J-S72014-14 

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37 

JILL MCINTYRE, IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA 

 Appellee 

v. 

TONY RAY MCINTYRE, 

 Appellant No. 517 WDA 2014 

Appeal from the Order Entered March 21, 2014 

In the Court of Common Pleas of Erie County 

Civil Division at No(s): 17033-14 

BEFORE: BENDER, P.J.E., SHOGAN, J., and STRASSBURGER, J.* 

MEMORANDUM BY BENDER, P.J.E.: FILED JANUARY 05, 2015 

 Appellant, Tony Ray McIntyre, appeals from a final protection from 

abuse (PFA) order entered against him on March 21, 2014, for a period of 

two years. We affirm. 

 On March 14, 2014, Appellee, Jill McIntyre, filed a PFA petition alleging 

that Appellant was exhibiting behaviors that placed Appellee in danger of 

serious bodily injury. That same day, the court conducted an ex parte

hearing and issued a temporary PFA order against Appellant. 

 On March 21, 2014, a final PFA hearing was conducted. The court 

thoroughly detailed the evidence presented at that hearing as follows: 

____________________________________________ 

*

 Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court. 
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Appellee and Appellant have been married and living together for 

approximately five and a half years. Appellant is currently 

employed as a police officer for the City of Corry Police 

Department. However, Appellant is not actively working as he 

is receiving workers compensation due to injuries he sustained 

while on duty on August 23, 2013, when Appellant suffered two 

seizures and multiple facial fractures, which resulted in double 

vision, and Appellant was diagnosed with a traumatic brain 

injury. Appellant is currently being treated by five (5) 

physicians, including the VA hospital, for his injuries and 

condition. 

On February 25, 2014, Appellee was out of the residence 

taking Appellant's mother to an appointment when Appellee 

decided to return to the residence with Appellant's mother to 

retrieve something from her computer. Prior to arriving, 

Appellee inquired from Appellant for permission to do so via text 

message to his phone. Appellant confirmed this was okay. While 

at the residence, Appellee had difficulty with their printer, so she 

again texted Appellant requesting he come downstairs from the 

bedroom, where he was napping, to fix the printer. Appellant 

came "stomping down the stairs, banging things, banging the 

printer, banging the computer, acting angry." Appellant 

admitted he was annoyed by [Appellee] about being asked to fix 

the printer at that time. 

After the printer was fixed, Appellant returned to the 

bedroom upstairs, and Appellee proceeded to take Appellant's 

mother to her home and then returned to the residence. 

Appellee related Appellant seemed calm when she entered, 

which scared her, but soon thereafter, the verbal altercations 

again began between the two of them due to Appellee[’s] 

bringing the Appellant's mother into the house, despite her 

asking for his permission prior to doing so. During this 

altercation, Appellee noticed Appellant had torn her "posters, 

and pictures and articles" off of the wall where she had hung 

them. In the past, Appellant has displayed physical signs of 

anger and violence when he kicked the doors in the residence, 

kicked Appellee's door to her vehicle and thrown a cell phone 

and his CPAP machine at the Appellee, breaking these items. 

Eventually this altercation ceased when Appellant returned 

upstairs to the bedroom to sleep, stating he was not feeling well. 

Appellee then contacted a mutual friend of Appellee[’s] and 

Appellant[’s], who is a Cambridge Springs Police Officer, Kyle 
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Allen Grill, (hereinafter "Grill"), due to Appellee[’s] being scared 

about the current situation[,] explaining Appellant had become 

aggressive and angry. Grill has known Appellant for seven years 

through military service and met Appellee a few years after that 

time at a military function. Based on the information received 

from Appellee, Grill advised Appellee that if she did not feel safe 

to leave the residence and telephone the police. In the 

meantime, Grill was on his way to their residence to assist. Upon 

arrival, Grill immediately proceed[ed] upstairs to the bedroom 

where Appellant was located. Grill, perceiving Appellant to be 

asleep, returned downstairs to obtain more information from [] 

Appellee about the situation. Upon hearing more of the story, 

Grill returned to the bedroom and woke Appellant up by 

knocking on the door frame and calling his name. Grill then 

asked Appellant as to what was going on, and Appellant replied 

he was not feeling well and did not currently want to talk about 

the situation. Grill then returned downstairs and observed the 

crumpled articles that Appellee had re-taped onto the wall. 

Appellee called the Pennsylvania State Police reporting she 

was scared and was requesting to have Appellant removed from 

the residence. Upon inquiry by the Pennsylvania State Police, 

Appellee confirmed Appellant kept a loaded gun in the residence. 

The Pennsylvania State Police then requested Appellee remove 

Appellant's loaded gun from the residence, if possible. 

Appellant[’s] possessing a gun in the residence had been a tense 

topic between the parties for some time as Appellee explained 

she is uncomfortable and fearful for her life [because] of such 

weapons. Appellee proceeded upstairs to the bedroom, where 

Appellant was sleeping, and she retrieved two bags from the 

closet. One bag contained the gun and the other bag contained 

knives. Appellant woke up and asked Appellee what she was 

doing. Appellee told him that she was “just grabbing 

something...” and took the bags downstairs and left in her car. 

Grill observed this incident as he had followed Appellee 

upstairs and remained in the hallway. Grill observed Appellant 

get up after Appellee took the bags and go into [] the bathroom. 

Eventually, Appellee transferred the gun to Grill. 

Appellee returned to the residence that evening and slept 

in the same bed as [] Appellant, but she moved out the next day 

on February 26, 2014. Following this time, Appellee received 

several “threatening” text messages from [] Appellant. One 

message, that was admitted into evidence as Appellee's Exhibit 
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1, contained Appellant's apology for his verbal abuse upon [] 

Appellee. Another text from [] Appellant mentioned that there 

had been an opossum on the deck, but that he had "taken care 

of it," directly followed by a request to talk. Appellant perceived 

this text message as threatening and feared for her life as she 

assumed Appellant had utilized his gun to kill the opossum, 

knowing that [Appellee] was fearful of guns. 

Trial Court Opinion (TCO), 5/22/14, at 1 – 5 (citations to the record 

omitted). 

Based on this evidence, the trial court granted Appellee’s petition for a 

final PFA order. Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal, as well as a timely 

Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) concise statement of errors complained of on appeal. He 

now presents the following issue for our review: 

I. Whether the trial court erred in finding that the evidence 

was sufficient to establish that abuse occurred as defined 

in the Protection From Abuse Act and support[ed] an order 

of Protection from Abuse against [Appellant]? 

Appellant’s brief at 6. 

Before addressing Appellant’s claim, we note that “[o]ur standard of 

review for PFA orders is well settled. ‘In the context of a PFA order, we 

review the trial court's legal conclusions for an error of law or abuse of 

discretion.’” Stamus v. Dutcavich, 938 A.2d 1098, 1100 (Pa. Super. 2007) 

(quoting Drew v. Drew, 870 A.2d 377, 378 (Pa. Super. 2005) (citation 

omitted)). 

Here, Appellant claims that the evidence was insufficient to support a 

PFA order. We review such claims under the following standard: 

“When a claim is presented on appeal that the evidence 

was not sufficient to support an order of protection from 
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abuse, we review the evidence in the light most favorable 

to the petitioner and granting her the benefit of all 

reasonable inference, determine whether the evidence was 

sufficient to sustain the trial court's conclusion by a 

preponderance of the evidence.” ... This court defers to the 

credibility determinations of the trial court as to witnesses 

who appeared before it. 

Fonner v. Fonner, 731 A.2d 160, 161 (Pa. Super. 1999) 

(quoting Miller on Behalf of Walker v. Walker, 445 Pa.Super. 

537, 665 A.2d 1252, 1255 (1995)). We also note that the 

preponderance of evidence standard is defined as the greater 

weight of the evidence, i.e., to tip a scale slightly is the criteria 

or requirement for preponderance of the evidence. 

Commonwealth v. Brown, 567 Pa. 272, 786 A.2d 961, 968 

(2001), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 1187, 123 S.Ct. 1351, 154 

L.Ed.2d 1018 (2003). 

Raker v. Raker, 847 A.2d 720, 724 (Pa. Super. 2004). 

In particular, Appellant maintains that the evidence presented at the 

final PFA hearing was insufficient to prove that he committed “abuse,” as 

that term is defined in section 6102 of the Protection From Abuse Act 

(PFAA), 23 Pa.C.S. §§ 6101-6122. That section reads: 

“Abuse.” The occurrence of one or more of the following acts

between family or household members, sexual or intimate 

partners or persons who share biological parenthood. 

(1) Attempting to cause or intentionally, knowingly or 

recklessly causing bodily injury, serious bodily injury, rape, 

involuntary deviate sexual intercourse, sexual assault, 

statutory sexual assault, aggravated indecent assault, 

indecent assault or incest with or without a deadly

weapon. 

(2) Placing another in reasonable fear of imminent serious 

bodily injury. 

(3) The infliction of false imprisonment pursuant to 18 

Pa.C.S. § 2903 (relating to false imprisonment). 
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(4) Physically or sexually abusing minor children, including 

such terms as defined in Chapter 63 (relating to child 

protective services). 

(5) Knowingly engaging in a course of conduct or 

repeatedly committing acts toward another person, 

including following the person, without proper authority, 

under circumstances which place the person in reasonable 

fear of bodily injury. The definition of this paragraph 

applies only to proceedings commenced under this title 

and is inapplicable to any criminal prosecution commenced 

under Title 18 (relating to crimes and offenses). 

23 Pa.C.S. § 6102(a). 

 Here, Appellee testified that Appellant behaved in an angry manner 

when she entered their home with his permission. Appellant then destroyed 

her personal belongings. This particularly concerned Appellee because, in 

the past, Appellant has broken her personal belongings by striking her with 

them. Appellee also testified that firearms make her fearful for her life, a 

fact which was known to Appellant, and prior to their marriage he agreed not 

to keep firearms in their home. Appellant nonetheless brought a firearm into 

the home, which he kept loaded with ammunition. When Appellee 

attempted to safely remove the weapon from the home and turn it over to a 

state trooper, she discovered a previously unknown bag of knives stored 

with the firearm. The next day, Appellant sent Appellee a series of text 

messages conceding he had verbally abused Appellee. In these texts, he 

also informed Appellee that he had “taken care of” an opossum at their 

home, which she believed meant he had killed an opossum using a firearm. 

In the next sentence of that text message, Appellant stated that he wanted 

to talk to Appellee. 
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In sum, Appellee’s testimony, which was credited by the trial court, 

provided sufficient evidence for the trial court to conclude, by a 

preponderance of the evidence, that Appellee reasonably feared that 

Appellant’s behavior placed her in danger of imminent serious bodily injury. 

Therefore, Appellant’s challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence to support 

the entry of a final PFA order is meritless. 

 Order affirmed. 

 Judge Shogan joins this memorandum. 

Judge Strassburger files a concurring memorandum. 

Judgment Entered. 

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq. 

Prothonotary 

Date: 1/5/2015