect.” Second, Jackson states in the complaint that he wants a “protection order,” and

attached a letter from the New Jersey Department of Human Services Special Response

Unit reporting that it had investigated Jackson’s complaint about abuse and found it

unsubstantiated. Thus, Jackson appears to complain of the manner in which the DDD

resolved his complaints of abuse.2
 (...continued) 2

only in writing. Jackson appealed that order, but we dismissed his appeal for lack of

jurisdiction because his notice of appeal was untimely. Jackson v. Div. of Developmental

Disabilities, C.A. No. 10-1859 (June 6, 2010).

 We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review the District Court’s 3

dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) de novo. See Mayer v. Belichick, 605 F.3d 223, 229 (3d

Cir. 2010). In doing so, “[w]e must accept all factual allegations in the complaint as true,

construe the complaint in the light favorable to the plaintiff, and ultimately determine

whether plaintiff may be entitled to relief under any reasonable reading of the complaint.” 

Id. Pro se complaints are “‘liberally construed’” and “‘held to less stringent standards

than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers[.]’” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007)

(citations omitted). The complaint, however, must contain allegations permitting “‘the

reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.’” Mayer, 605

F.3d at 230 (citations omitted). In undertaking our review, we may consider exhibits

attached to the complaint. See id. We may also affirm on any ground supported by the

record. See Grayson v. Mayview State Hosp., 293 F.3d 103, 109 (3d Cir. 2002). In

addition to dismissing Jackson’s complaint, the June 14 order denied his requests for

counsel and various forms of injunctive relief. We review both rulings for abuse of

discretion, see Tabron v. Grace, 6 F.3d 147, 158 (3d Cir. 1993) (counsel); Miller v.

Mitchell, 598 F.3d 139, 145 (3d Cir. 2010) (injunction), and we perceive none here.

3

The DDD filed a motion to dismiss Jackson’s complaint under Rule 12(b)(6),

arguing that it fails to state a claim and that the District Court should abstain from hearing

the suit under Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971). By order entered June 14, 2010,

the District Court granted the motion for several reasons, including the legal insufficiency

of Jackson’s complaint. Jackson appeals.3

II.

We agree that Jackson’s complaint does not state a claim upon which relief may be

granted, though for reasons somewhat different than those on which the District Court

relied. As the DDD argues, Jackson’s complaint and its attachments—no matter how
 To the contrary, documents attached to letters that Jackson has sent this Court indicate 4

that he has since been transferred away from Allies as he originally requested. That

transfer does not render this appeal moot because we read Jackson’s filings to request a

transfer to a facility somewhere outside of New Jersey, which from Jackson’s filings does

not appear to have occurred, but it does confirm that there is no merit to his claim that he

has been “denied” reassignment, let alone on the basis of his disability. 

4

liberally construed—do not permit a reasonable inference that the DDD has engaged in

any actionable conduct. His sole assertion is that the DDD “denied a[n] emergency

placement[] because of my dual diagnosis.” Thus, he appears to claim that the DDD

discriminated against him under the ADA by denying him emergency reassignment on the

basis of his disability. See 42 U.S.C. § 12132; Chambers v. Sch. Dist. of Phila. Bd. of

Educ., 587 F.3d 176, 189 (3d Cir. 2009). Jackson, however, has alleged nothing

reasonably suggesting that it did, and the only inference reasonably permitted by the

attachments to his complaint is to the contrary. Those attachments include an October 8,

2009 letter from the DDD to Jackson. The letter denies Jackson’s request for emergency

reassignment on the ground that he is not in imminent peril, but encourages him to pursue 

reassignment with his case manager in the ordinary course. Thus, it does not raise an

inference that the DDD denied Jackson reassignment on the basis of his disability.4

Nor does Jackson’s complaint permit the inference that the DDD may be liable for

the manner in which it responded to his complaints of abuse (assuming, without deciding,

that there may be some legal theory under which the DDD’s conduct might potentially be

actionable). The complaint itself seeks a “protection order,” but it contains no actual
 The predominant theme of Jackson’s letters is that he wants to be reassigned to 5

housing in a different state. He also complains about virtually every aspect of his care,

such as allegations that staff are “lazy,” talk on their cellular phones, or otherwise fail to

give him their undivided attention. While his letters often include assertions that staff

“abused” and “neglected” him, he makes no specific colorable allegations in that regard.

5

allegations in that regard. Instead, it attaches a June 11, 2009 letter from the Special

Response Unit stating that it investigated Jackson’s complaint of abuse and that the

documentary and testimonial evidence it reviewed showed the complaint to be

unsubstantiated. Jackson has alleged nothing raising an inference that the DDD’s actions

were anything other than this letter describes them to be.

In sum, Jackson’s complaint does not permit the reasonable inference that the

DDD engaged in any actionable misconduct. Ordinarily, a plaintiff must be given leave

to amend before his or her complaint is dismissed with prejudice on that basis. See

Phillips v. Cnty. of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 236 (3d Cir. 2008). In this case, however,

we have the benefit of the 106 letters that Jackson sent the District Court (as well as the

over 50 letters that he has sent this Court during the pendency of his appeal). Regardless

of whether these letters were properly filed with the District Court or with ours, they have

given Jackson ample opportunity to elaborate on his claims. Like his complaint, however,

they contain nothing suggesting that the DDD has engaged in actionable conduct. Thus,

we are satisfied that any amendment of Jackson’s complaint would be futile. See id.5

Accordingly, we will affirm the judgment of the District Court. Jackson’s motion

for the appointment of counsel is denied.