IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF MISSISSIPPI
N O. 2014-CP-01508-COA DAVID ADAMS A/K/A DAVID LEE ADAMS APPELLANT

v. STATE OF MISSISSIPPI APPELLEE DATE OF JUDGMENT: 10/02/2014 TRIAL JUDGE: HON. JOHN HUEY EMFINGER COURT FROM W HICH APPEALED: MADISON COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT: DAVID ADAMS (PRO SE) ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE: OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL BY: ALICIA MARIE AINSW ORTH NATURE OF THE CASE: CIVIL - POSTCONVICTION RELIEF TRIAL COURT DISPOSITION: DENIED MOTION FOR POSTCONVICTION RELIEF DISPOSITION: AFFIRMED - 05/24/2016 MOTION FOR REHEARING FILED: MANDATE ISSUED: BEFORE LEE, C.J., CARLTON AND FAIR, JJ. LEE, C.J., FOR THE COURT:

PROCEDURAL HISTORY ¶1. I n 2 0 0 5 , D a v i d A d am s pleaded guilty to three c ounts of arm ed r obbery

. H e w a s sentenced t o f

i f t e en y ears i n the custody of the Mississippi Departm ent of Corrections (MDOC) on each c ount, to be s erved concurrently , with six y ears to s e rv e , n i n e y e a rs suspended, and f

ive y ears of supervised p r o b a t i on. In Septem ber 2013, MDOC f

iled a petition alleging Adam s v iolated his supervised probation by f ailing to report to h is probation of f icer and to pay f

ees and court costs. On October 24, 2013, Adam s signed a w aiver of hisright to a prelim inary probation-revocation hearing. 1 ¶2. On Novem

ber 14, 2013, a f

orm al revocation hearing w as held during w hich Adam s adm itted to vio l a t i n g h i s s upervised p robation by f ailing t o report and pay f ees and court costs. Adam s stated under oath that he f ailed to report because he was u nder t he inf luence of illegal dr ugs. T h e t rial court revoked Adam s’s probation and ordered him to serve the

rem aining nine y ears. ¶3. Adam s f

iled a m otion requesting rehearing, which the trial court treated as a m otion
f or postconviction relief (PCR). The trial c o urt denied Adam s’s PCR m otion. Adam s now appeals, asserting that (1) he did not understand his rights d u ring the hearing; (2) the trial

court f a i l e d to inquire as to his f ailure to pay f

e es and court costs; ( 3) h e was denied a prelim inary

hearing; and (4) his sentence was unconstitutional.

STANDARD OF REVIEW ¶4. W h en reviewing a trial court’s d enial o r dism issal o f a P C R m otion, we will only disturb the trial court’s d e cision if it is clearly erroneous; however, we review the trial court’s legal conclusions under a de novo standard of review. Hughes v. State , 106 So. 3d 836, 838 (¶4) (Miss. Ct. App. 2012).
DISCUSSION ¶5. As a prelim inary m atter, A dam s’s m otion was procedu r a l l y barred since it did not contain a “ separate s t atem e nt of the specif i c f acts which are w ithin t he personal knowledge

1 In ad d itio n to th e o th er v io latio n s p rev io u s l y l i s t e d , th is w aiv er in d i cates A d am s c o mmi t t e d a rm ed ro b b ery o n S ep tem b er 2 0 , 2 0 1 3 , an d w as arrested o n O cto b er 5 , 2 0 1 3

. D u rin g th e rev o catio n h earin g , th e trial co u r t in d icated A d am s h ad b een ch arg ed w ith arm ed ro b b ery b u t w as n o t g o in g to co n s id er th is f act w h en rev o k in g A d a m s’s p ro b atio n . 2of t he petitioner and

. . . s worn to by t he petitioner.” Miss. Code Ann. § 99-39-9(1)(d) (Rev.

2015). Regardless, we will address the m e rits.
I. Revocation Hearing ¶6. Adam s f

irst argues that due to m edical i ssues, he was not f ully cognizant of his rights during the r evocation. But Adam s h as of f ered no support f

or hi s c l a i m that his m edical issues (nam ely , drug abuse and withdrawal s y m ptom s) af f ected his ability to understand the proceeding. ¶7. Adam s also suggests he needed an attorney present d ur i n g t h e hearing t o help him
f ully understand h is rights. However, probationers do n o t n e c essarily h ave a right to be represented by c ounsel a t probation-revocation hearings. Riely v
. State , 562 So. 2d 1206,
1209 (Miss. 1990). The trial court should appoint counsel f or probationers when the issues relevant to the revocation hearing are com plex or dif

f i cult to develop. Id

. (quoting Gagnon

v. Scarpelli , 411 U.S. 7 7 8 , 7 9 0 -91 (1973)). The issues d iscussed at Adam s’s revocation hearing were not dif

f icult or c om

plex. I n f

a c t , Adam s adm i tted at the hearing that he had

com m itted the v iolations charged in the petition to r evoke his probation. Furtherm ore, Adam s di d n o t request representation. The trial court gave him t he opportunity to seek representation, but Adam s declined. Adam s waived his right t o have a n attorney during the revocation hearing. Theref o re, this issue is without m erit.
II. Failure to Pay ¶8. Adam s claim s the trial court erred by not i nquiring as t o why Adam s f ailed to pay

f ees and court costs. Bef

ore revoking a def

endant’s probation f

or f ailure to pay f

ines, a trial court

3should f

irst inquire as to the reasons the def endant f ailed to pay . S

illman v. State , 8 So. 3d 256, 258 ( ¶10) (Miss. Ct. App. 2009). Here, the trial court did not ask Adam s why he f ailed to pay h i s f

ines and courts costs. But Adam s adm itted to a nother parole violation – f ailure

to r eport – so the revocation was not based solely on his f a i lure to pay f

i nes. Id

. at (¶11). This issue is without m erit.
III. Prelim inary Hearing ¶9. Adam s contends h e was not af f orded a prelim inary hearing. However, a probationer

m ay waive the right to a prelim inary hearing. Hubbard v. State , 919 So. 2d 1022, 1027 (¶16) (Miss. Ct. App. 2 0 05). Here, Adam s signed a w aiver of his right to a prelim inary probationrevocation hearing. Furtherm ore, Adam s was af f orded all t he n ecessary d ue-proc e s s saf eguards associated with his f i n al revocation hearing and h as not shown any prejudice resulting f

rom the f a ilure to hold a prelim inary h earing. See id. This issue is w ithout m erit.
IV. Sentence ¶10. A d a ms a l s o b r i e f ly states that his parole violations were “technica l ” ; t h u s , t h e im p osition of a nine-y ear sentence was cruel and unusual punishm ent. However, at the t im e Adam s ’s parole was revoked, it w as within the trial c ourt’s discretion t o revoke and reinstate

a def e ndant’s entire s uspen d e d sentence. See M iss. C ode A nn. § 47-7-37(5)(b); 2 see also Agent v. State , 30 So. 3d 370, 374 (¶11) (Miss. Ct. App. 2010). A dam s adm i ttedly violated parole, giving the trial court the discretion to revoke and im pose any or a ll of his suspended sentence. This issue is without m erit.

2 T h e statu te w as am en d ed ef f ectiv e Ju l y 1 , 2 0 1 4 , to p ro v id e f o r g rad u ated p en alties f o r tech n ical p aro le v io latio n s. S e e A tw o o d v. S ta te , 1 8 3 S o . 3 d 8 4 3 , 8 4 6 (¶6 ) (M i ss. 2 0 1 6 ).

4¶11. T H E J U D G M E N T O F T H E M A D I S O N C O U N T Y C I R C U I T C O U R T

DENYING T H E MOTION FOR POSTCONVICTION RELIEF IS AFFIRMED. ALL COSTS OF THIS APPEAL ARE ASSESSED TO MADISON COUNTY. IRVING AND G RIFFIS, P.JJ., BARNES, ISHEE, CARLTON, FAIR, JAMES, WILSON AND GREENLEE, JJ., CONCUR.

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