[Cite as In re Adoption of C.N.A., 2018-Ohio-897.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO 

THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT 

SHELBY COUNTY 

 

IN RE: THE ADOPTION OF: 

 CASE NO. 17-17-20 

 C.N.A. 

 O P I N I O N 

[BRENT L. ANDERSON - APPELLANT] 

 

Appeal from Shelby County Common Pleas Court 

Probate Division 

Trial Court No. 2017 ADP 00005 

Judgment Affirmed 

Date of Decision: March 12, 2018 

 

APPEARANCES: 

 

Jay M. Lopez for Appellant 

 Jeremy M. Tomb for Appellee 
Case No. 17-17-20 

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PRESTON, J. 

{¶1} Petitioner-appellant, Brent L. Anderson (“Brent”), appeals the 

September 18, 2017 decision of the Shelby County Court of Common Pleas, Probate 

Division, concluding that the consent of respondent-appellee, Nathaniel T. Parker 

(“Nathaniel”), to Brent’s petition to adopt C.N.A. is necessary. For the reasons that 

follow, we affirm. 

{¶2} C.N.A. was born in March 2011 to Nathaniel and Amanda Sue Brooks 

Anderson (“Amanda”). (Doc. No. 1). After Amanda and Brent were married in 

2015, Brent filed a petition to adopt C.N.A. on February 21, 2017. (Id.). In his 

petition, Brent asserted that Nathaniel’s consent to the adoption is not necessary 

because: (1) Nathaniel “failed without justifiable cause to provide more than de 

minimis contact with the minor for a period of at least one year immediately 

preceding the filing of the adoption petition”; and (2) Nathaniel “failed without 

justifiable cause to provide for the maintenance and support of the minor as required 

by law or judicial decree for a period of at least one year immediately preceding the 

filing of the adoption petition.” (Id.). Also on February 21, 2017, Amanda filed her 

consent to Brent’s adoption of C.N.A. (Doc. No. 3). Brent filed an amended 

petition to adopt C.N.A. on March 13, 2017. (Doc. No. 5). 

{¶3} On April 10, 2017, Nathaniel filed a motion “to stay this matter pending 

a determination from the Juvenile Court regarding [his] Motion to Establish Parental 
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Rights and Responsibilities, Motion for Interim Parenting Time, and Motion for 

Shared Parenting, or in the alternative, Parenting Time. (Doc. No. 9). Brent filed 

his memorandum in opposition to Nathaniel’s motion to stay the adoption 

proceeding on April 28, 2017. (Doc. No. 13). After a hearing on May 22, 2017, the 

trial court the next day denied Nathaniel’s motion to stay the adoption proceeding. 

(Doc. No. 20). 

{¶4} After hearings on July 27 and August 3, 2017, the trial court filed on 

September 17, 2017 its judgment entry that is the subject of this appeal. (Doc. No. 

32). In it, the trial court concluded that Nathaniel’s consent is required because 

Brent failed to prove that Nathaniel “failed without justifiable cause to provide more 

than de minimis contact with the child” and “failed to provide for the maintenance 

and support of the minor as required by law or judicial decree for a period of at least 

one year immediately preceding either [sic] the filing of the adopting petition.” 

(Id.). 

{¶5} Brent filed a notice of appeal on October 2, 2017. (Doc. No. 33). He 

raises one assignment of error for our review. 

Assignment of Error 

The Trial Court erred and acted contrary to law when it 

determined that Appellee, Nathaniel Parker’s, consent was 

necessary for the step-parent adoption. 
Case No. 17-17-20 

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{¶6} In his assignment of error, Brent argues that the trial court erred by 

concluding that Nathaniel’s consent to Brent’s adoption of C.N.A. is necessary. In 

particular, Brent argues that the trial court erred by concluding that he failed to prove 

that Nathaniel failed without justifiable cause to provide more than de minimis 

contact with C.N.A. Brent also argues that the trial court erred by concluding that 

he failed to prove that Nathaniel failed to provide for the maintenance and support 

of C.N.A. as required by law or judicial decree during the year immediately 

preceding the date on which Brent filed his petition to adopt C.N.A. 

{¶7} “‘Ordinarily, the written consent of a minor child’s natural parents is 

required prior to adoption, but R.C. 3107.07 provides exceptions to this 

requirement.’” In re Adoption of H.R., 3d Dist. Logan No. 8-14-15, 2014-Ohio5390, ¶ 23, quoting In re Adoption of K.C., 3d Dist. Logan No. 8-14-03, 2014-Ohio3985, ¶ 20. Specifically, R.C. 3107.07 states: 

Consent to adoption is not required of any of the following: 

(A) A parent of a minor, when it is alleged in the adoption petition 

and the court, after proper service of notice and hearing, finds by clear 

and convincing evidence that the parent has failed without justifiable 

cause to provide more than de minimis contact with the minor or to 

provide for the maintenance and support of the minor as required by 

law or judicial decree for a period of at least one year immediately 
Case No. 17-17-20 

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preceding either the filing of the adoption petition or the placement of 

the minor in the home of the petitioner. 

R.C. 3107.07(A). “‘R.C. 3107.07(A) is written in the disjunctive.’” In re Adoption 

of H.R. at ¶ 23, quoting In re Adoption of K.C. at ¶ 21. “‘Therefore, a failure without 

justifiable cause to provide either more than de minimis contact with the minor or

maintenance and support for the one-year time period is sufficient to obviate the 

need for a parent’s consent.’” (Emphasis sic.) Id., quoting In re Adoption of K.C. at 

¶ 21, citing In re Adoption of A.H., 9th Dist. Lorain No. 12CA010312, 2013-Ohio1600, ¶ 9. 

{¶8} “Because cases such as this one may involve the termination of 

fundamental parental rights, the party petitioning for adoption has the burden of 

proving, by clear and convincing evidence, that the parent failed to provide more 

than de minimis contact with the minor or failed to provide for the maintenance and 

support of the minor during the requisite one-year period and that there was no 

justifiable cause for the failure.” Id. at ¶ 24, citing In re Adoption of K.C. at ¶ 24, 

citing In re R.L.H., 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 25734, 2013-Ohio-3462, ¶ 9. “‘“Once 

the petitioner has established this failure, the burden of going forward shifts to the 

parent to show some facially justifiable cause for the failure. * * * The burden of 

proof, however, remains with the petitioner.”’” Id., quoting In re R.L.H. at ¶ 9, 

quoting In re A.N.B., 12th Dist. Preble No. CA2012-04-006, 2012-Ohio-3880, ¶ 10. 
Case No. 17-17-20 

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Clear and convincing evidence is that measure or degree of proof 

which is more than a mere “preponderance of the evidence,” but not 

to the extent of such certainty as is required “beyond a reasonable 

doubt” in criminal cases, and which will produce in the mind of the 

trier of facts a firm belief or conviction as to the facts sought to be 

established.” 

Id., quoting Cross v. Ledford, 161 Ohio St. 469 (1954), paragraph three of the 

syllabus, and citing In re Adoption of K.C. at ¶ 24. 

{¶9} “‘The Supreme Court of Ohio has articulated a two-step analysis for 

probate courts to employ when applying R.C. 3107.07(A).’” Id. at ¶ 25, quoting In 

re Adoption of K.C. at ¶ 23, citing In re Adoption of M.B., 131 Ohio St.3d 186, 2012-

Ohio-236, ¶ 23. “The first step involves deciding a factual question—in this case, 

whether the parent failed to provide more than de minimis contact with the minor 

or failed to provide for the maintenance and support of the minor for a period of at 

least one year immediately preceding the filing of the adoption petition.” Id., citing 

In re Adoption of K.C. at ¶ 23, citing In re R.L.H. at ¶ 12, citing In re Adoption of 

M.B. at ¶ 23. See also In re Adoption of S.J.M.H., 1st Dist. Hamilton No. C-130683, 

2014-Ohio-3565, ¶ 29. “‘“A trial court has discretion to make these determinations, 

and in connection with the first step of the analysis, an appellate court applies an 

abuse-of-discretion standard when reviewing a probate court decision * * *.”’” Id., 
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quoting In re Adoption of K.C. at ¶ 23, quoting In re Adoption of M.B. at ¶ 25. See 

also In re Adoption of S.J.M.H. at ¶ 29. “In the second step of the analysis, if a 

probate court finds the parent failed to provide more than de minimis contact or 

failed to provide for the maintenance and support of the minor, the court then 

determines ‘whether justifiable cause for the failure has been proved by clear and 

convincing evidence.’” Id., quoting In re Adoption of M.B. at ¶ 23. See also In re 

Adoption of K.C. at ¶ 23. “‘A probate court’s decision on whether justifiable cause 

exists will not be disturbed on appeal unless the determination is against the 

manifest weight of the evidence.’” Id., quoting In re Adoption of K.C. at ¶ 23, citing 

In re Adoption of M.B. at ¶ 24 and In re Adoption of Masa, 23 Ohio St.3d 163 (1986), 

paragraph two of the syllabus. 

In determining whether a judgment is against the manifest weight of 

the evidence, we must review the entire record, weigh the evidence 

and all reasonable inferences, consider witness credibility and 

determine whether, in resolving conflicts in the evidence, the trier of 

fact clearly lost its way and created such a manifest miscarriage of 

justice that there must be a reversal of the judgment and an order for 

a new trial. 
Case No. 17-17-20 

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In re Adoption of N.T.R., 10th Dist. Franklin No. 16AP-589, 2017-Ohio-265, ¶ 11, 

citing In re Adoption of E.E.R.K., 2d Dist. Miami No. 2013 CA 35, 2014-Ohio1276, ¶ 18. 

{¶10} As an initial matter, we must address Brent’s failure to comply with 

the Ohio Rules of Appellate Procedure by omitting any argument illustrating the 

reasons in support of his challenge to the trial court’s decision. “[A]n appellate 

court may disregard an assignment of error pursuant to App.R. 12(A)(2): ‘if the 

party raising it fails to identify in the record the error on which the assignment of 

error is based or fails to argue the assignment separately in the brief, as required 

under App.R. 16(A).’” Rodriguez v. Rodriguez, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 91412, 

2009-Ohio-3456, ¶ 4, quoting App.R. 12(A); Hawley v. Ritley, 35 Ohio St.3d 157, 

159 (1988). App.R. 16(A)(7) requires that Brent include in his brief: “An argument 

containing the contentions of the appellant with respect to each assignment of error 

presented for review and the reasons in support of the contentions, with citations to 

the authorities, statutes, and parts of the record on which appellant relies. The 

argument may be preceded by a summary.” “‘It is not the duty of an appellate court 

to search the record for evidence to support an appellant’s argument as to any 

alleged error.’” Rodriguez at ¶ 7, quoting State v. McGuire, 12th Dist. Preble No. 

CA95-01-001, 1996 WL 174609, *14 (Apr. 15, 1996). “An appellate court is not a 

performing bear, required to dance to each and every tune played on an appeal.” Id., 
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citing State v. Watson, 126 Ohio App.3d 316, 321 (12th Dist.1998) and McGuire at 

*14. 

{¶11} Brent failed to make any argument as to how the trial court specifically 

erred in concluding that he failed to prove that Nathaniel failed without justifiable 

cause to provide more than de minimis contact with C.N.A. and that Nathaniel failed 

to provide for the maintenance and support of C.N.A. Rather, Brent appears to 

imply that this court should conduct a de novo review of his statement of facts and 

decide the case in his favor. That does not comport with Ohio’s system of appellate 

review. 

{¶12} Applying the appropriate standard of review, we begin by addressing 

whether the trial court abused its discretion by finding that Brent failed to prove that 

Nathaniel failed to provide more than de minimis contact with C.N.A. In making 

that finding, the trial court stated, “The record is replete with instances of 

[Nathaniel] communicating or attempting to communicate with the child over the 

last year or more, including making direct contact by attending the child’s sporting 

events.” (Doc. No. 32). 

{¶13} As this court has previously discussed, “‘[t]he Legislature amended 

the statute to require a finding that the parent failed to “provide more than de 

minimis contact” with the minor child for a period of one year.’” In re Adoption of 

H.R., 2014-Ohio-5390, at ¶ 32, quoting In re Adoption of K.C., 2014-Ohio-3985, at 
Case No. 17-17-20 

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¶ 22. “‘The prior version of the statute required a finding that the parent failed to 

“communicate” with the minor child for a period of one year.’” Id., quoting In re 

Adoption of K.C. at ¶ 22. “‘“By changing the standard from ‘communicate,’ which 

could imply a single contact, to ‘more than de minimis contact,’ which seems to 

imply more than a single contact, the Legislature indicated its intent to require more 

effort from the parent to have contact and communication with the child.”’” Id., 

quoting In re Adoption of K.C. at ¶ 22, quoting In re J.D.T., 7th Dist. Harrison No. 

11 HA 10, 2012-Ohio-4537, ¶ 9. 

{¶14} Based on our review of the record, the trial court did not abuse its 

discretion in concluding that Brent failed to prove that Nathaniel failed to have more 

than de minimis contact with C.N.A. Nathaniel testified that he attended C.N.A.’s 

wrestling meet in January 2017. (July 27, 2017 Tr. at 17-18). Nathaniel “talked to 

[C.N.A.] throughout the entire meet in between matches” when C.N.A. would 

“come up, sit with [Nathaniel] in the stands and then after the meet, [Nathaniel] 

talked to him for about forty minutes.” (Id. at 18). Nathaniel also testified that he 

had four phone conversations with C.N.A. between February 21, 2016 and February 

21, 2017. (Id. at 19). In addition, Nathaniel Skyped with C.N.A. when C.N.A. 

visited Nathaniel’s parents. (Id. at 20-21). Further, Nathaniel testified that he 

consulted an attorney in June 2016 “regarding custody and visitation” with C.N.A. 
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(Id. at 38). Nathaniel then relocated to Ohio from Texas in December 2016 “to be 

with [C.N.A.]” (Id. at 37-38). 

{¶15} On appeal, Brent offers no authority contradicting the trial court’s 

conclusion that Nathaniel’s conduct constituted more than de minimis contact. 

Instead, Brent urges this court to reach the conclusion of the trial court in In re 

Adoption of K.C. that the father failed to provide more than de minimis contact with 

K.C. because he “failed to seize upon various opportunities to facility [sic] his 

contact with K.C.” (Appellant’s Brief at 10). See In re Adoption of K.C. at ¶ 17. In 

re Adoption of K.C. is entirely distinguishable from the facts of this case. In this 

case, unlike In re Adoption of K.C., the trial court concluded that Brent failed to 

meet his burden of proving that Nathaniel failed to have more than de minimis 

contact with C.N.A. Accordingly, Brent’s argument is erroneous with respect to the 

appellate review of a trial court’s de minimis contact determination under R.C. 

3107.07(A). That is, it is the job of an appellate court to review the trial court’s de 

minimis contact determination for an abuse of discretion, not to replace the trial 

court’s decision with its own. 

{¶16} We conclude Nathaniel made more than de minimis effort to have 

contact with C.N.A. Stated another way, the record reflects that Nathaniel made 

more than a minimal effort to contact C.N.A. Therefore, the trial court did not abuse 

its discretion in concluding that Brent failed to prove that Nathaniel failed to have 
Case No. 17-17-20 

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more than de minimis contact with C.N.A. for the one-year period preceding Brent’s 

petition for adoption. 

{¶17} Further, the trial court’s alternative conclusion that any failure by 

Nathaniel to provide more than de minimis contact with C.N.A. was also justified 

is not against the manifest weight of the evidence. “‘“Ohio courts have held that 

justification of a parent’s failure to communicate with his or her child is shown when 

there has been ‘significant interference’ with a parent’s communication with a child 

or ‘significant discouragement’ of such communication.”’” In re J.P.E., 11th Dist. 

Trumbull No. 2016-T-0113, 2017-Ohio-1108, ¶ 17, quoting In re M.E.M., 11th 

Lake No. 2010-L-020, 2010-Ohio-4430, ¶ 29, quoting In re Kr.E., 9th Dist. Lorain 

No. 06CA008891, 2006-Ohio-4815, ¶ 21, citing In re Holcomb, 18 Ohio St.3d 361 

(1985), paragraph three of the syllabus. “In determining whether a natural parent’s 

failure to have more than de minimis contact was justified, the central question is 

whether there was a significant interference with visitation and communication and 

not whether it was possible for the natural parent to have done more to overcome 

the interference with visitation and communication.” Id. at ¶ 26, citing In re S.B.D., 

2d Dist. Miami No. 2006-CA-25, 2006-Ohio-5133, ¶ 37. 

{¶18} The trial court concluded that Amanda “elected to take a number of 

actions to limit access to or communication with her or [C.N.A.]”—that is, 

Amanda’s “conduct was admittedly and intentionally designed to make 
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[Nathaniel’s] contact with [C.N.A.] more difficult.” (Doc. No. 32). Again, Brent 

makes no argument as to how the trial court’s alternative conclusion is against the 

manifest weight of the evidence. Based on our review of the record, we conclude 

that the trial court’s alternative conclusion is not against the manifest weight of the 

evidence. Stated differently, we conclude that the weight of the evidence supports 

the conclusion that Amanda significantly interfered with Nathaniel’s visitation and 

communication with C.N.A. Compare In re J.P.E. at ¶ 32. 

{¶19} Nathaniel testified that he placed “a hundred and ten phone calls” 

between February 21, 2016 and February 21, 2017 to contact C.N.A. (July 27, 2017 

Tr. at 19). According to Nathaniel, “out of the hundred and then [sic] phone calls 

during that time period, [Amanda] answered the phone one time and called 

[Nathaniel] back four other times * * * where [he] would’ve spoke to [C.N.A.]” 

(Id.). He testified that Amanda eventually “blocked [his] number in June” 2016 to 

prevent him from contacting C.N.A. (Id.). Nathaniel testified that Amanda 

informed Nathaniel’s parents “that they weren’t allowed to have anything other than 

supervised visits” after Amanda learned that Nathaniel’s parents were permitting 

C.N.A. to Skype with Nathaniel. (Id. at 21). Nathaniel also testified that he 

purchased a plane ticket “for Easter to come up and see [C.N.A.] for Easter [and to] 

take him to the zoo” but Amanda “just ignored” Nathaniel and did not permit him 

to see C.N.A. (Id. at 37). 
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{¶20} Amanda testified that, other than the wrestling meet, Nathaniel did 

“not ha[ve] any other contact” with C.N.A. (Id. at 49). However, she testified that 

“[t]here would have been one phone conversation in March of 2016. It was right 

before [C.N.A.’s] birthday” but that “it was not the best conversation that he had 

with [C.N.A.] because he would try to cut jabs.” (Id. at 50). 

{¶21} Amanda testified that she blocked Nathaniel in June 2016 from being 

able to call her because Nathaniel was being “derogatory through phone 

conversations” and because Nathaniel “had [] an argument * * * with Brent.” (Id. 

at 56). In particular, she testified that Nathaniel threatened her in December 2015 

when he stated to her “[t]hat he [did] not want[] to move to Ohio in fear that he 

would want to slit [her] throat.” (Id. at 52). According to Amanda, she sought 

“legal advice through an attorney” but was advised “not to [] file anything” since 

Nathaniel lived in Texas at the time. (Id. at 53-54). However, Amanda admitted 

that she continued to communicate with Nathaniel after that incident. (Id. at 54). 

After Amanda blocked Nathaniel from being able to call her, she communicated 

with Nathaniel through Facebook Messenger. (Id. at 56-57). Amanda testified that 

she did not permit C.N.A. to communicate with Nathaniel over the phone or through 

Facebook Messenger because of Nathaniel’s December 2015 threats and “the * * * 

comments that he had made in June.” (Id. at 57, 62). 
Case No. 17-17-20 

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{¶22} On cross-examination, Amanda testified that she did not permit 

C.N.A. to Skype with Nathaniel despite Nathaniel’s request to Skype with C.N.A. 

(Id. at 66-69). She admitted that she did not respond to Nathaniel’s request to see 

C.N.A. when Nathaniel was in Ohio. (Id. at 92-93). Amanda also testified that 

Nathaniel came to her residence in January 2017 to see C.N.A. but she instructed 

him “[t]o stay off [her] property.” (Id. at 100-102). (See also Aug. 3, 2017 Tr. at 

61-62). Amanda admitted that she did not respond to Nathaniel’s inquiry about the 

date and location of C.N.A.’s wrestling meet; however, Nathaniel “on his own went 

and found that schedule” and showed up to C.N.A.’s wresting meet. (July 27, 2017 

Tr. at 105). After Nathaniel showed up at C.N.A.’s wrestling meet, Amanda did not 

take C.N.A. to his three remaining wrestling meets that season. (Id.). 

{¶23} Nathaniel denied that he threatened Amanda. (Id. at 45); (Aug. 3, 2017 

Tr. at 59). According to Nathaniel, after Amanda alleged that he threatened her, 

they had “a ton of conversations after that. She, she called [him] and texted [him], 

[they] have texts about her * * * miscarriages, her problems with Brent, this and 

that, * * * so [he doesn’t] understand how she * * * didn’t cut contact off after [the 

alleged threat].” (July 27, 2017 Tr. at 45). Rather, Amanda “didn’t cut contact off 

until after [C.N.A.’s] last birthday conversation.” (Id.). 

{¶24} The trial court found Amanda’s explanation for blocking Nathaniel’s 

communication to be disingenuous. Indeed, Amanda’s explanation is ultimately a 
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credibility determination, which is left to the sound discretion of the trial court. “‘A 

trial court is “free to believe all, part, or none of the testimony of any witness who 

appears before it.”’” In re Adoption of K.C., 2014-Ohio-3985, at ¶ 26, quoting In 

re Adoption of M.C., 4th Dist. Jackson No. 11CA5, 2011-Ohio-6527, ¶ 19, quoting 

Rogers v. Hill, 124 Ohio App.3d 468, 470 (4th Dist.1998). See also In re J.P.E., 

2017-Ohio-1108, at ¶ 39 (“The trial judge was in the best position to determine the 

credibility of the witnesses and was entitled to believe the testimony of appellee and 

Mr. Grifa over Brent Erb.”). Accordingly, we conclude that the evidence supporting 

that Amanda significantly interfered with Nathaniel’s communication and visitation 

with C.N.A. is weightier than the evidence that she did not. As such, the trial court’s 

alternative conclusion that any failure by Nathaniel to provide more than de minimis 

contact with C.N.A. was justified is not against the manifest weight of the evidence. 

{¶25} Finally, Brent challenges the trial court’s conclusion that he failed to 

prove that Nathaniel failed to provide for the maintenance and support of C.N.A. 

for the one-year period preceding Brent’s petition for adoption. Again, Brent makes 

no argument as to how the trial court abused its discretion in making that conclusion. 

{¶26} The Supreme Court of Ohio defined “the maintenance and support 

required by R.C. 3107.07(A) [as] that which is specifically ‘required by law or 

judicial decree.’” In re Adoption of M.B., 131 Ohio St.3d 186, 2012-Ohio-236, at ¶ 

20. Under Ohio law, “[t]he biological or adoptive parent of a minor child must 
Case No. 17-17-20 

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support the parent’s minor children out of the parent’s property or by the parent’s 

labor.” R.C. 3103.03(A). “‘Such duty of support is not dependent upon the 

presence or absence of court orders for support.’” In re Adoption of K.L.M., 10th 

Dist. Franklin No. 15AP-118, 2015-Ohio-3154, ¶ 12, quoting In re Adoption of 

B.M.S., 10th Dist. Franklin No. 07AP-236, 2007-Ohio-5966, ¶ 23, citing Nokes v. 

Nokes, 47 Ohio St.2d 1, 5 (1976). “‘[A] parent of a minor, has the common-law 

duty of support as well as a duty of support decreed by court. The judicial decree 

of support simply incorporates the common-law duty of support.’” Id., quoting In 

re Adoption of McDermitt, 63 Ohio St.2d 301, 305 (1980). 

{¶27} “Maintenance and support, in the adoption context, do not simply refer 

to child support payments or other monetary contributions.” Id. at ¶ 15, citing In re 

Adoption of McNutt, 134 Ohio App.3d 822, 829 (4th Dist.1999). “Maintenance and 

support, ‘may mean any type of aid to feed, clothe, shelter, or educate the child; 

provide for health, recreation, travel expenses; or provide for any other need of the 

child. * * * Supplying shoes, diapers, or any other clothing can constitute support 

and maintenance.’” Id., quoting In re Adoptions of Groh, 153 Ohio App.3d 414, 

2003-Ohio-3087, ¶ 20 (7th Dist.2003), citing In re Adoption of McNutt at 830. “De 

minimis monetary gifts from a biological parent to a minor child do not constitute 

maintenance and support, because they are not payments as required by law or 

judicial decree as R.C. 3107.07(A) requires.” In re Adoption of M.B. at ¶ 20. 
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{¶28} The trial court concluded that (1) “[t]here is no judicial order for 

support” because Amanda “elected to make no application for support” and (2) 

Amanda and Nathaniel “are co-owners of a certain piece of rental real estate and 

that, during the applicable period in question, she has been receiving the full rental 

payment for the property” as “support for [C.N.A.]” (Doc. No. 32). The record 

supports the trial court’s findings. 

{¶29} Indeed, the parties testified that Nathaniel provided money to Amanda 

to purchase homes in Springfield, Ohio for use as rental properties to generate 

income for Amanda while Nathaniel was in prison. (July 27, 2017 Tr. at 31, 77-

79); (Aug. 3, 2017 Tr. at 45-51). The parties testified that the rental income was 

used as support for C.N.A. (July 27, 2017 Tr. at 31-32); (Aug. 3, 2017 Tr. at 51, 

54, 62-63). (See also July 27, 2017 Tr. at 81). That evidence alone demonstrates 

that Nathaniel provided for the maintenance and support of C.N.A. as required by 

law. See In re Adoption of McNutt at 829-830 (“Moreover, a ‘meager’ amount of 

support is sufficient to avoid a finding that the parent’s consent is not required.”), 

citing In re Bryant, 4th Dist. Washington No. 97CA635, 1997 WL 766460, *6 (Dec. 

9, 1997), Celestino v. Schneider, 84 Ohio App.3d 192, 197 (6th Dist.1992) (“father’s 

payment of $36 to CSEA precluded a finding of failure to provide maintenance and 

support”), Vecchi v. Thomas, 67 Ohio App.3d 688, 691 (2d Dist.1990) (“father’s 

payment of $130 to CSEA precluded a finding of failure to provide maintenance 
Case No. 17-17-20 

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and support”), In re Adoption of Salisbury, 5 Ohio App.3d 65, 67 (10th Dist.1982); 

In re Adoption of Dea, 11th Dist. Lake No. 92-L-120, 1994 WL 102390, *2 (Mar. 

25, 1994), and In re Adoption of Mills, 12th Dist. Warren No. CA93-04-036, 1993 

WL 430473, *2 (Oct. 25, 1993). See also In re Adoption of M.B. at ¶ 26. 

{¶30} Moreover, Nathaniel testified that he 

offered to give [Amanda] money, * * * and every time [he made] any 

kind of offer, * * * it was met with we don’t need it. But there was 

multiple offers made for soccer cletes [sic], for Halloween costumes, 

* * * there was multiple offers. 

(July 27, 2017 Tr. at 36). (See also Aug. 3, 2017 Tr. at 55-56, 60). Amanda admitted 

that Nathaniel offered to buy shoes and offered to pay for school for C.N.A. (July 

27, 2017 Tr. at 57, 71, 97). (See also July 27, 2017 Tr. at 91-92). 

{¶31} The above evidence demonstrates that Nathaniel “made a financial 

contribution that comports with the requirements of R.C. 3107.07(A) to contribute 

maintenance and support” for C.N.A. In re Adoption of M.B. at ¶ 23. Therefore, 

the trial court did not abuse its discretion by concluding that Brent failed to prove 

that Nathaniel failed to provide for the maintenance and support of C.N.A. for the 

one-year period preceding Brent’s petition for adoption. 
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{¶32} For the foregoing reasons, we hold that the trial court did not err in 

concluding that Nathaniel’s consent to Brent’s adoption of C.N.A. is required under 

R.C. 3107.07(A). 

{¶33} Brent’s assignment of error is overruled. 

{¶34} Having found no error prejudicial to the appellant herein in the 

particulars assigned and argued, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. 

Judgment Affirmed 

WILLAMOWSKI, P.J. and ZIMMERMAN, J., concur. 

/jlr