T h e C le r k o f C o u r t is d ire c te d to a m e n d th e o ff ic ia l c a p tio n a s in d ic a te d
. * The H onor abl e J ohn G l ees on, of t he U ni t ed St at es D i s t r i ct C our t f or t he Eas t er n D i s t r i ct of N ew Y or k, ** sittin g b y d e sig n a tio n . 1 07- 1892- cv So us a v . Roqu e UN ITED STA TES CO URT OF AP P EALS F OR TH E S ECO N D CI RCU IT Aug us t T erm, 200 8 (A rgue d: No vem ber

5, 2 008 Dec id ed: Aug us t 2 1, 2 009 ) Do cket No . 07 -1 892 -c v B R YA N S O U SA , Pl

aint iff -A ppella nt ,
v. A RT HUR R OQUE J R ., R O BERT K ALI S ZEW S KI , J OANNE D R I VE R , W I L L I A M E V A NS , and J A NE S T AHL , Defenda nts-App ellees
. *
B ef or e: C AB RA N E S and H ALL , Circuit Jud ges , and G L EE S ON , District Judge
. ** Plaintiff, a former employee of the Conne cticut Depa rtment of Environmental Protection (“DEP”), appea ls an April 23, 2007 j udgment of the United States Distr ict Court for the Dis trict of Con nec ti cut

(J anet C. H all , Judge

), which grante d a motion by defenda nts, all DEP officials, for
sum ma ry ju dgme nt o n p la in ti ff’ s cl aim s tha t th ey ha d re ta li a te d a ga in st hi m i n v io la ti on of t he Fir st Amendment for complaints he made reg arding primarily workpla ce viol ence . Speci fically , plaintiff argues that although the District Court corr ectly c oncluded tha t he was speaking “as a ci tizen” a nd not “as an em pl oye e” f

or th e pu rpo s es of

th e F ir s t A men dm ent , the D is tr ict Cou r t e r r ed i n co ncluding that2

hi s s pee ch w as un pr ot ect ed b ecau s e it was no t o n a m att er

of pu bl ic co nce r n. We a cknowle dge that our precede nts on what constitut es “a matter of public conc ern,” and par ti cul arly, th e ext ent

to whi ch a c ou r t m ay t ake i nt o acc ou nt th e s peak er ’s mo ti

ves whe n m aki ng that determination, are le ss than cle ar. We reaffirm our earlier holding i n Reula nd v. Hynes, that “the

s peak er ’s mo ti

ve i s no t dis po s it

ive indet ermi ni ng whether s pee ch i s ona matte r

of pu bl ic co nce r n. ” 460 F.3d 409, 411 (2d Cir. 2006). Beca use our holding is at odds with the District Court’s conclusion that Sousa’s s peec h did not address a matter of public conc ern solely beca use he was motivated by employment griev ance s, we vac ate the District Court’s or der granting summary judgment to defendants
onSo us a’s Fi r s t A men dm ent clai m. Vacat ed an d r ema nd ed. J OHN R. W I L L I A MS , N ew H aven , CT , fo r P lai nti ff- Appella nt . C L AR E E. K

I ND ALL , Assis tant Attorney General, for Ric hard Blumenthal, Attorney Generalof the State of Connec ticut, Office of the Attorney General, Ha rtf ord, CT , for Defendants-Ap

pellees
. J OS É A. C AB R ANES , Circuit Jud ge : Plaintiff B ryan Sousa (“plai ntiff” or “Sousa”), a former employee of the Connec ticut Dep ar tm ent

of Env ir on men tal

Pr ot ect io n ( “D EP ”) , ap peal s an Ap r il 2 3, 2 007 ju dgm ent

of th e Unit ed St ate s Di s tr

ict Cou r t f or th e Di s tr ict of Con nec ti cut

(J anet C. H all , Judge

). That judgment granted a motion by Arthur Roque, Commissioner of the DEP; Robert Kaliszewski, Sousa’s supervisor at the DEP ; J oan ne D r

ive r , a p er s on nel

of fi cer at the D EP ; Willia m Ev ans , a B ur eau Chief of th e DE P Pers onnel/Bureau of Financia l and Support Services; and Jane Stahl, Deputy C ommiss ioner of the DEP (c ollect

ive ly “ def end ant s ” or

“D EP of fi cial s ”) , f or s um mar y ju dgm ent

onpl ain ti ff

’s clai ms th at they had reta liated a gainst him in violation of the First Amendment for complaints he made regardingT h e fa c ts th a t fo llo w a r e ta k e n la r g e ly fr o m th e D istr ic t C o u r t’s A p r il 1 0 , 2 0 0 7 ru lin g . S e eS ous a v. R oque , 3: 05- 1 cv- 00822 (

J C H ) , 2007 W L 1100 318 (D
. C onn. A pr i l 10, 2007 )
. As t he D i s t r i ct C our t not ed, i t ac cept ed as t r ue f act s t hat w er e undi s put ed by t he p ar t i es , an d re s ol ved di s put ed f act s i n f avo r of t he n on- m ovi ng pl ai nt i ff wher e t her e was e v id e n c e to su p p o r t h is a lle g a tio n s. Id . a t *2 n .1
. 3 pr im ar ily wor kp lace vio len ce. S pec if ically, pl ain ti ff

argue s th at altho ughth e Di s tr ict Cou r t c orr ect

ly

co nc lu de d th a t he wa s spe a ki ng “a s aci ti ze n” a nd no t “ a s a n e mp lo ye e” for t he pu rpo ses o f th e F irst Amendment, the District Court erred in concluding that his speech w as unprotected beca use it was not
ona matte r

of pu bl ic co nce r n. We a cknowle dge that our precede nts on what constitut es “a matter of public conc ern,” and par ti cul arly, th e ext ent

to whi ch a c ou r t m ay t ake i nt o acc ou nt th e s peak er ’s mo ti

ves whe n m aki ng that determination, are le ss than cle ar. We reaffirm our earlier holding i n Reula nd v. Hynes, that “the

s peak er ’s mo ti

ve i s no t dis po s it

ive indet ermi ni ng whether s pee ch i s ona matte r

of pu bl ic co nce r n. ” 460 F.3d 409, 411 (2d Cir. 2006). Beca use our holding is at odds with the District Court’s conclusion that Sousa’s s peec h did not address a matter of public conc ern solely beca use he was motivated by employment griev ance s, we vac ate the District Court’s or der granting summary judgment to defendants
onSo us a’s Fi r s t A men dm ent clai m. BAC KGROUND I. F act ual O ver

vi ew1 So us a began wo r king as an engin eer at the D EP inJ uly 19 87. B y 19 95, he h ad b eco me a sup ervi sin g sa ni ta ry

en gi ne erin the W a te r Bure a u, adivi sio n wit hi n th e D E P. I n O ct ob er20 02 , S ou sa hada verbal

andphys ical

alt er cat io n wi thJ on ath an G ol dm an— a “lo wer -l evel [D EP] em pl oye e.” Sousa

v. Ro que, 3:05-cv-00822 (JCH), 200 7 WL 110031 8, at *2 (D. C onn. April 10, 2007 ). As a result of the in cid ent , b oth S ou s a andGo ld manwer e s us pen dedfo r th r ee d ays witho ut

pay. Fo llo wing hi s alt er cat

io n wi thGo ld man , So us a began m aki ng n um er ou s com pl ain ts to DEP of fi cial s , f ocu s ing onth e di s cip lin e he r ecei vedas a r es ul t o f the i nci den t an d, mo r e gen er ally,W e n o te, as d id the D ist ric t C o u rt, tha t S o u sa c laim s h e m a d e c o m p lain ts pr ior to th e alte rc a ti o n w it h 2 G o ld m a n . S ee S ousa , 20 07 W L 11 00 31 8 a t *2 n
. 4; C om pl ¶ 12
. T he re a pp ea rs t o b e n o e vid en ce i n the rec ord t o su pp ort th is a ss e r tio n . 4 workplace violenc e within the DE P. Around this t ime, Sousa al so r eported his concerns about a 2 ho sti le wo rk e nv

iro nm en t i n th e D E P. S ou saco mp la in ed a bo ut i nc id en ts of gro up ha ra ssme nt a ga in st him call ed “mobbing,” which is a proce ss of abusive behaviors inf licted ove r time. Specifica lly, he
r epo r te d that

he h ad b eenhar as s ed b y var io us lo wer -l evel

emp lo yees , an d that

tw o l owe r -l evel
em pl oy ee s ha d a lso suff

er ed ha ra ssme nt—

wh ic h S ou satoo k t o b e e vi de nc e, in pa rt, of “ re ve rse discrimination” within the DEP. Sousa then w rote to M arcia Bonito, the DEP’s Affirmative Action Administrator , aga in focusing on his claims of a hostile work environment, workplace violenc e, and “reverse discrimination.” He made similar complaints to Richa rd B lumenthal, the A ttorney General of the State of Conne cticut. Fi nally, So us a ar ti cul ate d s ever al o f thes e co nce r ns inan Ap r il 2 3, 2 003
mem or and umto hi s unio n. One of Sousa’s complaints in particular troubled DEP officials. On July 23, 2003, Sousa sent an e-mailto two DEP employee s, Karen Calieno and Lisa Picc arello, a bout providing a book on “m ob bi ng” to mem ber s of th e DE P’ s Wor kp lace Vio len ce T hr eat As s es s men t T eam , id

. at *2 n.3 . In th e e- mail, S ou s a wr ot e: When y ou read the book you will recogniz e that mobbing ca n often result in the dea th of th e vi ct im , ei th er du e t o illn es s , acc id ent

or s ui cid e. An other

r ef er enc e s ugg es te d tha t, in li gh t of

suc h ra mi fic a ti on s, w orkpl a ce mo bb in g sh ou ld be vi ew ed a s the la st remaining le gal me ans of committing homicide. I personally see it as a form of group vig ila nt is m. Id . at *2. Following this e-mail, the Human R esources Of fice of the DEP (“HR” ) sent Sous a a l etter on Aug us t 1 2, 2 003 , r equ

ir ing hi m t o u nd ergo afi tn es s -f or -d ut y evalu ati on . Although the ev ents that followed are in dispute, both parties agree that Sousa w as on leave for a substantial amount of time following HR ’s request that he undergo a fitness-f or-dut y eva luation. TheI n fact , t he D i s t ri ct C ou rt not ed , based u pon t he u nd i s pu t ed f act s , t hat “[ f] rom O ct ober 200 3 t hrough 3 D ecem ber 2004 , Sou s a w as on som e for m of l eave for m ore t han t en ful l m ont hs. ” S ousa , 2 0 0 7 W L 1 1 0 0 3 1 8 , a t *4
.

A L ou d erm ill hea r i ng i s hel d t o det er m i ne “ w het her t her e a r e r eas ona bl e g r ounds t o be l i eve t hat t he c har ge s 4 agai nst t he em pl oyee are t rue and s up port t he proposed act i on. ” C lev ela n d B d . of E d u c. v . L ou d

erm ill , 470 U
. S. 532, 545- 46 (1 9 8 5 ); see

also F a irbroth er v. M orri

son , 412 F. 3d 39, 45 n. 4 ( 2d C i r . 2005 ) ( r el yi ng on L ou d erm ill ). 5 Di s tr ict Cou r t f ou ndth at S ou s a was pu t o n p aidleav e onSep te mb er 29, 200 3, a ndth en o n u np aid le ave on Oc tob er15 , 2 00 3, wh il e S ou sa ’s d oc torwa s ga the rin g i nfo rma ti on for h is fi tne ss te st. So usa
was even tu ally f

ou ndfi t f or du ty inNo vem ber

200 3, a ndhe w as in s truct ed that he s ho ul d r epo r t b ack
to wor k o n D ecem ber

1, 2 003 . So us a in fo r medEvan s , a B ur eau Chief of th e DE P P er s on nel /B ur eau of Fi nan cial andSupp or t S er

vic es , that he didno t w ant

to r eturn t o wo r k o ut

of fe ar fo r hi s s af et y. Sousa remained out of the office for the month of Decembe r, using a combination of vac ation time ands ick leav e . Sousa returned to work in J anuary 20 04, and then reque sted that he be allow ed to work from home or “telecommute.” Sousa’s s upervisors denied the reque st. Dur ing the months that followed, So us a con ti nu ed t o t ake v ar io us fo r ms of

leav e. While S ou s a was onpai d s ick leav e inth e f

all of 200 4, 3 he w as in fo r medth at h e wo ul d h ave t o r eturn t o wo r k o n O ct ob er 18, 200 4, o r

he w ouldbe c las s if

ied

as bei ng o n “u nau th or

ized leav e witho ut

pay. ” Id . at *5. S ousa did not go to work on that date, and after five days, a he aring pursuant to Cle vel and B o ard o f Edu cat io n v. Lo ude rmi

ll , 47 0 U. S. 5 32, 538 -4 6 (1985) (“ Lo ude rmi

ll hear ing”) , was s et

fo r No vem ber

17, 200 4. There remained some conce rn about 4 wh et he r So usa wa s sti llfitfor d uty ; h ow ev er , a n i nd ep en de nt m ed ic a l e xa mi ne r re po rte d th a t S ou sa would be fit for work as of D ece mber 20, 2004. Sousa did not return to work on that day either and a second Lo ude rmi

ll hearing w as held on January 14, 2005. Following that hearing, Sousa’s employ ment with the D EP was te r mi nat ed f or , int er ali a , t wo in sta nc es o f un a uth ori ze d a bse nc es.6

II. Pr ocedural H istory OnM ay 24 , 20 05, So us a f

ile d the i ns tan t ac ti oninth e Di s tr ict Cou r t, pu r s uan t t o 4 2 U. S.C. § 1983, a lleging

that defendants violated hi s Fir st Amendment rights by retalia ting aga inst him f or
en ga gi ng in wh a t he cl aim ed wa s pro te ct ed spe ec h. Sp ec ifi ca lly, So usa cl aim ed tha t th e d ef en da nts’

a ctio ns— int

er ali a , ( 1) r equ ir ing hi m t o u nd ergo afi tn es s -f or -d ut y evalu ati on , (

2) pl acing hi m o n p aid leav e inSep te mb er

200 3, (3) pl acing hi m o n u np aidleav e inOct ob er 200 3, ( 4) denying hi m co nt

in ued medical leav e inOct ob er

200 4, ( 5) denying hi s J anu ary 20 04 r equ es t t o t elec om mu te , ( 6) s ub ject ing hi m to a ho s tile wo r k en

vir on men t f

r om200 3 t o his te r mi nat

io n i n 2 005 , an d ( 7) te r mi nat ing hi s employment—w ere all a cts of r etalia tion aga inst him f or exercising his Fir st Amendment right to
com pl ainabo ut , int

er ali a , workplac e viole nce a nd a hostile work environment within the DE P. So usa also clai med that two of defendants’ actions—requiring him to undergo a fitness- for- duty eva luation anddenying hi s r equ es t t o t elec om mu te —v io lat ed his r

igh t t o equal

pr ot ect io n o f the l aws gua r ant eed by the Fourteenth Amendment of the United State s Constitut ion. Finally , Sousa’s action include d state law c lai ms fo r

neg lig ent in fl ict io n o f e mo ti on al dis tr es s andfo r in te nt io nal in fl ict io n o f e mo ti on al di stre ss.I n J uly 20 05, def

end ant s fileda mo ti onto di s mi s s th e s tat e law clai ms . See

Do cket No . 3: 05- cv008 22 ( J CH) , En tr

y 6 ( D. Con n. J uly 7, 200 5) . T he D is tr ict Cou r t gr ant ed thi s mo ti onina De cem ber 2005 order with respect to Sousa’s claim for negligent infliction of emotionaldistr ess and denied it with
r es pec t t o his clai m f

or in te nt io nal in fl ict io n o f e mo ti on al dis tr es s . See Do cket No . 3: 05- cv- 008 22 (J CH) , En tr

y 25 (D . Co nn . D ec. 1 9, 2 005 ). Fo llowing di s cov ery, i n D ecem ber 200 6 d ef end ant s mo ved fo r s um mar y ju dgm ent , see Docket No. 3:05-cv -00822 (JCH), Entry 65 (D. Conn. De c. 20, 20 06), and
onApr il 1 0, 2 007 , the D is tr

ict Cour t e nt er ed a rul

ing gr ant ing de fe nd ant s ’ m ot

io n o n all o f S ou s a’sN ei t her pa r t y ch al l eng es t he D i s t r i ct C our t ’ s det er m i nat i on t hat Sous a was s pea ki ng as a “c i t i z en” an d not as 5 a n “ e m p lo y e e ,” a n d w e d o n o t a d d r e ss th e issu e h e r e . 7 fe der al cl aim s , an d d ecli ni ng t o ex er cis e s up pl eme nt al j ur is di ct io n o ver So us a’s r emaining s tat e law clai m o f i nt ent

io nal in fl ict io n o f e mo ti on al dis tr es s . See Sousa , 20 07 WL 110 031 8, a t * 8. W it h re spe ctto S ou sa ’s Fi rst A me nd me nt c la im , t he Di stri ctC ou rt sta te d th a t “ [t] he fir st qu es ti onth e co ur t m us t as k indec iding a F ir s t A men dm ent r et ali ati onclai m i s whe th er th e pu bl ic employe e spoke ‘as a c itizen upon ma tters of public conce rn’ or ‘as an employee upon matters of per s on al i nt er es t. ’” Id

. at *6 (cit ing Connick v. Myers

, 46 1 U. S. 1 38, 147 (1 983 )) . I n co ns id er ing wh ether Sousa was speaking a s a “citize n” or as an “employ ee,” the Distr ict Court noted that the Supreme Court in Garcetti v. Ceba llos , 542 U.S. 4 10 (2006), had he ld that the “controlling fac tor” in determining whether someone is speaking a s an employee was whethe r “the speaker’s ‘express ions were made pu r s uan t t o his du ti es .’” Sousa , 20 07 WL 110 031 8, a t * 6 (qu ot

ing Garcetti

, 547 U.S. a t 421). Without fu r th er exp lan ati on , the Co ur t c on clu dedth at, “[ h] er e, ther e is no evi den ce that So us a’s of

fi cial du ti es in clu dedcom pl aining ab ou t w or kp lace vio len ce o r har as s men t. ” Sousa , 20 07 WL 110 031 8, a t * 6. 5 T urni ng t o wh ether

So us a’s s pee ch ad dr es s ed a m att er of pu bl ic co nce r n, th e Cou r t f

ou ndth at S ou s a’s
com pl ain ts wer e “the e s s enc e of an em pl oye e gr

iev ance .” Id

. at *7. T he Co ur t thencon clu dedth at “[t]here is no Fir st Amendment protection for speech ca lcula ted to redress personal grievanc es in the emp lo yme nt

con te xt ” an d gr ant ed s um mar y ju dgm ent

fo r def end ant s onSo us a’s r et ali ati onclai m. Id
. OnApr

il 2 3, 2 007 , f

in al j udgm ent

infa vo r of th e de fe nd ant s was ent er ed. T hi s app eal f ollo wed
. DISCUSSI ON T he o nly po r ti onof

th e Di s tr ict Cou r t’ s rul

ing that So us a challe nge s onapp eal i s th e Cou r t’ s leg al co nclus io n that

hi s s pee ch w as no t o n m att er s of pu bl ic co nce r n an d, acco r di ngl y, i s no t p r ot ect ed by the First

Amendment. A ppella nt Br . 4. Spec ifically , Sousa renews the argument, made before theW e n o te th a t S o u sa n o w a r g u e s th a t h is sp e e c h a lso a d d r e ss e d , inter a lia , nep ot i s m wi t hi n t he D EP , ag ency 6 h irin g p r a c tic e s, a n d se x u a l h a r a ss m e n t w ith in th e D E P
. S ee A pp ell an t B r. 19 -20
. T he se clai m s w ere no t rai sed be fore th e D istr ic t C o u r t, a n d w e d o n o t a d d r e ss th e m h e r e . S e e , e .g. , H il l v. C it y of N ewYork , 4 5 F .3 d 6 5 3 , 6 6 3 (2 d C ir. 1 9 9 5 ). 8 Distr ict Court, that he wa s the victim of retaliation for s peaki ng on matters of public concern, includi ng ho s tile wo r k en

vir on men t, r ever s e di s cr

imin ati on , an d wo r kp lace vio len ce. 6 We a cknowle dge that our precede nts on what constitut es “a matter of public conc ern,” and par ti cul arly, th e ext ent

to whi ch a c ou r t m ay t ake i nt o acc ou nt th e s peak er ’s mo ti

ves whe n m aki ng that de te rmi na ti on , a re le ss tha n c le a r. Ba sed up on ou r re a di ng of S up re me C ou rt p re ce de nt, ou r ow n c a ses, and the ca ses of

our s ister Circuits, we conclude , as we did in Reuland , that “the speake r’s m otive is not di s po s it ive indet ermi ni ng whether s pee ch i s ona matte r

of pu bl ic co nce r n. ” 46 0 F .3dat 4 11. I. St an da r d o f R evi ew Su mm ary ju dgm ent

is app r op r

iat e only “ if

th e pl eadi ngs , the dis cov ery anddi s clo s ur e ma te r ial s on file, and a ny affidavits show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fa ct and that the
mo van t i s ent

it ledto ju dgm ent

as a matte r

of law. ” F ed R. Civ. P. 56(c) ; see also, e.g
. , Wright v. Goord

, 55 4 F.3d 255, 266 (2d C ir. 2009). “We review de novo the district court ’s grant of s ummary judgment, dr awing all

fa ctual in fe r enc es infa

vo r of th e no n- mo ving pa r ty .” Paneccasio v. Unisource Worldwide, Inc. , 532 F. 3d101 , 10 7 (

2dCir . 20 08)
. II. “Matter[ s] of P ublic Concern” For Sous a’s retaliation c laim to be via ble, we must f ind that his speech was protected by the Fi r s t A men dm ent . I t i s es tab lis hedlaw i n thi s Cir cui t that , “[ r ]egar dl es s of

th e f actual con te xt , we h ave
r equ ir ed a p lai nt

if f alle ging r et ali ati onto es tab lis h s pee ch p r ot ect ed b y the Fir s t A men dm ent .” Will iams v. To wn of Greenburgh , 53 5 F .3d71, 76 ( 2dCir . 20 08) . T o d et ermi ne w hether or no t a p lai nt

if f’ s s pee ch i s pr ot ect ed, a cou r t m us t b egi n b y as king “wh ether th e em pl oye e s po ke as a cit izenona matte r

of pu bl ic
con cern. ” Garcetti

, 5 47 U. S. a t 4 18 . If

the co urtde te rmi ne s tha t th e p la in ti ff e it he r di d n ot sp ea k a s a9

ci ti ze n o r di d n ot sp ea k o n a ma tte r of p ub li c c on ce rn, “t he em pl oy ee ha s no Fir st A me nd me nt c a use of act io n b as ed o n his or

her emp lo yer ’s r eact

io n t o the s pee ch. ” Id

. The Supreme Court has defined “a ma tter of public concern” as one that “rela t[es] to any
mat te r of po lit ical , s oci al, or

other con cern t o the c om mu ni ty .” Connick , 46 1 U. S. a t 1 46. “Whe th er an employe e’s speech addresses a matter of public concern must be determined by the conte nt, form , and
con te xt of a giv en s tat eme nt , as r evealedby the who le r eco r d. ” Id . at 147 -4 8. Connick con cernedth e s pee ch o f S heila Myer s , anAs s is tan t D is tr ict At to r ney inNew Or lean s . After Myers learned tha t she would be transferr ed to prosecute cases in a different section of the
crim in a l c ou rt— amo ve she stro ng ly op po sed —sh e d ist rib ute d a qu estio nn aire , “ solic itin g t he vi ew s” of the other s taff members conce rning the “office transfer policy, office morale, the ne ed for a grievanc e committee, the levelof confidence in supervisors , and whe ther employee s felt pr essur ed to
wor k inpo lit

ical cam paigns .” Id

. at 141 . Af te r di s tr ib ut ing the s ur

vey, Myer s was to ldby h er
s up er vis or th at h er emp lo yme nt

was te r mi nat ed b ecau s e of her r ef us al t o acc ept

th e tr ans fe r . Id

. She filed suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a lleging that her employment wa s wrongfully terminated beca use she hadexer cis ed h er

con s ti tu ti on ally pr ot ect ed r igh t t o f r ee s pee ch. Id

. In ass essing Myers ’s s tatements, the Supreme Court conclude d that, with one e xception, the is s ues s he r ais ed i n h er

qu es ti on nai r e di d n ot

invo lve mat te r s of

pu bl ic co nce r n. T he Co ur t n ot ed that “Myers did not s eek to inform the public that the District Attorney’s office wa s not dis charging i ts gov ernm ent al r es po ns ib ili ti es .” Id . a t 1 48 . In ste a d, the C ou rt o bse rve d, “t he foc us o f My er s’[ s] qu estio ns i s . . . t o g a the r a mmu ni ti on for a no the r rou nd of c on tro ve rsy wi th h ersup erio rs. Th ese questions r eflect one e mployee ’s diss atisfaction with a transfer and an attempt to turn that displeasur e in to a cau s e cél èbr e.” Id

. The Court went on to state that “[w]hile a s a matter of good judgment, pu blic off ic ia ls sh ou ld be re ce ptive to c on stru ctiv e c ritic ism off er ed by the ir e mp lo ye es, the Fir st10

Ame nd men t d oes no t r equ ir e a pu bl ic o ff ice t o b e runas a r ou nd tab le f or emp lo yee co mp lai nt s ov er in te r nal of fi ce af fair s .” Id . at 149
. Des pi te th e Cou r t’ s des cr

ip ti onof Myer s ’s mo ti

ve, it wen t o n t o co nclud e that

on e qu es ti onin her questionnaire did address a “matter of public conce rn”—namely, whether any of the assis tant di s tr ict att orney s “ev er

fe [l t] pr es s ur ed t o wo r k inpo lit ical cam paigns onbeh alf

of of fi ce s up po r te d candid ate s .” Id

. T he Co ur t n ot ed that

“ther e is a dem on s tr ate d i nt er es t i n thi s cou ntry that government service should depend upon meritorious perf ormance rather than politica l service,” a nd
con clu dedth at “ [g

]i venthis hi s to ry, we bel

iev e it app ar ent th at the i s s ue o f whether

as s is tan t dis tr

ict attorneys are press ured to work in political c ampaig ns is a matter of interest t o the community upon which it is essential that public e mployee s be able to speak out freely without fear of r etalia tory di s mi s s al. ” Id

. Acc or di ngl

y, the Connick decision supported, among other things, the propos ition that a speaker’s motive was not dispos itive in dete rmining whether his or her s peec h addressed “a matter of pu bl ic co nce r n. ” Our Court dir ectly a ddress ed the significanc e of a speake r’s m otive in Lewis v. Cowen , 16 5 F .3d 154 (2d Cir. 1999 ), a ca se involving the speec h of the chief of a state lottery unit, who all eged tha t he
was fi r ed i n r et ali ati onfo r “r ef us ing t o p ub lic ly s up po r t a c hange i n the l ot te ry.” Id . at 157 . T he Lew

is Court began i ts inquir

y into whethe r the unit chief’s s peec h addressed a matter of public conce rn by
no ti ng that

“[ w]h ether an em pl oye e’s s pee ch ad dr es s es a matte r of pu bl ic co nce r n i s a qu es ti onof law fo r th e co ur t t o d ecid e, t aki ng i nt o acc ou nt th e co nt ent , f

orm, andcon te xt

of a giv en s tat eme nt

as
r evealedby t

he who le r eco r d. ” Id

. at 163 (c it ing Connick , 46 1 U. S. a t 1 47- 48 a ndn. 7) . T he Lewis Court stated that “[i]n reaching this deci sion, the court s hould focus on the motive of the speaker and attempt to determine whether the speec h was ca lcula ted to redress personal grievanc es or whether it had a11

br oad er pu bl ic p urpo s e.” Lew

is , 165 F.3d at 163-64 (ci ting Curtis v. Okla homa C

ity Pub. Sch. Bd. of Educ. , 147 F. 3d120 0, 1 212 (1 0th Ci r . 19 98) ). Des pi te th e f

act th at the Lew

is Cou r t s ugg es te d that

th e s peak er ’s mo ti

ve wa s cr it ical in considering whether his or her s peec h addressed a matter of public conce rn, in Cioffi v. Averill Park Central School District B oard of Educa tion , 4 44 F.3 d 1 58 , 1 65 -66 (2 d C ir. 20 06 ), we he ld tha t mo tive is not dispos itive in making this determination. As our Court s tated: [D ]ef end ant s ’ co nt ent

io n that a s peak er ’s pr

im ary mo ti

vat io n f or s peak ing is di s po s it

ive in determining whe ther speech is pers onal or public c onflicts directly with the Supreme Court’s holding in Connick . There, a public e mployee distr ibuted a que stionnaire to fe llo w co -w or ker s inor der to mar s hal

s up po r t f or her per s on al gr

iev ance with s up er

io r s . Connick , 461 U.S. a t 148. Although pe rs onal interest primarily motivated the speec h, the Supreme Court conclude d that one of the questions on the questionnaire touched upon a matte r of pu bl ic co nce r n an d was th us pr ot ect ed b y the Fir s t A men dm ent . Id . at 148 -4 9. In other wo rds, alth ough the speaker’s overall motivation was p erso nal, that fa ct was not dis po si ti ve. If it were, then the Supreme Court’s direction that we ex amine the c ontent, form, and context of a given statement to determine w hether it addresses a matter of pu bl ic co nce r n wo ul d b e s tr

ip pedof it s mea ni ng a ndpu rpo s e. Cio ffi , 444 F.3d at 165-66 (empha sis added a nd footnote omitted). The decision in Cio

ffi was echoe d and expa nded by our deci sion in Reuland , 46 0 F .3d409
. Reuland con cerneda Senio r

As s is tan t D is tr

ict At to r ney fr omth e B r oo kly

n D is tr ict At to r ney ’s Of

fi ce, who had g

iven a n interview to New York ma ga zi ne a bo ut a bo ok he ha d w rit te n, wh ic h w a s a “f ict io nal izedacco un t o f aB r oo kly

n D is tr ict At to r ney .” Id

. at 411. In the interview , the Senior Assi sta nt D ist ric t A tto rne y st a te d th a t “ Broo klyn is t he be st pl a ce to b e a ho mi ci de pro sec uto r” b ec a use “[ w]e ’ve got mo r e de ad b odies per

s qu ar e in ch thananyp lace els e.” Id . at 411-12 (internal quotation
mar ks omit te d) . I n as s es s ing wh ether or no t the s pee ch i n ques ti onadd r es s ed a m att er of pu bl ic
conce rn, a divided pa nel of our Court reviewed the Supreme Court’s decision in Connick , an d h eldth at “the s peak er ’s mo ti

ve, while o ne f

act or th at m ay be con s id er ed, is no t dis po s it ive as to whe th er

hi s
s pee ch ad dr es s ed a m att er of pu bl ic co nce r n. ” Id

. at 415. R elying

on this general proposition, the12

pan el m ajo r

it y he ldth at, des pi te th e f

act th at the j ur

y at tr ial fo un d that

Reul andwas no t m ot

iva te d b y a desire to address a matter of public conc ern, the statement nevertheless address ed wha t the Court bel iev ed w as in her ent

ly a m att er

of pu bl ic co nce r n: th e cr

im e r ate inB r oo kly

n. Id . at 418 . T he p anel majority continued: “ [w]e therefore have little difficulty concl uding that Re uland’s statement to New York magazin e add r es s ed a m att er of pu bl ic co nce r n. ” Id

. In reaching its conclusion, the pane l majority in Reuland noted that its view wa s the majority view am ong ci r cui ts th at h ad co ns id er ed the r elev ance of a s peak er ’s mo ti

ve: Other cir cui ts th at h ave c on s id er ed the r ol e of mo ti ve o n the ques ti onof

pu bl ic conce rn have al most unif

ormly agreed with our r eading of Connick andfo un d that mo ti ve i s no t dis po s it

ive
. Se e T ri pp v. Co le, 42 5 F .3d5, 1 1 ( 1s t Ci r . 20 05) (“ Wher e a public employ ee speak s out on a topic which is cle arly a l egitimate matter of inherent con cern t o the e lect or ate , the c ou r t m ay es chew f ur th er in quir y in to th e em pl oye e’s mo ti ves . . . . ” (

in te r nal qu ot ati onmar ks andcit ati onomit te d) ); Markos v . City of Atlanta , 364 F.3d 567, 572 -73 (5th Cir. 2004) (noting that although motivation is often releva nt, it is not “the new litmus test for the matter of public conc ern analy sis , displacing the Connick fa ct or s ”) ; Anderer v. Jo nes, 38 5 F .3d104 3, 1 053 (7 thCir . 20 04) (“ We ackn owl edg e that

mo ti ve i s r elev ant

to th e ma tt er

of pu bl ic co nce r n i nqui ry, tho ughit is not dispos itive.” (internal quota tions and alterations omitted)); Alpha Energy Saver

s, Inc. v. Hansen , 381 F.3d 917, 92 5 (9th Cir. 2004) (“[W]e have he ld that motive should not be us ed as a li tm us te s t f

or pu bl ic co nce r n; r ath er , co nt ent is th e gr eat es t s ingle fa ct or in th e Connick inquiry.” (internal quotations omitted)); Azz aro v. Co unt y o f A lle gh en y , 11 0 F.3d 968, 978 (3d C ir. 1997) (“ Connick indica tes that the speaker’s motive, while often a relevant pa rt of

the context of the speech, is not disposit ive in de termining whether a par ti cul ar s tat eme nt

r elat es to a mat te r

of pu bl ic co nce r n. ”) ; Cha

ppel v. Montgomery

County Fi re Pr o t. Dis t. No . 1 , 13 1 F .3d564 , 57 6 ( 6th Ci r . 19 97) (“ [T ]h e mo ti ve whichun der

lie s an em pl oye e’s s tat eme nt s is a r elev ant , b ut no t n eces s ar

ily di s po s it ive fa ct or in considering whether an e mployee ’s s tatements may be fai rly charac terized as relating to any ma tter of political, social, or other conce rn to the community.” (citation and in te r nal qu ot ati onmar ks omit te d) ); Mor ris v. Crow , 11 7 F .3d449 , 45 7 ( 11th Ci r . 19 97) (“ [A ]nem pl oy ee ’s motive for s peec h, while not dispos itive, is a fac tor that mus t be con s id er ed i n d et ermi ni ng whether s pee ch i s a matte r

of pu bl ic co nce r n. ”) ; Barnard v. Jackson County , 43 F.3d 1218, 12 26 (8th Cir. 1995) (“Insofar as self-inter est is f ound to have mo tiva te d p ub li c- em pl oy ee spe ec h, the em pl oy ee ’s e xp re ssio n i s en ti tl ed to l ess weig ht inth e Pickering [ v. Bd. of Educ. , 391 U.S. 5 63 (1968)] bala nce than spee ch on matter of public conce rn intended to serve the public interest.” (internal quotations and alt er ati on s omit te d) ).13

Reuland , 46 0 F .3dat 4 17- 18. T he p anel maj or it y wen t o n t o n ot e that

only o ne Ci r cui t ar

gua bly hadexp r es s ed a dif

fe r ent view: Only the Tenth Circuit has potentiall y treated motive a s dis positive, although it has not exp lic it ly s o h eld
. See, e.g. , Schalk v. Gal lemore, 906 F.2d 491 (10th C ir. 1990) (“In drawing th e thi n l in e be tw eena pu bl

ic em pl oye e’s s pee ch whi ch t ou che s onmat te r s of pu bl ic con cern, ands pee ch f

r omth e s ame emp lo yee whichonly d eals with p er s on al employment ma tters , we have looke d to the subjective intent of the speaker.”). Id . at 418
. Finally, the panel ma jority in Reuland addressed the st atements in Lew is suggesting the centrality of a speaker’s motive in determining whe ther the speech constituted a matter of public conce rn, and attempted to reconcile its holding with Lew is: In Lewis v. Cowen , we n ot ed that , indet ermi ni ng whether an em pl oye e’s s pee ch ad dr es s es a matter of public conc ern, “the court should focus on the motive of the speaker and att emp t t o d et ermi ne whether th e s pee ch w as calc ul ate d t o r edr es s per s on al gr iev ance s or whe th er it hada br oad er

pu bl ic p urpo s e.” 165 F. 3d154 , 16 3- 64 ( 2dCir . 19 99)
. Nev er th eles s , co ns is te nt

with o ur pr evi ou s cas es , we f

ocu s ed o n p r

iva te mo ti ves r elat ed to emp lo yme nt , s tat

ing that “s pee ch o n a p ur ely p r

iva te mat te r , s uchas an em pl oye e’s diss atisfaction with the conditions of his employment, does not pertain to a matter of pu bl ic co nce r n. ” Id

. at 164 . N on e of

th es e cas es s ugg es t that

th e s peak er ’s mo ti

ve alo ne is di s po s it ive of th e pu bl ic co nce r n i s s ue, andthis is es pec ially true wher e thi s mo ti ve i s no t t o ad dr es s an em pl oym ent gr iev ance . Reuland , 46 0 F .3dat 4 17. Despite our holding in Reuland that a speake r’s m otive is not dispos itive whe n a court considers whether the speech a t iss ue addresses a matter of public concern, our recent holding in Ruotolo v. City of New York , 514 F.3d 184 (2d C ir. 2008) suggested otherwise. In Ruo to lo , a r et ir ed p ol ice s ergean t s ued the City of NewYork and va rious of ficials and membe rs of the New York C ity Police De partment, all egi ng r et ali ati oninvio lat io n o f the Fir s t A men dm ent fo r a laws ui t h e hadfiled . I n as s es s ing wh ether Ruo to lo ’s laws ui t ad dr es s ed a m att er of pu bl ic co nce r n, th e Ruo to lo

pan el r each ed b ack t o o ur earlie r decision in Lew

is:W e no t e t hat t he R uotolo d e c isio n , 5 1 4 F .3 d 1 8 4 , d o e s n o t c ite , m u c h le ss a p p ly , o u r C o u r t’s p r io r d e c isio n s in 7 C ioffi , 4 44 F. 3d 15 8, a nd R e ul and , 460 F. 3d 409. M i ndf

ul t hat t he l aw of

t he Ci r cui t ca n be m odi f i ed or ove r r ul ed onl y by act i on o f t he e n banc c o u r t, s e e

, e .g. , U nite d S tat

e s v. B rut us , 505 F. 3d 80, 87 n. 5 ( 2d C i r . 2007 ) ( “W e r ecog ni z e t hat t he l aw of t he c i r cui t doct r i ne di ct at es t hat we ar e ‘ bound by t he deci s i ons of pr i or pa nel s unt i l s uch t i m e a s t hey ar e ov er r ul ed ei t her by an en banc panel of ou r C ou rt or by t he Su prem e C ou rt . ’ ” ( qu ot i ng U nite d S tates v. Wil

k ers on , 361 F. 3d 717, 732 ( 2d C i r . 2004 ) ) ) , we cann ot con cl ude by i t s s i l ence on t hes e ca s es t hat t he R uotolo pan el m ean t i n a ny way t o ov er t urn or even na r r ow our p r i or hol di ng s i n C ioffi or R e ul and
. 14 “Whe ther an employe e’s speech addresses a matter of public concern is a question of law for the court to decide, ta king into ac count the content, form, and context of a giv en s tat eme nt

as r evealedby the who le r eco r d. ” Lewis v. Cowen , 16 5 F .3d154 , 16 3 ( 2d Cir. 1999) (citing

Connick v. Myers

, 46 1 U. S. 1 38, 147 -4 8 an d n . 7, 103 S. Ct . 16 84, 75 L. Ed. 2d708 (1 983 ))
. The heart of the matter is whe th er th e em pl oye e’s s pee ch w as “cal cul ate d t o r edr es s per s on al gr iev ance s or

whe th er it hada br oad er

pu bl ic p urpo s e.” Lew is , 16 5 F .3dat 1 63- 64. Ruo to lo , 51 4 F .3dat 1 89 (emp has is add ed) . T he Co ur t thencon clu dedth at b ecau s e “Ru ot ol o’ s laws ui t
s ought to r edr es s hi s per s on al gr

iev ance s [,] [

i] t didno t s eek t o advan ce a p ub lic pu rpo s e.” Id
. 7 T o the e xt ent

th at o ur pr eced ent s hav e be en l es s th an cl ear , we r eaf fi r m t od ay ou r

ho lding in Reuland : a spe a ke r’s m otive is n ot d isp osi tive in de te rmi ni ng wh et he r hi s or h erspe ec h a dd re sses a mat te r of pu bl ic co nce r n. Se e Reulan d

, 46 0 F .3dat 4 15. As bo thth e Reuland and Cio ffi dec is io ns mak e clea r, our conclusion here is also compelled by the hol ding of the Supreme Court in Connick
. Se e i d. at 416 (“The facts of the Supreme Court’s decision in Connick indica te that motive is not dispos itive as to whether an e mployee ’s s peec h is a matter of public conce rn.”); Cio ffi , 44 4 F .3dat 1 65- 66 (cit

ing Connick , 461 U.S. a t 148-49). In Connick , the S up r eme Cou r t c on clu dedth at p ar t o f t he ques ti on nai r e add r es s ed a matter of public conc ern despite the fact that the Assist ant Distr ict Attorney’s decision to circulate her qu es ti on nai r e was mo ti

vat ed b y he r

ownemp lo yme nt

gr ievance s . See Connick , 46 1 U. S. a t 1 48- 49
. As noted by our Court in Reuland , this r eading

of Connick has led almost every other court of appeal s to conclude that a speake r’s m otive is not dispos itive in a ss essing whether his or her speech addressed a
mat te r of pu bl ic co nce r n. Se e Reulan d

, 46 0 F .3dat 4 17- 18 ( “O th er cir cui ts th at h ave c on s id er ed the r ol e15

of motive on the question of public concern hav e almost uniformly agreed wi th our r eading of Connick and found that motive is not dispos itive.” (col lecting c ases)). We note that this holding does not negate the fac t that, as we stated in Lew is , “speech on a purely private ma tter, s uch as an e mployee ’s diss atisfaction with the conditions of his employment, do es no t p er tai n t o a m att er of pu bl ic co nce r n. ” Lew

is , 165 F.3d at 164. An employ ee w ho complains solely about his own dissatisf action with the conditions of his own employment is s peaki ng “upon
mat te r s only o f p er s on al i nt er es t. ” Connick , 46 1 U. S. a t 1 47. We ma ke cl ear to day, ho weve r , that

it does not follow that a person motivated by a per s on al gr iev ance cann ot

be s peak ing ona matte r

of pu bl ic
con cern. I n the c as e at

han d, we co nclud e that

th e Di s tr ict Cou r t e r r ed i n co ncluding that So us a’s s pee ch did not address a matter of public conc ern beca use he was motivated by employment griev ance s. T he Di s tr ict Cou r t r ead o ur

Cou r t’ s pr eced ent s to s tan d f or th e pr op os it

io n that “wh er e the e mp lo yee’ s private motives are expressed in the context of an employ ee griev ance . . . the speech a t iss ue does not add r es s a matte r

of pu bl ic co nce r n, ” Sousa , 20 07 WL 110 031 8, a t * 6, a ndcit ed o ur Cou r t’ s op inio n i n Reuland fo r s up po r t. I f a nythi ng, ho weve r , Reuland ma de pl ain tha t ou r C ou rt h a s not con s is te nt ly t aken this view: Ou r pr evi ou s cas es s ugg es ti ng that th e s peak er ’s mo ti

ve migh t i ndicat e that

th e s pee ch is no t o n a m att er

of pu bl ic co nce r n h ave f

ocu s ed p r im ar ily onpr iva te mo ti ves r elat ed to emp lo yme nt

gr iev ance s . See, e.g. , Ezekwo v. NYC Health & Hosps. Corp ., 9 40 F .2d775 , 781 (2 d Ci r . 19 91) (“ Ezek

wo w as no t o n a mis s io n t o p r ot ect th e pu bl ic we lf ar e. Ra ther, her primary aim was to protect her own reputation and individua l devel opment as a do ct or .”) ; Whi

te Plains Towing Corp. v. Patterso n , 99 1 F .2d104 9, 1 060 (2 d Ci r . 19 93) (“ Altho ugh[p lai nt

if f’ s ] Fir s t A men dm ent

in te r es t i n f

ili ng his s ho r t- liv ed p er s on nel complaint w ould be we ak if, as the trial record str ongly suggests, he took that action solely to obtain addi tional towing referrals, the trial court did not err in ruling the personnel complaint did a t least minimally touc h upon a matter of public conc ern.”); Blum v. Schlegel

, 18 F. 3d100 5, 1 012 (2 d Ci r . 19 94) (n ot ing that pr iva te mo ti ves s uchas “facing termination for pers onal consumption of marijuana” or “trying to evade or discredit a drug testing progr am” might mea n that employe e speech a dvocating theW e no t e t hat as pa r t of t he D i s t r i ct C our t ’ s pr ocee di ng s , i t m ay w i s h t o a s s um e ar g u e n do th a t S o u sa ’s 8 s t at em ent s di d t ouch o n “ a m at t er of publ i c co ncer n, ” and pr ocee d s t r ai gh t t o “ P icker ing bal anc i ng , ”— t hat i s , con s i deri ng w het her Sou s a’ s “i nt eres t i n fr ee com m ent i s outwe i ghed by t he Stat e’ s i nt eres t i n t he eff i ci ency of i t s pub l i c s ervi ces. ” C l ue v. John son , 179 F
. 3d 57, 60 ( 2d C i r. 1999 ) ( ci t i ng P icker ing , 3 9 1 U .S . a t 5 7 2 -7 3 ); see also B l a ck m a n v . N ewYork C it

y Tr an s it A u t h. , 4 9 1 F .3 d 9 5 , 1 0 0 n .5 (2 d C ir. 2 0 0 7 ) (“ W e p a u se to n o te th a t, in c a se s in w h ic h th e ‘m a tte r s o f p u b lic conc er n’ i s s ue i s cl os e but t he t as k of ba l anc i ng i nt er es t s does not ap pea r t o be a di ff i cul t one , i t g ener al l y wi l l be pr ef er abl e f or a di s t r i ct cour t t o a s s um e ar g u e n do t hat t he ‘ m at t er s of publ i c co ncer n’ r equi r em ent ha s bee n s at i s f i ed, an d th e n p r o c e e d d ire c tly to th e b a la n c in g o f in te r e sts . C f. L ocurto [ v. G i

ul i ani ], 447 F
. 3d [ 159 , ] 175 [ 2d C i r. 2006 ] ( ‘ A s s um i ng, t her ef or e, t hat t he p l ai nt i ffs were s pea ki ng on a m at t er of publ i c co ncer n, we pr ocee d t o t he s econ d par t of t he P icker

ing f r am ework. ’ )
. Such an app r oac h woul d avoi d t he n eed f or t i m e- cons um i ng r em ands , es peci al l y i n ca s es i n whi ch P icker ing b a lan c ing , tho u g h c lea rly fa v o rin g o n e p a rty , c a n n o t be d o n e c o m fo rta b ly b y an ap p e ll a te c o u rt. ” ). 16 lega liza tion of marijuana wa s not pr otected). In Ezekwo , the o nly o ne o f t he se cases to co ncl ude the speech at issue was not a m atter of publ ic concern, we relied not only on the motive o f the speaker, but on th e content of the speech , f in di ng that

bo thwer e r elat ed t o p er s on al gr iev ance s . 94 0 F. 2dat 7 81. Reuland , 460 F.3d at 417 (e mphasis added). Moreover, as noted above, the C ourt in Reuland emp has ized that even though some ea rlier cases had indeed ta ken motive into a ccount, pa rticularly in the emp lo yme nt

gr iev ance con te xt , “[

n] on e of th es e cas es s ugg es t that

th e s peak er ’s mo ti

ve alo ne is di s po s it ive of th e pu bl ic co nce r n i s s ue[ .] ” Id

. (emp has is inth e or

igi nal ). In s um, we c onclude tha t the Distr ict Court erred in stating as a gene ral rule that “[t]here is no Firs t Amendment protection for s peec h calc ulated to redress per sonal grievanc es in the employment
con te xt ,” Sousa , 2007 WL 1100318, a t *7. Whe ther or not speech addresses a matter of public concern “m us t b e de te r mi nedby the c on te nt , f orm, andcon te xt

of a giv en s tat eme nt , as r evealedby the who le
r eco r d, ” Connick , 46 1 U. S. a t 1 47- 48, andwhile m ot ives ur ely m ay be on e f

act or inmak ing thi s det ermi nat

io n, it is no t, s tan di ng alo ne, di s po s it ive or con clu s ive
. Acco r di ngl

y, we vacat e the A pr

il 2 3, 2 007 ju dgm ent

of th e Di s tr ict Cou r t i ns of

ar as it gr ant ed def end ant s s um mar

y ju dgm ent

onSo us a’s Fi r s t A men dm ent clai m, andwe r ema ndth e cas e f or fu r th er pro ce ed in gs. 817 CONCLUSI ON For the reasons s tated above , we rea ffirm the holding of Reuland , r oo te d i n the S up r eme Cou r t’ s decision in Connick , that “the speake r’s m otive, whil e one fac tor that may be considered, is not di s po s it ive as to whe th er

hi s s pee ch ad dr es s ed a m att er of pu bl ic co nce r n. ” Reuland

, 46 0 F .3dat 4 15. Acco r di ngl

y, we con clu de that

th e Di s tr ict Cou r t e r r ed i n i ts det ermi nat io n i n thi s cas e that

So us a’s

s pee ch w as no t o n “amat te r of pu bl ic co nce r n” s ol ely b ecau s e So us a was mo ti vat ed b y hi s emp lo yme nt

gr iev ance s . We ther ef

or e vac ate th e Ap r

il 2 3, 2 007 ju dgm ent

of th e Di s tr ict Cou r t i ns of

ar as it granted defendants summary judgment on Sousa’s Fir st Amendment claim, a nd we remand the

caus e f or fu r th er pr oce edi ngs con s is te nt

with thi s op inio n.