[Cite as In re G.S., 2016-Ohio-7471.]

STATE OF OHIO ) IN THE COURT OF APPEALS 

 )ss: NINTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 

COUNTY OF SUMMIT ) 

IN RE: G.S. 

 

 

 

C.A. No. 28050 

APPEAL FROM JUDGMENT 

ENTERED IN THE 

COURT OF COMMON PLEAS 

COUNTY OF SUMMIT, OHIO 

CASE No. DN 12-10-675 

DECISION AND JOURNAL ENTRY 

Dated: October 26, 2016 

 

CARR, Presiding Judge. 

{¶1} Appellant R.S. (“Mother”) appeals the judgment of the Summit County Court of 

Common Pleas, Juvenile Division, that denied Mother’s motion to modify legal custody. This 

Court affirms. 

I. 

{¶2} Mother is the mother of three children, E.H., J.H., and the subject child of this 

case, G.S. In late 2012, Summit County Children Service Board (“CSB”) removed the children 

and filed a complaint alleging that G.S. (then 10 months old) was a dependent child based on 

issues surrounding the safety and care of then-4-year old E.H., and then-3-year old J.H., as well 

as a lack of cleanliness and working utilities in the home. H.C. (“Father”) is the father of G.S., 

and he shared a home with Mother and the three children at the time of the children’s removal.1

 

 

1

 D.H. is the father of E.H. and J.H. Those children are now in the legal custody of D.H. and are 

not subjects of this appeal. 
2 

 

When Father’s parents (“Paternal Grandparents,” or, individually, “Paternal Grandfather” and 

“Paternal Grandmother”) learned of the existence of G.S. and that he had been removed from 

Mother’s and Father’s home, Paternal Grandparents relocated to Northeast Ohio to accept 

placement of G.S. during the pendency of the action. Mother’s mother and stepfather (“Maternal 

Grandparents,” or, individually, “Maternal Grandmother” and “Maternal Grandfather”) became 

involved in this matter after Paternal Grandparents had already obtained legal custody of the 

child. 

{¶3} At the adjudicatory hearing, Mother and Father waived their rights to a full 

hearing and instead agreed that G.S. be adjudicated a dependent child and placed in the 

emergency temporary custody of Paternal Grandparents. The parties further agreed that Mother 

and Father would have supervised visitation with the child as the parties may agree. At the 

subsequent dispositional hearing, Mother and Father again waived their rights to a full hearing; 

and the parties agreed that G.S. would be placed in the temporary custody of Paternal 

Grandparent subject to the protective supervision of CSB. Mother and Father were further 

granted a two-hour weekly visit with the child in Paternal Grandparents’ home. CSB developed 

case plan objectives for the parties. 

{¶4} At three subsequent review hearings, the child was maintained in the temporary 

custody of Paternal Grandparents under protective supervision. The parents’ visitation remained 

supervised. Mother and Father were each ordered to pay child support in the amount of $50.00 

per month. CSB filed a motion for legal custody to third parties, specifically Paternal 

Grandparents. 

{¶5} At the final dispositional hearing, Father waived his right to a full hearing and 

agreed that G.S. be placed in the legal custody of Paternal Grandparents. Mother did not waive 
3 

 

her rights and the matter proceeded to a full hearing. On November 26, 2013, the magistrate 

issued a decision ordering that the child be placed in the legal custody of Paternal Grandparents, 

that Mother and Father each pay child support in the amount of $50.00 per month, and that 

Mother and Father have supervised or monitored visitation as the parties may agree. In the event 

the parties could not agree regarding days, times, and places of visitation, it was to occur every 

Sunday from 2:00-4:00 p.m. in a public place. 

{¶6} Furthermore, according to the decision, the parties were aware that Paternal 

Grandparents, who were federal employees, would be transferred to another state for 

employment purposes. Therefore, the magistrate issued some contingency orders in the event of 

Paternal Grandparents’ relocation. In the event that the legal custodians intended to move out of 

Summit County, they were ordered to file a notice of intent to relocate. If the parties could not 

agree that such relocation was in the best interest of the child, Paternal Grandparents were 

directed to file a motion to modify Mother’s and Father’s visitation, with a request for a hearing. 

In the event of relocation out of state, Paternal Grandparents were ordered to make arrangements 

for Mother and Father to have monthly supervised visitation with the child. The juvenile court 

issued its judgment reiterating the above orders the same day that the magistrate issued his 

decision. Mother did not file objections to the magistrate’s decision. 

{¶7} In conjunction with the order granting legal custody, Paternal Grandparents both 

executed the statutorily required statement of understanding for legal custody which provided, 

inter alia, that they understood (1) that legal custody is intended to be permanent in nature and 

implicates a responsibility to the child until he reaches the age of majority, and (2) that Mother 

and Father retain residual parental rights, privileges, and responsibilities, including the privilege 

of reasonable visitation. 
4 

 

{¶8} On July 31, 2014, after being informed that the federal government was relocating 

them to Texas, Paternal Grandparents filed a Notice of Intent to Relocate, a motion to modify 

Mother’s and Father’s visitation, and a motion to modify Mother’s and Father’s monthly child 

support obligations to $0. Because these filings were not properly served on the other parties, 

Paternal Grandparents refiled their notice and motions on August 22, 2014. In response, Mother 

objected to the intent to relocate and moved to modify visitation. In addition, she filed a 

“complaint to determine custody,” which was properly construed as a motion to modify custody. 

Maternal Grandmother also objected to the intent to relocate, and filed her own motion for legal 

custody, or in the alternative, legal custody to Mother. Maternal Grandparents jointly filed a 

motion for visitation. Finally, Mother and Maternal Grandmother filed joint motions for the 

legal custodians to return the child to Ohio and for an order of temporary legal custody to 

Maternal Grandparents during the pendency of the matter. 

{¶9} The matter proceeded to a hearing before the magistrate. Father did not appear 

but the magistrate noted for the record that service was properly effected and that Father had 

submitted a response indicating his agreement and belief that the child’s relocation to Texas with 

Paternal Grandparents was in the child’s best interest. At the conclusion of the evidence and 

submission of the guardian ad litem’s report, the magistrate orally denied Mother’s and Maternal 

Grandmother’s joint motion for temporary legal custody, instructed all parties to buy appropriate 

equipment to facilitate “internet” communication and visitation, ordered that Mother and 

Maternal Grandmother be allowed to visit with the child before Paternal Grandparents returned 

with him to Texas, and directed the parties to submit their closing arguments in writing. 

{¶10} After closing arguments were briefed by the parties, the magistrate issued a 

decision ordering, in part, the following: (1) Mother’s and Maternal Grandmother’s objections to 
5 

 

Paternal Grandparents’ notice of intent to relocate were overruled; (2) Mother’s and Maternal 

Grandmother’s motions for legal custody were denied; (3) G.S. was to remain in the legal 

custody of Paternal Grandparents; (4) Mother and Maternal Grandparents may travel to Texas 

and their own expense to visit with the child up to 5 times each year for up to 7 days at a time; 

(5) Mother’s visitation was to be supervised by her sister, Maternal Grandmother, or another 

adult acceptable to Paternal Grandparents; (6) Father may visit with G.S. as the parties agree; (7) 

Mother, Father, and Maternal Grandparents may visit with the child at least once each week by 

telephone or audio-visual means via the internet; and (8) Mother’s and Father’s child support 

obligations were reduced to $0 per month to facilitate visitation travel. The juvenile court issued 

a judgment reiterating these orders the same day. 

{¶11} Mother and Maternal Grandparents filed objections to the magistrate’s decision, 

and Paternal Grandparents filed a brief in opposition to Mother’s objections. The juvenile court 

overruled all the objections, ordered that G.S. would remain in the legal custody of Paternal 

Grandparents, and adhered to its remaining prior orders. Mother appealed and raises five 

assignments of error for review. This Court consolidates and rearranges some assignments of 

error to facilitate review. 

II. 

ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR I

THE COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION BY DENYING THE MOTHER’S 

PARENTAL RIGHTS BY FINDING THAT MOTHER’S CHILD SHOULD 

REMAIN IN THE CUSTODY OF THE CHILD’S PATERNAL 

GRANDPARENTS, AS THE DECISION DENIED [MOTHER’S] 

SUBSTANTIVE RIGHT OF DUE PROCESS, WHICH IS A BEDROCK RIGHT 

GROUNDED IN CUSTODY LAW. 
6 

 

{¶12} Mother argues that the trial court erred by violating her substantive right of due 

process when it retained the child in the legal custody of Paternal Grandparents. This Court 

disagrees. 

{¶13} Constitutional substantive due process “‘provides heightened protection against 

government interference with certain fundamental rights and liberty interests.’” Troxel v. 

Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65 (2000), quoting Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720 (1997). 

It is well established that a parent’s interest in the care, custody, and control of his or her child 

“is perhaps the oldest of the fundamental liberty interests recognized * * *.” Troxel, 530 U.S. at 

65. The interest is not absolute, however, and may properly be limited under certain 

circumstances. See In re Hockstok, 98 Ohio St.3d 238, 2002-Ohio-7208, ¶ 17. 

{¶14} Mother relies on Hockstok at ¶ 16 for the proposition that “the overriding 

principle in custody cases between a parent and nonparent is that natural parents have a 

fundamental liberty interest in the care, custody, and management of their children.” She argues 

that her rights are, therefore, paramount and that the juvenile court erred by not deferring to her 

rights as the child’s biological mother. Mother’s reliance on Hockstok is misplaced in this case, 

however. 

{¶15} The Supreme Court of Ohio distinguished the two types of child custody disputes 

as those arising, depending upon the circumstances, under either R.C. 3109.04 (addressing 

shared parenting and allocation of parental rights and responsibilities) or R.C. 2151.23 

(addressing, inter alia, custody of children adjudicated dependent, neglected, or abused). Id. at ¶ 

13. The circumstances in Hockstok arose out of a parentage action during which the maternal 

grandparents were granted temporary custody of the child for six months to allow the mother 

time to establish a stable environment for the child. The mother agreed to this temporary 
7 

 

disposition, as well as an additional six-month extension. When the mother subsequently moved 

to regain custody, the maternal grandparents filed a cross-motion for legal custody. The 

domestic relations court solely considered the best interests of the child and awarded legal 

custody to the maternal grandparents. The Hockstok court remanded the matter to the domestic 

relations court to render a parental unsuitability determination prior to initially depriving the 

mother of her fundamental parental rights and awarding legal custody to a nonparent. Id. at ¶ 40. 

{¶16} The circumstances of the instant case are distinguishable. Here, the issue of the 

child’s custody arose out of a dependency action, governed by R.C. 2151.23. “A juvenile court 

adjudication of abuse, neglect, or dependency is a determination about the care and condition of 

a child and implicitly involves a determination of the unsuitability of the child’s custodial and/or 

noncustodial parents.” In re C.R., 108 Ohio St.3d 369, 2006-Ohio-1191, paragraph two of the 

syllabus. While a court may not award custody to a nonparent in the absence of a determination 

of parental unsuitability, where the parent has been adjudged unsuitable, “the state may infringe 

upon the fundamental parental liberty interest of child custody.” Hockstok at ¶ 17. Moreover, 

A parent should be given only one unsuitability determination, which should 

come at the time of the legal custody hearing. After such a determination has 

established, or taken away, a parent’s fundamental custodial rights, the focus must 

shift from the rights of the parents to the rights of the child. A child’s rights are 

effectuated through the use of the best-interest-of-the-child standard for 

subsequent custodial modifications requests. 

(Emphasis added.) Id. at ¶ 38. 

{¶17} Although a parent has been adjudged unsuitable, such a determination “does not, 

however, permanently foreclose the right of either parent to regain custody, because it is not a 

termination of all residual parental rights, privileges, and responsibilities[.]” In re C.R. at ¶ 23. 

A parent may move to modify custody pursuant to the law set forth in R.C. 2151.42. Id. Even 
8 

 

so, reunification between parent and child is not an eventual foregone conclusion. See In re J.S., 

9th Dist. Wayne No. 07CA0035, 2007-Ohio-6402, ¶ 17. 

{¶18} As Mother was earlier determined to be unsuitable based on the child’s 

adjudication of dependency (in this case, by agreement of the parties), her fundamental parental 

rights were limited, albeit not terminated. The subsequent requests to modify custody were filed 

and disposed in accordance with law, specifically pursuant to R.C. 2151.42(B). Therefore, the 

matter was resolved “pursuant to procedures that [were] fundamentally fair” as Mother argued 

they must be. Accordingly, the juvenile court did not violate Mother’s substantive due process 

rights when it retained the child in the legal custody of Paternal Grandparents. Mother’s first 

assignment of error is overruled. 

ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR II

THE COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION BY RELYING ON AN 

OUTDATED PSYCHOLOGICAL EVALUATION, REFERRED TO BY THE 

GUARDIAN AD LITEM, WHEREAS A NEW REPORT HAD BEEN MADE 

BY A QUALIFIED PSYCHOLOGIST WHO TESTIFIED, WHICH STATED 

THERE WAS NO REASON WHY [MOTHER] COULD NOT PARENT – AND 

FURTHER ABUSED ITS DISCRETION BY NOT CONSIDERING THE NEW 

REPORT OVER THE OUTDATED REPORT. THE NEW REPORT WAS THE 

ONLY ONE THAT SHOULD HAVE BEEN CONSIDERED AS A VALID 

REPORT, AND THE DOCTOR TESTIFIED AS TO BOTH REPORTS AND 

STATED THAT THE OLD REPORT WAS OUTDATED, BASED ON TIME, 

AND SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN CONSIDERED. 

ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR III

THE COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION BY RELYING ON AN IMPROPER 

EVALUATION MADE BY THE GUARDIAN AD LITEM. THE GUARDIAN 

AD LITEM DID NOT VISIT [MOTHER’S] DWELLING, AND DID NOT 

ADDRESS THE ALTERNATIVE OF UTILIZING THE RESIDENCE OF 

[MATERNAL GRANDMOTHER] IN OHIO, AND DID NOT VISIT THE 

RESIDENCE OF [ ] PATERNAL GRANDPARENTS IN TEXAS. AS A 

RESULT, THE GUARDIAN AD LITEM PRODUCED AN INCOMPLETE 

EVALUATION OF THE JUVENILE COURT TO CONSIDER. 
9 

 

ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR V

THE COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION NOT FULLY CONSIDERING THE 

FACTORS AND EVIDENCE THAT ARE IN THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE 

CHILD, AND THE BEST INTEREST OF THE CHILD STANDARD HAS NOT 

BEEN MET. WAS IT IN THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD TO MAKE 

IT DIFFICULT FOR THE CHILD TO KNOW HIS NATURAL MOTHER? 

[SIC] 

{¶19} Mother argues in these three assignments of error that the juvenile court abused 

its discretion by denying her motion for legal custody and that, moreover, the decision to retain 

G.S. in the legal custody of Paternal Grandparents was against the manifest weight of the 

evidence. This Court disagrees. 

{¶20} “The decision to grant or deny a motion for legal custody is within the juvenile 

court’s sound discretion.” In re K.A., 9th Dist. Lorain No. 02CA008162, 2003-Ohio-2635, ¶ 8. 

An abuse of discretion is more than an error of judgment; it means that the trial court was 

unreasonable, arbitrary, or unconscionable in its ruling. Blakemore v. Blakemore, 5 Ohio St.3d 

217, 219 (1983). When applying the abuse of discretion standard, this Court may not substitute 

its judgment for that of the trial court. Pons v. Ohio State Med. Bd., 66 Ohio St.3d 619, 621 

(1993). 

{¶21} “When evaluating whether a judgment is against the manifest weight of the 

evidence in a juvenile court, the standard of review is the same as that in the criminal context.” 

In re K.A. at ¶ 5. Accordingly, 

an appellate court must review the entire record, weigh the evidence and all 

reasonable inferences, consider the credibility of witnesses and determine whether, 

in resolving conflicts in the evidence, the trier of fact clearly lost its way and 

created such a manifest miscarriage of justice that the conviction must be reversed 

and a new trial ordered. 

State v. Otten, 33 Ohio App.3d 339, 340 (9th Dist.1986). 
10 

 

{¶22} To the extent that Mother argues that the juvenile court erred by relying on an 

outdated psychological evaluation and an incomplete evaluation by the guardian ad litem, the 

record belies these contentions. First, the references by the guardian ad litem to Mother’s initial 

psychological evaluation relevant to the initial award of legal custody to Paternal Grandparents 

merely set the historical context for Mother’s current status. Second, while the guardian ad litem 

did not visit either Mother’s or Paternal Grandparents’ current homes, she did an online review 

of the homes to determine their adequacy. While it was impractical for the guardian to travel to 

Corpus Christi, Texas, to personally observe Paternal Grandparents’ home, she was nevertheless 

able to determine from a Google Earth and online search that it was large enough to 

accommodate the child’s needs, and that there was nothing to indicate that the home was not 

appropriate. The guardian was not able to personally visit Mother’s home, because Mother did 

not return the guardian’s calls in a timely manner prior to the hearing. The guardian was able to 

determine from an online search, however, that Mother was living in an efficiency apartment that 

would not be large enough to accommodate the child. Nevertheless, she believed that Mother 

had the financial resources to move to a larger, more appropriate home if she had to do so. 

Accordingly, based on a review of the record and the juvenile court’s judgment, Mother’s 

arguments that the guardian performed an incomplete evaluation and that the trial court relied on 

outdated or incomplete information in ruling on Mother’s objections is not well taken. Under the 

particular circumstances here, where Mother did not facilitate a physical visit to her home, the 

trial court did not abuse its discretion in considering the guardian’s assessment of Mother’s home 

based on a mere online search. 
11 

 

{¶23} Modification or termination of an award of legal custody issued pursuant to R.C. 

2151.353(A)(3), as was the case here, is governed by R.C. 2151.42(B), which states, in relevant 

part: 

An order of disposition issued under [R.C. 2151.353(A)(3)] granting legal 

custody of a child to a person is intended to be permanent in nature. A court shall 

not modify or terminate an order granting legal custody of a child unless it finds, 

based on facts that have arisen since the order was issued or that were unknown to 

the court at that time, that a change has occurred in the circumstances of the child 

or the person who was granted legal custody, and that modification or termination 

of the order is necessary to serve the best interest of the child. 

{¶24} The juvenile court concluded that there had been the requisite change in 

circumstances of the child and/or Paternal Grandparents, and no party has appealed from this 

determination. Accordingly, the only issue for review is whether the juvenile court’s finding that 

retaining G.S. in the legal custody of Paternal Grandparents and denying Mother’s motion to 

modify custody was in the best interest of the child. 

{¶25} The child had been in the temporary or legal custody of Paternal Grandparents for 

over 24 months at the time of the modification hearing, at which time he was almost three years 

old. By all accounts, the child was thriving. Although there was tension between Paternal 

Grandparents and Mother and the maternal relatives, Mother had regular visitation with the child 

one weekend each month for a total of eight hours over the course of Saturday and Sunday. 

Paternal Grandparents testified that Mother agreed to those terms, and there is nothing in the 

record to indicate that Mother filed a contempt motion alleging she was being deprived of 

visitation or that Mother ever moved to increase visitation or remove the requirement that it be 

supervised or monitored. 

{¶26} The record indicates that all parties understood that Paternal Grandparents would 

have to relocate outside of Ohio based on their employment obligations. Given the option of 
12 

 

relocating to either Arizona or Texas, they chose Texas because it was closer to Ohio where 

Mother, Father, and others of the child’s relatives lived. After relocating to Texas for Paternal 

Grandfather’s employment, Paternal Grandmother was able to become a “virtual” employee, 

allowing the child to stay at home with her instead of spending his days in daycare. 

{¶27} Approximately a month before the hearing, Mother met with a clinical counselor 

who interviewed her for a couple hours and administered the MMPI to perform a mental status 

evaluation. The counselor declined to utilize the current assessment mechanism required by the 

DSM5, and instead rendered an assessment based on Axes which are no longer used for a mental 

status evaluation. Based on his evaluation, he opined that Mother presented as well adjusted, 

with no signs of depression, anxiety, or maladaptive behaviors; although he believed Mother 

may have underreported. 

{¶28} Mother’s current counselor, with whom she had counseled for 10 months prior to 

the hearing, declined to testify. The counselor granted the guardian ad litem access to her 

clinical notes and submitted a letter, however. The clinical notes indicated that Mother selfreported depression and insomnia during her intake assessment and still continued to suffer from 

depression and difficulty sleeping. Mother’s counselor refused to include her current diagnosis 

in her letter because she thought it might affect the case and outcome for Mother. 

{¶29} The guardian ad litem recommended that G.S. remain in the legal custody of 

Paternal Grandparents because he had been in their home for 24 months and all of his needs were 

being met. In fact, she reported that Paternal Grandparents were providing “excellent care” for 

the child, while Mother was still dealing with many of the same issues underlying her prior case 

plan objectives. While acknowledging the difficult nature of the situation in which the child 

would live 1600 miles away from Mother, the guardian opined that it would not be in the child’s 
13 

 

best interest to remove him from Paternal Grandparents’ home. She further acknowledged that 

visitation would be a difficult issue, but she presented various options to facilitate Mother’s right 

to visit with the child. In addition, the guardian supported Paternal Grandparents’ motion to 

reduce Mother’s child support obligation to $0 to mitigate travel expenses. Finally, the guardian 

ad litem testified that, all things being equal, had Maternal Grandmother originally been granted 

legal custody, she would have recommended that the child remain in that home, demonstrating 

her opinion that stability and consistency for the child was in his best interest. While she found 

Maternal Grandparents’ home suitable, she could not recommend that the child be placed in their 

legal custody due to the lack of a well-established bond. The guardian could not recommend 

Mother as the legal custodian under the circumstances. 

{¶30} Based on a review of the record, this Court cannot conclude that the trial court’s 

retention of the child in the legal custody of Paternal Grandparents was against the manifest 

weight of the evidence. Accordingly, we cannot conclude that the juvenile court abused its 

discretion when it denied Mother’s motion for legal custody. Mother’s second, third, and fifth 

assignments of error are overruled. 

ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR IV

THE COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION NOT CONSIDERING THE 

HARDSHIPS IMPOSED UPON [MOTHER] WITH REGARD TO VISITATION, 

AND THE DISTANCE INVOLVED IN ACHIEVING VISITATION IN TEXAS 

AND FURTHER ABUSED ITS DISCRETION BY NOT CONSIDERING THE 

BEHAVIOR OF [ ] PATERNAL GRANDPARENTS WITH REGARD TO 

ALIENATING THE CHILD FROM [MOTHER], AS THEY DID NOT TIMELY 

REVEAL THEIR LOCATION IN TEXAS AND PRIOR TO GOING TO TEXAS 

CAUSED HARDSHIP AS TO VISITATION. 

{¶31} Mother argues that the juvenile court abused its discretion in issuing the particular 

visitation order in this case, particularly in light of the Paternal Grandparents’ past behavior 

regarding visitation. This Court disagrees. 
14 

 

{¶32} This Court reviews a juvenile court’s decision regarding the modification of 

parental visitation for an abuse of discretion. In re Hinkle Children, 12th Dist. Butler No. 

CA2002-12-309, 2003-Ohio-5282, ¶ 9, citing Braatz v. Braatz, 85 Ohio St.3d 40 (1999), 

paragraph one of the syllabus; see also In re DeCara, 11th Dist. Portage No. 2001-P-0088, 2002-

Ohio-6584, ¶ 7, citing Miller v. Miller, 37 Ohio St.3d 71, 74 (1988). 

{¶33} Mother argues that the juvenile court abused its discretion by not considering 

Paternal Grandparents’ past behavior when it issued the current visitation order. In addition, 

Mother argues that the juvenile court abused its discretion by failing to place the child in the 

temporary custody of Maternal Grandmother to facilitate Mother’s visitation. To the extent that 

Mother again challenges the court’s retention of child in Paternal Grandparents’ legal custody, 

this Court has resolved that issue above. 

{¶34} As to Paternal Grandparents’ past behavior, this Court shares the guardian ad 

litem’s concerns regarding Paternal Grandfather’s rigidity regarding certain aspects of the prior 

visitation order and lack of compliance with other aspects. For example, Paternal Grandfather 

refused to allow any maternal relatives to accompany Mother during visits with the child because 

the order did not expressly grant them visitation. Moreover, Paternal Grandfather terminated one 

of Mother’s visits because she did not ask his permission to take photographs of the child, 

despite there being no order proscribing such conduct. Nevertheless, Mother’s remedy was to 

file a motion for contempt if she believed that the legal custodians were not complying with the 

court’s orders. However, she neither moved for contempt nor for modification of visitation to 

address her concerns. In any event, the trial court could, and in this case did, consider Paternal 

Grandfather’s behavior in regard to the issue of visitation. 
15 

 

{¶35} The juvenile court ordered supervised visitation for Mother, as well as visitation 

for Maternal Grandparents. Mother is entitled to visit in person with the child for a minimum of 

35 days each year, a substantial increase from her previous allowed visitation of eight hours each 

month. In addition, Paternal Grandparents must allow Mother and Maternal Grandparents to 

have telephone or audio-visual internet contact (e.g. Skype or FaceTime) with the child at least 

once per week. Finally, whenever Paternal Grandparents travel with the child within 500 miles 

of Akron, Ohio, they must inform Mother and Maternal Grandparents and allow them visitation 

with the child. Mother’s child support obligation was reduced to $0 to help offset the costs of 

travel to visit with the child. The juvenile court greatly expanded Mother’s opportunities to visit 

with the child under the current order. Moreover, Paternal Grandparents and the guardian ad 

litem recognized that Mother’s visitation could be expanded as the child ages. 

{¶36} The juvenile court addressed the concern that Paternal Grandparents at times had 

made Mother’s visitation with the child more complicated and cumbersome than appropriate by 

issuing specific orders and imposing obligations on Paternal Grandparents in order to provide 

safeguards and ensure Mother’s ability to have regular contact with the child. All parties and the 

trial court recognized the hardships associated with facilitating visitation with a child so far 

away. Nevertheless, the juvenile court attempted to ameliorate the visitation hardships by 

reducing Mother’s child support obligation to $0 to help offset her travel costs, by providing for 

much greater telephone and audio-visual communications with the child, and by facilitating 

greater visitation options for Mother’s family. In addition, the juvenile court directed any party 

that wished to enforce any order to file a motion, requesting a hearing. 

{¶37} Given the safeguards implemented by the juvenile court, coupled with the 

expansion of Mother’s opportunity to visit with the child, this Court cannot say that the juvenile 
16 

 

court abused its discretion with regard to visitation. Mother’s fourth assignment of error is 

overruled. 

III. 

{¶38} Mother’s assignments of error are overruled. The judgment of the Summit 

County Court of Common Pleas, Juvenile Division, is affirmed. 

Judgment affirmed. 

 

 There were reasonable grounds for this appeal. 

 We order that a special mandate issue out of this Court, directing the Court of Common 

Pleas, County of Summit, State of Ohio, to carry this judgment into execution. A certified copy 

of this journal entry shall constitute the mandate, pursuant to App.R. 27. 

 Immediately upon the filing hereof, this document shall constitute the journal entry of 

judgment, and it shall be file stamped by the Clerk of the Court of Appeals at which time the 

period for review shall begin to run. App.R. 22(C). The Clerk of the Court of Appeals is 

instructed to mail a notice of entry of this judgment to the parties and to make a notation of the 

mailing in the docket, pursuant to App.R. 30. 

 Costs taxed to Appellant. 

 

 DONNA J. CARR 

 FOR THE COURT 
17 

 

MOORE, J. 

HENSAL, J. 

CONCUR. 

APPEARANCES: 

MARY JO HANSON, Attorney at Law, for Appellant. 

ALEXANDRA HULL, Attorney at Law, for Appellee. 

KANI H. HIGHTOWER, Attorney at Law, for Appellee. 

LEE ANN SCHAFFER, Guardian ad Litem.