UNITED STATES CONSUMER PRODUCT SAFETY COMMISSION

In re: 16 CFR § 1051 Petition for Rulemaking Eliminating Accessible Cords On Window Covering Products

Petitioners:

Parents for Window Blind Safety, Consumer Federation of America, Consumers Union, Kids in Danger, Public Citizen, U.S. PIRG, Independent Safety Consulting, Safety Behavior Analysis, Inc., Onder, Shelton, O'Leary & Peterson,

PETITION FOR RULEMAKING

Petitioners, Parents for Window Blind Safety, Consumer Federation of America,

Consumers Union, Kids in Danger, Public Citizen, U.S. PIRG, Independent Safety Consulting,

Safety Behavior Analysis, Inc., and Onder, Shelton, O'Leary & Peterson, LLC (hereinafter

"Petitioners"), pursuant to 16 CFR § 1051 state to the U.S. Consumer Product Safety

Commission as follows:

INTRODUCTION

The U.S. Consumer Product Safety Commission (hereinafter "CPSC") has long recognized window covering cords as a hidden strangulation and asphyxiation hazard to children and today continues to include it as one of the top five hidden hazards in the home. (CPSC, 2007, CPSC 2013a) Since 1985, the CPSC has worked with and repeatedly pressed the window covering industry (hereinafter "Industry") to eliminate these hazards, through public education, multiple corrective actions, and the voluntary standards development process. Despite these efforts, the voluntary standard (first passed in 1996 and most recently revised in 2012) remains inadequate and continues to permit window coverings with hazardous accessible cords that injure and kill young children.

The unresolved issue of window covering cord injuries and deaths is not limited to the United States. Indeed, global frustration over this on-going hazard resulted in the June15, 2010 joint action by the CPSC, Health Canada and the European Commission wherein they joined together "in agreement on the need for immediate action," and made a trilateral request to the Industry for "support [of] a swift and comprehensive process that concurrently eliminates the risk factors causing deaths and injuries from all types of corded window covering products." (CPSC, HC, DO SANCO, 2010)

Acting upon the trilateral request, the Window Covering Manufacturers Association (hereinafter "WCMA") undertook a fifth revision of the voluntary standard, ANSVWCMA A100.1 American National Standard for Safety of Corded Window Covering Products. When it appeared that the renewed standards writing efforts were not satisfactorily addressing the major hazards responsible for injury and death, CPSC Chair Inez Tenenbaum wrote to the Industry on June 1, 2011, re-invoking the international call for a standard that eliminates window covering hazards, and stating, "I reaffirm to you my call for a comprehensive revised voluntary standard that eliminates- not just reduces- the strangulation risks from window coverings." (CPSC, 2011a) Ultimately, the inadequacy of the voluntary standards process, as well as the inadequate result toward which it was clearly heading, led consumer organizations reluctantly to take the unusual step ofwalking out of the process. (CFA 2011)

Indeed, the call for a standard that would finally eliminate window covering hazards

was disregarded. The voluntary ANSI standards development process failed again, when the fifth revision ofthe ANSIIWCMA A100.1 standard was approved in late 2012 with critical inadequacies. As will be shown below, 28 years after the CPSC first began working with Industry to address these hazards, the latest version of the standard still does not eliminate the major hazards that have caused approximately 40 percent of the deaths and injuries that have occurred since 1996. In fact, the new standard allows for increasing numbers of hazardous accessible cords to be loaded onto new window coverings. If the ANSVWCMA A100.1 voluntary standard is allowed to stand as the de facto industry safety standard, children will continue to strangle and asphyxiate on unsafe corded window covering products. ·

Due to Industry's failure to develop a standard that adequately mitigates the risk of strangulation on corded window coverings, the Petitioners hereby formally Petition for Rulemaking under the authority and process set forth in 16 CFR 

### § 1 051, 

### et seq. and request the Commission to promulgate a mandatory standard that prohibits any window covering cords where a feasible cordless alternative exists, and for those instances where a feasible cordless alternative does not exist, requires that all cords be made inaccessible through the use of passive guarding devices.



### HISTORY: THE FAILURE OF THE VOLUNTARY STANDARDS PROCESS

1985 Safety Alert

Following the reporting of 41 deaths on window covering cords between 1973 and 1980 and an additional report of another 35 deaths between 1981 and 1984, the CPSC approached Industry requesting its cooperative effort in issuing a joint Safety Alert. (CPSC, 1985a) CPSC staff met with representatives of Industry on September 13, 1985 and presented a proposed

2Safety Alert that made several recommendations including the cutting of cord loops. (CPSC, 1985b)

A joint Safety Alert was issued on December 20, 1985, but the recommendation to cut cord loops was not included. In fact, Industry did not accept the recommendation to cut cord loops for another nine years. The recommendations that were incorporated into the 1985 Safety Alert were: I) Keep cords out of the reach of children and utilize safety devices such as cord cleats; 2) Adjust cords to the shortest possible length for the application; and 3) Do not place cribs or other furniture near windows, for furniture gives children added height to reach cords. (CPSC, 1985c)

A year after the 1985 Safety Alert was issued, the WCMA created camera-ready warnings incorporating some of these safety recommendations and made them available for use by manufacturers as bottom rail labels, hang tags and warning sheets. (DWC, 1988) These warnings were used from 1986 until the adoption of the first voluntary standard in 1996, ANSVWCMA AIOO.l- 1996.

Warnings alone failed and children continued to be injured and killed:

1985: II fatalities 2 non-fatalities' 1986: 9 fatalities 0 non-fatalities 2 1987: 8 fatalities 2 non- fatalities 3
1988: 8 fatalities 0 non-fatalities 4
1989: II fatalities 4 non-fatalities 5
1990: II fatalities I non- fatality 6 1991: 18 fatalities I non-fatality 7 1992: 19 fatalities 0 non-fatalities 8 1993: 13 fatalities I non-fatality 9

1994 Cord Loops Efforts and Voluntary Corrective Action Plan

Faced with continuing deaths, the CPSC once again engaged Industry, requesting that window covering hazards be addressed through design changes, including the elimination of cord loops as CPSC first brought to Industry's attention in 1985.

In September 1994, Industry, through the newly-created Window Covering Safety Council, (hereinafter "WCSC") agreed to enter into a CPSC Voluntary Corrective Action Plan (hereinafter "VCAP") consisting of public education and outreach, retrofit product distribution, and product design modifications eliminating looped outer cords on certain horizontal window coverings. (WCSC, 1994) Simultaneously, Industry agreed to "look at future design changes to all window covering products (i.e., multiple cord products, vertical, cellular and pleated designs)
to incorporate [CPSC] staff approved changes" and "to work under the auspices of ANSI to formalize future design changes that incorporate safer design." (CPSC, 1994a)

In 1993 and1994, both the CPSC and Industry safety consultants had warned that separating outer cord loops on some window coverings was not sufficient by itself to prevent further fatalities and injuries. Both CPSC Human Factors evaluations of the proposed separated tassel/safety tassel redesign, and private studies performed for manufacturers, indicated that 3these limited redesigns would not eliminate cord risks or stop fatalities. (FAA, 1993; CPSC, 1994b; CPSC, 1994c; CPSC, 1994d; CPSC, 1994e) Industry was warned that pull cords would re-tangle and knot with use, recreating the cord loop hazard. Similarly, Industry was advised that single cords can wrap around a child's neck, resulting in serious injury or death. Accordingly, the VCAP indicated that it was simply an "interim solution" until better technology could be developed.

Industry codified the efforts of the VCAP into the voluntary standard, ANSIIWCMA A 100.1-1996. The 1996 ANSI standard required the elimination of some outer cord loops, which was accomplished by most manufacturers through the use of outer cords with separated tassels and/or a breakaway safety tassel on limited types of window coverings. Also, tie-down devices were required on continuous loop operating systems.

Further, leading up to the 1996 ANSI standard, by letter dated November 21, 1995, the CPSC requested the new standard include warnings for not just outer cord hazards but inner cord hazards, as well. (CPSC, 1995) Industry rejected CPSC' s recommendation to include a pictogram educating consumers about the existence of hidden inner cords and failed to create a design standard to prevent inner cord hazards. The only reference to inner cord hazards in the 1996 ANSI standard was the inclusion of a vague, unexplained warning statement about "cords that run through window coverings" on temporary hang tags (that are removed upon installation). The 1996 ANSI standard also did not address a number of other known hazards, including the loops on larger window coverings with more than two outer cords, unnecessarily long cords, multiple cord joiner hazards, exposed rear cords on roman shades, and lifting loops

on roll-up shades. The 1997 standard also failed to establish warnings for many hazards that

were not otherwise addressed.

As forewarned by the CPSC and safety experts, children continued to strangle on window covering cords with unaddressed hazards; the death and injury toll continued to rise:

1994: 16 fatalities 1995: 14 fatalities 1996: 17 fatalities 1997: 16 fatalities 1998: 12 fatalities 1999: 7 fatalities 2000: 11 fatalities

2000 Inner Cord/Lift Cord Efforts 1 non-fatality 10 4 non-fatalities 11 5 non-fatalities 12 3 non-fatalities 13
2 non-fatality 14 0 non-fatalities 15 5 c: 1 . . 16

non-1ata 1t1es

By letter dated September 3, 1999, CPSC staff wrote to Industry renewing its concern regarding inner cord strangulation hazards, and pressed for action. Faced with 14 recent inner cord deaths and one injury, the CPSC demanded that Industry also address the hazards associated with inner cord loop formation through design. (CPSC, 1999)

In cooperation with the CPSC, Industry entered into a second Voluntary Corrective Action Plan in September of2000, again involving public education and outreach, retrofit product distribution, and new product modification. (WCSC, 2000a) Under this VCAP, inner

4cord stops were placed on outer cords near the head rail to prevent the formation of an inner cord loop. The retrofit and public education efforts renewed with the continued distribution of safety tassels and continuous loop tie-down devices.

Industry's public education and outreach efforts have consistently included the WCSC's website providing Industry safety recommendations adopted in 2000, including the recommendation that consumers "install only cordless" window coverings in homes with young children. (WCSC, 20II; WCSC, 2000b)

Industry's 2000 VCAP efforts were then codified into a 2002 revision of the voluntary standard, ANSIIWCMA AIOO.l-2002. This revision ofthe standard continued to leave many accessible window cords unaddressed.

The ANSIIWCMA AIOO.l Standard was again revised in 2007, and then again in 2009 and 20IO following extensive CPSC recalls for un-addressed hazards of rear inner cords on
roman shades and lifting loops on roll-up shades.

Piecemeal redesign, retrofit, warnings and public education efforts had limited success, and the toll of injuries and deaths continued to rise:

200I: II fatalities 7 non- fatalities 17 2002: II fatalities 9 non-fatalities 18 2003: I7 fatalities 2 non-fatalities 19 2004: 6 fatalities 4 non-fatalities 20 2005: 9 fatalities 6 non-fatalities 21 2006: 7 fatalities 4non-fatalities 22 2007: 9 fatalities 3 non-fatalities 23
2008: I7 fatalities 9 non-fatalities 24 2009: I4 fatalities 30 non-fatalities 25 20IO: II fatalities I4 non- fatalities 26

While governmental pressures mount, the voluntary standard remains inadequate

Due to the continued inadequacies of the voluntary standard, the U.S. and foreign governments started to increase pressure on Industry. In the 20 I 0 trilateral letter referenced at the start of this petition, the CPSC, Health Canada and the European Commission made clear their directive to Industry that current voluntary standard provisions were not enough and requested they "eliminate the risk factors causing deaths and injuries from all types of corded window covering products."

In 20 I 0, safety experts and consumer organizations, including representatives from Parents for Window Blind Safety, Independent Safety Consulting, Consumer Federation of America, and Consumers Union, were for the first time allowed a limited role in the voluntary standards writing process. All held out great hope for the voluntary process. However, one year later, these safety experts and consumer representatives reluctantly walked out of a voluntary standards meeting and removed themselves from this process, because Industry was ignoring their recommendations and refusing to give them meaningful participation in the standards



### 5writing process. (NYT, 2011)

During the standards writing process, it became clear that loopholes in the voluntary standard were responsible for many injuries and deaths, but were not going to be addressed by Industry. Accordingly, in an August 4, 2011 speech directed to Industry, CPSC Chair Tenenbaum again called Industry to task, declaring, "It is time to 'eliminate' the strangulation risk on window blind cords. Notice how I did not say, 'reduce the hazard,' I said eliminate the hazard." (CPSC 2011b)

The Retailer Industry Leaders Association (hereinafter "RILA") was likewise alarmed, and by letter dated September 12, 2011, urged Industry to adopt standards that eliminate operational cords capable of forming hazardous loops and to address continuous loop tie-down devices. RILA urged Industry to finally agree to address these hazards, requesting that the WCMA "address concerns ofRILA, CPSC technical staff, and consumer advocacy groups as you work to develop the improved standard." (RILA 2011)

CPSC Staff comments on the January 23, 2012 proposed version of the voluntary standard primarily addressed the serious remaining risks associated with operating cords and recommended the clear-cut solution of limiting the combined length of all accessible cords to no longer than the neck circumference of the youngest child at risk regardless of the position of the window covering (i.e., raised or lowered, opened or closed). However, as later noted by CPSC, these comments were largely ignored in the final version of the standard: "the major hazards associated with operating cords and looped cords remained the same as the originally proposed version." (CPSC, 2012; CPSC, 2013)

When the ANSI/WCMA AlOO.l-2012 was approved on November 28,2012, yet again this standard failed to adequately address the strangulation hazard posed by accessible cords on window coverings. As further detailed below, the standard continues to permit window coverings with hazardous accessible cords that injure and kill young children. After this standard was promulgated, an analysis ofwindow covering incidents between 1996 (the date of the first voluntary standard) and 2012 was conducted. The purpose of this analysis was to identify both the cord characteristic of each window covering and the accident mechanism to determine what cord characteristic was involved, in order to determine whether the 2012 ANSIIWCMA voluntary standard would have prevented the incident from occurring. Based on this analysis, approximately 40% of incidents would not have been prevented. Further, the 2012 standard actually permits an increase in the number and types of hazardous accessible cords on some newer window coverings.

And so, 28 years after Industry agreed to work with CPSC to address this hazard, and having been given clear direction and multiple opportunities to develop a meaningful standard, and having been duly warned of the inadequacies ofthe proposed standard, even this latest version (the sixth attempt) ofthe ANSIIWCMA A100.1-2012 standard fails to eliminate or adequately reduce the risk of injury and death from accessible window covering cords.

In April of 1994, manufacturer Comfortex Window Fashions foreshadowed what has ultimately been borne out, namely that warning and redesign efforts will fail so long as they involve accessible cords. Comfortex warned, "Until all window coverings are free of cords for

6their operation, there will be no true safety if cords are available to small children." (Comfortex, 1994) Comfortex was right in 1994; those prophetic words have stood the test of time.

Recent injury data continues to reflect deaths and injuries from window coverings:

2011: 2012: 6 fatalities 5 fatalities 2 non-fatalities (data set incomplete) 27
I non-fatalities (data set incomplete) 28



### MANDATORY RULEMAKING IS APPROPRIATE TO ELIMINATE ACCESSIBLE CORDS ON WINDOW COVERINGS

By statute, efforts to address product hazards through voluntary consensus standards are necessary before a mandatory standard can be promulgated. According to CPSA Section 9(f)(3)(D), the promulgation of a mandatory standard is appropriate when:

"(i) Compliance with such voluntary consumer product safety standard is not likely to result in the elimination or adequate reduction of such risk of injury; or

(ii) It is unlikely that there will be substantial compliance with such voluntary

consumer product safety standard." (15 U.S.C. Section 2058)

Petitioners have carefully examined the injury and death data associated with window coverings and the record of compliance with the voluntary standard, and find that both of these criteria are met in the context of corded window coverings.



### Failure of ANSI/WCMA AlOO.l-2012 to Eliminate or Adequately Reduce Risk

First, examination of available injury and death data reveals that a high number of incidents since passage of the first standard in 1996 would not have been prevented by even the
most recent (2012) version of the ANSIIWCMA standard. (Exhibit 1) Of the total293 incidents between 1996 and 2012, 250 had sufficient information available to make such a determination. Ofthese 250 incidents, 102 ofthe injuries and deaths (approximately 40%) would not have been prevented by the current voluntary standard, indicating that an unreasonable risk of injury on corded window coverings continues to exist:

55 Incidents on manufacturer separated outer cords (both pull cords and tilt cords) that caused injury or death via knotted/tangled loops, defective break-away devices, and cord wrap-around.

29 Incidents on window coverings with looped outer cords but where the manufacturercreated loop did not cause the incident. These incidents involved either wrap-around incidents or children caught in tangled/knotted loops.

75 Continuous loop cord incidents where a tension/tie-down device was present at the scene but was either not installed, had pulled out of the wall, or had broken. (CPSC staff has criticized the effectiveness of the active tension device provision, since it is foreseeable that "tension devices may not be installed at all, uninstalled for some reason, or installed incorrectly

... " and therefore, "the proper installation of tension devices, a critical component for the safe use of the product, should not have to be done by consumers.") (CPSC, 2012)

6 Other instances caused by a hazardous cord allowed by the standard

- such as reverse inner cord incidents and incidents where the victim was caught in a cord joiner loop

on a multi-corded window covering.

7 Incidents caused by the manufacturer's failure to make the product according to the voluntary standard in effect at time of manufacture.

Second, even though Industry had already developed cordless window coverings in 1996, and by 2000 was recommending cordless window coverings for families with young children, the voluntary standard still allows corded window coverings.

Third, some manufacturers have taken advantage of weaknesses in the standard to actually increase the number and types of long, accessible cords on newer window coverings, thereby making blinds more hazardous than ever. For example, CPSC In-Depth Investigation (IDI) 120727CCC290 involves the 7/10/12 death of a 3-year-old girl who strangled when she wrapped the tilt cord of a 20 I 0 faux wood horizontal blind around her neck. The blind was manufactured by a large, well-known window covering manufacturer, and was sold and installed by a major home-improvement retailer. Not only does this blind have the hazards of most corded window blinds, such as long pull cords, but it also has a number of newer and functionally unnecessary hazards allowed by the 2012 

### WCMN ANSI standard. This blind is

more dangerous than traditional corded blinds in at least five different ways:

• It has 2 tasseled tilt cords instead oftraditional tilt wand to rotate the slats of the blind. This extra set of cords puts hazardous accessible outer cords on both the left and right side of the blinds (as opposed to only one side with standard pull cords).

• It has unnecessarily long tilt cords that are 2/3 the window's height, even though only

a few inches of cord are needed to perform the tilt function.

• It has large flat-topped tassels that are more likely to snag/catch on a single cord wrapped around a child's neck to create deadly loop, and have been implicated by the CPSC in-depth-investigation as a cause ofthis 7110112 death and at least one other death {080915HNE3763).

• It has "inner cords" strung along the outside of both front and back of the blind, instead of through holes in the center of the slats, that are more accessible and attached in a less secure manner. This style of 'inner cords strung on outside of blind'

was involved the 10/4/11 death of a child on a 2009 blind (CPSC IDI 111018CCC2027).

• It has doubled the number of pull cords used on each blind, because the traditional single inner cord that run through the slats was replaced with two cords, at both front and back of the slats.

8Instead of this blind having two traditional outer cords and a tilt wand, it has six long
outer cords, each with a large flat top tassel, that tangle easily, and has moved the inner cords from inside slats to the far more accessible, outside front and back locations. This example illustrates how the voluntary standard does not prohibit Industry from actually increasing the number of hazardous accessible window covering cords.

In all of these respects, the voluntary standard fails to eliminate or adequately reduce the unreasonable risk of injury or death associated with accessible cords on window coverings.



### Lack of Substantial Compliance with Voluntary Standards

There is substantial non-compliance with the voluntary standard. A number of manufacturers have ignored basic safety provisions of the voluntary standard, and have manufactured non-compliant window coverings for years and even decades. Since 2007, there have been at least 16 CPSC recalls involving blinds that were not manufactured in compliance with the voluntary standard.

Disturbingly, most of these instances of non-compliance (13 of 16) appear to have been discovered unintentionally as a by-product ofCPSC's 2008-2010 focus on roman shade and roll-up shade rear inner cord/lifting loop issues. While evaluating manufacturers' products for

roman shade back cord hazards and roll-up shade lift loop issues, CPSC staff caught numerous other violations of the voluntary standard, including looped pull cords, no inner cord stops, no tension devices provided with continuous loop products, and failure to attach a tension device
to a continuous loop cord. Almost all of these findings violated voluntary standard requirements that had been in effect since the first standard was published in 1996. Many of these non-complying products were on the market for years, and in one case, for two decades, before they were detected and recalled. (Exhibit 2)

The CPSC does not have the resources to maintain this level of enforcement. This example of how one short-term enforcement effort uncovered numerous standard violations implies that many more undiscovered instances of non-compliance by Industry exist, and that at least some portion of Industry cannot be relied upon to meet voluntary standards and
to manufacture compliant products.



### DESPITE FEASIBLE SAFE ALTERNATIVES, VOLUNTARY STANDARDS HAVE FAILED

Feasible Safe Alternatives

Safe alternatives exist and are feasible. For example:

Cordless technology

Cordless window covering designs that eliminate pull cords are available and

9economically viable. Cordless window coverings, such as pleated shades, horizontal blinds, cellular shades, wood blinds, and roman shades, have been made by a number of firms since approximately 2000 (CPSC, 2000; Hunter Douglas, 2000; Levolor, 2001). Cordless products of up to 78 inches wide and 84 inches long are available in all designs. Our research indicates that the manufacturer's cost of such alternative cordless technology is only $2.00- $3.00 more than the cost of an unsafe corded one-inch vinyl or aluminum blind. The manufacturer's cost for such cordless operating systems on a two-inch faux wood blind is in the $7.00- $9.00
range. While the current design of cordless products may include size limitations, these sizes encompass the overwhelming majority of all applications.

Furthermore, feasible and cost-effective alternative designs exist which likewise address this issue. This issue can be solved by utilizing a wand-type device similar to those used to tilt slats for light control.

Cord cover designs

In the 1990s, major window covering manufacturers developed and patented cord

cover devices to render the pull cords of window coverings inaccessible. (Springs, 1995a; Springs, 1995b; Newell, 1996) However, major manufacturers never brought products with this feature to market, and cord covers were essentially abandoned once the CPSC allowed separated cord tassels to serve as a compliant design alternative.

More recently, one manufacturer has created and brought to market a cord cover design aimed at eliminating accessible pull cords, at a price point that is affordable and cost effective for both new-product and retrofit applications. (Safe- T -Shade, 201 0; Safe- T -Shade website) This cord cover design renders pull cords inaccessible, while at the same time eliminating

concerns regarding the ability of cordless technology to meet very large applications, and applications where furniture is placed in front of window coverings. Such cord cover designs

can accommodate any window size currently being served by cord-accessible products, and its positioning in the same location as traditional pull cords accomplishes the same functionality and accessibility as traditional corded products.



### Voluntary standard efforts have failed

The economic reality is that the window covering industry is very competitive, particularly in the area of stock products. If one manufacturer wants to adequately address safety issues and render cords inaccessible at a slightly higher cost, it risks being undercut by another manufacturer willing to sell less safe but cheaper products. Big box retailer contracts

can be lost over a matter of pennies, nickels, or dimes as major retailers seek the lowest possible entry level price point in the window covering market. Absent a mandatory standard, manufacturers seeking to introduce safer cordless and cord inaccessible products will suffer from a competitive disadvantage against manufacturers willing to sell unsafe corded products.

Further, the large window covering manufacturers who dominate the WCMA and ANSI standards writing process have a vested interest in maintaining low industry standards. Those manufacturers have advanced custom product designs featuring cordless and cord inaccessible

10coverings, on which they are able to maintain premium pricing- but only so long as there is an absence of competition. Should standards mandate cordless or cord inaccessible product designs, this feature will no longer be able to command a premium price.

Absent mandatory rulemaking that eliminates accessible window covering cords, Industry has not and will not act alone. ANSilWCMA A100.1-2012 was Industry's sixth attempt to address exposed operational cords, and it has again chosen
not to do so meaningfully, despite extreme U.S. pressure and an international mandate.

For all these reasons, it is evident that the only way to achieve safety is to invoke CPSC rulemaking.

PETITION REQUEST

Despite the availability of feasible and cost effective design alternatives, Industry has failed to adopt a voluntary standard which engages the first tiers of the safety design hierarchy, i.e. to eliminate or guard against the hazard. It is only through design strategies that the cord hazard will be adequately addressed and true safety achieved. The repeated failure of Industry to adopt an effective voluntary standard over the last 28 years demonstrates that CPSC rulemaking is required to eliminate the hazard posed by accessible cords in window coverings.

As previously discussed, the latest voluntary standard is inadequate due to its allowance of products with accessible cords, even when cordless and/or inaccessible cord options are feasible. We believe a mandatory standard should eliminate all accessible cords:

The standard should prohibit the use of cords on window coverings when non-cord design options are feasible. For example, cords are not necessary for the tilting operation of horizontal blinds since wands can perform this function. Also, exterior pull cords on window coverings are unnecessary for products that have cordless options

- currently all products measuring less than 78 inches wide and 84 inches long.

Ifthere are products for which accessible cords cannot be currently eliminated, due to the large size of the product or other reasons, the standard should require that such cords be made inaccessible through passive guarding devices, such as a cord cover.

We defer to the CPSC as to what is the best approach for this standard. For example,

one approach would be to ban all accessible cords, and to develop a mandatory standard to define what constitutes an accessible cord. Since the CPSC staff has been working on this issue in earnest since at least 1994, there is vast in-house expertise in this subject matter.

In closing, due to Industry's repeated failure to develop a standard that adequately mitigates the risk of strangulation on corded window coverings, the Petitioners hereby formally Petition for Rulemaking under the authority and process set forth in 16 CFR § 1051, 

### et seq. and request the Commission to promulgate a mandatory standard that prohibits any window covering cords where a feasible cordless alternative exists, and for

11those instances where a feasible cordless alternative does not exist, requires that all cords be made inaccessible through the use of passive guarding devices.

The Petitioners appreciate the Commission's consideration ofthis request. We

are available to discuss this petition at your convenience.

Respectfully submitted,

Petitioners:



### Parents for Window Blind 

### Safety By: Linda Kaiser President PO Box 205 Barnhart, MO 63012 314-494-7890 linda@pfwbs.org



### Consumer Federation of America By: Rachel Weintraub Legislative Director and Senior Counsel 1620 Eye Street, NW, Suite 200 Washington, DC 20006 202-939-1012 rweintraub@consumerfed.org



### Consumers Union By: George P. Slover Senior Policy Counsel 1101 17th Street NW, Suite 500 Washington, DC 20036 202-462-6262 gslover@consumer.org



### Kids In Danger By: Nancy Cowles Executive Director 116 West Illinois St, Suite 4E Chicago, IL 70754 312-595-0649 Nancy@KidslnDanger .org

12Public Citizen Congress Watch By: Christine Hines Consumer and Civil Justice Counsel 215 Pennsylvania Ave, SE Washington, DC 20003 202-454-5135 chines@citizen.org

U.S.PIRG By: Nasima Hossain Public Health Advocate 218 D Street SE, 1st Fl. Washington, DC 20003 (202) 546-9707 nhossain@pirg.org

Independent Safety Consulting By: Carol Pollack-Nelson, Ph.D. 13713 Valley Drive Rockville, MD 20850 301-340-2912 pollacknel@comcast.net

Safety Behavior Analysis, Inc. By: Shelley Waters Deppa 18417 Shady View Lane Brookeville, MD 20833 301-774-9682 sdeppa@safetybehavior.com

Onder, Shelton, O'Leary & Peterson, LLC By: James G. Onder 11 0 E. Lockwood, 2nd Floor St. Louis, MO 63119 314-963-9000 onder@onderlaw .com

13Interest of Petitioners

This petition is brought by nine organizations on behalf of all children and their families affected by window covering cords:

Parents for Window Blind Safety (PFWBS) is a nonprofit organization that supports parents whose children have been seriously injured or killed by dangerous cords, educates consumers about the dangers of accessible window covering cords in homes, daycare facilities, and military housing, helps create safer standards in the industry, encourages innovation of safer products in the industry, and tests window covering products for safety.

Consumer Federation of America (CFA) is the nation's largest consumer advocacy organization representing more than 260 state, local, and national consumer organizations that

was established in 1968 to advance the consumer interest through research, advocacy, and education.

Consumers Union (CU) is the policy and advocacy division of Consumer Reports, an expert, independent, nonprofit organization, whose mission is to work for a fair, safe, and just marketplace for all consumers.

Kids In Danger (KID) is a nonprofit organization dedicated to protecting children by improving children's product safety. KID was founded in 1998 by the parents of sixteen-month-old Danny Keysar who died in his Chicago childcare home when a portable crib collapsed around his neck.

Public Citizen is a nonprofit consumer advocacy organization based in Washington, D.C.
founded more than 40 years ago and with more than 300,000 members and supporters nationwide.

U.S. PIRG, the Public Interest Research Group, is a non-profit, non-partisan public interest advocacy organization that takes on powerful interests on behalf of its members, working to win
concrete results for our health and well-being.

Independent Safety Consulting (ISC), through its principal, Carol Pollack-Nelson, provides

14human factors consulting specializing in consumer product safety, by evaluating product designs, warnings and instructions in order to identify hazards and reduce risks to consumers. Ms. Pollack-Nelson was a Human Factors Psychologist at the CPSC from 1988 through 1993.

Safety Behavior Analysis, Inc. (SBAI), through its principal, Shelley Waters Deppa, provides human factors consulting on the safety of consumer products, with a specialty in children's hazards, such as choking, suffocation, and strangulation. SBAI analyzes injury data, evaluates product designs, and develops and tests safety labels for effectiveness. Ms. Deppa worked in the CPSC's Human Factors Division from 1979 through 1992.

Onder, Shelton, O'Leary & Peterson, LLC pursues this petition on behalf of the over 50 families with whom they have worked whose children have strangled on window covering cords, that window covering cord hazards might be eliminated.

15Exhibits

Exhibit 1 -2013-04-26, SBAI, Incidents That Would Not Have Been Prevented By ANSI/WCMA A100.1.

Exhibit 2-2013-4-26, SBAI, Standard Is Not Adequate Because Manufacturers Are Ignoring The Voluntary Standard.

References Listed in order of appearance in petition Available upon request

CPSC (2007). 2007-08-01, CPSC Release #07-256 "Top Five Hidden Home

Hazards." CPSC (2013a). CPSC Website, CPSC Safety Alert, "Are Your Window
Coverings Safe?"

CPSC, HC, DG SANCO (2010). 2010-06-15, Letter from CPSC, Health Canada and DG SANCO to WCMA, ANSI, CEN-CENELEC and CSA Standards regarding joining together and requesting industry support for "a swift and comprehensive process that concurrently eliminates the risk factors causing deaths and injuries from all types of corded window covering products".

CPSC (20 11 a). 2011-06-01, Letter from CPSC Chair, Inez Tenenbaum to Ralph Vasami, Executive Director ofWCMA reaffirming her call "for a more comprehensive revised voluntary standard that eliminates-not just reduces-the strangulation risks from window coverings."

CF A (20 11 ). 2011-09-0 1, Press Release of Consumer Federation of America, Consumers Union, Independent Safety Consulting, and Parents for Window Blind Safety, available on the web at: http://www.consumerfed.org/pdfs/WindowCoveringsStandardPressRelease.pdf

CPSC (1985a). 1985-07-03, Memorandum of Telephone Conversation between Stan Marrow and Peter Rush- determining Association's interest in issuing a joint

consumer safety alert.

CPSC (1985b ). 1985-09-13, Agenda of Meeting between A WCMA and CPSC Staff

- Proposed Safety Alert recommending parents to "Cut off any excess cord, or cut it
to lengths that will not be able to be reached by children".

CPSC (1985c). 1985-12-00, CPSC Consumer Product Safety Alert "Parents Warned
16about the Danger of Strangulation if Children Become Entangled in Window Blind

or Drapery Cords."

DWC (1988). 1988-01-00, Draperies and Window Coverings: Warning Tags from A WCMA- Bottom rail labels and hang tags.

WCSC (1994). 1994-09-00, WCSC Voluntary Corrective Action Plan submitted to CPSC.

CPSC (1994a). 1994-10-03, Letter from David Schmeltzer, CPSC Office of Compliance

to Peter Rush, WCSC re: Window Covering Corrective Action Plan.

FAA (1993). 1993-12-00 Evaluation and Testing of Three Cord Management Devices, prepared for Levolor by Failure Analysis Associates, Inc.

CPSC (1994b ). 1994-03-31 Memorandum from Renae Rauchschwalbe to The Commission Re: Minutes ofMeeting between CPSC Staff and WCMA.

CPSC (1994c). 1994-04-05 Memorandum from Scott Heh, ESME to Renae Rauchschwalbe Re: ESME Response to PSA No. 9124, Hunter Douglas, Inc.

CPSC (1994d). 1994-05-24 Memorandum from Celestine Trainor to Renae Rauchswalbe

re: PSA 9287; Springs Window Fashions- Two Cord blind Fix.

CPSC (1994e). 1994-06-02 Memorandum from Scott Heh, ESME to Renae Rauschwalbe, CECA Re: PSA No. 9293, Spring Window Fashions, Blind Cords.

CPSC (1995). 1995-11-21, Letter from Marc Schoem, CPSC Division of Corrective Actions to Peter Rush, WCMA re: Follow-up to WCMA meeting ofNovember 14, 1985.

CPSC (1999). 1999-09-03, Letter from Renae Rauchschwalbe, CPSC Office of Compliance to Peter Rush, WCSC re: WCSC Strangulations Due to Cords that Run Through Window Coverings.

WCSC (2000a). 2000-09-12, WCSC Voluntary Corrective Action Plan submitted to CPSC.

WCSC (2011). 2011, Window Covering Safety Council Website- Basic Cord SafetyUrges parents to "Install only cordless window coverings in young children's bedrooms and sleeping areas."

WCSC (2000b). 2000-11-01 WCSC Release: WCSC Alerts Consumers To New Window-Blind Hazard; Free Repair Kit is Available.

NYT (20 11 ). 2011-09-01, NYTimes.com, "Consumer Advocates Withdraw from Talks

on Improving the Safety of Window Blinds."

17CPSC (20 11 b). 2011-08-04, International Consumer Product Health and Safety Organization Conference -CPSC Chair Inez Tenebaum in reference to the industry states "It's time to 'eliminate' the strangulation risk on window blind cords."

RILA (2011). 2011-09-12, Letter from Jim Neill, RILA to Ralph Vasami, WCMA urging industry to adopt standard that includes: eliminating any cord, including operational cord that can form a hazardous loop and address continuous loop tie down devices.

CPSC (2012). 2012-02-06, Letter from Rana Balci-Sinha, CPSC Division of Human Factors to Ralph Vasami, WCMA comments on the ANSIIWCMA A1100.1-2010 American National Standard for Safety of Window Covering Products.

CPSC, 2013b). 2013-03-18 CPSC Memorandum from Colin Church, Voluntary Standards Coordinator to The Commission re: Voluntary Standards Activities FY2012 Annual Report- Blind Cords- Revise ANSI/WCMA A 100.1 to reduce strangulation hazards associated with window covering cords.

Comfortex (1994). 1994-04-03, Letter from John Schnebly, Comfortex to Ann Brown, CPSC urging the "Commission to rethink its potential endorsement of the Hunter Douglas Breakthrough Safety Tassel."

CPSC (2000), 11/1/00, CPSC Release #01-023, "CPSC, Window Covering Industry Announce Recall to Repair Window Blinds- New Investigation of Children's Deaths Leads t Redesigned Window Blinds."

Levolor (2001), 3/26, Cordless Technology Provides Safest Alternative in Window Blinds and Shades, www.prnewsire.com/news-releases, 71825207.html.

Hunter Douglas (2000) http://www.hunterdouglasgroup.com/company/history.jsp
Springs (1995a). 1995-11-04 United States Patent: 5,465,775 Venetian Blind with Wand Operator

- Assigned to Springs Window Fashions Division, Inc.

Springs (1995b). 1995-12-05 United States Patent: 5,472,035 Window Blind with Wand Operator

- Assigned to Springs Window Fashions Division, Inc.

Newell (1996). 1996-05-07 United States Patent: 5,513687 Safety Device for Pull Cords of Window Coverings- Assigned to Newell Operating Company.

Safe-T-Shade (2010). 2010-03-27 Press Release: New Lift System For Window Shades Engineered to Protect Children's Lives.

Safe-T-Shade (website). www.fashionwand.com

18Footnotes

I 

### 1985: 8539000973, 8527004494, 850510WES4198, 8537017776,8506093927,8549005084, 8512080995 8501024422,8521023686,8512090059, G85A0131A, 8548102449, C4C5034A1

2 

### 1986: 8606003626,8604009348,8636028540, X655212A1, 8612060372,8648060413, 900816HCN2237, 8602001593, 72S2234A1

3 

### 1987: 8790630230-S, 870604023 7, 8740008599, 8704014317, 8751029702, 739064029, 8718041406 G87B0176A, 8712123753

4 

### 1988: 8837000499, 890711HCC1348, 890808HCC3233, 8838002200, 890808HCC3234, X89B0329A, 890711HCC1347, 890829HCC3254

5 

### 1989: 890526HCC1327, 891107HCC3351, 890060HCC1836, 890829HCC3258, 900531HCC3564, 890816HCC1384, 890828BEP0009, 900130HCC3418, 890926HBB3259, 900105HWE4005, 901115HCC2043, 891103HCC1544, 901219HCC0085, 891120HWE5013, 900119HCC1616

6 

### 1990: 900524HCC2219, 900920HCC2015, 9020005539, 921119HCC1912, 900530HNE5188, 00724HWE5019, 900723HCC3611, 901218HCC1095, 901101HCC0033, 901218HCC2062, 901213HCC0074, 901227HEP9001

7 

### 1991: 910123HCC0118, 910305HCC0153, 910213HCC1140, C94B0041A, 910503HCC0210, 920529HCC0188, 910521HEP2641, 971009CCC2057, 910712HCC2229, 910718HCC1333, 910807HCN1881, 910905CWE7078, 950224CCC2392, X9196730A, 910912HCN2234, 911211HCC0052, 911031HCC1464, 920722HCC2207, 920722HCC2208

8 

### 1992: 92030HNE5088, 920901HCC3229, 930303HCC3140, 920721HCC1775, 920422HEP1281 930222HCC3127, 930322HCC3159, 920720HCC1774, 930127HCC3090, 9206113354,920811CWE5005, 920928HCN2681, 921028HCC3034, 930303HCC3141, 930126HCC3087,921119CWE5024, 930409HCC1096, 930201HCC1027, 930126HCC3086

9 

### 1993: 930614HCC3232, 930310HCC1065, 9338001173, 9301015308, 930518HCC1131, 930915HCC3310, 930715CWE50 10, 940126HCC2056, 930920HCC 1775, 930923HCN2539, 960327CCC5075,940421 CCN1236, G93C0218A, 9401 03CWE500 1

10 

### 1994: 940302CWE5007, 940420CCC1437, 940415CCN1214, 940421CCN1237, 940603HNE5149, 950328CCC1521, 951208CCC1228, 941116HCC3016, 940623CBB2564, 951214CCC3246, P9714316A, 940802CBB3670, 940802CBB3669, 941101 CWE5006, 960805HCC5429, 951122CCC3190, 950330CCC3537

11 

### 1995: 950301CCC1401, 950216CCC1367, 961205CCC5112, 950410CCC3574, 950407CEP9005, 950615CWE5009, 950710CCC3842, 960108CCC3273, 950626CCN2286, 950721CEP9014, 950906CCC1961, 950727CWE1400, 951011 CBB 1085, 970319CCC1 036, 951128CWE7315, 960305CCC7064, 9511 08HCN0229, 9601 08CBB2261

12 

### 1996: 970814CCC2375, 960326CBB5070, 960304HCN0685, 960227CWE5006, 960403CCC5089, 960403CEP9003, C9650020A, 960611CCC5239, 960827CBB5576, 960520CNE5140, 960524CCC5190,

1996061ICCC5238, 970218CCC5320, 960717CCC5351, 970619CCC3227, 961114CBB5049, 961023CCC5005, 9611 07CCC5040, 9611 07CCC5036, 961125CWE7249, 970319CCC I 026, 970708CCC3254

13 1997: 981020CCC3026, 970127CNE5071, 980115HCC3534, 97032ICWE4110, 9801 13CCC2220, 9720005138, 970916CWE4149, 970418CEP900 I, 98 I 001 CCC40 14, 970522CCC3168, 970709CCC3258, 970808CCC3288, 980508HCC2533, 971015CCC1584, 971 I I 9CCC1679, 971 I 19CWE5009, 980105CCNOI 16, 980 I 09CCC2 I 77, 980 I I 2CCNO I 31

14 

### 1998: 980209CCC3581, 980218CCC0073, 980305CBB5364, H9840074A, 980522CCCI437, 980326CCC023 I, 9803 I OCBB6684, 980528CCC6842, 98070ICWE71 75, 980813CBB5779, 980821 CBB0662, 981222CCC2128, 001013CBB0041, 990818CCC0674

15 

### 1999: 990325CCC0369, 990728HCC3423, 990 I 2 I CBB2205, 990520CNE5 I 72, 990618CWE6004, 00101 7CBB2033, 0101 I 7CCC0232

16 

### 2000: 001 I 17CBB3055, 00225CBB2293, 000331CWE6005, 000714CNE5665, 010628CCC3361, 010323CCC3221, 10040144A, 000518CNE5554, 00083ICNE5737, 010614HCC2573, 001121CCC3068, 001108CCC0089, 001 102CNE5849, 001213CCC3106, 010111CCC3134, 030908CCC3405

17 

### 2001: 010109CBB0204, 010125CNE6092, 1/30/01, H0130329A, 010205CCN0282, 010607CCC3331, 010614CBB2575, 010510CNE6334, 010615CNE6462, 010625CCN0689, 010713CCC1724, 011212CCC21 I 8, 010723CCC2641, 2/25/09 Sauk Rapids MN, 010815CNE6651, 01121 ICCC1174, 020301CCC1368, 020 122CEP9002, 030 122CCC 1285

18 

### 2002: 020107CCN0223, 021016CCC3022, 020719CEP9009, 02061 1CEP9004, 020417CEP9003, 020610CCC1605, 020716HCC3266, 020604CNE7347, 020619CCN0542, 020807CCN0684, 020812CNE7432, 020905CCN0794, 020924CWE5017, 9120102 Wichita KS, 021 112CCN0097, 021 107CNE7560, 030123CCC2290, 030123CCC2289, 021218CCC3132, 021219CCN0213

19 

### 2003: 030707CWE4337, 030515CEP9004, 03042ICCC2409, 030402CCCI421, 03031ICWE5004, 030515CEP9003, 030723CCC1740, 030418CCN0479, 030521CBB2460, 030519CWE6003, 030612CCN0613, 030708CCC3335, 031113CCC3048, 030828CNE8057, 030903CCN0864, 030902CCN0848, 040423CCC3268, 0337093050-S, 040106CCC1316

20 2004: 040319CNEI406, 040629CEP9007, 040505CCC2500, 070914CCC1818, 040729CCC3405, 040722CCC2648, 0425981140-S, 041 I 19CCC2143, 041117CCC2129, 050124CCC3175

21 

### 2005: 050119CWE3007, 050303CCC1535, 060202CCC2315, 050407CCC3309, 050414CNE2280, 050426CCC3334, 7/14/05, 050804CCC1029, 7117105 Chillicothe OH, 050923CCC3504, 1012IOCCC1179, Xl050632A, 051206CCC3182, 0527035661, 060830CCC1755

22 

### 2006: 060124CCC1326, 060118CWE5081, 060308CBB1394, 060328CCC2466, 070213CCC3245, 060502CCC3480, 060602CCC 1567, 0608 I 1 CCC3785, 060920CCC3892, 061207CCC1153, 070213CCC3243

23 

### 2007: 070221CCC3260, 070719CCC2643, 070308CCC2346, 071219CCC3250, 07053ICCC2538, 070703CCC1583, 100106CCC2286, 070828CCC2757, 0742086600, 090811CCC3851, 071127HNE2987, 2007 (month and day unknown) Houston, TX

24 

### 2008: 080122HNE3082, 080124CCC1351, 090811CCC3850, 0803IOCCCI480, 080423CCCI551, 080415CCC1535, 081112HWE7844, 080424CCC2597, 100106CCC3229, 080530CCC2699, 080625CCC3646, 611 I /08 Atlanta GA, 080702CCC 1707, 080812CNE367 5, 109C I 052A, 090204CCC 1402, 080729CCC3 726, 110421CCC3667, 081002CCC2008, 081 I06CWE7837, 080915HNE3763, 090108CWE7977, I 1/13/08 Shelton



### 20WA, 081120CCC2142, 090115CCC1355, 090121CCC2276

25 

### 2009: 090921CCC1073, 2/1/09 Flagstaff AZ, 2/9/09 Supply NC, 090227CCC3369, 111116CCC3139, 090602CCC3635, 090728CCC2797, 090407CCC3500, 4/?/09 Bennettsville, SC, 090827CCC3926, 090410CCC2531, 090414HWE8180, 090416CCC2545, 090528CCC3624, 090901CCC3939, 100324CWE2013, 090910CWE8430, 090710CCC3731,100111CCC3235, 6/15/09 Creve Coeur MO, 090901CCC1033, 090629CNE4548, 091008CBB1013, 109C1086A, 091009CCC2026, 090728CCC2792, 0949020967, 100324CWE2012, 090817CNE4677, 090903CBB2900, I0981284A, 090921CCC1076, 090915CCC3962, 091223CCC1197, 091102CNE4799, 091106CCC3071, H09B0125A, 100714HWE2255, 100105CCC3221,, I09C1024A, 091210CCC3160, 091215CCC2238, 100106CCC2286, 100111CCC3232

26 

### 2010: 100405CCC3517, 100125CWE1054, 100217CCC3328, 100219CCC2387, 120402CCC2594, 100304CCC1300, 100308CCC2444, 100322CNE0248, 4/6/10 Springfield OH, 100413CCC3564, 100427CCC2639, 100519CWE2035, 100708CWE2246, 100803CCC1015, 101018CCC2063, 101207CCC3281, 101103HWE2393, 100915CBB3131, 100920CBB1174, 101123CCC2136, 101104CCC1094, 110103CCC3322, 101214CCC1191, 11 0204CCC3423, 110 103CCC3319

27 

### 2 011: 110601 CNEOOO 1, 11 0315CCC1402, 11 0404CCC2425, 11 0516CCC3728, 11 0607CCC3794, 111206CCC3198, 111018CCC2027, 111024CNE1400,

28 

### 2012: 120501CCC1644, 120709CCC3743, 120727CCC2904, 120816CWE5001, 120918HWE3109, 9117112 Sioux Falls SD

21Exhibit 1 Incidents That Would Not Have Been Prevented by ANSI/WCMA A100.1-2012 Analysis by Safety Behavior Analysis, Inc. (412611 3)

TOTAL NUMBER OF WINDOW COVERING INCIDENTS

293 Total number of window covering incidents between 1996 and 2012 (2010- 2012 information incomplete): 

### -=--.1J. Incidents where unknown/inadequate info to indicate whether in the outer cord loop, inner cord loop, or wrap-around and therefore can't tell whether separate cords/tassels would have made a difference.



### = 250 Incidents with enough information to determine whether outer cord loop, inner cord loop, or wrap-around was involved

KNOWN INCIDENTS BETWEEN 1996- 2012 (2010 to 2012 info incomplete) THAT WOULD NOT HAVE BEEN PREVENTED BY CURRENT VOLUNTARY STANDARD

55 (Table A) Incidents on manufacturer separated outer cords, including those with breakaway tassels or breakaway cord joiners, which caused injury or death via knotted/tangled loop, defective break away, or wrap-around. A( 1) Incidents on pull cords with separate tassels 

### = 51 A(2) Incidents on tilt cords with separate tassels 

### = 4 29 (Table B) Incidents on looped outer cords where the manufacturer created loop did not cause the incident, This includes following categories B(l) incidents on looped outer cords where child not caught in manufacturer created loop but was wrap-around 

### = 16 B(2) incidents in looped outer cords where child not caught in manufacturer created loop but caught in tangle/knot above tassel = 13 5 (Table C) Continuous loop incidents where a tension/tie-down device was present but either not installed, had pulled out of wall or broken (number doesn't include 1 possible but unverified incident listed on sub-table) 6 (Table D) Other instances where caused by a hazardous cord allowed by the standard

- such as reverse inner cord incidents, caught in cord joiner loop on multi-corded window coverings 

## 1 (Table E) Incidents which occurred where manufacturer's failure to make according the voluntary standard contributed to the cause of incident



### = 102 Incidents would not have prevented by the voluntary standard.

More than 40% (1 02 of 250) of all incidents would not have prevented by the current 2012 voluntary standard.Injury Data Table A (1996-2012 w/2010-2012 dataset incomplete)- Known Outer Cord Incidents Involving Manufacturer Separated Cords i.e. Separate Tassels, Breakaway Tassels, Breakaway Cord Joiners & Tilt Cords (in knotted/tangled loop, defective break away, or wrap-around) 55 total incidents (32 fatal, 4 severe injuries, 19 other injuries)

A(1) Incidents occurring on pull cords with separate tassels, breakaway tassels or breakaway cord joiners

Case# Date Age/ Outcome Sex 970319CCC 1026 10/29/96 4 yrs/ F Injury

Rome, NY 970418CEP900 1 4/8/97 21 mos I M Injury

Chicago, IL 981001CCC4014 4/17/97 14 mos I M Fatal

El Cajon, CA 970808CCC3288 7/28/97 4 yrsl M Injury

Kirkland (Bellevue), W A 990121CBB2205 1116/99 15 mos /M Fatal

Roselle (Chicago) (Glendale Heights), IL 010628CCC3361 3/20/00 4 yrsl F Fatal 0008006909 or 3/21/00 Douglas, WY Denver, CO 000518CNE5554 4/16/00 15 mos I M Injury

Columbia, TN 000831CNE5737 8126100 2yrsiM Fatal

Ambrid_g_e _(Pittsburgh}, PA 001108CCC0089 10119100 2.5 yrsl M Injury

Peabody, MA 010614CBB2575 4122101 1 yrl F Fatal

Sealy (Austin), TX 01 0723CCC2641 7121101 4 yrs I M Injury

Utica MICase# Date Age/ Outcome Sex 010815CNE6651 8/10/01 6 yrs/ F Fatal

Newnan, GA 020301CCC1368 10/27/01 20 mos/M Fatal X0210720A

Old Bridge, NJ 020107CCN0223 1/5/02 3 yrs I M Injury

Lincoln, NE 02061 

### occc 1605 4/8/02 8 mos IF Fatal

Carriere (Picayune), MS 020812CNE7432 8/8/02 18 mos I M Injury

- Severe

Bridgewater, MA 020905CCN0794 913102 4 yrs I M Fatal

Corinth, TX 030707CWE4337 1/7103 17 mos /M Fatal

Phoenix, AZ 030418CCN0479 4116103 14 mos IM Fatal

Sheboygan, WI 030708CCC3335 6116103 4 yrsiM Fatal

San Francisco, CA 030828CNE8057 8126103 16 mos IM Fatal

Charlotte, NC 030902CCN0848 08131103 4 yrs/ M Fatal

Middletown (Cincinnati) lrButler County), OH 040423CCC3268 9130103 17 mos I M Fatal 0344194240-S 0341024944 (DC 1011/03)

Eugene (Portland), OR 050303CCC1535 214/05 3.5 yrs IF Fatal

Naples (Golden Gate), FL 215105 050426CCC3334 4121105 3 yrsiM Injury

Pacifica, CACase# Date Age/ Outcome Sex Xl050632A 11118/05 4 yrs I M Injury Parent email to PWBS

El Cajon, CA 0603 28CCC2466 3/10/06 2 yrs /M Injury Gulfport, MS (IDI- typo, says 3110104) 060502CCC3480 4/11/06 15 mos IF Fatal

Elk Grove, CA lfJ4 mos) I 00 I 06CCC2286 8/8/07 2 yrs I M Injury

Minonk, IL 070828CCC2757 8/20/07 14 mos IF Fatal

Helena, AL 080122HNE3082 1/17/08 3 yrs/ M Fatal

Crystal Lake, IL 090204CCC 1402 7/5/08 4 yrs/ M Fatal

Essex, MD (Baltimore), MD) 090602CCC3635 3/1/09 2.5 yrs I M Injury

Phoenix, AZ

09041 OCCC2531 4/8/09 5yrs/F Injury

Ft. Benning, GA 090528CCC3624 4/29/09 3 yrs/M Fatal

Garland, TX 090817CNE4677 8/9/09 2 yrs I M Fatal

Gaithersburg, MD (DC- 8/11/09) Washington, DC 1 00217CCC3328 1/30/10 or 2 yrs IF Injury 1/31/10 Colorado Springs, CO I 00219CCC23 87 2114/10 3yrs/M Injury X1020251A

Saltillo, MSCase# Date Age/ Outcome Sex 1 00519CWE2035 5/16/10 22 mos /M Fatal CPSC Release #11-036, 11/10/2010 (5/25/1 0)

Cedar Falls (Iowa City), 

### lA
I 00708CWE2246 6/9110 3 yrs IF Fatal

Great Falls, MT I 009I5CBB313I 9/10/IO 5 yrs I M Injury

- Severe XI090325A

League City (Dickinson), TX IOII23CCC2136 I 0/30/I 0 2I mos IF Fatal

Medway (New Carlisle) (DC- I8 mos I F) (Dayton), OH

IOII04CCCI094 II/2/1 0 22 mos IF Injury

- Severe

Burlington (Burlington TWP), NJ IIOI03CCC3322 II/I0/10 4yrs/M Injury

Albany, OR IIOI03CCC33I9 I2/3IIl 0 I2 mos IF Injury

Spring, TX

II 060 I CNEOOO I 3/3/II**2-~** yrs IF Injury

- Severe

Richlands (Camp Lejuene), NC II03I5CCCI402 3/5/II 11 mos IF Fatal

Ellicott City (Columbia) (DC- 3/11/II) Baltimore City), MD II 0404CCC2425 3/I8/II 20 mos /M Fatal

Delavan (Geneva), WI III206CCC3I98 8/27/II 2yrs/M Fatal

Seattle, WACase# Date Age/ Outcome Sex Ill 0 18CCC2027 I 0/4/11 3 yrs /M Fatal

Bonaire, GA

120918HWE31 09 9/3/12 5yrs/M Fatal

Kenosha, WI

A(2) Incidents occurring on the separate tilt cords (not pull cords) of horizontal blinds

Case# Date Age/ Outcome Sex 080915HNE3763 9/13/08 3yrs/M Fatal

Miramar (Pembroke Pines), FL) 090728CCC2797 315/09 2 yrs I M Injury

Rockford, IL I 00308CCC2444 3/5/10 4 yrs I M Injury Elk River, MN 120727CCC2904 7/10/12 3 yrs/F Fatal Clarksville, TNInjury Data Table B (1996 -2012 w/2010 to 2012 incomplete): Window Coverin2sIncidents on window coverin2s with looped pull cords but involvin2 wrap-around or knot in loop cord 29 incidents total

B(1) Wrap-Around Incidents includes one that may be a combination cord joiner/wrap around (16 total, 8 fatal, 1 severe injury, 6 other injuries, 1 no injury)

Case# Date Age/ Outcome Sex 960304HCN0685 2/6/96 or 4.5 yrs/ F Fatal 2/5/96 or or Veedersburg (Crawfordsville), 

### 217/96 3yrs/F IN 9611 07CCC5040 9/16/96 2 yrs/ F Fatal

or Hunt Valley (Baltimore), MD 9/1/96 980305CBB5364 2/4/98 2.75 yrs 

### 1M Fatal

Eddyville, lA H0130329A 2/1/01 3yrs/M Injury

Ft. Leavenworth, KS 010625CCN0689 6/7/01 4yrs/M !No injury

Michigan City, IN 020417CEP9003 3/28/02 22 mos/M Injury

Everett, WA 030515CEP9003 3/13/03 3 yrs/M Injury

Lake Stevens, W A 030723CCC1740 3/29/03 10 mos 

### IF Fatal

Philadelphia, P A 050407CCC3309 3/17/05 4 yrs/ M Injury

Broomfield, CO 101210CCC1179 I 0/11/05 13 mos /M InjuryXIOC0115A Severe

La Plata, MDCase# Date Age/ Outcome Sex 051206CCC3182 12/1/05 18 mos 

### IF Fatal

Bothell (King County), W A 12 mos 080530CCC2699 5/17/08 14 mos/M Fatal

Loganville (Snellville), GA 080625CCC3646 6/9/08 12 

### mol M Fatal

Mesa, AZ lr15 moM) 090407CCC3500 3/29/09 8 mos /M Fatal

Oklahoma City, OK

X09B0059A 11/4/09 3Y2 yrs 

### I M Injury 1114/09 email to PWBS

Lynden, WA

120501CCC1644 4/13112 2yrs/M Injury Jacksonville, NC (Camp LeJeune)B(2) Incidents involving a knotted or /tangled cord above manufacturer created loop -where child caught in loop above knots (13 incidents

- 10 fatal, 1 severed injury, 2 other injuries)

Case# Date Age/ Outcome Sex 9801 09CCC2177 11127/97 20 mos 

### IF Fatal

or Mendota Heights (St. Paul), MN 12/01/96 (DC) 980326CCC0231 2/28/98 20 mos 

### IF Fatal

Miami, FL 980528CCC6842 05/14/98 3 yrs/ M Fatal

Tacoma, WA 981222CCC2128 9/1198 5 yrs/ F Fatal

Roseville (Columbus), OH 0010 13CBB0041 10/26/98 17 mos 

### IF Fatal

or Antrim (Peterborough) 16 mos 

### IF lrManchester), NH 001102CNE5849 1111100 13 mos 

### I M Fatal

Willingboro, NJ or 14 mos 

### I M 01051 OCNE6334 5/8/01 3yrs/M Fatal

Fayetteville, NC 01 0723CCC2641 7/21101 4yrs/M Injury I0170330A

Utica, MI 020604CNE734 7 5/28/02 17 mos 

### I M Fatal (or 19 mos/ M) Richmond, VA 030402CCC1421 2/27/03 3 yrs/M Fatal (2 days short of 3rct Union City (Union), TN b'day) 040722CCC2648 7/6/04 2.5 yrs 

### I M Fatal

Ennis (Waxahachie), TX 041119CCC2143 9/30/04 2yrs/M Injury

Wildwood (Chicago), ILCase# Date Age/ Outcome Sex Sheriffs Report, Photo & parents 11113/08 3yrs/F Injury- severe depositions

Shelton WA

### Injury Data Table C (1996- 2012 w/20120- 2012 data set incomplete)- Window**Coverin~:s** 

### Continuous loop incidents where there is a tension device present that

was not installed/pulled out of wall or broken (5 confirmed incidents followed by sub-table of listed but
not counted I possible unverified incident

- all 6 incidents are fatal)

Case# Date Age/ Outcome Sex 02I 0 I6CCC3022 I/7/02 3 yrs/ F Fatal

Wheatland, WY
050804CCC I 029 7/5/05 3 yrs I M Fatal 7/I5/05 Portsmouth (Yorktown) (Langley AFB), 7/17/05 VA 0608IICCC3785 7/30/06 18 mos I Fatal M San Bernadino, CA (DC

- 8/7 /06) lq7 mos) 09092I CCC I 07 6 9/II/09 3 yrs I M Fatal

Norfolk, VA II05I6CCC3728 4/8/li 5 yrs/M Fatal

Mill Creek, W A

Possible but unverified incidents:

Case# Date 

### Agel Outcome Sex 060830CCC1755 12/31105 2yrs/M Fatal

Virginia Beach (Norfolk). VA

### Injury Data TableD (1996 -2012 w/2010 to 2012 data set incomplete): Window**Coverin~:s** 

### Other incidents caused by a cord that met the standard

- such as reverse inner cord incidents,**cau~ht** 

### in cord joiner loop on multi-corded window**coverin~s** 

### 6 incidents total (5 fatal, 1 injury)

Case# Date 

### Agel Outcome Sex 990325CCC0369 113/99 1 yr/ F Fatal

Whiteville, NC 000714CNE5665 3/17/00 2 yrs/ M Fatal

or Irvington, NY 3118/00 Mt. Pleasant, NY 060 124CCC 1326 113/06 2yrs/M Injury (3 yrs) Orlando, FL 081112HWE7844 4/8/08 3yrs/M Fatal

Wahiawa, HI Schofield Barrack, U.S. Army Military housing 090121CCC2276 12/29/08 2yrs/M Fatal (12/30/08) Sartell,MN 090921 CCC 1076 9/11/09 3yrs/M Fatal

!Norfolk, VAInjury Data Table E (1996- 2012 w/2010 to 2012 dataset incomplete): Window Coverin&sIncidents caused or partially caused due to failure of manufacturer to comply with the voluntary standard 7 incidents ( 4 fatal, 3 non- fatal)

Case# Date 

### Agel Outcome Sex 060602CCC 1567 51I9106 4yrsiF Fatal CPSC Release# 09-329

Pensacola, FL

080702CCC I707 6126108 2 yrs IF Injury CPSC Release #09-05I (RI- N Bristol, CT I 012II08)

09092I CCC I 073 I/1109 2 yrs/M No Injury CPSC Release # 09-325 (8126109)

Philadelohia, PA 09090ICCC3939 511109 5 yrs IM Injury CPSC Release #I0-307

Tacoma, WA 0907I OCCC3 73I 5121109 2 yrs 5 mosl F Fatal police reports, photos, ME report

Mesa, AZ 090629CNE4548 6126109 2yrsiF Fatal CPSC release I2-273

Commerce Township, MI NIOI0309A; XIOI0430A 11211I 0 3 yrs I M Fatal I008003099

Firestone COExhibit2StandardisNotAdequateBecauseManufacturersAreIenorineTheVoluntaryStandardCompiledbySafetyBehaviorAnalysis,Inc.(4/26113)Therearenumerousrecalls(16)involvingblindsthatwerenotmanufacturedincompliancewiththevoluntarystandard.Mostofthesenon-compliances(13of16)appeartohavebeenfoundasaby-productofCPSC's2008-2010focusonromanshade&roll-upshadeinnercord/liftingloopissues.Whilecheckingonmanufacturersproductsforromanshadebackcordhazards,androll-upshadeliftingloopissues;CPSCcaughtotherviolationsofthevoluntarystandardincludingloopedpullcords,noinnercordstops,notensiondevicesprovidedwithcontinuousloopproductsand/orfailuretoattachatensiondevicetoacontinuousloopcord.Almostalloftheseviolationswereforstandardrequirementsthatwerepassedwiththefirstvoluntarystandardin 1996.Manyoftheseviolationswentonforyearsandinonecase2decadesbeforetheywerecaughtandrecalled.CPSCRecallViolationofVoluntaryStandardYearvolDatesLengthofRelease/Date:standardmanufacturedtimeRecall#req.and/orsoldmade/soldinpassedviolationoftheStandard#07-2628/3/2007CPSCandSpringsWindowFashionsannouncerecallof1996Manufactured8monthsBasicBlinds®WindowBlindssoldexclusivelyatLowesNovember2006which"havea[!UllcordthatislooQed,gosingatoJuly2007.strangulationhazardtoyoungchildren.CPSCFileNo.RP070430,p.75etseq.#09-05111120/2008"NearStrangulationofChildPromptsRecallto1996Soldover3yearsIRepairWindowBlindsbyGreenMountainnationwideVista"RollerShadeshaveacontinuousloopedbeadfromJune2005chainthatwaseithersoldwithoutatensiondeviceorthroughtensiondevicenotattachedtothecontinuousloopedSeptembercord.2008---CPSCRecallViolationofVoluntaryStandardYearvolDatesLengthofRelease/Date:standardmanufacturedtimeRecall#req.and/orsoldmade/soldinpassedviolationoftheStandard#09-0901113/2009RiskofStrangulationPromptsRecallofWindowBlinds1996sold2SoldatCostPlusandWorldMarketStoresnationwidenationwidefromFebruary2006throughAugust2008.fromFebruaryRomanShadesandRoll-upblindshavealoopedpull2006throughcordAugust2008.#09-3298/26/2009"StrangulationDeathofaChildPromptsRecallToRepair2002soldinPanama4yearsWindowBlindsByVerticalLand"Hazard:HorizontalCityandBlinds:TheblindsdonothaveinnercordstoQdevicestoPensacola,Fla.preventtheaccessibleinnercordsfrombeingpulledout.fromJanuary1992throughDecember2006#09-3258/26/2009"NearStrangulationPromptsRecallofRomanBlinds;Sold1996soldnationwide1yr,10mos.IExclusivelyatIKEA''MELINARomanBlindshaveafromAugustcontinuousloonednullcordthatdidnothavethetension2006throughdeviceattachedorwassoldwithoutatensiondevice.June2008.#09-3288/26/2009"RiskofStrangulationPromptsRecalltoRepairRoller1996SoldJanuary9yrs,3mosShadesbyLutronShadingSolutionsRollershade2000throughannarentlysoldwithouteitherwithoutatensiondeviceorApril2009withoutatensiondeviceattachedtothecontinuousloonedbeadchain.CPSCRecallViolationofVoluntaryStandardYearvolDatesLengthofRelease/Date:standardmanufacturedtimeRecall#req.and/orsoldmade/soldinpassedviolationoftheStandard#10-07412115/2009RiskofStrangulationPromptsRecallofRomanShadesby1996Soldnationwide9yrs,6mos.DraperInc.RomanshadewithcontinuouslooQclutchformMarchOQerationsystem.InadditiontoexQosedinnercords,there2000throughwaseithernotie-downQrovideand/orthetie-downwasSeptember2009.notattachedtotheshade."#10-07112/15/2009"NearStrangulationPromptsRecalltoRepairRomanand1996soldJanuary6yrs,10mos.RollerShadesSoldatPotteryBarn,PotteryBarnKids,and2003throughPBTeens"Rollershadewithouttension deviceattached.October2009.#10-07012/15/2009"RiskofStrangulationPromptsRecalltoRepair1996fromJanuary6mos.MatchstickRoll-upShadesbyInternationalMerchandise;2009throughSoldExclusivelyatBigLots"LoopedpullcordsJune2009.'I#10-71112/17/2009"RiskofStrangulationPromptsRecalltoRepairFaux1996SoldinTexas6mosIwoodblindsbyAmericanVintageGroup."Hazard:fromApril2009Strangulationcanoccurwhenachildplaceshis/herneckthroughbetweenthecordsofthepullcordabovethebreakawaySeptember2009.deviceandthedevicefailstobreakaway.#10-1493/2/2010"RiskofStrangulationPromptsRecalltoRepairRoman1996Soldnationwide9yrs,8mosShadesbyLutronElectronics"Soldwithouttension devicefromJanuaryattachedtocontinuouslooQedcord.2000throughAugust2009.-------------CPSCRecallViolationofVoluntaryStandardYearvolDatesLengthofRelease/Date:standardmanufacturedtimeRecall#req.and/orsoldmade/soldinpassedviolationoftheStandard#10-2616/10/2010"IKEARecallsRollerBlinds,allRomanBlindsandall1996Soldnationwide11yrs,6mosRoll-upBlindsDuetoRiskofStrangulation"ThisrecallfromJanuaryinvolvesrollerblindsthatdonothaveatensiondevice1998throughattachedtothebeadchain,allRomanblindsandallroll-upJune2009.blinds.#10-3077/22/2010"NearStrangulationPromptsRecallofRomanandRoller1996Soldnationwide12yrsShadesbySmith+Noble"Thisrecallinvolvesallrollerfrom1998shadesthatdonothaveatensiondeviceattachedtothethroughAprilcontinuousloopcordandallcustom,made-to-order2010.Romanshades.#11-30611/10/2010"StrangulationDeathofaChildPromptsRecallofRoman1996Soldfrom13yrs,10mosiShade,Roll-upBlinds,andRollerBlindsbyHanoverJanuary1996-DirectDomestications"ThisrecallinvolvesallstylesofthroughOctoberRomanshadeswithinnercords,allstylesofroll-upblinds,2009.androllerblindsthatdonothaveatensiondevice./#12-2739/6/2012"DeathofChildPromptsRecallofWindowBlindsby1996SoldinVerticalblindsBlindXpressTwo-year-oldstranglesincord"Thisrecall(attachedMichigan,Ohio22yrsinvolvesallBlindXpresscustom-madeverticalblindsthatcordtensionandIndianadonothaveacord-tensioningdevicethatattachestothedevice)fromJanuaryhorizontalwallorfloor,aswellasallhorizontalblindsthatdonot2002(inner1995throughblindshaveinnercordstopdevices.December2011.cordstops)9yrs---- ----------·----------------------CPSCRecallViolationofVoluntaryStandardYearvolDatesLengthofRelease/Date:standardmanufacturedtimeRecall#req.and/orsoldmade/soldinpassedviolationoftheStandard#13-7071112112012HunterDouglasRecallstoRepairCustomCellularand1996Soldnationwide1yr,8mos.PleatedWindowCoveringsDuetoStrangulationHazard.fromJanuaryNoincident.Someofthecordsinsidethe2011throughbreakawa:YcordstoQweretiedinasingleknotAugust2012.whichcan12reventthecordstoQfromfunctioningasdesignedtobreakawa:Y.Achildcanbecomeentangledinacordloopandstrangle.Standardcordlocktop-down/bottom-upDuetteandApplausehoneycombshades;standardcordlocktop-down/bottom-up HunterDouglaspleatedshades;HunterDouglasBrilliancePrivacyViewpleatedshadesandstandardcordlockDuetteandApplauseDuoliteshades--------·----·-