IN THE SUPREME COURT OF IOWA

No. 19–1442 

Submitted April 14, 2021—Filed May 14, 2021 

STATE OF IOWA,

Appellee, 

vs. 

TRAVIS JAMES JORDAN,

Appellant. 

On review from the Iowa Court of Appeals. 

Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Webster County, Kurt L. 

Wilke, Judge. 

The defendant challenges the sentence imposed following 

convictions on pleas of guilty, alleging the prosecutor breached the plea 

agreement by failing to remain silent regarding a sentencing 

recommendation. AFFIRMED. 

 

Christensen, C.J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which all 

justices joined. 

Jesse A. Macro Jr. of Macro & Kozlowski, L.L.P., West Des Moines, 

for appellant. 
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Thomas J. Miller, Attorney, Thomas J. Ogden, Assistant Attorney 

General, Darren D. Driscoll, County Attorney, and Brad M. McIntyre, 

Assistant County Attorney, for appellee. 
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CHRISTENSEN, Chief Justice. 

The plea agreement here provided the defendant would plead guilty 

to his pending charge of third-degree burglary, be released with 

supervision until sentencing, and be free to argue for probation at 

sentencing. Additionally, as part of the defendant’s supervised release 

agreement that he signed after entering his plea, he agreed to attend all 

court hearings. In exchange, the State agreed to dismiss the other pending 

charge against the defendant and remain silent at sentencing. However, 

the defendant absconded after the plea hearing and failed to appear for 

the sentencing hearing. Following his arrest nearly seven months later, 

he appeared for sentencing, where the State advocated for a prison 

sentence, which the district court then imposed. 

The defendant appealed, arguing the prosecutor breached the 

parties’ plea agreement by failing to remain silent at sentencing and his 

trial counsel was ineffective in failing to object to this breach. The court 

of appeals dismissed the appeal, concluding it lacked subject matter 

jurisdiction under Iowa Code section 814.7 (2020), which requires 

ineffective-assistance claims to be brought in postconviction proceedings 

rather than by direct appeal. After the court of appeals issued its decision, 

we issued our opinion in State v. Boldon, 954 N.W.2d 62 (Iowa 2021), in 

which we held Iowa Code section 814.7 did not preclude our review of an 

alleged prosecutorial breach of a plea agreement. Id. at 71. On further 

review, we hold we have subject matter jurisdiction and authority to 

consider the defendant’s appeal and affirm the defendant’s sentence 

because the defendant forfeited any rights to enforce the plea agreement 

when he breached it by absconding and failing to appear at the originallyscheduled sentencing. 
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I. Background Facts and Proceedings. 

On September 24, 2018, Fort Dodge Police Officer Jacob Naatz was 

on patrol in Fort Dodge when he observed Travis Jordan walking down an 

alley, seemingly going from garage to garage in the area. Officer Naatz 

continued to patrol the alleys and observed Jordan walk out of a garage 

with a backpack, leading Officer Naatz to stop Jordan and ask Jordan why 

he was in the garage. Jordan claimed he was in the garage because he 

thought it was his friend’s and he went in to go to the bathroom. The 

record is unclear how Officer Naatz discovered the materials in Jordan’s 

backpack, but the record shows Jordan’s backpack contained binoculars, 

gloves, wrenches, a knife, and a flashlight along with Jordan’s wallet. 

Officer Naatz then went into the garage and located a second flashlight on 

the ground where Jordan had been standing when Officer Naatz first made 

contact with him. This awoke the homeowner, who came out to talk with 

Officer Naatz and informed him that the flashlight was his and had been 

inside his vehicle parked in the garage. The homeowner told Officer Naatz 

that Jordan had no right to be in the garage. 

Jordan was subsequently arrested and charged with burglary in the 

third degree, a class “D” felony, in violation of Iowa Code sections 713.1 

and 713.6A(1) (2018), and possession of burglary tools, an aggravated 

misdemeanor, in violation of Iowa Code section 713.7. Jordan and the 

State entered into a plea agreement, which was placed on the record 

during the plea hearing on October 22. As Jordan’s counsel explained at 

the hearing, 

Mr. Jordan is going to enter a guilty plea to Count I for 

burglary in the third degree. The State is agreeing to dismiss 

Count II. The parties are agreeing to release Mr. Jordan [with 

supervision by the Second Judicial District Department of 

Correctional Services] after the hearing today. 
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The recommendation of the county attorney -- the 

county attorney’s going to agree to remain silent at 

sentencing, and the defendant is free to argue for probation. 

And that’s essentially the plea agreement. 

The assistant county attorney confirmed “[t]hat is the plea 

agreement reached between the parties,” and Jordan also confirmed that 

was his understanding of the plea agreement. In accepting Jordan’s plea, 

the district court specifically advised Jordan “to contact the Department 

of Correctional Services within 48 hours [of the hearing] and sign a 

contract of expectations of release agreement.” As part of this agreement 

Jordan signed after the plea hearing, he agreed to “appear in Court when 

required.” 

The district court set Jordan’s sentencing for November 26, but 

Jordan failed to appear and a warrant was issued for his arrest. Jordan 

was arrested on June 2, 2019, and his sentencing occurred on August 19. 

Jordan did not have the same counsel or district court judge at sentencing 

as he did during his plea hearing. The court began the hearing by 

explaining that “Mr. Jordan entered a plea of guilty to burglary in the third 

degree.” Instead of remaining silent, the assistant county attorney 

advocated for a five-year term of imprisonment, stating, 

I have no witnesses or evidence, just a recommendation, and 

that recommendation matches that of the PSI that was filed 

in this case. The defendant has a long criminal history that 

includes burglary and theft cases much like the one that is 

before the Court today and also includes violent charges. He 

has been previously incarcerated four times in the State of 

Iowa. And in this case, he was set for sentencing in November 

of 2018, and as the addendum to the presentence 

investigation report states, he failed to appear at that time and 

his whereabouts were unknown from November until June 

3rd of 2019, when he was arrested. So for seven months he 

absconded. He also has other absconsions on his record from 

the past. Given his criminal history, the unknown 

whereabouts for seven months pending sentencing after his 

plea in this matter, the State believes that for protection of the 

community from future offenses and for rehabilitation of the 

defendant, that imposition of the five-year -- the term not to 
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exceed five years is appropriate. With that, due to the 

incarceration, the State would ask that the fine and surcharge 

be suspended. There is a $125 Law Enforcement Initiative 

surcharge that would be imposed. I believe that’s the 

recommendation of the State. 

Jordan’s counsel sought a suspended sentence and probation without 

objecting that the State breached the plea agreement by failing to remain 

silent. The district court decided to “go along with the recommendation of 

the PSI and the recommendation of the State,” ordering Jordan to “be 

placed with the Iowa Department of Corrections for an indeterminate term 

not to exceed five years.” 

Jordan filed a timely appeal, arguing his counsel was ineffective in 

failing to object to the prosecutor’s breach of the plea agreement. We 

transferred the case to the court of appeals, which concluded it must 

dismiss the appeal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under Iowa Code 

section 814.7 because Jordan only raised ineffective-assistance claims. 

Jordan filed an application for further review, and we granted that 

application. 

II. Standard of Review. 

A defendant’s allegation of prosecutorial breach “is a species of 

sentencing error.” Boldon, 954 N.W.2d at 70. Thus, we review it for the 

correction of errors at law. See State v. Damme, 944 N.W.2d 98, 103 (Iowa 

2020). “We will not reverse a sentence unless there is ‘an abuse of 

discretion or some defect in the sentencing procedure.’ ” Id. (quoting State 

v. Formaro, 638 N.W.2d 720, 724 (Iowa 2002)).

III. Jurisdiction.

The State contends we lack jurisdiction to consider Jordan’s appeal 

under Iowa Code section 814.6(1)(a)(3), which establishes there is no right 

of appeal from a guilty plea unless the defendant establishes “good cause.” 

Iowa Code § 814.6(1)(a)(3). After the parties submitted their briefs in this 
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case, we decided Damme, in which we held the good cause requirement is 

satisfied “when the defendant challenges his or her sentence rather than 

the guilty plea.” Id. at 105. Because Jordan’s challenge is to his sentence 

instead of his guilty plea, he has good cause to appeal and section 

814.6(1)(a)(3) does not deprive us of subject matter jurisdiction. See id. 

The State also argues we lack subject matter jurisdiction to address 

Jordan’s claim of ineffective assistance of counsel on direct appeal under 

Iowa Code section 814.7 (2020), which requires ineffective-assistance 

claims to be brought in postconviction proceedings rather than by direct 

appeal. See Iowa Code section 814.7. We disagree. Section 814.7 does 

not limit jurisdiction; it limits the authority of Iowa’s appellate courts to 

resolve ineffective-assistance claims on direct appeal. See Boldon, 954 

N.W.2d at 69 (characterizing the statute as regulating the court’s 

authority); State v. Emery, 636 N.W.2d 116, 119 (Iowa 2001) (“[S]ubject 

matter jurisdiction should not be confused with authority.” (quoting State 

v. Yodprasit, 564 N.W.2d 383, 385 (Iowa 1997))). 

Here, we have jurisdiction, and we have the authority to resolve the 

sentencing issue on direct appeal. After the parties submitted their briefs 

and the court of appeals issued its decision dismissing this appeal for lack 

of jurisdiction, we issued our opinion in Boldon. There, we held Iowa Code 

section 814.7 did not preclude our review of an alleged prosecutorial 

breach of a plea agreement because the alleged breach was a claim of 

sentencing error that could be reviewed directly without being cast as an 

ineffective-assistance claim. Boldon, 954 N.W.2d at 71. As we explained, 

“[a] prosecutor’s breach of the plea agreement at sentencing irreparably 

taints the sentencing proceeding and a claim of breach is reviewable on 

direct appeal even in the absence of contemporaneous objection.” Id. 
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Consequently, Iowa Code section 814.7 is inapplicable here and does not 

preclude our review of Jordan’s claim of breach. 

IV. Analysis. 

Jordan maintains the prosecutor breached the parties’ plea 

agreement when the prosecutor recommended a five-year term of 

imprisonment instead of remaining silent as agreed upon on the record as 

part of the plea agreement reached nearly ten months earlier. Jordan 

seeks specific performance of the plea agreement and does not contend he 

should have been able to withdraw his plea due to the alleged breach. The 

State argues it was relieved of its obligation to remain silent at sentencing 

when Jordan breached the agreement by absconding and failing to appear 

at his originally-scheduled sentencing hearing in November 2018. We 

agree with the State. 

The terms of a plea agreement must be mutual for the agreement to 

be binding, and “[t]he State has no obligation to make available the 

anticipated benefits of a plea agreement when the defendant fails to 

perform his or her end of the bargain.” State v. Dudley, 856 N.W.2d 668, 

675 (Iowa 2014). In construing a plea agreement, we look to the parties’ 

“justified expectations.” Boldon, 954 N.W.2d at 71; see also United States 

v. Rivera, 954 F.2d 122, 124 (2d Cir. 1992) (“We look to ‘what the parties 

to this plea agreement reasonably understood to be the terms of the 

agreement.’ ” (quoting Paradiso v. United States, 689 F.2d 28, 31 (2d Cir. 

1982) (per curiam))). Implicit in the plea deal was the expectation Jordan 

would show up for the sentencing hearing. See United States v. Munoz, 

718 F.3d 726, 729–30 (7th Cir. 2013) (“When Munoz fled the country and 

spent nearly five years as a fugitive in Mexico, he breached what we believe 

was an implied but obvious term of the plea agreement that he remain in 

the country and show up for sentencing.”); Rivera, 954 F.2d at 124 (“[T]he 
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reasonable meaning of the plea agreement is that Rivera’s failure to appear 

for sentencing . . . would release the government from its obligations to 

recommend a sentence reduction.”). 

As part of the parties’ agreement to release Jordan with supervision 

following his plea hearing, Jordan agreed in his supervised release 

contract of expectations to “appear in Court when required.” Jordan 

clearly did not fulfill his end of the bargain, as he failed to appear at his 

November 2018 sentencing date and absconded for seven months with no 

information on his whereabouts until he was arrested on June 3, 2019. 

Consequently, the State had no obligation to abide by the plea agreement 

and therefore did not breach the plea agreement because Jordan forfeited 

any rights to enforce the plea agreement by breaching it first. See, e.g., 

United States v. Wells, 211 F.3d 988, 995 (6th Cir. 2000) (“a defendant 

who breaches a plea agreement forfeits any right to its enforcement”); 

Rivera, 954 F.2d at 124 (“[B]ecause [the defendant] failed to live up to his 

obligation [under the plea agreement], the government was not required to 

recommend a sentence reduction. Therefore, the government did not 

breach the agreement by declining to make such a recommendation.”); 

United States v. Calabrese, 645 F.2d 1379, 1390 (10th Cir. 1981) (“It is 

clear that a defendant’s failure to fulfill the terms of a pretrial agreement 

relieves the Government of its reciprocal obligations under the 

agreement.”); cf. Munoz, 718 F.3d at 730 (“No defendant could reasonably 

expect that he could abscond for five years and still hold the government 

to its promises under the plea agreement.”). 

Although we conclude the State did not breach the plea agreement 

in this case, we do so with a cautionary admonition. Nowhere in the record 

is there any acknowledgment by the sentencing court that the parties 

agreed Jordan had breached the plea agreement, let alone that Jordan’s 
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breach of the agreement automatically relieved the State of its agreement 

obligations. Nevertheless, there is no factual dispute that a bench warrant 

was issued because Jordan absconded and failed to appear at his first 

sentencing in violation of his release contract, and the sentencing court 

discussed Jordan’s absconding and failure to appear at his first sentencing 

in issuing Jordan’s sentence. Thus, the record in this case is adequate to 

determine the issue of breach as a matter of law without an evidentiary 

hearing. See United States v. Calabrese, 645 F.2d at 1390 (“The question 

of a defendant’s breach is not an issue to be finally determined unilaterally 

by the government. If the pleadings reveal a factual dispute on the issue 

of breach, the district court must hold a hearing to resolve the factual 

issues. If the pleadings reveal no disputed factual issues, no hearing is 

necessary and the court may determine the issue of breach as a matter of 

law.” (citation omitted)); see also United States v. Novosel, No. 03–4190, 

2004 WL 1406319, at *4 (10th Cir. June 24, 2004) (concluding the 

sentencing court’s statements about the defendant not being entitled to a 

sentencing adjustment based on his failure to appear at sentencing and 

absconding were adequate to indicate a judicial determination of breach 

and a release of the government from its plea agreement obligations). But 

that will not always be the case. Attorneys and sentencing courts should 

strive to ensure any issues involving a breach of a plea agreement are 

discussed on the record at the sentencing hearing to avoid the potential 

need for remand and resentencing following an appeal. 

V. Conclusion. 

For the aforementioned reasons, we affirm Jordan’s sentence. 

AFFIRMED.