FILED AUGUST 3, 2012 

S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N 

SUPREME COURT 

STAND UP FOR DEMOCRACY, 

 Plaintiff-Appellee, 

v No. 145387 

SECRETARY OF STATE and BOARD OF 

STATE CANVASSERS, 

 Defendants, 

and 

CITIZENS FOR FISCAL 

RESPONSIBILITY, 

Intervenor-DefendantAppellant. 

BEFORE THE ENTIRE BENCH 

MARY BETH KELLY, J. 

This case requires that we determine whether to grant a writ of mandamus in favor 

of plaintiff, Stand Up For Democracy, to compel the Board of State Canvassers to certify 

plaintiff’s referendum petition for inclusion on the November 2012 ballot. Intervening 

Michigan Supreme Court

Lansing, Michigan

Opinion Chief Justice: 

Robert P. Young, Jr. 

Justices: 

Michael F. Cavanagh 

Marilyn Kelly 

Stephen J. Markman 

Diane M. Hathaway 

Mary Beth Kelly 

Brian K. Zahra 
2

defendant, Citizens for Fiscal Responsibility, challenged the certification of plaintiff’s 

referendum petition, alleging that it failed to comply with the type-size requirement of 

MCL 168.482(2) and that the doctrine of substantial compliance, whereby technical 

deficiencies are resolved in favor of certification, did not apply. The Court of Appeals 

agreed with both assertions, but concluded it was required to follow its decision in 

Bloomfield Charter Township v Oakland County Clerk1

 and conclude that the petition 

substantially complied with the type-size requirement of MCL 168.482(2) and that 

certification was required. Consequently, the Court of Appeals directed the board to 

certify the petition.2

 

However, because MCL 168.482(2) uses the mandatory term “shall” and does not, 

by its plain terms, permit certification of deficient petitions with regard to form or 

content, a majority of this Court holds that the doctrine of substantial compliance is 

inapplicable to referendum petitions submitted for certification. Therefore, we reverse 

the Court of Appeals’ judgment in this regard and we overrule Bloomfield Charter Twp. 

Three justices of this Court further conclude that the type-size requirement of 

MCL 168.482(2) requires that the “type,” not the “letters,” of the petition heading 

measure 14 points. Because the Court of Appeals held that plaintiff failed to actually 

comply with the type-size requirement of MCL 168.482(2) given that the letters did not 

 

1 Bloomfield Charter Twp v Oakland Co Clerk, 253 Mich App 1; 654 NW2d 610 (2002). 

2 Stand Up For Democracy v Secretary of State, ___ Mich App ___; ___ NW2d ___ 

(2012). The Court of Appeals sought to convene a conflict panel, MCR 7.215(J)(2) and 

(3), but a majority of the Court declined to convene the panel in an order entered June 14, 

2012. Stand Up For Democracy v Secretary of State, ___ Mich App ___ (2012). 
3

measure 14 points, we would also have reversed that portion of the Court of Appeals’ 

judgment. 

Because a majority of this Court holds that a new writ of mandamus should enter 

directing the Board of State Canvassers to certify plaintiff’s petition as sufficient, a 

majority of this Court directs the Board of State Canvassers to certify plaintiff’s petition 

for the ballot. Pursuant to MCR 7.317(C)(3), we direct the Clerk of the Court to issue the 

judgment order forthwith. 

I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 

On February 29, 2012, plaintiff filed its referendum petition to invoke a 

referendum with regard to 2011 PA 4, MCL 141.1501 et seq., the emergency financial 

manager law, and to request certification of the petition from the Board of State 

Canvassers.3

 The petition contained 203,238 valid signatures, well exceeding the number 

 

3

 The people’s power of referendum is a constitutional right. Const 1963, art 2, § 9 

provides, in relevant part: 

The people reserve to themselves the power to propose laws and to 

enact and reject laws, called the initiative, and the power to approve or 

reject laws enacted by the legislature, called the referendum. . . . The 

power of referendum does not extend to acts making appropriations for 

state institutions or to meet deficiencies in state funds and must be invoked 

in the manner prescribed by law within 90 days following the final 

adjournment of the legislative session at which the law was enacted. To 

invoke the . . . referendum, petitions signed by a number of registered 

electors, not less than . . . five percent for referendum of the total vote cast 

for all candidates for governor at the last preceding general election at 

which a governor was elected shall be required. 

No law as to which the power of referendum properly has been 

invoked shall be effective thereafter unless approved by a majority of the 

electors voting thereon at the next general election. 
4

necessary to certify the petition and to place the referendum on the November 2012 

ballot. On March 14, 2012, plaintiff submitted its printer’s affidavit attesting that the 

petition heading was “PRINTED IN CAPITAL LETTERS IN 14-POINT BOLDFACE 

TYPE[.]” 

On April 9, 2012, intervenor filed a challenge to the form of plaintiff’s referendum 

petition, asserting, in part, that the heading, “REFERENDUM OF LEGISLATION 

PROPOSED BY INITIATIVE PETITION,” did not comply with the requirement of 

MCL 168.482(2) that the heading be “printed in capital letters in 14-point boldfaced 

type . . . .” 

The Board of State Canvassers considered intervenor’s challenge on April 26, 

2012. At the hearing, intervenor asserted that the form and content requirements of MCL 

168.482(2) are mandatory. Intervenor submitted two affidavits of two printers who 

reviewed the petition and stated that the petition was deficient because its heading did not 

measure 14-point type. Plaintiff countered that the board should apply the doctrine of 

substantial compliance and approve the petition and, alternatively, that its petition 

actually complied with the type-size requirement of the statute. Plaintiff relied on its 

printer’s affidavit, as well as the expert testimony of two printers, in support of its 

 

Once the Board of State Canvassers makes its official declaration of the sufficiency of a 

referendum petition and certifies the petition, the law subject to the referendum is no 

longer effective. See MCL 168.477(2) (“[A] law that is the subject of the referendum 

continues to be effective until the referendum is properly invoked, which occurs when the 

board of state canvassers makes its official declaration of the sufficiency of the 

referendum petition.”). 
5

argument. Plaintiff also criticized one of intervenor’s expert’s affidavits for simply 

measuring one of the capital letters in the heading. 

At the close of the hearing, two members of the board voted in favor of a motion 

to certify the petition, reasoning that “there was more than substantial compliance, . . . 

there was total compliance.” The remaining two board members voted to deny the 

motion, believing there to be a “legitimate question as to the size of the words” and 

reasoning that substantial compliance is insufficient under MCL 168.482(2) given its 

mandatory language. Consequently, the board did not approve the motion to certify the 

petition. 

Plaintiff then filed a complaint for mandamus in the Court of Appeals, requesting 

the Court to order defendants, the Board of State Canvassers and the Secretary of State, 

to certify the petition for inclusion on the November 2012 ballot because the board had a 

clear legal duty to certify the petition, because plaintiff either substantially or actually 

complied with the 14-point-type statutory requirement. The Court of Appeals first ruled 

that “the Calibri font utilized in plaintiff’s petition heading is smaller than the prescribed 

14-point type measurement of 14/72 inches.”4

 Without defining the term “type,” the 

panel reasoned that “text that does not measure 14 point, or 14/72 inches, is insufficient 

under the statute.”5

 The Court of Appeals, however, concluded that it was bound to 

follow Bloomfield Charter Twp and concluded that plaintiff’s petition had substantially 

 

4 Stand Up For Democracy, ___ Mich App at ___; slip op at 12.

5 Id. at ___; slip op at 12. 
6

complied with MCL 168.482(2).6

 The Court therefore granted plaintiff’s complaint for a 

writ of mandamus, compelling inclusion of the referendum on the ballot. 

We granted oral argument on the application for leave to appeal to consider “(1) 

whether plaintiff actually complied with the 14-point type requirement in MCL 

168.482(2), specifically given the terms ‘point’ and ‘type;’ and (2) if not, whether 

substantial compliance with the 14-point type requirement in § 482(2) is sufficient to give 

plaintiff a clear legal right to certification of the petition.”7

 In lieu of granting leave to 

appeal, pursuant to MCR 7.302(H)(1) a majority of this Court concludes that the Court of 

Appeals’ judgment is reversed, that substantial compliance is insufficient to certify 

plaintiff’s petitions, and we issue a writ of mandamus, directing the Board of State 

Canvassers to certify plaintiff’s petition as sufficient. 

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW 

We review for an abuse of discretion a court’s decision to issue or deny a writ of 

mandamus.8

 This dispute also involves a question of statutory interpretation, which we 

review de novo.9

 “[O]ur primary task in construing a statute, is to discern and give effect 

to the intent of the Legislature.”10 The words of the statute are the most reliable evidence 

 

6 Id. at ___; slip op at 12. 

7 Stand Up For Democracy v Secretary of State, 491 Mich ___ (2012). 

8 Casco Twp v Secretary of State, 472 Mich 566, 571; 701 NW2d 102 (2005). 

9 People v Kolanek, 491 Mich 382, 393; ___ NW2d ___ (2012). 

10 Sun Valley Foods Co v Ward, 460 Mich 230, 236; 596 NW2d 119 (1999).
7

of the Legislature’s intent and we must give each word its plain and ordinary meaning.11 

“In interpreting the statute at issue, we consider both the plain meaning of the critical 

word or phrase as well as ‘its placement and purpose in the statutory scheme.’”12 

III. ANALYSIS 

This appeal concerns a big constitutional issue, even though its focus is something 

as small as 14/72 of an inch. This matter turns on what many citizens may regard as a 

trivial issue: Whether a heading on a petition signed by over 200,000 people satisfies the 

statutory requirement that the petition heading be in “14-point boldfaced type[.]”13 As 

technical as this appears, the rule of law is implicated here because this issue concerns the 

constitutional foundation of how we govern ourselves. 

Although we colloquially call ourselves a “democracy,” we are not. We are a 

constitutional republic in which we, as Michigan citizens, elect our representatives to 

local and state legislative bodies to enact our laws. This republican form of government 

is guaranteed to us in the United States Constitution.14

In Michigan, we have enacted into our State Constitution an exception: The right 

of the people by initiative or referendum directly to enact laws or to repeal those validly 

 

11 Krohn v Home-Owners Ins Co, 490 Mich 145, 156; 802 NW2d 281 (2011). 

12 Sun Valley Foods Co, 460 Mich at 237, quoting Bailey v United States, 516 US 137, 

145; 116 S Ct 501; 133 L Ed 2d 472 (1995). 

13 MCL 168.482(2). 

14 Article IV, § 4 of the United States Constitution states: “The United States shall 

guarantee to every State in this Union a Republican Form of Government . . . .” 
8

enacted by our Legislature.15 Thus, as plaintiff seeks here, it is possible for a small 

minority of citizens to suspend a validly enacted law and require that that law be voted on 

in a general election. This case well demonstrates that tension between constitutional 

interests: the right to a republican form of government versus a constitutional process that 

allows a small minority to suspend the enactments of that government. 

In the very constitutional provision creating this right of petition by initiative and 

referendum, the Legislature is required to prescribe the rules by which such petitions may 

validly be made.16 It has done so, and one such provision is the mandatory 14-pointboldfaced-type requirement that is challenged here.17 No doubt in most ordinary 

circumstances whether a heading is in 14-point or 12-point type would be an 

inconsequential issue. But, because the power of referendum affects duly enacted laws, 

these so-called “trivial” requirements protect the citizens of Michigan from having their 

laws suspended by small factions—unless the petitioners satisfy all the requirements for 

invoking a referendum.18 With these principles in mind, we turn to the statutory 

requirement that the petition heading “shall be . . . printed in capital letters in 14-point 

boldfaced type[.]”19 

 

15 Const 1963, art 2, § 9. 

16 Const 1963, art 2, § 9 (“The power of referendum . . . must be invoked in the manner 

prescribed by law . . . .”). 

17 MCL 168.482(2). 

18 See Thompson v Secretary of State, 192 Mich 512, 522-523; 159 NW 65 (1916). 

19 MCL 168.482(2). 
9

A. SUBSTANTIAL COMPLIANCE 

Plaintiff first suggests that the statutory scheme allows for certification of a 

referendum petition if that petition substantially complies with MCL 168.482.20 The 

applicable statutory provision, MCL 168.482(2) provides: 

If the measure to be submitted proposes a constitutional amendment, 

initiation of legislation, or referendum of legislation, the heading of each 

part of the petition shall be prepared in the following form and printed in 

capital letters in 14-point boldfaced type: 

* * * 

REFERENDUM OF LEGISLATION 

PROPOSED BY INITIATIVE PETITION[21]

The Legislature’s use of the term “shall” “‘indicates a mandatory and imperative 

directive.’”22 Nowhere does the language of this provision indicate that compliance with 

the 14-point-type requirement may be achieved despite deficiencies. Indeed, other 

 

20 The partial dissent of Justices CAVANAGH, MARILYN KELLY, and HATHAWAY claims 

that it is “unnecessary,” post at 3, to rule on the issue of substantial compliance. 

However, the Court of Appeals treated this case as one involving substantial compliance 

and analyzed the doctrine in detail. Indeed, the basis for the Court of Appeals’ grant of 

mandamus was its conclusion that plaintiff had substantially complied with the type-size 

requirement of MCL 168.482(2). This Court, therefore, has the responsibility to obviate 

any doctrinal confusion regarding substantial compliance before analyzing the Court of 

Appeals’ ruling. Thus, the justices concluding that substantial compliance is insufficient 

are not reaching an “unnecessary” issue, but are instead correcting an error of law that 

pervaded the Court of Appeals’ decision and was essential to its ruling. 

21 Emphasis added. 

22 Mich Ed Ass’n v Secretary of State (On Rehearing), 489 Mich 194, 218; 801 NW2d 35 

(2011), quoting Burton v Reed City Hosp Corp, 471 Mich 745, 752; 691 NW2d 424 

(2005). 
10

provisions of the Michigan Election Law, MCL 168.1 et seq., demonstrate that the 

Legislature knows how to construct language specifically permitting substantial 

compliance with regard to form and content requirements.23 Similar language is 

conspicuously absent from MCL 168.482(2) and demonstrates a clear intent that petitions 

for referendums, voter initiatives, and constitutional amendments strictly comply with the 

form and content requirements of the statute. This conclusion is further supported by the 

Legislature’s 1965 amendment of MCL 168.482, which omitted language that 

specifically permitted substantial compliance but retained the mandatory requirement that 

the petition heading be in 14-point type.24 Indeed, the use of the mandatory term “shall” 

in MCL 168.482(2), in the absence of any language indicating that substantial 

compliance with the statute’s requirements suffices, indicates a clear intent that such a 

petition must strictly comply with the type requirement. Consequently, substantial 

 

23 See MCL 168.303(2) (the “nominating petition shall be substantially in the form 

prescribed in section 544c”); MCL 168.546 (“nominating petitions . . . must comply 

substantially with the above form”); MCL 168.590a(1) (a “qualifying petition shall be . . . 

in substantially the same form as provided in section 590h”); MCL 168.590h(2) (“the 

qualifying petition form shall be substantially as set forth in section 544c”); MCL 

168.653a(1) (“notice [of a special election] shall be in substantially the following form”); 

MCL 168.685(3) (“[new political party] petitions shall be in substantially the following 

form”); MCL 168.697 (the “names of the several offices to be voted for shall be placed 

on the ballot substantially in the following order”); MCL 168.759(5) (an “absent voter 

ballot application shall be in substantially the following form”); MCL 168.761(4) (the 

“clerk shall enclose with the ballot . . . a printed statement in substantially the following 

form”); MCL 168.952a (“A person may print his or her own recall petitions if those 

petitions comply substantially with the form prescribed by the secretary of state and the 

requirements of section 544c(2).”). 

24 Compare MCL 168.482, as amended by 1954 PA 116 (which included the phrase “type 

of the approximate size set forth”), with MCL 168.482, as amended by 1965 PA 312 

(which omitted that phrase). 
11

compliance with MCL 168.482(2) is not permitted. To certify a petition that does not 

strictly comply with the requirements of MCL 168.482 on the basis that it substantially 

complied with the statutory requirements would defeat the Legislature’s intent. 

However, “our judicial role precludes [us from] imposing different policy choices than 

those selected by the Legislature”; rather, we must apply the terms as written.25 

 Plaintiff, however, also relies on MCL 168.544d, which provides that petitions 

circulated countywide “shall be substantially as provided in [MCL 168.482] . . ..” 

Plaintiff asserts that this provision adopts the substantial compliance doctrine and permits 

certification of nonconforming referendum petitions. Because plaintiff circulated its 

petition countywide, MCL 168.544d is applicable. That provision provides: 

Nominating petitions for the offices under this act and petitions for a 

constitutional amendment, initiation of legislation, or referendum of 

legislation or a local proposal may be circulated on a countywide form. 

Petitions circulated countywide shall be on a form prescribed by the 

secretary of state, which form shall be substantially as provided in sections 

482, 544a, or 544c, whichever is applicable. The secretary of state may 

provide for a petition form larger than 8–1/2 inches by 13 inches and shall 

provide for identification of the city or township in which the person 

signing the petition is registered. The certificate of the circulator may be on 

the reverse side of the petition. This section does not prohibit the 

circulation of petitions on another form prescribed by this act. 

 By its plain language, this provision permits the Secretary of State to prescribe a 

form that itself “substantially” complies with the requirements of MCL 168.482. Thus, to 

the extent that MCL 168.544d permits substantial compliance, it only permits the 

Secretary of State to prescribe petition requirements that are in substantial compliance 

 

25 People v McIntire, 461 Mich 147, 152; 599 NW2d 102 (1999) (quotation marks and 

citation omitted). 
12

with MCL 168.482, MCL 168.544a, or MCL 168.544c of the Michigan Election Law. 

Contrary to plaintiff’s contention, the statute does not allow a petitioner itself to 

determine what substantially complies with the applicable election law requirements. 

The Legislature only provided the Secretary of State with that discretion. 

 More significantly, the Secretary of State’s prescribed form, as permitted by MCL 

168.544d, mandates strict compliance with the Legislature’s mandate in MCL 168.482(2) 

that the heading of a referendum petition be printed in 14-point type.26 Accordingly, 

MCL 168.544d does not constitute a broad substantial compliance provision, as plaintiff 

would have us interpret it. Because the Secretary of State’s prescribed form mandates 

strict compliance with MCL 168.482(2), plaintiff’s reliance on MCL 168.544d is 

unavailing. 

 In the absence of statutory language supporting the substantial compliance 

doctrine, plaintiff nevertheless posits that Michigan caselaw provides a general 

substantial compliance exception to the mandatory requirements of the Michigan Election 

Law. Plaintiff principally relies on Bloomfield Charter Twp for the proposition that 

Michigan courts have allowed issues to be placed on the ballot despite the existence of 

technical deficiencies in form and content. Although a lineage of Michigan Court of 

Appeals cases exists applying the substantial compliance doctrine before an election, we 

 

26 See Memorandum from the Secretary of State, Initiative and Referendum Petitions – 

Prescribed Format (Revised June 2011). The Secretary of State’s prescribed format 

requires that a referendum petition’s heading “shall be printed in capital letters in 14-

point boldface type on the left margin of the signature side of the sheet or at the top of the 

signature side of the sheet.” Id. Clearly, the Secretary of State has not relaxed the typesize requirement of MCL 168.482(2). 
13

are unwilling to follow this line of cases and adopt a general substantial compliance 

exception because such a rule is inconsistent with the statutory scheme as well as our 

jurisprudence.27 

 In Bloomfield Charter Twp,

28 a group of developers filed annexation petitions with 

the county clerk, who certified the petitions and scheduled a referendum election 

regarding annexation. The township sought to enjoin the election and also alleged, in 

part, that the annexation petitions failed to comply with MCL 168.488, which requires 

that annexation petitions meet the requirements of MCL 168.482(1) and (4) through (6). 

The circuit court denied the township’s request for injunctive relief and concluded that 

certification of the petitions was proper because “‘any technical deficiencies in the 

petitions are not material . . . .’”29 Approximately a year later, after voters had approved 

the annexation, the Court of Appeals affirmed the circuit court’s ruling. The Court 

 

27 Notably, our caselaw has consistently recognized the availability of substantial 

compliance if a petition is challenged in the post-election context. See footnote 33 of this 

opinion. Court of Appeals jurisprudence, however, has ignored the significance of the 

distinction between pre-election and post-election petition challenge cases. For example, 

in Settles v Detroit City Clerk, 169 Mich App 797; 427 NW2d 188 (1988), a pre-election 

challenge to an initiative petition in a home rule city, the Court cited post-election 

caselaw to hold that “all doubts as to technical deficiencies or failure to comply with the 

exact letter of procedural requirements in petitions . . . are resolved in favor of permitting 

the people to vote and express a choice on any proposal subject to election.” Id. at 802-

803, citing Meridian Charter Twp v East Lansing, 101 Mich App 805; 300 NW2d 703 

(1980). Likewise in Bloomfield Charter Twp, technically a post-election case, the Court 

cited cases involving both pre- and post-election challenges for the same proposition, 

citing both Meridian Charter Twp and Settles. 

28 Bloomfield Charter Twp, 253 Mich App 1. 

29 Id. at 18. 
14

acknowledged that the annexation petitions were technically deficient under the statute, 

and reasoned that it would apply “the doctrine [of substantial compliance] in this case 

involving imperfect petitions, absent the Legislature’s instruction that a petitioned-for 

election will be precluded unless the initiating petitions exactly match the Michigan 

Election Law requirements for form and content.”30 The Court, therefore, affirmed the 

circuit court and concluded that it had properly found substantial compliance and had 

correctly refused to permit the minor defects to preclude the election.31 

Bloomfield Charter Twp is overruled to the extent that it stands for the proposition 

that substantial compliance with mandatory petition requirements compels the preelection certification of a technically deficient petition. Clearly, Bloomfield Charter 

Twp’s reasoning is contrary to the plain language of MCL 168.482(2), which we have 

explained contains a mandatory 14-point-type requirement. A nonconforming 

referendum petition cannot be certified for inclusion on the ballot because that result is 

contrary to the Legislature’s intent that petitions strictly conform to the requirements of 

MCL 168.482. Simply because the Legislature has not included an explicit instruction 

that “a technically imperfect petition necessarily precludes an election regarding the 

matter therein addressed,” does not mean that the Legislature intended inclusion of 

deficient petitions as Bloomfield Charter Twp reasoned.32 Bloomfield Charter Twp

inferred too much from the legislative silence and effectively ignored the mandatory 

 

30 Id. at 23. 

31 Id. at 25. 

32 Id. at 22. 
15

language that the Legislature chose to use when stating the form and content 

requirements of MCL 168.482. 

 Moreover, while this Court has recognized application of the substantial 

compliance doctrine to mandatory petition requirements post-election,33 it has not 

recently sanctioned application of substantial compliance to nonconforming petitions 

before an election. The only Michigan Supreme Court case to apply the substantial 

compliance doctrine pre-election is Kadans v Wayne County Clerk.

34 In that case, the 

plaintiff sought a writ of mandamus compelling the defendant to certify his 

nonconforming nominating petitions. Fifty-eight of the plaintiff’s fifty-nine petitions 

were not 81⁄2 by 13 inches as required by former MCL 168.544, but were 21⁄2 to 3 inches 

shorter than 13 inches because they were missing the circulator’s affidavit. This Court 

unanimously found that former MCL 168.544 had “been complied with by plaintiff 

according to the rule of ‘substantial compliance’” and that the plaintiff was entitled to the 

writ of mandamus.35 

 

33 It has long been held that post-election challenges substantially relax technical 

requirements on the grounds that any technical deficiencies are cured by the voters’ 

affirmative approval of the underlying proposal. See Carmen v Secretary of State, 384 

Mich 443, 454-455; 185 NW2d 1 (1971) (reasoning that the error in noncompliant 

initiatory petitions was cured by voters’ adoption of the constitutional amendment 

because they were “directly notified” of the omitted information on election day); City of 

Jackson v Commissioner of Revenue, 316 Mich 694, 716-718; 26 NW2d 569 (1947) 

(noting that courts should view technical errors differently once the electors have voted 

affirmatively). 

34 Kadans v Wayne Co Clerk, 363 Mich 306; 109 NW2d 788 (1961). 

35 Id. at 308. 
16

Kadans’s broad application of the substantial compliance standard, however, was 

repudiated by the Legislature’s subsequent adoption of MCL 168.544d.36 Before 

adoption of that provision, the law was silent with respect to agency-created or agencyprescribed petitions. The adoption of MCL 168.544d now provides clear guidance 

concerning when substantial compliance is allowed with regard to agency-created or 

agency-prescribed petitions and essentially delegates to the Secretary of State the ability 

(through its prescribed petitions) to determine what requirements must be fully complied 

with and what requirements need be only substantially complied with. Consequently, the 

only case from this Court applying a general substantial compliance exception to 

mandatory petition requirements of the Michigan Election Law has been superseded by 

statute. 

 In sum, neither the statutory scheme nor the caselaw plaintiff relies on supports 

application of the substantial compliance doctrine in the period before an election. 

Rather, for substantial compliance to be sufficient before an election, its use must be 

rooted in a particular statutory exception to the statutory formatting and content 

requirements. Because no statutory provision permitting application of substantial 

compliance exists in the instant case, and because intervenor has raised a pre-election 

challenge, plaintiff must have actually complied with the requirements of MCL 

168.482(2) in order for its referendum petition to be certified.37

 

36 1975 PA 327. 

37 The partial dissent of Justices CAVANAGH, MARILYN KELLY, and HATHAWAY asserts 

that “there are four votes that find at least substantial compliance . . . .” Post at 3. This 

assertion is simply untrue. Rather, there are four votes for the elimination of the judicial 

expansion of the substantial compliance doctrine, and the partial dissent has refused to 
17

B. ACTUAL COMPLIANCE 

1. TYPE-SIZE REQUIREMENT OF MCL 168.482(2) 

To determine whether plaintiff has actually complied with MCL 168.482(2), we 

must first determine the meaning of the phrase “printed in capital letters in 14-point 

boldfaced type[.]” The Michigan Election Law does not define the terms “point” and 

“type,” but the parties agree that the traditional definitions of “point” and “type” have not 

substantially changed since the enactment of the statute in 1954. We agree with the 

traditional definitions proposed because they are consistent with those terms’ acquired 

technical meanings38 and those definitions have remained constant up to the present day. 

“Point” is defined as “a unit that is used to measure the size of type used in printing and 

that is equivalent to about 1/72 inch[.]”39 “Type” is defined as “[a] rectangular block, 

 

recognize that we have now eliminated this judicially created doctrine. Accordingly, 

when a petition is challenged pre-election, the petition must actually comply with the 

statutory mandates of MCL 168.482(2), or the petition must substantially comply 

pursuant to a specific statutory exception or through a form prescribed by the Secretary of 

State. Neither of the latter two circumstances exists in this case. 

38 MCL 8.3a. 

39 Webster’s Third New International Dictionary of the English Language, Unabridged 

Edition (1965), p 1750. The definition of “point system” before the enactment of the 

statute refers to substantially the same unit of measurement used to measure type. See 

Webster’s New International Dictionary of the English Language, Second Edition 

Unabridged (1948), p 1904 (“A system according to which the various sizes of type 

bodies, leads, etc., bear a fixed and simple relation to one another. The point system now 

in general use in America was adopted in 1886 by the United States Type Founders’ 

Association, though many founders were already using it. It is a modification of a French 

system, and is based upon the pica body then most used. This body is divided into 

twelfths, called “points,” and every type body consists of a given number of these points; 

as, the body of this book is printed in 6-point. The value of the point is .013837 inch, or 

nearly 1/72 inch. For specimens of sizes, see TYPE.”). 
18

usually of metal or wood, having its face so shaped as to produce, in printing, a letter, 

figure, or other character[.]”40 Multiple dictionary depictions of type show that the 

character, or typeface, does not cover the entire surface of the type, but rather includes 

spacing above or below the letters, to prevent the printed characters from touching.41 

These depictions further demonstrate that the point size of type measures the entire 

vertical face of the metal block. The significance of these definitions is that the character 

printed is smaller than the point size of the type.42 

 

40 Webster’s New International Dictionary of the English Language, Second Edition 

Unabridged (1948), p 2750. “Type” is also defined as “Such blocks, or the letters or 

characters impressed, collectively.” Id. Notably, Justice MARKMAN prefers this 

definition, but he does not faithfully adhere to it because he omits the definition’s 

reference to “blocks.” Further, despite the parties’ agreement regarding the technical 

meanings of these terms, Justice MARKMAN nonetheless asserts that because other 

methods of printing were available in 1954, that it is more reasonable to interpret “type” 

as the text or type produced. We reject Justice MARKMAN’s preferred definition of 

“type” based on the availability of other printing methods for the well-explained reasons 

articulated by Chief Justice YOUNG. These other printing methods are simply irrelevant 

because to ascertain the Legislature’s intent we must focus on the language used, not 

extraneous then-available printing methods. Indeed, the meanings of “point” and “type” 

were well-established in 1954, and had the Legislature intended some other unit of 

measurement to take account of these other printing methods, the Legislature could have 

said so, but it did not. 

41 See Webster’s Third New International Dictionary of the English Language, 

Unabridged Edition (1965), p 2476 (diagram of “type”); Webster’s New International 

Dictionary of the English Language, Second Edition Unabridged (1948), p 2750 

(diagram of “type”). 

42 Furthermore, the definition of “point” refers to “type used in printing,” Webster’s Third 

New International Dictionary of the English Language, Unabridged Edition (1965), p 

1750, and the definition of “point system” refers to the “sizes of type bodies,” Webster’s 

New International Dictionary of the English Language, Second Edition Unabridged

(1948), p 1904. These references to “type” within the definition of “point” further 

support the conclusion that, whether the “type” refers to the printer’s blocks themselves, 

or whether it refers to the alternative definition of the resulting printed letters, the point 
19

The parties’ views diverge, however, with respect to whether the phrase “printed 

in capital letters in 14-point boldfaced type” requires measurement of the “letters” or of 

the “type.” Intervenor, like the Court of Appeals, interprets the phrase to require that the 

“letters” measure 14 points. We disagree with this interpretation and conclude that the 

type must measure 14 points, not the resulting printed letters. This is because the 

technical definition of “point” specifically denotes that point measures type size, which is 

the entire vertical length of the printer’s block. As explained, the technical meanings of 

“point” and “type” necessarily incorporate some amount of blank space so that the capital 

letters in 14-point type do not necessarily measure 14/72 of an inch. 

Intervenor claims that because “in” means “made of,” the letters must measure 14 

points. However, this argument is specious. The term “14-point” specifically modifies 

the word “type,” and there is no indication that the Legislature intended to diverge from 

the technical meanings of the terms “point” and “type.” Had the Legislature intended 

that the physical height of the letters measure 14 points, it would not have used the term 

“type” as modified by “14-point” and instead could have specified that the letters must 

“measure 14 points.”43 

 

measurement of type exists by reference to the actual printer’s blocks, contrary to Justice 

MARKMAN’s claim. 

43 Having considered this textual argument, which is substantially the same as that 

offered by Justice MARKMAN, his contention that we have not considered this language is 

clearly incorrect. Rather, it is Justice MARKMAN that has failed to consider the phrase, 

“printed in capital letters in 14-point boldfaced type,” in the context of the entire section 

as we explain in footnote 44 of this opinion. 
20

Furthermore, intervenor’s argument does not take into account the remaining 

subsections within MCL 168.482, which provide additional support for our conclusion. 

Subsection (3) states, “The full text of the amendment so proposed shall follow and be 

printed in 8-point type,” while subsection (5) states, “The following warning shall be 

printed in 12-point type . . . .” Reading these subsections together with subsection (2), 

and consistently as a whole as we must,44 it is clear that the point size of all the required 

text refers to the size of the type and not the individual letters. The fact that the other 

content requirements are not required to be in capital letters, but a combination of 

uppercase and lowercase letters, necessarily contemplates that letters in the required type 

size may have different heights, since a lowercase “x” has a different height than an 

uppercase “E.” This provides further support for the conclusion that the “type,” and not 

each individual “letter,” must be measured. Otherwise, if intervenor’s position were 

adopted, each of the letters in subsections (3) and (5) would have to be of equal physical 

size, contrary to the Legislature’s clear indication in subsections (3) and (5) that the 

 

44 “[W]ords and phrases used in an act should be read in context with the entire act and 

assigned such meanings as to harmonize with the act as a whole.” People v Couzens, 480 

Mich 240, 249; 747 NW2d 849 (2008) (quotation marks and citation omitted). Yet, 

Justice MARKMAN, like intervenor, reads MCL 168.482(2) in isolation to conclude that 

“type” must refer to the point size of the letters. Were we to adopt intervenor’s and 

Justice MARKMAN’s position, we would essentially adopt two different definitions of 

type, requiring petitioners to measure the letters under MCL 168.482(2), but measure the 

type under MCL 168.482(3) and (5). Indeed, Justice MARKMAN does not explain how to 

reconcile the language of MCL 168.483(2) with that used in subsections (3) and (5). 

Instead, he posits that the language of MCL 168.482(2), specifically the terms “printed” 

and “letters,” and “in” instead of “with,” evince a clear intent that the letters measure 14 

points and not the type. This view is unpersuasive for reasons I, and Chief Justice 

YOUNG, have explained in detail. 
21

required text appear in both uppercase and lowercase letters. Given the foregoing, it is 

clear that the reference to “letters” in MCL 168.482(2) is intended merely to clarify that 

the text of the heading appear in all capital letters.45 We would therefore hold that MCL 

168.482(2), by its plain terms, requires that the type of the petition heading measure 14 

points, not the individual letters. 

2. MEASUREMENT OF DIGITAL TYPE 

Having concluded that the “type” of the petition heading and not the letters must 

measure 14-points, does not end the analysis. Rather, it must be determined whether 

plaintiff’s petition heading measures 14-point type. This question necessarily involves 

the preliminary issues whether the traditional meanings of “point” and “type” are 

transferrable to digital text and, if so, how digital 14-point type is to be measured. 

 While plaintiff and intervenor disagree on these points, the assistant attorneys 

general representing the Board of State Canvassers and the Secretary of State conceded at 

oral argument and in their supplemental brief concerning intervenor’s application for 

leave to appeal in this Court, that those “same [traditional] concepts [of point and type] 

are replicated in computer software programs that result in the production of digital type 

 

45 We disagree with intervenor’s and Justice MARKMAN’s suggestion that the letter must 

be measured because otherwise, an illegible 3-point letter in 14-point type would comply 

with the statute. Intervenor, like Justice MARKMAN, thus asserts that measurement of the 

type would defeat the purpose of MCL 168.482(2). This situation is not before this 

Court. Moreover, simply because the size of letters could be manipulated within a 14-

point-type setting does not mean that the Legislature intended that the heading’s letters 

each measure 14 points. 
22

from an electronic printer.”46 Counsel for the board and the Secretary of State has also 

conceded that the same methods of measurement applicable to metal blocks of type are 

applicable to digital type.47 Further, because this Court can take judicial notice of facts 

not subject to reasonable dispute,48 I acknowledge that Microsoft’s glossary of 

typographical terms defines “point” consistently with that term’s traditional meaning, as 

“[a] unit of measurement, often used to measure type size, equal to 0.013837 inch 

(approximately equal to 1/72 . . .).”49 And although Microsoft’s glossary does not 

 

46 At oral argument, the assistant attorney general representing the board and the 

Secretary of State stated, “Essentially software of the digital era is intended to replicate 

what was done in the past.” 

Further, although this Court construes the statutory language “in the light of the 

circumstances existing at the date of [the statute’s] enactment, not in the light of 

subsequent developments” Wayne Co Bd of Rd Comm’rs v Wayne Co Clerk, 293 Mich 

229, 235-236; 291 NW 897 (1940), I view the Legislature’s decision not to amend these 

technical terms, despite several amendments in the digital age, see 1993 PA 137 and 1998 

PA 142, as an acknowledgement that the meaning of those terms has carried over to 

computerized printing. 

47 With regard to the measurement of type, the assistant attorney general at oral argument 

answered, “That is my understanding,” in response to Chief Justice YOUNG’s inquiry, 

whether “[e]ven though we now have a different method of producing type, has that 

measurement [from the traditional printing industry] been faithfully transcribed to 

digitized production?” Curiously, neither Chief Justice YOUNG nor Justice MARKMAN

attach any significance to defendants’ concessions, despite the fact that the Board of State 

Canvassers and the Secretary of State are charged with implementing Michigan’s election 

laws, including the approval or denial of referendum petitions and are, thus, in the best 

position to provide expertise regarding the proper measurement of digital text. 

48 People v Goecke, 457 Mich 442, 448 n 2; 579 NW2d 868 (1998) (noting that this Court 

may take judicial notice of facts not subject to reasonable dispute); MRE 201. 

49 Microsoft Support, WD2000: Definitions of Typography Terms in Word

<http://support.microsoft.com/kb/192973/en-us> (accessed August 1, 2012). 
23

include the definition of “type,” it defines “font size” as the “size of type . . . .”50 A 

separate Microsoft webpage further indicates that, when measuring the point size of type, 

the letter does not cover the entire “block” because “a little bit [is] added on . . . so that 

lines of type ‘set solid’ (without any additional space between them) do not bash into 

each other.”51 

 

50 Id. Chief Justice YOUNG asserts that judicial notice cannot be taken of how Microsoft 

“programmed its font system . . . .” Post at 12 n 13. Yet, I have not taken judicial notice 

of such facts and have only taken judicial notice of terms specifically defined by 

Microsoft. That Microsoft has adopted certain definitions of “point,” and “font size,” and 

acknowledged that the point size of “type” measures not the letter but the digital block, is 

hardly subject to dispute. I fail to see how my acknowledgment of Microsoft’s 

definitions of these terms, made known to the public, is any different from this Court’s 

decisions to take judicial notice of economic conditions, In re Baldwin’s Estate, 311 

Mich 288, 312; 18 NW2d 827 (1945), common human behaviors, Moore v Capital Nat’l 

Bank of Lansing, 274 Mich 56, 66-67; 264 NW 288 (1936), or an agency’s decision to 

change an historical practice, Grandville Muni Executive Ass’n v City of Grandville, 453 

Mich 428, 442; 553 NW2d 917 (1996), or, indeed, this Court’s common practice of 

relying on dictionary definitions when interpreting a statute. 

Justice MARKMAN also attempts to discredit my use of judicial notice, asserting 

that I have assumed that Microsoft defines type as font size. His assertion that there is 

“no evidence” to reach this conclusion, post at 13, is unfounded because, as I explain, 

Microsoft has specifically acknowledged that the size of type incorporates additional 

space not covered by the font, or actual letter. 

51 Microsoft, The Relationship Between Font Size and Physical Type Size

<http://www.microsoft.com/typography/web/designer/face3.htm> (accessed August 1, 

2012). Consistently with Microsoft’s recognition that digitized type is larger than the 

actual character, other modern typographical sources recognize that computer characters 

are contained within an invisible box, or blocking around the letter, which replicates the 

metal block used in mechanical typesetting. See Ambrose & Harris, The Fundamentals 

of Typography (Lausanne: AVA Publishing SA, 2d ed, 2011), p 46; Bringhurst, The 

Elements of Typographic Style (Vancouver: Hartley & Marks, 1992), p 289. Notably, 

just like the characters on physical type, the digital characters within digital type will take 

up different amounts of space within the type depending on the font family. See Craig, 

Scala, & Bevington, Designing with Type: The Essential Guide to Typography (New 

York: Watson-Guptill Publications, 5th ed, 2006), pp 17-18. This is why different fonts 
24

Given the concessions made by counsel for the board and the Secretary of State 

and Microsoft’s definitions of point and type, it is clear that digital type is the equivalent 

of physical type and that computer software continues to use this basic terminology.52 

Further, because digital type and physical type are functional equivalents, they are 

measured in the same manner except in the instance of digital type; in that instance an 

invisible box, which replicates the printer’s block, is measured and is reflected by the font 

size selected.53 

3. APPLICATION 

 In the present case, plaintiff used 14-point Calibri font for its petition heading, as 

attested to by plaintiff’s printer. Although plaintiff’s printer’s affidavit did not state the 

basis for this conclusion, the affiant explained at the Board of State Canvassers hearing 

how he verified the point size: 

When I was asked to sign the affidavit, I took the file that we were 

given, that we had assembled for printing purposes, and I used a 

program . . . called PDF Suite. And I went in and I verified that it was 14-

point . . . . 

 

of different point, or font size, appear smaller or larger in comparison to one another. 

This is yet another reason why measurement of the digital letter will yield an inaccurate 

type size. 

52 Aside from the concessions and Microsoft’s definitions, multiple modern typographical 

sources also support this conclusion. Ambrose, The Fundamentals of Typography, p 46; 

Craig, Designing with Type, pp 17-18. 

53 This conclusion is implicit in Microsoft’s adoption of the technical term “point” and its 

acknowledgment that digital type is the equivalent of metal type. Adobe also 

acknowledges that measurement for metal type is used for the measurement of digital 

type. Adobe, Measuring Type <http://www.adobe.com/type/topics/info2.html> (accessed 

August 1, 2012). 
25

 Intervenor filed two competing affidavits, but did not present any expert testimony 

at the hearing. Both affiants measured the size of the petition heading’s capital letters 

and each concluded that the heading is in “a significantly smaller font than required” 

without providing a basis for this conclusion. I do not view these affidavits as dispositive 

because, as I have already concluded, measuring the letters to determine compliance with 

MCL 168.482(2) is an inappropriate method of measurement. 

 I also do not view as dispositive the intervenor’s supplemental affidavit submitted 

after we granted oral argument on the application.54 In this affidavit, the affiant attested 

that, using an E-scale ruler,55 the type of the petition heading did not measure 14 points, 

and that while the E-scale ruler “subtract[s] the space above or below the actual letter,” 

the E-scale ruler only reflects how characters of a particular font in 14-point type will 

appear. Because different fonts take up different amounts of space within the digital 

block, an E-scale ruler cannot definitively measure whether the actual font selected is in 

14-point type. 

 I also find the affiant’s comparison of plaintiff’s heading with 14-point type metal 

blocks that were available in 1954 to be unpersuasive. The affiant avers that this 

comparison shows that plaintiff’s heading is “clearly a smaller type size,” yet the spacing 

between the lines of text in each of the three examples appears to be the same. This 

 

54 After intervenor moved for leave to appeal and we granted argument on the 

application, this Court granted intervenor’s motion to supplement the record. Stand Up 

For Democracy v Secretary of State, 492 Mich ___ (2012). 

55 An E-scale ruler reprints various letters “E” of the same font family that comprise 

different type sizes to provide a side-by-side comparison between the example type size 

and the printed letter. 
26

exercise only demonstrates what we already know: Different styles of font will take up 

different amounts of space on a printer’s metal or digital block. In fact, plaintiff’s expert 

testified with regard to this very fact at the hearing: 

 Basically when you’re talking about 14-point type, you’re talking 

about an area that’s just less than a fifth of an inch, .194. And it becomes a 

canvas that a type designer gets to work with, and sometimes they use the 

whole canvas and sometimes they use part of the canvas. 

Consequently, the affiant’s comparison does not establish that plaintiff’s heading is 

noncompliant. Rather, because the spacing between the lines of each example of text 

appears to be equal, the comparison tends to demonstrate actual compliance with the 14-

point-type requirement. 

 My review of intervenor’s evidence shows that intervenor failed to establish that 

plaintiff’s petition’s heading was not in 14-point type and otherwise failed to create a 

legitimate question of fact regarding the type size used. Plaintiff’s evidence established 

that its printer used a 14-point Calibri font, which the printer verified using Adobe 

software, and which intervenor simply failed to rebut. Because Microsoft defines font 

size to equal type size, plaintiff presented evidence establishing that it actually complied 

with the type-size requirement of MCL 168.482(2). There being no evidence to the 

contrary, I conclude that plaintiff actually complied with MCL 168.482(2). 

C. MANDAMUS 

We must next determine whether plaintiff is entitled to a writ of mandamus 

requiring certification of the referendum petition. Mandamus is an extraordinary remedy 
27

and the primary purpose of a writ of mandamus is to enforce duties required by law.56 To 

obtain a writ of mandamus the plaintiff must show that it has a clear legal right to the 

performance of the specific duty sought to be compelled and that the defendant has a 

clear legal duty to perform the act.57

The board’s duty with respect to referendum petitions is limited to determining the 

sufficiency of a petition’s form and content and whether there are sufficient signatures to 

warrant certification.58 In this case, there is no question that plaintiff collected more than 

enough valid signatures in support of its petition. However, because the board 

deadlocked on the issue of compliance with the type-size requirement of MCL 

168.482(2), the board did not certify the petition. Because plaintiff’s petition actually 

complied with the type-size requirements of MCL 168.482(2), the board is obligated to 

certify the petition. Accordingly, I conclude that plaintiff is entitled to a writ of 

mandamus because the board has a clear legal duty to certify the petition as actually 

compliant with MCL 168.482(2). 

IV. CONCLUSION 

A majority of this Court holds that the doctrine of substantial compliance is 

inapplicable to referendum petitions submitted for pre-election certification and we 

overrule Bloomfield Twp. I and two other justices further conclude that the type-size 

 

56 State Bd of Ed v Houghton Lake Community Sch, 430 Mich 658, 666-667; 425 NW2d 

80 (1988). 

57 In re MCI Telecom Complaint, 460 Mich 396, 442-443; 596 NW2d 164 (1999). 

58 See MCL 168.476 and MCL 168.477. 
28

requirement of MCL 168.482(2) requires that the “type,” not the “letters,” of the petition 

heading measure 14 points. I additionally conclude that plaintiff actually complied with 

the type-size requirement. Finally, a majority of this Court holds that plaintiff is entitled 

to a new writ of mandamus requiring the Board of State Canvassers to certify its petition 

as sufficient. Accordingly, a majority of this Court directs the Board of State Canvassers 

to certify plaintiff’s petition for the ballot and, pursuant to MCR 7.317(C)(3), we direct 

the Clerk of the Court to issue the judgment order forthwith. 

SUMMARY 

(1) A majority of this Court holds that the Court of Appeals erred by granting 

mandamus on the basis of plaintiff’s substantial compliance with election law. The Court 

of Appeals opinion and grant of mandamus are reversed. Substantial compliance with the 

requirements of MCL 168.482(2) is insufficient to establish that plaintiff’s referendum 

petition is entitled to be placed on the ballot. Entitlement to be placed on the ballot 

requires a showing of actual compliance with the law. 

(2) The Board of State Canvassers shall certify the petition as sufficient because a 

majority of the Court concludes that plaintiff either actually complied with the law or that 

the Court of Appeals’ original writ of mandamus was not erroneous. Accordingly, a new 

writ of mandamus shall enter. 

 Mary Beth Kelly 
S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N 

SUPREME COURT 

STAND UP FOR DEMOCRACY, 

 Plaintiff-Appellee, 

v No. 145387 

SECRETARY OF STATE and BOARD OF 

STATE CANVASSERS, 

 Defendants, 

and 

CITIZENS FOR FISCAL 

RESPONSIBILITY, 

Intervenor-DefendantAppellant. 

YOUNG, C.J. (concurring in part and dissenting in part). 

We concur with and join parts I, II, III(A), and III(B)(1) of Justice MARY BETH 

KELLY’s opinion. We agree with Justices MARY BETH KELLY and MARKMAN that actual 

compliance with the statutory type requirements is mandated. In determining how to 

measure the type size, we believe that the technical (namely, the customary printer’s) 

understanding of the statutory terms “type” and “point” negate the intervernor’s notion 

that one can determine the size of “type” by measuring the characters actually printed. 

Consequently, the question we must resolve is whether the “size 14” Calibri font 

generated by plaintiff’s computer is a faithful replication of the statutorily required 
2

heading in 14-point type that would have been generated by using traditional movable 

type. 

On this question, Justice MARY BETH KELLY believes that it is possible on this 

record, and with reference to extrarecord materials, both to determine how a digitized 

computer font is produced and that the font at issue here meets the statutory size 

requirement. She does so by invoking judicial notice. We do not share Justice MARY 

BETH KELLY’s technical literacy: we lack the necessary knowledge of printing and, more 

important, the programming necessary to create computer fonts. Therefore, we 

respectfully dissent from her conclusion that plaintiff actually complied with the type size 

requirements in MCL 168.482(2). 

As a result, we conclude that plaintiff failed to establish that its petition heading 

met the statutory type and print requirements. Because of this failure of proofs, we 

would deny plaintiff’s claim for mandamus, thus reversing the Court of Appeals’ 

decision on the merits. However, given the stunning transformation of the printing 

industry since the statutory requirements were enacted—from movable type to computer 

generated print—and because we believe that the historical statutory terms are 

nonetheless applicable in this new computer era, it is important for this Court to establish 

a precedent to guide future petition efforts. While we reject her conclusion that actual 

compliance has been proved here, we believe that Justice MARY BETH KELLY’s opinion 

has provided this guidance on the controlling legal principles. 

Important to our resolution of this case, however, is the fact that the legal 

standards under which the Secretary of State, the Board of State Canvassers, and the 

parties operated were confused and, as held today, erroneous. As a consequence, we 
3

would allow plaintiff an opportunity to present proofs to the Board of State Canvassers 

under the announced correct legal standards. Accordingly, we would remand this case to 

the Board of State Canvassers for further proceedings to determine whether plaintiff’s 

petition heading actually complied with the type size requirements of MCL 168.482(2). 

As eloquently stated by Justice MARY BETH KELLY, this appeal concerns a big 

constitutional issue about an apparently small thing: the size of a heading required for 

circulated petitions like the one at issue here. And although a “technical” requirement—

the size of a petition heading—is involved, this is a legally and constitutionally 

significant matter because compliance with the legal petition requirements is the only 

means by which a small fraction of Michigan citizens is permitted to countermand the 

will of the people as expressed through the legislation duly enacted by their elected 

representatives. 

So this case about a “technicality” is not about the wisdom of the act the plaintiff’s 

petition seeks to suspend, nor is it about “the people’s right to vote,” as plaintiff 

characterizes the issue. The fact is, the people have voted: they elected the very 

Legislature and Governor who enacted the emergency financial manager act, PA 4, MCL 

141.1501 et seq., that plaintiff challenges with its petition. 

The sole question before us is whether plaintiff has filed a qualifying, legally 

compliant petition that permits it to both suspend this validly enacted law and require its 

members’ fellow citizens to determine whether this law will remain on the books. As 

Justice MARY BETH KELLY explains, this is a core issue in a constitutional republic like 

ours. 
4

I. ANALYSIS 

A. THE JUDGE-MADE “SUBSTANTIAL COMPLIANCE” DOCTRINE, TO THE 

EXTENT THAT IT REMAINS VIABLE, IS SUPERSEDED HERE BY THE 

LEGISLATIVELY DEFINED SUBSTANTIAL COMPLIANCE PROVISION OF MCL 

168.544d. 

MCL 168.482(2) requires that the petition heading “shall be . . . printed in capital 

letters in 14-point boldfaced type[.]” A majority of the Court agrees that, for the reasons 

that Justice MARY BETH KELLY’s and Justice MARKMAN’s separate opinions explain, the 

judge-made doctrine of substantial compliance is insufficient to entitle plaintiff to 

certification of its petition. Because MCL 168.482(2) uses the mandatory language 

“shall” regarding the type size of the petition heading, plaintiff must fully adhere to this 

provision unless another statutory provision specifically allows for substantial 

compliance. As Justices MARY BETH KELLY and MARKMAN correctly explain, there is 

no statutory provision that would allow the Board of State Canvassers to apply the 

doctrine of substantial compliance to plaintiff’s petition in this case. In particular, MCL 

168.544d incorporates a substantial compliance provision specifying that only the 

Secretary of State may prescribe forms that substantially comply with the statutory 

requirements for petitions. 

In this case, the Secretary of State actually mandated compliance with the required 

statutory conditions,1

 and plaintiff cannot prevail on the ground that it “substantially 

 

1

 The Secretary of State, in its advisory designed to provide guidance to citizens engaged 

in the petition process, cited MCL 168.482(2) and explained that the heading “shall be 

printed in capital letters in 14-point boldface type on the left margin of the signature side 

of the sheet or at the top of the signature side of the sheet.” Secretary of State 

memorandum, Initiative and Referendum Petitions – Prescribed Format (revised June 

2011). Of course, the Secretary of State has the authority to determine that “size 14,” 
5

complied” with the 14-point type requirement. Thus, unless plaintiff actually complied, 

there is no clear legal right to have its petition certified. 

B. THE MANDATORY STATUTORY “POINT” SIZE REQUIREMENTS FOR 

“TYPE” REFER TO THE SIZE OF A TRADITIONAL MOVABLE TYPE BLOCK, 

NOT THE SIZE OF THE ACTUAL PRINTED CHARACTER ON THE PETITION. 

 We agree with Justice MARY BETH KELLY that the Court of Appeals panel erred to 

the extent that it concluded that the petition heading’s printed letters themselves must 

measure 14 points in height. While the Court of Appeals panel correctly recognized that 

a point is a unit of measurement (approximating 1/72 of an inch), the definitions of 

“point” and “type” that predominated at the time the Legislature enacted MCL 168.482 

belie the conclusion that the printed letters themselves must measure 14 points in height. 

The Legislature enacted MCL 168.482 in 1954 and amended it in 1965 to provide 

that the heading “shall be . . . printed in capital letters in 14-point bold face type[.]”2

 In 

determining the meanings of “point” and “type,” this Court must accord these terms their 

“peculiar and appropriate meaning[s]” at the time of enactment.3

 

Webster’s New International Dictionary of the English Language, Second Edition 

Unabridged (1948) defines “type” as “[a] rectangular block, usually of metal or wood, 

 

“size 12,” or “size 8” computer fonts comply with the statutory type size requirements of 

MCL 168.482(2), (5), and (3), respectively. 

2

 1954 PA 116; 1965 PA 312. 1993 PA 137 amended MCL 168.482 to divide it into 

subsections and substitute “boldface” for “bold face,” while 1998 PA 142 substituted 

“boldfaced” for “boldface.” Neither of these subsequent amendments altered the terms 

“point” or “type.” 

3

 MCL 8.3a. 
6

having its face so shaped as to produce, in printing, a letter, figure, or other character” or, 

alternatively, as “[s]uch blocks, or the letters or characters impressed, collectively.”4

 It 

defines “point system” specifically in relation to the blocks themselves: “A system 

according to which the various sizes of type bodies, leads, etc., bear a fixed and simple 

relation to one another. . . . The value of the point is .013837 inch, or nearly 1/72 inch.”5

 

4 Webster’s New International Dictionary of the English Language, Second Edition 

Unabridged (1948), def 17, p 2750. Similarly, Webster’s Third New International 

Dictionary of the English Language (Unabridged) defines “type” as “a usu[ally] metal, 

wood, or plastic rectangular block having on its face a relief character of which an inked 

impression will produce a printed character” or, alternatively, as “a printed impression 

from type[.]” Webster’s Third New International Dictionary of the English Language 

(Unabridged) (1966), defs 3a and 3f, p 2476.

5 Webster’s New International Dictionary of the English Language, Second Edition 

Unabridged (1948), def 3, p 1904. 
7

Importantly, the dictionary contains a diagram of type that shows that the type

face, or raised portion of the type block that actually imprints the ink onto the paper, is 

somewhat smaller than the size of the type block itself. The following diagram of a type 

block, taken from a 1963 treatise on typography, similarly shows how the type face does 

not extend to the entire space of the printer’s block. Moreover, it shows that the point 

body of the type is measured by reference to the entire printer’s block.6

This is consistent with the print literature dating back to the turn of the last 

century. An early twentieth century technical treatise on type explains: 

Only a few letters, like J and Q, cover nearly the entire surface on 

the end of the type; other letters, like B h l i, cover the upper portion chiefly 

and leave a blank space at the bottom; while the small letters, like a e o u v, 

occupy only the middle portion of the surface; still others, like g y p, cover 

the middle and lower portions of the surface. As all these irregular shapes 

 

6

 Rosen, Type and Typography (New York: Reinhold Publishing Corp, 1963), p 16, 

available at <http://babel.hathitrust.org/cgi/pt?id=mdp.39015047342434> (accessed 

August 2, 2012). 
8

must be made to appear in line with each other, the type-body on which 

they are made is larger than the letter.[7]

Moreover, Webster’s Third New International Dictionary of the English Language 

(Unabridged) defines “point” by referring to an illustration of “type” that refers to the 

block’s “point size” as the entire length of the block, not just the raised portion that 

creates the printed character. 

 In short, there does not appear to be any dispute about the historical understanding 

of these technical printer’s terms.8

 These dictionary definitions and technical sources 

 

7

 Stewart, Type (Chicago: United Typothetae of America, 1918), pp 7-8. 

8

 Justice MARKMAN argues that printers employed other methods of printing in 1954, 

when this statute was first enacted, and some of these methods did not use movable type. 

This is certainly a true statement, but it does not gainsay that the terms “point” and “type” 

were rooted in the movable type process and have well-known fixed meanings as we 

have explained. 

 Thus, Justice MARKMAN’s examples of other alternative printing methods that did 

not require movable metal type blocks misses the point. Even if one of the rivals to 

letterpress printing methods were entirely divorced from the use of movable type, had it 

been used in a petition and challenged on the ground that it did not comply with the 14-

point requirement, the same legal question raised here would have been presented: Did 

the alternative printing method satisfy the 14-point requirement as points were commonly 

understood in the printing industry? 

 Justice MARKMAN may find it hard to understand why the Legislature chose an 

indirect method of specifying the size of various print in petitions, but that is exactly what 

it did. And it did so by using technical terms of art in the printing field that have a 

longstanding and undisputed meaning. Justice MARKMAN chooses to rely on some of 

those definitional meanings, such as the fact that a “point” measures 1/72 of an inch. 

However, he jettisons others (the fact that point size is measured by the printer block, not 

the size of the character that rests on top) to advance his “direct measure” theory that one 

must measure the actual printed letters. Justice MARKMAN is free to question the wisdom 

of this legislative choice, but he may not ignore it, nor may he pick and choose among the 

established technical definitions of the statutory terms. 
9

show unequivocally that, “although the body size of metal type is consistent, the printed 

letters themselves vary in size. Since no individual letter fills the entire body, you can 

see why merely measuring the printed letter will not reveal the point size.”9

 Moreover, 

 

9

 Craig, Scala & Bevington, Designing with Type (New York: Watson-Guptill 

Publications, 5th ed, 2006), p 17. 

One thing is clear: the Legislature mandated that the petition type used be of a 

certain point size, but it did not mandate that a particular style of printed character be 

used. And therein lies the problem. It appears that printed characters of a particular style 

can be larger or smaller than other styles in the same point size. 

Today, a modern Legislature might mandate the size of petition printing by 

reference to “fonts” rather than “points.” And as the record in this case demonstrates, 

even fonts listed as being of the same size appear to be larger and smaller than one 

another depending on the style of font selected. Accordingly, a “direct measure” 

approach to sizing the printed characters such fonts produce would be no more 

productive than it is in measuring points. 

Justice MARKMAN nevertheless concludes that the statutory reference to 14-point 

type means that the actual printed character set must measure 14/72 of an inch high when 

measured from the top of the ascender of a lowercase letter (such as “h”) to the bottom of 

the descender of a lowercase letter (such as “j”). He asks, how could the Legislature have 

made plainer this intention than by mandating “14-point boldfaced type”? 

 The Legislature used a commonly understood term, “point,” which was and is 

understood to refer not to the size of the character printed but the block on which the 

character that produces the printed image sat. Thus, even though “type” can refer to the 

printed characters produced from a block of movable type, the point measurement of 

“type” exists by reference to the underlying block of type, not to the printed “type.” The 

provenance of this definition is unchallenged. The Legislature need not have known 

precisely how printers designed type in order to have understood the general orders of 

size in typography and that 14-point type was larger than 12-point or 8-point type. It 

used each of these sizes in the petition requirements. Those who frequently used printed 

materials generated with traditional printing methods in 1954—which would have 

included legislators, given that the Legislature had its own printing press—would have 

certainly understood the general notion of point sizing, in much the same way that most 

adults today are familiar with computer fonts, even if they know nothing about how those 

fonts were created. 
10

because different type style families (now colloquially referred to as “fonts”) use the 

available space differently, “[d]ifferent typefaces having the same point size may appear 

larger or smaller . . . .”10 Therefore, plaintiff’s expert correctly explained at the hearing 

before the Board of State Canvassers that the space on the top of a printer’s block 

“‘becomes a canvas that a type designer gets to work with, and sometimes they use the 

 

 The intervenor posits the claim that each individual letter must measure 14/72 of 

an inch. However, if the Legislature wanted more directly to mandate the size of the 

actual printed characters, it could easily have stated that “the letters of the petition 

heading shall be ‘X’ tall” or, if it wanted to use printer’s jargon, “the letters of the 

petition shall be 14 points in height.” It did neither, presumably in reliance on the 

printing traditions then extant. Moreover, this argument founders when considering the 

whole of MCL 168.482. Subsections (3) and (5) both contain type size requirements. 

However, unlike subsection (2), they contemplate that the required text may appear in 

both capital and lowercase letters, which by definition have varying physical sizes. 

Nevertheless, the Legislature chose to use in subsections (3) and (5) the same terms—

“point” and “type”—that it used in subsection (2). 

10 Craig, Designing with Type, p 18. Thus, an E-scale ruler provides only an 

approximation of type size and not an exact measurement of type size. This is because an 

E-scale ruler only contains an example of one particular type style family among the 

multitude of various styles of type in use. To the extent that other type style families 

measure slightly differently than the E-scale’s example, the resulting E-scale 

measurement will not provide a precise determination of the type size shown. 

 Thus, contrary to the alternative method of measurement that the intervenor and 

Justice MARKMAN urge be used for determining type size by directly measuring the 

printed characters, the Board of State Canvassers cannot measure the type size of the 

petition heading simply by comparing the letters on the petition heading to a 14-point 

capital “E.” Indeed, the most compelling evidence in the record that the E-scale ruler 

provides only approximate sizing of type is the affidavit of the intervenor’s own expert, 

who indicated that one of the example headings that had been printed using 14-point 

metal type measured “slightly larger” than the 14-point capital “E” on an E-scale ruler. 

Moreover, the existence of variation between different type style families undermines 

Justice MARKMAN’s claim that application of the “printer’s block” approach would not 

warrant a remand in this case. 
11

whole canvas and sometimes they use part of the canvas.’”11 Because type size 

incorporates some amount of additional space on the printer’s block, and because 

different type style families use that space differently, different sized letters result even 

when printed from blocks of the same size. 

C. WHEN A PETITION IS PRINTED USING COMPUTER GENERATED FONTS, IN 

ORDER TO ESTABLISH COMPLIANCE WITH THE STATUTORY TYPE SIZE 

REQUIREMENT, THE PETITION’S PROPONENT MUST SHOW THAT THE FONT 

USED FAITHFULLY REPLICATES WHAT A TRADITIONAL TYPE BLOCK 

WOULD HAVE GENERATED. 

While these definitions of “point” and “type” are clear based on their customary 

technical meanings, the confounding issue in this case is how to apply these historical 

definitions in an age when digital printing predominates. Contrary to Justice MARY BETH 

KELLY’s conclusion, we do not believe that the evidence available to us is sufficiently 

clear for this Court to take judicial notice that Microsoft’s digital fonts replicate the point 

measure that the Legislature intended. Because digital fonts do not use physical printer’s 

blocks, it is not self-evident that the system of digital fonts accurately replicates the 

movable type point system.12 Plaintiff’s Calibri heading may well actually comply with 

the statutory 14-point type requirement. However, simply choosing a digital “size 14” 

 

11 Stand Up For Democracy v Bd of State Canvassers, ___ Mich App ___, ___; ___ 

NW2d ___ (2012) issued June 8, 2012 (Docket No. 310047), slip op at 6. 

12 Justice MARKMAN’s detailed critique of Justice MARY BETH KELLY’s resort to 

inconclusive materials outside the record reinforces our belief that this Court has no 

competency to make the kind of factual determination that was never addressed and 

certainly not provided in the record. 
12

font does not prove that it is equivalent to the 14-point type standard that the Legislature 

required when it enacted MCL 168.482. 

In light of the fact that no one understood when the Board of State Canvassers 

held the hearing that plaintiff was obligated to establish this equivalency, it is not hard to 

understand why its proofs consisted of little more than an attestation that its printer 

faithfully selected “size 14” Calibri font on his computer. Similarly, this is the reason 

why Justice MARY BETH KELLY must look outside the record and employ “judicial 

notice” in order to supply this critical missing set of proofs. Given that the computer font 

used in a petition must faithfully replicate what a movable type of the required point size 

would have produced in order to satisfy “actual compliance,” we are hard pressed to 

understand how this equivalency could be established without evidence from Microsoft, 

the producer of the Calibri font used here, about not only how it programmed the font but 

whether it actually replicates what the traditional printer’s type block would have 

produced. 

I do not believe that the pastiche of extrarecord evidence relied on by Justice 

MARY BETH KELLY establishes these necessary proofs. And if they do, we lack 

sufficient computer expertise to confirm it.13

 

13 Ordinarily, we judges take judicial notice of things that cannot be disputed, such as the 

state of the moon on a given date as reflected in an almanac. The cycles and phases of 

the moon are, after all, constant and predictable. How Microsoft programmed its font 

system seems well shy of the certainty level required for the application of judicial 

notice. 

If how Microsoft generated its font system and the question of its relationship to 

the sizing of traditional type blocks is not considered “technical”—outside the realm of 

common knowledge—then we are not sure what subject matter would qualify. 
13

Rather, we believe that the proper application of the statutory type size 

requirement in the context of a digital font requires plaintiff to show that a digital font 

accurately replicates the results that the point system would have generated. If plaintiff 

can show that the digitized font system it used accurately replicates a 14-point sized type 

that the point system would have generated, then it would be entitled to have its petition 

certified as sufficient. However, only with this showing can we know whether plaintiff’s 

“size 14” Calibri font actually satisfied the statutorily mandated 14-point type size under 

the traditional movable type point system. 

Because plaintiff has not proven the connection between its “size 14” font and the 

statutorily required 14-point type size, we do not believe that it is entitled to mandamus. 

Therefore, we concur in the decision to reverse the Court of Appeals panel decision on 

the merits, but we dissent from the decision to grant mandamus. Nevertheless, because 

the question whether the font system accurately reproduces what the point system would 

have produced has never been addressed and because a general substantial compliance 

rule erroneously had been recognized as a means of avoiding the actual requirements of 

 

Ordinarily, we judges rely on experts, not judicial notice, to resolve technical questions. 

For instance, MRE 201 allows a trial court to take judicial notice only of adjudicative 

facts that are “not subject to reasonable dispute” and that are either “generally known 

within the territorial jurisdiction of the trial court or . . . capable of accurate and ready 

determination by resort to sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned.” 

MRE 201(b). The questions presented here clearly are not of the kind that would qualify 

under MRE 201. More telling, almost no justification is offered in support of the 

application of judicial notice that “size 14” Calibri font generates the same result that the 

applicable point system would have yielded. We do not know whether the Web sources 

that Justice MARY BETH KELLY relies on are “capable of accurate and ready 

determination by resort to sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned,” 

MRE 201, and she does not even assert that they meet this exacting standard. 
14

this statute, we would permit a remand to the Board of State Canvassers to give plaintiff 

an opportunity to present proofs under the correct legal standard: that the digital font 

system actually replicates results that the movable type point system would have 

generated. Only upon such proof could plaintiff establish that the heading of its petition 

is in fact “14-point boldfaced type” as that phrase is properly understood. 

 Robert P. Young, Jr. 

 Brian K. Zahra 
S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N 

SUPREME COURT 

CAVANAGH, MARILYN KELLY, and HATHAWAY, JJ. (concurring in part and dissenting in 

part). 

We concur in Justice MARY BETH KELLY’s holding that a writ of mandamus 

should issue in this matter. As a result of our concurrence on this point, Proposition 4 

will appear on the ballot. 

However, we strongly dissent from the grave actions taken by the justices 

supporting the position in part III(A) of Justice MARY BETH KELLY’s opinion. Their 

decision to depart from 30 years of precedent by abandoning the substantial-compliance 

doctrine throws Michigan’s electoral process into chaos and disenfranchises citizens from 

one of the most basic rights of democracy: the right to vote. 

STAND UP FOR DEMOCRACY, 

 Plaintiff-Appellee, 

v No. 145387 

SECRETARY OF STATE and BOARD OF 

STATE CANVASSERS, 

 Defendants-Appellants, 

and 

CITIZENS FOR FISCAL 

RESPONSIBILITY, 

 

Intervenor-DefendantAppellant. 
2

The holding of these justices that a mere clerical technicality—which has not and 

cannot be shown to create any harm whatsoever—could have prevented a referendum 

vote from taking place, in the face of more than 200,000 citizens who signed the petition 

to place the referendum on the ballot, is unprecedented and highly disturbing. 

That position lacks any sense of the gravity and importance of democracy. Article 

1, § 1 of Michigan’s Constitution states that “[a]ll political power is inherent in the 

people. Government is instituted for their equal benefit, security and protection.” 

Furthermore, our Constitution provides that “[t]he legislature shall enact laws to preserve 

the purity of elections” and “to guard against abuses of the elective franchise . . . .” Const 

1963, art 2, § 4. MCL 168.482(2) is one of these laws, and it was intended to protect the 

election process,1

 but four justices have now turned it into a barrier that could prevent a 

vote from even taking place. Their holding will have a chilling effect on core political 

speech, and we cannot join this result. As the Court of Appeals so eloquently stated in 

Senior Accountants, Analysts & Appraisers Ass’n v Detroit, 218 Mich App 263, 270; 553 

NW2d 679 (1996): 

The wisdom of the principle of judicial restraint expressed by our 

Supreme Court in [Attorney General v Ingham Circuit Judge, 347 Mich 

579; 81 NW2d 349 (1957)], is self-evident; the notion that our courts may 

precipitously intervene in the political arena and preempt a vote of the 

people is inconsistent with both the role of the courts and the principles of 

our democracy. 

We vote to affirm the Court of Appeals and its issuance of mandamus. As stated, 

we also concur with Justice MARY BETH KELLY’s issuance of mandamus. As a result, 

 

1

 See, generally, Kadans v Wayne Co Clerk, 363 Mich 306, 308; 109 NW2d 788 (1961). 
3

Proposition 4 will appear on the ballot. We note that, given Justice MARY BETH KELLY’s 

finding of actual compliance—which must necessarily encompass substantial 

compliance, because actual compliance is a higher standard than substantial 

compliance—there are four votes that find at least substantial compliance and allow the 

voters to determine the merits of this proposal. The determination of whether actual or 

substantial compliance is the proper standard is unnecessary to the decision in this case. 

 Michael F. Cavanagh 

 Marilyn Kelly 

 Diane M. Hathaway 
S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N 

SUPREME COURT 

STAND UP FOR DEMOCRACY, 

 Plaintiff-Appellee, 

v No. 145387 

SECRETARY OF STATE and BOARD OF 

STATE CANVASSERS, 

 Defendants, 

and 

CITIZENS FOR FISCAL 

RESPONSIBILITY, 

 Intervenor-Defendant- 

 Appellant. 

MARKMAN, J. (concurring in part and dissenting in part). 

PROLOGUE 

Although to many the present dispute over font size may seem to be “much ado 

about nothing much” and a debate concerning a mere “technicality,” in which there may 

be only a “dime’s width” of difference between what is required of petitions by the law 

and what is actually contained in the petitions before the Court, a considerably larger 

issue is implicated: how faithful must the branch of government that interprets the law be 

to the language adopted by the branch of government that enacts that law? It is important 

to bear in mind that the very same constitutional provision that provides for the right of 
2

referendum also provides that it “must be invoked in the manner prescribed by law,” 

Const 1963, art 2, § 9, and it is the very same Constitution that provides for a 

representative form of government in which legislative majorities, not the views of a 

small percentage of the electorate, generally determine the course of public policy. Const 

1963, art 4, § 1. As explained by Chief Justice Marshall in Marbury v Madison, 5 US (1 

Cranch) 137, 177; 2 L Ed 60 (1803), which has been the lodestar for generations of 

judges in questions of statutory construction, the responsibility of a court of law is to 

declare what the law is, and not what it ought to be. This is one of the first principles of 

our system of separated constitutional powers. 

In this case, the law in dispute provides that a petition heading “shall” be in 14-

point type, the law has been amended by the Legislature to repudiate the idea of 

“approximateness,” and the law explicitly limits the concept of “substantial compliance” 

to those circumstances in which a petition has been preapproved by the Secretary of 

State. The question then becomes whether “14-point type” means 14-point type. It is 

not, I believe, whether 10- or 12-point type is “close enough,” or whether 10- or 12-point 

type is sufficiently legible, or whether it is “Dickensian,” “crabbed,” “pedantic,” 

“hairsplitting,” or “hypertechnical” to distinguish between 10- or 12-point type and 14-

point type. Instead, “we the people” of Michigan have determined that an extraordinary 

constitutional procedure-- one enabling a small segment of the people to enjoin a duly 

enacted law for up to two years-- “must be invoked in the manner prescribed by 

law . . . .” Have the proponents of the present referendum acted “in the manner 

prescribed by law”? Should this Court, for example, in reviewing a law requiring 
3

200,000 signatures to place a referendum on the ballot, find that 199,250 signatures is 

sufficient and constitutes “substantial compliance”? Should this Court, in reviewing a 

law establishing a five-year statute of limitations period, find that a lawsuit or prosecution 

undertaken five years and two months after an event is sufficient and constitutes 

“substantial compliance”? And should this Court, in reviewing a law requiring that a real 

estate filing be made within 180 days of some occurrence, find that 185 days is sufficient 

and constitutes “substantial compliance”? Perhaps it should, but it should also be 

understood that when the law is “relaxed,” or altered, in this manner, the law becomes 

less certain, more subject to judicial discretion and arbitrariness, less capable of clearly 

communicating to the people their rights and responsibilities, and more the subject matter 

of new lawsuits. To allow “substantial compliance” to satisfy the law when this has not 

been authorized by the Legislature is to accord more power to judges, and less power to 

legislative bodies and the people whom they represent, to say what the law “is.” 

It is the obligation of the judiciary to interpret the law in reasonable accord with its 

language, and I believe this has been accomplished when a law requiring that a printed 

heading be set forth in “14-point type” is interpreted to require “14-point type.” It is 

neither a “strict” construction nor a “narrow” construction to render such an 

interpretation, but simply a “reasonable” construction-- a construction that ordinary 

legislators and readers of the law would place upon this language. Had the Legislature 

been determined to ensure that certain petition headings would always be set forth in 14-

point type, and that no gamesmanship would be tolerated in the form of such petitions, 

how could the Legislature have made this any more clear than by what it said in the law 
4

in dispute in this case? How could the Legislature have been any more straightforward in 

its intention to communicate that “this is what we intend, and only this, no more and no 

less”? The issue in this case, as it is in most cases before this Court, is more than the 

significance of a “dime’s width” of difference between “14-point type” and a smaller 

type on a petition; rather, it is which institution of government gets to make decisions 

regarding what will be provided for in the law-- the branch comprised of persons broadly 

reflective of the people in their full range of backgrounds, interests, and professions, or 

the branch comprised exclusively of lawyers? 

ANALYSIS 

To begin with, it must be emphasized that the issue before this Court has nothing 

to do with our own personal beliefs regarding the wisdom, or the lack thereof, of the 

emergency financial manager law, or of the constitutionality of this law. Plaintiff is 

incorrect in its assertion that “the only substantial difference between the petition at bar 

and the [ones in earlier years that have placed matters on the ballot] is the subject matter 

and viewpoint of the [plaintiff].” Rather, the only two issues before this Court are (a) 

whether plaintiff actually complied with the 14-point-type requirement in MCL 

168.482(2), and (b) if it did not comply, whether “substantial compliance” with this 

requirement is tantamount to compliance with the law. Because I would answer both of 

these questions in the negative, I would reverse that part of the judgment of the Court of 

Appeals holding that “substantial compliance” with MCL 168.482(2) is sufficient to 

warrant a grant of mandamus, a position with which the judges of that Court disagreed 

but nonetheless felt obligated to follow because of an earlier precedent of that Court. 
5

Pursuant to the clear direction of MCL 168.544d, while “a form prescribed by the 

secretary of state” must substantially comply with MCL 168.482(2), a form not 

“prescribed by the secretary of state,” as in this case, must actually comply with that law. 

Therefore, although plaintiff suggests that our interpretation of the 14-point-type 

requirement in MCL 168.482(2) may prevent a number of petitions from reaching the 

ballot, each of the other petitions cited by plaintiff was apparently preapproved by the 

Board of State Canvassers, and thus must only “substantially comply” with the 14-pointtype requirement. Further, as highlighted on page 8 of plaintiff’s own supplemental brief, 

even a cursory review of the other petitions will show that each is printed in visibly larger 

type than that in the instant petition. 

(1) Plaintiff seeks a writ of mandamus against defendants. “Mandamus is an 

extraordinary remedy . . . .” Musselman v Governor, 448 Mich 503, 521; 533 NW2d 237 

(1995). The plaintiff in a mandamus proceeding has the difficult burden of proving that 

the defendant has the clear legal duty to act in the way the plaintiff seeks. Double I Dev 

Co v Taylor Twp, 372 Mich 264, 269; 125 NW2d 862 (1964). 

(2) Plaintiff urges this Court to direct that defendants certify for placement on the 

November 2012 general election ballot the referendum on Public Act 4 of 2011, MCL 

141.1501 et seq., the Local Government and School District Accountability Act, 

commonly known as the emergency financial manager law. Generally, it is the right of 

the people of Michigan to have public policy determined by a majority of the people’s 

democratically elected representatives in the Legislature. However, “[u]nder the 

referendum clause of the Constitution [Const 1963, art 2, § 9] one-twentieth of the 
6

electors of the State may suspend the operation, until the next general election, of any act 

of the legislature, however important [with certain exceptions] . . . . Where a power so 

great as this is vested in a minority of the people, every safeguard provided by law 

against its irregular . . . exercise should be carefully maintained.” Thompson v Secretary 

of State, 192 Mich 512, 522-523; 159 NW 65 (1916). 

(3) That is, there are constitutional rights in tension in this case, the constitutional 

right of the people to have the enactments of representatives respected and given timely 

effect, i.e., the right to a republican form of self-government, see Const 1963, art 4, § 1; 

US Const, art IV, § 4, and the right of the people under specified circumstances to enjoin 

the effects of such laws during the referendum process. Const 1963, art 2, § 9. 

Thompson has properly addressed this tension by both recognizing the importance of the 

referendum process and insisting that this process, which involves a departure from the 

ordinary constitutional process by which laws are formulated, be undertaken in a 

“regular” fashion and in compliance with the law. 

(4) Const 1963, art 2, § 9 provides that “[t]he power of referendum . . . must be 

invoked in the manner prescribed by law . . . .” 

(5) MCL 168.482(2) provides: 

If the measure to be submitted proposes a constitutional amendment, 

initiation of legislation, or referendum of legislation, the heading of each 

part of the petition shall be prepared in the following form and printed in 

capital letters in 14-point boldfaced type . . . . [Emphasis added.] 

As this Court has stated numerous times, the word “shall” constitutes a mandatory 

directive. See, e.g., Manuel v Gill, 481 Mich 637, 647; 753 NW2d 48 (2008). 
7

(6) That the Legislature in 1965 amended MCL 168.482 by striking the language 

permitting the heading to be in “type of the approximate size set forth” and replaced it 

with the language, “shall be . . . in 14-point bold face type,” underscores that the 

Legislature meant “shall be” to constitute a mandatory directive. (Emphasis added.) 

(7) MCL 168.544d provides: 

Nominating petitions for the offices under this act and petitions for a 

constitutional amendment, initiation of legislation, or referendum of 

legislation or a local proposal may be circulated on a countywide form. 

Petitions circulated countywide shall be on a form prescribed by the 

secretary of state, which form shall be substantially as provided in sections 

482, 544a, or 544c, whichever is applicable. The secretary of state may 

provide for a petition form larger than 8–1/2 inches by 13 inches and shall 

provide for identification of the city or township in which the person 

signing the petition is registered. The certificate of the circulator may be on 

the reverse side of the petition. This section does not prohibit the 

circulation of petitions on another form prescribed by this act. [Emphasis 

added.] 

Accordingly, while “a form prescribed by the secretary of state” may “substantially 

comply” with MCL 168.482(2), a form not “prescribed by the secretary of state” must 

actually comply with MCL 168.482(2). To the extent that Bloomfield Charter Twp v 

Oakland Co Clerk, 253 Mich App 1; 654 NW2d 610 (2002), an opinion of the Court of 

Appeals, suggests that all petition forms, regardless of whether they were “prescribed by 

the secretary of state,” need only “substantially comply” with MCL 168.482(2), it is 

wrong, in my judgment, because it is plainly inconsistent with the law. Therefore, I agree 

with the three other justices who conclude that the “substantial compliance” standard 

does not apply to forms that have not been “prescribed by the secretary of state.” 
8

(8) The form at issue in this case was not “prescribed by the secretary of state” 

because it was not preapproved by the Secretary of State, and it is not in compliance with 

the Secretary of State’s own rule that the heading “shall be printed in capital letters in 14-

point boldface[d] type . . . .” Secretary of State memorandum, Initiative and Referendum 

Petitions – Prescribed Format (revised June 2011), p 2. Therefore, the form must actually 

comply with MCL 168.482(2). As explained in the Secretary of State’s memorandum, 

Initiative and Referendum Petitions (January 2011), p 1, “While Michigan election law 

does not require the pre-approval of an initiative or referendum petition form, such 

approval greatly reduces the risk that signatures collected on the form will be ruled 

invalid due to formatting defects.” 

(9) Both MCL 168.482(2) and the Secretary of State’s own rule require the 

heading on the form to be “printed in capital letters in 14-point boldfaced type.” 

(10) The term “point” in the printing context is defined as “a unit of type 

measurement equal to . . . 1/72 inch . . . .” Random House Webster’s College Dictionary

(2d ed, 1997), p 1006; see also Webster’s New Collegiate Dictionary (1960), p 652 (“The 

value of the point is .013837 inch, or nearly 1/72 inch.”), and Spicer v Hartford Fire Ins 

Co, 171 Va 428, 432; 199 SE 499 (1938) (“An inch is the American standard of linear 

measure. . . . A like standard, while it may not be so generally known, is now used in 

ascertaining the size of type. . . . [T]he point system of measuring type . . . was adopted 

in 1886 by the United States Type Founders’ Association, although prior to that time 

many founders were using it.”). 
9

(11) The term “type” is defined consistently among dictionaries as being “a wood 

or metal block with a raised character on its surface that, when fixed into a press and 

coated with ink, prints an impression of the character on paper or a similar absorbent 

surface” or “a printed character or printed characters.” Random House Webster’s College 

Dictionary (2d ed, 1997), p 1391; see also Webster’s New Collegiate Dictionary (1960), 

p 921 (“A rectangular block, usually of metal or wood, having its face so shaped as to 

produce, in printing, a letter, figure, or other character” or “the letters or characters 

impressed, collectively.”). Therefore, we must determine whether the term “type” in 

MCL 168.482(2) refers to the blocks used to produce the letters or to the actual printed 

letters themselves, and, contrary to Justice MARY BETH KELLY’s contention, which of 

these definitions is ultimately controlling is hardly undisputed. Indeed, this matter is at 

the very heart of the dispute between plaintiff and the Governor, the Attorney General, 

and the intervening defendant. Also, contrary to the Chief Justice’s and Justice MARY 

BETH KELLY’s contention, and as is obvious in the language in this very paragraph, I do 

not “ignore” these alternative definitions, ante at 8 n 8, or “omit[] the definition’s 

reference to blocks,” ante at 18 n 40. Instead, I see fit to explain exactly why I believe 

the statute is better understood to incorporate the latter definition. See infra ¶¶ 12-16. 

Indeed, it is the Chief Justice who defines “type” as “a printed impression from type,” 

ante at 6 n 4, but who “omits” the remainder of that definition that defines type without

reference to letter blocks, to wit, “a printed impression from type: printed matter <very 

small type can be hard to read>.” 
10

(12) “Individual words and phrases, while important, should be read in the context 

of the entire legislative scheme.” Mich Props, LLC v Meridian Twp, 491 Mich ___, ___; 

___ NW2d ___ (2012), issued June 14, 2012 (Docket Nos. 143085-143087 and 143281), 

slip op pp 6-7. In the statute at issue here, the term “type” is used in a provision that 

states that “the heading of each part of the petition shall be . . . printed in capital letters in

14-point boldfaced type.” MCL 168.482(2) (emphasis added). That the Legislature 

specifically used the words “printed” and “letters” indicates that the Legislature was 

referring to the actual printed letters rather than the blocks used to make these letters. 

That the Legislature used the word “in” rather than “with” in two relevant places in the 

statute underscores this interpretation. The Chief Justice gives no consideration at all to 

this statutory language. 

(13) Interpreting “type” to mean the actual printed letters is also consistent with 

the only reasonable legislative purpose that can be served by MCL 168.482(2), to wit, 

ensuring that the signers of petitions can easily read what it is that they are signing. 

Interpreting “type,” on the other hand, to mean the blocks used in letter-press printing to 

produce letters would serve no conceivable purpose because the size of a block says 

nothing about the size of the letter produced by that block. Thus, requiring the preparer 

to merely use blocks that are physically 14/72 of an inch in size would permit the actual 

printed letters on the petition to be of the very smallest and most unreadable size. 

(14) It is noteworthy that the Chief Justice, who adopts the block argument, cites a 

treatise on printing that was written in 1918, but by 1954, when MCL 168.482(2) was 

originally enacted, there were many other methods of printing in addition to the less 
11

advanced letter-press method that requires individual blocks. For example, a printing 

press can use plates and does not require movable letter blocks; and offset printing uses a 

polyester or metal plate and does not require moveable letter blocks. All of these 

methods of printing, as well as others, were employed by 1954. Thus, the more 

reasonable interpretation of “type” is not “a wood or metal block . . . fixed into a press,” 

because this suggests that only printed letters produced by a letter-press are compliant 

with the statute. This underscores that the “block” definition of “type” unnecessarily 

focuses on the method of production, rather than on the result of production, the text or 

type produced. While the former has no bearing on what will actually be read by 

potential signers of petitions, the latter focuses precisely on what those signers will read. 

(15) Indeed, given that blocks are increasingly not used in the modern printing 

industry, it is difficult to conceive of how this Court, or the Secretary of State, or the 

Board of State Canvassers, or the parties themselves could practically and accurately 

determine whether the “14-point type” requirement of MCL 168.482(2) has been satisfied 

in a given instance if “type” means blocks. There are no such blocks in this case because 

the 14-point Calibri font that was used on this petition was not produced by blocks. 

Indeed, the Calibri font did not even exist when printing blocks were more widely used. 

(16) For these reasons, unlike the justices who adopt the printer’s-block argument, 

I do not believe that the 14-point-type requirement of MCL 168.482(2) can be reasonably 

understood to refer to the size of the blocks used to print the letters; instead, I believe it 

must refer to the actual printed letters or characters. 
12

(17) That MCL 168.482(2) refers to “the heading,” and that “type” refers to 

“printed characters” or “letters or characters impressed, collectively” suggests that the 

grouping of letters that comprises the heading should be considered as a whole in 

determining the point size of the type. This is buttressed by the statute’s requirement that 

“capital letters” must be printed “in 14-point boldfaced type.” (Emphasis added.) That 

the statute specifies that the “letters” must be printed in the specified “type” strongly 

implies that the “type” must be considered as a whole in evaluating whether the pointsize requirement has been satisfied. Contrary to Justice MARY BETH KELLY’s contention, 

I do not conclude that the actual printed characters must each measure 14/72 of an inch 

high, nor do I adopt different ways of measuring type under MCL 168.482(2), (3), and 

(5). Rather, when measuring type under any of these statutory provisions, I conclude 

only that the language must be collectively measured as described in ¶ 18. 

(18) As the Court of Appeals explained, the customary practice in the printing 

industry is to use a specialized printer’s ruler to determine the type size of printed text. 

Stand Up For Democracy v Secretary of State, ___ Mich App ___, ___ n 10; ___ NW2d 

___ (2012), issued June 8, 2012 (Docket No. 310047), slip op p 12 n 10. A typical 

printer’s ruler has a scale to measure points, as well as the graduated-sized letter “E” in 

order to visually represent the range of type size, known as the “E-scale.” To determine 

the point size of the printed text, the ruler is used to measure the distance in points 

between the ascender height, e.g., the top of the “h,” and the descender height, e.g., the 

bottom of the “p.” Thus, although a document may be printed in 14-point type, the actual 

point size of each letter will vary (e.g., a lowercase “x” will always be significantly less 
13

than 14/72 of an inch because it does not contain an ascender or descender). In fact, all 

individual letters in 14-point type will measure less than 14/72 of an inch because no 

letter in the English alphabet has both an ascender and a descender. If the printed text 

does not contain a letter with an ascender and a letter with a descender, the “E-scale” may 

still be used by comparing an E (or its nearest equivalent) in the text to the ones printed 

on the ruler. If an “E” in the text measures 14 points on the “E-scale,” the type is “in 14-

point.” 

(19) Although it is undisputed that the “font” used in the heading in this case was 

categorized by the Microsoft software as “14-point,” it is also undisputed that the actual 

size of the printed “type” varies widely depending upon the particular “font” chosen. In 

other words, a 14-point Calibri font may be of a considerably different type size than a 

14-point Arial font. As the Court of Appeals correctly explained, “‘font’ is not a unit of 

measurement.” Stand Up For Democracy, ___ Mich App at ___ n 11, slip op p 12 n 11 

(emphasis in original). That the Legislature imposed a “14-point type” requirement 

shows an intent to impose a specific type-size requirement, regardless of the particular 

font chosen. 

(20) Justice MARY BETH KELLY’s finding that there is “actual compliance” turns 

on the fact that Microsoft “defines ‘font size’ as the ‘size of type . . . .’” Ante at 23. 

Although she recognizes that Microsoft does not purport in this definition to define 

“type,” she assumes that Microsoft has employed the “printer’s block” definition of 

“type” that she has earlier articulated. However, there is simply no evidence for that 

conclusion. In fact, the full definition of “font size” provided by Microsoft is: 
14

The size of type, measured in points between the bottom of the 

descender and the top of the ascender (the vertical point size of a font). 

Sometimes referred to as the Type or Point Size. [Microsoft Support, 

WD2002: Definitions of Typography Terms in Word

<http://support.microsoft.com/kb/192973/en-us> (accessed August 1, 

2012).] 

This definition supports my ascender/descender measurement set forth in ¶ 18, and not 

Justice MARY BETH Kelly’s “invisible box” argument. Indeed, the diagram on the very 

same Microsoft typography page cited by Justice MARY BETH KELLY further illustrates 

that it is the height of the letters-- from highest ascender to lowest descender-- that 

controls, not the invisible box. For these reasons, I respectfully disagree with Justice 

MARY BETH KELLY, who concludes that because plaintiff’s petition heading is printed in 

a 14-point font, it “actually complies” with the 14-point-type requirement in MCL 

168.482(2). By this analysis, the Legislature’s ability to ever impose a specific type-size 

requirement in order to assure a minimum standard of legibility would be entirely 

frustrated. 

(21) Because the heading on the form here is smaller than 14 points as measured 

by an E-scale ruler (and considerably so), the form is clearly not in compliance with 

either MCL 168.482(2) or the Secretary of State’s rule. Therefore, plaintiff has failed to 

satisfy its burden of proving that defendants have any legal duty, much less a clear legal 

duty, for purposes of mandamus relief to certify the instant referendum for placement on 

the ballot. 

(22) Although plaintiff argues that in the past 15 years at least 14 referendums 

have been placed on the statewide ballot even though their headings were also not 14 
15

points in size, plaintiff acknowledges that all of those referendums were preapproved by 

the Secretary of State. Given this preapproval, those forms would only have had to 

“substantially comply” with MCL 168.482(2). Plaintiff, on the other hand, did not seek 

the Secretary of State’s preapproval, and thus was required to actually comply with MCL 

168.482(2), which it did not do. 

(23) Further, it is telling that on page 8 of plaintiff’s own supplemental brief, of 

the six other petition headings set forth in connection with matters that might appear on 

this year’s ballot, each is in larger type than plaintiff’s and five of these are in an identical 

or nearly identical typeface. While plaintiff may, or may not, be correct that its own 

heading “stands out for readability,” it also stands out in the distinctiveness of its type 

size. Moreover, as the Board of State Canvassers and the Secretary of State indicate, the 

six other petitions this year were each preapproved by the board, and thus subject only to 

substantial compliance with MCL 168.482(2). 

(24) Concerning the approach of the remanding justices, I see no benefit to be 

derived from this approach, and the remanding justices fail to explain what the benefit 

might be. That is, no matter which justice among us has correctly identified the proper 

method of measuring type, all of the information necessary to assess whether plaintiff’s 

petition satisfies the statute is already before us. See infra ¶¶ 25-27. Given existing time 

constraints, returning this case to the board would serve no purpose other than to 

effectively make the board, not this Court, the court of last resort on this issue. Before 

we do that, I would prefer to make the Court of Appeals the court of last resort, because 

that is what the Constitution and laws of our state certainly contemplate. I would not 
16

remand to the board without first providing it with relevant judicial guidance regarding 

what the law requires. The board has already deadlocked on the issue of type size and 

that is why this case is before the Court in the first place. 

(25) First, if one adopts the “character size” approach, as I do, a remand is not 

warranted because MCL 168.482(2) requires the heading to be printed in 14-point type as 

measured by an E-scale ruler and the intervening defendant has submitted an affidavit 

that asserts that the heading in this case is not printed in 14-point type as measured by an 

E-scale ruler, and plaintiff has not argued to the contrary. Further, as the Court of 

Appeals explained, “[b]ecause 14-point is a unit of measurement easily determined by 

use of an E-scale ruler, neither this Court nor the Board requires expert testimony to 

determine whether the correct measurement has been met.” Stand Up For Democracy, 

___ Mich App at ___ n 10, slip op p 12 n 10. That is, we can determine ourselves that 

“the heading on plaintiff’s petition only measures 12 point on an E-scale ruler,” id. at 

___, slip op p 12, and no remand to an expert body is required. What possible benefit 

would be derived from such a remand? 

(26) Second, if one adopts the “printer’s block” approach, as do the remanding 

justices, a remand is again unwarranted. The intervening defendant has also submitted an 

affidavit that provides that plaintiff’s heading is clearly smaller than the same heading 

printed with a variety of 14-point blocks that it has obtained, and again plaintiff has not 

argued to the contrary. That is, while the intervening defendant has presented evidence 

that neither the actual printed letters nor the blocks satisfy the 14-point requirement, 

plaintiff has presented no contrary evidence. Instead, it has been the dominant focus of 
17

plaintiff’s argument throughout this case that it has “substantially complied” with MCL 

168.482(2) and that the difference between the 14-point type required by the statute and 

the type used in its petition heading, which measures 12 points on an E-scale ruler, 

amounts to merely a “dime’s width of a difference.” What possible benefit would be 

derived from a remand? 

(27) Third, if one adopts the “font” approach, as do plaintiff and Justice MARY 

BETH KELLY, a remand is not warranted given that there is no dispute that plaintiff’s 

petition was in 14-point Calibri font. What possible benefit would be derived from a 

remand? 

(28) Further, for the same reasons that I do not believe that “substantial 

compliance” constitutes the appropriate legal standard, it is unclear to me how the 

remanding justices’ “faithful replication” standard, in which the board must assess 

whether the letters produced by Microsoft’s 14-point Calibri font are close enough to the 

letters produced by a 14-point Calibri block, if such a block can even be found, is any 

different than the “substantial compliance” standard that these justices themselves reject. 

(29) For all these reasons, I would reverse that part of the judgment of the Court of 

Appeals holding that “substantial compliance” with MCL 168.482(2) is sufficient to 

warrant a grant of mandamus. 

 Stephen J. Markman