Filed 4/26/22 P. v. Venturine CA2/6

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions 

not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion 

has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. 

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION SIX

THE PEOPLE,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

MARK ANTHONY 

VENTURINE,

 Defendant and Appellant.

2d Crim. No. B311624

(Super. Ct. Nos. 2018004449, 

2019027003, 2019033455)

(Ventura County)

Mark Anthony Venturine appeals the judgment entered 

after he pleaded no contest to five counts of making criminal 

threats (Pen. Code,

1 § 422), and one count each of inflicting 

corporal injury on a current or former cohabitant (§ 273.5, subd. 

(a)) and stalking (§ 646.9, subd. (b)). Appellant also admitted a 

prior strike and serious felony conviction (§§ 667, subds. (a)(1), 

1 All further undesignated statutory references are to the

Penal Code.
2

(c)-(e), 1170.12, subds. (a), (c)). The trial court sentenced him to

10 years in state prison.

2 

Appellant, who has been diagnosed with mental disorders 

including obsessive compulsive disorder and alcohol use disorder,

contends the court abused its discretion in denying his request 

for mental health diversion under section 1001.36. We conclude 

the request was properly denied because appellant failed to 

present a qualified mental health expert’s opinion that 

appellant’s “symptoms of the mental disorder motivating the 

criminal behavior would respond to mental health treatment,” as 

required under section 1001.36, subdivision (b)(1)(C). 

Accordingly, we affirm.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

In December 2017, appellant and his girlfriend Pauline M. 

got into an argument after she saw a text message from another 

woman on his cellphone. After Pauline asked appellant to leave 

her house, he told her “he would start with [her] car, then he 

would ruin [her] house and then he would find [her] and kill 

[her]. And then he said he would break [her] son’s neck.” 

Appellant, who had been drinking alcohol, also pushed Pauline 

and punched a hole in her bedroom door. 

In July 2018, appellant went to Pauline’s house and told 

her he was “cleaning up his act” and was residing in a sober 

living facility. Appellant began drinking beer and yelled at 

Pauline, who asked him to leave. Appellant pushed Pauline to 

the ground, straddled her, and repeatedly punched her in the face 

and head. Pauline, who was bleeding from her head, nose, and 

2 Appellant pleaded no contest in three separate cases and 

his appeals in the three cases were consolidated for purposes of 

argument and decision. 
3

ear, hit appellant with a flashlight in self-defense. Appellant told 

Pauline “I’m gonna kill you” and asked, “Where would you like 

me to bury your body?” Pauline ran to a neighbor’s house and 

appellant told the neighbor, “You’re next. I’m coming for you.” 

Several hours after his release from jail in August 2018, 

appellant went to Pauline’s place of employment and put a note 

on her car that said, “I’m out. Be careful.” 

In August 2019 Pauline saw appellant walking in front of 

her place of employment, in violation of a domestic violence 

restraining order. Appellant looked for Pauline’s car but did not 

see it because she had driven her father’s car to work that day. 

Following his release from jail in August 2019, appellant 

began a dating relationship with Jillian N. Jillian allowed 

appellant to stay at her residence so long as he did not consume 

alcohol. In September 2019, Jillian found alcohol in the

bathroom appellant used and asked him to leave. Appellant left 

without taking several of his items from the house. He 

subsequently sent Jillian numerous text and voicemail messages

threatening to kill her. In one such message he stated: “I will 

find you and I will fucking kill you you understand I know where 

you work I know [where] your car is located I know where you 

sleep do you wanna fuck with me like this you son of a bitch I will 

destroy you I will fucking kill you and I will kill your son I will 

come get you I’m on my way right fucking now.” Almost two 

months later, appellant sent Pauline text messages stating

among other things “you are a dead wom[a]n walking you had to 

be very careful within this next couple days because I am right 

there behind you I will find you and I will fucking kill you.” 

Appellant was subsequently charged in case no. 

2018004449 with three counts of making criminal threats (§ 422), 

battery (§ 243, subd. (e)(1)), and one count each of misdemeanor 
4

vandalism (§ 594, subd. (b)(2)(A)), disobeying a domestic relations 

court order (§ 273.6, subd. (a)), and inflicting corporal injury on a 

current or former cohabitant (§ 273.5, subd. (a)). In case no. 

2019027003, appellant was charged with stalking (§ 646.9, subd. 

(b)) and disobeying a domestic relations court order. In case no. 

2019033455, appellant was charged with two counts of making 

criminal threats, one count of vandalism, and two counts of 

making annoying telephone calls (§ 653m, subd. (a)). It was 

further alleged in all three cases that appellant had a prior strike 

and serious felony conviction. 

In September 2020, appellant filed a request for mental 

health diversion in all three cases pursuant to section 1001.36. 

In support of his request, appellant offered progress notes 

purportedly prepared by his psychiatrist, Dr. Nomi Fredrick, in 

September 2015. The notes state among other things that 

appellant had been diagnosed with major depression, persistent

depressive order, obsessive compulsive order (OCD), alcohol use 

disorder, and mild neurocognitive disorder due to a traumatic 

brain injury (TBI). 

Appellant reported that he began exhibiting symptoms of 

OCD when he was a teenager and was originally diagnosed with 

both OCD and borderline schizophrenia. He went to college on a 

football scholarship but was cut from the team due to his 

excessive drinking. After graduating from college, he successfully 

completed a residential treatment program and in 1997 he began 

working as a teaching assistant and football coach at Westlake 

High School. He subsequently suffered the TBI as the result of a 

2000 car accident. Appellant “had multiple involuntary 

psychiatric hospitalizations over the years” and “was first

psychiatrically hospitalized in his thirties” after sustaining his 

TBI. He also reported that when he was sober he experienced 
5

“insistent checking, counting, rereading, rewriting and 

hand[]washing” and “spends over half his day checking and 

counting.” 

Appellant sought diversion based on his OCD and urged 

the court to find that that the disorder played a significant role in 

his commission of the charged offenses, as provided in 

subdivision (b)(2) of section 1001.36, because he has a 

documented history of drinking alcohol when he “loses control of 

his OCD.” After noting that he had gone through 12 inpatient 

alcohol rehabilitation programs by 2015, appellant offered that 

“those that tried to help” him “often thought it was his alcoholism 

to blame. But truly, it was the change in circumstances (the 

ending of a program, the change in living situations, the lack of a 

structured environment) that would ignite his OCD causing him 

to self medicate with alcohol.” Appellant also noted that he had 

told Dr. Fredrick “he plans alcoholic binges to escape from his 

OCD brain” and “does not know how to stop checking or counting 

without being intoxicated . . . .” Appellant added that “[the 

d]efense fears, . . . like so many people that tried to help 

[appellant] in the past, the Court will blame alcohol as the 

primary culprit, and although it is a factor, it is truly his mental 

illness driving his actions.” 

To satisfy the requirement that a mental health expert 

opine the symptoms of appellant’s OCD would respond to mental 

health treatment (§ 1001.36, subd. (b)(1)(C)), appellant offered a 

March 2018 “client plan” prepared by Ricardo Juarez, his “case 

manager” at Ventura County Behavioral Health. Appellant 

stated “[i]t is [the] Defense’s position, that this plan should be 

implemented in addition to a residential program.” Appellant 

also attached a letter indicating he had been accepted into a 

residential alcohol and drug treatment program in Los Angeles. 
6

In opposing appellant’s request for mental health diversion, 

the prosecution noted that appellant had failed to provide a 

qualified mental health expert’s opinion that the symptoms of 

appellant’s mental illness that motivated his criminal behavior 

would respond to treatment as required under subdivision 

(b)(1)(C) of section 1001.36. The prosecution also asserted that 

appellant’s OCD was not a significant factor in his commission of 

the charged offenses, and that his proposed treatment plan “is 

not specific enough” in that “[i]t doesn’t address the medicine he 

would be taking or exactly what he would be doing to reach the 

goals they stated.” Finally, the prosecution argued that appellant

presented a danger to the public if released. 

The court denied the request for mental health diversion 

following a hearing. The court reasoned: “I agree with the 

People. The plan appears to be lacking in specifics. He may very 

well be OCD, but it seems like there’s something else going on 

here. But even beyond that, the behavior that’s alleged to be 

exhibited here multiple times with the criminal history he’s got, I 

completely understand the letters that these two alleged victims 

have submitted and why they would be fearful of him. And it’s 

not just these two People. It seems like one of them, I think, he 

was in a relationship with for less than two weeks. So if he gets 

out, there could very well be additional victims.” 

Pursuant to a negotiated agreement, appellant 

subsequently pleaded no contest to various charges and admitted 

the prior conviction allegations in exchange for a 10-year prison 

sentence. After appellant filed notices of appeal in all three cases 

and the trial court issued certificates of probable cause, the

appeals were consolidated for purposes of argument and decision.
7

DISCUSSION

Appellant contends the trial court erred in denying his 

request for mental health diversion under section 1001.36. We 

conclude otherwise. 

“Section 1001.36 authorizes courts to grant pretrial 

diversion to defendants who meet the statute’s six qualifying 

criteria or eligibility requirements. . . . If mental health diversion 

is granted and the defendant satisfactorily completes the court’s

approved mental health treatment program, then the defendant’s

criminal charges are required to be dismissed and the defendant’s

arrest on the charges ‘shall be deemed never to have occurred.’

(§ 1001.36, subd. (e).)” (People v. Gerson (2022) 74 Cal.App.5th 

561, 571-572 (Gerson).) 

“The defendant bears the burden of making a prima facie 

showing that he or she meets the minimum requirements of 

eligibility for diversion. [Citations.] The court ‘may’ (§ 1001.36, 

subd. (a)) grant pretrial diversion if a defendant meets all six 

enumerated requirements: (1) the court is satisfied that the 

defendant suffers from a mental disorder identified in the most 

recent edition of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental 

Disorders (DSM); (2) the court is satisfied the ‘defendant’s mental 

disorder was a significant factor in the commission of the charged 

offense’; (3) a qualified mental health expert opines ‘the 

defendant’s symptoms of the mental disorder motivating the 

criminal behavior would respond to mental health treatment’; (4) 

the defendant ‘consents to diversion and waives [his or her] right 

to a speedy trial’; (5) the defendant ‘agrees to comply with 

treatment as a condition of diversion’; and (6) the court is 

satisfied ‘the defendant will not pose an unreasonable risk of 

danger to public safety . . . if treated in the community.’ 

(§ 1001.36, subd. (b)(1)(A)-(F).) Even if a defendant otherwise 
8

satisfies the six eligibility requirements, the court must also be 

satisfied that the recommended mental health treatment 

program ‘will meet the specialized mental health treatment 

needs of the defendant.’ (§ 1001.36, subd. (c)(1)(A); People v. 

Frahs (2020) 9 Cal.5th 618, 627.)” (Gerson, supra, 74 Cal.App.5th 

at p. 572.)

In an appeal from an order denying a request for mental 

health diversion, “‘we must view the evidence in the light most 

favorable to the People and must presume in support of the 

judgment the existence of every fact the trier could reasonably 

deduce from the evidence.’ [Citation.]” (Gerson, supra, 74 

Cal.App.5th at p. 573.) The trial court’s decision cannot be 

rejected unless it amounts to an abuse of discretion. (Ibid.) “We 

therefore review for abuse of discretion the trial court’s decision 

whether to grant a request for mental health diversion. 

[Citation.] ‘A court abuses its discretion when it makes an 

arbitrary or capricious decision by applying the wrong legal 

standard [citations], or bases its decision on express or implied 

factual findings that are not supported by substantial evidence.’

[Citation.]” (Ibid.) Even if the court’s reasoning is erroneous, its 

ruling will be upheld if it is legally correct. (People v. Harden

(2022) 76 Cal.App.5th 262, 264-265.)

The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying 

appellant’s request for mental health diversion. Appellant failed 

to present “the opinion of a qualified mental health expert” that 

appellant’s “symptoms of the mental health disorder motivating 

the criminal behavior would respond to mental health 

treatment.” (§ 1001.36, subd. (b)(1)(C).) Such an opinion is a 

“threshold” requirement for eligibility for diversion. (People v. 

Frahs, supra, 9 Cal.5th at p. 640.) 
9

“A qualified mental health expert is someone, like a 

psychiatrist or psychologist, who is trained and experienced in 

diagnosing and treating mental health conditions.” (People v. 

Hines (2020) 58 Cal.App.5th 583, 608 [addressing qualifications 

of expert to opine a defendant is incompetent to stand trial 

pursuant to § 1368].) Here, appellant merely offered a “client 

plan” prepared in March 2018 by Ricardo Juarez, his “case 

manager” at Ventura County Behavioral Health. Although the 

plan outlines appellant’s treatment goals and objectives relating 

to his ongoing mental health treatment at that time, it does not 

include any expert opinions, much less any information

establishing Juarez’s expertise to offer such opinions. Because 

appellant did not offer the expert opinion required under 

subdivision (b)(1)(C) of section 1001.36, his request for mental 

health diversion pursuant to that statute was properly denied.

DISPOSITION

The judgment is affirmed.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.

PERREN, J.

We concur:

GILBERT, P.J. YEGAN, J.
Anthony J. Sabo, Judge

Bruce A. Young, Judge

Superior Court County of Ventura

______________________________

Nancy Wechsler, under appointment by the Court of 

Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.

Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief 

Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Senior 

Assistant Attorney General, Steven D. Matthews, Supervising 

Deputy Attorney General, and Gary A. Lieberman, Deputy 

Attorney General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.