11-3168-ag Lin-Guo v. Holder BIA A098 980 945 

### UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS **FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT** 

## SUMMARY ORDER

**RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO**  **A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED**  **AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF**  **APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT’S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN**  **ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.**  **At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals** 1 **for the Second Circuit, held at the Daniel Patrick Moynihan** 2 **United States Courthouse, 500 Pearl Street, in the City of** 3 **New York, on the 25 th** **day of July, two thousand twelve.** 4 5 **PRESENT:** 6 **ROBERT D. SACK,** 7 **GERARD E. LYNCH,** 8 **SUSAN L. CARNEY,** 9 Circuit Judges**.** 10

**_______________________________________** 11 12 **ZUO SHI LIN-GUO, AKA ZU SHI LIN,** 13 Petitioner**,** 14 15 **v. 11-3168-ag** 16 **NAC** 17 **ERIC H. HOLDER, JR., UNITED STATES** 18 **ATTORNEY GENERAL,** 19 Respondent**.** 20

**_______________________________________** 21 22 **FOR PETITIONER: Peter Lobel, New York, New York.** 23 24 **FOR RESPONDENT: Tony West, Assistant Attorney** 25 **General; Linda S. Wernery, Assistant** 26 **Director; William C. Minick,** 27 **Attorney, Office of Immigration** 28 **Litigation, United States Department** 29 **of Justice, Washington, D.C.** 302 UPON DUE CONSIDERATION of this petition for review of a 1 decision of the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”), it is 2 hereby ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the petition for 3 review is DENIED. 4 Zuo Shi Lin-Guo, a native and citizen of the People’s 5 Republic of China, seeks review of a July 12, 2011, decision 6 of the BIA denying his motion to reopen. In re Zuo Shi Lin7
Guo , No. A098 980 945 (B.I.A. July 12, 2011). We assume the 8 parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts and 9 procedural history of this case. 10 We review the BIA’s denial of Li’s motion to reopen for 11 abuse of discretion. Ali v. Gonzales, 448 F.3d 515, 517 (2d 12 Cir. 2006). When, as here, the BIA considers relevant 13 evidence of country conditions in evaluating the motion to 14 reopen, we review the BIA’s factual findings under the 15 substantial evidence standard. See Jian Hui Shao v. 16 Mukasey, 546 F.3d 138, 169 (2d Cir. 2008). 17 An alien may file only one motion to reopen and must do 18 so within 90 days of the agency’s final administrative 19 decision. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(A), (C); 8 C.F.R. 20 § 1003.2(c)(2). Although Lin-Guo’s motion was indisputably 21 untimely because it was filed more than two years after the 223 agency’s final order of removal, see8 U.S.C. 1 § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(i), there is no time limitation for filing 2 a motion to reopen to apply or reapply for asylum if it is 3 “based on changed country conditions arising in the country 4 of nationality or the country to which removal has been 5 ordered, if such evidence is material and was not available 6 and would not have been discovered or presented at the 7 previous proceeding.” 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii); see 8 also 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii). Here, the BIA did not 9 abuse its discretion in finding that Lin-Guo failed to 10 establish such circumstances based on his newly commenced 11 practice of Christianity in the United States. See Li Yong 12 Zheng v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice , 416 F.3d 129, 130-31 (2d 13 Cir. 2005) (explaining that a change in “personal 14 circumstances in the United States” did not constitute a 15 change in country conditions excusing the filing deadline 16 for motions to reopen). 17 Moreover, the BIA reasonably concluded that Lin-Guo’s 18 evidence of the persecution of Christians in China did not 19 establish a material change in country conditions since his 20 September 2006 proceedings. See 8 U.S.C. 21 § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii); Matter of 224 S-Y-G- , 24 I. & N. Dec. 247, 253 (BIA 2007) (noting that in 1 evaluating evidence of changed country conditions, the BIA 2 “compare[s] the evidence of country conditions submitted 3 with the motion to those that existed at the time of the 4 merits hearing below”). Indeed, the BIA, referencing the 5 U.S. State Department reports and newspaper articles in the 6 record, reasonably determined that, although some of the 7 evidence described a slight intensification of persecution 8 of Christians since 2006, the evidence nevertheless failed 9 to establish a material change in country conditions because 10 it described conditions substantially similar to those that 11 existed at the time of Lin-Guo’s 2006 hearing. 12
See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii); 8 C.F.R. § 13 1003.2(c)(3)(ii); see also Matter of S-Y-G- , 24 I. & N. Dec. 14 at 257 (explaining that an “incremental or incidental” 15 change in a country’s policies does not constitute changed 16 country conditions for purposes of motions to reopen) ; Siewe 17 v. Gonzales, 480 F.3d 160, 167 (2d Cir. 2007) (“where there 18 are two permissible views of the evidence, the fact finder’s 19 choice between them cannot be clearly erroneous.”). 20 Moreover, the BIA reasonably found that Lin-Guo failed 21 to demonstrate an intensification of persecution of 22 Christians in his native Fuzhou City since his 2006 hearing, 235 as the country conditions evidence in the record did not 1 describe any incidents of oppression of unregistered 2 Christians occurring in Fuzhou City. See 8 C.F.R. 3 § 1003.2(c)(1); Matter of S-Y-G- , 24 I. & N. Dec. at 257. 4 Furthermore, the BIA reasonably determined that the letter 5 written by Lin-Guo’s sister did not constitute material 6 evidence, as it was vague and lacking in detail, and did not 7 describe any change in the Chinese government’s treatment of 8 Christians since 2006. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1); see 9 also Abudu , 485 U.S. at 104-05 (recognizing that a movant’s 10 failure to produce material evidence is an independent basis 11 for the denial of a motion to reopen);Xiao Ji Chen v. U.S. 12 Dep’t of Justice , 471 F.3d 315, 342 (2d Cir. 2006)(holding 13 that the weight afforded to the applicant’s evidence in 14 immigration proceedings lies largely within the agency’s 15 discretion). 16 Accordingly, because substantial evidence supports the 17 BIA’s conclusion that Lin-Guo failed to establish that 18 conditions for Christians in China had materially changed 19 since his 2006 proceedings, the BIA did not abuse its 20 discretion in denying his motion to reopen as untimely. 21 See Ali , 448 F.3d at 517; Jian Hui Shao , 546 F.3d at 169. 22

236 For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is 1

DENIED. 2
FOR THE COURT: 3 Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk 4 5