NOT PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

Nos. 21-1645 & 21-2105

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

 

v.

TRAVIS THOMAS, a/k/a Mush

 Appellant

_

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of New Jersey

 (Criminal Action No. 2-16-cr-00324-001) 

District Judge: Honorable Susan D. Wigenton

_

Submitted Under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a)

On January 10, 2022

Before: AMBRO, BIBAS, and ROTH, Circuit Judges

(Opinion filed: February 1, 2022) 
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OPINION*

AMBRO, Circuit Judge

Appellant Travis Thomas seeks review of the District Court’s denial of his motion 

for compassionate release and its subsequent denial of his motion for reconsideration. 

For the reasons stated below, we affirm the Court’s decisions. 

I.

Thomas pled guilty in 2017 to eight counts related to his involvement in a 

conspiracy to distribute heroin. In November of the same year, the District Court 

sentenced him to 210 months’ imprisonment—seven years less than the bottom of the 

applicable Guidelines range. The District Court granted the downward variance to reflect 

Thomas’s background, his learning disabilities, and his emotional and mental health 

issues. App. at 106; see also United States v. Thomas, 750 F. App’x 129, 131 (3d Cir. 

2018) (affirming Thomas’s sentence). He has been incarcerated since December 2015. 

In September 2020, Thomas filed a pro se motion for compassionate release, and 

in January 2021, with the assistance of counsel, he filed a supplementary motion 

requesting that he serve a portion of his sentence under home confinement. Both motions 

were based on the risk of contracting COVID-19 while incarcerated and Thomas’s 

obesity and high blood pressure, preexisting conditions that increase the risk posed by

* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 

constitute binding precedent.
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COVID-19. The District Court denied both Thomas’s initial request and his motion for 

reconsideration. 

Thomas separately appealed both decisions. The two appeals are now 

consolidated.

II.

18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A) provides that a court “may reduce [a federal inmate’s] 

term of imprisonment . . . if it finds that . . . extraordinary and compelling reasons 

warrant such a reduction.” But a court may only do so “after considering the factors set 

forth in section 3553(a) to the extent that they are applicable.” Id. Those factors include, 

among other considerations, “the nature and circumstances of the offense and the history 

and characteristics of the defendant,” § 3553(a)(1), and the need for the sentence “to 

reflect the seriousness of the offense, to promote respect for the law, and to provide just 

punishment for the offense”; “to afford adequate deterrence to criminal conduct”; and “to 

protect the public from further crimes of the defendant,” § 3553(a)(2)(A)–(C).

We review denials of requests for a sentence reduction, including consideration of 

the § 3553(a) factors, for abuse of discretion. United States v. Pawlowski, 967 F.3d 327, 

330 (3d Cir. 2020). Our review is highly deferential because district courts view the facts 

from a better “vantage point” than we do. United States v. Tomko, 562 F.3d 558, 566 (3d 

Cir. 2009) (en banc).

Here we cannot conclude that the District Court erred in finding consideration of 

the § 3553(a) factors was “dispositive” against granting compassionate release. App. at 

6; see also App. at 13 (explaining that the District Court’s decision was “based on the 
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Section 3553(a) factors”). In considering those factors, the Court explained that altering 

Thomas’s sentence would discourage respect for the law, undermine any message of 

deterrence, and cause his sentence not to reflect the seriousness of his offense. It 

explained that Thomas’s criminal record was “extraordinarily serious” because, among 

other considerations, he tried to stop a Government witness from testifying against him 

and had an extensive criminal record. It also observed that Thomas had served less than 

one-third of his term of imprisonment—which, as noted, already included a seven-year 

downward variance from the Guidelines range. Under these circumstances, the Court did 

not abuse its discretion in finding that the § 3553(a) factors defeated Thomas’s petition 

for release. See Pawlowski, 967 F.3d at 330–31 (declining to disturb a denial of a 

petition for compassionate release when significant time remained in the defendant's term 

of imprisonment and the seriousness of the crimes justified an extended period of 

incarceration). 

Thomas advances three arguments for why the District Court erred in weighing the 

§ 3553(a) factors. None of the identified concerns create “a definite and firm conviction” 

that it “committed a clear error of judgment in the conclusion it reached upon a weighing 

of the relevant factors.” Oddi v. Ford Motor Co., 234 F.3d 136, 146 (3d Cir. 2000) 

(internal quotation marks and citation omitted). First, Thomas objects to the District 

Court’s consideration of a dropped charge for use of a cellphone while incarcerated. But 

after it was alerted that the charge was dropped, the Court explained that the dismissal of 

the cellphone charge did not “alter [its] conclusion” as to the § 3553(a) factors, as

Thomas’s criminal history remained “extraordinarily serious.” App. at 11–12. 
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Second, Thomas argues that his request was denied because he received the 

COVID-19 vaccine and this reasoning, if widely adopted, could perversely encourage

inmates to decline the vaccine. We disagree. The District Court appropriately 

recognized that Thomas’s vaccination reduced the health risks he relied on in support of 

his motion. This conclusion does not reward inmates who decline opportunities for 

vaccination. District courts routinely deny compassionate release to inmates who refuse 

the COVID-19 vaccine because they have voluntarily failed to mitigate the very health 

concerns they identify in support of an early release. See, e.g., United States v. Brinson, 

No. CR 19-153 (SDW), 2021 WL 2451970, at *2 (D.N.J. June 16, 2021) (Wigenton, J.) 

(“[B]ecause Defendant was offered and refused the COVID-19 vaccine, he cannot 

establish that ‘compelling and extraordinary reasons’ justify his release.” (internal 

citations omitted)); United States v. Sawyers, No. CR 15-00070-RSWL-1, 2021 WL 

2581412, at *4 (C.D. Cal. June 22, 2021) (“The glaring consensus among district courts 

is that refusal of a COVID-19 vaccine subverts a defendant's compassionate release 

motion.”), appeal dismissed, No. 21-50157, 2021 WL 6196971 (9th Cir. Oct. 18, 2021).

Third, Thomas argues that the District Court minimized the effect of the pandemic 

and prison lockdowns on his ability to receive treatment for his mental and emotional 

health concerns. But it considered his mental health and concluded that “[Thomas’s] 

mental health was not a sufficient reason to grant early release due to COVID-19.” App. 

at 12; see also App. at 5 n.2. It was within the Court’s discretion when weighing the 

§ 3553(a) factors to find that his mental health concerns do not support an early release, 
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especially because it already considered the same concerns when it initially sentenced 

Thomas.

Finally, Thomas also asked the District Court to modify his sentence so he could 

serve a portion of his sentence on home confinement. It properly denied the request. 

Only the Bureau of Prisons has the authority to put a prisoner on home confinement. See

Tapia v. United States, 564 U.S. 319, 331 (2011); 18 U.S.C. § 3624(c)(2); see also

United States v. Aguibi, 858 F. App’x 485, 486 n.2 (3d Cir. 2021).

* * * * *

We will thus affirm the District Court’s order denying Thomas’s request for 

compassionate release and its order denying his request for reconsideration.