BLD

- 006 NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

___________ No. 1 3

- 3558

___________ IN RE: ALTON BROWN , Petitioner

____________________________________ On a Petition for Writ of Mandamus from th e United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania (Related to E. D. Pa . Civ. No. 2

- 1 0

- cv
- 0 3458 )

____________________________________ Submitted Pursuant to Rule 21, Fed. R. App. P. October 10, 2013 Before: AMBRO, CHAGARES and VANAS KIE , Circuit Judges (Opinion filed : November 12, 2013 )

_________ OPINION

_________ PER CURIAM
Pro se petitioner, Alton Brown , seeks a writ of mandamus ordering the District
Court to direct that service of process be issued by the United States Marshal’s Service
with respect to his second amended and supplemental complaint and to rule on his
motions for injunctive relief

. We conclude that mandamus relief is not warranted in this

case at this time . Accordingly, we will deny the petition

. Mandamus is a “drastic remed y” available in extraordinary circumstances only. In re: Diet Drugs Prods. Liab. Litig. , 418 F.3d 372, 378 (3d Cir. 2005) . A petitioner seeking2 the writ “must have no other adequate means to obtain the desired relief, and must show that the right to issu ance is clear and indisputable.” Madden v. Myers , 102 F.3d 74, 79 (3d Cir. 1996) , superseded in part on other grounds by 3d Cir. L.A.R. 24.1(c) (1997)

. Generally, a court’s management of its docket is discretionary, In re Fine Paper Antitrust Litig. , 685 F.2d 810, 817 (3d Cir. 1982) , and there is no “clear and indisputable” right to
have a district court handle a case in a certain manner

. S ee Allied Chem. Corp. v. Daiflon, Inc. , 449 U.S. 33, 36 (1980) . However, mandamus may be warranted when a
district court’s delay “is tantamount to a failure to exercise jurisdiction” and rises to the level of a due process violation. Madden , 102 F.3d at 79

. The delay complained of by Brown is not tantamount to a failure to exercise j urisdiction. In an order issued o n January 2, 2013, we concluded that Brown made a sufficient showing of imminent danger to overcome the bar erected by 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g) . Accordingly, we directed that the District Court grant Brown leave to proceed with the underlying civil action in f orma pauperis

. See C.A. No. 11

- 1707. The District Court promptly complied with that directive . I n its order entered on February 14, 2013,
the District Court extended the 120

- day time limit for service of summons and the
amended c omplaint until further o rder of the court. Shortly thereafter, the action was reassigned to the Honorable Eduardo C. Robreno. Brown has filed numerous motions in
the District Court since the re assignment, including motions for injunctive relief and the recusal of Judge Robreno. T he District Court disposed of Brown’s motion for recusal,
but has yet to order service of his second a mended complaint or to issue an order on his3 requests for injunctive relief.
When we remanded the matter to the District Court with the direction that Brown be granted in forma pauperis status, we refrained from expressing any opinion regarding
the merits of his action. The Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA) provides authority for
the District Court to screen civil actions under § 1915(e)(2) “ without regard to whether the opposing party was served with process. ” Grayson v. Mayview State Hosp. , 293 F.3d 103, 111 n.15 (3d Cir. 2002)

. We stated in Grayson that, “[g]iven the emphasis in the
PLRA’ s legislative history on the cost to state and local govern ments of defending prisoner litigation, ” see 141 Cong. Rec. S14413 (1995) (statement of Senator Dole), the district courts’ authority to dismiss complaints prior to service of process “was meant to serve an important purpose. ” Id. We thus cannot conclude that the District Court’s decision to refrain from ordering service of summons in this case is tantamount to a failure to exercise jurisdiction. Likewise, given the steady stream of filings that Brown has submitted since his action was reassigned eight mo nths ago

– several of which have been filed in the past
four months and disposed of by the District Court

– the court’s delay in ruling on his motions for injunctive relief does not rise to the level justifying our intervention. See
Madden , 102 F.3d at 79 . We are fully confident that the District Court will adjudicat e
Brown ’s motions and complaint without undue delay. Accordingly, we will deny the petition for a writ of mandamus.