IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

S.B., :

Petitioner :

:

 v. : No. 341 M.D. 2020

:

The Pennsylvania State Police, : Submitted: February 6, 2024 

Respondent :

BEFORE: HONORABLE PATRICIA A. McCULLOUGH, Judge

HONORABLE ELLEN CEISLER, Judge

HONORABLE STACY WALLACE, Judge

OPINION NOT REPORTED

MEMORANDUM OPINION 

BY JUDGE McCULLOUGH FILED: March 18, 2024

Before this Court in our original jurisdiction is an Application for 

Summary Relief (Application) filed by S.B. (Petitioner), proceeding pro se, in 

connection with his petition for review filed against the Pennsylvania State Police 

(PSP) seeking removal of his name from PSP’s sex offender registry pursuant to the 

Sexual Offender Registration and Notification Act (SORNA), Act of February 21, 

2018, P.L. 27, No. 10, as amended by the Act of July 12, 2018, P.L. 140, No. 29 

(SORNA II).1In support of his claim, Petitioner asserts that because his plea agreement 

expressly stated that Megan’s Law2 was not applicable, PSP is violating his plea 

1

42 Pa.C.S. §§ 9799.10-9799.75.

2 Megan’s Law I, formerly 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 9791-9799.6, in 1995, followed five years later, in 

2000, by what is commonly known as Megan’s Law II, formerly 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 9791-9799.7. In 2004, 

the General Assembly enacted what is commonly known as Megan’s Law III, formerly 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 

(Footnote continued on next page...)
2

agreement by requiring him to register. Essentially, Petitioner is asking that we enforce 

his plea agreement against PSP. We deny Petitioner’s Application.

I. Facts and Procedural Background

On December 4, 1996, Petitioner was arrested and charged with rape, 

involuntary deviate sexual intercourse, indecent assault, and corruption of minors. On 

August 29, 1997, Petitioner entered a plea of nolo contendere to all charges except for 

the rape charge, which was nolle prossed. The Court of Common Pleas of York County

sentenced Petitioner to 2 1/2-6 years’ incarceration. The written colloquy signed by 

Petitioner contained the following language:

The trial court’s August 29, 1997 sentencing order stated “[t]his is not a Megan’s Law 

case by virtue of the time at which the incidents are alleged to have occurred.” 

(Petitioner’s Br., Ex. B.) The date of the incident was January 1, 1996. Before his

release on parole in May 2001, Petitioner registered with PSP as a lifetime sex offender. 

9791-9799.9, which remained in effect until the enactment of the Sexual Offender Registration and 

Notification Act (SORNA I), 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 9799.10-9799.41, in 2012. On July 19, 2017, the 

Pennsylvania Supreme Court decided Commonwealth v. Muniz, 164 A.3d 1189 (Pa. 2017), in which 

it held that a portion of SORNA I violated the ex post facto clauses of the United States and 

Pennsylvania Constitutions by increasing registration obligations on certain sex offender registrants. 

Thereafter, in 2018, to clarify that sex offender registration provisions were not ex post facto

punishment, the General Assembly enacted SORNA II.
3

Petitioner initiated this action, through counsel on June 9, 2020, filing a

Petition for Review and naming PSP as the sole respondent. Following the decision in 

Commonwealth v. Lacombe, 234 A.3d 602 (Pa. 2020), Petitioner twice amended his 

petition, filing his First Amended Petition for Review on July 21, 2020 and his Second 

Amended Petition for Review on November 11, 2020. On November 11, 2021, 

Petitioner filed an Application for Summary Relief. On December 14, 2021, PSP filed 

its answer to the Second Amended Petition. Shortly thereafter Petitioner’s counsel, 

who had been elected judge, sought and was granted permission to withdraw his 

appearance. On March 31, 2023, Petitioner, pro se, filed a brief in support of the 

Application along with supporting documents, including (1) a sentencing order from 

August 29, 1997, (2) a written guilty plea colloquy, and (3) a letter from PSP affirming 

the requirement to register with Megan’s Law. On July 10, 2023, PSP filed a brief in 

opposition to Petitioner’s Application.

II. Issue

Petitioner does not argue that Megan’s Law violates the ex post facto law 

as applied to him, but rather he asserts that because his 1997 plea agreement contained 

a negotiated condition of inapplicability of Megan’s Law to his case, his registration 

with the PSP as a sex offender violates the plea agreement, and he should be removed 

from the registry.
4

III. Discussion3

Petitioner’s offenses occurred on January 1, 1996, prior to the effective 

date of Megan’s Law I of April 22, 1996. See 42 Pa.C.S. § 9799.55(b). However, 

Petitioner does not dispute that the Supreme Court has held that application of 

Subchapter I of SORNA II4to those who committed their offenses before any sex 

offender registry existed (before April 22, 1996) does not violate their constitutional 

rights. T.S. v. Pennsylvania State Police, 241 A.3d 1091 (Pa. 2020). Petitioner’s sole 

argument is that his plea agreement was structured so that he would not have to register, 

that non-registration was a material part of his plea bargain, and that he is entitled to 

specific performance of that plea bargain. Petitioner states that when he was released 

on parole and received notice from PSP to register his current residence and 

employment address, he was under impression those were parole conditions and were 

not associated with Megan’s Law. (Petitioner’s Br., at 7.) Petitioner acknowledges

that SORNA II would otherwise apply to him; however, he arguesthat due to the agreed 

upon conditions of his plea bargain, the registration is not applicable in his case. 

3 This Court may grant an application for summary relief if the party’s right to judgment is 

clear, and no material issues of fact are in dispute. Gregory v. Pennsylvania State Police, 185 A.3d 

1202, 1205 n.5 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2018); Pa.R.A.P. 1532(b). In considering an application for summary 

relief, the record includes pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, admissions, affidavits, 

and reports signed by expert witnesses. Summit School, Inc. v. Department of Education, 108 A.3d 

192, 195-96 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2015). “When ruling on an application for summary relief, we must view 

the evidence of the record in the light most favorable to the non-moving party and enter judgment 

only if there is no genuine issue as to any material facts and the right to judgment is clear as a matter 

of law.” Gregory, 185 A.3d at 1205 (internal quotation and citation omitted). Because there are no 

material facts in dispute, we examine whether Petitioner’s right to judgment is clear as a matter of 

law. Id. at 1205 n.5; Pa.R.A.P. 1532(b).

4 Subchapter I of SORNA II, titled “Continued Registration of Sex Offenders,” provides, in 

relevant part, that its provisions shall apply to individuals who were “required to register with [PSP] 

under a former sexual offender registration law of this Commonwealth on or after April 22, 1996, but 

before December 20, 2012, whose period of registration has not expired.” 42 Pa. C.S. § 9799.52(2).
5

Petitioner is asking for this Court to hold that the trial court’s August 29, 1997 

sentencing order was a binding contract, and PSP violated his plea agreement by 

imposing a registration requirement on him. In essence, Petitioner asks this Court to 

enforce his plea agreement against PSP. Petitioner’s argument fails.

In Dougherty v. Pennsylvania State Police, 138 A.3d 152 (Pa. Cmwlth. 

2016), a petitioner argued that his plea agreement was conditioned on his registration 

as a sex offender for ten years only. Petitioner asserted, inter alia, that the terms of his 

plea agreement were breached by the imposition of SORNA which required him to 

register for a longer period of 25 years. PSP filed preliminary objections alleging that 

the petitioner’s contract-based claims failed because PSP was not a party to the plea 

agreement. In sustaining PSP’s preliminary objections, this Court explained that “it is 

the Commonwealth, acting through the appropriate prosecutor, not the PSP, [that] is a 

party to the plea agreement.” Id. at 160. We determined:

[T]he PSP has no duty to inquire into the content or intent of 

any underlying plea agreement. The PSP is not a party to the 

plea agreement and disputes over the alleged breach of a plea 

agreement, and the impact of the plea agreement on a [sex 

offender’s] duty to register with the PSP, are properly 

resolved through the criminal justice system in the 

appropriate sentencing court.

Id. (emphasis in original). Dougherty continues to remain valid precedent despite 

recent changes in the landscape of sex offender registration. See Huu Cao v. 

Pennsylvania State Police (Pa. Cmwlth., No. 512 M.D. 2015, filed October 16, 2019); 

Huyett v. Pennsylvania State Police (Pa. Cmwlth., No. 516 M.D. 2015, filed August 

17, 2017).

Here, as in Dougherty, PSP was not a party to Petitioner’s plea agreement. 

Because Petitioner’s breach of contract claim is premised on the terms of his plea 

agreement, any dispute regarding those terms must involve the Commonwealth, not
6

PSP. Furthermore, because the agreement was silent on the matter of registration, PSP, 

here, must apply the appropriate registration based on Petitioner’s conviction 

established in 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 9799.15, 9799.55. See W.W. v. Pennsylvania State Police

(Pa. Cmwlth., No. 239 M.D. 2020, filed Jan. 15, 2021); Dougherty. Thus, we must 

reject Petitioner’s argument.

IV. Conclusion

Accordingly, we deny Petitioner’s Application.

_______________________________

PATRICIA A. McCULLOUGH, Judge
IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

S.B., :

Petitioner :

:

 v. : No. 341 M.D. 2020

:

The Pennsylvania State Police, :

Respondent :

ORDER

AND NOW, this 18th day of March, 2024, Petitioner’s Application for 

Summary Relief is hereby DENIED.

________________________________

PATRICIA A. McCULLOUGH, Judge