# L_2017252EN.01012101.xml

| 29.9.2017 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | L 252/121 |
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29.9.2017

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

L 252/121

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RESOLUTION (EU) 2017/1619 OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT

of 27 April 2017

with observations forming an integral part of the decision on discharge in respect of the implementation of the general budget of the European Union for the financial year 2015, Section V — Court of Auditors

THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT,

| — | having regard to its decision on discharge in respect of the implementation of the general budget of the European Union for the financial year 2015, Section V — Court of Auditors, |
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having regard to its decision on discharge in respect of the implementation of the general budget of the European Union for the financial year 2015, Section V — Court of Auditors,

| — | having regard to the Special Report No 15/2012 of the European Court of Auditors: ‘Management of conflict of interest in selected EU Agencies’, |
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having regard to the Special Report No 15/2012 of the European Court of Auditors: ‘Management of conflict of interest in selected EU Agencies’,

| — | having regard to Rule 94 of and Annex IV to its Rules of Procedure, |
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having regard to Rule 94 of and Annex IV to its Rules of Procedure,

| — | having regard to the report of the Committee on Budgetary Control (A8-0151/2017), |
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having regard to the report of the Committee on Budgetary Control (A8-0151/2017),

| A. | whereas, in the context of the discharge procedure, the discharge authority stresses the particular importance of further strengthening the democratic legitimacy of the Union institutions by improving transparency and accountability, implementing the concept of performance-based budgeting and good governance of human resources, |
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A.

whereas, in the context of the discharge procedure, the discharge authority stresses the particular importance of further strengthening the democratic legitimacy of the Union institutions by improving transparency and accountability, implementing the concept of performance-based budgeting and good governance of human resources,

1.

Appreciates the cooperation between the Court of Auditors (the ‘Court’) and Parliament's Committee on Budgetary Control and welcomes regular feedback based on Parliament's demands; welcomes the recent practice that allows Parliament to present its suggestions to the Court for its annual work programme; calls for an even more structured annual debate between the Court's president and Parliament's Conference of Committee Chairs;

2.

Notes that the Court's annual accounts are audited by an independent external auditor in order to apply the same principles of transparency and accountability that the auditor applies to its auditees; takes note of the auditor's opinion that the Court's financial statements give a true and fair view of the financial position of the Court;

3.

Notes that in 2015, the Court's final appropriations amounted to a total of EUR 132 906 000 (compared to EUR 133 498 000 in 2014) and that the overall rate of implementation for the budget was 98,68 %; emphasises that the implementation rate was less than in 2014 (98,8 %);

4.

Stresses that the Court's budget is purely administrative, with a large amount being used for expenditure concerning persons working within the institution; stresses, however, that introducing performance-based budgeting should not apply only to the institution's budget as a whole but should also include the setting of specific, measurable, attainable, realistic and time-based (SMART) targets to individual departments, units and the annual plans of members of staff; in this respect, welcomes the Court's implementation of the performance-based budgeting principle in its daily operations;

5.

Reminds the Court that, according to the Common Approach on decentralised agencies adopted in July 2012 by Parliament, the Council and the Commission (at paragraph 54), the audit of the decentralised agencies remains ‘under the full responsibility of [the Court], which manages all administrative and procurement procedures required’; encourages the Court to put forward proposals to resolve the issue of the audit of the agencies within the context of the ongoing revision of the Financial Regulation, and the subsequent revision of the Framework Financial Regulation; considers that this matter should be clarified so as to reduce any excessive administrative burden on the decentralised agencies, without impairing the necessity and effectiveness of the Court's work;

6.

Notes that the Court's reform was implemented in 2015 and was considered to be a success by the Court; looks forward to receiving a mid-term assessment of the Court's 2013 to 2017 strategy, including an analysis of the achievements of the main objectives of the reform;

7.

Welcomes the Union's added value approach of the Court in its reports; calls for further work with the other institutions of the Union to develop the performance indicators and priorities for a good financial governance;

8.

Notes that the revision of Article 163 of the Financial Regulation provides that ‘special reports are drawn up and adopted within [...] 13 months’ (1); observes that this time frame was not complied with in 2015; urges the Court to comply with that time-limit without compromising the quality of the reports; in that regard, encourages the Court to improve the recommendations in its special reports to be even more targeted;

9.

Takes the view that the special reports of the Court should be given more prominence by the recipient institutions and should include annual, dedicated reports; emphasises that the effectiveness of separate special reports could be enlarged if they were grouped together in time in relation to specific policy areas, thus making it possible for Parliament to devote ad hoc reports to those special reports of the Court outside the discharge cycle;

10.

Deplores the fact that the Court has, to date, failed to present a special report on conflicts of interests in all agencies, in particular in those related to industries, despite the reiterated requests made by Parliament in its discharge resolutions since 2012; urges the Court to produce and publish a first special report on conflicts of interests by the end of June 2017 and to publish subsequent reports annually thereafter; considers the production of annual reports on conflicts of interests by the Court to be vital for the integrity of the Union institutions, bodies and agencies, and to avoid conflicts of interests between the Union agencies, in particular those relating to industry, and lobbying groups;

11.

Observes that the Court complies with the interinstitutional agreement to reduce staff by 5 % over a period of five years; asks to be informed, by June 2017, about how that reduction matches the new recruitments made by the Court in 2015 and of the percentage of the 2015 new recruitments;

12.

Regrets that within the members of the Court there was a gender imbalance of five women compared to 23 men in 2015 and that the number of women went down to three in 2016; regrets, furthermore, that the Court has an ongoing gender imbalance in senior and middle management posts (30,4 % women compared to 69,6 % men); calls on the Court to promote gender balance, in particular in management posts; calls, furthermore, on the Court to report back to the discharge authority on the measures taken and on the results achieved in that regard, without undermining its mission;

13.

Emphasises that geographical balance, namely a proportional relationship between the members of staff of a particular nationality and the size of the relevant Member State, must remain an important element of resources management, particularly with respect to the Member States that have acceded the Union in or after 2004; welcomes the fact that the Court has reached an overall balanced composition of officials from the Member States which acceded to the Union before 2004 and from the Member States which acceded in or after 2004; points out that, nevertheless, the Member States which joined the Union in or after 2004 remain underrepresented at the higher level of administration and in managerial posts, for which progress is still needed;

14.

Is concerned about the high number of days of sick leave among the staff; calls on the Court to target its well-being activities to ensure the well-being of its staff, in order to better perform its core mission;

15.

Notes the method used by the Court to calculate staff sick leave; is of the opinion that that method is not appropriate to calculate absences for sickness effectively; calls on the Court to apply a calculation system based on working days of absence per individual employee, as practised by other institutions;

16.

Notes that the Court organised five away days, mainly in preparation of the reform of the Court, with a low proportion of members of staff (only 107) participating; calls on the Court to target its well-being activities better in order to include proactive and positive human resources development, with the participation of as many members of staff as possible;

17.

Notes the Court's reinforced ethical framework to prevent conflicts of interests, as well as misconduct by members of staff; calls on the Court to report to Parliament on the revision of its internal anti-harassment rules;

18.

Urges the Court to enforce the submission of declarations of interests, instead of declarations of absence of conflicts of interests, as the self-evaluation of conflicts of interests is a conflict of interests in itself; considers that the evaluation of a situation of conflicts of interests must be made by a third party that is independent; asks the Court to report by June 2017 on the changes introduced and to indicate who is checking the situations of conflicts of interests; reiterates that integrity and transparency are key elements to public confidence; calls on the Court to establish clear rules regarding ‘revolving doors’ and to put in place measures and dissuasive penalties, such as the reduction of pensions or the prohibition to work at least three years in similar bodies, to prevent ‘revolving doors’;

19.

Reminds the Court that the Union's decentralised agencies must adopt codes of good administrative behaviour and be encouraged to use the transparency register as a reference instrument for their interaction with the relevant representatives;

20.

Calls on the Court to be party to the interinstitutional agreement on a mandatory transparency register;

21.

Welcomes the creation of a transparency portal on the Court's website as well as the fact that the Court has already in place rules on whistleblowing; recommends that the Court disseminate those rules among its staff so that all employees are aware of them; asks the Court to provide, by June 2017, details on whistleblower cases in 2015, if any, and on how they were handled and resolved;

22.

Notes that in 2015 the Court owned three buildings, K1, K2 and K3; asks the Court to include the planning for the upgrade works of those buildings in its annual activity report and to ensure the implementation of the highest possible standards of energy efficiency during the upgrades;

23.

Notes the summary of the Court's building policy included in its annual activity report and calls for more detailed information on this matter to be provided in the future;

24.

Notes the increased volume of translation work in 2015, which was almost 3 % more than in 2014; notes that under the Court's reform, the structure of the translation directorate was optimised; calls on the Court to clarify how that directorate improved its work;

25.

Notes the negotiations between the Court and the European Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF) to consider the possibility of an administrative arrangement; calls on the Court to report on the progress in negotiations on that matter;

26.

Reiterates its calls on the Court to include in its annual activity reports, in compliance with the existing rules on confidentiality and data protection, the results and consequences of closed OLAF cases, where the Court or any member of its staff were the subject of the investigation;

27.

Notes the internal auditor service recommendation to consider a more rational use of the Court's official vehicles; invites the Court to address this matter in cooperation with the Court of Justice of the European Union and to inform Parliament of the actions taken to rationalise the management of the fleet;

28.

Welcomes the Court's efforts and its achievements in lowering its environment footprint; notes that the Court launched an Eco-Management and Audit Scheme (EMAS) project in 2013, which aims to obtain the EMAS certification by the end of 2016; welcomes the fact that, on 13 November 2015, the Court adopted an environmental policy formalising its participation in a high-quality environmental management initiative; expresses concern for the delay of the EMAS certification;

29.

Stresses the importance of widening cooperation with universities in the Union for the creation of specialised courses on European auditing; calls on the Court to keep Parliament informed of the developments and of the results of that future enlarged cooperation;

30.

Calls on the Court to envisage the possibility of making recommendations on better communication about the budget of the Union, its functions and its mission, and on how to explain it more effectively to Union citizens.

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(1)  See Article 251(1) in Commission proposal COM(2016) 605.

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