# C_2016366EN.01000601.xml

| 5.10.2016 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 366/6 |
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5.10.2016

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 366/6

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Summary of Commission Decision

of 25 May 2016

relating to a proceeding under Article 101 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union and Article 53 of the EEA Agreement

(Case AT.39792 — Steel Abrasives)

(notified under document C(2016) 3121)

(Only the English text is authentic)

(2016/C 366/06)

On 25 May 2016, the Commission adopted a decision relating to a proceeding under Article 101 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union and Article 53 of the EEA Agreement. In accordance with the provisions of Article 30 of Council Regulation (EC) No 1/2003
   (1)
  , the Commission herewith publishes the name of the party and the main content of the decision, including any penalties imposed, having regard to the legitimate interest of undertakings in the protection of their business secrets.

On 25 May 2016, the Commission adopted a decision relating to a proceeding under Article 101 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union and Article 53 of the EEA Agreement. In accordance with the provisions of Article 30 of Council Regulation (EC) No 1/2003

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, the Commission herewith publishes the name of the party and the main content of the decision, including any penalties imposed, having regard to the legitimate interest of undertakings in the protection of their business secrets.

1.   INTRODUCTION

INTRODUCTION

| (1) | The Decision concerns the participation of the undertaking Pometon SpA (‘Pometon’) in a single and continuous infringement of Article 101 of the Treaty and Article 53 of the EEA Agreement in the sector of steel abrasives. The infringement for Pometon lasted from 3 October 2003 to 16 May 2007 and consisted of an agreement and/or concerted practice to coordinate the pricing of steel abrasives. |
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(1)

The Decision concerns the participation of the undertaking Pometon SpA (‘Pometon’) in a single and continuous infringement of Article 101 of the Treaty and Article 53 of the EEA Agreement in the sector of steel abrasives. The infringement for Pometon lasted from 3 October 2003 to 16 May 2007 and consisted of an agreement and/or concerted practice to coordinate the pricing of steel abrasives.

| (2) | Steel abrasives are loose steel particles, either in round (steel shot) or angular (steel grit) form, with their main applications in the steel, automotive, metallurgy, petrochemical and stone cutting industries. They are produced by the atomisation of molten steel from steel scrap, followed by a series of thermal and mechanical treatments in order to give them final characteristics. The anti-competitive conduct identified in this case covers both steel shot and steel grit in all their grades. |
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(2)

Steel abrasives are loose steel particles, either in round (steel shot) or angular (steel grit) form, with their main applications in the steel, automotive, metallurgy, petrochemical and stone cutting industries. They are produced by the atomisation of molten steel from steel scrap, followed by a series of thermal and mechanical treatments in order to give them final characteristics. The anti-competitive conduct identified in this case covers both steel shot and steel grit in all their grades.

| (3) | In this case two decisions have been adopted: on the one hand a decision for the four undertakings that submitted a formal request to settle (2) and were addressees of the Commission Decision of 2 April 2014 (the ‘Settlement Decision’) (3) that is to say (i) Ervin (ii) Winoa; (iii) Metalltechnik Schmidt; and (iv) Eisenwerk Würth, and, on the other hand, a decision for Pometon, which did not submit a request to settle. This summary relates to the decision addressed to Pometon. |
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(3)

In this case two decisions have been adopted: on the one hand a decision for the four undertakings that submitted a formal request to settle (2) and were addressees of the Commission Decision of 2 April 2014 (the ‘Settlement Decision’) (3) that is to say (i) Ervin (ii) Winoa; (iii) Metalltechnik Schmidt; and (iv) Eisenwerk Würth, and, on the other hand, a decision for Pometon, which did not submit a request to settle. This summary relates to the decision addressed to Pometon.

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2.   CASE DESCRIPTION

CASE DESCRIPTION

2.1.   Procedure

Procedure

| (4) | The case was opened on the basis of an immunity application by Ervin. The Commission carried out unannounced inspections between 15 and 17 June 2010 at the premises of various producers of steel abrasives. |
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(4)

The case was opened on the basis of an immunity application by Ervin. The Commission carried out unannounced inspections between 15 and 17 June 2010 at the premises of various producers of steel abrasives.

| (5) | During the investigation, the Commission also sent several requests for information under Article 18 of Regulation (EC) No 1/2003. |
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(5)

During the investigation, the Commission also sent several requests for information under Article 18 of Regulation (EC) No 1/2003.

| (6) | On 16 January 2013, the Commission initiated proceedings pursuant to Article 11(6) of Regulation (EC) No 1/2003 against the addressee of the Decision and other four undertakings with a view to engaging in settlement discussions with them. Settlement meetings took place between February 2013 and December 2013. At the end of the negotiations Pometon decided not to submit a request to settle and therefore the Commission reverted to the standard cartel procedure. |
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(6)

On 16 January 2013, the Commission initiated proceedings pursuant to Article 11(6) of Regulation (EC) No 1/2003 against the addressee of the Decision and other four undertakings with a view to engaging in settlement discussions with them. Settlement meetings took place between February 2013 and December 2013. At the end of the negotiations Pometon decided not to submit a request to settle and therefore the Commission reverted to the standard cartel procedure.

| (7) | On 3 December 2014, the Commission adopted a Statement of Objections addressed to Pometon. |
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(7)

On 3 December 2014, the Commission adopted a Statement of Objections addressed to Pometon.

| (8) | After having been granted full access to the file, Pometon replied in writing to the Statement of Objections on 16 February 2015 and participated in an oral hearing held on 17 April 2015. |
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(8)

After having been granted full access to the file, Pometon replied in writing to the Statement of Objections on 16 February 2015 and participated in an oral hearing held on 17 April 2015.

| (9) | The Advisory Committee on Restrictive Practices and Dominant Positions issued a favourable opinion on 25 April and 23 May 2016 and the Commission adopted the Decision on 25 May 2016. |
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(9)

The Advisory Committee on Restrictive Practices and Dominant Positions issued a favourable opinion on 25 April and 23 May 2016 and the Commission adopted the Decision on 25 May 2016.

2.2.   Summary of the infringement

Summary of the infringement

| (10) | The Decision concerns a cartel, the ultimate aim of which was to coordinate prices of steel abrasives and to restrict price competition. In order to achieve their aim the parties engaged in anticompetitive bilateral and multilateral contacts. Those contacts were used by the parties to discuss the key price components applicable to all their EEA steel abrasives sales. In particular, Pometon used these contacts to:






  (a) | coordinate the introduction of a uniform calculation model for a common scrap surcharge — a variable surcharge that would be applicable to the price of all steel abrasives in the EEA; the common surcharge was applicable throughout the entire period of the infringement; |
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(10)

The Decision concerns a cartel, the ultimate aim of which was to coordinate prices of steel abrasives and to restrict price competition. In order to achieve their aim the parties engaged in anticompetitive bilateral and multilateral contacts. Those contacts were used by the parties to discuss the key price components applicable to all their EEA steel abrasives sales. In particular, Pometon used these contacts to:

(a)

coordinate the introduction of a uniform calculation model for a common scrap surcharge — a variable surcharge that would be applicable to the price of all steel abrasives in the EEA; the common surcharge was applicable throughout the entire period of the infringement;

| (b) | coordinate behaviour with respect to individual customers; the parties discussed (mainly through bilateral contacts) which parameters of competition would be allowed between them as regards individual customers: in principle price competition was restricted, which limited competition only to quality and services. |
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(b)

coordinate behaviour with respect to individual customers; the parties discussed (mainly through bilateral contacts) which parameters of competition would be allowed between them as regards individual customers: in principle price competition was restricted, which limited competition only to quality and services.

| (11) | The geographic scope of the conduct was EEA-wide. |
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(11)

The geographic scope of the conduct was EEA-wide.

2.3.   Remedies

Remedies

| (12) | The Decision applies the 2006 Guidelines on Fines (4) and imposes fines on Pometon. |
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(12)

The Decision applies the 2006 Guidelines on Fines (4) and imposes fines on Pometon.

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2.3.1.   Basic amount of the fine

Basic amount of the fine

| (13) | In setting the fines, the Commission took into account the sales of Pometon in the markets concerned in the last year prior to the end of the cartel, the fact that price coordination arrangements are amongst the most harmful restrictions of competition, the duration of the infringement and it covered the entire EEA. The basic amount of the fine is set at 16 % of the value of the relevant sales as defined above and the additional amount at 16 % in order to deter undertakings from entering into price coordination practices. |
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(13)

In setting the fines, the Commission took into account the sales of Pometon in the markets concerned in the last year prior to the end of the cartel, the fact that price coordination arrangements are amongst the most harmful restrictions of competition, the duration of the infringement and it covered the entire EEA. The basic amount of the fine is set at 16 % of the value of the relevant sales as defined above and the additional amount at 16 % in order to deter undertakings from entering into price coordination practices.

2.3.2.   Adjustments to the basic amount: aggravating or mitigating circumstances

Adjustments to the basic amount: aggravating or mitigating circumstances

| (14) | The Commission did not apply any aggravating circumstances. The Commission considered that mitigating circumstances apply to Pometon, since evidence showed that it contributed to a lesser extent than other parties in maintaining the arrangement on coordination on individual customers. |
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(14)

The Commission did not apply any aggravating circumstances. The Commission considered that mitigating circumstances apply to Pometon, since evidence showed that it contributed to a lesser extent than other parties in maintaining the arrangement on coordination on individual customers.

2.3.3.   Adaption of the adjusted basic amount

Adaption of the adjusted basic amount

| (15) | In view of the specific circumstances of this case, the Commission exercised its discretion in accordance with point 37 of the 2006 Fines Guidelines and adapted the fine of Pometon at a level that is proportionate to the infringement and achieves a sufficiently deterrent effect. |
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(15)

In view of the specific circumstances of this case, the Commission exercised its discretion in accordance with point 37 of the 2006 Fines Guidelines and adapted the fine of Pometon at a level that is proportionate to the infringement and achieves a sufficiently deterrent effect.

2.3.4.   Application of the 10 % turnover limit

Application of the 10 % turnover limit

| (16) | Article 23(2) of Regulation (EC) No 1/2003 provides that the fine imposed for each infringement shall not exceed 10 % of the undertaking’s total turnover relating to the business year preceding the date of the Commission Decision. |
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(16)

Article 23(2) of Regulation (EC) No 1/2003 provides that the fine imposed for each infringement shall not exceed 10 % of the undertaking’s total turnover relating to the business year preceding the date of the Commission Decision.

| (17) | In this case, the fine does not exceed 10 % of Pometon total turnover for 2015. |
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(17)

In this case, the fine does not exceed 10 % of Pometon total turnover for 2015.

3.   CONCLUSION

CONCLUSION

| (18) | The following fine was imposed pursuant to Article 23(2) of Regulation (EC) No 1/2003:






  (a) | Pometon: EUR 6 197 000. |
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(18)

The following fine was imposed pursuant to Article 23(2) of Regulation (EC) No 1/2003:

(a)

Pometon: EUR 6 197 000.

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(1)  OJ L 1, 4.1.2003, p. 1.

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(2)  Article 10a(2) of Regulation (EC) No 773/2004, as amended by Regulation (EC) No 622/2008 as regards the conduct of settlement procedures in cartel cases.

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(3)  C(2014) 2074 Final, OJ C 362, 14.10.2014, p. 8.

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(4)  OJ C 210, 1.9.2006, p. 2.

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