F OR P UBLICATION



### UNIT E D ST AT E S CO URT O F APPE AL S FO R T H E NINT H CIRCUIT

R O N Y E S T U A R D O P E R E Z -G U Z M A N , AKA Ronnie Perez

- Guz man, P etitioner
,

v

.

L O R E T T A E. L Y

N C H , Attorney General, Respondent. N o. 13-70579

Ag ency No. A200-282-241

OPI NI ON

O n Petition for Review of an Order of the B oard of I

mmig ration Appeals

Arg ued and Submitted May 4, 2016 Pasadena, California

F iled Aug ust 31, 2016

B e fore: Ray

mond C. F isher, Milan D. Smith, J r ., and J acqueline H. Ng

uy en, Circuit J u d g es.

O pinion by

J udg e F isherP E R E Z -G U Z M A N V

. L Y N C H 2

SUMMARY *

Im m igration

The panel g ranted in part and d enied in part a p etition for review of a decision of the B o ard of I mmig ration Appeals. The panel h eld that the Attorne y G eneral’s reg ulation, 8 C.F .R. § 1208.31, precluding an i n d i vidual subject to a rein s t a t ed r emoval order from apply ing for a sy lum, is a reasonable interpretat i o n of the statutory scheme and is therefore entitled to d eference at step two of the framework established under Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, I

nc. , 467 U.S. 837 (1984). The panel also remanded the petitioner’s w i thholding of removal a nd Convention Ag ainst Torture claims in lig ht o f i ntervening authorities, including Henriquez-Rivas v. Holder

, 707 F .3d 1081 ( 9th Cir. 2013) (en banc), and Madrigal v. Holder

, 716 F .3d 499 (9th Cir. 2013).

The panel concluded that Cong ress has not directly spoken to the interplay b etween 8 U

. S

. C

. § 1158(a)(1) (permitting “[ a] ny alien” to apply for asy lum “irrespective o f such alien’s status”) and 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(5) (barring a liens subject to r einstated re m o v a l orders from “any relief u nder” chapter 12 of title 8 of the U.S. Code, w h ich includes the
asy lum statute).

At Chevron step two, however, the ag e ncy ’s reconciliation of these two provisions throug h 8 C.F .R. § 1208.31(e) was reasonable, and hence entitled to d eference.

* T h is su m m ary co n stitu

tes n o part o f th e o p in io n o f th e co u rt. It h as b een p rep ared b y

co u rt staf

f f o r th e co n v en i en ce o f

th e read er.P E R E Z -G U Z M A N V

. L Y N C H 3

The panel also held t h at the petitioner’s procedural challeng es to § 1208.31(e), unde r t h e Administrative Procedure Act, were untimely b ecause they were not broug ht within six y ears after adoption of the reg ulation.

COUNSEL

Eric M. F raser (arg

u ed), Osborn Maledon, P.A., Phoenix

, Ariz ona, for Petitioner.

Tim Ramnitz (arg

ued); Anthony C. Pay

ne, Senior L itig ation Cou n s e l ; J oy ce R. B randa, Acting Assistant Attorney General; Office of I mmig ration L itig ation, Civil Di v ision, United States Department of J ustice, Washing ton, D.C.; for Respondent.

Keren Z w ick (arg

ued), National I mmig rant J u s t i c e Center, Chicag o, I llinois; Stephen W

. Manning

, I mmig rant L aw Group P.C., Portland, O reg on; Robin L

. Goldfaden, L a wy ers’ Committee for Civil Rig h ts of the San F rancisco Ba y Ar ea, San F rancisco, California; for Amic us Curiae American I mmig r a tion L a wy ers Association, L awy ers’ Committee for Civil Rig hts of the San F rancisco B ay Area, and National I mmig r a nt J ustice Center.P E R E Z -G U Z M A N V

. L Y N C H 4

OP INION

F I SHER, Circuit J udg e :

Rony Estuardo Perez -Guz man ( Perez ), a n ative a nd citiz en of Guatemala, entered th e U nited States without inspection for the first time in 2011. The Department o f Homeland Security (DHS) a pprehend e d and removed him after e x pedited removal proc eeding s. Perez r eentered the U n ited States in 2012 and was a g ain a p prehended by D H S
, which r einstated the earlie r r e m oval order. After an asy lum officer found Perez had established a reasonable f ear o f being tortured if r e m o v e d to Guatemala, h e was referred to an I mmig r a tion J udg e (I J ) for consideration of his applications for withholding of rem o v al and protection under the Convention Ag a inst Torture (CA T )

. B ecause Perez was subject to a reinstated removal orde r , the I J declined to consider his application for asy lum. The I J denied on the merits his requests for w ithholding of removal and protection under CAT, and the B oard of I mmig ration Appeals (B I A) affirmed.

The parties ag ree that w e m u s t remand to the B I A on Perez ’ s claims for withholding of removal and protection under CAT in lig h t of intervening circuit pr e cedent. The issue we c on s ider here is w hether an individual subject to a reinstated removal order is elig ible to apply for asy lum under the I mmig ration and Nationality Act (I NA), as amended b y the I lleg al I

m m i g ration Reform and I mmig rant Responsibility Act of 1996 (I I RI RA). W e hold Cong ress h as n o t clearly

ex p ressed whether 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(5), enacted by I I RI RA, prevents a

n individual subject to a reinstated removal order f r o m a p ply ing for asy lum under 8 U.S.C. § 1158. W e conclude, however, that the A ttorney General’s reg ula t i o nP E R E Z -G U Z M A N V

. L Y N C H 5

preventing Perez from apply ing for asy lum under these circumstances is a reasonable interpretation of the s t a tutory scheme, and is entitled to defe r e n c e under Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.
, 4 67 U.S. 837 (1984). According ly

, we remand to the B I A on ly for reconsideration of Perez ’s withholding and CAT claims.

I. Background

A. F a ctual Background

Perez alleg es that t hree incidents in his home county o f Guate m a la make him elig ible f or asy lum, withholding o f removal and CAT protection. F irs t , P e r e z was struck by a stray bullet fired by members of a g ang ex torting a local businessman and g ave a statement to p olice about the g ang members involved in the shooting

. After they were released from jail, the g ang members visited Pere z ’s h o use w hile he
was away

.
Second, Perez discovered his n ame appeared on a “death squad kill list” compiled by a g r o u p o f police o fficers a nd soldier s w ho eng ag e d in ex trajudical law enforcement b y

ex e c uting suspected g ang members, g uerillas an d other criminals. Other i ndividuals on the list were later killed, including Perez ’s cousin. Shortly after his cousin’s murder, Perez fled his hometown.

F inally

, Perez was abducted by individuals purporting to be Guatemalan police officer s. T h e kidnappers blindfolded Perez
, tied him to a chair and b e at him b efore realiz ing they had abducted t he w rong man. The kidnappers d iscussed killing Perez
, but released him with the threat that they would kill him if he reported the attack.P E R E Z -G U Z M A N V

. L Y N C H 6

Perez left Guatemala and entered the United States for the first time in J u ne 2011, but was stopped by the B order Patrol. He later testified be f

o re t he I J that the B order Patrol ag ents

never asked him whether he f eared returning to G uatemala, but only “came out with a p a p e r ” for him to sig n certify ing
t hat he had e ntered the country illeg ally

. Records of a b r i e f interview conducted during t h e ex pedited r emoval process, however, note Perez answered in the neg ati v e when asked whether h e feared returning to Guatemala. He was removed to Guatemala in J uly 2011.

Perez reentered the United States a nd was apprehended a second time in J anuar

y 2 0 1 2. DHS r einstated his earlier removal order. B e c ause Perez ex pressed a f ear of returni n g to Guatemala, he was re f erred to an asy lum officer, w ho found h is fear of persecution or torture was reasonable a nd referred him to an I J for further proceeding s.

B e fore the I J
, Perez soug ht asy lum, w i t h h olding o f removal and protection u nder CAT. T h e I J
, however, concluded Perez was inelig ible for asy lum bec ause he h ad previously been removed and DHS had reinstated his earlier removal order. The I J also de n i e d Perez ’s applications for withholding of removal and CAT protection, concluding he h a d n o t established a likelihood that he would either be persecuted o n a protected g r ound or tortured w ith g overnment consent or acquiescence if retu rned to Guatemala. The B I A affirmed the d enial of w ithho l d ing o f removal and CAT protection on the merits. I t e x plained it would not reach the merits of Perez ’s a s y lum claim and that “[ b] ecause the Department of Homeland Security

. . . reinstated a prior order of removal in this case, the I m m ig ration J udg e’sP E R E Z -G U Z M A N V

. L Y N C H 7

consideration was limited to the applican t ’ s request for withholding of removal and CAT protection. S ee 8 C.F .R. § 1208.31(e).”

B. Legal Background

Perez ’ s claim turns on the interpla y between two provisions o f the I

NA – 8 U.S.C. § 1 158, the asy lum statute, and 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(5), the reinstatement bar. 1

The Refug ee Act of 1980 d irected th e Attorney General
to establish procedures f

or g ranting asy lum and enacted the initial version of § 1158, which afforded any alien the rig ht to apply for asy lum irrespective of i mmig ration status. See Refug ee Act of 1980, Pub. L

. No. 96-212, § 208, 94 Stat. 102 (codified as a mended at 8 U.S.C. § 1 1 5 8 )

. Althoug h Cong r ess later amended the statute to prevent individuals convicted o f ag g ravated felonies from receiving asy lum, see I mmig r a tion Act of 1 990, Pub. L

. No. 1 0 1

- 6 4 9
, § 515, 104 Stat. 4978, the law g overning asy lum a p p lications remained larg e ly u nchang ed until the enactment of I I RI RA, Pub. L

. No. 104-208, Div. C, 110 Stat. 3009 (1996).

I n its post-I I RI RA f

orm, § 1158(a) (1) retains its orig inal
scope, stati n g t hat “[ a ] ny alien who is p hy sically present in the United States

. . . irrespective o f such alien’s status , may apply f o r a sy lum in a ccordance with this section.” § 1158(a)(1) (emphasis added). A few statutory ex ceptions qualify this b ro ad elig ibility

, b arring asy lum applications from individuals who can be resettled in another country , see § 1158(a)(2)(A), failed to timely apply

, see § 1158(a)(2)(B ),

1 Un less o th erw ise n o ted , all citatio n s are to title 8 o f th e U n ited States Co d e.P E R E Z -G U Z M A N V

. L Y N C H 8

or previously were denied asy l u m, see § 1158(a)(2)(C). Section 1158(a)(2)(D) creates an ex c eption to the ex ceptions in subsections (a)(2)(B ) and (C), stating in relevant part that

an individual may make a second application for as y l u m notwithstanding a previous denial i f he shows chang ed circumstances affecting his elig ibility for asy lum. See § 1158(a)(2)(D).

I I RI R A also r evised the effect of reinstatement, the
summary removal process whereby the g overnment reinstates and e x ecutes an individual’s previous r emoval o r d er rather than initiating a new removal proceeding ag ainst him. B efore I I RI RA, only a su b s et of individuals w ho illeg ally r eentered the country were subject to r einstatement of t h eir earlier removal orders; the rest we re placed in ordinary removal proceeding s, even on subsequent reentries. See FernandezVargas v. Gonzales

, 5 48 U.S. 30, 33–35 (2006). I n addition, individuals in the “limited class of illeg al reentrants” subject
to reinstat e m e n t could still “seek some varieties o f discretionary

relief” f rom their reinstated removal order. Id.
at 34. W ith I I RI RA, however, Cong r ess replaced the old reinstatement provisions w ith “one that toed a harder line,” and “ [ u] nlike its predecessor,

. . . applie[ d] to all illeg al reentrants, ex plicitly insu l ate[ d] the [ reinstated] removal orders from review, and g e nerally foreclose[ d] discretionary relie f f r o m t he terms of the reinstated order.” Id. at 34–35 (noting the availability of wit h h olding of removal). This reinstatement bar, codified at § 1231(a)(5), states

[ i] f th e A t t o rney General finds that an a lien has reentered the United States i lleg ally a fter having been r emoved or having departed voluntarily

, u nder an order of remova l

, t he
pr i o r order of removal is reinstated from itsP E R E Z -G U Z M A N V

. L Y N C H 9

o r i g inal date and is not subject to being reopened or reviewed, the alien is not eligible and may not apply for any r el i ef under this chapter

, and the alien shall be r emoved under the prior order at any

time after the reentry

.
§ 1231(a)(5) (emphasis added). “[ T] his chapter” re f e r s to chapter 12 of title 8 of the U.S. Code, which c ontains both the
asy lum statute and reinstatement bar.

Consistent w ith t h i s section, the Attorney General promulg a ted 8 C.F .R. § 1 208.31(e), 2 which states in relevant part that “[ i] f an asy lum officer determines t h a t a n alien [ subject to a reinstated rem o val order] has a r easonable fear of persecution or torture, the officer shall so inform the alien

a n d i ssue a

. . . [ r] eferral to [ an] I mmig ration J udg e, for fu l l consideration of th e r e q u est for withholding of

removal only

. ” 8 C.F .R. § 1208.31(e) (emphasis a dded). 3 T h e notice published in the F e deral Reg ister stated in its s u mmary that “[ f] or persons subject to reinstatement,

. . . t h e r ule establishes a screening mechanism” similar to the one used in

ex p edited removal proceeding s. See Reg ulations Concerning the Con v e n t ion Ag ainst Torture, 64 F ed. Reg

. 8478, 8478

2 T h e reg u latio n w as o rig in ally pro m u lg ated as 8 C.F.R. § 2 0 8.3 1 (e), b u t th e ad m in i s t r ativ e reg u latio n s g o v ern in g im m ig ratio n p ro ceed i n g s w ere

reco d if ied in 2 0 0 3 to re fl e c t th e tran sf er o f th e Im

m ig ratio n an d Natio n ality S erv ice’ s f

u n ctio n s to DHS. S

ee A lien s an d Natio n ality ; Ho m elan d Secu rit y ; R eo rg an izatio n o f Reg u latio n s, 6 8 F ed

. Reg

. 9 8 2 4 (Feb

. 2 8
, 2 0 0 3 ). Fo r co n v en ien ce, w e ref er to th e reg u latio n

as 8 C .F.R. § 1 2 0 8.3 1 (e) th ro u g h o u t

th is o p i n io n

.

3 A sep arate reg u latio n p erm its an i n d iv id u al su b j ect to a rein st a t e d

rem o v al o rd er to seek CA T p ro te ctio n as w ell. S ee 8 C .F.R. § 1 2 0 8.1 6 (c)(4 ).P E R E Z -G U Z M A N V

. L Y N C H 10

(F eb. 19, 1999). The notice went on to ex plain that the new process was intended “to rapidly identify and assess” claims for withholding of removal and CAT protection made b y individuals subject to reinstated removal orders and o ther forms of ex p edited removal to “ allow for the fair a nd

ex p editious resolution o f s u ch claims without unduly disrupting the streamlined removal processes applicable to these ali en s .” Id. a t 8479; see also id. at 8 4 85 (discussing 8 C.F .R. § 1208.31 specifically ). The notice further stated the
ag ency ’s conclusion that such in d i v iduals, including “aliens subject to reinstatement of a previous removal o r d er under [ § 1231(a)(5)] ,” were “inelig ib l e for asy lum” but “may be entitled to withholding of removal” or CAT protection. Id. at 8485. The n o t i c e identified a number o f statutes g iving the
ag ency authority to promulg ate reg ulations to g overn asy lum and withholding procedures, includi n g § 1 158. S ee id. at 8487 ( listing the authorities f or 8 C.F .R. Part 208 g enerally ).

II. Discussion

As noted, the parties ag ree reman d is appropriate on Perez ’ s withholding of removal and CAT cl a i ms in lig ht o f intervening circuit precedent. The only disputed question is whether Perez is entitled to a remand o n his asy lum claim a s well. W e conclude he is not.

A . Exhaustion

At the outset, we reject the g o vernment’s c ontention that Perez f ai l e d t o ex haust his arg u ment for a sy lum elig ibility before the B I A. Althoug h we g enerally lack jurisdiction to review a final ag ency o rde r unless administrative remedies have been ex hausted, see Alvarado v. Holder

, 759 F

. 3d 1121, 1 1 2 7 (9th Cir. 2014), ex haustion is not required wher e i tP E R E Z -G U Z M A N V

. L Y N C H 11

would be futile to raise a p articular i s s u e before the ag ency

. Here, the B I A rejected Perez ’s asy lum claim under 8 C.F .R. § 1208.31(e), wh i c h bars individuals in reinstatement proceeding s from apply ing for asy lum. B ecause the B I A h ad

no authority to disreg ard t h i s reg ulation, ex haustion would have been futile. See Coyt v. H older

, 593 F .3d 902, 905 (9th Cir. 2010) ( “B ecause the B I A h a s no authority to de c l a r e a reg ulation invalid, ‘the ex h a ustion doctrine does not bar review of a q

uestion concerning the validity of an I NS
reg ulation b e c a use of a conflict with a statute.’” (quoting Espinoza-Gutierrez v. Smith

, 9 4 F.3d 1 270, 1273 (9th Cir. 1996))); Espinoza-Gutierrez
, 94 F .3d a t 1273 (observing that

an ar gu m e nt contesting the validity of an a g ency ’s o wn reg ulations will “necessarily . . . fall[ ] on deaf ears” because the B I A “simply has no authority to invalidate a reg ul a t i o n that it is bound to follow”).

B. Asylum

Perez a rg u e s the asy lum statute’s lang uag e permitting “[ a] ny alien” to apply for asy lum “irrespective o f such alien’s status” unambig uously permit s him to apply for asy lum notwithstanding his reinsta t ed r emoval order. § 1158(a)(1). The g o vernment, in response, arg u es the reinstatement bar’s
statement that an i n d i v idual subject to a reinstated removal order “is not elig ible and may not apply for a ny relief under this chapter” unambig uously makes Perez inelig ible to a pply fo r a s y l u m , a form o f relief arising under the same chapter. § 1231(a)(5). The question i s w hether § 1158’s permission
to apply for asy lum or § 123 1 (a)(5)’s denial of any relief falling within the same chapter g overns t h e c lass o f individuals who, like Perez
, are subject to reinstated removal orders.P E R E Z -G U Z M A N V

. L Y N C H 12

To a nsw e r t his question of statutory interpretation, we follow the framework laid out in C h e v r o n

. “Under the first step, we determine ‘whether Cong ress has d irectly spoken to the precise question at i s s ue.’” Humane Soc’y of U.S. v

. Locke

, 626 F .3d 1040, 1054 (9th Cir. 2010) (q uoting Chevron

, 467 U.S. at 8 4 2

– 4 3 )

. I f the intent of Cong ress is clear, our inquiry ends and we g ive effect to Cong ress’ unambig uously ex pressed intent. See id. I f, on t h e other hand, Cong r ess has n ot spoken to a p articular iss u e o r the
statute is ambig uous, we m a y consider the responsible
ag ency ’ s interpretation of the statutory scheme. “[ I ] f the implementing ag ency ’s c onstruct i o n is r easonable, Chevron requires a federal court to accept the ag ency ’s construction o f the statute, even if the ag ency ’s reading differs from what the
court b e l i e v es is the b est statutory interpretation.” Nat’l Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n v. Br a n d X Internet Servs.
, 545 U.S. 967, 980 (2005).

I n addressing this question, we are not writing on a clean slate. Three other circuits have already c o n s idered the interplay between § 1158 and § 1231. Each ha s c o ncluded that individuals subject to reinstated removal orders may not apply for asy lum relief. See J i m e nez-Morales v. U

.S. Att’y Gen.
, 821 F .3d 1307, 1310 (11th Cir. 2016); Ramirez-Mejia

v. Lynch

, 794 F .3 d 4 8 5
, 491 (5th Cir. 2015) (rely ing on § 1231(a)(5)’s plain lang uag e, as well as relevant reg ulations and case law); Herrera-Molina v. Holder

, 597 F .3d 1 2 8
, 138–39 ( 2d Cir. 2010) (discussing § 1231(a)(5)’s tex t as w ell

as relevant circuit precedent and reg ulations). A lthoug h we find these opinions persuasive in some respects, those c ircuits did not discuss § 1158(a)(1), but mentioned it only in passing

, see Ramirez-Mejia
, 794 F .3d at 4 9 0
, or not at all, see J imenez-Morales

, 821 F .3d a t 1 310; Herrera-Moli n a , 597 F .3d at 38–39. Thus, althoug h we reach the sameP E R E Z -G U Z M A N V

. L Y N C H 13

conclusion a s these other cou r t s , w e do so on somewhat different reasoning

.

1

. Chevron Step One

At step one of Chevron

, w e c o n clude Cong ress has not directly spoken to the interplay of § 1158(a)(1) a nd § 1231(a)(5). On the contrary , § 1158(a)(1) and § 1231(a)(5)

are in appare nt conflict. Section 1158 broadly g rants “any alien” the opportunity to seek a sy lum, “reg ardle ss of such alien’s status,” subject only to a few ex ceptions not applicable here. Section 1 231, by contrast, e x pressly bars aliens subject
to reinstated removal orders from any r elief under chapter 12, the chapter that includes asy lum. I n attempting to resolve this apparent conflict, we b e gi n w ith the lang uag e of the statute, reading it in contex t a nd gi v i n g undefined terms their ordinary meaning s. See CSX Transp., I nc. v

. A l a

. D ep’t of Revenue
, 562 U.S. 277, 283–84 (2011); Synagogue v. United States
, 482 F .3d 1058, 1061–62 ( 9th Cir. 2007). “Our g o al is
to understand the statute ‘as a sy mmetrica l a

nd coherent
reg ulatory scheme’ a

nd to ‘fit, if possi b l e , all parts into a harmonious who l e

. ’ ” Gila River I ndian Cmty. v. United States
, 729 F .3d 1139, 1145 (9th Cir. 2013) (quoting FDA v

. Brown & W

illiamson Tobacco Corp.
, 529 U.S. 1 20, 133 (2000)).

Each pa rty arg ues the plain lang uag e of § 1158 a nd § 1231(a)(5) can be harmoniz ed b y i n terpreting one section

as establish i ng a

n absolute r

ule to which the other section
must y ield. Perez contends § 1231(a)(5) does not re a l l y b a r “any relief” under chapter 1 2
, w h ereas the g overnment say s § 1158(a)(1) does not r eally permit “any a l ien” to apply for
asy lum. “Read n a turally

, the word ‘any ’ has a n ex pa n s i v e

m e a n ing .” United States v. G onzalez

, 520 U.S. 1, 5 ( 1 99 7 ).P E R E Z -G U Z M A N V

. L Y N C H 14

B ut within a

particular statute, “[ a] mbig uity is a creature

. . . of statutory contex t.” Brown v. Gardner , 513 U.S. 115, 118 (1994); see also Dada v. Mukasey

, 554 U.S. 1, 16 ( 2 008) ( “I n

r e a d i ng a statute we must not ‘look merely to a partic u l a r cla u s e , ’ b ut consider ‘in c onnection with it the whole statute.’” (quoting Kokoz h a v

. Belford

, 417 U.S. 642, 650 (1974)).

W e ag ree w ith the parties that althoug h both subsections

use absolute lang uag e, each is q u a l i fied in certain respects when re a d in contex t. T he tex t of § 1158(a)(1) states that “[ a] ny ” alien may

apply for asy lum “in accordance with this section,” reg ardless of immig ration status. § 1158(a)(1). The
rest of § 11 5 8, however, undercuts the breadth of that
g uarantee by including a se r i es of ex ceptions preventing certain aliens from apply ing u nder specifi c circumstances. See § 1158(a)(2)(A)–(C). Section 1 2 31(a)(5)’s tex t is perhaps strong er in stating that the reinstatement of a p r ior removal order precludes “any relief u nd e r this chapter.” § 1231(a)( 5 )

. B ut o ur well-settled interpretation o f § 1231(a)(5) recog niz es that, notwithstanding the p rohibition

on “any relief,” withholding of removal and CAT protection

are available to individuals in reinstatement proceeding s. See Ixcot v

. Holder

, 646 F .3d 1 202, 1207 (9th Cir. 2 011) (“Notwithstanding the seeming ly a bsolute bar

. . . a liens subject to [ § 1 231(a)(5)] ‘may seek w ithholding of removal’

. . . .” (quoting Fernandez-Vargas

, 5 48 U.S. a t 3 5 n .4)); Ortiz-Alfaro v

. Holder

, 694 F .3d 955, 956 n.1 (9th Cir. 2 012) ( a s suming CAT “constrains the Attorney G eneral f r om removing aliens

. . . n otwithstanding ” the lang uag e o f § 1231(a)(5)). The Attorney General’s reg ulations a g ree. See 8 C.F .R. § 1208.31(e) ( a l l o wing withholding o f removal);P E R E Z -G U Z M A N V

. L Y N C H 15

8 C.F .R. § 1208.16(c)(4) (allowing CAT protection); 8 C.F .R. § 214.14(c)(1)(ii) (allowing U Visas). 4

The relevant q

u estion, h owever, is n ot simply whether the
two p rovisions are absol u t e , but h ow Cong ress intended to harmoniz e t h em

. I f one subsection’s tex t were clearly intended to take precedence o ver the other, our inquiry would be at an end. That both provisions are qu a l i fied in c ertain respects moves us no c loser to a clear answer. Neither subsection g ives an indication of how Cong ress i n tended to resolve a conflict between the two. W e therefore turn to the other “traditional tools of statutory construction” in search o f

an answer. S

ee Chevron

, 467 U.S. at 843 n.9.

B o th Perez and the g overnment invo ke the canon o f
ge n e r a lia specialibus non derogant – the “principle that the specific g overns the g eneral” – to advanc e t heir preferred interpretation of the statutory scheme. See Nitro-Lift Techs., L L C v. H

o w ard

, 1 33 S. Ct. 5 00, 504 (2012). The canon provides that a “narrow, p recise, and s p e c i fic” statutory provision is not overridden by another p r ovision “covering a

more g eneraliz ed spectrum” o f iss u e s

. Radzanower v. Touche Ross & Co.
, 426 U.S. 148, 153–54 (1976). W hen two statutes

come into conflict, courts assume Cong ress intended specific

4 T h e g o v ern m en t su g g ested f o r th e f irst t im e at o ral arg u m en t th at th e tw o sectio n s d o n o t actu ally co n f lict if “ relief

” is u n d ersto o d as a term of
art u n d er th e INA

. It p o sits th at, in b arrin g an y “ relief ,” § 1 2 31 (a)(5 ) d oes

n o t p rev en t in div id u als f ro m seek in g n o n d iscre t i o n a ry f o rm s of

“ pro tectio n ” l i k e w ith h o ld in g o f rem o v al an d p ro tec t i o n u n d er CA T

. A lth o u g h o n e o th er circu i t f o u n d th is p u rp o rted d istin ctio n p ersu asiv e, see Ra mirez-Mejia
, 7 9 4 F.3 d at 4 8 9
, w e treat th i s arg u m en t as w aiv ed b ecau s e

an y tex tu al d istin ctio n b etw een th e tw o term s w as raised f o r th e f i rst tim e at o ral arg u

m en t, see Ha rg er v. Dep ’t o f La b o r , 5 6 9 F.3 d 8 9 8
, 9 0 4 n .9 (9 th Cir. 2 0 0 9 ).P E R E Z -G U Z M A N V

. L Y N C H 16

provisions to prevail over more g eneral o n e s , see F o urco Glass Co. v. Transmirra P rods. Corp.
, 353 U.S. 2 2 2, 228–29 (1957), the assumption being that the more specific of t wo conflicting provisions “come s c loser to addressing the very problem posed by the case at hand and is thus more d eserving of credence,” Antonin Scalia & Br y an A. Garner, Reading Law: The Interpretation of Legal Texts 183 (2012).

As Scalia and Garner acknowledg e, however, it is “[ s] ometimes

. . . difficult to d etermine whether a provision is a g eneral or a specific one.” Id. at 1 87. Here, the d ifficulty is t h a t e ach subsection is specific in c ertain r espects a nd
g eneral in others. Section 1 158(a)(1) is more specific in that it speaks narrowly to the r

ules g overning a sy lum a

pplications. Conversely

, § 1231(a)(5) is more specific in that it speaks directly to the particular subset of individuals, like Perez
, w ho

are subject to reinstated remova l o r d ers. Althoug h the
g overnment’s position may h ave a slig ht edg e, both parties’
arg uments on this p oint are sensible. W e concl u d e the
g eneral-specific canon does not help to clearly discern Cong r ess’s intent as to which section should take precedence here.

N o r does the leg islative h istory of § 1158 a n d § 1231(a)(5) resolve this ambig uity

. I I RI RA ’ s a m e ndments
to the I NA show Cong ress intended to add more detail to the

ex isting a sy lum scheme while simultaneously ex panding the
scope and c onsequences of the reinstatement of a n earlier removal o rder

. B ecause neither party has identified any leg islative materials speaking directly to the availability o f
asy lum in reinstatement proceeding s, however, we conclude the leg i slative history “is silent on the precise issue before us.” Chevron , 467 U.S. at 862.P E R E Z -G U Z M A N V

. L Y N C H 17

Perez and amici arg ue I I RI RA broadened the scope o f § 1158 when it a mended the statute s l i g htly to allow “[ a] n y alien,” rather than “an alien,” to a pply for a sy lum. B ut the
rest of § 1158(a)(1)’s tex t reenacted the ex isting lang uag e p e rmitting the alien, “ reg ardless of such a lien’s status, t o apply for asy lum.” Compare 8 U.S.C. § 1158 ( a ) (1980) (permitting “an alien phy sically present in the United States,

. . . , irrespective of such a lien’s status, to apply for asy lum”), with id. § 1158(a)(1) (1996) ( providing that “[ a ] ny a lien w ho is phy sically present in the United States

. . . , irrespective o f such alien’s status, may apply for asy lum”). W e are reluctant
to a s s u m e Cong r ess’ intent is clear from this chang e alone, and must read this a mendment in concert with the simultane ous enactment of § 1231(a)(5), which w as a completely new addi t i o n i n I I RI RA. I n a dopting both chang es simultaneously

, Con gr e ss effectively adopted “a clear limitation in one section” – § 1231(a)(5) – “without amending another section” dealing wit h t h e same subject
matter. See R amirez-Mejia
, 794 F .3d at 490. T h is mig ht
sug g est Cong ress assumed § 1231(a)(5)’s use of the phrase “any relief u nder this chapter” would most naturally be read

as precluding asy lum applications. See M cNary v

. Haitian Ref u gee Ctr., Inc.
, 4 98 U.S. 479, 4 96 (1991) (“I t is presumable that Cong ress leg islates with knowledg e o f our basic rules of statutory

construction. . . .”).

I n sum, when read in cont e x t and compared with e ach other, § 1158(a)(1) and § 1231(a)(5) r eveal no clear
cong ressional intent on how to resolve a claim, like Perez ’ s, which pla c e s t he two sections in conflict. B oth provisions
appear to establish b road a n d conflicting rules. On closer

ex a mination, however, it is a pparent that both provisions a re q ualified in certain r espects – § 1158 by various te x t u al

ex c e ptions, a

nd § 1231(a)(5) by the g overnment’s practiceP E R E Z -G U Z M A N V

. L Y N C H 18

and our precedent. F urthermore, we cannot say the g eneralspecific canon clearly resolves the ambig uity in the statutory scheme. 5 W e therefo re conclude Cong ress has n ot spoken directly to whether individuals subject to reinstated removal orders may apply for a sy lum

. We according ly proceed to C h e vron ’s second step, w here we ask whether the ag ency ’ s interpretation of an ambig uous statut e is a permissible construction o f the statutory scheme. S ee Chevron

, 467 U.S. at 843.

2. Chevron Step Tw o

B e fore we ad d r ess the substance of the ag e ncy ’s interpretation, we must briefly d i s cu s s Perez a nd a mici’s
arg ument that 8 C.F .R. § 1208.31(e) should not be accorded Chevron deference because the ag enc y f ailed to adequately

ex p lain its reasoning when it promulg ated the re gu lation in 1999. W e do not r each the merits of thi s a r g ument because it is untimely

.

5 P erez also cites th e “ lo n g stan d in g p rin cip le o f co n stru in g an y l in g erin g

am b i g u ities in

[rem ov al] statu tes in

f av o r o f th e alien .” INS

v. Ca rd oza

Fo n seca , 4 80 U.S. 42 1
, 44 9 (1 9 87 ). L ik e t h e ru le o f l en ity , th is ru le is a tieb reak er in t

h e case o f i n so l u

b l e

– o r “ l in g erin g ”

– am b ig u ity

. Id

. ; see La g a n d a on v. Ash cro

ft

, 38 3 F .3 d 9 8 3
, 9 9 3 (9 th Cir. 2 0 0 4 ). A s w e h av e h eld in th e crim in al co n tex t, h o w ev er, “ [t]h e ru l e o f len ity

. . . d o e s n o t p rev en t an ag en cy f

ro m reso lv i n g statu t o ry am b ig u ity th ro u g h a v alid
reg u latio n .” Pa ch eco -Ca ma ch o v. Ho o d

, 2 7 2 F .3 d 1 2 6 6
, 1 2 7 1

– 7 2 (9 th Cir. 2 0 0 1 ) (citin g Ba b b itt v. S weet Ho me Ch a

p ter o f Cmtys. fo r a Grea t Or.
, 5 1 5 U .S. 6 8 7
, 7 04 n .1 8 (1 9 9 5)); see a lso Mu ja h i d v. Da n iels

, 4 1 3 F.3 d 9 9 1
, 9 98

– 9 9 (9 th Cir. 20 0 5 ) (p rio ritizin g th e ru le o f len ity ov er Ch evro n d ef

eren ce “i s t e n u o u s at b est an d req u ires u s to f ill in m ore b lan k s th an

w e are w illin g to d o ”).P E R E Z -G U Z M A N V

. L Y N C H 19

a. Timeliness

Procedural challeng es to ag ency rules under the Administrative Procedure Act are subject to the g eneral six

y ear limitations period in the U.S. Code. See W ind River M i ning Corp. v. United States
, 946 F .2d 710, 7 13–14 ( 9th Cir. 1991) (citing 2 8 U

. S .C. § 2401(a)). Under W ind River
, challeng es to a “mere procedural violation in the adoption o f

a reg ulation or other ag ency action” must be broug ht within six y ears of the ag ency rulem aking

, whereas challeng es to “the substance of an a g ency ’s decision as ex ceeding constitutional or statutory authority ” may be broug ht a ny time “within six y e ars of the ag e ncy ’s a pplication of the disputed decision to the challeng er.” Id. a t 7 15–16. W hether Perez ’s challeng es are timely therefore d epends on whether the y a re procedural or substantive. 6

Perez ’ s central claim is that the Attorney G eneral’s refusal to consider his asy lum application is based on an unreasonable interpretation of § 1158 and § 1231(a)(5). The parties a g ree this is a substantive challeng e

. Be cause it was broug ht within six y ears of the B I A’s ref u s a l t o consider Perez ’ s asy lum application, it is timely

. See Cal. S ea Urchin Comm’n v. B ean , ___ F .3d

_ __, 2016 W L 3739700, a t *4 (9th

6 P erez arg u es w e sh ou ld n o t ru le o n tim elin ess b ecau se th e g o v ern m en t d id n o t rais e i t u n til su

p p lem en tal b rief

in g

. W e h av e g iv en b o th p arties

“ am p le o p p o rtu n ity to ad d ress th e issu e” th ro u g h su p p lem en tal b rief

in g , an d w ill ex ercise o u r discretio n to d ecid e it. U.S

. Na t’ l B a n k o f Or. v. In d ep

. In s. Ag en ts o

f Am., In c. , 5 0 8 U.S. 4 39
, 4 4 7

– 4 8 (1 9 9 3 ). A lth o u g h th e g o v ern m en t su g g ested in su p p lem en tal b rief

in g th at P erez’ s ch allen g e is su b stan tiv e, th ere is n o “ im

p ro p riety in ref

u s in g to accep t w

h at in ef f ect [is th e p arties’ ] s tip u latio n on a q u estio n o f law .” Id

. at 4 4 8

. In ad d itio n , th e g o v ern m en t n o ted th at “ [i]f th is w ere

. . . a p r o c ed u ral ch allen g e

. . . it w o u ld b e tim e- b arred .”P E R E Z -G U Z M A N V

. L Y N C H 20

Cir. J uly 12, 2016) (holding timely a challeng e to “the present application of an earlier rule t hat alleg edly contradicted the
ag ency ’s statutory

authority ”).

Perez and amici also arg ue that 8 C.F .R. § 1208.31 merits

no deference at Chevron step two because the ag ency alleg edly failed to ex plain its interpretation o f § 1158 a nd § 1231 when it o r i gi n a l ly promulg ated the reg ulation. This portion of their challeng e, in o t her words, alleg es “a procedural v iolation in the adop t i o n o f a reg ulation.” W ind River
, 9 4 6 F .2d at 714. W e conclude that althoug h Perez ’s
arg uments about the substance o f 8 C.F .R. § 1 208.31’s interpretation are timely

, his arg uments abou t t h e alleg ed procedural er r o r s in its promulg ation are not. W e therefore decline to c onsider them. See also Sai Kwan W ong v. Doar
, 571 F .3d 247, 262–63 (2d Cir. 2009) (collecting cases).

The Supreme Court’s re c en t d e cision in Encino Motorcars, LLC v. Navarro
, 136 S. Ct. 2117 (2016), supports this approach. There, the Court h eld a n ag ency reg ulation that r epresented a chang e in long standin g a ge ncy position

was not entitled to Chevron deference because the ag e ncy h ad failed to adequately ex plain its chang e in position. The Court

ex p lained that a “ basic procedural re q u i r ement[ ] o f ad m i n i s trative rulemaking is that an ag ency must g ive adequate reasons f

or i t s decisions.” Id. at 2125 (emphasis added); see also id. (“ Chevron deference is not warranted where the reg ul a t i on is ‘procedurally defective’ – that is, where the ag ency errs by failing to follow the correct procedures in issuing the reg ulation.”). “Of course,” it n oted, “a party mig ht b e foreclos e d i n some instances from challeng ing the procedures used to promulg ate a g iven rule.” Id. (citing JEM Broad. Co. v. FCC
, 22 F.3d 320, 324–26 (D.C. Cir. 1994)).P E R E Z -G U Z M A N V

. L Y N C H 21

JEM Broadcasting arose in a s i m i lar procedural p osture to this c a s e

. The F CC had earlier promulg ated a rule
p r e v e n t i ng review of certain license applications that includ e d i naccurate or incomplete information. See JEM Bro a d

. , 22 F .3d at 322–23. The F CC subsequently declined to r eview J E M ’ s defective a

pplication b y citing that rule, and J EM
soug h t to “attack

. . . t he procedural genesis of the [ r u le] in the contex t of an enforcement action ,” by arg uing the rule h ad been improperly promulg ated wit h o ut notice and comment
y ears earlie r

. I

d

. at 324. The D.C. Circuit held J EM’s challeng e was untimely :

J EM does not claim

. . . that th e “ h a r d look” rules are unconstitutional, that they ex ceed the

sco p e o f the F CC’s substantive authority

, o r

. . . that the r

ules are premised on an

err o n eous interpretation of a statutory term. . . .

[ C ] halleng es to the procedural lineage o f
agency regulations

, whether raise d b y direct appeal

. . . or as a defense to an agency

e n f o r c e m e n t p ro c e e d i n g , w i l l n o t b e entertained outside the

. . . p eriod provided b y statute.

Id. at 325 (quotin g M

o u n tain S tates Tel. & Tel. Co. v. F CC
, 939 F .2d 1035, 1040 (D.C. Cir. 1991)). Al t houg h it
recog niz ed that “some parties – such as those not y et in

ex istence when a r

ule is pro m u l ga ted” – would “never

. . . have t he o pportunity to challeng e the procedural lineag e o f rules that are applied to their detriment,” the court concluded

“ t he law countenances this result because of the val u e o f

r e p o s e .” Id. at 326. W e have reached the same conclusi o n

.P E R E Z -G U Z M A N V

. L Y N C H 22

See W ind River
, 946 F .2d at 715 (“The g overnment’s interest i n f inality outweig hs a late-comer’s desire to protest t h e ag ency ’s action as a matter of policy or p r ocedure.”); see also Cedars-Sinai Med. Ctr. v. S halala

, 177 F .3d 1126, 1 129 (9th Cir. 1999) (noting a limitations p e riod on procedural challeng es is necessary “ so that reg ulations are not indefinitely

subject to challeng e in court”). 7

I n the absence o f binding contrary authority

, w e apply the approach r e q u i red b y W ind River a

nd approved by the Supreme Court in E

ncino Motorcars t o conclude Perez ’s
proc e d u r a l challeng e to 8 C.F .R. § 1208.31(e) falls outside the limitations period. W e therefore move on to determine

w h e t her 8 C.F .R. § 1208.31(e) is a permissible c onstructi o n of the statute under Chevron step two.

b. The Chevron Step Two Inquiry

At step two of Chevron

, we must “accept the ag e ncy ’s construction of the statute” so long as that re ading is reasonable, “even if the ag ency ’s re a d i n g differs from what the court believes is the best statutory interpretation.” Brand

7 P erez also arg u es h is ch allen g e is tim ely b ecau se th e ag en cy “ f

ail[ed ]
to p u t ag g riev ed p arties o n reaso n ab l e n o tice of th e ru le’ s co n ten t.” JEM Bro a d

. , 2 2 F.3 d at 3 2 6. W e d isag ree. W e n o ted in W in d River th a t

“ ‘ [p ]u b licatio n in th e Fed eral Reg ister is l e g a l ly su f f icien t n o t ice to all in terested o r af

f ected p erso n s reg ard l ess o f actu al k n o w led g e o r h ard sh ip

resu ltin g f

ro m ig n o ran ce. ’” 9 4 6 F.2 d at 7 1 4 (alteratio n in o rig in al) (q u o tin g S

h in y Ro ck Min in g Co r

p

. v. Un ited Sta tes , 9 06 F.2 d 1 3 6 2
, 1 3 6 4 (9 th Cir. 1 9 9 0 )). Here, th e n o tice p u b lish ed i n th e Fed eral Reg ister w as

su f f icien t to in f

o rm an in terested p arty th e reg u l atio n created a stream lin ed
sy stem f o r assessin g claim s f

ro m in d iv id u als in rein statem en t p ro ceed in g s

an d th at th e ag en cy v iew ed su ch in d iv id u als as in elig ib le f o r asy lu m

. S

ee 6 4 Fed . Reg . at 8 48 5 , d iscu ssed ab o v e at p p . 9

– 1 0

.P E R E Z -G U Z M A N V

. L Y N C H 23

X I n ternet Servs.
, 545 U .S. at 9 80. Deference “is especia l l y appropriate in the immig r a tion conte x t where officials ‘ex ercise especia l l y s e n s i t i v e p o l i t ical functions that implicate questions of f

oreig n r e lations.’” INS v. Aguirre-Aguirre
, 526 U.S. 415, 425 ( 1999) (quoting INS v. Abudu

, 485 U.S. 94, 1 1 0 (1988)). W ith these principles in mind, we consider whether 8 C.F .R. § 1208.31 ( e )

, which prevents individuals subject to r einstated removal orders from apply ing for asy lum but p ermits them t o seek withholding of r emoval, is a reasonable interpretation of § 1158 and § 1231. W e conclude it is. 8

8 P erez an d am ici arg u e 8 C.F.R. § 1 2 0 8 .3 1 (e) d o es n o t m erit Ch evro n d ef eren ce becau se th e ag en cy f ailed to ex ercise its in terp retiv e au t h o rity
at all an d treated § 1 2 3 1(a)(5 ) as u n am b ig u o u s. T h ey t

h eref o re su g g est w e sh o u ld rem an d to th e ag en cy u n d er th e ru l e e x p r e s sed in Neg u sie v. Ho ld er , 5 5 5 U .S. 5 1 1 (2 0 0 9 ), an d Gila River In d ia n Co mmu n ity v. Un ited S t a t e s , 7 2 9 F.3 d 1 1 3 9 (9 th Cir. 2 0 1 3 ). W e rej ect th is su g g estio n

. T h e g o v ern m en t’ s arg u m en t o n ap p eal th at t h e statu te is u n am

b ig u o u s d o es n o t tell u s h o w th e ag en cy v iew ed th e statu te w h en it in itially p ro m

u lg ated th e reg u l a t i o n

. See Bo wen v. Geo rg eto wn U n iv. Ho sp

. , 4 8 8 U.S. 20 4
, 2 1 3 (1 9 8 8) (n o tin g ap p ellate co u n sel’ s “ co n v en ien t l itig atin g p o sitio n ” is n o t

en titled to d ef

eren ce). R ath er, ag en cy actio n rises o r f alls o n th e ag en cy ’ s

o w n co n t em p o ran eo u s reaso n in g , an d w h ere w e h av e rem an d ed u n d e r Neg u s ie th e ad m in istrativ e reco rd h as m o re clearly sh o w n t h at “ th e ag en cy

m isap p reh en d ed th e clarity o f th e statu te” an d “ m istak en ly dererm in e[d ] th at its in t erp retatio n [w as] ma n d a ted b y plain m ean in g , o r so m e o th er b i n d i ng ru le,” G ila River
, 7 2 9 F.3 d at 1 14 9 (em p h asis ad d ed ). T h e ad m i n istrativ e h isto ry d o es n o t d i scu ss t h e sp ecif ic lan g u ag e o f th e asy lu m

s t atu te, b u t n eith er d o es it su g g est th e ag en cy saw § 1 23 1 ( a ) ( 5 ) a s

co m pellin g th e reg u latio n ’ s p articu lar ap p ro ach to asy l u m , w ith h o ld in g of

rem o v al o r CA T p ro tectio n

. On th e co n trary , th e ag e n c y ’ s ex p lan atio n sh o w s it ap p lied i ts ex p ertise b y craf tin g an ex p ed ited screen in g p ro cess

an d b alan cin g t

h e f air reso l u tio n o f claim s f

o r relief f ro m rem o v al ag ain st Co n g ress’ d esire to p ro v id e f or stream l in ed rem ov al o f certain classes of in d iv i d u als, i n cl ud i n g th o se su bj ect t o rein s tated rem o v al o rd ers. S ee 6 4 Fed . Reg . at 8 48 5 , d iscu ssed ab o v e at p p . 9

– 1 0

.P E R E Z -G U Z M A N V

. L Y N C H 24

F irst, the reg ulation is consistent with a reasonab l e judg ment that § 1231(a)(5) is a more specific provision than § 1158, even if not c onclusivel y so, and is therefore “more deserving of credence” when the two provisions con f l i c t. S calia & Gardner, supra , at 183. As discussed, both part i e s advance r easonable a

rg uments for why the canon favors their interpretations of the statutory scheme. At step two, however, “we are not deciding between two plausible sta t u tory constructions; we are evaluating an ag ency ’s interpretation o f

a statute u nder Chevron

. ” Mo r ales-Izquierdo v. G onzales

, 486 F

. 3 d 484, 4 9 2 (9th Cir. 2007) (en banc). I t was not unreasonable for the ag ency to conclude § 1231(a)(5) ’s prohibition on “any r elief under t h is chapter” forecloses individuals from apply ing for asy lum relief. I ndeed, the other circuit s t o consider this issue have concluded it does. See Jimenez-Morales

, 8 21 F .3d at 1310; Ramirez -Mejia
, 7 9 4 F .3d at 490; Herrera-Molina , 597 F .3d at 138–39.

Second, the ag ency ’s ap p r o a ch is consistent with C o n g r ess’ intent in I I RI RA that the reinstatement of a previous removal o rder would cut off certain a v e nues for relief from r emoval. Reinstatement was d e s i gn ed to be “a different and far mor e s u mmary procedure” than reg ular removal. Moralez-Izquierdo

, 4 8 6 F .3d at 491. T o that end, Cong r ess intended § 1231(a)(5) to subject more individuals
to reinstatement p roceeding s and to “limit[ ] the possible r e lief from a removal order available to them.” Fernandez-Vargas

, 548 U.S. a t 3 3 ; see also R amirez-Mejia
, 794 F .3d a t 490. F orbidding asy lum applications f rom i ndividuals in reinstatement p roceeding s, althoug h harsh, is in keeping with this approach. See Barnhart v. W alton

, 535 U.S. 2 1 2
, 2 19 (2002) (upholding an ag ency cons t ruction that made

“ c o n s iderable sense in terms of the statute’s basic objectives”). F urthermore, the a ge n cy ’s interpretation is aP E R E Z -G U Z M A N V

. L Y N C H 25

reasonable construction of the leg islative history we discussed above, which is at least c o n s istent with the view that, in enacting § 11 5 8 (a)(1) and § 1 231(a)(5) tog ether, Cong r ess assumed the phrase “any relief under this chapter” would include the asy lum pr o v i s ion in the statute. See Chevron

, 467 U.S. at 862 (noting that when leg islative history “as a whole is silent” on the “precise issue” before the court, it may n onetheless be “consistent” with a p art i c u l ar interpretation of the statut e)

. Had Cong ress intended to include a carve-out for asy lum relief, it could have done so

ex p licitly when it wrote § 1231(a)(5) or revised § 1158.

T here are nonetheless some weaknesses in the ag ency ’ s approach, but they are not fatal to its interpretation. W e have already n oted that, notwithstanding § 1231(a)(5)’s bar on “any relief” under chapter 1 2, the Attorney General has interpreted that section to permi t i n d ividuals to seek withholding of removal, CAT protecti o n and U Visas

– all forms o f relief that, like a sy lum, arise under chapter 12. See 8 C.F .R. §§ 214.14(c)(1)(ii), 1208.16(c)(4), 1208.31(e). The
g overnment sug g ests this p olicy draws a reasonable l ine between discretionary and nondiscret i o nary relief, and the Supreme Court acknowledg ed “the practical import of th[ at] distinction,” albeit in a s l i gh tly different contex t. Cf. INS v

. Cardoza-Fonseca

, 480 U.S. 4 21, 4 44 (1987) (holding it was “not

. . . at all anom a l o u s ” t h at asy lum applicants a nd applicants f

or withh o l ding were g overned by different standards of proof and stating there was “no basis for the

. . . assertion that the discretionary /mandatory distinction has no practical sig nificance”).

T h i s ex planation, however, fails to account for w h y , under the Attorney Genera l ’s reg ulations, individuals in reinstatement are permitted to apply for U Visas – a form o fP E R E Z -G U Z M A N V

. L Y N C H 26

discretionary relief – but not for asy l u m

. I t m ay be relevant
t h a t U V isas were created in 2000, four y ears after I I RI R A implemented the revised a sy lum statute and the reinstatement bar. See Victims of Trafficking and Violence Prevention A ct of 2000, Pub. L

. N o. 106

- 386, § 1513, 114 Stat. 1464. I n concluding that the Attorney General’s approach in 8 C.F .R. § 1208.31(e) is reasonable under Chevron

, however, we n ote the Supreme Court apparently found n othing i nconsistent between the “absolute terms” b y which § 1 231(a)(5) bars relief and the g overnment’s decision to make certain forms o f relief from removal available in reinstatement proceeding s. See Fernandez-Vargas

, 548 U .S. at 35 n .4 (“Notwithstanding the a bsolute terms in which the bar on relief is stated, even an alien subject to [ § 1 2 31(a)(5)] may seek withholding of removal u nder [ § 1231(b)(3)]

. . . , or under 8 C.F .R. §§ 241.8(e) and 208.31.

. . .” ( e mphasis a dded)); see also Jimenez-Morales

, 821 F

. 3d at 1 310 (citing FernandezVargas
, 5 48 U.S. at 35 n.4); Herrera-Molina

, 597 F

. 3d at 139 n.8 (same). 9 Althoug h the availabil i t y of asy lum is an important c o m p onent of our immig ration law, it is not unreasonable to conclude Cong ress intended to bar this form of relief to persons in r einstat ed removal proceeding s while preserving relief f

or individuals able to m e et the hig her standards for withholding of removal and CAT relief. See Ramirez-Mejia v. Lynch

, 813 F .3d 240, 241 (5th Cir. 2 016) (deny ing r ehearing e n banc) (“Even if w ithholding of removal and CAT protection are slig htly less potent re m e d i es than

9 In Fern a n dez-Va rg a s , t h e S u prem e Co u rt p aren th etically d escrib ed 8 C.F.R. § § 24 1 .8 (e) an d 2 0 8 .3 1 as “ raisin g t h e p o s sib ility o f a sy l u m .” 5 4 8 U .S. at 3 5 n .4

. T h i s ap p ears to h av e b een an o v ersig h t; alth o u g h bo th
reg u latio n s ref

er to “ asy lu m o f

f icers,” th ey clearly p erm i t o n ly

w ith h o ld in g f

ro m rem o v al. In d eed

, th e m ain t ex t o f th e Co u rt’ s f o o tn o te

co rrectly ref

ers o n l y to “ s eek [in g ] w ith h old in g o f rem o v al” u n d er th ose reg u latio n s.P E R E Z -G U Z M A N V

. L Y N C H 27

asy lum, the diffe r e n ce may well be consistent with Cong r ess’s intent to penaliz e ille ga l reentry

. W e need not justify the difference, but we note possible reasons for it.”).

I n ad d ition, althoug h the A ttorney G eneral’s interpretation makes sense as applied to an individual w ho has already had an o pportunity to seek asy lum upon h is initial entry to the United States, it does n ot account for individuals in re instatement proceeding s who may have compelling claims based o n new circumstances arising subsequent to their previous removal proceeding s. The Attorney G eneral’s interpretation of § 1231(a)(5) m a y have dire humanitarian
consequences f

or individuals in reinstatement who seek relief from removal, either b ec a u s e they were previously denied
asy lum and are now subject to chang ed circumstances o r because they

were improperly

denied an opportunity to seek
asy lum during their earlier removal from the U ni t e d S tates. However, the g overnment h a s discretion to forg o reinstatement and instead place a n ind i v i dual in ordinary removal proceeding s. See V illa-Angu i a no v. H

older

, 727 F .3d 873, 878 (9th Cir. 2013). Once in ordinary proceeding s, the individual can r a i s e an asy lum a pplication without implicating § 1231(a)(5)’s bar. The g overnment has followed this procedure before, se e , e

. g. , Maldonado Lopez

v. Holder

, No. 12-72800 ( 9th Cir. d i s m i ssed F eb. 4, 2014), and we assume it will continue to ex ercise that discretion in appropriate cases, such as those presenting strong humanitari a n concerns. T o the ex tent this consideration “really centers on the w isdom of the ag e ncy ’ s p o licy

, rather than whether it is a r easonable choice within a g ap left open by Cong ress,” it c annot invalidate the ag ency ’s interpretation
at Chevron ’ s second step. See Chevron

, 467 U.S. at 866.P E R E Z -G U Z M A N V

. L Y N C H 28

I n sum, despite our reservati o n s , we are not persuaded that 8 C.F .R. § 1208.31(e)’s inter p retation of § 1231(a)(5) and § 1 158(a)(1) i s an unreasonable construction of the
st a t u te. See Chevron

, 467 U .S. at 8 43–44. I t is consistent with the broad lang uag e of § 1 2 31(a)(5), with Cong ress’ intent to make reinstatement an ex p edited p rocess for removing individuals who reenter the United States and with the overall leg islative history of both provisions.

Perez ’ s r emaining a

rg uments to the contrary are not persuasive. F irst, Perez and amici a rg ue the Attorney General’s interpretation of § 1231(a)(5) is contrary to the
structure of § 1158 i t s e l f

. They focus in particular on § 1158(a)(2)(D), which provides that an appl i c a n t’s second
asy lum application “may be considered” if he shows chang ed circumstances materially

affecting his elig ibility

for asy lum. Perez and amici arg ue that if § 1 2 31(a)(5) categ orically forbids a n individual in reinstateme n t from apply ing for
asy lum, § 1158(a)(2)(D) is superfluous. This a r gu m e nt incorrectly a ssume s t h a t a n y i n dividual to whom § 1158(a)(2)(D) applies w ill necessarily be s u b j e ct to a reinstated removal order. Not so. T h e r einstatement of a prior removal order is neit her “automatic” nor “ oblig a tory , ” and the A ttorney General h a s d i scretion not to reinstate an individual’s earlier rem o v a l order and instead p lace him in ordinary removal proceeding s. See Villa-Anguiano

, 727 F .3d
at 878 (quoting Alcala v. Holde r , 5 6 3 F .3d 1009, 1013 (9th Cir. 2009) )

. I f the Attorney General elects to place an individual who previously a pplied for a

n d was denied asy lum into ordinary removal proceeding s upon his reentr y to the United States, § 1158(a)(2) ( D ) is not superfluous. On the contrary , it a ffirmatively authoriz es a second asy lum claim inP E R E Z -G U Z M A N V

. L Y N C H 29

lig ht of his c hang ed ci r c u mstances – something that would ordinarily be precluded by

§ 1158(a)(2)(C). 1 0

Second, Perez and amici a rg ue the asy lum statute is a “closed u niverse” unaffected by other portions of the I NA. I n o ther w ords, they sug g est § 1 158’s enumerated ex ceptions for elig ibility to a

pply for asy lum are e x haustive. Amici n ote the asy lum scheme makes no r e ference to § 1231(a)(5), a nd
sug g est § 1158 was intended t o go vern asy lum applications independent of the rest of the I N A. The Attorne y General, however, is not unreasonable for adopting a con t ra ry v iew. None of t h e v arious p rovisions for relief under the I N A

ex p licitly refers to § 1231(a)(5), b ut § 1231(a)(5) specifies “any relief under this c h apter.” No ex plicit cross-reference to every affected section is necessary for us to conclude that “any relief under this chapter” can re a s o n ably be read to preclude applications for asy lum, a form of relief a rising under chapter 12.

F or the foreg oing reasons, we hold that 8 C .F .R. § 1208.31(e) is a reasonable interpre t a tion of the interplay between § 1158 and § 1231, and w e must th e r e f o re defer to it under Chevron

. I n keepi n g w i th that reg ulation, Perez is
not elig ible to apply for asy lum under § 1158 as long as he is subject to a reinstated removal order.

10 P erez is a f

i rst- tim e a s y l u m c l a i m an t, an d alleg es n o circu m stan ces th at m aterially ch an g ed b etw een h is rem o v al f ro m th e Un ited States an d h is s u b seq u en t re en try

. W e t h eref o re h av e n o o p p o rtu n ity h ere to d eterm in e h o w § 1 1 5 8 (a)(2 )(D) m i g h t af f ect § 1 2 3 1 (a)(5 ) i n a case w h ere th o se tw o p ro v isio n s are actu ally in co n f l ict.P E R E Z -G U Z M A N V

. L Y N C H 30

C. Withholding of Rem oval and CAT Relief

After t h e BI A c oncluded Perez had not shown past persecution on account of his membership in a part i c u lar social g roup, we held witnesses who testify ag ainst ga ng

m e m b e rs may constitute a “particular social g roup.” See Hen r i quez-Rivas v

. Holder

, 707 F .3d 1081, 1092 (9th Cir. 2013) (en b a n c)

. I n addition, after the B I A rejected Perez ’s CAT claim because there was no e v idence the G uatemalan
g overnment sanctioned his abuse by police, we held that local officials’ acquiescence in torture is sufficient to entitle an applicant to CAT relief, even if the national g overnment did
not acquiesce in the t r eatment. See M adrigal v

. H

older

, 716 F .3d 4 9 9
, 509 ( 9th Cir. 2013). I n lig ht of these intervening authorities, the parties a g ree we should r em a n d

on Perez ’ s claims for w ithholding of removal and CAT relief.

III. Conclusion

W e remand for the ag ency to reconsider Perez ’s applications for withholding of removal and CAT protection in lig ht of Henriquez-Rivas v. H older

, 7 07 F .3d 1081 (9th Cir. 2013) (en banc), and Madrigal v. Holder

, 716 F .3d 499 (9th Cir. 2013). W e affirm the B I A’s conclusion that it c ould not consider P e r e z ’ s application f or asy lum relief in lig h t of his reinstated removal order.

P ETITION G RANTED IN P A RT AND DENIED IN P A RT; REMANDED TO THE BIA.

Each party

shall bear its own costs on appeal.