J-S38010-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

v.

ALEXIS CAMILLE BOAZ 

Appellant

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 2812 EDA 2022

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered October 10, 2022

In the Court of Common Pleas of Chester County Criminal Division at 

No(s): CP-15-CR-0001701-2020

BEFORE: LAZARUS, J., KUNSELMAN, J., and PELLEGRINI, J.*

MEMORANDUM BY LAZARUS, J.: FILED NOVEMBER 30, 2023

Alexis Camille Boaz appeals from the judgment of sentence, entered in 

the Court of Common Pleas of Chester County, after a jury convicted her of 

one count each of endangering the welfare of children (EWOC)1 and simple 

assault.2 Upon review, we affirm.

On November 4, 2019, around 6:30 a.m., Boaz was nearing the end of 

her shift as a member of the support staff at Devereux, a facility in Chester 

County offering residential services for children and adolescents living with 

emotional, behavioral, and cognitive differences. Boaz engaged with a 

fourteen-year-old, male resident of Devereux, W.W., who was calling female 

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* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.

1 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 4304(a)(1). 

2 Id. at § 2701(a)(1). 
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staff inappropriate names, kicking towards staff, and threw a small object in 

their direction. Boaz verbally insulted W.W. Shortly thereafter, Boaz 

physically engaged with W.W. and the two fell to the ground. Boaz held W.W. 

down, hit his chest with her fists, and kicked or stomped him in the head 

several times. Nursing staff assessed W.W. after the incident and called 

ChildLine to report suspected child abuse. Nursing staff observed injuries in 

the form of red marks on W.W.’s chest, back, arms, face, head, and neck. 

After an evaluation, the nurse gave W.W. ice and placed him on bed rest. 

Approximately four to five hours after the incident, W.W.’s mother came to 

Devereux and brought him to Brandywine Hospital. Following his evaluation

at Brandywine Hospital, W.W. was placed on concussion protocol. Upon 

release from the hospital, W.W. returned to his family home, rather than 

Devereux, where he was later interviewed by police. 

Following a three-day trial, a jury convicted Boaz of the above-stated 

offenses. With respect to Boaz’s EWOC conviction, the jury specifically found 

that, in the course of committing the offense, Boaz created a substantial risk 

of death or bodily injury, increasing the grade of the offense to a third-degree

felony. See 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 4304(b)(1)(iii). The trial court ordered a presentence investigation report prior to sentencing. On October 10, 2022, the 

Honorable Allison Bell Royer sentenced Boaz to two years of probation for her 

conviction of EWOC, and a concurrent term of one year of probation for her 

conviction of simple assault. 
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On October 20, 2022, while still represented by trial counsel, Boaz filed 

three pro se post-sentence motions.3 On October 31, 2022, trial counsel for 

Boaz timely filed a notice of appeal. On December 29, 2022, this Court 

ordered that the trial court conduct a Grazier4 hearing in response to a 

November 18, 2022 petition filed by trial counsel requesting an allowance of

additional time for the appointment of replacement counsel. On January 24, 

2023, following the Grazier hearing, the trial court concluded that Boaz was 

not waiving her right to counsel and granted trial counsel’s motion to 

withdraw. Subsequently, the trial court appointed new counsel to represent 

Boaz on appeal. Boaz filed a timely court-ordered Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) concise 

statement of errors complained of on appeal. Boaz raises the following issues 

for our review: 

[1] Was [the Commonwealth’s] evidence insufficient for the jury’s 

finding that [Boaz], in the course of committing the offense of 

[EWOC], . . . created a substantial risk of death or serious bodily 

injury?

[2] Did the trial court err in granting [the] Commonwealth’s 

motion to preclude [from evidence the] Commonwealth’s 

witness’s conviction for unsworn falsification to law enforcement?

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3 Hybrid representation is forbidden in this Commonwealth. See

Commonwealth v. Jette, 23 A.3d 1032 (Pa. 2011) (disapproving of pro se

filings by counseled appellants); Commonwealth v. Reid, 117 A.3d 777, 781 

n. 8 (Pa. Super. 2015) (pro se post-sentence motion filed by defendant who 

is represented by counsel is a legal nullity); Pa.R.Crim.P. 576(A)(4). We note 

that Boaz’s trial counsel had filed a motion to withdraw as the attorney of 

record and for the appointment of new appellate counsel prior to filing the 

notice of appeal in this case. See Motions, 10/12/22. 

4 Commonwealth v. Grazier, 713 A.2d 81 (Pa. 1998). 
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Appellant’s Brief, at 6. 

In her first issue, Boaz claims that the evidence was insufficient for the 

jury to convict her of EWOC where her conduct during the incident with W.W. 

did not create a substantial risk of death or serious bodily injury. See

Appellant’s Brief, at 20. Boaz argues that there was insufficient evidence to 

prove that she created a substantial risk of death or serious bodily injury, and, 

therefore, the court improperly graded the offense as a third-degree felony. 

See Appellant’s Brief, at 21-22. Boaz suggests that to prove she created a 

substantial risk, the Commonwealth needed to present evidence she did so 

“knowingly,” the culpability required for the commission of EWOC. See 18 

Pa.C.S.A. § 4304(a)(1); id. at § 302(b), (d). Boaz further argues that the 

Commonwealth failed to prove she was “practically certain” her conduct would 

create a substantial risk of death or serious bodily injury, as it did not produce 

any medical testimony or evidence of W.W.’s injuries after he was taken to 

the hospital. See Appellant’s Brief, at 24. 

In reviewing a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, we must 

determine whether, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the 

Commonwealth as verdict winner, together with all reasonable inferences 

therefrom, the trier of fact could have found that each and every element of 

the crimes charged was established beyond a reasonable doubt. 

Commonwealth v. Randall, 758 A.2d 669, 674 (Pa. Super. 2000). 

Furthermore, “it is within the province of the fact finder to determine the 

weight to be given to the testimony and to believe all, part, or none of the 
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evidence.” Commonwealth v. Moore, 648 A.2d 331, 333 (Pa. Super. 1994) 

(citations omitted). “This standard is equally applicable to cases where the 

evidence is circumstantial rather than direct[,] so long as the combination of 

the evidence links the accused to the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” 

Commonwealth v. Swerdlow, 636 A.2d 1173, 1176 (Pa. Super. 1994) 

(citation omitted). See also Commonwealth v. Chmiel, 639 A.2d 9, 10-11 

(Pa. 1994). Moreover, we will not “substitute our judgment for that of the 

factfinder; if the record contains support for the convictions they may not be 

disturbed.” Commonwealth v. Brewer, 876 A.2d 1029, 1032 (Pa. Super. 

2005) (quotations omitted). Finally, “[b]ecause evidentiary sufficiency is a 

question of law, our standard of review is de novo and our scope of review is 

plenary.” Commonwealth v. Diamond, 83 A.3d 119, 126 (Pa. 2013). 

To convict someone of EWOC as a third-degree felony, the 

Commonwealth must prove that the accused is a “parent, guardian[,] or other 

person supervising the welfare of a child under 18 years of age, or a person 

that employs or supervises such a person,” that such a person “knowingly

endangers the welfare of the child by violating a duty of care, protection[,] or 

support,” and that during the commission of that violation, the person 

“created a substantial risk of death or serious bodily injury[.]” 18 Pa.C.S.A. 

§§ 4304(a)(1), (b)(1)(iii) (emphasis added).

5

 

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5 EWOC is graded as a misdemeanor of the first degree, unless the person 

committing the offense did so as a course of conduct, created a substantial 

(Footnote Continued Next Page)
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The standard for culpability is set out in statute as follows, in relevant 

part:

(b) Kinds of culpability defined.--

(2) A person acts knowingly with respect to a material 

element of an offense when:

(i) if the element involves the nature of his 

conduct or the attendant circumstances, he is 

aware that his conduct is of that nature or that 

such circumstances exist; and

(ii) if the element involves a result of his 

conduct, he is aware that it is practically certain 

that his conduct will cause such a result.

* * *

(d) Prescribed culpability requirement applies to all 

material elements.--When the law defining an offense 

prescribes the kind of culpability that is sufficient for the 

commission of an offense, without distinguishing among the 

material elements thereof, such provision shall apply to all the 

material elements of the offense, unless a contrary purpose plainly 

appears.

18 Pa.C.S.A. § 302. 

Boaz acknowledges that the information was amended to include the 

third-degree felony grading for the single EWOC count and that the 

Commonwealth’s intent to prove the “substantial risk” factor was set out prior 

to trial. See Appellant’s Brief, at 22-23. Boaz also acknowledges that the 

trial court properly instructed the jury on the additional factor and that the 

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risk of death or serious bodily injury, or the conduct was both a course of 

conduct and created a substantial risk. If any of those factors exist, then the

offense is graded at a higher felony level. See id.
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verdict sheet properly reflected a secondary question as to whether Boaz 

created a substantial risk. Id. at 23, App. B. See also Commonwealth v. 

Proctor, 156 A.3d 261, 269 (Pa. Super. 2017) (stating “the trial court must 

frame the legal issues for the jury and instruct the jury on the applicable law, 

[however] it must not usurp the power of the jury to be sole judge of the 

evidence”).

In reviewing the record in this case, the evidence shows that three 

witnesses testified they observed Boaz stomp or kick W.W., a fourteen-yearold, in the face or shoulders, as well as hit him in the chest. First, Boaz’s coworker, Erick Smith, testified that he was preparing to end his shift on 

November 4, 2019, when he was asked by a supervisor to support two female 

co-workers with a difficult minor resident. See N.T. Trial, 6/1/22, at 50. 

Smith observed Boaz and another staff member with W.W. Id. W.W. insulted

Boaz and the other staff member and “kick[ed] out [towards them.]” Id. 

Smith testified that Boaz called W.W. names, and, after a short time, Boaz

“rush[ed] in[,]” and Boaz and W.W. were “tussling a little.” Id. at 50-51. 

Smith testified that Boaz “was holding [W.W.’s] shirt and stuff [and] holding 

him down” after they fell to the ground. Id. at 59. Smith then stated that he 

saw Boaz ball her fists and hit W.W. in the chest several times. Id. at 59-60. 

Smith testified that Boaz got up and “start[ed] kicking [W.W.] in the head and 

stuff with . . . boots [] with a hard [rubber sole.]” Id. at 60. Smith’s testimony 

was clear that Boaz “stomp[ed]” W.W. on the head three to four times. Id.

at 61. 
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Second, Sheronda King, another of Boaz’s co-workers, testified that she 

was present during the altercation. King testified that Boaz had been alone in 

the room with W.W. for a few minutes and that, when King entered the room, 

Boaz and W.W. were “at each other” on the floor. Id., 6/2/22, at 48. King 

testified that she tried to separate the two, but was unsuccessful, and saw 

Boaz “on top of [W.W.] kicking him.” Id. W.W. was “on the ground in [] a 

fetal position[]” and Boaz was “swinging her feet towards [W.W.]” Id. at 48-

49. King testified that she saw Boaz’s “foot connect with [W.W.] . . . . 

[p]robably twice.”6 Id. at 49. 

Third, W.W. testified that during the interaction, Boaz, King, and an 

unidentified male staff member were blocking W.W.’s door, preventing him 

from leaving the room. Id. at 202-03. W.W. stated that King and Boaz were 

“instigating and calling [him] names and cursing at [him].” Id. at 204-05. 

W.W. then stated that Boaz “tripped [him] and [he] fell on the floor.” Id. at 

206. W.W. testified that, while he was on the ground, Boaz “stomped [his] 

head in.” Id. at 207-08. W.W. stated he could see Boaz to the side of him 

and could see the bottom of her shoe hit his face. Id. at 208. W.W. further 

stated that he “lost consciousness” during the altercation after his head hit 

the ground when Boaz kicked him. Id. at 208-09. 

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6 Later in her testimony, King stated that she saw Boaz kick W.W. four times

and that there was “a lot going on” and she could not be sure if Boaz punched 

W.W. Id. at 54. 
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W.W. testified that, later that day, his mother took him to Brandywine 

Hospital, where they took x-rays and scans of his head. Id. at 212. After 

leaving the hospital, W.W. had to stay away from bright lights, limit his screen 

time, and limit exercise. Id. at 213. W.W.’s mother also took photos of 

W.W.’s injuries after the altercation, which were presented to the jury. See 

id. at 217-18; Commonwealth Exs. 1 – 12, 16, 17 (admitted N.T. Trial, 

6/2/22, at 217-18).

Viewed in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, the testimony 

and evidence presented at trial was sufficient to prove that Boaz created a 

substantial risk of death or serious bodily injury as a result of her course of 

conduct during the altercation with W.W. Randall, supra. Further, the jury, 

as the trier of fact, was properly instructed on the definition of serious bodily 

injury. See N.T. Trial, 6/3/22, at 235, 237. We conclude that the jury could 

properly find that Boaz, particularly by repeatedly kicking or stomping on 

W.W.’s head, knowingly created a substantial risk of death or serious bodily 

injury. Thus, we conclude there was sufficient evidence for the jury to convict 

Boaz of EWOC graded as a third-degree felony. See Randall, supra. See 

also Commonwealth v. Santiago, 294 A.3d 482, 486 (Pa. Super. 2023) 

(compiling cases and concluding that concussion was serious bodily injury).

Boaz’s second claim is that trial court erred by granting the 

Commonwealth’s motion in limine to exclude from trial Smith’s, a

Commonwealth’s witness, more-than-ten-year-old conviction for unsworn 

falsification to law enforcement. Appellant Brief, at 25. Boaz takes issue with 
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the trial court’s determination that admission of a witness’s conviction would 

have been more prejudicial than probative due to “the age of [the] conviction 

coupled with the age of the witness at the time that it was incurred.” Id. at 

32-33 (citation omitted). See Pa.R.E. 609(b)(1). 

“Questions concerning the admissibility of evidence lie within the sound 

discretion of the trial court, and a reviewing court will not reverse the [trial] 

court’s decision on such a question absent a clear abuse of discretion.” 

Commonwealth v. Harris, 884 A.2d 920, 924 (Pa. Super. 2005) (citations 

omitted). “An abuse of discretion is not merely an error of judgment but is 

rather the overriding or misapplication of the law, or the exercise of judgment 

that is manifestly unreasonable, or the result of bias, prejudice, ill-will or 

partiality, as shown by the evidence of record.” Commonwealth v. Hyland, 

875 A.2d 1175, 1186 (Pa. Super. 2005) (citations omitted). 

Pennsylvania Rule of Evidence 609 provides, in pertinent part:

(a) In General. For the purpose of attacking the credibility of any 

witness, evidence that the witness has been convicted of a crime, 

whether by verdict or by plea of guilty or nolo contendere, must 

be admitted if it involved dishonesty or false statement. 

(b) Limit on Using the Evidence After 10 Years. This 

subdivision (b) applies if more than 10 years have passed since 

the witness’s conviction or release from confinement for it, 

whichever is later. Evidence of the conviction is admissible only if:

(1) its probative value substantially outweighs its 

prejudicial effect; and

(2) the proponent gives an adverse party reasonable 

written notice of the intent to use it so that the party 

has a fair opportunity to contest its use.
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Pa.R.E. 609(a), (b)(1) & (2).

Convictions more than ten years old may be used upon a judge’s 

determination that the probative value substantially outweighs the prejudicial 

effect. See Pa.R.E. 609(b)(1). The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has held 

that any prior convictions introduced “must be for a crime that reflects upon 

the perpetrator’s veracity.” Commonwealth v. Roots, 393 A.2d 364, 366 

(Pa. 1978). See also Commonwealth v. Bighum, 307 A.2d 255, 262 (Pa. 

1973). The Supreme Court also stated a trial court should consider and 

balance other factors before determining the admissibility of evidence in the 

form of prior convictions for impeachment purposes, including:

1) the degree to which the commission of the prior offense reflects 

upon the veracity of the []witness; 2) the likelihood, in view of the 

nature and extent of the prior record, that it would have a greater 

tendency to smear the character of the [witness] and suggest a 

propensity to commit [a] crime [], rather than provide a legitimate 

reason for discrediting him as an untruthful person; 3) the age 

and circumstances of the [witness]; 4) the strength of the 

prosecution’s case and the prosecution’s need to resort to this 

evidence as compared with the availability to the defense of other 

witnesses through which its version of the events surrounding the 

incident can be presented; and 5) the existence of alternative 

means of attacking the [witness’s] credibility.

Roots, 393 A.2d at 367. See also Commonwealth v. Randall, 528 A.2d 

1326, 1328 (Pa. 1987).
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The conviction at issue was Smith’s conviction for unsworn falsification 

to authorities7in 2008. The Commonwealth made a motion to prohibit Boaz 

from questioning Smith on the conviction on the basis that it was more than 

ten years old. See N.T. Preliminary Hearing, 5/31/22, at 55. Following an 

on-the-record discussion, the court briefly took the matter under advisement 

before ruling on the record and granting the Commonwealth’s motion. Id. at 

55-65. See also Trial Court Opinion, 5/4/23, at 13-16 (reproducing relevant 

portions of transcript).

Applying the five-factor test set out above, Roots, supra, as it pertains 

to Smith’s prior conviction, we find the trial court properly weighed the factors 

and did not abuse its discretion in granting the Commonwealth’s motion in 

limine. The first factor, the degree to which the offense reflects upon the 

witness’s veracity and credibility, directly relates to a conviction of crimen 

falsi. In the instant case, this was Smith’s only crimen falsi conviction. We 

have held that a prior conviction of perjury, for example, may be admissible 

well beyond the ten-year period. See Commonwealth v. Osborn, 528 A.2d 

623, 627 (Pa. Super. 1987). Furthermore, a prior conviction of crimen falsi is 

generally relevant to a jury’s determination of the witness’s testimony. See

Commonwealth v. Rivera, 983 A.2d 1211, 1228 (Pa. 2009); 

Commonwealth v. Cascardo, 981 A.2d 245, 256 (Pa. Super. 2009). The 

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7 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 4904. Crimes of falsehood, such as unsworn falsification to 

authorities, are commonly referred to as crimen falsi. See, e.g., 

Commonwealth v. Moser, 999 A.2d 602, 607 n.6 (Pa. Super. 2010).
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trial court, in its evaluation, noted that Smith’s conviction was related to an 

unsworn statement, not under oath, and not necessarily predictive of his 

veracity and credibility under oath. See Trial Court Opinion, 5/4/23, at 23. 

The trial court was aware that the conviction was related to a firearms charge. 

However, the firearms charge was nolle prossed and no additional information 

was presented to the trial court as to the circumstances surrounding the 

unsworn falsification conviction. See N.T. Preliminary Hearing, 5/31/22, at

57-58. 

The second factor addresses the nature and extent of Smith’s prior 

record and whether it would have a greater tendency to smear his character

than discredit him on the stand. Here, the conviction at issue was Smith’s only 

crimen falsi conviction and the trial court had limited information as to the 

circumstances, beyond its relation to a gun charge. The unsworn statement,

in conjunction with details about the gun charge, could tend to smear his 

character, rather than simply discredit his testimony. But see Osborn, 528 

A.2d at 627-28 (stating perjury, unlike other crimes, does not “suggest any 

propensity” to commit crimes for which the defendant-witness was charged).

Judge Royer inquired into the third factor, Smith’s age and 

circumstances, at the hearing. See N.T. Preliminary Hearing, 5/31/22, at 57. 

The Commonwealth stated that Smith was 23 years old at the time of his 

conviction, which occurred fourteen years prior to the trial. Id. The trial court 

found that Smith’s young age at the time of his conviction and the old age of 

the conviction to be a particularly compelling factor in favor of preclusion. Id.
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at 65. See Osborn, 528 A.2d at 628 (discussing ages of witnesses and 

convictions).

The fourth factor considers the importance of the witness’s testimony

and whether the case turned on the credibility of the witness. See id. The 

trial court recognized that Smith’s testimony was important as an individual 

“involved in the same fracas,” N.T. Preliminary Hearing, 5/31/22, at 64, but 

that he was not the only witness to provide testimony as to the events on the 

day in question. The jury heard from King, W.W., and Boaz, and was also 

shown photographs of W.W. following the incident.8 Smith was not the 

Commonwealth’s sole witness for the purpose of establishing what happened 

on the day in question and who was responsible for W.W.’s injuries.

Regarding the last factor, the existence of alternative means of 

attacking Smith’s credibility, Boaz had several alternative means, which she 

utilized at trial. Smith changed the details of his report by initially not stating 

Boaz had caused W.W.’s injuries. See N.T. Trial, 6/1/22, at 65-67, 72-74, 

81-82. Indeed, it was suggested that Smith may have been motivated to 

point the finger at Boaz to avoid being personally implicated in the incident, 

id. at 70-72, 74-78, 80-82, 86-103, 123-25, and it was even acknowledged 

at the preliminary hearing that Boaz had “plenty to explore without [the 

crimen falsi.]” N.T. Preliminary Hearing, 5/31/22, at 65.

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8 See supra pp. 7-8.
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Upon review of the record, and balancing the relevant factors set forth 

above, we find that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in granting the 

Commonwealth’s motion in limine. See Harris, supra. 

Judgment of sentence affirmed.

Date: 11/30/2023