IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE

AT NASHVILLE

Assigned on Briefs March 21, 2017, at Knoxville

STATE OF TENNESSEE v. GREGORY MAURICE MARLIN

Appeal from the Circuit Court for Bedford County

No. 18166 Franklin L. Russell, Judge

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No. M2016-01376-CCA-R3-CD

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The Defendant, Gregory Maurice Marlin, was convicted of evading arrest while 

operating a motor vehicle, evading arrest on foot, and operating a motor vehicle while 

declared a habitual traffic offender. The trial court sentenced the Defendant as a standard 

offender to two years for the evading arrest while operating a motor vehicle conviction, 

eleven months and twenty-nine days for the evading arrest on foot conviction, and two 

years for the operating a motor vehicle while declared a habitual offender conviction, all 

to be served consecutively to each other. After the sentencing hearing, the trial court 

amended the sentence and merged the evading arrest on foot conviction with the evading 

arrest while operating a motor vehicle conviction, for an effective sentence of four years 

in prison. The Defendant argues that the evidence is insufficient to support his 

convictions and that the trial court abused its discretion in sentencing him. After a 

thorough review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the judgments of the trial 

court. 

Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgments of the Circuit Court Affirmed

JOHN EVERETT WILLIAMS, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which TIMOTHY L.

EASTER and J. ROSS DYER, JJ., joined.

Donna Orr Hargrove, District Public Defender; and Michael Collins (at trial and on 

appeal) and Brian Belden (at trial), Assistant District Public Defenders, for the appellant, 

Gregory Maurice Marlin.

Herbert H. Slatery III, Attorney General and Reporter; Ruth Anne Thompson, Senior 

Counsel; Robert J. Carter, District Attorney General; and Michael D. Randles, Assistant 

District Attorney General, for the appellee, State of Tennessee.

04/24/2017
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OPINION

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

The Defendant was indicted for one count of evading arrest while operating a 

motor vehicle, one count of evading arrest on foot, and one count of operating a motor 

vehicle while declared a habitual traffic offender. The evidence presented at trial 

established the following underlying facts.

Deputy Garcia Jordan with the Bedford County Sheriff’s Department testified that 

he had known the Defendant for “several years” and could “easily recognize [the 

Defendant] by sight,” and he made an in-court identification of the Defendant. On March 

24, 2013, Deputy Jordan was at the Bedford County Workhouse having maintenance 

done on his marked patrol vehicle. The back of the workhouse where he brought his 

vehicle, abutted West Jackson Street. He testified that after the maintenance was 

completed, he pulled his vehicle out of the parking lot of the workhouse and attempted to 

pull out onto West Jackson Street. Before he could do so, he saw two vehicles traveling 

on West Jackson Street headed away from South Cannon Boulevard toward Tyson. He 

stated that the first vehicle he saw was a black Nissan Altima and the second vehicle, 

which passed by shortly thereafter, was a gold Chevrolet Caprice, traveling in the same 

direction as the Nissan Altima. He testified that the Caprice caught his attention because 

it was “obviously exceeding the 30-mile-an-hour speed limit.” 

Deputy Jordan decided to pull over the Caprice and activated his patrol lights and 

siren. He stated that as he pursued the Caprice, the driver of the Caprice accelerated, 

attempting to get away. He also stated that while in pursuit of the Caprice, he was 

travelling at about seventy to seventy-five miles per hour. Deputy Jordan testified that 

the driver of the Caprice made a right turn onto Pencil Street, travelled along Pencil 

Street until the intersection of West Lane Street, continued through a stop sign without 

stopping, and made a left turn onto West Lane Street. He explained that West Lane 

Street has a speed limit of thirty miles per hour. He stated that the driver of the Caprice 

then made a right turn onto Buckingham Lane, making no attempt to stop for Deputy 

Jordan. He also stated that the Caprice crested a hill along Buckingham Lane, and he 

briefly lost sight of the vehicle. 

Deputy Jordan testified that after losing sight of the Caprice for a moment, he 

regained a visual of the vehicle which was attempting a left turn onto the driveway of a 

house on Buckingham Lane. The house with the driveway that the Defendant attempted 

to turn into was later determined to belong to the Defendant’s cousin, Mr. Austin Smith. 

He also testified that the driver of the Caprice failed to successfully turn onto the 

driveway and instead skidded across the front yard of Mr. Smith’s residence, leaving 
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tracks in the yard from the road to the neighboring house’s yard. Deputy Jordan 

explained that the yard was wet because it had rained earlier in the day. He also 

explained that the Caprice came to a stop in the front yard of neighboring house and 

made a 180-degree turn while skidding across the front yard, causing the driver’s side of 

the Caprice to face him at a distance of about fifteen to twenty yards. He testified that at 

the time of the pursuit of the Caprice, it was daylight, it was not raining, and visibility 

was fine. He also testified that after the Caprice came to a stop, he saw the driver’s door 

open and the Defendant step out and look directly at him. Deputy Jordan stated that the 

Defendant closed the car door and quickly walked behind the neighboring house. He 

explained that he ran after the Defendant but that after reaching the back of the house, he 

did not see the Defendant. Deputy Jordan testified that there were many garages, 

toolsheds, trees, and shrubs behind the residence and that the Defendant could have found 

many places to hide. He also testified that once other police officers responded to the 

scene, they began to search the area for the Defendant but were unable to find him. 

Deputy Jordan testified that the black Nissan Altima he saw before pursuing the 

Caprice was in the driveway of Mr. Smith’s residence when the search for the Defendant 

began. He also testified that the license plate tag of the Caprice was registered to Mr.

Austin Smith who lived at the house on Buckingham Lane. Deputy Jordan stated that he 

was certain that the driver of the Caprice was not, in fact, Mr. Smith. He also stated that 

he checked the Defendant’s driving history and discovered that he was a habitual motor 

vehicle offender. 

On cross-examination, Deputy Jordan testified that during his pursuit of the 

Defendant, the black Nissan Altima followed the Caprice. Deputy Jordan was unable to 

identify the driver of the Caprice while it was moving. He admitted that at the 

preliminary hearing in General Sessions Court, he testified that the Defendant was fifty

yards away from him when the Defendant exited the Caprice, maintaining that he 

nonetheless immediately knew the driver of the Caprice to be the Defendant. Defense 

counsel presented Deputy Jordan with a report that Deputy Jordan then read from, 

stating, in part, “After further investigation, I identified the driver as” the Defendant. 

Deputy Jordan explained that he knew the Defendant’s identity immediately and that 

while writing his report, he does an investigation to verify what he saw. He conceded 

that he could not remember what the Defendant was wearing when he exited the vehicle. 

He acknowledged that his report listed 6:30 P.M. as the time of the incident. On re-direct 

examination, he explained that there was “plenty of daylight” to observe the events that 

took place. 

Mr. Austin Smith testified that on March 24, 2013, he was living on Buckingham 

Lane and owned a gold Chevrolet Caprice. He explained that he left the Caprice in the 

driveway of his house that morning because his producer picked him up and brought him 
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to work that day. He stated that after the Defendant escaped on foot following the 

vehicle pursuit, Mr. Smith’s father called and told him to come home. Mr. Smith 

testified that upon returning home, he did not see his Caprice in the driveway but rather 

saw it in his neighbor’s yard. He explained that the Caprice was not where he had left it 

that morning and that he did not give anyone permission to use his car that day. He also 

stated that the Defendant is his cousin and made an in-court identification of the 

Defendant. Mr. Smith testified that the ignition of his Caprice was malfunctioning and 

that a key was not necessary to drive the vehicle. 

On cross-examination, Mr. Smith testified that there was no physical damage to 

the Caprice. He conceded that “based off [the] ignition system, anybody could have 

come and gotten the car, because it was never locked.” He stated that on March 24, 

2013, he did not allow the Defendant to borrow his car and did not see the Defendant. 

The Defendant stipulated to being a habitual motor vehicle offender. The jury 

found the Defendant guilty of evading arrest in a motor vehicle, evading arrest on foot, 

and operating a motor vehicle while declared a habitual traffic offender. 

At the sentencing hearing, the trial court found several enhancing factors that 

applied to the Defendant. Defense counsel urged the trial court to run the sentences 

concurrently because the Defendant had not been previously convicted of a felony. 

Defense counsel also argued that the evading arrest on foot conviction should be merged 

with the evading arrest in a motor vehicle conviction. The trial court found that 

enhancement factor number one applied, noting that the Defendant had many prior 

convictions, including evading arrest, resisting arrest, jail escape, and assault. T.C.A. §

40-35-114(1) (2015). The trial court also found that enhancement factor number eight 

applied, noting that the Defendant, whose record contained four revocations of probation, 

failed to abide by the terms of prior releases into the public. Id. § 40-35-114(8). The trial 

court also found that enhancement factor number thirteen applied because the Defendant 

was out on bond and on probation at the time of the instant offenses. Id. § 40-35-

114(13). Based on the aforementioned findings and determining that the Defendant was 

a Range I offender, the trial court imposed the maximum sentence for each conviction: 

two years for evading arrest in a motor vehicle, eleven months and twenty-nine days at 

seventy-five percent for evading arrest on foot, and two years for operating a motor 

vehicle while declared a habitual offender. Id. §§ 40-35-111(e)(1), -112(a)(5). The trial 

court did not find that any mitigating factors applied, and that none were suggested to the 

court. 

The trial court ordered the Defendant to serve his sentences consecutively, finding 

that the Defendant’s criminal record was extensive and that the Defendant was on 

probation when he committed the instant offenses. Id. § 40-35-115(b)(2), (b)(6). The 
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trial court also refused to merge the evading arrest convictions, noting that the offenses 

occurred during separate and distinct time periods. Finally, the trial court denied 

alternative sentencing for the Defendant, concluding that his criminal record was too 

extensive and that his record for abiding by the terms of previous alternative sentencing 

was “abysmal.” The trial court later amended the Defendant’s sentence, merging the 

evading arrest on foot conviction with the evading arrest with a motor vehicle conviction. 

The Defendant received an effective four-year sentence of incarceration. 

ANALYSIS

On appeal, the Defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain his 

convictions. The crux of the Defendant’s argument lies in the proof concerning the 

identity of the driver of the gold Chevrolet Caprice. The Defendant challenges whether 

Deputy Jordan was capable of making a positive identification of the driver of the 

Caprice. The Defendant also argues that the trial court abused its discretion by giving the 

Defendant the maximum available sentence for his convictions. 

I. Sufficiency of the Evidence

When an accused challenges the sufficiency of the evidence, this court must 

review the record to determine if the evidence adduced during the trial was sufficient “to 

support the finding by the trier of fact of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.” Tenn. R. 

App. P. 13(e). The appellate court determines “whether, after viewing the evidence in the 

light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the 

essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” Jackson v. Virginia, 443 

U.S. 307, 319 (1979). In determining the sufficiency of the evidence, this court does not 

reweigh or reevaluate the evidence. State v. Goodwin, 143 S.W.3d 771, 775 (Tenn. 

2004). Instead, this court affords the State the strongest legitimate view of the evidence 

contained in the record, as well as all reasonable and legitimate inferences that may be 

drawn from that evidence. State v. Elkins, 102 S.W.3d 578, 581 (Tenn. 2003). “A guilty 

verdict by the jury, approved by the trial court, accredits the testimony of the witnesses 

for the State and resolves all conflicts in favor of the prosecution’s theory.” State v. 

Bland, 958 S.W.2d 651, 659 (Tenn. 1997). The conviction replaces the presumption of 

innocence with a presumption of guilt, and the accused has the burden of illustrating why 

the evidence is insufficient to support the verdict returned by the trier of fact. State v. 

Tuggle, 639 S.W.2d 913, 914 (Tenn. 1982). 

The identity of the perpetrator is an indispensable element of the crime. See White 

v. State, 533 S.W.2d 735, 744 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1975). The identity of an accused may 

be established by either direct evidence, circumstantial evidence, or a combination of the 

two. State v. Thompson, 519 S.W.2d 789, 793 (Tenn. 1975). “The credible testimony of 
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one identification witness is sufficient to support a conviction if the witness viewed the 

accused under such circumstances as would permit a positive identification to be made.” 

State v. Radley, 29 S.W.3d 532, 537 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1999). Identity is a question of

fact for the jury to determine after consideration of all the evidence. State v. 

Strickland, 885 S.W.2d 85, 87 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1993).

According to Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-16-603, “it is unlawful for 

any person to intentionally flee by any means of locomotion from anyone the person 

knows to be a law enforcement officer if the person: (A) knows the officer is attempting 

to arrest the person; or (B) has been arrested.” T.C.A. § 39-16-603(a)(1)(A), (B) (1995). 

Additionally, “[i]t is unlawful for any person, while operating a motor vehicle on any 

street, road, alley or highway in this state, to intentionally flee or attempt to elude any law 

enforcement officer, after having received any signal from the officer to bring the vehicle 

to a stop.” Id. § 39-16-603(b)(1). 

According to Tennessee Code Annotated section 55-10-616, “[i]t is unlawful for 

any person to operate any motor vehicle in this state while the judgment or order of the 

court prohibiting the operation remains in effect.” T.C.A. § 55-10-616(a). 

In the light most favorable to the State, it is clear from the record that Deputy 

Jordan attempted to arrest the driver of the gold Chevrolet Caprice, whom he identified as 

the Defendant. The vehicle involved in this incident was registered to the Defendant’s 

cousin, and the Defendant knew of the vehicle’s existence after visiting his cousin’s 

house previously. The Defendant engaged Deputy Jordan in a high-speed vehicle chase 

and ignored Deputy Jordan’s signal to pull over. The Defendant drove the Caprice to his 

cousin’s house where the Caprice was parked earlier that same day. After the vehicle 

chase ended, Deputy Jordan witnessed the Defendant exit the driver’s side door of the 

Caprice, look at Deputy Jordan, flee on foot, and disappear into a residential backyard. 

Deputy Jordan testified that he knew who the Defendant was as soon as he exited the 

Caprice because he has known the Defendant for many years. Deputy Jordan explained

that at that moment, visibility was fine, that the sun had not yet set, and that he was about 

fifteen to twenty yards away from the Defendant. It was reasonable for the jury to 

conclude that Deputy Jordan could positively identify the Defendant. Accordingly, the 

evidence was sufficient to support the evading arrest convictions.

At trial, the Defendant stipulated to being a motor vehicle habitual offender. 

Deputy Jordan made positive identification of the Defendant as the operator of the 

Caprice upon seeing the Defendant exit the driver’s side door of the Caprice. 

Accordingly, the evidence was sufficient to support the operating a motor vehicle as a 

habitual traffic offender conviction. 
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II. Sentencing

The Defendant argues that the trial court abused its discretion by imposing the 

maximum available sentence. He contends that he should be given a shorter sentence 

because of Tennessee’s limited ability to house prisoners. 

This court reviews challenges to the length of a sentence under an abuse of 

discretion standard, “granting a presumption of reasonableness to withinrange sentences that reflect a proper application of the purposes and principles of 

our Sentencing Act.” State v. Bise, 380 S.W.3d 682, 707 (Tenn. 2012). The court will 

uphold the sentence “so long as it is within the appropriate range and the record 

demonstrates that the sentence is otherwise in compliance with the purposes and 

principles listed by statute.” Id. at 709-10. Even if the trial court “recognizes and 

enunciates several applicable mitigating factors, it does not abuse its discretion if it does 

not reduce the sentence from the maximum on the basis of those factors.” State v. 

Carter, 254 S.W.3d 335, 345 (Tenn. 2008). The trial court is “to be guided by—but not 

bound by—any applicable enhancement or mitigating factors when adjusting the length 

of a sentence.” Bise, 380 S.W.3d at 706. Further, “a trial court’s misapplication of an 

enhancement or mitigating factor does not invalidate the sentence imposed unless the trial 

court wholly departed from the 1989 Act, as amended in 2005.” Id. A sentence imposed 

by the trial court that is within the appropriate range should be upheld “[s]o long as there 

are other reasons consistent with the purposes and principles of sentencing, as provided 

by statute.” Id. The appealing party bears the burden of proving that the sentence was 

improper. State v. Ashby, 823 S.W.2d 166, 169 (Tenn. 1991).

In determining the sentence, the trial court must consider: (1) any evidence 

received at the trial and the sentencing hearing; (2) the presentence report; (3) the 

principles of sentencing and arguments as to sentencing alternatives; (4) the nature and 

characteristics of the criminal conduct involved; (5) evidence and information offered by 

the parties on the applicable mitigating and enhancement factors; (6) any statistical 

information provided by the administrative office of the courts as to sentencing practices 

for similar offenses in Tennessee; and (7) any statement the defendant wishes to make in 

the defendant’s own behalf about sentencing. T.C.A. § 40-35-210(b). “The sentence 

imposed should be the least severe measure necessary to achieve the purposes for which 

the sentence is imposed,” and “[t]he potential or lack of potential for the rehabilitation or 

treatment of the defendant should be considered in determining the sentence alternative 

or length of a term to be imposed.” Id. § 40-35-103(4), (5).

The decision to impose consecutive sentences rests within the sound discretion of 

the trial court. State v. Hayes, 337 S.W.3d 235, 266 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2010); State v. 

Hastings, 25 S.W.3d 178, 181 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1999). Our supreme court held that the 
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standard of appellate review for consecutive sentencing is abuse of discretion 

accompanied by a presumption of reasonableness. State v. Pollard, 432 S.W.3d 851, 859 

(Tenn. 2013). To impose consecutive sentencing, the trial court must find by a 

preponderance of the evidence at least one of several factors, including that “[t]he 

defendant is an offender whose record of criminal activity is extensive” or “[t]he 

defendant is sentenced for an offense committed while on probation.” T.C.A. § 40-35-

115(b). The trial court may properly impose a consecutive sentence upon the finding of 

just one of the criteria listed in the statute. State v. Alder, 71 S.W.3d 299, 307 (Tenn.

Crim. App. 2001). Consecutive sentencing is also “guided by the general sentencing 

principles providing that the length of a sentence be ‘justly deserved in relation to the 

seriousness of the offense’ and ‘no greater than that deserved for the offense 

committed.’” State v. Imfeld, 70 S.W.3d 698, 708 (Tenn. 2002) (citing T.C.A. §§ 40-35-

102(1), -103(2)).

Here, the Defendant was convicted of evading arrest while operating a motor 

vehicle, which is a Class E felony that is punishable by a sentence of one to two years as 

a Range I offender. T.C.A. §§ 39-16-603(b)(3); 40-35-112(a)(5). The Defendant was 

also convicted of operating a motor vehicle as a habitual traffic offender, which is also a 

Class E felony that is punishable by a sentence of one to two years as a Range I offender. 

Id. §§ 55-10-616(b); 40-35-112(a)(5). The trial court sentenced the Defendant to the 

upper bounds of each sentencing range and ran the felony convictions consecutively to 

one another, imposing an effective four-year sentence of incarceration. 

Although the Defendant argues that the trial court abused its discretion, we hold 

that the trial court acted well within its discretion when sentencing the Defendant. At the 

sentencing hearing, the Defendant’s presentence report was introduced, which showed 

that the Defendant had numerous arrests, convictions, and failed attempts at probation. 

The trial court found that no mitigating factors and three enhancement factors applied to 

the Defendant: he had a criminal history, failed to abide by the requirements of probation 

many times, and committed the instant offenses while on probation and bail. See id. §§

40-35-113, -114(1), -114(8), -114(13). The trial court also found two criteria for 

imposing consecutive sentences: he was on probation and out on bail when he committed 

the instant offenses and his criminal record was extensive—over fifty prior convictions. 

See id. 40-35-115(b)(2), (6). The evidence introduced at the sentencing hearing supports 

the trial court’s findings. Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court did not err 

in sentencing the Defendant. 

CONCLUSION

Based upon the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.
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JOHN EVERETT WILLIAMS, JUDGE