No. 3--05--0749 

_________________________________________________________________ 

filed July 7, 2006. 

 IN THE 

 APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS 

 THIRD DISTRICT 

__________________________________________________________________ 

In re MARRIAGE OF ) Appeal from the Circuit Court 

KEITH HANSEL, ) of the 12th Judicial Circuit, 

) Will County Illinois. 

) 

Plaintiff-Appellee, ) 

 ) 

v. ) No. 02--D--1816 

) 

KRISTINA R. HANSEL, ) Honorable 

n/k/a KRISTINA R. KUKSTA ) Robert J. Baron, 

Defendant-Appellant.) Judge, Presiding. __________________________________________________________________ 

JUSTICE HOLDRIDGE delivered the opinion of the Court: 

 

The defendant, Kristina Hansel, n/k/a Kristina Kuksta, appeals 

from the October 12, 2005, order of the circuit court of Will 

County denying her petition to remove the parties= minor child, 

Ciara Hansel, to North Carolina. On appeal, Kristina argues that 

the trial court's denial of her removal petition was against the 

manifest weight of the evidence. We affirm. 

The parties were married in 1994. Ciara, the parties= only 

child, was born on January 27, 1996. The parties were divorced on 

February 28, 2001. The judgment for dissolution incorporated a 

joint parenting agreement which provided joint custody. Ciara 

resided with Kristina, while Keith had liberal and extensive 

visitation. 

On May 18, 2005, Kristina petitioned for leave to remove Ciara 

to North Carolina. At the time the petition was filed, Ciara was 9 
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years old. In her petition, she alleged that her intended husband, 

John Corry, lived in North Carolina where he operated several 

business enterprises. Kristina alleged that she wished to move to 

North Carolina after her marriage to John and that moving Ciara 

with her was in the best interest of Ciara. 

The trial court conducted a hearing on Kristina's petition on 

eight days between September 21, 2005, and October 12, 2005. 

Kristina testified that if the requested removal were allowed, she 

would be able to not work and thus devote more quality time to 

Ciara. Kristina testified that she currently was employed as a 

Catholic school teacher at St. Alphonsus in Lemont, Illinois. 

Ciara attended school at St. Alphonsus. Kristina=s work required 

her to be at school 50-60 hours per week. Kristina=s work schedule 

required Ciara to arrive at school at 6:30 a.m. and stay until 4:30 

p.m. along with Kristina. One night per week, Kristina worked late 

while Ciara had visitation with Keith. Kristina also worked 

weekends, often times Ciara would accompany Kristina to work on 

Saturdays. 

 Kristina earned approximately $25,000 per year. Due to John=s 

income level, Kristina would not have to work, thus not only giving 

her more time for Ciara, but also increasing family income, which 

Kristina claimed was also a benefit to Ciara. The record indicates 

that Keith pays approximately $27,000 per year in child support for 

Ciara. 

Kristina also testified that a move to North Carolina would 

provide Ciara with more opportunities for her to interact with 
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friends and engage in extra-curricular activities, things that she 

could not do currently due to the fact that she had to spend so 

much time at school while her mother worked. Kristina also 

testified that, in her opinion, the school Ciara would attend in 

North Carolina, St. Mark=s elementary, had more to offer and was 

better than St. Alphonsus. 

Keith testified that after his divorce from Kristina, he moved 

to an apartment only one mile from Kristina and Ciara, so that he 

could be close to Ciara. The parties= dissolution agreement gave 

Keith visitation with Ciara every other weekend from Friday until 

Monday morning, as well as overnight visitation on alternating 

Thursday nights. Additionally, he would also have a minimum of 

another four hours of visitation weekly. Keith also had two weeks 

visitation each summer. He exercised all of his visitation. 

In addition to the scheduled visitation, the record 

established that Keith had extensive contacts with Ciara, attending 

extracurricular events, school events, sporting events, etc. 

According to Keith, he is very involved in Ciara=s school and 

extracurricular activities. 

Dr. Roger Hatcher, a clinical psychologist retained by Keith, 

was ordered by the court pursuant to section 604.5 of the Illinois 

Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage Act (750 ILCS 5/604.5 (West 

200)(IMDMA)), to evaluate whether removal would be in the best 

interest of Ciara. Dr. Hatcher testified that he met with Kristina 

and Keith on eight separate occasions and with Ciara on two 

occasions. He administered various tests to all three. Based on 
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the meetings and the test results, Dr. Hatcher prepared a twelvepage report recommending that Ciara not be removed to North 

Carolina, noting that the proposed separation from Keith would 

actually harm Ciara. 

Dr. Hatcher testified that the proposed move would actually 

harm Ciara in that it would reduce significantly the involvement of 

her father in her life. Dr. Hatcher pointed out that research 

showed to his satisfaction that adolescent girls whose fathers are 

relatively absent from their lives have greater social problems 

than girls with fathers active in their lives. Dr. Hatcher also 

commented that Ciara had a close relationship to her extended 

family, all of which resided in the area. Dr. Hatcher indicated an 

especially close relationship with Ciara=s grandparents and great 

grandmother. His expert opinion was not refuted by other expert 

testimony. 

Following the hearing, the trial court denied Kristina's 

petition for removal. In making its removal determination, the 

trial court considered, among other factors, whether allowing 

removal would enhance the general quality of life for Ciara. The 

trial court found that removal would not enhance Ciara's quality of 

life. Pointing to Keith=s extensive visitation and contacts with 

Ciara, her contacts with family members, and Dr. Hatcher=s opinion 

as primary factors, the trial court found that removal would 

provide little enhancement. 

Kristina argues on appeal that the trial court's decision to 

deny her petition for removal was against the manifest weight of 
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the evidence. Section 609 of the Illinois Marriage and Dissolution 

of Marriage Act (750 ILCS 5/609 (West 2002)) governs requests for 

removal. That section provides: 

"The court may grant leave *** to any 

party having custody of any minor child 

or children to remove such child or 

children from Illinois whenever such 

approval is in the best interests of such 

child or children. The burden of proving 

that such removal is in the best 

interests of such child or children is on 

the party seeking removal." 750 ILCS 

5/609(a) (West 2002). 

As explained by our supreme court in People v. Eckert, 119 

Ill. 2d 316, 325 (1988), the paramount question in a removal action 

is whether the move is in the best interests of the child. A 

determination of a child's best interests can often be difficult 

for a trial court to make. Such a determination cannot be reduced 

to a simple bright-line test but, rather, must be made on a caseby-case basis, depending upon the circumstances of each case. 

Eckert, 119 Ill. 2d at 326. A trial court's determination of what 

is in a child's best interests should not be reversed unless it is 

clearly against the manifest weight of the evidence and it appears 

that a manifest injustice has occurred. Eckert, 119 Ill. 2d at 328. 

 A trial court should hear any and all relevant evidence before 
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making its determination, keeping in mind five salient factors. 

Eckert, 119 Ill. 2d at 326. Those factors are (1) whether the 

proposed move will enhance the quality of life for both the 

custodial parent and the child; (2) the custodial parent's motives 

in seeking the removal and whether the proposed move is merely a 

ruse intended to defeat or frustrate visitation; (3) the 

noncustodial parent's motives in resisting the removal; (4) the 

proposed move's likely effect on the noncustodial parent's 

visitation rights; and (5) whether a realistic and reasonable 

visitation schedule for the noncustodial parent can be worked out. 

Eckert, 119 Ill. 2d at 326-27. However, these factors are not 

exclusive. In re Marriage of Collingbourne, 204 Ill. 2d 498, 523 

(2003); In re Marriage of Smith, 172 Ill. 2d 312, 321 (1996). 

Moreover, no individual factor is controlling and the weight 

accorded each factor will vary according to the facts of each case. 

 Collingbourne, 204 Ill. 2d at 523; Smith, 172 Ill. 2d at 321. 

Applying the above principles to the present case, we cannot 

say that the trial court's denial of Kristina's petition for 

removal was against the manifest weight of the evidence. The trial 

court found that the first Eckert factor weighed against removal. 

Under the deferential standard of review, we find no error. It is 

clear that Kristina's life would be enhanced if she were allowed to 

move to North Carolina with Ciara, i.e., the move would allow her 

to spend more time with Ciara, and the move would be financially 

beneficial. It is also clear that these benefits to Kristina 

would, in turn, also benefit Ciara. However, by moving to North 
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Carolina, Ciara would be leaving much behind, most notably her 

close relationship with her father and, to a lesser extent, her 

extended family. Moreover, it does not appear that there was any 

evidence that Ciara=s school or extracurricular opportunities would 

be better in North Carolina. 

The second and third Eckert factors were of no relevance in 

this particular case. The trial court made a special effort to 

note that both parties had the purest of motives in seeking and 

opposing removal. In fact the court noted that it was quite 

impressed with the parties=s cooperation in parenting Ciara since 

the divorce. 

The fourth and fifth Eckert factors weighed against removal. 

As to the fourth factor, removing Ciara to North Carolina would 

drastically affect Keith's visitation. Ciara currently has quite 

extensive visitation and contact with Keith. The trial court found 

that these visits and contacts were nurturing and invaluable to 

Ciara. The current visitation schedule and frequent contacts 

obviously could not be maintained if Ciara was allowed to move to 

North Carolina. A removal to North Carolina would instead require 

Keith and Ciara to visit very differently, much less frequently, 

and in bigger blocks of time. We cannot say that the trial court=s 

determination was against the manifest weight of the evidence. 

 The fifth Eckert factor also weighed against removal. 

Kristina did propose a visitation schedule for Keith in the event 

removal was allowed. This schedule included the majority of the 

summer, several weekends during the school year, and alternating 
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holiday breaks. However, while this visitation schedule was "fair" 

it did not approximate the number of contacts Keith currently had 

with Ciara. Again, we cannot say that the trial court=s finding was 

against the manifest weight of the evidence. 

After carefully considering all of the above factors, the 

trial court denied Kristina's request to remove Ciara to North 

Carolina. Under the circumstances, with the majority of the 

factors weighing against removal, we find that the trial court's 

determination was not against the manifest weight of the evidence. 

Kristina also raises an issue concerning the trial court=s 

decision to allow Keith to amend two of his answers to her petition 

to remove Ciara. One response addressed Kristina=s allegation 

(Paragraph 7 (t) of her petition) that she had been the primary 

caregiver since birth. The second concerned Kristina=s allegation 

that she would provide Keith with a visitation schedule comparable, 

post removal, to what he currently has. We find no reversible 

error. A trial court is given broad discretion in deciding to 

allow amendment of pleadings. Healy v. Bearco Management, Inc., 

216 Ill. App. 3d 945 (1991). In the instant matter, the amended 

answers contained no new theories or issues, nor does it appear to 

us that Keith=s answers impacted the trial court=s ultimate decision 

to deny the petition to remove Ciara. We see no abuse of 

discretion in allowing Keith to amend his answers. Kristina lastly 

maintains that the trial court erred in considering certain points 

in Dr. Hatcher=s testimony. Specifically, Dr. Hatcher testified 

that Kristina told him that if she had to, she could remain in 
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Illinois after her marriage to John; apparently John was willing to 

sell his house in North Carolina and move to the Joliet area. 

Kristina argues that Dr. Hatcher misunderstood her comments. As 

this testimony was not referenced in the trial court=s decision, it 

is clear that this statement did not have any impact on the 

decision of the trial court. 

For the foregoing reasons, the decision of the circuit court 

of Will County is affirmed. 

Affirmed. 

LYTTON and BARRY, JJ., concur.