1997 Decisions

Opinions of the United

States Court of Appeals

for the Third Circuit

8-11-1997

Rogers v. Powell

Precedential or Non-Precedential:

Docket 96-7299

Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_1997

This decision is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit at Villanova

University School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in 1997 Decisions by an authorized administrator of Villanova

University School of Law Digital Repository. For more information, please contact Benjamin.Carlson@law.villanova.edu.

Recommended Citation

"Rogers v. Powell" (1997). 1997 Decisions. Paper 186.

http://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_1997/186
iled August 11, 1997 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 

NO. 96-7299 

ROBERT EUGENE ROGERS, 

Appellant

v. 

OFFICER KEVIN POWELL; OFFICER JEFFREY STINE, 

a/k/a Stiney; OFFICER TIMOTHY EILER; 

OFFICER JAMES EDWARDS, 

Appellees

On Appeal From the United States District Court 

For the Middle District of Pennsylvania 

(D.C. Civ. No. 95-cv-01204) 

Argued: January 28, 1997 

Before: BECKER, ROTH, Circuit Judges, and 

ORLOFSKY, District Judge.* 

(Filed August 11, 1997) 

DONALD A. BAILEY, ESQUIRE 

 (ARGUED) 

3540 Progress Avenue, Suite 209 

Harrisburg, PA 17110 

Attorney for Appellant

_________________________________________________________________ 

* Honorable Stephen M. Orlofsky, United States District Judge for the 

District of New Jersey, sitting by designation. 
THOMAS W. CORBETT, JR., 

 ESQUIRE 

Attorney General 

JACQUELINE E. JACKSON- 

 DEGARCIA, ESQUIRE (ARGUED) 

Deputy Attorney General 

CALVIN R. KOONS, ESQUIRE 

Senior Deputy Attorney General 

JOHN G. KNORR, III, ESQUIRE 

Chief Deputy Attorney General 

Office of Attorney General 

Strawberry Square, 15th Floor 

Harrisburg, PA 17120 

Attorneys for Appellees

OPINION OF THE COURT 
CKER, Circuit Judge. 

This is an appeal by plaintiff Robert Rogers from a

district court final judgment in a civil rights action, 42 

U.S.C. § 1983, in favor of four Pennsylvania state police 

troopers who Rogers claims violated his civil rights by 

arresting him without probable cause and by using 

excessive force in connection with the arrest. The unlawful 

arrest claim was disposed of by summary judgment. The 

excessive force claim was tried to a jury which found for the 

defendants. We find no error in connection with the trial, 

and affirm summarily with respect to the excessive force 

claim. However, we find the existence of a triable fact with 

respect to aspects of the unlawful arrest claim against some 

of the defendants. 

More specifically, we conclude that the information

received by Trooper James Edwards from Probation Officer 

Rita Miller about the supposed existence of an arrest 

warrant for Rogers was too insubstantial to justify

detaining him. Moreover, because Edwards' reliance on the 

vague and inconclusive statements of a parole officer was 

not reasonable, he was not entitled to qualified immunity. 

 2 
Thus, we reverse the grant of summary judgment as to 

Edwards. With respect to Trooper Timothy Eiler, who

arrested Rogers along with Edwards based on Edwards' 

representation that there was a valid arrest warrant, we 

affirm the grant of summary judgment on the grounds that 

he is properly held entitled to qualified immunity.

We also conclude that Troopers Jeffrey Stine and Kevin 

Powell, whose detention of Rogers was also based on

Edwards' representation, are entitled to qualified immunity, 

but only up to the point at which they were informed that 

there was no reason to hold Rogers in custody. Their 

qualified immunity disappeared when they continued to 

detain him for approximately one hour thereafter. We 

therefore affirm in part and reverse in part with respect to 

Stine and Powell. 

I. Facts and Procedural History

On September 25, 1994, Troopers James Edwards and 

Timothy Eiler were working the midnight shift in Clinton 

County, Pennsylvania.1 Edwards was assigned to the desk 

while Eiler was on patrol with Trooper Dale Gillette. Prior to 

starting his shift, Edwards claims that he had spoken with 

Trooper Davy. During this conversation, Davy allegedly 

mentioned that there was a "court paper out on Rogers." 

The record, however, is devoid of any declaration or 

deposition by Davy, so we cannot confirm exactly what he 

said to Edwards. 

Later that evening Edwards received a report of afight in 

nearby Logantown in which Rogers was allegedly involved. 

Edwards dispatched Eiler and Gillette to the scene of the 

fight. When they arrived, Rogers was not present. Eiler and 

Gillette then began to search for him. At this point, because 

of Edwards' earlier conversation with Davy, as well as 

Rogers' alleged involvement in the Logantown fight,

Edwards decided to determine if any warrants were pending 

for Rogers. 

Following Pennsylvania State Police procedure, Edwards 

contacted the Clinton County Communications Center 

_________________________________________________________________ 

1. The "midnight shift" began at 11 P.M. on September 25, and ended at 

7 A.M. on September 26. 

 3 
which informed him that there were two summary warrants 

pending for Rogers. Additionally, Edwards said he was 

informed that there might be other "open" paperwork on 

Rogers from the Clinton County Probation Office. As a 

result, Edwards called the probation office and requested 

that the officer on duty that evening contact him. Edwards 

then contacted Eiler and Gillette and told them not to pick 

up Rogers if they found him because the only warrants of 

whose existence Edwards knew were summary warrants.

When an individual is arrested for outstanding summary 

offense warrants, he must be taken to appear before the 

proper issuing authority "without delay." Pa. R. Cr. P. 

76(b)(4). Therefore, officers typically do not arrest an 

individual during the late evening or early morning hours 

for outstanding summary offense warrants because they 

are reluctant to awaken the district justice on duty. 

Later that night, Rita Miller, from the Clinton County 

Probation Office responded to Edwards' call. She too 

advised Edwards of the two summary warrants. Miller also 

stated that Trooper Davy wanted Rogers "because he [Davy] 

said that Lycoming County said that they'll hold him as an 

absconding witness."2 Edwards maintains that this 

statement gave him the belief that there was a warrant for 

Rogers' arrest in Lycoming County. 

A transcript of the conversation between Edwards and 

Miller, prepared by police communications officer Ruth 

Eoute at the request of Sergeant Salinas of the 

Pennsylvania State Police, the accuracy of which is not 

disputed by any of the parties, supports Miller's claim that 

she never confirmed the existence of a warrant for Rogers' 

arrest in Lycoming County: 

Edwards: State Police, Tpr. Edwards. 

Miller: Hi, it's Rita Miller. 

Edwards: Rita? 

Miller: Yeah. 

_________________________________________________________________ 

2. See 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 5125 (West 1983) (dealing with 

"absconding witnesses" and defining the offense as a misdemeanor of the 

third degree). 

 4 
Edwards: Do you want Robert Rogers? 

Miller: There's a warrant out for him. It's a 

 summary warrant. Davy wants him. 

 Because he says that Lycoming County 

 said that they'll have him as an 

 absconding witness. 

Edwards: Who will? Lycoming County? 

Miller: Yeah. Because he's to testify against 

 Doctor Bender in the hearing. 

Edwards: Mm Hm. 

Miller: Okay. And also I think there's two 

 warrants out from Lycoming County.3 I 

 think they're both from Frazier's office. 

 One's for Hit and Run over at (inaudible) 

 and one's for assaulting that guy and they 

 charged him with harassment. So he has 

 two summary warrants. Do you have 

 them? Copies of the warrants. 

Edwards: No. The Comm. Center does. 

Miller: Okay. No. I don't have him on any more 

 because they left him off of probation after 

 giving him that deal. You know, if he would 

 testify? 

Edwards: Yeah. 

Miller: So I don't have anything on him any more. 

 Do you guys have him? 

Edwards: No. He's with Mike Marshall tonight and 

 Gilly Stevenson and they're causing some

 shit. 

_________________________________________________________________ 

3. In her sworn deposition, Miller stated that she misspoke at this point 

in the conversation with Edwards. Frazier is a district justice in Clinton 

County, so it seems clear from the context of the conversation that Miller 

intended to say "there's two warrants out from Clinton County" when in 

fact she said "there's two warrants out from Lycoming County." We 

conclude from Edwards' response that he, too, understood that Miller 

meant to refer to Clinton County, rather that Lycoming County at this 

point in the conversation. (Appellees' Supplemental Appendix, p. 169). 

 5 
Miller: Mm Hm. 

Edwards: So, uh, the one guy that was out on the 

 road (inaudible) 

Miller: Mm Hm. 

Edwards: So they went to look to get him again and 

 he had left. So they're going down to a 

 place in Flemington to see if they're down 

 there. 

Miller: Okay. 

Edwards: So then if they get him, definitely pick him 

 up. Yes? 

Miller: Yeah. They can pick him up on the 

 warrants and then they can let Lycoming 

 County know and they were going to put 

 like high bail on him to hold him so that 

 he'd be able to testify at the trial. 

Edwards: Okay. If we're going to pick him up for the 

 warrants, what are we to do, take him to

 Lycoming County or take him here? 

Miller: You better bring him here. And then get 

 ahold of Trooper Davy and let him get 

 ahold of Lycoming County and let them 

 know. Because he said (inaudible), Davy 

 did. 

Edwards: This is Bob Rogers the third? 

Miller: Yep. 

Edwards: Okay. Okay. 

Miller: Okay? 

Edwards: Go back to sleep. 

Miller: Thanks. 

Edwards: Bye. 

Miller: Bye. 

After this conversation, Edwards radioed Gillette and Eiler 

and told them that if they found Rogers, they should arrest 

him. Gillette and Eiler did not locate Rogers that evening. 

 6 
The following evening, Edwards, Eiler, and Gillette were 

again working the midnight shift. This time Edwards and 

Eiler were on patrol and Gillette was on desk duty. At 

approximately 2:40 A.M., Gillette dispatched Eiler and 

Edwards to Dr. Barry Bender's residence. When they 

arrived at the residence, Bender informed the two troopers 

that they were not needed. Edwards and Eiler left, but 

returned within twenty minutes after Gillette again

dispatched them to Bender's residence because Rogers was 

creating a disturbance inside Bender's house. After

receiving consent to enter, Edwards and Eiler arrested 

Rogers inside. When Rogers demanded to see the warrant 

for his arrest, Edwards replied that he did not have the 

warrant and that Rogers would see it when he arrived at 

the Montoursville State Police Barracks in Lycoming

County. Edwards and Eiler left Bender's residence with 

Rogers at 3:19 A.M. 

While en route to Lycoming County, Edwards contacted 

Gillette and requested that Gillette arrange for a patrol car 

to meet them at the Clinton/Lycoming County line. Gillette 

then contacted the dispatch officer in Lycoming County, 

Police Communications Officer James Pfleegor, to request 

that he send a patrol car to the county line. Gillette 

informed Pfleegor that Rogers was being transferred to their 

custody because there was an outstanding warrant or

detainer waiting for him at Lycoming County Prison. At 

approximately 3:54 A.M., Pfleegor dispatched Troopers 

Stine and Powell to the county line to transport Rogers to 

Lycoming County Prison. Edwards and Eiler took Rogers to 

the county line and transferred him to the custody of Stine 

and Powell. Stine and Powell did not personally know 

Edwards or Eiler, or know of Rogers before this transfer. 

When Stine and Powell took Rogers into their custody, they 

noticed that he was belligerent and appeared to be 

intoxicated. 

While en route to the Lycoming County Prison, Stine and 

Powell radioed Pfleegor and requested that he notify the 

prison that they would be arriving shortly with Rogers and 

that the prison should begin to prepare any necessary 

paperwork. Pfleegor radioed back a short time later and 

informed Stine and Powell that the prison could not locate 

 7 
an outstanding warrant or detainer for Rogers' arrest. 

According to Stine and Powell, they did not immediately 

release Rogers after receiving Pfleegor's message because 

they were unclear as to whether an outstanding warrant or 

detainer for Rogers' arrest existed. Instead, they drove to 

the Montoursville Barracks to clarify the situation. 

Once they reached the barracks, both troopers took 

Rogers upstairs to the patrol room. It was at this point that 

the incident occurred between Stine and Rogers giving rise 

to the excessive force claim. Stine then sat Rogers into a 

chair, placed handcuffs on him, and connected him to a 

chain on the floor. Rogers fell asleep. 

While Rogers was sleeping, Powell spoke with Nancy 

Butts, an assistant district attorney of Lycoming County. 

Butts advised Powell that there was no outstanding bench 

warrant or detainer for Rogers' arrest in Lycoming County 

and that since they had no reason to hold Rogers they 

should release him and transport him back to the county 

line. 

At some point after 5:45 A.M., notwithstanding Butt's 

advice, Powell and Stine transported Rogers in handcuffs 

back to the county line. Edwards, Eiler, and Davy met Stine 

and Powell at the county line. Rogers remained in 

handcuffs until he was released back to Edwards, Eiler, 

and Davy at approximately 6:04 A.M. Rogers was finally 

dropped off, at his request, at the Dunkin Donuts in Lock 

Haven, Clinton County at approximately 6:25 A.M. 

Rogers brought suit against Powell, Stine, Eiler, and 

Edwards pursuant to § 1983, alleging that the officers 

violated his right to be free from unlawful seizures under 

the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments.4 The defendants 

_________________________________________________________________ 

4. In addition to his unlawful seizure claims against all four defendants, 

Rogers brought two claims solely against Stine. First, Rogers brought a 

§ 1983 claim against Stine arising out of an incident at the Montoursville 

Barracks alleging that Stine violated his right to be free from excessive 

force under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. Stine moved for 

summary judgment as to this excessive force claim, but the District 

Court denied Stine's motion. The claim went to trial and the jury entered 

a verdict in favor of Stine. Rogers asserts that the district court erred in 

 8 
moved for summary judgment on the grounds that no 

genuine issue of material fact existed with respect to the 

issue of whether the troopers had probable cause to arrest 

Rogers without a warrant. The district court agreed, and 

granted the defendants' motion. 

The district court properly exercised its jurisdiction 

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331; we exercise appellate

jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. Our review of the 

district court's grant of summary judgment is plenary. 

Ersek v. Township of Springfield, 102 F.3d 79, 83 (3d Cir. 

1996). 

II. The Unlawful Arrest Claim

We begin our inquiry by examining the question whether 

the arrest of Rogers was unlawful and thus violated his 

Fourth Amendment right to be free from an unlawful 

seizure. That the defendants may have violated the Fourth 

Amendment does not end our inquiry, however. They will 

be liable for damages only if the doctrine of qualified 

immunity does not protect them. 

A. The Applicable Rules

The Fourth Amendment prohibits a police officer from 

arresting a citizen except upon probable cause. Orsatti v.

New Jersey State Police, 71 F.3d 480, 482 (3d Cir. 1995) 

(citing Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156 

(1972)). In Pennsylvania, "[n]o arrest warrant shall issue 

but upon probable cause . . ." Pa. R. Cr. Pr. 119. The 

gravamen of Rogers' claim is that he was arrested without 

the requisite probable cause. The crux of the defendants' 

argument is that Edwards' mistaken belief that an arrest 

warrant had issued for Rogers supplied the probable cause 

required by the Fourth Amendment. 

_________________________________________________________________ 

refusing to allow him to offer evidence during the trial that he suffered 

some type of injury or damage during the incident. We find this claim 

patently without merit. 

Rogers also brought a pendent state law assault claim against Trooper 

Stine. The district court granted Stine's motion for summary judgment 

as to this claim on sovereign immunity grounds. Rogers did not appeal 

this ruling. 

 9 
"[P]robable cause to arrest exists when the facts and 

circumstances within the arresting officer's knowledge are 

sufficient in themselves to warrant a reasonable person to 

believe that an offense has been or is being committed by 

the person to be arrested." Orsatti, 71 F.3d at 483. The 

district court found that no genuine issue of material fact 

existed with respect to whether the officers had probable 

cause to arrest Rogers without a warrant because Edwards' 

conversations with Davy and Miller supplied him with the 

"facts and circumstances" necessary to support his finding 

of probable cause to arrest Rogers. 

The district court's conclusion was legally erroneous 

because statements by fellow officers conveying that there 

is probable cause for a person's arrest, by themselves, 

cannot provide the "facts and circumstances" necessary to 

support a finding of probable cause. Whitely v. Warden, 401 

U.S. 560, 568 (1971) ("[A]n otherwise illegal arrest cannot 

be insulated from challenge by the decision of the 

instigating officer to rely on fellow officers to make the 

arrest."). Probable cause exists only if the statements made 

by fellow officers are supported by actual facts that satisfy 

the probable cause standard. In United States v. Hensley, 

469 U.S. 221 (1985) the Court held that the lawfulness of 

a seizure made in reliance on the statements of fellow 

officers 

turns on whether the officers who issued the 

[statements] possessed probable cause to make the 

arrest. It does not turn on whether those relying on the 

[statements] were themselves aware of the specific facts 

which led their colleagues to seek their assistance. 

Id. at 231. 

Thus, the required basis for a lawful seizure where police 

rely on the statements of fellow officers is as follows. The 

legality of a seizure based solely on statements issued by 

fellow officers depends on whether the officers who issued

the statements possessed the requisite basis to seize the 

suspect. Id. at 231. Moreover, an officer can lawfully act 

solely on the basis of statements issued by fellow officers if 

the officers issuing the statements possessed the facts and 

circumstances necessary to support a finding of the

requisite basis. Id. at 232. 

 10 
We now apply these teachings to the facts to determine 

whether Rogers' Fourth Amendment rights were violated as 

a result of his arrest. 

B. Lawfulness of the Arrest in this Case

We conclude that the arrest of Rogers was unlawful.

Edwards had no knowledge of any facts or circumstances to 

support his own independent determination that probable 

cause to arrest Rogers existed.5 He relied solely on the 

statements made by Davy and Miller in arresting Rogers. 

However, it is clear that neither Davy nor Miller had 

knowledge of the requisite facts and circumstances 

necessary to support a finding of probable cause to arrest 

Rogers. 

Edwards arrested Rogers on the basis of the supposed 

Lycoming County arrest warrants. The undisputed facts 

make clear that no warrant existed in Lycoming County for 

Rogers' arrest. Miller did not confirm the existence of any 

Lycoming County warrants. Miller did nothing more than 

relate her awareness of rumors that were circulating about 

the possibility that an arrest warrant had issued, or was 

going to issue for Rogers in Lycoming County.6 At one 

_________________________________________________________________ 

5. We reject the appellee's suggestion that because Edwards could have 

lawfully arrested Rogers on the basis of two outstanding summary 

warrants in Clinton County, he possessed the requisite probable cause. 

It is clear from Edwards' signed declaration and the circumstances of 

Rogers' arrest that the summary warrants were not the basis for the 

arrest. 

We acknowledge that an arrest is not rendered invalid by the fact that 

the basis for the arrest, though legitimate, was merely pretextual. See

Whren v. United States, 116 S. Ct. 1769, 1774 (1996). In other words, 

had Edwards actually arrested Rogers on the basis of the summary 

warrants, even though he had subjectively arrested Rogers based on a 

non-existing Lycoming County warrant, he might have had the requisite 

probable cause. However, Edwards did not articulate the legitimate basis 

for the arrest (the Clinton County summary warrants) at the time of the 

seizure, nor did he advance it as a justification for the arrest at any 

point in the proceedings prior to this appeal. Although we do not reach 

the issue, we would be troubled by an argument suggesting that a 

legitimate basis for an arrest identified only after the arrest would 

provide sufficient grounds therefor. 

6. The only clear statement Miller made to Edwards concerning the 

existence of arrest warrants for Rogers referred to the Clinton County 

summary warrants, but those warrants were not the basis for Rogers' 

arrest. 

 11 
point, she said "So I don't have anything on him anymore." 

There is no information in the record about Davy's 

communication with Edwards, except that Miller said that 

Davy said that Lycoming County said that they'll have him 

as an absconding witness. That is "thin soup", as the old 

saying goes. Therefore, Edwards relied solely on his fellow 

officers' statements in arresting Rogers on the basis of a 

Lycoming County arrest warrant, and none of those officers 

had knowledge of facts and circumstances to support an 

independent finding of probable cause. 

Eiler, Stine, and Powell, like Edwards, had no knowledge 

of facts or circumstances sufficient to support an 

independent determination of probable cause to arrest 

Rogers; all of them relied on the statements of others. Eiler, 

Stine, and Powell relied solely on the statements of 

Edwards in determining that there was probable cause. 

Although there will be differences when we address the 

question of qualified immunity, at this juncture the 

significant question remains the same: did the officer 

making the statements (in this case Edwards) have 

knowledge of facts and circumstances sufficient to warrant 

a conclusion of probable cause? As we have already 

concluded, the answer is no. Thus, under Whitely and 

Hensley, Eiler, Stine, and Powell, like Edwards, did not 

have probable cause to arrest Rogers, and as a result, the 

arrest was unlawful and violated Rogers' Fourth 

Amendment right to be free from unlawful seizures. 

III. Qualified Immunity

A. The Applicable Rules

Despite unlawfully arresting Rogers and violating his 

Fourth Amendment rights, the defendants may still be 

shielded from civil liability by the doctrine of qualified 

immunity.7 The doctrine of qualified immunity protects 

"government officials performing discretionary functions . . . 

_________________________________________________________________ 

7. The district court never reached the qualified immunity question 

because it determined that the officers had lawfully arrested Rogers. 

However, since the qualified immunity issue is primarily a question of 

law and was raised by the defendants in both their motions for summary 

judgment and their appeal, we will address the issue. 

 12 
from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does 

not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional 

rights of which a reasonable person would have known." 

Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982). The 

reasoning behind the doctrine is that "[r]eliance on the 

objective reasonableness of an official's conduct, as 

measured by reference to clearly established law, should 

avoid excessive disruptions of government and permit the 

resolution of many insubstantial claims on summary 

judgment." Id. (footnote omitted). 

Whether a government official is entitled to protection 

under the doctrine of qualified immunity is a"purely legal 

question." Acierno v. Cloutier, 40 F.3d 597, 609 (3d Cir. 

1994). The appropriate inquiry is as follows: 

On summary judgment, the judge appropriately may 

determine, not only the currently applicable law, but 

whether that law was clearly established at the time an 

action occurred. If the law at that time was not clearly 

established, an official could not reasonably be 

expected to anticipate subsequent legal developments, 

nor could he fairly be said to "know" that the law 

forbade conduct not previously identified as unlawful. 

. . . If the law was clearly established, the immunity 

defense ordinarily should fail, since a reasonably 

competent public official should know the law 

governing his conduct. 

Harlow, 457 U.S. at 818-19. Moreover, "[t]he contours of 

the right must be sufficiently clear that a reasonable official 

would understand that what he is doing violates that right." 

Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640 (1987). 

The closest case to the one at bar is Capone v. Marinelli, 

868 F.2d 102 (3d Cir. 1989). In Capone, a police officer 

took an affidavit alleging probable cause for arrest based on 

criminal conduct attributed to Capone. Id. at 103. An arrest 

warrant was issued, the details of which were entered into 

the National Crime Information Center computer system 

which sent out an electronically transmitted bulletin across 

the country. Id. The bulletin clearly stated that Capone was 

wanted for kidnapping and other offenses, and that a 

warrant had been issued for his arrest. Id. Two days later 

 13 

a police officer from a different Pennsylvania county 

arrested Capone in reliance on that bulletin. Id.

We granted summary judgment in favor of the officers, 

holding that a "police officer who reasonably relies upon a 

bulletin that establishes the existence of a warrant for 

arrest is entitled to qualified immunity in a civil rights 

action brought against him for unlawful arrest and 
prosecution." Id. at 104. Our decision relied heavily on the 

dicta in Whitely and Hensley. In Whitely, the Court stated: 

We do not, of course, question that the . . . police were 

entitled to act on the strength of the radio bulletin. 

Certainly police officers called upon to aid other officers 

in executing arrest warrants are entitled to assume

that the officers requesting aid offered the magistrate 

the information requisite to support an independent

judicial assessment of probable cause. 

401 U.S. at 568. 

In Hensley, the Court wrote: 

If the flyer has been issued in the absence of a 

reasonable suspicion, then a stop in the objective 

reliance upon it violates the Fourth Amendment. In 

such a situation, of course, the officers making the 

stop may have a good-faith defense to any civil suit. It

is the objective reading of the flyer or bulletin that

determines whether other police officers can defensibly

act in reliance on it.

469 U.S. 232-33 (emphasis added). Thus we concluded in 

Capone: 

Given that the . . . bulletin expressly states that a 

warrant existed for the arrest of Capone, as well as the 

nature of the alleged offenses . . . [the] officer['s] 

reliance upon the bulletin cannot be said to have been 

unreasonable. Therefore, as a matter of law, the 

protection of qualified immunity . . . extends to[the 

officer]. 

868 F.2d at 106. These cases teach us that the actions of 

a police officer acting in reliance on what proves to be the 

flawed conclusions of a fellow police officer may be 

 14 
reasonable nonetheless and thus protected by the doctrine 

of qualified immunity. 

Although Capone dealt with the objective reading of a 

written flyer or bulletin, we see no reason why the same 

analysis should not be used in considering oral statements. 

Therefore, we hold that where a police officer makes an 

arrest on the basis of oral statements by fellow officers, an 

officer will be entitled to qualified immunity from liability in 

a civil rights suit for unlawful arrest provided it was 

objectively reasonable for him to believe, on the basis of the 

statements, that probable cause for the arrest existed. 

B. Immunity in this Case

1. Edwards 

Edwards acted in reliance on statements made by Davy 

and Miller concerning the existence of an outstanding 

arrest warrant for Rogers in Lycoming County. The relevant 

question is whether it was objectively reasonable for him to 

believe, on the basis of the statements, that probable cause 

existed for the arrest. Unlike the officers in Capone, 

Edwards never received a clear statement from a fellow law 

enforcement officer confirming the existence of probable 

cause for the suspect's arrest. The content of the 

statements made by Davy and Miller merely related rumors 

that were circulating about Rogers. The statements never 

confirmed the existence of an arrest warrant for Rogers in 

Lycoming County. Statements made by Miller regarding the 

existence of summary warrants in Clinton County were 

sufficiently clear; however those statements are not relevant 

since the summary warrants were not the basis for 

Edwards' arrest of Rogers. 

Given the facts before us and in the absence of any

statement confirming the existence of probable cause or a 

warrant itself, we do not believe that Edwards' reliance on 

the statements was reasonable. Thus, as a matter of law it 

was not objectively reasonable for Edwards to believe that 

probable cause existed for the arrest and hence Edwards is 

not protected against Rogers' § 1983 claim by the doctrine 

of qualified immunity. Accordingly, we will reverse the 

 15 
district court's order granting summary judgment as to 

Edwards.8 

2. Eiler 

Eiler acted in reliance on the statements of Edwards. 

Unlike the vague statements of Davy and Miller, the

statements made by Edwards to the other troopers involved 

were clear, and unambiguously related the existence of an 

arrest warrant for Rogers in Lycoming County. The 

circumstances surrounding Eiler's participation in Rogers' 

arrest are very similar to the circumstances in Capone and 

as a matter of law we find that it was objectively reasonable 

for Eiler to believe that probable cause existed for the 

arrest. 

Although the district court wrongly granted summary

judgment as to Eiler on the basis of a finding of probable 

cause for the arrest, we will affirm the order on the 

alternative grounds that having participated in the unlawful 

arrest of Rogers, Eiler is nonetheless shielded from civil 

liability for the § 1983 claim by the doctrine of qualified 

immunity. See Williams v. Stone, 109 F.3d 890, 891 (3d 

Cir. 1997) (affirming the judgment of the district court, 

although on different grounds than those relied upon by 

the district court). 

3. Powell and Stine 

Our holding as to Eiler largely controls our analysis of 

qualified immunity for Powell and Stine. Powell and Stine 

acted on the basis of the statements made by Edwards and 

conveyed by the Lycoming County dispatcher Pfleegor, 

stating that Rogers needed to be transported to the

_________________________________________________________________ 

8. Despite our conclusions that the arrest of Rogers was unlawful and 

that Edwards is not shielded from liability by the doctrine of qualified 

immunity, we do not enter summary judgment for Rogers. The district 

court never ruled on Rogers' motion for summary judgment, and hence 

Rogers was not able to appeal the issue to this court. We recognize 

precedent which, broadly construed, suggests that we could 

appropriately enter summary judgment for Rogers in this instance. See

Schmidt v. Farm Credit Services, 977 F.2d 511, 513 n.3 (10th Cir. 1992). 

However we decline to do so and instead remand the matter to the 

district court for decision in the first instance. 

 16 
Lycoming County Prison pursuant to an arrest warrant. It 

was objectively reasonable for Powell and Stine to believe, 

on the basis of those statements, that probable cause 

existed for the arrest of Rogers. Thus, for the initial period 

of time that Powell and Stine held Rogers, they are

protected from Rogers' § 1983 claim by the doctrine of 

qualified immunity. 

Powell and Stine do not enjoy qualified immunity, 

however, beyond the time at which assistant district 

attorney Butts communicated to them that there was no 

reason to hold Rogers in custody. Continuing to hold an 

individual in handcuffs once it has been determined that 

there was no lawful basis for the initial seizure is unlawful 

within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. See United

States v. Shareef, 100 F.3d 1491, 1507 (10th Cir. 1996). Of 

course, we recognize the possibility of some additional 

basis, independent of that claimed to support the initial 

seizure, that could support an official continuing to hold an 

individual in handcuffs. However, no such basis exists here.9 

As noted, Powell and Stine failed to remove the handcuffs 

from Rogers when they learned from their conversation with 

Butts that there was no basis for holding him, but rather 

detained him for an additional period time. For this reason 

they are not immunized from a § 1983 claim by Rogers 

regarding this final interval of time. Accordingly, we affirm 

in part and reverse in part the district court's order 

granting summary judgment as to Powell and Stine. The 

precise length of the additional holding period cannot be 

determined from the evidence contained in the record and 

will have to be decided on remand. 

IV. Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons the district court's grant of 

summary judgment in favor of Eiler will be affirmed. The 

court's order granting summary judgment as to Edwards 

_________________________________________________________________ 

9. Even assuming, without so holding, that the officers might have been 

justified in leaving the handcuffs on Rogers while transporting him to 

Clinton County had Rogers' behavior posed a threat of some kind during 

that time, there is nothing in the record to indicate that Rogers posed 

such a threat, nor did the appellees raise such an argument in these 

proceedings. 

 17 
will be reversed. The grant of summary judgment as to 

Powell and Stine will be affirmed in part but also reversed 

in part, and the cases against Edwards, Powell, and Stine 

will be remanded to the district court for further 

proceedings consistent with this opinion. 

A True Copy: 

Teste: 

Clerk of the United States Court of Appeals

for the Third Circuit

 18