If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to 

revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports.

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S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N

C O U R T O F A P P E A L S

DAWN CARTRETTE,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

UNPUBLISHED

March 3, 2022

v No. 355527

Wayne Circuit Court

CITY OF MELVINDALE POST 6032 VETERANS 

OF FOREIGN WARS OF THE UNITED STATES,

LC No. 15-015368-NO

Defendant,

and

DEPARTMENT OF MICHIGAN VETERANS OF 

FOREIGN WARS OF THE UNITED STATES,

INC.,

Garnishee Defendant-Appellee,

and

LYNN PATTERSON and GERALD GORSKI,

Garnishee Defendants.

Before: K. F. KELLY, P.J., and SAWYER and GADOLA, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

Plaintiff, Dawn Cartrette, appeals as of right the trial court’s order denying her motion to 

impose garnishee liability upon defendant, Department of Michigan Veterans of Foreign Wars of 

the United States, Inc. (the Department). We affirm.

I. FACTS

This case involves plaintiff’s attempt to garnish certain funds held by the Department to 

satisfy a default judgment she obtained against defendant, City of Melvindale Post 6032 Veterans 

of Foreign Wars of the United States (Post 6032). By way of background, the Veterans of Foreign 
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Wars of the United States (VFW) is a national organization of veterans whose members served 

overseas in the United States armed forces during wartime. 36 USC 230101. The defendantgarnishee Department is the Michigan chapter of the VFW; defendant Post 6032 was one of several 

VFW posts located in Michigan, chartered by and under the supervision of the Department. The 

Department and Post 6032 are distinct and separate nonprofit corporations. 

On September 23, 2013, the Department placed Post 6032 on a 90-day suspension in light 

of Post 6032’s ongoing delinquency in its audits and program reporting. On January 30, 2014, the 

Department recommended that Post 6032’s charter be revoked. After an appeal process, Post 

6032’s charter was revoked and the Post was declared defunct on July 8, 2014. Under VFW 

bylaws, upon revocation of the Post’s charter, title to all real and personal property of Post 6032 

passed “immediately” to the Department. On December 27, 2016, the Department reportedly sold 

the building where Post 6032 had been located for approximately $69,000. The Department 

allegedly transferred the proceeds from the sale, together with other funds previously belonging to 

Post 6032, into the Department’s bank account for a total amount of approximately $100,000.

Before Post 6032’s charter was revoked on July 8, 2014, however, plaintiff allegedly was 

injured while working1at the Post. On November 14, 2013, while serving drinks at Post 6032, 

plaintiff allegedly fell and was injured. On January 2, 2014, plaintiff filed for workers 

compensation benefits. The benefits were denied, apparently because Post 6032 had not purchased 

workers compensation coverage for plaintiff. 

On November 24, 2015, two years after her alleged injury and more than one year after 

Post 6032’s charter was revoked by the Department, plaintiff filed a negligence action against Post

6032. When the Post did not respond to the complaint, plaintiff was permitted to use alternative

service of posting and publication. On August 19, 2016, the trial court entered a default judgment 

in plaintiff’s favor against Post 6032 in the amount of $275,000. 

On December 14, 2018, plaintiff filed a writ of garnishment against the Department

alleging that the Department held assets that belonged to Post 6032 and that the Department was 

obligated to pay the assets to plaintiff to satisfy the default judgment against the Post. The 

Department filed a garnishee disclosure denying that it possessed assets belonging to Post 6032. 

Plaintiff moved to impose garnishee liability upon the Department2by seeking a default judgment 

under MCR 3.101(S)(1)(a) and (b). At the direction of the trial court, each party submitted 

proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law. The trial court thereafter denied plaintiff’s 

motion to impose garnishee liability upon the Department, and subsequently denied plaintiff’s 

motion for reconsideration. Plaintiff now appeals. 

 

1

It was not established whether plaintiff was acting as an employee or as a volunteer at the time 

of her alleged injury. 

2 Plaintiff originally filed writs of garnishment against garnishee defendants, Gerald Gorski and 

Lynn Patterson, and moved to impose garnishee liability against those defendants. The parties 

later stipulated to dismissal of the claims against Gorski and Patterson and the substitution of the 

Department in their place. 
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II. DISCUSSION 

Plaintiff contends that the trial court erred by failing to order the Department to pay plaintiff 

the funds that previously belonged to Post 6032. Plaintiff argues that the transfer of assets from 

Post 6032 to the Department was voidable under the Michigan Uniform Voidable Transactions 

Act (MUVTA), MCL 566.31 et seq., and that the Department therefore has garnishee liability to 

plaintiff, a judgment creditor of Post 6032. We disagree. 

In Michigan, garnishment actions are authorized by statute. Ladd v Motor City Plastics 

Co, 303 Mich App 83, 97; 842 NW2d 388 (2013). After a party obtains a judgment, the party may 

employ garnishment as a means to satisfy the claim. Premiere Prop Servs, Inc v Crater, 333 Mich 

App 623, 632; 963 NW2d 430 (2020). The trial court is required to exercise its garnishment power 

in accordance with the Michigan Court Rules. MCL 600.4011(2); Premier Prop Servs, Inc, 333 

Mich App at 632. We review de novo a trial court’s interpretation and application of statutes and 

court rules. Sandstone Creek Solar, LLC v Benton Twp, 335 Mich App 683, 698, 712; 967 NW2d 

890 (2021). We review the trial court’s factual findings for clear error, which occurs if this Court 

is definitely and firmly convinced that the trial court made a mistake. Speicher v Columbia Twp 

Bd of Election Comm’rs, 299 Mich App 86, 94; 832 NW2d 392 (2012). 

MCL 600.4011(1)(a) authorizes garnishment of: 

(a) Personal property belonging to the person against whom the claim is asserted 

but which is in the possession or control of a third person if the third person is 

subject to the judicial jurisdiction of the state and the personal property to be 

applied is within the boundaries of this state. 

Post-judgment garnishment proceedings are governed by MCR 3.101. Ladd, 303 Mich 

App at 97. MCR 3.101(G) provides, in relevant part:

(1) Subject to the provisions of the garnishment statute and any setoff permitted by 

law or these rules, the garnishee is liable for

(a) all tangible or intangible property belonging to the defendant in the garnishee’s 

possession or control when the writ is served on the garnishee, . . . 

* * * 

(h) all tangible or intangible property of the defendant that, when the writ is served 

on the garnishee, the garnishee holds by conveyance, transfer, or title that is void 

as to creditors of the defendant, whether or not the defendant could maintain an 

action against the garnishee to recover the property; . . . 

In Nationsbanc Mtg Corp of Georgia v Luptak, 243 Mich App 560, 567-568; 625 NW2d 

385 (2000), this Court explained the proper application of MCR 3.101(G)(1)(h), stating: 

MCR 3.101(G)(1)(h) clearly indicates that it applies only to conveyances 

that are void as to creditors at the time the writ is served on the garnishee defendant. 

Given the legal import attached to the term “void,” and crediting the Supreme Court 
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with full knowledge of such significance, we read the court rule as requiring a 

previous judicial determination that the transfer at issue is indeed void.

We also believe that such a reading is consistent with the requirements set 

forth in MCR 3.101(D) regarding the statement of claim made in a garnishment 

proceeding. Given the limited information that is required to be set forth in the 

verified statement, we believe that requiring a plaintiff to specifically allege the 

factual basis for a claim of fraudulent conveyance in a separate proceeding 

comports with due process guarantees. Without such specific pleadings, the 

garnishee’s ability to resist a mistaken deprivation of property is severely 

compromised. This is especially so when the garnishee was not even a named party 

in the prior lawsuit and judgment from which the garnishment proceeding stems. 

Although plaintiff did not specifically allege fraud in her motion before the trial court, in 

her findings of fact and conclusions of law submitted to the trial court plaintiff suggested that the 

transfer of assets from Post 6032 to the Department was voidable under the MUVTA. Applying 

Nationsbanc, the trial court observed that before seeking a garnishment, plaintiff was obligated to 

obtain a judicial determination that the transfer of funds from Post 6032 to the Department was 

void. The trial court stated “[a]ssuming arguendo plaintiff is challenging the conveyance of Post 

6032’s property to the Department of State VFW upon losing its charter and subsequent 

dissolution, the appropriate procedure to challenge the conveyance was to file a complaint to 

declare the transfer of property voidable and/or to set aside the transfer, not file a writ of 

garnishment.” We agree. It is undisputed plaintiff did not obtain a judgment declaring the transfer 

of the Post’s assets to the Department void. Given the necessity of a judicial determination 

declaring the transfer void before the assets could be subject to garnishment, the trial court did not 

err in finding the assets at issue were not subject to garnishment under MCR 3.101(G). See 

Nationsbanc, 243 Mich App at 567-568.

On appeal, plaintiff challenges the reasoning of Nationsbanc, arguing that “the 

Nationsbanc approach overlooks the concluding language of sub-sections (h) and (i) of MCR 

3.101(G),” thus disagreeing with this Court’s interpretation and application of MCR 

3.101(G)(1)(h) in that case. However, “[a] published opinion of the Court of Appeals has 

precedential effect under the rule of stare decisis.” MCR 7.215(C)(2). Thus, unless a decision 

from our Supreme Court holds to the contrary, we are bound to follow the prior published opinions 

of this Court. 

Plaintiff also points to this Court’s footnote in Nationsbanc, that “[w]e do believe, 

however, that if the parties so agreed, adjudication of a fraudulent conveyance claim could be 

disposed of in garnishment proceedings, assuming proper notice of the issues in controversy.” 

Nationsbanc, 243 Mich App at 568 n 3. In this case, however, the parties did not agree to the 

adjudication of plaintiff’s claim of fraudulent conveyance within the garnishment proceedings, and 

in fact, the Department consistently opposed plaintiff’s efforts to impose garnishee liability against 

the Department. 

Plaintiff further argues that even though she did not obtain a judgment against the 

Department, the Department nonetheless is subject to garnishee liability under MCR 3.101(M), 
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which permits a plaintiff to move for judgment against a garnishee defendant to the extent of the 

admissions in the garnishee defendant’s disclosures. MCR 3.101(M) provides, in relevant part:

(1) If there is a dispute regarding the garnishee’s liability . . . the issue shall be tried 

in the same manner as other civil actions.

(2) The verified statement acts as the plaintiff’s complaint against the garnishee, 

and the disclosure serves as the answer. The facts stated in the disclosure must be 

accepted as true unless the plaintiff has served interrogatories or noticed a 

deposition within the time allowed by subrule (L)(1) . . . . Except as the facts stated 

in the verified statement are admitted by the disclosure, they are denied. . . .

(3) Even if the amount of the garnishee’s liability is disputed, the plaintiff may 

move for judgment against the garnishee to the extent of the admissions in the 

disclosure. The general motion practice rules govern notice (including notice to the 

garnishee and the defendant) and hearing on the motion.

In this case, after being served the writ of garnishment the Department filed its disclosures 

indicating “[t]he garnishee defendant is not indebted to the defendant and does not possess or 

control the defendant’s property.” The trial court held that the Department’s garnishment 

disclosure truthfully stated that it was not indebted to Post 6032; rather, the property of Post 6032 

reverted to the Department upon the revocation of Post 6032’s charter. The trial court thus found 

that the Department was not liable to plaintiff as a garnishee defendant. Although under MCR 

3.101(M)(3) a plaintiff may move for judgment against the garnishee to the extent of the 

admissions in the disclosure, the Department did not admit to any garnishee liability in the 

disclosures. Therefore, the trial court did not err in denying plaintiff’s motion to impose liability 

under MCR 3.101(M).

3

 

Affirmed.

/s/ Kirsten Frank Kelly

/s/ David H. Sawyer

/s/ Michael F. Gadola

 

3 Plaintiff raises for the first time on appeal additional arguments that she was entitled to garnish 

the former Post 6032 assets held by the Department, including that the trial court should have 

permitted plaintiff to pierce the corporate veil and show that the Department and the Post were, in 

effect, a singular entity, and that common-law exceptions to corporate liability demonstrated 

plaintiff’s entitlement to recover the assets. Plaintiff waived review of these arguments by failing 

to timely raise them in the trial court. See Wells v State Farm Fire & Casualty Co, ___ Mich ___, 

___ n 6 (2022) (Docket No. 161911); slip op at 1 n 6. Moreover, as discussed, challenges to the 

validity of the transfer of the assets are relevant to an action seeking a judicial determination that 

the transfer of assets was void, but are misplaced in a garnishment action.