IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 15-31075

Summary Calendar

ANGELA BRAUD, 

 Plaintiff - Appellant Cross-Appellee

v.

EVIN SCOTT SPELL; RICKY FOX; TOWN OF VINTON, 

 Defendants - Appellees Cross-Appellants

Appeals from the United States District Court

for the Western District of Louisiana

USDC No. 2:14-CV-3132

Before KING, CLEMENT, and OWEN, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

Angela Braud appeals the district court’s denial of her various state and 

federal claims alleging that she was unlawfully arrested. The district court

determined that she was arrested pursuant to a valid warrant based on 

probable cause. This determination precluded recovery on all claims. “[T]he 

ultimate determination of whether there is probable cause for the arrest is a 

 

* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not 

be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH 

CIR. R. 47.5.4.

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

FILED

June 30, 2016

Lyle W. Cayce

Clerk

 Case: 15-31075 Document: 00513574742 Page: 1 Date Filed: 06/30/2016
No. 15-31075

2

question of law we review de novo.” United States v. Castro, 166 F.3d 728, 733 

(5th Cir. 1999). Here, the district court concluded that “[t]he . . . information 

in the affidavit—the polygraph examination results, the medication audit 

report from the previous school year, the statements from [school] staff, and 

the statements of Braud’s ex-husband and daughter—was certainly sufficient 

for a finding of probable cause.” Braud v. Spell, No. 2:14-CV-03132, 2015 WL 

7432813, at *2 (W.D. La. Nov. 19, 2015). We agree. Because there was probable 

cause to arrest, the district court did not err in rejecting Braud’s claims.

Defendants appeal the district court’s denial of their motion for 

attorney’s fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1988. “We review a denial of § 1988 attorney’s 

fees for abuse of discretion.” Dean v. Riser, 240 F.3d 505, 507 (5th Cir. 2001). 

“[P]revailing defendants in civil rights cases may be awarded attorney’s fees 

only where plaintiff’s action was frivolous, unreasonable, or without 

foundation . . . .” Kirchberg v. Feenstra, 708 F.2d 991, 995 (5th Cir. 1983). 

“Thus, attorney’s fees for prevailing defendants are presumptively unavailable 

unless a showing is made that the underlying civil rights suit was vexatious, 

frivolous, or otherwise without merit.” Dean, 240 F.3d at 508.

Here, the district court issued its final ruling only after a contested bench 

trial where both parties presented a case—a fact that weighs against a finding 

of frivolousness. See, e.g., Vaughner v. Pulito, 804 F.2d 873, 878 (5th Cir. 1986)

(no abuse of discretion in denying defendant’s request for attorney’s fees where 

action proceeded to trial on the merits); cf. Myers v. City of West Monroe, 211 

F.3d 289, 293 (5th Cir. 2000) (abuse of discretion in awarding attorney’s fees 

to defendants after complete trial). Thus, we hold that the district court did not 

abuse its discretion in denying attorney’s fees here. The judgment of the 

district court is AFFIRMED. Defendants’ motion for damages and costs under 

Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 38 is DENIED.

 Case: 15-31075 Document: 00513574742 Page: 2 Date Filed: 06/30/2016