NOT PRECEDENTIAL UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

___________ No. 1 3

- 2972

___________ MARZENA MAGDALENA BERA ,

Petitioner

v. ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES , Respondent

____________________________________ On Petition for Re view of an Order of the Board of Immigration Appeals (Agency No. A 0 89

- 913

- 017 ) Immigration Judge: Honorable Frederic G. Leeds

____________________________________ Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)

February 6, 2014 Before: FISHER, VANASKIE and ALDISERT, Circuit Judges

(Opinion filed : February 12, 2014 )

___________ OPINION

___________ PER CURIAM Marzena Magdalena Bera (“Bera ”) petitions for review of the Board of
Im migration Appeals’ (the “Board”) final order of removal . For the reasons that follow,

we w ill deny the petition for review.2 I. Petitioner Marzena Magdalena Bera, a citizen of Poland, entered the United States in September 2007. In September 2008, she applied for asylum but was referred to removal proceedings. The notice to appear charged her with being present in violation of the law, pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(1)(B). She conceded removability and applied for asylum, withholding of removal, and relief under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). In support of her application, she claim ed that she had been persecuted in Poland because she participated in the Solidarity Movement during the 1980s and because she is Jewish. In an oral decision, the I mmigration J udge (“IJ”) determined that Bera was credible, but he concluded that the harassm ent and discrimination that she faced did not amount to past persecution. The IJ found that Bera had not established that she would face future persecution if she returned to Poland, especially in light of the evidence contained in the International Relig ious Freedom Report, which indicated that the Polish government was reaching out to the Jewish community to improve the quality of life. The IJ also determined that the Polish government was “ready, willing and able” to offer protection to Bera. On that basis, the IJ denied Bera’s asylum, withholding of removal, and CAT claims and ordered her removal to Poland. Bera appealed to t he Board , and then filed three motions to remand. In June 2013, the Board dismissed her appeal, after determining that Bera h ad not established that she suffered past persecution or that she had a well

- founded fear of future persecution. The3

Board then agreed with the IJ’s conclusion that Bera had not established a clear probability of future persecution that would make her eli gible for withholding of removal. Regarding her CAT claim, the Board found that Bera had not established that it was “‘more likely than not’ that she would be subject to torture by, or with the consent or acquiescence of [,] a public official or other pers on acting in official capacity in Poland.”
The Board lastly considered the additional evidence that Bera submitted alongside her motions to remand, a nd it determined that the evidence did n ot establish Bera’s prima facie eligibility for relief. 1 Bera, th rough counsel, filed a timely petition for review

. II. We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252 . While our review extends only to the Board’s order of removal, we may review the decision of the IJ to the extent that the Board ’s order expressly adopts or defers to a finding of the IJ. Kayembe v. Ashcroft , 334 F.3d 231, 234 (3d Cir. 2003)

. “We apply substantial evidence review to agency findings of fact, departing from factual findings only where a reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to arrive at a contrary conclusion.” Mendez

- Reyes v. Att’y Gen. of the U.S. , 428 F.3d 187, 191 (3d Cir. 2005). Our review of legal conclusions is de novo, subject to principles of deference. Kaplun v. Att’y Gen. , 602 F.3d 260, 2 65 (3d Cir. 2010). We

1 The Board also determined that Bera had not shown any prejudice arising from i nterruptions during and mistranslations of her testimony , and that Bera failed to appeal the IJ’s determination that she was ineligible for asylum based on domestic violence . We note that, because Bera failed to raise these issues in her petition for revi ew and opening brief, they are waived. See Voci v. Gonzales , 409 F.3d 607, 609 n.1 (3d Cir. 2005).4

review denials o f motions to re mand under a deferential abuse of discretion standard

. S ee Huang v. Att’y Gen. , 620 F.3d 372, 3 89

- 90 (3d Cir. 2010)

. III. The Board denied Bera’s asylum claim after concluding that Bera had failed to
establish past persecution or a well

- f ounded fear of future persecution. To establish past persecution, an alien must show that , on account of a statutorily protected ground, she suffered “threats to life, confinement, torture, and economic restrictions so severe that they constitute a real t hreat to life or freedom . ” Chavarria v. Gonzalez , 446 F.3d 508, 518 (3d Cir. 2006). Isolated incidents that do not result in serious injury are generally not considered examples of persecution. See Voci v. Gonzales , 409 F.3d 607, 6 15 (3d Cir. 2005)

. M oreover, where an alien complains of threats, she must demonstrate that the threats are “highly imminent and menacing in nature,” so much so that they “cause significant actual ‘suffering or harm.’” Chavarria , 446 F.3d at 518. At the merits hearing befo re the I J, Bera testified that , as a result of her involvement with the Solidarity Movement, she was detained for a period of three days in 1982 and was legally unable to work or receive public assistance for the next eight years

. Bera also testified to a number of anti

- Semitic incidents leading up to and following her 2006 conversion to Judaism. H er husband , in

- laws, and children responded with verbal
abuse and disapproval. S oon after Bera ’s conversion , she was terminated from her municipal teaching jo b , though she did receive a pension within several months

. At various times prior to her arrival in the United States, she was harassed by s trangers ,5

including incidents where “skinheads” confront ed her on the street , unknown people imprint ed nearly 50 Sta rs of David on the sidewalk in front of her home, counter

protesters thr ew tomatoes and garbage a t her during a Parade for Equality, and passengers twice yell ed at her while she read the Talmu d and a Hebrew prayer book on the train. She also had a difficu lt time finding an apartme nt after divorcing her husband . At some point , Leszek Bub el, a well

- known leader of the anti

- Semitic Polish National Party, published Bera’s name in a book called the Great Encyclopedia of Jews

. After she left Poland, she sublet her apartment to two Jewish friends who were later evicted, and Bera’s possessions , including J udaica, were then destroyed by the landlord. However, Bera reported none of these incidents to the police or other authorities. Bera’s p ast experiences are tro ublesome but they fall short of past persecution. When she was arrested for three days in the 1980s, she was not mistreated or otherwise harmed. See Kibinda v. Att’y Gen. , 477 F.3d 113, 119

- 20 (3d Cir. 2007) ( stating that a five

- day detention and beating that required stitches and left a scar were not “severe enough to constitute persecution under our stringent standard”). T he incidents of anti

Semitism that Bera experienced were isolated and she did not report any serious injuries.
See Voci , 409 F.3d a t 615. She has not shown that the inclusion of her name in the Great Encyclopedia of Jews was a highly imminent threat caus ing her “ significant actual suffering or harm,” such that it constitutes persecution. See Chavarria , 446 F.3d at 518

. Although she reported two distinct periods of economic suffering

— after she was arrested in 1982 and again after she was terminated from her teaching job in 2006

— she6

also testified that she was able to work illegally and obtain a secondary degree during the 1980s, and that she received a pension in 2006. S he has therefore not shown that she suffered from economic persecution

. See Li v. Att’y Gen. , 400 F.3d 157, 16 9 (3d Cir. 2005) (holding that the “ deliberate imposition of severe economic disadvantage ” that could threaten a petitioner’s life or freedom may constitute persecution)

. We therefore conclude that substantial evidence supports the agency’s finding that Bera failed to demonstrate past persecution. The record evidence also supports the Board’s conclusion t hat Bera failed to demonstrate a well

- founded fear of future persecution . To prevail, Bera needed to show “potential harm rising to the level of persecution on account of a statutorily enumerated ground that is committed by the government or by forces the government is unable or unwilling to control.” Kibinda , 477 F.3d at 119. The record shows that anti

- Semitic threats are made somewhat frequently in Poland. Moreover, Bera’s name is included in Leszek Bubel’s anti

- Semitic publication

. However , Bera did not establish the involvement of any governmental officials in publishing the Great Encyclopedia of Jews ,

n or did she show that the threats to Poland’s Jewish population are made by the government or forces the Polish government is unable or unwilling to control

. Substantial evidence therefore supports the Board’s determination that Bera did not have an objective basis for her fear of future prosecution. 2

2 Bera fares no better on her withholding of removal claim, as the showing required for withholding of removal is the “heightened” showing of a clear pr obability of future7

The Board denied Bera’s CAT claim after concluding that Bera had not established that it was more lik ely than not that she would be subject to torture upon her return to Poland

. To be eligible for CAT relief, an alien must show that it is more likely than not that she will be tortured if removed to the country in question. 8 C.F.R. § 1208.16(c)(2). “To rture” consists of the intentional infliction of “severe pain or suffering . . . by or at the instigation of or with the consent or acquiescence of a public official or other person acting in an official capaci ty.” 8 C.F.R. § 1208.18(a)(1). Bera did not show that it is more likely than not that having her name published in the Great Encyclopedia of Jews makes her a target for torture by, or with the consent or acquiescence of , a public official or other person acting in an official capacity. Finally, the Board denied Bera’s motions to remand after determin ing that Bera’s newly submitted evidence would not establish her prima facie eligibility for relief

. The Board treats m otions to remand in the same manner as motions to reopen the record. Huang , 620 F.3 d at 389

- 90. Accordingly, the Board may deny the motion where the alien has not established a prima facie case for the relief sought. Caushi v. Att’y Gen. , 436 F.3d 220, 231 (3d Cir. 2006). Here, Bera submitted new evidence showing that the Polish gover nment thwarted a potential bomb attack on parliament, which had been planned by an avowed anti

- Semite. She also submitted evidence of verbal attacks on

persecution. Yuan v. Att’y Gen. , 642 F.3d 420, 426 (3d Cir. 2011). Bera also did not establish her eligibility for humanitarian asylum , which is reserved for those who have suffered severe past persecution

. See Sheriff v. Att’y Gen. , 587 F. 3d 584, 594

- 95 (3d Cir. 2009).8

Jews at a restaurant, in a play, and online (including music videos made by Leszek Bubel). T he Board p lausibly concluded that Bera’s evidence demonstrated the presence of potential societal discrimination, but not persecution. We therefore conclude that the agency did not abuse its discretion in denying Bera’s motions to remand. See Huang , 620 F.3d at 37 9, 390. After reviewing the record, we cannot conclude that the Board’s decision was not supported by substantial evidence. Accordingly , we will deny the petition for review.