J. S37044/19

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION – SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA :

:

IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

v. :

:

MUMIN SLAUGHTER, : No. 1839 EDA 2018

:

 Appellant :

Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered May 24, 2018,

in the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County

Criminal Division at No. CP-51-CR-1202271-2005

BEFORE: BOWES, J., KUNSELMAN, J., AND FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E. 

MEMORANDUM BY FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E.: FILED OCTOBER 15, 2019

Mumin Slaughter appeals from the May 24, 2018 order entered in the 

Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County dismissing his PCRA petition 

filed pursuant to the Post Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”), 42 Pa.C.S.A. 

§§ 9541-9546. We affirm.

The PCRA court set forth the procedural history as follows:

[Appellant], together with William Johnson, was 

charged by Philadelphia authorities with murder, 

generally, criminal conspiracy, and possessing 

instruments of crime, generally. Both men were tried 

jointly before [the trial c]ourt and a jury in 2007. 

Although the jury could not reach a verdict with 

respect to Mr. Johnson, it found [appellant] guilty of 

third-degree murder and criminal conspiracy.[

1] 

Although [appellant] was originally sentence[d] to an 

aggregate term of incarceration of twenty-five to fifty 

years’ incarceration, that sentence was vacated and 

 

1 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2502(c) and § 903(a)(1), respectively.
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on October 29, 2010, [appellant] received an 

aggregate sentence of fifteen to thirty years’

incarceration after he agreed to cooperate with 

authorities in the Johnson retrial.

Following the imposition of sentence [appellant] filed 

a notice of appeal and on November 6, 2012, the 

Superior Court affirmed the judgment of sentence. 

Commonwealth v. Slaughter, 63 A.3d 830 (Pa. 

Super. 2012) (Table). [Appellant] thereafter filed a 

petition for allowance of appeal in the Pennsylvania 

Supreme Court, which on May 29, 2013, denied the 

petition. Commonwealth v. Slaughter, 67 A.3d 

796 (Pa. 2013) (Table).

On October 9, 2013, [appellant] filed a pro se petition 

pursuant to the Post-Conviction Relief Act (hereinafter 

PCRA), 42 Pa.C.S.[A.] § 9541 et seq. Counsel was 

appointed to represent him and on February 2, 2017, 

counsel filed an amended petition alleging that trial 

counsel had been ineffective for erroneously advising 

[appellant] not to testify in his own defense because 

it would result in his being impeached with his arrest 

record. Counsel thereafter filed a supplemental 

amended petition on November 1, 2017, wherein 

[appellant] contended that trial counsel failed to call 

an alibi witness in [appellant’s] trial.

On November 3, 2017, [the PCRA c]ourt held an 

evidentiary hearing on [appellant’s] claim that trial 

counsel gave him wrong advice about testifying at 

which both [appellant] and trial counsel testified. The 

[PCRA c]ourt held the matter under consideration at 

the conclusion of the hearing. A second evidentiary 

hearing was convened on May 24, 2018, on 

[appellant’s] claim that trial counsel was ineffective 

for failing to present an alibi witness. [The PCRA 

c]ourt cancelled the hearing because [appellant] had 

given police [sic] a statement to police prior to his 

second sentencing hearing wherein he stated that he 

had been present at the scene of the crime when it 

occurred, the veracity of which he confirmed under 

oath during the re-sentencing hearing held on 

September 29, 2010.
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On May 24, 2018, [the PCRA c]ourt denied [appellant]

PCRA relief. On June 23, 2018, [appellant] filed a 

timely notice of appeal.

PCRA court opinion, 9/5/18 at 1-3 (footnote omitted; citation to notes of 

testimony omitted). The PCRA court did not order appellant to file a concise 

statement of errors complained of on appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b). 

However, the PCRA court filed a Rule 1925(a) opinion.

Appellant raises the following issue for our review: “Whether the PCRA 

Court erred in denying relief after [the] evidentiary hearing?” (Appellant’s 

brief at 4.)

Proper appellate review of a PCRA court’s dismissal of a PCRA petition 

is limited to the examination of “whether the PCRA court’s determination is 

supported by the record and free of legal error.” Commonwealth v. Miller, 

102 A.3d 988, 992 (Pa.Super. 2014) (citation omitted). We review the appeal 

“in the light most favorable to the prevailing party at the PCRA level[,]” and 

“[o]ur review is limited to the findings of the PCRA court and the evidence of 

record.” Commonwealth v. Henkel, 90 A.3d 16, 20 (Pa.Super. 2014)

(en banc). “The PCRA court’s findings will not be disturbed unless there is 

no support for the findings in the certified record.” Commonwealth v. 

Lawson, 90 A.3d 1, 4 (Pa.Super. 2014) (citations omitted). “This [c]ourt 

grants great deference to the findings of the PCRA court, and we will not 

disturb those findings merely because the record could support a contrary 

holding.” Commonwealth v. Hickman, 799 A.2d 136, 140 (Pa.Super. 2002) 
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(citation omitted). In contrast, we review the PCRA court’s legal conclusions 

de novo. Henkel, 90 A.3d at 20.

When presented with a claim of alleged ineffective assistance of trial 

counsel, this court has held:

[t]o be eligible for relief based on a claim of ineffective 

assistance of counsel, a PCRA petitioner must 

demonstrate, by a preponderance of the evidence, 

that (1) the underlying claim is of arguable merit; 

(2) no reasonable basis existed for counsel’s action or 

omission; and (3) there is a reasonable probability 

that the result of the proceeding would have been 

different absent such error. Commonwealth v. 

Steele, 961 A.2d 786, 796 (Pa. 2008). With regard 

to the second, i.e., the “reasonable basis” prong, this 

Court will conclude that counsel’s chosen strategy 

lacked a reasonable basis only if the appellant proves 

that “an alternative not chosen offered a potential for 

success substantially greater than the course actually 

pursued.” Commonwealth v. Williams, 899 A.2d 

1060, 1064 (Pa. 2006) (citation omitted). To 

establish the third prong, i.e., prejudice, the appellant 

must show that there is a reasonable probability that 

the outcome of the proceedings would have been 

different, but for counsel’s action or inaction. 

Commonwealth v. Dennis, 950 A.2d 945, 954 (Pa. 

2008).

Commonwealth v. Matias, 63 A.3d 807, 810 (Pa.Super. 2013), appeal 

denied, 74 A.3d 1030 (Pa. 2013). “The failure to satisfy any one of the prongs 

requires rejection of the petitioner’s claim.” Commonwealth v. Williams, 

141 A.3d 440, 454 (Pa. 2016) (citation omitted).

Our supreme court has held:

[t]he decision of whether or not to testify on one’s 

own behalf is ultimately to be made by the defendant 

after full consultation with counsel. In order to sustain 
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a claim that counsel was ineffective for failing to 

advise the appellant of his rights in this regard, the 

appellant must demonstrate either that counsel 

interfered with his right to testify, or that counsel gave 

specific advice so unreasonable as to vitiate a knowing 

and intelligent decision to testify on his own behalf.

Commonwealth v. Nieves, 746 A.2d 1102, 1104 (Pa. 2000) (citations 

omitted).

Here, appellant argues trial counsel was ineffective “for advising 

appellant not to testify in his own behalf because the Commonwealth could 

use his prior arrest record against him.” (Appellant’s brief at 13.) Appellant 

claims that in discussing whether he should testify during trial, trial counsel 

allegedly “told him that if he did testify the prosecutor would attack his 

record.” (Id. at 14, citing notes of testimony, 11/3/17 at 11-12.) Appellant 

argues:

The advice to not testify and forgo the opportunity to 

refute the purported eye witness testimony as to his 

having previously sold them drugs when they [sic] cat 

was already out the [sic] bag, was tantamount to

counsel saying the prosecutor will bring out his prior 

drug conviction should he testify, which was so 

unreasonable as to vitiate his knowing and intelligent 

decision not to testify in his own behalf.

Appellant’s brief at 15.

At the PCRA hearing, trial counsel, a veteran defense attorney for more 

than 30 years at the time, stated that he was confident he spoke to appellant 

about whether appellant should testify at trial. (Notes of testimony, 11/3/17 

at 48, 54.) Trial counsel also stated he would not have told appellant that, if 
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he testified, his prior drug conviction in federal district court would have been 

used to impeach him. (Id. at 45, 49, 56, 60.) Trial counsel explained that 

the drug conviction was not a crimen falsi conviction that could be used for 

impeachment purposes and would not be admissible. (Id.) Trial counsel 

further explained that it was logical that if appellant testified, his relationship 

with the two eyewitnesses, both of whom claimed they allegedly purchased 

drugs from appellant regularly, would have been explored by the prosecution. 

(Id. at 47-48.) Trial counsel stated that appellant “was better off not facing 

cross-examination by a skilled prosecutor.” (Id. at 50.) When asked what 

advice trial counsel gave appellant about whether to testify, appellant stated, 

“[h]e told me that it wouldn’t be a good look because I have an arrest record 

and that [the prosecutor] can bring my arrest record up.” (Id. at 13.)

Following the PCRA hearing, the PCRA court accepted trial counsel’s 

recollection of events as entirely credible, finding that appellant’s testimony 

wholly lacked in credibility. The PCRA court concluded, “[i]t was simply 

beyond belief that trial counsel, an experienced and excellent trial attorney, 

would have advised [appellant] that he should not testify because [he] could 

be impeached with his criminal record that did not contain any crimen falsi

crimes.” (PCRA opinion, 9/5/18 at 8-9.) 

The record demonstrates that absent appellant’s self-serving testimony, 

which the PCRA court found “wholly lacking in credibility,” appellant presented 

no other evidence that counsel interfered with his right to testify, or that 
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counsel gave specific advice so unreasonable as to vitiate a knowing and 

intelligent decision to testify on his own behalf. Therefore, the PCRA court’s 

determination that appellant failed to demonstrate by a preponderance of the 

evidence that his underlying claim had arguable merit is supported by the 

record and free from legal error.

Consequently, appellant’s claim that the PCRA court erred in dismissing

his PCRA petition fails.

Order affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 10/15/19