[DO NOT PUBLISH]

In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Eleventh Circuit

____________________

No. 23-11816

Non-Argument Calendar

____________________

TIDERA HARRIS, 

Plaintiff-Appellee,

versus

THE CITY OF MONTGOMERY,

Defendant,

GREGORY HARVEY, 

In his individual capacity, 

Defendant-Appellant.

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2 Opinion of the Court 23-11816

____________________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Middle District of Alabama

D.C. Docket No. 2:21-cv-00799-WKW-SMD

____________________

Before NEWSOM, GRANT, and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:

This case arises from an ill-fated series of events that began 

with a domestic violence report and ended with Tidera Harris 

being shot by an officer of the Montgomery Police Department. 

Though Harris’s injuries are unfortunate, the record shows that the 

officer did not use constitutionally excessive force. The district 

court therefore erred when it denied qualified immunity because 

the evidence in the record established that Harris’s Fourth 

Amendment rights were not violated in this encounter. 

I. 

The events leading to this appeal began when Chimeka 

Minefield, the fiancé of Tidera Harris and mother of several of his 

children, snuck out of her own home to seek her neighbor’s 

assistance in calling the police. Minefield was scared because Harris 

was, as she said, “acting up”—throwing furniture and “acting 

crazy.” Though her neighbor warned her not to go back, Minefield 

could not stand to leave her children alone in the house with Harris, 

so she returned home. Minefield’s neighbor informed the 911 

operator that Harris had several warrants against him, that he had 

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been beating Minefield, and that she did not know if Harris had a 

weapon. The neighbor was so concerned about Minefield’s 

wellbeing that she called back two more times, concerned that the 

police were taking too long to arrive. 

As a result of these calls, Officer Gregory Harvey was 

dispatched to Minefield’s home, along with Officer Helton as 

backup. From the dispatch, Harvey knew that this was a domestic 

violence call, which raised a sense of urgency and the possibility of 

a physical altercation. Harvey was also told that there were 

warrants out against Harris. Upon arrival, Harvey could hear a 

verbal altercation inside the home, so he entered the residence 

without knocking to intervene before things escalated. 

Minefield invited Harvey further into the home, telling him 

that Harvey needed to “get him”—referring to Harris. Attempting 

to de-escalate the situation, Harvey asked Harris to step outside 

with him. But despite Harvey’s repeated commands, Harris 

refused to follow orders. Instead, Harris began rummaging 

through the dimly lit house, requiring Harvey to utilize his 

flashlight so that the officers could see Harris’s hands and actions. 

Harris continued to pat his pockets, walk around the house, and 

dig through clothing and furniture. He also kept acting as though 

he was receiving phone calls—lifting the phone to his ear and 

walking away from the officers—but they did not hear the phone 

ring, vibrate, or otherwise indicate that he was receiving any calls. 

Officer Harvey was concerned that Harris might have been looking 

for a weapon. 

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Finally, Harris stepped outside. He willingly gave Harvey his 

name and date of birth. Meanwhile, though, Harris kept glancing 

toward the Dodge Charger with dark tinted windows that was 

parked in the driveway. Harris then picked up his phone again as if 

to answer an imaginary phone call. He began walking toward the 

vehicle, and once he was around to the driver’s side, Harris abruptly 

took off in a sprint toward the driver’s door. Harvey gave chase and 

shouted “No.” Upon rounding the back of the vehicle, he saw 

Harris reaching into the car and could not see his hands. Fearing 

that Harris was reaching for a weapon and forced to make a splitsecond decision, Harvey fired three shots. One bullet struck 

Harris’s shoulder and one hit him in the back. An outside 

investigation by the State Bureau of Investigations determined that 

Harvey’s actions were a reasonable exercise of his official duties 

under the totality of the circumstances. 

Harris’s operative complaint sets out four claims for relief: 

(1) assault and battery under Alabama state law against Harvey; (2) 

§ 1983 excessive force in violation of the Fourth Amendment 

against Harvey; (3) Monell liability against the City of Montgomery 

and the Montgomery Police Department; and (4) Negligence 

and/or Wantonness under Alabama state law against Harvey. The 

defendants moved for summary judgment on all counts. As 

relevant to this appeal, Harvey argued that he was entitled to 

summary judgment because he was entitled to immunity—

qualified immunity for the Fourth Amendment claims, and state 

agent immunity for the state law claims. After argument, the 

district court granted the motion with respect to the Monell claim 

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against the City but denied summary judgment to Harvey on all 

the claims against him. This appeal followed. 

II.

This court reviews the grant of summary judgment based

on qualified immunity de novo. Powell v. Snook, 25 F.4th 912, 920 

(11th Cir. 2022). Under this standard, we construe all facts and 

draw all inferences in the light most favorable to the nonmoving 

party. Id. 

III.

To demonstrate that qualified immunity does not apply in 

this case, Harris must show that Harvey (1) violated one of his 

constitutional rights, and (2) that it was clearly established at the 

time of the conduct that Harvey’s specific actions did so. Id. 

Because “an objectively reasonable officer in the same situation 

could have believed the use of force was not excessive,” Harris

failed to show that Harvey violated a constitutional right and 

Harvey is therefore entitled to qualified immunity. Brown v. City of 

Huntsville, Alabama, 608 F.3d 724, 738 (11th Cir. 2010). 

The Fourth Amendment’s protection against unreasonable 

searches and seizures includes the right to be free from the 

excessive use of force. See Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 394 

(1989). To determine whether a use of force was “reasonable,” 

courts must engage in a “careful balancing of the nature and 

quality of the intrusion on the individual’s Fourth Amendment 

interests against the countervailing governmental interests at 

stake.” Id. at 396 (quotation omitted). This is an objective inquiry: 

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“the question is whether the officers’ actions are ‘objectively 

reasonable’ in light of the facts and circumstances confronting 

them.” Id. at 397. Critically, however, this inquiry must be judged 

from the perspective of a “reasonable officer on the scene, rather 

than with the 20/20 vision of hindsight,” and allow for 

consideration of the fact that officers must often make “splitsecond judgments—in circumstances that are tense, uncertain, and 

rapidly evolving.” Id. at 396–97. 

For better or for worse, this test is fact specific, and requires 

courts to “slosh our way through the factbound morass of 

‘reasonableness.’” Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 383 (2007). There 

are, however, several factors that can help guide the analysis. These 

include (1) “the severity of the crime at issue,” (2) “whether the 

suspect poses an immediate threat to the safety of the officers or 

others,” and (3) “whether he is actively resisting arrest or 

attempting to evade arrest by flight.” Crenshaw v. Lister, 556 F.3d 

1283, 1290 (11th Cir. 2009) (quoting Graham, 490 U.S. at 396). 

First, Harvey had been discharged to Minefield’s home on a 

domestic violence call and warned that Harris had warrants 

outstanding—these are some of the most dangerous calls for 

officers. Second, though Harris did not pose an immediate threat 

when the officers arrived at the scene, his progressive 

noncompliance and dash to the vehicle—a common place to store 

weapons—created a threatening situation in which both officers 

feared for their lives. His sudden, unprovoked movement, coupled 

with the pattern of evasive behavior, could alert an objectively 

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reasonable officer of an imminent threat to his safety and the safety 

of the others standing nearby. See Oakes v. Anderson, 494 F. App’x 

35 (11th Cir. 2012) (unpublished). Third, Harris repeatedly and 

blatantly ignored Harvey’s commands and resisted Harvey’s efforts 

to de-escalate and investigate the alleged domestic violence 

incident. 

Under these circumstances, the balance of the evidence 

shows that a reasonable officer at the scene could have found that 

shooting Harris as he reached in the car was not an excessive use 

of force. Accordingly, Officer Harvey is entitled to qualified 

immunity for his § 1983 claim. 

That means Harvey is also entitled to state agent immunity 

on Harris’s state law claims. “The Alabama Supreme Court has 

largely equated qualified immunity with state agent immunity.” 

Cantu v. City of Dothan, Alabama, 974 F.3d 1217, 1236 (11th Cir. 2020) 

(quotation omitted) (alteration adopted). Thus, for the same 

reasons that Harvey is entitled to qualified immunity on the § 1983 

claim, he is also entitled to state agent immunity on the state law 

claims. 

* * *

It is regrettable when a person is shot and hindsight shows 

that it could have been avoided. But “tragedy does not equate with 

unreasonableness.” Powell, 25 F.4th at 925 (quotation omitted). 

Because Officer Harvey’s use of force was not objectively 

unreasonable under the circumstances of this case, there was no 

Fourth Amendment violation. The district court’s decision 

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denying qualified and state agent immunity is therefore 

REVERSED. 

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