1

Filed 11/28/23 P. v. Mota CA4/2

Review denied 3/12/24; reposted with Supreme Court order and statement

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for 

publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication

or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION TWO

THE PEOPLE,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

SALVADOR GARCIA MOTA,

Defendant and Appellant.

E079971

(Super.Ct.No. RIF74296)

OPINION

APPEAL from the Superior Court of Riverside County. John D. Molloy, Judge. 

Affirmed.

Arielle Bases, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and 

Appellant.

Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney 

General, Charles C. Ragland, Assistant Attorney General, Collette C. Cavalier and 

Kathryn Kirschbaum, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
2

At a resentencing hearing pursuant to Penal Code section 1172.75,1the court 

denied defendant and appellant’s, Salvador Garcia Mota, motion to strike his prior strike 

conviction findings pursuant to People v. Superior Court (Romero) (1996) 13 Cal.4th 497

(Romero). On appeal, defendant contends the court abused its discretion. We affirm. 

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND2

On July 31, 1978, the victim sat in a parked car waiting for friends. After her 

friends got into the car and her boyfriend turned on the ignition, defendant and his 

companion, armed with a revolver and a knife respectively, approached the car. After 

robbing the occupants of their valuables, they opened the car door and pulled the victim

out. While defendant held his revolver to the victim’s back, he and his companion led 

her to a waiting van. (People v. Mota (1981) 115 Cal.App.3d 227, 230 (Mota II).)

Once in the van, defendant and his companion forced the victim to lie on a 

mattress. Defendant, his companion, and another man then subjected her to multiple acts 

of forced sexual intercourse. While defendant was engaged in intercourse, the other two 

men fondled her breasts and genitals. (Mota II, supra, 115 Cal.App.3d at p. 230.)

They then drove the van to a secluded area. At approximately 1:00 a.m. on 

August 1, a security officer observed the parked van and approached to investigate. The

1

 All further statutory references are to the Penal Code unless otherwise stated.

2

 On the court’s own motion, we take judicial notice of our prior nonpublished 

opinion in defendant’s appeal from the original judgment, which was attached to the 

People’s opposition to defendant’s Romero motion. (People v. Mota (June 25, 1999,

E023277) [nonpub. opn.] (Mota I).) (Evid. Code, §§ 452, 459; Cal. Rules of Court, 

rule 8.1115(b).)
3

van sped off; the officer pursued and eventually succeeded in getting the van to pull over. 

The victim “jumped out of the van and ran to the officer, exclaiming, ‘Thank God, you 

saved my life. I’ve just been raped.’ ” (Mota II, supra, 115 Cal.App.3d at p. 230.)

The driver was immediately arrested; defendant and his companion were 

apprehended at the location to which they had fled when the van stopped. “A subsequent 

search of the van revealed a loaded revolver, two knives, the items taken in the robbery, 

and [the victim’s] pantyhose.” (Mota II, supra, 115 Cal.App.3d at p. 231.)

A jury convicted defendant of kidnapping (former § 207, count 1), three counts of 

robbery (§ 211, counts 3 through 5), and three counts of rape (former § 261, subds. 2, 3, 

counts 6 through 8.). The jury additionally found true enhancement allegations that 

defendant used a firearm (former §§ 12022.5 & 1203.06, subd. (a)(1)) and that a principal 

was armed with a firearm (former § 12022, subd. (a)) in the commission of the 

kidnapping and robberies. The court sentenced defendant to prison for 12 years.

(Mota II, supra, 115 Cal.App.3d at pp. 229-230.)

Defendant appealed. The appellate court modified defendant’s sentence by 

reducing it from 12 to 10 years of imprisonment. The appellate court otherwise affirmed 

the judgment. (Mota II, supra, 115 Cal.App.3d at p. 235.)

“On May 16, 1997, defendant was apprehended while shoplifting a pair of jeans 

from a Mervyn’s store in Corona.” A jury found defendant guilty of petty theft with a 

prior conviction. (Former § 666, count 1.) The court thereafter found true allegations 

that defendant had suffered five prior strike convictions (former §§ 667, subds. (c) & (e), 
4

1170.12, subd. (c)), and a prior prison term (former § 667.5, subd. (b)). The court

sentenced defendant to a term of 25 years to life plus 1 year for the prior prison term. 

(Mota I, supra, E023277.)

Defendant appealed, contending, as pertinent here, that the court abused its 

discretion in refusing to grant his Romero motion. Defendant had asked the court below, 

and this court, to consider the following factors: “(1) the current offense was neither 

violent nor serious, and the merchandise was returned to the store; (2) . . . defendant’s 

prior convictions arose out of a single case over 19 years [earlier]; (3) defendant was 

young when he committed the crimes;[3]and (4) his behavior since the priors has not been 

‘serious.’ ” (Mota I, supra, E023277.)

This court rejected defendant’s contention, noting defendant had been convicted of 

five felonies in 1978. “After being discharged from state prison in 1986, defendant 

continued his criminal activities. Between the years of 1989 and 1992, defendant was 

consecutively convicted of misdemeanor charges. Even while in jail in 1992, defendant 

received a conviction for possession of a controlled substance by a prisoner. During his 

probation period, defendant committed a new crime and was sent to state prison, where 

he remained until 1995. In other words, defendant has demonstrated a continuous pattern 

of criminal behavior which belies any suggestion that he has yet changed his ways.” This 

court affirmed the judgment. (Mota I, supra, E023277.)

3 Defendant was 18 years old at the time he committed the offenses.
5

On March 28, 2022, the court struck defendant’s prior prison term enhancement 

pursuant to former section 1171.1, reducing defendant’s sentence by one year. The court 

set the matter for hearing on an intended Romero motion.

On August 1, 2022, defense counsel filed an invitation for the court to dismiss 

defendant’s prior strike conviction findings pursuant to Romero. Defense counsel argued 

that defendant fell outside the spirit of the three strikes law, and that the following factors 

supported dismissing defendant’s prior strike conviction findings: (1) the nature and 

circumstances of the present offenses; (2) the remoteness of the prior convictions; 

(3) defendant’s youth and remote remaining criminal history; (4) his background, 

character, and prospects; and (5) postconviction factors including his disciplinary record, 

record of rehabilitation, and reduced physical risk for future violence. On September 21, 

2022, the People filed opposition to the motion in which they argued the court should 

decline defendant’s invitation to strike his prior strike conviction findings.

At the hearing on the Romero motion on October 5, 2022, the court indicated it 

had read the moving papers. Defendant’s niece made a statement that defendant “is truly 

changed.” “[H]e doesn’t make excuses for what he has done, and he accepts 

responsibility.” Defendant would have all their family’s support; he could stay with her, 

her mother, or her aunt. They would help him find work and obtain a driver’s license. 

“He is tired of living the life that he has been living for the last two decades, . . .”

Defendant also made a statement: “I would like to apologize to the Court, the 

community of Riverside . . . for being a burden and for stealing a pair of pants 25 years 
6

ago to support my drug habit.” “I stopped using drugs 12 years ago. I will be sober and 

clean, with the help of the A.A. mentors/sponsors that I met.” “I left my gang ties 12 

years ago.” “Finding a job won’t be a problem for me. I am a pipefitter by trade in the 

oil⸺in the oil industry, and I learned how to weld, electrical, and hydraulic⸺hydraulic 

machinery in VIA.” “I’m going to continue doing the A.A. meetings. I’m 62 years old 

now. I’m tired of the life that I had before. I gave it up.” “If the Court gives me an 

opportunity of freedom, I won’t be a disappointment to the Court, the community, or my 

family.” “I’m tired and worn out, really. And I realize that the laws and rules are meant 

to be kept, and I’m going to keep them. I’ve been keeping them for the last 12 years.”

Defense counsel noted that defendant was in “the lowest level of classification and 

placement score. He can’t go any lower. I found seven violations. Four were for 

one⸺or three were alcohol possession, one was drugs back in 2003/2004, three for 

fighting, two were in 2011 and 2012, and then he had one in 2018.” Defense counsel 

noted that the court should consider the fact that defendant had been rehabilitated, that he 

had “gone to classes, employment, education.” That defendant’s age and diminished 

capacity also militated toward granting the motion: “He has issues with liver [cirrhosis]. 

I have read [sic] medical records of cataracts. So it’s not only looking at what he has 

chosen to do, but just his physical condition itself.” That “keeping someone in [prison] 

longer that doesn’t pose” a risk to the public is against the intent of subsequent remedial 

legislation.
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The court reviewed the law with respect to Romero motions. It noted that in 

addition to the relevant considerations when the first Romero motion was made, it had to 

consider what subsequently happened in state prison. The court was “mindful of my 

responsibilities, and my discretion, and I am mindful of the things that I am supposed to 

balance.” It noted that it had to consider the facts and circumstances of the strike 

convictions.

The court observed, “Here they are as bad as they can be. Without them being 

homicides, they are as bad as they can be.” “[T]here were multiple victims here, . . .” 

“And, generally, when there are multiple victims, I’m much, much less inclined to strike 

strikes that arise out of the same fact pattern.”

“When you talk about his youthful age, let’s assume that that is part of [the] 

analysis because it’s⸺it’s part of the facts and circumstances of the strike, . . .” “But 

when we are talking about a person who has not only committed an offense, a prior 

offense, but had been to state prison for that prior offense, their youthful nature on the 

occasion of the incident offense, is much less amenable.” “If at any time his youthful 

nature played a role, it should have been back when we were talking about the strike 

offense. Because I think he was 18 at the time of the strike offense.” “I know that you 

mentioned [the] strikes [were] 43 years old, but they certainly were not 43 years old at 

the time of the incident events. They were much younger than that.”

The court concluded that the only remaining analysis was whether defendant had 

performed so well in prison that he warranted the relief requested. The court noted 
8

several instances where the court had exercised its discretion to strike prior convictions or 

enhancements where the defendant’s behavior in prison was exemplary. However, 

“[w]hen I look at this particular gentleman, I cannot ignore [seven] different . . . rules 

violations[.]” “I certainly can’t ignore the last one, which was just in 2018, which, for 

better or worse, he was charged with assault with a deadly weapon in jail.”

“Under these circumstances, the Court is not prepared to find that he falls outside 

the spirit of our three-strikes law, notwithstanding, the lengthy period of incarceration, 

and, notwithstanding, some of his physical impairments that have developed by virtue of 

him becoming older.” “On balance, I do not find that he falls outside the spirit of our 

three-strikes legislation. For that reason, the Romero motion is denied at this time.”

II. DISCUSSION

Defendant contends the court abused its discretion in denying his Romero motion. 

He maintains the court violated his due process rights by failing to act with informed 

discretion. We disagree. 

“Senate Bill No. 483 added section 1171.1 to the Penal Code, which was 

subsequently renumbered without substantive change as section 1172.75. (Stats. 2022, 

ch. 58, § 12, eff. June 30, 2022.) Section 1172.75, subdivision (a) provides that ‘[a]ny 

sentence enhancement that was imposed prior to January 1, 2020, pursuant to 

subdivision (b) of Section 667.5, except for any enhancement imposed for a prior 

conviction for a sexually violent offense . . . is legally invalid.’ [Citation.] Once the 

Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation identifies those persons ‘currently serving 
9

a term for a judgment that includes an enhancement described in subdivision (a)’ to the 

sentencing court, ‘the court shall recall the sentence and resentence the defendant.’

[Citation.]” (People v. Monroe (2022) 85 Cal.App.5th 393, 399 (Monroe).)

“In resentencing, ‘[t]he court shall apply the sentencing rules of the Judicial 

Council and apply any other changes in law that reduce sentences or provide for judicial 

discretion so as to eliminate disparity of sentences and to promote uniformity of 

sentencing.’ [Citation.] ‘The court may consider postconviction factors, including, but 

not limited to, the disciplinary record and record of rehabilitation of the defendant while 

incarcerated, evidence that reflects whether age, time served, and diminished physical 

condition, if any, have reduced the defendant’s risk for future violence, and evidence that 

reflects that circumstances have changed since the original sentencing so that continued 

incarceration is no longer in the interest of justice.’ [Citation.]” (Monroe, supra, 85 

Cal.App.5th at p. 399.) “By its plain terms, section 1172.75 requires a full resentencing, 

not merely that the trial court strike the newly ‘invalid’ enhancements.” (Id. at p. 402 

[reversing and remanding for resentencing where court thought it was without 

jurisdiction to strike firearm enhancements]; see People v. Hubbard (2018) 27 

Cal.App.5th 9, 12-13 [full resentencing includes jurisdiction to rule on Romero motion].)

“ ‘ “Defendants are entitled to sentencing decisions made in the exercise of the 

‘informed discretion’ of the sentencing court. [Citations.] A court which is unaware of 

the scope of its discretionary powers can no more exercise that ‘informed discretion’ than 

one whose sentence is or may have been based on misinformation regarding a material 
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aspect of a defendant’s record.” ’ [Citation.]” (People v. Fredrickson (2023) 90 

Cal.App.5th 984, 988; accord, People v. Lopez (2022) 78 Cal.App.5th 459, 466-467.)

“While the purpose of the Three Strikes law is to punish recidivists more harshly 

[citation], not all recidivists fall within the spirit of that law. A trial court therefore may 

strike or dismiss a prior conviction in the furtherance of justice. [Citations.] When 

considering whether to strike a prior conviction, the factors a court considers are whether, 

in light of the nature and circumstances of the defendant’s present felonies and prior 

serious and/or violent felony convictions, and the particulars of the defendant’s 

background, character, and prospects, the defendant may be deemed outside the scheme’s 

spirit, in whole or in part, and hence should be treated as though the defendant had not 

previously been convicted of one or more serious and/or violent felonies. [Citation.]” 

(People v. Avila (2020) 57 Cal.App.5th 1134, 1140 (Avila).) 

“We review a trial court’s ruling on a Romero motion under the deferential abuse 

of discretion standard, which requires the defendant to show that the sentencing decision 

was irrational or arbitrary. [Citation.] It is not enough that reasonable people disagree 

about whether to strike a prior conviction. [Citation.] The Three Strikes law ‘not only 

establishes a sentencing norm, it carefully circumscribes the trial court’s power to depart 

from this norm . . . [T]he law creates a strong presumption that any sentence that 

conforms to these sentencing norms is both rational and proper.’ [Citation.] Only 

extraordinary circumstances justify finding that a career criminal is outside the Three 

Strikes law. [Citation.] Therefore, ‘the circumstances where no reasonable people could 
11

disagree that the criminal falls outside the spirit of the three strikes scheme must be even 

more extraordinary.’ [Citation.]” (Avila, supra, 57 Cal.App.5th at p. 1140.)

Here, the court acted within its circumscribed discretion in denying defendant’s 

motion to strike his prior strike conviction findings. The court indicated it understood its 

discretion and went over the law that it was to apply when rendering a decision. The 

court noted that the offenses underlying the strike convictions, except for murder, were 

“as bad as they can be.” Since those offenses included kidnapping, the robbery of 

multiple victims at gunpoint, and the gang rape of the victim, the court’s conclusion was 

well within its discretion. We note that although defendant apologized for his theft of a 

pair of jeans in his statement to the court, he did not apologize for the robberies, rape, and 

kidnapping.

The court noted that although the strike offenses were 43 years old, they were not 

that old when defendant committed the offense to which the findings based on those 

offenses were attached. Indeed, the strike offenses were less than 20 years old when 

defendant committed the instant offense. Moreover, defendant had spent seven and onehalf of those years in prison for the strike offenses. Defendant thereafter was convicted 

of six misdemeanors and one felony. Defendant committed the first misdemeanor the 

year after he was released. He served another two years in prison for the felony offense. 

“In other words, defendant has demonstrated a continuous pattern of criminal behavior 

which belies any suggestion that he has yet changed his ways.” (Mota I, supra, 

E023277.)
12

The court next noted that defendant did not exactly have a sterling prison record. 

As the court pointed out, defendant had seven rule violations while in prison. Moreover, 

one of the rule violations, which occurred on December 13, 2018, included an allegation 

of assault or battery with a deadly weapon. During that offense, the correctional officer 

observed defendant, with two other inmates, “striking an inmate . . . in the upper torso 

and facial area multiple times with his fists.” The officer recovered a metal shiv from 

one of the other inmates. Defendant was found guilty of battery with a deadly weapon.4 

Defendant’s prison record further supported the court’s ruling. Thus, the court acted 

within its discretion in denying defendant’s Romero motion. 

Defendant complains that the court abused its discretion by finding defendant’s 

youth irrelevant, and by failing to mention his substance abuse, childhood trauma, and 

postconviction efforts at rehabilitation. First, the court acknowledged defendant’s youth 

when defendant committed the offenses underlying the prior strike conviction findings; it 

simply found that the nature and circumstances of those offenses were so serious that 

they substantially reduced the weight it would attach to defendant’s youth in its analysis. 

That determination was well within the court’s discretion.

Second, the court’s “failure” to address each specific factor raised by defendant to 

support his motion is not a due process violation or an abuse of its discretion. (See In re 

4 At oral argument, defense counsel argued that defendant had no record of 

conviction for committing violent offenses since his commission of the strike offenses. 

Although true, defendant was found guilty of a prison rule violation of battery with a 

deadly weapon, a definitionally violent offense. (§ 242 [“A battery is any willful and 

unlawful use of force or violence upon the person of another.”].)
13

Marriage of Diamond (2021) 72 Cal.App.5th 595, 602 [Where a statute requires a court 

to consider certain factors when rendering a decision, the court is not required to 

expressly address each factor unless the statute specifically so requires.]; People v. Nevill

(1985) 167 Cal.App.3d 198, 202 [sentencing court is presumed to have considered all 

relevant factors even if not expressly articulated].) 

Here, as discussed ante, the court made it amply clear that it had read the parties 

moving papers, knew the law, and understood its discretion in ruling on the motion. We 

presume that the court properly considered all relevant criteria when rendering its 

decision.5 Thus, the court acted within its discretion in denying defendant’s Romero

motion.

5 At oral argument, defense counsel argued this court should consider that 

defendant’s strike offenses were “aberrant,” that his offenses were related to his longstanding substance abuse issues, and that defendant’s circumstances had changed. Again, 

to the extent that the trial court did not specifically mention the purported “aberrance” of 

the strike offenses, his substance abuse issues, or his efforts at rehabilitation, we presume 

the court considered all relevant facts absent evidence indicating otherwise. 
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III. DISPOSITION

The court’s order denying defendant’s Romero motion is affirmed.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

McKINSTER

Acting P. J.

We concur:

MILLER

J.

CODRINGTON

J.
Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division Two - No. E079971

S283230

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA

En Banc

________________________________________________________________________

THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

SALVADOR GARCIA MOTA, Defendant and Appellant.

________________________________________________________________________

The petition for review is denied.

(See Concurring Statement by Justice Groban.)

______________________________

 Guerrero

 Chief Justice
PEOPLE v. MOTA

S283230

Concurring Statement by Justice Groban

On May 16, 1997, defendant Salvador Garcia Mota was 

apprehended while shoplifting a $38 pair of jeans from a 

Mervyn’s store. A jury found defendant guilty of petty theft. 

(Pen. Code, former § 666.) Approximately 20 years earlier, 

defendant — then a teenager — suffered several prior strike 

convictions arising out of a serious and violent crime that 

resulted in a 10-year sentence. Because of those prior strike 

convictions, defendant was sentenced to 25 years to life in prison 

under the three strikes law for the offense of shoplifting. 

At a resentencing hearing pursuant to Penal Code section 

1172.75, the court denied defendant’s motion to strike his prior 

strike conviction findings pursuant to People v. Superior Court 

(Romero) (1996) 13 Cal.4th 497. In support, the court relied 

primarily on the severity of the crime defendant committed as a 

teenager some 45 years ago. Under the highly deferential 

standard of review governing Romero motions, I agree with the 

Court of Appeal’s conclusion that we cannot say the decision was 

“so irrational or arbitrary that no reasonable person could agree 

with it.” (People v. Carmony (2004) 33 Cal.4th 367, 377.) I 

therefore join my colleagues in voting to deny review. The 

troubling fact remains, however, that defendant, now in his mid60s and suffering from numerous medical ailments, has spent 

over 27 years in prison for stealing a pair of jeans — conduct 

that can be sentenced as a misdemeanor under current law. 
PEOPLE v. MOTA

Groban, J., concurring statement upon denial of review

2

(See Pen. Code, §§ 490; 666.) By comparison, the median time 

served in state prison before initial release for murder is 17.5 

years. (Bureau of Justice Statistics, U.S. Dept. of Justice, Time 

Served in State Prison, 2018 (Mar. 2021) table 1, p. 2.) 

I write separately to highlight that our denial of the 

petition for review does not necessarily preclude defendant from 

obtaining relief at some point in the future, including: 

(1) a potential referral for recall and resentencing by the 

Secretary of the Department of Corrections and 

Rehabilitation, the Board of Parole Hearings, or the 

district attorney (see Pen. Code, § 1172.1, subd. (a)(3) 

[“The resentencing court may, in the interest of justice 

and regardless of whether the original sentence was 

imposed after a trial or plea agreement,” reduce or 

vacate the sentence]); 

(2) at a future parole suitability hearing (see Cal. Code 

Regs., tit. 15, § 2281, subd. (b) [“All relevant, reliable 

information available to the panel shall be considered 

in determining suitability for parole. Such information 

shall include . . . the base and other commitment 

offenses”]; Pen. Code, § 4801, subd. (c)); 

(3) pursuant to a commutation recommendation (see Pen. 

Code, § 4801, subd. (a) [“The Board of Parole Hearings 

may report to the Governor, from time to time, the 

names of any and all persons imprisoned in any state 

prison who, in its judgment, ought to have a 

commutation of sentence or be pardoned and set at 

liberty on account of good conduct, or unusual term of 

sentence, or any other cause . . . .” (italics added)]. 
PEOPLE v. MOTA

Groban, J., concurring statement upon denial of review

3

GROBAN, J.

We Concur:

LIU, J.

EVANS, J.