[Cite as New California Woods Homeowners Assn. v. Jakse, 2021-Ohio-3783.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO 

THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT 

UNION COUNTY 

 

NEW CALIFORNIA WOODS 

HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION, CASE NO. 14-21-04 

 PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, 

 v. 

JENNIFER A. JAKSE, ET AL., 

 DEFENDANTS-APPELLEES, 

 -and- O P I N I O N 

DOUGLAS J. VANBUREN, ET AL., 

 DEFENDANTS-APPELLANTS. 

 

Appeal from Union County Common Pleas Court 

Trial Court No. 2019-CV-0220 

Judgment Affirmed 

Date of Decision: October 25, 2021 

 

APPEARANCES: 

Douglas J. VanBuren, Appellant 

 

Melissa M. VanBuren, Appellant 

Anthony C. Will for Appellee, New California Woods 

 Homeowners Association 

 
Case No. 14-21-04 

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WILLAMOWSKI, P.J. 

{¶1} Defendants-appellants Douglas J. VanBuren and Melissa M. VanBuren 

(collectively “the VanBurens”) appeal the judgment of the Union County Court of 

Common Pleas, alleging that the trial court erred (1) by granting plaintiff-appellee 

New California Woods Homeowners Association’s (“NCWHA”) motion for 

summary judgment and (2) by granting the permanent injunction requested by the 

NCWHA. For the reasons set forth below, the judgment of the trial court is 

affirmed. 

Facts and Procedural History 

{¶2} In 1993, a Declaration (“Original Declaration”) establishing the New 

California Woods Subdivision was recorded in the Union County Recorder’s Office. 

Doc. 52, Ex. G. This Original Declaration contained the following use restriction: 

No structure of a temporary character, trailer, mobile home, tent, 

shack, garage, barn or other outbuilding shall be used on the 

Property at any time as a residence, shall be used for storage 

purposes or for any other purpose. 

Doc. 52, Ex. G. This Original Declaration stated that “[e]ach grantee of Declarant, 

its successors or assigns, by the acceptance of a deed of conveyance accepts the 

same subject to all restrictions, conditions, covenants * * * created * * * by this 

Declaration * * *.” Doc. 52, Ex. G. Further, the Original Declaration stated that, 

[u]pon filing of an amendment to this Declaration, thereby 

subjecting additional property to this plan for ownership of New 

California Woods, such additional property shall thereafter be 

subject to all the terms and provisions of this Declaration, to the 
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same extent and with the same effect as if such additional 

property had been described herein * * *. 

Doc. 52, Ex. G. 

{¶3} Subsequently, several amendments to the Original Declaration were 

recorded as the New California Woods Subdivision was developed. Doc. 52, Ex. J, 

H. In 1998, a fourth amendment (“Phase IX Amendment”) to the Original 

Declaration was recorded. Doc. 52, Ex. H. The property subject to this Phase IX 

Amendment was subdivided into lots 105 to 116 of Phase IX of the New California 

Woods Subdivision. Doc. 52, Ex. H. The Phase IX Amendment stated that “[t]he 

purpose of this amendment is to submit the real property referred to herein” to the 

Original Declaration. Doc. 52, Ex. H. 

{¶4} In 2006, an Amended and Restated Declaration (“2006 Restated 

Declaration”) was recorded because the “[d]eclarant desire[d] to amend and restate 

the Original Declaration as described in this document to address certain issues 

which have arisen since the recording of the Original Declaration[.]” Doc. 52, Ex. 

D. This Restated Declaration contained the following use restriction: “No structure 

of a temporary character, trailer, mobile home, shack, garage, barn or other 

outbuilding shall be permitted on the Property at any time.” Doc. 52, Ex. D. 

{¶5} In June of 2017, the VanBurens obtained title to Lot 108 in Phase IX of 

the New California Woods Subdivision. Doc. 2, Ex. 4. Doc. 52, Ex. E. When the 

VanBurens purchased this property, no shed was located on the premises. Melissa 
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VanBuren Deposition, 6. Douglas VanBuren Deposition, 18. The VanBurens 

indicated that this shed was installed in or around June of 2017. Doc. 37. 

{¶6} On July 1, 2019, the NCWHA’s counsel sent a letter to the VanBurens 

that stated a “shed/outbuilding” on their property violated the deed restrictions in 

the Declaration for the New California Woods Subdivision. Doc. 17. See Doc. 52. 

The letter requested removal of the outbuilding on their property by August 1, 2019. 

Doc. 17. On August 11, 2019, the NCWHA notified the VanBurens that legal action 

would ensue if the outbuilding was not removed. Doc. 17. The NCWHA requested 

that the shed be removed by October 1, 2019. Doc. 51. However, the shed was not 

removed. Doc. 2, 17. 

{¶7} On December 2, 2019, the NCWHA filed a complaint against the 

VanBurens.1

 Doc. 2. This complaint alleged that the VanBurens had an outbuilding 

on their property in violation of the use restrictions governing the property. Doc. 2. 

The NCWHA requested a permanent injunction enjoining the Van Burens from 

constructing additional outbuildings on their properties and an order that required 

them to remove the temporary structure already existing on their lots. Doc. 2. 

{¶8} On August 3, 2020, the NCWHA filed a motion for summary judgment. 

Doc. 51, 52. On November 4, 2020, the trial court found that the VanBurens’ 

property was subject to the restriction that prohibited outbuildings. Doc. 70. The 

1

 This complaint named a number of other parties as defendants. Doc. 2. The complaint alleged that these 

other parties had outbuildings that violated the applicable use restriction against outbuildings. Doc. 2. 

However, this appeal only concerns the VanBurens. Doc. 2. 
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trial court then granted the NCWHA’s motion for partial summary judgment and 

issued the permanent injunction requested by the same. Doc. 70. The trial court 

then set a hearing for damages. Doc. 70. On January 13, 2021, the trial court issued 

a judgment entry that awarded the NCWHA $13,990.13 for costs and fees.2

 Doc. 

86. 

{¶9} The VanBurens filed their notice of appeal on February 12, 2021. Doc. 

91. On appeal, the VanBurens raise the following two assignments of error: 

First Assignment of Error 

The Trial Court errored [sic] in granting the Motion for 

Summary Judgment and the award of Permanent Injunction to 

Plaintiff in accordance with Civ.R. 56(C). 

Second Assignment of Error 

The Trial Court errored [sic] in granting the award of Permanent 

Injunction to Plaintiff as a matter of law. 

First Assignment of Error 

{¶10} The VanBurens allege that the use restriction prohibiting outbuildings 

does not apply to their property and that, for this reason, the trial court erred in 

granting summary judgment to the NCWHA. 

 

2

 While noting that the NCWHA is simply a registered fictitious name, we nonetheless make no determination 

regarding the validity of the judgment in its favor. 
Case No. 14-21-04 

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Legal Standard 

{¶11} Appellate courts consider a summary judgment order under a de novo 

standard of review. James B. Nutter & Co. v. Estate of Neifer, 3d Dist. Hancock 

No. 5-16-20, 2016-Ohio-7641, ¶ 5. Under the Ohio Rules of Civil Procedure, 

[s]ummary judgment shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, 

depositions, answers to interrogatories, written admissions, 

affidavits, transcripts of evidence, and written stipulations of fact, 

if any, timely filed in the action, show that there is no genuine issue 

of material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment 

as a matter of law * * *. A summary judgment shall not be 

rendered unless it appears from the evidence or stipulation, and 

only from the evidence or stipulation, that reasonable minds can 

come to but one conclusion and that conclusion is adverse to the 

party against whom the motion for summary judgment is made, 

that party being entitled to have the evidence or stipulation 

construed most strongly in the party’s favor. 

Civ.R. 56(C). “The party moving for summary judgment has the initial burden ‘to 

inform the trial court of the basis for the motion, identifying the portions of the 

record, including the pleadings and discovery, which demonstrate the absence of a 

genuine issue of material fact.’” Middleton v. Holbrook, 3d Dist. Marion No. 9-15-

47, 2016-Ohio-3387, ¶ 8, quoting Reinbolt v. Gloor, 146 Ohio App.3d 661, 664, 

767 N.E.2d 1197 (3d Dist. 2001). 

{¶12} “The burden then shifts to the party opposing the summary judgment.” 

Bates Recycling, Inc. v. Conaway, 2018-Ohio-5058, 126 N.E.3d 341, ¶ 11 (3d Dist.), 

quoting Middleton at ¶ 8. “In order to defeat summary judgment, the nonmoving 

party may not rely on mere denials but ‘must set forth specific facts showing that 

there is a genuine issue for trial.’” Byrd v. Smith, 110 Ohio St.3d 24, 2006-Ohio-
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3455, 850 N.E.2d 47, ¶ 10, quoting Civ.R. 56(E). “[B]ecause summary judgment 

is a procedural device to terminate litigation, it must be awarded with caution.” 

Williams v. ALPLA, Inc., 2017-Ohio-4217, 92 N.E.3d 256 (3d Dist.), quoting 

Murphy v. Reynoldsburg, 65 Ohio St.3d 356, 358-359, 604 N.E.2d 138 (1992). 

“The court must thus construe all evidence and resolve all doubts in favor of the 

non-moving party * * *.” Webster v. Shaw, 2016-Ohio-1484, 63 N.E.3d 677, ¶ 8 

(3d Dist.). 

{¶13} “A ‘restrictive covenant’ is a ‘private agreement, usu[ally] in a deed 

or lease, that restricts the use or occupancy of real property, esp[ecially] by 

specifying lot sizes, building lines, architectural styles, and the uses to which the 

property may be put.’” Canton v. State, 95 Ohio St.3d 149, 2002-Ohio-2005, 766 

N.E.2d 963, ¶ 28, quoting Black’s Law Dictionary (7th Ed.Rev. 1999) 371. 

“Restrictive covenants are often utilized to effect a general plan for a development.” 

Dillingham v. Do, 12th Dist. Butler Nos. CA2002-01-004, CA2002-01-017, 2002-

Ohio-3349, ¶ 16. “An owner of land is free to adopt a general building plan for a 

development, designed to make it more attractive for residential purposes.” Id. at ¶ 

10. “Restrictive covenants run with the land and bind subsequent purchasers * * *.” 

Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. Michael, 2013-Ohio-2545, 993 N.E.2d 786, ¶ 29 (7th 

Dist.). 

{¶14} “Contract construction rules apply to the interpretation of the deed 

restrictions.” Siltstone Resources, LLC v. Ohio Public Works Commission, 2019-
Case No. 14-21-04 

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Ohio-4916, 137 N.E.3d 144, ¶ 29 (7th Dist.). “Contracts are to be interpreted so as 

to carry out the intent of the parties, as that intent is evidenced by the contractual 

language.” Nationwide Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. Pusser, 160 Ohio St.3d 203, 2020-

Ohio-2778, 155 N.E.3d 839, ¶ 8. “Where the language in the restriction is clear, the 

court must enforce the restriction. Otherwise, the court would be rewriting the 

restriction.” Clark v. Osting, 3d Dist. Allen No. 1-03-17, 2004-Ohio-98, ¶ 11, 

quoting Dean v. Nugent Canal Yacht Club, Inc., 66 Ohio App.3d 471, 475, 585 

N.E.2d 554, 557 (6th Dist. 1990). 

Legal Analysis 

{¶15} The VanBurens raise four main issues in their appeal. We will 

consider each of these issues in turn. First, the VanBurens argue that the use 

restriction prohibiting outbuildings ceased to apply to their property when the 

Restated Declaration was recorded to restate and amend the Original Declaration. 

The Restated Declaration states the following: 

WHEREAS, Declarant desires to amend and restate the Original 

Declaration as described in this document to address certain 

issues which have arisen since the recording of the Original 

Declaration; and 

WHEREAS, Declarant desires to subject the property described 

in Exhibit B to those certain conditions, restrictions, easements, 

covenants, and assessments described below. 

Doc. 52, Ex. D. The Restated Declaration then annexes Phases Six and Seven of 

the New California Woods Subdivision. Doc. 52, Ex. D. 
Case No. 14-21-04 

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{¶16} The VanBurens then point to an amendment (“2019 Amendment”) to 

the Restated Declaration that was filed in 2019. Doc. 52, Ex. J. This 2019 

Amendment states the following: 

WHEREAS, on or around January 20, 2006 Declarant executed 

an Amended and Restated Declaration creating and establishing 

a plan of ownership of New California Woods thereby replacing 

the Original Declaration and all amendments made thereto * * *. 

Doc. 52, Ex. J. Based on this language, the VanBurens assert that the restrictions 

in the Restated Declaration only apply to Phases Six and Seven of the New 

California Woods Subdivision because the Restated Declaration “replac[ed]” the 

Original Declaration and the associated Phase IX Amendment. Doc. 52, Ex. J. 

{¶17} However, in its own terms, the Restated Declaration was recorded to 

“amend and restate the Original Declaration” in addition to annexing Phases Six and 

Seven to the New California Woods Subdivision. Doc. 52, Ex. D. Thus, the 

Restated Declaration did not release the areas already subject to the Original 

Declaration from any and all use restrictions but restated and amended these existing 

use restrictions. Practically, this simply means that property owners in this 

subdivision are to look at the Restated Declaration rather than the Original 

Declaration to determine their rights and obligations. 

{¶18} Further, “the purpose” of these restrictions was to “enhance[e] and 

protect[] the value, desirability and attractiveness of the Property.” Doc. 52, Ex. D. 

The Restated Declaration was clearly intended to also impose restrictions on Phases 

Six and Seven of the subdivision. In the content of the relevant recorded 
Case No. 14-21-04 

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instruments, we see no reason why the builder would have used the Restated 

Declaration to impose use restrictions on Phases Six and Seven of this subdivision 

while, at the same time, lifting these use restrictions from the rest of the subdivision. 

{¶19} Turning to the 2019 Amendment, the language of this recorded 

instrument states that Restated Declaration “replac[ed]” the Original Declaration. 

Doc. 52, Ex. J. However, in the recitals, the 2019 Amendment states its relevant 

background, mentioning the Original Declaration, the six amendments made 

thereto, and the Restated Declaration. Doc. 52, Ex. J. These recitals place the 

Restated Declaration and the 2019 Amendment within the larger scheme of the New 

California Woods Subdivision. The recitals in the 2019 Amendment contemplate 

this subdivision as a whole and evince an intent to subject a new phase of this 

development to the use restrictions that already prevailed in the existing subdivision. 

There is no indication in these recorded instruments that the declarant intended for 

portions of the New California Woods Subdivision to be subject to use restrictions 

while other portions of this subdivision are exempt. 

{¶20} Ultimately, the language identified by the VanBurens in the 2019 

Amendment refers home owners in the New California Woods Subdivision to the 

Restated Declaration rather than the Original Declaration as the controlling 

instrument in determining their rights and obligations. Doc. 52, Ex. J. As we noted 

above, the Restated Declaration amended and restated the Original Declaration, 

thereby becoming the primary controlling instrument for the New California Woods 
Case No. 14-21-04 

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Subdivision. Doc. 52, Ex. D, G. There is no indication that the Restated Declaration 

or the 2019 Amendment was recorded with the intention of releasing the properties 

in Phase IX of the development from the use restrictions that govern the New 

California Woods Subdivision. 

{¶21} The recorded instruments that the NCWHA filed with the trial court 

indicate that the VanBurens’ property is subject to the use restriction that prohibits 

outbuildings. In response, the VanBurens have not demonstrated that a genuine 

issue of material fact exists as to whether their property is subject to the use 

restrictions as set forth in the Restated Declaration. For this reason, the arguments 

raised in this first issue are without merit. 

{¶22} Second, the VanBurens argue that the Original Declaration, the 

Restated Declaration, and the Phase IX Amendment fail to comply with Ohio’s 

Planned Community Law in two regards. Initially, the VanBurens assert that the 

bylaws were not filed with the Phase IX Amendment. R.C. 5312.02 reads, in its 

relevant part, as follows: 

(A) Any planned community in this state is subject to this chapter. 

No person shall establish a planned community unless that person 

files and records a declaration and bylaws for that planned 

community in the office of the recorder of the county or counties 

in which the planned community is located. 

(B) Any declaration for a planned community shall be 

accompanied by bylaws that provide for the operation of the 

planned community. * * * 

R.C. 5312.02(A), (B). R.C. 5312.01(G) contains the following definition: 
Case No. 14-21-04 

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‘Declaration’ means an instrument a property owner executes 

and records to declare that the property is a planned community

subject to the provisions of this chapter. 

R.C. 5312.01(G). In this case, the NCWHA filed certified copies of the Original 

Declaration and the Restated Declaration that had been recorded in Union County. 

Doc. 52, Ex. D, G. Both of these instruments were recorded with copies of the 

bylaws. Doc. 52, Ex. D, G.3

 

{¶23} The Phase IX Amendment was an addition to the Original Declaration. 

See Black’s Law Dictionary (11th Ed. 2019) (defining an amendment as “a formal 

and usu[ally] minor revision or addition proposed or made to a[n] * * * instrument”). 

This amendment merely brought additional property into an existing planned 

community that had already been created by the Original Declaration. The Phase 

IX Amendment contains the following language: 

[T]he [Original] Declaration and all attachments thereto, 

including but being not limited to the By-Laws of the New 

California Woods Association, are hereby incorporated by 

reference as though fully rewritten herein. 

Doc. 52, Ex. H. This amendment expressly subjected the property in Phase IX of 

the subdivision to the Original Declaration and bylaws that had already been filed 

in the recorder’s office. Since the Original Declaration was recorded with the 

bylaws, this argument does not establish noncompliance with R.C. 5312.02. 

3

 We note that R.C. 5312.02(A), (B) became effective on September 10, 2010. R.C. 5312.02. Both the 

Original Declaration and the Restated Declaration were filed before this provision became effective. Doc. 

52, Ex. D, G. Nonetheless, both instruments are in compliance with R.C. 5312.02(A), (B). 
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{¶24} Next, the VanBurens assert that no copy of the bylaws was recorded 

180 days after the effective date of R.C. 5312.02 in violation of R.C. 5312.02(D)(1). 

R.C. 5312.02(D)(1) reads as follows: 

(D)(1) The board of directors of the owners association of any 

planned community that is in existence on the original effective 

date of this chapter shall file and record the bylaws of that 

planned community that are in effect on that effective date in the 

office of the recorder of the county or counties in which the 

planned community is located within one hundred eighty days 

after that effective date. 

R.C. 5312.02(D)(1). The effective date of this provision was September 10, 2010. 

R.C. 5312.02. Thus, R.C. 5312.02(D)(1) required existing homeowners 

associations to have their bylaws recorded no later than 180 days after September 

10, 2010. R.C. 5312.02(D)(1). 

{¶25} In this case, since the bylaws had already been filed and recorded with 

the Original Declaration and Restated Declaration, there was no need to refile and 

re-record the bylaws within 180 days of September 10, 2010. Thus, the arguments 

in this second issue do not establish noncompliance with R.C. 5312.02. See also

R.C. 5312.02(C) (stating that nothing in the Ohio Planned Community Law 

“invalidates any provision of a document that governs a planned community” if that 

provision was in the document and recorded prior to September 10, 2010). 

{¶26} Third, the VanBurens challenge an affidavit from the NCWHA’s 

expert witness, Tina Owens-Ruff (“Owens-Ruff”). In her affidavit, Owens-Ruff 

listed a number of recorded documents that she had reviewed and concluded that 
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the use restrictions that prohibited outbuildings applied to the VanBurens’ property. 

Doc. 52, Ex. C. The VanBurens argue that this affidavit should be of no 

consequence because there is no indication that Owens-Ruff examined the 2019 

Amendment. The VanBurens assert that the 2019 Amendment is of significance 

because it states that the Restated Declaration “replac[ed]” the Original Declaration. 

Doc. 52, Ex. J. 

{¶27} However, the NCWHA filed certified copies of the Original 

Declaration, the Phase IX Amendment, the Restated Declaration, and the 2019 

Amendment with the trial court. Doc. 52. For this reason, we were able to examine 

these documents independently. After we reviewed the 2019 Amendment as part 

of the first issue in this assignment of error, we concluded that it did not render the 

use restriction against outbuildings inapplicable to the VanBurens’ property. Thus, 

while Owens-Ruff may not have had the 2019 Amendment before her when she 

concluded that the use restrictions applied to the VanBurens’ property, we did have 

the 2019 Amendment before us and reached the same conclusion. As such, the 

arguments presented under this third issue do not establish that the use restriction 

that prohibits outbuildings is inapplicable to the VanBurens’ property. 

{¶28} Fourth, the VanBurens allege that the plat maps for Phase IX of the 

New California Woods Subdivision did not list the page numbers where additional 

deed restrictions could be found. See DeRosa v. Parker, 197 Ohio App.3d 332, 

2011-Ohio-6024, 967 N.E.2d 767, ¶ 36 (7th Dist.). This argument appears to be 
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about whether the recorded instruments provided adequate notice of the relevant use 

restrictions to property owners. To be bound by use restrictions on property, a 

purchaser of land must have actual or constructive notice of those restrictions. 

Emrick v. Multicon Builders, Inc., 57 Ohio St.3d 107, 109, 566 N.E.2d 1189 (1991) 

(“[A] bona fide purchaser for value is bound by an encumbrance upon land * * * if 

he has constructive or actual knowledge of the encumbrance.”). 

{¶29} “Constructive notice is that which the law regards as sufficient to give 

notice and is regarded as a substitute for actual notice.” Williams Creek 

Homeowners Assn. v. Zweifel, 10th Dist. Franklin No. 07AP-689, 2008-Ohio-2434, 

¶ 40. If the restrictions are recorded in an instrument that is in a purchaser’s chain 

of title, the purchaser is generally deemed to have constructive knowledge of those 

restrictions. Saddlebrook Homeowners Assn., Inc. v. Dunfee, 10th Dist. Franklin 

No. 90AP-1260, 1991 WL 82018, *2 (May 14, 1991). See Spring Lakes, Ltd. v. 

O.F.M. Co., 12 Ohio St.3d 333, 467 N.E.2d 537 (1984); Kimberly Recreation Assn. 

v. Butts, 10th Franklin No. 96APG09-1202, 1997 WL 170293, *3 (Apr. 10, 1997). 

{¶30} In this case, if the plat maps had contained the relevant page numbers, 

this “would certainly give additional express notice to a buyer of the deed 

restrictions on the property * * *.” DeRosa at ¶ 36. See also Columbia Gas Transm. 

Corp. v. Bennett, 71 Ohio App.3d 307, 315, 594 N.E.2d 1 (2d Dist. 1990). However, 

the fact that these blanks on the plat maps were not filled in does not mean that the 

VanBurens did not have constructive notice of these use restrictions. The relevant 
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use restrictions were contained in recorded instruments in the VanBurens’ chain of 

title. Thus, notwithstanding these blanks on the plat map, a search of their chain of 

title would uncover the fact that their property is subject to recorded instruments 

that contain a use restriction that prohibits outbuildings on their property. 

{¶31} We also note that, in addition to the relevant use restriction having 

been stated in recorded instruments in the VanBurens’ chain of title, the VanBurens’ 

deed also stated that their property was “[s]ubject to conditions, restrictions and 

easements, if any, contained in prior instruments of record.” Doc. 52, Ex. E. See 

Smith v. Volk, 85 Ohio App. 347, 350, 53 Ohio Law Abs. 432, 86 N.E.2d 30, (2d 

Dist. 1948) (holding that constructive notice of restrictions existed where a deed 

stated that it was “subject to all restrictions of record”). For these reasons, we 

conclude that the arguments raised under the fourth issue in this assignment of error 

are without merit. 

{¶32} In conclusion, the NCWHA filed certified copies of the Original

Declaration, the Phase IX Amendment, the Restated Declaration, and the 2019 

Amendment with the trial court. These recorded instruments indicate that the 

VanBurens’ property is clearly subject to a use restriction that prohibits 

outbuildings. In response, the VanBurens have not demonstrated that a genuine 

issue of material fact exists for trial. As such, we conclude that the trial court did 

not err in granting the NCWHA’s motion for summary judgment. The VanBurens’ 

first assignment of error is, therefore, overruled. 
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Second Assignment of Error 

{¶33} The VanBurens next allege that the NCWHA did not establish that the 

use restriction prohibiting outbuildings applied to their property and that the trial 

court, therefore, erred in granting the NCWHA a permanent injunction. However, 

in our analysis of the first assignment of error, we concluded that the NCWHA did, 

in fact, establish that the use restriction prohibiting outbuilding does apply to the 

VanBurens’ property. As such, the argument raised by the VanBurens in their 

second assignment of error has been decided by our disposition of their first 

assignment of error. For this reason, their second assignment of error is overruled. 

Conclusion 

{¶34} Having found no error prejudicial to the appellants in the particulars 

assigned and argued, the judgment of the Union County Court of Common Pleas is 

affirmed. 

Judgment Affirmed 

ZIMMERMAN and MILLER, J.J., concur. 

/hls