NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.

UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL

AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE

ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS

DIVISION ONE

TIFFANY L., GREGORY C., Appellants,

v.

DEPARTMENT OF CHILD SAFETY, P.C., Appellees.

No. 1 CA-JV 19-0355

Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County

No. JD35891

The Honorable Jo Lynn Gentry, Judge

AFFIRMED

COUNSEL

Maricopa County Legal Defender’s Office, Phoenix

By Jamie R. Heller

Counsel for Appellant Tiffany L.

David W. Bell Attorney at Law, Higley

By David W. Bell

Counsel for Appellant Gregory C.

Arizona Attorney General’s Office, Tucson

By Autumn Spritzer

Counsel for Appellee Department of Child Safety

FILED 5-19-2020
TIFFANY L., GREGORY C. v. DCS, P.C.

Decision of the Court

2

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Presiding Judge Lawrence F. Winthrop delivered the decision of the Court, 

in which Judge Maria Elena Cruz and Judge David B. Gass joined.

W I N T H R O P, Judge:

¶1 Tiffany L. (“Mother”) and Gregory C. (“Father”) appeal the

juvenile court order terminating their parental rights to their minor child, 

P.C. Mother and Father argue the juvenile court abused its discretion in 

determining the Department of Child Safety (the “Department”) met its 

burden of proof on grounds for termination. They also argue the juvenile 

court erred in finding termination was in the best interests of P.C. For the 

following reasons, we affirm.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶2 Mother and Father are the biological parents of P.C., born in 

May 2018. The Department received a report that Mother tested positive 

for methamphetamine when P.C. was born, and Mother admitted to using 

methamphetamine throughout her pregnancy with P.C.

¶3 The Department petitioned for dependency a few days later, 

alleging P.C. was dependent as to Mother on the grounds of her history of 

substance abuse, domestic violence between Mother and Father, mental 

health concerns, and an inability to provide for P.C.’s basic needs. The 

Department alleged P.C. was dependent as to Father on the same grounds.

At the time, paternity had not been confirmed for Father. Although he and 

Mother lived together, he was not listed on P.C.’s birth certificate and 

declined to participate in Department services. When a Department intake 

case worker arrived at Mother and Father’s home, Father threatened to 

throw the case worker “off the balcony if he took my child.”

¶4 The Department removed P.C. from the home and placed her 

in her maternal grandmother’s care. The juvenile court subsequently found 

P.C. dependent as to Mother and Father.

¶5 Mother admits to long-term substance use, beginning when 

she was fifteen years old with sporadic periods of sobriety. In July 2018,

she began participating in substance-abuse services with TERROS; for the 

first few months, her participation was “about 50 percent” before she 
TIFFANY L., GREGORY C. v. DCS, P.C.

Decision of the Court

3

participated more regularly. She also engaged in twice-weekly urinalysis 

tests. Despite a series of negative test results, the Department case manager

suspected Mother continued to use illegal substances and ordered a hairfollicle test. In December 2018, the hair-follicle test returned positive for 

methamphetamine. A second hair-follicle test in May 2019 was also 

positive for methamphetamine. A May 2019 urinalysis test was positive for 

marijuana. After each positive test, Mother denied using illegal substances.

¶6 In June 2019, the guardian ad litem (“GAL”) representing P.C. 

moved to terminate Mother’s parental relationship with P.C. on the 

grounds of Mother’s illegal substance abuse. As to Father, the GAL moved 

to terminate his parental rights on the grounds of abandonment and six

months’ time-in-care. The Department filed a similar motion as to both 

parents the following day, alleging the same grounds.

¶7 At around the same time, Father contacted the Department 

and sought to establish paternity and initiate his relationship with P.C. A 

DNA test confirmed his paternity of P.C. Also around the same time, 

Mother’s participation in TERROS services “dropped off,” and TERROS 

closed her out of services for lack of engagement in July 2019. The 

Department referred her again to TERROS in August 2019.

¶8 Following a trial, the juvenile court found the Department 

proved each ground for termination by clear and convincing evidence and 

found by a preponderance of the evidence termination was in the best 

interests of P.C. The juvenile court terminated Mother’s parental rights 

based on her history of chronic substance abuse, see Arizona Revised 

Statutes (“A.R.S.”) section 8-533(B)(3), and terminated Father’s parental 

rights on the grounds of abandonment and six months’ time-in-care. A.R.S. 

§ 8-533(B)(1), (B)(8)(b). Mother and Father timely appealed. We have 

jurisdiction pursuant to A.R.S. § 8-235(A) and Arizona Rule of Procedure 

for the Juvenile Court 103(A).

ANALYSIS

¶9 We review the juvenile court’s decision to terminate parental 

rights for abuse of discretion and will affirm the decision unless it is “clearly 

erroneous.” Jesus M. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 203 Ariz. 278, 280, ¶ 4 (App. 

2002). “The juvenile court, as the trier of fact in a termination proceeding, 

is in the best position to weigh the evidence, observe the parties, judge the 

credibility of witnesses, and make appropriate findings.” Id. Because the 

juvenile court is uniquely positioned to resolve conflicts of evidence, we do 

not reweigh evidence. See Jennifer S. v. Dep’t of Child Safety, 240 Ariz. 282, 
TIFFANY L., GREGORY C. v. DCS, P.C.

Decision of the Court

4

287, ¶ 16 (App. 2016). Accordingly, on appeal, we review the juvenile 

court’s findings of facts for clear error, viewing the evidence in the light 

most favorable to affirming its decision. Raymond F. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. 

Sec., 224 Ariz. 373, 376, ¶ 13 (App. 2010).

I. Mother

¶10 Before the juvenile court terminates parental rights under 

A.R.S. § 8-533(B)(3), it must find by clear and convincing evidence (1) the 

parent has a history of chronic abuse of controlled substances; (2) the parent 

is unable to discharge her parental responsibilities because of her chronic 

abuse of controlled substances; and (3) reasonable grounds exist to believe 

the condition will continue “for a prolonged and indeterminate period.”

Raymond F., 224 Ariz. at 377, ¶ 15; see Kent K. v. Bobby M., 210 Ariz. 279, 284, 

¶ 22 (2005). The juvenile court must also find the Department “had made 

reasonable efforts to reunify the family or that such efforts would have been 

futile.” Jennifer G. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 211 Ariz. 450, 453, ¶ 12 (App. 

2005).

¶11 On appeal, Mother does not dispute the juvenile court’s 

finding that she has a history of chronic substance abuse. She argues the 

Department failed to prove that she was unable to discharge her parental 

responsibilities and that there are reasonable grounds to believe her 

substance use will continue for a prolonged, indeterminate period.

¶12 First, Mother contends the record does not support the 

juvenile court’s finding that she was unable to discharge her parental 

responsibilities due to her substance use, citing her commitment to 

TERROS services, the Department’s assessment that she had “enhanced her 

protective capacities,” and her successful completion of parent-aide 

services. “The term [parental responsibilities] is not intended to encompass 

any exclusive set of factors but rather to establish a standard which permits 

a trial judge flexibility in considering the unique circumstances of each 

termination case before determining the parent’s ability to discharge his or 

her parental responsibilities.” Maricopa Cty. Juv. Action No. JS-5894, 145 

Ariz. 405, 409 (App. 1985).

¶13 Although the evidence supports Mother’s contention that she 

demonstrated progress, it does not change the fact that Mother’s chronic 

substance use has interfered with her ability to parent. At trial, Mother 

testified that she had secured employment and housing, but she had not 

completed a substance-abuse program. She testified she began using

methamphetamine approximately fifteen years earlier with some periods 
TIFFANY L., GREGORY C. v. DCS, P.C.

Decision of the Court

5

of sobriety, and testified she used methamphetamine approximately 

“weekly” throughout her pregnancy. Mother admitted “[m]ost of the time 

it’s stress” that triggers her use of methamphetamine. She also testified she 

completed a third-party hair-follicle test after the May 2019 test requested 

by the Department; she disclosed the third-party test was also positive for 

methamphetamine. Despite the positive hair-follicle tests, Mother insisted 

she had “not used since before that baby was born.”

¶14 Mother insists she had maintained sobriety since P.C.’s birth

and her substance-abuse treatment, but the juvenile court noted Mother’s 

positive hair-follicle tests and found “no evidence presented to explain the 

disparity in the science versus her claims that she’s not using.”

Accordingly, the juvenile court found “concerns that Mother has not made 

the behavior changes needed” regarding her substance use. We find no 

clear error in the juvenile court’s assessment of credibility and its finding of 

facts, and no abuse of discretion in its finding that Mother is unable to 

discharge her parental responsibilities because of her substance use.

¶15 Mother also argues reasonable evidence does not support the 

juvenile court’s finding that her substance use will continue for a 

prolonged, indeterminate period. She contends the Department did not

present evidence “to explain the discrepancy between [Mother’s] 100 

negative random urine tests and her positive hair follicle tests.”

¶16 In determining whether sufficient evidence supports the 

juvenile court’s findings on this requirement of A.R.S. § 8-533(B)(3), “[i]t is 

not the number of times that [Mother] has tested positive or negative for 

drug abuse that is key, but rather, it is the fact that [she] has consistently 

failed to abstain from drugs.” Raymond F., 224 Ariz. at 379, ¶ 29. The record 

indicates Mother has a fifteen-year history of methamphetamine use, with 

periods of sobriety followed by relapse; furthermore, she testified at trial 

that she had not yet completed a substance-abuse program. The juvenile 

court found that the positive hair-follicle tests “as recent as August of 2019 

. . . suggest[] that she continues to use methamphetamine.” Mother 

essentially asks us to resolve this conflict in the evidence—that we, in effect,

reweigh the evidence of her negative urine tests and her testimony that she 

“had been sober for 500 days” against the evidence of the hair-follicle test 

results. We will not do so. Jesus M., 203 Ariz. at 282, ¶ 12; see also Jennifer 

S., 240 Ariz. at 287, ¶ 16 (“[T]he resolution of conflicts in the evidence is 

uniquely the province of the juvenile court . . . .”). We find on this record 

sufficient evidence exists for the juvenile court to have reasonably 

concluded that Mother’s chronic substance use would continue for a 
TIFFANY L., GREGORY C. v. DCS, P.C.

Decision of the Court

6

prolonged indeterminate period and would also continue to interfere with 

her ability to parent.

¶17 Finally, Mother argues that the Department did not use 

reasonable efforts to reunify the family because it failed to provide Mother 

with individual counseling with a domestic-violence component pursuant 

to a court order. The Department provided Mother with services related to 

her substance use, including substance-abuse assessment and treatment, 

substance testing, and parent-aide services. At trial, the Department case 

manager for Mother admitted she did not refer Mother for such domesticviolence counseling, citing a consultation with a psychiatrist who 

determined counseling would not be appropriate at the time because 

Mother was not fully participating in substance-abuse services. Mother

self-referred to Cradles to Crayons for trauma therapy and spent a year on 

the waitlist before beginning services in July 2019. A trauma clinician with 

Cradles to Crayons testified that Mother had been engaged in trauma 

therapy for six sessions and noted “it works best” if trauma and addiction 

are addressed simultaneously. The juvenile court found the Department 

case manager’s testimony “highly troubling,” but, after weighing the 

evidence, it found no evidence “to suggest that even had that [domesticviolence counseling] service been put in place [any earlier] that Mother 

would have overcome her substance abuse.” Accordingly, we accept the 

juvenile court’s findings that the Department made reasonable efforts to 

reunite the family because the juvenile court is better situated to evaluate 

“the effectiveness and impact of the services provided.” Shawanee S. v. Ariz. 

Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 234 Ariz. 174, 178, ¶ 15 (App. 2014).

¶18 We find no abuse of discretion in the juvenile court’s finding 

the ground for terminating Mother’s parental rights under A.R.S. § 8-

533(B)(3) was clearly established.

II. Father

¶19 Although Father admits his thirteen-month absence from 

P.C.’s life creates a presumption of abandonment, see A.R.S. §§ 8-

531(1), -533(B)(1), he argues the juvenile court erred in finding he did not 

overcome that presumption when he initiated a relationship “over the four 

months prior to the termination trial.”

¶20 When determining whether a parent has abandoned a child, 

the juvenile court evaluates the objective evidence of the parent’s conduct, 

not the parent’s subjective intent. Michael J. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 196 

Ariz. 246, 249-50, ¶ 18 (2000). “The burden to act as a parent rests with the 
TIFFANY L., GREGORY C. v. DCS, P.C.

Decision of the Court

7

parent, who should assert his legal rights at the first and every 

opportunity.” Id. at 251, ¶ 25. In his testimony, Father admitted he did not 

attempt to engage with the Department or otherwise attempt to reunify 

with P.C. for more than one year. He acknowledged the Department 

contacted him at the outset of the dependency case to request he engage in 

services, and he stated he was familiar with the Department’s reunification 

process.

¶21 Father consciously chose not to take steps to establish 

paternity or engage in Department services until more than a year after 

P.C.’s birth, despite the Department’s outreach. The Department is not 

required to leave “the window of opportunity for remediation [of a ground 

for termination] open indefinitely.” Maricopa Cty. Juv. Action No. JS-501568, 

177 Ariz. 571, 577 (App. 1994). On this record, we find no abuse of 

discretion in the juvenile court’s finding that Father abandoned P.C.

pursuant to A.R.S. §§ 8-531(1) and -533(B)(1).

¶22 Father also argues the juvenile court erred in finding evidence 

sufficient to terminate his rights for six months’ time-in-care pursuant to 

A.R.S. § 8-533(B)(8)(b). Because we affirm the juvenile court’s order based 

on the ground of abandonment, we do not address the time-in-care ground. 

See Crystal E. v. Dep’t of Child Safety, 241 Ariz. 576, 577-78, ¶ 5 (App. 2017).

Finally, Father argues that the juvenile court made improper findings 

regarding Mother that prejudiced its decision to terminate his parental 

rights. As we find no error in the juvenile court’s findings as to Mother, we 

do not reach this argument from Father.

III. Best Interests

¶23 Once the juvenile court finds the grounds to terminate a 

parent’s rights have been established, it must find by a preponderance of 

the evidence that termination is in the best interests of the child. Raymond 

F., 224 Ariz. at 379, ¶ 30. This standard may be met if the juvenile court 

finds the child’s current placement meets the child’s needs and the child is 

adoptable. Demetrius L. v. Joshlynn F., 239 Ariz. 1, 3-4, ¶ 12 (2016). Courts 

consider the “totality of the circumstances existing at the time of the 

severance determination,” including a parent’s efforts to rehabilitate. Alma 

S. v. Dep’t of Child Safety, 245 Ariz. 146, 150-51, ¶¶ 13, 15 (2018). The parents’

liberty interests in the care and control of their child, however, are 

necessarily diluted when measured against the child’s interest in stability 

and security. Demetrius L., 239 Ariz. at 4, ¶ 15; see Kent K., 210 Ariz. at 286, 

¶¶ 34-35.
TIFFANY L., GREGORY C. v. DCS, P.C.

Decision of the Court

8

¶24 Mother and Father both argue the juvenile court erred in 

finding termination of their parental rights to be in the best interests of P.C.

Mother argues the juvenile court did not properly consider her 

rehabilitation efforts and her therapist’s testimony that she could continue 

to improve with more time in services. But P.C.’s interest in permanency 

must prevail over Mother’s “uncertain battle with drugs.” See Raymond F., 

224 Ariz. at 379, ¶ 29. Father again argues the juvenile court erred in 

terminating Mother’s rights and that those errors affected its consideration 

of best interests as to him. As noted above, the juvenile court did not err as 

to Mother’s ground for termination. Father’s argument as to best interests, 

therefore, similarly fails. The record indicates P.C. is in placement with her 

maternal grandmother, who is meeting the child’s needs and is willing to 

adopt her. Reasonable evidence supports the juvenile court’s finding that 

termination was in the best interests of P.C.

CONCLUSION

¶25 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the juvenile court’s order 

terminating Mother and Father’s parental rights to P.C.