[Cite as State v. Lay , 2012-Ohio-4447.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT CHAMPAIGN COUNTY STATE OF OHIO : : Appellate Case No. 2012-CA-7 Plaintiff-Appellee : : Trial Court Ca se No. 05-CR-251 v. : JERRY R. LAY : (Criminal Appeal from : ( Common Pleas Court) Defendant-Appellant : :

. . . . . . . . . . . O P I N I O N Rendered on the 28 th day of September, 2012.

. . . . . . . . . . . NICK A. SELVAGGIO, Atty. Reg. #0055607, Champaign County Prosecutor’s Office, 200 North Main Street, Urbana, Ohio 43078 Attorney for Plaintiff-AppelleeJERRY R. LAY, #456-077, Chillic othe Correctional Institution, Post Office Box 5500,Chillicothe, Ohio 45601 Defendant-Appellant, pro se

. . . . . . . . . . . . . HALL, J. {¶ 1} Jerry R. Lay appeals pro se from the trial court’s denial of his motion to vacate his sex-offender registration a nd notification requirements. {¶ 2} In his sole assignment of error, La y contends the trial court abused its2 discretion in denying his motion. {¶ 3} Lay pled guilty to eight counts of gross sexual imposition in 2006. The trial court imposed an aggregate fifteen-year prison term and designated him a sexual predator under the Megan’s Law version of R.C. Ch apter 2950. This court affirmed in an Anders appeal, agreeing with appointed appellate counsel that there were no non-frivolous issues for review. State v. Lay , 2d Dist. Champaign No. 2007-CA-08, 2007-Ohio-5179. {¶ 4} Lay filed his pro se motion to v acate his sex-offender registration and notification requirements on January 5, 2012. Relying on State v. Williams , 129 Ohio St.3d 344, 2011-Ohio-3374, 952 N.E.2d 1108, Lay claimed the trial court erred in retroactively applying the Megan’s Law version of R.C. Chapter 2950 to him because he committed his sex offenses in 1993. He argued that by desi gnating him a sexual predator under Megan’s Law, the trial court unlawfully imposed punitive registration and notification requirements on him that did not exist when he committed his crimes. {¶ 5} The trial court rejected Lay’s argume nt for two reasons. First, it found that Williams was inapplicable because it concerned retroactive application of the Adam Walsh Act version of R.C. Chapter 2950. The trial c ourt reasoned that applying the Megan’s Law version of the statute to Lay was permitted. Second, the trial court determined that res judicata precluded Lay from challenging his sexual predator classification and the requirements imposed on him by Megan’s Law. {¶ 6} On appeal, Lay repeats his claim that Williams prohibits applying the Megan’s Law version of R.C. Chapter 2950 to him b ecause he committed his offenses in 1993. Lay also insists that res judicata does not apply b ecause application of Megan’s Law to him is3 “contrary to law” and, therefore, may be challenged at any time . As the trial court correctly found, both arguments lack merit. {¶ 7} In Williams , the Ohio Supreme Court held that the Adam Walsh Act version of R.C. Chapter 2950 is punitive and, therefore, cannot be applied retroactiv ely to sex offenders who committed their crimes before the legislation’s effective date. But the Adam Walsh Act version of the statute has not been applied to Lay. Even he acknowledges that the trial court designated him a sexual predator under the earlier Megan’s Law version of R.C. Chapter 2950. The Ohio Supreme Court consistently has he ld that pre-Adam Walsh Act versions of R.C. Chapter 2950 are remedial, not punitive, and that retroactive app lication of them does not violate the Ohio or United States Constitutions. See , e.g. , State v. Cook , 83 Ohio St.3d 404, 1998-Ohio-291, 700 N.E.2d 570; State v. Ferguson , 120 Ohio St.3d 7, 2008-Ohio-4824, 896 N.E.2d110. {¶ 8} Because Lay was designated a sexual predator under a pre-Adam Walsh Act version of R.C. Chapter 2950, Williams has no applicability to him. The legislation under which sex-offender registrati on and notification requirement s were imposed on Lay is remedial, not punitive. Therefore, retroactive application of those requirements to him is permitted. {¶ 9} Finally, we agree with the trial court that res judicata precludes Lay from challenging his sex-offender cl assification under Megan’s Law. The trial court’ s designation of Lay as a sexual predator and its impos ition of corresponding re porting and notification requirements were valid parts of the trial court’ s final judgment. On direct appeal, this court upheld Lay’s designation as a sexual pred ator under Megan’s Law. Res judicata now4 precludes him from further litigating his sex-offender registration and notification obligations under that law. {¶ 10} Lay’s assignment of error is overrule d, and the judgment of the Champaign County Common Pleas Court is affirmed.

. . . . . . . . . . . . . FAIN and DONOVAN, JJ., concur.

Copies mailed to: Nick A. Selvaggio Jerry R. Lay Hon. Roger B. Wilson